The estimated cost of report or study
for the Department of Defense isapproximately $45,000 in Fiscal
Years 2015-2016.
Generated on 2016 Jan05
RefID: 3-A116136

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Military and Security Developments Involving
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
2015

A Report to Congress
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012

Section 1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 11281, as amended by Section 1292 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2013 and Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified andunclassified form, on the current and future military power of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea” (DPRK). The report shall address an assessment of the security situationon the Korean Peninsula, the goals and factors shaping North Korean security strategy andmilitary strategy, trends in North Korean security, an assessment of North Korea’s regional
security objectives, including an assessment of the North Korean military’s capabilities,
developments in North Korean military doctrine and training, an assessment of North
Korea’s proliferation activities, and other military security developments.

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Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1

CHAPTER ONE: ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION

3

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREAN AND PENINSULAR SECURITY

3

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

4CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY

5STRATEGIC GOALS

5NATIONAL STRATEGY6

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND BEHAVIOR

6

CHAPTER THREE: THE CAPABILITIES AND MODERNIZATIONGOALS OF NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY FORCES

9OVERVIEW

9AN AGING FORCE...WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIES10CHAPTER FOUR: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PROGRAMS AND PROLIFERATION21NORTH KOREA’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROGRAMS21

PROLIFERATION

22

CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MISSILE SALES

22

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

22

INTERDICTED TRANSFERS

23

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) remains one of the mostcritical security challenges for the United States and the broader international community.
In particular, North Korea’s willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing
behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its continued development of
nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its proliferation of weapons incontravention of United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) pose a serious threat
to the United States, the region, and the world.
Since assuming control in December 2011, Kim Jong Un has solidified his grip on power byembracing the coercive tools used by his father and grandfather. His regime has used
force and the threat of force combined with inducements to quell domestic dissent andstrengthen internal security; co-opt the North Korean military and elites; develop strategic
military capabilities to deter external attack; and challenge the ROK and the U.S.-ROK
Alliance. In April 2013, Kim announced the “byungjin” policy, which emphasizes the paralleldevelopment of the country’s economy and nuclear weapons program, to reinforce his
regime’s domestic, diplomatic, economic, and security interests.
North Korea fields a large, conventional, forward-deployed military that retains thecapability to inflict serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls andaging hardware. The U.S.-ROK Alliance has deterred large-scale conventional attacks bymaintaining a robust combined defense posture and strong military readiness. On a smallerscale, however, the DPRK has demonstrated a willingness to use military provocation toachieve national goals. In August 2015, two North Korean landmines exploded in the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which seriously wounded two ROK soldiers, raised tensions on the
Korean Peninsula for several weeks, and was resolved through high-level inter-Korean talks.
North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities and developmentof intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile programs underscore the growing threat it
poses to regional stability and U.S. national security. North Korea’s pursuit of a submarinelaunched ballistic missile capability also highlights the regime’s commitment to diversifying
its missile force, strengthening the missile force’s survivability, and finding new ways tocoerce its neighbors. Furthermore, North Korea continues to proliferate ballistic missile
technology prohibited under UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094, exacerbating the security
challenge for the United States and the international community.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
1Given the continued and growing threat from North Korea, its nuclear and missile
programs, and its proliferation of related technology, the U.S. Department of Defense willcontinue to manage the North Korean security challenge through close coordination andconsultation with the international community, particularly the ROK and Japan. The UnitedStates remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocations and steadfast
in its commitments to allies in the region, including the extended deterrence commitments
provided through both the nuclear umbrella and conventional forces.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
2

CHAPTER ONE:ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATIONKEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH

to disparage the regime’s human rights

KOREAN AND PENINSULAR

record. These efforts have had little
success, and North Korea remains unable

SECURITY

to significantly expand ties with foreign

Over the past year, the Democratic

partners.

People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK or

In August 2015, Kim undertook anotherNorth Korea) leader Kim Jong Un has

coercive campaign against the ROK.

solidified his grip on power and continued

Tensions on the Peninsula surged aftertonational

North Korean landmines severely injured

agenda. Kim has embraced the coercive

two ROK soldiers inside the Demilitarized

tools used by his father and grandfather —Zone (DMZ) on August 4. In response, theforce and the threat of force combined

ROK resumed the use of loudspeakers

with inducements — to quell domestic

acrossdissent, strengthen internal security, andbroadcasts, the first time in over 11 years.

co-opt the North Korean military and elites.

In addition, the ROK placed military units

Under Kim’s leadership, North Korea hason heightened alert, and U.S. Forces Korea

continued to develop strategic military

adopted an enhanced watch posture.

capabilities to deter external attack andNorth Korea responded with loudspeaker

challenge the Republic of Korea (ROK or

broadcasts of its own. On August 20, ROKSouth Korea) and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. In

forces reported incoming artillery fire from

April 2013, Kim announced the “byungjin”

North Korean units and responded by firing

policy, which emphasizes the parallel

artillery into the DMZ. North Korea thendevelopment of the country’s economy

issued an ultimatum demanding South

and

to

Korea disable the loudspeakers. With

domestic,

tensions remaining high, the two sides met

security

to discuss an end to the crisis. After more

implement

nuclearhis

broader

weapons

reinforce

his

diplomatic,

economic,

program,regime’sandinterests.
In early 2015, Kim began reaching out
diplomatically to Southeast Asia, Africa,
and Russia to improve North Korea’s
economy, lessen its dependence on
China, and counteract international efforts

the

DMZ

for

propaganda

than 43 hours of high-level talks, North
Korea expressed regret over the August 4
landmine incident, South Korea agreed tostop propaganda broadcasts, and bothsides agreed to hold further talks on
improving relations.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
3

The two Koreas also agreed to hold family

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY

reunions, which took place on October 20-

PERCEPTIONS

26. It is unlikely, however, that suchengagement will prevent North Korea fromundertaking another provocation should
Kim so choose. Moreover, North Korea
could return to confrontational behavior,such as conducting a ballistic missile
launch or an unconventional attack on
the ROK, at any time.

nuclear program. In September 2015, the
DPRK’s Atomic Energy Institute noted thatits nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including
uraniumenrichment

plant

and

reactor,

have

been

“adjusted

andaltered,”

and

that

operations

haverestarted for the purpose of building its
nuclear force.

develop its nascent space program, likely
as an attempt to provide a veneer oflegitimacy to its ballistic missile program. In
National

years. These include the expanding gap innational power compared to South Korea,
North Korea’s deepening political andeconomic isolation, the need to eliminate
family, and a political culture that isdefinedbyanunending

existential

struggle with outside forces.
The regime sees threats emanating frominside and outside the country. It does nottrust regional actors, including China andRussia, nor does the regime trust its own
population. The regime continues toportray a garrison state worldview ofNorth Korea has also maintained efforts to

mid-September

not substantially changed in the past two

perceived internal threats to the Kim

North Korea continues to advance its

theNorth Korean security perceptions have2015,

AerospaceNorth

Korea’sDevelopment

Administration announced that it waspressing forward with development ofweather and geostationary satellites andthat more long-range space launches toplace satellites into orbit would occur.
North Korea’s space-vehicle launches use
ballistic missile technology similar to thetype used in inter-continental ballistic
missiles, which is prohibited by UNSCRs
1874, 2087, and 2094.

imminent threat, which serves to justify
draconian internal security controls, vast
expenditures on the military, and thecontinued unchallenged rule by the Kim
regime.
Internally,

the

Kim

maintainideologicalregime

seeks

to

over

a

control

citizenry that is growing less reliant on theState because it is no longer the primarysource of basic goods and services. The
regime continues to prioritize ideologicalindoctrination,

intimidation,andpreferential treatment of the privileged
elite in Pyongyang and of select military
units.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
4

CHAPTER TWO:UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGYSTRATEGIC GOALS
North Korea’s goals and strategies stem
from

the

regime’spolitical

isolation,

economic deprivation, and deteriorating
conventional military, as well as theincreasing political, economic, and military
power of nearby states. The strategic goalof the regime is to ensure Kim family rule inperpetuity.

The

overarchingnational

security objectives to achieve this goal
under Kim Jong Un have remained largely
consistent

over

the

last

two

years:

international recognition as a nucleararmed state; maintenance of a viable
deterrent capability; the simultaneousdevelopment of its economy and nuclear
weapons program (i.e., the “byungjin”line); reinforcement of its military-first
approach to domestic and foreign affairs(“songun”);

tight

control

overcommunications, borders, movement, andtrade; and reunification of Korea underNorth Korea’s control. North Korea uses
reunification with South Korea as a key
component of its national identity narrative
to validate its strategy and policies, and tojustifysacrifices

demandedofthepopulace. However, North Korea’s leaders
almost certainly recognize that achieving
reunification under North Korean control is,Songun (Military-First Ideology)
North Korea’s songun or military-first
ideology, a derivative of its Juche (selfreliance) ideology, elevates the Korean
People’s Army as the ultimate defenderof the country’s sovereignty and themain force of the revolution. Introducedin the mid-1990s by Kim Jong Il as a way
to consolidate power and mitigate theprecarious

securityenvironment

following the death of Kim Il Sung andthe dissolution of the Soviet Union, thispolicy co-opts the military by giving it
primacy in the regime’s domestic,
foreign, economic, and social policy
decision-making. The military is viewed
as one and the same with the State andparty, unified with the working class as
the backbone of North Korean socialism.
The Korean People’s Army participatesin all aspects of daily life and is prioritizedin resource allocation. The military-first
approach, which views military strength
as the best way to deter and defend
against foreign aggression, also bolsters
the centrality of nuclear weapons to theregime’s survival.

for the foreseeable future, unattainable.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
5

program and human rights record. North

NATIONAL STRATEGY

Korea likely believes periodic “charm

Beyond its fundamental role as a guarantorof national and regime security, the North
Korean military supports the Kim regime’s
use of coercive diplomacy as part of its
larger foreign policy strategy. North Korea
uses limited provocations — even thosethat are kinetic and lethal in nature, suchas military actions and small-scale attacks— to gain psychological advantage in
diplomacy and win limited political andeconomic concessions.

strategy are North Korea’s nuclear andballistic missile programs. DPRK leaders see
these programs as necessary for a credible
deterrent capability essential to its survival,
andrelevance,

will

eventually

lead

to

improvements in regional relationships andgradual advancement of its strategic
objectives.
In 2015, Kim Jong Un declined invitations totravel abroad to Moscow and Beijing forcelebrations marking the 70th anniversaryof the end of World War II, instead sending
seniorgovernment

officials.

These

important events could have afforded
North Korea the opportunity to improve

Closely tied to its coercive diplomaticsovereignty,

offensives”

andsupportive of its coercive military threats
and actions.

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND
BEHAVIOR

relations

with

its

powerfulneighbors,

though during these visits Kim would haverisked criticism of his nuclear program andunflattering comparisons to other world
leaders in attendance.
Relations between North and South Korea
remained stalled this year until the twosides met in August to resolve theconfrontation resulting from the landmine
attack. The ROK’s responses may havesurprised Kim Jong Un and led to thedecision to deescalate the situation, but it

North Korea remains focused on extracting

is unclear whether continued talks will lead

economic aid and diplomatic concessions

to a significant improvement in relations

from the international community whilewith Seoul.

defending against perceived threats to its
sovereignty. Since 2013, North Korea has

North Korea remains dependent on China

increased diplomatic overtures to otheras its key economic benefactor, and North

countries in an attempt to secure foreign

Korea’s leaders are conscious that efforts

investment and improve its economy, but

tosuch outreach has failed to produce

capabilities angers China. Nevertheless,meaningful gains due to international

the regime likely thinks China prioritizes the

sanctions and stigmatization related topreservation of regional stability and willconcerns about its nuclear weapons

refrain from punishing North Korea too

advanceits

nuclearandmissileMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
6severely or entirely cutting off diplomatic or

resulted in North Korea agreeing to re-economic ties.

open its investigation into the fate of theJapanese abductees and provide Japan

North Korea also maintains friendly relations

with a report, in exchange for Japan

with Russia, though the relationship is lesseasing some of its unilateral sanctions

robust than North Korea’s relationship withagainst North Korea. To date, however,China. Long-stalled plans for the creation

North Korea has not provided Japan withof a natural gas pipeline from Russia to

any new substantive information. In AugustSouth Korea through North Korea — a2015, North Korea claimed to have a reportproject that could earn North Korea millions

but that the Japanese refused to receive it,of dollars annually in transit fees — havea claim Japan denies. Regardless, Japan

made little concrete progress in recent

continues to seek resolution with North

years.

Korea on the abductee issue.

North Korean relations with Japan thawed

North Korea remains willing to disrupt

somewhat in 2013 when North Korea

temporarily

accepted

Japaneseneighbors, including Russia and China, anddelegation and indicated it might beabsorb the associated cost when it

willing to discuss the longstanding issue ofbelieves coercive actions toward SouthJapanese citizens abducted by North

Korea or the United States will advance its

Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. In May 2014,

strategic objectives.

a

visit

by

a

relationswithregional

the Japanese and North Koreans held
official talks in Stockholm, Sweden, which

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
7

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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
8

CHAPTER THREE:THE CAPABILITIES AND MODERNIZATION GOALSOF NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY FORCESOVERVIEW

programs;

anddeveloping

new

or

improved means to support its coercive
The North Korean military poses a serious

diplomacy – most notably via its cyberthreat to the ROK, its other neighbors, andand missile programs. North Korea directs

U.S. forces in the region despite its many

its limited resources to areas where it seesinternal

the potential for localized comparative

challenges

andconstraints,

including deterioration of its conventional
capabilities.

advantage.
Despite resource shortages and aging

North Korea’s national military strategy isequipment, North Korea’s large, forward-

designed to support its national security

positioned military can initiate an attack

strategy by defending the Kim regime’s

against the ROK with little or no warning,rule and enabling the regime to conduct

minimizing the logistics strain it would incur

coercive diplomacy. This strategy relies

if deploying forces from further away. The

heavily

strategicallymilitary retains the capability to inflictthrough its nuclear weapons program andsignificant damage on the ROK, especially

supportingandin the region from the DMZ to Seoul.

conventionally by maintaining a large,

Although North Korea is unlikely to attack

heavily-armed, forward-deployed militaryon a scale that would risk regime survivalthat presents a constant threat to Southby

Korea,

counterattacks, North Korea’s threshold forondeterrence,deliveryespeciallythesystems

greaterSeoul

inviting

overwhelming

asymmetric

U.S.-ROK

metropolitan area. These two aspects of its

smaller,military strategy are meant to be mutually

provocations

supporting; the threat posed by one isprovocations (e.g., the November 2014

employed to deter an attack on the other.

cyberattackis

attacks

unclear.

againstSony

andRecentPictures

Entertainment and the August 2015 DMZ
North Korea’s force modernization goals

landmines incident) suggest that Northare aimed at maintaining the credibility of

Korea sees some value in such attacks.

its conventional forces through more

Indeed, North Korea’s special operations

realistic

modestforces (SOF), growing artillery, and missile

production of new systems; enhancing theforces provide significant capabilities fortraining

andthecredibility of its strategic deterrence byadvancingits

nuclearandmissileMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
9small-scale attacks that could rapidly

ranks, making it the fourth largest military inescalate into a larger scale confrontation.

the world. Four to five percent of North
Korea’s 24 million people serve on active

North Korea is making efforts to upgrade

duty, and another 25 to 30 percent are

select elements of its large arsenal of

assigned to a reserve or paramilitary unit

mostly outdated conventional weapons. It

and

has reinforced long-range artillery forces

mobilization.

near the DMZ and has a substantial

percent of its ground forces and 50

number of mobile ballistic missiles thatpercent of its air and naval forces

could strike a variety of targets in the ROK

deployed within 100 kilometers of the DMZ,

and Japan. However, the DPRK’s force

the KPA poses a continuous threat to themodernization

ROK and U.S. forces stationed there. The

defensive

and

will

likelyemphasize

asymmetricattackcapabilities to counter technologically

would

be

subjectWithtowartimeapproximately

70

general disposition of the KPA has notchanged in the last two years.

superior ROK and U.S. conventional forces.
The KPA primarily fields legacy equipment,
North Korea will likely continue to develop

either produced in or based on designs

and test-launch missiles, including thefrom the Soviet Union and China dating

Taepodong (TD)-2 intercontinental ballisticback to the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.

missile (ICBM)/ space-launch vehicle (SLV).

Although a few weapons systems areNorthenhancebased on modern technology, the KPA

deterrence and defense and to improve

has not kept pace with regional military

its ability to conduct limited attacks

capability developments. The KPA has notagainst the ROK drives its road-mobile

acquired new fighter aircraft in decades,

ICBM development, missile tests, andrelies on older air defense systems, lacks

programs to improve unmanned aerial

ballistic missile defense, its Navy does not

vehicles (UAV), denial and deception,

train for blue water operations, andcyber,

recently unveiled artillery systems include

Korea’sdesireelectronic

towarfare,andsubmarines.

tractor-towed rocket launchers while mostother countries are improving the mobilityof such systems.

AN AGING FORCE...WITH

Kim Jong Un seems to prioritize the

EMERGING CAPABILITIESdevelopment of new weapons systems, as
demonstrated

by

his

numerous

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) — a

appearances with military units andlarge, ground force-centric organization

research and development organizations.

comprising ground, air, naval, missile, andHe has personally overseen land- and sea-

SOF — has over one million soldiers in its

based ballistic missile and anti-ship cruise

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
10missile testing activity in 2014 and 2015. He

Air and Air Defense. The North Korean Air

has also overseen events designed toForce (NKAF), a fleet of more than 1,300

demonstrate

aircraft that are primarily legacy Soviet

theproficiency

of

his

conventional military forces.

models,isprimarily

responsiblefordefending North Korean air space. Its
Ground. The KPA’s ground forces areotherpredominantly regular and light infantry

transportation

units,

andreconnaissance, and tactical air support

heavy

for KPA ground forces. However, because

concentrations of artillery. These forces areof the technological inferiority of most of its

forward-deployed,

aircraftsupportedmechanized

thousand

by

units

armor
and

fortifiedundergroundinseveralmissions

fleet

include
and

and

SOF

insertion,

logistics

support,

rigid

air

defensefacilities, andcommand and control structure, much ofinclude long-range cannon and rocket

North Korea’s air defense is provided byartillery forces that are capable ofsurface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-

reaching targets in Seoul from theiraircraft artillery (AAA).

garrisons.
The NKAF’s most capable combat aircraft
The ground forces possess numerous lightare its MiG-29s, procured from the Soviet

and medium tanks, and many armored

Union in the late 1980s, its MiG-23, and its

personnel carriers. The KPA’s large artillery

SU-25 ground-attack aircraft. However, theforce includes long-range 170-mm guns

majority of its aircraft are less capableand 240-mm multiple rocket launchers

MiG-15s, MiG-17s, MiG-19s (F-6), and MiG-

(MRL), many deployed along the DMZ

21s. The NKAF operates a large fleet of An-

posing a constant threat to northern parts

2 COLT aircraft, which are 1940s vintageof the ROK.

single-engine, 10-passenger biplanes, likely

In October 2015, North Korea paraded
what appears to be a large-caliber MRL —larger than its 240-mm MRL — that carries
eight tubes on a wheeled chassis. In
recent years, North Korea has unveiled
other new ground force equipment,
including tanks, artillery, armored vehicles,
and infantry weapons. The display of thesetasked with inserting SOF into the ROK. The
Air Force is rounded out with several
hundred helicopters that would be used
for troop transport and ground attack,including predominantly Mi-2/HOPLITE andsome

U.S.-madeMD-500helicoptersobtained by circumventing U.S. export
controls in 1985.

systems shows that North Korea continues

North

to produce, or at least upgrade, limited

overlapping air defense system of SA-2,

types and numbers of military equipment.

SA-3, and SA-5 SAM sites, mobile SA-13
SAMs,

Korea

mobilenumerouspossesses

and

fixed

man-portableadense,

AAA,andair-defense

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
11systems like the SA-7. As the NKAF’s aircraft

variety of patrol craft, guided-missile patrol

continue to age, it increasingly relies on its

boats, submarines, and landing craft.

ground-based air defenses and on hiding
or hardening assets to counter air attacks.

The

NKN

has

displayed

During a 2010 military parade, North Korea

modernization

displayed a new mobile SAM launcher

upgrades to select surface ships and a

and accompanying radar, which bore

continued

external resemblance to the Russian S-300

submarines. North Korea unveiled a new

and Chinese HQ-9.

submarine in mid-2015, which it claims wasefforts,

limitedhighlighted

programtobyconstructdeveloped domestically and can fire a
North Korea publicized a March 2013

ballistic missile.

military live-fire drill that for the first timefeatured an unmanned aerial vehicle

Special Operations Forces. North Korean(UAV) in flight. The UAV appeared to be a

SOF are among the most highly trained,

North Korean copy of a Raytheon MQM-

well-equipped,

107 Streaker target drone. North Koreanmotivated forces in the KPA. As Northpress coverage of the event described the

Korea’s conventional capabilities decline

UAV as being capable of precision strike

relative to the ROK and United States,by crashing into the target. The drill also

North Korea appears to increasingly

featured the UAV as a cruise-missile

regardsimulator, which was then shot down by aasymmetric coercion.

mobile SAM.

SOF

best-fed,

capabilities

and

as

highlyvital

forStrategic SOF units dispersed across North

Naval. The North Korean Navy (NKN) is the

Korea appear designed for rapid offensive

smallest of the KPA’s three main services.

operations,This coastal force is composed primarily of

foreign attacks, or limited attacks against

numerous, though aging, small patrol craft

vulnerable targets in the ROK as part of athat carry a variety of anti-ship cruise

coercive diplomacy effort. They operate in

missiles, torpedoes, and guns. The NKN

specialized

maintains one of the world’s largest

reconnaissance, airborne and seaborne

submarine forces, with around 70 attack-,

insertion,commandos,

coastal-, and midget-type submarines. In

specialties.

Allemphasize

speed

of

addition, the NKN operates a large fleet of

movementandsurprise

attacktoair-cushioned

andaccomplish their missions. SOF may be

conventional landing craft to support

airlifted by An-2 COLT or helicopters (andamphibious operations and SOF insertion.

possibly Civil Air Administration transports),

The force is divided into East and West

moved by maritime insertion platforms, or

Coast Fleets, which each operate a

travel on foot over land or via suspected

hovercraftinternal

defenseunits,

againstincluding
and

other

underground, cross-DMZ tunnels to attack

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
12high-value targets like command andNorth Korea is committed to developing acontrol nodes or air bases in the ROK.

long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is
capable of posing a direct threat to theBallistic Missile Force. North Korea has

United States. Pyongyang displayed theseveral hundred short- and medium-range

KN08 ICBM, which it refers to as Hwasong-ballistic

MRBMs)

13, on six road-mobile transporter-erector-

available for use against targets on the

launchers (TEL) during military parades in

KoreanA

2012 and 2013. If successfully designed

intermediate-range

and developed, the KN08 likely would be

missiles(SRBMsPeninsuladevelopmental

and

and

Japan.

ballistic missile (IRBM), though untested

capableand unreliable as a weapon, could also

continental United States, assuming the

be launched at targets in the region.

missiles

North Korea has an ambitious ballistic
missile development program in addition
to its deployed mobile theater ballistic
missiles. Since early 2012, North Korea has
made efforts to raise the public profile ofits ballistic missile command, now called
the Strategic Rocket Forces. In 2014, Kim
Jong Un

personally oversaw several

ballistic missile launch exercises, and North
Korea

launched

anunprecedented

number of ballistic missiles. The Stateofreaching

displayed

much
are

of

the

generally

representative of missiles that will befielded. However, ICBMs are extremelycomplex systems that require multiple flighttests to identify and correct design or
manufacturing defects. Without flight tests,
the KN08’s current reliability as a weapon
system would be low. In October 2015,
North Korea paraded four missiles on KN08
TELs. These missiles are noticeably different
from those previously displayed on theseTELs.

media covered the usually secretive

North Korea also continues to develop theevents, including reporting on two launch

TD-2, which could reach the continental

cycles in the same week. Kim’s public

United States if configured as an ICBM. In

emphasis of the missile force continued

April and December 2012, North Korea

into 2015, when he appeared at what

conducted

North Korea portrayed as the test launch

configured as a SLV, which used ballisticof a submarine-launched ballistic missile

missile technology. The April launch failed(SLBM). In late November 2015, the ROK’s

but the December launch succeeded.

launches

of

the

TD-2

Yonhap news agency reported that North
Korea appeared to conduct an SLBM test

Developing an SLV contributes heavily to

but it ended in failure with no indication

North Korea’s long-range ballistic missilethat the missile successfully ejected fromdevelopment, since the two vehicles havethe vessel.

many shared technologies. However, aspace launch does not test a reentry
vehicle (RV). Without an RV capable of

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
13

surviving atmospheric reentry, North Korea

Sony Pictures Entertainment, shutting down

cannot deliver a weapon to target from

employee access and deleting data. As aan ICBM.

result of North Korea’s historical isolationfromAdvancesinballistic missile delivery

systems, coupled with developments in

outsidecommunications

andinfluence, it is likely to use Internet
infrastructure from third-party nations.

nuclear technology discussed in Chapter
4, are in line with North Korea’s statedIntelligenceobjective of being able to strike the U.S.

intelligence and security services collecthomeland.

its

political, military, economic, and technicalFebruary 12, 2013 nuclear test with ainformation through open-source, humancampaign

intelligence,

North
of

authoritative

Korea

media
publicfollowed
releasesandServices.

North

cyber,

Koreanandsignalsannouncements

intelligence capabilities. North Korea’s

reaffirming its need to counter perceived

primary intelligence collection targets

U.S. hostility with nuclear-armed ICBMs.

remain South Korea, the United States, andNorth Korea continues to devote scarce

Japan.

resources to these programs, but the paceof its progress will also depend, in part, on

The Reconnaissance General Bureau

how much technology and other aid it(RGB) is North Korea’s primary foreign

can acquire from other countries.

intelligence

service,

responsibleforcollection and clandestine operations. The
Cyberwarfare Capabilities. North Korea

RGB is comprised of six bureaus withhas an offensive cyber operations (OCO)

compartmented

capability. Implicated in malicious cyber

operations, reconnaissance, technology

activity and cyber effects operations sinceand cyber, overseas intelligence, inter-

2009, North Korea probably views OCO as

Korean talks, and service support.

functions

includingan appealing platform from which tocollect intelligence and cause disruption in

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is North

South

Korea’s

Korea

and

other

adversaries

primary

counterintelligence

including the United States. North Korea

service and is an autonomous agency oflikely views cyber as a cost-effective,

the North Korean government reporting

asymmetric, deniable tool that it candirectly to Kim Jong Un. The MSS isemploy with little risk from reprisal attacks,

responsible for operating North Korean

in part because its networks are largely

prison camps, investigating cases ofseparated from the Internet and disruption

domesticof Internet access would have minimal

defectors,

impact on its economy. On November 24,

counterespionage

2014, North Korean cyberactors using the

Korea’s foreign missions.

espionage,andrepatriating

conducting
activities

overseasinNorth

name “Guardians of Peace” attacked

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
14

The United Front Department (UFD) overtly

nationwide cellular network. However,attempts to establish pro-North Korean

telecommunication services and accessgroups in South Korea such as the Korean

are strictly controlled and all networks are

Asia-Pacific Committee and the Ethnic

available for military use, if necessary.

Reconciliation Council. The UFD is also theprimary department involved in managing

Cellinter-Korean dialogue and North Korea’s

exceeds three million nationwide with

policy toward South Korea.

continued growth of Koryolink, a joint

The 225th Bureau is responsible for training
agents to infiltrate South Korea andestablishing underground political parties
focusedon

fomentingunrestandrevolution.

Korea’ssubscribership

reportedly

venture between Pyongyang and Egypt’s
Global Telecom Holding. Mobile phoneusers are concentrated in major cities, withgrowth in small towns and villages.
However, most cell phones cannot accessthe Internet and can only make domestic

Command, Control, and Communications.
North

phone

National

DefenseCommission (NDC) is the official authority
over the North’s military and security
services. The Ministry of People’s Armed
Forces (MPAF) is the administrative superiorof the KPA, while operational commandand control is exercised by the General
Staff Department. The 1992 constitution
gives control of North Korea’s military to
the NDC, and Kim Jong Un exercises
control of the military as “First Chairman”
of the NDC and “Supreme Commander”
of the KPA. Kim Jong Un further exercises
control as “First Secretary” of the Korean
Worker’s Party (KWP) and “Chairman” of
the KWP’s Central Military Commission.

calls. In 2014, Orascom suggested thefuture of Koryolink was uncertain, in part
because the North Korean Government
had launched a competing cellular
network. In addition, Global Telecom citedinternational sanctions and the absenceof a free-floating currency exchange as
impediments to the transfer of its profits outof North Korea. This could sour further
investment by global investors into North
Korea’s telecoms sector. The Government
restricts most North Koreans from using theInternet, but some are able to access thenational intranet, which is insulated fromthe World Wide Web. The intranet hosts
government-approved websites, primarily
tosupportacademic

researchandgovernment businesses.

North Korea has a nationwide fiber-optic
network, and has invested in a modern

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
15

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
16

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
17

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
18

North Korean Ballistic Missile Forces
System# of Launchers

Estimated Range

Toksa

75 milesSCUD-B

185 miles
Fewer than 100

SCUD-C

310 miles

SCUD-ER

435-625 miles

No Dong

Fewer than 50

800 miles

IRBM

Fewer than 50

2,000+ miles

TD-2

Unknown*

3,400+ miles**SLBM

At least 1

Unknown

KN08

At least 6

3,400+ miles**Note: North Korea has produced its own version of the SCUD B, and the SCUD C,
an extended-range version of the SCUD B. North Korea will continue using andimproving the TD-2, which has only been used in a space-launch role, but could
reach the United States with a nuclear payload if developed as an ICBM. North
Korea is also developing the KN08 road-mobile ICBM and has paraded six
launchers for the system. The KN08, an IRBM, and an SLBM have not been flighttested and their current reliability as weapon systems would be low.
* Launches of the TD-2 have been observed from both east and west coast
launch facilities.
** ICBM is defined as a ballistic missile (land-based) capable of a range inexcess of 5,500 kilometers (or 3,418 miles).

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
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Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
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CHAPTER FOUR:WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PROGRAMS AND PROLIFERATIONNORTH KOREA’S WMDPROGRAMS

The director of the DPRK Atomic Energy

Nuclear Weapons. North Korea continues

including the uranium enrichment plantto pursue a nuclear weapons program,and reactor, were “adjusted and altered”

having conducted nuclear tests in 2006,

following the April 2013 announcement

2009, and 2013. In April 2013, less than two

and restarted for the purpose of building

months after its third nuclear test, North

its nuclear force. The director also claimed

Korea promulgated a domestic “Law onthat scientists and technicians were

Consolidating

enhancing the levels of various nuclear

Positionas

Institute confirmed in September 2015 that
all of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon,a

NuclearWeapons State” to provide a legal basis

weapons in quality and quantity.

for its nuclear program and another signalthat it does not intend to give up its pursuit

These activities violate North Korea’sof nuclear development. The law states

obligations under UNSCRs 1718, 1874, 2087,“the nuclear weapons of the DPRK canand 2094, contravene its commitments

only be used by a final order of theunder the September 19, 2005 Six-Party

Supreme Commander of the Korean’sTalks Joint Statement, and increase the risk

People’s Army (Kim Jong Un) to repelof proliferation.

invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear
weapons state and make retaliatory
strikes.” North Korea continues to invest inits

nuclearinfrastructure

and

could

conduct additional nuclear tests at any
time. In 2010, North Korea revealed auranium enrichment facility at Yongbyonthat it claims is for producing fuel for a lightwater reactor under construction. In April
2013, North Korea announced its intent torestart and refurbish the nuclear facilities
atYongbyon, including

thenuclear

Biological Weapons. DoD assesses that
North Korea may consider the use of
biological weapons as an option, contrary
to its obligations under the Biological andToxins Weapons Convention (BWC). North
Korea continues to develop its biologicalresearch and development capabilities,
but has yet to declare any relevant
developments and has failed to provide a
BWC

Confidence-Building

Measuredeclaration since 1990.

reactor that had been shut down since2007 and the uranium enrichment facility.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
21

Chemical Weapons. North Korea probably

CONVENTIONAL ARMS

has

AND MISSILE SALES

hadweaponsalongstanding(CW)

programchemicalwiththecapability to produce nerve, blister, blood,and choking agents and likely possesses a
CW stockpile. North Korea probably could
employ CW agents by modifying a varietyof

conventional

munitions,

includingartillery and ballistic missiles. In addition,
North Korean forces are prepared tooperate in a contaminated environment;
they train regularly in chemical defense
operations. North Korea is not a party to
the Chemical Weapons Convention.

North Korea uses a worldwide network tofacilitate

arms

sales

activities

andmaintains a core, but dwindling group ofrecipient countries including Iran, Syria,
and Burma. North Korea has exported
conventional and ballistic missile-related
equipment, components, materials, andtechnical assistance to countries in Africa,
Asia, and the Middle East. Conventional
weapons sales have included ammunition,
small arms, artillery, armored vehicles, and
SAMs.

PROLIFERATIONNorth Korea has been an exporter ofconventional arms and ballistic missiles forseveral decades. Despite the adoption ofUnited Nations Security Council resolutions(UNSCRs) 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094,
which prohibit all weapons sales and theprovision of related technical training from

In addition to Iran and Syria, past clients forNorth

Korea’sballistic

missilesandassociated technology have included
Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen.
Burma has begun distancing itself from
North

Korea

but

concerns

remainregarding lingering arms trade ties.

North Korea, the DPRK continues to

North Korea uses various methods tomarket, sell, and deliver weapons-related

circumvent UNSCRs, including falsifying

goods and services. Weapons sales are a

end-user certificates, mislabeling crates,

critical source of foreign currency for Northsending cargo through multiple front

Korea, which is unlikely to cease export

companies and intermediaries, and using

activity in spite of UN Security Council

air cargo for deliveries of high-value andsanctions;sensitive arms exports.

theimplementationof

Executive Order 13382, under which
designated WMD proliferators’ access to

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

the U.S. and global financial systems aretargeted; or increased international efforts

North Korea’s demonstrated willingness toto interdict its weapons-related exports.

proliferate nuclear technology remains
one of our gravest concerns. North Korea
provided Libya with uranium hexafluoride,
the form of uranium used in the uranium

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
22enrichment process to produce fuel for
nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons,
via the proliferation network of Pakistani
nuclear scientist AQ Khan. North Korea
also provided Syria with nuclear reactor
technology until 2007.

 In June 2011, the M/V Light, a merchantvessel bound for Burma suspected ofcarrying military-related cargo, returned
to North Korea after refusing a U.S. Navy
inspection request.
 In February 2010, South Africa seized

INTERDICTED TRANSFERS

North Korean-origin spare tank parts

Global concern about North Korea’s

destined for the Republic of Congo.

proliferation activities continues to mount, In December 2009, Thai authorities

leading various nations to take action.

impounded the cargo of a charteredNotablecargo plane containing about 35 metricrecentinterdiction

eventspursuant to UNSCRs include:tons In July 2013, Panamanian authorities
stopped and inspected the North
Korean flagged vessel Chong ChonofincludingNorth

Koreanartilleryweapons,

rockets,

rocket-propelled grenades, and SAMs.
 In October 2009, the ROK seized North

Gang, finding hidden cargo including

Korean-origin

two

protective suits destined for Syria.

MiG-21fighter

aircraftandchemical

warfareassociated engines, SA-2 and SA-3 SAMrelated equipment, and unspecified

Although some of its weapons-transfer

missiles. Cuba issued a statementattempts have been interdicted by theacknowledging

theinternational community, North Korea will

military equipment and claiming it wascontinue to attempt arms shipments via

being sent to North Korea for overhaul.

new and increasingly complex routes.

ownershipof

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24