Special Lecture
The ELSJ 3rd International Spring Forum

Relations in Minimalism
Hisatsugu Kitahara
Keio University
In this paper, after reviewing the two distinct approaches to syntactic relations: Epstein et. al's(1998) derivational approach and Chomsky's (2000) compositional approach, I point out that,given Epstein, Kitahara, and Seely's (2009) law of conservation of relations, which subsumes
Chomsky's (2007, 2008) no-tampering condition, these two approaches become empiricallyequivalent. I then discuss Chomsky's (2007, 2008) suggestion, under which c-command isdispensable from the narrow syntax, in favor of probe-goal and minimal search conditions.
Suppose there is no empirical difference between the derivational approach and thecompositional approach. Is there any way we can construct a conceptual argument, which
separates these two approaches? At a first glance, it is not clear whether we can. The
derivational approach argues that unavoidable derivation is sufficient to provide syntacticallysignificant relations (in particular, c-command), and the compositional approach argues thatsyntactic operations and composition of relations are the minimal assumptions about theavailable relations.
In his recent work, however, Chomsky (2008:141) suggests: "whether c-command plays a role
within the computation to the C-I interface is an open question." More specifically, he suggeststhat c-command is not required in binding theory. He argues that binding relations can bereformulated as probe-goal relations. Chomsky (2007:18) presents as the most important case,Reuland's (2005) discovery: the binding relation holds between the antecedent XP and thereflexive R in the structures of the form [T...XP...R], where XP does not c-command R, butboth are c-commanded by the head T that agrees with XP. Note this is the case of probe-goal byT, not c-command by XP. Suppose such reformulation of binding relations is possible. Then,c-command looses its strong empirical support. But still a question remains: if not c-command,
what guarantees the observed relation between the probe and the goal?
Chomsky (2007:9) answers: "restricted to heads (probes), c-command reduces to minimal
search," given "minimal search conditions limit the goal of the probe to its complement, thesmallest searchable domain." I argue his answer is on the right track. Take K={H, XP}.
Suppose NS accesses K and identifies H as the probe. What will be the search domain of theprobe H? Given K is a two-membered set, the simplest option will be its co-member: if one
becomes a probe, then the other becomes a search domain. Thus, the natural searchable domainof the probe H will be the one and only one co-member XP, the complement of the probe H.
Under these assumptions, c-command is (arguably) dispensable from the computation to theC-I interface, in favor of probe-goal and minimal search conditions.
If probe-goal and minimal search conditions are sufficient to determine what we have beencalling c-command, then any further characterization of c-command appears to be redundant.
Selected References
Chomsky, N. 2000. Minimalist inquiries: The framework. Chomsky, N. 2007. Approaching
UG from below. Chomsky, N. 2008. On phases. Epstein, S. D., E. Groat, R. Kawashima, and H.
Kitahara. 1998. A derivational approach to syntactic relations. Epstein, S. D., H. Kitahara, andT. D. Seely. 2009. Structure Building That Can’t Be. Reuland, E. 2005. Agreeing to bind.