Military and Security Developments Involving
theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea
2012
A Report to Congress
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act
for
Fiscal Year 2012

Section 1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law
112-81, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified
and unclassified form, on the current and future military power of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea” (DPRK). The report shall address an assessment of the
security situation on the Korean Peninsula, the goals and factors shaping North Korean
security strategy and military strategy, trends in North Korean security, an assessment ofNorth Korea’s regional security objectives, including an assessment of the North Korean
military’s capabilities, developments in North Korean military doctrine and training, anassessment of North Korea’s proliferation activities, and other military security
developments.

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Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1

CHAPTER ONE: ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION

3

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREAN AND PENINSULAR SECURITY

3

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

3

CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGY

5STRATEGIC GOALS

5NATIONAL STRATEGY5

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND REGIONAL BEHAVIOR

6

CHAPTER THREE: FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDS

7OVERVIEW

7MAINTAINING THE THREAT

7AN AGING FORCE...

8...WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIES

8CHAPTER FOUR: PROLIFERATION11OVERVIEW

16

CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MISSILE SALES

16

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION16NORTH KOREA’S WMD PROGRAMS16

INTERDICTED TRANSFERS

17

CHAPTER 5: SIZE, LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIESOF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES

18

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains one of the United States’
most critical security challenges in Northeast Asia. North Korea remains a security threat
because of its willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior,including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its pursuit of nuclear weapons andlong-range ballistic missiles, and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contraventionof its international agreements and United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
North Korean aspiration for reunification – attainable in its mind in part by expelling U.S.
forces from the Peninsula – and its commitment to perpetuating the Kim family regime
are largely unchanged since the nation’s founding in 1948, but its strategies to achievethese goals have evolved significantly. Under Kim Jong Il, DPRK strategy had been
focused on internal security; coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its
diplomatic, economic and security interests; development of strategic militarycapabilities to deter external attack; and challenging the ROK and the U.S.-ROK
Alliance. We anticipate these strategic goals will be consistent under North Korea’s
new leader, Kim Jong Un.
North Korea fields a large, forward-deployed military that retains the capability to inflict
serious damage on the ROK, despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware.
The DPRK continues to be deterred from conducting attacks on the ROK largely
because of the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. On a smaller scale, however, theDPRK has demonstrated its willingness to use military provocation to achieve national
goals, such as in 2010 when it sank the ROK naval vessel CHEONAN, killing 46 ROK Navysailors, and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing two ROK Marines and two civilians.
North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities anddevelopment of long-range ballistic missile programs, as reflected in the December
2012 Taepo Dong 2 missile launch and April 2012 display of a new road-mobileintercontinental ballistic missile, underscores the threat to regional stability and U.S.
national security posed by North Korea.

These programs, as well as North Korea’s

expressed hostility toward the ROK and proliferation of items prohibited under United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2087 make the DPRK a continued
security challenge for the United States and its Allies and partners.
North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013 and its 2010 revelation of a uranium
enrichment facility highlight the continued challenge posed by North Korea’s nuclear

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

1

programs. Both the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks and United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2087 call for the complete andverifiable denuclearization of North Korea. Given North Korea’s unwillingness to abideby these commitments, the Department of Defense will continue to manage the North
Korean security challenge through close coordination and consultation with theinternational community, particularly with our ROK and Japanese Allies.
The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocations
and steadfast in commitments to Allies in the region, including the security provided byextended

deterrence

commitments

through both thenuclearumbrellaandconventional forces.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

2

CHAPTER ONE:ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATIONKEY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH

coordination with the United States and

KOREAN AND PENINSULAR

its linkage of assistance to the North to

SECURITY

progress in denuclearization grew over

The Democratic People’s Republic of

Myung-bak, and is unlikely to change

the past five years of President Lee

Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has statedthat it is entering what it calls “the door ina strong and prosperous nation” in 2012.
The transfer of power to Kim Jong Un,
after the death of Kim Jong Il insignificantly under the tenure of President
Park Geun-hye.

NORTH KOREAN SECURITY
PERCEPTIONS

December 2011, has shaped the internal
political landscape of North Korea andNorth Korean threat perceptions are

its international relations.

In April 2012,

shaped by a legacy of guerilla warfare

Kim Jong Un assumed top-level positions

dating back to its anti–colonial struggle

in the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) andagainst the Japanese, political andtheCommission,

economic isolation, experience duringformalizing his role as the North’s top

wartime, and a political culture that isleader.

definedNational

Defensebyanunending

existential

struggle with outside forces. North Korea
Yet North Korea continues to fall behindhas portrayed the ROK and the United

the rising national power of its regional

States as constant threats to Northneighbors, creating a widening military

Korea’s

disparity and fueling its commitment toattempt to legitimize and justify the Kim

improvingstrategicfamily rule, its draconian internal control

deterrent capabilities as the primarymechanisms, and its existing strategies as

guarantor of regime survival.

the best defense against encroachments

asymmetricandTensions on the Korean Peninsula havesovereignty,

inaprobableon the North’s sovereignty.

grown as relations between the DPRKThe regime’s greatest security concern isandopposition

theRepublic

of

Korea

(ROK)

from

within,andoutsideworsened through 2011 and remained

forces – primarily South Korea – taking

uneasy through mid-2012.

advantage

The DPRK’s

frustration with the ROK’s close policy

toppletheofinternal
regimeinstability
andMilitary and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

toachieve3

unification of the Korean Peninsula.

In

consequence of repressive governments,

North Korea’s view, the destruction of

but rather

regimes such as Ceausescu, Hussain, andnecessary capabilities to defend their

Qadhafirespective autocratic regime’s survival.

was

not

an

inevitableafailureto secure

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

the4CHAPTER TWO:UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA’S STRATEGYSTRATEGIC GOALS
Regimesurvival

competition

forNorth Korea’s pursuit of a “military firstinalegitimacy

zero-sumonthe

Peninsula with the South has been theconsistent,

overarchingstrategic

objective of the Kim regime since 1945,
but North Korean goals and supporting
strategy have evolved significantly over
the years.

Throughout the 1960s and1970s, North Korea boasted a viableeconomy and military and international
relationships

that

eithermatchedoroutclassed those of the ROK. During thisperiod,

North

Korea

had

reasontobelieve its goal of reunification on its
terms was a possibility. Since the loss oftheSoviet

Union

as

a

principal

benefactor, devastating famine of the
1990s,

andtheeconomic

rise

and

political maturation of the ROK, North
Korea has largely abandoned unilaterally
enforced reunification as a practicalgoal. North Korean goals and strategies
reflect the reality of political isolation,
significant

economic

deprivation,adeteriorating conventional military, andthe increasing political and military powerof nearby states. Nevertheless, the Northhas pursued a military posture that allows
it to influence coercively South Korea
through provocation and intimidation,and to attempt to have as equal a voice
as possible in the future of the Peninsula.

policy”

demonstrates

its

view

that

ultimately the national security of North
Korea is disproportionately dependent on
military might in the absence of any othernotable elements of national power. The
DPRK seeks recognition as an equal andlegitimate international player and as arecognized

nucleareventually

able

power

to

that

is

normalize

its

diplomatic relations with the Westernworld and pursue economic recovery
and prosperity.

The DPRK’s rhetoricsuggests the regime at this time is unlikely
to pursue this second goal, at theexpense of the primary goal of pursuing
its nuclear and missile capabilities.

NATIONAL STRATEGY
Beyondits

fundamental

guarantor

ofsecurity,thenational
North

role

as

a

and

regimeKoreanmilitary

supports the Kim regime’s use of coercive
diplomacy as part of its larger diplomatic
strategy.

Through the use of limited

provocations – even those that are
kinetic and lethal in nature – North Korea
uses

small-scaleattacks

togain

psychological advantage in diplomacy
and win limited political and economic
concessions, all while likely believing it
can control escalation.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

5

Closely tied to this strategy of politicalthecoercion are North Korea’s nuclear anddiplomacy and coercion while minimizing

ballistic missile programs which – absent

any influence or leverage the ROK might

normalized relations with the international

try to wield in return.

community – it sees as essential to its

adopted a largely adversarial posturegoals

toward former ROK President Lee Myungofsurvival,

sovereignty,

andrelevance.

ROK

using

a

combinationofNorth Korea

Bak and his administration given his
insistence on reciprocity and linking of aid

REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND

to progress in denuclearization, leading

REGIONAL BEHAVIOR

to the failure of the North’s traditional

North Korea is dependent on China as a

ROK and drive a wedge in the U.S.-ROK

key

benefactor,

both

approach to exact concessions from the
in

terms

of

relationship. North Korea’s objectives in

diplomatic and economic support. North

delinkingKorea also maintains friendly relations

denuclearization and minimizing politicalwith Russia, although the relationship isconcessions it makes in response to ROK

not as robust as North Korea’s relations

economic and development assistancewith China. In its pursuit of nuclear andmissile capabilities, and in its use of limited
provocations for diplomatic objectives,
North Korea is always conscious of how
China and Russia will respond, and likely
calculates both are more concerned
about limiting U.S. responses than trying
tocontrolordictateNorth

Korea’s

behavior.

areinter-Korean

likelytoberelationsunchanged

from

in

its

approach to the new Park Geun-hye
administration.
North

Korea

relationship

has
with

a

contentious

theJapanese

Government. Absent a breakthrough on
the issue of North Korean abductions ofJapanese citizens, there is little prospect
for improvement in relations or for a lifting

In its approach to the ROK, North Korea

of Japanese economic sanctions against

seeks to extract aid and investment from

North Korea.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

6

CHAPTER THREE:FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDSOVERVIEW

the TD-2 ICBM/ Space Launch Vehicle(SLV).

Missile

tests

and

other

includingdenialNorth Korea’s large, forward-positioned

improvement

military can initiate an attack against theand deception, artillery, development of

ROK with little or no warning, even thoughait suffers from resource shortages andoperations forces, are driven by North

aging

the

Korea’s desire to enhance deterrence

capability to inflict significant damage on

and defense, and enhance North Korea’s

the ROK, especially in the region from theability to conduct limited attacks against

De-militarized

the South.

equipment.

Zone

It

(DMZ)

retainstoSeoul.

efforts,

road-mobile

ICBM,

and

specialAlthough North Korea is unlikely to attack
on a scale that it assesses would risk thesurvival of its government by inviting
overwhelming counterattacks by the ROKor the United States, we do not know how
North Korea calculates this threshold of
behavior.
scale

North Korea’s use of small-

attacks

andprovocativeacts

leaves much room for miscalculation that
could spiral into a larger conflict.

Despite its many internal challenges andconstraints as well as deterioration inconventional

capabilities,

the

North

Korean military poses a serious threat to
the ROK, its other neighbors, and U.S.
forces in the region.
Two key events demonstrated North

North Korea is making some efforts to
upgrade its conventional weapons.

MAINTAINING THE THREATIt

has reinforced long-range artillery forcesnear the DMZ and has a substantial
number of mobile ballistic missiles that
could strike a variety of targets in the ROK
and Japan. However, we assess that the
DPRK’s emphasis will be to leverage theperception of a nuclear deterrent to

Korea’s willingness to employ its military as
part of a coercive diplomacy strategy. A
multinational

Joint

Civilian-Military

Investigation Team concluded that a
North Korean midget submarine sank the
ROK naval corvette CHEONAN on March
26, 2010 near the contentious Northern
Limit Line in the Yellow Sea, killing 46 ROK
sailors. In November 2010, North Korea

counter technologically superior forces.

shelled Yonpyong Island, killing two ROK

We expect that North Korea will seek toresponse to these provocative acts wascontinue to test-launch missiles, including

Marines and two civilians.
restrained,

but

the

The ROK’s

attacks

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

have

7

strengthened the ROK’s resolve to react

to produce, or at least upgrade, limited

more forcefully in the future.

types and numbers of equipment.

AN AGING FORCE...

Air and Air Defense. The North Korean Air
Force (NKAF) operates a fleet of more

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) – anthan 1,300 aircraft, primarily legacy Soviet

umbrella organization comprising ground,models.

air, naval, missile, and special operations

combat aircraft are its MiG-29s, procured

forces – ranks in personnel numbers as thefrom the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.

fourth largest military in the world. Four toNorthfive percent of North Korea’s 24 million

acquisition

people serve on active duty, and asurreptitiously purchased used Kazakh

further 25-30 percent are assigned to aMiG-21s.

reserve or paramilitary unit and subject towartime mobilization.
primarilylegacyThe KPA fields

equipment,

eitherproduced in, or based on designs of, theSoviet Union and China, dating back to
the 1950s, 60s and 70s, though a few
systems are based on more modern
technology.

military

parades

displayed

held

in

for

the

first

time,

highlighting continued efforts to improvethe military’s conventional capabilities,
despite financial hardships.

was

in

newly identified

North Korean tanks,

artillery, and other armored vehicles.
weapons

displayed as well.

recent1999

aircraftwhenit

As the NKAF’s aircraft continue to age, it
increasingly relies on its ground-based air
defenses and hiding or hardening ofassets to counter air attacks. During the2010

military

parade,

North

Korea

introduced a new vertical launchedmobile surface-to-air missile launcher and
It bears external

Naval. The North Korean Navy (NKN) has
displayedverylimitedmodernization

efforts, highlighted by upgrades to selectsurface ships and a continued program
to construct small submarines.

The

submarinebutforce,

unsophisticateddurable, demonstrated its capabilities by

Ground. The parades featured several

infantry

mostcapableChinese HQ-9.

2012, a number of new weapon systems

New

Korea’smostresemblance to the Russian S-300 andPyongyang in October 2010 and April
were

NKAF’saccompanying radar.

...WITH EMERGING CAPABILITIES
During

The

have

been

The display of thesesystems shows that North Korea continues

covertly attacking and sinking the ROK
warship CHEONAN with an indigenously
produced submarine and torpedo.
Special Operations. In addition to theSpecial Operations Forces (SOF) wartime
mission of deep strike infiltrations in a

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

8

combined arms peninsular attack,

SOF

These advances in ballistic missile delivery

may also conduct limited asymmetricsystems, coupled with developments in

attacks for political aims.

nuclear technology discussed in Chapter

Ballistic Missile Force. North Korea has anambitious ballistic missile development
programandhas

deployedmobiletheater ballistic missiles (TBM) capable ofreaching targets throughout the ROK,Japan, and the Pacific theater.

North

Korea continues to develop the TD-2,
which could reach parts of the UnitedStates if configured as an intercontinental
ballistic

missile(ICBM)

capableofcarrying a nuclear payload. Developing
a SLV contributes heavily to North Korea’s
long-range ballistic missile development,
since the two vehicles have many sharedtechnologies. However, a space launchdoes not test a re-entry vehicle (RV),
without which North Korea cannot deliver

4, are in line with North Korea’s statedobjective of being able to strike the U.S.
homeland.

North Korea followed its

February 12, 2013 nuclear test with acampaign

ofauthoritative

media
publicreleasesandannouncements

reaffirming its need to counter perceived
U.S. “hostility” with nuclear-armed ICBMs.
North Korea will move closer to this goal,as well as increase the threat it poses to
U.S. forces and Allies in the region, if it
continues testing and devoting scarce
regime resources to these programs. The
pace of its progress will depend, in part,on how many resources it can dedicate
to these efforts and how often it conducts
tests.

a weapon to target from an ICBM.

Cyberwarfare Capabilities. North Korea

Development also continues on a newprobably has a military computer network

solid-propellant

operations (CNO) capability. Implicatedshort-range

ballistic

in several cyber attacks ranging frommissile (SRBM).
North Korea showcased its TBM force in its
October 2010 military parade in honor of
the

65th

anniversary

of

the

KWP’s

founding, including two missile systems
shown publically for the first time: anintermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)

computer network exploitation (CNE) to
distributed

denialofservice(DDoS)

attacks since 2009, the North Korean
regime may view CNO as an appealing
platform

from

which

to

collectanewspaper,

intelligence.

and a version of the No Dong medium-• According

torange ballistic missile (MRBM) fitted with a

Seoul’scone-cylinder-flare payload. All of these

attributed to North Korea a CNO

systems, as well as what appeared to be

activitya new road-mobile ICBM, were paraded

Agriculturalin April 2012. This new mobile ICBM has(Nonghyup Bank) servers in April 2011.

not been flight tested.

Through

Centralon

ROK

Prosecutor’s

the

ROK’s

Cooperative

remoteofficeNational
Federation

execution,

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

actors9

rendered the bank’s online services

Technical

inaccessible and deleted numerous

operations remains challenging due tofiles

the internet’s decentralized architecture

concerning

customerbank

attributionofcyberspaceaccounts while removing all evidence

and inherent anonymity.

Given Northof CNO activity in the bank’s servers.

Korea’s bleak economic outlook, CNO
may be seen as a cost-effective way to• In the years spanning 2009-2011, Northmodernize some North Korean military

Korea was allegedly responsible forcapabilities. As a result of North Korea’s

conductingahistoricaldenialserviceofseriesofdistributed(DDoS)

isolation

fromoutsideattacks

communications and influence, it is likely

against ROK commercial, government

to employ Internet infrastructure fromand military websites, rendering themthird-party nations.

inaccessible.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

10

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

11North Korea, Ground Forces
Total
Tanks

4,100

Armored Vehicles

2,100

Field Artillery

8,500

MRLs

5,100

Note: With a maximum strength of approximately 950,000
personnel, the ground forces comprise the vast majority ofNorth Korea’s military.

Most of the conventional weaponssystems were developed based on 1960s and 1970s era
technology. However, they have attempted to overcome thistechnological disadvantage by relying on massive numbers ofartillery systems while simultaneously increasing its light infantry
forces.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

12

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

13

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

14

North Korea, Ballistic Missile Forces
SystemLaunchers

Estimated Range

KN-2

75 milesSCUD-B

185 miles

SCUD-C

Fewer than 100

SCUD-ER

310 miles
435-625 miles

No Dong

Fewer than 50

800 miles

IRBM

Fewer than 50

2,000+ miles

TD-2

Not yet deployed

3,400+ miles

Note: North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development
program and has exported missile technology to other countries,
including Iran and Pakistan. North Korea has produced its own
version of the SCUD B, as well as the SCUD C, an extended-range
version of the SCUD B. North Korea will continue using andimproving the TD-2, which could reach the United States with anuclear payload if developed as an ICBM.

An intermediate-

range ballistic missile (IRBM) and a new short-range, solidpropellant ballistic missile are also being developed.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

15

CHAPTER FOUR: PROLIFERATIONOVERVIEW
North Korea has been an exporter ofconventional arms and ballistic missiles
for several decades.
Despite theadoption of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718, 1874,
and 2087 which prohibit all weapons
sales and certain categories of technicaltraining from North Korea, the DPRK
continues to proliferate weapons-related
goods and technology. Weapons sales
are a critical source of foreign currency
for North Korea and North Korea isunlikely to cease export activity in spiteof UN Security Council sanctions or
successful interdictions of its weaponsrelated exports.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS
AND MISSILE SALES
North Korea uses a world-wide network
to facilitate arms sales activities andmaintains a core group of recipient
countries including Burma, Iran, andSyria.
North Korea has exported
conventional and ballistic missile-related
equipment, components, materials, andtechnical assistance to countries inAfrica, Asia, and the Middle East.
Conventional weapons sales haveincludedammunition,
small
arms,
artillery, armored vehicles, and surfaceto-air missiles.
•

In addition to Burma, Iran, and Syria,
past clients for North Korea’s ballistic
missiles and associated technology
have included Egypt, Iraq, Libya,
Pakistan, and Yemen.

North Korea uses various methods tocircumvent UNSCRs, including falsifying
end-user certificates, mislabeling crates,
sending cargo through multiple front
companies and intermediaries, andusing air cargo for deliveries of highvalue and sensitive arms exports.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
One of our gravest concerns about North
Korea’s activities in the international
arena is its demonstrated willingness toproliferate nuclear technology. North
Korea provided Libya with uranium
hexafluoride, a compound used in theuraniumenrichment
processthat
produces fuel for nuclear reactors andnuclear weapons, via the proliferation
network of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.
Q. Khan. North Korea also provided Syria
with nuclear reactor technology until
2007.

NORTH KOREA’SWMD PROGRAMS
Nuclear. North Korea conducted nuclear
tests in 2006, 2009, and most recently in
February 2013. North Korea could
conduct additional nuclear tests at any
time. North Korea continues to invest in its
nuclear infrastructure. In 2010, North
Korea revealed a uranium enrichment
facility at Yongbyon that it claims is for
producing fuel for a light water reactor
under construction.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

16

These activities violate North Korea’s
obligations under United Nations Security

INTERDICTED TRANSFERS

Council Resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2087,

Global concern about North Korea’s

contravene its commitments under the

proliferation activity continues to mount,

September 19, 2005 Joint Statement ofleading various nations to take action.

the Six-Party Talks, and increase the risk of

Notableproliferation.

pursuant to UNSCRs include:

Biological. Open sources have often• In June 2011, a vessel bound forreported defector allegations of a North

Burma, suspected of carrying military-

Koreanprogram.

related cargo, returned to North Korea

research

after refusing a U.S. Navy inspection

Northbiological
Korea

warfarecontinues

tobacterial and viral biological agents that
could support an offensive Biological
Weapons

program.

Infrastructure,

combined with its weapons industry,
gives North Korea a potentially robust
biological warfare capability.

a longstanding Chemical Weapons (CW)
program with the capability to produce
nerve, blister, blood, and choking agentsand likely possesses a CW stockpile.
North Korea probably could employ CW
bymodifyingavarietyofconventional munitions, including artillery
and ballistic missiles.

In addition, North

Korean forces are prepared to operate
in a contaminated environment; theytrain

regularlyininterdiction

eventsrequest.
• In February 2010, South Africa seized
North Korean-origin spare tank parts
destined for the Republic of Congo.
• In December 2009, Thai authorities

Chemical. North Korea probably has had

agentsrecentchemical

defenseoperations. North Korea is not a party to
the Chemical Weapons Convention.

impounded the cargo of a charteredcargo plane containing about 35
metric tons of North Korean weapons
includingartilleryrockets,

rocket-propelled grenades, and surface-toair missiles.
• In October 2009, the ROK seized North
Korean-origin

chemical

warfareprotective suits destined for Syria.
Despitethese

successesbytheinternational community, North Korea willcontinue to attempt arms shipments via
new and increasingly complex routes.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

17

CHAPTER 5:

SIZE, LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIESOF NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCESThe Korean People’s Army (KPA) is along-range 170-mm guns and 240-mm

large ground-centric military, supported

MRLs, many of which are deployedbyarsenal,along the DMZ and pose a constantextensive special operations forces andthreat to northern parts of the ROK,

limited air and naval forces.

including its capital city of Seoul.

a

large

ballistic

missileWithapproximately 70 percent of its groundforces and 50 percent of its air and naval
forces deployed within 100 km of thedemilitarized zone, which has served as
the de facto shared border since 1953,
the KPA poses a continuous threat to the
ROK and deployed U.S. forces. However,after decades under a failed economy
and the resulting food shortages, the KPA
is a weakened force that suffers fromlogistical shortages, aging equipment,
and poor training.

Air Forces. The Air Force is primarily
responsible for defending North Korean
air space. Its other missions include
specialoperationstransportation

andreconnaissance,

andforcesinsertion,

logistics

support,bombingandtactical air support for KPA groundforces.

However,

due

to

the

technological inferiority of most of its
aircraft

fleet

and

rigid

air

defensecommand and control structure, muchof North Korea’s air defense is provided

Ground Forces. The KPA’s ground forcesby surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-

are dominated by conventional andaircraft artillery (AAA).

light infantry units, supported by armor
andmechanized

units

and

heavy

concentrations of artillery. These forces
are forward deployed, are fortified inseveral thousand underground facilities,
and include long-range cannon androcket artillery able to fire deep into the
ROK from their garrisons.

The

NKAF’smostcapablecombataircraft are its MiG-29 and MiG-23 fightersand its SU-25 ground-attack aircraft.
However, the majority of aircraft are lesscapable MiG-15s, -17s, -19s (F-6), and 21s. The NKAF operates a large fleet ofAN-2 COLT aircraft, 1940s vintage singleengine, 10-passenger, bi-planes, which

The ground forces possess light andare likely tasked with inserting SOF into

mediumthe ROK.

tanks

armoredpersonnel

The air force is rounded out

carriers, and multiple rocket launchers

with(MRLs). This large artillery force includes

predominantly Mi-2/HOPLITE and U.S.-

severalhundredhelicopters,

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

18

made MD-500 helicopters (obtained byagainst foreign attacks, or limited attacks

circumventing U.S. export controls inagainst vulnerable targets in the ROK as1985). The rotary-wing fleet is used bothpart of a coercive diplomacy effort. SOF

for troop transport and ground attack.

operate in specialized units of lightinfantry, reconnaissance, airborne and

North

Korea

possessesadense,

overlapping air defense system of SA2/3/5 SAM sites, mobile and fixed AAA,and numerous man-portable air-defense

seaborne insertion, commandos, andother specialties, all emphasizing speed
and surprise. SOF may be airlifted by AN2 COLT and helicopters (and possibly

systems (MANPADS), like the SA-7.

Civil

Naval Forces. The North Korean Navyandservices.

This

coastalforce

iscomposed primarily of aging, thoughnumerous, small patrol craft that employ
a variety of anti-ship cruise missiles,
torpedoes, and guns. The NKN maintains
one of the world’s largest submarine
forces, with around 70 attack-, coastal,andmidget-type

submarines.

In

addition, the NKN operates a large fleetof

air-cushioned

Administrationtransports),

maritime insertion platforms, overland,(NKN), the smallest of the KPA’s three
main

Air

(hovercraft)andconventional landing craft to support

via

underground,cross-bordertunnels to attack high-value targets likecommand and control nodes or air
bases.
Theater Ballistic Missiles. North Korea has
several hundred SCUD SRBM and No
Dong MRBM missiles available for use
against targets on the Korean Peninsula
and Japan. On July 3 and 4, 2009 North
Korea

launched

seven

SCUD-based

missiles into the Sea of Japan, in adisplay that was similar to the July 2006

amphibious operations and SOF insertion.

series of launches.

Special Operations Forces. North Korean

2012 Taepo Dong 2 Launches. North

SOF are likely some of the most highly
trained, well-equipped, best-fed, andmost motivated forces in the KPA.

As

North Korea’s conventional capabilities
decline relative to the ROK and UnitedStates,webelieve

North

Korea

increasingly regards SOF capabilities as avital tool for asymmetric coercion.
Strategic

SOF

units dispersed

Korea successfully launched the TD-2
(called the Unha-3 by North Korea) on
December 12, 2012. All three stages of
the TD-2 appeared to operate nominallyand placed a satellite into orbit. This test
was preceded by a launch in April 2012that

failedcrashedinto

shortly

after

lift-offandtheYellowSea.

Bothlaunches occurred from North Korea’s
acrossNorth Korea appear designed for rapid
offensive operations, internal defense

new west coast launch facilityNorth
Korea has pledged to continue using thissystemtoconduct

furtherspace

launches.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

19

CommandandControl.

The

DPRK

month, Kim Jong Un was named first

National Defense Commission (NDC) is

secretary of the Korean Worker’s Party,

the symbolic nominal authority over theafter his father was made “eternal

North’s military and security services. The

general secretary” of the KWP. At the

Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces (MPAF)

same time, Kim Jong Un also becameis the administrative superior of the KPA,

the chairman of the Central Military

while operational command and control

Commission

of

the

KWP,

havingis exercised by its subordinate Generalpreviously

been

one

of

vice

Staff Department. The 1992 constitution

chairmen.

twoshifted control from the president to the
NDC and Kim Jong Il directly exercised
control of the military as chairman of the
NDC, and Supreme Commander of the
KPA.

Kim Jong Un was made thesupreme commander of the KPA shortly
after his father’s death and named to
the newly created position of “firstchairman” of the NDC in April 2012,
when Kim Jong Il was made “eternal
chairman” of the NDC.

In the same

Telecommunications.
nationwide

fiber

North

optic

Korea’s

networkisavailable to every sector of society, andNorth Korea has invested in a modern
nationwide

cellularnetwork.

Telecommunication services and accessare strictly controlled, and all networks
areavailableformilitaryuse,

ifnecessary.

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

20

Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

21