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Foreword
From the Chief of Staff of the Army
America’s adversaries have studied US operations closely during Operations DESERTSTORM, IRAQI FREEDOM, and ENDURING FREEDOM. They know the American way of
war well and that we excel in a way of war that emphasizes joint and combined operations;
technological dominance; global power projection; strategic, operational, and tactical maneuver;effective joint fires; sustainment at scale; and mission command initiative.
Simultaneously, emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, hypersonics, machinelearning, nanotechnology, and robotics are driving a fundamental change in the character of war.
As these technologies mature and their military applications become more clear, the impacts havethe potential to revolutionize battlefields unlike anything since the integration of machine guns,
tanks, and aviation which began the era of combined arms warfare.
Strategic competitors like Russia and China are synthesizing emerging technologies with
their analysis of military doctrine and operations. They are deploying capabilities to fight the US
through multiple layers of stand-off in all domains – space, cyber, air, sea, and land. The military
problem we face is defeating multiple layers of stand-off in all domains in order to maintain thecoherence of our operations.
Therefore, the American way of war must evolve and adapt. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations, 2028 is the first step in our doctrinal evolution. It describes how US Army forces, aspart of the Joint Force, will militarily compete, penetrate, dis-integrate, and exploit our adversaries
in the future.
This product is not a final destination, but is intended to provide a foundation for continued
discussion, analysis, and development. We must examine all aspects of our warfighting methods
and understand how we enable the joint force on the future battlefield. We must challenge ourunderlying assumptions, and we must understand the capabilities and goals of our potential
enemies. That is how we change our warfighting techniques and build the fighting forces we needin the future. It is also how we maximize deterrence and, if necessary, win future wars.
Read, study, and dissect the multi-domain operations concept in this document. Every oneof you is part of our evolution and the construction of the future force, and we want your criticalfeedback. Our intent is to publish another iteration in about 12 months following feedback fromvarious wargames and exercises. We are laying the cornerstone for the success of our future Armyin a profession where there is no room for second place. With your help, we will ensure America’s
Army is ready, lethal, and prepared to destroy its enemies now and in the future, in any domain,anytime, anywhere.
Army Strong!
Mark A. Milley
General, United States Army
39th Chief of StaffiTRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Preface
From the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
One of our duties as Army professionals is to think deeply and clearly about the problem of armed
conflict in the future so that we can build and prepare our Army to deter that conflict and, if
necessary, fight and win it. As we consider the future, our Army's challenge is clear. In a new eraof great power competition, our nation's adversaries seek to achieve their strategic aims, short ofconflict, by the use of layered stand-off in the political, military and economic realms to separate
the U.S. from our partners. Should conflict come, they will employ multiple layers of stand-off in
all domains--land, sea, air, space and cyberspace--to separate U.S. forces and our allies in time,
space, and function in order to defeat us.
If they are successful, we risk losing the strategic depth that gives our Joint Force its operational
advantage and enables our offensive military capability. As a nation, we rely on our ability to
project power from the Continental United States and to integrate the actions of the Joint Forceglobally. Our adversaries seek to fracture this capability and erode the United States' strategic
advantage--the greatest challenge to U.S. security, power and influence to emerge in the 21st
century. The American way of war must evolve if we are to successfully thwart the aims of ouradversaries in competition or to defeat them in conflict.
The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 concept proposes a series of solutions to solve
the problem of layered standoff. The central idea in solving this problem is the rapid andcontinuous integration of all domains of warfare to deter and prevail as we compete short ofarmed conflict. If deterrence fails, Army formations, operating as part of the Joint Force,
penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems; exploit the resulting
freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy systems, formations and objectives and to achieve ourown strategic objectives; and consolidate gains to force a return to competition on terms morefavorable to the U.S., our allies and partners.
To achieve this, the Army must evolve our force, and our operations, around three core tenets.
Calibrated force posture combines position and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances.
Multi-domain formations possess the capacity, endurance and capability to access and employ
capabilities across all domains to pose multiple and compounding dilemmas on the adversary.
Convergence achieves the rapid and continuous integration of all domains across time, space andcapabilities to overmatch the enemy. Underpinning these tenets are mission command anddisciplined initiative at all warfighting echelons.
To win tomorrow, we must evolve how we organize and integrate the Army as part of the Joint
Force. To do this we will (1) continue to refine a warfighting concept that provides our azimuth tothe future--The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 is that concept; (2) develop acomprehensive Army modernization strategy linked to this concept and synchronized with ajoint approach to force development; (3) drive rapid, non-linear solutions in Army
doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, andpolicy; (4) deepen the operational integration of general purpose and special operations forces
and with our allies and partners.

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This concept is about warfighting and its centerpiece is the American Soldier. Throughout theUnited States Army's 243-year history, the grit, ingenuity and initiative of the American Soldier
stands at the forefront of our Nation's success in peace, competition, and armed conflict.
As a concept, this is not the final answer. We will refine and update this concept as we learn fromour operations, exercises and experiments as well as from other services, allies and partners andeven our adversaries. The evolution of this concept into doctrine and practice will inform the way
the Army recruits, trains, educates, operates and drives constant improvement and change to ensure
the U.S. Army can deter, fight and win on any battlefield, against any foe, now and into the future.

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Figure 1. Logic mapv

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Executive Summary
1. Purpose: From Multi-Domain Battle to Multi-Domain Operations. TRADOC Pamphlet
525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 expands upon the ideas previously
explained in Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century. It
describes how the Army contributes to the Joint Force’s principal task as defined in the
unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy: deter and defeat Chinese and Russian
aggression in both competition and conflict. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations
concept proposes detailed solutions to the specific problems posed by the militaries of postindustrial, information-based states like China and Russia. Although this concept focuses on
China and Russia, the ideas also apply to other threats.
2. The problem.
a. Emerging operational environment. Four interrelated trends are shaping competition andconflict: adversaries are contesting all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and theinformation environment and U.S. dominance is not assured; smaller armies fight on an
expanded battlefield that is increasingly lethal and hyperactive; nation-states have moredifficulty in imposing their will within a politically, culturally, technologically, and strategicallycomplex environment; and near-peer states more readily compete below armed conflict making
deterrence more challenging. 1 Dramatically increasing rates of urbanization and the strategic
importance of cities also ensure that operations will take place within dense urban terrain.
Adversaries, such as China and Russia, have leveraged these trends to expand the battlefield intime (a blurred distinction between peace and war), in domains (space and cyberspace), and ingeography (now extended into the Strategic Support Area, including the homeland) to create
tactical, operational, and strategic stand-off. 2 For the purpose of this document, Russia serves as
the pacing threat. In fact, Russia and China are different armies with distinct capabilities, but
assessed to operate in a sufficiently similar manner to orient on their capabilities collectively.
0F

1F

b. China and Russia in competition. In a state of continuous competition, China and Russia
exploit the conditions of the operational environment to achieve their objectives without
resorting to armed conflict by fracturing the U.S.’s alliances, partnerships, and resolve. They
attempt to create stand-off through the integration of diplomatic and economic actions,
unconventional and information warfare (social media, false narratives, cyber attacks), and theactual or threatened employment of conventional forces. 3 By creating instability withincountries and alliances, China and Russia create political separation that results in strategic
ambiguity reducing the speed of friendly recognition, decision, and reaction. Through thesecompetitive actions, China and Russia believe they can achieve objectives below the threshold ofarmed conflict.
2F

Hyperactive means more active than usual or desirable; hyper-competitive during competition and hyper-violent in armed conflict.
Stand-off is the strategic and operational effect Russia, China, and their surrogates are attempting to achieve. It is achieved with both politicaland military capabilities. Stand-off is the political, temporal, spatial, and functional separation that enables freedom of action in any, some, or all
domains, the EMS, and the information environment to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives before an adversary can adequately
respond.
3
Within this document, the term information warfare denotes actions taken by an adversary or enemy. The scope and meaning of the term arederived from Russian doctrine. The document refers to friendly actions as information environment operations.
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c. China and Russia in armed conflict. In armed conflict, China and Russia seek to achieve
physical stand-off by employing layers of anti-access and area denial systems designed to rapidly
inflict unacceptable losses on U.S. and partner military forces and achieve campaign objectives
within days, faster than the U.S. can effectively respond. Over the last twenty-five years, China
and Russia invested in and developed a systematic approach to “fracture” AirLand Battle bycountering the Joint Force’s increasingly predictable use of time-phased and domain-federated
operational approaches in armed conflict. The resulting anti-access and area denial systems
create strategic and operational stand-off that separates the elements of the Joint Force in time,
space, and function. Moreover, both China and Russia are continuing to improve these antiaccess and area denial systems and are proliferating the associated technologies and techniques
to other states. The Joint Force has not kept pace with these developments. It is still designed
for operations in relatively uncontested environments that allow for sequential campaigns basedon predictable approaches that assume air and naval supremacy: extensive shaping with air andnaval strikes before the final destruction of severely degraded enemy forces through joint
combined arms operations.
3. Conducting Multi-Domain Operations.
a. Central idea. Army forces, as an element of the Joint Force, conduct Multi-Domain
Operations to prevail in competition; when necessary, Army forces penetrate and dis-integrate
enemy anti-access and area denial systems and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver toachieve strategic objectives (win) and force a return to competition on favorable terms. 4
3F

b. Tenets of the Multi-Domain Operations. The Army solves the problems presented by
Chinese and Russian operations in competition and conflict by applying three interrelated tenets:
calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence. Calibrated force posture isthe combination of position and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. Multi-domain
formations possess the capacity, capability, and endurance necessary to operate across multiple
domains in contested spaces against a near-peer adversary. Convergence is rapid and continuous
integration of capabilities in all domains, the EMS, and information environment that optimizes
effects to overmatch the enemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all
enabled by mission command and disciplined initiative. The three tenets of the solution are
mutually reinforcing and common to all Multi-Domain Operations, though how they are realized
will vary by echelon and depend upon the specific operational situation.
c. Multi-Domain Operations and strategic objectives. The Joint Force must defeat
adversaries and achieve strategic objectives in competition, armed conflict, and in a return tocompetition. In competition, the Joint Force expands the competitive space through active
engagement to counter coercion, unconventional warfare, and information warfare directedagainst partners. 5 These actions simultaneously deter escalation, defeat attempts by adversaries
to “win without fighting,” and set conditions for a rapid transition to armed conflict. In armed
4F

4Dis-integrate refers to breaking the coherence of the enemy's system by destroying or disrupting its subcomponents (such as command andcontrol means, intelligence collection, critical nodes, etc.) degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of theenemy’s capabilities or will to fight. This definition revises the current doctrinal defeat mechanism disintegrate.
5
Expanding the competitive space is a key idea from the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and is a logical extension of the 2017 Joint Concept for
Integrated Campaigning. Expanding the competitive space refers to taking actions to expand options (diplomatic, information, military,economic, etc.) for the political leadership and extending competition in time while also deterring escalation to armed conflict.

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conflict, the Joint Force defeats aggression by optimizing effects from across multiple domains at
decisive spaces to penetrate the enemy’s strategic and operational anti-access and area denial
systems, dis-integrate the components of the enemy’s military system, and exploit freedom of
maneuver necessary to achieve strategic and operational objectives that create conditions
favorable to a political outcome. In the return to competition, the Joint Force consolidates gains
and deters further conflict to allow the regeneration of forces and the re-establishment of aregional security order aligned with U.S. strategic objectives.
d. Multi-domain problems and solutions. To achieve these strategic objectives, the Army,as part of and with the Joint Force and partners, must solve five operational problems:(1) How does the Joint Force compete to enable the defeat of an adversary’s
operations to destabilize the region, deter the escalation of violence, and, should violence
escalate, enable a rapid transition to armed conflict? In the past, the U.S. military, due tocultural, statutory, and policy reasons, has often remained reactive in competition below armed
conflict. Successful competition requires Army forces actively engaging across domains(including space and cyberspace), in the EMS, and in the information environment. Army forces
enable the Joint Force and interagency to seize and sustain the initiative in competition bydeterring conflict on terms favorable to the U.S., defeating an adversary’s efforts to expand thecompetitive space below the threshold of conflict, and setting the conditions to enable the Joint
Force’s rapid transition to armed conflict. The Army’s posture, capabilities (to include necessary
authorities), and readiness to execute Multi-Domain Operations deter adversaries fromescalation, counter their information and unconventional warfare, undermine their efforts tocoerce U.S. partners with the threat of armed conflict, and set conditions in the event of conflict.
Denying or restricting the support provided by the adversary’s conventional forces to proxies
allows U.S. partners to more easily counter attempts to destabilize their countries. The
demonstrated capability to prevail in armed conflict counters narratives by adversaries who
portray the U.S. as a weak or irresolute partner. These actions combine to create a favorable
environment for the Joint Force’s rapid transition to armed conflict.
(2) How does the Joint Force penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems
throughout the depth of the Support Areas to enable strategic and operational maneuver?
In the event of armed conflict, Army forces immediately penetrate enemy anti-access and area
denial systems by neutralizing enemy long-range systems, contesting enemy maneuver forces,
and maneuvering from strategic and operational distances. Multi-domain formations converge
capabilities with the Joint Force and partners to rapidly strike the enemy’s long-range systems.
Forward presence forces immediately contest an enemy attack in multiple domains. Forward
presence forces also preserve lines of communications by degrading enemy long-range
surveillance and reconnaissance and by employing a mixture of deception, dispersion, andprotection. The appropriate balance of capabilities across the Total Force provides cohesive,
fully capable forward presence forces and expeditionary capabilities able to deploy withinstrategically relevant time periods.
(3) How does the Joint Force dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems
in the Deep Areas to enable operational and tactical maneuver? The Joint Force must disintegrate the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems to further the defeat of the enemy’sviii

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
stand-off capabilities, prevent the re-integration of remaining capabilities, and enable freedom of
maneuver. Army forces at echelon employ cross-domain fires to defeat the enemy’s long-range
systems and begin the neutralization of the enemy mid-range systems. Convergence optimizes
the employment of capabilities across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment tostimulate, see, and strike the enemy. Convergence also complicates the enemy’s attempts toconceal and defend its long- and mid-range systems by providing the Joint Force with multiple
options for attacking the enemy’s vulnerabilities. Joint, Army, and partner maneuver forces
execute operational maneuver and deception to further stimulate enemy mid-range systems andfix or isolate enemy maneuver forces.
(4) How does the Joint Force exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to achieve
operational and strategic objectives through the defeat of the enemy in the Close and Deep
Maneuver Areas? In the Close and Deep Maneuver Areas, Army forces exploit weaknesses inthe enemy’s command system and their dependence on air defense and ground fires to complete
the defeat of the enemy. Army forces employ deception and convergence with other domains todislocate the enemy defense by physically, virtually, and cognitively isolating its subordinate
elements, allowing friendly forces to achieve overmatch and favorable force ratios. The Joint
Force continues dis-integrating tactical anti-access and area denial systems to enable further
exploitation until it achieves U.S. campaign objectives.
(5) How does the Joint Force re-compete to consolidate gains and produce sustainableoutcomes, set conditions for long-term deterrence, and adapt to the new security
environment? Army forces consolidate gains and set conditions for a favorable new security
environment by maintaining control of key terrain and populations that provide U.S.
policymakers with a political advantage. They consolidate gains through three concurrent
activities: physically securing terrain and populations for sustainable outcomes; setting
conditions for long-term deterrence by regenerating partner and Joint Force capacity and by
actively engaging across domains and the information space; and adapting force posture to the
new security environment. This provides time for U.S. forces to regenerate regional military
structures and continue to provide a credible deterrent.
4. Implications for the Army.
a. Enhanced and broader need for combined arms maneuver. The emerging operational
environment and the challenges posed by China and Russia, particularly their capability to create
political and military stand-off, demand that the Joint Force apply the proven principles ofcombined arms maneuver and massing of effects at decisive spaces. What is different is the ideathat Army forces must apply these joint capabilities more comprehensively (earlier, in greater
capacity, and at lower echelons) and in new ways (faster and with greater agility). Multi-domain
formations provide the Joint Force with additional means to stimulate, see, and strike key
components and vulnerabilities within enemy systems. Army forces also continue to conduct thetraditional tasks of seizing terrain, destroying enemy forces, and securing friendly populations.
Army forces retain the ability to overmatch the enemy, despite reduced friendly capacity, by
converging capabilities from across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment.

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b. Operating at echelon. Army forces execute Multi-Domain Operations with echeloned
formations that conduct intelligence, maneuver, and strike activities across all five domains (air,land, maritime, space, and cyberspace) as well as the information environment and the EMS. 6
The ability of Army formations at echelon to converge capabilities in multiple ways andsequences provide the Joint Force Commander with options to impose additional complexity on
the enemy. The echeloning of forces prevents the isolation of forward positioned forces within
the stand-off range of enemy anti-access and area denial systems at the beginning of a conflictand enables strategic and operational maneuver by forces from outside the range of anti-accessand area denial systems. Maneuver at echelon by Army forces then enables the Joint Force tooverwhelm Chinese and Russian military systems with multiple dilemmas and massed effects,
creating windows of superiority to enable freedom of maneuver. 7
5F

6F

c. Converging cross-domain capabilities. Convergence has two advantages over singledomain alternatives: cross-domain synergy creates overmatch and multiple forms of attack
create layered options across domains to enhance friendly operations and impose complexity on
the enemy. The ability to converge cross-domain capabilities enables the Joint Force tostimulate, see, and strike vulnerabilities in the Chinese and Russian systems and defeat theirefforts to create stand-off. 8 Currently, the Joint Force converges capabilities through theepisodic synchronization of domain-federated solutions, but will have to conduct continuous andrapid integration of multi-domain capabilities enabled by mission command and disciplined
initiative against near-pear threats in the future.
7F

d. Maximize human potential. The Army builds and sustains multi-domain formations
through the selection, training, and education of the leaders, Soldiers, and teams in them.
Employing multi-domain capabilities requires the Army to attract, retain, and employ leaders andSoldiers who collectively possess a significant breadth and depth of technical and professional
expertise. The Army must exercise careful talent management to make the most of these highquality personnel and integrate them into trusted teams of professionals who are able to thrive inambiguity and chaos. Improving the resilience of leaders and Soldiers—the Army’s mostvaluable capability—requires training, educating, equipping, and supporting them to execute
Multi-Domain Operations in all of its intensity, rigor, and complexity.
e. Required Army capability sets. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept
requires the Army to develop or improve capabilities to contribute cross-domain options within
the Joint Force by:

The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver, 2020-2040 defines cross-domain maneuver as “the employment of mutually
supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities in multiple domains to generate overmatch, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and enable Joint
Force freedom of movement and action.”
7
As an example, Army formations can maneuver—or assist Joint Force maneuver—as a reconnaissance action, fighting to gain intelligence, key
terrain, and set conditions that enable strikes, rather than maneuvering only after passive intelligence collection, deliberate analysis, and precision
strikes have prepared the battlefield for maneuver.
8
The U.S. Army Concept for Multi-Domain Combined Arms at Echelons Above Brigade, 2025-2045 calls for formations able to integrate,synchronize, and converge all elements of combat power across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment to execute cross-domain
maneuver; provide essential linkage to the expanded instruments of national power; and operate ubiquitously with joint, interagency, andmultinational partners to overmatch any threat in any future environment.
6x

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(1) Calibrating force posture geographically and across all the Army components to defeat
Chinese and Russian offensive operations in competition and to deter escalation to armed
conflict. 98F(2) Preparing the operational environment by building partner capacity and interoperability
and setting the theater through such activities as establishing basing and access rights,
prepositioning equipment and supplies, conducting preparatory intelligence activities, andmapping EMS and computer networks. 10 (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization
Priorities: Army Network)
9F(3) Building partners’ and allies’ capacities and capabilities to defeat increasingly
sophisticated Chinese and Russian-sponsored unconventional and information warfare.
(4) Preparing the operational environment for competition and conflict by building
understanding of and capabilities in select urban areas of particular operational or strategic
importance.
(5) Establishing precision logistics that provides a reliable, agile, and responsive
sustainment capability necessary to support rapid power projection, Multi-Domain Operations,and independent maneuver from the Strategic Support Area to the Deep Maneuver Area.
(Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Future Vertical Lift, Army Network)(6) Establishing necessary authorities and permissions normally reserved for conflict or tohigher echelons to operate in competition and rapidly transition to conflict effectively.
(7) Improving the capability to conduct Multi-Domain Operations in dense urban terrain at
all echelons through the development of tactics and capabilities to increase the accuracy, speed,
and synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects. (Supported by Army Materiel
Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Army
Network, Soldier Lethality)(8) Supporting a credible U.S. information narrative through cross-domain actions that
communicate and counter threats by Chinese and Russian reconnaissance, strike, combined arms,
and unconventional warfare capabilities.
(9) Enabling commanders and staffs at each echelon to visualize and command a battle inall domains, the EMS, and the information environment, converging organic and external
capabilities at decisive spaces. This requires new tools to more rapidly converge capabilities
across the Joint Force, shifting training paradigms, and changing personnel and talentmanagement practices. This also requires that Army formations be trained, manned, andequipped to leverage all available information, from national, joint, commercial, and Service
repositories and libraries, or directly from collection assets seamlessly and in a time dominant
9
The idea of calibrating and re-calibrating force posture globally aligns with the idea of “forming operationally coherent forces” as described in
the Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation.
10“Setting the theater” encompasses the actions to establish and maintain conditions to seize the initiative and retain freedom of action for a
specific theater. These actions may occur outside of the theater as well.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
manner. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Army Network, Soldier
Lethality, Synthetic Training Environment)(10) Providing to the Joint Force Commander multi-domain formations and systems thatcan converge capabilities to attack specific vulnerabilities in Chinese and Russian multi-layered,mutually reinforcing military forces and systems. This means creating commanders and staffs
who have the means and ability to access and employ capabilities that reside across the Joint
Force. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires,
Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Soldier Lethality)(11) Providing to the Joint Force Commander with multi-domain formations that havesystems, leaders, and Soldiers that are durable, can operate in a highly contested operational
environment, cannot easily be isolated from the rest of the Joint Force or from partners, and areable to conduct independent maneuver and employ cross-domain fires. This requires extended
sustainability of systems and formations, and leaders and Soldiers who continue to operate
effectively in austere environments and conditions. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization
Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift,
Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, Soldier Lethality)(12) Consolidating gains through clear demonstrations of U.S. security commitments topartners through combined exercises, training, information exchanges, and other presence
activities.
(13) Enabling and complementing land, air, and maritime capabilities with operations inspace, cyberspace, and the EMS to support the opening of and exploitation of windows ofsuperiority that create dilemmas for the enemy while protecting the ability to conduct friendly
operations in degraded, disrupted, and/or denied operational environments.
(14) Attracting, retaining, and making maximum use of high-quality, physically fit,mentally tough Soldiers who have the skills and expertise to conduct Multi-Domain Operations.
f. Success in Multi-Domain Operations requires these capabilities be sufficiently developed,
trained, and practiced within the Army, with the remainder of the Joint Force, and with allies andpartners.

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Department of the Army
Headquarters, United States Army
Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Eustis, VA 23604*TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

27 November 2018
Military Operations

THE U.S. ARMY IN MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS 2028

STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND
General, U.S. Army
Commanding

WILLIAM T. LASHER
Senior Executive
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6
History. This is a major revision of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1. It replaces The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in aComplex World, and the Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century
concept.
Summary. This pamphlet describes how Army forces contribute to the Joint Force’s principal
task as defined in the unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy: deter and defeat
Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and conflict.
Applicability. This document applies to all Department of the Army (DA) activities thatdevelop doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, andfacilities (DOTMLPF) capabilities. It guides future force development and informs the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System process. It also supports Army capabilities
development processes and functions as a conceptual basis for developing supporting concepts
related to the future force within DOTMLPF.
Proponent: The proponent of this document is the Director, Concept Development andLearning Directorate, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ATFC-ED), 950 Jefferson Avenue,
Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5763.

*This pamphlet supersedes TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, dated 31 October 2014.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Suggested improvements. Users are invited to submit comments and suggested improvements.
Comments may be provided via DA Form 2028 to Director, ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 950 Jefferson
Avenue, Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604-5763.
Availability. The official published version of this pamphlet is available on the TRADOC
Administrative Publications website (http://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/). It is also available atthe Joint and Army Concept Division DODTechSpace at
https://www.dtic.mil/dodtechspace/groups/army-capabilities-integration-center/projects/jointand-army-concepts-division.
Summary of Change
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028
This major revision, dated 27 November 2018o Describes how Army forces contribute the Joint Force’s principal task to deter and defeat
Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and armed conflict as outlined in the
unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy.
o Provides a threat-based approach to operations against near-peer adversaries.
o Addresses operations in competition, armed conflict, and the transition back to competition(return to competition).
o Describes how Army forces fight across all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and theinformation environment and at echelon.
o Introduces or revises the terms: Multi-Domain Operations, calibrated force posture,
convergence, multi-domain formations, decisive space, independent maneuver, dense urban
terrain, dis-integrate, information space, stand-off, and precision logistics.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Contents

Page

Foreword .......................................................................................................................................... i
Preface............................................................................................................................................ iii
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... vi
Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 5
1-1. Purpose ................................................................................................................................... 5
1-2. Methodology and organization ............................................................................................... 5
1-3. Major changes from Multi-Domain Battle ............................................................................. 5
Chapter 2 The Operational Context ............................................................................................... 6
2-1. The emerging operational environment .................................................................................. 6
2-2. Russia: Achieve objectives in competition below armed conflict ......................................... 9
2-3. Russia in armed conflict: Separate the Joint Force and create strategic and operational
stand-off ...................................................................................................................................... 11
2-4. Russia’s consolidation operations in competition, armed conflict, and return tocompetition ................................................................................................................................. 14
2-5. Systemic vulnerabilities and dependencies .......................................................................... 14
2-6. Other threats in the operational environment ....................................................................... 15
2-7. Implications for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) ............................................................. 15
Chapter 3 Conducting MDO ........................................................................................................ 15
3-1. Military problem ................................................................................................................... 15
3-2. Central idea ........................................................................................................................... 17
3-3. Tenets of MDO ..................................................................................................................... 17
3-4. MDO and strategic objectives .............................................................................................. 24
3-5. MDO in competition: Compete to expand the competitive space ....................................... 27
3-6. MDO in armed conflict: Penetrate strategic and operational stand-off ............................... 32
3-7. MDO in armed conflict: Dis-integrate the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems ... 37
3-8. MDO in armed conflict: Exploit freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy objectives .......... 42
3-9. MDO in return to competition: Re-compete to consolidate and expand gains ................... 45
Chapter 4 Conclusion................................................................................................................... 46
Appendix A Assumptions .......................................................................................................... A-1
Appendix B Key Required Capabilities..................................................................................... B-1
Appendix C MDO Supporting Ideas.......................................................................................... C-1
Appendix D MDO in Dense Urban Terrain (DUT) ................................................................... D-1
Appendix E Linkage to other concepts .......................................................................................E-1
Appendix F Lessons learned from the fielded force ................................................................... F-1
Appendix G References ............................................................................................................. G-1
Glossary .................................................................................................................................... GL-1

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Figure List
Figure 1. Logic map ....................................................................................................................... v
Figure 2-1. MDO framework ......................................................................................................... 8
Figure 2-2. China and Russia in competition and armed conflict.................................................. 9
Figure 2-3. Adversary’s layered stand-off ................................................................................... 12
Figure 3-1. Problems superimposed on the MDO framework ..................................................... 16
Figure 3-2. Converging capabilities to generate cross-domain synergy and layered options ..... 21
Figure 3-3. MDO solutions .......................................................................................................... 26
Figure 3-4. Competition ............................................................................................................... 27
Figure 3-5. Penetrate and dis-integrate anti-access and area denial systems; exploit freedom of
maneuver ..................................................................................................................................... 32
Figure C-1. Characteristics of the ground, air, maritime, and enduring virtual weapons
cycles......................................................................................................................................... C-8

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Chapter 1
Introduction
1-1. Purpose
United States (U.S.) Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The
U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations describes how Army forces contribute to the Joint
Force’s principal task as defined in the unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy:
deter and defeat Chinese and Russian aggression in both competition and conflict. 11 The U.S.
Army in Multi-Domain Operations proposes detailed solutions to the specific problems posed by
the militaries of post-industrial, information-based states like China and Russia. Although thisconcept focuses on China and Russia, the ideas also apply to other threats. The concept
describes the Army in 2028, though some of the capabilities described might not be fully fielded
across the entire force by that time.
10F

1-2. Methodology and organization
The U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept describes how Army forces fight across all
domains, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and the information environment and at echelon.
The concept is based on extensive analyses, wargaming, experimentation, and collaboration withother Services and the Joint Staff. Chapter 2 describes the characteristics, capabilities, andvulnerabilities of Chinese and Russian anti-access and area denial systems in competition and in
conflict. Chapter 3 describes the military problem, gives a detailed description of the tenets ofMulti-Domain Operations (MDO), and then provides detailed descriptions of their application tosolve the five multi-domain problems. Chapter 4 summarizes the immediate implications of
MDO and describes the path of future concept development.
1-3. Major changes from Multi-Domain Battle
a. Title changed to The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations to better reflect the broader
scope of competition and conflict and the inherently joint nature of modern warfare.
b. Insights from the U.S. Army Mosul Study and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)Urbanization Project informed revisions to the description of the emerging operational
environment, refinements to the solution, and a new dense urban terrain appendix.
c. Insights gained from wargames, simulations, Joint Warfighting Assessments, and joint andmulti-Service collaboration are incorporated into refined descriptions of Chinese and Russian
systems, tenets of MDO, and required capabilities.
d. Provides much greater detail regarding the application of MDO as a basis for functional
concept development, further experimentation, and force development.
The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028 concept is a single Service concept and therefore refers to “Army forces,” even in instances
when “ground forces” could also be used because U.S. Marine Corps units would operate differently within their Service structures. Similarly,“Army forces” is also used in instances describing the use of space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissancecapabilities that are possessed by one or more of the other Services, but because the Services organize and operate differently, limits thedescription to Army forces. This concept reinforces the requirement for multi-Service and joint operations in new ways without prescribing roles,
functions, and organization for the other Services or partners. The concept strengthens the idea that the Army will operate as an element of the
Joint Force in the execution of Multi-Domain Operations.
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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Chapter 2
The Operational Context
2-1. The emerging operational environmenta. The Joint Operating Environment 2035 predicts that for the foreseeable future, U.S.
national interests will face challenges from both persistent disorder and states contesting
international norms. 12 This concept addresses the second of those challenges. As the Joint
Force responds to adversaries contesting international norms in either competition or armed
conflict, it will conduct operations in an emerging operational environment shaped by fourinterrelated characteristics: adversaries are contesting all domains, the EMS, and the information
environment and U.S. dominance is not assured; smaller armies fight on an expanded battlefieldthat is increasingly lethal and hyperactive; nation-states have more difficulty in imposing theirwill within a politically, culturally, technologically, and strategically complex environment; andnear-peer states more readily compete below armed conflict, making deterrence morechallenging. These characteristics allow adversaries, particularly near-peer threats like China
and Russia, to expand the battlefield in time (a blurred distinction between peace and war), in
domains (space and cyberspace), and in geography (now extended into the homeland) to create
tactical, operational, and strategic stand-off.
11F

b. An additional important characteristic of the emerging operational environment is its urban
nature. The strategic importance of cities suggests that Army forces will have to conduct
operations within dense urban terrain. 13 The physical and demographic density of thisenvironment creates distinct physical, cognitive, and operational characteristics. The cumulative
effect of these factors compounds the friction of war by increasing the number of tasks required
within a given physical or temporal space while multiplying the tactical, operational, andstrategic variables that commanders and staffs must take into account. Operations in dense urban
terrain might be in response to either persistent disorder or to contested norms. In the latter case,adversaries will exploit dense urban terrain to gain advantage or to mitigate the Joint Force’s
strengths. 14
12F

13F

c. Among the states most likely to contest international norms, China and Russia prove themost capable. They are, therefore, the focus of this concept. As described below, both China
and Russia are pursuing capabilities and approaches to create the same effect of operational andstrategic stand-off, though by somewhat different means. This concept assumes—for the
purposes of organizing a strategic and operational construct—that Chinese and Russia concept
and force development are sufficiently similar for the Army to solve the problems presented by
Russia in the near- to mid-term and adapt to the changes China develops in the mid- to far-term.
12
Contested norms involve increasingly powerful revisionist states and select non-state actors using all elements of power to establish their own
set of rules unfavorable to the U.S. and its interests. Persistent disorder is characterized by an array of weak states that become increasingly
incapable of maintaining domestic order or good governance. Publications supporting this assessment include the Joint Operating Environment
2035; Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb 2016; Military andSecurity Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, Annual Report to Congress; and David E. Johnson, The Challenges of the“Now” and Their Implications for the U.S. Army (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 2016).
13
Dense urban terrain is “areas characterized by extraordinarily closely-packed manmade infrastructure and high population density, potentially
including concentrations of high-rise buildings, subterranean features, and densely packed slums.” There is no formal doctrinal term; both dense
urban terrain and dense urban environments are used synonymously. For purposes of this concept, dense urban terrain is used.
14
Appendix D provides a more comprehensive description of Multi-Domain Operations in dense urban terrain.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
This document, therefore, accounts for both China and Russia’s approaches to create stand-off,but uses Russia as the present pacing threat for technical and tactical purposes. 15
14F(1) Russia has demonstrated the intent and the most effective combinations of systems andconcepts to challenge the U.S. and its allies militarily in the near term. Russia’s actions in
Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria have demonstrated their intent to fracture the relationship between
the U.S. and its partners and their ability to pursue strategic objectives below the threshold ofarmed conflict. Russia uses unconventional and information warfare to propagate a narrativethat breeds ambiguity and delays the reactions of their adversaries. Over the last decade, Russia
has increased its investments in anti-access and area denial capabilities and systems intended todeny the Joint Force entry into a contested area and set the conditions for a fait accompli attack.
(2) China possesses the vision and strategic depth to become the U.S.’s most powerfulcompetitor in time. Unlike Russia, China has the economy and technological base, such as anindependent microelectronics industry and world-leading artificial intelligence development
process, sufficient to overtake current Russian system overmatch in the next 10-15 years. China
is rapidly building a world class military intended to project power globally. In the future, China
will become the conceptual pacing threat for the Joint Force. The risk associated with thisassumption will be continuously assessed to ensure the ability to adapt conceptually should
China accelerate its capability development.
d. Chinese and Russian attempts to create political and military stand-off challenge the Joint
Force’s ability to dominate all domains, the EMS, and the information environment. If
successful, stand-off grants these near-peer competitors the strategic freedom of action to pursue
objectives at the expense of the U.S. and its allies. 16 They, in conjunction with aligned state andnon-state actors, will increasingly challenge the global order by undermining U.S. security
guarantees to allies and partners. Vulnerable fault-line states are the principal targets of Chineseand Russian offensive operations short of armed conflict, which are calculated to avoid
triggering a decisive U.S. response. China and Russia’s ability to escalate through a rapidtransition to overt military action provides them the means to seize and maintain the initiative
before U.S. and partner forces can prepare a response.
15F

e. Within this emerging operational environment, China and Russia employ a variety ofpolitical and military anti-access and area denial strategies and systems to create stand-off incompetition and conflict. In competition, both states seek to fracture U.S. alliances andpartnerships through a combination of diplomatic and economic actions; unconventional warfare;
information warfare; exploitation of social, ethnic, or nationalistic tensions in a region; and theactual or threatened employment of conventional forces. By generating instability withincountries and alliances, they create political separation that results in strategic ambiguity,
reducing the speed of friendly recognition, decision, and reaction. In armed conflict, China andRussia employ anti-access and area denial systems to create strategic and operational stand-off toseparate elements of the Joint Force in time, space, and function.
15
Both China and Russia require individual, classified tactical and operational battlefield development plans for solution development, analysis,
and requirements determination. These plans are under development; they have and will continue to inform Multi-Domain Operations.
16
The National Defense Strategy describes Russian and China as competitors and states that “Long-term strategic competitions with China andRussia are the principal priorities for the Department [of Defense],” Unclassified Summary of the National Defense Strategy, pg. 1, 4

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
f. The emerging operational environment and the threat necessitate adapting the Joint Force’s
current understanding of the battlefield. Adversaries have expanded the battlefield in four ways:
in time (phases), domains, geography (space and depth), and actors. They have blurred thedistinctions between actions “below armed conflict” and “conflict,” enabling the achievement ofstrategic objectives short of what the U.S. traditionally considers “war.” They have expanded
the battlefield by making space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and information key componentsof their operations. Potential adversaries have also expanded the battlefield geographicallybecause the effects of their multi-domain capabilities are less bound by geographic and time
constraints and extend the range in which formations are under “contact.” Finally, they rely on
an increasing number of “non-traditional” actors, including proxies and surrogates, to pursue
their objectives.
g. The framework depicted in figure 2-1 illustrates the breadth of activities, spaces, distances,and interrelationships for which MDO must account. This concept uses this framework
throughout to illustrate friendly as well as an adversary’s actions in and across spaces. Despite
the linear depiction in figure 2-1, the areas are not defined by fixed geographic relationships ordimensions but by the operational context, the interplay of friendly and enemy capabilities, andterrain. The areas are not self-contained. Instead, the principal utility of the framework is that itallows commanders and staffs to visualize the relationships between actions that take placeacross the depth of the expanded battlefield. A more detailed description of the framework is
found in appendix C.

Figure 2-1. MDO framework

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
2-2. Russia: Achieve objectives in competition below armed conflict 17
16F

a. In competition, Russia attempts to separate the U.S. and friendly states politically, limiting
a coordinated allied response and destabilizing target states. To accomplish this task, Russia
executes coordinated campaigns employing national- and district-level capabilities, information
warfare (social media, false narratives, cyber attacks), and unconventional warfare to achieve
strategic objectives. Russia leverages the presence and posture of conventional forces to bothactively support these efforts and demonstrate the capability to rapidly transition to armed
conflict (e.g., “snap drills”). This posture also provides Russia with an escalation advantage,
because their conventional forces threaten the Joint Force’s freedom of action in the air andspace and its ability to conduct expeditionary maneuver (see figure 2-2). 18 Through thesecompetitive actions, Russia seeks to achieve objectives without risking armed conflict with the
U.S.
17F

Figure 2-2. China and Russia in competition and armed conflictb. National- and district-level capabilities. Russian national- and district-level capabilities
hold the U.S. homeland at risk and threaten expeditionary maneuver.

17
Sections 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 describe how Russian forces (the pacing threat) operate. It is assumed that China and other Chinese and Russian
proxies operate with characteristics sufficiently similar to use Russian operations as a basis for analysis.
18
An escalation advantage is essentially a dynamic position of relative advantage, generally achieved by conventional forces.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(1) Russian national-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets
collect targeting information on fixed sites (headquarters, communications, critical infrastructure,and power projection facilities), detect predictable friendly patterns of operations, and monitorchanges to friendly force posture. Space-based reconnaissance, special operations forces (SOF)and sympathizers, open-source collection, ground-based signal intercept platforms, and thecommunications network linking these sensors to headquarters are the most important ISR
capabilities retained at the national and military district levels. Nuclear and other weapons ofmass effect (to include widespread cyberspace attacks) threaten the U.S. homeland, allies andpartners, and friendly military forces.
(2) Russia conducts active, persistent surveillance of adjoining states, regional allies, andthe U.S. homeland. They focus on U.S. capabilities that enable a rapid response, such as Joint
Force intelligence collection and transmission, air superiority control and sustainment, andpower projection facilities. Russian surveillance enables long-range strikes with ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, offensive cyber, and SOF direct action teams. These strike capabilities
support their information narrative in competition by assisting them in controlling escalation on
their terms. National- and district-level ISR capabilities enable Russia to determine whether they
have achieved the necessary correlation of forces to continue offensive operations incompetition. Comprehensive ISR by national- and district-level assets in competition alsoenables their conventional forces to transition rapidly to armed conflict.
c. Unconventional warfare. Russian SOF, local paramilitaries, and activists conductunconventional warfare to destabilize targeted governments by separating their control of certain
regions or populations. Russian unconventional warfare activities empower proxies and activist
networks to conduct a range of operations, including terrorism, subversion, destabilizing criminal
activities, reconnaissance, information warfare, and direct action strikes. These actions add
physical support to their information narrative. Unconventional warfare capabilities support
conventional forces with reconnaissance and the ability to exert influence or control over someelements of terrain and populations within U.S. partner territory.
d. Information warfare. 19 Russian information warfare is composed of the information
narrative and information warfare capabilities. Information warfare works with, and is supported
by, their national-level capabilities and unconventional and conventional warfare activities. 20
Adversaries seek to influence both domestic and foreign audiences. 21 Information warfare often
involves cyber reconnaissance and strike actions that support other reconnaissance,
unconventional, and conventional warfare activities. Information warfare can be destructive,
using offensive cyber capabilities to disable, monitor, or spoof friendly and civilian command
networks. An increasingly prevalent form of information warfare is the “firehose offalsehood”—fabricated stories distributed by paid “trolls” or automated “bots” that unsuspecting
citizens amplify through social media or other means—to confuse audiences or divert attention
18F

19F

20F

19
This concept refers to an adversary’s actions by the Russian doctrinal term information warfare and friendly actions by the term information
environment operations. For Russia, information warfare embodies their plans for information confrontation that includes targeting all aspects ofa society—diplomatic, economic, military, political, cultural, social, and religious information arenas. (http://freebeacon.com/nationalsecurity/dia-reveals-new-details-russian-information-warfare/)20
Russian information warfare capabilities are largely cyber.
21
An information warfare (or information environment operation for friendly usage) campaign employs various information related capabilities
working together toward a common strategic or operational objective.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
from adversaries’ intentions. 22 This form of information warfare creates ambiguity to prevent ordelay political recognition, decision, and reaction.
21F

e. Conventional forces. Russia postures conventional forces in competition to create afavorable correlation of forces in regard to the Joint Force and its partners. Exercises,demonstrations, and “snap drills” generate force readiness and stimulate friendly response
patterns for their national- and district-level ISR capabilities to collect and analyze. Russian
conventional forces possess the demonstrated ability to conduct a fait accompli attack withlimited warning. 23 Russian surface-to-surface missiles, long-range surface-to-air missiles(SAM), counterspace, and combined arms ground forces are in position to physically isolate U.S.
partners and destroy forward-positioned defenders before the Joint Force can respond effectively.
This local military superiority supports information narratives of Russian strength and postures
their conventional forces to support unconventional warfare directly through covert assistance orindirectly by providing them with an escalation advantage that constrains friendly responses.
22F

f. Summary of Russian systems in competition. The operational center of gravity for
Russian actions in competition is the close integration of information warfare, unconventional
warfare, and conventional forces. The ability to employ all elements in a coordinated manner
provides Russia with an escalation advantage, in which any friendly reaction risks a more
powerful response. Within competition, the most extreme escalation is the transition to armed
conflict, which favors an adversary with the ability to conduct a fait accompli attack with theirconventional forces. The demonstrated ability to accomplish a fait accompli provides credibility
to Russian information narratives. The combination of information warfare, unconventional
warfare, and conventional and nuclear forces provides Russia with political and military standoff within which they can secure strategic objectives short of armed conflict with the U.S.
Information warfare and unconventional warfare contribute to the destabilization of regional
security, but are insufficient in themselves to achieve all Russian strategic objectives. The
escalation advantage provided by conventional forces supplements information warfare andunconventional warfare, enabling Russia to maintain the initiative in competition.
2-3. Russia in armed conflict: Separate the Joint Force and create strategic andoperational stand-off
a. Russian conventional forces seek to further enhance physical stand-off by creating layers ofanti-access and area denial systems designed to inflict unacceptable losses on U.S. and partner
military forces and to achieve campaign objectives within days, before the U.S. can effectively
respond. These forces are enabled by all-domain reconnaissance that operates in depth, from as
deep as the U.S. homeland to the area of operations. Empowered by extensive reconnaissancecomplexes, these threats can conduct simultaneous attacks throughout the depth of thebattlefield. Russian systems are designed to separate the Joint Force in time, space, and function
by employing long-range systems to prevent friendly expeditionary maneuver from strategic andoperational distances, and by employing direct and indirect fires from mid- and short-range
systems to isolate and destroy forward deployed friendly forces.
22
Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,2016).
23
A fait accompli attack is intended to achieve military and political objectives rapidly and then to quickly consolidate those gains so that any
attempt to reverse the action by the U.S. would entail unacceptable cost and risk.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

Figure 2-3. Adversary’s layered stand-off
b. Long-range fires systems.
(1) Within Russian combined arms ground formations, long-range fires systems arecarefully concealed from friendly ISR and well-protected by layered air defenses. In acontinental theater, short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and long-range SAM are the criticalelements creating military stand-off, and are supplemented by long-range multiple rocket
launchers (MRL), offensive cyber, counterspace, and unconventional warfare. Enemy longrange systems use intelligence gathered by SOF and espionage networks, space-based systems,
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and ground-based sensors.
(2) The range of Russian long-range systems expands the battlefield into Support Areas. In
conflict, the enemy will target U.S. command and sustainment capabilities to degrade friendly air
and maritime superiority and reconnaissance, strike, and strategic lift. 24 Long-range kinetic
strike capabilities will also target Army forward postured forces, prepositioned equipment, andmunitions stocks. Russian offensive electronic warfare (EW), counterspace, and offensive cybercapabilities will jam, spoof, exploit, or destroy friendly space-based reconnaissance andcommunications platforms to prevent effective friendly mission command and ISR. Enemy
long-range strike capabilities will also be used against civilian infrastructure and resources that
support military operations, such as transportation networks, energy generation and distribution
systems, and the defense industrial base.
23F

c. Mid-range and short-range systems.
(1) Within Russian combined arms ground formations, mid-range systems provide themajority of fires. Advanced mid-range radars and SAM, capable of integration with long-range
systems, pose a significant threat to friendly air forces. The weight of fire produced by standard
MRL and cannon artillery employed in mass present the greatest danger to friendly groundforces, which can be destroyed before closing with enemy maneuver forces. Networked multi24
Destroying integrated air defense systems (IADS) to facilitate deep strikes, isolating enemy maneuver forces, and opening the theater forfriendly strategic movement are the critical initial premises of current Joint Force operations.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
domain reconnaissance forces deployed in depth enable enemy mid-range fires. These forcesconsist of numerous ground observation teams, unmanned aerial systems, radars, and signal
intercept units. Additionally, the enemy can commit offensive cyber, SOF, space-based, airstrike, and maritime capabilities to reinforce combined arms ground maneuver formations when
they are the main effort. Mid- and short-range air defenses severely limit friendly air
surveillance capabilities, air assault, attack aviation, and close air support by forcing them toeither operate at increased risk locally or with reduced effectiveness from stand-off ranges.
(2) Within the stand-off created by mid-range systems, enemy short-range systems (groundmaneuver forces) maneuver to occupy key terrain, and create defensive positions that protect
both the enemy long- and mid-range fires systems. In the offense, enemy short-range systems
are designed to find and fix friendly forces to be destroyed by their long- and mid-range fires.
Once in defensive positions, Russian combined arms ground formations employ camouflage,
concealment, and decoys to defeat Joint Force surveillance and reconnaissance.
d. Unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare activities support Russian conventional
forces in armed conflict with reconnaissance, direct action strikes, and support in consolidating
gains. Unconventional warfare capabilities play an important role in attacking friendly Support
Areas by performing reconnaissance and direct action.
e. Information warfare. The actions of Russian conventional, national- and district-level
capabilities, and unconventional warfare enable and empower its information narrative. The
information narrative targets friendly leaders, populations, and forces. The effectiveness of theRussian information narrative in undermining friendly will is enhanced greatly by the success of
its conventional forces.
f. National- and district-level capabilities. National- and district-level capabilities support
Russian conventional forces in armed conflict by performing reconnaissance, disrupting the Joint
Force’s strategic and operational maneuver, and preventing a deliberate counteroffensive.
Nuclear forces, information warfare, cyber capabilities, cruise missiles, space-based platforms,
and special operations teams provide Russia a variety of options to threaten U.S. and partner
homelands outside of the range of most conventional forces. Russia uses (or threatens to use)these capabilities to isolate the theater and to transition to consolidation operations after its
conventional forces have accomplished objectives.
g. Summary of Russian systems in conflict. Russian long- and mid-range fires systems are
its operational center of gravity in armed conflict. These systems create stand-off that enables asuccessful fait accompli attack. Russia employs these systems to destroy friendly forces’ highvalue capabilities, including headquarters, aircraft, and trained combat formations that are
difficult to regenerate and essential to achieving U.S. operational and strategic objectives.
Destroying these friendly high-value capabilities strengthens Russian information narratives andcreates time and space to consolidate operational gains on political terms favorable to Russia.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
2-4. Russia’s consolidation operations in competition, armed conflict, and return tocompetition
a. Russian forces begin consolidation operations during armed conflict and continue these into
the return to competition. During consolidation operations, Russia regenerates and re-postures
military capacity while preserving any political gains achieved in conflict. If consolidation
operations occur in a situation in which the Joint Force and partners have achieved a militaryadvantage, the use or threat of Russian nuclear systems becomes an important element inmaintaining its gains.
b. The information narrative is the main effort in Russian consolidation operations during thereturn to competition. The information narrative legitimizes gains while projecting the image ofsustained military strength. In a supporting effort, unconventional warfare, conventional forces,
and security forces extend control in enemy territory, eliminating dissent and blocking friendly
information narratives from reaching the population or its own forces. Remaining Russianreconnaissance capabilities continue to operate in U.S. and partner territories. Russian groundforces enable its control over territory by destroying any friendly SOF and irregular capabilities.
c. Weapons of mass effect provide military stand-off during the return to competition, whichallow Russia to regenerate and reposition military capabilities and consolidate gains. The
combination of weapons of mass effect, information warfare, unconventional warfare, andproxies allows Russia to continue contesting the Joint Force in the return to competition, even if
its conventional forces are severely degraded. This stand-off creates time and space for defeatedenemy forces to reorganize and limits the extent to which the Joint Force can exploit operational
military advantage.
2-5. Systemic vulnerabilities and dependencies
a. Russia’s military exhibits patterns and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by changes to
Joint Force operations, force posture, and capabilities. Russia:(1) Uses information warfare (enabled by cyber) and conventional military forces in ways
that, when exposed, galvanize rather than separate the U.S. and its allies.
(2) Organizes and operates forces through highly centralized command and control
structures that have difficulty adapting to rapid tactical changes or complexity.
(3) Cannot accept high attrition to elite formations or key integrated air defense systems(IADS) and fires systems.
(4) Depends on achieving air superiority from the ground to protect its fires systems.
(5) Relies on a limited number of long-range strike systems and enabling munitions.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(6) Operates in territory and among populations in part or wholly friendly to the U.S.;
therefore, the revisionist power faces constrained freedom of access in competition and will becontested in conflict.
(7) Possesses limited ability to reconstitute space-based assets.
b. The Chinese and Russian militaries are powerful, but they also have vulnerabilities that
MDO seek to exploit. Both China and Russia are fielding mutually supporting systems designed
to be effective against the well-understood patterns, posture, and capabilities of the current Joint
Force. Altering Joint Force operational patterns and force posture will mitigate existing capacity
and capability gaps and create opportunities to exploit Chinese and Russian operational
shortfalls. The militaries of China and Russia have and will continue to have finite capacity ofcritical capabilities. The Joint Force’s demonstrated capability to destroy or defeat these criticalcapabilities would prevent China and Russia from accomplishing objectives in competition,
succeeding in armed conflict, or effectively transitioning to consolidation operations.
2-6. Other threats in the operational environment
The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept applies to threats other than China andRussia. North Korea and Iran also seek to create political and military stand-off in order toachieve their strategic goals by destabilizing regional security. In some instances, North Korea
and Iran directly employ or further proliferate Chinese and Russian anti-access and area denial
capabilities to create military stand-off. Additionally, these countries employ indigenously
developed capabilities or strategies to create stand-off. The Joint Force, therefore will also
employ MDO adapted for the unique cultural, geographic, and military context against these andother future threats.
2-7. Implications for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)
The common aspect among the current and emerging threats described in this chapter is theintent and capability to challenge the U.S. by employing a variety of means to generate stand-off
that exploits political ambiguity and the strategic posture and operational predictability of the
Joint Force. The current conceptual framework of the Joint Force and the Army does notaccount for the problem of stand-off, nor does it acknowledge the need to compete below thethreshold of armed conflict against a near-peer adversary to expand the competitive space forpolicymakers. Countering these threats will require an operational concept that integrates
capabilities from all domains, the EMS, and the information environment to offer solutions to awide array of problems in both competition and armed conflict.
Chapter 3
Conducting MDO
3-1. Military problema. How does the Army enable the Joint Force to compete with China and Russia below armed
conflict, penetrate and dis-integrate their anti-access and area denial systems and ultimately
defeat them in armed conflict and consolidate gains, and then return to competition?

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
b. Solving the overarching military problem requires Army forces to address five problems
posed by China and Russia in competition and conflict (see figure 3-1).
#1 How does the Joint Force compete to enable the defeat of an adversary’s operations todestabilize the region, deter the escalation of violence, and, should violence escalate, enable a
rapid transition to armed conflict?
#2 How does the Joint Force penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems
throughout the depth of the Support Areas to enable strategic and operational maneuver?
#3 How does the Joint Force dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems in the
Deep Areas to enable operational and tactical maneuver?
#4 How does the Joint Force exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to achieve
operational and strategic objectives through the defeat of the enemy in the Close and Deep
Maneuver Areas?
#5 How does the Joint Force re-compete to consolidate gains and produce sustainableoutcomes, set conditions for long-term deterrence, and adapt to the new security environment?

Figure 3-1. Problems superimposed on the MDO framework

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
3-2. Central idea
Army forces, as an element of the Joint Force, conduct MDO to prevail in competition; whennecessary, Army forces penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems
and exploit the resultant freedom of maneuver to achieve strategic objectives (win) and force a
return to competition on favorable terms.
3-3. Tenets of MDO
a. MDO solves the five problems through the combined application of three tenets: calibrated
force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence. 25 The tenets are mutually reinforcing
and common to all MDO, though how they are realized will vary by echelon and depend upon
the specific operational situation. The employment of the tenets – particularly calibrated force
posture and convergence – also enable the global integration of the Joint Force to counter China
and Russia during competition and armed conflict.
24F

b. Calibrated force posture. Calibrated force posture is the combination of capacity,
capability, position, and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. Calibrated force
posture allows Army forces to support Joint Force objectives in competition; deters armed
conflict by preventing adversaries from attempting a fait accompli attack on favorable terms; andenables friendly forces to quickly seize the initiative in large-scale combat operations by setting
the theater for expeditionary forces. Accomplishing these tasks requires a dynamic mix ofdifferent types of forces that adapt and change as dictated by the strategic environment: forward
presence forces (U.S. and partner, conventional and SOF), expeditionary forces (Army and joint
units and capabilities), and national-level cyberspace capabilities, space-based platforms, andstrike capabilities. The appropriate balance of capabilities across the Total Force provides
cohesive, fully capable forward presence forces and expeditionary forces able to deploy withinstrategically relevant time periods. Those postured forces also require the appropriate authorities
to operate in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment, particularly incompetition. The ability of the Joint Force to rapidly and unpredictably present an adversary
with different combinations of forces and capabilities expands the competitive space for the U.S.
and helps deter aggression by complicating an adversary’s ability to achieve local superiority. In
the event of a conflict, the application of calibrated force posture positions the right mix of readyforces and capabilities so they can rapidly transition to combat operations, penetrate and disintegrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems within days, and exploit the resultant
freedom of maneuver to defeat the enemy within weeks rather than months. 26
25F(1) Forward presence forces. Forward presence forces consist of Army forward deployed
and rotational units and capability sets. Forward presence forces include a wide array of Army
capabilities, but of particular value due to their role in competition and the transition to armed
conflict are mission command, intelligence, fires, sustainment, security force assistance, civil
affairs, psychological operations, and SOF. Forward presence forces also provide enhanced
25
The components of the solution link to the National Defense Strategy goals for developing a more lethal force: “Forward force maneuver andposture resilience” and “Develop a lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment,” Unclassified Summary of the National Defense
Strategy, pg. 6, 7.
26
Calibrated force posture aligns with the Global Operating Model described in the National Defense Strategy. The National Defense Strategy“contact force” is composed of forward presence forces. The “blunt force” is a combination of forward presence forces and early-entry
expeditionary forces. The “surge force” is follow-on expeditionary forces that arrive after the outbreak of armed conflict.

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interoperability with partners through their integration into existing structures for command andcontrol, intelligence, targeting, and cyberspace that are difficult for expeditionary forces toestablish in a crisis or conflict. The persistence of Army forward presence forces is afoundational element of dynamic employment of the Joint Force as it enables joint strategic
maneuver with critical combat, sustainment, protection, and mission command capabilities.
(2) Expeditionary forces. Expeditionary Army forces are those formations ready tomaneuver from the U.S. or other regions across strategic distances while in contact with theadversary’s reconnaissance, long-range fires, space, and cyberspace capabilities. Forces that
deploy by air either bring their equipment or draw prepositioned equipment and are ready tofight within days or a few weeks of alert. Expeditionary forces deploying by sea are ready tofight within weeks. Expeditionary forces may also have to conduct joint forcible entry
operations in the absence of forward presence forces or to open an additional line of operation.
In conflict, the speed and effectiveness with which expeditionary forces can deploy along
contested lines of communications are heavily dependent on the preparation and support offorward presence forces, the Reserve Components, other Services, and partners.
(3) National-level capabilities. National-level capabilities include intelligence,cyberspace, space-based, and some kinetic strike capabilities normally controlled above thetheater level. These capabilities complement forward presence and expeditionary forces with
their unique effects, global reach, and rapid execution that require little or no physicalmovement. The scarcity of these resources and the potential for unintended consequences with
their use might cause policymakers to retain authorities or permissions for their use. The
extensive preparation required to use these resources must begin in competition, when U.S.
forces develop detailed intelligence identifying specific vulnerabilities, gain or prepare to request
required authorities, and train to use national-level capabilities.
(4) Authorities. To operate in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment, thelowest appropriate echelon of Army forces requires tailored authorities in three broad areas:
access, surveillance, and employment. 27 In competition, they need access to and presence in
geographic areas and military and civilian networks that enable them to operate in bothcompetition and conflict. In armed conflict, Army forces must have authorities to employ
capabilities such as electronic attack, offensive cyberspace and space measures, and lethal
strikes, especially to support a rapid transition from competition to conflict. In both competitionand conflict, authorities to operate in the cyberspace domain and information environment must
be granted earlier, faster, and to lower echelons to enable MDO. Forward presence headquarters
enable success in both competition and the transition to armed conflict by making necessary
coordination and lowering barriers to obtaining authorities before they are needed. Tailoredauthorities must also enable the Army’s role as a force provider, with particular focus on
authorities to notify and mobilize planned and contingency Reserve Component forces,
formations, and headquarters.
26F

27
Examples of authorities include country team permissions for physical and virtual access (e.g., overflight permissions, access agreements,
convoy clearances, materiel and non-materiel host nation support, ability to use or block segments of the EMS, and ability to employ offensive
cyberspace operations), the ability to task transportation assets and forces for deployment, authority to obligate funds, and authority to conduct
cross-boundary coordination.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
c. Multi-domain formations. Multi-domain formations possess the combination of capacity,
capability, and endurance which generates the resilience necessary to operate across multiple
domains. All Army formations must be multi-domain capable to some degree. Multi-domain
formations can conduct independent maneuver, employ cross-domain fires, and maximize humanpotential. The most important materiel contributors to resilience are advanced protection
systems, reduced signatures, redundant channels for communications hardened against enemy
interference, multiple sustainment networks, robust maneuver support capability and capacity,layered air defense, layered reconnaissance, and multi-domain obscuration capabilities. The
most important non-materiel contributors to resilience are flexible planning that account forenemy actions, the ability to reorganize formations in conflict, leaders and staffs capable ofoperating in accord with intent, and small, dispersed, cross-trained headquarters. These
combined contributors provide the resilience necessary for Army formations and systems at allechelons to conduct both offensive and defensive operations in contested spaces against a nearpeer adversary.
(1) Conduct independent maneuver. Multi-domain formations conduct independent
maneuver by continuing operations in a contested environment within the intent of the theater
campaign. 28 Independent maneuver alludes to formation possessing the capacity, capability, andempowered initiative to operate under the constraints of the operational environment. Multidomain formations possess organic capabilities to sustain and protect themselves until theyregain contact with adjacent and supporting units. They are enabled by capabilities such as
reduced visual and electromagnetic signatures, redundant channels for communications hardened
against enemy interference, reduced logistics demand, enhanced medical support, multiple
sustainment networks, robust maneuver support capability and capacity, and multi-domain
obscuration capabilities. Brigades, divisions, and corps, specifically, require organic missioncommand, ISR, and sustainment capabilities to maintain offensive operations for several days
despite highly contested lines of communications.
27F(2) Employ cross-domain fires. The ability to employ cross-domain fires provides
options to commanders and builds resilience within the Joint Force to overcome temporary
functional separation imposed by enemy anti-access and area denial systems. Beyond
modernized air and missile defense and long-range ground fire capabilities, multi-domain
formations deliver cross-domain fire capabilities through aviation systems; advanced protection
systems, layered air defense and reconnaissance, EW devices; multi-spectral sensor-fusedmunitions; and cyberspace, space, and information related capabilities. Cross-domain fires
include the ISR capabilities required to employ them, which can comprise a mixture of organic
capabilities and access to external assets. Cross-domain fires combine with necessary
advancements in mobility and lethality in future air and ground platforms, communications
networks, and data processing (speed and volume) to provide the capabilities for cross-domain
maneuver.
(3) Maximize human potential. The Army builds and sustains multi-domain formations
through the selection, training, and education of the leaders and Soldiers in them. Advances in28
Independent maneuver is operating dispersed for an extended period without continuous [or contiguous] support from higher echelons while
retaining the ability to concentrate combat power rapidly at decisive spaces by employing cross-domain fires and maneuver to achieve mission
objectives within the intent of the theater campaign.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
performance science enable Soldiers and junior leaders to enter operations at peak cognitive,
physical, and emotional potential. Biotechnical sensors monitoring the status and changes inhuman performance augment commanders’ understanding of their units, inform decisions about
the tempo and intensity of operations, and assist units in sustaining and regenerating physical andpsychological strength. Man-machine interfaces, enabled by artificial intelligence and highspeed data processing, improve human decision making in both speed and accuracy. Employing
multi-domain capabilities requires the Army to attract, train, retain, and employ leaders andSoldiers who collectively possess a significant breadth and depth of technical and professional
expertise. The Army must exercise careful talent management to make the most of these highquality personnel and integrate them into trusted teams of professionals who are able to thrive inambiguity and chaos. Improving the resilience of leaders and Soldiers—the Army’s mostvaluable capability—requires training, educating, equipping, and supporting them to execute
MDO in all of its intensity, rigor, and complexity.
d. Convergence. Convergence is the rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all
domains, the EMS, and the information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch theenemy through cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by missioncommand and disciplined initiative. The Joint Force currently converges capabilities throughepisodic synchronization of domain-federated solutions. Future operations against a near-peer
threat, however, will require the Joint Force to conduct continuous and rapid integration of multidomain capabilities to gain cross-domain overmatch at decisive spaces. Decisive spaces arelocations in time and space (physical, virtual, and cognitive) where the full optimization of theemployment of cross-domain capabilities generates a marked advantage over an enemy andgreatly influences the outcome of an operation. Convergence complicates the enemy’s attempts
to conceal and defend its center of gravity by providing the Joint Force with multiple options for
attacking the enemy’s vulnerabilities at decisive spaces. Multi-domain formations, at echelon,
utilize convergence during competition and conflict to apply capabilities against vulnerabilities
in an adversary’s or enemy’s systems.
(1) Convergence has two advantages over single-domain alternatives: the creation ofcross-domain synergy and the layering of options across domains to enhance friendly operations
and impose complexity on the enemy. Through convergence, multi-domain capabilities arebrought together in stimulate-see-strike or see-strike combinations that disrupt, degrade, destroy,
or dis-integrate enemy systems or create windows of superiority to enable friendly exploitationof the initiative.
(a) Cross-domain synergy. 29 The principle of cross-domain synergy is an evolution of
combined arms maneuver. The combination of complementary effects complicates an enemy’s
ability to act, producing an overall effect greater than the sum of the individual parts (see figure3-2). Synergy optimizes capabilities from across all domains, the EMS, and the information
environment to achieve the maximum effect from the available resources. Against a near-peer
enemy, the Joint Force will not have sufficient capacity to achieve overmatch without crossdomain synergy.
28F

Cross-domain synergy is an idea introduced in the Joint Operational Access Concept and continued as a key idea in the Capstone Concept for
Joint Operations. It is defined as the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that eachenhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will
provide the freedom of action required by the mission.
29

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Figure 3-2. Converging capabilities to generate cross-domain synergy and layered options(b) Layered options. The layering of multiple forms of convergence provides friendly
commanders with options and imposes complexity on the enemy (see figure 3-2). The creationof additional options makes it easier for friendly forces to target enemy vulnerabilities in
unexpected ways and avoids dependence on a single method of seeing or striking. Layered
options also confront the enemy with an array of different threats to which it must respond. Solong as those convergence combinations are relatively simple for friendly forces to execute, theresult is a net imposition of complexity upon enemy command and control systems.
(2) Mission command. Mission command remains an essential element of Army
operations on a contested battlefield against a near-peer enemy. Since the enemy will disrupt
friendly communications and plans, mission command must expand to enable initiative anddynamic cooperation across Service and other partner lines—at some risk—to allow the Joint
Force to preserve the ability to continuously and rapidly integrate multi-domain capabilities
despite disrupted communications. One manifestation of mission command is intent-based
synergy, the dynamic cooperation that enables the sufficient integration of available crossdomain capabilities to achieve dominant or essential effects at a decisive space, acknowledging
some degree of risk or collateral cost. Commanders must deliberately create and foster
conditions favorable to mission command so that ever disparate formations and capabilities areready to act upon mutual recognition of an opportunity or in response to a battlefielddevelopment.

21

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(3) Convergence at echelon. Multi-domain formations and calibrated force posture enable
convergence. The principles of convergence apply across echelons, but vary based on specificrequirements.
(a) Theater army. Theater armies are forward presence forces. They enableinteragency access, set the theater, enable expeditionary maneuver, and protect joint bases,
nodes, and networks. Theater armies set the conditions for operational and tactical convergenceby calibrating force posture with Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and Headquarters,
Department of the Army to ensure that necessary joint and Army capabilities are in theater or canbe accessed when and where needed to deter or defeat aggression. Theater armies converge
offensive space control capabilities on behalf of all Army forces in theater. Theater armies arealso the main Army echelon converging capabilities to support joint and combined information
environment operations.
(b) Field army. Field armies are forward presence forces in regions that have near-peer
threats. They relieve the operational burden on theater armies to facilitate focused opposition
toward that specific threat within a distinct area of operations. They prosecute the campaign incompetition by conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), enabling partners and
SOF, deterring the adversary’s aggression, and managing the transition to conflict. They havethe ability to command two or more corps. The field army provides long-range fires to othercomponent commanders against enemy long-range systems. In competition, the field army
oversees deception, the selective demonstration of capabilities, and the masking of others tocreate uncertainty and deter an adversary’s aggression. The field army also creates options forconvergence through focused planning and preparation for multi-domain interoperability withpartners. The field army converges capabilities to destroy enemy long-range ground fires and, if
no corps headquarters is present during the transition to armed conflict, will assist with thetargeting and neutralization of mid-range systems. In competition and conflict, the field army is
the Army echelon responsible for converging national-level capabilities into its or subordinate
echelons’ maneuver. In competition and conflict, the field army is responsible for analyzing
high-volume data from national and theater intelligence collection assets, and linking sensors tospecific shooters in support of operational ground objectives. Intelligence enabling formations at
the field army level will be task organized and tailored to the operational environment.
(c) Corps. Corps are expeditionary forces. The corps shapes multiple enemy combinedarms armies simultaneously by assisting with the defeat of long-range systems and theneutralization of mid-range systems. The corps also commands two or more divisions andenablers. It is responsible for converging capabilities against all enemy long-range systems (airdefense, anti-ship, and long-range ground fires) within areas designated by the Joint Force
Commander and providing Army capabilities to assist other components when the corps is
responsible for multi-domain command and control. A corps converges capabilities against
enemy mid-range fires formations within its areas of operations. The corps is the Army echelon
responsible for converging large amounts of joint fires, whether against enemy mid-range
systems or in support of division or brigade maneuver. The corps also converges national- andtheater-level offensive cyberspace with other capabilities to achieve operational and tacticalobjectives. The corps creates conditions for convergence at lower echelons by allocating
resources, sequencing division maneuver, and incorporating it with deception. In competition

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
and conflict, a corps conducts intelligence analysis to converge national, theater, and organic ISR
collection to support tactical ground objectives.
(d) Division. Divisions can be either forward presence or expeditionary forces. A
division enables independent maneuver, conducts expeditionary maneuver, commands multiple
brigade combat teams and enabling brigades, and defeats a shaped enemy army in the Close
Area. It converges aviation, fires, EW, maneuver support, and multi-brigade maneuver toachieve positions of advantage against a combined arms army (or similar formation) that has had
its mid-range fires systems destroyed or neutralized. The division has the multi-domain
command and control capacity to incorporate some reinforcing joint or Army fires when it is asecondary effort. A division that is the main effort and has been allocated a large number of air
sorties, a significant amount of naval strikes, or several brigades of reinforcing ground fires
requires assistance from the corps to converge capabilities on that scale. With assistance fromhigher echelons, the division can converge national-level and offensive space capabilities into its
scheme of maneuver. A division has the analytical capacity to converge limited amounts ofnational- or theater-level intelligence sources with its organic ISR.
(e) Brigade. 30 Brigades converge organic ISR, maneuver, and fires capabilities withlimited amounts of available aviation, maneuver support, EW, joint fires, and offensive spacecapabilities. All brigades are multi-domain capable, yet those responsible for controlling terrain
require high levels of cross-domain organic capabilities to create the convergence that enables
their broader task sets. Brigades habitually access intelligence, EW, cyberspace, and spacecapabilities through the division, corps, and field army as described above. Brigades executeconvergence and cross-domain maneuver to see, isolate, maneuver, and/or protect to exploit theinitiative and achieve positions of advantage to accomplish their missions. A brigade has theanalytical capacity to converge limited amounts of national- or theater-level intelligence sources
with its organic ISR.
29F

e. Multi-domain command and control. Interoperability across Service, interagency, andmultinational partners is a key element to executing MDO. Multi-domain command and control
is the combination of joint and combined materiel, processes, and authorities that underpin
convergence, multi-domain formations, and mission command designed to enable and exploit
interoperability. 31 Effective multi-domain command and control requires a resilient technicalarchitecture, flexible command relationships, and multi-domain control measures. A resilient
technical architecture provides connectivity to pass critical information between headquarters,
units, aircraft, or ships at critical moments in operations. Flexible command relationships allow
the rapid reallocation of multi-domain capabilities and formations across functional components
and echelons to achieve convergence. Flexible command relationships also allow the creation offavorable force ratios through rapid task organization and re-organization of reinforcing fires andcapabilities among echelons. Multi-domain control measures create the framework for missioncommand by allowing units the greatest possible latitude to execute cross-domain maneuver
within intent. Multi-domain control measures also facilitate coordination between echelons,
30F

This includes all types of brigade-level formations, not only Brigade Combat Teams.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Joint Publication 01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, describes the three dimensions of joint and alliedinteroperability – technical (e.g., hardware, systems) procedural (e.g., doctrines, procedures), and human (e.g., language, terminology, andtraining). These directly align to the technical architecture, control measures, and command relationships in multi-domain command and control.
30
31

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
adjacent units, and joint partners. When technical architecture is disrupted, flexible command
relationships and multi-domain control measures are the enabling elements of mission command.
3-4. MDO and strategic objectives
a. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations is an operational-level military concept
designed to achieve U.S. strategic objectives articulated in the National Defense Strategy,
specifically deterring and defeating China and Russia in competition and conflict. 32 The conceptalso supports execution of the Army’s four enduring strategic roles: prevent conflict, shape thesecurity environment, prevail in large-scale ground combat operations, and consolidate gains.
These strategic objectives require Army forces to solve the five multi-domain problems
described in section 3-1. The following sections describe how MDO solves each of these
problems. Section 3-5 addresses the first problem of competing to defeat aggression short ofarmed conflict and to deter conflict. Section 3-6 addresses the second problem of penetrating
enemy anti-access and area denial systems to enable strategic and operational maneuver in
conflict. Section 3-7 addresses the third problems of dis-integrating enemy’s anti-access andarea denial systems in theater to enable operational and tactical maneuver. Section 3-8 addresses
the fourth problem of exploiting freedom of maneuver to defeat the enemy and achieve U.S.
strategic objectives. Section 3-9 addresses the final problem of re-competing to consolidate
gains and expand the competitive space and enable policymakers to resolve the conflict. The
remainder of this section describes how solving these operational problems leads to theattainment of strategic objectives.
31F

b. A multi-domain capable Joint Force can achieve friendly strategic objectives (win) anddefeat the adversary in three different ways. The preferred method of attaining strategic
objectives is effective competition that deters escalation and defeats adversaries’ destabilization
efforts. If deterrence fails, the second method is to employ a combination of forward presence
and expeditionary forces to deny enemy objectives within days and achieve an operational
position of relative advantage within weeks that leads to an acceptable, sustainable politicaloutcome. If neither side is able to achieve its objectives in a short conflict, the third method is todefeat the enemy in a protracted war. The three methods are interrelated as the will andcapability to win a long war, if necessary, is an essential element to convincing an adversary thatit cannot achieve a fait accompli and will not achieve aims in competition below armed conflict.
The demonstrated ability and readiness to deny a fait accompli attack, in turn, creates a positionof strength for the Joint Force in competition. The Army is essential in each of the three ways to
defeat an aggressive adversary and provide political leaders with as many options as possible todeter through determined competition or, when necessary, prosecute and end an armed conflicton favorable conditions before returning rapidly to a renewed competition.
c. Compete. The Joint Force succeeds in competition by defeating the adversary’s efforts toachieve their strategic goals and deterring military escalation; it does this by expanding thecompetitive space for policymakers through multiple options for employing the elements of

32
U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
national power. 33 Army forces play an integral role in this effort, actively engaging acrossdomains (including space and cyberspace), in the EMS, and in the information space. The
demonstrated capability to prevail in competition and in conflict counters adversaries’ narratives
that portray the U.S. as a weak or irresolute partner. The combination of the ability to both
effectively compete below armed conflict and to respond to an escalation toward armed conflictcreates a position of strength and sets favorable conditions if conflict ensues. This position ofstrength provides a favorable environment for Joint Force, interagency, and partner efforts tocounter adversaries’ coercion through unconventional and information warfare. The adversary’s
proxies receive little or no support from its conventional forces, which allows U.S. partners tocounter attempts to destabilize their countries more easily. The combined and persistent effects
of deterring armed conflict and defeating unconventional and information warfare in a campaign
of competition create unpredictability for the adversary and generate additional friendly options,
thereby expanding the competitive space for policymakers.
32F

d. Penetrate, dis-integrate, and exploit. In the event of armed conflict, Army forward
presence and expeditionary forces enable the rapid defeat of aggression through a combination ofcalibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence to immediately contest an
enemy attack in depth. Army long-range fires converge with joint multi-domain capabilities topenetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems to enable Joint Force
freedom of strategic and operational maneuver. Within the theater, Army forces converge
capabilities to optimize the employment of capabilities from across multiple domains against
critical components of the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems, specifically long-range
air defense and fires systems. Convergence against the enemy’s long-range systems enables theinitial penetration. This sets the conditions for a quick transition to joint air-ground operations inwhich maneuver enables strike and strike enables maneuver. MDO in the Close and Deep Areas
combine fires, maneuver, and deception to dislocate the enemy defense by physically, virtually,
and cognitively isolating its subordinate elements, thereby allowing friendly forces to achieve
local superiority and favorable force ratios. Army forces, having penetrated and begun the disintegration of the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems, exploit vulnerable enemy units
and systems to defeat enemy forces and achieve friendly campaign objectives. As part of the
Joint Force, Army forces rapidly achieve given strategic objectives (win) and consolidate gains.

33
Expanding the competitive space entails those activities, short of war, that integrate multiple elements of national power to counter the longterm strategic objectives of adversaries. A more lethal force, strong alliances and partnerships, American technological innovation, and a cultureof performance generate decisive and sustained U.S. advantages. See, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States ofAmerica, 4.

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Figure 3-3. MDO solutions
e. Re-compete. Army forces contribute to the consolidation of strategic gains after a conflictby securing the initiative and maintaining operational contact in all domains, the EMS, and theinformation environment. This approach ensures that military and political conditions remainfavorable to the U.S. and its partners. Particularly following an armed conflict with a nuclear
power, the enemy will retain significant conventional military capability in the field. Army
forces, therefore, have to simultaneously deter a return to conventional warfare and assist partner
forces in restoring order to prevent the enemy from exploiting the internal disruption for strategic
advantage. 34 These functions spanning the competition continuum expand the competitive spacefor policymakers, enable strategic objectives, and secure the initiative. 35
33F

34F

In most cases, the Army will be required to execute tasks to restore order and support partner’s political, economic, and social structure
recovery (per FM 3-07 Stability) because civilian agencies lack the capacity or capability to do this in a combat zone.
The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning proposes the notion of a competition continuum that offers an alternative to the obsolete
peace/war binary with a new model of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. These are not mutually exclusive
conditions and various states of relationships with other actors can exist concurrently. This concept focuses on conditions of competition andarmed conflict.
34
35

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
3-5. MDO in competition: Compete to expand the competitive spacea. Multi-domain problem #1: How does the Joint Force compete to defeat an adversary’s
operations to destabilize the region, deter the escalation of violence, and, should violence
escalate, enable a rapid transition to armed conflict?

Figure 3-4. Competitionb. Success in competition achieves three critical objectives: deterring conflict on terms
favorable to the U.S., countering adversaries’ efforts to expand the competitive space below thethreshold of armed conflict, and enabling the rapid transition to armed conflict. In the past, theU.S. military—due to cultural, statutory, and policy reasons—has often remained reactive incompetition below armed conflict. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations conceptemphasizes the importance of active engagement by the Joint Force, and particularly the Army,in competition to defend U.S. interests, deter conflict, and, when needed, create the mostfavorable conditions for the Joint Force’s rapid transition to armed conflict.
c. The Army competes successfully, as part of a joint, interagency, and multinational team, bydefeating the adversary’s attempts to destabilize regional security and by deterring armed
conflict through a series of mutually reinforcing actions. The field army conducts detailed
tactical and operational intelligence preparation of the battlefield to enable forward presence and27

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
expeditionary forces to immediately defeat a surprise attack by the adversary. In conjunction
with partners and the Joint Force, Army forces counter the adversary’s reconnaissance andconduct deception to create uncertainty within an adversary’s decision making process. Forward
presence forces also contribute to the defeat of the adversary’s unconventional warfare
campaign, both directly and indirectly, both by enabling partners with advisors and capabilities
and by building enduring partner capability and capacity. These formations, enabled by thenecessary authorities, actively engage in the information space through a variety of means,including cyberspace and EMS capabilities. Finally, both the theater and field army conduct
intensive preparations for conventional warfare to demonstrate a credible deterrent. The theaterarmy sets the theater to enable the dynamic employment of the Joint Force. The field army “setsthe campaign” to ensure the Joint Force and partners can rapidly transition from competition toconflict.
d. Conduct intelligence and counter adversary reconnaissance. In competition, the fieldarmy coordinates collection against and analysis of the adversary’s operational and tacticalsystems, as well as other facets of the operational environment and civil networks.
Subsequently, the field army disseminates information to allocated joint and Army expeditionary
forces to familiarize them with the adversary’s systems and likely areas of joint and Army
operations. The field army also has the primary responsibility for countering the adversary’s
reconnaissance through counter-reconnaissance and deception. Collectively, these actions
enable the Joint Force to rapidly transition to armed conflict and create uncertainty for theadversary as to whether it can achieve its objectives through a surprise attack.
(1) Develop understanding of military capabilities. The complexity of modern militaryequipment requires months or years of focused intelligence collection and analysis to identify
and exploit tactical or technical weaknesses. The field army works primarily with theater- andnational-level capabilities to develop a detailed understanding of the adversary’s command andcontrol and long-range (IADS, SRBM, and long-range MRL) and mid-range systems (mid-range
SAM, MRL, and cannon artillery). When the adversary’s forces conduct maneuvers or “snapexercises” near territory of U.S. partners, the field army deploys organic and allocated ISR (e.g.,
airborne ISR, high-altitude ISR balloons, and electronic intelligence capabilities) to refine
technical intelligence and to understand the adversary’s operational patterns and methods of
employment by specific unit and capability. The field army also seeks to create intelligencecollection opportunities by leveraging training and reassurance operations in partner territory
adjacent to an adversary to stimulate and analyze enemy ISR capabilities.
(2) Analyze operational environment and civil networks. All echelons of forward
presence forces conduct terrain analysis and familiarization of friendly territory threatened by anadversary. This effort builds the necessary information that allows the Joint Force Commander
to visualize the three-dimensional, multi-domain environment at a level of detail for tacticalexecution and operational planning. Dense urban terrain requires additional preparatory
intelligence activities to understand the human, social, and infrastructure details. The field army
focuses IPB on select urban areas that are likely to be of critical of strategic and operational
importance in conflict.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(3) Conduct deception. In competition, the theater and field armies conduct deception
primarily through dynamic changes to calibrated force posture. These actions seek to complicate
the adversary’s efforts to determine the capability and capacity of friendly forces in theater.
While exercises, training, and alerts are designed to demonstrate specific capabilities, they also
provide opportunities to mislead the adversary regarding the disposition and staging of forces,use of the EMS and cyberspace signatures, and patterns and methods of employment. These
actions create unpredictability and complicate the adversary’s reconnaissance efforts, which
increases the likelihood of compromising its assets. The theater army also employs dataencryption, network access limitations, and decoy data to defeat the adversary’s cyberreconnaissance.
(4) Execute counter-reconnaissance. The field army conducts and coordinates counterreconnaissance operations principally through partner security forces and interagency partners.
Partner security forces generally possess the authorities, capacity, and local expertise to counterthe enemy’s covert intelligence efforts. The primary role of the field army, therefore, is to assist
partner security forces with counter-reconnaissance operations. These actions reduce the tacticaleffectiveness of an adversary’s efforts in competition and their ability to transition rapidly fromcompetition to armed conflict.
e. Enable defeat of the adversary’s information and unconventional warfare. Army
forces support joint and partner campaigns to defeat the adversary’s information andunconventional warfare operations through the provision of capabilities, expanded authorities,
and the conduct of supporting operations.
(1) Conduct information environment operations (IEO). The Joint Force seizes theinitiative in competition by actively engaging in the information space across domains (toinclude cyberspace) and the EMS. The theater army converges Army actions and messaging in
support of the Joint Force Commander’s IEO, though all echelons engage in the information
space in support of policy and commander’s intent. To accomplish this mission, subordinate
echelons must be enabled with access to intelligence, cyberspace, and EMS capabilities;
appropriate authorities and permissions normally reserved for conflict or at higher echelons; andpolicy guidance expressed as intent rather than narrow, restrictive directives. This allows
forward presence forces to aggressively take tailored actions and employ messages to counterand expose inconsistencies in the adversary’s information warfare operations. The Armyprimarily contributes to the strategic narrative, however, by reinforcing the resolve andcommitment of the U.S. to its partner and demonstrating its capabilities as a credible deterrent toconflict.
(2) Conduct irregular warfare. 36 The theater and field armies enable joint, interagency,
and partner irregular warfare campaigns by providing multi-domain formations with regional
understanding to the Joint Force Commander. When an adversary employs proxies, Army forces
defeat them principally through the indirect enabling of partners, but can support directly throughunilateral action. Special operations forces and security force assistance brigades support partner
35F

36
Irregular warfare is comprised of five core activities: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense,and stability operations.

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irregular warfare efforts both by building enduring partner capacity and by enabling them withadvisors and capabilities.
f. Demonstrate credible deterrent. By shaping the entire theater and addressing aggression
outside the field army’s area of operations, the theater army allows the field army to set the
campaign against a near-peer adversary’s military formations and stand-off capabilities. To
provide a credible deterrent, the field army calibrates force posture to reduce an adversary’s local
military superiority, employs multi-domain formations to withstand a surprise attack, anddemonstrates the ability to converge forward presence, joint, and national-level capabilities to
disrupt any surprise attack. Specifically, Army forces must demonstrate four capabilities incompetition to deter the adversary.
(1) Ability to immediately deny a fait accompli attack. The field army must be able todeny an enemy fait accompli attack within weeks by employing a mixture of forward presence,
expeditionary (air deployed assets/formations and prepositioned equipment), and national-level
forces.
(2) Ability to penetrate anti-access and area denial systems. Forward presence Armylong-range fires must enable the Joint Force to immediately begin neutralizing enemy long-range
systems (IADS, SRBM, long-range MRL, and command and control) and have munitions
stockpiles in theater sufficient to support operations for several weeks.
(3) Ability to conduct strategic and operational maneuver. Army expeditionary forcesmust build and demonstrate the ability to conduct strategic and operational maneuver into an areaof operations despite contested lines of communications.
(4) Ability to support MDO. Army forces have to calibrate force posture and field multidomain formations to facilitate the Joint Force to dictate and sustain operational tempo inconflict. To credibly accomplish these tasks, the theater and field army establish command andcontrol mechanisms, ensure interoperability, and sustain and protect forward presence forces.
(a) Establish command and control mechanisms. In competition, the field army
prepares to converge lethal and nonlethal effects from the beginning of a conflict by planningwith forward presence forces, other elements of the Joint Force, and partners. This preparation
includes developing the necessary multi-domain command and control architectures, flexible
command relationships, and physical and virtual control measures for converging capabilities.
Precise and integrated effects are critical to operations in dense urban terrain, but also facilitate
operations in other environments, particularly chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear(CBRN) impacted zones.
(b) Ensure interoperability. Forward presence forces must be fully interoperable withthe remainder of the Joint Force and, to the greatest extent possible, with multinational partners
and relevant interagency partners. If a low degree of interoperability exists with a partner, Army
forces integrate MDO through an array of doctrinal or ad hoc organizational methods, such as
liaison cells. Increasing interoperability builds capacity and expands the range of options for the
Joint Force Commander.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(c) Sustain and protect forward presence forces. The theater army ensures the
Operational Support Area has the capacity, capability, and endurance to sustain and generate
force despite the adversary’s long-range fires (ballistic and cruise missiles, special operations,
offensive space, and cyber attacks). The field army ensures the Tactical Support Area and Close
Area possess the multi-domain formations needed to sustain and generate force despite theadversary’s ballistic missiles, long-range MRLs, air defenses, and cyber attacks. The theaterarmy creates resilience through the protection, hardening, and dispersal of key command,
control, and logistics nodes. It also plans and coordinates for multiple sea and air ports of entry
and lines of communication throughout the Operational and Tactical Support Areas.
g. Conclusion: MDO in competition. Army forces, as part of the Joint Force, compete witha near-peer adversary by defeating their operations below the threshold of armed conflict anddeterring an escalation of violence. Army forces at all echelons support U.S. policy andobjectives through proactive engagement in the information space, and are in turn enabled bydelegated authorities and permissions, intent-based guidance, and access to joint and nationallevel capabilities in intelligence, cyberspace, and the EMS. The friendly information narrative is
supported by the demonstrated capability to deny a fait accompli attack and an adversary’s
operational objectives. Demonstrated capabilities in competition undermine the adversary’s
information warfare operations and generate complexity and uncertainty in their decision making
process. Most importantly, active engagement in competition establishes a robust operational
assessment of the adversary’s forces and capabilities and sets the campaign to ensure the Joint
Force can rapidly transition to armed conflict and immediately provide an offensive response toaggression.
The three subsequent sections detail actions to penetrate stand-off, dis-integrate anti-accessand area denial systems, and exploit the resulting freedom of action and maneuver. Although
presented sequentially, each section’s actions overlap in time and space to varying degrees.
Because near-peer enemies have the ability to adapt, reorganize, and reconstitute their systems
and formations, friendly forces continue penetration and dis-integration concurrent tomaneuver to fully exploit windows of superiority.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
3-6. MDO in armed conflict: Penetrate strategic and operational stand-off
a. Multi-domain problem #2: How does the Joint Force penetrate enemy anti-access and area
denial systems throughout the depth of the operational framework to enable strategic andoperational maneuver?

Figure 3-5. Penetrate and dis-integrate anti-access and area denial systems; exploit
freedom of maneuverb. The Joint Force utilizes the active engagement in competition to enable the penetration ofstrategic and operational stand-off by immediately neutralizing the enemy’s long-range systems,
contesting enemy maneuver forces in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment,
and conducting strategic and operational maneuver. The neutralization of enemy long-range
systems enables strategic and operational maneuver by reducing the threat to friendly lines ofcommunications. Simultaneously, forward presence forces begin the defeat of enemy stand-off“from the inside” by operating within the range of enemy long- and mid-range systems.
Together, these efforts effectively contest the enemy’s attack; enable greater freedom tomaneuver elements of the Joint Force from strategic and operational distances into the area of
operations; and enable the dis-integration of the enemy’s long- and mid-range systems indecisive spaces.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
c. Neutralize enemy-long-range systems. Benefiting from extensive preparations during thecompetition period, forward positioned Army fires and air defense forces immediately begin
neutralizing the enemy’s long-range anti-access and area denial systems (ballistic and cruise
missiles, long-range IADS) during the transition to armed conflict.
(1) The field army and corps employ long-range fires elements and integrate joint andcombined capabilities to neutralize the enemy’s long-range systems. Fires formations at thoseechelons provide responsive cross-domain fires to the Joint Force Commander into the Close,
Deep Maneuver, and Operational Deep Fires Areas. In combination with other multi-domain
capabilities, these fires begin to neutralize the enemy’s integrated air defense and long-range
fires systems. They accomplish this by receiving targeting information for high-priority enemy
long-range systems from space- and high-altitude-based surveillance or low-observable air
platforms, and striking those high-payoff targets within minutes (paragraphs 3-7.d and 3-7.e
provide a more detailed description of how the enemy’s long-range systems are identified andattacked).
(2) Ground-based long-range fires provide redundant strike options to the Joint Force,
posing dilemmas for the enemy in multiple ways. Long-range ground fires offer a responsive
strike capability (cued by intelligence within minutes), with the capacity to overwhelm point
defenses and strike targets over larger areas. Long-range ground fires complicate enemy
defenses by forcing the enemy to react to multiple forms of attack simultaneously against anumber of different systems for which it does not have an effective counter. The Army’s
contribution of highly mobile and dispersed long-range fires systems also complicates theenemy’s counterfire, reconnaissance, and targeting. By combining Army long-range fires withother multi-domain capabilities, the Joint Force increases the speed and scale of its efforts toneutralize the enemy’s long-range systems.
d. Contest enemy maneuver forces. Forward positioned forces immediately contest theenemy attack by enemy maneuver forces. Depending on force posture and the amount ofintelligence and warning, forward presence forces in the Close Area could vary in strength froma single brigade to an entire division of forward deployed, rotational, and expeditionary forces
deployed by air prior to the conflict. When attacked, forward presence forces in the Close Area(partner territory that the enemy is attempting to seize), in concert with partner forces, impose
losses on the enemy to delay its achievement of campaign objectives and consolidation of gains.
Forward presence Army forces and partners employ layered ISR, both organic and joint, todevelop an understanding of the enemy’s attack and their capabilities. They also build on the
counter-reconnaissance activities executed in competition to rapidly degrade enemy intelligencein the Close Area. The Joint Force Commander employs joint fires and national-level
capabilities to assist forward presence forces denying enemy objectives in the Close Area and thefield army executes IEO contingency plans to rapidly seize the initiative in the information
environment.
(1) See with layered ISR. U.S. and partner forces in the Close Area employ a layered ISR
network to determine the disposition of enemy forces. The layered ISR network provides
redundancy against the enemy’s ability to contest friendly ISR assets and facilitates layered
collection and dissemination.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(a) Layered collection plan. Forward presence divisions and brigades employ theirorganic ground reconnaissance and UAS to develop the immediate tactical situation. The fieldarmy primarily relies on organic high-altitude surveillance and joint ISR capabilities deployedfrom the forward edge of the Tactical Support Area, supplemented by low-observable manned
and unmanned aircraft, space surveillance, and cyberspace intelligence. The field army alsoutilizes an existing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance network developed withpartners during competition that consists of overlapping systems of remote and autonomous
sensors, human intelligence, and friendly special operations forces.
(b) Processing and dissemination. The field army uses standard and non-standard
communications methods to rapidly process and disseminate intelligence to maneuver forces in
the Close Area and to sustainment and protection forces in the Tactical Support Area. The fieldarmy analyzes the intelligence and disseminates time sensitive combat information to thedivision and the brigades using resilient, low-density data formats to mitigate significant enemy
jamming and counter-communications attacks. The field army also establishes sensor-to-shooter
links to enable cross-domain fires in support of subordinate operations.
(2) Degrade enemy intelligence effectiveness in Close Area. Forward presence forces
and partners target enemy intelligence capabilities to complicate the enemy’s collection plan andforce the reallocation of assets at multiple levels. The division and the brigades degrade enemy
tactical ISR through a combination of air defense against manned and unmanned aerial ISR,
camouflage, and decoys. Tactical deception plans complicate the enemy’s intelligence collection
and may force the enemy to adjust their ground attack. The theater army coordinates with thedivision and the brigades for active anti-space ISR measures to support maneuver forces atcritical times and spaces. The degradation and reallocation of the enemy’s ISR capabilities in the
Close Area cause the enemy to divert ISR resources from targeting friendly forces in the Support
Areas, thereby enabling strategic and operational maneuver.
(3) Deny enemy objectives. Forward presence maneuver forces and partner nation
conventional forces use the advantages of the defense, particularly in dense urban terrain, to attrit
and slow enemy forces and enable the arrival of friendly expeditionary forces. Army forces
leverage their preparation during competition to harden friendly urban areas to slow enemy
advances and complicate its maneuver. The division and brigades employ organic cross-domain
maneuver (primarily fires and air defense, as well as EW and aviation if a division is present) in
conjunction with joint and Army multi-domain capabilities from the Support Areas (see next
section) despite degraded communications. The field army assists the division and the brigades
by shaping the fight in the Close Area through the accomplishment of three enabling tasks.
(a) Converge joint fires from Support Areas and national-level capabilities. The
field army (or corps) supports the division and brigades in the Close Area by contesting enemy
maneuver forces with long-range fires and coordinating for joint multi-domain capabilities. The
field army (or corps) identifies high-priority targets (IADS, SRBM, long-range MRL, andcommand and control) in the Close Area and either strikes the target or disseminates theinformation to the division or brigades for their own targeting. Theater and operational fires
commands, employing long-range fires, are initially the primary means of striking high-priority
targets within the Close Area from the Support Area. Attacking these high-priority targets

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
requires resilience in multi-domain command and control at each echelon, provided throughredundant means of communications, flexible command relationships, and multi-domain control
measures designed to withstand degraded communications. The field army (or corps) balances
the enduring requirement to neutralize the enemy’s long-range fires with providing direct support
to the division and brigades defending and executing maneuver in the Close Area.
(b) Employ deception in the Close Area. The field army uses deception plansdeveloped in competition to create tactical unpredictability for the enemy and prevent the fullmassing of enemy lethal and nonlethal effects in the Close Area. The deception plans alsopresent the enemy with mixtures of real, exaggerated, and false capabilities, especially incyberspace and the EMS. Divisions and brigades execute deception in the Close Area by having
multiple options to defend so even if the enemy gains access to U.S or partner planning, it must
disperse reconnaissance assets among multiple possible locations of units, logistics, and multidomain command and control nodes.
(c) Contest the information environment. The Joint Force, through the field army,
immediately contests the information environment through the execution of IEO contingency
plans with a credible, compelling message to bolster friendly political will and deny enemy
information warfare objectives. These plans include prepared messages and methods of delivery
based on anticipated wartime conditions, such as disruptions to civilian media and energy
networks. Commanders in the Close Area exploit opportunities to take the initiative with images
and messaging regarding friendly successes, particularly contesting the enemy advance and therapid arrival of expeditionary forces, and disseminates it to the field army to shape public
perception and reinforce the Joint Force Commander’s campaign in the information
environment.
e. Maneuver across strategic and operational distances. Executing maneuver acrossstrategic and operational distances builds friendly combat power and sets the conditions for thedis-integration of the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems and the exploitation of theresulting freedom of maneuver. Army expeditionary forces use joint strategic transportation andprepositioned equipment to enter the theater at multiple points within days or weeks of theenemy’s attack. Joint forcible entry operations can be employed to open additional lines ofoperations or initial entry points to enable these actions. Forward presence forces and national
assets degrade enemy long-range surveillance and reconnaissance to reduce the enemy’s
effectiveness in attacking the lines of communications. In the area of operations, the theater andfield army mitigate the effects of the enemy’s attack throughout the Support Areas by executing
deception plans to further complicate the enemy’s ISR collection, protecting and hardening
Army prepositioned stocks (APS), and conducting deployment and sustainment in dispersed
formations along multiple routes.
(1) Degrade enemy long-range ISR. The theater and field armies have the responsibility
to degrade the enemy’s long-range ISR systems targeting the Operational and Tactical Support
Areas. In both areas, friendly forces defeat or degrade enemy long-range reconnaissance acrossall domains, the EMS, and the information environment.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(a) Counter enemy SOF and human intelligence (HUMINT). Host nation
counterintelligence, military, and internal security forces provide the primary means forcountering enemy SOF and HUMINT networks in the Support Areas. The theater and fieldarmies’ counterintelligence and HUMINT assets collaborate with the host nation to generate athreat intelligence assessment and provide intelligence and enablers such as aviation, signals
intelligence, EW, and cyberspace assets, to enable host nation’s efforts. Security force assistancebrigades, SOF, and civil affairs units also contribute to the strong relationships required tocounter enemy SOF and HUMINT.
(b) Counter enemy space ISR. Prompt action by the theater army deprives the enemy
of its primary means of long-range surveillance and significantly increases friendly survivability
in the Operational Support Area. During the transition to armed conflict, the theater army
provides offensive space and counter-space control for all ground forces in theater through either
its organic capabilities or through coordination for joint capabilities. Although the theater armyis the coordinating echelon, subordinate units down to brigade-level have responsibility toidentify points in time and space that require the employment of necessary space capabilities toprotect critical assets or movements. Proactively countering enemy space surveillance isparticularly important in the Operational Support Area because the large number of potential
targets spread across a wide geographic area that exceeds the capacity of enemy strategic
reconnaissance and HUMINT. Effectively countering the enemy’s space ISR capabilities causes
the enemy to either accept more risk with strategic reconnaissance forces or shift to commercial
space surveillance. Both of these actions create exploitable vulnerabilities.
(c) Counter enemy cyber ISR. The theater and field armies direct cyberspace
defensive teams to protect critical systems for sustaining and deploying forces in the Support
Areas. This requires detailed knowledge of the theater’s networks, particularly its transportationand sustainment functions that have links to partner commercial, civilian, governmental,
military, and coalition systems. Army forces counter the enemy’s cyber reconnaissance andattacks with deception and traps, creating confusion and multiple presentations of false friendly
systems to probing enemy cyber teams.
(2) Mitigate effects of enemy attacks in the Support Areas. The theater and field armies
mitigate the effects of enemy attacks in the Support Areas to enable the reception ofexpeditionary forces executing strategic and operational maneuver. Multi-domain forces in the
Support Areas employ deception to cause the enemy to expend resources on decoys or targets
that have moved; miss fleeting opportunities; or expend high-value capabilities on less important
targets. APS are protected and hardened to allow the rapid integration of expeditionary forces
and the generation of combat power. Army forces in the Support Areas build resilience andredundancy by dispersing critical deployment and sustainment capabilities in mixed clusters andgain residual protection from air and missile defense radars and launchers, aerial surveillance,and other specialized protection capabilities that they would otherwise not be allocated.
(a) Employ deception in Operational and Tactical Support Areas. The theater andfield armies conduct deception to complicate enemy ISR in their respective areas. Similar to
deception in the Close Area, deception plans for the Support Areas employ multiples means todisperse enemy surveillance and reconnaissance and present a mixture of real, false, and36

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
exaggerated capabilities to increase operational unpredictability. The friendly forces’ deception
plan must be coherent across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment toeffectively counter the enemy’s multi-domain reconnaissance.
(b) Protect and harden Army prepositioned stocks (APS). APS sites are a criticalcomponent of calibrated force posture. Hardened APS sites provide protection, especiallyagainst cruise missile attacks. The main defense for APS sites, however, is the ability to issue
the equipment or supplies to expeditionary forces quickly, which requires maintaining storedequipment at high readiness levels, rehearsing rapid fielding procedures with designatedexpeditionary forces, and stockpiling of critical supplies and munitions to enable immediate
employment in large-scale ground combat operations.
(c) Disperse deployment and sustainment. The theater army executes deployment andsustainment along multiple, dispersed routes. Army expeditionary forces deploy from thehomeland and other regions using joint strategic transportation and arrive at multiple points intheater, proceed forward along multiple routes, and then occupy dispersed tactical assemblyareas within range of enemy anti-access and area denial systems. Aviation units employ split
basing between the Tactical and Operational Support Areas, or in the case of division formations,
between the Tactical Support and Close Areas. Aircraft and units rotate through a network ofdispersed, austere locations in the Tactical Support and Close Areas. Sustainment draws on
multiple sources for local procurement and prepositioned supplies, distributed through dispersed
supply nodes operated by forward presence units. Intensive sustainment-level maintenance of
aviation, ground and electronic combat systems, including battle damage assessment and repair
is conducted within the Operational Support Area’s lower threat environment. The Army
postures redundant sustainment infrastructure forward, plans and prepares precision logistics
support, and ensures the availability of additional expeditionary capacity through proper balanceacross the Active and Reserve Components.
f. Conclusion: Penetrate. The Joint Force penetrates strategic and operational stand-off byimmediately neutralizing the enemy’s long-range systems, contesting enemy maneuver forces inall domains, the EMS, and the information environment, and conducting strategic andoperational maneuver. The key to penetration is the neutralization of the enemy’s long-range
systems in decisive spaces enabled by Army long-range fires. The neutralization of thesesystems creates conditions for friendly forces to contest the enemy attack in the Close Area andfor expeditionary forces to conduct strategic maneuver into theater. This initial penetration
denies enemy objectives, builds friendly combat power, and enables the corps to begin the disintegration of the enemy’s long-range systems (high-tier IADS, SRBMs, long-range MRLs) andmid-range systems (mid-tier IADS, standard MRLs, self-propelled artillery) in decisive spaces.
3-7. MDO in armed conflict: Dis-integrate the enemy’s anti-access and area denial
systemsa. Multi-domain problem #3: How does the Joint Force dis-integrate enemy anti-access andarea denial systems in the Deep Areas to enable operational and tactical maneuver?

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b. Dis-integration of enemy anti-access and area denial systems requires the defeat of theenemy’s long-range systems, the neutralization of the enemy’s mid-range systems, andconducting operational maneuver to begin the dis-integration of the enemy’s mid-range systems.
These actions do not constitute a discrete phase, but overlap with the execution of penetration(described in the previous section, 3-6) and exploitation (described in section 3-8). Essential tothe dis-integration effort is continuous refinement of intelligence through multiple domains toenable the Joint Force to see or stimulate and strike the enemy’s remaining anti-access and area
denial systems. This intelligence enables the field army’s defeat of enemy long-range systems,
building on the neutralization that began in penetration. It also allows the corps to begin theinitial neutralization of the mid-range systems (MRL and cannon artillery) to enable operational
maneuver of friendly ground forces. Operational maneuver completes the dis-integration bystimulating the remaining enemy mid-range fires and fixing and isolating enemy maneuver
formations, generating favorable force ratios for friendly maneuver forces. The resulting disintegration places maneuver forces in position to conduct rapid exploitation at decisive spaces
and defeat the enemy.
c. Refine intelligence of enemy anti-access and area denial systems. Army forces provide
the foundation of intelligence collection and analysis in the Close and Deep Maneuver Areas.
The field army and corps continue to use the layered ISR network consisting of unmanned
sensors, special operations forces, human intelligence, and high-altitude surveillance. Friendly
intelligence collection focuses initially on locating the several dozen long-range systems of eachcombined arms army that prevent friendly air and ground maneuver forces from closing with theenemy (mid-tier IADS, SRBM, and long-range MRL). As dis-integration operations continue,
the focus shifts to identifying the most critical and vulnerable elements of the enemy’s mid-range
systems. The enemy protects its critical systems with camouflage, concealment, and deception,
so the field army and corps must converge multiple types of sensors to acquire targetable
intelligence. The key to converging capabilities across all domains, the EMS, and theinformation environment is high-volume analytical capability and sensor-to-shooter links
enabled by artificial intelligence, which complicates enemy deception and obscuration throughautomatic cross-cueing and target recognition. The intelligence refinement required for disintegration depends on five interrelated systems.
(1) Wide area surveillance. The field army and corps require persistent, wide-areasurveillance throughout the depth of the battlefield that is responsive to operational and tacticalintelligence demands. The enemy will attempt to degrade this capability through both active(jammers, dazzlers) and passive (decoys, camouflage) means. Persistent, wide-area surveillance,
therefore, requires redundancy with a mixture of space-based and high-altitude systems tocomplicate enemy countermeasures. The field army and corps are the primary echelons for
employing persistent, wide-area surveillance because they have the analytical capability andcapacity, communications and data infrastructure, and authorities to process, exploit, anddisseminate high-volume data.
(2) Penetrating reconnaissance. Fifth-generation fighters and other penetrating joint air
reconnaissance provide responsive collection of targets cued by persistent, wide-areasurveillance, which requires resilient communications with these aircraft and ground terminals toaccess the information for the field army and the corps.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(3) Stand-off surveillance and reconnaissance. Joint and Army stand-off air surveillance
and reconnaissance supplements the collection effort by focusing on signatures that identify
high-priority enemy systems, particularly electronic intelligence for IADS, and rapidly
processing and disseminating (within minutes) this intelligence to attack fleeting targets.
(4) Expendable surveillance and reconnaissance. Joint and Army expendable
surveillance and reconnaissance (low-cost UAS, artillery- and air-delivered unmanned sensors)refine target locations cued by other forms of intelligence and also provide a means to stimulate
enemy air defenses to allow collection by another sensor.
(5) Human networks. Special operations forces and their human intelligence networks
provide intelligence about high-priority targets and disseminate this intelligence through nonstandard communications systems to SOF coordination teams at the field army and corps.
d. Defeat enemy long-range fires systems. Army long-range fires formations in the fieldarmy’s theater fires command, reinforced by the corps’ operational fires command as required,converge with other joint capabilities to destroy or suppress enemy long-range systems (SRBM,
mid-tier IADS, anti-ship missiles, and long-range MRL). The field army, when given
responsibility for multi-domain command and control against enemy long-range systems,
converges both joint and Army capabilities into multiple see-strike or stimulate-see-strike
combinations against enemy systems that target friendly air and ground forces. The morecombinations of see-strike options the Joint Force presents, the more likely the enemy willconclude that it is impossible to counter or mitigate them all and slows its rate of fire to preserve
its critical systems. This makes stimulating and seeing enemy systems more difficult, butachieves the larger effect of creating freedom of maneuver for the Joint Force. By causing theenemy to shift to a passive, cautious posture, friendly forces gain the operational initiative andbegin the dis-integration of the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems.
(1) Stimulate long-range fires systems. Stimulating enemy long-range systems (e.g.,
IADS radars) makes them visible for detection and destruction under tactical conditions
favorable to the U.S. and partner forces. Army forces stimulate through deception or offensive
action. Stimulation through deception employs decoys mimicking the signature of friendly
aircraft, vehicles, or command nodes. Stimulation through offensive action uses cyberspace
attacks in conjunction with maneuver and air, naval, or ground fires. Although many of thecapabilities that stimulate enemy long-range systems are joint, the corps must possess the ability
and authority to employ them when it commands and controls operations against enemy longrange systems.
(2) See long-range fires systems. The primary method for identification of enemy longrange systems is wide-area, persistent space-based or high-altitude surveillance rapidly
disseminating data to a field army or corps analysis cell employing artificial intelligence or othercomputer assistive technologies to analyze the high volume of data. This combination allows
identification of high-priority targets on a “cluttered battlefield” filled with thousands ofsignatures from military and civilian sources and complicated by enemy attempts at camouflage,
concealment, and deception. The alternate method of “seeing” is with fifth-generation fighters,
cyber capabilities, SOF and HUMINT teams, or artillery- or air-delivered UAS sensors tipped to39

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
a location identified by another intelligence source that provided a reliable but low-fidelity
location. Seeing enemy long-range systems in conjunction with stimulation requires a sensor
tailored to the target and its expected reaction. For example, a counterbattery radar or a highaltitude ISR balloon with infrared sensors senses enemy long-range MRLs firing at a decoy
friendly command post. Regardless of the sensor type, converging stimulation and sensing
requires rapid analysis and dissemination (within minutes) because the enemy reaction offers
only a brief window of superiority to exploit.
(3) Strike long-range fires systems. The Joint Force generates cross-domain synergy toovercome point defenses protecting enemy long-range systems. The main Army strike capability
against enemy long-range systems is long-range precision fires (LRPF). It is the lowest cost,lowest risk, and most responsive method to attack enemy targets as they are identified in the
Deep Maneuver and Deep Fires Areas. LRPF does not require suppression of enemy defenses
for access, can be ready to fire in case the precise time of engagement is unknown, and canengage opportunity targets over large areas. LRPF, however, is best suited for attacking
stationary targets due to its long time of flight. Naval strikes and stand-off air strikes (airlaunched cruise missiles and similar systems) have characteristics similar to LRPF. Fifthgeneration aircraft are the primary means of engaging moving targets or those with reliable but
low-fidelity location data that the aircraft and pilot can improve. The Army’s persistent enablingof the Joint Force to stimulate, see, and strike the enemy’s long-range systems results in theinitial key task in dis-integrating the anti-access and area denial systems.
e. Neutralize enemy mid-range fires systems. While the field army suppresses or defeats
enemy long-range systems, the corps focuses on destroying enemy mid-range fires systems (selfpropelled artillery and standard MRLs). 37 This effort occurs simultaneously with the operational
maneuver (next section), with the corps shifting resources between the two as necessary. The
corps’ operational fires command destroys enemy mid-range fires by converging multiple seestrike combinations of Army and joint capabilities. While the enemy has dozens of long-range
systems in each combined arms army, they possess hundreds of mid-range systems. In
comparison to the long-range systems, attacking the large quantity of mid-range systems requires
simpler methods of convergence that can be executed more quickly and on a larger scale. Rather
than stimulate individual enemy radars, batteries, or battalions through meticulously planned
stimulate-see-strike combinations (as required for the long-range systems), the corps creates
simpler, quickly repeatable see-strike combinations to neutralize the enemy’s mid-range systems.
Presented with this approach, the enemy mid-range fires formations face a three-fold dilemma:
support their at-risk maneuver forces and risk destruction by U.S. fires; displace and risk
detection and destruction; or remain inactive, thereby leaving their maneuver forces without
support and risk eventually being outmaneuvered or isolated.
36F(1) See mid-range fires systems. The corps employs multiple sensors to see enemy midrange systems, which cover a large area over the duration of the counterfire fight (several days).
During such an extended period, the enemy will counter any single surveillance orreconnaissance method, so the corps must present a shifting array of multiple, layered sensors tocomplicate enemy counteractions. The corps’ primary system for identifying enemy mid-range
fires systems before they engage is persistent, wide-area high-altitude or space-based
37

With the division fires command, the division also has the capability to conduct a counterfire fight against enemy mid-range systems.

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surveillance. The primary systems for identifying enemy fires as they engage friendly forces arecounterbattery radars. Ground reconnaissance, unmanned and manned aerial systems, EW andsignals intelligence units, SOF, space, and cyberspace reconnaissance forces augment theseprimary systems. In contrast with enemy long-range systems, which require the capacity toprocess a high-volume of data to find well-hidden but largely stationary targets, detecting midrange fires systems is easier—a battalion volley of MRL creates a large signature—but requires
fast processing and decision to strike the target before it displaces.
(2) Strike mid-range fires systems. The corps converges joint and Army capabilities
against enemy mid-range fires systems. Destroying a large number of mobile systems requires
simple, rapid forms of convergence, achieved by linking sensors directly to specific forms ofstrike. Air ISR cues air strike or ground fires; counterbattery radars and persistent, wide-areahigh-altitude surveillance cue ground fires; unmanned UAS cues attack aviation and groundfires. The ability of the corps to employ relatively simple air, space, and ground capabilities inlayered combinations imposes greater complexity on enemy command and control systems
without adding significant complexity to friendly actions. As friendly maneuver forces close
within range of the mid-range systems, the division’s fires will contribute to these strike efforts,
especially against enemy mid-range systems able to effect march objectives and decisive spaces.
f. Conduct operational maneuver. Operational maneuver completes the dis-integration of
the enemy’s anti-access and area denial systems. The field army continues its defeat of the longrange systems, but transitions some capabilities to identifying high-value targets in the Close
Area and either strikes them or rapidly disseminates the data to the corps to support their
maneuver. The corps continues with its neutralization of mid-range systems and directs thedivision and brigades as they transit the Support Areas to the Close Area. The enemy willattempt to isolate and deny friendly maneuver forces support from adjacent units, multi-domain
enablers, or higher echelons. Friendly maneuver forces, anticipating the implications ofoperating in such a contested environment, prepare to execute independent maneuver andpractice intent-based synergy.
(1) Operational maneuver ideally occurs following the defeat of the enemy’s long-range
systems and the neutralization of the enemy’s mid-range systems. To protect these criticalsystems, however, the enemy may employ them in a passive, but opportunistic posture capableof engaging friendly maneuver forces at critical places in either time or space. The corps anddivision, therefore, may have to maneuver forces in the Close Area and threaten to seize key
terrain or isolate enemy maneuver forces to stimulate the enemy’s mid-range systems.
(2) The corps and the division in the Close Area employ operational deception to fix enemy
maneuver forces (a combined arms army or equivalent) and critical capabilities of their midrange systems. The corps and division employ physical and virtual deception to generate
uncertainty in the enemy’s decision making, leaving forces or capabilities out of position or at aforce ratio disadvantage relative to attacking friendly forces. Deception also prevents the enemy
from gaining the full disposition of the friendly force and delays their recognition of decisive
spaces. The corps also employs deception to stimulate the enemy mid-range system and enable
its strike by multi-domain capabilities.

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g. Conclusion: Dis-integrate. Operational maneuver, successfully executed, capitalizes on
the neutralization of the enemy’s mid-range systems to complete the dis-integration of theenemy’s anti-access and area denial systems in decisive spaces. It also sets conditions fortactical success in the Close and Deep Maneuver Area by bringing sufficient combat power with
momentum to bear in decisive spaces, ready to exploit opportunities. The dis-integration of theenemy’s anti-access and area denial systems, however, is not a permanent condition. If given
time, the enemy will regenerate the system through tactical adaptation, reorganization, andlimited reconstitution. Because it is impossible to completely dis-integrate the entire anti-accessand area denial capability of a near-peer enemy, commanders must exploit and enlarge windowsof superiority to simultaneously complete the dis-integration of the enemy and further the
exploitation of the resulting freedom of maneuver.
3-8. MDO in armed conflict: Exploit freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy objectives
a. Multi-domain problem #4: How does the Joint Force exploit freedom of maneuver toachieve strategic and operational objectives through the defeat of the enemy in the Close andDeep Maneuver Areas?
b. The Joint Force exploits the freedom of maneuver generated by dis-integrating the enemy’s
anti-access and area denial systems to defeat the enemy’s mid-range systems, neutralize its shortrange systems, and isolate and defeat enemy land forces through maneuver. Exploitation andmaneuver sustains the penetration and dis-integration of the enemy’s systems and enables theachievement of strategic objectives. The conditions for exploitation are achieved through MDO
focused at decisive spaces. Army forces optimize the employment of multi-domain capabilities
at decisive spaces and maneuver to dislocate the enemy’s defense by physically, cognitively, andvirtually isolating its subordinate elements, allowing friendly forces to achieve favorable force
ratios and decisive tactical results. The physical, political, economic, social, and cultural
importance of cities will often make them decisive spaces, critical to either denying enemy
objectives or achieving friendly ones. The Joint Force, in dense urban terrain as well as all otherterrain, links successful actions at decisive spaces to disrupt the enemy’s operational plans, deny
the enemy’s strategic objectives, and, ultimately, achieve sufficient military superiority to attainfriendly strategic objectives.
c. Defeat the enemy’s mid-range systems. The corps continues to attack the enemy’s midrange fires during exploitation. The capabilities employed to see and strike are the same as thoseused to achieve the initial neutralization (see paragraph 3-7.e). The initial friendly success,however, will cause the enemy to attempt to preserve these systems by limiting their use anddevoting greater effort to protection and survivability (e.g., more frequent survivability
movements, greater dispersion). The combination of corps fires and division maneuverovercomes this enemy attempt to prevent the defeat of its mid-range systems, which are the mostdangerous element of its tactical systems. Divisional maneuver compels the enemy to employ its
remaining mid-range systems, which the corps’ fires is ready to defeat. As the exploitation
continues, the dislocation of the enemy defense caused by friendly maneuver offers increased
opportunities to attack and overrun the enemy’s fire and sustainment formations, completing thedefeat of the enemy’s mid-range systems at the decisive spaces.

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d. Neutralize the enemy’s short-range systems. The division converges a combination ofcapabilities across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment (e.g., attack aviation;
UAS; short-range air defenses; EW; counter-position, navigation, and timing; cyberspacemeasures; fires; and maneuver forces) to neutralize the enemy’s short-range systems. The
division coordinates with the theater army for space control and space-based capabilities. The
division coordinates with the field army (or corps if acting as Land Component Command) tointegrate the division’s organic air defense and aviation capabilities (to include UAS) with thejoint air campaign. Although every echelon defends its own cyberspace, the senior tactical
headquarters (field army or corps) allocates additional cyber defense teams to the division toneutralize the attacks that occur uniquely at short range. As the primary echelon responsible formanaging the EMS, the division reinforces subordinate brigades with ground- and air-based EW
capabilities, prioritizing support to air maneuver. The division supports the aviation brigade withboth EW and fire support to suppress enemy air defenses and enable exploitation of tactical
opportunities. The enemy has a significant number of short-range systems, which makes theirneutralization essential to enabling maneuver.
e. Maneuver to isolate and defeat land forces. Divisions exploit freedom of maneuver byaccessing joint multi-domain capabilities and employing their brigades at decisive spaces. The
corps will play a significant role in supporting maneuver in dense urban terrain due to theincreased need for converging joint and interagency capabilities. Ground forces that tactically
overmatch the enemy are the foundation of the Joint Force’s ability to exploit freedom of
maneuver. Tactical overmatch is the product of adaptable, aggressive leaders and Soldiersorganized in cohesive, well-trained formations; and aircraft, fighting vehicles, small units, andindividuals with superior mobility, protection, and lethality. Divisions exploit the advantage offormation-level tactical overmatch by employing deception and maneuver to create favorable
force ratios at decisive spaces. Divisions converge the abilities to see, deceive, and maneuverwith multi-domain attacks against enemy communications, fires, and reserves. This convergenceleads to breaking the physical, virtual, and cognitive cohesion of enemy formations, causing theirdefeat.
(1) See. Divisions and brigades employ their manned and unmanned air ISR, groundreconnaissance, and EW capabilities to see. These organic capabilities are supplemented by thecorps, which analyzes data from high-volume sensors (e.g., space-based and high-altitude ISR)
for subordinate echelons and translates that information to resilient low-volume data formats.
This enables lower echelon units to access these intelligence sources even though they lack the
analytical capability or communications links to exploit the sensors directly. The combination oforganic reconnaissance and access to joint and national surveillance and intelligence provides
commanders with additional options for sensing the enemy, which aids protection, deception,
isolation, and maneuver.
(2) Maneuver to isolate. Divisions have primary responsibility for isolating enemy
elements physically, virtually, and cognitively by converging air and ground maneuver, fires,
EW, and deception. Additionally, divisions incorporate offensive space and cyberspace into thisisolation of enemy elements by accessing these capabilities through the theater and field armies.
The division fires command, combat aviation brigade, and coordinated air interdiction directedagainst enemy lines of communications, reserves, and adjacent units physically isolate maneuver

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elements through fire. Division terrestrial and aerial EW capabilities coordinated with offensive
space and cyberspace capabilities virtually isolate the enemy by disrupting enemy command andcontrol systems with a particular emphasis on reconnaissance and fires. Friendly forces achieveboth physical and virtual isolation through a combination of maneuver, the skillful use of terrain,
exploiting the initiative, and deception to fix enemy reserves and adjacent units. The
combination of physical, virtual, and cognitive isolation creates favorable force ratios formaneuver to exploit.
(3) Maneuver to defeat. The division is the foundational maneuver echelon. Divisions
direct their brigades and Brigade Combat Teams to execute basic multi-domain convergence ofmaneuver, fires, EMS operations, and air support. Divisions employ brigades simultaneously tooverwhelm the enemy through cross-domain fires and independent maneuver or in sequence toextend the duration of offensive operations. They can accomplish this even when isolated fromhigher headquarters for periods of time because of their organic fires, ISR, and ability tocommunicate locally with aircraft. Brigades integrate EW, medium-scale air operations, cyberattacks, and offensive space control into their maneuver. Independent brigades have thecapability to conduct offensive operations for 72 to96 hours. Divisions and their brigades exploit
tactical opportunities operating within the commander’s intent to achieve decisive tacticalresults.
(4) Maneuver in dense urban terrain. Dense urban terrain poses a particular challenge tofriendly exploitation of freedom of maneuver because it tends to slow the tempo of operations
and consume significant quantities of supplies, enablers, and forces. In dense urban terrain, thedivision remains the foundational element of maneuver, but it will require additional support
from the field army and corps to converge specialized capabilities and coordinate withmultinational and interagency partners. If the commander decides to bypass dense urban terrain,
then multi-domain capabilities can reduce the risk and cost of securing lines of communications
through virtual isolation, use of unmanned sensors, and deception. In other instances, the Joint
Force might enable coalition forces by augmenting them with multi-domain assets orcapabilities. Army forces will fight in dense urban terrain when it is a decisive space due to its
military, economic, or political value. Dense urban terrain offers increased possibilities for using
cyberspace- and EMS-based weapons, but it also increases the requirements for using thosecapabilities precisely. Due to the potential for collateral damage to friendly forces or to civilian
populations, the use of physical and virtual weapons will require detailed intelligence
preparation, planning, and command oversight.
f. Conclusion: Exploit. The successful exploitation creates military conditions favorable toachieving strategic objectives. Rapid exploitation minimizes the strategic and operational cost tofriendly forces and prevents the enemy from re-integrating its systems and consolidating gains in
captured territory. In a conflict with a near-peer enemy armed with nuclear weapons, theoperational exploitation, however, will conclude with some combination of policy, logistics, andresource constraints. Although the enemy’s conventional forces will be severely degraded, it
will retain cohesion and capabilities to remain a threat. If there is a period of extended politicalnegotiation, the enemy will use the threat or limited resumption of conventional operations inconjunction with unconventional and information warfare to win diplomatic advantage andundermine the consolidation of gains by friendly forces. The Joint Force, therefore, might have

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denied the enemy from achieving its objectives by penetration, dis-integration, and exploitation,
but the full attainment of friendly strategic objectives requires a successful transition fromconflict to return to competition.
3-9. MDO in return to competition: Re-compete to consolidate and expand gains
a. Multi-domain problem #5: How does the Joint Force re-compete to consolidate gains andproduce sustainable outcomes, set conditions for long-term deterrence, and adapt to the new
security environment?
b. The Joint Force and partners re-compete to retain and build upon the military advantages
gained in conflict. In an operational environment where peer enemies have nuclear capacity, it isan unlikely expectation to hope for a vanquished opponent; some form of a return to competitionand status quo is more realistic. The persistence and presence of ground forces allow the U.S. toconsolidate gains and provide continuing deterrence until the adversary no longer seeks tooverturn the outcome through a return to armed conflict. In the return to competition, Army
forces conduct three concurrent tasks: physically secure terrain and populations to produce
sustainable outcomes; set conditions for long-term deterrence by regenerating partner and Armycapacity; and adapt force posture to the new security environment.
c. Produce sustainable outcomes. In the return to competition, the field army retains overallcommand of Army conventional combat forces in their area of operations. The primary missionof these forces is to retain the physical and psychological advantages over the enemy achieved
during armed conflict and secure key terrain and friendly populations. If the expeditionary corps
redeploys, the field army resumes the role of converging large quantities of capabilities against
the adversary’s remaining mid-range fires. The potential for conventional lethal operations totake place, either in sporadic clashes during the return to competition or through the return toarmed conflict, requires the field army to continue intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
Actions in cyberspace, however, will likely continue at a high intensity level similar to that of thearmed conflict, because physical separation of the armies will not ensure that either willsurrender access to cyberspace. Operations in the information environment will also continue asboth sides seek to consolidate gains by influencing friendly and enemy civilians, militaries, andgovernments. Civil affairs activities support partner governments to re-establish essential
services and governance. At the same time, the theater army supports joint and multinational
irregular warfare against other proxies outside of the field army’s area of operations and supports
any allied corps or division deterring enemy conventional attacks outside the field army’s area of
operations. Taken together, these Army efforts at echelon consolidate gains rapidly and create afoundation for deterrence.
d. Set conditions for long-term deterrence. Army forces set conditions for long-term
deterrence by regenerating and expanding both Army and partner capacity. Forward presence
Army forces use defensive planning and preparation that deter a return to conflict as a means ofbuilding greater interoperability with partner forces. The field army also uses the relative
freedom of maneuver in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment afforded by the
post-conflict environment to set the conditions for a sustainable, advantageous calibrated force
posture. The Army enables deterrence by rapid regeneration of munitions stockpiles, which will
be severely depleted after even a relatively short campaign. Army forces assist the building or45

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
regenerating of partner capabilities and capacity for self-defense against conventional andunconventional threats. SOF and security force assistance forces are essential to rebuilding
partner capacity and strengthening deterrence. From the adversary’s perspective, the Joint
Force’s and Army’s actions show an increasing and enduring ability to counter aggression,
demonstrated through robust exercises, cyber reconnaissance, and information operations. In
combination, they renew and set conditions for long-term deterrence.
e. Adapt to the new security environment. Conflict causes significant changes to regional
security environments. Army forces provide persistent presence to ensure the new security
environment is advantageous for the U.S. and its partners. The theater and field armies
coordinate with partners, joint headquarters, and Headquarters, Department of the Army to best
adapt calibrated force posture to the new operational environment. Army forces retain thecapability to immediately counter and rapidly renew offensive operations. Reserve component
formations extend Army presence while allowing the regeneration of expeditionary readiness.
f. Return to competition. Through a successful transition from armed conflict to the return
to competition, the Joint Force translates operational success in armed conflict to the attainmentof strategic objectives. The consolidation of gains, reconstitution of friendly forces, and building
capacity of partners enables long-term deterrence of renewed armed conflict. More importantly,
the successful adaptation to the new security environment results in an overall improvement of
the United States’ strategic position.
Chapter 4
Conclusion
a. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept challenges Army leaders to visualize
and conduct maneuver in fundamentally new ways that enable the defeat of Chinese and Russian
systems. Convergence enables Army forces to compete with capable adversaries, and topenetrate and dis-integrate their anti-access and area denial systems—even when outnumbered—by attacking vulnerabilities in the enemy’s military system. Convergence, however,will not be easy to achieve. Army headquarters must not only have the technical, intellectual,and doctrinal tools to execute multi-domain command and control, but rigorous joint andcombined training to realize it. In this way, Army forces achieve intent-based synergy across all
domains, the EMS, and the information environment to compete, penetrate, dis-integrate, exploit,
and re-compete.
b. The Army organizes for MDO with echeloned formations that conduct intelligence,
maneuver, and strike activities across all domains, the EMS, and the information environment. 38
Army formations maneuver by moving and linking capabilities in multiple or unexpected ways
and sequences to defeat or destroy adversaries’ military systems. This method of maneuver atechelon by Army forces overwhelms Chinese and Russian military systems at critical spaces
37F

The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver, 2020-2040 defines cross-domain maneuver as “the employment of mutually
supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities in multiple domains to generate overmatch, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and enable Joint
Force freedom of movement and action.”
38

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with multiple dilemmas and massed effects, creating windows of superiority for the Joint Forceto accomplish objectives. 39
38F

c. MDO requires the Army to develop or improve capabilities to contribute cross-domain
options to the Joint Force, by:(1) Calibrating force posture geographically and across all the Army components to defeat
Chinese and Russian offensive operations in competition and to deter escalation to armed
conflict. 40
39F(2) Preparing the operational environment by building partner capacity and interoperability
and setting the theater through such activities as establishing basing and access rights,
prepositioning equipment and supplies, conducting preparatory intelligence activities, andmapping EMS and computer networks. 41 (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization
Priorities: Army Network)
40F(3) Building partners’ and allies’ capacities and capabilities to defeat increasingly
sophisticated Chinese and Russian -sponsored unconventional and information warfare.
(4) Preparing the operational environment for competition and conflict by building
understanding of and capabilities in select urban areas of particular operational or strategic
importance.
(5) Establishing precision logistics that provides a reliable, agile, and responsive
sustainment capability necessary to support rapid power projection, MDO, and independent
maneuver from the Strategic Support Area to the Deep Maneuver Area. (Supported by Army
Materiel Modernization Priorities: Future Vertical Lift, Army Network)(6) Establishing necessary authorities and permissions normally reserved for conflict or tohigher echelons to operate in competition and rapidly transition to conflict effectively.
(7) Improving the capability to conduct MDO in dense urban terrain at all echelons throughthe development of tactics and capabilities to increase the accuracy, speed, and synchronizationof lethal and nonlethal effects. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long
Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicle, Army Network, Soldier Lethality)(8) Supporting a credible U.S. information narrative through cross-domain actions that
communicate and counter threats by Chinese and Russian reconnaissance, strike, combined arms,
and unconventional warfare capabilities.

As an example, Army formations can maneuver—or assist Joint Force maneuver—as a reconnaissance action, fighting to gain intelligence, key
terrain, and set conditions that enable strikes, rather than maneuvering only after passive intelligence collection, deliberate analysis, and precision
strikes have prepared the battlefield for maneuver.
40
The idea of calibrating and re-calibrating force posture globally aligns with the idea of “forming operationally coherent forces” as described in
the Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation.
41“Setting the theater” encompasses the actions to establish and maintain conditions to seize the initiative and retain freedom of action for a
specific theater. These actions may occur outside of the theater, as well.
39

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(9) Enabling commanders and staffs at each echelon to visualize and command a battle inall domains, the EMS, and the information environment and shift capabilities rapidly between
domains and organizations to mass combat power against Chinese and Russian vulnerabilities.
This requires new tools to more rapidly converge capabilities across the Joint Force, shifting
training paradigms, and changing personnel and talent management practices. This also requiresthat Army formations be trained, manned, and equipped to leverage all available information,from national, joint, commercial, and Service repositories and libraries, or directly fromcollection assets seamlessly and in a time dominant manner. (Supported by Army Materiel
Modernization Priorities: Army Network, Soldier Lethality)(10) Providing to the Joint Force Commander multi-domain formations and systems thatcan converge capabilities to attack specific vulnerabilities in Chinese and Russian multi-layered,mutually reinforcing military forces and systems. This means creating commanders and staffs
who have the means and ability to access and employ capabilities that reside across the Joint
Force. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires,
Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Soldier Lethality)(11) Providing to the Joint Force Commander with multi-domain formations that havesystems, leaders, and Soldiers that are durable, can operate in a highly contested operational
environment, cannot easily be isolated from the rest of the Joint Force or from partners, and able
to conduct independent maneuver and employ cross-domain fires. This requires extended
sustainability of systems and formations, and leaders and Soldiers who continue to operate
effectively in austere environments and conditions. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization
Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift,
Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, Soldier Lethality)(12) Consolidating gains through clear demonstrations of U.S. security commitments topartners through combined exercises, training, and other presence activities.
(13) Enabling and complementing land, air, and maritime capabilities with operations inspace, cyberspace, and the EMS to support the opening of and exploitation of windows ofsuperiority creating dilemmas for the enemy while protecting the ability to conduct friendly
operations in degraded, disrupted, and/or denied operational environments.
(14) Attracting, retaining, and making maximum use of high-quality, physically fit,mentally tough Soldiers who have the skills and expertise to conduct MDO.
d. The U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept drives experimentation; informs
capability and doctrine development; and frames organizational trade-offs and force posturedecisions that restore the Army’s ability as part of the Joint Force to deter adversaries that utilize
Chinese and Russian systems. MDO is at present an Army concept—informed by contributions
from other Services and partners—describing Army contributions to and requirements for a joint
campaign conducted alongside partners against near-peer adversaries. Future development of
MDO will test the method of operations described in this edition of the concept in otherscenarios and with even greater involvement from the Joint Force and partners.

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Appendix A
Assumptions
A-1. Baseline Assumptions
a. The U.S. Army will remain a professional, all-volunteer force, relying on all components of
the Army to meet future commitments.
b. The Army will adjust to fiscal constraints and have resources sufficient to preserve thebalance of readiness, force structure, and modernization necessary to meet the demands of thenational defense strategy in the mid- to far-term (2020 to 2040).
c. Except for an immediate response to a national emergency, the Army will conduct
operations as part of joint, interagency, and multinational teams.
A-2. Fundamental assumptions
a. Adversaries will challenge U.S. interests by means and with ways below the threshold ofarmed conflict and short of what the U.S. considers war.
b. Adversaries can conduct armed conflict via regional campaigns with limited warning toseize limited strategic objectives and consolidate gains within days or weeks.
c. The proliferation of precision-guided weapons, integrated air defenses, cyberspace
weapons, counterspace weapons, and other technologies allows an increasing number ofpotential adversaries to contest and hold at risk U.S. forces in all domains, the EMS, and theinformation environment at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
d. U.S. and partner political authorities will authorize and enable sufficient force posture andreadiness levels to respond to and defeat near-peer adversaries if deterrence fails.
e. U.S. and partner governments will provide authorities for friendly forces to conduct
operational preparation of the environment, as well as offensive EMS, cyberspace, space,
unconventional warfare, and information environment operations to deter and defeat adversaries.
f. U.S. and partner government agencies, headquarters, and fielded forces will develop andsustain sufficient interoperability between Services, government agencies, and allies to conduct
combined operations that deter and defeat adversaries.
g. Neither the U.S. nor adversaries will employ nuclear weapons. The use of such weapons
would so significantly alter the strategic context that different operational approaches would be
required. (This assumption does not mean that this concept ignores the threat of nuclear
weapons. Army forces must be resilient against all possible forms of attack. Furthermore,commanders will have to account for the possibility of nuclear attack in formulating schemes ofmaneuver and accounting for the risk of escalation that might lead to operational restrictions on
where and how the Joint Force operates.)

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Appendix B
Key Required Capabilities
B-1. Introduction. This appendix lists capabilities needed to conduct MDO as described in thisconcept.
B-2. Required capabilities
a. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability tocalibrate force posture geographically and across all the Army components to defeat Chinese andRussian offensive operations in competition and to deter escalation to armed conflict.
(Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires)
b. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to
prepare the operational environment by building partner capacity and interoperability and setting
the theater through such activities as establishing basing and access rights, prepositioning
equipment and supplies, conducting preparatory intelligence activities, and mapping EMS andcomputer networks. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Army Network)c. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability tobuild partners’ capacities and capabilities to defeat increasingly sophisticated Chinese andRussian -sponsored unconventional and information warfare.
d. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to
prepare the operational environment for competition and conflict by building understanding ofand capabilities in select urban areas of particular operational or strategic importance.
e. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require precisionlogistics that provides a layered, agile, and responsive sustainment capability necessary tosupport operations from the Strategic Support Area to the Deep Maneuver Area. Precisionlogistics is enabled by: a sustainment enterprise resource planning decision support system withpredictive analysis tools and the ability to resupply without request and/or redirect supplies basedon priority; a real-time common operating picture viewable by commanders and logisticians atechelon; and significant demand reduction across the Total Force to lessen delivery requirementsby as much as 50% and extend operational time and reach of formations.
f. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require necessary
authorities and permissions to operate in competition and rapidly transition to conflict
effectively.
g. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability to
conduct MDO in dense urban terrains at all echelons with tactics and capabilities that increase
the accuracy, speed, and synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects. (Supported by Army
Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat
Vehicle, Army Network, Soldier Lethality)

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h. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability tosupport a credible U.S. information narrative through cross-domain actions that communicate
and counter threats by Chinese and Russian reconnaissance, strike, combined arms, andunconventional warfare capabilities.
i. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability toenable commanders and staffs at each echelon to visualize and command a battle in all domains,the EMS, and the information environment and shift capabilities rapidly between domains andorganizations to mass combat power against Chinese and Russian vulnerabilities. This requires
new tools to more rapidly converge capabilities across the Joint Force, shifting training
paradigms, and changes in personnel and talent management practices. This also requires that
Army formations be trained, manned, and equipped to leverage all available information, fromnational, joint, commercial, and Service repositories and libraries, or directly from collection
assets seamlessly and in a time dominant manner. (Supported by Army Materiel Modernization
Priorities: Army Network, Soldier Lethality)
j. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability toprovide to the Joint Force Commander multi-domain formations and systems that can converge
capabilities to attack specific vulnerabilities in Chinese and Russian multi-layered, mutually
reinforcing military forces and systems. This means building tactical formations and leaders that
can think through, access, and/or employ capabilities that reside across the Joint Force.
(Supported by Army Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next
Generation Combat Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Soldier Lethality)
k. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require resilient multidomain formations with systems, leaders, and Soldiers that are durable, can persist in a difficult
operational environment, cannot easily be isolated from the rest of the Joint Force or frompartners, and able to conduct independent maneuver and employ cross-domain fires. Thisrequires extended sustainability of systems and formations, and leaders and Soldiers who
continue to operate effectively in austere environments and conditions. (Supported by Army
Materiel Modernization Priorities: Long-Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat
Vehicles, Future Vertical Lift, Army Network, Air and Missile Defense, Soldier Lethality)
l. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability toconsolidate gains through clear demonstrations of U.S. security commitments to partners throughcombined exercises, training, and other presence activities.
m. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, Army forces require the ability toenable and complement land, air, and maritime capabilities with operations in space, cyberspace,
and the EMS to support the opening of and exploitation of windows of superiority, creating
dilemmas for the enemy while protecting the ability to conduct friendly operations in degraded,disrupted, and/or denied operational environments.
n. To conduct MDO in a highly contested environment, the Army must attract, retain, andmake maximum use of high-quality, physically fit, mentally tough Soldiers who have the skills
and expertise to conduct MDO.

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Appendix C
MDO Supporting Ideas
C-1. Maneuver in MDO
a. Maneuver is the combination of movement and fires to achieve positions of advantage that
defeats the enemy. 42 Movement is the adjustment of the physical location of a capability toanother more favorable location. In addition to the physical effect of repositioning, movement
usually produces cognitive effects on the enemy, as well. All military capabilities originate froma physical location and undergo movement (of some form) when employed, even thosecapabilities intended to produce cognitive or virtual effects. Fires are the destructive or
disruptive effects a formation or asset produces on an enemy. Fires can produce a combinationof physical, virtual, and cognitive effects on the enemy. Fires, even if they are particles or
waves, must also travel through a domain to reach their intended target, which is also a physicallocation, even if the target is a computer or a human mind.
41F

b. MDO requires fires and maneuver to operate within and across domains. Cross-domain
fires and cross-domain maneuver exploit an opportunity from one or more domains intended toachieve an advantage in another domain.
(1) Cross-domain maneuver is the employment of mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal
capabilities of multiple domains to create conditions designed to generate overmatch, present
multiple dilemmas to the enemy, and enable Joint Force freedom of movement and action.
(2) Cross-domain fires is the integration and delivery of lethal and nonlethal fires acrossall five domains (land, maritime, air, space and cyberspace), the EMS, and the information
environment.
c. Cross-domain maneuver and cross-domain fires are a realization that a commander mustvisualize and exploit the physical, virtual, and cognitive effects of maneuver and fires in multiple
domains and environments over time. For example, a ground tactical formation must operate in(and potentially affect, if it contains appropriate cross-domain capabilities) the relevant air andmaritime domains above or adjacent to its land-based area of operations, as well as understandcyberspace, EMS, information environment, and space activities that can impact friendly
operations. Based on this visualization, the commander must converge organic and available
Joint Force capabilities in time and at the proper place to identify, create, and exploit windows ofsuperiority.
C-2. MDO frameworka. The operational environment, threats, and problems envisioned in MDO demand aframework that brings order to the complexities of a multi-domain environment. Because nearpeer adversaries contest and can deny all domains, the EMS, and the information environment at
extended distances, current and anticipated future problems exceed what could be assigned
42
An enemy force is defeated when it has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. To defeat the enemy, joint
forces destroy, dislocate, dis-integrate, and isolate enemy forces.

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within a single area of operations under the current joint operational framework. The MDO
framework must also account for all domains, extending to space and cyberspace, as well as the
EMS and information environment, because activities in these domains across time produce
tactical, operational, and strategic effects not captured by the existing joint framework. 43 An
expanded multi-domain framework allows commanders to arrange operations in the emerging
operational environment. The MDO framework (see figure 2-1) provides an expanded physicalframework from which to reference actions across all domains, the EMS, and the information
environment conducted by the Joint Force, partners, adversaries, and enemies.
42F

b. Since the MDO framework is operational, it is also grounded in physical spaces. Abstract
aspects more evident in some domains are also grounded physically, despite their predominantly
immaterial presentations. At some point, all the abstract elements (cognitive, virtual,
informational, and human) demonstrate their effects physically at a place or in an area through asystem or people. Representing these elements in a physically based framework clarifies analready very complex multi-domain operational environment for commanders and staffs. The
following description of the framework places all friendly and enemy activities and physicallocations in categories of physical space as the fundamental visualization layer.
c. The areas in the MDO framework are defined by the mixture of capabilities (both friendly
and enemy) available for use within each area. MDO take a different form in each area because
the two contending sides have a different mixture of capabilities available for competing andfighting. Because of the expanded battlefield in which actions in one area can influence another,the breadth of the battlefield needs to be placed within a single, simple framework to illustratethese sometimes complex relationships. Though depicted geometrically for simplicity, the areas
within the framework are not defined by geographic space or relationships. In some theaters, forexample, a Deep Maneuver Area could be physically adjacent to an Operational Support Area
due to the types of capabilities available to each side. The complementary nature of unique andinteroperable Service capabilities provides the Joint Force multiple options to maneuver in areas
inaccessible to single-Service and single-domain solutions. Previous depictions of the battlefield
did not capture the full range of places and times that friendly and enemy capabilities interact in
the current and future operational environment. This increased number of battlefield areas,
expansion in geographic area, and extended time horizons are new features of MDO.
d. MDO framework spaces(1) Deep Fires Areas: The Operational and Strategic Deep Fires Areas comprise the Deep
Fires Areas. These areas are defined as the areas beyond the feasible range of movement for
conventional forces but where joint fires, SOF, information, and virtual capabilities can be
employed. Operational and Strategic Deep Fires Areas are differentiated by the types ofcapabilities that can, or are authorized, to operate in each area. These areas are either too far(beyond operational reach) for conventional maneuver forces to enter or they are prohibited bypolicy (such as an international border). 44 Therefore, operations in the Deep Fires Areas are
43F

FM 3-0, C1 dated 6 Dec 2017 incorporates some of the ideas related to the framework proposed by this concept (pp. 1-29 to 1-35).
In cases where policy restrictions create Deep Fires Areas, the areas might be geographically non-contiguous. For instance, in acounterinsurgency campaign the Joint Force might have full freedom of action within the host country but is allowed to use only virtual
capabilities against the enemy sanctuary in a neighboring country. In that instance, the international border would represent the boundary
between Close and Deep Fires Areas.

43
44

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
limited to whatever physical and virtual capabilities are permitted by law or policy and that canoperate in the heart of enemy defenses. This limited accessibility and the inherent difficulty ofoperating deep within enemy territory place a premium on the ability to combine and employ
whatever capabilities are available from across all domains, the EMS, and the information
environment.
(2) Deep Maneuver Area: This area is the highly contested area where conventional
maneuver (ground or maritime) is possible, but requires significant support from multi-domain
capabilities; commanders must make a concerted effort to “break into” the Deep Maneuver Area.
Because more friendly capabilities possess the range and survivability to influence or operate
within this space than in the Deep Fires Areas, and because commanders can take advantage ofthe combination of fire and movement, there are many more options for Joint Force employment
here than in the Deep Fires Areas. Moreover, the persistence of ground and maritime maneuver
forces allows operations to persist for far longer than in the Deep Fires Areas, where effects willoften be more transitory. In most anticipated campaign designs, many operational objectives arein the Deep Maneuver Area.
(3) Close Area: The Close Area is where friendly and enemy formations, forces, andsystems are in imminent physical contact and will contest for control of physical space in supportof campaign objectives. The Close Area includes land, maritime littorals, and the airspace overthese areas. The new operational environment and improved enemy and friendly capabilities
have expanded the Close Area. Operations in the Close Area require tempo and mobility inorder to overcome these enemy capabilities through sufficiently integrated and concentrated
combat power at the critical time and space. Characteristics of the Close Area present challenges
to integrating cross-domain capabilities because of the reduced time available to access andemploy enablers, such as centrally controlled, low-density capabilities. Commanders employ
capabilities from all domains, the EMS, and the information environment, organic and external,
in the Close Area to generate complementary effects of combined arms, but speed of action,
coordination, and synchronization of effects place a premium on organic capabilities. Operationsin the Close Area are designed to create windows of superiority for maneuver to defeat enemy
forces, disrupt enemy capabilities, physically control spaces, and protect and influence
populations.
(4) Support Areas: Collectively, the Support Areas represent that space in which the
Joint Force seeks to retain maximum freedom of action, speed, and agility and to counter theenemy’s multi-domain efforts to attack friendly forces, infrastructure, and populations. The
nature of these threats varies with the adversary, though with current technology virtually all
adversaries will have reach into the homeland (for example, through cyberspace, information
warfare, agents, sympathizers, and space), even if only by using social media to undermine
public support and encourage “lone-wolf attacks.” The reach of regional powers is also growing
and the most potent adversaries already possess multiple advanced cyberspace, space, andphysical capabilities (air, naval, special operations, and/or missile forces) that can contest thefriendly rear areas at all times. Though enemy capabilities will vary with the situation, acommon requirement will be the need to ensure that responsibilities, resources, and authorities
are properly aligned among echelons, functions, and political organizations. Consequently, theC-3

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Support Areas are divided according to friendly and enemy capabilities typically operating ineach area.
(a) The Strategic Support Area: This area is the area of cross-Combatant Command
coordination, strategic sea and air lines of communications, and the homeland. Most friendly
nuclear, space and cyberspace capabilities, and important network infrastructure are controlled
and located in the Strategic Support Area. Joint logistics and sustainment functions required tosupport MDO campaigning throughout competition and armed conflict emanate from theStrategic Support Area. The enemy will attack the Strategic Support Area to disrupt and degrade
deployments and reinforcements attempting to gain access to the Operational Support Area andmove to the Close Area, taking advantage of the reach of strategic lethal and nonlethal weapons,
as well as special operations reconnaissance and strikes. Enemy engagements in the Strategic
Support Area will drive a rapid tempo of friendly operations in other areas to seek decision andlimit enemy options for escalation.
(b) The Operational Support Area: This is the area where many key Joint Force missioncommand, sustainment, and fires/strike capabilities are located; these can be land or sea-based.
This area normally encompasses many entire nations, thus making the Operational Support Area
an important space for friendly political-military integration. Due to the political and militaryimportance of the Operational Support Area, the enemy targets this area with substantial
reconnaissance, information warfare, and operational fires capabilities. Friendly units
maneuvering in the Operational Support Area, therefore, are never out of contact. The Joint
Force will enable friendly operations in this area by dedicating significant capacity during armed
conflict to open windows of superiority in the Operational Support Area that enable friendly
operations.
(c) The Tactical Support Area: This is the area that directly enables operations in the
Close, Deep Maneuver, and Deep Fires Areas. Many friendly sustainment, fires, maneuver
support, and mission command capabilities are in the Tactical Support Area. The enemy directs
information warfare, unconventional warfare, tactical fires, maneuver forces, and even
operational fires at friendly forces, populations, and civil authorities in the Tactical Support
Area. Friendly units in the Tactical Support Area must be prepared to endure threat fires anddefeat enemy ground force infiltration through and penetrations of the Close Area. Mobility andsurvivability are key requirements for friendly forces operating in or rapidly transiting this area.
C-3. MDO at echelon
a. Theater army.
(1) In competition and return to competition:• Set conditions for competitive campaigning by working with joint and multinational
partners to defeat information and unconventional warfare in countries away from theadversary’s near abroad

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1• Translate tactical successes in defeating information and unconventional warfare byusing aggressive competition as a means to deepen cooperation and improve the U.S.’s strategic
posture in the region• Deter armed conflict by building resilience in friendly command and control,
sustainment, and other force generation capabilities located in the Operational Support Area,
with a particular focus on enabling quick draw of APS• Coordinate with partners on cyberspace defense of key logistics and transportation
systems; develop resilience by creating back-up methods to ensure sustainment• Set the theater intelligence architecture, provide access to theater collection anddatabases, conduct open source intelligence in support of IEO, establish intelligencepartnerships, facilitate intelligence engagement, and provide counterintelligence in support offorce protection in the Operational Support Area
(2) In conflict:• Counter enemy SOF actions against the Operational Support Area through the provisionof intelligence and enablers to partner security forces• In conjunction with other components, provide ballistic and cruise missile defense for
critical targets• Enable joint maneuver in the Close and Deep Areas through long-range fires provided by
the Theater Fires Command• Coordinate offensive space control for Army forcesb. Field army.
(1) In competition and return to competition:• Set the campaign through focused tactical and technical intelligence on critical adversary
military systems that then drives war and deployment plans, training, and resource decisions• Set the campaign through creation of multi-layered ISR belts in likely areas of enemy
aggression• Coordinate with the Air Component to ensure continuity of support in the Close Area
• Set conditions for competitive campaigning by working with joint and multi-national
partners to counter information and unconventional warfare in countries most threatened by theadversary

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1• Translate tactical successes in countering information and unconventional warfare byusing aggressive competition as a means to deepen cooperation and improve the U.S.’s strategic
posture in the region with most threatened partners• Deter armed conflict by building resilience in the Tactical Support Area so that U.S. andpartner forces can stage a credible force within range of adversary anti-access and area denial
systems• Orchestrate actions with information environment operations to counter adversary
narratives in the most threatened partner countries(2) In conflict:• Counter enemy SOF actions against the Operational Support Area through the provisionof intelligence and enablers to partner security forces• Employ Army high-altitude ISR platforms to develop stand-off intelligence of enemy
mid-range IADS and fires• Coordinate complex joint convergence (air and naval strikes, cyberspace) in support ofcorps scheme of maneuver or on behalf of subordinate echelons• Be prepared to assist theater army with enabling joint maneuverc. Corps.
• Coordinate complex joint convergence if no field army present• Employ divisions simultaneously to overwhelm enemy or in sequence to extend theduration of operations• Provide access to subordinate echelons by tailoring high-volume intelligence requiring
significant analysis capacity and communications bandwidth to manageable data
d. Division.
• Coordinate complex electromagnetic and information operations convergence• Employ brigades simultaneously to overwhelm enemy or in sequence to extend theduration of operations
e. Brigade.
• Coordinate simple convergence of maneuver, ground, and air internally and be able tointegrate complex convergence into scheme of maneuver with the assistance of higher echelons

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1• Conduct independent maneuver based on intent and employing internal convergence andresilience if physically and virtually isolated
C-4. Convergence considerations
a. Physical, virtual, and cognitive capabilities across the domains, environments, andfunctions often possess substantially different time characteristics that govern how they can be
employed. When creating and exploiting windows of superiority, commanders must visualize
and execute combined arms maneuver in new ways because the varied characteristics of different
capabilities that must be converged at a place or places to achieve a purpose impose unique time
considerations to operations. The Joint Force and its partners must also reconsider time in termsof converging actions during competition to achieve objectives without resort to, but also
through transition to, armed conflict and a return to competition. To support converging
capabilities in time and purpose at decisive spaces, MDO proposes five elements—preparation
time, planning and execution time, duration time, reset time, and cycle time—to visualize theconvergence of capabilities. Preparation time is the time required to produce conditions required
for a capability’s employment. Planning and execution time is the time required to initiate
movement combined with the time required to move or transmit to the objective. Duration timeis the time that a capability produces the intended effect. Reset time is the time required toregenerate a capability between employments. Cycle time is one iteration of planning throughreset time. Understanding time is both art and science as elements of time for some capabilities,
such as planning and execution time for a ballistic missile attack, can (or must) be known withgreat certainty while other aspects, such as duration of a cyberspace effect, can only be
estimated.
b. At the operational level, MDO requires the modulation cycles and usage rates. There is an
art and a science to the application of convergence. Perfect synchronization is generally
unobtainable due to operational constraints. Additionally, utilizing all available assets at once
may not support desired operational outcomes. Some assets have limited-use timeframes andmust be held back for when the application has the highest payoff. Commanders will invariably
accept less-than-perfect multi-domain synchronization in order to maintain a higher tempo. The
mission dictates campaign tempo, not domain synchronization.
c. Figure C-1 provides general characteristics for the four cycles (ground, air, maritime, andenduring virtual weapons).

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Cycle TypeGround 45

Build-up Time (if notalready present in theater)
Very long (months)

Persistence When
EmployedLong (days)

Air

Short (days)

Short (hours)

Maritime

Medium (weeks)

Very long (months)

44F

Reset IntervalLong (days toweeks)
Short (hours to
days)
Very long(weeks) 46
Very short(minutes tohours) 48
45F

Enduring virtual weapons(cyberspace/space/EW)

Short (days)

47
46F

Very short (seconds tominutes)

47F

Figure C-1. Characteristics of the ground, air, maritime, andenduring virtual weapons cycles

d. The two usage rates are preferred munitions and expendable virtual weapons. As opposedto the cycles representing capabilities that can be continually used so long as they do not suffer
attrition, the two usage rate categories decrease with use. Due to the significant time required toreplenish these stockpiles when compared to the anticipated usage, it is only a slightoversimplification to regard them as essentially a fixed arsenal that must be carefully managed.
Losing the “battle of the burn rates” and thereby being forced to severely curtail the use ofpreferred munitions or expendable virtual weapons while the adversary still has significant
quantities would put the Joint Force at a severe disadvantage. Put differently, failing to manage
usage rates in conjunction with the four cycles nullifies MDO and effectively returns one side to
the 20th century while their better-supplied (or more judicious) enemy retains 21st century
capabilities.
e. In conjunction, the limits of the four cycles and two usage rates define the art of thepossible at the operational level. The Joint Force Commander’s allocation of resources and risks
within each establishes the tempo of the campaign. There is no fixed relation among thesecycles and usage rates; the proper balance will vary according to the situation. The essential
takeaway is that the degree of multi-domain capability will vary over the course of a campaign.
Tactical commanders should not assume that all domain capabilities will be available at any
given time.

45
For instance, the deployment of a division with some combination of Stryker and Armored Brigade Combat Teams would require several
months, particularly against an adversary capable of contesting strategic lines of communications. In a deliberate offensive operation, thedivision might be able to sustain operations for several days before culmination. Depending on the attrition and expenditure of stocks, it could
then require days or weeks to reset before a similar effort.
46
Reset refers to out-of-theater replenishment, such as is required for reloading vertical launch tubes. If the reset requires repairing significant
battle damage, then it could extend to months or years.
47
This category covers a large array of capabilities for which it is difficult to make generalizations. This rating envisions a capability with asmall set of personnel and equipment that could be rapidly deployed by air. Some capabilities in this category are global and so have no build-up
time. Others might require technical infrastructure that could require weeks or months to put in place.
48
Again, it is difficult to generalize about this broad array of categories. Decades of experience with EW suggests that unlike the other cycles,
the reset interval will often not be the limiting factor of use. Cold War doctrine did not envision continuous jamming but intermittent use tied tothe scheme of maneuver in order to maintain survivability, security, and effectiveness of EW assets.

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C-5. Information environment operations (IEO) 49
48F

a. Information operations is the current terminology used by the Department of Defense(DoD) for operations in the information environment. To support MDO, information operations
must evolve to IEO. IEO synchronizes information related capabilities (IRC), in concert with
operations, to create effects in and through the information space. 50 IRC advance thecommander's intent and concept of operations; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in theinformation space; and consolidate gains in the information environment, to achieve a decisive
information advantage over enemies and adversaries. IEO can provide commanders additional
ways and means to:
49F• Degrade, disrupt, or destroy threat capabilities that inform or influence decision making.
• Degrade, disrupt, or destroy threat capabilities that command and control maneuver,fires, intelligence, communications, and information warfare capabilities employed against
friendly forces.
• Protect friendly information, technical networks, and decision-making capabilities froman exploitation by adversary/enemy information warfare assets.
• Influence enemy formations and populations to reduce their will to fight.
• Influence friendly and neutral populations to enable friendly operations.
b. In support of MDO, IEO must be fully integrated into the planning and execution of thejoint targeting process. When converged with other capabilities, IEO directly supports opening
and exploiting windows of superiority during competition and armed conflict. The militarycapabilities that contribute to IEO which should be taken into consideration include: strategic
communications, joint and interagency coordination, public affairs, civil-military operations,cyberspace operations, information assurance, space operations, military information support tooperations, intelligence, military deception, operations security, EMS operations, and militaryand civilian engagement.
c. Commanders must understand the information space and determine how enemies andadversaries operate in that environment. Understanding begins with analyzing theadversary/enemy’s use of the information space and how it employs IRC to gain an advantage.
It continues with determining threat vulnerabilities that friendly forces can exploit andidentifying areas which must be defended against adversary/enemy IRC.
d. IEO provides commanders an implementation strategy and integrative framework for
employing IRC. An integrated IEO campaign may include the use of the cyberspace domain, thespace domain, and the EMS to deliver IEO products, observe enemy or adversary actions and49
IEO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of information related capabilities (IRC) in concert with other lines of operations
to influence, deceive, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of enemies and adversaries while protecting our own; to influence enemy
formations and populations to reduce their will to fight; and influence friendly and neutral populations to enable friendly operations.
50
For purposes of this concept, the information space refers to the complex system of interrelated and networked information flows amongst andbetween populations that a commander must understand and consider to gain and maintain freedom of action.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
reactions, or to deliver cyberspace, space, or EW effects. Integrating cyberspace, space, and EW
capabilities generates synergistic information space effects. When employed as part of IEO that
includes multiple IRC; intelligence, cyberspace, space, and EW operations can provide
commanders an alternative solution to challenging operational problem sets.
C-6. Engagement 51
50F

a. Since war is fundamentally and primarily a human endeavor, the Joint Force working with
its partners, must address the cognitive aspects of political, human, social, and culturalinteractions to achieve operational and national objectives. Employing engagement, the Joint
Force and its partners synchronize activities to understand, influence, and achieve humaninteractions which cross all domains, the EMS, and the information environment to achieve a
position of relative advantage during competition or armed conflict. Engagement enables U.S.
forces to outmaneuver an adversary cognitively as well as physically and virtually to deter,counter, and deny the escalation of violence in competition, and defeat the enemy if armed
conflict cannot be avoided. Additionally, through engagement, routine contact and interaction
between the Joint Force and its partners build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate
mutual activities, and maintain influence.
b. Employing the operational tenets of engagement presents multiple dilemmas to an enemy,
converging multi-domain capabilities that will create windows of superiority for friendly
forces. 52 In the best case, engagement activities can strengthen U.S. options and measures incompetition, and avert or deter armed conflict. However, if armed conflict cannot be avoided,
engagement provides a deeper and common understanding of the operational environment, andenables opening windows of superiority and turning denied spaces into contested spaces.
51F

c. A cognitive window of superiority is created by degrading, disrupting, or otherwise
manipulating a decision maker’s understanding and decision cycle or influencing a formation’sor population’s will to establish favorable conditions. Achieving cognitive windows ofsuperiority requires careful consideration of the following tenets:• Understand human factors of the operational environment 53
52F• Incorporate human factors into campaign and operations planning, training, andexercises• Build partner operational, institutional, governance, and expeditionary capabilities, andjoint, interagency, and multinational partner networks• Operate with and through joint, interagency, and multinational partners and indigenous
populations to shape the operational environment and conduct security activities
Engagement is the combination of physical, informational, and psychological actions taken to influence actors' decision making (moral andmental).
52
Some examples of these dilemmas include: security cooperation activities can strengthen an ally’s defensive capabilities and resolve; civil
affairs operations can help influence a population positively toward U.S. presence and operations; military information support to operations canshape an enemy’s will to fight; interactions with the host nation can develop valuable situational understanding.
53
Human factors are the physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions,
understanding, and interaction.
51

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Appendix D
MDO in Dense Urban Terrain (DUT)
D-1. Introduction
a. Purpose. This appendix applies MDO ideas and solutions to a dense urban terrain. It
provides a description of the problems encountered in DUT and implications for MDO. The
ideas and solutions found in this appendix use historical and current urban conflict analyses
across a collection of sources, but are informed primarily from the Mosul Study Group Phase II
literature review, research, and campaign analysis.
b. Background. National defense documents focus on the evolving threat and the changing
character of warfare identify urbanization trends that portend future competition or conflict withthe evolving threat will take place in urban environments. Particularly problematic is thepotential for competition and armed conflict in megacities. 54 These areas involve diverse,interconnected human and physical networks, three-dimensional engagement areas, and terrain
and infrastructure that provide varying levels of ready-made cover and concealment. Urban
operations are inherently multifaceted. The scale and complexity posed by megacities challenge
Army forces’ capabilities and capacities to compete with, operate and fight versus preparedadversaries.
53F

D-2. Dense urban terrain
a. Characteristics of dense urban terrain. Dense urban terrain possess uniquecharacteristics that complicate all aspects of friendly and enemy operations, to include
competition below the threshold of armed conflict, penetration and dis-integration of an
adversary’s anti-access and area denial systems, exploitation of freedom of maneuver to defeat
enemy forces, and consolidation of gains. The physical characteristics (e.g., scale of urban area,
urban density, and infrastructure) constrain maneuver, limit situational understanding, and create
unique problems for targeting and delivering effects against enemy positions. Cognitive
characteristics (e.g., degree of internal and external connectedness, demographics of the humanterrain, institutions, and governance) influence political decisions, which in turn shapeoperations, rules of engagement, and narratives. Finally, operational characteristics in DUT(e.g., the type of enemy, degree of joint access, mission, and type of combined force) drive force
and capability requirements.
(1) Physical. Physical characteristics of DUT effect all aspects of competition and armed
conflict. Man-made terrain and natural barriers combine to fragment and frustrate maneuver
operations. The density and diversity of structures obscure enemy positions and strength,
challenge friendly communications, and, when destroyed, create rubble causing mobility andcountermobility problems. Large groups of non-combatants complicate maneuver and fires
operations, overwhelm rear-area capabilities, and create challenges to intelligence collection and

The number of megacities (defined as metropolitan areas encompassing more than 10 million inhabitants) has doubled in the past 20 years andis projected to double again by 2050. Megacities contain populations, and exercise political, economic, and social influence comparable to manynation-states.

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analysis. Each city presents its own challenges but all urban operations require extensive force
commitments both for combat and stability operations.
(2) Cognitive. Cognitive considerations consist of the flow of people, goods, and data inand between dense urban areas. The interrelated flow of people, goods, and data createsenvironmental complexity, which congests and complicates the use of all domains, the EMS, andthe information environment. The unique physical and cultural design of each urban area
influences its internal flow. Function – centered on formal or informal institutions of governance– connects and informs flow relative to the rest of the country, region, or globe. The networkingof urban environments on a regional or global scale has expanded the influence of population
centers and the impact of urban operations on political, economic, and social systems. These
characteristics present commanders and staffs with a constantly changing operational picture toassess making intelligence gathering and effects planning (lethal or nonlethal) difficult.
(3) Operational. Regardless of location or type of operation, in dense urban terrain the
Army usually operates in unfamiliar and complex terrain in support of a partner force or local
government objectives. This requires that the Army understand mission requirements, coalitionand host nation security force capabilities, and return to competition objectives. These threeconsiderations inform force size, logistics, and set the theater requirements. The force
requirement for any mission (offense, defense, stability) is greater in DUT than in any otherenvironment. Partner force and coalition members influence rules of engagement and determine
the support or enabling capabilities required to facilitate movement and maneuver in urban areas.
Finally, return to competition objectives impact consolidation of gains operations, which in DUT
can require the generation of extensive stability forces.
b. Compounding and compressing the problems. During armed conflict, urban areas bothcompound the friction of war and compress physical and temporal spaces. Dense urban terrain
compounds friction by combining more obstacles to maneuver (people, terrain, congested EMS
and airspace) and by requiring the simultaneous execution of more tasks (airspace and fires deconfliction, protection, lethal and nonlethal fires synchronization) to enable constrained
maneuver. To execute more tasks simultaneously, the Army must deploy more forces andcapabilities into urban areas, which compresses the physical and temporal space available for
operations. The phenomenon of increased friction and compressed space complicate theexecution of core competencies, which demands greater focus and discipline from tactical andoperational units. This reduces individual Soldier, unit, and staff bandwidth for the incorporationof new technologies introduced during conflict.
D-3. Operating in dense urban terrain
a. Challenges in dense urban terrain. There are several challenges to operating in DUT,
including:(1) Constraining offensive maneuver operations by requiring the attacker to expend force
and energy either to secure lines of communications in the vicinity of a bypassed city or to enterand clear the city.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(2) Obscuring operations and forces (physical and cognitive).
(3) Increasing requirements for combat power to maintain operational reach, sustain
relative advantages, prevent early culmination, and enable stability operations.
(4) Requiring the synchronization and integration of lethal and nonlethal effects incongested and contested spaces.
(5) Challenging the ability to seize the initiative, and dictate operational tempo as a resultof greater friction and attrition.
(6) Sustaining friendly forces in widely dispersed locations to include providing medical
and mortuary affairs support/evacuation.
b. To set politically favorable conditions for conflict, in competition an adversary will focus
information warfare and unconventional warfare operations on targeted populations andinfluential DUT. During the transition to armed conflict, adversary forces will rapidly seize
vulnerable urban areas to enable swift consolidation of gains and protection of lines ofcommunications. Dense urban terrain’s advantages thus lay in the potential for providing early
warning and slowing enemy operational tempo. To capitalize on these advantages, the Armymust understand, organize, and train to operate in strategically and operationally significant
urban areas.
(1) Understanding dense urban terrain in competition. To best understand DUT incompetition, the Army should position forces in operationally and strategically significant cities.
The placement of Army forces in cities, however, is likely to cause political complications.
Regardless, understanding urban areas during competition requires a grasp of the characteristics
of DUT described above, and the best ways to employ urban terrain defensively during conflict.
Dense urban terrain provides early warnings of enemy intent, or partner nation activities likely
elicit a military response from the enemy (such as anti-Russian rallies in Kiev in 2014).
Understanding the flow of people and ideas enables the Army to identify major environmental
changes, which is essential to understanding DUT in competition. This level of understanding
requires technical collection means, but is largely achievable through physical presence (e.g.,
HUMINT and SOF) and the collection of open source data, particularly from social media. By
developing an understanding of the cognitive and operational characteristics of DUT during
competition, the Army gains an initial advantage in armed conflict.
(2) Understanding dense urban terrain in conflict. Once conflict starts, the urban
environment becomes increasingly dynamic, which quickly erodes initial advantages inunderstanding. Gaining or maintaining an understanding of an urban area during conflictrequires considerable technical means to enable collection, analysis, and display of multi-domain
data. Joint and partner nation collection means, primarily mechanical sensors, must saturate theterrain and airspace above a city. This enables collection of immense amounts of data regarding
the physical, cognitive, and operational characteristics of DUT. From the large volume andvarious forms of collected data, intelligence analysts must synthesize and isolate information
critical to operations and decision making. Then, to enable the rapid action against smaller and

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easily concealed forces, mission command systems must display analyzed data in near real-time.
Technical understanding of DUT in conflict serves two primary purposes. First, it provides units
with situational awareness of the immediate area. Second, mechanical sensors enable
intelligence collection that supports targeting and shaping operations. Establishing andmaintaining situational awareness in DUT, however, consumes considerable resources, whichchallenges Army capability and capacity to collect and processing, exploitation, anddissemination of intelligence, which necessitate artificial intelligence-enabled processes.
(3) Organizing for operations in dense urban terrain. No single military Service or Army
unit is capable of unilaterally operating in DUT during competition or conflict. During
competition, the Army relies on host nation and whole-of-government approval and support for
its presence and operations. During conflict, the Army supports host nation operations in urban
environments to mitigate political risk and reduce operational costs for U.S. forces. Dense urban
terrain operations also require considerable synchronization of joint capabilities and integrationof conventional and special operations forces. Further, maneuver units must create combinedarms teams with a mixture of engineer, armor, infantry, and artillery forces. This enables
movement to and through urban areas, and penetration and clearance of physical structures.
Disaggregated maneuver units move along splintered axes of advance and conduct distributed
operations, which require more sustainment and maneuver support resources. To understand andsupport DUT operations, echelons above brigade must streamline processes to enable faster more
precise communications, decision making, and enabler support. Finally, urban operations
require extensive Joint Force generation and logistics, which depend on a robust theater armyand enabling commands to set the theater during competition.
(4) Training for operations in dense urban terrain. The Army must train at echelon for
urban operations. Successful urban operations are predicated on the ability to conduct threeessential tasks. First, multi-domain isolation of an urban area to control logistics andcommunications. Second, penetration of the hardened exterior boundary and internal structuresof an urban area. Third, the ability to gain and maintain contact with the enemy once inside
DUT. Although effective tactical engagement is an important aspect of these tasks, operationaland strategic actions ensure victory in urban battles. Field armies and corps train to manage thepolitical conditions and operational tasks associated with isolating urban areas. Field armies andcorps, in conjunction with divisions, train to plan and execute rapid maneuver operations. These
units must also train to set the sustainment infrastructure required to project and maintain combat
forces, should urban combat require deliberate house-to-house clearance operations. At andbelow the division level, maneuver units train to penetrate and operate in urban terrain.
Divisions train to support maneuver units by coordinating force generation and projection,
sustainment, and joint effects integration. Brigades and below train to penetrate urban terrain,
and gain and maintain contact with the enemy in this complex environment.
(5) Operating in dense urban terrain. As an expeditionary force, the Army primarily
operates in urban areas during natural or man-made disasters. This has conditioned the Army tovisualize urban operations in conflict terms defined by minimal understanding and offensive or
stability actions. Dense urban terrain, however, is increasingly a competition space, which
provides the Army an opportunity to deter conflict. By operating in DUT, the Army can better
understand enemy intentions and coordinate training exercises to confront aggression and

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conduct IEO and special operations to deter escalation. In conflict, urban areas support
defensive operations against larger, more sophisticated forces, but remain vulnerable to isolation.
During offensive operations, DUT constrains maneuver and slows operational tempo requiring
additional forces. Finally, stabilizing or consolidating gains in urban areas, particularly partner
nation capitals and DUT surrounding critical air and sea ports, is essential to securing lines ofcommunications and political support for all operations.
c. The tenets of MDO applied in dense urban terrain.
(1) Calibrate force posture. Calibrated force posture for DUT operations requires
preparation during competition. Actions in competition focus on visualizing urban environments
in enough detail to anticipate their unique force generation, sustainment, and intelligencerequirements during conflict. This enables theater and field armies to effectively set the theater.
(a) Forces. U.S. forces must focus on prepositioning theater enabling commands (TEC)that support intelligence, fires (lethal and nonlethal), sustainment, and mission command
functions. Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is the Army's operational intelligencearm. Through the Military Intelligence Brigade-Theater (MIB-T), INSCOM enables thegeographic combatant command (GCC) to focus collection efforts on operationally andstrategically significant urban areas. Lethal and nonlethal fires TEC allow GCC to synchronize
joint effects during initial phases of conflict operations. Operational control measures that will
be required to converge lethal and nonlethal fires in DUT areas can be established and rehearsed
in competition. Sustainment TEC develop pre-conflict estimates and pre-coordinate contracting
requirements needed to maintain forces executing deliberate urban operations. Finally, missioncommand requires headquarters elements to command and control, exercise authority, andprovide direction. Signal TEC provide the network capability and capacity to support coalition
operations in congested and contested communications space. Signal TEC also enable the
distribution of massive amounts of intelligence and information flowing from the DUT. Setting
the theater with enough intelligence, fires, sustainment, and mission command capability
provides GCC with the capacity to visualize critical urban areas during competition, andtransition to conflict when required.
(b) Footprint. An increase in forward presence forces requires a commensurate increase in
the forward footprint (facilities). Basing and infrastructure to accommodate in-theater forcesmust enable joint and combined operations in urban operations. APS also need to be evaluatedand adjusted to support U.S., partner, or allied maneuver, fires, sustainment, and force protection
operations in urban areas.
(c) Agreements. Agreements with partner nations and allies must account for force andfootprint requirements, and for increased intelligence and information gathering activities in
specific urban areas. If U.S. forces intend to understand DUT during competition, activities suchas IPB or operational preparation of the environment will increase and likely require Departmentof the State awareness, if not concurrence. IPB or operational preparation of the environment isbest conducted in collaboration with the host nation. Additionally, joint and coalition forcesmust establish urban specific rules of engagement during competition to inform set the theater
requirements and enable a rapid transition to armed conflict.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(2) Multi-domain formations. Since dense urban terrain operations attrit forces at a higher
rate than operations in other environments, formations, systems, and Soldiers that provide the
combination of capacity, capability, and endurance necessary to operate across multiple domains
in contested spaces against a near-peer adversary are required. Independent maneuver enables
quicker adaptation by units operating in a constantly evolving DUT. Cross-domain fires
integrates and delivers lethal and nonlethal fires across all domains, the EMS, and theinformation environment effecting the physical, cognitive, and operational characteristics present
within DUT. Finally, each combatant in urban operations exerts constant physical andpsychological pressure on its adversary. The Army requires human dimension research thatenables mitigation of these impacts on friendly forces while increasing, particularly, thepsychological impact of urban operations on the enemy.
(3) Convergence. The advantages of convergence, creation of cross-domain synergy andthe layering of options, apply equally in DUT. Implementation of convergence, however, may
be challenged by complex and congested physical and virtual environments and potential
restrictions of rules of engagement. There may be increased use of nonlethal effects, and not alllethal effects may be useable.
D-4. Conclusion
Urban environments are inherently multi-domain. The interconnectedness of urban areas enables
the flow of information, people, and commodities that make this environment disproportionately
influential to all human affairs, including armed conflict. Dense urban terrain compresses
physical and temporal spaces, compounds obstacles, and demands the simultaneous execution ofmultiple tasks. This means that while operations are slowed, the pace and complexity of tacticalengagements increases. Employing the components of MDO in conjunction with improvements
in Army capacity and capability to understand, organize, and train to operate in DUT enables
successful operations.

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Appendix E
Linkage to other concepts
E-1. This concept has linkages to the following concepts: Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Marine Corps Operating
Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century, Air Superiority 2030 FlightPlan, Air Force Future Operating Concept, Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC),
Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global
Commons (JAM-GC), Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO), Joint Concept for Human
Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO), and Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation.
E-2. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations establishes globally integrated operations as the
future joint operational concept designed to address the challenge of meeting unremitting
strategic requirements with constrained military resources. This concept describes how the Joint
Force, and particularly ground forces, will overcome current challenges for rapid aggregation of
globally distributed forces to conduct globally integrated operations.
E-3. A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower states that naval forces perform theseessential functions: all-domain access, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime
security. The U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept proposes joint approaches that help
address these essential functions.
E-4. The Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21stCentury focuses on five key drivers of change: complex terrain, technology proliferation,
information as a weapon, battle of signatures, and increasingly contested maritime domain. The
U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept proposes joint approaches that help address thesechanges.
E-5. Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan states that developing and delivering air superiority for thehighly contested environment in 2030 requires a multi-domain focus on capabilities andcapacity.
E-6. The Air Force Future Operating Concept states that flexibility in operational agility
manifests as integrated MDO. It further asserts that operationally agile forces will defeat future
enemy threats by fighting in a highly coordinated manner under the principle of missioncommand, and that this approach must be developed within the framework of the joint andcombined team.
E-7. The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) describes a complex operational
environment in which the Joint Force continually campaigns within the competition continuum,
which features some mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed
conflict. Within this construct, the purpose of the Joint Force is to continually seek themaintenance and sustainment of strategic aims, while countering efforts of revisionist states toundermine U.S. interests. MDO offers the means for the Joint Force to more effectively
campaign across the competition continuum.

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E-8. The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) identifies the problem of projecting militaryforce into an operational area and sustaining it in the face of armed opposition by increasingly
capable enemies and within contested domains. The JOAC proposes employing cross-domainsynergy – the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different
domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of theothers – to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide the freedom ofaction required by the mission. This concept shows how ground forces will help to obtain crossdomain synergy in support of the joint campaign.
E-9. The Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) states thatthe future force must be distributable, resilient, and tailorable, with sufficient scale and capableof operations of ample duration. The JAM-GC’s solution includes advanced integration ofoperations across multiple domains, both inside and outside the contested environment. This isconsistent with many of the ideas in this paper. This concept expands JAM-GC’s premises fromthe global commons to operational maneuver by combined arms formations on land, integrated
with those in the air, maritime, cyberspace, and space domains.
E-10. The Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO) focuses on the integration of force
capabilities across domains in order to secure freedom of maneuver on foreign territory within an
operational area. This concept complements and helps set conditions for the operational ideas in
the JCEO.
E-11. The Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO) supports the
U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept’s need to understand relevant actors’ motivations
and the underpinnings of their will. JC-HAMO acknowledges the centrality of human will in
war and provides a framework that integrates with the commander’s decision cycle, enabling the
Joint Force to influence a range of relevant actors. The goal of this concept is to improveunderstanding and effectiveness for cognitive activities during the conduct of operations.
E-12. The Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation seeks to improve the speed, effectiveness, andefficiency of Joint Force aggregation in support of globally integrated operations. It describes
the idea of forming operationally coherent joint and combined forces by quickly combining
forces and capabilities, internally and with mission partners, across domains, echelons,
geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations. MDO complements this with the idea ofdynamically calibrating force posture.

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Appendix F
Lessons learned from the fielded force
F-1. Lessons to inform the U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations concept
The Army has begun a rigorous process of experimentation and analysis to further inform andrefine the U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations concept. In 2017, the Chief of Staff of the
Army (CSA) directed the design and testing of Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) as forwardstationed formations able to execute aspects of MDO. Designed to deliver long-range precision
joint strike as well as integrate air and missile defense, electronic warfare, space, cyber, andinformation operations, the MDTF operates across all domains, the EMS, and the information
environment in both competition and conflict to provide the Joint Force and coalition with newcapabilities to enable the defeat adversaries’ anti-access and area denial strategies. Given its
capability to compete and provide and initial penetration, the MDTF, as a forerunner to othermulti-domain formations now in development, is the essential first step to realizing an MDOcapable Army by 2028.
a. U.S. Army Pacific is building the first experimental MDTF and executing a multi-year joint
and combined experimentation program to inform future MDTF design. This experiment
combines 17th Field Artillery Brigade with an augmented headquarters element, a joint
intelligence, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and space (ICEWS) component, and other tasked
organized formations to provide realistic assessments of concepts and capabilities and gather
warfighter feedback to inform both Army plans and concept development. Forward stationed
MDTFs with capabilities in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment create new
dilemmas for adversaries that strengthen deterrence by complicating potential enemy war plans.
During conflict, MDTFs also enable successful combat operations through early attrition of theadversary’s anti-access and area denial systems and supporting combat forces from the inside,
thereby re-enabling joint and combined maneuver held at risk today. Over numerous
experiments and exercises in 2018, the MDTF successfully linked systems and Services acrossall domains, the EMS, and the information environment in ways never previously accomplished.
Joint and combined components demonstrated new ways to share surveillance and targeting
capabilities in support of combined schemes of maneuver. Most significantly, the MDTF
demonstrated methods of employing layered non-kinetic effects (EW, space, cyberspace, andinformation operations) that helped set the conditions for successful combined kinetic
engagements against both maritime and airborne targets. U.S. Army Pacific’s efforts haveprovided critical lessons for both the Army and the Joint Force and are enabling faster, andeffective transitions of MDO from concept to fielded capabilities.
b. Joint Warfighter Assessment (JWA) is the Army's capstone multi-echelon live andconstructive exercise intended to demonstrate and assess future force concepts and capabilities
required for a more lethal, expeditionary, and agile force. JWA exercises establish theconditions to assess unit execution of the MDO concept, ensure integration and interoperabilityof joint and multinational partners, and integrate and assess future force concepts andcapabilities. To achieve an MDO-capable Army by 2028, JWA exercises provide the Army withvaluable opportunities to focus the approach to "operationalizing MDO." These exercises allow
for multi-echelon participants to experiment with the conceptual component solutions and tomature enabling capabilities to solve the five key problems of the MDO fight against a peer

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adversaries: how does the Joint Force compete, penetrate, disintegrate, exploit, and re-compete
throughout the depth of the operational environment to fight, win, and survive. JWA 18-1 was
the first, examining MDO ideas at Grafenwoehr, Germany, between 27 April and 10 May 2018.
F-2. Lessons learned – tenets of MDO
a. Calibrated force posture. To effectively compete against a near-peer adversary, the Joint
Force requires forward deployed multi-domain formations that operate within the range of an
adversary’s long-range anti-access and area denial systems. As a component of the Joint Force,the Army presents a reasonable option to provide an enduring and resilient posture in areas
contested by an adversary’s actions in competition and armed conflict.
(1) Ideally, these formations would represent the Army component of a permanent or
virtual CJTF that develops habitual training relationships. These Army formations, however,must also have the capability to execute independent maneuver and employ cross-domain fires
based on the Joint Force Commander’s intent in cases where command and control capabilities
are severely degraded. Multi-domain formations would also employ movement and maneuver
throughout the theater in the competition phase and conduct capabilities demonstrations in
support of deterrence, influence operations, and military deception plans.
(2) Non-kinetic effects are increasingly important in setting the conditions for successful
kinetic operations by creating a relative advantage, particularly when force ratios favor anadversary. Effects such as denial and disruption of enemy communications, surveillance,
tracking, navigation capabilities, the introduction of false information into enemy networks, andinfluence operations will be increasingly important factors of successful kinetic engagements.
These can only be provided by forward deployed forces operating within areas or regions
contested by an adversary.
b. Multi-domain formations.
(1) Wargames and simulations indicate that ground forces are relatively survivable(compared to air and naval forces) operating deep within an adversary’s anti-access and area
denial threat zone, provided they employ a layered set of protective measures. These measures
include dispersal; a robust mobility plan; strict emissions control until certain trigger criteria aremet; camouflage, concealment, and deception (including electromagnetic deception); and mobile
mission command. Multi-domain formations provide a decisive contribution to the Joint Forceby immediately contesting enemy aggression and conducting the initial penetration of enemy
long-range systems from inside the range of their anti-access and aerial denial systems.
(2) Training and evaluating Soldiers and leaders in executing MDO will require state of theart real-time wargame simulation capabilities that include other Service, interagency, andmultinational partner capabilities.
c. Convergence. Convergence is achieved both through Service-centric and joint integrationof capabilities in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment. Schemes for Service-

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centric integration are well-advanced. The Joint Force, however, has important shortfalls in its
capability to achieve Joint convergence. Some shortfalls are technical, others are conceptual.
(1) Technical shortfalls. Two of the most important technical shortfalls are the lack of a
joint common operational picture (COP) and limitations in joint sensor-to-shooter loop
functionality. The Joint Force requires a COP, or visualization and decision support tool, whichallows commanders in any Service, at any echelon, in any mission area, and at any classificationlevel to "down-select" the categories of information they need to make informed decisions. It
should also include the technical means to get that information pushed to them from all
supporting components. The joint and combined team also require the capability for any joint
sensor to publish surveillance and targeting data so it is available to any joint shooter, kinetic or
non-kinetic. Army multi-domain formations must have the capability, for example, to receive
targeting data and clearance of fires from joint platforms such as the F-35, Aegis, or from other
Theater or National Technical Means. The Army and the other Services have many programs
and initiatives underway that can help close these shortfalls.
(2) Conceptual shortfalls.
(a) Mission command. The Army must continue to build trusted teams of professionals
that thrive in ambiguity and chaos and who are empowered through a doctrine of missioncommand to rapidly react to threats and opportunities based on a commander's intent. The MDO
concept leverages a critical U.S. military advantage—our people. But the Army does not always
design our training programs and exercises in ways that facilitate or require this type ofdecentralized decision making. More intellectual effort is required to improve training designs
that facilitate mission command of MDO given the increased complexity.
(b) Authorities. Many of the most important non-kinetic capabilities across the Joint
Force are compartmented, and only a small number of staff at the theater headquarters level areauthorized access. Many of these same programs require authorization to employ a capability at
the Secretarial level or higher and/or authorization from a functional combatant command. The
Joint Force needs to put in place and exercise processes to rapidly obtain approval to employ
these capabilities in support of tactical operations (i.e., below Corps, Fighter Wing, Carrier StrikeGroup, and Marine Expeditionary Force). This is particularly critical when force ratios favor anadversary.
(c) Munitions optimization planning. Limited inventories of munitions across the Joint
Force could create critical shortfalls that lead to defeat in combat. Therefore, when multiple
joint fires systems are in kinetic range of the same adversary threats, munitions plans that
optimize and sequence fires can help husband limited resources while achieving desired effects.
An integrated munitions optimization plan is required in addition to de-confliction mechanisms.
F-3. Lessons learned – materiel modernization
While DoD once dominated virtually all technological development related to combat
operations, today the commercial sector is producing many combat enabling technologies fasterthan DoD. In some areas, DoD acquisition processes almost guarantee the obsolescence ofequipment by the time it is fielded. Ongoing acquisition reforms efforts recommend the Army

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consider selective fielding of new capabilities that are Acquisition Category II or III and adopt
the "Buy, Try, Decide" model pioneered by U.S. Special Operations Command. This will help
ensure Army formations remain equipped with state of the art capabilities to meet their mission
requirements and will allow the Army to better assess what emerging capabilities should become
new Army programs of record or which might inform change proposals to current programs ofrecord.

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Appendix G
References
Section I
Required References. Army regulations, Department of the Army pamphlets, field manuals(FMs), Army doctrine publications, Army doctrine reference publications (ADRP), andDepartment of the Army forms are available at Army Publishing Directorate home page
http://www.usapa.army.mil TRADOC publications and forms are available at TRADOC
Administrative Publications home page at http://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil. Joint publications(JPs) are available on the Joint Electronic Library at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm or https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0
Army-Marine Corps Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century White Paper(2017, January 18)
Joint Operating Environment 2035, The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered WorldTRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0
The U.S. Army Capstone Concept
Section II
Related References
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
Army Doctrine Publication 1-01
Air Force Future Operating Concept
Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan
Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republicof China 2015. (2015, April 7). Retrieved from https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations Planners Guide – January 2016
Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations
FM 3-60
The Targeting Process

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FM 3-90-1
Offense and Defense Volume 1
Fruhling, S., & Lasconjarias, G. (2016, March 21). NATO, A2/AD, and the Kaliningrad
challenge. Survival Magazine, 58(2), 95-116. Retrieved fromhttps://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2016-5e13/survival--global-politics-andstrategy-april-may-2016-eb2d/58-2-07-fruhling-and-lasconjarias-de87
Grau, L.W. & Bartles C. K. (2017 July). The Russian Way of War, Force Structure, Tactics andModernization of the Russian Ground Forces. Foreign Military Studies Office. Retrieved fromhttps://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/fmso-bookshelf
Johnson, D. (2016). The Challenges of the “Now” and Their Implications for the U.S. Army,
RAND. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE184.html
Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons
Joint Concept for Entry Operations
Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations
Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning
Joint Concept for Rapid Aggregation
Joint Operational Access Concept
Karber, P. & Thibeault, P. (2016, May 13). Russia’s new-generation warfare. Army Magazine.
Retrieved from http://www.armymagazine.org/2016/05/13/russias-new-generation-warfare/
Karber, P. (2015, July 8). “Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War: Personal
Observations,” Report for the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory and U.S. Army
Capabilities Center, The Potomac Foundation. Retrieved fromhttps://prodev2go.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/rus-ukr-lessons-draft.pdf
Littoral Operations in Contested Environments
Retrieved from https://marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/concepts/littoral-operationscontested-environment
Marine Corps Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century
Paul, C. and Matthews, M. (2016). The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model,
RAND Corporation. Retrieved fromhttps://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE198/RAND_PE198.pdf

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Rinehart, I. E. (2016, March). The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress.
Congressional Research Service. Retrieved fromhttps://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc847539/m2/1/high_res_d/R44196_2016Mar24.p
df
Romjue, J. (1984, June). From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army
Doctrine, 1973-1982. Historical Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Retrieved
from https://books.google.com/books/about/From_active_defense_to_AirLand_Battle.html?id=RqcZAAAAIAAJ
Shlapak, D. and Johnson, M. (2016). “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank,
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics,” RAND. Retrieved fromhttps://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html
Skinner, D. (1988, September). AirLand Battle Doctrine, Professional Paper 463, Center forNaval Analysis. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA202888&
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Snegovaya, M. (2015, September). Russia Report I, “Putin’s Information Warfare in the
Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare.” Retrieved fromhttp://www.understandingwar.org/report/putins-information-warfare-ukraine-soviet-originsrussias-hybrid-warfare
Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved fromhttps://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-StrategySummary.pdf
Thomas, T. L. (2007). Decoding the Virtual Dragon: Critical Evolutions in the Science andPhilosophy of China’s Information Operations and Military Strategy, Foreign Military Studies
Office. Retrieved from https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/fmso-bookshelf
Thomas, T. L. (2016, May 2). Russia Military Strategy, Impacting 21st Century Reform andGeopolitics, Foreign Military Studies Office. Retrieved fromhttp://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/EPubs/Epubs/Thomas_Russian%20Military%20Strategy_Final_(2%20May%202016).pdf
Unified Challenge 18.1 Seminar Final Event Report. Mission Command Battle Lab. Available
upon request from the proponent.
Weitz, R. (2014, August). “NATO Must Adapt to Counter Russia’s Next-Generation Warfare;”World Politics Review. Retrieved from http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13976/
nato-must-adapt-to-counter-russia-s-next-generation-warfare

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Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee onIntelligence. (2016, February 9). Retrieved fromhttp://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default /files/wwt2016.pdf

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Glossary
Section I
Abbreviations
ADRP
APS
DoD
DUT
EMS
EW
FM
HUMINT
IADS
IEO
IRC
ISR
JAM-GC
JCEO
JCIC
JOAC
JP
LRPF
MDO
MDTF
MRL
NATO
SOF
SAM
SRBM
TEC
TRADOC
UAS
U.S.

Army doctrine reference publication
Army prepositioned stocks
Department of Defense
dense urban terrain
electromagnetic spectrum
electronic warfare
field manualhuman intelligence
integrated air defense system
information environment operations
information-related capability
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons
Joint Concept for Entry Operations
Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning
Joint Operational Access Concept
joint publication
long-range precision fires
Multi-Domain Operations
Multi-Domain Task Forcemultiple rocket launcher
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
special operations forces
surface-to-air missile
short-range ballistic missile
theater enabling command
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
unmanned aircraft system
United States

Section II
Terms
adversary
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force
may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)
air domain
The atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon
operations become negligible. (JP 3-30)

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armed conflict
When the use of violence is the primary means by which an actor seeks to satisfy its interests.
(JCIC)
battlefield*
The area where military operations are conducted to achieve military goals consisting of alldomains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace), the electromagnetic spectrum, and theinformation environment (including human cognitive aspects). It includes factors and conditions
that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete themission including enemy and friendly armed forces, infrastructure, weather, and terrain within
the operational areas and areas of interest.
calibrated force posture*
The combination of position and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. It includes,
but is not limited, to basing and facilities, formations and equipment readiness, the distribution ofcapabilities across components, strategic transport availability, interoperability, access, andauthorities.
campaign
A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives
within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)
Close Area*
Where friendly and enemy formations, forces, and systems are in imminent physical contact andcontest for control of physical space in support of campaign objectives.
competition
The condition when two or more actors in the international system have incompatible interests
but neither seeks to escalate to open conflict in pursuit of those interests. While violence is not
the adversary’s primary instrument in competition, challenges may include a range of violent
instruments including conventional forces with uncertain attribution to the state sponsor. (JCIC)
contested spaces*
Those areas where U.S., allied, or coalition forces can challenge the adversary’s denial measures,
maintain some degree of friendly freedom of action, and potentially deny adversary freedom ofaction.
convergence*
Rapid and continuous integration of capabilities in all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum,and information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch the enemy through crossdomain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission command and disciplined
initiative.
counterinsurgency
Comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and containinsurgency and address its root causes. (JP 3-34)

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cross-domain*
Having an effect from one domain into another.
cross-domain fires*
The integration and delivery of lethal and nonlethal fires across all five domains (land, maritime,
air, space and cyberspace), the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment.
cross-domain maneuver
The employment of mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities of multiple domains tocreate conditions designed to generate overmatch, present multiple dilemmas to the enemy, andenable Joint Force freedom of movement and action. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6)
cross-domain synergy
The complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains suchthat each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others – toestablish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide the freedom of action
required by the mission. (Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, JOAC)
cyberspace
A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks
of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
(JP 3-12)cycle time*
The shortest overall time required to complete one full linkage of preparation, planning andexecution, duration, and reset of a capability.
decisive operation
The operation that directly accomplishes the mission. (ADRP 3-0)
decisive space*
Conceptual geographic and temporal location where the full optimization of the employment ofcross-domain capabilities generates a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influences
the outcome of an operation.
Deep Fires Areas*
The areas beyond the feasible range of movement for conventional forces but where joint fires,
SOF, information, and virtual capabilities can be employed.
Deep Maneuver Area*
The area where maneuver forces can go (beyond the Close Area) but is so contested that
maneuver still requires significant allocation and convergence of multi-domain capabilities.
destroy
Tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat ineffective until it isreconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot
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perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 390-1)
denied spaces*
Those areas where the adversary can severely constrain U.S. and allied forces’ freedom of action
through anti-access and area denial and other measures.
dense urban terrain*
Areas characterized by extraordinarily closely-packed manmade infrastructure and highpopulation density, potentially including concentrations of high-rise buildings, subterranean
features, and densely packed slums.
dis-integrate*
Break the coherence of the enemy's system by destroying or disrupting its subcomponents (suchas command and control means, intelligence collection, critical nodes, etc.) degrading its ability
to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will tofight.
dislocate*
Render the enemy’s strength irrelevant (and ill positioned) by achieving positional advantage
through movement, removing the enemy from the decisive point, or achieving functional
advantage through technology or tactics. (proposed change to existing doctrinal term)
domain*An area of activity within the operational environment (land, air, maritime, space, andcyberspace) in which operations are organized and conducted. (modified joint definition)echeloning or echelonment*
Maneuver of forces from the Strategic and Operational Support Areas into the Tactical Support
Area and Close Area.
electromagnetic spectrum
The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26
alphabetically designated bands. (JP 3-13.1)
enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADRP 3-0)
engagement*
The combination of physical, informational, and psychological actions taken to build
relationships or influence actors' decision-making (moral and mental).
escalation advantage*
The ability to change the correlation of forces in your favor faster than an adversary.

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expeditionary maneuver*
The rapid deployment of task-organized combined arms forces able to transition quickly to
conduct operations of sufficient scale and ample duration to achieve strategic objectives.
fix
A tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy from moving any part of hisforce from a specific location for a specific period. Fix is also an obstacle effect that focuses fireplanning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s movement within a specified area, normally an
engagement area. (FM 3-90-1)
globally integrated operations
Operations arranged as cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as awhole to address transregional, all domain, and multi-functional challenges. (Capstone Concept
for Joint Operations (draft-2018))
hyperactive*
More active than usual or desirable; hyper-competitive during competition and hyper-violent inarmed conflict.
independent maneuver*
Operating dispersed for an extended period without continuous [or contiguous] support fromhigher echelons while retaining the ability to concentrate combat power rapidly at decisive
spaces by employing cross-domain fires and maneuver to achieve mission objectives within theintent of the theater campaign.
information space*
The complex system of interrelated and networked information flows amongst and between
populations that a commander must understand and consider to gain and maintain freedom ofaction.
information environment
The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act
on information. (JP 3-13)
information environment operations*Integrated employment of information related capabilities (IRC) in concert with other lines ofoperation to influence, deceive, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of enemies andadversaries while protecting our own; to influence enemy formations and populations to reduce
their will to fight; and influence friendly and neutral populations to enable friendly operations.
information operations
Integrated employment, during military operations, of information related capabilities (IRC) inconcert with other lines of operation to influence, deceive, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision
making of enemies and adversaries while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)

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information warfare
Employing information capabilities in a deliberate disinformation campaign supported by actionsof the intelligence organizations designed to confuse the enemy and achieve strategic objectives
at minimal cost. 55
54Finteroperability
The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (JP 3-0) 2. The condition
achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics
equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between
them and/or their users. (JP 6-0)
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceAn integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planningand operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in
direct support of current and future operations. Also called ISR. (JP 2-01)
irregular warfare
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the
relevant population(s). Also called IW. (JP 1) [Note: Irregular warfare favors indirect andasymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, toerode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.]
isolateA tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically— anenemy from sources of support, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and prevent the isolated
enemy force from having contact with other enemy forces. (FM 3-90-1)
land domain
The area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime
domain in the landward segment of the littorals. (JP 3-31)
littoral
The littoral comprises two segments of the operational environment: 1. Seaward: the area fromthe open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2.
Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from thesea. (JP 2-01.3)
maritime domain
The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including
the littorals. (JP 3-32)
multi-domain*
Dealing with more than one domain at the same time.
55
Derived from Russia Report I, pg 9. Adapts Soviet reflexive control to the contemporary geopolitical context. “Reflexive control” is defined asa means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision
desired by the initiator of the action.

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multi-domain formations*
Army organizations possessing the combination of capacity, capability, and endurance necessary
to operate across multiple domains in contested spaces against a near-peer adversary.
Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)*
Operations conducted across multiple domains and contested spaces to overcome an adversary’s(or enemy’s) strengths by presenting them with several operational and/or tactical dilemmas
through the combined application of calibrated force posture; employment of multi-domain
formations; and convergence of capabilities across domains, environments, and functions in timeand spaces to achieve operational and tactical objectives.
near-peer adversaries*
Those nation states with the intent, capabilities, and capacity to contest U.S. interests globally inmost or all domains, the EMS, and the information environment.
neutralize
A tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable ofinterfering with a particular operation. (FM 3-90-1)
operational maneuver*
Maneuver that supports operational level objectives; usually occurs within a theater of operations(intratheater)
operational preparation of the environment
The conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape theoperational environment. (JP 3-05)
Operational Support Area*
The area of responsibility from which most of the air and maritime capabilities derive theirsource of power, control, and sustainment as well as where ground forces enter theater, organize,
and prepare for rapid onward movement and integration.
overmatch*
The application of capabilities or unique tactics either directly or indirectly, with the intent toprevent or mitigate opposing forces from using their current or projected equipment or tactics.
planning and execution time*
The time required to plan employment and then execute it to create an effect, to include creating
a window of advantage. Typically, planning and preparation occur simultaneously thoughdepending on the situation and capability one or the other might be the limiting factor.
position of relative advantage
A location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations thatprovides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an

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enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage. (ADRP 30)
precision logistics*
The art of delivering support forward utilizing a combination of sensor-driven predictive
analysis, condition-based maintenance at the point of need, and robotic autonomous delivery
combined with the beneficial results of demand reduction to enable multi-domain formations topresent a credible deterrence during competition, to transition to armed conflict with speed andagility, and to execute Multi-Domain Operations in depth, including resupply of formations
conducting independent maneuver to extend time and reach of protracted operations.
preparation time*
The time required to organize and maneuver forces or capabilities (e.g. a cyber weapon) from its
current location to the intended employment space or window of advantage.
reset
A set of actions to restore equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate witha unit’s future mission. (JP 4-0)
resilience*
The ability for Army formations and systems at all echelons to operate in contested spaces
against a capable adversary
shaping operation
An operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy,
other actors, and the terrain. (ADRP 3-0)
snap drill*
Rapid reaction military exercise to test combat readiness.
space domain
The area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible.
(JP 3-14)
stand-off*
The physical, cognitive, and informational separation that enables freedom of action in any,some, or all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment to achieve
strategic and/or operational objectives before an adversary can adequately respond. It is
achieved with both political and military capabilities.
strategic maneuver*
Maneuver that supports strategic level objectives; usually occurs across more than one theater ofoperations (intertheater)

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Strategic Support Area*
The area of cross-combatant command coordination, strategic sea and air lines ofcommunications, and the homeland.
system
A group of interacting, interrelated, and interdependent components or subsytems that form acomplex and unified whole. Systems have a purpose with their parts arranged in a way(structure) to carry out their purpose. (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-3)
Tactical Support Area*
The area that directly enables decisive tactical operations in the Close Area and extension ofcapabilities into the Deep Maneuver and Deep Fires Areas.
unconventional warfare
Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, oroverthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground,auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. (JP 3-05.1)
window of superiority*
Converging capabilities in time and space in selected domains and environments to enablecommanders to gain localized control or physical, virtual, and/or cognitive influence over a
specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful
friendly operations.
* Proposed definition.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

The U.S. Armyin Multi-Domain Operations

2028