Report to Congress
Department of Defense Arctic Strategy

June 2019
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
As required by Section 1071 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year2019 (P.L. 115-232).

The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of
Defense is approximately $73,000 for the 2019 Fiscal Year. This
includes $0 in expenses and $73,000 in DoD labor. Generated on
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 2019 Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy updates the previous 2016 DoD Arctic
Strategy as requested by Section 1071 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization
Act for fiscal year (FY) 2019. This update includes a classified annex.
Specifically, the 2019 DoD Arctic Strategy updates DoD’s strategic objectives for the Arctic
region, in light of DoD’s renewed assessment of the evolving Arctic security environment andthe release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Anchored in NDS goals and priorities,
this updated Arctic strategy outlines DoD’s strategic approach for protecting U.S. national
security interests in the Arctic in an era of strategic competition.
DoD’s desired end-state for the Arctic is a secure and stable region in which U.S. national
security interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work
cooperatively to address shared challenges. Protecting U.S. national security interests in the
Arctic will require the Joint Force to sustain its competitive military advantages in the IndoPacific and Europe, identified in the NDS as key regions of strategic competition, and tomaintain a credible deterrent for the Arctic region.
DoD must be able to quickly identify threats in the Arctic, respond promptly and effectively tothose threats, and shape the security environment to mitigate the prospect of those threats in the
future. The 2019 DoD Arctic strategy outlines three strategic ways in support of the desired
Arctic end-state:•••

Building Arctic awareness;
Enhancing Arctic operations; and,Strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic.

1

2019 DoD Arctic Strategy
Introduction
This document articulates the Department of Defense’s (DoD) strategy for the Arctic
region in an era of strategic competition. 1 It is informed by the 2017 National Security Strategy
and anchored in the priorities of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and its focus oncompetition with China and Russia as the principal challenge to long-term U.S. security andprosperity. This strategy supersedes the 2016 DoD Arctic strategy.
DoD’s desired end-state for the Arctic is a secure and stable region where U.S. national
interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively toaddress shared challenges. This strategy sets forth DoD’s assessment of the Arctic security
environment, risks posed to U.S. national security interests, DoD Arctic objectives, and thestrategic approach by which DoD will achieve these objectives.
A secure and stable Arctic region benefits the United States and necessitates a rulesbased order, reflecting Arctic nations’ respect for national sovereignty and constructive
engagement to address shared challenges. The network of U.S. allies and partners with sharednational interests in this rules-based order is the United States’ greatest strategic advantage in the
Arctic region, and thus the cornerstone of DoD’s Arctic strategy. DoD cooperation with Arctic
allies and partners strengthens our shared approach to regional security and helps deter strategiccompetitors from seeking to unilaterally change the existing rules-based order.
NDS goals and priorities guide DoD’s strategic approach to the Arctic. The Joint Forcemust be able to deter, and if necessary, defeat great power aggression. DoD must prioritize
efforts to address the central problem the NDS identifies – i.e., the Joint Force’s eroding
competitive edge against China and Russia, and the NDS imperative to ensure favorable regionalbalances of power in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Developing a more lethal, resilient, agile, andready Joint Force will ensure that our military sustains its competitive advantages, not only forthese key regions of strategic competition, but globally as well. Maintaining a credible deterrent
for the Arctic region requires DoD to understand and shape the Arctic’s geo-strategic landscapefor future operations and to respond effectively to contingencies in the Arctic region, both
independently and in cooperation with others. DoD’s strategic approach seeks to do so byimplementing three ways in support of the desired Arctic end-state (each described in detail inthis document):•••

Building Arctic awareness;
Enhancing Arctic operations; andStrengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic.

1

This DoD Arctic Strategy uses the definition of the Arctic codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4111. The Arctic means all U.S.
and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary formed by the
Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort,
Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian islands chain.

2Assessment of Arctic Security Environment
The United States is an Arctic nation. The Arctic security environment has direct
implications for U.S. national security interests. Geographically, the Arctic comprises thenorthern approaches of the United States and represents a potential vector both for attacks on thehomeland and for U.S. power projection. Approaches to the Arctic Ocean to both the east andwest of the United States form strategic corridors for maritime traffic. Arctic sea routes transit
through the Bering Strait between the United States and Russia, while the Greenland, Iceland,
United Kingdom – Norwegian (GIUK-N) gap is a strategic corridor for naval operations between
the Arctic and the North Atlantic.
The Arctic region is comprised of the eight nations with sovereign territory in the Arctic, 2
including multiple U.S. allies and partners. The United States does not recognize any otherclaims to Arctic status by any State other than these eight nations. The United States maintains
strong defense relationships with six of the seven other Arctic nations. Four are NATO Allies:
Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland), Iceland, and Norway; and two are
NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners: Finland and Sweden. They are highly capable, withimmense experience in high latitude operational environments.
The Arctic security environment is complex. Many positive, cooperative trends endure in
the region. At the same time, the region is increasingly uncertain, with a deepening andintensifying of certain problematic strategic trends. Although the immediate prospect of conflictin the Arctic is low, these trends could adversely affect U.S. national security interests, promote
instability, and ultimately degrade security in the region. Key dynamics include:
Changing Physical Environment: The Arctic’s physical environment continues to change,
including through diminished sea ice coverage, declining snow cover, and melting ice sheets. 3
Temperatures across the Arctic region are increasing more than twice as fast as global averagetemperatures, accompanied by thawing permafrost and loss of sea ice and glacier mass. 4
Diminishing Arctic sea ice is opening new shipping lanes and increasing access to natural
resources during the summer months. If the warming trends continue at the current rate, Arcticwide sea ice loss may result in nearly ice-free late summers by the 2040s. 5 Thawing permafrost,compounded by storm surge and coastal erosion, adversely affects infrastructure, including DoD
installations, and complicates the development of new and resilient DoD infrastructure. The
physical effects of the changing Arctic frontier are also causing some local communities to adapt
2

Arctic nations refers to those countries that are members of the Arctic Council: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark(including Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States.
3
NOAA. Osborne E., J. Richter-Menge, and M. Jeffries, Executive Summary [in NOAA Arctic Report Card 2018],
p.2-3.
4
USGCRP. Hayhoe, K., D.J. Wuebbles, D.R. Easterling, D.W. Fahey, S. Doherty, J. Kossin, W. Sweet, R. Vose and
M. Wehner, 2018: Our Changing Climate. In Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National
Climate Assessment, Volume II [Reidmiller, D.R., C.W. Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, T.K.
Maycock, and B.C. Steward (eds.)]. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, p.74.
5USGCRP. Taylor, P.C., W. Maslowksi, J. Perlwitz, and D.J. Wuebbles, 2017: Arctic changes and their effects on
Alaska and the rest of the United States. In Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment,
Volume I [Wuebbles, D.J, D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock (eds.)]. U.S.
Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, p. 303.

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by relocating. Even so, the Arctic continues to be characterized by harsh conditions, including
extremes of cold and darkness, which impose specific requirements for operating and sustaining
Joint Force capabilities in the region.
Multilateral Cooperation to Address Shared Interests and Challenges: Arctic nations havehistorically sought to isolate the region from wider geopolitical conflicts. They continue todemonstrate a strong commitment to multilateral cooperation. Arctic nations have, to date,largely respected each other’s sovereign interests in the region, even where these interests
diverge. International agreements on scientific research, maritime traffic, and environmental
issues represent concrete measures to address the challenges associated with human andeconomic activity in this harsh Arctic environment. In this context, there has to date generally
been a shared interest in a peaceful and stable region that allows the Arctic nations to realize thepotential benefits of greater access to the region’s resources.
Status of Arctic Sea Routes: Russia and Canada claim the right to regulate Arctic waters inexcess of the authority permitted under international law. Russia requires foreign vessels to
obtain permission, embark Russian ice pilots, and serve under escort of Russian icebreakers
before entering the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Russia has also reportedly threatened to use
force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian regulations. Canada considers the waters of
the Northwest Passage to be internal waters, subject to the complete sovereignty of Canada.
Increasing Military Activity: Russia views itself as a polar great power and is the largest Arctic
nation by landmass, population, and military presence above the Arctic Circle. Russia’scommercial investments in the Arctic region have been matched by continued defense
investments and activities that strengthen both its territorial defense and its ability to control the
NSR. Russia formed the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command in December 2014 tocoordinate its renewed emphasis on the Arctic. Since then, Russia has gradually strengthened its
presence by creating new Arctic units, refurbishing old airfields and infrastructure in the Arctic,
and establishing new military bases along its Arctic coastline. There is also a concerted effort toestablish a network of air defense and coastal missile systems, early warning radars, rescue
centers, and a variety of sensors. China’s operational presence in the Arctic is more limited. It
includes China’s icebreaking vessels, the Xuelong and newly-constructed Xuelong 2, and civilian
research efforts, which could support a strengthened, future Chinese military presence in the
Arctic Ocean, potentially including deployment of submarines to the region. 6
Attempts to Alter Arctic Governance through Economic Leverage: Despite having no territorial
claims in the region, China is seeking a role in Arctic governance. As part of China’s “One Belt,
One Road” initiative, it has linked its economic activities in the Arctic to its broader strategic
objectives, as articulated in its first Arctic policy white paper in January 2018. China’s statedinterests in the Arctic are primarily focused on access to natural resources and the opportunities
offered by the Arctic sea routes for Chinese shipping. China does not currently have apermanent Arctic military presence, but is increasing its presence through economic outreach,
DoD Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,p.114.

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investments in Arctic states’ strategic sectors, and scientific activities. China maintains researchstations in Iceland and Norway and has pursued energy development and infrastructure projects
in Russia, such as the Yamal liquefied natural gas project. China also continues to seek
opportunities to invest in dual-use infrastructure in the Arctic. Despite China’s claim of being a“Near Arctic State,” the United States does not recognize any such status.
U.S. National Security Interests in the Arctic
The United States has three broad, interlocking sets of national security interests related
to the Arctic region. These interests are derived from DoD’s assessment of how U.S. national
security interests, as defined in the 2017 National Security Strategy, 7 apply to the Arctic region.
They include:
1) The Arctic as the U.S. homeland: The United States is an Arctic nation with sovereign
territory and maritime claims in the region. Its interests include defending U.S. sovereignty
and the homeland, including through early warning and missile defense; protecting U.S.
critical infrastructure; and achieving domain awareness to protect U.S. security interests in
the region.
2) The Arctic as a shared region: The Arctic includes a domain of shared interests whose
security and stability depend on Arctic nations constructively addressing shared challenges.
Regional cooperation – built on a bedrock of internationally recognized principles likenational sovereignty – is in the U.S. interest 8 and contributes to a secure and stable Arctic.
This is strengthened by the U.S.-led alliance and partnership network in the Arctic and by
maintaining activities in the region in line with international norms.
3) The Arctic as a potential corridor for strategic competition: The Arctic is a potential avenue
for expanded great power competition and aggression spanning between two key regions ofongoing competition identified in the NDS — the Indo-Pacific and Europe — and the U.S.
homeland. U.S. interests include maintaining flexibility for global power projection,
including by ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight; and limiting the ability of China
and Russia to leverage the region as a corridor for competition that advances their strategic
objectives through malign or coercive behavior.
Protecting U.S. national security interests in the Arctic requires a holistic approach thatrecognizes the relationship between these three sets of interests. As DoD examines both theUnited States’ and other nations’ interests and activities in the Arctic, DoD will prioritize risks
and opportunities at the intersection of these three sets of interests. Additionally, DoD activities
to protect U.S. national security interests in the Arctic will be in support of broader whole-ofgovernment efforts.

7

The 2017 National Security Strategy identifies U.S. interests as follows: protecting the American people, thehomeland, and American way of life; promoting American prosperity; preserving peace through strength; andadvancing American influence.
8
The National Security Strategy refers to the Arctic and affirms that “It is vital to U.S. prosperity and security thatthese [international] institutions uphold the rules that help keep these common domains open and free”.

5Risks to U.S. National Security Interests
Trends in the Arctic security environment present specific risks across the three sets of
U.S. national security interests:
Homeland: The Arctic is strategic terrain as a potential vector for an attack on the U.S.
homeland. China and Russia pose discrete and different challenges in their respective theaters,
but both are also pursuing activities and capabilities in the Arctic that may present risks to thehomeland. In addition to the challenge posed by strategic competitors, coastal erosion andpermafrost thaw pose risks to DoD Arctic installations. Increased economic activity in the
Arctic raises the probability of a mass casualty incident in the Arctic where DoD assistance may
be requested. Natural disasters or other contingencies, such as an oil spill, may severely affectAlaska, requiring DoD support to civil authorities. These events may also inhibit DoD’s ability
to project power from the homeland.
Shared Region: In different ways, Russia and China are challenging the rules-based order in the
Arctic. Russia regulates maritime operations in the NSR, contrary to international law, and hasreportedly threatened to use force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian regulations.
Russia has generally followed international law and procedure in establishing the limits of its
extended continental shelf. Russia could choose to unilaterally establish those limits if theprocedures prove unfavorable and could utilize its military capabilities in an effort to deny accessto disputed Arctic waters or resources. China is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in waysthat may undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic
behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic.
Potential Corridor for Strategic Competition: Developments in the Arctic have the potential todirectly or indirectly constrain DoD’s ability to flow forces globally, and more broadly to affect
U.S. strategic objectives related to competition with China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific andEurope. The Arctic remains vulnerable to “strategic spillover” from tensions, competition, or
conflict arising in these other regions.
DoD Arctic Objectives
The 2018 NDS provides the overarching strategic guidance for framing DoD’s Arctic
Strategy. The NDS establishes DoD’s goals and priorities for defending the homeland andprotecting U.S. and allied interests globally by regaining the Joint Force’s competitive militaryedge against China and Russia. Anchored in this strategic aim and supporting NDS tenets, andinformed by DoD’s assessment of risks to U.S. national security interests, this strategy sets forth
the following prioritized DoD objectives for the Arctic region:
1. Defend the homeland: The NDS affirms defense of the homeland as the first priority for
DoD. The Department must be prepared to defend U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic. The
Arctic is also strategic terrain because it constitutes the northern approaches to the UnitedStates; DoD must defend the homeland against threats emanating from these approaches.
2. Compete when necessary to maintain favorable regional balances of power: The Arctic is
a potential corridor – between the Indo-Pacific and Europe, and the U.S. homeland – forexpanded strategic competitions. Strategic competitors may undertake malign or coercive
6

activities in the Arctic in order to advance their goals for these regions. DoD must be
prepared to protect U.S. national security interests by taking appropriate actions in the Arctic
as part of maintaining favorable balances of power in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
3. Ensure common domains remain free and open: The Arctic is a shared region comprising
the territories of the eight circumpolar nations and including the Arctic Ocean. DoD, in
partnership with other Federal departments and agencies and our Arctic allies and partners,
should ensure continued access to the Arctic for legitimate civilian, commercial, and military
purposes.
These Arctic objectives are not mutually exclusive; they are interdependent and will need
to be achieved in concert with one another. Close collaboration across and between DoD
components in support of these strategic objectives will ensure consistent implementation of thisstrategy. Additionally, this prioritization of objectives should not be interpreted to mean that all
DoD activities, presence, and investments related to a particular objective are a higher priority
than those related to another objective. Rather, this framing offers a broad, relative scheme ofprioritization based on risks to U.S. national security interests, relevance to and consequences for
NDS priorities, and the mandate of established DoD roles and missions.
DoD’s Strategic Approach for the Arctic
DoD’s strategic approach for the Arctic is to protect U.S. national security interests andprudently address risks to those interests in ways that uphold the region’s rules-based order,
without fueling strategic competition. Competitive behavior in the Arctic must not distract fromor undermine broader NDS priorities; the Department must remain vigilant to how developmentsin the Arctic affects these priorities. A stable and conflict-free Arctic benefits the United Statesby providing favorable conditions for resource development and economic activity, as well as bycontributing to upholding the international order and regional cooperation on challenges that
affect all Arctic nations. DoD will seek to shape military activity in the Arctic region to avoid
conflict, while ensuring that the Joint Force is postured and prepared to deter strategiccompetitors from threatening our interests.
U.S. Allied and Partner Network: Cooperation with allies and partners is the cornerstoneof this strategic approach. U.S. allies and partners share a deep, mutual interest in the existing
rules-based order. Our network of allied relationships and capabilities is the United States’
greatest strategic advantage in the Arctic region. Our defense ties extend and amplify thecredibility of our collective deterrent against shared challenges; enhance our ability to contend
with strategic competition; and form the basis for a mutual approach to maintaining a secure andstable Arctic region. DoD will pursue a collaborative approach with allies and partners,
including both Arctic nations and like-minded non-Arctic nations, in working across the ways
and means identified in this strategy.
Deterrence in the Arctic: To ensure a credible deterrent for the Arctic, DoD must be able
to quickly identify threats in the region, respond promptly and effectively to these threats, andshape the security environment to reduce or mitigate the prospects of these threats manifesting in
the future. The United States must be able to deter strategic competitors from aggression in the7Arctic by ensuring the Joint Force has the proficiency to respond to regional contingencies, both
independently and in cooperation with allies and partners. The U.S. Arctic deterrent will requireagile, capable, and expeditionary forces with the ability to flexibly project power into andoperate within the region, as the Joint Force must be able to do elsewhere globally. As DoD
examines the attributes of Joint Force capabilities, posture, operations, and activities necessary
for deterrence in the Arctic, it will do so in a strategy-driven and resource-informed way.
Determinations will be made on the basis of U.S. interests, NDS goals and priorities, DoD’s
Arctic objectives, and emerging threats in the Arctic and other key theaters of competition, rather
than by a parity-based approach that seeks to approximate competitors’ capabilities and numbersof units, systems, or bases.
Support to other U.S. Department, Agency, and Community Roles: Other Federal
departments and agencies play critical roles in protecting U.S. national security interests in the
Arctic; DoD will work closely with other Federal departments and agencies in support of theirefforts. These departments and agencies have lead responsibilities for key aspects of the Arctic
security environment, including from a diplomatic and homeland security perspective. DoD will
work with other Federal departments and agencies by identifying and communicating the effectsof strategic competitors’ activities, engagements, and interests in the region, and supporting
wider U.S. Government engagement within Arctic multilateral forums. DoD will continue tocoordinate and collaborate with interagency partners on research and development activities tobuild Arctic capabilities through the Interagency Arctic Research and Policy Committee. DoD
will also seek to provide support as appropriate to wider U.S. Government responses tocontingencies in the Arctic, such as natural disasters.
DoD will also continue to recognize the importance of working with Alaska Natives in
the Arctic. DoD engages closely with local communities in Alaska and recognizes their equities
as part of DoD activities in the region. DoD has instituted specific programs to ensure regularcommunication with Alaska Natives and to incorporate their views on regional developments
into DoD activities.
Arctic Ways & Means
Implementing the strategic approach described above to advance DoD’s Arctic objectives
requires three sets of strategy-informed ways:•••

Building Arctic awareness;
Enhancing Arctic operations; andStrengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic.

These strategic ways will inform DoD’s presence, capability, and resourcing priorities in
the Arctic. They encompass both activities DoD is undertaking and capability gaps DoD isaddressing in order to achieve the desired strategic effects in the Arctic. DoD decisions on
resourcing in these areas will be made as part of the Department’s Planning Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution process.

8Commander U.S. Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) is designated as DoD's
Arctic Capability Advocate. This designation recognizes the unique challenges posed by the
Arctic environment, as well as the Arctic geography which spans across multiple CombatantCommand’s Areas of Responsibility. Arctic capabilities advocacy comes in many forms. In therole of DoD Arctic Capability Advocate, CDRUSNORTHCOM will coordinate with other
Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, and Defense Agencies to ensure that Arctic
capability gaps are identified and prioritized, and that appropriate means of advocacy are
emplaced to effectively communicate associated risks.
Building Arctic Awareness
DoD’s ability to detect threats in the Arctic is a prerequisite to deterring or responding tostrategic competitors’ activities in the region. In order to operate effectively in the Arctic, DoD
must also maintain the ability to understand its operational environment.
The Arctic environment presents specific operational challenges that limit
communications, including the harsh climate, vast distances, and atmospheric phenomena. Even
within the Arctic there is considerable variation between the North American Arctic, which has aharsher climate, and the milder, Gulf Stream-affected, European Arctic. The North American
Arctic also lacks the relatively robust logistics infrastructure of the European Arctic. Operating
effectively in the Arctic, therefore, requires DoD to make time-sensitive, risk-informed
investments to understand and build awareness of the region.
Enabling domain awareness. Effective surveillance of the northern air and maritime approaches
to North America is foundational to homeland defense aerospace warning, aerospace control,
maritime warning, and missile defense. Cooperation with Canada through the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is key to the defense of the northern approaches. To
detect and track potential airborne threats, including Russian long-range bombers and cruise
missiles, the United States and Canada rely on radar systems such as the aging North Warning
System, a network of aerospace surveillance radars in northern Canada and Alaska. DoD’s
ability to detect threats and defend North America is challenged by rapidly advancing strategiccompetitors’ capabilities. Modernizing DoD’s missile and cruise missile defense systems iscritical to maintaining a layered approach to domain awareness through multi-domain sensors
that include terrestrial radars and space-based capabilities. DoD’s current binational study with
Canada’s Department of National Defence is evaluating potential solutions for modernization of
sensor coverage of North America to deter, detect, track, and enable defeat of both existing andemergent airborne threats to North America, including the threats posed by Russia’s advanced
cruise missile and hypersonic glide vehicle capabilities. Among potential Arctic defense
investments, DoD will prioritize modernization of infrastructure supporting enhanced domainawareness.
Additionally, DoD is enhancing maritime surveillance of the GIUK gap and the North Atlantic
through cooperation with the United Kingdom and Norway on P-8 aircraft patrols. This
complements existing NATO air policing missions hosted by Iceland.

9Improving communications & Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, and ISR (C4ISR) are essential to operations in the Arctic,
but remains challenging above 65 degrees North latitude. Communications challenges exist as
atmospheric interference in the form of solar and magnetic phenomena degrades high-frequency
radio signals. Satellite-based communications are also limited, further constraining reliable
voice communication and restricting data coverage in the Arctic region.
Given this operating environment, there is a need for deployable communications and data
networks capable of operating in the northern latitudes. This requires establishing robust anddynamic communications architecture with terrestrial, aerial, and space layers that are fully
integrated and interoperable with mission partners. Both terrestrial and aerial communications
equipment must be designed to function in the harsh Arctic weather conditions, which include
rapid cycles of freezing and thawing and temperatures below minus 60 degrees Fahrenheit.
Equipment testing must also be conducted in realistic Arctic conditions for sufficient periods oftime. Adequate data coverage requires sufficiently ruggedized sensors to be deployed yearround for longitudinal data-set acquisition.
Increasing in-situ observations and enhancing environmental modeling. Understanding andpredicting the physical environment is critical for meeting mission demands and for ensuring thesafety of personnel and equipment. The Arctic operational environment is made morechallenging by several factors, including sea ice, ocean currents, wind, water and air temperature,sea spray and icing conditions, highly variable ionospheric densities, and daylight durations.
DoD continues to invest in improved predictive capabilities for the Arctic regions that will
enable more reliable forecasts. DoD is exploring solutions as the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program, a key tool in sensing and weather data collection in support of U.S. military
operations, reaches its end-of-life.
Increasing in-situ meteorological, oceanographic, and atmospheric observation data is key. DoD
will continue to collaborate with other Federal departments and agencies to advance predictive
capability. This involves partnerships with other Federal entities, including the U.S. National Ice
Center, to support efforts such as the U.S. Interagency Arctic Buoy Program to increase
observations, and the National Earth System Prediction Capability program, to develop fully
coupled ocean and atmospheric models that incorporate oceanographic and atmosphericparameters, including sea waves and sea ice.
Supporting the Coast Guard’s Homeland Security Missions. The Coast Guard is the lead agency
for homeland security in the Arctic. It has specific responsibilities for establishing andmaintaining situational awareness across the region. The Coast Guard’s investments in icebreaking ships through the Polar Security Cutter program support Arctic operations for a rangeof mission sets, including homeland security, defense, and search and rescue. 9 DoD willcontinue to support this program, as it provides a key capability to ensure interoperability
between Coast Guard and Navy vessels and to support U.S. presence in the Arctic region.
9

The Coast Guard is recapitalizing its polar icebreaker fleet through the Polar Security Cutter Program to address
the need for six new polar security cutters.

10

Continued engagement through the National Fleet Board will support close dialogue andcooperation between DoD and the Coast Guard on maritime domain awareness, intelligence, andstrategic planning.
Enhancing Arctic Operations
DoD’s ability to provide a combat-credible deterrent for the Arctic region requires
enhancements in the Joint Force’s flexibility to respond promptly and effectively tocontingencies in the region. DoD’s emphasis will be on adapting existing capabilities and, where
necessary, selectively acquiring new capabilities, combined with Arctic-tailored training,
exercises, and posture refinements.
Regular exercises and deployments in the Arctic. DoD will demonstrate and enhance the Joint
Force’s ability to operate in the Arctic through regular exercises and deployments in the region,
both independently and with allies and partners. Some exercises will be conducted within theNATO context; others will be bilateral or multilateral. Exercises with Arctic allies and partners
enable our ability to deter aggression from strategic competitors, including anti-submarine
warfare and cold weather and mountainous training. DoD is also an active participant inexercises hosted by other nations, including TRIDENT JUNCTURE, ARCTIC CHALLENGE,
and COLD RESPONSE Exercises.
Exercises such as ARCTIC EDGE and BOLD QUEST will enhance the Joint Force’s familiarity
with, and proficiency operating in, Arctic conditions and will improve joint, as well as Service,
operations in the region. The Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex enables training andexercising opportunities in Arctic conditions and across domains.
Recognizing that the Arctic region, and our strategic competitors’ activities, extend beyond the
responsibility of any single Combatant Command, exercises naturally drive increased
cooperation between geographic Combatant Commands across Areas Of Responsibility, as well
as between geographic and functional Combatant Commands. The Joint Staff-led Globally
Integrated Exercise construct supports enhanced coordination of Arctic-related exercises andexercise objectives.
Cold Weather Training. Operating in extreme cold weather conditions (exceeding minus 60
degrees Fahrenheit) requires specific tactics, techniques, and procedures. Toward this purpose,
DoD will build on existing cold weather training for other operating environments. The
Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska provides cold weather
and mountain training, while Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska hosts the Arctic Survival Training
School which is the Air Force’s oldest survival school. DoD will continue to assess cold weather
training needs to prepare its forces for Arctic operations, particularly for joint operations.
Additionally, DoD will work to ensure that forces deployed within Arctic areas of operation
employ ground mobility assets capable of sustained operations in extreme cold weather, acrossall forms of terrain that may be encountered on a year-round basis, including Arctic ice.

11

Cold weather training is also conducted in cooperation with Arctic allies and partners. The
rotations of U.S. Marines through the North Atlantic region include combined training involving
mountainous assault exercises and cold weather survival.
Refining Arctic posture. The Arctic offers an alternative vector for U.S. power projection andmaneuver as part of DoD operations in other regions. DoD will maintain access to the Arctic tosupport the global mobility and projection of U.S. military forces. The forward deployment andpre-positioning of U.S. equipment and supplies in Arctic allied and partner nations supports the
Joint Force’s ability to quickly respond to contingencies in the region. The Department willassess the needs, costs/risks, and benefits of targeted investments to modestly enhance existing,regional infrastructure, both in Alaska and in Europe, to enable operational flexibility to project
forces into the region on an expeditionary basis. In this continued assessment of potential
infrastructure development needs in the Arctic, DoD will take into account the long lead times
and logistical challenges arising from the extreme weather and environmental conditions. DoD
investments in infrastructure will complement Arctic allied and partner investments, as they host
U.S. and other like-minded nations’ forces.
Supporting resilient infrastructure. Critical infrastructure supports the Joint Force’s ability toflow forces from the homeland and project power globally. DoD will seek to enhance theresilience of critical infrastructure in the Arctic region by coordinating with other Federal
departments and agencies and the private sector to protect against asymmetric attacks. The
Department will also continue to take steps to build the resilience of infrastructure in the face ofenvironmental hazards, including through research on permafrost effects to infrastructure.
Predicting where permafrost thaw will occur is vital to maintaining Arctic training operations
and assessing impending environmental management challenges. Continued DoD research,development, testing and evaluation will support efforts to build the resilience of Arctic
infrastructure in the face of environmental hazards.
Working with other Federal Departments and Agencies on Civil Contingency Responses. The
demand for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) activities is likely to grow withincreased economic activity and enduring geological and environmental risks in the Arctic,
including demand for responses to possible mass casualty incidents and natural disasters. DoD is
responsible for the coordination of aeronautical search and rescue for the Elmendorf search andrescue region and works closely in support of the Coast Guard, the lead Federal agency formaritime search and rescue. DoD does not shape or size the Joint Force for DSCA activities, butwill enhance cooperation with relevant State and Federal departments and agencies in order toimprove DoD’s effective, coordinated responses to such contingencies.
Strengthening the Rules-Based Order in the Arctic
DoD will continue to work with allies and partners to strengthen the existing,international rules-based order in the Arctic. Sustaining and strengthening the rules-based order
will help to both deter strategic competitors from specific, aggressive acts and from unilaterally
seeking to change norms governing access to the region. Toward this aim, DoD will cooperate12with allies and partners to strengthen regional security and will support enhanced U.S.
Government participation and cooperation in Arctic forums.
Cooperating with allies and partners to deter aggression. DoD will work with Arctic allies andpartners to improve our collective deterrent and ability to respond to contingencies in the Arctic.
This will include continued efforts to enhance our shared situational awareness of the Arctic
security environment through strategic dialogues and information sharing, as well as further
developing a common understanding of our activities in, and approaches to, the region. The
DoD will strengthen this cooperation through senior leader visits and bilateral meetings, regulardefense engagement forums such as the U.S. European Command-led military-to-military Staff
Talks and Policy-led Bilateral Study Groups and Strategic Dialogues, and implementation ofbilateral roadmaps and statements of intent. Frequent U.S. participation in Nordic Defense
Cooperation-led and Northern Group-led forums, in addition to the Arctic Security Forces
Roundtable, will help build a shared approach to challenges in the Arctic. Beyond diplomaticforums, Arctic allies and partners are highly capable, with experience and proficiency in Arctic
conditions that will benefit the Joint Force. DoD will also seek to enhance cooperation throughcombined training and exercises, both in the United States and elsewhere in the region.
DoD’s cooperation within NATO uniquely contributes to Arctic security and deters strategiccompetitors from using the Arctic as a corridor for expanded competition enabling theirobjectives in other regions. The principle of collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty applies to NATO members located in the Arctic, and thus helps deter
aggression. Arctic allies and partners are active participants in NATO activities; NATO
exercises in the High North, such as Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE, offer opportunities toimprove interoperability in harsh climactic conditions. The establishment of Joint Force
Command Norfolk in 2018 as an operational-level warfighting headquarters supports theprotection of sea lines of communication and allied reinforcement across the North Atlantic.
These initiatives strengthen the United States’ and allies’ collective defense and address potential
maritime challenges arising from the projection of power from the Arctic through the GIUK-N
gap.
Preserving Freedom of the Seas. Maintaining freedoms of navigation and overflight are criticalto ensuring that the Arctic remains a free and open domain and that U.S. forces retain the global
mobility guaranteed under international law. DoD will continue to fly, sail, and operate
wherever international law allows. When necessary and appropriate, the United States will
challenge excessive maritime claims in the Arctic to preserve the rules-based international orderand the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight, as well
as for other, related high seas uses.
Conclusion
Within the context of NDS implementation more broadly, DoD will continue to prepare
and posture the Joint Force to ensure that the Arctic is a secure and stable region where U.S.
national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work
cooperatively to address shared challenges. This strategy outlines a Departmental approach andsupporting measures to ensure that the Joint Force presents a credible deterrent for the Arctic
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region, while also prioritizing a continued, cooperative approach to maintaining the existing
rules-based order in the Arctic.

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Annex A: Service Roles and Missions in the Arctic
Each Military Department plays a critical role in achieving objectives and approach
outlined in this Arctic strategy.
Air Force
The Air Force operates the majority of DoD’s assets in the Arctic. The Air Force’s
activities support international norms of access and navigation to ensure adequate protection of
U.S. national security interests in the region.
Air and space assets are especially crucial for the Arctic region due to its vast distancesand minimal land and maritime infrastructure. Air Force mission sets in the Arctic range frommissile defense and power projection to space situational awareness and search andrescue. Vital early warning decision space for homeland defense is provided by the Alaska
Radar System and more than 50 radars that comprise the North Warning System acrossCanada. Assets at Clear, Alaska, and Thule, Greenland, are uniquely positioned for supporting
space surveillance and satellite control networks, tracking tens of thousands of objects in orbit
daily.
The Air Force maintains several large air bases supporting Arctic operations, including
those at Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) and Eielson AFB in Alaska. Alaska offers key
strategic locations for projecting airpower into the Indo-Pacific and Europe. These Alaskanbases support critical advanced generation fighter aircraft, including the F-35, and aerial
refueling tankers from a strategic forward location offering global reach. The New York Air
National Guard operates unique ski-equipped aircraft that provide access to some of the mostremote locations on the Greenland ice sheet. The Alaska Air National Guard’s Rescue
Coordination Center works closely with the Coast Guard to perform hundreds of search andrescue missions annually.
The Air Force contributes to essential training events focused on Arctic readiness,
including operating Air Force’s oldest survival school at Eielson AFB, Alaska. Finally, the Air
Force executes Exercise RED FLAG Alaska and contributes to the Joint Pacific Alaska Range
Complex, DoD’s largest airspace, at 65,000 square miles, optimized for high-end training against
strategic competitors.
In addition to these key, existing assets and posture, the Air Force continues to explore
opportunities to modernize and enhance Arctic capabilities.
Navy
The Arctic region is uniquely relevant to the Navy’s ability to provide flexible deterrent
options. The Arctic provides additional maneuver room for distributed nuclear and conventional
force deterrent operations. The Navy’s 2nd Fleet has responsibility for ensuring the readiness of,and dynamically employing, maritime forces in the Atlantic and the Arctic, and the ability to15

fight across multiple domains, thereby deterring aggression. Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet is dualhatted as Commander of NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk.
The Navy will be ready to exercise, maintain, and exploit Sea Control in order to defend
U.S. maritime access and interests in the Arctic. Naval forces provide maritime security in themaritime domain and the seaborne approaches to the United States, including the Arctic.
Maritime security in the Arctic includes defending sea lines of communication and the homelandfrom seaborne attacks, maritime domain awareness, and supporting Coast Guard operations as
required. The Navy builds interoperability with the Coast Guard through the National Fleet Plan
and the associated National Fleet Board. Regular meetings of the Coast Guard-Navy National
Fleet Board Arctic Working Group address cooperation and maritime security operations in the
Arctic. The Navy also ensures access to the Arctic through routine deployments of submarines
and aircraft to the region.
The Arctic enables sea-based power projection (e.g., precision fires from ships,
submarines, carrier-based aircraft, and Marines Corps operations) from vectors outside of
traditional operating areas. The Navy conducts the biennial ICEX submarine exercise north of
Alaska’s North Slope. This is a multi-national submarine exercise that enhances readiness forsustained Arctic operations.
Through its sealift operations, the Navy provides timely movement, positioning, andsustainment of the Joint Force across the range of military operations, including the movement of
personnel, material, and forces to and from or within the Arctic, by sea.
The Navy will provide support as required to Arctic search and rescue missions
conducted and led by the Coast Guard, and as directed in support of international partners.
As part of its DSCA and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief responsibilities, theNavy will remain ready to support Arctic operations, such as: pollution response and natural
disaster recovery; integrated planning efforts with local, State, Federal, and native communities;
and interoperability with the Coast Guard and international partners.
Marine Corps
The Marine Corps maintains capability to support Naval operations in "any clime andplace," including the Arctic. Depending on seaborne lift, the Service plans for a baseline of two
Marine Expeditionary Brigades that can conduct offensive operations in extreme cold weather
environments.
To develop and maintain this capability, the Marine Corps routinely deploys Marine AirGround Task Forces of varying sizes to conduct cold weather training. The units train at the
Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center, and other venues, including Camp Ripley,
Minnesota and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The Service also trains in Alaska, in Exercise ARCTIC
EDGE, and in Norway, in exercises such as TRIDENT JUNCTURE, as well as through wintertraining rotations above the Arctic Circle. These training exercises feature interoperability
training with NATO allies such as Norway and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the Marine

16Corps conducts cold weather training in the Pacific, including in the Korea Marine Exercise
Program, and in northern Japan, in winter exercises such as FOREST LIGHT.
The Marine Corps has recently upgraded its Infantry Combat Clothing and Equipment(ICCE) cold weather inventory. The Service maintains sufficient cold weather ICCE for theentire active and reserve population and Extreme Cold Weather Clothing System (ECCWCS)ICCE (sufficient for temperatures to minus 25 degrees Fahrenheit) for 35,000 Marines. The
resulting ability to outfit 39,000 Marines for extreme cold weather supports the Arctic-capable
two MEB objective.
Army
On order, U.S. Army Alaska (USARAK) executes Joint Forces Land Component
Commander functions in support of United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) operations and
USNORTHCOM Homeland Defense and DSCA missions in Alaska. Army forces are postured
to support mission sets through the USNORTHCOM-defined Alaska Joint Operations Area, as
well as worldwide unified land operations in support of USARPAC.
Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command mans andoperates Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, to defend the U.S. homeland fromlong-range ballistic missile attacks.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Engineering (USACE) Research and Development
Center, Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (ERDC-CRREL) works to enhance
Arctic domain awareness by examining the effects of a changing climate; and by monitoring
Arctic effects on the operational environment, including sensor performance and signal
propagation. The USACE ERDC-CRREL addresses effects on infrastructure and operations
resulting from exposure to extreme environmental and dynamic climactic conditions. USACEERDC-CRREL is pursuing technology to detect permafrost conditions, providing facilities tosimulate Arctic conditions, as well as systems and materials evaluation and development.
The U.S. Army Cold Regions Test Center, located at Fort Greely, Alaska, plans andconducts developmental testing, with an emphasis on Soldier participation, in the snow, extreme
cold, and sub-arctic natural environment. This provides acquisition and Army leadership withtimely, accurate, and relevant information relating to system performance.
USARAK manages Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex training areas and airspace inand around Eielson Air Force Base and Fort Greely.
Special Operations Forces
Special Operations Forces (SOF) routinely participate in Arctic or near-Arctic region
exercises (e.g., BOLD QUEST, NORTHERN GRIFFIN, TRIDENT JUNCTURE) to ensureinteroperability with allies and partners.
The agile and expeditionary nature of SOF, combined with established allied and partner
relations and interoperability, provides DoD a ready capability to compete below the level ofarmed conflict in the Arctic region, and across the spectrum of SOF core activities.
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National Guard
The National Guard, through the Army or the Air Force, provides forces that may bemade available to support DoD’s missions in the Arctic region.
The National Guard operates in both Federal and State capacities in the Arctic,
contributing to a spectrum of DoD missions. In a Federal duty status, the National Guard
provides ready forces available for mobilization as part of defense of the homeland or abroad, as
well as for conducting DSCA missions. Drawing on forces located in Alaska and other regions,
the National Guard augments Title 10 DoD forces, including in such missions as ballistic missile
defense. The National Guard also contributes to DoD’s air mobility in the Arctic and leads the
only U.S. LC-130 Wing capable of operating C-130s from ice locations in the Arctic.
In Title 32 and State duty status, the National Guard undertakes Disaster Response,
Domain Awareness, Arctic Search and Rescue, Homeland Defense, and Environment Protection
missions. The National Guard’s performance of these roles in Alaska builds operational
proficiency in extreme climactic conditions and helps address some of the challenges posed by
the changing physical environment. In addition, in Alaska the National Guard leads the Alaska
Native Tribal liaison, supporting engagement with local indigenous communities.
In a State duty status, the National Guard has conducted international engagement with
Arctic allies and partners, including planning and coordination activities related to disaster
response and civil support. The National Guard Arctic Interests Council focuses andsynchronizes interstate Arctic interests and expertise.

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