The Chinese Military Power: Its Real Situation & the Influence
Yoshiaki Yano 矢野義昭（留学中のパリから）
Although China has a long history for more than three thousand years, The
PRC is a newly built communism country on the basis of the traditional thought
and strategy of the Chinese. The PRC is now attracting the eyes of the world
because of her amazing economic growth. At the same time, the more countries
have become pay more attention for the negative influences on the internationalsociety.
This paper tries to make the analysis on the reality of the Chinese military
power and its influence on the surrounding countries form the viewpoint of Japan.
Japan, as one of the surrounding countries of China, has not only imported
many various cultures from China and also waged the wars with her. Japanese
viewpoint would be beneficial for other countries because of the lessons learned
through the long history of the communication with China.

1. Traditional Power of China
GDP & Population
In the history of China, many dynasties got appeared, rising andexperienced the height of its power for about fifty years, then became falling, andfinally disappeared from the history. The Chinese history has experienced thistype of cycles at the interval of several hundred years. In those cycles, theprosperity and the population on the continent of China changed dramatically.
Over most of the past two thousand years China has accounted for between 22
and 33 percent of world GDP. But the economic power of China sharply fell
down according to the collapse of the social order. For example, in 1950, thenext year of the end of the Civil War, China’s share of the global GDP fell,
reaching 4-5 percent, where it stayed until 19731.
The population has also been changing dramatically. In the Warring States
period (403 -221 B. C.), the total population of China had already reached toabout twenty millions. In Han Dynasty, the population reached about sixty
millions in 2 A. D. After that, the population fell down dramatically to twenty
millions in the one generation, because of the population collapse caused by the1Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001), Appendix B, p. 263.
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civil war and the famine. The population of China increased in the stable andprosperous society in Han, Tang, Song, Qing Dynasties, reaching about sixty
millions. In the 17th Century, the population of Qing Dynasty reached one
hundred million, in the 19th Century, reached about four hundred millions. And
China also experienced dramatic decrease of the population, reaching less thantwenty millions several times2.

The most militarized civilization and formidable than the Soviets
China has been very militarized from the ancient times, because of thefrequently happening civil wars, the rebellions and the invasions by thesurrounding tribes, which resulted in the population collapse. In China, there had
been more than 6,000 battles in 4,000 plus years from the twenty-sixth century B.
C. to the end of Qing Dynasty. This figure was more than one-third of the total
numbers that had happened around the world during the same period3.
China has had a huge amount of force. For example, Shihuangdi (259-210
B.C.), Initial Emperor, in Qin Dynasty, commanded about one million personnel.
The total force of China, including all of the warring states in those days, isestimated about 5,300,000. This huge amount of the force is far outnumbered
the force commanded by Caesar, reaching twenty to thirty thousands. China
also invented and developed the revolutionary armaments like the gunpowder,
the advanced crossbows and the rockets propelled by the gunpowder; andbesides, they deployed and used them in a huge amount in the battle fields.
Although China was almost colonized by the lack of the military power copingwith the modernized western countries after the eighteenth century, it would bebetter not to forget the fact that China has historically been seriously militarized
civilization.
The U. S. confronted with the Soviet Union in the Cold War Era. Whichnation does have the greater power, the PRC or the Soviet Union? The PRC has
the almost similar amount of the territory to that of the U. S. The Soviet Union
had the 2.3 times more of that of the U. S. But the most important factor deciding
the national strength is GDP. Because it is not only the most useful indication of
the economic power of the nation, but also decides the capability to invest theconstruction of the military power. In terms of GDP, the Soviet Union could not
2Toru Kato, The History of the Population of China,
http://www.geocities.jp/cato1963/jinkou996.html.
3 Peng Guangqing and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military
Science Publishing House, 2005), p. 3.
2

succeed to overwhelm the U. S. The best record of the Soviet Union’s economy
was nearly a half of the GDP of the U. S.
According to the IMF, in 1990 China’s GDP share of global economy was at
5.61 percent, increasing to 11.02 percent in 2000, 14.39 percent in 2005, and an
estimated 15.83 percent in 20074. In 2020’s, the China’s GDP would becomelarger than that of the U. S., if the annual economic growth of China maintainmore than 7 to 9 percent. The population of China is about five times larger thanthat of the U. S. The Soviet Union had almost the similar amount of the
population to that of the U. S.
In total, the Soviet Union had almost the same power as the U. S., on theassumption of its vast territory has the same importance as GDP in the national
power. Considering the importance of the GDP and the population, China would
become about five times more powerful than the U. S., because China will havealmost the same GDP in the 2020’s, on the other side, she has the five times
larger population and the same size of the territory. China should become more
formidable than the Soviet Union for the U. S. in neat future, and especially forthe adjacent countries of China like Japan, Korea and Taiwan.

Until when will China be formidable and what should we do?
The average duration of the most powerful and prosperous period of thedynasties is about fifty years according to the Chinese history. The pressure on
the surrounding countries caused by the growing China would be kept for morethan ten to twenty years, because the economic growth began in the late 1970’s
under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership.
After 2030, China will become a society occupied by more than two
hundred million aged people and the population of China will begin to decrease5.
China will surely lose the momentum of the economic growth and the military
expansion. According to the lessons from the Chinese history, the PRC will besuffering from the civil war or the rebellions after 2030. The most important issue
on the national security of the neighboring countries should be how to endure
the increasing pressure of the Chinese military challenge until 2030.
4International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007,
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/weouept.aspx?sy=1990&ey=...
5 Keiichirou Ooizumi, “the Possibilities of the Sustainable Economic Growth from theViewpoint of the Demographic Dynamics,”The Possibilities of the Sustainable China’s
Economic Growth edited by Zhu Yan, supervised by Toshio Watanabe & the 21st Century
Public Policy Institute (Keisousyobou, 2011), pp.3-10.
32. Mao’s Strategy
Active Defense Strategy
The rise and fall of the dynasties on the continent of China brought the
Chinese philosophers some unique view on the history. They considered
the human history as the cyclic change in the mixture of the positive aspectof all events within the universe, Yang, and the negative one, Yin. The
Chinese people would never give up in the worst situation, because they
believe Yang will surely come back again in some day. They would always
be cautious not become arrogant about the height of the best situation,
because Yin has certainly already stolen up behind them.
Such a view on the history based upon the dualism has prevailed
among all factions of the Chinese philosophers, including the most famous
ancient military strategist, Sunzi. Mao Zedong was also influenced by thisview in his strategy. Mao viewed a war as the highest form of struggle forresolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage6. Healso said that “A war is the continuation of politics by other … means. When
politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by theusual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way7.”

He asserted that the seizure of power by armed forces, the settlement of theissue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution8, and only withguns can the whole world be transformed9. Thus, Mao seemed the military force
as the only decisive means to resolve the political contradictions between theimperialism states.
However, he also put the great importance on the politics and othernon-military factors. This shows the dualism. The PRC leaders and thestrategists emphasize the importance called Sanzhan, including phycological
warfare, propaganda campaign to the masses and the legal warfare, those arevery effective to collapse the adversary metal strength.
As the other side of the dualism, Mao formalized the Active Defense
Strategy. This strategy contains three stages; the first stage is our strategic
6“Problems of the Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (December 1936), Selected
Works, Vol. Ⅰ, p. 180.
7 “On Protracted War” (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. Ⅱ, pp. 152.
8 Ibid., p. 219.
9 “Problems of War and Strategy”(November 6, 1938), Selected Works, Vol. Ⅱ, p. 225.
4

defensive; the second one is our preparation for the offensive confronting theenemy’s defensive posture; and the final one is our strategic offensive andenemy strategic withdrawal10. On the defensive stage, Mao asserted; wesometimes have to retreat to avoid our casualties caused by waging war with theoverwhelming enemy. If possible, we should disturb the enemy in order to wear
down the enemy strength. The preparation stage is the hardest period for China
during the long protracted war. During this stage, we should alter the balance ofpower, by wearing down the enemy enough to launch the offensive with theadvantageous power. On the offensive stage, we should pursue the annihilationof the enemy11.
This Active Defense Strategy is in effective under the modernized local
conflicts, such as those concerning the sovereignty of the disputed territories.
This strategy adapting to the conflicts over the sovereignty of the territories puts
more emphasis on the offensive than the Mao’s Active Defense Strategy for thereunification of the mainland China. The People’s Liberation Army would not giveup their assertion to the sovereignty for the disputed territories, including
Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) Islands. Senkaku Islands were incorporated into
Japan’s territory according to the International Law with the legal procedures in1895 by the Japanese government. At that time, Qing did not declare any
protests to the incorporation. The PRC abruptly began to assert their sovereignty
to Senkaku Islands in 1971, only after the discovery of the submarine oil field by
ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) in 1968.
The similar situation has already observed in the South China Sea. The
PRC is disputing the islands with Vietnam and the Philippines, both waged thebattle, and other neighboring countries. The PRC would not give up their illegal
request for the sovereignty to the islands, and if the balance of power is seemed
to become overwhelming to the adversary, they will not hesitate to occupy thedisputed area with their force by surprise. Once succeeding in the occupation,
they would by no means bring back the territory. This shows the inherent
endurance of the Chinese leaders to accomplish their aim in the long run, andtheir will to use force to do it without any hesitation if there is an opportunity.

Nuclear Forces Combined with People’s War
Another principle of Mao’s Strategy is “Liang-Dan Yi-Xing.” This means the10
11“On Protracted War” (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. Ⅱ, p. 472.
Niu Li, Mao Zedong’s Military Strategy (Jiefangjun Chuban, 2004),pp. 98-103.
5

Ballistic Missiles with Nuclear Warheads and the Artificial Satellites. Peng
Dehuai, Commander of the Chinese Volunteer Force dispatched to Korea during
the Korean War, opposed to Mao’s People’s War Concept, because of thesevere experience of waging war with the modernized U. S. Forces. Pengasserted the need to modernize the PLA conventional forces by learning fromthe Soviet Forces. On the other hand, Peng would accept the extended nuclear
deterrence of the Soviet Union.
However, Mao rejected the Peng’s request for the modernization. Mao, as
the leader of newly built the PRC, would not accept the reliance of the nuclear
deterrence on the Soviet forces. Mao decided to develop the nuclear bombs andthe ballistic missiles under the support of the Soviets. All supports provided by
the Soviet side were withdrawn, as the result of the confrontation between the
PRC and the Soviet Union in 1960. In spite of it, the PRC independently
succeeded to develop the nuclear bombs and various kinds of the ballistic
missiles by the early 80’s12. Mao established the foundation of the sovereignty
and the independence of the PRC from the U. S. and Russia by attaining her
own nuclear deterrence power.
On the other hand, Mao would defend China from the invasion especially by
the Soviet Army along the long border with the Soviet Union by the People’s War
Strategy. On People’s War Strategy, Mao said “What is a true bastion of iron? It
is the masses, the millions upon millions of people who genuinely and sincerely
support the revolution13.” and he also said, “The operations of the people’s
guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each otherlike a man’s right arm and left arm14.” However, People’s War Strategy should
impose the burden of the guerrilla warfare and the casualties on the civilians;
and besides the enemy should be allowed the invasion in the depth of theChinese territory to wear down their strength15.
People’s War Strategy has a great influence on the PLA military strategy
today. For example, the Chinese strategists now consider the information
warfare as a new type of People’s War. And they put the emphasis on themobilization of the cyber militias from the IT specialists in the civilian sectors.
12Shi Xueyuan,The Nuclear Force and the Policy of the World Nuclear Powers (Junshi

Chubanshe, Beijing,1991), pp. 136-138.
“Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work”(January 27, 1934), Selected Works, Vol. Ⅰ, p.150.
14 “On Protracted War” (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. Ⅰ, p. 238.
15 Niu Li, Mao Zedong’s Military Strategy, pp.103-107.
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They also assert that information warfare is not only a war using the computers
but also a new special war mobilizing radio communication and Internet
technology16. The PLA strategists put the emphasis on the creation and thedevelopment of People’s War Theory under the current national defense
circumstances. In order to match the request for war with the advanced
technology, to accomplish the ideal and perfect mobilization system and theintimate corporation between the PLA and the civilian sectors is indispensable17.
China is also emphasizing integration of defense and civilian sectors to leverage
output from China’s expanding science and technology base18. This reflects the
traditional total mobilization system of People’s War Strategy.
Another example of People’s War Strategy is “Ciaoxian Zhan”, which means
war without any limitations. This strategy is based on the idea that every usefulmeasure in the civilized society should be utilized as weapons19.

3. Deng Xiaoping’s Modernization of the PLA
The PLA modernization
Deng Xiaoping got the supreme power after the catastrophic Great Cultural
Revolution led by Mao. Under Deng ’s leadership, the “Four Modernizations,”
consisting of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense,
were promulgated in 1973. Since 1978, China embarked on a fundamental
process of reform and modernization that has resulted in an unprecedented rateof economic development. China has been successful in attracting vast amounts
of foreign direct investment20.
Revamping the military was, however, seen as “a long-term strategic
program, and put the fourth priority of the “Four Modernizations.” No dramatic
upsurge in the level of Chinese defense spending or effort occurred in the late1970s and early 1980s. Instead, attention centered on redesigning the armed
forces so that they would be capable of absorbing and effectively using more
16

Study of War Theory & Strategy Department, Military Science Institute, Study on War
Strategy (Jiefangjun Chuban, 2005),pp. 339-340.
17 Ibid, pp. 498-501.
18 US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2013, p. 47.
19 Qiao Liang & Wang Xiansui, War without Any Limitations (Junshi Wenyun Chubanshe,
Beijing, 1999), Chapter 7.
20 Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Abram N. Shulsky, Daniel L. Byman, Roger Cliff, David T. Orletsky,
Davie Shlapak, Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military
Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), p. 1.
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advanced weapons and equipment21.
In 1975 the CMC (Central Military Commission) concluded that a massive
Soviet invasion was more of a myth than reality. With Mao’s support and Deng’s
guidance, the CMC implemented a three-year plan of force reduction, cutting theoverall forces level of the PLA from 6.1 to 4.5 million. The army was reduced by
32 per cent, strategic missile force by 27.2 per cent, and the air force by 13.4 percent. Only the navy increased its number of sailors22.
In 1983, Deng proposed that the PLA’s war strategy be altered frompreparation for an early all-out war with the USSR to one of ‘steady development’in a changed international environment. The Soviets were mainly focusing on
the European theatre and preoccupied by the threat posed to it by hardline US
policy. Thus the PLA enjoyed historic opportunity of development and reform: the
PLA was no longer forced to keep a giant army23.
In July 1975, when Deng Xiaoping surveyed the PRC military, hesummarized the problems of the PLA in five words: “bloating, laxity, conceit,
extravagance and inertia.”24 The PLA did not perform well against theVietnamese in 1979. Thereafter, first Deng and then his successors Jiang Zeminand Hu Jintao continually sought to shrink the total number of PLA personnel;
reestablish and then upgrade the military education system; build anoncommissioned officer corps; gradually create a more secure nuclear
deterrent; reduce the dominance of ground units in the force structure anddecision-making system; elevate the positions and capabilities of the strategic
and missile forces (second artillery), navy, and air force; revolutionize thetechnological level of all services and functions such as logistics, intelligence,command, control, and communications; and increase mobility and joint
operational capabilities25.

The Rising of the Resources after the Tiananmen Incident
The resources devoted to military modernization rose in the 1990s as
China’s economy gained strength, as communist regimes in Eastern Europe and21

Ibid., p. 37.
You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (London & New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1999),
pp. 32-33.
23 Ibid., p. 4.
24 Deng Xiaoping, “The Task of Consolidating the Army,” July 14, 1975, in Selected Worksof Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), p. 27.
25David M. Lampton,The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds(Berkeley Los Angeles & London: University of California Press,2008),p. 39.
22

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the Soviet Union collapsed, and as mutual strategic suspicion between Beijing
and Washington increased following the June 4, 1989, violence in the PRC, theTiananmen incident, in which the PLA had played a decisive role. Officiallyannounced military budgets from 1990 largely rose by double digits26.
Beijing fears that the United States would intervene to protect Taiwan if the
PRC used force against the island. However, a lack of response by the PRC
would undermine the regime’s legitimacy with its own people. Given thisdilemma, Beijing’s chosen course has been to increase its military strength inhopes of deterring a Taiwan declaration of its independence and, failing that,
deterring a U.S intervention27.
Moreover, the 1991 display of U. S. military superiority in the gulf War, the1996 dispatch of two U.S. carrier groups to the waters off Taiwan, a move that
Beijing found it difficult to respond to, and the 1999 Kosovo War also created arationale for increased military spending. Finally, a major contributor to rising
military spending has been the need to keep military pay somewhat competitive
with compensation in the civilian sector. Beijing’s 2006 defense white paper
acknowledged the protracted nature of the military modernization task by sayingthat the goal was “building informationized armed forces and being capable ofwinning informationized wars by the mid-21st century28.
US Office of the Secretary of Defense describes in Annual Report toCongress in March 2013 that, “Beijing announced a 10.7 percent increase in its
annual military budget to $114 billion, continuing more than two decades ofsustained annual defense spending increases. Analysis of data from 2003
through 2012 indicates China’s officially disclosed military budget grew at an
average of 9.7 percent per year in inflation-adjusted terms over the period. China
has the fiscal strength and political will to support defense spending growth atcomparable levels, despite lowering its economic growth forecast in 2012 to 7.5
percent from 8 percent in 2011. Continued increases will support PLA
modernization efforts and facilitate China’s move toward a more professional
force. Using 2012 prices and exchange rates, the U.S Department of Defense
estimates that China’s total actual military-related expenditure for 2012 falls
between $135 billion and $215 billion.”29
26

Ibid., p. 40.
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), especially ch. 8.
28 D. M. Lampton,The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds, pp. 39-40.
29 US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
27

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As long as the strong political power of the PLA will be kept, the trend of themilitary budget increase will be maintained, even if the economic growth
becomes lower.

The Maritime Strategy Development from the Coastal Navy to
the Offshore Navy
Deng Xiaoping made an on-the-spot inspection on the sea to astate-of-the-art destroyer equipped with missiles in 1979. He declared that we
had the right to assert our interests in the issues in the Pacific Ocean. Then hewrote down a slogan appealing to construct a strong navy with the capabilities ofconducting modern operations30. Deng appointed Liu Huaqing as Supreme
Commander of the PLA Navy, and ordered him to construct such a modernized
navy in 198231.
Liu showed the strategic guidance which the reform of the PLA navy
should base on. Active Defense and Offshore Operation (Jinhai Zuozhan) were
the guidance shown by Liu32. There are several reasons in addition to the threatby the U. S. intervention, why the PLA has to construct a strong navy and why
Liu showed such guidance.
The presence of a large and growing percentage of China’s GDP in coastal
areas vulnerable to air and sea threats is a concern Beijing is addressing33.
From 1978 to 1980, 32.7 percent of China’s GDP was located in coastal areas;by 1995-97, that percentage had risen to 41.7. Doctrinally, therefore, Beijing
wants to push the space for potential conflict offshore. This requires enhanced
naval and air capabilities, as well as the means to command, control, andcoordinate fast-moving and far-flung forces34.
Another reason is the nation’s increasing dependence on important imported
strategic resources, notably oil, that are concentrated in volatile areas, especially
the Middle East. It is an increasing concern in Beijing. The U.S. Department ofEnergy estimates that by 2025 the PRC will be 73 percent dependent on oil

Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2013, p. 45.
30 Shi Changxue, Navy Supreme Commander Liu Huaqing (Changsha Chubanshe, Beijing,2013), p. 125.
31 Ibid., pp. 33-35.
32 Ibid., p. 86.
33 Su Ruozhou, “A Great Military reform- Roundup of Strategic Changes in Our Army
Building,” Jiefangjun Bao, December 18, 1998, pp. 1-2.
34 D. M. Lampton,The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds, p. 41.
10

imports35.
Liu indicated the six principles in the PLA navy strategy, as follows: The firstprinciple is to match the multilayered system of the theoretical principles; Thesecond one is to materialize the strategy given by the CMC; The third is to reflect
the inherent requests of navy construction and future operations; The fourth is tobase upon the objective needs brought by the development of the naval
circumstances; The fifth is to respond to the requests from the circumstances ofthe strategic status and the posture of the maritime battle field in the Chinese
defense districts on the sea; The final one is to meet with the increasing demandbrought by the improvement of the China’s status in the international society36.
Liu said: Comrade Deng Xiaoping clearly indicated the orientation on the two
fundamental issues, the strategic characteristic and the basic area of the naval
operations. The characteristic is defensive, and the area is the offshore sea.
According to this orientation, we have to make sure that our naval strategy is todefend the offshore area, and it belongs to one type of the area defense
strategies.37
Liu also said: It is needless for China to pursue the blue water navy to attainthe hegemony. Our objective is to maintain the unification of our nation, and to
defend our territory and sovereignty, to cope with the local conflicts on the sea,
and to deter and defend the possible invasion from the sea by the imperialism
and the hegemonism. The primary operational area for the PLA navy of the houris the offshore sea which is encircled by the first island chain, including Yellow
Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. All of this area is under theadministration of China according to the international maritime laws, andincluding the inherent territories of China like the islands in South China Sea.
According to advancing the level of the economic power and the science andtechnology, the naval power should become much stronger. The operational
area of the PLA navy should be gradually extended to the northern part of the
Pacific Ocean and the second island chain. Our navy will conduct theoperational phase in which both we and enemy launch the offensive, according
to the doctrine of the Active Defense campaign38.
This Offshore Active Defense strategy is the basic theory leading theconstruction and the operational concept of the PLA navy today. The U. S.
35

Ibid., p.41.
Shi Changxue, Navy Supreme Commander Liu Huaqing, pp. 118-119.
37 Ibid., p. 125.
38 Ibid., p. 126.
36

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analysts fear the appearing strategy of the PLA, called the Anti-Access/Area
Denial (A2/AD) Strategy. Although this strategy is the concept estimated by the
U. S. side, it has clearly been resulted from the Offshore Active Defense
declared by Deng and executed by Liu.

4. The threat of the A2/AD in the western Pacific Ocean
China’s leadership has supported former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s
dictum from the early 1990s that China should, “observe calmly; secure ourposition; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capabilities and bide our time; begood at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” This guidancereflected Deng’s belief that Chinese interests are best served by focusing on
internal development and stability while steering clear of challenging or
confronting major powers.

Rising of Power and Change of the Strategy
However, some Chinese scholars question whether Deng’s policy approach
will continue to win support as China’s interests increase abroad and its power
expands. China’s perceived security interests have changed considerably since
Deng’s era to include a heavy reliance on maritime commerce. China’s
improving naval capabilities enable roles and missions that would have been
impossible for the PLA to pursue just a decade ago39.
Today the PRC became the country having the largest GDP except the U. S.
Some analysts estimate that the GDP of China will surpass that of the U. S. by2030. Analysis of 2000-2009 data indicates China’s officially disclosed military
budget grew at an average of 11.8 percent in inflation-adjusted terms over theperiod, while gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 9.6 percent40. If this trend is
kept, the resources allotted to the military will become larger than that of the U. S
in ten years, because the U. S., now suffering from the huge amount of thebudget deficits, is obliged to cut the defense budget for five hundred billion
dollars in ten years.
In August 2011, President Obama and Congress struck a grand bargain toraise the U. S. debt limit known as the Budget Control Act of 2011 (Public Law
123-25). This law immediately placed ceilings on discretionary “security”
39

US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2013, p. 20.
40
US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2010, p. 41.
12spending. In implementing the Budget Control Act’ s spending ceilings, the WhiteHouse’s Office of Management and Budget is reportedly looking to trim as muchas $489 billion more from the Pentagon’s budget over the next decade41.
Earlier this decade, China began a new phase of military development byarticulating roles and missions for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that go
beyond China’s immediate territorial interests. Some of these missions andassociated capabilities have allowed the PLA to contribute to international
peacekeeping efforts, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counterpiracy operations. Other investments have allowed the PLA to pursue
anti-access and area-denial strategies. Still others appear designed to improve
the PLA’s ability for extended-range power projection, although China’s ability tosustain military power at a distance, today, remains limited42.

The Background of the Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy
The PLA strategists conceive that the U. S. Forces are strengthening theirenvelopment around the PRC, especially in the north-eastern Asia-Pacific area,
as Hilary Clinton declared in Guam on January 8, 2011. The PLA strategists
assert: In order to accomplish their aim, the U. S. Forces are taking several
measures as follows;
The first measure is to construct the so-called “three island chains,” thechains for the military envelopment zones. The first island chain starts from
Kyushu, Japan in the north, to Malaysia in the south, including Republic of Korea,
Japan, one of the PRC provinces, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei andSingapore. The core of the second island chain is Guam where the largest U. S.
Air and Navy bases in the western Asia-Pacific are stationed. The core of thethird islands is Hawaii;
The second is to strengthen the military alignment in the Asia-Pacific. “Tianan
Incident,” the incident where the ROK navy vessel was sunk, and thesovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan are especially
utilized for strengthening the Japan-U. S. military alignment and the ROK-U. S.
one. By the exchange of the information, the corporation in the logistics, and thebilateral military exercises, the de facto military alignments among the U. S.,
Japan and ROK is constructed. Its aim is not only to threaten the North Korea
41

Foreign Policy Initiative, Defending Defense (November 17, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/defense-spending-super-committee-and-price-g….
42 US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2010, p.Ⅰ.
13

but also to defend and deter our intention;
The third is by conducting the bilateral and multilateral exercises surrounding
China, to threaten the safety of our country. The objectives of the offensives inthose exercises were clearly China. And besides, during the U. S. exercise with
the ROK and Japan in 2010, the U. S. Navy aircraft carrier group entered into
the Yellow Sea area. They became the real threat against the safety of ourcountry, although they did not commit the violation of the territorial waters ofChina43.
The PLA is preparing for the new types of war and operation in the current
local wars; joint operation, non-contact and asymmetric operation, firepower
war, information war, quick maneuver operation, command-and-control war,
special operation, aerospace war, amphibious operation, air-raid, air defense,
biological war, psychological war, ecological war, and chemical war44.

The Threat of the Medium-Range Missile Forces
On firepower war, as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report notes,“China is developing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range
ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced
weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic
warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, andcounter-space systems.”45

43

National Security Policy Committee, China Political Science Study Conference edited,
Review of China’s Geo-Security Environment (2010-2011)(Beijing: Central Compilation &Translation Press, August 2011), pp. 118-119.
44 Study of War Theory & Strategy Department, Military Science Institute, Study on War
Strategy (Jiefangjun Chuban, 2005),pp. 186-206.
45 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 31.
14

46

Among them, the missile forces have shown the most dramatic increase in
the quantity and the quality. According to the US DOD report, the Chinese
missile force in 2012 is as follows; China’s Missile Force
SystemMissilesLaunchers
Estimated Range
ICBM
50-75
50-75
5,500+ km
IRBM
5-20
5-20
3,000-5,500 km
MRBM
75-10075-1001,000-3,000 km
SRBM
1,000-1,200 200-250< 1,000 km
GLCM
200-500
40-55
1,500+ km47
The Second Artillery has deployed more than 1,100 SRBM s (Short Range
Ballistic Missiles) to garrisons across from Taiwan and is fielding cruise missiles,
including the ground-launched CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile48. Cross-Strait
economic and cultural ties continued to make important progress in 2009.
Despite these positive trends, China’s military build-up opposite the island
continued unabated. The PLA is developing the capability to deter Taiwan
independence or influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms while
simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for
the island in case of conflict. The balance of cross-Strait military forces continues
to shift in the mainland’s favor49.
Concerning the number deployed China’s missiles in the range of within 3,000
46

US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2012, May 2012, p. 40, 42.
47 US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2012, May 2012, p. 29.
48 US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2013, p. 38.
49 US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2010, p.Ⅰ
15

km, including the GLCM (Ground-Launched Cruise Missile), it reached about
280-620 based on the above assessment in 2012. On the other hand, the UnitedStates will retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N).
The reasons why the United States decided to do so is explained as follows:This system serves a redundant purpose in the U. S. nuclear stockpile. It has
been one of a number of means to forward-deploy nuclear weapons in time ofcrisis. Other means include forward-deployment of bombers with either bombs
or cruise missiles, as well as forward-deployment of dual-capable fighters. U. S.
ICBMs and SLBMs are capable of striking any potential adversary. The
deterrence and assurance rolls of TLAM-N can be adequately substituted bythese other means, and the United States remains committed to providing acredible extended deterrence posture and capabilities50.
The retirement of the U. S. TLAM-N will bring the limitation in the number of
the U. S. Forces missiles ranging within 3,000km with the nuclear orconventional warheads deployed in the western Pacific. The deployed warheads
will be limited to the ALCM (Air-Launched Cruise Missile) s, and bombs
equipped with the bombers deployed in Guam and the fighter/bombers of theaircraft carriers. It will lead the inferiority in the numbers of the warheads
deployed in the Asia-Pacific to those of the PLA.
On the aircraft carriers, the most serious concern for the U. S. Forces
deployed in the region within 3,000km are the MRBM (Medium-Range Ballistic
Missile) called DF-21D. China continues to field an ASBM (Anti-Ship Ballistic
Missile) based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) MRBM that it began deploying
in 2010. Known as the DF-21D, this missile provides the PLA the capability to
attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific. The DF-21D
has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead51.
As the result from the retirement of the TLAM-N and the threat of the DF-21D,
the credibility of the U. S. extended deterrence for Japan and the ROK, would bedecreased in near future, in spite of the reassurance of the credibility by the U. S.
side. In that situation, the order and stability in the Asia-Pacific might become
unstable.

The Threat of the Asymmetric Wars
50

US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 28.
US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2013, p. 38.
51

16

The strategists of the PLA put the great emphasis on the asymmetric wars.
They assert that: In such a war, the inferior side finally got the victory for about
30 percent of the wars. There are many aspects of the non-symmetries; power,
operation domain, period, equipment and technologies, and methods of theoperations. In the Post-Cold War era, the asymmetric warfare represents the
new characteristics of information war. We should analyze and research theasymmetric wars. Today by using the missiles, the inferior side can defend
directly against the superior side indirect attacks like the strategic bombings52.
According to this thinking, despite the decrease of the effective attacks causedby the deployment of the MD (Missile Defense) systems in the U. S. and its allies,
for the PLA, the missiles should be kept as one of the most reliable asymmetricdirect attack measures against the superior forces like the U. S. Forces.
The PLA has made a great effort to win the local conflicts under thecircumstances of the military information operations, especially after the Iraq
War in 2003. The PLA strategists recognize that information war is the mostimportant aspect of the new types of wars, and the operation domain should
include the aerospace and the cyber space53.
For attacks on U. S. C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computer,Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) Systems and to defend their
C4ISR Systems, they have developed and conducted the clandestine cyber
operations in the peacetime, as one of the operation domains and the methods
supported by the advanced IT technologies in the new asymmetric war54. China
is executing the vigorous activities to increase their space capabilities, especiallyfor the military purposes like the anti-satellite attacks. They are also developing
other soft-kill measures, including covert operative, jammer and EMP(electromagnetic pulse)55.
The hard-kill capabilities for the amphibious assault operation, the special
operation and the submarine attacks, under the support of the modernized joint
forces, are put a great emphasis, judging from the trend of their military force

52

Study of War Theory & Strategy Department, Military Science Institute, Study on War
Strategy (Jiefangjun Chuban, 2005), pp. 229-234, 261-267.
53 Ibid., pp. 469-480.
54 National Security Policy Committee of China Political Science Study Conference edited,
Review of China’s Geo-Security Environment (2010-2011), pp. 58-79.
55 Roger Cliff et al., "Entering the Dragon's Lair- Chinese Anti-access Strategies and Their
Implications for the United States,” RAND Project Air Force, RAND Corporation, 2007, p.
111.
17

construction56. Although the elements of the hard-kill methods and the soft-killones mentioned above should be effectively combined each other, the total
effects brought by these war capabilities could increase the probability of thesuccess of the A2/AD strategy in the western Pacific.
And besides, the U. S. forces rely on the vast transportation networks for thelogistic support spread among the allied countries in the western Pacific. Thisreliance brings the serious vulnerability to the U. S. Forces. If the allied countries
reject the use of the U. S. bases in their countries, the U. S. Forces will notsupport the forward deployed forces. Because Japan, South Korea and Taiwan
located within 1,500 km from the coast of China are in the range of the Chinese
MRBMs and cruise missiles, those countries might reject the use of the U. S.
bases when threatened by China with their missile forces, additional to thespecial force attacks and the cyber-attacks, without any engagements of themilitary forces.

5. The U. S. Estimate of the Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy &its Counter Measures
The U. S. Estimate of the Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy
The U. S. government estimates that states are developing anti-access andarea-denial capabilities and strategies to constrain U. S. and international
freedom of action. These states are rapidly acquiring technologies, such as
missiles and autonomous and remotely-piloted platforms that challenge ourability to project power from the global commons and increase our operationalrisk57. China is clearly involved in those challenging states. This shows that the
China’s ability to defend the offshore sea of China encircled by the three island
chains, has been estimated to be effective by the U. S. side.
A combination of ballistic, cruise missiles, aircraft, and covert operative
attacks on runways, aircraft, shelters, and other critical facilities could render U.
S. airfields in Okinawa, South Korea, and the main islands of Japan unusable,
particularly in the days of a conflict. In addition, ballistic missile, cruise missile,aircraft, covert operative, jammer, antisatellite, EMP, and computer network
attacks could degrade command-and-control or early warning capabilities for56

US Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving People’s Republic of China 2013, pp. 6-11.
57 U.S. Department of Defense, the National Military Strategy of the United States ofAmerica 2011-Redefining America’s Military Leadership, 08 February, 2011, p. 3.
18

forward-deployed forces, particularly air forces operating from bases within
about 1,500 km of China, to the point that the theater commander would choose
to move them farther away58.
Even if Chinese anti-access measures did not result in the outright defeat of
the United States, they would likely make it significantly more costly for theUnited States to operate in the region. Moreover, it is possible that these costs
could rise enough that, even if U. S. decision-makers were confident that theUnites States would eventually prevail in a conflict with China, they might beunwilling to pay those costs.
The United States, however, can take a number of actions to counter Chinese
anti-access threats. Strengthening passive defenses at air bases, deploying air
and missile defense systems, strengthening defenses against covert operatives,and bolstering allied air-defense capabilities will reduce the vulnerability of air
bases to anti-access attacks. Diversifying basing options for aircraft will diminish
the effects of such attacks. Air and missile defense systems, strengthened
defenses against covert operatives, improved allied defensive capabilities,
improved information-security practices, and efforts both to deter and to mitigate
the potential effects of high-altitude nuclear detonations can reduce thevulnerability of C4ISR systems59.

The U. S. Counter Measures against A2/AD
The US Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle
concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military capabilities. The
concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all
operational domains to counter growing challenges to U. S. freedom of action.
As it matures, the concept will also help guide the development of futurecapabilities needed for effective power projection operations60. This new concept
known as “Joint Air-Sea Battle Concept,” is, however, the only a concept. It is notguaranteed by the budget. Offshore balancing is control.
The shortage of the budget influences most seriously on the R&D (researchand development). As global R&D investment increases, it is proving
increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain a competitive advantage
across the entire spectrum of defense technologies. We cannot afford everything
58

Roger Cliff et al., "Entering the Dragon's Lair- Chinese Anti-access Strategies and Their
Implications for the United States,” RAND Project Air Force, p. 111.
59 Ibid., pp. 113-114.
60 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 32.
19

we might desire: therefore, in the future, the Department must balance capability
portfolios to better align with budget constraints and operational needs, basedon priorities assigned to warfighter capabilities61.
U. S. President Obama made remarks to the Australian Parliament on
November 17, 2011. He said in the remarks that: Reduction in U. S. defense
spending will not come at the expense of the Asia Pacific. We will keep ourcommitments, including our treaty obligations to allies. And we will constantly
strengthen our capabilities to meet the needs of the 21st century. Indeed, we are
already modernizing America’s defense posture across the Asia Pacific. It will be
more broadly distributed – maintaining our strong presence in Japan and the
Korean Peninsula, while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia. Our posture
will be more flexible – with new capabilities to ensure that our forces can operate
freely. And our posture will be more sustainable, by helping allies and partners
build their capacity, with more training and exercises. The closer relationshipbetween U. S. and Australia will be brought and it will allow us to respond fasterto the full range of challenges. Meanwhile, the United States will continue oureffort to build a cooperative relationship with China. And we will seek more
opportunities for cooperation with Beijing, including greater communication
between our militaries62.
In the remarks, the U. S. efforts to rebalance the military resources to copewith the new situation in the western Pacific, in other words, the rising threat of
the A2/AD are appeared. The gravity of the U. S. Forces deployment will begetting back to the safer rear area like Australia and the Southeast Asia fromJapan and South Korea. On the other hand, in order to save the resources, themore contributions by the allies are requested in the exchange for the transfer of
the U. S. military experience through bilateral trainings.
Hilary Clinton published her opinion in November 2011. She said that: We aremodernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in Northeast Asia and our commitment on this is rock solid – while enhancing our presence inSoutheast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. For example, the United States will
be deploying littoral combat ships to Singapore, and we are examining otherways to increase opportunities for our two militaries to train and operate together.
And the United States and Australia agreed this year to explore a greater
61

Ibid., pp. 76, 94.
Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Remarks By President Obama to theAustralian Parliament, November 17, 2011.
6220

American military presence in Australia to enhance opportunities for more joint
training and exercises63.
Clinton’s statement declared the strong will of the U. S. to keep its forces in
Asia-Pacific. Responding to the political decision and Joint Air-Sea Battle
Concept, the strategists in the U. S. are proposing the concept of Offshore
Balancing and Offshore Control. Both concepts take the limitation of theresources and the new military situation in the western Pacific into consideration.
The possibilities of how much and when these concepts are realized are
uncertain. Representatives of the three military services indicated that theywould be struggling in 2014 to restore readiness. For example, the Air Force forthe first time in its history is implementing a “tiered” approach to unit
preparedness. About one-third of the service’s forces that are not deployed or
preparing to deploy will be “standing down” and rated unready. The move willaffect a number of nuclear-capable forces, with some B-2 bombers64.
Will these measures really not affect the credibility of the U. S. extended
deterrence? If the U. S. extended deterrence becomes less credible, the U. S.
allies will have to construct their own military forces to deter the threat of China
and to defense against the invasion of the PLA.

Conclusion
New Secretary-General Xi Jinping stated on November 15, 2012, that hewould make every effort to realize a great revival of the China race. Socialism
looks like one of the tools for realizing such a nationalistic aim. He declared thatthe objective for the modernization of the PLA is the construction of firm defense
and strong military forces adapted to the national security and interest. He also
said that we should fundamentally realize the mechanization and make a great
advance in the construction of the information-oriented military by 2020. That the
security of ocean, aerospace and cyber-space should be paid attention
continuously is pointed out. The PLA will continue to pursue the construction of
the capabilities enough to win the local wars under the information-oriented
condition. The missile forces will be put the emphasis.
Consistency of the military strategy and the firm will among the leaders tomake the endurable effort to realize it is the marvelous characteristic of the PLA.
63

Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy (November 2011).
Brian Everstine and Marcus Weisgerber, “Reduced Flying Hours Forces USAF To
Ground 17 Combat Air Squadrons,” Defense News, April 8, 2013.

64

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The PLA is trying to seize the exclusive control in the South and East China Sea.
The PLA will accomplish its objective to control the sea encircled by the threeisland chains in a long-term. U. S. Forces are suffering from the defense budget
cut, and the forward deployed forces might gradually decrease, in spite of thestatement to keep the American commitments to the allies in western Pacific.
If the U. S. does not accept the challenge by the PLA pursuing the control ofthe larger area, spread beyond the first or second islands chain, some conflicts,
including use of military forces will happen in the future. At that time, the allies
will be urged to defend by themselves for some period or eternally.

22