THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCEARCTIC STRATEGYENSURING A STABLE ARCTIC THROUGH VIGILANCE, POWER PROJECTION, COOPERATION, AND PREPARATION

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The Department of the Air Force
Arctic Strategy
Executive Summary

activities in the region by great power competitorswith increased physical access due to receding land
ice and sea ice, yields the potential for intensified
regional competition as well as opportunities forcooperative endeavors with allies and partners.

The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy
fully supports the 2018 National Defense Strategy(NDS) and implements the 2019 Department of
Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy embracing the DoD’sdesired Arctic end-state: A secure and stable region
where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, thehomeland is protected, and nations address sharedchallenges cooperatively.

The Department of the Air Force contributions to
U.S. national security in the Arctic are large, but
relatively unknown. Given the Arctic’s vast distancesand challenges to surface operations, air and spacecapabilities have long been essential to gain rapid
access and provide all-domain awareness, early
warning, satellite command and control, andeffective deterrence. Offering a solid foundation onwhich to build and project power across the region,
the Department of the Air Force is the most active
and invested U.S. military department in the Arctic.2

The strategy outlines the Department of the Air
Force’s unique role and optimizes Air Force andSpace Force capabilities for the region. The Arctic’s
increasing strategic importance, coupled with theServices’ significant regional investment, requires
the Department to have a unified, deliberate, andforward-looking approach, ensuring the Air andSpace Forces can compete and defend the nation’s
interests in the Arctic region.

The strategy identifies the Arctic as a region ofstrategic opportunity for the Air and Space Forces,
Joint Force, allies, and partners. It provides
recommendations in light of the Arctic’s mostsignificant strategic threats and opportunities,
based on Combatant Commander requirements andthe Air and Space Forces’ missions.

Residing at the intersection between the U.S.
homeland and two critical theaters, Indo-Pacific andEurope, the Arctic is an increasingly vital region for
U.S. national security interests. The Arctic’s capacity
as a strategic buffer is eroding, making it an avenueof threat to the homeland, due to advancements
by great power competitors. Additionally, it hosts
critical launch points for global power projection
and increasingly accessible natural resources.
While the DoD analyzes the immediate prospectof conflict in the Arctic as low,1 the confluence of1.
2.

The Department approaches the Arctic with fourmain lines of effort: Vigilance, Power Projection,
Cooperation, and Preparation. The strategy outlines
how the Air and Space Forces will organize, train,
and equip to provide Combatant Commanders
with combat-credible assets capable of conducting
operations throughout the Arctic into the future.

DoD Report to Congress: Arctic Strategy 2019.
DoD Report to Congress: Resourcing the Arctic Strategy 2016.

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First, through investments in missile warningand defense, as well as command, control,
communications, intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (C3ISR), the Air and Space Forces
will defend the homeland by maintaining vigilance.

Third, strong alliances and partnerships in the Arctic
are a strategic advantage for the United States. The
strategy outlines ways to enhance cooperation as
well as interoperability, operations, and exercises
between the United States and its Arctic partners.
To uphold the international rules-based order in the
Arctic, the Air and Space Forces must leverage thestrong defense relationships among Arctic nations
and work closely with regional and joint partners.

Second, the Air and Space Forces will utilize uniquepositioning afforded by bases in locations like
Alaska and Greenland to project combat-credible,
all-domain air and space power. Infrastructure,
focused on thermal efficiency and durability, will be
combined with fifth generation aircraft and lethal
capabilities to ensure the Air and Space Forces
remain agile and capable in the future.

Finally, the strategy outlines essential training
and preparation for operations within thisunique environment. To meet this challenge, theDepartment will renew focus on training, research,and development for Arctic operations, whileleveraging the Arctic expertise of the Total Force.

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The Air & Space Forcesin the Arctic

The Arctic is a region of immense geostrategic
significance and a key location for global power
projection. With two large Alaska air bases, Joint
Base Elmendorf-Richardson and Eielson Air
Force Base (AFB), and other strategic facilities,
the Air and Space Forces project power into
two critical theaters: Indo-Pacific and Europe.
Often unrecognized, Alaska offers the quickest
flight access to strategic locations across the
Pacific region and western Russia. As evidence of
Alaska’s strategic location, once the planned F-35
bed-down is complete, Alaska will be home tomore advanced fighters than any other location in
the world.

The Arctic represents a cornerstone of the nation’s
defense. The Department of the Air Force provides
close to 80% of DoD resourcing to the Arctic region.3
Installations across Alaska, Canada, and Greenland
include large bases, training complexes, satellite
command and control stations, and a constellationof more than 50 early warning and missile
defense radars. For reference, page 5 highlights
Department of the Air Force Arctic equities.

As strategic as the Arctic is to power projection, it
is equally critical to deterrence and U.S. defense.
From an air and space power perspective, it is theshortest distance for adversaries to threaten thehomeland with strategic air and missile attacks. The
Alaska Radar System and the 50-plus radars thatcomprise the North Warning System across Canada
provide vital early warning for homeland defense
and North American Aerospace Defense Command(NORAD). Locations like Clear, Alaska and Thule,Greenland uniquely enable missile warning anddefense in addition to space domain awareness,helping USSPACECOM track tens of thousands ofobjects daily.

Geographically, the Arctic region consists of the
Arctic Ocean, adjacent seas, and parts of eightnations: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark(including Greenland), Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.4
Demographically, among the millions of Arctic
inhabitants, indigenous communities possessmillennia of knowledge about the Arctic domain
passed down through generations.
Several factors make the Arctic particularly reliant
on air, space, and cyberspace power to provide
rapid access, reach, and domain awareness. The
area above the Arctic Circle (above 66 degrees
North latitude) is vast, almost 2.5 times thesize of the continental United States. Lacking
the climate-moderating effect of the warm
Gulf Stream, the North American Arctic hosts amuch harsher environment than the European
Arctic and significantly less road and maritime
infrastructure. Alaska epitomizes this geographicaldisparity in infrastructure. It is the largest state(twice the size of Texas) covering 586,000
square miles, but offering only 5,600 milesof highway.5

3.
4.

5.

From aerial refueling tankers to the Air National
Guard’s ski-equipped aircraft, the Air Force brings
mobility capabilities that provide access to someof the harshest and most remote locations in the
Arctic. Meanwhile the Alaska Rescue Coordination
Center and affiliated rescue squadrons work closelywith partners, including the U.S. Coast Guard, on
hundreds of search and rescue missions annually.

DoD Report to Congress: Resourcing the Arctic Strategy 2016.
The Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy uses the definition of the Arctic codified at 15 U.S.C. § 4111. The Arctic means all U.S.
and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon,
and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the AleutianIslands chain.
Alaska Department of Transportation & Public Facilities. Department Fast Facts Prepared for Legislative Session 2020.

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F-22, E-3, C-17, C-130, C-12F, Alaska Rescue
Coordination Center: HC-130, HH-60

79%

Eareckson
EIELSON AFB: F-35, F-16, ANG KC-135, PolarAS
Survival School

DAF is responsible forof DoD Arctic Resourcing

Department of the Air Force Equities in the Arctic

USA
USAF EQJBER & ALASKA
Alaska Rescue
JOINT PACIFIC
RANGE COMPLEX
Coordination Center(JPARC): Airspace & Training Grounds

Source: 2016 DoD Report to Congress

CLEAR
AFS:
Ballistic Missile Early Warning,
Eielson AFB,
Clear
AFS, Domain
JPARC
Space
Awareness

79%
79%

ALASKADAF is responsible forBarrow& NorthPOINT BARROW/NORTH SLOPE:
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F-22, E-3, C-17, C-130, C-12F, Alaska Rescue
Coordination Center: HC-130, HH-60

EARECKSON AS:Source:
Missile Defense
Radar
2016 DoD
Report to Congress
North Warning

SystemSource: 2016 DoD
Report to Congress

EIELSON AFB: F-35, F-16, ANG KC-135, Polar
Survival School

CANADAALASKAThule
ALASKANORAD: NorthABWarning System (~50 radars)

JOINT PACIFIC ALASKA RANGE COMPLEX(JPARC): Airspace & Training Grounds

JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSONSAMPLE OF(JB
AR
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GREENLAND
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F-22, E-3, Coordination
C-17, C-130, C-12F,
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POINT BARROW/NORTH SLOPE: Alaska
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THULE
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EARECKSON AS: Missile Defense Radar
JOINT PACIFIC ALASKA RANGE COMPLEXJOINT PACIFICALASKARANGECOMPLEX(JPARC):
Airspace& Training
Grounds
Eareckson(JPARC):
Airspace&
Training
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CANADAAS
CLEAR AFS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning,
Map Source: National Geospatial-Intell
CLEAR AFS:
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Space
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NORAD: North Warning System (~50 radars)
JBER & Alaska Rescue
Space Domain Awareness
BARROW/NORTHSLOPE: Alaska
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CLEAR AFS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning,
Space Domain Awareness

AF EQUITIES IN THE ARCTIC%

USAF EQUITIES IN THE ARCTIC%

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Warning System

RAVEN CAMP: ANG Training for LC-130

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D

The Changing Strategic
Environment

Great Power Activity in the Arctic
Russia is an Arctic nation. No other country has asmuch permanent military presence above the 66th
parallel. Russia’s recent Arctic initiatives include
refurbishing airfields and infrastructure, creating
new bases, and developing an integrated networkof air defense, coastal missile systems, and early
warning radars to secure its northern approaches.
Further, Russia seeks to regulate maritime traffic on
the Northern Sea Route in ways that may exceed
its authority permitted under international law.
Close to 25% of Russia’s gross domestic productcomes from the Arctic region. Reflecting this, Russia
is expected to continue investing in the region toadvance its economy and bolster national identity.
The Russian military plays a significant role insecuring these interests and may leverage ostensibly
defensive capabilities for other purposes. Finally,
Russia tightly manages its Arctic messaging tohighlight its capabilities and control.

The United States is an Arctic nation, and a numberof trends impact U.S. interests in the complex
security environment.

Changing Physical Environment
Changes in the Arctic environment are transforming
Arctic ecosystems.6 The environment is often citedas the greatest adversary to Arctic operations.
Variations in weather and climate forecasting
hamper missions and long-term planning for Joint
Force needs and capabilities. Thawing permafrost
affects infrastructure across the region, including
Department of the Air Force hangars and runways.
Reductions in single and multi-year polar ice areaccelerating the rate of coastal erosion, putting
Air and Space Forces’ already sparse infrastructure
at risk.

China is not an Arctic nation (its northernmost
city, Mohe, shares roughly the same latitude ofPhiladelphia and Dublin), but it sees the region as
important to its long-term economic and security
interests. China’s Arctic narrative attempts tonormalize Chinese presence in the region, enhancepolar operating capabilities, and gain a regional
governance role. In 2018, China linked its Arctic
activities to its One Belt, One Road initiative
underscoring its strategic ambition toward theregion’s vast quantities of rare earth minerals,
hydrocarbons, and fisheries.

Increasing Access & Human Activity
Melting ice, transportation advances, and extraction
innovation are exposing resources once thought
inaccessible. The Arctic is estimated to harborover 90 billion barrels of oil reserves, 30% of theworld’s untapped natural gas, and around one
trillion dollars’ worth of rare earth minerals.7
Extended seasonal access, growth in commercial
traffic, and an uptick in tourism increaseinternational competition and the potential needfor disaster response.

6.
7.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Richter-Menge, J., M. L. Druckenmiller, and M. Jeffries: Arctic Report Card 2019.
U.S. Geological Survey. Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Natural Gas North of the Arctic Circle 2008.

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A secure and stable Arctic region, founded on respect
for national sovereignty and the internationalrules-based order, benefits the United States. Many
challenges transcend borders. Arctic nations havehistorically respected sovereignty and constructively
engaged even when interests diverge. In recognitionof the Arctic’s strategic significance to the defenseof the homeland and American national security
interests, the region remains a focus for the
Department of the Air Force.

1.

The Air and Space Forces’ ability to protect thehomeland requires Arctic domain awarenessincluding threat detection, targeting and tracking,communications, and weather forecasting sufficient
to build a reliable operational picture.

Missile Defense

DoD Arctic Objectives

Defending the homeland is the first priority for the
DoD. The Department of the Air Force is responsible
for the majority of the architecture used to detect,
track, and engage air and missile threats that could
transit the Arctic. These architectural assets include
COBRA DANE, which provides real-time missile data,
and the new Long Range Discriminating Radar at
Clear, Alaska, which provides persistent long-range,
mid-course discrimination, precision, and trackingof missile threats. Adding to these capabilities,
cooperation with Canada through NORAD is criticalto the defense of the northern approaches. NORAD
relies on radar systems like the aging North Warning
System, a network of aerospace surveillance radars
in northern Canada and Alaska, for early detectionof adversary air threats.

The Department of the Air Force will contribute to
the achievement of the three objectives set out in the2019 DoD Arctic Strategy:
Defend the homeland
Compete when necessary to maintainfavorable regional balances of power
Ensure common domains remain free
and openLines of Effort

The DoD’s ability to detect threats and defend
North America is challenged by rapidly advancing
strategic competitors’ capabilities. Today’s threats
have longer range, better precision, and lower radarcross-sections. To counteract evolving threats:

The Air and Space Forces will enhance vigilance,reach, and power through four coordinated linesof effort:
1.

Vigilance in All Domains

2.

Projecting Power through a
Combat-Credible Force3.

Cooperation with Allies & Partners

4.

Preparation for Arctic Operations

Vigilance in All Domains

The Department of the Air Force will enhance
its missile defense surveillance system in thenorthern tier while continuing to work with
Canada to identify materiel and non-materielsolutions to the North Warning System.
The Department of the Air Force will improvedomain awareness through new technologies
ranging from over the horizon radar tospace assets.

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Command, Control, Communications,Intelligence, Surveillance &Reconnaissance (C3ISR)

Space Capabilities

Arctic communications capabilities and capacity
above 66 degrees North latitude must meet Joint
Force and Air and Space Forces’ needs for the region.
Environmental and geographic limitations challenge
the Air and Space Forces’ three main communications
capabilities in the region: satellite communications,high frequency radio, and long-haul terrestrial
systems. In response to these impediments:

Space assets reduce the need for a physical footprintin the demanding Arctic operating environment
while supporting ISR, missile defense, satellite
command and control, and all-domain awareness.
Challenges in the space domain are particularly
acute in the Arctic. To operate effectively, theSpace Force must overcome Arctic-unique orbital
mechanics and electro-magnetic obstacles as wellas rising threats from the United States’ principal
competitors. The Department can no longer assume
space superiority. In response:

The Air and Space Forces will work as
part of the Joint Force to develop an Arctic
communications roadmap that examines
current capabilities and emerging technologies.

The Space Force will work closely with allies,
partners, and the private sector to establish
mutually beneficial relationships that addresscommon goals in space and the Arctic region.

The Department will pursue satellite
communications options with the Joint Forceand ally and partner nations to develop
critical communications and data links for
operations in the region.

The Space Force will develop new technologies
and modernize existing assets in the Arctic
necessary to ensure access to and freedom tooperate in space.
The Space Force will devise capabilities
to mitigate and predict environmental
disturbances unique to the Arctic region.

The Air and Space Forces will work as part of
the Joint Force and with interagency partners
to ensure adequate C3ISR coverage to matchprojected activity in the region.

Terrestrial Weather
Forecasting & Prediction
Weather in the North American Arctic remains
difficult to predict due to terrain, scarce surfacebased sensors, and underdeveloped climate models.
Frequent winds, fog, and icing are hazardous toair operations. In response:
The Air and Space Forces will collaborate withinteragency partners to address understudied
areas and expand meteorological coverage
including terrestrial and nascent air and spacesurveillance systems.

Thule Early Warning Radar

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The Department will work with the Joint Forceto protect and maintain freedom of navigationand overflight.

The Air and Space Forces will work withinteragency partners to forecast changes to the
Arctic environment that impact infrastructure
and operations.

2.

The Air Force will provide strategic airlift andcritical refueling to both U.S. and partner
aircraft operating in the region and provide key
mobility to parts of the Arctic unreachable byother means.

Power Projection through a
Combat-Credible Force

The Air Force will advance recapitalization andexplore modernization of existing and emergent
polar mobility platforms that are critical forreaching remote areas.

Protecting America’s interests in the homeland
and abroad entails more than a vigilant defensive
posture. The Arctic also affords significant strategic
opportunities for all-domain power projection.

Power Projection
With increasing levels of air and space traffic over
the Arctic, it is imperative that the region remains
a free and open domain. Air and Space Forcesmust retain the global access guaranteed underinternational law.
Fundamental to this access, Alaska bases
provide air and space power to significant
portions of USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM
while simultaneously providing defense for North
America’s northern and western flanks. Recent
upgrades to Clear, Alaska’s Early Warning Radarenhance the detection of satellites, further enabling
space combat power. Additionally, once the planned
F-35 bed-down at Eielson AFB is complete, Alaska’s
unparalleled concentration of fifth generation
fighters will present a highly-effective power
projection capability.

Global Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility
USAFRICOMUSCENTCOMUSEUCOMUSNORTHCOMUSINDOPACOMUSSSOUTHCOM

Source: NORAD/NORTHCOM. The distances depicted innautical miles are to select world capitals from Joint BaseElmendorf-Richardson (JBER).

Supporting military, interagency, and civil Arctic
activities, the Department provides year-round
access to the Greenland ice sheet via ski-equipped
LC-130s. Critically, long range strike aircraft
provide reach, combat ability, and a growing
sensor capability contributing to regional deterrence,
vigilance, and power projection. To ensure power
projection:

Agile Operations & Logistics
Because the U.S. homeland is no longer a sanctuary,
the NDS highlights the need for flexibility and agility
in force posture and employment. New concepts
to complicate adversary planning include agile

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The Arctic is among
the world’s moststrategically significant
regions – the keystone
from which the U.S.
Air and Space Forces
exercise vigilance.
BARBARA BARRETT
Secretary of the Air Force10

Ally and partner nations that comprise the Arctic
share unique experiences, capabilities, and security
interests.

operations, which may involve expanded fixedbases, unoccupied airfields, or portable radarsystems. The Arctic supply chain remains complex
and expensive, and most operations must provide
their own logistical support. In response:
The Department of the Air Force must adopt
Arctic-grade, resilient permanent infrastructureand expeditionary, modular components.
The Department of the Air Force, with the Joint
Force, will develop Arctic basing concepts thatcomplicate enemy targeting systems.

Infrastructure Development
Base infrastructure across the northern tier is acentral component to Air and Space Forces’ power
projection, and the Department maintains significant
installations across the Arctic region. To survive
in the region, materials need to meet standards
including: high thermal efficiency; long-term
durability; tolerance to repeated freeze and thaw
cycles; and resistance to permafrost degradation.
Infrastructure in many austere locations, likeThule, Greenland, has deteriorated due to extreme
environmental factors. To address this:

Air Chiefs from Sweden, Finland, U.S., Norway, Denmark sign
letter of intent to develop Arctic Challenge Air Exercise in 2017

Interoperability
Interoperability is especially critical in the Arctic
region due to terrain, limited access, and thelow-density of domain awareness assets. Throughthe centuries, regional allies and partners havedeveloped concepts, tactics, techniques, andprocedures from which the Joint Force can greatly
benefit. Allies and partners are on the frontline ofdeterrence; maintaining their partnership is criticalto Arctic domain awareness.

The Department of the Air Force will advocate
for investment in installations that match future
operational needs.

3.

Cooperation with
Allies & Partners

By developing interoperable systems withsister Services as well as allies and partners, theDepartment of the Air Force demonstrates capability,
enhances operational flexibility, and conveys a strong
deterrent message. To support interoperability:

Alliances and partnerships represent key strategic
advantages for the United States in the Arctic. The
United States maintains strong defense relationships
with six of the seven other Arctic nations. Four are
NATO Allies: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark(including Greenland), Iceland, and Norway; andtwo are NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partners:
Finland and Sweden.

The Department of the Air Force will continuebuilding relationships and promoting air
and space information sharing with ally andpartner nations.

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The Department of the Air Force willlearn from ally and partner operating concepts,
including advanced F-35 implementation,
dispersed basing, and search and rescue
techniques.

The Department of the Air Force will look for ways
to build upon Arctic operations-focused forums toincrease collaboration, information sharing, andtrust building.
The Department of the Air Force will build
upon existing relationships with indigenous
communities in the Arctic region.

The Department of the Air Force will continue
working toward shared capabilities, such as
hosted payloads, mobility, logistics, and basing.

The Department of the Air Force will cooperatewith ally and partner nations as well as Air
National Guard units from cold weather states
to take advantage of mutual interests and skills.

Exercises
Joint exercises demonstrate cooperation, enhanceinteroperability, and expand deterrence. In air,maritime, land, space, or cyberspace, exercises
mitigate operational uncertainties and build
trust with allies and partners. Working with local
indigenous communities, who possess uniqueknowledge about the region, helps Air and Space
Forces understand the Arctic environment andenriches training and exercises. To build onthese efforts:

4.

Preparation for Arctic Operations

Preparation is essential to operate in the Arctic
where a lack of training and understanding of theenvironment can have perilous consequences.

Exercises & Training

The Department of the Air Force will enhanceand explore additional training, exercises,
wargames, and combined deployments with
regional and joint partners.

The Arctic environment requires specialized training
and acclimation by both personnel and materiel. The
ability to operate and survive extreme cold weather(down to -60 degrees Fahrenheit) is fundamental forcontingency response or combat power generationin many potential operating areas. The Joint Pacific
Alaska Range Complex, offering some of the best
training airspace in the world, and the Air Force’s
polar survival school at Eielson AFB represent astrong foundation on which to build. To ensure Arctic
operational readiness:

Expand Collaborative
Planning Opportunities
U.S. cooperation with Arctic allies and partners isbased on shared values as well as defense, safety,
and security goals in the region. Building these
relationships counters influence from adversaries,
whose actions are not aligned with U.S. interests,
and bolsters U.S. national security. The Departmentof the Air Force must work to highlight sharedgoals, ensuring a peaceful and stable region
where international norms and standards areupheld. To strengthen collaborative international
security relationships:

The Department of the Air Force will assess
requirements for Arctic readiness certification,
designating personnel with Arctic training andexperience in the event of an emergency.
The Department of the Air Force will work
across Services, Joint Staff, and CombatantCommands to enhance integration of Arcticrelated exercises and maximize existing
training capacity.

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Humanitarian Assistance& Disaster Response (HADR)& Personnel Recovery

Total ForceA substantial portion of the Department’s
Arctic expertise resides with the Air Reserve
Component. The Alaska Air National Guard
conducts civilian and military search and rescue
operations with its Guardian Angel personnel,
HH-60 helicopters, and HC-130 aircraft. The Air
Force Reserve operates F-22s out of Joint BaseElmendorf-Richardson, while the New York Air
National Guard operates LC-130s, the DoD’s only
ski-equipped transport and contingency aircraft.
Both the Guard and Reserve play a critical role insupporting space missions at Clear, Alaska and Thule,Greenland. To increase Arctic capability throughout
the Total Force:

Because of the Department of the Air Force’s
inherent rapid-response and long-range capabilities,
Airmen will likely be first to the scene in the eventof any Arctic disaster. Through air and spacesystems that build situational awareness, establish
communications, or deliver Arctic survival packages,
the Department’s substantial capabilities often
augment other departments’ HADR and personnel
recovery missions in the Arctic. To ensure thesecapabilities in the future:

The Department of the Air Force will leverage
Guard and Reserve expertise to enhance Arctic
training and operations.
The Department will pursue mutual objectives
with the National Guard’s Arctic Interest Council,a group of Guard units from states with Arctic
interests, capabilities, and resources.

Research & Development (R&D)
Eielson AFB Cool School Attendee

Foundational to future operations, Air andSpace Forces’ R&D ranges from research on thespace environment and engineering standards
to cold-weather materials and radar technology.
In the future:

The Air and Space Forces must assess
how they deploy capabilities for the mostlikely large-scale disasters and personnel
recovery missions.

The Air and Space Forces will work as part of the
Joint Force along with USNORTHCOM’s Arctic
Capability Advocacy Working Group to sustain
Arctic R&D to address operational needs.

To ensure readiness, the Air and Space Forcesmust prepare for increased activity in theregion and practice jointly and multi-nationally,learning from allies and partners.
The Air and Space Forces will work with
Alaskan Command and the U.S. Coast Guard tofurther develop air-deployable rescue packages
and personnel recovery techniques for Arctic
conditions and locations.

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Conclusion
Since its earliest days, the Department of the Air
Force has recognized the strategic importance of
the Arctic. The Department will continue to lead as
the DoD’s most active and invested department in theregion – critical as a juncture between the homeland,Indo-Pacific, and Europe. Building on a globally
capable force and its current posture in the Arctic,
the Department will continue innovating along fourlines of effort:
1.

Vigilance in All Domains

2.

Projecting Power through a
Combat-Credible Force3.

Cooperation with Allies & Partners

4.

Preparation for Arctic Operations

The Air and Space Forces value the Arctic. As
the Arctic’s importance increases, so too will the
Department of the Air Force’s focus on the region.
The Department of the Air Force’s Arctic Strategy
supports both the NDS and DoD’s effort to securea stable region where U.S. national interests are
safeguarded, the homeland is protected, and nations
address shared challenges cooperatively.

This strategy is accompanied by a Classified Annex.

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