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Extended deterrence and a Nuclear weapon Free Zone in NE Asia
Can extended nuclear deterrence coexist with a Nuclear weapon Free Zone in NE Asia?
Valère Mantels
This paper assesses two aspects of the strategic security situation in NE Asia: the perceptionthat extended nuclear deterrence provided to non-nuclear weapon States can provide security,and the contribution of a nuclear weapon free zone to alleviating concerns regarding the abilityof non-nuclear weapon states to participate in some sort of nuclear alliance with a nuclear
weapon state. 1
Continued relevance of nuclear deterrence
Proponents have not spared efforts to underscore the continued value of deterrence. Nuclear
weapons can deter nuclear attacks, prevent invasions and confer great power status. It was theindispensable military strategy behind containing the Soviet Union and a crucial ingredient inwinning the Cold War without fighting World War III. Deterrence has been for many decades
and continues to be a buzzword. Looking back, it was only through a mix of sheer luck andsome (occasional) clear thinking that the world avoided the worst of catastrophes.
As Richard K. Betts observed in a Foreign Affairs essay last year, “Deterrence isn’t what it usedto be.” Until recently it was widely believed that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
ended World War II. However, recent research of Japanese, US and Russian documents
indicate that the destruction of the cities did not significantly impact the position of theJapanese government and military. It is assumed that it was rather the declaration of war by
the Soviet Union that brought hostilities to an end.
It is striking that top US military officials were openly opposed to using nuclear weapons inJapan. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey group, assigned by President Truman to study the airattacks on Japan, produced a report in July of 1946 that concluded inter alia:“Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of thesurviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31
December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would havesurrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had notentered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.”

1The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official
policy or position of the United Nations

2Since the end of the Cold War, significant attention has focussed on the issue of nuclear
deterrence and in particular whether formal nuclear security guarantees from nuclear weapon
States to non-nuclear weapon States involving the possible use of nuclear weapons have aplace in the twenty-first century global strategic landscape. Growing support for nucleardisarmament in the US and elsewhere has seen serious doubts being raised about the ongoing
utility of extended nuclear deterrence.
In a January 2007 article in the Wall Street Journal, former cold-war policy makers Henry
Kissinger, Bill Perry, George Shultz, and Sam Nunn asserted that far from making the world
safer, nuclear weapons had become a source of extreme risk. "Senior European statesmen andwomen" called for further action in 2010 in addressing problems of nuclear weapons
proliferation. They said: "Nuclear deterrence is a far less persuasive strategic response to aworld of potential regional nuclear arms races and nuclear terrorism than it was to the coldwar.”
Nevertheless, we see all around us preparations to engage in a nuclear war. We see that theCold War doctrine of nuclear deterrence continues to be integrated into the security policies ofcountries representing most of humanity, including both possessor states and members of
nuclear alliances. We see well-funded, long-term plans underway to modernize nuclear
weapons and their delivery systems, yet no government plans or negotiations for nucleardisarmament.
My concern is that much of the time deterrence is an illusion: we can never know for sure what
our adversaries are observing or planning, and thus that the foundation for our security in themodern world is deeply compromised. One has to recall exercise Able Archer of 1983 as areminiscing close call in that respect. One can argue that the DPRK has not been deterred in
producing nuclear weapons.
In addition, many of the proponents lose sight of the evolving nature of the international
security environment. Rational opponents have been replaced by irrational groups that cannot
be deterred. Who would have predicted 9-11 or anticipated the more recent success of theIslamic State in the Middle East. The question that begs is then: who do we wish to deter? Why
the vast arsenal of nuclear weapons? And in times of scarce economic resources, is theexpense worth the perceived benefit?

3Nuclear weapons and International Humanitarian Law
It is a fact that the catastrophic and potentially irreversible implications of any nuclear weapon
detonation are known to and understood by all States.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty itself was concluded in the knowledge and understanding of “thedevastation that would be visited upon all humankind by a nuclear war and the consequent
need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard
the security of peoples…”
Until the commencement of the present Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, there has been
insufficient debate about what this might mean in practice. The 2010 Review Conference Final
Document clearly expressed the Conference’s “deep concern at the continued risk for humanity
represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons”.
That this narrative has been taken up enthusiastically by a majority of United Nations Member
States and a majority of NPT States parties within the period of the current Non-Proliferation
Treaty review cycle demonstrates that it is of central relevance to the issue of nuclear
disarmament. Humanitarian concerns were a motivating factor in establishing the NPT; theyremain a motivating factor in insisting that its provisions are implemented fully.
Recent fact-based discussions around the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons,
including at two open-ended Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons,convened by Norway in March 2013 and by Mexico in February 2014, have enabled us todeepen our collective understanding of these calamitous consequences and of the increasing
risks to life and health arising from possible (and actual) accidents, human error or systems
failures at nuclear weapons facilities.
A key message from experts and international organizations throughout these discussions has
been that no State or international body has the capacity to address the humanitarian
emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation or to provide adequate assistance to thevictims.
In addition to the immediate consequences for victims killed or injured by a detonation, thecalamitous longer-term and trans-boundary implications - for human survival and the health offuture generations; for our environment and ecosystems; for agriculture; for socioeconomicdevelopment; and for our economies - are also clearly understood.
We see a growing recognition worldwide of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any
use of nuclear weapons and the basic incompatibility of such weapons with fundamental norms
of international humanitarian and human rights laws, customary international law, and thetimeless laws of morality. Nuclear disarmament has evolved far beyond the utopian dream so4often cited by its critics. The demand for progress in this field has become a historical reality
and this is very good news indeed.
Extended nuclear deterrence
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons, cornerstone of the nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation regime left open a number of ways to allow for military
nuclear cooperation. Blatant examples of such loopholes are the nuclear weapon sharing
arrangements between the United States and European NATO members as well as thecontinued policy of extended nuclear deterrence.
The most obvious version of extended nuclear deterrence is the one extended to NATO withforward deployed nuclear weapons on the territories of a number of European NATO partners,
as well the guarantees extended to Japan and the Republic of Korea. Nuclear weapons used tobe deployed in the latter two countries as well under the assumption that such forward
stationing would strengthen the value of the deterrence offered by these weapons.
Recently, the United States has gradually moved away from a strong emphasis on nuclear
security guarantees to a mix of conventional forces coupled with ballistic missile defences. 2Here, I wish to highlight the understanding or rather misunderstanding of the commitment of
the provision of assurances to non-nuclear weapon States under the format of a nuclear
umbrella. 3 A pledge by the country to assist states under threat or attack is by no means anassurance that it will do so, less a legal obligation.
In addition, following recent developments in Ukraine, one can be concerned about themeaning of security assurances provided to a country in return for it becoming a non-nuclearweapon State party to the NPT.
Concerns have also been voiced over the reliability of security assurances extended by thepermanent members of the Security Council in connection with the conclusion and indefinite
extension of the NPT.
In the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, the States parties agreed that disarmament
offered the only absolute guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons and I suspect thatsame theme will reappear in 2015.
2See 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review
See also Jeffrey Lewis in Policy Forum 10-054: Rethinking Extended Deterrence in Northeast Asia", NAPSNet
Policy Forum, November 03, 2010

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It is my view that deterrence and therefore extended deterrence with nuclear weapons is aflawed concept that has no place in security strategies. If we maintain to cling to the concept ofdeterrence and extended deterrence, nuclear disarmament will remain a distant goal.

Role of NWFZs
In his opening remarks to the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear
Disarmament in New York on 26 September, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
called for increased denuclearization, stressing that “States without nuclear weapons havemuch to contribute, as seen in the expanded cooperation between members of regional
nuclear weapon- free zones”
The role of nuclear-weapon free zones (NWFZs) as a regional approach for pursuing nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation was recognized in article VII of the NPT and reaffirmed by
the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The contribution of NWFZs to maintaining international
peace and security is obvious.
While participation of non-nuclear weapon states in various alliances is considered compatible
with the NPT, the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements do not totally restrict theirmembers from various facets of cooperation with nuclear weapon States. While some of thesezones close some of the loopholes in the NPT, they do so in a very random way. Only theTreaty of Tlatelolco prevents its members to participate in any use of nuclear weapons, directly
or indirectly. Other treaties have various forms of flexibility in this regard.
It is obvious that curtailing the ability of non-nuclear weapon states to participate in any use ofnuclear weapons in nuclear weapon free zones would go a long way in eliminating the doctrineof extended nuclear deterrence. For non-possessors who are not in an alliance with a nuclear
weapon State this would be largely symbolic. For those in an alliance, it would imply someadjustment in their security arrangements. It is my view that maintaining a policy of extended
nuclear deterrence and the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone are mutually exclusive.
I must underscore, however, that such nuclear weapon free zones are neither ends inthemselves nor substitutes for other efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

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The situation in NE Asia
The six-party talks are obviously moribund. A new framework is needed to manage theinsecurity created by nuclear weapons of the DPRK and the risk of nuclear war in the region.
Since President Obama declared the abolition of nuclear weapons to be the overarching goal of
American policy, security analysts and ordinary people have been grappling with theimplications of this declaration for the East Asia region.
It is my view that a nuclear weapon free zone in the region in which the members undertake
political and legal commitments to adhere to the stringiest disarmament standards that can befound among existing arrangements.
Any such commitment would be accompanied by measures to evaluate/ verify its proper
implementation. It would be counterproductive to create a zone in which (a) member(s) would
continue to rely on extended nuclear deterrence.
Awaiting the exploration of new options such as a nuclear weapons convention or a frameworkof agreements that would ultimately prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons, such a zone may
prove the most promising avenue for the region.
The elaboration of such a treaty in the region could serve to mobilise efforts to bring otherzones up to the highest standards and effectively eliminate the policy of extended nuclear
deterrence globally. It would possibly pave the way to a more comprehensive agreement tooutlaw nuclear weapons altogether.