Quadrennial Defense Review
ReportFebruary 2010

CONTENTSPREFACEi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYiii

INTRODUCTION

1

DEFENSE STRATEGY

5A Complex Environment

5

America’s Interests and the Roles of Military Power

9

U.S. Defense Objectives

11

REBALANCING THE FORCE

17

Defend the United States and Support Civil Authorities at Home

18

Succeed in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Operations

20

Build the Security Capacity of Partner States

26

Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments

31

Prevent Proliferation and Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction

34

Operate Effectively in Cyberspace

37

Guiding the Evolution of the Force

39

Sizing and Shaping the Force

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Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure, FY 2011 – 15

45

TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

49

Wounded Warrior Care

49

Managing the Deployment Tempo

50

Recruiting and Retention

51

Supporting Families

52

Keeping Faith with the Reserve Component

53

Developing Future Military Leaders

54

Developing the Total Defense Workforce

55

STRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS

57

Strengthening Key Relationships Abroad

57

The Role of U.S. Defense Posture

62

Strengthening Interagency Partnerships

69

REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESS

73

Reforming Security Assistance73

Reforming How We Buy

75

Institutionalizing Rapid Acquisition Capability

80

Strengthening the Industrial Base81

Reforming the U.S. Export Control System

83

Crafting a Strategic Approach to Climate and Energy

84

A DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

89

Operational Risk

90

Force Management Risk

92

Institutional Risk

93

Future Challenges Risk

94

Strategic, Military, and Political Risk

95

CONCLUSION: THE WAY AHEAD

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CHAIRMAN’S ASSESSMENT OF 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The mission of the Department of Defense is to protect the American people and advance ournation’s interests.
In executing these responsibilities, we must recognize that first and foremost, the United States isa nation at war. In Afghanistan, our forces fight alongside allies and partners in renewed efforts to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In Iraq, U.S. military personnel advise,train, and support Iraqi forces as part of a responsible transition and drawdown. Above all, theUnited States and its allies and partners remain engaged in a broader war—a multifaceted
political, military and moral struggle—against Al Qaeda and its allies around the world.
Furthermore, as a global power, the strength and influence of the United States are deeplyintertwined with the fate of the broader international system—a system of alliances, partnerships,
and multinational institutions that our country has helped build and sustain for more than sixty
years. The U.S. military must therefore be prepared to support broad national goals of promoting
stability in key regions, providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common
good.
With these realities in mind, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review advances two clear
objectives. First, to further rebalance the capabilities of America’s Armed Forces to prevail intoday’s wars, while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats. Second, to further
reform the Department’s institutions and processes to better support the urgent needs of thewarfighter; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer
dollars are spent wisely and responsibly.
The strategy and initiatives described in the QDR will continue to evolve in response to thesecurity environment. Using the QDR as its foundation, the Department will continually
examine its approach—from objectives to capabilities and activities to resources—to ensure its
best alignment for the nation, its allies and partners, and our men and women in uniform.
A Complex Environment
The United States faces a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change
continues to accelerate. The distribution of global political, economic, and military power isbecoming more diffuse. The rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India, theworld’s largest democracy, will continue to shape an international system that is no longer easily
defined—one in which the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must
increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.

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Globalization has transformed the process of technological innovation while lowering entry
barriers for a wider range of actors to acquire advanced technologies. As technological innovationand global information flows accelerate, non-state actors will continue to gain influence andcapabilities that, during the past century, remained largely the purview of states.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues to undermine global
security, further complicating efforts to sustain peace and prevent harmful arms races. The
instability or collapse of a WMD-armed state is among our most troubling concerns. Such an
occurrence could lead to rapid proliferation of WMD material, weapons, and technology, andcould quickly become a global crisis posing a direct physical threat to the United States and allother nations.
Other powerful trends are likely to add complexity to the security environment. Rising demand
for resources, rapid urbanization of littoral regions, the effects of climate change, the emergenceof new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic tensions in several regions are
just some of the trends whose complex interplay may spark or exacerbate future conflicts.
America’s Global Role
America’s interests are inextricably linked to the integrity and resilience of the international
system. Chief among these interests are security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values,
and an international order that promotes cooperative action.
Consistent with the President’s
vision, the United States will
advance these interests bystrengthening our domestic
foundation and integrating all
elements of national power,
engaging abroad on the basis ofmutual interest and mutual
respect, and promoting aninternational
order
that
President Barack Obama holds a briefing on Afghanistan with senior national
security leaders including Vice President Joseph Biden, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Situation Room at the WhiteHouse on Oct. 30, 2009. Official White House photo by Pete Souza.

advances our interests byreinforcing the rights andresponsibilities of all nations.

America’s interests and role in the world require armed forces with unmatched capabilities and awillingness on the part of the nation to employ them in defense of our interests and the common
good. The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale
operations over extended distances. This unique position generates an obligation to beiv
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responsible stewards of the power and influence that history, determination, and circumstancehave provided.
Defense Strategy
In order to help defend and advance our national interests, the Department of Defense balances
resources and risk among four priority objectives: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter
conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserveand enhance the All-Volunteer Force. These priorities shape not only considerations on thecapabilities our Armed Forces need but also the aggregate capacity required to accomplish their
missions now and in the future. Our approach to achieving them must evolve and adapt in
response to a changing security environment.
Prevail in today’s wars: We must ensure the success of our forces in the field—in Afghanistan,Iraq, and around the world. Along with our allies and partners, we have renewed efforts to help
the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda andeliminate its safe havens within both nations. In Iraq, years of effort have helped enable thatgovernment to take the lead in protecting its people and providing essential services. As the
responsible drawdown of the U.S. military presence proceeds, U.S. forces will continue to play
important roles advising, training, and supporting Iraqi forces. Elsewhere, U.S. forces work withpartners and allies to locate and dismantle terrorist networks.
In the near term to midterm, substantial numbers of U.S. forces will likely be operating in
Afghanistan and U.S. forces in Iraq will continue a responsible drawdown. These efforts will
substantially determine the size and shape of major elements of U.S. military forces for several
years. In the mid- to long term, we expect there to be enduring operational requirements in
Afghanistan and elsewhere to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies.
Prevent and deter conflict: America’s enduring effort to advance common interests without
resort to arms is a hallmark of its stewardship of the international system. Preventing the rise of
threats to U.S. interests requires the integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense,
along with intelligence, law enforcement, and economic tools of statecraft, to help build thecapacity of partners to maintain and promote stability. Such an approach also requires working
closely with our allies and partners to leverage existing alliances and create conditions to advancecommon interests.
Our deterrent remains grounded in land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited andlarge-scale conflicts in environments where anti-access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as
forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups.
These forces are enabled by cyber and space capabilities and enhanced by U.S. capabilities todeny adversaries’ objectives through ballistic missile defense and counter-WMD, a resilientv
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infrastructure, and our global basing and posture. Until such time as the Administration’s goal ofa world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core
mission for the Department of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal to deter attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners.
While U.S. forces are heavily engaged in current wars, the Department’s prevent-and-deter
activities will be focused on ensuring a defense in depth of the United States; preventing the
emergence or reemergence of transnational terrorist threats, including Al Qaeda; and deterringother potential major adversaries. In the future, as our forces transition into a period of lessintensive sustained operations, the Department’s force planning assumes an ability to undertake abroader and deeper range of prevent-and-deter missions, acting wherever possible as part of awhole-of-government approach and in concert with allies and partners.
Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies: If deterrence fails
and adversaries challenge our interests with the threat or use of force, the United States must be
prepared to respond in support of U.S. national interests. Not all contingencies will require theinvolvement of U.S. military forces, but the Defense Department must be prepared to provide
the President with options across a wide range of contingencies, which include supporting a
response to an attack or natural disaster at home, defeating aggression by adversary states,
supporting and stabilizing fragile states facing serious internal threats, and preventing humansuffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.
In the mid- to long term, U.S. military forces must plan and prepare to prevail in a broad range
of operations that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping time frames. This includes
maintaining the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state aggressors, but we must takeseriously the need to plan for the broadest possible range of operations—from homeland defense
and defense support to civil authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions—occurring in
multiple and unpredictable combinations.
Operations over the past eight years have stressed the ground forces disproportionately, but the
future operational landscape could also portend significant long-duration air and maritime
campaigns for which the U.S. Armed Forces must be prepared.
Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force: Years of war have significantly stressed our
military personnel and their families. Given the continuing need for substantial and sustained
deployments in conflict zones, the Department must do all it can to take care of our people—
physically and psychologically. For too long, the health of the All-Volunteer Force, the civilian
workforce that supports it, and the processes by which the Department provides needed
equipment and platforms have been underemphasized priorities. The prolonged wartime period
since 2001 has greatly elevated their importance, and the consequences of failure haveaccordingly become more serious. To reflect the urgency that the Department’s leadership placesvi
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on these issues, the QDR has striven to include them as core components of our policy,
planning, and programming considerations.
Our preserve-and-enhance efforts will focus on transitioning to sustainable rotation rates that
protect the force’s long-term health. The Department plans that in times of significant crisis,
U.S. forces will be prepared to experience higher deployment rates and briefer dwell periods for
up to several years at a time and/or to mobilize the Reserve Component. This will typically benecessary if the United States is engaged for long periods in more than one large operation, suchas Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Department will also expand its Civilian Expeditionary
Workforce (CEW) to augment the military effort as required.
These four priority objectives are at once timely and enduring. They capture the Department’s
key priorities and drive considerations about the size and shape of America’s Armed Forces now
and in the future. Successfully balancing them requires that the Department make hard choiceson the level of resources required as well as accepting and managing risk in a way that favors
success in today’s wars.
Rebalancing the ForceIn order to successfully protect and advance U.S. interests while balancing the priority objectives
outlined above, the QDR makes a series of recommendations aimed at helping to rebalance
America’s Armed Forces to better enable success in the following missions critical to protecting
and advancing the nation’s interests. Required force enhancements were identified by examining
ongoing conflicts as well as the performance of the current and planned force throughcombinations of scenarios spanning the range of plausible future challenges. Significant
enhancements were directed in the following key mission areas:
Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home: The rapid proliferation ofdestructive technologies, combined with potent ideologies of violent extremism, requires
sustaining a high level of vigilance against terrorist threats. Moreover, state adversaries are
acquiring new means to strike targets at greater distances from their borders and with greater
lethality. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the full range of potential
natural disasters.
The QDR directs a series of enhancements, including:Improve the responsiveness and flexibility of consequence management response forces;

Enhance capabilities for domain awareness;Accelerate the development of standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities; andEnhance domestic capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

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Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations: The United States
must retain the capability to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency, stability, andcounterterrorism operations in a wide range of environments. In order to ensure that America’s
Armed Forces are prepared for this complex mission, it is vital that the lessons from today’s
conflicts be further institutionalized in military doctrine, training, capability development, andoperational planning.
QDR initiatives include:

Increase the availability of rotary-wing assets;

Expand manned and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) for intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR);

Increase key enabling assets for special operations forces (SOF);



Increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and counterterrorism competency andcapacity in general purpose forces;

Increase regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan; andStrengthen key supporting capabilities for strategic communication.

Build the security capacity of partner states: Since the end of World War II, DoD has worked tobuild the security capacity of allied and partner states and to ensure that the Armed Forces of theUnited States have ample opportunities to train with and learn from counterpart forces. As
ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq make clear, these dimensions of U.S. defense strategy
have never been more important.
Key QDR initiatives in this mission area include:Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force
assistance;Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability;Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces;

Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training; andCreate mechanisms to expedite acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to partner
forces.

Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments: U.S. forces must be able to deter,
defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile nation-states. This capability isfundamental to the nation’s ability to protect its interests and to provide security in key regions.
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In the absence of dominant U.S. power projection capabilities, the integrity of U.S. alliances andsecurity partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence andincreasing the possibility of conflict.
The QDR directs the following enhancements:


Expand future long-range strike capabilities;



Exploit advantages in subsurface operations;

Increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure;Assure access to space and the use of space assets;Enhance the robustness of key ISR capabilities;

Defeat enemy sensors and engagement systems; andEnhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad.

Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction: The potential spread of weaponsof mass destruction poses a grave threat. As the ability to create and employ weapons of mass
destruction spreads globally, so must our combined efforts to detect, interdict, and contain theeffects of these weapons. Deterrence of such threats and defense against them can be enhanced
through measures aimed at better understanding potential threats, securing and reducing
dangerous materials wherever possible, positioning forces to monitor and track lethal agents andmaterials and their means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeating the agents themselves.
Through the QDR, the Secretary of Defense directs the following:

Establish a Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters to plan, train, and execute WMDelimination operations;

Research countermeasures and defense to nontraditional agents;

Enhance nuclear forensics;

Secure vulnerable nuclear materials;

Expand the biological threat reduction program; andDevelop new verification technologies.

Operate effectively in cyberspace: The security environment demands improved capabilities tocounter threats in cyberspace. In the 21st century, modern armed forces simply cannot conduct
effective high-tempo operations without resilient, reliable information and communication
networks and assured access to cyberspace. DoD must actively defend its networks.
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DoD is taking several steps to strengthen capabilities in cyberspace:

Develop a more comprehensive approach to DoD operations in cyberspace;

Develop greater cyber expertise and awareness;Centralize command of cyber operations; andEnhance partnerships with other agencies and governments.

Guiding the Evolution of the ForceIn combination and over time, the initiatives described in the QDR are designed to significantly
enhance the ability of U.S. forces to protect and advance U.S. interests in both the near andlonger term. In addition to better preparing our own forces for the future, these initiatives will
improve the Department’s ability to build the capability and capacity of partners.
Changes directed under the QDR can be broadly characterized by the following trends:


U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus
on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, andcounterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.



U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence andpower projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with awide range of partner navies. The rapid growth in sea- and land-based ballistic missile
defense capabilities will help meet the needs of combatant commanders and allies inseveral regions.



U.S. air forces will become more survivable as large numbers of fifth-generation fightersjoin the force. Land-based and carrier-based aircraft will need greater average range,
flexibility, and multimission versatility in order to deter and defeat adversaries that are
fielding more potent anti-access capabilities. We will also enhance our air forces’contributions to security force assistance operations by fielding within our broader
inventory aircraft that are well-suited to training and advising partner air forces.



The United States will continue to increase the capacity of its special operations forces andwill enhance their capabilities through the growth of organic enablers and key support
assets in the general purpose forces.



The capabilities, flexibility, and robustness of U.S. forces across the board will be
improved by fielding more and better enabling systems, including ISR, electronic attack
capabilities, communications networks, more resilient base infrastructure, and enhanced
cyber defenses.

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Of course, many of these enhancements will be costly. The QDR report describes some of the
tradeoffs that DoD’s leaders have identified to enable the rebalancing of U.S. militarycapabilities. More such tradeoffs could be necessary in the future.
Early in the QDR and as part of the process of completing DoD’s budget submission for FY
2010, the Secretary took action to direct resources away from lower-priority programs andactivities so that more pressing needs could be addressed, both within that budget and in theyears that follow it. Those decisions included ending production of the F-22 fighter,
restructuring the procurement of the DDG-1000 destroyer and the Future Combat Systems
programs, deferring production of new maritime prepositioning ships, and stretching out
procurement of a new class of aircraft carrier. The Air Force is substantially reducing its fleet ofolder fourth-generation fighter aircraft.
In addition to these steps, DoD is proposing in its budget submission for FY 2011 to shut down
production of the C-17 airlift aircraft, having completed the planned procurement of thoseaircraft. DoD has also decided to delay the command ship replacement (LCC) program and toextend the life of existing command ships, cancel the CG(X) cruiser, and terminate the Net
Enabled Command and Control program. Those actions, among others, have enabled theDepartment to redirect resources into the high-priority areas outlined above.
Where it has not been possible to set in motion initiatives to meet certain future operational
needs, the Secretary has identified vectors for the evolution of the force, calling on DoD
components to devote sustained efforts toward developing new concepts and capabilities toaddress those needs. Assessments of future operating environments will continue, with an eye
toward refining our understanding of future needs. At the same time, the Department willcontinue to look assiduously for savings in underperforming programs and activities, divestiture,technology substitution, less-pressing mission and program areas, and other accounts so that
more resources can be devoted to filling these gaps.
Taking Care of Our People
America’s men and women in uniform
constitute the Department’s most importantresource. Multiple long deployments aretaking a significant toll on our people andtheir families, and the Department remains
focused on their health and welfare. As partof this focus, the QDR has elevated theneed to preserve and enhance the AllVolunteer Force and included this priority in U.S. Army Sgt. Noel Rodriguez shares a moment with his two
daughters—Emily, left, and Noemi, right—and wife Lily
our force planning and in our strategy during a homecoming at Victory Field, Calif., Aug. 18, 2009.
U.S. Army photo by Cpl. Nicole Lavine.
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deliberations. In order to better take care of our people, the Department is focusing on several
fronts.
Wounded warrior care: Our wounded, ill, or injured service members deserve every opportunity
to return to active duty following their recovery, or to make a seamless transition to veteran status
if they cannot be returned to active duty. Apart from prevailing in current conflicts, caring for
our wounded warriors is our highest priority, and we will work to provide them top-quality carethat reflects their service and sacrifice. The Department is improving the treatment of ourwounded warriors in many ways, which include:

Increasing funding for wounded warrior initiatives across the Military Departments;

Improving health benefits and adding additional personnel for wounded warrior support
programs; and

Broadening the scope and quality of information sharing between the Department of
Defense and Veterans Affairs to strengthen continuity of care and benefits delivery for
military members.

Managing the deployment tempo: Doing everything possible to better manage a complex
deployment tempo is an important aspect of the Department’s commitment to our personnel
and families. We must strive to provide them and their families with greater clarity andpredictability regarding current and planned deployments. To this end, the Department
continues to work toward increasing time spent between deployments to two years at home forevery one deployed for the Active Component and five years demobilized for every one year
mobilized for Guard and Reserve units.
Recruiting and retention: Our recruiting efforts are long-term investments that can yield
generational gains. In this challenging wartime environment, the Department continues to meet
its recruiting and retention goals. The Department must continue developing innovative
programs to attract qualified young men and women into the Armed Forces, and to retain them.
Examples of recent efforts include:

Revising bonus policies to allow the Military Departments to pursue innovative ways toretain quality personnel; andOffering more flexible ways for military personnel to serve, by implementing programs
designed to better enable transitions between Active and Reserve Component service.

Supporting families: We have a critical and enduring obligation to better prepare and support
families during the stress of multiple deployments. Access to robust single member, spouse, child,and youth services is no longer a desirable option, but necessary, as these are services essential tomaintain the health of the All-Volunteer Force. Examples of recent efforts include:xii
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S U M M A R YIncreasing resources devoted to institutionalizing service member and family support
programs across the Department;

Replacing or renovating a majority of DoD Educational Activity schools by 2015; andContinuing efforts of the Military Departments to improve family and community
support services.

Developing future military leaders: The Department will continue its work to ensure that
America’s cadre of commissioned and noncommissioned officers are prepared for the full rangeof complex missions that the future security environment will demand. DoD will continue toplace special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and the building of partner
capacity skill sets in its professional military education and career development policies. Examplesof efforts in this area include:

Building expertise in foreign language, regional, and cultural skills;



Recognizing joint experience whenever and wherever it occurs in an officer’s career; and

Ensuring that the Department’s educational institutions have the right resources andfaculty that can help prepare the next generation of military leaders.

Developing the total defense workforce: The demands of a complex and uncertain security
environment require the Department to assess whether it possesses the right workforce size andmix of military, government civilian, and contractor personnel. As part of these efforts, DoD willtake the following steps:Improve the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, which provides deployable civilian experts
to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other theaters; and

Work to reduce the number of support service contractors, thereby helping to establish abalanced workforce that appropriately aligns functions to the public and private sector.

Strengthening Relationships
Achieving the Department’s strategic objectives requires close collaboration with counterparts athome and with key allies and partners abroad. Through its foreign defense relationships, theUnited States not only helps avert crises but also improves its effectiveness in responding tothem. Moreover, by integrating U.S. defense capabilities with other elements of national
security—including diplomacy, development, law enforcement, trade, and intelligence—thenation can ensure that the right mix of expertise is at hand to take advantage of emerging
opportunities and to thwart potential threats. The Department will take the following steps:

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Strengthening key relationships abroad: America’s power and influence are enhanced bysustaining a vibrant network of defense alliances and new partnerships, building cooperative
approaches with key states, and maintaining interactions with important international
institutions such as the United Nations. Recognizing the importance of fostering and improving
military and defense relations with allies and partners, the Department continues to emphasize
tailored approaches that build on shared interests and common approaches.
Evolving U.S. global defense posture: The United States is a global power with global
responsibilities. Including operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, approximately 400,000 U.S.
military personnel are forward-stationed or rotationally deployed around the world. The UnitedStates will continue to tailor its defense posture to enhance other states’ abilities to solve global
security problems, and to address challenges including ongoing conflicts, the proliferation of
nuclear technology and theater ballistic missiles, anti-access and area-denial capabilities, andmaintaining secure access to the global commons.
Improving unity of effort: The Department remains committed to further improving a whole-ofgovernment approach to national security challenges. From improving our partnership with the
Department of State in conflict zones, to our enduring relationship with America’s intelligencecommunity, to supporting civil authorities at home through our partnership with the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense will closely cooperate with other
U.S. departments and agencies to better protect and advance America’s interests.
Reforming How We Do Business
Years of war have demanded that America’s Armed Forces rapidly innovate and adapt—the
Department’s institutional base must do the same. The QDR highlights several issues requiring
particular attention.
Reforming security assistance: Despite the recognition that our security is increasingly tied tobuilding partner capacity, our security assistance tool kit has not kept pace. America’s security
assistance efforts remain constrained by a complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls
in resources, unwieldy processes, and a limited ability to sustain long-term efforts. The
Department is working to improve its internal efforts, ensure that urgent warfighter needs are
met—through such means as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, the Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund, and the Iraq Security Forces Fund—and work with interagency partners tocreate new and more responsive mechanisms for security assistance.
Reforming how we buy: The conventional acquisition process is too long and too cumbersome to
fit the needs of the many systems that require continuous changes and upgrades—a challengethat will become only more pressing over time. The Department will improve how it matches
requirements with mature technologies, maintains disciplined systems engineering approaches,xiv
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institutionalizes rapid acquisition capabilities, and implements more comprehensive testing. We
must avoid sacrificing cost and schedule for promises of improved performance. Our efforts mustalso include reforming the U.S. export control system for the 21st century, and spurringcontinued improvements in the provision of rapid logistical support to our forces abroad.
Strengthening the industrial base: America’s security and prosperity are increasing linked withthe health of our technology and industrial bases. In order to maintain our strategic advantage
well into the future, the Department requires a consistent, realistic, and long-term strategy forshaping the structure and capabilities of the defense technology and industrial bases—a strategy
that better accounts for the rapid evolution of commercial technology, as well as the uniquerequirements of ongoing conflicts.
Reforming the U.S. export control system: Today’s export control system is a relic of the Cold
War and must be adapted to address current threats. The current system impedes cooperation,technology sharing, and interoperability with allies and partners, hindering U.S. industrial
competitiveness. The Department will work with interagency partners and with Congress toensure that a new system fully addresses the threats the U.S. will face in the future.
Crafting a strategic approach to climate and energy: Climate change and energy will playsignificant roles in the future security environment. The Department is developing policies andplans to manage the effects of climate change on its operating environment, missions, andfacilities. The Department already performs environmental stewardship at hundreds of DoD
installations throughout the United States, working to meet resource efficiency and sustainability
goals. We must continue incorporating geostrategic and operational energy considerations into
force planning, requirements development, and acquisition processes.
Balancing for a Complex Future
The priorities advanced in the QDR, coupled with both the FY 2010 and FY 2011 budgets
reflect the Secretary’s consistent emphasis on ensuring the Department does everything possible
to enable success in today’s wars while preparing for a complex and uncertain future. This QDRreport and the preceding months of deliberation served two purposes: first, to establish the
Department’s key priority objectives, providing context and recommendations regarding
capability development and investment portfolios; and second, to communicate the Secretary’s
intent for the next several years of the Department’s work. The QDR thus serves as a critical
capstone document, shaping how the Department of Defense will support America’s men andwomen in uniform today, and building the policy and programmatic foundation for security inthe years to come.

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Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure
Taking into account the demands of a dynamic and complex security environment, therequirements of U.S. defense strategy, the need for enhancements to key capabilities
across a wide range of missions, and the need for forces with sufficient aggregate
capacity to meet the criteria laid out above, DoD has determined that U.S. forces, forthe duration of the FY 2011–15 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), will conformto the general parameters outlined below. Where ranges of force elements are provided,
these reflect variations in force levels that are planned across the FYDP.
Department of the Army:
4 Corps headquarters
18 Division headquarters
73 total brigade combat teams (BCTs) (45 Active Component [AC] and 28 Reserve
Component [RC]), consisting of:
40 infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs)
8 Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs)
25 heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs)
21 combat aviation brigades (CABs) (13 AC and 8 RC)
15 Patriot battalions; 7 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries
Department of the Navy:
10 – 11 aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings
84 – 88 large surface combatants, including 21 – 32 ballistic missile defense-capable
combatants and Aegis Ashore
14 – 28 small surface combatants (+14 mine countermeasure ships)
29 – 31 amphibious warfare ships
53 – 55 attack submarines and 4 guided missile submarines
126 – 171 land-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic
warfare (EW) aircraft (manned and unmanned)
3 maritime prepositioning squadrons
30 – 33 combat logistics force ships (+1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP))
17 – 25 command and support vessels (including Joint High Speed Vessels, 3 T-AKE
Class dry cargo/ammunition ships, 1 mobile landing platform)
51 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels
The formations and platform types shown here generally encompass only the major combat elementsof each of the military departments. Nuclear forces, which will be detailed in the report of the
Nuclear Posture Review, are not shown here.

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Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure (continued)
3 Marine expeditionary forces
4 Marine divisions (3 AC and 1 RC)
11 infantry regiments
4 artillery regiments
4 Marine aircraft wings (6 fixed-wing groups, 7 rotary-wing groups, 4 control groups,
4 support groups)
4 Marine logistics groups (9 combat logistics regiments)
7 Marine expeditionary unit command elements
Department of the Air Force:
8 ISR wing-equivalents (with up to 380 primary mission aircraft)
30 – 32 airlift and aerial refueling wing-equivalents (with 33 primary mission aircraft per
wing-equivalent)
10 – 11 theater strike wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wingequivalent)
5 long-range strike (bomber) wings (with up to 96 primary mission aircraft)
6 air superiority wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent)
3 command and control wings and 5 fully operational air and space operations centers(with a total of 27 primary mission aircraft)
10 space and cyberspace wings
Special Operations Forces:
Approximately 660 special operations teams (includes Army Special Forces Operational
Detachment-Alpha[ODA] teams, Navy Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] platoons, Marine
special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams, and operational aviation
detachments [OADs])
3 Ranger battalions
165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft
The above parameters rightly reflect the heavy demands being placed on portions of theforce by today’s wars. As these demands evolve, so too may the appropriate size and mix
of forces.

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Quadrennial Defense Review ReportINTRODUCTION
The Department of Defense conducted the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) fromFebruary 2009 through January 2010.
From the outset, this QDR aimed at advancing two objectives. The first was to further rebalance
the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and institutionalize successful wartime innovations tobetter enable success in today’s wars while ensuring that our forces are prepared for a complex
future. Not only will the outcome of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq shape the security
environment for decades to come, but the character of these wars—with enemies hiding among
populations, manipulating the information environment, and employing a challenging mix oftactics and technology—will be an important part of the future spectrum of conflict. The second
objective was reform: For too long we have been slow to adapt our institutions and processes tosupport the urgent needs of our men and women in harm’s way. From strategy and policy
development to personnel and acquisition processes, it is imperative to further reform how we dobusiness.
This QDR was strategy-driven. It began with an assessment of the emerging security
environment and the many ways in which the U.S. Armed Forces may be called on to protect
and advance the nation’s interests. The Department used the 2008 National Defense Strategy
and the strategic precepts of the President’s fiscal year (FY) 2010 defense budget as touchstones
for this assessment. It then worked closely with the White House, other departments andagencies, and key allies to refine its approach, ensuring consistency with the President’s national
security priorities and the Administration’s major security reviews.
These efforts made clear that the United States and its allies and partners face a complex and
uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. The rise of new
powers, the growing influence of non-state actors, the spread of weapons of mass destruction andother destructive technologies, and a series of enduring and emerging socioeconomic trends willcontinue to pose profound challenges to international order.
America’s leadership in this world requires a whole-of-government approach that integrates allelements of national power. Agile and flexible U.S. military forces with superior capabilities
across a broad spectrum of potential operations are a vital component of this broad tool set,
helping to advance our nation’s interests and support common goals. The United States remains
the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale combat operations over extended distances.
This unique position generates an obligation to be responsible stewards of the power andinfluence that history, determination, and circumstance have provided.

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To help defend and advance our national interests, the Department of Defense must balance
resources and risk among four priority objectives: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter
conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserveand enhance the All-Volunteer Force.
In balancing resources and risk, the QDR recognized the current fiscal challenges facing theUnited States and made difficult tradeoffs where these were warranted. The QDR’s goals inthese four areas are well funded in the FY 2011 budget, providing sufficient resources tosuccessfully execute the full range of missions called for in our strategy.
In order to determine the mix of military capabilities best suited to supporting the nation’s
defense strategy, the QDR was analytically grounded. The Secretary, advised by other seniorcivilian and military leaders within the Department, reviewed, modified, and endorsed a set of
scenarios that the QDR used to help evaluate current and potential future forces. The analysis
also focused heavily on assessing the needs of commanders and forces in the field today,
principally in Afghanistan and Iraq, in order to ensure that the Department’s leaders had a clear
picture of the demands of ongoing operations.
The QDR analysis strongly suggested that the Department must further rebalance its policy,
doctrine, and capabilities to better support the following six key missions:

Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home;

Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;

Build the security capacity of partner states;

Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; andOperate effectively in cyberspace.

Although these missions do not encompass the totality of ways in which our Armed Forces serve,
they are areas of particular need that require attention today and into the future.
Through the QDR, the Department developed and evaluated proposals for addressing gaps andshortfalls in the capabilities of the force. Once these proposals were vetted and their costs
determined, the Secretary issued planning guidance to DoD components. This QDR guidancedrove the development and review of the FY 2011 budget proposal and the Department’s Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP) FY 2011–2015. In some cases the resulting investments serve as adown payment on capabilities that may not come to fruition for several years.

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Beyond directing specific shifts in the capabilities required to accomplish the above missions, the
QDR also considered the aggregate military capacity needed to prevail in a series of overlapping
operations of varying character and intensity. The QDR force-sizing and force-shaping constructdifferentiates between current commitments and plausible future requirements, and forms thebasis for determining the appropriate type and range of the main elements of U.S. force structurenecessary to meet the needs of the defense strategy.
It is evident that years of war have imposed considerable strain on the All-Volunteer Force.
Multiple long deployments are taking a significant toll on our people. Given the requirements of
Afghanistan, Iraq, and other operations, the Department remains deeply committed toconstantly assessing the health of the force. We will do all we can to ensure that our people are as
prepared as possible for their wartime service while working to lessen the burden shouldered byour personnel and their families—the most important pillar of America’s defense.
Part of the Department’s obligation to defend and advance U.S. interests while taking care of ourpeople is the imperative to reform how it does business. The Department is working to help
build a whole-of-government approach to the provision of security assistance, improving ourdefense acquisition and logistics processes to better support our personnel in harm’s way,strengthening our technology and industrial bases to facilitate innovation, and crafting a strategic
approach to climate and energy challenges.
Given the complex security environment and the range of missions, capabilities, and institutional
reforms necessary to protect and advance U.S. interests, the QDR highlights the importance ofrevitalizing defense relationships with allies and partners in key regions. An important element ofrevitalizing key relationships is the need to craft an approach to the U.S. defense posture thatemphasizes cooperation with allies and partners and retailoring military forces, facilities, anddefense agreements across regions.
This QDR benefited from extensive engagement with key stakeholders. As the QDR generated
insights and interim findings, these were shared with and reviewed by a wide range of experts,
both within DoD and beyond. Over the course of the review, QDR staff consulted with andbriefed congressional staff as well as representatives of allied and other governments. DoD
officials also engaged with their counterparts elsewhere in the U.S. government to further thekind of integrated security approaches long advocated by the President, Secretary of Defense, andSecretary of State. For example, Defense leaders and staff worked closely with the Departmentsof State and Homeland Security, as well as the Intelligence Community, as they undertook their
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,
and Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review respectively, sharing insights regarding
analysis, key missions, capabilities, and plans in overlapping issue areas.

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I N T R O D U C T I O NThis QDR report and the preceding months of deliberation served two purposes: first, toestablish the Department’s key priority objectives, providing context and recommendations
regarding capability development and investment portfolios; and second, to communicate theSecretary’s intent for the next several years of the Department’s work. The QDR thus serves as a
critical capstone document, shaping how the Department of Defense will support America’s men
and women in uniform today, and building the policy and programmatic foundation for security
in the years to come.

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Quadrennial Defense Review ReportDEFENSE STRATEGYA Complex Environment
The United States faces a series of challenges and opportunities at a time of significant change in
the international system. More than eight years of war in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and against Al
Qaeda and its allies have demanded sustained sacrifice from America’s men and women inuniform.
In addition to ongoing conflicts, the United States faces a complex and uncertain security
landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. Not since the fall of the Soviet
Union or the end of World War II has the international terrain been affected by such farreaching and consequential shifts. The rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state
actors, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other destructive enabling technologies,
and a series of enduring and emerging trends pose profound challenges to international order.
The United States must demonstrate steadfast engagement to address these global challenges andcapitalize on emerging opportunities. We must display a continued willingness to commit
substantial effort to strengthen and reform the international order and, in concert with our allies
and partners abroad, engage in cooperative, purposeful action in the pursuit of common
interests.
Current Operations
The United States remains a nation atwar. The outcome of today’s conflicts
will directly shape the global security
environment for decades to come, andprevailing in current operations
constitutes the Department’s toppriority.
The United States, along with ourallies and partners, has renewed its
efforts to help the governments of
Afghanistan and Pakistan disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda andeliminate safe havens within bothnations. By the end of 2010,
approximately 100,000 American

Soldiers from Company A, Special Troops Battalion, 101st Airborne
Division, perform an air assault into a village inside the Jowlzak
valley in the Parwan province of Afghanistan. U.S. Army photo by
Spc. Scott Davis.

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military personnel will be fighting alongside allied and partner forces to deny Al Qaeda safe
haven and reverse the Taliban’s momentum. Recognizing that victory in Afghanistan ultimately
lies with its people, U.S. and allied forces are focused on securing key population centers, training
competent Afghan security forces, and partnering with them as they fight for their country’s
future.
Our efforts in Afghanistan are inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan—one basedon mutual interest and respect. The United States is committed to strengthening Pakistan’s
capacity to target those extremists who threaten both countries, and our military partnership is
strengthened as we cooperate to eliminate terrorist safe havens. Though our partnership withPakistan is focused urgently on confronting Al Qaeda and its allies, America’s interest in
Pakistan’s security and prosperity will endure long after the campaign ends.
While the epicenter of the terrorist threat to the United States is rooted in Afghanistan andPakistan, the war against Al Qaeda and its allies continues around the world. We have become
more adept at disrupting terrorist networks; nevertheless, our terrorist adversaries continue tolearn and adapt, posing an enduring threat to the security of America and its allies and partners.
Recognizing that sustainable success requires the patient and persistent application of all elementsof U.S. and international power, we will continue to employ military force as necessary to defeat
Al Qaeda and its allies.
In Iraq, years of effort and a critical shift toward a population-centered counterinsurgency
strategy have helped enable the Iraqi government to take the lead in protecting its people andproviding essential services. A sovereign, just, and accountable Iraqi state capable of sustaining
national unity can serve as a long-term U.S. partner, and will buttress America’s strategic goals
and those of its allies. As the responsible drawdown of the U.S. military presence proceeds, U.S.
forces will continue to play important roles advising, training, and supporting Iraqi forces.
The demands of these ongoing operations have strained America’s Armed Forces, and many ofour personnel have served multiple tours in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Recognizing thesestrains, and as described in further detail in this report, the Department has elevated the need topreserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force in our policies, force planning, and budget
priorities.
Key Geopolitical Trends
In addition to fully appreciating the influence that ongoing conflicts will have on the shape of the
future security environment, the Department of Defense must remain cognizant of underlying
dynamic global forces and trends that will significantly alter the contours of the international
system.

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The distribution of global political, economic, and military power is shifting and becoming morediffuse. The rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India, the world’s largest
democracy, will continue to reshape the international system. While the United States willremain the most powerful actor, it must increasingly cooperate with key allies and partners tobuild and sustain peace and security. Whether and how rising powers fully integrate into theglobal system will be among this century’s defining questions, and are thus central to America’s
interests.
The continued growth and power of non-state actors will remain a key feature of theenvironment. Globalization has transformed the process of technological innovation while
lowering entry barriers for a wider range of actors to develop and acquire advanced technologies.
As technological innovation and global information flows accelerate, non-state actors willcontinue to gain influence and capabilities that, during the previous century, remained largely thepurview of states.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues to undermine global
security, complicating efforts to sustain peace and prevent harmful arms races. Even as theUnited States and Russia make progress in reducing the number of deployed strategic nuclear
weapons, other nations are pursuing nuclear weapons programs.1 Moreover, Al Qaeda and otherterrorist networks have demonstrated an interest in WMD. Perhaps most troubling would be theinstability or collapse of a WMD-armed state. This could lead to rapid proliferation of WMD
material, weapons, and technology, and could quickly become a global crisis posing a direct
physical threat to the United States and all other nations.
A series of powerful cross-cutting trends, made more complex by the ongoing economic crisis,threatens to complicate international relations and make the exercise of U.S. statecraft moredifficult. The rising demand for resources, rapid urbanization of littoral regions, the effects ofclimate change, the emergence of new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic
tensions in several regions are just some of the trends whose complex interplay may spark or
exacerbate future conflicts.
Shifting Operational LandscapeLessons from ongoing conflicts and assessments of the likely security environment point to achallenging operational landscape for America’s Armed Forces. Perhaps more than ever before,
the United States requires joint military forces able to function and succeed across a wide
geographic and operational spectrum. Moreover, military forces must be capable of working
effectively with a range of civilian and international partners.

1

The challenges associated with nuclear weapons in the current and projected security environment are outlinedin the Department’s Nuclear Posture Review.
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Three features of the current and expected operational landscape are most pressing.
First, the continued dominance of America’s Armed Forces in large-scale force-on-force warfare
provides powerful incentives for adversaries to employ methods designed to offset our strengths.
We see this dynamic at work today. From non-state actors using highly advanced militarytechnology and sophisticated information operations to states employing unconventional
technologies, our current adversaries have shown that they will tailor their strategies and employ
their capabilities in sophisticated ways.
The term “hybrid” has recently been used to capture the seemingly increased complexity of war,
the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional categories of conflict.
While the existence of innovative adversaries is not new, today’s hybrid approaches demand that
U.S. forces prepare for a range of conflicts. These may involve state adversaries that employ
protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces to coerce and intimidate, or non-state
actors using operational concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with states.
We must also anticipate the employment of other novel methods. Future adversaries may use
surrogates including terrorist and criminal networks, manipulate the information environment inincreasingly sophisticated ways, impede
access to energy resources and markets,and exploit perceived economic anddiplomatic leverage in order tocomplicate our calculus. Because suchapproaches may be difficult to detect orpredict, the ability of our forces torapidly innovate and adapt will become
even more critical.
Second, as other powers rise and as
non-state actors become more powerful,
U.S. Navy Information Systems Technician 2nd Class Athena
Stovall, scans the network on her computer for intrusions during a U.S. interests in, and assured access to,
cyber war training course at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems
the global commons will take on added
Center in Pearl City, Hawaii. U.S. Navy photo by Mass
Communication Spec. 3rd Class Michael A. Lantron.
importance. The global commons are
domains or areas that no one state
controls but on which all rely. They constitute the connective tissue of the international system.
Global security and prosperity are contingent on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea, as
well as information transmitted under the ocean or through space.
A series of recent trends highlight growing challenges to stability throughout the global
commons—from cyberspace attacks abroad and network intrusions here at home, to increased
piracy, to anti-satellite weapons tests and the growth in the number of space-faring nations, to8
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the investments some nations are making in systems designed to threaten our primary means ofprojecting power: our bases, our sea and air assets, and the networks that support them.
Prudence demands that the Department prepare for possible future adversaries likely to possessand employ some degree of anti-access capability—the ability to blunt or deny U.S. power
projection—across all domains. Given the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology,
smaller states and some non-state actors may be able to acquire and employ longer-range andmore precise weapons. Future adversaries will likely possess sophisticated capabilities designed tocontest or deny command of the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains.
Finally, the changing international environment will continue to put pressure on the modern
state system, likely increasing the frequency and severity of the challenges associated withchronically fragile states. These states are often catalysts for the growth of radicalism andextremism. In some cases they are nuclear-armed or are critically important to enduring
American interests. Over the course of the next several decades, conflicts are at least as likely toresult from state weakness as from state strength.

America’s Interests and the Roles of Military Power
America’s interests are inextricably linked to the integrity and resilience of the international
system. Chief among these interests are security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values,
and an international order that promotes cooperative action.
Consistent with the President’s vision, the United States will advance these interests bystrengthening our domestic foundation and integrating all elements of national power, engaging
abroad on the basis of mutual interest and mutual respect, and promoting an international orderthat advances our interests by reinforcing the rights and responsibilities of all nations.
America has been steadfast in supporting liberty, freedom, and open access to markets and ideas.
The United States can lead only when others trust it to carry forward their best interests, to listen
to their concerns, and to uphold the norms and values of the international community.
The United States remains committed to exercising mutual respect and leadership within thearchitecture of a just and effective international system. America’s enemies fear its ability to build
consensus against tyranny. Pursuing and underwriting a strong international order is anundertaking that benefits all nations, none more than the United States. This principle will guidethe Department’s interactions with the international community, and it frames our approach todefending the American people and promoting their interests.
America’s interests and role in the world require Armed Forces with unmatched capabilities and awillingness on the part of the nation to employ them in defense of our national interests and thecommon good. The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale

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operations over extended distances. This unique position generates an obligation to be
responsible stewards of the power and influence that history, determination, and circumstancehave provided.
The role of the Department of Defense is to field, sustain, and employ the military capabilities
needed to protect the United States and its allies and to advance our interests. In order to fulfill
this role, the Department must continually assess how America’s Armed Forces are evolving in
relation to the wartime demands of today and the expected character of future challenges.
Strong regional allies and partners are fundamental to meeting 21st century challenges
successfully. Helping to build their capacity can help prevent conflict from beginning or
escalating, reducing the possibility that large and enduring deployments of U.S. or allied forces
would be required.
As a global power, the United States has a broad range of tools for advancing its national interests
described above. Whenever possible, we seek to pursue those interests through cooperation,
diplomacy, economic development and engagement, and the power of America’s ideas andvalues. When absolutely necessary, the United States and its allies have shown the willingness andability to resort to force in defense of our interests and the common good.
Whenever possible, the United States will use force in an internationally sanctioned coalition
with allies, international and regional organizations, and like-minded nations committed to thesecommon principles. America’s Armed Forces will retain the ability to act unilaterally anddecisively when appropriate, maintaining joint, all-domain military capabilities that can prevail
across a wide range of contingencies.
Despite those who disregard the rules of the international system, the United States must remain
a standard-bearer in the conduct of war. The United States will maintain and support
international norms by upholding the Geneva Conventions and by providing detainees andprisoners of war the rights and protections afforded to them under international law.
The evolution of modern warfare has brought significant advances in technology. The increasing
precision, persistence, and autonomy of unmanned systems hold great promise. As these systems
grow in capability and number, we must ensure that our policies on use of force advanceaccordingly.
Any decision to commit U.S. forces to hostile environments should be based on a considerationof U.S. and allied interests, including treaty commitments, and the likely costs and expected risksof military action. America’s men and women in uniform should never be put at risk absent a
clear mission and a realistic and sufficiently resourced plan to succeed. Our Soldiers, Sailors,
Marines, Airmen, and Coast Guardsmen constitute our most critical strategic and most treasured
resource. They deserve the unflinching support of a nation that clearly understands, from the10
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outset, why the All-Volunteer Force has been placed in harm’s way and what risks and costs
come with the use of military force.

U.S. Defense Objectives
In order to defend and advance our national interests, the Department of Defense must balance
resources and risk among four priority objectives: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter
conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserveand enhance the All-Volunteer Force. These objectives reflect a strategic approach that can evolveand adapt in response to a changing security environment.
Prevail in Today’s Wars
In today’s conflicts, as in the past, America must ensure the success of its forces in the field.
Prevailing against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan
requires a comprehensive approach employing all elements of national power. Focusing ourresources to protect the population of Afghanistan, our military and civilian efforts align with thefollowing objectives:

Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action by the United States, ourNATO allies and contributing partners, and Afghanistan’s security forces;

Denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers andlines of communication;

Disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and preventing Al Qaeda from regaining
sanctuary in Afghanistan;

Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghan National Security Forces(ANSF);



Increasing the size and capability of the ANSF and employing other local forces selectively
to begin transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan government by July 2011; and

Building the capacity of the Afghan government, particularly in key ministries.

Achieving these objectives requires a renewed international and whole-of-government effort,
including the commitment of an additional 52,000 American military personnel to Afghanistan
since January 2009 for a total U.S. force of approximately 100,000, with substantial increases inallied and partner commitments. The number of deployed forces and the challenging terrain
make it imperative that the Department focus on rapidly increasing the number and quality of
the key enablers—fixed- and rotary-wing lift, aerial delivery, unmanned aerial systems, and arange of other combat support and combat service support assets, as these are critical to success.

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Prevailing in this conflict also requires focused attention on increasing the ability of U.S. forces
to train and partner, especially in combat, with Afghan army and police forces. The next sectionof this report addresses these issues in detail.
In Iraq, U.S. forces are working totransition efforts from combat tostability operations. U.S. forces willcontinue to implement the U.S.-Iraq
Security Agreement by transitioning
enduring functions primarily to the
Iraqi government, with some
activities shifting to the U.S.
Embassy and other internationalorganizations.
American and Iraqi soldiers exit a helicopter during partnered air
assault training, carried out by Iraqi commandos and scouts of 1st
Iraqi Army Division and paratroopers of 2nd Battalion, 504th
Parachute Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division(Advise and Assist Brigade), at Camp Ramadi, Iraq, on Nov. 15,
2009. DoD photo by Spc. Michael J. MacLeod, U.S. Army.

Integral to the U.S.-Iraq Security
Agreement and consistent withpresidential guidance, U.S. forces in
Iraq continue to execute a responsible
drawdown. By August 31, 2010, U.S.
forces will have transitioned from combat and counterinsurgency activities to a more limited
focus on training and advising the Iraqi Security Forces, conducting targeted counterterrorism
operations, providing force protection for U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities, andsupporting civilian agencies and international organizations in their capacity-building efforts.
U.S. forces also continue to provide key enablers to the Iraqi Security Forces, who have assumed
the lead for security responsibility in Iraq.
Further drawdown activity will occur in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement toredeploy all U.S. forces by December 31, 2011. The pace of the drawdown will becommensurate with Iraq's improving security while providing U.S. commanders sufficient
flexibility to assist the Iraqis with emerging challenges. Even as U.S. forces are redeployed, theUnited States will continue to pursue sustained political engagement and regional diplomacy.
The continuing fight against Al Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan and elsewhere will demand
continued vigilance and determination. Prevailing against this multifaceted enemy requires anextensive array of tools for ready and effective military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law
enforcement action. These capabilities must be dedicated, responsive, and appropriately
resourced to prevail against an adaptive adversary. The defense contribution to this effort takes
two basic forms: a highly capable network of special operations and intelligence capabilities
designed to seek out, identify, and eliminate Al Qaeda’s leadership, dismantle its networks, and12
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erode its effectiveness; and an enduring effort to build the security capacity of key partners
around the world, where improved local and regional capability and capacity can reduce the size
and number of Al Qaeda’s safe havens and prevent their regeneration.
Prevent and Deter Conflict
America’s enduring effort to advancecommon interests without resort toarms is a hallmark of its stewardshipoftheinternational
system.
Preventing the rise of threats to U.S.
interests requires the integrated useof diplomacy, development, anddefense, along with intelligence, law
enforcement, and economic tools ofstatecraft to help build the capacityof partners to maintain and promotestability. Such an approach also
requires working closely with ourallies and partners to leverage existing
alliances and create conditions toadvance common interests.

Sgt. Eric Petersen and British Army Maj. James J.M. Driscoll, discuss
operations in Garmsir City District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
during a relief-in-place. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl Alex C.
Guerra.

The Department defends the United States from direct attack, deters potential adversaries, fosters
regional security, and assures access to the global commons by pursuing the following efforts:
Assisting partners in developing and acquiring the capabilities and systems required to
improve their security capacity;Enhancing U.S. capabilities to train, advise, and assist partner-nation security forces andcontribute to coalition and peacekeeping operations;

Maintaining awareness of the global environment to identify potential threats andemerging opportunities;

Supporting U.S. diplomatic and development efforts to foster a range of governanceefforts and to counter radicalization, including working with civilian agencies on security
assistance and police training programs;Extending a global defense posture composed of joint, ready forces forward-stationed androtationally deployed to prevail across all domains, prepositioned equipment and overseas
facilities, and international agreements;

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S T R A T E G YContributing to an appropriately sized and shaped portfolio of homeland defense and civil
support capabilities integrated with U.S. homeland security activities;Protecting critical DoD infrastructure, including in space and cyberspace; and

Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal at the lowest levels consistent with
U.S. and allied interests as we pursue the peace and security of a world free of nuclear
weapons.

Credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments will demand tailored approaches to deterrence.
Such tailoring requires an in-depth understanding of the capabilities, values, intent, and decision
making of potential adversaries, whether they are individuals, networks, or states. Deterrence also
depends on integrating all aspects of national power.
The United States is positioned with capabilities across all domains to deter a wide range ofattacks or forms of coercion against the United States and its allies. Until such time as the
Administration’s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will bemaintained as a core mission for the Department of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, andeffective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners.
Deterrence also depends on land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale
conflicts in environments where anti-access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces
prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups. These
forces are enabled by cyberspace and space capabilities, and enhanced by U.S. capabilities to denyadversaries’ objectives through ballistic missile defense and counter-WMD, resilient
infrastructure (including command and control systems), and global basing and posture. The
United States is strengthening its approach to deterrence in multiple ways.


The Department of Defense continues to improve its ability to attribute WMD, space,and cyberspace attacks in order to hold aggressors responsible and deny them the ability toevade detection in new domains or use proxies.

To reinforce U.S. commitments to our allies and partners, we will consult closely withthem on new, tailored, regional deterrence architectures that combine our forward
presence, relevant conventional capabilities (including missile defenses), and continued
commitment to extend our nuclear deterrent. These regional architectures and newcapabilities, as detailed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and the forthcoming
Nuclear Posture Review, make possible a reduced role for nuclear weapons in our national
security strategy.

America’s resilience—robustness, adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery—is an
important dimension of our deterrent posture. So too is America’s ability to assist allies in
responding to both attacks and natural disasters.
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The United States will work with like-minded nations to foster norms regarding behavior
in domains where an attack on one nation has consequences for all—especially in spaceand cyberspace.

Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies
If deterrence fails and adversaries challenge our interests with the threat or use of force, theUnited States must be prepared to respond in support of U.S. national interests.
The range of plausible future challenges is significant; DoD requirements to deal with suchchallenges include the following:

Defeating Al Qaeda and its allies;

Supporting a national response to attacks on, or natural disasters in, the United States;Defeating aggression by adversary states, including states armed with advanced anti-accesscapabilities and/or nuclear weapons;

Locating, securing, or neutralizing weapons of mass destruction, key materials, and related
facilities in the context of a loss of control of such weapons or materials, and thwarting thepotential for a non-state adversary to acquire them;Supporting and stabilizing fragile states facing threats from terrorist and insurgent groups;Protecting American citizens in harm’s way overseas;Conducting effective operations in cyberspace; andPreventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.

These types of challenges are not necessarily distinct. Indeed, our future operational environment
is likely to entail complex combinations of multiple challenges. As described earlier, America’s
potential adversaries are likely to employ a hybrid mix of approaches and capabilities if and when
they choose to oppose the United States, its allies, or its partners. As will be outlined in the next
section, U.S. forces must be sized and shaped to provide the maximum possible versatility for thebroadest plausible range of conflicts.
Preserve and Enhance the All-Volunteer ForceIn order to succeed in today’s wars and prepare for the future, the Department of Defense mustensure the long-term viability of the All-Volunteer Force, its most precious military resource.
This will require policies that sustain the rotation base, provide care for our people—service
members and their families—in peace and conflict, and adapt as required by the environment.

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Years of war have significantly stressed
our military personnel and theirfamilies. Although a strong sense of
purposeanddemonstrated
operational excellence are sharedacross all Services and ranks,
indicators of strain on the force—from retention levels in key
commissioned and noncommissioned
officer ranks, to increased rates ofcombat stress and substance abuse,
U.S. Sailors assigned to Navy Recruiting Command Great Lakes,
Division 929, stand in formation for the Janesville, Wis. Memorial Day and to even more tragic outcomes
Celebration on May 25, 2009. U.S. Navy photo by Senior Chief Mass
such as increased levels of suicide andCommunication Spc. Gary Ward.
divorce—are cause for concern. Given
the continuing need for substantial and sustained deployments in conflict zones, the Department
must do all it can to take care of our people—physically and psychologically. The health of the
All-Volunteer Force depends on substantial and enduring efforts to track and improve physicaland mental health, readiness, family support, and leader development programs across the force.
Now and for several years upon completion of operations we must reset equipment lost throughcombat and the strain of today’s wars. In many cases, this process will not require wholesale
replacement of our current generation of military platforms. Rather, it will necessitate morepractical and efficient procurement processes and programs and hard choices about our futurecapability needs. Toward this end the Department must continue to elevate the importance of its
acquisition efforts and work to reform what and how we buy. From ensuring greater
responsiveness and integrity in the acquisition process, to enhancing resource allocation
decisions, to improving cost analysis and program execution, the Department will work to meetits obligation to provide our forces with the capabilities they need when they need them while
exercising good fiscal stewardship.
For too long, the health of the All-Volunteer Force, the civilian workforce that supports it, andthe processes by which the Department provides needed equipment and platforms have been
underemphasized priorities. The prolonged wartime period since 2001 has greatly elevated theirimportance, and the consequences of failure have accordingly become more serious. To reflect
the urgency that the Department’s leadership places on these issues, the QDR has striven to
include them as core components of our policy, planning, and programming considerations.

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REBALANCING THE FORCE
This QDR has explicitly linked force planning, which determines the overall size and capabilitiesof the Armed Forces, to the priority objectives of the defense strategy: prevail in today’s wars;
prevent and deter conflict; prepare to succeed in a wide range of contingencies, both near- andlonger-term; and preserve and enhance the force. The QDR developed insights regarding theways in which the capabilities of U.S. forces should evolve by evaluating alternative future forces
in a diverse set of scenarios, which depicted a wide range of plausible challenges that might callfor a response by U.S. military forces. The Department also assessed lessons learned fromongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Collectively, these assessments helped
inform decisions affecting capabilities in six key mission areas:Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home;

Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;

Build the security capacity of partner states;

Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; andOperate effectively in cyberspace.

Analysis focused on identifying gaps in capabilities and shortfalls in capacity that programmed
forces might encounter in executing these missions over the near-term, midterm-, and longer
term. Insights regarding those gaps and shortfalls helped focus efforts to improve the “fit”
between programmed forces and the demands that may be placed on them in future operations.
Those efforts have resulted both in specific initiatives to address gaps and shortfalls and in
guidance intended to shape the evolution of the force and its capabilities over the longer term.
Some initiatives involve investments in new or existing systems. Others involve creating newunits within the force to perform functions that are in high demand. Still others involve
adjustments to training, doctrine, or force posture.2 These choices require managing a degree ofrisk over time and across components—a later section of this report details DoD’s risk
management framework.

2

By congressional direction, DoD has conducted reviews of U.S. nuclear strategy and forces, ballistic missile
defense, and space assets and operations in addition to the QDR. The findings of these reviews are being
reported separately, but key insights were drawn on for this report.
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QDR analyses pointed emphatically to two overarching conclusions. The first is that U.S. forces
would be able to perform their missions more effectively—both in the near-term and against
future adversaries—if they had more and better key enabling capabilities at their disposal. These
enablers include rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, intelligence analysis and foreign
language expertise, and tactical communications networks for ongoing operations, as well as
more robust space-based assets, more effective electronic attack systems, more resilient baseinfrastructure, and other assets essential for effective operations against future adversaries.
The second theme to emerge from QDR analyses is the importance of ensuring that U.S. forces
are flexible and adaptable so that they can confront the full range of challenges that could emerge
from a complex and dynamic security environment. Together, these insights helped inform the
Department’s leaders as they made choices regarding the evolution of the force.
The remainder of this section provides an overview of initiatives emerging from the QDR. They
are grouped according to the six mission areas listed above. As they reach fruition, these
initiatives will accelerate the evolution of our Armed Forces toward a mix of activities andcapabilities better suited to the demands of the emerging security environment. Even so, many ofthese steps should be regarded as down payments that will be followed by further reforms andrebalancing actions that will continue beyond the current FYDP.

Defend the United States and Support Civil Authorities at Home
The first responsibility of any government and its defense establishment is to protect the lives andsafety of its people. Because the United States benefits from favorable geography and continental
size, direct attacks against the country itself have been rare throughout our history. However,
events since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, remind us that the rapid proliferation ofdestructive technologies, combined with potent ideologies of violent extremism, portends a
future in which all governments will have to maintain a high level of vigilance against terrorist
threats. Moreover, state adversaries are acquiring new means to strike targets at greater distancesfrom their borders and with greater lethality. Finally, the United States must also be prepared torespond to the full range of potential natural disasters.
The experiences of the past several years have deepened the realization that state- and non-state
adversaries alike may seek to attack military and civilian targets within the United States.
Protecting the nation and its people from such threats requires close synchronization between
civilian and military efforts. Although many efforts to protect the United States are led by otherfederal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the role of the
Department of Defense in defending the nation against direct attack and in providing support tocivil authorities, potentially in response to a very significant or even catastrophic event, has
steadily gained prominence.

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When responding to an event within the United States, the Department of Defense will almost
always be in a supporting role. DoD can receive requests to provide federal assistance throughtwo avenues: first, through DHS as the lead federal agency, or second, through a governor’s
request under U.S. Code Title 32 authorities.
To ensure that the Department of Defense is prepared to provide appropriate support to civil
authorities, the QDR examined the sufficiency of the programmed force and sought to identify
capability enhancements that were of highest priority for the future. Key initiatives resulting fromthis assessment include efforts to:

Field faster, more flexible consequence management response forces. The Department has
gained important experience and learned valuable lessons from its efforts to field
specialized consequence management response forces for chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosives events (CBRNE). Given the potential for surprise
attacks within the United States, the Department will begin reorganizing these forces toenhance their lifesaving capabilities, maximize their flexibility, and reduce their response
times. First, the Department will begin restructuring the original CBRNE Consequence
Management Response Force (CCMRF), to increase its ability to respond more rapidly toan event here at home. To address the potential for multiple, simultaneous disasters, thesecond and third CCMRFs will be replaced with smaller units focused on providing
command and control and communications capabilities for Title 10 follow-on forces.
Complementing the evolution of the first CCMRF, the Department also will draw on
existing National Guard forces to build a Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of theten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions. These ten HRFs will
provide a regional response capability; focus on planning, training and exercising; andforge strong links between the federal level and state and local authorities.

Enhance capabilities for domain awareness. The Department of Defense and its
interagency partners must be able to more comprehensively monitor the air, land,
maritime, space, and cyber domains for potential direct threats to the United States. Suchmonitoring provides the U.S. homeland with an extended, layered in depth defense. Thiseffort includes enhanced coordination with Canada for the defense of North America as
well as assisting Mexico and Caribbean partners in developing air and maritime domainawareness capacities. Special attention is required to develop domain awareness tools for
the Arctic approaches as well. In coordination with domestic and international partners,
DoD will explore technologies that have the potential to detect, track, and identify threatsin these spheres to ensure that capabilities can be deployed to counter them in a timely
fashion. For example, the Department is working with DHS and the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) through a joint technology capability demonstration program to explore
new technologies to assist in the detection of tunnels. This technology can support U.S.
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authorities conducting domestic missions and also help meet the needs of forces operating
overseas.


Accelerate the development of standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities. DoD
will improve its ability to detect radiological and nuclear material and weapons at a
distance. Developing and fielding these sensors will make possible more effective widearea surveillance in the maritime and air approaches to the United States, and will help
address the challenge of locating and securing nuclear weapons and materials during
overseas contingencies.

Enhance domestic counter-IED capabilities. To better prepare the Department tosupport civil authorities seeking to counter potential threats from domestic improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), DoD will assist civil authorities with counter-IED tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and capabilities developed in recent operations.

Succeed in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Operations
The wars we are fighting today and assessments of the future security environment together
demand that the United States retain and enhance a whole-of-government capability to succeed
in large-scale counterinsurgency (COIN), stability, and counterterrorism (CT) operations inenvironments ranging from densely populated urban areas and mega-cities, to remote mountains,deserts, jungles, and littoral regions. In some cases, it may be in the U.S. interest to help
strengthen weak states, including those facing homegrown insurgencies and transnational
terrorist and criminal networks or those that have been weakened by humanitarian disasters.
Moreover, there are few cases in which the U.S. Armed Forces would engage in sustained largescale combat operations without the associated need to assist in the transition to just and stable
governance. Accordingly, the U.S. Armed Forces will continue to require capabilities to create asecure environment in fragile states in support of local authorities and, if necessary, to support
civil authorities in providing essential government services, restoring emergency infrastructure,and supplying humanitarian relief.
In order to ensure that America’s Armed Forces are prepared for these complex and taxing
missions, it is vital that the lessons from today’s conflicts be further institutionalized in military
doctrine, training, capability development, and operational planning. Stability operations, largescale counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations are not niche challenges or the
responsibility of a single Military Department, but rather require a portfolio of capabilities as wellas sufficient capacity from across America’s Armed Forces and other departments and agencies.
Nor are these types of operations a transitory or anomalous phenomenon in the security
landscape. On the contrary, we must expect that for the indefinite future, violent extremistgroups, with or without state sponsorship, will continue to foment instability and challenge U.S.
and allied interests. Our enemies are adaptive and will develop systems and tactics that exploit
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our vulnerabilities. For example, IEDs have been used effectively against U.S. and othercounterinsurgency forces and have become the weapon of choice of some enemies. We must
assume that the IED threat will evolve and persist even as better countermeasures are developed.
Since 2001, U.S. forces have become far more proficient in operations against insurgents andterrorist groups and in helping partners to provide security to populations threatened by suchgroups. U.S. forces will need to maintain a high level of competency in this mission area for
decades to come. Accordingly, the Department is continuing to grow capabilities for criticalcounterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, andelsewhere. To institutionalize the lessons learned over these years, DoD has made and willcontinue to make substantial changes to personnel management practices, professional militaryeducation and training programs, and career development pathways.
Operational innovation and adaptability have always been hallmarks of the American Soldier,
Sailor, Airman, Marine, and Coast Guardsman. Our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan andelsewhere has tested our forces and they are again proving their mettle. The Department andsupporting defense industry must continue to adapt, accommodating both longer timelines for
operations and engagements, and shorter ones for fielding new tactics and capabilities against
highly adaptive adversaries. They must be as responsive, flexible, and mission-focused as theforces they are supporting.
The QDR has placed special emphasis on ensuring that the men and women fighting today’s
conflicts have the tools and resources they need to succeed. Accordingly, The Secretary has
directed that investments be increased in certain capabilities that have been in consistently inhigh demand and have proven to be key enablers of tactical and operational success. Successful
COIN, stability, and CT operations are necessarily the products of strategies that orchestrate theactivities of military and civilian agencies, as well as those of indigenous governments and partner
states. Enhancements to the capabilities and capacity of the U.S. Armed Forces, then, are being
pursued in the context of continued growth in
the capabilities of other U.S. agencies and in thecontributions of allied and partner governments.
Chief among these enhancements are thefollowing:

Increase the availability of rotary-wing
assets. Vertical lift has been indispensable
to successful counterinsurgency andcounterterrorism operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere. As operationsin the rugged terrain of Afghanistan grow

U.S. Army Spc. Justin Slagle returns to Forward
Operating Base Lane in a UH-60 Black Hawk
helicopter after an air assault mission in the Zabul
province of Afghanistan, Oct. 15, 2009. U.S. Armyphoto by Spc. Tia P. Sokimson.

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in scope and intensity, more rotary-wing lift capacity will be needed to ensure thatcoalition and Afghan forces can be transported and resupplied at remote outposts andeffectively cover their areas of responsibility. Demand for these capabilities will remainhigh in the future as distributed U.S. forces conduct CT, COIN, and foreign internal
defense operations elsewhere. Among other steps, the Army and U.S. Special Operations
Command will add a company of upgraded cargo helicopters (MH-47G) to the Army’s
Special Operations Aviation Regiment. In addition, the general purpose forces will takesteps, including the expansion of pilot training, to make selected vertical lift assets more
readily accessible to forces in forward theaters of operations. The Navy, for example, will
dedicate two helicopter squadrons for direct support to naval special warfare units. For its
part, the Army will reorganize remaining separate Active Component formations to form
an additional (12th) Active Component combat aviation brigade, and will create a 13th
Active Component combat aviation brigade to help meet global demand for these assets.


Expand manned and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) for intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR). Long-dwell UASs, such as the Predator, Reaper, and othersystems, have proven to be invaluable
for monitoring activities in contested
areas,
enhancingsituationalawareness, protecting our forces, andassisting in targeting enemy fighters.
In FY 2010, the Department made acommitment to grow to a capacity of50sustained
orbitsofPredator/Reaper by FY 2011. The
Air Force is on track to achieve thisgoal and will continue to expand the
U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Stephanie Hughes, an MQ-9 Reaper force to 65 orbits by FY 2015. The
unmanned aerial vehicle weapons loader assigned to the 432nd Army is expanding all classes of UASs,
Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, reviews loading procedures
during weapons loading training at Creech Air Force Base, including the accelerated production
Nev., April 22, 2009. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airmanof the Predator-class Extended Range
Larry E. Reid Jr.
Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) UAS. The
Navy is introducing sea-based UASs. And DoD is exploring ways to enhance theeffectiveness of its fleet of ISR aircraft by developing innovative sensor technologies,
support infrastructures, and operating concepts.

Expand intelligence, analysis, and targeting capacity. Forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, andelsewhere have developed new and more effective means for rapidly processing, exploiting,and fusing information from a wide array of sources and disseminating this information to
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operators at the tactical level. We have also learned that information sharing with allied
and partner forces can be critical to success. These approaches have yielded significant
improvements in our ability to understand insurgent and terrorist networks and to target
key elements. The Department is adding trained manpower and critical supporting
systems, including communications architectures, to support these approaches and tomatch planned increases in collection capacity. The added capabilities will support both
special operations forces and general purpose forces and will enhance the effectiveness andprecision of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Improve counter-IED capabilities. The Department will continue to place greatemphasis on defeating the evolving threat of IEDs. Doing so necessitates a multipronged
approach that includes synchronizing counter-IED efforts Department wide, providing
specialized training, attacking the networks that make and deploy IEDs, and defeating
the devices themselves. Airborne electronic warfare (EW) assets in particular have beenin high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan in the fight against IEDs and will be valuable infuture conflict environments as well. In order to increase coverage over these battlefields,
the Air Force will continue tofield
additional
EW
capabilities, which will include
fielding
one
additional
C-130 aircraft outfitted in the
EW configuration; the Navy
will procure additional E/A18Gs; and the Marine Corps
will extend the service lives of
EA-6B EW aircraft. In
addition, many of theenhancements
listedU.S. Air Force crew chief Airman 1st Class Raheem Crockett guides
previously, especially in ISR and a mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle as it’s loaded onto a C-17
intelligence
analysis,
will Globemaster III in Iraq, Dec. 1, 2009. U.S. Air Force photo by
Senior Airman Tony R. Ritter.
contribute to our forces’ ability
to counter IED networks.
Expand and modernize the AC-130 fleet. AC-130 gunships have been invaluable insupporting operations against insurgent and terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These units have therefore been in heavy demand even as a portion of the fleet approached
the end of its service life. Beginning in FY 2012 the Air Force will convert 16 new C-130J
aircraft to the gunship configuration; older model AC-130s will be retired. These changes
will simultaneously modernize the fleet and enlarge it from 25 to a total of 33 aircraft.
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

Increase key enabling assets for SOF. As the Department continues to expand special
operations forces, the QDR recognized the need to invest in enabling capabilities
commensurate with programmed growth. Special operations forces require general
purpose enablers to meet increasing demand for special operations and to maximize theiroperational effectiveness. As noted above, the Department is replacing and modernizing
the gunship inventory to provide close air support and force protection. Additionally, theDepartment is increasing the number of organic combat support and combat service
support assets available to both Army and Naval special operations forces units. Theseassets include logisticians, communications assets, information support specialists, forensic
analysts, and intelligence experts.

Increase COIN, stability operations, and CT competency and capacity in general purpose
forces. Our assessment of security trends points clearly to the conclusion that the future
mix of missions facing U.S. forces will call for greater flexibility and agility to operate
among diverse populations, with a wide range of partners, and in a variety of operating
environments. By FY 2013 the Army will convert a heavy brigade combat team (BCT) to
the Stryker configuration. As resources become available and future global demands
become clearer, the Department may convert several more BCTs. Our assessment of the
future operating environment also suggests that increasing capacity for maritime
operations in coastal and riverine environments will be appropriate. Therefore, beginningin FY 2011, the Navy will add a fourth riverine squadron to its force structure and will
invest in service life extension programs for its coastal patrol craft.



Expand civil affairs capacity. Ineffective governance can create areas that terrorists andinsurgents can exploit. Circumstances are ripe for violent ideologies to spread among a
population when governments struggle to provide basic services, justice and security, or
the conditions for economic
opportunity. Civil affairs
forces address these threats byserving as the vanguard of
DoD’s support toU.S.
government efforts to assist
partner governments in thefields of rule of law, economic
stability, governance, publichealthandwelfare,infrastructure, and public
U.S. Navy Lt. Rasha Hanna, a dental officer from Steubenville, Ohio,
education and information.
interacts with Iraqi children during a Female Civil Affairs Mission to aschool in Abu Tiban, Iraq. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Gunnery Sgt. Because of their linguistic and
Kevin W. Williams.

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cultural skills, civil affairs personnel often serve as liaisons to reduce friction between our
military forces and the civilian population. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan haveplaced high demands on existing civil affairs forces, which were heavily concentrated in
the Reserve Component. The Department has begun to readjust that balance. The FY2010 budget invested in the first active duty civil affairs brigade to support general
purpose forces. The Army will continue to increase civil affairs capacity organic to
USSOCOM. The Department is also exploring ways to better integrate civil affairs
functions with complementary stability operations activities, such as those of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams and Human Terrain Teams deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.


Increase regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recently launched an initiative to develop and deploy a cadre of regionallyaligned experts proficient in COIN doctrine and relevant language skills, and also
culturally attuned to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. These skills are essential to effective
intelligence gathering, engagement, and communication, and hence are central to thesuccess of our overall strategy. Language training is the cornerstone of this program and by
January 2010, several hundred students will have received language instruction in Dariand Pashto. These numbers will continue to grow. To gain maximum value from the
Department's investment in training this cadre of military and civilian personnel,
participants will rotate between U.S.- and theater-based key staff and leadership positions
to provide necessary expertise in support of U.S. operations in the region.

Strengthen key supporting capabilities for strategic communication. As part of the U.S.
government's integrated civilian-military efforts to interact effectively with a variety ofaudiences and stakeholders, DoD will continue to improve key capabilities that support
strategic communication. Effective strategic communication requires close collaboration
across interagency lines at all stages, and DoD works particularly closely with the
Department of State to support State’s core role in communicating with foreign
governments and international publics. Effective strategic communication also requires
the orchestration of multiple lines of operation. Chief among these are policy
implementation, force employment, information operations, public affairs, civil affairs,
and public diplomacy and engagement. Together, the effects of these activities support
national objectives. Strategic communication is essential in COIN, CT, and stability
operations, where population and stakeholder beliefs and perceptions are crucial to our
success, and where adversaries often enjoy the advantage of greater local knowledge andcalibrate their activities to achieve sophisticated information objectives. Elsewhere in thisreport, we have noted a number of current Department initiatives to improve language
and cultural capabilities and to increase educational and training programs that prepare
our people to work in and among foreign populations. We see these efforts as among the25
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important

T H E

investments

F O R C E

insupportofeffective

strategic

The President's forthcoming report to Congress on U.S. government strategic
communication will outline a common vision of interagency collaboration in this area anddefine the Administration’s position on this issue. At DoD, we will examine capabilities
to better access and produce knowledge on complex social communication systems and on
the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of populations and stakeholders. We will also assess
our current understanding of the direct and indirect effects of potential actions and signals
on perceptions, attitudes and beliefs, and we will formulate and deliver timely andculturally attuned messages. Finally, we will ensure that we can shape and coordinate theactivities of our forces in support of our overall strategy.
In addition to bolstering the Armed Forces’ ability to conduct COIN, stability, and CT
operations, these investments will improve capacity for peacekeeping operations. These
investments will also facilitate unconventional warfare operations or conventional military
operations against state or non-state adversaries.

Build the Security Capacity of Partner States
Since the United States assumed the role of a leading security provider after the end of WorldWar II, DoD has worked actively to build the defense capacity of allied and partner states. Doingso has also given the U.S. Armed Forces opportunities to train with and learn from theircounterparts. These efforts further the U.S. objective of securing a peaceful and cooperativeinternational order. Security cooperation activities include bilateral and multilateral training andexercises, foreign military sales (FMS) and financing (FMF), officer exchange programs,
educational opportunities at professional military schools, technical exchanges, and efforts toassist foreign security forces in building competency and capacity. In today’s complex andinterdependent security environment, these dimensions of the U.S. defense strategy have neverbeen more important. U.S. forces, therefore, will continue to treat the building of partners’
security capacity as an increasingly important mission.
Within the range of security cooperation activities, the most dynamic in the coming years will be
security force assistance (SFA) missions: “hands on” efforts, conducted primarily in hostcountries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries’ forces in becoming more proficient at
providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories. In order toensure that improvements in partner security forces are sustained, the Department must seek toenhance the capabilities and capacity of security institutions, such as defense ministries, that
support fielded forces.

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As we place greater emphasis on building the capacity of our partners, our efforts will continue tobe informed by our long-term determination to foster human dignity. This commitment is
manifested in human rights vetting and other controls that shape our efforts to train, equip,
advise, and assist foreign forces and partner security institutions. America’s efforts to build thecapacity of our partners will always be defined by
support for healthy civil-military relations, respect forhuman dignity and the rule of law, promotion ofinternational
humanitarian
law,
and
the
professionalization of partner military forces.
These SFA activities can help enable host-country
participation in coalition stability operations andmultilateral peacekeeping operations that improve
regional security. Working in conjunction with other
U.S. government agencies and allied military forces tostrengthen the security institutions of partner nations
will be a crucial part of U.S. and allied efforts to
defeat terrorist groups around the world.
Terrorist groups seek to evade security forces byCapt. Commander Laurentiu Chirita, left, with
exploiting ungoverned and undergoverned areas as safe the Romanian Ministry of Defense, receives abriefing from U.S. Air Force Lt. Col.
havens from which to recruit, indoctrinate, and train preflight
Scott Bridgers, the safety officer of the 169thfighters, as well as to plan attacks on U.S. and allied Fighter Wing, South Carolina Air National
Guard, before an orientation flight at theinterests. Where appropriate, U.S. forces will work McEntire Joint National Guard Base (JNGB),
with the military forces of partner nations to S.C. Aug. 18, 2008. U.S. Air Force photo by
Senior Master Sgt. Edward E. Snyder
strengthen their capacity for internal security, and will
coordinate those activities with those of other U.S. government agencies as they work tostrengthen civilian capacities, thus denying terrorists and insurgents safe havens. For reasons ofpolitical legitimacy as well as sheer economic necessity, there is no substitute for professional,
motivated local security forces protecting populations threatened by insurgents and terrorists intheir midst.
U.S. forces have been training, advising, and assisting Afghan and Iraqi security forces so thatthey can more effectively uphold the rule of law and control and defend their territories against
violent non-state actors. In these contested environments, partnered COIN, in which Afghan
and Iraqi units operate in tandem with U.S. forces, is an effective way to train and advise forces
while conducting combat operations against insurgents. These partnered host-nation units havethe advantage of knowing the terrain, language, and local culture. Partnering with U.S. forces in
return allows them to train and learn by doing.

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Efforts that use smaller numbers of U.S. forces and emphasize host-nation leadership are
generally preferable to large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns. By emphasizing host-nation
leadership and employing modest numbers of U.S. forces, the United States can sometimes
obviate the need for larger-scale counterinsurgency campaigns. For example, since 2002 U.S.
forces have trained and advised elements of the Philippine armed forces working to secure areasof the southern Philippines that had been a haven for the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization andother terrorist elements. Over the past eight years, U.S. forces and their Philippine counterparts
have trained together and worked to understand the organization and modus operandi of theadversary. As their equipment and skills have improved, Philippine forces have patrolled more
widely and more frequently, bringing security to previously contested areas.
This model is being applied elsewhere to good effect. U.S. forces are working in the Horn ofAfrica, the Sahel, Colombia, and elsewhere to provide training, equipment, and advice to their
host-country counterparts on how to better seek out and dismantle terrorist and insurgent
networks while providing security to populations that have been intimidated by violent elementsin their midst. For example, over the past ten years, U.S. advisors have helped Colombia toenhance its land, air, and maritime capabilities and improve the professionalism of its security
forces. The results of these efforts, when combined with U.S. economic and governanceassistance, have included the demobilization of some 50,000 members of illegal armed groups
and a dramatic reduction in terrorist incidents since 2002. Around the world, the United States
Coast Guard also deploys international training teams to partner nations, providing technicaltraining and consulting services in maritime law enforcement, marine safety and environmental
protection, small boat operations and maintenance, search and rescue, port security, andinfrastructure development.
Many governments facing active or latent threats from violent extremist groups would welcome
tailored advisory assistance from the United States. As U.S. forces draw down in Iraq and makeprogress toward building stability in Afghanistan, more capacity will be available for training,
advising, and assisting foreign security forces in other parts of the globe. In some countries, theUnited States will provide this training directly. In others, it will facilitate cooperation among
regional partners and international organizations. Although special operations forces will be able
to meet some of this demand, especially in politically sensitive situations, U.S. general purpose
forces will need to be engaged in these efforts as well. The deploying units will require specialized
training and preparation for these operations.
Key QDR initiatives to support this mission area include the following:Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force
assistance. All four Services provide specialized training to individuals and groups
deploying abroad to train and advise the security forces of partner nations. In anticipation

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of the growing role of security force assistance in U.S. defense strategy and operations, theArmy, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps will add more than 500 personnel to theirtrain-the-trainer units for general purpose forces. The Air Force will also expand its
regionally oriented contingency response groups (CRGs). The intention is for these units
to steadily grow to the point at which their staffs can sustain specialized expertise inregions and countries of greatest importance and regularly detach experts to accompany
units deploying to training missions abroad. In addition, the Air Force will field lightmobility and light attack aircraft in general purpose force units in order to increase theirability to work effectively with a wider range of partner air forces. Finally, the investments
in airborne ISR and in green and brown water maritime capacity described above will also
contribute to U.S. capacity for security force assistance missions.


Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability. Operating in partnership with hostnation security forces and among local populations puts a premium on foreign language
skills and regional and cultural knowledge. Today’s operating environment demands amuch greater degree of language and regional expertise requiring years, not weeks, oftraining and education, as well as a greater understanding of the factors that drive socialchange. For these reasons, the Department is investing $33 million in expanded language
training centers to fund ten language training detachments to support general purpose
forces in ongoing operations. The Department is also adding $14 million for language,
regional expertise, and culture training for special operations forces. Beginning in FY
2011, the Defense Language
Institute Foreign Language Center
will increase the capacity of its
Foreign Language Immersion
Program. The Department willcontinue to adapt existing language
programs and policies, and,through such programs as theMinerva Initiative, to develop theintellectual capital necessary tomeet the challenges of operating inachanging
andcomplex U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. Patrick Kelly (left), with India
Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, uses anenvironment. The Department will interpreter to speak with Afghan men during a patrol throughalso continue to refine its processes the village of Sahtut, Afghanistan, on Dec. 25, 2009. DoD
photo by Lance Cpl. Chad J. Pulliam, U.S. Marine Corps.
forgenerating
requirements,
managing existing resources, providing strategic direction and setting priorities, andresourcing language and regional expertise needs. As forces draw down from Iraq and,later, Afghanistan, the Military Departments will regionally align some portion of their
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general purpose forces, including those conducting security force assistance, to takeadvantage of investments in foreign language training and regional knowledge.
Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces. Today, theDepartment meets only half of the current demand for training partner aviation forces. In
order to address this persistent shortfall, starting in FY 2012, DoD will double its current
capacity to provide such training. This enhancement will include the purchase of light,
fixed-wing aircraft to enable the Air Force’s 6th Special Operations Squadron to engage
partner nations for whose air forces such aircraft might be appropriate. Also in FY 2012,
two non-U.S. helicopters will be acquired to support the unit’s activities. Providing
training to partner aviation forces is an area that QDR analysis suggests will continue togrow. Toward that end, the Department will also seek authorities and resources to enable
the Army to sustain and expand its ability to train partner forces to operate and maintainhelicopters used by partner states.

Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training. As noted above, the Department
recognizes that in order to ensure that enhancements developed among security forces are
sustained, the supporting institutions in partner nations must also function effectively.
This ministerial training mission is being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan today by
military officers, contractors, and members of the Department’s Civilian Expeditionary
Workforce (CEW). In FY 2010, the Department launched two formal programs, theDefense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) and the Ministry of Defense Advisor(MODA) program, to strengthen U.S. defense reform efforts in key countries andimprove the preparation of DoD civilian advisors for such missions. The Department
anticipates that the CEW, DIRI, and MODA programs will continue to develop andexpand in support of both whole-of-government approaches and broad U.S. government
objectives in reforming the security sector.



Create mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel. SFA missions inrecent years have repeatedly encountered delays in transferring critical end items topartner state forces that were ready to employ them. The Department is exploring options
for expediting the acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to partner forces.



Strengthen capacities for training regional and international security organizations. The
Department will improve its capacity for enabling the United Nations and othermultinational peacekeeping efforts, from the training and equipping of soldiers and police
in their home countries to their deployment/employment and sustainment as
peacekeepers. In addition to undertaking bilateral activities designed to boost contributing
nation capacity, the Department will work to enhance the capacity of United Nations andregional organizations’ peacekeeping field operations.
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Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments
U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostilenation-states. This capability is fundamental to the nation’s ability to protect its interests and toprovide security in key regions. Anti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the ability to
project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be
conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant U.S. capabilities to project power, theintegrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S.
security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.
In the future, U.S. forces conducting power projection operations abroad will face myriad
challenges. States with the means to do so are acquiring a wide range of sophisticated weaponsand supporting capabilities that, in combination, can support anti-access strategies aimed at
impeding the deployment of U.S. forces to the theater and blunting the operations of thoseforces that do deploy forward.
North Korea and Iran, as part of their defiance of international norms, are actively testing andfielding new ballistic missile systems. Many of these systems are more accurate and have greater
ranges than the Scud-class missiles used by Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. As the inventories andcapabilities of such systems continue to grow, U.S. forces deployed forward will no longer enjoy
the relative sanctuary that they have had in conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Air bases,
ports of debarkation, logistics hubs, command centers, and other assets essential to high-tempo
military operations could be at risk.
As part of its long-term, comprehensive military modernization, China is developing and fielding
large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines
equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic
warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-spacesystems. China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of
its military modernization programs, raising a number of legitimate questions regarding its longterm intentions.
U.S. power projection forces also confront growing threats in other domains. In recent years, anumber of states have acquired sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles, quiet submarines, advanced
mines, and other systems that threaten naval operations. In addition to these weapons, Iran has
fielded large numbers of small, fast attack craft designed to support “swarming” tactics that seek
to overwhelm the layers of defenses deployed by U.S. and other nations’ naval vessels.
U.S. air forces in future conflicts will encounter integrated air defenses of far greater
sophistication and lethality than those fielded by adversaries of the 1990s. Proliferation ofmodern surface-to-air missile systems by Russia and others will pose growing challenges for U.S.

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military operations worldwide. Several states have the capability to disrupt or destroy satellites
that provide surveillance, communications, positioning, and other functions important tomilitary operations. And non-state actors such as Hezbollah have acquired unmanned aerial
vehicles and man-portable air defense systems from Iran.
Because of their extreme lethality and long-term
effects, nuclear weapons are a source of special
concern, both for the United States and for its allies
and partners in regions where adversary states possess
or seek such weapons. If regional adversaries succeed
in fielding even small arsenals of nuclear weapons,
the security dynamics of key regions could be severelycomplicated. Even as we strive to prevent
The Missile Defense Agency is examining the utility proliferation, we must take steps to hedge against itsof airborne infrared sensors mounted on unmanned
possibility. Accordingly, DoD will continue toaerial vehicles to detect and track ballistic missiles.
enhance U.S. capabilities for deterring and preventing
the use of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In addition, the United States, its allies,
and its partners will undertake consultations on policies and postures to prevent proliferation andcredibly deter aggression.
DoD is taking steps to ensure that future U.S. forces remain capable of protecting the nation andits allies in the face of this dynamic threat environment. In addition to ongoing modernization
efforts, this QDR has directed the following further enhancements to U.S. forces andcapabilities:3
Develop a joint air-sea battle concept. The Air Force and Navy together are developing a
new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military
operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial
capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities
across all operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to counter growing
challenges to U.S. freedom of action. As it matures, the concept will also help guide thedevelopment of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations.



Expand future long-range strike capabilities. Enhanced long-range strike capabilities are
one means of countering growing threats to forward-deployed forces and bases andensuring U.S. power projection capabilities. Building on insights developed during the
QDR, the Secretary of Defense has ordered a follow-on study to determine what

3

The Nuclear, Space, and Ballistic Missile Defense reviews have developed additional initiatives to enhancecapabilities relevant to meeting these challenges. Those initiatives are described in these respective reports.
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combination of joint persistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack
capabilities, including both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapons, will best support
U.S. power projection operations over the next two to three decades. Findings from thatstudy will inform decisions that shape the FY 2012-17 defense program. A number ofrelated efforts are underway. The Navy is investigating options for expanding the capacityof future Virginia-class attack submarines for long-range strike. It is also slated to conduct
field experiments with prototype versions of a naval unmanned combat aerial system(N-UCAS). The N-UCAS offers the potential to greatly increase the range of ISR andstrike operations from the Navy’s carrier fleet. The Air Force is reviewing options forfielding survivable, long-range surveillance and strike aircraft as part of a comprehensive,
phased plan to modernize the bomber force. The Navy and the Air Force are cooperatively
assessing alternatives for a new joint cruise missile. The Department also plans toexperiment with conventional prompt global strike prototypes.


Exploit advantages in subsurface operations. The Navy is increasing funding for thedevelopment of an unmanned underwater vehicle that will be capable of a wide range oftasks.



Increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure. In key regions,
U.S. forces will need to have access to networks of bases and supporting infrastructuresthat are more resilient than today’s in the face of attacks by a variety of means. The
Department is studying options to increase the resiliency of bases in selected theaters andwill consult with allies and fund these as promising initiatives are identified throughanalysis. Appropriate steps will vary by region but will generally involve combinations ofmeasures, including hardening key facilities against attack, redundancy and dispersal
concepts, counterintelligence, and active defenses, complemented by long-range platforms
for ISR and strike operations.



Assure access to space and the use of space assets. The Department, through theimplementation of priorities from the Space Posture Review, will explore opportunities toleverage growing international and commercial expertise to enhance U.S. capabilities andreduce the vulnerability of space systems and their supporting ground infrastructure. The
Department will broaden and deepen relationships with other nations and private firms tocreate mutually beneficial partnerships to share capabilities, systems, technology, andpersonnel, while ensuring that we also protect sensitive sources and methods. Working
both bilaterally and multilaterally, the Department will promote spaceflight safety. Air
Force investments in space situational awareness will support U.S. efforts by enhancing
the ability to attribute actions in space and gain greater understanding of events in space.
Ongoing implementation of the 2008 Space Protection Strategy will reduce vulnerabilities

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of space systems, and fielding capabilities for rapid augmentation and reconstitution of
space capabilities will enhance the overall resiliency of space architectures.
Enhance the robustness of key C4ISR capabilities. In concert with improving thesurvivability of space systems and infrastructure, U.S. forces will require more robust andcapable airborne and surface-based systems to provide critical wartime support functions.
In particular, airborne ISR assets must be made more survivable in order to support
operations in heavily defended airspace. The Department is also exploring options for
expanding jam-resistant satellite communications and for augmenting these links withlong-endurance aerial vehicles that can serve as airborne communications relay platforms.



Defeat enemy sensor and engagement systems. In order to counter the spread of advanced
surveillance, air defense, and strike systems, the Department has directed increased
investments in selected capabilities for electronic attack.

Enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad. In consultation withallies, the Department is examining options for deploying and sustaining selected forces inregions facing new challenges. For example, selectively homeporting additional naval
forces forward could be a cost-effective means to strengthen deterrence and expand
opportunities for maritime security cooperation with partner navies. The Department willconduct regional and global reviews of U.S. defense posture to identify key posturepriorities that require consultation with allies and constituents.

Prevent Proliferation and Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological capabilities among state andnon-state actors can threaten our ability to defend U.S. and allied interests, promote peace andsecurity, ensure regional stability, and protect our citizens. Further, the use of a nuclear weapon
or a biological attack would have global ramifications. Preventing the proliferation and use ofsuch weapons is therefore a top national priority for which many federal agencies have important
responsibilities. As the ability to create and employ weapons of mass destruction spreads globally,so must our combined efforts to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of these weapons.
Deterrence of such threats and defense against them can be enhanced through measures aimed atbetter understanding potential threats, securing and reducing dangerous materials wherever
possible, monitoring and tracking lethal agents and materials and their means of delivery, and,
where relevant, defeating the agents themselves.

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For these reasons, the Department
will expand capabilities to counter
WMD
threats,
strengtheninterdiction operations, refocus
intelligencerequirements,
enhance and extend international
partnerships
tothwartproliferation,andsupportcooperative threat reduction
efforts,
such
as
the
Administration’s
newinternational initiative to secure
all vulnerable nuclear material Members of a joint U.S. and Australian navy boarding team conduct a
security sweep aboard USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO 193), Oct. 29,
worldwide. In addition, to deter 2009, during a boarding exercise in the South China Sea as part of theadversaries considering the use of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise Deep Sabre II. DoD photoby Communication Spc. 2nd Class Seth Clarke, U.S. Navy.
chemical or biological weapons, theDepartment will enhance efforts to develop countermeasures, defenses, and mitigation strategies.
Further, the Department must prepare to contain WMD threats emanating from fragile states
and ungoverned spaces. Success in this area will hinge on the ability to prevent and respond to
global WMD crises, such as situations in which responsible state control of nuclear, chemical, or
biological materials is not guaranteed. Faced with such emergencies, the Department will require
the ability to locate and secure WMD and WMD-related components, as well as interdict themon land, on sea, or in the air.
Geographic containment of areas of concern will be necessary to ensure that WMD and relatedmaterials do not fall into the hands of hostile actors—a concept of operations that will involve
U.S. forces, interagency capabilities, and the cooperation of regional powers and coalition forces.
Effectively responding to WMD-armed threats will require an integrated, layered defense
network in multiple geographic environments. This could include areas inside the state ofconcern, along the state’s borders, in global transshipment lanes, in the approaches to the UnitedStates, and in the United States itself. Such an integrated, layered defense is essential topreventing an attack before it occurs, as well as responding to an attack should prevention fail. In
addition, these preparations can help deny state and non-state adversaries the benefits they seek
through actual or threatened use of WMD by raising the costs and risks of such an attack.
Through the QDR, the Secretary of Defense has directed that the following initiatives be
undertaken:

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Establish a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters. In order to better plan,
train, and execute WMD-elimination operations, the Department is establishing astanding Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters with increased nuclear disablement,
exploitation, intelligence, and coordination capabilities.



Research countermeasures and defenses to non-traditional agents. The globalization of theworld’s chemical industry, coupled with scientific breakthroughs, increases the possibilityof non-traditional chemical agents being used against U.S. and allied forces. The
Department, with interagency partners, is increasing the resources for research anddevelopment of technologies to meet and defeat these emerging threats.

Enhance nuclear forensics. Improving our ability to attribute nuclear threats to theirsource can help deter aggressors from considering the use of nuclear weapons, as well as
deter state and non-state actors that may provide direct or indirect support of nuclear
terrorism and prevent follow-on attacks through more rapid identification andapprehension of an attacker. Research is underway to identify new means by which we canarrive more quickly at reliable technical nuclear forensic assessments. Improving the ability
to determine the source of material used in a nuclear attack will strengthen deterrence.
Additional resources will enhance DoD’s air and ground sample collection mission as well
as augmenting current laboratory assessment capabilities. In this regard, the Department is
examining new platforms for conducting nuclear/radiological air and ground sampling.



Secure vulnerable nuclear materials. Preventing a radiological or nuclear attack by aterrorist organization begins by ensuring the security of all weapons-usable material at thesource and promoting stringent nuclear security practices for both civilian and defense
facilities across the globe. In support of the President’s Global Lockdown Initiative, DoD
is working with interagency partners to identify countries that could benefit from site
upgrades, security training facilities, and the disposition of weapons-grade materials.

Expand the biological threat reduction program. Countries that have the infrastructure
and capability to report and track the spread of an outbreak of disease are able to savemore lives. Detecting, diagnosing, and determining the origin of a pathogen will enable
U.S. authorities to better respond to future disease outbreaks and identify whether they
are natural or man-made. Accordingly, we are expanding the biological threat reduction
program to countries outside the former Soviet Union in order to create a global network
for surveillance and response.



Develop new verification technologies. In order to support a robust arms control,
nonproliferation, and counterproliferation agenda, new technologies for verification andmonitoring will be necessary to ensure full compliance from all parties. DoD is developing

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new initiatives to build the specialized technological solutions needed to support these
efforts.

Operate Effectively in Cyberspace
Our assessments of conflict scenarios involving state adversaries pointed to the need for improved
capabilities to counter threats in cyberspace—a global domain within the information
environment that encompasses the interdependent networks of information technology
infrastructures, including the Internet and telecommunication networks. Although it is a manmade domain, cyberspace is now as relevant a domain for DoD activities as the naturally
occurring domains of land, sea, air, and space.4 There is no exaggerating our dependence on
DoD’s information networks for command and control of our forces, the intelligence andlogistics on which they depend, and the weapons technologies we develop and field. In the 21st
century, modern armed forces simply cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without
resilient, reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace.
It is therefore not surprising that DoD’s information networks have become targets foradversaries who seek to blunt U.S. military operations. Indeed, these networks are infiltrated
daily by a myriad of sources, ranging from small groups of individuals to some of the largest
countries in the world. For example, criminals may try to access DoD’s healthcare systems inorder to obtain personal information to perpetrate identity theft. Terrorists may seek to disrupt
military networks and systems to cause chaos and economic damage. Foreign intelligence or
military services may attempt to alter data in DoD databases to hinder our military’s ability tooperate effectively. DoD must actively defend its networks.
This is no small task. DoD currently operates more than 15,000 different computer networks
across 4,000 military installations around the world. On any given day, there are as many asseven million DoD computers and telecommunications tools in use in 88 countries using
thousands of warfighting and support applications. The number of potential vulnerabilities,
therefore, is staggering. Moreover, the speed of cyber attacks and the anonymity of cyberspace
greatly favor the offense. This advantage is growing as hacker tools become cheaper and easier to
employ by adversaries whose skills are growing in sophistication.
We must therefore be constantly vigilant and prepared to react nearly instantaneously if we are toeffectively limit the damage that the most sophisticated types of attacks can inflict. In thisenvironment, the need to develop strategies, policies, authorities, and capabilities for DoD tomanage and defend its information networks is manifest.

4

The man-made nature of cyberspace distinguishes it from other domains in which the U.S. armed forces
operate. The Administration will continue to explore the implications of cyberspace’s unique attributes forpolicies regarding operations within it.
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DoD is taking a number of steps to strengthen its capabilities in the cyberspace:

Develop a comprehensive approach to DoD operations in cyberspace. A Department-wide
comprehensive approach will help build an environment in which cyber security and theability to operate effectively in cyberspace are viewed as priorities for DoD. Strategies andpolicies to improve cyber defense in depth, resiliency of networks, and surety of data andcommunication will allow DoD to continue to have confidence in its cyberspace
operations. A central component of this approach is cultural and organizational: The
Department will adapt and improve operational planning, its networks, its organizational
structures, and its relationships with interagency, industry, and international partners.
New operational concepts, such as dynamic network defense operations, could enhance
effectiveness by enabling more rapid actions and more comprehensive actions to protect
DoD’s networks.



Develop greater cyberspace expertise and awareness. The Department will redouble its
efforts to imbue its personnel with a greater appreciation for the threats and vulnerabilities
in the cyber domain and to give them the skills to counter those threats and reduce thosevulnerabilities at the user and system administrator levels. DoD can no longer afford tohave users think of its information technologies and networks as simply the benign
infrastructure that facilitates their work. Users and managers must be held accountable for
ensuring network security and for implementing best practices. DoD is also growing its
cadre of cyber experts to protect and defend its information networks and is investing inand developing the latest technologies to enable our forces to operate in cyberspace undera wide range of conditions, including in contested and degraded environments.

Centralize command of cyberspace operations. In an effort to organize and standardize
cyber practices and operations more effectively, the Department is standing up U.S. Cyber
Command (USCYBERCOM), a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command,
to lead, integrate and better coordinate the day-to-day defense, protection, and operationof DoD networks. USCYBERCOM will direct the operation and defense of DoD’s
information networks, and will prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum
cyberspace military operations. An operational USCYBERCOM will also play a leadingrole in helping to integrate cyber operations into operational and contingency planning.
In addition, DoD is training cyber experts, equipped with the latest technologies, toprotect and defend its information networks. Essential to the success of this new approach
will be the capabilities and growth of the Service components that are stood up to support
USCYBERCOM.



Enhance partnerships with other agencies and governments. Freedom of operation incyberspace is important and DoD must have the capabilities to defend its own networks.
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However, the interdependence of cyberspace means DoD networks are heavily dependent
on commercial infrastructure. Just as it does in conducting many of our missions, DoD
needs to collaborate with other U.S. departments and agencies and international partners
both to support their efforts and to ensure our ability to operate in cyberspace. Thismutual assistance includes information sharing, support for law enforcement, defense
support to civil authorities, and homeland defense. In particular, DoD will strengthen its
cooperation with DHS, which leads the national effort to protect federal information
systems.

Guiding the Evolution of the ForceIn combination and over time, the QDR initiatives described above will significantly enhance theability of U.S. forces to protect and advance U.S. interests in both the near-and longer-term
future. In addition to better preparing our own forces for the future, these initiatives will improve
the Department’s ability to build the capability and capacity of partners. Changes directed underthe QDR can be broadly characterized by the following trends:


U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus
on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, andcounterterrorist operations alone and inconcert with partners.



U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to becapable of robust forward presence andpower projection operations, even as they
add capabilities and capacity for working
with a wide range of partner navies. The
rapid growth in sea- and land-based ballistic
missile defense capabilities will help meetthe needs of combatant commanders andallies in several regions.



U.S. air forces will become more survivable
as large numbers of fifth-generation fighters The F-35 Lightning II will provide the Air Force,join the force. Land-based and carrier-based Navy, USMC, and U.S. allies and partners withhighly-advanced, multirole, fifth generation
aircraft will need greater average range, capabilities. Photo courtesy of the Joint Strike Fighter
flexibility and multimission versatility in Program.
order to deter and defeat adversaries that are fielding more potent anti-access capabilities.
We will also enhance our air forces’ contributions to security force assistance operations by
fielding within our broader inventory aircraft that are well-suited to training and advisingpartner air forces.
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The United States will continue to increase the capacity of its special operations forces andwill enhance their capabilities through the growth of organic enablers and key support
assets in the general purpose forces.



The capabilities, flexibility, and robustness of U.S. forces across the board will be
improved by fielding more and better enabling systems, including ISR, electronic attack,communications networks, more resilient base infrastructure, and enhanced cyberdefenses.

Our assessment of ongoing and potential future military operations identified a significant
number of possible shortfalls in the capabilities or capacity of programmed U.S. forces. In somecases, opportunities exist to remedy these shortfalls by investing in new systems or additional
force structure. In other cases, no readily available solutions are at hand but greater investments
in research and development or concept exploration are warranted. Of course, many of theseenhancements will be costly. Some of the tradeoffs that DoD’s leaders have identified to enable
the rebalancing of U.S. military capabilities are described below. More such tradeoffs could benecessary in the future.
Early in the QDR and in the course of the process of completing DoD’s budget submission for
FY 2010, the Secretary took action to direct resources away from lower-priority programs andactivities so that more pressing needs could be addressed, both within that budget and in theyears that follow it. Those decisions included ending production of the F-22 fighter,
restructuring the procurement of the DDG-1000 destroyer and the Army’s Future Combat
Systems programs, deferring production of new maritime prepositioning ships, and stretchingout the procurement of a new class of aircraft carrier. The Air Force is substantially reducing its
fleet of older fourth-generation fighter aircraft.
In addition to these steps, DoD is proposing in its budget submission for FY 2011 to conclude
production of the C-17 airlift aircraft, having completed the planned procurement of thoseaircraft. DoD has also decided to delay the command ship replacement (LCC) program and toextend the life of existing command ships, cancel the CG(X) cruiser, and terminate the Net
Enabled Command and Control program. Those actions, among others, have enabled theDepartment to redirect resources into the high-priority areas outlined above.
Where it has not been possible to set in motion initiatives to meet certain future operational
needs, the Secretary has identified vectors for the evolution of the force, calling on DoD
components to devote sustained efforts toward developing new concepts and capabilities toaddress those needs. Assessments of future operating environments will continue, with an eye
toward refining our understanding of future needs. At the same time, the Department willcontinue to look assiduously for savings in underperforming programs and activities, divestiture,40
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technology substitution, less-pressing mission and program areas, and other accounts so that
more resources can be devoted to filling these gaps.
In some capability areas, meeting emerging challenges will call for the development of wholly
new concepts of operation. Confronting sophisticated anti-access challenges and threats posed by
nuclear-armed regional adversaries will pose particularly difficult problems. In recognition of the
dynamism of the threat environment and advances in unmanned technologies, the Department
will be examining future operational needs in several capability areas, including ISR, fighters andlong-range strike aircraft, joint forcible entry, and information networks and communications.
Assessments of programmed forces in these areas will center on iterative, interactive war games, inwhich force planners, operators, and technical experts can explore alternative strategies andoperational concepts in an environment that tests forces against an intelligent, adaptive adversary.
Insights gained from these efforts will inform future investments in research and development
and, over time, will help decision makers to further rebalance future forces.

Sizing and Shaping the Force
The considerations outlined above relate to the capabilities that U.S. forces will need in order toaccomplish their missions now and in the future. Force planning also requires that decisions be
made about the aggregate capacity of the force: that is, how many operations should the force beable to accomplish simultaneously if called upon, and what types of operations could benecessary? This force-sizing and force-shaping construct is a key part of defense strategy thatprovides a yardstick by which to gauge the sufficiency of current and future forces. It is informedby the needs of the nation, assessments of threats and challenges that could confront the UnitedStates and its allies, the operational and force management requirements of the force, and a senseof the overall level of resources that may be available and appropriate for the defense of thenation and its interests. It is derived from the defense objectives articulated earlier in this report:

Prevail in today’s wars;

Prevent and deter conflict;Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and

Preserve and enhance the force.

Given the current and projected security environment, our Armed Forces must, in aggregate, becapable of conducting a broad range of several overlapping operations to prevent and deter
conflict and, if necessary, to defend the United States, its allies and partners, selected criticalinfrastructure, and other national interests. This includes the potential requirement to conductmultiple concurrent operations, including large-scale combat operations, in disparate theaters.
Any lesser capability would present the risk that the nation might be unable to defend important
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interests while its forces were undertaking a single large-scale operation. Such a possibility would
increase the risk of aggression by other potential adversaries.
Largely for this reason, past defense reviews have called for the nation’s armed forces to be able tofight and win two major regional conflicts in overlapping time frames. These have beencharacterized as conflicts against state adversaries, typically employing conventional militaryforces. This QDR likewise assumes the need for a robust force capable of protecting U.S.
interests against a multiplicity of threats, including two capable nation-state aggressors. It breaks
from the past, however, in its insistence that the U.S. Armed Forces must be capable ofconducting a wide range of operations, from homeland defense and defense support to civil
authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions, to the conflicts we are in and the wars wemay someday face.
In short, U.S. forces today and in the years to come can be plausibly challenged by a range of
threats that extend far beyond the familiar “major regional conflicts” that have dominated U.S.
planning since the end of the Cold War. We have learned through painful experience that thewars we fight are seldom the wars that we would have planned. For instance, in Iraq and
Afghanistan, two theaters in which we are engaged simultaneously, we have seen that achieving
operational military victory can be only the first step toward achieving our strategic objectives.
Because America’s adversaries have been adopting a wide range of strategies and capabilities thatcan be brought to bear against the United States and its forces, allies, and interests, it is no longer
appropriate to speak of “major regional conflicts” as the sole or even the primary template forsizing, shaping, and evaluating U.S. forces. Rather, U.S. forces must be prepared to conduct awide variety of missions under a range of different circumstances. Ensuring flexibility of thewhole force does not require each part of the force to do everything equally well. Not all
challenges pose the same degree of threat to national interests, rely on U.S. military capabilities
equally, or have the same chance of occurrence. Operations may also vary in duration andintensity for maritime, air, ground, space, and cyber forces. The QDR thus employed several
scenario combinations to represent the range of likely and/or significant challenges anticipated in
the future and tested its force capacity against them.
Combinations of scenarios assessed in the QDR included the following:

A major stabilization operation, deterring and defeating a highly capable regional
aggressor, and extending support to civil authorities in response to a catastrophic event in
the United States. This scenario combination particularly stressed the force’s ability to
defeat a sophisticated adversary and support domestic response.

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Deterring and defeating two regional aggressors while maintaining a heightened alert
posture for U.S. forces in and around the United States. This scenario combination
particularly stressed the force’s combined arms capacity.

A major stabilization operation, a long-duration deterrence operation in a separate theater,a medium-sized counterinsurgency mission, and extended support to civil authorities in
the United States. This scenario combination particularly stressed elements of the force
most heavily tasked for counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.

QDR force analysis also tested the force’s ability to sustain robust levels of engagement overseas
through forward stationing and routine rotational deployments. Successfully achieving any of thecore missions of the U.S. Armed Forces requires strong security relationships with a host of allies
and partners—relationships best enabled and maintained through both a long-term presence
abroad and sustained, focused interactions between U.S. and partner forces.
In all of the scenario sets it tested, the Department assumed ongoing U.S. military engagement inpresence and deterrence missions. The Department’s force planning assumes that over timeforces can be redirected from most prevent-and-deter activities in order to meet more pressing
operational needs.
The types of contingencies that U.S. forces will actually be called upon to conduct in the future
will certainly extend beyond the range of these examples. Reality is always less clear-cut and lesspredictable than our planning paradigms. For this reason, DoD’s force planning stresses theimportance of fielding forces that are versatile and that, in aggregate, can undertake missions
across the full range of plausible challenges.
Force-Sizing Construct
Based on its assessment of the ability of U.S. forces to meet the types of demands outlined above,
the Department developed a force-sizing construct to guide components in their resource
allocation decisions. Whereas QDRs have often emphasized shaping the force beyond the fiveyear time frame, this QDR, of necessity, had to focus intensively on present conflicts as well as
potential future needs. Our force-sizing construct therefore takes into account the realities of thecurrent operational environment. In order to shape the force of the future, however, theconstruct also establishes sizing criteria for the midterm (5–7 years) and long term (7–20 years).
To ensure a tight coupling of strategic ends to means, the QDR force-sizing construct is definedaccording to the priority objectives of the defense strategy.
Prevail
For the near- and midterm future, substantial numbers of U.S. forces will likely be operating in
Afghanistan and U.S. forces in Iraq will continue a responsible drawdown in accordance withthat nation’s wishes and as Iraqi forces take on greater roles for providing security. These efforts
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will substantially determine the size and shape of major elements of U.S. military forces forseveral years.
Even following the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq and the transition to greater Afghan
leadership in providing security, there will continue to be enduring operational requirements in
Afghanistan and elsewhere to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies. Nevertheless, we anticipate that lessof the force will be dedicated to these missions. Our force planning thus assumes greater force
availability for the remaining three priority objectives in the midterm to long term.
Prevent and Deter
While U.S. forces are heavily engaged in prevail efforts, the Department’s prevent-and-deter
activities will be focused on ensuring a defense in depth of the United States, preventing the
emergence or reemergence of transnational terrorist threats, including Al Qaeda; and deterringother potential major adversaries.
As our forces transition into a period of less-intensive sustained operations, the Department’s
force planning assumes an ability to undertake a broadened and deeper range of prevent-anddeter missions, acting wherever possible as part of a whole-of-government approach and inconcert with allies and partners. The Department’s efforts to deter threats to U.S. territory indepth and prevent the growth or reemergence of transnational terrorist movements will continue
and may grow in some areas. Our planning assumes even greater force availability for efforts todeter other would-be aggressors through forward presence and sustained operations to build
partnership capacity.
PrepareEven as it works to prevail in current
overseas operations, our force planningrequires the U.S. military to prepare
for significant new challenges. This
includes defending the United Statesand supporting civil authorities in theevent of an emergency. It also includes
the requirement to deter potential
challengers in times of crisis and, if
necessary, defeat their threats to U.S.
and allied interests.

U.S. Navy Engineman 2nd Class Kpaku Palay prepares for
deployment to critical coastal and inshore areas of Iraq and Kuwait
with a simulated escort of a high value asset transiting San Diego
Bay, Nov. 7, 2008. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Spc.
1st Class R. Jason Brunson.

In the midterm to long term, U.S. military forces must plan and prepare to prevail in a broad
range of operations that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping timeframes. Such
operations include supporting civil authorities in response to a catastrophic event in the United
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States, deterring and defeating state and non-state aggressors, and conducting large-scale stability
operations. Operations over the past eight years have stressed the ground forces
disproportionately, but the future operational landscape could also portend significant longduration air and maritime campaigns for which the U.S. military must be prepared. The QDR
scenario combinations described earlier in this section provide insight into the potential number
and size of overlapping operations for which U.S. military forces must plan to prepare.
Preserve and Enhance
The Department must always be vigilant in its management of the All-Volunteer Force. U.S.
forces are second to none, and the health and vitality of the force is especially critical in light ofthe stresses being generated by today’s missions. The Department will be prepared to manage therisks of significant new military missions that may arise during this time, which may require
shifts in current operations or further mobilization of the Reserve Component.
Even as the United States transitions its role in Iraq and, later, Afghanistan, the Department’s
force planning assumes a taxing operational environment. Our preserve-and-enhance efforts will
focus on transitioning to sustainable rotation rates that protect the force’s long-term health. The
Department plans that in times of significant crisis, U.S. forces will be prepared to experiencehigher deployment rates and lower dwell times for up to several years at a time and/or mobilize
the Reserve Component. This will typically be the case if the United States is engaged for long
periods in more than one large operation, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Department
will also expand its Civilian Expeditionary Workforce to augment the military effort as required.

Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure, FY 2011 – 15
Taking into account the demands of a dynamic and complex security environment, therequirements of U.S. defense strategy, the need for enhancements to key capabilities across a wide
range of missions, and the need for forces with sufficient aggregate capacity to meet the criteria
laid out above, DoD has determined that U.S. forces, for the duration of the FY 2011–15 Future
Years Defense Program, will conform to the general parameters outlined below. Where ranges offorce elements are provided, these reflect variations in force levels that are planned across the
FYDP. Our judgment with regard to the overall capacity of the force reflects in part the heavy
demands being placed on portions of the force by ongoing operations. As those demands evolve,
so too might the appropriate size and mix of forces. In addition, in assessing the force’s shape andsize, the Department made prudent assumptions regarding the likely contribution both ofAmerican civilian agencies and of key allies and partners to current and future operations.

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Department of the Army:
4 Corps headquarters
18 Division headquarters
73 total brigade combat teams (BCTs) (45 Active Component [AC] and 28 Reserve
Component [RC]), consisting of:
40 infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs)
8 Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs)
25 heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs)
21 combat aviation brigades (CABs) (13 AC and 8 RC)
15 Patriot battalions; 7 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries
Department of the Navy:
10 – 11 aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings
84 – 88 large surface combatants, including 21 – 32 ballistic missile defense-capable combatantsand Aegis Ashore
14 – 28 small surface combatants (+14 mine countermeasure ships)
29 – 31 amphibious warfare ships
53 – 55 attack submarines and 4 guided missile submarines
126 – 171 land-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare(EW) aircraft (manned and unmanned)
3 maritime prepositioning squadrons
30 – 33 combat logistics force ships (+1 Mobile Landing Platform [MLP])
17 – 25 command and support vessels (including Joint High Speed Vessels, 3 T-AKE Class dry
cargo/ammunition ships, 1 mobile landing platform)
51 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels
3 Marine expeditionary forces
4 Marine divisions (3 AC and 1 RC)
11 infantry regiments
4 artillery regiments
4 Marine aircraft wings (6 fixed-wing groups, 7 rotary-wing groups, 4 control groups,
4 support groups)
4 Marine logistics groups (9 combat logistics regiments)
7 Marine expeditionary unit command elements
Department of the Air Force:
8 ISR wing-equivalents (with up to 380 primary mission aircraft)
30 – 32 airlift and aerial refueling wing-equivalents (with 33 primary mission aircraft per wingequivalent)

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10 – 11 theater strike wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent)
5 long-range strike (bomber) wings (with up to 96 primary mission aircraft)
6 air superiority wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent)
3 command and control wings and 5 fully operational air and space operations centers (with a
total of 27 primary mission aircraft)
10 space and cyberspace wings
Special Operations Forces:
Approximately 660 special operations teams (includes Army Special Forces Operational
Detachment-Alpha[ODA] teams, Navy Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] platoons, Marine special
operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams, and operational aviation detachments [OADs])
3 Ranger battalions
165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft
The formations and platform types shown here generally encompass only the major combat
elements of each of the military departments. Nuclear forces, which will be detailed in the reportof the Nuclear Posture Review, are not shown here. Neither are most of the noncombat and“enabler” elements that play such crucial roles in supporting effective operations in complex
environments. Selected mobility resources, including sealift, prepositioning, and airlift assets, arelisted above. The capacity of these force elements was tested and validated in the Department’s
Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016.
The absence from this section of some elements of the force is in no way a reflection of theirrelative importance. As noted at the beginning of this section of the report, supporting andenabling capabilities are vital to effective operations and they will be resourced accordingly. But
the purpose of listing the building blocks shown above is to provide a summary portrayal of themain force elements around which the rest of the force is built.
The Department will continue to strive to ensure a proper balance between the overall size of
U.S. combat forces, the capabilities and capacity of key support elements and enablers, andinvestments in sustained and new capabilities that will be needed by forces called on to carry out
future missions. As noted above, in this dynamic security environment U.S. forces must continue
to adapt. America’s Armed Forces have a long history of devising creative solutions to newchallenges and this spirit of innovation will be essential as we further evolve and rebalance theforce in the years to come.

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Quadrennial Defense Review ReportTAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE
America’s men and women in uniform constitute the Department’s most important resource.
Prevailing in today’s wars while working to prevent future conflict depends on the Department’s
ability to create and sustain an all-volunteer force that is trained and resourced to succeed in thewide range of missions we ask them to execute. Years of war have imposed considerable strain on
the force. Multiple long deployments are taking a serious toll on our people and their families,
and the Department remains focused on their health and welfare. As part of this focus, the QDR
has elevated the need to preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force and included this priority
in our force planning and our strategy deliberations. From the care of our wounded warriors, tofamily support, to the recruiting and retention of personnel, we must tend to the health of the
All-Volunteer Force, for it constitutes the foundation of our national defense.

Wounded Warrior Care
Apart from working to prevail in
ongoing conflicts, caring for our
wounded warriors is our highest
priority, and we will strive to provide
them the top-quality physical andpsychological care that befits theirservice and sacrifice. Providing worldclass care and management, benefit
delivery, and standardization of services
among the Military Departments andfederal agencies continues to be the U.S. Army Sgt. Saul Martinez intercepts a passed ball during an
focus of the Department’s most senior intramural wheelchair basketball game between soldiers from the
Army Warrior Transition Unit and Marines from the Marine
leadership. Our wounded, ill, or injured Wounded Warrior Battalion–West detachment at Naval Medical
servicemembers
deserveevery Center San Diego in California on Jan. 14, 2009. DoD photo by
Petty Officer 3rd Class Jake Berenguer, U.S. Navy.
opportunity to return to active duty
following their recovery, or to make a seamless transition to veteran status if they cannot be
returned to active duty. The Department is working to improve the treatment of our wounded
warriors in many ways, which include:Improving health benefits for military members and their families by increasing funding
in FY 2011 to provide more than 1000 additional personnel for Wounded Warrior
Support, continuing the implementation of a military health system enterprise-wide

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approach to prioritizing requirements for modernizing treatment facilities, and increasing
overall health care funding by 9 percent from FY 2010.


Establishing Centers of Excellence for the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of military
eye injuries, including those related to traumatic brain injury, hearing loss and auditory
system injuries, and traumatic extremity injuries and amputations.



Increasing funding and attention to wounded warrior initiatives across the Military
Departments, including the Army’s $530 million investment in the construction of six
Wounded Warrior Complexes and twenty Soldier Family Assistance Centers, as well as
the Marine Corps’ Wounded Warrior Regimental Headquarters and Wounded Warrior
Battalions; increasing the number of Air Force Recovery Care Coordinators; andexpanding the Navy’s Safe Harbor program, which reviews, evaluates, and provides arange of assessment, support, and treatment programs to Active and Reserve Sailors andtheir families.



Establishing a single Disability Evaluation System that creates a simpler, faster, and moreconsistent process for determining whether wounded, ill, or injured service members may
continue their military service or should transition to veteran status.



Broadening the scope of information sharing between the Departments of Defense andVeterans Affairs, to support stronger continuity of care and benefits delivery for military
members. Within five years, the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record will enhance theavailability of administrative and health information to DoD, VA, and third-party healthproviders, better ensuring seamless health care through active service and beyond.

Creating innovative policies, processes, and programs aimed at ensuring continuity inmental health care and counseling services for military personnel as they transition fromone duty station to another, or transition from military to veteran care.

Working with the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department will place
200 Public Health Service mental health professionals in the military health system.

Managing the Deployment Tempo
Ensuring time at home station between deployments and honoring our commitment to releaseservice members at the end of their service obligations remain among the most tangible
demonstrations of commitment to our service members and their families. Years of conflictrequiring long and numerous deployments have imposed significant strain on our uniformed
men and women—physically and psychologically.

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The Department strives to provide service members and their families with greater clarity andpredictability regarding current and planned deployments. Between deployments, we must
everything possible to give our personnel sufficient time to recover.


Our near-term planning objective for the Active Component remains two years at homestation for every one year deployed. Our objective for mobilization of Guard and Reserve
units remains five years demobilized for every one year mobilized. Today’s global demands
will require a number of selected Guard/Reserve units to be remobilized more frequently
than this standard, however. Just as we are asking the active forces to do more in this timeof national need, so we must ask more of the Reserve Component.

The status of U.S. forces in Korea is changing from being forward-deployed to being
forward-stationed with family members. When fully implemented, this change will enable
forces to deploy from Korea, helping to expand the pool of available forces for global
contingencies.

Recruiting and Retention
Our recruiting efforts are longterm investments that can yield
generational gains. After morethan five years of the mostchallenging
recruiting
environment since the 1973
inception of the All-Volunteer
Force, the Department succeeded
in meeting its recruiting andretention objectives in 2009.
Nevertheless, in coming years,
we will face additional challenges Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates shakes the hand of a Marine recruit in
to our ability to attract qualified training at the Edson Firing Range on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton,
Calif., on Jan. 7, 2008. Camp Pendleton is the Corps' largest West Coast
young men and women into the expeditionary training facility, encompassing more than 125,000 acres of
Armed Forces. Among them are a Southern California terrain. DoD photo by Cherie A. Thurlby.
large and growing proportion ofyouth who are ineligible to serve in the military for medical, criminal, ethical, or physical reasons.
We will also be challenged to recruit personnel with specialized skills in such areas foreign
languages, medicine, and computer network operations.
While we continue to employ a mix of programs and incentives to recruit quality personnel, we
are also focused on retaining those with valuable operational experience. Examples of recent
efforts to improve retention include:
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Revising our bonus policies to allow the Military Departments to pursue innovative ways
to retain quality personnel. For example, the Marine Corps helps ensure retention of
combat-experienced Marines through the Selective Reenlistment Bonus program.



Employing more flexible ways for personnel to serve, by implementing programs designed
to better enable transitions from Active and Reserve Component service. For example, theNavy is developing a career intermission pilot program that, when implemented, could
allow an active Sailor to join the Selected Reserve for a period of time before returning toactive duty, providing better options for work-life balance and career flexibility.

Supporting Families
We have a critical and enduring
obligation to better prepare andsupport families during the stress ofmultiple deployments. Robust single
member, spouse, child, and youth
services are no longer desirable
options, but are services essential tomaintain the health of the AllVolunteer Force. Programs such as
quality education for children,
expanded child care, outreach to
U.S. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Jonathan Mackey reunites with his Guard and Reserve members andson during the homecoming of the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake
Champlain in San Diego, Calif., July 30, 2009. U.S. Navy photo by families, accessible family support
Petty Officer 2nd Class Daniel Barker.
assistance, referrals for counseling,financial education and training, pre-teen and teen programs, and access to training certification
opportunities for spouses all provide lifelines of support for service members and their families
stationed around the globe. Examples of our efforts to improve and renew family support
programs include:

Increasing the resources devoted to institutionalizing service member and family support
programs across the Department—a 41 percent increase in FY 2011 from FY 2010.



Replacing or renovating 106 of 192 Department of Defense Educational Activity(DoDEA) schools by 2015.



Normalizing the stationing of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea from unaccompanied
to accompanied tours, which will result in nearly 5,000 service members and families
being forward-stationed on the peninsula. The Department’s long-term goal is to phaseout all unaccompanied tours in Korea.
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Continuing efforts of the Military Departments to improve family and community
support services. For example, the Marine Corps is hiring dedicated civilian family
readiness officers for all active and reserve battalion-level units, and the Army and Navyare implementing new programs to increase family support for reserve personnel.

Building on the authorization contained in the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act,
which allows DoD to compensate military members whose families care for them during
recovery from catastrophic medical conditions. We are assessing the adequacy of thiscompensation and developing recommendations based on the findings.

Keeping Faith with the Reserve Component
Achieving the defense strategy’s objectives requires vibrant National Guard and Reserves that are
seamlessly integrated into the broader All-Volunteer Force. Prevailing in today’s wars requires a
Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity—available, trained, and equippedfor predictable routine deployment. Preventing and deterring conflict will likely necessitate thecontinued use of some elements of the Reserve Component—especially those that possess highdemand skill sets—in an operational capacity well into the future.
Over the past eight years, the National Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated theirreadiness and ability to make sustained contributions to ongoing operations. The challenges
facing the United States today and in the future will require us to employ National Guard andReserve forces as an operational reserve to fulfill requirements for which they are well-suited in
the United States and overseas. For example, the National Guard often serves at the forefront of
DoD operations. The associated incentive structure within the Reserve Component must be used
to create easier access to those capabilities that are routinely in high demand.
At the same time, within this operational reserve, our nation must have a force generation modelthat provides sufficient strategic depth. As the operational environment allows, the Department
will seek ways to rebalance its reliance on the Reserve Component to ensure the long-term
viability of a force that has both strategic and operational capabilities.
Effective use of the Reserve Component also helps preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Forceby increasing its capacity and expanding the range of capabilities it provides. Using the National
Guard and Reserves in this way will lower overall personnel and operating costs, better ensure theright mix and availability of equipment, provide more efficient and effective use of defense assets,
and contribute to the sustainability of both the Active and Reserve Components. Today’s
National Guard and Reserve men and women volunteer knowing that they will periodically serveon active duty. They also serve expecting to be judiciously used, given meaningful work to do,
and provided the right training and equipment to complete the mission. The Department will
work to meet these expectations.
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The Reserve Component has untapped capability and capacity. Over the coming year, theDepartment will conduct a comprehensive review of the future role of the Reserve Component,
including an examination of the balance between active and reserve forces.

Developing Future Military Leaders
The Department will continue towork to ensure that America’s
cadre of commissioned andnoncommissioned officers areprepared for the full range ofcomplex missions that the future
security environment will likely
demand. Too often, a focus on
weapons acquisition programs andoverall force structure crowd out
needed attention concerning how
Thirty-one U.S. military members take the oath of allegiance before
the Military Departments generate,friends and family during a U.S. military naturalization ceremony in thePentagon courtyard, Sept. 10, 2009. DoD photo by First Class Petty train, and sustain their leaders. As
Officer Molly A. Burgess, U.S. Navy.
part of our commitment to ensurethat tomorrow’s leaders are prepared for the difficult missions they will be asked to execute, DoD
will place special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and building partner
capacity skill sets in its professional military education and career development policies. Examplesof DoD efforts in this area include:

Building expertise in foreign language, regional, and cultural skills. We will continue ouremphasis on enhancing these skills in general purpose force officers during pre-accession
training. Given the inherent link between language and cultural expertise and mission
success, this area requires continued focus.



Recognizing joint experience whenever and wherever it occurs in an officer’s career. Until
recently, wartime service in combat zones—where joint and multinational operations arecommon—was not recognized as fulfilling the requirements of joint service for purposesof promotion. Reserve Component officers will also have the opportunity to have theirjoint experiences recognized to earn the same qualifications as their Active Component
counterparts.



Recognizing the critical role that professional military education plays in the developmentof military officers, the Department will work to ensure that all its educational institutions
are resourced and staffed with the right mix of civilian and military experts who can help
prepare the next generation of leaders. Given the continuing need to develop military54
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leaders who can work effectively with a range of civilian counterparts, we will also look to
expand opportunities for military officers to attend civilian graduate institutions.

Developing the Total Defense Workforce
The Department is facing mission
requirements of increasing scope,variety, and complexity. To ensure theavailability of needed talent to meet
future demands, we are conducting adeliberate assessment of current andfuture workforce requirements. Thiseffort will ensure that the Department
has the right workforce size and mix(military/civilian/contractor) with theright competencies. This assessment will
be enterprise-wide, enabling the
Department to better recruit and retain
personnel with the most-needed skills.

Civilians from the Department of Defense's Executive Leadership
Development Program learn how to properly wear the Interceptor
Body Armor with the help of soldiers from 2nd Battalion 9th
Infantry Mar. 25, 2009 at Rodriguez Live Fire Complex. U.S.
Army Photo by Sgt. Scott Kim.

As part of these efforts, the Department is working to better employ the talents of our civilian
personnel to meet today’s challenges. For example, the Secretary of Defense has created the
Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW), which will provide deployable civilian experts to
support efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other contingencies. Specifically, the CEW is designed
to enhance DoD’s ability to work alongside and help build the capacity of partner defense
ministries, in so doing reflecting the importance of civilian oversight. By the end of FY 2011, atleast 90 percent of the deploying CEW personnel will have access to standardized predeployment training. A parallel effort is under way to synchronize civilian and military leadershiptraining, with the goals of ensuring common professional training and education between senior
executive service (SES) and flag officers and increasing joint capability for deployment of SES
personnel. As we continue to implement the CEW, the Department will ensure that those who
participate are given the benefits and support programs required to facilitate their assignments
abroad.
The services provided by contractors will continue to be valued as part of a balanced approachthat properly considers both mission requirements and overall return. In keeping with the
Administration’s goal of reducing the government’s dependence on contractors, the Department
introduced its in-sourcing initiative in the FY 2010 budget. Over the next five years, theDepartment will reduce the number of support service contractors to their pre-2001 level of 26
percent of the workforce (from the current level of 39 percent) and replace them, if needed, with55
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full-time government employees. These efforts will help establish a balanced total workforce ofmilitary, government civilians, and contractor personnel that more appropriately aligns publicand private-sector functions, and results in better value for the taxpayer.

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Quadrennial Defense Review ReportSTRENGTHENING RELATIONSHIPS
Achieving the Department’s strategic objectives requires close collaboration with key
counterparts at home and with allies and partners abroad. Through its foreign defense
relationships, the United States not only helps avert crises but also improves its effectiveness in
responding to them. Moreover, by integrating U.S. defense capabilities with other instruments ofstatecraft—including diplomacy, development, law enforcement, trade, and intelligence—thenation can ensure that the right mix of expertise is at hand to take advantage of emerging
opportunities and to thwart potential threats. The Department will therefore strengthen its
relationships with allies and like-minded partners, develop its supporting global defense posture,and build close and sustained relationships with U.S. government agencies and other criticalactors at home.

Strengthening Key Relationships Abroad
Sustaining existing alliances and creating new partnerships are central elements of U.S. security
strategy. The United States cannot sustain a stable international system alone. In an increasinglyinterdependent world, challenges to common interests are best addressed in concert with likeminded allies and partners who share responsibility for fostering peace and security. America’s
national security and defense strategies depend on strong foreign ties, including a vibrantnetwork of defense alliances and partnerships adapted to this challenging era. Building andsustaining such networks and partnerships will require effective strategic communication. We
will need to improve our ability to understand the concerns, perceptions, and attitudes of foreign
governments and populations, as well as the ways in which our words and actions may affectallies and partners. Thoughtful engagement, communication, and collaboration with allies andpartners who share our interest in fostering peace and security remain essential.
Central to the security of the United States is a strong transatlantic partnership, which isunderpinned by the bilateral relationships between the United States and the governments ofEurope. We will continue to work with this community of like-minded nations, whether byengaging with allies still shaping their democracies after decades of living in the shadow of theSoviet Union, building on the benefits of French reintegration into NATO’s military structure,or addressing new security issues such as those arising in the Arctic region. Our shared history
and interests with the United Kingdom have created a steadfast bond, strengthened in recent
years through operations together in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.
The United States is committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the cornerstone oftransatlantic security since the beginning of the Cold War. NATO is critical to ensuring thesecurity and stability of Europe by addressing a broad range of security issues both inside and57
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outside NATO’s treaty area. We will work to ensure a strong NATO that provides a credible
Article 5 security commitment, deters threats to Alliance security, has access to U.S. capabilities
such as the phased, adaptive approach to European missile defense to address the proliferation ofballistic missiles, and takes on new threats such as cyberspace attacks. The U.S. relationship with
the European Union, together with the NATO-EU relationship, has become even more
important in recent years in projecting the full force of transatlantic power. The need for NATOto develop its own comprehensive civil-military approach, as well as greater cooperation with the
EU and other international organizations, is especially evident in Afghanistan, where every
NATO ally and the EU are contributing to the international effort—including personnel
contributions to the International Security Assistance Force—to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al
Qaeda and eliminate its safe havens.

Nations Contributing Personnel to the International Security Assistance Force
Albania*

Denmark*

Latvia*Romania*

Armenia

Estonia*

Lithuania*

Singapore

Australia

Finland

Luxembourg*

Slovakia*

Austria

France*Macedonia

Slovenia*

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Montenegro

Spain*

Belgium*
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Germany*
Greece*Netherlands*
New ZealandSwedenTurkey*Bulgaria*

Hungary*

Norway*UkraineCanada*Iceland*

Poland*United Kingdom*

Croatia*

Ireland

Portugal*

United States*

Czech Republic*

Italy** NATO Members

The countries of Eurasia are positioned to improve Europe’s energy security, support
international efforts in Afghanistan, and play critical roles in countering transnational threats,
including extremism, weapons proliferation, and illicit trafficking. Yet the region contains
unresolved conflicts that inhibit the ability of many of its countries to counter these threats. The
United States is working with its NATO allies and partners to promote peaceful resolutions to
protracted conflicts and to build our partners’ security capacity, support their defense reform
efforts, and facilitate their integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The United States and Russia share many interests—including countering proliferation andconfronting terrorism. We are working with Moscow to develop a new START Treaty—animportant step in the President’s initiative toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The new
START Treaty will further reduce both nations’ nuclear arsenals while maintaining important

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treaty-monitoring provisions. We will seek out opportunities to work with Moscow on emerging
issues, such as the future of the Arctic and the need for effective missile defense architecturesdesigned to protect the region from external threats. At the same time, the United States willcontinue to engage with Russia’s neighbors as fully independent and sovereign states.
The foundation of our presence in Asia remains our historical treaty alliances. These alliances
have helped maintain peace and stability for more than sixty years, particularly through thecontinued presence of capable U.S. forces in the region, and we remain steadfastly committed tothe security commitments embodied in these agreements. The regional and global security
environments are more complex today, however. Global peacekeeping, stability, andreconstruction operations; nonproliferation activities; missile defense cooperation; and energy
security initiatives are all critical issues for regional defense cooperation. This emerging security
landscape requires a more widely distributed and adaptive U.S. presence in Asia that relies on andbetter leverages the capabilities of our regional allies and partners.
In Northeast Asia, DoD is working
closely with key allies Japan and theRepublic of Korea (ROK) to
implement our agreed-on plans andshared visions to build a comprehensive
alliance of bilateral, regional, and global
scope; realign our force postures;
restructure allied security roles andcapabilities; and strengthen ourcollective deterrent and defense
capabilities. These changes will firmly
U.S. Air Force Maj. Miralba Fernandez-Covas works closely withposition these alliances for the 21st- South
Korean air force officers Maj. Kim Heonjoong and 1st Lt.
century security landscape and ensure Cho Sungmin during Exercise Key Resolve/Foal Eagle, Mar. 17,
2009, at Osan Air Base, South Korea. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff
their enduring strength, readiness, and Sgt. Benjamin Rojek.
resilience for the future. In the PacificRim, we are deepening our partnership with Australia, an alliance that stretches beyond Asia toprovide essential cooperation on a wide range of global security challenges. In Southeast Asia, we
are working to enhance our long-standing alliances with Thailand and the Philippines, deepen
our partnership with Singapore, and develop new strategic relationships with Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Vietnam, to address issues such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and support
to humanitarian assistance operations in the region. The United States is also encouraging thecontinued development of multilateral institutions and other integrated approaches to regional
security affairs.

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China’s growing presence and influence in regional and global economic and security affairs is
one of the most consequential aspects of the evolving strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacificregion and globally. In particular, China’s military has begun to develop new roles, missions, andcapabilities in support of its growing regional and global interests, which could enable it to play amore substantial and constructive role in international affairs. The United States welcomes astrong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater global role. The United States
welcomes the positive benefits that can accrue from greater cooperation. However, lack oftransparency and the nature of China’s military development and decision-making processes raise
legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond. Our
relationship with China must therefore be multidimensional and undergirded by a process ofenhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that reinforces mutual interests. The
United States and China should sustain open channels of communication to discuss
disagreements in order to manage and ultimately reduce the risks of conflict that are inherent inany relationship as broad and complex as that shared by these two nations.
As the economic power, cultural reach, and political influence of India increase, it is assuming amore influential role in global affairs. This growing influence, combined with democratic values
it shares with the United States, an open political system, and a commitment to global stability,
will present many opportunities for cooperation. India’s military capabilities are rapidly
improving through increased defense acquisitions, and they now include long-range maritime
surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, air interdiction, and strategic airlift. India has
already established its worldwide military influence through counterpiracy, peacekeeping,humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief efforts. As its military capabilities grow, India willcontribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
The United States also recognizes that Pakistan is at the geopolitical crossroads of South andCentral Asia, giving it an important regional role in security and stability. Extremism, economic
instability, resource scarcity, and illicit trafficking all imperil Pakistan’s future. A secure, stable
Pakistan is vital to U.S. national security, the region, and the world. For these reasons, theUnited States has committed to a long-term strategic partnership with Pakistan that is built on afoundation of mutual interests and joint efforts. We will work with Pakistan to strengthen its
capacity to combat extremism, and we will provide substantial resources to support Pakistan’s
democracy and development.
The United States has a substantial interest in the stability of the Indian Ocean region as a whole,which will play an ever more important role in the global economy. The Indian Ocean provides
vital sea lines of communication that are essential to global commerce, international energy
security, and regional stability. Ensuring open access to the Indian Ocean will require a more
integrated approach to the region across military and civilian organizations. An assessment that60
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includes U.S. national interests, objectives, and posture implications would provide a useful
guide for future defense planning.
Stability in the Middle East remains critical to U.S. interests. As we strive toward acomprehensive peace in the region between Israel and its neighbors, the closeness of our defense
relationship and cooperation with Israel will continue. Enduring U.S. security cooperation with
Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf States continues to strengthen
partner capabilities to counter extremism and other regional threats, including the proliferationof ballistic missiles. A persistent Al Qaeda threat will necessitate expanded counterterrorism
cooperation with regional partners, including in countering terrorist financing, disseminating
anti-extremist messages, and protecting critical infrastructure. A variety of maritime security
challenges, including piracy, smuggling, and human trafficking, will require greater participationin regional maritime security organizations in order to protect vital sea lines of communication.
We will also continue to work with our Middle East partners to develop a regional architecturethat broadens and improves interoperable air and missile defenses. Finally, as our forces continue
their drawdown from Iraq, the United States remains committed to developing a strategic
partnership that promotes peace and prosperity in Iraq and the region.
The United States will continue working with African partners to help foster stability andprosperity throughout the continent. The need to assist fragile, post-conflict states, such as
Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan, and failed states such as Somalia,
and transnational problems, including extremism, piracy, illegal fishing, and narcotics trafficking,pose significant challenges. America’s efforts will hinge on partnering with African states, otherinternational allies and partners, and regional and subregional security organizations to conductcapacity-building and peacekeeping operations, prevent extremism, and address humanitariancrises.
The United States will continue
to work toward a secure anddemocratic Western Hemisphereby developing regional defense
partnerships
that
address
domesticandtransnational
threats such as narcoterrorist
organizations, illicit trafficking,and social unrest. We willcontinue to work closely with
Mexicotoimproveourcooperative approach to bordersecurity, enhance defense capacity

Canadian soldiers from the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force(SPMAGTF) 24, depart a U.S. Navy landing craft, air cushion and deploy
onto Mayport Beach, Fla., April 25, during Partnership of the Americas(POA) 2009. POA is an annual joint exercise that focuses on enhancing
interoperability between U.S. Marines and partner-nation Marines.
U.S. Marine Corps photo by Chief Warrant Officer Keith A. Stevenson.

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for coordinated operations, and address other issues. The Department will also enhance defense
relationships and continue to work with Canada in the context of regional security, increased
interaction in the Arctic, and combat operations in Afghanistan. The United States remains
committed to building a strong partnership with Brazil—the hemisphere’s second largest
economy and second most populous democracy—on all regional issues and global security
concerns.

The Role of U.S. Defense Posture
The United States is a global power with global responsibilities. Including operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, approximately 400,000 U.S. military personnel are forward-stationed or
rotationally deployed every day around the world to help sustain U.S. capacity for global reachand power projection. There are three key elements to our defense posture: forward-stationed
and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities, and equipment; a supporting overseas network of
infrastructure and facilities; and a series of treaty, access, transit, and status-protection agreements
and arrangements with allies and key partners.
Our experience of operating as part of multinational coalitions in long-duration conflicts has
demonstrated the importance of continually fostering long-term relationships with allies andpartners. For operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our relationships both with those nations
contributing forces and with thoseenabling transit of logisticalsupport have proved vital.
The Department must ensure that
our overseas posture adapts andevolves in ways that respond to—
and anticipate—changes in theinternational security environment.
The persistence of conflict, thediffusion of power around theworld, the proliferation of nuclear
and other weapons technologies,
The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73)
transits the Pacific Ocean while an SH-60B Sea Hawk helicopter and rising complexity in sea, air,assigned to the Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light (HSL) 51
conducts flight operations in the background on Nov. 18, 2009. U.S. space and cyberspace domains pose
Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Charles Oki.
new security challenges that requireinnovative adjustments to our defense posture. Toward this end, we will seek a new architectureof cooperation, one that generates openings for the United States to work together with allies andpartners on shared regional and global security opportunities and challenges.

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Toward a Cooperative and Tailored Posture
In a future marked by continued globalization and enduring transnational threats, the UnitedStates and its allies and partners will face a multiplicity of shared challenges and opportunities.
This dynamic security environment calls for a cooperative and tailored approach to our global
defense posture.
The United States will seek to strengthen or add cooperative measures to address shared regionaland global security concerns where U.S. interests align with those of our allies and partners. Suchan approach recognizes that the United States cannot effectively manage these security challenges
on its own, nor should it attempt to do so.
Viewing defense posture through a cooperative lens, the Department will support developmentof—and capitalize on—the specialization and expertise of allies, partners, and other U.S.
government agencies. The United States will work with our allies and partners to effectively use
limited resources by generating efficiencies and synergies from each other’s portfolios of militarycapabilities, thereby enhancing our collective abilities to solve global security problems. The
presence of U.S. military forces overseas can be a powerful catalyst for promoting multilateralapproaches and regional security architectures that serve both U.S. and partner states’ interests.
Our approach to defense posture begins at home, with significant government collaboration in its
development, articulation, and execution. Global defense posture is a key means ofcommunicating U.S. foreign and security policy and thus must be closely coordinatedthroughout the national security community.
The United States will also apply a regionally tailored approach in determining the posture of its
forces. A tailored defense posture reflects unique regional political and security dynamics bybringing into harmony the right combination of forward-stationed and rotational forces andcapabilities, prepositioned equipment and basing infrastructure, and relationships andagreements. It calibrates the U.S. presence in each region to best support ongoing and future
operations, respond to crises, and prevent and deter threatening activities. It also recognizes thataugmenting our overseas presence is not always the most effective method to achieve our strategic
objectives.
The Department will be guided by the following principles in making future defense posturedecisions.
First, forward-stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant andrequired. The long-term presence of U.S. forces abroad reassures allies and partners of ourcommitment to mutual security relationships, generates enduring trust and goodwill with hostnations, and increases regional and cultural expertise in the force. We cannot simply “surge” trust
and relationships on demand.
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Second, our defense posture will balance the need for a permanent overseas presence that assures
allies and partners of our commitments with the need for a flexible ability to respond tocontingencies, emerging threats, and global security needs in distant theaters.
Third, the United States will balance the need for assured access to support ongoing operations
with the risks of introducing fragility into its lines of communication. For example, generating
and sustaining a defense posture to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan has proved
difficult. To meet this and similar challenges, we will seek innovative ways to add strategic depth
to our posture network and prioritize the development and maintenance of enduring
relationships with trusted partners that serve mutual security interests over the long term.
Fourth, America’s defense posture should provide a stabilizing influence abroad and be welcomedby the host nation. Forward stationing and rotational deployment of U.S. forces are designed tocontribute to regional security and will be enhanced, lessened, or reshaped as necessary toreassure allies and partners and strengthen deterrence. The United States will work closely withallies and partners to maintain an appropriately tailored military presence that serves aconstructive role in maintaining regional security.
Fifth, our defense posture will continuously adapt to changes in the strategic environment.
Deliberate, ongoing assessment of national interests, military requirements and the strategic
environment should guide U.S. global defense posture planning. In the emerging security
environment, the United States will tailor its defense posture to address challenges such as
insurgency and terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear technology and theater ballistic missiles,
anti-access and area-denial capabilities, and the maintenance of secure access to the global
commons.
Regional Posture Perspectives
The United States will emphasize the following priorities in adapting and developing its global
defense posture over the next five years:Reaffirm our commitment to Europe and NATO, including through the development ofEuropean missile defense capabilities;

Work with allies and key partners to ensure a peaceful and secure Asia-Pacific region;

Balance ongoing operations, crisis response, and prevent-and-deter activities in thedevelopment of a strategic defense posture in the broader Middle East, Africa, and Central
and South Asia; andSupport partnership capacity-building efforts in key regions and states.

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EuropeThe security of Europe has been
central to American national
interests for much of the past
century. The American defense
posture in Europe has changed
significantly since the end of theCold War as legacy forces and basing
structures transformed into a lighter,more flexible, and more deployable
forward posture. Maintaining arobust U.S. military presence in Several military participants in this year’s Combined Endeavor are
recognized during the closing ceremony at Willem Lodewijk Van
Europe serves to deter the political Nassaukazerne, Zoutkamp, the Netherlands, Sept. 17, 2009. U.S. Air
intimidation of allies and partners; Force photo by Staff Sgt. Joshua L. DeMotts.
promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea regions; demonstrate U.S.
commitment to NATO allies; builds trust and goodwill among host nations; and facilitate
multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests both inside and outside thecontinent.
Working with allies and partners, the United States will therefore ensure a European defense
posture network that advances U.S. interests and communicates its commitment to the securityof NATO allies. Pending the review of NATO’s Strategic Concept and an accompanying U.S.
assessment of our European defense posture network, the United States will retain four brigade
combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters forward-stationed on the continent. The UnitedStates will also begin the deployment of a revised U.S. missile defense architecture in Europe andan enhanced forward-deployed naval presence in the region to support this initiative and enable
increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security.
The Pacific
The United States has been a Pacific power for more than a century. The vast distances of the
Pacific and the low density of U.S. basing and infrastructure there place a premium on forwardstationed and forward-deployed U.S. forces. We seek to sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacificalliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace andsecurity in the region, while also promoting contributions by our allies and partners to global
security. Toward this end, we will augment and adapt our forward presence, which reassures
allies of the U.S. commitment to their security. At the same time, we will encourage our allies
and partners to enhance their roles in security and in regular multilateral security cooperation
within the region to build trust, increase transparency, and reduce the risks of crisis or conflict.

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R E L A T I O N S H I P SSpecifically, the United States will
work with allies and partners tocontinue to adapt its defense
presence as necessary to maintainregional stability and assure allies of
their security, including throughtheprovisionofextended
deterrence to Japan and theRepublic of Korea. We willaugment regional deterrence and
The Seawolf-class attack submarine USS Connecticut (SSN 22) is under
way in the Pacific Ocean on Nov. 17, 2009, with an HH-60H Sea
Hawk helicopter from the Chargers of Helicopter Anti-Submarine
Squadron (HS) 14. In the background are the aircraft carrier USS George
Washington (CVN 73) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forcehelicopter destroyer JS Hyuga (DDH 181). U.S. Navy photo by Mass
Communication Spc. 1st Class John M. Hageman.

rapid response capabilities and seek
opportunities to build the capacityof our Asian partners to respond
more effectively to contingencies,
including humanitarian crises andnatural disasters.

With Japan, we will continue to implement the bilateral Realignment Roadmap agreement thatwill ensure a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam, the westernmost
sovereign territory of the United States, into a hub for security activities in the region.
The United States will develop a more adaptive and flexible U.S. and combined force posture on
the Korean Peninsula to strengthen the alliance’s deterrent and defense capabilities and long-term
capacity for regional and global defense cooperation. Doing so includes continuing to advancethe ROK’s lead role in the combined defense of its territory, together with the transition of
wartime operational control to the ROK military in 2012.
We intend to improve the resiliency of U.S. forces and facilities in the region in order tosafeguard and secure U.S., allied, and partner assets and interests in response to emerging antiaccess and area-denial capabilities. In addition, we will explore opportunities for a more forwarddeployed presence that supports increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security andenhanced capabilities for assured access to the sea, air, space, and cyberspace. For instance, theSecurity Framework Agreement and cooperative basing with Singapore are essential tosupporting U.S. forces deployed in Asia.
Finally, the United States seeks to develop additional opportunities for joint and combined
training in the Western Pacific that respond to the need for constant readiness of U.S. forces tocarry out joint operations, particularly in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, andmaritime security; the scarcity of available land and facilities in the Pacific; and the potential for66
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leveraging U.S. engagement with allied and partner militaries to build multilateral security
relationships and operational capacity among the countries of the region.
The Greater Middle East
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 have significantly increased the U.S. presence inthe greater Middle East as well as in Central and South Asia. The urgency of these operations
caused the Department to prioritize changes in defense posture needed for near-term operational
capability. It is time to renew focus on a strategic architecture that better serves U.S., allied, andpartner interests through the medium to long term. An emphasis on long-term relationships andshared interests with allies andpartners will clarify our extended
commitment to the region’s
security, enhance the resiliency ofour defense posture, and improve
our collective ability to carry out
current operations while preparing
for contingency response.
The United States will therefore
manage a responsible force
drawdown in Iraq and support an Members of the Ninawa Provincial Reconstruction Team meet with theorderly transition to a more normal staff of the Qayara Medical Clinic in Qayara, Iraq, on Dec. 1, 2009.
DoD photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Rufus Hucks, U.S. Navy.
diplomatic and civilian presence.
We will also maintain the current level of access and develop alternatives in support of operationsin Afghanistan while expanding access elsewhere in the region to prepare for contingency
requirements, steps that will include reducing the vulnerability of our infrastructure.
Furthermore, we will ensure that our near-term investments in infrastructure and capabilities tosupport ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are consistent with long-term goals for theregion.
Working with allies and partners, the United States will reshape its defense posture to assure
partners of a credible, long-term commitment to mutual security relationships and to deter
regional actors from aggression while balancing that requirement against the regional sensitivity
to a large, long-term U.S. force presence. We will also support a regional security architecture
focused on strengthening defense capabilities and posture networks and on advancing regional
stability and security.

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AfricaIn Africa, the United States will continue to maintain a limited rotational military presence tohelp build partner security capacity, including for peacekeeping operations; generate regional
security cooperation opportunities; and foster the development of constructive African civilmilitary relations. All such efforts to build partner capacity will pay special attention to the
dynamics associated with civilmilitary relations in hostcountries and will emphasize theprinciples of civilian control andrespect for dignity, rule of law,andprofessionalism.
The
expanse of Africa and the light
U.S. footprint there highlight theimportance
of
en
route
infrastructure to support defense
activities in theater.
Staff Sgt. Andre Amantine of 2nd Battalion, 18th Field Artillery Regiment,out of Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, salutes Sgt. 1st Class Cary Adams during a
15-week counterterrorism course, June 16, 2009, at Camp Kasenyi, Uganda.
More than 100 Ugandan soldiers graduated from this course. DoD photo by
Master Sgt. Loren Bonser, U.S. Air Force.

The United States will work withallies and partners to enhance a
defense posture that supports
contingency
responsebyimproving our relationships and access agreements with African allies and partners, improving
preexisting African-owned infrastructure, and exploring innovative opportunities for logisticalcollaboration with African militaries. We also strive to share facilities and cooperate more closelywith European allies in our efforts to help African states build capacity and to prepare forcontingency response.
The Western Hemisphere
Our defense objectives within the Western Hemisphere do not require a robust forward presence.
We will retain a limited presence while seeking to improve relationships with regional states andmilitaries in pursuit of common hemispheric security goals. Our defense posture in the Western
Hemisphere will support interagency capabilities to address critical issues including control ofillicit trafficking, detection and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, border and coastal
security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In North America, the United States will
maintain the defense posture required for mission assurance, consequence management, support
for civil authorities, strategic dispersal, and homeland defense.

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To mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack,accident, or natural disaster, the U.S.
Navy will homeport an East Coast carrierin Mayport, Florida. We also seek todevelop new cooperative partnerships andbolster current partnerships with key
nations in the hemisphere, particularly inthe maritime domain, and encourage
closer partnerships in undertaking
multilateral security initiatives.

Strengthening Interagency
Partnerships

U.S. Army Spc. Brent Nailor passes out humanitarian aid meals
to women and children in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Jan. 16, 2010.
DoD photo by Fred W. Baker III.

Just as maintaining America’s enduring defense alliances and relationships abroad is a central
facet of statecraft, so too is the need to continue improving the Department of Defense’s
cooperation with other U.S. departments and agencies. Years of war have proven how important
it is for America’s civilian agencies to possess the resources and authorities needed to operate
alongside the U.S. Armed Forces during complex contingencies at home and abroad. As our
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, sustainable outcomes require civilian
development and governance experts who can help build local civilian capacity. Although the
U.S. military can and should have the expertise and capacity to conduct these activities, civilian
leadership of humanitarian assistance, development, and governance is essential. The Department
will retain capabilities designed to support civilian authorities as needed.
A strong and adequately resourced cadre of civilians organized and trained to operate alongside orin lieu of U.S. military personnel during a variety of possible contingencies is an importantinvestment for the nation’s security. This is an urgent requirement for ongoing operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and will remain an enduring need in the future security environment—both toprevent crises and to respond to them.
America’s civilian instruments of statecraft were allowed to atrophy in the post–Cold War era,and the lack of adequate civilian capacity has made prevailing in current conflicts significantly
more challenging. Unfortunately, despite a growing awareness of the need and real efforts
throughout the government to address it, adequate civilian capacity will take time and resources
to develop and is unlikely to materialize in the near term. The Department will therefore
continue to work with the leadership of civilian agencies to support the agencies’ growth andtheir operations in the field, so that the appropriate military and civilian resources are put forth
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lessons learned from examples such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan andIraq, and work toward improving a whole-of-government approach.
Just as the U.S. military is not the most appropriate institution to lead capacity-building efforts
to enhance civilian institutions overseas, so the Department of Defense should likewise act insupport of civil authorities here at home. The Department of Defense supports the Departmentof Homeland Security, and other federal civilian agencies, as part of a whole-of-government,
whole-of-nation approach to both domestic security and domestic incident response. It isessential that DoD improve its capabilities for contributing to civilian-led activities andoperations, supporting “unity of effort” in homeland security. The Department continues towork closely with its interagency partners, in particular the Department of Homeland Security,
to build capacity vertically from the federal level down to the local level, and horizontally acrossthe federal government. DoD also values its engagement with stakeholders in the private sector,
with nonprofit organizations, and with other elements of the public.
As part of this effort to build capacity at the national level, the Department seeks to develop a
more comprehensive approach to assessing its own preparedness capabilities and to contribute to
the development of domestic capabilities across the interagency. Developing an integrated
strategy for DoD preparedness would better align ongoing DoD efforts with broader initiatives
by interagency partners now under way.
While national consequence
management
plans
and
capabilities
have
been
significantly improved in recent
years, plans and policies focusedon preventing imminent events
inside the United States are lesswell developed. On a daily basis,federal,state,
andlocal
authorities are together engaged
in a wide range of ongoingprevention activities, and theseregular interactions are very
effective. It is less clear how thesedifferent organizations will andshould interact if there are strong and credible indications of an imminent attack about whichlittle is known. The Department of Defense plans to work closely with its interagency partners tobetter understand the challenges associated with preventing future attacks, including clarifying
U.S. Airmen assigned to the 304th Rescue Squadron, Portland Air
National Guard Base, Ore., talk wearing gas masks before entering an area
to recover simulated injured civilians during an exercise simulating thedetonation of a "dirty bomb" near Portland. U.S. Air Force photo by SeniorAirman John Hughel.

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federal roles and responsibilities as well as identifying what additional technical capabilities may
be needed, particularly in the areas of wide-area search, interdiction, and attribution of attacks.
Finally, the Department of Defense will continue to advocate for an improved interagency
strategic planning process that makes optimal use of all national instruments of statecraft. The
complexity of 21st century conflicts demands that the U.S. government significantly improve
interagency comprehensive assessments, analysis, planning, and execution for whole-ofgovernment operations, including systems to monitor and evaluate those operations in order toadvance U.S. national interests. One solution is to allocate additional resources across thegovernment and fully implement the National Security Professional (NSP) program to improvecross-agency training, education, and professional experience opportunities. This will help foster
a common approach to strategic and operational planning and implementation, improving
prospects for success in future contingencies.

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REFORMING HOW WE DO BUSINESSA centerpiece of this defense strategy is its focus on reforming how the Department operates.
Our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the projections of a complex future environment
demand more agile, innovative, and streamlined processes and institutions. As past
administrations have learned, successful reform in these areas is difficult, and ongoing efforts areat different stages of maturity. The Department’s persistence in these areas over the next several
years will be critical to prevent reversion to old ways of doing business—approaches that inhibit
our forces in the field. The QDR focused on four specific issues where reform is imperative:
security assistance, defense acquisition, the defense industrial base, and energy security andclimate change.

Reforming Security Assistance
U.S. security is inextricably tied tothe effectiveness of our efforts to
help partners and allies build theirown security capacity. The value ofprograms to build partner capacity
extends well beyond conflicts such
as Afghanistan and Iraq—indeed, as
outlined earlier in the report,
conducting such efforts before
conflicts become serious can help
mitigate them or even prevent themin the first place. Despite an U.S. Army Capt. Michael Harrison and Pakistani army Capt. Fahad
discuss continued cooperation and information sharing along the Nawa
increased emphasis on the capacity- Pass, a border separating Afghanistan's Kunar province and Pakistan's
building mission over the past few Federally Administered Tribal Areas. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Matthew
C. Moeller.
years, America’s efforts remain
constrained by a complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, unwieldy
processes, and a limited ability to sustain such undertakings beyond a short period.
Although security assistance is not new, what has fundamentally changed is the role that suchassistance can play in providing security in today’s environment. Threats to our security in thedecades to come are more likely to emanate from state weakness than from state strength. The
future strategic landscape will increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous gray area that isneither fully war nor fully peace. In such an environment, enabling our partners to respond tosecurity challenges may reduce risk to U.S. forces and extends security to areas we cannot reachalone.
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In part because our security assistance architecture was designed to support long-term
relationships to help resist a Cold War adversary, processes for making decisions and getting
resources to the field can take months or—more often—years. As a result, there has been
constant pressure to develop special legislative and procedural workarounds. We have anenduring need to build future coalitions and help partners address their own indigenous
challenges, and we need the right tools positioned beforehand rather than having to respondfrom scratch to each contingency or systemic failure. We have historically underinvested in thesecapabilities; now is the time to build on lessons learned and institutionalize them to better
position the United States for a complex future.
Many of our authorities and structures assume a neat divide between defense, diplomacy, anddevelopment that simply does not exist. For example, well-trained security forces are of limited
utility, or indeed can even be counterproductive, without the institutional systems and processes
to sustain them or the governance and regulatory frameworks to hold them accountable tocivilian oversight and the rule of law. We have gained a new appreciation of the security sector—
which includes the defense and criminal justice sectors, government management and oversightbodies, and civil society—as a system of systems that demands interagency partnerships.
Developing the security sector requires comprehensive, whole-of-government programs andactivities, but the current patchwork of authorities incentivizes piecemeal, stovepiped approaches.
Solving this problem will require the recognition within our government that security is a shared
responsibility and that our programs and processes must reflect that reality.
Many adjustments to improve security sector assistance have been limited in scope, duration, andresources. As a result, the combatant commanders lack sufficient tools to support their theater
campaign plans and their assigned mission to build partner capacity. These missions may require
DoD to play a lead or supporting role, in coordination with relevant U.S. civilian agencies, andmay range from the wholesale reconstitution of security forces within a major stability operation,
to fulfilling urgent train-and-equip requirements for a partner confronting serious security
challenges, to supporting civilian agencies in the rebuilding of a state’s capacity to deliver
essential services to vulnerable populations and provide access to justice.
The United States has developed some important tools to meet many of its most pressing needs,
and is taking steps to lay the groundwork for additional reforms. In 2009, the Administration
worked with Congress to create the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund and extend Section 1206
“Global Train-and-Equip” authority to support coalition operations—facilitating increased
contributions to Afghanistan. The Department is also pursuing efforts to build the ministerial
capacity of partners in order to sustain their operational investments.
Equally significant, the Administration has in the past year initiated a comprehensive review of
security sector assistance, overseen by the National Security Council. This review will identify

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and elevate security assistance issues for senior leadership, and it will examine related roles,
missions, authorities, and resources.
The Department of Defense continues to make key internal adjustments as well. The Defense
Security Cooperation Agency has launched a global review of security cooperation manning toensure that our manpower reflects requirements. The Department is taking steps to improve theprocess of implementing foreign military sales to make the requirements, definition, andprocurement processes more efficient. The Military Departments have made strides toward
improving doctrine, education, and training for U.S. service personnel engaged in these activities.
But we can and must do more. The Department is also exploring how to make changes to ourpersonnel, organizations, and processes to develop and track qualified personnel for capacitybuilding activities, and develop critical enablers such as language, regional, and cultural skills. We
are also reviewing our organizations and processes, identifying the capabilities necessary to
improve how requirements are defined and to determine the balance of such capabilities required
both at the combatant commands and in supporting DoD organizations.
The Department will continue to work with its interagency partners and with Congress indeveloping new and innovative approaches to reforming security sector assistance. Somewarfighter needs are urgent, and meeting them should proceed alongside broader reform efforts.
Of particular importance are the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, the Iraq Security
Forces Fund, and the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, whose continued funding is critical tosuccess in Iraq and Afghanistan. To enhance flexibility, the Department’s Global Train-andEquip authority has now been extended to coalition activities. Further, to avoid procurement andcontracting delays, the Department will take steps to establish a Defense Coalition Acquisition
Fund, which would allow the U.S. government to maintain an inventory of items commonly
needed by partners. The Department will also seek authority to expedite support services for theprovision of training and equipment—accelerating and improving the delivery of equipment topartners—when it is in our national security interest to do so.
Preventing conflict, stabilizing crises, and building security sector capacity are essential elementsof America’s national security approach. Success in convincing partners to pursue shared national
security objectives, often at great political and physical risks, ultimately depends on proving that
the United States is a reliable partner. We must recognize that security sector assistance is a
resource-intensive mission that requires focused, efficient, and predictable funding as well as
adequate authorities to provide the right assistance at the right time to the right people.

Reforming How We Buy
Another pressing institutional challenge facing the Department is acquisitions—broadly
speaking, how we acquire goods and services and manage the taxpayers’ money. Today, the75
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Department’s obligation to defend and advance America’s national interests by, in part,
exercising prudent financial stewardship continues to be encumbered by a small set of expensive
weapons programs with unrealistic requirements, cost and schedule overruns, and unacceptableperformance.
Over several decades and across multiple administrations, the Pentagon’s acquisition system hasdeveloped four major problems that hamper our ability to acquire critical platforms andcapabilities in a timely manner and at acceptable cost.
First, the requirements for new systems are too often set at the far limit of current technologicalboundaries. Such ambition can sometimes help produce breakthrough developments that cansignificantly extend America’s technological edge. But far too often the result is disappointing
initial performance followed by chronic cost and schedule overruns. The Department and thenation can no longer afford the quixotic pursuit of high-tech perfection that incurs unacceptable
cost and risk. Nor can the Department afford to chase requirements that shift or continue toincrease throughout a program’s life cycle.
Second, the Pentagon’s acquisition workforce has been allowed to atrophy, exacerbating a decline
in the critical skills necessary for effective oversight. For example, over the past ten years, theDepartment’s contractual obligations have nearly tripled while our acquisition workforce fell by
more than 10 percent. The Department also has great difficulty hiring qualified senioracquisition officials. Over the past eight years the Department has operated with vacancies in key
acquisition positions averaging from 13 percent in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force.
There remains an urgent need for technically trained personnel—cost estimators, systems
engineers, and acquisition managers—to conduct effective oversight.
Third, our system of defining requirements and developing capability too often encourages
reliance on overly optimistic cost estimates. In order for the Pentagon to produce weaponssystems efficiently, it is critical to have budget stability—but it is impossible to attain suchstability in DoD’s modernization budgets if we continue to underestimate the cost of such
systems from the start. We must demand cost, schedule, and performance realism in ouracquisition process, and hold industry and ourselves accountable. We must also ensure that only
essential systems are procured, particularly in a resource-constrained environment. There are too
many programs under way. We cannot afford everything we might desire; therefore, in the
future, the Department must balance capability portfolios to better align with budget constraints
and operational needs, based on priorities assigned to warfighter capabilities.
Fourth, effective and efficient delivery of logistical support to our men and women in the field isan enduring priority and an area where continued improvements must be made. DoD is working
to improve the integration of joint logistics to provide operational commanders with theflexibility and sustainability required to better support unity of effort within the joint force and76
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between multinational, interagency,
and nongovernmental elements.
Wartime innovations in logistics
rules, tools, and processes havehelped support high levels of longterm deployments, and hasenhanced operational freedom ofaction.
The
combatantcommanders
andmilitary
departments
areintegrating
operational contract support (OCS)
into the adaptive planning process Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates meets with plant workers during aand institutionalizing common tour of an aircraft production facility in Fort Worth, Tex., on Aug. 31,
2009. DoD photo by Cherie Cullen.
operational contracting approaches
to provide more responsive support for current operations and pre-planned, rapidly deployable
contracted support for future contingencies. U.S. Transportation Command is spearheading
efforts to improve distribution service levels across the full spectrum of operations in order bothto improve end-to-end supply chain velocity and to reduce supply chain costs, ultimately
providing better support for our people in harm’s way.
To help in overcoming these challenges and to institutionalize ongoing innovations, President
Obama signed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) into law on May 22,
2009. The goal of this important new statute is to improve acquisition outcomes in the
Department, with specific emphasis on major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) and major
automated information systems (MAISs). In signing the act, the President stated that thelegislation is designed to “limit cost overruns before they spiral out of control. It will strengthen
oversight and accountability by appointing officials who will be charged with closely monitoring
the weapons systems that we’re purchasing to ensure that costs are controlled.” The law also will
substantially improve the oversight of major weapons acquisition programs, while helping to put
MDAPs on a sound footing from the outset by addressing program shortcomings in the earlyphases of the acquisition process. To achieve these goals and to improve how we acquire and fieldcritical capabilities for today’s wars and tomorrow’s challenges, the Department is undertaking a
far-reaching set of reforms.
Developing our people: To operate effectively, the acquisition system must be supported by anappropriately sized cadre of acquisition professionals with the right skills and training tosuccessfully perform their jobs. To address personnel deficiencies, we will increase the number ofacquisition personnel by 20,000 positions by 2015. We will continue to significantly enhance

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training and retention programs in order to bolster the capability and size of the acquisition
workforce.
Ensuring integrity in the acquisition process: Since early decisions and estimates greatly influencea program’s eventual success or failure, the Department is focusing on strengthening the front
end of the acquisition process. We will ensure that all major programs are subjected to an earlyand clear definition of approved requirements based on a rigorous assessment of alternatives. To
reduce technical risk, we will conduct a comprehensive design review, including independent
reviews, to certify that the technologies involved are sufficiently mature before any program canprogress to the costly final phase—engineering and manufacturing development. We will use
competitive prototypes, when doing so is cost-effective and in the interest of national security
objectives. As we subject our acquisition process to more rigorous assessment, we must be
mindful that in some cases the Department must accept some risk in order to field a capability
that is needed for ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere.
Bolstering cost analysis: The Department is undertaking several initiatives to strengthen our cost
analysis capabilities in line with the goals of recent legislation. We are increasing our reliance on
independent analyses in order to ensure that decisions on acquisition and logistics programs are
based on the most realistic cost estimates possible. We are expanding the Department’s
independent cost assessment capabilities and are modernizing the cost and price analysis trainingthat DoD personnel receive. To strengthen our cost databases and make costs more visible, we
are improving contractor data reporting of actual costs, early systems engineering anddevelopment planning, earned value management, and pricing information. The more robust
data gleaned from contractor reports will enable more continuous monitoring of program
execution and facilitate improvements in the requirements-establishment and contracting
processes of the Department. Finally, we will improve the transparency of cost estimates,
establish a more rigorous quality assurance program, and report annually to Congress on the
Department’s cost- estimating activities.
Improving program execution: Beyond ensuring that acquisition efforts begin on the right track,
the Department must also continue to strengthen the execution phase of weapons development
programs by pursuing several avenues:Begin to employ fixed-price development contracts more frequently when appropriate.

Constrain the tendency to add requirements to programs by employing the Configuration
Steering Boards previously endorsed by Congress.



Demonstrate critical technologies and prove concepts by creating competitive prototypes
prior to initiating engineering and manufacturing development.

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Certify technology maturity through independent reviews and technology readinessassessments.

Develop more accurate technical baselines by applying disciplined systems engineering
throughout the life cycle.

Conduct realistic integrated testing to identify system problems as early as possible. Whennecessary, so as not to slow the fielding of urgently needed systems, the Department willconduct fielding in parallel with testing to assess safety and identify system capabilities andlimitations.



Better align profitability with performance by linking contract fee structures with
contractor performance, rigorously examining service-based contracts to ensure that feesare properly earned, eliminating the use of no-bid contracts whenever possible, andensuring that multiyear contracts are limited to instances in which real, substantial savings
are accrued to the taxpayer.

Achieve effective life cycle cost management by employing readiness-based sustainment
strategies, facilitated by stable and robust government-industry partnerships.

In short, we need to match requirements with mature technologies, maintain a disciplined
systems engineering approach, integrated with comprehensive testing, and avoid sacrificing costand schedule for promises of improved performance.
Lowering military health systems cost: The Department spends about $50 billion annually for
health care for active duty personnel, their dependents, and retirees. More than half of this care isbought from the private sector. In addition, supplies and medical equipment are purchased fromthe private sector to support military treatment facilities and deployed medical forces around theworld. DoD continues to review the costs of providing health care in an effort to identify
efficiencies that can reduce cost growth while sustaining high-quality care. Such efficiencies
include the following:Implementing targeted initiatives to recover overpayments and fraudulent, abusive, or
wasteful payments from healthcare providers.

Standardizing medical/surgical supply chains. The Department should develop andimplement leading private-sector supply chain processes to obtain the best medical
products at the best prices.

In addition to the health care efficiencies identified above, the Department intends to continue
to develop health care initiatives for the 2012 Program Review that will improve the quality andstandard of care, while reducing growth in overall costs. These initiatives will be fully alignedwith the military health system’s “Quadruple Aim”—a simultaneous balance of increased
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readiness, improved health of the population we serve, enhanced patient experience of care(including quality, access, and reliability), and responsibly managed per capita cost of care—asdescribed in the Military Health System Strategic Plan.
In sum, the Department must work to further reform how it does business and eliminate thosechallenges that hinder our success: a risk-averse culture, a litigious process, parochial interests,
excessive and changing requirements, unnecessary budget churn and instability, and sometimes
adversarial relationships within the Pentagon and with other parts of the government. We willcontinue to work within the Department and with Congress to improve our acquisition andprocurement processes in order to better meet our obligation to be good stewards of the AllVolunteer Force and of the investments that all Americans make to ensure our common defense.

Institutionalizing Rapid Acquisition Capability
America’s current and future adversaries will make innovative use of readily available emerging
and commercial technologies and employ asymmetric tactics to disrupt the superiority of U.S.
military power. The QDR outlines a number of enhancements to rebalance the force consistent
with defense priorities and to better prepare our forces for the challenges ahead.
The Department must not only
prepare for those threats we cananticipate, but also build the agile,
adaptive and innovative structures
capable of quickly identifying
emerging gaps and adjusting
program and budgetary priorities
to rapidly field capabilities that will
mitigate those gaps.
Reforming how we buy the goods
U.S. Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Tyreek Hayward lays coil to rewind a and services that will enable U.S.
motor in the machine shop aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz in the forces to succeed is critical, but
Gulf of Oman, Nov. 9, 2009. U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Robert Winn.
acquisition is only part of theprocess that delivers urgently needed capability to the field. The ability to quickly respond to
urgent needs involves three main components: deciding what you need (requirements), providing
adequate resources to buy it (programming and budgeting), and assessing alternatives andexecuting a solution (acquisition). In addition to acquisition improvements, the Department
needs a means to quickly prioritize and quantify requirements and to ensure that the resources
are available to enable rapid fielding of capabilities inside of the Department’s Planning
Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) cycle. All components must ensure

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that throughout the process, appropriate priority is placed on delivering timely and sufficientcapabilities to meet the urgent needs of operational commanders.
To prepare the Department for the complex threats that will surely emerge in the future, we needto make our “deliberate” processes more agile and capable of responding to urgent needs. During
periods of conflict, in the traditional risk areas of cost, schedule, and performance, “schedule”
often becomes the least acceptable risk.
Through robust analysis employing a variety of approaches, our research and development
community must continually assess the threat of emerging and commercially available technology
and ensure that our technology needed to counter these threats is mature before they materialize
in a disruptive way.

Strengthening the Industrial BaseIn order for the Department of Defense to develop, field, and maintain high-quality equipment,
it must rely on a robust and capable defense industry. Indeed, America’s industrial capacity andcapability made victory in World War II possible, maintained the technological edge against theSoviet Union, and today helps ensure that our military personnel in harm’s way have the world’s
best equipment and are supported by modern logistics and information systems; thus ourtechnological advantage must be closely monitored and nurtured.
Unfortunately, the federal government as a whole and the Pentagon in particular have notadequately addressed the changes both within the industry and in the Department’s needs in thecurrent strategic environment. The result has been that America’s defense industry has
consolidated and contracted around 20th-century platforms rather than developing the broad
and flexible portfolio of systems that today’s security environment demands.
Remedying the outdated—for decades, largely hands-off—attitude toward the U.S. defense
industrial base cannot be done quickly, and change will require a long-term approach undertaken
in partnership with industry and Congress. The range of products and services on which ourforces depend requires that the Department develop a more sophisticated relationship with theindustrial base, one that takes into account the rapid evolution of commercial technology, as wellas the unique requirements of the Department.
Whenever possible and appropriate, the Department will rely on market forces to create, shape,and sustain industrial and technological capabilities, but we must be prepared to intervene whenabsolutely necessary to create and/or sustain competition, innovation, and essential industrial
capabilities.
For too long the defense industry has been viewed as a monolithic sector of the economy whose
key players are made up of only the select few that are established military industrial providers.

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B U S I N E S SThis simply is not true. The goods and services on which the Department relies reach far moredeeply into the overall U.S. economy. Although some unique items are produced solely for the
Department, these items themselves often rely on a complex and integrated supply chain of
product providers that, if strained at the second, third, and even fourth tiers, would jeopardize
the ability of even the seemingly pure military industrial providers to continue to support ourforces.
Many of the defense industries’ jobs that require the most irreplaceable skills reside within nonprime suppliers. Many of these small, highly specialized companies depend on the major
suppliers and their unique requirements for their very survival. The cascading effects on them ofdecisions that the Department makes at the overall programmatic level must be better
understood—to ensure that critical lower-tier providers have the capacity to respond to thesedecisions, to ensure the continued supply of critical subcomponents to our defense industrial
base, to ensure that critical skills are not lost, and to protect our national security from the risk ofusing compromised supply chains.
Moreover, the financial community has an important, and often overlooked, role to play inmaintaining the health of our industrial base. From the small technology start-ups that seek
venture funding to pursue new products and systems, to the debt markets that provide capital
support as programs mature and evolve, the Department must ensure that we do not take thisaccess to capital for granted and must work to form a more transparent view of our requirements
and long-term investment plans.
Likewise, although innovations unique to national security often occur within the “pure-play”
defense industrial base, the vast majority of innovative and revolutionary components, systems,
and approaches that enable and sustain our technological advantage reside in the commercial
marketplace, in small defense companies, or in America’s universities.
Therefore, the Department will work to establish requirements and pursue specific programs thattake full advantage of the entire spectrum of the industrial base at our disposal: defense firms,
purely commercial firms, and the increasingly important sector of those innovative andtechnologically advanced firms and institutions that fall somewhere in between.
The Department will also work to adopt a more integrated approach that can improve our ability
to identify potential single points of failure or concern earlier in the acquisition process, and will
establish a more comprehensive and, when appropriate, interagency approach to industrial policy
and industrial base issues.
Our engagement with industry does not mean the Department of Defense will underwrite sunset
industries or prop up poor business models. It does mean that the Department will create an82
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environment in which our industries, a foundation of our nation’s strength, can thrive andcompete in the global marketplace.
As we take steps to revitalize our defense industrial base, we also recognize the value of our allies
and their defense industrial capacities. We will continue to value our allies’ capabilities, ensurethat when they bid on U.S. contracts that they are treated fairly, just as we expect our firms to betreated fairly in international competitions, and deepen our collaborative effort to innovate
against 21st century threats.
In order for the defense industry to remain a source of strategic advantage well into the future,
the Department and our nation require a consistent, realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping
the structure and capabilities of the defense industrial base. Toward this end, the Department iscommitted to being more forward leaning in its ongoing assessments of the industrial base—refocusing our efforts on our future needs, not just our past performance; working much moreclosely with the Services to foster an integrated approach to the overall industrial base; andplacing transparency and dialogue with industry at the forefront of our agenda.

Reforming the U.S. Export Control System
Today’s export control system is a relic of the Cold War and must be adapted to address current
threats. The current system impedes cooperation, technology sharing, and interoperability withallies and partners. It does not allow for adequate enforcement mechanisms to detect export
violations, or penalties to deter such abuses. Moreover, our overly complicated system results insignificant interagency delays that hinder U.S. industrial competitiveness and cooperation withallies.
The United States has made continuous incremental improvements to its export control system,
particularly in adding controls against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and theirmeans of delivery. The United States has also been a leader in international export controls,
creating and improving the multilateral regimes made up of U.S. allies and trading partners that
control what is exported to countries of concern to the United States. The regimes also havebecome a global control standard via United Nations Security Council resolutions. They help
ensure that key technologies and items available in numerous countries are controlled in order toprevent their acquisition by actors who would use them contrary to U.S. and allied interests.
However, the current system is largely out-dated. It was designed when the U.S. economy waslargely self-sufficient in developing technologies and when we controlled the manufacture ofitems from these technologies for national security reasons. Much of the system protected an
extensive list of unique technologies and items that, if used in the development or production of
weapons by the former Soviet Union, would pose a national security threat to the United States.

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The global economy has changed, with many countries now possessing advanced research,development, and manufacturing capabilities. Moreover, many advanced technologies are nolonger predominantly developed for military applications with eventual transition to commercial
uses, but follow the exact opposite course. Yet, in the name of controlling the technologies usedin the production of advanced conventional weapons, our system continues to place checks on
many that are widely available and remains designed to control such items as if Cold War
economic and military-to-commercial models continued to apply.
The U.S. export system itself poses a potential national security risk. Its structure is overly
complicated, contains too many redundancies, and tries to protect too much. Today’s export
control system encourages foreign customers to seek foreign suppliers and U.S. companies to seek
foreign partners not subject to U.S. export controls. Furthermore, the U.S. government is notadequately focused on protecting those key technologies and items that should be protected andensuring that potential adversaries do not obtain technical data crucial for the production ofsophisticated weapons systems.
These deficiencies can be solved only through fundamental reform. The President has therefore
directed a comprehensive review tasked with identifying reforms to enhance U.S. national
security, foreign policy, and economic security interests. Reform efforts must reflect an inherently
interagency process as current export control authorities rest with other departments. Similarly,
meaningful reforms will not be possible without congressional involvement throughout theprocess. The Department of Defense has a vital stake in fundamental reform of export controls,
and will work with our interagency partners and Congress to ensure that a new system fully
addresses the threats that the United States will face in the future.

Crafting a Strategic Approach to Climate and Energy
Climate change and energy are two key issues that will play a significant role in shaping thefuture security environment. Although they produce distinct types of challenges, climate change,energy security, and economic stability are inextricably linked. The actions that the Department
takes now can prepare us to respond effectively to these challenges in the near term and in the
future.
Climate change will affect DoD in two broad ways. First, climate change will shape the operating
environment, roles, and missions that we undertake. The U.S. Global Change Research Program,composed of 13 federal agencies, reported in 2009 that climate-related changes are already being
observed in every region of the world, including the United States and its coastal waters. Amongthese physical changes are increases in heavy downpours, rising temperature and sea level, rapidly
retreating glaciers, thawing permafrost, lengthening growing seasons, lengthening ice-free seasonsin the oceans and on lakes and rivers, earlier snowmelt, and alterations in river flows.

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Assessments conducted by the intelligence community indicate that climate change could havesignificant geopolitical impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental
degradation, and the further weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will contribute tofood and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate massmigration.
While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or
conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world. In
addition, extreme weather events may lead to increased demands for defense support to civil
authorities for humanitarian assistance or disaster response both within the United States andoverseas. In some nations, the military is the only institution with the capacity to respond to alarge-scale natural disaster. Proactive engagement with these countries can help build theircapability to respond to such events. Working closely with relevant U.S. departments andagencies, DoD has undertaken environmental security cooperative initiatives with foreign
militaries that represent a nonthreatening way of building trust, sharing best practices on
installations management and operations, and developing response capacity.
Second, DoD will need to adjust
to the impacts of climate change
on our facilities and militarycapabilities. The Department
already provides environmental
stewardship at hundreds of DoD
installations throughout theUnited States and around theworld, working diligently tomeet resource efficiency andsustainability goals as set by
relevant laws and executive
orders. Although the United At Fort Carson, Colo., the Army partnered with a local energy provider inStates has significant capacity to an enhanced-use lease. The energy provider built a photovoltaic solar arrayon top of a closed landfill. That site now provides energy to some 540 homes.
adapt to climate change, it will U.S. Army photo.
pose challenges for civil society
and DoD alike, particularly in light of the nation’s extensive coastal infrastructure. In 2008, theNational Intelligence Council judged that more than 30 U.S. military installations were alreadyfacing elevated levels of risk from rising sea levels. DoD’s operational readiness hinges oncontinued access to land, air, and sea training and test space. Consequently, the Department
must complete a comprehensive assessment of all installations to assess the potential impacts ofclimate change on its missions and adapt as required.
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In this regard, DoD will work to foster efforts to assess, adapt to, and mitigate the impacts ofclimate change. Domestically, the Department will leverage the Strategic Environmental
Research and Development Program, a joint effort among DoD, the Department of Energy, andthe Environmental Protection Agency, to develop climate change assessment tools. Abroad, theDepartment will increase its investment in the Defense Environmental International
Cooperation Program not only to promote cooperation on environmental security issues, butalso to augment international adaptation efforts. The Department will also speed innovative
energy and conservation technologies from laboratories to military end users. The Environmental
Security and Technology Certification Program uses military installations as a test bed todemonstrate and create a market for innovative energy efficiency and renewable energy
technologies coming out of the private sector and DoD and Department of Energy laboratories.
Finally, the Department is improving small-scale energy efficiency and renewable energy projects
at military installations through our Energy Conservation Investment Program.
The effect of changing climate ontheDepartment's
operatingenvironment is evident in themaritime commons of the Arctic.
The opening of the Arctic waters in
the decades ahead which will
permit seasonal commerce andtransitpresentsauniqueopportunity to work collaboratively
in multilateral forums to promote abalanced approach to improving
human and environmental security
Personnel from the University of Washington's Applied Physics in the region. In that effort, DoD
Laboratory prepare to recover a torpedo from under the ice on March must work with the Coast Guard
20, 2009. DoD photo by Mass Communication Spec. First Classand the Department of Homeland
Tiffini M. Jones, U.S. Navy.
Security to address gaps in Arctic
communications, domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental observation andforecasting capabilities to support both current and future planning and operations. To support
cooperative engagement in the Arctic, DoD strongly supports accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
As climate science advances, the Department will regularly reevaluate climate change risks andopportunities in order to develop policies and plans to manage its effects on the Department’s
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B U S I N E S Schange will require DoD to work collaboratively, through a whole-of-government approach, withboth traditional allies and new partners.
Energy security for the Department means having assured access to reliable supplies of energy
and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet operational needs. Energy
efficiency can serve as a force multiplier, because it increases the range and endurance of forces in
the field and can reduce the number of combat forces diverted to protect energy supply lines,
which are vulnerable to both asymmetric and conventional attacks and disruptions. DoD must
incorporate geostrategic and operational energy considerations into force planning, requirements
development, and acquisition processes. To address these challenges, DoD will fully implement
the statutory requirement for the energy efficiency Key Performance Parameter and fullyburdened cost of fuel set forth in the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act. The
Department will also investigate alternative concepts for improving operational energy use,
including the creation of an innovation fund administered by the new Director of Operational
Energy to enable components to compete for funding on projects that advance integrated energy
solutions.
The Department is increasing its use of renewable energy supplies and reducing energy demand
to improve operational effectiveness, reduce greenhouse gas emissions in support of U.S. climatechange initiatives, and protect the Department from energy price fluctuations. The Military
Departments have invested in noncarbon power sources such as solar, wind, geothermal, andbiomass energy at domestic installations and in vehicles powered by alternative fuels, including
hybrid power, electricity, hydrogen, and compressed national gas. Solving military challenges—
through such innovations as more efficient generators, better batteries, lighter materials, andtactically deployed energy sources—has the potential to yield spin-off technologies that benefit
the civilian community as well. DoD will partner with academia, other U.S. agencies, andinternational partners to research, develop, test, and evaluate new sustainable energy
technologies.
Indeed, the following examples demonstrate the broad range of Service energy innovations. By
2016, the Air Force will be postured to cost-competitively acquire 50 percent of its domestic
aviation fuel via an alternative fuel blend that is greener than conventional petroleum
fuel. Further, Air Force testing and standard-setting in this arena paves the way for the muchlarger commercial aviation sector to follow. The Army is in the midst of a significant
transformation of its fleet of 70,000 non-tactical vehicles (NTVs), including the current
deployment of more than 500 hybrids and the acquisition of 4,000 low-speed electric vehicles atdomestic installations to help cut fossil fuel usage. The Army is also exploring ways to exploit theopportunities for renewable power generation to support operational needs: for instance, theRucksack Enhanced Portable Power System (REPPS). The Navy commissioned the USS Makin
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biofuel in 2009—two key steps toward the vision of deploying a “green” carrier strike groupusing biofuel and nuclear power by 2016. The Marine Corps has created an Expeditionary
Energy Office to address operational energy risk, and its Energy Assessment Team has identified
ways to achieve efficiencies in today’s highly energy-intensive operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
in order to reduce logistics and related force protection requirements.
To address energy security while simultaneously enhancing mission assurance at domestic
facilities, the Department is focusing on making them more resilient. U.S. forces at home andabroad rely on support from installations in the United States. DoD will conduct a coordinatedenergy assessment, prioritize critical assets, and promote investments in energy efficiency toensure that critical installations are adequately prepared for prolonged outages caused by natural
disasters, accidents, or attacks. At the same time, the Department will also take steps to balanceenergy production and transmission with the requirement to preserve the test and training ranges
and the operating areas that are needed to maintain readiness.

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Quadrennial Defense Review ReportA DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKThe depth, scope, and scale of activities that the Department of Defense undertakes every day are
unparalleled. From employing forces in operations around the world, to providing education,
health care, and housing for our people, to researching, developing, testing, and fielding newtechnologies, the Department has a unique set of global responsibilities.
As described earlier, defense strategy requires making choices: accepting and managing risk isthus inherent in everything the Department does. Although difficult, risk management is central
to effective decision-making and is vital to our success. For our nation, it can mean the difference
between victory and defeat; for our men and women in uniform and their families, suchdecisions have life-and-death consequences. That is why the Department is focused so centrally
on rebalancing our capabilities and reforming our institutions to better enable success in today’swars while preparing for a wide range of contingencies.
Effectively managing risk across such a vast enterprise is difficult; the range and volume ofcomponent activities and competencies defy simple identification, categorization, andaggregation of risk. Moreover, a dynamic security environment requires the Department to beflexible and diminishes the value of formulaic risk assessments. Taken together, the challenges
associated with measuring risk and performance relegate the use of quantitative metrics to an
important but supporting role: in any risk assessment, DoD necessarily places a premium on
informed judgment at all echelons of command.
In assessing risk for this QDR, the Department used a multidisciplinary approach. The
assessment reflects updated thinking on best practices, which increasingly not only draws on
quantitative analysis, but also relies on informed judgments, expert opinions, and the use of
scenarios. The Department ensured that its risk assessment was strategy driven. Our efforts were
informed by recent risk identification efforts conducted by various components of the
Department, including the DoD Inspector General and by the Government Accountability
Office.55

The GAO produces an annual list of high-risk management issues in the U.S. government, and in 2009 eight
applied to DoD: supply chain management, weapon systems acquisition, contract management, financial
management, business systems modernization, support infrastructure management, approach to business
transformation, and the Personnel Security Clearance Program. The DoD Inspector General summary ofmanagement and performance challenges for FY 2009 also identified eight risk areas for the Department:
financial management; acquisition process and contract management; joint warfighting and readiness;
information assurance, security, and privacy; health care; equipping and training Iraqi and Afghan security
forces; the nuclear enterprise; and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
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As a framework to organize its assessment, the 2010 QDR used risk categories, described below,that have been employed since 2001:
Operational risk: the ability of the current force to execute strategy successfully within
acceptable human, materiel, financial, and strategic costs. Consideration of operationalrisk requires assessing the Department’s ability to execute current, planned, andcontingency operations in the near term.

Force management risk: our ability to recruit, retain, train, educate, and equip the AllVolunteer Force, and to sustain its readiness and morale. This requires the Department toexamine its ability to provide trained and ready personnel in the near term, midterm, andlong term.

Institutional risk: the capacity of management and business practices to plan for, enable,
and support the execution of DoD missions. It encompasses the ability to develop
effective and efficient organizations and processes over the near term, midterm, and long
term.



Future challenges risk: the Department’s capacity to execute future missions successfully,
and to hedge against shocks. Here most consideration is given to the Department’s ability
to field superior capabilities and sufficient capacity to deter/defeat emerging threats in themidterm and long term.

Ongoing efforts to rebalance the joint force, including those taken during the course of this
QDR, help better position DoD not only to prevail across a range of missions but to do so in thechallenging current and likely future security environment. However, existing and emerging
issues could complicate the Department’s ability to execute the defense strategy. Therefore, on
the basis of an enterprise-wide review, this QDR risk assessment identifies those key shortfalls orcomplex problems that threaten the Department’s ability to successfully execute its priority
objectives, and that consequently require the sustained attention of DoD’s senior leadership.

Operational Risk
Key issues that pose risk to operational missions in the near term include providing sufficientenabling capabilities, building partnership capacity, and securing DoD systems in cyberspace.
A failure to provide sufficient enablers would constrain ongoing operations in multiple ways andwould constitute particular risk to achieving the near-term goals of prevailing in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Key capability enablers are currently stressed and will remain so in the near- to midterm
environment because they play a critical and potentially growing role in ongoing operations.
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special operations forces enablers. DoD continues to work toward filling persistent gaps.
Drawing on the results of the QDR’s analysis, the Department has identified enabling
capabilities that are useful in a wide range of operations and intends to make continued
investments in them. But despite these efforts to reduce stress on enablers across the FYDP, thisrisk could worsen over time given the projected demands in the future security environment.
Allies and both international and interagency partners are critical to success in meeting today’ssecurity challenges. Overseas, the inability or unwillingness of international partners to support
shared goals or provide access would place additional operational risk on U.S. forces and would
threaten our ability to prevail in current or future conflicts. Building the defense capacity of allies
and partners and ensuring that the
U.S. Armed Forces are able toeffectively train and operate withforeign militaries is a high-priority
mission. As the emphasis on
developing the capability ofindigenous security forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq reflects,
conducting security force assistance(SFA) operations is an increasingly
critical element of building
partnership capacity. In anticipationof the growing role of security force
U.S. Navy Chief Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician Kenneth
assistance in U.S. strategy and Simpson, right, discusses disposal techniques with Philippine Chief
operations, the Department is Inspector Eric Maniego, with the National Police Maritime GroupSpecial Reaction Unit, at Crow Valley, Philippines, March 25, 2009.
institutionalizing general purpose U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Spec. 2nd Class Aaron
force capabilities for security force Burden.
assistance; enhancing language, regional, and cultural abilities; strengthening and expanding
capabilities for training partner aviation forces, as well as capacities for ministerial-level training;and creating mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel. Working withinteragency partners and with Congress, DoD is also exploring how to improve the ways inwhich security assistance funds are authorized and overseen within the executive branch toenhance their effectiveness in supporting national security goals.
A failure by the Department to secure its systems in cyberspace would pose a fundamental risk to
our ability to accomplish defense missions today and in the future. Attacks in cyberspace could
target command and control systems and the cyberspace infrastructure supporting weaponssystem platforms. To ensure unfettered access to cyberspace, DoD mission-critical systems andnetworks must perform and be resilient in the face of cyberspace attacks. The recent
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establishment of U.S. Cyber Command is a critical step forward. In addition, the Department istaking steps to identify mission-critical command and control systems and networks, examining
how best to further protect them, and exploring ways to develop operational approaches andlogistics that better address potential vulnerabilities. The Department is also actively participating
in a broader interagency approach for securing cyberspace, including the Comprehensive
National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). To ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are properly
trained and equipped to counter this threat, the Department must develop and maintain theability to accurately assess the performance of network-enabled information systems in realistic
threat environments.

Force Management Risk
Key issues in force management include supporting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,
providing health care to DoD personnel, and ensuring the proper mix and roles of the Active
Component and Reserve Component.
The scale and duration of concurrent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are placing aconsiderable strain on individual service members and their families, on the overall health of the
All-Volunteer Force, and on our ability to reset and reconstitute it. Because it has been engagedin war for eight years, the Department has been unable to maintain desired deployment to dwell
ratios. In the near term to midterm, this high operational tempo requires DoD to pay extra
attention to the well-being of our service members, their families, and institutions. The
Department is continually measuring rates of suicide and divorce, among a range of otherindicators, to identify strains on the health of the force. DoD assesses these data against national
benchmarks and Service-specific trends. Although the Department is currently meeting its targets
for recruitment and retention, for instance, we continue to closely monitor these numbers. The
drawdown in Iraq, coupled with increased requirements in Afghanistan, will dictate the pace of
movement toward more sustainable dwell rates. Demand for support, however, is an enduringneed that will not end with withdrawal of service members from combat. It is critical that an
extensive, institutionalized system of support for the All-Volunteer Force be strengthened andsustained. The Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, which seeks to place equal
importance on mental and physical fitness, is one initiative toward that end. Similarly, theMarine Corps’ Combat Operational Stress Control Program aims at equipping leaders with theskills to identify and address signs of stress. In the midterm to long term, the Department’s newforce-sizing construct and its approach to planning and executing operations will seek to betteraccount for the demands made on the All-Volunteer Force by long-duration operations.
Over the long term, rising costs and continuing pressures threaten the Department’s approach toproviding high-quality health care to members of the U.S. Armed Forces, veterans, and theirdependents. Although achievement of this objective is not at immediate risk, an increasing

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number of military health system users, steady cost shares/co-pays, and congressionally mandated
benefit increases have all increased the Department’s health care costs well beyond theprogrammed budget. Continued engagement in long-duration operations and a growing numberof veterans approaching 65 years of age will further increase DoD costs. DoD continues to
identify efficiencies that can reduce cost growth while sustaining high-quality care.
The critical contribution made by the Reserve Component in recent years—currently 25 to 30
percent of U.S. Central Command forces—has led to increased capability and heightened
readiness. Significant reductions in use of the RC following the drawdown in Iraq and efforts toreset the force will necessitate a thorough assessment of RC readiness and future roles. The
Department has already initiated several studies examining issues associated with employing the
RC on a routine, rotational basis as part of the total operational force, changing the AC/RC mix,
and/or changing the role of the RC. Drawing on this work, the Department will explore thepotential to redefine the role of the RC for both domestic and overseas operations.

Institutional Risk
Key issues that pose institutional risk include reforming general acquisition processes, optimizing
information technology acquisition processes, and maintaining the defense industrial base.
Shortcomings in the acquisition process put the Department at risk of being unable to deliver thecapabilities it needs, when it needs them, and at acceptable costs, and these potential failures inturn threaten the successful execution of military operations. The Department’s acquisition andsupport processes have rightly received consistent criticism for delays, cost growth, anoverstretched workforce, and other inefficiencies. Given the importance of a healthy acquisition
process, we must not embark on programs with artificially low cost estimates, immature designs
and technology, fluid requirements, excessive technical authority certification requirements,
unstable budgets, and unsustainable procurement profiles. The December 2008 release of DoD
Directive 5000.02, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” seeks to mitigate key risks
associated with the acquisition process. The Department will closely track implementation of
new policies instituted by the directive aimed at ensuring more rigorous assessment ofalternatives, competitive prototyping, more frequent and effective program reviews, theprevention of requirements creep, independent assessment of “technology readiness,” and bettermethods of testing and evaluation. We must also ensure that the Department is able to rapidly
create prototypes and field new capabilities, maximizing its ability to meet warfighter needs andleverage technological advantages. By 2015, the Department also plans to hire 20,000 new
acquisition professionals, filling 9,000 new jobs and 11,000 converted contractor positions.
The Department’s deliberate acquisition process is especially poorly suited for keeping pace with
innovations in information technology (IT). The inability to acquire powerful IT solutions in an
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ensure and enhance agility, flexibility, responsiveness, and effectiveness. This results in an
enduring missed opportunity to benefit more fully from DoD, interagency, and international IT
capabilities. The Department must reform the IT acquisition process, drawing on successfulcommercial practices, with a view to accelerating the acquisition cycle.
The Department’s need for a robust defense industrial base with appropriate levels ofcompetition, innovation, and industrial capacity represents another area of institutional risk.
Since World War II, the U.S. defense industry has consolidated and contracted around 20th
century platforms. The U.S. defense industry is, accordingly, not well-positioned to meet the
Department’s 21st century requirements. This creates risk that extends not only to the relatively
small number of major, established providers of defense platforms but also to a much larger
community of product providers. Working closely with international partners and industry, theDepartment will strive to better ensure that its future requirements can be met. Such an
approach should not, however, include underwriting sunset industries or sustaining poor businessmodels—courses of action that simply exacerbate risk to the equipping of the U.S. military.

Future Challenges Risk
Preceding sections highlighted numerous challenges and opportunities in the security
environment. Other major issues that pose future challenges include managing uncertainty about
the future environment and science and technology (S&T) trends.
Difficulties in anticipating the nature of the future security environment create the risk that the
Department may not be adequately prepared for threats that materialize over the midterm tolong term. To better hedge against the uncertainty inherent in long-term defense planning, theDepartment drew on a wide range of analyses—including the use of multiple scenarios andcombinations of scenarios—to inform its judgments for this QDR. DoD also benefited fromanalysis on the likely future security environment produced by the U.S. intelligence community.
DoD intends to further refine this analytic process, making it more iterative and adaptive, andleveraging the results of experimentation and alternative futures analysis to enhance efforts tomanage future risk.
A number of factors related to research and development will, over time, generate increased risk
to America’s technological edge. As global research and development (R&D) investment
increases, it is proving increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain a competitive
advantage across the entire spectrum of defense technologies. Even at current, relatively robust
levels of investment, the DoD S&T program is struggling to keep pace with the expanding
challenges of the evolving security environment and the increasing speed and cost of global
technology development. The Department’s options for managing risk with respect to S&T must
be synchronized with efforts by other agencies as well as the private sector. The health of the U.S.
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commercial and academic interests beyond the direct influence of DoD spending. To assure
future technology competence, the Department will continue to be a leading proponent ofeducation standards and opportunities relevant to the technology requirements to enhancenational security. The Department will consider the scope and potential benefits of an R&D
strategy that prioritizes those areas where it is vital to maintain a technological advantage. Thiseffort will be coupled with further work to assess how best to work with the academy andindustry, as well as key international allies to leverage breakthroughs and avoid duplication.

Strategic, Military, and Political Risk
In the face of ongoing war and a range of pressing current and future challenges, the UnitedStates requires a defense strategy and portfolio of military resources that can help protect andadvance the nation’s interests. To create and maintain the right mix of forces and militarycapability, the Department must make hard, strategy-informed choices. To do so, it must
determine where to invest additional resources and where to accept and manage a degree of
operational, force management, institutional and future challenge risk over the near and longerterm. These judgments inform our broader consideration of strategic, military, and political risks,
as required by Title 10 legislation.
In the 2010 QDR risk assessment, strategic risk constitutes the Department’s ability to executethe defense priority objectives in the near term, midterm, and long term in support of national
security. Military risk encompasses the ability of U.S. forces to adequately resource, execute, andsustain military operations in the near- to midterm, and the mid- to longer term. In theinternational context, political risk derives from the perceived legitimacy of our actions and theresulting impact on the ability and will of allies and partners to support shared goals. In thedomestic context, political risk relates to public support of national strategic priorities and theassociated resource requirements in the near term, midterm, and long term.
This QDR identified areas of weakness in our defense program, presented options to mitigate
them, and made recommendations on where and how to rebalance the Department toward ourmost pressing challenges. The risks identified in this section will require sustained leadership
attention in order to ensure that they are successfully managed and mitigated. The QDR risk
assessment concludes that the Department is positioned to successfully balance overarchingstrategic, military, and political risk between the near to midterm and the mid- to long term, as
well as across the full range of military missions required to protect and advance national
interests.

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Quadrennial Defense Review ReportCONCLUSION: THE WAY AHEAD
This QDR report and the preceding months of deliberation served two purposes: first, toestablish the Department’s key priority objectives, providing strategic context andrecommendations on key capability development and investment priorities; and second, tocommunicate the Secretary’s intent for the next several years of the Department’s work. The
QDR serves as a capstone institutional document, shaping how the Department of Defense will
support America’s military personnel today, while building the policy and programmatic
foundation that will enable the next generation to protect the American people and advance theirinterests.
The challenges facing the United States are immense, but so are the opportunities. This QDRclarified the Secretary’s priority objectives for the Department: prevail in today’s wars, preventand deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, andpreserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. The Secretary has been clear, and this report
reaffirms the need to manage risk prudently across these objectives in favor of prevailing intoday’s wars—it has outlined in detail how the Department intends to further rebalance its
capabilities and reform its institutions in order to do so.
Strategy-driven, this QDR provided an assessment of the strategic environment, America’s
national interests and global role, the role of U.S. military power, and a comprehensive
description of the Department’s strategy and the implications for capability development, key
policies and authorities, and our key defense relationships at home and abroad.
This report will be used to shape and influence a series of ongoing processes and reviews thatprovide direction to Department of Defense components. The strategic and investment priorities
described in this report reflect the Secretary’s intent as the Department continues to reform andrebalance the U.S. military to better enable success in today’s wars while preparing for
tomorrow’s threats.

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CHAIRMAN’S ASSESSMENT OF
2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEWThe QDR identifies initiatives and areas for focus that address my top priorities: improving
stability and defending our vital interests in the Middle East and South Asia, remaining goodstewards for the health of the force, and balancing global strategic risk.
Winning Today’s Fight: Vital Interests in the Middle East and South Asia
The QDR places appropriate priority on our mission to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda
globally and particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent it from threatening America
and our allies in the future. We must continue to find new ways to meet the pressing needs ofour forces engaged in these important operations as we complete a responsible drawdown in Iraq
and implement the new strategy in Afghanistan.
The QDR supports investment in many critical enablers that have been persistently short in ourinventory. Examples include rotary wing aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, counter-improvised
explosive device capabilities, Special Operations Forces, Civil Affairs, language and culturalexpertise, and capabilities that will enable increased Security Force Assistance activities. The
QDR also recognized the need to expand our electronic warfare capabilities and enhance
intelligence and information operations capabilities. These key capabilities, as well as newtechnologies being explored, support flexible and effective forces for today’s fight and contributeto our readiness for operations across the full range of military operations.
I remain concerned about the nuclear ambitions and confrontational postures of Iran and North
Korea. The QDR emphasizes the President’s focus on engagement and reinforces our efforts towork with allies and partners to prevent global nuclear proliferation, regardless of origin. At thesame time, it addresses the need for investment in developing appropriate counter-WMD
measures and consequence management responses. It also calls for expanding our capabilities todetect and secure uncontrolled weapons of mass destruction and related materials, as well as theneed to enhance nuclear forensics – both of which are vital to our national interests.
I applaud the QDR’s focus on rapidly providing our warfighters with essential capabilities, and I
am convinced that innovative commercial technology solutions and streamlined developmental
efforts can and will be applied to ongoing operations.
Health of the ForceI emphatically support the QDR’s focus on preserving and enhancing the all-volunteer force as
the foundation of our military. The men and women of our Armed Forces, as well as theirfamilies, are America’s greatest strategic assets, and as such, we must do all we can to preserve
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their quality of service and honor their commitment. As we finish well in Iraq and shift the maineffort to Afghanistan, we have the opportunity to begin resetting and reconstituting our units
and, as dwell time increases, reduce stress on our service members and their families.
The QDR advocates important initiatives for improving the health of the force. These initiatives
will enhance warrior and survivor care and provide a single medical record for our service
members throughout their lives. The QDR reinforces the urgency to increase research andtreatment for a broad range of injuries, especially the signature wounds of Post Traumatic StressandTraumatic
Brain
Injuries.
Increased rates of combat stress,
substance abuse, and suicide point to aforce that is under a high degree ofpressurefromrepeatedlong
deployments and limited time at home.
Reducing deployment time andincreasing time at home, as appropriate
for each component, are important for
reintegrating our service members
U.S. Navy Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of returning from a combat environment
Staff reenlists ten soldiers assigned to 2/5 Stryker Brigade stationed at
Forward Operating Base Frontenac in Kandahar, Afghanistan, to routine activities at home. Though
December 17, 2009. DoD photo by Mass Communication Spec. 1st the force has remained incrediblyClass Chad J. McNeeley.
resilient over the course of eight years ofwar, we must prioritize programs that sustain resiliency such as: child care facilities, quality
education for children, 24/7 family support assistance, outreach to Guard and Reserve members
and their families, and referrals for non-medical counseling. By emphasizing the emotional,social, spiritual and family aspects of fitness, these health-of-the-force investments will pay
dividends in national security today and well into the future.
The Reserve Component plays a vital role in meeting our defense missions and in enabling us to
manage stress on the active force. In short, we could not have accomplished what we have thesepast eight years were it not for our Reserve and National Guard forces. I applaud the QDRreport’s commitment to conduct a comprehensive assessment of Reserve Component policies. In
that review, it is important that we consider the proper balance of maintaining the operational
capabilities and strategic depth of the Reserve Component as an integrated force to meetrequirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Access to the Reserve Component remains a
critical lever for meeting global operational demands without substantially increasing the size ofthe active force.
I also strongly endorse the QDR’s efforts to address joint force readiness for the full range ofchallenges we face. The focus is on building joint force capability and capacity for irregular
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warfare without compromising our conventional and nuclear superiority. Although we havealways retained sufficient capacity and capability to address the entire spectrum of threats, anaggressive and sustained tempo of operations has necessitated prioritizing training and readinessfor current missions over other types of operations. With the drawdown in Iraq and appropriate
time and resources provided for reset and reconstitution of the force, our readiness andavailability to counter multiple, wide-ranging challenges will increase and we will move toward
desired goals for force rotation. Many elements of the joint force will remain in high demand in
the near term, and will continue to reset in stride between deployments. We must continue ourprogress towards a properly balanced force.
Reset and prepositioned stock replacement are two crucial issues for maintaining readiness. We
need to reset equipment that is lost in combat and repair or replace equipment degraded by wear
and tear, with full restoration not expected until years after OIF and OEF are completed.
Ensuring funding for related activities, such as depot operations, is essential for maintenance ofthe force. And the enormity of the equipment and unit reset challenge, as we withdraw from
Iraq and increase efforts in Afghanistan, will require continuous review of our joint requirements
and timelines. In the mid to long term, it is imperative that we have a robust industrial base with
sufficient manufacturing capability and capacity to preserve our technological edge and provide
for the reset and recapitalization of our force.
Properly Balance Global Strategic Risk
My assessment of risk in the QDR is based on a realistic understanding of the security
environment which remains complex, dynamic, and uncertain. While defense analysis identifies
trends, it is problematic to predict the time, place, and nature of future challenges. The QDR
force planning construct is properly focused on balancing capabilities to fight today’s wars withthose needed to counter future potential adversaries. It enables us to build a ready and agile force
with sufficient capacity and capability to defeat adversaries across the range of military
operations. And finally, it places priority on our ability to defend the homeland and support civil
authorities.
We expect to be increasingly challenged in securing and maintaining access to the global
commons and must also be prepared for operations in unfamiliar conditions and environments.
The QDR gives solid direction on developing capabilities that counter the proliferation of antiaccess and area-denial threats, which present an increased challenge to our maritime, air, space,and cyber forces. Our national strategy also depends on our ability to rapidly project forces andresupply globally, giving us the ability to provide our operational commanders with forces andlogistics superiority when and where needed. Furthermore, while we have better organized ourforces to operate in the cyber domain, the QDR highlights the need to break down institutional
barriers and ensure our cyber capabilities receive the support necessary to properly provide our103
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national security. In addition, the QDR initiated important efforts to explore requirements
involving long-range strike capabilities, enhancing the protection of our valuable assets,
accelerating the development of unmanned systems across components, and improving our
integrated missile defenses. The QDR reinforces developing flexible and adaptable regional
deterrence which includes missile defense.
I fully support the QDR’s increased emphasis on the important roles of our interagency andinternational partners in achieving our desired end states and helping to balance global risk. No
one – and certainly no one military – can do it alone. We must strive to develop a better
understanding of the roles, missions, and authorities of departments and organizations within the
U.S. government and to minimize friction and duplicative efforts. This concern is particularly
acute in the areas of cyber, space operations, and homeland security where the interests of many
government departments intersect. Although our joint force must retain the capacity to act
decisively when appropriate, we prefer to partner and work with others in major operations
across a wide range of contingencies. Building the capacity of our partners to deter and prevent
conflict makes them more capable of providing assistance as we address common threats
together. Increasing the capacity of our partners and increasing the sharing of information areimportant national security investments. If partners are unable to build the needed capability orcapacity, however, our joint force must be able to shoulder the security burden when directed.
I strongly agree with the QDR’s vision of a globally engaged force that supports the developmentof security forces and conducts necessary operations against violent extremists around the world,in addition to other operations. To meet this goal, we must maintain appropriate force levels
and expertise. This will require allocation of sufficient resources to maintain the correct balanceof capabilities and capacity within the joint force. As we apply resources, we will prioritize
readiness and capability over capacity.
The QDR assessed regional posture requirements measured against global strategic and policy
expectations. This approach leverages key capabilities, that are prepositioned, rotational, andforward-stationed, to maximize the benefits of presence in a region while ensuring the capability
to meet warfighting demands globally. This tailored approach to force posture assures allies anddeters potential aggressors, while maintaining appropriate force levels in the continental UnitedStates to support critical defense and civil support missions at home and for expeditionary global
response. Our strategy supports the development of a tailored posture in the broader Middle
East and Central and South Asia, promotes a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region, andreaffirms our commitment to NATO and Europe.
Conclusion
U.S. Armed Forces can perform the missions called for in the QDR. Within this mission set,
two strategic imperatives require our immediate attention. First, we must disrupt, dismantle, and104
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defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan while acting against its global affiliates, and prevent
its capacity to threaten the United States and our allies. Second, we must continue to preventand deter conflict in strategically important regions, including those involving Iran and North
Korea. Our success in these and other missions depends upon obtaining sufficient, timely
funding to reset the force and restore readiness and a responsible withdrawal from Iraq.
Managing risk under the new QDR force planning construct requires further analysis, including
new scenarios to test joint concepts of operation and force mixes and the development ofassociated operational and strategic assumptions. Our planning and assessment efforts will vary
the size, duration, and simultaneity of operations and account for associated policies and goals forforce rotation, disengagement, and access to the Reserve Component.
Overall, the QDR provides an accurate depiction of our future national security requirements.
Our challenge as a nation will be to properly resource these priorities.

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