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United States Army
Counter - Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS)
Strategy Extract

October 5, 2016

Distribution A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited
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Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................. 4
1-1. Purpose ..................................................................................................................... 4
1-2. Background .............................................................................................................. 4
1-3.
Assumptions...................................................................................................... 4
1-4.
Linkages ............................................................................................................ 5
Operational Environment ........................................................................ 5
Background. ...................................................................................................... 5
UAS Threat Types and Observations. .............................................................. 5
Proliferation. ..................................................................................................... 5
2-4.
Vignette………………………………………………………………………..6
Meeting the UAS Challenge: Ends, Ways and Means. .......................... 7
3-1.
Ends................................................................................................................... 7
3-2.
Ways ............................................................................................................... 7
3-3.
Means.. .............................................................................................................. 8
Governance Process .............................................................................. 13
Conclusion ............................................................................................ 13

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Introduction
1-1. Purpose
This strategy is the Army’s effort to integrate and synchronize C-UAS efforts across theArmy, and to inform joint, inter-organizational, and multinational (JIM) partners about the Army
C-UAS efforts. This strategy frames the C-UAS mission set, presents the ends, ways, andmeans, and prescribes C-UAS lines of effort in an unified approach to defeat threat UAS.
1-2. Backgrounda. Analysis of the future operational environment and recent military operations around theglobe, clearly illustrates the seriousness of the UAS threat. The Army C-UAS capabilities, past,current and future cross every warfighting function and many JIM partners capabilities play arole in defeating all threat UAS. This strategy represents the effort to align C-UAS efforts acrossthe force.
b. The strategy will address focus on Groups 1-3 UAS since they pose challenges to theforce that are less effectively countered by existing integrated air and missile defense (IAMD)
capabilities. Smaller sized UAS, Group 1-3, are more challenging targets to consistently defeat
due to their ease of proliferation and low/slow kinematic profile, especially in congested airspacewith standoff surveillance capabilities and limited detection/engagement windows.
c. This strategy seeks to provide forces at all echelons with solutions across the doctrine,organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, facility-policy (DOTMLPF-P) frameworkthat will enable defeat of UAS threats. It seeks combined arms solutions, utilizing capabilities
from every warfighting function, in a coordinated, synchronized way. It seeks cross-domain
solutions, recognizing that the C-UAS mission set exists in every domain, not just in the air.
Finally, it seeks a whole-of-government approach, recognizing that a comprehensive C-UAS
capability will involve JIM partners from all areas of government, working together towards acommon goal.
1-3. Assumptions
All assumptions from the Army Capstone Concept (ACC) and the Army Operating Concept(AOC) apply to this strategy. In addition, the following assumptions have been identified: UAS will become smaller, cheaper, and more capable as technology evolves.
 UAS proliferation will increase as UAS become more capable and less expensive.
 Related new technologies will emerge/evolve that enhance UAS operations.
 Future decisions will provide adequate resources and organizational structure to support CUAS capabilities development.
 Current and future IAMD capabilities, to include surface-to-air systems, air-to-air systems,
Command and Control Systems, are adequate to deal with large UAS.
 The cyber domain and electromagnetic spectrum will be more contested in the future.
Adversaries will challenge the United States in these areas due to evolving technology andproliferation.
 Army and JIM partners will continue development of integrated cooperative identification
technologies for application onto most or all friendly UAS platforms.
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1-4. The Army C-UAS Strategy accounted for and provides linkage to:- The Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020 (2012) and the Roadmap for Joint
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (JIAMD) 2020-2030 (2014).
- The Army Operating Concept (AOC) and the Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFCs)
Operational Environment
Background.
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have advanced technologically and proliferated
exponentially over the past decade. As technology has progressed, both reconnaissance andattack capabilities have matured to the point where UAS represent a significant threat to Army
operations from both state and non-state actors.
UAS Threat Types and Observations.
“Groups” are the most widely used and recognized means to classify UAS. The numericaldefinitions use performance characteristics:
Group 4 and 5 UAS are known to fly high and have long distance platforms. They tend tooperate at speeds and altitudes and are similar in size to manned aircraft, performing
missions that are operational or strategic in nature.



Smaller UAS platforms, Groups 1-3, are slower and have shorter-range than the larger
UAS. As UAS have become smaller, slower and operate at lower altitudes, they havebecome more challenging to detect, identify, and defeat. Technological advances haveexacerbated these challenges. These systems can be either proprietary, state sponsored orcommercial-off-the-shelf (COTS). Typical roles for these UAS are limited-scalereconnaissance and surveillance. However, miniaturization of components will makethese UAS more capable in the future. This, coupled with their small size, low cost, andwidespread availability will drastically increase their use worldwide.

Proliferation.
a. Currently, there are more than 600 types of UAS used in over 80 countries. Most
countries that domestically produce UAS have either the same or like models available for saleto foreign governments. The production of small UAS is simple, rapid, and inexpensive.
Estimates vary from 80,000 to half a million drones now operating in U.S. airspace, and theConsumer Electronics Association estimates that 700,000 new UAS will be sold to commercial
and recreational users in the U.S. this year alone.
b. The proliferation of UAS has created an airspace environment in which target
identification is an issue. Many countries now deploy the same or similar models of UAS leading
to issues with combat identification; similarly, users often combine components from different
manufacturers to create ad-hoc “hybrid” UAS. Distinguishing friendly from other UAS may bepossible through technical means, but difficulties from proliferation of similar systems issystemic and unlikely to decline in the near- to mid-term.

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2-4. Vignette - from a collection of open-source reporting
With skies contested by large numbers of highly lethal counter-air systems and a pressing needfor full spectrum ISR, Moscow and Kiev both have deployed large numbers of UAS in supportof their operations in the Crimea. Both sides are using unarmed reconnaissance drones to informtheir forces about the opponent’s movements and positions. One UAS capability in particular
has emerged as a substantial enabler: target acquisition for artillery. One analyst has described
the UAS targeting of the Russian-backed separatists as the most significant difference-maker in a
conflict between otherwise equal forces. Ukraine’s military has not invested heavily in UAS
capabilities; as a result, Ukraine’s forces have resorted to improvising new homemade drones
and buying whatever they can from allies and the commercial market. In contrast, Russianbacked rebels in Ukraine have access to cutting edge UAS technology. Moscow has suppliedthese rebels with both indigenous Russian and foreign systems, including from Israel, France,
and China. In addition, the rebel’s electronic warfare systems far exceed that of Ukraine,
allowing the rebels to control the electromagnetic spectrum and effectively neutralize Ukrainian
UAS while allowing their own freedom of maneuver.
The current Russian advantage in UAS capability stems largely from lessons learned in a past
conflict: Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia. Though the Russians easily defeated Georgia’s tiny
military, Georgian forces made extensive use of Israeli-made UAS in ISR roles, illustrating theirpotential to Russian forces. Soon after, the Russians implemented a massive UAS development
program, buying large numbers of Israeli UAS and investing billions in domestic UAS programs.
Despite their late start, Russia’s UAS program paid dividends in Ukraine. A U.S. Armyspokesman, said in a recent interview, that Russian drones are a major contributing factor to therebel’s extraordinarily accurate artillery.
Russian drones confirmed to be operating in the Crimea include the Orlan-10, the Granat-1, andthe Takhion. All of these drones are tactical: they are physically small and fly low, slow profiles.
All have modular ISR packages and all are used in conjunction with artillery units to increase
accuracy in the target location and response in counterfire. Separatist forces claim that the
Granat-1 doubles the accuracy of artillery battalions equipped with them. Typically, rebel forces
are equipping artillery battalions with tactical UAS, usually at the target acquisition platoon.
Russian tactical UAS can be moved into position and launched very quickly (< 20 minutes),allowing artillery battalions to utilize these systems in support of rapidly moving maneuver units.
The systems utilize modular sensor suites allowing commanders to tailor the sensor to themission and conditions; optical sensor s for good weather, IR or electronic surveillance for badeweather, audio and flash sensors for counterfire missions. These UAS digitally pass accurate
target location data to their operators, who are closely integrated with shooters. Minimal
restrictions allow shooters to engage and destroy targets rapidly, even when targets are concealedor hardened. Most of these UAS do not need to overfly hostile territory and conduct their ISR
from standoff distances.

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Meeting the UAS Challenge: Ends, Ways and Means.
3-1.Ends. The Army develops and provides a comprehensive set of capabilities that enable
current and future commanders at all echelons to detect, identify, and defeat threat UAS andenjoy strategic and tactical freedom of maneuver and action through all domains including
the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS): home and abroad.
3-2. Ways. There is no single, comprehensive materiel solutionthat will make the UAS problem disappear; nor does asingle Army, joint, or multinational capability that can, fromeither a proficiency or sufficiency standpoint, defeat the
UAS threat. Success in the C-UAS mission requires
integration of numerous capabilities that stretch across allseven warfighting functions and across all twenty Army
Warfighting Challenges. This strategy proposes three broad
actions to direct the allocation of future efforts andresources: pursue Joint Combined Arms Solutions, integrate
capabilities across all domains, and adopt a whole-ofgovernment approach.
a. Pursue Joint Combined Arms Solutions. Joint combined arms operations seek tosynchronize capabilities in such a way that achieve mutually complementary effects; including
both traditional military combat systems and the broad range of JIM capabilities necessary toaccomplish a given mission. The C-UAS mission must be viewed as an inherently combinedarms operation despite being seen as an Air Defense only problem; one which Army, joint, andmultinational air defense forces must address unilaterally. While air defense forces play a keyrole in C-UAS, Army, joint and multinational air defense formations are insufficient in bothquantity and capability to address the threat alone. In the JIM realm, Fires forces integrate
surveillance capabilities, identify targets, and facilitate and conduct engagements. Protection andintelligence forces integrate cover, concealment, and deception (CCD) and situational awarenesscapabilities. Electronic Warfare and other Cyber Electro-Magnetic Activity (CEMA) type cells
exploit and integrate cyberspace operations, Electronic Attack (EA) and Electronic Protection(EP) capabilities. Maneuver forces contribute to surveillance and identification while conducting
engagements of threat systems. Mission Command integrates capabilities, implements plans,enhances situational awareness and understanding, and enables leaders’ decision-making. The
goal of this solution seeks an endstate where a rapid and seamless integration of capabilities
aggressively addresses the entire spectrum of the UAS threat, from the national strategic level
down to the individual Soldier. Once operations commence, the objective is to disrupt threat
UAS operations “left-of-launch” both kinetically (strike) and non-kinetically (CEMA or
EW/Cyber) using both passive and active measures seek to defeat systems before their effects
can be employed.
b. Integrate capabilities across all domains. Joint combined arms is, by definition, multidomain. This strategy emphasizes the role of integrating capabilities that cut across multiple
domains, illustrating the joint combined arms approach necessary for a successful C-UAS
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capability. On land, Army and JIM forces target UAS ground stations and support facilities
utilizing integrated air, space, ground, and EMS sensors to accurately locate targets. Groundstations and support facilities are disrupted or destroyed through synchronized and integrated
fires including EA. At sea, Army forces integrate with JIM partners to detect, identify, andengage threat UAS operating over water. In the air, UAS are detected, identified, and defeatedby a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic means. This includes air defense, direct fire and EW,
along with CCD efforts. In space, advanced threat UAS that integrate space-based capabilities
are disrupted through space control measures where space-based sensors contribute surveillance
and targeting data to Army and JIM systems enabling defeat efforts in other domains. In
cyberspace, Army and JIM cyber capabilities are employed to surveil, disrupt, degrade, or
destroy threat UAS. Threat networks to include UAS control systems are attacked, tacticalcommanders are enabled via a cyber-common operating picture (CCOP).
c. Adopt a Whole-of-Government Approach. The Army Operating Concept extends Joint
Combined Arms to encompass enablers and capabilities from across all Army and JIM
organizations and cooperate with JIM partners in developing and implementing a comprehensive
C-UAS strategy. Multinational partners have already begun implementing aggressive C-UAS
plans of their own, and by combining efforts and sharing knowledge, US forces can maximize
the effects of limited resources; however, joint efforts must be coordinated and synchronizedwith JIM efforts to avoid redundancies and conflicts. Multinational partners will, as always, be
important participants in the C-UAS fight. Strategic considerations (basing, sustainment, etc.)
will set the stage for a successful C-UAS mission. These require building partner capacity long
before hostilities commence. Inter-organizational partners play a prominent role in the C-UAS
mission set and efforts between the Army and inter-organizational partners must be coordinatedand synchronized in much the same way as the joint services.
3-3. Means. There are four Lines of Effort (LoEs): Mission Command, Detection,
Identification, and Defeat. This aligns with the problems identified in the 2012 and 2014 CUAS CONOPS. Select lines of effort are bifurcated into two distinct areas: near-term, andmid/far-term. Near-term is intended to cover the timeline through the year 2020; mid- andfar-term looks at five to 25 years from the present time. These lines of effort are intended as
broad discussions of capabilities.

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a. Mission Command. Underpinning the “detect, identify and defeat” methodology is theability to effectively understand, integrate, and command those capabilities.
(1) Airspace Control and Management. Effective airspace management is a cornerstone
to any successful counter-air operation to including supporting and controllingmanned/unmanned aircraft, clearing and authorizing fires through airspace, and supporting
positive and procedural identification of targets of all types. In the long-term, the Army mustpursue automated dynamic airspace management tools that will provide instantaneous clearance
and dynamic airspace control to commanders.
(2) Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Risk Management. Having ROE that are properly
tailored to the situation will facilitate timely engagements of threat systems while mitigating thechances of fratricide.
(3) Tactical Air Picture and Early Warning. Commanders need to provide theirsubordinates with UAS early warning when possible. All C-UAS measures are more effective
when systems and operators have advanced notice, and a higher quality and quantity of thewarning enables more effective C-UAS measures. In the near term, commanders will utilize
existing Army and joint data networks to promulgate data to the lowest possible echelon; longterm will require a comprehensive, tailorable Common Operating Picture (COP) distributed
automatically to all Soldiers who require it.
b. Detection. This line of effort examines and integrates the multiple programs andinitiatives that contribute to detecting UAS; promulgating that information to the affectedcommands. The size, composition, and flight profiles of theater and strategic UAS are equal indifficulty for detecting, tracking, and identifying as manned aircraft. However, other UAS
typically have smaller radar cross sections, smaller IR signatures, and limited electromagnetic
footprints. Current and future sensors require more advanced capabilities to effectively increase
UAS detection. The five subordinate lines of effort for this task are: radar, other electromagnetic
and electronic sensors, OE/IR, acoustic sensors, and visual/audible detection.

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to inform commanders and support C-UAS operations. In the far-term, multi-mission sensors
provide comprehensive radar detection and enhanced identification with fewer sensors.
(2) EO/IR sensors. Electro-optic and infrared (EO/IR) sensors can provide a search,detect, and track capability for all UASs. They can also provide resolved imagery which can beused for recognition and identification, either by human operator or an automated/aided system.
(3) Other Electromagnetic and Electronic Sensors. In addition to radars, formations
must have the capability to detect UAS using other means. Being able to detect, and ideallylocate the source, is an enabler to defeating the UAS threat set. In the near-term, emerging
Electromagnetic and Electronic Sensor capabilities will contribute to this effort.
(4)Acoustic sensors. Acoustic sensors can be standalone or combined with other sensor
modes for a fused sensor system providing a robust capability and a low false-alarm rate.
(5) Visual and Audible. For very small UAS, it is plausible that the first indication of
their presence will be visually seeing or hearing the UAS due to their limited altitudes andranges. Capabilities that allow for these non-electronic detections to be integrated into the joint
tactical picture will enable early warning, commander decision-making, and defeat. Individual
Soldiers must be trained to recognize the sound of a UAS, trained on visual scanning techniques,
and be prepared to communicate critical target information (distance, direction, and type) tohigher echelons.
c. Identification. Forces that have detected a UAS target now must identify its character:threat, friendly, or neutral. Upon detection, by any method, there remains a requirement todifferentiate threat from friendly or neutral UAS to enable tactical and timely decision-making.
(1) Electronic. Electronic means of identification are typically the most sure and also thefastest, though they require the most resources. Improving friendly force identification tools,
will allow the joint force to integrate reliable electronic identification capabilities on all aerial
platforms, simplifying identification procedures at all levels. Emerging sensors that have thecapability to identify targets based on radar cross section, IR signatures, or other electronic
signatures should be integrated into identification processes. These capabilities greatly lessen
the risk to friendly aircraft and thus allow commanders to implement a more aggressive ROE.
(2) Procedural. Procedural ID methods involve identifying a target based on behavior
relative to established airspace control measures, point of origin, or other behavioral
characteristics. Establishing airspace control measures at all echelons, including tactical, is amajor enabler of this method of identification.
(3) Visual. Visual aircraft recognition is a key ID enabler for UAS defeat. While thenumber of UAS types is enormous and varied, they take on only a few primary physical forms.
Training Soldiers to identify UAS based on a handful of primary characteristics (rotary-wing vsfixed wing, pusher vs tractor, etc) can give added information to assist in the hostile or friendly
nature of target.
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d. Defeat. The UAS threat requires a fully integrated combined arms approach. This
strategy proposes a “defense-in-depth” methodology, wherein UAS operations are aggressively
addressed through three distinct tiers: left-of-launch, standoff, and close contact. These tiers canbe thought of as most preferential to least: ideally, UAS are defeated prior to launch, if not, thenat standoff distances, then, if required, in close contact. Capabilities assigned to these tiers are
not intended to be conclusive; rather, it is intended as a broad framework for providing defensein-depth. Each of these capabilities are an option available to a commander to defeat UAS.

(1) Left-of-Launch. Left-of-launch efforts attempt to defeat or disrupt UAS threats prior
to their aerial vehicles ever being deployed. They are conducted across all levels of war. They
will typically involve higher tactical and operational echelons in targeting and integrating
electronic warfare and cyber capabilities, with synchronized diplomatic/political efforts.
a. Proliferation Prevention. As with many other potential threats, the UnitedStates and her allies must attempt to control the proliferation of UAS technology to threat nations
and non-state actors as the diplomatic and political environment allows. While the simplicity
and low cost of UAS technology makes it far more difficult to control than, some levels ofinterference are possible. The Army must interface with these branches of government assigned
to this task and support their efforts.
b. Facility Strike. Attacking launch, maintenance, and command and control
facilities is a method in counter-air campaigns. While not all UAS will have large and/or visible
facilities, those that can be targeted must be a priority target for Army and joint planners. These
actions will likely take place at higher echelons will be integrated through the targeting process.
While this line of effort is identified as a left-of-launch initiative, in practice it must occur
throughout operations.
c. Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations. Many commercial and somemilitary UAS are dependent on cyberspace and EMS capabilities for planning, command, andcontrol. These capabilities must be targeted and attacked in the same way as are tangible
facilities. These efforts are likewise integrated through targeting and must involve joint andmultinational partners.

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UNCLASSIFIED(2) Standoff. Standoff engagements seek to defeat or disrupt UAS operations prior to theemployment of the UAS’s capabilities. These options involve using offensive and defensive
capabilities at longer ranges to deny the use of wide areas to threat UAS. Broadly speaking thesecapabilities will be employed at operational and higher tactical echelons, though some(particularly EW) will likely make their way to very low tactical echelons as new systems are
fielded.
a. UAS Ground Station and Operator Attack. While related to the kinetic attack
operations option above, this effort refers primarily to defeating deployed UAS through attacking
ground stations and operators using joint-combined arms approach.
b. Electronic Warfare. The overall goal of Offensive Electronic Attack (OEA)
involves the use of Electromagnetic (EM) energy and directed energy to control theElectromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) or to attack the enemy. EW efforts are integrated throughtargeting and will occur at all echelons as applicable and must be synchronized. All EW efforts
require effective spectrum management operations to eliminate spectrum fratricide and protect
friendly UAS operations.
c. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). IAMD plays a key role in CUAS at all echelons. Commanders and air defense planners must account for the UAS threat
when establishing critical/defended asset lists, planning system deployments, and developing
ROE. IAMD systems also play a key role in promulgating the joint tactical air picture across theforce, especially to tactical echelons. Air Defenders within tactical formations must inform theircommanders about threat UAS activities and then work to develop a defeat strategy that
integrates all available capabilities.
d. Counter-Reconnaissance. Counter-reconnaissance seeks to undermine thethreat’s ability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. UAS plays a significant role
in reconnaissance for both threat and friendly forces; thus, all counter-reconnaissance plans mustaccount for UAS.
(3) Close Contact. If both left-of-launch and standoff efforts fail to defeat or disrupt
UAS operations, the task of defeating the UAS will likely fall on the unit or asset that the UAS is
attacking or surveilling. These lines of effort can be thought of as a “last line of defense”. Somethreat UAS will be difficult to defeat left-of-launch or at standoff ranges. These lines of effort
will be focused largely on the individual and small unit levels.
a. Individual and Unit Common Task Training. UAS are similar to previous
broadly employed threat capabilities (artillery, air attack, IEDs, etc) that the Army has faced.
When a particular threat capability can affect the entire force, individual and unit task training asa means to counter that threat becomes very important. UAS events must be treated as battle
drills or “warrior tasks” by Soldiers and units: proper responses (reporting, engaging, finding
cover) must be standardized and trained in both institutional and unit environments. Facilities
must also be upgraded, enabling commanders and institutional training alike to conduct C-UAS
as integral parts of training.

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b. Camouflage, Concealment, Deception (CCD) and Hardening. The majority of
UAS employed today and in the near future will not have an organic attack capability. Instead,they are used to detect and identify targets for other weapons systems, such as artillery. Thesesystems can be defeated simply by eliminating their ability to detect their targets. Commanders
at all echelons must emphasize CCD/hardening resourcing and training. Relatively simple
solutions such as camouflage and smoke, can have a significant impact on threat UAS operations
with minimal effort required by friendly forces. Hardening can defeat both attack UAS and fires
enabled by UAS surveillance.
c. Combined Arms for Air Defense (CAFAD) and Other Direct FireEngagements. When units are threatened by UAS operating outside the scope or capability ofother defeat mechanisms, CAFAD engagements must be an option. CAFAD is broadly definedas the use of a unit’s organic direct fire systems (including both kinetic and non-kinetic systems)
to engage an aerial target. Commanders must assess the risk to their formation posed by threat
UAS, the capabilities of their organic direct fire systems, and other available defeat mechanisms
prior to making the decision to engage a target. Commanders must identify the target (andengage per their ROE), and must clear their fire both through the air and on the “beaten zone”(the area where rounds may fall).
Governance Process
The Fires Center of Excellence (CoE), the Army lead for C-UAS, in coordination with other
CoEs, leads an ARCIC directed Integrated Capability Development Team (ICDT) with aquarterly General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). This synchronizes capability
development and shares situational understanding about C-UAS gaps across the Army. Longterm equities are addressed in near-term approaches/agreements; existing developmental
requirements and programs are informed about C-UAS developments. In addition, the Fires
CoE, in cooperation with Army and JIM partners, develops recommended solutions and injects
into the TRADOC, HQDA and other Joint governance processes.
Conclusion
The Army’s existing capabilities and ongoing work to counter threat UAS must be energized inconjunction with efforts that facilitate an Army-wide assessment across the domains. The Armyrecognizes this is not a one size fits all approach to the categorization of threat UAS nor to coretasks associated with C-UAS: detect, identify and defeat. Exploring interoperable andinterdependent joint solutions and bridging some level of shared capability with ourallied/partner nations, this strategy provides a relevant framework for incorporating immediate
and interim measures to protect the force now, and provides the direction toward re-instituting a
joint combined arms approach training strategy for offensive and defense C-UAS capabilities.

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