DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

USCC 2014 ANNUAL REPORT

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00001

Fmt 6019

Sfmt 6019

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00002

Fmt 6019

Sfmt 6019

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

2014
REPORT TO CONGRESSof theU.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC ANDSECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESSSECOND SESSIONNOVEMBER 2014

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00003

Fmt 6012

Sfmt 5011

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

G:\GSDD\USCC\USChina.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Printed for the use of the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.uscc.gov

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00004

Fmt 6012

Sfmt 5011

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

1

2014
REPORT TO CONGRESSof theU.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC ANDSECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESSSECOND SESSIONNOVEMBER 2014

Printed for the use of the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.uscc.gov

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00005

Fmt 5012

Sfmt 5011

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

G:\GSDD\USCC\USChina.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

WASHINGTON : 2014

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
Hon. DENNIS C. SHEA, Chairman
Hon. WILLIAM A. REINSCH, Vice Chairman

COMMISSIONERSCAROLYN BARTHOLOMEWPETER BROOKESROBIN CLEVELANDJEFFREY L. FIEDLER
Hon. CARTE P. GOODWINDANIEL M. SLANE
Hon. JAMES M. TALENT
Hon. KATHERINE C. TOBINMICHAEL R. WESSELLARRY M. WORTZELMICHAEL R. DANIS, Executive Director

The Commission was created on October 30, 2000, by the Floyd D. Spence
National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238, Pub. L. No. 106–398,
114 STAT. 1654A–334 (2000) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2001), as
amended by the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act
for 2002 § 645 (regarding employment status of staff) & § 648 (regarding
changing annual report due date from March to June), Pub. L. No. 107–67,
115 STAT. 514 (Nov. 12, 2001); as amended by Division P of the ‘‘Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,’’ Pub. L. No. 108–7 (Feb. 20, 2003)(regarding Commission name change, terms of Commissioners, and responsibilities of Commission); as amended by Pub. L. No. 109–108 (H.R. 2862)(Nov. 22, 2005) (regarding responsibilities of Commission and applicabilityof FACA); as amended by Pub. L. No. 110–161 (Dec. 26, 2007) (regarding
changes in annual report due date; submission of financial reports; printing
and binding of Congressional reports; employee compensation and performance reviews; and applicability of House rules for travel by members andstaff).
The Commission’s full charter http://www.uscc.gov/about/uscc-charter andStatutory Mandate http://www.uscc.gov/about/fact_sheet are available via
the World Wide Web.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00006

Fmt 0486

Sfmt 0486

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

G:\GSDD\USCC\CONGRESS.#17

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(II)

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSIONNOVEMBER 20, 2014
The Honorable Patrick Leahy,
President Pro Tempore of the U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510
The Honorable John Boehner,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20510
DEAR SENATOR LEAHY AND SPEAKER BOEHNER:
On behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, we are pleased to transmit the Commission’s 2014 Annual
Report to the Congress—the twelfth major Report presented toCongress by the Commission—pursuant to Public Law 106–398(October 30, 2000), as amended by Public Law No. 109–108 (November 22, 2005). This Report responds to the mandate for theCommission ‘‘to monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on thenational security implications of the bilateral trade and economic
relationship between the United States and the People’s Republicof China.’’ The Commission reached a broad and bipartisan consensus on the contents of this Report, with all 12 members voting
to approve and submit it to Congress.
In accordance with our mandate, this Report, which is current asof October 17, includes detailed treatment of our investigations of
the areas identified by Congress for our examination and recommendation. These areas are:
• PROLIFERATION PRACTICES—The role of the People’s Republic of China in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and other weapons (including dual-use technologies), including
actions the United States might take to encourage the People’s
Republic of China to cease such practices;

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• ECONOMIC TRANSFERS—The qualitative and quantitative nature of the transfer of United States production activities to thePeople’s Republic of China, including the relocation of high technology, manufacturing, and research and development facilities,
the impact of such transfers on United States national security,
the adequacy of United States export control laws, and the effectof such transfers on United States economic security and employment;• ENERGY—The effect of the large and growing economy of thePeople’s Republic of China on world energy supplies and the role
the United States can play (including joint research and development efforts and technological assistance) in influencing the energy policy of the People’s Republic of China;• UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS—The extent of access toand use of United States capital markets by the People’s Republic of China, including whether or not existing disclosure andtransparency rules are adequate to identify People’s Republic ofChina companies engaged in harmful activities;

iii

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00007

Fmt 8486

Sfmt 6602

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

• REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY IMPACTS—The triangular economic and security relationship among the UnitedStates, [Taiwan] and the People’s Republic of China (including
the military modernization and force deployments of the People’s
Republic of China aimed at [Taiwan]), the national budget of thePeople’s Republic of China, and the fiscal strength of the People’s
Republic of China in relation to internal instability in the People’s Republic of China and the likelihood of the externalizationof problems arising from such internal instability;• UNITED STATES–CHINA BILATERAL PROGRAMS—Scienceand technology programs, the degree of noncompliance by the
People’s Republic of China with agreements between the UnitedStates and the People’s Republic of China on prison labor imports and intellectual property rights, and United States enforcement policies with respect to such agreements;• WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION COMPLIANCE—The compliance of the People’s Republic of China with its accession agreement to the World Trade Organization (WTO); and• FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION—The implications of restrictions
on speech and access to information in the People’s Republic ofChina for its relations with the United States in the areas of economic and security policy.
The Commission conducted seven public hearings, taking testimony from 60 witnesses that included members of Congress, the executive branch, industry, academia, think tanks and research institutions, and other experts. For each of these hearings, the Commission produced a transcript (posted on its website at www.uscc.gov).
The Commission received a number of briefs by executive branchagencies, the Intelligence Community, and the Department of Defense, including classified briefings on China’s military aerospacemodernization, China-Russia relations, China-Middle East relations, China-North Korea relations, and China’s activities in the
East China Sea. The Commission is preparing a classified reportto Congress on these and other topics. The Commission also received briefs by foreign diplomatic and military officials as well as
U.S. and foreign nongovernmental experts.
Commissioners made official delegation visits to South Korea andAustralia to hear and discuss perspectives on China and its global
and regional activities. In these visits, the Commission delegation
met with U.S. diplomats, host government officials, business representatives, academics, journalists, and other experts. The Commission officially requested the opportunity to visit China this year,
but this request was denied by Chinese government authorities.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Commission also relied substantially on the work of our excellent professional staff and supported outside research in accordance with our mandate.

iv

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00008

Fmt 8486

Sfmt 6602

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

The Report includes 48 recommendations for Congressional action. Our ten most important recommendations appear on page 29
at the conclusion of the Executive Summary.
We offer this Report to Congress in the hope that it will be usefulas an updated baseline for assessing progress and challenges in
U.S.-China relations.
Thank you for the opportunity to serve. We look forward to continuing to work with you in the upcoming year to address issuesof concern in the U.S.-China relationship.
Yours truly,

William A. Reinsch
Vice Chairmanv

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00009

Fmt 8486

Sfmt 6602

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

SheaSig.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Dennis C. Shea
Chairman

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00010

Fmt 8486

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\2014sigs.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

vi

CONTENTS
Page

TRANSMITTAL LETTER TO THE CONGRESS ...............................................................
COMMISSIONERS APPROVING THE REPORT ..............................................................
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................

iii
vi
1
29
33

2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE
U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION
Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations .............................
Section 1: Year in Review: Economics and Trade .............................................
Section 2: U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Economic Challenges ....................
Section 3: China’s Health Care Industry, Drug Safety, and Market Accessfor U.S. Medical Goods and Services ..............................................................
Section 4: U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation .............................................
Recommendations ..................................................................................................

127
183
227

Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China .......................
Section 1: Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs .................................
Section 2: China’s Military Modernization ........................................................
Section 3: China’s Domestic Stability .................................................................
Recommendations ..................................................................................................

231
231
282
347
408

Chapter 3: China and the World .....................................................................
Section 1: China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture ............................
Section 2: Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with North Korea ..
Section 3: Taiwan .................................................................................................
Section 4: Hong Kong ..........................................................................................
Recommendations ..................................................................................................

411
411
446
470
516
546

Comprehensive List of the Commission’s Recommendations ..................

549

Additional Views of Commissioners ................................................................

556

Appendices:
Appendix I:
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Charter ..................................................................................................................
Appendix II:
Background of Commissioners .....................................................
Appendix III: Public Hearings of the Commission During 2014 ......................
Appendix IIIA: List of Witnesses Testifying Before the Commission
During 2014 ..........................................................................................................
Appendix IV: List of Interlocutors During Commission Fact-Finding Trips
to Asia During 2014 .............................................................................................
Appendix V:
List of Research Material ............................................................
Appendix VI: Acronyms and Abbreviations .......................................................
2014 Commission Staff and Acknowledgements ..........................................

37
37
88

559
569
579
583
587
589
595
599

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(VII)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00011

Fmt 5904

Sfmt 5904

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00012

Fmt 5904

Sfmt 5904

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations
Year in Review: Economics and Trade
In 2014, China’s government focused on stimulating its economy
to achieve official growth targets, rather than implement substantive economic reform. Although the Chinese government
pledged not to employ large-scale stimulus in 2014, Beijing implemented expansionary fiscal initiatives throughout the year, including subsidized fixed investment and exports, credit loosening, andtax incentives to bolster its economy. These measures enabled
China to sustain economic growth at or near its official target rateof 7.5 percent through the first three quarters of 2014. However,
the government failed to address China’s underlying structuralproblems, such as oversupply, overcapacity, mounting local government debt, and asset bubbles that put its economy at risk of a
sharp slowdown or ‘‘hard landing.’’ In 2013, Chinese President Xi
Jinping laid out a sweeping economic reform agenda during theThird Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to address
many of China’s underlying economic problems. President Xi’s proposed reforms include a revised tax system, financial liberalization,and partial reform of restrictions on imports and inbound foreign
investment. However, President Xi’s government made minimal
progress in implementing these reforms in 2014, and it remains
unclear whether the Xi government will accelerate reform in 2015.
Meanwhile, China’s economic imbalances—both external and internal—continue to burden the U.S. and global economies. China’s
dependence on exports for growth, a policy supported by an undervalued currency, has resulted in China’s accumulation of record foreign currency reserves, and contributes to global trade imbalances.
Despite China’s economic slowdown, its exports continue to grow,and China in 2014 sustained its global trade surplus. In the firsteight months of 2014, the U.S.-China trade deficit increased by 4.1
percent year-on-year to a total of $216 billion. Domestically, thegovernment’s failure to shift the economy toward a more consumption-based growth model maintains China’s overdependence on exports and investment and limits opportunities for U.S. exports to
China.
In 2014, Chinese direct investment flows into the United States
exceeded U.S. investment into China for the first time as foreign
firms faced an increasingly hostile investment climate in China.
According to data from China’s Ministry of Commerce, foreign direct investment (FDI) into China declined 1.8 percent in the firsteight months of 2014 compared to the same period in 2013. China
ramped up use of its Anti-Monopoly Law against foreign firms inwhat appears to be unequal enforcement in order to create favor-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(1)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00013

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

2
able market conditions for Chinese competitors. China used theAnti-Monopoly Law to investigate foreign firms in sectors designated by the government as ‘‘strategic and emerging,’’ including
automobiles and information technology. In addition, uneven enforcement of Chinese laws, lack of transparency, and state-run
media attacks on foreign firms contributed to further deteriorationof the foreign investment climate in China. At the same time,
China accelerated its 2001 ‘‘go out’’ policy, which encourages Chinese firms to expand their global presence. In the United States,
stock of Chinese FDI grew from $1.9 billion in 2007 to $17 billion
in 2012.
Trade tensions between the United States and China escalated
in 2014 as key World Trade Organization (WTO) cases advanced orwere concluded and the U.S. Department of Justice filed indictments against five Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiersfor engaging in state-sponsored, cyber-enabled theft of commercial
property. The WTO Dispute Resolution Panel ruled in favor of U.S.
claims that China was imposing unlawful export restrictions onrare earths and antidumping and countervailing duties on U.S.
automobile imports. However, several trade disputes with China
remain unresolved or uncontested, including China’s consistent
failure to report subsidies to the WTO, localization requirementsthat force the transfer of U.S. technology to Chinese firms, and restricted market access in several industries.
Conclusions• Despite U.S. exports to China growing by 6.2 percent, imbalances in the U.S.-China trade relationship increased in thefirst eight months of 2014 as the trade deficit grew by 4.1 percent. China stalled on liberalizing key sectors in which theUnited States is competitive globally, such as services. Chinese
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the United States
grew, while U.S. FDI into China fell as foreign firms faced anincreasingly hostile investment climate in China.
• Supported by government stimulus, China sustained economic
growth at or near its official target rate of 7.5 percent throughthe first three quarters of 2014. Underlying economic problems
in China, including oversupply of property and industrial overcapacity, continue to put economic growth at risk of further deceleration.
• China’s chronic overcapacity, especially in sectors such as steel
and solar panels, continued to harm U.S. manufacturing andexports by dumping excess supply into global markets.
• China’s government made little to no progress this year in implementing the economic reforms designated by its leadershipduring the 2013 Third Plenum. Instead, Chinese President Xi
Jinping and his leadership team focused on a broad anticorruption campaign, while using stimulus to avoid further
economic slowdown.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• While disposable income and consumption have increased relative to savings, China has not yet weaned itself off its tradi-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00014

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

3
tional investment and export-based growth model, and continues to struggle with large internal imbalances.
• China’s nontransparent policymaking came under criticism atthe World Trade Organization, and China obstructed progressin key trade negotiations, such as the Information Technology
Agreement. China’s confrontational behavior in addressing contentious territorial disputes with neighboring countries also
harmed economic and trade relations in the Asia Pacific.
U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Economic Challenges

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Since China joined the WTO in 2001, U.S.-China bilateral trade
has grown exponentially, but the trading relationship has become
increasingly unbalanced. In the last year, China shipped nearlyfour dollars’ worth of goods to the United States for every dollar’sworth of imports from the United States. The resulting U.S. trade
deficit with China set a record for the fourth year in a row. This
deficit, non-existent three decades ago, is now the largest bilateral deficit in the world—three times the size of the second largest
U.S. deficit, with Japan. Americans turn primarily to China to purchase computer and communications equipment and apparel. China’s main purchases from the United States, meanwhile, are oil
seeds, aircraft, and waste and scrap. China thus has the benefit ofselling more value-added goods to the United States, the production of which tends to employ more Chinese workers at higher pay.
Meanwhile U.S. exports to China are falling short both in volume
and in labor market value. As of the end of August 2014, the U.S.
trade deficit with China already stood at $216 billion, about $8.5
billion more than the same time last year. At this pace, the 2014
deficit will reach another high.
The size of the overall trade deficit—and the bilateral trade deficit with China in particular—is a perennial source of concern in
the United States about declining competitiveness, job losses, andChinese companies’ unfair trade practices. Alliance for American
Manufacturing President Scott Paul is among those economists
blaming the U.S. trade deficit with China for ‘‘a shrinking middle
class’’ and ‘‘fewer good job opportunities,’’ and ‘‘further proof that
our economic policies—including a lack of enforcement of existing
trade laws—contribute to outsourcing.’’ U.S. employment in some
sectors, particularly the manufacturing sector, has dropped substantially as trade with China has increased. Since China joined
the WTO, the United States has lost 29 percent of its manufacturing jobs, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, andeconomists have begun to establish clear correlations between thisjob loss and trade with China.
The bilateral trade imbalance is driven, in large part, by China’s
mercantilist and state-directed policies. Although China promised
extensive market reforms when it joined the WTO, it has been reluctant to implement them. Instead, the Chinese government has
institutionalized preferences for state-owned enterprises and favored industries, particularly in areas designated as ‘‘strategic.’’ As
a consequence, the United States continues to face challenges with
China’s WTO-illegal and trade-distorting subsidies, discrimination
against U.S. goods, services, and technologies, prohibited localiza-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00015

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

4
tion requirements, and inadequate protections for intellectual property (IP), among other barriers to free trade.
The United States government uses a combination of diplomacy
and enforcement tools to try to address China’s unfair practices,but despite these efforts, Chinese trade violations continue and thebilateral trading relationship grows more lopsided. Unfortunately,
the United States too often chooses dialogue with China overstrong enforcement measures, and bilateral talks often fail to deliver much more than an expanding menu of follow-on discussions.
And although the Obama Administration has significantly stepped
up trade enforcement cases against China, these efforts are limitedin their impact because defendants continue to rely on an array ofloopholes for avoiding trade remedies.
An even bigger challenge for enforcement efforts looms ahead. In
December 2016, the provision of China’s WTO accession protocolthat enables countries to treat China automatically as a non-market economy expires. The expiration of this WTO provision may potentially make it more difficult for the United States to levy penalty tariffs against China for dumping. This does not mean that theUnited States will have to recognize China as a market economy.
The existing statutory test under U.S. law will still apply for purposes of determining China’s status, and multiple subject matter
experts testified to the Commission that China is far from meetingthe criteria.
As dialogue and enforcement efforts fall short, a rapidly expanding stream of Chinese direct investment is flowing into the UnitedStates. This trend could be a boon to U.S. employment if the investments prove to be engines for job creation. However, the presence of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the United States may
also pose significant competitive challenges for domestic companies,
with potentially serious drawbacks for U.S. workers. Chinese investment in the United States could also create impediments fordomestic industries petitioning the federal government for tradeenforcement assistance, and anecdotal evidence demonstrates thatstate efforts to attract Chinese investment can undermine federal
trade enforcement measures as well.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Conclusions• The United States’ trade deficit with China is by far its largest, and it has grown sharply in recent years to become thesingle biggest bilateral deficit in the world. In 2013, it reached$318.4 billion, setting a record for the fourth straight year,with China exporting nearly four dollars’ worth of goods to theUnited States for every dollar’s worth of imports it purchasedfrom the United States. Even as U.S. exports to China havegrown, our deficit has grown faster. This deficit is associatedwith declining U.S. economic competitiveness and job losses,
which helps explain why 52 percent of Americans now believethat China poses a critical threat to vital future U.S. economic
interests.
• U.S. employment in some sectors, particularly the manufacturing sector, has dropped substantially as trade with China
has increased. Since China joined the World Trade Organiza-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00016

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

5

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

tion (WTO), the United States has lost 29 percent of its manufacturing jobs, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
and economists have begun to establish clear correlations between this job loss and the bilateral trading relationship.
• Even as U.S. manufacturing has slumped, U.S. corporations
have relocated manufacturing operations to China and importsof Chinese manufactured goods have grown exponentially. As
a result, the benefits of the U.S.-China trade relationship haveaccrued disproportionately to U.S. corporations, while most of
the drawbacks have been borne by U.S. workers.
• Unfair Chinese trade practices, including market protections,subsidization, and favoritism toward certain domestic players,
as well as provisions for limiting foreign investment in certain
manufacturing operations, have also contributed indirectly tothe ongoing decline in U.S. manufacturing employment. Although China committed to sweeping reforms when it joined
the WTO, Chinese efforts to honor these commitments haveslackened in the last ten years. The Chinese economy benefits
from a host of policies and practices that violate the spirit, andeven the letter, of Beijing’s WTO commitments and harm U.S.
interests. Despite a proliferation of bilateral forums for engagement, U.S. efforts to talk through these problems have consistently fallen short. Enforcement actions have increased, but theresults of these efforts have been limited, and many issues remain unaddressed.
• The dominance of state-owned enterprises in the Chinese economy is one of the reasons the United States has not designated
China as a market economy, despite China’s active pursuit ofsuch a designation for many years. The United States has astatutory test for determining whether an economy can be classified as a market economy. The factors to be considered under
U.S. law in granting market economy status include the extent
to which the country’s currency is convertible, the extent towhich wage rates are freely determined by negotiations between labor and management, and the extent to which the government owns or controls the means and decisions of production. Expert witnesses have testified to the Commission that
China is not currently a market economy and is not on thepath to become one in the near future.
• Because trade remedies are often inaccessible, they are effectively useless to smaller U.S. companies that cannot afford to
pursue cases and to companies that cannot muster the threshold industry support. Available trade remedies remain inadequate and fail to account for the interests of other affected
constituents, such as workers and communities; China’s undervaluation of its currency, for example, continues to function asa de facto subsidy for its exports, and U.S. law still does notprovide a sufficient remedy to this problem for private parties.
The Administration has not been effective in getting China tochange its policies. A number of U.S. petitioners have asserted
claims against China’s currency policy as an actionable subsidy, but the Commerce Department has refused to treat cur-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00017

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

6
rency undervaluation as actionable under the law. Even when
trade remedy cases are successful, they do not always deliver
sufficient and timely relief.
• Growing Chinese investment in the United States could be aboon to U.S. employment, but the peculiarities of state influence on Chinese corporate behavior in the United States may
also pose significant competitive challenges for domestic companies, with serious drawbacks for U.S. workers. Chinese investment in the United States could pose impediments tomembers of domestic industries petitioning the Federal Government for trade enforcement assistance, and anecdotal evidence demonstrates that state efforts to attract Chinese investment can also undermine federal trade enforcement efforts.
The potential impact of inbound Chinese investment should be
more thoroughly investigated and addressed.
China’s Health Care Industry, Drug Safety, and Market Access for
U.S. Medical Goods and Services

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The healthcare sector has played a marginal role in U.S.-China
relations, but that is beginning to change. China has become theworld’s top producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients and inert
substances, as well as a significant exporter of medical products.
U.S. drug companies and distributors are sourcing a large share ofingredients and finished drugs from China and selling them in the
United States. Concurrently, China is experiencing a major demographic and epidemiologic transition, challenging the nation’s
health care system. An older and wealthier population, with a rising incidence of non-communicable diseases, is seeking more frequent and better-quality treatment. U.S. companies that market
drugs, medical devices, and healthcare services view China as animportant opportunity.
U.S. reliance on foreign medical products has increased substantially in the 21st century, and that trend is reflected in U.S. imports from China. The total number of shipments of products from
China regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) increased from approximately 1.3 million entry lines (i.e., items suchas food, drugs, and devices) in 2007 to almost 5.2 million in 2013.
In a 2010 study of pharmaceutical executives, 70 percent of respondents cited China as their top source country for pharmaceutical ingredients. The United States imported over 100 million
kilograms of pharmaceutical goods from China in 2013, close to a
200 percent increase over the past decade. China is a leading
source of U.S. imports of vitamins, antibiotics, and nonprescription
painkillers, such as ibuprofen, acetaminophen, and aspirin.
These trends are worrying because China is also a manufacturerof fake and substandard drugs. Tainted heparin, containing ingredients sourced from China, claimed at least 81 lives in the UnitedStates in 2007 and 2008. Subtler risks to consumers include inadequate dosages, fake packaging, and ingredient impurities. The
Chinese government is taking preliminary steps to improve regulation of pharmaceutical production. Important measures include updating good manufacturing practices legislation in 2011 and consolidating separate regulatory agencies into the China Food and

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00018

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

7

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Drug Administration (CFDA) in 2013. However, China’s ability toregulate its own producers is hampered by bureaucratic infighting
between the CFDA and other central government agencies, as well
as excessive decentralization of regulatory responsibilities to local
governments. The absence of checks and balances in China’s authoritarian system also makes it difficult to hold manufacturers
and officials accountable.
Congress has passed new bills, such as the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (2012), to enhance the
FDA’s efforts to monitor drug safety overseas, at the border, andin the U.S. market. Using a computerized algorithm called PREDICT, U.S. drug regulators are better able to quantify the risks ofindividual shipments. However, U.S. consumers remain at risk. As
of October 2014, the FDA had only one part-time and two full-time
drug inspectors to police China’s vast and fragmented drug industry. A key problem has been securing work visas from the Chinese
government for additional U.S. inspectors. The issue was raised byVice President Joe Biden on his December 2013 trip to China. But
as of September 2014 these efforts had not produced any results.
Behind the U.S. border, the FDA faces the challenge of implementing track-and-trace technologies and regulating wholesalers at
the state level.
China’s median age will exceed that of the United States within
this decade, and the proportion aged 65 and above will increase to
25 percent by 2040, totaling 300 million. The incidence of diseases
such as cancer and diabetes is rising, brought on not only by aging
and insufficient preventive care, but also by increasing affluence,urbanization, and pollution. In response, the Chinese governmentis stepping up efforts to fix the country’s troubled healthcare system. In addition to structural reforms, it invested more than $371
billion into the healthcare sector between 2009 and 2012. And yet,healthcare costs are rising, hospitals are overcrowded, and patienton-doctor violence is on the increase. The government has focusedon expanding public health insurance coverage and raising fixed investment in infrastructure and machines, without addressing low
pay in the medical profession or improving coordination between
large hospitals and local clinics. Distorted fee schedules incentivize
doctors to undersupply basic services and oversupply costly drugs
and treatments.
U.S. companies keen to sell goods and services in China’s healthcare sector must contend with Beijing’s heavy-handed intervention
in the healthcare market. Government entities run the largest hospitals and insurers, set prices, and determine which foreign drugs
make it onto drug reimbursement lists. Private sector providers operate on an uneven playing field and as a result have done little
to improve overall delivery. Onerous clinical trials can delay themarketing of U.S. drugs by up to eight years. Unequal access to reimbursement lists—which are seldom updated—makes some U.S.
drugs expensive for Chinese patients. U.S. device makers likewisesuffer from a number of regulatory hurdles that impact data protection and competitiveness.
Not least of all, foreign companies are struggling to operate ethically in an authoritarian state plagued by widespread corruption.
In September 2014, a secret one-day trial was held in a Chinese

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00019

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

8
court to adjudicate the case of British drug maker GlaxoSmithKline, which stood accused of funneling money through a local
travel agency to pay bribes to doctors in return for prescribing its
drugs. GlaxoSmithKline was fined nearly half a billion dollars, thehighest fine on record against a foreign company. The court also
sentenced the company’s British former country manager and fourother company managers to prison terms of up to four years.
Conclusions

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• China today is the world’s largest producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients and inert substances. In a 2010 study ofpharmaceutical executives by the consulting firm Axendia, 70
percent of respondents cited China as their top source country
for pharmaceutical ingredients. China’s rise as a pharmaceuticals exporter has coincided with growing reliance on drug
and drug ingredient imports in the United States, which is estimated to be the top importer of China’s pharmaceutical raw
materials. These trends are worrying because China, by someestimates, is also the world’s leading supplier of fake and substandard drugs. Tainted heparin, which contained ingredientssourced from China, claimed at least 81 lives in the UnitedStates in 2007–2008. More subtle risks of unsafe drugs include
inadequate dosages of active ingredients, impure ingredients,and false packaging.
• Since 2007, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
taken important steps to improve drug safety regulation. In
China, the FDA is expanding its team of drug inspectors, increasing the frequency of inspections, and working closely with
its counterparts at the China Food and Drug Administration.
In the United States, Congressional legislation has given theagency more authority to hold companies accountable for their
supply chain safety, collect user fees from companies to financeregulatory efforts, seize unsafe products at the border, andtrack-and-trace products via serial numbers. The agency has
also transitioned to an electronic, risk-based surveillance system known as PREDICT.
• There is much work to be done to improve drug safety in the
United States. Regulating China’s vast drug industry, especially the production of precursor chemicals by semi-legitimate
companies, is a severe challenge. China’s own drug safety regulation is fragmented and decentralized and lacks civil society
monitoring. The FDA’s China offices have had trouble securing
work visas for new inspectors and conducting unannounced
factory inspections.
• Alongside its role as a pharmaceutical producer, China is undergoing an epidemiologic and demographic transition that isfundamentally changing the country’s demand for healthcare.
Chronic and non-communicable diseases are on the rise, due toan aging population and to a worrying decline in public health,caused by pollution, poor diet, and other factors. A more affluent and urbanized population is seeking better quality care.
Some experts estimate China’s healthcare spending to increase

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00020

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

9

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

from $357 billion in 2011 to $1 trillion in 2020, making China
the second-largest market after the United States.
• At present, China’s healthcare market is ill equipped to meetthe rise in demand for care. Relative to wealthier countries,
doctors and hospital beds are in short supply. Healthcare
spending is only 5 percent of gross domestic product, compared
to an average of 9 percent in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. To remedy this situation, the Chinese government launched ambitious healthcare
reforms in 2009 that aim to extend basic government-subsidized health insurance, expand the population health benefit
package, strengthen primary care, control the price of essential
drugs, and reform government-owned hospitals. Fiscal spending to support these reforms totaled some $371 billion in 2009–2012.
• Not all of China’s healthcare reforms have succeeded, and serious problems remain. Expanded insurance coverage has had
some success in reducing rural-urban gaps and out-of-pocket
spending. But the insurance coverage of migrant workers is
not portable, and coverage is limited for costlier drugs andtreatments. The absence of a functioning referral system has
led to overcrowding in large hospitals and underutilization of
local providers.
• On the supply side, most of China’s public funding increases
for healthcare have gone toward brick-and-mortar investments
and new machines, rather than increases in doctors’ salaries.
Prices and fees remain subject to government interference,
which incentivizes doctors to undersupply basic services andoversupply costly drugs and treatments. The net result is that
hospitals are short of qualified staff and rely excessively on
drug revenues, while healthcare spending is rising on the backof escalating costs rather than improvements in care. Private
sector providers operate on an uneven playing field and havedone little to improve overall delivery.
• U.S. companies that market drugs, medical devices, andhealthcare services view China as an important opportunity,
not only to source cheap inputs, but also to market goods andconduct research and development. An important impetus tofocus resources on China is slowing demand and changing regulation in the United States, as well as a lack of other markets
that match China in terms of market size and level of development.
• Market access for U.S. drug and device makers remains restricted. Companies are concerned about being targeted by China’s recent anticorruption drive and indiscriminate use of its
antimonopoly law, which ostensibly aim to lower healthcare
costs but serve to disadvantage foreign companies. China’s
process for approving new drugs leads to excessive data transfers. Loopholes in China’s intellectual property laws allow local
drug makers to reproduce U.S. patent drugs prematurely. Onerous clinical trials, combined with state interference in tendering, pricing, and reimbursement, cause delays of up to eight

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00021

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

10
years for state-of-the-art U.S. drugs, and make these drugs
prohibitively expensive for ordinary Chinese patients. U.S. device makers are concerned as well about proposed amendments
to China’s Medical Device Law, published in March 2014. The
amendment could impose hundreds of new requirements on
foreign device makers, including indigenous standards for serial number tracking.
U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The United States and China lead in global energy consumption
and rely on abundant domestic coal resources to provide energy,
which results in high levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.
China is the world’s largest emitter of CO2, followed by the UnitedStates, and their joint efforts are necessary for successful global reduction of emissions. Both countries are investing in renewable resources, such as wind and solar, while at the same time both countries are also working on increasing efficiencies and reducing pollution by making conventional energy sources, such as natural gas
and coal, cleaner. At the June 2008 Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the United States and China signed the Ten Year Framework on Energy and Environmental Cooperation, establishing goals
for cooperation on clean electricity, clean water, clean air, efficienttransportation, and forest conservation. During a November 2009
trip to Beijing, President Obama used this framework as the basis
for establishing a number of initiatives to enhance U.S.-China cooperation on clean energy.
The U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) is themost ambitious U.S.-China program for joint research and clean
energy development to come out of the November 2009 meeting between President Obama and President Hu. As part of the program,the U.S. Department of Energy awarded grants to research teams
led by West Virginia University on clean coal, the University ofMichigan on clean vehicles, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory on building energy efficiency. These U.S. teams conduct
joint research with Chinese teams led by Huazhong University of
Science and Technology on clean coal, Tsinghua University on
clean vehicles, and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development on building energy efficiency. CERC is funded in equalparts by the United States and China, with each consortium allocating a budget of $50 million for the first five years ($25 million
provided by the national governments matched by $25 million fromindustry, universities, research institutions, and other stakeholders). The nature of CERC’s work is collaborative, with several
participants (academic, industry, or a combination) working oneach project at the same time. As of July 2014, CERC consisted of
75 individual projects within its three consortia, of which 58 were
joint efforts.
One of CERC’s unique features is its Technology Management
Plan (TMP), which was created to address IP concerns associatedwith joint research and development activities. While the TMP does
not add any new IP protections that the law does not otherwise
provide, TMP establishes a framework to manage any IP developed
under the umbrella of CERC. However, to date, most CERC participants still tend to design collaborative projects only around less

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00022

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

11
sensitive research topics, and little of the new IP generated
through CERC activities has come from collaborative efforts—anindication that China’s history of poor IP protection continues tohave a chilling effect on cooperation.
Keen on reducing its reliance on coal, the Chinese governmenthas been investing in nuclear energy and natural gas. However,China lacks knowledge necessary to develop indigenous nuclear
technology or to tap its massive reserves of shale gas. Instead,
China has sought to acquire the necessary expertise through cooperation with foreign governments and companies. The UnitedStates and China are already working together in both governmental and private capacities. However, commercial activities remain the predominant channel for information sharing and technology transfer in the shale gas sector and in the nuclear energy
sector. Because U.S. companies are valuable sources of information
on fracking technology for Chinese oil companies, Chinese investment in the U.S. shale gas sector has been on the rise. In 2013
alone, China invested $3.2 billion in the U.S. energy sector. However, the success of Chinese investors in the United States points
to a troubling lack of reciprocity: While Chinese companies canfreely acquire assets in U.S. oil and natural gas companies, theChinese government prohibits foreign companies from doing thesame, forcing them instead to form partnerships with Chinese entities. The situation is similar when it comes to civil nuclear energy.
The United States and China have cooperated for nearly 30 years,
although for most of its history, the cooperation has focused primarily on strengthening nuclear safety. More recently, transfer oftechnology through commercial engagement came to dominate
U.S.-China nuclear cooperation. In 2007, U.S.-based Westinghouse(owned by Toshiba Corp.) won the contract to build four AP1000
nuclear reactors in China. The deal included a technology transfer
agreement that allowed China’s State Nuclear Power Technology
Corp., directly under China’s State Council, to receive over 75,000
documents that relate to the construction of the AP1000 reactors.
To the extent that China’s investment in clean energy leads toreduced emissions of CO2 and other pollutants, U.S. public and private cooperation with China on development of clean energy has
positive outcomes for all nations. China is a global leader in clean
energy investment, and Chinese funding could be used to boost
technologies that are not cost effective in the short run. China’s
lack of strong IP standards and potential for future competition
with U.S. renewable energy companies remain primary challenges
to closer cooperation. Analysts and policymakers continue to fearthat China could reap the benefits of cooperation at the expense of
U.S. industry and workers.
Conclusions

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• The United States and China share similar challenges in theirquest for clean energy. Both countries are leading global
emitters of greenhouse gasses and could benefit from cooperation on issues related to climate change and environmental
protection.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00023

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

12
• The United States and China have been cooperating for over
30 years on environmental and clean energy initiatives, withmuch of the early agreements focusing more on establishing
the basic frameworks for cooperation and on energy policy discussions. In the 2000s, clean energy and climate change mitigation emerged as leading topics of cooperation between China
and the United States, culminating in 2009 with the establishment of the Clean Energy Research Center (CERC), a joint research initiative.
• The CERC facilitates joint research and development on clean
energy technology by teams of scientists and engineers fromthe United States and China. Funded in equal parts by theUnited States and China, CERC has participation from universities, research institutions and industry. CERC’s three research priorities (the consortia) are advanced clean coal technologies, clean vehicles, and building energy efficiency.
• While Chinese CERC participants have been filing patents in
China and in the United States, to date, there have been no
jointly-created intellectual property (IP) and no U.S. inventions
patented in China, suggesting that China’s history of lax protection of IP dampens enthusiasm for collaboration.
• While collaboration under CERC is research-driven, U.S.China cooperation on shale gas development is more commercial, largely involving investment by Chinese companies in
U.S. shale assets in order to acquire technology and know-how.
• Similar to shale gas, U.S.-China cooperation on civil nuclear
energy involves a sale of technology to China, supplemented by
nuclear safety, safeguards, and security training to Chinese
regulators and technicians to ensure China meets the highest
nuclear safety and nonproliferation standards.
Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China
Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Although it is still early in his administration, General Secretary
Xi appears to have consolidated a high degree of control over China’s security and foreign policy-making processes in his first two
years in power. His proactive—and sometimes aggressive—approach to security and foreign affairs has been a hallmark of histenure thus far. In fact, China’s Foreign Minister remarked in ahigh-profile press conference in March 2014 that ‘‘ ‘active’ is themost salient feature’’ of China’s diplomacy under the Xi Administration. President Xi has emphasized ‘‘peripheral diplomacy’’ and in
the past year has announced several ambitious projects to link
China with its continental and maritime neighbors, including a
Silk Road Economic Route across Eurasia, a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road through the Indo-Pacific, and a Bangladesh-ChinaIndia-Myanmar Economic Corridor. In addition, the PLA increased
its global footprint in 2014, continuing its counterpiracy operationsin the Gulf of Aden, conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan in thePhilippines, and participating in regional search and rescue oper-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00024

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

13
ations following the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370.
The PLA also participated in more exercises and drills with foreign
militaries in 2014 than in any previous year since 2005, and participated for the first time in the U.S.-led multinational Rim of the
Pacific exercise.
Beijing’s efforts to cultivate positive relations with peripheral
countries were overshadowed, however, by its increasingly bold andcoercive actions toward its maritime neighbors. Although China’s
assertive approach to its maritime territorial disputes has been ongoing since approximately 2009, the past year saw several worrying
new developments. First, China in late 2013 established an Air Defense Identification Zone over islands and waters in the East China
Sea contested by Japan. Not only did this ratchet up already-simmering tensions between Beijing and Tokyo over the dispute, but
it led to dangerous air encounters between Chinese and Japanesemilitary aircraft. In May 2014, China sparked widespread protests
in Vietnam (and attracted criticism from the international community) when it moved an oil rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic
zone.* The rig was accompanied by dozens of Chinese fishing,
Coast Guard, and naval vessels, and clashes between these and Vietnamese boats injured dozens of Vietnamese fishermen and sunka Vietnamese fishing boat. Starting in March 2014, the China
Coast Guard began to disrupt access by the Philippines to one ofits naval outposts in the South China Sea in an apparent effort toweaken Manila’s control over contested parts of the Spratly Islands. And finally, in an effort to augment its own presence in the
Spratly Islands, China ramped up land reclamation projects on atleast five reefs, several of which now appear to feature robust civilian and military infrastructure including radars, satellite communication equipment, antiaircraft and naval guns, helipads, docks,
and potentially an airstrip.
With a few exceptions, the U.S.-China security relationship deteriorated in 2014 as well. Turmoil in the East and South China Seas
was a key driver of this downturn in bilateral relations, not leastof all because two of the countries embroiled in territorial disputes
with China—Japan and the Philippines—are U.S. treaty allies. In
addition, Chinese military aircraft and vessels have on several occasions since late 2013 confronted U.S. military aircraft and ships
in East Asia’s air and maritime commons. On each of these occasions, Chinese military personnel engaged in unsafe, unprofessional, and aggressive behavior that could have resulted in theloss of life or a major political crisis. China’s decision to send an
uninvited intelligence collection ship to spy on the U.S.-led Rim of
the Pacific exercise also was inappropriate, and undermined thespirit of cooperation and transparency that the exercise sought tocultivate. It is becoming clear that President Xi’s government iswilling to cause a much higher level of tension in the bilateral rela-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal state is entitledto an exclusive economic zone, a 200-nautical mile zone extending from the coastline of its mainland and from the coastline of any territorial land features. Within this zone, the state enjoys‘‘sovereign rights’’ for economic exploitation (such as oil and natural gas exploration and exploitation), but not full sovereignty. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ‘‘Article 56:
Rights, Jurisdiction, and Duties of the Coastal State in the Exclusive Economic Zone.’’ http://
ww.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos//part5.htm; United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, ‘‘Article 121: Regime of Islands.’’ http://ww.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos//part8.htm.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00025

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

14
tionship than past administrations have. Unfortunately, China’s
pursuit of a more confrontational relationship with the UnitedStates likely will persist.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Conclusions• China has been aggressively advancing its security interests inEast Asia. This has led to tension, confrontation, and near-crises with its neighbors and the United States and has fueled
competition with the United States that increasingly appears
to be devolving into a zero-sum rivalry. A central characteristicof this pattern is Beijing’s effort to force the United States tochoose between abandoning its East Asian allies to appease
China and facing potential conflict with Beijing by protecting
its allies from China’s steady encroachment. China’s pattern of
behavior is likely to persist.
• China’s People’s Liberation Army has undertaken provocative,
aggressive, and dangerous behavior aimed at the U.S. military
in maritime East Asia, which creates the risk of misperception,
miscalculation, escalation, and loss of life.
• Having rapidly consolidated power, Chinese President Xi
Jinping appears to have achieved a higher degree of control
over China’s national security and foreign policy than his predecessor and is pursuing a more active role for China in regional and international affairs. President Xi’s proposed regional arrangements, the Silk Road Economic Belt, 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and Bangladesh-China-IndiaMyanmar Economic Corridor, are designed to project a positiveand ‘‘responsible’’ image of China to the region and the world,develop trade routes, and gain access to natural resources.
These initiatives, couched in terms of cooperation and friendship, belie China’s increasingly strident efforts to intimidate
and coerce many of its neighbors.
• China’s territorial dispute with Japan remains one of the region’s most dangerous flashpoints. China’s declaration of an
Air Defense Identification Zone over contested waters in the
East China Sea in late 2013 ratcheted up tensions with Japanand created an unsafe and unpredictable air environment in
the region. On two occasions in 2014, Chinese and Japanesemilitary aircraft activity in China’s Air Defense Identification
Zone led to close encounters which could have resulted in an
accident and loss of life.
• China moved aggressively in asserting its claims in the South
China Sea in 2014, using unilateral and destabilizing actions
to advance its territorial ambitions. In March, it began attempts to block access to a Philippine military outpost in theSouth China Sea, Second Thomas Shoal. In May, it moved an
oil rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. Throughout theyear, it continued work on various land reclamation projects in
the South China Sea, including building military facilities on
Fiery Cross Reef and potentially Johnson South Reef in the
Spratly Islands. China’s actions have introduced greater instability to the region and violate China’s 2002 agreement with

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00026

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

15
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which stipulates
that all claimants should ‘‘exercise self-restraint in the conductof activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.’’• China’s People’s Liberation Army participated in more exercises and drills with foreign militaries in 2014 than in any previous year since 2005. In particular, China’s participation in
the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific exercise illustrated the People’s
Liberation Army’s intent to increase its participation in regional and global security affairs. However, China’s decision tosend an uninvited intelligence collection ship to the exercise
seemed to belie its rhetoric of peaceful cooperation with its
neighbors.
• Due largely to institutional and training reforms over the last
decade, China’s People’s Liberation Army now is able to maintain higher day-to-day readiness rates and conduct longerrange and more frequent, robust, and realistic training. As
these reforms continue, the Chinese military gradually will become more proficient and confident operating its advanced
weapons, platforms, and systems and conducting large-scale,sophisticated operations.
• China’s naval operations within weapons range of U.S. bases
and operating areas in the Indian Ocean region will become
more frequent as China expands and modernizes its fleet ofsubmarines and surface combatants. However, the Chinese
navy in the near term likely will not seek to develop the ability
to establish sea control or sustain combat operations in the Indian Ocean against a modern navy.
China’s Military Modernization

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China’s rapid economic growth has enabled it to provide consistent and sizeable increases to the PLA budget to support its
military modernization and its gradually expanding missions. China’s announced official projected defense budget increased fromRMB 720 billion (approximately $119.5 billion) in 2013 to RMB 808
billion (approximately $131.6 billion) in 2014, a 12.2 percent increase. With the exception of 2010, China’s official defense budget
has increased in nominal terms by double-digits every year since1989. China’s actual aggregate defense spending is higher than theofficially announced budget due to Beijing’s omission of major defense-related expenditures—such as purchases of advanced weapons, research and development programs, and local government
support to the PLA—from its official figures.
In the late 1990s, China’s leaders began to take concrete steps
to strengthen the country’s defense industry. Although the PLA has
not fully overcome its dependence on foreign suppliers, China sincethen has increased the size and capacity of several defense sectors
in support of the PLA’s equipment modernization plans. In particular, China has made progress in its missile sector and now isable to rapidly develop and produce a diverse array of advanced
ballistic and cruise missiles. China maintains the largest and mostlethal short-range ballistic missile force in the world; fielded the

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00027

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

16

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

world’s first antiship ballistic missile in 2010; deployed its military’s first long-range, air-launched land-attack cruise missile in2012; and will widely deploy its military’s first indigenous advanced, long-range submarine-launched antiship missile in thenext few years, if it has not already. In 2014, China conducted its
first test of a new hypersonic missile vehicle, which can conduct kinetic strikes anywhere in the world within minutes to hours, andperformed its second flight test of a new road-mobile intercontinental missile that will be able to strike the entire continental
United States and could carry up to 10 independently maneuverable warheads.
In the maritime domain, China in 2014 continued its transformation from a coastal force into a technologically-advanced navy
capable of projecting power throughout the Asia Pacific. Since theCommission’s 2013 Annual Report, the PLA Navy has expanded its
presence in the East and South China Seas and for the first time
begun combat patrols in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, China’s
first aircraft carrier in January conducted its first long-distancetraining deployment. The nature of the deployment suggests China
is experimenting with multiple types of carrier formations, including those resembling U.S. combined expeditionary groups.
Regarding China’s nuclear forces, high-confidence assessments of
the numbers of Chinese nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads are not possible due to China’s lack of transparency
about its nuclear program. The Department of Defense (DoD) has
not released detailed information on China’s nuclear program, only
noting in 2013 that ‘‘China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists ofapproximately 50–75 intercontinental ballistic missiles,’’ and that‘‘the number of Chinese intercontinental missile nuclear warheads
capable of reaching the United States could expand to well over
100 within the next 15 years.’’ DoD has not provided an unclassified estimate of China’s nuclear warhead stockpile since 2006,
when the Defense Intelligence Agency said China had more than
100 nuclear warheads. Estimates of China’s nuclear forces and nuclear capabilities by nongovernmental experts and foreign governments tend to be higher. Despite the uncertainty surrounding China’s stockpiles of nuclear missiles and nuclear warheads, it is clear
China’s nuclear forces over the next three to five years will expand
considerably and become more lethal and survivable with the fielding of additional road-mobile nuclear missiles; as many as five nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, each of which can carry
12 sea-launched intercontinental-range ballistic missiles; and intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles.
In space, China in 2014 continued to pursue a broad counterspace program to challenge U.S. information superiority in a conflict and disrupt or destroy U.S. satellites if necessary. Beijing also
likely calculates its growing space warfare capabilities will enhance
its strategic deterrent as well as allow China to coerce the UnitedStates and other countries into not interfering with China militarily. Based on the number and diversity of China’s existing anddevelopmental counterspace capabilities, China probably will beable to hold at risk U.S. national security satellites in every orbital
regime in the next five to ten years.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00028

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

17
China’s rapid military modernization is altering the military balance of power in the Asia Pacific in ways that could engender destabilizing security competition between other major nearby countries, such as Japan and India, and exacerbate regional hotspots
such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, andthe South China Sea. Moreover, China’s growing antiaccess/area
denial capabilities increasingly will challenge the ability of theUnited States to deter regional conflicts, defend longtime regional
allies and partners, and maintain open and secure access to the air
and maritime commons in the Asia Pacific. While the UnitedStates currently has the world’s most capable navy, its surface firepower is concentrated in aircraft carrier task forces. China is pursuing a missile-centric strategy with the purpose of holding U.S.
aircraft carriers at high risk if they operate in China’s near seas
and thereby hinder their access to those waters in the event of acrisis. Given China’s growing navy and the U.S. Navy’s planned decline in the size of its fleet, the balance of power and presence inthe region in shifting in China’s direction. By 2020, China could
have as many as 351 submarines and missile-equipped surface
ships in the Asia Pacific. By comparison, the U.S. Navy, budget
permitting, plans to have 67 submarines and surface ships stationed in or forward deployed to the region in 2020, a modest increase from 50 in 2014. Furthermore, Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, testified to
the House Armed Services Committee in January 2014 that concerning ‘‘technological superiority, DoD is being challenged in waysthat I have not seen for decades, particularly in the Asia Pacific region. . . . Technological superiority is not assured and we cannot becomplacent about our posture.’’China’s rise as a major military power challenges decades of airand naval dominance by the United States in a region in which
Washington has substantial economic and security interests.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Conclusions• As a result of China’s comprehensive and rapid military modernization, the regional balance of power between China, on
the one hand, and the United States and its allies and associates on the other, is shifting in China’s direction.
• China’s accelerated military modernization program has beenenabled by China’s rapid economic growth; reliable and generous increases to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) budget; gradual improvements to China’s defense industrial base;and China’s acquisition and assimilation of foreign technologies—especially from Russia, Europe, and the UnitedStates—through both purchase and theft.
• Since 2000, China has significantly upgraded the quality of its
air and maritime forces as well as expanded the types of platforms it operates. Together with the fielding of robust command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, these improvements
have increased China’s ability to challenge the United Statesand its allies and partners for air and maritime superiority in
the Asia Pacific. China’s power projection capability will grow

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00029

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

18
rapidly between now and 2020 with the addition of up to approximately 60 new submarines and surface ships; China’s
first carrier-based aviation wing and second aircraft carrier;and 600 new modern combat aircraft, including China’s first
fifth-generation fighters.
• After over a decade of research, development, and production,
many of China’s regional strike capabilities have matured. China’s ballistic and cruise missiles have the potential to provide
the PLA with a decisive military advantage in the event of aregional conflict and are contributing to a growing imbalancein the regional security dynamic. China now is able to threaten
U.S. bases and operating areas throughout the Asia Pacific, including those that it previously could not reach with conventional weapons, such as U.S. forces on Guam.
• China’s nuclear force will rapidly expand and modernize overthe next five years, providing Beijing with a more extensive
range of military and foreign policy options and potentiallyweakening U.S. extended deterrence, particularly with respect
to Japan.
• China is becoming one of the world’s preeminent space powers
after decades of high prioritization and steady investment from
Chinese leaders, indigenous research and development, and asignificant effort to acquire and assimilate foreign technologies,
especially from the United States. Qualitatively, China now
produces near-state-of-the-art space systems for certain applications, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissancesatellites to support China’s long-range cruise missiles. Quantitatively, China’s numerous active programs continue to increase its inventory of satellites and other space assets.
• Based on the number and diversity of China’s existing and developmental counterspace capabilities, China likely will be able
to hold at risk U.S. national security satellites in every orbital
regime in the next five to ten years.
• Fundamental U.S. interests are at stake in the evolving geopolitical situation in East Asia and the Western Pacific. China’s rise as a major military power in the Asia Pacific challenges decades of air and naval dominance by the UnitedStates in a region in which Washington has substantial economic and security interests.
China’s Domestic Stability

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Twenty-five years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, manyof the underlying causes of unrest persist, leading to hundreds ofthousands of localized protests each year. The most common
sources of dissatisfaction in China are land seizures and labor disputes. Other social issues that contribute to the rising levels of unrest include unemployment, the urban-rural divide, religious repression, environmental degradation, and corruption. Heightened
public awareness combined with the growth of Internet connectivity and social media have helped citizens to organize protests andto air grievances. In response, the Chinese leadership attempts to

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00030

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

19
suppress and censor most protests to prevent a sudden national
movement capable of toppling the CCP. The limited legal channels
available for Chinese citizens to seek redress for their grievances,such as petitioning and lawsuits, are mostly ineffective and often
serve to encourage further unrest rather than resolve citizen complaints.
Over the past year, ethnic unrest in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has intensified with major attacks against civilians
by militant Uyghur separatists. Uyghur militants also have demonstrated their capacity to attack outside Xinjiang. Chinese internal security forces’ increasingly harsh response to ethnic unrest
and tightened restrictions on Uyghur minorities’ political, religious,and cultural expression and freedom of movement have contributed
to growing radicalization of disenfranchised Uyghurs within
Xinjiang. Such responses have resulted in greater conflict between
Uyghurs and the government and Han Chinese.
The Chinese leadership has historically maintained domestic stability by relying on internal security forces and closely monitoring
unrest. President Xi has centralized China’s stability maintenanceapparatus by chairing two new policymaking bodies on domestic security and the Internet. In addition, President Xi has implemented
a wide reaching campaign against outspoken dissidents and advocates calling for reform under Chinese law. China’s three main internal security forces over the last decade have expanded capabilities, allowing for faster, more robust, and more lethal responses tosudden outbreaks of unrest. The Chinese government’s announced
public security spending in 2013 was approximately RMB 778.7 billion (about $127.4 billion), exceeding national defense spending forthe fourth year in a row.
China’s information controls also have been tightened since
President Xi took office, particularly China’s censorship of private
communications and social media. The Chinese leadership has implemented new regulations on domestic news media and has increased harassment and economic pressure on U.S. and other foreign media to coerce compliance with its information controls. In
2014, President Xi assumed authority of the Internet control apparatus, instituting wide-scale Internet campaigns intended to stifle
dissent and crack down on popular Chinese microbloggers andother leaders of public opinion. China’s restrictive Internet andmedia controls are increasingly affecting U.S. companies operatingin China, blocking market access and forcing companies to relocate
their operations or to self-censor.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Conclusions• Heightened public awareness, the growth in Internet and social media use, and the lack of satisfactory channels for redress
have led to a large number of ‘‘mass incidents’’ each year. Public outrage centers on land seizures, labor disputes, wide-scalecorruption, cultural and religious repression, and environmental degradation. Such incidents challenge the legitimacy
and competence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) andthe government at all levels. Local governments have responded to such incidents with a mixture of repression andconcessions.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00031

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

20

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• This year marked an escalation in violence linked to unrest in
Xinjiang. Clashes between Uyghurs and police are increasingly
ending in bloodshed, including the death of nearly 100 people
in late July. In addition, attacks by militant Uyghur separatists are shifting from targeting government officials and buildings to attacking civilians and soft targets such as train stations and public spaces.
• In an effort to address the underlying causes of unrest, President Xi has launched robust anticorruption and counterterrorism campaigns, dedicated resources to address the public’s
environmental and health concerns, and proposed hukou system reforms.
• In response to rising levels of unrest, China’s leaders are
expanding and improving China’s stability maintenance apparatus by streamlining domestic security policymaking,strengthening forces responsible for maintaining internal security, tightening the Party’s control over legal institutions, significantly increasing funding for public security, and using information controls to clamp down on dissent.
• With the entire legal apparatus under the CCP’s control, local
and national officials contain unrest by limiting citizens’ accessto legal counsel and impartial trials, restricting the ability of
citizens to obtain redress for grievances through official channels, and detaining government critics through legal and extralegal means. Although President Xi has implemented several
substantial reforms and hinted at others, the same legal mechanisms to target dissent likely will persist, and meaningful reform will remain elusive.
• President Xi has implemented a campaign not seen in China
since the 1970s against individuals expressing dissent. In addition to targeting outspoken dissidents, President Xi has
cracked down on popular online commentators. This year’s
25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre marked
the harshest crackdown on dissenters yet and the tightest online censorship implemented thus far.
• Although China already has one of the most restricted media
environments in the world, since President Xi took office,China has increased censorship of domestic and foreign media.
China’s information controls directly affect U.S. media companies and journalists with China operations through visa restrictions, cyber attacks, physical harassment, favoritism, andthreats. Tightened media controls also affect Chinese citizens
who face increasing difficulty accessing information sourcesthat express alternative views from the CCP.
• Beijing likely will take calculated measures to strengthenInternet controls. However, China probably will struggle withthe rapid and unpredictable development of Internet-based applications and technologies that could help users defy Beijing’s
current controls. Furthermore, the increasing number and sophistication of Internet users in China makes Beijing’s approach vulnerable to public backlash when authorities restrain

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00032

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

21
users’ access and network performance, especially in sectors
where the Internet has become a critical component of economic growth and commerce.
Chapter 3: China and the World
China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Using a variety of foreign and domestic policy tools, Beijing is attempting to expand a sphere of influence in its peripheral regions.
Recent public statements by high-level Chinese officials suggest
China is departing from its traditional low-profile foreign policy to‘‘hide capacities and bide time.’’ Senior Chinese leaders in the past
year have begun to challenge the U.S. position as the primary
power in East Asia by promoting a new Asian security architecture
led by Asian countries, with China in the leading role. As it seeks
to take on a role as a ‘‘major responsible country,’’ China’s influence in Asia is deepening and the security architecture of Asia isadjusting to this change.
In Northeast Asia, China seeks to thwart the potential for a trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance. Published Chinese views
on China-Japan security relations encompass a mix of suspicion,
alarm, and concern—especially on the issues of Japan’s increasingly robust defense and security establishment, the developmentof the U.S.-Japan alliance, and perceived lack of Japanese atonement over its wartime past. Conversely, official Chinese views on
China’s relations with South Korea reflect an interest in continued
cooperation between Beijing and Seoul on regional security.
Whereas Japan is balancing against China by boosting its own
capabilities and reaffirming its alliance with the United States,
South Korea appears to be pursuing a hedging strategy by cultivating its security relationships not only with the United States
but with China as well. The challenge for Washington as it seeks
to modernize its Northeast Asian alliances will be to balance differing sets of security perceptions and priorities in Tokyo and Seoul
as well as manage simmering political tensions stemming fromtheir troubled past.
Southeast Asia and Oceania generally share the same wary viewof the unfolding U.S.-China competition for regional power and influence. China’s central objectives with regard to Southeast Asia
are to defend its sovereignty claims and preserve its territorial integrity; to secure and ensure access to resources for continued economic development; and to maintain a secure buffer zone aroundthe Chinese mainland. With Australia, China seeks to maintainstrong trade ties while pursuing stronger security relations to atleast partially counterbalance the formal and robust U.S.-Australia
alliance.
Southeast Asian states and Australia are hedging against what
they perceive to be strategic uncertainty in the region by building
new security relationships, strengthening existing security relationships, diversifying and strengthening military and paramilitary capabilities, and emphasizing the role of regional institutions andinternational law to manage disputes. As the United States continues to rebalance to Asia, achieving its security goals in the region will require reassurance and reinforcement of its alliances and

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00033

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

22
security associates in addition to continued strong engagementwith regional political and security institutions.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Conclusions• Beijing has concluded the U.S.-led East Asia security architecture does not benefit its core interests of regime preservation,
economic and social development, and territorial integrity. In
2014, China’s leaders began to promote a vision of regional security that marginalizes the United States and ‘‘relies on thepeople in Asia to run Asia’s affairs, deal with Asia’s problems,and uphold Asia’s security’’—a vision at odds with the present
security architecture encompassing a strong network of U.S.
alliances and partnerships in East Asia.
• China is engaged in a sustained and substantial military buildup that is shifting the balance of power in the region, and isusing its growing military advantages to support its drive fora dominant sphere of influence in East Asia
• China employs economic incentives and punishments toward
its neighbors to support its diplomatic and security goals in
East Asia to extract political or security concessions from its
Asian neighbors. The market dependencies of many East Asian
countries on China—the result of China’s deep integration into
regional manufacturing supply chains—afford it leverage inpursuing regional security interests.
• China’s security relations with Japan are deteriorating over
the Senkaku Islands dispute and grievances over Japan’s wartime past. Conversely, China’s security relations with South
Korea are warming as Beijing seeks continued cooperation
with Seoul on North Korea. The two Northeast Asian powers
differ in their responses to China’s assertive security policy inthe region: Japan is balancing against China by boosting its
own defensive capabilities and its alliance with the UnitedStates, while South Korea appears to be pursuing a hedging
strategy by maintaining security relations with both theUnited States and China.
• The current regional security arrangement in Northeast Asia,
for which the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea provide a basis, will probably remain unchanged in the near term.
Differences in security priorities between Japan and South
Korea means that without greater political will to overcome
these differences, full-fledged trilateral security cooperation
among Japan, South Korea, and the United States is unlikely
to materialize in the near- to mid-term.
• China’s increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea
have led Southeast Asia and Australia to build new defense relationships, deepen existing defense relationships, strengthen
military and paramilitary capabilities, and emphasize the roleof regional institutions and international law to manage disputes.
• As the United States seeks to reaffirm its alliance with Australia as part of the U.S. rebalance to Asia, China is seeking

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00034

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

23
stronger security ties with Australia to serve as a counterweight to the alliance. Australia’s challenge is to ensure its
own economic and security interests in the midst of the ongoing Pacific power shift. Similarly, continued U.S. engagementwith ASEAN ensures the political sustainability of U.S. security policy in East Asia, but carries the risk of relying too heavily upon an organization which has yet to define its role in
East Asian security.
Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with North Korea

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Sino-North Korean relations have become increasingly tense
since late 2012, and high levels of distrust and frustration now
characterize the relationship, particularly on the Chinese side. The
downturn in bilateral relations began with North Korea’s December
2012 rocket launch, which was a thinly-veiled attempt to test theNorth’s ballistic missile technology. Pyongyang conducted its third
nuclear test soon thereafter despite repeated warnings from Beijing. As tensions rose, high-level contacts between North Korean
and Chinese officials decreased in 2013 and 2014. One of the clearest indications of turmoil in the relationship was Kim Jong-Un’spurge and execution of his powerful uncle, Jang Song-taek, in late2013. Mr. Jang, who had been Beijing’s most important interlocutor
in Pyongyang, was accused of crimes of selling ‘‘precious underground resources’’ and ‘‘selling off North Korean land’’ to China.
Meanwhile, China and North Korea each are seeking to balance
the other by strengthening ties with other countries. China’s relations with South Korea have warmed significantly since mid-2013,
much to Pyongyang’s consternation. For its part, North Korea hassought to diversify its external relations, and has been reaching out
to Russia and others.
Pyongyang’s provocations have led to a shift in China’s perception of North Korea. For example, Beijing has allowed a vibrantpublic debate on the utility and wisdom of Chinese policy toward
North Korea to emerge since Pyongyang’s 2013 nuclear test. Further, although China historically has not viewed North Korean
denuclearization as an urgent task, Beijing now appears to begenuinely concerned about Pyongyang’s accelerating nuclear program. As a result, China has redoubled efforts to restart the longstalled Six Party Talks between China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, which were establishedover a decade ago to negotiate the termination of North Korea’s nuclear program. China’s efforts to restart the negotiations are intended to ‘‘keep them talking and not fighting,’’ but also are motivated by Beijing’s desire to exert control over the negotiating process and assert influence over the parties involved. These efforts on
the diplomatic front have been accompanied by progress in China’s
enforcement of United Nations sanctions against North Korea, although significant gaps remain.
China’s growing displeasure with North Korea notwithstanding,Beijing continues to support the Kim regime in an effort to encourage continued stability in the North. China fears instability could
prompt a political or humanitarian crisis, leading to regime collapse, which could result in a refugee crisis on its border. More concerning to China’s leaders, however, is the prospect that a North

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00035

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

24
Korean collapse could provide a pretext for U.S. military intervention in North Korea. In Beijing’s view, a sustained U.S. or U.S.South Korean allied military presence on the Korean Peninsula isinimical to China’s security interests, and China would perceive
U.S. troops crossing into North Korea as an urgent deterioration of
its already degraded security environment. Unfortunately, China’s
mistrust of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, its alliance with North
Korea, and its unique security priorities vis-à-vis the North prevent
it from meaningfully engaging with South Korea and the UnitedStates in discussions about North Korean collapse scenarios andcontingency planning.
Conclusions• North Korea has the potential to be one of the most dangerous
flashpoints in U.S.-China relations. Although regime collapse
or a major humanitarian disaster in North Korea do not appear likely in the near term, such an event could lead to war
on the Korean Peninsula, which likely would draw simultaneous military intervention jointly by the United States andSouth Korea and by China. At the current time, trilateral communication among these countries about their intentions andpossible actions in the event of a major contingency in North
Korea appears dangerously insufficient to avoid accidents, miscalculation, and conflict.
• Sino-North Korean relations are at their lowest point in decades. This is driven largely by China’s frustration over North
Korea’s destabilizing behaviors since late 2012, including a nuclear test and a high volume of missile tests. Beijing’s frustration with Pyongyang notwithstanding, China continues to support North Korea in the interest of stability. China assesses
that as long as the North Korean regime remains stable, North
Korea will continue to exist as a buffer between itself and U.S.allied South Korea. Preserving this buffer is the fundamental
objective of China’s relationship with North Korea.
• China appears to be genuinely concerned about North Korea’s
nuclear program. This concern is mostly over second-order effects of the North’s nuclear advances. For example, China believes North Korea’s continued progress on its nuclear program
incentivizes the United States to strengthen its military presence and capabilities on the Korean Peninsula. Further, China
believes the North’s nuclear progress could prompt U.S. allies
Japan and South Korea to develop their own nuclear programs.
Either of these outcomes would constitute a major deterioration of China’s security environment.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Since 2013, China has redoubled its efforts to restart the SixParty Talks. Although Beijing is skeptical North Korea will
halt its nuclear program as a result of the Six-Party Talks, itvalues the forum because it ensures China will have a central
role in the international community’s interaction with North
Korea and allows China to exert influence over the parties involved.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00036

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

25
• China increasingly views U.S. interests on the Korean Peninsula as inimical to its own. Beijing assumes Washington uses
North Korean provocations as a pretext to bolster the U.S.
military presence and capabilities on the Korean Peninsulaand justify a ‘‘rebalance’’ policy that is actually aimed at containing China.
• China’s relationship with South Korea is significantly improving in both the economic and security realms. Beijing’s efforts
to strengthen ties with Seoul reflect China’s frustration with
North Korea and are meant in part to signal its disapproval
to Pyongyang. China’s pursuit of stronger ties with South
Korea also is aimed in part at drawing South Korea away fromits alliance with the United States. As its influence over South
Korea grows, China judges it eventually will be in a stronger
position to pressure South Korea to reduce its security ties
with the United States.
TaiwanDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Cross-Strait economic ties continue to grow. China is Taiwan’s
largest trading partner, largest export market, and largest sourceof imports. In 2013, annual cross-Strait trade reached $124.4 billion, a nearly 27 percent increase since 2008. This expansion continued through the first seven months of 2014, growing 4.1 percent
when compared with the same period last year. In 2014, China for
the first time surpassed Japan to become Taiwan’s largest sourceof imports. Although China remains the largest destination, Taiwan FDI to China reached a three-year low in 2013 ($9.2 billion,
a 40 percent decline year on year), as labor costs in China rose andslower Chinese demand for Taiwan manufactured goods cut exports. In contrast, Chinese FDI to Taiwan has grown nearly 300
percent from $94 million in 2010 to $349 million in 2013 due to theloosening of investment caps and regulations on mainland investment into Taiwan under President Ma Ying-jeou.
However, deepening cross-Strait trade and investment have increased public concerns over Taiwan’s growing dependence on China’s economy and Taiwan’s vulnerability to Chinese economic andpolitical coercion. In 2014, protestors occupied Taiwan’s legislative
chamber for 23 days in opposition to the Cross-Strait Services
Trade Agreement (CSSTA), which was signed in 2013 but has yet
to be ratified by the Taiwan legislature. The grassroots protest
movement, later called the Sunflower Movement, ignited a publicdebate in Taiwan about the agreement, further delayed its ratification, and temporarily postponed negotiations of other cross-Strait
agreements. Cross-Strait negotiations have since resumed but it isunclear how successful these negotiations will be given Taiwan citizens’ strong opposition to the CSSTA.
In February 2014, prior to the Sunflower Movement, Taiwan and
China reached a milestone in cross-Strait relations by holding thefirst formal talks between the heads of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs
Council and China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) since Taiwan and
China split in 1949. Later, in June 2014, the director of TAO
Zhang Zhijun visited Taiwan, the first visit to Taiwan by a TAO
director.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00037

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

26
In 2014, the United States raised the visibility of relations with
Taiwan by sending U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Gina McCarthy to Taiwan—the first visit by a U.S. Cabinet-level official since 2000. Annual bilateral trade reached $57.3
billion in 2013 and continued to grow during the first seven monthsof 2014, increasing 6 percent over the same period last year. U.S.Taiwan military-to-military contact also increased in 2013. In 2013,
U.S. DoD personnel conducted more than 2,000 visits to Taiwan,
compared to approximately 1,500 visits in 2012.
Six years of cross-Strait rapprochement have been beneficial to
the United States by temporarily reducing the likelihood of military conflict, enhancing regional stability and development, and allowing U.S. policymakers to address other priorities in the U.S.China and U.S.-Taiwan relationships. However, improved crossStrait relations have not resolved the fundamental sovereignty
issues between Taiwan and China. China’s military modernization
continues to focus on improving its ability to conduct military operations against Taiwan and to deter, delay, and deny any U.S. intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. China’s military now appears topossess an increasing advantage over Taiwan’s military. The increased range and capabilities of China’s power projection platforms have largely negated Taiwan’s historic geographic advantages in a cross-Strait conflict.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Conclusions• Under President Ma, cross-Strait economic relations have
deepened with the expansion of trade and investment and thesigning of numerous economic agreements. However, these
agreements face increasing public and political opposition. The
Taiwan public’s concerns about the effects of cross-Strait economic integration on the country’s economy and political autonomy led to a temporary postponement of cross-Strait negotiations and a push for increased oversight of cross-Strait
agreements by Taiwan’s legislature.
• Prior to the Sunflower Movement, cross-Strait relations
reached a milestone with the first formal talks between theheads of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and China’s Taiwan Affairs Office in February 2014. After a temporary postponement following the protests, Taiwan and China restarted
trade negotiations in September, but the Taiwan legislature
will unlikely ratify any new agreements until it agrees on aformal legislative oversight process for cross-Strait agreements.
• U.S.-Taiwan relations took positive but small steps forward
this past year with progress in the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks, the first trip to Taiwan by a Cabinet-level official since 2000, and recent growthin bilateral trade. Remaining obstacles to further progress in
the TIFA talks are disputes over pork imports, pharmaceuticalintellectual property rights, and private-equity investment regulations.
• The United States and Taiwan continue to engage in a robust
but low-profile security partnership, including increased mili-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00038

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

27
tary-to-military contact in 2013. However, the U.S. government
has not authorized a major arms sale to Taiwan since 2011,
which allows China to further tip the cross-Strait balance ofpower in its favor.
• Taiwan has expanded its international engagement in recent
years, but China continues to restrict Taiwan’s participation inmost international organizations. Furthermore, Taiwan’s discussions with other countries regarding bilateral free trade
agreements have reportedly stalled due to those countries’ hesitation over China’s opposition and questions about Taiwan’s
ability to ratify any negotiated free trade agreement following
strong public opposition to the Cross-Strait Services Trade
Agreement.
• Despite the recent cross-Strait rapprochement, the core sovereignty and security issues between Taiwan and China remain unresolved. China’s military modernization has significantly increased Beijing’s ability to conduct military operations
against Taiwan and to deter, delay, and deny any U.S. intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. Taiwan’s recent focus on developing innovative and asymmetric military capabilities andcontinued acquisition of major conventional platforms andweapon systems from the United States have improved Taiwan’s military capabilities. However, the cross-Strait balanceof power has shifted decidedly in China’s favor.
Hong Kong

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

In 2014 Hong Kong’s government advanced the electoral reform
process aimed at implementing universal suffrage for the 2017
chief executive election. However, democracy advocates in Hong
Kong sought not only expansion of direct election to all Hong
Kong’s eligible voters, but also relaxation of restrictive nominating
requirements for potential candidates. After Beijing ruled out anominating process open to public participation, and instead adopted a framework that favors pro-Beijing candidates, protesters initiated an extended occupation of areas around government buildings
and the Central business district to pressure the government to accept a fair nominating process.
Currently, to be nominated, a potential chief executive candidate
must be supported by no fewer than 150 members (or 12.5 percent)of a 1,200-member election committee, which also elects the chief
executive. With strong business and political ties to mainland
China, many committee members are local elites seeking to curryfavor with government officials and Communist Party members in
Beijing. One member of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council estimatedthat nearly 80 percent of election committee members are controlled by Beijing.
On August 31, 2014, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC)
issued a decision allowing all registered voters to participate in thenext chief executive election, but proposed a nominating mechanism that may prevent candidates who are not pro-Beijing fromstanding for election. According to the NPC, only two or three candidates may be nominated to stand for election, each of whom mustbe supported by more than 50 percent of the nominating com-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00039

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

28
mittee, which will be modeled on the current election committee
and is expected to maintain the same pro-Beijing bias. Moreover,the chief executive candidate must be a ‘‘patriot’’ who will not oppose CCP dictates or one-party rule.
In a strongly-worded paper on the implementation of the ‘‘one
country, two systems’’ policy, issued on June 10, 2014, China’s
State Council Information Office reasserted China’s control overthe ‘‘high degree of autonomy’’ granted to Hong Kong upon its
handover and enshrined in the Basic Law.* The paper required all
Hong Kong’s administrators, including members of its independent
judiciary, to be ‘‘patriotic’’ and ‘‘love the country’’ (i.e., the People’s
Republic of China). The paper also warned of foreign forces acting
in collusion with groups within Hong Kong to promote democracy
in order to thwart China’s unity.
China’s interference in and control over Hong Kong’s political developments incited a large-scale public backlash from democracy
activists and student protesters. The Occupy Central campaign,
which was organized in 2013 to lobby the central government fortrue democratic electoral reform, conducted an unofficial referendum on electoral reform which showed that 90 percent of voters wanted the Legislative Council (LegCo), Hong Kong’s legislature, to veto any government proposal that does not allow for genuine fair nomination of chief executive candidates. While all 27 prodemocracy LegCo members (of 70 total members) vowed to veto a
final electoral reform proposal that is based on Beijing’s framework, if the proposal was successfully vetoed, the 2017 election
would follow the same procedures as in 2012.
China’s military activity in Hong Kong also increased in 2014. In
February, the Hong Kong government advanced the construction ofa Chinese military port along the waterfront of Victoria Harbor.
The PLA administers Hong Kong’s defense through its Hong Kong
garrison, and maintains 19 military sites there. The garrison is obligated by law to reveal the location of military sites that restrict
public access; however, one undisclosed restricted access militaryzone containing a radar station was discovered in July 2014. One
LegCo member supported conducting a judicial review of this concealment. Displays of new weaponry and anti-riot gear by the military garrison worried democracy protesters that peaceful demonstrations may be met with military force.
Hong Kong’s global press freedom ranking slipped from 35th in2013 to 37th in 2014, continuing a downward trend dating back to
2004, according to Freedom House. One blow to press freedom occurred when Kevin Lau, then-editor of independent newspaper
Ming Pao, which often featured content critical of the Chinese government, was removed from his position without explanation andsubsequently brutally attacked by knife-wielding assailants. Many
members of Hong Kong’s media community believed the attack was

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The ‘‘one country, two systems’’ framework is a policy measure adopted by China following
the establishment of Hong Kong and Macau as special administrative regions. The system
grants Hong Kong and Macau the right to self govern their economy and political system to acertain extent, excluding foreign affairs and defense. China’s policies concerning Hong Kong are
outlined in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, a legally binding international treaty that
dictated the terms of Hong Kong’s handover from the United Kingdom in 1997. In the Joint
Declaration, China granted Hong Kong a ‘‘high degree of autonomy,’’ and promised that ‘‘Hong
Kong will retain its current lifestyle and legal, social, and economic systems until at least theyear 2047.’’

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00040

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

29
politically motivated. In another instance, due to pressure from thecentral government’s liaison office in Hong Kong, major international companies dropped advertisements in prominent independent news outlet Next Media, owned by outspoken pro-democracy advocate Jimmy Lai.
Conclusions• China’s central government has put forth a framework for theelection of Hong Kong’s next chief executive in 2017 that effectively excludes democratic candidates from nomination and allows Beijing to control the outcome. This proposal conflicts
with standards set forth in Hong Kong’s Basic Law and theInternational Convention on Civil and Political Rights, andruns counter to international commitments made by China in
the 1984 Sino-UK Joint Declaration to preserve Hong Kong’s‘‘high degree of autonomy’’ and way of life for 50 years following its 1997 handover from the United Kingdom.
• Increased Chinese military activity in Hong Kong signals China’s determined presence there and serves to intimidate prodemocracy activists from participating in the Occupy Central
movement and other peaceful movements out of fear of military retaliation.
• Increased infringement on Hong Kong’s press freedom, particularly in the forms of violence against journalists and politicalpressure on advertisers, threatens the media’s ability to serve
as a watchdog. The steady erosion of press freedom is a worrying trend that has worsened over the last ten years, and appears to be targeted at outspoken pro-democracy media.
THE COMMISSION’S KEY RECOMMENDATIONSThe Commission believes that ten of its 48 recommendations toCongress are of particular significance. The complete list of recommendations appears at the Report’s conclusion on page 549.
The Commission recommends:

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Congress consider legislation that would make available a remedy to domestic firms that have been injured from the anticompetitive actions (such as access to low-cost or no-cost capital) of foreign state-owned companies for the injury that has
been inflicted and allow for the potential award of treble damages.
• Congress fund the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding and operational efforts to increase its presence in the Asia Pacific to at least 67
ships and rebalance homeports to 60 percent in the region by2020 so that the United States will have the capacity to maintain readiness and presence in the Asia Pacific, offset China’s
growing military capabilities, and surge naval assets in theevent of a contingency.
• Congress appoint an outside panel of experts to do a net assessment of the Sino-American military balance and make rec-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00041

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

30

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

ommendations to Congress regarding the adequacy of the current U.S. military plans and budgets to meet the security requirements of the United States in the Pacific.
• Congress require the Department of the Treasury to include inits semiannual report to Congress specific information on thebeneficial economic impact of China moving to a freely floating
currency in terms of U.S. exports, economic growth, and job
creation. In addition, Congress should urge the Administration
to begin immediate consultations at the G–7 to identify a multilateral approach to addressing China’s currency manipulation.
• Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to update its report on the effectiveness of the U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade and the Strategic andEconomic Dialogue. The updated report should include an assessment of the objectives sought by the United States in thesetalks and whether China has honored its commitments to date.
• Congress consider amending existing trade enforcement rules
to ensure that foreign investment in the United States cannot
be used to impede the ability of domestic producers to bring petitions for trade enforcement actions. Congress could direct the
Department of Commerce to update its regulations and procedures for antidumping and countervailing duty cases to createa rebuttable presumption that firms that are state-owned,
state-controlled, or state-invested with facilities in the UnitedStates are operating at the direction of the state. Those statedirected companies would then be excluded from calculations ofindustry support or opposition unless they can prove that there
is no such involvement or direction.
• Congress request that the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Department of Commerce, and International
Trade Commission report to Congress on the extent to which
existing authorities would allow for sanctions to be imposed
against entities that benefit from trade secrets or other information obtained through cyber intrusions or other illegalmeans and were provided by a national government, foreign intelligence service, or other entity utilizing such means. If authorities do not exist, they should provide a proposal to address
such problems.
• Congress pursue measures to improve the government’s information about drug ingredient and dietary supplement producers, especially for imports. To this end, Congress shouldurge the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to work with its
Chinese counterparts to establish a more comprehensive regulatory regime for registering China-based active pharmaceutical ingredient producers, and make this producer information available on demand for U.S. agencies.
• Congress adopt a resolution urging China to keep its commitments to allow broadly representative nomination and electionof Hong Kong’s chief executive by universal suffrage in accordance with democratic procedures as articulated in the 1984

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00042

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

31

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong,
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
• Congress urge the FDA to insist on expedited approvals fromthe Chinese government for work visas for the FDA staff, andon expanded authority to conduct unannounced visits at drug
manufacturing facilities in China.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00043

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00044

Fmt 6633

Sfmt 6633

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

INTRODUCTION
This past year, the new Chinese leadership sought to consolidate
political power and keep the economy expanding at a predictablepace even if it meant shelving many of the reforms it embraced in
the National People’s Congress. Party leaders placed their highest
priority on maintaining public support through rapid economic
growth and job creation. The Party set as a goal an annual grossdomestic product growth rate of 7.5 percent, and toward the endof the year, appeared to be on track to meeting that objective.
While Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping
moved more cautiously than anticipated on the economic restructuring approved by the top Party leadership in March, he acted
quickly on some fronts, particularly in removing from power his political opponents as well as those opposed to his reform agenda.
General Secretary Xi surprised most observers with his widely publicized campaign for fighting corruption among government andParty officials. Despite expectations some had for change, China’s
formula of authoritarian one-party rule and state-directed capitalism prevailed. By most accounts, Xi positioned himself to be themost powerful Party and government leader in two decades as hetook direct command of the military and a strengthened internal
security apparatus while installing longtime loyalists in key economic policy positions.
Although China’s leaders promised to restructure its economy to
one based on domestic consumption rather than fixed investment
and exports, in 2014 they continued their traditional ways—borrowing heavily to stimulate the economy by building infrastructure,such as railways, highways, and oil and gas distribution systems.
Rather than moving forward with the broad reform agenda proposed by General Secretary Xi when he first took office a year
ago—by allowing market forces and financial liberalization to playa ‘‘decisive role’’ in the economy—the government continued to subsidize favored industries and maintain an artificially low value ofthe renminbi in order to boost exports and inhibit imports. The predictable result: Chinese government spending rose 25 percent in
the first half of 2014 while the value of the renminbi tumbled andexports to the United States continued to grow. Meanwhile, thetrade imbalance headed toward another record figure for 2014,
likely surpassing last year’s record $318.7 billion U.S. trade deficit
in goods with China.
Structural problems in China’s economy persist, to the continuing detriment of China’s trading partners and its own citizens.
Chinese government-directed excess capacity in industries such as
steel, cement, glass, construction, solar panels, and shipbuilding
has unfairly harmed international competitors. The lack of opportunity for Chinese citizens to safely and productively invest theirsavings in the state-owned banking system or the underdeveloped

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(33)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00045

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

34

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

stock and bond markets or with foreign financial firms has driven
China’s citizens to speculate in the volatile real estate sector.
State-owned banks—the primary source of commercial finance—
continue to favor Chinese government-owned companies rather
than private companies or entrepreneurs. Promises to provide
banking customers with deposit insurance and floating interest
rates remain unfulfilled.
During the course of 2014, foreign companies investing in China
faced increased regulatory burdens and barriers to business dealings that do not similarly encumber China’s highly favored ‘‘national champions.’’ China’s anti-monopoly laws, in particular, appear to be focused on disadvantaging foreign invested companies
rather than being applied equitably.
For the first time, in 2014, foreign direct investment (FDI) from
China into the United States exceeded FDI from the United States
to China. While this may spur job growth in the United States, investment by Chinese state-owned or state-controlled companies in
the United States risks creating a hybrid economy where privately
owned U.S.-based business must compete with Chinese state-financed companies motivated more by Beijing’s policy directives
than profit. Moreover, there are potential national security concerns associated with investments by Chinese state-owned or statecontrolled companies in U.S. critical infrastructure.
China’s cyber espionage continued unabated in 2014, despite aconcerted U.S. effort since 2013 to expose and stigmatize Chinese
economic espionage. In May, the U.S. Justice Department charged
five Chinese military officers with cyber-theft from five U.S.-based
corporations and a major international labor union. China responded to the allegations by suspending its participation in a bilateral dialogue on cyber security and by retaliating against U.S.
based computer software and hardware firms. China’s material incentives for continuing this activity are immense and unlikely to bealtered by small-scale U.S. actions.
As expected, the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Squaremassacre was noted by Chinese dissidents and by sympathizers inHong Kong. But it received scant attention by the Chinese government-controlled media and provoked an early crackdown on Chinese political activists in an attempt to muzzle opposition. Amid
the pronouncements of coming economic, educational and social improvements, the promise of political reform was notably absent.
The central government in Beijing has continued to stifle dissent
through use of internal security forces, legal and extralegal measures, and media censorship. Disputes over working conditions andpay in factories, as well as farmland seizures by local and provincial governments and the subsequent sale to business interests,
continue to be a source of injustice and protest.
Nevertheless, 2014 was marked by some positive developments.
China’s government has followed through on its promise to extend
better health care and health insurance, particularly to the underserved rural population, although rural-urban inequities persist.
The leadership also took the first steps to lift China’s onerous residency permit system that discriminates against China’s 200 million
migrant workers and their families. Leaders began to implement
plans for a free trade zone in Shanghai that might provide greater

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00046

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

35

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

access to foreign financial services and health care companies.
However, many key issues remain unresolved. Market access for
U.S. providers of health care goods and services remains restricted.
Furthermore, increased spending has not stemmed rising costs andpoor delivery in the health care sector, and drug safety remains apressing concern for Chinese patients, as well as for U.S. patients
who consume the drugs and drug ingredients that China exports.
During 2014, China’s military modernization continued at a fastpace, creating additional challenges for the United States and its
allies, and China’s neighbors. Most notably, China conducted its
first test of a new hypersonic missile vehicle, which could enable
China to conduct kinetic strikes anywhere in the world within minutes to hours, and performed its second flight test of a new roadmobile intercontinental missile that will be able to strike the entire
continental United States and could carry up to 10 independently
maneuverable warheads. Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) increased its inventory of modern submarines, surface ships,
and combat aircraft while upgrading its legacy platforms with new
weapon systems.
In the maritime domain, the PLA Navy continued its transformation from a coastal force into a technologically advanced navy
capable of projecting power throughout the Asia Pacific. Since theCommission’s 2013 Annual Report, the PLA Navy has expanded its
presence in the East and South China Seas and for the first time
begun combat patrols in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, China’s
first aircraft carrier in January conducted its first long-distancetraining deployment. The nature of the deployment suggests China
is experimenting with multiple types of carrier formations, including those resembling U.S. combined expeditionary groups.
China’s growing confidence in its military capabilities has
emboldened Beijing to aggressively advance its territorial ambitions. Since approximately 2009, China has increasingly used coercive military and economic measures to assert control over its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. Since late 2013,
however, China has been more willing to advance its sovereignty
claims without seeking to justify its actions as responses to perceived provocations by rival claimants. The three most significant
manifestations of this new, even more assertive turn are China’s
establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East
China Sea; China’s relocation of an oil rig to waters disputed by
Vietnam in the South China Sea; and China’s ongoing attempts toprevent the Philippines from resupplying its military outpost at
Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.
China in 2014 continued construction work on various land reclamation projects in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In addition to dredging sand to create islands where there previously
were none, China appears to be expanding and upgrading militaryand civilian infrastructure—including radars, satellite communication equipment, antiaircraft and naval guns, helipads, and docks—
on some of the islands.
Perhaps of most concern is Beijing’s apparent willingness to provoke incidents at sea and in the air that could lead to a major conflict as China’s maritime and air forces expand their operations beyond China’s immediate periphery. China already has initiated

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00047

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

36

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

dangerous encounters at sea on several occasions. In December
2013, a U.S. Navy ship was forced to maneuver to avoid a collision
with a PLA Navy ship that had intentionally stopped in front ofit. Both ships were operating in international waters. Later in
2014, a China Coast Guard ship rammed Vietnamese government
ships following China’s placement of a state-owned deep-sea drilling platform inside Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, and a Chinese fighter flew within 30 feet of a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace.
This pattern of unilateral Chinese actions in sensitive and disputed areas is raising tensions in the Asia Pacific and alienating
many of its neighbors. China’s deepening economic, diplomatic, andmilitary influence on its geographic periphery has led its neighboring countries to reconsider their security strategies and relationships, particularly those involving the United States. As the UnitedStates seeks to reaffirm its alliances and boost its security links
with associates in East Asia and Oceania, it must contend with
China’s competing vision of a China-led regional security architecture. This uncertain environment is further complicated by China’s
support for North Korea, which continues to pose the most dangerous threat to East Asian security.
Across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing continued its efforts to promote
eventual unification by increasing Taiwan’s economic interdependence with the mainland while expanding its ability to project military power across the Strait. Some of China’s efforts met opposition, however, when more than 100,000 Taiwan citizens protested
the proposed ratification of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement. The protests, which came to be known as the Sunflower
Movement, illustrated the growing unease in Taiwan over economic
interdependence. Concerns over China’s creeping influence were
not limited to Taiwan, however. Hong Kong’s Occupy Central andstudent protest movements were motivated by China’s efforts tocontrol the nomination process for the election of the chief executive. Developments there were closely monitored by Taiwan, which
China has suggested might someday wish to join Hong Kong and
Macau as another Special Administrative Region.
The United States has fundamental interests at stake in the
evolving geopolitical situation in East Asia and the Western Pacific. China’s rise as a major military power in the Asia Pacificchallenges decades of air and naval dominance by the UnitedStates in a region in which the United States has substantial economic and security interests. However, as a result of China’s comprehensive and rapid military modernization, the regional balanceof power between China, on the one hand, and the United Statesand its allies and associates on the other, is shifting in China’s direction.
The Commission’s 2014 Annual Report examines these and otherissues as part of its mandate from Congress to monitor the evolving
economic and security relationship between our two countries.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00048

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

CHAPTER 1
U.S.-CHINA TRADEAND ECONOMIC RELATIONSSECTION 1: YEAR IN REVIEW:ECONOMICS AND TRADE
Introduction
Supported by government stimulus, China sustained economic
growth at or near its official target rate of 7.5 percent through thefirst three quarters of 2014. China’s gross domestic product (GDP)growth has been under 8 percent for ten consecutive quarters, with
Chinese government leaders calling current growth rates the ‘‘newnormal’’ for China.1 Responding to signs of an imminent economic
slowdown, China’s government used various policy tools to intervene in the economy and try to achieve its official growth target for2014.2 Branded as a ‘‘mini-stimulus,’’ fiscal spending increased by
25 percent year-on-year in May as the government accelerated subsidization of large infrastructure and housing projects.3 A continuing policy of Chinese government intervention in international
currency markets supported China’s exports in the first half of theyear by maintaining an undervalued renminbi (RMB).
Chinese President Xi Jinping laid out a sweeping economic reform agenda during the 2013 Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to address many of China’s underlying economic problems. Xi’s proposed reforms range from a revised tax
system, to financial liberalization, to partial reform of restrictions
on imports and inbound foreign investment.* However, President
Xi’s government made minimal progress in implementing these reforms in 2014. Instead, President Xi and his leadership team focused on a broad anticorruption campaign while using the stimulus
to avoid further economic slowdown. It remains unclear if the Xiled government will accelerate reform in 2015.
Although China prevented further deceleration of growth in 2014
through stimulus, the government failed to address underlying
structural problems, such as oversupply, overcapacity, mounting
local government debt, and asset bubbles that put its economy at* China has traditionally used catalogs to denote which products, services, and investments
are approved for market access. Sectors not specifically listed in the catalogs are restricted fromforeign competition. The system more widely used globally is a ‘‘negative list’’ approach which
denotes only those sectors which face market access restrictions; sectors not listed are considered open.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(37)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00049

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

38
risk of a sharp slowdown or ‘‘hard landing.’’ * Excessive levels of investment in property and heavy industries such as steel, which
fueled China’s growth since the 1990s, have caused these underlying structural problems. Although market forces have been forcing prices downward, China’s government continues to use subsidized fixed investment and exports to bolster its economy to levels of growth that ensure low unemployment and reduce the riskof social unrest. While disposable income and consumption have increased relative to savings, China has not yet weaned itself fromits traditional investment and export-based growth model, and thus
continues to struggle with large internal imbalances.4
Imbalances in China’s trade and investment relationship with
the United States and other countries worsened in 2014. In thefirst eight months of 2014, the U.S.-China trade deficit increased
by 4.1 percent year-on-year to a total of $216 billion. Despite its
economic slowdown, China’s exports continued to grow and it sustained a global trade surplus. Chinese direct investment into theUnited States exceeded U.S. investment into China in 2014 for the
first time as foreign firms faced an increasingly hostile investment
climate in China. China accelerated its 2001 ‘‘Go Out’’ policy, which
encourages Chinese firms to expand their global presence.5 China’s
nontransparent policy-making processes frustrated trading partners and obstructed progress in key trade negotiations, such as theInformation Technology Agreement (ITA). China’s confrontational
behavior in addressing contentious territorial disputes with neighboring countries has also harmed economic and trade relations in
the Asia Pacific. Such behavior has economic implications for theUnited States because of the large volumes of U.S. trade that flow
through these disputed waters as well as the presence of potentially vast natural resources, including oil, natural gas, and othermineral deposits.
China’s Economic Slowdown and Stimulus
Slowdown—Causes and Symptoms
In the first three quarters of 2014, China reported an average
growth rate of 7.4 percent, just below its official growth target of
7.5 percent, as the economy was bolstered through government
stimulus. Throughout 2014, Chinese government leaders said lower
growth rates would become the norm as the country seeks to transition from an investment and export-led economy to a consumption-based growth model. For example, Chinese Premier Li
Keqiang said that China’s economy must grow at a ‘‘proper rate’’expected at around 7.5 percent, which he described as ‘‘slower thanthe past, but normal.’’ Li indicated that the Chinese government
was ‘‘adjusting its economic operations’’ to ensure that growth did
not fall below 7.5 percent, a rate determined to maintain job creation.6 Li also pledged that there would be ‘‘no hard landing’’ for
China’s economy.7 In summation, China conceded to a slower
growth rate in 2014 but ensured intervention through stimulus
whenever growth decelerated below the official target rate of 7.5
percent.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* A hard landing is a scenario in which an economy slows sharply toward or into recession
after a period of growth.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00050

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

39
Figure 1:

China’s Annual GDP and GDP Growth

Source: World Bank Development Indicators. ‘‘Other BRICS Average GDP Growth’’ is an average of the GDP growth rates of Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa.

Figure 1 shows China’s annual GDP and GDP growth rates since1990. Over this 23-year period, China’s annual GDP increased from$200 billion to $4.8 trillion. Although annual growth rates declined
somewhat from the peaks of the 1990s and early 2000s, they continue to remain consistently high, even in comparison to otherlarge emerging economies. As shown in Figure 2, quarterly GDP
growth rates declined slightly in 2010 and 2011, but have generally
hovered in the 7.4 to 8 percent range since 2012. In the absenceof sustained government stimulus, economists generally agree that
China’s GDP growth would have continued to decelerate below its
official target in 2014.8
Figure 2:

China’s Quarterly GDP Growth Rates

Source: Trading Economics.

C1S1Fig2.eps

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00051

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S1Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China’s Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), an indicator of economic expansion and a proxy for industrial utilization, reveals how
expanding government stimulus in 2014 may have mitigated China’s economic slowdown. As shown in Figure 3, in the first half ofthe year, China’s PMI remained under 50, the threshold for contraction in the economy. However, by June, as China’s stimulus
began to expand and take effect, China’s PMI rose above 50, indicating evidence of increased production.9

40
Figure 3: Purchasing Managers’ Index(>50 = expansion; <50 = contraction)

Source: China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing (CFLP), via CEIC data; HSBC.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00052

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S1Fig3.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Although China’s economy avoided a ‘‘hard landing’’ in 2014, several underlying structural problems combined to jeopardize growth:a worsening property market, persistent industrial overcapacity,and increasing debt levels. According to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), China’s ‘‘growth has relied too heavily on investment
and credit, a pattern that is not sustainable and [is] resulting in
rising vulnerabilities.’’ 10 High levels of investment, especially inthe property sector and related heavy industries, have been a central driver of economic growth and job creation in China since the1990s.11 Real estate and construction make up about 14 percent ofurban employment in China, and local governments have financed
construction-intensive projects as an easy means of job creation.12
As slowing growth threatens to raise unemployment in China, local
governments may continue to subsidize these industries to sustain
employment levels and prevent the risk of domestic instability.
Historically, China’s dynamic property sector has bolstered demand for steel, cement, and construction—the same industries thatnow face the most severe overcapacity problems. Such investment
in traditional industries has often been spurred indirectly throughlocal government subsidization of infrastructure projects that increased China’s debt to the highest levels ever. Thus, the interdependence of China’s property market, subsidized overcapacity of
traditional industries, and rising local government debt has resulted in a vicious cycle that continues to put China’s economy atrisk of further slowdown.
Property Slump: In 2014, China’s residential property prices fell
for the first time in two years, sparking fears of an imminent crisis.
As shown in Figure 4, price increases of newly constructed residential properties in 70 Chinese cities began to slow in March 2013and continued to decelerate throughout that year.13 In May 2014,41
prices began to decline and continued to do so into the third quarter. In July, 64 of 70 cities surveyed in China reported declining
property prices, the largest proportion of cities showing a monthly
decline since 2005. On average, property prices fell 0.9 percent between June and July.14
Figure 4:

Change in Price of New Residential Construction(Average of 70 Surveyed Chinese Cities)

Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, via CEIC data.

According to UBS Bank, ‘‘the risk of a more persistent andsharper downturn in the property sector is now the biggest risk
facing China’s economy in 2014 and 2015.’’ 15 As a pillar of China’s
growth, the property sector affects a multitude of other key sectors,
such as construction and steel production. Moody’s Analytics estimates that, including construction and home renovation, property
sales account for nearly one-quarter of China’s GDP.16
Overcapacity: China’s chronic problem of overcapacity and excess
investment continued to plague the economy. Chinese policymakers
have been trying to pare down industrial overcapacity since 2005;
yet after nearly a decade of efforts, economists believe that the
problem has actually worsened.17 Traditionally, China’s overcapacity has been concentrated in certain sectors, such as steel,solar panels (photovoltaics), plate glass, cement, construction, andshipbuilding.18 Official data indicate that the average industrial
utilization rate was 78 percent in the first half of 2013, while steel
and plate glass had the lowest utilization rates at 72 percent, alevel that would be considered recessionary in a capitalist system.* 19 In the aluminum sector, overcapacity has increased with

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00053

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S1Fig4.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The utilization rate is a measurement of industrial capacity and is the rate at which thepotential output levels are being met or used. Normal utilization rates in the United States tend
to average around 80 percent.

42
approximately three million tons of new smelter space establishedsince 2013.20
China’s steel sector also suffers from serious overcapacity.21
Local governments amplify this problem by relying on steel mill expansion as an easy way to increase local output and employment.22
Chinese government subsidization of steel, even when domestic demand is low, has resulted in the selling of Chinese steel exports inglobal markets at below-market rates. As a result, the U.S. Commerce Department announced in July a preliminary decision to impose countervailing duties on certain Chinese steel imports; a final
decision will be announced in November.23
Economists estimate that for China to meet its 2014 target
growth rate without enhanced stimulus, it would have to reduce excess capacity by 56.3 percent in steel, 38.9 percent in plate glass,and 11.4 percent in cement.24 Although necessary in the long-term
to reduce inefficiencies, the Chinese government appears to haveadopted the view that reducing overcapacity during a time of economic slowdown would exacerbate the decline. For example, China’s Minister of Industry and Information Technology, Miao Wei—
who is charged with reducing industrial overcapacity—admitted tothe difficulty of addressing the problem while the economy is under
downward pressure.25 The government did request that banks notlend to industries suffering from overcapacity; however, easy accessto credit through the shadow banking sector has negated any effectfrom the official but widely ignored policy.26
Rising Debt Levels: In 2014, China’s debt levels rose at record
rates, imposing another underlying threat to China’s economic stability. Standard Chartered estimated that China’s total debt-toGDP ratio surpassed 250 percent in 2014,27 a level well above mostemerging economies and on par with Australia, South Korea,
France, and Italy.* By comparison, the U.S. total debt-to-GDP ratio
in 2013 was estimated at 270 percent. While economists do not consider the ratio itself to be dangerously high, they are concerned
about the rate at which China’s debt levels are increasing. By July
2014, China’s debt-to-GDP ratio had already increased 20 percent
over the previous year.28 In the first half of 2014, China’s total social financing, a more robust measurement of credit beyond traditional bank lending, increased 23.7 percent year-on-year.29 China’s
rising debt levels are accompanied by a growing number and valueof non-performing loans (NPL), which are loans upon which theborrower has not made payments for at least 90 days.30 NPLs in
China have been rapidly rising since late 2013, as shown in Figure
5. In addition, in 2014, China experienced its first corporate bonddefault since the establishment of its bond market in the early
1990s.31 If this trend continues, it could have negative consequences on the financial sector, as well as the broader economy.32

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Standard Chartered’s estimate of total debt is more comprehensive than China’s official debt
statistics and includes both domestic and foreign lending, as well as some types of lending thatare often referred to as shadow banking. These include trust loans and entrusted loans, but do
not include lending by underground banks, guarantee companies, online lending firms, andpawn brokers, which Standard Chartered considers to be very small compared to overall credit
estimates. Some analysts estimate these forms of lending not included in Standard Chartered’s
calculation to be as high as 8 percent, in which case China’s total debt-to-GDP ratio would be
about 258 percent.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00054

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

43
Figure 5:

Chinese Non-Performing Loans(as percentage of commercial bank loans)

Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission, via CEIC database.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00055

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S1Fig5.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Local governments are a major contributor to China’s rising debt
levels. Excessive investment in China’s property sector and overcapacity-laden industries has largely been supported through local
government financing.33 In an effort to bolster local economic
growth in a given Chinese town or province, local governments borrow to finance infrastructure projects that artificially boost demandfor construction services and building materials. Consequently,
local government debt is raising China’s overall debt-to-GDP ratioat record rates and introducing another vulnerability to China’s
economic growth. In December 2013, a report issued by China’s National Audit Office (NAO) revealed that ‘‘three provincial governments, 99 cities, 195 county-level administrations, and 3,465 townships had local public debt exceeding 100 percent’’ of their local
economic activity.34 In total, the NAO report disclosed that China’s
local governments held nearly $3 trillion in debt, approximately
one-third of China’s GDP in 2013.35
In recent years, China’s central government has tried to rein inrising local government debt to lessen the oversupply of property
and industrial overcapacity; however, Beijing’s efforts have been
largely inconsequential. Local governments have simply circumvented central government restrictions by borrowing from the large
shadow banking sector.36 The shadow banking system can bebroadly defined as ‘‘lending that falls outside of the official banking
system,’’ and includes lending products such as entrusted loans, investment trusts, wealth management products, credit guarantees,
and certain forms of microlending.37 This year, the China Banking
Regulatory Commission revealed that China’s shadow banking sector reached about $5.29 trillion, or 57 percent, of GDP in 2013.38
Beijing has attempted to rein in the prominent shadow banking
sector. For example, in May, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC),

44
China’s central bank, instructed commercial banks to limit interbank lending and lending to other financial institutions—both ofwhich are important financing mechanisms for shadow bank lending. According to analysts, by limiting lending between banks andfinancial institutions, the government can curb risk-laden debt
across the economy.39 The government’s efforts seem to haveslowed shadow bank lending, which declined since 2013 as a shareof aggregate credit; however, borrowing has simply shifted to thebond market, nullifying any net effect on overall debt.40 (For more
analysis of China’s shadow banking sector, see the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2013 Annual Report toCongress, Chapter 1, Section 3, ‘‘Governance and Accountability in
China’s Financial System.’’)DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Stimulus—Scale and EffectivenessSetting aside the structural reforms promised in the 2013 Third
Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Central Committee (hereafter,‘‘Third Plenum’’), the Chinese government in 2014 resorted insteadto economic stimulus to mitigate the slowdown. Although the Chinese government promised not to employ large-scale stimulus in
2014, Beijing implemented expansionary fiscal initiatives throughout the year to bolster the economy and maintain a growth rate ator near the official 7.5 percent target. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang
stated that the government would only rely on ‘‘smart and targeted
regulation’’ rather than strong stimulus.41 The government waswary of increasing already high debt levels, particularly among
local governments.42
Unofficially referred to as a ‘‘mini-stimulus,’’ fiscal initiatives announced in July 2013 included expanded investment in railways
and public housing, as well as reductions in the Required Reserve
Ratios (RRRs) for banks, tax breaks for small businesses, and incentives for homebuyers.43 Economists estimated that these fiscal
initiatives, initially modest in volume, would have been insufficient
to offset the effects of the slowing property market on economic
growth.44 Indeed, following the announcement of 7.4 percent GDP
growth in the first quarter of 2014, the Chinese government steadily added to the initial ‘‘mini-stimulus,’’ steering growth back toward the official target rate of 7.5 percent. For example, in September 2014, the PBOC provided $81 billion in low-interest loans
to China’s five major state-owned banks as growth estimates declined in the third quarter of the year.45 In July, the IMF calledon China to lower its economic growth targets for 2015 and refrainfrom continued stimulus in favor of a ‘‘safer and more sustainablegrowth path.’’ 46
Fiscal Spending: China’s overall fiscal spending increased andaccelerated throughout 2014 as the government increased stimulus.
New central government spending, which increased 15.8 percent
year-on-year in May, continued to support railway expansion, butalso included other large infrastructure projects such as highways,
oil and gas distribution, and storage facilities.47 By mid-2014, thegovernment had raised railway spending to $128 billion, an increase of about 25 percent from 2013.48 The China Railway Corporation (formerly, the Ministry of Railways) announced that it
would be constructing 4,350 miles of new tracks in 2014.49 Some

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00056

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

45
analysts claim that China’s rail system does not suffer from theovercapacity found in other sectors and is, therefore, ripe for enhanced investment.50 However, others argue that government subsidization of freight rail and investment in rail infrastructure serveas an indirect subsidy to China’s export-oriented industries.* 51
Despite high debt levels, Beijing urged local governments toboost fiscal spending. Fiscal spending accelerated throughout 2014
reaching a year-on-year increase of 26.1 percent in June.52 While
the value of these fiscal initiatives paled in comparison to the $640
billion stimulus implemented during the 2008–2009 global economic slowdown, the steady expansion of the stimulus over theyear illustrated the Chinese government’s commitment to bolstering the economy to avert rising unemployment and possible social instability.
As the decline of China’s property market became the main risk
to its economy in 2014, the government made policy adjustments
to increase demand for housing. For example, the PBOC encouraged the country’s largest banks to accelerate mortgage approvals.53 Banks began offering low down-payment options to help firsttime homebuyers.54 Local governments also provided incentives tohome buyers, such as tax breaks 55 and local household registration,† or hukou, to residents from other Chinese provinces.56 On
the supply side, the government also reduced reserve requirementsof banks to allow property developers to obtain easier financing.57
To boost lending, Chinese regulators redefined how loan-to-deposit
ratios are calculated; the maneuver freed up new credit for small
businesses.58
Building Megaregions with Mini-Stimulus
The government’s increased infrastructure expenditure underthe mini-stimulus is accelerating the Chinese government’s plans
to integrate cities into megaregions. According to the McKinsey
Global Institute, China is currently integrating cities into 22
clusters, seven of which can be characterized as megaregions.59
The megaregions are Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Nanjing, the Shandong Byland, and the Jing-Jin-Ji cluster,which includes Beijing, Tianjin, and parts of Hebei province.
However, the government’s efforts to build megaregions havealso come under criticism for contradicting Xi Jinping’s pledge to
let the market play a decisive role in the economy. While 2014
stimulus spending was small compared to the 2008 package,economists are concerned that China continues to resort to investment spending to boost the economy, exacerbating the overcapacity problem, and elevating the risk of an impending debt
crisis. As one analyst remarked, ‘‘There are only so many ‘ghost
cities’ and ‘high-speed rail lines to nowhere’ [Xi’s] government
can build.’’ 60

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* In the United States, the freight railway operators own the vast majority of rail tracks andself-finance new rail infrastructure investment.
† The location of one’s household registration in China is the basis for eligibility to receivea variety of government services, such as education. It has traditionally been very difficult tochange the location of one’s household registration in China.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00057

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

46
Building Megaregions with Mini-Stimulus—Continued
Furthermore, many urban planners argue that China’s megaregions are not being built in a way that would maximize the advantages of large urban clusters. Specifically, China’s megaregions are built around a single urban core with concentric circles of commuters extending out from the center.61 Some urban
planning experts say that this model worsens traffic and pollution because residents will ultimately gravitate toward themegaregion’s core for work and city services.62 For example, Jan
Wampler, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) architect, criticized the Jing-Jin-Ji megaregion as simply an expansion of Beijing by building out more commuter ring roads.*
Wampler said, ‘‘You can’t continue to build ring roads. It’s got tostop sometime.’’ 63 Instead, planning experts believe that the integration of cities only works when multiple urban cores aremaintained, such as the U.S. Northeast corridor stretching from
Washington, DC, to Boston, MA.64
Supporters of the megaregion concept respond that theseurban clusters are at less risk of becoming ghost towns since
they build upon the economic momentum of China’s major cities.
For example, in the case of the Jing-Jin-Ji cluster, advocatesargue that the integration of the nearby but lesser developed
Hebei region into the Beijing-centric megalopolis will reducepressure on Beijing’s housing market, migrant flow, and water
scarcity.65
Status of China’s Economic Reform Agenda
In 2014, China’s government made minimal progress on the economic reforms it pledged to implement during the 2013 Third Plenum.66 At the Third Plenum, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced an ambitious and comprehensive economic reform plan. In
an oft-cited speech from that event, Xi stated the following:
A proper relationship between the market and government
remains the core of China’s economic reform. To build sucha relationship is to settle whether the market or government
plays a decisive role, and the market has proven to be themost effective.67
Xi’s comments articulate a clear guiding principle that the market should play a ‘‘decisive role’’ as China implements reforms.68
However, in the same speech, Xi emphasized that the state would
continue to play a key role in the economy, seemingly contradicting
the so-called ‘‘decisive role’’ of the market. Critics noted that Xi’scomments should therefore not be misinterpreted to mean that the
CCP would relinquish any power over China’s economy; on the contrary, the reforms have the potential to strengthen the CCP’s influence by clarifying the role of the state and consolidating its

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* A ring road is a circumferential highway that surrounds a city, similar to the Capital Beltway (I–495) around Washington, DC, I–695 around Baltimore and I–285 around Atlanta (285).
European cities, such as Stockholm, London, and Rome also have ring roads surrounding a city
center.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00058

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

47
power.69 As The Brookings Institution scholar Arthur Kroeber said,‘‘The respective roles of state and market need to be clarified, but
the state role will remain very large.’’ 70 However, the IMF noted
in a July 2014 country report on China that its reform blueprint‘‘has not been followed up with details on the specific reforms ortimetables.’’ 71 In lieu of implementing substantive economic reforms, Xi and his economic reform leadership team spent the better
part of 2014 consolidating political power and executing a vast
anticorruption campaign.72
Reform Leadership and Power Consolidation
In 2013, the Chinese government underwent a once-in-a-decadeleadership transition that brought in Xi Jinping as president andaltered the membership of the Politburo and other Party organs.*
Initially, the transition sparked uncertainty about who would guide
China’s future economic policies. Many analysts believed a broadconsensus in China’s government supported comprehensive reform,
highlighted by the November 2013 Third Plenum. At the National
People’s Congress (NPC) meetings in March, the annual work reports issued by the Premier, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) were moredetailed than previous reports, and appeared to build on the Third
Plenum agenda.†
However, in 2014, President Xi took control over key Party organs, suggesting that he believes centralization of power is necessary to implement his reform agenda. For example, Xi has reorganized the CCP’s Central Committee’s small leading groups andnow personally chairs more than half of them, including the powerful Comprehensive Deepening Reform, State Security, and Internet
Security and Informationization groups.73 The government’s justification for creating the Reform Group is that the Third Plenum
reforms would be hard to implement through existing institutions,which represent local and sectoral interests, and do not coordinate
sufficiently.74 Attacking ‘‘vested interests’’ may present a pretext
for Xi to target rivals, particularly in state-dominated sectors.75

Some Key Economic Officials in Xi’s Cabinet
Lou Jiwei (Minister of Finance): Lou Jiwei is one of the mostfrequently quoted Chinese officials. In response to concerns
about China’s economic slowdown, Lou argued that job creation
is more important than GDP growth, and that a weaker role for
manufacturing will help to relieve overcapacity and pollution.76

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For more information, see Chapter 1, Section 1, of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November 2013.
† For details, see Nargiza Salidjanova and Iacob Koch-Weser, China’s 2014 Government Work
Report: Taking Stock of Reforms (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April
1, 2014). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20Backgrounder_NPC%20scorecard.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00059

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

48
Some Key Economic Officials in Xi’s Cabinet—Continued
He has also called on China to shift its tax base from production
to consumption, with a focus on luxury goods, property, and energy-intensive products.77 In an unusual move, Lou acknowledged in June 2014 that ‘‘persistent downside pressures in economic growth’’ could force the government to miss its fiscal revenue target, even as President Xi stated that there was ‘‘no way’’
China would miss its 2014 GDP growth target.78 In China’s
power structure, Lou likely has less influence than long-serving
central bank head Zhou Xiaochuan, who was allowed to retain
his post after the leadership transition.79 The Xi administration
recently criticized mismanagement at China’s sovereign wealthfund China Investment Corporation, where Lou served as chairman from 2007 to 2013.80
Zhou Xiaochuan (PBOC Governor): Following the extension of
his term as PBOC governor in March 2013, Zhou Xiaochuan now
stands as China’s longest serving central banker.81 The extension of his tenure following last year’s leadership transition is
likely related to his reformist views on interest rates and China’s
exchange rate regime. Zhou is credited with overseeing the transition away from a fixed exchange rate to the current ‘‘managed
float’’ system that designates a limited daily trading band within
which the RMB can change value vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.82 He
is also known for recruiting U.S. educated economists into key
PBOC posts, which is further evidence of his reformist views on
economics.83 Under Zhou’s leadership, the PBOC has taken marginal steps to address China’s growing credit crisis, such as bylimiting lending within the shadow banking sector. However,given that the PBOC is not an independent government entity
like the U.S. Federal Reserve, it is unlikely the Zhou-led PBOC
will have the same power as the Federal Reserve in implementing broader economic reforms.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Zhang Gaoli (Executive Vice Premier): Considered to be a close
ally of Xi Jinping, Zhang Gaoli holds multiple high-level titles
that imply he is a key economic figure in Xi’s cabinet; however,analysts say that his ‘‘low-profile approach’’ makes it difficult todetermine which economic issues are more important to him andhow influential he is in Xi’s decision-making.84 Zhang is not onlya member of the Politburo Standing Committee and the executive vice premier; he also holds one of the four positions on theleading small group on reform, along with Xi Jinping, Li
Keqiang, and Liu Yunshan. However, Zhang holds no other key
positions on any other leading small groups.85 Some analysts
argue that Zhang’s leadership experience in some of China’s
most developed regions, including Shenzhen, Shandon, andTianjin, is evidence of Zhang’s support for economic reform.86
However, Zhang’s alleged persecution of Falun Gong followers
when he was Party secretary in Shandong province and his tightgrip on the media when serving as Party secretary in Tianjin areevidence of his opposition to political reform.87

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00060

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

49
Some Key Economic Officials in Xi’s Cabinet—Continued
Wang Yang (Vice Premier): Prior to the leadership transition,
Wang Yang served as Party secretary of Guangdong province,
and was known as a particularly liberal reformer. He failed tosecure a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, giving him
less authority than Zhang Gaoli. That is also reflected in theCentral Reform Leading Group, where Wang Yang is an ordinary member, whereas Zhang co-heads the Group.88 Nonetheless, Wang Yang is actively engaged in China’s economic policy.
He has inherited many functions of Wang Qishan, the former
vice premier who now spearheads Xi’s anticorruption campaign.
Wang Yang is lead negotiator in China’s Strategic and Economic
Dialogue (S&ED) and Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade(JCCT) talks with the United States, where he has emphasized
the importance of the Third Plenum reform agenda.89 He frequently serves as interlocutor for foreign companies and commercial delegations, and has emphasized the importance of improving intellectual property protection and developing e-commerce.90
Xu Shaoshi (Director of the NDRC): The NDRC, the powerfulsupra-ministry that formulates industrial policies, issues approvals, and sets prices, has arguably been relegated to secondary
status under the new leadership.91 No one from the NDRC isrepresented in the Central Leading Reform Group, and the agency’s former Deputy Director Liu Tienan was indicted on corruption charges in June 2014.92 However, the NDRC’s current director Xu Shaoshi appears keen to adapt the agency to the reform
agenda of the new leadership. Xu has called for increasing private sector investment in financial services, energy, and utilities,
a departure from the NDRC’s historic protection of domestic industry.93 He told the NPC in March that the focus on industrial
growth was restraining efforts to cut emissions and energy use.94
Xu is also heading a new coordinating body, established by theState Council in May, which will seek ways to reduce income inequality.95 On July 8, Xu published a lengthy opinion piece in
the People’s Daily, the Party-controlled paper, in which hepraised ‘‘Comrade Xi Jinping’s’’ ‘‘brilliant’’ speeches on market
reform since the 18th Party Congress.96
Xi Jinping’s Anticorruption Campaign

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

In 2014, Xi Jinping accelerated his anticorruption campaign toaddress a major source of public dissatisfaction and eliminate hispolitical opponents while further consolidating his power.97 However, some analysts believe that the elimination of other politicalfactions, namely former Politburo Standing Committee member
Zhou Yongkang and his supporters as well as former President
Jiang Zemin’s lingering loyalists in the Shanghai region, is Xi’s
method for laying the groundwork for wider economic reforms.98
The 2013 Third Plenum called for internal Party reform and reformof the CCP’s disciplinary system in its blueprint for China’s economic reforms. Xi and his likeminded reform leaders argued that

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00061

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

50
the government must eliminate the long-standing incentives that
entice officials—especially local officials—to engage in corrupt practices.99 For example, in September 2013, executives of China’s largest oil and gas company PetroChina were forced out when the government launched a corruption campaign.100 As one of China’s
three big oil companies, PetroChina has control over domestic fuelprices and oil supply in the Chinese energy market. Some analysts
predict that Xi’s pro-reform government initiated the corruption
probe into PetroChina as a means of breaking the state-owned enterprise (SOE) into smaller companies, thereby allowing for some
privatization of the oil sector. The logic is that if Xi is able to remove high-level officials with vested interests in SOEs such as
PetroChina on the basis of corruption, he can more swiftly implement other SOE-related reforms.101
Because President Xi’s ten-year term is in its beginning, the impact of Xi’s broad-sweeping housecleaning on his economic reform
aspirations is not yet clear. Some analysts believe that if the
anticorruption campaign continues to gain momentum, Xi risks intimidating the broad majority of Chinese officials into isolation,
rendering them unwilling to govern effectively.102 Moreover, if Xi
fails to implement other economic reforms in a timely manner because of a prolonged anticorruption purge, it is likely that China’s
economic growth will continue to slow and imbalances will worsen.103 (For more analysis of Xi’s anticorruption campaign, see
Chapter 2, Section 3, ‘‘China’s Domestic Stability.’’)DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Stagnant Implementation of Economic Reform
China made minimal progress in 2014 toward implementing the
economic reforms laid out in the 2013 Third Plenum.104 The government stopped short of fulfilling its reform promises despite its
slowing economy and ongoing dependence on export and investment-led growth. In July, the IMF urged China to expedite its economic reform agenda stating that it was ‘‘increasingly urgent’’ andthat the current growth model was ‘‘not sustainable and is raisingvulnerabilities.’’ 105 U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew called on
China ‘‘to speed up’’ its reforms, reduce reliance on exports, adopt
a consumption-led growth model, and contribute to a level playing
field in global trade.106 The U.S.-China Business Council reported
that only six out of 59 reform policy announcements have a ‘‘significant impact’’ on foreign investment; of these, four were describedas ‘‘largely aspirational.’’ 107
Shanghai Free Trade Zone (FTZ): Launched in September 2013,
the Shanghai FTZ was lauded as one of China’s major reform initiatives.108 However, the FTZ has achieved minimal progress in2014 as businesses and legal advisers struggle to find any notablebenefit from operating in the trade zone rather than elsewhere in
China.109 Incremental trade-related reforms, such as lifting a ban
on foreign video game consoles, have benefited some niche industries; however, analysts compare these reforms to those of a traditional Chinese special economic zone, such as Shenzhen, notingthat the Shanghai FTZ was intended to be far more comprehensive
in its liberalization.110 Regarding foreign investment, the Shanghai
FTZ adopted a negative list approach to regulating which sectors

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00062

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

51
face restrictions on foreign investment.* The FTZ came under criticism, though, when the negative list was revealed to include 190
sectors with foreign investment restrictions. In what was probably
the most notable advance in the FTZ thus far, China reduced that
number to 139 sectors in July, granting greater foreign investment
access in industries such as finance, health care, and entertainment.111
Monetary reforms were also intended to be a defining characteristic of the Shanghai FTZ; but these have been largely inconsequential, and economists have criticized some of the more aggressive reforms as infeasible. In one ostensible reform, the Chinese
government informed foreign companies that by holding bank accounts in the Shanghai FTZ, they can more easily transfer excess
local currency in and out of China; however, FTZ officials were reported saying that the process can already be done nationwide,based on regulations outside of the FTZ.112 The government has
also promised liberalized interest rates and full currency convertibility within the FTZ. Neither of these reforms has yet to belaunched, and economists argue that it is nearly impossible to liberalize interest rates and adjust monetary policy within only asmall region of the country.113 Economists believe that liberalized
rates within the FTZ alone would not be a meaningful test of theeconomic reforms Beijing purports to launch nationally. Similarly,
currency convertibility confined to the FTZ would require ‘‘a strong
firewall,’’ which economists argue is challenging and would fail toaccurately test the reforms on a nationwide basis.114
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Reform: Reform of China’s SOEs
largely stalled in 2014, though some limited SOE reform did takeplace. For example, Sinopec launched a hybrid ownership structurethat permits private investors to purchase company shares, andPetroChina privatized some of its pipeline business as well.115 On
the policy side, the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) tracked
three new official policies on SOE reform, including a Shanghai
municipal government announcement that accelerates SOE reform,
but only for Shanghai-based SOEs; a China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) notice that requires SOEs to provide a portionof their revenues back to the government; and a State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) statement calling on SOEs to improve efficiency by using economic
value-added (EVA) to measure performance.116 In addition, theanticorruption campaign is considered to be contributing partiallyto SOE reform by eliminating vested interests of government officials and incentives to engage in corruption.117
Financial Reforms: On financial reform, China made very limited
progress toward liberalizing interest rates and reforming its government-managed exchange rate system that has allowed it toundervalue and manipulate its currency.118 China’s economy has
been under increasing pressure to liberalize interest rates as risk-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* China has traditionally used purchasing catalogs to denote which products, services, and investments are approved for market access. Sectors not specifically listed in the catalogs are restricted from foreign competition. The system more widely used globally is a ‘‘negative list’’ approach which denotes only those sectors which face market access restrictions; sectors not listed
are considered open.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00063

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

52

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

ridden shadow banking and unregulated wealth managed products
have flourished in circumvention of financial regulations.119 The
shadow banking sector poses risks because it does not provide adequate disclosures of risk-related information to investors.120 While
China’s regulators may understand that deregulation of interest
rates is the best solution to reining in the massive shadow-banking
sector and addressing China’s growing debt problem, they lack thepolitical clout to implement such a reform.121 In addition, the government has long touted the need for a bank deposit insurance system, but to date, has not implemented one.122 Although the World
Bank, IMF, and U.S. government have called on China to implement these reforms in a timely manner, PBOC Governor Zhou
Xiaochuan said the timing would depend on ‘‘good conditions’’ in
the Chinese and global economies, and estimated that liberalization would take two years.123
China made few reform moves toward a more flexible marketbased exchange rate system. The United States has repeatedly
called on China to adopt a floating exchange rate policy and cease
undervaluing its currency; a policy that makes Chinese products
cheaper and, therefore, serves as an export subsidy. Secretary Lew
said that China needs to speed up floating its currency, a measurethat will be a ‘‘crucial step’’ for the economy. However, during the2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Chinese Vice
Premier Wang Yang warned against China moving too fast in exchange rate reform.124 PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan said thatwhile China will ‘‘eventually’’ move toward a market-determinedexchange rate regime, money flows were too unstable to do so
now.125 Despite the government’s often stated intention of floating
its currency, China has never tried to achieve this goal, nor has itannounced any timeline for doing so.
Foreign Investment Reform: China’s government has made minimal progress in liberalizing restrictions on foreign investment. In
September 2013, the PBOC issued a ‘‘Notice on Relevant Matters
Regarding RMB Settlement of Foreign Investors Investing in Domestic Financial Institutions,’’ which allows foreign investors to use
local currency for a broad range of domestic financial transactions
that can support their expansion within China.126 This was the
only reform related to foreign investment that the USCBC reported
as having a ‘‘significant impact’’ on foreign companies operating in
China.127 USCBC considered other reform initiatives that streamline certain administrative processes for foreign firms in China tohave only moderate or limited impact.128 Many sectors remain fullyor partially closed to foreign investment in China, but the government has reformed foreign ownership restrictions in some niche
sectors, such as hospitals.129
Administrative and Procedural Reforms: Administrative reforms—specifically regarding how companies are incorporated andobtain licenses in China—were one area where the government
took some positive, though still incremental, steps forward. In February, China’s State Council issued a ‘‘Notice on Registered Capital
Registration System Reform,’’ which reduced capital requirements
for establishing new businesses and streamlined incorporation
processes.130 According to legal analysts, the reforms should apply

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00064

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

53
to both domestic and foreign-invested businesses.131 The USCBC
rated the measure as having ‘‘significant impact’’ on the operationof foreign firms in China. Other measures adopted by the StateCouncil simplified procedures for obtaining administrative licensing, and began laying the groundwork for reviewing new investment projects based on a negative list approach to restricting foreign investment.132
Internal Reforms: China made moderate progress in planning for
certain internal reforms in areas such as the tax system, household
registration or hukou system, and urbanization. Xi Jinping said,‘‘Now the Chinese economy is too complex; [China] must first build
the institutions of economic governance in which the market will
operate.’’ 133 According to former World Bank president and U.S.
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, this implies that internal reforms such as the tax and household registration system are priorities for Xi.134 Concrete timelines set out by the government inthese areas indicate that the reform leadership considers thesetime-sensitive areas of reform. For example, the Ministry of Finance announced in July that a reform of China’s tax system,
which includes a phased shift toward greater dependence on avalue-added tax (VAT), will be completed by 2016.135 In 2014,
China announced multiple reforms to its household registration
system that currently blocks many migrant workers in China’s
largest cities from access to basic social services, such as education.136 The reforms should allow for migrants from other provinces to apply for local hukou registration in the city they have migrated to, though initially the reforms are restricted to mediumsize cities.137 Analysts in China are optimistic that, with Beijing
leading hukou reform, the effort may be ‘‘substantive’’ and ‘‘systematic.’’ * 138 (For more analysis of the hukou system, see Chapter 2,
Section 3, ‘‘China’s Domestic Stability.’’)China’s Economic Rebalancing
In the absence of substantive reforms, China’s economic imbalances—both external and internal—continue to plague its economy
and burden the U.S. and global economies. Externally, China’s dependence on exports for growth, which is supported by an undervalued currency, as well as large volumes of foreign currency reserves, contributes to major global trade imbalances. Internally,
the government’s failure to shift the economy toward a consumption-based growth model sustains China’s overdependence on investment and limits opportunities for U.S. exports to China.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

External Rebalancing
Global Trade Imbalances: In 2014, China maintained a global
trade surplus, a hallmark feature of its export-oriented growthmodel. As of June, China’s trade surplus was approximately $31.5
billion, a year-on-year increase of 16 percent. China’s expanding
current account surplus was driven by increased exports, whichrose by 7 percent year-on-year. Imports into China increased 5 percent year-on-year, but the higher rate of increase of exports was
sufficient to sustain China’s surplus. As depicted in Figure 6, Chinese exports recovered in the first half of 2014 from a seasonal

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00065

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

54
drop in February. Thus, despite slowing economic growth, China’s
global trade surplus, including export levels, continued to rise as
the government injected stimulus into the economy and maintained
an undervalued currency. The IMF indicated that a reduction in
China’s current account surplus as a percentage of its GDP to 1.9
percent in 2013 was a positive sign toward external rebalancing;however, the change was due largely to weak global demand andincreasing investment boosted by the stimulus.139
Figure 6:

China’s Global Trade Flows(US$ billions)

Source: China General Administration of Customs, via CEIC database.

Figure 7 shows the trend in the U.S.-China trade balance since2001, when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). In
the first eight months of 2014, the U.S.-China trade deficit in goods
was over $216 billion, an increase of 4.1 percent from the same period in 2013, according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau. In
the first half of 2014, U.S. exports to China grew 6.2 percent yearon-year, while Chinese imports increased by only 4.6 percent.* The
U.S.-China trade deficit in Advanced Technology Products (ATP)was $72.6 billion in the first eight months of 2014, an increase ofless than 1 percent year-on-year.140 Tables 1 and 2 outline the top
five U.S. exports to China and U.S. imports from China in the firsthalf of 2014, respectively. The United States continued to registera trade surplus with China in services, which totaled $13.5 billion
in the first half of 2014, an increase of 25 percent year-on-year.141(For further analysis of the challenges of the U.S.-China economic
and trade relationship, see Section 2, ‘‘U.S.-China Bilateral Tradeand Economic Challenges.’’)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00066

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S1Fig6.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* This calculation is based on the value of U.S. exports to China year-to-date from January
to May 2014. The year-on-year comparison refers to the same period in 2013.

55
Figure 7:

U.S. Trade Deficit with China(US$ billions)

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table 1:Top Five U.S. Exports to China
2014 H1(US$ billions)

Percent Change(year-on-year)

Transportation Equipment

12.2

21.6%

Computer and Electronic Products

7.8

¥0.7%

Agricultural Products

7.3

10.2%

Chemicals

6.9

6.0%

Machinery (Except Electrical)

4.9

¥3.2%

Product Type

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

Table 2:Top Five U.S. Imports from China
2014 H1(US$ billions)

Percent Change(year-on-year)

Computer and Electronic Products

74.6

¥0.3%

Electrical Equipment, Appliances &Components

17.7

17.0%

Miscellaneous Manufactured Commodities

15.2

4.9%

Machinery (Except Electrical)

15.1

26.1%

Apparel and Accessories

13.7

0.4%

Product Type

Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00067

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S1Fig7.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Monetary Policy Issues: Undervaluation of the RMB continues toserve as a subsidy to Chinese exports. In March 2014, the PBOC

56
doubled the RMB’s trading band with the U.S. dollar (USD) to ±2
percent each day.142 However, the Chinese government retained
the power to set a new value for the RMB-dollar exchange rateeach new trading day, even while allowing greater fluctuations inintra-day trading. While China’s trade surplus should have caused
the RMB to increase in value, the opposite happened as China continued to intervene massively in currency markets to lower thevalue of the RMB. The PBOC’s confusing policy change was followed by an immediate weakening of the RMB against the USD by
7.7 percent from January to June. In its mid-year report to Congress released in April, the Treasury Department associated the expanded daily trading band with greater flexibility for China to intervene in its currency. The report states:
In the month prior to the band widening, the PBOC took
measures, including reported heavy intervention, to significantly weaken the RMB and push it away from the mostappreciated edge of the previous band. The RMB has seen
periods of depreciation before, such as mid-2012 when the
RMB fell 1.5 percent against the dollar over a three-month
period. However, the pace and the size of the recent decline
were unprecedented.152

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

For the 20th consecutive year, the Treasury Department stopped
short of officially accusing China of currency ‘‘manipulation’’; however, a comparison of changes in the RMB–USD exchange rate
against increases in Chinese exports demonstrates that the PBOC
purposefully undervalued the RMB as a means of subsidizing Chinese exports during the first quarter of 2014, just as China fell
short of reaching its 7.5 percent official growth target. As shownin Figure 8, the year-on-year change in the RMB value relative tothe dollar, which had been gradually appreciating since 2005, suddenly declined sharply to almost no year-on-year appreciation by
May. During that same period, year-on-year changes in Chinese exports to the United States, which were declining from November
2013 to February 2014 as China’s economy slowed, suddenly
spiked. In February, at the time of the PBOC band increase, Chinese exports to the United States were down about 11 percent
year-on-year. By April, exports were increasing by over 12 percent
year-on-year. Nonetheless, PBOC officials called the weakening of
the RMB as falling within a ‘‘normal scope.’’ 144

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00068

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

57
Figure 8:

RMB Undervaluation as Export Subsidy(Year-on-Year Change)

Source: People’s Bank of China and General Administration of Customs, via CEIC data.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00069

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S1Fig8.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Foreign Exchange Reserves: Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is further evidence of China undervaluing its currency andusing monetary policy to subsidize exports. In the first quarter of2014, China’s foreign exchange reserves increased sharply by about$140 billion bringing its total foreign reserve assets to nearly $4
trillion. The foreign exchange reserve data from 2014 confirms that
China’s weakening RMB is due to ‘‘intensive intervention’’ by the
PBOC.145 Economists infer that China’s increasing foreign reserves
while maintaining a trade surplus is convincing evidence of heavyintervention in currency markets.146 Figure 9 shows a direct correlation between China’s exports and the purchase of foreign reserve assets from 2004 to 2011. Following a sharp drop in new foreign reserves in 2012, exports increased again as China resumed
large-scale accumulation of foreign reserves in 2013. Preliminary
data from 2014 indicates that this trend will continue. By May,
Chinese exports began to increase again following the PBOC’s massive interventionist policies in the first quarter.

58
Figure 9: China’s Annual Acquisition of Foreign Reserves(Left Axis: US$ billions; Right Axis: US$ trillions)

Source: China State Administration of Foreign Exchange and General Administration of Customs, via CEIC data.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00070

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S1Fig9.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Internal Rebalancing
The Chinese government’s official narrative in 2014 was that its
economy made progress toward a greater reliance on domestic
sources rather than exports for growth by reducing wasteful investment.147 China’s growth model, which has been driven by high levels of investment in manufacturing capacity and infrastructure, is
not sustainable and China needs to shift to a primarily consumption-driven growth model.148 China’s leadership has stated it accepts this view, which is also held by several Western governments,
the World Bank, and the IMF. Analysis by the Peterson Institutefor International Economics (PIIE) shows that in the first quarterof 2014, China’s GDP growth and the growth rate of disposable income—a proxy for consumption capacity—expanded at nearly thesame rate with a gap of only -0.2 percent.149 PIIE economist Nicholas Borst said that the increase in Chinese disposable income,even during a time of slow growth, is the best sign for internal rebalancing in China since 2012.150
Analysts continue to debate whether the positive trends in China’s disposable income figures during 2014 reflect true internal rebalancing toward a sustainable consumption-led growth model. Figure 10 shows a comparison of annual per capita disposable income
and savings with the contribution of consumption to GDP growth.
Since 2012, per capita savings has remained constant, while percapita disposable income increased nearly 20 percent, an indicatorof increasing consumption. However, with 2013 and 2014 government stimulus focusing on infrastructure investment and credit
loosening—which tends to boost investment rather than consumption—the contribution of consumption to GDP growth declined from2012 to 2013.

59
Figure 10:

Per Capita Disposable Income and Savings in China(Left Axis: US$)

Source: China National Bureau of Statistics and People’s Bank of China, via CEIC data. The
data for disposable income and savings compare year-to-date data in June of each year. The consumption contribution to GDP data is annual.

Official data on the first half of 2014 indicates that consumption’s contribution to GDP surpassed the contribution of gross capital formation this year.151 In addition, China’s retail sales increased by 10.8 percent in the first half of 2014, which may also
support this analysis.152 Analysts view both as positive signs ofprogress toward internal rebalancing; however, it remains to be
seen if this trend toward greater consumption can be sustained in
the absence of government stimulus and without increasing China’s
debt levels, which already account for 250 percent of GDP.153
U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Investment Issues

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00071

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S1Fi10.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Bilateral Investment Issues
For the first time, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows
into the United States are surpassing U.S. FDI into China.154 This
shift in the bilateral investment relationship occurs in an increasingly hostile investment climate for foreign firms operating in
China.
Foreign Investment Climate in China: U.S. and other FDI flows
into China continued a steady deceleration in 2014 as new investment opportunities dwindled and foreign firms faced hostile or discriminatory treatment by Chinese regulators (see Figure 11).155 According to data from China’s Ministry of Commerce, FDI into
China declined 1.8 percent in the first eight months of 2014 compared to the same period last year.156 According to University ofNorth Carolina Finance Professor Christian Lundblad, the ‘‘lowhanging fruit’’ that foreign investors have enjoyed in China foryears have been harvested, leaving opportunities only in the sectors where regulatory complications make investment very difficult
or even impossible.157 These include sectors dominated by Chinese
SOEs, or in areas deemed sensitive or strategically important, such

60

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

as telecommunications, media, and financial services. In most ofthese sectors, foreign investment is either banned or restricted tojoint ventures with Chinese partners.158 Localization requirements—such as China-based research and development, technology
transfer, and network servers—are also costly and inefficient forforeign businesses, especially those in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector.159
Chinese regulators and state media have disproportionately targeted foreign firms operating in China with accusations ranging
from monopolistic behavior to exploitation of Chinese consumers.160
In 2014, China ramped up use of its Anti-Monopoly Law (AML)against foreign firms in what appears to be unequal enforcement
in order to create favorable market conditions for Chinese competitors.161 This year, China used the AML to investigate foreign firms
in sectors designated by the government as ‘‘strategic and emerging,’’ including automobiles and information technology. Four foreign industry associations including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the U.S.-China Business Council, the American Chamber
Commerce in China, and the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China issued reports in 2014 accusing China of unfair enforcement of the AML.162 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce said that‘‘in many cases involving foreign companies, China’s anti-monopoly
enforcement agencies have skewed the implementation of the AML
and related statutes to support China’s industrial policy goals
through discrimination and protectionism.’’ 163 The U.S.-China
Business Council reported that 86 percent of respondents to its
2014 member company survey said that they were ‘‘at least somewhat concerned about China’s evolving competition regime.’’ 164 The
European Union (EU) Chamber of Commerce said that the lack oftransparency in China’s enforcement of the AML leaves speculation
about the government’s intentions with the law.165
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce added that China disproportionately uses the AML against foreign firms to protect domestic industries and support national champions. The U.S. Chamber further
argued that such unequal enforcement could violate China’s WTO
obligations.166 China’s NDRC, one of the enforcement agencies of
the AML, refuted the industry groups’ accusations and claimed
that in an NDRC review of 300 AML cases, only 10 percent wereof foreign firms.167 However, the NDRC failed to disclose the timeframe of the 300 cases or how they were chosen for the review.
The Chinese government also uses procurement rules, statemedia, and anticorruption laws to target foreign-invested firms disproportionately. For example, in May 2014, China banned the procurement of new government computers equipped with Microsoft’s
Windows 8 operating system.168 Two months later, under the auspices of an antimonopoly investigation, China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) raided Microsoft’s offices in
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu, seizing documents
and computers.169 In addition, in June 2014, Chinese state media
called U.S. technology firms, such as Google and Apple, ‘‘pawns of
the U.S. Government,’’ accusing them of espionage and cyber-theftin China.170 Historically, China has disproportionately targeted foreign firms in corruption investigations, with one estimate indicating that of approximately 500,000 corruption investigations in

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00072

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

61
China between 2000 and 2009, 64 percent were of foreign-based
firms.171 There also appears to be a coordinated effort by the Chinese government to promote domestic industries, while state-run
media attack foreign competitors. For example, in 2010, after
China announced plans to boost domestic-made car sales to control
the majority of the Chinese auto market, state-run China Central
Television (CCTV) launched a media campaign against Volkswagen
that resulted in a recall of 640,000 vehicles.172
In 2013, the USCBC described U.S. industry’s attitude toward investment in China as ‘‘tempered optimism.’’ 173 In its annual survey of the Chinese business environment, USCBC’s members
agreed that nine of the ten most pressing challenges they face in
China—which include uneven enforcement of Chinese laws, transparency issues, and discriminatory practices toward foreign firms—
did not improve at all from the previous year.174
Figure 11:

Foreign Investment in China(percent change year-on-year)

Source: FDI from China Ministry of Commerce and Portfolio Investment from China PBOC,
via CEIC database.

Despite the growing hostility to foreign investment in China, foreigners continue to invest there, though the year-on-year rate has
declined steadily through the first half of 2014 (see Figure 11).
Commensurate with the leadership transition in early 2013, China’s FDI inflows remained generally positive with an upward spikein early 2014, perhaps in conjunction with enhanced government
stimulus. However, as China’s government has generally stalled
implementation of economic reforms, year-on-year increases in FDI
inflows have decelerated to a rate of 2.2 percent in June 2014.175
Likewise, portfolio investment into China has been decelerating almost continuously since September 2013.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00073

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S1Fi11.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Inbound Chinese Investment: While U.S. FDI into China is slowing, Chinese investment in the United States has grown dramatically. According to analysis by Rhodium Group, the stock of Chinese FDI in the United States grew from $1.9 billion in 2007 to62over $17 billion in 2012.176 From 2011 to 2012, the number of Chinese investments—mergers and acquisitions and greenfield projects
combined—nearly doubled from below 40 to about 70. RhodiumGroup estimated there were 82 new investments in 2013. The increase in inbound Chinese FDI has occurred simultaneously with
Executive Branch efforts to attract more foreign investment into
the United States, particularly with hopes of spurring job creation.
Rhodium Group estimates that in 2013, Chinese-owned firms employed more than 70,000 U.S. citizens.177 In recent years, theObama Administration began more targeted efforts to attract FDI,
including FDI from China, by, for example, expanding the Department of Commerce’s investment promotion function in 2012.178,179
China’s Share of U.S. Housing Market Grows
According to the National Association of Realtors (NAR), Chinese buyers ranked as the largest foreign purchasers of U.S. realestate by dollar value in 2014.* 180 Chinese buyers also constitute the fastest growing segment of foreign buyers.181 In thefirst three months of the year, Chinese buyers spent $22 billion
on U.S. homes, more than any other nationality, and an increaseof 72 percent from the same period in 2013.182 Over 75 percent
of buyers from China pay cash for U.S. homes, and the medianhome price among Chinese buyers was $523,148, more than
twice the median price of existing home sales.183 With this growing demand, the online real estate listing company Zillow Inc. established a Chinese language search portal in 2014 to link more
effectively with potential Chinese buyers.184
The motivation of Chinese buyers to purchase U.S. homes isvaried. Chinese buyers view purchasing U.S. homes as a cheap,
but reliable, investment with strong rent potential.185 In addition, by purchasing U.S. real estate as a limited liability corporation (LLC) or through other ‘‘creative corporate structuring,’’ the
U.S. property market is a convenient way to store money overseas anonymously.186 Perhaps the most cited reason for Chinese
buyers to purchase a home in the United States is because theirchildren are enrolled, or hope to enroll, in U.S. schools and universities. One survey of wealthy Chinese shows that 85 percent
want to send their children overseas for school.187 Real estate
brokers report that Chinese buyers prefer property near major
educational institutions; one New York broker said that many
Chinese clients purchase in Manhattan in hopes of sending theirchildren to Columbia or New York University.188
In light of a $50,000 cap on the amount of money an individual
can take out of China per year, the methods some Chinese buyers use to acquire property in the United States raise questions

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The NAR includes buyers from Taiwan and Hong Kong in their classification of ‘‘Chinese.’’However, the NAR confirmed that only about 1 percent of ‘‘Chinese buyers’’ surveyed were from
Taiwan or Hong Kong with the remaining 99 percent reportedly from mainland China.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00074

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

63
China’s Share of U.S. Housing Market Grows—Continuedof legality, transparency, and money laundering. Because 76 percent of Chinese buyers are offering cash on U.S. homes averaging well over $500,000, money must be wired or physically carried as currency or valuables into the country.189 University ofCalifornia Los Angeles economist William Yu says that wealthy
Chinese find creative ways to circumvent the $50,000 restriction,
including laundering money through Macau casinos and ‘‘cooking
the books’’ of import-export firms.190,191 Potential buyers canalso set up LLCs or other corporate entities to make the property
ownership ‘‘untraceable.’’ 192
According to the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists, this practice has allowed many U.S. real estate
deals linked to Chinese financial and political corruption scandals to take place.193 For example, the 2011 investigation offormer Chinese Minister of Railways Zhang Shuguang revealed
that he purchased an $860,000 home in a suburb of Los Angeles
in 2002 while his government salary was less than $400 per
month.194 Weeks prior to the start of the investigation, Zhang
transferred full ownership of the property to his wife. The investigation is reportedly continuing, and some analysts predict thatthe property may be seized as President Xi Jinping’s anticorruption drive begins to target the overseas assets of corrupt
officials.195
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT): Claimed by the Administration
as a major breakthrough following the 2013 U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue, negotiations resumed with China on BIT
in 2013 and continued throughout 2014.196 The talks are divided
into two phases, focusing first on the core text of the treaty andthen on a so-called negative list of sectors that the parties would
deem off limits or restricted to foreign investment.197 During the2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the two sides
committed to reach agreement on the core text by the end of 2014
and to start discussions on their respective negative lists early in2015.198 U.S. Treasury Secretary Lew estimated that a treaty—if
one is ultimately agreed upon—would not be finalized until 2016at the earliest.199 Uncertainty remains about what China’s negative list for the BIT will look like. U.S.-China Business Council
Vice President Erin Ennis said that getting China to commit to a‘‘commercially significant negative list could be a battle,’’ citing the
Chinese government’s sluggish approach to liberalization in the
Shanghai FTZ.200 American Enterprise Institute expert Derek Scissors believes that given the increasingly hostile foreign investment
climate in China, the United States should suspend the BIT negotiations, arguing that under current conditions, Chinese investors
in the United States have much more to gain from an agreement
than U.S. investors in China.201

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Bilateral Trade Issues
Trade tensions between the United States and China escalated
in 2014 as key WTO cases advanced or were concluded and the

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00075

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

64
U.S. Department of Justice filed indictments against five People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers for engaging in state-sponsored,cyber-enabled theft of commercial property. Three key sectors ofdispute included rare earths, auto parts, and Chinese subsidizationof solar panels.
Rare Earths: In a March 26, 2014 decision, the WTO Dispute
Settlement Panel ruled that China’s export quotas on rare earths
violated its WTO obligations.202 Rare earths are crucial to many
U.S. industries, especially clean energy and advanced electronics.203 The Rare Earths case was initiated in 2012 by theUnited States, the European Union, and Japan in response to China’s restrictions on the exports of rare earths.204 The WTO Dispute
Settlement Panel found that China failed to justify its restrictions
as legitimate conservation or environmental protection measures,
saying the export quotas were ‘‘designed to achieve industrial policy goals rather than conservation.’’ China appealed the decision,
but the WTO Appellate Body rejected its appeal in August.* 205
Rare earths are one of many raw materials upon which China imposes export restraints. Trade law analysts estimate that China
imposed export duties on 346 items in 2014, only 103 of which arepermitted under China’s WTO accession agreement.206 Even if
China lifts all of the export restraints deemed unlawful in the
WTO ruling on rare earths, 162 items will still be subject to export
duties.207
Automobiles and Auto Parts: In another WTO Dispute Settlement Panel ruling, the United States was successful in its complaint regarding China’s application of antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties (CVD) on U.S. cars and sport utility vehicles withan engine capacity of 2.5 liters or larger.208 China alleged that certain U.S. cars were being subsidized or ‘‘dumped’’ in its markets,
citing two programs under the U.S. government’s Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP), which provided loans to General Motors(GM) and Chrysler.209 The U.S. defense focused on the failure by
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) to demonstrate thatthe duties caused economic injury.210 The Panel agreed with the
U.S. defense and further found MOFCOM failed to disclose to U.S.
respondents the essential facts that formed the basis of its decision
to impose duties. China’s duties affected an estimated $5.1 billion
worth of auto exports in 2013.211 Still pending before the WTO is
another auto-related case, challenging Chinese subsidization of
auto and auto parts producers located in designated regions knownas ‘‘export bases.’’ 212 According to the U.S. Trade Representative(USTR), consultations last took place on the auto parts dispute in
November 2012, and the United States and China have been ‘‘engaging in further discussions’’ since then.213 There is no public information of further progress in the case.
Solar Panels: In 2014, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced preliminary determinations in CVD and AD investigationsof imports of certain types of Chinese solar panels.214 U.S. Customs
will begin collecting the duties—which range from 18.56 percent toDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Following China’s appeal, the United States also filed an appeal because of concerns related
to the Panel’s decision to reject certain exhibits issued in support of its case.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00076

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

65
35.21 percent in CVDs and 26.33 percent and 165.04 percent in
ADs.215 The recent duties build upon CVD and AD duties ranging
from 24 percent to 36 percent imposed by the Commerce Department in 2012 on other types of solar panel products imported from
China.216 Chinese manufacturers responded to those duties by buying solar cells from Taiwan and elsewhere, which allowed them toavoid most of the duties. The U.S. solar industry is divided about
the duties, with many companies opposed to the Commerce Department’s determination.* 217 Some U.S. solar panel manufacturers
support the duties arguing that Chinese dumping of solar panels
has harmed U.S. manufacturing and employment and that duties
will help ‘‘level the playing field.’’ 218 However, companies developing solar-power projects have criticized the duties arguing thatthey will result in more expensive equipment, thereby inhibiting
innovation and growth in the solar energy sector. (For further discussion of clean energy issues, please refer to Chapter 1, Section4, ‘‘U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation.’’)Table 3 summarizes recent cases brought by the United Statesagainst China at the WTO. Table 4 lists recent cases by China
against the United States. Addendum I provides a more comprehensive summary of unresolved or uncontested trade disputes
with China, many of which have no public record of progress madein 2014.
Table 3:

Recent WTO Cases Brought against China by the United States
Request for
Consultations

Panel
ReportMeasures Imposing Countervailing andAntidumping
Duties on
Grain-Oriented
Flat-Rolled
Electrical Steel(GOES)

September 15,
2010

June 15,2012 (Appellate
Body Report, October 18,
2012)

The Panel upheld U.S.
claims, and the Appellate Body upheld thePanel decision; China
agreed to implement
the ruling by July 31,
2013. In January 2014,
the United States requested consultations
with China regarding
China’s failure to implement WTO ruling.

Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty
Measures on
Broiler Products from theUnited States

September 20,
2011

August 2,
2013

The Panel upheld most
U.S. claims. In July
2014, China informed
the WTO that it had
fully implemented thePanel’s decision. The
United States disagreed with China’s
assertion that it had
fully complied.

No.

Title

DS414

DS427

StatusDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* SolarWorld Industries America Inc. filed the AD and CVD petitions with the U.S. Department of Commerce and received support from the Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing,an industry association with 255 U.S. solar manufacturer members. The Coalition for Affordable
Solar Energy, an association of 94 U.S. solar energy firms, is opposed to the duties. http://origin.
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/June%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00077

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

66
Table 3:

Recent WTO Cases Brought against China by the United States—
Continued
Request for
Consultations

Panel
ReportMeasures Related to the Exportation ofRare Earths,
Tungsten and
Molybdenum

March 13, 2012

March 26,2014 (Appellate
Body Report, April
8, 2014)

The Panel upheld U.S.
claims. In April 2014,
both parties to the dispute appealed certain
issues of law coveredin the panel report.
The Appellate Body rejected China’s appeal,and did not rule on the
U.S. appeal.

DS440

Antidumping
and Countervailing Duties
on Certain
Automobiles
from theUnited States

July 5, 2012

May 23,
2014

The Panel agreed with
the United States that
China’s imposition ofantidumping and countervailing duties on
U.S.-made cars and
SUVs violated China’s
obligations under the
WTO.

DS450

Certain Measures Affecting
the Automobile
and Automobile-Parts
Industries

September 17,
2012

In consultations;panel notyet formed

The United States requested consultations
with China concerning
export-contingent provisions of certain subsidies and other incentives to automobile andautomobile-parts enterprises in China.

No.

Title

DS431

Status

Source: WTO; compiled by Commission staff.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Table 4:

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Recent WTO Cases Brought against the United States by China
Request for
Consultations

No.

Title

DS437

Countervailing
Duty Measures
on Certain
Products from
China *

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

May 25, 2012

Frm 00078

Fmt 6601

Panel
ReportJuly 14,2014

Sfmt 6601

StatusThe Panel issued amixed ruling, rejectingsome of China’s claims,
but finding that theUnited States acted inconsistently with someof its obligations under
the WTO. China appealed the decision.

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

67
Table 4:

Recent WTO Cases Brought against the United States by China—
Continued
Request for
Consultations

Panel
ReportCountervailingand Antidumping Measures on Certain
Products from
China 219

September 17,
2012

March 27,
2014

The Panel upheld U.S.
Public Law (PL) 112–99 entitled ‘‘An act toapply the countervailing duty provisionsof the U.S. Tariff Act
of 1930 to nonmarket
economy countries, andfor other purposes,’’but found that theUnited States acted inconsistently with its
obligations in failing toinvestigate whether‘‘double remedies’’
arose in proceedings at
issue.

Antidumping
Methodologies

December 3,
2013

Panel establishedMarch 26,
2014; report pending.

China requested consultations with theUnited States regarding the use of certain
methodologies in antidumping investigations
involving Chinese
products.

No.

Title

DS449

DS471

StatusDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Chinese products concerned by these investigations consist of solar panels; wind towers; thermal paper; coated paper; tow behind lawn groomers; kitchen shelving; steel sinks; citric acid; magnesia carbon bricks; pressure pipe; line pipe; seamless pipe; steel cylinders; drill
pipe; oil country tubular goods; wire strand; and aluminum extrusions.
Source: WTO; compiled by Commission staff.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00079

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

68
Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Theft
Cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property (IP) and commercial espionage are among the biggest risks facing U.S. companies
today. In the United States, the annual cost of cyber crime andcyber espionage is estimated to account for between $24 billion
and $120 billion (or 0.2 to 0.8 percent of GDP), and results in theloss of as many as 200,000 U.S. jobs annually.220 The Chinese
government’s engagement in cyber espionage for commercial advantage was exposed on May 19, 2014, when the U.S. Department of Justice charged five PLA officers for cyber-enabled theft
and other related offenses committed against six U.S. victims, including Westinghouse Electric Co. (Westinghouse), U.S. subsidiaries of SolarWorld AG (SolarWorld), United States Steel Corp.
(U.S. Steel), Allegheny Technologies Inc. (ATI), Alcoa Inc., andthe United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International
Union (USW or Steelworkers Union).221 According to the indictment, PLA Unit 61398 * 222 officers Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang,
Wen Xinyu, Huang Zhenyu, and Gu Chunhui hacked, or attempted to hack, into the victims’ computers to steal informationthat would be useful to competitors in China, including SOEs.223
One victim, SolarWorld, subsequently petitioned the U.S. Department of Commerce to investigate the allegations made in theindictment as they directly related to SolarWorld’s ongoing tradedispute over imports of solar products from China.224
The Chinese government strongly denied what it called the‘‘fabricated’’ allegations,’’ 225 and within days of the indictment,
China retaliated both economically and politically against theUnited States. The Chinese government suspended participation
in a U.S.-China Cyber Working Group, which was established in2013 as a bilateral dialogue on cyber security.226 China also announced that its government offices were forbidden from using
Microsoft’s Windows 8 operating system and ordered security
checks on foreign IT products and services seemingly directed at
U.S. companies, including Cisco Systems.227 Likewise, the PBOC
and the Chinese Ministry of Finance asked banks to replace IBM
servers with those produced by domestic brands to protect financial security.228 In the same week, the Chinese government instructed SOEs to sever ties with U.S. consulting companies, including McKinsey, Boston Consulting Group, Bain & Company,
and Strategy & Co. (formerly known as Booz & Co.), and urged
SOEs to establish teams of domestic consultants out of fears that
U.S. consultants are government spies.229

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* In 2013, U.S. cybersecurity firm Mandiant issued a report that identified one of the ‘‘most
prolific cyber espionage groups in terms of the sheer quantity of information stolen’’ as Shanghai-based Unit 61398 of China’s PLA, confirming that it is highly likely that China engages instate-sponsored, cyber-enabled economic espionage of U.S. companies, including large-scale theftof IP and confidential business information.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00080

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

69
Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Theft—Continued
Chinese entities have long been engaging in cyber-enabled
theft against U.S. companies for commercial gain; however, theMay 19 indictment represents the ‘‘first ever charges against
known state actors for infiltrating U.S. commercial targets bycyber means’’.230 In addition, the indictment states that ‘‘Chinese
firms hired the same PLA Unit where the defendants worked toprovide information technology services.’’ 231 This established achannel through which the Chinese firms could issue tasking orders to the PLA defendants to engage in cyber theft and commercial espionage. For example, in one case, according to the indictment, a Chinese SOE hired the PLA Unit ‘‘to build a ‘secret’
database to hold corporate ‘intelligence.’’’ 232
Of the 141 organizations allegedly compromised by PLA Unit
61398 since 2006, 81 percent were located or headquartered in
the United States.233 In June 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Chinese energy firm Sinovel for cyber-enabled IP
theft committed against Massachusetts-based American Superconductor (AMSC).* Florida-based biofuel company Algenol,
which is developing technology that converts algae into fuels
while decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, fell victim to morethan 39 million hacking attempts since mid-2013.234 According
to Algenol’s technology chief, 63,000 hacking attempts came from
China, of which 6,653 attempts came from IP addresses identified by cyber security firm Mandiant as belonging to PLA Unit
61398.235 Algenol’s investigation also identified Alibaba’s cloudcomputing subsidiary Aliyun as an originator of hacking attempts, though Alibaba claimed that Algenol mischaracterized
ordinary Internet traffic as hacking attempts.236
China’s Multilateral Trade and Investment Issues
China’s Role in the Global Trade System
China’s engagement in the multilateral trade arena continued toreflect its protectionist policies and its lack of regulatory transparency. Concerns about China’s opaque policies were raised during China’s fifth mandatory WTO trade policy review, and wereagain raised in response to China’s obstructive behavior in the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) negotiations, which further
demonstrated its efforts to insulate domestic industries from competition.
China’s WTO Trade Policy Review: In 2014, China underwent its
fifth WTO Trade Policy Review (TPR) since its 2001 WTO accession. While the official WTO report was mostly neutral in its description of China’s trade and investment policies, some statements
within the TPR reflect several WTO members’ concerns about Chi-DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* AMSC continues to seek compensation from Sinovel through lawsuits in China. U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November 2013,p. 248.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00081

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

70
na’s lack of transparency in forming and implementing trade-related policies. For example, the TPR was critical of the complexity
and inconsistency of trade and investment catalogs, which China
uses to specify those sectors that are eligible for preferential treatment in trade or are open to foreign investment.* The TPR said:
It is not always clear how the different Catalogues should
be read, as they sometimes overlap and even conflict, reflecting the different agendas at the different levels [of government]. The different layers of regulation add an additional level of difficulty when trying to unravel specific policy measures in China.237
The TPR also stated that it is unclear how China subsidizes agricultural exports ‘‘since China has failed to notify [the WTO of] any
agricultural support provided after 2008.’’ 238 The review went on
to say that ‘‘China retains a large number of support programs
aimed at achieving its economic and social goals, but the WTO
could not identify the full scope of these policies because they were
often the result of ‘‘internal administrative measures.’’ 239
During China’s TPR proceedings, the United States was highly
critical of China’s lack of transparency in trade and investment-related policymaking. The United States described China’s trade andinvestment practices as shrouded in a ‘‘systemic web of secrecy.’’ 240
The United States accused China of failing to meet the transparency obligations that it agreed to upon accession to the WTO in
2001. Specifically, the Chinese government was inconsistent in notifying the WTO in advance of newly enacted policies that affect or
distort trade, a requirement for WTO members.241 The UnitedStates called China’s subsidization of its domestic industries ‘‘widespread and massive.’’ 242 China did not respond directly to theUnited States’ accusations, but said it would work to reply to questions as soon as possible.243
Information Technology Agreement (ITA): China continued to obstruct efforts to conclude a revised ITA in the WTO this year. During the latest negotiating round in June 2014, China failed to tablea promised new offer amenable to the United States and other participants.244 Originally slated for conclusion last year, the ITA negotiations have stalled due to China’s unwillingness to include key
products such as multicomponent integrated circuits (MCOs) andflat-panel displays, and its insistence on lengthy tariff phase-out
periods for other products.245 An updated ITA is considered an important component of early-harvest outcomes in the WTO Doha
Round.246 The next meeting of the ITA Committee was scheduled
for October 31, 2014, and the hope is still to reach an agreementby the end of the year.247
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA): In September 2013, China
asked to join multilateral negotiations toward a Trade in Services
Agreement (TiSA), which began in May 2013 and have been spearheaded by the United States and EU Member states.248 In theDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* China’s ‘‘catalog’’ system is the opposite of the more widely used ‘‘negative list’’ approach,which only includes the sectors where foreign products or investors face restrictions.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00082

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

71
aftermath of China’s disruption in the ITA talks, some analysts
speculate that allowing China to join the TiSA talks would be akinto inviting in a Trojan horse.249 The EU and Australia have welcomed China’s bid to join the TiSA talks, arguing that liberalization of China’s relatively small services sector would open more opportunities for trade and investment.250 However, China’s procrastination in unilaterally liberalizing its services sector—a reform
pledge it made in the Third Plenum—may be a signal that it is notcommitted to actual liberalization of services. Many of China’s service industries are either highly consolidated into large SOEs, suchas telecommunications, or highly fragmented and uncompetitive
globally, such as logistics.251 Information services, such as digitallytransferable services, are heavily restricted because of China’s control and censorship over the Internet. Only select service sectors in
China, such as construction and shipping, are expected to be competitive globally.252 These factors, combined with China’s nontransparent political processes, raise serious concerns about including
China in the TiSA talks.
Economic Aspects of China’s Territorial Disputes
Territorial disputes between China and its neighbors haveharmed commercial activity in the Asia Pacific and put at risk key
U.S. interests in the region. In 2014, rising tensions surrounding
these disputes have attracted global attention due to the large economic assets that are at stake around some of the territories, including key global trade routes, large oil and gas reserves, and fisheries. (Further analysis of China’s territorial disputes is discussed
in Chapter 2, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs’’ and Chapter 3, Section 1, ‘‘China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture.’’)The locations of China’s most sensitive territorial disputes are ofstrategic economic importance globally and to the United States.
By the estimates of the U.S. Energy Information Administration(EIA), approximately 11 billion barrels of oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves lie in proved and probablereserves in the South China Sea.253 This equates to an approximate $1.14 trillion in oil reserves and $833 billion in natural gas
reserves in the South China Sea.254 In addition, the EIA estimatesthat the East China Sea likely has approximately 200 million barrels of oil reserves and between 1 trillion and 2 trillion cubic feetin natural gas reserves, which equates to $20.8 billion in oil reserves and between $4.39 billion and $8.77 billion in natural gas
reserves.* 255,256 Some Chinese sources claim undiscovered resources can run as high as 70 billion to 160 billion barrels of oil
across the East China Sea.†
The South and East China Seas are also home to vast fisheries.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations esti-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Calculations for oil reserves are based on a price of $103.93 per barrel and for natural gas
are based on $4.27 per million British Thermal Units, MMBtu.
† Expert testimony delivered to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in2013 cast doubt on the feasibility of exploring and extracting these proven and probable reserves
from the South and East China seas. For details, see the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2013 Annual Report to Congress, Chapter 2, Section 3, ‘‘China’s Maritime
Disputes.’’

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00083

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

72
mates that the South China Sea produces 1.7 billion tons of fish,
which accounts for over 10 percent of global fisheries production.
The region is considered a key supply source for the fisheries sectors of Southeast Asian economies, a large portion of which are
U.S.-bound exports.257
The South China Sea is also a key trading route. One hundredand seventy-two ports are located around the perimeter of theSouth China Sea, and approximately $5 trillion of ship-borne trade(or nearly 30 percent of global trade) passes through the South
China Sea every year.258 Annual U.S. trade through the South
China Sea is valued at about $1.2 trillion, which is nearly a quarter of overall U.S. trade.259,260 Should a crisis occur, the diversionof cargo ships to other routes would harm the global economy due
to higher transport costs and longer shipping times.
Implications for the United States
China’s preoccupation in 2014 with stimulating its economy toreach official GDP growth targets has been detrimental to the U.S.
economy. China’s ‘‘mini-stimulus,’’ which continued to growthroughout the year, is causing investment to increase in sectors
where overcapacity and oversupply are already problematic, suchas steel. These subsidies encourage China to dump excess supply
in overseas markets at below-market rates, putting U.S. manufacturers at a disadvantage.
Slow implementation of substantive economic reform has also
been harmful to the United States. For example, U.S. businesses
continue to face high market access barriers, including those for
U.S. exports and investment. Separately, failure to transition to afloating exchange rate regime allows China to continue undervaluing its currency, thereby subsidizing Chinese exports, raising thecost of imports from the United States, and increasing the U.S.China trade deficit. In addition, failure to accelerate privatizationof sectors dominated by SOEs allows these companies, which areheavily subsidized by the government, to enjoy an unfair competitive advantage globally. China’s slow path toward internal rebalancing and adopting a consumption-based growth model is also
harmful to the United States. High levels of investment and savings rather than consumption by the Chinese keeps U.S. exports to
China relatively low, which expands the U.S.-China trade deficit.
China’s increasingly hostile foreign investment climate is also
harming U.S. business interests. Beijing is using multiple tools—
including its Anti-Monopoly Law and state-run media attacks—todiscriminate against foreign invested firms. In addition, state-sponsored cyber theft of commercial IP and trade secrets has harmed
U.S. businesses and the economy. China’s obstructionist behavior
in key multilateral trade negotiations, such as the Information
Technology Agreement, has also inhibited the U.S. trade agenda.
Conclusions

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Despite U.S. exports to China growing by 6.2 percent, imbalancesin the U.S.-China trade relationship increased in the first eightmonths of 2014 as the trade deficit grew by 4.1 percent. China
stalled on liberalizing key sectors in which the United States is

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00084

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

73

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

competitive globally, such as services. Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the United States grew, while U.S.
FDI into China fell as foreign firms faced an increasingly hostile
investment climate in China.
• Supported by government stimulus, China sustained economic
growth at or near its official target rate of 7.5 percent throughthe first three quarters of 2014. Underlying economic problems
in China, including oversupply of property and industrial overcapacity, continue to put economic growth at risk of further deceleration.
• China’s chronic overcapacity, especially in sectors such as steel
and solar panels, continued to harm U.S. manufacturing and exports by dumping excess supply into global markets.
• China’s government made little to no progress this year in implementing the economic reforms designated by its leadership during the 2013 Third Plenum. Instead, Chinese President Xi
Jinping and his leadership team focused on a broad anticorruption campaign, while using stimulus to avoid further economic slowdown.
• While disposable income and consumption have increased relative to savings, China has not yet weaned itself off its traditional investment and export-based growth model, and continues
to struggle with large internal imbalances.
• China’s nontransparent policymaking came under criticism atthe World Trade Organization, and China obstructed progress in
key trade negotiations, such as the Information Technology
Agreement. China’s confrontational behavior in addressing contentious territorial disputes with neighboring countries also
harmed economic and trade relations in the Asia Pacific.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00085

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

74

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I:

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Unresolved Trade Disputes with China

Issue

Last Action Taken

Summary of Dispute

China’s Failure
to Notify the
WTO on Subsidies

The United States
requested notification on Chinese subsidy programs in2012 and 2014.
There is no publicrecord of China responding the requests.

As noted in China’s Fifth Trade Policy
Review, China has a history of failing toreport subsidies to the WTO, a requirement for all WTO members. China notified the WTO twice of subsidies in 2006
and 2011. In the latter case, the notification was made only after the UnitedStates issued a counter notification; however, China’s notification only covered 93
subsidy programs from 2005 to 2008.
The United States submitted requests
for notification of Chinese subsidies in2012 and 2014, but there is no publicrecord of China responding to the requests.

Chinese Protectionist Measures on AutoParts

The United States
and China held consultations in November 2012 andare ‘‘engaging infurther discussions.’’
There is no publicrecord of progresson the dispute sincethat time.

In 2012, the United States held consultations with China regarding auto parts
export subsidies that appear to violate
China’s WTO obligations. The UnitedStates also accused China of failing to
notify the WTO of the subsidies and failing to publish the measures as well as toprovide translations in an official WTO
language. There is no public record offurther progress on the case or efforts toescalate the case to a Dispute Settlement
Panel.

Subsidies toChinese ‘‘Famous Brands’’

In 2009, the UnitedStates and China
came to an agreement in which
China would eliminate a subsidy program to Chinese ‘‘famous brands.’’

In 2008, the United States and other
WTO Member States challenged China
for subsidies to producers of so-called
Chinese ‘‘famous export brands.’’ In December 2009, China agreed to eliminate
the subsidy programs; however, Chinese‘‘famous brands’’ subsidies have subsequently been reported, such as the one toa Chinese shrimp producer which became the basis of a 2013 U.S. countervailing duty.

Chinese Export
Restraints

In April 2014, theUnited States won acase against China
for export restraints
on rare earths.
Other export restraints have notyet been disputed.

Although prohibited by the WTO withlimited exceptions, China maintains export restraints on several products, especially those deemed as strategic andemerging industries. In 2009, the UnitedStates and other WTO Member Stateslodged a dispute on export restraints ofrare earths. In 2014, the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body ruled against China;
and an Appellate Body upheld the ruling. However, industry analysts report
Chinese export duties on a broad rangeof other products which have yet to be
disputed at the WTO.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00086

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

75
Addendum I:

Unresolved Trade Disputes with China—Continued

Issue

Last Action Taken

Summary of Dispute

Export Credits
from China’s
Export-ImportBank

In 2012, the UnitedStates and China
agreed to form aworking group to establish guidelines
on export financing
by 2014.

Following U.S. industry complaints that
China’s Export-Import Bank provided export credits at below-market rates, theUnited States raised the issue of export
financing with China in the 2011 U.S.China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
Both sides agreed to form a working
group to establish guidelines on export
credits by 2014; however, reports fromthe European Union indicate that thescope of negotiations have been narrow,focusing on ships and medical equipment. To date, a dispute on Chinese export credits has not been raised at the
WTO.

Localization
Requirements

The USTR reports
on-going discussions
with China regarding localization requirements, such asof servers in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector.

China imposes localization requirementson several strategic and emerging industries as a means of acquiring foreigntechnology. For example, Internet companies that wish to provide services in
China must establish a local presence,
including servers, with a Chinese jointventure partner. The USTR states in its
annual report on China to Congress thatit continues to discuss these localization
requirements with China. To date, noformal dispute has been raised against
China at the WTO.

Barriers to
Trade in
Digitally Distributable
Services

In 2009, the WTO
ruled partially infavor of the UnitedStates in a landmark dispute on
trade in certain
audiovisual services.
China has yet tocome into full conformity with theruling.

The United States raised a case against
Chinese barriers to the import of certain
audio-visual services, and the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel ruled in favor of
the United States in 2009. While China
has come into partial compliance by permitting more imports of foreign-mademovies, opaque Internet regulations in
China continue to severely limit accessfor digitally distributable exports to
China. The USTR submitted questions to
China on its Internet censorship regulations in 2011, but the WTO has not published any response from China and adispute settlement case has not beenraised.

Market Accessfor Foreign
Electronic Payment Services

China agreed to
grant access to foreign suppliers ofelectronic payment
services by July
2013, following adispute panel decision that China’s
regulations were not
WTO-compliant. To
date, China has
failed to grant market access.

In 2010, the United States raised a caseagainst Chinese regulations that banned
foreign suppliers of electronic payment
services which are used to process credit
card payments and other transfers
among financial institutions. In 2012,
the Dispute Settlement Panel found Chinese restrictions to be noncompliant, andChina agreed to implement the Panel’s
recommendations by July 2013. To date,
China has yet to authorize access to foreign suppliers, and there is no publicrecord of further action on the dispute.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Source: WTO and USTR; compiled by Commission staff.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00087

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

76
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 1

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. Thomas Penny, ‘‘Li Says China to Avoid Hard Landing as GBP Trading
Starts,’’ Bloomberg, June 18, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-18/lisays-china-will-avoid-hard-landing-while-limiting-stimulus.html.
2. Bloomberg News, ‘‘China Needs More Stimulus to Meet Growth Goal,’’July 23, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-23/china-seen-needing-morestimulus-to-meet-growth-goal.html.
3. Reuters, ‘‘China Ramps Up Spending to Spur Economy, Central Bank Sees
Stable Policy,’’ June 8, 2014. http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/06/11/china-economyidINKBN0EM0GW20140611.
4. Esther Fung, ‘‘How a Slumping Property Market Could Drag Down China’s
GDP,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/06/19/how-a-slumping-property-market-could-drag-down-chinas-gdp/; Ryan Rutkowski, Will China Finally Tackle Overcapacity? (Peterson Institute for International
Economics, China Economic Watch, April 22, 2014). http://blogs.piie.com/china/?p=3857.
5. Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘‘Issue in Focus: China’s‘Going Out’ Investment Policy,’’ Freeman Briefing, May 27, 2008.
6. Thomas Penny, ‘‘Li Says China to Avoid Hard Landing as GBP Trading
Starts,’’ Bloomberg, June 18, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-18/lisays-china-will-avoid-hard-landing-while-limiting-stimulus.html.
7. Thomas Penny, ‘‘Li Says China to Avoid Hard Landing as GBP Trading
Starts,’’ Bloomberg, June 18, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-18/lisays-china-will-avoid-hard-landing-while-limiting-stimulus.html.
8. Bloomberg News, ‘‘China Needs More Stimulus to Meet Growth Goal,’’July 23, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-23/china-seen-needing-morestimulus-to-meet-growth-goal.html.
9. Richard Silk, ‘‘Economists React: China’s Factories Bank in Business,’’ WallStreet Journal, June 22, 2014. http://stream.wsj.com/story/markets/SS-2-5/SS-2-4169
17/.
10. International Monetary Fund, People’s Republic of China 2014 Article IV
Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 14/235. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2014/cr14235.pdf.
11. David Keohane, ‘‘China Property, Structural Faith Edition,’’ FTAlphaville,
June 9, 2014. http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/06/09/1872412/china-property-structuralfaith-edition/.
12. Kenneth Rapoza, ‘‘Real Estate Oversupply Becoming Bigger Problem for
China,’’ Forbes, August 3, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2014/08/03/
real-estate-oversupply-becoming-bigger-problem-for-china/.
13. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis ofTrade Data,’’ July 3, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/July%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf; James Kynge, ‘‘China Property Slump Gathers
Pace in July,’’ Financial Times, August 18, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/51b
45632-269c-11e4-bc19-00144feabdc0.html.
14. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis ofTrade Data,’’ July 3, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/July%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
15. Reuters, ‘‘China New Home Prices Fall in May—First Drop in Two Years,’’
June 18, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL4N0OZ0JB20140618.
16. Esther Fung, ‘‘How a Slumping Property Market Could Drag Down China’s
GDP,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/06/19/how-a-slumping-property-market-could-drag-down-chinas-gdp/.
17. Ryan Rutkowski, Will China Finally Tackle Overcapacity? (Peterson Institute for International Economics, China Economic Watch, April 22, 2014). http://
blogs.piie.com/china/?p=3857.
18. Andy Xie, ‘‘China Must Allow Bad Loans to Fail for the Good of Its Economy,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 1, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/
comment/article/1544348/china-must-allow-bad-loans-fail-good-its-economy.
19. Peter Cai, ‘‘Curbing China’s Excess Capacity,’’ Business Spectator, June 10,
2014. http: // www.businessspectator.com.au / article / 2014 / 6 / 10 / china / curbing-chinasexcess-capacity.
20. Abheek Bhattacharya, ‘‘Steer Clear of China’s Aluminum Crush,’’ Wall Street
Journal, July 1, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/heard-on-the-street-steer-clear-ofchinas-aluminum-crush-1404205417?tesla=y&mg=reno64-wsj.
21. Andy Xie, ‘‘China Must Allow Bad Loans to Fail for the Good of Its Economy,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 1, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/
comment/article/1544348/china-must-allow-bad-loans-fail-good-its-economy.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00088

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

77

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

22. Andy Xie, ‘‘China Must Allow Bad Loans to Fail for the Good of Its Economy,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 1, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/
comment/article/1544348/china-must-allow-bad-loans-fail-good-its-economy.
23. International Trade Administration, Fact Sheet: Commerce Preliminarily
Finds Countervailable Subsidization of Imports of Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel
Wire Rod from the People’s Republic of China (U.S. Department of Commerce, July 1,2014). http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-carbon-certainalloy-steel-wire-rod-cvd-prelim-070114.pdf.
24. Peter Cai, ‘‘Curbing China’s Excess Capacity,’’ Business Spectator, June 10,
2014. http: // www.businessspectator.com.au / article / 2014 / 6 / 10 / china / curbing-chinasexcess-capacity.
25. Peter Cai, ‘‘Curbing China’s Excess Capacity,’’ Business Spectator, June 10,
2014. http: // www.businessspectator.com.au / article / 2014 / 6 / 10 / china / curbing-chinasexcess-capacity.
26. Richard Silk, ‘‘Despite Low Inflation, China Has Little Room to Cut Rates,’’Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/03/13/
despite-low-inflation-china-has-little-room-to-cut-rates/.
27. Stephen Green, ‘‘China—Total Debt Breaks 250 Percent of GDP,’’ Standard
Chartered, July 21, 2014.
28. Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘China Debt Tops 250 Percent of National Income,’’ Financial Times, July 21, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/895604ac-10d8-11e4-812b00144feabdc0.html.
29. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis ofTrade Data,’’ August 6, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/
August%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
30. Investopedia, ‘‘Definition of Nonperforming Loan—NPL,’’ http://www.
investopedia.com/terms/n/nonperformingloan.asp.
31. Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘China Suffers First Corporate Bond Default,’’ Financial
Times, March 7, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d4ccd956-a5cb-11e3-9818-00144
feab7de.html.
32. Heather Timmons, ‘‘China’s Enormous Bad Debts May Mean Good Times for
Bankruptcy Experts,’’ Quartz, July 22, 2014. http://qz.com/234779/chinas-enormousbad-debts-may-mean-good-times-for-bankruptcy-experts/.
33. Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘China Debt Tops 250 Percent of National Income,’’ Financial Times, July 21, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/895604ac-10d8-11e4-812b00144feabdc0.html.
34. Economist, ‘‘Local Government Debt: Counting Ghosts,’’ January 4, 2014.
http://www.economist.com/node/21592628/comments.
35. Neil Gough, ‘‘China Says Local-Level Debt Soars, Stirring Fear,’’ New YorkTimes, December 30, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/31/business/international/chinese-local-government-debt-up-13-in-6-months.html.
36. Economist, ‘‘Local Government Debt: Counting Ghosts,’’ January 4, 2014.
http://www.economist.com/node/21592628/comments.
37. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013, p. 123.
38. Forbes, ‘‘China Shadow Banking Sector Valued at 80 Percent of GDP,’’May 21, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2014/05/21/chinas-shadow-bankingvalued-at-80-of-gdp/.
39. Bloomberg, ‘‘China Orders Interbank Lending Curbs to Quell Shadow Debt,’’
May 16, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-16/china-orders-interbanklending-curbs-to-quell-shadow-financing.html.
40. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis ofTrade Data,’’ August 6, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/
August%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
41. Li Keqiang, ‘‘Keynote Address at the Chatham House Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs,’’ June 18, 2014. http://www.chathamhouse.org/event/keynoteaddress-chinese-premier-li-keqiang.
42. James Kynge, ‘‘China Property Sales Fall in June, Smaller Cities Hit Hardest,’’ Financial Times, June 24, 2014. http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/06/23/
china-property-sales-fall-in-june-smaller-cities-hit-hardest/.
43. ‘‘Priming China’s Economy: Don’t Say Stimulus,’’ Economist, June 7, 2014.
http://www.economist.com/node/21603459.
44. David Keohane, ‘‘China Property, Structural Faith Edition,’’ FTAlphaville,
June 9, 2014. http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/06/09/1872412/china-property-structuralfaith-edition/.
45. Lingling Wei, ‘‘China’s Central Bank Injects $81 Billion into Top Banks toCounter Slowdown,’’ Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2014. http://topics.wsj.com/
person/W/lingling-wei/1562.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00089

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

78

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

46. Reuters, ‘‘China Should Set Less Ambitious 2015 Growth Target, Refrainfrom Stimulus: IMF,’’ July 31, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/31/uschina-economy-imf-idUSKBN0G002P20140731?.
47. Reuters, ‘‘China Ramps Up Spending to Spur Economy, Central Bank Sees
Stable Policy,’’ June 8, 2014. http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/06/11/china-economyidINKBN0EM0GW20140611.
48. Xiaowen Bi and Pete Sweeney, ‘‘China Raises Railway Spending Target to800 Billion in 2014,’’ Reuters, May 2, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/
02/china-railway-idUSL3N0NO25S20140502.
49. Xiaowen Bi and Pete Sweeney, ‘‘China Raises Railway Spending Target to800 Billion in 2014,’’ Reuters, May 2, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/
02/china-railway-idUSL3N0NO25S20140502.
50. Wall Street Journal, ‘‘China Unveils Mini-Stimulus Measures,’’ April 2, 2014.
http: // online.wsj.com / news/articles/SB100014240527023038478045794770600046797
26.
51. Ryan Rutkowski, Rebalancing China’s Railway Sector (Peterson Institute forInternational Economics, August 29, 2013). http://blogs.piie.com/china/?p=3145.
52. Reuters, ‘‘China June Fiscal Spending Jumps 26.1 Percent y/y as Beijing
Spurs Flagging Economy,’’ July 14, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/14/
us-china-fiscal-idUSKBN0FJ08F20140714.
53. Bloomberg News, ‘‘China Central Bank Call for Faster Home Lending in
Slump,’’ May 14, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-13/china-centralbank-calls-for-faster-home-lending-in-slump.html.
54. Bloomberg News, ‘‘China No-Money-Down Housing Echoes U.S. Subprime
Loan Risks,’’ June 13, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-12/china-s-nomoney-down-housing-echoes-u-s-subprime-lending-risks.html.
55. Bloomberg News, ‘‘China Central Bank Call for Faster Home Lending in
Slump,’’ May 14, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-13/china-centralbank-calls-for-faster-home-lending-in-slump.html.
56. China Daily (Europe), ‘‘Cities Eye ‘House-for-Hukou’ to Boost Property Market,’’ June 22, 2014, via Sinocism.
57. Gwynn Guilford, ‘‘It May Be too Late for the Chinese Government to StopIts Housing Bubble from Popping,’’ Quartz, May 14, 2014. http://qz.com/209377/itmay-be-too-late-for-the-chinese-government-to-stop-its-housing-bubble-from-popping/.
58. Aaron Back, ‘‘China Tries to Sweeten Stimulus,’’ Wall Street Journal, July
3, 2014, p. C8.
59. Richard Dobbs, et al., Urban World: Mapping the Economic Power of Cities(McKinsey Global Institute, March 2011), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/urban_world.
60. Gordon Chang, ‘‘China in Deflationary Spiral, New Stimulus Looks Ineffective,’’ Forbes, June 1, 2014, http://www.forbes.com / sites / gordonchang / 2014 / 06 / 01 /china-in-deflationary-spiral-new-stimulus-looks-ineffective/.
61. Richard Macauley, ‘‘China’s Mega-Cities Are Combining into Mega-Regions,and They’re Doing It All Wrong,’’ Quartz, May 5, 2014. http: // qz.com / 201012 /chinas-mega-cities-are-combining-into-even-larger-mega-regions-and-theyre-doing-itall-wrong/.
62. Richard Macauley, ‘‘China’s Mega-Cities Are Combining into Mega-Regions,and They’re Doing It All Wrong,’’ Quartz, May 5, 2014. http: // qz.com / 201012 /chinas-mega-cities-are-combining-into-even-larger-mega-regions-and-theyre-doing-itall-wrong/.
63. Lily Kuo, ‘‘China’s New Megalopolis Would Be Bigger Than Uruguay andMore Populous Than Germany,’’ Quartz, April 12, 2014. http://qz.com/198337/chinasnew-megalopolis-would-be-bigger-than-uruguay-and-more-populous-than-germany/.
64. Richard Macauley, ‘‘China’s Mega-Cities Are Combining into Mega-Regions,and They’re Doing It All Wrong,’’ Quartz, May 5, 2014. http: // qz.com / 201012 /chinas-mega-cities-are-combining-into-even-larger-mega-regions-and-theyre-doing-itall-wrong/.
65. Lily Kuo, ‘‘China’s New Megalopolis Would Be Bigger Than Uruguay andMore Populous Than Germany,’’ Quartz, April 12, 2014. http://qz.com/198337/chinasnew-megalopolis-would-be-bigger-than-uruguay-and-more-populous-than-germany/.
66. Simon Rabinovitch, ‘‘IMF Urges China to Implement Critical Economic Reforms,’’ Financial Times, July 17, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/103cf672-eebd11e2-b8ec-00144feabdc0.html.
67. Christopher Johnson, Decoding China’s Emerging ‘Great Power’ Strategy in
Asia (Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2014), p. 10.
68. Christopher Johnson, Decoding China’s Emerging ‘Great Power’ Strategy in
Asia (Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2014), p. 10.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00090

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

79

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

69. Arthur Kroeber, After the NPC: Xi Jinping’s Roadmap for China (Brookings
Institution, March 11, 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/11after-npc-xi-jinping-roadmap-for-china-kroeber.
70. Arthur Kroeber, After the NPC: Xi Jinping’s Roadmap for China (Brookings
Institution, March 11, 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/11after-npc-xi-jinping-roadmap-for-china-kroeber.
71. International Monetary Fund, People’s Republic of China 2014 Article IV
Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 14/235, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2014/cr14235.pdf.
72. Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Drive in China Takes Autocratic Turn,’’ Financial Times, June 23, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9b645f
40-fac1-11e3-8959-00144feab7de.html.
73. Alice Miller, More Already on the Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups(Hoover Institution, July 28, 2014). http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm44am.pdf.
74. ‘‘Reform Leading Group: What Can We Expect,’’ China Youth Daily, July 14,
2014.
Staff
translation.
http://views.ce.cn/view/ent/201407/14/t20140714_
3151206.shtml; ‘‘Xi Jinping Hosts First Meeting of the Central Reform LeadingGroup,’’ CCTV, January 22, 2014. Staff translation.
75. Peter Martin and David Cohen, ‘‘Inside Xi Jinping’s Reform Strategy,’’ National Interest, March 20, 2014, via Factiva.
76. Reuters, ‘‘China Finance Minister: Job Creation Most Important Policy
Goal,’’ March 5, 2014, via Factiva; China Daily Industry Updates, ‘‘Growth Drop Is
Not a Cause for Alarm, Minister Says,’’ February 24, 2014, via Factiva.
77. Reuters, ‘‘China May Tax More Luxury Goods, Expand Property Tax—
Xinhua,’’ August 28, 2013, via Factiva; China Daily Industry Updates, ‘‘Officials Eye
Consumer, Vehicle Taxes,’’ November 21, 2013, via Factiva; and Wei Tian, ‘‘More
Tax Reforms on the Agenda,’’ China Daily, March 7, 2014, via Factiva.
78. Victoria Ruan, ‘‘Chinese Local Governments Urged to Boost Spending,’’
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), June 26, 2014, via Factiva.
79. Reuters, ‘‘China’s Zhou Re-Appointed Central Bank Chief in Reform Push,’’March 16, 2013. http://www.cnbc.com/id/100560227.
80. Bloomberg, ‘‘China’s Wealth Fund Vows Better Investment Management
after Audit,’’ June 19, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-19/china-s-cicvows-to-improve-investment-management-after-audit.html.
81. Kevin Yao, ‘‘China Central Bank Head to Spur Reforms through Tough
Waters,’’ Reuters, March 16, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/16/chinaparliament-zhou-idUSL3N0C7CV920130316.
82. Tom Orlik, ‘‘The Steady Hand of China’s Central Banker,’’ Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2013. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/03/13/the-steady-handof-chinas-central-banker/.
83. Kevin Yao, ‘‘China Central Bank Head to Spur Reforms through Tough
Waters,’’ Reuters, March 16, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/16/chinaparliament-zhou-idUSL3N0C7CV920130316.
84. ‘‘Chinese Leaders: Zhang Gaoli,’’ Chinese-Leaders.org, http://chinese-leaders.org/zhang-gaoli/.
85. Alice Miller, More Already on the Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups(Hoover Institution, July 28, 2014). http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm44am.pdf.
86. Cheng Li, China’s Top Future Leaders to Watch: Zhang Gaoli (The Brookings
Institution). http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china/top-future-leaders/zhang_gaoli.
87. Staff Reporter, ‘‘Zhang Gaoli: A Man of Means,’’ Want China Times (Taiwan),
September 17, 2012. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=2012
0917000062&cid=1601.
88. Zachary Keck, ‘‘China Reveals Members of New Leading Group on Reform,’’
Diplomat (Tokyo), January 24, 2014, via Factiva.
89. Xinhua, ‘‘Vice Premier: China Reform Plan a Major Breakthrough,’’ November 15, 2013, via Factiva.
90. Xinhua, ‘‘Chinese Vice Premier Stresses e-Commerce,’’ January 6, 2014, via
Factiva; Reuters, ‘‘IBM’s CEO Visits China for Trust-building Talks with Govt Leaders–Sources,’’ February 12, 2014, via Factiva; and Xinhua, ‘‘Chinese Vice PremierStresses Fight against Counterfeits,’’ February 16, 2014, via Factiva.
91. Peter Martin, The Humbling of the NDRC: China’s National Development
and Reform Commission Searches for a New Role amid Restructuring (Jamestown
Foundation, March 6, 2014). http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ ttnews%5Bany_ of_ the_ words%5D=

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00091

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

80

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

south%20stream&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42057&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&c
Hash=d28daaa8147c34e0668e12b74d9997cf#.U8Wy-vldXmc.
92. Josh Chin, ‘‘Former Chinese State Planning Official Charged with Taking
Bribes; Case Involves Liu Tienan, Who Was Expelled from Party Last Year,’’ WallStreet Journal Online, June 23, 2014, via Factiva.
93. Aileen Wang and Kevin Yao, ‘‘China Central Bank Suggests Faster Tempo
for Freeing Yuan,’’ Reuters, November 20, 2013, via Factiva.
94. Reuters, ‘‘China’s New Environment Law Submitted to Parliament,’’ April
22, 2014, via Factiva.
95. Wall Street Journal Online, ‘‘Beijing Moves to Address Growing Inequality,’’
May 14, 2014, via Factiva.
96. Renmin Ribao Online, ‘‘Article by Chair of National Development, Reform
Commission on Guide for Healthy Economic Growth,’’ July 8, 2014. https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_ 0_ 0_ 200_ 203_ 121123_ 43/content/
Display/CHR2014070812420259#index=97&searchKey=15782087&rpp=500.
97. Wall Street Journal, ‘‘Xi Jinping and Mao’s Playbook,’’ July 9, 2014. http://
online.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-and-maos-playbook-1404924289.
98. Cheng Li, Xi’s Reform Agenda: Promises and Risks (Brookings Institution,
March 6, 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/06-xi-reformagenda-promises-risks-li.
99. Adam Hersh, Assessing China’s Economic Reform Agenda (Center for American Progress, May 1, 2014). http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/
2014/05/01/88864/assessing-chinas-economic-reform-agenda/.
100. Aibing Guo, Rakteeni Katakey, and Benjamin Haas, ‘‘Graft Probe Threatens
PetroChina as Executives Targeted,’’ Bloomberg, September 5, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com / news / 2013 - 09 - 04 / graft - probe - threatens - petrochina - as - executives targeted-energy.html.
101. Oliver Blade Barron, ‘‘China: Stimulus, Corruption, and Reform,’’ Forbes,
July 9, 2014. http: // www.forbes.com / sites / oliverbarron / 2014 / 07 / 09 / china - stimulus corruption-and-reform/.
102. Arthur Kroeber, After the NPC: Xi Jinping’s Roadmap for China (Brookings
Institution, March 11, 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/11after-npc-xi-jinping-roadmap-for-china-kroeber.
103. Simon Rabinovitch, ‘‘IMF Urges China to Implement Critical Economic Reforms,’’ Financial Times, July 17, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/103cf672-eebd11e2-b8ec-00144feabdc0.html.
104. Simon Rabinovitch, ‘‘IMF Urges China to Implement Critical Economic Reforms,’’ Financial Times, July 17, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/103cf672-eebd11e2-b8ec-00144feabdc0.html.
105. Simon Rabinovitch, ‘‘IMF Urges China to Implement Critical Economic Reforms,’’ Financial Times, July 17, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/103cf672-eebd11e2-b8ec-00144feabdc0.html.
106. Howard Schneider and Krista Hughes, ‘‘China Must Speed Reforms Despite
Potential Fallout, Says Lew,’’ Reuters, June 11, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/06/11/us-usa-economy-jacklew-idUSKBN0EM17X20140611; Kasia Klimasinska,‘‘Lew Urges China to Be Clear about Exchange-Rate Interventions,’’ Bloomberg,
July 8, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-08/lew-urges-china-to-be-clearabout-exchange-rate-interventions.html.
107. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘USCBC Economic Reform Scorecard,’’ June
2014. http://uschina.org/sites/default/files/2014%20USCBC%20Economic%20Reform%
20Scorecard_June_1.pdf.
108. Guardian, ‘‘China Opens Shanghai Free Trade Zone,’’ September 29, 2013.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/29/china-shanghai-free-trade-zone.
109. Simon Rabinovitch, ‘‘Benefits of Shanghai Free-Trade Zone Still Shrouded in
Mystery,’’ Financial Times, May 14, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c1b3a678d592-11e3-adec-00144feabdc0.html.
110. Simon Rabinovitch, ‘‘Benefits of Shanghai Free-Trade Zone Still Shrouded in
Mystery,’’ Financial Times, May 14, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c1b3a678d592-11e3-adec-00144feabdc0.html.
111. Richard Silk, ‘‘Shanghai Free Trade Zone Reduces Restrictions,’’ Wall Street
Journal, July 1, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB30001424052702304344
504580002372998937764.
112. Simon Rabinovitch, ‘‘Benefits of Shanghai Free-Trade Zone Still Shrouded in
Mystery,’’ Financial Times, May 14, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c1b3a678d592-11e3-adec-00144feabdc0.html.
113. John Sudworth, ‘‘Can Shanghai’s Free Trade Zone Spur China’s Growth?’’BBC News, January 19, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-25774227.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00092

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

81

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

114. John Sudworth, ‘‘Can Shanghai’s Free Trade Zone Spur China’s Growth?’’BBC News, January 19, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-25774227.
115. Jing Song, ‘‘China Faces SOE Reform Dilemma,’’ Finance Asia, May 14,
2014. http://www.financeasia.com/Tools/Print.aspx?CIID=385446.
116. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘USCBC Economic Reform Scorecard,’’ June
2014. http://uschina.org/sites/default/files/2014%20USCBC%20Economic%20Reform%
20Scorecard_June_1.pdf.
117. Jing Song, ‘‘China Faces SOE Reform Dilemma,’’ Finance Asia, May 14,
2014. http://www.financeasia.com/Tools/Print.aspx?CIID=385446.
118. Howard Schneider and Krista Hughes, ‘‘China Must Speed Reforms Despite
Potential Fallout,’’ Reuters, June 11, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/11/
usa-economy-jacklew-idUSL2N0OS0MI20140611.
119. Takeshi Jingu, China’s Financial Reform Roadmap Unveiled at Third Plenum (Nomura Research Institute, January 10, 2014). http://www.nri.com/∼/media/
PDF/global/opinion/lakyara/2014/lkr2014185.pdf.
120. Takeshi Jingu, China’s Financial Reform Roadmap Unveiled at Third Plenum (Nomura Research Institute, January 10, 2014). http://www.nri.com/∼/media/
PDF/global/opinion/lakyara/2014/lkr2014185.pdf.
121. Takeshi Jingu, China’s Financial Reform Roadmap Unveiled at Third Plenum (Nomura Research Institute, January 10, 2014). http://www.nri.com/∼/media/
PDF/global/opinion/lakyara/2014/lkr2014185.pdf.
122. Bob Davis, ‘‘China Central Bank Said Committed to Rate Reform,’’ Wall Street
Journal, July 10, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/pbocs-zhou-still-committed-tointerest-rate-liberalization-in-two-years-1404970714.
123. Bob Davis, ‘‘China Central Bank Said Committed to Rate Reform,’’ Wall Street
Journal, July 10, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/pbocs-zhou-still-committed-tointerest-rate-liberalization-in-two-years-1404970714.
124. Kwong Man-ki and Teddy Ng, ‘‘Balance Needed in Financial Reforms, Wang
Yang Says at Summit with U.S.,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 10,
2014. http: // www.scmp.com / news / china / article / 1550594 / balance - needed - financial reforms-wang-yang-says-summit-us.
125. Bob Davis, ‘‘China Central Bank Said Committed to Rate Reform,’’ Wall Street
Journal, July 10, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/pbocs-zhou-still-committed-tointerest-rate-liberalization-in-two-years-1404970714.
126. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘USCBC Economic Reform Scorecard,’’ June
2014. http://uschina.org/sites/default/files/2014%20USCBC%20Economic%20Reform%
20Scorecard_June_1.pdf.
127. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘USCBC Economic Reform Scorecard,’’ June
2014. http://uschina.org/sites/default/files/2014%20USCBC%20Economic%20Reform%
20Scorecard_June_1.pdf.
128. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘USCBC Economic Reform Scorecard,’’ June
2014. http://uschina.org/sites/default/files/2014%20USCBC%20Economic%20Reform%
20Scorecard_June_1.pdf.
129. Benjamin Shobert, ‘‘Confusing Messages for Investors and Multinationalfrom China’s Healthcare Reforms,’’ Forbes, July 1, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/
benjaminshobert/2014/07/01/confusing-messages-for-investors-and-multinationals-from-chinas-healthcare-reforms/.
130. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘USCBC Economic Reform Scorecard,’’ June
2014. http://uschina.org/sites/default/files/2014%20USCBC%20Economic%20Reform%
20Scorecard_June_1.pdf.
131. Lester Ross, Kenneth Zhou, Tao Xu, ‘‘Reforms to China’s Company Registration Law,’’ Wilmer Hale, April 4, 2014. http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publications
andnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=17179872056.
132. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘USCBC Economic Reform Scorecard,’’ June
2014. http://uschina.org/sites/default/files/2014%20USCBC%20Economic%20Reform%
20Scorecard_June_1.pdf.
133. Robert Zoellick, ‘‘The Aim of Xi’s Reforms Is to Preserve Party Control,’’ Financial Times, June 12, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee06f38c-efce-11e3-9b4c00144feabdc0.html#axzz37AHCuOdw.
134. Robert Zoellick, ‘‘The Aim of Xi’s Reforms Is to Preserve Party Control,’’ Financial Times, June 12, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee06f38c-efce-11e3-9b4c00144feabdc0.html#axzz37AHCuOdw.
135. Xinhua, ‘‘China Focus: Timetable Set for New Fiscal System: Minister,’’
July 6, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/06/c_133463797.htm.
136. Economist, ‘‘Urbanization: Moving on Up,’’ March 22, 2014. http://www.economist.com/node/21599397/print; Chris Buckley, ‘‘China Moves to Ease HomeRegistration Rules in Urbanization Push,’’ New York Times, July 30, 2014. http://

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00093

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

82

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/world/asia/with-urbanization-as-goal-china-moves-tochange-registration-rules.html.
137. Economist, ‘‘Urbanization: Moving on Up,’’ March 22, 2014. http: // www.economist.com/node/21599397/print.
138. Chris Buckley, ‘‘China Moves to Ease Home-Registration Rules in Urbanization Push,’’ New York Times, July 30, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/
world/asia/with-urbanization-as-goal-china-moves-to-change-registration-rules.html.
139. International Monetary Fund, People’s Republic of China 2014 Article IV
Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 14/235, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2014/cr14235.pdf.
140. U.S. Census Bureau (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade Division). http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/.
141. U.S. Census Bureau (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade Division). http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/.
142. U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘‘Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,’’ April 15, 2014. http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/exchange-rate-policies/Documents/2014-4-15_FX%20REPORT%20
FINAL.pdf.
143. U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘‘Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,’’ April 15, 2014. http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/exchange-rate-policies/Documents/2014-4-15_FX%20REPORT%20
FINAL.pdf.
144. Fu Bilian, ‘‘RMB Depreciation: Response to U.S. Report; Domestic Impact,’’
Guoji Jinrong Bao Online, April 25, 2014. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHR
2014042546191297.
145. Josh Noble, ‘‘China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves Near Record $4 Trillion,’’Financial Times, April 15, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4768bd3c-c461-11e38dd4-00144feabdc0.html.
146. Josh Noble, ‘‘China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves Near Record $4 Trillion,’’Financial Times, April 15, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4768bd3c-c461-11e38dd4-00144feabdc0.html.
147. Wall Street Journal, ‘‘Yes, China Is Beginning to ‘Rebalance,’ But There’s aLong Way to Go,’’ July 17, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/17/yeschina-is-beginning-to-rebalance-but-theres-a-long-way-to-go/.
148. Wall Street Journal, ‘‘Yes, China Is Beginning to ‘Rebalance,’ But There’s aLong Way to Go,’’ July 17, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/17/yeschina-is-beginning-to-rebalance-but-theres-a-long-way-to-go/.
149. Nicholas Borst, China Rebalancing Update—Q1 2014 (Peterson Institute forInternational Economics, April 29, 2014). http://blogs.piie.com/china/?p=3875.
150. Nicholas Borst, China Rebalancing Update—Q1 2014 (Peterson Institute forInternational Economics, April 29, 2014). http://blogs.piie.com/china/?p=3875.
151. Financial Times, ‘‘China Has the World’s Best Consumer Story,’’ July 16,
2014. http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/07/16/guest-post-china-has-the-worlds-bestconsumer-story/#.
152. Financial Times, ‘‘China Has the World’s Best Consumer Story,’’ July 16,
2014. http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/07/16/guest-post-china-has-the-worlds-bestconsumer-story/#.
153. Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘China’s Debt to GDP Tops 250 Percent,’’ Financial Times,
July 22, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/895604ac-10d8-11e4-812b-00144feabdc0.html.
154. Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, New Realities in the U.S.-China Investment Relationship (Rhodium Group, April 29, 2014). http://rhg.com/notes/newrealities-in-the-us-china-investment-relationship.
155. Simon Denyer, ‘‘U.S. Companies Feel a Chill in China, Even as Many Still
Rake in Profits,’’ Washington Post, July 4, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/us-companies-feel-a-colder-wind-in-china-even-as-many-still-rake-in-profits/2014/07/03/dcbfa233-ee13-4e67-b791-3b3e38bca890_story.html.
156. Liyan Qi, Grace Zhu, Mark Magnier, Laurie Burkitt. ‘‘China Foreign Direct
Investment at Four-Year Low,’’ Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2014. http: //online.wsj.com/articles/china-foreign-direct-investment-at-four-year-low-1410846696.
157. Simon Denyer, ‘‘U.S. Companies Feel a Chill in China, Even as Many Still
Rake in Profits,’’ Washington Post, July 4, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/us-companies-feel-a-colder-wind-in-china-even-as-many-still-rake-in-profits/2014/07/03/dcbfa233-ee13-4e67-b791-3b3e38bca890_story.html.
158. Simon Denyer, ‘‘U.S. Companies Feel a Chill in China, Even as Many Still
Rake in Profits,’’ Washington Post, July 4, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/us-companies-feel-a-colder-wind-in-china-even-as-many-still-rake-in-profits/2014/07/03/dcbfa233-ee13-4e67-b791-3b3e38bca890_story.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00094

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

83

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

159. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ‘‘Localization Barriers to Trade,’’http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/localization-barriers.
160. John Gong, ‘‘How Fair Is China’s Crackdown on Anti-Monopoly Behaviour?’’South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 9, 2013. http: // www.scmp.com /comment/insight-opinion/article/1295294/how-fair-chinas-crackdown-anti-monopolybehaviour.
161. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ‘‘Competing Interests in China’s Competition
Law Enforcement,’’ September 9, 2014. https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/
aml_final_090814_final_locked.pdf.
162. Michael Martina, ‘‘EU Lobby Piles in on Foreign Criticism of China’s Antitrust Enforcement,’’ Reuters, September 9, 2014. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/09/uk-china-antitrust-eu-idUKKBN0H40SB20140909.
163. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ‘‘Competing Interests in China’s Competition
Law Enforcement,’’ September 9, 2014. https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/
files/aml_final_090814_final_locked.pdf.
164. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘Competition Policy and Enforcement in
China,’’ September 2014. http://uschina.org/sites/default/files/AML%202014%20Report%20FINAL_0.pdf.
165. Michael Martina, ‘‘EU Lobby Piles in on Foreign Criticism of China’s Antitrust Enforcement,’’ Reuters, September 9, 2014. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/09/uk-china-antitrust-eu-idUKKBN0H40SB20140909.
166. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ‘‘Competing Interests in China’s Competition
Law Enforcement,’’ September 9, 2014. https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/
files/aml_final_090814_final_locked.pdf.
167. Wall Street Journal, ‘‘China Denies Using Antimonopoly Law to Target Foreign Companies,’’ September 11, 2014. http: // online.wsj.com / articles / china - denies using-antimonopoly-law-to-target-foreign-companies-1410429955.
168. Simon Denyer, ‘‘As Cyber Rift Deepens, China Bans Use of Windows 8 on
Government Computers,’’ Washington Post, May 21, 2014. http://www.washington
post.com/world / asia_ pacific / as-cyber-rift-deepens-china-bans-use-of-windows-8-ongovernment-computers/2014/05/21/11bdb4b6-597e-4afe-ba16-ce27afa7a7d7_story.html.
169. Zheng Peishan, ‘‘Microsoft’s Ties with Government on Rocks as Offices inFour Cities Raided,’’ Caixin, July 30, 2014, http://english.caixin.com/2014-07-30/
100710968.html.
170. Reuters, ‘‘China State Media Calls for ‘Severe Punishment’ for Google,
Apple, U.S. Tech Firms,’’ June 4, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/04/
china-usa-tech-idUSL3N0OL3N320140604.
171. Ting Xu, Don’t Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs (Center for Strategic& International Studies, PacNet 60, July 23, 2014). http://csis.org/publication/pacnet60-dont-kill-goose-lays-golden-eggs.
172. Ting Xu, Don’t Kill the Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs (Center for Strategic& International Studies, PacNet 60, July 23, 2014). http://csis.org/publication/pacnet60-dont-kill-goose-lays-golden-eggs.
173. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘USCBC 2013 China Business Environment
Survey Results,’’ https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/USCBC%E2%80%942013
Member%20Survey_1.pdf.
174. U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘USCBC 2013 China Business Environment
Survey Results,’’ https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/USCBC%E2%80%942013
Member%20Survey_1.pdf.
175. Reuters, ‘‘China June FDI Rises for 16th Straight Month,’’ July 14, 2014.
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/15/china-economy-fdi-idUKL4N0PQ0KF20140715.
176. Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, New Realities in the U.S.-China Investment Relationship (Rhodium Group, April 29, 2014). http://rhg.com/notes/newrealities-in-the-us-china-investment-relationship.
177. Daniel Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, New Realities in the U.S.-China Investment Relationship (Rhodium Group, April 29, 2014). http://rhg.com/notes/newrealities-in-the-us-china-investment-relationship.
178. David Marchick, Fostering Greater Chinese Investment in the United States(Council on Foreign Relations, February 2012). http://www.cfr.org/china/fosteringgreater-chinese-investment-united-states/p27310.
179. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013.
180. Nick Timiraos, ‘‘Foreigners Step up U.S. Home Purchases,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB400014240527023046428045
80017490191373632.
181. Nick Timiraos, ‘‘Foreigners Step up U.S. Home Purchases,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 9, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB400014240527023046428045
80017490191373632.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00095

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

84

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

182. John Gittelsohn, ‘‘Chinese Cash-Bearing Buyers Drive U.S. Foreign Sales
Jump,’’ Bloomberg, July 9, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-08/chinesecash-bearing-buyers-drive-u-s-foreign-sales-jump.html.
183. Lawrence Yun, Jed Smith, and Gay Cororaton, ‘‘2014 Profile of International
Home Buying Activity,’’ National Association of Realtors, June 2014. http://www.realtor.org / sites / default / files/2014%20Profile%20of%20International%20Home%20
Buying%20Activity.pdf.
184. Nick Timiraos, ‘‘Zillow to Offer Real Estate Listings to Chinese Portal,’’ WallStreet Journal, April 2, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702
303847804579477993029528798.
185. John Gittelsohn, ‘‘Chinese Cash-Bearing Buyers Drive U.S. Foreign Sales
Jump,’’ Bloomberg, July 9, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-08/chinesecash-bearing-buyers-drive-u-s-foreign-sales-jump.html.
186. Andrew Rice, ‘‘Stash Pad,’’ New York Magazine, June 29, 2014. http://nymag.
com/news/features/foreigners-hiding-money-new-york-real-estate-2014-6/?src=longreads.
187. Juwai, ‘‘The Market,’’ Juawai.com, July 22, 2014.
188. Michelle Conlin and Maggie Lu Yueyang, ‘‘The Chinese Take Manhattan:
Replace Russians as Top Apartment Buyers,’’ Reuters, April 25, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/25/us-realestate-china-manhattan-insight-idUSBREA3O0
TL20140425.
189. Andrew Rice, ‘‘Stash Pad,’’ New York Magazine, June 29, 2014. http://nymag.
com/news/features/foreigners-hiding-money-new-york-real-estate-2014-6/?src=longreads.
190. John Gittelsohn, ‘‘Chinese Cash-Bearing Buyers Drive U.S. Foreign Sales
Jump,’’ Bloomberg, July 9, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-08/chinesecash-bearing-buyers-drive-u-s-foreign-sales-jump.html.
191. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘China and theWorld: Macau and Hong Kong,’’ 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November 2013.
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%203%
3B%20Section%203%20Macau%20and%20Hong%20Kong.pdf.
192. Andrew Rice, ‘‘Stash Pad,’’ New York Magazine, June 29, 2014. http://nymag.
com/news/features/foreigners-hiding-money-new-york-real-estate-2014-6/?src=longreads.
193. Andrew Rice, ‘‘Stash Pad,’’ New York Magazine, June 29, 2014. http://nymag.
com/news/features/foreigners-hiding-money-new-york-real-estate-2014-6/?src=longreads.
194. Gu Yongqiang and Zhang Tao, ‘‘Mysteries of a Railways Minister’s Confidant,’’ Caixin (English edition), December 23, 2011. http://english.caixin.com/201112-23/100341893.html.
195. Heather Timmons, ‘‘Beijing Goes Hunting for Overseas Real Estate Boughtwith Dirty Money,’’ Quartz, November 5, 2013. http://qz.com/143017/beijing-goeshunting-for-overseas-real-estate-by-corrupt-officials/.
196. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013.
197. Xinhua, ‘‘Negative List Phase of BIT Negotiations Start between U.S.,
China,’’ Want China Times (Taiwan), July 11, 2014. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/
news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140711000070&cid=1201&MainCatID=12.
198. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Sixth Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue U.S. Fact Sheet—Economic Track (July 11, 2014). http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2563.aspx.
199. Kenneth Rapoza, ‘‘China Says U.S. Investment Treaty on ‘Fast Track,’ ’’Forbes, July 10, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2014/07/10/china-saysu-s-investment-treaty-on-fast-track/2/.
200. ‘‘U.S.-China S&ED Produces BIT Timeline, Few Other Concrete Outcomes,’’
China Trade Extra, July 11, 2014.
201. Derek Scissors, ‘‘Stop the U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)
Talks,’’ AEIdeas, August 19, 2014. http: // www.aei-ideas.org / 2014 / 08 / stop-the-uschina-bilateral-investment-treaty-bit-talks/.
202. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ April 4, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/April%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
203. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ April 4, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/April%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
204. World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/1,
Request for Consultations Received March 13, 2012. http: // www.wto.org / english /tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds431_e.htm.
205. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ May 6, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/May%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00096

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

85

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

206. Terence Stewart, Elizabeth Drake, and Ping Gong, ‘‘WTO Rules against China’s Export Restraints on Rare Earths,’’ Stewart and Stewart, March 26, 2014.
http://www.stewartlaw.com/Article/ViewArticle/989.
207. Terence Stewart, Elizabeth Drake, and Ping Gong, ‘‘WTO Rules against China’s Export Restraints on Rare Earths,’’ Stewart and Stewart, March 26, 2014.
http://www.stewartlaw.com/Article/ViewArticle/989.
208. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ June 4, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/June%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
209. World Trade Organization, China—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
on Certain Automobiles from the United States, Dispute DS440. http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds440_e.htm.
210. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ June 4, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/June%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
211. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ June 4, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/June%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
212. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ June 4, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/June%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/05232014-China%20Auto-Fact-sheet.pdf.
213. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ‘‘2013 Report to Congress on China’s
WTO Compliance,’’ December 2013. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013-Report-to-Congress-China-WTO-Compliance.pdf.
214. International Trade Administration, Fact Sheet: Commerce Preliminarily Finds Countervailable Subsidization of Imports of Certain Crystalline Silicon
Photovoltaic Products from the People’s Republic of China (June 3, 2014). http://
enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-crystalline-silicon-photovoltaic-prod-cvd-prelim-060314.pdf.
215. Biman Mukherji, ‘‘U.S. Hits China Solar Firms,’’ Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-hits-china-solar-firms-1406882738?mod=asia_home.
216. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ June 4, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/June%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
217. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ June 4, 2014.
218. Keith Johnson and Cassandra Sweet, ‘‘Solar Trade Fight Flares Up,’’ WallStreet Journal, March 20, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527
02304724404577293660723773198.
219. China’s claims relate to the imposition or collection of duties in connection
with investigations or reviews initiated between November 20, 2006 and March 13,
2012. For a full list, see WTO, ‘‘United States—Countervailing and Antidumping
Measures on Certain Products from China,’’ request for consultations by China,
WTO WT/DS449/1 (Geneva, Switzerland: September 20, 2012). https://docs.wto.org/
dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-Html.aspx?Id=53282&BoxNumber=3&Document
PartNumber = 1&Language = E&Window = L&PreviewContext = DP&FullTextSearch =#KV_GENERATED_FILE_000007.htm.
220. CSIS, Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime (Center for
Strategic and International Studies, June 2014), pp. 3, 21. http: // csis.org / files /attachments/140609_rp_economic_impact_cybercrime_report.pdf; McAfee and CSIS,‘‘The Economic Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber Espionage,’’ McAfee, 2013, http://
www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-cybercrime.pdf.
221. U.S. Department of Justice, ‘‘U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for
Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage,’’ May 19, 2014. http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-528.html.
222. Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units (Mandiant,February 2013), p. 52. http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.
223. Indictment, United States v. Wang Dong, No. 14–118 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014),
pp. 1–2. http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf.
224. Krista Hughes, ‘‘SolarWorld Seeks Probe into Claims of Chinese Cyber-spying,’’ Reuters, July 1, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/01/us-usa-tradesolar-idUSKBN0F65KL20140701.
225. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong
Lei’s Regular Press Conference on May 21, 2014,’’ May 21, 2014. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1158256.shtml.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00097

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

86

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

226. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘China Reacts Strongly to U.S. Announcement of Indictment against Chinese Personnel,’’ May 19, 2014. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/vs2510_665401/2535_665405/t1157487.shtml; Ting Shi
and Michael Riley, ‘‘China Halts Cybersecurity Cooperation after U.S. Spying
Charges,’’ Bloomberg, May 20, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-20/
china-suspends-cybersecurity-cooperation-with-u-s-after-charges.html.
227. Shannon Tiezzi, ‘‘In Cyber Dispute with US, China Targets IBM, Cisco,’’Diplomat (Tokyo), May 28, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/in-cyber-disputewith-us-china-targets-ibm-cisco/; Cao Yin, ‘‘Checks to Help Ensure Cybersecurity,’’
China Daily, May 23, 2014. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/23/content_
17535124.htm.
228. ‘‘China Said to Study IBM Servers for Bank Security Risks,’’ Bloomberg,
May 27, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-27/china-said-to-push-banksto-remove-ibm-servers-in-spy-dispute.html.
229. Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘China Clamps Down on US Consulting Groups,’’ Financial
Times, May 25, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/310d29ea-e263-11e3-89fd-00144
feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz32VG5zYGW.
230. U.S. Department of Justice, ‘‘U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for
Cyber Espionage against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage,’’ May 19, 2014. http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-528.html.
231. Indictment, United States v. Wang Dong, No. 14–118 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014),
pp. 1–2. http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf.
232. Indictment, United States v. Wang Dong, No. 14–118 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014),
pp. 1–2. http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf.
233. Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units (Mandiant,February 2013), p. 22. http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.
234. Steven Mufson, ‘‘Why Were This Company’s Computers Attacked Millions ofTimes This Year? Algae.’’ Washington Post, July 12, 2014. http://m.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/why-were-this-companys-computers-attacked-millions-of-timesthis-year-algae/2014/07/10/ac4df98c-f59a-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html.
235. Steven Mufson, ‘‘Why Were This Company’s Computers Attacked Millions ofTimes This Year? Algae.’’ Washington Post, July 12, 2014. http://m.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/why-were-this-companys-computers-attacked-millions-of-timesthis-year-algae/2014/07/10/ac4df98c-f59a-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html.
236. Steven Mufson, ‘‘Why Were This Company’s Computers Attacked Millions ofTimes This Year? Algae.’’ Washington Post, July 12, 2014. http://m.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/why-were-this-companys-computers-attacked-millions-of-timesthis-year-algae/2014/07/10/ac4df98c-f59a-11e3-a3a5-42be35962a52_story.html.
237. World Trade Organization, ‘‘Fifth Trade Policy Review: China,’’ July 3, 2014.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s300_sum_e.pdf.
238. China Trade Extra, ‘‘U.S. Blasts China’s System Secrecy on Subsidies, Discriminatory Trade Policies,’’ July 2, 2014. http: // chinatradeextra.com / 20140702
2475888/China-Trade-Extra-General/Daily-News/us-blasts-chinas-systemic-secrecy-onsubsidies-discriminatory-trade-policies/menu-id-428.html.
239. China Trade Extra, ‘‘U.S. Blasts China’s System Secrecy on Subsidies, Discriminatory Trade Policies,’’ July 2, 2014. http: // chinatradeextra.com / 20140702
2475888/China-Trade-Extra-General/Daily-News/us-blasts-chinas-systemic-secrecy-onsubsidies-discriminatory-trade-policies/menu-id-428.html.
240. China Trade Extra, ‘‘U.S. Blasts China’s System Secrecy on Subsidies, Discriminatory Trade Policies,’’ July 2, 2014. http: // chinatradeextra.com / 20140702
2475888/China-Trade-Extra-General/Daily-News/us-blasts-chinas-systemic-secrecy-onsubsidies-discriminatory-trade-policies/menu-id-428.html.
241. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ July 3, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/July%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf..
242. China Trade Extra, ‘‘U.S. Blasts China’s System Secrecy on Subsidies, Discriminatory Trade Policies,’’ July 2, 2014. http: // chinatradeextra.com / 20140702
2475888/China-Trade-Extra-General/Daily-News/us-blasts-chinas-systemic-secrecy-onsubsidies-discriminatory-trade-policies/menu-id-428.html.
243. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ July 3, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/July%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
244. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ July 3, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/July%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00098

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

87

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

245. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ July 3, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/July%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
246. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ July 3, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/July%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
247. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ‘‘Monthly Analysis of
U.S.-China Trade Data,’’ July 3, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Research/July%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf.
248. James Parker, ‘‘China Asks to Join the Trade in Services Agreement Talks,’’
Diplomat (Tokyo), October 11, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/china-asks-tojoin-the-trade-in-services-agreement-talks/.
249. James Parker, ‘‘China Asks to Join the Trade in Services Agreement Talks,’’
Diplomat (Tokyo), October 11, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/china-asks-tojoin-the-trade-in-services-agreement-talks/.
250. Iacob Koch-Weser, Should China Join the WTO’s Services Agreement? (U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 11, 2014). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/.
251. Iacob Koch-Weser, Should China Join the WTO’s Services Agreement? (U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 11, 2014). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/.
252. Iacob Koch-Weser, Should China Join the WTO’s Services Agreement? (U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 11, 2014). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/.
253. U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘‘South China Sea,’’ EIA, February
7, 2013. http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf.
254. Bloomberg, ‘‘Energy & Oil Prices,’’ Bloomberg, June 4, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/energy/.
255. U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘‘East China Sea,’’ EIA, September
25, 2012. http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=ECS.
256. Bloomberg, ‘‘Energy & Oil Prices,’’ Bloomberg, June 4, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/energy/.
257. Eva Pejsova, The South China Sea’s Commons: Behind and Beyond Sovereignty Disputes (European Union Institute for Security Studies, May 2014). http://
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_30_South_China_Sea.pdf.
258. Manuel Mogato, ‘‘Philippines Calls for Construction Freeze in South China
Sea,’’ Reuters, May 16, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/16/us-philippines-southchinasea-idUSKBN0ER0LE20140616.
259. Bonnie S. Glaser, ‘‘Armed Clash in the South China Sea’’ (Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012). http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/
p27883.
260. U.S. Census Bureau, ‘‘U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services December 2012,’’ U.S. Department of Commerce, February 8, 2014. http://www.bea.gov/
newsreleases/international/trade/2013/pdf/trad1212.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00099

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

SECTION 2: U.S.-CHINA BILATERALTRADE AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
Introduction
The U.S.-China trade and economic relationship grows larger—
and more unbalanced—with each passing year. China became theworld’s largest trading nation in 2013, overtaking the UnitedStates to register a record $4.16 trillion in total exports and imports.1 Like a mirror image of the United States, China’s tradeledger was heavily weighted toward exports over imports. China
enjoyed a global surplus of $260 billion and a surplus with theUnited States of $318.4 billion. As of the end of August, the U.S.
trade deficit with China already stood at $216 billion, about $8.5
billion more than that time last year.2 At this pace, the 2014 deficit
will reach a historic high.
U.S. exports to China have grown—fourfold in the last decade—and China has become America’s third largest export market, behind neighbors Canada and Mexico.3 The United States shipped$120 billion worth of goods to China in 2013, a 7 percent increaseover 2012.4 In 2014, U.S. exports to China also increased, totaling$68 billion through the end of July, a 7 percent increase over thesame period in 2013.5 But the value of imports from China still
dwarfs the value of our exports to China.6 Americans turn to China
to purchase computer and communications equipment, and apparel.
China’s main purchases from the United States are oil seeds, aircraft and parts, as well as waste and scrap. China thus has thebenefit of selling more value-added goods, which tend to employ
more workers at higher pay in the production process than does themarketing of commodities or lower value-added goods. Consequently, a growing percentage of the U.S. trade deficit also involves high-tech merchandise. The United States ran a $116.8 billion deficit in advanced technology trade with China in 2013.7 In
short, Chinese exports to the United States are contributing to anincreasingly sophisticated labor market while U.S. exports to China
are falling short both in volume and in labor market value. Table
1 and Table 2 show top U.S. imports from China and exports to
China between 2009 and 2013.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(88)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00100

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

89
Table 1:

Total and Top U.S. Imports from China, 2009–2013(US$ millions)

Year

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Percent Percent
Change Change
2009–
2012–
2013
2013

Total Imports
from China

296,402 364,944 399,335 425,644 440,434

48.5%

ComputerEquipment

44,81859,80068,276

68,815

68,123

51.9% ¥0.10%

Communications
Equipment

26,362

33,46439,80651,857

58,839123%

Miscellaneous
Manufactured
Commodities

30,66834,16832,67232,64432,4405.7% ¥0.60%

Apparel

22,66926,60327,55426,926

27,41021%

1.80%

Semiconductors
and Other
Electronic
Components

12,363

18,263

19,83519,012

19,363

56.7%

1.80%

3.50%

13.50%

Source: U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb and Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S.
Trade Issues (Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2014).

Table 2:

Total and Top U.S. Exports to China, 2009–2013(US$ millions)

2011

2012

2013

Percent Percent
Change Change
2009–
2012–
2013
2013

Year

2009

2010

Total Exports toChina

69,57691,878 103,879 110,590 122,016

75.4%

Oilseeds andGrains

9,376

11,208

11,500

16,546

16,092

76.4% ¥2.70%

Aerospace Products and Parts

5,344

5,766

6,392

8,367

12,62036.4%

Waste and Scrap

7,142

8,561

11,540

9,526

8,765

22.7% ¥8.00%

Motor Vehicles

1,134

3,515

5,369

5,788

8,614

660%

48.80%

Navigational,
Measuring,Electromedical,
and Controlling
Instruments

2,917

3,782

4,275

5,153

5,732

96.5%

11.20%

10.30%

50.80%

Source: U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb and Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S.
Trade Issues (Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2014).

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Meanwhile, a rapidly growing stream of Chinese direct investment is flowing into the United States, which currently totals $35.9
billion. More than $14 billion of this amount was contributed in2013 alone, and $8 billion in the first quarter of 2014.8 In 2014,
the relationship between the two countries reached a milestone as

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00101

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

90
Chinese direct investment into the United States began to surpass
U.S. direct investment into China.9 Despite this recent change,
China is not among the top sources of foreign direct investment in
the United States. The top nine sources—the United Kingdom,Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, France, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Germany, and Belgium—collectively account for more than
80 percent of the total stock of foreign direct investment in the
United States, while China, with less than 1 percent, is just oneof 150 other countries that collectively account for the remainder.10
However, China is the fastest growing source of foreign direct investment (FDI) globally, and in the United States, and its global
outbound investment is expected to continue to grow exponentiallyin the years to come.11
This section draws on the Commission’s February 21, 2014, public hearing on U.S.-China economic challenges. It advances theCommission’s continuing assessment of the impact of U.S.-China
trade on U.S. employment and investment. It examines the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy and the sufficiency of enforcement efforts in attempting to bring greater balance to the trading relationship. Finally, it assesses the motives and incentives driving Chinese investment in the United States and forecasts the potential
impacts of this investment flow on U.S. labor markets.
The Impact of Bilateral Trade on U.S. Employment
Sizing up the Deficit

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

U.S.-China bilateral trade reached a new peak of $562 billion in2013, but China shipped nearly four dollars’ worth of goods to theUnited States for every dollar’s worth of imports it purchased fromthe United States.12 The resulting U.S. trade deficit with China set
a record for the fourth straight year.13 This deficit, non-existent
three decades ago, is now the largest bilateral deficit in the world
and three times the size of the second largest deficit, with Japan.14
Figure 1 illustrates the rise in the U.S.-China trade deficit between
1986 and 2013.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00102

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

91
Figure 1:

U.S. Trade Deficit with China: Annual 1986–2013(US$ billions)

Source: United States Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#
2006.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00103

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S2Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China’s trade surplus in goods with the United States last year
represented 41 percent of America’s total global deficit in goods of$703 billion.15 The size of the overall trade deficit—and the bilateral trade deficit with China in particular—is a perennial source ofconcern in the U.S. about ‘‘declining competitiveness, job losses,
and unfair trade practices by Chinese companies.’’ 16 In a February
2014 press release, Alliance for American Manufacturing President
Scott Paul blamed the U.S. trade deficit with China for ‘‘a shrinking middle class’’ and ‘‘fewer good job opportunities,’’ and describedthe deficit as ‘‘further proof that our economic policies—including
a lack of enforcement of existing trade laws—contribute to outsourcing.’’ 17 A 2012 Gallup poll found that a majority of Americans(66 percent) believe the trade deficit with China is a major barrierin the bilateral relationship, and 52 percent of Americans see China’s economy as a critical threat to U.S. vital interests in the future.18
Yet some economic theories support the opposite conclusion: that
trade creates jobs overall when nations specialize in producing
goods in categories where they enjoy an advantage due, perhaps,
to an abundance of natural resources or transportation routes.
Even where no actual advantage exists in any particular good, according to David Ricardo’s classic economic theory a ‘‘comparativeadvantage’’ falls to the nation that is able to specialize in production.19 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, argues that ‘‘liberalized trade is an engine for job creation in all countries.’’ 20 The United States International Trade Administration (ITA) cites statistical evidence thatexports supported the creation of 1.6 million jobs between 2009 and2013. This perspective on trade, however, assumes that nations follow generally accepted international trade rules, are market ori-

92
ented and not dominated by state-owned enterprises, and that commercial ventures are not provided lavish government subsidies orgovernment protection from imports. Such is not the case with
China, whose longstanding industrial policies call for running large
trade surpluses by discriminating against imports in favor of domestically produced goods.* China hurts the U.S. economy ‘‘by undermining our comparative advantage,’’ notes Derek Scissors, aneconomist at the American Enterprise Institute. He notes that
China protects its domestic industries by blocking some U.S. exports. The Chinese government also ‘‘reserves large parts of its
market for state-owned enterprises’’ which compete unfairly. Finally, as the world’s ‘‘biggest thief’’ of American intellectual property, China ‘‘undermines our biggest advantage in trade,’’ says Dr.
Scissors.21
Economic Policy Institute economist Robert Scott told the Commission at its February 21 hearing that while exports support U.S.
jobs, imports undermine jobs in import-sensitive industries and in
related industries. Thus, Scott contends, while trade can create
jobs, it is ‘‘the trade balances—the net of exports and imports—that
determine the number of jobs created or displaced by trade agreements.’’ Dr. Scott argues that if liberalized trade relations do notraise exports more than imports, there will not be a net job gain.22
Although the extent to which growing bilateral trade deficits haveshifted jobs from the United States to China is unclear, Dr. Scottbelieves as many as 2.4 million American jobs have been lost or
displaced as a result of China joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.23 This would represent a significant portion of
the 3.6 million reduction in manufacturing jobs in the UnitedStates since December 2001.24
Other economists disagree as to the extent to which trade with
China is responsible for U.S. job losses. According to the Chicago
Council’s Philip Levy, equating a given value of trade with a given
number of jobs is a ‘‘popular—and deeply flawed—shortcut.’’ He
points out that Dr. Scott’s analysis assumes any imports that did
not come from China would be replaced with U.S. production eventhough there is much reason to believe that production would simply shift to other countries where it could be done more cheaply
than it can be done here at home.25 But Dr. Scott is not an outlier
in his conclusion that the economic relationship has cost Americanjobs, especially in the manufacturing sector. Yale economist andCommission witness Peter Schott published a National Bureau of
Economic Research study in 2013 demonstrating that closer traderelations with China have depressed American manufacturing job
growth.26 Dr. Schott’s findings are corroborated by an earlier study
led by Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist David
Autor, which found that ‘‘increased exposure to low-income-country
imports [such as those from China] is associated with rising unemployment, decreased labor-force participation, and increased use of
disability and other benefits, as well as with lower wages.’’ 27 Yeteven as some critics decry the costs of U.S.-China trade, proponents
counter that China is a source of affordable goods for American

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For further descriptions of China’s industrial policies, see the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2012 Annual Report to Congress, Chapter 1, Section 3, ‘‘The Evolving U.S.-China Trade and Investment Relationship,’’ p. 82.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00104

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

93
consumers, which raises their buying power. Proponents of trade
agreements with China also note China’s growing significance as
an export market for U.S. goods, and the opportunities for U.S.based companies to invest in the Chinese market. In 2013 alone,
U.S. companies invested $3.4 billion in China.*
Gross vs. Value-Added Measurements of Trade
One view is that different stories are borne out by different calculations. The WTO and the OECD argue that traditional trade
data distorts our understanding of bilateral trade balances.28 They
advocate the use of value-added measurements of trade, whichhave the effect of reducing the U.S. trade deficit with China. Thisaccounting methodology was highlighted in the February 21 hearing discussion of value added, a topic that has garnered growing
attention in recent years and was taken up in depth by the Commission in 2012.† Whereas traditional measurements of trade attribute the entire value of a good to the country in which it lastunderwent processing, value-added measurements account specifically for the value contributed to the good while in that country.
Although China is the final assembly place for many goods exported to the United States, it often adds comparatively little value
to those goods. Applying value-added measurements to the bilateral trade relationship could reduce the perceived deficit with
China by approximately 25 percent, according to the WTO and theOECD.29 These measurements particularly impact perceptions
where high-tech goods are concerned, because technology goods
tend to be high-value, but China may add only marginal labor-assembly value to the high-tech goods it exports.30
Because value-added measurements of the deficit portray thetrade imbalance as much smaller than is suggested by traditional
measurements, it might be assumed that the damage sustained by
the U.S. labor market has been overstated as well. But value-added
measurements of trade do not alter the overall trade deficit. They
merely reapportion responsibility among the surplus countries. Regardless of how the bilateral trade balance is measured, U.S. employment in some sectors has clearly declined as trade with China
has increased. The negative impact the trade relationship has hadon employment in those sectors is not diminished by the lower deficit estimates that value-added measurements produce. In fact, as
Dr. Schott noted, in the U.S. manufacturing sector, value added
has increased even as employment has declined. This means thepercentage of total value a country adds to its goods is not necessarily a reflection of the health of its labor market.31 U.S. manufacturers appear in some instances to have increased value added
by applying more efficient technologies and simultaneously cutting
workers—reducing jobs while increasing their share of the total
production process precisely to improve their ability to compete

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* See ‘‘China 2013 Foreign Investment Inflows Hit Record High,’’ Reuters, January 16, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/us-china-economy-fdi-idUSBREA0F0EI20140116; Derek
Scissors, The U.S. and China: Jobs, Trade, and More (Heritage Foundation, October 11, 2012).
http: // www.heritage.org / research / reports / 2012 / 10 / the- us- and - china - jobs - trade - and - more; and‘‘Shades of Grey: Ten Years of China in the WTO,’’ The Economist, December 10, 2011. http://
www.economist.com/node/21541408.
† See the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2012 Annual Report to Congress, Chapter 1, Section 3.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00105

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

94
with China.32 Furthermore, increased value added is often
achieved by more skilled and more highly paid workers, so thesedevelopments have been a boon to some American workers, butthey have nevertheless translated to fewer American jobs overall.
Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) and China’s
WTO Accession
Some analysts maintain that a contributing factor in the development of the trade imbalance was the decision to allow China to join
the WTO in 2001 without making it first fully commit to removing
all barriers to imports.* While U.S. manufacturing employment haslong been in decline, and has dropped 34 percent from its peak in
the 1970s, China’s WTO entry and initial membership years coincided with a particularly precipitous dip.33 Dr. Schott noted in his
testimony that there was an 18 percent drop in U.S. manufacturing
employment from March 2001 to March 2007. Dr. Scott calculates
that ‘‘since China entered the WTO in 2001, job losses have increased to an average of 353,000 per year.’’ 34 China currently holds
bilateral trade deficits with Australia, Germany, and Japan.35 The
European Union’s trade deficit with China declined from $236 billion in 2008 to $182 billion in 2013.36 Yet, China’s trade surplus
with the United States continues to grow. Figure 2 illustrates thegrowth of the U.S. trade deficit with China over time, as comparedto surpluses with China maintained by developed nations on eachof the other continents.
Figure 2:

China’s Monthly June Bilateral Trade Balance with the UnitedStates vs. Other Developed Nations, 2001–2014(US$ millions)Dr. Schott’s research indicates that the U.S. decision to grantpermanent normal trade relations (PNTR), which paved the way
for China to join the WTO and receive most-favored nation status

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00106

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S2Fig2.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* See for example David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013).

95(MFN),* led to the 18 percent U.S. employment drop in the ensuing
years. According to Dr. Schott, a clear correlation exists between
the jobs dip and the U.S. granting PNTR to China, which preceded
China’s entry into the WTO.37 Once China had permanent MFN
status and WTO membership, the yearly voting requirement ended,
and U.S.-based corporations could invest in China with confidence
that Congress would not revoke China’s MFN status, which would
have raised tariffs on Chinese exports to the United States. Withthe uncertainty removed, foreign investment in China climbed dramatically, funding foreign-invested factories and jobs producing exports bound for the United States and Europe. In 2012, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s top destination for
FDI.38 FDI into China rose from $40 billion per year in 1999 39 to$95 billion in 2009 and $117.59 billion in 2013.40 Since China
joined the WTO, foreign-invested enterprises have accounted for between 45 and 60 percent of Chinese exports annually.41 In recent
years, the United States has consistently ranked as China’s fifthlargest source of FDI, behind Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, andJapan. China’s Ministry of Commerce reported U.S. FDI into China
of $3.35 billion in 2013.42 In 2013, an estimated 55 percent of allexports from China to the United States were from foreign-invested
enterprises—80 percent in the case of advanced technology products.43
As Chinese imports rose, U.S. employment fell across a range ofmanufacturing sectors, but this impact was most dramatic in those
U.S. industries where tariffs had previously stood to rise most significantly if Congress did not renew annual MFN rates. According
to Dr. Schott, it was this ‘‘ending of the possibility of sudden spikes
in Chinese import tariffs that likely strengthened import competition and suppressed U.S. employment growth.’’ 44 Dr. Schott notesthat the ‘‘very large’’ decline in U.S. manufacturing was more precipitous in the 2001 to 2007 period than in response to the 2008
international economic crisis.45 ‘‘In absolute levels, manufacturing
employment is kind of sideways until you get to about (2001) andthen it falls off a cliff,’’ he testified. Figure 3 indicates the declines
in the percentage of manufacturing employment since 2000 in several of China’s major trading partner countries.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* MFN or PNTR, as it came to be known. China was provided permanent most-favored nation
status by Congress as part of its successful efforts to negotiate the terms of its entry into WTO
membership. Previously, the administration could grant temporary MFN status each year under
the terms of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (Section 401, Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, P.L.
93–618) that governed U.S. trade relations with communist countries that restrict freedom of
emigration and other human rights. While successive administrations granted China annual
waivers from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, Congress each year debated rescinding the waiver, as provided for in the Amendment. The debate in Congress became particularly heated after
the 1989 massacre of students and prodemocracy protestors at Tiananmen Square. But Congress
never succeeded in revoking the administration’s yearly grant of temporary MFN status toChina. After a debate in which supporters championed the benefits of China’s WTO accession,
the House approved PNTR for China on May 24, 2000. The Senate gave its approval in September 2000.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00107

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

96
Figure 3:

Comparative Declines in Manufacturing Jobs in Countries
Trading with China, 2000–2012(as percentage of total employment)

Source: ‘‘Brazil: Distribution of Employment by Economic Sector from 1999 to 2011,’’ Statista.
http://www.statista.com/statistics/271042/employment-by-economic-sector-in-brazil/; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00108

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S2Fig3.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The granting of permanent MFN status also had three other effects which drove down employment in the United States, according to Dr. Schott. China’s new MFN status encouraged more U.S.
businesses to outsource their manufacturing to Chinese subcontractors. This trend was already underway in low value-added manufacturing, such as clothing and shoes, but it accelerated, particularly in the field of electronics. In addition, Chinese manufacturers
were also reassured by the granting of permanent MFN status thatthey could count on the United States as a more reliable market.
With the advantage of lower labor costs, lower costs of capital due
to below-market rate loans from state-owned banks, and with othergovernment tax inducements to export, Chinese manufacturers responded to the call to increase exports.46
Finally, U.S.-based manufacturers who elected to maintain production in the United States felt comfortable doing so if they wereable to cut production costs in domestic plants—often by automating to reduce labor costs. ‘‘U.S. manufacturers both used technology that substituted away from workers to make the things thatthey were making before, but they also substituted out of labor intensive manufacturing and into the higher-value-added [sectors]
that you think the U.S. has a comparative advantage in, as is completely predicted by most views of trade,’’ said Dr. Schott.47
Among other indirect causes of declining employment in U.S.
manufacturing brought on by China’s WTO membership were theprovisions for limiting foreign investment in certain manufacturing
operations in China, according to the testimony of Oded Shenkar,
an Ohio State University economist who has studied the effects on
the U.S. automobile industry of trade with China. Dr. Shenkar
pointed to a Chinese prohibition on majority ownership of auto

97
plants in China as one cause for U.S. job losses. The prohibition
facilitated Chinese efforts to obtain process technology in vehicle
manufacturing because foreign firms interested in participating in
the Chinese auto industry were forced to bid on the chance to become minority shareholders in joint ventures with Chinese companies, often with contractual obligations to share their technology
with the Chinese partner and to assist the partner in developinga Chinese car brand. ‘‘The Chinese have done a remarkable job ofabsorbing this technology . . . and they are now ready to take it to
the next level,’’ he said. ‘‘We are entering an imitation age, meaning that it is easier to imitate, it is more beneficial to imitate.’’ 48
As a result, China has quickly developed a sophisticated vehicle
manufacturing capability that could supply most of the Chinese
market without imports from North America or Europe.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the decline of U.S. manufacturingjobs and the growth of the U.S. trade deficit with China since thelate 1970s. As a percentage of total U.S. employment, manufacturing jobs have dropped from 21.8 percent in 1971 to 8.3 percent
in 2013.49 Figure 6 shows how the U.S. trade deficit with China
has grown over time.
Figure 4:

U.S. Manufacturing Jobs in Thousands, January 1978–January
2014

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00109

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S2Fig4.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

98
Figure 5:

Manufacturing as a Percentage of Total U.S. Employment, 1971–
2013

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Figure 6:

U.S. Trade Balance with China, 1979–2013(US$ billions)

C1S2Fig6.eps

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00110

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S2Fig5.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Source: 1979–1984 numbers from International Monetary Fund, via China Business Review,
March–April 1985; 1985–2013 (through November) numbers from U.S. Census Bureau.

99
Managing the Bilateral Trade Relationship
When China joined the WTO in 2001, Beijing committed to
sweeping reforms, which required ‘‘changes to hundreds of laws,
regulations, and other measures affecting trade and investment,’’
according to the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).50
China’s very motivation for joining the WTO was ‘‘rooted in the realization that it needed an external impetus to overcome domestic
obstacles to further reforms . . . if it was to sustain the rapid economic growth of the 1980s and 1990s,’’ according to supporters ofChina’s WTO entry.51 But in 2003, the Hu Jintao leadership came
to power and began emphasizing increased state involvement in
the economy, leading to institutionalized preferences for stateowned enterprises and other state interferences that conflicted withthe market reforms envisioned by the United States as well asother trading partners, and promised by China itself. The reportfrom the Third Plenum calls for the market to play a ‘‘decisive role’’in the allocation of resources in the economy, rather than the ‘‘fundamental role’’ it has previously been allocated. But thanks to thepolicies of the Hu Jintao era, China has already solidified its roleas the workshop to the world, according to David Shambaugh, director of the China policy program at the George Washington University. Says Dr. Shambaugh:
Currently, it is the world’s largest producer of household
and office furniture sets, machine tools, lubricant oils, lithium ion batteries, Christmas ornaments, footwear, cameras,
computers, televisions, tape recorders, instrumentation,
cloth and nylon fibers, textiles, plastics, stainless steel,washing machines, watches, mobile phones, and other consumer durables. In 2014 China is projected to overtake
Australia as the world’s largest wine producer by volume.52

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

According to a 2012 report from the Information Technology andInnovation Foundation, ‘‘While virtually all governments havecrafted economic development policies to boost competitive advantages, China has developed the most comprehensive set of policies,
with most of them violating the spirit, if not the letter of the lawof the WTO.’’ 53 Currency manipulation, subsidies, tariffs, forced
technology transfers, export restrictions, manipulative standard
setting and other policies have been used to ‘‘gain an absolute advantage’’ for Chinese companies across a wide array of industries,
to the detriment of competitors in the United States and globally.54
While the WTO membership committed China to adopt free market
policies, its divergence from WTO rules and principles benefited
China at the expense of its rule-following trading partners.
The United States has relied on a combination of dialogue andenforcement efforts to try to address the range of problems arisingfrom Chinese state capitalism and to encourage China to uphold its
WTO accession commitments. Washington has pressed 15 of the 31
WTO cases brought against Beijing to date, more than twice as
many as any other WTO member.55 (For a detailed list of pendingcases before the WTO involving the United States and China, see
Chapter 1, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Economics and Trade.’’) In
addition to these enforcement efforts, high-level diplomatic engage-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00111

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

100
ments are scheduled throughout each year in the form of the biannual meetings of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade(JCCT), the annual meetings of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), and a host of related meetings. In many respects,
however, these efforts have been ineffective, as underscored by theannual reports to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, in which
the Office of the United States Trade Representative highlights
many of the same issues year after year.*
Dialogues—All Talk, Little Action
The JCCT was established in 1983 to focus on bilateral economic
issues, and the S&ED was launched in 2006 (originally as the Strategic Economic Dialogue), to serve as a bilateral framework for
managing a wide array of political, economic, and security issues.
These dialogues are intended to act as information-sharing forums
and to facilitate reciprocity and collaboration.56 They provide structure to the bilateral relationship, offering ‘‘a degree of assurance
that diplomatic relations will not be allowed to regress beyond acertain point.’’ 57 Face-to-face meetings are supposed to grease thewheels for collaborative action, and in the last decade, the numberof meetings has proliferated as both sides have identified more andmore issues in need of attention. The JCCT includes at least 13
trade-related dialogues and working groups, four devoted to intellectual property rights, and seven that are sector specific, while the
S&ED has at least 30 working groups and dialogues of its own.58
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the range of trade and economic working groups and dialogues associated with the JCCT and S&ED, respectively.
Figure 7: Working Groups and Dialogues of the
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade
Working Groups that Meet Throughout the Year
Agriculture
Commercial Law
Environment
High Technology and Strategic Trade
Industries and CompetitivenessInformation Industry
InsuranceIntellectual Property

Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices
Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Statistics
Steel
Structural Issues
Trade and Investment
Trade Remedies
Travel and Tourism

Additional Known JCCT Working Groups
and Dialogues that Meet or Have Met Irregularly
TradeIntellectual Property Rights

Transparency Dialogue
Trade Remedies Working Group
Antimonopoly Dialogue
Commercial Law Working GroupIntellectual Property Rights Law
Enforcement GroupIntellectual Property Rights Criminal
Enforcement Working GroupDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Prepared pursuant to section 421 of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–286),
22 U.S.C. § 6951, which requires USTR to report annually to Congress on China’s compliancewith commitments made as part of its 2001 accession to the WTO, including multilateral commitments and bilateral commitments made to the United States.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00112

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

101
Figure 7: Working Groups and Dialogues of the
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade—Continued
Additional Known JCCT Working Groups
and Dialogues that Meet or Have Met Irregularly
TradeIntellectual Property Rights

Structural Issues Working Group
Business Development and Industrial
Cooperation Working Group
Telecommunications Dialogue
Insurance Dialogue
Industries and CompetitivenessDialogue
Broadband Wireless Internet Protocol
Standard Group
Statistics Working GroupHigh Technology and Strategic Trade
Working Group
Statistics Working Group
Industrial and Innovation Policies
Dialogue

Government SOE Procurement GroupIntellectual Property Rights Working
Group on Software Legalization
Sectors
Agricultural Trade Working Group
Textiles Consultative Group
Travel and Tourism Working Group
Information Industry Working Group
Steel Dialogue
Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement

Figure 8: Economic Track Working Groups and Dialogues
Under the Strategic and Economic Dialogue
S&ED Economic Track Pillars
Macroeconomic Cooperation
Global Economic GovernanceTrade and Investment
Financial Markets
Additional Known S&ED Economic Track Working Groups
and Dialogues that Meet or Have Met Irregularly
EnergyOther

Climate Change Policy Dialogue
Energy Policy Dialogue
Ten-Year Framework Joint Working
Group
U.S.-China Energy Efficiency Forum
Renewable Energy Forum
Advanced Biofuels Forum

Anticorruption Group
Investment Forum
Policy Planning Dialogue
Initiative on City-level Economic
Cooperation
U.S.-China Governors Forum to
Promote Sub-national Cooperation

Regional

Quasi-independent

Africa Dialogue

Joint Experts Dialogue on Rules ofOriginAnnual Labor Dialogue
High-level Consultation on People-toPeople Exchange
Healthcare Forum
Joint Financial Committee

Central Asia Dialogue
Latin America Dialogue
South Asia Dialogue

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Sources: Derek Scissors, Tools to Build the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, BackgrounderNo. 2590 (Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2011); United States has Secured Commitments in
Key Bilateral Dialogues, but U.S. Agency Reporting on Status Should be Improved, Report toCongressional Requestors, United States Government Accountability Office, February 2014.
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660824.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00113

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

102
Critics argue the meetings have become ‘‘glorified talk-shops’’
that do not produce real progress. Dr. Scissors has criticized the
S&ED and its subordinate institutional arrangements as ineffective
tools that seem to have evolved ‘‘haphazardly over time’’ rather
than having been consciously designed.59 He notes an ‘‘incoherent
proliferation of groups and discussions,’’ which ‘‘appear to have nological relationship whatsoever.’’ 60 As these sub-level engagements
continue to multiply, Dr. Scissors says that they ‘‘have become thecover story for the failure to act on fundamental matters—that is,
nothing was accomplished but the two sides agreed to create several more working groups.’’ 61 A February 2014 study by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) lends credence to his critique. The GAO identified 298 trade and investment commitments
made by China through the various JCCT and S&ED dialogues
since 2004, but was unable to determine the extent to which anyof them had been fulfilled due to poor tracking by U.S. government
agencies.62 The report concluded that ‘‘more comprehensive reporting would give Congress and other policy makers a clearer understanding of progress and the role of the dialogues as they continue
to assess challenges in the U.S.-China relationship.’’ 63
Enforcement Efforts
In all, the Obama Administration has brought more than twice
as many trade enforcement cases against China as did the previous
Bush Administration, stepping up efforts to enforce China’s agreements.64 The current Administration has filed eight requests for
WTO consultations * with China to date, and has alerted the WTO
to the existence of 200 Chinese subsidy programs that Beijing
failed to disclose to the WTO as required by Article 25 of the WTO
Agreement.65 It is the first administration to enforce the Section
421 China-specific safeguard, an import relief mechanism aimed at
protecting U.S. industries and workers in the event of importsurges from China.† 66 It also accepted a Section 301 petition on
China’s funding and protection of its clean energy industries, resurrecting a trade enforcement tool that has largely lain dormant inrecent years.‡ 67
Despite these efforts ‘‘violations continue and our trade relationship grows more lopsided each year,’’ according to Elizabeth Drakean expert on international trade at the Washington law firm Stewart and Stewart. Ms. Drake cited ‘‘problems such as WTO-illegal
and trade-distorting subsidies, discrimination against U.S. goods,
services, and technologies, localization requirements, inadequate
protections for intellectual property and more.’’ 68 One particularly
acute problem, according to Ms. Drake, is that when issues are politically sensitive, the United States too often chooses dialogue

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* A consultation request is the first step in filing a formal complaint in the WTO.
† Section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended allowed the United States to apply safeguard measures targeted exclusively at Chinese products, an exception to WTO rules that wasavailable to counter Chinese import surges until it expired on December 11, 2013 in accordancewith provisions of the U.S.-China WTO agreement.
‡ According to the International Trade Administration, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
as amended is ‘‘the principal statutory authority under which the United States may impose
trade sanctions on foreign countries that either violate trade agreements or engage in other unfair trade practices. When negotiations to remove the offending trade practice fail, the UnitedStates may take action to raise import duties on the foreign country’s products as a means torebalance lost concessions.’’

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00114

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

103
rather than enforcement action, and the problem festers when the
dialogue fails to deliver. She cites China’s undervaluation of its
currency as a prime example of a problem that creates major distortions in our trade relationship and yet continues to go unresolved because of a lack of enforcement action on the part of the
U.S. government.69
The Currency Problem—A Case StudyDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

By artificially suppressing the tendency of a currency value torise in an economy running a large trade surplus, China is able to
avoid the compensatory pressures of a higher renminbi (RMB) thatwould otherwise make its exports more expensive and imports
cheaper. By counteracting the compensatory forces that would tend
to level the playing field in international trade, China has ‘‘gained
a substitute for the mercantilist measures it gave up to join the
WTO,’’ according to Ms. Drake.70
China has made little effort to conceal the way it deliberately
stymies market forces to keep the RMB from appreciating. As amatter of policy, China tightly pegged its currency’s value to thatof the dollar from 1995 to 2005, at a rate of slightly more than 8
RMB per dollar. In July 2005, the government announced a policyof allowing the RMB to trade within a narrow margin compared toan unspecified ‘‘basket of currencies.’’ The RMB gradually appreciated 21.2 percent against the U.S. dollar even as China’s bilateral
trade surplus continued to climb.71 From July 2008 through July
2010, the RMB was again pegged to the U.S. dollar. In July 2010,
China announced a return to a ‘‘managed float’’ exchange rate system in which some flexibility was tolerated during the trading day,but the RMB-to-dollar ratio was reset at the start of each tradingday.72 Between July 2010 and October 2013, the RMB appreciated12 percent against the U.S. dollar, and by the end of 2013, it had
appreciated roughly 45 percent in inflation adjusted terms since
China began its currency reform efforts in 2005.73 The currency exchange rate is now at about 6.2 RMB per dollar.74
The International Monetary Fund estimates that the RMB remains ‘‘moderately undervalued’’ by ‘‘about 5 to 10 percent on areal effective basis, as of August 2014.’’ 75 There is no universally
accepted method of calculating the extent to which a currency isundervalued, and some experts argue that the RMB may still be
depressed by as much as 20 percent.76 In 2014, the U.S. Treasury
Department reiterated its longstanding assessment that China’s
currency is ‘‘significantly undervalued.’’ 77
China is not alone in seeking to gain an export advantage by
undervaluing its currency. Fred Bergsten and Joseph Gagnon of
the Peterson Institute for International Economics note that morethan 20 countries have intervened in international currency markets in a variety of ways, trading currencies at an average rate ofnearly $1 trillion annually ‘‘in order to keep their currencies undervalued and thus boost their international competitiveness andtrade surpluses.’’ 78 They calculate that the United States has lost
between 1 million and 5 million jobs as a result of currency manipulation globally.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00115

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

104

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The largest loser [where currency undervaluation is concerned] is the United States, whose trade and current account deficits have been $200 billion to $500 billion peryear larger as a result. . . . Half or more of excess U.S. unemployment—the extent to which current joblessness exceeds the full employment level—is attributable to currency
manipulation by foreign governments. . . . Eliminating excessive currency intervention would narrow the U.S. trade
deficit by 1 to 3 percent of GDP and would thus move theU.S. economy much of the way to full employment, with aneven larger effect possible once multiplier effects on domestic demand are taken into consideration.79
Dr. Bergsten and Dr. Gagnon’s data show that China is far andaway the most significant currency intervener, ‘‘in terms of both
economic importance and amounts of intervention.’’ 80 China’s lower
currency valuation functions as a de facto subsidy, giving its exports a price advantage vis-à-vis domestically produced goods in
the U.S. marketplace and vis-à-vis U.S. products globally. Experts,
including Dr. Scott, contend that this translates to artificially highdemand for Chinese manufactured exports and the movement of
U.S. manufacturing jobs overseas. According to Dr. Scott, China’s
currency manipulation has led to the loss of 3 million U.S. jobs
since China joined the WTO in December 2001, more than threefourths of them in the manufacturing sector.81 If China were tovalue its currency fairly, 2.3 to 5.8 million U.S. jobs would be created, he says.82
President Obama has said that China’s undervaluation of its currency puts American firms at a ‘‘huge competitive disadvantage,’’and in 2010 he made the issue a top policy priority in dealings with
China, devoting most of a two-hour meeting with Chinese Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao to underscoring currency concerns.83 As recently as March of 2014, the president urged his Chinese counterpart to move the RMB toward a more market-based exchange
rate.84 The last time the U.S. Treasury Department branded China
a currency manipulator was in 1994, and successive administrations, including that of President Obama, have consistently declined to label China a currency manipulator in biennial reports toCongress. Naming China would have elevated the issue diplomatically by requiring the Treasury Department to initiate negotiations
on the issue with China. (Since at least 2003, the United States
has raised the issue in other annual bilateral talks such as the Security and Economic Dialogue.) 85 Though there would be no otherdirect impact, Congressional proponents believe that naming China
as a currency manipulator is needed. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department has unofficially cited a variety of reasons not to, among
them: (1) high pressure would make the Chinese government lesslikely to respond because to do so would embarrass officials; (2)China has allowed the RMB to gradually appreciate during certain
periods and is therefore moving toward compliance, albeit slowly;(3) Chinese officials have secretly promised to do so once the economy is stabilized; and (4) the issue in China is simply too sensitive
so officials are unable to act.86
To date, the Commerce Department has also refused to treat currency undervaluation as an indirect export subsidy, a ruling that

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00116

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

105
could lead to penalty tariffs on certain imports from China, thereby
boosting the competitiveness of domestic alternatives.87 A numberof U.S. countervailing duty petitioners have asserted claims against
China’s currency policy as an actionable subsidy under U.S. law.
However, the Commerce Department has not officially included undervalued currency as part of a countervailing duty investigation.
There is also debate over whether such an action would be consistent with U.S. law and WTO rules. In two 2010 cases involving
aluminum and coated paper producers, the Commerce Department
found that currency undervaluation did not constitute a domestic
subsidy specific to a particular company, industry, or group of companies or industries, as is statutorily required for Commerce to initiate an investigation. Both U.S. law and WTO regulations definesubsidies as financial contributions from a government benefitinga specific industry.88 Bills to address China’s currency policy havebeen introduced during every session of Congress since 2003. Whilenone of these bills has yet become law, during the 111th Congress,
the House passed the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act (H.R.
2378) by a vote of 348 to 79. During the 112th Congress, the Senate passed the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of2011 (S. 1619) by a vote of 63 to 35.89 There remains significant
support in the House and Senate to require the Commerce Department to treat currency undervaluation as a subsidy. In September
2013, a bipartisan group of 60 senators signed a letter calling foraction on the Chinese currency issue as part of the United States’
Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.90 Various other proposedbills would require greater action by the executive branch to address China’s currency manipulation, or would define currency manipulation as an illegal subsidy and would make China and othertransgressor nations subject to penalty duties.* However, gradualappreciation of the RMB and strong opposition from the U.S. business community and the Administration have thwarted the passageof legislation. The United States has also declined to challenge China’s currency valuation practices at the WTO, though that, too, isa potential enforcement tool at our disposal.91
Some insist that currency undervaluation is not as serious a
problem as critics of China’s policy contend. Edward Lazear, former
chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers during
the George W. Bush Administration (2006–2009), points out that
Chinese exports to the United States do not track closely with currency movements, evidence he cites to claim that currency undervaluation is not a key factor in determining trade patterns. Dr.
Lazear notes that between 1995 and 2005, when the dollar-RMB
exchange rate was stagnant, Chinese exports to the United States
increased sixfold, or 19.6 percent per year. Between 2005 and 2008,
when the RMB’s value relative to the dollar appreciated roughly 21

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Bills to address China’s currency manipulation in the 113th Congress have included:
H.R. 1276: The Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, which would seek to clarify that the Commerce Department can consider a ‘‘fundamentally misaligned currency’’ as an actionable subsidy, and S. 1114: The Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2013, which specifies
criteria for identifying fundamentally misaligned currencies and would require action to correct
misalignment where certain ‘‘priority’’ countries are concerned. Both bills are essentially identical to legislation proposed but not passed in previous Congresses. For more detailed information on these and older legislative proposals to address Chinese currency valuation, see Wayne
M. Morrison, ‘‘China’s Currency Policy: An Analysis of the Economic Issues.’’ https://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RS21625.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00117

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

106
percent, Chinese exports to the United States should have fallen if
there were a strong correlation between trade and currency valuation. Instead Chinese exports ‘‘continued to grow at about thesame pace, averaging 18.2 percent per year.’’ 92 Forbes Magazine
contributor Dan Ikenson echoes Lazear’s argument, noting that‘‘the U.S. economy has ‘created’ more jobs in periods when the
trade deficit was growing than in periods when it was shrinking.’’ 93 Dr. Scissors agrees, noting that ‘‘jobs have been lost by the
millions over the past three years, while the yuan has either held
steady or been rising against the dollar.’’ 94
Even if U.S. employment rates are affected by China’s currency
valuation, business community advocates generally contend thattrying to force China to revalue its currency will only result in layoffs in the United States and price increases for consumer goods in
the U.S. marketplace, not the return of jobs lost in prior years.
Commission witness Philip Levy, senior fellow at the Chicago
Council on Global Affairs, notes that U.S. companies that have
moved manufacturing facilities to China would not return those operations to the United States if China’s currency were revalued,
but would instead shift manufacturing to alternative cost-effective
countries, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia.95 This is because, said Dr. Levy, ‘‘there is no way a minimum-wage worker in
the United States earning a meager annual income of $13,920 cancompete with someone in Asia earning between $1,000 and $1,500
annually.’’ 96 Groups such as the U.S.-China Business Council also
oppose legislative proposals because they would impose tariffs
based on ‘‘subjective estimates.’’ 97 This means that findings would
inevitably be politicized, they argue, triggering a trade war thatwould undermine U.S. employment by stunting the growth of U.S.
exports to China without delivering U.S. jobs in import-sensitive
industries.98
While forcing a revaluation of China’s currency may be a key
component to resolving the negative impact of bilateral trade on
U.S. employment that does not guarantee it will be a panacea. In
his testimony to the Commission, Dr. Shenkar of the Ohio State
University recalled the 1985 Plaza Accord,* which was supposed torebalance the U.S. trade deficit with Japan by decreasing the U.S.
dollar’s valuation vis-à-vis the Japanese yen, but even after thecurrency misalignment was altered in the U.S. favor, the UnitedStates never realized the expected recovery of employment in the
U.S. car manufacturing industry.99 But Dr. Scott contends that
there is no doubt that China’s currency undervaluation contributes
to the bilateral trade imbalance, and neglecting to push harder for
resolution in order to protect the growth of U.S. exports to China
is short sighted. ‘‘Talking about trade and only talking about thegrowth of exports is like keeping score in a baseball game and only
counting runs scored by the home team,’’ he says. ‘‘It might makeyour team sound like it’s doing well, but it won’t tell you if they’ve
won the game.’’ 100 While U.S. exports to China have grown dra-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Plaza Accord, signed in September 1985, was an agreement among France, West Germany, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, which allowed the depreciation of
the U.S. dollar in relation to Japan’s Yen and West Germany’s Deutsche Mark. The goal of thisagreement was to reduce the U.S. current account deficit and assist the U.S. economy in recovering from a serious recession by making the U.S. manufacturing industry more competitive in
the global market place.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00118

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

107
matically, our trade deficit ‘‘is still so vast that even if this great
growth rate continues, it would take 38 years for America to closeit,’’ he points out.101
The Interagency Trade Enforcement Center
In February 2012, President Obama created the Interagency
Trade Enforcement Center (ITEC) via executive order. The purpose was to engage in ‘‘robust monitoring and enforcement of
U.S. rights under international trade agreements, and enforcement of domestic trade laws.’’ 102 The center is within the USTR
and coordinates enforcement efforts among the Departments ofState, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, National Intelligence, and others. It is meant to provide‘‘a more dedicated ‘whole-of-government’ approach to addressing
unfair trade practices and barriers,’’ by serving as a forum for coordination between experts across agencies.103 ITEC may be improving U.S. trade enforcement efforts overall, but there has
been no specific news of ITEC efforts aimed at addressing China’s trade abuses since the establishment of the interagencygroup in February 2012, and the last U.S. request for WTO consultations to resolve a trade dispute with China came in September 2012.104
Accessibility of Trade Remedies, the Need for a Private Rightof Action and Other Proposals for New Enforcement
Tools

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Even when U.S. industries are successful at seeking trade remedies, they do not always work. Witnesses at the February 21 hearing testified about a range of shortcomings in the United States’
trade remedy toolbox. As Ms. Drake put it, ‘‘If a trade remedy caseis successful, it should actually deliver the relief that is promised.’’ 105 But circumvention of penalty tariffs, transshipment ofgoods through a third party, duty evasion by specific companies, alack of transparency, access, and accountability, are among themany problems ‘‘severely hampering the ability of domestic industries to ensure the orders they have fought for are being effectively
enforced.’’ 106 Ms. Drake told the Commission that we need more
tools to ‘‘help our trade relationship mature into one that is morebalanced and more beneficial to American industries, workers andcommunities.’’ 107
U.S. trade remedy laws can be ineffective and U.S. industries canoften face challenges bringing petitions for relief because of quirks
in trade remedy laws. For example, when a domestic industry
brings a case, it is required to demonstrate that a sufficient percentage of other domestic producers in the same industry support
the petition. Specifically, petitioners must represent at least 25 percent of domestic production.108 Sometimes industry interests are
fragmented because of shifting trade or investment relationships oflarge players, so producers in need of relief cannot seek it. As the
U.S. wooden furniture industry switched from manufacturing within the United States merely to retailing furniture made in China,

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00119

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

108
furniture manufacturers-turned-retailers opposed efforts to protect
the remaining furniture makers in the United States.* In addition,
currently no means exist by which other parties with vested interests in fair trade enforcement, such as states and localities, canbring petitions.
Other significant challenges for U.S. industries seeking relief
from anticompetitive Chinese practices are the shortcomings of the
WTO’s dispute resolution system, including long trial delays andappeals and weak enforcement. As Dr. Scissors points out, ‘‘WTO
adjudication certainly seemed like an obvious solution to bilateral
disputes at the time of the PRC’s accession a decade ago. The WTO
has since been revealed to be ponderous in dispute resolution, effectively permitting years of ‘illegal’ behavior before penalties can be
imposed.’’ 109
Unfortunately, U.S. industry suffers from limited options for directly pursuing trade complaints, since neither domestic nor international trade rules provide for a private right of action. Existing
rules of international trade limit dispute settlements to government-to-government actions. One 1916 law that allowed for private
lawsuits against rule-breaking companies was struck down shortly
before China joined the WTO. The Antidumping Act of 1916 provided a private cause of action against international companies
that illegally dumped goods in the United States by selling themat prices below fair market value. It was the only law that allowed
U.S. companies to file an action against competitors directly and intheir home market jurisdictions, rather than seeking U.S. government assistance in pursuing dumping charges. But in 2000, a WTO
dispute settlement panel ruled that the U.S. law violated Articles
VI:1 and VI:2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Articles 1, 4, and 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and Article
XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement because the Act, as reinterpreted by
U.S. courts, provides antidumping measures that do not comply
with requirements of those provisions.110,111 In 2004, the Act was
repealed by Public Law 108–492, the Miscellaneous Trade andTechnical Corrections Act.112
Market Economy Status
Even as debate focuses on how to rectify negative impacts of thebilateral trade relationship on U.S. employment, there is generalagreement that granting China market economy status would exacerbate the problem. Multiple witnesses have testified to the Commission that China is not now a market economy and is not on thepath to become one within the next two years. But in December
2016, the provision of China’s WTO accession protocol that enablescountries to treat China automatically as a non-market economy(NME) expires. China agreed to accept this temporary provision
during its negotiations to join the WTO but has aggressively sought
to have the designation terminated by its trading partners and willalmost certainly demand that the United States treat it as a market economy after 2016.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For more on the difficulty faced by U.S. furniture and textile industries in bringing unfair
trade actions against overseas competitors, see the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission’s 2007 Annual Report to Congress, Chapter 1, Section 4, ‘‘A Case Study of the Local
Impact of Trade with China: North Carolina.’’

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00120

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

109
Neither NME status nor market economy status are explicitly
mentioned in China’s WTO Accession Protocol. However, the Protocol does specify the expiration of Article 15(a)(ii) in December
2016. At the end of 2016, the existing statutory test will be theonly basis upon which the United States determines whether acountry operates as a market economy is applied. Under the law,
there are criteria that the Administration would have to certifythat China has met before granting China market economy status.
The main effect of a shift to market economy status for China
would be to make it far more difficult for the United States to levy
penalty tariffs on China for dumping.* A 2005 study by GAO foundthat, ‘‘if Commerce grants China market economy status . . . required methodological changes could well reduce antidumping duties [and] it is not clear whether CVDs [countervailing duties]
would compensate for these reductions.’’ 113 However, GAO also
concluded that even if China is not designated as a market economy, ‘‘there is an element of uncertainty about the magnitude of
the total level of protection that would be applied to Chinese products’’ in either scenario.114 China is currently the single largest target of U.S. antidumping actions. From 2001 through 2012, theUnited States initiated 91 antidumping cases against China, imposing measures in 66 of those cases, and spearheaded 15 of the
31 WTO complaints brought against China.115
A market economy is an economic system in which decisions
about the allocation of resources and production are made on thebasis of prices generated by voluntary exchanges among producers,
consumers, workers, and owners of factors of production. In China’s
economy, crucial economic processes are determined by the staterather than by market forces. Chinese government officials themselves describe China as a socialist market economy, in which ‘‘thegovernment accepts and allows the use of free market forces in a
number of areas to help grow the economy, but still plays a vitalrole in managing the country’s economic development.’’ 116 As of2009, 97 nations had granted China market economy status. But
because of government interventions in the Chinese marketplace,the United States and other major developed countries still recognize China as an NME.117
In situations involving imports from an NME, the WTO more
readily allows for the ‘‘normal value’’ (the appropriate price in themarket of the exporting country) of the imports to be determinedusing data from a surrogate country. Typically, the WTO requires
the normal value of a country’s export be based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in that country. Since Chinese domestic prices and costs are often artificially suppressed because ofgovernment subsidies, surrogate country data is generally crucial
for trading partners to demonstrate that China is engaged in
dumping.118
Much attention has been focused on arguments that the expiration of Article 15(a)(ii) will not give China market economy status,

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Dumping is the act of introducing a product into another country’s market at less than its‘‘normal value.’’ ‘‘Normal value’’ is ‘‘the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, forthe like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.’’ See Christian Tietje
and Karsten Nowrot, Myth or Reality? China’s Market Economy Status under WTO Anti-Dumping Law after 2016, Policy Papers on Transnational Economic Law, No. 34 (Transnational Economic Law Research Center, December 2011).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00121

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

110
not least because Article 15(d) of China’s Accession Protocol makes
clear that China’s recognition as a market economy is something
it must achieve bilaterally with individual members by meeting theconditions of those members’ national laws. As international trade
law expert Bernard O’Connor argues in his heavily cited paper, The
Myth of China and Market Economy Status in 2016, China’s WTO
Accession Protocol contains ‘‘no presumption’’ that it will attainmarket economy status in 2016, and to imply that presumption‘‘reads out of the law China’s burden to prove that it is a market
economy as defined by the laws of the country it seeks recognition
from.’’ 119 But even if market economy status is not automatic in
2016, the expiration of Article 15(a)(ii) does mean that China will
no longer automatically be assumed to be an NME. In short, China’s market economy status will be left to the determination ofeach of its trading partners, and the United States will not automatically have to grant China that status after 2016. But even if
the United States opts to continue treating China as a non-market
economy, the terms of the Accession Protocol will increase the evidentiary burden for justifying the use of surrogate country data inassessing duties against China after 2016.
Eileen Bradner, senior director and counsel for Nucor Corporation, told the Commission that, ‘‘part of the reason our trade laws
work is because they properly treat China as a non-market, government-run economy. That should not change until China itself
changes.’’ 120 However, China is working under the assumptionthat market economy status will be conferred upon it in 2016, andany action by the United States to continue treating China as an
NME is almost certain to provoke a challenge by China at the
WTO. U.S. law lays out criteria for deciding whether or not a country is a market economy, but grants great flexibility to the U.S. executive branch in making the determination,* a determination that
Ms. Drake notes is not currently reviewable by U.S. courts.121 Thismeans that if the U.S. executive branch determines it is diplomatically in our best interest to treat China as a market economy beginning in 2016, negatively impacted companies will have no clear
legal recourse to challenge that decision.
The Non-Market Economics of Chinese Investments in the
United States
The Primacy of the State Sector in China’s Economy
When China joined the WTO, its accession agreement indicateda gradual move towards a free market economy and a diminishing

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The United States’ Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, provides a statutory test for determining
if an economy can be classified as a market economy. The law specifies that the determinationof a country’s market or non-market status be made in consideration of the following factors:(i) the extent to which the currency of the foreign country is convertible into the currency ofother countries,(ii) the extent to which wage rates in the foreign country are determined by free bargaining
between labor and management,(iii) the extent to which joint ventures or other investments by firms of other foreign countries
are permitted in the foreign country,(iv) the extent of government ownership or control of the means of production,(v) the extent of government control over the allocation of resources and over the price andoutput decisions of enterprises, and(vi) such other factors as the administering authority considers appropriate.
See U.S. Section 771(18) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00122

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

111
role for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Although China adopted
significant reforms, many of the country’s largest and most influential businesses remain state-owned or state-controlled, enjoying
preferential treatment and financing at the central, provincial, or
local level.122 By some estimates, in 2011, China had approximately 144,700 enterprises owned and operated by a branch of thecentral government with total assets of $13.7 billion, revenues of$6.3 billion, and profits of $418.5 billion, or nearly half of the country’s total industrial and business profit.123 For detailed discussionof the breakdown of enterprises owned or controlled by the Chinesestate, see Chapter 1, Section 2, of the Commission’s 2012 Annual
Report.
China’s Third Plenum of the 12th National People’s Congress,
held in late 2013, introduced new reform initiatives for SOEs, butthey are primarily aimed at restructuring and increasing the efficiency of the state sector, not reducing the state’s role in the economy. The Plenum emphasized the equal importance of the state
sector and the private sector, a departure from previous plenums
which gave primacy to the state, but it still gave state ownershipa ‘‘leading role’’ in the economy.124 Commission witness Willy Shih,a professor at the Harvard Business School, described the reforms
as a deliberate attempt to increase SOEs’ exposure to the competitive forces of China’s private economy while preserving theirpower.125 The Brookings Institution’s Arthur Kroeber offered askeptical prognosis, calling it ‘‘a very safe bet that when he retires
in 2022, Xi will leave behind the world’s biggest collection of stateowned enterprises.’’ 126 ‘‘Xi is not some Chinese version of Ronald
Reagan or Margaret Thatcher,’’ Kroeber said. ‘‘For him and his colleagues, the market is a tool, not an end in itself. The respectiveroles of state and market need to be clarified, but the state role willremain very large.’’ 127
A recent media campaign of the State-owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission (SASAC), which oversees China’s
121 central state-owned enterprises, appears to affirm these assessments. SASAC’s advertising blitz, via articles and coverage inmajor state-run news outlets including The People’s Daily, Xinhua,
and CCTV, promotes the benefits of a state sector that has alreadybeen ‘‘transformed’’ and ‘‘streamlined into a competitive force.’’ * 128
As witness Adam Hersh of the Center for American Progress testified to the Commission:
The same people with the same policy levers and the samefinancial incentives will continue to be in charge of China’s
productive resources even if the Third Plenum plans are
implemented. . . . The ability to deliver subsidies to keepthese state-owned enterprises operating on a non-market
basis can go on for quite some time given the politicalstructure and the ability to extract incomes from individuals in China and from firms throughout the economic system. . . . This is not a model that is going to fail in any economically meaningful timeline.129

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The number of enterprises owned by the central government has generally been declining
each year due to consolidations and mergers rather than privatization.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00123

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

112

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Characteristics of China’s Outbound Investment
Chinese investment in the United States has increased in recent
years. Since FDI is generally associated with job creation and economic development, this trend has been generally applauded, particularly within state governments. The Washington, DC, based Organization for International Investment notes in its 2013 reportthat ‘‘foreign companies fund domestic manufacturing plants, buttress research and development facilities, and support 5.6 million
well-paying American jobs with average pay of around $77,000 in
2011.’’ 130 The United States International Trade Administration
also highlights the importance of FDI for ‘‘the creation of jobs, anincrease in wealth and living standards, and [the] overall growthand innovation that drive U.S. economic competitiveness.’’ 131 But
the U.S. experience with investment by state-directed corporations
is limited, and the ramifications are unclear.
China’s global outbound FDI exceeded $77 billion in 2012 and is
projected to reach $2 trillion by 2020. Of this outbound investment,
private firms accounted for only an estimated 9.5 percent, while
SOEs accounted for the remainder.132 The business motivation for
Chinese companies to invest abroad is strong. Some seek to acquire
advanced technology to maintain an edge in a fiercely competitivedomestic market, and others are driven to expand market shareoutside of China to broaden their customer bases, develop recognition as global brands, and gain expertise in global marketing andsupply chain management.133 But the government is also a key
driver for both private and SOE outbound investment activities.
International investment helps the government to secure resources
needed to maintain China’s economic growth, serves as a form of
economic diplomacy, and ‘‘provides the Chinese government with achannel to invest its vast foreign exchange reserves while boosting
long-term economic growth.’’ 134
Outbound Chinese investment is supported and encouraged by aformal government framework, the ‘‘go out’’ policy, which waslaunched in 2000.135 Although the Chinese government recently
announced plans to eliminate the need for government approval ofoutbound investments valued at less than $1 billion, virtually alllarger proposed investments by Chinese companies abroad muststill be reviewed and approved by the government.136 The Guidelines for Investments in Overseas Countries’ Industries as well as
the Overseas Investment Guidance Catalogue provide guidance suchas recommended industry sectors and recommended recipient nations (of which there are currently 115).137 The government involvement in Chinese outbound investment is also underscored by
the entourages of businessmen Chinese officials typically bringalong when traveling abroad.138
Chinese SOEs and private firms with access to state aid or statecontrolled bank capital are ‘‘aggressive,’’ according to Timothy
Brightbill, a Commission witness and partner at the law firm of
Wiley Rein LLP in Washington, DC. ‘‘They think globally, and they
have long investment horizons.’’ 139 In 2012 testimony before theCommission, Mr. Brightbill noted that Chinese investment abroad‘‘represents a new and growing threat to fair competition and theability of U.S. producers to compete here and around the globe’’ because ‘‘these SOEs that often do not operate based on market prin-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00124

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

113
ciples . . . [and] can introduce anti-competitive behavior and othermarket distortions where they invest.’’ 140 He described a situationin which U.S. companies are essentially competing directly against
the Chinese government in U.S. and global markets, ‘‘creating significant imbalances that harm U.S. workers and private companies.’’ 141 Noting reluctance on the part of the United States to address this challenge proactively, Dr. Shih testified that, ‘‘we needto learn from history and not delude ourselves into thinking thatin the end, fair play and justice will prevail.’’ 142
Chinese Investment in the United States
China is the world’s fifth largest overseas direct investor.143 It is
not yet among the top sources of foreign investment in the UnitedStates. Official estimates are that FDI from China averaged roughly $1 billion between 2010 and 2012, or a miniscule 0.5 percent of
the United States’ total inbound FDI.144 However, it is the fastest
growing source of U.S.-bound FDI, registering an average annual
growth rate of almost 71 percent from 2008 through 2012.145 As of2013, Chinese firms had invested in 37 U.S. states.146 This trend
appears to be accelerating. In June 2013, China announced its largest purchase of a U.S. asset to date—a $4.7 billion acquisition of
Virginia-based Smithfield Foods, Inc.147 Research conducted by the
Rhodium Group, a leading private sector consultancy tracking Chinese investments in the United States, indicates that private firms
now account for the majority of U.S.-bound Chinese investments.
According to their calculations, in 2013, private firms and entrepreneurs contributed 87 percent of Chinese direct investment
transactions in the United States and 76 percent of the total valueof inbound Chinese investment.148 As of the second quarter of2014, cumulative private Chinese investment in the United Statessince 2000 totaled $21.7 billion, as compared to $18 billion in stateowned investment. (See Figure 9.)
Figure 9:

Volume and Value of Chinese SOE and Non-SOE Investments in
the United States, 2000–2014Q2

Source: Rhodium Group.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00125

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S2Fig9.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

But SOE investment in the United States remains significant,and at any rate, when it comes to Chinese enterprises, the distinc-

114
tion between public and private is often a false dichotomy. SOEs
are frequently complex, multilayered business groups with ‘‘a myriad of subsidiary firms, some of which may be publicly listed on
stock exchanges in China and overseas.’’ 149 Joel Backaler, directorof the Frontier Strategy Group, testified to the Commission thatgovernment control of Chinese firms is not limited exclusively tostate-owned enterprises and ‘‘it is wrong to think that state-owned
enterprises are the only firms with ties to the Chinese governmentand recipients of financial and political support from the state.’’ 150
In addition, as Dr. Hersh testified, the extent of state ownershipand subsidization ‘‘are becoming increasingly obscured as more enterprises are corporatized and registered in offshore tax havens.’’ 151
Potential Pitfalls of Chinese Investment
Although private Chinese companies pursuing deals overseas
have typically provoked fewer concerns from government regulators, the murky connections between the state and private sectors
show that there may be little difference between the two in termsof their impact on U.S. competitors. Whether nominally private,
Chinese companies may enjoy low-cost or free land rights andbelow-market interest rates on loans, and ‘‘in some cases have amonopoly on an entire industry and thus enormous pricing
power.’’ 152 They may not be beholden to market forces, and accessto the government’s printing press and preferential treatment can
provide Chinese companies competitive advantages far beyond thereach of foreign private counterparts.153 It is not the type of Chinese investment but its likely impact that should be foremost in
the minds of policymakers.154 Ms. Bradner summarized the potential anticompetitive challenges for Commissioners:
We can compete with anyone if it’s fair, but if you’re competing with a government that does not have to cover theircosts, does not have to show a profit to their shareholders
or their board of directors, it’s a big concern. . . . We needsome kind of an enforceable mechanism [to ensure that]these entities [are operating] on commercial terms, and I
think the key is that we can’t be required to wait until weshow injury before some kind of enforcement mechanism
kicks in. . . . Some producers will be driven out of business,and it’s not just the producers, but it’s also the upstream
and the downstream affected. And it’s not at all clear thateven if the foreign producer then corrects itself . . . once they
get the market share, it’s not at all clear that the domestic
industry would be able to reconstitute itself because someof those players will be gone and won’t be able to comeback.155

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

How does an American company or an American industry compete with a Chinese company that opens up a factory in the UnitedStates and has little or no cost of capital and innumerable subsidies? No comprehensive tracking exists of job creation by Chinese
investment in the United States, but the bulk of China’s outboundinvestment is in the form of mergers and acquisitions, rather than

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00126

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

115
the greenfield investment that tends to be the biggest boon to local
employment.156 Still, some do promise significant job creation.
When a major Chinese SOE investment could create hundreds or
thousands of jobs but also creates a threat of unfair competition forthe domestic industry in question, how should the United Statesbalance the risks and benefits? In June 2011, the Alabama legislature passed the 2011 Alabama Tariff Subsidy Bill, attracting a$100 million manufacturing investment from Henan Provincebased Golden Dragon Precise Copper Tube Group Inc. by offering
tax incentives that countered antidumping duties the U.S. government had leveled against imports of the company’s products. Currently no federal law is aimed at deterring states from offering investment incentives that have the purpose or effect of undermining
federal trade enforcement efforts.
Rules aimed at preventing undue foreign influence on trade petitions may also fall short where Chinese investment is concerned.
Trade petitions for antidumping and countervailing duty cases
must be supported by at least 25 percent of the domestic industry(as measured by production), and while U.S. companies that are related to foreign producers and importing the merchandise under investigation may be excluded from calculations of industry support,157 companies that do not themselves import the merchandise
under investigation cannot be excluded. This may prove to be a significant loophole for state-influenced Chinese companies investingin the United States, allowing them to influence unduly trade petitions involving merchandise from China.
Ms. Drake noted that China’s WTO accession agreement did include a general requirement that it ensure its SOEs operate on acommercial basis, but this commitment has never been enforced. As
for the more specific threats that Chinese investments may pose,she told Commissioners that this is part of ‘‘a very broad area
where we would like for there to be rules that govern behavior, but
we don’t have those rules exactly right now.’’ 158 The United States
also lacks sufficient tracking of Chinese investments.* The Commerce Department has tracked, on average, slightly less than $1
billion per year in Chinese investment in the United States between 2010 and 2012, whereas the Rhodium Group, a private sector consulting firm, has tracked $16.9 billion for that same period.159 The United States does not have clear data on how muchmoney U.S. investment bankers are raising on behalf of Chinese
SOEs in initial public offerings, nor the ownership structures ofthese SOEs or the bases for their contracts. This is material information for U.S. shareholders in these companies and relevant to arange of other parties potentially impacted when these companies
invest here.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The International Trade Administration (ITA), a bureau within the U.S. Department of Commerce, stated in a 2013 report on Chinese FDI in the United States that it is ‘‘important tobe aware of different estimates’’ of Chinese investment. ITA noted that private sector valuations
employ different definitions of FDI, data gathering mechanisms, and accounting methods thatlead to differences in reported value of investments. See International Trade Administration, Report: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the United States from China and Hong Kong SAR(Washington, DC: July 17, 2013).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00127

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

116
Are Worries Overblown?
In defense of Chinese investment in the United States, Mr.
Backaler, of the Frontier Strategy Group, testified that ‘‘overall,the United States has much to gain from the global emergence ofChinese companies, including: employment generation, tax revenues, potential investors in domestic infrastructure, and new market access.’’ 160 Dr. Scissors says, ‘‘American individuals and companies voluntarily engage in transactions with Chinese companies
and benefit from them.’’ He argues that the discussion of the Chinese investment threat is largely politically motivated and saysthese ‘‘exaggerations do not serve the national interest.’’ 161
Other experts, such as Dr. Shambaugh agree, noting that worries
over Chinese investment tend to credit Chinese companies withmore competence than most of them have yet demonstrated. Dr.
Shambaugh stresses that Chinese firms are, by and large, still
navigating a steep learning curve to understand how to compete on
par with leading multinational corporations from more developed
countries. Most do not develop business plans and strategies before
they globalize but instead are driven by ‘‘pent-up cash in search ofa place to invest.’’ 162 They ‘‘often fail to do their homework to develop detailed plans for global market entry . . . and demonstratedifficulties adapting to foreign legal, regulatory, tax and politicalenvironments.’’ 163 In fact, the vast majority of Chinese investments
overseas are not even successful. As much as 90 percent of China’s
300 overseas mergers and acquisitions in 2008–2010 were unsuccessful for a variety of reasons, including overpaying and inability
to manage the new company.164
Implications for the United States

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

New research and analysis conducted by Dr. Schott suggests thatthe rapid growth of the United States’ bilateral trade relationshipwith China since 2001 has indirectly contributed to a sharp decline
in U.S. manufacturing employment during that same period. Although China has become America’s third-largest export market
and fastest-growing export destination, imports of Chinese goods to
the United States still far surpass sales of U.S. goods to China. The
imbalance is most pronounced in the manufactured goods sector,
since the bulk of U.S. sales to China involves commodities whereas
the bulk of Chinese sales to the United States is manufactured
products. Direct investment in China by U.S. and other foreign corporations has increased sharply since China joined the WTO,165
and 55 percent of Chinese exports to the United States are now
manufactured by foreign invested enterprises. The net result is atrade relationship that clearly produces jobs for Chinese workers
but costs jobs for blue collar Americans even as U.S. exports to
China grow.
The negative impacts on some segments of the U.S. workforce
have persisted, in part, because of inadequate U.S. management of
the bilateral relationship. The United States relies heavily on dialogue to press China to uphold its international trade commitments, further open its markets, and ensure fair treatment of U.S.
businesses. The number and variety of talks continue to proliferate,
but they generally result in vague or narrow commitments, and no

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00128

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

117
guarantee that promises will be upheld. Under the Obama Administration, American enforcement efforts have been redoubled, but
enforcement tools are limited and often ineffective.
There is some room for optimism that China’s growing FDI in
the United States will become an abundant source of new jobs here
at home. Forbes Magazine recently projected Chinese investmentin the United States could reach $300 billion and create 1 million
U.S. jobs by 2020.166 But U.S. experience with Chinese investment
remains limited; the bulk of this investment to date has been in
the form of merger and acquisition transactions, not the greenfield
investments that tend to be big job creators, and concern exists regarding the influence of the state on both state-owned and ostensibly private Chinese companies’ behavior, which may pose threats
to fair competition in the U.S. marketplace and hurt domestic employers.
Conclusions

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• The United States’ trade deficit with China is by far its largest,and it has grown sharply in recent years to become the single
biggest bilateral deficit in the world. In 2013, it reached $318.4
billion, setting a record for the fourth straight year, with China
exporting nearly four dollars’ worth of goods to the United States
for every dollar’s worth of imports it purchased from the UnitedStates. Even as U.S. exports to China have grown, our deficit has
grown faster. This deficit is associated with declining U.S. economic competitiveness and job losses, which helps explain why
52 percent of Americans now believe that China poses a criticalthreat to vital future U.S. economic interests.
• U.S. employment in some sectors, particularly the manufacturingsector, has dropped substantially as trade with China has increased. Since China joined the World Trade Organization(WTO), the United States has lost 29 percent of its manufacturing jobs, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, andeconomists have begun to establish clear correlations between
this job loss and the bilateral trading relationship.
• Even as U.S. manufacturing has slumped, U.S. corporations haverelocated manufacturing operations to China and imports of Chinese manufactured goods have grown exponentially. As a result,the benefits of the U.S.-China trade relationship have accrued
disproportionately to U.S. corporations, while most of the drawbacks have been borne by U.S. workers.
• Unfair Chinese trade practices, including market protections,subsidization, and favoritism toward certain domestic players, aswell as provisions for limiting foreign investment in certain manufacturing operations, have also contributed indirectly to the ongoing decline in U.S. manufacturing employment. Although
China committed to sweeping reforms when it joined the WTO,
Chinese efforts to honor these commitments have slackened in
the last ten years. The Chinese economy benefits from a host ofpolicies and practices that violate the spirit, and even the letter,of Beijing’s WTO commitments and harm U.S. interests. Despite
a proliferation of bilateral forums for engagement, U.S. efforts to

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00129

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

118

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

talk through these problems have consistently fallen short. Enforcement actions have increased, but the results of these efforts
have been limited, and many issues remain unaddressed.
• The dominance of state-owned enterprises in the Chinese economy is one of the reasons the United States has not designated
China as a market economy, despite China’s active pursuit ofsuch a designation for many years. The United States has a statutory test for determining whether an economy can be classified
as a market economy. The factors to be considered under U.S.
law in granting market economy status include the extent towhich the country’s currency is convertible, the extent to which
wage rates are freely determined by negotiations between laborand management, and the extent to which the government owns
or controls the means and decisions of production. Expert witnesses have testified to the Commission that China is not currently a market economy and is not on the path to become one
in the near future.
• Because trade remedies are often inaccessible, they are effectively useless to smaller U.S. companies that cannot afford to
pursue cases and to companies that cannot muster the thresholdindustry support. Available trade remedies remain inadequate
and fail to account for the interests of other affected constituents,
such as workers and communities; China’s undervaluation of its
currency, for example, continues to function as a de facto subsidy
for its exports, and U.S. law still does not provide a sufficient
remedy to this problem for private parties. The Administration
has not been effective in getting China to change its policies. A
number of U.S. petitioners have asserted claims against China’s
currency policy as an actionable subsidy, but the Commerce Department has refused to treat currency undervaluation as actionable under the law. Even when trade remedy cases are successful, they do not always deliver sufficient and timely relief.
• Growing Chinese investment in the United States could be aboon to U.S. employment, but the peculiarities of state influenceon Chinese corporate behavior in the United States may alsopose significant competitive challenges for domestic companies,
with serious drawbacks for U.S. workers. Chinese investment in
the United States could pose impediments to members of domestic industries petitioning the Federal Government for trade enforcement assistance, and anecdotal evidence demonstrates thatstate efforts to attract Chinese investment can also undermine
federal trade enforcement efforts. The potential impact of inbound Chinese investment should be more thoroughly investigated and addressed.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00130

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

119
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 2

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. Angela Monaghan, ‘‘China Surpasses US as World’s Largest Trading Nation.’’ The Guardian, January 10, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/
jan/10/china-surpasses-us-world-largest-trading-nation.
2. U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.
3. ‘‘China is America’s Third Largest Export Market,’’ Governing, June 7, 2013.
http://www.governing.com/news/state/sl-states-seek-to-increase-trade-with-china.html;
Benjamin Carlson, ‘‘Good News: U.S. Exports to China Soar, Setting a New Record,’’Global Post, January 21, 2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/140120/good-news-us-exports-china-soar-setting-new-record.
4. Benjamin Carlson, ‘‘Good News: U.S. Exports to China Soar, Setting a New
Record,’’ Global Post, January 21, 2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/
regions/asia-pacific/china/140120/good-news-us-exports-china-soar-setting-new-record.
5. U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.
6. U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.
7. Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues (Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2014). http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf.
8. Rhodium Group, China Investment Monitor. http://rhg.com/interactive/chinainvestment-monitor; Daniel H. Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, High-Tech: The Next
Wave of Chinese Investment in America (Rhodium Group, April 1, 2014). http://
rhg.com/reports/high-tech-the-next-wave-of-chinese-investment-in-america. Thilo Hanemann, Chinese FDI in the United States: Q1 2014 Update (Rhodium Group, May 8,2014). http://rhg.com/notes/chinese-fdi-in-the-united-states-q1-2014-update.
9. ‘‘Chinese Investment in U.S. Surpasses American Investment in China,’’ Financial Review, April 30, 2014. http://www.afr.com/p/world/chinese_investment_in_
us_surpasses_kJuD3wyytWpR6Fb7QuxuYJ.
10. Thilo Hanemann, Chinese FDI in the U.S. in 2012: A Record Year amid a
Gloomy FDI Environment (Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 28, 2012). http://blogs.piie.com/china/?p=2147; Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States, 2013 Report (Organization for International Investment, 2013). http://
www.ofii.org/sites/default/files/FDIUS_2013_Report.pdf.
11. Thilo Hanemann and Cassie Gao, Chinese FDI in the US: 2013 Recap and2014 Outlook (Rhodium Group, January 7, 2014). http://rhg.com/notes/chinese-fdi-inthe-us-2013-recap-and-2014-outlook.
12. U.S. Census Bureau, ‘‘Foreign Trade.’’ http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
top/dst/current/deficit.html.
13. Alliance for American Manufacturing, ‘‘U.S. Trade Deficit with China Sets
New Record in 2013,’’ Industrial Distribution. http://www.inddist.com/news/2014/02/
us-trade-deficit-china-sets-new-record-2013.
14. U.S. Census Bureau, ‘‘Foreign Trade.’’ http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
top/dst/current/deficit.html.
15. U.S. Census Bureau, ‘‘U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services.’’
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/exhibit_history.pdf.
16. Kemal Dervis, Joshua Meltzer and Karim Foda, Value-Added Trade and Its
Implications for International Policy (Brookings Institution, April 2, 2013). http://
www.brookings.edu / research / opinions / 2013 / 04 / 02- implications-international-tradepolicy-dervis-meltzer.
17. Alliance for American Manufacturing, U.S. Trade Deficit with China Sets
New Record in 2013 (Alliance for American Manufacturing, February 6, 2014).
http://www.inddist.com/news/2014/02/us-trade-deficit-china-sets-new-record-2013.
18. Cynthia English, ‘‘Americans Split on Whether China’s Economy Is Good for
U.S.,’’ Gallup, April 12, 2012. http://www.gallup.com / poll / 153860 / americans-splitwhether - china - economy - good.aspx; Michael Lipin, ‘‘What Americans Think about
China,’’ Voice of America, May 12, 2014. http://www.voanews.com/content/new-serieswhat-american-think-about-china-/1913088.html.
19. Andrew Beattie, ‘‘What is Comparative Advantage?’’ Investopedia, February
26, 2009. http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/09/law-comparative-advantage.asp; Roy J. Ruffin, ‘‘David Ricardo’s Discovery of Comparative Advantage,’’ University of Houston. http://www.uh.edu/∼rruffin/Ricardo’s%20Discovery.pdf.
20. Organization for Economic Development, ‘‘Trade and Jobs.’’ http://www.oecd.org/tad/tradeandjobs.htm.
21. Derek Scissors, The U.S. and China: Jobs, Trade, and More (Heritage Foundation, October 1, 2012). http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/the-us-andchina-jobs-trade-and-more.
22. Robert E. Scott, ‘‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership Could Be Much Worse thanthe Over-Hyped Korea Deal.’’ (Economic Policy Institute, July 18, 2013). http://
www.epi.org/publication/trade-pacts-korus-trans-pacific-partnership/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00131

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

120

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

23. Robert E. Scott, ‘‘Unfair China Trade Costs Local Jobs.’’ http://american
manufacturing.org/content/unfair-china-trade-costs-local-jobs.
24. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet.
25. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, written testimony of Philip Levy, February 21, 2014.
26. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Peter K. Schott, February 21, 2014.
27. David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, The China Syndrome:
Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States (National
Science Foundation, March 2011).
28. WTO, ‘‘Lamy: Better Statistics Today Will Contribute to Better Policies Tomorrow.’’ http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl261_e.htm.
29. ‘‘WTO, OECD Find U.S.-China Deficit Smaller under ‘Value-Added’ Approach,’’ World Trade Online, January 22, 2013. http://insidetrade.com/Inside-TradeGeneral/Public-Content-World-Trade-Online/wto-oecd-find-us-china-deficit-smallerunder-value-added-approach/menu-id-896.html.
30. Sherry Stephenson, ‘‘Services and the Global Value Chain,’’ The Shifting Geography of Global Value Chains, Implications for Developing Countries and Trade
Policy (World Economic Forum, Global Agenda Council on the Global Trade System,2012). http: // issuu.com / ictsd / docs / wef_ gac_ globaltradesystems_ report_ 2012; U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on the Evolving U.S.China Trade and Investment Relationship, written testimony of Shang-Jin Wei,
June 14, 2012.
31. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Peter K. Schott, February 21, 2014.
32. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Peter K. Schott, February 21, 2014.
33. ‘‘U.S. Manufacturing Employment 1970–2010, Down 34%,’’ Daily Kos, December 19, 2010. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/12/19/927976/-US-ManufacturingEmployment-1970-2010-down-34#.
34. Robert E. Scott, Costly Trade with China (Economic Policy Institute, May 1,2007). http://www.epi.org/publication/bp188/.
35. Trading Economics, ‘‘China Balance of Trade.’’ http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/balance-of-trade; Statistisches Bundesamt, Foreign Trade: Ranking ofGermany’s Trading Partners in Foreign Trade (Statistisches Bundesamt, March 27,2014).
36. Trading Economics, ‘‘Euro Area Balance of Trade,’’ 2014. http://www.trading
economics.com/euro-area/balance-of-trade; Eurostat, EU28 Deficit in Trade in Goods
with China Down to 62 bn euro in the First Six Months of 2013 Stat/13/172 (European Commission, November 19, 2013). http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/6-19112013-BP/EN/6-19112013-BP-EN.PDF.
37. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, written testimony of Peter K. Schott, February 21,
2014; Robert E. Lighthizer, Submission before the Committee on Ways and Means,
Hearing on China Trade and Industrial Policies (U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, June 16, 2010). http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/2010jun16_
robertlighthizer_submission.pdf.
38. ‘‘China Becomes World’s Largest FDI Recipient,’’ Xinhua, October 24, 2012.
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/7988220.html.
39. K.C. Fung, Hitomi Iizaka, and Sarah Tong, ‘‘Foreign Direct Investment in
China: Policy, Trend and Impact,’’ China’s Economy in the 21st Century’’ (HongKong Institute of Economic and Business Strategy, June 24–25, 2002). http://www.hiebs.hku.hk/working_paper_updates/pdf/wp1049.pdf.
40. Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, ‘‘Statistics of FDI in
China in January-December 2013.’’ http: // english.mofcom.gov.cn / article / statistic /foreigninvestment/201402/20140200498911.shtml.
41. Valentina Romei and Rob Minto, ‘‘Chart of the Week: Who Makes China’s
Exports—Local Companies or Foreign?’’ Financial Times, September 10, 2012. http://
blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/09/10/chart-of-the-week-who-is-making-chinas-exports/.
42. Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, ‘‘Statistics of FDI in
China in January-December 2013.’’ http: // english.mofcom.gov.cn / article / statistic /foreigninvestment/201402/20140200498911.shtml.
43. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Oded Shenkar, February 21, 2014.
44. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, written testimony of Peter K. Schott, February 21,
2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00132

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

121

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

45. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, written testimony of Peter K. Schott, February 21,
2014.
46. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, written testimony of Peter K. Schott, February 21,
2014.
47. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, written testimony of Peter K. Schott, February 21,
2014.
48. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Oded Shenkar, February 21, 2014.
49. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES30000000
01.
50. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2013 Report to Congress
on China’s WTO Compliance, December 2013.
51. Ramesh Adhikari and Yongzheng Yang, ‘‘What Will WTO Membership Mean
for China and Its Trading Partners?’’ Finance and Development 39:3 (September
2002). http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/09/adhikari.htm.
52. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 158.
53. Robert D. Atkinson, Enough is Enough: Confronting Chinese Innovation Mercantilism (Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, February 2012).
http://www2.itif.org/2012-enough-enough-chinese-mercantilism.pdf.
54. Robert D. Atkinson, Enough is Enough: Confronting Chinese Innovation Mercantilism (Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, February 2012).
http://www2.itif.org/2012-enough-enough-chinese-mercantilism.pdf.
55. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2013 Report to Congress
on China’s WTO Compliance, December 2013.
56. Hoo Tiang Boon, The Growing Institutionalization of U.S.-China Relations(East Asia Forum, August 3, 2013). http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/03/thegrowing-institutionalisation-of-us-china-relations/.
57. Hoo Tiang Boon, The Growing Institutionalization of U.S.-China Relations(East Asia Forum, August 3, 2013). http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/03/thegrowing-institutionalisation-of-us-china-relations/.
58. Derek Scissors, Tools to Build the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, Backgrounder No. 2590 (Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2011). http: // thf_ media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2590.pdf.
59. Derek Scissors, Tools to Build the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, Backgrounder No. 2590 (Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2011). http: // thf_ media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2590.pdf.
60. Derek Scissors, Tools to Build the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, Backgrounder No. 2590 (Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2011). http: // thf_ media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2590.pdf.
61. Derek Scissors, Tools to Build the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, Backgrounder No. 2590 (Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2011). http: // thf_ media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2590.pdf.
62. U.S. Government Accountability Office, United States Has Secured Commitments in Key Bilateral Dialogues, but U.S. Agency Reporting on Status Should Be
Improved, GAO–14–102, February 11, 2014. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14102.
63. U.S. Government Accountability Office, United States Has Secured Commitments in Key Bilateral Dialogues, but U.S. Agency Reporting on Status Should Be
Improved, GAO–14–102, February 11, 2014. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14102.
64. Aaron Stanley, ‘‘U.S. Challenges China over Compliance with WTO Ruling,’’
Financial Times, January 13, 2014. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fb9a6b52-7c95-11e39179-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2yDpSsteJ.
65. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Elizabeth Drake, February 21, 2014.
66. U.S. International Trade Administration, ‘‘Safeguards.’’ http://www.trade.gov/
mas/ian/tradedisputes-enforcement/tg_ian_002099.asp.
67. Sewell Chan, ‘‘U.S. Says China Fund Breaks Rules,’’ The New York Times,
December 22, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/business/global/23trade.html?pagewanted=all; ‘‘USTR Initiates Section 301 Investigation into China’s Subsidies
and Restrictive Practices on Green Technology Sector,’’ Mayer Brown, October 18, 2010.
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications /USTR-Initiates-Section-301-Investigationinto -Chinas-Subsidies-and-Restrictive-Practices-on-Green-Technology-Sector-10-182010/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00133

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

122

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

68. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Elizabeth Drake, February 21, 2014.
69. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Elizabeth Drake, February 21, 2014.
70. ‘‘China’s Economy and the WTO, All Change,’’ Economist, December 10,
2011. http://www.economist.com/node/21541448.
71. Guonan Ma and Robert McCauley, Bank for International Settlements, ‘‘The
Evolving Renminbi Regime and Implications for Asian Currency Stability.’’ http://
www.bis.org/publ/work321.pdf; U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to Congresson International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, July 8, 2010. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-policies/Documents/Foreign%
20Exchange%20Report%20July%202010.pdf.
72. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, July 8, 2010. http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/exchange-rate-policies/Documents/Foreign%20Exchange%20Report%20July%202010.pdf.
73. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, October 30, 2013. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-policies/Documents/2013-10-30_ FULL%20FX%20
REPORT_FINAL.pdf.
74. Edward P. Lazear, ‘‘Chinese ‘Currency Manipulation’ is Not the Problem,’’Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142
4127887323320404578213203581231448?mg=reno64-wsj.
75. International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions, August 2014. http: // www.imfbookstore.org / ProdDetails.asp?ID=AREAERALL&PG=1&Type=RLMc.
76. Brain Palmer, ‘‘If Currency Manipulation Is so Great for Exports, Why Don’t
We Do It?’’ Slate, October 17, 2012. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
explainer/2012/10 /china_currency_manipulation_how_does_it_harm_the_u_s_and_
what_can_we_do.html.
77. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, April 15, 2014. http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/exchange-rate-policies/Documents/2014-4-15_FX%20REPORT%20
FINAL.pdf.
78. C. Fred Bergsten and Joseph E. Gagnon, Currency Manipulation, the U.S.
Economy, and the Global Economic Order, Number PB12–25 (Peterson Institute forInternational Economics, December 2012). http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb1225.pdf.
79. C. Fred Bergsten and Joseph E. Gagnon, Currency Manipulation, the U.S.
Economy, and the Global Economic Order, Number PB12–25 (Peterson Institute forInternational Economics, December 2012). http://www.iie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2302.
80. C. Fred Bergsten and Joseph E. Gagnon, Currency Manipulation, the U.S.
Economy, and the Global Economic Order, Number PB12–25 (Peterson Institute forInternational Economics, December 2012). http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb1225.pdf.
81. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Robert Scott, February 21, 2814.
82. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Robert Scott, February 21, 2014.
83. The White House, Remarks by the President at the Senate Democratic Policy
Committee Issues Conference, February 3, 2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-senate-democratic-policy-committee-issues-conference; David
E. Sanger, ‘‘With Warning, Obama Presses China on Currency,’’ New York Times,
September 23, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/world/24prexy.html?_r=1&
partner=rss&emc=rss.
84. ‘‘Obama Presses China’s Xi over Currency—White House,’’ Reuters, March24, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/24/usa-china-currency-idUSL1N0
ML0RF20140324.
85. ‘‘China, U.S. to Talk on Currency,’’ CNN, December 9, 2003. http://www.cnn.com/2003/BUSINESS/12/09/china.us.wentrade.biz/.
86. Wayne M. Morrison, ‘‘China’s Currency Policy: An Analysis of the Economic
Issues.’’ https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21625.pdf.
87. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Elizabeth Drake, February 21, 2014.
88. Doug Palmer, ‘‘U.S. Turns Down China Currency Probes in Two Cases,’’Reuters, August 31, 2010. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2010 / 08 / 31 / usa - china currency-idUSN3124941420100831.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00134

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

123

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

89. Congress Votes, Govtrack.US. https: // www.govtrack.us / congress / votes / 111 2010 / h554; United States Senate, Legislation and Records. http: // www.senate.gov /legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?&congress=112&session=1&vote=00159.
90. American Manufacturing, ‘‘Senate TPP Currency Manipulation.’’ http://american
manufacturing.org/files/SenateTPPCurrencyManipulation.pdf.
91. Wayne M. Morrison, ‘‘China’s Currency Policy: An Analysis of the Economic
Issues.’’ https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21625.pdf.
92. Edward P. Lazear, ‘‘Chinese ‘Currency Manipulation’ Is Not the Problem,’’Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142
4127887323320404578213203581231448?mg=reno64-wsj.
93. Dan Ikenson, ‘‘Foreign ‘Currency Manipulation’ Does Not Warrant Washington’s Attention,’’ Forbes, January 8, 2013. http: // www.forbes.com / sites / danikenson /2013/01/08/foreign-currency-manipulation-does-not-warrant-washingtons-attention/.
94. Derek Scissors, Tools to Build the U.S.-China Economic Relationship (Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2011). http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/
tools-to-build-the-us-china-economic-relationship.
95. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Philip I. Levy, February 21, 2014.
96. Doug Guthrie, ‘‘Condemning China on Currency Will only Hurt U.S. Economy,’’ Forbes, October 23, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougguthrie/2012/10/23/
condemning-china-on-currency-will-only-hurt-u-s-economy/.
97. Stephanie Henry, U.S.-China Business Council, ‘‘Treasury: China Not a Currency Manipulator.’’ http://www.uschina.org/washington-update/treasury-china-notcurrency-manipulator.
98. Benjamin Carlson, ‘‘Good News: U.S. Exports to China Soar, Setting a New
Record,’’ Global Post, January 21, 2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/
regions/asia-pacific/china/140120/good-news-us-exports-china-soar-setting-new-record.
99. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Oded Shenkar, February 21, 2014.
100. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Robert Scott, February 21, 2014.
101. Benjamin Carlson, ‘‘Good News: U.S. Exports to China Soar, Setting a New
Record,’’ Global Post, January 21, 2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/
regions/asia-pacific/china/140120/good-news-us-exports-china-soar-setting-new-record.
102. The White House, ‘‘Executive Order—Establishment of the Interagency Trade
Enforcement Center,’’ February 28, 2012. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/28/executive-order-establishment-interagency-trade-enforcement-center.
103. Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘‘ITEC Frequently Asked
Questions.’’ http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforcement/itec/faq.
104. ‘‘China—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile and Automobile-Parts
Industry,’’ Dispute DS450, WTO. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds450_e.htm.
105. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Elizabeth Drake, February 21, 2014.
106. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Elizabeth Drake, February 21, 2014.
107. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Elizabeth Drake, February 21, 2014.
108. U.S. International Trade Administration, ‘‘An Introduction to U.S. Trade
Remedies.’’ http://enforcement.trade.gov/intro/.
109. Derek Scissors, Tools to Build the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, Backgrounder No. 2590 (Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2011). http: // thf_ media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2590.pdf.
110. Edward A. Geltman and James P. Wehner, Manufacturers outside U.S. Face
Increased Threat of Private Litigation under 1916 Antidumping Act (Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P., 2004). http://www.ssd.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFile
Upload5689%5C8859%5C1916%20Antidumping%20Act.pdf.
111. Chakravarthi Raghavan, ‘‘WTO Panel Rules against 1916 U.S. Anti-Dumping
Law,’’ Third World Network, April 2000. http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/1916.htm.
112. ‘‘United States Repeals Antidumping Act of 1916,’’ eBearing News, December
14, 2004. http://www.ebearing.com/news2004/121401.htm.
113. U.S. Government Accountability Office, ‘‘Commerce Faces Practical andLegal Challenges in Applying Countervailing Duties,’’ June 17, 2005. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-474.
114. U.S. Government Accountability Office, ‘‘Commerce Faces Practical andLegal Challenges in Applying Countervailing Duties,’’ June 17, 2005. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-474.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00135

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

124

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

115. Guobing Shen and Xiaolan Fu, ‘‘The Trade Effects of US Anti-dumping Actions against China Post-WTO Entry,’’ The World Economy 37:1 (2014). http://online
library.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/twec.12125/pdf; Chad P. Brown, World Bank, ‘‘Global
Antidumping Database.’’ http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd/gad/.
116. KPMG Global China Practice, State-Owned Entities: From CentrallyPlanned Origins to Hybrid Market Competitors (KPMG, June 2013). http: //www.kpmg.com / CN / en / IssuesAndInsights / ArticlesPublications /Newsletters/
China-360/Documents/China-360-Issue9-201306-State-owned-entities.pdf.
117. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 160.
118. Christian Tietje and Karsten Nowrot, Myth or Reality? China’s Market Economy Status under WTO Anti-Dumping Law after 2016, Policy Papers on Transnational Economic Law, No. 34 (Transnational Economic Law Research Center, December 2011). http://tietje.jura.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/telc/PolicyPaper34.pdf.
119. O’Connor European Lawyers, ‘‘The Myth of China and Market Economy Status in 2016.’’ http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/files/oconnorresponse.pdf.
120. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Eileen Bradner, February 21, 2014.
121. Elizabeth Drake (partner, Stewart and Stewart), telephone interview with
Commission staff, March 27, 2014.
122. Dexter Roberts, ‘‘How China May Lose a Chance for Reform,’’ Businessweek,
October 11, 2013 http: // www.businessweek.com / articles / 2013 - 10 - 11 / chinas - third plenum-get-ready-for-disappointment.
123. Eve Cary, ‘‘Reforming China’s State-Owned Enterprises,’’ Diplomat, June 19,
2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/reforming-chinas-state-owned-enterprises/?all
pages=yes; ‘‘China Focus: China Pledges Further Reforms for State-Dominated Sectors,’’ Xinhua, October 24, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-10/
24/c_131928023.htm.
124. Arthur R. Kroeber, Xi Jinping’s Ambitious Agenda for Economic Reform in
China (Brookings Institution, November 17, 2013). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/17-xi-jinping-economic-agenda-kroeber.
125. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Trends
and Implications of Chinese Investment in the United States: Issues for Policymakers, testimony of Willy C. Shih, May 9, 2013.
126. Arthur R. Kroeber, Xi Jinping’s Ambitious Agenda for Economic Reform in
China (Brookings Institution, November 17, 2013). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/17-xi-jinping-economic-agenda-kroeber.
127. Arthur R. Kroeber, After the NPC: Xi Jinping’s Roadmap for China (Brookings Institution, March 11, 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/11-after-npc-xi-jinping-roadmap-for-china-kroeber.
128. ‘‘China’s State Sector Strikes Back,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2013.
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/06/06/chinas-state-sector-strikes-back/.
129. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Adam Hersh, February 21, 2014.
130. Content First, LLC, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 2013 Report (Organization for International Investment, 2013). https: // www.ofii.org / sites /default/files/FDIUS_2013_Report.pdf.
131. Tazeem Pasha, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, Drivers of U.S.
Competitiveness (International Trade Administration, December 31, 2013). http://
selectusa.commerce.gov / sites / selectusa.commerce.gov / files / documents / 2014 /january/
2013-12-31_selectusa_report_-_fdi_in_the_united_states.pdf.
132. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Trends
and Implications of Chinese Investment in the United States: Issues for Policymakers, written testimony of Elizabeth J. Drake, May 9, 2013; U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Trends and Implications of Chinese
Investment in the United States, written testimony of Derek Scissors, May 9, 2013;
and Zhangqin, ‘‘Xinhua Insight: Twists and Turns for Chinese SOEs Abroad,’’Xinhua, September 28, 2012. http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/2012-09/28/
content_26662276.htm.
133. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Joel Backaler, February 21, 2014.
134. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Joel Backaler, February 21, 2014.
135. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Joel Backaler, February 21, 2014.
136. ‘‘China Says to Ease Restriction on Overseas Investments,’’ Reuters, April
10, 2014. http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/china-investmentgrade-idINDEEA3
A02I20140411.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00136

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

125

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

137. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 176.
138. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 176.
139. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Willy C. Shih, February 21, 2014.
140. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on ChineseState-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises, written testimony of Timothy C.
Brightbill, February 15, 2012. http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2.15.12brightbill_testimony.pdf.
141. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on ChineseState-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises, testimony of Timothy C. Brightbill,
February 15, 2012.
142. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Willy C. Shih, February 21, 2014.
143. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 156–157.
144. The White House, ‘‘Foreign Direct Investment in the United States.’’ http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2013fdi_report_-_final_for_web.pdf.
145. Tazeem Pasha, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, Drivers of U.S.
Competitiveness (International Trade Administration, December 31, 2013). http://
selectusa.commerce.gov / sites / selectusa.commerce.gov / files / documents / 2014 /january/
2013-12-31_selectusa_report_-_fdi_in_the_united_states.pdf.
146. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 183.
147. Zijing Wu and Jonathan Browning, ‘‘Lenovo Heeds Jiang’s ‘Go Out’ Call in
Second China M&A Wave,’’ Businessweek, March 26, 2014. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-03-25/lenovo-heeding-jiang-s-go-out-call-in-second-china-wave-of-mand-a.
148. Thilo Hanemann and Cassie Gao, Chinese FDI in the US: 2013 Recap and2014 Outlook (Rhodium Group, January 7, 2014). http://rhg.com/notes/chinese-fdi-inthe-us-2013-recap-and-2014-outlook.
149. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Joel Backaler, February 21, 2014.
150. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Joel Backaler, February 21, 2014.
151. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Adam Hersh, February 21, 2014.
152. Dexter Roberts, ‘‘How China May Lose a Chance for Reform,’’ Businessweek,
October 11, 2013 http: // www.businessweek.com / articles / 2013 - 10 - 11 / chinas - third plenum-get-ready-for-disappointment.
153. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Willy C. Shih, February 21, 2014.
154. Zijing Wu and Jonathan Browning, ‘‘Lenovo Heeds Jiang’s ‘Go Out’ Call in
Second China M&A Wave,’’ Businessweek, March 26, 2014. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-03-25/lenovo-heeding-jiang-s-go-out-call-in-second-china-wave-of-mand-a.
155. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Eileen Bradner, February 21, 2014.
156. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 179.
157. Timothy C. Brightbill, Linda S. Chang, and Peggy A. Clarke, Trade Remedies for Global Companies (American Bar Association, 2006), p. 26. http://books.google.com/books ? id=_ 5LyLgAQw_YC&pg=PR2&lpg=PR2&dq=brightbill+clark+chang+
trade+remedies+for+global+companies&source = bl& ots = DdyAQCeoO_ & sig = nKqb1_ jO_-_VZSibsPIR77Y8ffM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=JaStU4PAA-qssAS334CYAQ&ved=0CC
gQ6AEwAQ#v=snippet&q=industry%20support&f=false.
158. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Elizabeth Drake, February 21, 2014.
159. U.S. Department of Commerce and the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, ‘‘Foreign Direct Investment in the United States.’’ http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/2013fdi_report_-_final_for_web.pdf; Rhodium Group, ‘‘China Investment Monitor.’’ http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.
160. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Economic Challenges, testimony of Joel Backaler, February 21, 2014.
161. Derek Scissors, China’s Global Investment Rises: The U.S. Should Focus on
Competition (Heritage Foundation, January 9, 2013). http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/chinas-global-investment-rises-the-us-should-focus-on-competition.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00137

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

126

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

162. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 188–189.
163. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 188–189.
164. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 180.
165. ‘‘China 2013 Foreign Investment Inflows Hit Record High,’’ Reuters, January
16, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/us-china-economy-fdi-idUSBREA
0F0EI20140116.
166. Lin Yang, ‘‘Jobs From China? An Estimated 1 Million U.S. Jobs Supported
by 2020,’’ Forbes, June 16, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/linyang/2014/06/16/jobsfrom-china-an-estimated-1-million-u-s-jobs-created-by-2020/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00138

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

SECTION 3: CHINA’S HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY,DRUG SAFETY, AND MARKET ACCESS FOR
U.S. MEDICAL GOODS AND SERVICES
Introduction
The healthcare sector has played a marginal role in U.S.-China
relations, but that is beginning to change. China has become theworld’s top producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs)
and inert substances, as well as a significant exporter of medical
products.1 U.S. drug companies and distributors are sourcing alarge share of ingredients and finished drugs from China and selling them in the United States. Concurrently, China is experiencing
a major demographic and epidemiologic transition, challenging thenation’s health care system. China’s median age will exceed that of
the United States within this decade, and the proportion aged 65
and above is projected to increase from 9 percent in 2013 to 25 percent by 2040, totaling 300 million.* 2 An older and wealthier population, with a rising incidence of non-communicable diseases, isseeking more frequent and better-quality treatment.3 U.S. companies that market drugs, medical devices, and healthcare services
consequently view China as an important opportunity.4
To explore these issues, the Commission held a hearing in April
2014 on China’s healthcare sector, drug safety, and the U.S.-China
trade in medical products. Among the witnesses were Christopher
J. Hickey, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) country
director for the People’s Republic of China; Rod Hunter, senior vicepresident for international affairs at PhRMA; and Karen Eggleston,fellow and director of the Asia Health Policy Program at the
Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center of Stanford University.
The hearing built on the Commission’s past work on healthcare, inparticular the April 2010 commissioned report Potential Health &Safety Impacts from Pharmaceuticals and Supplements Containing
Chinese-Sourced Raw Ingredients, authored by NSD Bio Group,
LLC.5
The Commission determined that the Chinese government is
stepping up efforts to fix the country’s troubled healthcare system.
In addition to promoting structural reforms, it invested over $371
billion between 2009 and 2012, much of which has gone toward expanding public health insurance and building healthcare facilities
in small towns and rural areas.6 The government is also taking
preliminary steps to improve regulation of pharmaceutical production. Important measures include updating good manufacturing
practices (GMP) legislation in 2011 and consolidating separate reg* The U.S. over-65 population is 14 percent. United States Census Bureau, ‘‘Quickfacts,’’ http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(127)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00139

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

128

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

ulatory agencies into the China Food and Drug Administration(CFDA) in 2013.7
However, not all of China’s healthcare reforms have succeeded,and serious problems remain. The government operates the largest
hospitals and health insurers, thereby competing against the private sector and creating conflicts between government ownershipand regulatory functions. Beijing also intervenes heavy-handedly inthe healthcare market by controlling prices for drugs and devices,setting distorted fee schedules for medical providers, and determining which drugs are eligible for reimbursements from government-run insurers. Meanwhile, underfunded hospitals and doctors
solicit bribes and overprescribe costly drugs and treatments to compensate for strict curbs on fees. Escalating costs, as well as risingutilization, are driving healthcare spending. Some frustrated patients have even taken violent action against doctors and nurses.
Central directives to address these issues are often poorly designed
or implemented unevenly by local governments.8
The goal of promoting indigenous producers has also impeded efforts to develop a well-regulated pharmaceutical industry. Althoughsome private Chinese companies are competing fairly, the government is subsidizing domestic firms while inducing technology
transfer from foreign drug and device makers.9 At the same time,
China has become one of the prime sources of counterfeit and substandard drugs and drug ingredients. Fragmented supply chains,competition based primarily on pricing, and weak enforcement ofstandards encourage producers to cut corners.10
As producer and consumer, China now plays a central role in the
global healthcare sector. For the United States, this presents opportunities as well as risks. Outsourcing production to China may
help U.S. drug makers lower production costs but can compromise
the safety of U.S. consumers. Tainted heparin products that originated in China claimed at least 81 U.S. lives and many sick patients in 2007–2008.11 Since then, the FDA has enhanced its efforts
to monitor drug safety in China, at the border, and in the U.S.
market. Congress has passed new bills, such as the Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) (2012) andDrug Quality and Security Act (DQSA) (2013), to enhance theagency’s legal authority and operational capabilities over drug imports. Still, in view of China’s vast industry and weak domestic
regulation, U.S. consumers remain at risk. As of late September
2014, the FDA had just one part-time and two full-time drug inspectors stationed in China.12
U.S. companies looking to sell goods and services in China’s
healthcare sector also face market access barriers. Onerous clinical
trials in China can delay the marketing of U.S. drugs by up to
eight years. Uneven access to reimbursement lists makes U.S.
drugs less affordable for Chinese patients.13 U.S. device makers
likewise suffer from a number of regulatory hurdles that impact
data protection and competitiveness.14 A recent crackdown on foreign drug makers on bribery charges has raised broader questions
about whether U.S. companies can operate ethically in an authoritarian state plagued by widespread corruption.15

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00140

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

129
China’s Pharmaceutical Exports: Public Health Risks andPolicy Responses
China’s Position in the Global Drug Industry
U.S. reliance on foreign medical products has increased substantially in the 21st century. The number of drugs from foreignsources for sale in the U.S. market doubled between 2001 and2008, and today represents 40 percent of the market. Import reliance is even starker for APIs—some 80 percent are now sourced
from abroad.16 This trend is reflected in U.S. imports from China.
According to Dr. Hickey, the total number of shipments of FDAregulated products from China increased from approximately 1.3
million entry lines (food, drugs and devices) in 2007 to almost 5.2
million in 2013.* 17 Dr. Allan Coukell, a drug safety expert at the
Pew Charitable Trusts, testified that about 40 percent of APIs usedin the United States are sourced from China and India. The UnitedStates imported over 100 million kilograms of pharmaceuticalgoods from China in 2013, a close to 200 percent increase over the
past decade.18 Charles Bell, a health expert at Consumers Union,
told the Commission: ‘‘Over the last decade or so, a lot of thesourcing of dietary supplements and vitamin ingredients has shifted to China, following the pattern set by the drug industry.’’ 19
Product-specific data substantiates these claims. Import statistics
gathered by the U.S. International Trade Commission demonstrate
that, although volumes fluctuate over time, a substantial share of
U.S. non-prescription painkillers such as ibuprofen, acetaminophen, and aspirin, originates in China (see Table 1). The increasein China’s share of antibiotics imports is striking, as is the relianceon China for organic glands used for organotherapeutic purposes.
According to Chinese government sources, China’s volume of production for a range of drugs has increased substantially since 2005
(see Table 2).
Table 1:

U.S. Imports of Select Pharmaceuticals, Drug Ingredients, andVitamins †(kilograms thousands)
Volume of Total U.S. Imports (kilograms thousands)

Ibuprofen
Acetaminophen
AspirinGlands/organs fororganotherapeutic uses
Antibiotics
Vitamin C
Vitamin D

1998

2003

2008

2013

415
1,488
2,034

1,492
2,291
4,314

3,017
3,040
4,663

3,837
1,941
4,453

—
8,455
12,405306—
5,752
21,601
583

3,758
6,759
36,251
1,195

3,699
8,233
33,006
1,246

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* In this context, a ‘‘line’’ is an FDA entry line, which represents each portion of a shipmentthat an importer lists as a separate item on an entry document. According to Dr. Hickey, 3.4
million entry lines in 2013 were medical devices and 25,000 were drugs and biologics.
† HTS codes used for this table are: Ibuprofen (2916391500), acetaminophen (2924296210), aspirin (2918221000), glands and other organs for organotherapeutic uses, dried, whether or not
powdered (30019001), antibiotics (all 10-digit codes under HTS 2941), vitamin C and its derivatives (2936270000), vitamins D and their derivatives (2936295020).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00141

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

130
Table 1:

U.S. Imports of Select Pharmaceuticals, Drug Ingredients, andVitamins †—Continued(kilograms thousands)
China’s Share of U.S. Imports (%)

Ibuprofen
Acetaminophen
AspirinGlands/organs fororganotherapeutic uses
Antibiotics
Vitamin C
Vitamin D

1998

2003

2008

2013

0.1%
48.5%
37.0%

6.2%
65.1%
39.7%

73.4%
41.9%
31.8%

70.3%
44.7%
28.6%

—
39.4%
64.7%
0.3%

—
26.3%
86.4%
16.5%

69.4%
51.0%
90.1%
53.6%

57.9%
70.4%
89.9%
83.4%

Source: U.S. International Trade Commission.

Table 2:

Selection of Top Pharmaceuticals Products Produced in China(by Volume)(tons)
Tons
2005

2013

Compound annual
growth rate (%)

7,765
362
1,320

14,401
4,396
4,009

8.0%
36.6%
14.9%

44,2442,437

64,485
5,795

11.4%
11.4%

80,804
12,562
2,259
704

107,042
40,133
5,804
1,789

3.6%
15.6%
12.5%
12.4%

Antibiotics
Amoxicillin
Penicillin K
Ceftriaxone Sodium
Antipyretics and Analgesics
Paracetamol
Ibuprofen
Antiparasitics, Vitamins, and Minerals
Vitamin C
Vitamin E Powder
Vitamin A Powder
Vitamin B12

Drugs for Central, Alimentary, and Respiratory Systems
Caffeine
Taurine, 2-Aminoethanesulfonic acid
Piracetam
Sodium Bicarbonate for Injection

9,630
2,141
2,096
733

14,34912,159
2,947
1,450

5.1%
24.2%
4.3%
8.9%

Fluid, Electrolyte & Acid Base Balance and Anaesthetics
Sodium Chloride for Injection
Dicalcium Phosphate
Potassium Chloride for Injection

16,239972
396

32,18921,638
2,156

8.9%
47.4%
23.6%

122
710
529

1,894
1,361
1,004

40.9%
8.5%
8.3%

255,308
78,153
8,644
2,036
57

304,388
88,972
34,345
3,159
1,328

2.2%
1.6%
18.8%
5.6%
48.3%

Antiallergic Agents, Enzymes, and Other Biochemicals
Phenylalanine
Thioproline
LeucineOther Substances
GlucoseGlucose for Injection
Xylitol
Microcrystalline Cellulose
Fructose

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Source: China State Food and Drug Administration, via CEIC data.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00142

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

131
The outsourcing of drug production to developing countries is notunique to China. U.S. and European drug makers today are manufacturing fewer small molecules in house and focusing instead on
the higher-value development of biologics.* Much of their researchand development (R&D) takes place in Boston, Geneva, and other‘‘clusters of expertise.’’ 20 Producers across Asia have entered drug
manufacturing, taking advantage of low labor costs, advances intransport and communications, and government policies that encourage value-added exports. India is now the preeminent supplierof generic drugs, serving as an export platform for U.S.-based multinationals, as well as Indian competitors.21 To regulate Indian
drug exports to the United States more effectively, the FDA has established offices in New Delhi and Mumbai, and stationed one fulltime medical products investigator in New Delhi.22
However, China also occupies a distinctive position in global drug
production. In contrast to India, its products tend to enter thevalue chain further upstream, or in a more preliminary stage—
what experts call the ‘‘precursor supply chain.’’ 23 Precise evidenceis hard to come by, but experts estimate that China is the top global manufacturer of APIs and drug dyes, binding agents, gel capsules, and other inert substances.24 In a 2010 study of pharmaceutical executives by the consulting firm Axendia, 70 percent ofrespondents cited China as their top country source for pharmaceutical ingredients.25 Research conducted at the Commission’s request by NSD Bio Group shows that the United States in 2008 was
the top destination for China’s pharmaceutical raw material exports, with a 16.2 percent share. India ranked as China’s secondleading export destination.26 Since India’s drug industry is exportoriented, a substantial portion of Chinese-origin ingredients processed in India may be exported to the United States as part of finished drug products. Indian customs data show that China’s shareof India’s organic chemical imports and the U.S. share of India’s
drug exports have both risen over the past decade (see Figure 1).

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The bio/pharmaceutical industry discovers and develops both small molecule drugs (also referred to as New Chemical Entities or NCEs) and biomolecular drugs, also called biologics (alsoreferred to as New Biological Entities or NBEs). While NCEs tend to be chemically synthesizedand have a known structure, NBEs are complex mixtures that are not easily identified or characterized. Since the early 1980s, drug innovations for NCEs have leveled off while those for
NBEs have increased. Biological products often represent the cutting-edge of biomedical research and, in time, may offer the most effective means to treat a variety of medical illnesses
and conditions that have no other treatments available. U.S. Food and Drug Administration,‘‘What Are ‘Biologics’ Questions and Answers.’’ http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/Officeof MedicalProductsandTobacco / CBER / ucm133077.htm; ‘‘Small Molecule Drugs versus Biomolecular Drugs (Biologics)’’ (James Samanen Consulting, 2014). http://www.portfoliomanagement solutions.com /the-organization-of-pharmaceutical-rd/small-molecule-drugs-versus-biomoleculardrugs-biologics/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00143

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

132
Figure 1:

China Share of India’s Organic Chemical Imports; U.S. Share ofIndia’s Drug Exports(Share, %)Source: India Ministry of Commerce and Industry, via CEIC.

China’s Production of Counterfeit and Substandard Medicines
China is a prolific source of counterfeit and substandard medicines. Fake drug production is, of course, a global problem, notleast in India.* Dr. Shaohong Jin, vice president of China’s staterun National Institute for Food and Drug Control, maintains thatthe incidence of fake and substandard drugs in China has in fact
declined: His tests of thousands of drug samples indicate that theshare of failed drugs fell from 14 percent in 1998 to less than 5 percent in 2013.27 However, there is alarming evidence that points inthe other direction. In 2012, for example, Chinese authorities discovered 77 million gel capsules made from industrial waste.† Economist Ginger Zhe Jin told the Commission that fake drugs from
China are making their way across the world. In a recent study,
she sampled 1,437 drugs sold in 18 poor-to-middle-income countries. Drugs labeled ‘‘made in China’’ accounted for 6 percent of thetotal sample, but for 20 percent of the fake drugs in the sample.28
The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy states that

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00144

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S3Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* During a crackdown in May 2014, authorities in the United Kingdom seized millions of dollars worth of counterfeit and unlicensed medicines. Of these, 72 percent came from India and11 percent from China. Margaret Davis, ‘‘Fake and Unlicensed Drugs Seized,’’ Press Association
National Newswire, May 22, 2014, via Factiva.
† Other prominent cases of drug safety lapses in China include: Xinfu Clindamycin Injections(2006); Qiqihar Counterfeit Armillarisin A Injections (2006); Shanghai Hualian Major Drug Production Quality Accident (2007); and Dalian Jingang Anti-Counterfeit Rabies Vaccines (2009).
For an analysis of these cases, see NSD Bio Group LLC, Potential Health & Safety Impacts fromPharmaceuticals and Supplements Containing Chinese-Sourced Raw Ingredients (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, April 2010), pp. 35–40; Associated Press, ‘‘Tainted
Drug Scandal: China Makes Arrests, Seizes 77 Million Capsules in Crackdown of Pills Madefrom Industrial Waste,’’ April 23, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/23/china-tainteddrugs_n_1444926.html.

133
China is among the countries producing precursor chemicals for theillicit narcotics trade.* Roger Bate, a counterfeit drug expert andVisiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, says that
China is ‘‘the largest manufacturer of fake drugs in the world.’’ 29
China has advantages in producing both legitimate and illegitimate drugs. The country’s large manufacturing industry and domestic consumer market facilitate economies of scale that lower
costs. To promote goods for export, the Chinese government has for
decades promoted foreign direct investment, along with loosely regulated special economic zones that move massive volumes of goods
each day.30 During the global financial crisis, the government provided generous export tax rebates to producers of active pharmaceutical ingredients, claiming that this would boost exports in ‘‘highvalue-added’’ industries.31
Protection of intellectual property is weak, which serves as a
backdoor subsidy to Chinese companies that rely on piracy for profits. According to data from the World Customs Organization, collected from 121 countries in 2008, 65 percent of seized counterfeit
shipments detected worldwide and 79 percent of counterfeits seizedin the United States were shipped from mainland China. In theEuropean Union, where sector-specific data is available, 6 percent
of all seized counterfeits in 2008 were medicines.32
China is a top producer of basic chemicals and agricultural products, which supply important drug ingredients to Chinese manufacturers. For example, over half of the global pig herd is based in
China, providing a cheap and ready supply of porcine mucosate tissue for crude heparin, which is made into anticoagulant, or ‘‘blood
thinner.’’ † China has overtaken the United States as the leader in
global chemical shipments (see Figure 2). China’s exports of organic
chemicals, the ones most commonly used in pharmaceuticals, grewfrom $5.3 billion in 2004 to $36.5 billion in 2013. Over the same
period, the sales revenue of organic chemical producers in China
increased from $17 billion to $241 billion.‡ 33
The agricultural and chemical industries are heavy polluters of
air, water, and soil, and require commodity imports such as soybean feed and petrochemicals. In the interest of public health, domestic stability, and resource security, the Chinese government istaking measures to reform these industries.§ For the time being,
though, many U.S. companies find it more expedient to source from
China than to produce domestically in the United States.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy states: ‘‘Global efforts to preventthe diversion of methamphetamine precursors have made significant progress. This is a complex
effort, requiring cooperation of the countries that produce these precursor chemicals-principally
India, China, and Germany.’’ Controlling Precursor Chemicals (Washington, DC: The WhiteHouse). http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/precursor-chemicals.
† For more information, see U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, Chapter 1, Section 4.
‡ Export data denominated in current U.S. dollars. Sales revenue data in current renminbi,
converted to U.S. dollars based on historic exchange rates (year-end 2004 and year-end 2013).
§ For more information on environmental issues in China, see U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Annual Report to Congress, Chapter 1, Section 4.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00145

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

134
Figure 2:

Global Chemical Shipments, 2003–2013: China vs. theUnited States(US$ billions)

Source: American Chemistry Council. http://www.americanchemistry.com/Jobs/EconomicStatistics/Industry-Profile/Global-Business-of-Chemistry.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00146

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S3Fig2.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Detecting Harmful Drugs in a Complex Industry
Regulating China’s vast drug industry is difficult. Production isextremely fragmented, with some 4,000 manufacturers of pharmaceutical products, about 400,000 retail pharmacy shops, and according to Chinese customs data, about 29,000 firms involved in exporting medical products.34 Since most suppliers in China sell to otherbusinesses downstream instead of directly to the consumer, they
are easily missed by regulators. According to Dr. Hickey:
In China, whether they’re manufacturers of active pharmaceutical ingredients or, for instance, workshops that do therendering that creates crude heparin that goes into heparin,
those kinds of sites are not accustomed to being inspected
as much as let’s say [generic drug producer] Ranbaxy in
India. So there’s less familiarity perhaps with how our inspections work and what our inspection regime is.35
Criminals in China resort to a variety of ruses to avoid detection.
According to Dr. Coukell, China hosts many ‘‘show and shadow factories,’’ where the factory of record is not the actual origin of anactive ingredient.36 Packaging may also take place at a different location from production. Chinese counterfeiters sometimes claim on
packages that the drug is ‘‘made in India,’’ so that when quality
issues are detected, Indian rather than Chinese producers areblamed. Dr. Bate’s fieldwork has revealed that manifests at ports
are frequently inaccurate, helping fake drugs from China to go undetected when they are unloaded in other parts of the world, particularly at transit ports.37
While China has its fair share of outright criminal operations,many harmful products stem from semi-legitimate producers. Examples include licensed chemical producers who supply pharma-

135
ceutical ingredients that they are not licensed to produce; illegal
producers that are owned by companies selling into the legitimate
supply chain; and firms that produce legitimate products during
the day shift and grey market products during a secret night shift.
Suppliers may also adjust the level of quality based on the standards and detection capability of the customer and export market tominimize compliance costs.38
When producers of harmful drugs are identified, it is hard toprove liability. In theory, experts distinguish ‘‘substandard’’ from‘‘counterfeit’’ drugs; in practice, the distinction is blurred, sincecompanies can claim that they unwittingly corrupted their products. Ingredients may contain residues of toxins, which could originate either from the production facilities themselves (e.g., trace elements of one production line spill over to another) or from a priorstage in the value chain (e.g., agrochemical residues). Moreover,companies may be caught unaware if contamination or counterfeiting was committed by their upstream suppliers.39
When a harmful product reaches the end consumer, its effects
vary widely. Most pernicious are cases where an incorrect formulaof active ingredients is used. That is what occurred with tainted
heparin in 2007–2008: the culprits used an extremely harmful substitute ingredient that was not detected by standard laboratory
tests (see textbox). Other illegitimate products commonly seen in
the market exert a subtler impact:• No active ingredients: In this case, the patient thinks he/she isreceiving effective medication and so foregoes corrective treatment until it is too late. This problem has arisen, for instance,with anti-malarial drugs sold in Africa; 40• Insufficient dosage: In this case, the patient may develop resistance to the particular drug, making the patient less responsive to subsequent treatments. This problem is compoundedamong large populations since increasing resistance makes
specific legitimate drugs, or even entire classes of them, useless; 41• Trace amounts of dangerous substances: Examples include
heavy metals such as lead or cadmium that have been foundin China’s contaminated soils. In this case, the damage to theuser is cumulative, raising the probability of cancer and chronic degenerative illness. Similar problems arise with food imports from China; *• False packaging: This can affect the quality of drugs in storage
and processing, mislead users about ingredients and effects,
and in the case of counterfeits, do grievous damage to the reputation of the real company.42
Another challenge for regulators is to identify which types ofdrug products are most liable to be corrupted. Counterfeiters operate on a risk-return basis. The mimicking of higher-end products

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Over half of herbal dietary supplements tested in a Congressional investigation in 2010 contained trace amounts of lead and other contaminants. While the levels of heavy metals did notexceed levels that the investigators thought were dangerous, in 16 of 40 samples, the pesticide
residues exceeded legal limits. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing
on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Charles Bell, April 3, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00147

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

136
(e.g., a brand-name drug by a leading U.S. pharmaceutical company) offers a higher return but also a higher risk of detection,
since the affected companies can afford superior supply chain monitoring. The faking of lower-end products, such as ‘‘made in India’’
generics, offers lower returns but also a lower risk of detection.43
As Dr. Jin argued, any investment in enforcement by drug makers
themselves has to be seen relative to the final consumer price ofthe drug. If margins are low or the cost of supervision cannot bepassed on to the consumer, companies may lack the willingness orcapability to properly monitor their supply chains.44 According to
Dr. Coukell, the likelihood of an active ingredient coming from
China is higher in the case of a generic than a brand-name drug.45
Counterfeiters often prefer to produce ‘‘lifestyle’’ drugs rather
than the better regulated ‘‘lifesaving’’ drugs. Weight-loss pills,
antihair loss agents, virility and muscle enhancing drugs, andother non-essential medical products have proliferated in recent
years, as has the demand for vitamins and botanicals. According to
Mr. Bell, the United States spends an estimated $32 billion a year
on dietary supplements, and six in ten Americans reportedly takedietary supplements on a regular basis. Since lifestyle drugs are
rarely prescribed by doctors and pharmacists, consumers are moreindiscriminately exposed than in the case of lifesaving drugs. Key
facilitators of lifestyle drug sales—and other over-the-counter medications—are online pharmacies, which afford buyers privacy,
choice, and convenience, but also make it difficult to certify thequality of the product and the integrity of the seller.46 Chinesewholesalers, for instance, have set up websites that claim to be
based in Canada.47
The dangers of fake lifestyle drugs became apparent in a 2009case involving a Texas emergency room doctor, who nearly diedfrom tainted weight-loss pills he had purchased on eBay. The blue
capsules were loaded with sibutramine, a prescription drug the
FDA had warned was linked to heart attacks and strokes and subsequently pulled off the market. The FDA launched a long-term investigation. According to a May 2014 report, the FDA linked thefake pills to a Chinese national, Shengyang Zhou, who had soldthem into the United States through a middleman. An agent fromthe FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations, posing as a potential
client, met with Zhou in Bangkok in 2010. The agent discoveredthat Zhou had made millions of dollars selling counterfeit drugs
that he produced in a small factory operation in Southwest China.
He had traveled frequently to the United States, purchasing real
drugs that he used as a template to make authentic-appearing
fakes.48

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Lessons from the Heparin Case
Between January 2007 and May 2008, at least 81 Americans
died after taking contaminated heparin, a blood-thinning agent.
Many other patients suffered from acute symptoms, such as
breathing difficulties, plunging blood pressure, nausea, and ex-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00148

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

137
Lessons from the Heparin Case—Continued
cessive sweating. Baxter International, Inc., the U.S. company
selling the product, relied on a long and complex supply chain
for the active ingredient that led back to China. Somewhere inthat upstream supply chain, someone deliberately substituted
over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate, a counterfeit and toxic ingredient, for crude heparin.49
The case exposed troubling gaps in drug supply chain monitoring. Baxter began receiving heparin from a new Chinese plantin 2004. Wisconsin-based Scientific Protein Laboratories (SPL)
was the API supplier to Baxter. But SPL had a joint U.S.-Chinese branch, Changzhou Scientific Laboratories (CZSPL), which
purified pigs’ intestines to make heparin. Baxter did not conduct
its own audit of the heparin supplier CZSPL plant until 2007, relying instead on an earlier assessment by a different company.
The FDA approved the plant as a supplier for Baxter without
conducting a pre-approval inspection, in part because the agency
confused the plant with another site in its database.50 To makematters worse, CZSPL was licensed as a chemical manufacturer
in China, not a pharmaceutical manufacturer, exempting it fromthe GMP standards enforced by China’s State Food and Drug
Administration (SFDA).51
The FDA and the U.S. National Institutes of Health eventuallyfound suspect samples from six companies associated with thecontamination over a period of several years.52 In March 2008,
the FDA inspected the CZSPL facility in China for the first time.
It found numerous violations of GMP standards, including
scratched tanks with ‘‘unidentified material’’ sticking to their interiors and missing records for some sources of raw heparin.53
Even at this stage, the Chinese government denied Baxter access
to upstream workshops and consolidators, and refused the FDA
access to two upstream consolidators of heparin as well.54
The legal ramifications of the case proved costly for the U.S.
pharmaceutical company but had minimal impact on China’s
heparin exporters. The victims of the contaminated product filed
hundreds of lawsuits against Baxter. In the first decision in June
2011, a jury in Cook County, Illinois, awarded $625,000 to theestate of a 63-year-old Chicago area man, Steven Johansen. The
award was for the pain and suffering over a five-day period.55
Chinese authorities acknowledged that heparin produced in
China contained harmful ingredients but never accepted that thecontaminated drug caused the deaths associated with Baxter’s
products in the United States.56 China’s heparin exporters appear to have recovered quickly from the scandal: the volume ofannual exports fell to 65,087 kilograms in 2008, but has averaged 107,560 kilograms per year since then.57

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Drug Safety Regulation in China
The first line of defense for guaranteeing the safety of Chinese
medical products is the Chinese government itself. The spread of

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00149

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

138
counterfeit and substandard drugs, however, indicates that Chinese
regulators do not adequately meet their obligations. The evident
failure to guarantee the safety of domestic drugs has compelled
Chinese consumers to buy from abroad. According to Mr. Hunter:‘‘[Because] of the weakness of the regulatory system, [Chinese] people don’t have the same assurance that Chinese-company-produced
pharmaceuticals are of the same quality, even if it’s the same molecule.’’ 58
China only began to build an FDA-type regulatory system in thelate 1990s. As Mr. Hunter acknowledged:

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

One of the challenges that China has is building the state
capacity of a modern regulatory state. Our experience [inthe United States] is a relatively recent one of the last several decades that we’ve built an FDA capacity to the extent
that it [is] now. China has to do this all within a periodof a decade. [The CFDA] is not very well-resourced, either
in terms of numbers of people or financially.59
Several capacity-building efforts are already underway. Since a
Memorandum of Agreement was signed between the then-SFDA
and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in
December 2007, U.S. regulators and corporations have lent support
to China’s efforts.60 Areas of progress include:• Bureaucratic consolidation: China in 2013 reorganized disparate government agencies into the CFDA to better coordinate regulatory efforts. The FDA’s China Office has encouraged the CFDA to participate in the International Medical Devices Regulatory Forum, an important multilateral venue. The
FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health now meetsregularly with its CFDA counterparts under the auspices of
the Forum.61• New legislation: China updated its GMP legislation under the‘‘Good Manufacturing Practices for Pharmaceutical Products(2010 Revision),’’ which took effect in March 2011. The legislation was a coordinated effort by the then SFDA, the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry ofIndustry and Information Technology (MIIT) and the Ministryof Health (MOH). According to Dr. Hickey, the Chinese regulators incorporated and implemented some of the U.S. FDA’s
suggestions.62 The new GMP requires the manufacturers ofsterile drugs to acquire the new GMP certificate by year-end
2013, and other drug manufacturers to be licensed by December 2015. Those who fail to meet the requirements face rejection of their new drug registration applications, and in the caseof a pending registration application, suspension of the approval process.63• Upgrading record-keeping systems: At the 2009 Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) talks between the UnitedStates and China, China agreed to strengthen its oversightand enforcement of APIs and counterfeit pharmaceuticals by
establishing a Drug Master File system; enforcing record-keeping requirements for companies that manufacture and sell
APIs; and regulating unregistered Chinese companies adver-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00150

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

139
tising and marketing APIs at foreign trade shows and on theInternet.64• Personnel training: The FDA is training CFDA regulators. For
example, an expert from FDA’s China Office recently instructed over 1,000 Chinese inspectors on how to conduct inspections based on the new GMP standards China enacted in
2011.65• Joint enforcement and information sharing: The FDA has held
formal monthly meetings with its Chinese counterparts since2008. The two sides discuss strategy and regulatory issues, collaboration and joint capacity building, and emerging issues ofbilateral concern. Informal communication also takes place ona day-to-day basis. In addition, CFDA inspectors now regularly
observe FDA inspections in China, and since 2012, the FDA’s
Office of Criminal Investigations has worked closely with
CFDA to strengthen U.S.-China collaboration in the fightagainst Internet-based illegal distribution of falsified, counterfeit, and adulterated goods. In December 2013, Hong Kong,
U.S., and European authorities jointly raided 700 counterfeit
websites worldwide.66 The Customs Administration of China
also announced in 2012 its intention to carry out a global operation, in conjunction with the World Customs Organization, tocombat illicit drugs and chemical substances being transported
by post and express carrier.67
It is questionable, however, whether these efforts will tangibly
improve drug regulation in China. First, the new GMP standards
may not be well adapted to China. According to one industry journal, cash-strapped drug manufacturers, lacking in technical support and intrinsic capacity, have adopted a ‘‘wait-and-see attitude’’toward the new legislation, or worse yet, abandoned plans to apply
for the new GMP certificate by the 2015 deadline.68 For similarreasons, the CFDA has had difficulty enforcing record-keeping requirements and regulating unregistered Chinese companies advertising and marketing APIs overseas.69 The FDA also informed theCommission that China has made slow progress in implementing
its 2009 JCCT commitments:
While the China Food and Drug Administration aims to establish a Drug Master File system, it has not done so todate. Through China’s current implementation of new requirements for Good Manufacturing Practices for drugs, it
is in the early stages of implementing the commitment toenforce requirements for record keeping. . . . China has not
yet made significant strides in regulating unregistered Chinese companies that advertise and market API’s at foreign
trade shows or on the Internet.70

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

According to Dr. Bate, China’s GMP legislation does not clearly
define at what point in the supply chain manufacturers are obliged
to comply. A process may be GMP-certified based solely on final
process in final location, without compliance by earlier suppliers.71
Dr. Jin told the Commission that dietary supplement facilities are
subject only to voluntary GMP standards.72

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00151

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

140

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Second, in China’s fragmented and authoritarian political structure, conflicts of interest frequently contribute to regulatory failure.
At the central level, this is illustrated by the uncertain status of
China’s food and drug regulator, the CFDA. The CFDA’s predecessor, the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), was oneof the U.S.-type regulatory bodies that the Chinese government created in the 1990s.73 Revelations of corruption, however, resulted in
the execution of the head of the SFDA in 2007 and placement of
the agency under the supervision of the MOH in 2008.74 A ProductQuality and Food Safety Leading Small Group was set up the same
year to coordinate government agencies in addressing major issues
related to product quality and drug safety.75 The creation in 2013of the CFDA—a ministerial-level agency directly answerable to theState Council—signaled a reversion to the earlier policy of having
an independent food and drug regulator. Yet it left many bureaucratic dilemmas unresolved. For instance, the scores of pharmaceutical producers in China that are registered as ‘‘chemical producers’’ are answerable to the Ministry of Chemical Industry. The
same goes for ingredients sourced from the agriculture sector,
which are monitored by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministryof Commerce. In regard to drug exports and imports, the CFDA has
usurped some functions of the General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine (AQSIQ), but the AQSIQ
is still a ministerial-level department that reserves the right to inspect production facilities (see Figure 3).76
In addition to infighting among agencies, drug regulators in
China are too decentralized. There are about 400 CFDA staff in
Beijing, compared to approximately 200,000 local food and drug
regulators in 31 provinces, 2,321 counties, and 339 municipalities.77 Because some localities (e.g., Shanghai municipality) are
better able to enforce GMP standards, counterfeiters may migrate
to other jurisdictions that are less vigilant.78 Where local regulators are underpaid and overloaded with applications, they become
susceptible to bribes from drug producers seeking expedited approvals.79

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00152

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00153

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S3Fig3.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

141

142
Because regulators rely on local governments for funding, theirwork may be compromised by vested interests, or face capacity constraints. Fiscal decentralization policies enacted in 1994 have left
local governments with limited taxation and borrowing authority
but an inordinate share of government spending on public services.
According to a World Bank study, governments at the county levelaccounted for half of healthcare expenditures in China in 2007.80
Recent changes to the Party cadre evaluation system have introduced novel performance metrics that emphasize local welfare;* yetthe overarching concern of cadres is to collect taxes and fees tomeet spending obligations.† There is thus an incentive to support
rather than punish local drug and chemical enterprises that boost
the economy and generate tax revenue.81 In Shanxi province, forexample, the China Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in2010 appointed a private entrepreneur to head up their Biological
Product Distribution Center and allowed his own company (not licensed to handle vaccines) to monopolize vaccine distribution in theprovince.82 If a safety lapse occurs, cadres come under greater pressure to maintain social stability. Yet in such cases, there is still an
incentive either to cover up the incident or to ‘‘pass the buck,’’ since
the cadres wish to remain in favor with the higher-ranking officials
who determine their career advancement.83
The tendency of local governments to shirk responsibility is apparent in cases of epidemic outbreaks. According to Dr. Yanzhong
Huang of the Council on Foreign Relations, China has made significant strides in terms of disease surveillance and risk communication since the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak ‡ a decade ago. But communication between local and central
authorities is not always smooth. After the H7N9 outbreak § in2013, the Shanghai municipal government and the Shanghai Cen-DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Since the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), the Chinese government has adjusted the cadre
evaluation system to incorporate more qualitative performance metrics, such as energy efficiency
and environmental governance. Alex L. Wang, ‘‘The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China,’’ Harvard Environmental Law Review 37 (2013): 36–440.
† In a groundbreaking study, the political scientist Victor Shih and his colleagues find ‘‘no evidence that strong growth performance was rewarded with higher party ranks at any of the postreform party congresses. Instead, factional ties with various top leaders, educational qualifications, and provincial revenue collection [emphasis added] played substantial roles in elite ranking, suggesting that promotion systems served the immediate needs of the regime and its leaders, rather than encompassing goals such as economic growth.’’ Victor Shih, Christopher Adolph,
and Mingxing Liu, ‘‘Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement ofCentral Committee Members in China,’’ American Political Science Review 106:1 (2012): 166–187.
‡ The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define SARS as follows: ‘‘Severe acuterespiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus, called SARSassociated coronavirus (SARS–CoV). SARS was first reported in Asia in February 2003. The illness spread to more than two dozen countries in North America, South America, Europe, andAsia before the SARS global outbreak of 2003 was contained. Since 2004, there have not been
any known cases of SARS reported anywhere in the world. The content in this Web site wasdeveloped for the 2003 SARS epidemic.’’ U.S. Centers for Disease Control, ‘‘Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).’’ http://www.cdc.gov/sars/.
§ The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention defines H7N9 as follows: ‘‘H7N9 is thedesignation for one subtype of influenza viruses that is sometimes found in birds, but that does
not normally infect humans. Like all influenza A viruses, there also are different strains of
H7N9 . . . While H7N9 viruses had never before been detected in people, from March 31 throughApril 30, 2013, China reported more than 126 cases of human infection with this new H7N9
virus . . . Most of these infections are believed to result from exposure to infected poultry or contaminated environments, as H7N9 viruses have also been found in poultry in China. While somemild illnesses in human H7N9 cases have been seen, most patients have had severe respiratory
illness, with about one-third resulting in death.’’ U.S. Centers for Disease Control, ‘‘H7N9: Frequently Asked Questions.’’ http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h7n9-faq.htm; and U.S. Centers for
Disease Control, ‘‘Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus.’’ http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h7n9virus.htm.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00154

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

143
ter for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) were able to identify
a novel type of flu virus but waited two weeks before communicating with the central CDC in Beijing. During the hand, foot,and mouth disease outbreak in 2008, the Anhui provincial government waited two weeks to communicate the problem and send samples of the virus to the central CDC.84 Local CDCs in sensitive border regions and minority areas, such as Xinjiang Autonomous Region and Yunnan Province, are reluctant to divulge information on
infectious diseases.85
Even where the government has acted decisively to combat counterfeiting, it has done so via sporadic crackdowns. After scandals
involving tainted pharmaceutical, milk, and pork products were revealed in 2007, a nationwide counterfeit food and drug sweep went
after scores of producers, and lasted until around 2009.86 The recurrence of food and drug safety incidents since then, however, suggests that these law enforcement efforts came up short.
Inconsistent enforcement is compounded by shortcomings in China’s legal system. As the U.S. Trade Representative’s annual reporton China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) compliance details,
China has a history of weak enforcement against counterfeiting
and intellectual property theft.87 In 2009, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued a new judicial interpretation that raised the penalties—including lengthy jail sentences—for manufacturers of counterfeits in cases where their products cause severe harm to publichealth.88 Although it is difficult to assess the application of thisspecific law, a study of China’s 2009 Food Safety Law, conductedby John Balzano of Yale University Law School, suggests potential
pitfalls. Disputes invoking the Food Safety Law are frequently dismissed by the courts because a product’s origin is difficult to traceor its specific defects are obscure. More often than not, reported
cases are against retailers of food products rather than the counterfeiters themselves, because of the lack of access to evidence or indepth discovery procedures. Among the tort cases studied by Dr.
Balzano, none of those allowed in court involved death or serious
injury, presumably because such cases would be politically sensitive. In none of the tort cases were punitive damages awarded.89
These judicial procedures are emblematic of the absence ofchecks and balances in China’s political system. Dr. Jin argued
that local governments ‘‘have an incentive to try to minimize theexposure of [drug safety] problems, and the whistleblowers or evensometimes the victims have been discouraged, harassed, or jailed
for merely exposing the problem.’’ 90
According to Dr. Bate, private investigators in China avoid publicity and contact with foreigners for fear of being punished by thegovernment.91 Mr. Bell said he felt ‘‘some obligation to speak out
for the right of Chinese civil society to do what we’re doing here
[in the United States]. You need to have watchdogs, and you needto have whistleblowers.’’ 92

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

U.S. Regulation of Drug Imports from China
Safety lapses in the pharmaceutical industry have become a global concern. In the United States, the 2007–2008 heparin scandal
drew wider attention to the issue. Several hearings on drug safety
have since been held in Congress, including by the House Energy

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00155

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

144

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB& Commerce Committee (April 2008 and March 2014) and the Senate Committee for Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (September 2011). A landmark report issued by the Institutes of Medicine of the National Academies in 2013 called for tougher standards and regulations to avert an impending crisis.93 Finding concrete solutions at the international level, however, has been difficult. There is disagreement on whether ‘‘counterfeit’’ should be defined merely as a product that violates intellectual property
rights—a definition preferred by major pharmaceutical companies—or also incorporate broader concepts of public health. Although drug safety is an issue that affects patients in all countries,
some governments view anticounterfeit efforts foremost as a threat
to affordable generic drugs or to the growth of their domestic pharmaceutical industries.94
In this context, the U.S. FDA, U.S. companies, and regulators
elsewhere have begun to tackle drug safety on numerous fronts. In
addition to supporting Chinese regulatory authorities, the FDA relies on two ‘‘layers of defense’’: its inspectors on the ground in
China and its regulators back in the United States.
The FDA’s Work in China
Based on a bilateral agreement signed in December 2007, the
FDA now operates three field offices (Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou) in China. The U.S. agency has been working with the
Chinese government to train local regulators and to share information. Drug inspections carried out by the FDA in China averaged
79 per year in 2011 to 2013, compared to 19 inspections in 2007.
In fiscal year 2013, the FDA’s China office received $10 million in
additional federal funding and was authorized to increase its staff
size from 13 people (eight U.S. civil servants and five Chinese staff)
to 27 people, which includes nine additional drug inspectors.95
Given China’s vast drug industry, these measures are only preliminary steps. According to Dr. Hickey’s testimony, the FDA currently has just one part-time and two full-time drug inspectors
based in China. Even the increase in staff size proposed in fiscal
year 2013 proved difficult to implement due to China’s reluctanceto grant the necessary work visas. Although the FDA notified theChinese government as early as February 2012 of its intention tohire more inspectors, China delayed issuing the visas.96 The FDA
told the Commission in September 2014:
There are currently two visa applications pending with the
Chinese Government for staff members who were hired for
the FDA China Office in FY 2012 and FY 2013. In discussions connected with the December 2013 visit to Beijing byVice President Joe Biden, the Chinese Government assured
FDA that it would begin granting visas for an increased
number of U.S. food and drug CSOs [Consumer Safety Officers] stationed in China. These new FDA staff, however,
have still not received visas.97
Limited in terms of manpower, the FDA also faces restricted access to Chinese manufacturing sites. Said Dr. Hickey:
When we’re operating overseas, whether it’s in China orIndia or anywhere else, we don’t have the same authority

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00156

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

145
to enter a premises that we do in the United States. . . . As
a result, in the vast majority of cases when we’re doing inspections in China or in India or elsewhere, we are notifying firms in advance and working to schedule those inspections in advance. . . . We do reserve the right, and wehave, in a handful of cases, done inspections unannounced
as we would in the United States.98
Changes in U.S. Product Safety Regulation
The FDA issued a landmark report in 2011 on improving U.S.
supply chain security, titled Pathway to Global Product Safety andQuality. The report signaled a shift away from the frequency of inspections toward risk-based surveillance.99 A program called PREDICT forms the foundation of this new surveillance system. It collects data on individual producers—including those registered in
China—from a variety of federal agencies, corporations, and foreign
governments to calculate a customized risk score for every line in
an entry. PREDICT score calculations are based on numericalweights, which factor in inherent risk, data anomaly, and data
quality rules as well as the compliance history of firms and products associated with the line. Application of rules results in thegeneration of a cumulative score for a specific line. The higher thescore, the greater the identified risk and likelihood that the productwill be put on import alert and detained at the border. Each line
receives a percentile rank based on all other lines screened over the
past 30 days.100
PREDICT does not assign risk based on specific countries where
the FDA carries out field assignments. However, a substantial
number of FDA import alerts are specific to a country or area. For
China, as of September 24, 2014, there were nine country-wide import alerts for particular products. According to Dr. Hickey, an exporter that has been placed under import alert usually stops sending products to the United States, because such an exporter is unwilling to meet the extensive requirements for readmission.101
In 2012–2013, Congress also passed two pieces of legislation thatsignificantly enhance the FDA’s legal authority and operational capability. The first is the Food and Drug Administration Safety andInnovation Act (FDASIA), signed into law on July 9, 2012. Under
this law, the FDA has the following rights:• To administratively detain drugs, meaning the FDA has theauthority to halt the movement of drugs while investigating
and determining the appropriate response. Products may also
be refused admission into the U.S. market, unless the importer
is able to demonstrate that the product is in compliance with
relevant laws and regulations. Dr. Hickey has argued that thisnew authority better enables the FDA to better prevent ‘‘port
shopping,’’ as well as to refuse exports from a Chinese manufacturing site that ‘‘delays, limits, or refuses inspection.’’ * 102• To make explicit that industry compliance with GMP standards includes managing upstream risks, which would also include inputs sourced from China. FDASIA also requires drug

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Port shopping refers to the practice of selecting ports that are understaffed or otherwise illequipped to conduct rigorous inspections.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00157

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

146

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

importers to register with the FDA, and adhere to Good Importer Practices (GIP). The FDA has indicated that it expects
to propose a GIP rule by April 2015, and finalize it by January
2017.103• To share confidential information with other foreign regulators; enter into agreements to recognize inspections by foreign regulators that are capable of conducting inspections thatmeet U.S. standards; and use the results of these foreign inspections as evidence of compliance with U.S. law.104• To collect user fees from industry to fund reviews of innovator
drugs, medical devices, generic drugs and bio-similar biologicalproducts.105 According to Dr. Hickey, these user fee acts havegreatly enhanced the FDA’s ability to carry out risk-based assessments.106
The Drug Quality and Security Act (DQSA), signed into law on
November 27, 2013, further supports the FDA’s mandate. Title IIof DQSA outlines critical steps to build an electronic, interoperable
system to identify and trace certain prescription drugs as they are
distributed in the United States. The new ‘‘track and trace’’ system
will enable verification of the legitimacy of the drug product identifier down to the package level, enhance detection and notificationof illegitimate products in the drug supply chain, and facilitate
faster recalls of drug products. Dr. Coukell explained that, four
years from now, every package of prescription drugs in the UnitedStates will have a unique serial number that can be checkedagainst a database. Faking a serial number requires far greater
skill than faking packaging.107
In spite of these legislative and regulatory improvements, unsafe
drugs are still entering the United States from China. Risk-based
surveillance represents an innovative step, but may not suffice tooffset the low frequency of inspections at the border and overseas.
A 2010 report by the Government Accountability Office reported
that the FDA inspected fewer than 11 percent of the plants on its
own list of high-priority sites.108 Moreover, according to Dr. Bate,the laboratory tests currently required by the FDA and U.S. Pharmacopeia are insufficient to uncover trace amounts of harmful residues. Until recently, so-called ‘‘rapid dye tests’’ were only able todetect products that contained no active ingredients, not ones that
contained inadequate levels of ingredients, which can be just as
harmful.109
Dietary supplements remain under-regulated as well. Mr. Bell
told the Commission that, among the 465 adulterated drugs andsupplements recalled in the United States between January 2004
and December 2012, over half were dietary supplements. His research demonstrates, however, that the FDA has done a poor job
taking dangerous supplements off the market.110
Actors at the local level in the United States also share theblame for lapses in drug safety. In its 2011 study ‘‘After Heparin:
Protecting Consumers from the Risks of Substandard and Counterfeit Drugs,’’ Pew Charitable Trusts found that many safety lapses
occur through the redistribution of drugs among small wholesalers,
national and regional wholesalers, and hospitals and pharmacies.111 Individual states retain the power to grant licenses to

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00158

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

147
intermediaries between manufacturers and retailers. In states
where regulation is lax, individuals with little or no pharmaceutical qualifications are able to set up drug wholesale businesses,
usually online. Some states previously were reluctant to implement‘‘e-pedigree’’ * systems, suggesting that nationwide adoption ofunique serial numbers in the coming years will not be easy.112
Industry self-regulation is on the increase, led by Rx360, a nonprofit consortium that includes the largest U.S. drug manufacturers and suppliers. The consortium is developing a shared audit program and disseminates risk information to its members.113 Evenso, Dr. Bate alleges that 90 percent of Chinese drug substancesbought by Western purchasers are only audited after purchase.
U.S. and European pharmaceutical companies are misinformed
about the identity of the manufacturing site of 39 percent of the
drug substances they purchase from China. A mere 6 percent of
suppliers in China provide impurity profiles † to their U.S. customers. U.S. companies frequently fail to verify the GMP certifications of new suppliers before entering into contracts, and background checks on suppliers-of-suppliers are even rarer.114 When asafety lapse does occur, companies may delay a recall out of fearthat it will damage their reputation, even though a delay can leadto heavier losses once the problem is exposed.115
Drug safety experts also question whether the right lessons havebeen learned from the heparin incident. As Dr. Coukell acknowledged:
Heparin was a wake-up: All of a sudden, we realized we
had risks that we weren’t thinking about, we weren’t awareof, we needed to make some changes. . . . So if that was thesort of level of awareness of branded pharma at that stage,
it’s reasonable to assume that there are companies that areless sophisticated, that are store brands, that have less skinin the game, that just have not taken those steps now, andhave frankly less incentive to do so.116
China’s Healthcare Challenges and Reforms
China’s Healthcare Market Potential
Alongside its role as a pharmaceutical exporter, China is also becoming a major healthcare market. China’s healthcare spending,public and private, amounted to $357 billion in 2011.117 That isstill far from the $2.8 trillion spent in the United States in 2012,118
but China could catch up with the U.S. market sooner than ex-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* An electronic pedigree is an e-document that provides data on the history of a particular
batch of a drug. It satisfies the requirement for a ’drug pedigree’ while using a convenient electronic form.
† Various regulatory authorities such as the International Conference on Harmonization(ICH), the U.S. FDA, and the Canadian Drug and Health Agency (CDHA) are emphasizing purity requirements and the identification of impurities in APIs. The various sources of impurity
in pharmaceutical products include reagents, heavy metals, ligands, catalysts, other materials
like filter aids, and charcoal, as well as degraded end products obtained during and after manufacturing of bulk drugs. The different pharmacopoeias such as the British Pharmacopoeia,
United States Pharmacopoeia, and Indian Pharmacopoeia are slowly incorporating limits to allowable levels of impurities present in APIs or formulations. Various methods are used to isolate
and characterize impurities in pharmaceuticals. Kavita Pilaniya et al., ‘‘Recent Trends in the
Impurity Profile of Pharmaceuticals,’’ Journal of Advanced Pharmaceutical Technology and Research 1:3 (July–September 2010): 302.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00159

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

148
pected. McKinsey & Company projects the country’s healthcare
spending to reach $1 trillion in 2020.119 Benjamin Shobert, ahealthcare consultant and member of the National Bureau of Asian
Research, forecasts China’s over-the-counter and branded genericmarket to expand from $23 billion in 2010 to $369 billion in 2020.
That would make China the second-largest pharmaceutical market
after the United States.120
China’s burgeoning healthcare market signals a transition to amature economy. China’s fertility rates have declined precipitously,
owing not only to urbanization and rising incomes, but also to thelasting effects of the One-Child Policy. Average Chinese are living
longer lives and are less prone than their grandparents to contract
infectious diseases.121 China’s healthcare system must now adjust
to an aging demographic, which entails treatment of chronic diseases and provision of long-term care. A 2013 study, for example,
showed that China in 2010 had more people living with Alzheimer’s disease than any other country—and twice as many casesof dementia as the World Health Organization (WHO) thought.122
Over the next two decades, the WHO predicts the number of noncommunicable diseases among Chinese over age 40 to rise substantially (see Table 3).123
Table 3:

Projected Cases of Non-Communicable Diseases in China,
2010–2030(Cases millions)Compound annual
growth rate

Myocardial infarction
StrokeCOPDs
Lung Cancer
Diabetes Mellitus
Total

2010

2020

2030

2010–2020

2020–2030

8.1
8.2
25.7
1.4
36.2

16.1
21.4
42.5
4.6
52.1

22.6
31.8
55.2
7.4
64.3

7.1%
10.1%
5.2%
12.6%
3.7%

3.4%
4.0%
2.6%
4.9%
2.1%

79.6

136.7

181.3

5.6%

2.9%

Source: Adapted from the World Bank, ‘‘Toward a Healthy and Harmonious Life in China’’(2011), p. 2.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Urbanization and rising incomes are also spurring China’s
healthcare sector. Just half of China’s population officially resides
in cities, and given that urban residents currently spend twice asmuch on healthcare as rural residents, health spending will probably increase along with urbanization. China’s economic growth isslowing but has created a middle-income class of some 300 million
people. Household consumption growth, though low as a share ofgross domestic product (GDP), is outpacing other large economies.
At the same time, the healthcare sector is still underdeveloped relative to wealthier countries. The ratio of healthcare spending to
GDP was 5.2 percent in 2013, compared to an Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average of 9.5
percent. As of 2012, China had 1.8 physicians per 1,000 people, afigure that ranged from 2 to 4.3 in OECD countries. Similarly,

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00160

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

149
there are only 3.7 hospital beds per 1,000 people—European Union
countries average greater than six.124
China’s policy priorities appear to be aligning around healthcare.
In 2009, the government released a long-awaited healthcare reformbill, the product of three years of deliberation by the senior party
leadership. The bill sets out five ambitious goals: to extend basic
government-subsidized health insurance; expand the population
health benefit package; strengthen primary care; control the priceof essential drugs at grassroots service providers; and reform government-owned hospitals.125 Dr. Huang estimated that the Chinese
government invested over $371 billion in healthcare between 2009
and 2012, which accounted for 5.7 percent of total fiscal spending.126 In China’s 2014 central government budget, healthcare isamong the fastest growing items, along with national defense andsocial security, and surpasses spending on science and technology.127 Mr. Hunter told the Commission that the government’s
extension of public health insurance, attaining 95 percent of China’s population in 2011, will help drive healthcare spending.128 At
the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, held in November
2013, the government offered further suggestions for healthcare reform.*
Systemic Challenges: Unaffordable and Low-Quality Care
China’s healthcare system still has many failings. One indicatorof the system’s own troubled health is the rapid rise in costs, whichhave consistently outpaced per capita income growth, making careless and less affordable. According to a 2008 estimate, the averagetreatment cost for an inpatient stay is equivalent to 60 percent ofChina’s annual per capita income. Another study found that rising
healthcare expenditures in the early years of the 21st century led
to the impoverishment of 67.5 million people.129 ‘‘Inaccessible andunaffordable healthcare’’ is perennially cited as a top concern in
China’s social surveys; 130 an October 2013 survey revealed thatsuch sentiments have not changed much since the recent healthcare reforms were implemented (see Figure 4). Many ordinary patients choose either to forego treatment or to resort to traditional
Chinese medicine, a cheaper alternative.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Important policy suggestions set out in the Third Plenum Decision include: (1) integrate
medical services across regions and rural and urban areas, especially at the grassroots level;(2) pay medical staff based on performance and skill, and allow physicians to practice in many
locations; (3) allow private providers to be incorporated as designated locations for medical insurance and give priority to non-profit medical institutions; (4) reform the method of paying for
medical insurance; (5) expand medical insurance to cover catastrophic diseases.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00161

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

150
Figure 4:

Public Opinion on Healthcare in China (October 2013)

Source: Horizon Research Consultancy Group, via Yanzhong Huang, ‘‘What Money Failed to
Buy: The Limits of China’s Healthcare Reform,’’ Council on Foreign Relations, March 4, 2014.

Figure 5:

Gross Savings Rates by Country

Source: World Bank.

C1S3Fig5.eps

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00162

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S3Fig4.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

High healthcare costs also damage China’s economy. Households
accumulate excessive savings to make up for rising costs, hampering growth (see Figure 5). As the workforce share of the population peaks and the ratio of retirees to workers increases, China
can ill afford to finance exorbitant healthcare costs. Chinese workers, many of them single children, are forced to support not only
themselves but also their dependents (see textbox, ‘‘China ‘Getting
Old before Getting Rich’ ’’). Stated Dr. Huang:

151
So this is what I call the schizophrenic situation the Chinese government has to face: On the one hand, they havethe incentive to lower the prices to rein in the rapid increase of healthcare costs. On the other hand, they havestrong incentives to promote the healthcare industry. Thatmeans high healthcare costs because they say, ‘‘well, healthcare spending is only [5] percent of total GDP, but theworld average is about 9 percent, so we still have a lot ofroom to improve.131
China ‘‘Getting Old before Getting Rich’’
China’s labor force is peaking and its ‘‘first demographic dividend’’ is ending. This may impact economic growth. Fewer workers will be forced to finance more dependents, while the government will have to divert more resources from capital spending(on items such as infrastructure) to current spending on healthcare. In a 2008 study of 40 countries, China is the only one inwhich retirees are funded almost entirely from labor income, due
to a shortage of public retirement funds and non-monetary assets.132
China’s life expectancy is primarily increasing among people
aged 60 or older, who contribute little to productivity gains in
the labor market. Due to the One-Child Policy, which was relaxed only recently,* many single adult children have to foot the
medical bills of their parents and grandparents (representativeof the ‘‘4–2–1’’ family structure). Changing social norms place additional strains on China’s healthcare market. Parents of migrants take care of their grandchildren in rural villages while
their children work in the cities. In return, migrants earn higher
wages and use surplus income to support their parents in oldage. This ‘‘implicit social contract,’’ however, is falling apart due
to the decline in filial piety values and the strains of the ‘‘4–2–1’’
family structure. Urbanization also weakens traditional problemsolving capacities in rural areas that facilitate care for the sick,elderly, and unemployed.133
Higher costs have not translated into better quality or efficiency
in delivering care. Academic studies show that, relative to Europe
and the United States, China’s hospitals have low rates of staff
productivity and are inefficient in terms of the time and cost required to cure illnesses. Smaller hospitals and local clinics have
low bed occupancy rates.134 China has more magnetic resonanceimaging (MRI) machines per million people than middle-income
countries like Thailand and Mexico; yet qualified staff is in short
supply, especially at lower-level facilities.135 While underproviding
basic services, doctors routinely induce demand among wealthy andwell-insured patients by over-prescribing expensive drugs andtreatments, and prolonging inpatient stays. According to a 2010 es-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* As of this year, China will allow families in urban areas to have two children if one parent
is a single child. Previously, both parents had to be single children to do this.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00163

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

152
timate, ‘‘supplier-induced demand’’ accounts for over 20 percent ofChina’s healthcare spending.* 136
Compounding subpar care at hospitals is deficient preventive
care. China’s urban residents on average consume more calorie-richdiets and engage in less physical activity than 30 years ago.137 According to the WHO, 61 percent of China’s adult males smoke.†
About one in every seven Chinese has high blood pressure (hypertension),138 and according to a nationwide survey released in September 2013, China accounts for one in three diabetes sufferers
globally.139 Based on a 2012 study by the U.S. National Institutesof Health, lung cancer accounts for a quarter of China’s cancer illnesses, with a much higher incidence than in the United States.140
Meanwhile, mining, industry, and traffic accidents persist—China
led the world with 275,983 traffic fatalities in 2010 (approximately
twice the per capita rate as the United States, which had 32,788
fatalities).141
Equally taxing on health is the state of the environment. Drinking water is rendered unsafe by manure runoff, chemical residues,
and other pollutants.142 According to an April 2013 study in a British medical journal, outdoor air pollution caused 1.2 million deaths
in China in 2010, nearly 40 percent of the global total. In a March2014 report, the World Bank projected that the environmental effects of urban sprawl will cost China $300 billion a year in premature deaths, birth defects, and other health-related problems.143
Where preventable illnesses do not result in death, they cause anincrease in disability-adjusted life-years, which reduces a person’s
ability to participate productively in society.
Infectious diseases in China have resurged as well. Stated Dr.
Eggleston: ‘‘The nature of disease in China has changed from a primary burden of infectious disease to a disease burden dominatedby chronic, non-communicable diseases . . . but with important lingering problems from endemic and reemerging infectious diseases
such as hepatitis (a primary cause of liver cancer), multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS.’’ 144 A new strain of avian influenza (H7N9) resulted in 132 infections and 44 deaths in thespring of 2013, primarily in China.145 Sexually transmitted diseases are spreading in border regions and major industrial centerswhere migrant laborers, female sex workers, and intravenous drug
use are common.146 Not least, the overuse of antibiotics in Chinese
hospitals has reduced antimicrobial effectiveness,‡ posing a threat
to global public health.147

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Supplier-induced demand is not unique to China. The medical scholar Milton Roemer first
proposed this hypothesis in 1961 from the observation that areas with greater hospital bed supply showed greater hospital use. The basic theory is that because doctors have more medical
knowledge than their patients, patients depend on their doctors for treatment decisions, anddoctors might exploit this situation by suggesting higher reimbursement procedures or by providing excessive care. A 1989 study, for example, demonstrated that Caesarean sections provided $500 more in income to physicians than vaginal delivery. Kim Beomsoo, ‘‘Do Doctors Induce Demand?’’ Pacific Economic Review 15:4 (October 2010): 554–555. For a discussion of thisproblem in the United States, see Craig L. Garthwaite, ‘‘The Doctor Might See You Now: The
Supply Side Effects of Public Health Insurance Expansions,’’ American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4:3 (2012): 190–215.
† This figure is based on adjusted prevalence estimates for WHO member states. World HealthOrganization, Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic (2013), p. 276.
‡ An antimicrobial is an agent that kills microorganisms or inhibits their growth.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00164

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

153
Accounting for the Problems in China’s Healthcare System
Why has China’s healthcare system underperformed in terms of
cost and delivery? Certainly, administering healthcare in a large
developing country is challenging. Experts also disagree on what
the ideal healthcare policy should look like. What is clear is that
China’s market reforms have not done enough to improve healthcare. Mao-era China (1949–1976) lacked modern medical infrastructure and qualified professionals, but basic care was affordable.148 From 1960 to 1980, China’s average life expectancy increased by 24 years, compared to a world average of 11 years.149
Since then, a series of misguided policies has slowed down progressin public health indicators and made the healthcare system resistant to meaningful reform.
The Government as Owner and Regulator
Private healthcare provision in China has moderately expanded
since the government introduced market-oriented reforms in the
1980s. Every third provider in China today is in private hands (either for-profit or non-profit). In December 2010, China enacted new
policies to encourage private investment in hospitals; for example,
the approval process for opening new joint venture hospitals wasshifted from central to provincial authorities.150 The official target
is for private hospitals to handle 20 percent of in-patient and outpatient traffic by 2015.151
Nonetheless, over 90 percent of China’s patient traffic in 2010
went through public hospitals (see Figure 6). Private providers in
China tend to be much smaller than public hospitals in terms of
total assets, staff, beds, and equipment, and deal mainly with specialized cases, like skin disease and sexually transmitted diseases,
rather than general acute cases.152
Figure 6:

Private vs. Public Hospitals: Share of Patient Traffic, 2010
(584 million hospital visits; 20,918 hospitals)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00165

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S3Fig6.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Source: Jing Ulrich et al., ‘‘Medicine for the Masses-China’s Healthcare Reform: Progress andFuture Steps,’’ J.P. Morgan Hands-On China Report (J.P. Morgan, October 10, 2011), p. 3.

154
Dr. Eggleston, citing field research she conducted in Chinese hospitals, said that private and public providers both suffer from policy distortions in the healthcare system. Privatization in and of
itself is not the solution.* 153 What is clear is that the playing field
is not level; private providers confront a series of regulatory hurdles. Because they tend to be ranked lower in China’s hospital accreditation system—over which local governments have considerable discretion—private providers have difficulty attracting thebest doctors.† Since doctors are licensed to work only at one hospital, they prefer larger public providers, which offer greater incentives for career progression, as well as welfare benefits. Private
providers frequently resort to hiring retired healthcare workers,
which may undermine their service quality and reputation.154 Patients are discouraged from seeking private care because manysuch providers are not under contract with government insurers.155
Meanwhile, the 2009 healthcare reforms have done little to upgrade the public healthcare bureaucracy. Dr. Eggleston and her colleagues note that ‘‘Ministry of Health, military, and [state-owned]
enterprise hospitals all provide similar services, increasing competition but also contributing to excess capacity and lack of coordinated care.’’ 156 The MOH exercises conflicting roles as regulator,
manager, owner, and financier of state-owned healthcare providers.157 According to Dr. Huang, MOH opposition was a key reason why pro-market measures were watered down in China’s 2009
healthcare bill.158 Beyond the MOH, regulation is divided into
silos. For example, the CFDA issues drug approvals, but drug pricing authority rests with the NDRC, China’s premier industrial
planning body. Health insurance is administered separately by the
MOH for rural areas and the Ministry of Human Resources & Social Security for urban areas.159
Insurance Coverage and the Referral System
Before market reform, rural cooperatives (under the Cooperative
Medical Scheme, or CMS) and urban work units bore most healthcare costs. Although this system extended privileges to party cadres and urban workers, most Chinese had access to basic treatment
and preventive care. Market reforms, however, gradually dissolved
cooperatives and work units, while failing to account for migrant
workers who fell through the cracks. The result was a rapid in-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* A study carried out by Dr. Eggleston and her colleagues in Guangdong, one of China’s
wealthiest provinces, shows that private providers account for a disproportionate share of outpatient surgery, a niche market for patients seeking care at bargain prices. The same
Guangdong study also finds that mortality rates—a common metric of quality—do not statistically differ between government and non-government hospitals of similar size, accreditationlevel, and patient mix. The scholars conclude that ‘‘changes in ownership type alone are unlikely
to dramatically improve or harm overall quality.’’ Karen Eggleston et al., ‘‘Comparing Public andPrivate Hospitals in China: Evidence from Guangdong,’’ BMC Health Services Research 10:76(2010): 1–11.
† According to Dr. Eggleston: ‘‘Chinese hospital accreditation began in 1989 with a system established by the Ministry of Health. This system defines three hospital grades (3, 2, and 1)
based on infrastructure and administrative level and three within-grade levels (A, B, and C)
based on evaluation by a committee established by the local health bureau. Since 2005, the hospital accreditation system rates hospitals according to a wider range of criteria, including ‘scientific management,’ patient safety, and service quality, and allows for rewards (e.g., government budgetary subsidies) and sanctions (e.g., fines or risk of closure) . . . The national accreditation guidelines give local governments considerable discretion in implementation, which limits
comparability across regions. Many provinces do not include the private sector, and few include[township health centers] and village clinics.’’ Karen Eggleston et al., ‘‘Health Service Delivery
in China: A Literature Review,’’ Health Economics 17 (2008): 160.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00166

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

155
crease in out-of-pocket spending, which skewed delivery toward
urban areas, the wealthy, and party cadres.* 160
Since the 1990s, the government has taken measures to improvecoverage, primarily through government-run insurance programs.
In 1998, the government introduced basic medical insurance forurban employees (UEBMI), based on payroll taxes paid by the employer and employee. The proceeds were divided into individual accounts for outpatient care and pooled risk accounts for inpatientand catastrophic needs. This was followed in 2004 by the introduction of a new CMS (NCMS) for rural residents, based on a small
premium that is matched by the central and local government. A
similar system of basic medical insurance was introduced for urban
residents (URBMI) in 2007.161 Insurance coverage was ratcheted
up under the 2009 healthcare spending plan. While the majority ofChinese was uninsured before 2008, about 95 percent are coveredby government insurance plans today. The bulk is enrolled in therural NCMS, which counted nearly a billion members by 2010.162
Expanded coverage is reflected as well in the value of total healthinsurance premiums, which grew from virtually zero in the year
2000 to over RMB 100 billion (about $17 billion) last year (see Figure 7).
Figure 7:

Total Health Insurance Premiums in China(current RMB billions)

Source: China Insurance Regulatory Commission, via CEIC.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00167

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S3Fig7.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Said Dr. Huang: ‘‘At the provincial level, the provincial leaders certainly have access to good
healthcare for free. They have the Provincial People’s Hospitals for each province. In some provinces, they also have the military hospitals that provide similar service . . . Despite thehealthcare reform, there’s still a percentage of basically what we call ‘cadres,’ the government
officials [that] can access healthcare for free . . . There may be a couple million, eight million
or so, of the government officials. They have free access to healthcare. But there’s also a hierarchy in terms of what kind of services you have free access to.’’ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China
Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.

156
Relative to other parts of the reform agenda, insurance coverage
has had moderate success in increasing access and reducing costs.
The share of private spending on healthcare has declined sharply,
from a peak of 60 percent in 2001 to 35 percent in 2011. Reimbursement rates for inpatient treatment expenses increased from50 percent in 2008 to 75 percent in 2013.163 City dwellers a decadeago spent four times as much on healthcare as their rural counterparts; in 2012, they spent only twice as much (see Figure 8).* At
the National People’s Congress meetings in March 2014, Premier
Li Keqiang announced that the annual government subsidy forbasic medical insurance premiums for the NCMS and URBMI
would be raised again to RMB 320 ($52) per capita, from RMB 120($20) in 2010.164
Figure 8:

Per Capita Healthcare Spending in China(in RMB)

Note: RMB in current prices.
Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, via CEIC data.

However, insurance expansion has not been a panacea. Said Dr.
Huang:The problem is that [the official coverage rate] includes 200
million migrant workers who are nominally covered in the
countryside, but because they live and they work in the cities, they actually are not covered because their health insurance schemes so far are not portable. . . . If you[dis]count these 200 million migrant workers, the actual
coverage rate is about 87 percent.165
Insurance coverage is also shallow. According to Dr. Eggleston,
the NCMS and URBMI, which are voluntary government-sub-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00168

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S3Fig8.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Convergence between rural and urban spending power generally indicates a decline in ruralurban- inequality. In the healthcare sector, however, rural spending may be attributed to induced demand or high costs, so that convergence with urban spending levels is not necessarily
a measure of success.

157
sidized programs, have lower premiums and less generous benefit
packages than the mandatory and longer-standing insurance programs for urban employees and government workers. Some provinces are merging the NCMS and URBMI to widen risk poolingand thereby deepen benefit packages, but these reforms are at an
early stage.166 At present, according to Dr. Huang, most benefit
packages fail to cover dental care and many of the effective medicines for treating non-communicable diseases.167
Paradoxically, the expansion of insurance coverage has also compelled patients to seek too much inpatient care. The hospital bed
utilization rate surged from 36 percent in 2003 to 88 percent in2011, worsening the overcrowding at large hospitals.168 A root
cause is the absence of a functioning referral system. Before market reform, Communist China’s healthcare system was built on athree-tiered hierarchy of government-run providers,* with separate
systems for urban and rural areas. Local clinics, which focused on
preventive care, were the first resort for the sick, who could only
visit larger hospitals with an official doctor’s referral. Although thebasic three-tier system is still in place, patients can now choose toforego local providers in favor of larger hospitals, as long as they
can afford the cost. This has reduced the use, quality, and reputation of local clinics.†
The bias of patients toward larger hospitals has also affected
government efforts to build out local clinics. In the government’s
2009–2011 healthcare budget, 71 percent of supplier-side spending
went toward upgrading or constructing medical facilities, primarily
in rural areas. The result was 2,000 new county hospitals (China
has 2,859 counties); 29,000 new and 5,000 upgraded township hospitals; and thousands of clinics.169 According to Dr. Huang, ‘‘thecounty hospital is extremely crowded, but at the township healthcenter you stay an entire day and won’t see that many people actually seeking care . . . despite the fact that the government has invested billions of dollars trying to strengthen the grassroots level
healthcare institutions.’’ 170
Financing and Payment of Providers
On the supply-side of the healthcare sector, market reforms led
to changes in the way China’s providers are financed and paid. In
the prereform period, central government funding, particularly inurban areas, was the primary source of provider income. Beginningin the 1980s, however, decentralization forced local governments toshoulder most of the funding burden, widening disparities between
rich and poor regions. Overall subsidies were reduced as well; in
2009, the government health budget accounted for less than 10 percent of the actual costs of hospitals. The smaller pot of government
funding was heavily skewed toward larger hospitals, even though

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* In rural areas, the hierarchy is village clinics (tier-1), township health centers (tier-2), andcounty hospitals (tier-3). In urban areas, the hierarchy is urban health centers (tier-1), district
hospitals (tier-2), and city hospitals (tier-3).
† Researchers from Stanford University conducted a study of 44 township health centers in2005 to 2008. They found that rural health insurance ‘‘did not increase the overall number ofpatients served or the likelihood that a sick person would seek care at a township center.’’ Kimberly S. Babiarz et al., ‘‘China’s New Cooperative Medical Scheme Improved Finances of Township Health Centers But Not the Number of Patients Served,’’ Health Affairs 31:5 (2012): 1065;
Karen Eggleston et al., ‘‘Health Service Delivery in China: A Literature Review,’’ Health Economics 17 (2008): 151.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00169

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

158

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

these facilities are less cost effective and prevention oriented than
primary care units.171
While forced to generate their own revenue, healthcare providers
in China have been squeezed by distorted fee schedules and pricecontrols. The government, on one hand, has forced providers tooffer essential treatments and drugs at below marginal cost; on theother hand, it has deregulated prices for costlier treatments andpermitted hospitals. Hospitals not only prescribe their own drugs,
but also charge markups on the drugs they sell. Providers thus
have a perverse incentive to undersupply basic drugs and services,and oversupply costlier ones. Alternatively, they can raise thequantity of drugs and services provided to make up for the low
prices of basic services. A 2010 study found that the average Chinese hospital depends on drug sales for 45 percent of its revenue,
and for every four doctors employs one pharmacist. As Dr. Eggleston has noted, once patients choose to receive treatment at a certain provider, they have little choice about what goods and services
they will consume, and rely on doctors to determine what is rightfor them.172 Over time, patients have come to expect drug prescriptions as part of their treatment. According to a 2008 study, China’s
spending on medicines accounts for 40 percent of total health expenditure, compared to 16 percent in OECD countries.’’ 173
A further perverse incentive has to do with how government-run
insurers pay providers. Because Chinese insurers use a ‘‘fee-forservices’’ system without adequate safeguards, providers are able tocharge excessive fees retroactively, based on services rendered. Insurers in most advanced economies adopt sophisticated managed
care systems to contain costs, such as diagnostic-related groups(pay providers based on prospective costs for a given treatment);
capitation (pays providers a set amount for each enrolled person
assigned to them, whether or not that person seeks care); or a fixedpool of funds (pay providers a fixed sum based on average caseload, case mix, and other criteria).174
Reforms have done little to alter costly incentives. Although government funding for healthcare has increased, only a small shareof these funds has gone toward subsidizing the day-to-day operations of hospitals. Local governments, which contributed somethree-quarters of the $371 billion in investments in 2009–2012,
have become reluctant to pick up the tab, especially in poor regionsthat are short of revenue. Vague directives from Beijing, which
grant local authorities autonomy to experiment with healthcare reforms, have resulted in uneven implementation and regulatory uncertainty. Many providers pocket the funds from the government
and use them as ‘‘seed money’’ to buy expensive equipment andramp up capacity to offer specialized services. Recent data indicates that hospital revenue still depends heavily on drug revenue
and expensive treatments.175 Although pilot programs have triedout sophisticated payment systems, fee-for-services remains thenorm.176
The government is attempting to control drug prices by establishing an essential drugs formulary (the National Essential Drugs
List, EDL) and forbidding markups. But this strategy has backfired. Government subsidies meant to compensate for the loss indrug revenue have been grossly insufficient, because policymakers

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00170

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

159
underestimated the hospitals’ original markup rates, which inmany cases exceeded the legal rate. Larger hospitals have usedtheir political leverage to continue charging markups for lucrative
drugs, while shirking MOH standards for prescribing a certain volume of essential drugs. The brunt of the reform has thus fallen on
the already unpopular grassroots providers, who have responded to
the no-markup policy by reducing their drug inventories, reinforcing the incentive of patients to seek care at larger providers.177
According to Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, a China healthcare expert at
Albright Stonebridge Group, forcing down drug prices has also
caused shortages in drug production for domestic consumption.
Chinese drug makers, many of them small private firms, do not see
why they should produce drugs that offer scant profits.178
The Medical Profession
A key reason why doctors overprescribe drugs and treatments isthat they earn low base salaries. Doctors rely on fee-based revenue,
and in many cases, are rewarded by hospital administrators basedon the revenues they bring in rather than the efficacy of treatment.
Bribes are another form of income. Said Ms. Boynton: ‘‘Patients
who can afford bribery can get better care.’’ 179
Only a small share of added government spending has gone toward raising medical workers’ salaries. Hospital administrators, inturn, prefer to invest in physical assets, such as new machines.
Since doctors cannot form independent unions, they lack bargaining power. Normally, they are licensed to work in just one hospital. According to Dr. Eggleston, the government hospital has toconsent if its physician is going to go practice in a private hospital,‘‘but then the government hospital manager doesn’t necessarily
have the incentive to let their best doctors do that.’’ 180
Doctors in China are increasingly confronted by patients who are
upset about the high cost and poor quality of care. According to Dr.
Eggleston, patients have begun to disregard advice for taking
drugs, assuming that profit-seeking is distorting the doctor’s judgment.181 Worse yet, angry patients have resorted to violence. Murray Scott Tanner, a researcher at the Center for Naval Analysis,
told the Commission that China’s ‘‘medical disturbance’’ incidents,
in which patients or their family members ‘‘violently beat, threaten, or curse medical personnel,’’ increased from 10,248 in 2006 to
17,243 in 2010, and have ‘‘attracted the attention of party leadersand law enforcement officials.’’ * 182 In 2006, the last year that
MOH published statistics on hospital violence, attacks by patientsor their relatives injured some 5,500 medical workers.183 The government in March 2014 passed a new regulation requiring police,rather than in-house security services, to maintain the order andsafety of hospitals.184
Low pay, limited mobility, and difficult work conditions have reduced the supply of good doctors. According to a prominent epidemiologist who has done fieldwork in China, the medical profession is looked down upon by aspiring professionals.185 As Mr.
Shobert observed, ‘‘A doctor that graduates in Beijing for the first
couple of years will make less money than if he were driving a taxi-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For more information, see Chapter 2, Section 3, ‘‘China’s Domestic Stability.’’

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00171

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

160
cab.’’ 186 According to Dr. Huang, the competitiveness of entering
medical studies in China is considerably lower than in the UnitedStates, because the country’s best minds find better job prospects
elsewhere. The quality of medical education is also inferior: ‘‘If you
meet someone from China who claims that he’s an M.D., don’t
think that it’s the same M.D. you find here in the U.S. because
usually these are the people who . . . receive five years of medical
training, basically on the undergraduate level.’’ 187
Young Chinese who graduate with a medical degree are reluctant
to work in the countryside, especially at the township and village
levels. As part of its effort to improve primary care, the government is launching a number of pilot programs to incentivize physicians from large hospitals to practice in local clinics. However,since physicians earn their main income from fees instead of salaries, working with poorer patients in under-used local clinics is notvery attractive. According to Ms. Boynton, even in cities, doctors
are unhappy, and are looking to either move abroad if they havethe qualifications or switch to the hospital administrator side of thesystem.188
Market Access for U.S. Medical Goods and Services
Why U.S. Companies Do Business in China’s Healthcare Sector

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Major U.S. companies are cognizant of the problems in China’s
healthcare system. And yet, the China market is now central to
U.S. business strategy. Biopharmaceutical products represent a
growing net export from the United States to China, increasing by
28 percent every year for the last ten years to $1.4 billion in
2013.189 Pfizer, the largest U.S. pharmaceutical company, claims it
is ‘‘the top multinational R&D-based biopharmaceutical company inChina.’’ Its China subsidiary has cumulative investments of $1 billion; business operations in over 300 Chinese cities; four state-ofthe-art manufacturing facilities; and over 9,000 employees (business, R&D, production and other areas).190 Mr. Hunter, speaking
on behalf of PhRMA’s member companies, said he expects his members’ presence in China to ‘‘only strengthen in time.’’ This presence
is no longer limited to production and sales: International drugmakers are now bringing as much as $8 billion per year in R&D
investment to China.191 United Family Healthcare, the healthcare
services division of the U.S. company Chindex International Inc., is
China’s largest foreign-invested healthcare provider.192
A variety of factors explain this turn to the China market. As
Mr. Shobert observed, ‘‘[China] is no longer just an alternative geography where you can find a lower-cost supply partner. It’s also
somewhere you can sell into.’’ 193 China’s healthcare boom is also
occurring at a time when mature markets are losing luster. After
decades of escalating costs, healthcare providers in Europe, Japan,
and the United States are under pressure to make care affordable.
Governments and households, still hurting from the 2009 financial
crisis, are eager to reduce their debt burdens by cutting the costof healthcare goods and services. In parallel, there has been a precipitous decline in pharmaceutical R&D productivity since the1980s.194 According to Bain & Company, pharmaceutical companies

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00172

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

161
will lose more than $100 billion in patent protection by 2015, as
key patents expire.195
U.S. companies could turn to other developing markets, but mostare smaller and present their own regulatory challenges. Mr. Hunter argued that China is faring better than India: ‘‘People havetalked . . . about the challenges to the Chinese system, but if you
were just to turn a little bit farther to the West, you’d find a country of a similar size that is vastly worse off.’’ India spends only 1.5
percent of GDP on healthcare. Because most Indians are uninsured, at least 70 percent of spending is out of pocket. Rural residents barely have access to care. All told, China’s healthcare sector‘‘is decades or at least a decade ahead.’’ 196 An additional advantage
of operating in China is that it has a large aging population compared with other emerging markets.
Witnesses told the Commission that the risk of intellectual property (IP) theft is not sufficient reason to avoid the China market.
Mr. Hunter noted that India has pursued an aggressive policy tomarket generic drugs and rewrite the World Trade Organization’s
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS). Although patented drugs only account for 5 percent of the Chinese market, the figure is less than 1 percent inIndia.* China also helps U.S. pharmaceutical companies recoup
R&D costs. Said Mr. Hunter: ‘‘If you don’t take your product to amarket, you don’t work the patent in a market, and somebody else
can use it. . . . It’s either you use it or lose it.’’ As for why U.S. drugmakers would engage in R&D in China despite the risk of losing
IP, Mr. Hunter pointed to China’s large pool of well-qualified scientists, and to the need to adapt U.S. drugs to Asia’s patient profiles.197
Ralph Ives, executive vice president for global strategy and analysis at AdvaMed, acknowledged that IP theft is a concern in the
medical device segment as well, especially when counterfeits do not
perform like the original and put patient safety at risk. Yet suchrisks are mitigated by the innovation model of the medical device
industry, which is different from pharmaceuticals. New medical devices come out about every 18 months, which reduces the incentive
for counterfeit, since the fakes quickly become outdated. Higher
value-added devices (e.g., implants) are usually sold in China
through business-to-business transactions. That allows device makers to develop a direct relationship with doctors at hospitals, whothemselves have an intrinsic interest in buying high-quality devices
that are safe for their patients.198
Closer analysis of market access issues, however, indicates that
U.S. companies are incurring substantial risks by operating in
China. Said Mr. Shobert:
In my [consulting] practice, we work pretty hard to get people to say no [to entering China], and that’s not because
we’re fundamentally hostile to China, but simply [because]

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Stated Mr. Hunter: ‘‘India has had for some time a strong generics industry, and when it
came time to implement its WTO obligations with TRIPS, the generics industry was very influential in the final drafting of the legislation that was passed in 2005, and it includes a seriesof provisions that undercut those commitments. We’ve seen in the case of India over the past
two years either the disallowance or the attack in one form or another on the patents on some
15 products of which there are only 45 patented products in the market.’’

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00173

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

162
we want any new entrant to China to understand at themost basic level within their organization—and this goes
all the way to the top, especially when you’re talking aboutcompliance risk—selling into the healthcare economy in
China is inherently a political act.199
China’s Medical Services Market
In contrast to drug and device makers, U.S. healthcare providers have yet to penetrate the Chinese market on a significant
scale. They currently focus on delivering premium care to
wealthy and privately insured patients in tier-1 cities like
Shanghai and Shenzhen. But China’s need for high-tech facilities, as well as user-friendly spaces for the elderly, is raising demand for U.S. healthcare services. Given the current price pressures on drug makers, Bain & Company forecasts that hospitals
will account for 40 percent of healthcare profit growth in China
through 2020.200 Less than 2 percent of China’s senior population currently uses institution-based care, but more than 10
percent are willing to receive care in institutions.201
Some promising projects are in progress. Medical device manufacturers across the world are vertically integrating into aftersales services, sometimes through in-house clinics. The U.S. company Chindex, for example, operates healthcare facilities across
China, and also produces medical devices used in those facilities.202 A Harvard-affiliated U.S. hospital, Brigham & Women’s,
is reportedly exploring the ‘‘possibility of collaborating’’ with
Evergrande Real Estate Group Ltd., a Chinese real estate company, to build a state-of-the-art hospital in China.203 In addition,
the U.S. firm Henningson, Durham & Richardson signed anagreement with a Chinese company to jointly supply architectural planning and concept design for the proposed Beijing International Medical Center, a state-invested facility that aspires tobecome the largest healthcare education and research center inthe world.204

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Premier Li has also hinted that China will permit more ‘‘nongovernmental capital’’ into the healthcare sector. In August
2014, the Ministry of Commerce and the National Health andFamily Planning Commission announced a pilot program thatwill allow foreign investors in some parts of the country to set up
new hospitals. The program will apply to Beijing, Tianjin, andShanghai municipalities, as well as to the provinces of Jiangsu,
Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. That followed a decision in
July to let the German hospital operator Artemed Group establish China’s first hospital fully funded by foreign capital, basedin the Shanghai Free Trade Zone.205

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00174

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

163
China’s Medical Services Market—Continued
Despite these advances, it is uncertain whether foreign investors will be permitted to make full acquisitions of China’s public
hospitals. It may also prove difficult for U.S. companies to expand beyond the premium segment in the largest cities, if efforts
to rein in healthcare costs put pressure on pricing and give preference to cheaper local providers. U.S.-style institution-based elderly care is too expensive for the mass of retirees and has been
criticized by those who think the elderly should be cared for by
their children, or at the very least receive community-basedcare.206
Corruption in the Chinese Healthcare System

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The potential risks of operating in China were on display lastyear, when Chinese authorities began looking into allegations thatthe British drug maker GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) had funneledmoney through a local travel agency to pay bribes to doctors in return for prescribing its drugs. While the legal outcome dragged on,
GSK reported that its third-quarter 2013 China sales fell 61 percent.207 In September 2014, a secret one-day trial was held in a
Chinese court to adjudicate the case. GSK was fined nearly $500
million, the highest fine on record against a foreign company. According to Xinhua, China’s official news agency, the court also sentenced GSK’s British former country manager and four other company managers to prison terms of up to four years. It suspended
the sentences, however, allowing the defendants to avoid incarceration if they did not engage in further wrongdoing. GSK said in astatement that it ‘‘fully accepts the facts and evidence of the investigation, and the verdict of the Chinese judicial authorities.’’ 208
Other companies were targeted on bribery charges as well. The
drug makers Sanofi (France), Bayer (Germany), AstraZeneca(United Kingdom—Sweden), and Eli Lilly and Company (UnitedStates), all reported visits from authorities to their China offices inAugust and September of 2013. Sanofi was accused of bribing over
500 Chinese doctors with $277,600 in illicit payments.209 Nu Skin
Enterprises, a listed U.S. company that develops personal careproducts and dietary supplements, was charged in January 2014
with operating an illegal pyramid scheme. The allegations werefirst lodged by The People’s Daily, China’s Party-run newspaper,
which also accused Nu Skin of using direct-marketing methods‘‘akin to brainwashing.’’ Following publication of the report, China’s
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) launched
an investigation.210
If a U.S. company had acted the way GSK did, it would likely
have violated the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, inviting substantial penalties in U.S. federal courts. In Ms. Boynton’s opinion,
the GSK case also signaled a sincere effort by the Chinese government to rein in escalating healthcare costs. The investigations put
many foreign pharmaceutical companies in the spotlight but were
not exclusively antiforeign. China National Pharmaceutical Group

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00175

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

164
Corporation (Sinopharm Group), China’s largest state-owned drug
distributor, was also targeted.211
Mr. Shobert, however, drew a negative conclusion from the GSK
case. Although GSK did what it was accused of doing, the argument that the company behaved unethically is ‘‘convenient but notentirely accurate.’’ He argued that bribery is a ‘‘reality of doing
business’’ in China’s healthcare sector:
You pay this money to your doctor to be seen, and you paythat money to see a specialist, and you pay that money tojump to the front of the line. And you pay that money toget drugs that actually are high quality. Behind the scenes
the same type of red envelope payments takes place between
pharmaceutical sales representatives, dealers, [and] hospital administrators.212
Mr. Shobert further claimed that the GSK case is emblematic of
aggressive tactics being taken by the Chinese government against
foreign companies. The government not only seeks to benefit domestic companies, but also to promote the public perception that it
is combating the escalation in healthcare costs. In 2012, the NDRC
investigated four drug classes comprising over 500 different drugs,
after which prices dropped by 17 percent. GSK reacted to the allegations in its case by agreeing to reduce its drug prices, as otherforeign companies have done in response to the antimonopoly
law.213
These actions reflect the Chinese government’s aggressive andprejudicial use of antitrust litigation. China’s antimonopoly law,enacted in August 2007, is applied by the NDRC, the SAIC, andthe Ministry of Commerce to hold companies accountable for anticompetitive agreements, abuse of a dominant position, or mergers
that would lead to a dominant position. The law also calls for
China to establish a review process to screen inward investment fornational security implications.214 The U.S. Trade Representative
has complained that, even though the assets of state-owned enterprises account for 42 percent of the total assets of Chinese industrial enterprises, the market position of state-owned enterprises
has been strengthened through administrative mergers that may
not have been subject to review under the new antimonopoly law.
At the same time, the law has been used as a pretext to block foreign investors, shielding selected Chinese domestic enterprises,
even inefficient or monopolistic enterprises, from foreign competition.215 The law has been applied with greater intensity in 2014,
most recently against foreign automotive manufacturers.216
Technology Transfer and Clinical Trials

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Foreign drug makers are setting up state-of-the-art R&D facilities in China. This trend has coincided with government policies tospur innovation in the life sciences. In 2008, the Chinese government unveiled the New Drug Creation and Development Program,creating 20 incubator sites for life science innovation. The 12thFive-Year Plan (2011–2015) mandates that 4 percent of the country’s GDP be derived specifically from the life science sector by
2015, and sets aside $10 billion in funding. Said Mr. Shobert: ‘‘As

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00176

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

165

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

a result of China’s goals, American companies have found they now
must begin to allocate funding towards R&D directed specifically atbench science, product development and clinical trials completed in
China.’’ One example is Merck and Co.’s late 2011 announcementthat it would be spending $1.5 billion to improve its R&D capacity
in China. Mr. Shobert argued that, just as China has conditioned
market access on technology transfer in the renewable energy
equipment sector, it is now doing so in life sciences, the next
emerging industry.217
In the near term, China is not expected to compete as a drug innovator. Only 9 percent of domestic pharmaceutical sales are attributed to non-generic brands. At $150 billion, China’s spendingon drug R&D is only about one-third that of the United States.218
Mr. Hunter told the Commission that his members are less concerned about China’s state-led innovation efforts. He argued that
it will be difficult for China to imitate the U.S. innovation system,
which combines robust IP protection with synergistic relationships
among the National Institutes of Health, U.S. universities, andpharmaceutical manufacturers. China’s efforts to control drug pricing could also discourage capital-intensive drug innovation, andwould have to be offset by substantial government subsidies. To theextent that China is innovating, it is doing so via its private sector;
for example, the Chinese drug maker Tasly Phar. International Co.
Ltd. has a cardiovascular product that is in phase III clinical trials
in the United States.219
Nonetheless, the Chinese government appears to be acquiring
data from U.S. companies in ways that violate its WTO commitments. At the 2012 JCCT talks, China agreed to ‘‘define new chemical entities in a manner consistent with international research anddevelopment practices in order to ensure regulatory data of pharmaceutical products are protected against unfair commercial use
and unauthorized disclosure.’’ 220 The impetus for this agreement
stemmed from complaints that China is not providing six years ofdata protection to U.S. patent drugs, as is set forth in its WTO
commitments. This problem is directly attributable to China’s StateIntellectual Property Office (SIPO), which uses a poorly definedphrase, ‘‘new chemical entity,’’ that has allowed Chinese pharmaceutical manufacturers to receive approval from the CFDA before
the six-year period of protection that China’s IP laws establish.221
The U.S. Trade Representative has also expressed concern with
SIPO’s interpretation of Article 26.3 and related provisions of China’s Patent Law, which govern information disclosure requirementsfor pharmaceutical patent applications. SIPO: (1) requires the disclosure of more information than that sought by its counterparts in
the United States; (2) requires all of this information be disclosed
at the time of application, instead of permitting supplemental disclosure filings under appropriate circumstances; and (3) has retroactively applied the new standards in Article 26.3 to invalidate
some older patents.222
A related concern is China’s onerous clinical trial process. It
takes an average of eight years for an existing U.S. patented drug
to be re-patented in China, and therefore, to reach Chinese patients who could already be benefiting from innovative drugs available in the United States. For drugs that have a patent life of

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00177

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

166
around 15 years, this delay can substantially affect a drug maker’s
ability to recoup R&D costs. The Chinese government fails to compensate this loss by extending periods of market exclusivity. These
delays are also damaging to China. For example, in the case of cancer, terminally ill patients may be denied access to state-of-the-art
medications from the United States. Slow domestic clinical trials
also hamper China’s ability to participate in global R&D.223
Rather than simply registering a clinical trial with the government, U.S. drug makers must first apply for permission. This canbe a drawn-out process, due to staffing limitations at the CFDA.
Once clinical trials begin, they undergo the same process as a full
approval; in contrast to most major economies that market U.S.
drugs, China does not make adequate use of clinical trial data
available for the same drug from the FDA.224 Chinese regulators
have also been holding up or invalidating U.S. pharmaceutical patents by charging that the application contains insufficient information, without allowing companies to supplement information after
the initial filing. At the 2013 JCCT talks, China ‘‘affirmed’’ that it
would end this practice, and that it would ‘‘ensure that pharmaceutical inventions receive patent protection during examinations
and re-examinations and before China’s courts.’’ 225
According to Mr. Ives, clinical trials can delay the release ofsome U.S.-origin medical devices in China. FDA-approved products
require re-approval by Chinese regulators, and the device has to beapproved first by the FDA before it can begin the registration process in China. These regulatory hurdles could increase substantially
under China’s proposed amendment to the Medical Device Law, released in March 2014. The amendment could impose hundreds of
new requirements on foreign device makers, including indigenous
standards for serial number tracking.226
Distribution, Pricing, and Reimbursement
Once a U.S. drug or device hits the Chinese market, it faces further hurdles. To lower the cost of drugs, the MOH introduced a National Reimbursement Drug List (NRDL) in 2004, which designated
1,027 Western drugs eligible for reimbursement from state-run insurers and to be given preference by state-run hospitals.* In 2009,
the same year that China greatly expanded health insurance coverage, an updated NRDL was published and supplemented by the
Essential Drug List (EDL), a shorter compendium of generic drugs
to be sold by grassroots providers at no markup.
The use of these lists has put U.S. drug makers in an uncomfortable position. While pricing and reimbursement lists are typically
updated at least on an annual basis around the world, in China,
the last update was in 2009. China’s own laws dictate that updates
should occur every two years. Effectively, all the U.S. drugs thathave entered the market since then have not been eligible for reimbursement. Foreign drugs not on the lists can achieve moderate
success in China, particularly for advanced treatments. Reimbursements can be negotiated individually with providers. But U.S. drugmakers like Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and Merck derive signifi-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* These numbers exclude the traditional Chinese medicine products that account for over halfof the NRDL.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00178

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

167
cant sales from drugs that are on the lists.227 The drug list policy
also harms Chinese patients who, in addition to not enjoying timely
access to the latest drugs, may not get adequate reimbursement forthem.
A revised NRDL, due out in 2014, could place additional foreign
drugs to the list. U.S. drug makers, however, will be forced to participate in reimbursement drug bidding, an opaque process thatvaries by region and often favors the lowest bidder, while giving
less consideration to quality or to the costs incurred in developing
and producing the drug.228
Widespread state ownership of pharmacies and providers has
further hindered the introduction and distribution of U.S. products.
Small clinics, for instance, are expected to sell only the essential
drugs on the EDL, excluding foreign drugs deemed ‘‘non-essential.’’According to Marc de Garidel, CEO of French drug maker Ipsen,
doctors at public hospitals can be ‘‘paid by the state’’ to refuse foreign drug makers’ sales representatives.229 In light of these risks,
foreign drug makers have come to rely heavily on local pharmaceutical distributors to navigate the process. Getting these companies involved, however, siphons off profits that could be pocketedby the drug makers themselves. Conflict of interest is magnified in
the case of Sinopharm Group, a Hong Kong-listed, central stateowned enterprise that distributes medicines and runs retail pharmacy chains, but also researches, develops, and manufactures its
own medicines.230
The medical device sector faces a series of regulatory hurdles aswell. The Chinese government has required hospitals and clinics toacquire medical devices at the provincial level. Foreign medical devices are frequently subject to price ceilings or are prevented fromcompeting in local tendering.231 U.S. government and industry representatives have opposed these practices since they were first instituted by the NDRC in 2006. Although China at the 2012 JCCT
talks vaguely committed to ‘‘taking into account comments from theUnited States on this issue,’’ its amended Medical Device Law, released this year, appears to make matters worse. Said Mr. Ives:
It is expected that the revision to this law will impact all
aspects of China’s regulatory system (clinical trials, testing,inspections, evaluations, re-registration, post-market surveillance, etc.). We have already seen more than 20 new requirements with significant impact to our industry over the
past year, and expect to see hundreds more as the revision
is implemented.232

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Of particular concern to the device industry is China’s implementation of Unique Device Identifiers (UDI), a bar code that will be
required on all medical technology products. The ostensible purposeof UDI is to improve patient safety by allowing regulators to identify devices throughout distribution and use, akin to ‘‘track andtrace’’ technology being adopted in the United States. But while theU.S. rule is based on international standards—in conjunction with
the International Medical Devices Regulators’ Forum—Mr. Ives expressed concern that China is contemplating a ‘‘home grown’’ UDI
system that would not be consistent with the global approach. U.S.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00179

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

168
device companies would spend huge sums to comply with China’s
indigenous standards throughout the supply chain.233
Implications for the United States

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Healthcare, still a marginal issue in U.S.-China relations, has
the potential to become a positive and stabilizing force, at a time
when bilateral disputes in other areas remain unresolved. The FDA
is building constructive relationships with its Chinese counterparts, as pandemics and food and drug safety issues have forgeda stronger partnership under duress. On the corporate side, thesheer size of China’s market has compelled U.S. drug and device
makers to do business there. Sourcing cheap ingredients is an important motive, but so are China’s large pool of patients and its
deepening role in developing drug products for the Asian market.
Net exports of biopharmaceuticals to China can help remedy the bilateral trade imbalance. U.S. companies can help China to upgrade
its pharmaceutical production and inform regulators on best practices.
U.S. policy and corporate interests could complement China’s objective to make healthcare provision equitable and efficient. Policy
documents and statements, such as the Third Plenum Decision,suggest that the new party leadership is indeed interested in modifying existing market structures and regulatory frameworks tobridge rural-urban gaps, realign incentives for medical professionals, and permit a larger number of foreign and private companies into emerging market niches, such as long-term care. Lower
rates of precautionary saving could raise consumption among Chinese households, and with it, consumer demand for U.S. goods andservices.
The reality, however, is that China’s healthcare system is in direneed of repair. The reforms undertaken in 2009 introduced generous fiscal spending but could not remedy escalating costs and distorted incentives that have taken root over decades. In this difficult
environment, U.S. drug and device companies are struggling tomarket their latest cutting-edge products and to move beyond therichest Chinese consumers in tier-1 cities. They also face ethical dilemmas when dealing with regulators, competitors, partners, or clients who view corruption and bribery as part of doing business.
U.S. drug and device companies have made some use of the
JCCT to address market concerns in China, but appear hesitant torely too much on government-to-government negotiations. An example is the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement(GPA), which China has not signed, and which could potentially resolve the issues that U.S. companies face at the local level in
China. Mr. Hunter said: ‘‘I am not sure going to USTR [U.S. Trade
Representative] to complain about GPA is the most effectivemeans, but we certainly engage with [China’s Ministry of Health],
the relevant ministries, and at the provincial level to urge expeditious updates of the reimbursement list to begin that complicatedprocess.’’ 234 Referring to counterfeiting in the device industry, Mr.
Ives said that ‘‘so far, [our members] have not wanted to pursue[remedies] through the USTR.’’ Device makers have preferred toraise their concerns with the relevant Chinese authorities.235 These

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00180

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

169
statements raise questions about the role the U.S. government
should and can play in resolving market access issues.
At greatest risk, perhaps, are U.S. consumers who continue topurchase China-origin drug products, in many cases unknowingly.
The FDA has made significant efforts since the 2007–2008 heparinscandal to remedy this problem but still faces a series of obstacles.
In China, increasing the number of drug inspectors has taken over
two years, and inspections of API suppliers are infrequent. U.S.
taxpayer funds are being used to train CFDA regulators, while the
FDA has not been granted sufficient work visas or permission to
conduct unannounced inspections of drug facilities. Back in the
United States, the new authorities and capabilities afforded by
FDASIA and DQSA will take time to be fully adopted. Drug regulation is challenged by uneven state-level oversight of wholesalers,
infrequent inspections at the border, and loopholes with regard toingredients, dietary supplements, and lifestyle drugs.
Conclusions• China today is the world’s largest producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients and inert substances. In a 2010 study ofpharmaceutical executives by the consulting firm Axendia, 70
percent of respondents cited China as their top source country forpharmaceutical ingredients. China’s rise as a pharmaceuticals
exporter has coincided with growing reliance on drug and drug
ingredient imports in the United States, which is estimated to be
the top importer of China’s pharmaceutical raw materials. These
trends are worrying because China, by some estimates, is also
the world’s leading supplier of fake and substandard drugs.
Tainted heparin, which contained ingredients sourced from
China, claimed at least 81 lives in the United States in 2007–2008. More subtle risks of unsafe drugs include inadequate dosages of active ingredients, impure ingredients, and false packaging.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Since 2007, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has taken
important steps to improve drug safety regulation. In China, the
FDA is expanding its team of drug inspectors, increasing the frequency of inspections, and working closely with its Chinese counterparts at the China Food and Drug Administration. In the
United States, Congressional legislation has given the agency
more authority to hold companies accountable for their supply
chain safety, collect user fees from companies to finance regulatory efforts, seize unsafe products at the border, and track-andtrace products via serial numbers. The agency has alsotransitioned to an electronic, risk-based surveillance system
known as PREDICT.
• There is much work to be done to improve drug safety in the
United States. Regulating China’s vast drug industry, especiallythe production of precursor chemicals by semi-legitimate companies, is a severe challenge. China’s own drug safety regulation is
fragmented and decentralized and lacks civil society monitoring.
The FDA’s China offices have had trouble securing work visas for
new inspectors and conducting unannounced factory inspections.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00181

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

170

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Alongside its role as a pharmaceutical producer, China is undergoing an epidemiologic and demographic transition that is fundamentally changing the country’s demand for healthcare.
Chronic and non-communicable diseases are on the rise, due toan aging population and to a worrying decline in public health,caused by pollution, poor diet, and other factors. A more affluent
and urbanized population is seeking better quality care. Some experts estimate China’s healthcare spending to increase from $357
billion in 2011 to $1 trillion in 2020, making China the secondlargest market after the United States.
• At present, China’s healthcare market is ill equipped to meet therise in demand for care. Relative to wealthier countries, doctors
and hospital beds are in short supply. Healthcare spending isonly 5 percent of gross domestic product, compared to an averageof 9 percent in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. To remedy this situation, the Chinese government launched ambitious healthcare reforms in 2009 that aim
to extend basic government-subsidized health insurance, expand
the population health benefit package, strengthen primary careby constructing new clinics, control the price of essential drugs,
and reform government-owned hospitals. Fiscal spending to support these reforms totaled some $371 billion in 2009–2012.
• Not all of China’s healthcare reforms have succeeded, and serious problems remain. Expanded insurance coverage has had
some success in reducing rural-urban gaps and out-of-pocket
spending. But the insurance coverage of migrant workers is not
portable, and coverage is limited for costlier drugs and treatments. The absence of a functioning referral system has led toovercrowding in large hospitals and underutilization of local providers.
• On the supply side, most of China’s public funding increases forhealthcare have gone toward brick-and-mortar investments andnew machines, rather than increases in doctors’ salaries. Prices
and fees are subject to government interference, which
incentivizes doctors to undersupply basic services and oversupply
costly drugs and treatments. The net result is that hospitals areshort of qualified staff and rely excessively on drug revenues,
while healthcare spending is rising on the back of escalating
costs rather than improvements in care. Private sector providers
operate on an uneven playing field and have done little to improve overall delivery.
• U.S. companies that market drugs, medical devices, and healthcare services view China as an important opportunity, not only
to source cheap inputs, but also to market goods and conduct research and development. An important impetus to focus resources on China is slowing demand and changing regulation in
the United States, as well as a lack of other markets that match
China in terms of market size and level of development.
• Market access for U.S. drug and device makers remains restricted. Companies are concerned about being targeted by China’s recent anticorruption drive and indiscriminate use of its
antimonopoly law, which ostensibly aim to lower healthcare costs

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00182

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

171

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

but serve to disadvantage foreign companies. China’s process forapproving new drugs leads to excessive data transfers. Loopholes
in China’s intellectual property laws allow local drug makers to
reproduce U.S. patent drugs prematurely. Onerous clinical trials,
combined with state interference in tendering, pricing, and reimbursement, cause delays of up to eight years for state-of-the-art
U.S. drugs, and make these drugs prohibitively expensive for ordinary Chinese patients. U.S. device makers are concerned aswell about proposed amendments to China’s Medical Device Law,published in March 2014. The amendment could impose hundreds of new requirements on foreign device makers, including
indigenous standards for serial number tracking.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00183

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

172
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 3

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
2. Karen Eggleston et al., ‘‘Will Demographic Change Slow China’s Rise?’’ Journal of Asian Studies 72:3 (August 2013): 505; data from World Bank, http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS.
3. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
4. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Ralph Ives, April 3, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Rod Hunter.
5. NSD Bio Group LLC, Potential Health & Safety Impacts from Pharmaceuticals and Supplements Containing Chinese-Sourced Raw Ingredients (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, April 2010).
6. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
7. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
8. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the
U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014;
and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, April 3, 2014.
9. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Ralph Ives, April 3, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Rod Hunter.
10. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Roger Bate, April 3, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Ginger Zhe Jin.
11. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
12. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014; Uchenna Alexander (Congressional Affairs Specialist, Office of Legislation, U.S. Food and Drug Administration),e-mail to Commission staff, September 24, 2014.
13. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
14. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ralph Ives, April 3, 2014.
15. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.
16. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
17. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00184

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

173

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

18. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
19. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Charles Bell, April 3, 2014.
20. Ann Marucheck et al., ‘‘Product Safety and Security in the Global Supply
Chain: Issues, Challenges, and Research Opportunities,’’ Journal of Operations
Management 29 (2011): 700–701; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China
Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
21. Heather Timmons, ‘‘A Pharmaceutical Future,’’ New York Times, July 7,
2010, via Factiva.
22. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, ‘‘Global Engagement: U.S. Food andDrug Administration.’’ http: // www.fda.gov / downloads / AboutFDA / ReportsManuals
Forms/Reports/UCM298578.pdf; Uchenna Alexander (Congressional Affairs Specialist, Office of Legislation, U.S. Food and Drug Administration), e-mail to Commission staff, September 24, 2014.
23. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.
24. NSD Bio Group LLC, Potential Health & Safety Impacts from Pharmaceuticals and Supplements Containing Chinese-Sourced Raw Ingredients (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, April 2010), p. 1; U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Roger Bate,
April 3, 2014.
25. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
26. NSD Bio Group LLC, Potential Health & Safety Impacts from Pharmaceuticals and Supplements Containing Chinese-Sourced Raw Ingredients (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, April 2010), p. 16.
27. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Roger Bate, April 3, 2014.
28. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ginger Zhe Jin, April 3, 2014.
29. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Roger Bate, April 3, 2014.
30. Fred. C. Bergsten et al., China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities. (Peterson Institute, 2008), pp. 106–109; Shankar Gopalakrishnan, ‘‘Negative Aspects ofSpecial Economic Zones in China,’’ Economic and Political Weekly, April 28, 2007.
http: // farmwars.info / wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Negative-aspects-of-SEZ-in-China.pdf.
31. Shuang Lewis, ‘‘China to Increase Tax Rebates on Anti-HIV and Insulin API
Exports,’’ Global Insight Daily Analysis, October 24, 2008, via Factiva; ‘‘China
Raises Export Tax Rebates of Some Antibiotic APIs,’’ Interfax China Business
Newswire, June 9, 2009, via Factiva.
32. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Globalization of Crime: A
Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime), pp. 177–178.
33. Data from the China General Administration of Customs and the China National Bureau of Statistics, via CEIC.
34. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ginger Zhe Jin, April 3, 2014.
35. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
36. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
37. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Roger Bate, April 3, 2014; Roger Bate, Phake: The Deadly World

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00185

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

174

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

of Falsified and Substandard Medicines (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2012),
pp. 196–198.
38. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, oral
and written testimony of Ginger Zhe Jin, April 3, 2014; Peter S. Goodman, ‘‘China’s
Killer Headache: Fake Pharmaceuticals,’’ Washington Post, August 30, 2002; ‘‘Drug
Piracy: A Wave of Counterfeit Medicines Washes Over Russia,’’ New York Times,
September 5, 2006, via Factiva; and Andrew Batson, ‘‘As China Reins in Piracy,
Some Seek Faster Results,’’ Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2006, via Factiva.
39. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
40. Ann Marucheck et al., ‘‘Product Safety and Security in the Global Supply
Chain: Issues, Challenges, and Research Opportunities,’’ Journal of Operations
Management 29 (2011): 710; Agnes Binagwaho, Roger Bate et al., ‘‘Combating Substandard and Falsified Medicines: A View from Rwanda,’’ PLoS Med 10:7 (2013):
1–3.
41. Lawrence O. Gostin, Gillian J. Buckley, and Patrick W. Kelley, ‘‘Stemming
the Global Trade in Falsified and Substandard Medicines,’’ Journal of American
Medical Association 309:16 (April 24, 2013): 1693–1694.
42. Lawrence O. Gostin, Gillian J. Buckley, and Patrick W. Kelley, ‘‘Stemming
the Global Trade in Falsified and Substandard Medicines,’’ Journal of American
Medical Association 309:16 (April 24, 2013): 1693–1694.
43. Nayanah Siva, ‘‘Tackling the Booming Trade in Counterfeit Drugs,’’ The
Lancet 376 (November 2010): 1726.
44. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ginger Zhe Jin, April 3, 2014.
45. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
46. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, oral
and written testimony of Charles Bell, April 3, 2014; Roger Bate, Making a Killing:
The Deadly Implications of the Counterfeit Drug Trade (Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute, 2008), pp. 8–24.
47. Jill Wechsler, ‘‘Campaign Mounts to Curb Counterfeit Drugs; Manufacturers
and Regulators Struggle to Control Phony Versions of Crucial Medicines,’’ BioPharm
International, September 1, 2012, via Factiva.
48. Jon Swartz and Elizabeth Weise, ‘‘Online Buyer, Beware of Fakes,’’ USA
Today, May 1, 2014, via Factiva.
49. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
50. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
51. Roger Bate, Phake: The Deadly World of Falsified and Substandard Medicines (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2012), p. 13.
52. Roger Bate, Phake: The Deadly World of Falsified and Substandard Medicines (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2012), p. 13.
53. NBC News, ‘‘Heparin Probe Reveals Global Drug Market Perils,’’ April 13,
2008. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/24015019/#.UtgSFPRDvmc.
54. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
55. ‘‘Nation’s First Contaminated Chinese Heparin Case,’’ China Weekly News
via VerticalNews.com, June 21, 2011, via Factiva.
56. Roger Bate, Phake: The Deadly World of Falsified and Substandard Medicines (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2012), p. 14.
57. Data from China Administration of Customs, via CEIC.
58. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
59. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00186

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

175

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

60. NSD Bio Group LLC, Potential Health & Safety Impacts from Pharmaceuticals and Supplements Containing Chinese-Sourced Raw Ingredients (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, April 2010), p. 14.
61. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
62. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
63. Nadine He, ‘‘China Urges Pharmaceutical Manufacturers to Meet New
GMP Standards,’’ ChemLinked, January 17, 2013. https: // chemlinked.com / news /pharmaceutical/china-urges-pharmaceutical-manufacturers-meet-new-gmp-standards.
64. U.S.-China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade, ‘‘2009 Fact Sheet.’’http: // www.ustr.gov / about - us / press - office / fact - sheets / 2009 / october / us - china - joint commission-commerce-and-trade.
65. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
66. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014; Jon Swartz and Elizabeth Weise,‘‘Online Buyer, Beware of Fakes,’’ USA Today, May 1, 2014, via Factiva.
67. ‘‘Illicit Trade Report 2012’’ (Brussels, Belgium: World Customs Organization,2013), p. 63.
68. Nadine He, ‘‘China Urges Pharmaceutical Manufacturers to Meet New
GMP Standards,’’ ChemLinked, January 17, 2013. https: // chemlinked.com / news /pharmaceutical/china-urges-pharmaceutical-manufacturers-meet-new-gmp-standards.
69. Roger Bate (Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute), e-mail to Commission staff, August 20, 2014.
70. Uchenna Alexander (Congressional Affairs Specialist, Office of Legislation,
U.S. Food and Drug Administration), e-mail to Commission staff, September 24,
2014.
71. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Roger Bate, April 3, 2014.
72. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ginger Zhe Jin, April 3, 2014.
73. Yanzhong Huang, Governing Health in Contemporary China (New York:
Routledge, 2013), pp. 112–134; Margaret Pearson, ‘‘The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State,’’ World
Politics 57:2 (January 2005): 296–322.
74. Vivian Wu, ‘‘Food, Drugs Fall under Health Ministry’s Charge: Regulatory
Agency Integrated under Reform,’’ South China Morning Post, September 3, 2008,
via Factiva.
75. Dali Yang, ‘‘Total Recall,’’ National Interest, March 1, 2008, via Factiva;
Yanzhong Huang, Governing Health in Contemporary China (New York: Routledge,2013), pp. 112–134.
76. APCO Worldwide, ‘‘Will China’s Food Safety Law Make China’s Food Safer?’’
April 2009. http://www.apcoworldwide.com/content/contactus.aspx; Vivian Wu, ‘‘Food,
Drugs Fall under Health Ministry’s Charge: Regulatory Agency Integrated under
Reform,’’ South China Morning Post, September 3, 2008, via Factiva; and Yanzhong
Huang, Governing Health in Contemporary China (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.
112–134.
77. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Roger Bate, April 3, 2014.
78. Based on comments made by Dr. Christopher J. Hickey and other speakers
at 50th Annual Meeting of the Drug Information Association, San Diego, California,
June 18, 2014. http://www.diahome.org/en-US/Flagship-Meetings/DIA2014/MeetingProgram/Find-Sessions-and-Presentations/Event-Details.aspx ? productID = 2972652 &eventType=SESSION.
79. Yanzhong Huang, Governing Health in Contemporary China. (New York:
Routledge, 2013), p.124.
80. Christine Wong, ‘‘Toward Building Performance-Oriented Management in
China: The Critical Role of Monitoring and Evaluation and the Long Road Ahead,’’
ECD Working Paper Series 27 (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2012), p.6.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00187

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

176

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

81. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ginger Zhe Jin, April 3, 2014.
82. Yanzhong Huang, Governing Health in Contemporary China. (New York:
Routledge, 2013), p. 133.
83. Daniel Chinoy, ‘‘Black-Hearted Products: The Causes of China’s Product
Safety Problems,’’ Columbia East Asia Review 2 (2009): 29–36.
84. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
85. Information from a leading epidemiologist who briefed the Commission on
August 19, 2014.
86. Roger Bate, Phake: The Deadly World of Falsified and Substandard Medicines (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2012), pp. 188–195.
87. U.S. Trade Representative, 2013 Report on China’s WTO Compliance, p. 4.
88. Shuang Lewis, ‘‘China Gets Heavy-Handed on Counterfeit Drugs,’’ IHS
Global Insight Daily Analysis, May 28, 2009, via Factiva.
89. John Balzano, ‘‘China’s Food Safety Law: Administrative Innovation and Institutional Design in Comparative Perspective.’’ Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal
13:2 (2012): 23–80.
90. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ginger Zhe Jin, April 3, 2014.
91. Roger Bate, Phake: The Deadly World of Falsified and Substandard Medicines (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2012), p. 183; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, andthe U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Roger Bate, April
3, 2014;
92. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Charles Bell, April 3, 2014.
93. Lawrence O. Gostin, Gillian J. Buckley, and Patrick W. Kelley, ‘‘Stemming
the Global Trade in Falsified and Substandard Medicines,’’ Journal of American
Medical Association 309:16 (April 24, 2013): 1693–1694.
94. Senate Finance Committee, Hearing on Trade Enforcement, testimony ofBart Peterson, June 25, 2014; Ann Capling and John Ravenhill, ‘‘Symposium: Australia–U.S. Economic Relations and the Regional Balance of Power Australia, theUnited States and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Diverging Interests and Unintended Consequences,’’ Australian Journal of Political Science 48:2 (2013): 184–196.
95. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
96. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
97. Uchenna Alexander (Congressional Affairs Specialist, Office of Legislation,
U.S. Food and Drug Administration), e-mail to Commission staff, September 24,
2014.
98. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
99. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Food and Drug Safety, Public Health, and the Environment in China, written testimony of Steven M. Solomon,
May 22, 2013; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on
China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
100. Uchenna Alexander (Congressional Affairs Specialist, Office of Legislation,
U.S. Food and Drug Administration), e-mail to Commission staff, September 24,
2014.
101. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
102. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00188

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

177

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

103. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
104. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
105. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Christopher J. Hickey, April 3, 2014.
106. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
107. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
108. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Food and Drug Administration:
Overseas Offices Have Taken Steps to Help Ensure Import Safety, but More LongTerm Planning Is Needed, GAO–10–960 (October 25, 2010).
109. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Roger Bate, April 3, 2014.
110. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Charles Bell, April 3, 2014.
111. Pew Health Group, After Heparin: Protecting Consumers from the Risks of
Substandard and Counterfeit Drugs (Washington, DC, 2011), p.14.
112. Suchira Ghosh, ‘‘RFID Act of 2006 and E-Pedigrees: Tackling the Problem
of Counterfeit Drugs in the United States Wholesale Industry,’’ Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 13:2 (2006–2007): 577–600; Roger Bate,
Making a Killing: The Deadly Implications of the Counterfeit Drug Trade (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2008), pp. 25–38.
113. Rx360.org homepage. http://www.rx-360.org/AboutRx360/tabid/55/Default.aspx;
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written
testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
114. Roger Bate, Phake: The Deadly World of Falsified and Substandard Medicines (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2012), pp. 177–182; U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Roger Bate,
April 3, 2014.
115. Ann Marucheck et al., ‘‘Product Safety and Security in the Global Supply
Chain: Issues, Challenges, and Research Opportunities,’’ Journal of Operations
Management 29 (2011): 716–717.
116. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Allan Coukell, April 3, 2014.
117. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.
118. CMS, ‘‘National Health Expenditures 2012 Highlights.’’ http://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf.
119. Franck Le Deu et al., ‘‘Health Care in China: Entering ‘Uncharted Waters,’ ’’McKinsey & Company (November 2012). http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health_systems_and_services/health_care_in_china_entering_uncharted_waters.
120. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.
121. Shanlian Hu et al., ‘‘Reform of How Health Care Is Paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities,’’ Lancet 372:9652 (2008): 1846.
122. Debora MacKenzie, ‘‘China’s Alzheimer’s Time Bomb Revealed,’’ New Scientist, June 7, 2013. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23673-chinas-alzheimerstime-bomb-revealed.html#.UzMLHPldXmc.
123. The World Bank, ‘‘Toward a Healthy and Harmonious Life in China: Stemming the Tide of Non-Communicable Diseases’’ (2011), p. 2. http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/NCD_report_en.pdf.
124. Jun Ma et al., China: Themes and Strategy for 2014, (Deutsche Bank, January 3, 2014), pp. 28–33.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00189

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

178

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

125. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
126. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
127. Wall Street Journal, ‘‘Beijing Plans to Spend $2.45 Trillion This Year,’’March 5, 2014.
128. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
129. Shanlian Hu et al., ‘‘Reform of How Health Care Is Paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities,’’ Lancet 372:9652 (2008): 1846–1847; U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Karen
Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
130. Karen Eggleston, ‘‘Healthcare for 1.3 Billion: China’s Remarkable Work in
Progress,’’ Miken Institute Review, Second Quarter 2013.
131. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
132. Qiulin Chen, Karen Eggleston, and Ling Li, ‘‘Demographic Change, Intergenerational Transfers, and the Challenges for Social Protection Systems in the People’s Republic of China,’’ in Park, Donghyun, Sang-Hyop Lee, and Andrew Mason,
Aging, Economic Growth, and Old-age Security in Asia (Northampton, MA: Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2012), pp. 161–202.
133. Karen Eggleston et al., ‘‘Will Demographic Change Slow China’s Rise?’’ Journal of Asian Studies 72:3 (August 2013): 505–518.
134. Shanlian Hu et al., ‘‘Reform of How Health Care Is Paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities,’’ Lancet 372:9652 (2008): 1847–1848.
135. Karen Eggleston et al., ‘‘Health Service Delivery in China: A Literature Review,’’ Health Economics 17 (2008): 151–152.
136. Christina Ho, ‘‘Health Reform and De Facto Federalism in China,’’ China:
An International Journal 8:1 (March 2010): 38–39.
137. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
138. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, April 3, 2014.
139. Bloomberg, ‘‘China ‘Catastrophe’ Hits 114 Million as Diabetes Spreads,’’ September 3, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013–09–03/china-catastrophe-hits114-million-as-diabetes-spreads.html.
140. Yong-chuan Wang et al., ‘‘Comparison of Cancer Incidence between China
and the USA,’’ Cancer Biol. Med. 9:2 (June 2012): 128–132. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3643656/#!po=10.0000; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
141. Global Status Report on Road Safety 2013: Supporting a Decade of Action(Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2013).
142. Mindi Schneider, Feeding China’s Pigs: Implications for the Environment,
China’s Smallholder Farmers and Food Security (Institute for Agriculture andTrade Policy, May 2011), pp. 19–22.
143. New York Times, ‘‘Pollution Killed 7 Million People Worldwide in 2012, Report Finds,’’ March 26, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/world/pollutionkilled-7-million-people-worldwide-in-2012-report-finds.html; ‘‘Air Pollution Linked to
1.2 Million Premature Deaths in China,’’ New York Times, April 1, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/world/asia/air-pollution-linked-to-1-2-million-deaths-in-china.html?_r=2&.
144. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
145. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ‘‘Avian Influenza A (H7N9)
Virus.’’ http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h7n9-virus.htm.
146. Information from a leading epidemiologist who briefed the Commission on
August 19, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00190

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

179

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

147. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
148. Yanzhong Huang. Governing Health in Contemporary China (New York:
Routledge, 2013), pp. 24–52; Zhe Dong and Michael R. Phillips, ‘‘Evolution of China’s Health-Care System,’’ Lancet 372 (November 2008): 1715–1716.
149. Data from World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.
IN.
150. Jing Ulrich et al., ‘‘Medicine for the Masses—China’s Healthcare Reform:
Progress and Future Steps,’’ J.P. Morgan Hands-On China Report (J.P. Morgan, October 10, 2011), p. 3.
151. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, April 3, 2014.
152. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
153. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
154. Karen Eggleston and Winnie Yip, ‘‘Hospital Competition under Regulated
Prices: Application to Urban Health Sector Reforms in China,’’ International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 4:1 (2004): 347–348.
155. Karen Eggleston et al., ‘‘Health Service Delivery in China: A Literature Review,’’ Health Economics 17 (2008): 159.
156. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
157. ‘‘Information from webinar presented April 20, 2012 by Double Helix, titled
Drug Policy Reform in China: Where Now and What Does It Mean for the Pharmaceutical Industry?’’158. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
159. Shanlian Hu et al., ‘‘Reform of How Health Care Is Paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities,’’ Lancet 372:9652 (2008): 1847–1848.
160. Zhe Dong and Michael R. Phillips, ‘‘Evolution of China’s Health-Care System,’’ Lancet 372 (November 2008): 1715–1716.
161. Shanlian Hu et al., ‘‘Reform of How Health Care Is Paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities,’’ Lancet 372:9652 (2008): 1847–1848; U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Xiaoqing Lu
Boynton, April 3, 2014.
162. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, April 3, 2014.
163. Karen Eggleston, ‘‘Health Care for 1.3 Billion: An Overview of China’s
Health System,’’ Asia Health Policy Program Working Paper 28 (January 2012): 17;
Shan Juan, ‘‘Medical Reform Must Be Rational,’’ China Daily, March 10, 2014.
http://www.chinadailyasia.com/news/2014–03/10/content_15123737.html.
164. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
165. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written and oral testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
166. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
167. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
168. Jing Ulrich et al., ‘‘Medicine for the Masses—China’s Healthcare Reform:
Progress and Future Steps,’’ J.P. Morgan Hands-On China Report (J.P. Morgan, October 10, 2011), pp. 2–3.
169. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00191

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

180

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

170. Yuanli Liu, ‘‘Reforming China’s Healthcare: For the People by the People?’’Lancet 373 (January 2009): 282; Shanlian Hu et al., ‘‘Reform of How Health CareIs Paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities,’’ Lancet 372:9652 (2008): 1848;
and Zhe Dong and Michael R. Phillips, ‘‘Evolution of China’s Health-Care System,’’
Lancet 372 (November 2008): 1715–1716.
171. Karen Eggleston and Winnie Yip, ‘‘Hospital Competition under Regulated
Prices: Application to Urban Health Sector Reforms,’’ International Journal of
Health Care Finance and Economics 4:1 (2004): 343–344; Karen Eggleston et al.,‘‘Comparing Public and Private Hospitals in China: Evidence from Guangdong,’’
BMC Health Services Research 10:76 (2010): 3; and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, andthe U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Yanzhong Huang,
April 3, 2014.
172. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Ginger Zhe Jin, April 3, 2014.
173. Karen Eggleston et al., ‘‘Health Service Delivery in China: A Literature Review,’’ Health Economics 17 (2008): 154–155.
174. Karen Eggleston et al., ‘‘Health Service Delivery in China: A Literature Review,’’ Health Economics 17 (2008): 154–155.
175. Christina Ho, ‘‘Health Reform and De Facto Federalism in China,’’ China:
An International Journal 8:1 (March 2010): 38–53; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, andthe U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Yanzhong Huang,
April 3, 2014.
176. Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, Olivia Ma, and Molly Claire Schmalzbach, Key Issues
in China’s Health Care Reform: Payment System Reform and Health Technology Assessment (Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2012).
177. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the
U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Benjamin Shobert,
April 3, 2014.
178. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, April 3, 2014.
179. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, April 3, 2014.
180. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
181. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
182. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Murray Scott Tanner, May 15, 2014.
183. Sharon LaFraniere, ‘‘Chinese Hospitals Are Battlegrounds of Discontent,’’
New York Times, August 11, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/world/asia/
12hospital.html?_r=0.
184. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, April 3, 2014.
185. Information from a leading epidemiologist who briefed the Commission on
August 19, 2014.
186. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.
187. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
188. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, April 3, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the
U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00192

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

181

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

189. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
190. Pfizer.com, ‘‘Pfizer in China.’’ http://www.pfizer.com.cn/pfizer-china/about_pfizer_china_en.aspx.
191. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
192. United Family Healthcare, ‘‘About Us.’’ http://www.ufh.com.cn/en/about-us/.
193. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.
194. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.
195. George Eliades et al., Healthcare 2020 (New York: Bain & Company, 2012),
p. 1.
196. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
197. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
198. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ralph Ives, April 3, 2014.
199. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.
200. George Eliades et al., Healthcare 2020 (New York: Bain & Company, 2012),
p. 3.
201. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014.
202. United Family Healthcare, ‘‘About Us.’’ http://www.ufh.com.cn/en/about-us/.
203. John Lauerman and Michael McDonald, ‘‘Harvard-Linked Hospital Eyes Expansion with China Billionaire,’’ Bloomberg, February 17, 2014.
204. U.S. Department of Commerce, Fact Sheet: 24th U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) Signings (December 20, 2013). http://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2013/12/20/fact-sheet-24th-us-china-joint-commissioncommerce-and-trade-jcct-signin.
205. Fanfan Wang, ‘‘China to Allow Foreign Ownership of Hospitals,’’ WallStreet Journal, August 27, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-to-allow-foreignownership-of-hospitals-1409133296.
206. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Yanzhong Huang, April 3, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Karen Eggleston, April 3, 2014.
207. Drew Armstrong, ‘‘China’s Pharma Potential Diminished,’’ Bloomberg Businessweek, November 14, 2013.
208. Keith Bradsher and Chris Buckley, ‘‘China Fines GlaxoSmithKline Nearly$500 Million in Bribery Case,’’ New York Times, September 19, 2014. http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/business/international/gsk-china-fines.html?—r=0.
209. Reuters, ‘‘China Investigates France’s Sanofi for Alleged Bribery: Xinhua,’’
August 10, 2013, via Factiva; China Economic Review, ‘‘China Investigates Bayer
for Alleged Wrongdoings,’’ September 16, 2013. http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/china-investigates-bayer-alleged-wrongdoings.
210. Wall Street Journal, ‘‘Communist Party Paper Alleges U.S. Company Is Operating Pyramid Scheme,’’ January 16, 2014, via Factiva.
211. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, April 3, 2014.
212. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00193

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

182

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

213. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.
214. Slaughter and May, ‘‘Competition Law in China,’’ January 2014. http://
www.slaughterandmay.com/media/879862/competition-law-in-china.pdf.
215. U.S. Trade Representative, 2013 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO
Compliance (December 2013), pp. 69, 79.
216. Colum Murphy, ‘‘China Regulator Finds Evidence of Mercedes-Benz Monopolistic Behavior,’’ Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2014. http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/china-regulator-finds-evidence-of-mercedes-benz-monopolistic-behavior-2014–08–
18.
217. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written and oral testimony of Benjamin Shobert, April 3, 2014.
218. Drew Armstrong, ‘‘China’s Pharma Potential Diminished,’’ Bloomberg Businessweek, November 14, 2013.
219. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
220. U.S. Department of Commerce, Fact Sheet: 23rd U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (December 19, 2012).
221. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
222. U.S. Trade Representative, 2013 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO
Compliance (December 2013), p. 108.
223. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
224. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
225. U.S. Trade Representative, 2013 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO
Compliance (December 2013), p. 5.
226. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ralph Ives, April 3, 2014.
227. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014; IMS, The 2009 Revision of the National Reimbursement Drug List (Beijing: IMS Intelligence Applied, 2009).
228. Jing Ulrich et al., ‘‘Medicine for the Masses—China’s Healthcare Reform:
Progress and Future Steps,’’ J.P. Morgan Hands-On China Report (J.P. Morgan, October 10, 2011), pp. 6–7; IMS, The 2009 Revision of the National Reimbursement
Drug List (Beijing: IMS Intelligence Applied, 2009).
229. Drew Armstrong, ‘‘China’s Pharma Potential Diminished,’’ Bloomberg Businessweek, November 14, 2013.
230. See Sinopharm Group homepage. http://www.sinopharm.com/p391.aspx.
231. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ralph Ives, April 3, 2014.
232. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Ralph Ives, April 3, 2014.
233. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, written testimony of Ralph Ives, April 3, 2014.
234. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Rod Hunter, April 3, 2014.
235. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Healthcare Sector, Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products, testimony of Ralph Ives, April 3, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00194

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

SECTION 4: U.S.-CHINA
CLEAN ENERGY COOPERATION
Introduction
The United States and China have a long history of bilateralclean energy cooperation, both through official channels and among
private and nongovernmental actors. Both nations have seen somebenefits from the technology-sharing relationship as have neighboring nations whose skies and waterways have been subject to increasing levels of pollution from the rapidly industrializing China.
After a slow start, the benefits of some of the cooperative energy
programs are only now being recognized. Future efforts, particularly in joint research and development, will require more assessment and measurement of progress if the many programs are to retain public and industry support.
This section, which draws from the April 25 Commission hearing
on U.S.-China clean energy cooperation and other sources, continues the Commission’s examination of China’s rapidly growing
domestic energy needs, its attempts to implement clean energy
policies, and the opportunities and challenges that exist for bilateral cooperation in these areas. This section will focus on the facilitation by the governments of the United States and China of cooperative activities aimed at improving the efficiencies of conventional energy sources such as coal, natural gas, and nuclear.*Through several case studies, this section explores the role of U.S.
government agencies, universities, and businesses in this cooperation. The section concludes by assessing the implications of such cooperation for U.S. national interest.
U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation Policy
In a briefing to the Commission, Jonathan Elkind, acting assistant secretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Department ofEnergy (DOE), said the United States cooperates with China on
clean energy both ‘‘because we need to and because we want to,’’pointing to shared interest in protecting the environment and creating business opportunities.1 Indeed, the two countries sharemany energy and climate challenges. The United States and China
lead in global energy consumption and rely on the abundant domestic coal resources to provide energy, which results in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. China is the world’s largest emitter of CO2(26 percent of world emissions in 2010), followed by the UnitedStates (17 percent),2 and their joint efforts are necessary for suc* For a discussion of wind and solar industries see U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission, 2010 Annual Report to Congress, November 2010, pp. 183–210. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2010-Report-to-Congress.pdf.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(183)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00195

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

184
cessful global reduction. Both countries are investing in renewable
resources, such as wind and solar, while also working on increasing
efficiencies and reducing pollution by making conventional energy
sources, such as natural gas and coal, cleaner.
China’s environmental problems pose some of the most pressing
challenges for Chinese leaders. The combination of its large population, rapid economic growth, and lax environmental enforcement
has led China to consume more energy with each year and emit
ever more toxins into the air and water. A major international
study found that air pollution contributed to 1.2 million premature
deaths in China in 2010.3
China’s heavy reliance on coal for energy generation, industrial
production, and heating is a major contributor to its environmental
woes. While use of nuclear and renewable energy is growing rapidly, they remain minor energy sources, and are not expected tosoon replace coal in a substantial way.4 According to latest datafrom the U.S. Energy Information Administration, coal supplied 69
percent of China’s total energy consumption in 2011 (see Figure1).5 The corresponding figure for the United States was far lower,
at 20 percent.*
The Chinese leadership, through consecutive Five-Year Plans,
has placed increasing emphasis on reducing pollution and energy
consumption through regulation and promotion of clean energy andtechnologies.† China has stated it plans to cap coal use below 65
percent by 2017 and to raise non-fossil fuel energy consumption to
15 percent of the energy mix by 2020 (though consumption of coal
will continue to rise in absolute terms).6 In addition, the 12th FiveYear Plan sets targets for increasing energy efficiency and carbon
efficiency of the economy by 16 percent and 17 percent, respectively.7 The government reemphasized its commitment to promotean ‘‘ecological’’ civilization during the 2014 National People’s Congress, promising to ‘‘declare war’’ on pollution and providing someconcrete targets for reducing energy inefficiency.‡
Coal and peat also dominate China’s electricity generation, accounting for almost 80 percent of China’s electrical capacity in2011. Although coal and peat are the largest fuel source for the
U.S. electricity market, the energy mix is much more diversified(see Figure 2). Coal and peat account for only 43 percent of U.S.
electricity generation.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The United States holds the world’s largest estimated recoverable reserves of coal and is a
net exporter of coal. In 2012 U.S. coal mines produced more than a billion short tons of coaland more than 81 percent of this coal was used by U.S. power plants to generate electricity.
http://www.eia.gov/coal/. According to EIA, in 2012 China was the third biggest market for U.S.
coal (9 percent of the total) behind the Netherlands (12 percent) and UK (11 percent). In 2012,
the U.S. was the eighth largest source of Chinese coal imports behind Indonesia, Australia,
Mongolia, Russia, Vietnam, South Africa, and North Korea.
† For an in-depth analysis of Chinese government’s policies supporting the clean energy sector,
see U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission, 2010 Annual Report to Congress, November 2010, pp. 183–210. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2010-Reportto-Congress.pdf.
‡ For more details on the 2014 National People’s Congress and the Government Work Report,
see Nargiza Salidjanova and Iacob Koch-Weser, China’s 2014 Government Work Report: Taking
Stock of Reforms (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 1, 2014). http://
origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20Backgrounder_NPC%20scorecard.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00196

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

185
Figure 1:

Total Energy Consumption by Type, 2011

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00197

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S4Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China is the world’s largest investor in clean energy (it surpassed
the United States in 2012). In 2013 alone, China’s combined public
and private investment in that sector reached $61.3 billion, or
about one quarter of the $254 billion world total.8 But even as China’s spending on clean energy development surpasses all other nations, its consumption of fossil fuels is still growing much faster

186
than its consumption of clean energy. For every gigawatt (GW) of
new solar capacity that China added in 2013, for example, China
added 27 GW of new coal capacity.9
Figure 2:

Total Electricity Generation by Source, 2011

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00198

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C1S4Fig2.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Source: International Energy Agency. http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/.

187
In 2013, U.S. public and private investment in clean energy totaled $48.4 billion, the second largest national investment globally.10 The Obama Administration has set a goal for the UnitedStates to generate 80 percent of its electricity from clean sourcesby 2035,11 and has sought to fund and incentivize an array of activities to help the country reach this milestone (U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that coal-fired power plants willcontinue to be the largest source of electricity generation in the
United States, though coal’s share of total U.S. power generation
will decline from 42 percent in 2011 to 38 percent in 2025 and 35
percent in 2040).12 As clean energy alternatives have become more
viable, the U.S. private sector has also deepened its investments,
resulting in dynamic market growth and technological advancement.
With so much combined investment focused on clean energy, thepotential opportunities for both countries are immense, and U.S.
and Chinese governments have endorsed cooperation. Many experts
argue that U.S.-China cooperative initiatives ‘‘could increase thecapacity and reduce the cost of new energy technologies, which overthe long term will produce economic, energy, and environmental security benefits on both sides of the Pacific.’’ 13
At a 2011 Brookings Institution seminar, Zhou Dadi, vice chairman of the China Institute for Innovation and Development Strategy, urged cooperation because it ‘‘provides each side with accessto the specialized expertise of the other . . . increases the diversityof approaches that can be investigated . . . and speeds up progress
on both sides.’’ 14 U.S. businesses are also interested in cooperation,
given the substantial economic opportunities that exist in the clean
energy field.15 At an energy cooperation event in Beijing in April
2013, Secretary of State John Kerry summed up the opportunities:
The energy market that we are talking about here today,
the energy market of the future, is a $6 trillion market withfive billion users today and growing to perhaps nine billion
users over the next 40 years. This is the largest of all markets ever imagined on the face of this planet.16
However, the tremendous opportunities of U.S.-China clean energy cooperation are tempered by significant obstacles, stemming
primarily from China’s lax protection of intellectual property rights
and China’s use of allegedly WTO-illegal subsidies to promote its
clean energy sector.* The Chinese government’s deployment of
massive resources toward developing clean energy technologies—
such as tax breaks, preferential financing, access to government
contracts and other incentives—is a major challenge confronting
proponents of U.S.-China clean energy cooperation, and may havedamaging consequences for the U.S. energy sector and economy.17
As a result of the anticompetitive aspects of Chinese policies, U.S.China trade disputes involving clean energy industries have proliferated.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For an in-depth analysis of Chinese government’s policies supporting the clean energy sector,
see U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission, 2010 Annual Report to Congress, November 2010, pp. 183–210. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2010-Reportto-Congress.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00199

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

188
In 2010, the United States challenged China’s Special Fund forWind Power Manufacturing at the World Trade Organization(WTO). China’s program gave domestic wind turbine manufacturers special subsidies, in violation of its WTO commitments.18 Following consultations with the United States, China agreed to end
the subsidies program.19 In 2012, the U.S. International Trade
Commission (ITC) found that cheap wind tower imports from China
were having detrimental effects on U.S. manufacturers because
Chinese wind tower companies were receiving countervailable subsidies and dumping (i.e., selling below cost of production) theirproducts in the U.S. market.20
The Chinese government’s heavy subsidization of the domestic
solar industry—which allowed Chinese solar manufacturers to sell
their products below market value—has also led to U.S. trade action.21 In June and July 2014, the U.S. Department of Commerce
announced preliminary countervailing (CVD) and antidumping(AD) duty investigations of imports of Chinese solar panels. U.S.
Customs will begin collecting duties based on the preliminary ratesof 18.56 to 35.21 percent in the CVD investigation and 26.33 percent to 165.04 percent in the AD investigation.22 The final determination is expected in December 2014.
This marks the latest step in a fight over low-cost solar panelsfrom China. In 2012, Commerce imposed AD and CVD duties onimports of Chinese solar panels, in response to a petition by
SolarWorld Americas, a U.S. subsidiary of a German solar company, and a coalition of other solar manufacturers, alleging WTOillegal subsidies from the Chinese government to Chinese producers.23
China asked the U.S. Department of Commerce for a suspensionof the duties, and for a chance to negotiate a settlement. But while
the U.S. government has not yet responded to China’s request,
SolarWorld Americas asked the U.S. Department of Commerce toincrease the duties applied to Chinese solar products in response
to Chinese military personnel hacking the company’s computers.24
The request follows the U.S. Justice Department’s indictment offive members of the Chinese military for allegedly stealing documents and files from U.S. companies, including SolarWorld (for additional information on China’s use of state-sponsored cyber-theft
to promote domestic companies, see Chapter 1, Section 1 of this Report.)
Public-Private Partnerships

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The two countries have been cooperating for over 30 years on environmental and energy efficiency initiatives, with much of theearly agreements focusing more on establishing the basic frameworks for cooperation and on energy policy discussions (see Addendum I for a timeline of U.S.-China cooperation on clean energy andclimate change). In the 2000s, clean energy and climate change
mitigation emerged as leading topics of cooperation between China
and the United States, culminating with a series of agreements
signed in 2008–2009, which moved beyond discussion and into therealm of technical cooperation.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00200

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

189
At the June 2008 Strategic Economic Dialogue, the United States
and China signed the Ten Year Framework on Energy and Environmental Cooperation, establishing goals for cooperation on clean
electricity, clean water, clean air, efficient transportation, and forest conservation. During President Obama’s November 2009 trip to
Beijing, he used this framework as the basis for establishing a
number of initiatives to enhance U.S.-China cooperation on clean
energy (see Table 1).

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Table 1:

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Government-Sponsored U.S.-China Cooperation Initiatives
Signed in 2009

Initiative

Chinese Body

U.S. Body

Description

U.S.-China
Clean Energy
ResearchCenter(CERC)

Ministry of
Science andTechnology;
National Energy Agency

Department ofEnergyEstablishes research center focused on developing energy efficiency, clean coal, and clean
vehicle technologies, including
carbon capture and storage.

U.S.-China
Electric Vehicles Initiative

Various public
and private
entities

Various public
and private
entities

Includes joint standards development for electric vehicles,
demonstration projects in China, creation of a research anddevelopment (R&D) and manufacturing roadmap, and public
education projects.

U.S.-China
Energy Cooperation
Program(ECP)

Various public
and private
entities

Various public
and private
entities

Provides private sector money
for work in China on renewables, smart grid, clean transportation, green building, cleancoal, combined heat and power,
and energy efficiency.

U.S.-China
Renewable
Energy Partnership

Various public
and private
entities

Various public
and private
entities

Fosters collaboration on advanced wind, biofuels, solar,
and grid technologies, while expanding trade in these sectors
through an annual U.S.-China
Renewable Energy Forum.

21st Century
Coal

Various public
and private
entities

Various public
and private
entities

Creates joint ventures andother public-private partnerships on clean coal, including
carbon capture and near-zeroemissions coal plants.

U.S.-China
Energy Efficiency Action
Plan

Various public
and private
entities

Various public
and private
entities

Develops energy efficient building codes and rating systems,
benchmarks industrial energy
efficiency, trains building inspectors and energy efficiency
auditors for industrial facilities, and convenes a new annual U.S.-China Energy Efficiency Forum.

Fmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00201

Sfmt 6601

88483

190
Table 1:Government-Sponsored U.S.-China Cooperation Initiatives
Signed in 2009—Continued

Initiative

Chinese Body

U.S. Body

Description

Shale Gas
Initiative

Various public
and private
entities

Various public
and private
entities

Enables both nations to use experience gained in the UnitedStates to assess China’s shalegas * potential, conduct joint
technical studies, and promote
shale gas investment in China
through the U.S.-China Oil and
Gas Industry Forum, study
tours, and workshops.

* Shale gas is natural gas trapped within shale formations. Although the complex geology of
shale gas formations makes it more difficult to extract than conventional natural gas, recent
advances in hydraulic fracturing (commonly called ‘‘fracking’’) have enabled gas producers to
extract shale gas economically. U.S. Energy Administration, ‘‘What is Shale Gas and Why is it
Important?’’ December 5, 2012. http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/about_shale_gas.cfm.
Source: The White House, U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘U.S.-China Clean Energy Announcements,’’ November 17, 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-cleanenergy-announcements.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

U.S.-China government-facilitated collaboration takes many
forms—from sponsoring workshops where U.S. and Chinese businesses and academics meet to discuss shared challenges to providing funding for projects. Most often, the collaboration is conducted through public-private partnerships, with the U.S. government providing resources or capacity building while academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, andthe private sector join government-established frameworks. U.S.based environmental NGOs have sizeable China programs and engage in cooperative activities with Chinese partners. These NGOs
include the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental
Defense Fund, and the World Resources Institute.
One example of such public-private partnerships is work done by
the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), which focuseson trade capacity building initiatives, technical assistance, and pilot
projects in the transportation, energy, information technology, andhealthcare sectors. In 2013, USTDA completed 6 study tours and
16 workshops, conferences, and training programs for over 1,200
Chinese participants in the areas of transportation, energy, waterand environment, healthcare and emergency response, and antimonopoly law. According to USTDA, its China projects have facilitatedover $8.1 billion in exports since 2001, including over $960 million
in new exports in 2013.25 USTDA reports that in 2013, 21 percent
of its total China portfolio was invested in the clean energy sector.
In her testimony before the Commission, USTDA Director Leocadia Zak highlighted the Energy Cooperation Program (ECP),
which USTDA supports through grants for feasibility studies, technical assistance, and workshops.26 ECP is a nongovernmental organization that includes over 45 U.S. companies across ten industry
subsector working groups.27 Several U.S. government agencies‘‘support the ECP’s efforts to connect Chinese decision-makers to
U.S. technical expertise in clean energy,’’ including the Departmentof Commerce and the Department of Energy, which joined USTDA
in signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that created
ECP in 2009.28

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00202

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

191
Building on the work done by USTDA to enhance cooperation
with Chinese government counterparts, ECP leverages private sector resources for project development work in China, encompassing
renewable energy, smart grid, clean transportation, clean coal, andenergy efficiency. To support ECP and promote clean energy development in China, USTDA has funded eight Chinese trade missions
to the United States, seven pilot projects in China, and six workshops for Chinese public and private leaders.29
U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC)
CERC is the most ambitious U.S.-China program for joint research and clean energy development to come out of the November
2009 meeting between President Obama and President Hu. CERC
is governed by a steering committee which includes ministerial or
secretary level oversight from DOE and three ministries—the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the National Energy Administration (NEA), the Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural
Development (MOHURD)—from the Chinese side. According to its
steering committee, CERC’s goal is toaccelerate the development and deployment of clean energy
technologies for the benefit of both countries . . . by providing a supportive platform for collaborative research, protecting intellectual property, and encouraging top scientists
and engineers in both countries to join forces, learn fromeach other, and capitalize on unique assets and complementary strengths.30
CERC’s work was launched in January 2011, with the signing of
joint work plans by the participants. Its three research priorities(the consortia) are advanced clean coal technologies, including carbon capture and storage (CCS),* clean vehicles (including advanced
biofuels), and building energy efficiency (for a list of CERC projects,
see Addendum II). As part of the program, DOE awarded grants
to research teams led by West Virginia University on clean coal,
the University of Michigan on clean vehicles, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory on building energy efficiency. These U.S.
teams conduct joint research with Chinese teams led by Huazhong
University of Science and Technology on clean coal, Tsinghua University on clean vehicles, and the Ministry of Housing and UrbanRural Development on building energy efficiency. CERC is fundedin equal parts by the United States and China, with each consortium allocating a budget of $50 million for the first five years ($25
million provided by the national governments matched by $25 million from industry, universities, research institutions, and otherstakeholders).31 U.S. funds support only U.S. researchers and Chinese funds support only Chinese researchers.
On the U.S. side, each consortium is allocated $2.5 million peryear from DOE; this is matched equally by the academic and industrial participants. On the Chinese side, there is no matching requirement. According to Huei Peng, the U.S. director of the CERCDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Carbon capture and storage (CCS) (or carbon capture and sequestration) is the process of
capturing waste CO2 from large sources, such as fossil fuel used in power generation and otherindustries, transporting it to a storage site, and depositing it where it will not enter the atmosphere.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00203

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

192
clean vehicles consortium, Chinese industrial partners only provide
guidance and in-kind contributions.32 In its 2012–2013 Annual Report, CERC reported its funding plan for the duration of the first
five-year phase (see Table 2).
Table 2:Multi-Year Bilateral CERC Funding Plan

Note: Shaded areas indicate planned spending.
Source: U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, p. C1.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00204

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

Table2.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Management of Intellectual Property under CERC
The nature of CERC’s work is collaborative, with several participants (academic, industry, or a combination) working on eachproject at the same time. As of July 2014, the CERC consisted of
75 individual projects within its three consortia, of which 58 were
joint. For example, the Clean Vehicles Consortium’s work on advanced batteries is conducted by representatives from University ofMichigan, the Ohio State University, Beijing Institute of Technology, and Tsinghua University. Managing intellectual property(IP) resulting from such cross-national joint work is a key challenge
to overcome. One of CERC’s unique features is its Technology Management Plan (TMP), which was created to address IP concerns associated with joint research and development (R&D) activities.
While the TMP does not add any new IP protections that the law
does not otherwise provide, TMP establishes a framework to manage any IP developed under the CERC umbrella. The TMP statesthat the owners of background IP retain ‘‘all right [sic], title, andinterest in their background IP’’ and they are not required to ‘‘license, assign or otherwise transfer’’ it, though using it may require
an appropriate license.33 For IP created by signatories from one
country only, the TMP mandates that participants agree to negotiate in good faith terms of a nonexclusive license to the other participants.
Although common elements are shared in the plan framework,
each consortium has a TMP to address the unique characteristics
of its individual research.34 To help researchers understand the
TMPs and other IP laws and practices in each country, the U.S.
DOE and China’s Ministry of Science and Technology carry out acontinuing program of IP education and training. The program includes legal education, technical assistance, and a series of IP
workshops for CERC participants.35
While the TMP was designed to manage the joint ownership ofIP resulting from CERC research activities, its utility is yet to be193
tested in practice, because CERC is not yet producing inventions
that were jointly developed by U.S. and Chinese participants.36
Protection of IP is a crucial component of promoting collaborative
innovation, yet lack of joint IP from CERC research projects points
to a longstanding mistrust of China’s lax IP protections. Joanna
Lewis, an expert on China’s energy policy at Georgetown University, noted that the TMP ‘‘does not seem to have sufficiently
changed’’ behavior of CERC participants with regards to their willingness to share IP or co-develop IP with Chinese participants.
U.S. participants are reluctant to share IP likely because ‘‘although
the TMP provides IP protection on paper, in practice there is stillmuch skepticism about its enforceability.’’ 37
CERC Cooperation Case Study: Advanced Coal Technology
Consortium (ACTC)
The Advanced Coal Technology Consortium (ACTC) is led jointly
by James Wood, West Virginia University (WVU) and Zheng
Chuguang, Huazhong University of Science and Technology. The
U.S. side of the ACTC is headquartered in the WVU National Research Center for Coal and Energy, located in Morgantown, WV.
The consortium consists of U.S. universities, national laboratories,and energy companies (see Table 3).
Table 3:

CERC Advanced Coal Technology Consortium Current Members

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

U.S. Members

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Chinese Members

West Virginia University (lead)

Huazhong University of Science andTechnology (lead)

University of Wyoming

China Huaneng Group Clean Energy
Research Institute

University of Kentucky

China University of Mining and Technology

Wyoming State Geological Survey

Harbin Institute of Technology

Indiana Geological Survey

Institute for Rock & Soil Mechanics, Chinese
Academy of Science

Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory

Northwest University

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Research Center for Energy & Power, Chinese
Academy of Sciences

National Energy Technology
Laboratory

Shanghai JiaoTong University

U.S.-China Clean Energy Fund

Tsinghua University

World Resources InstituteZhejiang University

American Electric Power

China Huaneng Group Power International,
Inc.

Babcock and Wilcox *China Power Engineering Consulting Group
Corporation

Duke Energy, Inc.

China Power Investment Corporation

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00205

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

194
Table 3:

CERC Advanced Coal Technology Consortium Current
Members—Continued

U.S. Members
General Electric (GE)

Chinese Members
ENN

LP Amina

Shaanxi Yanchang Petroleum Group Co., Ltd.
Shenhua Group* Note: Participation ended June 30, 2014, with further participation subject to corporate review.38
Source: U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/Advanced_
Coal_Technology.html.

The ACTC was the first CERC consortium to launch joint demonstration projects, several of which expanded upon existing private sector partnerships that had been in the early stages of development as CERC was being established and were folded into the
CERC portfolio.39 For example, Huaneng and Duke Energy had
begun cooperation related to advanced coal technology and CCS
demonstration in 2009 as the CERC agreement was being negotiated.40
In its most basic form, CCS is the process by which CO2 emissions from power plants and other industrial facilities are captured
and stored underground. CCS can be applied to electricity generating plants that burn fossil fuels, such as coal- or gas-fired power
stations, and can also significantly reduce emissions from industry,
such as the cement, steel, and chemical industries. Although theUnited States has championed CCS research in the 2000s,* interest in coal emission mediation (and related funding) has been on
the decline as a result of the influx of cheap natural gas derived
from advancements in ‘‘fracking.’’ 41 As greater attention and financing has focused on natural gas for its cheap generation costand low emissions relative to alternatives, utilities are reducing
their demand for coal, and are unwilling to pay a premium for
CCS.42 China’s reliance on coal, however, will remain quite strong
for the near future: Even if the Chinese government is successful
in reducing the share of coal in the energy mix, as envisioned in
the 12th Five-Year Plan, consumption of coal will rise in absoluteterms, as total energy demand is set to grow 4.3 percent a year
over the 2011–2015 period. In 2013 alone, China approved the construction of more than 100 million tons of new coal production capacity, six times more than a year earlier.43 Therefore, involvement

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Several CCS demonstration projects are currently underway in the United States, mostwith DOE support. For some examples of DOE’s programs, see U.S. Department of Energy,‘‘Carbon Capture and Storage Research.’’ http://energy.gov/fe/science-innovation/carbon-captureand-storage-research. An electrical generating station currently under construction in Kemper
County, Mississippi, when completed, will be the first U.S. power plant with integrated CCS
technology (the plant is expected to go into operation in 2015). The project, however, has been
behind schedule and over budget, leading to criticism of its viability and broader applicability
to U.S. coal power plants. See Steven Mufson, ‘‘Intended Showcase of Clean-Coal Hits Snags,’’
Washington Post, May 17, 2014. http: // www.washingtonpost.com / business / economy / intendedshowcase-of-clean-coal-future-hits-snags/2014/05/16/fc03e326-cfd2-11e3-b812-0c92213941f4_ story.html. Another project partially funded by DOE, the Petra Nova Carbon Capture Project (underconstruction in Thompsons, Texas), will be the largest CCS coal power plant in the world. The
project is expected to be completed in 2016. Ucilia Wang, ‘‘NRG’s $1B Bet To Show How Carbon
Capture Could Be Feasible For Coal Power Plants,’’ Forbes, July 15, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2014/07/15/nrgs-1b-bet-to-show-how-carbon-capture-could-be-feasible-for-coal-power-plants/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00206

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

195
in the ACTC presents a unique opportunity for U.S. companies specializing in CCS and related clean coal research.44
The ACTC’s current research agenda is divided into seven
themes to match the research interests and efforts of both theUnited States and China. These can be loosely categorized into
three general areas: CCS; power generation; and coal conversion.45
Jerald Fletcher, founding director of the ACTC noted in his testimony before the Commission that although both countries are engaged in all aspects of the research, ‘‘it has been clear from the beginning that the [United States] perceived the carbon management
issues to be of the highest interest while China was most interested in the increasing efficiency and technical advances in power
generation and coal utilization.’’ 46
This mismatch in research interests is reflected in IP creation.
Although several of the ACTC’s projects have led to IP creation,none of the IP is jointly held by Chinese and U.S. partners. As ofJanuary 2013, ACTC participants had filed 15 patents (12 filed in
China by Chinese ACTC members, and three filed in the UnitedStates by U.S. members).47
According to CERC’s U.S. Director Robert Marlay, as of July
2014, the ACTC had 39 research projects, 30 of which are joint research activities; some of which are highlighted here.48

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Clean Coal Conversion Technology Project involves joint research, led by WVU and Zhejiang University, into developing
new technology to convert conventional power plants into
power plants that use waste heat and fuel combustion to
produce chemicals and further byproducts from coal, making
the overall coal power production process more efficient, reducing emissions, and increasing economic benefits. To date, researchers have successfully validated the theoretical modelingon a 1-megawatt pilot plant. Upon completion of the project,
the newly developed technology is expected to reduce maintenance costs and greenhouse gas emissions by more than 25
percent, compared to conventional energy. Future plans include ACTC participant LP Amina building a demonstration
project at a power plant in Shanxi, China.49• CO2 Utilization Project involves research, by the University of
Kentucky and Duke Energy on the U.S. side and ENN Groupand Zhejiang University on the Chinese, into developing an
economically feasible technology to use CO2 to make biofuels.
In a demonstration facility installed at Duke Energy’s East
Bend power plant in Rabbit Hash, Kentucky, CERC researchers feed to algae the CO2 captured after combustion. Eventually, the algae, which absorb the CO2, as do all plants, can be
harvested for biogas fuels and animal feed. The research involves finding the optimum methods for growing and harvesting the oil from the algae, picking the best varieties ofalgae, and selecting the best types of growing media, such as
ponds or closed-loop photobioreactors.50• Advanced Power Generation Project is led by LP Amina on the
U.S. side and Tsinghua University on the Chinese side. Researchers designed and constructed a unique experimental sys-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00207

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

196
tem to research pulverized coal combustion and developed atoolbox of energy conservation and emission reduction technologies for coal-fired power plants. Researchers investigatedcombustion characteristics of Xinjiang Houxun coal in advanced ultra supercritical (A–USC) boilers. Power plants
equipped with A–USC boilers have the potential to dramatically improve efficiency and reduce emissions compared to existing coal-fired power plants. The development of improved A–
USC boiler technologies was adopted as a national program in
China.51• Post-combustion CO2 Capture Project is focused on developing
new technologies to capture and dissolve captured CO2, which
will be used to lower energy costs related to the post-combustion capture process. The research is led by University of Kentucky and China Huaneng Group. Researchers completed thesimulation of a 1 million ton/year post-combustion CO2 capturesystem at Duke Energy’s Gibson station, which revealed advantages over other methods. A two-phase solvent and a new
catalyst family with record activity levels were also developed
for the project.52• CO2 Sequestration and Storage Project resulted in the publication of 11 peer-reviewed papers and conference papers on thestorage and use of CO2 in the Ordos Basin in China. Led byWest Virginia University, University of Wyoming, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Shenhua Group, and the Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics (Chinese Academy of Sciences), the researchers initiated design, construction, and injection of CO2 at a pilot
project in China. They also assembled a large data set regarding the geologic structural framework of the Ordos Basin in
China, as well as for the Wyoming and Illinois Basins in the
United States. The significant opportunity for storage and useof CO2 in the Ordos Basin complements opportunities that are
being explored in the Wyoming and Illinois Basins.53

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Another U.S.-based ACTC participant, LP Amina, had begun cooperation with Gemeng International Energy Co. of Shanxi province, following a successful demonstration of an LP Amina technology process in China with the Zhejiang Energy Group. LP
Amina’s new technology, a coal classifier, prevented larger coal particles from entering the boiler, reducing nitrogen oxide emissions
by up to approximately 15 percent, and reduced coal consumption
and emissions. Despite the benefits, customers in the United States
would not buy the new classifier because it was an unproven technology that demanded a substantial upfront investment.54 After engagement in joint R&D and workshops convened by the CERC–
ACTC, LP Amina partnered with Zhejiang Energy Group, which installed the converter at one of its power plants in Fengtai in theAnhui Province in eastern China. David Piejak, president of LP
Anima in the United States, said that following the successful demonstration in China, LP Amina started marketing this technology
to global companies, including plants in the United States.55

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00208

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

197
CERC Cooperation Case Study: Clean Vehicles Consortium(CVC)
Huei Peng from the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) leads
the U.S. consortium, and Minggao Ouyang from Tsinghua University leads the Chinese consortium. Current CVC participants arelisted in Table 4.
Table 4:

CERC Clean Vehicles Consortium Current Members

U.S. Members

Chinese Members

University of Michigan (lead)

Tsinghua University (lead)

The Ohio State University

Beihang University

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)Beijing Institute of Technology

Sandia National Laboratories

Chinese Academy of Sciences

Joint BioEnergy Institute

Hunan University

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

North China Electric Power University

Argonne National Laboratory

Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Aramco Services

Tianjin University

DelphiTongji University

Denso

Wuhan University of Technology

Eaton

Changzhou ECTEK Automotive Electronics
LimitedFord Motor Company

China Automotive Engineering ResearchInstitute Co., Ltd.

Honda R&D Americas, Inc.

China Automotive Technology & ResearchCenterHuntsman International

China Potevio

PJM

Geely GroupTE Connectivity

JAC Motors
Jing-jin Electric Co., Ltd.
Keypower

Toyota Motor Company,
North America

SAIC Motor.
Shanghai General Motor Muling
Tianjin Lishen Battery Joint-stock Co., Ltd.
Wanxiang

Source: U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center. http: // www.us - china - cerc.org / Clean _Vehicles.html.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

According to the testimony from Dr. Peng, the CVC’s research
projects officially started in 2011. Since then, joint research has
been conducted in the following areas: advanced batteries and en-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00209

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

198
ergy conversion, advanced biofuels and clean combustion, vehicle
electrification, advanced lightweight materials and structures, vehicle-grid integration, and energy systems analysis. The CVC has
been one of the most active consortia in terms of inventions. According to CERC U.S. Director Robert Marlay, as of July 2014, theCVC had 24 research activities, of which 16 were joint, some ofwhich are highlighted here.56• Degradation in Li-ion Batteries is a project led by the Ohio
State University, Tsinghua University, and Beijing Institute ofTechnology. The researchers explored ways to extend life andimprove performance of lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries, commonly used in hybrid and electric vehicles. The CVC researchers demonstrated a new design that minimizes this degradation in performance by applying a special polymer coating. The
final outcome of this research is expected to be a developmentof a new battery cell for further studies.57• Research into Materials Sourcing and Driving Behavior is led
by University of Michigan and Tsinghua University, in partnership with General Motors and Ford. CERC researchers
used GPS tracking software on 1,000 vehicles to reveal that 60
percent of Beijing drivers travel fewer than 25 miles per day.
By contrast, U.S. drivers log an average of 40 miles daily,
which guided U.S. design criteria for battery-sizing of the
Chevrolet Volt. Based on this new information, General Motors
could downsize the Volt’s battery in the Beijing market andstill provide a level of service similar to that provided in the
United States. Researchers simulated a Plug-in Hybrid Electric
Vehicle similar to the Chevrolet Volt and examined the impactof vehicle component materials on lifecycle energy and emissions.58• Vehicle Body Design Optimization, a project led by Universityof Michigan, Tsinghua University, and Tongji University, explores a methodology for using lightweight materials in vehicle
design. Further research is expected to explore the safety of
newly designed vehicles, the effects of battery layouts on crashworthiness, and optimization of the vehicle’s aerodynamic performance.59• Electric Vehicle Charging Station Simulations conducted by researchers at the Ohio State University and Tsinghua University was aimed at improving coordination between road networks and electricity systems. Researchers found that current
strategies for determining the location of vehicle charging stations will result in significant inefficiencies, and proposed alternative solutions.60
As of January 2013, participants in the CERC CVC had filed 12
patents in China and 11 in the United States, as well as 20 disclosures * in the United States. Although all of the patents filed in
China were filed by Chinese participants, the 11 patents filed in
the United States were also filed by Chinese participants. These fil-DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* An invention disclosure is a document describing the invention, prepared by the scientist,
investor, or a third party, which usually serves as a first step in the patenting process.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00210

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

199
ings were related to patents that had first been filed in China. In
contrast, U.S. participants filed no patents in China.61 Furthermore, none of the patents were filed jointly by U.S. and Chinese
CERC participants. The lack of jointly-created IP and of U.S. inventions patented in China—features shared by all CERC consortia—point to the continued sensitivity over the capacity of Chinese law to protect IP and address violations.
The automotive industry is highly competitive and, although foreign brands or joint ventures have dominated the Chinese automotive market to date, Beijing is heavily invested in making China
a world leader in the production and deployment of electric and hybrid vehicles.* This poses a significant competitive challenge to
U.S. industrial partners in CERC—how to advance their own presence in China while maintaining an edge over Chinese competitors.
According to Dr. Peng, the funding model for U.S. CERC ensuresthat all work supported by U.S. industrial membership fees is U.S.only and does not have Chinese collaborators.62
Unlike the CERC ACTC, where several industry partners joined
to seek help with demonstrating a ready technology, the work doneby CERC CVC participants is in the early stages of research, withcommercialization years away.63 Still, Dr. Peng noted in a 2013
CERC CVC progress report that U.S. industrial partners have requested a review of the implementation for all U.S. based tasks,
with the goal of setting clear pathways towards commercialization.64
U.S.-China Cooperation on Natural Gas
Although natural gas accounted for only 4 percent of China’s energy consumption in 2011 (the most recent data available), the government has invested heavily in resource development and infrastructure. The 12th Five-Year Plan set a target to boost the shareof natural gas to 8 percent of total consumption by the end of 2015
and to 10 percent by 2020. According to a 2014 report by the U.S.
Energy Information Administration, China’s technically recoverable
shale gas reserves are 1,115 trillion cubic feet, the largest shale gas
reserves in the world.65
The government agenda for natural gas in China is ambitious,
but it faces significant obstacles. China lacks technical experienceand adequate infrastructure which, coupled with the difficult geology of Chinese reserves, makes recovery challenging. The Chinese
shale gas revolution cannot progress without U.S. cooperation. 66
The United States and China are working together in both a governmental and private sector capacity. In 2009, Presidents Barack
Obama and Hu Jintao announced the launch of the U.S.-China
Shale Gas Resource Initiative with the goal of sharing information
about shale gas exploration and technology to reduce greenhousegas emissions, promote energy security, and create commercial op-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The government established targets for pure electric and hybrid electric vehicles of 500,000
by 2015 and 5 million by 2020. Its ‘‘ten cities, thousand vehicles’’ program, launched the same,planned for ten cities to develop 1,000 electric vehicles each; by 2011, the list of cities had expanded to 25. Subsidies of 50,000–60,000 RMB ($8,000–$9,600) were offered to consumers whopurchased the cars. Elizabeth Economy, ‘‘China’s Round Two on Electric Cars: Will It Work?’’
Asia Unbound (Council on Foreign Relations), April 17, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2014/04/17/
chinas-round-two-on-electric-cars-will-it-work-2/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00211

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

200
portunities. The U.S.-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative promotes information sharing and joint studies to provide U.S. commercial opportunities and increase the pace of development of shale
gas in China.67 Tours, workshops, and the U.S.-China Oil and Gas
Industry Forum are functions of the Initiative used to increase investment in China’s shale market. The U.S.-China Oil and Gas Industry Forum sponsors an annual meeting designed to bring industry players together to share information via technical presentations.68 In September 2012, the forum sponsored a meeting focused on shale gas. DOE also has relevant work underway that focuses on issues under Annex III of the bilateral Fossil Energy Protocol.69
Other examples of government-to-government collaboration include the U.S. Geological Survey and DOE’s work with Chinesecounterparts to develop estimates for China’s shale gas resources.70
USTDA has also contributed by partnering with China’s NEA on
a training program that included four short courses led by the Gas
Technologies Institute and targeted attendees from the Chinese
government and industry.71
These government-led activities notwithstanding, commercial activities have been the main avenue for information sharing andtechnology transfer in the shale gas sector. The U.S. technologicaledge makes U.S. companies valuable sources of fracking know-how
for Chinese oil companies, and Chinese investment in the U.S.
shale gas sector has been on the rise. Rhodium Group, aconsultancy, shows that from 2000 to the first quarter of 2014, Chinese investors made over 100 deals, both greenfield and acquisition, in the U.S. energy sector, valued at nearly $12 billion.72 In
2013 alone, China invested $3.2 billion in the U.S. energy sector.
Sinopec invested $1 billion in Chesapeake Energy’s oil and gas assets in Oklahoma; Sinochem bought the Wolfcamp shale field for$1.7 billion from Pioneer Natural Resources, and CNOOC acquired
Nexen’s U.S. operations in the Gulf of Mexico.73
The success of Chinese investors in the United States points toa troubling lack of reciprocity. As Sarah Forbes, senior associate at
World Resources Institute, has pointed out, China prohibits foreigncompanies from fully entering this sector on their own, forcing
them instead to form partnerships with Chinese entities.74 Chinesecompanies face no such obstacles when they acquire assets in U.S.
gas and oil companies working on shale projects. While Chinese
capital helps U.S. companies to pursue the domestic energy
projects driving the United States’ move toward energy independence, they raise concerns about the long-term effects of technology
transfer on U.S. economic competitiveness.
U.S.-China Cooperation on Civil Nuclear Energy

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

As a reliable non-fossil energy source, nuclear power plays a central role in China’s plan to reduce its reliance on coal.75 Although
nuclear sources accounted for only 1 percent of China’s total energy
consumption in 2011 (the most recent data available), Chinese nuclear expansion plans are by far the most ambitious in the world.
While China has 20 reactors online (accounting for about 2 percent
of total generation capacity),76 it has 28 reactors under construc-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00212

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

201

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

tion (representing roughly 40 percent of reactor construction
around the world),77 and an additional 58 reactors are being
planned.78 China’s installed nuclear capacity was 14.7 GW in 2013;
the 12th Five-Year plan set a goal of 40 GW by the end of 2015
and 58 GW by 2020. In contrast, the United States has 62 commercial nuclear power plants with 100 nuclear reactors (with combined
capacity of 101 GW) generating 19 percent of the country’s electricity, behind coal and natural gas.
The Chinese government’s plans for nuclear energy developmentemphasize self-reliance. Technology development, however, presents a major challenge for the Chinese nuclear sector, where a select number of state-owned nuclear companies have long struggled
to develop advanced reactor technology based on older reactor imports.79 As it has done in other industrial sectors, the government
started obtaining foreign technology to rectify gaps in indigenous
capability.
The United States and China have cooperated on nuclear energy
for nearly 30 years, although for most of its history, the cooperation
has focused primarily on strengthening safety. Under the U.S.China Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology Agreement of 1998,
DOE has provided nuclear safety, safeguards, and security training
to Chinese regulators and technicians to ensure China meets thehighest nuclear safety and nonproliferation standards. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration has been collaborating with
Chinese authorities on radioactive source security, nuclear safeguards, export controls, materials and waste management, emergency management, and the establishment of a center of excellence
for nuclear security training.
The United States and China also participate in cooperative research in nuclear energy technology under the auspices of the U.S.China Bilateral Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperative Action Plan,signed in 2007. Designed to ‘‘explore advanced nuclear fuel cycle
approaches in a safe, secure and proliferation-resistant manner,’’
the two countries cooperate in the areas of advanced fuel cycle
technology, fast reactor technology, and small and medium reactors.80
As with shale gas development, however, transfer of technology
through commercial engagement dominates U.S.-China nuclear cooperation. In 2007, U.S.-based Westinghouse (owned by Toshiba
Corp.) won the contract to build four AP1000 nuclear reactors in
China. The deal included a technology transfer agreement that allowed China’s State Nuclear Power Technology Corp., directly
under China’s State Council, to receive over 75,000 documents that
relate to the construction of the AP1000 reactors.81 The first reactor built under this arrangement was expected to go on line in2013, but construction delays and tougher safety checks pushed thestart back several times—first to December 2014 and later to theend of 2015.82
According to Jane Nakano, Energy and National Security Program fellow at CSIS, the construction of AP1000 reactors has been
providing U.S. regulators and engineers with valuable first-handobservations that contribute to the overall improvement of work on
nuclear safety.83 China decided to begin construction on the
AP1000 reactors before they were approved by the U.S. Nuclear

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00213

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

202
Regulatory Commission, essentially becoming a ‘‘pilot’’ for U.S.-designed reactors.
China has drawn technology from foreign partners (notably Russia and France) prior to the Westinghouse deal. In fact, the mostcommon reactor type currently under construction is the CPR–
1000, a Chinese development of French design. The intellectual
property rights were retained by the French company Areva, however, which limited the overseas sales potential for the CPR–
1000.84 Because the sale of the AP1000 entailed a substantial IP
transfer, it created a situation where Westinghouse bolstered thecompetitiveness of Chinese vendors. As Ms. Nakano notes in her
testimony, the Chinese government has dedicated significant resources to ‘‘indigenize’’ most advanced nuclear technology, making
development of a Chinese reactor based on the AP1000 one of the
16 ‘‘national projects’’ under China’s Medium- and Long-Term National Science and Technology Development Plan (covering 2006–2020).85 According to various statements from Chinese nuclear regulators and operators, the intellectual property rights on ‘‘indigenous’’ reactor, CAP1400, reside with the Chinese entities, referringto their agreement with Westinghouse that reportedly ‘‘gave theChinese domestic rights to much of the core AP1000 derivatives.’’ 86
As a consequence of using, adapting, and improving foreign technology, China is now self-sufficient in reactor design and construction, and is pursuing a policy of exporting nuclear technology.87
China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General
Nuclear Power Group (CGN), China’s main nuclear operators, areworking to find an international market for their reactors, mostly
developed based on the CAP1400 reactor. In 2013, CNNC was contracted to build two reactors for a nuclear power project in Pakistan,* with the Chinese government committing to finance $6.5 billion of the $9.95 billion for the project.88
United States and China also collaborate on the next generationof nuclear technologies. Under an MOU on Cooperation in Nuclear
Energy Sciences and Technologies, which includes cooperation on
nuclear fuel resources and nuclear hybrid energy systems,89 DOE
and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) are collaborating on amolten salt reactor † that could run on thorium. Thorium, a naturally-occurring radioactive metal, is an alternative to uranium, andis abundant in nature.90
The first thorium reactor was designed and built at DOE’s Oak
Ridge National Laboratory in the 1960s (the program was ultimately cancelled due to a preference for uranium-fueled reactors).
The Chinese government made research into thorium-based reactors a priority and budgeted $350 million to a project at the Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics, with the intention to ‘‘obtain full
intellectual property rights on the technology.’’ 91 The Chinese pro-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Although the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), of which China is a member, forbids the supply of nuclear power plants to non-members like Pakistan without approval, China has argued
that its agreement with Pakistan for cooperation in civil nuclear technology was signed before
China joined the NSG. NSG has not censured China for the deal. See Saurav Jha, ‘‘With Reactor
Deal, China and Pakistan Seek to Reshape Global Nuclear Governance,’’ World Politics Review,
November 5, 2013. http: // www.worldpoliticsreview.com / articles / 13349 / with-reactor-deal-chinaand-pakistan-seek-to-reshape-global-nuclear-governance.
† Unlike the pressurized water cooling system most often used in traditional uranium-fueledreactors, molten salt reactors are an experimental class of nuclear fission reactors in which theprimary coolant is a molten salt mixture, which reduces the risk of meltdowns.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00214

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

203
gram is headed by Jiang Mianheng, son of the former Chinesepresident Jiang Zemin, who in 2010 brokered a cooperative agreement between DOE (primarily Oak Ridge National Laboratory) andCAS.92 In 2011, DOE gave a $7.5 million grant for related research
led by MIT in collaboration with the University of California at
Berkeley and the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Westinghouse has been tapped as a commercial partner,93 but no U.S. government program currently exists to develop thorium reactors.
Implications for the United States

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

To the extent that China’s investment in clean energy leads toreduced emissions of CO2 and other pollutants of water, air, andsoil, U.S. public and private cooperation with China on development of clean energy has positive outcomes for all nations. China
is a global leader in clean energy investment, and Chinese funding
could be used to boost technologies that are not cost effective in the
short run. Moreover, the combined work of U.S. and Chinese researchers can magnify progress made individually. Intangible benefits, such as building trust and mutual understanding, are also valuable and will likely lead to future collaboration.
China’s lack of strong IP standards and potential for future competition with U.S. renewable energy companies remain primarychallenges to closer cooperation. Analysts and policymakers continue to fear that China could reap the benefits of cooperation at
the expense of U.S. industry and workers.94 Although much of thecurrent friction has been concentrated in the renewable energy sector, the Chinese government has deployed massive resources topromote the clean energy sector as well, which may result in additional anticompetitive or illegal practices. In 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce applied antidumping and countervailing duties
on Chinese solar panels after U.S. solar companies successfully argued that Chinese manufacturers were unfairly subsidized by the
Chinese government.95 In a separate case, American Superconductor Corp. (AMSC) sued Sinovel, a Chinese wind turbine
manufacturer, through the Chinese courts for up to $1.2 billion ofdamages for theft of IP.96 The U.S. Department of Justice charged
Sinovel (along with two of its employees and a former employee ofan AMSC subsidiary) with stealing trade secrets from AMSC, causing an alleged loss of more than $800 million to the company. The
case is still pending.97
CERC’s efforts are still too new to comprehensively assess.
Under CERC, the policy dialogue, capacity building, and technology
transfer are supplemented with joint R&D and new technologies.
The Technology Management Plan set up by CERC is one example
of an attempt to alleviate concerns over protection of IP. However,to date, most CERC participants still tend to design collaborative
projects only around less sensitive research topics and little of the
new IP generated through CERC activities has come from collaborative efforts—an indication that China’s history of poor IP protection continues to have a chilling effect on cooperation.
Dr. Lewis noted that many of the truly collaborative and international projects under CERC do not deal in true R&D activities,
but rather less sensitive research areas, such as technology mod-VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00215

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

204
eling and policy analysis.98 Experts working on other collaborative
efforts have reached the same conclusion. For example, Valerie
Karplus, project director of the China Energy and Climate Projectat MIT, echoed Dr. Lewis’s assessment. The China Energy and Climate Project collaborative team studies energy and environmental
policy decision making in China, in most cases employing opensource modeling tools, which eliminates common IP- or competition-related concerns associated with U.S.-China cooperation onclean energy.99 Focusing on building trust might be a good option
in the short term, but work needs to be truly collaborative in thelong run to ensure that benefits accrue equally to all participants.
For U.S. energy companies, lack of consistent U.S. government
policy and secure funding for new technologies means that they
have to seek research or implementation opportunities elsewhere.
According to Dr. Lewis, for almost all of the U.S. business participants in CERC ‘‘one of the biggest advantages of participating . . .
was to gain leverage for technology demonstration projects.’’ 100
Many industry CERC participants have invested their own moneyin the collaborations ‘‘far in excess of government support because
government involvement provided leverage for project approvals,
and many CERC collaborations were perceived to have current or
future commercial value.’’ 101
Despite some positive trends, all too often, U.S.-China collaboration continues to default to the transfer of U.S. technology to
China. Collaboration on shale gas and nuclear power exemplify thistrend. Investment by Chinese companies in U.S. shale points to theunequal access U.S. energy companies have in China, even as theirChinese counterparts do not have similar restrictions in the UnitedStates. In civil nuclear energy, too, the collaboration seems to haveconsisted solely of a transfer of U.S. intellectual property to China,
which is now building its own reactors.
So many collaborative initiatives with overlapping priorities exist
in the government-sponsored arena alone (see Addendum I) that it
becomes difficult to track spending, mark progress, and identify
redundancies. When various academic and industry initiatives(many receiving public money) are added to the mix, the task ofseparating successful and useful initiatives from the wasteful ones
becomes even more challenging.
Another challenge to productive collaboration is getting participants to move from discussion to action. In her assessment of U.S.China cooperation on clean coal and CCS, Kelly Sims Gallagher, director of the Center for International Environment and Resource
Policy at Tufts University, said that although bilateral work ontechnical research continues to become more robust, ‘‘the problem
remains of too many meetings and not enough concrete
projects.’’ 102 Still, CERC is only halfway through its first five
years, and will likely be renewed for a second five-year phase(2016–2020).
Conclusions

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• The United States and China share similar challenges in theirquest for clean energy. Both countries are leading global emitters

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00216

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

205
of greenhouse gasses and could benefit from cooperation on
issues related to climate change and environmental protection.
• The United States and China have been cooperating for over 30
years on environmental and clean energy initiatives, with muchof the early agreements focusing more on establishing the basic
frameworks for cooperation and on energy policy discussions. In
the 2000s, clean energy and climate change mitigation emerged
as leading topics of cooperation between China and the UnitedStates, culminating in 2009 with the establishment of the Clean
Energy Research Center (CERC), a joint research initiative.
• The CERC facilitates joint research and development on clean
energy technology by teams of scientists and engineers from theUnited States and China. Funded in equal parts by the UnitedStates and China, CERC has participation from universities, research institutions and industry. CERC’s three research priorities (the consortia) are advanced clean coal technologies, clean
vehicles, and building energy efficiency.
• While Chinese CERC participants have been filing patents in
China and in the United States, to date, there have been no
jointly-created intellectual property (IP) and no U.S. inventions
patented in China, suggesting that China’s history of lax protection of IP dampens enthusiasm for collaboration.
• While collaboration under CERC is research-driven, U.S.-China
cooperation on shale gas development is more commercial, largely involving investment by Chinese companies in U.S. shale assets in order to acquire technology and know-how.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Similar to shale gas, U.S.-China cooperation on civil nuclear energy involves a sale of technology to China, supplemented by nuclear safety, safeguards, and security training to Chinese regulators and technicians to ensure China meets the highest nuclear
safety and nonproliferation standards.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00217

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

206

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

1979

Scientific andTechnology
Cooperative
Agreement

Official bilateralgovernmental
agreement established by President Carter andVice PremierDeng Xiaoping

Began with a focus on high-energy physics and then served as
an umbrella for 30 subsequent bilateral environment and energy
protocols. Extended for 5 years.

1979

MOU for Bilateral Energy
Agreements

U.S. DOE andthe China State
Development
Planning Commission (SDPC)

Led to 19 cooperative agreements
on energy, including fossil energy,
climate change, fusion energy, energy efficiency, renewable energy,
peaceful nuclear technologies, andenergy information exchange.

1979

Atmosphereand Scienceand Technology Protocol

NOAA and Chinese Meteorological Administration

Promotes bilateral exchange on
climate and oceans data, research, and joint projects.

1983

Protocol on
Nuclear Physics and Magnetic Fusion

DOE and State
Science andTechnology Commission (SSTC)

Pursues the long-term objective
to use fusion as an energy source.

1987

Annex III to
the Fossil Energy Protocol
Cooperation in
the Field of
Atmospheric
Trade Gases

DOE and State
Science andTechnology Commission (SSTC)

Cooperative research program on
the possible effects of CO2 on climate change.

1988

Sino-American
Conference onenergy demand, markets and policy in Nanjing

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL)/
DOE and State
Planning Commission (SPC)/
Energy ResearchInstitute (ERI)

Informal bilateral conference onenergy efficiency that led to an
exchange program between ERI
and LBNL, and the first assessment of China’s energy conservation published by LBNL in 1989.

1992

U.S. Joint
Commission
on Commerce
and Trade

U.S. Departmentof Commerce(DOC)

Facilitates the development ofcommercial relations and related
economic matters between the
U.S. and China. The JCCT’s Environment subgroup supports
technology demonstrations, training workshops, trade missions,exhibitions and conferences tofoster environmental and commercial cooperation.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00218

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

207

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

1993

U.S. Commercial Mission toChina

DOE and DOC

For U.S. companies to promote
their electric power technology
services in China. Industry representatives identified a potential
for $13.5 billion in U.S. electric
power exports between 1994–
2003 (not including nuclear
power), equating to 270,000 highsalary U.S. jobs and an opportunity for introducing cost-effective, environmental sound U.S.
technologies into China’s electric
power industry.

1993

Establishmentof the Beijing
Energy Efficiency Center(BECon)ERI, LBNL, Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory (PNNL),
WWF, EPA, SPC,
SETC, SSTC

The first nongovernmental, nonprofit organization in China focusing on promoting energy efficiency by providing advice to central and local government agencies, supporting energy efficiency
business development, creating
and coordinating technical training programs, and providing information to energy professionals.

1994

Annexes tothe fossil energy protocol

DOE and SSTC

(1) To make positive contributions
towards improving process andequipment efficiency, reduce atmospheric pollution on a global
scale, advance China’s Clean Coal
Technologies Development Program, and promote economic andtrade cooperation beneficial toboth parties. (2) Cooperation incoal-fired magnetohydrodynamic(MHD) power generation.

1994

China’s Agenda 21 Document Released

SSTC and China’s National Climate Committee

Lays out China’s request forinternational assistance on environmental issues. The U.S.
agreed to support China through
DOE’s Climate Change Country
Studies and Support for National
Actions Plans programs.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00219

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

208

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

1995

Series of DOE
bilateralagreements
signed by Secretary of Energy Hazel
O’Leary

Bilateral agreements on energy between DOE andministries as noted below:(1) MOU on bilateral energy consultations (withSPC)(2) Research on reactor fuel (with China Atomic Energy Authority)(3) Renewable energy (with Ministry of Agriculture)(4) Energy efficiency development (with SSTC)(5) Renewable energy technology development (withSSTC)(6) Coal bed methane recovery and use (with Ministry of the Coal Industry)(7) Regional climate research (with the China Meteorological Administration)
Also established• Plan for mapping China’s renewable energy resources (with SPC)
• Strategies for facilitating financing of U.S. renewable energy projects in China (with SPC, Chineseand U.S. Ex-Im Banks)• Discussions for reducing and phasing out lead gasoline in China (DOE & EPA with China’s EPA &SINOPEC)

1995
(some
annexesin 1996)

Protocol for
Cooperation in
the Fields ofEnergy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technology Development andUtilization

DOE and various
ministries

This Protocol has seven annexes
that address policy; rural energy(Ministry of Agriculture); largescale wind systems (with SEPA);
renewable energy business development (with SETC) and geothermal energy; energy efficiency(with SPC); and hybrid-electricvehicle development. Ten teamsof Chinese and U.S. governmentandindustry
representatives
work under this protocol focusing
on: energy policy, information exchange and business outreach,
district heating, cogeneration,buildings, motor systems, industrial process controls, lighting,amorphous core transformers,
and finance.

1995–
2000

Statement ofIntent for Statistical information exchange (later
became a Protocol)

DOE and China’s
National

Consisted of five meetings to discuss energy supply and demandand exchange information on
methods of data collection andprocessing of energy information.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00220

Fmt 6601

Purpose/Description

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

209

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

1997

U.S.-China
Forum on Environment &Development

Established byVice President Al
Gore and Premier Li Peng

Venue for high-level bilateral discussion on sustainable development. Established four working
groups: energy policy, commercial
cooperation, science for sustainable development, and environmental policy. Three priority
areas for cooperative work: urban
air quality; rural electrification;and clean energy and energy efficiency.

1998-ongoing

Agreement ofIntent on Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Technology

DOE and SPC

Paved the way for the exchange
of information and personnel,
training and participation in research and development in thefield of nuclear and nuclear nonproliferation technologies.

1997

Energy andEnvironment
Cooperation
Initiative(EECI)

DOE and SPC

Targeted urban air quality, rural
electrification and energy sources,
and clean energy sources and energy efficiency. Involved multiple
agencies and participants frombusiness sectors, and linked energy development and environmental protection.

1997

U.S.-China
Energy andEnvironmental Center

Tsinghua University and Tulane
University, with
DOE and SSTC/
MOST

An
initiative
centeredatTsinghua and Tulane Universities co-funded by DOE and
MOST to: (1) provide training
programs in environmental policies, legislation and technology;(2) develop markets for U.S. clean
coal technologies; and (3) help
minimize the local, regional andglobal environmental impact ofChina’s energy consumption.

1998

Joint Statement on Military Environmental Protection

U.S. Secretary of
Defense andVice-Chairman ofChinese Central
Military Commission

MOU provides for the exchange ofvisits by high-level defense officials and the opening of a dialogue on how to address common
environmental problems.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00221

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

210

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

1999

U.S.-China
Forum on Environment &Development

The U.S. Ex-Im
Bank, DOE, theChina Development Bank, andthe SDPC

The second meeting of the Forumin Washington, co-chaired by Vice
President Al Gore and Premier
Zhu Rongji. Two key agreementsthat came out of the meeting related to renewable energy included a MOU for the establishment of a $100 Million Clean Energy Program to accelerate thedeployment of clean U.S. technologies to China in the area ofenergy efficiency, renewable energy, and pollution reduction, anda Statement of Intent on Cleaner
Air and Cleaner Energy Technology Cooperation that focusedon energy efficiency improvements in industrial coal-fired
boilers; clean coal technology;
high-efficiency electric motors;
and grid-connected wind electric
power.

1999–
2000

Fusion Program of Cooperation

DOE and CAS

Plasma physics, fusion technology, advanced design studies
and materials research.

2002–
2003

U.S.-China
Fusion Bilateral Program

DOE and CAS

Plasma physics, fusion technology
and power plant studies.

2003

FutureGEN

DOE with many
international
partners

Initially planned as a demonstration project for an Integrated
Gasification
Combined
Cycle(IGCC) Coal plant with carbon
capture and storage (CCS), theproject was significantly restructured in January 2008 and now
may provide federal funding tosupport CCS on a privately funded IGCC or PC plant, though thetimeframe is highly uncertain.

2004

U.S.-China
Energy Policy
Dialogue

DOE and NDRC

Resumed the former Energy Policy Consultations under the 1995
DOE–SPC MOU. Led to a MOU
between DOE and NDRC on Industrial Energy Efficiency Cooperation and includes energy audits of up to 12 of China’s mostenergy-intensive enterprises, aswell as training and site visits in
the U.S. to train auditors.

2004

U.S.-China
Green Olympic Cooperation Working
Group

DOE, Beijing
Government

Included opportunities for DOE toassist China with physical protection of nuclear and radiologicalmaterials and facilities for the
Beijing Olympics as done in Athens, Greece.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00222

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

211

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

2006

Asia-PacificPartnershipon CleanU.S., China +India, Japan,
Korea, Australia(later Canada)

Created public-private task forces
around specific sectors: Aluminum, Buildings and Appliances, Cement, Cleaner Use of
Fossil Energy, Coal Mining,
Power Generation and Transmission, Renewable Energy andDistributed
Generation,
andSteel.

2006

U.S.-China
Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED)

U.S. Treasury
Secretary Henry
Paulson and Vice
Premier Wu Yi.
Includes DOE,
EPA, NDRC,
MOST

Bi-annual, cabinet level dialoguethat includes an energy and environment track.

2007

MOU on Cooperation on
the Development of
Biofuels

USDA and
NDRC

Encourages cooperation in biomass and feedstock production
and sustainability; conversion
technology and engineering; biobased product development andutilization standards; and ruraland agricultural development
strategies.

2007

U.S.-China Bilateral Civil
Nuclear Energy Cooperative ActionPlan

DOE and NDRC

To compliment discussions under
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNDP) towards the expansion of peaceful, proliferationresistant nuclear energy forgreenhouse gas emissions-free,sustainable electricity production.
Bilateral discussions include separations technology, fuels andmaterials development, fast reactor technology and safeguards
planning.

2007

U.S.-China
Westinghouse
Nuclear Reactor Agreement

DOE, State Nuclear PowerTechnology Corporation(SNPTC)DOE approved the sale of four
1,100-megawatt AP1000 nuclear
power plants which use a recently
improved version of existing Westinghouse pressurized water reactor technology. The contract wasvalued at $8 billion and included
technology transfer to China. The
four reactors are to be built between 2009 and 2015.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00223

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

212

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

2008

Ten Year Energy & Environment Cooperation
Framework(SED IV)

DOE, Treasury,
State, Commerce,
EPA, NDRC,State Forestry
Administration,
National Energy
Administration(NEA), Ministryof Finance, Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP),
MOST, and MFA

Establishes five joint task forceson the five functional areas of theframework: (1) clean efficiency
and secure electricity production
and transmission; (2) clean water;(3) clean air; (4) clean and efficient transportation; and (5) conservation of forest and wetland
ecosystems.

2009

U.S.-China
Strategic &Economic Dialogue

U.S. Departmentof State and Department ofTreasury, China
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In April 2009 the SED was rebranded as the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), with theState and Treasury Departments
now co-chairing the dialogue for
the United States. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner andSecretaryofState
Hillary
Rodham Clinton were joined forthe first Dialogue in July 2009 by
their respective Chinese CoChairs, State Councilor Dai
Bingguo and Vice Premier Wang
Qishan, to cover a range of strategic and economic issues. The
S&ED was convened again in
Beijing in May 2010.

2009

Memorandumof Understanding toEnhance Cooperation on
ClimateChange, Energy and theEnvironment
This MOU is
to be implemented via
the existing
Ten-Year Energy and Environment Cooperation
Framework,and a newly
established
ClimateChange Policy
Dialogue, as
well as new
agreements
forthcoming.

Signed between DOE, State and NDRC. To strengthen and coordinate respective efforts to combat global
climate change, promote clean and efficient energy,
protect the environment and natural resources, andsupport environmentally sustainable and low-carbon
economic growth. Both countries resolve to pursue
areas of cooperation where joint expertise, resources,
research capacity and combined market size can accelerate progress towards mutual goals. These include, but are not limited to:• Energy conservation and energy efficiency• Renewable energy• Cleaner uses of coal, and carbon capture and storage• Sustainable transportation, including electric vehicles• Modernization of the electrical grid
• Joint research and development of clean energy
technologies• Clean air• Clean water• Natural resource conservation, e.g., protection of
wetlands and nature reserves• Combating climate change and promoting low-carbon economic growth

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00224

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

213

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

2009

ClimateChange Policy
Dialogue

Representativesof the two countries’ leaders

The United States and China will
work together to further promote
the full, effective and sustained
implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. The dialogue
will promote: (1) discussion andexchange of views on domestic
strategies and policies for addressing climate change; (2) practical solutions for promoting thetransition to low-carbon economies; (3) successful international
negotiations on climate change;(4) joint research, development,
deployment, and transfer, as mutually agreed, of climate-friendly
technologies; (5) cooperation on
specific projects; (6) adaptation toclimate change; (7) capacity building and the raising of publicawareness; and (8) pragmatic cooperation on climate change between cities, universities, provinces and states of the two countries.

2009

Memorandumof Cooperation
to Build Capacity to Address Climate
Change

EPA and NDRC

In support of the MOU to Enhance Cooperation on Climate
Change, Energy and the Environment, this five-year agreement includes: (1) capacity building fordeveloping greenhouse gas inventories; (2) education and publicawareness of climate change; (3)the impacts of climate change toeconomic development, humanhealth and ecological system, as
well as research on corresponding
countermeasures; and (4) otherareas as determined by the participants.

2009

U.S.-China
Joint Commission on Commerce andTradeCo-chaired by
U.S. Dept. ofCommerce Secretary Gary
Locke, U.S.
Trade Representative Ron Kirk,
Chinese Vice Premier Wang
Qishan, with participation frommany ministries/
agencies fromboth countries

The Commission met in October
2009 in Hangzhou, China, andreached multiple agreements inmany sectors, including, in theclean energy sector for China toremove its local content requirements on wind turbines.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00225

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

214

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

2009

U.S.-China
Clean Energy
Research Center (CERC)

DOE, MOST,NEAFirst announced in July 2009
during U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Steven Chu’s visit
to Beijing and finalized during
the November 2009 Presidential
Summit, the Center will facilitate
joint research and development ofclean energy technologies byteams of scientists and engineersfrom the United States andChina, as well as serve as a clearinghouse to help researchers ineach country. The Center will besupported by public and private
funding of at least $150 million
over five years, split evenly between the two countries. Initialresearch priorities will be building energy efficiency, clean coalincluding carbon capture andstorage, and clean vehicles.

2009

U.S.-China
Electric Vehicles Initiative

DOE, MOST,
NEA

Announced during the November
2009 Presidential Summit andbuilding on the first-ever U.S.China Electric Vehicle Forum in
September 2009, the initiative
will include joint standards development, demonstration projects inmore than a dozen cities, technical roadmapping, and public
education projects.

2009

U.S.-China
Renewable
Energy Partnership

DOE, MOST,
NEA

Announced during the November
2009 Presidential Summit, thePartnership calls for the twocountries to develop roadmaps forwidespread renewable energy deployment in both countries. The
Partnership will also provide
technical and analytical resources
to states and regions in bothcountries to support renewableenergy deployment and will facilitate state-to-state and region-toregion partnerships to share experience and best practices. A
new Advanced Grid Working
Group will bring together U.S.
and Chinese policymakers, regulators, industry leaders, and civilsociety to develop strategies forgrid modernization in both countries. A new U.S.-China Renewable Energy Forum will be held
annually, rotating between thetwo countries. The first was held
in China late May 2010.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00226

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

215

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

2009

21st Century
Coal

DOE, MOST,
NEA

Announced during the November
2009 Presidential Summit, thetwo Presidents pledged to promote cooperation on cleaner usesof coal, including large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS)
demonstration projects. Throughthe new U.S.-China Clean Energy
Research Center, the two countries are launching a program oftechnical cooperation to bringteams of U.S. and Chinese scientists and engineers together indeveloping clean coal and CCS
technologies. The two governments are also actively engaging
industry, academia, and civil society in advancing clean coal and
CCS solutions.

2009

Shale Gas Resource Initiative

DOE, MOST,
NEA

Announced during the November
2009 Presidential Summit, thisshale gas initiative will use experience gained in the UnitedStates to assess China’s shalegas potential, promote environmentally sustainable developmentof shale gas resources, conduct
joint technical studies to accelerate development of shale gas
resources in China, and promote
shale gas investment in China
through the U.S.-China Oil and
Gas Industry Forum, study tours,
and workshops.

2009

U.S.-China
Energy Cooperation Program

A public-private
partnership, including 22 companies as founding members, including Peabody
Energy, Boeing,
Intel and GE.

Announced during the November
2009 Presidential Summit, theU.S.-China Energy Cooperation
Program (ECP) will leverage private sector resources for project
development work in China
across a broad array of clean energy projects on renewable energy, smart grid, clean transportation, green building, clean coal,
combined heat and power, andenergy efficiency.

2010

U.S.-China
Strategic &Economic Dialogue

U.S. Departmentof State and
NDRC/NEA

26 specific outcomes were produced by the second round of the
S&ED under the Strategic trackalone. Key outcomes addressing
energy and climate issues specifically included MOUs on nuclear
safety cooperation, EcoPartnerships, and Shale Gas; a jointstatement on energy security; andthree clean energy forums heldeach year.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00227

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

216

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

2010

U.S.-China
Energy Efficiency ForumNEA/NDRC,
MIIT, DOE/
LBNL/ORNL/
FERC, private
sector participantsThis first meeting of this Forum(established in the 2009 U.S.China Energy Efficiency ActionPlan) included the signing of an
MOU on industrial energy efficiency between Lawrence Berkley
National Laboratory, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory and the University of Science and Technology, Beijing.

2010

U.S.-China
Renewable
Energy ForumNEA/NDRC,
DOE/NREL/
FERC, private
sector participants

The first meeting of this forum
that was established in the 2009
U.S.-China Renewable Energy
Partnership included a significant
focus on potential cooperation opportunities between U.S. and Chinese renewable energy companies. The forum was followed bytechnical discussions that established three working groups onrenewable energy, including: (1)planning, analysis and coordination; (2) wind technology; and (3)solar technology.

2010

U.S.-China
Advanced
Biofuels
Forum

NEA/NDRC,
DOE/NREL, private sector participants

The eight MOUs signed under
this forum focus on private sector
partnerships in advanced biofuels
research and deployment. Private
sector partnerships include: Boeing and PetroChina jointly developing a sustainable aviation
biofuels industry in China; an expanded research collaboration between Boeing Research & Technology and the Qingdao Instituteof Bioenergy and Bioprocess
Technology on algae-based aviation biofuel development; and an
inaugural flight using biofuel derived from biomass grown andprocessed in China conducted by
Air China, PetroChina, Boeingand Honeywell.

2011

MOU for Protocol for Cooperation in
EnergySciences

U.S. Departmentof Energy andthe Chinese
Academy of
Sciences

This Protocol will facilitate andpromote cooperation in energy
sciences such as nuclear energy
sciences, biological science andenvironmental science.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00228

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

217

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

2011

U.S.-China
Strategic &Economic Dialogue

U.S. Departmentof State and Department ofTreasury, China
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Decided to share information
about regulatory experiences andpractices of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and the
National Energy Administration
related to energy issues in boththe United States and China.
Also decided to enhance cooperation and analysis of the planningand deployment of large-scalewind projects research, and connecting wind projects to the electric transmission grid.

2011

MOU on Support of the Energy Cooperation Program

U.S. Trade & Development Agency (USTDA),
NEA

Provides support for a wide rangeof clean energy activities in 2012.
These include activities on clean
fuels, energy efficiency, power
generation, renewable energy,
smart grid, and clean transportation.

2011

MOU for theadvancementof Eco-Cities

DOE and the
China Ministryof Housing and
Urban Rural Development

Advance Eco-Cities Initiative in
the United States and China,
under which both sides will develop guidelines and policies tosupport the integration of energy
efficiency and renewable energy
into city design and operation.

2013

MOU for thecreation of a
Joint U.S.China Green
Data CenterIndustrial Initiative

U.S.-China Energy Cooperation
Program (ECP)and Chinese Institute of Electronics (CIE)

Creation of a Joint U.S.-China
Green Data Center Industrial Initiative aims to provide valuablereference and living best practices
for green data center development in China through deep cooperation between both U.S. andChina industries.

2013

MOU on U.S.China Clean
Energy Cooperation

China Industrial
Overseas Development andPlanning Association (CIODPA)
and ECP’s Energy Financing
and Investment
Working Group(EFI WG)

This MOU establishes the agreement for jointly cooperate initiatives that expand opportunities
for U.S.-China collaboration inclean energy investment in the
U.S. and other international markets. It also establishes a communication channel with ECP members and other key stakeholders
to improve cooperation on Chinese investment in the energy
sectors.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00229

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

218

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

2013

MOU in Support of U.S.China Energy
Cooperation
Program

U.S. Trade andDevelopment
Agency (USTDA)
and China’s National Energy
Administration(NEA)

This MOU will establish a work
plan between USTDA and NEA
that will cover a broad range ofenergy activities over the next
year in support of ECP. Subjects
include, but are not limited to:clean transportation (clean fuels),
decentralized energy and combined cooling, heat and power, industrial energy efficiency, shalegas, renewable energy, smart gridand microgrid, and other fields as
mutually determined. USTDA intends to continue contributing
funding for feasibility studies,consultancies, study tours, workshops and related project development work on clean and efficientenergy best practices, as identified in continued consultation
with ECP, the NEA, and other
Chinese government agencies.

2013

U.S.-China
Strategic &Economic Dialogue

U.S. Departmentof State and Department ofTreasury, China
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Established the U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group to
develop and implement significant proposals for bilateral cooperation on climate change between the two. Also decided toenhance cooperation on energy
security and transparency. Alsosigned an MOU on Enhancing
Energy Regulation Cooperation
between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the National Energy Administration to
expand cooperation on electricity,oil, and gas issues.

2013

MOU to lower
carbon dioxide
emissions

Xie Zhenhua,
vice-minister of
the National Development andReform Commission of China,
and California
Governor Jerry
Brown

A two-year agreement to shareexpertise and resources to reduce
CO2. It includes sharing of information and experiences regarding
policiesandprograms
tostrengthen low carbon development across economic sectors.
The MOU also includes exchanges and temporary assignments of personnel from one ofthe parties to the other; cooperative research on clean and efficient energy technologies, including developing shared research,development and deployment
projects.

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00230

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

219
Addendum I: U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy
and Climate Change, 1979–2014—Continued
Year

Initiative

Participants

Purpose/Description

2013

U.S.-China
Energy Efficiency ForumDOE and NDRC

MOUs were signed between Chinese partners and the Universityof Colorado-Boulder to initiate
the International Center for
Urban and Building Engineering
Sustainability, the Digital Energy
andSustainability
SolutionsCampaign on comprehensive exchanges to improve the efficiencyof the IT sector, and LBNL toharmonize standards and foster
pre-competitive R&D collaboration on high performance data
center.

2014

U.S.-China
Strategic &Economic Dialogue

U.S. Departmentof State and Department ofTreasury, China
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Launched eight demonstration
projects—four on carbon capture,utilization, and storage, and fouron smart grids. Agreed to adopt
stronger heavy and light duty vehicle fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions standards,
conduct a study on the efficiency
and use of gas in industrial boilers, and launched a new initiativeon climate change and forests.

2014

MOU for cooperation on
strategic petroleum reserves

U.S. Secretary ofEnergy Ernest
Moniz and Administrator Wu
Xinxiong of China’s National Energy Administration, DOE, NEA

The MOU enables the DOE’s Office of Petroleum Reserves andNEA’s National Oil Reserve Office to share information on technical, management, and policy
issues related to oil stockpiles.
DOE and NEA will conduct annual technical meetings to beheld alternately in the UnitedStates and China.

2014

MOU for cooperation onelectric vehicles and industrial energy efficiency

U.S. Secretary ofEnergy Ernest
Moniz and Minister Miao Wei of
the Chinese Ministry of Industry
and Information
Technology

The MOU facilitates cooperationin the fields of electric vehicles
and related technologies, as wellas energy efficiency improvement
for end use products.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Source: Agreements for the 1979–2010 period adapted from Joanna Lewis, ‘‘The State of
U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining the Bilateral and Multilateral Relationship,’’ China Environment Series, no. 11 (December 2010): 26–34. http: // www.wilsoncenter.org /sites/default/files/Feature%20Article%20The%20State%20of%20U.S.-China%20Relations%20on%
20Climate%20Change.pdf. Agreements for the 2011–2014 period compiled by Commission staff.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00231

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

220
Addendum II:

CERC Research Topics 103

Advanced Coal Technology Consortium (ACTC)
ACTC focuses on the most critical research needs, categorized by the following
eight research areas:
1. Advanced Power Generation: Develop breakthrough technologies in advanced
coal power generation and the application of advanced technology.
2. Clean Coal Conversion Technology: Conduct research, development, and demonstration of new coal co-generation systems with CO2 capture, including newcoal-to-chemical co-generation; new CO2 capture processes; and co-generation
systems with combined pyrolysis, gasification, and combustion. Projects in thisarea will pursue high-efficiency conversion.
3. Pre-Combustion CO2 Capture: Conduct major industrial-scale demonstrationsof integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) power generation with carbon
capture and sequestration.
4. Post-Combustion CO2 Capture: Investigate various technologies for post-combustion capture and conduct demonstrations of CO2 capture, utilization, andstorage in cooperation with large power generation companies.
5. Oxy-Combustion Research, Development, and Demonstration: Study the fundamental and pilot-scale combustion and emission characteristics of indigenous
Chinese and U.S. coals of different ranks under oxyfuel conditions, create amodel for oxy-fired burner design, evaluate and optimize pilot-scale oxy-combustion, and conduct a commercial-scale engineering feasibility study for an
oxyfuel–combustion reference plant, with the goal of achieving cost and performance breakthroughs in the laboratory and the field that help overcome thechallenges to oxyfiring with both U.S. and Chinese coals.
6. Sequestration Capacity and Near-Term CCUS Opportunities: Develop research
work focused on CO2 geological sequestration (CGS) in China’s Ordos Basin tobetter understand and verify key technologies for CO2 storage in saline formations, to provide the scientific evidence to implement large-scale carbon captureand storage (CCS) in China and to provide support for CCS development in the
United States.
7. CO2 Algae BioFixation and Use: Support the industrial demonstration of carbon biofixation using microalgae to absorb CO2 and turn the biomass produced
into a rich source of renewable energy, including biodiesel.
8. Integrated Industrial Process Modeling and Additional Topics: Apply modelingtechniques to a wide variety of issues associated with pre- and post-combustion
CO2 capture and oxy-combustion to assess the economic and operability potential of existing capture technologies in conjunction with removal of criteria pollutants, assess the technical feasibility and potential economic benefit andoperability of new carbon capture technologies, and optimize the economics ofdifferent carbon capture technologies.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Clean Vehicles Consortium (CVC)
CVC research is organized into six areas:
1. Advanced Batteries and Energy Conversion: Increase application of novel battery designs that promise much higher energy densities, such as lithium-air
and lithium-sulfur batteries; develop high efficiency thermoelectric materials torecover waste heat.
2. Advanced Biofuels, Clean Combustion, and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU): Accelerate development and deployment of advanced biofuels with molecular models
that can be used to predict the behavior of novel fuels in various combustion
environments; system controls for clean vehicles; and development, integration,and control of APU systems.
3. Vehicle Electrification: Develop electric motors and power electronics withhigher conversion efficiencies and power/energy densities than are currently
possible.
4. Advanced Lightweight Materials and Structures: Develop low-cost, energy-efficient, high-quality processes for producing, forming, and joining of lightweightmaterials to increase integration of aluminum alloys, magnesium alloys, andcarbon-polymer composites into vehicle structures while maintaining structural
rigidity and crash safety.
5. Vehicle-Grid Integration: Develop advanced control strategies and protocols tocoordinate plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) charging and develop interfaces to accelerate the deployment of PEVs and minimize impact to grid quality and battery aging.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00232

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

221
6. Energy Systems Analysis, Technology Roadmaps, and Policies: Integrate vehicle and energy infrastructure systems to address temporal and spatial variation of energy sources, petroleum demand, and CO2 emissions impacts; diversity in consumer drive cycles and trip patterns; producer and consumer economic factors; global vehicle and fuel market factors; and future fuel efficiency
and carbon policy regimes.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Building Energy Efficiency Consortium (BEE)
BEE has developed a collaborative research agenda organized into six research
topics:
1. Integrated Building Design & Operation of Very Low Energy, Low Cost Buildings: Provide a rich foundation to support prioritization of energy savings opportunities from buildings. Research in this topic area is focusing on new scientific methods for collecting data and modeling energy consumption that will
guide development of high-impact energy efficiency technologies.
2. Building Envelope: Develop new building materials and related control and integration systems. Research in this area improves understanding and strategies for ventilation, comfort systems, and cool roofs.
3. Building Equipment: Research and demonstrate the adaptability of advanced
building equipment technologies. Research in this area includes new lighting
system design and control and improvements to the performance and market
penetration of climate control (heating, ventilation, and cooling) technologies.
Research includes integrating building equipment with control systems andmetering equipment and optimizing management software.
4. Renewable Energy Utilization: Research and demonstrate technological adaptability in applying new and renewable energy to buildings. This research area
includes integration of geothermal, solar, and wind energy systems, among others, to convert buildings from energy consumers to net energy suppliers.
5. Whole Building: Research and demonstrate integrated building energy technologies. Research in this area includes analyzing building energy use in the
United States and China to improve building integration and optimize the useof energy-efficient and low-carbon energy supply technologies.
6. Operation, Management, Market Promotion and Research: Evaluate standards,
certification, codes and labels, and other policy mechanisms to establish aknowledge base from which to make effective decisions.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00233

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

222
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 4DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. Jonathan H. Elkind, U.S.-China Cooperation on Clean Energy, briefing to
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, July
31, 2014.
2. United States Department of Energy, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis
Center (CDIAC). http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749&crid=.
3. Edward Wong, ‘‘Air Pollution Linked to 1.2 Millions Premature Deaths in
China’’ New York Times, April 1, 2013.
4. Wang Yue, ‘‘China Unlikely to Reduce Coal Use in the Next Decade,’’ China
File, February 12, 2014. https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6718-China-unlikely-toreduce-coal-use-in-the-next-decade/en.
5. U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘‘Countries Analysis: China,’’ February 4, 2014. http: // www.eia.gov / countries / cab.cfm ? fips = CH; included in Supplemental readings of this book.
6. ‘‘China Announces Targets on Carbon Emissions Cuts,’’ http://english.gov.cn/
2009-11/26/content_1474008.htm; ‘‘Air Pollution Prevention Action Plan,’’ http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-09/12/content_2486773.htm.
7. Jonathan Moch, ‘‘What Are China’s National Climate and Energy Targets?’’
China FAQs, May 22, 2014. http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/ChinaFAQs_
table_China_climate_energy_targets_0.pdf.
8. ‘‘Clean Energy Investment Falls for Second Year,’’ Bloomberg New Energy Finance, January 15, 2014. http://about.bnef.com/press-releases/clean-energy-investment-falls-for-second-year/.
9. Benjamin Carlson, ‘‘Why China’s Reputation as the Clean Energy King is
Overblown,’’ Global Post, February 18, 2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/140217/china-clean-energy-world-leader-debunked.
10. ‘‘Clean Energy Investment Falls for Second Year,’’ Bloomberg New Energy Finance, January 15, 2014. http://about.bnef.com/press-releases/clean-energy-investment-falls-for-second-year/.
11. The White House, ‘‘Fact Sheet: The State of the Union: President Obama’s
Plan to Win the Future,’’ January 25, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/fact-sheet-state-union-president-obamas-plan-win-future.
12. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2013, April
2013, p. 71. http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf.
13. Peter V. Marsters, Jennifer L. Turner et al., ‘‘Cooperative Competitors: Potential of U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation,’’ Woodrow Wilson Center China Environment Forum Brief, 2012. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Cooperative%20Competitors-English_0.pdf.
14. Zhou Dadi, Vice Chairman, China Institute for Innovation and Development
Strategy, Second Annual United States-China Strategic Forum on Clean Energy
Cooperation, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, January 18, 2011. http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/events/2011/1/18%20china%20clean%20energy/20110118_china_clean_energy_part2.pdf.
15. Paul Joffe, ‘‘Clean Energy Forum Seeks Further Benefits from U.S.-China
Cooperation,’’ China FAQs, January 24, 2011. http://www.chinafaqs.org/blog-posts/
clean-energy-forum-seeks-further-benefits-us-china-cooperation.
16. Secretary of State John Kerry, ‘‘Remarks at Energy Cooperation Event’’(Diayutai Hotel, Beijing, China, April 13, 2013). http: // www.state.gov / secretary /remarks/2013/04/207474.htm.
17. Melanie Hart, Shining a Light on U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation(Center for American Progress, February 2012). http://www.americanprogress.org/
wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/02/pdf/china_trade.pdf.
18. Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘‘United States Requests
WTO Dispute Settlement Consultations on China’s Subsidies for Wind Power Equipment Manufacturers,’’ December 22, 1010. http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/december/united-states-requests-wto-dispute-settlement-con.
19. Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘‘China Ends Wind Power
Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States in WTO Dispute,’’ June 7,
2011. http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/june/china-endswind-power-equipment-subsidies-challenged.
20. International Trade Administration, ‘‘Fact Sheet: Commerce Finds Dumping
and Subsidization of Imports of Utility Scale Wind Towers from the People’s Republic of China (China) and Dumping of Imports of Utility Scale Wind Towers from theSocialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam),’’ December 18, 2012. http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet_ china-vietnam-uswt-adcvd- final- 20121218.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00234

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

223

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

21. Melanie Hart, Shining a Light on U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation(Center for American Progress, February 2012). http://www.americanprogress.org/
wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/02/pdf/china_trade.pdf.
22. International Trade Administration, ‘‘Fact Sheet: Commerce Preliminarily Finds Countervailable Subsidization of Imports of Certain Crystalline Silicon
Photovoltaic Products from the People’s Republic of China,’’ June 3, 2014. http://
enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-crystalline-silicon-photovoltaic-prod-cvd-prelim-060314.pdf; International Trade Administration, ‘‘Fact Sheet: Commerce Preliminarily Finds Dumping of Imports of Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from China and Taiwan,’’ July 25, 2014. http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-multiple-solar-products-ad-prelim-072514.pdf.
23. SolarWorld ‘‘SolarWorld and Coalition of U.S. Solar Manufacturers Petition to Stop Unfair Trade by China’s State-sponsored Industry,’’ October 19, 2011.
http: // www.solarworld-usa.com / newsroom / news-releases / news / 2011 / domestic-solarmanufacturers-petition-to-stop-unfair-trade-by-china.aspx.
24. Diane Cardwell, ‘‘Solar Company Seeks Stiff U.S. Tariffs to Deter Chinese
Spying,’’ New York Times, September 1, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/
business/trade-duties-urged-as-new-deterrent-against-cybertheft.html?ref=science&_r=
1.
25. USTDA, ‘‘USTDA in China,’’ March 2014.
26. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Leocadia I. Zak, April 25,
2014.
27. U.S.-China Energy Cooperation Program, 2013 Annual Report. http://www.uschinaecp.org/Downlond/ECP_Report_216x280_EN_713.pdf.
28. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Leocadia I. Zak, April 25,
2014.
29. USTDA, ‘‘USTDA in China,’’ March 2014.
30. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Recent Achievements (July 2014),
p. 1. http: // www.us-china-cerc.org / pdfs / June_ 2014_ Steering_ Committee_ Meeting /CERC_booklet_FINAL.pdf.
31. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, ‘‘About CERC.’’ http://www.uschina-cerc.org/about.html.
32. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Huei Peng, April 25, 2014.
33. U.S. Department of Energy, China Ministry of Science and Technology &China National Energy Administration, 2011. ‘‘U.S.-China Clean Energy ResearchCenter Technology Management Plans (TMPs).’’ U.S.-China Clean Energy ResearchCenter. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/Intellectual_Property.html#tmps.
34. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, ‘‘Intellectual Property.’’ http://
www.us-china-cerc.org/Intellectual_Property.html.
35. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, ‘‘Intellectual Property.’’ http://
www.us-china-cerc.org/Intellectual_Property.html.
36. Joanna Lewis, ‘‘Managing Intellectual Property Rights in Cross-Border
Clean Energy Collaboration: The Case of the U.S.-China Clean Energy ResearchCenter,’’ pre-publication draft (accepted for publication in Energy Policy), December
2013.
37. Joanna Lewis, ‘‘Managing Intellectual Property Rights in Cross-Border
Clean Energy Collaboration: The Case of the U.S.-China Clean Energy ResearchCenter,’’ pre-publication draft (accepted for publication in Energy Policy), December
2013, p. 15.
38. Robert Marlay, U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center Overview, briefing
to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC,
July 31, 2014.
39. Joanna Lewis, ‘‘Managing Intellectual Property Rights in Cross-Border
Clean Energy Collaboration: The Case of the U.S.-China Clean Energy ResearchCenter,’’ pre-publication draft (accepted for publication in Energy Policy), December
2013, p. 11.
40. Brian Spegele, ‘‘China Fuels Energy Innovation,’’ Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204517204577
04240048678123v4?mg=reno64-wsj.
41. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Report of the Interagency Task Forceon Carbon Capture and Storage, August 2010. http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
Downloads/ccs/CCS-Task-Force-Report-2010.pdf.
42. Valerie Volcovici, ‘‘Shale Boom Derails U.S. Investments in Clean Coal Technology,’’ Reuters, October 18, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/18/usacoal-natgas-idUSL1E8LFFNL20121018.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00235

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

224

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

43. David Stanway, ‘‘China Approves Massive New Coal Capacity Despite Pollution Fears,’’ Reuters, January 7, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/07/
china-coal-idUSL3N0K90H720140107.
44. David B. Piejak (LP Amina U.S. President), telephone interview with Commission staff, March 18, 2014.
45. U.S. Advanced Coal Technology Consortium. http: // www . nrcce . wvu . edu /USCEC/actc.cfm.
46. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Jerald Fletcher, April 25,
2014.
47. Jerald J. Fletcher and Zheng Chuguang, ‘‘U.S.-China ACTC Research Overview,’’ January 2013. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US/4A_ENG_1.pdf.
48. Robert Marlay, U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center Overview, briefing
to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC,
July 31, 2014.
49. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, August 2013, p. E5. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US-China_CERC_Annual_Report_2012-2013.pdf.
50. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, August 2013, p. E14. http: // www.us - china - cerc.org / pdfs / US - China _ CERC _ Annual _Report_2012-2013.pdf.
51. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, August 2013, p. E3. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US-China_CERC_Annual_Report_2012-2013.pdf.
52. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, August 2013, pp. E8–E9. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US-China_CERC_Annual_
Report_2012-2013.pdf.
53. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, August 2013, pp. E12–E13. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US-China_CERC_Annual_Report_2012-2013.pdf.
54. Brian Spegele, ‘‘China Fuels Energy Innovation,’’ Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204517204577
042400486781234?mg=reno64-wsj.
55. David Piejak, ‘‘Road Testing American Carbon-Saving Technology in China,’’
China FAQs, July 9, 2012. http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/China%20FAQs_
Road_Testing_Tech_v1_6.pdf.
56. Robert Marlay, U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center Overview, briefing
to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC,
July 31, 2014.
57. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, August 2013, pp. G4–G5. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US-China_CERC_Annual_
Report_2012-2013.pdf.
58. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, August 2013, pp. G60–G61. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US-China_CERC_Annual_Report_2012-2013.pdf.
59. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, August 2013, pp. G44–G45. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US-China_CERC_Annual_Report_2012-2013.pdf.
60. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, August 2013, pp. G46–G47. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US-China_CERC_Annual_Report_2012-2013.pdf.
61. Huei Peng and Ouyang Minggao, ‘‘US-China CVC Research Overview andTechnical Highlights,’’ January 2013. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US/5_ENGL_1.pdf.
62. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Huei Peng, April 25, 2014.
63. Robert Marlay, U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center Overview, briefing
to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC,
July 31, 2014.
64. Huei Peng, ‘‘CERC–CVC: U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center Clean
Vehicles Consortium Progress Report October 1st–December 31st 2013.’’ http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/Quarterly/CERC-CVC-2013-Q4.pdf.
65. U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘‘Countries Analysis: China,’’ February 4, 2014. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH.
66. Luna Lin, ‘‘Closer U.S.-China Cooperation Could Fuel Shale Gas Boom, Say
Experts,’’ China Dialogue, May 13, 2013. https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6000Closer-US-China-cooperation-could-fuel-shale-gas-boom-say-experts/en.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00236

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

225

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

67. The White House, ‘‘FACT SHEET: U.S.-China Shale Gas Resource Initiative,’’ November 17, 2009. http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/US-China_Fact_
Sheet_Shale_Gas.pdf.
68. U.S.-China Oil & Gas Industry Forum, ‘‘Background.’’ http://www.uschinaogf.org/.
69. U.S. Department of Energy, ‘‘Fossil Energy Protocol between the UnitedStates and China.’’ http://www.fossil.energy.gov/international/International_Partners/
China.html.
70. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Sarah Forbes, April 25, 2014.
71. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Sarah Forbes, April 25, 2014.
72. Rhodium Group, ‘‘China Investment Monitor.’’ http://rhg.com/interactive/china-investment-monitor.
73. Thilo Hanemann and Cassie Gao, ‘‘Chinese FDI in the U.S.: 2013 Recapand 2014 Outlook,’’ January 7, 2014. http://rhg.com/notes/chinese-fdi-in-the-us-2013recap-and-2014-outlook.
74. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Sarah Forbes, April 25, 2014.
75. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Jane Nakano, April 25, 2014.
76. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Jane Nakano, April 25, 2014.
77. World Nuclear Association, ‘‘Nuclear Power in China,’’ July 2014. http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China-Nuclear-Power/.
78. World Nuclear Association, ‘‘Nuclear Power in China,’’ July 2014. http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China-Nuclear-Power/.
79. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Jane Nakano, April 25, 2014.
80. United States-China: Bilateral Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperative Action
Plan, pp. 3, 5. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/1a_1_1.pdf?_=1317157933.
81. Leslie Hook, ‘‘U.S. Group Gives China Deals of Nuclear Technology,’’ Financial Times, November 23, 2010.
82. David Stanway, ‘‘China Says First Westinghouse Reactor Delayed Until at
Least End-2015,’’ Reuters, July 18, 2014. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/18/
china-nuclear-ap-idUKL4N0PT0T820140718.
83. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Jane Nakano, April 25, 2014.
84. World Nuclear Association, ‘‘Nuclear Power in China,’’ July 2014. http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China-Nuclear-Power/.
85. Government of the People’s Republic of China, ‘‘China Issues S&T Development Guidelines,’’ February 9, 2006. http://english.gov.cn/2006-02/09/content_183426.htm.
86. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Jane Nakano, April 25, 2014;
World Nuclear Association, ‘‘Nuclear Power in China,’’ July 2014. http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China—Nuclear-Power/.
87. World Nuclear Association, ‘‘Nuclear Power in China,’’ July 2014. http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China-Nuclear-Power/.
88. Matthew Miller and Yan Huang, ‘‘China to Beat 2020 Nuclear Targets after
Projects Restarted—CNNC,’’ Reuters, March 12, 2014.
89. DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, ‘‘Bilateral Cooperation.’’ http://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-reactor-technologies/international-nuclear-energy-policy-and-cooperation/bilateral.
90. World Nuclear Association, ‘‘Thorium,’’ http: // www.world - nuclear.org / info /current-and-future-generation/thorium/.
91. World Nuclear Association, ‘‘Thorium,’’ http: // www.world - nuclear.org / info /current-and-future-generation/thorium/.
92. David Lague and Charlie Zhu, ‘‘Special Report — The U.S. Government
Lab Behind China’s Nuclear Power Push,’’ Reuters, December 20, 2013. http://
in.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/breakout-thorium-idINL4N0FE21U20131220; World
Nuclear Association, ‘‘Thorium,’’ http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/current-and-future-generation/thorium/.
93. Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, ‘‘MIT Wins $7.5M DOE Grant toDevelop a New Generation of Advanced Reactors,’’ September 2011. http://web.mit.edu / nse / news / 2011 / advanced-reactors.html; Nuclear Energy University Program,2013 Annual Report: High-Temperature Salt-Cooled Reactor for Power and Process

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00237

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

226

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Heat, October 20, 2013. https://inlportal.inl.gov/portal/server.pt/document/139420/fhr_annual_report_2013_no_app_data_sheet_pdf.
94. Joanna Lewis, ‘‘The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining the Bilateral and Multilateral Relationship,’’ China Environment Series,
no. 11 (December 2010): 17–18. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Feature%20Article%20The%20State%20of%20U.S.-China%20Relations%20on%20Climate%20
Change.pdf.
95. Melanie Hart, Shining a Light on U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation(Center for American Progress, February 9, 2012). http: // www.americanprogress.org/issues/china/report/2012/ 02/ 09/ 11030/ shining-a-light-on-u-s-china-clean-energycooperation/.
96. Michael A. Riley and Ashlee Vance, ‘‘China Corporate Espionage Boom
Knocks Wind Out of U.S. Companies,’’ Bloomberg, March 15, 2012. http: // www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-15/china-corporate-espionage-boom-knocks-wind-out-ofu-s-companies.html.
97. U.S. Department of Justice, ‘‘Sinovel Corporation and Three Individuals
Charged in Wisconsin with Theft of AMSC Trade Secrets,’’ June 27, 2013. http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/June/13-crm-730.html.
98. Joanna Lewis, ‘‘Managing Intellectual Property Rights in Cross-Border
Clean Energy Collaboration: The Case of the U.S.-China Clean Energy ResearchCenter,’’ pre-publication draft (accepted for publication in Energy Policy), December
2013.
99. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Valerie Karplus, April 25,
2014.
100. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Joanna Lewis, April 25, 2014.
101. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.China Clean Energy Cooperation, written testimony of Joanna Lewis, April 25, 2014.
102. Kelly Sims Gallagher, The United States and China: Moving Forward on
Coal and Climate Change (Brookings Institution, July 2013). http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/Events/2014/2/06%20china%20clean%20energy/USChina%20Moving%20
Forward%20on%20Coal%20and%20Climate%20Change_KSGallagher.pdf.
103. U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, Annual Report 2012–2013, August 2013, pp. E2, F2, G2–G3. http://www.us-china-cerc.org/pdfs/US-China_CERC_
Annual_Report_2012-2013.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00238

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

RECOMMENDATIONS
U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Economic Challenges
The Commission recommends:• Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to update
its report on the effectiveness of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). The updated report should include anassessment of the objectives sought by the United States in thesetalks and whether China has honored its commitments to date.
• Congress require the Department of the Treasury to include inits semiannual report to Congress specific information on thebeneficial economic impact of China moving to a freely floating
currency in terms of U.S. exports, economic growth, and job creation. In addition, Congress should urge the Administration to
begin immediate consultations at the G-7 to identify a multilateral approach to addressing China’s currency manipulation.
• Congress direct the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center(ITEC) to provide briefings to the House Ways and Means and
Senate Finance Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on its activities, since its creation, to coordinate and improve upon the enforcement of U.S. laws against
unfair trade. Congress should examine whether providing statutory authority for ITEC would enhance enforcement activities
and ensure that adequate resources are available and that other
Departments and Agencies are responsive to its requests.
• Congress consider amending existing trade enforcement rules toensure that foreign investment in the United States cannot be
used to impede the ability of domestic producers to bring petitions for trade enforcement actions. Congress could direct the Department of Commerce to update its regulations and procedures
for antidumping and countervailing duty cases to create a rebuttable presumption that firms that are state-owned, state-controlled, or state-invested with facilities in the United States areoperating at the direction of the state. Those state-directed companies would then be excluded from calculations of industry support or opposition unless they can prove that there is no such involvement or direction.
• Congress consider whether state and local governments shouldbe treated as interested parties under laws against unfair trade
and thereby have standing to bring or participate in trade cases.
Further, Congress should consider creating a private right of action allowing U.S. companies to take legal action against com-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(227)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00239

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

228
petitors directly in antidumping and countervailing duty cases,
rather than having to rely on U.S. government assistance.
• Congress seek clarification from the executive branch as to its interpretation of Article 15 of China’s World Trade Organization
Accession Protocol concerning China’s achievement of ‘‘market
economy’’ status.
• Congress consider legislation that would make available a remedy to domestic firms that have been injured from the anticompetitive actions (such as access to low-cost or no-cost capital)of foreign state-owned companies for the injury that has been inflicted and allow for the potential award of treble damages.
• Congress direct the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) to brief
the Joint Economic Committee on existing data collection efforts
within the Administration regarding investments by Chinese entities in the United States. CEA shall describe the differing data
sets available from public and private sources and the extent towhich existing data provides adequate information to U.S. policy
makers to assess changing trends and the potential economic implications from these investments.
• Congress require the Department of Commerce to prepare a comprehensive analysis of excess productive capacity in China acrossa range of sectors, including, but not limited to, steel, glass,paper, cement and solar products, and provide a report to the
President and to Congress on what actions should be taken toaddress this problem. This report shall be prepared annually fora period of five years, at a minimum. In addition, the Administration should consult with major trade allies with similar concerns about Chinese overcapacity in these sectors to determine
what multilateral engagement would effectively deal with thisproblem. As part of this approach, the Administration shallevaluate effectiveness of other efforts to address global and China’s overcapacity in certain sectors, such as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Steel Committee, theU.S.-China Steel Dialogue, JCCT and S&ED talks.
• Congress request that the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Department of Commerce, and International Trade
Commission report to Congress on the extent to which existing
authorities would allow for sanctions to be imposed against entities that benefit from trade secrets or other information obtained
through cyber intrusions or other illegal means and were provided by a national government, foreign intelligence service, orother entity utilizing such means. If authorities do not exist, theyshould provide a proposal to address such problems.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Congress require the Office of the United States Trade Representative to brief the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, within 60 days, on trade enforcement issues
involving China which have been initiated or announced since2009, but have not yet been resolved, and identify what steps
will be taken to ensure a more rapid resolution of such issues.
The briefing shall include an estimate of the economic value to

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00240

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

229
the U.S. in terms of production and job creation, if the identified
market barrier or impediment were eliminated.
China’s Healthcare Industry, Drug Safety, and Market Access for U.S. Medical Goods and Services
The Commission recommends:• Congress urge the Institutes of Medicine of the National Academies to convene a task force to assess purchasing decisions by
U.S. wholesalers, retailers, and healthcare providers with regard
to China-origin drugs and drug ingredients, and to recommend
ways in which to improve information sharing and coordination
with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
• Congress urge the FDA to insist on expedited approvals from the
Chinese government for work visas for the FDA staff, and on expanded authority to conduct unannounced visits at drug manufacturing facilities in China.
• Congress monitor the efficacy of the FDA’s regulatory activities
in China, consider ways to optimize the use of appropriated funding, and identify what other steps are necessary to protect thehealth and safety of the U.S. population.
• Congress pursue measures to improve the government’s information about drug ingredient and dietary supplement producers, especially for imports. To this end, Congress should urge the FDA
to work with its Chinese counterparts to establish a more comprehensive regulatory regime for registering China-based active
pharmaceutical ingredient (API) producers, and make this producer information available on demand for U.S. agencies.
• Congress adopt measures that make greater use of ‘‘track andtrace’’ technology. To this end, Congress should: (1) urge the U.S.
government negotiators to demand that China harmonize withinternationally recognized standards its unique device identifiers
for medical devices and its serialized verification of APIs, so as
to allow for equivalency with U.S. systems and standards; (2)make the use of serial numbers for product verification at U.S.
pharmacies mandatory at all times, not only in cases where a
product is suspect (as currently spelled out in the Drug Quality
and Security Act).
• Congress direct the Trade Policy Review Group of the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative to review the interests of U.S.
healthcare goods and services providers in the Chinese market,
Chinese market barriers, and opportunities to promote humanhealth in China in ways that promote U.S. consumer and business interests.
U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Commission recommends:• Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to conduct
an assessment of U.S.-China collaborative initiatives on clean energy. This assessment should describe the nature of collabora-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00241

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

230

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

tion, including funding, participation, and reporting on the outcomes; consider whether the intellectual property rights of U.S.
researchers and companies are being protected; examine whether
Chinese state-owned enterprises are benefitting from U.S. taxpayer-funded research; investigate if any U.S. companies, universities and labs participating in government-led collaboration with
China have been subject to cyber penetrations originating in
China; and evaluate the benefits of this collaboration for theUnited States. Further, this assessment should examine
redundancies, if any, among various U.S.-China government-led
collaborative programs, and make suggestions for improving collaboration.
• Congress require that the Department of Energy, in consultation
with the Department of Commerce, identify barriers to market
access in China for clean and renewable energy products andservices and their impact on U.S. production and job creation,and report to the committees of jurisdiction, within 120 days, on
specific action plans to address these barriers. As part of this report, the Departments shall identify sourcing patterns that havechanged over the last 10 years in these sectors and also the extent to which U.S. companies are producing in the Chinese market to serve that market and whether they were previously able
to manufacture these products in the United States for export toChina.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00242

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

CHAPTER 2MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUESINVOLVING CHINASECTION 1: YEAR IN REVIEW:SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRSIntroduction
This section reviews aspects of China’s national security and foreign affairs that have emerged since the Commission published its
previous Annual Report in November 2013. It also addresses thePeople’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) most significant activities of theyear, and the evolving U.S.-China security relationship. The statements and assessments presented here are based on Commission
hearings, briefings by U.S. and foreign government officials, theCommission’s fact-finding trips to Asia, and open-source research
and analysis. For a full treatment of China’s military modernization, see Chapter 2, Section 2, ‘‘China’s Military Modernization.’’For an in-depth discussion of how China’s security and foreign policies impact East Asia, see Chapter 3, Section 1, ‘‘China and Asia’s
Evolving Security Architecture.’’China’s Major National Security and Foreign Policy Developments in 2014
Since the publication of the Commission’s 2013 Annual Report,
China’s national security and foreign policy apparatuses have established several new institutions, norms, and policies designed toadvance China’s expanding and evolving interests.
China Establishes a ‘‘Central National Security Commission’’
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee announced at its November 2013 Third Plenary Session that it would
establish a Central National Security Commission to ‘‘perfect national security systems and strategies in order to ensure national
security.’’ * 1 The Central National Security Commission’s status asan agency under the Central Committee makes it the most comprehensive security policy-making body in the Chinese government.
* China’s Central National Security Commission is comparable to the United States’ National
Security Council insofar as both bodies deliberate and coordinate national security policies. A
key difference between the two is that the former is a Party organization while the latter isa government organization. Further, China’s Central National Security Commission appears tohave a much broader mandate, particularly on domestic issues, than the U.S. National Security
Council.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(231)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00243

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

232
Chinese President Xi Jinping heads the Central National Security
Commission, which convened for the first time in April 2014.
The Central National Security Commission’s broad mandate allows it to establish and direct policy over a wide range of issues,
which include political security, homeland security, military security, economic security, cultural security, societal security, scienceand technology security, information security, ecological security,
resources security, and nuclear security.2 Its four responsibilities
with respect to each of these issues are ‘‘stipulating and implementing state security strategies, pushing forward the constructionof the rule of law system concerning state security, setting security
principles and policies, [and] conducting research.’’ 3
The Central National Security Commission’s mandate covers
both internal and external security issues; however, official Chinese statements, Chinese academics and policy experts, and Chinese state media indicate it likely will focus on the former.4 According to Fudan University Associate Dean Shen Dingli, the Central
National Security Commission’s internal focus suggests President
Xi has determined ‘‘domestic factors [will] pose the most substantial challenge to [China’s] national security for decades to come.’’ 5
For an in-depth discussion of China’s internal security challenges,
see Chapter 2, Section 3, ‘‘China’s Domestic Stability.’’By establishing the new Central National Security Commission,
President Xi seeks to (1) improve the coordination of China’s national security decision making, and (2) consolidate his control over
China’s national security agenda.
First, the Central National Security Commission’s high-level status and its oversight of China’s vast and convoluted security policymaking apparatus appear designed to overcome stovepiping, turf
battles, and other bureaucratic obstacles to effective and efficient
policy making.* President Xi, citing inadequate ‘‘security work systems and mechanisms,’’ argued the Central National Security Commission was needed to ‘‘strengthen centralized, unified leadershipover national security work.’’ 6
Second, and relatedly, the Central National Security Commission
appears designed to improve President Xi’s ability to personallycontrol China’s national security activities. Although much of theCentral National Security Commission’s composition is unknown toforeign observers, at least two of President Xi’s political allies—Cai
Qi and Meng Jianzhu—are rumored to hold prominent positions,†
which they likely will use to support President Xi’s security priorities. Placing his close associates on the Central National Security
Commission also allows President Xi to minimize the influence ofpolitical rivals in the national security decision-making process.7

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Central National Security Commission’s portfolio of security issues overlaps with severalof China’s leading small groups. Leading small groups are the CCP’s ad hoc policy and coordination working groups, the membership of which consists of Chinese political elites. The work andactivities of the leading small groups are generally not transparent, and it is unclear whether
or how the new Central National Security Commission will restructure, govern, or marginalize
existing leading small groups for national security issues.
† Cai Qi is the former deputy governor of Zhejiang Province; Meng Jianzhu is a Politburo
member and in 2012 succeeded Zhou Yongkang as secretary of the CCP’s Central Politics and
Law Commission, which oversees legal and law enforcement issues. The only confirmed members of the Central National Security Commission besides President Xi are two of his fellow Politburo Standing Committee members, Premier Li Keqiang and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Zhang Dejiang.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00244

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

233
In addition to providing the means to advance his control over
China’s national security policy, President Xi’s ability to establish
the Central National Security Commission in the first place is indicative of his remarkably swift consolidation of power since he became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP in
2012. For at least ten years, Chinese leaders had tried and failed
to establish similar national security bodies; it is, therefore, particularly meaningful that President Xi was able to secure support
from the multiple stakeholders required to finally establish theCentral National Security Commission.*
Xi Administration Signals a More ‘‘Active’’ Foreign Policy
Another indication of President Xi’s consolidation of power is his
success in articulating and directing a much more proactive foreign
policy than his predecessors. In March 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a high-profile press conference on foreign policy
issues during which he said, ‘‘ ‘Active’ is the most salient feature of
China’s diplomacy in the past year. . . . In 2014, China will continue
to pursue an active foreign policy.’’ 8 Foreign Minister Wang’s remarks are consistent with the Xi Administration’s early steps to redefine China’s relationship with the world, including its efforts topromote a ‘‘new type of major-country relationship’’ with the UnitedStates, which was a key theme of U.S.-China relations in 2013.†
China’s foreign policy under President Xi appears to represent a
break from former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy
tenet to ‘‘hide capacities and bide time.’’ ‘‘Hide and bide’’—the ideathat China should seek to develop its economy and society successfully, respond to global events calmly and humbly, and conceal its
military capabilities—has served as the basis for China’s foreign
policy decision making since the early 1990s. President Xi’s policy
shift is driven by a confluence of factors, including China’s expanding regional and global interests; China’s growing number of foreign policy actors, some of whom favor a more active global role for
China; and China’s increasing confidence in its ability to use economic and military tools to achieve its foreign policy objectives.9

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* In an interview for the Wall Street Journal, senior advisor and Freeman Chair in China
Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Christopher K. Johnson said of
the Central National Security Commission’s establishment, ‘‘I think this is huge. They’ve beentalking about this forever and Xi Jinping has gone and done it in his first year in office. . . .
He’s showing that he controls all the levers of power.’’ Jeremy Page, ‘‘China Deepens Xi’s Powers
with New Security Plan,’’ Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702304644104579193921242308990. See also Marc Julienne, How Far
Will the NPC Go in Implementing Reform: The New Central National Security Commission (European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2014), p. 6. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ChinaAnalysis_March2014.pdf; and Yun Sun, ‘‘PacNet #81: China’s New ‘State Security Committee’: Questions
Ahead,’’ Pacific Forum CSIS, November 14, 2013. http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1381_0.pdf.
† Beginning in 2012 and increasingly throughout 2013, Beijing called for a ‘‘new type of majorcountry relationship’’ with the United States. Official Chinese statements claim the ‘‘new type’’
relationship intends to promote stable relations between China and the United States and avoid
the kind of deleterious competition that typically plagues relationships between dominant powers and rising powers. The Obama Administration since late 2013 has sometimes invoked theconcept (which it usually refers to as a ‘‘new model’’ of relations) when discussing bilateral ties
with China. Caitlin Campbell and Craig Murray, China Seeks a ‘‘New Type of Major-Country
Relationship’’ with the United States (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
June 25, 2013). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Seeks%20New%
20Type%20of%20Major-Country%20Relationship%20with%20United%20States_Staff%20Research%20Backgrounder.pdf; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November 2013, p. 229; and U.S. Department of State Bureau of International
Information Programs, ‘‘U.S., China Agree to ‘New Model’ of Relations, Kerry Says.’’ http://iip
digital.usembassy.gov/st/english/inbrief/2013/09/20130919283179.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00245

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

234
China’s ‘‘Peripheral Diplomacy’’A key element of China’s new, active foreign policy is the conceptof ‘‘peripheral diplomacy.’’ Peripheral diplomacy, which emphasizes
China’s relations with countries in its immediate neighborhood,
was the topic of a high-level foreign policy meeting held in October
2013 by the Politburo Standing Committee and attended by otherhigh-level officials.10 The event was the highest-level foreign policy
meeting since 2006. In it, President Xi said China should ‘‘strive
for obtaining an excellent peripheral environment for our country’s
development, bring even more benefits of our country’s development to peripheral countries, and realize common development.’’ 11
Beijing’s emphasis on strengthening ties with neighboring countries has been ongoing since the first year of the Xi Administration,
during which 12 of the 22 countries visited by President Xi andPremier Li Keqiang were China’s close neighbors.12
China’s focus on building positive relations with its neighbors
has manifested in several new diplomatic initiatives, including the‘‘Silk Road Economic Belt,’’ the ‘‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road,’’and the ‘‘Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor.’’ 13
Notably, each of these three initiatives heavily emphasizes economic cooperation and integration. Although the initiatives are in
their early stages, Beijing’s enthusiasm and initial steps toward
implementation indicate China’s emphasis on peripheral diplomacy
is not merely rhetorical.
Silk Road Economic Belt: During a trip to Kazakhstan in late2013, President Xi proposed establishing a Silk Road Economic
Belt from China through Central Asia to Europe for the purposeof enhancing regional economic and cultural integration (see Figure1).14 Soon thereafter, representatives from 24 cities in China, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to establish the Silk Road Economic
Belt.15 According to President Xi, the Silk Road Economic Belt
should seek to ‘‘build policy communication’’ in the region by having ‘‘full discussions on development strategies and policy
response[s]’’; ‘‘improve road connectivity’’ between the Pacific Ocean
and the Baltic Sea; ‘‘promote unimpeded trade’’ by removing tradeand investment barriers; ‘‘enhance monetary circulation’’ by settling trade in local currencies; and ‘‘increase understanding between our people’’ by encouraging people-to-people exchanges.16
China also likely intends for this new regional arrangement tofacilitate access to Central Asian natural resources, particularly oil
and natural gas,* and encourage economic development and stability in China’s underdeveloped and restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.17 In addition, Beijing also likely seeks to emphasize to foreign observers its largely positive and peaceful relations
with its western neighbors while diverting attention from its coercive actions against many of its East Asian maritime neighbors,

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* China’s quest for energy security is a primary driver of its engagement in Central Asia, aregion rich in oil and natural gas. For a discussion of China’s energy engagement with Central
Asia, see House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,
Hearing on the Development of Energy Resources in Central Asia, written testimony of Dennis
Shea, May 21, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Shea_Testimony_China%E2%80%99s%20Energy%20Engagement%20with%20Central%20Asia%20and%20Implications%20for%20
the%20United%20States_0.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00246

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

235
discussed below.18 Uncertainty about the impact U.S. withdrawal
from Afghanistan will have on the region may be another factor behind Beijing’s efforts to bolster its presence in Central Asia. China
in recent years has steadily increased economic, political, and security engagement with Afghanistan and has indicated it intends toplay a stabilizing role in Afghanistan in the future.*
21st Century Maritime Silk Road: Soon after President Xi proposed the Silk Road Economic Belt, he introduced its corollary, the21st Century Maritime Silk Road, a maritime thoroughfare running from China’s coast through maritime Southeast Asia and theIndian Ocean to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 1).19
Thus far, there is no agreement formalizing participation in the initiative. According to Chinese state-run media, a Chinese Ministryof Foreign Affairs spokesperson stressed that the 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road is an ‘‘open’’ initiative and that China welcomes ‘‘suggestions from other countries to perfect it.’’ 20
Projects associated with the Maritime Silk Road will focus on
maritime transport infrastructure.21 The arrangement also likely
will serve as a symbolic banner under which China and other countries along the route can extol cooperative efforts in the political
realm and by which China can reassure its maritime neighbors—
many of which have territorial disputes with China—that it seeks
to play a cooperative, rather than confrontational, role in Asia’s
maritime commons.22

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* China has demonstrated a growing interest in stability and security in Afghanistan. For example, in 2012, Zhou Yongkang—then China’s top security official—visited Afghanistan, where
he signed economic and security agreements, including one to send 300 Afghan police officers
to China for training. Mr. Zhou had been the highest-ranking official to visit the country in 46
years. More recently, China established a diplomatic position of Special Envoy for Afghan Affairs, ‘‘so as to step up the communication with Afghanistan and all parties concerned and safeguard lasting peace, stability and development of Afghanistan and the region.’’ In the near term,
however, China is unlikely to take on a military role in Afghanistan like that of the UnitedStates. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarkson the Foreign Ministry’s Establishment of the Special Envoy for Afghan Affairs,’’ July 18, 2014.
http: // www.fmprc.gov.cn / mfa_ eng / xwfw_ 665399 / s2510_ 665401 / t1175878.shtml;
U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Annual Report to Congress, November 2012,
p. 320; and Michael Martina, ‘‘China Will Not Fill U.S. Void in Afghanistan: Official,’’ Reuters,
July 21, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/21/us-china-afghanistan-idUSKBN0FQ12I
20140721.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00247

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

236
Figure 1:

China’s Proposed ‘‘Silk Road Economic Belt’’ and‘‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’’

This map, adapted from one featured on the website of Chinese official media outlet Xinhua,
traces China’s proposed ‘‘Silk Road Economic Belt’’ (the northern section of the loop), and ‘‘21stCentury Maritime Silk Road’’ (the southern section of the loop). Locations are not exact. For
the original map, see Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘New Silk Road, New Dreams.’’ http://www.
xinhuanet.com/world/newsilkway/index.htm.

Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor:
According to officials from participating countries, the BCIM Economic Corridor is meant to ‘‘advance multi-modal connectivity, harness the economic complementarities, promote investment andtrade and facilitate people-to-people contacts.’’ 23 Like the Silk Road
Economic Belt, BCIM aims to bring economic development, mostly
in the form of transport infrastructure, to rural regions in each of
the participating countries.24 Beijing and New Delhi in particularprobably will seek to use BCIM as a way to cooperate and build
trust to attempt to defuse simmering bilateral political and security
tensions.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00248

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S1Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China Establishes Development Bank with Other BRICS
Countries
To complement and reinforce its efforts to increase its influencein peripheral regions, China also is strengthening its global presence by contributing to the New Development Bank, which was established in July 2014 by BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa). The bank, meant to fund ‘‘infrastructureand sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing countries,’’ 25 is headquartered in Shanghai andhas an initial subscribed capital of $50 billion, which later will be
increased to $100 billion.26 (By comparison, the World Bank has$232 billion in capital.)27 China, having provided 41 percent of theinitial $50 billion in capital for the bank, likely will enjoy a higher
degree of control over how money is spent than the other BRICS

237
countries. Several observers welcomed the creation of the New Development Bank and heralded its potential to fill infrastructure
gaps in low- and middle-income countries. Others, however, havequestioned the credibility of the institution (and the countries it
represents) as a globally responsible leader.28 For example, China’s
lending practices sometimes attract criticism for undermining good
governance and environmental sustainability in recipient countries.29
China’s New Foreign Aid White Paper
When Foreign Minister Wang extolled China’s ‘‘active’’ foreign
policy in early 2014, he noted that one of its central characteristics
was ‘‘playing the role of a responsible, big country.’’ 30 One manifestation of China’s efforts to play this role is its foreign aid programs. Although China has had such programs for decades, it appears to have made foreign aid a higher priority since 2011, when
it released its first foreign aid white paper.* The white paper, China’s most authoritative publication on the subject, noted China’s
total foreign aid through 2009 reached around $40 billion and had
increased by almost 30 percent year-on-year between 2004 and2009.31 China’s second foreign aid white paper, which was releasedin July 2014 and covers the years 2010 through 2012, during which
China appropriated about $14.4 billion in aid,† notes ‘‘China willcontinue to increase the input in foreign assistance’’ in the future.
The paper does not, however, provide any details on China’s future
foreign aid budget.32
The 2014 white paper identifies two objectives for Chinese foreign aid: improving people’s livelihood (primarily through projects
in the areas of agriculture, education, and public welfare) and promoting economic and social development (primarily through infrastructure development). Infrastructure development accounted foralmost half (45 percent) of China’s allocated foreign aid from 2010
to 2012.33
China’s foreign aid has been and will continue to be an important foreign policy instrument for Beijing. China’s ‘‘no strings attached’’ giving, along with its emphasis on solidarity among developing countries, South-South cooperation,‡ and ‘‘win-win’’ relationships, appeals to recipient governments that often resent the conditionality typical of foreign aid from Western countries and lending
institutions. China’s particular brand of foreign aid bolsters its reputation among governments in the developing world, particularly in
Africa, which received 52 percent of Chinese aid from 2010 to2012.34 Beijing almost certainly will continue to use foreign aid andDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Chinese government has released dozens of white papers over the years on a varietyof economic, foreign policy, political, military, and social issues. These papers serve both informational and propaganda purposes.
† Official Chinese statistics generally blur the distinction between development finance andaid, often referring to them both as ‘‘aid.’’ Yun Sun, China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?
(The Brookings Institution, February 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/
07-china-aid-to-africa-sun.
‡ China’s foreign policy in recent years has increasingly emphasized the importance of SouthSouth cooperation, which the United Nations defines as ‘‘a broad framework for collaboration
among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains. Involving two or more developing countries, it can take place on a bilateral, regional, subregional or interregional basis.’’ United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation,‘‘What Is South-South Cooperation?’’ http: // ssc.undp.org / content / ssc / about /what_is_ssc.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00249

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

238
other means to cultivate the perception that China is a friend to
the developing world.35
Though recipient governments have warmly welcomed China’s
foreign aid, human rights groups and local populations in recipient
countries have been critical.36 China has gained a reputation forusing Chinese companies and workers for its foreign aid projects
instead of empowering local businesses and people, and for not respecting labor, safety, or environmental regulations in the courseof its foreign aid projects.37 Whether the Chinese government iswilling and able to improve upon this model will shed light on China’s progress toward becoming a truly ‘‘responsible’’ global leader.
China’s effort to project an image of itself ‘‘playing the role of a
responsible, big country’’ is at odds with its increased aggressiveness toward its neighbors and willingness to flout internationallaws and norms. Further, its commitment to ‘‘playing the role of a
responsible, big country’’ only seems to be a salient feature of China’s foreign policy when ‘‘being responsible’’ is in Beijing’s own narrow national interests.38 Indeed, China’s foreign policy rebranding
obscures the fact that one of China’s fundamental foreign policy objectives—to preserve China’s economic growth and the continuity of
CCP rule—has not changed. Foreign Minister Wang suggested asmuch when he said the primary purpose of China’s foreign policy
is to ‘‘serv[e] the efforts of comprehensively deepening reform in
China,’’ ‘‘creat[e] a more enabling external environment for domestic reform and development,’’ and ‘‘creat[e] more favorable conditions for the transformation and upgrading of China’s economy.’’ 39
In the near term, China’s foreign policy almost certainly will feature more robust external engagement, particularly with its neighbors in Asia. However, Beijing is unlikely to fundamentally reorient its external relations to take on greater responsibility for regional and global challenges. Instead, Beijing will continue to marshal its diplomatic capabilities to advance China’s own interests,
sometimes at the expense of other countries. Nowhere in China’s
external relations is this clearer than in China’s management of its
territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas.
Key Developments in China’s Maritime Territorial Disputes
in 2014Since the Commission published its 2013 Annual Report, China
has increasingly used coercion to consolidate control over its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas.* Although China’s
actions are consistent with a pattern of assertiveness in its maritime disputes since approximately 2009, Beijing until late 2013often justified this assertiveness by claiming it was merely responding to rival claimants’ efforts to secure territorial gains in disputed waters. For example, China defended its sharply increased
air and maritime presence near the East China Sea’s Senkaku Is-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For the Commission’s assessment of the economic implications of China’s maritime disputes,
see Chapter 1, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Economics and Trade.’’ For past Commission assessments of China’s objectives, strategies, and behavior related to its territorial disputes in theSouth and East China Seas, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013
Annual Report to Congress, November 2013, pp. 266–294; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Annual Report to Congress, November 2012, pp. 215–242; and U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Annual Report to Congress, November
2011, pp. 166–172.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00250

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

239
lands in 2012, claiming it was in response to Japan nationalizing
the islands. Similarly, when the Philippines deployed a naval ship
to the South China Sea in response to illegal Chinese fishing activities at Scarborough Reef in 2012, China responded opportunistically by establishing a near-constant maritime presence in andaround the Reef. After the Philippine ships exited the Reef as partof a U.S.-mediated deal for both countries to simultaneously leave
the area and reduce tensions, China apparently reneged on theagreement, keeping its ships at the Reef.40 Since then, China has
effectively controlled access to the Reef.41
Since late 2013, however, China has been more willing to advance its sovereignty claims without using a perceived provocation
by a rival claimant to justify its actions. Ely Ratner, senior fellow
and deputy director of the Asia Pacific Security Program at theCenter for a New American Security, explained:
Although China began acting more assertively after perceiving its ascension to great power status in the wake ofthe global financial crisis, Beijing still felt compelled to justify its muscular movements in Asia as necessary reactions
to the provocations of ‘‘troublemakers’’ in the region. Sure,
China was standing strong, but arguably in response to theadventurism of others. It was more retaliatory than overtly
belligerent.
As Beijing made a habit of tempering and justifying its behavior, leading Western analysts developed terms like ‘‘reactive assertiveness’’ and described Chinese revisionism as‘‘cautious and considered.’’ . . . [Since late 2013] however,China’s efforts to alter Asia’s geography have become unequivocally self-initiated. . . . China is changing the status
quo in Asia because it wants to and thinks it can. Xi
Jinping is a confident and powerful leader with a high-priority to-do list, and he’s increasingly enabled with greater
capabilities and the institutions to deploy them. Mix in an
economic slowdown and a healthy dose of nationalism andyou have a recipe for revisionism.42
The three most significant manifestations of this new, even more
assertive turn are China’s establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in November 2013; its
relocation of an oil rig to waters disputed by Vietnam in the South
China Sea in May 2014; and its ongoing attempts to prevent thePhilippines from resupplying its military outpost at Second Thomas
Shoal in the South China Sea.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China Establishes an ADIZ in the East China Sea: China’s Ministry of Defense in November 2013 declared an ADIZ over a portionof the East China Sea. The new East China Sea ADIZ is the boldest of China’s recent attempts to demonstrate control, sovereignty,
and administration of disputed areas in the East China Sea. Beijing claims the ADIZ, which includes airspace over areas claimed
by Japan and South Korea, is necessary to ‘‘[protect] state sovereignty and territorial and airspace security’’ in the East China
Sea.43

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00251

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

240
Putting China’s ADIZ in Context
An ADIZ is a publicly-declared area established in international airspace adjacent to a state’s national airspace in which
civil aircraft must be prepared to submit to local air traffic control and provide aircraft identifiers and location. Its purpose is toallow a state the time and space to identify the nature of approaching aircraft prior to entering national airspace in order toprepare defensive measures if necessary.44 The United States established the first ADIZ during the Cold War, and today several
countries maintain ADIZs for security reasons.45
ADIZs are not prohibited or otherwise explicitly addressed ininternational law.46 This allows states significant flexibility indefining their own ADIZs. For example, unlike most (but not all)countries with ADIZs, China has stated it will apply its ADIZ
regulations not only to aircraft intending to enter its sovereign
airspace but also to foreign aircraft transiting or operating in the
ADIZ that do not intend to enter its sovereign airspace.* The
U.S. government opposes this expansive interpretation of therights of a country to regulate activity in an ADIZ.47
Because ADIZs have no explicit basis in international law,states are not legally obligated to comply with other countries’
ADIZ requirements.48 However, ‘‘states tend to recognize thembecause doing so can enhance security and safety by providing
clear rules and areas for the operation and possible interceptionof aircraft near territorial airspace,’’ according to Michael D.
Swaine, senior associate at the Asia Program at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.49

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* According to Mark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, China’s Air Force
Shanghai Base likely will be the principal implementing body for the ADIZ, with the PLA Air
Force Third Radar Brigade and the PLA Navy Second Radar Brigade providing ground-based
radar surveillance in the northern and southern sections of the ADIZ, respectively. Mark Stokes,‘‘China’s ADIZ System: Goals and Challenges,’’ Thinking Taiwan, April 24, 2014. http://thinkingtaiwan.com/chinas-adiz/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00252

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

241
Figure 2:

China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea

Source: Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Statement by the Government of the People’s Republic ofChina on Establishing an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,’’ November 23, 2013.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911635.htm.

The United States, Japan,* South Korea, Australia, the European Union, and others criticized China’s newly established
ADIZ.† 50 According to Evan Medeiros, senior director for Asian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, ‘‘We [the United States]
do not accept, we do not acknowledge, we do not recognize China’s
declared ADIZ.’’ 51 Nevertheless, in response to a question about
China’s ADIZ during a November 2013 press conference, the U.S.
Department of State Office of the Spokesperson said, ‘‘The U.S.
government generally expects that U.S. carriers operating internationally will operate consistent with NOTAMs (Notices to Airmen) issued by foreign countries. Our expectation of operations by
U.S. carriers consistent with NOTAMs does not indicate U.S. government acceptance of China’s requirements for operating in the
newly declared ADIZ.’’ 52
Beijing likely perceived several potential advantages to establishing an ADIZ:

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00253

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S1Fig2.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The United States and Japan submitted a letter to the United Nations’ civil aviation regulator, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), requesting a review of whether
China’s ADIZ conforms to ICAO regulations on the safe passage of civilian aircraft. ICAO is expected to consider the letter but it is unclear whether it will respond. NHK Online (English edition), ‘‘Japan Asks UN Aviation Body about China’s Air Zone,’’ March 11, 2014. Open Source
Center transcription. ID: JPR2014031130022028.
† The U.S. Senate also affirmed its opposition to the ADIZ in July 2014 when it passed a bipartisan resolution condemning ‘‘coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede
freedom of operations in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the statusquo or to destabilize the Asia-Pacific region.’’ Reaffirming the Strong Support of the UnitedStates Government for Freedom of Navigation and other Internationally Lawful Uses of Sea andAirspace in the Asia-Pacific Region, and for the Peaceful Diplomatic Resolution of Outstanding
Territorial and Maritime Claims and Disputes, S. Resolution 412, 113th Cong., 2nd Sess., July
10, 2014.

242• Establishing an ADIZ is a relatively low-cost, low-risk way tobolster China’s territorial claim. An ADIZ requires relatively
little financial investment, can be established unilaterally, isloosely defined and not explicitly addressed in internationallaw, and provides China the opportunity to augment its growing collection of maps and legal documents that attempt to justify its maritime territorial claims.53• Establishing an ADIZ puts the onus on foreign countries andforeign aircraft operating in international airspace to decide
whether to recognize and comply with China’s ADIZ requirement and creates a situation in which foreign aircraft (especially passenger aircraft) are motivated to comply in an effort
to mitigate safety risks. As noted above, even the UnitedStates, which does not recognize China’s ADIZ, for safety reasons has indirectly advised U.S. commercial airlines to comply
with it.*• Beijing likely judges its ADIZ helps China achieve parity withJapan and to a lesser extent South Korea. Both Japan andSouth Korea have decades-old ADIZs in disputed airspace inthe East China Sea and view entry by foreign military aircraftin their respective zones as triggering mechanisms for militaryresponses.54 Beijing almost certainly perceived this as advantageous for Japan and South Korea, and sought to ‘‘level theplaying field’’ by establishing its own ADIZ.
• China likely views its ADIZ as a public relations tool. By publicizing data on ‘‘intrusions’’ into its ADIZ, China can paint itself
as a victim rather than an aggressor.55 Conversely, for every
aircraft that complies with China’s ADIZ requirements, China
probably judges its body of evidence justifying its administration of airspace in the ADIZ grows.†
Since establishing its ADIZ, China appears to have dramaticallyincreased its military and government air presence near disputed
areas of the East China Sea. According to the Chinese Ministry of
Defense website, China ‘‘controlled the flight activity of 800 foreign

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Japan does not recognize China’s ADIZ, and the Japanese government in November 2013
requested that Japanese airlines refrain from submitting flight plans to Chinese authorities
when operating in China’s ADIZ. However, remarks by Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio
Kishida in a December 2013 press conference suggest this request was somewhat flexible. He
said, ‘‘Japan’s commercial airplanes take necessary measures which facilitate the easy identification of the number of flights, location information, etc. These airplanes are equipped with
two-way radio telephone apparatus, automatic answering equipment among other devices, whichenables communication at any time.’’ Tim Kelly, ‘‘Japanese Airlines to Stop Giving China FlightPlans through New Zone,’’ Reuters, November 26, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/
26/us-japan-airlines-china-idUSBRE9AP0US20131126; Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs,‘‘Press Conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida,’’ December 13, 2013. http://
www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000030.html.
† This approach has worked for Japan, a country that regularly documents noncompliant aircraft intrusions into its own ADIZ. According to Eric Heginbotham, a political scientist at the
RAND Corporation, ‘‘Japan has used its ADIZ . . . as an effective public relations and diplomatic
tool vis-à-vis China. The Japanese Ministry of Defense publishes detailed statistics on scrambles
to intercept aircraft within its ADIZ, together with details of some of those events (such as aircraft tracks and photographs). In recent years, the Japanese Ministry of Defense has highlighted
a steadily increasing number of intercept missions against Chinese aircraft in Japan’s ADIZ.’’
Eric Heginbotham, ‘‘The Foreign Policy Essay: China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea,’’ Lawfare(Blog), August 24, 2014. http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/08/the-foreign-policy-essay-chinas-adizin-the-east-china-sea/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00254

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

243
war planes’’ * in the ADIZ in the month after the ADIZ was established, and sent surveillance, early warning, and fighter aircraft on
87 flights to patrol the ADIZ.56 Japan Air Self-Defense Force(JASDF) fighter jet scrambles against Chinese patrols in Japan’s
own ADIZ—an imperfect but useful indicator of China’s growing
air presence above contested waters in the absence of reliable Chinese statistics—markedly increased after China established its
ADIZ. JASDF fighter jets scrambled against China’s aircraft 138
times between October and December 2013, the highest ever number of scrambles against China and 58 more times than in thequarter preceding the establishment of the ADIZ.57 Chinese air incursions around Japan in the six months between October 2013
and March 2014 increased 78 percent over the previous six-month
period.58
China’s ADIZ is problematic in several ways. First, the ADIZ announcement exacerbated the strained bilateral relationship between Japan and China during a period of heightened tension overthe East China Sea. Second, China appears to have announced the
ADIZ without prior consultation or coordination with other countries.59 According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, this‘‘adds to tensions, misunderstandings, and could eventually [leadto] dangerous conflict.’’ 60 Third, China’s expansive interpretation ofa state’s right to establish and enforce an ADIZ (described above)and its willingness to establish an ADIZ above contested maritime
territory demonstrate China’s inclination to contravene international norms intended to cultivate a safe environment for international flight in order to advance its own narrow interests. (Thisalso raises questions about whether international aviation law issufficiently developed to address sovereignty and other political disputes between countries.) Fourth, the Chinese government has notmade clear how it would employ what it refers to as ‘‘defensive
emergency measures’’ in its ADIZ.61 This lack of clarity over rulesof engagement combined with existing geopolitical frictions elevates
the risk of operational miscalculation or accidents among civilian
and military aircraft, including those of the United States.
Two close encounters between the PLA Air Force and the Japan
Self-Defense Force in China’s ADIZ in 2014 illustrate this lastpoint. The first incident, which occurred in May, involved Chinese
SU–27 fighter jets that flew within 170 feet of a Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) OP–3C surveillance plane and within
100 feet of a JASDF YS–11EB electronic intelligence aircraft.62 A
second incident occurred in June, when Chinese SU–27 fighter aircraft again flew within 100 feet of a JASDF YS–11EB and within
150 feet of a JMSDF OP–3C.63
Beijing’s November 2013 announcement that it plans to establish
additional ADIZs ‘‘at an appropriate time after completing preparations’’ led some observers to speculate China will declare an ADIZ
in the South China Sea, where China has maritime disputes with
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan.64 ThisDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Chinese Ministry of Defense does not clarify what it means by ‘‘controlled,’’ but the term
likely refers to monitoring and identification activities. Michael D. Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Views
and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),’’ China
Leadership Monitor 43 (March 2014): 22. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM43MSCarnegie
013114.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00255

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

244
likely would yield fewer risks than in the East China Sea due tothe smaller number of aircraft operating in the South China Sea.
However, it would escalate tensions among the claimants and violate the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea, a 2002 document in which China and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) declare they will‘‘exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.’’ 65 According to Dr. Medeiros, such a move would be viewed ‘‘as a provocative and destabilizing development that would result in changes
in [the United States’] presence and military posture in the region.’’ 66
China Tows an Oil Rig into Disputed Waters near Vietnam: Between May and July 2014, Chinese state-owned oil company China
National Petroleum Corporation towed China’s only ultradeepwater
oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 to locations 130–150 nautical miles(nm) off the coast of Vietnam into waters disputed by the two countries.* 67 This marked the first time China has deployed an oil rig
to another country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) † without obtaining permission.68 According to the government of Vietnam, over
100 escort vessels, including military ships, accompanied the rig. In
the weeks after the rig was deployed, both China and Vietnam accused the other of harassing its vessels in the waters surrounding
the rig, with Vietnam claiming China Coast Guard vessels rammed
and fired water cannons at Vietnamese law enforcement vessels,
injuring dozens of Vietnamese officers and sinking one Vietnamesefishing boat.69 China subsequently sent three smaller rigs to theSouth China Sea, at least one of which also appears to have been
towed into waters contested by Vietnam.70

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Although China National Petroleum Corporation was operating the rig while it was stationed near Vietnam, the rig is owned by another Chinese state-owned oil company, China National Offshore Oil Corporation.
† According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal state is entitledto an EEZ, a 200-nautical-mile zone extending from the coastline of its mainland and from thecoastline of any territorial land features. Within this zone, the state enjoys ‘‘sovereign rights’’for economic exploitation, (such as for oil and natural gas exploration and exploitation) but not
full sovereignty. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ‘‘Article 56: Rights, Jurisdiction, and Duties of the Coastal State in the Exclusive Economic Zone.’’ http://ww.un.org/depts/
los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos//part5.htm; United Nations Convention on the Law of theSea, ‘‘Article 121: Regime of Islands.’’ http://ww.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/
unclos//part8.htm.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00256

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

245
Figure 3:

Location of China’s Oil Rig in Vietnam’s EEZ

Source: Adam Taylor, ‘‘The $1 Billion Chinese Oil Rig that Has Vietnam in Flames,’’ Washington Post, May 14, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/05/14/the-1billion-chinese-oil-rig-that-has-vietnam-in-flames/.

Vietnam stated China’s behavior ‘‘seriously infringed Vietnam’s
sovereignty . . . and went against the spirit and wording of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the [South China Sea] andrelated regulations in international law.’’ 71 Thousands of Vietnamese citizens responded by looting and setting fire to factories
and businesses thought to be Chinese-owned in cities across Vietnam, resulting in several casualties.* 72 The U.S. Department ofState noted that ‘‘China’s decision . . . is provocative and raises tensions. This unilateral action appears to be part of a broader patternof Chinese behavior to advance its claims over disputed territory ina manner that undermines peace and stability in the region.’’ 73
Others, including several foreign ministers from ASEAN countries,
issued statements explicitly or implicitly condemning China’s actions.74
After drawing ire from Vietnam and the international community
for two months, China unexpectedly announced Haiyang Shiyou
981 had concluded its activities one month ahead of schedule after
successfully finding oil and gas reserves and would relocate towaters approximately 68 nm from China’s island province, Hainan.75 China may have decided to remove the rig from disputed
waters early in an effort to minimize criticism of China at the approaching August ASEAN Regional Forum.76

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00257

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S1Fig3.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Reports on the number of casualties range from four to 21. Gregory B. Poling, Recent Trends
in the South China Sea and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International
Studies, July 2014), p. 5. http://csis.org/files/publication/140728_Poling_TrendsSouthChinaSea_
Web.pdf; Kate Hodal and Jonathan Kaiman, ‘‘At Least 21 Dead in Vietnam Anti-China Protests
over Oil Rig,’’ Guardian, May 15, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/vietnamanti-china-protests-oil-rig-dead-injured.

246
China’s decision to deploy the rig to disputed waters demonstrates the Chinese government’s willingness and ability to use
state-owned oil companies to achieve political and national security
objectives. In fact, Haiyang Shiyou 981’s political and strategic purposes were foretold at its 2012 unveiling, when it was referred toby officials as ‘‘mobile national territory’’ and a ‘‘strategic instrument.’’ 77

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China Challenges the Philippines’ Control over Second Thomas
Shoal: China in March 2014 sought for the first time to block access by the Philippines to its military outpost on Second Thomas
Shoal, a contested land feature in the South China Sea located approximately 120 nm from the Philippine coast and more than 800
nm from the Chinese coast.78
In what the Philippines government called ‘‘a clear and urgent
threat to the rights and interests of the Philippines,’’ China Coast
Guard ships prevented Philippine civilian supply ships from replenishing Philippine marines aboard the Sierra Madre, a warship
the Philippines intentionally grounded in 1990 on Second Thomas
Shoal.79 After being blocked by the China Coast Guard ships, thePhilippines was forced to airlift supplies to its outpost.80 Three
weeks later, Chinese ships again sought to block a resupply mission to the Sierra Madre by sailing close to the Philippine resupply
ship and blocking its path. The supply ship eventually completed
the mission by sailing through waters too shallow for the Chinese
ships to enter.81 Since then, the Philippine Navy has regularly airdropped supplies to the Sierra Madre via parachute.82 It is notclear whether additional attempts have been made to resupply theship by boat. In addition to blocking access to the Sierra Madre,
Chinese vessels also reportedly blocked or chased away Filipino
fishermen from waters near Second Thomas Shoal at least eighttimes between December 2013 and March 2014,83 and marines
aboard the Sierra Madre observed what appeared to be three Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles hovering above the Shoal in Julyand August.84
China’s efforts to deny the Philippines access to the groundedvessel represent a new step in a now-familiar Chinese strategy to
use Coast Guard and other nonmilitary vessels to establish a regular or constant presence in contested waters, intimidate otherclaimants, and gradually change the status quo. The PLA Navybacks up these operations from a distance, typically deploying destroyers and frigates 60 to 100 nm from China Coast Guard andother non-military ships.85 Policy makers in Beijing probably wereemboldened by China’s success in effectively wresting control of
Scarborough Reef from the Philippines in 2012 and seek to achievea similar outcome at Second Thomas Shoal. China likely will persist in its activities near the Shoal with the objective of increasingly imposing costs on the Philippines’ continued efforts to sustain
the Sierra Madre and maintain control over the Shoal.
The presence of a Philippine Navy ship (albeit a grounded one)and Philippine Marines stationed at Second Thomas Shoal raises
the stakes for both countries, as well as the United States. Should
Chinese vessels seek to use force against the Sierra Madre and themarines stationed there, the United States could decide to inter-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00258

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

247
vene on the behalf of the Philippines, with which it shares a mutual defense treaty. This treaty provides, among other things, that:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the PacificArea on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet thecommon dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. . . . [A]n armed attack on either of the Parties isdeemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories
under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces,
public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.* 86
The treaty’s application to ‘‘armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific’’ is clearly relevant to the ongoing situation at
Second Thomas Shoal. However, the treaty’s language is purposefully vague in its prescription for a response to ‘‘an armed attack.’’
For example, should Chinese government or military vessels attack
the Sierra Madre, the United States could respond in any numberof ways—diplomatic, military, or otherwise—to meet its treaty commitment of ‘‘act[ing] to meet the common dangers in accordancewith its constitutional processes.’’ 87
In addition to these particularly strident new demonstrations ofassertiveness, China continued to gradually assert control andgrow its physical presence in disputed waters in 2014 in the following ways:• China Ramps Up Land Reclamation in the South China Sea:
China in 2014 made significant progress on various land reclamation projects on Johnson South Reef, Johnson North Reef,
Cuateron Reef, Gaven Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, all of which
are Chinese-controlled outposts in the disputed Spratly Islands(see Figure 4, below). In addition to dredging sand to make islands where there previously were none (see Figure 5, below),
China appears to be expanding and upgrading military and civilian infrastructure—including radars, satellite communication equipment, antiaircraft and naval guns, helipads, anddocks—on some of the islands.88

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* President Obama reaffirmed the mutual defense treaty during an April 2014 visit to thePhilippines, saying, ‘‘For more than 60 years, the United States and the Philippines have beenbound by a mutual defense treaty. And this treaty means that our two nations pledge . . . our‘common determination to defend themselves against external armed attacks, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone.’ . . . In other words,
our commitment to the Philippines is ironclad and the United States will keep that commitment, because allies never stand alone.’’ Jim Garamore, ‘‘From Bataan to Typhoon, Obama
Praises U.S.-Philippine Alliance,’’ American Forces Press Service, April 29, 2014. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122141.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00259

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

248
Figure 4: China’s Major Land Reclamation Projects in the South China Sea

Locations are not exact. Map adapted from James Hardy et al., ‘‘China Goes All Out withMajor Island Building Project in Spratlys,’’ IHS Jane’s 360, June 20, 2014. http://www.janes.com/
article/39716/china-goes-all-out-with-major-island-building-project-in-spratlys.

These land reclamation projects appear intended to bolster thelegal standing of China’s South China Sea claims ahead of anInternational Tribunal on the Law of the Sea ruling requested by
the Philippines.89 The Philippines has asked the tribunal to declarewhether certain land features in the South China Sea are islands(which can generate full EEZs) or smaller land features (which can
only generate territorial seas out to 12 nm).* China may perceivethat if it can demonstrate that the remote South China Sea outposts it occupies are true islands, rather than mere rocks or reefs,
it will strengthen the legal and practical justification for its vastterritorial claims (see Figure 5, below).†

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00260

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S1Fig4.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ‘‘an island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide’’ and which
may generate an EEZ. However, ‘‘rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic
life of their own’’ cannot generate territory beyond territorial seas out to 12 nm. United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, ‘‘Part 8: Regime of Islands.’’ http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention/agreements/texts/unclo/clos/indx.htm.
† According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, artificial islands are notconsidered true islands, and thus cannot generate their own territorial seas or EEZs. United249
Moreover, these infrastructure improvements are enhancing China’s ability to sustain its naval and maritime law enforcement
presence in the South China Sea. This is particularly the case at
Fiery Cross Reef, where a five-square mile project has been underconstruction intermittently since 1988. According to IHS Jane’s,
Chinese facilities there serve as ‘‘base’’ for conducting land reclamation projects elsewhere in the Spratly Islands and host communications equipment, a greenhouse, a wharf, a helipad, andcoastal artillery.90 Andrew S. Erickson, associate professor at the
U.S. Naval War College, and Austin M. Strange, PhD student at
Harvard University, suggest Fiery Cross Reef could eventually sustain a PLA Navy command and control center twice the size ofDiego Garcia, a U.S. naval base in the Indian Ocean.91
China also appears to be constructing an airstrip at Johnson
South Reef. The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs in May
2014 released a series of photographs demonstrating the progressof Chinese land reclamation activities there (see Figure 5, below).
Although Vietnam, the Philippines, the United States, and othercountries have criticized China’s land reclamation projects, a Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesperson defended them, saying,‘‘China’s activities on relevant islands and reefs of the [Spratly] Islands fall entirely within China’s sovereignty and are totally justifiable.’’ 92

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ‘‘Part 5: Exclusive Economic Zone.’’ http://
www.un.org/depts/los/convention/_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00261

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

250
Figure 5:

China’s Land Reclamation Activities at Johnson South Reef,
March 2012–March 2014

Photographs of China’s land reclamation activities on Johnson South Reef, from top to bottom,
taken in March 2012, February 2013, February 2014, and March 2014. Image adapted from Pia
Lee-Brago, ‘‘Photos Reveal Stages of China Reclamation at Reef,’’ Philippine Star, May 16, 2014.
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/05/16/1323659/photos-reveal-stages-china-reclamationreef.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00262

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S1Fig5.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• China Asserts Greater Control over Fishing Activities in theSouth China Sea: In January 2014, the government of China’s
island province, Hainan, enacted new measures requiring all
foreign ships to obtain approval from the Chinese government
before entering ‘‘maritime areas’’ within the 770,000 square nm
of Hainan’s claimed jurisdiction.93 In March, the Party Secretary for Hainan Province commented that Chinese authorities enforce the regulations ‘‘if not every day then at least oncea week,’’ noting that ‘‘the majority [of perceived incursions byforeign fishing vessels in China’s claimed waters] are dealt
with by negotiating and persuasion.’’ 94 China does not regularly publicize arrests of foreign fishermen, but media reports

251suggest Chinese authorities frequently arrest or otherwise harass foreign fishermen operating in Hainan’s claimed waters.95
It is unclear whether the new regulations have led to an increase from previous years in arrests of foreign fishermen in
Hainan’s claimed waters.
Although the new measures do not appear to set forth new policy, subtle linguistic differences from previous iterations of theregulations suggest Hainan is taking a more pronounced
stance regarding perceived foreign infringements on China’s‘‘maritime rights and interests.’’ 96 Whether Hainan’s new regulations are the result of directives from the central government is unclear, but given the regulations’ politically sensitive
nature and implications for China’s relationships with its
neighbors, Beijing likely had a role in shaping the new measures.
Figure 6:

Hainan Province’s Claimed Maritime Jurisdiction

The shaded areas of the map represent Hainan Province’s claimed maritime jurisdiction. Locations are not exact. Map adapted from Open Source Center, ‘‘China: Hainan Province Requires Foreign Fishing Vessels to Gain Permission before Entering Waters,’’ December 20, 2013.
ID: CHO2013122036238672.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00263

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S1Fig6.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• China Continues Air and Sea Patrols around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea: China continues to strengthen its
military and law enforcement presence near the Senkaku Is-

252
lands with increased patrols by PLA Navy surface ships and
PLA Air Force fighters in the East China Sea, the continuation(albeit at a lower rate than in 2013) of patrols by China’s maritime law enforcement ships in disputed areas,97 and the beginning of long-range air strike training in the East China Sea inlate 2013.98 China uses these highly visible operations to assert its territorial claims, deter Japan from challenging its
claims, provide the PLA and maritime law enforcement agencies with valuable operational experience in the East China
Sea, and hone China’s military options in the event its strategy
to consolidate its East China Sea claims through coercion fails.
Developments in Cross-Strait Relations
Relations between China and Taiwan remained stable in 2014 as
the two sides tried to sustain progress on economic and other cooperation agreements. Despite the cross-Strait rapprochement, China’s military modernization continues to focus on improving its capabilities for Taiwan conflict scenarios that include U.S. intervention.99 This modernization program is designed to hedge against a
failure of China’s cross-Strait diplomatic strategy; deter Taiwan
from taking steps toward de jure independence; signal to theUnited States that China is willing to use force against Taiwan if
necessary; and enhance China’s ability to deter, delay, or deny any
U.S. intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. Meanwhile, Taiwan continues to struggle to maintain a credible deterrent capability.100
For a thorough discussion of economic, political, diplomatic, andmilitary developments in the cross-Strait and U.S.-Taiwan relationships, see Chapter 3, Section 3, ‘‘Taiwan.’’
PLA Exercises and Training
PLA exercises accomplish multiple objectives, which include
training in core warfighting competencies, integrating new weapon
systems and tactics, developing and refining integrated joint operations command structures and concepts, evaluating crew and platform proficiencies, and demonstrating to other countries that China
can project power in Asia and beyond. From late 2013 to 2014,high-profile exercises and patrols included the following:
Mission Action 2013

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

From September to October 2013, China conducted a major exercise known as Mission Action 2013, which involved about 50,000
troops from China’s ground, naval, and air forces as well as extensive civilian assets. The exercise is the latest in the Mission Action
series, which began in 2010 and is designed to demonstrate andtest the PLA’s ability to mobilize large numbers of troops acrosslarge distances for power projection in a high-intensity, long-duration campaign.101
Based on the types of activities conducted, official Chinese media
reporting, and the PLA units involved, Mission Action 2013 likely
simulated a Taiwan invasion scenario. The exercise had threephases: the first and third phases concluded with multi-service amphibious landing operations and the second phase culminated in along-range air assault. Mission Action 2013 was led by elements

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00264

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

253
from the Nanjing and Guangzhou military regions, which would beheavily involved in any potential military course of action against
Taiwan, and the PLA Air Force. The exercise attests to more robust preparations for potential wartime contingencies.102
Highlights of the exercise include the following: the use of advanced information systems, such as the ‘‘Information Command
Platform,’’ to provide a near-real-time picture of battlefield conditions and allow commanders to issue orders rapidly to multiple
units at the same time while on the move; long-range maneuvers
by troops via road, rail, military and civilian air, and navy andground force ships; two joint amphibious landing drills that were
supported by civilian transport ships; and a joint long-range air assault drill with almost 100 aircraft.103
Maneuver-5 Exercise
From October 18 to November 1, 2013, the PLA Navy held a sophisticated, large-scale training exercise that spanned China’s nearseas and distant seas.* The PLA Navy’s largest blue water exercise
to date, it marked the first time the PLA Navy has conducted coordinated combat drills in the Western Pacific with elements fromall three of its fleets: the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, andSouth Sea Fleet.† 104
Operational highlights of the exercise include the following:• Interoperability between Fleets: Maneuver-5 demonstrated the
PLA Navy’s increasing ability to coordinate air, sea, and underwater elements from all three PLA Navy fleets.105 During
the exercise, the PLA Navy used China’s regional satellite
navigation system, Beidou-2, to facilitate communication andprovide guidance and tracking data to participating units.106
In one instance, a shipboard helicopter provided over-the-horizon targeting information to a destroyer to enable simulated
long-range strikes against a target ship.107• Readiness in Realistic Combat Conditions: Throughout the deployment, the PLA Navy used ‘‘ad hoc’’ scenarios to train shipboard commanders to react to events as they occurred. These
scenarios were designed to enhance tactical commanders’ flexibility and responsiveness to changing conditions at sea.108 PLA
Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli said the exercise wasdesigned to ‘‘[be] combat-realistic to the maximum extent, set
combat-realistic scenarios to the maximum extent, [and test]
the maximum performance effects of weaponry and equipment.’’ 109 Traditionally, PLA Navy tactical commanders during
exercises have relied on a predetermined exercise script, strict
rules of engagement, or explicit orders from higher echelons toguide their actions.110

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* China typically defines its ‘‘near seas’’ as waters within the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, andSouth China Sea. China typically describes its ‘‘distant seas’’ as waters outside of its near seas.
† The PLA Navy’s three fleets are its principal operational and administrative command entities. The North Sea Fleet, headquartered in Qingdao, is responsible for the Yellow Sea and theBohai. The East Sea Fleet, headquartered in Ningbo, is responsible for the East China Sea, including the Taiwan Strait. The South Sea Fleet, headquartered in Zhanjiang, is responsible for
the South China Sea, including the contested Spratly and Paracel Islands.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00265

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

254
• Ability to Operate in Distant Seas and ‘‘Break Through’’ theFirst Island Chain: The Maneuver-5 exercise was the eighth
PLA Navy long-distance surface deployment of 2013 and showcased the PLA Navy’s growing ability to operate in distantseas.111 Chinese media claimed the Maneuver-5 exercise
marked ‘‘the first time the three PLA [Navy] fleets simultaneously [passed] through the first island chain * to carry out ajoint exercise in the Western Pacific.’’ 112 PLA Senior Colonel
Du Wenlong said, ‘‘The [PLA Navy] has cut up the whole island chain into multiple sections so that the so-called island
chains are no longer existent.’’ 113 Beijing almost certainly
views its familiarity with and ability to operate in the Western
Pacific as key to interdicting U.S. forces in a potential conflict.
PLA Navy Conducts First-Ever ‘‘Combat Readiness Patrol’’ in
the Indian Ocean
In January and February 2014, a three-ship Chinese surface action group carried out a sophisticated training exercise spanning
the South China Sea, eastern Indian Ocean, and Philippine Sea.
The deployment marked the first time the PLA Navy has conducted what official Chinese sources refer to as a ‘‘combat readiness patrol,’’ or ‘‘blue-water training,’’ in the Indian Ocean. Although the PLA Navy has made forays into the region since atleast 1985,114 its presence there has increased considerably overthe last five years.115 The PLA Navy used the 23-day deployment
to improve operational proficiencies for antisubmarine warfare, airdefense, electronic warfare, and expeditionary logistics; train toseize disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea; enhance
its ability to conduct integrated and multi-disciplinary operations;and demonstrate to the Indo-Pacific region that China’s combat
reach now extends to the eastern Indian Ocean.116
The surface action group consisted of the Changbaishan
YUZHAO-class amphibious transport dock (LPD), the Wuhan
LUYANG I-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG), and the Haikou
LUYANG II-class DDG. At approximately 20,000 tons, the
YUZHAO LPD is China’s largest indigenously built ship class.†
During the deployment, the Changbaishan embarked China’s only

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The first island chain refers to a line of islands running from Japan, the Senkaku Islands,
Taiwan, and the west coast of Borneo to Vietnam. The second island chain refers to a line ofislands running from the Kurile Islands through Japan, the Bonin Islands, the Mariana Islands,
the Caroline Islands, and Indonesia. PLA strategists and academics have long asserted theUnited States relies primarily on the ‘‘first island chain’’ and the ‘‘second island chain’’ to strategically ‘‘encircle’’ or ‘‘contain’’ China and prevent the PLA Navy from operating freely
in the Western Pacific. Hai Tao, ‘‘The Chinese Navy Has a Long Way to Go to Get to the
Far Seas,’’ International Herald Leader, January 6, 2012. Open Source Center translation.
ID: CPP20120109671003.
† The YUZHAO LPD can carry up to four YUYI hovercraft, 20 amphibious armored vehicles,
800 marines, and at least four helicopters. Given the ship’s size, range, and ability to support
over-the-horizon operations using helicopters and hovercraft, it is well suited for amphibious assaults against islands and reefs in the South China Sea and Taiwan-controlled islands in the
Taiwan Strait, as well as for search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,and counterpiracy operations. See Chapter 2, Section 2, ‘‘China’s Military Modernization,’’ formore information on China’s YUZHAO specifically and China’s amphibious capabilities generally. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization
and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse Karotkin, January 10,
2014; IHS Aerospace, Defense, and Security, ‘‘Analysis: China’s Expanding Amphibious Capabilities,’’ October 2013; and Craig Murray et al., China’s Naval Modernization and Implications
for the United States (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, August 26, 2013).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00266

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

255
operational YUYI-class hovercraft, three helicopters, and one company of marines.117
Operational highlights of the exercise include the following:• During the deployment, the PLA Navy conducted its first
known transit through the Sunda, Lombok, and Makassarstraits. These are international straits with regular flows ofmaritime shipping, albeit far less than the more economicalroute via the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. As with the
Maneuver-5 exercise, these transits appear to be part of a concerted effort by the PLA Navy since 2013 to demonstrate its
ability to ‘‘break through’’ the first island chain to operate in
China’s ‘‘distant seas.’’ 118• Soon after the surface action group left port, it reportedly rendezvoused with multiple PLA Navy submarines for ‘‘submarine-vessel joint ‘enemy’ blockade breakout drills’’ in theSouth China Sea. It is unlikely the submarines accompanied
the surface action group for the duration of the deployment.
Official Chinese media coverage indicates increasing submarine involvement in PLA Navy surface deployments since atleast 2010, signaling China is seeking to improve its ability tocoordinate surface and submarine units at sea.119• On January 22, the surface action group conducted amphibious
assault training for small-island and reef seizures in the
Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, several of which arecontested by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The training included landing marines by shipborne helicopters and hovercraft. The PLA Navy’s use of YUZHAO LPDs in amphibious
assault training since 2008 and the ship’s range and ability tosupport over-the-horizon assaults using helicopters and hovercraft suggest it would play a significant role in seizures of islands and reefs in the South and East China Seas or in an amphibious assault against Taiwan.120
Separately, from December 2013 to February 2014, a SHANG
nuclear-attack submarine conducted China’s first submarine combat readiness patrol to the Indian Ocean.121 China likely also usedthe deployment to test the submarine and its crew’s ability to operate for long durations at extended distances from China as well as
to train for potential crises and wartime operations in the Indian
Ocean. China informed Indian military officials that the submarine
would be supporting the PLA Navy’s ongoing counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.122 In September 2014, a PLA Navy submarine made a port call in Colombo, Sri Lanka, which coincidedwith President Xi’s visit to the country.123
PLA Conducts Series of Large-Scale Exercises from May to
September 2014

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

From late May to late September 2014, the PLA held a series oflarge-scale exercises that involved the PLA ground, air, and naval

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00267

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

256
forces and all seven military regions.* A Chinese state-run newspaper said the exercises were ‘‘of a rare breadth and scale’’ and explained they were part of the PLA’s efforts to ‘‘hone its craft in simulating battles to prepare for potential challenges in a more convoluted international situation.’’ 124• From late May to early September, the PLA held a cross-region
mobility exercise, known as Stride-2014. The exercise featured
seven separate parts, each led by a combined arms brigadefrom a different military region. Stride-2014 tested the participating forces’ ability to rapidly maneuver over long distances
under simulated wartime conditions. Modes of travel included
road, rail, and air.125• Beginning in late June, the PLA conducted a 100-day, two-partartillery exercise, known as Firepower-2014. Exercise participants included six artillery units from the Shenyang, Beijing,
Jinan, and Guangzhou military regions; several PLA universities, including the Nanjing Artillery Academy and the Air
Defense Forces Academy; multiple training bases; about 20,000
personnel from five military regions; and 1,000 pieces of main
battle equipment.126• From late July to early August, the PLA Navy simultaneously
conducted major exercises in at least three distinct maritime
areas: the Gulf of Tonkin, which borders both China and Vietnam; the East China Sea; and the Yellow Sea. Although a Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesperson characterized the exercises as routine annual training, several official Chinese media
articles cited military experts claiming the scale of the naval
activity was unprecedented.127
Due to PLA requirements for Chinese airspace during these exercises, Beijing ordered 12 airports in eastern China, including twoof the country’s busiest airports in Shanghai, to reduce flights by
25 percent from July 20 to August 15, resulting in the cancellationof hundreds of flights.128
PLA Participation in Major Joint and Multinational Activities
The PLA participated in more exercises and drills with foreign
militaries in 2014 than in any previous year since 2005, according
to the U.S. Department of Defense and other sources.129 Growing
PLA engagement with worldwide militaries complements and augments Beijing’s broader foreign policy efforts, bolsters China’s
international image, helps the PLA identify and address specificshortfalls in PLA operational capabilities by observing and absorbing best practices from foreign militaries, and in some cases allows
the PLA to field test equipment and obtain hands-on experience operating in unfamiliar environments. As the PLA modernizes andDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* China is geographically organized into seven military regions, whose headquarters serve as
the administrative centers for the army, navy, and air force units contained within their boundaries. They are, in protocol order: Shenyang, Beijijng, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, andChengdu.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00268

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

257
becomes more capable and confident, it likely will increase its engagement with foreign militaries.
RIMPAC
Most significant among the PLA’s international engagements in2014 was its participation for the first time in the U.S.-led multinational Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise. The biennial
exercise is the largest maritime exercise in the world, and this year
included 49 surface ships, 6 submarines, more than 200 aircraft,
and more than 25,000 personnel from 22 countries.130 China contributed the second-largest contingent to the exercise (behind theUnited States).131 The PLA Navy’s decision to send a LUYANG IIclass DDG, a JIANGKAI II-class missile frigate, and the Peace Ark
hospital ship to the exercise * showcases China’s desire to use its
modern, domestically produced vessels for high-profile missions andinternational engagements to highlight the PLA Navy’s modernization.132
China’s participation in RIMPAC began with a ten-day group sailfrom Guam to Hawaii with naval ships from the United States,
Singapore, and Brunei. During the group sail, contingents from thefour countries participated in ‘‘a number of exercises involving personnel exchanges, weapons firing, ship handling and maneuvering
drills and communications exercises,’’ according to Captain Patrick
Kelly, commanding officer of the U.S. task force.133 According tomedia sources, once the RIMPAC participants arrived in the waters
off Hawaii, the PLA Navy participated in the following bilateraland multilateral activities with other navies: live-fire drills; † drills
for maritime replenishment, small boat assault, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, tracking and surveillance of merchantvessels, multi-vessel interception and boarding, antipiracy, andmaritime search and rescue; 134 military medical exchanges; andother bilateral and multilateral military and cultural activities.135
According to the Chinese contingent’s drill director, the PLA
Navy had three goals for the exercise: to advance U.S.-China ‘‘newtype’’ military relations, to deepen cooperation and communication
with participating navies, and to demonstrate the PLA’s intent toprotect and promote regional and global peace, security, and stability.136

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Participation by the PLA Navy’s Peace Ark, along with U.S. Navy hospital ship Mercy, marks
the first participation of hospital ships in RIMPAC. The Peace Ark participated in medical subject matter expert exchanges, simulated disaster relief operations at sea, and hosted a military
medical symposium attended by around 60 medical officials from participating countries. Hang
Shaohu and Chen Weihua, ‘‘Visitors Tour Chinese Ships in Hawaii,’’ China Daily, July 7, 2014.
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-07/07/content_17652596.htm.
† Official U.S. Department of Defense sources have characterized this activity as a ‘‘simple
gunnery exercise’’ involving shooting large-caliber guns at targets. Responding to concerns about
whether the gunnery exercise violates U.S. law prohibiting engagement in military-to-militaryactivities with China that could ‘‘create a national security risk due to inappropriate exposure,’’(National Defense Authorization Act of 2000), Pentagon officials said, ‘‘Through many monthsof coordination, our expert planners and lawyers have ensured that China’s participation in
RIMPAC is in strict compliance with U.S. law’’ and concluded that ‘‘there’s no violation of U.S.
law, so no reason not to do it.’’ PLA Daily, ‘‘The ‘RIMPAC 2014’ Exercise Carries Out Main Gun
Firing Drills,’’ July 15, 2014. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHR2014071525159222;
Zhang Yunbi, ‘‘Timeline of China’s RIMPAC 2014 Highlights,’’ China Daily, August 4, 2014. http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-08/04/content_18244900.htm; and Jeremy Page, ‘‘In Pacific
Drills, Navies Adjust to New Arrival: China,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2014. http://online.
wsj.com/articles/in-rimpac-naval-drills-off-hawaii-militaries-adjust-to-new-arrival-china-1405527
835.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00269

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

258
China sent an uninvited intelligence collection ship to monitor
and gather information on the exercise.* Although Admiral SamuelJ. Locklear III, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, said deploying the intelligence ship inside the United States’ EEZ ‘‘is within
the law and it’s [China’s] right to do it,’’ he admitted China’s ‘‘introduction of the [intelligence ship] [was] . . . a little odd.’’ † 137 Indeed,
the intelligence collection ship’s presence was inappropriate andundermined the spirit of cooperation and transparency that
RIMPAC seeks to cultivate.
China’s deployment of the intelligence ship also runs counter to
Beijing’s insistence that foreign militaries provide notification andreceive approval prior to operating in China’s claimed EEZ. Beijing’s naval presence in foreign EEZs indicates China’s willingness
to operate its military assets in a manner it currently protests. Beijing is unlikely to change its policy to one more aligned with thatof the United States, and rather will continue to assert its authority to regulate U.S. military activities in its EEZ even as it increases its own military operations in foreign EEZs and disputed
waters in the South and East China Seas.138
Aside from its troubling decision to send an intelligence collection
ship to the exercises, China’s participation in RIMPAC enabled limited but meaningful progress in China’s participation in regional
security and U.S.-China military-to-military relations.139 Michael
O’Hanlon, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, explained that‘‘in isolation [China’s participation] doesn’t do a great deal of goodof course, but it provides the basis for more [cooperation].’’ 140 All
RIMPAC participants are routinely invited back, so China likely
will participate again in 2016.141
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
The PLA contributed to major humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts in the Asia Pacific twice in 2014: in response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and in the search formissing airliner Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. The PLA achieved anumber of ‘‘firsts’’ with these two operations. As the PLA’s HA/DR
capabilities mature and as China seeks to portray itself as an effective leader in East Asia, China almost certainly will seek to playa more prominent role in responding to humanitarian crises anddisasters in the region.‡
China provided limited HA/DR contributions to the Philippines
in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, which hit the Philippines in
November 2013. China’s Peace Ark arrived in the Philippines two
weeks after the typhoon hit, marking the first time China sent a

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* China had deployed a similar ship to observe RIMPAC in 2012, but China did not participate
in that iteration of the exercise. Kimberly Hsu and Craig Murray, China’s Expanding Military
Operations in Foreign Exclusive Economic Zones (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, June 19, 2013), p. 1. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20
Backgrounder_China%20in%20Foreign%20EEZs.pdf.
† One civilian expert compared China’s behavior to ‘‘inviting a friend over for dinner and thenhaving their buddy break in your back door to rob you.’’ Andrew S. Erickson and Emily de La
Bruyere, ‘‘China’s RIMPAC Maritime-Surveillance Gambit,’’ National Interest, July 29, 2014.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-rimpac-maritime-surveillance-gambit-10970.
‡ During the RIMPAC exercises, the commander of China’s Peace Ark hospital ship told reporters, ‘‘The Chinese Navy will take part in more . . . international humanitarian rescues.’’
Rosalind Mathieson, ‘‘China’s Navy Offers Massages in Soft-Power Display in Hawaii,’’ Bloomberg, July 28, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-27/china-s-navy-shows-off-massagetechniques-in-soft-power-display.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00270

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

259
naval vessel overseas for a medical HA/DR mission.142 The Peace
Ark’s helicopter transferred sick and injured people to and from theship for medical treatment, and Chinese media reported the Peace
Ark’s naval doctors treated 2,208 patients over the 16-day long mission.* 143
Following the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 inMarch 2014, China deployed a large number of assets to conduct
search and rescue operations. These assets included two IL–76
strategic airlifters, one Y–8 transport aircraft, two modern guidedmissile frigates, two large amphibious ships, maritime law enforcement ships, and four helicopters.144 China also tasked 21 satellites
to assist in the operation.145 The majority of passengers aboard themissing flight were Chinese citizens, and China’s rapid response to
the disaster likely reflected growing expectations in China for the
PLA to protect Chinese citizens and commercial interests overseas.146
During the search for the plane, China participated in several
multinational and bilateral operations, providing China’s untested
HA/DR force with examples of best practices in the field. For example, the PLA Air Force detachment contributed to multinational air
search operations under the coordination of the Royal Australian
Air Force, with PLA Air Force aviators working with Australia’s
Headquarters Joint Operations Command to locate debris thought
to be from the missing plane.147 PLA Navy ships also coordinatedtheir search efforts with those of other countries and for the firsttime cooperated at the tactical level with the Royal Australian
Navy by embarking an officer on an Australian naval ship.148 Additionally, a PLA Navy DDG conducted information and personnel
transfers with an Australian naval ship.149
Removal of Syrian Chemical Weapons
From January to June 2014, two PLA Navy JIANGKAI–II guided-missile frigates participated in 20 escort missions of the United
Nations Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons toremove chemical weapons from Syria to international waters forneutralization. The escorts were the first time China provided marine transport support for chemical weapons destruction and were
undertaken jointly with navies from Russia, Denmark, and Norway.150 China also reportedly provided ten ambulances and surveillance cameras to assist operations to bring Syria’s chemical weapons to port.151 The PLA Navy was well placed to join in the escort
mission due to its experience conducting naval escorts in the Gulf

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Peace Ark’s accomplishments were overshadowed somewhat by political tensions related
to China’s maritime territorial dispute with the Philippines. International media criticized Beijing’s initial $100,000 donation to the relief efforts as too modest, with some observers suggesting China’s limited response was a reflection of increased political tensions between the twocountries. Perhaps in response to this criticism, China later pledged an additional $1.64 million
in aid and supplies. Brian Spegele, ‘‘China Offers Modest Aid to Philippines after Typhoon
Haiyan,’’ China Real Time Report (Blog), November 12, 2013. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/
2013/11/12/china-offers-modest-aid-to-philippines-after-typhoon-haiyan/; Jane Perlez, ‘‘China Offers
Relatively Modest Aid for Typhoon Victims,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times blog), November 11,
2013. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/china-offers-relatively-modest-aid-for-typhoon-victims/; Hannah Beech, ‘‘China to Philippines: Here, Have a Measly $100,000 in Aid,’’ Time,
November 13, 2013. http://world.time.com/2013/11/13/china-to-philippines-here-have-a-measly100000-in-aid/; and ‘‘Typhoon Haiyan: China Gives Less Aid to Philippines than Ikea,’’ Guardian, November 14, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/14/typhoon-haiyan-chinaaid-philippines-ikea.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00271

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

260
of Aden since 2009. By virtue of this experience, PLA Navy ships
involved in counterpiracy activities in the Gulf of Aden also havebecome familiar with the Mediterranean Sea through port calls andother activities.152
From a political standpoint, China’s role in the chemical weapons
removal likely was motivated by Beijing’s desire to demonstrate
China’s will and ability to play a positive role in addressing global
security problems, particularly after being criticized by the international community in recent years for its refusal to condemn the
Syrian government in the United Nations Security Council.153
Counterpiracy Operations
Since January 2009, China has sustained a naval task group in
the Gulf of Aden to conduct counterpiracy operations. This represents the PLA’s largest overseas presence. As of August 2014, the
PLA Navy had deployed more than 10,000 personnel in 18 successive two- or three-ship task groups over nearly six years. Chinese
official media sources state the PLA Navy has protected more than
5,670 commercial ships from China and over 60 other countries
over the course of more than 540 escorts. In the past year, PLA
Navy special forces also conducted on-board escort missions for 18
ships and rescued one commercial vessel from a pirate attack.154
In September 2014, the PLA Navy deployed a submarine to theGulf of Aden to support its counterpiracy operations there.155
In addition to its ongoing counterpiracy operations in the Gulf ofAden,* the PLA Navy has conducted antipiracy drills with several
other countries in 2014. In March, the 16th escort task force to theGulf of Aden conducted joint antipiracy drills—including taskforce
maneuvering, maritime replenishment, light signaling,† and antiship firing—with the European Union Combined Task Force
465.156 In May, as part of a joint China-Russia exercise in the East
China Sea, the PLA Navy and Russian Navy simulated antipiracy
rescue operations.157 In June, before sailing back to China following the completion of its escort responsibilities in the Gulf ofAden, the PLA Navy’s 16th escort task force visited eight Africancountries and for the first time conducted antipiracy drills with the
Cameroon Navy in the Gulf of Guinea.158 The PLA Navy and the
U.S. Navy are scheduled to hold the third in a series of annual
joint counterpiracy exercises in 2014.159 As this Report went toprint, this exercise had not occurred.
14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium
China hosted the Western Pacific Naval Symposium for the firsttime in April 2014.160 The Symposium was established in 1988 and
now includes 21 members and three observers.‡ According to its

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For an overview of China’s counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2009, see U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November
2013, pp. 215 and 231; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Annual Report to Congress, November 2012, pp. 136, 143, 301, and 318; U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, 2011 Annual Report to Congress, November 2011, pp. 162–163; and U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009 Annual Report to Congress, November
2009, pp. 118–125.
† Light signaling refers to visual communication between ships using patterns of flashinglights.
‡ The members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium are Australia, Brunei, Cambodia,
Canada, Chile, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00272

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

261
charter, the Symposium aims to ‘‘increase cooperation and the ability to operate together, as well as to build trust and confidence between Navies by providing a framework to enable the discussion ofmaritime issues of mutual interest, the exchange of information,
the practice and demonstration of capabilities, and the exchange of
personnel.’’ 161
The most notable accomplishment of the two-day event, which
was held in Qingdao, Shandong Province, was the unanimous approval of a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). According to the U.S. Navy, CUES, which China had opposed at previous
iterations of the Symposium,* is a voluntary and legally nonbinding ‘‘agreement upon which the participating nations have astandardized protocol of safety procedures, basic communications
and basic maneuvering instructions to follow for naval ships andaircraft during unplanned encounters at sea.’’ 162 If observed consistently, CUES could significantly reduce the risk of miscommunication, miscalculation, and accidents at sea. Regional navies
warmly welcomed CUES’ approval. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Jonathan Greenert remarked, ‘‘We’ve agreed to increase
the standards that we will set at sea. We’ve agreed to establish
proficiency in communications. We’ve agreed to establish common
behavior at sea. We’ve agreed to prevent misunderstanding andmiscalculations,’’ and Admiral Wu Shengli praised the agreement
as a ‘‘milestone document.’’ 163
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium was not untouched by regional tensions, however. China declined to invite Japan to aninternational fleet review that it had planned to host in Qingdao
following the Symposium. Although China maintained it was holding the review to celebrate the anniversary of the establishment of
the PLA Navy, U.S. officials said China had invited the U.S. Navyto participate in the review as part of the Symposium, not as a separate event. In response to China’s snub of Japan, the UnitedStates decided not to send its own ships to the fleet review, andinstead participated as an observer. China ultimately cancelled its
international fleet review, ostensibly due to the ‘‘special circumstances and atmosphere’’ of the international search for missing Malaysia Airlines Flight 370.164
Implications for the United States
With a few exceptions, the U.S.-China security relationship deteriorated in 2014. The rhetoric of a ‘‘new type of major-country relationship,’’ embraced by both countries in 2013, has not had awarming effect on bilateral ties and mutual suspicion and distrust
persist.165 This can be attributed in large part to the two countries’
competing visions for the future of Asia: whereas the United States
seeks a stable and prosperous region in which it has a primary rolein perpetuating the rules-based liberal order, China seeks to dis-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Peru, Philippines, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United States, andVietnam. Bangladesh, India, and Mexico are observers.
* At the 2012 Western Pacific Naval Symposium, for example, China opposed endorsing CUES
because it was concerned the word ‘‘code’’ implied that the agreement was legally binding.
Megha Rajagopalan, ‘‘China won’t swallow ‘bitter pill’ of ceding sovereignty rights: military official,’’ Reuters, April 23, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/23/us-china-militaryidUSBREA3M0YY20140423.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00273

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

262

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

place U.S. primacy in East Asia and the Western Pacific and promote a new regional security architecture led by China and inwhich the United States plays a more limited role. (For an in-depth
discussion of China’s vision for Asian security, see Chapter 3, Section 1, ‘‘China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture.’’)In addition to longstanding policy differences between the UnitedStates and China over fundamental security issues (such as Taiwan), the relationship was strained most obviously in 2014 by China’s destabilizing, unilateral, and coercive actions in the South andEast China Seas and China’s willingness to engage the UnitedStates in confrontational and dangerous air and maritime encounters.
As noted previously, China has pursued a more assertive approach to its longstanding territorial disputes in the South andEast China Seas since 2009. China’s efforts to justify and consolidate its claims directly undermine the values guiding U.S. policyin Asia: peace, stability, and the rule of law. Washington has a particular interest in the peaceful resolution of China’s disputes withJapan and the Philippines, both of which are U.S. treaty allies.
U.S. and Chinese officials frequently exchanged barbs over the
disputes in 2014, usually following a pattern in which U.S. officials
would express concern and Chinese officials would respond by asserting Washington should stay out of ‘‘regional matters.’’ In
March, for example, the U.S. Department of State referred toChina Coast Guard vessels’ efforts to intimidate Philippine ships in
the South China Sea as a ‘‘provocation’’ and the Chinese Foreign
Ministry responded by saying ‘‘The U.S. comments ignored thefacts, ran against its status as a non-claimant, and violated its
commitment to not taking sides over the dispute.’’ 166 Later, in response to a U.S. State Department proposal to ‘‘freeze certain actions and activities that escalate disputes and cause instability’’ in
the South China Sea, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated, China‘‘hopes that countries outside the region strictly maintain theirneutrality, clearly distinguish right from wrong and earnestly respect the joint efforts of countries in the region to maintain regional peace and stability.’’ 167
China’s most strident attempts to change the status quo in theSouth and East China Seas in the past year—establishing an ADIZ
in the East China Sea, placing an oil rig in Vietnam’s EEZ, attempting to block the Philippines’ access to Second Thomas Shoal,
and its land reclamation activities in the South China Sea—challenge U.S. efforts to de-escalate ongoing tensions in the Asia Pacific. Calls, however strongly worded, from the United States andother governments for China to cease using intimidation and coercion to achieve its territorial objectives have not deterred Chinese
behavior.
In addition to antagonizing U.S. allies in East Asia, PLA aircraft
and ships have on several occasions since late 2013 confronted U.S.
military aircraft and ships in international airspace and waters inEast Asia. On each of these occasions, Chinese military personnel
engaged in unsafe, unprofessional, and aggressive behavior.
• In December 2013, U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser Cowpens
and a PLA Navy amphibious landing ship came close to colliding in international waters of the South China Sea when the

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00274

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

263
Chinese ship approached to within 300 feet of the Cowpens andblocked its path. The Cowpens was forced to take evasive action to avoid a collision. Secretary Hagel referred to the Chinese ship’s actions as ‘‘unhelpful’’ and ‘‘irresponsible,’’ andwarned that such behavior ‘‘could be a trigger or a spark that
could set off some eventual miscalculation.’’ 168• In August 2014, an armed Chinese J–11 fighter jet crossed several times beneath a U.S. Navy P–8 surveillance plane. The
Chinese jet then barrel rolled over the U.S. plane, passing
within 20 to 45 feet. U.S. defense officials called the maneuver,which occurred over international waters in the South China
Sea, ‘‘aggressive,’’ ‘‘unprofessional,’’ and a ‘‘deeply concerning
provocation.’’ 169 The Pentagon disclosed that this was one offour similar incidents since March in which Chinese military
aircraft intercepted U.S. planes.
It is unclear whether these actions were tactical-level decisions
made by the pilots or the commanding officer of the ship, operational-level decisions made by unit commanders, or actions ordered by higher authorities in Beijing to send strategic signals. Regardless, the PLA has demonstrated a pattern of provocative, aggressive, and dangerous behavior aimed at the U.S. military inmaritime East Asia that creates the risk of miscalculation, escalation, and loss of life.
Although confrontation over maritime issues was the biggest contributor to U.S.-China tensions in 2014, other major impasses inthe bilateral relationship persisted. Most prominent among thesewere cybersecurity and North Korea, both of which are addressed
elsewhere in this Report.* Regarding the former, longstanding tension between Washington and Beijing over cyber issues continued
to plague the relationship in 2014 when China in May suspended
a bilateral Cyber Working Group after the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five PLA personnel for cyber espionage.† 170 Similarly,
China and the United States made no measurable progress in cooperating on North Korea, despite the North’s ever-growing threat
to East Asian security.
Despite the steady deterioration of the bilateral security relationship between China and the United States, the bilateral militaryto-military relationship is becoming increasingly institutionalized.
The most visible manifestations of improving relations are more
frequent and higher-profile combined and joint naval exercises andincreased military engagements at every level between the U.S.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* See Chapter 1, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Economics and Trade,’’ for a discussion of China’s
cyber-enabled commercial theft aimed at the United States. For an assessment of China’s cyberpolicies and their implications for the United States, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November 2013, pp. 243–265. For a discussion of China-North Korea relations and the role North Korea plays in U.S.-China relations, see
Chapter 3, Section 2, ‘‘Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with North Korea.’’† Although U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry noted that conversations about cybersecurity
at the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue were ‘‘frank,’’ it appears the UnitedStates made little progress convincing China to change its approach to cyberspace or deter Chinese cyber theft of U.S. intellectual property. In fact, the word ‘‘cyber’’ does not even appear
on a 116-item list of ‘‘outcomes’’ of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue’s Strategic Track discussions. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of theStrategic Track,’’ July 14, 2014. http: // www.state.gov / r / pa / prs / ps / 2014 / 07 / 229239.htm; Lesley
Wroughton and Michael Martina, ‘‘China, U.S. to Boost Security Ties, but No Breakthroughs,’’
Reuters, July 10, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/10/us-china-usa-idUSKBN0FF0Y5
20140710.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00275

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

264
Armed Forces and the PLA.171 Thus far, however, stronger military-to-military ties have done little to reduce distrust and tension
in the broader relationship.
Selected U.S.-China Security-Related Visits
and Exchanges
Presidents Obama and Xi meet at The Hague: Presidents
Obama and Xi met on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit at The Hague in March 2014. They discussed a wide array of
issues. Regarding North Korea, President Obama stressed theneed for China and the United States jointly to prioritize
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. President Xi called
for the United States to adopt an ‘‘objective and fair attitude’’ toward China’s maritime disputes, while President Obama ‘‘reiterated his support for the security of our allies, Japan and thePhilippines.’’ President Obama underscored the need for theUnited States and China to work closely on issues of cybersecurity. In response to President Xi’s comments about a New YorkTimes report suggesting that the U.S. National Security Agency
hacked into the servers of Chinese company Huawei, President
Obama assured President Xi that the United States does not engage in espionage to gain commercial advantage.172 The two
leaders plan to meet again in Beijing in November 2014 on thesidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting.173
U.S. Secretary of Defense Visits China: On his first trip to
China in his current position, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel traveled to China (as well as Hawaii, Japan, and Mongolia) in April 2014 and met with President Xi, Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan, and Central Military Commission Vice Chairman General Fan Changlong, among others. Secretary Hagel also toured China’s aircraft carrier (he was the firstforeign military leader to do so) and delivered a speech at China’s National Defense University. The most tangible outcomes ofthe visit were announcements to establish a bilateral army-toarmy dialogue and to begin an ‘‘Asia-Pacific security dialogue’’within the year.174

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

PLA Chief of General Staff Visits the United States: PLA Chiefof the General Staff General Fang Fenghui visited the UnitedStates in May 2014, reciprocating Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff General Martin Dempsey’s visit to Beijing in April
2013.175 In San Diego, General Fang visited the aircraft carrier
Ronald Reagan and the littoral combat ship Coronado. He also
observed Marine training at Camp Pendleton and met with Admiral Locklear.176 At the Pentagon, General Fang received the

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00276

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

265
Selected U.S.-China Security-Related Visits
and Exchanges—Continued
first full-honor arrival ceremony for any chief of defense since2012.177 During meetings at the Pentagon, General Dempsey
and General Fang disagreed over China’s South China Sea territorial claims but agreed to conduct more HA/DR exercises and tocooperate on counterterrorism and antipiracy. They also discussed ‘‘establishing a mechanism for mutual notification ofmajor military activities and devising standards of behavior for
air and sea military safety in a maritime domain.’’ 178
Other Military Visits and Exchanges: More high-level U.S.China military-to-military exchanges happened in 2014 than ineach of the previous three years.179 In addition to Secretary
Hagel, U.S. officials who were scheduled to visit China in 2014
included the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations (who visited China twice), Commandant of the Marine
Corps, Pacific Command Commander, and Northern Command
Commander. Likewise, the PLA Navy Commander and the
Nanjing Military Region Air Force Commander visited theUnited States. In addition to these high-level visits, 32 activities
the Department of Defense characterizes as ‘‘functional exchanges,’’ ‘‘academic exchanges,’’ and ‘‘recurrent exchanges’’ wereplanned for the two militaries in 2014.180
The growing tensions in the U.S.-China relationship, despitesome isolated progress in military-to-military relations, reveal animportant shift in the way China views the United States. President Xi’s government appears willing to cause a much higher levelof tension in the bilateral relationship than past administrations
have. This may be a consequence of China’s growing confidence inits economic and military power. It may also be part of a deliberate
effort by China to apply pressure to the bilateral relationship to determine if and how the United States will ‘‘push back.’’ In fact, several experts from the region told the Commission China’s assertiveness in the South and East China Seas—particularly toward Japanand the Philippines—is actually meant to test the United States’commitment to its treaty allies and the region. China’s pursuit ofa more competitive relationship with the United States likely willcontinue to present obstacles to the bilateral relationship in the future.
Conclusions

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• China has been aggressively advancing its security interests inEast Asia. This has led to tension, confrontation, and near-crises
with its neighbors and the United States and has fueled competition with the United States that increasingly appears to be devolving into a zero-sum rivalry. A central characteristic of thispattern is Beijing’s effort to force the United States to choose between abandoning its East Asian allies to appease China and facing potential conflict with Beijing by protecting its allies from

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00277

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

266

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China’s steady encroachment. China’s pattern of behavior is likely to persist.
• China’s People’s Liberation Army has undertaken provocative,
aggressive, and dangerous behavior aimed at the U.S. military inmaritime East Asia, which creates the risk of misperception, miscalculation, escalation, and loss of life.
• Having rapidly consolidated power, Chinese President Xi Jinping
appears to have achieved a higher degree of control over China’s
national security and foreign policy than his predecessor and ispursuing a more active role for China in regional and international affairs. President Xi’s proposed regional arrangements,
the Silk Road Economic Belt, 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,
and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, aredesigned to project a positive and ‘‘responsible’’ image of China
to the region and the world, develop trade routes, and gain access to natural resources. These initiatives, couched in terms ofcooperation and friendship, belie China’s increasingly strident efforts to intimidate and coerce many of its neighbors.
• China’s territorial dispute with Japan remains one of the region’s
most dangerous flashpoints. China’s declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone over contested waters in the East China
Sea in late 2013 ratcheted up tensions with Japan and createdan unsafe and unpredictable air environment in the region. On
two occasions in 2014, Chinese and Japanese military aircraft activity in China’s Air Defense Identification Zone led to close encounters which could have resulted in an accident and loss of life.
• China moved aggressively in asserting its claims in the South
China Sea in 2014, using unilateral and destabilizing actions toadvance its territorial ambitions. In March, it began attempts toblock access to a Philippine military outpost in the South China
Sea, Second Thomas Shoal. In May, it moved an oil rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. Throughout the year, it continued
work on various land reclamation projects in the South China
Sea, including building military facilities on Fiery Cross Reef andpotentially Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands. China’s
actions have introduced greater instability to the region and violate China’s 2002 agreement with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, which stipulates that all claimants should ‘‘exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.’’• China’s People’s Liberation Army participated in more exercisesand drills with foreign militaries in 2014 than in any previous
year since 2005. In particular, China’s participation in the U.S.led Rim of the Pacific exercise illustrated the People’s Liberation
Army’s intent to increase its participation in regional and global
security affairs. However, China’s decision to send an uninvitedintelligence collection ship to the exercise seemed to belie its
rhetoric of peaceful cooperation with its neighbors.
• Due largely to institutional and training reforms over the last
decade, China’s People’s Liberation Army now is able to maintainhigher day-to-day readiness rates and conduct longer-range andmore frequent, robust, and realistic training. As these reforms

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00278

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

267

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

continue, the Chinese military gradually will become more proficient and confident operating its advanced weapons, platforms,
and systems and conducting large-scale, sophisticated operations.
• China’s naval operations within weapons range of U.S. bases andoperating areas in the Indian Ocean region will become more frequent as China expands and modernizes its fleet of submarines
and surface combatants. However, the Chinese navy in the nearterm likely will not seek to develop the ability to establish sea
control or sustain combat operations in the Indian Ocean against
a modern navy.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00279

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

268
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 1

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. Xinhua, ‘‘Xi Jinping: Explanation Related to The Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Several Problems of Fully Deepening Reform,’’ November 15,
2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201311/15/c_118164294.htm, translated in
Joel Wuthnow, Decoding China’s New ‘‘National Security Commission’’ (Alexandria,
VA: CNA China Studies, November 2013), pp. 1–2. http://www.cna.org/sites/default/
files/research/CPP-2013-U-006465-Final.pdf.
2. Shen Dingli, ‘‘Framing China’s National Security,’’ China-US Focus, April 23,
2014. http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/framing-chinas-national-security/;
Shannon Tiezzi, ‘‘China’s National Security Commission Holds First Meeting,’’ Diplomat, April 16, 2014. http: // thediplomat.com / 2014 / 04 /chinas - national - security commission-holds-first-meeting/; and Chen Xiangyang, ‘‘Xi’s Speech a Rallying Callfor National Security,’’ China-US Focus, April 30, 2014. http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/xis-speech-a-rallying-call-for-national-security/.
3. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Xi Explains China’s Reform Plan,’’ November 15,
2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/15/c_132891949.htm.
4. Andrew Erickson and William McCahill, ‘‘Take Heed of China’s Security
Commission,’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), January 31, 2014.
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/01/31/pay-close-attention-to-chinas-new-security-commission/; Marc Julienne, How Far Will the NPC Go in Implementing Reform:
The New Central National Security Commission (European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2014), p. 6. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ChinaAnalysis_ March2014.pdf;
Teddy Ng, ‘‘Domestic Security Threats, Not Diplomacy, to Be Priority of China’s National Security Body,’’ South China Morning Post, February 24, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1434032/internal-security-threats-not-diplomacy-be-topconcern-chinas-national; and Yun Sun, ‘‘PacNet #81: China’s New ‘State Security
Committee’: Questions Ahead,’’ Pacific Forum CSIS, November 14, 2013. http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1381_0.pdf.
5. Shen Dingli, ‘‘Framing China’s National Security,’’ China-US Focus, April 23,
2014. http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/framing-chinas-national-security/.
6. Xinhua, ‘‘Xi Jinping: Explanation Related to The Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Several Problems of Fully Deepening Reform,’’ November 15,
2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164294.htm, translated in
Joel Wuthnow, Decoding China’s New ‘‘National Security Commission’’ (Alexandria,
VA: CNA China Studies, November 2013), p. 2.
7. Keith Zhai and Zhang Hong, ‘‘Xi Jinping Ally Cai Qi to Have Senior Roleat National Security Commission,’’ South China Morning Post, March 28, 2014.
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1458826/xi-jinping-ally-cai-qi-have-seniorrole-national-security-commission; Andrew Erickson and William McCahill, ‘‘Take
Heed of China’s Security Commission,’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), January 31, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/01/31/pay-closeattention-to-chinas-new-security-commission/.
8. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets thePress,’’ March 8, 2014. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/
2461_663310/t1135385.shtml.
9. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, April 24, 2014, p.
20. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf; Linda Jakobson and
Dean Knox, China’s New Foreign Policy Actors (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2010). http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf; andAnne-Marie Brady, ‘‘Chinese Foreign Policy: A New Era Dawns,’’ Diplomat, March
17, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/chinese-foreign-policy-a-new-era-dawns/.
10. Li Xiaokun et al., ‘‘Diplomacy to Focus on Neighborhood,’’ China Daily, January 2, 2014. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-01/02/content_17209286.htm.
11. Xinhua, ‘‘Xi Jinping’s Speech at Meeting on the 60th Anniversary of Publication of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Full Text),’’ June 28, 2014. Open
Source Center translation. ID: CHR2014062852739388; Bonnie Glaser and Deep
Pal, ‘‘China’s Periphery Diplomacy Initiative: Implications for China’s Neighbors
and the United States, China-US Focus, November 17, 2013. http://www.chinaus
focus.com/foreign-policy/chinas-periphery-diplomacy-initiative-implications-for-chinaneighbors-and-the-united-states/.
12. Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, China’s New Silk Road Diplomacy (Polish Instituteof International Affairs, December 2013), p. 1. http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=
15818.
13. Jayadeva Ranade, China’s New Policy of ‘Peripheral Diplomacy’ (New Delhi,
India: Center for China Analysis and Strategy, May 2014). http://ccasindia.org/
article_details.php?aid=14.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00280

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

269

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

14. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Xi Suggests China, C. Asia Build Silk Road Economic Belt,’’ November 7, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-09/07/
c_132700695.htm.
15. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China Focus: Cities Ink Silk Road Economic Belt
Agreement,’’ November 19, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/
29/c_132929641.htm.
16. Xi Jinping, President Xi Jinping Delivers Speech at Nazarbayev University,
Video, Produced by CCTV, September 8, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
dHkNzMjEv0Y; China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘President Xi Jinping Delivers
Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central
Asian Countries,’’ September 7, 2013. http: // www.fmprc.gov.cn / mfa _ eng / topics _665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml.
17. People’s Daily, ‘‘China Focus: New Road Exemplifies Xinjiang Prosperity,
Stability Drive,’’ July 5, 2014. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0705/c908828751420.html.
18. Michael D. Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy,’’ China Leadership Monitor 44 (Summer 2014): 6–12. http: // www.hoover.org /sites /default/files/research/docs/clm44ms.pdf.
19. Wu Jiao and Zhang Yunbi, ‘‘Xi in Call for Building of New ‘Maritime Silk
Road,’ ’’ China Daily, October 4, 2013. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-10/04/
content_17008940.htm; Shannon Tiezzi, ‘‘China’s ‘New Silk Road’ Vision Revealed,’’
Diplomat, May 9, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-new-silk-road-visionrevealed/; and Shannon Tiezzi, ‘‘The Maritime Silk Road vs. the String of Pearls,’’
Diplomat, February 13, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-maritime-silk-roadvs-the-string-of-pearls/.
20. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China Underscores Maritime Silk Road Cooperation,’’ February 13, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/13/c_1331
13098.htm.
21. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Fund to Boost China’s Maritime Silk Road Development,’’ May 19, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/19/c_1333
44970.htm; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China Accelerates Planning to Re-Connect
Maritime Silk Road,’’ April 16, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201404/16/c_133267903.htm.
22. Michael D. Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy,’’ China Leadership Monitor 44 (Summer 2014): 8–9. http: // www.hoover.org /sites /default/files/research/docs/clm44ms.pdf.
23. Ananth Krishnan, ‘‘BCIM Corridor Gets Push after First Official-Level Talks
in China,’’ Hindu, December 21, 2013. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/
world/bcim-corridor-gets-push-after-first-officiallevel-talks-in-china/article5483848.ece;
Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar to Boost Cooperation,’’ December 20, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/20/c_
132984485.htm.
24. K. Yhome, ‘‘BCIM Project Cooperation Could Be Key to Development of Border Regions,’’ Global Times, December 18, 2013. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/
832878.shtml; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar to
Boost Cooperation,’’ December 20, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/
2013-12/20/c_132984485.htm.
25. Press Information Office, Government of India, Prime Minister’s Office,Sixth Brics Summit—Fortaleza Declaration, July 16, 2014. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/
PrintRelease.aspx?relid=106712.
26. Richard Silk, ‘‘5 Things to Know about the BRICS Bank,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/07/21/5-things-to-know-about-thenew-brics-bank/; Monthly Analysis of U.S.-China Trade Data (U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, August 6, 2014), p. 12. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/
sites/default/files/trade_bulletins/August%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin_0.pdf.
27. Richard Silk, ‘‘5 Things to Know about the BRICS Bank,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/07/21/5-things-to-know-about-thenew-brics-bank/.
28. Monthly Analysis of U.S.-China Trade Data (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, August 6, 2014), p. 12. http: // origin.www.uscc.gov / sites /default/files/trade_bulletins/August%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin_0.pdf.
29. Yun Sun, China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah? (The Brookings Institution, February 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/07-chinaaid-to-africa-sun; Economist, ‘‘The Chinese in Africa: Trying to Pull Together,’’ April
20, 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/18586448.
30. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets thePress,’’ March 8, 2014. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/
2461_663310/t1135385.shtml.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00281

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

270

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

31. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
China’s Foreign Aid, April 21, 2011. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/
2011-04/21/c_13839683.htm.
32. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
China’s Foreign Aid (2014), July 10, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/
2014-07/10/c_133474011.htm.
33. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
China’s Foreign Aid (2014), July 10, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/
2014-07/10/c_133474011.htm.
34. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
China’s Foreign Aid (2014), July 10, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/
2014-07/10/c_133474011.htm.
35. Chen Shilei, ‘‘Commentary: China’s Foreign Aid Bonds Chinese Dream withWorld’s,’’ Xinhua (English edition), July 10, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
indepth/2014-07/10/c_133474711.htm; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China’s Foreign Aid
Serves for South-South Cooperation: White Paper,’’ April 21, 2011. http://capetown.china-consulate.org/eng/xwdt/t817652.htm.
36. Howard French, ‘‘Into Africa: China’s Wild Rush,’’ New York Times, May 16,
2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/opinion/into-africa-chinas-wild-rush.html;
Thomas Lum, et al., ‘‘China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, andSoutheast Asia,’’ Congressional Research Service, January 25, 2009. http://fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/R40361.pdf.
37. Deborah Brautigam, China’s African Aid: Transatlantic Challenges (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2008), p. 28. http://www.gmfus.org/doc/Brautigam0410aFINAL.pdf.
38. Anne-Marie Brady, ‘‘Chinese Foreign Policy: A New Era Dawns,’’ Diplomat,
March 17, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/chinese-foreign-policy-a-new-eradawns/.
39. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets thePress,’’ March 8, 2014. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/
2461_663310/t1135385.shtml.
40. Keith Bradsher, ‘‘Philippine Leader Sounds Alarm on China,’’ New YorkTimes, February 4, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/world/asia/philippineleader-urges-international-help-in-resisting-chinas-sea-claims.html?_r=2; Jane Perlez,‘‘Philippines and China Ease Tensions in Rift at Sea,’’ New York Times, June 18,
2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/world/asia/beijing-and-manila-ease-tensions-in-south-china-sea.html.
41. M. Taylor Fravel, ‘‘China’s Island Strategy: Redefine the Status Quo,’’
Diplomat, November 1, 2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/chinas-island-strategyredefine-the-status-quo/; International Crisis Group, Dangerous Waters: China-Japan
Relations on the Rocks (Asia Report No. 245, April 8, 2013), pp. 12–14. http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/245-dangerous-waters-china-japanrelations-on-the-rocks.pdf.
42. Ely Ratner, ‘‘China Undeterred and Unapologetic,’’ War on the Rocks (Blog),
June 24, 2014. http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/china-undeterred-and-unapologetic/.
43. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Defense Ministry Spokesperson on China’s Air Defense Identification Zone,’’ December 3, 2013. http: // news.xinhuanet.com / english/
china/2013-12/03/c_132938762.htm.
44. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operationsand Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, andU.S. Coast Guard, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,
July 2007, p. 2–13. https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-99250defea93325c/; Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ‘‘In Search of Theoretical Justification for Air
Defence Identification Zones,’’ Journal of Transportation Security (September 2011).
45. Peter A. Dutton, ‘‘Caelum Liberum: Air Defense Identification Zones outside
Sovereign Airspace,’’ American Journal of International Law 103:4 (October 2009):
691; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Defense Ministry Spokesman Responds to Air Defense Identification Zone Questions,’’ November 23, 2013. Open Source Center transcription. ID: CHR2013112331229959; David A. Welch, ‘‘What’s an ADIZ? Why theUnited States, Japan, and China Get It Wrong,’’ Foreign Affairs, December 9, 2013.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140367/david-a-welch/whats-an-adiz; Elizabeth
Cuadra, ‘‘Air Defense Identification Zone: Creeping Jurisdiction in the Airspace,’’
Virginia Journal of International Law 18 (1977–78): 485; and Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ‘‘In Search of Theoretical Justification for Air Defence Identification Zones,’’
Journal of Transportation Security (September 2011).
46. Michael D. Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),’’ China Leadership Monitor 43 (Spring2014): 1, 5. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM43MS_Final_022514.pdf; James

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00282

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

271

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Manicom, ‘‘China’s Controversial Air Defense Zone Portends Problems, or Opportunities,’’ Global Observatory, December 18, 2013. http: // theglobalobservatory.org /analysis/645-chinas-controversial-air-defense-zone-portends-problems-or-opportunities.html.
47. John Kerry, Secretary of State Press Statement, November 23, 2013. http://
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218013.htm.
48. Michael D. Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),’’ China Leadership Monitor 43 (Spring2014): 1, 5. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM43MS_Final_022514.pdf; Peter A.
Dutton, ‘‘Caelum Liberum: Air Defense Identification Zones outside Sovereign Airspace,’’ American Journal of International Law 103:4 (October 2009): 691; Xinhua,‘‘Defense Ministry Spokesman Responds to Air Defense Identification Zone Questions,’’ November 23, 2013. OSC ID: CHR2013112331229959; David A. Welch,‘‘What’s an ADIZ? Why the United States, Japan, and China Get It Wrong,’’ Foreign
Affairs, December 9, 2013. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140367/david-awelch/whats-an-adiz; Elizabeth Cuadra, ‘‘Air Defense Identification Zone: Creeping
Jurisdiction in the Airspace,’’ Virginia Journal of International Law 18 (1977–78):
485; and Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ‘‘In Search of Theoretical Justification for Air
Defence Identification Zones,’’ Journal of Transportation Security (September 2011).
49. Michael D. Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),’’ China Leadership Monitor 43 (Spring2014): 1, 5. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM43MS_Final_022514.pdf.
50. Michael D. Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),’’ China Leadership Monitor 43 (Spring2014): 2. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM43MS_Final_022514.pdf; Yonhap
News Agency, ‘‘S. Korea Expresses Regrets over China’s ADIZ,’’ November 25, 2013.
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/11/25/46/0301000000AEN20131125004
252315F.html; and Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Announcement on the ‘East China Sea Air Defense
Identification Zone’ by the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic ofChina,’’
November24,
2013.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_
000098.html.
51. Jun Kaminishikawara, ‘‘U.S. Could Change Military Posture if China Expands Air Defense Zone,’’ Kyodo News, January 31, 2014. http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2014/02/269068.html.
52. U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, ‘‘China’s ADIZ: Guidance for U.S. Air Carriers,’’ November 29, 2013. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2013/11/218139.htm; Michael D. Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Views and Commentary on the
East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),’’ China Leadership
Monitor 43 (Spring 2014): 2. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM43MSCarnegie
013114.pdf.
53. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operationsand Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, andU.S. Coast Guard, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,
July 2007, p. 2–13. https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-99250defea93325c/; Michael D. Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Views and Commentary on the East
China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),’’ China Leadership Monitor
43 (Spring 2014): 1. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM43MSCarnegie013114.pdf.
54. Kimberly Hsu, Air Defense Identification Zone Intended to Provide China
Great Flexibility to Enforce East China Sea Claims (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 14, 2014), p. 3. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/Research/China%20ADIZ%20Staff%20Report.pdf.
55. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Beijing Slams Japanese ‘Intrusion’ into East
China Sea ADIZ,’’ May 30, 2014. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclasscnt.aspx?id=20140530000136&cid=1101.
56. Michael D. Swaine, ‘‘Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea
Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),’’ China Leadership Monitor 43 (March2014): 21. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM43MSCarnegie013114.pdf; Xinhua(English edition), ‘‘Defense Ministry: China Effectively Monitors ADIZ in East China
Sea,’’ December 27, 2013. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2013-12/27/content_4480962.htm.
57. Sheila A. Smith, ‘‘An East China Sea Update,’’ Asia Unbound (Center on
Foreign Relations blog), February 4, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2014/02/04/aneast-china-sea-update/.
58. Ian Forsyth, ‘‘The East China Sea ADIZ: Old Policy, New Packaging,’’ China
Brief 14:17 (September 3, 2014). http: // www.jamestown.org / programs / chinabrief /VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00283

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

272

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42781&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=a8e8709ebd6f9d2
a1bc760f765397a37#.VBrqUHchGsg.
59. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Joint Press Conference with Secretary Hagel and
Minister Chang in Beijing, China,’’ April 8, 2014. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5411; Jun Osawa, China’s ADIZ over the East China
Sea: A ‘‘Great Wall in the Sky’’? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, December 17, 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-airdefense-identification-zone-osawa.
60. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Joint Press Conference with Secretary Hagel and
Minister Chang in Beijing, China,’’ April 8, 2014. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5411.
61. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules
for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone of the P.R.C.,’’ November 23,
2013. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2013-11/23/content_4476143.htm.
62. Tim Hume, ‘‘Close Call as China Scrambles Fighter Jets on Japanese Aircraft in Disputed Territory,’’ CNN, May 26, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/26/
world/asia/china-japan-jets-scramble/; Reuters, ‘‘China, Japan Exchange Barbs over
Action by Warplanes in East China Sea,’’ May 25, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/25/us-japan-china-idUSBREA4O01920140525.
63. Martin Fackler, ‘‘Japan Protests Chinese Flybys over East China Sea,’’ New
York Times, June 11, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/world/asia/japanprotests-chinese-flybys-over-east-china-sea.html?_r=0; Kosuke Takahashi and James
Hardy, ‘‘Chinese Su-27s Buzz Japanese Patrol Aircraft over East China Sea for Second Time,’’ IHS Jane’s 360, June 10, 2014. http: // www.janes.com / article / 39051 /chinese-su-27s-buzz-japanese-patrol-aircraft-over-east-china-sea-for-second-time.
64. Xinhua, ‘‘Defense Ministry Spokesman Responds to Air Defense Identification Zone Questions,’’ November 23, 2013. Open Source Center transcription.
ID: CHR2013112331229959; Wendell Minnick, Jung Sung-Ki, and Paul KallenderUmezu, ‘‘More Chinese Air ID Zones Predicted,’’ Defense News, December 1, 2013.
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131201/DEFREG03/312010004/More-ChineseAir-ID-Zones-Predicted; and Paul Lewis and Spencer Ackerman, ‘‘US Calls on China
to Rescind Air Defence Zone to Avoid Japan Confrontation,’’ Guardian, December
3, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/us-china-rescind-air-defencezone-confrontation-japan?CMP=twt_fd.
65. Association of Southeast Nations, ‘‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea,’’ November 4, 2002. http: // www.asean.org / asean / externalrelations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea.
66. Jun Kaminishikawara, ‘‘U.S. Could Change Military Posture if China Expands Air Defense Zone,’’ Kyodo News, January 31, 2014. http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2014/02/269068.html.
67. Consulate of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in New York, United Statesof America, Position Paper of Viet Nam on China’s Illegal Placement of Haiyang
Shiyou 981 Oil Rig in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of Viet
Nam, July 7, 2014. http://vietnamconsulate-ny.org/news/2014/07/position-paper-vietnam-chinas-illegal-placement-haiyang-shiyou-981-oil-rig-exclusive.
68. Carlyle Thayer, ‘‘China’s Oil Rig Gambit: South China Sea Game-Changer?’’
Diplomat, May 12, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-oil-rig-gambit-southchina-sea-game-changer/.
69. Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to Thailand, Press Release:
China’s Illegal Placement of Haiyang Shiyou 981 Oil Rig in the Exclusive Economic
Zone and Continental Shelf of Viet Nam, and the Sovereignty of Viet Nam over the
Hoang Sa Archipelago, July 4, 2014. http://www.vietnamembassy-thailand.org/en/
nr070521165843/nr070725012202/ns140704195817; Bloomberg, ‘‘China-Vietnam Tensions Rise as Both Say Ships Rammed near Rig,’’ June 9, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-09/china-vietnam-tensions-rise-as-both-say-ships-rammed-near-rig.html.
70. Ankit Panda, ‘‘China Moves Second Oil Rig into Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone,’’ Diplomat, June 20, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-movessecond-oil-rig-into-vietnams-exclusive-economic-zone/; Megha Rajagopalan and Charlie Zhu, ‘‘China Sends Four Oil Rigs to South China Sea amid Tensions,’’ Reuters,
June 20, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/20/us-china-southchinasearigs-idUSKBN0EV0WG20140620.
71. Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the United States of America, ‘‘Vietnam Demands China Withdraw from Territorial Waters,’’ May 7, 2014. http://
vietnamembassy-usa.org/news/2014/05/vietnam-demands-china-withdraw-territorialwaters.
72. Suman Varandani, ‘‘Anti-China Protesters in Vietnam Burn Factories over
China Oil Rig in South China Sea; Taiwanese Businesses Suffer as Tensions Grow,’’

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00284

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

273

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

International Business Times, May 17, 2014. http: // www.ibtimes.com / anti - china protesters-vietnam-burn-factories-over-china-oil-rig-south-china-sea-taiwanese-1584034.
73. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Vietnam/China: Chinese Oil Rig Operations near
the Paracel Islands,’’ May 7, 2014. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225750.htm.
74. Manuel Mogato and John Ruwich, ‘‘Vietnam, Philippines Jointly Denounce
China’s Maritime Moves,’’ Reuters, May 21, 2014. http://news.yahoo.com/vietnamphilippines-jointly-denounce-chinas-maritime-moves-115049485-finance.html; Carl
Thayer, ‘‘China’s Oil Rig Gambit: South China Sea Game-Changer?’’ Diplomat, May
12, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-oil-rig-gambit-south-china-sea-gamechanger/.
75. China Daily, ‘‘China’s Oil Rig No. 981 Sets Sail Again,’’ July 26, 2014. http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-07/26/content_17928818.htm.
76. Greg Poling, China’s Oil Rig Removal and the ASEAN Regional Forum (Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 24, 2014.) http://csis.org/publication/
chinas-oil-rig-removal-and-asean-regional-forum.
77. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2012, pp. 234–235.
78. Jim Gomez, ‘‘Filipinos Saw China Blocking Fishermen from Shoal,’’ Philippine Star, April 23, 2014. http://news.yahoo.com/filipinos-saw-china-blocking-fishermen-shoal-081524232.html; Rupert Wingfield Hayes, ‘‘China’s Island Factory,’’ BBC,
September
9,2014.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/2014/newsspec_8701/
index.html.
79. Manuel Mogato, ‘‘Manila Air Drops Supplies to Troops on Disputed Shoal,’’Reuters, March 12, 2014. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2014 / 03 / 12 / us - china philippines-idUSBREA2B0CI20140312.
80. Jane Perlez, ‘‘Philippines and China in Dispute over Reef,’’ New York Times,
March 31, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/world/asia/beijing-and-manilain-dispute-over-reef.html?_r=0; Manuel Mogato, ‘‘Manila Air Drops Supplies to Troops
on Disputed Shoal,’’ Reuters, March 12, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/
12/us-china-philippines-idUSBREA2B0CI20140312.
81. Erik De Castro and Roli Ng, ‘‘Philippine Ship Dodges China Blockade toReach South China Sea Outpost,’’ Reuters, March 30, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/03/30/us-philippines-china-reef-idUSBREA2T02K20140330.
82. Rupert Wingfield Hayes, ‘‘China’s Island Factory,’’ BBC, September 9, 2014.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/2014/newsspec_8701/index.html.
83. Jim Gomez, ‘‘Filipinos Saw China Blocking Fishermen from Shoal,’’ Philippine Star, April 23, http://news.yahoo.com/filipinos-saw-china-blocking-fishermenshoal-081524232.html.
84. Jaime Laude, ‘‘Chinese Drones Fly Over Phl Ship in Ayungin,’’ Philippine
Star, August 21, 2014. Open Source Center transcription. ID: SER2014082077730
554.
85. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013, pp. 275–279.
86. Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of thePhilippines, August 30, 1951. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.
87. Walter Lohman, Scarborough Shoal and Safeguarding American Interests,(The Heritage Foundation, May 14, 2012). http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/
2012 / 05 / south- china- sea- dispute- between- china- and- the- philippines- safeguardingamericas-interests.
88. Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘China’s Reclamation on Mabini Reef,’’ May 15, 2014. http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-0627-21-50-36/dfa-releases/2871-china-s-reclamation-on-mabini-reef; James Hardy et al.,‘‘China Goes All Out with Major Island Building Project in Spratlys,’’ IHS Jane’s 360,
June 20, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/39716/china-goes-all-out-with-majorisland-building-project-in-spratlys; and Andrew S. Erickson and Austin Strange,‘‘Pandora’s Sandbox: China’s Island-Building Strategy in the South China Sea,’’ Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141632/andrewerickson-and-austin-strange/pandoras-sandbox.
89. Gregory B. Poling, Recent Trends in the South China Sea and U.S. Policy(Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2014), p. 5. http://csis.org/files/
publication/140728_Poling_TrendsSouthChinaSea_Web.pdf.
90. James Hardy, ‘‘More Details Emerge on China’s Reclamation Activities in
the Spratlys,’’ IHS Jane’s 360, July 4, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/40335/
more-details-emerge-on-china-s-reclamation-activities-in-spratlys.
91. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin Strange, ‘‘Pandora’s Sandbox: China’s Island-Building Strategy in the South China Sea,’’ Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00285

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

274

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141632/andrew-erickson-and-austin-strange/
pandoras-sandbox.
92. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua
Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on September 9, 2014,’’ September 9, 2014.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1189470.shtml.
93. Xinhua Wang, ‘‘PRC Approves ‘Measures Requiring Approval of Foreign
Fishing in Hainan-Administered Waters,’ ’’ December 1, 2013. Open Source Centertranslation. ID: CHR2013120355920828; Hainan Maritime Safety Administration
Official Website, accessed January 21, 2014. http://www.hnmsa. gov.cn/news_
2489.aspx.
94. Reuters, ‘‘China Apprehending Boats Weekly in Disputed South China Sea,’’March 6, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/06/us-china-parliament-seasidUSBREA2512I20140306.
95. Reuters, ‘‘China, Vietnam Trade Accusations over Boats in Disputed Waters,’’
September 10, 2014. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2014 / 09 / 10 / us-southchinaseachina - vietnam - idUSKBN0H50V120140910; BBC, ‘‘China Detains Vietnamese Fishermen in South China Sea,’’ July 4, 2014. http: // www.bbc.com / news / world - asia 28168447; M. Taylor Fravel, ‘‘All Quiet in the South China Sea: Why China Is Playing Nice (for Now),’’ Foreign Affairs, March 22, 2012. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/137346/m-taylor-fravel/all-quiet-in-the-south-china-sea; Le Quan, ‘‘Vietnam
Condemns Inhuman Acts against Fishermen,’’ Thanh Nien News (Vietnam), August21, 2014. http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/vietnam-condemns-inhuman-actsagainst - fishermen - 30245.html; Hanoi Vietnam News Agency Online (English edition), ‘‘123 Chinese Vessels ‘Aggressively’ Defend Disputed Oil Rig,’’ June 25, 2014.
Open Source Center transcription. ID: SEL2014062580432361; Agence FrancePresse, ‘‘Vietnam Accuses Chinese Ship of Sinking Fishing Boat,’’ May 27, 2014.
Open Source Center transcription. ID: CHR2014052775710766; Vietnam News
Agency Online (English edition), ‘‘Vietnam Requests Chinese Investigation of Damage to Fishing Boats in South China Sea,’’ March 20, 2014. Open Source Centertranscription. ID: SER2014032079515275; and Channel NewsAsia Online, ‘‘Philippines Accuses Chinese Coast Guard of Firing Water Canon at Fishermen in Disputed Reef,’’ February 24, 2014. Open Source Center transcription. ID: SEN201402
2430088552.
96. Craig Murray and Kimberly Hsu, China’s New Fishing Regulations Seek toJustify and Consolidate Control in the South China Sea (U.S.-China Economic andSecurity Review Commission, January 2014), p. 3. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/Research/USCC%20Staff%20Report_China%27s%20New%20Fishing%20
Regulations%20Seek%20to%20Justify%20and%20Consolidate%20Control%20in%20
the%20South%20China%20Sea_01%2027%2014.pdf.
97. Open Source Center, Japan Coast Guard Releases Data on PRC Government
Ships in Senkaku Waters in September 2014, October 2, 2014. ID:
JPO2014100202761001.
98. Rebecca Grant, ‘‘China Flies,’’ Air Force Magazine, July 2014. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2014/July%202014/China-Flies.aspx; U.S.
Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, April 24, 2014. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf.
99. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof William S. Murray, June 5, 2014.
100. Kelven Huang and S.C. Chang, ‘‘Taiwan Ships, Aircraft Drill inside China’s
ADIZ in East China Sea,’’ Central News Agency (Taipei), February 26, 2014. http://
focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201402260023.aspx; Gavin Phipps and James Hardy, ‘‘Taiwan Holds Biggest Spratly Islands Drill in 15 Years,’’ IHS Jane’s 360, April 29,
2014. http://www.janes.com/article/37245/taiwan-holds-biggest-spratly-islands-drillin-15-years; Joseph Yeh, ‘‘MND to Kick Off War Games with China’s First Carrierin Mind,’’ China Post (Taiwan), May 19, 2014. http: // www.chinapost.com.tw /taiwan /national / national-news / 2014/ 05/ 19/ 408074/ MND-to.htm; J. Michael Cole,‘‘Chinese Surveillance Aircraft Enter Taiwan’s Airspace,’’ Diplomat, August 27,
2014. http://thediplomat.com / 2014 / 08 / chinese-surveillance-aircraft-enter-taiwansairspace/; and Julian Ku, ‘‘Dear News Agencies of the World: China Did Not BreachTaiwan’s Airspace, Just Its ADIZ,’’ Opino Juris (Blog), August 27, 2014. http://
opiniojuris.org/2014 / 08 / 27 / dear - news - agencies - world - air - defense - identification zones - territorial -airspace/.
101. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, unclassified interview with Commission
staff, April 2014; U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, unclassified
interview with Commission staff, April 2014; and Jonathan Pollack and Dennis

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00286

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

275

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Blasko, Is China Preparing for a ‘Short, Sharp War’ Against Japan? (The Brookings
Institution, February 25, 2014.) http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/
25-mission-action-2013-jpollack.
102. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, unclassified interview with Commission
staff, April 2014; U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, unclassified
interview with Commission staff, April 2014; and Jonathan Pollack and Dennis
Blasko, Is China Preparing for a ‘Short, Sharp War’ Against Japan? (The Brookings
Institution, February 25, 2014.) http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/
25-mission-action-2013-jpollack.
103. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, unclassified interview with Commission
staff, April 2014; U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, unclassified
interview with Commission staff, April 2014; Jonathan Pollack and Dennis Blasko,
Is China Preparing for a ‘Short, Sharp War’ Against Japan? (The Brookings Institution, February 25, 2014.) http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/25mission-action-2013-jpollack; and Open Source Center, ‘‘China ‘Mission Action-2013’
Joint Exercise Tests Information Systems, ‘New-Type Forces’; Video,’’ February 6,
2014. ID: CHO2014011033191318.
104. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, March 2013, p. i.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf.
105. Bai Ruixue and Gao Yi, ‘‘Interpretation of Four Big Keywords for Navy
‘Maneuver-5’ Military Exercise,’’ Xinhua (English edition), October 23, 2013. http://
chn.chinamil.com.cn/jwjj/2013-10/23/content_5604605.htm.
106. CCTV–7, ‘‘History of PLA’s Satellite Navigation, Positioning Main Station
Reviewed,’’ November 9, 2013. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHO20131121
28648867.
107. CCTV–7, ‘‘PLA Navy’s ‘Maneuver-5’ Exercise Holds Beyond-Visual-Range
Guided Attack Drill,’’ October 22, 2013. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHO
2013102328677998.
108. PLA Daily (English edition), ‘‘Rear Admiral: ‘Maneuver-5’ Exercise Is theFirst High-Sea Confrontation Training in Real Sense,’’ November 4, 2013. Open
Source Center transcription. ID: CHL2013110432823505; PLA Daily, ‘‘HD Photo:
Navy Unprecedented Scale ‘Maneuver-5’ Exercise Moments Playback,’’ October 18,
2013. http://news.southern.com/z/2013-11/13/content_84468959.htm.
109. Zhou Yuan and Mo Xiaoliang, ‘‘PLA Navy ‘Maneuver-5’ Live Force Exercise
Concludes; Wu Shengli Makes Summing-up Speech,’’ PLA Daily, November 2, 2013.
Open Source Center translation. ID: CHL2013110226670300.
110. Fang Lihua, Liu Yaxun, Wang Zhipeng, ‘‘Evaluate Footsteps of Training
Using Yardstick of Real Combat—Report from Unidentified Destroyer Flotilla ofEast Sea Fleet on Exploring Realistic Combat Training,’’ People’s Navy, January 7,
2014. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHR2014021281803320; Li Yunqiang
and Shen Shu, ‘‘Command Confrontations Are No Longer ‘Scripted Performance,’ ’’People’s Navy, May 27, 2013. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHR20130730
51135318; CCTV–7, ‘‘PLAN South Sea Fleet Ships Fight with JH–7 Bombers in ‘Maneuver-5’ Drill in South China Sea,’’ October 20, 2013. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHO2013102227858984; Bai Ruixue and Gao Yi, ‘‘Maneuver-5’ Participating Vessels Hold Anchored Defensive Battle Drills ‘Back to Back.’ Combat Naval
Exercises Have Become the Norm,’’ Xinhua (English edition), October 19, 2013.
http://chn.chinamil.com.cn/yx/2013-10/19/content_5598860.htm; and Chen Hu, ‘‘View
the Development Tendency of the Chinese Navy from the Combined Live Force Exercise of the Three Fleets,’’ Xinhua Wang, October 25, 2013. Open Source Centertranslation. ID: CHR2013103149537680.
111. Hubei Daily Online, ‘‘ ‘Maneuver-5’ Joint Exercise Is Carried Out on Largest
Scale; Three Fleets of the PLA Navy Jointly Forge Combat Power in Distant Sea,’’
October 22, 2013. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHR2013102240143629;
Want China Times, ‘‘Mobile 5 Naval Exercise Hints at Future PLA Carrier Battle
Group,’’ October 23, 2013. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131023000133&cid=1101; and Rear Admiral Umio Otsuka, Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force, briefing to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, November 8, 2013.
112. Hubei Daily Online, ‘‘ ‘Maneuver-5’ Joint Exercise is Carried Out on Largest
Scale; Three Fleets of the PLA Navy Jointly Forge Combat Power in Distant Sea,’’
October 22, 2013. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHR2013102240143629.
113. David Lague, ‘‘Special Report: China’s Navy Breaks Out to the High Seas,’’Reuters, November 27, 2013. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2013 / 11 / 27 / us-chinanavy-specialreport-idUSBRE9AQ04220131127.
114. C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indian Pacific (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), p. 110.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00287

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

276

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

115. China’s Navy Extends Its Combat Reach into the Indian Ocean (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, March 14, 2014), p. 4. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf.
116. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Chinese Fleet Wraps up Ocean Sea Patrol,’’ February 11, 2014. Open Source Center transcription. ID: CHR2014021279574682; Open
Source Center Program Summary, ‘‘CCTV–7 ‘Military Report’ 11 February 2014,’’February 11, 2014. ID: CHO2014021203299014; U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘China:
PLA Activities Report, 16–31 January 2014,’’ February 11, 2014. Open Source Center transcription. ID: CHR2014021164116373; Rory Medcalf, ‘‘China Makes Statement as It Sends Naval Ships off Australia’s Maritime Approaches,’’ Interpreter(Lowy Institute for International Policy blog), February 7, 2014. http://
www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/02/07/China-makes-statement - as - it - sends - naval ships- off- Australias- maritime- approaches.aspx; Jiang Tao, ‘‘Military Affairs: Chinese Navy’s Distant Sea Training—Navigation All the Way, Training All the Way,
Confrontations All the Way,’’ China News Service, February 2, 2014. Open Source
Center translation. ID: CHR2014020240969504; Jiang Tao and Li Youtao, ‘‘Military
Affairs: South Sea Fleet’s Distant Sea Training Formation Carries out Comprehensive Defense Drill,’’ China News Service, February 1, 2014. Open Source Centertranslation. ID: CHR2014020145790748; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China Navy Patrols Nansha Islands,’’ January 25, 2014. Open Source Center transcription. ID:
CHR2014012559505999; Ni Guanghui, ‘‘The First Blue Water Training of the Yearfor the PLA Navy—The South China Sea Fleet Patrols the Xisha Islands and Goes
Out to the High Seas,’’ People’s Daily, January 24, 2014. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHL2014012411085606; and Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Chinese Flotilla
Patrols Xisha Islands,’’ January 22, 2014. Open Source Center transcription. ID:
CHR2014012243160795.
117. China’s Navy Extends Its Combat Reach into the Indian Ocean (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, March 14, 2014), p. 2. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf.
118. China Youth League Newspaper, ‘‘The ‘Lock on the Chain’ Is Taiwan Island,
the Center of Gravity Is in Japan—The Chinese Navy Plots to Break Through the‘Island Chain Blockade’,’’ October 31, 2012. Open Source Center translation. ID:
CPP20121102787010; Hai Tao, ‘‘The Chinese Navy Has a Long Way to Go to Get
to the Far Seas,’’ International Herald Leader, January 6, 2012. Open Source Centertranscription. ID: CPP20120109671003.
119. China’s Navy Extends Its Combat Reach into the Indian Ocean (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, March 14, 2014), p. 6. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf.
120. China’s Navy Extends Its Combat Reach into the Indian Ocean (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, March 14, 2014), p. 6. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf.
121. Sandeep Unnithan, ‘‘Exclusive: Indian Navy Headless as Chinese Nuclear
Sub Prowls Indian Ocean,’’ India Today, March 21, 2014. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-navy-chinese-nuclear-sub-indian-ocean/1/350498.html;
SenateArmed Services Committee, Defense Intelligence Agency Annual Threat Assessment,
written statement of Michael Flynn, February 11, 2014. p. 28. http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Flynn_02-11-14.pdf.
122. Sandeep Unnithan, ‘‘Hidden Dragon on the High Seas,’’ India Today, March
21, 2014. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-nuclear-powered-attack-submarinesouth-china-sea/1/350573.html.
123. Sam LaGrone, ‘‘Chinese Submarine Headed to Gulf of Aden for Counter Piracy Operations,’’ USNI News, September 30, 2014. http://news.usni.org/2014/09/30/
chinese-submarine-headed-gulf-aden-counter-piracy-operations.
124. Bai Tiantian, ‘‘PLA Begins Large-Scale Drills,’’ Global Times Online (English
edition), July 28, 2014. Open Source Center transcription. ID: CHR2014072766333
381.
125. Open Source Center, China: PLA Uses Cross-Region Mobility Exercises to
Advance Force Modernization, September 12, 2014. ID: CHO2014091249173664.
126. U.S. Department of Defense, China: PLA Activities Report, 16–30 June 2014,
July 16, 2014. Open Source Center. ID: CHR2014071655179765.
127. U.S. Department of Defense, China: PLA Activities Report, 1–15 August
2014, September 9, 2014. Open Source Center. ID: CHR2014090955189890; Open
Source Center, China: PRC Media’s Unusual Highlighting of ‘Simultaneous’ Naval
Drills in Four Seas, August 6, 2014. ID: CHO2014080640311547; Minnie Chan and

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00288

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

277

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Kristine Kwok, ‘‘PLA’s Drills May Help Shinzo Abe’s Cause to Lift Ban on Army,
Expert Says,’’ South China Morning Post, July 30, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/
china/article/1562190/plas-drills-may-help-shinzo-abes-cause-lift-ban-army-expert-says;
and Want China Times, ‘‘PLA Navy Conduct Naval Exercises to ‘Take Back’ Lost
Sea Territories,’’ July 27, 2014. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140727000154&cid=1101.
128. Joanne Chiu, ‘‘Military Exercises Result in Glut of Canceled Flights,’’ WallStreet Journal, July 29, 2014. http: // online.wsj.com / articles / commercial - airlines asked-to-reduce-flights-by-75-in-shanghai-due-to-military-exercises-1406622812.
129. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving thePeople’s Republic of China 2011 (U.S. Department of Defense, May 2011), pp. 80–
81. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf; Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
2014 (U.S. Department of Defense, April 2014), pp. 74–75. http://www.defense.gov/
pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf; China Military Online, ‘‘ ‘Peace Angel 2014’
China-Pakistan Joint Medical Exercise Concludes,’’ April 28, 2014. http://
eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-04/28/content_5883969.
htm; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘ ‘Peace Mission-2014’ Scale: More than Ever,’’ August 28, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/28/c_133603431.htm;
Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Chinese Troop Joins ASEAN Humanitarian Exercise, Disaster-Relief Exercise,’’ April 29, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201404/29/c_133296424.htm; Rory Medcalf, ‘‘Australia-US-China Military Exercise Challenges Assumptions,’’ Interpreter (Lowy Institute for International Policy blog), October 9, 2014. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/09/Australia-US-China-military-exercise-challenges-assumptions.aspx; Sam LaGrone, ‘‘China and Russia Kick
Off Joint Naval Drills,’’ USNI News, May 21, 2014. http://news.usni.org/2014/05/21/
china-russia-kick-joint-naval-drills; China Military Online, ‘‘Chinese and European
Naval Forces Launch First Anti-Piracy Military Drill,’’ March 24, 2014. http://eng.
mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2014-03/24/content_4499624.htm; People’s Daily Online(English edition), ‘‘Expert: China’s Participation in Cobra Gold Military Exercise
Confirms Chinese Military Influence,’’ February 17, 2014. http://english.people.com.
cn/98649/8538162.html; Zhang Yunbi, ‘‘Timeline of China’s RIMPAC 2014 Highlights,’’ China Daily, August 4, 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-08/
04/content_18244900.htm; China Military Online, ‘‘Chinese and Cameroonian Navies
Conduct First Anti-Piracy Joint Drill,’’ June 4, 2014. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/
DefenseNews/2014-06/04/content_4513999.htm; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China
Holds Multi-Country Maritime Exercise,’’ April 23, 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/china/2014-04/23/content_17457391.htm; William Banton, ‘‘Pacific Angel 14–4
Mongolia: Humanitarian Assistant and Joint Cooperation,’’ U.S. Air Force Public Affairs, August 13, 2014. http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/
7464/Article/10553/pacific-angel-14-4-mongolia-humanitarian-assistant-and-joint-cooperation.aspx; Sam LaGrone, ‘‘Chinese Ships in Iran for Joint Exercises,’’ USNI
News, September 22, 2014. http://news.usni.org/2014/09/22/chinese-ships-iran-jointexercises; Kelby Sanders, ‘‘Blue Ridge Partners with PLA(N) North Sea Fleet in
Search and Rescue Exercise,’’ U.S. Navy, August 9, 2014. http://www.public.navy.
mil/surfor/lcc19/Pages/BlueRidgePartnerswithPLANNorthSeaFleetinSearchandRescueExercise.aspx#.VE5nFXcxqd4; and Singapore Ministry of Defense, ‘‘Singapore andChinese Navies Conduct Bilateral Naval Exercise,’’ September 3, 2014. http://www.
mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2014/sep/03sep14_nr.html#.
VE5pJncxqd4.
130. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, ‘‘China’s RIMPAC Debut: What’s
in It for America?’’ National Interest, July 3, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-rimpac-debut-what%E2%80%99s-it-america-10801.
131. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, ‘‘China’s RIMPAC Debut: What’s
in It for America?’’ National Interest, July 3, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-rimpac-debut-what%E2%80%99s-it-america-10801; Chen Weihua
and Zhang Shaohu, ‘‘China Navy Is RIMPAC ‘Highlight,’ ’’ China Daily, July 1, 2014.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-07/01/content_17629844.htm.
132. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Chinese Navy Sails Out for 2014 RIMPAC,’’ June
10,
2014.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/09/c_133394704.htm;
CCTV.com, ‘‘China Sends Second Largest Fleet to RIMPAC,’’ June 25, 2014. http://
english.cntv.cn/2014/06/25/VIDE1403635798197215.shtml; and Marie V. Milward,‘‘Exercises in Military Diplomacy: RIMPAC 14 and China’s Participation,’’ Banyan
Analytics
Brief,
July
1,
2014.
https: // wss.apan.org / s / GISD /MaritimeCivilAffairsProject / Shared%20Documents/Exercises%20in%20Military%20
Diplomacy_%20RIMPAC%2014%20and%20China%E2%80%99s%20participation%
20_%20ANALYTIC%20SERVICES%20INC%20by%20By%20Marie%20V.%20
Milward.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00289

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

278

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

133. U.S. Navy, ‘‘Multinational Task Force Arrives for RIMPAC 2014,’’ June 25,
2014. http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/cg65/Pages/MultinationalTaskForceArrives
forRIMPAC2014.aspx#.VBrzgXchGsg.
134. Wu Min, Shao Longfei, Yu Lin, ‘‘A Blockade Action Unfolds Between the
Crests and Troughs of the Waves—Witnessing the Chinese Naval Vessel Formation’s
Maritime Exercises in ‘RIMPAC–2014,’ ’’ PLA Daily, July 14, 2014. Open Source
Center translation. ID: CHR2014071411742795; China Military Online, ‘‘Chinese
Naval Taskforce Shifts to Maritime Exercise Phase of RIMPAC,’’ July 11, 2014.
http://Keng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-07/11/content_
6044706.htm.
135. Want China Times, ‘‘PLA Sends Multiple Signals in First RIMPAC Exercise,’’ June 11, 2014. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=
20140611000024&cid=1101; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Chinese Fleet Arrives in Hawaii for RIMPAC Drill,’’ June 26, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/
2014-06/26/c_133439692.htm; and Jeremy Page, ‘‘In Pacific Drills, Navies Adjust to
New Arrival: China,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/
article_email/in-rimpac-naval-drills-off-hawaii-militaries-adjust-to-new-arrival-china1405527835-lMyQjAxMTA0MDEwNzExNDcyWj?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Situation%20Report&utm_campaign=JULY%2017%202014%20
SITREP.
136. Ding Ying, ‘‘Taking Part at Sea,’’ Beijing Review Online, July 5, 2014. Open
Source Center transcription. ID: CHR2014070710212044.
137. Paul McLeary, ‘‘PACOM Chief: U.S. Not Worried about Chinese Intel Ship
off Hawaiian Coast,’’ Defense News, July 29, 2014. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140729/DEFREG02/307290038/PACOM-Chief-US-Not-Worried-About-Chinese-Intel-Ship-off-Hawaiian-Coast.
138. Kimberly Hsu and Craig Murray, China’s Expanding Military Operations in
Foreign Exclusive Economic Zones (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 19, 2013), p. 2. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/
Staff%20Backgrounder_China%20in%20Foreign%20EEZs.pdf.
139. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘RIMPAC Drill Signals China-U.S. Trust Building,’’ June 10, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/10/c_133397296.htm.
140. Agence France-Presse, ‘‘At Navy Drills US and China Try to Forge Relationship,’’ June 24, 2014. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140624/DEFREG02/306240029/At-Navy-Drills-US-China-Try-Forge-Relationship.
141. Sam LaGrone, ‘‘China Invited Back for Future RIMPAC Exercises,’’ USNI
News, July 3, 2014. http://news.usni.org/2014/07/02/china-invited-back-future-rimpacexercises.
142. Qiu Yongzheng and Liu Yunlong, ‘‘China’s Peace Ark Wins over Filipinos,’’
Global Times (English edition), December 26, 2013. http: // www . globaltimes . cn /content/834194.shtml.
143. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China’s Hospital Ship Begins Treatments in Disaster-Hit Philippines,’’ November 26, 2014. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/827694.shtml; Zhu Ningzhu, ‘‘China Ready to Send Medical Team to Philippines,’’ Xinhua(English edition), November 19, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201311/19/c_ 132900966.htm; Zhu Ningzhu, ‘‘China’s Peace Ark Departs for the Philippines Thursday,’’ Xinhua (English edition), November 20, 2013. http://news.xinhua
net.com/english/china/2013-11/20/c_132904621.htm; Qiu Yongzheng and Liu Yunlong,‘‘China’s Peace Ark Wins over Filipinos,’’ Global Times (English edition), December 26, 2013. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/834194.shtml; and Xinhua, ‘‘China’s
Peace Ark Leaves Philippines,’’ December 10, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
china/2013-12/10/c_132957221.htm.
144. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘China: PLA Activities Report, 16–30 March
2014.’’ Open Source Center transcription. ID: CHR2014050772980344; U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘China: PLA Activities Report, 1–15 March 2014.’’ Open Source
Center transcription. ID: CHR2014050772879616.
145. Kirk Semple and Eric Schmitt, ‘‘China’s Actions in Hunt for Jet Are Seen
as Hurting as Much as Helping,’’ New York Times, April 14, 2014. http://www.ny
times.com/2014/04/15/world/asia/chinas-efforts-in-hunt-for-plane-are-seen-as-hurtingmore-than-helping.html.
146. ‘‘Chinese Navy Warships Join Search for Missing Jet,’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), March 9, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/
2014/03/09/chinese-navy-warships-join-search-for-missing-jet/.
147. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘China: PLA Activities Report, 16–30 March
2014.’’ Open Source Center transcription. ID: CHR2014050772980344; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Multinational Search for Missing MH370 Plane Laudable, Unprece-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00290

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

279

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

dented,’’ May 3, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2014-05/03/c_133307
215.htm.
148. Naval Today, ‘‘Gallery: Common Cause Brings Navy Teams Searching for
MH370 Closer,’’ April 14, 2014. http://navaltoday.com/2014/04/14/gallery-commoncause-brings-navy-teams-searching-for-mh370-closer/.
149. Naval Today, ‘‘Australia, China Cooperate in MH370 Search Mission,’’ April
7, 2014. http://navaltoday.com/2014/04/07/australia-china-cooperate-in-mh370-searchmission/.
150. Guo Renjie, ed., ‘‘Chinese Navy Wraps up Escort Mission for Syria’s Chemical Weapons,’’ China Military Online (English edition), June 25, 2014. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-06/25/content_6010867.htm.
151. Shannon Tiezzi, ‘‘Chinese Navy’s Role in Syrian Chemical Weapons Destruction,’’ Diplomat, December 20, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinese-navysrole-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-disposal/.
152. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, ‘‘China and the Far Seas,’’ Diplomat, January 10, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/china-and-the-far-seas/.
153. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013, pp. 310–311.
154. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013, p. 305; China Military Online, ‘‘18th Chinese Naval
Task Force Sets Sail,’’ August 4, 2014. http: // eng.chinamil.com.cn / news-channels /china-military-news/2014-08/04/content_6078172.htm; and China Military Online,‘‘16th Chinese Naval Task Force Returns,’’ July 21, 2014. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/
news-channels/china-military-news/2014-07/21/content_6057012.htm.
155. China Ministry of National Defense, ‘‘Defense Ministry’s Regular Press Conference on Sep. 25, 2014,’’ September 25, 2014. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2014-09/
25/content_4539896.htm; Sam LaGrone, ‘‘Chinese Submarine Headed to Gulf ofAden for Counter Piracy Operations,’’ USNI News, September 30, 2014. http://news.usni.org/2014/09/30/chinese-submarine-headed-gulf-aden-counter-piracy-operations.
156. China Military Online, ‘‘Chinese and European Naval Forces Launch First
Anti-Piracy Military Drill,’’ March 24, 2014. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/201403/24/content_4499624.htm; PLA Daily, ‘‘China-Europe Navies Conduct Joint AntiPiracy Drill,’’ July 16, 2014. Open Source Center ID: CHR2014071711215523.
157. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China-Russia Navies Conduct ‘Anti-Piracy’ Exercises,’’ May 23, 2014. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0523/c90883-8731998.html.
158. China Military Online, ‘‘Chinese and Cameroonian Navies Conduct First AntiPiracy Joint Drill,’’ June 4, 2014. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Photos/2014-06/04/content_
4513998.htm.
159. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, April 2014, p.
73. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf.
160. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Xinhua Insight: Naval Symposium Endorses CUES
to Reduce Uncertainty,’’ April 22, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/
2014-04/22/c_133281654.htm.
161. Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) Business Charter, September
2010. http://img.mod.gov.cn/reports/201310/bzdd/site21/20131128/4437e6581cab1400f
31f09.pdf.
162. U.S. Navy, ‘‘Navy Leaders Agree to CUES at 14th WPNS,’’ April 23, 2014.
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=80532.
163. U.S. Navy, ‘‘Navy Leaders Agree to CUES at 14th WPNS,’’ April 23, 2014.
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=80532; Zhao Shengnan, ‘‘Pact toReduce Sea Conflicts,’’ China Daily, April 23, 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china / 2014 - 04 / 23 / content_ 17455623 . htm; and Shannon Tiezzi, ‘‘Small but Positive
Signs at Western Pacific Naval Symposium,’’ Diplomat, April 24, 2014. http: // thediplomat.com/2014/04/small-but-positive-signs-at-western-pacific-naval-symposium/.
164. China Military Online, ‘‘Qingdao Int’l Naval Fleet Review Rivets IndianMedia,’’ April 18, 2014. http: // www.mod.gov.cn / reports / 201311 / ocean / 2014-04 / 18 /content_ 4504155.htm; Reuters, ‘‘China Denies Naval Snub for Japan Over Fleet
Review,’’ April 15, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/15/us-china-japanidUSBREA3E0KD20140415; and Phil Stewart, ‘‘U.S. to Skip China Fleet Review
after Japan Shunned,’’ Reuters, April 4, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/04/us-usa-china-military-idUSBREA3307C20140404.
165. Shannon Tiezzi, ‘‘S&ED Sparks Mini Reset in US-China Relationship,’’ Diplomat, July 3, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/sed-sparks-mini-reset-in-us-chinarelationship/; Jane Perlez, ‘‘President Xi Jinping’s Solo Decision-Making Presents
Challenges,’’ New York Times, July 8, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/world/
asia/china-us-xi-jinpeng-washington-kerry-lew.html; Elizabeth C. Economy, ‘‘Is Wash-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00291

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

280

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

ington Getting China Policy Wrong?’’ Asia Unbound (Center on Foreign Relations
blog), May 22, 2014. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2014/05/22/is-washington-getting-chinapolicy-wrong/; and Scott A. Snyder, ‘‘Sour Notes from China on the U.S. Rebalance
to Asia,’’ Asia Unbound (Center on Foreign Relations blog), June 20, 2014. http://
blogs.cfr.org/asia/2014/06/20/sour-notes-from-china-on-the-u-s-rebalance-to-asia/.
166. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China Blasts U.S. Comments on South China Sea
Reef,’’ March 13, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/13/c_126264
398.htm.
167. Ben Blanchard, ‘‘China Tells U.S. to Stay Out of South China Seas Dispute,’’Reuters, July 15, 2014. http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0FK0CM20140715?irpc=932; David Brunnstrom, ‘‘RPT–U.S. Wants Freeze on Acts Stoking South China
Sea Tensions,’’ Reuters, July 11, 2014. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/usachina-asean-idUKL2N0PM0S620140711.
168. John Harper, ‘‘Hagel Calls Chinese Actions against USS Cowpens ‘Irresponsible,’ ’’ Stars and Stripes, December 19, 2013. http://www.stripes.com/news/us/hagelcalls-chinese-actions-toward-uss-cowpens-irresponsible-1.258458; Barbara Starr, ‘‘U.S.,
Chinese Warships Come Dangerously Close,’’ CNN, December 13, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/13/politics/us-china-confrontation/.
169. Tom Cohen, ‘‘ ‘Aggressive’ Chinese Fighter Jet Flies Dangerously Close to
U.S. Military Plane,’’ CNN, August 24, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/22/world/
asia/us-china-air-encounter/; ‘‘Chinese Intercepts of U.S. Aircraft: Rogue Pilots or
Realpolitik?’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), August 26, 2014.
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/08/26/chinese-intercepts-of-u-s-aircraft-roguepilots-or-realpolitik/; and Scott Neuman, ‘‘Photo Released of Chinese Fighter that
Buzzed U.S. Navy Plane,’’ NPR, August 23, 2014. http: // www.npr.org / blogs / thetwo-way/2014/08/23/342673459/photo-released-of-chinese-fighter-that-buzzed-u-s-navyplane.
170. Jane Perlez, ‘‘President Xi’s Solo Decision-Making Presents Challenges,’’ New
York Times, July 8, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/world/asia/china-us-xijinpeng-washington-kerry-lew.htmlK.
171. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on U.S. Pacific Command andU.S. Forces Korea, testimony of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, 113th Cong., 2nd sess.,
March 25, 2014; Richard Weitz, ‘‘U.S.-China Security Transparency Highlights
Divergences’’ (Jamestown Foundation China Brief, May 7, 2014.) http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42330&cHash=ffe6
a939ff8aa8aea0ab4c3a7f6b28fa#.U8bnUXdMLa8; and Jeremy Page, ‘‘China Pushes
Limits to Closer Ties with U.S. Military,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2014. http://
online.wsj.com/articles/china-pushes-limits-to-closer-ties-with-u-s-military1405964884.
172. The White House, Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic
Communications Ben Rhodes, March 24, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/24/briefing-deputy-national-security-advisor-strategic-communicationsben-r; The White House, Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinpingof China Before Bilateral Meeting, March 24, 2014. http: // www . whitehouse . gov /the-press-office/2014/03/24/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-chinabilateral-meeting; and Shannon Tiezzi, ‘‘Obama, Xi Meet at Nuclear Security Summit,’’ Diplomat, March 25, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/obama-xi-meet-atnuclear-security-summit/.
173. David Brunnstrom, ‘‘U.S., China Plan Followup to Sunnylands Summit inNovember,’’ Reuters, August 28, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/29/ususa-china-idUSKBN0GT02C20140829.
174. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Joint Press Conference with Secretary Hagel
and Minister Chang in Beijing, China,’’ April 8, 2014. http: / /www.defense.gov /transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5411.
175. Shannon Tiezzi, ‘‘China’s Chief of PLA General Staff to Visit US,’’ Diplomat,
May 13, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/chinas-chief-of-pla-general-staff-to-visit-us/.
176. Jim Garamone, ‘‘Dempsey to Host Chinese Defense Leader at Pentagon,’’
U.S. Department of Defense, May 13, 2014. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122241.
177. Jim Garamone, ‘‘Dempsey Welcomes Chinese Counterpart to Pentagon,’’ U.S.
Department of Defense, May 15, 2014. http: // www.defense.gov / news / newsarticle.aspx?id=122261.
178. Jim Garamone, ‘‘Dempsey, Fang Meet to Strengthen U.S.-China Military Relations,’’ U.S. Department of Defense, May 15, 2014. http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=122267.
179. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving thePeople’s Republic of China 2014 (U.S. Department of Defense, April 2014), pp. 72–

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00292

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

281

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

73. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf; Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
2013 (U.S. Department of Defense, May 2013), pp. 69–71. http://www.defense.gov/
pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf.
180. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving thePeople’s Republic of China 2014 (U.S. Department of Defense, April 2014), p. 72.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00293

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

SECTION 2: CHINA’S MILITARY
MODERNIZATION
Introduction
This section examines China’s evolving security perceptions; select inputs to China’s military modernization; and current and future capabilities of China’s naval, air, missile, and space forces. It
concludes with a discussion of the implications of China’s militarymodernization for the United States. The statements and assessments presented here are based on Commission hearings, briefs by
U.S. and foreign government officials, consultations with nongovernmental experts on China’s military,* the Commission’s factfinding trip to Asia, and open-source research and analysis.
China’s Evolving Security Perceptions
In the early 1980s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began totransition from a large infantry-based peasant army designed tofight protracted wars to a smaller, well-trained, and technology-enabled force. For the next 15 years, China’s military modernization
was gradual, incremental, and focused primarily on overcoming the
PLA’s obsolescence, reflecting Beijing’s view that a major war was
unlikely and that China’s economic development was the Chinese
Communist Party’s (CCP) most pressing strategic goal.
However, Taiwan’s steady march toward democracy in the 1990s
raised fears in Beijing that Taiwan’s increasingly progressive government would produce a president who would pursue de jure independence from mainland China. This provided an impetus for the
PLA to strengthen its capabilities for Taiwan conflict scenarios.
Furthermore, the success of U.S. long-range, precision strikes andnetwork-centric warfare during multiple U.S. and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) military operations in the 1990s andthe U.S. deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups during the
Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–1996 demonstrated to Beijing that
the United States might be willing to intervene in a Taiwan conflict involving China and could do so effectively. This led Beijing toaccelerate its military modernization in the late 1990s and to focus
on developing capabilities to counter U.S. naval and air intervention in a Taiwan contingency.1
By the mid-2000s, the growth of China’s export-driven economy
and Beijing’s recognition of the immense value and vulnerability of* Commission staff interviewed or consulted the following nongovernmental experts during thedrafting of this section; however, these experts do not necessarily agree with or endorse theCommission’s assessments and statements contained herein: Ken Allen, Richard Bejtlich, Richard Bitzinger, Dennis Blasko, J. Michael Cole, Gabe Collins, Mark Cozad, Tai Ming Cheung,Ian Easton, Jeffrey Engstrom, Andrew Erickson, Richard Fisher, M. Taylor Fravel, Scott Harold,
Terrence Kelly, Adam Liff, Jonathan McDowell, Joe McReynolds, Kevin Pollpeter, Michael
Raska, Mark Rosen, Mark Stokes, Lloyd Thrall, and Peter Wilson.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(282)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00294

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

283
sea lanes and resources in China’s maritime periphery combined toincentivize China to develop the ability to protect regional andstrategic sea lanes and preserve freedom of movement on the highseas. Faced with this emerging requirement, as well as the desireof CCP leaders to legitimize their regime by successfully asserting
China’s nationalistic ambitions, China hastened the development ofmaritime capabilities necessary to assert control over China’s
claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea and to protect
China’s access to marine resources.
In 2004, Beijing issued a directive to the PLA to prepare for nontraditional missions beyond China’s immediate periphery, including
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, counterterrorism, andinternational peacekeeping operations. In Beijing’s view, these missions are essential to China’s development because they enhance
China’s diplomatic and political leverage in global affairs; bolster
China’s image as a great nation for domestic and international audiences; and protect China’s expanding foreign economic assets andinterests, which the CCP views as a cornerstone of the regime’s legitimacy and a requirement for preserving the political system.2
Linking China’s economic and strategic interests abroad created arequirement for the PLA to be able to project power outside of Asia
on a limited basis. As the PLA’s operational capabilities have improved, its naval, air, and ground forces have begun to operate beyond China’s immediate periphery to fulfill these new missions anddemonstrate to the world its increasing ability to project military
power throughout the Asia Pacific region and beyond.
• The number of what official Chinese sources refer to as PLA
Navy ‘‘combat readiness patrols,’’ or ‘‘blue-water training’’ deployments, increased from six in 2007 to 28 in 2013, according
to Commission analysis of U.S. government information andCommission discussions with U.S. and foreign government officials (see Figure 1).3 The PLA Navy now maintains a near-constant presence throughout the first and second island chains(see Figure 2).* This activity currently is concentrated in thePhilippine Sea, an area Beijing judges would be crucial tointerdicting U.S. forces in a conflict,4 but is expanding gradually into the southern reaches of the South China Sea and theIndian Ocean. According to a senior U.S. Navy official, ‘‘theamount of time [PLA Navy surface task groups] train in thePhilippine Sea now rivals that of the United States.’’ 5• Since 2009, the PLA Navy has conducted counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to protect Chinese commercial shipping interests. Not including naval diplomacy, the initial Gulfof Aden mission represented China’s first operational deployment of naval forces outside of China’s regional waters. Morerecently, from January to June 2014, two successive PLA NavyDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* PLA strategists and academics argue the United States relies primarily on the ‘‘first island
chain’’ and the ‘‘second island chain’’ to encircle strategically China and prevent China from‘‘settling’’ its objectives vis-à-vis Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. The
first island chain extends from Western Japan through the Ryukyus and Taiwan to the Philippines, and the second island chain stretches from the Kuriles through Eastern Japan and theBonin Islands to Saipan and Guam in the Marianas. Although Western observers usually describe the ‘‘island chains’’ concept as a Chinese one, Chinese analysts claim the concept was developed by the United States following World War II to ‘‘surround’’ and ‘‘contain’’ the newly established People’s Republic of China.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00295

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

284

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

ships joined ships from Russia and Europe for 20 joint escortsof chemical weapons used in Syria’s civil war from Syria into
international waters for neutralization.6 The PLA Navy’s activities in the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea demonstrate its ability to conduct small-scale long-distance naval
operations for extended durations despite China’s lack of overseas military bases. For more on these PLA Navy operations,see Chapter 2, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs.’’• In 2010, China deployed fighter aircraft to Turkey for a joint
China-Turkey air exercise that reportedly involved mock
dogfights and other air-based maneuvers.7 During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Peace Mission exercise later in
2010, PLA Air Force bombers, escorted by fighter aircraft, carried out China’s first simulated long-range air strike from air
bases in western China. Following mid-air refueling, the aircraft rehearsed bombing ground targets in Kazakhstan.8 China’s activities during these exercises demonstrated for the firsttime the PLA Air Force’s ability to conduct long-range air
strikes and air-ground operations.
• In 2011, the PLA Air Force and Navy deployed four cargo aircraft and one surface combatant, respectively, to support andprotect the evacuation of 35,000 Chinese nationals from Libya
in China’s first overseas noncombatant evacuation operation.
China’s Ministries of Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Public
Security; the Civil Aviation Administration of China; Chinesecompanies operating in Libya; and Chinese shipping companies
also participated in the evacuation and coordinated closelywith the PLA. This operation enabled the PLA to demonstrate
a commitment to the protection of Chinese citizens overseas
and highlighted China’s ability to rapidly mobilize civilian assets for military operations.9• In 2013, the PLA contributed nearly 400 troops to the United
Nations (UN) Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. This was Beijing’s first deployment of infantry tosupport a peacekeeping operation since China began participating in UN missions in 1990. China previously had limited
the PLA’s participation in peacekeeping operations to noncombat troops—mainly military observers; staff officers; and engineering, medical, and transportation personnel.10 Additionally,
China began to deploy 700 troops to the UN Mission in South
Sudan in September 2014, marking Beijing’s first contributionof an infantry battalion to a UN peacekeeping force.11• In early 2014, a PLA Navy surface task group carried out a sophisticated training exercise spanning the South China Sea,
eastern Indian Ocean, and Philippine Sea. The deployment
marks the first time the PLA Navy has conducted a surface
combat readiness patrol in the Indian Ocean.12 Furthermore,from late 2013 to early 2014, China conducted its first submarine combat readiness patrol to the Indian Ocean.13 For
more on these PLA Navy deployments to the Indian Ocean, see
Chapter 2, Section 1, ‘‘Security and Foreign Affairs Year in Review.’’

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00296

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

285
Figure 1:

PLA Navy Surface and Submarine Combat Readiness
Deployments, 2007–2013

Source: This figure reflects Commission estimates and judgments based on Commission analysis of U.S. government information and Commission discussions with U.S. and foreign government officials.

The CCP’s 18th Party Congress work report, China’s 2012 defense white paper, and official Chinese media indicate continuity inBeijing’s assessments of the nature of future warfare and its immediate and long-term threat perceptions. This suggests the PLA’s
strategy and modernization priorities will remain focused on building offensive and defensive capabilities for long-duration, high-intensity regional conflicts, including those involving U.S. intervention.14
At the same time, President, CCP Chairman, and Central Military Commission (CMC) * Chairman Xi Jinping’s speeches to themilitary and official PLA statements and documents indicate the
PLA probably will increase its efforts to address longstanding, pervasive institutional and structural problems that could limit the
PLA’s actual ability to sustain combat operations, despite its impressive capability gains. CMC Chairman Xi has repeatedly called
for the PLA to develop a strong, professional force that is ‘‘fully capable of fighting’’ and can ‘‘win every war’’ by increasing ‘‘combat
realism’’ in training.15 Moreover, CMC Chairman Xi reportedly told
a committee of CCP leaders in March 2014: ‘‘There cannot be modernization of national defense and the military without modernization of the military’s forms of organization. There has to be thoroughgoing reform of leadership and command systems, force structure and policy institutions.’’ According to David Finkelstein, vicepresident and director of China Studies of CNA China Studies,‘‘Military reform is part of the larger program that Xi is putting inplace to put his imprimatur on the Chinese party-state. . . . ‘This

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00297

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S2Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The CMC—China’s highest military decision-making body—ensures continued CCP controlof the PLA, sets military policy and strategy, interprets CCP guidance for the military, and oversees the daily operations of the massive PLA bureaucracy. The CCP chairman since 1989 typically has served as CMC chairman.

286
time, we’re serious’ should be the subtext of this new tranche of reform. It will be five years before you see the fruits of it. But 10
years from now, you might see a very different PLA.’’ 16
Figure 2:

China’s First and Second Island Chains

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, 2012, p. 40.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00298

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S2Fig2.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Furthermore, China’s offensive missile force—the Second Artillery—may play an increasingly important role in China’s military
strategy and modernization priorities. Chinese state media reported that CMC Chairman Xi met with the Second Artillery in
one of his first public meetings with the PLA since taking office in2012. During the meeting, he reportedly called on the Second Artillery to ‘‘build a powerful and technological missile force’’ and said
the missile force ‘‘is the core strength of China’s strategic deterrence, the strategic support for the country’s status as a major
power, and an important cornerstone safeguarding national security.’’ 17 Chairman Xi’s promotion of Second Artillery Commander

287
Wei Fenghe to full general shortly after Xi assumed office also may
indicate the growing importance of China’s missile force. This was
the first PLA promotion over which Xi presided as the military’s
new leader.18
Select Inputs to China’s Military Modernization
Military Spending
China’s rapid economic growth has enabled it to provide consistent and sizeable increases to the PLA’s budget to support its
military modernization and gradually expanding missions. China’s
announced official projected defense budget increased from 720 billion RMB (approximately $119.5 billion) in 2013 to 808 billion
renminbi (RMB) (approximately $131.6 billion) in 2014, a 12.2 percent increase. With the exception of 2010, China’s official defense
budget has increased in nominal terms by double-digits every year
since 1989 (see Figure 3).19
Figure 3:

China’s Announced Defense Spending, 1989–2014

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00299

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S2Fig3.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Note: These numbers represent China’s announced official defense budgets, not actual aggregate defense spending. They do not account for inflation or appreciation in the value of China’s
currency.
Source: This figure reflects Commission judgments based on several sources. Each provides
data for part of the period 1989–2014. The most recent source is used when these sources disagree. For 1989–93, David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, andProspects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), p. 189; for 1994–2001, Dennis J.
Blasko et al., Defense-Related Spending in China: A Preliminary Analysis and Comparison with
American Equivalents (The United States-China Policy Foundation, 2007), p. 19. http://www.
uscpf.org/v2/pdf/defensereport.pdf; for 2002–12, Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff, ‘‘Demystifying
China’s Defense Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,’’ China Quarterly (December2013): 805–830; for 2013, Jeremy Page, ‘‘China Raises Defense Spending 12.2% for 2014,’’ WallStreet Journal, March 5, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304732804579
421021045941010; and for 2014, Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff, ‘‘The Budget This Time: Taking the Measure of China’s Defense Spending,’’ Asan Forum 2:2 (March–April 2014). http://
www.theasanforum.org/the-budget-this-time-taking-the-measure-of-chinas-defense-spending/.

288
China’s actual aggregate defense spending * is higher than theofficially announced budget due to Beijing’s omission of major defense-related expenditures—such as purchases of advanced weapons, research and development programs, and local government
support to the PLA—from its official figures. The Department of
Defense (DoD) estimates China’s actual defense spending in 2013
exceeded $145 billion, approximately 21 percent higher than China’s announced defense budget of $119.5 billion; 20 the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute estimates China’s actual defense spending in 2013 was $188 billion, approximately 57 percent
higher than China’s announced defense budget.21
The definition of defense spending is intrinsically subjective andno major power includes all defense-related spending in its official
defense budget. However, relative to the United States and otheradvanced industrial democracies at a comparable level of militarydevelopment, China is exceptional in the extent and type of defense
spending excluded and, most importantly, the fact that the relevant
data generally are not publicly available elsewhere. Therefore, outside calculations of China’s actual defense spending—at least thoserelying on open-source data—involve a significant amount of guesswork. Efforts to assess China’s actual defense spending and to compare budgets over time also are hampered by changing official
RMB–U.S. dollar (USD) exchange rates since 2005, a lack of consensus about appropriate RMB evaluation, the PLA’s poor financial
management practices, and the difficulty determining how China’spurchasing power parity affects the cost of China’s foreign militarypurchases and domestic goods and services.22
The PLA focuses on advancing and defending its interests in the
Asia Pacific while developing the capacity to project power elsewhere. Moreover, China’s defense spending is increasing at a far
greater rate than that of the United States as well as U.S. treaty
allies and established and emerging U.S. security associates in theregion.†Andrew Erickson, associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College, testified to the Commission that China’s defense spending levels provide the PLA with ‘‘sufficient funding to develop formidable
military capabilities for use on its immediate periphery and in its
general region.’’ Dr. Erickson also explained China’s focus on developing regional capabilities has allowed the PLA to ‘‘rapidly exploit
its geographical proximity and the vulnerabilities of its potential
adversaries’ military technologies and force structures, potentiallyplacing them on the costly end of a capabilities competition.’’ He
testified this acquisition strategy has provided China with ‘‘asymmetric capabilities that are disproportionately efficient in asserting
its interests, even though its overall defense spending still remains
a distant second to America’s.’’

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* There is no international consensus on which items should or should not be included in acountry’s ‘‘official’’ defense budget. Every major power—including the United States and major
allies—spends money on the military that is not captured in the country’s official ‘‘defense budget.’’ For a discussion of several different definitions of total defense-related spending, see Dennis
Blasko et al., Defense-Related Spending in China: A Preliminary Analysis and Comparison with
American Equivalents (United States-China Policy Foundation, 2007). http://www.uscpf.org/v2/
pdf/defensereport.pdf.
† U.S. treaty allies in the Asia Pacific are Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, andThailand. ‘‘Established and emerging U.S. security associates’’ refers to Indonesia, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, and India.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00300

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

289
In a paper published by the Center for a New American Security,
Captain Henry Hendrix (U.S. Navy) illustrates the efficacy and efficiency of China’s asymmetric approach by comparing the cost of
China’s DF–21D antiship ballistic missile with the cost of the platform it is designed to strike, the U.S. aircraft carrier. Assuming
China’s DF–21D costs $11 million per missile, the high-end of an
estimate made by two Chinese analysts, and future U.S. aircraft
carriers cost $13.5 billion each, Captain Hendrix explains:
China could build 1,227 DF–21Ds for every carrier theUnited States builds going forward. U.S. defenses would
have to destroy every missile fired, a tough problem given
the magazines of U.S. cruisers and destroyers, while China
would need only one of its weapons to survive to [achieve]a mission kill. Although U.S. Navy and Air Force leaders
have coordinated their efforts to develop the means to operate in an anti-access/area denial environment by disrupting opposing operations, the risk of a carrier sufferinga mission kill that takes it off the battle line without actually sinking it remains high.23
China’s defense spending increases appear sustainable. Even
high-end foreign estimates put Beijing’s actual aggregate defense
spending at a moderate 2–3 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP). Furthermore, increases to the official defense budget
often have been exceeded by growing central government expenditures in other areas,24 probably insulating Chinese leaders frompotential criticism that they are spending too much on the military.
In a 2013 article in the China Quarterly journal, Dr. Ericksonand Adam Liff, a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University’s
Woodrow Wilson School and an assistant professor at Indiana University, explain the practical consequences of China’s defense
spending going forward:
The more sophisticated and technology-intensive [thePLA’s] systems become, the less benefit the PLA can derivefrom acquiring and indigenizing foreign technologies, andthe less cost-advantage China will have in producing andmaintaining them. . . . Developing the capabilities necessary
to wage high- or even medium-intensity warfare beyond
China’s immediate vicinity would require significant additional increases in the defense budget and heavy investment
in new platforms, weapons and related systems; as well as
training, operations and maintenance; not to mention someform of support infrastructure abroad. If China decides todevelop significant power projection capabilities, its investments are likely to be increasingly inefficient and provide
significantly less ‘‘bang’’ for a significantly larger ‘‘buck.’’ 25

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Defense Industry
In the late 1990s, China’s leaders began to take concrete steps
to strengthen the country’s defense industry. Although the PLA has
not fully overcome its dependence on foreign suppliers, China sincethen has increased the size and capacity of several defense sectors
in support of the PLA’s equipment modernization plans. According

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00301

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

290
to Tai Ming Cheung, director of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, ‘‘there are so many
projects underway [in 2014] that the Chinese defense industry appears to be on steroids.’’ 26
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles: China is able to rapidly develop
and produce a diverse array of advanced ballistic and cruise missiles. China maintains the largest and most lethal short-range ballistic missile force in the world; fielded the world’s first antishipballistic missile in 2010; deployed its military’s first long-range,
air-launched land-attack cruise missile in 2012; and will widely deploy its military’s first indigenous advanced, long-range submarinelaunched antiship cruise missile in the next few years, if it has notalready.* Furthermore, the PLA is developing hypersonic glide vehicles as a core component of its next-generation precision strikecapability. Hypersonic glide vehicles could render existing U.S. missile defense systems less effective and potentially obsolete (see thetext box, ‘‘China’s Hypersonic Missile Program,’’ later in this section).
Naval Shipbuilding: China has demonstrated it is capable ofmanufacturing a wide range of naval combatants, including patrolboats, frigates, destroyers, large amphibious ships, and conventional and nuclear submarines and is developing its first indigenous aircraft carrier. Jesse Karotkin, senior intelligence officer for
China at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), testified to theCommission that ‘‘during 2013 alone, over fifty naval ships werelaid down, launched, or commissioned, with a similar number expected in 2014.’’ China’s shipbuilders already have surpassed theircounterparts in Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea in termsof the number and types of ships they can produce; China’s shipbuilders could reach the technical proficiency† of Russian shipbuilders by 2020 and approach the technical proficiency of U.S.
shipbuilders by 2030.27
Naval Technology: China is developing its own marine gas turbines and already has produced them domestically for its YUYIclass hovercraft. China likely will develop the ability to mass
produce marine gas turbines for larger combatant ships in the next
decade. Gas turbines will give PLA Navy ships better accelerationand combat maneuverability than steam turbines that power them
today due to their high power-to-weight ratio, speed, fuel efficiency,
and compact size. Gas turbines also will allow the PLA Navy toachieve higher readiness rates, because they do not require thestart-up time of steam turbines.28
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: China is one of the world’s leading
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) producers, with dozens of models
currently in production. According to a 2012 report by the Defense
Science Board:[China’s] move into unmanned systems is alarming. The
country has a great deal of technology, seemingly unlimited

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The PLA Navy already possesses an advanced, long-range submarine-launched antiship
cruise missiles, but it was acquired from Russia.
† ‘‘Technical proficiency’’ refers to the ability to develop, produce, and integrate advanced mechanical, electrical, cargo, habitability, and weapon systems into ships.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00302

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

291
resources and clearly is leveraging all available information on Western unmanned systems development. Chinamight easily match or outpace U.S. spending on unmannedsystems, rapidly close the technology gaps and become aformidable global competitor in unmanned systems.29
China thus far has focused on using UAVs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) but has fielded units capable ofdelivering lethal weapons (such as missiles) and conducting electronic warfare.30 Furthermore, China’s UAV industry recently
made advancements in unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV)
development. In November 2013, China conducted the inauguraltest flight of its first stealth UCAV, the Lijin. According to a Chinese aerospace expert quoted in the state-owned China Daily, ‘‘the[Lijin] can be used for reconnaissance and an air-to-ground strike.
. . . The size and technological capability of the Lijin [also] make ita suitable choice for the [PLA Navy] if it is to select an unmanned
combat platform for its aircraft carrier.’’ 31 In addition to the Lijin,
China in 2013 revealed it is developing two other UAVs that aredesigned to carry weapons.32
China’s Hypersonic Missile Program
In January 2014, China tested its first hypersonic missile vehicle, reportedly designated the WU–14. The test was acknowledged by China’s Ministry of National Defense and later confirmed by DoD. After the WU–14 is deployed, the missile could
enable China to conduct kinetic strikes anywhere in the world
within minutes to hours.33 According to Mark Stokes, executive
director of the Project 2049 Institute, Chinese technical literature suggests that research into boost-glide weapons has been
underway for some time and that China may seek to field a‘‘boosted hypersonic glide missile capable of intercontinental
strike’’ by 2020 and a ‘‘hypersonic scramjet-propelled cruise vehicle for global operations’’ before 2025.34

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China tested the WU–14 again in August, according to two
media reports citing unnamed sources.35 The test has not been
acknowledged by China or confirmed by DoD. Although the test
reportedly was unsuccessful,36 Lora Saalman, an associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, explains,‘‘The decision to conduct a second WU–14 test only a few months
after its first test shows China’s commitment to fast-tracking
this program. . . . When compared with the yearly gaps between
its [antisatellite] and [ballistic missile] tests in 2007, 2010, 2013,
and 2014, the WU–14 accelerates China’s developmental
timeline exponentially.’’ 37

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00303

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

292
China’s Hypersonic Missile Program—Continued
The United States and Russia are the only other countries
withdevelopmental
hypersonic
weapons
programs.
Hypersonic vehicles create two challenges for existing missile
defense systems, which are designed to counter slower, lessmaneuverable weapon systems. Hypersonic weapons travel at
speeds of Mach 5 to Mach 10 (3,840 to 7,680 miles per hour).
Furthermore, because hypersonic vehicles launched from ballistic missiles can travel at lower altitudes, they can evade
quick detection.38 Lee Fuell, technical director for force modernization and employment at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), testified to the Commission:
The Chinese have talked about a recent successful test of a
hypersonic glide vehicle, which is basically a ballistic missile launch system that gets the target or gets the payload
fast and high, pitches over, dives to hypersonic speed, andthen basically just glides to the target. At this point,
NASIC thinks that it is associated with [China’s] nuclear
deterrent forces. Of great concern would be if [China] wasto apply the same technology and capability with a conventional warhead or even just without a warhead because of
the kinetic energy that it has in combination with their
theater ballistic missiles, you know, in a theater role.
The hypersonic vehicles of any kind, whether they are glide
vehicles or cruise missiles, are extremely difficult to defend
against because just the time is so compressed between initial detection, being able to get a track, being able to get afire control solution, and then just being able to have aweapon that can intercept them in some way just becauseof the speed at which they’re moving. If that is combinedwith more traditional ballistic missile attacks forcing atarget to defend against very high aspect warheads comingin this way at the same time they have to defend against
low altitude, very high speed targets coming in this way, it
makes the defense problem orders of magnitude worse forthe defender.39

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China’s progress modernizing its defense industry is due in largepart to China’s substantial and sustained investment in defense research and development (R&D). China’s large-scale, state-sponsored theft of intellectual property and proprietary information also
has allowed China to fill knowledge gaps in its domestic defense
and commercial R&D. This process has enabled China to save timeand money on defense R&D. China probably allocates at least 5
percent and potentially up to 10 percent of its overall defense
spending to R&D, making it second only to the United States inoverall defense R&D spending.40
Furthermore, according to Battelle’s 2014 Global R&D Funding
Forecast:[China] has increased its overall R&D investments by 12
percent to 20 percent annually for each of the past 20 years;

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00304

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

293

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

while at the same time, U.S. R&D spending increased atless than half those rates. As a result, China’s investment
is now about 61 percent that of the United States, and continuing to close. At the current rates, China’s commitment
is expected to surpass that of the United States by about
2022, when both countries are likely to reach about $600
billion in R&D.41
Although this spending is not explicitly intended for use by the
PLA, China since the late 1990s has promoted ‘‘civil-military integration’’ to facilitate the transfer of commercial technologies formilitary use. As part of this effort, China has encouraged civilian
enterprises to participate in military R&D and production, sponsored research into dual-use science and technology, and developed
common military and civilian technical standards.
The most important coordinating body for China’s military R&D
is the Central Special Committee, formally known as the National
Defense Industry Special Committee. Established in the early
1960s and led through the decades by some of China’s top politicalleaders, the Central Special Committee brings together Chinese civilian and military leaders and top technical experts to direct andcoordinate high-priority strategic R&D programs for China’s military modernization, such as China’s nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, and space weapons. The composition
and role of the Committee under President and CMC Chairman Xi
is unknown, but it likely is led by Premier Li Keqiang.42
To manage China’s investment in R&D, Beijing has promulgateda number of formal R&D plans, research funding programs, andpolicies that have ambitious goals and concrete timelines. China’s
R&D initiatives cut across the government, military, and private
spheres by coordinating state-funded R&D efforts across them andplacing a heavy emphasis on funding basic and foundational research with impacts on multiple fields.
• In its National Medium- to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006–2020), approved in 2006,
Beijing calls for the transformation of Chinese economy into ascience and technology (S&T) powerhouse by 2020 and a global
leader by 2050. This ‘‘grand blueprint of S&T development’’ isdesigned to bring about the ‘‘great renaissance of the Chinese
nation.’’ 43• Document 37, issued in 2010 by the State Council and CMC,
directs the PLA to improve its defense industry by (1)strengthening political guidance and coordination; (2) encouraging the opening up and sharing of military-local resources,
particularly for S&T; (3) promoting the mutual transfer ofdual-use technology; (4) accelerating the development of national key laboratories that facilitate civilian-military integration; (5) bolstering joint research of dual-use technologies; (6)expanding the scope and intensity of civilian R&D work thatcivilian research institutions and enterprises conduct in military-use technologies; and (7) developing civil-military integration S&T parks, and civil-military dual-use technology innovation bases.44

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00305

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

294
Comparing R&D in China and the United States, James Lewis,
senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, testified to theCommission:
China has engaged in a sustained investment in technology
for thirty years while U.S. investments in science have too
often come in fits and starts and been driven by fads. China’s policy to maintain and increase economic growth has
many flaws, but at least they have one, and the contrast is
beginning to tell. A centrally-directed economy subject toheavy political interference can be remarkably inefficient inmaking investment decisions and in production, but China
has compensated for this with heavy and sustained government spending to build capacity and by drawing upon an
immense and underutilized talent pool.
Furthermore, Beijing reportedly is drafting a plan to incorporate
military research institutes into listed state-owned enterprises, providing them access to capital markets. Currently, these military research institutes are funded entirely by the Chinese governmentand do not seek profits.45 With expanded sources of funding, China’s defense industry may improve both its ability to meet PLA requirements and to compete in the global arms market.
Foreign Acquisitions
China turns to foreign countries, mainly Russia, to purchaseweapon systems and technologies that it cannot produce indigenously.* Although Moscow’s concern over China’s record of disregarding intellectual property rights by copying Russian weapon
designs † has contributed to a decline in arms sales to China since
the mid-2000s, the two sides reportedly are negotiating several
sales of major weapon systems, including those designed specifically to counter the United States (for more information on potential Russian arm sales to China, see ‘‘China’s Maritime Forces’’ and‘‘China’s Air Forces’’ later in this section).
China also continues to purchase weapon systems and technology
from European Union (EU) countries, despite the limited arms embargo those countries imposed on China after its military massacred civilians in the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. Unlike
the United States, which enacted strict legislation prohibiting
weapon sales to China, the EU embargo is nonbinding, and eachmember is permitted to interpret it in the context of their respective national laws and regulations.46 According to Oliver Brauner,a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI):DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Based on the numbers of contracts signed for licensed production and direct export, Russia
from 2000–2013 significantly outstripped all other arms suppliers to China. During this same
period, China imported smaller numbers of arms from France, Ukraine, Germany, the United
Kingdom, Belarus, Israel, and Switzerland. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,‘‘The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.’’ http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.
† For example, after absorbing and mastering the technology and knowledge transfers that
Russia provided for the Su-27 fighter aircraft, China reverse engineered the Su-27 to create theJ–11. The J–11 features improvements over the Su-27, such as a reduced radar cross-section
and a better fire-control radar, and has a Chinese-developed engine.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00306

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

295
The EU has so far failed to develop a strategic approach
toward the potential security implications of transfers ofEuropean militarily sensitive technologies that goes beyond
the existing arms embargo and currently lacks effective
mechanisms to control the flow of such technologies toChina. . . . This is mainly because the EU-China relationship continues to be dominated by the economic interests ofindividual member states, both in trade and increasingly ininvestments. Furthermore, due to a lack of direct security
interests in the Asia-Pacific, Europeans do not generally see
China as a security threat or a strategic competitor.47
EU arms makers received licenses to export 3 billion euros(about $3.8 billion) of military equipment from 2001–2011.* The
most recent EU report on arms sales by member nations claims
member countries approved licenses to export 173 million euros(about $220 million) of military equipment in 2012. France accounted for more than 80 percent of these licenses by value, according to the EU report.48 Perhaps more importantly, EU countries
are exporting dual-use technology that in many cases can be soldwithout licenses. For example, most of China’s indigenous dieselelectric submarines and several of its surface combatants areequipped with engines designed and manufactured by German andFrench firms.49
With the emergence of a more modern and able domestic defense
industrial base, China is gradually shifting its focus from purchasing complete foreign systems to procuring foreign military anddual-use subsystems and components via open sources, trade, andtraditional and nontraditional espionage. Among China’s most effective methods used to acquire sensitive U.S. technology are cyberespionage; witting and unwitting collection by Chinese students,
scholars, and scientists; joint ventures; and foreign cooperation.
These methods are discussed in this section.
Cyber Espionage: Since at least the mid-2000s, the Chinese government has conducted large-scale cyber espionage against theUnited States. China has compromised a range of U.S. networks,
including those of DoD, defense contractors, and private enterprises. A 2012 Defense Science Board report identified dozens ofcritical system designs compromised by Chinese cyber actors, including the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 air defense system, theF–35 and the F/A–18 fighter aircraft, the P–8A reconnaissance aircraft, the Global Hawk UAV, the Black Hawk helicopter, the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense System, and the Littoral Combat Ship.
The report also revealed Chinese cyber actors have obtained information on various DoD technologies, including directed energy, theUAV video system, tactical data links, satellite communications,electronic warfare systems, and the electromagnetic aircraft launchsystem.50 However, the actors seeking information on these weapon
systems and technologies are not just stealing the designs themselves, but they also are targeting internal communications, program schedules, meeting minutes, and human resource records,
among other documents.51

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The approval of a license to export does not necessarily translate into an actual export.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00307

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

296

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Dr. Lewis testified to the Commission that cyber espionage ‘‘hasbeen and continues to be a godsend to China’s economic and technological modernization.’’ He explained:
Technological espionage has carried over into cyberspace,as the Chinese discovered that the Internet gave them unparalleled access to poorly secured western networks. Cyberespionage has given China access to defense-industrial
databases, [which are] the record of previous weapons programs and an invaluable resource. These databases provide
the historic experience of building weapons. They show design changes, modifications, how production problems were
overcome, and testing results.
U.S. private cyber security firms such as FireEye have reported
that China’s levels of cyber espionage activity have not substantially decreased in 2014,52 despite a concerted U.S. effort since2013 to expose and stigmatize Chinese economic espionage.
China’s material incentives for continuing this activity are immense and unlikely to be altered by small-scale U.S. actions. According to Joe McReynolds, a research associate at Defense Group
Inc.’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis:
Western analysts of the PLA often frame discussions of China’s expanding Computer Network Operations capabilities
as a question of whether the Chinese will one day becomea ‘status quo’ power in cyberspace, finding agreement with
the United States on shared ‘rules of the road’ that do notprivilege either party. Implicit in this thinking is the notionthat cyberspace has a natural equilibrium, which the Chinese have temporarily disrupted through aggressive use ofComputer Network Operations against military and commercial targets but will one day have a material interest inprotecting. However, the emergence of China as a truly status quo power in cyberspace is unlikely. China accrues vast
benefits from penetrating foreign networks, and China’s
strategic thinkers see the status quo in cyberspace as leaving China intolerably vulnerable due to the United States’
asymmetric control of the Internet’s core infrastructure.53
In February 2014, Admiral Locklear (U.S. Navy), commander ofU.S. Pacific Command, explained, ‘‘the sooner we come to the realization that if we expect the Chinese to behave . . . well as a nationin cyberspace just because we ask them to, it is not realistic. I
think we have to design into our own capabilities and our own systems things that protect our capabilities.’’ 54
Using Students, Scholars, and Scientists for Espionage: Chinese
students attending U.S. universities have the potential to collectinformation, whether wittingly or unwittingly, on sensitive U.S.
technology on behalf of the Chinese government and military. A
2011 study by the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides an example of how China may have attempted to obtain restricted information or products by targeting U.S. universities:
Despite university warnings on the restrictions on his research, University of Tennessee professor Reece Roth em-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00308

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

297

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

ployed a Chinese and an Iranian student to assist in plasma research while working on a classified U.S. Air Forceproject that stipulated no foreign nationals could work on
the project. Roth also traveled to China with his laptop
computer containing export-restricted information and had
a sensitive research paper emailed to him there through a
Chinese professor’s email account. Roth claimed the research was ‘‘fundamental’’ and not sensitive, but a jury concluded otherwise. . . . In September 2008, Roth was foundguilty on 18 counts of conspiracy, fraud, and violating theArms Export Control Act; he was later sentenced to four
years in prison.
A country or company does not have to orchestrate the actual theft of the research in order to capitalize on it. It is
unknown how the Chinese used the information they obtained from Roth, but because they invited him to visit
China and he had a sensitive report emailed to him while
there, it should be assumed they were interested in his research and planned to utilize it.55
The Defense Security Service’s annual report in 2013 also suggests China uses students and academics to acquire sensitive U.S.
technology from cleared defense contractors:
The Defense Security Service assesses [with high confidence] that many East Asia and the Pacific students andacademics in the United States probably pose a counterintelligence and technology transfer threat to cleared industry. While available information does not point to a directconnection between most, if any, academics and home-country intelligence services, such individuals and their sponsoring institutions likely view placement in U.S. facilities
as supporting current R&D goals, some of which have military applications. Such placement opportunities are abundant in the United States, and East Asia and the Pacificstudents will almost certainly continue to seek them.56
It has become difficult to discern Chinese traditional and nontraditional collectors from legitimate students as the number ofChinese students in the United States grows.57 The number of students from China attending U.S. universities more than doubled
from 2008–2009 to 2012–2013, from approximately 100,000 to
235,000 (see Figure 4). In 2012–2013, about 40 percent of thesestudents were undergraduate students and 44 percent were graduate students; for all academic levels, the top fields of study werebusiness/management (29 percent), engineering (19.2 percent), andmath/computer science (11.2 percent).58 According to a 2014 reportby a Chinese organization subordinate to the Ministry of Education, the majority of these students return to China after conducting their studies abroad.59 They bring with them advanced scientific knowledge and the tacit knowledge of research strategies
and techniques not found in scientific journals.
Furthermore, many PLA universities have established partnerships with Chinese civilian universities. For example, in January
2013, seven PLA universities and seven Chinese civilian univer-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00309

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

298
sities signed a ‘‘strategic partnership’’ to ‘‘cultivate personnel andexplore new modes of military-civilian joint education,’’ according toChinese state-owned press.60 In addition to training the next generation of China’s defense scientists and engineers, these partnerships concentrate civilian S&T research on emerging military technologies and could provide PLA scientists and engineers with opportunities to interact with U.S. entities and networks to gather information on sensitive U.S. technology.
Figure 4: Students from China Attending U.S. Universities:
Total Enrollment, 2003–2004 to 2012–2013 Academic Years

Source: Institute of International Education, Open Doors: Report on International Educational
Exchange, November 2013. http://www.iie.org/∼/media/Files/Corporate/Open-Doors/Fact-Sheets2013/Country/China-Open-Doors-Fact-Sheet-2013.ashx.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00310

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S2Fig4.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Joint Ventures: Chinese companies that acquire advanced technologies through joint ventures with foreign companies are legallyrequired—under Chinese state security laws—to share the technology with the PLA and Chinese intelligence services if requested.
The Law of the People’s Republic of China for Protection of State
Secrets, adopted in 1988, defined state secrets as all ‘‘matters thathave a vital bearing on state security and national interests.’’ The
law and its implementation guidelines were so broad and vague
that they encompassed essentially all conceivable information. A
new version of the law, passed in 2010, offers slightly refined but
still remarkably unclear parameters for what constitutes a state secret.61
Furthermore, Chinese joint-venture partners often exploit theagreement by demanding more technology than their foreign partners originally intended. The physical access to proprietary information and technologies provided by a joint venture also enables
Chinese partners to more easily steal technology via traditional
theft from their foreign partners.62

299
One instance of this occurred in China’s developing rail industry.
Japanese Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which had entered into a
joint venture with China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corporation Ltd. (CSR), accused CSR of copying and selling its bullet
train technology on both the domestic and global markets.63 In another case, China-based cyber actors compromised a company
shortly after it entered into a joint venture with a Chinese entity.
The cyber actors targeted internal communications belonging to thecompany’s executive leadership, who were involved in talks with
their Chinese counterparts over a deal involving a specific project.
FireEye assesses that the cyber actors then gave this information
to the Chinese entity to provide it with an advantage in the negotiations, which, if successful, would provide the Chinese organization with exclusive access to the company’s technologies and proprietary data. However, the cyber actors also targeted and stole information pertaining to several of the company’s technologies and critical systems, which they likely gave to Chinese companies for use
in developing an economic advantage in the industry.64
Foreign Cooperation: Chinese state-owned companies are pursuing foreign cooperation to improve their commercial design andmanufacturing capabilities. For example, in the late 2000s, a Chinese company signed a deal with a U.S. company for final assembly
and testing of the CF34–10A engine in China.65 The engine will be
used to power China’s first indigenous passenger jet aircraft. No
open-source information exists on the extent to which current Chinese military programs are exploiting technologies and know-how
gained through foreign cooperation on civilian projects, but such activity would be consistent with China’s past behavior. China almost
certainly views the benefit to military development from suchtransfers as outweighing the risk of censure for violating end-useragreements on technology transfer deals.
PLA Navy Modernization

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

In the late 1980s, China began a modernization program totransform the PLA Navy from a coastal force into a technologicallyadvanced navy capable of projecting power throughout the Asia Pacific. China’s acquisition of platforms, weapons, and systems hasemphasized qualitative improvements, not quantitative growth,and centered on improving its ability to strike opposing ships at
sea and operate at greater distances from the Chinese mainland.
From 2000 to June 2014, China’s aggregate number of submarines
and surface ships increased slightly from 284 to 290, while its overall capabilities improved significantly as it rapidly replaced legacy
platforms with modern ones equipped with advanced, long-range
weapon systems and sensors. China’s modern ships also tend to belarger than legacy platforms, allowing them to handle rougherseas, hold more fuel and supplies for long deployments, mountmore weapons, and carry larger crews to support a broader set of
missions.
As of June 2014, the PLA Navy had 5 nuclear attack submarines(SSNs); 4 nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs); 39 diesel
attack submarines (SS); 12 diesel air-independent attack submarines (SSP); 1 aircraft carrier; 24 destroyers (DD) and guided-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00311

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

300
missile destroyers (DDG); 63 frigates (FF), light frigates, and guided-missile frigates (FFG); about 85 missile-equipped patrol craft;and 57 medium and large amphibious ships.66
Mr. Karotkin, ONI’s senior China analyst, explained to the Commission the inherent difficulties of using Chinese and U.S. naval
orders-of-battle for comparing Chinese and U.S. naval capabilities:. . . key differences in the types of PLA Navy ships (in comparison to the U.S. Navy) make it extremely difficult toapply a common basis for comparing the order-of-battle. A
comprehensive tally of ships that includes hundreds ofsmall patrol craft, mine warfare craft, and coastal auxiliaries provides a deceptively inflated picture of China’s actual combat capability. Conversely, a metric based on shipdisplacement returns the opposite effect, given the fact thatmany of China’s modern ships . . . are small by U.S. standards, and equipped primarily for regional missions.

Defining ‘‘Modern’’ Submarines and Surface Ships
In reference to China’s submarine force, the term ‘‘modern’’ isused in this report to describe a second-generation submarinethat is capable of employing antiship cruise missiles or submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. The following PLA Navy submarine classes are considered modern:
SHANG SSN, YUAN SSP, SONG SS, KILO 636 SS, and JIN
SSBN.67
In reference to China’s surface force, the term ‘‘modern’’ isused in this Report to describe a surface ship that possesses amulti-mission capability, is armed with more than a short-range
air defense capability, and has the ability to embark a helicopter.
The following PLA Navy surface ship classes are considered
modern: LUHU DD, LUHAI DD, LUZHOU DDG, LUYANG I/II/
III DDG, Sovremenny I/II DDG, JIANGWEI I/II FF, JIANGKAII FF, and JIANGKAI II FFG.68
The PLA Navy also has a large number of submarines andsurface combatants that are not considered modern as well as
amphibious warfare, mine warfare, and auxiliary ships with various roles. Including all types and sizes, the PLA Navy currently
operates more than 720 ships.69

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Table 1:

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

PLA Navy Orders-of-Battle, 2000–2020

Type

2000

2005

2010

2014

2020

Diesel Attack Submarines

60

51

54

51

59–64

Nuclear Attack Submarines

5

6

6

5

6–9

Nuclear Ballistic Missile
Submarines

1

2

3

4

4–5

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00312

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

301
Table 1:

PLA Navy Orders-of-Battle, 2000–2020—Continued

Type

2000

2005

2010

2014

2020

Aircraft Carriers

0

0

0

1

1–2

Destroyers

21

21

25

24

30–34

Frigates

37

43

49

63

83–97

Amphibious Ships

60

43

55

57

50–55

Coastal Patrol (Missile)

100

51

85

85

85

TOTAL

284

217

277

290

318–351

Note: ‘‘Frigates’’ refers to frigates, light frigates, and guided-missile frigates. The rapid construction of the JIANGDAO-class light frigate accounts for a large share of the anticipatedsharp increase of total frigates in the PLA Navy from 2014 to 2020. Some sources classify China’s JIANGDAO ship as a ‘‘corvette’’ rather than a light frigate.
Source: This chart reflects Commission estimates and judgments based on unclassified briefs
by U.S. and foreign government officials, discussions with nongovernmental experts on China’s
military, consecutive versions of DoD’s annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, and consecutive versions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ The Military Balance.

Modern Submarines
Over the last 14 years, the PLA Navy has increased its inventoryof modern nuclear and conventional submarines from one in 2000
to nearly 40 in 2014. China has at least seven classes of modern
submarines in use, in production, or under development: SHANG
SSN, YUAN SSP, SONG SS, KILO 636 SS, JIN SSBN, Type-096
SSBN, and Type-095 guided-missile, nuclear powered submarine(SSGN).
• The PLA Navy’s SHANG SSN, YUAN SSP, and SONG SS are
designed for antisurface warfare and ISR in the approaches toChina’s maritime periphery and likely will escort future nuclear deterrent patrols and aircraft carrier task groups. Initially equipped with the subsonic, medium-range YJ–82 antiship cruise missiles (20 nm),* the PLA Navy likely will install
the advanced, long-range CH–SS–N–13 antiship cruise missile(120+ nm) on these three classes in the near term, if it has notalready.70 The upgraded SHANG SSN, YUAN SSP, and SONG
SS will complement the PLA Navy’s KILO 636 SS, which isequipped with the supersonic, long-range SS–N–27 antiship
cruise missile (120 nm).
• By the end of 2014, the PLA Navy’s JIN SSBN probably willconduct its first patrol while armed with the JL–2 submarinelaunched ballistic missile (see ‘‘China’s Offensive Missile
Force’’ later in this section for more information). China also
is developing its next-generation SSBN and submarinelaunched ballistic missile, called the Type 096 SSBN and theJL–3, respectively. The new SSBN likely will feature improved
stealth over its predecessor, the JIN, which is a very noisy submarine and could be vulnerable to U.S. and Japanese antisub-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Throughout this section, the maximum range of cruise and ballistic missiles is indicated inparenthesis following the first reference of the missile.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00313

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

302
marine capabilities. Additionally, the new submarine-launchedballistic missile probably will have a longer range and be morelethal than the JL–2.71• China is pursuing a new class of nuclear attack submarines,
the Type 095 SSGN. Although details of the program are unavailable in open sources, Mr. Karotkin testified to the Commission that the Type 095 may ‘‘provide a generational improvement in many areas such as quieting and weapon capacity’’ and carry the PLA Navy’s first submarine-launched landattack cruise missile.
Furthermore, China is pursuing joint-design and production offour to six Russian advanced diesel-electric attack submarines containing Russia’s latest submarine sonar, propulsion, and quieting
technology.72 The deal would improve the PLA Navy’s capabilities
and assist China’s development of quiet submarines, thus complicating future U.S. efforts to track and counter PLA Navy submarines.
China’s expanding inventory of modern submarines has significantly enhanced China’s ability to strike foreign surface ships, including those of the U.S. Navy, near major seas lines of communication in the Asia Pacific. According to William Murray, associateresearch professor at the U.S. Naval War College:
Beijing’s ongoing investment in increasingly modern (andtherefore progressively quiet) antiship-cruise-missile-firing
diesel submarines reflects a determination to overwhelm
and destroy surface ships operating within at least a hundred miles of shallow waters of [China’s] near seas, including Taiwan. This distance is greatly extended and reinforced by the DF–21D [antiship ballistic missile] and by[antiship cruise missiles] launched from surface warships
and . . . aircraft. PLA reliance on large numbers of antiship
cruise missiles as a means of deterring and defeating opposing surface naval forces represents a significant challenge for a potential adversary, and it suggests specificallythat the U.S. Navy’s post-Cold War ability to conduct highvolume, uncontested, maritime strike operations from surface ships in the western Pacific has ended, at least temporarily.73
Aircraft Carriers

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in2012 after approximately six years of renovation work on the Soviet-designed, Ukrainian-built hull and one year of sea trials, andis developing a carrier-based fighter aircraft, the J–15. At least six
J–15 prototypes are being tested. China conducted the first test
flight of the J–15 in 2009; the first takeoff from a land-based simulated ski jump in 2010; and the first take-offs and landings on the
Liaoning in 2012. The J–15 had begun performing full-stops andtake-offs with maximum weapon loads by September 2013.74
Although the Liaoning is an important symbol for the Chinese
government, Chinese citizens, and regional observers of China’s
ever-increasing military power, the Liaoning’s military value cur-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00314

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

303
rently is limited to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, helicopter support to ground forces, antisubmarine warfare, airborne
early warning, search and rescue, and presence operations. However, after China’s first carrier-based aviation unit becomes operational, which is expected by 2016, the Liaoning could contributesignificantly to the PLA’s combat capabilities in the South China
Sea, where the nation’s airpower today is limited by the shortranges of China’s fighter fleet (for more information on China’s air
combat range limitations, see ‘‘China’s Air Forces’’ later in this section). In the South China Sea, China’s aircraft carrier probably
could quickly overwhelm potential adversaries such as the less capable naval and air forces of the Philippines and Vietnam. The
Liaoning and its embarked aircraft likely would not represent
much of an offensive strike threat against U.S. carrier strikegroups operating in the South China Sea, though together they
could conduct air defense and antisubmarine warfare in support ofChina’s broader antiaccess/area denial operations against theUnited States.75
The Liaoning and its embarked aircraft also could provide China
with a potent expeditionary force. During the carrier’s first-everlong-distance training deployment in early 2014, it reportedly exercised with at least 12 other ships, including submarines and amphibious ships, suggesting China is experimenting with multiple
types of future carrier formations, including those resembling U.S.
combined expeditionary groups.76
China probably intends to follow the Liaoning with at least two
and potentially as many as four indigenously-produced hulls 77 thatwill be larger than the Liaoning’s 60,000 tons and feature designand engine improvements. Construction of China’s first indigenous
carrier has yet to be observed; however, modern ship construction
methods allow sections of a ship to be constructed inside buildings
long before a full ship is laid down in the dock, making it difficult
to corroborate China’s progress in this area. If the first of these indigenous carriers began construction in 2013, as U.S. analysts
widely reported, it could reach initial operational capability by
2020.78 Regarding China’s aircraft carrier construction, Admiral
Jonathan Greenert (U.S. Navy), the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, in July 2014 said China is ‘‘moving on a pace that is extraordinary.’’ 79
Modern Surface Combatants

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Over the last 14 years, the PLA Navy more than tripled its inventory of modern destroyers and frigates, from less than 15 in2000 to about 50 in 2014. China also continues to regularly upgrade legacy platforms with new weapon systems as they become
available.
• The PLA Navy surface force has significantly enhanced its
antisurface warfare capabilities since 2000 with the fielding ofadvanced long-range antiship cruise missiles and over-the-horizon targeting systems aboard the PLA Navy’s newest destroyers and frigates. These antiship cruise missiles include theRussian SS–N–22 (130 nm) and the Chinese YJ–62 (150 nm),
YJ–83 (95 nm), and YJ–8A (65 nm). China’s newest destroyer,

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00315

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

304

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

the LUYANG III, which is expected to enter the force by theend of 2014, will be fitted with a new vertically-launched, longrange antiship cruise missile.80• Although naval air defense has historically been a weak area
for the PLA Navy, its newest destroyers and frigates feature
medium- or long-range surface-to-air missiles that enable PLA
Navy ships to operate beyond land-based air defenses whilestill maintaining air defense coverage. These surface-to-air
missiles include the Russian SA–N–20 (80 nm) and SA–N–7(20 nm) and the Chinese HHQ–9 (55 nm) and HHQ–16 (40nm). The new LUYANG III DDG will carry an extended-range
variant of the HHQ–9 surface-to-air missile.81• The PLA Navy does not have the ability to strike land targets
with cruise missiles but likely will field its first sea-based landattack cruise missile in the next five to ten years on the
LUYANG III DDG and Type 095 SSGN. A future sea-basedland-attack cruise missile, when combined with greater frequency of long-range combat readiness patrols, will complement the PLA’s arsenal of other cruise and ballistic missiles, enhancing Beijing’s flexibility for attacking land targets
throughout the Asia Pacific, including U.S. facilities inGuam.82• China appears to be developing a new cruiser, potentiallycalled the Type 055, which reportedly would displace approximately 10,000 tons and carry large numbers of antiship cruise
missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and land-attack cruise missiles
as well as potentially laser and rail-gun weapons.83
The PLA Navy’s expanding and modernizing fleet of combat
ships has improved Beijing’s ability to project power in the Taiwan
Strait, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Philippine Sea as well as to fulfill the PLA Navy’s growing missions beyond the Asia Pacific, such as expeditionary warfare, defense of
distant maritime trade routes, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and counterpiracy. Dr. Erickson explained the trajectory of the
PLA Navy and its implications for the United States and the region:
While one of the world’s largest, China’s slightly-expanding
surface fleet has grown far faster in quality. Chinese naval
platforms display a growing multi-mission emphasis.
Whereas previously antisurface warfare focus eclipsed competing priorities, now increasing emphasis is devoted to theover-the-horizon targeting necessary to support antisurface
warfare, as well as to antiair warfare. China’s latest destroyers and frigates, which its large, increasingly advanced shipbuilding industry is building steadily, boast
significant area air defense capabilities. With a developing
aircraft carrier program, the possibility of land-attack
cruise missiles being deployed in surface vessel verticallaunch systems in the near future, and deployment of larger amphibious vessels including YUZHAO-class landing
platform docks and Zubr air-cushioned landing craft, the
PLA Navy may be starting to develop a force capable of

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00316

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

305
conducting strike operations ashore. As China’s consolidating coast guard forces increasingly patrol disputed
areas in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China
Sea to advance China’s claims there, PLA Navy ships arefree to range further afield to bolster China’s antiaccess/area denial envelope in the Western Pacific and expand its
presence and influence in the Indian Ocean and beyond.84
As the PLA Navy has strengthened its long-range capability, italso has bolstered its shorter-range forces with the introduction of
60 HOUBEI-class guided-missile patrol boats (PTGs) from the midto late-2000s and the ongoing deliveries of JIANGDAO-class lightfrigates, which began in 2012.85
The HOUBEI PTG, equipped with eight long-range antiship
cruise missiles and able to attain high speeds, has significant offensive potential against U.S. and allied forces operating within 200
nm of China’s coast. John Patch, a U.S. intelligence analyst, explains the significant operational and tactical ramifications of the
HOUBEI PTG for the U.S. Navy:The HOUBEI PTG’s size and partial stealth mean that the[U.S. Navy] may never locate with long-range sensors thefiring platform . . . making prosecution by the [U.S. Navy’s]
surface-launched Harpoon [antiship cruise missile] difficultat best. . . . Air-launched Harpoons or aerial cueing may besolutions, but operating friendly aircraft or unmanned aerial systems within range of China’s growing fourth-generation naval air defense raises the risks to these platforms. . . .
Recent U.S. government assessments of the Littoral Combat
Ship suggest that it too will not be up to the task of
HOUBEI hunter-killer missions in high-threat waters.86
The JIANGDAO light frigate is armed with several naval guns,
torpedoes, and four long-range antiship cruise missiles and is able
to support helicopter operations. In contrast to the HOUBEI PTG,
the JIANGDAO light frigate appears to be designed primarily for
patrol, surveillance, and sovereignty protection in the East China
Sea and the South China Sea rather than rapid offensive strike
missions. China to date has built 14 JIANGDAO light frigates andis expected to field 15–25 more units. The integration of the
JIANGDAO light frigate into the force will free the PLA Navy’s
larger, more capable surface combatants to focus on operations farther from the Chinese mainland.87

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Replenishment Ships
The demands of the PLA Navy’s expanding missions in distantseas—such as its Gulf of Aden counterpiracy deployments since2009 and its search for missing Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 in
2014—have strained the capacity of the PLA Navy’s logistics fleet,placing its small fleet of replenishment oilers on near-constant deployment status. To help improve the PLA Navy’s ability to sustain
high-tempo operations at longer ranges, China introduced two new
oilers in 2013, bringing its total inventory of oilers to seven, andlaunched another in June 2014. There are indications China plansto build two additional oilers in the next one to two years and po-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00317

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

306
tentially more units later in the decade. Oilers are very easy for
China to build; they can be completed (keel to commissioning) in
12 to 18 months.88
Amphibious Ships
Beginning in approximately 2006, the PLA Navy’s amphibious
acquisition shifted from small tank landing ships designed for afull-scale invasion of Taiwan toward larger multipurpose amphibious ships designed to provide the PLA Navy with greater flexibility in balancing its growing commitments to diverse missions.
From 2007–2012, the PLA Navy commissioned three YUZHAOclass amphibious transport docks (LPD). China likely will build additional YUZHAO LPDs and may introduce a new landing helicopter assault ship, called the Type-081, in the next five years.89
The YUZHAO LPD can carry up to four YUYI hovercraft,* 20
amphibious armored vehicles, and 800 combat troops and at least
four helicopters. Given the ship’s size, range, and ability to support
over-the-horizon operations using helicopters and hovercraft, it iswell-suited for amphibious assaults against the islands and reefs in
the South China Sea and Taiwan-controlled islands in the Taiwan
Strait, as well search and rescue, humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief, and counterpiracy. Furthermore, the YUZHAO’s LPD’s recent deployment to the Indian Ocean and amphibious assault training suggest the PLA Navy is developing operational concepts andproficiencies for expeditionary missions, such as amphibious raids,
direct action operations, airfield and port seizures, and personnel
and materiel seizure/recovery.
The PLA continues to increase the size, sophistication, and frequency of its amphibious training. China’s amphibious force consists of the 1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division and anamphibious armored brigade in the Nanjing Military Region, the124th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Division in the Guangzhou
Military Region, and the 1st and 164th marine brigades in theSouth Sea Fleet.90
Maritime Law Enforcement Ships
China employs its maritime law enforcement ships to monitor,
protest, and in some cases harass foreign vessels engaging in activities that it believes violate its maritime rights. Beijing almost
certainly views this approach as less provocative than deploying its
navy because it allows China to present the confrontation as a domestic law enforcement issue rather than a foreign defense issue
requiring the military’s intervention. Nevertheless, the PLA Navystill plays a role by backing up maritime law enforcement patrols
from a distance; visibly training and transiting through disputed
waters; and resupplying Chinese-controlled land features in theSouth China Sea.91
Prior to 2013, China had six chief Maritime Law Enforcement
agencies, all with separate and sometimes overlapping missions.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The YUYI LCUA—similar in size to the U.S.-designed landing craft air cushion—can carryapproximately 60 tons and has space for one main battle tank. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the UnitedStates, written testimony of Jesse Karotkin, January 10, 2014; IHS Aerospace, Defense, and Security, ‘‘Analysis: China’s Expanding Amphibious Capabilities,’’ October 2013.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00318

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

307
China in June 2013 officially consolidated four of these six agencies
into the new China Coast Guard * in an effort to address longstanding shortcomings in its coordination of maritime policy and to
centralize control of China’s maritime law enforcement operations.92 The consolidation has allowed the China Coast Guard to
more flexibly deploy patrol ships in response to perceived challenges to China’s sovereignty and more easily patrol China’s maritime claims.
Together, China’s maritime law enforcement agencies operateover 100 ocean-going ships and over 1,000 patrol craft and smallerboats.93 Some of these ships have light mounted-weapons but mostare unarmed. However, all of them likely have a gun locker for personnel weapons. In some instances, newly constructed ships for the
China Coast Guard have provisions for future fit of guns (for example, empty gun collars). According to Mr. Karotkin, future weapons,
if installed, would be similar to other coast guards worldwide, including the U.S. and Japanese Coast Guards.
China’s maritime law enforcement force, like the PLA Navy, isin the midst of a major modernization program and will expand
significantly between now and 2020. Most of these units will belarger and more capable than previous ones, and some will havethe ability to embark helicopters.94
U.S. Force Posture in Asia
In August 2014, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) reported it
has approximately 360,000 personnel, including 140,000 assigned to the Navy; 86,000 assigned to the Marine Corps; 29,000
assigned to the Air Force; 60,000 assigned to the Army; 38,000
DoD civilians; and 1,200 Special Operations personnel. PACOM’sorder-of-battle includes 200 ships, 50 of which are forward-stationed or forward-deployed in the Asia Pacific while the remaining 150 are stationed in the Eastern Pacific (from the West
Coast of North America to the International Date Line); 1,500
aircraft (including those from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps,
and U.S. Air Force); and two Marine Expeditionary Forces.95
The declared U.S. rebalance to Asia policy calls for increasing
the forward presence of the U.S. Navy from about a 50/50 distribution between the Pacific and the Atlantic to a 60/40 distribution by 2020 and using these assets in new ways to enhance
U.S. posture and partnerships. Under its submission to the
President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2015, the U.S. Navy would increase its forward presence in the Asia Pacific from about 50
ships on average today to about 67 on average in 2020. The 2020
total includes an additional attack submarine in Guam, where
three are stationed today. The U.S. Navy also plans to operate
MQ–4C TRITON high endurance UAVs from Guam by 2018.96

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* China’s former six chief maritime law enforcement agencies were China Maritime Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, China Coast Guard, Maritime Customs Service,
Maritime Safety Administration, and China Rescue and Salvage. China consolidated the assetsof all but the Maritime Safety Administration and China Rescue and Salvage into the new
China Coast Guard.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00319

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

308
U.S. Force Posture in Asia—Continued
However, budget uncertainty could impact PACOM’splanned upgrades to its force posture, presence, and readiness. In March 2014, PACOM Commander Admiral Locklear
explained:
Budget uncertainty has hampered our readiness and complicated our ability to execute long-term plans and to efficiently use our resources. These uncertainties impact ourpeople, as well as our equipment and infrastructure by reducing training and delaying needed investments. They ultimately reduce our readiness, our ability to respond to crisis and contingency as well as degrade our ability to reliably interact with our allies and partners in the region.
. . . Due to continued budget uncertainty, we were forced tomake difficult short-term choices and scale back or cancel
valuable training exercises, negatively impacting both themultinational training needed to strengthen our alliancesand build partner capacities as well as some unilateraltraining necessary to maintain our high-end warfighting
capabilities. These budgetary uncertainties are also driving
force management uncertainty. Current global force management resourcing, and the continuing demand to source
deployed and ready forces from PACOM [area of responsibility] to other regions of the world, creates periods in
PACOM where we lack adequate intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities as well as key response forces, ultimately degrading our deterrence posture and our ability torespond.97
China’s Air Forces
In the early 1990s, Beijing began a comprehensive modernization
program to upgrade the PLA Air Force from a short-range, defensively-oriented force with limited capabilities into a modern, multirole force capable of projecting precision airpower beyond China’s
borders, conducting air and missile defense, and providing early
warning and dynamic situational awareness. This program has focused on weapon system acquisition and integration, infrastructure
upgrades, tactics development, and more recently, training improvements.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Combat Aircraft
The PLA Air Force has approximately 2,200 operational combat
aircraft. This total includes air defense and multi-role fighters,
ground attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, and bombers (see Table 2).
Of these combat aircraft, 330–500 operate from permanent bases inthe eastern half of China, allowing them to conduct operations inand around Taiwan without aerial refueling. Moreover, China—
using its robust military, civilian, and reserve airfield network—
could forward deploy hundreds of additional combat aircraft on
short notice in a conflict scenario.98

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00320

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

309
Defining ‘‘Modern’’ Combat Aircraft
The definition of ‘‘modern’’ combat aircraft changes frequently
as new technologies are proven and fielded. Combat aircraft canbe characterized by their radar signatures, sensors, avionics,
weapons, propulsion, controls, materials, and flight performancecapabilities. Features and capabilities can be introduced piecemeal as an interim upgrade to an existing airframe, or via therollout of an all new system.
In reference to China’s combat aircraft, the term ‘‘modern’’ isused in this report to describe the following aircraft, all of whichfeature advanced avionics and weapon systems: J–10, J–11, JH–
7, Su-27, and Su-30. If and when they are acquired by China,
the J–15, J–20, J–31, and Su-35 will be added to this list.
Table 2:China’s Combat Aircraft, 2000–2014
2000

2005

2010

2014

Total
(Approximate)

3,000

1,900

1,617

2,193

Modern(Approximate)

65

154

381

593

Percent Modern(Approximate)

2

8

24

27

Note and Source: Estimates of China’s inventory of total combat aircraft, including modern
and legacy aircraft in the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy, vary across sources. This chart uses
data from consecutive versions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ The Military
Balance, which is the most demonstrably reliable and comprehensive source available.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Air Defense and Multi-role Fighters, Ground-Attack Aircraft, andFighter-bombers: The PLA Air Force has approximately 2,100 air
defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, and fighterbombers, including about 600 that are considered modern.
Complementing China’s new modern combat aircraft are a diverse array of beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles; all of China’s
fighters in 2000, with the potential exception of a few modified Su27s, were limited to within-visual-range missiles. China over thelast 15 years also has acquired a number of sophisticated shortand medium-range air-to-air missiles; precision-guided munitions
including all-weather, satellite-guided bombs, antiradiation missiles, and laser-guided bombs; and long-range, advanced airlaunched land-attack cruise missiles and antiship cruise missiles.
Moreover, China has installed advanced electronic warfare systems
on some its aircraft, improving their survivability and lethality andallowing them to jam or interfere with an adversary’s communications.99
Comparing U.S. and Chinese trends in fighter modernizationfrom 1995 to the present, David Shlapak, a senior policy analyst
at the RAND Corporation, explains:Now visualize a . . . meeting . . . in 1995. The U.S. pilot
would most likely have been flying an F–15, F–16, or F/A–
18—a sophisticated ‘‘fourth generation’’ fighter featuring

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00321

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

310

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

cutting-edge radar and avionics, as well as advanced ‘‘fireand forget’’ air-to-air missiles. The PLA Air Force pilot, on
the other hand, most likely would . . . be flying a J–6,
armed with a Chinese copy of a Soviet copy of a first-generation, short-range U.S. air-to-air missile. The U.S. pilot
would have enjoyed an overwhelming qualitative advantage
in aircraft, electronics, and weapons. Advance 20 years to
the present day. The United States would most likely be
represented by the same F–15 equipped with somewhat updated versions of the same sensors, avionics, and missiles.
The PLA Air Force, meanwhile, could meet it with a J–10
or J–11, both modern fighters comparable in performanceto the fourth-generation U.S. jets. The Chinese pilot would
likewise have at its disposal weapons and other equipmentthat reflect rough parity with those found on the typical
U.S. fighter.100
With the J–10, J–11, Su-27, and Su-30, China likely would be
able to sustain air combat operations along the Taiwan Strait andover the Senkaku Islands, even in the face of U.S. intervention.
During a conflict with Japan or Taiwan, China’s quantitative advantages over those countries, combined with the proximity of China’s air bases to the prospective war zones, would allow for a shortlogistics chain, high sortie rates, and extensive aircraft availability
and help to facilitate integrated air defense and command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Furthermore, the upgraded JH–7 attack aircraft, introduced in the mid-2000s, provides China with potent air
intercept and maritime strike capabilities. During a conflict, thisplatform would allow China to protect its territorial airspace andcoastal airspace as well as attack foreign surface forces operating
throughout much of the first island chain.
Nevertheless, most of China’s fighter and attack aircraft lack the
combat range to conduct air operations in the Philippine Sea andthe southern reaches of the South China Sea. Until the PLA Navy’s
first carrier-based aviation wing becomes operational, China mustuse air refueling tankers to enable air operations at these distancesfrom China. However, China’s current fleet of air refueling aircraft,which consists of only about 12 1950s-era H–6U tankers, is too
small to support sustained, large-scale, long-distance air combat.101
Furthermore, the H–6U tanker has a limited capacity to holdtransferable fuel, China has inadequate support infrastructure on
the ground, and most of China’s fighters do not have the equipment
necessary to refuel in the air.102
To augment its H–6U tankers, China purchased as many as 10
IL–78 tankers from Russia in the mid-2000s. Production issues
have prevented Russia from delivering any of the IL–78 tankers todate. Some indications, however, suggest deliveries could begin by
the end of 2014. Furthermore, China reportedly acquired a small
number of tankers from Ukraine in 2013–2014 103 and may build
a large number of new tankers using the Y–20 transport aircraft’s
airframe when it becomes available (for more information on the
Y–20, see ‘‘Strategic Airlift’’ later in this section).104
Over the next five years, China is expected to continue to develop
and modernize its fleet of fighter and attack aircraft with variants

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00322

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

311
of its existing platforms. China also is on track to introduce two
fifth-generation fighters, the J–20 and the smaller J–31. China’s
fifth-generation fighters probably will have low visibility, high maneuverability, and large internal weapons bays and feature advanced sensors, radars, and datalinks. The J–20 and J–31 are expected to reach initial operational capability between 2017–2019.
• China continues to produce variants of the J–10 and J–11
fighters. Future aircraft may feature the more powerful Chinese WS–10A turbofan engine, new radars, new cruise missiles, and design modifications. Among the J–11 variants in
production, the J–16 is the most notable because it could havesignificantly improved range, payload capacity, and maneuverability compared to China’s current inventory. China likely will
initially use the J–16 to augment the JH–7 and Su-30 in the
PLA Air Force and PLA Navy. Depending on its performanceand the status of other aircraft programs, the J–16 may eventually replace these fighters.105• The PLA Air Force conducted the first test flight of the J–20
in January 2011 and continues to build and test prototypes of
the aircraft. The third and fourth prototypes, which flew inMarch and July 2014, respectively, feature a number of important design modifications, suggesting China continues to improve its stealth technology.106 The J–20 fighters will be moreadvanced than any other fighter currently deployed by Asia
Pacific countries, adding to China’s military leverage against
Taiwan, Japan, and South China Sea counterclaimants. Furthermore, according to Mr. Shlapak, the J–20 ‘‘will confront
the U.S. military with, in effect, the dilemma that the U.S. Air
Force has for 20 years been imposing on adversaries—how to
defend against low-observable aircraft.’’ 107• China conducted the first flight test of the J–31 in October
2012 and may have as many as three prototypes in production.* The J–31’s intended use remains unknown to foreign observers. A PLA Navy official in 2013 claimed the aircraft is designed for export to China’s friends and allies that are unable
to purchase the F–35; however, another PLA Navy official in2013 said the J–31 will serve as the basis for China’s next-generation carrier-based aircraft.108 China also could field thesmaller stealth fighter to complement the J–20.
Furthermore, China appears to be in the final stages of purchasing Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft. The Su-35 is a versatile,
highly capable aircraft that would offer significantly improved
range and fuel capacity over China’s current fighters. The aircraft
thus would strengthen China’s ability to conduct air superiority
missions in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and South China

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The J–31 appears to share similarities to Lockheed Martin’s F–35 and F–22 fighters. Credible reporting indicates Chinese cyber operators stole data on the design, performance, and othercharacteristics of the F–35 from the Western defense firms. Trefor Moss, ‘‘China’s Stealth Attackon the F–35,’’ Diplomat, September 27, 2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/the-fake-35-chinasnew-stealth-fighter/; Australian, ‘‘Security Experts Admit China Stole Fighter Jet Plans,’’ March
12, 2012. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/security-experts-admit-china-stole-secretfighter-jet-plans/story-fnb64oi6-1226296400154?nk=d041d43ecbce5fdb831ea5201b29dee9#.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00323

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

312
Sea as well as provide China with the opportunity to reverse engineer the fighter’s component parts, including its advanced radarand engines, for integration into China’s current and future indigenous fighters.109
Bombers: China operates approximately 100 bombers, more thanany other country in the world except for the United States andRussia. The current inventory is comprised of multiple variants ofthe H–6 bomber. China gained the newest and most capableversion, the H–6K, in 2013. The H–6K has improved survivability
over China’s existing bomber fleet and can carry China’s new longrange land-attack cruise missile, the CJ–20. The H–6K/CJ–20
weapon system provides the PLA Air Force with the ability to
strike Guam, which previously had been out of its range.110 Although the CJ–20 land-attack cruise missile appears to be designed
primarily for conventional strikes, the U.S. Air Force Global Strike
Command claims it can carry a nuclear warhead.111
China’s current bomber fleet gives it the ability to hold at risktargets on Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, as well as
U.S. forces in Japan, South Korea, and Guam. However, China’s
paucity of air refueling tankers and their limited capacity to offload
fuel (discussed previously in this section) could require China’s
bombers to conduct long-range strike missions without fighter escorts, potentially decreasing their effectiveness in some regional
strike missions. Moreover, China’s bombers, all of which are derived from a 1950s-era Soviet air-frame, probably require frequent
maintenance and have low engine life expectancies. China is developing a new long-range stealth bomber that could address theseissues and strengthen the PLA Air Force’s ability to project power
regionally.112 According to Richard Fisher, senior fellow at theInternational Assessment and Strategy Center, ‘‘Many Chinesesources note [Xian Aircraft Corporation’s] new bomber will be a‘flying wing’ design similar to the U.S. Northrop-Grumman B–2
Spirit bomber. Xian’s design effort has benefited from espionage,especially from the disclosures made by former Northrop engineer
Noshir Gawadia.’’ 113 Furthermore, China and Russia are discussing the joint development of an advanced bomber, according toa Russian official quoted in Taiwan media.114
Strategic Airlift

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

In January 2013, China conducted the first test flight of its indigenously-built jet cargo aircraft, designated the Y–20. China previously was unable to build heavy transports so has relied on 10–
15 Russian IL–76 aircraft for strategic airlift since the 1990s.
Aircraft specifications provided by official Chinese media indicate
the Y–20 can carry 66 tons, about twice the cargo load of the PLA’s
only operational jet cargo aircraft, the IL–76, and three times the
cargo load of the U.S. C–130. Such a cargo capacity would allow
the Y–20 to deploy China’s heaviest armored vehicle, the Type
99A2 main battle tank, or about 90 paratroopers. Although the Y–
20 currently is powered by Russian D–30KP–2 engines, China ultimately plans to replace these with a Chinese engine, potentially
the WS–20, which could feature better fuel efficiency and thrustto-weight ratio.115 If and when the Y–20 is mated with a Chinese

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00324

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

313
engine, the airframe could become the basis for a new generationof support planes for the PLA for missions such as air refueling,airborne early warning, command and control, and electronic warfare.116
China probably will operationally deploy its first Y–20 transports
within the next two years. A report by China’s National Defense
University published in 2014 recommends that the PLA build 400
Y–20s.117 Such a large fleet of Y–20s would significantly improve
the PLA Air Force’s ability to mount and sustain large-scale air operations. In particular, the Y–20 will enhance the PLA’s ability to
rapidly move cargo, troops, and heavy equipment to Taiwan during
an invasion; to China’s far western territories for a conflict against
India or internal stability operations; and to offshore locations,such as Hainan Island. The Y–20 also will provide PLA commanders with increased flexibility during international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations.118
C4ISR Aircraft

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China is developing and fielding a variety of dedicated C4ISR
aircraft to provide high-fidelity and time-sensitive tracking for China’s air and maritime forces. Lacking airborne early warning andcontrol (AEW&C) aircraft in 2000, the PLA Air Force today deploys
12 of them, split between two models: the KJ–2000 and the KJ–
200. The KJ–2000, which China uses primarily for long-range
C4ISR operations, ‘‘employs radar technology two generations
ahead of that used by the U.S. Air Force’s E–3C [aircraft],’’ according to Dr. Carlo Kopp, an Australia-based military analyst and editor of Air Power Australia.119 China’s smaller KJ–200 complements
the KJ–2000 by performing shorter-range C4ISR operations. Dr.
Kopp assesses the KJ–200’s technology is ‘‘two generations aheadof the mechanically steered technology used by the UnitedStates.’’ 120 China likely will continue to steadily field additional
KJ–2000 and the KJ–200, potentially doubling its force of AEW&C
aircraft over the next five years.
In addition to its two dedicated AEW&C platforms, China overthe past decade has fielded more than a dozen specialized C4ISR
aircraft, most of which are based on the Y–8. Notably, China recently began to develop a Y–8 variant for antisubmarine warfare.121 China’s current inventory of only a few large, fixed-wing
antisubmarine warfare aircraft—the cornerstone of open-ocean
antisubmarine warfare for other leading world navies, including
the United States and Japan—prevents China from fully realizing
the potential of its growing inventory of modern surface combatants and could limit the PLA Navy’s ability to conduct antiaccess/area denial operations.
The PLA also is steadily incorporating UAVs into its air forces
to supplement manned C4ISR aircraft. Strategic reconnaissance
UAVs—such as the BZK–005, deployed in 2010—are designed forlong-duration C4ISR at extended distances from the Chinese mainland, allowing them to provide over-the-horizon targeting for the
PLA’s long-range antiship cruise missiles and antiship ballistic
missiles. In particular, they could be useful for detecting, locating,and tracking high-value fixed and mobile targets—such as U.S. and

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00325

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

314
Japanese naval ships—throughout the East China Sea, northern
portions of the South China Sea, and the Philippine Sea. UAVs likethe BZK–005 probably will become some of China’s most valuable
ISR assets in managing maritime disputes and asserting maritime
claims. The BZK–005 reportedly conducted its first ISR mission
over the East China Sea in September 2013.122 According to Mr.
Fisher, ‘‘Given their low cost, about $1 million for a UAV the sizeof the BZK–005, China could soon inundate Japan’s ADIZ with
UAVs that might overwhelm [Japan’s air forces].’’ 123
China also is developing smaller, tactical reconnaissance UAVs
designed to provide ISR on fixed and mobile targets on Taiwan andin the Taiwan Strait and to test operational concepts for UAV use.
Depending on their basing and range, some of these UAVs also
could conduct ISR in portions of the East China Sea and South
China Sea.124
Land-Based Air Defense
Previously comprised mostly of variants of the 1950s-era SA–2
surface-to-air system, the PLA Air Force’s air defense capabilities
have significantly improved since 2000. China now has one of themost robust air defense forces in the world.125
China in the mid-2000s fielded several new types of indigenous
surface-to-air missiles to augment the advanced, long-range surface-to-air missiles it purchased from Russia in the mid-1990s. China’s surface-to-air missile systems—which are concentrated along
the Taiwan Strait and China’s southeastern coast—include theChinese HQ–9 (124 miles) and the Russian SA–10 (56+ miles), SA–
20A (93 miles), and SA–20B (124 miles). China has at least eightand potentially up to 16 SA–20B battalions. The SA–20B is themost advanced surface-to-air missile system sold by Russia.126
Complementing the purchase and development of these new systems are improvements in China’s national air defense network,
which since 2007 has spanned the entire country. Together, these
improvements enable the PLA Air Force to extend air defense coverage over the Taiwan Strait and northeastern Taiwan and provide
overlapping, integrated air defenses for important Chinese military, industrial, and population centers.127
In 2014, Russia approved in principle the sale of its next-generation surface-to-air missile system, the S–400, to China, according
to Russian media reports. Such a sale has been under negotiation
since at least 2012.128 The S–400 would more than double therange of China’s air defenses from approximately 125 to 250
miles—enough to cover all of Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, andparts of the South China Sea 129—and feature an improved ballistic
missile defense capability over China’s existing surface-to-air missile systems.130 As China pursues the S–400, it also is developing
its next-generation indigenous surface-to-air missile, the HQ–19,
which likely will have features and range similar to the S–400.131
China’s Offensive Missile ForceDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Since the mid-1990s, China’s offensive missile force—the Second
Artillery—has added significant conventional strike capabilities;
previously, the force had been comprised of only nuclear ballistic

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00326

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

315
missiles. During this period, the Second Artillery has developed
and fielded a robust and modern short-range ballistic missile force.
The force also has introduced conventional medium-range ballistic
missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, antiship ballistic
missiles, and ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles designed
to counter key aspects of U.S. military power. Meanwhile, China
has gradually modernized and expanded its nuclear strike capability by deploying its first road-mobile intercontinental ballistic
missiles and its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent capability.132
According to DoD, the Second Artillery has at least 1,330 and potentially more than 1,895 ballistic and cruise missiles, which includes 1,000–1,200 short-range ballistic missiles, 75–100 mediumrange ballistic missiles, 5–20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles,
50–75 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 200–500 groundlaunched land-attack cruise missiles.133 A more precise estimate of
the number of missiles in the Second Artillery’s inventory is hindered by DoD’s omission of detailed missile orders-of-battle in its
annual report to Congress on China. According to Hans Kristensen,
director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation ofAmerican Scientists, ‘‘Up until 2010, the annual DoD reports included a table overview of the composition of the Chinese missile
force. But the overview gradually became less specific until it wascompletely removed from the reports in 2013. The policy undercuts
the Administration’s position that China should be more transparent about its military modernization by indirectly assisting Chinese government secrecy.’’ 134
Conventional Strike

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (less than 621 miles): In 2002,
China had 350 short-range ballistic missiles. After a rapid expansion, China today has the world’s largest short-range ballistic missile force, with 1,000–1,200 missiles. The force also has become
more lethal as China has gradually replaced older missiles lacking
a true precision-strike capability with new short-range ballistic
missiles and variants of existing short-range ballistic missiles thatfeature longer ranges and improved accuracies and payloads.135
China’s short-range ballistic missile force consists mainly of multiple variants of the DF–11 and DF–15. All of these missiles are
solid-propelled and road-mobile; most variants have a maximum
range of more than 373 miles, allowing them to strike targets
throughout Taiwan.136 Moreover, the Second Artillery in 2010–2011 fielded a new short-range ballistic missile, the DF–16. The
DF–16 reportedly has a higher reentry velocity than the DF–11
and DF–15 and an extended range of 621 miles. In addition to increasing China’s ability to penetrate Taiwan’s missile defenses, theDF–16 for the first time allows the Second Artillery to target large
sections of the East China Sea with short-range ballistic missiles.137
China also is developing several new road-mobile short-range
ballistic missiles: the CSS–9, the CSS–14, the CSS–X–15, and the

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00327

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

316
CSS–X–16.* These missiles have maximum ranges of between 93–
174 miles 138 and presumably feature greater accuracy and precision than previous models. According to Mr. Fisher, ‘‘China’s development of new classes of short-range ballistic missiles is promptedby the requirement to strengthen its ability to coerce or attack Taiwan, but also by commercial pressures to offer better short-range
ballistic missiles to capture export markets. Short-range ballistic
missiles are produced at two, possibly three Chinese factories, and
it is Chinese government policy to promote vigorous competition between them and to support export efforts.’’ 139
During a conflict with Taiwan, China likely would use its shortrange ballistic missiles to strike critical military infrastructure andcommand and control nodes as well as key political and economic
centers. Chinese military doctrine suggests the Second Artillery
would fire large salvos from multiple axes to confuse, overwhelm,and exhaust Taiwan’s ballistic missile defenses. The Second Artillery has been conducting increasingly larger missile exercises; todate, its live-fire exercises have included salvoes of at least ten
missiles.140 Mr. Murray testified to the Commission that China’s
expanding and modernizing missile force could rapidly defeat Taiwan’s defenses, despite Taipei’s significant investments in ballistic
missile defenses.
Theater-Range Ballistic Missiles (621 miles to 3,418 miles): † In
2008, the PLA fielded its first conventional theater-range ballistic
missile, the DF–21C medium-range ballistic missile. With a rangeof more than 1,087 miles, the DF–21C gives China the ability totarget U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea. China also may have
deployed a second conventional medium-range ballistic missile in2010–2011: a DF–16 variant with a maximum range of 746
miles.141
China plans to deploy a new conventional intermediate-range
ballistic missile that can strike land targets out to at least 1,864
miles and potentially as far as 3,418 miles.142 This missile, which
probably will be operationally deployed in the next five years, could
allow China to threaten U.S. forces in Guam, Northern Australia,
and Alaska, and U.S. bases in the Middle East and the Indian
Ocean, depending on its ultimate range. Moreover, according to Ian
Easton, research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, ‘‘If the PLA’sconventional intermediate-range ballistic missile program is successful, it is possible that China could develop the means to threaten Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States with a conventional intermediate-range ballistic missile by sometime in theearly-to-mid 2020s.’’ 143

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* These are the NATO designators provided by the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence
Center; the Chinese designators for these short-range ballistic missiles are unknown to foreignobservers at this time.
† Theater-range ballistic missiles are comprised of medium-range ballistic missiles (621–1,864
miles) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (1,864–3,418 miles).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00328

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

317
Table 3:China’s Conventional Ballistic Missiles

Chinese Designatorand Missile TypeNATO
Designator

Deployment
Mode

Approximate
Maximum
Range (Miles)

DF-11 SRBM

CSS-7 Mod 1

Road Mobile

186

DF-11A SRBM

CSS-7 Mod 2

Road Mobile373

DF-15 SRBM

CSS-6 Mod 1

Road Mobile373

DF-15A SRBM

CSS-6 Mod 2

Road Mobile528+

DF-15B SRBM

CSS-6 Mod 3

Road Mobile450+

DF-16 SRBM

CSS-11 Mod 1

Road Mobile621

DF-16 MRBM

Unknown

Road Mobile746

DF-21C MRBM

CSS-5 Mod 3

Road Mobile

1,087+

DF-21D ASBM

CSS-5 Mod 5

Road Mobile932+

Sources: Commission judgments and estimates based on analysis by nongovernmental experts on China’s military, consecutive versions of the annual U.S. DoD Report to Congress on
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, a 2013 report by
the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, and U.S. and Asian media reporting.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Antiship Ballistic Missiles: In 2010, China deployed the world’s
first antiship ballistic missile, the DF–21D. The DF–21D has amaximum range of more than 932 miles and is armed with a maneuverable warhead, providing China with the ability to threaten
U.S. Navy aircraft carriers operating east of Taiwan from securesites on the Chinese mainland. China may be developing an evenlonger-range antiship ballistic missile capable of striking ships operating in maritime areas as far as Guam.144 The Second Artillery
appears to have already formed two antiship ballistic missile brigades—not testing or training units—in Qingyuan City (southeastern China) 145 and Laiwu City (northeastern China).146 The
antiship ballistic missile brigade in Qingyuan reportedly conducted
one of its first major field training exercise in spring 2011.147
Ground-Launched Land-Attack Cruise Missiles: In 2007–2008,
the Second Artillery introduced its first ground-launched land-attack cruise missile, the CJ–10. China’s large inventory of CJ–10s—
200–500 missiles deployed on 40–55 road-mobile launchers 148—
suggests the missile plays a central role in China’s regional strikestrategy. The CJ–10 reportedly features a stealthy design and has
a maximum range over 932 miles, giving the PLA the ability tohold at risk U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea.149 Although it
appears to be primarily intended for conventional missions, a 2013
NASIC report suggests the missile also could carry a nuclear warhead.150 Mr. Fuell explained the potential utility of China’s emerging land-attack cruise missile capabilities to the Commission:
Combining long stand-off distances with high accuracy
makes cruise missiles an excellent tool to reach targets difficult to engage with many other classes of weapons. Because there is an overlap in the kinds of targets China islikely to engage with either ballistic missiles or cruise mis-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00329

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

318
siles, land-attack cruise missiles provide key operational
and planning flexibility. These weapons are likely to reducethe burden on ballistic missile forces, as well as creating
somewhat safer strike opportunities for Chinese aircrew, allowing them to engage from much longer distances and/orfrom advantageous locations of their own choosing. This inturn will complicate their adversary’s air and missile defense problem. Combining cruise missiles with ballistic
missile attacks on the same target further complicates thedefensive problem. Fundamentally, land-attack cruise missiles are yet another component of China’s complex arsenal,
and could be used as a flexible tool for engaging a rangeof targets.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Nuclear Strike
China’s official pronouncements about its nuclear policies andstrategies are short, rare, and vague. For example, China’s 2012
Defense White Paper only says that ‘‘if China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force will act upon the orders of
the Central Military Commission, go into a higher level of readiness, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy
from using nuclear weapons against China.’’ 151 Previous defense
white papers and other official Chinese statements convey that‘‘China consistently upholds the policy of no first use of nuclear
weapons, adheres to a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will
never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.’’ However, China’s so-called ‘‘no first use’’ policy is subject to interpretation, and some doctrinal evidence suggests exceptions to the policy
exist. For example, according to a Second Artillery doctrinal publication, ‘‘under our predetermined nuclear guidelines, in generalcases China would retaliate only after being hit first.’’ 152 The text
does not explain under which circumstances China would conduct
a first strike. Other PLA writings suggest China might deem anenemy first strike to have occurred when Beijing believes an enemy
nuclear attack is imminent or judges an enemy is threatening thedestruction of China’s nuclear deterrent capability with conventional weapons.153 For planning purposes, Chinese strategists consider the United States as the principal threat.154
High-confidence assessments of the numbers of Chinese nuclearcapable ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads are not possible
due to China’s lack of transparency about its nuclear program. China’s official statements about its nuclear forces and nuclear capabilities are short, rare, and vague in order to maintain ‘‘strategic
ambiguity.’’
DoD has not released detailed information on China’s nuclear
program, only noting in 2013 that ‘‘China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of approximately 50–75 intercontinental ballistic
missiles,’’ 155 and that ‘‘the number of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile nuclear warheads capable of reaching the UnitedStates could expand to well over 100 within the next 15 years.’’ 156
DoD also has not provided an unclassified estimate of China’s nuclear warhead stockpile since 2006, when the Defense Intelligence
Agency said China had more than 100 nuclear warheads.157 Estimates of China’s nuclear forces by nongovernmental experts and

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00330

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

319
foreign governments tend to be higher. Dr. Kristensen and Robert
Norris, senior fellow for nuclear policy at the Federation of American Scientists, assess ‘‘China has approximately 250 [nuclear] warheads in its stockpile for delivery by nearly 150 land-based ballistic
missiles, aircraft, and an emerging ballistic submarine fleet,’’ 158
while Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense asserts China has‘‘over 200 nuclear warheads.’’ 159 Some analysts assess China may
be obscuring a much larger nuclear effort and have much larger
stockpiles.*Despite the uncertainty surrounding China’s stockpiles of nuclear missiles and nuclear warheads, it is clear China’s nuclear
forces over the next three to five years will expand considerablyand become more lethal and survivable with the fielding of additional road-mobile nuclear missiles; as many as five JIN SSBNs,
each of which can carry 12 JL–2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) (for an overview
of China’s nuclear ballistic missiles, deployment modes, and maximum ranges, see Table 4). At the same time, China likely will continue to improve its silo-based nuclear force; harden its nuclear
storage facilities, launch sites, and transportation networks; andexpand its already extensive network of underground facilities.160
Table 4:China’s Nuclear Ballistic Missiles

Chinese Designator andMissile TypeNATO
Designator

Deployment
Mode

Approximate
Maximum
Range(Miles)

DF–3A IRBM

CSS–2

Transportable

1,864

DF–4 ICBM

CSS–3

Transportable

3,418+

DF–5A ICBM

CSS–4 Mod 2

Silo

8,078+

DF–5B ICBM

CSS–4 Mod 3

Silo

8,078+

DF–21 MRBM

CSS–5 Mod 1

Road Mobile

1,087+

DF–21A MRBM

CSS–5 Mod 2

Road Mobile

1,087+

DF–31 ICBM

CSS–10 Mod 1

Road Mobile

4,474+

DF–31A ICBM

CSS–10 Mod 2

Road Mobile

6,959+

JL–1 SLBMCSS–NX–3

SSBN

1,056

JL–2 SLBMCSS–NX–14

SSBN

4,598+

Note: China likely is in the process of phasing out the DF–3A IRBM.
Source: Commission judgments and estimates based on analysis by nongovernmental experts
on China’s military, consecutive versions of the annual U.S. DoD Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, a 2013 report by the
U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, and U.S. and Asian media reporting.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For example, Georgetown University professor Phillip Karber has suggested China may have3,000 or more nuclear weapons. This assertion apparently follows from extrapolations of historical Western reports and analysis of the elaborate underground tunnel complexes China uses
for nuclear weapons storage and transportation. These methods have received criticism fromother arms control experts and scholars, who place greater emphasis on suspected nuclear materials stockpiles and delivery systems.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00331

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

320
Road-Mobile Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missiles: China deployed
the DF–31 intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2006 and the moreadvanced DF–31A intercontinental ballistic missiles in 2007. China
apparently has ceased production of the DF–31 but continues tofield additional DF–31As.161 Unlike the rest of the Second Artillery’s intercontinental ballistic missile force, the DF–31 and DF–
31A are road mobile, allowing for faster launch times and making
them much more difficult for an adversary to locate and attack.
Furthermore, the new missiles use solid fuel instead of liquid fuel,increasing portability and service life while reducing maintenancecosts. The DF–31A has a maximum range of at least 6,959 miles,
allowing it to target most of the continental United States.162
Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent: China has commissioned three JIN
SSBNs since 2007 and likely will introduce two additional units by
2020.163 The JIN SSBN’s intended weapon, the JL–2 submarinelaunched ballistic missile, appears to have reached initial operational capability 164 after approximately ten years of R&D, giving
China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.* The JL–2’srange of approximately 4,598 miles gives China the ability to conduct nuclear strikes against Alaska if launched from waters near
China; against Alaska and Hawaii if launched from waters southof Japan; against Alaska, Hawaii, and the western portion of thecontinental United States if launched from waters west of Hawaii;
and against all 50 U.S. states if launched from waters east of Hawaii.165
A November 2013 article in a Chinese newspaper sponsored by
the CCP hails the arrival of China’s JIN SSBN and JL–2 submarine-launched ballistic missile and illustrates a notional employment scenario against the United States:
After a nuclear missile strikes a city, the radioactive dust
produced by 20 warheads will be spread by the wind, forming a contaminated area for thousands of kilometers. The
survival probability for people outdoors in a [746 to 870
mile] radius is basically zero. Based on the actual level ofChina’s one million tons TNT equivalent small nuclear
warhead technology, the 12 JL–2 nuclear missiles carriedby one JIN nuclear submarine could cause the destructionof five million to 12 million people, forming a very clear deterrent effect. There is not a dense population in the UnitedStates’ midwest region, so to increase the destructive effect,
the main soft targets for nuclear destruction in the UnitedStates will be the main cities on the west coast, such as Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego.166
The same article includes a graphic depicting the potential destructive effect of a Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile attack
on Los Angeles (see Figure 5). The graphic evokes then Lieutenant
General Xiong Guangkai’s assertion to Chas Freeman, a former

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The PLA Navy has operated one SSBN/SLBM weapon system with the XIA-class SSBN and
the JL–1 SLBM since the late 1980s; however, the U.S. Department of Defense does not consider it to be a credible threat. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, p. 6; U.S.
Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese
Characteristics, 2009, p. 23.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00332

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

321
U.S. assistant secretary of defense, that ‘‘Americans care more
about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan’’ during the Taiwan
Strait Crisis in 1995–1996. Lieutenant General Xiong, who at thetime was a deputy chief in the PLA office that is responsible forintelligence and international matters, was suggesting China could
use its intercontinental ballistic missile force to target the UnitedStates for intervening on behalf of Taiwan in a cross-Strait conflict.167
MIRVs: In December 2013, China reportedly conducted the second flight test of a new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, the DF–41. The DF–41, which could be deployed as early as
2015, may carry up to 10 MIRVs and have a maximum range as
far as 7,456 miles, allowing it to target the entire continental
United States.168 In addition, some sources claim China has modified the DF–5 and the DF–31A to be able to carry MIRVs.169 Moreover, China in late September reportedly conducted the first flighttest of a new DF-31 variant, the DF-31B, which may be able tocarry MIRVs.170 China could use MIRVs to deliver nuclear warheads on major U.S. cities and military facilities as a means ofoverwhelming U.S. ballistic missile defenses. Mr. Fuell testified to
the Commission:

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Mobile missiles carrying MIRVs are intended to ensure theviability of China’s strategic deterrence. MIRVs provide
operational flexibility that a single warhead does not. Specifically, they enable more efficient targeting, allowing moretargets to be hit with fewer missiles, more missiles to be
employed per target, or a larger reserve of weapons held
against contingency. China is likely to employ a blend ofthese three as MIRVs become available, simultaneously increasing their ability to engage desired targets while holding a greater number of weapons in reserve.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00333

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

322
Figure 5: Chinese Media Depiction of the Potential Destructive Effect ofa MIRV-Capable Intercontinental Ballistic Missile on Los Angeles

Source: Pei Shen, ‘‘China Has Undersea Strategic Nuclear Deterrent against United States
for the First Time,’’ Global Times, October 13, 2013. Open Source Center translation. ID:
CHR2013100762536387.

China’s Space and Counterspace Programs
Expanding Space-Based C4ISR Capabilities

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00334

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S2Fig5.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The PLA in the mid-1990s began an extensive C4ISR modernization program to improve its ability to command and control its
forces; monitor global events and track regional military activities;

323
and increase the range at which it can place U.S. ships, aircraft,and bases at risk with conventional missile systems. Mr. Karotkin
explained to the Commission the ‘‘formidable challenge’’ for China
of building and disseminating a picture of all air and maritime activities in the Asia Pacific:
China must build a maritime and air picture covering
nearly 875,000 square nautical miles (sqnm). The Philippine Sea, which could become a key interdiction area ina regional conflict, expands the battlespace by another 1.5
million sqnm. In this vast space, many navies and coast
guards converge along with tens of thousands of fishingboats, cargo ships, oil tankers, and other commercial vessels.
China’s initial efforts focused on developing a robust and secure
network of fiber optic cables, mobile radios, datalinks, and microwave systems. However, China in the mid-2000s shifted the emphasis of its C4ISR modernization program to expanding and enhancing its space-based infrastructure. China now has approximately 100 active satellites in orbit,* compared to about 10 in 2000
and 35 in 2008.† Although these satellites conduct a wide array of
missions, many serve C4ISR functions for the PLA, and those satellites that are capable of contributing to a military mission likely
do so.171
Maritime ISR: China is fielding increasingly sophisticated spacebased electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic reconnaissance satellites. Combining these varying capabilities is
crucial, as satellite instruments face tradeoffs in achieving highresolution in spatial, spectral, radiometric, and temporal categories.
China’s current maritime ISR satellite coverage likely is concentrated in the first island chain to support PLA operations in potential conflicts against Taiwan, Japan, or South China Sea
counterclaimants but almost certainly will expand to the Philippine
Sea and Indian Ocean in the next five to ten years as China fields
additional ISR and data relay satellites. Mr. Stokes explained theimplications of this development to the Commission:
As its persistent sensor and command and control architecture increases in sophistication and range, the PLA’s ability
to hold at risk an expanding number of targets throughout
the western Pacific Ocean, South China Sea, and elsewherearound its periphery is expected to grow. A survivablespace-based sensor architecture, able to transmit reconnaissance data to ground sites in China in near-real time, fa-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* This number excludes Chinese satellites that are in orbit but assessed to no longer be active.
Including those that are both active and inactive, China has 146 satellites in orbit. Jonathan
McDowell, ‘‘China Satellite Update: 2014,’’ Jonathan’s Space Report, June 2014. http://planet
4589.org/space/papers/china2014.pdf; Jonathan McDowell (Astrophysicist, Harvard-Smithsonian
Center for Astrophysics), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 15, 2014.
† For comparison, the United States has between 500 to 550 active satellites in orbit and Russia has approximately 130 active satellites in orbit. Jonathan McDowell, ‘‘China Satellite Update: 2014,’’ Jonathan’s Space Report, June 2014. http://planet4589.org/space/papers/china2014.pdf; Jonathan McDowell (Astrophysicist, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics), e-mailinterview with Commission staff, June 15, 2014; and Union of Concerned Scientists, ‘‘UCS
Satellite Database.’’ http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/solutions/spaceweapons/ucs-satellite-database.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00335

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

324
cilitates the PLA’s ability to project firepower at greater distances and with growing lethality and speed.
China’s most important space-based ISR asset is the Yaogan series of advanced electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic reconnaissance satellites. Although purportedly civilian in
mission, the technical and orbital characteristics of the Yaogan series suggest it is intended to provide overlapping, near-persistent,
medium-resolution ISR of military targets,172 such as U.S. carrier
strike groups, as far as China’s second island chain.173 China todate has launched at least 26 Yaogan satellites, including somethat form a constellation similar to the U.S. Navy’s state-of-the-art
electronic intelligence satellite system, the Naval Ocean Surveillance System.174 China’s Shijian series and Gaofen series of satellites also probably play vital roles in the PLA’s ISR infrastructure. The Gaofen series, which was launched in 2013 and ultimately is expected to consist of five to seven satellites, features
China’s first high-resolution satellites.175
Regional Satellite Navigation: In December 2012, China’s Beidou
regional satellite navigation system became fully operational.
Using 16 satellites and a network of ground stations, Beidou provides subscribers, including the PLA, with 24-hour regional precision, navigation, and timing services as well as a short messaging
service for messages up to 120 characters. The system thus gives
China’s military an operational alternative to foreign navigation
systems, such as Global Positioning System (GPS), for the firsttime. According to official Chinese press, the PLA already is using
Beidou extensively during exercises to track its forces and communicate. Additionally, the availability of Beidou would allow China
to attack an adversary’s access to GPS or other foreign systems
without disrupting the PLA’s own capabilities. Beijing plans to expand Beidou to provide global coverage by 2020.176
Data Relay: In July 2012, China launched a Tianlian data relay
satellite into orbit, completing China’s first global data relay satellite constellation.177 As China fields more relay-capable ISR satellites, the Tianlian constellation will enhance the accuracy andtimeliness of the PLA’s ISR by reducing the time the PLA must
wait before receiving intelligence data.178 Without a data relay system, Chinese satellites must wait until they orbit into view ofChina before sending ISR information, potentially causing a timelag and thus reducing the PLA’s ability to collect time-sensitive intelligence on mobile targets.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Space-Launch Capabilities
China continues to expand and improve its ability to launch civil,
military, and commercial satellites, despite enduring technologicaldeficiencies in China’s industrial base. China conducted 52 known
space launches from 2011–2013, only three less than the UnitedStates during this period (see Table 5).179 China likely will expand
its space-based C4ISR architecture with the launch of approximately 35–50 additional satellites through 2015.180 This growth
will be facilitated by planned improvements to China’s groundbased space infrastructure and launch vehicles.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00336

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

325
Table 5:Chinese versus U.S. Space Launches, 2011–2013
2011

2012

2013

Chinese Launches(Satellites Deployed)

19 (18)19 (25)14 (17)

U.S. Launches(Satellites Deployed)

19 (38)16 (31)20 (82)

Source: Jonathan McDowell, ‘‘China Satellite Update: 2014,’’ Jonathan’s Space Report, June
2014. http: // planet4589.org / space / papers / china2014.pdf ; Jonathan McDowell (Astrophysicist,
Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June15, 2014.

Ground-Based Infrastructure: Space operations require a substantial terrestrial footprint, including launch, telemetry, control,
and tracking. China has three dedicated launch sites (Jiuquan,
Xichang, and Taiyuan) and plans to open a new space launch facility in Hainan Island, in the southernmost province of China, by theend of 2014.181 This site likely was chosen for its proximity to seaports, the open ocean, and the equator. China also continues tobuild telemetry, control, and tracking facilities across the nation.
Furthermore, because domestic tracking stations are unable to
track satellites and manned space vessels around the world, China
operates at least three space-tracking naval ships in the Pacificand Indian Oceans (under PLA control) and has established atleast five overseas tracking stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Chile,
Kenya, and most recently, Australia.182
Launch Vehicles: China’s next-generation LM–5 space launch vehicle may conduct its first flight as early as 2015 if China’s spaceindustry is able to overcome challenges to building the vehicle.
Once operational, the rocket will more than double the size of payloads China can send into geosynchronous orbit,183 allowing it tolaunch more advanced C4ISR satellites, modules of China’splanned space station, and potentially reusable orbital vehicles.
Furthermore, in September 2013, China launched a satellite
using a new solid-fueled orbital launch vehicle called the‘‘Kuaizhou.’’ China also is developing a second solid-fueled launchvehicle, the LM–11, which China is expected to test launch by asearly as the end of 2014. Solid-fueled rockets lack the payload capacity of liquid-fueled rockets but are cheaper, simpler to operate,transportable, and can be released with less preparation. Although
Chinese media have highlighted the use of these launch vehicles in‘‘natural disaster monitoring,’’ China likely is developing the
Kuaizhou and LM–11 to put microsatellites * into orbit on short notice. Such a capability would allow the PLA to rapidly replace oraugment its satellites in the event of any disruption in coverageduring a conflict.184

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* In 2000, China began to launch microsatellites. Although their small size often limits theircapabilities, microsatellites are significantly cheaper and easier to develop than larger satellites
that serve similar functions. Microsatellites also have lower observable signatures than larger
satellites, making them harder for an adversary to track in space. Mark Stokes and Dean
Cheng, China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests (Project 2049 Institute, April 26, 2012), pp. 37–39. http://project2049.net/documents/uscc_china-space-programreport_april-2012.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00337

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

326
Pursuing a Multifaceted Counterspace Program
The PLA is pursuing a broad counterspace program to challenge
U.S. information superiority in a conflict and disrupt or destroy
U.S. satellites if necessary. Beijing also likely calculates its growing space warfare capabilities will enhance its strategic deterrent
as well as allow China to coerce the United States and other countries into not interfering with China militarily.185• In July 2013, China launched a LM–4C rocket carrying threesatellites, one of which is equipped with a robotic arm for grabbing or capturing items in space.186 Once in orbit, one of thesatellites fired onboard thrusters to adjust its speed and trajectory, and then it passed near two other Chinese satellites instatic orbit.187 Although publicly available information is insufficient to definitely assess the nature of this event, the movement of the satellite and the potential involvement of a satellite equipped with a robotic arm suggest China may havebeen testing a new space-based counterspace weapon designed
to attack satellites in orbit. Co-orbital antisatellite (ASAT) systems can employ multiple attack methods, such as grabbing,damaging, or colliding with another satellite, or jamming or
disrupting a target satellite’s communication, guidance, or electrical systems.188• In May 2013, China fired a rocket into nearly geosynchronous
Earth orbit, marking the highest known suborbital launchsince the U.S. Gravity Probe A in 1976 and China’s highest
known suborbital launch to date. Beijing claims the launch
was part of a high-altitude scientific experiment; however,available data suggest China was testing the launch vehicle
component of a new high-altitude ASAT capability. If true,such a test would signal China’s intent to develop an ASAT capability to target satellites in an altitude range that includes
GPS and many U.S. military and intelligence satellites.189• In 2011, China’s unpiloted Shenzhou 8 spacecraft andTiangong-1 orbiting space lab completed the country’s firstand second-ever dockings in orbit. China followed with its firstand second-ever piloted dockings in 2012 and a more advanced
piloted docking in 2013.190 These dockings are significant
achievements that will facilitate proximity operations criticalfor future manned space missions and contribute to the development of ASAT and other military technologies.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• In 2010 and 2013, China carried out its first and second landbased missile intercept tests.191 These tests have not been definitively tied to China’s ASAT program but probably were designed to help China assess the performance of homing technologies that it could use to target satellites in low Earthorbit.192 In July 2014, official U.S. and Chinese sources confirmed China conducted its third land-based missile intercept
test. In a statement to Space News, a U.S. Department of State
spokesperson said, ‘‘We call on China to refrain from destabilizing actions—such as the continued development and testing of destructive anti-satellite systems—that threaten the

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00338

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

327

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

long term security and sustainability of the outer space environment, on which all nations depend.’’ 193• In January 2007, China destroyed an aging Chinese weather
satellite with an ASAT kinetic kill vehicle, demonstrating China’s ability to put at risk satellites in low Earth orbit, such as
remote sensing satellites. The impact produced vast amountsof orbital debris, generating worldwide criticism and threatening NASA and international space activities in low Earthorbit.194• China likely has developed ground-based satellite communications jammers, which the PLA could potentially employ to degrade or deny U.S. access to some satellite communicationsand GPS within line of sight of China.195• Chinese military doctrine and the integration of cyber operations, electronic warfare, and counterspace reflected in certain
Chinese military organizations and research programs suggest
the PLA would attempt to conduct computer network attacks
against ground-based facilities that interact with U.S. satellite
systems.196
In January 2014, Ashley Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, assessed the implications ofChina’s counterspace program for the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and the Subcommittee on Seapower
and Projection Forces:
The immensity of the burdens associated with securing thisinformation dominance in an era when all U.S. ISR, communications, and other combat support systems will be
under persistent attack—even if they are not physically destroyed—cannot be underestimated. Even if Beijing eschews
kinetic attacks on U.S. space systems and their ground segments in the early phases of a Chinese counterspace campaign, U.S. military forces will have to apply enormous effort toward: defeating Chinese deception and denial operations; mitigating the Chinese jamming of all critical U.S.
space systems to include the Global Positioning System constellation and its terrestrial receivers, space-based synthetic
aperture radars, major satellite communication systems,
and the links that ensure the effectiveness of the electro-optical and infrared surveillance systems; protecting all satellites from laser dazzling and damage; and, warding off
cyber attacks on the space control networks and eventually
against the space systems themselves. Thus, even if kinetic
attacks against satellites and their ground segments by direct-ascent, co-orbital, nuclear and missile weapons, andspecial forces are excluded from consideration, the challenges confronting the U.S. military in regard to sustaining
the information dominance it has traditionally enjoyed—in
the face of current and prospective Chinese counterspace capabilities—will be enormous. Furthermore, given that kinetic counterspace attacks cannot be ruled out at any pointin the event of a conflict, the U.S. military will have to simply prepare for all eventualities, irrespective of what Chi-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00339

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

328
nese space warfare theorists contend is either plausible ordesirable.
The United States is eminently capable of dealing with thethreats posed by Chinese counterspace investments throughboth defensive and offensive counterspace responses of its
own, but these will necessarily require significant financial
resources if they are to be successfully brought to fruition.
. . . Suffice it to say that because protecting U.S. information dominance is vital not only to securing success in war
but also to procuring that victory at the lowest cost in termsof lives and effort expended, both the administration and
the Congress should not stint in funding all the mitigation
efforts required to defeat China’s counterspace initiatives—
the term ‘‘defeat’’ in this context understood as enabling the
U.S. military to successfully complete its missions despite
opposition.197
Later in 2014, General William Shelton (U.S. Air Force), Commander, U.S. Air Force Space Command testified to the Senate
Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that due to China’s investment in counterspace technologies, among other factors,
the United States is at a ‘‘strategic crossroad in space.’’ He explained:
In space, our sustained mission success integrating these[satellite] capabilities into our military operations has encouraged potential adversaries to further develop
counterspace technologies and attempt to exploit our systems and information. . . . We are so dependent on spacethese days. We plug into it like a utility. It is always there.
Nobody worries about it. . . . You do not even know sometimes that you are touching space. So [to lose U.S. space capabilities] it would be almost a reversion back to . . . industrial-based warfare.198

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Implications for the United States
China’s rapid military modernization is altering the military balance of power in the Asia Pacific in ways that could engender destabilizing security competition between other major nearby countries, such as Japan and India, and exacerbate regional hotspots
such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, andthe South China Sea.
Moreover, China’s growing antiaccess/area denial capabilities increasingly will challenge the ability of the United States to deter
regional conflicts, defend longtime regional allies and partners, andmaintain open and secure access to the air and maritime commonsin the Asia Pacific. While the United States currently has theworld’s most capable navy, its surface firepower is concentrated inaircraft carrier task forces. China is pursuing a missile-centric
strategy with the purpose of holding U.S. aircraft carriers at highrisk if they operate in China’s near seas and thereby hinder theiraccess to those waters in the event of a crisis. Given China’s growing navy and the U.S. Navy’s planned decline in the size of its
fleet, the balance of power and presence in the region is shifting

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00340

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

329
in China’s direction. By 2020, China could have as many as 351
submarines and missile-equipped surface ships in the Asia Pacific.
By comparison, the U.S. Navy, budget permitting, plans to have 67
submarines and surface ships stationed in or forward deployed toregion in 2020, a modest increase from 50 in 2014. Furthermore,Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, testified to the House Armed Services Committee in January 2014 that concerning ‘‘technological superiority,
DoD is being challenged in ways that I have not seen for decades,
particularly in the Asia Pacific region. . . . Technological superiority
is not assured and we cannot be complacent about our posture.’’ 199
Evan Braden Montgomery, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments, adds that ‘‘because the United States
has grown accustomed to opponents that are too weak to seriously
threaten its overseas bases, air and naval forces, and information
networks, a confrontation with [China] would represent a major departure from the types of conflicts it has fought and prepared for
during the unipolar era.’’ 200
The United States would need to quickly and safely deploy military forces across great distances during a regional conflict.* This‘‘tyranny of distance’’ would pose significant challenges to U.S. logistics and C4ISR, potentially exacerbating any U.S. capability andtechnology gaps. China’s large-scale cyber campaign against theUnited States † could further impede U.S. wartime operations in
the Asia Pacific. The Senate Armed Services Committee released areport in September 2014 that provides evidence China is conducting a cyber campaign against the networks of key U.S. Transportation Command contractors.201 The nature of this activity and
PLA writings suggest the goal of these peacetime cyber intrusions
is to enable the PLA during wartime to disrupt U.S. networks, including satellite networks, that support the mobilization and movement of U.S. forces toward China and that link forward-deployed
U.S. forces with rear-area command and logistics units.202 The
Commission in its 2011 Annual Report highlighted this potential
vulnerability when it recommended that ‘‘relevant Congressional
committees investigate the adequacy of security for the Department of Defense’s logistics data system, the time-phased force deployment data system, to ensure that the data therin are securefrom cyberattack.’’ 203
Growing Chinese confidence in the PLA’s expanding capabilities
also increases the risk China’s leaders will seek to compensate fordeclining economic growth and rising social unrest by encouraging
and relying on popular nationalism. Promoting a sense of grievanceamong the Chinese people and creating diversionary tensions in
the region would carry real risks of escalation and create the potential for the United States to be drawn into a regional conflict.
Perhaps of even greater concern is the increasing number of opportunities Beijing will have to provoke incidents at sea and in the
air that could lead to a crisis or conflict as China’s maritime andair forces expand their operations beyond China’s immediate pe-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For context, Taiwan is about 7,000 miles from San Diego.
† For more information on China’s cyber operations against the United States, see ‘‘China’s
Cyber Activities’’ (Chapter 2, Section 2) in the Commission’s 2013 Annual Report, and ‘‘China’s
Cyber Activities’’ (Chapter 2, Section 2) in the Commission’s 2012 Annual Report.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00341

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

330
riphery. China already has initiated dangerous encounters at sea
on several occasions. In December 2013, a U.S. Navy ship wasforced to maneuver to avoid a collision with a PLA Navy ship that
had intentionally stopped in front of it. Both ships were operating
in international waters. Later in 2014, a China Coast Guard ship
rammed a Vietnamese coast guard ship following China’s placement of a state-owned deep-sea drilling platform inside Vietnam’s
exclusive economic zone, and a Chinese fighter flew within 30 feetof a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace.
DoD characterized the latter incident as a ‘‘very, very close, very
dangerous’’ intercept that ‘‘posed a risk to the safety and well-beingof the [U.S.] air crew and was inconsistent with customary international law.’’ 204
Regarding crisis management, regional crisis stability mechanisms remain underdeveloped (including U.S.-China mechanisms),
and Beijing remains hesitant to invest substantively in mechanisms for incidents at sea and in the air. Although U.S.-China military-to-military ties have increased somewhat during the last two
years, Beijing has been reluctant to engage in substantive military
diplomacy with the United States.
Based on (1) the changing balance of military power, (2) the continued strength of regional and Chinese nationalism, (3) increasing
Chinese assertiveness in the Asia Pacific, and (4) the relatively
nascent state of crisis stability mechanisms, the potential for security miscalculation in the region is rising. Regarding conventional
deterrence and the regional military balance, U.S. and Chinese analysts likely hold differing beliefs about how a military conflict
would conclude and which side would be victorious. As highlighted
by RAND’s Lloyd Thrall:Great power warfare, particularly in the air and sea domains, remains rare, and its operational underpinnings areboth highly technical and highly secretive. It is therefore
unsurprising that the history of great power warfare isfraught with strategic and operational surprise. In practice,confidently calculating the balance of power is a difficultand contingent science; we should acknowledge that theperceptions of military capability and national will underpinning conventional deterrence are likely to differ. As suggested by Pearl Harbor, it is possible for either side to confidently reach wrong conclusions.205
Fundamental U.S. interests are at stake in the evolving geopolitical situation in East Asia and the Western Pacific. China’s
rise as a major military power in the Asia Pacific challenges decades of air and naval dominance by the United States in a regionin which Washington has substantial economic and security interests.
Conclusions

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• As a result of China’s comprehensive and rapid military modernization, the regional balance of power between China, on the
one hand, and the United States and its allies and associates on
the other, is shifting in China’s direction.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00342

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

331
• China’s accelerated military modernization program has been enabled by China’s rapid economic growth; reliable and generous
increases to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) budget; gradual improvements to China’s defense industrial base; and China’s
acquisition and assimilation of foreign technologies—especiallyfrom Russia, Europe, and the United States—through both purchase and theft.
• Since 2000, China has significantly upgraded the quality of its
air and maritime forces as well as expanded the types of platforms it operates. Together with the fielding of robust command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance capabilities, these improvements have increased China’s ability to challenge the United States and its allies and partners for air and maritime superiority in the Asia Pacific. China’s power projection capability will grow rapidly between now and 2020 with the addition of up to approximately 60
new submarines and surface ships; China’s first carrier-based
aviation wing and second aircraft carrier; and 600 new modern
combat aircraft, including China’s first fifth-generation fighters.
• After over a decade of research, development, and production,
many of China’s regional strike capabilities have matured. China’s ballistic and cruise missiles have the potential to provide the
PLA with a decisive military advantage in the event of a regional
conflict and are contributing to a growing imbalance in the regional security dynamic. China now is able to threaten U.S.
bases and operating areas throughout the Asia Pacific, including
those that it previously could not reach with conventional weapons, such as U.S. forces on Guam.
• China’s nuclear force will rapidly expand and modernize over the
next five years, providing Beijing with a more extensive range ofmilitary and foreign policy options and potentially weakening
U.S. extended deterrence, particularly with respect to Japan.
• China is becoming one of the world’s preeminent space powers
after decades of high prioritization and steady investment from
Chinese leaders, indigenous research and development, and asignificant effort to acquire and assimilate foreign technologies,
especially from the United States. Qualitatively, China now produces near-state-of-the-art space systems for certain applications,such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites
to support China’s long-range cruise missiles. Quantitatively,
China’s numerous active programs continue to increase its inventory of satellites and other space assets.
• Based on the number and diversity of China’s existing and developmental counterspace capabilities, China likely will be able tohold at risk U.S. national security satellites in every orbital regime in the next five to ten years.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Fundamental U.S. interests are at stake in the evolving geopolitical situation in East Asia and the Western Pacific. China’s
rise as a major military power in the Asia Pacific challenges decades of air and naval dominance by the United States in a region

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00343

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

332

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

in which Washington has substantial economic and security interests.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00344

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

333
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 2

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, p. 41;
Andrew Erickson, ‘‘China’s Modernization of Its Naval and Air Power Capabilities,’’in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s Military
Challenge (Seattle, WA, and Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asia Research,2012), pp. 63–67; Michael McDevitt, ‘‘The PLA Navy’s Antiaccess Role in a Taiwan
Contingency,’’ in Phillip Saunders et al., eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011),
pp. 191–214; and Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess
Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2007), pp. 3–12.
2. M. Taylor Fravel, ‘‘Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity, and Military Strategy: Explaining the Rise of Noncombat Operations in China,’’ Asian Security 7:3(2011): 177–200; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing
on China’s Military and Security Activities Abroad, written testimony of Daniel
Hartnett, March 4, 2009; James Mulvenon, ‘‘Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Missions,’ ’’ China Leadership Monitor (January 2009). http://www.hoover.org/
publications / china - leadership - monitor / 3564; and Open Source Center, Analysis:
China—Media Highlight Noncombat Missions to Address Nontraditional Threats,
October 16, 2008. ID: FEA20081017785345.
3. Commission estimates and judgments are based on the following sources:
U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence analysts, unclassified discussion with Commission
staff, Washington, DC, April 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the United States,
written testimony of Jesse Karotkin, January 30, 2014; Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, Japan’s National Security Faced with Challenges and Problems to Maritime Order in East Asia, unclassified briefing to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, November 2013; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving thePeople’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, p. 39; U.S. naval intelligence data reproduced in Hans Kristensen, ‘‘Chinese Nuclear Developments Described (and Omitted)
by DOD Report,’’ FAS Strategic Security Blog, May 13, 2013. http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/05/china2013/; U.S. Seventh Fleet, unclassified briefing to the U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, Yokosuka, Japan, July 2013; andU.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, 2011, p. 15.
4. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA
Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse
Karotkin, January 30, 2014; James Fanell, ‘‘WEST 2014: What about China?’’ (San
Diego, CA, February 11–13, 2014); Lou Qingyun and Zhou Yancheng, ‘‘Always Keeping Taut the Bowstring of Fighting War—A Report from the Enhancement of Combat Power by a Certain Submarine Flotilla of the South Sea Fleet,’’ People’s Navy,
December 16, 2013. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHL2014021850956262;
and Modern Ships, ‘‘The Problems That China Needs to Solve to Beat the UnitedStates,’’ July 1, 2013. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHR2013090447001392.
5. James Fanell, ‘‘WEST 2014: What about China?’’ (San Diego, CA, February
11–13, 2014).
6. Guo Renjie, ‘‘Chinese Navy Wraps Up Escort Mission for Syria’s Chemical
Weapons,’’ China Military Online, June 25, 2014. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/newschannels/china-military-news/2014-06/25/content_6010867.htm; Andrew Ericksonand Austin Strange, ‘‘China and the Far Seas,’’ Diplomat, January 10, 2014. http://
thediplomat.com/2014/01/china-and-the-far-seas/.
7. Open Source Center, PRC 2010 Military Training Stresses Joint Operations
in Complex Conditions, February 17, 2011. ID: CPF20110216638001; David
Fulghum, ‘‘China’s Fighters Train in Turkey,’’ Aviation Week, October 10, 2014.
http://awin.aviationweek.com/portals/awin/cmsfiles/media/pdf/as_ pdf/2010/10/04/asd_ 10_ 04_ 2010.pdf.
8. Kenneth Allen and Emma Kelly, Assessing the Growing PLA Air Force Foreign Relations Program (Jamestown Foundation, August 26, 2012). http://
www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39304#.U_zFuWOK0pc;
Roger McDermott, China Showcases Expeditionary Military Power in Peace Mission
2010 (Jamestown Foundation, September 28, 2010). http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36955&no_cache=1#.U_zGNWOK0pc.
9. Michael Chase, The PLA Prepares for Future Non-Combatant Evacuation
Operations (Jamestown Foundation, February 15, 2013). http://www.jamestown.org/
single/ ? tx_ ttnews[tt_ news]= 40463%no_ cache =1#.VAB62GOK0pc; U.S.-China Eco-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00345

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

334

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

nomic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Annual Report to Congress, November
2011, pp. 162–163; and Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, Implications of China’s
Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya (Jamestown Foundation, March 10,2011).
http://www.jamestown.org/programs / chinabrief / single / ?tx_ ttnews [tt_news] = 37633%cHash=7278cfd21e6fb19afe8a823c5cf88f07#.U_zC9mOK0pc.
10. Craig Murray, China to Deploy ‘‘Security Force’’ to UN Peacekeeping Operation in Mali (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 9, 2013).
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Backgrounder_China%20to%20Deploy%20Security%20Force%20to%20UN%20Peacekeeping%20Operation%20in%20Mali_0.pdf.
11. Nicholas Bariyo, ‘‘China Deploys Troops in South Sudan to Defend Oil
Fields, Workers,’’ Wall Street Journal, September 9, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-deploys-troops-in-south-sudan-to-defend-oil-fields-workers-1410275041;
Colum Lynch, ‘‘UN Peacekeepers to Protect China’s Oil Interests in South Sudan,’’Foreign Policy, June 16, 2014. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/06/15/un_
peacekeepers_to_protect_chinas_oil_interests_in_south_sudan.
12. Craig Murray, Caitlin Campbell, and Kimberly Hsu, China’s Navy Extends
its Combat Reach to the Indian Ocean (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, March 14, 2014). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/
Staff %20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf.
13. Sandeep Unnithan, ‘‘Exclusive: Indian Navy Headless as Chinese Nuclear
Sub Prowls Indian Ocean,’’ India Today, March 21, 2014. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-navy-chinese-nuclear-sub-indian-ocean/1/350498.html; Senate Arms
Services Committee, Defense Intelligence Agency Annual Threat Assessment, written
statement of Michael Flynn, February 11, 2014. p. 28. http://www.armed-services.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Flynn_02-11-14.pdf.
14. Commission judgments based on the following sources: RAND Corporation
analysts, unclassified discussion with Commission staff, Washington, DC, June 8,
2014; David Cohen, China Examines Military Strategy (Jamestown Foundation, February 7, 2014). http://www.jamestown.org/regions/chinaasiapacific/single/?tx_ttnews[pointer]=3%tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41932%tx_ttnews[backPid]=664 % c Hash =6d22d936c56c37f ba96e3732d5eec079 #.U5b2lSh5ZhR; and M. Taylor Fravel and
Dennis Blasko, ‘‘Xi Jinping and the PLA,’’ Diplomat, March 19, 2013. http://
thediplomat.com/2013/03/xi-jinping-and-the-pla/.
15. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013, pp. 209–10.
16. Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, ‘‘China’s Leaders, Seeking to Build its Muscle, Pushes Overhaul of the Military,’’ New York Times, May 24, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/world/asia/chinas-leader-seeking-to-build-its-muscle-pushes-overhaul-of-the-military.html?_r=0.
17. Bi Mingxin, ed., ‘‘Xi Jinping Calls for Powerful Missile Force,’’ Xinhua(English edition), December 5, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201212/05/c_132021964.htm.
18. Michael Chase, The Second Artillery Force in the Xi Jinping Era (Jamestown
Foundation, March 28, 2013). http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40662&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=688&no_cache=1#.VCVspkvtV-I.
19. Jeremy Page, ‘‘China Raises Defense Spending 12.2% for 2014,’’ Wall Street
Journal, March 5, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230473
2804579421021045941010; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Andrew Erickson, January 30, 2014; and Adam Liff and Andrew
Erickson, ‘‘Demystifying China’s Defense Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,’’ China Quarterly (December 2013): 4–5.
20. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 43.
21. Sam Perlo-Freeman and Carina Solmirano, Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2013 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2014): p.
2. http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=476#.
22. Adam Liff (Postdoctoral Fellow, Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson
School and Assistant Professor, Indiana University), e-mail interview with Commission staff, May 27, 2014; Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff, ‘‘The Budget This Time:
Taking the Measure of China’s Defense Spending,’’ Asan Forum 2:2 (March-April2014). http://www.theasanforum.org/the-budget-this-time-taking-the-measure-of-chinas-defense-spending/; and Adam Liff and Andrew Erickson, ‘‘Demystifying China’s Defense Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,’’ China Quarterly (December2013).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00346

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

335

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

23. Henry Hendrix, At What Cost a Carrier? (Center for a New American Security, March 2013), p. 10.
24. Adam Liff (Postdoctoral Fellow, Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson
School and Assistant Professor, Indiana University), e-mail interview with Commission staff, May 27, 2014; Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff, ‘‘The Budget This Time:
Taking the Measure of China’s Defense Spending,’’ Asan Forum 2:2 (March-April2014). http://www.theasanforum.org/the-budget-this-time-taking-the-measure-of-chinas-defense-spending/; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearingon PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimonyof Andrew Erickson, January 30, 2014; and Andrew Erickson and Adam Liff, ‘‘China’s Military Development, Beyond the Numbers,’’ Diplomat, March 12, 2013. http://
thediplomat.com/2013/03/chinas-military-development-beyond-the-numbers/?allpages=yes.
25. Adam Liff and Andrew Erickson, ‘‘Demystifying China’s Defense Spending:Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,’’ China Quarterly (December 2013): 21.
26. Tai Ming Cheung, The Current State of Defense Innovation in China and Future Prospects (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation,
January 2014), p. 1. http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/505243.pdf.
27. Gabe Collins (Co-Founder, China SignPost), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 26, 2014; Gabe Collins, ‘‘China Has Become a Top Global Warship
Builder’’ in Tai Ming Cheung, ed., The Chinese Defense Economy Takes Off: Sectorby-Sector Assessments and the Role of Military End-Users (San Diego, CA: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, January 2014), p. 40.
28. Gabe Collins (Co-Founder, China SignPost), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 26, 2014; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, unclassified discussion
with Commission staff, Washington, DC, April 2014.
29. U.S. Defense Science Board, Task Force Report: The Role of Autonomy in
DoD Systems, July 2012, p. 71.
30. Kimberly Hsu, China’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 13, 2013). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Military%20UAV%20Industry_14%20June%202013.pdf.
31. Zhao Lei, ‘‘China Conducts Test Flight of Stealth Unmanned Drone,’’ China
Daily, November 22, 2013. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-11/22/content_
17124629.htm.
32. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 33.
33. Bradley Perrett, Bill Sweetman, and Michael Fabey, U.S. Navy Sees Chinese
HGV as Part of Wider Threat (Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 27,2014). http://aviationweek.com/awin/us-navy-sees-chinese-hgv-part-wider-threat; Bill
Gertz, ‘‘Hypersonic Arms Race: China Tests High-Speed Missile to Beat U.S. Defenses,’’ Washington Times, January 13, 2014. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/13/hypersonic-arms-race-china-tests-high-speed-missil/?page=all.
34. Mark Stokes, ‘‘China’s Quest for Joint Aerospace Power: Concepts and Future Aspirations,’’ in Richard P. Hallion et al., eds., The Chinese Air Force: Evolving
Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 2012), pp. 50–51.
35. Minnie Chan, ‘‘China’s Second Hypersonic Glider Test Fails as PLA Trials
Nuclear Weapons Delivery System,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 22, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1578756/chinas-second-testnuclear-armed-hypersonic-glider-fails; Bill Gertz, ‘‘China Secretly Conducts Second
Flight Test of New Ultra High-Speed Missile,’’ Washington Times, August 19, 2014.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/20/china-secretly-conducts-secondtest-new-hypersonic/.
36. Minnie Chan, ‘‘China’s Second Hypersonic Glider Test Fails as PLA Trials
Nuclear Weapons Delivery System,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 22, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1578756/chinas-second-testnuclear-armed-hypersonic-glider-fails.
37. Bill Gertz, ‘‘China Secretly Conducts Second Flight Test of New Ultra HighSpeed Missile,’’ Washington Times, August 19, 2014. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/20/china-secretly-conducts-second-test-new-hypersonic/.
38. Zackery Keck, ‘‘Will Hypersonic Capabilities Render Missile Defense Obsolete?’’ Diplomat, February 7, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/will-hypersoniccapabilities-render-missile-defense-obsolete/.
39. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA
Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, testimony of Lee Fuell,
January 30, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00347

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

336

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

40. Tai Ming Cheung (Director, University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 20, 2014; Tai
Ming Cheung, China’s Really Big Military R&D Effort (Lowy Institute, October 6,2013). http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/10/08/Chinas-really-big-military-RDeffort.aspx.
41. Battelle, 2014 Global R&D Funding Forecast, December 2013, p. 14. http://
www.battelle.org/docs/tpp/2014_global_rd_funding_forecast.pdf?sfvrsn=4.
42. Tai Ming Cheung, ed., China’s Emergence as a Defense Technological Power(New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), p. 51; Tai Ming Cheung, ed., New Perspectives On
Assessing The Chinese Defense Economy 2011 Industry Overview And Policy Briefs(University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2011). http://
igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/504358.pdf; and Evan A. Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to Information
Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003): p. 53.
43. James McGregor, China’s Drive for ‘Indigenous Innovation’—A Web of Industrial Policies (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, July 27, 2010). https://www.uschamber.com/report/china’s-drive-indigenous-innovation-web-industrial-policies.
44. Brian Lafferty, Aaron Shraberg, and Morgan Clemens, ‘‘China’s Civil-Military Integration’’ in Tai Ming Cheung, ed., The Chinese Defense Economy: Sectorby-Sector Assessments and the Role of Military End-Users (San Diego, CA: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2013), p. 60.
45. Henry Sanderson and Steven Yang, ‘‘China Said to Plan Capital Market Access for Military,’’ Bloomberg, April 23, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201404-22/china-said-to-plan-move-of-military-assets-to-listed-companies.html.
46. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ‘‘EU Arms Embargo on
China,’’ November 20, 2012. http: // www.sipri.org / databases / embargoes / eu _ arms _embargoes / china; Dallas Boyd, Advanced Technology Acquisition Strategies of thePeople’s Republic of China (Science Applications International Corporation, September 2010), p. 21.
47. Oliver Brauner, ‘‘Beyond the Arms Embargo: EU Transfers of Defense andDual-Use Technologies to China,’’ Journal of East Asia Studies 13 (2013): 457.
48. Tom Hancock, ‘‘EU Firms Help Power China’s Military Rise,’’ AFP, May 1,
2014. https: // sg.news.yahoo.com / eu-firms-help-power-chinas-military-rise-051120343.html; David Lague, ‘‘Chinese Military’s Secret to Success: European Engineering,’’ Reuters, December 20, 2013. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/breakoutsubmarines-special-report-pix-g-idINL4N0JJ0FM20131219.
49. David Lague, ‘‘Chinese Military’s Secret to Success: European Engineering,’’ Reuters, December 20, 2013. http: // in.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/breakoutsubmarines-special-report-pix-g-idINL4N0JJ0FM20131219.
50. Washington Post, ‘‘A List of the U.S. Weapon Designs and Technologies Compromised by Hackers,’’ May 27, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-list-of-the-us-weapons-designs-and-technologies-compromised-by-hackers/
2013/05/27/a95b2b12-c483-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html.
51. FireEye analysts, interview with Commission staff, June 5, 2014.
52. FireEye analysts, interview with Commission staff, June 5, 2014. Mandiant,
M Trends: Beyond the Breach—2014 Threat Report, February 2014, pp. 15–21.
53. Joe McReynolds (Research Associate, DGI’s Center for Intelligence Researchand Analysis), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 22, 2014.
54. Dan Lamothe, ‘‘Exclusive: Top Admiral Says China Likely to Keep Stealing
Military Secrets,’’ Foreign Policy, April 18, 2014. http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2014/04/18/exclusive_top_admiral_says_china_likely_to_keep_stealing_military_
secrets.
55. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Higher Education and National Security:
The Targeting of Sensitive, Proprietary, and Classified Information on Campusesof Higher Education, April 2011. http: // www.fbi.gov / about - us / investigate / counterintelligence/higher-education-and-national-security.
56. U.S. Defense Security Service, Targeting U.S. Technology: A Trend Analysisof Cleared Industry Reporting, 2013, p. 26.
57. Commission judgments based on the following sources: William C. Hannas,
James Mulvenon, and Anna Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), pp. 136–
185; Daniel Golden, ‘‘American Universities Infected by Foreign Spies Detected
by FBI,’’ Bloomberg, April 8, 2012. http: // www.bloomberg.com / news / 2012 - 04 - 08 /american-universities-infected-by-foreign-spies-detected-by-fbi.html; Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets
in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009–2011, October 2011. http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/
Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf; James McGregor, China’s Drive for ‘Indige-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00348

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

337

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

nous Innovation’—A Web of Industrial Policies (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, July 27,2010). https: // www.uschamber.com / report / china’s-drive-indigenous-innovation-webindustrial-policies; and George Tenet and Louis Freeh, Report to Congress on Chinese Espionage Activities against the United States, December 12, 1999.
58. Institute of International Education, Open Doors 2013 Data. http://www.iie.org/en/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data.
59. Zhang Yue, ‘‘Chinese Return from Overseas Hungry for Work,’’ China Daily,
March 30, 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-03/30/content_17389967.htm.
60. Liu Daxin and Fan Jvwei, ‘‘Military and Civilian Universities in Wuhan
Establish Strategic Partnership,’’ China Military Online, January 6, 2013. http://
english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8079393.html.
61. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, National People’s CongressStanding Committee Issues Revised State Secrets Law, May 20, 2010. http: //www.cecc.gov / publications/commission-analysis/national-peoples-congress-standingcommittee-issues-revised-state.
62. FireEye analysts, interview with Commission staff, June 5, 2014; House
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Hearing on Espionage Threats atFederal Laboratories: Balancing Scientific Cooperation with Protecting Critical
Information, written testimony of Michelle Van Cleave, May 16, 2013.
63. Michael Fitzpatrick, ‘‘Did China Steal Japan’s High-Speed Train?’’ Fortune, April 15, 2013. http://fortune.com/2013/04/15/did-china-steal-japans-high-speed-train/.
64. FireEye analysts, interview with Commission staff, June 5, 2014.
65. Shengyang Liming, ‘‘GE Aviation Sign Accord,’’ China Civil Aviation Report,
2012. http://www.chinacivilaviation.com/articles/ccar_405.html.
66. These numbers reflect Commission estimates and judgments based on thefollowing sources: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June
2014, pp. 7–8, 77; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearingon PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimonyof Jesse Karotkin, January 30, 2014; and U.S. and Asian media reporting.
67. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA
Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse
Karotkin, January 30, 2014.
68. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA
Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse
Karotkin, January 30, 2014.
69. Commission estimate based on discussions with nongovernmental experts on
China’s military, consecutive versions of DoD’s annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, and consecutive versions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ The Military
Balance.
70. Commission judgments based on the following sources: William Murray,‘‘Underwater TELs and China’s Antisubmarine Warfare: Evolving Strength and Calculated Weakness,’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds.,
China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: Naval War College, February2014), p. 19; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on
PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony ofJesse Karotkin, January 30, 2014; and U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Reportto Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina 2010, 2010, pp. 3, 30.
71. Commission judgments based on the following sources: J. Michael Cole (Editor-in-Chief, Thinking Taiwan), e-mail interview with Commission staff, August 15,
2014; Michael Chase, ‘‘China’s Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent,’’
Asia Policy 16 (July 2013): 91; Tseng Fu-sheng, ‘‘Assessing China’s Naval Buildup,’’
Want China Times (Taiwan), February 9, 2013. http: // www.wantchinatimes.com /news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20130209000029%cid=1703; Benjamin Purser and Michael Chase, Waypoint or Destination? The Jin-Class Submarine and China’s Quest
for Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence (Jamestown Foundation, August 3, 2012). http://
www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39729%tx_ttnews[backPid]=589#.U4d
TEyh5ZhQ; J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Analysis: Questions Remain on China’s Nuclear
Stance,’’ Taipei Times, May 23, 2011. http: // www.taipeitimes.com / News / taiwan /archives/2011/05/23/2003503945/2; and U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, 2009, p.
22.
72. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 47;

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00349

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

338

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Loro Horta, ‘‘China Steals a March on Russia Arms,’’ Asia Times Online, December
13, 2013. http: // www.atimes.com / atimes / China / CHIN - 02 - 131213.html; and BBC,‘‘China Buys Fighter Jets and Submarines from Russia,’’ March 25, 2013. http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21930280.
73. William Murray, ‘‘Underwater TELs and China’s Antisubmarine Warfare:
Evolving Strength and Calculated Weakness,’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson,
and Ryan Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI:
Naval War College, February 2014), p. 27.
74. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 68;
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse Karotkin,
January 30, 2014.
75. Commission judgments based on the following sources: Daniel Kostecka,‘‘Aerospace Power and China’s Counterstrike Doctrine’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew
Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2014), pp. 57–58; David Shlapak, ‘‘Chinese
Air Superiority in the Near Seas,’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson, and Ryan
Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: Naval War
College, February 2014), p. 65.
76. Dean Cheng, ‘‘Taking China’s Carrier Operations Seriously,’’ War on the Rocks,
May 14, 2014. http://warontherocks.com/2014/05/taking-chinas-carrier-operationsseriously/; Richard Fisher, ‘‘Liaoning Completes Successful First South China Sea
Trip,’’ IHS Jane’s, January 5, 2014. http: // www.janes.com / article / 32100 / liaoningcompletes-successful-first-south-china-sea-trip.
77. Want China Times (Taiwan), ‘‘PLA Navy Set to Build 10 Aircraft Carriers,’’
August 12, 2014; Tate Nurkin, ‘‘The Global Implications of China’s Military Modernization,’’ IHS Jane’s, 2014. http: // www.ihs.com / tl / quarterly / features / chinas military -modernization.aspx; Want China Times (Taiwan), ‘‘PLA Could Commission
Four Carrier Battle Groups: Kanwa,’’ May 28, 2014; and Defense News, ‘‘China To
Build 2 More Aircraft Carriers: Taiwan,’’ May 21, 2012. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120521/DEFREG03/305210003/China-Build-2-More-Aircraft-Carriers-Taiwan.
78. Commission judgments based on the following sources: Andrew S. Ericksonand Gabe Collins, ‘‘China Carrier Demon Module Highlights Surging Navy,’’ National Interest, August 6, 2013. http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-carrierdemo-module-highlights-surging-navy-8842; Peter W. Singer and Jeffrey Lin, ‘‘Aboutthose Chinese Aircraft Carrier Pics: What We Know and What We Can Guess,’’
Defense One, August 5, 2013. http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2013/08/thosechinese- aircraft- carrier- pics- what- we- know- what-we-can-guess-and-what-we-cant/68114/; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, unclassified interview with Commission
staff, Washington, DC, June 2013; and U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Reportto Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina 2013, May 2013, p. 6.
79. Claudette Roulo, ‘‘Greenert: China Moving Quickly to Modernize Navy,’’ DoD
News Defense Media Activity, July 26, 2014.
80. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA
Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse
Karotkin, January 30, 2014; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, 2009, pp. 27–28.
81. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA
Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse
Karotkin, January 30, 2014; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, 2009, p. 18.
82. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, pp. 6–
7; J. Michael Cole, ‘‘China’s Growing Long-Range Strike Capability,’’ Diplomat,
August 13, 2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/chinas-growing-long-range-strikecapability/.
83. David Axe, ‘‘Looks Like China’s Building a Giant New Warship, Possible
Missile Cruiser Could Outweigh Rival Surface Combatants,’’ War Is Boring, Undated. https://medium.com/war-is-boring; David Axe, ‘‘New Chinese Cruiser—Not as
Big as We Thought, But Still Pretty Big,’’ War Is Boring, Undated. https://medium.com/war-is-boring; and Bill Gertz, ‘‘China Reveals New Carrier Jet Prior to Hagel
Visit,’’ Washington Free Beacon, April 9, 2014. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-reveals-new-carrier-jet-prior-to-hagel-visit/.
84. Andrew Erickson (Associate Professor, Naval War College), e-mail interview
with Commission staff, June 16, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00350

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

339

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

85. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 9;
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse Karotkin,
January 30, 2014.
86. John Patch, ‘‘Chinese Houbei Fast Attack Craft: Beyond Sea Denial’’ in Peter
Dutton, Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2014), p. 11.
87. Commission judgments based on the following sources: U.S. Department of
Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 9; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, unclassified interview with Commission staff, Washington, DC, April 2014;
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse Karotkin,
January 30, 2014.
88. Commission judgments based on the following sources: Strategy Page, ‘‘Logistics: And the Chinese Replenishment Ships Just Keep Coming,’’ June 12, 2014.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlog/articles/20140612.aspx; U.S. Office of NavalIntelligence, unclassified interview with Commission staff, April 2014; U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its
Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse Karotkin, January 30,
2014; and Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, ‘‘China’s Real Blue Water Navy,’’ Diplomat, August 30, 2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/chinas-not-so-scary-navy/?allpages=yes.
89. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA
Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse
Karotkin, January 30, 2014; Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, July 5, 2013), pp. 3–38; and U.S. Department of Defense,
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, pp. 7–8, 39.
90. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, pp. 56,
76; Dennis Blasko, PLA Amphibious Capabilities: Structured for Deterrence (Jamestown Foundation, August 19, 2010). http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/
single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36770%tx_ttnews[backPid]=25%cHash=5c40a5009d#.U8e2
n7Ggfvc.
91. U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet, meeting with Commissioners, Yokosuka, Japan,
July 2013; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas, testimony of Peter
Dutton, April 4, 2013; and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas, written
testimony of Michael McDevitt, April 4, 2013.
92. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, unclassified interview with Commission
staff, Washington, DC, June 2013; Jin Chang and Zhu Yu, ‘‘State Council Plans to
Reorganize SOA, Set Up National Oceanic Commission; SOA to Protect Sovereignty,
Enforce Laws in Name of PRC Coast Guard,’’ China Ocean Daily, March 12, 2013.
Open Source Center translation. ID: CPP20130312680007.
93. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, unclassified interview with Commission
staff, Washington, DC, June 2013.
94. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, p. 41.
95. U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters, ‘‘About U.S. PACOM: Organization.’’http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM.aspx; U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, CNO’s
Navigation Plan: 2015–2019 (Washington, DC, August 20, 2014).
96. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, CNO’s Navigation Plan: 2015–2019 (Washington, DC, August 20, 2014); Jonathan Greenert, Statement of Admiral Jonathan
Greenert, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services
Committee on FY 2015 Department of the Navy Posture, March 12, 2014.
97. Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, U.S. Navy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, March 25, 2014. http: // www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Locklear_03-25-14.pdf.
98. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 78;
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Lee Fuell, January 30, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00351

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

340

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

99. Commission judgments based on the following sources: Richard Fisher (Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center), e-mail interview with
Commission staff, June 20, 2014; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report toCongress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina 2014, June 2014, p. 40; U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, unclassified interview with Commission staff, April 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for
the United States, written testimony of Lee Fuell, January 30, 2014; and David
Shlapak, ‘‘Equipping the PLAAF: The Long March to Modernity,’’ in Richard P.
Hallion et al., eds., The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2012), pp. 191–198.
100. David Shlapak, ‘‘Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas,’’ in Peter Dutton,
Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities(Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2014), p. 61.
101. Carlo Kopp, The PLA–AF’s Aerial Refueling Programs (Air Power Australia,
April 2012). http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-Tanker-Programs.html; U.S. Defense Science Board, Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Aerial Refueling
Requirements, May 2004. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/aerial.pdf; and Andrew Erickson, ‘‘Naval and Air Forces,’’ in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds.,
Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s Military Challenge (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), p. 112.
102. Commission judgments based on the following sources: Gabriel Collins, Michael McGauvran, and Timothy White, ‘‘Trends in Chinese Aerial Refueling Capacity for Maritime Purposes,’’ in Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, eds., Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles (Annapolis, MD: Naval InstitutePress, 2011), pp. 194–195, 199; Michael D. Swaine, China’s Military and the U.S.
-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), p. 53.
103. Richard Fisher (Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 20, 2014; Jeffrey Lin and P.W.
Singer, ‘‘Finally, a Modern Chinese Aerial Tanker,’’ Popular Science Easter Arsenal
Blog, April 2, 2014. http://www.popsci.com/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/finally-modern-chinese-aerial-tanker.
104. Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, ‘‘Limited Liftoff Looming: Y–20 Transport Prepares for 1st Test Flight,’’ Diplomat, January 8, 2013.
105. Commission judgments informed by Richard Fisher (Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center), e-mail interview with Commission staff,
June 20, 2014.
106. Richard Fisher, ‘‘Fourth Known J–20 Prototype Makes First Flight,’’ IHS
Jane’s Weekly, July 29, 2014; David Cenciotti, ‘‘Third Prototype of China’s Stealth
Jet Makes Maiden Flight and Shows Improvements,’’ Aviationist, March 2, 2014.
http://theaviationist.com/2014/03/02/j-20-3rd-prototype-comparison/; and David Axe,‘‘China’s Latest Stealth Fighter Prototype Has, Well, Actual Stealth Feature,’’ War
is Boring, January 20, 2014. https://medium.com/war-is-boring/chinas-latest-stealthfighter-prototype-has-well-actual-stealth-features-6b8ebf775795.
107. David Shlapak, ‘‘Chinese Air Superiority in the Near Seas,’’ in Peter Dutton,
Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities(Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2014), p. 69.
108. Jack Mulcaire, ‘‘China’s Stealth Fighters Ready to Soar?’’ National Interest,
April 16, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-stealth-fighters-readysoar-10252; Zachary Keck, ‘‘China Says J–31 Fighter Will Compete with F–35 forSales,’’ Diplomat, September 27, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/china-says-j31-fighter-will-compete-with-f-35-for-sales/.
109. Commission judgments based on the following sources: Richard Fisher (Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center), e-mail interview with
Commission staff, June 20, 2014; Peter Wood, ‘‘How China Plans to Use the Su-35,’’
Diplomat, November 27, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/how-china-plans-touse-the-su-35/?allpages=yes; Wendell Minnick, ‘‘China’s New Jet, Radar Complicate
U.S. Posture,’’ Defense News, July 6, 2013. http://www.defensenews.com/article/2013
0706/DEFREG03/307060004/China-s-New-Jet-Radar-Complicate-US-Posture; Sofia
Wu, ‘‘Talk of the Day—China Aims to Buy 24 Su-35 Fighters,’’ Central News Agency(Taiwan), June 24, 2013. Hosted by the Open Source Center. ID: CPP2013062496
8172; and Feng Cao, Making Sense of Massive China-Russia Arms Deal (U.S. Naval
Institute, April 5, 2013). http://news.usni.org/2013/04/05/making-sense-of-massivechina-russia-arms-deal.
110. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, May 2013, pp. 42, 81;
Ian Easton, The Assassin under the Radar: China’s DH–10 Cruise Missile Program

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00352

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

341

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(Project 2049 Institute, October 2009), p. 3. http://project2049.net/documents/assassin_under_radar_china_cruise_missile.pdf; and Robert Hewson, ‘‘Chinese Air-Launched
Missile Emerges from the Shadows,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 31, 2007.
111. Hans Kristensen, ‘‘Air Force Briefing Shows Nuclear Modernizations but Ignores U.S. and UK Programs,’’ FAS Security Blog, May 29, 2013. http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/05/afgsc-brief2013/; Ian Easton, The Assassin under the Radar: China’s DH–10 Cruise Missile Program (Project 2049 Institute, October 2009). pp. 1–
6. http://project2049.net/documents/assassin_under_radar_china_cruise_missile.pdf.
112. Want China Times (Taiwan), ‘‘Long-Range Stealth Bomber under Development in China,’’ January 1, 2014. www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx? id = 20140119000025 % cid = 1101; Want China Times (Taiwan), ‘‘Is China’s H–18
Bomber a Joke? Asks Duowei,’’ November 13, 2013. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20131113000004%cid=1101.
113. Richard Fisher (Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 20, 2014.
114. Want China Times (Taiwan), ‘‘Russia and China Can Jointly Develop Bomber: Voice of Russia,’’ February 17, 2014. http: // www.wantchinatimes.com / news subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140217000019%cid=1101.
115. Zhao Huanxin, ‘‘Confidence Sky-High Over Jumbo Cargo Plane,’’ China
Daily, March 19, 2013. Hosted by the Open Source Center. ID: CPP20130319968
029.
116. Open Source Center, Summary: PRC Expert Says Yun-20 Transport Makes
Strategic Air Force Possible, January 27, 2013. ID: CPP20130128787028.
117. Richard Fisher, ‘‘China’s NDU Recommends 400-Strong Y–20 Fleet,’’ HIS
Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 28, 2014.
118. Commission judgments based on the following source: Open Source Center,
Summary: Guangdong Journal Views Strategic Card of ‘Yun-20’ Jumbo Air Freighter, January 31, 2013. ID: CPP20130214695013; Andrew Erikson and Gabe Collins,‘‘The Y–20: China Aviation Milestone Means New Power Projection,’’ Wall Street
Journal: China Real time Report, January 28, 2013. http: // blogs.wsj.com / chinarealtime/2013/01/28/the-y-20-china-aviation-milestone-means-new-power-projection/.
119. Andrew Erickson, ‘‘Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR,’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities(Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2014), pp. 90–95.
120. Andrew Erickson, ‘‘Chinese Air- and Space-Based ISR,’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities(Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2014), pp. 90–95.
121. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA
Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse
Karotkin, January 30, 2014.
122. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 33;
J. Michael Cole, China Flies Bombers and Drone Near Japanese Skies,’’ Diplomat,
September 10, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/china-flies-bombers-and-dronenear-japanese-skies/
123. Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats, Foreign Affairs
Committee of the United States House of Representatives, Hearing on China’s Maritime and Other Geographic Threats, written testimony of Richard Fisher, October30, 2013.
124. Kimberly Hsu, China’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 13, 2013). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Military%20UAV%20Industry_14%20June%202013.pdf.
125. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities, written testimony of Roger Cliff, May 20, 2010; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation
Capabilities, written testimony of Bruce Lemkin, May 20, 2010.
126. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of
the People’s Republic of China 2009, 2009, p. 50.
127. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, p. 83;
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities, written testimony of
Bruce Lemkin, May 20, 2010.
128. Zachary Keck, ‘‘Putin Approves Sale of S–400 to China,’’ Diplomat, April 11,
2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/putin-approves-sale-of-s-400-to-china/; Peter
Dunai and Matthew Smith, ‘‘Russia, China S–400 Deal Moves Forward,’’ IHS Jane’s

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00353

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

342

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

360, March 31, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/36226/russia-china-s-400-dealmoves-forward.
129. Wendell Minnick, ‘‘China’s New Jet, Radar Complicate U.S. Posture,’’ Defense News, July 6, 2013. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130706/DEFREG03/
307060004/China-s-New-Jet-Radar-Complicate-US-Posture; Wendell Minnick, ‘‘Time
Running Out for Taiwan if Russia Releases S–400 SAM,’’ Defense News, May 25,
2013. http: // www.defensenews.com / article / 20130525 / DEFREG / 305270012 / Time Running-Out-Taiwan-Russia-Releases-S-400-SAM.
130. Zackary Keck, ‘‘Putin Approves Sale of S–400 to China,’’ Diplomat, April 11,
2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/putin-approves-sale-of-s-400-to-china/.
131. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 10.
132. Commission judgments based on the following sources: U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of William Murray, June 5,2014; U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, unclassified interview with
Commission staff, April 2014; Ron Christman, ‘‘China’s Second Artillery Force: Capabilities and Missions for the Near Seas,’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson, andRyan Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: Naval
War College, February 2014), pp. 37–38; and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for theUnited States, written testimony of Lee Fuell, January 30, 2014.
133. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 6;
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Annual Threat Assessment: Statement Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, February 11, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for
the United States, written testimony of Lee Fuell, January 30, 2014; U.S. National
Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, July 2013;
U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, p. 5; and U.S.
Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, May 2012, p. 29.
134. Hans Kristensen, ‘‘DoD Report Shows Chinese Nuclear Force Adjustments
and US Nuclear Secrecy,’’ FAS Blog, June 11, 2014. http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/06/china-dodreport2014/.
135. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof William Murray, June 5, 2014.
136. U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat, July 2013, p. 13.
137. Ron Christman, ‘‘China’s Second Artillery Force: Capabilities and Missions
for the Near Seas,’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds.,
China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: Naval War College, February2014), pp. 37–38; U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic andCruise Missile Threat, July 2013, p. 13; and J. Michael Cole, ‘‘PRC Missile Could
Render PAC–3 Obsolete,’’ Taipei Times, March 18, 2011. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/03/18/2003498473/1.
138. U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat, July 2013, p. 13.
139. Richard Fisher (Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 20, 2014.
140. U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, unclassified interview with
Commission staff, April 2014.
141. Ron Christman, ‘‘China’s Second Artillery Force: Capabilities and Missions
for the Near Seas,’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds.,
China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: Naval War College, February2014), p. 38.
142. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA
Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Lee
Fuell, January 30, 2014; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013,
May 2013, p. 42.
143. Ian Easton, China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities (Project2049 Institute, February 2014), p. 7.
144. Andrew Erickson, How China Got There First: Beijing’s Unique Path to
ASBM Development and Deployment (Jamestown Foundation, June 7, 2013). http://
www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=40994%tx

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00354

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

343

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=25%cHash=913594fd5785c82b653cc6b00de7850c#.Ueh_F5U-aX1; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, pp. 5–6, 42.
145. Mark Stokes, ‘‘Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite
Taiwan,’’ AsiaEye (blog), April 18, 2011. http://blog.project2049.net/2011/04/expansion-of-chinas-ballistic-missile.html.
146. Ron Christman, ‘‘China’s Second Artillery Force: Capabilities and Missions
for the Near Seas,’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds.,
China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: Naval War College, February2014), pp. 33–34.
147. Mark Stokes, ‘‘Expansion of China’s Ballistic Missile Infrastructure Opposite
Taiwan,’’ AsiaEye (blog), April 18, 2011. http://blog.project2049.net/2011/04/expansion-of-chinas-ballistic-missile.html.
148. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011, May 2011, p. 78.
149. Ian Easton, China’s Evolving Reconnaissance—Strike Capabilities (Project2049 Institute, February 2014), p. 8; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Reportto Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina 2013, May 2013, p. 81. http://www.project2049.net/documents/aerospace_trends_asia_pacific_region_stokes_easton.pdf; and Ian Easton, The Assassin Under the Radar: China’s DH–10 Cruise Missile Program (Project 2049 Institute, October 2009),
p. 3. http://project2049.net/documents/assassin_under_radar_china_cruise_missile.pdf.
150. U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat, July 2013, p. 29.
151. China’s Information Office of the State Council, The Diversified Employmentof China’s Armed Forces, April 16, 2013. Hosted by the Open Source Center. ID:
CPP20130416968060.
152. Larry Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach (Washington, DC: Potomac
Books, 2013), p. 101.
153. M. Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros, ‘‘China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,’’ International
Security 35.2 (Fall 2010): 80.
154. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2012, p. 173.
155. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, p. 31.
156. U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat, July 2013, p. 3.
157. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Developments in China’s Nuclear and Cyber Capabilities, written testimony of Mark Stokes,
March 26, 2012; Hans Kristensen, ‘‘No, China Does Not Have 3,000 Nuclear Weapons, FAS Strategic Security Blog, December 3, 2011. http://fas.org/blogs/security/2011/12/chinanukes/.
158. Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2013, Bulletinof the Atomic Scientists 69.6: 1 (November 2013). http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/
6/79.full.
159. Taiwan Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Report, 2013, Table
2–3. http://report.mnd.gov.tw/en/m/part4.html.
160. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, pp. 29–
31; Andrew Erickson and Michael Chase, China Goes Ballistic (National Interest,
May/June 2014).
161. Hans Kristensen, DoD Report Shows Chinese Nuclear Force Adjustments andU.S. Nuclear Secrecy,’’ FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 11, 2014. http://fas.org/
blogs/security/2014/06/china-dodreport2014/; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual
Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, June 2014, p. 28.
162. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, May 2013, p. 11;
Andrew Erickson and Michael Chase, China Goes Ballistic (National Interest, May/
June 2014); and Nicolas Giacometti, ‘‘China’s Nuclear Modernization and the Endof Nuclear Opacity,’’ Diplomat, April 10, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/chinas-nuclear-modernization-and-the-end-of-nuclear-opacity/.
163. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, unclassified interview with Commission
staff, Washington, DC, June 2013; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report toCongress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina 2013, May 2013, pp. 10, 31.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00355

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

344

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

164. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on PLA
Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written testimony of Jesse
Karotkin, January 30, 2014; U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
2013, May 2013, p. 31.
165. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service,
April 26, 2014), pp. 19; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on PLA Modernization and Its Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Jesse Karotkin, January 30, 2014; and Hans Kristensen, ‘‘New Nuclear
Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization,’’ FAS Security Blog, November 13,
2013. http://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/11/chinanukes2013/.
166. Pei Shen, ‘‘China Has Undersea Strategic Nuclear Deterrent against UnitedStates for the First Time,’’ Global Times, October 13, 2013. Open Source Centertranslation. ID: CHR2013100762536387.
167. Patrick Tyler, ‘‘As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens,’’
New York Times, January 24, 1996. http: // www.nytimes.com/1996 / 01 / 24 / world / aschina-threatens-taiwan-it-makes-sure-us-listens.html.
168. Commission judgments based on the following sources: Kanwa, ‘‘DF41 ICBMCapable of Covering Whole United States,’’ June 1, 2014. Hosted by the Open
Source Center. ID: CHR2014060931184116; Bill Gertz, ‘‘China Fields New Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missile,’’ Washington Free Beacon, March 3, 2014. http://
freebeacon.com/national-security/china-fields-new-intermediate-range-nuclear-missile/;
Bill Gertz, ‘‘China Conducts Second Flight Test of New Long-Range Missile,’’ Washington Free Beacon, December 17, 2013. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-conducts-second-flight-test-of-new-long-range-missile/; and Zhang Han and Huang
Jingjing, ‘‘New Missile Ready by 2015,’’ Global Times Online, February 18, 2011.
Open Source Center translation. ID: CPP20110218722001.
169. Zachary Keck, ‘‘Is China Preparing MIRVed Ballistic Missiles?’’ Diplomat,
August 8, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/is-china-preparing-mirved-ballisticmissiles/; Richard Fisher (Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy
Center), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 20, 2014; J. Michael Cole,‘‘Analysis: Questions Remain on China’s Nuclear Stance,’’ Taipei Times, May 23,
2011. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/05/23/2003503945/2.
170. Bill Gertz, ‘‘China Conducts Flight Test of New Mobile ICBM,’’ Washington
Free Beacon, October 2, 2014. http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-conductsflight-test-of-new-mobile-icbm/.
171. Richard Fisher (Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 20, 2014.
172. Jane’s Space Systems and Industry, ‘‘Yaogan Series’’; Andrew Erickson,‘‘China’s Air- and Space-Based ISR: Integrating Aerospace Combat Capabilities over
the Near Seas,’’ in Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson, and Ryan Martinson, eds., China’s Near Seas Combat Capabilities (Newport, RI: Naval War College, February2014), pp. 97–102; and Kevin Pollpeter, ‘‘Controlling the Information Domain:Space, Cyber, and Electronic Warfare,’’ in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds.,
Strategic Asia 2012–2013: China’s Military Challenge (Washington, DC: National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), pp. 167–171.
173. S. Chandrashekar and Soma Perumal, China’s Constellation of Yaogan
Satellites and the ASBM (International Strategic and Security Studies Program,
National Institute of Advanced Studies, January 22, 2014). http://isssp.in/chinasconstellation-of-yaogan-satellites-the-asbm/.
174. Kevin Pollpeter, ‘‘Controlling the Information Domain: Space, Cyber, andElectronic Warfare,’’ in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia
2012–2013: China’s Military Challenge (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2012), p. 169.
175. Want China Times, ‘‘China Makes Large Strides in Satellite Intelligence:
Duowei,’’ August 26, 2014. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?
id=20140826000160%cid=1101%MainCatID=11; Collin Skockik, ‘‘China Launches
Gaofen-2 Satellite,’’ SpaceFlight Insider, August 19, 2014. http://www.spaceflightinsider.com/space-flight-news/china-launches-gaofen-2-satellite/.
176. Xinhua, ‘‘China Targeting Navigation System’s Global Coverage by 2020,’’
March 3, 3012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2013-03/03/c_132204892.htm.
177. Xinhua, ‘‘China Launches 3rd Satellite in its Global Data Relay Network,’’
July 26, 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2012-07/26/c_131738886.htm.
178. Zhang Xiaoxia, ‘‘Relay Satellites: The Satellite of Satellites—An Interview ofExperts on Developing and Building China’s Relay Satellite System,’’ China MilitaryNews, July 28, 2012. Open Source Center translation. ID: CPP20120831090004.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00356

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

345

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

179. Jonathan McDowell, ‘‘China Satellite Update: 2014,’’ Jonathan’s Space
Report, June 2014. http: // planet4589.org / space / papers / china2014.pdf; Kevin
Pollpeter (Deputy Director, Study of Innovation and Technology in China, University of California, San Diego), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 16,
2014; and Jonathan McDowell (Astrophysicist, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics), e-mail interview with Commission staff, June 15, 2014.
180. Jonathan McDowell, ‘‘China Satellite Update: 2014,’’ Jonathan’s Space
Report, June 2014. http: // planet4589.org / space / papers / china2014.pdf; Jonathan
McDowell (Astrophysicist, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics), e-mailinterview with Commission staff, June 15, 2014.
181. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 11.
182. Andrew Erickson and Amy Chang, ‘‘China’s Navigation in Space,’’ Proceedings (April 2012): 42–47; Stephen Chen, ‘‘China Has Tracking Station in Australia,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), November 5, 2011. http://www.scmp.com/article/983889/china-has-tracking-station-australia.
183. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, p. 11.
184. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, pp. 10–
11; Mark Stokes and Dean Cheng, China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications
for U.S. Interests (Project 2049 Institute, April 26, 2012), pp. 37–39. http://project2049.net/documents/uscc_china-space-program-report_april-2012.pdf.
185. Craig Murray, China Missile Launch May Have Tested Part of a New AntiSatellite Capability (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May
22, 2013). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Missile%
20Launch%20May%20Have%20Tested%20Part%20of%20a%20New%20Anti-Satellite%20Capability_05.22.13.pdf.
186. Kevin Pollpeter, China’s Space Robotic Arm Programs (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October 2013). http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/505021.pdf.
187. Marcia S. Smith, ‘‘Surprise Chinese Satellite Maneuvers Mystify Western
Experts,’’ Space Policy Online, August 19, 2013. http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/
news/surprise-chinese-satelllite-maneuvers-mystify-western-experts; Robert Christy,‘‘Chinese Satellites Playing Tag . . . Now There are Three!’’ Zarya, August 17, 2013.
http://www.zarya.info/blog/?p=1396.
188. David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronland, The Physics of Space Security: A Reference Manual (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts andSciences and Union of Concerned Scientists, 2005). http: // www.ucsusa.org / assets /documents/nwgs/physics-space-security.pdf.
189. Craig Murray, China Missile Launch May Have Tested Part of a New AntiSatellite Capability (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May
22, 2013). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Missile%
20Launch%20May%20Have%20Tested%20Part%20of%20a%20New%20Anti-Satellite%20Capability_05.22.13.pdf.
190. Leonard David, ‘‘China’s Space Docking is a Step Toward Ambitious Futurein Space,’’ Space.com, June 14, 2013. http://www.space.com/21566-china-shenzhou-10-mission-space-ambitions.html; Clara Moskowitz, ‘‘China Successfully Docks Manned
Space Capsule at Orbiting Module,’’ Space.com, June 18, 2012. http://www.space.com/16179-china-manned-space-docking-shenzhou-9.html; Mike Wall, ‘‘China Succeeds
in First Space Docking by 2 Spaceships,’’ Space.com, November 2, 2011. http://www.space.com/13477-china-space-docking-success-shenzhou8-tiangong1.html.
191. Xinhua, ‘‘China Carries out Land-Based Mid-Course Missile Interception
Test,’’ January 28, 2013. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/28/c_12428
5293.htm; Xinhua, ‘‘China conducts test on ground-based midcourse missile interception,’’ January 11, 2010. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/11/content_
12792329.htm.
192. Brian Weeden, Anti-Satellite Tests in Space—The Case of China, (Secure
World Foundation, August 29, 2013). http://swfound.org/media/115643/China_ASAT_ Testing_ Fact_ Sheet_ Aug2013.pdf; Li Bin, What China’s Missile Intercept Test
Means (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 4, 2013). http: //carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/04/what-china-s-missile-intercept-test-means/fa45.
193. Mike Gruss, ‘‘U.S. State Department: China Tested Anti-Satellite Weapon,’’Space News, July 28, 2014. http://www.spacenews.com/article/military-space/41413usstate-department-china-tested-anti-satellite-weapon.
194. Brian Weeden, Anti-Satellite Tests in Space—The Case of China (Secure
World Foundation, August 29, 2013). http://swfound.org/media/115643/China_ASAT_Testing_Fact_Sheet_Aug2013.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00357

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

346

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

195. U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, Risk Assessmentof United States Space Export Control Policy, March 2012, section 4.3. http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/1248_Report_Space_Export_Control.pdf.
196. Commission judgments based on the following source: Bryan Kreskel, Patton
Adams, and George Bakos, Occupying the High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for
Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage (U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, March 7, 2012). http: // origin.www.uscc.gov / sites / default / files /Research/USCC_ Report_ Chinese_ Capabilities_ for_ Computer_ Network_ Operations_
and_Cyber_%20Espionage.pdf; Chang Xianqi, Military Astronautics (2nd edition)(Beijing, China: National Defense Industries Press, 2005), pp. 59–71. Open Source
Center translation. ID: CPP20091231572001.
197. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Joint Hearing on the People’s Republic of China’s Counterspace Program and the Implications for U.S. National Security, written testimony of Ashley Tellis, January 28, 2014.
198. Yasmin Tadjdeh, ‘‘New Chinese Threats to U.S. Space Systems Worry Officials,’’ National Defense, July 2014. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/ 2014 / July / Pages / NewChineseThreatstoUSSpaceSystemsWorryOfficials.aspx; Senate
Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for National Security Space Activities, written
statement of William Shelton, March 12, 2014.
199. AFP, ‘‘Kendall: China Threatens U.S. Military Superiority,’’ January 29,
2014. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140129/DEFREG02/301290037/KendallChina-Threatens-US-Military-Superiority.
200. Evan Braden Montgomery, ‘‘Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,’’ International Security 38:4
(Spring 2014): 117.
201. Senate Armed Services Committee, Inquiry into Cyber Intrusions Affecting
U.S. Transportation Command Contractors, September 17, 2014. http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SASC_Cyberreport_091714.pdf.
202. Senate Armed Services Committee, Inquiry into Cyber Intrusions Affecting
U.S. Transportation Command Contractors, September 17, 2014. http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SASC_Cyberreport_091714.pdf; Bryan Krekel, Patton Adams, and George Bakos, Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese
Capabilities for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage (U.S. China
Economic and Security Review Commission, March 7, 2012). http://origin.www.uscc.
gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC_Report_Chinese_Capabilities_for_Computer_
Network_Operations_and_Cyber_%20Espionage.pdf.
203. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2011, p. 358. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
annual_reports/annual_report_full_11.pdf.
204. Helene Cooper, ‘‘Pentagon Says Chinese Fighter Jet Confronted American
Navy Plane,’’ New York Times, August 22, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/world/asia/us-says-chinese-fighter-jet-confronted-american-navy-plane.html?_r=0.
205. Lloyd Thrall (Project Associate, RAND Corporation), interview with Commission staff, Washington, DC, June 2, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00358

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

SECTION 3: CHINA’S DOMESTIC STABILITY
Introduction
Twenty-five years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, manyof the same underlying causes of unrest persist today. Land seizures, labor disputes, wide-scale corruption, cultural and religious
repression, and environmental degradation have led to hundreds ofthousands of localized protests annually throughout China since2010. The Chinese leadership has consistently responded to increased unrest with repression, censorship, and, occasionally, limited accommodation. Over the past year, ethnic unrest escalated in
response to excessive force by China’s internal security forces andthe growing radicalization of disenfranchised Uyghurs in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Militant Uyghur separatists
also shifted their tactics from attacking Chinese authorities to targeting civilians and public spaces.
President Xi Jinping, like his predecessors, has made the preservation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule and domestic stability his top priorities. He has issued a series of policy directives
and institutional changes to centralize the domestic stability maintenance apparatus under his personal oversight and to expand its
scope and capabilities.
The growth of Internet connectivity and social media in China
has provided Chinese citizens with new tools to express grievancesand organize larger, more numerous, and better coordinated protests. To contain this rising threat to authority, President Xi has
instituted new constraints on Internet criticism of the CCP,
launched high-profile judicial cases against popular online commentators and advocates, and further tightened news media andInternet controls.
This section—based on a Commission hearing in May 2014 on
China’s domestic stability and briefings by U.S. and foreign government officials and outside experts throughout 2014—examines the
economic, political, and social tensions that contribute to unrest in
China; China’s response to its internal security challenges; andChina’s use of media and information controls to contain domestic
unrest and manage public opinion. The section concludes with a
discussion of the implications of China’s domestic stability and information controls for the United States.
Unrest in China
Because the Chinese government suppresses information about
unrest, official statistics on the number of protests in China are difficult to obtain, dated, and often unreliable.1 Murray Scot Tanner,
senior research scientist at CNA, noted in his written statement at
the Commission’s May hearing, ‘‘In recent years the picture has
been harder to track, as Chinese authorities have made it harder

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(347)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00359

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

348
to obtain [this] data, even within their law enforcement system.’’ 2
Despite these limitations, a review of information released by China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS), state-affiliated academic institutions, and official Chinese press reports shows broad trends.
Based on figures from the MPS, the number of ‘‘mass incidents’’ *grew in number from 8,700 in 1993 to more than 120,000 in 2008.3
Growth in the number of incidents occurred despite major increases in domestic security budgets and personnel to suppress unrest.4 More recent data from state-related academic institutions underscore the high level of unrest. Zhu Lijia, director of the publicresearch department of the Chinese Academy of Governance, statedthe number of ‘‘mass incidents’’ doubled from 2006 to reach 180,000
in 2010.5 In 2012, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences found‘‘mass incidents’’ regularly exceed 100,000 per year.6 Based on dataof other social unrest indicators from the MPS, Dr. Tanner foundthat after a sustained increase of two decades, unrest remains at
a high level but ‘‘may have plateaued somewhat in the past 3–4
years.’’ 7
Restrictions on Protests in China
In response to domestic unrest, local governments employ a mixture of repression and concessions. The Chinese government suppresses public protests and dissent through use of internal security
forces, legal and extralegal measures, and censorship. (For more information on these measures, see ‘‘China’s Responses to Unrest’’later in this section). Local governments also use direct bargaining,
co-option of protest leaders and participants, and bureaucratic
measures such as the imposition of excessive paperwork to register
protests.8 Since 2008, local governments increasingly buy stability
through cash payments to protestors and employment opportunities
for protest leaders.9 As a result of local governments’ suppressionof unrest and concessionary tactics, ‘‘an estimated 80 percent of incidents of large scale unrest from 1995 to 2006 were resolved entirely at the subnational level,’’ Steve Hess, assistant professor ofpolitical science at University of Bridgeport, told the Commission
at its May hearing.10
Protests in China
Most ‘‘mass incidents’’ remain local, issue-specific, and temporary
forms of unrest. According to Dr. Hess, ‘‘these actions are: framedaround material and issue-specific grievances; lack broad and coordinated coalitions of social actors who are based in diverse societal and economic sectors and geographic localities; and target particular local officials.’’ 11
Lawsuits and petitioning are two official channels for Chinese
citizens to redress grievances, but these efforts are largely unsuccessful. Public interest lawyers have cited laws and regulations to

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The term ‘‘mass incidents’’ was coined in 2005 by Zhou Yongkang, then Minister of Public
Security, as ‘‘any kind of planned or impromptu gathering that forms because of ‘internal contradictions,’ including mass public speeches, physical conflicts, airing of grievances or otherforms of group behavior that may disrupt social stability.’’ This broad definition varies acrossprovinces and incorporates sit-ins, strikes, marches, and rallies, participation in cults or organized crime, and gambling, among other things. Will Freeman, ‘‘The Accuracy of China’s ‘Mass
Incidents’,’’ Financial Times, March 2, 2010. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9ee6fa64-25b5-11df9bd3-00144feab49a.html#axzz30qzHoNaC; EastSouthWestNorth, ‘‘Statistics of Mass Incidents,’’
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20061115_1.htm.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00360

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

349
advocate for deeper changes in the legal system and strengthen
citizens’ rights.12 Here, too, success is limited. In the few trials thathave occurred, local CCP officials with interests in the outcome ofa particular case often advised the presiding judge on the trial’s
verdict.13
Official petitioning, derived from Chinese Imperial rule, provides
citizens an avenue to register formal complaints through local petition offices. However, local officials are at times the offending party
or complicit with the offender. In response, petitioners often attempt to appeal to national authorities in Beijing, but local officials, whose career advancement in the CCP partly depends ontheir record promoting domestic stability, often detain citizens in‘‘black jails’’ * before they can reach central government officials.14
In April 2014, the Chinese government announced changes to thenational petitioning system to ban non-Beijing residents from submitting petitions to Beijing. This ban restricts one of the main
channels petitioners use to seek redress and may further increase
frustration.†
The lack of satisfactory channels for redress has led some disgruntled citizens to take direct action against local government officials. Chinese citizens are increasingly organizing larger, more numerous, and better coordinated demonstrations, sometimes involving tens of thousands of protesters. According to Xi Chen, politicalscience professor at the University of North Carolina, these dissatisfied citizens have been able to extract gains from the governmentby using ‘‘troublemaking’’ tactics: gathering in large numbers, disrupting government operations, marching, conducting sit-ins, anddisplaying banners with slogans.15 The success of these tactics remains dependent on the publicity and size of the demonstration, resulting in the common maxim, ‘‘Big disturbance, big resolution;
small disturbance, small resolution; no disturbance, no resolution.’’ 16
The growth in Internet connectivity and social media has provided dissatisfied citizens a new organizational tool and venue forairing grievances to a broader audience.17 Social media lowers organizational and communication costs, accelerates transmission of
information, and broadens disgruntled citizens’ exposure to information outside of official state media channels while expanding
their reach.18 In January 2013, a report by the state-run Legal
Daily ‡ found that citizens used Weibo,§ a social media tool, to organize protests in approximately 13 percent of ‘‘mass incidents’’ in
2012.19 In March 2014, citizens harnessed social media to call attention to protests, involving more than 10,000 people, over the expansion of a paraxylene (PX) ¶ factory in Maoming, Guangdong

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Black jails are unofficial detention centers used to house individuals, mainly petitioners, indefinitely without trial. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘An Alley in Hell: China’s Abusive ‘Black Jails’,’’November 2009. www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china1109web_1.pdf.
† In April 2014, another change to the petition system included the promise of an online petition system by the end of 2014, but similar efforts in recent years have failed. Xinhua (English
edition), ‘‘China to Build National Online Petitioning System,’’ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
china/2014-04/11/c_133255772.htm.
‡ The Legal Daily is under the CCP’s Central Politics and Law Commission.
§ Weibo, a microblogging service launched by Sina in August 2009, was one of the first majorsocial media platforms in China.
¶ Paraxylene is a chemical used in manufacturing plastic bottles and polyester clothing. The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency found that long-term exposure to paraxylene can harm
the respiratory, cardiovascular, kidney, and central nervous systems. Chevron Phillips, ‘‘ParaxyContinued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00361

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

350
Province, and subsequent violent crackdown.20 Although eventuallycensored, posts of the Maoming protests became one of the most
discussed topics on social media, leading to smaller sympathetic
protests in other cities in Guangdong.21
The ability to translate online dissent into action remains limited
by citizens’ unwillingness to risk their job, family, or personal safety to protest. Gao Zhisheng, a human rights lawyer who China’s
Ministry of Justice named one of the top ten Chinese lawyers in
2001, was recently released from a nine-year jail sentence, where
he faced torture, solitary confinement, and malnutrition, for advocating on behalf of Falun Gong practitioners.22 In addition, authorities threatened his children, leading him to confess to subversion
charges in 2006; authorities harassed and kept him and his family
under 24-hour surveillance until his family’s escape to the UnitedStates in 2009.23
The Chinese leadership still fears the potential for a sudden national movement and closely monitors and censors social media andthe Internet (see ‘‘Internet and Social Media Censorship Controls’’
later in this section). The recent crackdown on Chinese citizens’
pro-democracy remarks and online support for protests in Hong
Kong, known as the Umbrella Revolution, demonstrates the CCP’sconcern.24 Social media and Internet monitoring provides the Chinese government with the identity, location, and network of activist
citizens and the leadership of any movement.25 More recently, theChinese government reportedly released a sophisticated phishingattack through a fake application to gain access to Hong Kongprotestors’ personal data, phone calls, messages, and location.26
Protestors who express pro-democracy sentiments, share strategies, or attempt to organize demonstrations outside of local or provincial jurisdictions face censorship, arrest, and imprisonment. For
example, the Chinese government detained Zhang Zhiru, a prominent Chinese labor activist, for attempting to assist striking workers at Yue Yuen Industrial Holdings, and arrested his colleague,
Lin Dong, for communicating with Yue Yuen workers about another strike through QQ, one of China’s most popular instant messaging services.27
Underlying Causes of Unrest
Following the Tiananmen Square massacre, the CCP made an
implied ‘‘grand bargain’’ with its citizens to reestablish its legitimacy—economic development and a higher quality of life in exchange for relinquishing political freedom.28 Since then, the Party
has sought to institutionalize this bargain through policies focusedon driving economic growth and a patriotic education campaign.*
In the last year, several high-level officials have reiterated the
CCP’s central role in government. President Xi cautioned that
China should not pursue alternative government structures ‘‘be-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

lene,’’ http://www.cpchem.com/bl/aromatics/en-us/Pages/Paraxylene.aspx; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, ‘‘Xylenes (A) (Mixed Isomers),’’ Technology Transfer Network—Air Toxics website, January 2000. http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/hlthef/xylenes.html.
* Launched in 1992, this campaign promotes the uniqueness and legitimacy of China’s political system; the historical links between pre-communist rule under the Qing Dynasty and current CCP rule; the CCP as the defender of China’s national interests; and national unity against
ethnic nationalism.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00362

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

351
cause it would not fit us and it might even lead to catastrophic consequences.’’ 29
High economic growth rates since the 1980s have raised morethan 600 million Chinese citizens out of poverty.30 This rapid economic growth has contributed to a burgeoning and more mobile
middle class, an increasingly active and educated young population,and rising public expectations for enhanced quality of life and employment. Simultaneously, China’s changing demographic composition and aging labor force are placing strains on workers, employers, families, and the economy.
Heightened public awareness combined with the growth of Internet connectivity has spurred demonstrations seeking fair compensation for seized land, enforcement of basic labor rights andsafe working conditions, equal access to government services, andgreater ability to worship. In addition, understanding of the publichealth risks from severe pollution has contributed to the recent
growth in environmental protests. Pervasive corruption exacerbates
these concerns.
Although estimates differ, Chinese academics and the U.S. government agree that the two most common causes of ‘‘mass incidents’’ are disputes over labor and land.31 Based on a review of
media reports, the U.S. government’s Open Source Center foundland and labor disputes accounted for 46 percent of publicly reported ‘‘mass incidents’’ in 2013 and 52 percent in the first half of2014.* 32 A 2014 report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
similarly found labor disputes and land seizures were the largest
causes of ‘‘mass incidents’’ † from January 2000 to September
2013.33
Demographic Challenges
China’s one-child policy that was enacted a generation ago has
resulted in a rapid drop in birth rates and the appearance of a new
family structure. The ‘‘4–2–1’’ families—consisting of four grandparents, two parents, and one child—have contributed to a rise inhousehold spending on education.34 This family structure, alongwith insufficient social safety nets, shifts financial burdens eventually to the youngest generation to support their retired parents andgrandparents.35 By 2050, approximately a third of China’s population will be 60 years or older—compared with 27 percent in the
United States.36 In addition, the one-child policy has distorted gender ratios as Chinese mothers have decided to carry more males
than females to full term. By 2020, China will have 30 million
more men than women.37 This excess of young, unmarried men has
contributed to increases in crime, prostitution, mail-order marriages, and human trafficking.38
Finally, the emergence of a middle class over the last two decades has resulted in more voices pushing for clean air and water,
safe food and drugs, and better employment for their children.39
Grandparents and parents have heavily invested in their children’s

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Open Source Center figures underestimate the scale of unrest because ‘‘mass incidents’’ in
China are largely unreported in rural areas and censored by local governments. Despite thislimitation, the similar findings of both the Open Source Center and Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences suggest broad trends.
† In this particular report, ‘‘mass incidents’’ were defined as protests involving more than 100
people.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00363

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

352
education over the last ten years, creating a more educated andskilled workforce. The number of university graduates grew fromless than a million in 1999 to nearly 7 million in 2014.40 At thesame time, the job market for these aspirants has not kept pacewith this shift, creating a glut of low-income university graduates.
Too proud or embarrassed to work in factories, these graduates
face higher unemployment and lower wage growth than migrants.41 A 2014 Peking University survey found more than onethird of recent Chinese graduates rely on their parents for financial
support after graduation.42
In part to address these issues, the CCP pledged to relax China’s
one-child policy in the Third Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee in November 2013 and allow select families to have a second
child.43 However, relaxation of the one-child policy is a long-term
solution and will not address the near-term financial burdens of anaging population.
Land Seizures
Compulsory seizures or acquisitions of land remains one of themost common and contentious sources of unrest. Throughout thecountry, localized disputes occur over inadequate compensation,
forced demolition of ancestral homes, and the diversion of money
into the pockets of local officials. Land disputes accounted forroughly 25 percent of unrest between January 2013 and June 2014,
according to Open Source Center analysis of Chinese and overseas
Chinese media.44 Local governments under the guise of furthering
economic development seize land at reduced prices and then resell
at a higher rate to factory owners or real estate developers. The
price difference is either skimmed by local officials or directed into
the local government’s treasury.45 These sales generate roughly 60
percent of local government budgets.46 According to the 2010 Nationwide Survey on Rural Land Rights, farmers were unsatisfied in
58 percent of reported land seizures due to low compensation or an
unfair process.* These seizures occurred despite a central government policy that no overall reduction of agricultural land is allowed
and compensation to farmers is to be fair and equitable. A 2014 report by the World Bank found that farmers’ compensation was generally 15 to 20 percent of the market price.47 Despite attempts by
the central government to rein in these seizures through audits
and directives, land sales grew 45 percent between 2012 and 2013,reaching an estimated renminbi (RMB) 4 trillion (approximately$645 billion).48 A 2014 report by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the CCP’s anticorruption agency, foundillegal land seizures and real estate corruption in 20 of the 21 provinces visited, accounting for 95 percent of all inspections.49
Labor Disputes
Independent labor unions, which might be expected to advocate
on behalf of workers and farmers, do not exist in China. Weak enforcement of basic rights and safe working conditions, the absence

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* This survey, conducted by Landesa, China Renmin University, and Michigan State University, interviewed 1,564 rural households in 17 major agricultural provinces. Jeffrey Riedinger
and Zhu Keliang, Chinese Farmers’ Land Rights at the Crossroads—Findings and Implications
from a 2010 Nationwide Survey (World Bank, April 18, 2011). http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTIE/Images/475494-1294353056366/ZhuLandRightsPres4.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00364

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

353
of collective bargaining and freedom of association, and the inactionof the state-run All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)
have fostered worker unrest in China.50 Chinese workers remain
largely unable to resolve disputes with employers over low compensation, wage and benefit arrears, factory closures or relocations,and poor working conditions.51 Migrants from rural areas are particularly vulnerable to exploitation.52 The ACFTU, an organization
under direct CCP control, oversees all representational activity.
Workers and most labor experts view the ACFTU as largely ineffective in representing workers’ grievances due to appointment of
ACFTU officials by employers and strong CCP control.53 Attempts
to organize outside of the ACFTU are largely suppressed.54 Local
governments are reluctant to step in to protect workers’ rights,
which could impact economic growth, employment, and investment.55 As a result, local governments force negotiated settlements
through a mixture of threats of imprisonment,* detention,† or violence.56 The China Labor Bulletin, a Hong Kong-based nongovernmental labor rights organization, found that police intervened inapproximately 20 percent of the 1,171 recorded wildcat strikes andprotests between January 2012 and December 2013, with a noticeable increase in the second half of 2013.57 Negotiated settlements
generally improve compensation for workers but provide little protection for strike leaders, who are generally sacked shortly after
the dispute is settled.58
Despite tight restrictions, Chinese workers have increasingly
held strikes and protests, emboldened by their ability to harnesssocial media and the passage of labor-related legislation in 2008
and 2010.59 Social media provides a new tool to mobilize and share
information on employment conditions and opportunities, allowing
workers to compare their conditions and to pursue higher wages.60
Public debates prior to the passage of legislation in 2008 and 2010
educated the labor force on their legal rights.61 Furthermore, growing labor shortages caused by the decline in the absolute numberof working-age people in China since 2012 have strengthened workers’ bargaining power.62 As a result, the number of labor disputes
reported by the Chinese government increased 50 percent since2008 (see Figure 1).63 In April 2014, 40,000 workers at Yue Yuen
Industrial Holdings, a supplier for Nike, Adidas, and other international companies, held a two-week strike over retirement benefits and low wages, representing one of the largest labor protests
since the 1970s.64 While these protests are generally unsuccessful,‡continued labor shortages, soaring living costs, and expectations for

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Strikers can face up to five years of imprisonment for having ‘‘disturbed social order.’’ Tom
Mitchell and Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘‘China Labor Activism: Crossing the Line,’’ Financial Times,
May 7, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bb0f1c3a-c953-11e3-99cc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Cp
fayWjq; China Labor Bulletin, ‘‘Labor Activist Wu Guijun Detained for One Year: China’s Workers More Determined Than Ever,’’ May 23, 2014. http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/labour-activistwu-guijun-detained-one-year-china%E2%80%99s-workers-more-determined-ever.
† For example, the Chinese government detained Wu Guijun for a year after his involvementin leading a mass protest in Shenzen over compensation regarding the relocation of a foreignowned factory. Geoffrey Crothall, ‘‘In China, Labor Activism Is Waking Up,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 1, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/
1500831/china-labour-activism-waking.
‡ The China Labor Bulletin estimates that of the estimated 1,515 strikes and protests between
January 2011 and August 2014, only 5 percent were successful. China Labor Bulletin, ‘‘Strike
Database,’’ http://www.numble.com/PHP/mysql/clbmape.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00365

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

354
enhanced retirement benefits as the first wave of migrant workers
reaches middle age could spur more disputes.65
Figure 1:

Total Labor Disputes Handled in China, 2001–2012

Source: Mary Gallagher, ‘‘China’s Workers Movement and the End of the Rapid-Growth Era,’’Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 81–95.

Rural-Urban Divide
China is undergoing the world’s largest rural to urban migration,
placing further strains on families. Over the last three decades, 260
million migrants have moved from rural to urban areas, responding, in part, to government programs that seek to boost growththrough urbanization.66 However, cities have not developed programs to care for the new city-dwellers due to China’s residency
permit system, the hukou.* The hukou system is hereditary and establishes eligibility for employment opportunities, compensation,
and access to government services such as education, healthcare,and housing. Changing the location of one’s hukou is very difficult,thereby linking migrants perpetually to the rural areas from which
they originated.67 Currently, 54 percent of China’s population resides in urban areas but only 36 percent of the population has anurban residency permit.68 Urban residents without a permit have
limited access to government services, creating a permanent
underclass and worsening the rural-urban divide. In some cases,
children are left with grandparents or on their own as their parents live and work far away.69
Then President Hu Jintao aggressively sought to reduce thisrural-urban divide and increase economic opportunities by shifting
economic development to inland provinces, eliminating the agricultural tax for farmers, building rural health clinics and subsidized

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00366

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S3Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For more information on the hukou system, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Chapter 2, Section 5, ‘‘China’s Internal Dilemmas,’’ 2011 Annual Report to Congress, November 2011, pp. 115–119.

355
housing, and supporting more lenient policies toward migrant
workers.70 For example, the Chinese government made significant
strides in reducing the healthcare disparity between rural andurban areas, but the government has not been able to overcome
soaring medical costs and overcrowding at large hospitals. (Formore information, see Chapter 1, Section 3, ‘‘China’s Health Care
Industry, Drug Safety, and Market Access for U.S. Medical Goods
and Services.’’) In July, the Chinese government under the leadership of President Xi issued a proposal to loosen hukou restrictions
with a goal of reallocating 100 million rural residents to urban
areas by 2020.71 But the plan faces pushback from municipal governments and urban residents, who are concerned over an erosionof service quality and additional costs from an influx of millions of
migrants into the system.72
Religious Repression
Since its inception in 1999, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has found systematic and egregious
violations of religious freedom in China.73 The Chinese government
maintains tight restrictions on Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, Falun
Gong, Catholicism and Protestantism, through harassing leaders,arresting and detaining practitioners, destroying property, and restricting the dissemination of religious materials.74 In May 2014,
China’s first national security ‘‘blue book’’ * designated religion asa serious threat to its national security.
Islam: In Xinjiang, Chinese officials regulate the appointment ofreligious leaders, conduct surveillance of mosques and practitioners,† and detain and arrest practitioners. They also restrict
overseas pilgrimages, forbid the observance of Ramadan,‡ and prohibit minors from entering mosques.75 In 2014, the Chinese government strengthened its ban on men growing long beards, women
wearing face-covering veils, and the education of children in religious schools.76 Since August, the CCP has claimed that it ‘‘rescued’’ nearly 300 children from religious education and detained atleast 85 people in connection with the religious schools.77
Tibetan Buddhism: The Chinese government maintains sole authority for the selection and education of Tibetan Buddhist lamas,
regularly denigrates the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual leader, ar-DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The ‘‘blue book’’ outlined four major national security threats: Western democratic values,
Western cultural hegemony, information inflows through cyberspace and the foreign media, andunderground religious activities. Lanxin Xiang, ‘‘China’s National Security Blue Paper a Worrying Throwback to the Cold War,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 20, 2014. http://
www.scmp.com/comment/article/1516132/chinas-national-security-blue-paper-worrying-throwbackcold-war.
† In Kashgar prefecture, Chinese officials maintained registrations of Muslim households withdetailed information on their religious behaviors, start of Quran instruction, and dress, such aswhether women wear veils. Qiao Long, ‘‘China Registering the Religious in Xinjiang,’’ RadioFree Asia, May 2, 2013. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/registration-05022013112851.html; Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, October
10, 2013.
‡ The Chinese government compels Party members, civil servants, students, and teachers notto observe Ramadan by threatening to expel or dismiss violators. To ensure compliance, the Chinese government required them to eat instead of fasting in front of colleagues and classmatesand scheduled classes or work during Friday prayers. Simon Denyer, ‘‘China’s Clampdown on
Islam Stokes Resentment and Violence,’’ Washington Post, September 20, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-war-on-terror-becomes-all-out-attack-on-islam-in-xinjiang/2014/09/19/5c5840a4-1aa7-4bb6-bc63-69f6bfba07e9_story.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00367

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

356
rests and detains practitioners, and restricts overseas travel andobservance of religious festivals or ceremonies.78 In addition, theChinese government interferes with Tibetan Buddhist religious
study to include: assigning government and CCP officials to monastery management, locating police stations or security offices onor near monasteries, restricting movement of nuns and monks between monasteries,* and forcing participation in ‘‘patriotic
education’’† campaigns.79
Falun Gong: The Chinese government maintains a nationwide
campaign‡ to curb the growth of the Falun Gong, a meditationbased spiritual movement, through arbitrary detention, torture,
psychiatric abuse, and arrest of practitioners as well as harassmentof lawyers who attempt to represent them.80
Christianity: In the last year, the Chinese government implemented more restrictions on Christianity, which it had previously
tolerated through informal understandings and self-censorship between officials and practitioners.81 Estimates in 2011 placed thenumber of Christians in China at 60 million with the largest Christian concentrations in Anhui, Fujian, Henan, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang
provinces.82 In April, Professor Fenggang Yang at Purdue University claimed the number of Christians in China will reach 247 million by 2030, making it the largest Christian population in theworld.83 The Chinese government has sought to rein in the public
profile and growth of Christianity since early 2014 by demolishing
163 churches and removing crosses or other signs of Christian faithin Zhejiang Province.§ 84 Catholics have reported church demolitions in Anhui and Henan provinces.85 In August, the State Administration for Religious Affairs announced that it will construct its
own Christian belief system to ‘‘adapt to China’s national condition
and integrate with Chinese culture.’’ 86 With the rapid growth ofChristianity in China, standoffs between practitioners and officials
likely will increase.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* A cornerstone of Tibetan Buddhist religious education is receiving training from theologicalexperts in various monasteries and religious sites, but restrictions on movement limit the quality and continuity of monastic study.
† ‘‘Patriotic education’’ in Tibet involves the denunciation of the Dalai Lama, support of the
CCP leadership and the socialist system, and allegiance to the 11th Panchen Lama, who is recognized by the Chinese government but unapproved by the Dalai Lama. Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report for 2013, U.S. State Department, July 28, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper.
‡ In 1999, following a large-scale protest involving 10,000 participants in Tiananmen Square
over harassment of practitioners, the Chinese government launched a nationwide campaign
against the Falun Gong, labeling the Falun Gong as an ‘evil cult’ in July 1999 and arresting
more than 30,000 Falun Gong practitioners by 2001. John Pomfret and Michael Laris, ‘‘China
Outlaws Nonconformist Spiritual Sect,’’ Washington Post, July 23, 1999. http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/china/stories/sect072399.htm; Adam Brookes, ‘‘Falun Gong: Living
in Fear,’’ BBC, April 26, 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/726895.stm.
§ Zhejiang province is a center for Christianity in China. In Wenzhou, a city known as ‘‘China’s Jerusalem,’’ Christians make up approximately 15 percent of the 9 million inhabitants. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Moves Against 2 Churches in Campaign against Christianity,’’ New YorkTimes, July 28, 2014. http: // www.nytimes.com / 2014 / 07 / 29 / world / asia / china-moves-against-2churches-in-campaign-against-christianity.html; China Aid Association, ‘‘Updated: China Aid Received Compilation of Persecuted Zhejiang Churches,’’ China Aid News, July 14, 2014. http://
www.chinaaid.org/2014/05/china-aid-receives-compilation-of-64.html; and Brice Pedroletti, ‘‘China’s Christians Fear New Persecution after Latest Wave of Church Demolitions,’’ Guardian,
July 4, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/05/china-christianity-wenzhou-zhejiangchurches.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00368

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

357
Environmental and Health Concerns
Greater public awareness of the effects of severe environmental
degradation and threats to public health from food and pharmaceutical impurities has led Chinese citizens to demand greater governmental action. Recent official reports, including the first nationwide survey on soil pollution, found that one-fifth of China’s arable
land and 60 percent of the country’s water is polluted.87 The Yale
2014 Environmental Performance Index found Chinese citizens’ exposure to fine particulate matter (PM2.5)* the highest in the world,
ranking last in a list of 178 countries.88 Furthermore, the Ministryof Environmental Protection found that only 9 out of 161 cities met
the new urban air quality standards for the first half of 2014.89
This degradation contaminates land, water, and air, posing significant health risks for Chinese citizens. (For an in-depth backgroundon food and health safety challenges in China, see Chapter 1, Section 3, ‘‘China’s Healthcare Industry, Drug Safety, and Market Access for U.S. Medical Goods and Services.’’)Public alarm over these health risks and ineffective mechanisms
to address these concerns has led to online activism and large-scaleprotests involving thousands of participants from various socioeconomic classes. The Open Source Center found that the numberof environmental protests grew from at least 47 incidents in 2013
to 72 incidents in just the first half of 2014.90 This increase is partially attributed to a series of environmental protests† against construction of PX factories.‡
Public anger at hazardous levels of air pollution reached a tipping point in 2013 and forced the Chinese government to dedicate
additional resources and to allow wider coverage of the issue by official media.91 The 12th Five-Year Plan on Environmental Protection allocated RMB 3.4 trillion (approximately $546.3 billion) for
environmental protection, and the State Council dedicated RMB
1.7 trillion (nearly $277 billion) to reduce air pollution by 2017.92
Furthermore, Premier Li Keqiang ‘‘declared war’’ on pollution in
March 2014 at the National People’s Congress.93 In April, the National People’s Congress passed amendments to the Environmental
Protection Law, which increase penalties for violations, strengthen
environmental agencies’ enforcement capability, and hold local
governments accountable for their jurisdiction’s environmental
quality.94
However, environmental and health damage will remain an issue
due to lax enforcement and restrictions on the creation of cross-provincial or national environmental nongovernmental organizations(NGOs).95 Local officials are reluctant to implement environmental
laws and regulations that reduce economic growth or otherwise
hinder officials’ promotion prospects within the CCP.96 In addition,

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* PM2.5 is made up of metal, organic chemical, acid, soil or dust, and allergen particulates
measuring 2.5 micrometers or smaller in diameter. Excessive exposure to PM2.5 aggravates existing heart and lung disease and is linked to higher incidences of heart attacks, asthma attacks, and bronchitis. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, ‘‘Basic Information,’’ http://www.epa.gov/airquality/particlepollution/designations/basicinfo.htm.
† Protests against the construction of PX factories have occurred in Xiamen in 2007, Dalian
in 2011, Ningbo in 2012, Kunming in 2013, Pengzhou in 2013, and Maoming in 2014.
‡ These figures are based on limited Chinese, Hong Kong, and other media reporting, which
likely underestimate the scale of environmental protests in China due to censorship and the remote location of such protests. Open Source Center, China: Anti-PX Protests Raise Social Tension, Impede PX Production, April 16, 2014. ID: CHR2014041629988268.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00369

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

358
local environmental regulators not only lack significant personnel
and financial resources but also rely on local governments rather
than the Ministry of Environmental Protection for funding, thus
creating a weak regulatory system vulnerable to political pressure.97 Citizens who attempt to increase public oversight of polluting firms risk harassment or arrest.98 Furthermore, restrictions
on registering and funding NGOs hamper the development of national or regional environmental NGOs, limiting the ability of the
public to challenge vested state and industry interests.99
Wide-Scale Corruption
Wide-scale corruption continues to erode the CCP’s legitimacy toits citizens. Small-scale profiteering has been augmented by the exploitation of critical economic factors such as land, promotions, investment funds, loans, permits, and construction. This profiteering
is increasingly seeping into everyday life for Chinese citizens.
Bribes are becoming a prerequisite for access to social services,entry into the best schools, and care in public hospitals. In Beijing,
the best public education costs more than double the average annual salary—despite regulations guaranteeing free public education.100 The frequency of embezzlement and bribes in new infrastructure projects has resulted in poor construction.* According toa statement by Qiu Baoxing, vice minister of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, in 2010, the average life expectancy † of a Chinese building is 25–30 years compared with 74 years
in the United States.101 Furthermore, increases in defense spending have created more opportunities for illicit activity by military
units responsible for procurement, logistics, and fiscal management.102
Patronage within the military has become institutionalized withlower level officials providing gifts and business deals to higher
level officials in return for promotions and assignments.103 In 2014,
recruits generally paid between RMB 50,000 and 100,000 (roughly$8,000 to $16,000), depending on their family’s connections, to ensure an entry-level position in the People’s Liberation Army that
paid an annual salary of around RMB 20,000 (approximately$3,000).104 Consideration for higher level positions requires bribes
worth hundreds of thousands of dollars.105 Once in these higher
level positions, officials expect to receive millions of dollars inbribes for promotions and appointments of subordinates, kickbacks
from procurement, and the embezzlement of public funds.106 Xu
Caihou, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission,
reportedly received RMB 35 million (an estimated $6 million) for
promotions from his subordinate Gu Junshan, then People’s Liberation Army deputy logistics chief.107 Gu Junshan benefited fromthese promotions, receiving RMB 120 billion (roughly $20 million)

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Shoddy construction contributed to the collapse of school buildings that killed 20,000 children in the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, a major railway crash in 2011, and the collapse of at leastsix bridges from 2011–2012. Eve Cary, ‘‘China’s Dangerous Tofu Projects,’’ Diplomat, February 10,
2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/chinas-dangerous-tofu-projects/; Jacey Fortin, ‘‘Bridges Falling Down—China’s Embarrassing Infrastructure Problem,’’ International Business Times, August 24, 2012. http://www.ibtimes.com/bridges-falling-down-chinas-embarrassing-infrastructureproblem-757205.
† Building life expectancy ‘‘refers to the durability of housing without substantial renovation.’’China Economic Review, ‘‘China’s Housing Sector Is Crumbling—Literally,’’ April 21, 2014. http://
www.chinaeconomicreview.com/china-housing-shoddy-building-quality-energy-incentives-GDP.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00370

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

359
in kickbacks for selling military-owned land in Shanghai for commercial development and distributing more than 400 homes, including more than 10 apartments in an expensive neighborhood in
Beijing, as gifts to friends and allies.108
In response, President Xi launched an anticorruption campaign
shortly after taking office in 2012. Although leadership transitionsin the past have often led to anticorruption crackdowns, recent developments demonstrate that President Xi’s campaign is wider inbreadth and larger in scope than previous campaigns in the last
three decades.109 In 2013, 182,000 party officials of the roughly 80
million CCP members were investigated.* In 2014, the CCDI moreaggressively expanded investigations. From January to May 2014,
the CCDI disciplined nearly 63,000 officials, a 35 percent year-onyear increase.110‘Fire Chief Wang’—
Leading China’s Anticorruption Campaign
At the helm of Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign is thehead of the CCP CCDI and member of the Politburo Standing
Committee, Wang Qishan. Known colloquially in China as ‘‘Fire
Chief Wang’’ for his frequent role as crisis manager, Wang holds
a reputation in China ‘‘as a leader who is capable and trustworthy.’’ 111 For example, in 2004, Wang was appointed to serve
as mayor of Beijing to help address the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) crisis.112
Wang’s background indicates he is a powerful figure alignedwith President Xi. Cheng Li, director of the John L. Thornton
China Center at The Brookings Institution, estimates that Wangis the second most powerful figure in China after Xi Jinping.113
Li notes that Wang Qishan and Xi Jinping have been closefriends for over 40 years. The two were classmates and study
partners as early as 1979.114 In terms of Wang’s politics, Brookings’ biography of Wang describes him as ‘‘likely [to] promote thedevelopment of foreign investment and trade, the liberalizationof China’s financial system, and tax-revenue reforms.’’115 Brookings’ analysis cites Wang’s leadership roles in key Chinese banks
and financial regulatory bodies prior to and during the 1997
Asian financial crisis. Wang served as vice governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and governor of China’s Construction Bank. From 2000 to 2003, Wang also served as the directorof the State Council General Office of Economic Reform.116

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* To put the anticorruption campaign in context, of the 5,000 officials ranked vice minister orabove only 35 have been arrested, representing 0.7 percent of high-ranking officials. Cheng Li
and Tom Orlik, ‘‘China’s Corruption Crackdown More Than Factional Politics, Says Cheng Li,’’
Bloomberg Brief, July 31, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/research/files/interviews/2014/07/31%20china%20corruption%20crackdown%20li/brief%20cheng%20li.pdf; Lingling Wei and Bob
Davis, ‘‘China’s Top Graft Buster, Wang Qishan, Probing Thousands,’’ Wall Street Journal, August 20, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-top-graft-buster-probing-thousands-1408588202.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00371

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

360
‘Fire Chief Wang’—
Leading China’s Anticorruption Campaign—Continued
During his administration of the CCDI, Wang has shown thatthe current leadership in China is serious about cracking down
on corruption, at least among Xi’s political enemies. In what wasconsidered his boldest move, Wang successfully proposed a controversial policy to allow investigation of current and retired
members of the Politburo Standing Committee.117 The change
seemed to be a prerequisite for Wang and the CCDI to target theformer Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang,
who is a key political adversary to Xi Jinping.118 While Wang’s
actions may be construed to mean that he is paving the way for
Xi to implement the true economic reforms he has promised,some analysts speculate that Wang’s own history as a princelingthrough marriage* and his strong ties with major state-owned
enterprises indicate that he may favor state monopoly over agreater role for the market in China’s economy.119
Further diverging from previous anticorruption campaigns, thecurrent campaign has targeted greater numbers of high-level officials within the CCP, military, and state-owned enterprises to include: Zhou Yongkang, former Politburo Standing Committee member and secretary of the CCP’s Central Politics and Law Commission;† Xu Caihou, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission under then President Hu; and Jiang Jiemin, the former chairman of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).120 Zhou,
highly influential in the petroleum sector and domestic security apparatus, became the first current or retired member of the Politburo Standing Committee to be investigated in over three decades.121 Xu, the most powerful uniformed military official under
President Hu, became the highest-ranking PLA officer to be expelled from the CCP in nearly three decades.122 Both Zhou and Xu
are linked to the disgraced Chongqing party boss Bo Xilai, who was
expelled from the CCP and sentenced to life in prison in 2013.123
The anticorruption campaign has also targeted high-level officialsat powerful state-owned enterprises, such as the CNPC, China’s
largest national oil company. China’s National Audit Office uncovered 35 cases of bribery and embezzlement at various state-owned
enterprises earlier this year and in June reported fraud in 11 stateowned enterprises.124 Shortly after, the CCP expelled Jiang Jiemin,the former chairman of CNPC, and Wang Yongchun, the former
vice general manager of CNPC.125 In total, the CCDI has found 67

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Wang Qishan is the son-in-law of former Politburo Standing Committee member and vice
premier Yao Yilin. Kerry Brown, The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China (NewYork, NY: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2014), pp. 150–158; Brookings Institution, ‘‘Wang Qishan: One
of China’s Top Future Leaders to Watch,’’ http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china/topfuture-leaders/wang_qishan.
† The CCP’s Central Politics and Law Commission oversees China’s domestic security andlegal apparatus encompassing police, prosecutors, and judges. Cheng Li, China’s Top Future
Leaders to Watch Biographical Sketches of Possible Members of the Post-2012 Politburo (Part 3)(The Brookings Institution, August 16, 2012). http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/research/files/
papers/2012/8/16 china top leaders 3 li/china leaders three.pdf; Jeremy Page, ‘‘China Reins in New
Security Boss’s Clout,’’ Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2012. online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323622904578128683521454390?mg=reno64-wsj.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00372

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

361
high-level officials at state-owned enterprises guilty of corruption,
including 38 executives.126
Additionally, the Chinese government has widened the anticorruption campaign to target ‘‘naked officials,’’ who remain in China
while sending their children or spouses, usually along with ill-gotten assets, abroad.127 The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimated that between 1995 and 2008, 20,000 officials fled abroadwith $130 billion in assets.128 In January, the Organization Department of the CCP’s Central Committee * issued regulations thatprohibited ‘‘naked officials,’’ who are viewed as a flight risk, frompromotions within the CCP.129 In July, Wang Qishan directed
CCDI investigators to pursue ‘‘naked officials’’ and dispatched inspection teams in July to ten provinces to identify such officials as
part of its broader corruption investigations.130 Later that month,the Guangdong provincial government identified 2,190 ‘‘naked officials,’’ resulting in the removal of 866 officials from their posts.131
In September, Cao Jianming, the Procurator-General of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, announced a six-month campaign inpursuit of suspects of corruption who fled abroad through extradition, repatriation, and persuasion.132 The Chinese government in2013 extradited 762 suspects and recovered $1.7 billion in property
and funds.133 This year, more than 400 suspects of corruption were
either extradited or volunteered to return to China to turn themselves in.134 Chinese official media reported that more than 150
corrupt Chinese officials and citizens currently reside in the UnitedStates.135
President Xi is attempting to build public support and consolidate power by addressing corruption within the Party and eliminating the power bases of prominent members of different CCP factions that threaten his leadership. In late July, official Chinese
media reported that the CCDI was sending a large task force to investigate corruption allegations of CCP members in Shanghai, an
enduring stronghold of former President Jiang Zemin.136 Thesemoves further suggest that President Xi’s anticorruption campaign
is designed at least in part to eliminate potential political threats
to his leadership.
Some analysts suggest the anticorruption campaign could help
bolster the CCP’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public with the dismissals of high-ranking officials. It could also improve official behavior—at least in the short-run—with reductions in luxury consumption and provide the necessary political capital for President
Xi to implement broader institutional reforms in the future.137 For
analysis on the anticorruption campaign’s potential impact on future economic reform, see Chapter 1, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review:
Economics and Trade.’’The campaign is having an effect on the sales of tobacco and liquor, traditional luxury gifts given to Chinese officials in exchange
for political favors.138 For example, Diageo, the world’s largest liquor firm, experienced a 79 percent drop in 2014 net sales of its
high-quality Chinese liquor.139 Diageo CEO Ivan Menezes estimates that one-fifth of its high-end Chinese liquor market is attrib-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Organization Department of the CCP’s Central Committee is in charge of the selection,
promotion, and assignments of CCP officials.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00373

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

362
uted to gift giving and government entertaining.140 In addition, thecampaign is harming the VIP gambling market * in Macau, which
relies on gaming revenue for nearly 90 percent of its government
revenue.141 The revenues from VIP gambling by Chinese government officials and wealthy business executives in Macau dropped
17 percent year-on-year in June.142 In Hong Kong, sales of luxury
goods such as jewelry and watches dropped 28 percent in June, declining for the fifth straight month in a row.143
Nonetheless, profiteering opportunities remain endemic in the
CCP’s patronage structure. Without systematic legal and political
reforms such as free media and an independent judicial system, theanticorruption campaign will have limited long-term effectiveness.144 The recent crackdowns on anticorruption activists such as
the New Citizens Movement† and continued secrecy of CCDI investigations suggest the government is not ready for such reforms.145
Ethnic Unrest
In the past year, the Chinese government increased its alreadytight control in the autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, providing residents there few outlets to resolve grievances ranging
from land seizures and demolitions to religious repression.‡ Unrestin these regions remains a highly sensitive issue for the CCP because protests attract considerable international attention andsympathy, challenge CCP and Chinese government rule over theregions where they are located, and reflect what the CCP considers
the ‘‘three evils’’ (separatism, extremism, and terrorism).146 Exact
figures on ethnic unrest are difficult to obtain in Xinjiang andTibet.§ The Chinese government maintains ‘‘widespread, arbitrary,
and unexplained’’ restrictions on independent reporting,¶ severely

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The VIP gambling market accounts for nearly two-thirds of gambling revenues in Macau.
Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘‘Macau’s High-Rolling Casinos Suffer amid China Anti-Graft Storm,’’
Financial Times, September 26, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/79e893dc-4552-11e4-9b7100144feabdc0.html#slide0.
† The New Citizens Movement is a loosely organized civil society organization that advocatesfor freedom, justice, equality, and rule of law, specifically the disclosure of government officials’
assets. In 2014, the Chinese government launched a crackdown on the group, arresting manyof its members. While its total membership is unknown, the CCP views the group as a threat.
Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: End Nationwide Crackdown on Activists,’’ June 29, 2014. http://
www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/29/china-end-nationwide-crackdown-activists.
‡ In 2009, the Chinese government announced plans to demolish 85 percent of the Old Cityof Kashgar and redevelop with new construction, but similar to Han Chinese concerns over landseizures, local Uyghur residents report a lack of consultation or transparency and worry overthe quality of new construction. Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2013 Annual
Report to Congress, October 10, 2013; Joshua Hammer, ‘‘Demolishing Kashgar’s History,’’ Smithsonian Magazine, March 2010. http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/demolishing-kashgarshistory-7324895/?all.
§ Access to Tibet and other Tibetan areas in nearby provinces for foreign journalists, humanrights researchers, and tourists remains highly restricted—even more than in Xinjiang—severely limiting the amount of information available. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014
(January 23, 2014). www.freedomhouse.org / report / freedom-world / freedom-world-2014; Stephen
McDonell, ‘‘Inside Xinjiang: China Clamps Down on Dissent in Restive Uighur Homeland,’’ Australian Broadcasting Corporation, September 30, 2014. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-30/
journalists-blocked-from-reaching-areas-in-xinjiang/5776086.
¶ Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) China correspondent Stephen McDonell faced
intense surveillance and constant interference by Chinese officials while filming an investigative
report in Xinjiang. In September, Chinese embassy officials warned the ABC in Sydney thatscreening their report on Xinjiang would have ‘‘wider implications,’’ likely referring to ABC’s
business relationships with CCTV and Shanghai Media Group. Stephen McDonell, ‘‘Inside
Xinjiang: China Clamps Down on Dissent in Restive Uighur Homeland,’’ Australian Broadcasting Corporation, September 30, 2014. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-30/journalistsblocked-from-reaching-areas-in-xinjiang/5776086; ‘‘Chinese Embassy Warns of ‘Wider Implications’ over Foreign Correspondent Story on Xinjiang Conflict,’’ Australian Broadcasting Corpora-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00374

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

363
punishes locals who share information on unrest with foreign news
media, and aggressively censors online and social media platforms.* 147 Following ethnic riots in Tibet in 2008 † and in Xinjiangin 2009,‡ the Chinese government implemented martial law inthese regions that is still largely in effect today.
To counter ethnic dissent, the Chinese government pursues adual track strategy of a heavy security presence and economic investment.148 On average, spending on public security from 2007 to2012 increased annually in Tibet by 28 percent and in Xinjiang by
27 percent.149 Authorities maintain strict controls on political, religious, and cultural expression and further tighten these controls
around sensitive anniversaries such as the CCP’s ‘‘peaceful liberation’’ of Tibet in May, the CCP’s founding in July, and the 2009
Urumqi ethnic riots in July. Measures include severe limitations on
religious practices and institutions; § short-term shutdowns ofmedia and Internet access; ¶ restrictions on international and domestic travel; arbitrary detentions, harassment, and imprisonmentof Tibetans and Uyghurs; forcible repatriation of ethnic Uyghurs;
and compulsory bilingual education.#
The Chinese government also dedicates billions of dollars toward
development projects to increase living standards and spur doubledigit economic growth.150 For example, China is planning to build
808 miles of railway lines and 68,351 miles of roadways in Tibet
by 2020.151 Similarly, the Chinese government in 2011 dedicated
RMB 2 trillion (roughly $300 billion) on infrastructure in Xinjiang

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

tion, October 1, 2014. http: // www.abc.net.au / news / 2014 - 09 - 30 / abc - warned - of - wider implications-from-china-story/5779218.
* In August, a Uyghur man who wrote online about the violence in July 2014 was arrested
for spreading ‘‘rumors.’’ Nectar Gan, ‘‘China Arrests Man for Allegedly Spreading Rumours
about Deadly Xinjiang Attack,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 12, 2014. http://
www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1571316/china-arrests-man-allegedly-spreading-rumours-aboutdeadly-xinjiang.
† In March–April 2008, peaceful protests in Lhasa spread throughout Tibet and quickly turned
violent, resulting in as many as 220 deaths, 1,300 injured, and nearly 7,000 detained or imprisoned. Robert Barnett, ‘‘The Tibet Protests of Spring 2008: Conflict between the Nation and theState,’’ China Perspective, March 2009. http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/4836?file=1; Edward
Wong, ‘‘China Tightens Security in Tibet,’’ New York Times, March 9, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/10/world/asia/10tibet.html.
‡ A conflict between Uyghur and Han in Guangdong province that led to the death of two
Uyghur workers triggered large-scale, violent ethnic riots that resulted in 1,700 injuries, 197
deaths, and 1,400 arrests. Amnesty International, ‘‘China: ‘Justice, Justice: The July 2009 Protests in Xinjiang, China’,’’ July 2, 2010.
§ For example, in August, local officials in Karamay, Xinjiang, instituted a temporary ban on
men with beards and women with headscarves riding public transportation during a sports
competition. Ben Blanchard, ‘‘China Charges Prominent Uighur Professor with Separatism,’’
Reuters, February 25, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/25/us-china-xinjiang-academicidUSBREA1O15420140225; Alexa Olesen, ‘‘In One Xinjiang City, Beards and Muslim Headscarves Banned from Buses,’’ Foreign Policy, August 5, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/
2014/08/05/karamay_bans_beards_muslim_headscarves_from_public_buses_xinjiang.
¶ Authorities have regularly shut down the Internet in parts of Xinjiang and Tibet for several
days or weeks in response to unrest to include at least twice in 2009, two times in 2012, oncein 2013, and twice in 2014. Tania Branigan, ‘‘China Cut Off Internet in Area of Tibetan Unrest,’’Guardian, February 3, 2012. http: // www.theguardian.com / world / 2012 / feb / 03 / china - internet links-tibetan-unrest; Index on Censorship, ‘‘China Celebrates Dalai Lama’s Birthday by Cutting
Communications in Tibetan Region,’’ July 10, 2012. http://www.ifex.org/china/tibet/2012/07/10/
communications_cut/; Madeline Earp, Throttling Dissent: China’s New Leaders Refine Internet
Control (Freedom House, July 2013). http: // www.freedomhouse.org / sites / default / files / resources /Throttling%20Dissent_FOTN%202013_China_0.pdf; Li Jing, ‘‘Police Shoot Dead Dozens ofAttackers during Mob Violence in Xinjiang,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 29,
2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1562211/dozens-killed-mob-violence-xinjiang-terrorattack; and Jeremy Page and Ned Levin, ‘‘Web Preaches Jihad to China’s Muslim Uighurs,’’
Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/web-preaches-jihad-to-chinasmuslim-uighurs-1403663568.
# For in-depth analysis on Xinjiang and Tibet, see Congressional Executive Commission on
China, 2014 Annual Report to Congress, October 9, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00375

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

364
from 2010 to 2015 to include: six airports, 5,200 miles of railways,
and 4,446 miles of roadways.152
These infrastructure projects aid extraction of natural resources,
attract additional Han migration and tourism, and facilitate rapid
deployment of Chinese military troops to China’s western borders.153 In Tibet, the expansion of the railways has improved theaccessibility and extraction of Tibet’s mineral reserves, valued at
RMB 600 billion (an estimated $98 billion). Natural resource extraction is expected to grow from 3 percent of the region’s GDP in2010 to account for one-third by 2020.154 However, these mining
projects come at the expense of local Tibetans, who must live withsevere environmental degradation resulting from mining activities.
Local Tibetans also lack royalties or other forms of compensationfrom these projects—largely overseen by state-owned mining firms
with Han Chinese migrant laborers.155 Additionally, the windfall
from tourism largely benefits Han Chinese who provide nearly all
the services for Chinese tourists, including hotels, restaurants, andtransportation.156 Uyghurs face similar issues. One Uyghur scholar
noted, ‘‘The resources from Xinjiang are going one way, and people
from the mainland are coming the other way.’’ 157
Simultaneously, the Chinese government promotes assimilationby providing incentives for interethnic marriages and encouraging
Han Chinese migration to ethnic areas to dilute the population of
Tibetans and Uyghurs, who are the majority. Under President Xi,
the Chinese government is encouraging more interethnic marriages, a policy first implemented in Tibet and recently expanded
to Xinjiang.158 Interethnic couples from Tibet and Xinjiang receive
cash incentives and preferential access to medical, schooling, andhousing benefits.159 As ethnic tension has risen, these benefits
have increased. In one Uyghur-dominated province in Xinjiang,
couples are eligible for an annual RMB 10,000 (approximately$1,600) subsidy for up to five years as well as up to RMB 20,000(roughly $3,250) in medical expenses and RMB 5,000 (around $800)
per year for their children attending a state-approved Chinese
school.160 When combined, these benefits are roughly five times theaverage annual income for rural residents.161 Additionally, thequasi-military, quasi-commercial Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps * announced plans in August to build seven new
cities in the next few years to integrate Uyghurs in Xinjiang’s restive southern region † into Chinese society.162
Despite these attempts to further integrate Tibetan and Uyghur
minorities, discriminatory hiring practices ‡ continue to expand theDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps is a unique quasi-military, quasi-commercial that maintains its own administrative, judicial, and enforcement bodies. It is also an important economic driver in Xinjiang, accounting for 17 percent of Xinjiang’s GDP in 2013. Chen
Yang, ‘‘Xinjiang to Build Cities from Scratch in Restive Regions,’’ Global Times (China), July
3, 2014. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/868764.shtml; Economist, ‘‘Circling the Wagons,’’ May
25, 2014. http://www.economist.com/news/china/21578433-region-plagued-ethnic-strife-growthimmigrant-dominated-settlements-adding.
† Ethnic minorities, mainly Uyghurs, compose 80 percent of the population in southern
Xinjiang. Chen Yang, ‘‘Xinjiang to Build Cities from Scratch in Restive Regions,’’ Global Times(China), July 3, 2014. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/868764.shtml.
‡ For example, Uyghurs are prevented from becoming truck drivers because they cannot obtain the necessary license to haul fuel over concerns that oil and gas tankers could become
weapons. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Uighurs in China Say Bias Is Growing,’’ New York Times, October
7, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/world/asia/uighurs-in-china-say-bias-is-growing.html?pagewanted=all.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00376

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

365
income disparity between these minority groups and Han Chinese,exacerbating tensions.163 State-owned enterprises continue to hire
Han Chinese predominantly. Local governments have reportedly
provided subsidies for Han farmers, separating Uyghurs and Tibetans from the economic opportunities of this investment.164 For example, a RMB 534 billion (approximately $87 million) investmentby the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in its agricultural farms designated 30 percent of the positions at these farms
for ethnic minorities with the remaining 70 percent left for Han
Chinese.165 In July, Chinese officials announced RMB 20 billion(an estimated $3.2 billion) in funding for Xinjiang’s textile sector *to create 800,000 new jobs, but it is unclear how many of these jobs
will be designated for Uyghurs.166
Tibet
Self-immolation became a dramatic form of protest against CCP
rule following the ethnic riots in 2008. According to Human Rights
Watch and Tibetan exile groups, 132 self-immolations have occurred since 2009.167 In response, the Chinese government increased its surveillance in 2012 through the construction of 600 police posts and expansion of volunteer security groups.168 In 2013,
the Chinese government further bolstered its presence by stationing 60,000 new officials and Party members in Tibet to conduct
political reeducation programs, establish security units for surveillance, and promote economic development.169 The cost and size of
this campaign accounts for more than a quarter of the regional
budget and the largest proportion of provincial-level officials sent
to the countryside since 1949.170 In addition, local governments enacted collective punishment on communities and family members tocombat the spread and increasing frequency of self-immolation.171
In the predominantly Tibetan Ruoergai County in Sichuan Province, forms of punishment included three-year bans on family members’ application for loans, business licenses, or government employment; mandatory financial deposits by communities with return dependent on no self-immolations; halt of investment projects
for villages and districts where self-immolations occurred; and isolation and financial auditing of monasteries.† Similar guidelines
have been found in other counties.172 These actions have contributed to the decline in the number of self-immolations in the lastyear. Under President Xi, restrictions remain severe.173
Xinjiang
Since 2013, attacks by militant Uyghurs against Han Chinese in
Xinjiang have escalated and evolved. Chinese state-run media
claims at least 373 people, mainly Uyghurs, have died in Xinjiangrelated violence since April 2013, while Uyghur exile groups andthe U.S.-government-funded Radio Free Asia report much higher
death tolls.174 See Table 1 for a timeline of this violence.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, whose workforce is nearly 90 percent Han Chinese, dominates cotton production in Xinjiang. Economist, ‘‘Circling the Wagons,’’ May 25, 2014.
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21578433-region-plagued-ethnic-strife-growth-immigrantdominated-settlements-adding; James Leibold, Xinjiang Work Forum Marks New Policy of ‘Ethnic Mingling’ 14:12 (Jamestown Foundation China Brief, June 19, 2014).
† For additional information on this policy, see Congressional Executive Commission on China,
2014 Annual Report to Congress, October 9, 2014, pp. 176–178.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00377

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

366
Table 1:Timeline of Recent Reported Major Attacks in China

Date

Location

Explanation

October 28,
2013

Tiananmen Square
Car Bombing
Beijing, Beijing
Municipality

A car bomb was driven into the gate ofTiananmen Square killing five and injuring approximately 40 people. The
East Turkestan Islamic Movement(ETIM) claimed responsibility.

March 1, 2014

Knife Attack
Kunming, Yunnan

A group of eight knife-wielding attackers, rumored to be Uyghur separatists,killed 29 people and wounded more than
143 in the Kunming train station.

April 30, 2014

Train Station Bombing Shortly after President Xi’s trip to the
Urumqi, Xinjiang
province, a bombing at the Urumqi
train station killed three and injured 79
people. Chinese officials blamed ETIM;
the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP)
claimed responsibility.

May 22, 2014

Market Bombing
Urumqi, Xinjiang

Two cars drove through a Han vegetable
market and set off handmade explosive
devices, killing 43 people and injuring
94.

July 28, 2014

Violent Clashes
Shache County,
Xinjiang

Violent clashes between Chinese policeand Uyghurs reportedly led to thedeaths of 35 civilians and 59 terrorists
and the arrest of 215 people. Chinese officials waited a day to report the violence and blamed the bloodshed on
ETIM and the influence of foreign terrorist organizations. The number is likely higher with one Han resident claiming more than 1,000 people were killed,
and the World Uyghur Congress claiming at least 2,000.

September 21,
Multiple Bombings
Several bombs detonated in a shop,
2014
Bugur County, Xinjiang open market, and two police stations.
Chinese official media initially reported
2 deaths and revised its figures fivedays later to 50 deaths, including 40 ‘rioters’ and 54 injured. Radio Free Asia
disputes these figures with reports fromeyewitnesses of over 100 people injured.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Source: ‘‘China Says Islamist’s Holy War Message Proves Terror Threat,’’ Reuters, November
25, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/25/us-china-xinjiang-idUSBRE9AO0B520131125;
Shannon Tiezzi, ‘‘Who Is Fighting China’s War on Terror?’’ Diplomat, November 26, 2013. http://
thediplomat.com/2013/11/who-is-fighting-chinas-war-on-terror/; BBC, ‘‘China Kunming Knife
Attack: Three Suspects Captured,’’ March 3, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china26420863; AFP, ‘‘Kunming Knife Gang ‘Tried to Leave China’ before Attack,’’ Telegraph, March 5,
2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10677244/Kunming-knife-gang-triedto - leave - China - before - attack.html; Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘Attacks Show Bolder Terror Threat
Growing in China,’’ Associated Press, May 2, 2014. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/
may/2/attacks-show-bolder-terror-threat-growing-in-china/; Michael Martina and Megha Rajagopalan, ‘‘Islamist Group Claims China Station Bombing: SITE,’’ Reuters, May 14, 2014. http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/us-china-xinjiang-idUSBREA4D07H20140514; Edward Wongand Chris Buckley, ‘‘32 Terrorist Groups Smashed in Xinjiang, China Says,’’ New York Times,
June 23, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/world/asia/32-terrorist-groups-smashed-inxinjiang-china-says.html; Alexa Olesen, ‘‘In One Xinjiang City, Beards and Muslim Headscarves
Banned from Buses,’’ Foreign Policy, August 5, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/05/karamay_bans_beards_muslim_headscarves_from_public_buses_xinjiang; Xinhua, ‘‘37 Civilians Killed, 13 Injured in Xinjiang Terror Attack,’’ China Daily, August 3, 2014. http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-08/03/content_18237292.htm; Shohret Hoshur and Qiao Long,‘‘’At Least 2,000 Uyghurs Killed’ in Yarkand Violence: Exile Leader,’’ Radio Free Asia, August
5, 2014. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/yarkand-08052014150547.html; Xinhua, ‘‘40 Ri-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00378

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

367
oters Dead in Luntai Country Violence in Xinjiang,’’ September 25, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/25/c_127035563.htm; and Shohret Hoshur and Eset Sulaiman, ‘‘Official Death Toll in Xinjiang’s Bugur Violence Climbs to 50,’’ Radio Free Asia, September 25,
2014. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/bugur-09252014210804.html.

Official Chinese media and government sources labeled these incidents as terrorist attacks and have regularly blamed Uyghur terrorists with ties to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)*
and Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) for any violence in Xinjiang.175
However, many analysts argue that the current influence andreach of Uyghur terrorists within Xinjiang has remained small.176
Michael Clarke, research fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, argues that TIP is limited by lack of resources, small membership,
and a base of operations in Uzbekistan.177 Furthermore, Dilxat
Rexit, a spokesperson for the World Uyghur Congress, highlighted
China’s exaggeration of terrorism in Xinjiang stating, ‘‘This socalled charge of terrorism is a way for the government to avoid taking responsibility for the use of excessive force that causes so many
casualties.’’ 178 For example, in May, protests by hundreds ofdisenfranchised Uyghurs over the arrest of several middle school
girls and women wearing headscarves ended in the death of atleast two protestors and detention of more than 100 Uyghurs.179 A
complete and rigorous analysis of the scope and nature of the violence in Xinjiang is difficult because Beijing tightly controls traveland media reporting in the region. As a result, available information is fragmented or poorly corroborated.
In addition to rising levels of violence between disaffected
Uyghurs and police, the nature of the attacks by Uyghur militants
has changed. Whereas Uyghur militants had usually targeted government officials and buildings in Xinjiang, they are now attacking
civilians and soft targets in the region. Dr. Clarke explains:
The pattern of the recent attacks does suggest an escalation
or even radicalization of Uighur opposition to Chinese rule.
In contrast to past episodes of low-level violence inXinjiang, which have been characterized by low technology
and opportunistic attacks on representatives of the state(e.g., police, public security personnel or government officials), the current spate of violence through its targeting of
public spaces is clearly designed to be indiscriminate andmass impact in nature.180
Moreover, these militants may be employing tactics and strategies learned through their association with other international organizations. In a paper for Strategic Studies Quarterly, Philip Potter, an assistant professor of public policy and political science at
the University of Michigan, explains, ‘‘China’s ongoing security
crackdown in Xinjiang has forced the most militant Uyghur separatists into volatile neighboring countries, such as Pakistan, where
they are forging strategic alliances with, and even leading, jihadist
factions affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.’’ 181

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* ETIM is a Uyghur terrorist group seeking an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang. It was
designated in 2002 as a terrorist organization on the UN’s 1267 list and the U.S. Departmentof State’s Terrorist Exclusion Act. Most analysts believe ETIM operated briefly from the late
1990s to the early 2000s, collapsing after the death of its leader in 2003. It was largely replacedby the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) in 2005, leading the U.S. Department of State to remove
ETIM from their list.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00379

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

368
To help rein in rising unrest in Xinjiang, the Chinese government has stepped up economic development programs and enacted
stronger social and religious restrictions to promote stability and tofurther assimilate the Uyghurs into China’s majority ethnic Hansociety. In February, the Xinjiang government announced that overthe next two years, it would expand its local presence by stationing
200,000 high-level Party members within the region to conduct outreach, increase surveillance, and promote economic development.182
Instead of easing tension, these restrictions along with pervasive
discrimination are increasingly radicalizing Uyghur opposition
within Xinjiang.183
In addition, President Xi in May 2014 launched a year-longcounterterrorism campaign that has led to numerous arrests, public mass sentencing of suspects, new rules for bus carry-on items,
and expansion of surveillance. Since the campaign began, Chinese
officials have dismantled more than 40 organizations labeled by
Beijing as terrorist groups and arrested more than 600 people in
Xinjiang.184 In a show of force, authorities held a public mass sentencing at a stadium in Xinjiang for 55 people and handed out
three death sentences for terrorism, separatism, and murder.185 In
July, the Chinese government raised the level of security checks in
Urumqi on public transportation and issued stricter rules for bus
carry-on items—similar to airlines—that ban liquids, cigarette
lighters, and even yogurt.186 In September, officials in Urumqi
sought to further expand surveillance by raising rewards for information on terrorism or religious extremism up to RMB 1 million(roughly $163,000).187 Approximately RMB 100,000 (nearly$16,000) in rewards was handed out to each of six informants in
Hotan in August.188
China’s Responses to Unrest
The CCP has historically maintained domestic stability by relying on internal security forces and closely monitoring unrest. Since
the late 1990s, rising social unrest has led to increasing public security budgets and personnel dedicated to suppressing dissent.
President Xi has further expanded and enhanced China’s domestic
stability maintenance apparatus. These changes have implications
for freedom of expression and rule of law in China, as well as U.S.
economic and security interests.
The CCP’s Stability Maintenance Apparatus
The set of tools China uses to address social instability cuts
across powerful, overlapping institutions, involving the political, security, and legal arms of the Chinese government and CCP—fromthe national through the local levels. China’s internal security
structure includes its three main internal security forces—the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), People’s Armed Police (PAP), andPeople’s Liberation Army (PLA)—along with the Ministry of State
Security,* other state law enforcement organs, state and private se-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is one of China’s leading civilian intelligence entities
responsible for both foreign and domestic intelligence work. It is subordinate to the State Council. Among other responsibilities, the MSS collects intelligence on dissenters in China and reportedly targets Chinese dissidents and prodemocracy groups abroad. For more information, see
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009 Annual Report to Congress, November 2009, pp. 150–151.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00380

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

369
curity contractors, and citizen volunteers. The legal body of China’s
stability maintenance apparatus involves petition offices, courts,
procuratorial bureaus, and China’s vast network of legal and extralegal detention facilities. Finally, the stability maintenance apparatus includes the Party’s Central Propaganda Department, whichis responsible for censoring media to prevent discussion of topics
that could lead to calls for change, and the Internet censorshipapparatus.189
Prior to President Xi, then Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, now under investigation for corruption, largely
controlled China’s domestic stability maintenance apparatus by virtue of his position as Secretary of the CCP’s Central Politics and
Law Commission. The Central Politics and Law Commission at thetime oversaw the political-legal committees across the Chinese government that have jurisdiction over the courts, prosecutors, police,
and surveillance. Since coming to power in 2012, President Xi hastaken control of the domestic security apparatus by demoting theCentral Politics and Law Commission Secretary seat from the Politburo Standing Committee to the regular Politburo, along withcreating and chairing the new Central National Security Commission and the Central Internet Security and Informationization
Leading Group (see ‘‘Internet and Social Media Censorship Controls’’ later in this section). For a discussion of the Central National
Security Commission and its focus on domestic security, see Chapter 2, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs.’’
As chair of these new policy bodies, President Xi directly oversees the most important actors and components of China’s domestic
stability maintenance apparatus, superseding the Central Politics
and Law Commission. The stability maintenance apparatus now
has higher level and more centralized leadership under President
Xi, potentially enabling China to more effectively and efficiently
anticipate and respond to social unrest. Dr. Tanner testified to theCommission that ‘‘[President] Xi may be the first Party chief since1949 to personally head a top committee overseeing domestic security and may be on his way to becoming the most hands-on leader
with regard to social control in China’s history.’’ 190
China’s Internal Security Forces
Over the last decade, China strived to improve its ability to suppress ‘‘mass incidents’’ by adding resources to and adjusting thestructure and missions of the MPS, PAP, and PLA. These forces
now have higher-quality equipment and arms and conduct more realistic training, allowing for faster, more robust, and more lethal
responses to sudden outbreaks of unrest.
Ministry of Public Security: According to the CCP, the MPS—
along with national and local state security, judicial, and procuratorial bureaus—serve as China’s ‘‘first line’’ of internal security.*

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* According to CCP writings, the MPS serves as the first line of internal security, the PAP
functions as the second line, and the PLA occupies the third line. Murray Scot Tanner, ‘‘Chapter
3: How China Manages Internal Security Challenges and its Impact on PLA Missions,’’ in Roy
Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2009), p. 45.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00381

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

370
The ministry, which is subordinate to the State Council, wasformed in 1954. The MPS deploys approximately 1.9 million police
officers to local Public Security Bureaus that are spread across
China.191
China supplements MPS officers with additional law enforcement
and other personnel, who are mainly supplied by private Chinese
security firms, to assist with the challenges of responding to sudden outbreaks of unrest. In a September 2011 speech, then domestic security czar Zhou Yongkang mentioned that 3,000 security
companies and a total of over 4.2 million personnel—more thandouble the number of MPS police officers—assist law enforcement
efforts.* In addition, cities employ urban management law enforcement officers † charged with enforcing a broad group of city regulations, such as performing forced evictions. Many cases depict theseofficers violently suppressing dissent, and as a result, citizens often
view them unfavorably.192
According to its official website, the ministry’s main responsibilities are local law enforcement and ‘‘maintenance of social security
and order.’’ 193 Local police under the MPS often are the first responders to civil disturbances, dispersing crowds and, alongside
local government officials, negotiating settlements with protesters.
In response to a string of violent attacks against civilians since
2013—such as the knife attack at the Kunming train station in
March 2014—and rising levels of violence and attacks on police officers in China more broadly, the MPS has increased routine patrols in urban areas.194 These patrols are focused particularly on
high-traffic areas, such as train stations, airports, schools, hospitals, and tourist attractions.195 Although most MPS officers on
routine patrols historically have been unarmed, possessing only
non-lethal means to quell unrest (such as pepper spray and clubs),
a new policy announced in April 2014 allows officers to carry revolvers while patrolling in major cities and sensitive regions.‡ Reports of accidental shootings by MPS officers in China already haveoccurred, suggesting a lack of adequate MPS police training for operating firearms. Continued accidental shootings could fuel greaterlevels of unrest by increasing public resentment of Chinese authorities.196
The MPS also has expanded its surveillance and monitoring
presence in major cities in an effort to combat terrorism. Security
checks at train and subway stations in Beijing and other cities
have increased.197 In addition, the MPS enlisted 850,000 volunteers to monitor suspicious activity in Beijing; other provinces andmunicipalities have followed. The Beijing Municipal Public Security
Bureau began providing awards of up to RMB 40,000 (approxi-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Dr. Tanner adds that this figure may not include hundreds of thousands of private security
personnel not affiliated with the forces Zhou Yongkang mentioned. Murray Scot Tanner, ‘‘Internal Security,’’ in Chris Ogden, Handbook of China’s Governance and Domestic Politics (London:
Routledge, 2013), pp. 90–91.
† Urban management law enforcement officers are commonly referred to as chengguan. For
more background on these officers and their common use of violence to address unrest, see
Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Beat Him, Take Everything Away,’’ May 23, 2012. http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/china0512ForUpload_1.pdf.
‡ The new armed patrols are being conducted in Xi’an, Shanghai, Qingdao, Changsha, andKunming, among other cities, and in the autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. AssociatedPress, ‘‘Chinese Police Begin Carrying Guns During Patrols,’’ April 21, 2014. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/chinese-police-begin-carrying-guns-during-patrols.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00382

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

371
mately $6,500) for any ‘‘substantial information on threats,’’ while
Liaoning and Sichuan, among other provinces, have announced
awards up to RMB 500,000 (approximately $81,000).198
Over the last decade, the MPS has strengthened its ability to
conduct law enforcement and stability maintenance operations bycreating ‘‘special police’’ units in major cities across China that specialize in antiriot and counterterrorism operations; 199 improving
the ministry’s intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities
through an emphasis on ‘‘informationization’’;* and constructing
additional extrajudicial detainment facilities.200
People’s Armed Police: The PAP is China’s ‘‘second line’’ of internal security. It falls under the direction of the Central MilitaryCommission and State Council. Formed in 1982, the paramilitary
police force consists of over 660,000 personnel.† Almost two-thirds
are assigned to local governments for internal security or to PAP
headquarters in Beijing, while most of the remaining personnel are
assigned to the MPS for border defense.201
There are generally two types of PAP units responsible for internal security: strategic PAP divisions and provincial PAP units. The
14 strategic PAP divisions are converted PLA infantry divisions.‡
These divisions are available to respond to internal disturbances—including riots, terrorist attacks, and emergency operations—anywhere in China and would support the PLA during wartime.§ The
30 provincial PAP units are subordinate to provinces, autonomous
regions, and centrally-administered cities.202 These units usually
are the first reinforcements for the local public security bureau
during ‘‘mass incidents.’’ PAP units generally are armed with automatic rifles and full riot gear, and operate armored personnel carriers.203 Some elite PAP subunits possess sniper rifles, silenced
submachine guns, and assault rifles.204
The PAP’s ineffective response to the 2009 Xinjiang riots, one ofthe deadliest incidents of unrest in China in the last decade withalmost 200 deaths, provided Beijing with the impetus to accelerate
PAP modernization. During the riots, the Xinjiang PAP units failed
to provide sufficient warning of the approaching violence and could
not stop the attacks without calling in strategic PAP units for reinforcement.205 Since the 2009 Xinjiang riots, the PAP has taken

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* ‘‘Informationization’’ refers to the forces’ ability to use C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities to accomplish missions. Peter Mattis, Informatization Drives Expanded Scope of Public Security (Jamestown
Foundation China Brief, April 12, 2013).
† PAP estimates vary to as high as one million, but the official government figure is 660,000.
Anthony H. Cordesman, Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese andOutside Perspectives (Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2, 2014), p. 164; International Institute for International Studies, The Military Balance (London: Routledge, February2014), p. 239; and Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation
for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, February 2012), pp. 27–28.
‡ No PAP units are stationed in Hong Kong or Macau. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army
Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, February 2012),
pp. 109–111.
§ The PAP consists of three unit groupings: (1) internal security units under PAP headquarters; (2) security guard, border defense, and firefighting units managed by provincial andcounty-level departments, and MPS bureaus; and (3) hydropower, gold mine, transportation,
forestry, and construction units with oversight from PAP headquarters and various ministries.
Cortez A. Cooper III, ‘‘Chapter 4: ‘Controlling the Four Quarters’: China Trains, Equips, andDeploys a Modern, Mobile People’s Armed Police Force,’’ in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, andTravis Tanner, Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2012), p. 137.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00383

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

372
measures to enhance information sharing and disseminate intelligence within and across units and to high-level leadership in Beijing. The PAP also has increased its ability to rapidly move forces
to priority areas by upgrading its facilities in Xinjiang and Tibet;
forward-deploying elements of an elite PAP unit to Xinjiang; andimproving its capabilities through more realistic and frequent
training.206
Beijing’s dissatisfaction with the PAP’s response to the 2009
Xinjiang riots also led the government to make a major change to
the PAP’s bureaucratic structure. The 2009 People’s Armed Police
Law for the first time clearly delegated authority over the PAP, reassigning bureaucratic control over deploying the PAP from county
officials to provincial officials and explicitly outlining its missions.207 Although the People’s Armed Police Law sought to clarify
which officials are allowed to mobilize the PAP in the event of anincident, Dr. Tanner noted to the Commission there is still a bureaucratic struggle between law enforcement and military officials
over delegating authority to local officials.208
To facilitate the PAP’s incremental upgrades of its facilities andunits, Beijing has increased the PAP budget by over 10 percent
every year since 2005 (see Figure 2). The PAP budget has morethan doubled in the last five years, from RMB 63.4 billion (approximately $9.3 billion) in 2008 to RMB 136.2 billion (approximately$22.3 billion) in 2013. China did not publicly announce its 2014
PAP budget in March during the annual National Party Congressmeeting as it has in past years.
Figure 2:

China’s Official Budget for the PAP, 2003–2013(US$ billions)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00384

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S3Fig2.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Note: These numbers represent China’s official PAP budgets, not actual aggregate spending.
All budgetary figures are converted from RMB into U.S. dollar (USD) based on China’s yearend nominal exchange rate.
Source: China’s Ministry of Finance, http://yss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengshuju/.

373
President Xi’s calls for more realistic training in the PAP and
frequent visits to PAP units in 2014 following successive violent attacks on civilians in China indicate his greater emphasis on China’s counterterrorism efforts and on developing PAP forces prepared for real-world missions.209 President Xi’s plans for broader
PAP reform, however, are unclear. The Third Plenum Decisioncalled for streamlining the structure of China’s internal security
forces, but Beijing has not publicized any subsequent policy decisions.210
People’s Liberation Army: The PLA serves as China’s third andfinal ‘‘line’’ of internal security, and one of its primary missions is
to maintain domestic stability and defend Party control. It falls
under the direction of the Central Military Commission. The PLA
consists of about 2.3 million total active personnel and roughly
510,000 reserve forces.211 The majority of PLA personnel are subordinate to China’s seven geographically organized military regions
and garrisoned near or in major Chinese cities.212
Although the PLA increasingly has emphasized external missions
beyond China’s borders since 1989, the PLA’s main mission remains to preserve the CCP regime. Beijing can deploy the PLA forinternal security missions as necessary. For example, the PLA canprovide transportation, logistics, and intelligence support for the
MPS and PAP and assist local internal security forces with the protection of key facilities and infrastructure during crises.213
Since the mid-2000s, the PLA also has assumed broader domestic
responsibilities to include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).214• According to Chinese state media, the PLA in 2014 has nine
national teams consisting of 50,000 troops and 45,000 provincial personnel for HA/DR.215 In response to the August
Yunnan earthquake that killed almost 600 people, the PLA deployed around 10,000 troops and 10 helicopters for rescue operations. The increased frequency and human impacts of national disasters, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake thatkilled 87,150 people, have pushed China to improve domestic
readiness and place greater emphasis on HA/DR as a key PLA
peacetime activity.216
Counterterrorism is another area in which the PLA has assumed
greater responsibilities over the last decade.217• In March 2014, Saimati Muhammat, major general and deputy
commander of the Xinjiang Military Area Command, said‘‘Xinjiang has been upgrading supplies for border troops andstepped up counter-terrorism training to armed forces.’’ 218 In
addition, the PLA has increased training with the MPS and
PAP to improve coordination for offensive counterterrorism operations and border defense.219

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• The PLA has expanded the frequency and scope of joint
counterterrorism training with foreign militaries. In August
2014, China participated in ‘‘Peace Mission-2014,’’ a counterterrorism exercise conducted in Inner Mongolia with over 7,000

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00385

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

374
troops from all Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) *member countries, marking the largest joint SCO military exercise to date.220 China has participated in previous Peace Mission iterations since 2007, sending only basic support personnel and conducting basic training with other SCO units.221
In this year’s exercise, China sent new PLA personnel andequipment for the first time, including more specialized Chinese logistics and reconnaissance personnel and an armed
drone.222 In addition, this year’s exercise focused on incorporating information-based conditions and conducting joint operations across SCO countries.223
U.S.-China Cooperation on Counterterrorism
In July 2014, the United States and China jointly held the
U.S.-China Counterterrorism Dialogue as part of the U.S.-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Human Rights Watch criticized the decision of the United States to hold the event, as it
could be viewed by Beijing as U.S. acceptance of China’s repressive treatment of Uyghurs as part of its counterterrorism campaign.224 Since April 2013, Chinese state media has reported atleast 323 deaths in Xinjiang alone—internal security forces were
responsible for almost half of the casualties and most were killedwith little reported evidence the accused assailants were indeed
terrorists.225
According to Amy Chang, research associate at the Center fora New American Security, the United States should be careful
engaging with China on counterterrorism:
The Counterterrorism Dialogue could have been an opportunity for the United States to moderate China’s harshcounterterror activities, but U.S. officials should be concerned that its cooperation is not misconstrued for endorsement of China’s stance. The United States has previously made this mistake: after the September 11 attacks,
China capitalized on U.S. vulnerability to terrorism topaint its own domestic ethnic-religious problems as a substantive terrorist issue. In 2002, this resulted in the designation of East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as
a foreign terrorist organization, granting a carte blanche
for China to pursue severe counterterrorist policies without judicious oversight.†
Although U.S. cooperation with China on counterterrorism
poses many challenges, it also has the potential for positive engagement if exchanges are limited to areas of common concern—such as Middle East jihadist groups and piracy.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Shanghai Cooperation Organization formed in 2001 and consists of six core member
countries, including China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Krgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Shanghai Cooperation Organization, http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/index.asp.
† Several years after designating ETIM as a terrorist organization, the United States removed
ETIM’s terrorist designation. Amy Chang, ‘‘Can America ‘Just Say No’ to China?’’ National Interest, August 18, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-just-say-no-china-11090?
page=2.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00386

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

375
China’s Legal Mechanisms to Repress Dissent
China has expanded its stability maintenance capabilities by enhancing legal mechanisms to repress dissent. After more than two
decades of promising legal reforms—albeit slowly and unevenly implemented—Beijing since the mid-2000s has sought to weakenthese legal measures and reassert the Party’s control.226 President
Xi’s early speeches and official appointments led some observers tobe hopeful he would pursue broader legal reforms. However, thewide-scale crackdown on rights advocates and lack of measured
progress to strengthen rule of law leave reform in doubt. CCP officials have indicated they will maintain close management of theChinese legal system, preventing any challenges to the Party.227
One of the Chinese government’s methods of repressing dissent
is the pervasive practice of pressuring judges to resolve civil disputes through Maoist-era mediation instead of trials decided bylaw. By doing so, China hinders citizens’ access to legal counsel
and a fair trial. According to Carl Minzner, associate professor oflaw at Fordham University, mediation sessions involving cases that
could generate social unrest are ‘‘primarily political conferences
aimed at coordinating responses between government bureaus (including the judiciary) and crafting solutions to ward off protest.’’ 228
Such disputes often do not result in fair compensation for litigants
and tend to do little to prevent future citizen complaints and unrest. In some cases, the sessions can be held outside of legal channels, and the parties involved in the dispute can be barred fromparticipating.229
In the limited trials that do occur, lawyers in China, particularly
those handling public interest cases, face more pressure from the
Chinese government. For example, lawyers representing politicallysensitive individuals often experience regular harassment, thethreat of detention, and, in some cases, the revocation of their license or practice.230 Continuing a trend from the latter years ofthen President Hu, President Xi is reining in lawyers advocating
for justice based on the Chinese constitution.231 In January 2014,
President Xi emphasized that ‘‘all political and legal workers
should maintain absolute loyalty to the Party.’’ 232
The CCP also restricts the ability of Chinese citizens to obtainredress for their grievances by detaining critics through extralegalmeans. For example, extralegal detention allows officials to put
citizens expressing dissent into ‘‘black jails’’ and to forcibly admit
them into psychiatric and drug rehabilitation facilities* and ‘‘legal
education classes.’’ † ‘‘Legal education classes,’’ often held in poor
conditions, are designed to ‘‘educate’’ dissenters about relevant laws
and regulations.233 In these extralegal detention facilities, citizens
lack access to a lawyer and can be held indefinitely.234
In a potentially positive development, China recently announced
legal reforms meant to remove some tools used by local officials to

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Although China in 2013 enacted its first Mental Health Law, requiring most patients admitted to psychiatric facilities to be made voluntarily, petitioners are still forcibly admitted. RadioFree Asia, ‘‘Chinese Activists Continue to Be ‘Mentally Illed’ in Spite of New Law,’’ November
14, 2013. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/law-11142013172615.html.
† Police also use ‘‘soft detention,’’ or de facto house arrest, on dissidents, rights activists, andothers who threaten ‘‘social stability.’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual
Report 2013, October 10, 2013, p. 79.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00387

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

376
arbitrarily imprison Chinese citizens. One of these reforms was theabolition of the reeducation through labor (RTL) system following
the Third Plenum in November 2013.235 RTL is an extrajudicial,administrative detention system of sentencing for up to three
years, with a possible fourth year extension, imposed by police officials against political dissidents and petitioners seeking redress forgrievances.236 China’s new leadership likely seeks to be seen as responding to public outrage over a string of high-profile abuses thathave been covered extensively in recent years in official and unofficial media in China and discussed by Chinese Internet users.
Although Chinese state media claims tens of thousands of prisoners had been released from RTL facilities by February 2014, local
governments retain methods to detain government critics either
extralegally or through the current legal system. Short-term criminal detentions have already increased significantly in the wake of
the RTL system’s closure, and other forms of extralegal detention
appear to be on the rise.237
Local governments also may have economic incentives to continue operating RTL facilities despite central government directives. The Chinese government has long viewed the RTL system as
an important source of economic production. As of 2013, an estimated 160,000–260,000 prisoners produce a wide-range of products,
some of which China exports to the United States.238 These RTL
facilities are a valuable source of income for local officials andwould be difficult to replace.239
China’s Public Security Budget
The CCP provides China’s stability maintenance apparatus with
ample funding to support its expanding missions and capabilities.
The official public security budget includes funds for China’s internal security forces, legal apparatus, and censorship regime. In addition, the budget includes other areas that do not apply specifically to stability maintenance, such as public infrastructure, safety,
and traffic control.240
China’s publicly acknowledged public security spending * in 2013
was RMB 778.7 billion (approximately $127.4 billion). Official public security spending increased more than RMB 67 billion (roughly$14 billion) in 2013 from 2012, exceeding national defense spending
for the fourth year in a row (see Figure 3). (For more information
on China’s national defense budget, see Chapter 2, Section 2, ‘‘China’s Military Modernization.’’) China’s central government public
security budget (not including provincial and local spending) rose
8 percent faster than the official national defense budget from 2007
to 2013, according to data from China’s Ministry of Finance.241
Nicholas Bequelin, researcher at Human Rights Watch, explainsthat this trend ‘‘shows the party is more concerned about the potential risks of destabilization coming from inside the country thanoutside, which tells us the party is much less confident.’’ 242

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Observers assert the actual public security budget is far greater than China’s announced figure. Edward Wong, ‘‘Beijing Goes Quiet on Rise of Local Security Budgets,’’ New York Times,
March 6, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/beijing-goes-quiet-on-rise-of-localsecurity-budgets/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00388

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

377
Figure 3:

China’s Official Spending on Public Security, 2007–2013(US$ billions)

Note: All data is extracted from budget execution figures, reflecting the official year-end funds
outlaid. All budgetary figures are converted from RMB into USD based on China’s year-end
nominal exchange rate. China’s Ministry of Finance does not provide specific national ‘‘public
security’’ budgetary data prior to 2007.
Source: China’s Ministry of Finance, http://yss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengshuju/.

In 2014, China for the first time did not publicly disclose its full
public security budget after the annual session of the National People’s Congress, only reporting the central government budget (RMB
205.1 billion or approximately $33.3 billion).243 China’s decision not
to release this figure could be due in part to the sensitive timingof the Party session following multiple violent attacks on Chinese
civilians. Dr. Xie Yue, political science scholar at Tongji University
and expert on China’s public security budget, asserted, ‘‘Once thestability maintenance fund gets too big, especially in comparison
with the defense budget, it’s likely to raise concerns among theinternational community and domestic public. I think [Beijing is]sidestepping the issue on purpose.’’ 244
Crackdown on Dissenters under President Xi

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00389

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S3Fig3.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

President Xi has implemented a campaign not seen in China
since the 1970s against individuals expressing dissent. Aside fromtargeting outspoken dissidents, President Xi has cracked down on
popular online commentators and advocates calling for reform
under Chinese law. Since President Xi took office, dozens of individuals across civil society—lawyers, writers, activists and others—
have been sentenced to one- to four-year jail terms.245 Dr. Sophie
Richardson, China director of Human Rights Watch, testified to theCommission that ‘‘people are now being [criminally charged] for activities that previously would have resulted in a mere chat with the378
authorities.’’ 246 Some of the most notable arrests this year include
the following:• In January, police arrested Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur rights activist and economics scholar, despite his peaceful calls for equal
rights to Uyghur minorities. Six months later, Xinjiang prosecutors charged Mr. Tohti with separatism, a charge that carries a potential death sentence.247 In September, Mr. Tohti
was given a life sentence in prison, and all of his assets wereseized by court order.248 Notably, in July, Elliot Sperling, aU.S. scholar on Tibet and Indiana University professor, wasdenied entry to China, likely due to his ties to Mr. Tohti.249
Dr. Sperling is part of a growing number of U.S. academics
barred from China as a result of their professional work on
topics China deems sensitive or their relationships with certain
Chinese citizens.*• In January, Xu Zhiyong, lawyer and founder of the New Citizens Movement, was arrested and received a criminal sentenceof four years in prison. He was charged with ‘‘gathering a
crowd to disturb public order.’’ 250 Dr. Richardson, after the
April arrests of New Citizens Movement members for
anticorruption protests, said, ‘‘Ironically, it was in part Xi
Jinping’s [anticorruption campaign]—as well as Xu Zhiyong’s[ideas] and others—that inspired these activists to take to thestreets to peacefully support the official campaign.’’ 251
In addition, the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 2014 marked the largest crackdown on public expression
yet. According to Human Rights in China, a New York-based nonprofit organization, 136 individuals were either detained or arrested, faced restricted movements, or disappeared due to their
purported involvement or feared participation in 25th anniversary
activities.252 Nearly a month before the anniversary, Chinese authorities detained Pu Zhiqiang, a well-known human rights lawyer,
the day after he attended a private Beijing seminar of 16 liberal
academics, lawyers, and others, revisiting the official verdict of the
Tiananmen Square massacre. Along with the arrest of Mr. Pu, 12of the meeting participants spent weeks in detention before eventually being released the day after the anniversary.253 The Chinese
government formally arrested Mr. Pu in June on charges of ‘‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles’’ and ‘‘illegally obtaining personal information.’’ 254 As of the publication of this Report, the Chinese government has not announced his sentence.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* In addition to Dr. Sperling, other prominent examples of U.S. scholars banned from China
include: the so-called ‘‘Xinjiang 13,’’ a group of U.S. scholars who wrote a book on Xinjiang published in 2004, and Perry Link and Andrew Nathan, co-editors of The Tiananmen Papers, a 2002
collection of leaked Chinese government documents on Beijing’s deliberations surrounding theTiananmen Square massacre. Dr. Link, professor at University of California-Riverside, asserts
the most concerning impact of China’s blacklist is its pressure on U.S. scholars to self-censor;
for more information see Perry Link, ‘‘The Long Shadow of Chinese Blacklists on American Academe,’’ The Chronicle of Higher Education, November 22, 2013. http://chronicle.com/blogs/
worldwise/the-long-shadow-of-chinese-blacklists-on-american-academe/33359; Daniel Golden
and Oliver Staley, ‘‘China Banning U.S. Professors Elicits Silence from Colleges Employing
Them,’’ Bloomberg, August 10, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-11/chinabanning-u-s-professors-elicits-silence-from-colleges.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00390

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

379
In September, the Chinese government responded to Chinese
citizens’ support for Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution with acrackdown on sympathizers and wide-scale censorship. (For more
information on the demonstrations in Hong Kong, see Chapter 3,
Section 4, ‘‘Hong Kong.’’) Some Chinese citizens assembled sympathy protests, and others shaved their heads and held umbrellas,
distributing these images on microblogs to show unity with theircompatriots.255 In response, the Chinese government has detained
more than 40 individuals for distributing images and news of thedemonstrations on microblogs, participating in sympathy protests,
and attending a poetry reading inspired by the Umbrella Revolution.256 For example, a Chinese poet was arrested and sentenced
to three years in prison for posting a photograph of himself withhis head shaved and holding an umbrella in front of a Taiwan
flag.257 In order to prevent images of the protests being shared online, the Chinese government heavily censored news from HongKong. For the first time, Beijing reportedly blocked Instagram, apopular mobile photograph sharing application.258 See ‘‘Internetand Social Media Censorship Controls’’ later in this section for
more information on the tightening of information controls in
China.
China’s Media and Information Controls
China’s media and information controls also have been tightenedsince President Xi took office, particularly China’s censorship ofprivate communications and social media. This tightening appears
to be driven by a number of factors, including: the expanding reachof domestic media, more extensive foreign investigative reporting in
China, the growing number of Chinese Internet users, and the riseof domestic social media platforms. The CCP views these dynamics
as threatening its control over information and causing instability.
China’s media and information controls have direct implications for
U.S. economic interests through its impact on U.S. company operations and profits both within China and abroad.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China’s Domestic Media Controls
Although China already has one of the most restricted media environments in the world, President Xi has increased the government’s censorship of domestic media, especially on the Internet.
This censorship is designed to prevent negative coverage and topromote content that follows the CCP’s established narrative of aparticular story.259 The Chinese government can restrict domestic
media coverage on virtually all topics but focuses on eliminating
content related to autonomy in Xinjiang and Tibet, the Falun Gong
spiritual group, writings of political dissidents, Taiwan independence, as well as unfavorable coverage of CCP leaders. Freedom
House analysis of leaked state media censorship directives published by China Digital Times, a U.S.-based bilingual China news
portal, shows President Xi, like his predecessor, has extensively applied this tactic.260
Chinese media over the last decade has increasingly challenged
Beijing’s tight grip on the media by pushing the government-instituted limits, particularly with its expanded investigative reporting

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00391

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

380
on sensitive topics. Largely due to the increased challenges posedby the proliferation of new media and Internet users driving conversations away from Beijing’s preferred narrative, President Xi
has employed more extensive controls on Chinese media personnel
than did his predecessor.
For example, in June and July of this year, China’s top media
regulator, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio,
Film and Television, issued a series of directives intended to further centralize and strengthen the CCP’s control over domestic
media outlets. One new rule forbids Chinese journalists from publishing critical news stories without official approval or outside of
their assigned topics or regions.261 Another regulation restricts any
use of undefined state and commercial secrets, as well as‘‘unpublicized’’ information the Party has not already released.262 A
third rule bans any cooperation between Chinese journalists andforeign news agencies.263 Finally, the Chinese government now requires journalists to sign a secrecy agreement with their employer
to obtain press credentials.264 A single violation of any of these newrules could result in the loss of media credentials and employment.
The regulation on cooperation with non-Chinese media personnel
reflects the CCP’s growing concerns with the role of foreign media
in China obtaining and reporting on news China considers sensitive, such as the wealth of high-level Party officials.
Western organizations that track freedom of press issues worldwide find Chinese restrictions are becoming more stringent andmore pervasive both within and outside mainland China.265 As ofthe publication of this Report, 30 journalists and 74 netizens * are
imprisoned in China, according to Reporters Without Borders.266
China now ranks 175 out of 180 countries on Reporters Without
Borders’ 2014 World Press Freedom Index, two places behind Iran.
The report also warned this year that ‘‘China’s growing economic
weight is allowing it to extend its influence over the media in Hong
Kong, Macau and Taiwan, which had been largely spared political
censorship until recently.’’ 267 In particular, media freedom in Hong
Kong has deteriorated in 2014. Hong Kong journalists have faced
increased intimidation, physical abuse, and cyber attacks frommainland China.268 For more information on the crackdown, see
Chapter 3, Section 4, ‘‘Hong Kong.’’
China’s Restrictions on U.S. and Foreign MediaThe Chinese government has tightened restrictions on international media in China after several dramatic revelations byWestern news organizations embarrassed Beijing in the run-up to
the 2012 Chinese leadership transition. This highlighted the government’s inability to isolate Chinese audiences from foreign perspectives. In response, Beijing has delayed and rejected foreign reporters’ visa applications. The government has organized and conducted increasingly sophisticated cyber operations against foreign
journalists in China and foreign media companies abroad. Beijing
has allowed physical attacks on journalists within China and has
used economic incentives and threats to encourage foreign media to

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* A netizen is an Internet user who engages in discussions on social, political, and governmental topics online.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00392

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

381
avoid coverage that might embarrass the government and Party.269
According to the Foreign Correspondents Club of China (FCCC),*
80 percent of respondents to the FCCC’s 2014 Annual Reporting
Conditions Survey believed their work conditions worsened or
stayed the same since the previous year, a 10 percent increase over2013. Half of respondents with Chinese assistants said their assistants faced harassment at least once, exceeding 2013 levels.270
Sarah Cook, senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom
House, testified to the Commission that pressure on foreign media
over the past two years has ‘‘taken the form of delaying or rejecting
visas for journalists known for hard-hitting reporting, especially onhuman rights or high-level corruption.’’ 271 Since 2012, China has
effectively expelled four leading China journalists—Austin Ramzyof the New York Times in 2014, Paul Mooney of Reuters in 2013,
and Melissa Chan of Al-Jazeera and Chris Buckley of the New
York Times in 2012—by denying them visas.272 Before then, no accredited foreign correspondent had been expelled from China since1998, when two journalists were accused of stealing state secrets.273 Since 2012, Bloomberg and the New York Times have reported visa delays after publishing stories on the amassed family
wealth of Xi Jinping and then Premier Wen Jiabao; the New YorkTimes has been unable to obtain visas for new employees—including Philip Pan, its chosen bureau chief in Beijing, who has been
waiting for a visa since 2012.274
Foreign media companies operating in China are experiencing increased levels of cyber attacks. Dalphine Halgand, U.S. director ofReporters Without Borders, noted in her testimony to the Commission that members of the FCCC continue to be regular targets ofcyber attacks designed to infect their computers with malware andspyware.275 Since 2008, China has also conducted a cyber espionage campaign against U.S. media organizations, with intrusions
into the networks of the New York Times, the Washington Post,
the Wall Street Journal, and Bloomberg.† China likely seeks to use
information acquired through these intrusions to shape U.S. press
coverage of China by intimidating U.S. journalists’ sources in
China and to gain advance notice about negative coverage of China
before it is published.276
Another disturbing trend is the increasing physical harassmentof foreign journalists on the ground in China. Ms. Halgand, in her
testimony to the Commission, described the nature of such incidents:
In January this year, journalists covering the trial of cyberdissident Xu Zhiyong were barred from the courtroom andwere even prevented from filming outside when Xu’s trial
opened. BBC, Sky News and CNN crews outside were all
pushed away violently by uniformed and plainclothes policemen. CNN reporter David McKenzie reported that he
was manhandled and detained by police, who broke his
crew’s equipment. Two other journalists, Mark Stone and

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Foreign Correspondent’s Club is a professional group of international journalists reporting from China.
† For information on China’s cyber espionage campaign against U.S. news agencies, see U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 2, Section 2, ‘‘China’s Cyber Activities,’’ 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November 2013, pp. 243–265.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00393

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

382
Martin Patience, were also manhandled by police during
coverage of the trial.277
Finally, China is using economic pressure to induce U.S. andother foreign media organizations’ compliance with its expanding
information controls. According to the FCCC, the Chinese government has sought to pressure senior editors of France 24, ARD TV(Germany), and the Financial Times, along with various Japanese
news organizations, to restrain reporting from their Beijing bureaus.278 In addition, after Bloomberg published its story on thewealth of Xi Jinping’s family in 2012, Chinese officials orderedsome Chinese businesses to stop subscribing to Bloomberg’s financial data terminals, according to The New York Times.279 As a result, the company ‘‘reportedly suffered significant commercial harmfrom a drop in sales of its data terminals.’’ 280 In 2013, Bloomberg
News stopped the release of an investigative report about a web ofcorruption linking one of China’s wealthiest businessmen and highlevel Chinese government officials. Bloomberg’s Editor-in-Chief
Matthew Winkler explained at the time that ‘‘the reporting . . . was
not ready for publication,’’ but several Bloomberg writers and editors blamed pressure from Beijing and Bloomberg’s fear of reprisal.281 As of the publication of this Report, the Bloomberg report
has not been published. Although China currently comprises asmall share of Bloomberg’s core terminal market,* Bloomberg executives have emphasized that China is an important part of thefirm’s long-term strategy to expand into emerging markets.282 The
Bloomberg case demonstrates to other media companies that China
is willing to use economic levers to enforce information controls.
Other U.S. media firms have suffered losses in revenue after
China blocked access to online content tailored for the Chinese
market. China cut off access to the New York Times’ English- andChinese-language websites in China after the organization published the story on then Premier Wen Jiabao’s family members in
2012, causing heavy losses in revenue from advertisers and Chinese users.† In addition, Reuters’ Chinese-language portal faced
intermittent outages in November and December 2013 after reporting on the involvement of Wen’s daughter in the JP Morgan hiring
scandal.283 The Wall Street Journal’s own English and Chineselanguage websites were similarly censored during the same period
as those of Reuters but were blocked again in China on May 31,days prior to the Tiananmen anniversary.284 As of the publicationof this Report, the Wall Street Journal’s websites remain blocked
in China.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Bloomberg only has an estimated 3,000 terminals in China, compared with 100,000 in
the United States. The terminal market accounts for over three-quarters of Bloomberg’s total
revenue. Neil Gough and Ravi Somaiya, ‘‘Bloomberg Hits at Curb on Articles about China,’’
New York Times, March 20, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/business/international/
bloomberg-should-have-rethought-articles-on-china-chairman-says.html.
† In 2013, the New York Times launched a Chinese language, lifestyle-focused website that
the Chinese government subsequently blocked. Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, ‘‘Position
Paper on Working Conditions for Foreign Correspondents in China,’’ September 2014. http://
www.fccchina.org/2014/09/12/fccc-position-paper-2014/; Sarah Cook, The Long Shadow of Chinese
Censorship: How the Communist Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets around theWorld (Center for International Media Assistance, October 22, 2013), p. 18.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00394

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

383
Internet and Social Media Censorship Controls
The inherent difficulty of monitoring and stopping the spread of
information via new Internet and social media—such as Internet
videos, blogs, and Twitter-like microblogs—and mobile phone messaging presents challenges to Beijing’s ability to manage public dissent. The speed and ease with which the Chinese public can accessinformation and express opinions compresses the timeline for Beijing to respond to heated public demands. According to the official
China Internet Network Information Center, as of June 2014,
China has 632 million total Internet users—527 million of whom
use the mobile Internet.285 The number of Internet users is expected to continue increasing rapidly; the Boston Consulting Groupprojects China will have 730 million users by 2016.286
Expansion of China’s Internet Control Apparatus
China’s Internet monitoring and censorship apparatus is vast—
including at least ten government and CCP entities and more than
two million personnel *—and redundant, with overlapping responsibilities throughout the system.287
Beijing’s difficulty stopping the spread of Internet video andnews related to ethnic riots in Tibet in 2008 underscored for Beijing the need for stronger Internet controls. Then President Hu responded by shutting down YouTube, among other websites.288
After a brief loosening of Internet controls over the 2008 Beijing
Olympics to assuage international concerns about China’s Internet censorship, following the games China redoubled its efforts toblock non-Chinese websites. The government even expanded the
pre-Olympics censorship apparatus. Prior to the 20th anniversaryof the Tiananmen Square massacre, China temporarily blocked
Twitter.289 Shortly thereafter, following the 2009 Xinjiang riots,
Chinese authorities permanently blocked access to Twitter andFacebook.290
Beijing stepped up Internet censorship in 2011 after calls for
Arab Spring-inspired † pro-democracy protests early that year incities across China. Tightened Internet controls were part of abroader effort by Chinese officials to prevent or respond quickly to
public criticism of CCP authority or legitimacy in the run-up to the2012 leadership transition. Beijing also created a new central organization, the State Internet Information Office, to better coordinate
its massive censorship apparatus.291
After assuming China’s top leadership positions in 2012 and2013, President Xi continued to strengthen China’s Internet control
apparatus. In February 2014, President Xi established the newCentral Internet Security and Informationization Leading Group.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Chinese government hires about two million people to monitor activity on microblogs.
Estimates of CCP censors who are allowed to delete postings are between 20,000 and 50,000
people. In addition, private companies hire in-house censors to delete content; a source told Harvard researchers about two to three of these censors operate for every 50,000 users. ‘‘China Employs Two Million Microblog Monitors State Media Say,’’ BBC, October 4, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24396957; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on Stability in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States,
written testimony of David Wertime, May 15, 2014.
† The call for public gatherings in China similarly used the Internet and social media to attempt to organize protests in over a dozen Chinese cities. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Chinese Government
Responds to Call for Protests,’’ New York Times, February 20, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/02/21/world/asia/21china.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00395

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

384
The group is tasked with enhancing Internet security, and according to President Xi, aims to ‘‘build [China] into a cyber power.’’ 292
Lu Wei, head of the State Internet Information Office and President Xi’s Internet czar, reportedly serves as director of the group’s
administrative office, signaling the prioritization of Internet censorship as one of its main objectives.293 Although little is known about
specific policy measures from the leading group, it is likely intended to centralize and strengthen Internet information controls.294
Over the last year, Beijing has initiated several campaigns targeting the spread of ‘‘rumors,’’ * ‘‘illegal’’ content, and pornography †on the Internet via microblogs, effectively crippling the platform.
David Wertime, senior editor at Foreign Policy, explained to theCommission, ‘‘While the immediate loss of localized social control
has long been a bugbear for Chinese authorities, the [P]arty appears to have realized somewhat belatedly that the social web,often highly critical of government, also threatened its ability tocontrol its message.’’ 295 As a result of President Xi’s campaign toeradicate online ‘‘rumors’’ and ‘‘illegal’’ content, Weibo users havedeclined rapidly over the last several years—as much as 70 percent
of its users have left according to some estimates.296 Many of theseusers shifted to its rival, WeChat. After rapidly increasing its own
user base, WeChat was similarly targeted in March 2014. Censors
deleted dozens of WeChat accounts, many of which were politicallyliberal.297 In August, China passed new regulations on instantmessaging platforms—largely targeted at WeChat—requiring realname registration for the first time and banning non-news accounts
from sharing political information.298 As the top instant messaging
platform with a user base of 393 million people, WeChat likely will
suffer the same fallout as alternative microblog platforms emerge.
In recent years, growth of social media and its potential for creating instability has prompted the CCP to enact new rules and expand the ability to arrest individuals for posting unfavorable content. In December 2012, shortly after President Xi assumed leadership, China announced the passage of a new law allowing censors
to delete social media posts or web pages containing ‘‘illegal’’ information and requiring Internet service providers to turn over information to law enforcement authorities.299 As part of Xi Jinping’s
crackdown on Internet ‘‘rumors,’’ China in September 2013 introduced new regulations on online posts: if a post deemed offensive
is reposted 500 or more times or viewed more than 5,000 times, theposter could face three years in prison.300 In April 2014, Chinese
blogger Qin Zhihui was reportedly the first person to be arrested
under these new regulations, guilty of ‘‘slander’’ and ‘‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles.’’ Hundreds more netizens have reportedly been detained during the crackdown on social media.301

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* ‘‘Rumors’’ are broadly defined as information disseminated online that does not follow the
Party line. Megha Najagopalan, ‘‘China’s Rumor Crackdown Has Cleaned the Internet, Says Official,’’ Reuters, November 28, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/28/us-china-internetidUSBRE9AR0BQ20131128.
† The CCP’s campaign against pornography, set to last through November 2014, appears totarget domestic media and netizens. Zhang Jialong, ‘‘China’s New Internet Crackdown: Not about
Porn,’’ Foreign Affairs, April 16, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/16/chinas_
new_internet_crackdown_not_about_porn.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00396

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

385
Tiananmen Anniversary Disrupts Google Services inTightest Internet Controls Yet
China disrupted access to Google products and services in thedays around June 4, increasing its Internet censorship to thehighest levels yet. The anonymous founder of GreatFire.org, anonprofit organization that monitors Chinese censorship, said,‘‘It would be wrong to say this is a partial block. It is an attempt
to fully block Google and all of its properties.’’ 302 A review of
Google’s traffic data shows a drop in usage during the most sensitive dates of the anniversary (see Figure 4). Google services remained partially accessible until May 30, when China’s estimated fraction of Google’s normalized worldwide traffic dropped
more than fourfold in the days leading to June 4. By comparison,
during the same period a year ago, access to Google services remained stable at pre-June 4 levels.303 Google websites remain
blocked in China despite periodic openings of less than a day, asof the publication of this Report.
Figure 4:

China’s Fraction of Google’s Worldwide Traffic Normalized,
May 26–June 12, 2014

Note: The x-axis represents dates. The y-axis depicts China’s estimated fraction of Google’s
worldwide traffic. The graphic does not depict real-time Google traffic, but reflects trends inusage.
Source: Google, Transparency Report Database—China.

China’s Internet Censorship Tools
The Chinese government is improving its efforts to scrutinize
and block ‘‘sensitive’’ terms on Chinese social media platforms thathave the ability to instantaneously reach large numbers of followers. China blocks information on the Internet and social media
through three main methods: (1) shutting down access to websites
through a filtering system—colloquially referred to as the ‘‘Great
Firewall’’; (2) blocking lists of keyword searches; and (3) manually
removing text that passes through the first two methods deemed
offensive to Chinese censors.304 Recent studies have found around
15 percent of total posts are deleted by censors; most are deleted
within 24 hours.* According to a May 2013 Harvard University

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00397

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C2S3Fig4.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* A University of Illinois-Chicago study found 16 percent of social media posts are blocked,
while a Harvard University study found an average of 13 percent of posts are censored. Eachstudy used a different data set. David Bamman, Brendan O’Connor, and Noah A. Smith, ‘‘Censorship and Deletion Practices in Chinese Social Media,’’ First Monday 17:3, March 5, 2012.
http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3943/3169; Gary King, Jennifer Pan, andMargaret Roberts, ‘‘How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,’’ American Political Science Review 107:2 (May 2013): 6.

386
study, posts calling for collective action have the highest chance ofbeing censored.305 Such censorship reflects the CCP’s overarchinggoal to prevent coordinated protests and contain dissent locally. According to Xiao Qiang, founder and editor of the China Digital
Times, China also blocks the following information: unfavorable
coverage of high-level Chinese officials; challenges to the legitimacyof one-party rule; inner-workings of the Party and censorship system; political opposition groups such as the Falun Gong; politicalreporting not in sync with the CCP and Central Propaganda Department; and major historical events depicting the Party in a negative light.306
China’s state and Party organs use a number of tools to keep theInternet and microblog platforms free of sensitive content, including: cyber intrusions on activists’ e-mail and computer networks;
surveillance of Internet-connected devices and networks; requirements for real-name registration of all websites; restrictions on
Internet availability; domestic and foreign company compliancewith law enforcement to provide information on netizens; and public outreach, such as employing users to push online content favorable to the Party.307 Ms. Cook noted to the Commission an increasein China’s hiring of so-called ‘‘50 Cent Party’’ members who driveInternet and microblog conversation supportive of the CCP andharass alternative voices.*
The Chinese government also is using offline measures—cracking
down on popular microbloggers and leaders of online opinion—to
attempt to force netizens to self-censor. For example, Charles Xue,
one of these influential online celebrities, had more than 12 million
followers before being arrested on prostitution charges as part of
the Weibo crackdown and forced to confess on national television
for spreading microblog ‘‘rumors.’’ 308 The arrest led to a reductionin political commentary on Chinese social media, causing users toswitch to other platforms.309
However, such measures have not succeeded in stamping out online dissent. Citing the increased number and frequency of deleted
Weibo posts and usage of circumvention tools to access banned
websites, Xiao Qiang testified to the Commission, ‘‘As I have followed Chinese social media, it has become clear to me that more
and more netizens are less intimidated by repressive measures.’’ 310
Internet users also have responded by shifting the language they
use to talk about sensitive topics and bypass censors. According to
Mr. Wertime, this strategy includes: using homophones, words thatsound similar to those censored; homographs, words that look similar to those censored; and memes, repeated phrases or images thatcarry a particular cultural or political meaning.311

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* These individuals, hired by central and local government authorities, reportedly receive 50
cents renminbi for each post. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing
on Stability in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Sarah Cook, May 15, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00398

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

387
Impact of China’s Internet and Media Controls on U.S. Companies
In the past five years, China’s restrictive Internet and media controls are increasingly affecting U.S. affiliates. Twitter, Facebook,*
and YouTube remain blocked in China in part due to their unwillingness to censor content and China’s accusations that they foment
unrest. In Beijing’s view, these platforms’ ability to organize groupsof dissenters, demonstrated during the 2011 Arab Spring, present
a direct threat to Party control. Liu Xiaoming, China’s ambassador
to the United Kingdom, said in an interview this year that thesewebsites are blocked because they violate Chinese law and spread‘‘rumors’’ unfavorable to the CCP.312 In September, Lu Wei, director of the State Internet Information Office, said that Facebook‘‘cannot’’ gain access to China’s market now or in the foreseeable
future.313 As a result, these U.S. firms have lost considerable business opportunities in China, and compliant Chinese ‘‘copycat’’firms, such as Weibo, RenRen, and Youku, have taken theirplace.314
In addition, U.S. companies are forced to decide whether to relocate their operations in an increasingly difficult business environment or self-censor. Google in 2010 redirected all search traffic
from its mainland-based domain to its uncensored Hong Kong domain due to Chinese censorship and cyber intrusions on its software platforms based in China.†
In 2014, Reader’s Digest self-censored an English-language novel
planned to be printed in China for distribution in several Asia Pacific countries after Chinese authorities objected. Instead of relocating to a printer outside of mainland China and taking on added
financial burden to avoid censorship, the company decided to cancel
the publication.315
Other companies are shelving their freedom of expression values
in order to gain access to or maintain their operations in the Chinese market. LinkedIn said it would comply with Chinese censorship in order to enter the Chinese market. ‘‘We are strongly in support of freedom of expression. But it was clear to us that to create
value for our members in China and around the world, we would
need to implement the Chinese government’s restrictions on content,’’ a spokesman explained.316 Over the last year, LinkedIn
censored content for Chinese-language users beyond the Great
Firewall—in this case English-language content for users based in
the United States—stating ‘‘content posted from China IP addresses will be blocked globally to protect the safety of our members thatlive in China.’’ 317
Apple Corporation, in 2013 removed applications, including
anticensorship software, from its China software store. According

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Facebook maintains a small advertising sales office in China and has expressed interest inentering the Chinese market. Reed Albergotti, ‘‘LinkedIn Considers Changes after China Censorship Revealed,’’ Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/09/
03/linkedin-considers-changes-after-china-censorship-exposed/; Benjamin Pimentel, ‘‘Is Facebook
About to Enter China?,’’ MarketWatch, April 14, 2014. http://www.marketwatch.com/story/isfacebook-about-to-enter-china-2014-04-14/.
† Google retains research and development as well as sales offices in Beijing and Shanghai.
E-mail correspondence with Google representative; Miguel Helft and David Barbosa, ‘‘Google
Shuts Down China Site in Dispute over Censorship,’’ New York Times, March 22, 2010. http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/23google.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00399

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

388
to the application developer, Apple said Chinese authorities ordered the removal of the software ‘‘because it includes content thatis illegal in China.’’ 318 Early this year, GreatFire.org released a report that found Microsoft’s Bing search engine ‘‘censors a vast
amount of content that is hosted inside China and which is not
censored by China-based internet companies like Baidu.’’ * 319 In response, Microsoft acknowledged errors and confirmed its policy of‘‘[adjusting] search results to comply with local [Chinese] law or for
quality or safety reasons such as child abuse or malware.’’ 320
Implications for the United States
China’s domestic instability and how Beijing responds to dissent
have implications for U.S. interests and U.S.-China relations. Domestic instability in China affects U.S. investment and productionin China. A 2014 protest by 40,000 employees at a Nike supplierover low wages halted production for two weeks, leading to an estimated $58 million in losses.321 Protests at a Cooper Tire factory
over the company’s potential sale in December 2013 cost a reported$70 million.322 Labor shortages and soaring living costs could increase such disputes in the future.
Moreover, in recent years, the increasing impact of Chinese
media and Internet censorship on U.S. company operations andprofits both within China and abroad has denied some U.S. businesses market access and forced other U.S. businesses to reduce activities in China, relocate operations, and self-censor. As a result,some U.S. firms are losing out on business opportunities in theworld’s largest consumer market; others face the difficulty of balancing protections for freedom of expression while operating under
China’s authoritarian regime.
The recent increased restrictions on freedom of expression andfreedom of the press in China undermine the ability of U.S. news
agencies and journalists to operate in China. U.S. journalists arefacing more frequent harassment, visa restrictions, cyber attacks,and economic incentives and threats. Such policies force U.S. news
agencies to reduce operations in China, thereby limiting U.S. news
coverage of China.
Conclusions• Heightened public awareness, the growth in Internet and social
media use, and the lack of satisfactory channels for redress have
led to a large number of ‘‘mass incidents’’ each year. Public outrage centers on land seizures, labor disputes, wide-scale corruption, cultural and religious repression, and environmental degradation. Such incidents challenge the legitimacy and competenceof the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government at
all levels. Local governments have responded to such incidents
with a mixture of repression and concessions.
• This year marked an escalation in violence linked to unrest in
Xinjiang. Clashes between Uyghurs and police are increasingly
ending in bloodshed, including the death of nearly 100 people inlate July. In addition, attacks by militant Uyghur separatists are
shifting from targeting government officials and buildings to at-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Baidu is China’s most popular search engine.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00400

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

389
tacking civilians and soft targets such as train stations and public spaces.
• In an effort to address the underlying causes of unrest, President
Xi has launched robust anticorruption and counterterrorism campaigns, dedicated resources to address the public’s environmental
and health concerns, and proposed hukou system reforms.
• In response to rising levels of unrest, China’s leaders are expanding and improving China’s stability maintenance apparatus bystreamlining domestic security policymaking, strengthening
forces responsible for maintaining internal security, tightening
the Party’s control over legal institutions, significantly increasing
funding for public security, and using information controls toclamp down on dissent.
• With the entire legal apparatus under the CCP’s control, local
and national officials contain unrest by limiting citizens’ accessto legal counsel and impartial trials, restricting the ability of citizens to obtain redress for grievances through official channels,
and detaining government critics through legal and extralegalmeans. Although President Xi has implemented several substantial reforms and hinted at others, the same legal mechanisms totarget dissent likely will persist, and meaningful reform will remain elusive.
• President Xi has implemented a campaign not seen in China
since the 1970s against individuals expressing dissent. In addition to targeting outspoken dissidents, President Xi has cracked
down on popular online commentators. This year’s 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre marked the harshest
crackdown on dissenters yet and the tightest online censorship
implemented thus far.
• Although China already has one of the most restricted media environments in the world, since President Xi took office, China
has increased censorship of domestic and foreign media. China’s
information controls directly affect U.S. media companies andjournalists with China operations through visa restrictions, cyberattacks, physical harassment, favoritism, and threats. Tightened
media controls also affect Chinese citizens who face increasing
difficulty accessing information sources that express alternative
views from the CCP.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Beijing likely will take calculated measures to strengthen Internet controls. However, China probably will struggle with therapid and unpredictable development of Internet-based applications and technologies that could help users defy Beijing’s current controls. Furthermore, the increasing number and sophistication of Internet users in China makes Beijing’s approach vulnerable to public backlash when authorities restrain users’ access and network performance, especially in sectors where theInternet has become a critical component of economic growth andcommerce.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00401

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

390
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 3

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. Christian Gobel and Lynette H. Ong, Social Unrest in China (Europe China
Research and Advice Network, August 2012), pp. 21–23; Jonathan Walton, Intensifying Contradictions: Chinese Policing Enters the 21st Century (National Bureauof Asian Research, February 2013), p. 11.
2. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Murray Scot Tanner, May 15, 2014.
3. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Murray Scot Tanner, May 15, 2014.
4. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Murray Scot Tanner, April 14, 2005. http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
files/4.14.05tanner_murray_wrts.pdf; Jonathan Walton, Intensifying Contradictions:
Chinese Policing Enters the 21st Century (National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2013); U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on
Major Internal Challenges Facing the Chinese Leadership, written testimony of
Murray Scot Tanner. February 3, 2006. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
testimonies/2006/RAND_CT254.pdf; and Carl Minzner, Chapter 3: Social Instability
in China—Causes, Consequences, and Implications (Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 1, 2006). http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090212_03
social_instability.pdf.
5. Mi Aini, ‘‘ ‘Mass Incidents’ Present the Biggest Challenge to CCP’s Continued
Rule,’’ Oriental Outlook—Xinhua (China), January 25, 2010. http://finance.ifeng.com/
news/20100125/1753721.shtml. Staff translation; Sun Liping, ‘‘China’s Challenge:
Social Disorder,’’ Economic Observer (China), February 28, 2011. http://www.eeo.com.cn/zt/lhqh/bza/2011/02/28/194614.shtml. Staff translation; and Jonathan Walton, Intensifying Contradictions: Chinese Policing Enters the 21st Century (National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2013).
6. People’s Daily (China), ‘‘Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Report Says‘‘Mass Incidents’’ in China Each Year Number in Tens of Thousands,’’ December 18,
2012. http://news.163.com/12/1218/11/8J0KU2R500014JB6.html. Staff translation.
7. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Murray Scot Tanner, May 15, 2014.
8. Cai Yongshun, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed
or Fail (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 42; Shing Kwan Lee andYonghong Zhang, ‘‘The Power of Instability: Unraveling the Microfoundations of
Bargained Authoritarianism in China,’’ American Journal of Sociology 118:6 (May2013): 1475–1508; and Christian Gobel and Lynette H. Ong, Social Unrest in China(Europe China Research and Advice Network, August 2012). http: // www.euecran.eu/Long%20Papers/ECRAN%20Social%20Unrest%20in%20China_%20Christian%20
Gobel%20and%20Lynette%20H.%20Ong.pdf.
9. Ching Kwan Lee, ‘‘State and Social Protest,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014):
124–134.
10. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Steve Hess, May 15, 2014.
11. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Steve Hess, May 15, 2014.
12. Carl Minzner, ‘‘Chinese Turn Against Law,’’ Human Rights Watch, October30, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/30/china-s-turn-against-law.
13. Benjamin van Rooij and Alex Wang, ‘‘China’s Pollution Challenge,’’ New
York Times, May 19, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/opinion/chinas-pollution-challenge.html.
14. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Steve Hess, May 15, 2014; Sophie Richardson, ‘‘Dispatches: Casting a Light
into China’s Black Jails,’’ Human Rights Watch, March 28, 2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/dispatches-casting-light-china-s-black-jails.
15. Xi Chen, ‘‘The Power of ‘Troublemaking’: Protest Tactics and Their Efficacy
in China,’’ Comparative Politics 41:4 (July 2009): 456–462.
16. Xi Chen, ‘‘The Power of ‘Troublemaking’: Protest Tactics and Their Efficacy
in China,’’ Comparative Politics 41:4 (July 2009): 456–462; Shing Kwan Lee andYonghong Zhang, ‘‘The Power of Instability: Unraveling the Microfoundations of

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00402

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

391

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Bargained Authoritarianism in China,’’ American Journal of Sociology 118:6 (May2013): 1475–1508.
17. Christian Gobel and Lynette H. Ong, Social Unrest in China (Europe China
Research and Advice Network, August 2012). http://www.euecran.eu/Long%20Papers/
ECRAN%20Social%20Unrest%20in%20China_ %20Christian%20Gobel%20and%20
Lynette%20H.%20Ong.pdf; China Labor Bulletin, Searching for Union: The Workers’
Movement in China 2011–2013 (February 2013).
18. Marko Papic and Sean Noonan, ‘‘Social Media as a Tool for Protest,’’ Stratfor,
February 3, 2011. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110202-social-media-tool-protest#
axzz3CBEmg1Um.
19. Australian Centre on China in the World, ‘‘Mass Incidents in 2012,’’ http://
www.thechinastory.org/ yearbooks/ yearbook-2013/chapter-4-under-rule-of-law/massincidents-in-2012/.
20. Patrick Boehler, ‘‘Violence, Arrests in Guangdong City of Maoming as Locals
Rally against Petrochemical Plant,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March
31, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1461609/violence-arrestsguangdong-city-maoming-locals-rally-against; Open Source Center, China: Anti-PX
Protests Raise Social Tension, Impede PX Production, April 16, 2014. ID: CHR2014
041629988268.
21. Patrick Boehler, ‘‘Violence, Arrests in Guangdong City of Maoming as Locals
Rally against Petrochemical Plant,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March
31, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1461609/violence-arrestsguangdong-city-maoming-locals-rally-against; Open Source Center, China: Anti-PX
Protests Raise Social Tension, Impede PX Production, April 16, 2014. ID: CHR2014
041629988268.
22. Teng Biao, ‘‘A Chinese Activist: Out of Prison but Not Free,’’ Washington Post,
September 7, 2014. www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinese-leaders-should-givegao-zhisheng-his-freedom/2014/09/07/3fabba16-353d-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html; Austin Ramzy, ‘‘Family of Dissident Lawyer Fears for His Health after Prison,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times blog), August 14, 2014. sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/family-of-dissident-lawyer-fears-for-his-health-after-prison-2/?_ php=
true&_ type=blogs&_r=0.
23. David W. Chen, ‘‘How the Family of a Dissident Fled China,’’ New York Times,
May 9, 2009. www.nytimes.com / 2009 / 05 / 10 / world / asia / 10dissident.html; Charles
Hutzler, ‘‘Gao Zhisheng, Missing Chinese Lawyer, Described Torture before Disappearing,’’ Associated Press, January 10, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/10/gao-zhisheng-missing-chin_n_806998.html.
24. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Chinese Web Censors Struggle with Hong Kong Protest,’’New York Times, September 30, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/world/
asia/chinese-web-censors-struggle-with-hong-kong-protest.html.
25. Marko Papic and Sean Noonan, ‘‘Social Media as a Tool for Protest,’’Stratfor, February 3, 2011. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110202-social-mediatool-protest#axzz3CBEmg1Um.
26. Paul Mozur, ‘‘Protestors in Hong Kong Are Targets of Scrutiny through
Their Phones,’’ New York Times, October 1, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/
02/business/protesters-are-targets-of-scrutiny-through-their-phones.html.
27. John Ruwitch, ‘‘China Activist Missing after Trying to Help Striking Workers,’’ Reuters, April 23, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/23/us-chinastrike-detention-idUSBREA3M0EJ20140423; Sui-Lee Wee, ‘‘China Labor Activist
Held over Online ‘Disturbance’,’’ Reuters, April 29, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/04/29/us-china-labour-activist-idUSBREA3S05720140429; and Demetri
Sevastopulo, ‘‘China Charges Labor Activist after Yue Yuan Shoe Factory Strike,’’Financial Times, April 29, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8242a8d2-cf92-11e39b2b-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3CpfayWjq.
28. ‘‘Tiananmen Square Massacre Resonates in China Despite Enforced ‘Amnesia’,’’ Public Broadcasting Service, June 4, 2014. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
tiananmen-square-massacre-resonates-china-despite-enforced-amnesia/.
29. John Ruwitch, ‘‘Xi Says Multi-party System Didn’t Work for China,’’ Reuters,
April 2, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/02/us-china-politics-xi-idUSBR
EA3107S20140402.
30. International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report: People’s Republic of China(International Monetary Fund, July 2014), p. 4. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
scr/2014/cr14235.pdf.
31. Dexter Roberts, ‘‘What Drives China’s Protest Boom? Labor Disputes andLand Grabs,’’ Bloomberg, April 9, 2014. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201404-09/what-drives-chinas-protest-boom-labor-disputes-and-land-grabs; Open Source
Center, Reported PRC Civil Disturbances in 2013, April 11, 2014. ID: CHR2014
041132236657; Open Source Center. Reported Civil Disturbances First Quarter 2014,

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00403

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

392

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

June 16, 2014. ID: CHR2014061820842996; and Open Source Center, China: Reported Civil Disturbances Second Quarter 2014, September 25, 2014. ID: CHR2014
092509069733.
32. Open Source Center. Reported PRC Civil Disturbances in 2013, April 11, 2014.
ID: CHR2014041132236657; Open Source Center. Reported Civil Disturbances First
Quarter 2014, June 16, 2014. ID: CHR2014061820842996; and Open Source Center,
China: Reported Civil Disturbances Second Quarter 2014, September 25, 2014. ID:
CHR2014092509069733.
33. Dexter Roberts, ‘‘What Drives China’s Protest Boom? Labor Disputes andLand Grabs,’’ Bloomberg, April 9, 2014. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201404-09/what-drives-chinas-protest-boom-labor-disputes-and-land-grabs.
34. Deborah S. Davis, ‘‘Demographic Challenges for a Rising China,’’ Daedalus
143:2 (Spring 2014): 26–38.
35. Deborah S. Davis, ‘‘Demographic Challenges for a Rising China,’’ Daedalus
143:2 (Spring 2014): 26–38.
36. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Profiles of Aging 2013, December 2013. http://esa.un.org/unpd/popdev/Aging
Profiles2013/default.aspx.
37. Christina Larson, ‘‘In China, More Girls Are on the Way,’’ Bloomberg, July
31, 2014. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-07-31/chinas-girl-births-ratioimproves-as-country-gets-more-educated.
38. Mara Hvistendahl, Unnatural Selection: Choosing Boys over Girls, and theConsequences of a World Full of Men (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011).
39. Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘How Long Can the Chinese Party Survive in China?’’ Financial Times, September 20, 2013; Barry Naughton, ‘‘China’s Economy: Complacency, Crisis, and the Challenge of Reform,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 14–25.
40. Yukon Huang and Canyon Bosler, ‘‘China’s Burgeoning Graduates: Too Muchof a Good Thing?’’ National Interest, January 7, 2014. http: // nationalinterest.org /commentary/china%E2%80%99s-burgeoning-graduates%E2%80%94too-much-goodthing-9674?page=show; Qinghua Wang, ‘‘Crisis Management Regime Survival and‘Guerrilla-Style’ Policy-Making: The June 1999 Decision to Radically Expand Higher
Education in China,’’ The China Journal 71 (January 2014): 132–152.
41. Yukon Huang and Canyon Bosler, ‘‘China’s Burgeoning Graduates: Too Muchof a Good Thing?’’ National Interest, January 7, 2014. http: // nationalinterest.org /commentary/china%E2%80%99s-burgeoning-graduates%E2%80%94too-much-goodthing-9674?page=show.
42. Te-Ping Chen and Ma Si, ‘‘Meet the Boomerang Kinds: One-Third of Graduates Still Rely on Parents, Survey Finds,’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street
Journal blog), August 7, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/08/07/meetchinas-boomerang-kids-one-third-of-graduates-still-rely-on-parents-survey-says/.
43. Nargiza Salidjanova and Iacob Koch-Weser, Third Plenum Economic Reform
Proposals: A Scorecard (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 19, 2013). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Backgrounder_Third%20Plenum%20Economic%20Reform%20Proposals-A%20Scorecard%20%282%
29.pdf; Deborah S. Davis, ‘‘Demographic Challenges for a Rising China,’’ Daedalus
143:2 (Spring 2014): 26–38.
44. Open Source Center. Reported PRC Civil Disturbances in 2013, April 11,
2014. ID: CHR2014041132236657; Open Source Center. Reported Civil DisturbancesFirst Quarter 2014, June 16, 2014. ID: CHR2014061820842996; and Open Source
Center, China: Reported Civil Disturbances Second Quarter 2014, September 25,
2014. ID: CHR2014092509069733.
45. Jeffrey Riedinger and Zhu Keliang, Chinese Farmers’ Land Rights at the
Crossroads—Findings and Implications from a 2010 Nationwide Survey (World Bank,
April 18, 2011). http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTIE/Images/475494-1294353056
366/ZhuLandRightsPres4.pdf; Shijin Liu, Jun Han, et al., Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization (World Bank, June 16, 2014). http://
www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/07/18/00
0333037_20140718130919/Rendered/PDF/881720PUB0REPL00Box385279B00PUBLIC
0.pdf.
46. Wei Gu, ‘‘China’s Game of Real-Estate Chicken,’’ Wall Street Journal, May 29,
2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-game-of-real-estate-chicken-1401392299;
Joseph Fewsmith and Xiang Gao, ‘‘Local Governance in China: Incentives and Tensions,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 170–183.
47. Shijin Liu, Jun Han, et al., Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, andSustainable Urbanization (World Bank, June 16, 2014), p. 27. http: // www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/07/18/000333037_
20140718130919/Rendered/PDF/881720PUB0REPL00Box385279B00PUBLIC0.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00404

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

393

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

48. Esther Fung, ‘‘China Warns Local Governments on Land Misuse,’’ WallStreet Journal, April 9, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702
303873604579490832266247084.
49. CCTV, ‘‘CCDI: 95% of Visits to Provinces Found Land Corruption,’’ Sina, August 5, 2014. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-08-05/002530629662.shtml. Staff translation.
50. China Labor Bulletin, Searching for Union: The Workers’ Movement in China
2011–2013 (February 2013); Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2013
Annual Report to Congress, October 10, 2013, pp. 67–76.
51. China Labor Bulletin, Searching for Union: The Workers’ Movement in China
2011–2013 (February 2013).
52. Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, October 10, 2013, pp. 67–76.
53. China Labor Bulletin, Searching for Union: The Workers’ Movement in China
2011–2013 (February 2013); Elaine Sio-ieng Hui, ‘‘How Direct Are the ‘Direct Elections’ of Trade Union Officials in China?’’ Global Labor Column 109 (October 2012).
http://www.global-labour-university.org/fileadmin/GLU_ Column/papers/no_ 109_ Hui.pdf; and Congressional Executive Commission of China, Hearing on Working Conditions and Working Rights in China: Recent Developments, written testimony of Mary
E. Gallagher, July 31, 2012.
54. Congressional Executive Commission of China, Hearing on Working Conditions and Working Rights in China: Recent Developments, written testimony of Mary
E. Gallagher, July 31, 2012; Bill Taylor and Qi Li, ‘‘Is the ACFTU a Union and DoesIt Matter?’’ Journal of Industrial Relations, 49:5 (November 2007): 701–715.
55. Chris King-Chi Chan and Elaine Sio-leng Hui, ‘‘The Development of Collective Bargaining in China: From ‘Collective Bargaining by Riot’ to ‘Party State-led
Wage Bargaining’.’’ The China Quarterly 217 (March 2014): 221–242; China Labor
Bulletin, Searching for Union: The Workers’ Movement in China 2011–2013 (February 2013).
56. Mary Gallagher, ‘‘China’s Workers Movement and the End of the RapidGrowth Era,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 81–95; Congressional Executive Commission of China, Hearing on Working Conditions and Working Rights in China: Recent Developments, written testimony of Mary E. Gallagher, July 31, 2012; Tom
Mitchell and Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘‘China Labor Activism: Crossing the Line,’’ Financial Times, May 7, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bb0f1c3a-c953-11e3-99cc00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CpfayWjq; and China Labor Bulletin, ‘‘Labor Activist Wu
Guijun Detained for One Year: China’s Workers More Determined Than Ever,’’ May
23, 2014. http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/labour-activist-wu-guijun-detained-oneyear-china%E2%80%99s-workers-more-determined-ever.
57. China Labor Bulletin, Searching for Union: The Workers’ Movement in China
2011–2013 (February 2013), p. 34.
58. Geoffrey Crothall, ‘‘In China, Labor Activism is Waking Up,’’ South China
Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 1, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/1500831/china-labour-activism-waking; China Labor Bulletin, Searching for Union: The Workers’ Movement in China 2011–2013 (February 2013).
59. China Labor Bulletin, Searching for Union: The Workers’ Movement in China
2011–2013 (February 2013); Mary Gallagher, ‘‘China’s Workers Movement and theEnd of the Rapid-Growth Era,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 81–95.
60. Tom Mitchell and Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘‘China Labor Activism: Crossing theLine,’’ Financial Times, May 7, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bb0f1c3a-c95311e3-99cc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CpfayWjq.
61. Mary Gallagher, ‘‘China’s Workers Movement and the End of the RapidGrowth Era,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 81–95.
62. Christina Larson, ‘‘Scrapping Its One-Child Policy Won’t Solve Worker
Shortage,’’ Bloomberg, November 19, 2013. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2013-11-19/scrapping-the-one-child-policy-wont-solve-chinas-worker-shortage; Mary
Gallagher, ‘‘China’s Workers Movement and the End of the Rapid-Growth Era,’’Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 81–95.
63. Mary Gallagher, ‘‘China’s Workers Movement and the End of the RapidGrowth Era,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 81–95.
64. Richard Valdmanis, ‘‘Nike CEO Says Could Shift China Production Over
Labor Strife,’’ Reuters, May 1, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/01/usnike-labor-china-idUSBREA400SR20140501.
65. Mary Gallagher, ‘‘China’s Workers Movement and the End of the RapidGrowth Era,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 81–95.
66. Shijin Liu, Jun Han, et al., Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, andSustainable Urbanization (World Bank, June 16, 2014), p. 5.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00405

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

394

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

67. Martin King Whyte, ‘‘Soaring Income Gaps: China in Comparative Perspective,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 39–52.
68. Shijin Liu, Jun Han, et al., Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, andSustainable Urbanization (World Bank, June 16, 2014), p. 5; Chris Buckley, ‘‘With
Urbanization as Goal, China Moves to Change Registration Rules,’’ New York Times,
July 30, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/world/asia/with-urbanization-asgoal-china-moves-to-change-registration-rules.html.
69. Shijin Liu, Jun Han, et al., Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, andSustainable Urbanization (World Bank, June 16, 2014).
70. Cheng Li and Eve Cary, The Last Year of Hu’s Leadership: Hu’s to Blame?
(Jamestown Foundation China Brief, December 20, 2011). http://www.jamestown.org/
programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38811&cHash=c0006cd99bfe55199.1fcf
1924d37c0cf#.U9Ap8LGgfgc.
71. Chris Buckley, ‘‘With Urbanization as Goal, China Moves to Change Registration Rules,’’ New York Times, July 30, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/
world/asia/with-urbanization-as-goal-china-moves-to-change-registration-rules.html.
72. Shijin Liu, Jun Han, et al., Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, andSustainable Urbanization (World Bank, June 16, 2014).
73. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2014,
April 30, 2014, pp. 47–49. http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%202014%
20Annual%20Report%20PDF.pdf.
74. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2014,
April 30, 2014, pp. 47–49. http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/USCIRF%202014%
20Annual%20Report%20PDF.pdf; Congressional Executive Commission on China,
2013 Annual Report to Congress, October 10, 2013, pp. 86–95.
75. Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, October 10, 2013, pp. 169–170.
76. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious
Freedom Report for 2013, U.S. State Department, July 28, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper.
77. Ben Blanchard, ‘‘China Says ‘Rescues’ More Children from Xinjiang Religious Schools,’’ Reuters, September 14, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/
15/us-china-xinjiang-idUSKBN0HA07520140915.
78. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious
Freedom Report for 2013, U.S. State Department, July 28, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper.
79. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious
Freedom Report for 2013, U.S. State Department, July 28, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper.
80. Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, October 10, 2013, pp. 89–90.
81. Robert P. Weller, ‘‘The Politics of Increasing Religious Diversity in China,’’
Daedalus (Spring 2014): 135–144; Steve Finch, ‘‘China’s Not So Secret War on Religion,’’ Diplomat, June 16, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-not-so-secretwar-on-religion/; and Elizabeth J. Perry, ‘‘Growing Pains: Challenges for a Rising
China,’’ Daedalus (Spring 2014): 5–13.
82. Tim Gardam, ‘‘Christians in China: Is the Country in Spiritual Crisis?’’ BBC,
September 11, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-14838749; Open Source
Center. Zhejiang Church Demolitions Raise Religious Tension, Fears of Wider Crackdown, September 5, 2014. ID: CHR2014090530262479.
83. Tom Phillips, ‘‘China on Course to Become ‘World’s Most Christian Nation’within 15 Years,’’ Telegraph, April 19, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10776023/China-on-course-to-become-worlds-most-Christian-nationwithin-15-years.html.
84. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Moves Against 2 Churches in Campaign against
Christianity,’’ New York Times, July 28, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/
world/asia/china-moves-against-2-churches-in-campaign-against-christianity.html?ref=world&_r=0; China Aid Association, ‘‘Updated: China Aid Received Compilation ofPersecuted Zhejiang Churches,’’ China Aid News, July 14, 2014. http://www.china
aid.org / 2014 / 05 / china - aid - receives - compilation - of - 64.html; and Brice Pedroletti,‘‘China’s Christians Fear New Persecution after Latest Wave of Church Demolitions,’’ Guardian, July 4, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/05/chinachristianity-wenzhou-zhejiang-churches.
85. Open Source Center, Zhejiang Church Demolitions Raise Religious Tension,Fears of Wider Crackdown, September 5, 2014. ID: CHR2014090530262479.
86. ‘‘China Will Create Own Christian Belief System amid Tensions with Church,
Official Says,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 7, 2014. http://www

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00406

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

395

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB.scmp.com/news/china/article/1568209/china-will-create-own-christian-belief-systemamid-tensions-church-says.
87. ‘‘China’s Ravaged Farmlands,’’ New York Times, April 28, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/opinion/chinas-ravaged-farmlands.html; Edward Wong, ‘‘Report Finds Widespread Water Pollution in China,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times
blog), April 24, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/report-findswidespread-water-pollution-in-china/.
88. Yale University, ‘‘2014 Environmental Performance Index,’’ http://www.epi.yale.edu/epi.
89. Zhu Jianping, ‘‘MEP: Only 9 of 161 Chinese Cities Meet Urban Air Quality
Standards in the First Half of 2014,’’ 21st Century Business Herald, August 6, 2014.
http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20140806/12866926_0.shtml. Staff translation.
90. Open Source Center. Reported PRC Civil Disturbances in 2013, April 11,
2014. ID: CHR2014041132236657; Open Source Center. Reported Civil DisturbancesFirst Quarter 2014, June 16, 2014. ID: CHR2014061820842996; Open Source Center, China: Reported Civil Disturbances Second Quarter 2014, September 25, 2014.
ID: CHR2014092509069733.
91. Edward Wong, ‘‘China Lets Media Report on Air Pollution Crisis,’’ New YorkTimes, January 14, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/world/asia/china-allows-media-to-report-alarming-air-pollution-crisis.html.
92. State Council, 12th Five-Year Plan on Environmental Protection, 2011. http://
www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-12/20/content_2024895.htm. Staff translation; Wu Wencong,‘‘Tougher Plan to Reduce Air Pollution,’’ China Daily, July 25, 2013. http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-07/25/content_16826754.htm.
93. Anna Nicolaou, ‘‘China Fertile Ground for Green Progress: Report,’’ Reuters,
May 7, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/us-china-environment-activism-idUSKBN0DN06L20140507.
94. Open Source Center, China: Government Sets Climate Change as National
Priority, Seeks Fairness in Emissions Targets, May 28, 2014. ID: CHR2014052871
855071.
95. Elizabeth Economy, ‘‘Environmental Governance in China: State Control to
Crisis Management,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 184–197; Benjamin van Rooij
and Alex Wang, ‘‘China’s Pollution Challenge,’’ New York Times, May 19, 2014
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/opinion/chinas-pollution-challenge.html; and Jennifer Holdaway and Wang Wuyi, ‘‘Stronger Enforcement Won’t Be Enough to Solve
China’s Environment and Health Problems,’’ ChinaDialogue, April 29, 2014. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/6926-Stronger- enforcement-won- t- beenough-to-solve-China-s-environment-and-health-problem.
96. Elizabeth Economy, ‘‘Environmental Governance in China: State Control to
Crisis Management,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 184–197.
97. Elizabeth Economy, ‘‘Environmental Governance in China: State Control to
Crisis Management,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 184–197.
98. Benjamin van Rooij and Alex Wang, ‘‘China’s Pollution Challenge,’’ New YorkTimes, May 19, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/opinion/chinas-pollutionchallenge.html.
99. Elizabeth Economy, ‘‘Environmental Governance in China: State Control to
Crisis Management,’’ Daedalus 143:2 (Spring 2014): 184–197; Benjamin van Rooij
and Alex Wang, ‘‘China’s Pollution Challenge,’’ New York Times, May 19, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/opinion/chinas-pollution-challenge.html.
100. Evan Osnos, Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New
China (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), pp. 251–252; Stanley Lubman, ‘‘Why China Can’t Clean Up Corruption,’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street
Journal blog), April 9, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/04/09/whychina-cant-clean-up-corruption/.
101. Qian Yanfeng, ‘‘ ‘Most Homes’ to Be Demolished in 20 Years,’’ China Daily,
August 7, 2010. http: // www.chinadaily.com.cn / china / 2010-08 / 07 / content_ 11113982.htm.
102. Ben Blanchard and Megha Rajagopalan, ‘‘Chinese Military’s Ability to Wage
War Eroded by Graft, Its Generals Warn,’’ Reuters, August 18, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/18/us-china-corruption-defence-idUSKBN0GI1Z220140818;
Evan Osnos, Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China(New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014).
103. Evan Osnos, Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New
China (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), pp. 251–252.
104. Ting Shi, ‘‘Chinese Families Pay $16,000 for Kids to Pass Army Entrance
Exam,’’ Bloomberg, July 1, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-01/chinesefamilies-pay-16-000-for-kids-to-pass-army-entrance-exam.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00407

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

396

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

105. John Garnaut, ‘‘Rotting from Within,’’ Foreign Policy, April 16, 2012. http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/16/rotting_from_within.
106. John Garnaut, ‘‘Rotting from Within,’’ Foreign Policy, April 16, 2012. http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/16/rotting_from_within; Ben Blanchard andMegha Rajagopalan, ‘‘Chinese Military’s Ability to Wage War Eroded by Graft, Its
Generals Warn,’’ Reuters, August 18, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/
18/uk-china-corruption-defence-idUKKBN0GI1YI20140818.
107. Teddy Ng, Keith Zhai, and Minnie Chan, ‘‘Former PLA General Xu Caihou
to Face Court Martial over Graft Changes,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong),
June 30, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1543660/communist-partyexpels-former-military-chief-xu-caihou-corruption?page=all; Teddy Ng, ‘‘PLA General
Gu Junshan Faces Court Martial as Prosecutors Press Four Graft Charges,’’ South
China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 31, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
article / 1461810 / pla-general-gu-junshan-faces- court- martial- prosecutors- press-fourgraft.
108. Wang Heyan, ‘‘How a PLA General Built a Web of Corruption to Amass a
Fortune,’’ Caixin (English edition), January 16, 2014. http://english.caixin.com/201401-16/100630028.html?p0#page1; Jane Perlez, ‘‘Corruption in Military Poses a Test
for China,’’ New York Times, November 14, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/
15/world/asia/corruption-in-china-military-poses-test.html.
109. Wall Street Journal, ‘‘Xi Jinping and Mao’s Playbook,’’ July 9, 2014. http://
online.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-and-maos-playbook-1404924289.
110. Michael Lelyveld, ‘‘China’s Economy Faces Anti-Graft Fears amid Crackdown,’’ Radio Free Asia, August 4, 2014. http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/
energy_watch/corruption-08042014120820.html.
111. Brookings Institution, ‘‘Wang Qishan: One of China’s Top Future Leaders to
Watch,’’ http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china/top-future-leaders/wang_qishan.
112. Brookings Institution, ‘‘Wang Qishan: One of China’s Top Future Leaders to
Watch,’’ http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china/top-future-leaders/wang_qishan.
113. John Ruwitch, ‘‘Mr. Clean Catches China’s Graft Tigers by the Tail,’’ Reuters,
September 12, 2013. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2014 / 07 / 17 / us-ukraine-crashairplane-idUSKBN0FM1TU20140717/.
114. Cheng Li, Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle: Friends from Xi’s Formative Years (TheBrookings Institution, July 18, 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/research/files/articles/2014/07/18%20xi%20jinping%20inner%20circle%20friends%20li/clm44cl.pdf.
115. Brookings Institution, ‘‘Wang Qishan: One of China’s Top Future Leaders to
Watch,’’ http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china/top-future-leaders/wang_qishan.
116. Brookings Institution, ‘‘Wang Qishan: One of China’s Top Future Leaders to
Watch,’’ http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china/top-future-leaders/wang_qishan.
117. John Ruwitch, ‘‘Mr. Clean Catches China’s Graft Tigers by the Tail,’’ Reuters,
September 12, 2013. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2014 / 07 / 17 / us-ukraine-crashairplane-idUSKBN0FM1TU20140717/.
118. Foreign Policy, ‘‘The Leading Global Thinkers of 2013: Wang Qishan,’’ http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/2013_global_thinkers/public/.
119. Brookings Institution, ‘‘Wang Qishan: One of China’s Top Future Leaders to
Watch,’’ http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china/top-future-leaders/wang_qishan.
120. Economist, ‘‘No Ordinary Zhou,’’ July 30, 2014, http://www.economist.com/
blogs/analects/2014/07/chinese-politics.
121. Jeremy Page, Brian Spegele, and James T. Areddy, ‘‘China Puts Ex-Security
Chief Zhou Yongkang under Investigation,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2014. http://
online.wsj.com/articles/china-puts-ex-security-chief-zhou-yongkang-under-investigation1406629464.
122. Chris Buckley, ‘‘China Says Zhou Yongkang, Former Security Chief, Is under
Investigation,’’ New York Times, July 29, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/
world/asia/china-says-zhou-yongkang-former-security-chief-is-under-investigation.html.
123. John Garnaut, ‘‘China’s Power Politics,’’ New York Times, August 11, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/opinion/chinas-power-politics.html.
124. John Foley, ‘‘China Audit Scrapes at Rust in SOE Engine,’’ Reuters, June23, 2014. http: // www.breakingviews.com/china-audit-scrapes-at-rust-in-soe-engine/
21152313.article.
125. Teddy Ng, Keith Zhai, and Minnie Chan, ‘‘Former PLA General Xu Caihou
to Face Court Martial over Graft Charges,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong),
June 20, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1543660/communist-partyexpels-former-military-chief-xu-caihou-corruption?page=all; Lingling Wei and Bob
Davis, ‘‘China’s Top Graft Buster, Wang Qishan, Probing Thousands,’’ Wall Street
Journal, August 20, 2014. http: // online.wsj.com / articles / chinas - top - graft - buster probing-thousands-1408588202.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00408

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

397

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

126. ‘‘67 State-Owned Enterprise Management-level Employees, of Which 38 Top
Executives, Found Guilty of Corruption since the 18th Party Congress,’’ BeijingTimes, September 15, 2014. http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2014-09/15/content_125741.htm. Staff translation.
127. Ben Blanchard, ‘‘China Widens Anti-Corruption Drive to Officials with Family
Abroad,’’ Reuters, July 16, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/16/us-chinacorruption-idUSKBN0FL2A320140716.
128. Angela Meng, ‘‘Hong Kong First Target of China’s New Pursuit of Corrupt
Officials,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), September 28, 2014. http://
www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1602643/hong-kong-first-target-chinas-new-pursuitcorrupt-officials.
129. Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, Regulations
on the Selection and Appointment of CCP Leadership, January 15, 2014. http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2014-01/15/content_2567800.htm. Staff Translation.
130. Ben Blanchard, ‘‘China Widens Anti-Corruption Drive to Officials with Family
Abroad,’’ Reuters, July 16, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/16/us-chinacorruption-idUSKBN0FL2A320140716; Laura Zhou, ‘‘China Searches Entire Bureaucracy in 10 Provinces to Pinpoint ‘Naked Officials’,’’ South China Morning Post
(Hong Kong), July 15, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1554704/chinasearches-entire-bureaucracy-10-provinces-pinpoint-naked-officials.
131. Kazunori Takada, ‘‘China’s Guangdong Province Removes over 850 ‘Naked
Officials’ from their Posts,’’ Reuters, July 26, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/07/26/us-china-corruption-idUSKBN0FV04F20140726.
132. Angela Meng, ‘‘Hong Kong First Target of China’s New Pursuit of Corrupt
Officials,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), September 28, 2014. http://
www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1602643/hong-kong-first-target-chinas-new-pursuitcorrupt-officials.
133. Sui-Lee Wee, ‘‘China Says over 150 ‘Economic Fugitives’ at Large in the
U.S.,’’ Reuters, August 11, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/11/us-chinacorruption-idUSKBN0GB0CS20140811.
134. Xinhua, ‘‘88 Nailed in Manhunt for Fugitive Economic Crime Suspects,’’
China Internet Information Center, September 21, 2014. http://www.china.org.cn/
china/2014-09/21/content_33569245.htm; Sui-Lee Wee, ‘‘China Says over 150 ‘Economic Fugitives’ at large in the U.S.,’’ Reuters, August 11, 2014. http://www.reuters.
com/article/2014/08/11/us-china-corruption-idUSKBN0GB0CS20140811.
135. Sui-Lee Wee, ‘‘China Says over 150 ‘Economic Fugitives’ at large in the
U.S.,’’ Reuters, August 11, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/11/us-chinacorruption-idUSKBN0GB0CS20140811.
136. Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘Shanghai to Feel Full Force of Xi’s Anti-corruption Onslaught,’’ Financial Times, July 30, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0fbd483e17dc-11e4-b842-00144feabdc0.html.
137. Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen, ‘‘Debunking Misconceptions about Xi Jinping’s
Anti-Corruption Campaign,’’ China-US Focus, July 17, 2014. http://www.chinaus
focus.com / political- social- development/ debunking-misconceptions-about-xi-jinpingsanti-corruption-campaign/.
138. Allen T. Cheng, ‘‘Chinese Step Up Antigraft Drive Despite Impact on Consumption,’’ Institutional Investor, August 18, 2014. http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3371634/banking-and-capital-markets-emerging-markets/chinese-step-upantigraft-drive-despite-impact-on-consumption.html#.VAkM4fldXmc.
139. Ben Bouckley, ‘‘ ‘Shui Jing Fang Appears to Be Broken from the Outside’:
Analyst Tells Diageo Boss,’’ Beverage Daily, August 1, 2014. http://www.beverage
daily.com/Manufacturers/Shui-Jing-Fang-seems-broken-from-the-outside-Analyst-tellsDiageo.
140. Ben Bouckley, ‘‘ ‘Shui Jing Fang Appears to Be Broken from the Outside’:
Analyst Tells Diageo Boss,’’ Beverage Daily, August 1, 2014. http://www.beverage
daily.com/Manufacturers/Shui-Jing-Fang-seems-broken-from-the-outside-Analyst-tellsDiageo.
141. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 2, Section 3,‘‘Macau and Hong Kong,’’ 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November 2013, pp. 354–
371.
142. Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘‘Macau’s High-Rolling Casinos Suffer amid China AntiGraft Storm,’’ Financial Times, September 26, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
79e893dc-4552-11e4-9b71-00144feabdc0.html#slide0.
143. Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘‘Macau’s High-Rolling Casinos Suffer amid China AntiGraft Storm,’’ Financial Times, September 26, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
79e893dc-4552-11e4-9b71-00144feabdc0.html#slide0.
144. Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen, ‘‘Debunking Misconceptions about Xi Jinping’s
Anti-Corruption Campaign,’’ China-US Focus, July 17, 2014. http://www.chinaus

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00409

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

398

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

focus.com / political- social- development/ debunking-misconceptions-about-xi-jinpingsanti-corruption-campaign/.
145. Curtis Chin, ‘‘Of Tigers, Flies, Big Fish & Small Potatoes,’’ China-US Focus,
September 15, 2014. http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/oftigers-flies-big-fish-small-potatoes/; Minxin Pei, ‘‘Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Enters a Crucial Phase,’’ China-US Focus, April 11, 2014. http://www.china
usfocus.com/ political-social-development/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-entersa-crucial-phase/; Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen, ‘‘Debunking Misconceptions about
Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,’’ China-US Focus, July 17, 2014. http://www.chinausfocus.com / political- social -development / debunking- misconceptions- about- xijinpings-anti-corruption-campaign/; and Anne Henochowicz, ‘‘Minitrue: Axe Story on
Naked Officials,’’ August 7, 2014. http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/08/minitrue-axestory-naked-officials/.
146. Murray Scot Tanner, ‘‘China Rethinks Unrest,’’ Washington Quarterly 27:3
(Summer 2004): 140–141; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on Stability in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for theUnited States, written testimony of Steve Hess, May 15, 2014.
147. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China’s Account of Bloodshed in Far West Is Disputed,’’New York Times, July 29, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/asia/massassault-belatedly-reported-in-chinas-far-west.html; Foreign Correspondents’ Club ofChina, ‘‘Position Paper on Working Conditions for Foreign Correspondents in China,’’
September 2014. http://www.fccchina.org/2014/09/12/fccc-position-paper-2014/.
148. Raffaello Pantucci, ‘‘China’s Domestic Insurgency,’’ RUSI, July 23, 2014.
https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C53CFAAF5CC377/#.U9D883eiWsj.
149. Ministry of Finance, via CEIC data.
150. Evan Osnos, ‘‘After 3/1: The Dangers of China’s Ethnic Divide,’’ New Yorker,
March 3, 2014. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/03/after-31-thedangers - of - chinas - ethnic - divide.html; Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Country Summary:China,’’ January 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/china;
Colin Mackerras, ‘‘Xinjiang in 2013: Problems and Prospects,’’ Asian Ethnicity 15:2
(November 18, 2013): 247–250; and Michael Clarke, ‘‘Why Is Xinjiang Violence Escalating?’’ BBC, May 23, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27534049.
151. Suhasini Haidar, ‘‘China Inaugurates New Rail-Lines in Tibet,’’ Hindu, September 2, 2014. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-inaugurates-newraillines-in-tibet/article6369931.ece.
152. Jeremy Page, ‘‘ ‘Silk Road’ Plan for Xinjiang Makes for a Rough Tapestry,’’
Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424
053111904007304576495950526450210.
153. Edward Wong, ‘‘China’s Money and Migrants Pour into Tibet,’’ New YorkTimes, July 24, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html?
pagewanted=all; Mark O’Neill, ‘‘Tibet on Fast Track to Development,’’ South China
Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 13, 2010. http://www.scmp.com/article/708432/
tibet-fast-track-development.
154. Economist, ‘‘Taming the West,’’ June 21, 2014. http://www.economist.com/
news/china/21604594-communist-party-deepens-tibets-integration-rest-country-tamingwest; Gabriel Lafitte, ‘‘Tibet’s Resource Curse,’’ China Dialogue, December 19, 2011.
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/4696-Tibet-s-resource-curse; and Edward Wong,‘‘China’s Money and Migrants Pour into Tibet,’’ New York Times, July 24, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html?pagewanted=all.
155. Joshua Lipes, ‘‘Police Fire on Mine Protestors,’’ Radio Free Asia (UnitedStates), August 26, 2012. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/mine-082620101427
56.html; Gabriel Lafitte, ‘‘Tibet’s Resource Curse,’’ China Dialogue, December 19,
2011. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/4696-Tibet-s-resource-curse; Rukor, ‘‘Copper and Gold Mining in Tibet,’’ October 11, 2011. http://rukor.org/copper-and-goldmining-in-tibet/.
156. Mark O’Neill, ‘‘Tibet on Fast Track to Development,’’ South China Morning
Post (Hong Kong), March 13, 2010. http://www.scmp.com/article/708432/tibet-fasttrack-development.
157. Simon Denyer, ‘‘China Hopes to Revive the Silk Road with Bullet Trains to
Xinjiang,’’ Guardian Weekly, September 30, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/sep/30/china-bullet-high-speed-train.
158. Simon Denver, ‘‘China’s Campaign for Mixed Marriages Spreads to Troubled
Xinjiang,’’ Washington Post, September 1, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/01/chinas-campaign-for-mixed-marriages-spreads-to-troubledxinjiang/.
159. William Wan and Xu Yangjingjing, ‘‘China Promotes Mixed Marriages in
Tibet as Way to Achieve ‘Unity’,’’ Washington Post, August 16, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/ asia_ pacific / china-promotes-mixed-marriages-in-tibet-as-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00410

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

399

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

way-to-achieve-unity/ 2014/ 08/ 16 / 94409ca6-238e-11e4-86ca-6f03cbd15c1a_ story.html;
Simon Denver, ‘‘China’s Campaign for Mixed Marriages Spreads to Troubled
Xinjiang,’’ Washington Post, September 1, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/01/chinas-campaign-for-mixed-marriages-spreads-to-troubledxinjiang/.
160. Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘Chinese Authorities Offer Money for Mixed Marriages in
Bid to Quell Uighurs,’’ Finacial Times, September 1, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/eed8fdf8-31ca-11e4-a19b-00144feabdc0.html.
161. Jamil Anderlini, ‘‘Chinese Authorities Offer Money for Mixed Marriages in
Bid to Quell Uighurs,’’ Finacial Times, September 1, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/eed8fdf8-31ca-11e4-a19b-00144feabdc0.html.
162. Tom Phillips, ‘‘China Plans to Fight Terror with ‘Dozens’ of New Cities,’’
Telegraph, August 19, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/
11042528/China-plans-to-fight-terror-with-dozens-of-new-cities.html.
163. Yan Yi, ed. ‘‘China Voice: Xi’s Tour Delivers New Signals on Xinjiang Policies,’’ Xinhua (English edition), May 4, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
china/2014-05/04/c_133309290.htm.
164. Edward Wong, ‘‘China’s Money and Migrants Pour into Tibet,’’ New YorkTimes, July 24, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html?
pagewanted=all.
165. Chen Yang, ‘‘Xinjiang to Build Cities from Scratch in Restive Regions,’’ Global
Times (China), July 3, 2014. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/868764.shtml.
166. Michael Martina, ‘‘China Sets Up Textile Fund to Boost Xinjiang Stability,’’
Reuters, July 18, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/18/china-xinjiangidUSL4N0PT2YS20140718.
167. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Country Summary: China,’’ January 2014. http://
www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/china; Parameswaran Ponnudurai,‘‘Tibetan Student Perishes in First Self-Immolation in Five Months,’’ Radio Free
Asia, September 21, 2014. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/burning-0921201412
1057.html.
168. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: Alarming New Surveillance, Security inTibet,’’ March 20, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/20/china-alarming-newsurveillance-security-tibet.
169. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: ‘Benefit the Masses’ Campaign Surveilling Tibetans,’’ June 19, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/18/china-benefit-massescampaign-surveilling-tibetans; Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2014
Annual Report to Congress, October 9, 2014. p. 179.
170. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: ‘Benefit the Masses’ Campaign Surveilling Tibetans,’’ June 19, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/18/china-benefit-massescampaign-surveilling-tibetans.
171. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious
Freedom Report for 2013 (U.S. State Department, July 28, 2014). http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper.
172. Patrick Boehler, ‘‘Local Government Threatens Severe Punishments for
Families of Tibetan Self-Immolators,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), February 14, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1427690/sichuancounty-sets-down-years-long-punishments-families-tibetan.
173. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious
Freedom Report for 2013 (U.S. State Department, July 28, 2014). http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper.
174. Gillian Wong, ‘‘Killings by China Anti-Terror Cops Raise Concerns,’’ Associated Press, September 8, 2014. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/killings-china-anti-terrorcops-raise-concerns; Shohret Hoshur and Eset Sulaiman, ‘‘Official Death Toll in
Xinjiang’s Bugur Violence Climbs to 50,’’ Radio Free Asia, September 25, 2014.
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/bugur-09252014210804.html.
175. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Kunming Terrorist Attack Orchestrated by
Xinjiang Separatists,’’ March 2, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201403/02/c_133152815.htm; Sui-Lee Wee, ‘‘Update 2-Chinese Police Blame Separatist
Group for Urumqi Bombing—Xinhua,’’ Reuters, May 18, 2014. http://
www.reuters.com / article / 2014 / 05 / 18 /china - xinjiang - idUSL3N0O405C20140518;
and Xinhua, ‘‘37 Civilians Killed, 13 Injured in Xinjiang Terror Attack,’’ China
Daily, August 3, 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-08/03/content_
18237292.htm.
176. Michael Clarke, ‘‘Why Is Xinjiang Violence Escalating?’’ BBC, May 23, 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27534049.
177. Michael Clarke, ‘‘Why Is Xinjiang Violence Escalating?’’ BBC, May 23, 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27534049.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00411

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

400

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

178. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Says Nearly 100 Are Killed in Week of Unrest in
Xinjiang,’’ New York Times, August 3, 2014. http: // www.nytimes.com / 2014 / 08 / 04 /world/asia/china-says-nearly-100-are-killed-in-week-of-unrest-in-xinjiang.html.
179. Shohret Hoshur, ‘‘Over 100 Detained After Xinjiang Police Open Fire on Protestors,’’ Radio Free Asia, May 23, 2014. www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/detained05232014165418.html.
180. Michael Clarke, ‘‘Why Is Xinjiang Violence Escalating?’’ BBC, May 23, 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27534049.
181. Phillip B.K. Potter, ‘‘Terrorism in China: Growing Threats with Global Implications,’’ Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter 2013): p. 71. http://www.au.af.mil/
au/ssq/digital/pdf/winter_13/2013winter-Potter.pdf.
182. Xinjiang Daily (China), ‘‘200,000 Cadres Sent to the Countryside to Implement ‘3 Full Coverage’ Policy,’’ February 15, 2014. http: // xjrb.xjdaily.com / jryw /1016658.shtml. Staff translation; James Leibold, Xinjiang Work Forum Marks New
Policy of ‘Ethnic Mingling’ 14:12 (Jamestown Foundation China Brief, June 19,2014). http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42518&no_cache=1#.VCR
8kGOwRLo.
183. Dan Levin, ‘‘At Least 50 Killed in Xinjiang Violence, Officials Say,’’ New YorkTimes, September 25, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/world/asia/deathtoll-in-xinjiang-violence-may-be-higher-than-reported.html.
184. Michael Martina, ‘‘China’s Crackdown in Restive Xinjiang Nets 400 Suspects,’’ Reuters, July 7, 2014. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2014 / 07 / 07 / us - china xinjiang - idUSKBN0FC18820140707; Xinhua, ‘‘37 Civilians Killed, 13 Injured in
Xinjiang Terror Attack,’’ China Daily, August 3, 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2014-08/03/content_18237292.htm; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Says Nearly 100
Are Killed in Week of Unrest in Xinjiang,’’ New York Times, August 3, 2014. http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/world/asia/china-says-nearly-100-are-killed-in-week-ofunrest-in-xinjiang.html; and Edward Wong, ‘‘25 Sentenced for Terrorism in Western
China,’’ New York Times, August 12, 2014. http: // www.nytimes.com / 2014 / 08 / 13 /world/asia/25-sentenced-for-terrorism-in-western-china.html.
185. Megha Rajagopalan, ‘‘China’s Xi Vows to Address Poverty, Ethnic Unity inTroubled Xinjiang,’’ Reuters, May 30, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/
30/us-china-xinjiang-idUSKBN0EA0MF20140530; BBC, ‘‘China Sentences 55 Peoplein Xinjiang Stadium,’’ May 28, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china27600397.
186. Michael Martina, ‘‘China Imposes Airline-Like Restrictions on Bus Passengers in Xinjiang Capital,’’ Reuters, July 25, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/ 07/ 25/ us-china-xinjiang-idUSKBN0FU17A20140725; Raffaello Pantucci, ‘‘China’s Domestic Insurgency,’’ RUSI, July 23, 2014. https: // www.rusi.org / analysis /commentary/ref:C53CFAAF5CC377/#.U9D883eiWsj.
187. Chun Han Wong, ‘‘ ‘People’s War’ on Terrorism in China Turns Lucrativewith One Million Yuan Rewards,’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street Journalblog), September 11, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/09/11/peoples-waron-terrorism-in-china-turns-lucrative-with-one-million-yuan-rewards/.
188. Alexa Olesen, ‘‘In One Xinjiang City, Beards and Muslim Headscarves
Banned from Buses,’’ Foreign Policy, August 5, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2014/08/05/karamay_bans_beards_muslim_headscarves_from_public_buses_
xinjiang; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ‘‘Amateur ‘Terrorist Hungers’ Offered Millions in
Cash in Xinjiang,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times blog), August 4, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/amateur-terrorist-hunters-offered-millionsin-cash-in-xinjiang/.
189. Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, Understanding China’s Political
System (Congressional Research Service, March 20, 2013), p. 13.
190. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Murray Scot Tanner, May 15, 2014.
191. Murray Scot Tanner, ‘‘Internal Security,’’ in Chris Ogden, Handbook of China’s Governance and Domestic Politics (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 88.
192. Murray Scot Tanner, ‘‘Internal Security,’’ in Chris Ogden, Handbook of China’s Governance and Domestic Politics (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 95.
193. Ministry of Public Security, ‘‘People’s Republic of China Ministry of Public
Security Department Responsibilities,’’ February 22, 2014. http://www.gov.cn/fuwu/
2014-02/22/content_2618656.htm. Staff translation.
194. Reuters, ‘‘China Police to Increase Armed Patrols in Crime Crackdown,’’
March 16, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/16/us-china-security-idUS
BREA2F09120140316; Murray Scot Tanner, ‘‘Internal Security,’’ in Chris Ogden,
Handbook of China’s Governance and Domestic Politics (London: Routledge, 2013),
p. 95.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00412

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

401

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

195. South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), ‘‘More Than 1,000 Armed Police
Start Patrols in Shanghai,’’ April 20, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/
1491809/more-1000-armed-police-start-patrols-shanghai.
196. Didi Tang, ‘‘Shootings Rise after China Gives Its Police Guns,’’ AssociatedPress, June 27, 2014. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/shootings-rise-after-china-gives-itspolice-guns.
197. ‘‘Beijing Commutes Get Even Longer with Stepped-Up Subway Security,’’
China Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), May 28, 2014. http: //blogs.wsj.com / chinarealtime / 2014 / 05 / 28 /beijing - commutes - get - even - longer - with stepped - up- subway - security/; CRI English (China), ‘‘Beijing Tightens Security at
Railway Station,’’ March 22, 2014. http://english.cri.cn / 6909 / 2014 / 03 / 22 /2702s818604.htm; and Xu Wei, Yang Wanli, and Zheng Caixiong, ‘‘Security Tightened at Railway Stations, Airports in Major Cities,’’ China Daily, March 4, 2014.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-03/04/content_17319684.htm.
198. Zheng Xin and Hou Liqiang, ‘‘Capital Mobilizes Anti-Terrorism Volunteer
Force,’’ China Daily, June 12, 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-06/12/
content_17580603.htm.
199. Cortez A. Cooper III, ‘‘Chapter 4: ‘Controlling the Four Quarters’: China
Trains, Equips, and Deploys a Modern, Mobile People’s Armed Police Force,’’ in Roy
Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains
at Home and Abroad (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2012), pp. 130, 142; Murray Scot Tanner, ‘‘Internal Security,’’ in Chris Ogden,
Handbook of China’s Governance and Domestic Politics (London: Routledge, 2013),
p. 93.
200. Economist, ‘‘Treating the Symptoms,’’ March 2, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/china/21572814-name-social-order-government-turns-blind-eye-black-jailstreating-symptoms.
201. Anthony H. Cordesman, Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives (Center for Strategic and International
Studies, July 2, 2014), p. 164; International Institute for International Studies, The
Military Balance (London: Routledge, February 2014), p. 239; and Dennis J. Blasko,
The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, February 2012), pp. 27–28.
202. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation
for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, February 2012), p. 111.
203. Dennis Blasko, The PRC Anniversary Parade: Equipment on Display, Not
Military Capabilities (Jamestown Foundation China Brief, September 24, 2009).
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=355
35&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=ef559314a9#.U_37CfldWSo.
204. Chinese Military Review, ‘‘Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (CAPF) to
Use Improved Type 81 Automatic Rifles,’’ July 10, 2012. http://chinesemilitaryreview.blogspot.com/2012/07/chinese-peoples-armed-police-force-capf.html; Cortez A. Cooper
III, ‘‘Chapter 4: ‘Controlling the Four Quarters’: China Trains, Equips, and Deploysa Modern, Mobile People’s Armed Police Force,’’ in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, andTravis Tanner, Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2012), pp. 145–146.
205. Cortez A. Cooper III, ‘‘Chapter 4: ‘Controlling the Four Quarters’: China
Trains, Equips, and Deploys a Modern, Mobile People’s Armed Police Force,’’ in Roy
Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains
at Home and Abroad (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2012), p. 134.
206. Cortez A. Cooper III, ‘‘Chapter 4: ‘Controlling the Four Quarters’: China
Trains, Equips, and Deploys a Modern, Mobile People’s Armed Police Force,’’ in Roy
Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains
at Home and Abroad (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2012), pp. 127–162.
207. Michael Wines, ‘‘China Approves Law Governing Armed Police Force,’’ New
York Times, August 27, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/28/world/asia/28china.html?_r=2&.
208. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Murray Scot Tanner, May 15, 2014.
209. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Murray Scot Tanner, May 15, 2014.
210. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Murray Scot Tanner, May 15, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00413

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

402

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

211. Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation
for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, February 2012), p. 24; International Institute for International Studies, The Military Balance (London: Routledge, February2014), p. 287.
212. Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (NewYork, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012, p. 298.
213. Murray Scot Tanner, ‘‘Chapter 3: How China Manages Internal Security
Challenges and its Impact on PLA Missions,’’ in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, andAndrew Scobell, Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle, PA:
U.S. Army War College, April 2009), pp. 73–74; Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army
Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, February 2012), p. 100; and U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014), p. 41.
214. Murray Scot Tanner, ‘‘Chapter 3: How China Manages Internal Security
Challenges and its Impact on PLA Missions,’’ in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, andAndrew Scobell, Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle, PA:
U.S. Army War College, April 2009), pp. 44–46.
215. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China Voice: Disaster Relief a Military Priority in
Peacetime,’’ August 8, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-08/07/c_
133540098.htm.
216. James Mulvenon, ‘‘The Chinese Military’s Earthquake Response Leadership
Team,’’ China Leadership Monitor 25 (Summer 2008); James Daniell, ‘‘Sichuan
2008: A Disaster on an Immense Scale,’’ BBC, May 8, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/
news/science-environment-22398684.
217. Murray Scot Tanner, ‘‘Chapter 3: How China Manages Internal Security
Challenges and Its Impact on PLA Missions,’’ in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, andAndrew Scobell, Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle, PA:
U.S. Army War College, April 2009), pp. 44–46.
218. China Military Online (English edition), ‘‘Uyghur General: PLA Backs
Xinjiang’s Counter-terrorism Efforts,’’ March 3, 2014. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/
news-channels/china-military-news/2014-03/03/content_5792990.htm.
219. Cortez A. Cooper III, ‘‘Chapter 4: ‘Controlling the Four Quarters’: China
Trains, Equips, and Deploys a Modern, Mobile People’s Armed Police Force,’’ in Roy
Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner, Learning by Doing: The PLA Trains
at Home and Abroad (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2012), pp. 154–156.
220. David Tweed, ‘‘China, Russia Fight Terror in Biggest Central Asian Army
Drill,’’ Bloomberg, http: // www.bloomberg.com / news / 2014-08-19 / china-russia-fightterror-in-biggest-central-asian-army-drill.html.
221. Open Source Center, JFJB: Chinese Forces for ‘Peace Mission—2014’ Exercise in Position, August 20, 2014. ID: CHR2014082121279006; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China’s Drone Blasts Off Missile in SCO Anti-Terror Drill,’’ August 26, 2014.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/26/c_126921067.htm.
222. Open Source Center, JFJB: Chinese Forces for ‘Peace Mission—2014’ Exercise in Position, August 20, 2014. ID: CHR2014082121279006; Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China’s Drone Blasts Off Missile in SCO Anti-Terror Drill,’’ August 26, 2014.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/26/c_126921067.htm.
223. Open Source Center, JFJB: Chinese Forces for ‘Peace Mission—2014’ Exercise in Position, August 20, 2014. ID: CHR2014082121279006.
224. Associated Press, ‘‘U.S. Defends Counterterrorism Dialogue with China,’’ July17, 2014. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/us-defends-counterterrorism-dialogue-china.
225. Gillian Wong, ‘‘Killings by China Anti-Terror Cops Raise Concerns,’’ Associated Press, September 8, 2014. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/killings-china-anti-terrorcops-raise-concerns.
226. Carl Minzner, ‘‘Chinese Turn Against Law,’’ Human Rights Watch, October30, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/30/china-s-turn-against-law.
227. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Carl Minzner, May 15, 2014; Carl Minzner, ‘‘Chinese Turn Against Law,’’
Human Rights Watch, October 30, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/30/china-sturn-against-law.
228. Carl F. Minzner, ‘‘China’s Turn against Law,’’ American Journal of Comparative Law 59 (February 2011): 946.
229. Carl F. Minzner, ‘‘China’s Turn against Law,’’ American Journal of Comparative Law 59 (February 2011): 946.
230. Carl Minzner, ‘‘The Turn against Legal Reform,’’ Journal of Democracy 24:1
(January 2013): 68.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00414

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

403

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

231. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Carl Minzner, May 15, 2014.
232. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China Focus: Xi Stresses Vitality and Order inRule of Law,’’ January 8, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/08/
c_133029399.htm.
233. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: Arbitrary Detention in Mental Health Institutions,’’ May 3, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/03/china-end-arbitrarydetention-mental-health-institutions; Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘Legal Education: Arbitrary Detention Doesn’t End with RTL,’’ April 2, 2013. http://www.duihuaresearch.org/2013/04/legal-education-arbitrary-detention.html; and Patrick Boehler, ‘‘China’s
New Mental Health Law to Make It Harder for Authorities to Silence Petitioners,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), May 1, 2013. http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/article/1227431/chinas-new-mental-health-law-make-it-harder-authoritiessilence.
234. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Sophie Richardson, May 15, 2014.
235. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China to Abolish Reeducation through Labor,’’ November 15, 2013. http: // news.xinhuanet.com / english / china / 2013-11/ 15/ c_ 132891921.htm.
236. John Dotson and Teresa Vanfleet, Prison Labor Exports from China and Implications for U.S. Policy (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
July 9, 2014). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_
Prison%20Labor%20Exports%20from%20China_Final%20Report%20070914.pdf.
237. Verna Yu, ‘‘How China Is Using Criminal Detention in Place of Re-education
through Labour,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), April 21, 2014. http://
www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1492192/china-using-criminal-detention-place-reeducation-through-labour; Rebecca Valli, ‘‘Chinese ‘Reprimand Centers’ Replace Labor Camps,’’ Voice of America, Feburary 13, 2014. http://www.voanews.com/content/chinese-reprimand-centers-replace-labor-camps/1850540.html.
238. Thomas Lum, ‘‘Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy,’’ Congressional Research Service, June 19, 2013. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43000.pdf; John Dotson andTeresa Vanfleet, Prison Labor Exports from China and Implications for U.S. Policy(U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 9, 2014). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_Prison%20Labor%20Exports%20from%20China_Final%20Report%20070914.pdf; and Maya Wang, ‘‘Rights Group:‘‘China May Not Be Ready for Labor Camp Reforms,’’ CNN, January 15, 2013. http://
www.cnn.com/2013/01/15/opinion/china-labor-camps-human-rights-watch/.
239. John Dotson and Teresa Vanfleet, ‘‘Prison Labor Exports from China and
Implications for U.S. Policy,’’ U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 9, 2014. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20
Report_Prison%20Labor%20Exports%20from%20China_Final%20Report%20070914.
pdf.
240. Emmanuel Puig, The Importance of Domestic Security Apparatus in China’s
Leadership Transition (Institute for Security Studies, September 27, 2012). http://
www.iss.europa.eu / publications / detail / article / the - importance - of - domestic- securityapparatus-in-chinas-leadership-transition/.
241. China’s Ministry of Finance, via CEIC data.
242. Ben Blanchard and John Ruwitch, ‘‘China Hikes Defense Budget, to Spend
More on Internal Security,’’ Reuters, March 5, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/03/05/us-china-parliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305.
243. Michael Martina, ‘‘China Withholds Full Domestic Security Spending Figure,’’ Reuters, March 4, 2014. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2014 / 03 / 05 / us - china parliament-security-idUSBREA240B720140305.
244. Edward Wong, ‘‘Beijing Goes Quiet on Rise of Local Security Budgets,’’
Sinosphere (New York Times blog), March 6, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/beijing-goes-quiet-on-rise-of-local-security-budgets/.
245. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Sophie Richardson, May 15, 2014.
246. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Sophie Richardson, May 15, 2014.
247. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China Charges Leading Uighur Scholar with Separatism,’’
New York Times, July 30, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/world/asia/
china-ilham-tohti-uighurs-xinjiang.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00415

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

404

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

248. Edward Wong, ‘‘China Court Sentences Uighur Scholar to Life in Separatism
Case,’’ September 23, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/world/asia/chinacourt-sentences-uighur-scholar-to-life-in-separatism-case.html.
249. Edward Wong, ‘‘China Denies Entry to an American Scholar Who Spoke Up
for a Uighur Colleague,’’ New York Times, July 7, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/world/asia/us-scholar-who-supported-uighur-colleague-is-denied-entry-to-china.html.
250. Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, ‘‘China Sentences Xu Zhiyong, Legal Activist, to 4 Years in Prison,’’ New York Times, January 26, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/world/asia/china-sentences-xu-zhiyong-to-4-years-for-role-in-protests.html.
251. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China: Drop Charges against Civic Activists,’’ April 10,
2014. http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/10/china-drop-charges-against-civic-activists.
252. Human Rights in China, ‘‘Restrictions, Detentions, Disappearances, and Arrests Related to June 4, 2014,’’ http: // www.hrichina.org / en / restrictions - detentions disappearances-and-arrests-related-june-4-2014.
253. Sui-Lee Wee, ‘‘China Frees Three Activists after Tiananmen Anniversary,’’
Reuters, June 5, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/05/us-china-tiananmen-usa-idUSKBN0EG0DC20140605.
254. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘China to Prosecute Pu Zhiqiang for Activism,’’ New YorkTimes, June 13, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/world/asia/formal-arrestannounced-of-chinese-human-rights-lawyer-Pu-Zhiqiang.html.
255. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Chinese Web Censors Struggle with Hong Kong Protest,’’New York Times, September 30, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/world/
asia/chinese-web-censors-struggle-with-hong-kong-protest.html.
256. Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Chinese Authorities Make Arrests in Attempt to Prevent
Pro-Democracy Campaigns on Mainland,’’ New York Times, October 9, 2014. http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinese-authorities-make-arrests-in-attemptto-prevent-pro-democracy-campaigns-on-the-mainland.html.
257. Tom Philips, ‘‘Chinese Poet Faces Jail for Possession of Umbrella,’’ Telegraph,
October 7, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/hongkong/11145122/
Chinese-poet-faces-jail-for-possession-of-umbrella.html.
258. Ryan Vlastelica, ‘‘Instagram Reportedly Blocked in China Amid Hong Kong
Protests,’’ Reuters, September 28, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/28/uschina-instagram-idUSKCN0HN0VW20140928; Josh Chin and Eva Dou, ‘‘Hong Kong
Protests Lead to Censorship on WeChat,’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street
Journal blog), October 3, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/10/03/hongkong-protests-lead-to-censorship-on-wechat/.
259. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Sarah Cook, May 15, 2014.
260. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Sarah Cook, May 15, 2014.
261. Reuters, ‘‘China Bans Unauthorized Critical Coverage by Journalists,’’ June18, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/18/uk-china-media-idUKKBN0ET14H
20140618.
262. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China Journalists Banned from Disseminating
State Secrets,’’ July 8, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/08/c_
133468542.htm.
263. Kiki Zhao, ‘‘Chinese Journalists Warned Not to Work with Foreign Media,’’
Sinosphere (New York Times blog), July 10, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/07/10/chinese-journalists-warned-not-to-work-with-foreign-media/.
264. Kiki Zhao, ‘‘China Requiring Secrecy Pledge for Press Credentials,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times blog), July 15, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/07/15/china-requiring-secrecy-pledge-for-press-credentials/.
265. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘China,’’ World Report 2014. http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2014/country-chapters/china; Freedom House, ‘‘China,’’ Freedom of the Press
2014, May 1, 2014; and Reporters Without Borders, 2014 World Press Freedom
Index (January 2014). http://rsf.org/index2014/data/index2014_en.pdf.
266. Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘2014: Journalists Imprisoned,’’ http://en.rsf.org/
press-freedom-barometer-journalists-imprisoned.html?annee=2014; Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘2014: Netizens Imprisoned,’’ http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-barometernetizens-imprisoned.html?annee=2014.
267. Reporters Without Borders, 2014 World Press Freedom Index (January 2014).
http://rsf.org/index2014/data/index2014_en.pdf.
268. Economist, ‘‘Tamed Hounds,’’ July 19, 2014. http://www.economist.com/news/
china/21607879-press-hong-kong-though-still-free-has-lost-its-bite-tamed-hounds.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00416

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

405

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

269. Sarah Cook, The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist
Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets around the World (Center for International Media Assistance, October 22, 2013), pp. 15–17.
270. Foreign Correspondents Club of China, ‘‘Annual Reporting Conditions Survey,’’ May 2014. https://www.cpj.org/blog/fccc_report_may_2014.pdf.
271. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Sarah Cook, May 15, 2014.
272. Sarah Cook, The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist
Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets around the World (Center for International Media Assistance, October 22, 2013), p. 16; Andrew Jacobs, ‘‘Reporter for
Reuters Won’t Receive China Visa,’’ New York Times, November 9, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/world/asia/reporter-for-reuters-wont-receive-china-visa.html;
and Charles Clover, ‘‘New York Times Reporter Austin Ramzy Forced to Leave
China,’’ Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/31afe64a-8984-11e3-882900144feab7de.html.
273. David Eimer, ‘‘Al Jazeera Reporter Expelled from China,’’ Telegraph, May 8,
2012. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9251273/Al-Jazeera-reporter-expelled-from-China.html.
274. Tania Branigan, ‘‘China Denies ‘Deporting’ New York Times Journalist Austin Ramzy,’’ Guardian, January 31, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
jan/31/china-denies-deporting-new-york-times-journalist; Michael D. Shear, ‘‘WhiteHouse Urges China to Act on Journalists’ Visas,’’ New York Times, January 30,
2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/world/asia/white-house-urges-china-to-acton-journalists-visas.html.
275. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Delphine Halgand, May 15, 2014.
276. Nicole Perlroth, ‘‘Hackers in China Attacked the Times for Last 4 Months,’’
New York Times, January 30, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/technology/chinese-hackers-infiltrate-new-york-times-computers.html.
277. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Delphine Halgand, May 15, 2014.
278. Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, ‘‘Position Paper on Working Conditions for Foreign Correspondents in China,’’ September 2014. http://www.fccchina.org/2014/09/12/fccc-position-paper-2014/.
279. Edward Wong, ‘‘Bloomberg News Is Said to Curb Articles That Might Anger
China,’’ New York Times, November 8, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/09/
world/asia/bloomberg-news-is-said-to-curb-articles-that-might-anger-china.html.
280. Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, ‘‘2013 Annual Working Conditions
Survey,’’ July 11, 2013. https://cpj.org/blog/CHINA%2007%2011%2013%20FCCC%20
Annual%20Working%20Conditions%20Report%20for%20pdf.pdf.
281. Edward Wong, ‘‘Bloomberg News Is Said to Curb Articles That Might Anger
China,’’ New York Times, November 8, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/09/
world / asia / bloomberg - news - is - said - to - curb - articles - that- might- anger- china.html;
Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘‘Bloomberg Accused of Blocking Report to Stay in China,’’ Financial Times, November 11, 2013. http: // www.ft.com / intl / cms / s / 0 / d121fd70-49f211e3-9a21-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3D47y3fQM.
282. Howard W. French, ‘‘Bloomberg’s Folly,’’ Columbia Journalism Review, May
1, 2014. http://www.cjr.org/feature/bloombergs_folly.php?page=all; Neil Gough andRavi Somaiya, ‘‘Bloomberg Hits at Curb on Articles about China,’’ New York Times,
March 20, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/business/international/bloomberg-should-have-rethought-articles-on-china-chairman-says.html.
283. Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘China Blocks Reuters and Wall Street Journal
Sites,’’ November 15, 2013. http://en.rsf.org/china-china-blocks-reuters-and-wall-1511-2013,45463.html.
284. Angela Doland, ‘‘Times and WSJ Have Chinese Sites—Too Bad They’re
Blocked in China,’’ AdAge, June 16, 2014. http: // adage.com / article / global - news /blocked-china-times-journal-s-chinese-sites/293706/.
285. People’s Daily (English edition), ‘‘China’s Online Population Rises to 632 Million,’’ July 21, 2014. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0721/c90882-8758625.html.
286. Kenneth Rapoza, ‘‘By 2016, China Internet Users to Double Entire U.S. Population, Forbes, April 28, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2014/04/28/by2016-china-internet-users-to-double-entire-u-s-population/.
287. Freedom House, ‘‘Freedom on the Net 2013—China,’’ October 3, 2013. http://
www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/china#.U80swvldWSo.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00417

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

406

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

288. Dan Nystedt, ‘‘Google News, YouTube Blocked in China Amid Tibet Riots,’’
Washington Post, March 17, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/03/17/AR2008031701006.html; Mark Sweney, ‘‘China Blocks Media Due
to Tibet Unrest,’’ Guardian, March 17, 2008. http: // www.theguardian.com / media /2008/mar/17/chinathemedia.digitalmedia.
289. Scitech (CNN blog), ‘‘Reports: China Blocks Web Sites Ahead of Tiananmen
Anniversary,’’ June 2, 2009. http://scitech.blogs.cnn.com/2009/06/02/reports-chinablocks-web-sites-ahead-of-tiananmen-anniversary/.
290. Robin Wauters, ‘‘China Blocks Access to Twitter, Facebook after Riots,’’
TechCrunch, July 7, 2009. http://techcrunch.com/2009/07/07/china-blocks-access-totwitter-facebook-after-riots/.
291. Freedom House, ‘‘Freedom on the Net 2013—China,’’ October 3, 2013. http://
www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/china#.U80swvldWSo.
292. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Xi Jinping Leads Internet Security Group,’’ February 27, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/27/c_133148273.htm.
293. China Copyright and Media, ‘‘Cybersecurity and Informatization LeadingGroup: Names and Documents,’’ March 13, 2014. http://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/03/13/cybersecurity-and-informatization-leading-group-namesand-documents/.
294. Analyst at the Congressional Research Service in a telephone interview withstaff; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Dalphine Halgand, May 15, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Xiao Qiang, May 15, 2014.
295. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of David Wertime, May 15, 2014.
296. Malcolm Moore, ‘‘China Kills Off Discussion on Weibo after Internet Crackdown,’’ Telegraph, January 30, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
china/10608245/China-kills-off-discussion-on-Weibo-after-internet-crackdown.html.
297. David Wertime, ‘‘Surprising Crackdown at WeChat,’’ Tea Leaf Nation, March
14, 2014. http://www.tealeafnation.com/2014/03/surprising-crackdown-on-wechat/.
298. Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘China Regulates Internet Messaging Services,’’
August 7, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/v2014-08/07/c_133539676.htm.
299. Reuters, ‘‘China Tightens Internet Controls, Legalizes Post Deletion,’’ December 28, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/28/net-us-china-internetidUSBRE8BO01320121228.
300. Jonathan Kaiman, ‘‘China Cracks Down on Social Media with Threat of Jailfor ‘Online Rumours’,’’ Guardian, September 10, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/sep/10/china-social-media-jail-rumours.
301. Agence France-Presse, ‘‘Blogger Becomes First to Be Jailed in China’s Official Crackdown on Internet Rumours,’’ April 17, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/
china/article/1485882/blogger-jailed-three-years-official-crackdown-internet-rumours;
Xinhua (English edition), ‘‘Internet Rumormonger Gets 3-Year Jail Term,’’ April 17,
2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/17/c_133269304.htm.
302. Julie Makinen, ‘‘China Broadens Crackdown on Google Services,’’ Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2014. http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-0614-google-china20140614-story.html.
303. Google, ‘‘Transparency Report Database—China.’’ http: // www.google.com /transparencyreport/traffic/explorer/ ?r=CN&l=EVERYTHING&csd=1369610708834&
ced=1370983380000.
304. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts, ‘‘How Censorship in China
Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,’’ American Political Science Review 107:2 (May 2013): 3.
305. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts, ‘‘How Censorship in China
Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,’’ American Political Science Review 107:2 (May 2013): 14–15.
306. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, testimony of Xiao Qiang, May 15, 2014.
307. Rebecca MacKinnon, ‘‘China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism,’ ’’ Journal of Democracy 22:2 (April 2011): 39–41.
308. William Wan, ‘‘China Broadcasts Confession of Chinese-American Blogger,’’
Washington Post, September 15, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00418

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

407

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

broadcasts-confession-of-chinese-american-blogger/2013/09/15/3f2d82da-1e1a-11e3-8459-657e0c72fec8_story.html.
309. Malcolm Moore, ‘‘China Kills Off Discussion on Weibo after Internet Crackdown,’’ Telegraph, January 30, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
china/10608245/China-kills-off-discussion-on-Weibo-after-internet-crackdown.html.
310. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, written
testimony of Xiao Qiang, May 15, 2014.
311. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Stability
in China: Lessons from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States, written
testimony of David Wertime, May 15, 2014.
312. Jerin Mathew, ‘‘China Defends Blocking Facebook, Twitter and Bloomberg,’’
International Business Times, January 16, 2014. http: // www.ibtimes.co.uk / chinadefends-blocking-facebook-twitter-bloomberg-1432488.
313. Edmond Lococo, ‘‘Facebook Says Chinese Wants Its Site as Regulator Says
No,’’ Bloomberg, September 11, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-11/
facebook-says-china-consumers-want-service-as-regulator-says-no.html.
314. ‘‘Ours, All Ours,’’ Economist, April 6, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/
special-report/21574638- wealth- internet- businesses- chinese- characteristics-ours- allours.
315. Nick Cohen, ‘‘How Reader’s Digest Became a Chinese Stooge,’’ Guardian,
March 29, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/29/readersdigest-chinese-stooge-censorship.
316. Rob Schmitz, ‘‘LinkedIn Censors Its Members in China . . . Globally,’’ Marketplace, September 1, 2014. http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/linkedin-censorsits-members-chinaglobally.
317. Rob Schmitz, ‘‘LinkedIn Censors Its Members in China . . . Globally,’’ Marketplace, September 1, 2014. http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/linkedin-censorsits-members-chinaglobally.
318. Julie Blussé, ‘‘Apple Blocks App Developed by Chinese Activists and RNW,’’Radio Netherlands Worldwide, December 13, 2013. http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/
apple-blocks-app-developed-chinese-activists-and-radio-netherlands-worldwide-0.
319. GreatFire.org, ‘‘Bing Bests Baidu Censorship,’’ March 19, 2014. https: //en.greatfire.org/blog/2014/mar/bing-bests-baidu-censorship; Xia Chu, ‘‘An Audit on
Bing’s China Censorship or, an Independent Transparency Report,’’ March 1, 2014.
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B8ztBERe_FUwdkVPbWxkMHJ2ZG8/edit.
320. Microsoft Bing, ‘‘Setting the Record Straight,’’ February 12, 2014. http: //blogs.bing.com/search/2014/02/12/setting-the-record-straight/.
321. John Ruwitch and Donny Kwok, ‘‘Yue Yuen Counts Cost of China Shoe
Strike, Says Most Workers Returned,’’ Reuters, April 26, 2014. http: // www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/26/us-china-strike-idUSBREA3P05020140426.
322. Tom Michell and Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘‘China Labor Activism: Crossing theLine,’’ Financial Times, May 7, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bb0f1c3a-c95311e3-99cc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz37YLdsFhD.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00419

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

RECOMMENDATIONS
China’s Military Modernization
The Commission recommends:• Congress fund the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding and operational efforts to increase its presence in the Asia Pacific to at least 67
ships and rebalance homeports to 60 percent in the region by2020 so that the United States will have the capacity to maintainreadiness and presence in the Asia Pacific, offset China’s growing
military capabilities, and surge naval assets in the event of acontingency.
• Congress appoint an outside panel of experts to do a net assessment of the Sino-American military balance and make recommendations to Congress regarding the adequacy of the current
U.S. military plans and budgets to meet the security requirements of the United States in the Pacific.
• Congress ensure the adequacy of open source collection, production, and dissemination capabilities vis-à-vis security issues involving China.
• Congress direct U.S. Pacific Command to brief Congress on the
People’s Liberation Army Navy’s participation in the Rim of the
Pacific-2014 exercise.
• Congress direct the Department of Defense to provide to Congress its purpose and rationale for its military-to-military engagement planning with the People’s Liberation Army, including
proposed programs already discussed with the People’s Liberation Army.
• Given the importance of understanding China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missile programs, Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to provide an unclassified report, witha classified annex, that examines China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missile capabilities, intentions, and force structure.
China’s Domestic Stability
The Commission recommends:• Members of Congress reaffirm their support for human rights,
freedom of expression, and rule of law in China and raise citizens’ rights to freedom of speech, expression, and religion in
their meetings with Chinese government officials.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(408)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00420

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

409

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Congress support the efforts of the U.S. Agency for International
Development, U.S. Department of State, and the National Endowment for Democracy to strengthen governance and improve
the well-being of Chinese citizens through capacity-building
training programs and exchanges.
• Congress closely monitor U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation to ensure the United States is not endorsing or providing
any support for China’s suppression of Chinese citizens, including Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other ethnic minorities.
• Congress continue to support and fund media outlets that promote the free flow of information and Internet freedom within
China.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00421

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00422

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

CHAPTER 3
CHINA AND THE WORLDSECTION 1: CHINA AND ASIA’S EVOLVINGSECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Introduction
This section discusses China’s security interests in Asia and explores how Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania are responding to China’s growing capabilities, influence, and assertiveness in the region. It also examines how the regional security dynamics in East Asia are shifting, as well as the implications of thisevolving security architecture for U.S. alliances and partnerships.
It is based on a March Commission hearing on changing security
dynamics in East Asia and Oceania; a Commission fact-finding trip
to South Korea and Australia, and Commission meetings in Washington, DC, with embassy officials from Asian countries; as well as
research conducted throughout the year.
China’s Approach to Regional Security
Beijing views competing territorial claims as obstacles to thedominant position China seeks in East Asia. Using a variety of foreign and domestic policy tools, Beijing is attempting to expand asphere of influence in its peripheral regions. Recent public statements by high-level Chinese officials suggest China is departingfrom its traditional low-profile foreign policy to ‘‘hide capacities andbide time.’’ In November 2013, for example, Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi gave a speech introducing a new role for China
as a ‘‘major responsible country,’’ one that is ‘‘more actively engaged in international affairs.’’ 1 As it seeks to take on this role,
China’s influence in Asia is deepening and the security architectureof Asia is adjusting to this change. For more information on China’s more active foreign policy, particularly regarding states on its
periphery, see Chapter 2, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Security andForeign Affairs.’’
China’s Multifaceted Strategy to Defend and Advance Its
Sovereignty Claims
Although China has settled most of its land border disputes, it
is engaged in intense maritime disputes in its near seas—the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. Due to their strategic, historical, and resource value, Beijing’s near seas are ‘‘ofparamount importance to a China that feels acutely wronged byhistory, has largely addressed its more basic security needs, andDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(411)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00423

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

412
craves further development,’’ according to Andrew S. Erickson, a
China expert at the U.S. Naval War College.2 In the East China
Sea (see Figure 1), the Senkaku Islands disputed by Japan and
China (which calls them the Diaoyu Dao) are a focal point for tensions. In the South China Sea (see Figure 2), China claims waters
or land features extending as far as 800 nautical miles from thecoast of mainland China based on a variety of factors such as ‘‘historic rights.’’ Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, andBrunei object to all or part of China’s claim.*

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* China denotes its South China Sea claim on maps with a ‘‘u-shaped line’’ comprised of ninedashes along the coasts of South China Sea littoral states. More recently China’s official maps
have included a tenth dash around its South China Sea claim, delineating China’s claim overTaiwan. The meaning of the dashes and the specificity of China’s claim within the dashes remains unclear. Jonathan G. Odom, ‘‘A China in a Bull Shop? Comparing the Rhetoric of a Rising
China with the Reality of the International Law of the Sea,’’ Ocean and Coastal Law Journal
17:2 (2012): 234–236, 247; Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, ‘‘The Nine-Dash Line in the South
China Sea: History, Status, and Implications,’’ American Journal of International Law 107:1(January 2013): 98–124; and Euan Graham, ‘‘China’s New Map: Just Another Dash?’’ Strategist(Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog), September 17, 2013. http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-new-map-just-another-dash/. For more information on China’s maritime disputes in the
East and South China Seas, see Chapter 2, Section 3, ‘‘China’s Maritime Disputes,’’ of the Commission’s 2013 Annual Report.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00424

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

413
Figure 1: East China Sea Map

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00425

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C3S1Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Source: U.S. Navy, Maritime Claims Reference Manual, 2014; Flanders Marine Institute, ‘‘EEZ
Boundaries,’’ http://www.marineregions.org/eezsearch.php. Commission staff approximation ofmaritime claims. Names and boundary representation are not authoritative. The EEZ approximations shown are derived from the straight baseline claims of China, Taiwan, South Korea,
and Japan, none of which is recognized by the United States. Japan’s EEZ claim also includes
an additional region further east, not shown here.

414
Figure 2: South China Sea Map

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, South China Sea Maritime Claims Map, 2013. http://
www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs; Gregory Poling, The South China Sea in
Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute (Center for Strategic and International Studies,
July 2013). http://csis.org/files/publication/130717_Poling_SouthChinaSea_Web.pdf. Commission
staff approximation of maritime claims. Names and boundary representation are not authoritative. Both Vietnam and the Philippines claim the Spratly Islands independently of their maritime claims.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00426

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C3S1Fig2.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

In testimony to the Commission, Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser
for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, described China’s incremental approach to vindicating its territorial
claims and advancing its dominance in the region: ‘‘Through asteady progression of small steps, none of which by itself is a casus
belli, Beijing seeks to gradually change the status quo in its
favor.’’ 3 These small steps are diverse and wide-ranging. They include physical measures to demonstrate sovereignty over China’s
maritime claims, such as maritime patrols and land reclamationand civil construction projects in the South China Sea.4 They also
include administrative and legal measures to assert sovereignty,
such as the enactment in 2014 of fishing regulations requiring foreign vessels to request permission to enter Chinese-claimed waters
and the establishment in 2013 of an Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ) over the disputed East China Sea (see Chapter 2, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs,’’ for a discussion of the ADIZ).5
The expanded capabilities and growing power of China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) are another key component of China’s
multifaceted strategy to protect its sovereignty claims. China’s
military modernization and activities seek to expand China’s mari-415
time perimeter out to its second island chain * approximately 1,800
nautical miles from China. Controlling China’s maritime periphery
improves China’s abilities to (1) deter Taiwan’s moves toward independence, reverse Taiwan’s actions should that policy fail, anddeter, delay, and deny any U.S. intervention in such a scenario; (2)defend against an enemy blockade and strikes on important political, economic, and military targets along China’s coast and into
the interior; and (3) advance and defend China’s maritime territory, sovereignty, and interests, including access to natural resources.6
Finally, the market dependencies of many East Asian countries
on China—the result of China’s deep integration into regional manufacturing supply chains—afford Beijing greater leverage in pursuing regional security interests. At the Commission’s March 2014
hearing, several witnesses expressed concern about China’s willingness to utilize coercive economic measures to extract political or security concessions from its Asian neighbors. 7 One scholar describes
China’s employment of economic levers as the ‘‘selective applicationof economic incentives and punishments designed to augment Beijing’s diplomacy.’’ 8
An Increasingly Assertive China Seeks a New Regional Security Architecture
Because a relatively stable external environment allows China tofocus on domestic economic development, Beijing likely will continue to be a free-rider in the U.S.-underwritten global security
system.9 Although emboldened by its progress in shifting regional
security dynamics, Beijing seeks to manage external perceptions
that could elevate concerns about China’s intentions and lead regional actors to unite against China or seek intervention from outside powers, especially the United States. However, in the past five
years, China has exerted diplomatic clout and economic influencein the region, backed by rapidly growing military capabilities.
These factors have enabled China’s increasingly assertive pursuitof its security interests in East Asia. As China has become more
confident in its capabilities, it has already begun to change the regional balance of power in its direction.
Moreover, senior Chinese leaders in the past year have begun tochallenge the U.S. position as the primary power in East Asia bypromoting a new Asian security architecture led by Asian countries, with China in the leading role.10 Upon taking the chairmanship of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia for three years in May 2014, Beijing turned a
low-profile multilateral venue into an opportunity to articulate its
vision for this new security architecture.† In a speech addressing

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* See Figure 2 in Chapter 2, Section 2, ‘‘China’s Military Modernization,’’ for a depiction ofChina’s first and second island chains and for a more detailed description of the concept.
† The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) was initially proposed and convened by Kazakhstan in 1992 as a mechanism to discuss the changing
security dynamics following the conclusion of the Cold War. Today, CICA’s membership includes
26 members from the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, and a few
observer states and organizations. The United States is a CICA observer state. Secretariat of
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, ‘‘About CICA.’’ http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&; Mu Chunshan, ‘‘What is CICA (And Why Does China
Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00427

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

416
the conference, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated, ‘‘We need torely on the people in Asia to run Asia’s affairs, deal with Asia’s
problems, and uphold Asia’s security. The people in Asia have thecapability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in Asia
through enhanced cooperation.’’ 11
China’s increasingly forceful approach to regional security,
though, could constrain its future policy options in Asia. Robert
Sutter, professor of practice of international affairs at George
Washington University, testified to the Commission that China’s
assertiveness:. . . puts nearby governments on guard and weakens Chinese regional influence. It reminds China’s neighbors of[its] longstanding and justified Cold War reputation as themost disruptive and domineering force in the region. . . .
[China’s] practice of promoting an image of consistent andrighteous behavior in foreign affairs is so far from realitythat it grossly impedes effectively dealing with disputes anddifferences with neighbors and the United States.12
Some observers suggest China’s behavior also is narrowing therange of U.S. policy options in East Asia. According to former Australian defense department official Hugh White, currently a professor at Australia National University:
By using direct armed pressure in these disputes, China
makes its neighbors more eager for U.S. military support,
and at the same time makes America less willing to give it,
because of the clear risk of a direct U.S.-China clash . . .
Beijing is betting that, faced with [the choice between deserting its friends and fighting China], America will backoff and leaves its allies and friends unsupported. This will
weaken America’s alliances and partnerships, undermine
U.S. power in Asia, and enhance China’s power.13
In a 2013 speech, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
speculated on the possible outcomes of a continued shift in power:‘‘The truth is that overwhelming U.S. military power combinedwith continued significant U.S. economic power lies very much at
the fulcrum of the stability of the post-war order. And if China begins to replace the American fulcrum, the legitimate question fromus all is what sort of alternative regional and global order would
China seek to construct in its place.’’ 14
At the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing, statements of senior officials reflected the competitive yetintertwined nature of the U.S.-China security relationship. Whilecontrasting the positive outcomes of a cooperative U.S.-China relationship against the ‘‘disastrous’’ outcome of confrontation between
the two countries, President Xi alluded to China’s growing ambitions for the operating areas and missions of the PLA, stating, ‘‘The
vast Pacific Ocean has ample space to accommodate two great nations.’’ 15 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry acknowledged the differences between the two countries but also expressed confidence in

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Care about It)?’’ Diplomat, May 17, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/what-is-cica-and-whydoes-china-care-about-it/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00428

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

417
managing these differences: ‘‘I can tell you that we are determined
to choose the path of peace and prosperity and cooperation, andyes, even competition, but not conflict. When the United States andChina work with each other, we both stand to gain a great deal.’’ 16
Yet, the manner in which China has pursued its regional security interests in the past year has undergone a troubling shift. In
the past, Beijing sought to frame its assertiveness as a retaliatory
response to provocative neighboring states. Since the announcement of its East China Sea ADIZ in late 2013, however, Beijing hastaken provocative actions in support of its maritime claims without
the kind of public rationalization that may have been expected inyears prior. According to Ely Ratner, senior fellow and deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New
American Security, this recent shift suggests the United States
has not only failed to deter assertive Chinese behavior, but also
allowed a permissive environment in which China is comfortableescalating its actions. Beijing is ‘‘incurring few tangible costs for its
assertiveness and appearing to believe (perhaps rightly so) thatit can ride out whatever regional criticism arises in response. . . .
Acknowledging Chinese behavior for what it is—undeterred andunapologetic assertiveness—will necessitate a more serious American response than we have seen to date.’’ 17
In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aaron
L. Friedberg, professor of politics and international affairs at
Princeton University, underscored the need for continued U.S. involvement in matters of East Asian security:
In the absence of an effective American response, China
may yet be able to successfully pursue a divide and conquer
strategy: intimidating some of its neighbors into acquiescence while isolating and demoralizing others. Indeed, thisappears to be precisely what Beijing is now trying to do:reaching out to Washington and proclaiming its desire toform a ‘‘new type great power relationship’’ with the UnitedStates, while at the same time ratcheting up pressure on
key targets, especially U.S. allies.18
Shifting Security Dynamics in Northeast Asia

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Since the mid-20th century, the U.S. alliances with Japan andSouth Korea have served as the pillars for the Northeast Asian security architecture, and North Korean instability has been the primary focal point of regional threat perceptions. However, China’s
rise is altering the regional security environment, prompting discussion among the United States, Japan, and South Korea on how
to update their alliances for the 21st century. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Helvey testified to the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and PacificAffairs:
We are actively working with Japan and [South Korea] totransform and modernize our alliances in ways that ensure
they meet our original security goals of assurance and deterrence while also building our alliances into platforms forbroader cooperation on traditional and nontraditional secu-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00429

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

418
rity challenges, both in Asia and globally. . . . In recent
years, and in concert with the senior leaders of both countries, we have developed for each alliance a forward-looking
agenda based on enhancing security, increasing the abilityof our militaries to work together seamlessly, and building
our allies’ capacity to contribute to regional and global security.19
The challenge for Washington as it seeks to modernize its Northeast Asian alliances will be to balance differing sets of security perceptions and priorities in Tokyo and Seoul as well as manage simmering political tensions stemming from its troubled past. The region’s divisions over interpretations of its history have aggravatedboth China-Japan relations and South Korea-Japan relations. Aslong as China and South Korea perceive a lack of ongoing sincere
contrition by Japan for its colonial and wartime actions, politicalrifts will persist in Northeast Asia that will hinder the UnitedStates from bringing two of its most crucial allies together on regional security issues.* 20
This subsection considers in broad terms the impact China hason U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia. For a fuller consideration of
the Korean Peninsula, see Chapter 3, Section 2, ‘‘Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with North Korea.’’ For a comprehensive treatment of Taiwan issues, see Chapter 3, Section 3,‘‘Taiwan.’’China and Security in Northeast Asia
China’s Chief Security Interests in Northeast Asia
China’s two chief security interests in Northeast Asia are ensuring stability on the Korean Peninsula and securing Chinese maritime claims in the East China Sea. Both are central to China’s objective of a strong, stable homeland bordered by a secure periphery.21
To somewhat varying degrees, China, Japan, and South Korea
share a common security interest in the stability of North Korea,
a state that is inscrutable to outsiders and engages in destabilizing
rhetoric and actions. Given their relatively sizable land borders
with North Korea, China and South Korea would be heavily affected by refugee flows, potentially in the millions, in the event ofa crisis on the Peninsula. Lacking the same proximity to North

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Visits by senior Japanese leaders to Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war
dead, are chief among the issues of historical memory that divide the region. Another majordifference is the perception of Japan’s contrition over ‘‘comfort women,’’ Asian women—mostly
Korean—forced into sexual slavery at Japanese military brothels during World War II. Other
divisive issues that persisted during 2014 include differences in secondary school history curricula, particularly between China and Japan; and the memorializing by China and South Korea
of Ahn Jung-geun, a Korean resistance figure who assassinated a four-time Japanese prime
minister and governor of Japanese-occupied Korea. Jennifer Lind, ‘‘When History Humiliates
Former Enemies,’’ CNN, January 3, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/03/opinion/lind-japanwar-memories/index.html; Zheng Wang, ‘‘History Education: The Source of Conflict between
China and Japan,’’ Diplomat, April 23, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/history-educationthe-source-of-conflict-between-china-and-japan/; Esther Felden, ‘‘Former Comfort Woman Tells
Uncomforting Story,’’ Deutsche Welle, February 9, 2013. http://www.dw.de/former-comfortwoman-tells-uncomforting-story/a-17060384; and Yuka Hayashi and Alexander Martin, ‘‘Japan
Finds Tokyo, Seoul Agreed on Comfort Woman Apology,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2014.
http://online.wsj.com/articles/japan-finds-tokyo-seoul-agreed-on-comfort-women-apology-14032583
38.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00430

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

419
Korea, Japan does not share this specific concern with China andSouth Korea; nevertheless, it views Pyongyang’s continued development of ballistic missiles and nuclear arms as potential sources ofregional instability.22
China approaches its contested maritime claims with Japan andSouth Korea quite differently. Whereas China bitterly contests
ownership of the Senkaku Islands with Japan, it tends to downplay
its dispute with South Korea over Socotra Rock (see Figure 1),
known in China as Suyan Jiao and in Korea as Ieodo.
• The Senkaku Islands dispute has intensified since 2010, reflected in the increased air and maritime presence of both
China and Japan near the islands and in deteriorating ChinaJapan political relations. China’s 2012 white paper entitled‘‘Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China,’’ with chapters
entitled ‘‘Japan Grabbed Diaoyu Dao from China,’’ ‘‘Backroom
Deals Between the United States and Japan Concerning
Diaoyu Dao are Illegal and Invalid,’’ and ‘‘Japan’s Claim ofSovereignty over Diaoyu Dao is Totally Unfounded,’’ are illustrative of China’s views on the Senkaku Islands.23• Socotra Rock, on which South Korea built an ocean researchstation in 2003, is only a minor point of contention between
China and South Korea because it falls within their overlapping claimed Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Since states
enjoy only economic rights, not full sovereignty, in an EEZ,
Socotra is not technically a matter of territorial dispute. Furthermore, as a submerged feature in the Yellow Sea, the rockcannot be claimed as territorial land under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.* Since the mid-2000s Beijing has officially affirmed several times that ‘‘China and[South Korea] have a consensus on the Suyan Jiao, that is, therock does not have territorial status, and the two sides haveno territorial disputes.’’ 24
China’s Contrasting Security Relationships with Japan andSouth Korea
The differing intensities of the Senkaku Islands dispute and the
Socotra Rock dispute are embodied in China’s contrasting security
relationships with the two Northeast Asian powers—strained andantagonistic with Japan and generally non-confrontational with
South Korea. In China’s view, South Korea’s regional priorities
largely contribute to China’s interest in maintaining stability on
the Peninsula. However, China perceives Japan’s recent security
reforms and pursuit of a more muscular military as destabilizing
and potentially threatening China’s ability to achieve its territorial
ambitions in the East China Sea.25

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal state is entitledto an EEZ, a 200 nautical mile zone extending from the coastline of its mainland and fromthe coastline of any territorial land features. Within this zone, the state enjoys ‘‘sovereign
rights’’ for economic exploitation and exploration, but not full sovereignty. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 56: Rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal statein the exclusive economic zone. http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/
part5.htm; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 121: Regime of islands.
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part8.htm.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00431

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

420

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

In addition to managing its relations with the Northeast Asian
powers differently, China also seeks to thwart the potential for amore formal U.S.-Japan-South Korean alliance in the region. Without formal alliances, China is a ‘‘lonely’’ rising power, according toJohn Lee, fellow and adjunct professor at the University of Sydney.
This concept is especially applicable in Northeast Asia, home to twoof the United States’ strongest alliances. At a meeting with Commissioners in Washington, DC, Dr. Lee noted Beijing’s proposed‘‘new type of major country relationship’’ with the United States reflects its interest in simplifying the strategic landscape, particularly one in which China perceives the odds are stacked against it.
Just as China seeks to divide Southeast Asia in order to provide
it more room for policy maneuver, a divided Northeast Asia—one
with limited U.S. influence and security guarantees—is also strategically favorable for China.
• Published Chinese views on China-Japan security relations encompass a mix of suspicion, alarm, and concern—especially on
the issues of Japan’s increasingly robust defense and security
establishment, the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance, andperceived lack of Japanese atonement over its wartime past.
One quasi-authoritative Chinese media source put it bluntly:‘‘Japan must adopt the correct attitude toward historicalissues; stop provocative acts; and take concrete action to win
the trust of Asian neighbors and the international community.’’ 26 Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, Deputy Chief of
the PLA General Staff Department, also captured these sentiments in off-script remarks at an international conference for
defense and security leaders in June 2014. Referring to speeches made earlier in the conference by Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe and U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, he said,‘‘[The United States and Japan] supported and encouraged
each other in provoking and challenging China . . . who is really stirring up trouble and tension in the region and who is initiating disputes and spat? . . . From the speeches of Mr. Abe
and Mr. Hagel, we know who is really assertive. Assertivenesshas come from the joint actions of the United States andJapan, not China.’’ 27• Conversely, official Chinese views on China’s relations with
South Korea—which in the words of the Chinese Ambassador
to South Korea, Qiu Guohong, ‘‘have never been better’’—reflect an interest in continued cooperation between Beijing andSeoul on regional security.28 As President Xi made his first
visit to South Korea as president in July 2014, he authored anarticle striking an optimistic tone on China-South Korea security relations: ‘‘I have exchanged views many times with
[South Korean] President Park Geun-hye on this issue, and wehave agreed that our two countries should take on responsibility and work constructively for lasting peace and stability in
our region.’’ 29 President Xi’s speech at Seoul National University, entitled ‘‘Jointly Create a Beautiful Future of China[South Korea] Cooperation and Accomplish the Great Cause of
Asia’s Revitalization and Prosperity,’’ emphasized his desire forwarm relations between the two countries.30 As China appears

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00432

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

421
to draw South Korea closer, China may also seek to drive
wedges between South Korea and the United States as well as
between South Korea and Japan.31
Japan and South Korea: Security Responses to China
Japan and South Korea are responding to China’s actions andrhetoric in different ways. Whereas Japan is balancing against
China by boosting its own capabilities and reaffirming its alliancewith the United States, South Korea appears to be pursuing a
hedging strategy by cultivating its security relationships with not
only the United States but with China as well.32
Japan
China’s ongoing assertions of its East China Sea claims have anacute effect on Japan’s security calculus. In response to a changing
security environment in Northeast Asia, Tokyo has sought to morevigorously safeguard its national interests and more fully participate in international security affairs through a ‘‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’’ policy.33 To that end, Tokyo is pursuing the following measures.
Reforming Japan’s legal and political framework to facilitate
U.S.-Japan defense cooperation and the flexible employment of Japan’s armed forces.34 Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan has madeseveral institutional and legal reforms that could allow more robust
participation in its alliance with the United States and in efforts
to preserve international peace and security.
• Prime Minister Abe’s Cabinet in July 2014 issued a reinterpretation of its constitution to allow Japan to exercise ‘‘collective self-defense.’’ * Previously, under its self-imposed prohibition against ‘‘collective self-defense,’’ Japan had no ability tocome to the defense of allies such as the United States unless
Japan itself was under attack. Under a constitutional reinterpretation, Japan could engage in a wider range of joint military activities with the United States in the East and South
China Seas. Furthermore, Japanese Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense-capable KONGO-class destroyers could for the first time
formally provide air defenses for U.S. ships conducting missile
defense against North Korean missiles.35• The Japanese government in late 2013 announced the establishment of its first-ever National Security Council and National Security Strategy, and separately, the passage of a statesecrecy law intended to strengthen the protection of classified
information. For the United States, these are strong measuresthat will contribute to the improvement of its defense and information-sharing partnership with Japan.36

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* As this Report went to print, the Cabinet decision on collective self-defense has yet to undergo deliberation in the Diet. The Cabinet decision requires the Diet to make amendments to several existing laws in order to take full effect. Yoshisuke Iinuma, ‘‘Abe Finding It Hard to Get
His Way on Defense,’’ East Asia Forum, August 19, 2014. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/08/
19/abe-finding-it-hard-to-get-his-way-on-defence/; Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi,
Japan Takes a Step Forward on Defense Policy Reform (Center for Strategic and International
Studies, July 2, 2014). http://csis.org/publication/japan-takes-step-forward-defense-policy-reform.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00433

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

422
• Japan in April 2014 eased its self-imposed ban on arms exports. This policy will facilitate Japan’s participation in multinational arms development projects—such as the U.S.-led effort to develop the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, of which Japanintends to purchase 42. The policy also will help improve andexpand Japan’s defense industry. Unable to recoup development costs on the international market under the previous policy, Japanese defense companies under the arms export ban
had difficulty pursuing advanced military technologies.37 Lastly, the new policy offers the potential for Japan to provide military equipment and services to certain U.S. allies and security
associates and provides Tokyo with another means of security
cooperation with potential partners across Asia.
Building a ‘‘more robust alliance and greater shared responsibilities’’ with the United States.38 During an October 2013 Security
Consultative Committee meeting of the U.S. Secretaries of Stateand Defense and their Japanese counterparts, the United States
and Japan outlined goals to strengthen and enrich their alliance,
including strengthening bilateral security and defense cooperation,
increasing regional engagement, and realigning U.S. forces inJapan.39 In testimony to the Commission, James L. Schoff, seniorassociate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, proposed an overarching concept to guide theUnited States and Japan as they redefine the contours of their alliance. A capabilities-based approach to the U.S.-Japan alliance thatwould rely on the United States for front-end military activities
and Japan for rear area support activities, according to Mr. Schoff,would ‘‘enhance alliance flexibility and better integrate alliance cooperation than the current approach without carving new—potentially politically sensitive—overseas missions for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces [JSDF].’’ * 40
Developing a network of regional security partners, especially inSoutheast Asia. China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness in the region are driving many Asian countries to strengthen
security ties with one another. Since late 2012, Japan has made its
relationship with Southeast Asian states a hallmark of its foreignand security policy. One key aspect of Japan’s relationships with
Southeast Asian states is providing capacity building assistance on
maritime safety and security—an indication of the common security goals Japan and Southeast Asia face with regard to China inthe maritime realm.41
Bolstering the capabilities of the JSDF. In line with its self-defense mission, the JSDF’s order-of-battle focuses on deterring anddefending an attack against the homeland.42 While the mere existence of the JSDF and U.S.-Japan alliance once may have been sufficient for the purposes of deterrence, Mr. Schoff testified this is nolonger the case:

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The rear area support activities Mr. Schoff proposes for Japan would include ‘‘ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and domain awareness; more collaborative planning;
cybersecurity; electronic warfare; antisubmarine warfare; missile defense; and more direct
logistical support.’’ James L. Schoff, How to Upgrade U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, January 16, 2014). http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/16/how-to-upgrade-u.s.-japan-defense-cooperation/gykq.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00434

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

423
[Tokyo] now realizes that lower thresholds of conflict might
only be deterred if it shows willingness and ability to fight,
and the object of this deterrence is China in the East China
Sea. Moreover, Japan needs to be able to project force in a
flexible manner to adapt to unpredictable situations in casedeterrence fails, as well as to give Japan’s leaders different
options for controlling escalation. Of course, Japan is notjust looking to increase its own military capability as ameans to thwart Chinese intimidation and so-called grayzone conflict (i.e., a state of neither peace nor war, such as
skirmishes between Coast Guard vessels). Boosting the military is also seen as responding to U.S. requests for moreproactive Japanese contributions to regional security . . .43
Tokyo’s initial efforts to boost defense capabilities are focused onstrengthening its intelligence gathering and maritime domainawareness in the East China Sea, bolstering its outer island defense, developing a limited expeditionary and rapid deployment capability, improving its missile defense capability, and expanding its
defense industry under the easing of Japan’s arms exports ban.44
South Korea
North Korea remains South Korea’s chief security concern—one
the United States, China, and Japan all share to different degrees.
However, deteriorating political relations among the Northeast
Asian powers pose a major hurdle to region-wide efforts to address
North Korean instability and other Northeast Asian security challenges. As its relations with Japan continue to deteriorate, South
Korea is nurturing its alliance with the United States whilestrengthening its relationship with China. In other words, according to the testimony of Jennifer Lind, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, Seoul is pursuing a hedging strategy
between the United States and China.45 Indications of Seoul’s
hedging are evident in the manner in which it handles each of its
relationships with the key players in Northeast Asia.
Upholding its alliance with the United States while maintainingsome strategic autonomy. During President Obama’s April 2014
visit to South Korea, the United States and South Korea highlighted their commitment to the sustainability of their alliance. In
addition to concluding a new alliance cost-sharing agreement thisyear, the two countries have agreed to delay the transfer of wartime operational control * to South Korea from 2015 to a futuredate. South Korea also announced its intention to procure from theUnited States the RQ–4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle system, which would improve Seoul’s intelligence, surveillance, and re-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* During the Korean War, the United States took command of allied forces in South Korea
under the United Nations Command. Having returned peacetime control of South Korean forces
to Seoul in 1994, the United States still maintains the responsibility of wartime operational
control of the South Korea forces under a Combined Forces Command. Donald Kirk, ‘‘US andSouth Korea Postpone Transfer of Wartime Control to Seoul,’’ Christian Science Monitor, April
25, 2014. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Under-the-Radar/2014/0425/US-andSouth-Korea-postpone-transfer-of-wartime-control-to-Seoul; Robert E. Kelly, ‘‘South Korea: Who
Should Have Wartime Command?’’ Diplomat, August 12, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/
south-korea-who-should-have-wartime-command/?allpages=yes.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00435

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

424

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

connaissance (ISR) capability, and the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter,
which would improve South Korea’s air capabilities.46
Nevertheless, South Korea preserves some strategic autonomy
from the United States, most evident in Seoul’s concern regarding
the North Korean missile threat. South Korean leaders maintainthe U.S.-Japanese vision for missile defense in the region is too expansive for South Korean defense purposes and has elected not toparticipate in the U.S.-led regional ballistic missile defense architecture.47 Instead, South Korea prefers its own capability, known
as the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system. Following
a May 2014 U.S. announcement on the potential deployment toSouth Korea of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
system capable of intercepting short-, medium-, and intermediaterange missiles, Seoul expressed cautious support for the system’sability to deter and counter North Korean provocations while reiterating its preference not to join in the U.S.-led regional ballistic
missile defense architecture.48 Seoul’s public statements suggestthat even as it expresses quiet approval for elements of enhanced
U.S.-Korean defense cooperation, it also seeks to reassure Chinathat improvements in its missile defense are limited in scope andmission. In spite of THAAD’s reported radar detection range of atleast 621 miles (1,000 km)—or as far as China’s major coastal regions—a South Korean defense ministry spokesman stated, ‘‘If installed, its primary goal will be to detect ballistic missile launchesfrom North Korea and should not be a big issue for China.’’ 49
Benefiting from economic integration with China, while hedging
against China’s growing military influence in the region. Part ofSouth Korean ambivalence about the country’s role in the changing
Northeast Asian security architecture derives from the strong andmutually beneficial economic ties between China and South Korea.
Although South Korea seeks to continue to develop its economic relationship with China, it is unlikely to do so at the expense of its
alliance with the United States.50 At the same time, South Korea
tends to be reluctant to participate in initiatives it may view aspart of a U.S.-led security arrangement positioned against China,
such as the regional ballistic missile defense system rather than
one narrowly focused on North Korea.51
South Korean military modernization has accelerated in recent
years largely in response to increased North Korean provocations; 52 however, Seoul also seeks to hedge against future Chinese military influence in the region. In testimony to the Commission, Mr. Schoff viewed the 2012 South Korean decision to extend
the range of its indigenous ballistic missiles from 186 miles (300km) to 497 miles (800 km) as an investment toward a capability
that could be necessary for a post-unification Korea in a neighborhood of nuclear giants China and Russia, in addition to serving asa capability to counter the ongoing North Korean missile threat.53
Maintaining distance from Japan. According to Dr. Lind, an additional aspect of South Korea’s hedging strategy is ‘‘the distanceit maintains from Japan. Seoul’s rejection of closer relations with
Tokyo reassures China that [South Korea] is not participating ina balancing effort’’ against China.54 The Japan-South Korea relationship suffers from a difference in security perceptions in North-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00436

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

425
east Asia: South Korea prioritizes North Korea while Japanprioritizes China as its chief security concern. A long-running dispute over the Liancourt Rocks (see Figure 1), which South Korea
calls Dokdo and Japan calls Takeshima, further fuels mistrust between the two countries. Analysts at the Asan Institute for Policy
Studies, a Seoul-based think tank, told the Commission that public
opinion polls showed South Koreans view the Liancourt Rocks dispute as the most significant obstacle to healthy Japan-South Korean relations. This sentiment is true even among those respondents with the most favorable attitudes toward Japan.* 55
Yet another difference that continues to strain their relations involves the historical narrative of Japan’s early 20th-century colonial rule of and wartime actions in Korea. President Park statedin a 2013 interview:
Japan and [South] Korea share many things in common—
our shared values of democracy, freedom, and a market
economy—and there is a need for us to cooperate on North
Korea. . . . But the Japanese have been opening past wounds
and have been letting them fester, and this applies not only
to Korea but also to other neighboring countries. . . . This
arrests our ability to really build momentum, so I hope thatJapan reflects upon itself.56
As in China, South Korean officials reacted with outrage at
Prime Minister Abe’s December 2013 visit to Yasukuni Shrine,
which honors nearly 2.5 million Japanese war dead, including 14
war criminals.57 In testimony to the Commission, Dr. Lind emphasized that the conflict over historical memory is a symptom, not acause, of unwillingness in both Seoul and Tokyo to seek reconciliation: ‘‘History does not ‘get in the way’: leaders decide (based on
strategic or other interests) whether or not they want to seek reconciliation, and as a result they either put history in the way, or
make efforts to remove it as an obstacle.’’ 58
Outlook for Trilateral Security Cooperation
Japan’s ongoing affirmation of its alliance with the United States
combined with continued hedging by South Korea ensures theNortheast Asian security architecture likely will remain a ‘‘U.S.
hub and ally spokes’’ model rather than an integrated security bloc.
Differing security perceptions about China among the UnitedStates, Japan, and South Korea suggest the three countries are unlikely to achieve full trilateral security cooperation in the current
security environment in the near- to mid-term.
China perceives the U.S.-South Korea alliance as more narrowly
focused on the North Korea issue, whereas the U.S.-Japan alliancehas the potential to target China and is more wide-ranging andthreatening in Beijing’s view. Beijing’s public statements on theDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Although the Liancourt Rocks are currently South Korea-occupied, the United States does
not take a position on the sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks. The United States has made clearthat the Senkaku Islands fall under the U.S.-Japan security treaty, meaning that the UnitedStates would defend Japan in the event of an armed attack on the islands; however, it has nottaken a position on the applicability of the U.S.-Korea security treaty to the Liancourt Rocks.
Demetri Sevastopulo and Simon Mundy, ‘‘U.S. Leaves South Korea in Limbo over Contested
Dokdo Islands,’’ Financial Times (London), February 18, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
bdaa3820-987b-11e3-a32f-00144feab7de.html#axzz3AIUe1gLd.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00437

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

426
U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia generally invoke the historicalcontext under which the alliances were formed, but in the case of
the U.S.-Japan alliance tend to suggest their potential to harm theinterest of third parties, such as China.
• Echoing a frequently voiced Chinese concern about U.S. alliances reflecting the harsh security environment of the Cold
War era, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespeople have depicted
the U.S.-Japan alliance as ‘‘a bilateral arrangement formed
under specific historic conditions,’’ and one that ‘‘should not go
beyond the bilateral scope and undermine the interests of athird party, including those of China.’’ 59• China’s Foreign Ministry has described the U.S.-Korea allianceas ‘‘a bilateral arrangement formed under specific historicalcircumstances. We hope that the development of relevant bilateral relations could play a constructive role for peace and stability of the Peninsula and the region.’’ 60
In the past year, the United States’ expanding and deepening engagement in Northeast Asia has yielded modest gains in the U.S.Japan-South Korea trilateral relationship. A trilateral summit inMarch 2014 convened by President Obama yielded a series of defense talks culminating in, among other items, a joint statement affirming the importance of information sharing among the threeparties. In a nod to South Korea’s interests, the language focused
exclusively on the North Korea issue; Japan, on the other hand,achieved its goal of revisiting the issue of intelligence sharing with
South Korea after a breakdown in talks on the issue with Seoul in2012.61 Despite the lack of a formal commitment, the statement is
an example of the leadership role the United States can play in the
Northeast Asian security architecture. However, particularly withregard to South Korea, it is possible in the coming years the UnitedStates will seek more support in countering Chinese influence fromits allies than they may be willing to extend.62
Shifting Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia and Oceania

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Southeast Asia and Oceania comprise a vast and geographicallyvaried region with a diversity of political systems, cultures, andlevels of development. The region’s security architecture is more
multifaceted than the relatively straightforward hub-and-spoke alliance structure in Northeast Asia. Despite these differences, theregion generally shares the same wary view of the unfolding U.S.China competition for regional power and influence. Singapore’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Shanmugam in 2013 described thethinking of many in the region:
The relative weight of China is growing. I’m not one ofthose who believes the United States is in permanent decline. But nevertheless, the respective levels of influence,
there will be a relative shift. And Singapore’s position has
consistently been to be good friends of both. . . . Would thatbe a challenge-free approach? It really depends on how . . .
the relationship between the United States and China develops. It could develop in a way that makes it challenging

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00438

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

427
for all of us who are friends with both countries and wewill just have to adapt to that.63
As the United States continues to rebalance to Asia, achieving its
security goals in the region will require reassurance and reinforcement of its alliances and security associates in addition to continued strong engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN).* ASEAN, the primary multilateral venue to address political issues in the region, has struggled to respond cohesively to China’s coercive foreign policy in the region, particularlyon the South China Sea disputes. The development of subgroups
sharing common interests within ASEAN and the inclusion of interested non-ASEAN parties in these groups, nevertheless offer areason to be optimistic about the ability of the organization to build
regional confidence.
China and Security in Southeast Asia and Australia
China’s central objectives with regard to Southeast Asia are to
defend its sovereignty claims and preserve its territorial integrity;
to secure and ensure access to resources for continued economic development; and to maintain a secure buffer zone around the Chinese mainland. All of these objectives are encompassed in the region’s most volatile security issue: the South China Sea disputes
among China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. For more information on the South China Sea disputes, see
Chapter 3, Section 1, ‘‘China and the South China Sea,’’ of theCommission’s 2012 Annual Report to Congress, and Chapter 2, Section 3, ‘‘China’s Maritime Disputes,’’ of the Commission’s 2013 Annual Report to Congress.
Beijing’s security relationships with Southeast Asian states are
as diverse as the region itself. China maintains strong defense ties
with its closest geographic neighbors, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos,and Burma. In maritime Southeast Asia, China has traditionally
maintained strong diplomatic and economic influence but weak defense ties. Although maritime Southeast Asian states have become
increasingly vocal in their opposition to China’s forceful measures
to assert its South China Sea claims, Beijing appears undeterred.64
For a survey of China’s actions since late 2013 to consolidate control over the South China Sea, such as China’s deployment of an
ultra-deepwater drilling rig to waters disputed with Vietnam from
May through July 2014, see Chapter 2, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review:
Security and Foreign Affairs.’’
With Australia, China seeks to maintain strong trade ties whilepursuing stronger security relations to at least partially counterbalance the formal and robust U.S.-Australia alliance.65 Despite
the formalization of a strategic partnership between China andAustralia in 2013, the relationship has tempered since then, due inlarge part to a Chinese perception that Australia has hewed too
closely to the United States, and to a lesser extent, Japan.66 One
example of this dynamic emerged following Australia’s criticism ofChina’s East China Sea ADIZ. At a Track 1.5 China-Australia dia-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* U.S. allies in Southeast Asia and Oceania include Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
U.S. security associates (both established and emerging) include Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00439

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

428
logue,* one Chinese delegate reportedly referred to the Australian
position on the ADIZ as an affront to China’s sovereignty and territorial interests, suggesting a likely concern in Beijing of the U.S.Australia alliance’s potential to constrain China in the Asia Pacific.67
Southeast Asia and Australia: Security Responses to China
As China pursues its claims in the South China Sea and develops the military capacity to undertake missions farther afield, its
increasingly assertive behavior has led Southeast Asian countries
and Australia to reconsider their security perceptions.68 For example, Vietnam’s reaction to China’s decision to deploy its oil rig incontested waters was a departure from its usual efforts to maintainfriendly ties with China. In addition to publicly condemning Beijing
for what it called an ‘‘extremely serious violation of Vietnam’s territorial sovereignty,’’ Hanoi sought to apply pressure on Beijing
through diplomacy and regional forums.69 Australia has also takennote of China’s growing confidence and expanding operating areas.
In early 2014, the PLA Navy’s first-ever Indian Ocean combat readiness patrol operated closer to Australia than any previous patrolby the PLA Navy (for more on this deployment, see Chapter 2, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Security and Foreign Affairs’’). Former
Australian intelligence official Rory Medcalf, currently of the Lowy
Institute for International Policy, called the exercise ‘‘a bit of a
wake-up call to [Australian] defense planners to contemplate thatin the future they’re going to have to expect the Chinese to be able
to operate in considerable force in the vicinity of [Australia’s] ocean
territories.’’ 70
Because of the growing gap in capabilities between China’s PLA
and many of the militaries in the region, as well as China’s immense economic and cultural influence, ‘‘engaging and working
with China is more a necessity than a choice,’’ according to Dr.
Ratner.71 Despite the United States’ rebalance to Asia policy,
Southeast Asian government representatives who met with theCommission this year expressed some uncertainty about the UnitedStates’ continued security commitments given domestic politicaland fiscal restraints.72 Furthermore, as Walter Lohman, director of
the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation testified to
the Commission, most Southeast Asian countries emphasize nonalignment in their foreign policy, such as Indonesia’s ‘‘a million
friends and zero enemies’’ approach.73 Consequently, Southeast
Asian states and Australia are hedging against what they perceive
to be strategic uncertainty in the region in the following ways.
Increasing the breadth of security ties by building new relationships. New configurations of intra-Asian security relationships
have developed since the late 2000s. These ties tend to derive fromthe need to balance reliance on China as an economic partner withreliance on the United States as a security guarantor. A desire
among many states in the region to participate more actively on
the international stage, as well as a need for multilateral solutions

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* A Track 1.5 dialogue is an international dialogue between governments that also includes
nongovernmental officials, such as leaders in industry, academia, and nongovernmental organizations, and retired senior officials.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00440

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

429
to a diversity of transnational threats also drive the proliferationof new defense ties.74 Key trends in this growing network of intraAsian defense ties include:• Japan is emerging as a key source of support to ASEAN countries on maritime security in the region.75 Tokyo offered a $184
million soft loan to the Philippines to finance its sale of 10 new
patrol ships for the Philippine Coast Guard, due to begin arriving in 2015. These ships are expected to patrol Philippineclaimed waters disputed with China. Similarly, Japan has
promised to transfer six used patrol vessels and related equipment valued at $4.9 million to Vietnam in 2015.76• Australia’s growing role in the Asia Pacific also is enhancing
the burgeoning informal network of regional security ties. In
its Defense White Paper 2013, Canberra indicated it envisioned
expanding its defense engagement beyond its traditional partners in Southeast Asian and Oceania to the larger Indo-Pacific.
Under Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s government,
which came to power in late 2013, Australia is likely to continue deepening security relations across the region, particularly with Japan (discussed in more detail later in this section).77• Cooperative measures among Southeast Asian claimants in theSouth China Sea dispute is yielding unexpected linkages. The
most notable example is the developing defense relationshipbetween the Philippines and Vietnam. In a response to China’s
aggression in the South China Sea, the two countries have cooperated on measures demonstrating their unity on a peacefulresolution to the South China Sea dispute. Symbolic of thisnew relationship, in May 2014 Philippines President Benigno
Aquino and Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung announced a ‘‘roadmap toward a strategic defense partnership’’ todeter China in the South China Sea; in June 2014 Philippine
and Vietnamese troops held friendly soccer and volleyballmatches on a disputed Vietnamese-held island in the Spratly
Islands.78

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Increasing the depth of existing security ties. Even with an increasingly broad array of defense relationships in East Asia andOceania, the diversity of security interests in the region suggests
a formal multilateral security arrangement similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is unlikely in the near future.79
Instead, existing bilateral security ties—particularly alliances with
the United States—have deepened in recent years. In April 2014,
the United States and Philippines announced an Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement intended to advance the implementation of
their defense treaty alliance. During a June 2014 meeting, President Obama and Prime Minister Abbott announced the conclusionof the U.S.-Australian Force Posture Agreement, laying the foundation to expand the U.S. military presence in Australia beyond theexisting U.S. Marine rotational force in Darwin. The Obama-Abbott
meeting also identified ballistic missile defense in the Asia Pacificas another potential measure of cooperation.80

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00441

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

430
Diversifying and strengthening military and paramilitary capabilities. Many states, facing increasing maritime challenges from
China over competing South China Sea claims, have shifted emphasis in defense procurement from ground forces to air and maritime forces. In particular, regional militaries have expressed interest in acquiring capabilities that could boost maritime domainawareness such as patrol craft and maritime surveillance aircraft,
and more advanced capabilities for deterrence such as submarinesand fighter aircraft.81 Indonesia, for example, is undergoing a longterm military modernization effort seeking to achieve ‘‘minimum
essential force’’ to secure its roughly 17,000-island archipelago by
2024. Then-presidential candidate Joko Widodo stated that Indonesia ‘‘rejects solutions [to the South China Sea dispute] throughmilitary power’’; nevertheless, elected this year on a platform that
included a promise to triple the defense and security budget, President Widodo will probably seek to continue a military modernization effort to ensure adequate readiness and capability among Indonesia’s armed forces.82 In the absence of high-end military capabilities, one common strategy for Southeast Asian states to defend
their maritime claims against China has been to strengthen andre-organize maritime law enforcement fleets. Vietnam renamed its
Marine Police force the Vietnam Coast Guard in late 2013, reportedly to make it eligible to obtain patrol boats under the specifications of Japanese aid programs.83
Emphasizing the role of regional institutions and international
law to manage disputes.84 Although ASEAN members originally envisioned a political and economic organization, ASEAN and
ASEAN-based forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum have inrecent years served as a vehicle to address security-related issues
in the region (for further discussion of the role of ASEAN in regional security, see the following subsection).85 ASEAN’s non-binding ‘‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’’
with China was viewed as a success when it was concluded in
2002; progress toward a binding Code of Conduct, however, hassince stalled. Facing asymmetry in the balance of military power
against China and political deadlock in ASEAN, many Southeast
Asian states have emphasized the peaceful settlement of maritime
disputes under international law. The Philippines in 2013 filed forlegal arbitration over conflicting South China Sea claims with
China, which has declined to participate. Following China’s deployment of its oil rig to waters contested by Vietnam, senior Vietnamese leaders publicly stated Vietnam also was prepared to pursue arbitration of maritime claims disputed with China.86

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Role of ASEAN in Regional Security
The consensus-based nature of ASEAN, in conjunction with thediverse security interests of its members, has hampered its ability
to effectively tackle regional security challenges such as the South
China Sea dispute. Although ASEAN has begun to expand its mission set to include security issues, the organization has yet to define the nature of the role it is willing and able to play in regional
security.
At the Commission’s March 2014 hearing, witnesses differed on
the role of ASEAN in the United States’ security strategy in the

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00442

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

431
region. Pointing to ASEAN’s inability to achieve progress on pressuring China on a South China Sea Code of Conduct, Mr. Lohman
felt the United States should advocate ‘‘forcefully’’ for its own interests in the South China Sea rather than depend too heavily on amultilateral organization whose members generally seek to balance
security guarantees from both the United States and China. In
written testimony to the Commission, he stated, ‘‘China’s aggressiveness is not sufficiently galvanizing ASEAN against China’s
challenge. Something needs to be done to change its calculation.
This argues for greater American pressure on ASEAN while hedging against its continued failure.’’ 87 Dr. Ratner took a more sanguine view of ASEAN, advocating for increased U.S. security ties
with its allies and security associates in Southeast Asia. In his
view, U.S. engagement with ASEAN not only enhances the politicalsustainability of U.S. military access and presence in the region,
but also strengthens the capacity of ASEAN member allies and security associates to support U.S. operations and more independently defend their own interests in the face of Chinese coercion.88
Despite differences in outlook on ASEAN’s ability to support U.S.
security interests, both witnesses agreed on the unlikelihood of theemergence of an ASEAN-centric security architecture given China’s
diplomatic preference in Southeast Asia to address the region’s
most pressing issues on a bilateral basis, and the reluctance of
ASEAN members to complicate their relationships with China or
publicly challenge China.89
ASEAN has encountered limited success in resolving the South
China Sea dispute with China, but has made progress on nontraditional security issues, particularly under the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) framework established in 2010.* In
meetings with the Commission this year, Southeast Asian government representatives consistently supported ADMM+ mechanisms
as central pillars of the regional security architecture. Although
China’s membership in the ADMM+ and other ASEAN-offshoot organizations limits the ability of these organizations to maneuver
beyond China’s preferences, these organizations will continue to bevaluable for the purposes of confidence building in the region. Solereliance on these organizations, however, is unlikely to be enoughto ensure peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute in theinterest of all claimants.90
The Role of the U.S.-Australian Alliance in Regional Security
Formed in the aftermath of World War II, the U.S.-Australian alliance continues to be highly valued among the Australian public
and policymakers today.91 The alliance commits the United Statesand Australia to ‘‘act to meet the common danger’’ in the event ofan ‘‘armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties.’’ 92

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The ADMM+ includes defense ministers from the ten ASEAN member states and eight‘‘Plus’’ countries including the United States and China. At its inaugural meeting, the ADMM+
agreed on five areas of practical cooperation: maritime security, counter-terrorism, humanitarianassistance and disaster management, peacekeeping operations, and military management.
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, ‘‘About the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMMPlus),’’ March 28, 2014. https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm-plus.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00443

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

432
China-Australia Economic Relations
China’s rise in Asia has generated debate in Australia about
how to manage the tension between its economic relationshipwith China, Australia’s largest trading partner, and its security
relationship with the United States, Australia’s ally.93
China is Australia’s biggest trading partner, primarily due toChina’s strong demand for Australian commodities. In 2013, 36
percent of Australia’s goods exports ($88.5 billion) went to China,
nearly a 30 percent increase in exports to China year-on-year.
Over 80 percent of Australian exports to China in 2013 wereores and minerals including iron, coal, and gold.94 China’s shareof Australian resource exports grew from 8 percent in 2002–2003
to 52 percent in 2012–2013.95 China is also the biggest market
for Australian agricultural products (including meat and dairy),accounting for 20 percent of all agricultural exports in 2013.
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Australia, thoughsmall, has been growing steadily. In 2013, Chinese FDI in Australia was $9 billion, down 10 percent from 2012. As with trade,
China’s FDI is concentrated primarily in the mining sector:
Since 2006, roughly 75 percent of Chinese FDI has been in mining and natural gas deals.96 There is also significant interest by
Chinese investors in Australian real estate, with $1.2 billion
worth of FDI in commercial real estate in 2013 (Credit Suisse estimates that Chinese buyers account for 18 percent of all new
property purchases in Sydney).97
During the Commission’s trip to Australia, Australian business leaders told Commissioners China’s demand for Australiancommodities was fundamental to Australia’s ability to weather
the global financial crisis (indeed, on the strength of its exports,
Australia has been running substantial trade surpluses with
China). However, Australia’s overreliance on commodities trade
has resulted in a skewed economic development where the resources sector has grown, but other sectors lag.* Moreover, therecent economic slowdown in China, coupled with the global decline in commodity prices, has exposed the vulnerabilities of Australian overdependence on China’s demand.98
In his meeting with the Commission, Mr. White, the Australian
National University professor, opined Australia should support anAsian security architecture accommodating both China and theUnited States, in order to avoid the dilemma of choosing between
the two or stoking a heated strategic rivalry.99 This strategy has
not widely taken root among Canberra’s policymakers. Instead, theAustralian government has emphasized its firm alliance commitment to the United States in clear terms. At his meeting with
President Obama in June 2014, Prime Minister Abbott stated, ‘‘Iwant to assure the President that Australia will be an utterly de-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Between 2003 and 2012, companies invested almost A$400 billion ($415 billion) on projects;
during the same period, mining’s share of Australia’s national output doubled. Jamie Smyth,‘‘Australia’s Luck Runs Low as Chinese Economy Cools,’’ Financial Times, September 23, 2014.
http: // www.ft.com / intl / cms / s / 0 / 6412e84e - 42e8 - 11e4 - 9a58 - 00144feabdc0 . html?siteedition=intl#
axzz3EAdZbuJ3.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00444

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

433
pendable ally of the United States.’’ 100 Commission interlocutors at
U.S. Embassy Canberra, U.S. Consulate Sydney, and the Australian Department of Defense, similarly emphasized Canberra’s
ongoing dedication to the alliance.
Unlike in Northeast Asia, where political friction limits security
cooperation between U.S. allies, Australia’s burgeoning security relationship with Japan hints at the potential for two U.S. allies toreshape the Asian security architecture in a manner favorable to
U.S. interests. Prime Minister Abe’s remarks to the AustralianParliament in July 2014 referenced the shared values and common
U.S. ally between Japan and Australia. He also reinforced the notion that aligned security interests can overcome lingering wartime
tensions: ‘‘. . . Japan and Australia will finally use our relationshipof trust, which has stood up through the trials of history, in our
cooperation in the area of security.’’ 101

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Key Acquisitions for the Australian Defense Force
Australia’s anticipated military acquisitions from the UnitedStates, in addition to strengthening confidence in the U.S.-Australia alliance, will boost Australian interoperability with U.S.
forces for potential missions in the Asia Pacific. Australia intends to acquire at least 72 F–35 Joint Strike Fighters, the firstof which debuted to great fanfare in July 2014.102 Additionally,
Australia plans to purchase both the U.S. P–8 Poseidon, a Boeing 737-derivative designed for antisubmarine warfare andantisurface warfare, and the U.S. MQ–4C Triton unmanned maritime surveillance aircraft, capable of missions of over 24 hours
covering an area of over 1 million square nautical miles. The
complementary capabilities of these aircraft would provide Australia with an improved ability and range for maritime patroland ISR.103
Perhaps the Australian Defense Department’s most challenging task at present is replacing its fleet of six COLLINSclass diesel electric submarines (SS), which will begin to reachthe end of their service lives in the late 2020s, with a new platform with improved stealth and significant range and endurance.
European firms have for some time been the strongest contenders to replace the COLLINS SS.104 In large part due to thegrowing relationship between Australia and Japan and changes
in Japanese arms export policy in 2014, Canberra also has begun
to seriously consider Japan’s SORYU-class diesel electric submarine as a candidate platform.105 As this Report went to print,
media reports indicated the strong possibility of an Australia
contract for the Japanese SORYU-class design.106 Having only
recently eased its arms export ban, Japan would need to seriously consider the impact of such a sale on its pacifist identity.
On the Australian side, engineering and technical requirements
would need to be closely scrutinized—particularly after a trying
experience with the beleaguered COLLINS program—to ensure
the new platform meets Australia’s programmatic and budgetaryneeds.107

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00445

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

434
Implications for the United States

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

As China continues to pursue its national interests aggressively,
U.S. allies and security associates will continue to seek reassurance
about the breadth, depth, and limits of the United States’ security
guarantees. The credibility of U.S. alliances in the region is therefore central to their deterrent value against China. Across the region, U.S. allies and security associates are seeking greater certainty and specificity from Washington on the costs it is willing toimpose on China for its ongoing attempts to subordinate international norms to its own narrow interests in the region and useof coercive measures to assert its claimed sovereignty and even secure territorial gains in disputed areas.108
At the same time, a perception by U.S. allies of a ‘‘blank check,’’or unconditional and open-ended security commitment from theUnited States, could embolden allies to engage in risky or provocative actions. Dr. Lind emphasized in her testimony to the Commission this risk can be managed if parties can agree on genuine
shared interests within the alliance. The alternative could be a confrontation with China over issues in which the United States has
minimal strategic interest.109
Over the next several years, the sustainability of the UnitedStates’ security partnerships in Asia will be complicated by emerging security challenges outside of Asia. This will require not only
reinforcing the ‘‘rebalance’’ policy with additional U.S. forces, butalso increased inputs and resources from U.S. allies and partners
in the region. In a speech in May 2014, Admiral James ‘‘Sandy’’
Winnefeld, USN, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated,‘‘it’s likely we’ll come to rely more on [our] partners to resource themeans for their defense, as we work closely together on theways.’’ 110 As the United States finds itself asking more of its allies,
continued communication on what constitutes shared security interests is critical to the success of the alliance.
The long-term benefits of strong U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the region far outweigh the risks those relationships
pose to the United States. U.S. support for enhanced military andlaw enforcement capabilities for its friends and allies, such as thetransfer of decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard cutters to the Philippine Navy, serve both to strengthen deterrent capabilities in theregion and to enhance possibilities for interoperability with the
U.S. armed forces. Expanding the forward-deployed U.S. militarypresence in allied host nations serves not only as a tangible commitment to the alliance but also improves the United States’ ability
to shape the strategic environment, respond to contingencies, anddeter conflicts. Finally, increased U.S. support for ISR capabilities
of its friends with whom it shares intelligence in the region, suchas the sale of Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to Korea, contributes to improved situational awareness for the United States as
well.
China’s assertive behavior in East Asia is taking place in thecontext of what it views as a ‘‘period of strategic opportunity’’through 2020 and a favorable external security environment inwhich it can focus on economic development.111 This suggests that
if and when China achieves its domestic development goals, China

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00446

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

435
may pursue an even more assertive foreign policy. In this scenario,
Beijing likely would be less concerned about damaging U.S.-China
relations over policy differences and more willing to impose costs
on other regional powers that challenge China’s core interests.
China also might try to obstruct more directly those policies it perceives undermine China’s regime survival, economic and social welfare, and sovereignty. If this is the case, the United States also
faces a critical window over the next five years to lay the groundwork for its long-term security interests in the Asia Pacific.
Conclusions• Beijing has concluded the U.S.-led East Asia security architecture does not benefit its core interests of regime preservation,
economic and social development, and territorial integrity. In
2014, China’s leaders began to promote a vision of regional security that marginalizes the United States and ‘‘relies on the people in Asia to run Asia’s affairs, deal with Asia’s problems, anduphold Asia’s security’’—a vision at odds with the present security architecture encompassing a strong network of U.S. alliancesand partnerships in East Asia.
• China is engaged in a sustained and substantial military buildupthat is shifting the balance of power in the region, and is using
its growing military advantages to support its drive for a dominant sphere of influence in East Asia.
• China employs economic incentives and punishments toward its
neighbors to support its diplomatic and security goals in East
Asia to extract political or security concessions from its Asianneighbors. The market dependencies of many East Asian countries on China—the result of China’s deep integration into regional manufacturing supply chains—afford it leverage in pursuing regional security interests.
• China’s security relations with Japan are deteriorating over the
Senkaku Islands dispute and grievances over Japan’s wartime
past. Conversely, China’s security relations with South Korea arewarming as Beijing seeks continued cooperation with Seoul on
North Korea. The two Northeast Asian powers differ in their responses to China’s assertive security policy in the region: Japanis balancing against China by boosting its own defensive capabilities and its alliance with the United States, while South
Korea appears to be pursuing a hedging strategy by maintaining
security relations with both the United States and China.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• The current regional security arrangement in Northeast Asia, forwhich the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea provide abasis, will probably remain unchanged in the near term. Differences in security priorities between Japan and South Korea
means that without greater political will to overcome these differences, full-fledged trilateral security cooperation among Japan,
South Korea, and the United States is unlikely to materialize inthe near- to mid-term.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00447

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

436
• China’s increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea
have led Southeast Asia and Australia to build new defense relationships, deepen existing defense relationships, strengthen military and paramilitary capabilities, and emphasize the role of regional institutions and international law to manage disputes.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• As the United States seeks to reaffirm its alliance with Australia
as part of the U.S. rebalance to Asia, China is seeking stronger
security ties with Australia to serve as a counterweight to the alliance. Australia’s challenge is to ensure its own economic andsecurity interests in the midst of the ongoing Pacific power shift.
Similarly, continued U.S. engagement with ASEAN ensures thepolitical sustainability of U.S. security policy in East Asia, but
carries the risk of relying too heavily upon an organization which
has yet to define its role in East Asian security.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00448

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

437
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 1

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. Yang Jiechi, ‘‘China’s New Diplomacy at a New Historical Starting Point,’’(21st Century Council Conference, Beijing, China, November 2, 2013); ‘‘Less Bidingand Hiding,’’ Economist, December 2, 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/1760
1475; Bonnie Glaser and Alison Szalwinski, Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese
Characteristics, (Jamestown Foundation China Brief, August 9, 2013). http://
www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41253&
cHash=0a8feca702f07ed9446305974da9d0d3#.VAXZi_ldWSo; and Fu Ying, ‘‘Chinese
Dream and Asian Security,’’ China US Focus, February 1, 2014. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinese-dream-and-asian-security/.
2. Andrew Erickson, ‘‘China’s Near Seas Challenges,’’ National Interest, January-February 2014. http: // nationalinterest.org / article / chinas - near - seas - challenges 9645.
3. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Bonnie
Glaser, March 13, 2014.
4. Felix K. Chang, ‘‘China’s (Is)land Reclamation in the South China Sea,’’
Geopoliticus (Foreign Policy Research Institute blog), May 15, 2014. http://www.
fpri.org/geopoliticus/2014/05/chinas-island-reclamation-south-china-sea; Trefor Moss,‘‘China Rejects Philippines’ Call for Construction Freeze: Beijing Says it Has Right
to Build in Disputed Areas of South China Sea,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2014.
http: // online.wsj.com / articles / philippines-seeks-construction-halt-in- disputed -south china-sea-1402912823; and Li Hui and Ben Blanchard, ‘‘China To Build Lighthouses
on Five Islands in Defiance of U.S. Call,’’ Reuters, August 7, 2014. http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/08/07/us-china-southchinasea-idUSKBN0G70VI20140807.
5. Craig Murray and Kimberly Hsu, China’s New Fishing Regulations Seek toJustify and Consolidate Control in the South China Sea (U.S.-China Economic andSecurity Review Commission, January 27, 2014). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/Research/USCC%20Staff%20Report_China%27s%20New%20Fishing%20
Regulations%20Seek%20to%20Justify%20and%20Consolidate%20Control%20in%20
the%20South%20China%20Sea_01%2027%2014.pdf; Kimberly Hsu, Air Defense
Identification Zone Intended to Provide China Greater Flexibility to Enforce East
China Sea Claims (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January
14, 2014). http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20ADIZ%20
Staff%20Report.pdf; and China Water Transport News (Wuhan, China), ‘‘China Marine Surveillance Ships Patrolled More Than 2 Million Nautical Miles and Handled
Nearly 1,000 Rights Violation Cases in the Past 8 Years, Writing a Grand MusicalMovement of Safeguarding Maritime Sovereign Rights—Review of Comprehensive
Law Enforcement at Sea by China Marine Surveillance,’’ June 25, 2014. Open
Source Center translation. ID: CHR2014062572278631.
6. Craig Murray, Andrew Berglund, and Kimberly Hsu, China’s Naval Modernization and Implications for the United States (U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review, August 26, 2013), p. 2. http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Backgrounder_China%27s%20Naval%20Modernization%20and%20Implications%20
for%20the%20United%20States.pdf; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Bonnie Glaser, March 13, 2014.
7. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Bonnie
Glaser, March 13, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Robert Sutter, March 13, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Hearing on China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia,
testimony of Ely Ratner, March 13, 2014; and Timothy Heath, Asian Economic Integration Fuels PRC Frustration with U.S. Alliances (Jamestown Foundation, June
19, 2014). http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42521&no_cache=1#.U7ri3vldWSo.
8. James Reilly, China’s Economic Statecraft: Turning Wealth into Power (Lowy
Institute for International Policy, November 27, 2013). http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/chinas-economic-statecraft-0.
9. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Robert Sutter, March 13, 2014; Christopher K. Johnson et al., Decoding China’s Emerging‘‘Great Power’’ Strategy in Asia (Center for Strategic and International Studies, June2014), pp. 16–18, 26–28. http://csis.org/files/publication/140603_Johnson_Decoding
ChinasEmerging_WEB.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00449

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

438

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

10. Timothy R. Heath, ‘‘China and the U.S. Alliance System,’’ Diplomat, June 11,
2014. http: // thediplomat.com / 2014 / 06 / china - and - the - u - s - alliance - system /; Wang
Guanz-hong, ‘‘Major Power Perspectives on Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific,’’(Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 1, 2014). https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-4-a239/wang-guanzhong-2e5e;
and Fu Ying, ‘‘Chinese Dream and Asian Security,’’ China US Focus, February 1,
2014. http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinese-dream-and-asian-security/.
11. Xi Jinping, ‘‘Actively Foster an Asian Security Concept and Jointly Create
New Prospects for Security Cooperation’’ (Conference on Interaction and ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Asia, Beijing, China, May 21, 2014.); Open Source Centertranslation. ID: CHR2014052139501046; John Ruwitch, ‘‘China’s Xi Issues Veiled
Warning to Asia over Military Alliances,’’ Reuters, May 21, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/21/us-china-xi-idUSBREA4K02V20140521.
12. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, testimony of Robert Sutter, March
13, 2014.
13. Hugh White, ‘‘Explaining China’s Behavior in the East and South China
Seas,’’ Interpreter (Lowy Institute for International Policy blog), May 22, 2014. http://
www . lowyinterpreter . org / post/2014/05/22/Explaining-Chinas-behaviour-in-the-Eastand-South-China-Seas.aspx.
14. Kevin Rudd, ‘‘China’s Impact on Regional and Global Order’’ (Alastair
Buchan Memorial Lecture, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, December 16, 2013). http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2013-5126/decemberc771/rudd-buchan-083c.
15. Xinhua News, ‘‘News Analysis: Xi’s Speech Delivers Key Messages to U.S.,
World,’’ July 11, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/11/c_133475
367.htm; Jane Perlez, ‘‘Chinese Leader’s One-Man Show Complicates Diplomacy,’’
New York Times, July 8, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/world/asia/chinaus-xi-jinpeng-washington-kerry-lew.html?_r=0.
16. John Kerry, ‘‘Remarks’’ (Sixth Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, July 9, 2014).
17. Ely Ratner, ‘‘China Undeterred and Unapologetic,’’ War on the Rocks, June24, 2014. http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/china-undeterred-and-unapologetic/.
18. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on The Future of U.S.-China
Relations, testimony of Aaron L. Friedberg, June 25, 2014.
19. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East-Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Hearing on Strengthening U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia, written testimony ofDavid Helvey, March 4, 2014.
20. Malcolm Cook, Northeast Asia’s Turbulent Triangle: Korea-China-Japan
Relations (Lowy Institute for International Policy, January 2014), pp. 7–8. http://
www.lowyinstitute.org/publications / northeast - asias - turbulent - triangle - korea - china japan - relations; Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, Overcoming the Japan-South
Korea Historical Identity Complex (Center for Strategic and International Studies
PacNet #14, February 6, 2014.) http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-14-overcomingjapan-south-korea-historical-identity-complex.
21. Andrew Scobell, China’s Evolving Thinking About North Korea, briefing to
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, January 29, 2014.
22. Japan’s Office of the Prime Minister, National Security Strategy, Provisional
Translation, December 17, 2013, pp. 11–12; Japan’s Ministry of Defense, Defense ofJapan 2014, July 2014, pp. 17–24.
23. China’s State Council Information Office, Diaoyu Dao, An Inherent Territoryof China, September 2012.
24. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Transcript of regular news conference,
March 12, 2012. See also China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Transcript of regularnews conference, December 9, 2013; China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Transcriptof regular news conference, September 14, 2006.
25. Malcolm Cook, Northeast Asia’s Turbulent Triangle: Korea-China-Japan Relations (Lowy Institute for International Policy, January 2014). http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/northeast-asias-turbulent-triangle-korea-china-japanrelations; Andrew Scobell, China’s Evolving Thinking About North Korea, briefing
to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC,
January 29, 2014.
26. Zhong Sheng, ‘‘Bigoted and Arrogant ‘Ordinary Mind,’ ’’ People’s Daily Online, April 22, 2014. Open Source Center translation. ID: CHR2014042223384516.
27. Wang Guanzhong, ‘‘Major Power Perspectives on Peace and Security in the
Asia-Pacific,’’ (Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 1, 2014). https://www.iiss.org/en/

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00450

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

439

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-4-a239/wang-guanzhong2e5e.
28. Qiu Guohong, ‘‘Ambassador: Let Our Dreams Brighten the Future of ChinaROK Friendship,’’ People’s Daily Online, July 3, 2014. Open Source Center transcription. ID: CHL2014070323282926; China’s Foreign Ministry, Transcript of regular news conference, May 27, 2014; and Xinhua, ‘‘Interview: Xi’s Visit to Strengthen
Strategic Cooperative Partnership with South Korea—Ambassador,’’ July 2, 2014.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/02/c_126702961.htm.
29. Xinhua, ‘‘Xi Expects to Inject Vitality into China-S. Korea Ties,’’ July 3,
2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014xivisitskorea/2014-07/03/content_1764
2041.htm.
30. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President Xi Jinping Delivers an Important Speech in ROK’s Seoul National University, Stressing that China Will Always
Be a Country that Maintains Peace, Promotes Cooperation, and Is Modest to Learn
from Others, and that China Will Create the Future of China-ROK Cooperation andAccomplish Asia’s Revitalization and Prosperity Together with ROK, July 4, 2014.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1172436.shtml.
31. Jane Perlez, ‘‘Chinese President’s Visit to South Korea Is Seen as a Way to
Weaken U.S. Alliances,’’ New York Times, July 2, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/07/03/world/asia/chinas-president-to-visit-south-korea.html; Teddy Ng, ‘‘Xi Jinping Sends Pyongyang a Message by Making First Korea Trip as President toSeoul,’’ South China Morning Post, July 2, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
article/1544521/xi-jinping-sends-pyongyang-message-making-first-korea-trip-president;
Associated Press, ‘‘Chinese Leader’s Seoul Visit Snubs North Korea,’’ July 3, 2014.
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201407030037; and Guardian, ‘‘China
Snubs North Korea with Leader’s Visit to South Korea,’’ July 3, 2014. http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/03/china-snubs-north-korea-with-leaders-visitto-south-korea.
32. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Jennifer
Lind, March 13, 2014.
33. Japan’s Office of the Prime Minister, National Security Strategy, Provisional
Translation, December 17, 2013, p. 1.
34. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Jennifer
Lind, March 13, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimonyof James L. Schoff, March 13, 2014.
35. U.S. Missile Defense Agency, ‘‘Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,’’ http://
www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html; Alexander Martin and Toko Sekiguchi,‘‘Japan Policy Shift to Ease Restrictions on Military,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 1,
2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/japan-policy-shift-to-ease-restrictions-on-military1404211813; and James L. Schoff, ‘‘A Collective Win for Asia,’’ US News & World
Report, July 1, 2014. http: / / www.usnews.com / opinion / articles / 2014 / 07 / 01 / japandefense-initiative-is-a-win-for-all-of-asia.
36. Isabel Reynolds and Takashi Hirakawa, ‘‘Japan’s Abe Secures Passage of
Secrecy Law as Opposition Revolts,’’ Bloomberg, December 6, 2013. http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-06/japan-s-abe-seeks-to-pass-secrecy-bill-that-sappedpopularity.html; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on
China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of JamesL. Schoff, March 13, 2014.
37. Martin Fackler, ‘‘Japan Ends Decades-Long Ban on Export of Weapons,’’
New York Times, April 1, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/world/asia/japanends-half-century-ban-on-weapons-exports.html?_r=0; Bruce Einhorn and Matthew
Philips, ‘‘Japan Prepares to Enter the Arms Market,’’ Bloomberg Businessweek, May
1, 2014. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-01/japan-prepares-to-enter-thearms-market; Government of Japan, The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense
Equipment and Technology, April 1, 2014; and Kiyoshi Takenaka, ‘‘Japan Exempts
F–35 Components from Arms Export Ban,’’ March 1, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/
3article/2013/03/01/us-lockheed-fighter-japan-idUSBRE92007420130301.
38. United States-Japan Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee:
Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities, October 3,
2013. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215070.htm.
39. United States-Japan Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee:
Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities, October 3,
2013. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215070.htm.
40. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of James L.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00451

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

440

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Schoff, March 13, 2014; James L. Schoff, How to Upgrade U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 16, 2014). http: //carnegieendowment.org / 2014 / 01 /16 / how-to-upgrade-u.s.-japan-defense-cooperation/
gykq.
41. Fumio Kishida, Foreign Policy Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio
Kishida to the 186th Session of the Diet, January 24, 2014. http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page18e_000037.html; U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact
Sheet: U.S.-Japan Global and Regional Cooperation, April 25, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov / the-press-office / 2014 / 04 / 25 / fact-sheet-us-japan-global-and-regionalcooperation; Kei Koga, ‘‘Japan’s ‘Strategic Diplomacy’: Leveraging ASEAN in 2014,’’RSIS Commentaries, January 2, 2014; and Andrew Chubb, ‘‘Abe’s Southeast Asian
Diplomacy: Intersection of the South and East China Sea disputes,’’ China Policy
Institute Blog, February 25, 2013. http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/
2013/02/25/abes-southeast-asian-diplomacy-intersection-of-the-south-and-east-chinasea-disputes/.
42. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of James L.
Schoff, March 13, 2014.
43. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of James L.
Schoff, March 13, 2014.
44. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of James L.
Schoff, March 13, 2014; Seth Robson and Chiyomi Sumida, ‘‘With Eye on China,
Japan Slowly Building Amphibious Force with Help of U.S. Marines,’’ Stars andStripes, August 7, 2014. http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/with-eye-on-china-japanslowly-building-amphibious-force-with-help-of-us-marines-1.297115.
45. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Jennifer
Lind, March 13, 2014.
46. Michelle Tan, ‘‘U.S., South Korea Delay Transfer of Wartime Control,’’ Defense News, October 23, 2014. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141023/DEF
REG03/310230041; The White House, Joint Fact Sheet: The United States-Republicof Korea Alliance: A Global Partnership, April 25, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the - press - office / 2014 / 04 / 25 / joint - fact - sheet - united - states - republic - korea - alliance global-partnership; Aaron Mehta and Wendell Minnick, ‘‘South Korea Officially Selects F–35,’’ Defense News, March 24, 2014. http://www.defensenews.com/article/
20140324/DEFREG03/303240012/South-Korea-Officially-Selects-F–35.
47. Song Sang-ho, ‘‘Korea Will Not Join U.S. Missile Defense System,’’ Korea
Herald, October 16, 2013. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=201310160009
03.
48. Julian E. Barnes, ‘‘Washington Considers Missile-Defense System in South
Korea,’’ Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB10001424052702303403604579588510526946566-lMyQjAxMTA0MDIwNzEyNDcy
Wj; Karen Montague, A Review of South Korean Missile Defense Programs (George
C. Marshall Institute, March 2014). http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/
South-Korean-BMD-Mar-14.pdf; Song Sang-ho, ‘‘U.S. Ups Missile Defense Pressure
on Seoul,’’ Korea Herald, May 27, 2014. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140527001302; Sarah Kim, ‘‘Korea Coming Around to THAAD Idea,’’ Korea
JoongAng Daily, July 22, 2014. http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/arti
cle.aspx?aid=2992350; and Japan’s Ministry of Defense, Japan’s BMD, 2010. http://
www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/bmd/bmd.pdf.
49. Huang Yinjiazi, ‘‘Bad Idea for Inviting S. Korea to Join U.S. Missile Defense
Network,’’ Xinhua, May 29, 2014. Open Source Center transcription. ID: CHR20140
52932855531; Sarah Kim, ‘‘Korea Coming Around to THAAD Idea,’’ Korea JoongAng
Daily, July 22, 2014. http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2992350; Park Byong-su, ‘‘Defense Minister Says He Wouldn’t Oppose THAAD,’’
Hankyoreh (Seoul), June 19, 2014. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/643168.html; and U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Army Navy/Transportable
Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY–2) September 2013.
50. Kim Hankwon, A New Type of Relationship between Major Countries andSouth Korea: Historical and Strategic Implications (Asan Institute for Policy Studies, December 20, 2013). http://www.theasanforum.org/a-new-type-of-relationshipbetween-major-countries-and-south-korea-historical-and-strategic-implications/.
51. Jennifer Lind, ‘‘Between Giants: South Korea and the U.S.-China Rivalry,’’
Atlantic, July 12, 2012. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/
between-giants-south-korea-and-the-us-china-rivalry/260060/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00452

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

441

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

52. Christopher Hughes, ‘‘China’s Military Modernization: U.S. Allies and Partners in Northeast Asia,’’ in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, China’s Military
Challenge (Seattle; Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), pp.
234–239; Anthony H. Cordesman and Ashley Hess, ‘‘Volume I: Strategy, Resources,
and Modernization,’’ in The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula andNortheast Asia (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
June 2013), pp. 16–24, 116–139. http://csis.org/files/publication/130513_KMB_
volume1.pdf.
53. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of James L.
Schoff, March 13, 2014.
54. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Jennifer
Lind, March 13, 2014.
55. Kim Jiyoon, et al., Korea-Japan Relations in 2014 (Asan Institute, February2014). http://en.asaninst.org/contents/challenges-and-opportunities-for-korea-japan-relations-in-2014/.
56. Lally Weymouth, ‘‘South Korean President Park Geun-hye Answers Questions,’’ Washington Post, May 7, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/south-korean-president-park-geun-hye-answers-questions/2013/05/ 07 / d7482e5a-b76111e2-b94c-b684dda07add_story.html.
57. Antoni Slodkowski and Linda Sieg, ‘‘Japan’s Abe Visits Shrine for War Dead,
China, South Korea Angered,’’ Reuters, December 26, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/26/us-japan-shrine-abe-idUSBRE9BP00Q20131226; Rupert WingfieldHayes, ‘‘Why Japan’s Shinzo Abe Went to Yasukuni Shrine,’’ BBC News, December
26, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25518137; and Yonhap, ‘‘Abe’s Yasukuni Shrine Visit ‘Lamentable,’ Will Have Repercussions: Seoul,’’ December 26,
2013. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/12/26/11/0301000000AEN201312
26004753315F.html.
58. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Jennifer
Lind, March 13, 2014.
59. China’s Foreign Ministry, Transcript of regular news conference, December
27, 2012; Ruan Zongze, ‘‘Winning the Next Decade: China Builds Multi-Pivot Diplomacy,’’ China International Studies, July 15, 2013. Open Source Center translation.
ID: CHR2013111359366165; China’s Foreign Ministry, Transcript of regular news
conference, April 23, 2014; and Zhong Sheng, ‘‘Don’t Get Trapped in Web of One’s
Own Spinning on Account of Island-Nation Complex,’’ People’s Daily, April 1, 2013.
Open Source Center translation. ID: CPP20130401708002.
60. China’s Foreign Ministry, Transcript of regular news conference, May 8,
2013.
61. Rachel Oswald, ‘‘U.S., Allies Agree to Further Study Intel Swaps on North
Korea Missiles,’’ Global Security Newswire, June 2, 2014. http://www.nti.org/gsn/
article/us-japan-s-korea-deepen-cooperation-against-n-korea-nuclear-missile-threat/.
62. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Jennifer
Lind, March 13, 2014.
63. K. Shanmugam, ‘‘Transcript of Minister for Foreign Affairs K. Shanmugam’s
Reply to Parliamentary Questions and Supplementary Questions’’ (Singapore, January 14, 2013). http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/tr/2013/
January/transcript_20130114.html.
64. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Activities in Southeast Asia and Implications for U.S. Interests, written testimonyof Bronson Percival, March 13, 2010; Open Source Center, Indonesia: Standing Up
to China’s Assertive Moves in the South China Sea, March 28, 2014. ID:
SEL2014032822721702; Open Source Center, Malaysia: Taking More Assertive, If
Measured, Stance on SCS Claims, March 5, 2014. ID: SEN2014030603393748; andU.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, response to request for information from Commission staff, 2014.
65. Jingdong Yuan, A Rising Power Looks Down Under: Chinese Perspectives onAustralia (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 2014), p. 16. https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/a-rising-power-looks-down-under-chinese-perspectiveson-australia/Rising_Power_China.pdf.
66. Linda Jakobson, Australia’s Relations with China in Turbulence (AsanForum, January 25, 2014). http://www.theasanforum.org/australias-relations-withchina-in-turbulence/; Linda Jakobson, ‘‘Australia-China Strategic Partnership: Two
Years of Fits and Starts,’’ Interpreter (Lowy Institute for International Policy blog),

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00453

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

442

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

April 10, 2013. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/04/10/Australia-and-ChinaTwo-years-of-fits-and-starts.aspx.
67. Open Source Center, China Tempering Sharp Reaction to U.S.-Australia
Military Ties, November 18, 2011. ID: CPF20111118358001; Peter Hartcher, ‘‘China
Vents Its Anger at Australia’s Stand on Airspace Rights,’’ Sydney Morning Herald, December 3, 2013. http://www.smh.com.au/comment/china-vents-its-anger-ataustralias-stand-on-airspace-rights-20131202-2ylye.html#ixzz34oHl7yyS; Geoff Wade,‘‘China’s Efforts to Break the Australia-U.S. Alliance,’’ Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog), December 16, 2013. http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-efforts-to-break-the-australia-us-alliance/.
68. Andrew Shearer, ‘‘Southeast Asia and Australia: Case Studies in Responding
to China’s Military Power,’’ in Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner, China’s Military
Challenge (National Bureau of Asian Studies: 2012), pp. 274–275; Catherine
McGrath, ‘‘Australia Urged to up Defense Spending to Meet Threat from RisingPower China,’’ ABC News, June 11, 2014. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-30/
call-for-review-of-australian-defence-spending/5487968.
69. Vietnam News Agency, ‘‘National Assembly’s 7th Session Opens in Hanoi,’’
May 20, 2014. Open Source Center transcription. ID: SER2014052019146856; Open
Source Center, Vietnam: Hanoi’s Handling of Oil Rig Crisis Suggests Change to
China Policy, June 6, 2014. ID: SER2014060673219498.
70. China’s Navy Extends Its Combat Reach to the Indian Ocean (U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, March 14, 2014). http://origin.www.
uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20Reach% 20to% 20the% 20Indian% 20 Ocean.pdf; David Wroe,‘‘China’s Military Might Is Australia’s New Defense Reality,’’ Sydney Morning Herald, February 15, 2014. http://www.smh.com.au/world/chinas-military-might-isaustralias-new-defence-reality-20140214-32rb1.html.
71. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Ely Ratner,
March 13, 2014.
72. See also U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on
China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Robert Sutter, March 13, 2014.
73. Rory Medcalf and C. Raja Mohan, Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry: Australia, India, and Middle Power Coalitions (Lowy Institute for International Policy,
August 2014), pp. 8–9. http: // www.lowyinstitute.org / files /responding_to_indo-pacific_rivalry_0.pdf. See also U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Walter Lohman, March 13, 2014.
74. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, response to request for information by
Commission staff, 2014; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, interview with Commission staff, 2014; Patrick M. Cronin et al., The Emerging Asia Power Web: The Riseof Bilateral Intra-Asian Security Ties (Center for a New American Security, June2013), pp. 15–17. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AsiaPowerWeb.pdf.
75. The White House, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Japan Global and Regional Cooperation,
April 25, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/fact-sheet-usjapan-global-and-regional-cooperation.
76. Manabu Sasaki and Yoshihiro Makino, ‘‘Japan Coast Guard Vessels andEquipment in High Demand in S.E. Asia, Africa,’’ Asahi Shimbun (Osaka), September 30, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/around_asia/AJ201309300001;‘‘Patrol Boats from Japan to Start Arriving in 2015,’’ Philippine Daily Inquirer,
March 31, 2014. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/590453/patrol-boats-from-japan-tostart-arriving-in-2015; ‘‘With Eye on China, Japan to Provide Patrol Boats to Philippines,’’ Asahi Shimbun (Osaka), May 23, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201305230042; Vu Trong Khanh, ‘‘Japan to Help Improve Maritime
Capability,’’ Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/japanto-help-vietnam-improve-maritime-capability-1406883961; and Rachel Armstrong,‘‘Vietnam Expects Japan Coastguard Ships Next Year: Vice Defense Minister,’’ Reuters, June 1, 2014. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2014 / 06 / 01 / us - asia - security vietnam - idUSKBN0EC13R20140601.
77. Australia’s Department of Defense, Defense White Paper 2013, 2013, pp. 55–
69; Australia’s Department of the Prime Minister, Strong and Secure: A Strategy forAustralia’s National Security, January 2013, pp. 23–26; Sam Roggeveen, ‘‘Will
Abbott Change Australia’s Foreign Policy?’’ National Interest, September 10, 2013.
http: // nationalinterest.org / commentary / will-abbott-change-australias-foreign-policy9028; Greg Sheridan, ‘‘Tony Abbott’s Softly Softly Approach Pays Off,’’ Australian,

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00454

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

443

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

October 12, 2013. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/
tony-abbotts-softly-softly-approach-to-asia-pays-off/story-fn59nm2j-1226738565297.
78. Manuel Mogato and Nguyen Phuong Linh, ‘‘Philippine, Vietnamese Troops
Drink Beer, Play Volleyball on Disputed Isle,’’ Reuters, June 8, 2014. http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/08/us-philippines-vietnam-idUSKBN0EJ068201406
08; Open Source Center, Philippines-Vietnam: Budding Alliance Seeks to Curb PRC
in South China Sea, June 11, 2014. ID: SER2014061158177245.
79. Kevin Baron, ‘‘Still a Long Way from Asian NATO,’’ Atlantic Media: Defense
One website, May 31, 2014. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/05/still-long-wayasian-nato/85552/.
80. Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement, April 28, 2014. http: // www.gov.ph / 2014 / 04 / 28/qna-on-theenhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/; U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The United States and Australia: An Alliance for the Future,
June 12, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov / the - press - office / 2014/06 /12/fact - sheet united - states - and - australia - alliance-future; U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Spokesperson, 2014 Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations Joint Communique,
August12,2014.
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/08/
20140812305446.html?CP.rss = true#axzz3ACD6l73W.
81. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, response to request for information by
Commission staff, 2014.
82. Tadao Onaga, ‘‘Indonesia Ready to Mediate Sovereignty Disputes in South
China Sea,’’ Asahi Shimbun (Osaka), August 12, 2014. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/
asia / around _ asia / AJ201408120038; Natalie Sambhi, ‘‘Jokowi and the Defense
Realm,’’ Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog), April 2, 2014. http://
www.aspistrategist.org.au/jokowi-and-the-defence-realm/; Greta Nabbs-Keller, ‘‘Indonesia: Defense and Foreign Policy Implications of a Jokowi Presidency,’’ Interpreter(Lowy Institute for International Policy blog), July 21, 2014. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/07/21/Indonesia-Defence-foreign-policy-implications-Jokowi.aspx;
and Sita W. Dewi, ‘‘Jokowi Promises to Triple Defense, Security Budget,’’ Jakarta
Post, June 3, 2014. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/03/jokowi-promisestriple-defense-security-budget.html.
83. Carlyle Thayer (Professor, University of New South Wales at the Australian
Defence Force Academy), e-mail interview with Commission staff, July 18, 2014;
Carlyle Thayer, Vietnam’s Maritime Forces (Paper presented to CSIS Conference on
Recent Trends in the South China Sea and U.S. Policy, Washington, DC, July 10–
11, 2014); U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, response to request for information by
Commission staff, 2014; and Manabu Sasaki and Yoshihiro Makino, ‘‘Japan Coast
Guard Vessels and Equipment in High Demand in S.E. Asia, Africa,’’ Asahi
Shimbun (Osaka), September 30, 2013. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/around_asia/AJ201309300001.
84. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Ely Ratner,
March 13, 2014.
85. ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, March 2009. http://www.
asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf.
86. Rosemarie Francisco and Manuel Mogato, ‘‘Vietnam PM Says Considering
Legal Action against China over Disputed Waters,’’ Reuters, May 22, 2014. http://
www.reuters.com / article / 2014 / 05 / 22 /us-vietnam-china-idUSBREA4K1AK20140522;
Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘‘Vietnam Considers Taking China to Court over Territorial
Dispute,’’ Financial Times, May 22, 2014. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76705ea8-e16411e3-b59f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz34LEzk1Nx.
87. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Walter
Lohman, March 13, 2014.
88. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Ely Ratner,
March 13, 2014; Ely Ratner, Resident Power: Building a Politically Sustainable U.S.
Military Presence in Southeast Asia and Australia (Center for a New American Security, October 2013) pp. 12–15. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/
CNAS_ResidentPower_Ratner.pdf.
89. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Walter
Lohman, March 13, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, written testimony of Ely Ratner, March 13, 2014; Open Source Center, ASEAN Hesitant to Confront PRC on SCS; Media Note Lack of Progress, October 19, 2010. ID: SEF2010
1019463001; and Open Source Center, Southeast Asia: Shangri-La Dialogues Cri-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00455

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

444

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

tiques of China Draw Praise, Spur Unease, June 6, 2014. ID: SEL2014
060664827393.
90. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, interview with Commission staff, 2014;
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China and the
Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, testimony of Walter Lohman, March 13,
2014; and ASEAN, ‘‘Chairman’s Statement,’’ (First Expanded ASEAN Maritime
Forum Manila, October 9, 2012).
91. Lowy Institute for International Policy, ‘‘Lowy Institute Poll 2014.’’ http: //www.lowyinstitute.org /publications/lowy-institute-poll-2014.
92. Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States ofAmerica, September 1, 1951.
93. Darren Lim (Visitor, Australian National University), telephone and e-mailinterview with Commission staff, February and August 2014.
94. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, China Fact Sheet(June 2014). http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/chin.pdf. ‘‘Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s Trade by Country (Goods Only).’’ http://
www.dfat.gov.au/trade/australias-trade-at-a-glance/goods-by-country.html.
95. Jamie Smyth, ‘‘Australia’s Luck Runs Low as Chinese Economy Cools,’’ Financial Times, September 23, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6412e84e-42e811e4-9a58-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3EAdZbuJ3.
96. KPMG/University of Sydney China Studies Centre, Demystifying Chinese Investment in Australia (March 2014), p. 12. http://sydney.edu.au/china_studies_centre/
images/content/Research/KPMG_2014_Demystifying-Chinese-Investment-in-AustraliaWEB.PDF.
97. KPMG/University of Sydney China Studies Centre, Demystifying Chinese Investment in Australia (March 2014), p. 6. http://sydney.edu.au/china_studies_centre/
images/content/Research/KPMG_2014_Demystifying-Chinese-Investment-in-AustraliaWEB.PDF; Andrew Browne, ‘‘Economic Reality Puts Australia in a Corner,’’ WallStreet Journal, June 17, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/economic-reality-putsaustralia-in-a-corner-1402987174.
98. Andrew Browne, ‘‘Economic Reality Puts Australia in a Corner,’’ Wall Street
Journal, June 17, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/economic-reality-puts-australiain-a-corner-1402987174; Jamie Smyth, ‘‘Australia’s Luck Runs Low as Chinese
Economy Cools,’’ Financial Times, September 23, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6412e84e-42e8-11e4-9a58-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3EAdZbuJ3.
99. Hugh White, ‘‘Australia’s Choice: Will the Land Down Under Pick theUnited States or China?’’ Foreign Affairs, September 4, 2013. http://www.foreign
affairs.com/articles/139902/hugh-white/australias-choice.
100. U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘Remarks by President
Obama and Prime Minister Abbott of Australia after Bilateral Meeting,’’ June 12,2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/12/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abbott-australia-after-bilate.
101. Shinzo Abe, ‘‘Remarks by Prime Minister Abe to the Australian Parliament’’(Australian Parliament, Canberra, Australia, July 8, 2014). http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201407/0708article1.html.
102. Australian Associated Press, ‘‘Australia’s New F–35 Lightning Fighter Jet
Rolls Out to Rock Music,’’ July 25, 2014. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/nationalaffairs/defence/australias-new-f35-lightning-fighter-jet-rolls-out-to-rock-music/story-e
6frg8yo-1227001124899?nk=85579e0cd0982400735dfbe12dd24426.
103. Bill Carey, ‘‘Australia Will Purchase MQ–4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft,’’
Aviation International News Online, March 21, 2014. http://www.ainonline.com/
aviation-news/2014-03-17/australia-will-purchase-mq-4c-triton-unmanned-aircraft;
Guy Norris and Amy Butler, ‘‘Northrup Fights for Global Hawk as Triton Flights
Start,’’ Aviation Week, May 27, 2013. http://aviationweek.com/awin/northrop-fightsglobal-hawk-triton-flights-start.
104. Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson, How to Buy a Submarine, Part 2 (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 2014), pp. 3–7. https: // www.aspi.org.au /publications/how-to-buy-a-submarine-part-2/SI72_Submarines.pdf.
105. ABC News (Australia), ‘‘Government Struggling to Find Replacement Design
for Collins Class Subs: Defence Minister,’’ April 9, 2014. http://www.abc.net.au/news/
2014-04-09/defence-minister-david-johnston-collins-submarines-replacement/5377266;
Mari Yamaguchi, ‘‘Japan, Australia Agree on Stealth Technology Deal,’’ AssociatedPress, June 11, 2014. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/japan-australia-eye-sub-deal-closer-defense-ties; and David Johnston, Minister of Defense Address (Australian Strategic
Policy Institute Conference ‘‘The Submarine Choice,’’ Canberra, Australia, April 9,2014). https://www.aspi.org.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/0011/20720/Johnston-Speech.pdf.
106. David Wroe, ‘‘Jobs Alarm over Plan to Buy Japanese Submarines,’’ Sydney
Morning Herald, September 9, 2014. http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/polit

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00456

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

445

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

ical-news/jobs -alarm-over-plan-to-buy-japanese-submarines-20140909- 10ekcu.html;
Rob Taylor, ‘‘Australia Nears Deal to Buy up to 10 Japanese Submarines,’’ WallStreet Journal, September 8, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/australia-nearsdeal-to-buy-up-to-10-japanese-submarines-1410166854.
107. Andrew Davies (Senior Analyst, Australia Strategic Policy Institute), e-mailinterview with Commission staff, August 5, 2014; Mark Thomson (Senior Analyst,
Australia Strategic Policy Institute), e-mail interview with Commission staff, August
5, 2014; and James L. Schoff (Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), e-mail interview with Commission staff, August 6, 2014.
108. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearing on Strengthening U.S. Alliances in Northeast Asia, written testimonyof Michael Auslin, March 4, 2014.
109. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China
and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia, testimony of Jennifer Lind, March
13, 2014.
110. Paul McLeary, ‘‘Burden Sharing Is the Future of Asian Missile Defense,
Pentagon Official Says,’’ Defense News, May 28, 2014. http://www.defensenews.com/
article/20140528/DEFREG03/305280028; Julian E. Barnes, ‘‘Washington Considers
Missile-Defense System in South Korea,’’ Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2014. http://
online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB1000142405270230340360457958851052694656
6-lMyQjAxMTA0MDIwNzEyNDcyWj.
111. Christopher K. Johnson et al., Decoding China’s Emerging ‘‘Great Power’’
Strategy in Asia (Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2014), p. 16.
http://csis.org/files/publication/140603_Johnson_DecodingChinasEmerging_WEB.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00457

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

SECTION 2: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
CHINA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH NORTH KOREA
Introduction
This section examines China’s relationship with North Korea andassesses how China’s approach to relations with North Korea isshifting in light of Pyongyang’s continued destabilizing behavior. It
concludes with a discussion of how the evolving China-North Korea
relationship impacts the United States.* The statements and assessments presented here are based on the Commission’s June2014 hearing on China-North Korea relations, briefings by government and nongovernmental experts on China-North Korea relations, the Commission’s fact-finding trip to South Korea, and opensource research and analysis.
Overview of China-North Korea Relations
China and North Korea fought alongside each other in the Korean War and have shared a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operationand Mutual Assistance since 1961.† Each is the other’s only treaty
ally, and their relationship is founded on wartime camaraderie,
decades of communist party ties, proximity, and a shared resentment of the West, among other factors. Mao Zedong famously said
that China and North Korea are ‘‘closer than lips and teeth,’’ andboth countries for decades have perpetuated that image.

* For a more comprehensive examination of China-North Korea relations, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November 2013, pp.
228–229; and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Annual Report toCongress, November 2011, pp. 241–252.
† Among other assurances, the treaty provides that ‘‘the Contracting Parties undertake jointly
to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any
state. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any
state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting
Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.’’ Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, July 11, 1961.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(446)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00458

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

447
Figure 1: Korean Peninsula Map

Source: Ian McGibbon, ‘Asian Conflicts-Korean War,’ Te Ara—The Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 16-Nov-12. http://TeAra.govt.nz/en/map/34516/korean-peninsula-showing-the-38thparallel.

China’s support for North Korea is multifaceted. On the economic
front, China provides vital food and energy aid to North Korea, promotes investment, and funds and develops joint special economic
zones. China generally seeks to use this economic engagement as
a way to enhance stability in North Korea.1 On the diplomatic
front, China uses its position on the United Nations (UN) Security
Council to shield North Korea from international condemnationand to blunt the impact of sanctions.2 In addition, China has soldmilitary and dual-use materials associated with ballistic missiles to
North Korea, though it is unclear whether this support continues
today.* China has provided jet fuel and small arms to North Korea
as well.3 China’s failure to fully enforce UN sanctions on North

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00459

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C3S2Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Most recently, in 2012, North Korea displayed transport-erector-launchers for its new KN–
08 ballistic missile affixed to vehicles imported from China. The Chinese government claimed
the vehicles were lumber transporters exported to North Korea in 2011 for agricultural use andstated the sale did not violate sanctions or Chinese law. The U.S. Department of State also understands the sale to be of a civilian, not military, nature. However, the UN Panel of Experts
tasked with investigating sanctions enforcement against North Korea noted in a 2013 reportthat ‘‘the particulars of the transaction remain unclear and the Panel will continue its investigations.’’ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to
Resolution 1874 (2009), June 11, 2013, p. 27. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=
S/2013/337; Associated Press, ‘‘China Denies Exporting North Korean Missile Launch Vehicles,’’
June 13, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/13/china-north-korea-missile-vehicles.
Some analysts remain skeptical of China’s claim that the vehicles were truly intended for civilian use. For example, see Mark Hibbs, ‘‘China and the POE DPRK Report,’’ Arms Control Wonk
(Blog), July 2, 2012. http://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/879/china-and-the-poe-dprk-report;
and Jeffrey Lewis, ‘‘That Ain’t My Truck: Where North Korea Assembled Its Chinese Transporter-Erector-Launchers,’’ 38 North, February 3, 2014. http://38noth.org/2014/02/jlewis020314/.

448
Korea has also enabled the North’s military modernization, including its ballistic missile programs.4
China’s support for North Korea belies the true nature of SinoNorth Korean relations, which can be described as a ‘‘mutual hostage’’ situation in which North Korea depends on Chinese economic, political, and security assistance for regime survival andChina depends on North Korea to provide a strategic buffer between itself and U.S.-allied South Korea.5 This mutual dependence
causes resentment on both sides. North Korea resents its near-total
dependence on China, and perceives Beijing as high-handed andcondescending.6 It also distrusts China, which it feels has abandoned its Marxist-Leninist principles and has become politicallyand morally corrupted by capitalism and its relations with South
Korea and the United States.7 For its part, Beijing resents
Pyongyang’s continued provocations, which it fears will destabilize
and raise the risk of conflict in the region; drive South Korea andthe United States to strengthen their alliance and military capabilities, which also could be used to threaten China; and prompt
the international community to criticize China for its role as
Pyongyang’s primary supporter.8
The following pages chronicle the deterioration of Sino-North Korean ties in recent years, but conclude that in spite of the growing
risks North Korea poses to China’s interests, China still supports—
and likely will continue to support—its neighbor. China’s anxiety
over the United States is the primary driver of this seemingly
counterintuitive policy. Beijing sees U.S. military power on the Korean Peninsula as a threat to its security environment and, assuch, relies on and seeks to bolster the North Korean buffer to ensure U.S. troops remain below the 38th parallel.
China-North Korea Relations Deteriorate
According to several subject matter experts consulted by theCommission during its hearing and trip to Seoul, South Korea,
Sino-North Korean relations have become increasingly tense sincelate 2012. High levels of distrust and frustration now characterize
the relationship, particularly on the Chinese side.9
North Korea Tests Long-Range Missile Capability andConducts its Third Nuclear Test

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Sino-North Korean ties began to deteriorate after North Korea’s
December 2012 rocket launch, which put the country’s first satellite into orbit. Although Pyongyang insisted the launch was partof a peaceful civilian space program, the international community
viewed it as a thinly-veiled attempt to test the North’s long-range
ballistic missile capability, and the UN Security Council condemned the launch as a violation of resolutions prohibiting North
Korea from using ballistic missile technology in space launches.10
A few months later, in February 2013, North Korea conducted its
third nuclear test, also in violation of UN resolutions.11 Much to
China’s frustration, both the rocket launch and the nuclear test
took place during China’s sensitive leadership transition and de-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00460

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

449
spite Beijing’s repeated warnings to Pyongyang against such provocations.* 12
Beijing’s diplomatic response to North Korea’s 2013 nuclear test
was swift but limited, as it stopped short of taking serious economic and political actions against Pyongyang. China issued several strongly worded statements opposing the nuclear test, summoned North Korea’s ambassador to China, and cooperated with
the United States and other UN Security Council members to craft
and pass Security Council Resolution 2094, which ‘‘strengthen[s]and expand[s] the scope of United Nations sanctions against [North
Korea] by targeting the illicit activities of diplomatic personnel,transfers of bulk cash, and the country’s banking relationships, in
response to that country’s third nuclear test.’’ 13 Although China
took some steps to enforce the new sanctions (see below), China’s
efforts in crafting and passing Resolution 2094 likely were meant
more to send a signal of disapproval to Pyongyang than be a punitive measure.14
Kim Jong-un Purges and Executes Jang Song-taek
In December 2013, relations soured further when North Koreanleader Kim Jong-un purged and executed Jang Song-taek, his uncle
and then second-most powerful official in North Korea. According
to North Korean official media, Mr. Jang’s crimes included selling‘‘precious underground resources at random’’ and ‘‘committing suchan act of treachery . . . as selling off the land of the Rason economic
and trade zone to a foreign country.’’ 15 These allegations werebarely-veiled references to Mr. Jang’s dealings with China, which
imports North Korean resources and shares the Rason special economic zone with North Korea.
Beijing was stunned and upset by Mr. Jang’s execution, according to several subject matter experts and U.S. and South Korean
government officials consulted by the Commission.16 Mr. Jang had
been Beijing’s main interlocutor in Pyongyang and was known for
his role in promoting bilateral economic projects. Sue Mi Terry,senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute atColumbia University, testified to the Commission that Mr. Jang‘‘was a man that Chinese leaders had gotten used to dealing
with.’’ 17 Chinese officials sought to quickly reestablish normalcy inthe relationship following Mr. Jang’s execution, according to Daniel
Pinkston, deputy project director for Northeast Asia at the International Crisis Group, who met with the Commission in Seoul.†

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Among North Korea’s other destabilizing actions in 2013 were its decision to temporarily
shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex, an industrial zone in the North shared and jointly
managed by North Korea and South Korea, and its frequent and belligerent official statements
threatening the United States and South Korea. Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North
Korea Close (International Crisis Group, December 9, 2013), pp. 3-4. http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/254-fire-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.pdf.
† In recent years, Beijing increasingly has sought to conduct its relationship with North Korea
through official diplomatic channels, a departure from a long history of relations conducted primarily via party-to-party ties. China’s loss of its connection to the North via Mr. Jang probably
reinforced to China’s top policymakers the need for more institutionalized and formal state-tostate ties. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of Stephanie
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014; Yonhap News Agency, ‘‘(LEAD) China’s Relations with North
Korea Have Normalized: U.S. Expert,’’ May 22, 2014. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/
2014/05/22/93/0401000000AEN20140522006100315F.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00461

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

450
North Korea Conducts Missile Tests
A review of open-source reporting suggests North Korea fired
more than 100 projectiles over the course of at least 18 missile
tests in 2014.18 According to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, at least ten of these tests used ballistic missile technology,19 violating UN resolutions against the use of ballistic missile technology in North Korean launches. The UN Security Council—which includes China—condemned two of the launches.20 The
Chinese government responded to each of the missile tests with thesame basic formulation, along the lines of: ‘‘We hope all parties
make efforts to reduce tension and safeguard peace and stability on
the Korean Peninsula.’’ 21
North Korea carried out some of these tests without prior warning, contravening international norms for safety of navigation. In
one instance, the South Korean government reported that four tactical ballistic missiles test-fired by North Korea in March passed
above airspace traversed by a China Southern Airlines passenger
aircraft seven minutes later.22 Regarding this incident, a Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated, ‘‘Countries, while
conducting military trainings or exercises, should adopt necessary
measures in accordance with international conventions to ensure
the safety of civil aircrafts and vessels in relevant airspaces andwaters.’’ * 23
China Strengthens Ties with South Korea
The warming of ties between China and South Korea since mid2013 is both an indication of and a response to deteriorating SinoNorth Korean relations.† Beijing’s public and high-profile efforts toadvance relations with Seoul suggest Chinese leaders are becoming
increasingly unhappy with China’s relationship with North Korea
and wish to communicate as much to Pyongyang, Seoul, and theworld.
Relations between Beijing and Seoul have significantly improved
since South Korean President Park Geun-hye traveled to China fora state visit in June 2013. Her visit culminated in an ambitious
joint statement announcing several initiatives to strengthen bilateral security and economic cooperation, including a high-level hot-DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The United States and several other countries in July 2014 issued a letter to the International Civil Aviation Organization, a UN body that develops standards and recommended
practices for international civil aviation, expressing concern that North Korea’s failure to issue
prior notification of its missile launches poses a ‘‘serious threat’’ to international aviation safety.
North Korea in the past notified the International Civil Aviation Organization of some launches.
Agence France-Presse, ‘‘U.S. Warns of Aviation Risk from N. Korea Rockets,’’ July 16, 2014.
http://news.yahoo.com/us-warns-aviation-risk-n-korea-rockets-210129436.html.
† Warming Sino-South Korean relations are not merely a reflection of the Sino-North Korean
relationship. China’s more friendly approach to relations with South Korea also is motivated by
China’s desire to alienate Japan, with which it is embroiled in a contentious territorial dispute.
Policy experts who met with the Commission at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul
assessed that Beijing seeks to take advantage of an ongoing rift in the Japan-South Korea relationship to drive a wedge between Seoul and Tokyo. For example, Beijing implored Seoul to join
it in criticizing Tokyo in 2013 when several high-level Japanese officials visited the Yasukuni
Shrine, a site controversial for its commemoration of several war criminals implicated in wartime atrocities against Chinese and South Koreans. For an in-depth discussion of the ChinaSouth Korea-Japan triangular relationship, see Chapter 3, Section 1, ‘‘China and Asia’s Evolving
Security Architecture.’’ See also Andrew Browne, ‘‘South Korea-Japan Rift on Exhibit in China,’’
Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023048
15004579418653837738902; and Robert E. Kelly, ‘‘The Complex China-South Korea Relationship,’’ Diplomat, June 18, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/the-complex-china-south-korea-relationship/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00462

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

451
line between South Korea’s chief of national security and China’s
state councilor for foreign affairs, and a semiannual bilateral strategic dialogue between the two countries’ vice foreign ministers.24
The visit also laid the groundwork for several follow-up meetings
between officials from both countries.25
From July 3–4, 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping reciprocatedPresident Park’s 2013 visit with a trip to Seoul, marking the firsttime a sitting Chinese president had ever visited South Korea before North Korea. The joint statement from the visit declared, ‘‘The
two countries reaffirm their firm opposition to the development of
nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.’’ President Park statedshe and President Xi agreed that ‘‘denuclearization of North Korea
must be achieved at all costs.’’ 26 Pyongyang expressed its displeasure with President Xi’s trip to Seoul by conducting several
missile tests in the weeks leading up to the visit,27 and North Korea’s National Defense Commission asserted, ‘‘Some backbone-lacking countries are blindly following the stinky bottom of the U.S.,
also struggling to embrace Park Geun-hye.’’ 28 The ‘‘backbone-lacking country’’ referenced almost certainly is China.
North Korea has been and remains a central focus of the ChinaSouth Korea relationship. North Korea likely was a prominentissue on the agenda for the July 2014 summit meeting between
Presidents Xi and Park,29 and U.S. officials told the Commissionthat a telephone call between Presidents Xi and Park in the runup to the summit featured coordination on denuclearizing North
Korea. Official communication about North Korea is supplemented
by informal engagements and dialogues. For example, U.S. government officials in Seoul told the Commission that former Chinese
People’s Liberation Army leaders and retired Chinese government
officials are increasingly willing and able to meet with their South
Korean counterparts to discuss North Korea.
Assuming China-South Korea relations continue to warm, China’s influence and leverage over South Korea will grow. According
to South Korean government officials with whom the Commission
met in Seoul, Beijing seeks to use this leverage to pressure Seoul
to abandon its alliance with the United States. Andrei Lankov, associate professor of social science at Kookmin University in Seoul
and an expert on Sino-North Korean relations, told the Commissionthat Beijing thinks time is on its side and expects its influence overSeoul (and Pyongyang) will grow in the future, which will better
position China to affect outcomes on the Peninsula. He noted it ishighly likely that China intends to use its growing influence overSeoul to apply pressure on the U.S.-South Korea alliance in orderto negotiate a diminished U.S. presence on the Peninsula.
High-Level Contacts between China and North Korea
Decrease

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

In stark contrast to the China-South Korea bilateral relationship,high-level contacts between China and North Korea in 2014 havebeen conspicuously limited.30 According to open-source reporting,
only seven high-level exchanges have occurred between the twocountries since 2013, compared to 30 such meetings during the pre-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00463

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

452
vious two years.* 31 Moreover, President Xi has not met with Kim
Jong-un. By comparison, he has met with President Park five times
since 2013.32
North Korea Reaches Out to Russia and Others
Just as China has strengthened ties with South Korea, North
Korea has been reaching out to other countries, suggesting it too
is dissatisfied with its relationship with China.
In 2013 and 2014, North Korea bolstered economic ties with Russia in particular:• In September 2013, state-owned Russian Railways and theNorth Korean Ministry of Railways completed repairs on North
Korea’s Rajin Port and on a railroad from Siberia to the port.
In early 2014, Russia began using the reopened port as atransshipment hub for coal exports destined for China.33• In April 2014, the Russian parliament agreed to forgive 90 percent (close to $10 billion) of North Korea’s debt to Russia.34• During a high-level Russian delegation to Pyongyang in April
2014, the two countries signed an agreement on bilateral tradeand economic cooperation and Russia donated an unspecified
number of fire engines to North Korea.35• In June 2014, North Korea reportedly announced plans to simplify visa requirements and provide Internet access and mobile
services for Russian investors and businesspeople working inNorth Korea.36• In June 2014, Russian officials appeared to revive a longstanding and ambitious plan to extend the Trans-Siberian
Railroad through both North and South Korea.†• North Korea in 2014 imported greater amounts of Russiancrude oil than in previous years, and according to open-source
research conducted by NK News, North Korean oil tankers in2014 visited Russian ports more often than Chinese ports.37
This current upswing in Russia-North Korea relations reflects
Pyongyang’s decades-long practice of playing its two patrons, China
and Russia, against one another to extract political and economic
gains and to mitigate the effects of international isolation.38 The
success of this strategy is succinctly illustrated in remarks madeby Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2003 about the prospective
Trans-Siberian Railroad extension through the Korean Peninsula:

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For the purposes of this Report, meetings held at the vice-ministerial level or higher are considered high-level meetings.
† With the exception of brief cross-border rail service between 2007 and 2009, North andSouth Korean efforts to establish a trans-Korean rail link have been stymied for several decades, mostly due to political sensitivities and security issues. Discussions of linking a transKorean railway with the Trans-Siberian Railroad have been ongoing since the late 1990s. Russia
Times, ‘‘Russia to Extend Trans-Eurasian Rail Project to Korea,’’ June 6, 2014. http://rt.com/
business/164116-russia-railway-north-korea/; Andrei Lankov, ‘‘A Trans-Korean/Trans-Siberian
Railway? Not Any Time Soon,’’ NK News, November 18, 2013. http://www.nknews.org/2013/11/a-trans-koreantrans-siberian-railway-not-any-time-soon/; and North Korea-Russia Relations: A
Strained Friendship (International Crisis Group, December 4, 2007), p. 12. http://www.
crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/b71_north_korea_russia_relations___a_strained_ friendship.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00464

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

453
‘‘Russia must build the [railroad] for the simple reason that if it
does not, then our dear friend China will do it.’’ 39
In what appears to be another attempt to lessen its economic isolation, North Korea in early 2014 took steps to improve ties withJapan as well. In May, Pyongyang agreed to re-open stalled investigations into North Korea’s kidnapping of several Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s in exchange for Japan lifting some ofits unilateral economic sanctions on North Korea.* 40 Japan began
to lift sanctions in July, but by mid-September North Korea appeared to be delaying progress on the investigation. Japanese Chief
Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga announced that Pyongyang’s initial report on the investigation, expected in the fall of 2014, could
be delayed up to one year, predicting that negotiations with North
Korea ‘‘will not go smoothly.’’ 41 Even if Pyongyang makes progresson the abduction investigations, Japan is unlikely to pursue a morefriendly relationship with North Korea. Japan, which does not haveofficial diplomatic relations with North Korea, views the North asa major security threat, which it works in concert with its ally theUnited States and South Korea to address.† Indeed, North Korea
is a central focus of the U.S.-Japan alliance and a driver of Japan’s
ongoing security reforms.42
North Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong traveled to Southeast
Asia in August, where he attended the high-profile Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations Regional Forum. A South Korean official
referred to the trip as ‘‘a move to come out of international isolation and gather ground in the global diplomatic arena.’’ 43
These efforts reflect North Korea’s desire to reduce its overwhelming dependence on China and suggest the Kim regime has
determined it should hedge against the potential that China willabandon its long-standing North Korea policy. Stephanie KleineAhlbrandt, director of Asia-Pacific Programs at the United States
Institute of Peace, testified to the Commission, ‘‘There’s nothing
more the North Koreans would like [than] to do a great deal withJapan, a sunshine deal ‡ with South Korea, get in touch with
Myanmar, Indonesia, and any other country that will deal withthem.’’ 44
China’s Perceptions and Policies Evolve, Strategy Remains
the Same
Although North Korea’s recent provocations are leading to a shift
in China’s perception of North Korea and an adjustment of policy

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Sanctions lifted by Japan include (1) some restrictions on the flow of people between Japan
and North Korea; (2) reporting requirements for some currency transfers from Japan to North
Korea; and (3) an embargo on some North Korean ships docking in Japanese ports. Asahi
Shimbun, ‘‘Japan to Lift 3 Sanctions Against North Korea; Abduction Reinvestigation to Start,’’July 3, 2014. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201407030071; Linda Sieg andKiyoshi Takenaka, ‘‘Japan Lifts Some North Korean Sanctions amid Report of Surviving Abductees,’’ Reuters, July 3, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/03/us-japan-northkoreaidUSKBN0F70NK20140703.
† Japan and South Korea cooperate on security issues related to the North, especially in thecontext of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship. However, bilateral cooperation between thetwo countries has recently suffered from political tensions between Tokyo and Seoul, according
to U.S. officials in Seoul and policy experts who met with the Commission at the Asan Institutefor Policy Studies. For a more comprehensive discussion of tensions between Japan and South
Korea, see Chapter 3, Section 1, ‘‘China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture.’’‡ This is a reference to South Korea’s ‘‘sunshine policy’’ toward North Korea, which lasted
from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s and was intended to build positive ties with the North.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00465

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

454
toward North Korea, China’s overarching strategy and objectives
have not changed. China continues to prioritize reinforcing stability
in North Korea with the aim of maintaining a credible buffer between itself and the U.S.-allied South.
A Vibrant Debate on North Korea Emerges
Beijing has allowed a vibrant public debate on the utility andwisdom of China’s policies toward North Korea to emerge since
North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013.* 45 The spectrum of views
ranges from proponents of China’s current policy of supporting theKim regime, to those calling for Beijing to pressure Pyongyang tomoderate its destabilizing behavior,† to the ‘‘abandonment school’’of strategists and commentators who argue North Korea is a liability for China and that Beijing should ‘‘cut its losses and cut North
Korea loose.’’ 46 Dr. Lankov characterizes the debate:
We should keep in mind that North Korean studies remain
a rather divided area in China. There are some specialists
in China who are genuine supporters of North Korea’s
cause. Some of these people belong to an older generationof specialists who once studied the North as students, whilesome others merely see North Korea as a useful strategic
buffer against the bullying United States. There are also
experts who see North Korea as a troublesome anachronism, a fossil from a Maoist-Leninist past that most Chinese wish to forget about. However, even such people, oftenwith close connection to South Korea, still tend to appreciate the strategic advantages presented by North Korea to
China.47
So far, the ‘‘abandonment school’’ of thought appears to be a minority view and has not gained traction among China’s senior leaders. However, the ongoing debate reveals a demographic trend that
may have implications for China’s policy toward the North in the
future. Ms. Kleine-Ahlbrandt’s testimony to the Commission echoes
Dr. Lankov’s observation that Chinese public opinion on North
Korea is subject to a generational divide, and asserts that younger
Chinese ‘‘overwhelmingly view [North Korea] with pity and contempt.’’ 48 It may be the case that future generations of Chinese
leaders—those who have no memory of the Sino-North Korean camaraderie of the 1950s and who prefer China shed its reputationas North Korea’s only patron—will calculate it is no longer in China’s interests to support the North unconditionally.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Similar debates emerged in China following North Korea’s first and second nuclear tests in2006 and 2009. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of Stephanie
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
† Chinese state-affiliated newspaper Global Times published an editorial by a prominent Chinese expert on North Korea which stated that North Korean missile launches ‘‘have alreadyposed a grave threat to the security of neighboring countries,’’ and opined that China should‘‘impose a certain amount of pressure’’ on North Korea. Although commentaries such as this do
not necessarily represent the views of the Chinese government, they suggest frustration over
North Korea’s behavior is on the rise in China. Zhang Liangui, ‘‘Pyongyang Missile Launch
Risks Isolation,’’ Global Times, May 18, 2014. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/849325.shtml.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00466

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

455
China Begins to Take Denuclearization Seriously
Although China historically has not viewed North Korean
denuclearization as an urgent task, U.S. government officials in
Seoul told the Commission that Beijing appears to be genuinely
concerned about North Korea’s accelerating nuclear program. Fourdistinct but related perceptions appear to be driving China’s evolving threat perception. First, Kim Jong-un’s decision to proceed witha third nuclear test despite China’s strong opposition likely convinced Beijing that Kim Jong-un is both reckless and unconcerned
about whether North Korea’s provocations will anger China. Second, China perceives the United States could use a North Korean
provocation as a pretext to deepen its military engagement in theregion, an outcome China desperately seeks to avoid.49 Third,
China is concerned that the North’s progress on its nuclear program could precipitate a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. In
particular, China fears U.S. allies South Korea and Japan may develop nuclear weapons, which it believes would seriously degrade
China’s security environment.50 Fourth, China recognizes that
North Korea’s leverage—vis-à-vis China and the rest of the international community—grows as its nuclear program becomes morecredible. Notably, none of these perceptions reflects concern about
North Korean nuclear weapons posing a direct threat to China.
Rather, China’s concerns relate to how North Korean nuclear
weapons could precipitate second-order effects that could result ina more vulnerable security environment for China.
China’s heightened sense of anxiety over North Korea’s nuclear
program has not led to a wholesale shift in China’s North Korea
strategy, but it appears to have informed one recent policy adjustment: Beijing’s reinvigorated efforts to resume the Six-Party
Talks.* China’s efforts to restart the Six-Party Talks have included
holding a ‘‘Track 1.5’’ talk between officials from some of the countries involved in the Six-Party Talks; 51 sending Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin to conduct ‘‘shuttle diplomacy’’ visits toSeoul and Pyongyang; 52 holding meetings with senior U.S. officials; 53 and generally emphasizing the importance of the Six-Party
Talks in official statements.54
China’s motivations for restarting the Six-Party Talks are manifold. According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the aimof the negotiations has always been to ‘‘keep them talking and notfighting.’’ 55 Ms. Kleine-Ahlbrandt testified to the Commission that
China’s motives are more complex:
China prioritized the talks because as Chair, it was guaranteed a central role in setting international policy toward[North Korea]. Beijing never expected that the talks would
resolve the issue, rather, the process kept negotiations open
and lessened the possibility of crises escalating, while allowing Beijing to exert control over the international re-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Six-Party Talks involving China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and theUnited States were established in 2003 to negotiate the termination of North Korea’s nuclear
program. After six rounds of negotiations, North Korea left the Six-Party Talks in 2009, andthe negotiations have not resumed since. Jayshree Bajoria and Beina Xu, The Six Party Talks
on North Korea’s Nuclear Program (Council on Foreign Relations, September 30, 2013). http://
www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00467

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

456
sponse by ensuring interaction with and influence over allparties.56
An additional driver of China’s desire to revive the Six-Party
Talks, according to Ms. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, is Beijing’s fear that
Pyongyang will ‘‘cut a deal’’ with Washington to denuclearize orotherwise thaw relations, which would leave China with diminished leverage and little control over the situation on the Peninsula.57
Another potential indicator that denuclearization is a rising priority for Beijing is a growing emphasis on denuclearization in official Chinese statements. China’s long-standing official line on
North Korea has been ‘‘no war, no instability, no nukes.’’ 58 This
characterization conveys not only China’s interests vis-à-vis North
Korea, but also the prioritization of those interests, with denuclearization as the lowest priority.59 Recently, however, some official Chinese statements, including those made at the July 2014
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, have begun to list‘‘denuclearization’’ before ‘‘stability’’ in discussions of China’s interests and priorities on the Korean Peninsula.60
China Strengthens Sanctions Enforcement, but Problems
RemainChina’s enforcement of UN sanctions against North Korea has
improved somewhat since North Korea’s third nuclear test. In
March 2013, China appeared to enhance border inspections of cargo
traveling from China to North Korea.61 In April 2013, the Chinese
government issued directives for ‘‘relevant agencies to take measures to strictly enforce’’ Security Council Resolution 2094.62 In August 2013, Chinese diplomats told researchers from International
Crisis Group that China was for the first time strictly enforcing
sanctions on North Korea.63
These developments notwithstanding, gaps in China’s sanctions
enforcement remain. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in June 2014, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel R. Russel acknowledged China’s
efforts but insisted it ‘‘could do more to prevent North Korea fromengaging in proliferation activities.’’ * 64 According to a UN Panel ofExperts established to monitor enforcement of sanctions against
North Korea, China’s recent failures to fully enforce sanctions include:• The Chinese port of Dalian in March 2013 appears to have
served as a transshipment hub for five aluminum alloy rods
(considered nuclear-related dual-use equipment by the International Atomic Energy Agency) from North Korea destined for
Burma.65

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* In addition to lax enforcement, China continues to use its position on the UN Security Council to weaken sanctions resolutions. According to Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for
Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation, ‘‘After the April 2012 missile launch, the U.S.,
South Korea, Japan, and the EU proposed adding 40 additional North Korean entities to the
U.N. sanctions list. China vetoed all but three, severely limiting the scope of U.N. efforts against
North Korea’s prohibited nuclear and missile programs.’’ Bruce Klingner, North Korea: Sanctions, Nuclear and Missile Threat (Heritage Foundation, April 2, 2014). http://www.heritage.org/
research/testimony/2014/04/north-korea-sanctions-nuclear-and-missile-threat.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00468

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

457
• China has made implementing UN prohibitions on transferring‘‘luxury items’’ to North Korea difficult because its definition of‘‘luxury goods’’ is much more limited than that of most othercountries. For example, when Switzerland prohibited the saleof ski lifts to North Korea, a Chinese company acquired thecontract and delivered the ski lifts to North Korea in January
2014.66
Indeed, China’s partial efforts to enforce sanctions after the nuclear test were probably intended to signal displeasure to North
Korea rather than truly seek to isolate the regime and cut off inputs to the North’s missile and nuclear programs. This is
unsurprising given China’s rhetorical aversion to formal sanctions
in general. China does not view sanctions as an effective tool topressure North Korea; instead, China believes the best way to deal
with the North is to engage it through dialogue and economic exchange.67
China Continues to Prioritize Stability
The deterioration in Sino-North Korean relations has not led toa change in China’s long-standing strategic objective regarding
North Korea: stability.* Beijing emphasized this in February 2014
when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi articulated China’s ‘‘redline’’ on the Korean Peninsula, saying, ‘‘We will not allow war or
instability on the Korean Peninsula.’’ 68 According to subject matter
experts who met with the Commission in Washington and Seoul,
China fears a North Korean collapse could provide a pretext for
U.S. military intervention in North Korea and allow Washington
greater influence over the future of the Peninsula.69 In Beijing’sview, a sustained U.S.-South Korea allied military presence on the
Peninsula is inimical to China’s security interests, and China
would perceive the crossing of U.S. troops into the North as an urgent deterioration of its already-degraded security environment.
This view is informed by China’s perception that the United States
seeks to encircle and contain China with regional alliances andpartnerships in Northeast Asia. China’s overriding imperative to
avoid such a scenario is what drives its economic and political support for Pyongyang.
Does China Have Leverage over North Korea?
The United States and South Korea frequently call on China
to use its close relationship with North Korea to pressure
Pyongyang to halt its nuclear program and cease its destabilizing behavior.70 China’s ambassador to the United States Cui
Tiankai called Washington’s and Seoul’s requests for China topressure North Korea a ‘‘mission impossible,’’ and claimed China
does not have the kind of leverage over North Korea that theUnited States and others thinks it has.71

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Stability, in China’s perception, is characterized by the absence of unrest, upheaval, or othersudden shifts in a country’s internal situation and often is synonymous with regime stability.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00469

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

458
Does China Have Leverage over North Korea?—Continued
Because China’s economic and diplomatic support for North
Korea is so great, Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang is indeed
significant. Dr. Terry testified to the Commission that ‘‘by someestimates, Beijing provides some 80 percent of North Korea’s
consumer goods, 45 percent of its food, and 90 percent of its energy imports. Sino-North Korean trade accounts for nearly 90
percent of North Korea’s global trade, while official Chinese investment accounts for almost 95 percent of foreign direct investment in the North.’’ 72 Several experts in China and the Westhave suggested Beijing could pressure Pyongyang to cease its
provocative behavior by cutting off (or threatening to cut off) its
exports, particularly oil exports, to North Korea. According to
Ms. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, China has used this leverage—albeit in alimited way—by charging above market prices for food or delivering oil at slower rates to ‘‘annoy and send messages to North
Korea.’’ 73 Dr. Lankov also told the Commission that China sometimes uses its leverage over North Korea to deter Pyongyang
from undertaking provocative actions such as missile and bomb
tests.
In reality, although China does have leverage over North
Korea, Beijing’s uncompromising commitment to stability prevents it from using that leverage. Beijing fears applying too
much pressure on the Kim regime could be destabilizing. Ms.
Kleine-Ahlbrandt testified that some Chinese strategists believe
the amount of pressure required to force North Korea todenuclearize would be so great that it almost certainly would result in regime change, which to China could be a worse outcome
than a nuclear North Korea.74

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Witnesses who testified at the Commission’s June 2014 hearing
differed in their assessments of whether China will ever reach a‘‘tipping point’’ at which it would deem the threat of a nuclear
North Korea is greater than the threat of instability in North
Korea and abandon its unconditional support for Pyongyang infavor of an approach more in line with that of South Korea and theUnited States. Dr. Terry opined China will only reconsider its support for North Korea if China ‘‘feel[s] like there is an imminent
threat such as a conflict on the Peninsula.’’ 75 Ms. Kleine-Ahlbrandt
suggested China might reach a tipping point if North Korea instigated a major provocation along the China-North Korea border ina way that threatened China’s own domestic stability.76 Ambassador Joseph R. DeTrani, president of the Intelligence and National
Security Alliance, suggested China may have already reached a tipping point. Referring to speculation that Beijing had gone to great
lengths to convince Pyongyang not to carry out a planned fourth
nuclear test in the spring of 2014,77 Ambassador DeTrani said, ‘‘I
don’t think it’s an accident we’re not seeing a fourth nuclear
test.’’ 78

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00470

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

459
The Potential for North Korean Collapse: China’s Interests
and Potential Responses
Kim Jong-un has rapidly consolidated power since succeeding hisfather as North Korea’s supreme leader in late 2011, defying expectations that his youth and inexperience would prevent him from exerting control over Pyongyang’s elite leadership. Indeed, several
subject matter experts consulted by the Commission in 2014 asserted that that Kim Jong-un appears to have complete and unchallenged control over decision making in Pyongyang.79 Kim Jongun’s successful purges of top Korean officials like his uncle, Jang
Song-taek, demonstrate his ability to eliminate threats to his ruleand command fear and respect from his inner circle.
Nevertheless, North Korea, like many authoritarian regimes,
may be ‘‘stable until it’s not,’’ 80 and the potential for regime instability or collapse exists.81 Indeed, Kim Jong-un’s mysterious disappearance from public view for 40 days in September and October
2014 prompted some outside observers to speculate that a coup hadtaken place in Pyongyang.82 As this Report went to print, however,North Korean media reports suggest Kim Jong-un’s absence wasdue to health problems and that he remains firmly in control of thecountry.83
In response to a North Korean regime collapse, Beijing would
make its long-term strategic objectives for the Peninsula—most importantly restoring stability and ensuring continued Chinese influence—its top priority. China almost certainly would intervene in
the event of North Korean regime collapse.84 Its response would be
scenario-dependent and based on what course of action it judges
most closely aligns with its national interests at that moment.
These responses could include:• Reinforcing Border Security: China fears regime collapse orlarge-scale unrest in North Korea could precipitate a refugee
crisis with potentially millions of North Koreans crossing theborder into China. According to Bruce W. Bennett, senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation and author of Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse, China
likely would avoid such a situation by deploying troops to seal
China’s side of the border with North Korea and potentiallycreating a buffer zone within North Korea in which to set up
refugee camps.85• Securing Nuclear Weapons: According to Dr. Bennett, interlocutors who met with the Commission in Seoul, and others,
China likely would cross into North Korea to secure weaponsof mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in the eventof regime collapse.*• Maintaining a Strategic Buffer: According to subject matter experts who met with the Commission in Seoul, China prefers adivided Korean Peninsula over a unified one because it values

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility is about 80 miles from the Chinese border. Bruce
W. Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse (RAND Corporation, 2013),
pp. 89–90. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND_
RR331.pdf. See also Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad, ‘‘China’s North Korea Policy: Rethink or
Recharge?’’ Parameters 44:1 (Spring 2014): 58–60. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
pubs/parameters/issues/Spring_2014/5_ScobellCozad.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00471

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

460
North Korea as a buffer between itself and the U.S.-alliedSouth. Should regime instability or collapse occur, China
would take steps to ensure North Korea continues to serve asa strategic buffer.* However, if China judged unification under
the South to be the inevitable outcome of instability or collapse
in the North, it likely would go to great lengths to ensure that
U.S. troops on the Peninsula remain as far south as possible.
China is not the only country planning for contingency scenarios
in North Korea. U.S. government officials in Seoul told the Commission that the United States in concert with South Korea plans
for all contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. According to policy
experts who met with the Commission at the Asan Institute for
Policy Studies in Seoul, Chinese officials are reluctant—althoughless reluctant than in the past—to discuss North Korean collapse
scenarios with their South Korean counterparts. At the unofficial
level, however, Chinese and South Korean think tank and academic experts discuss North Korean regime collapse and participate in regime collapse war games.
China’s mistrust of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, its alliancewith the North, and its unique security priorities vis-à-vis theNorth prevent it from meaningfully engaging with South Korea
and the United States in discussions about collapse scenarios andcontingency planning.86 As a result the three countries most likely
to intervene in North Korea in the event of regime collapse—the
United States, China, and South Korea—are not fully informed ofeach other’s intentions, which could lead to accidents, miscalculation, and conflict should regime collapse occur.
U.S.-China Relations in the North Korea Context
According to the Obama Administration, North Korea is theUnited States’ biggest security concern in East Asia.87 The 2014
Quadrennial Defense Review, a legislatively-mandated review of
the U.S. Department of Defense’s strategy and priorities, describes
North Korea’s long-range missile and weapons of mass destruction
programs as a ‘‘significant threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia’’ and a ‘‘growing, direct
threat to the United States.’’ 88
Unfortunately, as the need for cooperation between China andthe United States on North Korea grows more urgent, China increasingly views U.S. interests on the Peninsula as inimical to its
own. As discussed earlier, the United States is central to China’s
calculus when it comes to devising and implementing its North
Korea policies. Ms. Kleine-Ahlbrandt testified:
When China looks at North Korea, it does so through an
East Asian strategic lens with growing rivalry with theUnited States as the focal point. Despite its interests being
seriously harmed by North Korean behavior, Beijing be-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* According to Dr. Bennett, such steps could include seeking to sustain the incumbent North
Korean government, supporting a new, pro-China North Korean government, or occupying partsof North Korean territory along the Chinese border in order to maintain a buffer zone. Bruce
W. Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse (RAND Corporation, 2013),
pp. 89–90. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND_RR
331.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00472

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

461
lieves that Washington and its allies pose a larger threat
to China’s strategic interests than Pyongyang does. Consensus amongst analysts in Beijing is that the U.S.-led bloc
is using North Korea and tensions in the South and East
China Seas as excuses to deepen the Asia rebalance,
strengthen regional alliances, expand military exercises andmove missile defense and military assets to the region.
China is increasingly uncomfortable with long-standing
U.S. defense relationships with countries around China’s
periphery (including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, thePhilippines, Vietnam, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan). From the Chinese perspective,
China-North Korea relations are intrinsically part of SinoU.S. geopolitical competition in East Asia. As long as
China continues to view the U.S. with such strategic mistrust and suspicion, a fundamental shift in its policy toward North Korea remains unlikely.89
Moreover, China believes Washington (as well as Seoul) is as
much to blame for instability on the Korean Peninsula as
Pyongyang. For example, China resolutely opposes U.S. military
exercises with South Korea, saying they provoke Pyongyang andcontribute to a hostile environment on the Peninsula.90 In some official statements, China appears equally disapproving of U.S.-South
Korea military drills and North Korean nuclear test threats.*
China’s distrust of the United States likely will continue to inform China’s approach to relations with North Korea, especially if
U.S.-China security relations continue to deteriorate in other areas,such as over territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.
However, Dr. Terry assessed in her testimony to the Commissionthat the recent deterioration in relations between China and North
Korea might present an opportunity for the United States to ‘‘takeadvantage of [China’s] concerns’’ and pursue a more robust dialogue with China on the future of the Korean Peninsula.91
Conclusions• North Korea has the potential to be one of the most dangerous
flashpoints in U.S.-China relations. Although regime collapse or
a major humanitarian disaster in North Korea do not appear
likely in the near term, such an event could lead to war on the
Korean Peninsula, which likely would draw simultaneous military intervention jointly by the United States and South Korea
and by China. At the current time, trilateral communication between these countries about their intentions and possible actionsin the event of a major contingency in North Korea appears dangerously insufficient to avoid accidents, miscalculation, and conflict.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson replied to a question about tensions on
the Korean Peninsula by answering that China is ‘‘opposed to any action that may lead to theescalation of tension. We disapprove of joint military drills and the threat of nuclear tests.’’
China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular
Press Conference on April 15, 2014,’’ April 15, 2014. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1147430.shtml.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00473

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

462

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Sino-North Korean relations are at their lowest point in decades.
This is driven largely by China’s frustration over North Korea’s
destabilizing behaviors since late 2012, including a nuclear test
and a high volume of missile tests. Beijing’s frustration with
Pyongyang notwithstanding, China continues to support North
Korea in the interest of stability. China assesses that as long as
the North Korean regime remains stable, North Korea will continue to exist as a buffer between itself and U.S.-allied South
Korea. Preserving this buffer is the fundamental objective of China’s relationship with North Korea.
• China appears to be genuinely concerned about North Korea’s
nuclear program. This concern is mostly over second-order effectsof the North’s nuclear advances. For example, China believes
North Korea’s continued progress on its nuclear program
incentivizes the United States to strengthen its military presence
and capabilities on the Korean Peninsula. Further, China believes the North’s nuclear progress could prompt U.S. allies
Japan and South Korea to develop their own nuclear programs.
Either of these outcomes would constitute a major deteriorationof China’s security environment.
• Since 2013, China has redoubled its efforts to restart the SixParty Talks. Although Beijing is skeptical North Korea will halt
its nuclear program as a result of the Six-Party Talks, it values
the forum because it ensures China will have a central role in
the international community’s interaction with North Korea andallows China to exert influence over the parties involved.
• China increasingly views U.S. interests on the Korean Peninsula
as inimical to its own. Beijing assumes Washington uses North
Korean provocations as a pretext to bolster the U.S. militarypresence and capabilities on the Korean Peninsula and justify a‘‘rebalance’’ policy that is actually aimed at containing China.
• China’s relationship with South Korea is significantly improving
in both the economic and security realms. Beijing’s efforts tostrengthen ties with Seoul reflect China’s frustration with North
Korea and are meant in part to signal its disapproval to
Pyongyang. China’s pursuit of stronger ties with South Korea
also is aimed in part at drawing South Korea away from its alliance with the United States. As its influence over South Korea
grows, China judges it eventually will be in a stronger position
to pressure South Korea to reduce its security ties with theUnited States.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00474

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

463
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 2

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. Mathieu Duchâtel and Phillip Schell, China’s Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, December 2013), pp. 17–40. http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRI
PP40.pdf; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Annual Report to Congress, November 2011, pp. 246–249.
2. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2011, pp. 242–246.
3. Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction andMissiles: Policy Issues (Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2014), pp. 19–
21. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf; Mark Bromley, Mathieu Duchâtel, andPaul Holtom, China’s Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 2013), pp. 36, 40. http://books.sipri.org/
files/PP/SIPRIPP38.pdf; and Yonhap News Agency, ‘‘(LEAD) China Ships No Crude
Oil to N. Korea for 7th Month,’’ August 23, 2014. http: / / english . yonhapnews . co . kr /national/2014/08/23/82/0301000000AEN20140823001400315F.html.
4. Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian A. Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation (Congressional Research Service, January
15, 2014), p. 15. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf.
5. Victor Cha, ‘‘Why China Can’t Cut Off North Korea,’’ Huffington Post,
April 6, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-cha/china-north-korea-relations_b_1404178.html; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 Annual Report to Congress, November 2011, pp. 241–252.
6. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Foreign Policy: Challenges and Players, written testimony of Victor Cha, April 13,
2011; Gordon G. Chang, ‘‘Fatal Attraction: China’s Strengthening Partnership with
North Korea,’’ World Affairs Journal (May/June 2011). http://www.worldaffairs
journal.org/article/fatal-attraction-chinas-strengthening-partnership-north-korea.
7. Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History(New York, NY: Basic Books, 2014), pp. 186–193; U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of Sue Mi Terry, June 5, 2014.
8. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Sue Mi Terry, June 5, 2014.
9. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Sue Mi Terry, June 5, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North
Korea, testimony of Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014. Several interlocutors
with whom the Commission met in Seoul, including from Seoul National University,
Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and the South Korean government, echoed this assessment.
10. Duyeon Kim, North Korea’s Successful Rocket Launch (Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, December 18, 2012). http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/
northkorea/articles/north_koreas_successful_rocket_launch/.
11. Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close (International Crisis Group, December 9, 2013), p. 3. http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/
north-east-asia/254-fire-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.pdf.
12. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony ofStephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014; Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps
North Korea Close (International Crisis Group, December 9, 2013), pp. 4–5. http://
www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/254-fire-on-the-city-gate-whychina-keeps-north-korea-close.pdf.
13. United Nations Security Council, ‘‘Security Council Strengthens Sanctions on
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in Response to 12 February Nuclear Test,’’March 7, 2013. https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10934.doc.htm; Fire on
the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close (International Crisis Group, December 9, 2013), p. 7. http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/
254-fire-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.pdf; and David Chance
and Jack Kim, ‘‘North Korean Nuclear Test Draws Anger, Including from China,’’
Reuters, February 12, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-korea-north-idUSBRE91B04820130212.
14. Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close (International Crisis Group, December 9, 2013), p. 8. http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/
north-east-asia/254-fire-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00475

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

464

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

15. Korean Central News Agency, ‘‘Traitor Jang Song Thaek Executed,’’ December 13, 2013. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201312/news13/20131213-05ee.html.
16. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Sue
Mi Terry, June 5, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North
Korea, testimony of Joseph R. DeTrani, June 5, 2014. Researchers with whom theCommission met in Seoul, including academic experts from Seoul National University and others, noted China’s anxiety and frustration over Mr. Jang’s execution.
17. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Sue
Mi Terry, June 5, 2014.
18. Choonsik Yoo, ‘‘UPDATE 2-North Korea Fires Short-Range Missiles in Apparent Exercise,’’ Reuters, February 27, 2014. http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/02/27/
korea-north-missiles-idINL3N0LW3SG20140227; Ashley Rowland and Yoo Kyong
Chang, ‘‘North Korea Launches 2 More Missiles, South Says,’’ Stars and Stripes,
March 2, 2014. http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/north-korea-launches-2-moremissiles-south-says-1.270832; Choe Sang-Hun, ‘‘North Korea Tests Rocket Launcher
with Range Beyond Seoul, South Says,’’ New York Times, March 4, 2014. http://
www . nytimes . com / 2014 / 03 / 05 / world / asia / north-korea-tests-rocket-launcher-withlonger-range-south-says.html?_r=0; Judy Kwon and Halimah Abdullah, ‘‘North
Korea Launches Missiles into Sea,’’ CNN, March 6, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/27/world/asia/north-korea-missiles/; Paula Hancocks and K.J. Kwon, ‘‘North
Korea Fires Short-Range Rockets, South Says,’’ CNN, March 17, 2014. http://
www.cnn.com/2014/03/16/world/asia/nkorea-missile-launches/; K.J. Kwon and Ben
Brumfield, ‘‘North Korea Launches 30 Short-Range Rockets into the Sea, South
Korea Says,’’ CNN, March 22, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/22/world/asia/
north-korea-rockets/index.html; Euan McKirdy, ‘‘North Korea Ups Stakes with Latest Missile Launch,’’ CNN, March 26, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/26/world/
asia/north-korea-rodong-missile-launch/; Louis Charbonneau, ‘‘U.N. Security Council
Members Condemn North Korea Missile Launch,’’ Reuters, March 27, 2014. http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/03 / 28 /us-korea-north-un-idUSBREA2Q2E220140328;
Jonathan Cheng, ‘‘North Korea Hypes ‘New’ Missile Launch,’’ Wall Street Journal,
June 27, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/06/27/north-korea-hypes-newmissile-launch/; Narae Kim, ‘‘North Korea Launches Two Missiles, Defies UN Ban,’’Reuters, June 29, 2014. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2014 / 06 / 29 / us-northkoreamissiles-idUSKBN0F405H20140629; Jonathan Cheng, ‘‘In Run-Up to Xi Visit, North
Korea Seeks Spotlight,’’ Korea Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), June30, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/06/30/in-run-up-to-xi-visit-northkorea-seeks-spotlight/; K.J. Kwon and Jethro Mullen, ‘‘North Korea Fires Two ShortRange Rockets into Sea,’’ CNN, July 1, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/01/world/
asia/north-korea-missiles; Jung-Yoon Choi and Hyung-Jin Kim, ‘‘North Korea Fires
Missiles into Ocean,’’ Associated Press, July 8, 2014. http: // www.huffingtonpost.com /2014 / 07 / 08 / north-korea-missiles_n_5568880.html; Jeyup S. Kwaak, ‘‘North Korea
Launches Two Short-Range Missiles,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2014. http://
online.wsj.com / articles / north-korea-launches-two-short-range-missiles-1405222190;
Yonhap News Agency, ‘‘N. Korea Fires Two Ballistic Missiles: Seoul,’’ July 13, 2014.
http: // english.yonhapnews.co.kr / northkorea / 2014 / 07 / 13 / 0401000000AEN201407130
00252315.html; Associated Press, ‘‘North Korea has Launched Nearly 100 Missile
and Rocket Tests in 2014 as Kim Jong-un Seeks World’s Attention,’’ July 14, 2014.
http: // news.nationalpost.com/2014/07/14/north-korea-has-launched-nearly-100-missile-and-rocket-tests-in-2014-as-kim-jong-un-seeks-worlds-attention/; Associated Press,‘‘North Korea Fires Short-Range Missile into Sea,’’ July 26, 2014. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/26/north-korea-fires-short-range-missile-sea/; Associated Press, ‘‘North Korea Test-Fires Missiles as Pope Visits South,’’ August 14,
2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/14/north-korea-missile-test-popefrancis-south; Tass (Moscow), ‘‘North Korea Fires Short-Range Ballistic Missile into
Sea of Japan - media,’’ September 1, 2014. http://en.itar-tass.com/world/747478; andChoe Sang-Hun, ‘‘North Korea Reported to Test Short-Range Missiles,’’ New YorkTimes, September 6, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/asia/northkorea-reported-to-test-short-range-missiles.html.
19. Jung-Yoon Choi and Hyung-Jin Kim, ‘‘North Korea Fires Missiles into
Ocean,’’ Associated Press, July 8, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/08/
north-korea-missiles_n_5568880.html.
20. ‘‘UN Security Council Condemns North Korea Missile launch,’’ BBC, March
27, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26780542; Michelle Nichols, ‘‘U.N. Security Council Condemns North Korea Missile Launches,’’ Reuters, July 17, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00476

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

465

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/18/us-northkorea-missiles-un-idUSKBN0FM
2ES20140718.
21. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin
Gang’s Regular Press Conference on February 28, 2014,’’ February 28, 2014. http://
www . fmprc . gov . cn / mfa _ eng / xwfw _ 665399 / s2510 _ 665401 / 2511 _ 665403/t1133216.
shtml; China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong
Lei’s Regular Press Conference on March 17, 2014,’’ March 17, 2014. http://
www . fmprc . gov . cn / mfa _ eng / xwfw _ 665399 / s2510 _ 665401 / 2511 _ 665403/t1138083.
shtml; China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong
Lei’s Regular Press Conference on March 26, 2014,’’ March 26, 2014. http://
www . fmprc . gov . cn / mfa _ eng / xwfw _ 665399 / s2510 _ 665401 / 2511 _ 665403/t1141211.
shtml; China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong
Lei’s Regular Press Conference on June 30, 2014,’’ June 30, 2014. http://
www . fmprc . gov . cn / mfa _ eng / xwfw _ 665399 / s2510 _ 665401 / 2511 _ 665403/t1170032.
shtml; and China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong
Lei’s Regular Press Conference on July 2, 2014,’’ July 2, 2014. http://
www . fmprc . gov . cn / mfa _ eng / xwfw _ 665399 / s2510 _ 665401 / 2511 _ 665403/t1170852.
shtml.
22. Jeyup S. Kwaak, ‘‘North Korea Missiles Passed near Chinese Passenger Jet,’’Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424
052702303824204579420623335971350.
23. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin
Gang’s Regular Press Conference on March 6, 2014,’’ March 6, 2014. http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1134743.shtml.
24. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Korea Chair Monitor (June
13–26, 2013), p. 1. http://csis.org/files/publication/130627_KoreaChair%20Monitor_
Vol1Issue2.pdf.
25. Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, ‘‘China-Korea Relations: China’s Red Line on
the Korean Peninsula,’’ Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East
Asian Bilateral Relations 16:1 (May 2014): 103–104. http://csis.org/files/publication/
1401q.pdf.
26. Jane Perlez, ‘‘China and South Korea Affirm Antinuclear Goals,’’ New YorkTimes, July 3, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/world/asia/presidents-ofchina-and-south-korea-reaffirm-push-for-north-korean-denuclearization.html.
27. Deutsche Welle, ‘‘Chinese President Xi Visits Seoul in Apparent Snub toNorth Korea,’’ July 3, 2014. http://www.dw.de/chinese-president-xi-visits-seoul-inapparent-snub-to-north-korea/a-17754872.
28. Yonhap News Agency, ‘‘N. Korea Takes Sideswipe at China’s Policy toward
Pyongyang,’’ July 21, 2014. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/07/21/93/0401000000AEN20140721006100315F.html.
29. Jonathan Cheng, ‘‘In Run-Up to Xi Visit, North Korea Seeks Spotlight,’’ Korea
Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), June 30, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/
korearealtime/2014/06/30/in-run-up-to-xi-visit-north-korea-seeks-spotlight/.
30. Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, ‘‘China-Korea Relations: China’s Red Lineon the Korean Peninsula,’’ Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on
East Asian Bilateral Relations 16:1 (May 2014): 103. http://csis.org/files/publication/
1401q.pdf.
31. Open Source Center, OSC Report: Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges Jan-Mar
2011, April 8, 2011. ID: KPP20110408032007; Open Source Center, OSC Report:
Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges April-June 2011, August 30, 2011. ID: KPP
20110830032002; Open Source Center, OSC Report: Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges
July-September 2011, October 20, 2011. ID: KPP20111020032004; Open Source Center, OSC Report: Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges October-December 2011, January
19, 2012. ID: KPP20120119032002; Open Source Center, OSC Report: Chart of
PRC–DPRK Exchanges Jan-Mar 2012, April 5, 2012. ID: KPP20120405032002;
Open Source Center, OSC Report: Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges Apr-Jun 2012,
August 27, 2012. ID: KPP20120827032002; Open Source Center, OSC Report: Chartof PRC–DPRK Exchanges Jul-Sep 2012, October 26, 2012. ID: KPP20121026032001;
Open Source Center, OSC Report: Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges Oct-Dec 2012,
January 18, 2013. ID: KPP20130117032001; Open Source Center, OSC Report:
Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges Jan-Mar 2013, April 15, 2013. OSC ID: KPP
20130415032001; Open Source Center, OSC Report: Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges
Apr-Jun 2013, July 15, 2013. ID: KPR2013071219948731; Open Source Center, OSC
Report: Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges July-September 2013, March 18, 2014. ID:
KPO2013102811769617; Open Source Center, Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges October-December 2013, March 25, 2014. ID: KPR2014032519725582; Open Source Center, PRC–DPRK: Chart of PRC–DPRK Exchanges January-March 2014, April 15,

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00477

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

466

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

2014. ID: KPO2014041423869917; and Open Source Center, China-North Korea: Exchanges April through June 2014, July 21, 2014. ID: KPR2014072121546812.
32. Matthias von Hein, ‘‘A Turbulent Triangle: Beijing, Seoul, and Pyongyang,’’
Deutsche Welle, July 1, 2014. http://www.dw.de/a-turbulent-triangle-beijing-seouland-pyongyang/a-17748898.
33. Yonhap News Agency, ‘‘North Korea Newsletter No. 311 (May 1, 2014),’’
April 30, 2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140430/north-korea-newsletter-no-311-may-1-2014-2; Anatoly Medetsky, ‘‘First Russian Coal
Heads to North Korean Port,’’ Moscow Times, April 8, 2014. http://www.themoscow
times.com/business/article/first-russian-coal-heads-to-north-korean-port/497748.html.
34. Yonhap News Agency, ‘‘North Korea Newsletter No. 311 (May 1, 2014),’’
April 30, 2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140430/north-korea-newsletter-no-311-may-1-2014-2; Reuters, ‘‘RPT-Russia Writes Off 90
Percent of North Korea Debt, Eyes Gas Pipeline,’’ April 19, 2014. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/19/russia-northkorea-debt-idUKL6N0NB04L20140419.
35. Yonhap News Agency, ‘‘North Korea Newsletter No. 311 (May 1, 2014),’’
April 30, 2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140430/north-korea-newsletter-no-311-may-1-2014-2.
36. Voice of Russia, ‘‘N Korea to Ease Visa Regime, Activate Internet, Mobile
Services for Russian Businessmen,’’ June 5, 2014. http://voiceofrussia.com/news/
2014_06_05/N-Korea-to-ease-visa-regime-activate-Internet-mobile-services-for-Russianbusinessmen-6922/.
37. Leo Byrne and James Byrne, ‘‘Mapped: North Korea’s Oil Routes,’’ NK News,
August 28, 2014. http://www.nknews.org/2014/08/mapped-north-koreas-oil-routes/.
38. Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2014), p. 120; North Korea-Russia Relations: A
Strained Friendship (International Crisis Group, December 4, 2007), pp. 1, 3, 12.
http://www.crisisgroup.org /∼ / media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/b71_north_korea_russia_relationsla_strained_friendship.pdf; and Burt Herman, ‘‘Newsview:
North Korea uses China, Russia,’’ Associated Press, October 13, 2006. http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/13/AR2006101300991.html.
39. North Korea-Russia Relations: A Strained Friendship (International Crisis
Group, December 4, 2007), p. 12. http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/northeast-asia/north-korea/b71_north_korea_russia_relationsla_strained_friendship.pdf.
40. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abductions of Japanese Citizens by
North Korea, 2014. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000044846.pdf; Sebastian Maslow, Will Japan and North Korea Be Able to Solve the Abduction Issue? (Center for
Strategic and International Studies, July 16, 2014). http://csis.org/publication/pacnet56-will-japan-and-north-korea-be-able-solve-abduction-issue; and Yoko Wakatsuki
and Jethro Mullen, ‘‘Japan Eases Sanctions on North Korea after Talks on Abductions,’’ CNN, July 4, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/04/world/asia/japan-northkorea-sanctions/.
41. Asahi Shimbun, ‘‘North Korea Delays First Report on Reinvestigation of Abduction Issue,’’ September 19, 2014. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201409190048; Alexander Martin and Toko Sekiguchi, ‘‘Japan-North Korea Abduction Talks Hit Snag,’’ Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2014. http://online.
wsj.com/articles/japan-north-korea-talks-hit-snag-1411106307.
42. Kyle Mizokami, ‘‘Japanese Government Recommends Major Defense Policy
Change,’’ USNI News, May 15, 2014. http: // news.usni.org / 2014 / 05 / 15 / japanesegovernment-recommends-major-defense-policy-change; Sheila A. Smith, ‘‘North Korea
in Japan’s Strategic Thinking,’’ Asan Forum, October 7, 2013. http://www.theasan
forum.org/north-korea-in-japans-strategic-thinking/.
43. Yonhap News Agency, ‘‘N. Korea’s Top Diplomat Launches Trip to ASEANCountries,’’ August 2, 2014. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/08/02/
0401000000AEN20140802001600315.html.
44. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony ofStephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
45. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014; Mathieu Duchâtel and Phillip Schell,
China’s Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, December 2013), p. 9. http://
books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP40.pdf.
46. Mathieu Duchâtel and Phillip Schell, China’s Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, December 2013), p. 9. http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP40.pdf;

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00478

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

467

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Open Source Center, China-DPRK: PRC Media Suggest Rising Chinese Concern
Over North Korea, April 1, 2014. ID: CHN2014040183701836.
47. Andrei Lankov, ‘‘How China’s View of North Korea is Changing,’’ NK News,
July 24, 2014. http://www.nknews.org/2014/07/how-chinas-view-of-north-korea-ischanging/.
48. Andrei Lankov, ‘‘How China’s View of North Korea is Changing,’’ NK News,
July 24, 2014. http://www.nknews.org/2014/07/how-chinas-view-of-north-korea-ischanging/; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
49. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
50. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Joseph R. DeTrani, June 5, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North
Korea, written testimony of Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
51. Yonhap News Agency, ‘‘(2nd LD) China Proposes Holding Informal Six-Party
Meeting on N. Korea,’’ September 5, 2013. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/09/05/70/0401000000AEN20130905009000315F.html; CCTV.com, ‘‘Top Nuclear Negotiators Attend Seminar on Six-Party Talks in Beijing,’’ September 18,
2013. http://english.cntv.cn/program/newsupdate/20130918/103330.shtml; and Scott
A. Snyder, ‘‘Anniversary of Six-Party Talks: Commemoration, Wake, or Revival?’’Asia Unbound (Center on Foreign Relations blog), September 19, 2013. http://
blogs.cfr.org/asia/2013/09/19/anniversary-of-six-party-talks-commemoration-wake-orrevival/.
52. Yonhap News Agency, ‘‘(2nd LD) China Pressing to Revive N. Korea Nuclear
Talks,’’ Feburary 20, 2014. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/02/20/39/
0301000000AEN20140220010300315F.html.
53. Airang News, ‘‘China, U.S. Meet Second Time to Resume 6-Party Talks,’’
April 16, 2014. http://www.arirang.co.kr/news/News_View.asp?nseq=160876.
54. Ankit Panda, ‘‘The Long Road Back to the Six Party Talks,’’ Diplomat, February 28, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-long-road-back-to-the-six-partytalks/.
55. Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea (International Crisis Group,
November 2, 2009), p. 2. http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/north-eastasia/179_shades_of_redlchinas_debate_over_north_korea.pdf.
56. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
57. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
58. Workshop Presentation by a U.S. Army Major General (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 17, 2014).
59. Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on
the Korean Peninsula (Center for Strategic and International Studies, November2012), p. 1. http://csis.org/files/publication/121217_Glaser_ReOrderingChinese_web.
pdf.
60. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin
Gang’s Regular Press Conference on April 24, 2014,’’ April 24, 2014. http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1149944.shtml;
China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s
Regular Press Conference on July 4, 2014,’’ July 4, 2014. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1171644.shtml; and U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Joint U.S.-China Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Strategic & Economic Dialogue,’’ July 10, 2014. http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/
2014/07/228999.htm.
61. Associated Press, ‘‘China Tightens Border Searches to Punish North Korea as
US Asks for Sterner Measures,’’ March 23, 2013. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/03/23/china-tightens-border-searches-to-punish-north-korea-as-us-asks-for-sterner/.
62. Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close (International Crisis Group, December 9, 2013), p. 7. http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/
north-east-asia/254-fire-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.pdf.
63. Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close (International Crisis Group, December 9, 2013), p. 7. http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/
north-east-asia/254-fire-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00479

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

468

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

64. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on the Future of US-China Relations, written testimony of Daniel R. Russel, June 25, 2014.
65. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts EstablishedPursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), March 6, 2014, p. 19. http://www.securitycouncil
report.org / atf / cf / %7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_147.pdf.
66. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts EstablishedPursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), March 6, 2014, p. 41. http://www.securitycouncil
report.org / atf / cf / %7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_147.pdf.
67. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony ofStephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014; Mathieu Duchâtel and Phillip Schell,
China’s Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Disarmament(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, December 2013), pp. 7–9. http://
books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP40.pdf.
68. Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, ‘‘China-Korea Relations: China’s Red Line on
the Korean Peninsula,’’ Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East
Asian Bilateral Relations 16:1 (May 2014): 104. http://csis.org/files/publication/1401q.pdf.
69. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Sue
Mi Terry, June 5, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North
Korea, testimony of Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014. See also Fire on theCity Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close (International Crisis Group, December 9, 2013), pp. 13–15. http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/
254-fire-on-the-city-gate-why-china-keeps-north-korea-close.pdf.
70. Gordon Fairclough, ‘‘U.S. Warns China North Korea May Test Bomb Soon,’’Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2005. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB11141946
0095914669; Jill Dougherty, ‘‘Kerry to Urge China to Pressure North Korea,’’ CNN,
April 11, 2013. http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/11/kerry-to-urge-china-to-pressure-north-korea/.
71. Agence France-Presse, ‘‘Envoy: US has Given China a ‘Mission Impossible’
on North Korea,’’ April 10, 2014. http: // www.defensenews.com / article / 20140410 /DEFREG03/304100035/Envoy-US-has-Given-China-Mission-Impossible-North-Korea.
72. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Sue Mi Terry, June 5, 2014.
73. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony ofStephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
74. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony ofStephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
75. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Sue
Mi Terry, June 5, 2014.
76. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony ofStephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
77. China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin
Gang’s Regular Press Conference on April 24, 2014,’’ April 24, 2014. http://
www . fmprc . gov . cn / mfa _ eng / xwfw _ 665399 / s2510 _ 665401 / 2511 _ 665403 / t1149944.shtml; Reuters, ‘‘China ‘Back-Channeling’ with North Korea to Prevent Another
Nuclear Test,’’ May 19, 2014. http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.591545; and Bill
Gertz, ‘‘China Signals Plan to Sanction North Korea for Tests,’’ May 8, 2014. http://
freebeacon.com/national-security/china-signals-plan-to-sanction-north-korea-for-tests/.
78. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Joseph R. DeTrani, June 5, 2014.
79. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony ofStephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Sue Mi Terry, June 5, 2014. See also Yun Sun,‘‘The North Korea Contingency: Why China Will Not Cooperate,’’ 38North.com, July25, 2014. http://38north.org/2014/07/ysun072514/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00480

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

469

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

80. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony ofStephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
81. Bruce W. Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse(RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 13–14. In addition, several interlocutors with whom
the Commission met in Seoul raised the possibility of a North Korean collapse.
82. Chang Jae-soon, ‘‘U.S. Says it has ‘No Confirmation’ of Rumours of Military
Coup in N. Korea,’’ Yonhap News Agency, September 30, 2014. http://m.yna.co.kr/
mob2/en/contents_en.jsp?domain=3&ctype=A&site=0100000000&cid=AEN201409300
00200315&mobile; Sam Kim, ‘‘Kim Jong Un Absence Fuels N. Korea Leadership
Speculation,’’ Bloomberg, October 8, 2014. http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2014-1008/kim-jong-un-s-absence-fuels-rumors-over-his-hold-on-power.html;
andKeeganHamilton, ‘‘Former Top Official Says Kim Jong-un is No Longer in Control of North
Korea,’’ Vice News, October 2, 2014. https://news.vice.com/article/former-top-officialsays-kim-jong-un-is-no-longer-in-control-of-north-korea.
83. Open Source Center, ‘‘DPRK 14 October Report: Kim Jung Un Gives Guidance at Newly Built Residential District; No Date Given,’’ October 13, 2014. ID:
KPR2014101377141405; Open Source Center, ‘‘DPRK Daily Carries Photos of Kim
Jong Un Guiding KPA Fighter Pilots’ Take-Off, Landing Drills,’’ October 19, 2014.
ID: KPR2014101903724533; U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence andResearch, DPRK: Kim Jong Un Reappearance Probably Aimed at Dispelling Rumors, October 15, 2014. Open Source Center ID: KPR2014101602871103; and Open
Source Center, ‘‘DPRK 26 October Report: Kim Jong Un Visits North Korea Baby
Home, Orphanage; No Date Given,’’ October 25, 2014. ID: KPO2014102620991358.
84. Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad, ‘‘China’s North Korea Policy: Rethink or Recharge?’’ Parameters 44:1 (Spring 2014): 58–60. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Spring_2014/5_ScobellCozad.pdf.
85. Bruce W. Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse(RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 88–90.
86. Yun Sun, ‘‘The North Korea Contingency: Why China Will Not Cooperate,’’38North.com, July 25, 2014. http://38north.org/2014/07/ysun072514/.
87. Agence France-Presse, ‘‘U.S. Pacific Fleet Chief Says N. Korea is Top Security Concern,’’ January 22, 2014. http: // www.defensenews.com / article / 20140122 /DEFREG02/301220027/US-Pacific-Fleet-Chief-Says-N-Korea-Top-Security-Concern.
88. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, March 4,2014, p. 4. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.
89. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
90. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, June 5, 2014.
91. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Sue Mi Terry, June 5, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00481

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

SECTION 3: TAIWAN
Introduction
The continued growth of cross-Strait trade and investment andthe pursuit of cross-Strait trade agreements under President Ma
Ying-jeou are raising public concern in Taiwan, including concern
about uneven competition from mainland Chinese firms and exports and Taiwan’s vulnerability to Chinese influence and economic
coercion. Cross-Strait relations continue to deepen, but negotiations
slowed in the past year due to a student-led protest movement thatchallenged the existing cross-Strait negotiation framework andratification process. To counterbalance its economic dependence on
China and increase its global competitiveness, Taiwan continued
its longstanding efforts to diversify its trading partners through bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and to reinvigorate its
economic relationship with the United States.
The United States and Taiwan raised the visibility of their relationship with the first visit of a U.S. Cabinet-level official since2000 and a meeting under the bilateral Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement that yielded positive yet limited steps forward for U.S. firms. In an effort to address the threat posed to Taiwan by China’s military modernization, the United States and Taiwan maintain a strong but low-profile security partnership throughmilitary-to-military exchanges and arms sales.
This section—based on a June 2014 Commission hearing on
cross-Strait and U.S.-Taiwan economic and security developments,
briefings by nongovernmental experts on Taiwan throughout 2014,
and staff research and analysis—examines Taiwan economic issues;
cross-Strait political relations; Taiwan’s international engagement;
Taiwan military and security issues; and U.S.-Taiwan relations.
This section concludes with a discussion of the implications of thesedevelopments for the United States.
Taiwan Economic Issues
Cross-Strait Trade and Investment
China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner,* largest export market, and largest source of imports. In 2013, annual cross-Strait
trade reached $124.4 billion, a nearly 27 percent increase since2008 (see Figure 1). This expansion continued through the firstseven months of 2014, growing 4.1 percent when compared withthe same period last year. Taiwan’s exports to China largely drive
this relationship. They composed nearly two-thirds of total bilateral
trade and accounted for Taiwan’s $39.2 billion trade surplus with
* China became Taiwan’s largest trading partner in 2005. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan),‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(470)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00482

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

471
China in 2013. This year, China, for the first time, surpassed
Japan to become Taiwan’s largest source of imports.1
Figure 1: Cross-Strait Trade, 2003–2013(US$ billions)

Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan).

Approximately 45 percent of the world’s microchip * output is exported to China for both domestic consumption and as components
and other products for export.2 Taiwan, the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturer, has tapped into this market, supplying 31
percent of China’s total imports of semiconductors in 2013.3 Taiwan
firms generally manufacture microchips and other semiconductorrelated products in Taiwan for assembly and testing in China.4
Microchips are Taiwan’s largest export to and largest importfrom China (see Table 1).5 In 2013, semiconductor-related exports,
including microchips, semiconductors, and printed circuit boards,
made up three of the top five exports to China and accounted fornearly a quarter of Taiwan’s total global exports of these products.6
Microchips and semiconductors continued to dominate Taiwan’s exports to China in 2014. A comparison of the first seven months of2014 to the same period last year shows that semiconductor exports increased 21 percent and microchip exports increased 17 percent.7
Table 1: Taiwan’s Major Exports and Imports to China(US$ billions)
Top Taiwan Exports to China
Product

20132014 (January–July)

Microchips
Liquid crystal display (LCD) products
Semiconductors
Cyclic hydrocarbons
Printed circuit boards

13.1
12.4
3.6
3.4
2.3

8.6
6.1
2.4
1.9
1.3

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00483

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C3S3Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Semiconductor products such as microchips and printed circuits are incorporated into a wide
range of modern electronics such as cellular telephones, computers, cars, military systems, andplanes. Semiconductor Industry Association, ‘‘SIA Infographic.’’ http://www.semiconductors.org/
clientuploads/Comms/sia-new-11-gr.pdf.

472
Table 1: Taiwan’s Major Exports and Imports to China—Continued(US$ billions)
Top Taiwan Imports from China
Product
Microchips
Cellular telephones
Flat-rolled stainless steel
Electronic computers
Chemical elements for use in electronics

2013

2014 (January–July)

5.4
3.2
1.5
2.0
1.2

3.7
1.7
1.2
1.1
0.9

* Re-export and re-import figures are included.
Note: Listed in order of largest amount based on 2014 figures.
Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan).

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The concentration of Taiwan’s exports to China contrasts withthe diversity of Taiwan’s imports from China. Taiwan’s imports ofcellular telephones and electronic computers, the second and thirdlargest imports, reflect China’s dominance in manufacturing.8 A
2013 Bank of America-Merrill Lynch report shows China assembled 70.6 percent of all the world’s cellular telephones and 90.6 percent of all the personal computers produced in 2011.9 Taiwan’s imports of cellular telephones from China increased nearly 15 percent
since 2012 to reach $3.2 billion in 2013.10
Imports from China pose stiff competition for Taiwan’s domestic
industries, particularly steel manufacturers. Since 2009, Taiwan’s
imports of flat-rolled stainless steel from China have grown 1,257
percent and now account for nearly three-quarters of Taiwan’s total
stainless steel imports.11 Tariff reductions by Taiwan and oversupply in China have driven down prices for mainland steel overthe last five years.12 Competition from these imports has forcedsome smaller Taiwan producers into bankruptcy, and the combined
impact of Chinese and Korean steel imports led to a 30 percent decrease in production by Taiwan’s top two stainless steel firms.13(For more information on overcapacity in China’s steel sector, see
Chapter 1, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Economics and Trade.’’)China is the leading recipient of Taiwan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) as Taiwan’s firms seek to take advantage of China’s
enormous market, relatively low labor costs, geographic proximity,
and close historical, cultural, and linguistic ties. Taiwan’s annual
FDI to China reached a peak of $14.6 billion in 2010 and has since
tapered down to $9.2 billion in 2013 (see Table 2). Contributing tothis decline are lower profit margins as labor costs rose and as reduced demand from China for Taiwan manufactured goods cut exports.14 Despite the decline, China accounted for 64 percent of Taiwan’s total outward FDI in the first eight months of 2014.15 Of this$6.5 billion of investment, the leading recipients were financial andinsurance (18.2 percent), wholesale and retail trade (13.0 percent),
electronic parts and components manufacturing (10.7 percent), andchemical material manufacturing (10.1 percent).16 This concentration in manufacturing reflects the cross-Strait production cluster,where Taiwan firms export components for assembly in China. In
2014, financial and insurance sector investment became the largest
recipient sector due to greater market access and broader easing of

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00484

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

473
restrictions in China while manufacturing sector investment costsrose.17
Table 2: Cross-Strait FDI Flows, 2009–2014(US$ millions)

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

January–
August2014

Taiwan’s FDI to
China$7,143$14,618$14,377$12,792$9,190$6,484China’s FDI to
Taiwan

$37

$94

$52

$332

$349

$239

Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment Commission(Taiwan).

Although restricted, Chinese FDI in Taiwan is growing rapidly.18
Since 2010, Chinese FDI has grown nearly 300 percent from $94
million to $349 million in 2013 due to the loosening of investment
caps and regulations * on mainland investment into Taiwan under
President Ma.19 From June 2009 to August 2014, Chinese investment by value is concentrated in wholesale and retail trade (24.4
percent), banking services (18 percent), harbor port services (12.6
percent), and electronics parts and components manufacturing(10.4 percent).20
Cross-Strait Economic Agreements
Since President Ma’s first term in office began in 2008, Taiwan
and China have signed 21 agreements to broaden the cross-Strait
economic relationship and deepen cross-Strait ties (see Table 3).
The two most important of these agreements are the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), signed in June 2010, andthe follow-on Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA).†The ECFA provides the foundation for future economic integrationand lays out a roadmap for four subsequent agreements concerninginvestment protection, trade in goods, trade in services, and dispute settlement. ECFA has opened up cross-Strait trade, but critics
argue that gains from ECFA and CSSTA largely benefit a few,
large Taiwan firms at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises.‡ 21

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For example, in March 2012, Taiwan loosened mainland investment caps originally set at
a 10 percent stake in local firms and 50 percent in joint ventures in Taiwan’s semiconductor,
liquid crystal display, integrated circuit assembly and testing, microelectronics production equipment, and metal tool manufacturing sectors. Although, loosened, Taiwan government approvalis still required for all investments, and controlling stakes or appointing managers in mainland
investments is still prohibited. PWC, Chapter 4: The Bigger Picture—China’s Impact on the
Semiconductor Industry 2012 Update, September 2012. http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/technology/chinas-impact-on-semiconductor-industry/assets/pwc-china-semincon-2012-chp4-pdf.pdf.
† For more information on the ECFA and CSSTA, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 3, Section 2, ‘‘Taiwan,’’ 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November
2013, pp. 329–330.
‡ In June 2010, President Ma and Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, then Chairwoman of Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, weighed the benefits and risks of ECFA in ahigh-profile, televised policy debate. This was the first-ever televised debate on a major policy
issue between the leaders of Taiwan’s ruling party and the major opposition party outside ofa presidential election.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00485

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

474
Table 3: Cross-Strait Agreements, 2008–2014
Year

Agreement

2008• Cross-Strait Agreement Signed Between Straits Exchange Foundation(SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)
Concerning Mainland Tourists Traveling to Taiwan• SEF–ARATS Minutes of Talks on Cross-Strait Charter Flights• Cross-Strait Postal Service Agreement• Cross-Strait Air Transport Agreement• Cross-Strait Sea Transport Agreement• Cross-Strait Food Safety Agreement

2009• Agreement on Joint Cross-Strait Crime-fighting and Mutual Judicial
Assistance• Cross-Strait Financial Cooperation Agreement• Cross-Strait Air Transport Supplementary Agreement• Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation of Agricultural Product
Quarantine and Inspection• Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation in Respect of Fishing Crew
Affairs• Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation in Respect of Standards,
Metrology, Inspection and Accreditation2010• Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement• Cross-Strait Agreement on Intellectual Property Right Protection andCooperation• Cross-Strait Agreement on Medical and Health Cooperation

2011• Cross-Strait Agreement on Nuclear Power Safety and Cooperation2012• Cross-Strait Agreement on Investment Protection and Promotions• Cross-Strait Customs Cooperation Agreement

2013• Cross-Straits Service Trade Agreement

2014• Cross-Strait Collaboration Agreement on Seismological Monitoring• Cross-Strait Collaboration Agreement on Meteorology

Source: Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan).

The ECFA provided an early harvest program to reduce tariffs
in both countries.* President Ma highlighted the benefits of the
program in April 2014, claiming Taiwan’s firms had saved over $1
billion in customs duties.22 However, the ultimate effects of the
ECFA remain controversial. One report by the Legislative Yuan,
Taiwan’s legislature, in 2012 found ‘‘a reverse effect on cross-strait
trade’’ that instead boosted the share of China-made products in
Taiwan. The report noted that market share of Taiwan’s early harvest products in China eroded for five consecutive years and raised
public concern on the benefits of additional economic agreementswith China.23
The CSSTA, signed in June 2013, would eliminate investment restrictions and other barriers across 80 service industries in China
and 63 service industries in Taiwan. Taiwan’s service sector is already an important driver of Taiwan’s economy, accounting for 70
percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) and nearly 60 percent
of its workforce.24 This sector could benefit from a deal opening up
China’s banking and financial industries to both investment andDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* An ‘‘early harvest’’ program allows negotiators in trade talks to lower trade barriers immediately to certain goods and services even before the final agreement on the entire agreement
is reached.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00486

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

475
imports of services.25 Taiwan’s financial and retail-related services
compose roughly 25 percent of GDP and would gain advantages
from liberalization through the ability to establish sub-branches inparts of China and greater access to the renminbi service platform.26 But Taiwan’s legislature has yet to ratify the agreement in
the face of political and public opposition. Opponents of the CSSTA
fear the agreement creates unfair competition for local firms andmoves Taiwan closer toward political unification with the Mainland.
Trade agreements under ECFA—such as the Early Harvest Program and CSSTA—generally foster uneven competition between
Taiwan’s small and medium-sized enterprises and large, stateowned Chinese firms, according to JoAnn Fan, a visiting fellow at
The Brookings Institution who testified at the Commission’s June
hearing.27 The trade gains are usually limited to a few beneficiaries while most firms and workers ‘‘appear to be left without
substantial recourses or trade adjustment compensations.’’ 28 For
example, opening up the cross-Strait tourism sector would pit over
3,000 Taiwan small and medium-sized firms against three Chinesestate-owned firms. Chinese and Hong Kong firms retain a near monopoly on Chinese tourists traveling to Taiwan, providing complete
service for Chinese tourists—from travel agents to airline travel tohotel operators and tour bus companies.29 Therefore, small Taiwan
firms are unlikely to reap the expected benefits of opening up this
sector in either Taiwan or China.
In March 2014, the Taiwan public launched massive protests,
known as the Sunflower Movement, and pushed Taiwan’s legislature to delay ratification of the CSSTA (see ‘‘The Sunflower Movement’’ later in this section). The protesters highlighted their concerns in a public statement:
Regardless of the political division between pro-unification
with China and those pro-independence for Taiwan, thistrade agreement will allow large capital to devour the majority of small peasants, laborers and small businesses, notto mention the difficulties the future generation of Taiwan
will face.30
These protests played a large role in temporarily postponing
cross-Strait negotiations and pushing the Legislative Yuan to implement an oversight mechanism on cross-Strait agreements anddelay CSSTA ratification.31 President Ma has since revitalized
cross-Strait negotiations with the restart of discussions over a potential goods trade agreement in September, but it is unclear how
successful these on-going negotiations will be given Taiwan citizens’ strong opposition to the CSSTA.32

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Economic Security Issues Arising from Expanding CrossStrait Ties
Cross-Strait economic integration presents numerous opportunities and risks for Taiwan. Large Taiwan firms have taken advantage of expanding market access in China and lower tariffs on
goods exported to China to create advantageous production clusters.33 For example, Hon Hai Precision Industry Company has successfully capitalized on China’s relatively low-cost, skilled labor to
become the world’s largest electronics manufacturer and Apple Cor-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00487

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

476
poration’s main manufacturing partner.34 In addition, Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturer, benefits from lower tariffs as it exports its
products to China for final assembly and testing and gains easy access into its customers’ various electronic products’ supply chainsin China.35
At the same time, however, this integration has opened up sectors in Taiwan to greater mainland competition and raised Taiwan’s vulnerability to China’s political and economic coercion. A
May 2014 investigation by CommonWealth magazine found that
despite overall growth of Taiwan’s exports to China, the market
share of these early harvest products in China has declined.36 Taiwan’s steel sector, one of the expected beneficiaries of ECFA’s
Early Harvest Program, has faced significant financial losses fromcompetition with Chinese firms that offered stainless steel at 30
percent lower prices.37 The rapid growth of cheap, flat-rolled stainless steel imports from China spurred Taiwan to impose emergency, temporary antidumping measures in August 2013.38
As Taiwan’s reliance on China as a trading partner has increased
from 12 percent of annual trade in 2003 to 22 percent in 2013, its
overall share of trade with its other major trading partners has
necessarily decreased (see Figure 2). Demand from China accounts
for approximately 26 percent of Taiwan’s total exports, and China
is now the largest source of Taiwan’s imports at 17 percent, according to figures for the first seven months of 2014.39 As China’s economy slows and production costs in China rise, this dependency creates potential risks to Taiwan’s export-dependent economic growth
and returns on foreign investment in China.
Figure 2: Comparison of Taiwan’s Largest Trading Partners, 2003 and 2013

Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00488

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C3S3Fig2.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Furthermore, this dependency may provide additional leverage to
China as it seeks to tie Taiwan closer to China and make progress
on its long-term goal of unification with Taiwan. Taiwan is ‘‘facing
a turning point’’ in cross-Strait relations, according to former U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. She warned of Taiwan’s vulnerability from its increased reliance on China and linked Taiwan’s
greater economic dependency with political dependency. ‘‘Everytime you make a decision, whether it is in a trade agreement oron flight routes, you must take a prudent view of the expected results and whether there may be unintended consequences,’’ Secretary Clinton warned.40

477
Chinese Influence in Taiwan’s Media
Potential investment in the publishing and media sector by highprofile Taiwan businesspersons who favor unification and/or havecommercial interests in China continues to raise public concern in
Taiwan about increasing Chinese influence on Taiwan’s media.*
Furthermore, although Chinese investment in this sector is tightly
regulated, Chien-Jung Hsu, adjunct research associate at Monash
University in Melbourne, Australia, found China has stepped up its
efforts to influence Taiwan’s media directly. China does so by encouraging the purchase of Taiwan’s media outlets by pro-China
Taiwan businesspersons, pressuring Taiwan media owners to censor by offering or restricting mainland sales and investment opportunities, and purchasing increasing numbers of advertisements to
influence public opinion.41 Reporters Without Borders’ 2014 World
Press Freedom Index emphasized this concern. ‘‘China’s growing
economic weight is allowing it to extend its influence over the
media in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, which had been largely
spared political censorship until recently.’’ 42
Developments in U.S.-Taiwan Economic Relations
The United States and Taiwan maintain a robust economic relationship. The United States continues to be Taiwan’s largest foreign investor and is Taiwan’s third-largest trading partner, accounting for 10 percent of Taiwan’s global trade in 2013.43 For theUnited States, Taiwan is its 12th largest trading partner, composing 1.7 percent of total U.S. trade in the first seven months of2014.44
Annual bilateral trade reached $57.3 billion in 2013 and continued to grow during the first seven months of 2014 (see Figure 3).
Bilateral trade figures during this period grew 6.0 percent over thesame period in 2013.45 Taiwan maintained a $7.4 billion trade surplus with the United States in 2013.46 This surplus had been
shrinking since 2011.47
Figure 3: U.S.-Taiwan Trade, 2003–2013(US$ billions)

Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00489

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C3S3Fig3.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* For a recent example of a pro-China Taiwan businessperson’s attempted acquisition of a Taiwan media outlet, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Chapter 3, Section 2, ‘‘Taiwan,’’ 2013 Annual Report to Congress, November 2013.

478
These trade flows, specifically Taiwan’s exports to the UnitedStates, are more diversified than Taiwan’s trade to China but similarly reflect the importance of the semiconductor industry to Taiwan’s economy. Taiwan exports to the United States are mainlycomposed of manufactured parts and accessories and cover a relatively wide range of sectors including cellular telephones, motor
vehicle parts and accessories, and office machine parts and accessories (see Table 4). By contrast, Taiwan’s imports from the UnitedStates are dominated by semiconductor-related equipment, agriculture, and arms sales. Arms sales have constituted an importantcomponent of trade, with deliveries of U.S. arms to Taiwan
amounting to $3.0 billion from 2008 to 2011.48 For more information, see ‘‘Developments in U.S.-Taiwan Military and Security Relations’’ later in this section.
Table 4: Taiwan’s Major Exports and Imports to the United States(US$ billions)
Top Taiwan Exports to the United States
Product

20132014 (January–July)

Cellular telephones

2.6

1.4

Tractor and special purpose motor
vehicle parts and accessories

1.5

0.9

Fasteners

1.3

0.8

Office machines parts and accessories

1.4

0.8

Microchips

1.4

0.8

Top Taiwan Imports from the United States
Product

20132014 (January–July)

Semiconductor, microchip, and LCD
manufacturing machines

3.1

1.9

Microchips

2.5

1.6

Miscellaneous

1.7

1.3

Petroleum and coal oils and oil products

0.9

0.6

Helicopters, satellites, and spacecraft
launch vehicles

0.1

0.6

Iron and steel waste and scrap

1.1

0.6

Soy beans

0.6

0.5

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Re-export and re-import figures are included.
Note: Listed in order of largest amount based on 2014 figures.
Source: Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00490

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

479

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Taiwan’s largest U.S. import is the machinery to make semiconductors and liquid crystal display (LCD) products. Taiwan’s imports of this machinery totaled $3.1 billion in 2013, accounting for
26 percent of Taiwan’s total import market of this machinery.49 According to figures from the industry association SEMI, Taiwan’s
billions of dollars of investment in the last two years makes it thesingle largest semiconductor equipment market in the world.50
This investment partly accounts for the 20 percent increase between 2012 and 2013 of Taiwan’s imports of these machines,
though growth slowed in the first seven months of 2014.51
Taiwan is also a major importer of U.S. agricultural goods, constituting the seventh largest U.S. agricultural export market in2013.52 In particular, soybeans have become a major export to Taiwan as Taiwan’s demand for soybean meal for livestock feed grows.
According to AgroChart’s 2014 Annual Report, the United States
has once again become the largest supplier of soybeans to Taiwan
and accounts for roughly 50 percent of Taiwan’s import market.
U.S. soybeans are favored over South American competitors partly
due to their superior protein quality.53 In 2013, soybeans were thesixth largest import from the United States at $615 million. Demand in the first seven months of 2014 grew 36 percent in comparison to the same period last year.54
Despite the recent growth spurt in bilateral trade this year, U.S.Taiwan economic relations have been largely unchanged since2008. Annual bilateral trade grew only 1 percent from 2008 to
2013.55 President Ma has sought to reinvigorate these ties by enacting trade liberalization policies and opening new bilateral tradetalks. The American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei’s 2014 White
Paper found that Taiwan’s government has made significant
progress in the last year on improving its business climate. Of the
103 suggestions for improving the business climate in its 2013
White Paper, the organization noted resolution of six of the issues
raised and satisfactory progress on 21 others.56
President Ma also hopes to establish a free trade agreement(FTA) or bilateral investment agreement with the United States
but faces obstacles as a result of disputes over pork imports, pharmaceutical intellectual property rights, and private-equity investment regulations. In November 2013, former Taiwan vice president
Vincent Siew led a large trade delegation of senior Taiwan industry
leaders to the United States in support of enhancing the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship.57 This trip led to millions of dollars ofinvestment in the United States and elevated U.S.-Taiwan economic and business relations within U.S. government policy.58
More specifically, Hon Hai announced a $30 million investment ina high-tech manufacturing facility in Pennsylvania and a $10 million research and development fund at Carnegie Mellon University.59
President Ma has made significant efforts to revitalize the Tradeand Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) negotiations. The
U.S.-Taiwan TIFA is an annual, high-level forum on economics andtrade for trade dispute resolution, trade promotion, and investment
cooperation. The TIFA talks were suspended in 2007 due to the dis-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00491

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

480
pute over Taiwan’s ban on importing U.S. beef * and did not resume until the issue was partially resolved in 2013.† 60 In April
2014, the United States and Taiwan held their eighth TIFA meeting and noted progress on easing restrictions on cross-border datatransfer in the financial sector and addressing the concerns ofpharmaceutical firms regarding intellectual property rights.‡
However, future progress may be constrained by Congressional
demands for the removal of Taiwan’s restrictions on U.S. pork imports and additional improvement in pharmaceutical and privateequity disputes.61 Although some progress has been made in thepharmaceutical and private-equity sectors, Taiwan’s ability to reduce barriers on pork is hampered by its politically powerful domestic pork industry and aversion by Taiwan’s citizens to the useof ractopamine in pork production.62 Until this row is resolved,
progress on advancing the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationshipthrough trade agreements likely will remain limited.
Diversification of Trading Partners
Taiwan’s export-oriented economy requires the expansion of economic ties with the Asia Pacific region to maintain its competitiveness as one of the world’s largest suppliers of electronic products
and components.63 Taiwan’s exports are a critical driver of its economic growth, accounting for 62 percent of GDP. Taiwan’s international status and strong opposition from China limit its ability
to negotiate FTAs or other trade liberalization accords, thereby
placing its companies at a disadvantage.64 For example, the FTA
between South Korea, Taiwan’s main economic competitor, and theUnited States eliminates tariffs for specific Korean imports andthereby provides Korean firms with a 2.5 to 10 percent price advantage over competitors in Taiwan.65 Despite this disadvantage,
Taiwan’s GDP grew 2.1 percent in 2013 and is expected to grow 3.4
percent in 2014.66
Taiwan has placed a high priority on joining bilateral and regional trade agreements, but the government achieved little success in the past year. In 2013, Taiwan signed FTAs with New Zealand, the first country without official diplomatic ties with Taiwan
to do so, and with Singapore. Although these agreements represent
a step toward enhancing Taiwan’s export competitiveness, trade

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Taiwan banned imports of U.S. beef because Taiwan citizens were concerned over insufficient safeguards to prevent mad cow disease and U.S. farmers’ use of ractopamine, a controversial feed additive that promotes leanness in meat. Ractopamine is widely used in U.S. pork
and beef production, but Taiwan, the European Union, and China have banned the use of
ractopamine based on health and safety concerns. J.R., ‘‘Gored,’’ Banyan Asia (Economist blog),
March 8, 2012. http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/03/taiwan-america-and-meat-wars;
Shirley Kan and Wayne Morrison, U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues (Congressional Research Service, April 22, 2014), pp. 34–36.
† The issue was partially resolved when the Taiwan government established a maximum residue limit for ractopamine in beef in September 2012, allowing U.S. beef exports greater accessto Taiwan. In 2013, the U.S. became Taiwan’s largest beef supplier by value. Cleo Fu and Emily
Scott, ‘‘U.S. Beef Exports to Taiwan Realize 2013 as Record Year,’’ USDA Foreign Agricultural
Service, March 31, 2014. http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/U.S.%20Beef%
20Exports%20to%20Taiwan%20Realize%202013%20as%20Record%20%20Year_Taipei_Taiwan_
3-31-2014.pdf.
‡ Taiwan agreed to allow financial institutions to store their data on servers outside of Taiwan
and has made progress in clarifying investment regulations in the private equity sector. In exchange, the United States agreed to allow imports of Taiwan guava and orchids. ‘‘U.S. Secures
Pledges on Data Transfers, Pharmaceuticals from Taiwan,’’ China Trade Extra, April 18, 2014.
http://chinatradeextra.com/201404182468024/China-Trade-Extra-General/Daily-News/us-securespledges-on-data-transfers-pharmaceuticals-from-taiwan/menu-id-428.html.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00492

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

481
with these two countries constitutes a relatively small share of Taiwan’s overall trade.67 Singapore is Taiwan’s fifth largest trading
partner, with roughly 5 percent of total trade, and New Zealand is
the 38th largest, with one-fifth of a percent of total trade.68
Taiwan is in various stages of negotiating FTAs with Australia,
Brunei, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Paraguay,
Peru, the Philippines, and Vietnam.69 Taiwan already has conducted feasibility studies on the economic impact of proposed FTAs
with India, Indonesia, and Malaysia.70 Taiwan and the Philippines
are currently in the process of conducting a similar study.71 Details
about the status of the other negotiations are limited due in partto China’s opposition to such agreements.72
In April, Taiwan’s then Economic Minister Chang Chia-juch said
that many countries shelved their FTA negotiations with Taiwan
for the rest of this year due to concern that Taiwan public opposition to the ratification of the CSSTA would similarly occur withany future negotiated FTA with Taiwan.73 Although a potential
factor, countries seem more concerned over China’s opposition thanthat of the Taiwan public. In August, Chinese Ambassador to Malaysia Huang Huikang openly expressed China’s opposition to a
proposed Taiwan-Malaysia FTA, likely discouraging both Malaysia
and other potential partners from upsetting one of their largest
trading partners.74 Former Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha
Rao highlighted this concern and said, ‘‘Establishing a relationshipwith Taiwan should not spoil our relationship with [China], which
is far more important than [Taiwan] to the Indian establishment.’’ 75
Beyond bilateral FTAs, Taiwan seeks to join the two major Asian
regional trade agreements currently under negotiation, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and theTrans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).* The RCEP † is a proposed free
trade agreement between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ‡ and six other Asian countries § that would encompass over half of Taiwan’s annual trade.76 Taiwan has also expressed interest in joining the TPP as a way to counterbalance its
economic dependence on mainland China. The TPP is a free trade
agreement under negotiation among 12 countries that together purchase 32 percent of Taiwan’s total exports.77 Taiwan’s government
has made significant efforts to become a party to the negotiations
by lobbying current participants and amending over 900 laws andregulations.78 Mr. Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of theDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The countries negotiating the TPP are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Alexander Bernard andPaul J. Leaf, ‘‘The U.S., TPP and Taiwan,’’ The National Interest, April 24, 2014. http://national
interest.org/feature/the-us-tpp-taiwan-10300. ‘‘TPP Talks Made Progress, Barring Thorny Issues,’’
Jiji Press (Japan), July 13, 2014. http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0001421519.
† Launched in November 2012, the RCEP seeks to broadly liberalize trade in goods and services, encourage investment, establish a dispute settlement mechanism, and foster economic andtechnical cooperation. Rohit Sinha and Geethanjali Nataraj, ‘‘Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP): Issues and Way Forward,’’ Diplomat, July 30, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/
2013/07/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-issues-and-way-forward/.
‡ ASEAN is composed of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEAN, ‘‘ASEAN Member States.’’ http://www.
asean.org/asean/asean-member-states.
§ Participants in the RCEP negotiations are ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. Rohit Sinha and Geethanjali Nataraj, ‘‘Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): Issues and Way Forward,’’ Diplomat, July 30, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-issues-and-way-forward/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00493

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

482
U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, highlighted President Ma’s efforts
in his testimony to the Commission. ‘‘We are seeing a degree of
unilateral reform within Taiwan that frankly we haven’t seen since
the WTO [World Trade Organization] accession days in the 1990s,’’
he said.79
Cross-Strait Political Relations

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Sunflower Movement
Cross-Strait relations reached a potential turning point in 2014as protesters occupied Taiwan’s legislative chamber for 23 days in
opposition to the CSSTA. The grassroots protest movement, latercalled the Sunflower Movement, ignited a public debate in Taiwan
about the agreement, delayed its ratification, and temporarily postponed negotiations of other cross-Strait agreements. Looking
ahead, the Taiwan public’s concerns about the impact of crossStrait relations on Taiwan’s economy and political autonomy, as
well as continued civic activism in Taiwan, could force the Taiwan
and Chinese governments to change the way they have approached
the relationship during the previous six years of cross-Strait rapprochement.80
The Sunflower Movement was sparked when Kuomintang (KMT)
legislator and convener of the Legislative Yuan’s Internal Administration Committee Chang Ching-chung announced the CSSTA
would be put to a vote—despite Taiwan’s legislature having failed
to conduct a review of the agreement, as the KMT and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan’s main opposition party,
had previously agreed.81 Prior to this announcement, KMT and
DPP legislators were locked in a dispute over the procedure for thereview.82 Mr. Chang’s announcement led protesters, mostly comprised of university students, to occupy the legislative chamber on
the evening of March 18, 2014 and to remain there until April 10.
During the occupation, on March 30, more than 100,000 people
demonstrated outside Taiwan’s presidential office.83
The protesters asserted the Ma Administration negotiated the
CSSTA in an opaque manner, failed to properly evaluate the impact on Taiwan’s industries, and tried to force it through the legislature without a review. They expressed concerns the agreement
will negatively impact Taiwan’s small and medium-sized enterprises, hurt employment opportunities in Taiwan, and increase
China’s influence over Taiwan.84 They also raised concerns regarding the potential for the agreement to open opportunities for large
numbers of Chinese citizens to emigrate to Taiwan.85 Although the
DPP shared some of the Sunflower Movement’s concerns about the
CSSTA, the DPP did not organize the movement.86
The Ma Administration argued Taiwan must ratify the agreement to increase its economic competitiveness and to avoid falling
further behind South Korea in the number of FTAs it has signed.
The Administration also warned that the dispute over the CSSTA
will hurt Taiwan’s credibility in trade negotiations with other countries.87
The unease voiced by the Sunflower Movement represents broader public concern in Taiwan about cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s growing economic dependence on China.88 The movement re-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00494

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

483
flects a resurgence of civic activism in Taiwan. Over the previous
two years, mass protests and other forms of activism by Taiwan
civil society organizations occurred in response to a range ofissues.89 The leaders of the Sunflower Movement had been involved
in several civil society organizations and social movements beginning in 2008.90
The occupation of Taiwan’s legislative chamber ended after legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng, a member of the KMT, promisedthat the legislature would create an oversight mechanism for crossStrait agreements before Taiwan legislators meet to discuss the
CSSTA.91 Taiwan’s legislature has made little progress since thentoward passing an oversight bill.
Following the end of the occupation of the legislative chamber,
Taiwan and China postponed a meeting, originally scheduled forApril 2014, during which the two sides had planned to continue negotiating a goods trade agreement.92 They also planned to discussa dispute resolution mechanism and the establishment of representative offices, among other areas of cooperation.93 The two sides
resumed negotiations in September 2014.94 However, even if othercross-Strait agreements are signed, the legislature is unlikely to
discuss their ratification until it passes a cross-Strait oversight bill.
If enough time passes without the ratification of the CSSTA, Beijing may conclude cross-Strait cooperation agreements are nolonger meeting its objectives and pursue a more destabilizing, unilateral approach to Taiwan. However, for the time being, Beijing
has chosen to increase its efforts to win ‘‘hearts and minds’’ in Taiwan. After the end of the occupation of Taiwan’s legislative chamber, the Chinese government sought to present an image of openness, humility, and respect toward the needs and desires of thepeople of Taiwan and to focus on ‘‘the grassroots’’ of Taiwan society. President Xi’s statements during his meeting in May 2014 withchairman of Taiwan’s People First Party James Soong reflected
Beijing’s intent to show it is aware of and willing to address theways in which cross-Strait economic integration may not be benefitting certain groups in Taiwan.95 During the visit to Taiwan inJune 2014 by the director of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) *Zhang Zhijun, the first ever visit to Taiwan by a TAO director, in
addition to meeting with his counterpart Mainland Affairs Council(MAC) † Minister Wang Yu-chi, Director Zhang met with membersof a Taiwan aboriginal group, religious leaders, farmers, and small
businesses. He also met with students but not with the Sunflower
Movement’s student leaders, who had requested to meet withhim.96 Protesters gathered at several locations along Director
Zhang’s route. Moreover, due to confrontations between protesters
and police, he canceled three events that he was to attend at theend of the visit.97
During the trip, Director Zhang said, ‘‘We know that Taiwan people cherish very much the social system and the life style they havechosen. . . . We in mainland China respect what Taiwanese people
have chosen.’’ 98 While Director Zhang’s statements in Taiwan wereDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* TAO is an agency within China’s State Council that is responsible for overseeing China’s
cross-Strait policies.
† MAC is a cabinet-level agency in Taiwan’s executive branch that is responsible for overseeing Taiwan’s cross-Strait policies.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00495

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

484
conciliatory, the Chinese government’s actions and statements regarding Hong Kong, such as its 2014 white paper on the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ policy, undermine its efforts to create a favorable
image for itself among the Taiwan public. Witnesses testified to theCommission that people in Taiwan closely follow developments inHong Kong.99 In August 2014, after the Chinese government announced its decision to rule out the open nomination of candidates
for Hong Kong’s chief executive, Wu Jieh-min, a researcher at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica, said the decision ‘‘should serve as a redflag for Taiwan that Beijing could also break its promises to Taiwan no matter how rosy cross-strait ties appear right now.’’ 100 In
September 2014, the student association of Taiwan’s National
Tsing Hua University created an Internet-based petition to express
support for university students in Hong Kong who organized a boycott of classes to protest the Chinese government’s decision.101 Approximately a week later, protesters gathered in the lobby of theHong Kong Economic, Trade, and Cultural Office in Taipei to express their opposition to the Hong Kong police’s use of pepper
spray and tear gas against protesters in Hong Kong and to voice
their support for democracy in Hong Kong.102 Reflecting public sentiment, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New York, Taiwan’s New York representative office, in early October stated, ‘‘The
protests [in Hong Kong] clearly show that the so-called ‘one country, two systems’ formula does not work and that Beijing has failed
to keep its promises. We empathize with the people of Hong Kongand their demands for true democratic elections.’’ 103 At the time ofwriting of this Report, the situation in Hong Kong continues to develop. (For more information about developments in Hong Kongand the connection between Hong Kong and Taiwan, see Chapter
3, Section 4, ‘‘Hong Kong.’’)Negotiations and Meetings
Several weeks prior to the Sunflower Movement, Taiwan’s semiofficial Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and its Chinese counterpart, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait(ARATS),* signed two agreements on cooperation in the areas ofearthquake monitoring and meteorology.104 These agreements reflect a continuation of President Ma’s focus on cross-Strait economic and other areas of cooperation rather than issues of sovereignty and security. President Ma has pursued this approach to
cross-Strait relations since he was first elected in 2008 based on
the Taiwan public’s continued aversion to political talks due to its
concern that such talks might move the sides closer to unification.
Furthermore, Taiwan and China reached a milestone in crossStrait relations by holding the first formal talks between the headsof MAC and TAO since Taiwan and China split in 1949 following
the Chinese civil war. At the meeting—held in February 2014 in

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* SEF and ARATS facilitate cross-Strait negotiations in the absence of formal ties between thegovernments of Taiwan and China. Although SEF and ARATS are semiofficial organizations,they receive direction from their respective governments. Richard Bush, director of the Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies, explains, ‘‘Representatives of SEF and
ARATS may open their joint meetings and then attend to preserve the fiction that these are
not governmental interactions, but the individuals who are conducting the negotiations are officials from the relevant government agencies.’’ Richard C. Bush, Uncharted Strait: The Futureof China-Taiwan Relations (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2013), p. 59.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00496

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

485
Nanjing, China—MAC Minister Wang and TAO Director Zhang
agreed to create a mechanism that, according to Minister Wang,
will allow direct communication between the heads of the agencies,
their assistants, and their deputies.105 Prior to the meeting, communication between the two agencies took place at the working
level; however, top-level officials could not directly contact one
another. According to a TAO spokesperson, during the meeting
Director Zhang said he hopes the mechanism will ‘‘eliminate andreduce misjudgment, misunderstanding, and various kinds of interference.’’ 106
In addition to enhancing communication, Taiwan and China took
an important step toward an agreement on opening representative
offices on each side’s territory. One major point of disagreement
concerned whether personnel from these offices will be able to visit
their own citizens who have been detained by the other government. The Taiwan government insisted its representatives in
China should have this right, but the Chinese government was initially reluctant to agree.107 After the MAC–TAO meeting inNanjing, during which the two sides discussed the issue but could
not come to an agreement, Minister Wang explained that Beijing
was concerned a Taiwan representative office would resemble a
diplomatic facility in its functions.108 However, China subsequently
conceded to Taiwan on this point, and, in March 2014, Minister
Wang announced that SEF and ARATS agreed that representative
offices should have the right to conduct visits to their detained citizens.109 The two sides are still negotiating a final agreement on
representative offices.
In 2014, leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continued to meet with Taiwan politicians from the pan-blue * coalition
during these politicians’ visits to China. Prior to People First Party
Chairman Soong’s visit to China, honorary chairman of the KMTLien Chan also visited China and met with President and CCP
General Secretary Xi. This inter-party dialogue has served as aforum for communication between Taiwan and China since Mr.
Lien and Mr. Soong met with then President Hu Jintao in China
in 2005. DPP legislators have criticized these exchanges for theirlack of legislative oversight and for being outside of Taiwan’s democratic structure.110
Taiwan’s International Engagement
China’s insistence on the ‘‘one China principle’’ precludes any
country or international organization from simultaneously recognizing China and Taiwan, thereby restricting Taiwan’s full participation in the international community. For example, Taiwan is unable to participate in the International Court of Justice, the International Maritime Organization, the World Intellectual Property
Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, andthe International Atomic Energy Agency.111 The Taiwan government also continues to be excluded from the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change.112 A joint study by theWorld Bank and Columbia University found that ‘‘Taiwan may be
the place on Earth most vulnerable to natural hazards.’’ 113

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The pan-blue coalition refers to the KMT, the People First Party, and the New Party.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00497

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

486
Nevertheless, Taiwan pursues greater international space by
maintaining its official diplomatic relations with 22 countries,* expanding its participation in international organizations throughcreative diplomacy, and strengthening economic partnerships withcountries other than China.
The U.S. government supports Taiwan’s efforts to expand its
international engagement and has played a key role in Taiwan’s
entry into or retaining of a seat in international organizations, including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the World
Trade Organization, and the Asian Development Bank.114 In October 2013, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kin Moy said that‘‘with [U.S.] support, Taiwan has participated as an observer in theWorld Health Organization, or ‘WHO,’ Assembly for four consecutive years.’’ 115 In 2014, Taiwan was invited again to participate asan observer in the World Health Assembly.116
In 2008, China and Taiwan reached a tacit understanding—or
what President Ma unilaterally declared to be a ‘‘diplomatic
truce’’—to stop poaching each other’s diplomatic partners in orderto maintain positive momentum in the cross-Strait relationship.117
The truce appears to still be in place despite The Gambia’s severing of diplomatic relations with Taiwan in November 2013. Beijing has not established diplomatic ties with The Gambia since thedecision, and no public evidence exists to suggest China enticed orpressured the West African country to break diplomatic relations
with Taiwan. Taiwan’s Foreign Minister stated that The Gambia’s
decision was related to Taiwan’s refusal to grant the country additional financial aid that it had requested.118 The Gambian president may have mistakenly calculated China would establish diplomatic relations with The Gambia after it split with Taiwan or that
China would provide The Gambia with aid or other benefits exceeding what Taiwan provided, even without diplomatic relations. Sucha calculation could explain the president’s willingness to cut ties
with a country which former Gambian Foreign Minister Sidi
Sanneh described on his blog as the president’s ‘‘most important
diplomatic partner.’’ 119
The cross-Strait diplomatic truce has enabled Taiwan to retain
most of its diplomatic partners during President Ma’s tenure. However, should cross-Strait relations sour, Taiwan may find it difficult
to maintain some of these relationships. According to Zhang
Zhexin, a research fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Beijing has rejected overtures from at least fivecountries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan since President
Ma’s election in 2008. Moreover, the lack of diplomatic relations
with these countries has not prevented them from engaging in extensive business activity with China, including Chinese companies
exploring investment projects in Nicaragua and Honduras.120 Someof their governments also are increasing contact with the Chinese
government. For example, in November 2013, the government ofSão Tomé and Principe and the Chinese government agreed to

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The following countries have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan: Belize, Burkina Faso,
the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, the Holy See, Honduras, Kiribati, theMarshall Islands, Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Christopher and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, São Tomé and Principe, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, and Tuvalu.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00498

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

487
open a Chinese trade office in the Central African country. Then,in June 2014, the president of São Tomé and Principe visited China
in what he said was an effort to seek investment in a deep-water
harbor and to support his country’s economic development.121
Taiwan Military and Security Issues

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Cross-Strait Military Balance
Although relations between the governments of Taiwan and
China have improved dramatically since 2008, China’s militarymodernization continues to focus on improving its ability to conduct
military operations against Taiwan and to deter, delay, and denyany U.S. intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. Over the last decade, the balance of military power across the Taiwan Strait has
shifted. China’s military now appears to possess an increasing advantage over Taiwan’s military. Moreover, the increased range andcapabilities of China’s power projection platforms have largely negated Taiwan’s historic geographic advantages in a cross-Strait
conflict.
In contrast to this assessment, Ian Easton, research fellow at the
Project 2049 Institute, testified to the Commission that there has
not been ‘‘a fundamental shift in the cross-Strait military balance.
Rather, the situation remains fluid and dynamic.’’ 122 He explainedinternal PLA documents and technical studies indicate the PLA believes it is unable to gain air superiority over Taiwan with its current precision strike capabilities. In addition, he asserted Taiwan
so far has countered the PLA’s strike capabilities with targeted investments in missile defense and radars, infrastructure hardening,
rapid runway repair capabilities, and military training. Many of
Taiwan’s improvements in these areas have been supported or enabled by the United States.123
Notwithstanding pessimistic PLA assessments of China’s capabilities and areas of excellence within the Taiwan military, theCommission assesses the expanding number and increasing effectiveness of China’s military assets points to an increasing militaryadvantage for China over Taiwan. China currently has approximately 2,100 combat aircraft and 280 naval ships available for a
Taiwan conflict, as well as overlapping air and missile defense coverage over most of Taiwan. About 600 of China’s combat aircraft
and 90 of China’s submarines and surface ships are modern. China
continues to expand its fleet of modern platforms rapidly while regularly upgrading legacy platforms with new weapon systems as
they become available. By comparison, Taiwan has approximately
410 combat aircraft and 90 naval combatants.124 Fewer than 330
of Taiwan’s combat aircraft and about 25 of Taiwan’s surface ships
are modern.125 Taiwan has not acquired a modern combat aircraft
or naval combatant since the mid-2000s. For a definition of modern
combat aircraft and naval combatants, see Chapter 2, Section 2,‘‘China’s Military Modernization.’’Moreover, China’s vast arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles
and cruise missiles would provide it with a crucial advantage in a
conflict with Taiwan. William Murray, associate research professor
at the U.S. Naval War College, testified to the Commission that a
Chinese short-range ballistic missile attack on Taiwan’s air bases

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00499

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

488

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

likely would render the runways temporarily unusable and prevent
the Taiwan Air Force from taking off during the early hours of aconflict. Follow-on short-range ballistic missile and cruise missile
attacks then could destroy aircraft that were stuck on the runways.
In addition, a surprise short-range ballistic missile attack on Taiwan’s naval ports while ships were still moored could destroy manyof the Taiwan Navy’s destroyers and frigates. Those Taiwan surface combatants already at sea during the attack then would bevulnerable to strikes by China’s large number of sea-, air-, andland-based antiship cruise missiles.126 Furthermore, short-range
ballistic missile and cruise missile strikes against Taiwan’s command and control infrastructure would hamper the Taiwan military’s ability to coordinate its response to a PLA attack.127
Mr. Murray testified about the challenge Taiwan faces in defending against China’s short-range ballistic missiles. He said:
In 2002 China had 350 [short-range ballistic missiles] withan estimated accuracy, or Circular Error Probable (CEP),
of approximately 300 meters. By 2012, China had over
1,100 missiles deployed to units opposite Taiwan, with
CEPs on the order of 20 meters. This level of accuracy, increased inventory, and the targeting flexibility provided bymultiple types of warheads means that [short-range ballistic missiles] now provide China new options against Taiwan. 128
Mr. Murray added that Taiwan’s Patriot missile defense systems
are costly and ‘‘will likely stop no more than 323 of the . . . shortrange ballistic missiles China could fire. This arms race between
Chinese [short-range ballistic missiles] and Taiwan’s Patriot interceptors is thus one Taiwan cannot win, and cannot afford to continue.’’ 129
Beyond their utility during a cross-Strait conflict, China’s large
and diverse inventory of short-range ballistic missiles also provides
China with ‘‘significant psychological coercive value,’’ according toMark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute.130
Mr. Stokes testified to the Commission in 2010 that ‘‘every citizenof Taiwan lives within seven minutes of destruction, and they know
that.’’ 131
A combination of factors has led to the shift in the cross-Strait
balance of power, including China’s large defense budget and annual increases in defense spending for more than 20 years, Taiwan’s smaller defense budget and decreases in defense spending,and Taiwan’s limited ability to acquire platforms and weapon systems on the global market.
• Cross-Strait defense spending trends since 2001 have dramatically shifted in China’s favor. The officially reported budget
gap between Taiwan and China in 2014 totaled more than$120 billion.132 For more information on China’s defense
spending, see Chapter 2, Section 2, ‘‘China’s Military Modernization.’’• Taiwan’s defense budget as a percentage of GDP has decreased
from 3.8 percent in 1994 to 2 percent in 2014.133 This decline
is due largely to political gridlock in Taiwan and competing

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00500

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

489
budget priorities. Furthermore, President Ma during the firstsix years of his tenure has had little incentive to increase thedefense budget. Improved cross-Strait relations have reduced
the Taiwan public’s perceptions of the threat posed by China
to Taiwan,134 and domestic and social welfare issues have become more salient as Taiwan’s economy attempts to recoverfrom the global financial crisis and its workforce ages.
• Taiwan does not have the expertise and experience to design
and produce certain weapon systems, and in many cases it has
been unable to procure these systems from other countries.
Aside from the United States, no country has been willing tosell major platforms and weapon systems to Taiwan since theearly 1990s due to pressure from the Chinese government.135
Keenly aware of the threat posed by China’s military modernization, Taiwan is attempting to expand and upgrade its military capabilities with a combination of domestic production and acquisition from the United States. Major domestic programs under development or recently completed include the following:• Air-to-Ground Cruise Missiles: In January 2014, the Taiwan
Air Force introduced a new domestically-produced air-toground cruise missile, called the Wan Chien. Taiwan has already upgraded over half of its Indigenous Defense Fighters to
be capable of carrying the missile. In a cross-Strait military
conflict, Taiwan could use the Wan Chien to attack military
targets on China, including runways, missile bases, and radar
installations.136• Antiship Cruise Missiles: In February 2014, Taiwan media reported the country will begin to produce a supersonic longrange antiship cruise missile that eventually will be deployed
to land-based mobile launchers along Taiwan’s coast.137 The
new missile will complement Taiwan’s existing land-based
fixed and mobile antiship cruise missile units, which areequipped with an earlier version of the missile, as well as Taiwan’s extensive inventory of sea-based antiship cruise missiles.
The land-based variant of the missile will be more survivableand lethal than its naval predecessor, providing Taiwan military commanders with increased operational flexibility and enhancing Taiwan’s ability to target the PLA’s amphibious ships
during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.138

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Missile Corvette: In March 2014, the Taiwan Navy received thefirst ship in a new class of catamaran-style missile corvettefrom Taiwan’s Lung Teh Shipbuilding Company.139 Taiwan
may build as many as 12 of these ships.140 The new corvettehas better range, endurance, and sea-keeping ability than Taiwan’s current patrol ships, and it will be armed with longrange antiship cruise missiles. The ship will provide the Taiwan Navy with greater survivability, due to the ship’s stealthfeatures, and lethality in a potential cross-Strait conflict aswell as increase the Taiwan Navy’s ability to patrol the Eastand South China seas.141

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00501

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

490
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Taiwan is said to be developing its first UAV capable of carrying munitions. This UAV
also will have stealth capability, according to a Taiwan official.142 The Taiwan Army already has 32 UAVs designed forintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions
that are based on Taiwan’s southeastern coast. Taiwan reportedly is considering establishing a second UAV base in southwestern Taiwan.143
Select military equipment Taiwan is acquiring or pursuing fromthe United States includes the following:• P–3C Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft: In late 2013, Taiwan received the first four of 12 P–3C Orion maritime patrol aircraftthat it agreed to purchase from the United States in 2007. Taiwan is scheduled to receive five more in 2014 and the remaining aircraft in 2015.144 Taiwan incorporated the P–3C into thecommand post and field training portions of the 2014 Han
Kuang military exercise.145 The aircraft will supplement andultimately replace Taiwan’s aging S–2T maritime patrol aircraft. The P–3C will increase the capability and endurance ofthe military’s fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft force, improving Taiwan’s ability to perform antisubmarine warfare andISR.
• Apache Attack Helicopters: In November 2013, Taiwan received
the first six of 30 AH–64E Apache helicopters that it agreed
to purchase from the United States in 2010.146 As of September 2014, Taiwan had received 18 more helicopters, withthe six remaining helicopters scheduled to be delivered by theend of 2014.147 These helicopters are armed with a chain gun
and can also carry air-to-air or air-to-ground missiles or rockets.148 Taiwan likely would use these helicopters to counter a
PLA invasion force that was approaching or had already landed on Taiwan territory.149• Fighters: In October 2012, the United States awarded Lockheed Martin a $1.85 billion contract to begin performing a midlife upgrade on Taiwan’s existing fleet of 145 F–16 A/B fighter
aircraft. The upgrades are scheduled to occur from 2017 to
2021 in groups of about 24 aircraft.150 In March 2014, the U.S.
Air Force cancelled the budget for the Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite upgrade for 300 of its own F–16
fighters in the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 2015 budget
request.* Although Taiwan and the United States apparently
plan to move forward with the mid-life upgrade program, thecost of upgrading each Taiwan F–16 almost certainly will increase without cost sharing with the U.S. Air Force.151 Even
with the scheduled upgrade to Taiwan’s F–16 A/Bs, in August
2014, the deputy director general of the Department of Strategic Planning in Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense indi-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* As of October 2014, Congress has not yet passed a National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2015. To date, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (H.R.
4435) passed by the U.S. House of Representatives would require the Secretary of the Air Forceto provide a report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the effects of canceling the Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite program.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00502

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

491
cated Taiwan is still considering procuring F–16 C/Ds from theUnited States.152• OLIVER HAZARD PERRY-Class Guided-Missile Frigates: In
April 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R.
3470, a bill authorizing the sale of four decommissioned andunarmed PERRY-class frigates to Taiwan. Taiwan subsequently announced it would only purchase two of the ships if
they are made available, due in part to budget constraints.153
After being fitted with Taiwan weapon systems, these two
ships would supplement the eight PERRY-class frigates already serving in the Taiwan Navy and help to offset theplanned retirement over the next few years of Taiwan’s eight
KNOX-class frigates, which specialize in antisubmarine warfare.154 While the U.S. Senate has yet to consider H.R. 3470,
in November 2013, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
did approve S. 1683, a related bill that awaits consideration on
the Senate floor.155• Submarines: In 2001, the United States approved Taiwan’s request to purchase diesel-electric submarines via the foreign
military sales process. However, the sale has stalled for a number of reasons on both sides. These include partisan political
gridlock in Taiwan’s legislature, delays in Taiwan’s commitment of funds, and disagreements between Washington andTaipei over costs. Furthermore, the United States has not built
a diesel-electric submarine since the 1950s or operated one
since 1990. In late 2014, the Taiwan media reported the Taiwan Ministry of Defense has decided to pursue an indigenous
submarine program. The ministry’s spokesperson said Taiwan
would prefer to procure new U.S. submarines but due to thestalling of the procurement process Taiwan will ‘‘pursue bothforeign procurement and domestic building plans in tandem.’’
He added, ‘‘We welcome the US and other free, democratic
countries to collaborate with us to advance our indigenous submarine-building program.’’ 156 The U.S. government has not
said whether it will authorize the transfer of technology to an
indigenous submarine program in Taiwan. Taiwan’s current
fleet of four submarines includes two former U.S. boats thatwere built in the 1940s and transferred to Taiwan in the
1970s.
Taiwan Defense Policy and Reform

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

As explained to the Commission by Mr. Easton, ‘‘even more important than advanced weapons are the investments Taiwan ismaking into high quality military personnel.’’ 157 Taiwan originallyplanned to complete its transition to an all-volunteer force by theend of 2014, but due to low recruitment rates it pushed the completion date to 2017.158 In addition to recruitment challenges, the establishment of an all-volunteer force has been more expensive than
expected, and Taiwan has had to divert funds from other portionsof the defense budget, including operations and investments, toease the rising personnel costs.159 Taiwan also has sought to offset
some of the rising costs resulting from the recruitment and reten-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00503

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

492
tion of an all-volunteer force by downsizing its active duty force.
Taiwan aims to shrink the active duty force from 275,000 to
215,000 troops by the end of 2014 160 and to as few as 170,000
troops by 2019.161
Moreover, the all-volunteer force transition could adversely impact Taiwan’s reserve force, which presently consists of over 2.6
million personnel and is tasked to help defend against a PLA invasion and to support disaster relief efforts.162 Previously, Taiwan
conscripts performed one year of active duty service before becoming reservists. Under current Taiwan law, men born after 1994 arerequired to undergo four months of active-duty service, a length oftime that critics assert is inadequate to prepare them to be effective soldiers.163 At the end of four months, the conscripts enter Taiwan’s reserve system. Reservists participate in military training
every two years and in military exercises every year.164
Taiwan Military Training and Activities
The Taiwan military routinely conducts a range of exercises tomaintain combat readiness; test and improve its capabilities andwar plans; integrate new weapons systems; and demonstrate to the
Taiwan public, China, and the United States that it has a credible
deterrent capability. In some exercises, Taiwan also seeks to assert
its territorial claims and demonstrate freedom of navigation. Major
Taiwan military exercises and activities in late 2013 and 2014 included the following:• Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief to the Philippines: In
November 2013, the Taiwan military provided humanitarianassistance/disaster relief to the Philippines following Typhoon
Haiyan. Taiwan Air Force C–130 cargo aircraft and a Taiwan
Navy amphibious ship delivered relief supplies and equipment
to the Philippines. This marked the first visit by a Taiwan
Navy ship to the Philippines in 10 years.165 The relief supplies
and equipment which the Taiwan military transported to thePhilippines were donated by Taiwan nongovernmental organizations and were valued at approximately $8.25 million.* 166• ADIZ Exercise: In February 2014, Taiwan’s Coast Guard,
Navy, and Air Force carried out combined drills and patrols in
the area of the East China Sea where its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) overlaps with the ADIZ announced by
China in November 2013. (For a discussion of the ADIZ, see
Chapter 2, Section 1, ‘‘Year in Review: Security and Foreign
Affairs.’’) According to official Taiwan press, the exercise demonstrated that ‘‘Taiwan is pursuing its own national interests
despite China’s announcement . . . of a new ADIZ that heightened tensions in the region.’’ Exercise participants included

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The Taiwan government made a monetary donation of $921,000 to relief efforts. The Chinese
government donated $100,000 in cash and $1.4 million worth of relief supplies. Ministry ofForeign Affairs (Taiwan), ‘‘Love and Empathy Transcend Boundaries: Relief Aid Extended by
the Republic of China to the Philippines in Wake of Typhoon Haiyan.’’ http://www.mofa.gov.tw/
Upload/WebArchive/1304/8cdc1037-5708-4eb2-8f82-c33d8c006c6f.PDF; Jane Perlez, ‘‘China Increases Aid to Philippines,’’ New York Times, November 14, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/world/asia/chinese-aid-to-philippines.html?_r=0.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00504

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

493
two coast guard vessels, two navy frigates, an antisubmarine
aircraft, a helicopter, and two fighter aircraft.167• South China Sea Landing Exercise: In April 2014, the Taiwan
Navy and Marine Corps conducted an amphibious landing to
re-take control of Itu Aba (also known as Taiping Island),* anisland in the Spratly Islands (see Figure 4), from a notional
enemy force in the Taiwan military’s largest exercise in theSouth China Sea since 2000. Exercise participants included
two marine companies, 20 amphibious assault vehicles, andmultiple advanced frigates, amphibious ships, and coast guard
personnel.168 In addition to increasing the number of its military exercises in the South China Sea, Taiwan is upgrading its
military and civilian infrastructure on Taiwan-controlled islands in the region. Taiwan is expanding the wharf on Itu Aba,
currently only capable of accommodating small ships, to enablelarger ships to dock there. Taiwan also is renovating the island’s runway, including upgrading its drainage system andlights. These projects are expected to be completed by the endof 2015.169

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Taiwan and China have almost identical claims in the South China Sea. Both Taiwan and
China claim to have historic and legal rights in the South China Sea and they illustrate theirclaims with the nine-dash line. (For further discussion of China’s sovereignty claims, see Chapter 3, Section 1, ‘‘China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture.’’) According to Taiwan academics, in recent years, unnamed U.S. officials have expressed concern that Taiwan and Chinamight cooperate on the issue of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Although, on several
occasions, the Chinese government has proposed that Taiwan and China cooperate on this issue,
the Taiwan government has refused to cooperate with China. Chou Yi-ling and Maia Huang,‘‘MAC Sees No Room for Cross-Strait Cooperation on Territorial Issues,’’ Central News Agency(Taiwan), May 15, 2014. http: // focustaiwan.tw / news / acs / 201405150040.aspx; J. Michael Cole,‘‘Taiwan-China Ties in South China Sea Concern US,’’ Taipei Times, June 6, 2012. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/06/06/2003534621; and Peter Dutton, ‘‘Three Disputes
and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea,’’ Naval War College Review 64:4 (Autumn 2011): 44–45.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00505

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

494
Figure 4: South China Sea

Source: New York Times, ‘‘Territorial Claims in South China Sea.’’ http: // www.nytimes.com /interactive / 2012 / 05 / 31 / world / asia / Territorial-Claims-in-South-China-Sea.html. Adapted by the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Locations of various features are notexact.

• Han Kuang: In May 2014, the Taiwan military held the command post component of its annual Han Kuang exercise, Taiwan’s only national-level joint exercise. This year’s command
post exercise focused on defending against a simulated PLA
full-scale invasion of Taiwan that included attacks against Taiwan’s east coast launched from China’s new aircraft carrier,the Liaoning. Taiwan conducted the field training componentof Han Kuang in September.170 According to Taiwan officials,
the exercise included Taiwan’s largest maritime live-fire drillin 10 years.171 Typically, a team of around 50 U.S. military
personnel observes the Han Kuang exercise from various sites
throughout Taiwan. The observation teams include senior retired military officers, mid-level active duty or reserve officers,
mid-level civilian analysts, and contractors.172

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00506

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C3S3Fig4.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Response to PLA Flights through Taiwan’s ADIZ: On August25, 2014, the Taiwan Air Force deployed fighter aircraft to follow PLA surveillance aircraft that entered Taiwan’s ADIZ multiple times on their flights to and from the South China Sea.
These are highly unusual actions for PLA aircraft, which historically have avoided flying through Taiwan’s ADIZ.173 According to J. Michael Cole, editor-in-chief of Thinking Taiwan,

495
PLA aircraft may have entered Taiwan’s ADIZ to ‘‘to gauge
Taiwan’s surveillance capabilities and response mechanism.
Chinese electronic surveillance aircraft last year committed
similar intrusions near Okinawa and close to the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyu islets in the East China Sea to—it is speculated—evaluate Tokyo’s ability to respond (Japan’s response
was to scramble F–15 aircraft). Soon thereafter, China declared its controversial ADIZ over the East China Sea. Someanalysts believe that China is drawing up plans to establish an
ADIZ in the South China Sea, though Beijing has yet to giveany concrete indication that it intends to do so.’’ 174
Computer Network Defense
In addition to China’s conventional military forces, China’s computer network operation capabilities also pose a major threat to
Taiwan. According to the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense’s
2013 National Defense Report, ‘‘Once a conflict arises, these operations will enable [China] to cripple our command, control and logistics network, which will affect the normal operation of the [Taiwan] Armed Forces’ information systems, and delay its contingency
response time.’’ 175
To address the cyber threat from China, the Taiwan military is
attempting to enhance information security awareness through increased education, inspections, and exercises. It also plans to bolster the cyber defense of its command, control, communications,and information platforms.176 These measures supplement thesteps Taiwan has taken in recent years in this area, which include
increasing spending on cyberwarfare capabilities, establishing an
additional cyberwarfare unit within the Ministry of National Defense, and building a facility for cyber defense training against simulated attacks on critical infrastructure.177
Cross-Strait Espionage

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The counterintelligence risks to Taiwan and U.S. military information and equipment in Taiwan are increasing as cross-Strait ties
expand and Chinese citizens visit Taiwan in greater numbers.
China now has greater access to Taiwan and better opportunities
to conduct intelligence operations against Taiwan citizens both in
Taiwan and China. In 2013, nearly three million Chinese tourists
visited Taiwan, up from around 300,000 in 2008.178
In the last two years, Taiwan has arrested at least eight former
or active military officers, including one flag officer, for suspectedespionage.179 In April 2014, a former Taiwan Air Force major was
found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison for providing the
Chinese government with classified information related to Taiwan’s
E–2K airborne early warning aircraft, a U.S. system which Northrop Grumman first delivered to Taiwan in 2005.180 In addition
to gathering strategic, operational, tactical, and technical intelligence, these activities are intended to demoralize the Taiwan
military and public and increase concerns in the U.S. government
and military about the security of defense information and technology provided to Taiwan.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00507

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

496
The Taiwan military is implementing measures to counter Chinese intelligence activities. These measures include enhancing security at military bases, heightening awareness among the militaryof espionage threats, and requiring some military personnel to takemore polygraph tests.181 For example, in 2012 the Taiwan Ministryof National Defense instituted a policy to require ministry personnel posted overseas, including attachés and procurement officials, to return to Taiwan once a year for a polygraph test.182
The counterintelligence threat to Taiwan is not limited to military personnel; it also extends to civilian researchers. In 2014, Chinese and Taiwan media reported Chen Kun-shan, the former director of the Center for Space and Remote Sensing Research at Taiwan’s National Central University and a top expert on remotesensing technology, had defected to China and taken a position
with the State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing Science at Beijing Normal University.183 Taiwan media reported that an anonymous source within Taiwan’s intelligence community said Dr.
Chen’s former position would have given him access to classified information about the Taiwan military and Taiwan’s methods foranalyzing intelligence about China.184 He also would have been familiar with Taiwan’s remote sensing technology. In China, Dr.
Chen may contribute to Chinese research projects that have applications for the PLA.185
Although U.S. media reporting tends to focus on China’s intelligence successes against Taiwan, Mr. Easton testified that Taiwan
has an impressive track record of espionage against China:
Since 2004, China has suffered from dozens of Taiwaneseespionage cases. Taiwan’s agents have included the leadership of China’s Air Force Command Academy, a Central
Committee member, and more. Recent examples of successinclude Taiwan’s ability to collect detailed information on
China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles, drones, and airbases.
Taiwan also obtained timely forewarning of China’s intention to declare an air defense identification zone over the
East China Sea in November 2013. This allowed the [Taiwan] National Security Council to call an emergency meeting and deliberate in advance of Beijing’s declaration.186
U.S.-Taiwan Relations
Developments in U.S.-Taiwan Political Relations

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

April 10, 2014 marked the 35th anniversary of the passage of the
Taiwan Relations Act. Leading up to the anniversary, U.S. and Taiwan government officials praised the state of bilateral relations,saying the relationship is the strongest it has been in over three
decades.187 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator
Gina McCarthy’s visit to Taiwan in April, the first by a Cabinetlevel official since June 2000, reflects this positive momentum in
U.S.-Taiwan relations.188 In a speech at National Taiwan University, she spoke about U.S.-Taiwan collaboration and Taiwan’s leadership on environmental issues.189 The U.S. and Taiwan governments have co-hosted meetings involving participants from aroundthe world on topics such as port sustainability, electronic waste,

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00508

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

497
and environmental information.190 U.S. cabinet-level visits to Taiwan help to strengthen ties between high-level U.S. and Taiwan officials, reinforce the bilateral partnership, and express U.S. support
to Taiwan.*
Although the relationship has recovered from a period of heightened tension and weakened trust from 2002 to 2008, some analysts
point out there is still much room for improvement.191 Mr. Hammond-Chambers, in his testimony to the Commission, described therelationship as ‘‘adrift’’ and ‘‘underwhelming’’ due to the lack of‘‘significant goals and objectives.’’ 192 Mr. Hammond-Chambers andVincent Wei-cheng Wang, professor at the University of Richmond,
testified that the U.S. government probably has been complacentregarding Taiwan because it assumes the warming of cross-Strait
relations and greater economic engagement will lead to lasting
peace in the Taiwan Strait.193 Dr. Wang cautioned that eventhough the United States and Taiwan ‘‘share common values, commercial interests and [a] historical relationship,’’ the two sides
must constantly ‘‘cultivate and manage’’ the relationship.194
Developments in U.S.-Taiwan Military and Security Relations
Taiwan continues to be one of the largest buyers of U.S. arms in
the world. From 2008 to 2011, Taiwan agreed to purchase approximately $18.3 billion of U.S. arms.195 However, the U.S. government
has not authorized a major arms sale to Taiwan since 2011,† leading some analysts to question whether the United States is doing
enough to make defense articles available to Taiwan. Randall
Shriver, president and chief executive officer of the Project 2049 Institute, testified to Congress that ‘‘[the Obama Administration]needs bolder and more visible measures to fulfill U.S. obligations
to Taiwan consistent with notification requirements under theArms Export Control Act.’’ 196
David Firestein, vice president for the Strategic Trust-Building
Initiative at the EastWest Institute, testified to the Commissionthat U.S. policy toward Taiwan is falling short of its goal of enhancing Taiwan’s security. He said:
It is fair to say that U.S. policies, as implemented, do notseem to be able to keep pace with events in the region, particularly the rapid and well-documented development ofChina’s military capabilities. To put it in simple terms, theUnited States is selling arms to Taiwan at an arithmetic
pace, while China’s military capabilities are developing at
something closer to a geometric trajectory. On these terms,
this is a game that the United States and Taiwan cannot
win.197

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Administrator McCarthy was originally scheduled to visit Taiwan, in addition to China, in
December 2013, but she postponed the Taiwan portion of her trip for unknown reasons. Shirley
Kan and Wayne Morrison, U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues (Congressional
Research Service, April 22, 2014), p. 16.
† The executive branch is only required to notify Congress of arms sales through the foreign
military sales process that meet or exceed the following values: $14 million in major defense
equipment, $50 million in defense articles or services, and $200 million in design and construction services. Thus, there may have been U.S. arms sales to Taiwan that did not exceed theseamounts since 2011. Piin-Fen Kok and David J. Firestein, Threading the Needle: Proposals for
U.S. and Chinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan (EastWest Institute, September 2013),
p. 71. http://www.ewi.info/sites/default/files/TAS%20Final%20%2528ISSUU%20VERSION%209_
17_2013%2529.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00509

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

498
Mr. Firestein also explained that the U.S. executive branch’s
practice of ‘‘bundling’’ announcements of arms sales to Taiwan creates misperceptions of U.S. policy that could affect U.S. diplomaticefforts. He offered that, ‘‘By issuing more frequent, but smallerscale, notifications, the United States can perhaps mitigate some ofthe public diplomacy problem without affecting the content of thesales at all. . . . This approach might also sensitize the Chinese—
including the Chinese public—to the sales to a greater degree thanis the case now with less frequent, larger notifications.’’ 198
In addition to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. training and consultations are a key component of the bilateral security relationship. For example, the U.S. provides training to Taiwan fighter pilots, special operations personnel, and rapid runway repair personnel. Furthermore, members of Taiwan’s military study at U.S.
military educational institutions.199
In an important development, military-to-military contact increased in 2013. In 2013, DoD personnel conducted more than
2,000 visits to Taiwan, compared to approximately 1,500 visits in2012.* 200 Nevertheless the U.S. practice of limiting the highest
rank of U.S. military personnel who can visit Taiwan to colonels
and captains (O6-level) prevents the most senior U.S. officers fromgaining firsthand knowledge of the Taiwan military and the operational environment in a potential cross-Strait conflict. Mr. Easton
explained to the Commission:
Our most difficult operational plan calls for the U.S. military to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with Taiwan’s military.
How can the President of the United States, this or any future president, be assured that we could seamlessly do that
if we don’t allow our military leaders to go out and see thebattlespace firsthand? If you’ve not been out to the offshoreislands, Kinmen, Matsu, Tungyin, Penghus, if you’ve notseen the 18 invasion beaches on Taiwan’s west coast, andif you don’t have that personal relationship, I think that’s
a mistake.201
Role of Taiwan in U.S. Rebalance to Asia
The Obama Administration recognized the importance of the
Asia Pacific when it committed to ‘‘rebalance’’ U.S. government attention and resources to the region in 2011. The strategy intends
to strengthen U.S. economic, diplomatic, and security relations
throughout the Asia Pacific, both bilaterally and multilaterally,
with a ‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach to policy implementation.
However, some analysts have suggested the Obama Administration
has not adequately incorporated Taiwan into the U.S. rebalance toAsia policy, pointing to several important speeches and documents
about the rebalance by then Secretary of State Clinton, President
Obama, and then National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon.† 202

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* DoD personnel conducted nine exchanges with Chinese military personnel in China in 2013.
The total number of DoD personnel who participated in these exchanags is unavailable. U.S.
Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 5, 2014, p. 71.
† However, in a November 2011 speech about the rebalance to Asia policy, then Secretary ofState Clinton spoke about Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. She said, ‘‘We have a strong relationship with Taiwan, an important security and economic partner, and we applaud the progressthat we have seen in cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan during the past three

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00510

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

499
The Administration may feel constrained in addressing Taiwan’srole in the rebalance policy, particularly regarding military cooperation, by the unofficial nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations andconcerns about the impact of openly including Taiwan in the rebalance policy on U.S.-China relations.
According to some analysts, Taiwan could play an important rolein the U.S. rebalance to Asia given its geographic position, relatively advanced military capabilities, large and vibrant economy,
and robust democracy.203
In the military realm, Taiwan’s strengths in ISR could support
U.S. efforts to promote security and stability in the Asia Pacific.
Mr. Stokes and Russell Hsiao, non-resident senior fellow at the
Project 2049 Institute, explain:
Taiwan is uniquely positioned to contribute to regional situational awareness of the air, space, sea and cyber domains. Peacetime air surveillance data can be fused withother sources of information to better understand PLA Air
Force tactics and doctrine. Long range [ultra high frequency] early warning radar data could fill a gap in regional space surveillance. The Taiwanese Navy has a firm
grasp of the unique undersea geography and hydrologicalenvironment of the Western Pacific Ocean. . . . Taiwan’s geographic position and willingness to contribute to a regionalcommon operational picture, including maritime domainawareness, air surveillance, and space surveillance andtracking, could be of significant value for both disaster response and military purposes.204
Taiwan and the U.S. military also could cooperate on surveillance for missile defense. In May 2014, Representative Randy
Forbes added a provision to the House National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 requiring the U.S. Missile Defense
Agency to evaluate the potential for linking Taiwan’s highly advanced early warning radar to U.S. sensor and missile defense systems.205
Beyond sharing technical ISR data, the U.S. government could
learn from Taiwan’s unique insights into China, the PLA, and Chinese cyber operations. As Mr. Easton points out, Taiwan has a‘‘long history of leveraging its close cultural, linguistic, and economic ties to China for collecting traditional human intelligence’’and Taiwan’s research centers possess ‘‘unique expertise and historical experiences—as well as unparalleled access to data.’’ 206
In the area of China’s cyber operations, Taiwan’s cybersecurity
experts possess in-depth knowledge of Chinese cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures. For more than a decade, Taiwan’s information networks have been a major target for Chinese hackers. These
hackers have tried new tactics, techniques, and procedures on Taiwan’s networks before using them against networks in other countries.207
Cooperation with Taiwan on the development of defense technology is another area in which the U.S. military could benefit

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

years and we look forward to continued improvement so there can be peaceful resolution of theirdifferences.’’ Hillary Clinton, ‘‘America’s Pacific Century’’ (Honolulu, HI, November 10, 2011).

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00511

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

500
from Taiwan’s strengths. Taiwan has a great deal of expertise in
information and communications and cruise missile technology. It
also is able to produce these technologies at lower cost than the
United States.208 Mr. Stokes and Mr. Hsiao suggest ‘‘Taiwan andthe U.S. may find mutually beneficial ways to integrate their efforts including in defense-related R&D and low cost, high quality
electronic components that could reduce costs for U.S. weapon systems.’’ 209 This kind of collaboration also could have the benefit ofincreasing interoperability between U.S. and Taiwan military platforms and systems.
In addition to defense and security, economics and trade are amajor part of the rebalance to Asia policy, with the TPP as the central economic policy initiative. Taiwan has made joining the multilateral trade agreement a priority. In April 2014, President Ma told
an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
that ‘‘a TPP with Taiwan’s membership would not only assure Taiwan’s economic security, but would also help strengthen the economic presence of the U.S. in the Asia Pacific region.’’ 210 Although
there are substantial political obstacles in Taiwan and the UnitedStates to Taiwan joining the TPP, the U.S. government in 2014
welcomed Taiwan’s interest in the TPP.211
Finally, in line with another aspect of the rebalance to Asia policy, Taiwan can play a role in the development of democracy andthe promotion of universal rights and freedoms in the Asia Pacific.
Taiwan is a vibrant democracy in a region with many authoritarian
governments. As an example of democratic governance, humanrights, freedom of expression, and rule of law to its neighbors, mostimportantly to China, Taiwan can support positive change in thesecountries. Highlighting Taiwan’s achievements in these areas in official statements could support and augment U.S. efforts to promote democracy and human rights in the region and around theworld.212

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Implications for the United States
The United States and Taiwan maintain a strong relationshipbuilt on shared values, commercial interests, and commitment toassist Taiwan’s defensive capability. Taiwan’s position as a major
U.S. trading partner, and its important role in the global hi-tech
supply chain, make it vital to U.S. economic interests. Taiwan companies are leaders in the global semiconductor industry and theirneed for advanced U.S. machinery has made semiconductor,
microchip, and LCD manufacturing machines the top U.S. export
to Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan’s role as a regional leader in democracy, human rights, and environmental protection further strengthens this relationship and provides opportunities for regional
partnering.213
Six years of cross-Strait rapprochement have been beneficial to
the United States by temporarily reducing the likelihood of military conflict, enhancing regional stability and development, and allowing U.S. policymakers to address other priorities in the U.S.China and U.S.-Taiwan relationships.
However, improved cross-Strait relations have not resolved thefundamental sovereignty issues between Taiwan and China. Deepening economic integration has increased Taiwan’s dependence on

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00512

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

501
China’s economy and raised its vulnerability to Chinese economic
and political coercion. China could leverage this dependence to advance its goal of unification with Taiwan.
In addition, China’s military modernization presents an intensechallenge to Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and the U.S. military’s
ability to intervene successfully in a cross-Strait conflict. It also improves China’s ability to use the threat of military force to coerce
Taiwan into making political concessions. Mr. Easton testified to
the Commission that ‘‘if the PLA used all the tools at its disposal
in a coordinated fashion, it could turn the defense of Taiwan into
the democratic world’s most stressful military challenge. To put it
another way, no other U.S.-friendly democracy faces the level ofmilitary threat that Taiwan does.’’ 214
Taiwan is confronted with the question of how to meet the requirements of national defense while also addressing domestic andsocial welfare issues. Taiwan is taking steps to enhance its defensive capabilities and increase the quality of its military personnel,
but some members of Congress and outside observers have raisedquestions and concerns about whether Taiwan’s defense spendingis sufficient to address the threat from China’s military modernization.215
Separate from questions regarding Taiwan’s defense spending, inthe 2000s, the question of whether the Taiwan military, government, and public would resist a PLA attack on Taiwan was the
subject of much discussion by U.S. analysts. Lieutenant Commander John E. Lee, USN, described the issue as follows: ‘‘In aconflict with [China], Taiwan’s ‘will to fight’ is its strategic centerof gravity—the source of massed moral strength, whose degradation would have a decisive impact on Taiwan’s ability to resist theenemy.’’ 216 Since then there has been little discussion of this issue.
However, Mr. Cole has written about Taiwan’s will to fight in recent years, and he asserts that ‘‘once bombs and missiles, however
precise, [begin] raining down on Taiwan, killing family members,
friends, and neighbors, most Taiwanese would rally round theflag.’’ 217
More broadly, Taiwan’s role in regional stability extends beyond
the Taiwan Strait due to its territorial claims in the East China
Sea and the South China Sea. In 2013, Taipei contributed to stability in the East China Sea with the fisheries agreement it signedwith the Japanese government. With regard to the South China
Sea, Taiwan is pursuing a fisheries agreement with the Philippines
that, according to a Taiwan official, the two countries are close tosigning.218 Analysts have proposed Taiwan could also help reduce
tension in the South China Sea by clarifying its definition of thenine-dash line, which is the basis for both Taiwan’s and China’s
claims in that area.219

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Conclusions• Under President Ma, cross-Strait economic relations have deepened with the expansion of trade and investment and the signingof numerous economic agreements. However, these agreements
face increasing public and political opposition. The Taiwan
public’s concerns about the effects of cross-Strait economic integration on the country’s economy and political autonomy led to

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00513

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

502

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

a temporary postponement of cross-Strait negotiations and apush for increased oversight of cross-Strait agreements by Taiwan’s legislature.
• Prior to the Sunflower Movement, cross-Strait relations reacheda milestone with the first formal talks between the heads of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and China’s Taiwan Affairs Office in February 2014. After a temporary postponement following
the protests, Taiwan and China restarted trade negotiations in
September, but the Taiwan legislature will unlikely ratify any
new agreements until it agrees on a formal legislative oversightprocess for cross-Strait agreements.
• U.S.-Taiwan relations took positive but small steps forward thispast year with progress in the bilateral Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks, the first trip to Taiwan bya Cabinet-level official since 2000, and recent growth in bilateral
trade. Remaining obstacles to further progress in the TIFA talks
are disputes over pork imports, pharmaceutical intellectual property rights, and private-equity investment regulations.
• The United States and Taiwan continue to engage in a robust
but low-profile security partnership, including increased militaryto-military contact in 2013. However, the U.S. government has
not authorized a major arms sale to Taiwan since 2011, whichallows China to further tip the cross-Strait balance of power in
its favor.
• Taiwan has expanded its international engagement in recent
years, but China continues to restrict Taiwan’s participation inmost international organizations. Furthermore, Taiwan’s discussions with other countries regarding bilateral free trade agreements have reportedly stalled due to those countries’ hesitation
over China’s opposition and questions about Taiwan’s ability toratify any negotiated free trade agreement following strong public opposition to the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement.
• Despite the recent cross-Strait rapprochement, the core sovereignty and security issues between Taiwan and China remainunresolved. China’s military modernization has significantly increased Beijing’s ability to conduct military operations against
Taiwan and to deter, delay, and deny any U.S. intervention ina cross-Strait conflict. Taiwan’s recent focus on developing innovative and asymmetric military capabilities and continued acquisition of major conventional platforms and weapon systems fromthe United States have improved Taiwan’s military capabilities.
However, the cross-Strait balance of power has shifted decidedly
in China’s favor.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00514

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

503
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 3

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
2. Gordon Orr and Christopher Thomas, ‘‘Semiconductors in China: Brave New
World or Same Old Story?’’ McKinsey Insights, August 2014. http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/semiconductors_in_china_brave_new_world_or_same_old_story.
3. SEMI, ‘‘The Power of Taiwan: Taiwan Semiconductor/LED/PV Market,’’ September 2013. http: // www.semi.org / ch / sites / semi.org / files / images / TaiwanMarketInfo
2013.pdf; Huang Chiao-wen and Frances Huang, ‘‘Taiwan Remains China’s Largest
Electronics Supplier,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), April 3, 2014. http: // focus
taiwan.tw/news/aeco/201404030031.aspx.
4. Jimmy Goodrich (Director of Global Policy, Information Technology Industry
Council), interview with Commission staff, August 27, 2014.
5. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
6. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
7. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
8. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
9. Matt Schiavenza, ‘‘China’s Dominance in Manufacturing—in One Chart,’’ Atlantic, August 5, 2013. http: // www.theatlantic.com / china / archive / 2013 / 08 / chinasdominance-in-manufacturing-in-one-chart/278366/.
10. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
11. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
12. Mike King, ‘‘Taiwan Metal Producers Affected by Overcapacity across the
Global Metals Market in 2013,’’ Companiesandmarkets.com. June 9, 2014. http://
www.live-pr.com/en/taiwan-metal-producers-affected-by-r1050388259.htm.
13. Fanny Liu, ‘‘Taiwan’s China Steel to Focus on Cutting Costs,’’ Wall Street
Journal, June 17, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/taiwans-china-steel-to-focus-oncutting-costs-1403061885.
14. JoAnn Fan (Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution), e-mail interview
with Commission staff, August 1, 2014.
15. Ministry of Economic Affairs, Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment Commission (Taiwan), Monthly Report (August 2014). http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_
external/ctlr?PRO=PubsCateLoad&lang=1.
16. Ministry of Economic Affairs, Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment Commission (Taiwan), Monthly Report (August 2014). http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_
external/ctlr?PRO=PubsCateLoad&lang=1.
17. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony
of JoAnn Fan, June 5, 2014.
18. Sarah Mishkin, ‘‘Taiwan: Cross-Strait Investment Slowly Picks Up as Political Relations Improve,’’ Financial Times, December 11, 2012. http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/2/49e1307a-3afc-11e2-bb32-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3B8GgjhFd.
19. Ministry of Economic Affairs, Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment Commission (Taiwan), Monthly Report (August 2014). http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_
external/ctlr?PRO=PubsCateLoad&lang=1.
20. Ministry of Economic Affairs, Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment Commission (Taiwan), Monthly Report (August 2014). http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_
external/ctlr?PRO=PubsCateLoad&lang=1.
21. Philip Chen, The Impact of the MOU and the ECFA on the Banking Sector (Deloitte 2010). http: // www.deloitte.com / assets / Dcom - China / Local % 20 Assets /Documents / Firmwide / AFF % 20 thought % 20 leadership / cn _ outlook _ Twthought % 20
leadersEN_150110.pdf ; Alan Romberg, ‘‘Ma at Mid-term: Challenges for Cross-Strait
Relations,’’ China Leadership Monitor 33 (Summer 2010). http://media.hoover.org/
sites/default/files/documents/CLM33AR.pdf ; Kerry Brown, Justin Hempson-Jones,
and Jessica Pennisi, ‘‘The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA),’’
Chapter 3 in Investment Across the Taiwan Strait, Chatham House, November 2010;
and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of JoAnn
Fan, June 5, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00515

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

504

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

22. Adam Tyrsett Kuo, ‘‘NT$42 Bil. Saved Through ECFA Early Harvest List:
Ma,’’ China Post (Taiwan), April 3, 2014. http: // www.chinapost.com.tw / taiwan /national/national-news/2014/04/03/404352/NT$42-bil.htm.
23. Lee Yu-hsin and Stacy Hsu, ‘‘ECFA Benefits Mostly China: Report,’’ Taipei
Times (Taiwan), October 2, 2012. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/
2012/10/02/2003544180.
24. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of JoAnn Fan, June 5, 2014; JoAnn Fan, ‘‘The Economics of the Cross-Strait
Services Agreement,’’ Diplomat, April 18, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/theeconomics-of-the-cross-strait-services-agreement/.
25. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony
of JoAnn Fan, June 5, 2014; Richard Chiou-Yuan Lu, ‘‘China, We Fear You,’’ Foreign Policy, March 21, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/21/china_
we_fear_you_taiwan_trade_pact_essay.
26. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of JoAnn Fan, June 5, 2014; JoAnn Fan, ‘‘The Economics of the Cross-Strait
Services Agreement,’’ Diplomat, April 18, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/theeconomics-of-the-cross-strait-services-agreement/.
27. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of
JoAnn Fan, June 5, 2014.
28. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of
JoAnn Fan, June 5, 2014.
29. Chen Shou-kuo and Y.F. Low, ‘‘Taiwan Hoping to Break Monopoly of Chinese, Hong Kong Travel Agents,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), June 30, 2014.
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406300013.aspx.
30. Hsiao-Hung Pai, ‘‘Taiwan’s Protestors Are Fighting for the Very Democracyof the Island,’’ Guardian, March 25, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/2014/mar/25/taiwans-protesters-democracy-china-taiwan-strait.
31. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of
Rupert Hammond-Chambers, June 5, 2014.
32. Taipei Times, ‘‘Taiwan, China Agree to Not Let Protests Curb Ties: SEF,’’
July 31, 2014. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/07/31/2003596
333; Lin Miao-jung and Michael Gold, ‘‘Taiwan, China to Restart Talks on Goods
Free-Trade Agreement,’’ Reuters, August 5, 2014. http: // www.reuters.com / article /2014/08/05/us-taiwan-china-trade-idUSKBN0G50Y120140805; and Yang Shu-min,Milly Lin, and Elaine Hou, ‘‘Talks on Goods Trade Pact with China Slated for September 10 (Update),’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 28, 2014. http://focus
taiwan.tw/news/acs/201409040038.aspx.
33. Da-Nien Liu and Hui-Tzu Shihg, The Transformation of Taiwan’s Status
within the Production and Supply Chain in Asia (The Brookings Institution, December 2013). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/04-taiwan-productionsupply-chain; Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
34. Tam Harbert, ‘‘Hon Hai Cornered by Own Success,’’ Electronics360, September 19, 2013. http://electronics360.globalspec.com/article/3066/hon-hai-cornered-byown-success; Faith Hung and Michael Gold, ‘‘Foxconn to Buy $390 Million Stake in
Taiwan Telecom Operator in 4G Push,’’ Reuters, May 27, 2014. http://news.yahoo.com/foxconn-buy-390-million-stake-taiwan-telecom-operator-071639449—finance.html;
and Jeffrey Wu, ‘‘Apple’s Expanding Product Lines to Benefit Hon Hai, Largan,’’Central News Agency (Taiwan), February 3, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/
201402030003.aspx.
35. Da-Nien Liu and Hui-Tzu Shihg, The Transformation of Taiwan’s Status
within the Production and Supply Chain in Asia (The Brookings Institution, December 2013). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/04-taiwan-productionsupply-chain; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on
Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written
testimony of JoAnn Fan, June 5, 2014.
36. Hsiang-Yi Chang, ‘‘The Early Harvest List, 3 Years On,’’ CommonWealth
Magazine, May 2, 2014. http://english.cw.com.tw/article.do?action=show&id=14757&
offset=0.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00516

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

505

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

37. Hsiang-Yi Chang, ‘‘The Early Harvest List, 3 Years On,’’ CommonWealth
Magazine, May 2, 2014. http://english.cw.com.tw/article.do?action=show&id=14757&
offset=0.
38. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE; SteelFirst, ‘‘Taiwan Imposes Anti-dumping Duties on Chinese,
S Korean Stainless Imports,’’ August 14, 2013. http: // www.steelfirst.com / Article /3243188/Taiwan-imposes-anti-dumping-duties-on-Chinese-S-Korean-stainless-imports.html.
39. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
40. Taiwan News, ‘‘Hillary Clinton Warns against Over-Dependence on China,’’
June 25, 2014. http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2513205.
41. Chien-Jung Hsu, ‘‘China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Media,’’ Asia Survey 54:3.
(May/June 2014): 515–539.
42. Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2014 (February 12,2014), pp. 8, 17. http://rsf.org/index2014/data/index2014_en.pdf.
43. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘U.S. Relations with Taiwan,’’ February 12, 2014.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm; Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘‘United States and Taiwan Enhance Trade Ties,’’ April 2014. http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2014/April / United-States-and-TaiwanEnhance - Trade - Ties ; and Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’
http: //cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
44. U.S. Census Bureau, ‘‘Top Trading Partners—July 2014,’’ https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/topcurmon.html.
45. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
46. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
47. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
48. Piin-Fen Kok and David J. Firestein, Threading the Needle: Proposals for
U.S. and Chinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan (EastWest Institute, September2013), p. 72. http://www.ewi.info/sites/default/files/TAS%20Final%20%2528ISSUU%20VERSION%209_17_2013%2529.pdf.
49. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
50. SEMI, ‘‘The Power of Taiwan: Taiwan Semiconductor/LED/PV Market,’’ September 2013. http: // www.semi.org / ch / sites / semi.org / files / images / TaiwanMarketInfo
2013.pdf.
51. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
52. Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘‘Taiwan,’’ May 9, 2014.
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china/taiwan.
53. AgroChart, ‘‘Taiwan. Oilseeds and Products Annual. Apr 2014,’’ April 2014.
http://www.agrochart.com/en/news/news/010514/taiwan-oilseeds-and-products-annualapr-2014/.
54. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
55. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
56. American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, 2014 Taiwan White Paper 44:6
(June 2014): 5.
57. Ministry of Economic Affairs (Taiwan), ‘‘Former VP Vincent Siew Leads Successful High-Level Industry Delegation Visit to the United States,’’ U.S.-Taiwan
Connect, November 27, 2013. http://www.ustaiwanconnect.org/Spotlight/Former-VPVincent-Siew-Leads-Successful-High-level-Industry-Delegation- Visit - to - the - UnitedStates; Leaf Chiang and Lilian Wu, ‘‘Former Vice President Calls for U.S. Investment Pact,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), November 19, 2013. http://www.etaiwannews.com/wap/vibo/fm600/content.php?id=2348407&lang=eng_news&cate_img=logo_taiwan.jpg&cate_rss=TAIWAN_eng.
58. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of
Rupert Hammond-Chambers, June 5, 2014.
59. Ministry of Economic Affairs (Taiwan), ‘‘Former VP Vincent Siew Leads Successful High-Level Industry Delegation Visit to the United States,’’ U.S.-Taiwan
Connect, November 27, 2013. http://www.ustaiwanconnect.org/Spotlight/Former-VPVincent-Siew-Leads-Successful-High-level-Industry-Delegation- Visit - to - the - UnitedStates.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00517

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

506

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

60. Shirley Kan and Wayne Morrison, U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of
Policy Issues (Congressional Research Service, April 22, 2014), pp. 34–36.
61. ‘‘U.S. Secures Pledges on Data Transfers, Pharmaceuticals from Taiwan,’’China Trade Extra, April 18, 2014. http: // chinatradeextra.com / 201404182468024 /China-Trade-Extra-General/Daily-News/us-secures-pledges-on-data-transferspharmaceuticals-from-taiwan/menu-id-428.html.
62. ‘‘U.S. Secures Pledges on Data Transfers, Pharmaceuticals from Taiwan,’’China Trade Extra, April 18, 2014. http://chinatradeextra.com/201404182468024/
China-Trade-Extra-General/Daily-News/us-secures-pledges-on-data-transfers-pharma
ceuticals-from-taiwan/menu-id-428.html; Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘‘United States and Taiwan Enhance Trade Ties,’’ April 2014. http://
www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2014/April/United-States-and-Taiw
an-Enhance-Trade-Ties; and Tony Liao and Jeffrey Wu, ‘‘U.S. Raises Taiwan Pork
Issues at WTO Meeting,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 18, 2014. http://
focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201409180031.aspx.
63. Fanny Liu, ‘‘Taiwan’s Export Orders Exceed Expectations,’’ Wall Street Journal, May 20, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304422704
579573351077620202.
64. Bonnie S. Glaser, Taiwan’s Quest for Greater Participation in the International Community (Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2013).
http: // csis.org / files / publication / 131121 _ Glaser _ TaiwansQuest _ WEB.pdf; American
Chamber of Commerce in Taipei, 2014 Taiwan White Paper 44:6 (June 2014): 5.
65. Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, ‘‘Taiwan and South Korea, Competitors
or Cooperative Partners?’’ Taiwan Insights, November 16, 2012. http://www.taiwan
insights.com/tag/fta; Roy Chun Lee, ‘‘The Importance of TPP for Taiwan’’ (Conference on The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Taiwan’s Future Development Strategy, Stanford University, October 11–12, 2013).
66. Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (Taiwan), ‘‘GDP:
Preliminary Estimation for 2014Q2 and Outlook for 2014–15,’’ August 15, 2014.
http://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=36282&ctNode=2008&mp=5.
67. Alan Romberg, ‘‘Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics,’’
China Leadership Monitor 44 (Summer 2014). http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/research/docs/clm44ar.pdf.
68. Bureau of Foreign Trade (Taiwan), ‘‘Trade Statistics.’’ http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.
69. Mignonne Man-jung Chan, Taiwan in the Global Economic Landscape (TheBrookings Institution, March 2012). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/
2012/03/12-taiwan-global-economy-chan; Min-Hua Chiang and Bernard Gerbier,‘‘Cross-Strait Economic Relations: Recent Development and Implications for Taiwan,’’ Political Economy of Contemporary Asia 13:1 (Spring 2013). http://regulation.revues.org/10177; ‘‘Taiwan Doesn’t Need China’s Consent for FTA with Malaysia: Duh,’’ Want China Times (Taiwan), August 22, 2014. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140822000095&cid=1101; and Ministry of Economic Affairs (Taiwan), ‘‘Progress in Launching and Signing of FTAs between Taiwan and Its Primary Trading Partners,’’ January 7, 2013.
70. Namrata Hasija, ‘‘Time India Stopped Looking at Taiwan through Chinese
Prism,’’ South Asia Monitor, July 11, 2014. http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?
type = sl & nid = 8534; Huang Chiao-wen and Elaine Hou, ‘‘Taiwan Doesn’t Need China’s Consent on FTA with Malaysia: Minister,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 21, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201408210025.aspx; and Ministry of
Economic Affairs (Taiwan), ‘‘Progress in Launching and Signing of FTAs between
Taiwan and Its Primary Trading Partners,’’ January 7, 2013.
71. Bernie Magkilat, PH Not Giving Up FTA with Taiwan (Philippine Institutefor Development Studies, February 16, 2014). http://www.pids.gov.ph/index4.php?pr=643.
72. Kong See Hoh, ‘‘China against Malaysia-Taiwan FTA,’’ Sun Daily (Malaysia), August 20, 2014. http://www.thesundaily.my/news/1146202; Chen Po-ting andTang Yu-lin, ‘‘Taiwan-Australia FTA ‘Not Impeded by Beijing, just Delayed,’ ’’ Want
China Times (Taiwan), October 8, 2014. http://www.wantchinatimes.com / news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20141008000034&cid=1101.
73. Central News Agency (Taiwan), ‘‘All FTA Talks Shelved over Service Pact
Protests: Minister,’’ The China Post (Taiwan), April 22, 2014. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/business/2014/04/22/405923/All-FTA.htm.
74. Kong See Hoh, ‘‘China against Malaysia-Taiwan FTA,’’ Sun Daily (Malaysia), August 20, 2014. http://www.thesundaily.my/news/1146202.
75. Namrata Hasija, ‘‘Time India Stopped Looking at Taiwan through Chinese
Prism,’’ South Asia Monitor, July 11, 2014. http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?
type=sl&nid=8534.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00518

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

507

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

76. Rohit Sinha and Geethanjali Nataraj, ‘‘Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP): Issues and Way Forward,’’ Diplomat, July 30, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep-issues-andway-forward/; Want China Times (Taiwan), ‘‘Taiwan’s Exports Will Suffer if Regional
Integration Fails,’’ May 15, 2014. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclasscnt.aspx?cid=1701&MainCatID=17&id=20140515000126.
77. Elaine Hou, ‘‘Ties with China Linked to Taiwan’s TPP Bid: Official,’’ Central
News Agency (Taiwan), April 24, 2014. http: // focustaiwan.tw / news / aipl / 20140424
0015.aspx; Kwei-Bo Huang, Beyond the Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement:
Seeking a ‘2014 Consensus’ for Taiwan (The Brookings Institution, April 2014).
http://www.brookings.edu / research / opinions / 2014 / 04/30-taiwan-economic-consensushuang; and Alexander Bernard and Paul J. Leaf, ‘‘The U.S., TPP and Taiwan,’’ National Interest, April 24, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-tpp-taiwan10300.
78. Suzie Chen, ‘‘Taiwan Aims to Be a Free-Trade Island,’’ South China Morning
Post (Hong Kong), April 15, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/
1482500/taiwan-aims-be-free-trade-island.
79. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of
Rupert Hammond-Chambers, June 5, 2014.
80. Chris Wang, ‘‘Sunflower Leaders to Form New Activist Organization,’’ Taipei
Times, May 19, 2014. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/05/19/
2003590698.
81. J. Michael Cole, Sunflowers in Springtime: Taiwan’s Crisis and the End of
an Era in Cross-Strait Cooperation (Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, April 9,2014). http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42209&no_cache=1#.VAnLYPldWSo.
82. Shih Hsiu-chuan, ‘‘DPP Service Pact Review a ‘Trick’: KMT,’’ Taipei Times,
March 9, 2014. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/03/09/200358
5231; Loa Iok-sin, ‘‘Legislative Review Descends into Chaos,’’ Taipei Times, March 13,
2014. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/03/13/2003585519.
83. Austin Ramzy, ‘‘Large Crowds Fill Taipei Streets in Protest over China
Trade Bill,’’ New York Times, March 30, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/03/30/large-crowds-fill-taipei-streets-in-protest-over-china-trade-bill/.
84. J. Michael Cole, Sunflowers in Springtime: Taiwan’s Crisis and the End of
an Era in Cross-Strait Cooperation (Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, April 9,2014). http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%
5D=42209&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=1dd7324920ebfb85fd56abf50878d
5fc#.VEaouPnF-So; Austin Ramzy, ‘‘Large Crowds Fill Taipei Streets in Protest over
China Trade Bill,’’ New York Times, March 30, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/large-crowds-fill-taipei-streets-in-protest-over-china-trade-bill/; HsiaoHung Pai, ‘‘Taiwan’s Protestors Are Fighting for the Very Democracy of the Island,’’
Guardian, March 25, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/
25/taiwans-protesters-democracy-china-taiwan-strait.
85. Jonathan Kaiman, ‘‘Taiwan Protesters to End Occupation of Legislature,’’Guardian, April 8, 2014. http: // www.theguardian.com / world / 2014 / apr / 08 / taiwanprotesters-end-occupation-legislature-china-trade.
86. David Brown and Kevin Scott, ‘‘China-Taiwan Relations: A Breakthroughand a Deadlock,’’ Comparative Connections 16:1 (May 2014): 5. http://csis.org/files/
publication/1401qchina_taiwan_0.pdf.
87. Office of the President (Taiwan), ‘‘President Ma’s Remarks on the CrossStrait Trade in Services Agreement,’’ March 23, 2014. http://english.president.gov.tw/
Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=31967&rmid=2355.
88. Alan Romberg, ‘‘Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics,’’
China Leadership Monitor Summer 2014: 44 (July 2014): 2.
89. J. Michael Cole, ‘‘324: Police Brutality or Commensurate Response?’’ China
Policy Institute Blog, March 27, 2014. http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicy
institute/2014/03/27/324-police-brutality-or-commensurate-response/.
90. John Scot Feng, ‘‘Activist Profiles: The Leaders of the Sunflower Student
Movement,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), March 31, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/
news/aipl/201403310016.aspx.
91. Austin Ramzy, ‘‘Concession Offered, Taiwan Group to End Protest of China
Trade Pact,’’ New York Times, April 7, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/
world/asia/concession-offered-taiwan-group-to-end-protest-of-china-trade-pact.html.
92. Wen Kuei-hsiang and Frances Huang, ‘‘Talks on Trade-In-Goods Pact With
China Postponed,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), May 8, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201405080011.aspx.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00519

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

508

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

93. Yin Chun-chie and Christie Chen, ‘‘Cross-Strait Talks Unaffected by Sunflower Movement: SEF Head,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 29, 2014. http://
focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201407290036.aspx.
94. Yang Shu-min, Milly Lin, and Elaine Hou, ‘‘Talks on Goods Trade Pact with
China Slated for September 10 (Update),’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), August28, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201409040038.aspx.
95. Lawrence Chung, ‘‘We’re Listening, Xi Jinping Says to Taiwan,’’ May 8,
2014, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong). http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
article/1507001/were-listening-xi-jinping-says-taiwan; Jenny W. Hsu, ‘‘China Official
Makes Rare Cross-Strait Trip in Effort to Forge Ties With Taiwan,’’ Wall Street
Journal, June 26, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-aims-ease-tensions-withtaiwanese-1403706355?cb=logged0.7325867088511586.
96. Jenny W. Hsu, ‘‘China Official Makes Rare Cross-Strait Trip in Effort toForge Ties with Taiwan,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/
articles/china-aims-ease-tensions-with-taiwanese-1403706355?cb=logged0.7325867088
511586; Chen Binhua, Liu Gang, and Chen Jun, ‘‘One Step Across 65 Years. CrossStrait Relations Enters a New Situation. A Look Back at Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun’s First Visit to Taiwan,’’ Xinhua (Chinese edition), June 29,
2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2014-06/29/c_126686539.htm.
97. Jenny W. Hsu, ‘‘China Official Cancels Appearances after Protests in Taiwan,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-official-cancels-appearances-after-protests-in-taiwan-1403938722; Reuters, ‘‘Mainland Official Zhang Zhijun Shrugs off Violent Protests During Taiwan Visit,’’ South China
Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 1, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/
1544241/mainland-official-zhang-zhijun-shrugs-violent-protests-during-taiwan.
98. Faith Hung, ‘‘China Official Met by Protests, Says Respects Taiwan’s
Choices,’’ Reuters, June 27, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/27/us-chinataiwan-idUSKBN0F209K20140627.
99. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of
JoAnn Fan, June 5, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North
Korea, testimony of Rupert Hammond-Chambers, June 5, 2014.
100. Jenny W. Hsu, ‘‘Taiwan Groups See Red Flag in Hong Kong Election Ruling,’’ Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/taiwangroups-see-red-flag-in-hong-kong-election-ruling-1409509200.
101. National Tsing Hua University Student Association, ‘‘Support Hong Kong’sStudent Movement. Campus Democracy Joint Action.’’ https://sites.google.com/site/
hongkongstudentprotest/home?previewAsViewer=1.
102. Liu Chien-pang and Lilian Wu, ‘‘Taiwanese Civic Groups End Protest outside Hong Kong Office,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 29, 2014. http://
focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201409290027.aspx.
103. James Yu, ‘‘Taiwan’s Perspective,’’ New York Times, October 8, 2014. http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/opinion/taiwans-perspective.html?ref=opinion&_r=0.
104. Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan), ‘‘Cross-Strait Agreements.’’ http://
www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67145&CtNode=5710&mp=1. Staff translation.
105. Zhai Sijia, ‘‘Wang Yu-chi: Cross-Strait Official Contact Is More Institutionalized,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), February 11, 2014. http://www.cna.com.tw/
news/aipl/201402110427-1.aspx. Staff translation.
106. ‘‘Ma Xiaoguang Reads Zhang-Wang Meeting Consensus, Major Initiatives,’’
China Review News (Hong Kong), February 12, 2014. http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/
doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=103017269. Staff translation.
107. Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan), ‘‘Heads of Competent Authorities for
Cross-Strait Affairs Successfully Hold First Meeting, Setting an Important Milestone for the Benign Development, Pragmatism and Progress of Cross-Strait Relations,’’ February 11, 2014. http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=107565&ctNode=6337&mp=3. Staff translation.; Chen Binhua, Zhang Zhanpeng, Ji Xianghui, ‘‘Zhang
Zhijun and Wang Yuchi Meet and Reach Positive Consensus,’’ Xinhua (Chinese edition), February 11, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2014-02/11/c_119288847.htm.
Staff translation.
108. Zhai Sijia, ‘‘Wang Yu-chi: Zhang Zhijun Plans to Visit during the First Halfof the Year,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), February 17, 2014. http://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/201402170294-1.aspx. Staff translation.
109. ‘‘Wang Yu-chi: The Two Sides of the Strait Reach Consensus on Humanitarian Visits for Reciprocal Institutions,’’ Radio Taiwan International, March 27,
2014. http://news.rti.org.tw/news/detail/?recordId=96576. Staff translation.
110. Chris Wang, ‘‘DPP Lawmakers Criticize Wu-Xi Meeting,’’ Taipei Times, June
14, 2013. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/06/14/2003564750.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00520

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

509

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

111. Sigrid Winkler, Taiwan’s UN Dilemma: To Be or Not to Be (The Brookings
Institution, June 2012). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/06/20-tai
wan-un-winkler; Steve Charnovitz, ‘‘Taiwan’s WTO Membership and Its International Implications,’’ George Washington University Law School, 2006. http://
scholarship . law . gwu . edu / cgi / viewcontent . cgi?article=1436&context=faculty_ publica
tions; Taipei Times, ‘‘Interpol Non-Membership Causing Fugitive Problems,’’ February 10, 2007. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/02/10/2003
3v484v00; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of Rupert Hammond-Chambers, June 5, 2014; and Bonnie S. Glaser, Taiwan’s
Quest for Greater Participation in the International Community (Center for Strategic
and International Studies, November 2013). http://csis.org/files/publication/131121_
Glaser_TaiwansQuest_WEB.pdf.
112. Kent Wang, ‘‘Taiwan and the UN Climate Change Framework,’’ Diplomat,
December 6, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/taiwan-and-the-un-climate-changeframework/.
113. The Earth Institute at Columbia University, ‘‘Risk Analysis Reports overHalf of World’s Population Exposed to One or More Major Natural Hazards,’’ March
29, 2005. http://www.earth.columbia.edu/news/2005/story03-29-05.html.
114. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, June 5, 2014.
115. Kin Moy, ‘‘Trends in the U.S.-Taiwan Relationship’’ (Cross-Strait Developments in 2013: New Trends and Prospects, Washington, DC, October 3, 2013).
116. Taipei Times, ‘‘Taiwan Invited to WHA as Observer,’’ April 16, 2014. http://
www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/04/16/2003588134.
117. China Post (Taiwan), ‘‘President-Elect Ma Calls for ‘Diplomatic Truce’ with
China,’’ May 11, 2008. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/
2008/05/11/155861/p1/President-elect-Ma.htm; Office of the President (Taiwan), ‘‘Viable Diplomacy.’’ http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=1077. Staff translation.
118. Angela Tsai and Scully Hsiao, ‘‘Gambian Aid Request Linked to Broken Ties
with Taiwan: Minister,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), November 25, 2013. http://
focustaiwan.tw/search/201311250017.aspx?q=gambia.
119. Sidi Sanneh, ‘‘Banjul-Taipei Diplomatic Rupture,’’ Sidi Sanneh (Blog), November 14, 2013. http://sidisanneh.blogspot.com/2013/11/banjul-taipei-diplomaticrupture.html.
120. Lucy Hornby and Luc Cohen, ‘‘No Ties? No Problem as China Courts Taiwan’s Remaining Allies,’’ Reuters, August 6, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/08/06/us-china-centralamerica-idUSBRE97514C20130806.
121. Reuters, ‘‘China to Open Mission with Tiny Sao Tome, Despite Its Taiwan
Links,’’ November 14, 2013. http: // www.reuters.com / article / 2013 / 11 / 14 / us-chinasaotome-idUSBRE9AD0CJ20131114; Hsieh Chia-chen and Lilian Wu, ‘‘Taiwan Perturbed by Sao Tome and Principe President’s Visit to China,’’ Central News Agency(Taiwan), June 6, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201406060014.aspx.
122. U.S.-Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of Ian
Easton, June 5, 2014.
123. U.S.-Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of Ian
Easton, June 5, 2014.
124. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, June 2014, pp. 77–
78.
125. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2014 (London,
UK: Routledge, 2014). pp. 281–282.
126. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof William Murray, June 5, 2014.
127. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof William Murray, June 5, 2014; Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, andJingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile
Ambitions (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, April 2014), p. 81.
128. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof William Murray, June 5, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00521

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

510

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

129. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof William Murray, June 5, 2014.
130. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s
Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities, testimony ofMark Stokes, May 20, 2010.
131. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on TaiwanChina: Recent Economic, Political and Military Developments across the Strait andImplications for the United States, testimony of Mark Stokes, March 10, 2010.
132. Jeremy Page, ‘‘China Raises Defense Spending 12.2% for 2014,’’ WallStreet Journal, March 5, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270
2304732804579421021045941010; Shirley Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales
since 1990 (Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2014), p. 34.
133. Shirley Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990 (Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2014), p. 34.
134. Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan), ‘‘Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China: Beijing’s Hostility toward ROC,’’ March 22, 2013.
http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/392314564819.gif.
135. Oliver Bräuner, ‘‘How Europe Shies from Taiwan,’’ Diplomat, March 20,
2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/03/how-europe-shies-from-taiwan/.
136. J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Taiwan Unveils ‘Wan Chien’ Air-To-Ground Cruise Missile,’’ Diplomat, January 17, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/taiwan-unveilswan-chien-air-to-ground-cruise-missile/; Gavin Phipps, ‘‘Taiwan Unveils Upgraded
IDF, Wan Chien Stand-Off Missile,’’ Jane’s, January 15, 2014. http://www.janes.com/
article/32443/taiwan-unveils-upgraded-idf-wan-chien-stand-off-missile.
137. Zhu Ming, ‘‘Locked on to the Liaoning, Extended-Range Hsiung-Feng 3 Missile to Begin Production,’’ Storm Media Group (Taiwan), February 23, 2014. http://
www.stormmediagroup.com/opencms/investigate/detail/28b23ab6-9b73-11e3-ae7e-ef28
04cba5a1/?uuid=28b23ab6-9b73-11e3-ae7e-ef2804cba5a1Open; J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Taiwan Unveils Road-Mobile ‘‘Carrier Killer’’ Launcher,’’ Diplomat, August 16, 2013.
http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/taiwan-unveils-road-mobile-carrier-killer-launcher/.
138. J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Taiwan Unveils Road-Mobile ‘‘Carrier Killer’’ Launcher,’’
Diplomat, August 16, 2013. http: // thediplomat.com / 2013 / 08 / taiwan-unveils-roadmobile-carrier-killer-launcher/.
139. Ridzwan Rahmat, ‘‘Taiwan Launches First ‘Carrier Killer’ Stealth Missile
Corvette,’’ March 13, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/35351/taiwan-launches-firstcarrier-killer-stealth-missile-corvette.
140. Claudia Liu and Jay Chen, ‘‘Taiwan’s First ‘Aircraft Carrier Killer’ Delivered,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), March 14, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/
aipl/201403140004.aspx.
141. James Holmes, ‘‘Taiwan’s Navy Gets Stealthy,’’ Diplomat, April 30, 2012.
http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/30/taiwan%E2%80%99s-navy-gets-stealthy/; J. MichaelCole, ‘‘ ‘Carrier Killer’ Program Goes Ahead,’’ Taipei Times, April 28, 2012. http://
www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/04/28/2003531472.
142. Claudia Liu and Sofia Wu, ‘‘Taiwan Developing Weapons Capable UAV,’’
Central News Agency (Taiwan), December 6, 2013. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/
201312060012.aspx.
143. Luo Tianbin, ‘‘Taiwan’s UAVs Conduct Reconnaissance on China,’’ Liberty
Times (Taiwan), July 13, 2014. http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/795567.
Staff translation; Zackary Keck, ‘‘Taiwan’s Using Drones to Spy on China,’’ Diplomat, July 13, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/taiwans-using-drones-to-spy-onchina/.
144. Tang Pei-chun and Jeffrey Wu, ‘‘U.S. Delivery of P–3C Aircraft to Taiwan
on Schedule: Military,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), February 5, 2014. http://
focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201402050027.aspx.
145. Rich Chang, ‘‘Han Kuang War Games to Focus on Invasion: Ministry,’’ Taipei Times, April 23, 2014. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/04/
23/2003588694; Gavin Phipps, ‘‘Taiwan Debuts New Kit at ‘Han Kuang’ Drills,’’
Jane’s, September 19, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/43297/taiwan-debuts-newkit-at-han-kuang-drills.
146. U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Security Report: Annual Review
2012 (U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, January 1, 2013), p. 22; ‘‘First Six AH–64E
Apache Attack Helicopters Arrive,’’ Taipei Times, November 5, 2013. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/11/05/2003576198.
147. ‘‘First Six AH–64E Apache Attack Helicopters Arrive,’’ Taipei Times, November 5, 2013. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/11/05/2003576198;
Army Technology.com, ‘‘Taiwanese Army Receives Third Apache Batch from US,’’
March 20, 2014. http://www.army-technology.com/news/newstaiwanese-army-receives-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00522

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

511

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

third-apache-batch-from-us-4200309; and Central News Agency (Taiwan), ‘‘Test
Flights of Six More Apache Helicopters in Taiwan,’’ August 31, 2014. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140831000022&cid=1101.
148. J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Taiwan Showcases AH–64E Apache Guardian Helicopters,’’
Diplomat, December 14, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/taiwan-showcases-ah64e-apache-guardian-helicopters/.
149. Zhu Ming, ‘‘Han Kuang Simulation. European Bison Attacks Taipei,’’ StormMedia Group (Taiwan), May 23, 2014. http://www.stormmediagroup.com/opencms/
news/detail/814ad916-e26f-11e3-9580-ef2804cba5a1/?uuid=814ad916-e26f-11e3-9580ef2804cba5a1. Staff translation; J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Taiwan Showcases AH–64E Apache
Guardian Helicopters,’’ Diplomat, December 14, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/taiwan-showcases-ah-64e-apache-guardian-helicopters/.
150. Shirley Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990 (Congressional Research Service, March 14, 2013), p. 25.
151. Wendell Minnick and Aaron Mehta, ‘‘Taiwan Faces Tough Choices after US
Cancels F–16 Upgrade,’’ Defense News, March 8, 2014. http://www.defensenews.com/
article/20140308/DEFREG03/303080020/Taiwan -Faces -Tough -Choices -After-USCancels-F-16-Upgrade; Chen Jiaqi and Wang Jionghua, ‘‘U.S. Cuts Military Budget.
It is Feared Taiwan’s F-16’s Will be Hard to Upgrade,’’ Apple Daily (Taiwan), March
10, 2014. http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/international/20140310/
35690353/. Staff translation.
152. Kelven Huang and Elizabeth Hsu, ‘‘Taiwan Still Hoping to Buy F–35 Fighters from U.S.: Defense Official,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 19, 2014.
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201408190034.aspx.
153. Aries Poon, Eva Dou, and Fanny Liu, ‘‘Taiwan Cuts Back Order for Secondhand U.S. Warships: Budget Concerns Trump Fears of China’s Growing Military
Clout,’’ Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2014. http: // online.wsj.com / news / articles /SB10001424052702303887804579501254256746972.
154. Rogge Chen and Jay Chen, ‘‘Taiwan to Buy Two U.S. Frigates,’’ Central
News Agency (Taiwan), May 20, 2013. http: // focustaiwan.tw / news / aipl / 20130520
0036.aspx; Wendell Minnick, ‘‘Taiwan Looks to Buy Two Perry Class Frigates from
U.S.,’’ Defense News, March 16, 2012. http://minnickarticles.blogspot.com/2012/10/
taiwan-looks-to-buy-2-perry-class.html.
155. ‘‘A Bill To Provide for the Transfer of Naval Vessels to Certain Foreign Recipients, And for Other Purposes,’’ S. 1683, 113th Congress, 1st Session. November
14, 2013.
156. Jason Pan, ‘‘Military Unveils Plan to Construct New Submarines,’’ Taipei
Times, October 1, 2014. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/10/
01/2003601004.
157. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Ian Easton, June 5, 2014.
158. Rich Chang, ‘‘Han Kuang War Games to Focus on Invasion: Ministry,’’ Taipei Times, April 23, 2014. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/04/
23/2003588694; Fu S. Mei, ‘‘Taiwan’s Defense Transformation and Challenges Under
Ma Ying-Jeou’’ (Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, April 22, 2011). http://www.jamestown.org / programs / chinabrief / single / ?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37838&tx_tt
news%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash = 183b175e8af7574c0a1645d6c2912560#.VCwYjfld
WSo.
159. U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Security Report: Annual Review
2012 (U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, January 2013), p. 17; Katherine Wei, ‘‘Military’s Budget Should Favor Weapons over Recruitment: DPP,’’ China Post (Taiwan),
May 9, 2013; Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), National Defense Report, October 27, 2009. Open Source Center ID: CPP20091027312001.
160. Joseph Yeh, ‘‘Plans for Downsizing of Military Not Yet Finalized: MND,’’
China Post (Taiwan), May 29, 2014. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/
national-news/2014/05/29/408853/Plans-for.htm.
161. Claudia Liu and Jay Chen, ‘‘Size of Taiwan’s Armed Forces to Be Cut Further,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), January 20, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/
aipl/201401200030.aspx.
162. Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), National Defense Report 2013, October 2013, p. 151; Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), 2013 Quadrennial Defense
Review, March 2013, p. 59.
163. J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Taiwan’s All-Volunteer Military ‘Vision or Nightmare’?,’’ Diplomat, July 9, 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/taiwans-all-volunteer-militaryvision-or-nightmare/1/.
164. Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), National Defense Report 2013, October 2013, pp. 152–153.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00523

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

512

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

165. Hsieh Chia-chen and Maia Huang, ‘‘Taiwan to Dispatch Navy Vessel to Deliver Supplies to the Philippines,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), November 24,
2013. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/asoc/201311240015.aspx; Emerson Lim, Pan Chi-i
and Y.F. Low, ‘‘ROC Naval Ship Reaches Philippines with Relief Supplies,’’ Central
News Agency (Taiwan), November 29, 2013. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201311
290011.aspx.
166. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan), ‘‘Love and Empathy Transcend Boundaries: Relief Aid Extended by the Republic of China to the Philippines in Wake ofTyphoon Haiyan.’’ http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/WebArchive/1304/8cdc1037-57084eb2-8f82-c33d8c006c6f.PDF.
167. Kelven Huang and S.C. Chang, ‘‘Taiwan Ships, Aircraft Drill inside China’s
ADIZ in East China Sea,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), February 26, 2014. http://
focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201402260023.aspx.
168. Gavin Phipps and James Hardy, ‘‘Taiwan Holds Biggest Spratly Islands
Drill in 15 Years,’’ Jane’s, April 29, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/37245/taiwanholds-biggest-spratly-islands-drill-in-15-years; ‘‘Seven Military Ships and 20 Amphibious Assault Vehicles Attack Taiping Island. ‘Territorial Defense Campaign’ Declares Sovereignty,’’ ettoday.net, April 28, 2014. http://www.ettoday.net/news/2014
0428/351355.htm. Staff translation; and Zachary Keck, ‘‘Taiwan Holds Largest
South China Sea Military Drill Since 2000,’’ Diplomat, May 7, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/taiwan-holds-largest-south-china-sea-military-drill-since-2000/.
169. Liu Chien-pang and Christie Chen, ‘‘Taiping Island Pier to Be Completed by
2015,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), October 6, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/
aipl/201410060007.aspx; Zachary Keck, ‘‘Taiwan Holds Largest South China Sea
Military Drill Since 2000,’’ Diplomat, May 7, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/
taiwan-holds-largest-south-china-sea-military-drill-since-2000/; Taiwan Area National Freeway Bureau, ‘‘Introduction to Nansha Taiping Island Transportation Infrastructure Project.’’ http://www.freeway.gov.tw/Upload/Html/201471595/page03.html.
170. Joseph Yeh, ‘‘MND to Kick Off War Games with China’s First Carrier in
Mind,’’ China Post (Taiwan), May 19, 2014. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/
national/national-news/2014/05/19/408074/MND-to.htm.
171. Gavin Phipps, ‘‘Taiwan Debuts New Kit at ‘Han Kuang’ Drills,’’ Jane’s, September 19, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/43297/taiwan-debuts-new-kit-at-hankuang-drills.
172. Commission staff interview with a member of multiple U.S. Pacific Command observation teams, August 29, 2014.
173. J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Chinese Surveillance Aircraft Enter Taiwan’s Airspace,’’
Diplomat, August 27, 2014. http: // thediplomat.com / 2014 / 08 / chinese - surveillance aircraft - enter - taiwans - airspace / ; Julian Ku, ‘‘Dear News Agencies of the World:
China Did Not Breach Taiwan’s Airspace, Just Its ADIZ,’’ Opinio Juris (Blog), August 27, 2014. http://opiniojuris.org/2014/08/27/dear-news-agencies-world-air-defenseidentification- zones- territorial - airspace /?utm_ source = rss&utm_ medium = rss&utm_
campaign = dear - news - agencies - world - air - defense - identification - zones - territorial airspace.
174. J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Chinese Surveillance Aircraft Enter Taiwan’s Airspace,’’
Diplomat, August 27, 2014. http: // thediplomat.com / 2014 / 08 / chinese - surveillance aircraft-enter-taiwans-airspace/.
175. Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), National Defense Report 2013, October 2013, p. 70.
176. Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), National Defense Report 2013, October 2013, p. 70.
177. Lo Tien-pin and Jake Chung, ‘‘Defense Ministry Increases Budget for Cyber
Warfare,’’ Taipei Times, September 3, 2012. http: // www.taipeitimes.com / News /taiwan / archives / 2012 / 09 / 03 / 2003541852; Paul Nash, ‘‘Taipei’s Cyberwarfare Gambit,’’ Diplomatic Courier, November 28, 2012. http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/
regions/asia/224-taipei-s-cyberwarfare-gambit; China Post (Taiwan), ‘‘Lawmakers to
Inspect New Cyber Warfare Unit,’’ May 30, 2013. http: // www.chinapost.com.tw /taiwan / national / national-news / 2013/ 05/ 30/ 379919/ Lawmakers-to.htm; and Lin
Nansen, ‘‘Taiwan Military Cyber Unit Revealed for the First Time to Legislators,’’
BBC (Chinese edition), May 31, 2013. http: // www.bbc.co.uk / zhongwen / trad / china /2013 / 05 /130531_tw_cyberwar_unit_byjameslin.shtml. Staff translation.
178. Tourism Bureau (Taiwan), ‘‘Visitor Arrivals by Residence, 2013.’’ http://admin.taiwan.net.tw/statistics/year_en.aspx?no=15; Tourism Bureau (Taiwan), ‘‘Visitor Arrivals by Residence, 2008.’’ http://admin.taiwan.net.tw/statistics/File/200812/
table02_2008.pdf.
179. Rich Chang, ‘‘Former Lieutenant Guilty of Spying,’’ Taipei Times, March 2,
2013. http: // www.taipeitimes.com / News / taiwan / archives / 2013 / 03 / 02 / 2003556087;

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00524

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

513

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Former Officer Gets 12 Life Terms in China Spy Case,’’ Taipei
Times, February 7, 2013. http: // www.taipeitimes.com / News / taiwan / archives / 2013 /
02 / 07 / 2003554439/1; United Daily News, ‘‘A Reproduction of the Luo Xianzhe Case?
High-ranking Navy Officers Suspected of Leaking Secrets to Communist China,’’
February 4, 2013. http: // news.rti.org.tw / index _ newsContent.aspx?nid = 404528. Staff
translation; China Post (Taiwan), ‘‘Ex-Air Force Major Given 20 Years for Info
Leak,’’ April 29, 2014. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/
2014/04/29/406476/Ex-Air-Force.htm; and Jason Pan, ‘‘Retired Colonel Detained on
Spying Charges,’’ Taipei Times, September 24, 2014. http://www.taipeitimes.com/
News/taiwan/archives/2014/09/24/2003600462.
180. Agence France-Presse, ‘‘Taiwan Air Force Major Jailed for Spying for China,’’
April 28, 2014. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140428/DEFREG03/304280015/
Taiwan-Air-Force-Major-Jailed-Spying-China; Pin-Fen Kok and David J. Firestein,
Threading the Needle: Proposals for U.S. and Chinese Actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan (EastWest Institute, September 2013), p. 76. http://www.ewi.info/sites/default/
files/TAS%20Final%20%2528ISSUU%20VERSION%209_17_2013%2529.pdf.
181. Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), National Defense Report 2013, October 2013, pp. 157–158.
182. Lin Nansen, ‘‘Taiwan Military Says Overseas Personnel All Pass Polygraph,’’BBC (Chinese edition), November 5, 2012. http: // www.bbc.co.uk / zhongwen / trad /chinese_news/2012/11/121105_twchinaspy_byjames.shtml. Staff translation.
183. J. Michael Cole, ‘‘A Defection to China and the Threat to National Security,’’Thinking Taiwan, May 23, 2014. http://thinking-taiwan.com/a-defection-to-china/;
Want China Times (Taiwan), ‘‘Top Taiwanese Scientist Chen Kun-shan Defects to
China,’’ May 24, 2014. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20
140524000026&cid=1103.
184. Zhou Meihong and Luo Tianbin, ‘‘Satellite Remote Sensing Expert Quits Position and Joins China,’’ Liberty Times (Taiwan), May 23, 2014. http://news.ltn.vcom.tw/news/focus/paper/781372. Staff translation.
185. J. Michael Cole, ‘‘A Defection to China and the Threat to National Security,’’Thinking Taiwan, May 23, 2014. http://thinking-taiwan.com/a-defection-to-china/.
186. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Ian Easton, June 5, 2014.
187. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing on the Promise of the Taiwan Relations Act, testimony of Kin Moy, March 14, 2014; Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearing on Evaluating
U.S. Policy on Taiwan on the 35th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, testimony of Daniel Russel, April 3, 2014; and Ma Ying-jeou, ‘‘A Video Conference with
His Excellency President Ma Ying-jeou, Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, and Dr. Paul Wolfowitz,’’ April 9, 2014. http://csis.org/files/attachments/140409_Ma_Videoconference_transcript.pdf.
188. Joseph Yeh, ‘‘US EPA Chief Praises ROC’s Environmental Protection Successes,’’ China Post (Taiwan), April 15, 2014. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/
foreign-affairs/2014/04/15/405373/p1/US-EPA.htm.
189. Gina McCarthy, ‘‘Remarks by Administrator Gina McCarthy of the U.S. Environmental Protection Administration’’ (National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, April 14, 2014).
190. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, ‘‘Collaboration with Environmental
Protection Administration Taiwan (EPAT).’’ http://www2.epa.gov/internationalcooperation / collaboration - environmental - protection - administration - taiwan - epat #programs.
191. Kerry Dumbaugh, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations(Congressional Research Service, April 20, 2007), p. 7.
192. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of
Rupert Hammond-Chambers, June 5, 2014.
193. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of
Rupert Hammond-Chambers, June 5, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, June 5, 2014.
194. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, June 5, 2014.
195. Ministry of National Defense (Taiwan), ‘‘U.S. Agrees to Taiwan F–16A/B
Retrofit,’’ September 21, 2011. http: // www.mnd.gov.tw / Publish.aspx?cnid=67&p=49539.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00525

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

514

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

196. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian andPacific Affairs, Hearing on Evaluating U.S. Policy on Taiwan on the 35th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, written testimony of Randall Schriver, April 3,
2014.
197. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof David Firestein, June 5, 2014.
198. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof David Firestein, June 5, 2014.
199. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Ian Easton, June 5, 2014.
200. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Ian Easton, June 5, 2014.
201. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Ian
Easton, June 5, 2014.
202. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, June 5, 2014.
203. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Ian Easton, June 5, 2014; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North
Korea, testimony of Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, June 5, 2014; Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearing on Evaluating U.S. Policy on Taiwan on the 35th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act,
written testimony of Randall Schriver, April 3, 2014; and Mark Stokes and Russell
Hsiao, ‘‘Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan,’’ Diplomat, April 13, 2012. http: // thediplomat.com/2012/04/why-u-s-military-needs-taiwan/1/.
204. Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, ‘‘Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan,’’ Diplomat, April 13, 2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/why-u-s-military-needs-taiwan/
1/.
205. Wendell Minnick, ‘‘US Might Tap into Taiwan Early Warning Radar,’’ Defense News, May 8, 2014. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140508/DEFREG03/
305080026/US-Might-Tap-Into-Taiwan-Early-Warning-Radar.
206. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Ian Easton, June 5, 2014.
207. Michael Gold, ‘‘Taiwan Is a ‘Testing Ground’ for Chinese Cyber Army,’’ Reuters, July 18, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/19/net-us-taiwan-cyberidUSBRE96H1C120130719.
208. Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, ‘‘Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan,’’ Diplomat, April 13, 2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/why-u-s-military-needs-taiwan/
1/; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimony of
Ian Easton, June 5, 2014.
209. Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, ‘‘Why U.S. Military Needs Taiwan,’’ Diplomat, April 13, 2012. http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/why-u-s-military-needs-taiwan/
1/.
210. Ma Ying-jeou, ‘‘A Video Conference with His Excellency President Ma Yingjeou, Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, and Dr. Paul Wolfowitz,’’ April 9, 2014. http://csis.org/
files/attachments/140409_Ma_Videoconference_transcript.pdf.
211. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing on the Promise of the Taiwan Relations Act, testimony of Kin Moy, March 14, 2014; Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearing on Evaluating
U.S. Policy on Taiwan on the 35th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, testimony of Daniel Russel, April 3, 2014.
212. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, testimony of Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, June 5, 2014.
213. Kin Moy, ‘‘Trends in the U.S.-Taiwan Relationship’’ (Cross-Strait Developments in 2013: New Trends and Prospects, Washington, DC, October 3, 2013).
214. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on Recent
Developments in China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea, written testimonyof Ian Easton, June 5, 2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00526

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

515

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

215. U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Samuel Locklear III, Nominee to Be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, February 9, 2012. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg80073/pdf/CHRG-112shrg
80073.pdf; Nick Zahn, ‘‘Senator Cornyn: Urgent Action Needed to Bolster Taiwan
Defense,’’ The Daily Signal, February 12, 2013. http://dailysignal.com/2013/02/12/
senator - cornyn - urgent - action - needed - to - bolster - taiwan - defense /; Phillip Saunders,‘‘The 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review of the ROC’’ (Taiwan’s Response to an
Evolving Security Environment, Washington, DC, April 29, 2013); and Michael
Mazza, Taiwanese Hard Power: Between a ROC and a Hard Place (American Enterprise Institute, April 2014). http://www.aei.org/files/2014/04/24/-taiwanese-hardpower-between-a-roc-and-a-hard-place_092826925958.pdf.
216. John E. Lee, Taiwan’s ‘Will to Fight’ and Implications for U.S. Operations(Defense Technical Information Center, May 23, 2008), p. 1. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/
tr/fulltext/u2/a484450.pdf.
217. J. Michael Cole, ‘‘Would Taiwan Fight?’’ Diplomat, September 24, 2012.
http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/would-taiwan-fight/.
218. Elaine Hou, ‘‘Taiwan-Philippine Fisheries Agreement to Be Signed Soon: Official,’’ Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 24, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/
aipl/201407240030.aspx.
219. Bonnie Glaser, A Role for Taiwan in Promoting Peace in the South China
Sea (Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2014). http: // csis.org /publication/role-taiwan-promoting-peace-south-china-sea; Jeffrey A. Bader, The U.S.
and China’s Nine-Dash Line: Ending the Ambiguity (The Brookings Institution, February 6, 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-china-ninedash-line-bader.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00527

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

SECTION 4: HONG KONG
Introduction
This section examines the controversy over implementing electoral reform in Hong Kong’s 2017 chief executive election and theresulting pro-democracy protests; China’s increasing military presence in Hong Kong; and Hong Kong’s declining freedom of thepress. It is based on briefings by foreign government officials, meetings with subject matter experts, and independent research. The
section concludes with a discussion of the implications of China’s
growing interference in Hong Kong’s political development for theUnited States. At the time of writing (October 29, 2014), events
surrounding Hong Kong’s electoral reform process were still developing.
Controversy over Electoral Reform
Throughout the reporting year, debate surrounding how to electHong Kong’s next chief executive in 2017 reflected a broader struggle regarding China’s role in Hong Kong’s political development.
China’s ‘‘basic policies’’ concerning Hong Kong are outlined in the1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, a legally binding international
treaty that dictated the terms of Hong Kong’s handover from theUnited Kingdom in 1997.1 In the Joint Declaration, China granted
Hong Kong a ‘‘high degree of autonomy,’’ and promised that ‘‘Hong
Kong will retain its current lifestyle and legal, social, and economic
systems until at least the year 2047,’’ while China would administer Hong Kong’s defense and foreign affairs in accordance withthe ‘‘one country, two systems’’ policy.2 The Joint Declaration alsoestablished that Hong Kong’s chief executive will be appointed by
China’s central government ‘‘on the basis of the results of elections
or consultations to be held locally.’’ 3
Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, serves to legally
implement China’s obligations under the Joint Declaration.4 The
Basic Law holds that the ‘‘ultimate aim’’ for the development ofHong Kong’s electoral system is to select the chief executive ‘‘byuniversal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.’’ 5In the reporting year, Hong Kong’s government advanced the electoral reform process to achieve the goal of implementing universal
suffrage in the 2017 chief executive election. Pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong supported not just expansion of suffrage to all
Hong Kong’s voters, but also relaxation of nominating requirements for potential candidates. While Beijing’s decision on Hong
Kong’s electoral reform allows all eligible voters to participate in
the next chief executive election, it proposes a nominating mechanism that will likely impede democratic candidates from standing

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(516)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00528

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

517
for election. This violates commitments made in the Basic Law to
uphold election by ‘‘democratic procedures.’’
Electoral Reform Framework Proposed by Beijing
On August 31, 2014, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC)
issued a decision that set new parameters for electing Hong Kong’s
next chief executive. NPC’s ruling declared that in 2017 the chief
executive may be elected by universal suffrage by the city’s 5 million eligible voters.6 While implementing universal suffrage is considered a milestone for Hong Kong’s political development, the
NPC’s decision—hailed by Beijing as ‘‘historic progress’’ 7—ironically limits the choice of candidates that voters will have if Beijing’s
proposal is approved by Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo).8
Currently, to be nominated, a potential chief executive candidate
must be supported by no fewer than 150 members (or 12.5 percent)of the 1,200-member election committee, which since Hong Kong’s
handover has also been responsible for electing the chief executive.9 While election committee membership has expanded from
400 members in the first chief executive election to 1,200 membersin the 2012 election, election committee members represent a mere
0.03 percent of Hong Kong’s registered voter population.* 10 Moreover, election committee members are exclusively selected fromfour major ‘‘sectors’’ (see Figure 1). With strong business and political ties to mainland China, many members are local elites seeking
to gain favor with Beijing.11 One member of LegCo estimated thatnearly 80 percent of election committee members are controlled by
Beijing.12 As a result of its small size and bias, the current nominating mechanism cannot reasonably be considered ‘‘broadly representative’’ as required by the Basic Law.13

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* As of July 25, 2014, Hong Kong’s registered voters numbered 3,507,786. Hong Kong SAR’s
Voter Registration Bureau, ‘‘Voter Registration Statistics,’’ July 25, 2014. http: // www.voter
registration.gov.hk/eng/statistic2014.html#1.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00529

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

518
Figure 1:

Composition of the Election Committee(Selected Subsectors)

Source: Hong Kong SAR Government, ‘‘Let’s Talk and Achieve Universal Suffrage,’’ December
2013, pp. 55–56. http://www.2017.gov.hk/filemanager/template/en/doc/Con_Doc_e (FINAL)_with_cover.pdf.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00530

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C3S4Fig1.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Implementing universal suffrage in the 2017 election will improve upon the current election configuration in which only a miniscule fraction of Hong Kong’s voters can participate, but Beijing’s
proposed framework for nominating chief executive candidates ismore restrictive than the current mechanism. According to the
NPC, only two or three candidates may be nominated to stand forelection in 2017. Each candidate must be supported by more than
50 percent of the nominating committee, compared with 12.5 percent in the 2012 election.14 Beijing announced that the 2017 nominating committee shall be formed ‘‘in accordance with the numberof members, composition, and formation method of the Election
Committee,’’ 15 such that the new nominating committee is expected to maintain the same pro-Beijing bias as the current election committee. Democracy advocates in Hong Kong worry that,though all eligible voters would have the opportunity to participate
in the next chief executive election if Beijing’s proposed framework
is approved, the proposed nominating mechanism rules out the possibility of ‘‘genuine’’ democratic election because voters will only beable to choose among two or three Beijing-approved candidates.16
Beijing’s proposal also stipulates that the chief executive must bea ‘‘patriot’’ 17 who ‘‘loves the country and loves Hong Kong.’’ 18 In
remarks made in 1984 regarding the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China under the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ policy,

519
former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping * identified a ‘‘patriot’’ as‘‘one who respects the Chinese nation, sincerely supports the motherland’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, and wishes not
to impair Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.’’ 19 In contrast, Beijing’s current interpretation of the term ‘‘patriot’’ suggests thatHong Kong’s next chief executive should be loyal to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). In an article published by state-run
media outlet Global Times on September 10, 2014, Chen Xiankui,
a professor of Marxism at the Renmin University of China, wrotethat ‘‘love of party and love of country are one and the same inmodern China,’’ implying that loyalty to the CCP is requisite forpatriotism.20 Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of the Global Times, likewise
argued on September 3 that separation of love of the Party fromthe concept of patriotism is a ‘‘poisonous arrow’’ fired by those with‘‘ulterior motives’’ seeking to undermine China’s unity.21
Beijing’s conflation of loving the country with loving the Party
extends to Hong Kong’s administrators. During a press conference
explaining Beijing’s electoral reform proposal, Li Fei, deputy secretary-general of the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC), stated ‘‘itgoes without saying’’ that chief executive candidates must love boththe country and the Party.22 After democracy advocates in Hong
Kong reacted angrily toward the patriotism requirement, NPCSC
chairman Zhang Dejiang reportedly said the next chief executive‘‘doesn’t have to love the Communist Party, or uphold the Communist Party,’’ according to Michael Tien, deputy chairman of asmall, pro-Beijing political party in Hong Kong.23 Zhang clarified
that candidates ‘‘can’t be against the Communist Party and oneparty rule.’’ 24 It is unclear whether conflicting views on patriotism
among government officials are due to ‘‘ideological divergence’’
within the CCP or rhetorical confusion.25
While the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ principle and the Basic
Law stipulate that the chief executive is ‘‘accountable’’ to both the
Chinese and Hong Kong governments,26 nowhere does the law
mandate that the chief executive must be a patriot or loyal to the
CCP. Likewise, according to Deng Xiaoping’s original explanationof the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ policy, Hong Kong’s leader neednot ‘‘be in favor of China’s socialist system,’’ but only ‘‘love themotherland and Hong Kong.’’ 27 However, in a strongly-worded
white paper on the implementation of the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ policy in Hong Kong issued on June 10, 2014, China’s StateCouncil Information Office reasserted the central government’s position on how the policy applies to Hong Kong’s administrators. The
white paper, a high-level document intended to explain Beijing’s
policies to foreign audiences, addressed what Beijing considers the‘‘many wrong views’’ surrounding Hong Kong’s political development that stem from ‘‘confused’’ and ‘‘lopsided’’ understanding ofthe ‘‘one country, two systems’’ principle.† 28

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Though Deng never assumed the position of Communist Party Chairman, he held a working
majority in the party’s leadership, and was considered China’s de facto ruler from the late 1970s
through 1997.
† China has in the past issued white papers on Xinjiang (2003, 2009), Taiwan (1993, 2000),and several papers on separatist threats in Tibet. Open Source Center, Hong Kong: White Paper
Reaffirms China’s Predominance Over Political Reform, August 25, 2014. ID: CHR20140825
61421053.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00531

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

520
China’s White Paper on the Practice of‘‘One Country, Two Systems’’• Hong Kong’s Autonomy: The white paper emphasized that Beijing maintains ‘‘overall jurisdiction’’ over Hong Kong, and thatthe ‘‘high degree of autonomy’’ guaranteed in Hong Kong’s
Basic Law is derived ‘‘solely from the authorization by the central leadership.’’ The State Council asserted that, for Hong
Kong, ‘‘there is no such thing called ‘residual power.’’’ In accordance with the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ principle, the existence and preservation of Hong Kong’s capitalist system ‘‘issubordinate to and derived from ‘one country’.’’ 29• Universal Suffrage: The white paper proclaimed Beijing’s commitment to implementing a conditional form of universal suffrage in the 2017 chief executive election, which ‘‘must serve
the country’s sovereignty, security and development interests’’and ‘‘tally with Hong Kong’s actual conditions.’’ Any system ofuniversal suffrage ‘‘must conform to HKSAR’s [Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region] legal status as a local administrative region directly under the central government’’ and in‘‘accord with’’ relevant NPCSC resolutions.30• Mandatory Patriotism: The white paper asserted that ‘‘loyalty’’and ‘‘loving the country’’ are ‘‘basic political requirements forHong Kong’s administrators.’’ 31 This assertion echoed claims
made by Chinese officials throughout the reporting year thatthe next chief executive of Hong Kong should abide by theprinciple of ‘‘love the country, love Hong Kong’’ and should not
oppose nor confront China’s central government.32
The barristers of the Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) haveargued the requirement that Hong Kong’s chief executive love
China is ‘‘highly questionable as a matter of law’’ and ‘‘cannot
possibly be a reasonable restriction’’ as it contradicts articles
in the Basic Law that guarantee the right to stand for election
in keeping with ‘‘democratic procedures.’’ 33 Moreover, theHKBA has also argued that the categorization of Hong Kong’s
judges and judicial officers as ‘‘Hong Kong’s administrators’’
upon whom a political requirement is imposed, as stated in
the white paper, would send the message that Hong Kong’s
courts are ‘‘part of the machinery of the Government and singin unison with it.’’ 34

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Foreign Intervention: The white paper warned of ‘‘outside
forces’’ that are attempting to ‘‘use Hong Kong to interfere in
China’s domestic affairs,’’ and called on readers to ‘‘preventand repel the attempt made by a very small number of people
who act in collusion with outside forces’’ from interfering with
Beijing’s interpretation of ‘‘one country, two systems’’ in HongKong.35 Chinese state-run media and Chinese officials warned
that Western-backed ‘‘color revolutions’’ 36 and ‘‘street politics’’ 37 bring not democracy but chaos comparable to that in
Ukraine and the Middle East.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00532

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

521
While the existing system has twice allowed democrats to run,*requiring potential chief executive candidates to satisfy Beijing’s
standards of patriotism and earn approval from a largely pro-Beijing nominating committee makes it unlikely that a democratic
candidate will be nominated, marking a ‘‘colossal step backwards’’in Hong Kong’s political development, according to former head ofHong Kong’s civil service Anson Chan.38 As such, Beijing’s proposal
appears to conflict with Article 45 of the Basic Law, which calls forelection by universal suffrage in accordance with ‘‘democratic procedures.’’ 39 Activists argue that Beijing’s proposal also violates Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR) as established by the United Nations Human Rights
Council, which stipulates:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 andwithout unreasonable restrictions:(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directlyor through freely chosen representatives;(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrageand shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing thefree expression of the will of the electors;(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.40
Article 39 of the Basic Law states that the ICCPR ‘‘shall remain
in force and shall be implemented through the laws’’ in HongKong.41 Therefore, any nominating mechanism that impedes certain candidates from standing election based on political affiliation
is inconsistent with Article 39 and Article 45 of the Basic Law.
Considered by some scholars to be ‘‘the worst outcome imaginable,’’ 42 Beijing’s plan for Hong Kong’s next chief executive election may also be designed to shut down aspirations for democracyin the Mainland. Larry Diamond, founding co-editor of the Journalof Democracy and senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, said that the ‘‘Iranian-style rigged system’’ proposed by
China offers no progress toward democracy, and is ‘‘not even an effort to gesture toward democracy.’’ 43 Hu Jia, a prominent Chinesedissident in Beijing, believes that, as Hong Kong is a ‘‘mirror for
people on the Mainland,’’ ‘‘the outcome of this battle for democracy
will also determine future battles for democracy for all of China.’’ 44
By offering only ‘‘fake’’ democracy, Beijing may be sending a message to Tibet, Xinjiang, and even Taiwan that political changemust ascribe to Beijing’s rules.45
There are few remaining options for rectifying Hong Kong’s electoral system before changes to the 2017 electoral method are finalized. A proposal based on Beijing’s framework will not be adopted
unless it is approved by two-thirds majority in LegCo. If the pro-

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The two pro-democracy (or, ‘‘pan-democrat’’) chief executive candidates who stood for electionin the past are Civic Party legislator Alan Leong Kah-kit in 2007 and Democratic Party legislator Albert Ho Chun-yan in 2012. Li Xueying, ‘‘China Insists on Right to Choose Candidates
for Hong Kong Leader,’’ Straits Times, August 31, 2014. http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/
east-asia/story/china-insists-right-choose-candidates-hong-kong-leader-xinhua-20140831.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00533

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

522
posal is not approved, Hong Kong will maintain its current electoral system under which the largely pro-Beijing election committee would choose the chief executive in 2017.46 All 27 pan-democratic LegCo members (of 70 total members) vowed to veto a final
proposal that is based on Beijing’s framework,47 but NPCSC Deputy Secretary-General Li Fei said that it would be a ‘‘big step backwards’’ if LegCo did not approve the plan.48 Another possibility isthat the formation of the nominating committee, yet undetermined,
will not be as closely modeled on that of the election committee as
expected. If the electoral base of the nominating committee wereexpanded, democratic candidates might still have a chance of being
nominated. Regardless of which electoral configuration is chosen by
Hong Kong, the NPCSC has the final say on any changes to the
Basic Law, including changes to electoral methods.49
Some analysts believe that Beijing’s display of control over Hong
Kong’s political reform may reflect the central government’s perception that Hong Kong’s economic importance to China is declining.
According to a report issued on August 27, 2014, by Trigger Trend,a Guangzhou-based research firm, Hong Kong is becoming a ‘‘mere
second-tier city’’ in China.50 Based on comparisons of Hong Kong’s
annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth with that of major regional cities in China, the report concluded that Guangzhou,
Shenzhen, and Tianjin will overtake Hong Kong in terms of GDP
by 2017, while inland cities including Chongqing, Chengdu, andWuhan will catch up by 2022.51 Hong Kong has long been the gateway to foreign investment in China, and is consistently ranked
near-top in global competitiveness by international organizations.*
However, if China accomplishes its lofty economic reform goals tointernationalize the renminbi, liberalize its capital account, and reform the banking system, Hong Kong’s role as a middleman in facilitating capital flows into China may shrink, according to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government think tank.52 China
is only obligated to maintain Hong Kong’s status as a market economy until 2047 in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration; if the two economies are less integrated at that time, Hong
Kong’s designation as a market economy is susceptible to change.
International Response to Beijing’s Proposed Electoral Reform Framework
In July 2014, the United Kingdom (UK) parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) launched an inquiry into the UK’s relations
with Hong Kong 30 years after the signing of the Joint Declaration.53 The inquiry aims to determine whether Britain and China
are ‘‘living up’’ to commitments made to preserve residents’ lifestyle, rights, freedoms, and social system for 50 years after thehandover. Lord Chris Patten, the last colonial governor of Hong
Kong, believes that the United Kingdom has a ‘‘continuing moral
and political obligation’’ to ensure that China keeps the commitments it made.54 The inquiry has been met with suspicion andfierce opposition from Chinese officials, who call for it to be can-DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* In 2014, Hong Kong ranked second by the World Bank in ease of doing business; fourth by
the International Institute for Management Development in world competitiveness; and first by
The Heritage Foundation in economic freedom.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00534

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

523
celled as it interferes in China’s internal affairs.55 Liu Xiaoming,
Chinese ambassador to Britain, warned FAC chairman Richard
Ottaway that the inquiry does not ‘‘serve the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, or the healthy development of China-UK relations,’’ and that it ‘‘will ultimately harm the interests of Britain.’’ 56
In response to Beijing’s election framework proposal, the U.S.
Department of State warned that Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity are dependent on maintaining the city’s status as ‘‘an open
society with the highest possible degree of autonomy and governed
by rule of law.’’ 57 After U.S. national security advisor Susan Ricemet with top Chinese officials in early September 2014, U.S. officials said ‘‘the ability for people of Hong Kong to choose their leadership based on the will of voters’’ is fundamental, and while Beijing’s proposal is one step of the electoral reform process, ‘‘there’s
further to go.’’ 58 Following the eruption of pro-democracy protestsin Hong Kong in late September 2014, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said the legitimacy of the chief executive
would be diminished if voters were not given ‘‘a genuine choice ofcandidates that are representative of the peoples’ and the voters’
will.’’ 59 When U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry addressed theelectoral decision protests in a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Washington, DC, on October 1, 2014, Mr. Wanginsisted that ‘‘Hong Kong affairs are China’s internal affairs,’’ andthat ‘‘illegal acts that violate public order’’ will not be tolerated.60
Hua Chunying, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed that China ‘‘firmly opposes external forces supporting illegal activities, such as the [democracy campaign known
as the] Occupy Central movement,’’ and is ‘‘opposed to any foreignand external interference in China’s internal affairs by any country.’’ 61 President Obama is expected to raise the issue with Chinese President Xi Jinping in November.62

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement
The people of Hong Kong remained politically active throughout
the year, as demonstrated by the high volume of protests held. Notably, on June 4, 2014, the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen
Square massacre, more than 100,000 Hong Kong residents gathered to commemorate the victims of China’s crackdown on peacefulstudent protest. The largest since 1989,63 the vigil mirrored growing discontent among some Hong Kong residents with China’s historical attempts to restrict civil liberties. On July 1, 2014, the 17th
anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover, democracy advocates peacefully participated in one of the largest marches in Hong Kong’s history, from Victoria Park through the Central business district. Estimates of attendance vary widely: police said that the number ofmarchers peaked at just over 98,000, while the University of Hong
Kong and South China Morning Post estimated the total was closer
to 150,000. Pro-democracy group Civil Human Rights Front, organizer of the march, estimated that 510,000 people marched during
the eight-hour demonstration.64
Intense political campaigning in the lead-up to the central government’s decision on electoral reform in 2017 spurred reactions
from groups across the political spectrum. Democracy advocatesdrew wide support from students, middle-class voters, independent

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00535

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

524
media,* and members of the city’s judiciary. The most prominent
pro-democracy force, known as Occupy Central with Love andPeace (Occupy Central), is a civil disobedience campaign organizedin 2013 to advocate for democratic elections in Hong Kong. Since
its inception, Occupy Central has widely publicized that 10,000 of
its participants will occupy Hong Kong’s Central business district,effectively blocking access to government offices and buildings that
operate there, unless Beijing accepts sufficiently democratic elections in Hong Kong.65
Both Hong Kong and Chinese authorities expressed disdain for
the Occupy Central movement. Current Chief Executive Leung
Chun-ying (CY Leung) and Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao denounced the movement as illegal, and threatened that carrying out
any protests would ‘‘delay universal suffrage.’’ 66 On August, 17,2014, protesters supporting Beijing’s view and estimated to number
between 88,000 and 111,000 marched through the city to express
their opposition to Occupy Central, which they claimed would disrupt peace and prosperity in Hong Kong.67 Amid allegations thatmarchers were bribed to attend, one Chinese-language news source
reported that the Federation of Hong Kong Shenzhen Associations
might have arranged for as many as 20,000 people to march in exchange for $38 and a free lunch.68
Occupy Central also attracted criticism from multinational companies. The Big Four global accounting companies (Ernst & Young,
KPMG, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and PricewaterhouseCoopers)
jointly issued advertisements in three Chinese-language newspapers stating their opposition to Occupy Central, warning that it
threatens rule of law and disrupts business with multinational clients.69 After pulling valuable advertisements from pro-democracy
news outlets (see ‘‘Declining Freedom of the Press,’’ later in thissection), British bank HSBC urged investors to sell stock in Hong
Kong companies citing ‘‘negative news flows’’ regarding Occupy
Central that could serve to ‘‘sour relations with China and . . . hurt
the economy.’’ 70
Leading up to Hong Kong’s annual July 1 march marking the region’s 1997 handover, Occupy Central organized an unofficial citywide referendum on three electoral reform proposals, all of which
advocated some form of public nomination (see Table 1).71 Nearly
800,000 Hong Kong residents, or 22.4 percent of registered voters,
participated in the referendum.72 Of the three proposals, about 42
percent of voters backed that of the Alliance for True Democracy,
which gives nomination privileges to the public, political parties,
and nominating committee members. Nearly 90 percent of voterswanted LegCo to veto any government proposal that does not allow
for genuine fair nomination of chief executive candidates.73 Public
nomination has since been ruled out by the Chinese government,
arguing that the Basic Law mandates nomination by a ‘‘broadly
representative’’ nominating committee.74

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* In this section, independent media refers to media sources that retain a high degree of freedom from political intervention and commercial influence, and promote democracy and freedomof speech in Hong Kong. ‘‘Hong Kong In-Media,’’ Multiple Journalism. http://www.
multiplejournalism.org/case/hong-kong-in-mediai-e-a-c-c-a-e-i.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00536

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

525
Table 1:

Referendum Proposals for Chief Executive Nomination

ProposalOriginator

Supporters

Nomination Requirements

Alliance
for True
Democracy

Democratic andCivic parties;
26 pro-democracy
legislators (of 27
total); Joseph Cheng(convener).

Candidates require either support of atleast 1 percent of registered voters; endorsement from political parties that have
won at least 5 percent of votes in theprevious legislative election; or, directelection by nominating committee.75

Scholarism andHong Kong
Federation ofStudents

Civic Party; Joshua
Wong (convener).

Candidates require support of at least 1
percent of registered voters.76

People Power2 legislators;
Wong Yuk-man
and Albert Chan
(conveners).

Candidates are nominated by the public,
LegCo members, and district council
members.77

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Voter turnout surpassed expectations despite ‘‘one of the largest
cyberattacks in history’’ temporarily shutting down the voting
website.78 Matthew Prince, chief executive of online security firm
CloudFlare, explained that the distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks on the voting site, considered to be among the ‘‘most sophisticated’’ DDoS attacks ever seen, shut down the site by hijacking computers scattered across the world with malware or viruses
and using them to send requests to the site in extremely rapid succession.79 According to Young Wo-sang, poll IT advisor and convener of the Internet Society of Hong Kong’s security and privacy
working group, 30 to 40 percent of the 10 billion DDoS attacks
came from IP addresses registered to mainland firms in HongKong.80
In the week leading up to the National Day holiday, which celebrates China’s founding, on October 1, 2014, public dissatisfaction
with Beijing’s electoral reform proposal broke out in waves of protest throughout Hong Kong. On September 22, thousands of Hong
Kong university students commenced a five-day strike by boycotting classes and demanding ‘‘genuine’’ electoral choice.81 The
Hong Kong Federation of Students, organizer of the boycott, estimated that 13,000 of Hong Kong’s 78,000 undergraduate students
attended a democracy rally originating at the Chinese Universityof Hong Kong on September 22.82 By Friday, September 26, university students were joined by approximately 1,500 grade school students outside the home of CY Leung where they demanded to discuss Hong Kong’s democratic future with him.83 Receiving no response, a group of about one hundred protestors gathered near thegovernment headquarters. Some attempted to breach a barricaded
area known as Civic Square that was blocked by police, who usedpepper spray and arrested some protesters.84
With participants estimated to number close to 200,000,85 protests continued to escalate into the early morning of September 28,
when riot police fired 87 cans of tear gas at protesters in order toclear the swelling crowds from the business district roadways.86
Cheung Tak-keung, assistant commissioner of Hong Kong police,

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00537

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

526

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

said police had ‘‘no alternative’’ but to fire tear gas—considered atactic of ‘‘minimum force’’—to control crowds.87 One day later, inspired by ‘‘the courage of the students and members of the publicin their spontaneous decision to stay’’ despite police action, Occupy
Central organizers announced the movement’s official commencement ahead of schedule to join student protests.88 The protesters—
now comprising Occupy Central, the students, and other supporters—adopted the moniker ‘‘Umbrella Revolution’’ to describe
the movement, as many demonstrators used umbrellas to shieldthemselves from pepper spray and tear gas.89
After riot police were withdrawn on September 29, protesters
continued demonstrating through National Day on October 1. Some
protesters, including Occupy Central co-founder Benny Tai Yiu-tingand organizers of the Hong Kong Federation of Students, demanded that Mr. Leung step down.90 While removing Mr. Leungfrom office would placate protesters’ demands in the short-term
without obstructing Beijing’s plan for electoral reform, any newleader to take office before Beijing’s reforms are implemented
would be selected by the electoral method currently in place.91 On
October 2, the Communist Party newspaper People’s Daily reported
that the central government would continue ‘‘unswervingly’’ to support Mr. Leung.92 Public criticism of Mr. Leung intensified, however, following revelations of his failure to disclose payments he received totaling $6.4 million from an Australian engineering company during his term as chief executive.93 According to Mr. Leung’s
statement, he is not required by Hong Kong law to disclose thepayments.94
In reaction to the Umbrella Revolution protests, Hong Kong
Chief Secretary Carrie Lam said on September 29 that further government discussions on political reform would be postponed until
the Hong Kong government could ‘‘re-examine the situation andfind a better time to introduce the next round of consultations.’’ 95
Mr. Leung said that protesters should not expect the NPC to reconsider or reverse their ruling on Hong Kong’s electoral reform because ‘‘the Chinese government won’t give in to threats asserted
through illegal activity.’’ 96 An advisor to Mr. Leung indicated thatthe Hong Kong government’s strategy for handling the protests wasto ‘‘wait and patiently deal with the crisis . . . to resolve it peacefully,’’ 97 but an editorial published in the People’s Daily on October
2 threatened that the ‘‘consequences will be unimaginable’’ for protesters, who ‘‘incited the masses, paralyzed transportation, disrupted businesses, stirred up conflict, and interfered with the daily
lives of Hong Kong people,’’ and accused Occupy Central of obstructing Hong Kong’s ‘‘smooth transition to democracy.’’ 98
With no clear resolution in sight, demonstrations over Beijing’s
decision continued through October in the face of pressure from police, the public, and violent gangs. Starting October 3 and continuing sporadically throughout the protests, gangs suspected ofhaving links to the Triads, an organized crime group, infiltrated
crowds supporting and opposing the Occupy Central protests, provoking violence among peaceful demonstrations in the Mong Kok
district. According to police superintendent Dan Ng Wai-hon, up to
200 suspected gangsters, of whom more than 40 were arrested inconnection with the October 3–4 attacks for fighting and illegal

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00538

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

527
gathering, ‘‘were well-organized and came with a purpose,’’ thoughpolice are still investigating their exact motives.99 On October 15,
clashes between protesters and police over the removal of barricades to resume traffic flow resulted in the beating of a handcuffed
protester by seven police officers, who were later suspended.100
Following the cancellation of two previously scheduled negotiations, Hong Kong government officials met with five student
leaders on October 21 to discuss their perspectives on electoral reform.101 In response to students’ concerns that the Hong Kong government’s July 2014 report to Beijing on popular political views
misled the NPC and influenced its proposed guidelines, Chief Secretary Lam conceded that the government was willing to submit a
new report to Beijing acknowledging the popular discontent stirred
up by the NPC’s electoral reform decision.102 The students andother protesters intend to continue demonstrating until their demands for an open nominating process are met, but Mr. Leung reiterated that the Hong Kong government ‘‘cannot make somethingthat is not in the Basic Law possible,’’ and ‘‘the Central Authorities. . . will not retract the decision of the Standing Committee.’’ 103 At
the time of writing (October 29, 2014), student protesters and government officials remained deadlocked over Beijing’s decision.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Macau and Taiwan Follow Hong Kong
Inspired by Occupy Central’s June referendum, democracy activists in Macau held their own informal referendum from August 24–
30, 2014, to determine whether residents support universal suffrage in the 2019 chief executive election.104 Only hours after thereferendum began on August 24, police arrested five participants,
including poll organizer Jason Chao, on charges of ‘‘qualified disobedience,’’ and started shutting down polling stations.105 Despite
heavy police interference, nearly 9,000 residents cast their votes
through an online polling website similar to that used in Hong
Kong’s referendum. The results of the poll showed that 89 percent
of participants do not trust the current chief executive, Fernando
Chui, and that 95 percent of participants support universal suffrage in the 2019 chief executive election.106 Chief Executive Chuiwas re-elected to office on August 31 by a 400-member pro-China
election committee.107 He was the only candidate.108
For Taiwan, the reform outcome in Hong Kong serves as a warning that, if Taiwan were reunified with China, Beijing would not
likely adhere to its promise to protect Taiwan’s civil liberties. In
1982, the NPC made a constitutional provision for reunifying Taiwan with China as a special administrative region under the ‘‘one
country, two systems’’ principle, exactly like Hong Kong.109 Under
this provision, ‘‘Taiwan’s current social and economic systems[would] remain unchanged, its way of life [would] not change, andits economic and cultural ties with foreign countries [would] notchange.’’ 110 On September 26, 2014, President Xi reaffirmed China’s ‘‘firm and unwavering stance’’ that the best way to reunify Taiwan with China would be under the ‘‘one country, two systems’’framework.111 Alan D. Romberg, director of the East Asia programat public policy think tank the Stimson Center, argued that China’s
strongly-worded white paper on the application of the ‘‘one country,
two systems’’ policy in Hong Kong strengthened the case for Tai-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00539

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

528
wanese independence as Hong Kong’s ‘‘high degree of autonomy’’has come under threat.112
Democracy advocates in Hong Kong and Taiwan have become
more engaged under the shared threat of China’s control. Activistsin Hong Kong and Taiwan have supported each other throughout
both Hong Kong’s democratic movement and Taiwan’s Sunflower
Movement, in which participants occupied the Legislative Yuan in
March and April 2014 to protest the Cross-Strait Services Trade
Agreement (see Chapter 3, Section 3, ‘‘Taiwan,’’ for fuller treatment
of Taiwan and the Sunflower Movement). Taiwan’s main politicalparties, typically fiercely divided, similarly expressed regret at Beijing’s decision to limit electoral reform in Hong Kong. President Ma
Ying-jeou expressed a ‘‘high degree of concern and support for [the]Hong Kong people’s continuing fight’’ for democratic progress, whilea spokesman from rival Democratic Progressive Party said that
Beijing’s decision ‘‘casts a shadow over the process of democratization.’’ 113
Following the breakout of Umbrella Revolution protests in response to Beijing’s decision, President Ma reaffirmed that he ‘‘fully
understand[s] and support[s] Hong Kong residents’ demand for freenomination and election of Hong Kong’s chief executive, and urge[s]the Mainland authorities to listen carefully to the voices of Hong
Kong residents and handle the matter in a peaceful and cautious
manner.’’ 114 On Taiwan’s National Day, October 10, President Ma
reiterated his strong support not just for Hong Kong’s democratic
movement, but for the Mainland’s as well, stating ‘‘now is the mostappropriate time for mainland China to move toward constitutional
democracy.’’ 115
China’s Increasing Military Presence in Hong Kong
Heightened activity by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in
Hong Kong throughout the reporting year alarmed Hong Kong prodemocracy advocates and media, as well as international observers.
Under Article 14 of the Basic Law and in accordance with the ‘‘one
country, two systems’’ policy, China’s central government is responsible for the defense of Hong Kong. As such, the PLA’s Hong Kong
garrison is tasked with the following functions to ‘‘vigorously safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’’: 116
1.
2.
3.
4.

To guard against and resist aggression, and to guarantee
Hong Kong’s security;
To shoulder the responsibility of defense and patrol duty;
To take charge of military installations;
To undertake relevant foreign military affairs.117

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

One indicator that Chinese military presence in Hong Kong willcontinue to expand is the Hong Kong Town Planning Board’s unanimous approval on February 14, 2014, to rezone an area of public
space measuring 2,970 square meters along the waterfront of Victoria Harbor where a Chinese military port is being constructed.118
The establishment of the ‘‘Central Military Dock’’ (CMD) was originally provisioned in 1994 under the Sino-British Defense Land

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00540

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

529
Agreement (DLA), and its construction is now near completion.119
Government officials said that the CMD would be used for ‘‘conducting military training, berthing military vessels, running ceremonial activities and carrying out pier maintenance,’’ though thedock will be open to the public when not in use.120
Public objections to the CMD construction plan were significant;during the public consultation period, only 0.1 percent of about
19,000 comments favored the plan.121 One of the most contentious
points was the Town Planning Board’s decision to rezone the areafrom ‘‘open space’’ to ‘‘military use.’’ 122 Opponents of the CMD
argue the rezoning not only disrupts public access to the waterfront
promenade,* but ensures that public access and law enforcement inthat area fall under the discretion of the commander of the PLA
garrison rather than the Hong Kong police.123 While Annex III of
the DLA guaranteed that the ‘‘Hong Kong Government will leave
free 150 meters of the eventual permanent waterfront . . . for theconstruction of a military dock after 1997,’’ it did not stipulate thatzoning should be altered in any way.124
In protest of the CMD construction plans, four activists forced
their way into garrison headquarters on December 26, 2013, calling
for the PLA to ‘‘get out’’ of Hong Kong.† 125 In a move widely perceived as retaliatory, the PLA staged its first air-and-sea drill of2014 in Victoria Harbor less than one month after the protests.
The January 24, 2014, drill was carried out by two frigates andthree helicopters, and was intended to make the PLA ‘‘more familiar with the air-and-sea situation of Hong Kong and improve its
ability to handle emergency situations,’’ according to state
media.126 Ni Lexiong, a naval expert and professor of Political
Science and Law at Shanghai University, contended the drill was‘‘aimed at warning the public that Hong Kong could continue toenjoy a certain level of freedom, but should not challenge the central government’s political authority, with military means being
Beijing’s last step to maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability.’’ 127
The CMD is the 19th military site in Hong Kong transferredfrom the British Army to the PLA as a Military Installations
Closed Area (MICA), 18 of which currently cover an area totaling
2,700 hectares (27 square kilometers).128 Hong Kong’s Garrison
Law stipulates that all restricted access military zones must be defined by the garrison ‘‘in conjunction with’’ the Hong Kong government, while the ‘‘locations and boundaries’’ of such zones shall bedeclared by the Hong Kong government.129 However, an undisclosed PLA radar station and compound atop Hong Kong’s tallest
mountain, Tai Mo Shan, was discovered in July 2014.130 The military and security publication Jane’s Defense Weekly reported thestation is likely an electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) facility, though the PLA refused to confirm, citing ‘‘military secrecy.’’ 131 The facility is behind fences that restrict publicaccess. Dr. Kenneth Chan Ka-lok, a LegCo member of the Civic

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* When the CMD section of the promenade is closed for military use, the public can use a pedestrian walkway to the south of the dock area. Hong Kong Security Bureau, e-mail exchangewith Commission staff, October 17, 2014.
† The four activists were subsequently arrested and convicted for breach of the Public Order
Ordinance. Hong Kong Security Bureau, e-mail exchange with Commission staff, October 17,
2014.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00541

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

530
Party, supported conducting a judicial review over the garrison’s
non-disclosure of the construction and use of the facility because‘‘the public has no knowledge about this and [LegCo] cannot findanything about it from documents filed to the legislature.’’ 132 With
regard to the compound, which is not listed among Hong Kong’s 19
designated military sites (including the CMD), Dr. Chan said the
PLA ‘‘should follow the Garrison Law provisions to designate theplace as a military site with restricted public access.’’ 133
On July 1, 2014, the same day as the annual march marking
Hong Kong’s handover, the PLA opened three military bases for
public viewing of the barracks.134 The garrison displayed several
new pieces of military equipment during the ‘‘open day’’:• Small arms: Type 11 pistol, Type 06 (QSW06) silenced pistol,and Type 10 (QBU10) antimateriel rifle• The garrison’s first two Type 056 Jingda-class corvettes:
Huizhou (596) and Qinzhou (597)• Logistics vehicles: Dong Feng EQ2102J-based trucks135
New equipment is often first tested by the garrison before being
introduced more widely into PLA service.136 Among the previously
used pieces of equipment displayed was a Z–9WA helicopter armed
with two 23mm cannons.137
Some Hong Kong commentators believe that the central government could deploy garrison forces to quell democracy protests andthat recent increases in military activity are in part meant to intimidate protesters.138 For example, during ‘‘counter-terrorism’’drills open to the public that were conducted on July 1, PLA soldiers at the bases were seen carrying riot shields and pepper sprayfor the first time.139 While the garrison ‘‘does not interfere in Hong
Kong affairs,’’ the Hong Kong government may by law request assistance from the garrison as necessary ‘‘in the maintenance of
public order and in disaster relief.’’ 140 Further, if the NPCSC decides that Hong Kong is in a state of emergency which ‘‘by reasonof turmoil . . . endangers national unity or security and is beyond
the control of the [Hong Kong] government,’’ the central government in Beijing ‘‘may issue an order applying the relevant national
laws’’ at its own discretion.141
Alan Hoo, chairman of the Basic Law committee and a Hong
Kong delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), likened the Occupy Central movement to recent
terrorist attacks in Kunming and Xi’an, and claimed that Occupy
Central threatens China’s national security.142 According to Hoo,
Occupy Central not only justifies PLA intervention under a stateof emergency, but also ‘‘fosters the legislation of Basic Law Article
23,’’ which mandates:

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact
laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government,or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the
Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of
the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.143

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00542

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

531
In 2003, an anti-subversion bill proposed under Article 23 wasshelved after 500,000 Hong Kong residents protested its implementation.144 Earlier this year, mainland academics insisted that Hong
Kong temporarily adopt Beijing’s national security laws until its
own Article 23 legislation is passed.145 Jasper Tsang Yok-sing,president of the LegCo, said that such a proposal is not consistent
with Article 23 of the Basic Law, which stipulates that Hong
Kong’s government should enact its own laws to handle subversion
against the central government.146
Declining Freedom of the Press
The reporting year was considered ‘‘the darkest for press freedom
for several decades’’ by the Hong Kong Journalists Association(HKJA), as demonstrated by the region’s continued fall in globalpress freedom rankings (see Figure 2).147 According to Freedom
House, a U.S.-based independent watchdog organization that ranks
countries by press freedom indices, violence against journalists andpressure from mainland China were two factors that contributed tothe downward trend in Hong Kong’s press freedom dating back to
2004.148 Likewise, Reporters Without Borders’ 2014 world press
freedom index indicated that ‘‘growing subjugation’’ of the Hong
Kong administration and media to China’s central government is‘‘increasingly compromising media pluralism.’’ 149
Figure 2: Hong Kong’s Global Press Freedom Ranking

Source: ‘‘Freedom of the Press,’’ Reporters Without Borders, 2002–2014. http://en.rsf.org/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00543

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

C3S4Fig2.eps

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Self-censorship on the part of reporters and media outlets alikeremained prevalent in Hong Kong in the reporting year.150 According to a report from the Committee to Protect Journalists, morethan half of Hong Kong’s media owners hold political appointments
in two of China’s main political bodies, the NPC and the CPPCC,
including Charles Ho of the Sing Tao news group; Richard Li (sonof Li Ka-shing, commonly referred to as the richest person in Asia)
of Now TV and the Hong Kong Economic Journal; and Peter Wooof i-Cable television.151 As a result, political considerations tend toovershadow objective reporting. According to a 2012 survey of jour-

532

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

nalists conducted by the HKJA, nearly 40 percent of respondents
said that ‘‘they or their supervisors had recently played down information unfavorable to China’s central government, advertisers,
media owners, or the local government.’’ 152
In the run-up to the 2017 election, the role of the press in determining Hong Kong’s democratic future has become even more critical. Members of the press and media outlets perceived as hostile
to Beijing’s interpretation of ‘‘one country, two systems’’ continued
to suffer professional and physical attacks, exemplified by theplight of one of Hong Kong’s few remaining independent newspapers, Ming Pao. In January 2014, Ming Pao announced the abrupt dismissal of its chief editor, Kevin Lau Chun-to, after nearly
two years on the job. Though Ming Pao claimed Mr. Lau was simply moving to a new position, journalists and scholars speculated
that Mr. Lau’s removal was retaliation for Ming Pao’s criticism ofgovernment policies and its revelation of the political scandals thatderailed 2012 pro-Beijing chief executive candidate Henry Tangunder Mr. Lau’s tenure.153 Ming Pao also partnered with the Consortium of Investigative Journalists in January 2014 to publish an
investigation into the overseas tax-haven accounts of Chinese officials.154
Out of concern for the preservation of Hong Kong’s press freedom, more than 90 percent of Ming Pao’s editorial staff petitioned
the paper to cite reasons for Mr. Lau’s dismissal, while hundredsof protesters gathered outside Ming Pao’s offices calling for media
independence.155 Rallies for press freedom continued throughout
February 2014, when popular radio host Lee Wai-ling, who is
known for her Beijing-critical commentary, was dismissed without
explanation by Commercial Radio Hong Kong (CRHK), one of Hong
Kong’s two commercial radio broadcasting companies.156 To continue broadcasting, CRHK must apply to extend its license, issued
by the Hong Kong Broadcasting Authority, by August 25, 2015. It
is an ‘‘open secret,’’ according to former CRHK broadcasting director Cheung Man-yee, that outspoken program hosts are often
forced to leave due to government pressure when a broadcasting
company is applying for license renewal.157
On February 26, less than two months after his dismissal, Mr.
Lau was critically injured by a knife-wielding assailant in Hong
Kong’s Sai Wan Ho neighborhood.158 Prompted by the belief thatthe attack (and previous attacks on journalists)159 was initiated by
pro-Beijing assailants in an effort to threaten free media, nearly
10,000 protesters took to the streets on March 2, 2014, in supportof Hong Kong’s press freedom, carrying banners reading ‘‘They
Can’t Kill Us All.’’ 160 Two suspects found in southern China’s
Guangdong Province were charged with Mr. Lau’s assault, and admitted that, as members of Hong Kong triad gang Shui Fong, they
were each paid approximately $130,000 to harm but not kill Mr.
Lau and then go into hiding on the Mainland.161 Hong Kong Police
Commissioner Andy Tsang Wai-hung said that the attack had‘‘nothing to do with press freedom,’’ but that the assailants weremerely hired hitmen.162 Less than one month after Mr. Lau’s attack, two Hong Kong media executives were attacked by four assailants with metal bars, an act condemned by the HKJA as another sign of Hong Kong’s deteriorating press freedom.163

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00544

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

533
History of Attacks on Journalists in Hong Kong
• March 2014: Lam Kin-ming and Lei Lun-han, executives witha new publication, The Hong Kong Morning News, were assaulted by four assailants with metal pipes.
• February 2014: Kevin Lau Chun-to, former chief editor of theinvestigative newspaper Ming Pao, was badly injured by aknife-wielding assailant.
• July 2013: Sze Wing-ching, founder of free Hong Kong daily
am730, had his car window smashed by two men as he wasdriving in downtown Hong Kong.
• June 2013: A car was rammed into the gates of the residenceof Jimmy Lai, founder of the pro-democracy Next MediaGroup, and an ax and machete were left behind at the scene.
• June 2013: Chen Ping, publisher of the political weekly iSun
Affairs, was beaten by two men wielding batons.
• July 2008: Jimmy Lai and pro-democracy leader Martin Lee
were the targets of a failed assassination attempt.
• November 2005: A small homemade bomb was sent to Ming
Pao’s editorial offices along with a threatening letter, injuring
one female employee.
• August 1998: Albert Cheng, host of talk radio’s popular ‘‘Teacup in a Tempest’’ program, was slashed with carving knives
on his way to work and seriously wounded.
Source: Isabella Steger, ‘‘Thousands Take to the Streets to Support Hong Kong Press Freedom,’’ Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270
2304585004579414611826771446.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Beijing continued to exert political and economic pressure on
businesses that advertise in pro-democracy media sources, further
suppressing Hong Kong’s press freedom. Hong Kong’s Next Media
Limited (Next Media), the publisher of the outspoken paper Apple
Daily, was reportedly boycotted by its two biggest advertisers at
the instruction of China’s central government.164 According to NextMedia executive Mark Simon, HSBC and Standard Charteredbanks were pressured by the central government’s liaison office inHong Kong into ending their long-held advertising relationships
with Apple Daily in September 2013.165,166 Mr. Simon reported
that prior to the boycott, the two banks spent approximately $3.8
million on advertisements in Apple Daily annually.167 In addition
to the losses incurred by the banks’ boycotts, Next Media reported
that additional advertising boycotts on the part of Beijing-dependent firms cost the company at least $26 million annually, or 10 percent of its present value.168
Manipulation of media advertising by the central government islikely retaliation for the independent media’s outspoken pro-democracy stance. Jimmy Lai, owner of Next Media and the ‘‘most powerful critic of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong,’’ has been
an outspoken political activist since the 1989 Tiananmen Squaremassacre.169 Under his leadership, Next Media released an online

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00545

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

534
animated video mocking Bloomberg’s alleged self-censorship—basedon commercial interests—to axe a story on the private wealth ofCommunist party elites in October 2013.170 Bloomberg later denied
the allegations.171 Next Media and Apple Daily also face the threatof cyber attacks in retaliation for critical reporting. In the days
leading up to Occupy Central’s unofficial referendum on June 20,
Apple Daily’s website was flooded by more than 10 billion DDoS attacks in a 24-hour period, many originating from IP addresses in
China and Russia.172 Apple Daily suspected that the attacks were‘‘carried out by hackers from China, trying to suppress Hong Kong
people’s determination to fight for democracy and to attack the prouniversal suffrage Next Media group.’’ 173
Independent media suffered another blow on July 26, 2014, whenpopular pro-democracy news website House News unexpectedly announced its closure, citing intense political pressure.174 Tony Tsoi
Tung-ho, House News co-founder and outspoken supporter of Occupy Central, explained his fear of the political atmosphere in anote he posted on the site:
Hong Kong has changed. To act as a normal citizen, a normal media outlet and to do something right for society is
becoming difficult, or even terrifying—not that you feel
alienated, but fearful. The ongoing political struggle makes
people very anxious—many democrats are tracked andsmeared. Their past records have been dug up. A sense of
White Terror * lingers in society and I feel the pressure as
well.175
Mr. Tsoi also noted that the popular news aggregator site was
not profitable because advertisement revenues were disproportionately low.176 House News co-founder Leung Man-tao explained that‘‘many big companies don’t place advertisements on our website because of our critical stance towards the government and Beijing.’’ 177 In his shutdown announcement, Mr. Tsoi claimed thatHong Kong’s tense political atmosphere and ‘‘abnormal society’’
have twisted the market, forcing House News to abandon its coredemocratic stance.178
Implications for the United States
In accordance with the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of
1992, the United States supports Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy. Beijing’s interpretation of the ‘‘one country, two systems’’
policy and infringement on civil liberties guaranteed to Hong Kongin the Sino-British Joint Declaration not only undermine Hong
Kong’s high degree of autonomy, but also reflect the Chinese government’s failure to comply with international commitments. Moreover, Beijing’s application of ‘‘one country, two systems’’ in Hong
Kong holds ominous implications for Taiwan if it were to be reunified with China under the same framework. The United States
shares with Hong Kong an interest in upholding democratic values,

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* The term ‘‘white terror’’ also refers to a period from 1949 to 1987 when several thousand
perceived opponents (Communist or pro-Taiwanese independence) of Chinese Nationalist Party
leader Chiang Kai-shek were incarcerated and executed in Taiwan. Many victims were intellectual and social elite.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00546

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

535
human rights, rule of law, independent journalism, and open andfair market competition, all of which are essential for Hong Kong’s
continued prosperity and development as an international financial
center.
Conclusions

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• China’s central government has put forth a framework for theelection of Hong Kong’s next chief executive in 2017 that effectively excludes democratic candidates from nomination and allows Beijing to control the outcome. This proposal conflicts withstandards set forth in Hong Kong’s Basic Law and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and runs
counter to international commitments made by China in the1984 Sino-UK Joint Declaration to preserve Hong Kong’s ‘‘highdegree of autonomy’’ and way of life for 50 years following its
1997 handover from the United Kingdom.
• Increased Chinese military activity in Hong Kong signals China’s
determined presence there and serves to intimidate pro-democracy activists from participating in the Occupy Central movement and other peaceful movements out of fear of military retaliation.
• Increased infringement on Hong Kong’s press freedom, particularly in the forms of violence against journalists and politicalpressure on advertisers, threatens the media’s ability to serve asa watchdog. The steady erosion of press freedom is a worrying
trend that has worsened over the last ten years, and appears to
be targeted at outspoken pro-democracy media.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00547

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

536
ENDNOTES FOR SECTION 4DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

1. Alvin Y.H. Cheung, ‘‘An Introduction to the Chief Executive Electoral Reform Debate,’’ Human Rights in China, July 25, 2014. http://www.hrichina.org/en/
china-rights-forum/introduction-chief-executive-electoral-reform-debate.
2. Consulate General of the United States, Hong Kong & Macau, United StatesHong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and
Senate), S. 1731. http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/ushk_pa_1992.html.
3. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, December 19, 1984. http: // www.legislation.gov.hk / blis_ pdf.nsf /6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532 / 84A057ECA380F51D482575EF00291C2F /$FILE/CAP_2301_e_b5.pdf.
4. Alvin Y.H. Cheung, ‘‘An Introduction to the Chief Executive Electoral Reform Debate,’’ Human Rights in China, July 25, 2014. http://www.hrichina.org/en/
china-rights-forum/introduction-chief-executive-electoral-reform-debate.
5. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China, Article 45. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html.
6. Hong Kong SAR Government, ‘‘Transcript of Remarks by CE, CS and SCMAat Media Session (with Video),’’ October 16, 2014. http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/
201410/16/P201410160832.htm.
7. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016
(Adopted at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress on August 31, 2014); published as ‘‘Full Text of NPC Decision on Universal Suffrage for HKSAR Chief Selection,’’ Xinhua, August 31, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/31/c_133609238_2.htm.
8. Richard C. Bush III, China’s Decision on Universal Suffrage in Hong Kong
(The Brookings Institution, September 2, 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/upfront/posts/2014/09/02-hong-kong-chief-executive-election-bush.
9. Amendment to Annex I to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Approved at the Sixteenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National
People’s Congress on August 28, 2010), Instrument 2. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/
basiclawtext/images/basiclawtext_doc1&2.pdf; Hong Kong SAR Government, ‘‘Let’s
Talk and Achieve Universal Suffrage,’’ December 2013, p. 25. http://www.2017.gov.hk/filemanager/template/en/doc/Chapter_3.pdf.
10. Hong Kong SAR’s Voter Registration Bureau, ‘‘Voter Registration Statistics,’’
July 25, 2014. http://www.voterregistration.gov.hk/eng/statistic20141.html#1.
11. Chris Buckley, ‘‘Q. and A.: Michael C. Davis on the Battle over Hong Kong’s
Future,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times blog), June 19, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.ny
times.com/2014/06/19/q-and-a-michael-c-davis-on-the-battle-over-hong-kongs-future/.
12. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013, p. 374.
13. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China, Article 45. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html.
14. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016
(Adopted at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress on August 31, 2014); published as ‘‘Full Text of NPC Decision on Universal Suffrage for HKSAR Chief Selection,’’ Xinhua, August 31, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/31/c_133609238_2.htm.
15. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016
(Adopted at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress on August 31, 2014); published as ‘‘Full Text of NPC Decision on Universal Suffrage for HKSAR Chief Selection,’’ Xinhua, August 31, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/31/c_133609238_2.htm.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00548

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

537

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

16. Demetri Sevastopulo and Julie Zhu, ‘‘Hong Kong Democracy Activists Vent
Their Anger against Beijing,’’ Financial Times, September 1, 2014. http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/e57acc96-30e9-11e4-b2fd-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#slide0.
17. China’s Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the ‘‘OneCountry, Two Systems’’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
June 10, 2014; published as ‘‘Full Text: Chinese State Council White Paper on ‘OneCountry, Two Systems’ Policy in Hong Kong,’’ South China Morning Post (HongKong), June 10, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-textpractice-one-country-two-systems-policy-hong-kong-special.
18. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016
(Adopted at the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress on August 31, 2014); published as ‘‘Full Text of NPC Decision on Universal Suffrage for HKSAR Chief Selection,’’ Xinhua, August 31, 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/31/c_133609238_2.htm.
19. Deng Xiaoping, selected remarks on the concept of ‘‘one country, two systems,’’ June 22–23, 1984; published as ‘‘Deng Xiaoping on ‘One Country, Two Systems’,’’ CRI English (China), January 11, 2007. http://english.cri.cn/4426/2007/01/11/
167@184039.htm.
20. Rachel Lu, ‘‘A New Definition of Chinese Patriotism,’’ Foreign Policy, September 11, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/11/a_new_definition_of_chinese_patriotism.
21. Rachel Lu, ‘‘A New Definition of Chinese Patriotism,’’ Foreign Policy, September 11, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/11/a_new_definition_of_chinese_patriotism.
22. Rachel Lu, ‘‘A New Definition of Chinese Patriotism,’’ Foreign Policy, September 11, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/11/a_new_definition_of_chinese_patriotism.
23. Lu Chen, ‘‘Top Party Official Seems to Soften Line on Hong Kong,’’ Epoch
Times, September 21, 2014. http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/972158-top-party-official-seems-to-soften-line-on-hong-kong/.
24. Lu Chen, ‘‘Top Party Official Seems to Soften Line on Hong Kong,’’ Epoch
Times, September 21, 2014. http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/972158-top-party-official-seems-to-soften-line-on-hong-kong/.
25. Lu Chen, ‘‘Top Party Official Seems to Soften Line on Hong Kong,’’ Epoch
Times, September 21, 2014. http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/972158-top-party-official-seems-to-soften-line-on-hong-kong/.
26. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China, Article 43. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html.
27. Deng Xiaoping, selected remarks on the concept of ‘‘one country, two systems,’’ June 22–23, 1984; published as ‘‘Deng Xiaoping on ‘One Country, Two Systems’,’’ CRI English (China), January 11, 2007. http://english.cri.cn/4426/2007/01/11/
167@184039.htm.
28. China’s Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the ‘‘OneCountry, Two Systems’’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
June 10, 2014; published as ‘‘Full Text: Chinese State Council White Paper on ‘OneCountry, Two Systems’ Policy in Hong Kong,’’ South China Morning Post (HongKong), June 10, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-textpractice-one-country-two-systems-policy-hong-kong-special.
29. China’s Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the ‘‘OneCountry, Two Systems’’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
June 10, 2014; published as ‘‘Full Text: Chinese State Council White Paper on ‘OneCountry, Two Systems’ Policy in Hong Kong,’’ South China Morning Post (HongKong), June 10, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-textpractice-one-country-two-systems-policy-hong-kong-special.
30. China’s Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the ‘‘OneCountry, Two Systems’’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
June 10, 2014; published as ‘‘Full Text: Chinese State Council White Paper on ‘OneCountry, Two Systems’ Policy in Hong Kong,’’ South China Morning Post (HongKong), June 10, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-textpractice-one-country-two-systems-policy-hong-kong-special.
31. China’s Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the ‘‘OneCountry, Two Systems’’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
June 10, 2014; published as ‘‘Full Text: Chinese State Council White Paper on ‘OneCountry, Two Systems’ Policy in Hong Kong,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00549

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

538

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Kong), June 10, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-textpractice-one-country-two-systems-policy-hong-kong-special.
32. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013, p. 376.
33. Tanna Chong, ‘‘Hong Kong Bar Association Rejects Public Nomination for2017 Chief Executive Election,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), April 28,
2014.
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1499245/nominating-committeeonly-approach-chief-executives-job-says-bar.
34. Response of the Hong Kong Bar Association to the White Paper on the Practice of ‘‘One Country, Two Systems’’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, June 11, 2014, p. 2. http://hkba.org/whatsnew/misc/White_Paper_Response_
eng.pdf.
35. China’s Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the ‘‘OneCountry, Two Systems’’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
June 10, 2014; published as ‘‘Full Text: Chinese State Council White Paper on ‘OneCountry, Two Systems’ Policy in Hong Kong,’’ South China Morning Post (HongKong), June 10, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-textpractice-one-country-two-systems-policy-hong-kong-special.
36. Wang Haiyun, ‘‘Remain on Alert for Dangers of Western-backed ‘Color Revolutions’,’’ Global Times, July 31, 2014. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/873666.shtml.
37. Liu Xiaoming, ‘‘Reform in Hong Kong Must Follow the Basic Law,’’ Financial
Times, July 8, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0ff00f7a-0685-11e4-ba32-00144
feab7de.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3BW0Qtju4.
38. Demetri Sevastopulo and Julie Zhu, ‘‘Hong Kong Democracy Activists Vent
Their Anger against Beijing,’’ Financial Times, September 1, 2014. http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/e57acc96-30e9-11e4-b2fd-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#slide0.
39. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China, Article 45. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html.
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Adopted by General
Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966, Entry into Force March 23,1976). http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.
41. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China, Article 39. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_3.html.
42. Jeffie Lam, ‘‘ ‘A Sad Day for Hong Kong and Democracy’: Scholar Slams
Beijing’s Reform Plan,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), September 1, 2014.
http: // www . scmp . com / news / hong - kong / article / 1583062 / sad - day - hong - kong - and democracy-scholar-slams-beijings-reform.
43. Jeffie Lam, ‘‘ ‘A Sad Day for Hong Kong and Democracy’: Scholar Slams
Beijing’s Reform Plan,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), September 1, 2014.
http: // www . scmp . com / news / hong - kong / article / 1583062 / sad - day - hong - kong - and democracy-scholar-slams-beijings-reform.
44. Chris Buckley and Michael Forsythe, ‘‘China Restricts Voting Reforms forHong Kong,’’ New York Times, August 31, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/
world/asia/hong-kong-elections.html.
45. Tom Mitchell and Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘‘Hong Kong: Voting with Their
Feet,’’ Financial Times, September 7, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/238d0f5c3415-11e4-b81c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CjGtnu3E.
46. Enda Curran, Kathy Chu, and James T. Areddy, ‘‘Hong Kong Election Ruling Stirs Fear over City’s Status as Finance Hub,’’ Wall Street Journal, September
1, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/beijing-decree-stirs-fear-over-hong-kong-statusas-finance-hub-1409615560.
47. Jeffie Lam, ‘‘ ‘A Sad Day for Hong Kong and Democracy’: Scholar Slams Beijing’s Reform Plan,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), September 1, 2014.
http: // www . scmp . com / news / hong - kong / article / 1583062 / sad - day - hong - kong - and democracy-scholar-slams-beijings-reform.
48. Demetri Sevastopulo and Julie Zhu, ‘‘Hong Kong Democracy Activists Vent
Their Anger against Beijing,’’ Financial Times, September 1, 2014. http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/e57acc96-30e9-11e4-b2fd-00144feabdc0.html#slide0.
49. Hong Kong SAR, ‘‘Questions and Answers on Constitutional Development.’’
http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/liberal/faq.html.
50. Rachel Lu, ‘‘Report: Hong Kong Becoming ‘Mere Second-Tier’ Chinese City,’’
Foreign Policy, September 2, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/02/
report_hong_kong_becoming_mere_second_tier_chinese_city.
51. Rachel Lu, ‘‘Report: Hong Kong Becoming ‘Mere Second-Tier’ Chinese City,’’
Foreign Policy, September 2, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/02/
report_hong_kong_becoming_mere_second_tier_chinese_city.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00550

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

539

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

52. Frank Chen, ‘‘Is Hong Kong Losing Its World Economy Status?’’ EJ Insight,
September 10, 2014. http://www.ejinsight.com/20140910-hong-kong-competitivenessmainland-cities-singapore/.
53. UK Parliament, ‘‘The UK’s relations with Hong Kong: 30 years after the
Joint Declaration,’’ July 22, 2014. http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/news/hong-kong-tor/.
54. Chris Patten, ‘‘Britain Is Honor Bound to Speak up for Hong Kong,’’ Financial Times, September 2, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6458d53c-328c-11e493c6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CjGtnu3E.
55. Alice Woodhouse, ‘‘Britain Will ‘Keep an Open Mind’ in Probe of Hong Kong
Political Reform,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), September 5, 2014.
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1585839/british-lawmakers-release-angry-letters-china-demanding-end-hong-kong.
56. Liu Xiaoming (Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom), correspondence
to Richard Ottaway (Chairman, UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee), July 14,
2014; published by UK Parliament. http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commonscommittees/foreign-affairs/ChineseAmbassador.pdf.
57. U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, September 2, 2014. http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2014/09/231216.htm#CHINA.
58. William Wan, ‘‘U.S. Urges China to Help with Islamic State in Iraq,’’ Washington Post, September 9, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-urges-chinato-help-with-islamic-state-in-iraq/2014/09/09/4f73ac90-3823-11e4-9c9f-ebb47272e40e_
story.html.
59. Ian Talley, ‘‘U.S. Steps Up China Criticism amid Hong Kong Pro-Democracy
Protests,’’ Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-ssteps-up-china-criticism-amid-hong-kong-pro-democracy-protests-1412027706.
60. U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, ‘‘Kerry, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang before Their Meeting,’’ October 1, 2014. http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/10/20141001309281.html#axzz3Hdcabqa6.
61. Bob Davis, ‘‘China Rejects Foreign Support of Pro-Democracy Protesters,’’
Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-rejectsforeign-support-of-pro-democracy-protesters-1411987480.
62. David Brunnstrom and Lesley Wroughton, ‘‘China Facing Growing U.S. Pressure over Hong Kong Protests,’’ Reuters, September 30, 2014. http: // www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/01/us-hongkong-china-whitehouse-idUSKCN0HP1WZ20141001.
63. Keith Bradsher, ‘‘Crowds Gather in Hong Kong for Anniversary of Tiananmen Crackdown,’’ New York Times, June 4, 2014. http: // www.nytimes.com / 2014 /06/05/world/asia/crowds-gather-in-hong-kong-to-mark-25th-anniversary-of-tiananmenkillings.html.
64. Ng Kang-chung and Joyce Ng, ‘‘Estimates of Numbers Who Marched on
Tuesday Vary Widely,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 4, 2014. http://
www.scmp.com / news / hong-kong / article / 1546137 / estimates- numbers- who- marchedtuesday-vary-widely.
65. Tony Cheung, ‘‘Occupy Central Will Not Back Down on Threat of Summer
Protest, Says Organizer,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 25, 2014.
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1456501/occupy-central-will-not-backdown-threat-summer-protest-says.
66. Chris Buckley, ‘‘Chinese Vice President Warns Hong Kong over Protests,’’ New
York Times, April 25, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/world/asia/chinesevice-president-warns-hong-kong-over-protests.html.
67. Michael Forsythe and Alan Wong, ‘‘Thousands in Hong Kong Rally in Support of China,’’ New York Times, August 17, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/
18/world/asia/thousands-protest-an-occupy-movement-in-hong-kong.html?_r=0.
68. Julie Zhu and Mark Wembridge, ‘‘Hong Kong Pro-China Rally Draws Fake
Crowd Allegations,’’ Financial Times, August 18, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/
0/09a2679c-2685-11e4-8bb5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3BW0Qtju4.
69. Josh Noble, Robin Kwong, and John Aglionby, ‘‘Big Four Accounting Firms
Warn Hong Kong over Democracy Push,’’ Financial Times, June 27, 2014. http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/574791ee-fdc1-11e3-acf8-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk#
axzz37AhqeMp5.
70. Heather Timmons, ‘‘Get Out of Hong Kong before the Next Pro-democracy
Protest, HSBC Tells Investors,’’ Quartz, July 7, 2014. http: // qz.com / 230880 / hsbcwants-investors-to-sell-hong-kong-stocks-because-of-a-one-day-pro-democracy-protest/.
71. Jeffie Lam, ‘‘Cyberattacks against Occupy Central Poll Traced to Mainland
Firms’ Computers in Hong Kong,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), June 23,
2014. http: // www.scmp.com / news / hong-kong / article / 1538965 / cyberattacks - against occupy-poll-traced-mainland-firms-computers-hong.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00551

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

540

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

72. Chris Buckley, ‘‘Hong Kong Poll Turnout Buoys Democracy Activists,’’ New
York Times, June 29, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/world/asia/turnoutfor-unofficial-vote-in-hong-kong-cheers-democracy-advocates.html.
73. Michael Lipin, ‘‘Hong Kong, Beijing Consider New Reality after Pro-Democracy Referendum,’’ Voice of America, July 2, 2014. http://www.voanews.com/content/
hong-kong-beijing-consider-new-reality-after-prodemocracy-referendum/1949208.html.
74. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China, Article 45. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html.
75. Kelly Ip, ‘‘Students’ Reform Proposals Get the Thumbs-up,’’ The Standard(Hong Kong), May 7, 2014. http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=
11&art_id=145115&sid=42211090&con_type=1; ‘‘H.K. Democracy Advocates Propose
Plan for 2017 Leadership Election,’’ Kyodo News International (Japan), January 8,
2014. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/140108/hkdemocracy-advocates-propose-plan-2017-leadership-el.
76. Kelly Ip, ‘‘Students’ Reform Proposals Get the Thumbs-up,’’ The Standard(Hong Kong), May 7, 2014. http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=
11&art_id=145115&sid=42211090&con_type=1.
77. ‘‘Kelly Ip, ‘‘Students’ Reform Proposals Get the Thumbs-up,’’ The Standard(Hong Kong), May 7, 2014. http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=
11&art_id=145115&sid=42211090&con_type=1; ‘‘Various Stakeholders’ Responses,’’
Mingsheng Bao (Canada), May 12, 2014. http://www.mingshengbao.com/tor/article.php?aid=196313.
78. Jeffie Lam, ‘‘Cyberattacks against Occupy Central Poll Traced to Mainland
Firms’ Computers in Hong Kong,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), June 23,
2014. http: // www.scmp.com / news / hong-kong / article / 1538965 / cyberattacks - against occupy-poll-traced-mainland-firms-computers-hong.
79. Paul Mozur and Chester Yung, ‘‘Hong Kong Democracy Poll Hit by Cyberattack,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/hong-kongdemocracy-poll-is-hit-by-cyberattack-1403258663.
80. Jeffie Lam, ‘‘Cyberattacks against Occupy Central Poll Traced to Mainland
Firms’ Computers in Hong Kong,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), June 23,
2014. http: // www.scmp.com / news / hong-kong / article / 1538965 / cyberattacks - against occupy-poll-traced-mainland-firms-computers-hong.
81. Alan Wong, ‘‘Digging In on Election Fight, Hong Kong Students Prepare forBoycott,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times blog), September 19, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/19/digging-in-on-election-fight-hong-kong-students-preparefor-boycott/.
82. Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, ‘‘Hong Kong Students Boycott Classes in Democracy Fight,’’ New York Times, September 22, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/ 23/ world / asia/ hong-kong-students-lead-democracy-fight-with-class-boycott.html;
Tzvi Kahn and Evan Moore, ‘‘FPI Fact Sheet on Hong Kong’s ‘Umbrella Revolution,’ ’’Foreign Policy Initiative, October 7, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpifact-sheet-hong-kong%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cumbrella-revolution%E2%80%9D.
83. James Pomfret and Yimou Lee, ‘‘Hong Kong Students Storm Government
HQ in Challenge to Beijing,’’ Reuters, September 26, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/09/26/us-hongkong-china-idUSKCN0HL1T820140926.
84. Chris Buckley and Alan Wong, ‘‘Pro-Democracy Students Are Arrested in
Hong Kong,’’ New York Times, September 26, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/
27/world/asia/hong-kong-democracy-leader-says-limits-harm-rest-of-china.html.
85. Regina Tan and Fion Li, ‘‘Hong Kong Students’ Deadline on Leung Nears;
Talks Sought,’’ Bloomberg, October 1, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201410-01/hong-kong-students-threaten-escalation-as-councilor-seeks-talks.html.
86. Isabella Steger, Fiona Law and Prudence Ho, ‘‘Pro-Democracy Protests Shake
Hong Kong,’’ Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/
hong-kongs-pro-democracy-protesters-face-off-against-police-1411876944; Enda Curran,‘‘Hong Kong Police Use of Tear Gas on Pro-Democracy Protesters Is Questioned,’’Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2014. http: // online.wsj.com / articles / hong-kongpolice-use-of-tear-gas-on-pro-democracy-protesters-is-questioned-1411991105?tesla=y&
mod=rss_about_china&mg=reno64-wsj.
87. Enda Curran, ‘‘Hong Kong Police Use of Tear Gas on Pro-Democracy Protesters Is Questioned,’’ Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2014. http: // online.wsj.com/
articles/hong-kong-police-use-of-tear-gas-on-pro-democracy-protesters-is-questioned1411991105 ? tesla = y & mod = rss_ about_ china&mg=reno64-wsj; Isabella Steger andPrudence Ho, ‘‘Occupy Central Launches Hong Kong Protest Campaign,’’ Wall Street
Journal, September 27, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/occupy-central-launcheshong-kong-protest-campaign-1411848966.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00552

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

541

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

88. Isabella Steger and Prudence Ho, ‘‘Occupy Central Launches Hong Kong
Protest Campaign,’’ Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/
articles/occupy-central-launches-hong-kong-protest-campaign-1411848966.
89. Adam Taylor, ‘‘The Humble Umbrella’s Surprising Role in Hong Kong’s Huge
Protests,’’ Washington Post, September 29, 2014. http: // www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/29/the-humble-umbrellas-surprising-role-in-hong-kongshuge-protests/.
90. Jason Chow and Chester Yung, ‘‘Hong Kong Leader Opens Talks with Protesters,’’ Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/hongkong-protesters-consider-escalating-actions-1412229794?tesla=y&mod=rss_about_china&mg=reno64-wsj.
91. Jeffrey Ng, ‘‘Hong Kong Chief Executive Rejects Protesters’ Demands,’’ Reuters, September 29, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-protests-wont-causebeijing-to-reverse-ruling-city-chief-says-1412047462.
92. Edward Wong, ‘‘Squeezed by Protesters and Beijing, Leader Tries to Save His
Job,’’ New York Times, October 1, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/world/
asia/for-hong-kong-leader-pressure-builds-from-both-sides.html?partner=MYWAY&ei=
5065.
93. Michael Forsythe and Keith Bradsher, ‘‘Hong Kong Government Scraps
Talks with Protesters,’’ New York Times, October 9, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/10/10/world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0.
94. ‘‘CY Leung Statement,’’ Sydney Morning Herald, October 8, 2014. http://www.smh.com.au/national/cy-leung-statement-20141008-11354i.html.
95. Chester Yung, ‘‘Carrie Lam: Hong Kong to Delay Discussions on Political Reform,’’ Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/carrielam-hong-kong-to-delay-discussions-on-political-reform-1411992195?tesla=y&mod=rss_about_china&mg=reno64-wsj.
96. Jeffrey Ng, ‘‘Hong Kong Chief Executive Rejects Protesters’ Demands,’’ WallStreet Journal, September 29, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-protestswont-cause-beijing-to-reverse-ruling-city-chief-says-1412047462.
97. Keith Bradsher, ‘‘Hong Kong Government’s Strategy on Protesters: Wait
Them Out,’’ New York Times, October 1, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/
world/asia/hong-kong-protests.html.
98. Nikhil Sonnad, ‘‘Here is the Full Text of the Chinese Communist Party’s
Message to Hong Kong,’’ Quartz, October 1, 2014. http://qz.com/274425/here-is-thefull-text-of-the-chinese-communist-partys-message-to-hong-kong/.
99. Samuel Chan and Clifford Lo, ‘‘Triads Infiltrated Camps of Occupy Supporters and Detractors, Say Police,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 13,
2014. http: // www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1615353/police-says-triads-sentinfiltrators-camps-occupy-supporters-and.
100. Isabella Steger, Chester Yung and Enda Curran, ‘‘Footage of Beating Prompts
Outrage at Hong Kong Police,’’ Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/footage-of-beating-prompts-hong-kong-police-to-launch-investigation1413343131.
101. Michael Forsythe and Alan Wong, ‘‘On TV, Hong Kong Openly Debates Democracy,’’ New York Times, October 21, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/world/
asia/hong-kong-student-protesters-and-city-leaders-meet-to-discuss-democracy.html.
102. Michael Forsythe and Alan Wong, ‘‘On TV, Hong Kong Openly Debates Democracy,’’ New York Times, October 21, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/world/
asia/hong-kong-student-protesters-and-city-leaders-meet-to-discuss-democracy.html.
103. Staff Reporters, ‘‘Government Ready for Talks with Students in Bid to End
Deadlock, Says CY Leung,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 16,
2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1617688/government-ready-talksstudents-bid-end-protests-says-cy-leung; Hong Kong SAR Government, ‘‘Transcript ofRemarks by CE, CS and SCMA at Media Session (with Video),’’ October 16, 2014.
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201410/16/P201410160832.htm.
104. Austin Ramzy, ‘‘Macau Activists Plan Hong Kong-Style Poll on Greater Democracy,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times blog), July 9, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.ny
times.com/2014/07/09/macau-activists-plan-hong-kong-style-poll-on-greater-democracy/.
105. Edward Ngai, ‘‘5 Arrested after Macau Attempts Hong Kong-Style Democracy Poll,’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), August 25, 2014.
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/08/25/5-arrested-after-macau-attempts-hongkong-style-democracy-poll/ ?mod=WSJBlog.
106. Farah Master, ‘‘Macau Poll Reveals Democracy Urges amid Hong Kong Row
with China,’’ Reuters, September 2, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/03/
us-macau-referendum-idUSKBN0GY07J20140903?feedType=RSS&feedName=world
News.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00553

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

542

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

107. Farah Master, ‘‘Macau Poll Reveals Democracy Urges amid Hong Kong Row
with China,’’ Reuters, September 2, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/03/
us-macau-referendum-idUSKBN0GY07J20140903?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews.
108. Fion Li, ‘‘Macau’s Chui Wins in Uncontested Chief Executive Re-Election,’’Bloomberg, August 31, 2014. http: // www.bloomberg.com / news / 2014-08-31 / macau-schui-wins-in-uncontested-chief-executive-re-election.html.
109. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘A Policy of ‘‘One Country, Two Systems’’on Taiwan.’’ http: // www.fmprc.gov.cn / mfa_ eng / ziliao_ 665539 / 3602_ 665543 /3604_
665547/t18027.shtml.
110. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘‘A Policy of ‘‘One Country, Two Systems’’on Taiwan.’’ http: // www.fmprc.gov.cn / mfa_ eng / ziliao_ 665539 / 3602_ 665543 /3604_
665547/t18027.shtml.
111. Jenny W. Hsu, ‘‘Be Like Hong Kong? Taiwan Tells Beijing No Thanks,’’
China Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), September 26, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/09/26/be-like-hong-kong-taiwan-tells-beijing-no-thanks/.
112. Kelwin Choi, ‘‘Cross-Strait Relations after the Sunflower Movement,’’ Diplomat, July 21, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/cross-strait-relations-after-thesunflower-movement/.
113. Austin Ramzy, ‘‘From Taiwan, Broad Support for Democracy in Hong Kong,’’
Sinosphere (New York Times blog), September 3, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.ny
times.com/2014/09/03/from-taiwan-broad-support-for-democracy-in-hong-kong/?_ php=
true&_type=blogs&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=0.
114. Kuomintang official website, ‘‘President Ma: I Fully Understand & Support
HK Residents’ Demand to Fully Choose Their CE,’’ September 30, 2014. http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=15197.
115. Larence Chung, ‘‘Mainland China Should Move towards Democracy, Taiwan’s President Says,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), October 10, 2014.
http: // www.scmp.com / news / china / article / 1613671 / mainland-should-move-towardsdemocracy-taiwans-president-says.
116. China’s Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the ‘‘OneCountry, Two Systems’’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
June 10, 2014; published as ‘‘Full Text: Chinese State Council White Paper on ‘OneCountry, Two Systems’ Policy in Hong Kong,’’ South China Morning Post (HongKong), June 10, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1529167/full-textpractice-one-country-two-systems-policy-hong-kong-special; Hong Kong SAR’s Basic
Law Promotion Steering Committee, ‘‘The Basic Law and Hong Kong—The 15th Anniversary of Reunification with the Motherland,’’ May 2012, pp. 122–127. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/publications/book/15anniversary_reunification_ch2_8.pdf.
117. Garrison Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, July 1, 1997. http: // www.asianlii.org / cn / legis / cen / laws /glothksarotproc785/.
118. Agence France-Presse, ‘‘Report: China Military Port Gets Key Hong Kong
Go-Ahead,’’ Defense News, February 16, 2014. http: // www.defensenews.com / article /20140216/DEFREG03/302160014/Report-China-Military-Port-Gets-Key-Hong-Kong-GoAhead.
119. Hong Kong Security Bureau, e-mail exchange with Commission staff, October 17, 2014.
120. Tom Philips, ‘‘Chinese Military Port Approved in Hong Kong,’’ Telegraph, February 16, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/hongkong/10642000/
Chinese-military-port-approved-in-Hong-Kong.html.
121. Tom Philips, ‘‘Chinese Military Port Approved in Hong Kong,’’ Telegraph, February 16, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/hongkong/10642000/
Chinese-military-port-approved-in-Hong-Kong.html.
122. Hong Kong SAR’s Development Bureau, ‘‘Objection to Setting Up a Military
Dock for Facilitating the Public to Use the Proposed Site at Central Harbourfront
for Enjoyment,’’ June 2014. http://www.districtcouncils.gov.hk/central/doc/en/committee_meetings_doc/clsac/20140220-CLSAC-Paper-6-2014-Annex-I.pdf.
123. Mike Rowse, ‘‘A Phoney War over PLA Dock,’’ South China Morning Post
(Hong Kong), November 25, 2013. http: // www.scmp.com / comment / insight - opinion /article/1362935/phoney-war-over-pla-dock.
124. Garrison Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The People’s Republic Of China, July 1, 1997. http: // www.asianlii.org / cn / legis / cen / laws /glothksarotproc785/.
125. Tony Cheung, ‘‘Pan-democrats Condemn PLA Barracks Protest as ‘Ineffective,
Unnecessary’,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), December 28, 2013. http://
www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1391769/pan-democrats-condemn-pla-barracksprotest-ineffective-unnecessary.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00554

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

543

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

126. Jeffie Lam and Minnie Chan, ‘‘PLA Drill in Victoria Harbour Seen as Warningto Hong Kong Protesters,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), January 25, 2014.
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1412911/pla-drill-victoria-harbour-seenwarning-hong-kong-protesters.
127. Jeffie Lam and Minnie Chan, ‘‘PLA Drill in Victoria Harbour Seen as Warningto Hong Kong Protesters,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), January 25, 2014.
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1412911/pla-drill-victoria-harbour-seenwarning-hong-kong-protesters.
128. Ian Cameron, ‘‘China Builds Listening Station in Hong Kong,’’ IHS Jane’s
360, July 24, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/41148/china-builds-listening-stationin-hong-kong/.
129. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Garrisoning of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (Adopted at the 23rd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on December 30, 1996, promulgatedby Order No. 80 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on December 30,
1996, and effective as of July 1, 1997), Chapter 3, Article 12. http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_ pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/68EF12FFF36A829A48
2575EF00293C8E/$FILE/CAP_2403_e_b5.pdf.
130. Ian Cameron, ‘‘China Builds Listening Station in Hong Kong,’’ IHS Jane’s
360, July 24, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/41148/china-builds-listening-stationin-hong-kong/.
131. Ian Cameron, ‘‘China Builds Listening Station in Hong Kong,’’ IHS Jane’s
360, July 24, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/41148/china-builds-listening-stationin-hong-kong/.
132. Cheung Chi-fai and Olga Wong, ‘‘Hong Kong ‘Hands PLA Radar Station on
Territory’s Highest Mountain in Secret Deal’,’’ South China Morning Post (HongKong), July 23, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1557307/doubtscast-covert-land-grant-peoples-liberation-army-tai-mo-shan.
133. Cheung Chi-fai and Olga Wong, ‘‘Hong Kong ‘Hands PLA Radar Station on
Territory’s Highest Mountain in Secret Deal’,’’ South China Morning Post (HongKong), July 23, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1557307/doubtscast-covert-land-grant-peoples-liberation-army-tai-mo-shan.
134. Nikki Sun and Adam Rose, ‘‘On Day of Hong Kong Mass Protests, China’s
Army Opens Barracks to Public,’’ Reuters, July 1, 2014. http: // www . reuters . com /article/2014/07/01/us-hongkong-protests-china-idUSKBN0F63SJ20140701.
135. Gordon Arthur, ‘‘China Shows Off New Kit at Hong Kong Garrison OpenDays,’’ IHS Jane’s 360, July 1, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/40214/chinashows-off-new-kit-at-hong-kong-garrison-open-days.
136. Gordon Arthur, ‘‘China Shows Off New Kit at Hong Kong Garrison OpenDays,’’ IHS Jane’s 360, July 1, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/40214/chinashows-off-new-kit-at-hong-kong-garrison-open-days.
137. Gordon Arthur, ‘‘China Shows Off New Kit at Hong Kong Garrison OpenDays,’’ IHS Jane’s 360, July 1, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/40214/chinashows-off-new-kit-at-hong-kong-garrison-open-days.
138. Open Source Center, Hong Kong: PLA Garrison Increasing Training, Focusing on Urban Center, June 9, 2014. ID: CHR2014060922894704.
139. Gordon Arthur, ‘‘China Shows Off New Kit at Hong Kong Garrison OpenDays,’’ IHS Jane’s 360, July 1, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/40214/chinashows-off-new-kit-at-hong-kong-garrison-open-days.
140. Hong Kong SAR’s Basic Law Promotion Steering Committee, ‘‘The Basic Law
and Hong Kong—The 15th Anniversary of Reunification with the Motherland,’’ May
2012, pp. 122–127. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/publications/book/15anniversary_reunification_ch2_8.pdf.
141. The Basic Law of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The People’s
Republic of China, Chapter 2, Article 18. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/
images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf.
142. Tanna Chong, ‘‘Occupy Central Could Spur Security Law and Use of Force,Warns Expert,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 21, 2014. http://
www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1453838/occupy-central-could-spur-security-law-and-use-force-warns-expert.
143. The Basic Law of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The People’s
Republic of China, Chapter 2, Article 23, p. 9. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basic
lawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf.
144. Tanna Chong, ‘‘Occupy Central Could Spur Security Law and Use of Force,Warns Expert,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 21, 2014. http://
www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1453838/occupy-central-could-spur-security-law-and-use-force-warns-expert.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00555

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

544

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

145. Jeffie Lam and Gary Cheung, ‘‘Hong Kong ‘Should Adopt National Security
Law until Own Version Is Ready’,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), April 7,
2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1466590/hong-kong-should-adoptnational-security-law-until-own-version-ready.
146. Jeffie Lam and Gary Cheung, ‘‘Hong Kong ‘Should Adopt National Security
Law until Own Version Is Ready’,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), April 7,
2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1466590/hong-kong-should-adoptnational-security-law-until-own-version-ready.
147. Hong Kong Journalists Association, ‘‘Press Freedom under Siege: Grave
Threats to Freedom of Expression in Hong Kong’’ (Hong Kong SAR: 2014 Annual
Report, July 2014), p. 2. http://www.hkja.org.hk/site/Host/hkja/UserFiles/file/annual_
report_2014_Final.pdf.
148. Freedom House, Hong Kong chapter (Washington, DC: Freedom of the Press
2014), pre-publication draft. http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTP_2014.pdf.
149. Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Asia-Pacific’’ (World Press Freedom Index 2014),
January 31, 2014, p. 17. http://rsf.org/index2014/data/index2014_en.pdf.
150. Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘Journalists in Hong Kong and Taiwan
Battle Beijing’s Influence,’’ February 2014. http://cpj.org/2014/02/attacks-on-thepress-hong-kong-analysis.php.
151. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013, p. 380.
152. Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘Journalists in Hong Kong and Taiwan
Battle Beijing’s Influence,’’ February 2014. http://cpj.org/2014/02/attacks-on-thepress-hong-kong-analysis.php.
153. Fiona Law, ‘‘Editor’s Removal Sparks Worries about Press Freedom in Hong
Kong,’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), January 9, 2014. http://
blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/01/09/editors-removal-sparks-worries-about-pressfreedom-in-hong-kong/.
154. John Garnaut, ‘‘A Media Mogul, Alone on the Island,’’ Foreign Policy, June 2,
2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/02/hong_kong_china_media_apple_daily_jimmy_lai_cleaver_attack.
155. Fiona Law, ‘‘Editor’s Removal Sparks Worries about Press Freedom in Hong
Kong,’’ China Real Time Report (Wall Street Journal blog), January 9, 2014. http://
blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/01/09/editors-removal-sparks-worries-about-pressfreedom-in-hong-kong/; Chris Buckley and Gerry Mullany, ‘‘Hong Kong Paper Ousts
Top Editor, Stirring Concern,’’ New York Times, January 30, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/world/asia/hong-kong-paper-ousts-top-editor-stirring-concern.html.
156. Te-Ping Chen, ‘‘Thousands Rally for Press Freedoms in Hong Kong,’’ WallStreet Journal, February 23, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240
52702304834704579400603420451052; Austin Ramzy, ‘‘Free Press Groups Warn ofChina’s Influence on Hong Kong and Taiwan Media,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times
blog), February 12, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/free-pressgroups-warn-of-chinas-influence-on-hong-kong-and-taiwan-media/.
157. Vivienne Chow, Stuart Lau, and Tanna Chong, ‘‘Station Takes Outspoken
Host off Prime-time Show,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), November 16,
2013. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1357254/station-takes-outspokenhost-prime-time-show.
158. Te-Ping Chen, ‘‘Former Hong Kong Paper Editor Stabbed,’’ China Real Time
Report (Wall Street Journal blog), February 26, 2014. http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/02/26/former-hong-kong-paper-editor-stabbed/.
159. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Annual Reportto Congress, November 2013, p. 381.
160. John Garnaut, ‘‘A Media Mogul, Alone on the Island,’’ Foreign Policy, June 2,
2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/02/hong_kong_china_media_apple_daily_jimmy_lai_cleaver_attack.
161. Samuel Chan, Clifford Lo, and Mimi Lau, ‘‘Two Fresh Arrests in Kevin Lau
Case Brings Total Held to 11,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 14,
2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1447145/least-one-suspect-arrestedformer-ming-pao-chief-editor-kevin-laus?page=all.
162. Samuel Chan, Clifford Lo, and Mimi Lau, ‘‘Two Fresh Arrests in Kevin Lau
Case Brings Total Held to 11,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), March 14,
2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1447145/least-one-suspect-arrestedformer-ming-pao-chief-editor-kevin-laus?page=all.
163. Austin Ramzy, ‘‘Assault on Hong Kong Media Executives Adds to Press Freedom Concerns,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times blog), March 20, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com / 2014 /03 / 20/ assault-on-hong-kong-media-executives-adds-to-pressfreedom-concerns/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00556

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

545

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

164. John Garnaut, ‘‘A Media Mogul, Alone on the Island,’’ Foreign Policy, June 2,
2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/02/hong_kong_china_media_apple_daily_jimmy_lai_cleaver_attack.
165. John Garnaut, ‘‘A Media Mogul, Alone on the Island,’’ Foreign Policy, June 2,
2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/02/hong_kong_china_media_apple_daily_jimmy_lai_cleaver_attack.
166. Michael Forsythe and Neil Gough, ‘‘Hong Kong Media Worries over China’s
Reach as Ads Disappear,’’ New York Times, June 11, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/06/12/business/international/hong-kong-media-worries-over-chinas-reach-as-adsdisappear.html.
167. John Garnaut, ‘‘A Media Mogul, Alone on the Island,’’ Foreign Policy, June 2,
2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/02/hong_kong_china_media_apple_daily_jimmy_lai_cleaver_attack.
168. John Garnaut, ‘‘A Media Mogul, Alone on the Island,’’ Foreign Policy, June 2,
2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/02/hong_kong_china_media_apple_daily_jimmy_lai_cleaver_attack.
169. John Garnaut, ‘‘A Media Mogul, Alone on the Island,’’ Foreign Policy, June 2,
2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/02/hong_kong_china_media_apple_daily_jimmy_lai_cleaver_attack.
170. Edward Wong, ‘‘Bloomberg News Is Said to Curb Articles That Might Anger
China,’’ New York Times, November 8, 2013. http: // www.nytimes.com / 2013 / 11 / 09 /world/asia/bloomberg-news-is-said-to-curb-articles-that-might-anger-china-.html?page
wanted=all.
171. Edward Wong, ‘‘Bloomberg News Is Said to Curb Articles That Might Anger
China,’’ New York Times, November 8, 2013. http: // www.nytimes.com / 2013 / 11 / 09 /world/asia/bloomberg-news-is-said-to-curb-articles-that-might-anger-china-.html?page
wanted=all.
172. Mark Simon, ‘‘Cyber Attacks from China Target Apple Daily Websites on
Eve of Pro-Democracy Referendum in Hong Kong,’’ Next Media, Ltd., June 20, 2014.
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cyber-attacks-from-china-target-apple-dailywebsites-on-eve-of-pro-democracy-referendum-in-hong-kong-263987291.html.
173. Alan Wong, ‘‘Pro-Democracy Media Company’s Websites Attacked,’’ Sinosphere (New York Times blog), June 18, 2014. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/06/18/pro-democracy-media-companys-websites-attacked/.
174. Shirley Zhao and Gary Cheung, ‘‘Pro-democracy Website House News Closes,
Citing Political Pressure, Low Revenue,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong),
July 27, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1560104/pro-democracywebsite-house-news-closes-citing-political-pressure-low.
175. Oiwan Lam, ‘‘ ‘Terrified’ Founder Decides to Shutter Hong Kong Pro-Democracy News Site ‘House News’,’’ Global Voices, July 27, 2014. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/07/27/terrified-founder-decides-to-shutter-hong-kong-pro-democracy-newssite-house-news/.
176. Shirley Zhao and Gary Cheung, ‘‘Pro-democracy Website House News Closes,
Citing Political Pressure, Low Revenue,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong),
July 27, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1560104/pro-democracywebsite-house-news-closes-citing-political-pressure-low; Oiwan Lam, ‘‘ ‘Terrified’ Founder Decides to Shutter Hong Kong Pro-Democracy News Site ‘House News’,’’ Global
Voices, July 27, 2014. http: // globalvoicesonline.org / 2014 / 07 / 27 / terrified-founderdecides-to-shutter-hong-kong-pro-democracy-news-site-house-news/.
177. Shirley Zhao and Gary Cheung, ‘‘Pro-democracy Website House News Closes,
Citing Political Pressure, Low Revenue,’’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong),
July 27, 2014. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1560104/pro-democracywebsite-house-news-closes-citing-political-pressure-low.
178. Oiwan Lam, ‘‘ ‘Terrified’ Founder Decides to Shutter Hong Kong Pro-Democracy News Site ‘House News’,’’ Global Voices, July 27, 2014. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/07/27/terrified-founder-decides-to-shutter-hong-kong-pro-democracy-newssite-house-news/.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00557

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

RECOMMENDATIONS
China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture
The Commission recommends:• Congress require the Administration to submit a one-time interagency report clarifying the progress of the Asia rebalance policy.
• Congress emphasize the value of the U.S.-Australia alliance in
its interactions with Australian legislators.
• Congress express support for Japan’s efforts to exercise ‘‘collective self-defense’’ in its interactions with Japanese legislators.
• Congress examine the Administration’s progress on greater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integration andsharing between the United States and its allies and security associates in East Asia and Oceania. In addition, Congress should
support efforts by the Department of Defense to improve ISR capabilities of allies and security associates in East Asia and develop a ‘‘common operating picture’’ for the East and South
China Seas.
• Congress urge the Administration to encourage allies to develop
their missile defense capabilities.
Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with North
Korea
The Commission recommends:• Appropriate Congressional committees require the Departmentsof Defense and State to jointly produce a classified report on U.S.
efforts to engage with China, South Korea, and Japan on issues
related to North Korean stability. The report should include a
discussion of prospects for political crisis or regime collapse in
North Korea; a discussion of each country’s outlook and approachto contingency planning for North Korea collapse scenarios; a detailed explanation of the current state of engagement between
these countries on contingency planning for North Korea collapse
scenarios; and an overview of existing track two dialogues aimed
at enhancing understanding and cooperation among these countries on issues related to North Korean stability, to include anassessment of the effectiveness of these track two dialogues.
• Congress require future classified and unclassified Departmentof Defense reports on ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ to include afull discussion of China’s activities impacting the military and security situation in North Korea.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(546)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00558

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

547
• Congress support nongovernmental organizations that encourage
democracy and promote human rights and economic liberalization in North Korea.
• Congress support nongovernmental organizations that facilitate
exchanges and dialogues between the United States, Japan,
South Korea, and China on issues related to security and weapons proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.
• Members of Congress and Congressional staff in their interactions with official delegations from China exchange views on
North Korea.
TaiwanThe Commission recommends:• Congress direct the Administration to permit and encourage official travel to Taiwan for uniformed military personnel above thelevel of O6 and urge Cabinet-level officials to make more frequent visits to Taiwan to promote commercial, technological, people-to-people, and military exchanges.
• Congress urge the Administration to make available to Taiwan
the arms and equipment it needs for its self-defense, consistent
with the Taiwan Relations Act, due to the shifting cross-Strait
military balance.
• Congress encourage the Administration to increase its public
support of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations
such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change.
• Congress encourage the Administration to strengthen economic
cooperation between the United States and Taiwan to further
their economic growth and prosperity.
Hong Kong

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Commission recommends:• Congress adopt a resolution urging China to keep its commitments to allow broadly representative nomination and election ofHong Kong’s chief executive by universal suffrage in accordancewith democratic procedures as articulated in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, the Basic
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
• Members of Congress, when visiting mainland China, also visit
Hong Kong to engage with high-level administrators on such
issues as democratic election.
• Members of Congress, jointly with members of British Parliament, promote Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law.
• Congress renew the biennial reporting requirements of the U.S.Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00559

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

548

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB• Congress reconvene a congressional caucus on Hong Kong to ensure continuous attention to the region’s democracy and civilrights issues.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00560

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF
THE COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations
Section 2: U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Economic
Challenges
The Commission recommends:
1. Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to update its report on the effectiveness of the U.S.-China Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) and the Strategic
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). The updated report should include an assessment of the objectives sought by the UnitedStates in these talks and whether China has honored its commitments to date.
2. Congress require the Department of the Treasury to include inits semiannual report to Congress specific information on thebeneficial economic impact of China moving to a freely floating
currency in terms of U.S. exports, economic growth, and job
creation. In addition, Congress should urge the Administration
to begin immediate consultations at the G–7 to identify a multilateral approach to addressing China’s currency manipulation.
3. Congress direct the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center(ITEC) to provide briefings to the House Ways and Means and
Senate Finance Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on its activities, since its creation, to coordinate and improve upon the enforcement of U.S. laws
against unfair trade. Congress should examine whether providing statutory authority for ITEC would enhance enforcement activities and ensure that adequate resources are available and that other Departments and Agencies are responsive
to its requests.
4. Congress consider amending existing trade enforcement rules
to ensure that foreign investment in the United States cannot
be used to impede the ability of domestic producers to bring petitions for trade enforcement actions. Congress could direct the
Department of Commerce to update its regulations and procedures for antidumping and countervailing duty cases to createa rebuttable presumption that firms that are state-owned,
state-controlled, or state-invested with facilities in the UnitedStates are operating at the direction of the state. Those statedirected companies would then be excluded from calculations ofindustry support or opposition unless they can prove that there
is no such involvement or direction.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(549)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00561

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

550

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

5. Congress consider whether state and local governments shouldbe treated as interested parties under laws against unfair
trade and thereby have standing to bring or participate intrade cases. Further, Congress should consider creating a private right of action allowing U.S. companies to take legal action against competitors directly in antidumping and countervailing duty cases, rather than having to rely on U.S. government assistance.
6. Congress seek clarification from the executive branch as to its
interpretation of Article 15 of China’s World Trade Organization Accession Protocol concerning China’s achievement of‘‘market economy’’ status.
7. Congress consider legislation that would make available a remedy to domestic firms that have been injured from the anticompetitive actions (such as access to low-cost or no-cost capital) of foreign state-owned companies for the injury that has
been inflicted and allow for the potential award of treble damages.
8. Congress direct the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) tobrief the Joint Economic Committee on existing data collection
efforts within the Administration regarding investments by
Chinese entities in the United States. CEA shall describe thediffering data sets available from public and private sources
and the extent to which existing data provides adequate information to U.S. policy makers to assess changing trends and thepotential economic implications from these investments.
9. Congress require the Department of Commerce to prepare acomprehensive analysis of excess productive capacity in China
across a range of sectors, including, but not limited to, steel,glass, paper, cement and solar products, and provide a reportto the President and to Congress on what actions should betaken to address this problem. This report shall be preparedannually for a period of five years, at a minimum. In addition,
the Administration should consult with major trade allies withsimilar concerns about Chinese overcapacity in these sectors todetermine what multilateral engagement would effectively deal
with this problem. As part of this approach, the Administration
shall evaluate the effectiveness of other efforts to address global and China’s overcapacity in certain sectors, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Steel
Committee, the U.S.-China Steel Dialogue, and JCCT and
S&ED talks.
10. Congress request that the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, Department of Commerce, and International
Trade Commission report to Congress on the extent to which
existing authorities would allow for sanctions to be imposed
against entities that benefit from trade secrets or other information obtained through cyber intrusions or other illegalmeans and were provided by a national government, foreign intelligence service, or other entity utilizing such means. If authorities do not exist, they should provide a proposal to address
such problems.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00562

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

551
11. Congress require the Office of the United States Trade Representative to brief the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, within 60 days, on trade enforcement issues
involving China which have been initiated or announced since2009, but have not yet been resolved, and identify what steps
will be taken to ensure a more rapid resolution of such issues.
The briefing shall include an estimate of the economic value tothe U.S. in terms of production and job creation, if the identified market barrier or impediment were eliminated.
Section 3: China’s Health Care Industry, Drug Safety, andMarket Access for U.S. Medical Goods and Services

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Commission recommends:
12. Congress urge the Institutes of Medicine of the National Academies to convene a task force to assess purchasing decisions by
U.S. wholesalers, retailers, and healthcare providers with regard to China-origin drugs and drug ingredients, and to recommend ways in which to improve information sharing and coordination with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
13. Congress urge the FDA to insist on expedited approvals fromthe Chinese government for work visas for the FDA staff, andon expanded authority to conduct unannounced visits at drug
manufacturing facilities in China.
14. Congress monitor the efficacy of the FDA’s regulatory activities
in China, consider ways to optimize the use of appropriatedfunding, and identify what other steps are necessary to protect
the health and safety of the U.S. population.
15. Congress pursue measures to improve the government’s information about drug ingredient and dietary supplement producers, especially for imports. To this end, Congress shouldurge the FDA to work with its Chinese counterparts to establish a more comprehensive regulatory regime for registering
China-based active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) producers,
and make this producer information available on demand for
U.S. agencies.
16. Congress adopt measures that make greater use of ‘‘track andtrace’’ technology. To this end, Congress should: (1) urge theU.S. government negotiators to demand that China harmonize
with internationally recognized standards its unique device
identifiers for medical devices and its serialized verification ofAPIs, so as to allow for equivalency with U.S. systems andstandards; (2) make the use of serial numbers for productverification at U.S. pharmacies mandatory at all times, notonly in cases where a product is suspect (as currently spelled
out in the Drug Quality and Security Act).
17. Congress direct the Trade Policy Review Group of the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative to review the interests of U.S.
healthcare goods and services providers in the Chinese market,
Chinese market barriers, and opportunities to promote humanhealth in China in ways that support U.S. consumer and business interests.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00563

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

552
Section 4: U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation
The Commission recommends:
18. Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to conduct an assessment of government-led U.S.-China collaborative
initiatives on clean energy. This assessment should describe
the nature of collaboration, including funding, participation,and reporting on the outcomes; consider whether the intellectual property rights of U.S. researchers and companies arebeing protected; examine whether Chinese state-owned enterprises are benefitting from U.S. taxpayer-funded research; investigate if any U.S. companies, universities and labs participating in government-led collaboration with China have been
subject to cyber penetrations originating in China; and evaluate the benefits of this collaboration for the United States. Further, this assessment should examine redundancies, if any,
among various U.S.-China government-led collaborative programs, and make suggestions for improving collaboration.
19. Congress require that the Department of Energy, in consultation with the Department of Commerce, identify barriers tomarket access in China for clean and renewable energy products and services and their impact on U.S. production and job
creation, and report to the committees of jurisdiction, within
120 days, on specific action plans to address these barriers. As
part of this report, the Departments shall identify sourcing
patterns that have changed over the last 10 years in these sectors and also the extent to which U.S. companies are producing
in the Chinese market to serve that market and whether they
were previously able to manufacture these products in the
United States for export to China.
Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China
Section 2: China’s Military Modernization

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Commission recommends:
20. Congress fund the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding and operational efforts to increase its presence in the Asia Pacific to at least 67
ships and rebalance homeports to 60 percent in the region by2020 so that the United States will have the capacity to maintain readiness and presence in the Asia Pacific, offset China’s
growing military capabilities, and surge naval assets in theevent of a contingency.
21. Congress appoint an outside panel of experts to do a net assessment of the Sino-American military balance and make recommendations to Congress regarding the adequacy of the current U.S. military plans and budgets to meet the security requirements of the United States in the Pacific.
22. Congress ensure the adequacy of open source collection, production, and dissemination capabilities vis-à-vis security issues
involving China.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00564

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

553
23. Congress direct U.S. Pacific Command to brief Congress on the
People’s Liberation Army Navy’s participation in the Rim of
the Pacific-2014 exercise.
24. Congress direct the Department of Defense to provide to Congress its purpose and rationale for its military-to-military engagement planning with the People’s Liberation Army, including proposed programs already discussed with the People’s Liberation Army.
25. Given the importance of understanding China’s nuclear andconventional ballistic missile programs, Congress direct theGovernment Accountability Office to provide an unclassified report, with a classified annex, that examines China’s nuclear
and conventional ballistic missile capabilities, intentions, andforce structure.
Section 3: China’s Domestic Stability
The Commission recommends:
26. Members of Congress reaffirm their support for human rights,
freedom of expression, and rule of law in China and raise citizens’ rights to freedom of speech, expression, and religion in
their meetings with Chinese government officials.
27. Congress support the efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and the National Endowment for Democracy to strengthen governanceand improve the well-being of Chinese citizens through capacity-building training programs and exchanges.
28. Congress closely monitor U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation to ensure the United States is not endorsing or providing
any support for China’s suppression of Chinese citizens, including Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other ethnic minorities.
29. Congress continue to support and fund media outlets that promote the free flow of information and Internet freedom within
China.
Chapter 3: China and the World
Section 1: China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture
The Commission recommends:
30. Congress require the Administration to submit a one-time
interagency report clarifying the progress of the Asia rebalance
policy.
31. Congress emphasize the value of the U.S.-Australia alliance in
its interactions with Australian legislators.
32. Congress express support for Japan’s efforts to exercise ‘‘collective self-defense’’ in its interactions with Japanese legislators.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

33. Congress examine the Administration’s progress on greater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integrationand sharing between the United States and its allies and secu-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00565

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

554
rity associates in East Asia and Oceania. In addition, Congressshould support efforts by the Department of Defense to improve ISR capabilities of allies and security associates in East
Asia and develop a ‘‘common operating picture’’ for the Eastand South China Seas.
34. Congress urge the Administration to encourage allies to develop their missile defense capabilities.
Section 2: Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with
North Korea
The Commission recommends:
35. Appropriate Congressional committees require the Departments of Defense and State to jointly produce a classified report on U.S. efforts to engage with China, South Korea, andJapan on issues related to North Korean stability. The report
should include a discussion of prospects for political crisis or
regime collapse in North Korea; a discussion of each country’s
outlook and approach to contingency planning for North Korea
collapse scenarios; a detailed explanation of the current stateof engagement among these countries on contingency planningfor North Korea collapse scenarios; and an overview of existing
track two dialogues aimed at enhancing understanding and cooperation among these countries on issues related to North Korean stability, to include an assessment of the effectiveness ofthese track two dialogues.
36. Congress require future classified and unclassified Departmentof Defense reports on ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ to include
a full discussion of China’s activities impacting the militaryand security situation in North Korea.
37. Congress support nongovernmental organizations that encourage democracy and promote human rights and economic liberalization in North Korea.
38. Congress support nongovernmental organizations that facilitate exchanges and dialogues among the United States, Japan,
South Korea, and China on issues related to security andweapons proliferation on the Korean Peninsula.
39. Members of Congress and Congressional staff in their interactions with official delegations from China exchange views on
North Korea.
Section 3: Taiwan
The Commission recommends:

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

40. Congress direct the Administration to permit and encourage official travel to Taiwan for uniformed military personnel above
the level of O6 and urge Cabinet-level officials to make more
frequent visits to Taiwan to promote commercial, technological,
people-to-people, and military exchanges.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00566

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

555
41. Congress urge the Administration to make available to Taiwan
the arms and equipment it needs for its self-defense, consistent
with the Taiwan Relations Act, due to the shifting cross-Strait
military balance.
42. Congress encourage the Administration to increase its public
support of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations
such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change.
43. Congress encourage the Administration to strengthen economic
cooperation between the United States and Taiwan to further
their economic growth and prosperity.
Section 3: Hong Kong
The Commission recommends:
44. Congress adopt a resolution urging China to keep its commitments to allow broadly representative nomination and electionof Hong Kong’s chief executive by universal suffrage in accordance with democratic procedures as articulated in the 1984
Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong,
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
45. Members of Congress, when visiting mainland China, also visit
Hong Kong to engage with high-level administrators on such
issues as democratic election.
46. Members of Congress, jointly with members of British Parliament, promote Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law.
47. Congress renew the biennial reporting requirements of the
U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

48. Congress reconvene a congressional caucus on Hong Kong toensure continuous attention to the region’s democracy and civilrights issues.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00567

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

556

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OFWILLIAM A. REINSCH, COMMISSIONERDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Once again this year I support issuing the report, notwithstanding my reservations about some of its recommendations, which I
discuss below.
Overall, the report does a fair job of detailing the Commission’s
work in 2014, and its recommendations accurately reflect the viewsof a majority of commissioners. Normally, at this point I lament thereport’s consistent tendency to focus unrelentingly on the bad news
at the expense of promising developments in the relationship. This
year, however, there is precious little good news to report. Business, labor, numerous nongovernmental organizations and the U.S.
government itself are all dissatisfied with aspects of the bilateralrelationship—economic, military and political.
Many of us had hoped the new leadership in China would bringwith it reforms that would improve the multilateral climate. At
this point not only is that prospect unrealized, but the new regime
is proving itself far more aggressive against its neighbors, less cooperative in multilateral fora, and much quicker to suppress alternative voices inside China than its predecessors. Historians and political scientists are already beginning to find echoes of traditional
Chinese imperial policies in the new leadership’s bullying approach
to its neighbors and its discriminatory actions against foreigners
doing business inside the country. The latter have led more andmore companies, both American and European, to reconsider theirpresence in China. While most will not leave, some will reduce
their profile there, and many will begin to put the larger share of
their new investment dollars or euros elsewhere.
While the Commission’s mandate does not specifically extend tohuman rights issues, we do annually review Hong Kong, and there
the Chinese government’s increasingly muscular efforts to suppress
dissidents at home and to impose conditions on Hong Kong’s promised transition to universal suffrage affect the security relationshipand deserve comment, as we have done. It is worth noting also that
the Commission itself has been a victim of China’s more restrictive
policies, as the Chinese government has refused to allow us to visit
China this year.
It is a real disappointment for me to write these things. I havespent a good part of my professional life, beginning in graduate
school, studying China, and arguing for greater efforts at mutual
understanding that focus on the benefits of cooperation rather thangive in to the mutual suspicion that is rapidly enveloping both ofus. I have always been an optimist about the relationship, but thatview is becoming increasingly untenable, as China asserts itself inways that are inevitably going to bump up against our interests in
the region and in multilateral fora. It is common knowledge that
there is no shortage of people in each country who believe the otheris an existential threat, and I have thought for some time the fundamental policy goal for each country should be to keep those people out of power. I have not changed my view about that, but it
does not appear to be happening in China, which will only makeit harder to prevent it from happening here.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00568

Fmt 6602

Sfmt 6602

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

557

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

With respect to specific recommendations, while there are nonethat are as objectionable as some of those made in previous years,
I am concerned, as usual, with the proliferation of economic proposals that in effect seek to revise our unfair trade practice rules.
These recommendations are motivated in part by a search for new
legal tools to address new forms of unfair competition. That is aworthy search, and stacking the deck in favor of American complainants is not by itself objectionable—and hardly different fromwhat every other country is doing—but it is important that we proceed in ways that are consistent with our multilateral obligations,particularly those of the World Trade Organization. The UnitedStates is a rule-of-law country, which we frequently remind theChinese (and others), and if we wish to move them in that direction, we must continue to maintain our own objective and transparent legal procedures which we can hold up as examples.
Changes in law or practice that depart from that principle weaken
our position when we negotiate with China and others. This year’s
recommendations, in my judgment, do not cross that line, but theycome close to it.
I am pleased to note that the Commission has for once avoided
the paranoia about Chinese investment in the U.S. that has characterized previous reports. I continue to believe the U.S. has adequate means in place via CFIUS to review a foreign investment’s
national security implications, which is the appropriate criterion.
This issue is not going to go away, as Chinese investment in the
U.S. will increase, but I hope the Commission will maintain a dispassionate view on the matter and avoid short-sighted recommendations that could hurt our economic growth if implemented.
Finally, close readers of this year’s report will notice that it isless nuanced and less temperate with respect to China’s militaryactivities. That is deliberate, and while it is not my style, I did not
object to it. It appears the Chinese have embarked on a path intended to push the U.S. to choose between confronting them militarily or abandoning our friends and allies in the region, gamblingthat we will choose the latter. That is a dangerous path, and theCommission is right to note it. Hopefully, adroit diplomacy, withboth China and others in the region, will prevent us from having
to make that choice.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00569

Fmt 6602

Sfmt 6602

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00570

Fmt 6602

Sfmt 6602

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

APPENDIX I
UNITED STATES–CHINA ECONOMIC ANDSECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION CHARTER
22 U.S.C. 7002 (2001)
The Commission was created on October 30, 2000, by the Floyd
D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238,
Pub. L. No. 106–398, 114 STAT. 1654A–334 (2000) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 7002 (2001), as amended by the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act for 2002 § 645 (regarding employment status of staff) & § 648 (regarding changing annual reportdue date from March to June), Pub. L. No. 107–67, 115 STAT. 514(November 12, 2001); as amended by Division P of the ‘‘Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003,’’ Pub. L. No. 108–7 (February 20, 2003) (regarding Commission name change, terms ofCommissioners, and responsibilities of Commission); as amended
by Pub. L. No. 109–108 (enacted November 22, 2005) (regarding responsibilities of Commission and applicability of FACA); as amended by Pub. L. No. 110–161 (enacted December 26, 2007) (regarding
changing annual report due date from June to December; reporting
unobligated balances and submission of quarterly financial reports;
deemed Commission a committee of Congress for printing and binding costs; amended employee compensation levels, and performancebased reviews and awards subject to Title 5 USC; and directed thattravel by members of the Commission and its staff shall be arranged and conducted under the rules and procedures applying totravel by members of the House of Representatives and its staff).
§ 7002. United States-China Economic and Security Review
Commission(a) Purposes. The purposes of this section are as follows:(1) To establish the United States-China Economic and Security
Review Commission to review the national security implications oftrade and economic ties between the United States and the People’s
Republic of China.
(2) To facilitate the assumption by the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission of its duties regarding thereview referred to in paragraph (1) by providing for the transfer tothat Commission of staff, materials, and infrastructure (including
leased premises) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission that areappropriate for the review upon the submittal of the final reportof the Trade Deficit Review Commission.
(b) Establishment of United States-China Economic and Security
Review Commission.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(559)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00571

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

560

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(1) In general. There is hereby established a commission to be
known as the United States-China Economic and Security Review
Commission (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Commission’’).
(2) Purpose. The purpose of the Commission is to monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implicationsof the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the UnitedStates and the People’s Republic of China.
(3) Membership. The United States-China Economic and Security
Review Commission shall be composed of 12 members, who shallbe appointed in the same manner provided for the appointment ofmembers of the Trade Deficit Review Commission under section
127(c)(3) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission Act (19 U.S.C.
2213 note), except that—(A) Appointment of members by the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be made after consultation with the chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives,in addition to consultation with the chairman of the Committee onWays and Means of the House of Representatives provided forunder clause (iii) of subparagraph (A) of that section;(B) Appointment of members by the President pro tempore of the
Senate upon the recommendation of the majority leader of the Senate shall be made after consultation with the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, in addition to consultation
with the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate provided for under clause (i) of that subparagraph;(C) Appointment of members by the President pro tempore of the
Senate upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the Senate shall be made after consultation with the ranking minority
member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, in addition to consultation with the ranking minority member of theCommittee on Finance of the Senate provided for under clause (ii)of that subparagraph;(D) Appointment of members by the minority leader of the Houseof Representatives shall be made after consultation with the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services of theHouse of Representatives, in addition to consultation with theranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives provided for under clause (iv) of thatsubparagraph;(E) Persons appointed to the Commission shall have expertise innational security matters and United States-China relations, in addition to the expertise provided for under subparagraph (B)(i)(I) of
that section;(F) Each appointing authority referred to under subparagraphs(A) through (D) of this paragraph shall—(i) appoint 3 members to the Commission;(ii) make the appointments on a staggered term basis, suchthat—(I) 1 appointment shall be for a term expiring on December 31,
2003;(II) 1 appointment shall be for a term expiring on December 31,
2004; and(III) 1 appointment shall be for a term expiring on December 31,
2005;

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00572

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

561
(iii) make all subsequent appointments on an approximate 2-year
term basis to expire on December 31 of the applicable year; and(iv) make appointments not later than 30 days after the date on
which each new Congress convenes.
(G) Members of the Commission may be reappointed for additional terms of service as members of the Commission; and(H) Members of the Trade Deficit Review Commission as of thedate of the enactment of this Act [enacted Oct. 30, 2000] shallserve as members of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission until such time as members are first appointed to the United States-China Economic and Security Review
Commission under this paragraph.
(4) Retention of support. The United States-China Economic andSecurity Review Commission shall retain and make use of such
staff, materials, and infrastructure (including leased premises) of
the Trade Deficit Review Commission as the United States-China
Economic and Security Review Commission determines, in the
judgment of the members of the United States-China Economic andSecurity Review Commission, are required to facilitate the readycommencement of activities of the United States-China Economic
and Security Review Commission under subsection (c) or to carryout such activities after the commencement of such activities.
(5) Chairman and vice chairman. The members of the Commission shall select a Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Commission
from among the members of the Commission.
(6) Meetings.
(A) Meetings. The Commission shall meet at the call of the
Chairman of the Commission.
(B) Quorum. A majority of the members of the Commission shallconstitute a quorum for the transaction of business of the Commission.
(7) Voting. Each member of the Commission shall be entitled to
one vote, which shall be equal to the vote of every other memberof the Commission.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(c) Duties.
(1) Annual report. Not later than June 1 each year [beginning in2002], the Commission shall submit to Congress a report, in both
unclassified and classified form, regarding the national security implications and impact of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
The report shall include a full analysis, along with conclusions andrecommendations for legislative and administrative actions, if any,of the national security implications for the United States of the
trade and current balances with the People’s Republic of China ingoods and services, financial transactions, and technology transfers. The Commission shall also take into account patterns of trade
and transfers through third countries to the extent practicable.
(2) Contents of report. Each report under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, a full discussion of the following:(A) The portion of trade in goods and services with the UnitedStates that the People’s Republic of China dedicates to militarysystems or systems of a dual nature that could be used for military
purposes.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00573

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

562

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(B) The acquisition by the People’s Republic of China of advanced
military or dual-use technologies from the United States by trade(including procurement) and other technology transfers, especiallythose transfers, if any, that contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems, or that undermine international agreements or United States laws with respect
to nonproliferation.
(C) Any transfers, other than those identified under subparagraph (B), to the military systems of the People’s Republic of China
made by United States firms and United States-based multinational corporations.
(D) An analysis of the statements and writing of the People’s Republic of China officials and officially-sanctioned writings that bearon the intentions, if any, of the Government of the People’s Republic of China regarding the pursuit of military competition with, andleverage over, or cooperation with, the United States and the Asian
allies of the United States.
(E) The military actions taken by the Government of the People’s
Republic of China during the preceding year that bear on the national security of the United States and the regional stability of the
Asian allies of the United States.
(F) The effects, if any, on the national security interests of theUnited States of the use by the People’s Republic of China of financial transactions and capital flow and currency manipulations.
(G) Any action taken by the Government of the People’s Republicof China in the context of the World Trade Organization that is adverse or favorable to the United States national security interests.
(H) Patterns of trade and investment between the People’s Republic of China and its major trading partners, other than the
United States, that appear to be substantively different from tradeand investment patterns with the United States and whether thedifferences have any national security implications for the UnitedStates.
(I) The extent to which the trade surplus of the People’s Republicof China with the United States enhances the military budget of
the People’s Republic of China.
(J) An overall assessment of the state of the security challenges
presented by the People’s Republic of China to the United States
and whether the security challenges are increasing or decreasingfrom previous years.
(3) Recommendations of report. Each report under paragraph (1)shall also include recommendations for action by Congress or the
President, or both, including specific recommendations for theUnited States to invoke Article XXI (relating to security exceptions)of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 with respect
to the People’s Republic of China, as a result of any adverse impact
on the national security interests of the United States.
(d) Hearings.
(1) In general. The Commission or, at its direction, any panel ormember of the Commission, may for the purpose of carrying out
the provisions of this section, hold hearings, sit and act at times
and places, take testimony, receive evidence, and administer oaths
to the extent that the Commission or any panel or member considers advisable.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00574

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

563

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(2) Information. The Commission may secure directly from the
Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and anyother Federal department or agency information that the Commission considers necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its
duties under this section, except the provision of intelligence information to the Commission shall be made with due regard for theprotection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information
relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, under procedures approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(3) Security. The Office of Senate Security shall—(A) provide classified storage and meeting and hearing spaces,
when necessary, for the Commission; and(B) assist members and staff of the Commission in obtaining security clearances.
(4) Security clearances. All members of the Commission and appropriate staff shall be sworn and hold appropriate security clearances.
(e) Commission personnel matters.
(1) Compensation of members. Members of the United StatesChina Economic and Security Review Commission shall be compensated in the same manner provided for the compensation ofmembers of the Trade Deficit Review Commission under section
127(g)(1) and section 127(g)(6) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission Act [19 U.S.C. 2213 note].
(2) Travel expenses. Travel expenses of the United States-China
Economic and Security Review Commission shall be allowed in thesame manner provided for the allowance of the travel expenses of
the Trade Deficit Review Commission under section 127(g)(2) of theTrade Deficit Review Commission Act [19 U.S.C § 2213 note].
(3) Staff. An executive director and other additional personnel for
the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission shall be appointed, compensated, and terminated in the samemanner provided for the appointment, compensation, and termination of the executive director and other personnel of the Trade
Deficit Review Commission under section 127(g)(3) and section
127(g)(6) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission Act [19 U.S.C.
§ 2213 note]. The executive director and any personnel who are employees of the United States-China Economic and Security Review
Commission shall be employees under section 2105 of title 5,
United States Code, for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87,
89, and 90 of that title [language of 2001 amendment, Sec. 645].
(4) Detail of government employees. Federal Government employees may be detailed to the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission in the same manner provided for the detail of Federal Government employees to the Trade Deficit Review
Commission under section 127(g)(4) of the Trade Deficit Review
Commission Act [19 U.S.C. § 2213 note].
(5) Foreign travel for official purposes. Foreign travel for official
purposes by members and staff of the Commission may be authorized by either the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Commission.
(6) Procurement of temporary and intermittent services. The
Chairman of the United States-China Economic and Security Re-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00575

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

564
view Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services
for the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission in the same manner provided for the procurement of temporary and intermittent services for the Trade Deficit Review Commission under section 127(g)(5) of the Trade Deficit Review Commission Act [19 U.S.C. § 2213 note].
(f) Authorization of appropriations.
(1) In general. There is authorized to be appropriated to theCommission for fiscal year 2001, and for each fiscal year thereafter,such sums as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carryout its functions under this section.
(2) Availability. Amounts appropriated to the Commission shallremain available until expended.
(g) Federal Advisory Committee Act. The provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to theCommission.
(h) Effective date. This section shall take effect on the first dayof the 107th Congress.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Amendments:
SEC. 645. (a) Section 1238(e)(3) of the Floyd D. Spence National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as enacted by Public Law 106–398) is amended by adding at the end the following:‘‘The executive director and any personnel who are employees of
the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission shall be employees under section 2105 of title 5, United States
Code, for purposes of chapters 63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 ofthat title.’’ (b) The amendment made by this section shall take effect on January 3, 2001.’’
SEC. 648. DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION OF ANNUAL REPORTS BY UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION. Section 1238(c)(1) of the Floyd D.
Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (asenacted into law by section I of Public Law 106–398) is amended
by striking ‘‘March’’ and inserting ‘‘June’’.
Changes: Enacted into law by Division P of the ‘‘Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution, 2003’’ Pub. L. No. 108–7 dated February 20, 2003:
H. J. Res. 2—
DIVISION P—UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSIONSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.—This division may be cited as the‘‘United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission’’.
SEC. 2. (a) APPROPRIATIONS.—There are appropriated, out of
any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $1,800,000,
to remain available until expended, to the United States-China
Economic and Security Review Commission.
(b) NAME CHANGE.—(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National
Defense Authorization Act of 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002) is amended—
as follows:

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00576

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

565

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

In each Section and Subsection where it appears, the name ischanged to the ‘‘U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION’’—(2) REFERENCES.—Any reference in any Federal law, Executive
Order, rule, regulation, or delegation of authority, or any documentof or relating to the United States-China Security Review Commission shall be deemed to refer to the United States-China Economic
and Security Review Commission.
(c) MEMBERSHIP, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND TERMS.—(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1238(b)(3) of the Floyd D. Spence
National Defense Authorization Act of 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002) isamended by striking subparagraph (F) and inserting the following:‘‘(F) each appointing authority referred to under subparagraphs(A) through (D) of this paragraph shall—‘‘(i) appoint 3 members to the Commission;‘‘(ii) make the appointments on a staggered term basis, suchthat—‘‘(I) 1 appointment shall be for a term expiring on December 31,
2003;‘‘(II) 1 appointment shall be for a term expiring on December 31,
2004; and‘‘(III) 1 appointment shall be for a term expiring on December 31,
2005;‘‘(iii) make all subsequent appointments on an approximate 2year term basis to expire on December 31 of the applicable year;
and‘‘(iv) make appointments not later than 30 days after the date on
which each new Congress convenes;’’.
SEC. 635. (a) Modification of Responsibilities.—Notwithstanding
any provision of section 1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 7002), or
any other provision of law, the United States-China Economic andSecurity Review Commission established by subsection (b) of that
section shall investigate and report exclusively on each of the following areas:(1) PROLIFERATION PRACTICES.—The role of the People’s Republic of China in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and other weapons (including dual use technologies), including actions, the United States might take to encourage the People’s Republic of China to cease such practices.
(2) ECONOMIC TRANSFERS.—The qualitative and quantitative
nature of the transfer of United States production activities to thePeople’s Republic of China, including the relocation of high technology, manufacturing, and research and development facilities,
the impact of such transfers on United States national security, theadequacy of United States export control laws, and the effect ofsuch transfers on United States economic security and employment.
(3) ENERGY.—The effect of the large and growing economy of
the People’s Republic of China on world energy supplies and therole the United States can play (including joint research and development efforts and technological assistance), in influencing the energy policy of the People’s Republic of China.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00577

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

566

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(4) UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.—The extent of access to and use of United States capital markets by the People’s
Republic of China, including whether or not existing disclosure andtransparency rules are adequate to identify People’s Republic ofChina companies engaged in harmful activities.
(5) REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY IMPACTS.—The
triangular economic and security relationship among the UnitedStates, Taipei and the People’s Republic of China (including themilitary modernization and force deployments of the People’s Republic of China aimed at Taipei), the national budget of the People’s Republic of China, and the fiscal strength of the People’s Republic of China in relation to internal instability in the People’s Republic of China and the likelihood of the externalization of problems arising from such internal instability.
(6) UNITED STATES-CHINA BILATERAL PROGRAMS.—
Science and technology programs, the degree of non-compliance by
the People’s Republic of China with agreements between the
United States and the People’s Republic of China on prison labor
imports and intellectual property rights, and United States enforcement policies with respect to such agreements.
(7) WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION COMPLIANCE.—Thecompliance of the People’s Republic of China with its accessionagreement to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
(8) FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.—The implications of restrictions on speech and access to information in the People’s Republicof China for its relations with the United States in the areas of economic and security policy.
(b) Applicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.—Subsection(g) of section 1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 is amended to read as follows:(g) Applicability of FACA.—The provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall apply to the activities of
the Commission.
The effective date of these amendments shall take effect on thedate of enactment of this Act [November 22, 2005].
Changes: Enacted into law by the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161 dated December 26, 2007:
H.R. 2764—
For necessary expenses of the United States-China Economic andSecurity Review Commission, $4,000,000, including not more than
$4,000 for the purpose of official representation, to remain available until September 30, 2009: Provided, That the Commission
shall submit a spending plan to the Committees on Appropriations
no later than March 1, 2008, which effectively addresses the recommendations of the Government Accountability Office’s audit of
the Commission (GAO–07–1128): Provided further, That the Commission shall provide to the Committees on Appropriations a quarterly accounting of the cumulative balances of any unobligatedfunds that were received by the Commission during any previous
fiscal year: Provided further, That for purposes of costs relating toprinting and binding, the Commission shall be deemed, effective on
the date of its establishment, to be a committee of Congress: Provided further, That compensation for the executive director of theCommission may not exceed the rate payable for level II of the Ex-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00578

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

567

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

ecutive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code:Provided further, That section 1238(c)(1) of the Floyd D. Spence
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, is amended by striking ‘‘June’’ and inserting ‘‘December’’: Provided further,That travel by members of the Commission and its staff shall bearranged and conducted under the rules and procedures applying
to travel by members of the House of Representatives and its staff.
COMMISSION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
SEC. 118. (a) REQUIREMENT FOR PERFORMANCE REVIEWS.—The United States-China Economic and Security Review
Commission shall comply with chapter 43 of title 5, United States
Code, regarding the establishment and regular review of employee
performance appraisals.
(b) LIMITATION ON CASH AWARDS.—The United StatesChina Economic and Security Review Commission shall comply
with section 4505a of title 5, United States Code, with respect tolimitations on payment of performance-based cash awards.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00579

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00580

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

APPENDIX IIBACKGROUND OF COMMISSIONERSThe Honorable Dennis C. Shea, Chairman
Chairman Dennis Shea was appointed by Senate Republican
Leader Mitch McConnell for a term expiring December 31, 2014.
An attorney with 25 years of experience in government and public
policy, he is the founder of Shea Public Strategies LLC, a publicaffairs firm based in Alexandria, Virginia. Before starting the firm,
he served as Vice President for Government Affairs—Americas for
Pitney Bowes Inc., a Fortune 500 company. Chairman Shea’s government service began in 1988, when he joined the Office of Senate
Republican Leader Bob Dole as counsel, subsequently becoming the
Senator’s deputy chief of staff in the Office of the Senate Majority
Leader. In these capacities, he advised Senator Dole and other Republican senators on a broad range of domestic policy issues, wasinvolved in the drafting of numerous pieces of legislation, and wasrecognized as one of the most influential staffers on Capitol Hill.
In 1992, Chairman Shea’s service with Senator Dole was interrupted when he ran for Congress in the Seventh District of New
York. During the 1996 elections, Chairman Shea continued to help
shape the national public policy debate as the director of policy for
the Dole for President Campaign. Following the elections, he entered the private sector, providing legislative and public affairs
counsel to a wide range of clients while employed at BKSH & Associates and Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson, and Hand.
In 2003, Chairman Shea was named the Executive Director of
the President’s Commission on the United States Postal Service.
Many of the Commission’s recommendations were subsequently
adopted in the landmark 2006 postal reform legislation.
In 2004, Chairman Shea was confirmed as Assistant Secretaryfor Policy Development and Research at the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development. As Assistant Secretary, Chairman Shea led a team responsible for conducting much of the critical analysis necessary to support the Department’s mission. In
2005, Chairman Shea left to serve as Senior Advisor to Senator
Elizabeth Dole in her capacity as chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee.
Chairman Shea received a J.D., an M.A. in History, and a B.A.
in Government, from Harvard University. He is admitted to thebar in New York and the District of Columbia. The Chairman currently resides in Alexandria, Virginia, with his wife Elizabeth anddaughter Juliette.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(569)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00581

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

570

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Honorable William A. Reinsch, Vice Chairman
Vice Chairman William Reinsch was reappointed to the Commission by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid for the term expiring
December 31, 2015. He was elected as Chairman of the Commission for the 2014 Report cycle effective January 1, 2014, and previously served as Chairman of the Commission for the 2013 and2011 Report cycles. Vice Chairman Reinsch served as Under Secretary for Export Administration in the U.S. Department of Commerce. As head of the Bureau of Export Administration, later
named the Bureau of Industry and Security, Vice Chairman
Reinsch was charged with administering and enforcing the export
control policies of the U.S. government, including its antiboycottlaws. Major accomplishments during his tenure included refocusing
controls regarding economic globalization, most notably on highperformance computers, microprocessors, and encryption, completing the first revisions of the Export Administration regulations
in over 40 years. In addition, he revised the interagency process forreviewing applications and permitted electronic filing of applications over the Internet.
During this time, Vice Chairman Reinsch delivered more than
200 speeches and testified 53 times before various committees of
the Congress. Before joining the Department of Commerce, Vice
Chairman Reinsch was a senior legislative assistant to SenatorJohn Rockefeller and was responsible for the senator’s work on
trade, international economic policy, foreign affairs, and defense.
He also provided staff support for Senator Rockefeller’s related efforts on the Finance Committee and the Commerce, Science, andTransportation Committee.
For over a decade, Vice Chairman Reinsch served on the staff ofSenator John Heinz as chief legislative assistant, focusing on foreign trade and competitiveness policy issues. During that period,
Senator Heinz was either the chairman or the ranking member of
the Senate Banking Committee’s Subcommittee on International
Finance. Senator Heinz was also a member of the International
Trade Subcommittee of the Finance Committee. Vice Chairman
Reinsch provided support for the senator on both subcommittees.
This work included five revisions of the Export Administration Act
and work on four major trade bills. Prior to joining Senator Heinz’s
staff, Vice Chairman Reinsch was a legislative assistant to Representatives Richard Ottinger and Gilbert Gude, acting staff director of the House Environmental Study Conference, and a teacher
in Maryland.
Today Vice Chairman Reinsch is president of the National Foreign Trade Council. Founded in 1914, the council is the only business organization dedicated solely to trade policy, export finance,international tax, and human resources issues. The organization
represents over 200 companies through its offices in New York City
and Washington.
In addition to his legislative and private sector work, Vice Chairman Reinsch served as an adjunct associate professor at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy and, earlier, its University College Graduate School of Management and Technology,
teaching a course in international trade and trade policy. He is alsoa member of the boards of the Executive Council on Diplomacy and

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00582

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

571
the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). Vice Chairman Reinsch’s publications include ‘‘Why China Matters to the
Health of the U.S. Economy,’’ published in Economics and National
Security; ‘‘The Role and Effectiveness of U.S. Export Control Policyin the Age of Globalization’’ and ‘‘Export Controls in the Age of
Globalization,’’ both published in The Monitor. In addition, Vice
Chairman Reinsch has published ‘‘Should Uncle Sam Control U.S.
Technology Exports,’’ published in Insight magazine; ‘‘Encryption
Policy Strikes a Balance,’’ published in the Journal of Commerce,and ‘‘Building a New Economic Relationship with Japan,’’ published with others in Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in
U.S. Foreign Policy.
Carolyn Bartholomew
Carolyn Bartholomew was reappointed to the Commission by
House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi for a seventh term expiringon December 31, 2015. She previously served as the Commission’s
Chairman for the 2007 and 2009 Report cycles and served as Vice
Chairman for the 2010, 2008, and 2006 Report cycles.
Commissioner Bartholomew has worked at senior levels in the
U.S. Congress, serving as counsel, legislative director, and chief ofstaff to now House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi. She was aprofessional staff member on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and also served as a legislative assistant tothen U.S. Representative Bill Richardson.
In these positions, Commissioner Bartholomew was integrally involved in developing U.S. policies on international affairs and security matters. She has particular expertise in U.S.-China relations,
including issues related to trade, human rights, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Ms. Bartholomew led efforts
in the establishment and funding of global AIDS programs and thepromotion of human rights and democratization in countries
around the world. She was a member of the first Presidential Delegation to Africa to Investigate the Impact of HIV/AIDS on Children
and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Congressional
Staff Roundtable on Asian Political and Security Issues.
In addition to U.S.-China relations, her areas of expertise include
terrorism, trade, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
human rights, U.S. foreign assistance programs, and international
environmental issues. She is a consultant to non-profit organizations and also serves on the board of directors of the Kaiser Aluminum Corporation and the nonprofit organization Asia Catalyst.
Commissioner Bartholomew received a Bachelor of Arts degreefrom the University of Minnesota, a Master of Arts in Anthropology
from Duke University, and a Juris Doctorate from Georgetown University Law Center. She is a member of the State Bar of California.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Peter Brookes
Commissioner Brookes was reappointed to the Commission by
House Republican Leader John Boehner for a term expiring December 31, 2014. Commissioner Brookes served in the George W.
Bush Administration as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Asian and Pacific Affairs. Prior to joining the Bush Administra-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00583

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

572
tion, Commissioner Brookes was a Professional Staff Member with
the Committee on International Relations in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives. Before his service in the Congress, Commissioner
Brookes worked in the Central Intelligence Agency, for the State
Department at the United Nations, and in the private sector.
Now, Commissioner Brookes is a Senior Fellow at The Heritage
Foundation and works to develop and communicate the Foundation’s stance on foreign policy and national security affairs throughmedia appearances, research, published articles, congressional testimony, and speaking engagements.
Commissioner Brookes is a decorated military veteran, having
served on active duty with the U.S. Navy in Latin America, Asia,and the Middle East. Dr. Brookes is a graduate of Georgetown
University, The Johns Hopkins University, the Defense Language
Institute, the Naval War College, and U.S. Naval Academy.
Robin Cleveland
Commissioner Cleveland was reappointed by Senate Republican
Leader Mitch McConnell for a third term expiring December 31,
2014. After three decades of government service, Commissioner
Cleveland is now serving as the Executive Director of the Office ofStudent Life at the Graduate School of Education and Human Development at The George Washington University. Having received
her Masters degree in school counseling, Ms. Cleveland also is pursuing her doctorate as a counselor educator. Previously, Commissioner Cleveland worked for U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell in a
number of positions in his personal office, on the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence, the Foreign Relations Committee, andthe Senate Appropriations Committee. In addition, Commissioner
Cleveland served as the Counselor to the President of the World
Bank, and as the Associate Director of the Office of Management
and Budget in the Executive Office of the President. During her
tenure serving President Bush, Commissioner Cleveland co-led theinteragency effort to develop and operationalize two Presidential
initiatives: the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. These efforts reflect her
commitment to link policy, performance, and resource management.
Commissioner Cleveland graduated from Wesleyan University
with honors and received her M.A. in Education and Human Development from The George Washington University.
Jeffrey L. Fiedler

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Commissioner Fiedler was reappointed to the Commission by
House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi for a fifth term expiring
December 31, 2015. He is Assistant to the General President, andDirector, Special Projects and Initiatives, for the International
Union of Operating Engineers. Previously, he was President of Research Associates of America (RAA) and the elected president of
the Food and Allied Service Trades Department, AFL–CIO(‘‘FAST’’). This constitutional department of the AFL–CIO represented ten unions with a membership of 3.5 million in the UnitedStates and Canada. The focus of RAA, like FAST before it, was organizing and bargaining research for workers and their unions.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00584

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

573
He served as a member of the AFL–CIO Executive Council committees on International Affairs, Immigration, Organizing, andStrategic Approaches. He also served on the board of directors of
the Consumer Federation of America and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. In 1992, Mr. Fiedler co-founded the
Laogai Research Foundation (LRF), an organization devoted to
studying the forced labor camp system in China. When the foundation’s executive director, Harry Wu, was detained in China in 1995,
Mr. Fiedler coordinated the campaign to win his release. He no
longer serves as director of the LRF.
Mr. Fiedler has testified on behalf of the AFL–CIO before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International
Affairs Committee and its various subcommittees, as well as theTrade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee
concerning China policy. He attended three of the American Assembly conferences on China sponsored by Columbia University
and has participated in a Council on Foreign Relations task force
and study group on China. He has been interviewed on CBS, NBC,
ABC, CNN, and CNBC on China policy, international trade issues,
human rights, and child labor.
A Vietnam veteran, he served with the U.S. Army in Hue in
1967–68. He received his B.A. in Political Science from Southern Illinois University. He is married with two adult children and resides in Virginia.
The Honorable Carte P. Goodwin

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Senator Carte P. Goodwin was appointed to the Commission by
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid for a second term expiring on
December 31, 2015. He is an attorney with the Charleston, West
Virginia, law firm of Goodwin & Goodwin, LLP. His practice includes commercial litigation, appellate advocacy, and intellectual
property.
In July 2010, West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin III appointed
Senator Goodwin to the United States Senate to fill the vacancy
caused by the passing of Senator Robert C. Byrd, where he served
until a special election was held to fill the remainder of Senator
Byrd’s unexpired term.
From 2005 to 2009, Senator Goodwin served four years as General Counsel to Governor Manchin, during which time he alsochaired the Governor’s Advisory Committee on Judicial Nominations. In addition, Senator Goodwin chaired the West Virginia
School Building Authority and served as a member of the State
Consolidated Public Retirement Board. Following his return to private practice in 2009, Senator Goodwin was appointed to chair the
Independent Commission on Judicial Reform, along with former
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, which was tasked
with evaluating the need for broad systemic reform to West Virginia’s judicial system.
Senator Goodwin also previously worked as a law clerk for the
Honorable Robert B. King of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. A native of Mt. Alto, West Virginia, Senator
Goodwin received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Philosophy fromMarietta College in Marietta, Ohio, in 1996 and received his Doctor

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00585

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

574
of Law degree from the Emory University School of Law, graduating Order of the Coif in 1999.
Senator Goodwin currently resides in Charleston, West Virginia,
with his wife, Rochelle; son, Wesley Patrick; and daughter, Anna
Vail.
Daniel M. Slane
Daniel Slane was reappointed to the Commission by Speaker ofthe House John Boehner for a fourth term expiring on December
31, 2015. Commissioner Slane served as the Commission’s Chairman for the 2010 Report cycle and as Vice Chairman for the 2011
Report cycle.
Commissioner Slane served for two years on active duty as a
U.S. Army Captain in Military Intelligence; in addition, he served
for a number of years as a Case Officer with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Commissioner Slane worked in the White Houseduring the Ford Administration.
In 1996, Commissioner Slane became a member of the board oftrustees of The Ohio State University and was chairman from 2005
to 2006. The Ohio State University is the nation’s largest university, with an annual budget of over $4 billion. He is also the former
chairman of University Hospital, a 1,000-bed regional hospital in
Columbus, and the former chairman of the James Cancer Hospital,a National Cancer Institute Comprehensive Cancer Center. Commissioner Slane serves on the board of two financial institutions
and a number of nonprofit organizations.
Commissioner Slane is the founder and co-owner of the Slane
Company, whose principal business includes real estate development, lumber, and furniture. He has extensive international business experience, including operating a business in China. Prior to
becoming a member of the Commission, Commissioner Slane manufactured plywood and related wood products at factories in Harbin, Dalian, and Balu (Pizhou), China. In 2007, he sold his interestin that company.
Commissioner Slane received a Bachelor of Science in Business
Administration and a Juris Doctorate from The Ohio State University. He holds a master’s degree in International Law from the Europa Institute at the University of Amsterdam in The Netherlands.
Commissioner Slane is a member of the Ohio Bar and was formerlya partner in the law firm of Grieser, Schafer, Blumenstiel, andSlane.
The Honorable James M. Talent

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Senator Jim Talent was appointed by Senate Republican Leader
Mitch McConnell for a second term expiring December 31, 2015.
Senator Talent is a national security leader who specializes inissues related to the Department of Defense. He has been active in
Missouri and national public policy for over 25 years.
Senator Talent’s public service began in 1984, when at the ageof 28 he was elected to the Missouri House of Representatives
where he served eight years, the last four as the Republican leader
in the Missouri House.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00586

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

575
In 1992, he was elected to the first of four terms in the U.S.
House of Representatives, where he represented Missouri’s Second
Congressional District. During his eight years in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives, Senator Talent co-authored the historic welfare
reform bill, championed national security issues on the House
Armed Services Committee, and enacted legislation to help revitalize distressed neighborhoods, both urban and rural. He was thechairman of the House Small Business Committee from 1997–2001,
where he worked on regulatory reform issues and on legislation tolower health care costs for small business people and their employees. Under Senator Talent’s leadership, the Small Business Committee became one of the most prolific and bipartisan in the Houseof Representatives, passing numerous bills without a single dissenting vote.
In 2002, Missourians elected Senator Talent to serve in the
United States Senate, where he worked with Republicans and
Democrats to enact critical legislation for Missouri. He served on
the Senate Armed Services, Energy and Natural Resources, andAgriculture committees. Working with Oregon Democrat Ron
Wyden, Senator Talent was successful in securing critical funding
through construction bonding in the highway bill. He and Senator
Dianne Feinstein (D–CA) succeeded in passing the most comprehensive anti-methamphetamine bill ever enacted into law. Senator Talent was a leader on energy issues and was instrumental in
the passage of the renewable fuel standard.
After leaving the Senate in 2007, Senator Talent joined The Heritage Foundation as a Distinguished Fellow specializing in militaryaffairs and conservative solutions to poverty. In 2008, he served asVice Chairman of the Commission on Prevention of Weapons ofMass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. In 2010, he servedon the independent panel that reviewed the Quadrennial Defense
Review of the Department of Defense. He also served on the independent panel that reviewed the Quadrennial Defense Review of2014. He also has been a member of the executive panel advising
the Chief of Naval Operations. Senator Talent was the first national figure outside Massachusetts to endorse Governor Mitt Romney for president in 2007 and was Governor Romney’s senior policy
advisor in both the 2008 and 2012 campaigns for president.
Senator Talent is an attorney. He earned his B.A. from Washington University in St. Louis and his J.D. from the University of
Chicago Law School.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Honorable Katherine C. Tobin, Ph.D.
Dr. Katherine Tobin was appointed to the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission by Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid in December 2012 for a two-year term expiring December 31,
2014. Dr. Tobin has 15 years of experience as a business manager,market researcher, and consultant in corporate America at institutions including the Hewlett-Packard Corporation, IBM, and Catalyst. She also has worked for 15 years as a university faculty member and administrator.
In 2009, Dr. Tobin was appointed by President Obama as Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Performance Improvement at the U.S. Department of Education. She focused on strengthening the Depart-

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00587

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

576
ment’s capacity to work more effectively with its political and educational partners at the national, state, and local levels.
In 2006, Dr. Tobin was appointed by President George W. Bushand served three years as a member of the Board of Governors of
the U.S. Postal Service. Dr. Tobin provided strategic vision to the
executive team, helped direct and control expenditures, reviewed
business practices, conducted long-range planning, and set policies
on all postal matters. She also chaired the Board’s Audit and Finance Committee at a critical time, when, due to Congress’s 2006
legislation, the U.S. Postal Service needed to strengthen its organizational and financial controls to become compliant by 2010 with
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
During her years at Hewlett-Packard, Dr. Tobin worked in the
Corporation’s Computer Systems Division and the Systems Technology Division, which were responsible for developing mini-computer systems purchased around the world for business, medical,
and scientific usage. Dr. Tobin worked closely with R&D and marketing teams early in the product development life cycle to en- surethat customer needs were clearly understood and translated into
engineering and market specifications.
Working as a consultant with IBM’s senior leaders, Dr. Tobin
conducted research on the corporation’s values across all its global
operations, institutional brand awareness and preference, distribution channels management, and the creation of a new businessplan for IBM’s Global Financing business.
Dr. Tobin earned a Ph.D. and Master of Arts degree from Stanford University. She earned a Master of Arts degree in Teachingfrom the University of Massachusetts and a Bachelor of Arts in
English from Skidmore College.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Michael R. Wessel
Commissioner Michael R. Wessel, an original member of the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, was reappointed by House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi for a seventhterm expiring on December 31, 2014.
Commissioner Wessel served on the staff of former House Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt for more than two decades, leaving
his position as general counsel in March 1998. In addition, Commissioner Wessel was Congressman Gephardt’s chief policy advisor,
strategist, and negotiator. He was responsible for the development,
coordination, management, and implementation of the Democratic
leader’s overall policy and political objectives, with specific responsibility for international trade, finance, economics, labor, and taxation.
During his more than 20 years on Capitol Hill, Commissioner
Wessel served in a number of positions. As Congressman Gephardt’s principal Ways and Means aide, he developed and implemented numerous tax and trade policy initiatives. He participatedin the enactment of every major trade policy initiative from 1978
until his departure in 1998. In the late 1980s, he was the executive
director of the House Trade and Competitiveness Task Force,
where he was responsible for the Democrats’ trade and competitiveness agenda as well as overall coordination of the Omnibus Tradeand Competitiveness Act of 1988.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00588

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

577
Commissioner Wessel was intimately involved in the development of comprehensive tax reform legislation in the early 1980s
and every major tax bill during his tenure. Beginning in 1989, hebecame the principal advisor to the Democratic leadership on economic policy matters and served as tax policy coordinator to the1990 budget summit. In 1995, he developed the Ten Percent Tax
Plan, a comprehensive tax reform initiative that would enableroughly four out of five taxpayers to pay no more than a 10 percent
rate in federal income taxes, the principal Democratic tax reform
alternative.
In 1988, he served as national issues director for Congressman
Gephardt’s presidential campaign. During the 1992 presidential
campaign, he assisted the Clinton presidential campaign on abroad range of issues and served as a senior policy advisor to the
Clinton Transition Office. In 2004, he was a senior policy advisor
to the Gephardt for President Campaign and later co-chaired theTrade Policy Group for the Kerry presidential campaign. In 2008,
he was publicly identified as a trade and economic policy advisor
to the Obama presidential campaign.
He has coauthored a number of articles with Congressman Gephardt and a book, An Even Better Place: America in the 21st Century. Commissioner Wessel served as a member of the U.S. Trade
Deficit Review Commission in 1999–2000, a congressionally createdcommission charged with studying the nature, causes, and consequences of the U.S. merchandise trade and current account deficits.
Today, Commissioner Wessel is President of The Wessel Group
Incorporated, a public affairs consulting firm offering expertise ingovernment, politics, and international affairs. He was formerly the
Executive Vice President at the Downey McGrath Group, Incorporated. Commissioner Wessel is a member of the board of directors of Goodyear Tire and Rubber. Commissioner Wessel holds a
Bachelor of Arts and a Juris Doctorate from The George Washington University. He is a member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and of Pennsylvania and is a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations. He and his wife Andrea have four children.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Larry M. Wortzel, Ph.D.
Larry Wortzel was reappointed by Speaker of the House John
Boehner for a seventh term expiring on December 31, 2014. He hasserved on the Commission since November 2001 and the Commission’s Chairman for the 2006 and 2008 Report cycles. A leading authority on China, Asia, and national security, Commissioner
Wortzel had a distinguished thirty-two year career in the U.S.
Armed Forces. Following three years in the Marine Corps, Commissioner Wortzel enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1970. His assignment
with the Army Security Agency took him to Thailand, where he focused on Chinese military communications in Vietnam and Laos.
Within three years, he had graduated from the Infantry Officer
Candidate School and the Airborne and Ranger schools.
After four years as an infantry officer, Commissioner Wortzel
shifted to military intelligence. Commissioner Wortzel traveled regularly throughout Asia while serving in the U.S. Pacific Command’s intelligence center from 1978 to 1982. The following year,

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00589

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

578
he attended the National University of Singapore, where he studied
advanced Chinese and traveled in China and Southeast Asia. He
next worked for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, developing counterintelligence programs to protect emerging defense
technologies from foreign espionage. Also, the Commissioner was
active in programs to gather foreign intelligence for the Army Intelligence and Security Command.
From 1988 to 1990, Commissioner Wortzel was the AssistantArmy Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China. After assignments on the Department of the Army staff, he returned to China
in 1995 as the army attaché. In these assignments he represented
U.S. defense interests in China and traveled around the country
observing and reporting on military and political events for the
U.S. government.
In December 1997, Commissioner Wortzel joined the faculty of
the U.S. Army War College as Director of the Strategic Studies Institute. Concurrently he was professor of Asian studies. He retired
from the army as a colonel at the end of 1999. After retirement
Commissioner Wortzel continued to be active in defense and Asiarelated policy matters. Commissioner Wortzel’s books include Classin China: Stratification in a Classless Society; China’s MilitaryModernization: International Implications; Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Military History; and The Dragon Extends its
Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes Global.
A graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army
War College, Commissioner Wortzel earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from Columbus College, Georgia, and his Master of Arts andDoctor of Philosophy degrees from the University of Hawaii. He
and his wife live in Williamsburg, Virginia.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Michael R. Danis, Executive Director
Formerly served as a senior intelligence officer with the DefenseIntelligence Agency. Mr. Danis managed the agency’s technology
transfer division, the U.S. government’s sole analytical entity
tasked with producing intelligence assessments regarding all aspects of foreign acquisition of U.S.-controlled technology and hightech corporations. He also established and led a unique team ofChina technology specialists producing assessments on China’s
military-industrial complex and the impact of U.S. export-controlled and other foreign technology on Chinese weapons development programs. While serving in the U.S. Air Force, Mr. Danis was
twice temporarily assigned to the office of the defense attaché in
Beijing.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00590

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

APPENDIX III
PUBLIC HEARINGS OF THE COMMISSION
Full transcripts and written testimonies are available online at
the Commission’s website: www.uscc.gov.
January 30, 2014: Public Hearing on ‘‘China’s MilitaryModernization and its Implications for the United States’’Washington, DC
Commissioners present: Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman; Hon.
William A. Reinsch, Vice Chairman; Peter Brookes; Hon. Carte P.
Goodwin; Daniel M. Slane; Hon. James M. Talent (Hearing CoChair); Hon. Katherine C. Tobin (Hearing Co-Chair); Michael R.
Wessel; Larry M. Wortzel.
Witnesses: Jesse Karotkin, Office of Naval Intelligence; Donald
L. Fuell, National Air and Space Intelligence Center; Andrew
Erickson, U.S. Naval War College; James Lewis, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mark Stokes, Project 2049 Institute; Roger Cliff, Atlantic Council; David Gompert, RAND Corporation; Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute.
February 21, 2014: Public Hearing on ‘‘U.S.-China
Economic Challenges’’
Washington, DC
Commissioners present: Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman; Hon.
William A. Reinsch, Vice Chairman; Carolyn Bartholomew; Peter
Brookes; Jeffrey L. Fiedler; Daniel M. Slane (Hearing Co-Chair);Michael R. Wessel (Hearing Co-Chair); Larry M. Wortzel.
Witnesses: Robert E. Scott, Economic Policy Institute; Oded
Shenkar, Ohio State University; Peter K. Schott, Yale University;
Elizabeth J. Drake, Stewart and Stewart; Philip I. Levy, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs; Eileen P. Bradner, Nucor Public Affairs, Inc. for Daniel R. DiMicco, Nucor Corporation; Willy C. Shih,
Harvard Business School; Joel Backaler, Frontier Strategy Group;
Adam Hersh, Center for American Progress.
March 13, 2014: Public Hearing on ‘‘China and the Evolving
Security Dynamics in East Asia’’Washington, DC
Commissioners present: Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman; Hon.
William A. Reinsch, Vice Chairman; Peter Brookes (Hearing CoChair); Robin Cleveland; Jeffrey L. Fiedler (Hearing Co-Chair);
Hon. Carte P. Goodwin; Daniel M. Slane; Hon. James M. Talent;
Hon. Katherine C. Tobin; Michael R. Wessel.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(579)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00591

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

580
Witnesses: Robert Sutter, George Washington University; Bonnie
Glaser, Center for Strategic and International Studies; James
Schoff, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Jennifer
Lind, Dartmouth College; Walter Lohman, Heritage Foundation;
Ely Ratner, Center for a New American Security.
April 3, 2014: Public Hearing on ‘‘China’s Healthcare Sector,
Drug Safety, and the U.S.-China Trade in Medical Products’’Washington, DC
Commissioners present: Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman (Hearing Co-Chair); Hon. William A. Reinsch, Vice Chairman (Hearing
Co-Chair); Jeffrey L. Fiedler; Hon. Carte P. Goodwin; Daniel M.
Slane; Hon. James M. Talent; Hon. Katherine C. Tobin; Michael R.
Wessel.
Witnesses: Christopher J. Hickey, U.S. Food and Drug Administration; Karen Eggleston, Stanford University; Yanzhong Huang,Council on Foreign Relations; Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, Albright
Stonebridge Group; Benjamin Shobert, Rubicon Strategy Group;
Rod Hunter, PhRMA; Ralph Ives, AdvaMed; Allan Coukell, The
Pew Charitable Trusts; Charles Bell, Consumers Union; Ginger
Zhe Jin, University of Maryland; Roger Bate, American EnterpriseInstitute.*
April 25, 2014: Public Hearing on ‘‘U.S.-China Clean Energy
Cooperation: Status, Challenges, and Opportunities’’
Washington, DC
Commissioners present: Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman; Hon.
William A. Reinsch, Vice Chairman; Peter Brookes; Robin Cleveland (Hearing Co-Chair); Jeffrey L. Fiedler; Hon. Carte P. Goodwin(Hearing Co-Chair); Daniel M. Slane; Hon. James M. Talent; Hon.
Katherine C. Tobin; Michael R. Wessel; Larry M. Wortzel.
Witnesses: Leocadia Zak, U.S. Trade and Development Agency;
Joanna Lewis, Georgetown University; Sarah Forbes, World Resources Institute; Jane Nakano, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Jerald J. Fletcher, West Virginia University; Valerie Karplus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Huei Peng,
University of Michigan.
May 15, 2014: Public Hearing on ‘‘Stability in China: Lessons
from Tiananmen and Implications for the United States’’Washington, DC
Commissioners present: Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman; Hon.
William A. Reinsch, Vice Chairman; Carolyn Bartholomew (Hearing Co-Chair); Peter Brookes; Robin Cleveland; Jeffrey L. Fiedler;
Hon. Carte P. Goodwin; Daniel M. Slane; Hon. James M. Talent;
Hon. Katherine C. Tobin; Michael R. Wessel; Larry M. Wortzel(Hearing Co-Chair).

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Congressional Perspectives: Hon. Frank Wolf, U.S. Representative from the state of Virginia.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00592

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

581
Witnesses: Joseph Fewsmith, Boston University; Xiao Qiang,
University of California–Berkeley; Steve Hess, University ofBridgeport; Murray Scot Tanner, CNA; Sophie Richardson, Human
Rights Watch; Carl Minzner, Fordham University; Sarah Cook,
Freedom House; Delphine Halgand, Reporters Without Borders;David Wertime, Foreign Policy.
June 5, 2014: Public Hearing on ‘‘Recent Developments in
China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea’’Washington, DC
Commissioners present: Hon. Dennis C. Shea, Chairman; Hon.
William A. Reinsch, Vice Chairman; Peter Brookes; Daniel M.
Slane (Hearing Co-Chair); Hon. Katherine C. Tobin (Hearing CoChair); Michael R. Wessel.
Witnesses: Rupert Hammond-Chambers, U.S.-Taiwan BusinessCouncil; Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, University of Richmond; JoAnn
Fan, The Brookings Institution; William Murray, U.S. Naval War
College; Ian Easton, Project 2049 Institute; David Firestein,
EastWest Institute; Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, U.S. Institute ofPeace; Sue Mi Terry, Columbia University; Joseph DeTrani, Intelligence and National Security Alliance.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Submitted material for the record.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00593

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00594

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

APPENDIX IIIA
LIST OF WITNESSES TESTIFYING BEFORETHE COMMISSION
2014 Hearings
Full transcripts and written testimonies are available online at
the Commission’s website: www.uscc.gov.
Alphabetical Listing of Panelists Testifying before the USCC
Panelist Name

Panelist Affiliation

USCC Hearing

Backaler, Joel

Frontier Strategy Group

February 21, 2014

Bate, Roger *American Enterprise Institute

April 3, 2014

Bell, Charles

Consumers Union

April 3, 2014

Boynton, Xiaoqing Lu

Albright Stonebridge Group

April 3, 2014

Bradner, Eileen P. (forDaniel R. DiMicco,
Nucor Corporation)

Nucor Public Affairs, Inc.

February 21, 2014

Cliff, Roger

Atlantic Council

January 30, 2014

Cook, Sarah

Freedom HouseMay 15, 2014

Coukell, Allan

The Pew Charitable Trusts

April 3, 2014

DeTrani, Joseph

Intelligence and National
Security Alliance

June 5, 2014

Donnelly, Thomas

American Enterprise Institute

January 30, 2014

Drake, Elizabeth J.

Stewart and Stewart

February 21, 2014

Easton, Ian

Project 2049 InstituteJune 5, 2014

Eggleston, Karen

Stanford University

April 3, 2014

Erickson, Andrew

U.S. Naval War College

January 30, 2014

Fan, JoAnn

The Brookings Institution

June 5, 2014

Fewsmith, Joseph

Boston University

May 15, 2014

Firestein, David

EastWest InstituteJune 5, 2014

Fletcher, Jerald J.

West Virginia University

April 25, 2014

Forbes, SarahWorld Resources Institute

April 25, 2014

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(583)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00595

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6602

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

584
Alphabetical Listing of Panelists Testifying before the USCC
Continued

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Panelist Name

VerDate Mar 15 2010

Panelist Affiliation

USCC Hearing

Fuell, Donald L.

National Air and SpaceIntelligence Center

January 30, 2014

Glaser, Bonnie

Center for Strategic andInternational Studies

March 13, 2014

Gompert, DavidRAND Corporation

January 30, 2014

Halgand, Delphine

Reporters Without Borders

May 15, 2014

Hammond-Chambers,
RupertU.S.-Taiwan Business Council

June 5, 2014

Hersh, Adam

Center for American ProgressFebruary 21, 2014

Hess, Steve

University of Bridgeport

May 15, 2014

Hickey, Christopher J.

U.S. Food and Drug
Administration

April 3, 2014

Huang, YanzhongCouncil on Foreign Relations

April 3, 2014

Hunter, Rod

PhRMA

April 3, 2014

Ives, Ralph

AdvaMedApril 3, 2014

Jin, Ginger Zhe

University of Maryland

April 3, 2014

Karplus, Valerie

Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology

April 25, 2014

Karotkin, Jesse

Office of Naval Intelligence

January 30, 2014

Kleine-Ahlbrandt,
Stephanie

U.S. Institute of Peace

June 5, 2014

Levy, Philip I.

The Chicago Council on Global
Affairs

February 21, 2014

Lewis, James

Center for Strategic andInternational Studies

January 30, 2014

Lewis, Joanna

Georgetown University

April 25, 2014

Lind, Jennifer

Dartmouth College

March 13, 2014

Lohman, Walter

Heritage Foundation

March 13, 2014

Minzner, Carl

Fordham University

May 15, 2014

Murray, William

U.S. Naval War College

June 5, 2014

Nakano, Jane

Center for Strategic andInternational Studies

April 25, 2014

Peng, Huei

University of Michigan

April 25, 2014

Ratner, Ely

Center for a New American
Security

March 13, 2014

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00596

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6602

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

585
Alphabetical Listing of Panelists Testifying before the USCC
Continued
Panelist Name

Panelist Affiliation

USCC Hearing

Richardson, Sophie

Human Rights Watch

May 15, 2014

Schoff, James

Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace

March 13, 2014

Schott, Peter K.

Yale University

February 21, 2014

Scott, Robert E.

Economic Policy InstituteFebruary 21, 2014

Shenkar, Oded

Ohio State University

February 21, 2014

Shih, Willy C.

Harvard Business School

February 21, 2014

Shobert, Benjamin

Rubicon Strategy Group

April 3, 2014

Stokes, Mark

Project 2049 Institute

January 30, 2014

Sutter, Robert

George Washington University

March 13, 2014

Tanner, Murray Scot

CNA

May 15, 2014

Terry, Sue Mi

Columbia University

June 5, 2014

Wang, Vincent Wei-cheng

University of RichmondJune 5, 2014

Wertime, David

Foreign Policy

May 15, 2014

Wolf, Frank

U.S. Representative from thestate of Virginia

May 15, 2014

Xiao, Qiang

University of California, Berkeley

May 15, 2014

Zak, Leocadia

U.S. Trade and Development
AgencyApril 25, 2014

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB* Submitted material for the record.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00597

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6602

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00598

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6602

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

APPENDIX IVINTERLOCUTORS’ ORGANIZATIONSAsia Fact-Finding Trip
June 2014
SOUTH KOREA AND AUSTRALIA, JUNE 2014
During the visit of a Commission delegation to South
Korea and Australia in June 2014, the delegation met withrepresentatives of the following organizations:
In South Korea
U.S. Government• U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan• U.S. Embassy in Seoul
Government of South Korea• Ministry of Foreign Affairs• Ministry of National Defense• Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy
United Nations• United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission
Nongovernmental Organizations• Asia Foundation• International Crisis Group
Research Organizations• Asan Institute for Policy Studies• Kookmin University• Korea Institute of Science and Technology• Seoul National University
In Australia
U.S. Government• U.S. Embassy in Canberra• U.S. Consulate in Sydney
Government of Australia• Department of Defense• Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Nongovernmental Organizations• Australia China Business Council• Minerals Council of Australia
Private Enterprise• KPMGDSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(587)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00599

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

588

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Research Organizations• Australian National University• Australian Strategic Policy Institute• University of Sydney• University of Technology, Sydney

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00600

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

APPENDIX V
LIST OF RESEARCH MATERIAL
Contracted and Staff Research Reports
Released in 2014
Disclaimer
The reports in this section were prepared at the request of theCommission to support its deliberations. They have been posted
to the Commission’s website in order to promote greater public
understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in
its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations andtheir implications for U.S. security, as mandated by P.L. 106–398,
P.L. 108–7, P.L. 109–108, and P.L. 110–161. The posting of thesereports to the Commission’s website does not imply an endorsement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner of theviews or conclusions expressed therein.
Contracted Reports————————————
Trends in U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation:
Collaborative Knowledge Production for the Twenty-First
Century?
Prepared for the USCC by Richard P. Suttmeier
September 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Trends%20
in%20US-China%20Science%20and%20Technology%20
Cooperation.pdf
Staff Research Reports and Backgrounders————————————————————————
October Monthly Trade Bulletin
Written by USCC Economic and Trade Analysts
October 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/October%20
2014%20Trade%20Bulletin_1.pdf
China Fiscal Policy Revamp Faces Hurdles
Written by USCC Policy Analyst Iacob Koch-Weser
September 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Issue%20brief_
China%20Fiscal%20Policy%20Revamp%20Faces%20Hurdles.pdf

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(589)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00601

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

590
The RMB’s Long Road to Internationalization
Written by USCC Policy Analyst Nargiza Salidjanova
September 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20Economic%20Issue%20Brief%20%20-%20RMB%20
Internationalization.pdf
The Risks of China’s Internet Companies on U.S. Stock
Exchanges (addendum added September 12, 2014)
Written by USCC Policy Analyst Kevin Rosier
September 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/The%20Risks%20of%20China%E2%80%99s%20Internet%20Companies%20on%20U.S.%20Stock%20Exchanges%20-%20with%20Addendum.pdf
September Monthly Trade Bulletin
Written by USCC Economic and Trade Analysts
September 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/September%20
2014%20Trade%20Bulletin_09%2004%2014_FINAL.pdf
August Monthly Trade Bulletin
Written by USCC Economic and Trade Analysts
August 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/August%20
2014%20Trade%20Bulletin_0.pdf
Prison Labor Exports from China and Implications for
U.S. Policy
Written by USCC Senior Policy Analyst John Dotson andResearch Fellow Teresa Vanfleet
July 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20
Report_Prison%20Labor%20Exports%20from%20China_Final%20Report%20070914.pdf
July Monthly Trade Bulletin
Written by USCC Economic and Trade Analysts
July 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/July%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

China’s Reported Ballistic Missile Sale to Saudi Arabia:
Background and Potential Implications
Written by USCC Policy Analyst Ethan Meick
June 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20
Report_China%27s%20Reported%20Ballistic%20Missile%20
Sale%20to%20Saudi%20Arabia_0.pdf

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00602

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

591
The China-Russia Gas Deal: Background and Implications
for the Broader Relationship
Written by Policy Analyst Iacob Koch-Weser andSenior Policy Analyst Craig Murray
June 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20
Russia%20gas%20deal_Staffbackgrounder.pdf
June Monthly Trade Bulletin
Written by USCC Economic and Trade Analysts
June 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/June%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf
China’s Expanding and Evolving Engagement with the
Caribbean
Written by Research Director and Policy Analyst Caitlin Campbell
and Research Intern Zoe ValetteMay 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20
Report_China-Caribbean%20Relations.pdf
Bitcoin’s Uncertain Future in China
Written by Policy Analyst Lauren Gloudeman
May 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20
Economic%20Issue%20Brief%20-%20Bitcoin%20-%2005%2012%2014.pdf
China and International Law in Cyberspace
Written by Policy Analyst Kimberly Hsu andSenior Policy Analyst Craig Murray
May 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20
International%20Law%20in%20Cyberspace.pdf
May Monthly Trade Bulletin
Written by USCC Economic and Trade Analysts
May 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/May%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Taiwan and China Agree to Enhance Communication, but
Cross-Strait Economic Agreements Face Uncertainty
Written by USCC Policy Analyst Matthew Southerland
April 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20
Report_Taiwan%20and%20China%20Agree%20to%20Enhance%20Communication%20but%20Cross-Strait%20Economic%20
Agreements%20Face%20Uncertainty.pdf

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00603

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

592
April Monthly Trade Bulletin
Written by USCC Economic and Trade Analysts
April 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/April%202014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf
China’s 2014 Government Work Report: Taking Stock of
Reforms
Written by USCC Policy Analysts Nargiza Salidjanova andIacob Koch-Weser
April 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20
Backgrounder_NPC%20scorecard.pdf
China’s Hunger for U.S. Planes and Cars: Assessing the
Risks
Written by USCC Policy Analyst Iacob Koch-Weser
March 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20
Economic%20Issue%20Brief_ChinasHunger_03.27.14.pdf
China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves and Holdings of
U.S. Securities
Written by USCC Policy Analyst Nargiza Salidjanova
March 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20
Economic%20Issue%20Brief_China%27s%20FX%20Reserves%20
and%20Treasury%20Holdings.pdf
China’s Navy Extends its Combat Reach to the Indian Ocean
Written by USCC Policy Analysts
March 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20
Report_China%27s%20Navy%20Extends%20its%20Combat%20
Reach%20to%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf
Should China Join the WTO’s Services Agreement?
Written by USCC Policy Analyst Iacob Koch-Weser
March 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20
Economic%20Issue%20Brief_03.11.14.pdf
March Monthly Trade Bulletin
Written by USCC Economic and Trade Analysts
March 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/March%20
2014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

February Monthly Trade Bulletin
Written by USCC Economic and Trade Analysts
February 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/February%20
2014%20Trade%20Bulletin.pdf

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00604

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

593
China’s New Fishing Regulations Seek to Justify andConsolidate Control in the South China Sea
Written by USCC Senior Policy Analyst Craig Murray and
Policy Analyst Kimberly Hsu
January 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20
Staff%20Report_China%27s%20New%20Fishing%20Regulations%20Seek%20to%20Justify%20and%20Consolidate%20Control%20
in%20the%20South%20China%20Sea_01%2027%2014.pdf

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

Air Defense Identification Zone Intended to Provide China
Greater Flexibility to Enforce East China Sea Claims
Written by USCC Policy Analyst Kimberly Hsu
January 2014
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20
ADIZ%20Staff%20Report.pdf

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00605

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00606

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

APPENDIX VI
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACFTU
ACTC
AD
ADIZ
ADMM+
AEW&C
AML
APEC
API
ARATS
ASAT
ASEAN
ASW
AQSIQ
BCIM
BIT
BRICS
C4ISR
CAS
CCDI
CCP
CCS
CCTV
CDC
CDHA
CEP
CERC
CFDA
CICA
CMC
CMD
CMS
CNPC
CO2
CPPCC
CRHK
CSR
CSRC
CSSTA

All-China Federation of Trade Unions
Advanced Coal Technology Consortium
antidumping duty
Air Defense Identification ZoneASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus
airborne early warning and control
Anti-Monopoly Law (China)
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
active pharmaceutical ingredient
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
antisatellite
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
antisubmarine warfare
General Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection, and Quarantine
Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar
bilateral investment treaty
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
Chinese Communist Party
carbon capture and storage
China Central Television
Center for Disease Control and Prevention
Canadian Drug and Health Agency
Circular Error Probable
U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center
China Food and Drug Administration
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia
Central Military Commission
Central Military Dock
Cooperative Medical Scheme
China National Petroleum Corporation
carbon dioxide
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
Commercial Radio Hong Kong
China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock
Corporation Ltd.
China Securities Regulatory Commission
Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB(595)

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00607

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

596
CUES
CVC
CVD
CZSPL
DDG
DDoS
DLA
DoD
DOE
DD
DPP
DQSA
ECFA
ECP
EDL
EEZ
EIA
ELINT
ETIM
EU
EVA
FAC
FCCC
FDA
FDASIA
FDI
FF
FFG
FTA
FTZ
GAO
GDP
GIP
GMP
GPA
GSK
GW
H7N9
HA/DR
HHS
HKBA
HKJA
HKSAR
ICAO
ICCPR
ICH
ICT
IMF
IP
ISR
ITA

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

ITC

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
Clean Vehicles Consortium
countervailing duty
Changzhou Scientific Laboratories
guided-missile destroyer
distributed denial-of-service(Sino-British) Defense Land Agreement
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Energy
destroyer
Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)
Drug Quality and Security Act
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
U.S.-China Energy Cooperation Program
Essential Drug List
exclusive economic zone
U.S. Energy Information Administrationelectronic intelligence
East Turkestan Islamic Movement
European Union
economic value-added
Foreign Affairs Committee (United Kingdom)
Foreign Correspondents Club of China
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Food and Drug Administration Safety
and Innovation Act
foreign direct investment
frigateguided-missile frigate
free trade agreement
free trade zone
U.S. Government Accountability Officegross domestic product
Good Importer Practices
good manufacturing practices
Agreement on Government Procurement
GlaxoSmithKline
gigawatt
avian influenza
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
U.S. Health and Human Services
Hong Kong Bar Association
Hong Kong Journalists Association
Hong Kong Special Administration Region
International Civil Aviation Organization
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Conference on Harmonization
information and communication technology
International Monetary Fund
intellectual property
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
Information Technology Agreement
U.S. International Trade Administration
U.S. International Trade Commission

PO 00000

Frm 00608

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

597
ITEC
JASDF
JCCT
JMSDF
JSDF
KAMD
KMT
LCD
LegCo
LLC
LPD
MAC
MFN
MICA
MIIT
MIRV
MOFCOM
MOH
MOHURD
MOST
MOU
MPS
MRI
MSS
NATO
NAO
NASIC
NBE
NCE
NCMS
NDRC
NEA
NGO
nm
NME
NOTAM
NPC
NPCSC
NRDL
OECD

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

ONI
PACOM
PAP
PBOC
PIIE
PLA
PNTR
PRC
PMI

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

Interagency Trade Enforcement Center
Japan Air Self-Defense Force
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade
Japan Maritime Self-Defense ForceJapan Self-Defense Forces
Korean Air and Missile Defense
Kuomintang (Taiwan)
liquid crystal display
Legislative Council (Hong Kong)
limited liability corporation
amphibious transport dock
Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan)
most-favored nation
Military Installations Closed Area
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology(China)multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
Ministry of Commerce (China)
Ministry of Health (China)
Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural
Development (China)
Ministry of Science and Technology (China)
Memorandum of Understanding
Ministry of Public Security (China)
magnetic resonance imaging
Ministry of State Security (China)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
National Audit Office (China)
U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center
New Biological Entity
New Chemical Entity
New Cooperative Medical Scheme
National Development and Reform Commission(China)National Energy Administration (China)
nongovernmental organization
nautical mile
non-market economy
Notice to Airmen
National People’s Congress (China)
Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress (China)
National Reimbursement Drug List
Organization for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment
U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence
U.S. Pacific Command
People’s Armed Police
People’s Bank of China
Peterson Institute for International Economics
People’s Liberation Armypermanent normal trade relations
People’s Republic of China
Purchasing Managers’ Index

PO 00000

Frm 00609

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

598
PTG
PX
R&D
RCEP
RIMPAC
RMB
RRR
RTL
S&ED
S&T
SAIC
SARS
SASAC
SCO
SEF
SFDA
SIGINT
SIPO
SIPRI
SOE
SPL
sqnm
SS
SSBN
SSGN
SSN
SSP
TAO
THAAD
TIFA
TIP
TiSA
TMP
TPP
TPR
TRIPS

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

UAV
UCAV
UDI
UEBMI
UK
UN
URBMI
USCBC
USD
USTDA
USTR
VAT
WHO
WTO
WVU

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

guided-missile patrol boats
paraxylene
research and development
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Rim of the Pacificrenminbi
required reserve ratio
reeducation through labor
Strategic and Economic Dialogue
science and technology
State Administration for Industry and Commerce
severe acute respiratory syndrome
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Straits Exchange Foundation
State Food and Drug Administration (China)
signals intelligenceState Intellectual Property Office (China)
Stockholm International Peace Research Institutestate-owned enterprise
Scientific Protein Laboratories
square nautical milediesel attack submarine
nuclear ballistic missile submarine
guided-missile, nuclear powered submarine
nuclear attack submarine
diesel air-independent attack submarine
Taiwan Affairs Office (China)
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
Turkestan Islamic Party
Trade in Services Agreement
Technology Management Plan
Trans-Pacific Partnership
Trade Policy Review (World Trade Organization)
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (World Trade Organization)
unmanned aerial vehicle
unmanned combat air vehicle
Unique Device Identifiers
Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (China)
United Kingdom
United Nations
Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance (China)
U.S.-China Business Council
U.S. dollar
U.S. Trade and Development Agency
U.S. Trade Representativevalue-added tax
World Health Organization
World Trade Organization
West Virginia University

PO 00000

Frm 00610

Fmt 6601

Sfmt 6601

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483

599
2014 COMMISSION STAFFMICHAEL R. DANIS, Executive Director
RICKISHA C. BERRIEN-LOPEZ, Staff Assistant
CAITLIN E. CAMPBELL, Research Director and Security and Foreign Affairs Analyst
C. REED ECKHOLD, Congressional Liaison and Communications Director
CHRISTOPHER P. FIORAVANTE, Management Analyst
KIMBERLY C. HSU, Security and Foreign Affairs Analyst
LAUREN E. GLOUDEMAN, Economic and Trade Analyst
IACOB N. KOCH-WESER, Economic and Trade Analyst
KATHERINE E. KOLESKI, Economic and Trade Analyst
PAUL C. MAGNUSSON, Senior Economic and Trade Analyst
ETHAN S. MEICK, Security and Foreign Affairs Analyst
R. CRAIG MURRAY, Senior Security and Foreign Affairs Analyst
KEVIN J. ROSIER, Economic and Trade Analyst
NARGIZA S. SALIDJANOVA, Economic and Trade Analyst
MATTHEW O. SOUTHERLAND, Security and Foreign Affairs Analyst
ANNA R. TUCKER, Economic and Trade Analyst
KATHLEEN WILSON, Finance and Operations Director

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Commission would like to express its deep appreciation to those who testified
before the Commission as expert witnesses, the researchers and analysts who prepared research papers under contract to the Commission, and others who assistedwith the Commission’s work by briefing the Commissioners on a wide array of economic and security issues. The Commissioners are also grateful to the agencies of
the Intelligence Community that briefed Commissioners on key issues of importanceto the U.S.-China relationship. All these efforts helped inform the Commission’s andthe public’s debates on issues vital to ongoing U.S.-China relations.
The Commission offers its special thanks to Assistant Secretary of State Daniel
R. Russel, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and his staff for their outstanding support of the Commission’s fact-finding trip to South Korea and Australia
in June 2014. The Commission owes a deep debt of gratitude and thanks to the following officials of the U.S. Department of State for their outstanding assistance andsupport provided during the Commission’s travel to Asia, and for their assistancein arranging the Commission’s meetings with government officials, business representatives, and academics, which was instrumental in the success of the Commission’s trips: Ambassador Sung Y. Kim, U.S. Embassy in Seoul, and staff, including
Samuel Yee and Dewey Moore; Ambassador John Berry, U.S. Embassy in Canberra,and staff, including Gary Childs; Consul General Hugo Llorens, U.S. Consulate in
Sydney, and staff, including Christopher Meade.

DSK7XT4K02 with $$_JOB

The Commissioners are especially grateful to Margaret Beresik and Erin Mulligan, who served as copyeditors of the Report, and to Victoria McLaughlin, who
served as transcriber for the Commission’s 2014 public hearings. The Commissioners also express their special thanks to former staff member John D. Dotson.
A special thanks also to current and former interns and fellows, who assisted theCommissioners and staff during this Report cycle by preparing research material
and background information and providing administrative and program support
for the 2014 briefings and public hearings. They include Nathan BeauchampMustafaga, Andrew Berglund, Kathryn Botto, Garland Ditz, Jason Klanderman, Michael Pilger, and Teresa Vanfleet Barndt. Finally, the Commission expresses its
thanks to the policy analyst staff for their exemplary assistance in framing the debate and assisting in writing and editing the final Report, and to the administrative
staff for ensuring the smooth operation of the Commission.

VerDate Mar 15 2010

13:44 Nov 05, 2014

Jkt 000000

PO 00000

Frm 00611

Fmt 6602

Sfmt 6621

G:\GSDD\USCC\2014\FINAL\88483.XXX

88483