Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 3 No. 5 | October 2008

Revisiting the North Korea Issue
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE

Speculation surrounding the veracity of reports
about North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s health problems, coupled with Pyongyang’s recent move toward
restarting activity at a nuclear reprocessing plant, has
once again rendered the future of the North Korean
issue unclear. Worse, the effects of these developments have been exacerbated by developments elsewhere in the world. Dialogue between Washingtonand Pyongyang is expected to stagnate as the UnitedStates enters the final stretch of its presidential election campaign, and the new South Korean administration has yet to consolidate its policy toward NorthKorea. The future of Japan–North Korea relations,beginning with the abductees issue, is also unclear in
the context of Prime Minister Fukuda’s abrupt resignation and the subsequent transition to the new Aso
administration, as well as the snap general electionthat is widely expected to be called sometime in thenext several weeks.
It is within this environment of uncertainty that
we take another look at the North Korea issue.

North Korea’s Changing Neighborhood
Over the past 20 years, the strategic environment inwhich North Korean leaders have sought to ensure
the survival of the current regime has dramaticallyworsened. Changes abound: North Korea’s economy
is in tatters, Russia has lost its military and political influence, South Korea has democratized andachieved economic prosperity, and China is growing in leaps and bounds as a result of its decision todeepen mutual interdependence with the international community. The US attacks on Afghanistanand Iraq certainly sent shivers down the spines ofNorth Korean leaders. In 2006, North Korea test fired
missiles and carried out a nuclear test in an attempt
to demonstrate its military capabilities and gain leverage in its relations with the United States. At thesame time, it has also occasionally adopted a seemingly constructive approach in order to create anadvantageous environment in its relations with theUnited States and ensure the survival of the current
regime. This latter approach is manifest in its efforts
to cooperate with South Korea under the “Sunshinewith a ­certain degree of skepticism. North Korea canhardly be expected to easily give up its nuclear weapons, which at present serve as its most valuable diplomatic leverage. As such, the patience of all nations
involved will be indispensable.
The diplomatic approach should have two central goals: preventing circumstances from worsening and advancing moves toward a gradualresolution. To achieve these goals, a process must
be undertaken to ensure that North Korea ceases
stockpiling plutonium, refrains from transferring
nuclear technology to other countries or terrorists,never again participates in or supports terrorist activities or abductions, stops transactions in counterfeit currencies and drugs, and ultimately is left
with no choice but to make the strategic decision
to abandon its nuclear weapons. Although this willundoubtedly be an arduous and time-consuming
process, the good news is that the appropriate
framework for making progress toward nuclear
verification and—ultimately—denuclearization already exists: the Six-Party Talks.
All of the nations involved in the Six-Party Talks
have a shared interest in seeing that North Korea’s
nuclear program, which has the potential to disruptprosperity in the region, is stopped. It is abundantly
clear that Pyongyang seeks a security guarantee as
one condition of an agreement. In the view of theNorth Korean leadership, this security guarantee
should be supported by all five nations, not only theUnited States, and include the following: a promisethat the United States will not unilaterally attack
North Korea, a commitment from the United States
and Japan to take steps to normalize diplomatic relations, measures to advance economic and energy
cooperation, and joint efforts to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
This framework presents something of a historical anomaly in international relations. Typically, acountry would be expected to first alter its antagonistic policies and meet certain minimal conditions
for behavior before the international community
would offer its support. However, this is not the casefor North Korea. After merely agreeing in principle
to the objective of eventual denuclearization andPolicy,” normalize diplomatic relations with Europe,and improve relations with Japan (as seen in bilateral summit meetings in 2002 and 2004).

Policy Options
The United States and Japan basically have twopolicy options through which to address theNorth Korea issue. The first option is to adopt a
confrontational approach that essentially aims toisolate the regime and wait for it to collapse. Thisapproach would involve, among other things, implementing severe sanctions against North Korea.
Unfortunately, however, North Korea is not a country that will respond positively to sanctions. On
the contrary, sanctions are almost certain to lead
­Pyongyang to pursue a policy of brinkmanship,
which will necessitate further sanctions and lead toa vicious cycle of escalation.
It goes without saying that any approach toward
North Korea would be ineffective without the military option on the table. Current circumstances are
similar to those during the first nuclear crisis in 1993
and 1994, and as tensions rise to extreme levels wemust be prepared to manage a possible crisis. However, two things must not be overlooked: the very
heavy price that North Korea’s neighbors, including
Japan, would end up paying in the event of a military conflict; and the fact that South Korea, China,and Russia are unlikely to support such a confrontational approach. It should also be pointed out thatany sanctions are bound to be ineffective without
the cooperation of these three countries.
In light of these circumstances, it is clear that theother option—a diplomatic solution through proactive negotiations—is the only realistic choice atpresent. Diplomacy must always be carried out withan objective in mind, and in the case of the North
Korea issue the objective is clear: ensure that North
Korea abandons its nuclear weapons and no longer
poses a threat to the international community.
Unfortunately, however, achieving this objective
will certainly take time. As long as the current regime continues to rule North Korea, countries involved in negotiations with it would be well advised
to look upon any commitment from Pyongyang
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this end, it is imperative that the five nations form aunited front.
In the long term, the Six-Party Talks framework
is integral to peace and stability on the Korean­Peninsula. Japan, the United States, China, Russia,
and the two Koreas all share a direct interest in regional stability, and there is no reason for the framework’s mandate to be limited to negotiations overthe nuclear issue. It also has an important role toplay in overseeing the implementation of an eventual agreement and should continue to exist as asemi-permanent organization tasked with facilitating cooperation among the six nations.

making a commitment to participate in a phased
process, North Korea is supposed to receive assistance from the five nations. As long as this approachcontinues, North Korea can be expected to makevarious excuses, delay measures, and even attempt
to stop the entire process. There are a fair numberof reasons for outsiders to be skeptical of its commitments thus far. Normalization of relations withforeign nations and economic and energy cooperation will inevitably lead to an influx of foreigners
and information, which could in turn weaken theregime’s ability to exercise complete control overthe movement of people and information and monopolize the means of production. Because thesedevelopments could bring an end to the current regime, many experts suspect that North Korea has nointention of seriously implementing the agreement
and is stalling for time.
Even if North Korea is merely stalling for time,
there are two reasons that the involved nations
should nevertheless continue this approach. Firstand foremost, there really is no other rational option.
Second, it is still possible that this process could bear
fruit in the future. North Korea’s national strengthis declining rapidly as a result of its domestic economic circumstances, and it is increasingly doubtfulthat the regime will be able to survive without substantial outside assistance. The current leadership in
Pyongyang seems to have realized that cooperation
with foreign countries will be an essential part of efforts to carry out necessary economic reforms. Additionally, whether or not rumors circulating about
Kim Jong-il’s poor health are true, the fact remainsthat his regime will not last forever.
As this process moves forward, we will eventually reach a point when North Korea will have nochoice but to decide for itself whether or not it willabandon its nuclear weapons. After all, its leaders seek to normalize diplomatic relations with theUnited States and Japan, and it is difficult to imagine
that either of those states would agree to normalize ties with a nuclear-armed North Korea. Under
any circumstances, we must recognize that negotiations with North Korea will not bear fruit without
an appropriate mixture of dialogue and pressure. ToEAST ASIA INSIGHTS

Overcoming Obstacles to Japan’s Full
Involvement
North Korea’s past abduction of Japanese citizens
has become an extremely delicate issue in Japan.
Partially as a result of the political sensitivity of thisissue, Japan’s approach to the Six-Party Talks has
lacked clear direction. Japanese leaders need to fundamentally adjust their approach to the issue.
Neither leaving the abductees issue unsettled nor
temporarily shelving the matter in order to normalize relations with North Korea is a feasible policy option for Japan. It was exactly this lack of options that
led Japan to carry out intense behind-the-scenes diplomacy with North Korea several years ago. Negotiations culminated in a 2002 summit meeting andthe Pyongyang Declaration. North Korea formallyacknowledged that the abductions had taken place
and allowed five survivors to return to Japan. Later,
an agreement was formulated through the Six-Party
Talks that reiterated that diplomatic normalization
between Japan and North Korea would be carriedout in a manner consistent with the Pyongyang
Declaration. The basic concept of this aspect of the“comprehensive resolution” is that without a resolution of the abductees issue there will be no normalization and without normalization there will be no
final resolution of the nuclear issue.
Progress in resolving the abductees issue will
come along with further progress toward a resolution of the nuclear issue. Conversely, there may be
no progress on the abductees issue if negotiations
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concerning the nuclear issue stall. Thus, in addition
to strengthening linkages with the other nations­involved in the Six-Party Talks and working withthem to resolve the nuclear issue, Japan must also
push forward comprehensive bilateral negotiations
that cover more than only the abductees issue.
If the focus of these negotiations is restricted
solely to the abductees issue, however, there will belittle hope for a breakthrough. Rather, Japan must
elucidate for North Korea why it is in Pyongyang’sinterest to seek progress on both the nuclear and abductees issues. Because history tells us that achieving
substantive outcomes from negotiations with North
Korea is impossible without the direct involvementof the state leader, Japan should—under the rightcircumstances—consider linking comprehensive
negotiations to a possible third Japan–North Korea
summit meeting.
It is also important for Japan to clarify what exactly a resolution of the abductees issue would entail. The primary precondition for a resolution is“verification of the facts.” The North Korean side
must provide detailed and verifiable information

detailing how many Japanese were abducted andwhat happened to them. It must also promptly return any victims who are still alive. Japanese police
and—depending on the circumstances—international institutions should be involved in this process.
Determining what happened to the abductees in averifiable manner will open the door to a final resolution of the issue.

Conclusion
While it is understandable that governments involved in the Six-Party Talks have become distracted
by domestic political affairs in recent months, it isimperative that they keep their eye on the ball. TheNorth Korea issue is simply too important to be relegated to the back burner. A diplomatic resolution
to the North Korea issue will remove arguably themost dangerous flashpoint in Northeast Asia andmake a substantial contribution to peace and stability in the region.
Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE. He ­previously
served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign affairs.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from the Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
Japan Center for International Exchange
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4© 2008 Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 3 No. 5 | October 2008