STRENGTHENING THE JAPAN-KOREA-U.S. STRATEGIC TRIANGLE:ADVANCING COMMON INTERESTS& SHARED VALUESSTRENGTHENING THE JAPAN-KOREA-U.S. STRATEGIC TRIANGLE:ADVANCING COMMON INTEREST AND SHARED VALUESIn the spring of 2022, the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation assembled a diverse team of thought leaders fromJapan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States (Japan-ROK-US) to articulate a shared vision for a more prosperous,
secure, and harmonious Indo-Pacific region. The Foundation asked the team to identify obstacles slowing progress towardthat future and generate ideas for how those challenges could be overcome or mitigated. This report summarizes our key
findings, arrived at over the course of two virtual sessions, one in-person three-day policy workshop held on the Big Islandof Hawaii, and subsequent discussions aimed at taking into account fast-moving events in the Indo-Pacific.
Although the ideas presented here flow from the program participants, this report was drafted by the Mansfield
Foundation which bears sole responsibility for the conclusions and recommendations included herein.

Cover Image: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa, and South Korean Foreign Minister ParkJin in Bali, July 8, 2022 | Image: Antony Blinken’s official Twitter

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SHARED VISION ACROSS THREE DOMAINS
Relationships among nations are rooted in people-to-people ties, so our trilateral dialogue followed a method advocatedby Ambassador Mansfield when attempting to bridge differences. The “Mansfield Way” fosters mutual understanding
and cooperation by emphasizing intentional listening, empathy, and humility. Rather than just debating policy content,
program participants are encouraged to share personal histories, question assumptions, and explore unfamiliar terrain.
This method of dialogue helped forge a community of equals dedicated to advancing common interests rather than an
assembly of three competing teams seeking national advantage.
Building on a foundation of mutual trust, we addressed four questions:•

What would an ideal trilateral Japan-ROK-US
relationship look like?

•

What benefits could we realize by fostering
trilateralism, or, short of that ambitious goal, moreclosely aligning national efforts to advance sharedeconomic goals, security interests, and values?

•

What could we be doing together that we are not doing?

•

What does the world need from the Japan-ROKUS triangle, and how might the three like-mindednations create public goods and strengthen functional
multilateralism?

Only after concluding this “visioning” exercise did we identify and prioritize obstacles impeding progress toward a more
ideal trilateral partnership. We determined that it is not necessary that the three nations “resolve” every issue—only thatthey take meaningful steps along the pathway toward resolution, or failing even that, to find ways to shrink obstacles
down to a manageable size. At times, the nations may find advantage referring disputes to third party adjudicatory bodies
such as the International Court of Justice or to avail themselves of third party mediation/facilitation. Although somechallenges may appear insurmountable at first, our team found ways to mitigate many historical legacy issues, motivatedby the shared goal of unlocking the benefits of a more prosperous and secure world marked by greater respect for rule oflaw, universal human rights, and democratic governance.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A THRIVING JAPAN-ROK-US TRIANGLE
We explored the topography of an ideal community across three broad policy terrains: economics, security, and democraticvalues. We refined these three baskets along the lines below:•

Promoting economic integration and interdependence, including reducing barriers to trade and investment,enhancing energy security and mitigating climate change, ensuring supply chain resiliency, strengthening cybersecurity, combating economic coercion, and reinvigorating multilateral economic bodies such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC);•

Strengthening national security, with a focus on extended nuclear deterrence, joint exercises, interoperability,
space and cyber resiliency, maritime domain awareness, sanctions enforcement, and intelligence sharing; and•Reversing the erosion of democratic governance and promoting respect for human rights.

Although domains such as the arts, education, language, and culture are integral components of international relations,
we chose to consider them only in the context of how they strengthen the connective tissues binding the three nations
together.
The trilateral community we envision is one that would be oriented toward advancing common interests, not an exclusive
arrangement targeting any outside party. Our goal is to shore up an open, rules-based international system that hashelped to prevent conflicts among great powers, improve the standard of living for billions of people across the Indo-Pacificregion, and expand respect for human rights and liberal democratic norms for more than 75 years. The three states do notseek to draw lines of division, but rather to create public goods within a free and open Indo-Pacific.

3ECONOMY: POSITIVE SUM, RESILIENT, AND SUSTAINABLE
Working in concert, the Japan, the ROK and theUnited States can play a pivotal role to help build
a more prosperous, equitable, and sustainableeconomic system characterized by adherence toglobal norms, free trade, and robust efforts toslow and eventually reverse the harm caused bygreenhouse gas emissions. Our shared vision isof a world with the freest possible flow of goods,
capital, and people in which economic disputes areresolved peacefully through agreed multilateralmechanisms. Japan-ROK-US share an interest in
reinforcing the rules-based international economicorder and accelerating the transition toward amore green, sustainable energy market.
Yet in the Post-Cold War world, progress toward
trade liberalization has slowed and in somecases reversed. Nationalist and protectionist
instincts are reasserting themselves. Global
economic governance mechanisms such as the
WTO Appellate Body have withered or been
hamstrung. When it comes to climate change, all
the latest data suggest that global progress toward
carbon neutrality is too slow to avoid disastrous
consequences for the planet, with dire implications
for human welfare and peace and security.

4

To address these challenges, Japan-ROK-US should moreclosely align their efforts in several key areas of economic andenvironmental policy:•

Strengthening supply chain resiliency for cutting edge
technologies;•

Cooperating on energy security, with special emphasis
on responding to the short-term crisis caused by relianceon Russian oil and gas while promoting investments inrenewable energy, nuclear power, and hydrogen/ammonia
energy solutions. Long-term, collaborative research on
nuclear fusion, space solar, and energy efficiency could help
set the planet on a path toward a truly sustainable energy
future and recovery from global climate change.

•

Enhancing the efficacy of multilateral structures designed
to improve global economic governance, including the G20,
the WTO, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (QUAD), and the Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework for Prosperity (IPEF); and•Finding ways to insulate and support each other, to theextent reasonably practicable, from any acts of economic
coercion.

ECONOMIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSThe Mansfield Foundation recommends the following actions to enhance the economic prosperity and resilience leg of
the Japan-ROK-US triangle:••

Formally designate each other as priority partners
for supply chain resiliency, removing barriers andconsidering incentives to encourage friend-shoringof critical manufacturing assets and technologies.
Examples of such friend-shoring—e.g. Samsung’splan to build computer chip manufacturing
facilities in Texas and a new partnership between
Honda and LG on battery technology—should becelebrated and replicated.

•► Electric vehicles (e.g. battery technology
research, charging infrastructure, etc.);► Energy storage technology and component
supply chains, including minerals mining,processing, recovery, and recycling;► Hydrogen/ammonia production, transport, andconsumption to reduce the carbon intensityof heavy industries (e.g. steel) that are notamenable to electrification;

Before the end of 2023, launch efforts coordinatedby the National Science Foundation of the UnitedStates, New Energy and Industrial Technology
Development (NEDO) of Japan, and the Korea
Research Foundation to spur joint basic researchin critical areas, including:► Common standards/building codes for energy
efficiency, smart grids, and distributive solar
and wind power energy generation, storage,
and transmission; and► Next-generation semiconductors;► Joint research on advanced nuclear reactors(including small modular reactors) and over-the
horizon energy solutions such as nuclear fusionand space solar.

► Aerospace technology;► 5G/6G communications technology;► AI/Quantum Computing; and► The Internet/Metaverse (with emphasison both data privacy and the free flow of
information).
•

Facilitate international educational exchanges,
with a priority on students pursuing advanced
degrees in Science, Technology, Engineering, andMathematics (STEM). The QUAD has alreadyestablished a priority for STEM education, andwe recommend exploring whether a new JapanROK-US STEM training initiative might be folded
into a QUAD working group. This would havethe added benefit of integrating the ROK into oneof the QUAD mechanisms, partially addressing
Seoul’s interest in deepening its connection to the
QUAD.

Intensify joint efforts on climate change, withemphasis on the following areas:•

Promote joint capabilities in the area of pandemic
detection and response, strengthening ties among
public health organizations, biomedical research
institutes, universities, and pharmaceutical industries.
Special emphasis should be placed on strengthening
translational medicine, to speed the pathway frombasic research to therapeutics.

•

Restore functionality to the WTO’s Appellate Body
before the end of 2023. The WTO is the single mostimportant multilateral instrument to help shore up
a rules-based international economic order, but it
cannot perform this vital role absent a functioning
dispute resolution mechanism. In coordination with
the IPEF dialogue mechanism, the Japan-ROK-US
should develop a WTO reform package and ensurethat personnel are nominated to restore the appellate
body to full functionality.

5

SECURITY: DEEPENING COHESION TO COPE WITH EMERGING THREATS
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea’s development of advanced ballistic missiles equipped to carry nuclear
warheads, and China’s disregard for international security norms are among many serious challenges to the sharednational security interests of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. Although the ROK-US and Japan-US
Alliances are robust, representing the “lynchpin” and “cornerstone” of the United States’ security partnerships in the
Indo-Pacific, Japan-ROK security ties remain under-developed, limiting the joint capacity of the Japan-ROK-US triangle toaddress common security threats.

SECURITY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
We identified dozens of trilateral security initiatives—some building on existing coordination mechanisms, others new—that
are worthy of near-term attention by policy makers. In the months since our working group first convened, the governmentsof Japan-ROK-US have already adopted some of the moves we endorse, including holding trilateral anti-submarine naval
exercises. We recommend the following steps to strengthen the national security ties among the three nations:•

Hold regular Defense Minister meetings and 2+2+2(Defense Minister and Foreign Minister) dialogues
to enhance trust and improve policy coordination.
The principals should frankly assess how to divvy
up responsibility for advancing shared peace andsecurity objectives in the Indo-Pacific region andaround the world.

•

Deepen intelligence sharing. The General Security of
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) covers
Japan-ROK exchanges, while a Trilateral Intelligence
Sharing Agreement (TISA) covers Japan-ROK-US
information flow. TISA is weaker and more limited inscope than GSOMIA, and is focused only on sharing
data and analysis of DPRK missile and nuclear tests.
We recommend expanding the scope of TISA to take
into account new subject areas, including air activity
and cyber security. We also strongly encourage
deepening cooperation to include more robust
joint analytic efforts. Finally, we recommend Japanand ROK establish intelligence units by the endof 2023 corresponding to the CIA's Transnational
and Technology Mission Center to coordinate
efforts to safeguard critical defense and industrial
technologies.

•

6

Bolster joint military exercises. In addition to the
newly announced joint anti-submarine warfare
drills and the existing Ballistic Missile Defense
exercises (Pacific Dragon), Japan-ROK-US should
expand training opportunities to include air defense
exercises, demining operations, and sanctions
enforcement. Tabletop exercises (TTX) should
address non-traditional “gray zone” challenges
to maritime security and other emerging threats,

including chemical and biological weapons and cyberthreats. TTX should also evaluate preparedness to
respond to regional contingencies, including bothnatural disasters and man-made humanitarian crises(e.g. refugee flows caused by civil unrest and politicalinstability).
•

Pursue joint development and deployment ofeffective Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Cruise
Missile Defense (CMD), and Theater Missile
Defenses (TMD) systems to address North Korea’s
growing ballistic missile capabilities and theproliferation of short, medium, and intermediate
range missile systems across the Indo-Pacificregion. All three nations should ensure adequate
legal authorities and military doctrines exist to
facilitate collective self-defense (e.g. ROK should be
authorized to use missile defense systems to shootdown a Japan-bound missile in boost phase, and viceversa).

•

Hold parallel civil defense exercises to respond to
the growing ability of the DPRK to target facilities/
cities/forces far from the Korean Peninsula. The
2018 false alarm/missile launch alert in Hawaii andthe DPRK’s recent ballistic missile launch over the
territory of Japan demonstrate a clear need to shore
up civil defense education and drills.

•

Reinforce extended nuclear deterrence, evaluating
the merits of new defensive systems, counterstrike capabilities, and force posture adjustments
to respond to the dynamic security situation in
Northeast Asia.

Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) along with Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) guidedmissile destroyer JS Chokai (DDG 176) and Republic of Korea Navy guided-missile destroyer ROKS Sejong The Great (DDG 991) conduct
a tri-lateral Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) exercise in the Sea of Japan, Oct. 6. , 2022 | Photo credit: U.S. Navy via U.S. Indo-PacificCommand Public Affairs•

Deepen policy coordination in response to new
DPRK nuclear and missile developments. We needa new version of the Trilateral Coordinating Group(TCOG) to talk about the capabilities the DPRK isdeveloping and how best to respond to them.

•

Deepen defense industrial cooperation, including
cross-servicing and acquisition agreements. These
agreements enhance readiness by improving accessto materials such as oil, lubricants, and ammunition
and also ensuring reliable maintenance ofequipment. The allies should also pursue more joint
production of defense goods to find efficiencies, drive
down costs, and promote interoperability.

••

Highlight critical infrastructure protection. Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, recent DPRK missile tests,
and Chinese anti-satellite tests all underscore theneed to improve the survivability and resiliencyof critical infrastructure, to include nuclear power
plants, electric grids, water purification, and satellite
communications systems.
Expand trilateral Maritime Domain Awareness(MDA) cooperation (perhaps utilizing the newlyannounced Indo-Pacific MDA initiative, or IPMDA),
and bring in other like-minded partners such as
Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, Australia, and

New Zealand. MDA should be enhanced throughthe application of small satellites and big data,
augmenting other forms of MDA data collection andanalysis.
•Strengthen disaster response coordination among
aid and disaster response agencies (e.g. JICA,
KOICA, and USAID). These efforts should also
encompass trilateral working groups to deconflict
and align aid missions carried out by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

•

Trilateralize existing bilateral military exchanges
from all services (including the Coast Guard), with
an emphasis on younger, distinguished officers who
can work together in a common language.

•

Enlarge public diplomacy outreach celebrating
shared values and interests. All three nations should
create more programs to promote understanding of
the security environment in Northeast Asia among
opinion leaders (journalists, scholars, think tankofficials) and the general public. Quasi-independent
foundations such as the Japan Foundation, theKorea Foundation, and the Asia Foundation could
spearhead this effort, and these organizations andothers with similar missions should receive enhanced
support from governments and the private sector.

7

8

VALUES: BUILDING ON COMMON GROUND AND ACCEPTING DIFFERENCES
Authoritarian states are leading a challenge to the liberal democratic order that has prevailed for most of the past 75 years.
Japan, the ROK, and the United States have the economic clout, military muscle, and political legitimacy to bolster liberal
democratic values in Northeast Asia and around the world, and they must summon the political will and resources to
do so. At times, Japan-ROK-US may find value in working in concert, as when applying sanctions against Russia for its
invasion of Ukraine. In other situations, the three may choose to act independently, but in consultation with each other, as
in response to Myanmar’s reversion to military rule after a period of more democratic governance.

VALUES-DRIVEN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Liberal democratic values can be difficult to define. Values often are co-mingled with cultural traits, religious teachings,
and historical national identities. Harmonizing values can actually be more challenging than harmonizing efforts
to advance other core national interests. Japan-ROK-US should prioritize defending and advancing the rules-based
democratic norms and values embodied in the existing international order. These norms are rooted in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and its accompanying legally binding covenants on civil and political rights and economic,
social, and cultural rights. They can also be found in the UN Charter and other UN documents outlawing torture andgenocide and defending the rights of children and the disabled. Japan-ROK-US should not seek to impose their own
national values on other nations, but rather, to promote universal human rights enshrined in UN treaties through anapproach appealing to common ground and rooted in empathy, understanding, and humility.
To protect human rights and advance liberal democratic norms, we recommend Japan-ROK-US intensify efforts in thefollowing areas:•

Expand assistance for refugees fleeing conflict, withspecial focus on the wars in Ukraine and Syria,
which have forced millions from their homes.

•

Support international efforts to ensure election
integrity, promote rule of law, protect minority
rights, and preserve freedom of the press.

•

Strengthen global democratic governance andhuman rights mechanisms established for that
purpose, e.g. the United Nations Human Rights
Council and its Universal Periodic Review, theOffice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights(OHCHR), the Millenium Development Goals, andother UN treaty bodies most relevant to humanrights, including the Committee on the Rights of
the Child, the Committee on the Elimination ofDiscrimination against Women, the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, etc.

•

Devise effective measures to counter global
disinformation and propaganda campaigns andpromote freedom of information.

•

Coordinate and increase funding for overseas
development assistance efforts, with a special focus
on women’s rights, education, and public health, toaddress the root causes of injustice and violence.

•

Work in concert with civil society groups on avalues agenda promoting universal human rights,
incorporating NGOs into the fabric of policymaking
and drawing on their expertise and operational
capabilities to augment government-led efforts.

•

Selectively use economic leverage, including targeted
sanctions, where appropriate, to underscore theimportance of liberal democratic values as coreelements of national strategy.

9South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (left) and Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa attend a meeting in Tokyo on July 18, 2022 |POOL / VIA AFP-JIJI

WHAT’S STOPPING US?
Trilateral Japan-ROK-US collaboration—not only on economic and security issues, but also on a values-driven agenda—
has fluctuated over time based largely on the vagaries of domestic politics. At this critical juncture, it is vital that Japanand the ROK not allow differences arising from historical issues to undermine cooperation in areas that would benefit
from closer policy coordination. The 1998 Obuchi-Kim Joint Declaration, the World Cup Soccer Competition cohosted
by Japan and the ROK in 2002, and the December 2015 Kishida-Yun Comfort Women agreement emblemize the spirit ofcooperation and mutual respect that should inform current policymakers as they seek to strengthen cooperation on sharedeconomic interests, security interests, and values.
The more cohesive community we envision can be realized by overcoming, or at least mitigating, three challenges:•

Finding a practical way to resolve the lawsuit filed by Koreans alleging mistreatment by Japanese companies underconditions of forced labor during World War II;•

Redressing grievances associated with Japan’s colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula (specifically the “Comfort
Women” issue); and•Restoring mutual confidence in export control systems to allow reciprocal “white list” treatment for the licensing ofexports of sensitive dual use technologies.

Since taking office, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida have begun to establish the positive atmosphere necessary
to address these issues through phone calls, congratulatory messages, and brief one-on-one meetings on the sidelines ofmultinational meetings. They are both working diligently to ensure that Japan and the ROK can realize the full potentialof joint action on a global agenda, and we commend them for their efforts.
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MITIGATING OBSTACLES TO CLOSER JAPAN-ROK RELATIONS
We propose the following general guidelines for handling of politically sensitive Japan-ROK historical disputes.
1. Address tough historical issues by
acknowledging that the two peoples
and their governments share a common
commitment to advancing respect forhuman rights. Reconciliation should bebuilt on a foundation of trust and pursued
with a spirit of empathy and mutual
understanding.
2. Listen more and speak with care.
Ambassador Mike Mansfield taught
unlocking the door to cooperation begins
with intentional listening. History is not
some absolute truth, but rather the productof our choices about what to remember andhow to remember it. Political leaders should
explore historical events using language thatis balanced and compassionate, and shouldtake care to remember examples of close
cooperation and shared action in addition toperiods of difficulty. Whenever possible, theyshould embrace a forward-looking attitude.

3. Expand people-to-people ties. Exchange programs, especiallyinvolving young people, media figures, and other influencers,
can help shape weave the fabric of community and shapepublic opinion. The Korea Foundation, Japan Foundation, Asia
Foundation, U.S.-Japan Council, Asia Society, Korea Society
and other groups should all be supported. The private sector
also has an important role to play. Ventures such as Hitachi’s
US-Japan International Affairs Fellowship, undertaken in
partnership with the Council on Foreign Relations, should
be replicated by companies in Japan and Korea to strengthen
Japan-ROK relations.
4. Exploit summitry to set the tone. We recommend a summit
meeting within the next year—a “Kim-Obuchi 2.0”—at which
Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon would adopt aroadmap for cooperation on shared economic, security, anddemocracy/human rights interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
The two nations should establish a tradition of annual summit
meetings to layer new agreements on positive foundational
documents such as the 1965 treaty normalizing relations,the 1993 Kono Statement, and the Kishida-Yun 2015 Joint
Statement.

These general guidelines can help reshape the diplomatic environment within which tough historical issues can beaddressed. For example, as applied to the field of education—specifically, how children are taught about the history ofJapan-Korea relations in school textbooks—these guidelines suggest continuing efforts to explore contentious historicalevents through dialogue and exchanges. As the United States has found in recent efforts to examine its own history—e.g.
The New York Times’s 1619 Project examining the legacy of slavery—delving into the past may not yield unanimity ofopinion. But debating and exploring the past can expand public awareness, deepen mutual understanding, and narrow
differences, particularly if care is taken to engage younger audiences in a spirit of mutual respect. Convening a youthfocused task force to study how best to present historical issues in textbooks would allow the governments of Japan and
ROK to delegate to the next generation of leaders the task of how best to memorialize the past while building a common
future.
In regard to the three urgent challenges highlighted above, our working group explored each and recommends thefollowing steps to narrow differences:11Forced Labor
We endorse a hybrid political/judicial approach broadly consistent with principles of justice and accountability motivating
the case brought before the ROK Supreme Court. The most viable way to handle the issue is for the Yoon administration
to orchestrate official ROK government payments to victims of forced labor complemented by Government of Japan (GOJ)
statements affirming responsibility for historic human rights violations and voluntary Japanese private sector initiatives toprovide a compensation package for Koreans who filed for redress of grievances through the courts. Such a package deal
is reportedly already under discussion by senior officials of both countries. These diplomatic efforts should include careful
outreach to the victims of forced labor, their families, and associated civil society groups.

Comfort Women

Export Controls

Tokyo and Seoul have made concerted efforts
in the past to address the issue of human rights
violations perpetrated by Japanese forces during
World War II, but these initiatives have notfully resolved the issue. Looking forward, werecommend that renewed efforts should begin
by framing the comfort women issue as a clear
violation of human rights and then placing it in the
broader context of the shared desire by Japan andthe ROK to work together now and into the future
to defend human rights—particularly women’s
rights. The suffering of the comfort women is notunique to the Korean Peninsula. Their suffering isemblematic of a larger truth: that in any conflictsituation, women and children are likely to be in
the most vulnerable position.

A dispute between Japan and the ROK over whether to accord
each other White List preferred treatment when consideringexport licenses has soured efforts to realize the full potential forcommon effort toward a shared economic vision. In August 2019,Japan removed the ROK from the White List of 27 nations given
preferential treatment when seeking to access to certain sensitive
dual use items. Japan cited concerns about sanctions violations,with dual use items allegedly finding their way from the ROK to
North Korea. The ROK retaliated one month later, removing Japan
from its list of trusted trading partners.

We recommend a Japan-ROK conference convene
to address this vulnerability and explore ways
to protect women and children in complex
humanitarian emergencies. Such a conference,centering civil society organizations, would place
the comfort women issue in the broader context ofprotecting the vulnerable, seeking accountability
and justice, and advancing universal humanrights norms. This conference could be hosted
by NGOs under the umbrella of an appropriate
UN agency, providing a forum at which surviving
Korean comfort women could tell their stories
alongside women from Ukraine, Afghanistan,
Syria, Iran, and other countries where women’s
rights are under assault. Such a forum would allow
officials from Japan and the ROK to reaffirm theircommitment to defending women’s rights and toacknowledge past actions that violated humanrights norms. It would afford opportunities for the
GOJ to embrace and reaffirm the spirit of the 1993
Kono Statement and for the ROK government toreaffirm the 2015 Kishida-Yun Comfort Women
joint statement.

12

In the years since those reciprocal moves, the ROK and Japan havemanaged to move more or less in concert to impose sanctions on
Russia in response to Moscow’s aggression against Ukraine, andhave coordinated closely on sanctions enforcement against the
DPRK in response to a recent flurry of missile tests in the runup toa possible nuclear test. As global attention turns to supply chain
resiliency and friend-shoring, it is more urgent than ever thatJapan-ROK-US coordinate closely on export controls to safeguard
critical technologies from potential embargo or compromise.
We recommend the governments of Japan and the ROK convene a
multilateral export controls/supply chain experts dialogue under
the auspices of IPEF as soon as possible, and in any event, nolater than mid-2023, to address emerging challenges, including
sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine, as wellas initiatives to tighten existing sanctions or impose new onesin response to the DPRK’s sustained ballistic missile testing. The
basic objective would be to strengthen, modernize, and harmonize
export controls. Over the course of these IPEF deliberations,Japanese and ROK delegates, working bilaterally in a multilateralcontext, can deepen mutual trust and communication, giving
each nation justification to restore White List treatment to theother. This should be done on the basis of technical considerations
and without fanfare. The restoration of White List treatment,
as well as the enhanced multilateral coordination on Russia andDPRK sanctions alignment, could be part of the “early harvest” of
IPEF—something the Biden Administration should celebrate andpoint to as proof of IPEF’s value as a dialogue platform.

CONCLUSION: BOUNDLESS OPPORTUNITIESWhen representatives of Japan, the ROK, and the UnitedStates meet and discuss the world in which we are living,
they quickly find common ground in the areas of economic
growth, sustainable energy and climate policies, preventing
war and building peace, and advancing shared values. The
citizens of all three nations share a common commitment
to the liberal democratic order that has allowed eachto flourish over the past seventy years. They enjoy the
freedoms embodied in their respective constitutions, andthrough diplomacy, foreign assistance, and increasingly theapplication of soft power, seek to ensure that others will
also enjoy the fruits of a rules-based international system.
Japan, the ROK, and the United States have alreadyaccomplished much by working together. They have forged
extraordinarily close economic relations rooted in free andfair trade, joint ventures, and foreign direct investment,
benefiting millions. They have collaborated to preserve
peace and security during the Cold War, and they have
responded resolutely to the threat posed by the DPRK’s
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and themeans to deliver them. They are among the most generous
nations in the world when it comes to foreign development
assistance and humanitarian aid, and have worked tosustain international bodies at the UN and elsewhere
designed to foster greater international respect for universal
human rights.
But there is much work that remains to be done. The
COVID-19 pandemic has not only claimed millions of lives,it has also exacerbated economic inequalities and set theworld on course for a global recession in 2023. Climatechange is exacting a heavy cost on many nations, with theburden falling disproportionately on those least able tocope with it. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has called into
question two fundamental premises of the rules-based
international order—the peaceful settlement of disputes
and the inviolability of sovereign borders. Russia’s attack
has also driven up energy and food prices and shone a
spotlight on the vulnerability of critical infrastructure,including nuclear power plants, to both conventional andcyber attacks. Elsewhere in the world, democratic norms
are under assault, with authoritarian leaders exploiting
populist, nativist sentiment to constrain rather than
expand basic rights such as freedom of speech, freedom ofworship, and freedom of assembly.
Against this backdrop of a world under stress, the JapanROK-US triangle holds enormous promise to create public
goods. The challenges and opportunities facing Japan, theROK, and the United States make it imperative that theyfind ways to overcome any and all obstacles that might
impair closer cooperation on areas of common interest.
From strengthening supply chain resiliency to harnessing
the potential of green energy, from deterring aggression to
responding to natural disasters, from defending the rights
of women in conflict zones to advancing liberal democratic
norms, the three like-minded nations have a full agenda
ripe for closer cooperation. The areas for cooperation are
not even bound by our planet’s atmosphere, extending into
space, where through joint efforts they can lead humanity
to the moon, Mars, and beyond. There is no reason to defer
action on a positive agenda that holds so much promise for
the Japan-ROK-US triangle and the world.
13

This report was prepared by Mansfield Foundation staff. We have attempted to accurately
present the key findings from the workshop and capture the consensus of the group. This
report may or may not reflect the views of any individual member of the group. The views
expressed herein should not be attributed to any individual participant or the organizations
with which they are affiliated. All members of the workshop attended in their personal capacity.
Conversations were conducted off-the-record to ensure an open and supportive environment.

14

DIALOGUE PARTICIPANTS
All members of the workshop attended in their personal capacity, and are listed by their affiliations as of Summer of 2022
for identification purposes only.
Cho Taeyong, National Assembly of the Republic of Korea
Erin Aeran Chung, Johns Hopkins University
Wendy Cutler, Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI)
Gordon Flake, University of Western Australia Perth USAsia Centre
Frank Jannuzi, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Pamela Kennedy, The Stimson Center
Koshino Yuka, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Kim Jina, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
Lee Sook Jong, Sungkyunkwan University
Walter Lohman, Heritage Foundation
Keith Luse, National Committee on North Korea
Toyoda Masakazu, Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)
Michishita Narushige, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
Nakabayashi Mieko, Waseda University
Jane Nakano, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Nishino Junya, Keio University
Stephen Noerper, Asia Dialogue
Park Cheol Hee, Seoul National University Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS)
Benjamin Self, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Mireya Solís, Brookings Institution
Song Kyungjin, Innovative Economy ForumYoon Young-kwan, Seoul National University
15

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