Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 52 (2018) 1– 5Article

Speech-Act Theory

Naoki ARAKI*(Received Oct. 31, 2017)

Abstract
J. L. Austin claims that to say something is to do something and divides all utterances into performative utterances (henceforth performatives) and constative utterances (henceforth constatives). Then,he endeavors to establish a criterion for distinguishing performatives and constatives, but he fails todo so. As a result, he abandons the criterion for separating utterances into performatives and constatives, and reaches a conclusion that all utterances are performatives. But his analysis of utterances
causes an infinite regress, which means that his logic collapses.
Key Words: performative, constative, infinite regress

as a typical performative, is a self-objectified one andIntroduction

essentially the same as the second and the third per-Austin insists that to say something is to do some-son one. Therefore, it is impossible from a logical point

thing and endeavors to distinguish performatives fromof view to attempt to draw a distinction between per-constatives. He searches for a criterion for distinguish-

formatives and constatives. All the utterances areing performatives from constatives but cannot findconstatives and should not be construed as performa-

any. So he concludes that all utterances are performa-tives.

(Araki 1992: 15)

tives. Austin’s idea is also summarized in PhilosophicalPapers 2nd edition (1969). Can his insistence be verified from a logical point of view?

In this present paper, Austin’s theory is examinedfrom a different point of view from Araki’s (1992).

The present author has written a paper entitled “ACritique of J. L. Austin’s Speech-Act Theory (Araki1. Performatives and Constatives

1992: 15-26).” Here is its abstract:

Austin insists that the following sentences areneither a description nor a statement of an act, but that

J. L. Austin divides utterances into performatives

saying them is nothing but actually doing the act itself:and constatives and then tries to establish a criterion
for distinguishing one from the other. But his efforts

I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.

all end in failure. This means that utterances cannot be

I give and bequeath my watch to my brother.

classified into performatives and constatives against

I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.

his assumption. However, he abandons the criterion(Austin 1962: 5)

and regards all the utterances as performatives. Infact, the first person expression, which he interprets

He names these sentences above performatives,* Department of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of Technology,
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp
─ 1 ─Naoki ARAKI

distinguishing them from other sentences he calls

So that considerations of the happiness andconstatives. According to him, performatives do not sayunhappiness type may infect statements (or someanything or they do not only simply say something butstatements) and considerations of the type of truth andalso do something. Also they do not report anythingfalsity may infect performatives (or some performa-true or false about some kind of topic. Austin says:tives).
We have then to take a further step out into theIn these examples it seems clear that to utter thedesert of comparative precision. We must ask: is there

sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances)some precise way in which we can definitely distin-

is not to describe my doing of what I should be said inguish the performative from the constative utterance?

so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it(Austin 1962: 55)

is to do it. None of the utterances cited is either trueMoreover, grammatical criteria are also denied

or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it.
(Austin 1962: 6)

when Austin tries to distinguish between performatives and constatives. Austin asks himself:

Moreover, Austin insists that performatives areeither happy (appropriate) or unhappy (inappropriate),Well, is the use of the first person singular and of

depending on the circumstances. On the other hand,the present indicative active, so called, essential to a

constatives are either true or false, depending on theperformative utterance?

(Austin 1962: 57)

situations. Austin says:
And he answers this question himself:
Let us first at least concentrate attention on thelittle matter already mentioned in passing [AustinA very common and important type of, one would

1962: 6]—this matter of ‘the appropriate circumstances’.

think, indubitable performative has the verb in theTo bet is not, as I pointed out in passing, merely tosecond or third person (singular or plural) and the verb

utter the words ‘I bet, &c.’: someone might do that allin the passive voice: so person and voice anyway areright, and yet we might still not agree that he had in

not essential. Some examples of this type are:fact, or at least entirely, succeeded in betting. […](1) You are hereby authorized to pay . . . .

Besides the uttering of the words of the so-called per-(2) Passengers are warned to cross the track by
the bridge only.

formative, a good many other things have as a generalrule to be right and to go right if we are to be said toIndeed the verb may be ‘impersonal’ in such cases

have happily brought off our action. What these are wewith the passive, for example:

may hope to discover by looking at and classifying(3) Notice is hereby given that trespassers will betypes of case in which something goes wrong and theprosecuted.

(Austin 1962: 57)

act—marrying, betting, bequeathing, christening, or
what not—is therefore at least to some extent a failure:

For example, Austin says that a sentence begin-

the utterance is then, we may say, not indeed false but

ning with I state … is not only a performative but also

in general unhappy.

a constative, and that it is certain that the sentence can(Austin 1962: 13-14)

be true or false (Austin 1962: 91-92). This means that

2. True-False and Happy-Unhappy

he denies his criterion that performatives are either

Next Austin seeks the distinction between perfor-

happy or unhappy and constatives are either true or

matives and constatives, thinking that the former isfalse. The reason is that he admits that one and theeither happy or unhappy, but that the latter is either

same sentence beginning with I state … can be both atrue or false. But in some cases, performatives are

performative (which is either happy or unhappy) and aeither true or false and constatives are either happy orconstative (which is either true or false) at the same

unhappy, he admits, and he cannot deny such a distinc-time. Austin says:tion is imperfect. Austin says:─ 2 ─Speech-Act Theory

Now let us consider where we stand for a moment:

Saying something will often, or even normally, pro-beginning with the supposed contrast between perfor-duce certain consequential effects upon the feelings,

mative and constative utterances, we found sufficientthoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker,

indications that unhappiness nevertheless seems toor of other persons: and it may be done with thecharacterize both kinds of utterance, not merely thedesign, intention, or purpose of producing them; andperformative; and that the requirement of conforming

we may then say, thinking of this, that the speaker hasor bearing some relation to the facts, different in dif-performed an act in the nomenclature of which refer-ferent cases, seems to characterize performatives, inence is made either (C. a), only obliquely, or even (C.

addition to the requirement that they should be happy,b), not at all, to the performance of the locutionary orsimilarly to the way which is characteristic of sup-illocutionary act. We shall call the performance of an

posed constatives.

act of this kind the performance of a perlocutionary act

Now we failed to find a grammatical criterion foror perlocution.

(Austin 1962: 101)

performatives, […] we still have utterances beginning‘I state that …’ which seem to satisfy the requirements

We have here then roughly distinguished threeof being performative, yet which surely are the mak-kinds of acts—the locutionary, the illocutionary, anding of statements, and surely are essentially true or

the perlocutionary.

(Austin 1962: 102-103)

false.
It is time then to make a fresh start on the prob-

Surprisingly enough, Austin goes on to insist thatlem. We want to reconsider more generally the sensesconstatives perform illocutionary act and perlocutionary

in which to say something may be to do something, oract just as performatives do. As a result, he completely

in saying something we do something (and also per-abandons the distinction between performatives andhaps to consider the different case in which by saying

constatives. Finally Austin comes to a conclusion thatsomething we do something). […] When we issue any

all speech acts (utterances) are performatives. He clas-

utterance whatsoever, are we not ‘doing something’?

sifies them into the following five types:(Austin 1962: 90-91)(1) Verdictives.

3. Unification of Performatives and Constatives(2) Exercitives.
(3) Commissives.

Eventually Austin develops his argument from the(4) Behavitives.

distinction between performatives and constatives to a(5) Expositives.

(Austin 1962: 150)

general theory of speech acts. He analyzes speech acts
as locutionary act (saying something), illocutionary act(what you’re trying to do by speaking), and perlucu-

4. Infinite Regress
If Austin’s conclusion is right, then what will hap-tionary act (the effect of what you say). Austin says:

pen? I shall follow his argument along the line of logic.
The act of ‘saying something’ in this full normal

He insists that all speech acts are performatives.

sense I call, i.e. dub, the performance of a locutionary

So the following sentence is an example of a performa-act,tive as Austin himself admits:(Austin 1962: 94)

It is raining.

To perform a locutionary act is in general, we(Austin 1962: 133)

may say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionaryact, as I propose to call it.

He insists that to say the sentence above is to state(Austin 1962: 98)

it and that saying it, that is, stating it, is quite the same
There is yet a further sense (C) in which to per-as verifying, betting, and warning something (Austinform a locutionary act, and therein an illocutionary

1962: 133). In other words, the sentence “It is raining”

act, may also be to perform an act of another kind.

can be interpreted as:─ 3 ─

Naoki ARAKII state that it is raining.

(Austin 1962: 133)

interpreted as
I state that I state that I state that he didn’t do that.

Surprisingly enough, along the same line of argument, Austin insists that the following is also a perfor-

This process goes on ad infinitum and is called anmative:infinite regress. The infinite regress is an example of
He didn’t (did not) do that (it). (Austin 1962: 134)

recursion, which is thought to be a universal propertyof human language by Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch

The reason is that the sentence above is not dif-(2002).
As Motoki Tokieda points out, we cannot describe

ferent from the following:a person who states something since such an infinite
regress takes place:

I state that he didn’t do that (it).
(Austin 1962: 133)

We can never describe ourselves by using lanThe sentence above, according to Austin, is aguage in the same way as when we depict somethingother than us. For example, when a painter paints his

performative just as the following are:or her self-portrait, the character in the self-portrait isI counterargue that he didn’t do that.

not the painter who is painting himself or herself but

I imply that he didn’t do that.

the character who is objectified and materialized inde-I bet that he didn’t do that.

(Austin 1962: 133)pendently of the painter who is painting himself orherself. This is true of language. “I” in “I read” is not

Therefore, for Austin, stating something is to per-the person who uses this expression but the character
who is objectified. (My translation)

form an act (Austin 1962: 138-139).

(Tokieda 1941: 42-43)

If we accept his insistence, then the following
sentence

A similar thing to this happens when we see animage which is reflected in a mirror by looking at

I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.

another mirror. It is another example of the infinite
regress.

can be interpreted as

So Austin’s analysis falls into an infinite regress
although he might not have noticed that his argu-

I state that I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.

ments led to the infinite regress.
because all utterances are stated. This should be true

Incidentally, from a different point of view, J. R.

of stating something as a logical conclusion. ThisRoss (1970) noticed this phenomenon when he pro-means that all sentences or utterances are stating

posed “performaitve analysis” based on transforma-something although he classifies them into the fivetional grammar. Geoffrey Leech explains:

types of performatives (Austin 1962: 150). So the folThe gist of the performative analysis is that in its

lowing sentence‘deepest structure’ […] every sentence is a performative; that is, every sentence contains as its main sub-I state that he didn’t (did not) do that.

ject a first-person pronoun, and as its main verb a
performative verb in the simple present tense. Foris also no exception and can be construed as

example, the declarative sentence Tomorrow will berainy has, in this view, a deep structure of a form such

I state that I state that he didn’t do that.

as I state that [tomorrow will be rainy] or I predict that
The utterance above is also stated, so it can be[tomorrow will be rainy], or I warn you that [tomorrow─ 4 ─Speech-Act Theory

will be rainy].

(Leech 1981: 323-324)

ing Austin’s five types of speech acts, can be thoughtof as stating something. Can Austin accept this conclu-He points out the difficulties of the performative

sion? Probably not. But this is a logical necessity.
Austin must admit it despite his insistence.

analysis:[…] to suppose that a double performative I state

Conclusion

to you that I promise you underlies this sentence [AsAustin tries to distinguish performatives from con-

for myself, I promise you that I’ll be there.] is to open

statives one way or another, but only to find that there

the door to potential infinite regression of performa-

is no such a criterion at all. As a result, he abandons

tives, one within the other:

distinctions between performatives and constatives andI state that X.

concludes that all utterances are performatives. But hisI state that I state that X.

theory falls into an infinite regress and collapses.

I state that I state that I state that X …

References(etc.)
If this sort of embedding is allowed, then every simple

Araki, Naoki. “A Critique of J. L. Austin’s Speech-Act

sentence can be derived from infinitely many deep

Theory.” Journal of Humanities XII, 15-26. Asso-structures.

ciation for the Study of Humanities. (1992).

(Leech 1981: 325-326)

Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford
University Press. 1962.

After all, Ross also abandoned his perfomative

Hauser, Marc D., Noam Chomsky, and W. Tecumseh

analysis because of the infinite regress.
Furthermore, we might think of Austin’s idea

Fitch. “The Faculty of Language: What It Is, Whofrom a different point of view. If Austin’s idea is right,

Has It, and How Did It Evolve?” Science 298:

then all utterances including his five types of speech

1569-1579. (2002).

acts (Austin 1962: 150)

Leech, Geoffrey. Semantics: The Study of Meaning 2nd

1. Verdictives

Ross, J. R. “On Declarative Sentences.” In Jacobs and2. Exercitives

Rosenbaum (eds.) Readings in English Transfor-

3. Commissives

mational Grammar. Blaisdell. 1970.

edition. Penguin Books. 1981.

Tokieda, Motoki. Theory of Japanese Linguistics.

4. Behabitives

Iwanamishoten. 1941. (in Japanese)

5. Expositives

Urmson, J. O., and G. J. Warnock (eds.) Philosophicalmight be interpreted as the only one type of speech
act: stating. The reason is that every utterance, includ-─ 5 ─Papers 2nd edition. Clarendon Press. 1969.