This report is available online at www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications
For media and public inquiries about this report, contact DIA-PAO@dodiis.mil
For more information about the Defense Intelligence Agency, visit DIA's website at www.dia.mil
Cover image, Russian tanks, model T90A. Source: Shutterstock.
DIA-11-1704-161

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKPREFACE
For more than 50 years, DIA officers have met the full range of security challenges facing our
great nation. Our intelligence professionals operate across the globe, and our work supports
customers from the forward-deployed warfighter to the national policymaker. DIA is united in
a common vision—to be the indispensable source of defense intelligence expertise—and for the
past five decades we have done just that.
As part of this vision, DIA has a long history of producing comprehensive and authoritative
defense intelligence overviews. In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet
Union’s military strength. The purpose was to provide America's leaders, the national security
community, and the public a complete and accurate view of the threat. The result: the firstedition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over 250,000 copies, and it soon became anannual publication that was translated into eight languages and distributed around the world.
In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S.
policymakers and the public for the first time.
Today, we are faced with a complexity of intelligence challenges from multiple threats that wecannot afford to misunderstand. In the spirit of Soviet Military Power, DIA is proud to produce
an unclassified defense intelligence overview of the military capabilities associated withthe challenges we face—beginning with Russia. This product is intended to foster a dialogue
between U.S. leaders, the national security community, partner nations, and the public about
the challenges we face in the 21st century.

IV

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Vladimir Putin’s address to the Russian Federal Assembly following the referendum
on annexation of Crimea, 18 March, 2014:“The USA prefers to follow the rule of the strongest and not by the international law. They areconvinced that they have been chosen and they are exceptional, that they are allowed to shapethe destiny of the world, that it is only them that can be right. They act as they please. Here andthere they use force against sovereign states, set up coalitions in accordance with the principle:
who is not with us is against us.”Within the next decade, an even more confident and capable Russia could emerge. The United States needs
to anticipate, rather than react, to Russian actions and pursue a greater awareness of Russian goals andcapabilities to prevent potential conflicts. Our policymakers and commanders must have a complete
understanding of Russia’s military capabilities, especially as U.S. and Russian forces may increasingly
encounter each other around the globe. DIA will continue to provide our leaders decision-space, ensuring
they have the time and information necessary to protect our nation. The wrong decisions—or the rightones made too late—could have dire consequences.
This report examines a resurgent Russia’s military power to foster a deeper understanding of its corecapabilities, goals, and aspirations in the 21st Century.

Vincent R . Stewar t
L ieut en a nt G enera l , US MC
D i r e c t or
D efen se I nt el l igence A genc y

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Russia continues to modernize its extensive nuclear forces and is developing long range precision-guided
conventional weapons systems. It is manipulating the global information environment, employing toolsof indirect action against countries on its periphery and using its military for power projection andexpeditionary force deployments far outside its borders. Its ultimate deterrent is a robust nuclear force
capable of conducting a massed nuclear strike on targets in the United States within minutes.

D E F E N S E

The resurgence of Russia on the world stage—seizing the Crimean Peninsula, destabilizing eastern
Ukraine, intervening on behalf of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and shaping the information
environment to suit its interests—poses a major challenge to the United States. Moscow will continue
to aggressively pursue its foreign policy and security objectives by employing the full spectrum of thestate’s capabilities. Its powerful military, coupled with the actual or perceived threat of intervention,
allows its whole-of-government efforts to resonate widely.

A G E N C Y

The international order established after the Second World War and developed throughout theCold War largely ensured widespread peace and stability even as it saw new conflicts—large andsmall—take place in different regions of the world. This post-war era, underwritten primarily by
the strength of the United States, also gave rise to the greatest period of prosperity in history,
witnessing countries rebuild from war and emerge from colonialism to become vibrant and valuable
members of the international community. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the UnitedStates emerged as a world leader militarily, economically and diplomatically. Today, however, theUnited States faces an increasingly complex array of challenges to our national security.

VINTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKRUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

CONTENTS
Introduction/Historical Overview.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  9
1991–Present: Fall and Rise of the Russian Military .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 9

Russian National Military Overview .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 14
Russia’s Threat Perceptions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

14

National Security Strategy .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 16
Stability Issues .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  17
External Defense Relations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 19

Military and Security Leadership .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  23
Main Operations Directorate . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 25

National Military Command and Control .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  25
Russian Nuclear Command and Control . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 26
Command and Control of Joint Forces . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 27

Core Russian Military Capabilities .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  29
Nuclear Forces and Weapons.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  29
Biological and Chemical Weapons.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

31

Anti-Access/Area Denial.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

32

Information Operations . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 32
Strategic Air Operations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 32
Integrated Air Defense System .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 33
Modern Precision Strike Capabilities . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 33

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Russian Perceptions of Modern Conflict .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  22

D E F E N S E

Military Doctrine and Strategy .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  22

A G E N C Y

Defense Budget .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  19

VII

Precision Strike.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  34
Space/Counterspace.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  35
Cyber .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

37

Propaganda Helps Shape The Information Environment . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 38
Cyber-Enabled Psychological Operations . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 39
Information Defense . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 40
Media Laws— A Hedge Against Instability . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 41

Indirect Action.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

41

Electronic Warfare .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  42
Power Projection .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

42

Underground Facilities.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  44
Denial and Deception.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  45

Outlook: A Modernizing Force .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  46
Appendix A: Russian Strategic Rocket Forces.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  47
Appendix B: Russian Ground Forces.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  50
Appendix C: Russian Aerospace Forces .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

58

Appendix D: Russian Navy.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  66
Appendix E: Russian Special Operations Forces.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  71
Appendix F: Russian Intelligence Services.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  72
Appendix G: Defense Industry and Modernization Programs.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  75
Appendix H: Arms Sales .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  85

VIII

1991-Present: Fall and Rise of the Russian MilitaryF

ollowing the collapse of the USSR in
1991, the Russian Federation inherited several formidable tasks and challenges from its Soviet predecessor. For the newly-formed Russian Ministry of Defense, the mostimmediate challenge was to relocate militaryequipment and personnel from the newly independent states of the former USSR and countries of the disbanded Warsaw Pact into a new
Russian state.1 The assets of the Soviet Union’s

nuclear arsenal were of particular importance.
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan,
the four states with nuclear weapons in theirterritory, eventually reached an agreement
to dismantle all tactical and strategic nuclear
weapons in the non-Russian republics or returnthem to Russia.2 The issue of conventional military forces was much more problematic. Forces
returning from Eastern Europe had to be reintegrated into the new Russian military, while

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Introduction/Historical Overview

D E F E N S E

Kremlin Guards in 2017. Military power has always been regarded as of critical importance by Russian andSoviet leaders, but after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow was left with a dramatically weakened military.

A G E N C Y

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Image Source: Shutterstock

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

9those in the newly independent states wereviewed as the basis for building national militaries for new sovereign countries.3
Returning military forces from Eastern
Europe were often shipped piecemeal backto unprepared bases in the Russian Federation.4 Other units located in the territory of
the former Soviet Union were absorbed by the
newly independent states. In certain cases,
units such as the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraineor the 14th Army in Moldova actively resisted
the attempts by the Soviet successor states toabsorb these forces. Some of these stranded
units became embroiled in ethnic conflicts in
Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan.5 Most significantly for the new Russian military, interior military districts, which under the Soviet
Union contained low-readiness mobilization
forces such as the Moscow and North Caucasus Military Districts, now became “front-line”
districts bordering foreign states.6 The Russian Federation emerged from the collapse of
the Soviet Union with a much smaller military
and an entirely new set of security challenges.7
Russia’s new military faced dramatic budgetary, readiness, and personnel shortfalls, aswell as uncertainty of its role as Moscow struggled to determine its place in the post-Cold War
world.8, 9 Russia cut military spending drastically during the decade of post-Soviet economic
turbulence. Fielding of new weapons systems
slowed to a trickle and eventually halted; thehuge former Soviet arms industry struggled,
focusing on gaining hard currency by selling its
most modern weapons to foreign buyers.10 At
the same time, Russian military units lacked

10

Troops gathered around a fire for warmth during theChechen conflict; the difficulties Moscow’s weakened
military faced during its operations against the separatist republic underscored its deterioration during
the 1990s.
Image Source: Shutterstock

funding and fuel to train and exercise, and pay
was often months in arrears. The readiness ofthe force was minimal, and the popular imageof the Russian military of the 1990s remains
ships rusting at pier side, pilots unable to fly,and Russian officers moonlighting with second
jobs to make ends meet.11
Moscow also had difficulty manning its military. Press reports on military life that began
to appear during the glasnost (openness) era of
the late 1980s highlighted the harshness of the
conscript’s lot, and in particular the brutal andsometimes deadly dedovschina hazing of newdraftees. Draft evasion became endemic, withmany young Russian men using any and all legal
or illegal measures to avoid military service.12, 13

Throughout the post-Soviet era, there wasa recognized need to reform and modernize
the military.16 Not only did the Russian military suffer from the readiness and manpower

shortfalls outlined above, but Moscow’s forces
retained their cumbersome Soviet-era organization, designed for the mobilization of massive numbers of reservists to conduct deep
mechanized theater operations in the context
of a major war.17 The 1990s and first decade of
the 21st century saw a series of military reform
efforts announced, discussed, and only abortively implemented. Russia’s first Minister ofDefense, General Pavel Grachev, (1992–1996)
posited the creation of a fully manned andequipped small “mobile force” component that
could rapidly move to a conflict area and holdthe line until additional forces mobilized;18, 19, 20
Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev (1997–2001)
created a new strategic nuclear deterrence
force based on his previous service, the Strategic Rocket Forces;21, 22 and Minister of Defense
Sergey Ivanov (2001–2007) and Chief of theGeneral Staff Yuriy Baluyevsky (2004–2008)
pushed for the establishment of new regional
theater commands and filling the military’sranks with professional “contract” personnel.23, 24 By the late 2000s, these reform plans
remained largely unimplemented, unsuccessful, or abandoned.

One arguable exception to this series of military reform failures was the effort during
the late 1990s to create “permanently readyforces,” a subset of the Russian force structure made up of units with better manningand equipment levels.25, 26 These units werecreated and used during the second Chechen
Russian SS-25 ICBM launcher; given the weakened
conflict (1999–2004) and enabled Moscow tostate of its conventional forces in the years after theintervene more rapidly and with more capacollapse of the USSR, Moscow prioritized the mainte­
ble forces than during the first Chechen War
nance of its nuclear capabilities.
27
Image Source: Shutterstock (1994–1995).

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Russian generals voiced complaints about thepoor quality of the conscripts they actually
received, as they were often unhealthy, poorly
educated, and sometimes arrived with criminal records.14 The military’s most painful trial,
however, was caused by insurgency within theborders of the Russian Federation. From 1994
to 1995, undermanned and poorly trained
Russian forces struggled to take and secure
the breakaway Chechen Republic in the North
Caucasus.15 The military’s problems and limitations were widely publicized by the Russianand international press, further undermining its reputation and reinforcing the desire ofyoung Russians to avoid service.

A G E N C Y

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

D E F E N S E

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

11Despite modest improvements and a measureof success in the second Chechen conflict, theRussian military still entered the first decadeof the 21st century with a Soviet-era mobilization force structure almost completely equippedwith dated Soviet-era equipment. Shortfalls inmodern command, control, communications,computers, and intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment and capabilities were particularly notable. Russian military limitations were fully on display during
the August 2008 “five-day war” with Georgia.28
Russian forces prevailed and defeated their relatively weak Georgian opponents, but after-action analysis by the Russian military highlighted many failings. Air and artillery strikes
missed their targets, an army commander had
to resort to a cell phone to contact a higher
headquarters,29 and several aircraft were lostto Georgian air defenses. While internationally

Minister of Defense Shoygu at the 2014 Victory Day
Parade; since 2012, Shoygu has presided over thecontinued modernization of the Russian military as
well as its operations in Ukraine and Syria.
Image Source: Shutterstock

Transition to the New Look Program
Moscow’s limitations in modernizing its military had led to heavy dependence on its aging
nuclear forces to defend the state. But while the presence of a robust nuclear deterrent
dissuaded potential aggressors from directly attacking the Russian Federation, it was
not flexible enough for Moscow to use in small, local conflicts such as Georgia or as atool of power projection. The New Look program was a comprehensive and massive effort,
aimed to change the Russian military from a Cold War-style mobilization force to a more
ready, modern, and professional military able to respond to 21st century conflicts.30 Partially-manned Soviet-style divisions were reorganized into what were planned to be fully-manned brigades; officer ranks were trimmed from 350,000 billets to initially 150,000,
although later the number rose to 220,000; the contract manning effort was reshaped andreinvigorated, with a goal of 425,000 professional enlisted personnel in the force by 2017;31
the six extant military districts were reshaped initially into four joint strategic commands,
which controlled all military assets in their areas in peace and war; and lastly, a massive
state armaments program was initiated, allocating 1.1 trillion rubles over 10 years, aiming
at fielding a Russian military with 70% new or modernized equipment by 2020.32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37

12Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

The years of Shoygu’s tenure have seen the
New Look military engaged in a series of active
operations. In early 2014, Russian naval infantry, special forces, and airborne troops rapidly
seized control of the Crimean Peninsula.44
While they faced almost no opposition, theoperation gave the world its first look at a military that appeared surprisingly disciplined
and well-equipped for those whose image of

The Russian military today is on the rise—notas the same Soviet force that faced the Westin the Cold War, dependent on large units
with heavy equipment, but as a smaller, moremobile, balanced force rapidly becoming capable of conducting the full range of modern warfare. It is a military that can intervene in countries along Russia’s periphery or as far away as
the Middle East. The new Russian military isa tool that can be used to underpin Moscow’s
stated ambitions of being a leading force in a
multipolar world.

A G E N C Y

The New Look was controversial and painful
for many in or associated with the Russian
military establishment.39, 40, 41 Even militaryeducation and medical support organizations became targets for major reductions. Inlate 2012, the unpopular Minister of Defense
associated with the reform effort, Anatoliy
Serdyukov, left office and the former head of
the Emergency Situations Ministry, Sergey
Shoygu, took over.42 Shoygu proved adept at
easing some of the most unpopular aspectsof the New Look while largely retaining andrefining the essence of the reform program.43

Russian forces was formed during the yearsof decay in the 1990s. Although their presence
was denied by Moscow, Russian special forces
and troops operated to mobilize, lead, equip,
and support separatist militias in the Donbas
region of eastern Ukraine from spring 2014 to
the present. Ukrainian forces have stressed
the capabilities of the Russian-enabled separatist units, especially with respect to C4ISR,
artillery firepower, and air defense.45, 46 In September 2015, Moscow launched its first expeditionary operation since the Soviet era, deploying fixed-wing and helicopter aviation assets to
Syria. Combined with other military support
to the Asad regime such as intelligence information, advisors, ammunition, and artillery,
Russian action arrested the decline in the Syrian
regime’s military position.47

I N T E L L I G E N C E

many were impressed by the ability of theRussian military, so derelict in the 1990s, toaccomplish its mission, Moscow was spurredby what it viewed as critical shortfalls in Georgia to rapidly push forward a whole new setof reforms—known as the “New Look”—which
had been under discussion before the conflict.38

D E F E N S E

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

13Russian Joint Strategic Commands

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design1612-11168

Russia has established five Joint Strategic Commands (Obyedinennoye Strategicheskoye Komandovaniye –OSK) to deal with perceived threats from the west, south, east, and Arctic.48

Russia National Military Overview
Russia’s Threat Perceptions
ince returning to power in 2012, Russian President Putin has sought toreassert Russia as a great power on
the global stage and to restructure an international order that the Kremlin believes is tilted

14

too heavily in favor of the United States at
Russia’s expense.49 Moscow seeks to promote a
multi-polar world predicated on the principles
of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in other states’ internal affairs, theRussia’s assertive promotion of its national
interests, punctuated by its military actions in
Ukraine and Syria, demonstrates a more confident and somewhat less risk averse Kremlin,
but it also has revived international concerns
about the re-emergence of a more militaristic
Russia. Russian military forces played a keyrole in the seizure of Crimea and fomenting an
artificial separatist revolt in eastern Ukraine,
blunting Kyiv’s aspirations to join NATO, atleast for the foreseeable future.52 Additionally, Russia’s military intervention in Syria
has changed the entire dynamic of the conflict,bolstering the Asad regime and ensuring thatno resolution to the conflict is possible without Moscow’s agreement. Nevertheless, theseactions also belie a deeply entrenched sense of
insecurity regarding a United States that Moscow believes is intent on undermining Russia
at home and abroad.53
Moscow undoubtedly views the United Statesand its NATO partners as the principle threat
to Russian security, its geo-political ambitions,and most importantly, the Kremlin’s continued hold on power. This perception of vulnerability vis-à-vis the United States is mostclearly evident in the latest Russian National

Security Strategy published in December 2015.
The document identifies the United States andits NATO allies as Russia’s main threat, andaccuses the West of pursuing a deliberate policy of containment against Russia to sustain
its domination of the post-Cold War international order and deprive Moscow of its rightfulplace on the world stage.54, 55 It explicitly states,“the Russian Federation's implementation of
an independent foreign and domestic policy
is giving rise to opposition from the UnitedStates and its allies, who are seeking to retain
their dominance in world affairs.” The security
strategy also cites the buildup of NATO military capabilities closer to the Russian border,
the deployment of U.S. missile defense capabilities in Europe, and the ongoing U.S. pursuitof strategic non-nuclear precision weapon systems as a serious threat to Russian security.56
Russia also has a deep and abiding distrust of
U.S. efforts to promote democracy around theworld and what it perceives as a U.S. campaign
to impose a single set of global values. Moscow
worries that U.S. attempts to dictate a set of
acceptable international norms threatens thefoundations of Kremlin power by giving license
for foreign meddling in Russia’s internal affairs.
The December 2015 National Security Strategy
warns of the importance of preserving traditional Russian spiritual and cultural values
against foreign Western ideas and influences
aimed at undermining Russia from within.57
The Kremlin is convinced the United Statesis laying the groundwork for regime change in
Russia, a conviction further reinforced by theevents in Ukraine. Moscow views the UnitedStates as the critical driver behind the crisis in

I N T E L L I G E N C E

primacy of the United Nations, and a carefulbalance of power preventing one state or groupof states from dominating the international
order.50 To support these great power ambitions, Moscow has sought to build a robust
military able to project power, add credibility
to Russian diplomacy, and ensure that Russian interests can no longer be summarily dismissed without consequence.51

A G E N C Y

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

D E F E N S E

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

15

Ukraine and the Arab Spring and believes thatthe overthrow of former Ukrainian President
Yanukovych is the latest move in a long-established pattern of U.S.-orchestrated regimechange efforts, including the Kosovo campaign,Iraq, Libya, and the 2003–05 “color revolutions”
in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.58
Russian threat perceptions are not limited to theUnited States, and Moscow views the danger
posed by Islamic militants and terrorists withgrave concern.59 The Kremlin is particularly sensitive to the growth and spread of these ideologies
and their potential to further radicalize RussianMuslims in the turbulent North Caucasus andother Muslim areas of central Russia. Russian
military operations in Syria are also intended toeliminate jihadist elements operating there thatoriginated in the territory of the former Soviet
Union, to prevent them from returning home andposing a threat to Russia. At the same time, Moscow remains anxious about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and the potential for Afghanbased Islamic extremists to spill over into theCentral Asian states of the former Soviet Union
and ultimately into Russia.60
Russian threat perceptions with regard to China
are more divided and nuanced. Russian officials
regularly praise the cooperative nature of thebilateral relationship, and Putin himself
has declared that the current Russian-Chinese
relationship is the best it has been in decades. In
fact, the Russian National Security Strategy lists
developing a strategic partnership with China as
one of Russia’s most important goals.61 Moscow
and Beijing share a common interest in weakening U.S. global influence and are actively coop-

16

erating in that regard.62, 63 Military cooperation
between the two countries is slowly expanding,as are economic ties.64 Nevertheless, some Russians are keenly aware of the growing power disparity between Russia and an ascendant China
and worry that Moscow is at risk of becoming Beijing’s junior partner.65 Others continue to harborsuspicions that China over the longer term will
once again become a military threat to Russia.66, 67

National Security Strategy
Russia’s current National Security Strategy was
signed by President Vladimir Putin on 31 December 2015 as an update to the previous National
Security Strategy published in 2009. The National
Security Strategy is the Kremlin’s foundational
planning document and is intended for domestic and external audiences.68 It codifies Moscow’s
strategic interests and national priorities for atleast the next 6 years. The national priorities
were consistent with those identified in previous
strategies; however, the tone of this update washarsher than the 2009 strategy, reflecting Moscow’s view of worsening relations with the West.
The 2015 strategy identifies Russian national
interests as strengthening the country’s defense,
ensuring political and social stability, raising theliving standard, preserving and developing culture, improving the economy, and strengthening
Russia’s status as a leading world power. Thesenational interests are to be achieved through concentration on eight strategic national priorities:• National defense• State and public security

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations• Healthcare• Culture• Ecology of living systems and rationaluse of natural resources• Strategic stability and equal strategic
partnership
In the 2015 document, the sections on national
defense, internal stability, economy, and culture
were significantly expanded.69 Moscow identified
new threats to state and public security posed byforeign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),“color revolutions,” and the use of social media to
foment unrest and undermine political and social
stability,70 reflecting Russian officials’ allegations
that Western powers seek to provoke regimechange in Russia.71 The culture priority contains
some of the strategy’s most significant revisions,emphasizing the need to preserve and strengthen“traditional Russian spiritual and moral values,”
and indicating that Moscow views culture, language, and history as a tool for influence.
Unlike the 2009 version, the new National Security Strategy directly accuses the United States
and NATO of pursuing actions that cause instability and threaten Russian national security.72
The importance of a strong military for a leading world power is acknowledged; the strategy
states that “the role of force as a factor in international relations is not declining.” The newstrategy reiterated key concepts outlined in Russia’s 2014 military doctrine on the importance ofdeterrence and conflict prevention, nuclear andnonnuclear deterrence, and the need to improve

Stability Issues
The Kremlin views internal political stability asa critical component of national strength and projecting power abroad, as evidenced by the emphasis placed on it in the National Security Strategy.
Since returning to the presidency in 2012, Russian
President Putin has worked to consolidate power.
His efforts to further centralize control have beenchallenged by a slowing economy, lower energy
prices, and growing public discontent with a system that lacks any genuine pluralism.74 Putin has
tried to deflect from these concerns by promising
to restore Russia to great power status, on parwith the United States, to mobilize public supportand secure his legitimacy.75, 76
The Kremlin has taken steps to neutralize political opposition by expanding laws to impose
harsh sentences that discourage public protests and encourage self-censorship.77 It has
also restructured its internal security forces toensure a more loyal and responsive apparatus.
Russia maintains security forces that are notsubordinate to the military to conduct a range ofinternal security and policing functions. Nonetheless, the Kremlin will likely face continuing challenges to its rule from democracy andanti-corruption activists, labor unrest, as wellthe ever present threat of terrorism emanatingfrom Russia’s restive North Caucasus region.

A G E N C Y• Science, technology, and education

Russia’s mobilization process.73 The National
Security Strategy reflects a Russia more confident of its ability to defend its sovereignty, resist
Western pressure, and contribute to the resolution of conflicts abroad (or insecurity).

I N T E L L I G E N C E• Economic growth

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Ministries with Internal Security Missions

1612-11145

Personnel(Number of Troops)

Ministry/Agency

MissionNational Guard

Regime and internal security,
federal law enforcement(200,000)78

Ministry of Internal Affairs(MVD)

Civil policing and local law
enforcement

904,800 79

Federal Security Services(FSB) Border Troops

Border security: ground and maritime(170,000)*80

Ministry of Justice (UIN)

Civil judicial system, prison guarding

32,000*81

Ministry of Emergency
Situations (EMERCOM)

Civil defense, disaster response,
humanitarian relief, firefighting

289,000 (7,500) 82

Federal Protection Service(FSO)

Presidential, VIP, and regime
protection

20,000 83*Estimate

Insurgency in the South
Russia’s enduring insurgency in its restive North Caucasus region continues at a consistent
but low level. Stemming directly from its two conflicts in Chechnya in 1994–96 and then reigniting in 1999, Moscow largely declared an end to major operations by 2009, although it stillretains a sizeable military and security force structure and counterterrorism regime in theregion.84 Still a volatile region, a general level of order is maintained via a mix of local andfederal-level Russian forces, including Chechen forces loyal to Moscow headed by Chechen
President Ramzan Kadyrov.85
Once the center of insurgent activity, levels of instability in Chechnya gradually have plateauedover the years, while those in its neighboring Muslim provinces such as Dagestan and Ingushetia have experienced sporadic upswings in activity over time. Although large groups of insurgents are now primarily a thing of the past, smaller bands still exist with affiliations to various
nationalist and extremist groups such as ISIS-Caucasus and the Imarat Kavkaz. These groups
and their members conduct small-scale operations and bombings against Russian forces—primarily from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) police or the National Guard. Although daily
attacks have largely abated since late 2013, pervasive socio-economic issues, corruption, andheavy-handedness (real or perceived) by Russian authorities will continue drive feelings of disenfranchisement amongst the populace, providing a steady source for radicalization in the region.

18

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Nonetheless, Russian efforts to build the
CSTO into a more structured and capableorganization on par with NATO largely havefloundered. Some of the non-Russian member
states worry that Moscow is using the organization to undermine their sovereignty andRussia also is building cooperative defense
relationships with other various countries
throughout the Middle East, Latin America,
Africa, and Asia, but its engagement is far lessrobust than in the former Soviet Union. Moscow appears to no longer be interested in funding Soviet-style patronage relationships, andRussian policy remains largely transactional
aimed at expanding arms sales and other Russian economic interests, which has contributed
to the limited nature of these ties.91, 92 Nevertheless, the Kremlin continues to view its military outreach to these countries as important
to enhancing its global stature and strengthening its regional influence.

Defense Budget
Russian government spending on national
defense has generally grown over the last
decade and in 2016 reached a post-Soviet
record. This increase in defense spending
was enabled by both a general increase in
the size of Russia’s GDP and a political decision to increase the defense burden—theshare of national wealth devoted to defense.
In 2015, Russian defense spending reached athen-record $52 billion (in 2017 dollars) andthe defense burden was nearly 4% of GDP.

A G E N C Y

The Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS) was a regional coordination body created among a number of the former Soviet
states in the wake of the dissolution of theformer Soviet Union. Nine states remain
members, with Ukraine and Turkmenistan
retaining associate member status. Russia’s
most important defense and security relationships are with its allies in the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—
Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan. Based on the 1992 Tashkent
Collective Security Agreement, the CSTO wasestablished in 2002 as part of a larger Russian effort in the post-Soviet environment
to create a more structured military organization capable of implementing the security
guarantees stipulated in the agreement. Since
then, the CSTO has developed a bureaucratic
staff under the organization’s secretary general and a rapid reaction force to respond tovarious contingencies that might impact the
security of the member states. The CSTO conducts yearly joint military exercises addressing various scenarios such as peacekeeping
or counterterrorism operations.86 Russia also
maintains an airbase at Kant, Kyrgyzstan,under the auspices of the CSTO.

independence and are cautious of deepening
military cooperation with Russia, as evidenced
by Uzbekistan’s withdrawal in 2007. Differing threat perceptions, an absence of trust
amongst the members, and funding shortfalls
have further plagued the organization.87, 88, 89, 90

I N T E L L I G E N C E

External Defense Relations

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The 2016 budget, which was initially todecrease defense spending, was amendedlate in the year to increase defense spending to $61 billion, a 4.5% defense burden
on GDP.93, 94, 95 By contrast, in 2006 defense
spending was $27 billion, and the defense
burden was 2.4%.96, 97
Moscow’s ambitious rearmament program has
driven the increase in defense spending. The
Strategic Armament Program (SAP) called
for spending 19.4 trillion rubles (equivalent
to $285 billion) to rearm Ministry of Defense
forces from 2011 through 2020. Each year the
SAP is implemented through the State Defense
Order (SDO), Moscow’s purchase of new weaponry, investment in weapons-related researchand design, and expenditure on modernization
and repair of existing weaponry.101 Funding forthe 10 year program was heavily back-loaded
such that just 31% was to be spent in the first
5 years (2011–2015) and nearly 70% was to be
spent from 2016 to 2020.102 In order for Moscow to meet its original target for SAP spending and maintain its operational spending atcurrent levels, defense spending from 2016
through 2020 will have to increase substantially over 2011–2015 levels.
Russian defense spending, however, is poised
to decrease in 2017.103 The 2017 budget callsfor 2.8 trillion rubles to be spent on national
defense, equivalent to $42 billion.104 This constitutes a 30% real cut in defense spending

Russia's Official Defense Spending 2006-2017 (billions of 2017 dollars) 98, 99, 100
27.02629.02430.75434.41232.37533.34537.86240.76243.41651.51960.82542.278

4.5

3.8

3.0

2.9

2.3

2.4

2006 2007 2008 20092010

Real defense expenditures US$

20

3.1

2.8
2.6

2.4

3.1

2.5

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

#

% of GDP (nominal NCU based expenditures)

1612-11108

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

A G E N C Y

Russian government revenues are highly
dependent on oil prices, and Moscow’s deci-sion to base its budget for 2017–2019 on
low projected oil prices in 2017–2019 islargely responsible for the glum outlook
for government revenue and low projected
GDP growth rates.110 According to the International Monetary Fund and a numberof prominent economists, Russia faces agrowth ceiling; absent structural reforms,
Russian GDP growth would probably reach
only 1 to 2 percent per year, even were oil
prices to increase significantly.111, 112

I N T E L L I G E N C E

from 2016 levels, and if it is not amended toincrease funds mid-year, it would be the lowest
budget for national defense since 2013.105, 106, 107
According to Russian press and Ministry of
Finance announcements, from 2017 through2019 Russian defense spending will be essentially frozen in nominal terms—and therefore
declining in real terms.108, 109

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Military Doctrine And Strategy
Russian Perceptions of Modern Conflictince at least 1991, the Russian perception of the nature of modern conflict has evolved. Russia views wars asoften undeclared, fought for relatively limited political objectives, and occurring acrossall domains, including outer space and theinformation space.113 Russian leaders havenoted the tendency for crises to arise quickly
and develop impetuously, and to potentially
escalate from local wars into global ones.114, 115
In addition, Moscow judges that modern conflicts are characterized by a destructive andrapid “initial period of war”—a subject onwhich Russian military leaders and theorists
have written extensively since the 1920s—
which is becoming more decisive than everbefore. In modern cyber-enabled information and battlefield spaces, this destructive
non-kinetic initial period can be reduced tomilliseconds, and kinetically to hours.116
Moscow fears that the speed, accuracy, andquantity of non-nuclear strategic precision-guided weapons can achieve strategic
effects on par with nuclear weapons,117 oneof the primary reasons that since at least 1993
(and most recently codified in the 2014 Military Doctrine) Russia has reserved the right toa nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack thatthreatens the existence of the state.118, 119, 120 In
addition to rejecting no-first-use, Moscow has
discussed using nuclear weapons to de-escalate22

a conflict.121, 122 While most military theorists
and leaders believe great-power conflict isunlikely, they nevertheless express concern
about the usability of the information space toachieve state goals.123 Russia has tied this decisive and shortened initial period to the idea that
only more proactive or even preemptive action
is required to counter it.124, 125, 126 Russian developments in precision-guided munitions indicate
a desire for “deep strike” capability to preempt
attacks from an adversary.
Russia’s Military Doctrine, last updated in
December 2014, contained several new elements not in the 2010 Doctrine, which reflect
Moscow’s military focus and threat perceptions. First codified in the doctrine wasthe concept of non-nuclear deterrence, anidea that has been evolving since the Soviet
period. The doctrine also underscored perceived threats to Russia’s domestic security
and described the military’s requirement toinflict unacceptable damage on any adversary
at any time. This requires the military to calculate or understand what level of damage
would constitute unacceptable damage to an
adversary.127, 128, 129 Mobilization readiness ofthe state was stressed, as were measures tounify state, societal, and individual efforts toprotect Russia and increase the effectivenessof military-patriotic indoctrination of citizens
and their preparation for military service.130

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Closely linked to strategic deterrence is theconcept of strategic stability. At its basic level,
Russia’s concept of deterrence, appropriately
applied in its view, assures strategic stability.
Strategic stability is the sum total of political,
economic, military, and other measures (e.g.,

Russia has observed modern conflicts and incorporated aspects of these observations into its
deterrence and warfighting strategies. Russia
seeks to shape the environment in peacetime
to avoid or deter conflict and, if war does occur,
will use its military force to establish a favorable outcome for Moscow.143, 144 Moscow’s warfighting strategy includes use of indirect action
and asymmetric responses, including using
technical and psychological operations to disrupt technical systems, influence public opinion, and “erode the opponent’s resolve.”145, 146, 147
The modernization of its nuclear and conventional forces to include precision-guided strikeweapons provide it a major military force toshape the outcome of war along the entire spectrum of modern conflict.

Military and Security
Leadership
Decisionmaking in Russia is highly centralized,
and President Vladimir Putin dominates Russia’s
decisionmaking, including for military and security issues. His constitutional responsibilities
include appointing the prime minister, chairmanof the Central Bank, government ministers, andjudges; he may announce State Duma elections
or dissolve it. His annual address to the Federal
Assembly sets guidelines for national internal
and foreign policies, and he resolves internal
governmental disputes. The Russian president

A G E N C Y

The Russians define strategic deterrence as a
package of coordinated political, diplomatic,
economic, ideological, moral, spiritual, informational, scientific, technological, military, andother actions taken by a country to demonstrate
the decisiveness of the political leadership to
tap all instruments of state power consecutively
or simultaneously—to stabilize the military,political, and strategic environment, to anticipate aggression, and to deescalate military
conflict.136, 137, 138, 139, 140 Some Russian theorists
break deterrence down further into non-forceful and forceful means and even into deterrenceby “type” (economic, military, nuclear, non-nuclear, etc.).141

force) retained by states in a stable balance
whereby neither side has the opportunity, interest, or intent to carry out military aggression.142

I N T E L L I G E N C E

The concepts of readiness, non-nuclear deterrence, and unacceptable damage are closely
linked in Russian thinking; Russian militaryleaders judge that a highly ready non-nuclear
force, able to inflict unacceptable damage onan aggressor—including against its economy—at any moment, is its own deterrent.131, 132, 133, 134
For Moscow, the word translated as “deterrence” () is more closely linked
to a concept of active restraint, or literally tohold back something moving with force.135 In
the West, deterrence is often seen as an established condition, whereas in Moscow it is anactive, flexible process that continues throughout the conflict spectrum.

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23

President Vladimir Putin

Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu

Gen-Army Valeriy Gerasimov
Image Source: Open source

governs foreign policy, signs international treaties, forms and heads the Security Council, andapproves military doctrine.148 The Russian president serves as the Supreme Commander in
Chief of the Russian military, and in times of
emergency he may introduce martial law.149

24

The Russian Ministry of Defense is subordinate
to President Putin as Supreme Commander in
Chief and is charged with implementing presidential policy within the military, overseeing
all readiness, manpower, and procurement
issues.150, 151, 152 The defense minister has thelegal authority to oversee and direct operations of the General Staff.153

The General Staff’s primary mission is toensure the military security of the Russian Federation (RF), that is, to protect the vital interests of the state and society from internal andexternal threats. The General Staff is responsible for monitoring and characterizing the threat
environment and developing strategic andoperational plans to equip, mobilize, employ,command, and control the armed forces.156, 157
According to a 2013 presidential edict describing General Staff missions and functions, its
range of responsibilities was broadened toinclude coordination of all activity undertaken
by federal executive organizations to ensure
defense capability and security.158

Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu was appointed
Defense Minister on 6 November 2012, after
18 years leading the Ministry of Emergency
Situations.154 Shoygu’s introduction of frequent strategic-level, no-notice inspections
in Russia’s military districts, unprecedented
in number and scope for the post-Soviet Russian military, has been critical in assessing
and increasing combat readiness in the armed
forces, as well in as refining defense reforms.155

The chief of the General Staff, Gen-Army Valeriy
Gerasimov, serves as the military head of theRussian Armed Forces.159 Gerasimov previously
served as deputy chief of the General Staff from
December 2010 until May 2012, when he wasappointed commander of the Central MilitaryDistrict.160 He became chief of the General Staff
in November 2012. He is a respected armor
officer with substantial combat experience andtime in command in Russia’s restive North

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

The Main Operations Directorate (GOU) of theGeneral Staff has operational control of thearmed forces, organizes strategic and operational force planning; executes military exercises and operational training, and engages
with multilateral military-security organizations such as the CSTO, CIS, and Shanghai
Cooperation Organization.168 The GOU shapes
the Defense Plan of the Russian Federation,
identifies sources of threats to Russia for strategic planning, and works with the General Staff’s
Military-Scientific Committee (VNK) to draft
the State Armament Program.169, 170, 171, 172, 173

Gen-Lt Sergey Rudskoy
Image Source: Open source

National Military Command
and Control
At the pinnacle of Russian military commandand control is the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, who serves as the Supreme Commander in Chief of the armed forces. As such,
he is the primary decisionmaker and is authorized to assume direct command and control
during times of crisis and martial law.176, 177 The
minister of defense is appointed by the president and is charged with implementing presidential policy within the Ministry of Defense.
This includes overseeing all hiring, equipping,training, care, and feeding of military personnel. With the implementation of Russia’s New
Look military reforms, the minister of defense
now has legal authority to oversee and direct
operations of the General Staff.178 The chief of
the General Staff is also appointed by the president and serves as the military head of thearmed forces.179 The General Staff’s primary
mission is to ensure the military security of theRussian Federation and is responsible for monitoring and characterizing the threat environment and developing strategic and operational
plans to equip, mobilize, employ, command, andcontrol the armed forces.180, 181 The service chiefs

A G E N C Y

Main Operations Directorate

General Lieutenant (Gen-Lt, two stars) Sergey
Rudskoy served as first deputy chief of the
GOU for 9 years before becoming its chief inNovember 2015, Rudskoy has been the General Staff’s senior representative at international forums, and he will likely leverage thisexperience to enhance coordination with othermilitaries operating in Syria.174, 175

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Caucasus region.161, 162, 163 Since his appointment,
Gerasimov has focused largely on dealing withmilitary readiness, modifying defense reforms
carried out by his predecessor, and preparing
for security concerns.164, 165, 166, 167

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RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

25

have the responsibility of organizing, training,and equipping their forces to meet current andfuture national security challenges.182
The Russian military has established a redundant and survivable command and control(C2) system to control its forces that serves
as a force-enabler. Russia’s C4ISR complex
uses multiple capabilities ranging from technologically advanced systems to mechanicallysimple, legacy Soviet devices intended to centralize control of the military while providing
intelligence support to speed up decisionmaking
cycles and carry out joint operations.183, 184
Russia’s C2 system has six key characteristics:• Built for the worst case scenario. Russian C2 systems are designed to enable
the dissemination of launch orders while
under nuclear attack through several C2
systems, including Perimetr, sometimes
referred to as the “Dead Hand.”190

Russian Nuclear Command
and Control
Maintaining control of its nuclear arsenal is of
critical importance to Moscow. During the Cold
War, Russia developed a centralized nuclear
C2 system capable of meeting its three primary
requirements: reliability, speed, and security.

• Centralized. The president of the Russian Federation is the commander in chiefof the armed forces and is authorized toassume direct C2 over the military via
the Ministry of Defense and General Staff
during times of crisis and martial law.185• Redundant. Multiple C2 systems are used
at each echelon to disseminate commands
and for the transmission of orders.186• Geographically dispersed. Russia’s
key C2 nodes and facilities are distributed
throughout the country to increase survivability and limit single points of failure.187• Secure. Moscow is upgrading C2 systems
to take advantage of modern and secure
digital communications networks.188

26• Reliable. Russia routinely conducts snap
and other training exercises to test the systems’ capabilities to pass information andincrease decisionmaking efficiency.189

President Putin with the nuclear briefcase.
Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 CopyrightRUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

To accomplish these goals, strategic planners
designed a complex system-of-systems that protects weapons from unauthorized or accidental
use and centralizes command authority at thehighest echelon, while guaranteeing the ability
to quickly launch when necessary.191

President Putin and Defense Minister Shoygu at theNTsUO, November 2015.
Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

National Defense Management Center (NTsUO),
November 2015.195, 196
Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

In contrast to pre-reform military districts
that were primarily land force commands,
the new OSKs are joint force elements thathave control in times of peace and war overall general purpose forces stationed in—or
deployed to—their territories. The phrase“military district” still exists and refers tospecific geographic boundaries, but an OSK
is the command element for that area. For
example, the Eastern Military District covers

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Moscow Implemented a Joint Strategic Command (OSK) structure in 2010 to better
facilitate joint military operations. Russia
converted its six military districts into four
OSKs.197, 198 In 2015, Russia created a fifth
OSK, the OSK Northern Fleet, to improve its
capability to project military power into the
Arctic and to take advantage of the openingof the Russia’s Northern Sea Route.199

A G E N C Y

Command and Control of
Joint Forces

D E F E N S E

Russian military doctrine underscores the central role of the Russian president in authorizing
the use of nuclear weapons. He uses the nuclear
briefcase, which is carried by officers whoalways remain near the president. The General
Staff monitors the status of the weapons of thenuclear triad and will send the direct commandto the launch crews following the president’s
decision to use nuclear weapons. The Russians
send this command over multiple C2 systems,
which creates a redundant dissemination process to guarantee that they can launch their
nuclear weapons. Moscow also maintains the
Perimetr system, which is designed to ensurethat a retaliatory launch can be ordered when
Russia is under nuclear attack.192, 193, 19427

the geographic territory from eastern Siberia
to the Pacific Ocean, but it is commanded by
OSK East.200, 201 These reforms resulted in a
reduced command structure, both verticallyand horizontally, which is more streamlined,
efficient, and flexible.202, 203
Moscow’s National Defense Management
Center (NTsUO), which came online in 2014,28

is a key component of the overall Russian C2
system. The NTsUO works with subordinate
regional and territorial defense management
centers to coordinate ministry and department
activities among lower echelons in accordancewith national defense and security directives
while liaising with municipal authorities.204

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Nuclear Forces and Weapons
ussia is one of the oldest nuclear
powers, first detonating a nuclear
device in 1949.205 As heir to the former
Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, Russia has
one of the world's two largest inventories ofstrategic weapons. While participating in strategic arms reduction treaties (START) with
the United States, Russia is also committed
to maintaining and modernizing its nuclear
forces. Land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles are controlled by the Strategic Rocket
Forces (SRF), and the sea-based and air stra-tegic systems are managed by the Navy andAerospace force, respectively. Moscow plans tospend about $28 billion by 2020 to upgrade thecapacity of its strategic nuclear triad.206• In the first leg of the triad the SRF operates
three older ICBM systems for more than halfof their land-based nuclear delivery vehicles. The oldest ICBMs in the arsenal are
the silo-based liquid-fueled SS-18 (deployed
in 1988–92) and SS-19 (deployed in 197984). These missiles carry, respectively, 10
and 6 multiple independently-targeted

I N T E L L I G E N C ECore Russian Military Capabilities

D E F E N S E

Dolgorukiy Class Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine.

A G E N C Y

Image Source: AFP

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

29

reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The solid-propellant, single-warhead SS-25 was deployed in
1985–92 as a road-mobile ICBM. As these
aging missiles reach the end of their operational lives, they will be withdrawn fromservice by 2019–2021 and replaced withnewer, modern road-mobile and silo-based
ICBMs by 2020. The SRF's missile inventories will be equally split between road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs.207• The second element of the nuclear triad isa fleet of at least 10 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) underadministrative control of the Naval HighCommand. The Russian strategic Navyis modernizing, mainly by building anddeploying the DOLGORUKIY-class SSBN
platform for the new SS-N-32 BULAVA
sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).208• The third element of the nuclear triad is theRussian Aerospace Force's fleet of strategic
bombers, which forms the core of the LongRange Aviation (LRA) Command. Likeother components of the triad, the LRA ismodernizing, to continue operating Tu-95

Russian SS-27 Mod 2 road-mobile ICBM.
Image Source: AFP

30

Russian Tu-160 heavy bomber and Il-78M tanker.
Image Source: AFP

BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK bombers
beyond 2030. The last “new” BLACKJACK
was added to the fleet in 2005, and all existing Tu-160s will be upgraded to Tu-160M1
or M2. Russia has announced that it will
resume production of Tu-160M2 bombers
and complete development of a new generation bomber (Russian designation: PAK-DA)
within a decade, but timelines for both programs may slip if financial difficulties arise.
The new bomber design is expected to havesome stealth and short- or rough-runway
capabilities, and employ both conventionaland nuclear armament.209, 210
The main function of strategic forces is effective, reliable deterrence. Scenarios for the use of
strategic nuclear forces fall into three main categories: preemptive strike (first strike), counterstrike (launch on warning, prior to impact
in-country), and retaliatory strike (response to
impacts in-country). Because the retaliation
option imposes the most difficult situation on
the strategic forces—which must respond even

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

The U.S.-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (New START), signed on 8 April 2010,sets for each country a limit of 1,550 warheads
on strategic platforms, including one warhead
attributed to each heavy bomber. There is also
a combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and aseparate limit of 700 deployed strategic systems
overall. The treaty will last 10 years, with central limits to be met by 2018 with the option for asingle extension of another 5 years. Colonel General Sergey Karakayev, commander of the SRF,
has stated that an arsenal of 1,500 nuclear warheads would provide Russia a sufficient deterrent against attack.214 According to Russia’s New
START Treaty data provided on 1 April 2017,
Russia declared 1,765 warheads on 523 deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.215
Russia currently has an active stockpile ofapproximately 2,000 non-strategic nuclear
weapons. These include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity

Russia’s nuclear forces modernization goals
include: replace Soviet-legacy systems withmodern nuclear weapons, maintain roughparity with the U.S. nuclear arsenal, improve
the survivability and efficiency of its nuclear
weapons, and maintain prestige on the international stage. Russia’s nuclear modernization includes both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.218, 219, 220, 221

Biological andChemical Weapons
In 1992, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin
admitted having an offensive biological weapons program and publicly committed to its termination. Subsequently, the Russian government reversed itself and now claims neither
the Soviet Union nor Russia has ever pursued
an offensive biological weapons program.222
In 1997, Moscow declared the world’s largest stockpile of chemical agents and munitions—40,000 metric tons of agents—under theChemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The
declared inventory consisted of a comprehensive
array of traditional chemical warfare agentsfilled in munitions such as artillery, bombs, andmissile warheads, as well as stored in bulk.223

A G E N C Y

Russia continues to retain a sizable nuclear
stockpile even after several decades of arms
reduction treaties. Russia has a large nuclear
weapons infrastructure and a production basecapable of producing large numbers of new
nuclear weapons annually.212, 213

bombs, and depth charges for medium-range
bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, andanti-aircraft missiles, and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines. There may also
be warheads remaining for surface-to-air andother aerospace defense missile systems.216, 217

I N T E L L I G E N C E

after an enemy's strategic strike has impacted
and disabled elements of the force—strategic
forces, weapons, and battle management systems are designed and built to be hardened,
stealthy, redundant, and reliable—and trained
to function in a WMD-degraded environment.211

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As a state party to the CWC, Russia is obligatedto destroy its chemical weapon stockpile.
As of January 2017, Russia had destroyed
96.4% of its declared chemical weapons stockpile, according to press reporting.224 Russia
intends to complete destruction of its remaining declared stockpile by 2020.225 Moscow hascompleted destruction activities and closed thefacilities in Gornyy, Kambarka, Maradykovskiy, Leonidovka, Schchuch’ye, and Pochep andcontinues destruction of its remaining chemical weapons stockpile at a facility in Kizner.226
Russia used chemical incapacitants to resolve
the Dubrovka Theater hostage situation in2002 and may consider using them in othercounterterrorism actions.227

Anti-Access/Area Denial

32

Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) refers to preventing an adversary from operating in a particular region or area. Russia repeatedly cites
in open source literature the need to repel ordefend against a Western aerospace attack.
Russia would seek to deter any Western use ofaerospace power against Russia using its conventional, non-strategic nuclear, and, in extreme
circumstances, its strategic nuclear forces. Russian military theorists have examined the likelihood of a great power war arising out of a local
conflict, similar to the events leading up to WorldWar I, and escalating to combat with U.S./NATOor another peer.228 Based on insight gleaned fromstudies of warfare since 1991, Russia would seek
to limit the capability of an adversary to conduct
aerospace strikes on its territory.229, 230

Russian strategy for A2/AD would focus on a
combination of various elements that militaryplanners and theoreticians have identified as
critical to the development of a comprehensive approach to A2/AD.231, 232 These involve theincorporation of the following elements.

Information Operations
Information operations are seen as a criticalcapability to achieve decisive results in the initial period of conflict with a focus on controlof the information spectrum in all dimensionsof the modern battle space. Authors often cite
the need in modern warfare to control information—sometimes termed “information blockade” or “information dominance”—and to seize
the initiative early and deny an adversary
use of the information space in a campaign so
as to set the conditions needed for “decisive
success.” Russia continues to emphasize electronic warfare and other information warfare
capabilities, including denial and deception aspart of its approach to all aspects of warfare
including A2/AD.233

Strategic Air Operations
Russian military theorists continue to emphasize the key importance of strategic air operations in modern war. This concept originatedin the 1920s, where Soviet planners viewed
the initial period of war as the time that aviation would strike deep in enemy rear areas todestroy mobilization and concentration areas.
At the same time, air forces would also prioritize the defense of the country against enemy
air attack and conduct close air support ofRUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

ground operations, achieving air supremacy inthe first days of the war using all means.234 This
concept was underscored in 1993, when Defense
Minister Grachev indicated that “war will begin
with an offensive aerospace operation on bothsides.”235 Russian planners have indicated thatin such a war there will be no front and no rear,
with space emerging as an independent theaterof military operations. Russian doctrine, down
to the present day, continues to emphasize thatstrategic objectives can be achieved with mass
aerospace strikes early in a conflict with victory
achieved without the seizure and occupation of
territory by forces.236

Russian S-400 Surface-to-air missile systems – a key
component of Moscow’s A2/AD strategy.

Russian doctrine places a great deal of emphasis on aerospace defense as a key component
in its overall A2/AD strategy.241, 242 Though stillin development, Russia’s 21st century integrated air defense system will be designed tointegrate future and existing systems arounda central command structure that is designed

Modern Precision Strike Capabilities:
Air and Sea Systems in Combination
with Older Technologies 245, 246
Russia continues to develop a variety of seaand aerospace-based programs that offer avariety of offensive and defensive capabilities
that could enable the implementation of its
integrated A2/AD strategy.247, 248 These include
the continued production and deployment ofcoastal defense cruise missiles, air/surface/sub-surface-launched anti-ship cruise missiles(ASCMs),249 submarine-launched torpedoes,
and naval mines, along with Russian fighter,bomber, and surface-to-air missile capability.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Integrated Air Defense System

to promote the interaction of all air defense
forces and weapons.243, 244 Capabilities optimized against cruise missiles are key to thisdefense component, not just those optimized totarget aircraft.

D E F E N S E

Russian planners have analyzed U.S. operations such as DESERT STORM, NOBLEANVIL, and IRAQI FREEDOM for insight,
observing military art at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in campaigns that
displayed U.S. aerospace capabilities andunderscored the importance of developing
comparable indigenous capabilities that canbe employed defensively.237, 238 This emphasis on strategic air operations is reflected inlong-term procurement goals of platforms andweapons focused on space, aerospace defense,and precision-guided munitions.239, 240

A G E N C Y

Image Source: AFP

33

These are intended provide Russia with theability to limit access to its territory andextend its strategic depth by providing longrange kinetic strike capability.

Precision Strike
Russian doctrine on Precision Strike isessentially a 21st century extension of theRussian doctrine of “deep battle” initiallycodified during the 1920s and 1930s by
Chief of the General Staff Marshal Mikhail
Tukhachevskiy and represents an attempt toincorporate new technology into traditional
Russian strategic, operational, and tacticalstrategy. Deep battle was a strategic conceptthat focused on terminating, overwhelming,or dislocating enemy forces not only at theline of contact, but throughout the depth of
the battlefield. Deep battle encompassed
maneuvers by multiple Soviet Army frontsize formations simultaneously. It was notmeant to deliver a victory in a single operation; instead, multiple operations, whichmight be conducted in parallel or successively, would induce a catastrophic failurein the enemy's defensive system. Initially,
deep battle focused on improved ground andair forces and was influential in Soviet operations in World War II from 1943 onward.
Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, writing in the 1970s to 1980s,
updated the deep battle concept to develop
a more aerospace-centric approach in an
attempt to incorporate traditional Russian
doctrine with precision technology.250

34

Ogarkov theorized throughout his tenure as
chief of the Soviet General Staff that conventional precision-guided munitions were partof a revolution in military affairs. In an influential 1983 Krasnaya Zvezda article, Ogarkov took notice of the impact of new types ofprecision weapons and micro-circuitry on thedevelopment of conventional capabilities. For
Ogarkov, the development of new conventional
forms of non-nuclear weapons would enable
the sorts of multi-front operations that wereenvisioned in the original deep battle concept.
On a theoretical basis, Ogarkov forecast thatprecision strike could exercise a direct anddecisive outcome of a future war.251, 252
Despite enthusiasm by the Soviet General
Staff, very little progress was made in thedevelopment of precision-guided munitions
except at the theoretical level for the remainder of the Soviet period. In 1991, DESERTSTORM provided the Soviet military with proof
of concept regarding the use of precision-guided
munitions. Former Soviet officials and Russianauthorities argued that the DESERT STORM
campaign demonstrated the capability of precision-guided airstrikes in the land attack role toparalyze the rear area and an adversary’s economy. Targets could include vulnerable areas ofthe economy, command and control centers,
and transportation centers. The introduction of
precision-guided munitions changed the natureof modern war by reinforcing traditional concepts that emphasized decisive action during
the initial stage of warfare and at the sametime undermined the traditional Russian reliance on large ground force groupings to achievetactical and strategic objectives.253

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

The Russian General Staff postulates thatmodern warfare is increasingly reliant on information, particularly from space, because of the
expansion of the geographic scope of military
action and the information needs of high-precision weapons.258 Russia has a significant
constellation of satellites in orbit. According
to Colonel Sergey Marchuk, chief of the Main
Test Space Center, Russia has more than 130
spacecraft, civilian and military, performing
communications, navigation, geodetic survey
support, meteorological, reconnaissance, andintelligence gathering missions.259
Russia’s space program is both formidable andin a state of rebuilding. Moscow seeks to maintain the health of its current constellations

Image Source: Shutterstock

while deploying a next-generation architecture
on par with Western space systems. Over the
next several years, Russia will prioritize themodernization of its existing communications,navigation, and earth observation systems,
while continuing to rebuild its electronic intelligence and early warning system constellations.
Russia’s current systems provide an array ofcapability including high-resolution imagery,terrestrial and space weather, communications, navigation, missile warning, electronic
intelligence, and scientific observations. Witha long-standing heritage in space, Russia gains
a sense of national pride from its space program, which has included manned missions
and leading the world in space launches. Currently ranked third in total number of satellites in orbit behind the United States andChina, the figure below displays a breakdown
of Russia’s satellites in orbit.

A G E N C YSpace/Counterspace

Kh-101/102 air-launched cruise missiles on a Tu-95MS
heavy bomber; Moscow first used its precision strikearsenal in combat during a series of 2015 strike operations by sea- and air-launched cruise missiles against
targets in Syria.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Russia was unable to achieve real progress inthe development of precision strike until thefirst decade of the 21st century, when it wasable to create a viable state armaments program that allowed prioritization of certain key
components of 21st-century warfare. Between
2010 and 2015, Russia’s strategic forces, space
and aerospace defense platforms, and precision-guided munitions254 such as ISKANDER,KALIBR, or KH-101 were defined as priorities, and system development, production,and testing occurred. The effectiveness of precision-guided munitions are being tested in avariety of settings, including Command Staff
exercises KAVKAZ-2012, VOSTOK-2014, and
KAVKAZ-2016, as well as operationally against
targets in Syria beginning in 2015.255, 256, 257

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35

Russian satellites in orbit, 5 October 2016 260
80

1612-11112

70

5

20

33

12

Communication

Relay

Earth
Observation

Navigation

Scienceand Tech

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Military

Russia has concluded that gaining and maintaining supremacy in space has a decisive
impact on the outcome of future conflicts.261
According to Russia’s 2010 military doctrine,
militarization of outer space is a “main external military danger.”262 The 2014 update to
Russia’s military doctrine calls out Western
global strike capability by name.263 Russia, in
military journals, has observed that Western
operations have shifted to non-contact operations that rely on long-range, space-supported
precision-guided munitions.264, 265, 266 Russia has
been very vocal expressing its concerns about
Western precision strike capabilities and missile defense plans. Deputy Prime Minister
Dmitry Rogozin compared U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts in Eastern Europe to theStrategic Defense Initiative of 1983 and stated

36

Civil

Commercial

that such an effort justifies the development of
Russian counterspace programs.
The Russian General Staff argues for pursuingin wartime such strategies as disrupting foreign
military C2 or information support because they
are so critical to the fast-paced, high-technology
conflicts characteristic of modern warfare.267, 268
Russia believes that having the military capabilities to counter space operations will deter
aggression by space-enabled adversaries andenable Russia to control escalation of conflict
if deterrence fails.269 Military capabilities forspace deterrence include strikes against satellites or ground-based infrastructure supporting
space operations.270
On 1 August 2015, Russia created the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces by merging

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

the former Air Force and Aerospace Defense
Troops. Defense Minister Shoygu stated thechange was “prompted by a shift in the centerof gravity… towards the aerospace sphere” andas a counter to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike
doctrine.271, 272 This merged force includes Russia’s space forces who have the mission of conducting space launches and maintaining theballistic missile early warning system, thesatellite control network, and the space object
surveillance and identification network.273, 274, 275
Russia also reorganized its space industry
responsible for space research, design, and production. Russia merged the government-owned
United Rocket and Space Corporation (ORKK),

which previously absorbed the majority of thespace industry corporations in 2013, with theFederal Space Agency.276, 277 President Putin
finalized the dissolution of the Federal Space
Agency on 1 January 2016, naming the joint
organization the Roscosmos State Corporation.

Cyber
Russia views the information sphere as a key
domain for modern military conflict.278, 279
Moscow perceives the information domain as
strategically decisive and critically important
to control its domestic populace and influence
adversary states. Information warfare is a key

Russia’s planned space launches through 2019 280
451612-11105

33

16

20

40

2

1

1

Communications

Earth
Observation

Navigation

Science & Tech

ELINT

EWS

Unknown

2017

2018

40

A G E N C Y

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

30
25
20
15
10
5
0

2019

D E F E N S E

I N T E L L I G E N C E

3537

means of achieving its ambitions of becoming adominant player on the world stage.281
Since at least 2010, the Russian military has
prioritized the development of forces and means
for what it terms “information confrontation,”282, 283 which is a holistic concept for ensuring information superiority, during peacetime
and wartime.284 This concept includes control of
the information content as well as the technicalmeans for disseminating that content. Cyber
operations are part of Russia’s attempts to control the information environment.
The weaponization of information is a key
aspect of Russia’s strategy and is employedin time of peace, crisis, and war. In practice,information battles draw upon psychological warfare tactics and techniques from theSoviet Era for influencing Western societies.285
Moscow views information and psychological

warfare as a measure to neutralize adversary
actions in peace to prevent escalation to crisis
or war.
Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov announced
that “information operations troops” wereinvolved for the first time in the Kavkaz-2016
strategic command staff exercise in September 2016, demonstrating Russian militarycommitment to controlling the information
domain. 286, 287, 288

Propaganda Helps Shape The
Information Environment
Russian propaganda strives to influence, confuse, and demoralize its intended audience,
often containing a mixture of true and false
information to seem plausible and fit into thepreexisting worldview of the intended audience. Russian propaganda targets a wide variety

Information Confrontation“Information confrontation,” or IPb (informatsionnoye protivoborstvo), is the Russian government’s term for conflict in the information sphere. IPb includes diplomatic, economic, military, political, cultural, social, and religious information arenas, and encompasses two measures for influence: informational-technical effect and informational-psychological effect.289, 290• Informational-technical effect is roughly analogous to computer network operations,
including computer-network defense, attack, and exploitation.
• Informational-psychological effect refers to attempts to change people’s behavior or
beliefs in favor of Russian governmental objectives.
IPb is designed to shape perceptions and manipulate the behavior of target audiences. Information countermeasures are activities taken in advance of an event that could be either
offensive (such as activities to discredit the key communicator) or defensive (such as measures to secure Internet websites) designed to prevent an attack.

38

appeal to Russia due to the difficulty of
attribution and the level of anonymity provided. It is widely accepted that Russia, via
patriotic hackers, conducted a cyber attack
on Estonia in 2007.293 Under the guise of
hacktivism, a group called “CyberCaliphate,” seemingly ISIS associated, conducteda hack against French station TV5 Mondein January 2015. The CyberCaliphategroup was later linked to Russian military
hackers. The same group hijacked the Twitter feed of the U.S. Central Command.294

Cyber-Enabled
Psychological Operations• CyberBerkut – A False Persona. Russian hackers also use false personas.
CyberBerkut is a front organization for
Russian state-sponsored cyber activity,
supporting Russia’s military operations
and strategic objectives in Ukraine.295
CyberBerkut employs a range of bothtechnical and propaganda attacks,
consistent with the Russian conceptof “information confrontation.” Since
emerging in March 2014, CyberBerkut
has been implicated in multiple incidents
of cyber espionage and attack, including distributed denial of service attacks
against NATO, Ukraine, and German

One of the newest tools in Russia’s information
toolkit is the use of cyber-enabled psychologicaloperations that support its strategic and tactical information warfare objectives. These newtechniques involve compromising networks forintelligence information that could be used toembarrass, discredit, or falsify information.
Compromised material can then be leaked tothe media at inopportune times.
• Hacktivists. Russian intelligence services
have been known to co-opt or masquerade
as other hacktivist groups. These groups

Major themes of Russian propaganda include:
The West’s liberal world order is bankrupt and should be replaced by a Eurasian neo-conservative post-liberal world order, which defends tradition, conservative values, and true liberty.296
The West demonizes Russia, which is only trying to defend its interests and sovereignty andact as an indispensable nation in world affairs.
The United States is determined to interfere with and overthrow sovereign governments
around the world.297

I N T E L L I G E N C E

of audiences, including its own population,
selected populations of other countries, domestic and foreign political elites, and the West
writ large.291, 292 The variety of techniques fordisseminating Russian propaganda include
pro-Kremlin “news” websites and TV and radio
channels such as Russia Today and Sputnik
News, bots and trolls on social media, searchengine optimization, and paid journalists in
Western and other foreign media.

A G E N C Y

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

D E F E N S E

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

39

government websites. More recently, it
has focused on the online publication of
hacked documents, ostensibly obtained
from the Ukrainian government andpolitical figures’ computers. CyberBerkut uses information gained throughthese hacks to discredit the Ukrainian
government. The intent is to demoralize, embarrass, and create distrust ofelected officials.298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303
CyberBerkut Arm Patch.

• Trolls. Russia employs a troll army of paid
online commentators who manipulate or
try to change the narrative of a given story
in Russia’s favor. Russia’s Troll Army, also
known as the Internet Research Agency, isa state-funded organization that blogs andtweets on behalf of the Kremlin.304 Trolls
typically post pro-Kremlin content andfacilitate heated discussions in the comments sections of news articles. Their goal
is to counter negative media and “Western
influence.” While the goal of some trolls is
to simply disrupt negative content, othertrolls promote completely false content.305• Bots. Another way Russia manipulates theinformation space is through the use of bots.
Bots are automated pushers of content on

X&sU-!

@#Tg^

e$4*!

Russia uses a Troll Army to disseminate and overwhelm blogs and twitter communications.
Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

40

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyrightsocial media. These bots vary in sophistication and can continuously push content orimitate real life patterns. Bots can drownout unwanted content or push a specificmessage. Bots have the ability to overwhelm
the information space and discourage readers from looking for real content.306, 307

Information Defense
The Russian Federation Security Council’s
2016 Information Security Doctrine mandates
protecting Russian citizens from outside threats
to the information sphere. The doctrine aims tosecure Russian information freedom and protect information technologies from foreign influence, cyberattacks, intelligence collection, andterrorism. The doctrine emphasizes the need todevelop a national system for government control of the Russian Internet, information warfare forces, and cyber weapons.308
Since at least 1999, Russia has attempted togain consensus on international governance of
the Internet and international norms and rules

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

guiding the behavior of states in the information
space. A major component of the proposal pertains
to a state’s ability to govern its information space
as a means of maintaining state sovereignty andpreventing an arms race in cyberspace. Althoughstate sovereignty traditionally refers to domestic enforcement law, Russia commonly uses thisterm to denounce other nations meddling in theirinternal affairs. Russia also proposed a code of
conduct for cyberspace with specific dictums
regarding non-state cyber-actors, such as criminal hackers involved in cyber activities.309, 310

Media Laws –A Hedge Against Instability
In the past decade, Russia has implemented
numerous laws curbing domestic media in broadcast, print, and cyber media, taking an abrupt
turn from the post-Soviet glasnost policies of
media “openness” and its own constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech.311 The use of social
media to organize opposition street protests in

Indirect Action
Indirect action is a component of Russia’s strategic deterrence policy developed by Moscow inrecent years. Its primary aim is to achieve Russia’s national objectives through a combination of military and non-military means while
avoiding escalation into a full blown, direct,
state-to-state conflict.315 Drawing on a combination of facets from Russia’s whole-of-government or interdepartmental strategy and overt
or covert military means, indirect action seeks
to exploit weaknesses and fissures in target
countries in order to fulfill Moscow’s desired
national goals.316

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

The Kremlin's strategy of reducing foreign influence on the media has not been confined to theinternet. Numerous other pieces of legislation
have been passed restricting the level of foreign
ownership of the media, impeding the work of
the foreign NGOs supporting independent media
in Russia and forcing Russian media to accountfor any foreign funding they receive. A recent
law has even banned foreign companies fromconducting TV audience research in Russia.314

D E F E N S E

The Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg.

A G E N C Y

2011 and 2012 prompted a reappraisal of official
internet policy. Since then, the authorities havetreated the Internet as a serious threat, pushing
through laws increasing government controls
over technology and content giving the state powers to block content, ban websites, monitor online
activity, and limit media ownership.312 The ultimate goal of this policy appears to be to create
what some have called a "sovereign internet.” 313

41

In Ukraine, indirect action manifested itself
in non-military measures first, with less visible efforts taken to exert pressure on Kiev, like
restricting food imports to Russia, but thenbroadening to wider actions involving financial,economic, and information warfare. Later, thiswas followed by unconventional military action
involving Russian Spetsnaz and other non-attributable military units in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.317 This phase involved the actual
seizure of facilities and infrastructure by thesecovered units, along with the use of local agents,
sympathizers, and irregular forces in the vicinity to cause unrest and subversion, all of which
are distinct hallmarks or evolutions of Soviet-era
Spetsnaz wartime operations.318

Electronic Warfare
Based on authoritative military academic writings, the Russian military views electronic
warfare as an essential tool for gaining andmaintaining information superiority over its
adversaries. Russia’s world-class electronic warfare forces support denial and deception operations and allow identification, interception, disruption, and, in combination with traditionalfires, destruction of adversary command, control,
communications, and intelligence capabilities.
In addition to technical disruption, effective useof electronic warfare can confuse adversary commanders and decisionmaking at any or all levels,
demoralize opposing troops, and allow Russianforces to seize the operational initiative.319, 320, 321
Russia has fielded a wide range of ground-based

electronic warfare systems to counter GPS, tactical communications, satellite communications,and radars.322 Further, military academics havesuggested that electronic warfare fuse with cyber
operations, allowing electronic warfare forces tocorrupt and disable computers and networked
systems as well as disrupt use of the electromagnetic spectrum.323, 324 Russia has aspirations
to develop and field a full spectrum of electronic
warfare capabilities to counter Western C4ISR
and weapons guidance systems.

Power Projection
Moscow continues to prioritize modernizing its
military forces, viewing military power as critical to achieving key strategic objectives andglobal influence. Russian acquisition plans for
its ground, air, naval, and missile forces aredesigned to enable the ability to conduct out of
area operations during peacetime and to contest

Russian jammer on display at Kubinka in 2016; Moscow has invested heavily in developing sophisticatedelectronic warfare capabilities.
Image Source: Shutterstock

42Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations• Long-Range Aviation: Russia periodically
deploys assets of its LRA bomber force to conduct limited out-of-area operations as a power
projection tool. LRA operations have included
activity in the Pacific, the Arctic, and even as
far south in 2008 as Venezuela. The capabilities of LRA aircraft allow for missions as far
as 5,000–10,000 kilometers away.325• Expeditionary Operations: Along withmore conventional power projection missions, Russia has displayed a new capability to field an expeditionary force capable of intervening in a foreign conflict. In
Syria, Russia used a mix of maritime andair assets to forward deploy its forces,
and Russia will almost certainly be able
to logistically support its current levelof operations in Syria via a mix of thosemeans for the foreseeable future.332
After politically supporting the Syrian regime
throughout the Syrian civil war, Moscow began
to deploy military forces to Syria in September
2015, likely both to shore up the regime andassert Russia’s status as a military player andpowerbroker in the Middle East.333 The majorityof Russian air strikes and artillery operations
have supported regime ground offensives andfocused on opposition targets, with an increased
focus against Islamic State forces at certain
points in their campaign.334, 335, 336
Russia has also sought to use the Syrian intervention as a showcase for its military modernization
program and advanced conventional weaponssystems, including employing systems from out-A G E N C Y

Russia’s State Armaments Program will continue to emphasize priority programs related tothe development of a viable 21st-century military, prioritizing strategic forces, space, precision-guided munitions, and aerospace defense
capabilities. Russia’s strategic triad along with
the increasing capability of its conventional
forces remains a critical deterrent in preventing
an attack. Russian long-range aviation remains
a priority for Russian leadership as a key part ofits strategic deterrent capability, while also providing an advanced conventional option to rapidly project power well beyond Russian borders.
Russia is also modernizing its naval forces, which
conduct operations globally in order to “show theflag” and contribute to Moscow’s narrative ofRussia’s re-emergence as a global power. Russia
is also focused on enhancing its C4ISR capabilities, which will enable improved targeting andtimely responses to perceived threats.

• Naval Forces: The Russian Navy willcontinue to conduct operations in parts of
the world that are deemed important tonational objectives. In recent times, thesehave included operations in the Mediterranean,326 the Arctic,327 and periodic deployments to the western hemisphere328 andthe Indian Ocean.329 Russia’s naval recapitalization program will focus on the development of modern general purpose submarines and surface combatants to enable
continued out-of-area operations.330, 331

I N T E L L I G E N C E

U.S./NATO military superiority in the event ofa regional conflict. The rebuilt Russian military includes modernized, agile general purpose forces, vital to limited out-of-area power
projection. While the objectives of the Russian
military do not suggest a return to the Cold War
posture, Moscow intends to use its military to
promote stability on its own terms and to assert
its great power status.

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43

side of Syrian territory to demonstrate its power
projection capacity. Moscow has launched Kalibr
land-attack cruise missiles from naval units in
the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean Sea,
demonstrated new capabilities with air-launchedcruise missiles from its Tu-160M1 BLACKJACK
and Tu-95MS BEAR H heavy bombers, forward-staged long-range Tu-22M3 BACKFIRE
bombers for strikes from Iranian territory, anddeployed some of its most advanced air and air
defense systems to Syria.337, 338, 339, 340 These operations are meant to demonstrate strategic capabilities and message the West about the mannerin which the Russian military could operate in a
major conventional conflict, while also providing
combat experience for the personnel and allowing the systems to be field tested.341, 342

A Russian naval task force centered on its only aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, conducted
a 5-month deployment to the Mediterranean tosupport strike operations in Syria.
Image Source: AFP

44

Underground Facilities
Russia inherited a vast underground facilities(UGFs) program from the Soviet Union, primarily
designed to ensure the survival of the leadershipand military command and control in wartime.
This program involved the construction of underground bunkers, tunnels, secret subway lines,
and other facilities beneath Moscow, other major
Russian cities, and the sites of major militarycommands. Although the majority of these hardened facilities are near-surface bunkers, many
critical sites are built deep underground and, insome cases, are hundreds of meters deep.343
Deep underground command posts both within
and outside of Moscow are interconnected by a
network of special deep subway lines that provide leadership a quick and secure means ofevacuation. The leadership can move from theirpeacetime offices through concealed entryways
to protective quarters beneath the city. A deep
underground facility at the Kremlin and an enormous underground leadership bunker adjacentto Moscow State University are intended for the
National Command Authority in wartime. They
are estimated to be 200–300 meters deep andcan accommodate an estimated 10,000 people.344
The leadership can remain beneath Moscow or
travel along the special subway lines that connect these urban facilities to their preferred
deep underground command posts outside thecity, and possibly to the VIP terminal at Vnukovo Airfield, 27 kilometers southwest of the
Kremlin. Two of the most important underground complexes for the National CommandBuilding a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Russian military officials suggest the UGF program has been retained. In October 2014, chiefof the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate, General-Lieutenant Andrey Kartapolov,
told a Rossiyskaya Gazeta correspondent thatthe new National Defense Management Center in Moscow is safe from a nuclear strike. The
National Defense Management Center became
operational in December 2014 and is at the apexof the national command structure. General
Kartapolov noted that protection against nuclear
strike is always considered in building the mostimportant facilities.347

Denial and Deception

Moscow employed maskirovka at the beginningof the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, when media
reported on the presence of “little green men”
in Crimea who strongly resembled Russian
soldiers although they wore uniforms without
insignia identifying their origins. President
Putin insisted they were “self-defense groups”
or “volunteers.” By the time Moscow admitted
to the presence of Russian troops in Crimea,
this deception had created enough confusion toforestall significant international intervention
in the conflict, and the ground reality was irreversibly tipped in Russia’s favor.354, 355, 356, 357, 358

The Russian military relies on extensive use ofdenial and deception (maskirovka) to obscureintentions and conceal military movement. The
family of capabilities that composed traditional
maskirovka includes camouflage, deception,
denial, subversion, sabotage, espionage, propaganda, and psychological operations.
Russian operational and tactical maskirovka is
a form of operational combat support. It encompasses a set of interrelated organizational andMoscow used troops without insignia – the “little
green men” – to seize the Crimean Peninsula in early
2014, claiming these forces were local militia.
Image Source: ShutterstockA G E N C Y

The support infrastructure for the UGFs inand around Moscow is substantial. A highly
redundant communications system, consistingof both on-site and remote elements, allows theleadership to send orders and receive reports.
Highly effective life support systems may permit independent operations for many months
following a nuclear attack.346

technical measures and practical actions of staffs,
troops, and facilities intended to deceive foreign
intelligence. Maskirovka promotes surprise,
maintenance of combat capability, and survivability. For example, maskirovka in rocket units
and subunits is organized and carried out for the
purpose of ensuring that the enemy experiencesmaximum difficulty in collecting intelligencedata to reduce the effectiveness of strikes, but
is also carried out to create the false appearanceof a combined unit in support of deception at theoperational level of war.348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Authority and General Staff are located some
60 kilometers south of the city.345

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45

Outlook: A Modernizing Forcehe Russian military has built on the military doctrine, structure, and capabilitiesof the former Soviet Union, and althoughstill dependent on many of the older Soviet platforms, the Russians have modernized their military strategy, doctrine, and tactics to include useof asymmetric weapons like cyber and indirect
action such as was observed in Ukraine.
One of Russia’s biggest hurdles since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union has been
its need to rely heavily on its nuclear forces todeter aggression, resulting in its stated willingness for first-use of nuclear weapons.359, 360 Russia
has been building its conventional force capability along with modernizing its nuclear forces tocreate a more balanced military. Moscow has
stressed development of conventional precision-strike weapons, a critical gap in its inventory, and recently has tested them in combat in
Syria, providing it with an advanced non-nuclear
capability to impact the battlefield.

46

In 2009, after almost two decades of deterioration and neglect of the Russian military, Moscow
began developing a more modern military force
capable of power projection outside Russia’s borders. The New Look reforms instituted structural and organizational reforms and the State
Armaments Program emphasized developmentof modernized platforms and weapons’ systems.
In 2013, readiness became an additional areaof emphasis with institution of no-notice “snap”
exercises and accompanying mobilization anddeployments. Moscow’s long-term goal is build-ing a military prepared to conduct the range ofconflicts from local war through regional conflictto a strategic conflict that could result in massive
nuclear exchange.
Recently, Russian forces have been involved inconflict in Ukraine and conducted an expeditionary deployment to Syria, providing experience in combat operations, and employing newtactics and advanced weapons systems. This
more flexible and modern Russian force did
not spring up overnight but is a result of yearsof concentrated effort to develop and field an
improved military force.
Russia’s desire to be a leader in a multipolarworld and recapture the “great power” status it had in Tsarist times and the latter daysof the Soviet Union requires a force capable ofdeterring aggression, fighting the range of conflicts from local crises to nuclear war, projecting
power and employing force if necessary to intervene in conflicts across the globe. Despite an
economic slowdown that will affect the Russian
military’s timeline for building all of its planned
capabilities, Russia is rapidly fielding a modern
force that can challenge adversaries and support
its “great power” aspirations.
Russia’s commitment to building its militaryis demonstrated by its retention of the draft.
All Russian males are required to registerfor the draft at 17 years of age and all men
between the ages of 18 and 27 are obligatedby law to perform one year of military service.

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Appendix A: Russian Strategic Rocket Forces
The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) (Russianname: Raketniye Voyska Strategicheskovo Naznacheniya [RVSN]), is one of the most potent missile forces in the world.361, 362 The SRF was established as a separate military service in December
1959 to operate the first nuclear-armed intercontinental-range land-based ballistic missile (SS-6),
as the third element of Russia's growing strategic nuclear force deterrent triad.363, 364

The Russian SRF headquarters is in Moscow.
The SRF's three missile armies—the 27th,
31st, and 33rd—have a total of 12 subordinate
missile divisions. Eight of the divisions operateroad-mobile ICBMs, with the other four armed
with silo-based missiles.365, 366 The Russian SRF
have approximately 60,000 personnel.367
In 2016, the SRF had deployed 299 operational
missiles, with half that number equipped with
1612-11167

Image Source: DIA. D3 Design

D E F E N S E

I N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y

Russia Strategic Rocket Forces

Locations of Strategic Rocket Forces missile divisions.368, 369, 370

47

multiple independently-targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRV) payloads. The SRF arsenal
includes three older ICBM types—46 SS-18s
and 30 SS-19s in silos, and 72 road-mobile
SS-25s—and two newer ICBM types—60 silobased and 18 road-mobile SS-27 Mod 1s, and
73 of the most modernized SS-27 Mod 2s.371, 372
The development of new ballistic missile systems
is a high priority for Russia. The Russian military has outlined that the SRF should be completely re-armed with modern (post-Soviet) missile systems by 2022.373 Russia has stated that it
will soon begin testing a developmental, heavy,liquid-propellant ICBM called the Sarmat to
replace the aging SS-18. Russia’s goal is to begin
Sarmat deployment in the 2018–2020 timeframe.
Russia has announced a new missile called the
Rubezh (Border) or RS-26, which is smaller thanthe SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM and will be deployed in2017.374 According to the SRF commander, theRS-26 is envisioned as a mobile system andhas been referred to by Russian Vice-PremierRogozin as a “missile defense killer.”375 Russianindustry officials also claim development of the
Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM is continuing. A
decision on full development, production, anddeployment will occur in the coming months.376
The currently deployed SS-18, which Russia
plans to replace with the Sarmat, is a silobased, 10-MIRV heavy ICBM first deployed
in 1988; it needs to be replaced by 2018–2020,
when the SS-18s' 27- to 30-year service lives
expire.377 The SS-19 is a silo-based, six-MIRVICBM that entered service in 1980, which the48

SRF will replace with silo-based SS-27 Mod 2
by 2019, as the SS-19s retire.378
The SS-25 solid-propellant, single-warhead,road-mobile ICBM was first deployed in 1985 andwill retire by 2019–2021, to be replaced by regiments of new production SS-27 Mod 2s, and possibly the two-stage, road-mobile RS-26 Rubezh.379, 380
In addition, Russian leadership claims a
new class of hypersonic glide vehicle is being
developed to allow Russian strategic missiles
to penetrate missile defense systems. Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) are maneuverable vehicles that travel at hypersonic (typically greater than Mach 5) speed and spend
most of their flight at much lower altitudes
than a typical ballistic missile. The combination of high speed, maneuverability, and relatively low altitude makes them challenging
targets for missile defense systems.381
Russia’s overall number of strategic systems
is constrained by the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START), which enteredinto force on 5 February 2011. This treaty
limits the United States and Russia to no
more than 1,550 deployed warheads each(including warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs,
and counting each heavy bomber as one warhead) 7 years after entry into force.382
Russia retains about 1,200 nuclear warheads for
ICBMs. Most of these missiles are maintainedon alert, capable of being launched within minutes of receiving a launch order. Although thenumber of missiles in the Russian ICBM force

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Russian ICBM Systems385

1612-11143

Numberof Stages

Warheads

Propellant

Deployment
Mode

Max Range km

SS-18
MOD 5

2 + PBV

10

LIQUID

SILO

10,000+

SS-19
MOD 3

2 +PBV

6

LIQUID

SILO

9,000+

SS-25

3 + PBV

1

SOLID

ROAD-MOBILE 11,000

SS-27
MOD 1

3 + PBV

1SOLID

SILO and
11,000
ROAD-MOBILE

SS-27
MOD 2

3 + PBV

Multiple

SOLID

SILO and
11,000
ROAD-MOBILE

SystemA G E N C Y

Despite Russia’s modernization efforts, thesize of the SRF may drop below 300 deployed
ICBMs by the early 2020s, but most of thosemissiles will be equipped with multiple warheads. The composition of the force is changing significantly to meet the deployed strategic
warhead total limit of 1,550. Notably, prior
to 2010, no SRF road-mobile ICBMs carried
MIRVs; by the early 2020s, all will do so.384

I N T E L L I G E N C E

will continue to decrease because of arms control agreements, aging missiles, and resource
constraints, Russia intends to retain the largest
ICBM force outside the United States.383

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49

APPENDIX B: Russian Ground Forces
Russian Ground Forces
The Russian ground forces are composed of the
Ground Troops, Airborne Troops (VDV), Naval
Infantry, Coastal Troops, Coastal Missile Artillery Troops, and National Guard. The RussianFederation armed forces are geographically distributed across four military districts: Western,Southern, Central and Eastern. The Western
Military District has three numbered combined-arms armies (CAAs), the Southern andCentral Military Districts each have two, andthe Eastern Military District has four.

The Ground Troops
The Ground Troops, or Sukhoputniye Voyska,
are the land warfighting component of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The Ground Troops
constitute the largest component of the RussianFederation armed forces. The Ground Troops
are currently organized into approximately 40
active and reserve maneuver brigades and eight
maneuver divisions.386 There are about 350,000
military personnel in the ground troops.387
According to Russia's Ministry of Defense, theroles of its Ground Troops include repelling
enemy aggression and the protection of Russia's territorial integrity and Russian national
interests.388 Its main peacetime missions include
maintaining adequate combat readiness, participating in international peacekeeping operations,participating in disaster recovery efforts, andassisting in the maintenance of internal security,50

if needed. Examples of what Moscow designates
peacekeeping operations include ongoing efforts
in breakaway enclaves in Georgia and Moldova.389
In times of heightened tension, the GroundTroops will mobilize forces, operationally deploy
to threatened areas, call up and train reservists,and prepare for defensive operations. Finally,in a time of war, Russia's Ground Troops arecharged to suppress military conflicts if possible,
repulse enemy aggression, conduct defensive
and counter-offensive operations to defeat theaggressor, and defend critical infrastructure.390
Organizationally, the Ground Troops are composed of main combat components—motorized
rifle, tank, missile and artillery, and air defense
units. Support elements for these units include

Russian armored fighting vehicles parade in Red
Square; ground forces have historically played a dominant role in Russian military issues and leadership.
Image Source: AFP

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations• Tank Troops are the main strike component of the Ground Troops. They support
Motorized Rifle Troop missions with direct
fires during meeting engagements.392• Missile Troops and Artillery are themain means of indirect fires for Russian
combined arms operations. Missile Troops
and Artillery forces are organized into missile, rocket-artillery, and combined artillery
units.393 Missile units operate close/shortrange ballistic missiles. Rocket-artillery
units operate multiple rocket launchers(MLRs), and combined artillery units operate composite towed or self-propelled artillery and MLRs.
• Air Defense Troops provide air defense for
the Ground Troops. These units are equippedwith anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft gun-and-missile systems,
and portable anti-aircraft missile systems.394• Reconnaissance Troops perform awide range of tasks in order to provide
decision makers with information about
enemy strength, disposition, terrain, andweather conditions.395• Engineer Troops perform a variety of
specialized tasks, including the construction of fortifications, installation of obsta-• Nuclear Biological Chemical Defense
Troops are specialized forces tasked with
mitigating the effects of nuclear, biological,
or chemical contamination.397• Signal Troops are specialized forces
designed for the deployment and maintenance of mobile redundant command, control, and communications systems.398

The New Look Reforms andthe Ground Troops
The centerpiece of the 2008–2009 New Look
reforms was the elimination of the divisional/
regimental structure and its replacement by thebrigade. The Russian Ground Troops currently
have about 40 combined arms brigades.399 In thewinter of 2013, one motorized rifle brigade andone tank brigade were reformed as divisions,and in the spring of 2016, it was announced
that four new divisions would be formed in theWestern and Southern Military Districts andone in the Central Military District.400
The transition to the brigade structure wasintended to optimize Russia's ground forces
to fight in what the Russians call "local wars
and armed conflicts," limited wars along Russia's periphery, which the Russian General
Staff believes to be very likely under modern
conditions. In November 2011, then-Chief of
the General Staff Nikolai Makarov said: "Thepossibility of local armed conflicts virtually

A G E N C Y• Motorized Rifle Troops units are themost abundant formations in Russia's
Ground Troops. Essentially mounted infantry, these are highly mobile forces tasked
with holding territory, repulsing enemy
attacks, breaking through enemy defenses,
capturing important areas, and defeating
the enemy.391

cles (mine fields, etc.), the preparation offield deployment locations, the preparationand maintenance of deployment routes,
the construction of bridges and ferry crossings, and water purification.396

I N T E L L I G E N C E

reconnaissance, engineer, nuclear, biologicaland chemical defense, and signal troops.

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51

along the entire perimeter of the border has
grown dramatically." 401 The Russian groundforces fielded brigades of this type that had been
field tested in Afghanistan (1979–1989) andhad proved to be quite effective in combat.402
Another development that had received great
impetus in the Afghanistan war was the reinforced battalion, or battalion tactical group(BTG), a motorized rifle or tank battalion,
strengthened by other assets, such as artillery,reconnaissance, and air defense resources. BTGs
are similar to NATO battalion task forces andare ad-hoc organizations, individually created
and optimized to fulfill a particular mission.403
The new Russian divisions are much smaller
than their Soviet predecessors. While a Soviet
motorized rifle division numbered around13,000 officers and soldiers, Russia's new
motorized rifle divisions number around 9,000.
A proponent of the mixed division-brigade groundforces, then-acting chief of the ground forces,
General Lieutenant Vladimir Popov, stated that
Russia's combined arms brigades “in terms ofstructure are intended for fighting in local wars,"
but that they also "can be successfully employedin large-scale wars. They differ from divisions bylesser numbers of personnel and military equipment and are capable of executing missions withthe very same high effectiveness as divisions,but in a smaller zone of responsibility."404 The
re-introduction of some smaller divisions may bebased more on their potential intimidation value
than they are on their potential value in combat.

52

These positive developments have led someanalysts to claim that Russia is developing
entirely new military concepts. Modern Rus-

sian tactics show a strong continuity with pastpractices. Recent Russian activity in eastern
Ukraine, for example, demonstrates a creativeuse of their traditional combined arms andreconnaissance-strike tactics combined witha more aggressive application of information
warfare concepts that date back to the Soviet
period. Russian ground forces troops have cooperated with non-traditional semi-military forces
such as partisans and Cossacks for centuries.405
Regardless, the contemporary Russian groundforces pose a serious challenge to U.S. militaryplanners, and they should be seen as neither asimple continuation of past Soviet practices, nor
an entirely new force employing entirely new
military concepts, but a highly nuanced andadaptive combination of both.406
The main combat power of the Ground Troops
is centered in tank and motorized rifle divisions
and separate tank and motorized rifle brigadesthat are normally subordinate to combined arms
armies. Although Russia's military strategy isofficially defensive, the Russian Ground Troops
basic principle of land warfare is violent, sustained, and deep offensive action, just as it was
during the Soviet era. Mechanized and armoredformations supported by aviation and artillery
are to seize the initiative at the outset of hostilities, penetrate the enemy's defenses, and drive
deeply and decisively into the enemy's rear area.

Combined Arms Armies
The combined arms army is an operational
and administrative organization that forms
the basis of the Russian field army. A typical
combined arms army includes two to four combined arms brigades, usually motorized rifle

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

The Tank Army

The Separate
Combined-Arms Brigade

The Russian armed forces currently only have
one tank army, the First Guards Tank Army
(1st GTA). It, like the combined arms army,
is both an operational and administrative

The primary combat formation of the GroundTroops is the separate combined-arms brigade,either motorized rifle (MR) or tank. There arethree basic tables of organization and equip-

New Look Motorized Rifle Brigade Table of Organizationand Equipment: Primary and Supporting Subunits407
Officers
327

NCOs
Enlisted
1,005 3,061

Civilians
128

TOTAL
4,521

Bde Cdr

MR BN x3

510

43 MT-LBV
8 2S12

Headquarters

19

Tank BN41 T-72

SP Arty BN x2
18 2S19

MRL BN
18 BM-21

AT Arty BN
12 MT-12
24 9P162

AD MSL BN
12 SA-15B TLAR
9x SA-18 MANPADS

Recon BNCBT Engr BN

Signal BN

Repair BN

Material Support BN

246
Commandant Company

48

1612-11131

227

223

Electronic Warfare Company

102

193

CBR Defense Company

81

AD MSL Arty BN

130
16 2S6M1
6 SA13280

Medical Company

60

A G E N C Y

unit. Currently, the 1st GTA includes a tankdivision, a motorized rifle division, and a tankbrigade, plus artillery, missile, air defense,
engineer, chemical defense, communications,
intelligence and reconnaissance, and rear
support units. The traditional role of a tankarmy is to exploit penetrations deep into theenemy's rear areas.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

brigades and in a few cases a tank brigade, plus
artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, chemical defense, communications, intelligence andreconnaissance, and rear support units. By
altering the mix of motorized rifle and tankformations and artillery and missile support,
the army can operate in either offensive or
defensive roles in different geographical areas
and under various operational constraints.

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53

ment (TO&Es) for separate MR brigades andone for separate tank brigades. All Russian
combined-arms brigades, however, regardlessof specific primary combat vehicle, are organized in essentially the same manner.408
Tank and MR brigades differ in organizationin that where the MR brigade has three MR
battalions, one tank battalion, and an antitank (AT) battalion, the independent tank brigade reverses this basic structure with threetank battalions, one motorized tank battalion,
and no AT battalion.409 The three MR TO&Es
differ from one another in their primary combat vehicle, either wheeled armored personnel carrier (APC) or tracked infantry fighting

vehicle (IFV).410 The organizational structureof a typical tracked APC-equipped independent MR brigade is shown in the accompanying illustration.411 In addition, the primaryequipment of a separate motorized rifle brigade is shown in the table below.

Battalion Tactical Groups
BTGs are task-organized battalion-plus-sized tactical combat entities that are capable of performing independent combined-arms combat missions. They are similar in purpose, structure, andtactical use to U.S. Army battalion task forces.
Most, if not all, New Look maneuver brigades

Russian Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade Personnel
and Primary Offensive Equipment412

54

Nomenclature

Quantity

Personnel

4521

T-72B3 Main Battle Tank

41

BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle or

129

BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle or

129

MT-LBV Tracked Armored Personnel Carrier

129

BTR-82A Wheeled Armored Personnel Carrier

129

2S19 152-MM SP Howitzer

18

BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launcher

181612-11142

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

The Airborne Troops
Russia's Airborne Troops, or VDV (Vozdushno-Desantniye Voyska), is an independent armof service within the Russian Federation armed
forces. It is composed of four maneuver divisions, four maneuver brigades, and a separate
special purpose (Spetsnaz) reconnaissance brigade.415 The VDV serves as Russia's high-mobility initial invasion and rapid response
force.416, 417 In its role as rapid response or initialassault forces, the VDV may be used to achieve
specific objectives that shape the battlespace for• Seizing key terrain (i.e., bridges, airports,and seaports)• Establishing blocking positions and vertical envelopment of a retreating enemy• Disrupting enemy logistical supplies, communications, and command centers• Destroying high value targets418
Maneuver formations within the VDV are designated as either parachute or air assault, theprimary difference being in whether they arriveat their objective via airdrop or overland means.
In all cases, VDV personnel are trained to operate both ways. Major VDV formations are:
• Two parachute divisions – the 98th
Guards and 106th Guards• Two air assault divisions – the 7th
Guards Mountain and 76th Guards• Four air assault brigades – the 11th, 31st,
56th, and 83rd
• One special-purpose reconnaissance brigade – the 45th Spetsnaz419
In line with its highly mobile function, the VDVis equipped with a large number of amphibious
air droppable combat vehicles, the BMD-series IFVs and BTR-D series APCs. The VDV's
increased mobility comes at the expense ofarmor and firepower; its primary combat vehicles are generally lighter than their GroundTroops counterparts. In late 2016, however, theair assault divisions and brigades received up
to a company (10 to 13) of T-72-series main battle tanks. The tank companies within these air
assault units will very likely increase to tankA G E N C Y

The need to have effective BTGs is a primary
driver of the New Look structural reforms. BTGs
have their theoretical origins in the late Soviet
period, where they were envisioned to fightagainst NATO on both a nuclear or non-nuclear
battlefield in a nonlinear, large-scale environment. BTGs have been used in every local war
or armed conflict in which Soviet and Russianforces have been involved since the Afghanistan
War (1979–1989).414 The tactical use of BTGs
in combat has impacted the tactical principles
that govern their construction and use. BTGs
currently serve—and will continue to serve—
as Russia's primary tactical fighting unit in all
tactical circumstances, both in large-scale andsmall-scale conflicts, well into the future.

follow-on ground forces. These may include:

I N T E L L I G E N C E

have one BTG, manned entirely or mostly with
contract soldiers, that is used to perform the mostdifficult or complicated combat tasks assigned tothe brigade. An order issued on 19 September
2012 required all maneuver brigade commanders
to create a contract-manned BTG within the brigade if they had not already done so.413

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55

battalions (30 to 42) by the end of 2018.420, 421
The MBTs are not intended for air drops, butwill accompany VDV ground maneuver formations to increase firepower and lethality.

Naval Infantry
Russian Naval Infantry is organized into
units that are operationally subordinate tofleet commanders. Naval Infantry is focusedon amphibious assaults, coastal defense,
counterterrorism, anti-piracy, and ship security missions. The organization and equipment of Naval Infantry units are generally
similar to that of motorized rifle units in the
Ground Troops.422
The Naval Infantry consist of four independent brigades, one separate brigade, andthree separate battalions.423

Coastal Troops
The Russian Coastal Troops consist of Coastal
Missile Artillery Forces (CMAF) and Coastal
Troops. CMAF consist of three independentbrigades, two independent regiments, and one
independent battalion.
The Coastal Troops are organized as groundforces but are subordinate to the Navy. The
Coastal Troops consist mainly of motorized rifle brigades and artillery brigades.
Their primary mission is coastal and regional
defense.424 The Navy Ground and Coastal
Troop Headquarters, a command unit basedin Moscow, heads the Coastal Troop force, butcoastal missile units likely take operational
orders from their respective fleets.425, 426, 427
Russia’s coastal missile and artillery forces
provide anti-ship defenses for Russia’s coast-

Russian VDV Primary Combat Vehicles

561612-11144

SystemFunction

Capacity(Crew/Dismounts)

BMD-2

Infantry Fighting Vehicle

2/5

BMD-4M

Infantry Fighting Vehicle

3/5

BTR-D

Tracked APC

3/10

BTR-MDM

Tracked APC

3/10

2S9

120-mm SP Combination Gun

3

2S25

125-mm Tracked SP Antitank Gun

3

Image Source: AFP

line and littoral regions. Coastal missile
defense in Russia is primarily centered onanti-ship missile systems. Most units are still
dependent on two systems that entered production in the late 1970s to early 1980s—the

STYX and SEPAL. Efforts are underway torearm the coastal missile force with new, longer-range missile systems.428 These systems
include the BAL and BASTION, and they areslowly being introduced to the force.429

I N T E L L I G E N C E

BASTION Coastal Defense Missile Launcher.

A G E N C Y

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

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57

APPENDIX C: Russian Aerospace Forces
The former Russian Federation Air Forces andAerospace Defense Troops merged to create theRussian Federation Aerospace Forces (VKS) in
August 2015. The merger places former space
and aerospace defense assets vital to strategic
aerospace operations under one organizational
structure.430, 431 The Russian Aerospace Forces
include four tactical air armies, which are alignedwith the military districts. They also contain the

Russian Air Forces Air Bases433

Long-Range Aviation (LRA) and Military Transport Aviation (VTA), as well as the Space Troops,
which are not subordinate to the military districts but to Aerospace Command in Moscow.432
Overall manpower for the Russian Aerospace
Forces is listed at 148,000 including conscripts.
The 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army
(AFADA) is subordinate to the Western Military
1612-11135

Moscow maintains aviation units in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, represented on the map by the two
fighter base symbols outside Russia’s borders.
Image Source: DIA, D3 Design58Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

District, the 14th Air Force and Air Defense
Army to the Central Military District, the 11th
Air Force and Air Defense Army to the Eastern
Military District, and the 4th Air Force and Air
Defense Army to the Southern Military District.

or nuclear weapons. Currently, TU-95MS
aircraft are being modernized to include theKh-101/102 missile system.434 The LRA has aninventory of 16 Tu-160, 60 Tu-95MS, and morethan 50 Tu-22M3 bombers.435

Long Range Aviation: The LRA is thebomber force of the Russian Aerospace Forces
and operationally subordinate to the Supreme
High Command of the Russian armed forces.
The LRA is tasked with long-range bombardment of strategic targets with conventional

Military Transport Aviation: The VTA is
subordinate operationally to the Supreme HighCommand of the Russian armed forces and is
the main provider of the air lift for Russian
troops and equipment. The recent Ukraine
and Syria conflicts have resulted in heavy

Russian Air Forces Order-of-Battle436

Total Number

Most Capable

Bomber141

Tu-160Fighter420

MiG-29Fighter Ground Attack

345

Su-35S

Attack

215

Su-25SM

ELINT

32

Il-22M

Airborne Warning and Control

22

A-50

C2

6

Il-86VKP

Tanker15

Il-78M

Heavy Transport

122

An-124Training

198

Yak-130I N T E L L I G E N C E

Aircraft TypeA G E N C Y

1612-11136

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RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

59

use of the VTA forces, allowing pilots to gainsignificant flight hours. The primary aircraft
operated by the VTA include the Il-76, An-124,
An-22, An-26, An-72, and An-12. The various
sizes of aircraft allow the VTA to support manydifferent missions from VIP flights, to small
cargo, to transporting tanks and aircraft. Additionally, these aircraft tend to have larger fueltanks allowing for extended missions without
refueling to increase efficiency.437

60Space Troops:438 These forces within the
Aerospace Forces have the mission of conducting space launches and maintaining the ballistic missile early warning system, the satellite
control network, and the space object surveillance and identification network.439, 440, 441

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Russian Combat Aircraft – Fighters 442, 443, 444, 445, 446

Fighter Aircraft

1612-11138

Entered Service

Role

Su-35S

2014

Multi-Role Fighter

Su-30SM2014

Multi-Role Fighter

Su-34

2012

Multi-Role Fighter-Bomber

MiG-31BM

2012

Fighter Interceptor

Su-27SM3

2011

Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-29K/KUB

2009

Multi-Role Naval Fighter

Yak-130

2009

Light Attack Fighter-Trainer

MiG-29N/SE

2009

Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-29SMT

2006

Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-29UBT

2006

Multi-Role Fighter

Su-27SM2006

Fighter Interceptor

Su-30M2/MK2

2003

Multi-Role Fighter

Su-33

1994

Naval Multi-Role Fighter

Su-27P/S

1986

Fighter Interceptor

Su-27UB

1990

Fighter Interceptor

MiG-291983

Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-31

1981

Fighter Interceptor

MiG-29M/M2

2018

Multi-Role Fighter

MiG-35S

2018

Multi-Role Fighter

PAK-FA

2020

5th Generation Multi-Role Fighter

LMFS

Circa 2030

Light Weight Multi-Role Fighter

PAK-DP

Circa 2030

Multi-Role Fighter Interceptor

I N T E L L I G E N C E
D E F E N S E

Developmental

A G E N C Y

Operational

61

Russian Bombers 447, 448, 449, 450, 451

1612-11107

Bomber AircraftEntered Service

Role

Tu-95MSM BEAR

2015

Modified Strategic/Tactical Bomber

Tu-160M BLACKJACK

2014

Modified Strategic/Tactical Bomber

Tu-22M3M BACKFIRE

2014

Modified Regional Bomber

Tu-1601987

Legacy Strategic Bomber

Tu-95MS1983

Legacy Strategic Bomber

Tu-22M3

1981

Legacy Regional Bomber

Tu-160M2

2020

New Build Strategic/Tactical Bomber

PAK-DA

2025+

Future Strategic/Tactical Bomber

Developmental

Integrated Air Defense System
Russia employs what is considered to be among
the very best of modern military integrated air
defense systems. Historically, Russia has beena leader in developing technologically advanced
detection and engagement elements. During the
1990s, Russia largely maintained its research62

and development programs for air defense equipment.452 During this period, Russia purchased
very few of these systems for domestic use.453
However, the State Armaments Program of 2015,
and the subsequent 2020 plan, significantly
enhanced support for the purchase and employment of the newest and most capable air defense
equipment including radar, surface to air mis-

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

siles, command and control, and electronic warfare equipment. Concurrent to the acquisition
plan, Russia continues to support research anddevelopment efforts in the air defense realm.454
The military integrated air defense system killchain provides the framework for the Russian
design, deployment, and command hierarchy of
deployed air defense assets. The kill chain con-tains the seven elements that a fully functional
Russian military integrated air defense system
would employ in an air defense scenario.
To support the kill chain (outlined below), Russia
employs redundant and overlapping systems.455
Russia employs its military integrated air defense
system at home and abroad. The military inte-

Russian Military Integrated Air Defense System Kill Chain

Human intelligence, signals intelligence, open-source information,
over-the-horizon radar

Detection

Air surveillance radar, airborne early warning and control radar,passive Detection system, ship-based radar, visual observation,
secondary surveillance radar

Identification

Secondary surveillance radar, visual identification, non-conformity
with approved routes

Tracking

Integration of detection data into data processing and command &control elements to maintain positional data on an airborne threat

Assignment

Command & control (variable echelon, based on threat conditionand other factors) takes track data and assigns target tracks toweapons platforms

Engagement

Surface to Air Missiles, Air to Air Missiles, Air Defense Artillery,
Electronic Warfare

Assessment

Verification of engagement: air surveillance radar, airborne early
warning and control radar, passive detection system, ship-based
radar, visual observer, secondary surveillance radar in conjunction
with command & control elements

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Indications andwarning

A G E N C Y

Associated Equipment/Process

D E F E N S E

Kill Chain Element1612-11110

63

grated air defense system also plays a significant
role in Russia’s domestic defense and expeditionary operations.456 Russia’s initial deployments to
Crimea and Syria included the Pantsir and S-300
air defense systems. These systems allowed Russia to build an echelon-based air defense systemin the Crimean Peninsula.457 At a later pointin the Crimean and Syrian operations, Russia

deployed long-range strategic surface to air missile systems in both countries.458

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
In 2008, Russia lagged behind the world in development of UAVs. However, the 2008 Georgia
conflict accelerated efforts with initial require-

Russian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles459, 460

UAV

1612-11113

Entered Service

Role

2009

Tactical UAV

2010

Tactical UAV

Zastava

2013

Tactical UAV

Orlan-102013

Tactical UAV

Forpost2013

Tactical & Strategic UAV

Rubezh-20 / Granat-4

2013

Tactical UAV

Takhion2014

Tactical UAV

Orion/Inokhodets

2018

Tactical & Strategic UAV

Altius-M

2019

Strategic UAV

Gonshchik

2020+

Tactical & Strategic UAV

Okhotnik-B/U

2025+

Medium Weight UCAVOperational
Pchela-1K
Zala 421-08
Grusha / Granat-1

Developmental

64

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Newly modified aerodynamic systems in
Syria demonstrate that Russian airpower
has returned in limited numbers. Similar
efforts with newly upgraded air combat systems have been used in the Crimea/Black Sea
and Baltic regions with Russian expectations
that provocative moves by the United States
and/or NATO will be met with more capable
Russian air power. Finally, a slowly improved
strategic bomber force (i.e., Tu-95MS BEAR
and Tu-160 BLACKJACK) is again using
Cold War concepts to conduct international
flights that impinge upon the sovereign borders of foreign nations.465
A G E N C Y

Russia’s fleet of aircraft is aging, but they are
rapidly modernizing their air force as well as
their air defense systems. When the Soviet
Union collapsed in 1991, Russia’s air force
entered a decline as industry and operational
units languished. Since 2008, however, the Russian Air Force and Navy have invested unprecedented financial resources toward airpower toinclude the upgrade and/or new build of approx-

imately 700 combat fighter/bomber aircraft
through 2020 to replace legacy systems.462, 463, 464

I N T E L L I G E N C E

ments focused on tactical reconnaissance systems that currently dominate inventory. Russia
has introduced a class of mini-UAVs for use by
the military, but the most significant defense
developments are occurring with larger, morecapable systems for tactical and strategic use.
Russia is also working on unmanned combat
aerial vehicles (UCAVs).461

D E F E N S E

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

65

APPENDIX D: Russian Navy
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991,
as well as the economic stagnation that followed,
led to a severe downsizing for the Navy. Naval
construction ground to a halt, and the fleet fell
into disrepair and obsolescence.466 Under Vladimir Putin, however, the Russian military’s
capabilities have undergone significant improvement, and the Navy is no exception.
The Russian Navy has approximately 130,000
personnel.467 The combined major forces of thecurrent Russian Navy number about onesixth to one-quarter of what was the Soviet
Navy in its heyday. That legacy force today
has an average age exceeding 20–25 years.
With the economic stabilization of the Russian Federation in the early 2000s, the past

10 years have seen a steady increase in themaintenance, training, and deployment activity of the Navy and, more importantly, theactivation of a broad submarine and ship construction program to recapitalize the fleet.
The Navy’s missions remain focused on strategic deterrence and homeland defense. Periodic distant deployments support the RussianFederation’s global foreign policy interests.
The Navy operates nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines, which are an essential
arm of Russia’s nuclear triad and capable ofdelivering nuclear warheads from thousandsof kilometers away. This strategic capability
puts the Russian Navy in the top tier of foreign navies.468

Russian Navy Organization

1612-11111

Russian Navy

66

Northern Fleet
Joint Strategic
Command (OSK)

Eastern
Military
District/(OSK)Western
Military
District/(OSK)Southern
Military
District/(OSK)Southern
Military
District/(OSK)Northern
Fleet

Pacific Fleet

Baltic Fleet

Black Sea
Fleet

CaspianFlotillaRUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Structure
The headquarters of the Russian Navy islocated in St. Petersburg. The Russian Federation Navy consists of four fleets (Baltic,
Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific) and a flotillain the Caspian Sea. The fleets receive administrative orders and guidance from the Navy
Staff in St. Petersburg, whereas operational
orders are issued from the various Joint Strategic Commands (OSKs).469 Each fleet and theCaspian Flotilla is operationally subordinate
to one of these OSKs.

tegic nuclear triad.470 Russia’s only operational
aircraft carrier is also based in the Northern
Fleet, along with the Navy’s only nuclear-powered heavy cruiser.471 Surface combatants andsubmarines deploy worldwide from the Kola
Gulf, playing an active role in the ongoing
Syria crisis, conducting counter-piracy patrols
off the Horn of Africa, along with power projection in the North Atlantic and Caribbean. The
Northern Fleet’s two primary missions are toprovide strategic deterrence with its ballistic
missile submarines and to defend the maritime approaches to northwest Russia.472

Northern Fleet
The Northern Fleet is Russia’s most capable
naval force. Based in Severomorsk, located in
the Kola Gulf (the only ice-free direct accessto the North Atlantic), its seven operationalballistic missile submarines provide the bulkof the firepower for the Navy’s arm of the stra-Black Sea Fleet
The Black Sea Fleet for years has been a fleet indecline, forced to operate with a handful of Soviet-era vessels. Beginning in 2014 after the occu-

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Image Source: AFP

D E F E N S E

GRIGOROVICH frigate.

The Pacific Fleet lags behind the Northern
Fleet in terms of maintenance and overall capability; however, it is still able to conduct strategic nuclear strikes against the U.S. mainland,
and its surface units are active from the Pacificregion to the Horn of Africa.473 The Pacific Fleet
has its headquarters in Vladivostok, but its
forces are split between two main locations withthe majority of surface ships and diesel powered
submarines in the Vladivostok region and thenuclear powered submarines, including the
SSBNs, located in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.474, 475 The workhorses of the PACFLT are
four UDALOY-class destroyers, which are regularly deployed throughout the region.476

A G E N C Y

Pacific Fleet

67

pation of Crimea, new units began to enter theorder of battle including modern coastal missiles
and naval infantry.477 Then in 2015, new submarines and surface combatants began to arrive tobolster the fleet. Now armed with the KALIBR
missile system, the Black Sea Fleet is a significant force in the region and over the next few
years could have as many as six new attack submarines and six new surface ships, which can
not only exert control on the Black Sea, but canoperate in the Mediterranean to counter NATO
forces and support operations in Syria.478

regional economic disputes. The KALIBR land
attack cruise missile gives Moscow a precision strike weapon that can range targets inCentral Asia, the Middle East, and parts ofEurope, as evidenced by strikes into Syria in
October 2015.483 Most of the flotilla’s combat
power (all of the KALIBR shooters) are based at
Makhachkala, possibly to be closer to regional
threats and also to avoid having to navigate
the Volga River Delta to reach the sea, as is thecase with ships based at Astrakhan.484, 485

Naval Aviation
Baltic Fleet
The majority of Baltic Fleet vessels are located at
Baltiysk in the Kaliningrad Oblast with a handful
further north near St. Petersburg.479 Headquartered at Kaliningrad, the fleet’s mission focuseson specifically ensuring sea-lines of communication and trade are open between Kaliningrad and
St. Petersburg, and in countering NATO forces in
the region.480, 481 The Baltic Fleet has also been akey player in support of Russian interests in the
Eastern Mediterranean Sea and Horn of Africa.482
With the arrival of two KALIBR-equipped vessels in 2016, the Baltic fleet presents a significant
long-range precision conventional and theater
nuclear strike threat to Western Europe.

Caspian Sea Flotilla
The Caspian Sea Flotilla is the dominant naval
force on the Caspian Sea and was the first Russian surface force operationally equipped with
the KALIBR missile system. Russia’s naval
superiority ensures Moscow has leverage in68

Naval aviation assets are spread throughfour fleet air forces, each with composite regiments under their command. The main missions of naval aviation are to track and destroy
enemy submarines and warships and also help
achieve air superiority where the fleet is operating.486 Most naval aviation aircraft are landbased; the only aircraft carrier, ADMIRALKUZNETSOV, can accommodate 22 strike aircraft and 17 attack helicopters.487

Submarine Forces
Russia’s sea-based strategic deterrent is deployedin the Northern and Pacific Fleets. There are six
DELTA IV SSBNs, one DOLGORUKIY SSBN,
and one remaining TYPHOON SSBN used as atest platform in the north. Three DELTA III and
two DOLGORUKIY SSBNs are in the Pacific. All
sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carriedby these submarines—SS-N-18 (DELTA III),
SS-N-23 (DELTA IV), and SS-N-32 (DOLGORUKIY)—can reach U.S. targets from their home-Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Non-nuclear diesel-electric submarines round out
the Russian submarine forces. These units are
assigned to all fleets for close-in area defense missions in adjacent seas. Older and newer versionsof the KILO class comprise most of this force: sixin the Northern Fleet, two in the Baltic, three new
KALIBR-equipped units in the Black Sea, andeight older KILO class in the Pacific. The newest KILO version continues in construction withthree more units destined for the Black Sea Fleet
and eventually another six for the Pacific Fleet.
A single PETERSBURG-class improved design
experimental unit is in the Northern Fleet with
two additional units to be completed. A futurenon-nuclear, KALINA design, likely having an
air independent propulsion plant, is in development with construction projected after 2020.

The Russian Navy’s major combatant surface
ships, frigates and larger, comprise some 32
units assigned across all 4 fleets.
• The Northern Fleet has Russia’s only aircraft carrier (KUZNETSOV), one nuclear-powered KIROV-class cruiser, one conventionally powered SLAVA-class cruiser,and four UDALOY-class destroyers. The
first new GORSHKOV-class (KALIBR)
guided missile frigate was recently commissioned with more expected. This fleet also
has 12 minor anti-ship and anti-submarine combatant ships, as well as 4 ROPUCHA-class amphibious assault ships.
• The Baltic Fleet has nine major ships—two
older SOVREMENNYY-class destroyers
and seven frigates: one KRIVAK-class, two
NEUSTRASHIMYY-class, and four new
STEREGUSHCHIY-class units. It recently
received two SVIYAZHSK-class (KALIBR)
guided missile patrol ships. These are supplemented by 18 minor combatants and 4amphibious assault ships.
• The Black Sea Fleet has one SLAVA-classcruiser, one 47-year-old KASHIN-classdestroyer, two older KRIVAK-class frigates, and the first of a planned six new
GRIGOROVICH-class (KALIBR) frigates.
More new construction units are expected
for the Black Sea Fleet. The fleet is supplemented by 15 minor combatants and 7
amphibious assault ships.
• The Caspian Flotilla has two GEPARD-classfrigates (one with KALIBR) and recently
received two new ASTRAKHAN-class patrol
ships and three SVIYAZHSK-class (KALIBR-capable) guided missile patrol ships.

A G E N C Y

These SSBNs are protected by nuclear-powered cruise missile and torpedo attack submarines, which also engage enemy surface andsubmarine forces and pose a land attack cruise
missile threat against an enemy homeland. In
the Northern Fleet, these attack submarines
include three OSCAR II and one SEVERODVINSK SSGNs and three VICTOR III, six
AKULA I/II, and four SIERRA SSNs. The
SEVERODVINSK class is new, extremely quiet
and is armed with a wide range of advanced
cruise missiles to destroy enemy ships and targets ashore. The Pacific Fleet has five OSCAR
II SSGNs and four AKULA I SSNs. It will eventually receive SEVERODVINSK SSGNs. A new
fifth-generation general purpose nuclear-powered submarine is under development.

Surface Forces

I N T E L L I G E N C E

base piers and, if required, could be launchedwith the submarines on the surface.

D E F E N S E

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

69• Finally, the Pacific Fleet has seven major
ships: one SLAVA-class cruiser, four UDALOYclass and two SOVREMENNYY-class destroyers. These are supplemented by 24 minor
anti-ship and anti-submarine combatants
and 4 amphibious assault ships.
The Russian Navy has several weapons upgrade
programs in progress. The new SS-N-32
BULAVA submarine launched ballistic missile
is being produced for the DOLGORUKIY-class
SSBNs. The most consequential development
is that Russia plans to deploy KALIBR capability on all new design construction nuclear andnon-nuclear submarines, corvettes, frigates, andlarger surface ships. KALIBR provides evenmodest platforms, such as corvettes, with significant offensive capability and, with the use ofland attack missiles, all platforms have a significant ability to hold distant fixed ground targets
at risk using conventional warheads. The prolif-

70

eration of this capability within the new RussianNavy is profoundly changing its ability to deter,
threaten, or destroy adversary targets.
Although the Navy is mainly made up of Soviet-era surface ships and submarines, an extensive modernization program is underway,
focusing first on the submarine force.488, 489, 490
Progress in submarine modernization is underway; however, the majority of the naval inventory still consists of aging units from the 1980s
and 1990s. While more new classes of ships
are planned, the Navy will have to maintainits older fleet for several years until these newvessels come online. Despite this, Russia is
still capable of deploying its assets worldwide,
best evidenced by continuous support to Russian operations in Syria since 2012 and recurring counter-piracy deployments to the Gulf ofAden since 2008.491, 492

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

APPENDIX E: Russian Special Operations Forces

A G E N C Y

Within Russia, the term Spetsnaz is often
misappropriated and misattributed. Moscow’s
true Spetsnaz force is a relatively small, selectgroup of mission-dedicated special purpose
forces, primarily belonging to the militaryand its Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)(e.g., the Defense Ministry’s ground and naval
Spetsnaz units), and to a lesser extent, thesecurity services of the National Guard, Federal Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and Justice and Emergency Situations Ministries.495 Estimated tonumber 20,000–30,000 personnel, Spetsnaz
units in these organizations all retain distinct
and separate missions from one another. The
single largest contingent with which recent
and visible exploits of Spetsnaz are attributed
reside with the GRU.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

These predecessor units became pivotal in
defining the hallmark missions of the modern Spetsnaz force, from diversionary acts
conducted by partisan units behind Germanlines in World War II to deep reconnaissanceand intelligence collection, reflecting the postwar perception of a potential conflict with
the West during the Cold War.494 These tra-ditional missions—with slight modificationsand variations—still manifest themselves inSpetsnaz doctrine and are associated with
Moscow’s recent strategy of using indirect
action, albeit with the wider aim of achieving
goals while avoiding a large-scale conflict.

D E F E N S E

Russia’s special operations forces are popularly known by the abbreviation “Spetsnaz,”short for Spetsial’noye naznacheniye, aterm meaning “special purpose.” Spetsnaz,
although similar to special operations forcesin Western countries, retains a slightly different set of roles and missions than those commonly found elsewhere. The current incarnation of Spetsnaz traces its origin back to naval
and ground units created back in the mid1950s to establish a dedicated special purpose force to operate with the armed forces,
although its wider lineage can be attributed
to counterrevolutionary and partisan units
formed during the Russian Revolution andWorld War II, respectively.493

71

APPENDIX F: Russian Intelligence Services
Russia has three primary intelligence services: the Federal Security Service (FSB), theForeign Intelligence Service (SVR), and theMain Intelligence Directorate of the General
Staff (GRU). The FSB and SVR trace theirlineage to the old Soviet Committee of State
Security (KGB). Although the FSB and SVR
are considered military services under Russian federal law, they are more akin to civilian intelligence agencies.496

The Federal Security Service
The FSB has three primary missions: countering foreign intelligence services, combattingorganized crime, and ensuring economic andfinancial security. It is also the Russian leadcounterterrorism organization.497 President
Vladimir Putin launched a major reorganization of the FSB during his first term, placing
the organization under the president’s directcontrol. The FSB has continued to grow, integrating the Border Guard Service of Russia
and the Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI).

72

The Foreign Intelligence Service
The SVR is Russia’s main external intelligenceagency; it focuses on civilian affairs, whereas
the GRU focuses on military affairs. According
to Russian law, the SVR is authorized to carryout the following missions:498• Conduct intelligence.
• Implement active measures (disinformation,
propaganda, etc.) to ensure Russia's security.
• Conduct military, strategic, economic,
scientific, and technological espionage.
• Protect employees of Russian institutions
overseas and their families.
• Provide personal security for Russian
government officials and their families.
• Conduct joint operations with foreign
security services.
• Conduct electronic surveillance inforeign countries.

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Responsibilities of Russian Intelligence Services 499, 500, 501, 502
Military
Intelligence

CounterIntelligence

Political
Security

Law
Enforcement

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Subsidiary Role

D E F E N S E

FederalProtection
Service (FSO)
National
Interior
Guard
Ministry(developing) (MVD)
Main Role

Measures ofSupportA G E N C Y

Main Intelligence
ForeignFederalSovietDirectorate
Intelligence
Security
KGB(GRU)
Service (SVR) Service (FSB)

Political
EconomicIntelligence Intelligence1612-11140

73

GRU Headquarters Moscow.503, 504
Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright

The Main Intelligence Directorateof the General Staff
The GRU is the Ministry of Defense’s foreign intelligence organization that provides
military intelligence for the General Staff,
Ministry of Defense, and senior government
officials.505, 506, 507, 508 The GRU’s responsibilities
include providing senior political and military leadership with all-source intelligence,
including indications and warning of strategic threats and information to assist leadership in making decisions regarding Russia’sarmaments program.509, 510 GRU operations
abroad involve human intelligence (HUMINT)

74

collection on potential enemies’ militaryindustrial capabilities, troop movements, andweapon systems.511, 512 The GRU manages military attachés, intelligence analysis, cryptanalysis, space-based assets, telecommunications
intercept capabilities, and radio-electronic
and telecommunications-based offensive capabilities.513, 514 It also oversees Spetsnaz units
and special operations forces.515, 516, 517, 518 GRU
operational combat and advisory roles have
expanded dramatically in the past decade,involving military operations in Ukraine’s
Crimea region, eastern Ukraine, and Syria.
519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

APPENDIX G: Defense Industry and Modernization Programs

A G E N C Y

Since May 2013, Putin has chaired week-longworking groups with the Defense Ministry anddefense industry leadership twice a year tomonitor program implementation and oversee
adjustments.541, 542, 543 By 2014, Putin decreed
himself Chairman of the VPK, probably toensure that defense modernization efforts
were fulfilled within economic constraints.544, 545
At the same time, Defense Minister Shoygu set
up a half dozen new Defense Ministry scientific and technical organizations, headed bymilitary scientists, to place priority on defense
orders that were cutting-edge, Russian-made,and technologically feasible.546, 547

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Challenges, partly due to Western sanctions,have slowed production for some weapons andequipment. Russian industry’s dependence on
weapons production, the depreciation of theruble, and growing interest rates on industrial
loans, which are used to finance facility modernization and production expenses, have increased
business costs for Russian defense firms.532
Russian economists have warned that theresulting imbalance between civilian and military spending could be problematic.533, 534, 535, 536

Russia’s 2011–2020 State Armaments Program reflects President Putin’s ambitious
mandate that 70% of Russia’s weapons inventory consist of new or upgraded equipment by
2020.537, 538 In pursuit of that goal, Putin personally makes decisions about the defense industry’s weapons modernization, production, andfinancing. Putin reestablished the Military
Industrial Commission (VPK) in 2007 to better manage state control of defense production
and acquisition.539, 540

D E F E N S E

Russia’s huge defense industrial complex
focuses predominantly on weapons production,
though the goal is to move toward a combination of military and non-military products.527
President Vladimir Putin and Deputy Premier
Dmitriy Rogozin, whose government portfolio
covers the defense industry, have said that highlevels of spending on the military and defense
industrial complex will benefit the entire
economy.528, 529 In April 2016, Putin announced
Russia’s arms sales from the last year had been
higher than planned, totaling $14.5 billion,
with additional orders for $56 billion, the highest since 1992.530, 531 However, while Moscow’s
pursuit of arms trade deals abroad may help
partially offset challenging financial conditions
and support continued military modernization
goals, significant problems remain.

75

The following are examples of weapons systems in active production, testing, or assimilation into military use, indicating current Russian leadership priorities for defense industry.

Ballistic Missile Sector
A key area of development detailed in Russia’s
2011–2020 State Armament Program are theballistic missile forces, which form the backbone of Moscow’s nuclear triad.548, 549 Russia has
three competent bureaus that specialize in thedesign and development of ballistic missiles.550
Russia’s modernization efforts are driven by anaging missile inventory, the need to maintaina credible launch capability, and concern withthe deployment of anti-missile defense systems
by the United States.551 As of 2015, modernizedsystems only made up 56% of the missile force;
they are scheduled to reach 100% by 2022.552

Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBM)
Russia has several legacy ICBMs in its active
inventory, including the SS-18, SS-19, andSS-25 that are being replaced by the SS-27, Sarmat, and SS-27 Mod 2; replacements should becompleted by 2022.553, 554, 555
The SS-27 is a solid-propellant ICBM (silo andmobile variants), which uses a delivery vehicle made by the Minsk Heavy Wheeled Vehicle Factory in Belarus with launch equipment
added by TsKb Titan in Volgograd. The SS-27
missile was designed by several institutes: the76

SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM.
Image Source: Shutterstock

Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology forthe overall design, NPO Soyuz in Lubertsy forthe three solid rocket motors, the All-Union
Scientific Research Institute of Experimental
Physics in Sarov for the nuclear warhead, andGPO Votkinskiy Mekhanicheskiy Zavod in
Votkinsk for final assembly.556, 557, 558
The Sarmat heavy ICBM is still in testing with
the State Missile Center Makeyev and is scheduled to complete development around 2018.559
The missile will be manufactured by the Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant, while the
NPO Energomash-designed motor will be produced by Proton-PM based in Perm.560
A new solid-propellant ICBM, the RS-26(Rubezh), was developed as a lighter version of
the SS-27 and will only be deployed as a mobile
variant sometime in 2017.561 The missile’s lower
weight increases mobility and survivability, andthe RS-26 will make use of various countermeasures to penetrate anti-missile defense systems.562

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

The SS-N-18 SLBM, first deployed in 1978, is a
two-stage liquid-propellant system designed tobe launched from a DELTA III submarine. The
latest version, the SS-N-18 Mod 3, can carry
up to three warheads to a maximum range ofover 5,500 kilometers.564
The SS-N-23, initially deployed in 1989, is athree-stage, liquid-propellant missile designedby the State Missile Center Makeyev. It can
carry four warheads to a range of over 8,000km and is launched from Delta IV submarines.565 An upgrade of the SS-N-23, known as
SINEVA, was completed in 2007 by the Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant.566
The SS-N-32 BULAVA is a solid-propellant,
sea-launched ballistic missile that underwent a
19-year development cycle at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology.567 The BULAVA
can carry up to six independent nuclear warheads to a range of around 8,000 kilometers, is

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)The SS-21 TOCHKA is a mobile, single-stage,solid-propellant missile; it originally entered service around 1976. The latest TOCHKA-U version
entered service in 1990 and is the most capablesystem (maximum range of 120 kilometers, inertial navigation with GLONASS updates, andradar or optical terminal guidance).570, 571
SS-26 ISKANDER-M is a mobile, single-stage, solid-propellant missile that is
replacing the SS-21. The ISKANDER isequipped with an inertial/GLONASS guidance system and either radar, electro-optical, or infrared image matching terminal guidance system, enabling it to strikemoving targets.572

A G E N C Y

Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)

in service on the DOLGORUKIY-class submarines, and is replacing older SLBMs in the Russian inventory.568, 569

I N T E L L I G E N C E

In addition, Russian officials claim a new classof hypersonic vehicle is being developed to allow
Russian strategic missiles to penetrate missile
defense systems. Hypersonic glide vehicles aremaneuverable vehicles that travel at hypersonic(typically greater than Mach 5) speed and spend
most of their flight at much lower altitudes
than a typical ballistic missile. Press reporting
claimed a successful test of this system from an
SS-19 booster occurred in April 2016.563

Russian ISKANDER-M missile system.
Image Source: AFP

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77

Cruise Missile Sector
Russia’s 2011–2020 State Armament Program
also places a priority focus on the development
and production of highly capable cruise missile
systems.573 Russia has invested heavily in thedevelopment of air-, ground-, and sea-launchedcruise missiles, and the development or refurbishment of associated launch platforms.574 In
addition to developing domestic variants, Russia
is focused on producing export variants of several cruise missile systems to remain competitive in the international arms market.575

Russia’s Tactical Missile Corporation
Russia’s Federal Target Program for “Restructuring and Development of [the] Defense Industry (2002–2006)” and a Presidential decree inJanuary 2002 prompted the establishment of theTactical Missile Corporation (KRTV). The corporation, which has oversight of 30 weapon manufacturing enterprises, is Russia’s largest developer and producer of anti-ship, anti-radar, andmultipurpose missiles for tactical airborne, shipborne, and coastal cruise missile systems.576, 577
In 2014, the General Director of KRTV reported
that the corporation received about $1 billion
from the Federally Targeted Program for theDevelopment of the Defense Industry (OPK)
through 2020 to help modernize and re-equip
production facilities.578, 579 To increase production capacity, Russia focused on improving
production facilities in anticipation of the highproduction demands under the State Armament Program 2020.580

78

Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM)
Russia is in the process of refurbishing its
long-range strategic bombers to carry the newest air-launched cruise missiles, the Kh-101(conventional) and the Kh-102 (nuclear-variant). These missiles were developed by the
Raduga Science and Production Association[Machine-Building Design Bureau], a Tactical Missile Corporation subsidiary located in
Dubna.581 The missiles are the follow-on system to the Kh-55, the main armament of Russia’s Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers.582, 583

Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM)
The KALIBR-family of cruise missiles aresome of Russia’s most capable systems.
Designed by the Novator Design Bureau, a
subsidiary of Almaz-Antey, the KALIBR-classmissiles are the more capable domestic versions of the CLUB-family, which Russia hasexported for several years.584 The KALIBR
class of missiles reportedly has an operational
range up to 2,500 kilometers and has a lower
flight profile than other Russian cruise missile systems.585, 586 The 3M-14 (SS-N-30A) is along-range, land-attack cruise missile capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads.587 The 3M-54 (SS-N-27A) is an antiship missile, capable of being launched fromsubmarine and surface ships.588
The ONIKS (SS-N-26) anti-ship cruise missile is another capable weapon system produced in Russia that also has a land-based
variant, the BASTION mobile shore-based
missile complex.589

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Russia is also developing and testing the
TSIRKON, its first hypersonic anti-ship cruise
missile. This missile, which is expected to enter
service in 2018, will have a 500 to 1,000-km
range.590 Once operational, the nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV will be one of the first naval vessels tocarry these cruise missiles.591
Russia demonstrated some of its newest capabilities in military technology in its Syria campaign. Russia’s use of the KALIBR sea-launchedcruise missile, including launches from a submerged submarine, and of the Kh-101 airlaunched cruise missile for the first time in acombat situation demonstrated its advancements in precision-guided munitions.592

Long-Range SAMs
Russia is adding new defense infrastructure
to increase production of its newest long-range
SAM system, the S-400; S-400 (SA-21) regiments are operational throughout Russia.597, 598

S-400 long-range SAM system.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Almaz-Antey is Russia’s primary company
responsible for development and production of air
defense systems, including land-based and naval
short, medium, and long-range air defense missile systems, ground surveillance radar stations,and automated control systems. Almaz-Anteyformed in 2002 as a result of a merger between
Antey Corporation and NPO Almaz.595, 596

The ANTEY-2500 is a long-range air defense
system that reportedly can engage short-andintermediate-range ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, precision-guided weapons, strategic
and tactical aircraft, as well as early warningand electronic warfare aircraft.599

D E F E N S E

Russia’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems
remain among the best in the world, and Russia
maintains a robust production capacity to satisfy both domestic and export requirements. In
recent years, Russia has also developed several
highly-capable SAM systems and has invested
in new infrastructure to support aggressive
SAM production schedules.593 Many countries,
including China, are interested in acquiring
some of Russia’s longer-range systems.594

A G E N C Y

Image Source: AFP

Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM)

ANTEY-2500 long-range SAM system.
Image Source: AFP

79

Short-to-Medium Range
Priority SAMs
The PANTSIR-S/S1 is a short-range air defense
system developed by the KBP (Instrument Design
Bureau) Tula. It is armed with 12 missiles and two
30-mm anti-aircraft guns; for target acquisition andtracking it uses two radars and an electro-opticalsystem. It was designed to defend ground installations and longer-range SAM systems against avariety of weapon systems, including fixed-wing
aircraft and helicopters, precision guided missiles
and cruise missiles, and unmanned air vehicles.600
It is usually deployed as a battery of 4–6 combat
vehicles per site and each combat vehicle canengage up to four targets simultaneously. Russian
air force plans to acquire 100–120 PANTSIR-S/S1
combat vehicles by 2020.601

Developmental Systems
The S-500 is a developmental system expected tohave the capability to simultaneously engage 10
targets at a maximum range of 600 kilometers;
it is expected to be operational around 2020.602
The Vityaz is a short-to-medium-range SAM
system; Russia hopes to produce up to 30 systems by 2020.603 The Vityaz system reportedly
can carry two types of missiles, the 9M96E
missiles or the 9M100.

trols 18 companies responsible for the design
and production of most military and civilian
aircraft.604, 605 UAC will have to deliver over
1,000 new airplanes and helicopters to Russia’s military forces by 2020 to meet modernization goals established in the 2011–2020
State Armament Program.606

Bombers
Russia plans to upgrade and operate its fleetof Tu-160/BLACKJACK, Tu-95MS BEAR H,
and Tu-22M/BACKFIRE bombers beyond
2030.607, 608 The upgrades are intended to keep
older aircraft operational until the fifth-generation PAK-DA bomber reaches production. The
PAK-DA will have new navigation systems andthe capability to deploy Kh-101/Kh-102 airlaunched cruise missiles (ALCMs).609, 610, 611, 612, 613
Russia has restarted Tu-160M2/BLACKJACK
initial production to fill a critical gap in aircraft availability. Serial production of new
Tu-160M2/BLACKJACK bombers is scheduled
to begin no earlier than 2023 at the Kazan Aircraft Plant. The new bombers will have NK-32

Air Sector
In 2006, Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) was created to consolidate aircraft design and production companies under
one state controlled corporation. UAC con-80

PAK-FA (T-50) fighter.
Image Source: AFP

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Russian fighter production occurs at several
plants, including the Sukhoi Aircraft-Manufacturing Plants in Komsomolsk, Irkutsk andNovosibirsk, which produce the Su-30SM,
Su-34, and Su-35; the MiG plants in Lukhovitsy
and Nizhniy Novgorod produce the MiG-29.615
The fifth-generation fighter (PAK-FA) program began in 2008 and is a high-priority item
for the Russian air force. Six flying prototype
aircraft were completed through 2016, withadditional prototype aircraft in testing by theend of 2016. The Ministry of Defense plans tostart serial production this year with the goalof producing 12 for the air force by 2020.616, 617

Helicopters
The state corporation Russian Helicopters
operates five primary helicopter plants that
produce the Ka 52 and Mi-28 attack variants,
Mi-8/17, Mi-35, Mi-26, and ANSAT for thearmed forces and for export.618, 619 Moscow’s previous reliance on helicopter engines producedin Ukraine has not adversely affected Russia’sability to meet the needs of its military.620

Transport Aircraft
The UAC is responsible for operating two large
aircraft production plants at Kazan and Ulyanovsk. Russia is producing its new transport,
the Il-76MD-90A, which is a redesign of theNaval Sector
In an effort to streamline the design and construction of surface ships and submarines,
President Putin established the United Shipbuilding Corporation in 2007 to provide oversight of all major domestic military and civilian shipbuilding. The corporation includes
approximately 40 companies, including design
bureaus and shipyards. Russia is currently
upgrading and modernizing its naval fleet, constructing multi-role platforms with modular
designs. 624 However, some new platforms
have taken up to, or over, a decade to complete construction and to enter into service as
Russia’s shipbuilding industry is besieged bysanctions. Moscow is working to overcome thenegative effects of international sanctions bybecoming more self-reliant, indigenously producing components formerly purchased fromforeign suppliers.625
Russia currently has eight operational shipyards
dedicated to surface ship and submarine construction. While construction of patrol boats andcorvettes has continued at a steady pace, major
combatants and amphibious ships have encountered significant delays. For example, the Yantar
Shipyard has faced difficulties meeting production deadlines during construction of the GRIGOROVICH FFG and IVAN GREN LST.

A G E N C YFighters

Il-76/CANDID transport, and plans to produce
39 Il-76MD-90A planes by 2020.621 The Ilyushin Design Bureau has begun developmentof the Il-78MD-90A refueler and the Il-112
light military transport, based on Il-76 airframe design.622, 623

I N T E L L I G E N C E

engines, which will be produced at the Samara-based enterprise Kuznetsov, currently being
modernized to start production by 2020.614

D E F E N S E

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

81

Surface Combatants
Construction of the ADMIRAL GRIGOROVICH and GORSHKOV-class frigates, alongwith the STEREGUSHCHIY-class corvette,
was to mark Russia’s return as a shipbuilding
power and are intended to become the backbone of the fleet. A total of 17 of the ships (6GRIGOROVICH, 4 GORSHKOV, and 8 STEREGUSHCHIY) were ordered to be built. Finaldelivery of over half of these ships was disrupted due to the lack of gas turbine and diesel engines from Ukraine’s Zorya-MashproyektState Gas-Turbine Manufacturing Enterprise.626
Delivery of three GRIGOROVICH and two
GORSHKOV frigates were eventually cancelled because domestically-produced gas-turbine engines would not be ready before 2020.
The imported engines for the STEREGUSHCHIY corvettes have been replaced by domestic diesel engines produced by the Kolomna
Engine Plant in Moscow, allowing for the production of corvettes and patrol boats to continue at a steady pace in spite of construction
delays to the larger ships.627

The Russian Navy has one operational aircraft carrier in its inventory, the 26-yearold ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV, which is
expected to enter a 2- to 3-year overhaul
period beginning in 2018. This overhaul is
not scheduled to consist of any major modernization or modifications and will keep
the KUZNETSOV in the fleet until a new
aircraft carrier becomes operational.628 The
Murmansk Shipyard is planning to convert
and enlarge its drydock to overhaul theKUZNETSOV and to provide maintenance/
repair service for large commercial ships.
When complete, the result will be the country’s largest drydock (400 x 80 meters).629
Russia is planning to start the design of
a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (theShtorm) in 2020, with completion by 2030.
Based on a model mock-up and initial information, the carrier will have a beam of 40
meters and draft of 11 meters. Shtorm willbe 330 meters in length, shorter than the
U.S. Navy’s newest carrier but 10% longer and wider than the KUZNETSOV. The
Shtorm will have RITM-200 nuclear reactors, a catapult, and two ski-jump ramps forlaunching aircraft and will be able to carry
up to 90 aircraft and helicopters.630

Submarines

GORSHKOV-class Frigate.
Image Source: Shutterstock82

Historically the backbone of the Russian Navy,
75% of the 61 operational submarines are over
20 years old and are slowly being replaced. Russia will continue production of its fourth-generation DOLGORUKIY-class submarines
through 2020. There are currently three inBuilding a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

Since 2010, there have been significant improvements in the condition of Russian ground arms,
including the modernization and upgrade of
the main battle tank (MBT) inventory. The
active inventory includes the T-72, T-80U, andT-90 MBTs.635 The T-72 is one of Russia’s oldest
active MBTs and has been upgraded to include
substantial enhancements in explosive reactive
armor, electronic components, and enhanced
navigation systems.636 Russia’s newest in-service
MBT, the T-90, features the new Sonsa-U sighting systems and Shtora soft-kill active protection
system.637 While Russia’s Ministry of Defense
planned to phase out the T-80, the Omsk Transport Machine Building Plant, one of Russia’s two
MBT production and modernization facilities, isplanning to upgrade the T-80U with Sosna-U,
Relikt third-generation dynamic protection complex, and advanced radio and C2 systems. 638

New Technology

YASEN SSGN Hull 1.
Image Source: Shutterstock

The Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) Corporation is Russia’s primary MBT production and modernization center and is responsible for the productionof Russia’s newest MBT (the Armata) to fulfill
part of the 2020 and 2025 State Armament Program.639, 640 The new-generation T-14 Armata
MBT is being used as a common chassis for the
Army’s heavy armored vehicles, including the
T-15 Armata heavy infantry fighting vehicle(IFV) and the Koalitsiya-SV 2S35 self-propelled
howitzer.641 This universal platform offers theRussian defense industry a more streamlined

A G E N C Y

The YASEN-class SSGN (Project 855, aka
SEVERODVINSK) will replace aging VICTORIII SSNs. The YASEN is produced at the
Sevmash shipyard; the first of up to 10 hulls
was delivered to the Navy in 2014, but the
program has encountered delays. The flagshipof the class (hull 1) required 16 years to complete; hull 2 should soon be completed after
7 years.633 Modernization and upgrade efforts
are occurring on the OSCAR II SSGN and
SIERRA II SSNs. The improved KILO SSK
class (Project 636.3) is being produced without significant delays. The initial order of 6
was expanded to 12 in early 2016. The first
three KILOS were delivered to the Black Sea
Fleet in 2014–2015.634

Ground Arms

I N T E L L I G E N C E

service, with an additional eight scheduled toenter service in the coming years. Russia is alsoplanning to construct a fifth-generation strategic missile SSBN between 2031 and 2050.631, 632

D E F E N S E

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

83

T-14 Armata Tank.
Image Source: AFP

means of armored vehicle production and will
reduce maintenance and modernization costs inthe future.

84

Like the Armata, the Kurganets-25—slated
to begin production in 2018—will provide alighter, universal tracked platform for new
IFVs and armored personnel carriers.642 The
Bumerang wheeled armored personnel carrier has completed preliminary testing as ofJune 2016.643, 644 Russia will continue to field
the BMP-3 (~700 units), BMP-2 (~1,800 units),
and BMP-1 (~500 units) while new systems
are designed and produced.645 The BMP-3 isRussia’s most modern IFV in service.646

Russian artillery modernization efforts include
the Koalitsiya-SV 2S35 152-mm self-propelled
howitzer, which is intended to be the future of
Russian self-propelled artillery units and will
ultimately phase out the 2S19 Msta-S.647 Severalof Russia’s multiple rocket launchers (MRLs)
have also been improved: the URAGAN 220mm
MRL, the SMERCH 300mm MRL, and the new
TORNADO-2 300 MRL, which is a modernizedversion of the SMERCH.648 Russian MRLs areproduced in large quantities for the Russian
Army and export customers worldwide.649

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

APPENDIX H: Arms Sales

Marketing, contracting, and exporting Russian defense products is executed by statecompany Rosoboronexport (ROE). ROE typically accounts for approximately 85% of Russia’s total exports of weapons and military
hardware. It ships Russian defense products
to about 70 countries and cooperates with

Russia is taking steps to overcome challenges
and remain competitive in the global arms market. ROE increasingly has been offering commercial credit for arms transactions, especiallyto countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa
that cannot afford to purchase expensive equipment or upgrade their armed forces without
financial assistance. Similarly, Russian officials
have acknowledged that exchanging arms foraccess to customers’ natural resources may be

A G E N C Y

Russia’s largest export markets for arms are
the Middle East/North Africa and the Asia-Pacific regions. Russia also maintains sales in
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and someparts of Europe, although at a much lower
level.655 Moscow is seeking to grow its market
share in Southeast Asia and Latin America
especially. Russia also is committed to expanding high-level military technical cooperation
with other member states of BRICS (Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa).656, 657

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Russia is an exporter of nearly every categoryof conventional military equipment, from smallarms to long-range air defense systems andsubmarines. Moscow sees great prospects in the
global arms marketplace for many of its products. In the aircraft sector, Su-35, Su-30 andMiG-29 fighter aircraft, Yak-130 combat trainers, and a variety of Mil and Kamov helicopters
are key products. In the air defense sector, S-400
TRIUMF, ANTEY-2500, BUK-M2E, and TORM2E surface-to-air missile systems, the PANTSIR-S1 air defense missile/gun system, andIGLA-S MANPADS are top sellers. Frigates,
submarines, and patrol boats are best-selling
naval exports. Russia’s land warfare products
are centered on T-90 tanks, BMP-3 infantry
fighting vehicles, and Tigr armored cars.652

over 700 Russian defense industry companies.
ROE is incorporated into Rostec (formerly
known as Russian Technologies or Rostechnologii), the state corporation established in2007 to promote the development, production,and export of civilian and military high technology products.653 Although ROE manages
the majority of Russian arms trade, over 15
companies are authorized to export products
abroad directly, most often spare parts andmaintenance services, and these contracts
account for about $2 billion annually.654

D E F E N S E

Russia remains the second largest arms
exporter worldwide, in terms of the annual
value of both its export contracts and equipment deliveries. Russia’s arms export strategy included planning $13 billion in annual
sales through 2016, and thereafter seeking
growth until 2020.650 In 2016, Russian officials
announced that Moscow exported $14.5 billion
in military products in 2015.651

85necessary to stave off competition from othersuppliers.658 President Putin has expressed
Moscow’s willingness to improve financing
options for contracts, expand offerings for joint
production and local assembly of defense equipment in customers’ countries, and improve upon
post-sale support and equipment servicing.659
Moscow casts itself as a reliable and predictable arms trade partner that does not make86

its commitments dependent on market preferences or political trends.660 Russia also is touting the effectiveness of its combat operationsin Syria and using this to add cachet to its
military products for export. Moscow believes
that advertising many of its weapons systems
as combat-proven will generate additional
interest and orders from customers.661

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Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

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80 Sokirko, Viktor. “Interview with Vladimir Pronichev.” Kom-somolskaya Pravda Online, 11 Oct 2011, http://www.kp.ru/.
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Bordachev, Timofey. "Restless Neighborhood.” Moscow
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81 Russia Federal Penitentiary Service. https://en.wikipedia.

68 Yegorov, Ivan. “Challenge Accepted; Nikolay Patrushev:

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69 Official government document. “The Russian Federation

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70 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving

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71 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving

appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National Security
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72 Official government document. “The Russian Federation

National Security Strategy Through 2020.” Russian Federation
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73 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving

appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National Security
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74 Yaffa, Joshua. “ What the Russian Protests Mean for Putin,”

27 March 2017, www.thenewyorker.com.

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82 Unattributed. “Putin caps Emergencies Ministry headcount.”

83 Wilson, Kyle. “Australia: The puzzle of Putin’s insecurity: prae-torian guards, Stalinist blueprints.” The Strategist, 23 May 2016,
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84 Unattributed. “Chechnya Move Worries Russian Press.”

BBC News Online, 17 Apr 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/.
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85 Milashina, Yelena. "How Putin Has Liquidated Kadyrov's

Army. Edict on the Formation of the National Guard Will Have
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86 Unattributed. “CSTO peacekeepers in exercise in Belarus topractice creation of corridors for refugees.” Moscow Interfax, 24
Aug 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 25 Aug 2016.
87 Unattributed. “CSTO's draft strategy views NATO approach

toward CSTO states' borders as threat to their security – Russian envoy Vasilyev (Part 2).” Moscow Interfax, 29 Jun 2016,
http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 30 Jun 2016.
88 Unattributed. “Soldiers from the Collective Security Treaty

Organisation (CSTO) have called on simulated NATO peacekeeping forces to surrender as part of exercise ‘Cooperation
2016.’" Moscow Zvezda TV, Ministry of Defense TV channel,
19 Aug 2016.
89 Korostikov, Mikhail. "Tajik Mountains Can Barely Hold Out.

75 Yaffa, Joshua. “ What the Russian Protests Mean for Putin,”

27 March 2017, www.thenewyorker.com.

Dushanbe Combating Terrorists and Drug Traffickers Using
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76 Lipman, Maria. “How Putin Silences Dissent: Inside the Krem-

90 Unattributed. "Hopeless Dead End. The Resolution of thelin’s Crackdown,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, pp. 38-47.

77 Lipman, Maria. “How Putin Silences Dissent: Inside the Krem-

lin’s Crackdown,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, pp. 38-47.

Karabakh Conflict Requires a Minimum Trust, Which Is Completely Absent.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 Oct 2016, www.
Ng.ru/nvo/. Accessed 16 Oct 2016.

A G E N C Y

Far Rapprochement Between Russia and China Could Go."78 Unattributed. “Russian National Guard to have central

I N T E L L I G E N C E

64 Kashin and Pyatachkova, "On The Road to an Alliance? HowD E F E N S E

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91

91 Karaganov, S.A. “A Strategy for Russia; Russian Foreign

106 Russian Federation Ministry of Finance. “Annual infor-

92 Karaganov, Sergey. "Russian Foreign Policy: New Stage?

107 State Duma draft law 2428-7, “On introducing amend-

Policy: The End of The 2010s to the Beginning of the 2020s."
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– Group of Established Experts Have Presented Their View of
the Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta
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93 Bocharova, Svetlana. “Siluanov Explained the Growth of theClassified Budget Expenditures.” RBC.ru, 17 Oct 2016. www.
rbc.ru. Accessed 20 Oct 2017.
94 Economist Intelligence Unit. Russia GDP, Exchange Rate,

GDP deflator. eiu.com. Accessed Jun 2017.

95 Unattributed. “Putin signs 2016 Budget Amendments,

Deficit Rises to 3 Trillion Rubles.” Interfax, 24 Nov 2016, http://
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96 Economist Intelligence Unit. Russia GDP, Exchange Rate,

GDP deflator. eiu.com. Accessed Jun 2017.

97 Russian Federation Ministry of Finance. “Annual information

about execution of the federal budget (data from 1 January2006).” National defense line item, http://minfin.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/#. Accessed 28 Nov 2016.

98 Economist Intelligence Unit. Russia GDP, Exchange Rate,

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99 Russian Federation Ministry of Finance. “Annual information

about execution of the federal budget (data from 1 January2006).” National defense line item, http://minfin.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/#. Accessed 28 Nov 2016.
100 State Duma draft law 2428-7. “On introducing amend-

ments in the Federal Law ‘On the Federal Budget in 2016,’”
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101 Cooper, Julian. “Russian State Armament Programme to2020: a quantitative assessment of implementation 2011–2015.” SIPRI, Mar 2016, p. 20.
102 Cooper, p. 14.
103 Prokopenko, Aleksandra. “Расходы прорвали линию

обороны.” Vedomosti Online, 9 Sep 2016.

104 Bocharova, “Siluanov Explained the Growth of the Classi-

fied Budget Expenditures.”

105 Economist Intelligence Unit. Russia GDP, Exchange Rate,

GDP deflator. eiu.com. Accessed Jun 2017.

92

mation about execution of the federal budget (data from 1
January 2006).” National defense line item, http://minfin.ru/ru/
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108 Unattributed. “Russian Finance Ministry suggests 5%budget cuts in 2017.” ITAR-TASS News Agency, 7 Jul 2016.
Accessed 7 Jul 2016.
109 Kuvshinova, Olga. “Доходы бюджета в 2019 годуснизятся до 20-летнего минимума” [Budget Outlays in 2019
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110 Unattributed. “Potential exists for Bashneft sale, but timingof Rosneft privatization needs analysis.” Interfax, 22 Jun 2016,www.interfax.com. Accessed 23 Jun 2016.
111 “Interfax Russia & CIS Banking and Finance Weekly.” Inter-

fax, 12 Aug 2016, www.interfax.com. Accessed 12 Aug 2016.
112 Prokopenko, Alexandra. “Experts Predict 'Lost Decade'for Russia's Stagnating Economy.” The Moscow Times,
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113 Gerasimov, Valery. “Ценность Науки В Предвидении

Новые Вызовы Требуют Переосмыслить Формы ИСпособы Ведения Боевых Действий” [The Value of Science
is in Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking of theForms and Methods of Conducting Combat Actions]. Military-Industrial Courier, 27 Feb 2013.
114 Unattributed. “Russian Chief of General Staff Makarov

Addresses Academy of Military Sciences.” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 19 Feb 2012, http://nvo.ng.ru/.
Accessed 19 Feb 2012.
115 Unattributed. “Numerous military conflicts may devel-

op into full-fledged war – Makarov (Part 2).” Interfax-AVN
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116 Chekinov, Sergey.G. and Bogdanov, Sergey A. “Initial Peri-

ods of Wars and Their Impact on a Country's Preparations fora Future War.” Military Thought, 31 Dec 2012.
117 Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in Foresight.”

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119 Unattributed. “К Вопросу o Ядерном Сдерживании” [On theand Russia's National Security Today.” Military Thought,
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134 Radchuk, V.A. “Determination of Levels of Unacceptable

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120 Felgengauer, Pavel. “Rybkin’s Preventive Strike.” Moscow

135 Ozhegov, S.I. and Shvedova, N.Yu. Encyclopedic Dictio-

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121 Unattributed. “Russia Classifies Information on Pre-emptivenary of the Russian Language. Russian Academy of Science
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136 Unattributed. “К Вопросу o Ядерном Сдерживании” [On the

122 Unattributed. “On Employing Nuclear Weapons to De-Es-

137 Unattributed. “Strategic Deterrence and Russia's National

123 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the

138 Unattributed. “Issues of Strategic Deterrence in Current

calate Military Operations.” Military Thought, 1 May 1999.

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124 Malashenko, E.I. “Creation and Employment of Strategic

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125 Garayev, M.A. "Lessons and Conclusions Drawn from theExperience of the Great Patriotic War for Building Up andTraining the Armed Forces.” Voyennaya Mysl, 5 May 2010.

126 Bogdanov, S.A. "Features of The Initial Period of Past andFuture Wars." Voyennaya Mysl, 1 May 2003.

127 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of theRussian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President
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128 President of the Russian Federation. “2010 Military Doc-trine of the Russian Federation.” 5 Feb 2010, http://www.
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129 Radchuk, V.A. “Determination of Levels of Unacceptable

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130 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of theRussian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President
V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president,
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131 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of theRussian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President
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132 Burenok, F.M. and Achasov, O.B. “Russia: Non-Nuclear

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139 Barynkin, V.M. “Assessment of Effectiveness of Measures

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140 Tsgychko, V.N. “Balance of Forces’ Category in Potential

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141 Unattributed. “К Вопросу o Ядерном Сдерживании” [On the

Question of Nuclear Deterrence]. Military Thought, 11 Jan 2002.

142 Unattributed. “К Вопросу o Ядерном Сдерживании” [On the

Question of Nuclear Deterrence]. Military Thought, 11 Jan 2002.

143 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of theRussian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President
V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president,
31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.
144 Official President Edict. “Presidential Edict 683 approving

appended text of ‘The Russian Federation's National Security
Strategy.’” Official website of the Russian Federation President, 31 Dec 2015, www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 5 Jan 2016.
145 Chekinov, S.G. and Bogdanov S.A. “Asymmetrical Ac-

tions to Maintain Russia’s Military Security.” Military Thought,
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146 Bikkenin, R. “Questions of Theory: Information Conflict in

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147 Giles, Keir. “Russia’s New Tools for Confronting the West.”

Research Paper, Chatham House, Mar 2016, https://www.
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A G E N C Y

Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President
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133 Chekinov, S.G. and Bogdanov, S.A. “Strategic Deterrence

I N T E L L I G E N C E

118 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of the

D E F E N S E

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148 “Constitution of Russia, chapter 4. The President of the

159 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation

149 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation

160 Unattributed. “GEN. Gerasimov Becomes Central Military

Russian Federation.” Wikisource, amended 30 Dec 2008,https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Russia#CHAPTER_4._THE_PRESIDENT_OF_THE_RUSSIAN_FEDERATION.
Accessed 14 Dec 2016.
President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Russian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.”
Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007,
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150 Unattributed. “Defense Minister General of the Army Sergey

Shoygu Conducted a Teleconference with Armed Forces Key
Personnel.” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 8
Apr 2013, www.mil.ru. Accessed 8 Apr 2013.

151 Unattributed. “Ministry of Defense Concludes First Contractfor Delivery of Over 100 Armata Tanks.” Moscow RIA Novosti,
6 Sep 2016, www.rian.ru. Accessed 7 Sep 2016.
152 Unattributed. “Russian Federation Ministry of Defense:

Russia is Preparing a Response to USA Prompt Global
Strike." ITAR-TASS, 2 Jun 2014, http://www.itar-tass.com/.
Accessed 3 Jun 2014.
153 Unattributed. “Defense Minister General of the Army Sergey

Shoygu Conducted a Teleconference with Armed Forces Key
Personnel.” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 8
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154 Yershov, Yevgeniy. “Shoygu the All-Purpose and... theOnly.” Moscow Polit.ru, 6 Nov 2012, http://polit.ru/.
Accessed 7 Nov 2012.

155 Unattributed. “General of the Army Sergey Shoygu, Rus-

sian Defense Minister, Has Summed Up the Outcome of Snap
Inspections of the Combat Readiness of the Troops (Forces).”
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 3 Aug 2015,
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156 Miranovich, Gennadiy. “Defense of the Country: ScientificApproach.” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 Jan 2014, http://
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157 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrineof the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President V. Putin.” Official website of the RussianFederation president, 31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru.
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158 President of the Russian Federation. “Statute on the

Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff.” Official
website of the Russian Federation president, 25 Jul 2012,
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94

President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Russian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.”
Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007,
www.K-press.ru/bh. Accessed 8 Nov 2007.
District Commander.” Moscow Interfax, 11 May 2012, http://
www.interfax.com. Accessed 11 May 2012.
161 BBC Monitoring. “BBCM Profile: Russia's New Armed

Forces Chief, Valeriy Gerasimov.” BBC Monitoring, 9 Nov
2012, www.monitor.bbc.co.uk. Accessed 9 Nov 2012.
162 Unattributed. “Traditions will be Continued.” Moscow

Krasnyy Voin, 3 Apr 2009. Accessed 4 Apr 2009.

163 Unattributed. “Gerasimov Will Bring Better Organization toGeneral Staff – Experts.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 9 Nov 2012,
http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 9 Nov 2012.
164 Unattributed. “The General Staff Planned a Complex of

Measures for Strategic Deterrence for the Provision of Military
Conflicts - Chief of the General Staff.” Moscow Interfax-AVN. 27
Jan 2014. http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 5 Feb 2014.
165 Unattributed. “Russian General Staff Chief Outlines 'Prob-

lematic Issues' with NATO.” Moscow Rossiya 24 TV, 23 Jan
2014, Vesti.ru. Accessed 23 Jan 2014.

166 Gerasimov, Valeriy. “First Main Test: Russia's Nuclear Arse-

nal Remains the Most Important National Security Guarantee.”Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK), 3 Sep 2014, http://
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167 Unattributed. “Russia Taking Measures to Prevent US,

NATO military superiority.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 30 Jan
2015,, http://www.interfax.ru/. Accessed 30 Jan 2015.

168 Unattributed. “Functions of the Main Operations Directorateof the General Staff.” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 30 May 2013, http://www.mil.ru. Accessed 31 May 2013.
169 Unattributed. “Chief of Main Operations Directorate Sergey

Rudskoy Speech During Briefing on Terrorism.” Ministry of
Defense of the Russian Federation, 2 Dec 2015, http://www.
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170 Tikhonov, Aleksandr. “Where the Threats to Peace Comefrom.” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 May 2014, http://www.
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171 Unattributed. “Out of 550 Proposals for RDT&E Costing

120 Billion, Only 146 Costing About 20 Billion Were Included
in Gosoboronzakaz-2011.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 4 Mar 2011,
http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 4 Mar 2011.

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

173 Unattributed. “Russian Army Revises State Defense Order,

Suspends Military Education Reform.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 14
Nov 2012. http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 14 Nov 2012.
174 Unattributed. “Russia, Syria did not strike at areas agreed

on in Geneva in past week – Rudskoi.” Interfax in English, 19
Sep 2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 19 Sep 2016.
175 Unattributed. “Russia, U.S. exchange info on ceasefire in

Syria - Russian Defense Ministry.” Interfax in English, 27 Feb
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176 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Biography of Russian Pres-

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President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Russian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.”
Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007,
www.K-press.ru/bh. Accessed 8 Nov 2007.
186 Yarynich, “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation.”
187 Yarynich, “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation.”
188 Litovkin, Dmitriy. "The Military Go on the Net." Izvestiya Online.

18 Oct 2010. http://www.izvestia.ru/.Accessed 18 Oct 2010.
189 Yarynich, Valery E. “Russian Missile Programs, The MTCR

and the Future of U.S. Russian Arms Control.” Conference
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190 Yarynich, “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation.”
191 Yarynich, “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation.”

177 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation

192 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine

178 Petrov, Ivan. "Young and Stern: The Generals Will Be

193 Yarynich, “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation.”

President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Russian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.”
Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007,
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Discharged by a 42-Year-Old Veteran of the State Emergency
Committee." RBK Daily, 6 Nov 2008.
179 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation

President in the Sphere of Command and Control of the Russian-Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime and Wartime.”
Chernyye Dyry V Rossisykom Zakondatelstve, 1 Oct 2007,
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180 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine of theRussian Federation, approved by Russian Federation President
V. Putin.” Official website of the Russian Federation president,
31 Dec 2014, http://www.kremlin.ru. Accessed 31 Dec 2014.
181 Miranovich, Gennadiy. “Defense of the Country: ScientificApproach.” Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 31 Jan 2014, http://
www.redstar.ru. Accessed 19 Feb 2014.
182 tUnattributed. “Personnel Training System for Russianof the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation
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194 Hoffman, David E. The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of

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195 Russian Ministry of Defense. http://function.mil.ru/news_

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196 Russian Ministry of Defense. http://function.mil.ru/news_

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197 Unattributed. “President Signs Decree On Four Joint Strate-

gic Commands in Russia.” ITAR-TASS in English, 15 Jul 2010.
198 Belousov, Yuriy and Tikhonov, Aleksandr. "From the Volgato the Yenisey." Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 10 Nov 2010, http://
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Ground Forces Will Be Improved – Commander-in-Chief.”
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199 Stepanov, Aleksandr. "Russia Expands Arctic Military Group-

183 Yarynich, Valery E. “C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Co-

200 Belousov and Tikhonov, "From the Volga to the Yenisey."

operation.” Conference paper, 2003. Source is former Russian
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184 Bozhov, Oleg. "How They Will Wage War in the Future:

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201 Unattributed. “Organization of Russia's new operational-stra-tegic commands will be over in 2010.” Interfax-AVN, 12 Jun
2010, http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 12 Jun 2010.

202 Belousov and Tikhonov, "From the Volga to the Yenisey."A G E N C Y

Research.” Moscow Interfax-AVN, 4 Mar 2011, http://www.
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185 Unattributed. “1.18 The Powers of the Russian-Federation

I N T E L L I G E N C E

172 Unattributed. “Russian General Gives Data On Military

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203 Unattributed. “Organization of Russia's new operational-stra-tegic commands will be over in 2010.” Interfax-AVN, 12 Jun
2010, http://www.militarynews.ru. Accessed 12 Jun 2010.
204 Unattributed. “Russia opens regional defense control

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205 Dyachenko, A.A. Опаленные В Борьбе При Создании

Ядерного Щита Родины: Научно-Публицистическая
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Edited by V.N. Mikhaylov, Moscow, 2008, pp. 465–471.

206 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment –216 Sutyagin, Igor. “Royal United Services Institute Occasion-al Paper; Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia’s
Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces.” Nov 2012, p. 5.
217 Arbatov, Alexei. “Nuclear Threat Initiative. A Russian

Perspective on the Challenge of U.S., NATO, and Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee,
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Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, RussianFederation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com.
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218 Unattributed. “Report: Russian Military Modernization 176

207 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment –Adjusts Plans to Enhance Combat Readiness of the Armed
Forces.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 May 2016, http://www.
ng.ru/. Accessed 19 May 2016.

Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, RussianFederation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com.
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208 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment –Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, RussianFederation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com.
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209 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment –Russia and the CIS, Strategic Weapon System, RussianFederation.” IHS Jane’s 360, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com.
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210 Unattributed. “Upgraded Russian-made Tu-160M2 bomber

to perform first flight in 2019.” TASS World Service, 2 Mar 2016.
211 Podvig, Pavel, et al. “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces.” Cen-

ter for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, English language
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212 Rosatom Annual Report – 2014.
213 Unattributed. “Medvedkov: The Creation of Infrastructure

for the Nuclear Deterrence Forces Is our Main Administration's
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243 Unattributed. “Advanced control systems to strengthen

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236 “Questions of strategic and Operational Art in Soviet

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238 Kalinkin, D.A., et al. “Strategic Deterrence against the U.S.

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257 Unattributed. “Kalibr Missile Launches in Kavkaz-2016

269 Bogdanov S.A. and Chekinov, S.G. “Strategic Deterrence

258 Ganin A.V. and Korolyov I.I. and Pavlov, V.N. “Electronic

270 Oleinikov, I.I., et al. “A Space Monitoring System as Part of259 Koybletskiy, Oleg. “From Above We Can See Everything!”

271 Unattributed. “New branch of Armed Forces, Aerospace

260 UCS Satellite Database. Union of Concerned Scientists.

272 Golts, Alexander. “Russia's Aerospace Forces Will Never

261 Morozov, Igor Vitalyevich. “Space and the Nature of

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266 Khudoleyev, Victor. “Troops for the Battle in the Ether.”

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268 Chekinov, S.G. and Bogdanov S.A. “Asymmetrical Actions to

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275 Durnovo, Aleksey. "Aerospace Defense Troops Space Com-

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276 Unattributed. “Yury Vlasov Appointed Acting United Rocket

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277 Unattributed. “Yury Vlasov Appointed Acting United Rocket

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278 Unattributed. “The Army: We Are Awaiting Assistancefrom Military Science and the Defense Industrial Complex:
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281 Chekinov, S. and Bogdanov, S. “The Nature and Content

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284 Prudnikov, D. P. “State Information Policy in the Defense

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285 Darczewska, Jolanta. “The Anatomy of Russian Information

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286 Solopov, Maksim. “Kavkaz with A Syrian Bias: The General

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287 Russian Federation Security Council. "Information Security

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297 Pomerantsev, Peter and Weiss, Michael. “The Menace of

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298 Haines, “Russia’s Use of Disinformation in the

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299 Unattributed. “CyberBerkut – The New Russian Proxy?”

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300 Unattributed. “Pro-Russian Hackers Claim 1,100 Ukrainian

288 President of the Russian Federation. “Military Doctrine

301 Unattributed. “Ukrainian Presidential Election: Security Ser-of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation
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290 Unattributed. “Putin signs law on industrial policy.” Moscow

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302 Unattributed. “Ukrainian State Agency Refutes Reportsof Hacker Attack on Central Elections Commission Website.” UNN Online, 25 Oct 2014, http://www.unn.com.ua/.
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303 Unattributed. “Alert: Ukrainian State Agency Confirms

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291 Haines, John R. “Russia’s Use of Disinformation in the Ukraine

304 Chen, Adrian. “The Agency.” New York Times, 2 Jun 2015,

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292 Darczewska. “The Anatomy of Russian Information War-

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293 Denning, Dorothy. “The Rise of Hacktivism.” Georgetown

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294 Leyden, John. “IT’S WAR: Hacktivists Throw in Their Lot

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308 Yegorov, Ivan. "Network Requires Protection. New Information

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296 Darczewska. “The Anatomy of Russian Information War-I N T E L L I G E N C E

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309 Baikova, Tatyana. "It Would Be Better for America to Ratify

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310 Unattributed. “Central Asia Military.” Highlights: Central

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311 Unattributed. “Russia’s Duma Adopts Revised Anti-Terror

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313 Unattributed. “Communications Ministry Mulls Total Control

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314 Unattributed. “Putin Bans Foreigners from Russian TV

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315 Rogozin, D.O. Ed. “War and Peace: Terms and Definition—

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316 Rogozin, “War and Peace: Terms and Definitions—Voyna I

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317 Borkovskyy, Antin. "Andriy Illarionov on Prospects for

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320 Dvornikov V.A., et al. “Tactics of Electronic Warfare Forces.”

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321 Donskov, Col. Yu. Ye. and Nikitin, Lt. Col. O. G. “Special In-

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328 Unattributed. “Russia, Venezuela to Have Joint Naval Drill in

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329 Unattributed. "The Large ASW Ship Severomorsk Is

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330 Unattributed. "The Large ASW Ship Severomorsk Is

Escorting Another Convoy of Three Ships." Severnyy Flot,
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331 Unattributed. "The Large ASW Ship Severomorsk Is Escort-

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332 Unattributed. “Syria Conflict: US Presses Russia on Military

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333 Unattributed. “Russia starts ground operations in Syria.” 23

Nov 2015, Al Bawaba Business.

334 Quinlivan, James T. “War on the Rocks—Artillery Returns to

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335 Unattributed. “RPT – Fight for Syria’s Aleppo Exposes

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336 Unattributed. “Syria: Russia’s continuing war.” BBC, 27

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337 McInnis, J. Matthew. “What does Iran Really Want in Ye-men?” AEI Ideas, 13 Apr 2015.

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338 Unattributed. “Fight for Syria’s Aleppo Exposes Limits of

322 Melnikov, Igor. “Weapons of Assymetrical Response.” Ros-

339 Unattributed. “Russian Cruise Missiles Target Syria.” Zaman

323 Donskov “Special Information Operations in Armed Conflicts.”

340 Unattributed. “Syria: Russia’s continuing war.” BBC, 27

tov-na-Donu Voyennyy Vestnik Yuga Rossii, 11 Apr 2015.
324 Dvornikov, “Tactics of Electronic Warfare Forces.”

325 Durnovo, Aleksey. “Long Range Aviation -- Air Force's Main

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326 President of Russia. “Visit to the Armed Forces Central

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341 Kozhanov, Nikolay. “What’s at stake for Russia in Syria?”

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346 1991 Military Forces in Transition. U.S. Department of

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348 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Strategic Rocket

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349 V.D. Zabolotin and N.E. Dimitriev. “Operational-Tactical Ma-

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351 V.D. Zabolotin and N.E. Dimitriev, “Surprise.” Slovar’

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356 Shevchenko, Vitaly. “Little green men or Russian invad-ers?” BBC News, 9 Mar 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/
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366 “No plans to reduce the number of missile divisions.” http://

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367 Unattributed. “No reductions planned in Russian Strategic

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368 Unattributed. “Key Russian Strategic Missile Deployments.”

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369 Multiple location name searches. www.google.com/maps.

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372 “Strategic Rocket Forces.” http://russianforces.org/mis-siles/. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.

373 Andreyev, Oleg. “RVSN Given Six Years to Rearm; Mos-

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358 Darczewska, “The Anatomy of Russian Information War-I N T E L L I G E N C E

342 Lavrov, Anton and Ramm, Aleksey. “Retribution without

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374 Unattributed. “Rubezh Missile Will Enter Duty in a Year.”

389 Luca, Ana Maria. “Post-Soviet Russian Military Interven-

375 Unattributed. “‘Missile defense killer’: Russia finalizes test-

390 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website

376 Litovkin, Viktor. “RS-26 Antimissile Defense 'Killer' Flies

391 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website

377 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment –392 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Website

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381 Bozhyeva, Olga. "Sources: Russia Successfully Tested

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384 “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2016.” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170359. Accessed 6 Sep 2016.

385 Unattributed. “Key Russian Strategic Missile Deployments.”

Jane's CBRN Assessments, 25 Apr 2016, www.janes.com.
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386 “Russian Army Order of Battle.” Globalsecurity.org, 27 Aug

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387 “Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, The Military Balance,” 2017,

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394 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Websiteof the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru.
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395 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Websiteof the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru.
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396 Russian Ministry of Defense. “Ground Troops.” Websiteof the Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016, www.mil.ru.
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397 “Ground Troops.” Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016,

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398 “Ground Troops.” Russian Ministry of Defense, 2 Sep 2016,

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399 Barabanov, Mikhail, Ed. Novaia armiia Rossii [The New

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401 Bridge, Robert. "Border Alert: Nuke risk rising." Russia Today,

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418 “The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area

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420 Ptichin, Sergey. "Authority": "Air Assault Force Will Change

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408 Anisimov, Vladimir. “Five Primary Missions: The Arrival of

422 “The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support;

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409 Anatoliy-K (forum moderator pseudonym). “Al'ternativnaya

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totrelkoviye Brigady - 3 Chast” [New Motorized Rifle Brigades,
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412 Anatoliy-K (forum moderator pseudonym). “Noviye Mo-

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413 Kirichenko, Ivan. “Unready Brigades: The Military Reformala Serdyukov and Makarov Has Returned to Where It Began.” Svobodnaya Pressa, 20 Sep 2012, http://svpressa.ru/
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414 Mikhaylov, Viktor. “The Russian Military Brigade Contract.”

Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 22 May 2009,http://nvo.ng.ru/. Accessed 28 May 2009.

415 Gavrilov, Yuriy. “Tests of the Latest ‘Rakushka’ BTR Will Be

Conducted near Tula.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 7 Jan 2015,
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421 Unattributed. "All Airborne Assault Formations of the Air-

Amphibious Operations.” U.S. Army, FM100-2-2, p. 4 1.

423 2017 Jane's World Navies, https://janes-ihs-com.pen-tagonlibrary.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322754.

424 Official Press Release. “Motorized Riflemen and Naval

Infantrymen of the Baltic Fleet Are Performing Life-Fire Drills as
Part of Squads.” Moscow Ministry of Defense of the RussianFederation, 11 Jul 2016, function.mil.ru/news page/country/
more?id12089569@egNews. Accessed 12 Jul 2016.
425 Khudoleyev, Victor. “Country Celebrated Missile Troops andArtillery Day on 19 Nov": "Heading for a Reconnaissance-Fire
Delivery System.” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 21 Nov 2014,
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426 Unattributed. “PF coastal troops redeployed as part of sur-prise checks into combat readiness.” Interfax, 15 Sep 2014,
http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 15 Sep 2014.
427 2017 Jane's World Navies, https://janes-ihs-com.pen-tagonlibrary.idm.oclc.org/WorldNavies/Display/1322754.

428 Avdeyev, Yuriy. “Navy Coastal Troops' Acquisition of New

Missile Systems Continues.” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 2 Nov
2015, http://www.redstar.ru. Accessed 9 Nov 2015.
429 Unattributed. “Pacific Fleet Bal Coastal Missile System

Battalion Starts Field Training in Primorye.” Ministry of Defenseof the Russian Federation, 17 Feb 2016, http://www.mil.ru.
Accessed 3 Mar 2016.
430 Bodner, Matthew. “Russian Military Merges Air Force andSpace Command.” The Moscow Times, 3 Aug 2015.

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zavtra" [The ground forces of Russia today and tomorrow].
Rossiiskoe voennoe obozrenie [Russian military review],
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416 Unattributed. “The VDV Will in the Coming Years Be-

I N T E L L I G E N C E

404 Popov, Vladimir. "Sukhoputnye voiska Rossii segodnia i

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RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

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431 Unattributed. “Russian Air Force/Aerospace Reorganiza-tion.” Fortuna’s Corner, 1 Jan 2015, http://fortunascorner.
com/2015/01/02/russian-air-force-reorganization/.

432 “Aerospace Forces.” Ministry of Defence of the RussianFederation, http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/type/vks.htm.
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433 Air Forces Intelligence Database. 28 Sep 2016,www.airforcesintel.com.

434 Tuchkov, Vladimir. “The Strategic Aircraft, of Which the

U.S. Is Frightened, Increases Its Might: With What Can
America Counter the Tu-160M2 Missile-Equipped Aircraft.”
Svobodnaya Pressa, 10 Aug 2016, http://www.svpressa.ru/.
Accessed 15 Aug 2016.
435 Tuchkov, Vladimir. “The Strategic Aircraft, of Which the

U.S. Is Frightened, Increases Its Might: With What Can
America Counter the Tu-160M2 Missile-Equipped Aircraft.”
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436 “Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, The Military Balance.”

2015, 115:1, 159-206.

448 “The Military Balance.” International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 2014.

449 “Russia’s New Air Force is a Mystery” Thomas Newdick,War is Boring, 21 Feb 2014.

450 Butowski, Piotr. “Russian Airpower: Almanac 2015.” Air

Force Magazine, 2015.

451 “Russian Air Force.” Combat Aircraft.
452 Dawisha, Karen and Parrott, Bruce. Russia and the New

States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval. Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 170.
453 Unattributed. “Aerospace Forces/Russian Federation Aero-space Forces.” Milkavkaz.net, 23 Dec 2015, www.milkavkaz.
net. Accessed 12 Oct 2016.

454 Unattributed. “Chief of Russian air defence enterprise out-lines plans for new Systems.” Moscow Vesti TV, 11 Sep 2007,
Vesti.ru. Accessed 15 Sep 2015.
455 Unattributed. “Aerospace Forces/Russian Federation Aero-

Aviation, 2009.

space Forces.” Milkavkaz.net, 23 Dec 2015, www.milkavkaz.
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438 Unattributed. “New branch of Armed Forces, Aerospace

456 Unattributed. “Russia Transports Ultra-Modern OSA Air

437 Gordon, Yefim. Russian Air Power. Military Transport

Forces, created in Russia – Shoygu.” Interfax, 3 Aug 2015,
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439 Bodner, Matthew. “Russian Military Merges Air Force andSpace Command.” The Moscow Times Online. 3 Aug 2015.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/. Accessed 3 Aug 2015.
440 Unattributed. “Russia's Space Troops: Armaments andFacilities.” Voyennoye Obozreniye, 25 Mar 2011, http://
topwar.ru/. Accessed 29 Mar 2011.
441 Durnovo, Aleksey. "Aerospace Defense Troops SpaceCommand's Primary Mission Is to Ensure Russia's Security inSpace." Ekho Moskvy Online, 9 Dec 2014, http://www.echo.
msk.ru. Accessed 9 Dec 2014.
442 “World Air Forces 2016.” FlightGlobal Insight, 2016.
443 “The Military Balance.” International Institute for Strategic

Studies, 2014.

444 Newdick, Thomas. “Russia’s New Air Force is a Mystery.”War is Boring, 21 Feb 2014.

445 Butowski, Piotr. “Russian Airpower: Almanac 2015.” Air

Force Magazine, 2015.

446 “Russian Air Force.” Combat Aircraft.

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447 “World Air Forces 2016.” FlightGlobal Insight, 2016.

Defense Missile Systems to the Crimea: Russian Military
Equipment is not Remaining in Place and it is Travelling
Further to the Crimean Peninsula.” Kyiv UNIAN, 18 Mar 2014,
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457 Unattributed. “Russian Defense Ministry explains S-300

deployment in Syria citing need for protection of Russian
military bases.” Interfax, 10 Oct 2016, Interfax.com.
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458 Unattributed. “Russian Defense Ministry explains S-300

deployment in Syria citing need for protection of Russian
military bases.” Interfax, 10 Oct 2016, Interfax.com. Accessed
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459 “The Military Balance.” International Institute for Strategic

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460 Butowski, Piotr. “Unmanned Russia.” Air International, Sep

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461 Butowski, Piotr. “Unmanned Russia.” Air International, Sep

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462 Oxenstrierna, Susane and Westerlund, Fredrik. “Arms pro-curement and the Russian Defense Industry: Challenges Up to2020.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2013.

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464 Bender, Jeremy. “Russia is Modernizing its increasing-ly aggressive air force.” Business Insider, 18 Mar 2015,
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465 Vaev, Pavel K. “Russian Air Power Tool Brittle for

Brinkmanship.” Ponars Eurasia, Policy Memo 398, Nov 2014.
466 Truffer, Patrick. “The Development of Russian Naval

Capabilities After the Cold War.” CIMSEC, 24 Nov 2015,
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467 “Military balance 2015.” Annual periodical on World Military

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468 Polmar, Norman. Guide to the Soviet Navy. Naval InstitutePress, 1985.

469 Pasyakin, Vladimir. “At the Highest Level of Coordination.”Sevastopol Flag Rodiny, 20 Dec 2014, www.sc.mil.ru/. Accessed 25 Jul 2016.

470 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian-ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.

471 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian-ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.
472 Flake, Lincoln Edson. “Russia’s Security Intentions in aships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.
480 Yurov, Dmitriy. “Service Reinforced by the Way of Life.”

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 May 2006, http://www.redstar.
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481 Russiannavy.com. Information on tasks, roles, andmissions. Accessed 18 Aug 2016.

482 Unattributed. "Russian Navy to use up to ten civil vessels

for military supplies to Syria.” Interfax, 15 Oct 2015, Interfax.
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483 Unattributed. “Caspian Flotilla ships carrying Kalibr-NK mis-siles depart for tactical drills.” Interfax, 25 Apr 2016, Interfax.
com. Accessed 25 Apr 2016.
484 Unattributed. “Caspian Flotilla force ends tactical exercis-

es.” Interfax, 8 Jul 2016, Interfax.com. Accessed 8 Jul 2016.
485 Unattributed. “Caspian Flotilla ships carrying Kalibr-NK
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486 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Rus-

sia and the CIS, Navy, Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s 360,
10 Aug 2016, www.janes.com.

487 Wertheim, Eric. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleetsof the World, 16th Edition. Naval Institute Press, 2013, p. 573.
488 Litovkin, Dmitriy. "Deep Rising. Russia's Nuclear Sub-melting Arctic.” Military and Strategic Affair Publication, vol. 6,
no. 1, Mar 2014.

marine Fleet Is Being Rapidly Upgraded and Renewed.”
Moscow Vzglyad, 28 Jul 2014, http://www.vz.ru/society/2014/7/28/697642.html. Accessed 3 Aug 2014.

473 Zhunusov, Oleg. “Rosneft' Is Taking 'Zvezda' From OSK: A

489 Unattributed. "Nuclear Submarine Severodvinsk Strikes

Consortium Will Help the Primorskiy Shipbuilders.” Kommersant Online, 22 Aug 2013, http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed
24 Aug 2013.

474 “Vladivostok.” Globalsecurity.org/Vladivostok. Accessed 18

Aug 2016.

475 The split of forces can be observed on Google Earth.

Accessed 17 Aug 2016.

476 “List of current ships of the Russian Navy.” russianships.

info, http://russianships.info/eng/today. Accessed 8 Jun 2016.
477 Zavolokin, Pavel. “The Crimea – Is Under Protection.”

Krasnaya Zvezda Online, 6 Feb 2015, http://www.redstar.ru.
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478 Unattributed. “Russia to end production of Varshavyanka

Kilo-class submarines.” Moscow RIA Novosti, 4 Sep 2015,
http://ria.ru/. Accessed 7 Sep 2015.

Coastal Training Target from Barents Sea." RIA Novosti, 2 May
2016, http://ria.ru/. Accessed 2 May 2016.
490 Khodarenok, Mikhail. “Strategic Ocean Operations No

Longer Are Being Planned: Current Russian Navy Status.”
Moscow Gazeta, 31 Jul 2016, http://www.gazeta.ru/.
Accessed 6 Aug 2016.
491 Blechschmidt, Peter. “War Ships Against Pirates.” Munich

Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 21 Nov 2008, Sueddeutsche.de.
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492 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian-ships.info, 8 Jun 2016, http://russianships.info/eng/today.
493 Suvorov, Viktor. “Chapter 3. A History of Spetsnaz.”

Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of Soviet Special Forces. Translated from Russian by David Floyd. Norton & Company, 1988.

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479 List of current ships of the Russian Navy – 2016. russian-

I N T E L L I G E N C E

463 Bender, Jeremy. “Russia is Modernizing its increasingly ag-

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494 Suvorov, Viktor. “Chapter 3. A History of Spetsnaz.”

Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of Soviet Special Forces. Translated from Russian by David Floyd. Norton & Company, 1988.
495 Galeotti, Mark. “The rising influence of Russian special forc-es.” Jane's Intelligence Review, 24 Nov 2014, https://janesihs-com.pentagonlibrary.idm.oclc.org/Janes/Display/1729350.

496 Федеральный конституционный закон "О Правительстве

Российской Федерации" [Federal Constitutional Law “Directorates of the Russian Federation”]. 17 Dec 1997.
497 Schneider, Eberhard. "The Russian Federal Security Ser-vice under President Putin.” Politics and the Ruling Group in
Putin’s Russia, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008, pp. 42–62.
498 Littell, Jonathan. The Security Organs of the Russian Federa-tion. A Brief History 1991–2004. Psan Publishing House, 2006.
499 Galeotti, Mark. “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence

Services.” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2016,www.ecfr.eu.
500 “Tests Complete for New Staff Module for Russia Power

Ministries.” RIA Novosti, 13 Jun 2016.

501 “In Russia the National Guard is Created.” Rossiiskoe

Voennoe Obozrenie, Issue 4; 30 Apr 2016.

502 “National Guard Conducted RCB (NBC) Training of its Unitsin Volga NG Administrative District (MD).” Vremenniy Informatsionniy Tsentr, FSBNGRF, 27 Sept 2016.
503 “GRU.” Special Services, http://specialsluz.my1.ru/index/

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504 Russian News Agency, http://ru-an.info/новости/шпионские-тайны-гру/.

505 Safronov, Ivan. "Intelligence to Remain In-House. Who

5 Nov 2009, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.

512 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can

the New GRU Chief Resolve?"

513 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad.

5 Nov 2009. www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.

514 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can

the New GRU Chief Resolve?"

515 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad.

5 Nov 2009. www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.

516 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can

the New GRU Chief Resolve?"

517 Unattributed. “Russian MP Antoshkin, Recently Back from

Syria, says Airstrikes Exceptionally Precise.” Interfax, 15 Oct
2015, http://www.interfax.com/.

518 Gorbenko, Aleksandr. "The Russian Military Space Programof Tomorrow: What will This Be?" Odnako Online, 19 Jun
2013, http://www.odnako.org/magazine/new.
519 Unattributed. “Russian Military Intelligence Chief Dies

Unexpectedly.” Charter 97, 5 Jan 2016, http://www.charter97.
org/en/news/.
520 Galeotti, Mark. “The Unexpected Death of Russia’s MilitaryIntelligence (GRU) Chief, Igor Sergun.” Moscow’s Shadows,
4 Jan 2016, www.inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com.
Accessed 5 Jan 2016.
521 Safronov, Ivan. "Intelligence to Remain In-House. Who

Could Replace Igor Sergun in the Post of Chief of the GRU?"
Kommersant Online, 14 Jan 2016, http://kommersant.ru/.
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Could Replace Igor Sergun in the Post of Chief of the GRU?"
Kommersant Online, 14 Jan 2016, http://kommersant.ru/.
Accessed 14 Jan 2016.

522 Unattributed. “Russian GRU Military Spy Chief Igor Sergun

506 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad,

523 Unattributed. “More evidence that captured Russians were

5 Nov 2009, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.

507 Mikhaylov, Aleksey. "Control of the Main Strike. What

Problems Can the New GRU Chief Resolve?" Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 10 Feb 2016, http://vpk-news.ru/.
Accessed 12 Feb 2016.
508 Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services.”
509 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad,

5 Nov 2009, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 7 Nov 2009.

510 Mikhaylov, "Control of the Main Strike. What Problems Can

the New GRU Chief Resolve?"106

511 Unattributed. “GRU on 91st Anniversary.” Moscow Vzglyad,

dies.” BBC Online, 5 Jan 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk.
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military intelligence officers.” Prava Lyudyny v Ukrayini, 25 Nov
2015, http://khpg.org.ua. Accessed 25 Nov 2015.
524 Pereborshchikov, Georgiy. "‘You could say we proved

ourselves.’ War stories from Russians returned from fighting ineastern Ukraine." Meduza, 22 Feb 2016, https://meduza.io/
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525 Unattributed. “Russia Ramps Up Syria Military Involvement:

Pro-Assad.” Beirut NOW, 27 Aug 2015, www.nowlebanon.
com. Accessed 27 Aug 2015.

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

527 Butrin, Dmitriy. "The Prime Minister's Eyes Opened to the

Budget—The 'Open Government' Proposes to Buy Textbooks
Rather Than Tanks." Kommersant Online, 10 Aug 2012,
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528 Hobson, Peter. “The Cost of Russia's War in Syria.” The

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2 Oct 2014,
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541 President of Russia. "Meeting on armed forces develop-

ment on 9 Nov 2015 in Sochi." Official Website of the RussianFederation President, 10 Nov 2015, http://eng.kremlin.ru/.
Accessed 10 Nov 2015.
542 Unattributed. “Pace of fulfilling presidential instructions

Moscow Times Online, 21 Oct 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/. Accessed 21 Oct 2015.

for military-industrial complex must be maintained - Putin.”
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529 Smirnov, Roman. "Russia's Defense Industry Complex

543 President of Russia. “Putin Chairs Meeting on Defence

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530 "Weapons of mass Acquisition." Оборона ибезопасность, 1 Apr 2016.

531 “With a Key from the Sky—President.” Оборона ибезопасность, 1 Apr 2016.

532 Zubarevich, Natalya. “Russian Economic Crisis Risks

Stagnation, Degradation (Op-Ed).” Moscow Times Online inEnglish, 25 Mar 2016, http://www.themoscowtimes.com.
Accessed 31 Mar 2016.
533 Butrin, "The Prime Minister's Eyes Opened to the Budget"
534 Pismennaya, Yevgeniy, et al. "Medvedev's Concern That

the Military Is Considered Too Expensive for the Country."
Vedomosti Online, 22 Dec 2011, www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/
news/1448040/oshibka_medvedeva. Accessed 22 Dec 2011.
535 Unattributed. “Russia's anti-crisis commission to soon

consider support for auto industry.” Interfax, 6 Feb 2015,
www.interfax.com. Accessed 6 Feb 2015.

536 Ivankhnik, Aleksandr. "Resuscitation of Economic Council."

Politkom, 22 Nov 2013, http://politcom.ru/.

537 Falichev, Oleg. "A Contingency Order.” Voyenno-Promysh-lennyy Kuryer, 26 Jan 2015, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed
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538 Unattributed. "Russia is proud of you." Rossiya 24

Television, 17 Mar 2016. Accessed 17 Mar 2016.

539 Falichev, Oleg. "Soldiers to Order; Military Robots Being

Rid of Outside Elements." Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer,
4 Jun 2015, http://vpk-news.ru/. Accessed 4 Jun 2015.
540 Russian Federation Defense Ministry Press Service andInformation Directorate. "Specialists from the Russian Defense Ministry Main Directorate of Scientific Research Activity
Are Taking Part in the Work of a Military Industry Conference
on the Development of Robotics for the Security Agencies."

Procurement.” Official Website of the Russian Federation
President, 15 May 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/. Accessed
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544 Safronov, Ivan. “Supreme decision-making commander.”Kommersant Online, 5 Sep 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2559841. Accessed 5 Sep 2014.
545 Safronov, Ivan and Kozichev, Yevgeniy. "The Supreme

Decider-in-Chief: Vladimir Putin will also Head the Military
Industrial Commission." Kommersant Online, 6 Sep 2014,
http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 6 Sep 2014.
546 Unattributed. "Russian Scientists Present Unique Projects

to the Ministry of Defense." ITAR-TASS, 4 Dec 2012.

547 “Шойгу С Рогозиным Задумали Эксперимент.” Nezavisi-

maia Gazeta, Issue 89, 29 Apr 2013. Accessed 29 Apr 2013.
548 “Russia will develop strike weapons to defeat US missile

defences – Putin.” Rossiya 24 Television, 10 Nov 2015.

549 Gorenburg, Dmitry. “How is Economic Crisis Affecting

Russian Military Modernization?” Russia Insider, 14 Apr 2016,
http://russia-insider.com/en/how-economic-crisis-impacting-russian-military-modernization/ri13882. Accessed 26 Aug 2016.
550 Marakhonov, Vladimir. "So Who Among Us Favors Strong

Russia? Conflict with Ukraine Has Cost Our Country Half
Its Nuclear Potential.” Novaya Gazeta Online, 20 Jul 2015,
www.novayagazeta.ru. Accessed 20 Jul 2015.

551 Vyatkin, Yaroslav. "Hypersonic Weapons: Even Alien Invaders

Have Failed to Help the United States." Argumenty Nedeli Online,
4 May 2016, http://argumenti.ru. Accessed 27 Jul 2016.
552 Unattributed. “The Acceptance in the Inventory of the RS-26‘Yars-M’ Missile Complex Is Planned in 2017.” Vzglyad Online,
12 May 2016, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 12 May 2016.
553 Litovkin, “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the

Hawaiian Islands: They Will Lay Out a New Route for the New
Ballistic Missile." Izvestiya Online, 4 Jul 2016, www.izvestiya.ru.
Accessed 4 Jul 2016.

A G E N C Y

Strategies and Technologies (CAST). LiveJournal, 19 Oct
2015, Livejournal.ru. Accessed 25 Oct 2015.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

526 “On Zaslon in Syria.” Russian Centre for Analysis of

D E F E N S E

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

107

554 Unattributed. “Russia Test Fires ICBM to Target in Kazakh-

569 Kristensen, Hans and Norris, Robert. “Russian nuclear

555 Summary of Reporting on Russian and FSU Nuclear Issues.

570 “OTR-21 Tochka.” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

stan.” Fars News Agency, 28 Dec 2013, http://www.english.
farsnews.com. Accessed 21 Sep 2016.
Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1 Dec 2014. Accessed 27
Nov 2016.
556 Marakhonov, "So Who Among Us Favors Strong Russia?

Conflict with Ukraine Has Cost Our Country Half Its
Nuclear Potential.”

557 Litovkin, Dmitriy. “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the

Hawaiian Islands: They Will Lay Out a New Route for the New
Ballistic Missile." Izvestiya Online, 4 Jul 2016, www.izvestiya.
ru. Accessed 4 Jul 2016.
558 Russian Space Web. Topol-M, online missile guide, 2 Nov

2014, www.russianspaceweb.com/topolm.html. Accessed 10
Sep 2016.
559 Litovkin, “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the

Hawaiian Islands.”

560 Unattributed. “Testing of heavy strategic missile ‘Sarmat’

to start promptly.” Interfax, 10 Aug 2016, www.interfax.com.
Accessed 11 Aug 2016.
561 Unattributed. “The Acceptance in the Inventory of the RS-

26 ‘Yars-M’ Missile Complex Is Planned in 2017.” Vzglyad Online, 12 May 2016, www.vzglyad.ru. Accessed 12 May 2016.
562 Unattributed. "Rubezh Missile Will Enter Duty in a Year."

Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 12 May 2016, www.rg.ru.
Accessed 12 May 2016.

563 Gertz, Bill. “Russia Tests Hypersonic Glide Vehicle on

Missile.” The Washington Free Beacon, 22 Apr 2016, http://
freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-tests-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/.
564 NASIC; “Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat; 2013; http://www.

dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a582843.&#65279;pdf

OTR-21_Tochka. Accessed 16 Sep 2016.

571 Unattributed. “SS-21 `Scarab' (OTR-21/9M79 Tochka).” Jane's

Strategic Weapon Systems, 19 Jul 2005, www.janes.com.

572 Unattributed. “SS-26 'Stone' (9M720 Tender/Iskander-E).”

Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 19 Jul 2005, www.janes.com.
573 Barabanov, Mikhail. "The Reason We Need a Combat

Aircraft.” Odnako Online, 18 Aug 2011, http://odnakoj.ru/.
Accessed 18 Aug 2011.
574 Unattributed. "RF Long-Range Aviation Will Test New

Cruise Missiles in 2014." RIA Novosti Online, 28 Jan 2014,
http://ria.ru/. Accessed 28 Jan 2014.
575 Khudoleyev, Konstantin, et al. “Serve Russia.” Zvezda TV,

9 Feb 2014.

576 Unattributed. "Tactical Missiles Corporation to Showcase

Modern Weapons.” Aviapanorama, 21 Aug 2013, Accessed
21 Aug 2013.
577 Tactical Missile Corporation, http://eng.krtv.ru/about_eng.

Accessed 18 Aug.

578 Unattributed. “V. Putin summarized series of Meetings,

Dedicated to Fulfillment of the GOZ and Outfitting the [State
Armaments Program] RF Armed Forces with Modern ViVT.”
Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 9 Dec 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/.
Accessed 9 Dec 2013.
579 President of Russia. “Russian leader, Defence Plant Chiefs

Discuss Production, Overhaul of Facilities.” Official website of
the Russian Federation President, 29 Nov 2013, http://eng.
kremlin.ru/. Accessed 29 Nov 2013.

580 President of Russia. “Russian leader, Defence Plant Chiefs

565 NASIC; “Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat; 2013; http://www.

dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a582843.&#65279;pdf

Discuss Production, Overhaul of Facilities.” Official website of
the Russian Federation President, 29 Nov 2013, http://eng.
kremlin.ru/. Accessed 29 Nov 2013.

566 Unattributed. “Offensive weapons, Ballistic missiles,

581 Yesin, Viktor. "Peace Vehicles—Part II: It Is Time to Eliminate

Russian Federation, R-29RM Shetal/Sineva (RSM-54/3M27).”
Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 18 Dec 2015.
567 Litovkin, “The Army: They Will Test Sarmat Near the

Hawaiian Islands.”

568 Petrov, Vladimir. “Russia announces deployment plans for

Bulava missile and Borey-class submarine.” Jane's Defence
Weekly, 30 Sep 2008, www.janes.com.

108

forces, 2016.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 72, no. 3,
13 Sep 2016, pp. 125–134.

the Gap Between Advanced Engineering Solutions andDefense-Industrial Complex Production Capabilities.”
Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, 27 Feb 2015, http://vpknews.ru/. Accessed 27 Feb 2015.

582 Mardasov, Anton. “Voyevoda and Stilet Will Reach America

Without Ukraine. How Far the Rupture with Kyiv Threatens theEffectiveness of Russian ICBMs and Cruise Missiles.” Moscow
Svobodnaya Pressa, 24 Aug 15, http://svpressa.ru/war21/
article/130231/. Accessed 30 Aug 2015.

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

584 Capaccio, Anthony. “Russia Deploys Advanced Cruise

Stock Company Concern Almaz-Antey.” Bloomberg, http://
www.bloomberg.com/Research/stocks/private/snapshot.
asp?privcapid=34169028. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.

Missiles in Major Navy Reboot.” Bloomberg, 30 Dec 2015,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-30/russia-deploying-advanced-cruise-missiles-in-major-navy-reboot.
Accessed 18 Aug 2016.

597 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment –585 Capaccio. “Russia Deploys Advanced Cruise Missiles in

Triumf; Production of Aerospace Defense Assets Will Increase
Tenfold in Near Future.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 Mar 2016,
http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 4 Mar 2016.

Major Navy Reboot.”

586 “U.S. Debates Cruise Missile Procurement.” Jane’s Intelli-gence Review, 7 Jul 2016.

587 Akulov, Andrei. “Kalibr: Russia’s Naval System Upping

Cruise Missile Game.” Strategic Culture Foundation, 24 May
2016, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/05/24/
kalibr-russia-naval-system-upping-cruise-missile-game.html.
Accessed 18 Aug 2016.
588 Akulov. “Kalibr: Russia’s Naval System Upping Cruise

Missile Game.”589 “Jane’s P-800 Oniks/Yakhont (SS-N-26 Strobile).” Jane’s

Defense Industry-Weapons: Naval.

590 Vyatkin, Yaroslav. "Hypersonic Weapons: Even Alien Invad-ers Have Failed to Help the United States." Argumenty Nedeli
Online, 4 May 2016, http://argumenti.ru. Accessed 27 Jul 2016.
591 Vyatkin, Yaroslav. "Hypersonic Weapons: Even Alien

Invaders Have Failed to Help the United States." Argumenty
Nedeli Online, 4 May 2016, http://argumenti.ru. Accessed
27 Jul 2016.
592 Unattributed. “Russian Defence Ministry Praises New Ka-

Russia and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10
Aug 2016, www.janes.com.
598 Mukhin, Vladimir. “Russian Arctic Will Be Protected by the599 “Antey-2500 Long-range Air Defense Missile System.”

Military Today, http://www.military-today.com/missiles/antey_2500.htm. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.
600 “Pantsyr S1 Close Range Air Defense System, Russia.”

Army-Technology.com, www.army-technology.com.
Accessed 22 Aug 2016.

601 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Rus-

sia and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug
2016, www.janes.com.
602 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment –Russia and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug
2016, www.janes.com.
603 Unattributed. “Jane's, Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia

and the CIS, Russia-Air Force.” IHS Jane’s 360, 10 Aug 2016,www.janes.com.
604 “Aircraft industry of Russia: Military aircraft.” Wikipedia,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_industry_of_Russia#Military_aircraft. Accessed 2 Sep 2016.

libr Missile launches on Syria targets.” TASS Russian News
Agency, 9 Dec 2015, http://tass.ru/ed/defense/842799.
Accessed 20 May 2016.

605 “United Aircraft Corporation.” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.

593 Mukhin, Vladimir. “Russian Arctic Will Be Protected by the

2020: Is the Third Time the Charm for Military modernization?”
PONARS Eurasia policy memo, 12 Oct 2010.

Triumf; Production of Aerospace Defense Assets Will Increase
Tenfold in Near Future.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2 Mar 2016,
http://www.ng.ru/. Accessed 4 Mar 2016.
594 Kozhin. “Negotiations on sale of S-400 surface-to-air

missile systems to China and India ongoing, but priority their
supply to Russian Armed Forces.” Moscow Interfax, 18 Apr 16,
http://www.interfax.com. Accessed 18 Apr 2016.
595 “Concern PVO “Almaz-Antey”/Concern Aerospace

Defense [PVO].” GlobalSecurity.org, 29 Mar 2016 http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/concern-pvo.
htm. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.

org/wiki/United_Aircraft_Corporation. Accessed 2 Sep 2016.

606 Gorengurb, Dmity. “Russia’s State Armaments Program

607 “Modernized Strategic Bombers to Debut in Victory Day

Parade Over Moscow.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 Apr 2016,janes.com. Accessed on 4 Aug 2016.
608 Harress, Christopher. “Russia Tupolev 22M3 Bombers Up-

grade: Modernized Jets to be in Service by the End of 2015.”
International Business Times, 17 Jul 2015, www.ibtimes.com.
609 “Modernized Strategic Bombers to Debut in Victory Day

Parade Over Moscow.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 Apr 2016,janes.com. Accessed on 4 Aug 2016.

A G E N C Y

of the George C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes,
missilethreat.com. Accessed 18 Aug 2016.

596 “Aerospace and Defense: Company Overview of Joint-

I N T E L L I G E N C E

583 “Cruise Missiles: Kh-101/102.” Missile Threat: A Project

D E F E N S E

RUSSIA M ILITARY P OWE R

610 “Aircraft Upgrades/Tupolev Tu-160.” Janes, 15 Dec 2015,janes.com. Accessed 8 Aug 2016.

109

611 Unattributed. “Russian Air Forces to Take Delivery of More

625 Unattributed. "Saylut Scientific Production Center Upgrades

612 Unattributed. “Russia Plans to Complete Tu-22M3 Bomber

626 Ishchenko, Sergey. “Squadron Losing Way: Construction ofthan 10 Upgraded Tu-95 Bombers in Two Years.” Russian Aviation, 30 Mar 2015, www.ruaviation.com. Accessed 9 Aug 2016.
Modernization Program by 2019.” Russian Aviation, 12 Jan
2016, www.ruaviation.com. Accessed 2 Aug 2016.
613 “Development of PAK-DA Bomber Moved from Preliminary

17 Surface Combatants for Our Navy Under Threat of Disruption.” Moscow Svobodnaya Pressa, 19 Mar 2015, http://www.
svpressa.ru/. Accessed 26 Mar 2015.

Design State to Research and Development Work.” Russian Aviation, 2 Jul 2015, www.ruaviation.com. Accessed 8 Aug 2016.

627 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s,

614 Jane’s Information Group, “Kuznetsov NK-321.” Jane’s

628 “Kuznetsov Overhaul Designed to Maintain Carrier Capa-

615 Shapkin, Dmitriy. “They Have Pulled Out of the Dive:

629 Litovkin, Dmitriy. “A Unique Dock Will Be Built to Accom-

616 Litovkin, Dmitriy. “The Army: The T-50 Fighter Aircraft Is

630 Unattributed. “Shtorm aircraft carrier design to begin in

Aero-Enginesm, Aero-engines - Turbofan, Russian Federation, 4 May 16.
Combat Aircraft.” Kommersant Online, 21 Aug 2013,
http://kommersant.ru. Accessed 24 Aug 2013.

Ready for Series Production: The Delivery of the Aircraft to the
Troops Will Begin in 2017.” Moscow Izvestiya Online, 15 Jun
2016, http://www.izvestia.ru/. Accessed 15 Jun 2016.
617 Khodarenok, Mikhail. “Long Restrained, We Will Fly Quickly;

Fifth-Generation Russian Fighter Will Be Serially Produced in2017.” Moscow Gazeta.ru, 1 Sep 2016. Accessed 13 Sep 2016.
618 Unattributed. “Nothing critical happens to Russian Heli-

copters holding as result of imposition of Western sanctions.”
Moscow Interfax, 8 Sep 2016, http://www.interfax.com/.
Accessed 8 Sept 2016.
619 Kramnick, Ilya. “Preserving the Heights: A Series of Ad-

30 Jun 2016, pp. 27–28.

bility While Russia Considers Future Carrier Options.” Jane’s
Navy International, 30 Jun 2016.
modate the Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuznetsov.” Izvestiya Online, 7 Jun 16, http://www.izvestia.ru/. Accessed 12 Jun 2016.
2020.” Moscow Interfax, 30 Jun 16, http://www.interfax.com.
Accessed 1 Jul 2016.
631 “Russia’s New Maritime Doctrine.” Jane’s Defense Weekly,

14 Aug 2015, p. 4.

632 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30

Jun 2016, p. 31.

633 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30

Jun 2016, p. 30.

634 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s, 30

Jun 2016, p. 30.

vanced Helicopters Must Help Russia to Not Lose Its Placein the World Market.” Moscow Vzglyad Online, 10 Dec 2012,
http://www.vz.ru/. Accessed 20 Dec 2012.

635 de Larrinaga, Nick. “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground

620 Unattributed. “Russian Helicopters business unaffected byModernisation.”

extension of Ukrainian sanctions.” Moscow Interfax, 25 Oct
2016, http://www.interfax.com/. Accessed 25 Oct 2016.
621 Fedorov, Konstantin. “Modernization of Russian Mili-

tary-Transport Aviation: Russia's Military-Transport Aviation:
Need for Radical Renewal.” Moscow Segodnya.Ru, 3 Jun
2015, http://www.segodnia.ru/. Accessed 5 Jun 2015.
622 Fedorov, “Modernization of Russian Military-Transport Aviation.”
623 Zhuravlev, Nataliya. “A Hope for a Trillion: Plans Were

Expressed on the Sale of the Latest Version of the VeteranTransport.” Moscow Vzglyad Online, 26 Dec 2012, http://
www.vz.ru/. Accessed 5 Jan 2013.
624 “Jane’s World Navies – Russian Federation.” IHS Jane’s,

30 Jun 2016, pp. 27–28.

110

Test Stands for Ship Engines." RIA Novosti, 23 Aug 2016,www.ria.ru. Accessed 23 Aug 2016.

Forces Modernisation.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 Mar 2016.
636 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces
637 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces

Modernisation.”

638 Koryakin, Oleg. “T-80 Tank Is Being Modernized with

Relikt and Sosna-U: Omsk Armorers Took on Modernizationof T-80BV Tank.” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 14 Jul 2016,
http://rg.ru/. Accessed 15 Jul 2016.
639 Golts, Aleksandr. “Higher Arithmetic of the Russian De-

fense-Industrial Complex.” Moscow Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal,
15 May 2015, www.ej.ru. Accessed 18 May 2015.
640 Frolov, Andrey. “An Obstacle for the Aircraft Carrier. The

State Armaments Program to 2025 Fits Ill with Economic Realities.” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 16 Mar
2016, vpk-news.ru. Accessed 21 Mar 2016.

Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations

642 Fedyushko, Dmitriy. “BMP-3's Second Youth. Vehicle

produce exports in 2014 – service.” Interfax, 26 May 2015,
www.interfax.com. Accessed 27 Mar 2015.

Designed a Quarter of a Century Ago Has Become the Basisfor the Newest Developments.” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy
Kuryer Online, 23 Sep 2015, http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/27164. Accessed 26 Oct 2015.

656 President of Russia. “Russian President Addresses Arms

643 Frolov, Andrey. “An Obstacle for the Aircraft Carrier. The

technological cooperation within BRICS (Part 2).” Interfax,
26 May 2015, www.interfax.com. Accessed 26 May 2015.

State Armaments Program to 2025 Fits Ill with Economic
Realities.” VPK Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, 16
Mar 2016, vpk-news.ru. Accessed 21 Mar 2016.
644 Official government statement. “Preliminary Testing ofState-of-Art Boomerang Armored Personnel Carrier Will Be
Completed in 2016.” Moscow TASS, 3 Jun 2016, tass.ru/.
Accessed 6 Jun 2016.
645 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces

Exports Commission Meeting.” Russian Presidential Website,
27 Jan 2015, www.eng.kremlin.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2015.
657 Unattributed. “Patrushev seeks broader military-

658 Safronov, Ivan. “’Our Goal is to Hold on to Russia’s Sec-ond Place in the Arms Delivery Sphere.’ Rosoboronexport
General Director Anatoliy Isaykin Talks About 2013’s Results
and the Prospects for 2014.” Kommersant Online, 27 Jan 2014,
www.kommersant.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2014.
659 President of Russia. “Russian President Addresses Arms

Modernisation.”

Exports Commission Meeting.” Russian Presidential Website,
27 Jan 2015, www.eng.kremlin.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2015.

646 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces

660 President of Russia. “Russian President Addresses Arms

Modernisation.”

647 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces

Modernisation.”

648 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground Forces

Modernisation.”

649 “Ukraine mobility upgrades for Russian rocket launchers.”

Jane’s International Defence Review, vol. 44, no. 3, Mar 2011,
pp. 31–33.
650 “Rosoboronexport outlines 2020 strategy.” Jane's Defence,

Industry Market Intelligence, 18 Nov 2013.

651 Safronov, Ivan and Dzhordzhevich, Aleksandr. “Demand

Gives Rise to Armament -- Russian Military Exports Beat
Records.” Moscow Kommersant Online, 23 Mar 2017,
http://kommersant.ru/. Accessed 29 Mar 2017.

652 Safronov, Ivan. “‘Our Goal is to Hold on to Russia’s Second

Place in the Arms Delivery Sphere.’ Rosoboronexport General
Director Anatoliy Isaykin Talks About 2013’s Results andthe Prospects for 2014.” Kommersant Online, 27 Jan 2014,
www.kommersant.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2014.
653 Unattributed. “Rosoboronexport's sales reach $6.5 bln

in H1 (Part 2).” Interfax, 15 Aug 2013, www.interfax.com.
Accessed 15 Aug 2013.
654 Unattributed. “Arms export costs account for $2 bln- $2.5 bln in Russia's arms exports – Military-TechnicalCooperation Service.” Interfax, 16 Jun 2015, www.interfax.com.
Accessed 16 Jun 2015.

Exports Commission Meeting.” Russian Presidential Website,
27 Jan 2015, www.eng.kremlin.ru. Accessed 27 Jan 2015.
661 Vlahovic, Branko. "Price Tag of Russian Weapons After

Syria." Belgrade Vecernje Novosti, 4 Apr 2016, www.novosti.rs.
Accessed 4 Apr 2016.

A G E N C Y

Forces Modernisation.”

655 Unattributed. “Russia broadens geography of military

I N T E L L I G E N C E

641 de Larrinaga, “Return of the Bear: Russian Ground

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