Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 52 (2018) 33– 42

ArticleAlan Turing’s Question

Naoki ARAKI*(Received Oct. 31, 2017)

Abstract
Can machines think? Alan Turing tried to answer this question using his Turing test. Moreover, he
expected that machines could pass the test in the future. On the other hand, John Searle proposes athought experiment called “Chinese room” and argues that machines do not think because they justonly manipulate symbols. But Noam Chomsky insists that the question of whether machines can think
is a matter of usage of words not a matter of fact. According to Yuval Noah Harari, organisms are biochemical algorithms. So we cannot find any differences between organisms and machines. Michio
Kaku claims that the question will not have any meaning if machines behave like human beings. Can
machines think or not?
Key Words: Turing test, Chinese room, biochemical algorithms

So next let’s take up the Turing test.

Introduction
Arthur C. Clarke writes in his science-fiction

1. Turing testnovel, 2001: A Space Odyssey:First of all, Alan Turing asks a question, “Canmachines think?” and says that it is dangerous to

Whether HAL [Heuristically programmed ALgo-answer the question based on definitions of the mean-

rithmic computer] could actually think was a question

ing of the terms “machine” and “think.” So he replaces

which had been settled by the British mathematician

the question by the following game called “the imita-

Alan Turing back in the 1940s. Turing had pointed out

tion game.” The details of the game are irrelevant

that, if one could carry out a prolonged conversation

here:

with a machine—whether by typewriter or microphone was immaterial—without being able to distin-It [the imitation game] is played with three peo-

guish between its replies and those that a man mightple, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C)give, then the machine was thinking, by any sensible

who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in adefinition of the word. HAL could pass the Turing test

room apart from the other two. The object of the gamewith ease.

for the interrogator is to determine which of the other(Clarke 1968: 97)

two is the man and which is the woman. He knows
Here Clarke thinks that a computer, HAL 9000
could think by passing the Turing test. Of course, thisthem by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game hesays either ‘X is A and Y is B’ or ‘X is B and Y is A’.

computer is fictitious, but could machines really think?

(Turing 1950: 433)

* Department of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of Technology,
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp
─ 33 ─Naoki ARAKI

Furthermore, Turing replaces the man (A) by aputer that could behave like us human beings in 1950.

machine and the interrogator determines which of the

So the question is, for Turing, not a question but atwo (the machine and the human) is the machine andpseudo-question and also a question of words, not awhich is the human. Turing thinks that the machinequestion of fact:

should be a digital computer (Turing 1950: 436). In
this way, he replaces his original question, “CanThe original question, ‘Can machines think?’ Imachines think?” by this modified imitation game,believe to be too meaningless to deserve discussion.

which is called the Turing test:

Nevertheless I believe that at the end of the century
the use of words and general educated opinion will

We now ask the question, ‘What will happen when

have altered so much that one will be able to speak of

a machine takes the part of A in this game?’ Will themachines thinking without expecting to be contra-interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game

dicted.

(Turing 1950: 442)

is played like this as he does when the game is played
between a man and a woman? These questions replace

As we shall see later, Chomsky also says that theour original, ‘Can machines think?’ (Turing 1950: 434)

question is a matter of words, not a matter of fact, asking a question like “Do submarines swim?” and so

Naturally, Turing expects a criticism of the imita-

forth. So it is (may be) no wonder that the computer
system HAL 9000 in the novel 2001: A Space Odyssey

tion game (the Turing test):

could pass the Turing test as Arthur C. Clarke depicts.
May not machines carry out something which

But John Searle does not agree with Turing, insisting

ought to be described as thinking but which is very

that even though machines pass the Turing test, theydifferent from what a man does? This objection is acannot be claimed to think the same way as humanvery strong one, but at least we can say that if, never-beings do because machines can only manipulate sym-theless, a machine can be constructed to play thebols but they do not understand meanings related toimitation game satisfactorily, we need not be troubled

the symbols. Next, we will examine Searle’s thoughtby this objection.

experiment called “Chinese room.”(Turing 1950: 435)

Here, Turing seems to point out the impossibility

2. Chinese Roomof a machine that can replace the part of A. But as weJohn Searle proposes a thought experiment called

shall see later, John Searle says that even if a machine“Chinese room.” Let me summarize his thought exper-

can carry out something which ought to be described

iment because it is too long to quote here.

as thinking, he does not think that what the machineFirst Searle says that he is in a room, being given

does is the same “thinking” as what we humans do ina Chinese writing. But he does not know anything

any sense. In any case, then Turing shows his answer

about Chinese (Searle 1980: 417-418).
Then he is given a second Chinese writing

to the question, “Can machines think?”

together with a set of rules for correlating the second
I believe that in about fifty years’ time it will be

writing with the first writing. The rules are in English

possible to programme computers, with a storage

so he understands them. The rules enable him to cor-

9capacity of about 10 , to make them play the imitation

relate one set of formal symbols with another set ofgame so well that an average interrogator will not haveformal symbols (Searle 1980: 418).
Then he is given a third Chinese symbols together

more than 70 percent chance of making the right iden-with some instructions in English that enable him totification after five minutes of questioning.
(Turing 1950: 442)

correlate elements of these third Chinese symbols
with the first two Chinese writings. These instructions

Here, Turing does think that “machines cantell him how to give back certain Chinese symbols inthink” even though it is impossible to program a com-

response to Chinese symbols given him in the third─ 34 ─

Alan Turing’s Question

standing has anything to do with computer programs,

writing (Searle 1980: 418).
The first Chinese writing is called a “script,” thethat is, with computational operations on purely for-second writing is called a “story,” and the third writing

mally specified elements. As long as the program isis called “questions.” The symbols given back in

defined in terms of computational operations on purely

response to the third writing are called “answers to theformally defined elements, what the example suggests

questions,” and the set of rules in English is called theis that these by themselves have no interesting con-“program” (Searle 1980: 418).

nection with understanding. They are certainly not

Suppose that his answers to the Chinese ques-sufficient conditions and they are not necessary condi-

tions are absolutely indistinguishable from those oftions or they do not make a significant contribution tonative Chinese speakers. Nobody just looking at his

understanding. Whatever purely formal principles you

Chinese answers can tell that he does not speak aput into the computer, they will not be sufficient for

word of Chinese. But he produces the Chinese answers

understanding, since a human will be able to follow theby manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. So as

formal principles without understanding anything.

far as the Chinese is concerned, he simply behaves

Such principles are not necessary or even contribu-

like a computer; he performs computational opera-

tory, since when he understands English he is nottions on formally specified elements. For the purposes

operating with any formal problem at all. What is itof the Chinese, he is simply an instantiation of thethat he has in the case of the English sentences thatcomputer program (Searle 1980: 418).

he does not have in the case of the Chinese sentences?

It is time for us to examine two claims: 1) the

The obvious answer is that he knows what the former

programmed computer understands the stories and 2)

mean, while he does not have the faintest idea what

the program in some sense explains human under-

the latter mean. But in what does this consist and why

standing (Searle 1980: 418).

couldn’t we give it to a machine, whatever it is? (Searle

As regards the first claim, he does not understand

1980: 418)

a word of the Chinese stories. So a computer under-

He understands stories in English; to a lesser

stands nothing of any stories, whether in Chinese,

degree he can understand stories in French; to a still

English, or whatever, because in the Chinese case thelesser degree, stories in German; and in Chinese, notcomputer is him. As regards the second claim, theat all. His car and his adding machine, on the othercomputer and its program do not provide sufficient

hand, understand nothing. We often attribute “under-

conditions of understanding because the computer

standing” and other cognitive predicates by metaphor

and the program are just only functioning (Searle

and analogy to cars, adding machines, and other arti-

1980: 418).

facts, but nothing is proved by such attributions. We

But some people insist that when he understands

say, “The door knows when to open because of its

a story in English, what he is doing is exactly the same

photoelectric cell,” “The adding machine knows how

as what he was doing in manipulating the Chinese(understands how, is able) to do addition and subtrac-

symbols. This insistence is based on two assumptions:tion but not division,” and “The thermostat perceives

1) that we can construct a program that will have thechanges in the temperature.” The reason we makesame inputs and outputs as native speakers 2) and thatthese attributions is quite interesting, and it has to do

speakers have some level of description where they

with the fact that in artifacts we extend our own inten-

are also instantiations of a program. This is logicallytionality; our tools are extensions of our purposes, andpossible, but what is suggested by the example is that

so we find it natural to make metaphorical attributions

the computer program is simply irrelevant to hisof intentionality to them. The sense in which an auto-

understanding of the story. In the Chinese case he hasmatic door “understands instructions” from its photo-

everything that artificial intelligence can put into him

electric cell is not at all the sense in which he under-

by way of a program, but he understands nothing; instands English. If the sense in which the programmed

the English case he understands everything, and there

computers understand stories is supposed to be theis so far no reason at all to suppose that his under-

metaphorical sense in which the door understands,

─ 35 ─Naoki ARAKIand not the sense in which he understands English,

Searle already notices that if the word “think” isthe issue would not be worth discussing. But someused in a metaphorical sense, the question will not be

people say that the kind of cognition they claim for

worth discussing:computers is exactly the same as for human beings.
Searle argues that in the literal sense the programmed

If the sense in which […] programmed comput-

computer understands what the car and the adding

ers understand stories is supposed to be the meta-machine understand, namely, exactly nothing. The

phorical sense in which the door understands, and notcomputer understanding is not just (like Searle’s

the sense in which I [Searle] understand English, theunderstanding of German) partial or incomplete; it isissue would not be worth discussing.
(Searle 1980: 419)

zero (Searle 1980: 418-419).

3. Chomsky’s View

Chomsky agrees with Turing on his stand that

Chomsky mentions a question of whether

the question is a matter of usage of words, but not amachines can think, referring to a British mathemati-

matter of fact. He repeats his idea on this question,

cian Alan Turing, who proposed the “Turing test” fortaking up Jacques de Vaucanson’s clockwork duck:machine intelligence as we have seen above:
When Jacques de Vaucanson amazed observers
The question [of whether machines can think]with his remarkable contrivances, he and his audiencehas aroused lively discussion and controversy, con-were concerned to understand the animate systems hetrary to Turing’s intentions. He [Alan Turing] regarded

was modelling. His clockwork duck, for example, wasthe question as “too meaningless to deserve discus-

intended to be a model of the actual digestion of asion,” though in half a century, he speculated, condi-

duck, not a facsimile that might fool his audience, thetions might have changed enough for us to alter our

neuropsychologist John Marshall points out in a recent

usage, just as some languages use the metaphor of

study. That is the purpose of simulation generally inflying for airplanes. Turing seems to have agreed with

the natural sciences. There is little if any role here for

Wittgenstein as to the pointlessness of the discussion

operational tests of one or another sort, and surely no

and debate that has ensued, until today, over whether

point in a debate over whether Vaucanson’s duck reallymachines can (in principle) think, play chess, under-

digests. In this regard, there has been considerable

stand Chinese, do long division, etc., and about how

regression in the modern “cognitive revolution,” in my

we could “empirically” establish that they do; or

opinion, though Turing himself was clear about thewhether robots can reach for objects and pick themmatter.

up, murder, and so on.

(Chomsky 1993: 30-31)(Chomsky 1993: 30)
If Chomsky is right, then Turing understands that

Here, Chomsky insists that the question of

his test is intended for simulation of thinking. So there

whether machines can think is meaningless or point-

is no point in the discussion on whether machines canless and it is a matter of usage of the word “think”:

really think. Furthermore, Chomsky refers to the Turing Test, taking up “breathing”:

I think Turing stand was correct. These are questions of decision about sharpening and altering usage,

On the other matter, do we confirm or refute thenot fact, just as there is no empirical question ofTuring Test by considering the possibility of a machine

whether airplanes can fly to London or whether sub-that duplicates our finite behavior? Well, I’m not con-marines really set sail but do not swim. The conclusion

vinced. Let’s try an analog. We breathe. Roughly

remains if we add further sensory conditions or crite-

speaking what happens is air comes into the nose andria beyond performance, as has been proposed.

carbon dioxide goes out after a lot of things go on. So(Chomsky 1993: 30)

there is an input-output system, air to carbon dioxide.
We could get a machine that duplicates that com-─ 36 ─

Alan Turing’s Question

pletely by some crazy mechanism. Would the machine

computer system HAL 9000 did not murder an astro-be breathing? Well, no, the machine would not benaut, Poole in 2001: A Space Odyssey. So thinking isbreathing for trivial reasons. Breathing is a thing thatsomething that humans do. Therefore machines dohumans do, therefore, the machine isn’t breathing. Is

not think. As we have seen, Chomsky thinks that theit a good model of humans? Well, that we’d look at andquestion of whether machines can think is meaning-see if it teaches us anything about humans. If it does,

less, saying that Turing was right:

it’s a good model of humans. If it doesn’t teach us
Therefore, it doesn’t seem to me possible toanything about humans, send it to Hume’s flames.
(Chomsky 1993: 90)

refute the Turing Test this way. I think Turing wasright. Remember what Turing said. He said, look, theAccording to Chomsky, “breathing” is a thing thatquestion whether a machine can think is too meaning-

humans do, so the machine does not breathe, howeverless to deserve discussion. It’s like asking in 1900

completely it duplicates human breathing by somewhether an airplane flies. It’s not a meaningful ques-mechanism. So Chomsky insists that the same is truetion. It flies if you want to call that flying. It doesn’t flyof thought and intelligence, referring to playing chess:

if you don’t want to call that flying. It’s just like asking,“Does my brain think?” That’s not the way we talkIt seems to me exactly the same is true when we

English, but if you want to change the language you

turn to thought and intelligence. Let’s say somebody

could say it. The same is true about this breathing

could come along with a chess-playing program thatdevice or about machines thinking and so on.
(Chomsky 1993: 91)

behaved exactly like Kasparov [a famous chess player],made exactly the moves he would every time. Would
it be playing chess? Well, no, just as in the case ofThen, what did Turing want to say? According to“breathing.” Playing chess is something that people

Chomsky, he said that we should drop the question of

do. Kasparov has a brain, but his brain doesn’t playwhat thinking is and create computational models ofchess. If we asked, “Does Kasparov’s brain play chess,”

intelligence because they might teach us something

the answer is no, any more than my legs take a walk.

about thinking:It’s a trivial point. It’s not an interesting point to discuss. My legs don’t take a walk, my brain doesn’t play

What Turing suggested is, let’s drop the question

chess or understand English. Just for the same reasonof what thinking is, and let’s try to create models ofthat a submarine doesn’t swim. Swimming is some-intelligence, computational models of intelligence.

thing that fish do. If we want to extend the metaphor

That’s perfectly reasonable. That’s like 250 years ago,to submarines, we could say they do. English hap-de Vaucanson saying let’s construct an automaton that

pened to pick a different metaphor, but these are notdoes things kind of like a duck, because maybe it will

substantive questions. A machine that duplicated theteach us something about ducks. Turing’s point was

air-to-carbon dioxide exchange would not be breathing

maybe this will teach us something about thinking.

for trivial reasons, just as if a robot sticks a knife into

Well, he also said that maybe 50 years from now wesomebody’s heart, it’s not murdering him. Robots can’t

will have just changed our language, and we’ll talkmurder. That’s something humans do. For these rea-

about that as thinking as we talk about airplanes flying.

sons, the questions just don’t mean anything.

But nothing substantive will have happened, just the(Chomsky 1993: 91)

decision to use a metaphor, like deciding to say thatsubmarines set sail. It doesn’t mean anything, andHere, Chomsky insists that playing chess is some-

we’re not confused into thinking it.
(Chomsky 1993: 92)

thing that people do. So machines do not play chess.
Also, swimming is something that fish do. So a subma-

A physicist, Michio Kaku also says the same thingrine does not swim. Murdering is something thathumans do. So robots can’t murder. In this sense, theas this:─ 37 ─Naoki ARAKIOver the centuries, a great many theories have

we didn’t understand how people walk, and someone

been advanced about whether a machine can think

said “Let’s figure out how they pole vault.” That justand feel. My own philosophy is called “constructiv-

wouldn’t be a sane scientific endeavor. Let’s first figureism”; that is, instead of endlessly debating the ques-

out how they move one leg in front of the other, thention, which is pointless, we should be devoting ourmaybe someday we’ll get to pole vaulting. Playing

energy to creating an automaton to see how far we canchess is something way out on the margins of whatget.

people do—that’s why it’s a game. It’s too remote from

(Kaku 2014: 238)

what we understand to make any sense to study. FurSo Chomsky insists that the discussion of thisthermore, from the very first moment it became clear

matter, including Searle’s Chinese room is not mean-that the way to win at chess was to deviate radicallyingful:from the way human beings do it and to use thecapacities of computers. That just means it’s rotten

In my opinion, all the discussion that’s gone on forsimulation. If Carnegie Tech’s computer program canthe last ten years about, say, John Searle’s Chinesebeat Kasparov, that’s about as interesting as the factroom and so on, or how do we empirically decidethat a bulldozer can lift more than some weight lifter.

whether computers play chess, it seems to me just like

Maybe. Who cares? It doesn’t teach you anything

asking: Does the brain think? Do my legs take a walk?

about the weight lifter, and it’s of no scientific interest.

If a rock fell off a roof and shattered someone’s skull,

In fact, about its only interest is to take the fun out of

did the rock murder him? It’s the same kind of ques-playing chess as far as I can see. Now the fact that ation. These are not meaningful questions. We shouldhuge amount of effort and money from the National

drop them and just look at the serious questions like

Science Foundation—I hope not the Russell Sage

whether simulation teaches us anything. If it does,Foundation—has gone into this, simply shows how

good; if it doesn’t, throw it out. Simulation that doesn’t

conceptual errors have misled the field, in my opinion.

teach us anything is useless.

(Chomsky 1993: 92)

We should be aware of that. (Chomsky 1993: 92-93)

Here, Chomsky thinks that the question of

According to Chomsky, effort and money spent

whether machines can think is a matter of usage of theon chess-playing programs are a waste of time! They

word “think,” but not a matter of fact. Chomsky thinks

are not scientific endeavour at all! The reason is thatthat a chess-playing program is not an interesting

they cannot teach us anything about thinking.

theme to study because it is not likely to help us learn
anything about human beings. So even though a pro-

4. Harari’s View

gram can beat a human, that’s about as interesting as

On the other hand, there is an idea that humanthe fact that a bulldozer can lift more than somebeings and machines are the same. According toweight lifter. This does not teach us anything about theHarari, autonomous cars already can cruise our roads

weight lifter, so it is of no scientific interest:

successfully and this means that the cars and manyother computer programs do not need any conscious-

Take the whole business about chess-playing pro-ness:

grams, which as Herbert Simon once put it, I think, isthe “dorosophila of cognitive science,” the idea around

The algorithms controlling the autonomous carwhich everything converges. He’s sort of right descrip-

make millions of calculations each second […] The

tively, but that tells you exactly where the field has

autonomous car successfully stops at red lights, […]gone off from the first moment. There are few projects

The car does all that without any problem—but with-less interesting, scientifically, than a chess-playingout any consciousness either. […] Many other com-

program. For one thing because chess-playing is notputer programs make allowances for their own actions,an interesting topic to study; right now, it’s unlikely to

yet none of them has developed consciousness,help us learn anything about human beings. It’s as if
─ 38 ─

(Harari 2015: 114)

Alan Turing’s Question

Harari insists that we should discard the mind justincluding Homo sapiens—is an assemblage of organic

as we discarded a substance called ether and God as aalgorithms shaped by natural selection over millions ofmeans of explaining numerous phenomena:

years of evolution.
2. Algorithmic calculations are not affected by the

If we cannot explain the mind, […] why not justmaterials from which you build the calculator. Whether

discard it? The history of science is replete with aban-

you build an abacus from wood, iron or plastic, two

doned concepts and theories. […], they [scientists]beads plus two beads equals four beads.
3. Hence there is no reason to think that organic

threw ether into the dustbin of science.
Similarly, for thousands of years humans usedalgorithms can do things that non-organic algorithms

God to explain numerous natural phenomena. […] nowill never be able to replicate or surpass. As long asarticle in any peer-review scientific journal takes God’s

the calculations remain valid, what does it matter

existence seriously.

whether the algorithms are manifested in carbon or(Harari 2015: 114-115)

silicon?

(Harari 2015: 319)

Harari thinks that the Turing Test is designed inorder to determine whether a computer has a mind,

So, for Harari, humans and computers are one

but that the Test actually examines only a social andand the same thing. In other words, he insists thelegal convention:same idea as La Mettrie’s that human beings aremachines.

The best test that scholars have so far come up
with is called the Turing Test, but it examines only

5. Kaku’s viewsocial conventions. […] the computer has passed theLike Chomsky, Michio Kaku proposes to build a

Turing Test, and we should treat it as if it really has arobot that can think like a human instead of endlessly

mind. However, that won’t really be a proof, of course.

debating the question of whether a robot can think:Acknowledging the existence of other minds is merely
a social and legal convention. […] According to Tur-[…] to settle the question of whether a robot caning, in the future computers would be just like gay

think, the final resolution may be to build one. Some,men in the 1950s. It won’t matter whether computers

however, have argued that machines will never be able

will actually be conscious or not. It will matter only

to think like a human. Their strongest argument iswhat people think about it.

that, although a robot can manipulate facts faster than(Harari 2015: 120)a human, it does not “understand” what it is manipulatHere, Harari’s interpretation of the Turing Test

ing.

(Kaku 2014: 239)

resembles Chomsky’s idea that it is a matter of words
not a fact whether computers can think or not. Also,

Here it seems that Kaku refers to Searle’s

Harari thinks that organisms, including human beings,“Chinese room” by “their strongest argument.” More-are biochemical algorithms:

over, he repeats the same thing as this:Over the last few decades biologists have reached[…] a computer might be able to translate

the firm conclusion that the man […] is also an algo-

Chinese words into English with great fluency, but itrithm. […] Humans are algorithms that produce […]will never be able to understand what it is translating.

copies of themselves […]In this picture, robots are like glorified tape recorders(Harari 2015: 84-85)

or adding machines, able to recite and manipulate
Harari says, comparing organic (conscious) algorithms, that is, humans with non-organic (non- con-information with incredible precision, but without any
understanding whatsoever.

(Kaku 2014: 239)

scious) algorithms, that is, machines:
Then Kaku argues against Searle’s insistence that
1. Organisms are algorithms. Every animal—

machines cannot think like a human:─ 39 ─Naoki ARAKI[…] it is only a matter of time before a robot will

ter. However, Chomsky understands this matter

be able to define Chinese words and use them in con-related to the Turing test, saying the question does nottext much better than any human. At that point, it

deserve any discussion as Turing pointed out. For

becomes irrelevant whether the robot “understands”

him, this is a matter of words not a matter of fact.

the Chinese language. For all practical purposes, theHarari and Kaku say the same thing as this. So, after

computer will know the Chinese language better thanall, the question of whether machines can think is not

any human. In other words, the word “understand” isa question but a pseudo-question.

not well defined.

(Kaku 2014: 239-240)

But we may have a totally different story about
this matter. If what is happening in our brain when we

As Kaku says, a language may be just permuta-

are thinking is quite the same thing as what is happen-

tions and combinations of characters, which are theo-

ing in a computer when it is functioning, we may beretically limited in their numbers. Kaku says that “theable to say that “computers are thinking.” Althoughquestion [of whether machines can think like a human]

Searle denies such an argument and Chomsky says

will cease to have any importance” (Kaku 2014: 240).

that it is not computers but humans that think, HarariThis means that “the problem lies […] in the nature of

may agree to this, saying that we do not need the mind

human language, in which words that are not wellin understanding humans and Kaku may also accept

defined mean different things to different people”

this, saying that the question will cease to have any(Kaku 2014: 240). What Kaku says is similar to what

importance when machines come to know language

Chomsky says about this matter. The question of

better than humans as HAL 9000 in 2001: a Space

whether machines can think is a matter of usage ofOdyssey does.

words not a matter of fact. Finally Kaku insists that
this is what Turing wanted to say by using the Turing

Incidentally, Roy Harris shows an interesting
interpretation concerning Turing’s question:

Test:
Descartes’s argument, [which appears in his DisThis was the philosophy behind Alan Turing’s

course on Method, Part V] as Turing and others later

famous Turing test. He predicted that one day arealized, can in any case be stood on its head. Shouldmachine would be built that could answer any ques-

not a machine that can handle words as well as ation, so that it would be indistinguishable from ahuman being be reckoned as having the ability tohuman. He said, “A computer would deserve to be

think?

(Harris 2003: 168)

called intelligent if it could deceive a human into
believing that it was human.”(Kaku 2014: 240)

What, then, does Descartes argue in his Discourse
on Method, Part V? Descartes says that human beings

Conclusion

are different from machines:

Alan Turing asks a question, “Can machines
think?” and replaces this question by the Turing test,[…] if there were machines bearing the image of

avoiding the problems caused by the word “think.” He

our bodies, and capable of imitating our actions as far

thinks that if a machine passes the Turing test, it can

as it is morally possible, there would still remain two“think.” So we can say that his question is concernedmost certain tests whereby to know that they were not

not with the fact that machines can think but with what

therefore really men.

(Descartes 1637: Part V)

we think of “thinking.” But other people do not thinkof Turing’s question as he wanted them to do. For
example, Searle performs a thought experiment called

What are the two tests to distinguish humanbeings from machines?

“Chinese room” and denies that machines can think.
He insists that machines can just manipulate symbols

Of these the first [test] is that they could never

but cannot think as humans do. Probably Turing

use words or other signs arranged in such a manner

understands what Searle wants to say about this mat-as is competent to us in order to declare our thoughts─ 40 ─

Alan Turing’s Question

to others: for we may easily conceive a machine to be

His idea is different from Turing’s. Like Searle, Des-so constructed that it emits vocables, and even that it

cartes thinks that machines just only imitate humanemits some correspondent to the action upon it of

behavior even if machines can communicate withexternal objects which cause a change in its organs;human beings using language as well as or much bet-

for example, if touched in a particular place it may

ter than human beings. Chomsky accepts Descartes’s

demand what we wish to say to it; if in another it may

idea and refers to his own theory of language as “Car-cry out that it is hurt, and such like; but not that it

tesian Linguistics.” So he, like Descartes, will insist

should arrange them variously so as appositely tothat machines do not speak because he thinks that

reply to what is said in its presence, as men of the low-

speaking is what human beings do. In fact, thinking is

est grade of intellect can do. (Descartes 1637: Part V)

what human beings do. On the contrary, Kaku andHarari, unlike Descartes, insist that machines can

The first test is that machines can never commu-

speak. Probably they say that “reason” or “mind” isnicate with human beings by using language. This

unnecessary, which exists, Descartes insists, in humanmeans that there cannot be any machine that can pass

beings but not in machines. After all, Turing’s ques-

the Turing test. What, then, is the other test?

tion, “Can machines think?” may have its origin in
Descartes’s idea that God has given “mind” or “rea-The second test is, that although such machines
might execute many things with equal or perhaps

son,” which is not present in animals and machines,
only to human beings.

greater perfection than any of us, they would, without

According to Harris, it is thought that Turing

doubt, fail in certain others from which it could be

stood Descartes’s argument on its head. In otherdiscovered that they did not act from knowledge, butwords, Descartes thinks that machines cannot speaksolely from the disposition of their organs: for while

like human beings because they do not have reason,

reason is an universal instrument that is alike available

mind, or intelligence. As we have already seen, Chom-on every occasion, these organs, on the contrary, needsky thinks the same way as Descartes. According toa particular arrangement for each particular action;

Chomsky, thinking is what human beings do but not

whence it must be morally impossible that there

what machines do. On the other hand, Turing thinks

should exist in any machine a diversity of organs suf-that if machines can speak like human beings, thenficient to enable it to act in all the occurrences of life,

they have reason, mind, or intelligence, which meansin the way in which our reason enables us to act.

that machines can think. On this point, Descartes’s(Descartes 1637: Part V)

and Turing’s idea is the head and tail of the same coin.
After all, can machines think? Is the Turing test,

Here, Descartes says that machines do not behave
based on “cognition,” “mind” or “reason.” In otherwhich was proposed by Turing more than half a century ago, plausible?

words, he insists that human beings have “reason” orReferences“mind” but machines or animals do not:Chomsky, Noam. Language and Thought. Moyer Bell.
1993.

[…] we observe that magpies and parrots canutter words like ourselves, and are yet unable to speak

Clarke, Arthur C. 2001: A Space Odyssey. Signet. 1968.

as we do, that is, so as to show that they understandDescartes, René. Discourse on the Method of Rightly

what they say;

(Descartes 1637: Part V)

Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in theHere, Descartes says that human beings have

Harari, Yuval Noah. Homo Deus: A Brief History of

Sciences. (English translation) 1637.
Tomorrow. Harvill Secker. 2015.

“reason” or “mind” but animals do not. He also saysthat machines cannot have “various arrangements ofHarris, Roy. Saussure and his Interpreters 2nd edition.

organs.” Thus, Descartes does not think that machines
can communicate with human beings using language.

Edinburgh University Press. 2003.
Kaku, Michio. The Future of the Mind: The Scientific─ 41 ─Naoki ARAKI(1980).

Quest to Understand, Enhance and Empower the
Mind. Penguin Books. 2014.

Turing, Alan. “Computing Machinery and Intelli-

Searle, John. “Minds, Brains, and Programs.” The
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: pp.417-457.

─ 42 ─

gence.” Mind 59 (236): pp. 433-460. (1950).