Workshop on Denuclearization of Northeast Asia and the WorldSession 2A Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia
September 15, 2014, Tokyo“An Observation about the Up-dated Agreement
Mitsuru Kurosawa, Professor, Osaka Jogakuin University
The up-dated version of Mr. Halperin’s paper submitted at thisworkshop includes some new ideas based on the original paper of December
2011. The new version incorporates some changes and additions in bothparts of the process to the agreement and the content of the agreement.
The Content of the Agreement
The Comprehensive Agreement on Peace and Security in Northeast
Asia consists of six elements. There is no change to this fundamental
structure of the agreement. Among the six elements, 1) Termination of thestate of war, 3 ) Mutual declaration of no hostile intent, 4) Provision ofassistance for nuclear and other energy and 6) Nuclear weapons free zone
have no change or substantially no change.
Regarding 2) Creation of a permanent council on security, it becomes
clear that the council would deal with future security problems, as thephrase in the old version that “the treaty should leave open the question ofwhether it might also become a forum to deal with future security problems
in the region”, has been changed to “to provide a forum to deal with future
security problems.”
It seems to me a very good improvement because a permanent council
should deal with future security issues “permanently” as a fundamentalorganization in this area to deal with security issues.
Regarding 5) Termination of sanctions, the phrase “based on its nuclear
programs as long as it fully adhered to the treaty” is deleted, and thereference to the U.S. special cases on sanctions is also deleted. These1

deletions do not change the content but make it clearer.
The Elements of the NWFZ
The part of the elements of the NWFZ is almost the same as theoriginal version except the following two deletions and one new paragraph.
First, in paragraph 2, the expression, “DPRK to re-join the NPT” isdeleted. Second, all of paragraph 3 about “the precise territorial scope ofthe non-nuclear commitment” is deleted. These deletions do not change thecontents.
At the end of the paper, a new paragraph stating, “One possible
approach to them would be through Mongolia which has declared itself to bea nuclear weapons free zone and which has good relations with the DPRK. In
fact it might make sense to include Mongolia in the proposed Treaty,” isadded.
I quite agree with this opinion as it is a good and reasonable idea toinclude Mongolia in the process for establishing a nuclear weapons free zone
in Northeast Asia. The opposition that Mongolia is not contiguous to otherstates makes no sense and has no reasonable or logical foundation.
The Process to the Agreement
The most spectacular new development in the new version is therecommendation that Japan should take a leading role in getting the talks
underway and Japan should propose a nuclear-weapons-free zone inNortheast Asia.
He proposes that Japan should tie economic assistance within thesolution of the abduction issue and with the resumption of the Six PartyTalks. It may be a good idea for Japan to go on with the negotiations on theabduction issue taking the Six Party Talks into account.
He proposes the Japanese initiative for a NWFZ in NEA for thefollowing three reasons.
1) This proposal would make de-nuclearization more acceptable to2

the DPRK as it would involve treaty commitment by ROK andJapan to not develop nuclear weapons, as well as a treaty
commitment from the five NWSs not to threaten the DPRK withnuclear weapons.
2) This proposal would increase China’s interest in securing anagreement considering it has long held concerns that Japan and/or
the ROK would develop nuclear weapons.
3) A commitment by Japan to participate in a NWFZ would benefit thecountry by helping to cope with the Asian response to various
actions of the Japanese Government in the security field including
the assertion of the collective self-defense, the expansion of Japan’s
security role, the revival of Japan’s nationalism, and Japanese
nuclear weapons capability.
I also highly recommend the Japanese Government to play a more
active role for establishing a NWFZ in NEA.
Although he mentions that the first step in the process must be to finda way to bring the U.S. and the DPRK to the negotiating table, andrecommends a new approach which takes account of where we are today andthe fundamental interests of the two sides, his conclusion is that this gap
still needs to be closed. However, there is no mention how to close this gap.
I personally believe that the key player in the security issue inNortheast Asia in general, and in the North Korean nuclear issue inparticular is the United States. He characterizes U.S. attitude as a policy ofstrategic patience but it seems to me a policy of just wait and see and noaction. Under the last two administrations, the Clinton and BushAdministrations, they kept a policy of just wait and see and no action, and at
the end of the administrations, they started active negotiations with theDPRK resulting in getting nothing and losing something such as delisting
the DPRK with no reward from the DPRK.
I hope the Obama Administration will not repeat this pattern ofbehavior, but engage in this issue earlier and more seriously.

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