A Comprehensive Agreement for Security in Northeast Asia
Morton H. Halperin
September 2014

The security of Northeast Asia is threatened by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) apparent intention to continue developing,
test, and deploy nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and by its
assertion that it is a nuclear weapons state.. The other five participantsin the negotiations of the Six Party Talks—The United States, Japan,
Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, and The People’s Republic of China(PRC)—have all expressed their opposition to the development ofnuclear weapons by the DPRK and their refusal to deal with the DPRK asa nuclear weapon state. However, in the past few years none of thefive have developed or put forward a workable strategy to prevent theDPRK from emerging as a nuclear weapons state.
The United States, preoccupied with other matters including a thus far
successful effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, has
opted for a policy of strategic patience. It has demanded that the DPRK
implement substantial steps to curb its existing and suspected nuclear
capability – both plutonium based and uranium based -- aspreconditions for holding another round of Six Party Talks. The USG
seems to believe that the DPRK will not, under any circumstances, giveup its existing nuclear capability and has not been interested in trying
to find a way forward. Japan has focused on seeking satisfaction on its
longstanding abductee issue with the DPRK, with some recent success,1but has not been in the lead in developing a plan to eliminate theDPRK’s nuclear capacity. Under its new President, the ROK has sought
to improve its relations with DPRK and has focused on building trust
between the two countries. Russia has been preoccupied with otherparts of the world and has not been an active participant in Northeast
Asia. China has been the most active and constructive of the Six Parties,
pressing the DPRK not to test a missile or a nuclear weapon andpressuring the United States’ Government to permit the Six Party Talks
to resume. It has not been successful however, and China seems toalternate between blaming the United States and the DPRK for thefailure.
A new approach is clearly needed to prevent the DPRK from testingand deploying its operational nuclear weapons capability. This paper
presents such an approach and outlines the steps that might be taken
to initiate serious talks either within the Six Party framework or under a
new arrangement.
The process outlined assumes that with the necessary incentives, theDPRK might be willing to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons
programs and rejoin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. At the least, this will require
the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia, a peace
process in Korea, and the establishment of new security architecture toprovide protection to all countries of the region. It is certainly possible
however, as many believe, that the DPRK is not willingly under any
circumstances to give up its existing nuclear stockpile. The only way toexplore the DPRK’s willingness is to resume serious negotiations.
The first step in the process must be to find a way to bring the United2States Government and the DPRK to the negotiating table. At this time
the DPRK seems willing to resume unconditional negotiations under theSix Party framework—a result of intense pressure from China, thegovernment chairing the Six Party Talks. The United States, as noted,
has been unwilling to resume the talks until the DPRK agrees todismantle its nuclear programs. The United States has not spelled out
precisely what it would require the DPRK to do before talks can begin.
The standoff between the United States and the DPRK has lasted forseveral years. It results not only from the two government’s differing
security perspectives but also from their diametrically different
understanding of their failed efforts to reach an agreement. In shorteach side believes that it had negotiated in good faith and met its
commitments and that the other had reneged. Historians may, one day,sort out the truth but what is relevant know is that each side thinks theother violated the agreements they reached and neither is open toanother effort to proceed in the same way.
A new approach is needed, one which takes account of where we aretoday and the fundamental interests of the two sides.
The first hurdle to overcome is to initiate negotiations. Private
conversations over the past year suggest that the gap may benarrowing and point to a possible way forward. The United States isclearly not willing to begin negotiations, only to have the DPRK test anuclear weapon or a space launcher while talks are underway. TheDPRK now seems willing to reaffirm the so-called “leap day” agreement
plus an added ban on space launch vehicle tests in return for some
limited forms of economic assistance. The United States still seems tobe insisting that the DPRK reveal all its uranium related weapons
3

production facilities and agree to halt production as a pre-condition fortalks. The DPRK is unlikely to be willing to make this commitment prior
to the initiation of talks. So this gap still needs to be closed.
If that is done, the parties should be able to agree that the goal of thenegotiations is to reach an agreement on the verified denuclearizationof the Korean peninsula, preferably within a larger de-nuclearized zone
in Northeast Asia.
Getting North Korean agreement will likely require a comprehensive
security agreement which includes an end to hostile intent and a peacetreaty. Getting the DPRK and the United States to come back to thetable on these terms will not be easy. A new impetus is needed.
This might well be the moment for Japan to play a leading role ingetting the talks underway. With progress toward an understanding on
the longstanding issue of abduction of Japanese citizens by the DPRK,Japan should now be willing to offer some economic assistance to theDPRK which should be tied to a resumption of the Six Party Talks.
More important over the long run, would be a Japanese proposal for anuclear-weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia that would include Japanand both Koreas. This proposal would make denuclearization more
acceptable to the DPRK since it would involve a treaty commitment
from both the ROK and Japan to not develop nuclear weapons, as well
as a treaty commitment from the five nuclear weapons states including
the United States to not threaten the DPRK with nuclear weapons.
Japan’s support for the Joint Statement on the Humanitarian
Consequences of Nuclear Weapons at the UNGA in October 2013
suggests that the current government may be open to considering4

additional steps to demonstrate its commitment to the elimination ofnuclear weapons including support for a Northeast Asia Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone.
This proposal would also increase China’s interest in securing anagreement considering it has long held concerns that Japan and/or theROK would develop nuclear weapons.
A commitment by Japan to participate in a nuclear-weapons-free zone
would benefit the country by helping to cope with the Asian response
to various action of the Japanese government in the security field
including its assertion that it wants to expand Japan’s security role byre-interpreting the Japanese constitution so as to permit collective
defense. There is substantial opposition to this proposal in Japan
including from the Komeito Party which is part of the ruling coalition.
The objections are both to the effort to make these change without
formally amending the constitution and to the substance of the change.
Whether it can push this change in the understanding of theconstitution through or not, the current government will press forward
its effort to expand Japan’s security role.
Much of the concern about these actions both in Japan and elsewhereis the fear that it reflects a revival of Japan’s nationalism which will
ultimately lead to a Japanese nuclear weapons capability. Japan cancounter this concern by announcing its support for a Northeast Asia
nuclear-weapons-free zone and playing an active role in spurring
agreement to resume the Six Party Talks.
When the Six Party Talks resume the governments should focus on
simultaneous, serious, negotiations about each element of the package.
Only after the text of the full package is agreed should the parties
5

negotiate the steps each will take to bring the entire agreement into
force in a way that assures compliance with all the provisions of theagreement.
Such an approach will avoid the misunderstandings of the past. The
end result will be spelled out in a binding international treaty with aclear understanding of the commitments of each participant and withinternational verification and enforcement procedures. Every
participant will be aware of what the final result will be. The steps
towards implementation need to be equally unambiguous—they willneed to be spelled out clearly and precisely with no party free to add or
subtract from the agreed steps with unilateral statements to the world
or to its own society.
Comprehensive agreement on peace and security in NEA
The proposed comprehensive treaty would be signed and ratified by anumber of states. Some sections would be adhered to only by some ofthe signatories; other would be adhered to by all the parties. Someprovisions may go into effect as soon as the treaty is ratified by therequired states. Other provisions would enter into force in the futurewhen specified conditions are met. The elements of thecomprehensive Treaty on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia would
include:Termination of state of war in Korea.
This is clearly a major objective of the DPRK. This section should
be adhered to by the armistice nations and by the ROK. It should end
the state of war and provide for the normalization of relations among
the signatures while providing for the eventual unification of the6

peninsula.
Creation of a permanent council on security
The Treaty should create a permanent council and organization tomonitor the other provisions of the treaty and to provide a forum todeal with future security problems in the region. In addition to the six
parties, and the other two nuclear weapons states, other states fromthe region and beyond would be invited to join.
Mutual declaration of no hostile intent
This is a key objective of the DPRK which put great stock in getting
such a statement from the Clinton Administration. It was flummoxedwhen the Bush Administration simply withdrew it and when this policy
was continued by the Obama Administration. To be credible thiscommitment must be embodied in the treaty and affect all the parties
relations with each other.
Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy.
The right of all parties to the treaty to have access to necessary
sources of energy including nuclear power will need to be affirmed.
Any limitations on the DPRK will need to apply equally to other nonnuclear states party to the treaty especially the ROK and Japan. The
DPRK will also want assurances that its energy needs will be subsidized.
Beyond a general commitment this will probably need to be negotiatedas a separate agreement.
Termination of sanctions
The Parties to the treaty will need to commit not to impose
sanctions on any other party to the treaty or to maintain them on a list7

of state sponsors of terrorism. The parties would reserve the right tocollective impose sanctions on any state which violates its
commitments under the treaty.
Nuclear weapons free zone
Finally, the treaty would contain a chapter which would create a
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Northeast Asia. The elements of that
Treaty are discussed in the next session.
Details of elements of NWFZ
This chapter of the Treaty would be consistent with the UN
resolutions concerning the appropriate elements of a NWFZ treaty. Itwould have specific obligations for the non-nuclear states and others
for the nuclear powers.
The ROK, Japan and the DPRK (and possibly other states including
Mongolia and perhaps Canada) would commit themselves not tomanufacture, test (for any purpose) or deploy nuclear weapons nor toallow nuclear weapons to be stored on their territory. They might agree
to future restrictions on reprocessing and enrichment. They wouldagree to permit agreed inspections on their territory by the security
organization created by the treaty so as to insure effective verificationof the agreement. The inspection provisions and the obligations toprovide information would apply equally to all the non-nuclear parties
to the treaty. In the case of North Korea there would need to be
specific provisions providing for the destruction of their existing
stockpile and production facilities under the auspices of the securityorganization. The ROK would need to commit that if Korea wereunified before the weapons and the production facilities were8dismantled it would immediately turn over the weapons to a NWS for
destruction and agree to international supervision of thedismantlement of the facilities.
The US, the PRC and Russia as well as the UK and France would
agree to abide by the provisions of the treaty and not to store nuclear
weapons in the zone or support in any way violations of the treaty by
the non-nuclear states. They would agree not to threaten or use
nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state that was observing theterms of the treaty. (Note that this offer by the USG is inherent in theclean negative security assurance offered by the USG in the Nuclear
Posture Review and consistent with past commitments of Russia andChina as well as the USG. The UK and France have made suchcommitments to states in other NWF zones). The parties would agree
to confer and to take appropriate actions if any non-nuclear state party
to the treaty was threatened with the use of nuclear weapons byanother party to the treaty or another state with nuclear weapons.
There would need to be provisions spelling out issues of transit ofnuclear armed ships or planes and defining the territorial scope of thetreaty in terms of international waters.
Alternative transition and EIF Arrangements
It goes without saying that any hope of success for the proposed
treaty depends on the DPRK being willing at the end of the day to giveup its nuclear weapons. There is a chance that with the right incentives
and the right pressure especially from China that it might at the end of
the day be willing to do so. The provisions in the treaty relating toentry into force and possible transition period should be structured so9

as to maximize the pressure on the DPRK and to give both China andNorth Korea the greatest incentives to accept the framework. Onepiece of that is to include in the same treaty the other elements that
the North has been seeking. Another is to propose a scenario foradherence by Japan and the ROK that contributes to this process.
One way to achieve this is to have a provision in the treaty which
permits the ROK and Japan to sign and ratify the treaty on a conditional
basis. The treaty could be structured so that it goes into effect when
the three nuclear weapons states (U.S., Russia, and China) ratify thetreaty and when two non-nuclear states (ie. Japan and ROK) ratify it.
However, the ROK and Japan would have the right to withdraw fromthe treaty after 3 or 5 years, unless the provisions are being enforced
effectively throughout the Korean peninsula. Effective enforcement
would occur if either the DPRK ratified and implemented the treaty, or
it collapses and the peninsula is unified under the ROK. If this condition
was not met, Japan and the ROK could opt to remain in the treaty for
another period of 3 or 5 years or to terminate their obligation. If thecondition were met, they would be permanent parties to the treaty
subject only to the standard withdrawal clause.
The obligations of nuclear weapons states that ratify the treaty or
the protocol would apply only to those non-nuclear states that also
ratify and are in compliance with all the provisions of the treaty.
These provisions would accomplish several purposes. First, theROK would be obliged to surrender any nuclear weapons or weapons
grade material it acquires as a result of the collapse of the DPRK.
Second, China would know that if it persuaded the DPRK to adhere to
the treaty, it would have a permanent treaty commitment by Japan and10the ROK to not acquire nuclear weapons or permit them to be stored
on their territory. The DPRK would be aware of this, and would have anegative security assurance from the USG if it joined the treaty.
Specific provisions would be included to develop a process bywhich the DPRK would dismantle its existing stockpile over some periodof time and receive compensation the specifics of which would besubject to agreement. A provision of the Treaty might permit the DPRK
to accept the basic commitment that it become a non-nuclear weapons
state while delaying its obligation to begin the dismantling process. Still
it will not be easy to persuade the DPRK to give up its existing nuclear
capability and it will certainly take some time. One possible approach tothem would be through Mongolia which has declared itself to be anuclear weapons free zone and which has good relations with the DPRK.
In fact it might make sense to include Mongolia in the proposed Treaty.

11