Statement by Dr. J. Enkhsaikhan, Chairman of Blue Banner on“Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status: a regional dimension”

September 15, 2014

Tokyo, Japan

Allow me first of all to thank RECNA and other organizers of this Third workshop on“Denuclearization of Northeast Asia and of the World – Developing a Comprehensive Approachto a NEA-NWFZ for inviting me to participate in this important forum and to speak at thesession on “Players for the Denuclearization of NEA”. I was asked to speak on Mongolia’s
nuclear-weapon-free status: a regional dimension.
Background1. Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status (NWFS)
Mongolia is located between two nuclear-weapon states. Throughout the second half of the XX
century, especially during the cold war, it was allied with one of the neighbors and hosted thelatter’s military bases. As such, it was held hostage to the tense relations between the twoneighbors and at the height of their dispute could have easily been drawn into their armedconflict. Hence in September 1992, when the last Russian troops were being withdrawn from thecountry, Mongolia declared its territory a nuclear weapon-free zone.
The objective of the initiative was to ban stationing of nuclear weapons or parts of such weaponssystem on the Mongolian territory and, in return, acquire security assurances from the fivenuclear-weapon states (P5).
In early 1990s, with the normalization of Sino-Russian relations and the virtual end of the cold
war, the external environment has undergone fundamental changed. The two neighbors haveagreed not to use territories and airspace of neighboring third countries against each other. That
served as a convenient external political condition for Mongolia’s initiative.
Internally, Mongolia introduced basic political and economic reforms. In foreign affairs, it
discarded the ideologically driven policy and reliance on one state or a group of states for its
security and, instead, has put its own national interests and those of the international community
as the basis of its foreign policy. Instead of relying on alliance with one great power for its
security, it has opted to ensure its security primarily by political and diplomatic means,
responding to the imperatives of common security.
It is in this spirit, and bearing in mind its cold war era experience, including witnessing over 25
percent of nuclear weapon tests on its doorsteps and the risk of being drawn into possible conflictof its nuclear-armed neighbors, in 1992 the President of Mongolia has declared at the United
Nations General Assembly the country a NWFZ and that it would have that status internationally1guaranteed. Mongolia’s initiative was welcomed by the international community as contributing
to regional stability and confidence-building.
However, the main challenge in materializing the initiative was connected with its geo-politicallocation since it could not form part of any traditional (regional) NWFZ that could be establishedin the Asia-Pacific region. Though the P5 recognized Mongolia as a ‘unique case’, they were andstill are hesitant to acknowledge it as a single-State NWFZ since, in their view, that might set aprecedent that could discourage others from establishing traditional NWFZs.
Despite the above challenge, in the past two decades Mongolia worked tirelessly with the P5 andUN membership, as a result of which its nuclear-weapon-free status (NWFS) has received wide
international recognition and support. Hence, in 2000 the P5 have made a joint statement
whereby they provided Mongolia with a political assurance that they would not use or threaten touse nuclear weapons against it. Mongolia welcomed the joint statement not so much as an
assurance, but as a significant step in institutionalizing the status. Further talks with the P5
resulted in 2012 in signing of parallel Mongolian and the P5 joint declarations, whereby
Mongolia reaffirmed its commitment not to allow stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory,
while the P5 - to respect its unique status and not to contribute to any act that would violate thatstatus.
Mongolia welcomed the 2012 P5 joint declaration as a valuable commitment tailored to its geopolitical location and relevant to its actual security needs. When providing the assurances,
however the P5 have pointed out that they would have difficulties in providing legally based
assurances, since that would set a precedent..
2. Present state of the status. In 2000 Mongolia has adopted a legislation that defined the status
at the national level and criminalized acts that would violate the status. In 2006 and 2014 theGovernment has submitted reports to the State Great Hural (parliament) on the implementationof the legislation as well as the measures to be taken for its fuller implementation.
At the international level, the UN General Assembly in its resolution 53/77 D in 1998 entitled“Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status” has welcomed Mongolia’s
initiative and has since been considering every second year the item with a similar title.
Mongolia believes that its nuclear-weapon-free status would be truly credible and viable, andcould, like other regional NWFZs, contribute to regional peace and security when it is gradually
integrated in the regional cooperative security arrangement or structure.
3. ARF factor. The ARF was designed to foster constructive dialogue and consultations onpolitical and security issues of common interest and concern, and make significant contributions
to confidence-building and conflict prevention in the APR.

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Due to its mixed membership, the ARF is an ideal forum where non-proliferation anddisarmament issues could effectively be considered, if not actually negotiated, since almost one
third of its membership are parties to the Bangkok or Rarotonga NWFZ treaties, while some ofits other non-nuclear-weapon states might not be able to join these zones due to politicalconsiderations or geographical reasons. Also ARF membership includes three recognized andthree de facto nuclear-weapon states, while other three nuclear capable states are under extended
nuclear umbrella. For these reasons Mongolia believes that regional approach to nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament could be relevant and useful.
4. Essence of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status. The main aim of Mongolia’s initiative
was and still is to ensure its own nuclear security, contribute to the common efforts to promote
greater transparency and confidence-building in the region as well as to nuclear non-proliferationin the region.
In 2000, following Mongolia’s adoption of its legislation, when the P5 have made a jointstatement providing it with negative and positive political security assurances, Mongolia has
indicated that to be properly institutionalized, the status needed to have legally-binding
assurances and that, bearing in mind Mongolia’s location, the assurance needed not be generic orbroad, but Mongolia-specific. It explained that what was meant was that the P5 needed to
officially recognize the status, vow to respect it and not to contribute in any way to theperformance of acts that would violate it.
As a result of joint efforts and bearing in mind Mongolia’s reasoning, in 2012 the P5 andMongolia were able to sign the parallel declarations that defined the status. While Mongolia
reaffirmed its pledge not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory, the P5 intheir joint declaration have taken note of Mongolia’s legislation, and pledged, as agreed, torespect the status and not to contribute to any act that would violate it.
5. Today Mongolia’s status is part and parcel of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Like thetraditional NWFZs, its obligations go further than the NPT commitments. Bearing in mind thedevelopments in some other parts of the world, Mongolia’s commitment is not limited only toprohibiting stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory. It would prohibit placing on its
territory of nuclear-weapon-related support facilities, such as communication, surveillance andintelligence-gathering facilities as well as air navigational installations designed to serve nuclear
strategic systems. This is important since the current trend among the nuclear-weapon states isstill to modernize their nuclear forces, develop and deploy new types of nuclear weapons ormissiles in line with their policies of enhancing survivability of their nuclear weapons, theirability to penetrate missile defenses, introducing new generations of missiles or developing
military technology to counter such weapons or systems. Nuclear concepts and policies still do
not preclude the use or threat of use of such weapons. The recent disturbing developments in andaround Ukraine and the cooling of relations between Russia on the one hand and the US and themost of Europe can lead to another cold war with all the possible harmful consequences,3

including perhaps accelerating works on building the destabilizing missile defenses and resultant
counter-measures in Europe and Asia.
Therefore I believe that such meetings as this one, with the active participation of scholars andexperts in the fields of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and regional security, is seen by
Mongolia, and by the Blue Banner in particular, as an important forum to exchange views andgenerate helpful ideas. Thus discussion of a possible comprehensive agreement for security inNortheast Asia, with its six elements (termination of the state of war, creation of a permanent
council on security, mutual declaration of no hostile intent, provisions of assistance for nuclearand other energy, termination of sanctions and establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone)
provides a good opportunity to share ideas on how to approach the issue, what would be thechallenges and how they could be addressed. Blue Banner, on its part, is prepared to share
Mongolia’s experience in establishing an internationally recognized and accepted nuclearweapon-free status, the challenges it faced and how they are being addressed. Our experience
shows the important role that committed NGOs can play in promoting the goals of nonproliferation.
6. Parallel regional initiatives of Mongolia. Besides promoting its nuclear-weapon-free status at
the regional level, Mongolia has also proposed to initiate dialogue process (Ulaanbaatardialogue) on Northeast Asian multilateral security, the main aim of which is to contribute to theextent possible to enhancing trust among the states of the region. It is not intended to take up theissues discussed at the Six Party Talks, but address broader issue of common interest such as
some issues of economic cooperation, environmental challenges and how to address them, nontraditional security threats, military transparency, regional stability, etc. Mongolia’s previous
initiative was intended to promote dialogue at the governmental level, to which some states wereto ready. Hence this initiative is intended to start informal dialogues at the 1.5 track level. In
order to create free environment to express personal views and opinions from the very beginningin June of this year the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia has organized a workshop in
Ulaanbaatar. It was attended by representatives of the academia and experts of 9 countries,including all NEA-n countries and the United States. The informal character of the meetingserved as a useful forum for exchange of views and it was decided to hold such fora annually,
perhaps focusing on specific sets of issues.
Another idea put forward by Mongolia is to see if and how a nuclear-weapon-free zone could beestablished in Northeast Asia, an issue that is also being considered here as an essential elementof a comprehensive approach to security in Northeast Asia. This is seen in Mongolia as apractical measure in promoting security by political and legal means. As President of Mongolia
has pointed out during his statement at the High-level meeting on nuclear disarmament last year,
such an endeavor would not be easy and would require courage, political will and perseverance,
but it is doable, if not right away. The geopolitics in the region and prospects of possible regionalarms race requires that an attempt be made to see if and under what conditions a NEA-NWFZ
could be established. Despite some degree of skepticism and doubt, it is an issue that needs to be4

addressed. I am happy that this comprehensive approach to security in Northeast Asia includes
NEA-NWFZ as an important part of the package.
When Mongolia in 1992 put forth its nuclear-weapon-free zone initiative, there were someskeptics and doubters, including in Mongolia itself. But common sense and common interest canovercome the sense of pessimism. The NEA-NWFZ issue is not a new one; it has been discussed
many times at the academic and expert levels and now needs to be looked at from practicalreality and necessity. A number of NEA-n civil society organizations, including the Blue Banner,have organized informal discussion of this issue on the margins of NPT Prepcoms. Perhaps theissue could be taken up in a separate forum, not necessarily on the margins of other conferences,which address other equally important issues. As representative of the Blue Banner had pointed
out, if need be it could look into the possibility hosting such an informal meeting.

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