MANSFIELD-CIIS FORUM ON
PEACE, SECURITY, AND
COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA

MANSFIELD-CIIS FORUM ON PEACE, SECURITY, AND
COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Background............................................................................................................... 2
Participants.. .............................................................................................................. 2
At a Glance: Energy Policy and Recent Developments............................................................ 5
Nuclear Power, Energy Security, and Environmental Protection. . .............................................. 6
Key Unknowns.. ................................................................................................ 7
Policy Recommendations..................................................................................... 7
Diplomatic Engagement: Broadening out from Trilateral to Global................................... 9
Fossil Fuels and Renewable Energy. . ................................................................................ 10
Energy Security and Climate Change: Key Issues....................................................... 11
Plurilateral Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Rational and Key Takeaways......................... 12
Looking Ahead: Energy Efficiency and Climate Action.....................................................................14
Mind the Gaps and Find the Overlap..................................................................................14
Subnational Climate Action: From Smart Grids to Smart Cities............................................16
Freeways and Speed Bumps to High-tech and Low-tech Clean Energy Transitions................... 17
		

The future role of nuclear energy.. ........................................................... 17		Green transportation technologies.. ......................................................... 17

Managing Climate Competition and Cooperation...................................................... 18
Conclusions and Recommendations....................................................................... 18
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Used. . ....................................................................... 20

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MANSFIELD-CIIS FORUM ON PEACE, SECURITY, AND COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA
BACKGROUND
In 2016-2022, the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, with support from the Carnegie Corporation of
New York, convened the Mansfield-CIIS Forum on Peace, Security, and Cooperation in Northeast Asia. The
Mansfield Foundation partnered with the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and organized three
two-day workshops in 2016, 2019, and 2022. The Forum was convened out of the Mansfield Foundation’s belief
that the United States, Japan, and China have many common interests and that there exists great potential tofoster cooperation for the preservation of peace and security in the region.
Climate change poses a serious threat to peace and security in Northeast Asia, and the United States, Japan,
and China have a common stake in the success of global efforts to slow global warming by reducing theirconsumption of fossil fuels and taking other measures. As the U.S.-China relationship continues to deteriorate
and cooperation between the two countries becomes increasingly difficult, continuing the dialogue on climatechange grows more and more important. The Mansfield-CIIS Forum aims to keep the communication channels
open and strengthen professional connections among the participants of the working group.
The Forum was inaugurated in October 2016 with a two-day workshop in Big Fork, Montana, where theprimary focus of the discussion was nuclear power, energy security, and environmental protection. The second
meeting was held in Beijing in June 2019 and the theme shifted to the role of fossil fuels and renewable energy
in the Northeast Asian energy mix, as well as shared energy and security concerns between the United States
and Northeast Asia. After a two-year gap due to the travel restrictions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, thethird workshop was held in June 2022 in Hawaii, where the discussion focused on a roadmap for U.S.-JapanChina trilateral climate action.
The participants in our Forum arrived at several key findings on how the three countries might foster greatercollaboration on shared challenges and concerns in the areas of climate change and energy.

Llewelyn Hughes, Associate Dean for Research at the College of Asia & the Pacific, Australian National University
Ashley Johnson, Senior Director, Energy and Environmental Affairs, The National Bureau of Asian Research
Yoh Kawanami, Director, Hawaiian Electric
Keith Luse, Executive Director, National Committee on North Korea
Mikiko Kainuma, Visiting research Fellow, National Institute for Environmental Studies
Ma Zhengang, Chinese Institute for International Studies
Koji Murata, Professor, Doshisha University
Pan Jiahua, Member, CASS; Director, Institute of Ecocivilization Studies, Beijing University of Technology
Jennifer Perron, Climate Policy Fellow, Berkeley California-China Climate Institute
Leon Roose, Specialist, Chief Technologist, GridSTART, HNEI, University of Hawaii at Manoa
Dennis Wilder, Assistant Professor of Practice and Senior Fellow, Georgetown University
Llewelyn Hughes, Associate Dean for Research at the College of Asia & The Pacific, Australian National University
Jennifer Turner, Director, China Environment Forum, Wilson Center
Jingjing Zhang, Energy/Environmental Policy Project Scientist/Engineer, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Masao Watanabe, Senior Vice President, Chief Energy Strategist, Mitsubishi Corporation
Gong Ting, Assistant Research Fellow, Department for American Studies, CIIS
Liu Feitao, Associate Research Fellow, Department for American Studies, CIIS
Liu Qing, Director, Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, CIIS
Liu Xuecheng, Senior Research Fellow, CIIS
Lu Ruquan, Director, International Department, CNPCPARTICIPANTS
Each meeting of the Forum convened from 13-18 experts on energy policy and climate change. The group was
drawn from academia, government, think tanks, and the private sector in the United States, Japan, and China, andrepresented a balance of interests. The participants attended in their “personal” capacity, and all conversations wereconducted under “Chatham House Rules,” meaning no attribution of remarks to any particular participant.
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Yasushi Akashi, Chairman, International House of Japan

Rong Ying, Vice President, CIIS
Sun Wenzhu, Assistant Research Fellow, Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, CIIS
Wang Mou, Deputy Director of the Division for Sustainable Development Economics, Institute for Urban andEnvironmental Studies, CASS
Zhang Liangfu, Professional Manager of Energy Economy Research Section, Institute of China National Offshore Oil
Corporation
Zhao Yongqiang, Deputy Director of the Center for Renewable Energy Development, Energy Research Institute,
National Development and Reform Commission

Feng An, Founder and Executive Director, Innovation Center for Energy and Transportation (iCET)

Masakazu Toyoda, Chairman and CEO, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan

Desaix Anderson, former Chairman of the Board, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation

Masao Watanabe, Senior Vice President, Chief Energy Strategist, Mitsubishi Corporation

Toshi H. Arimura, Professor, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University

Phyllis Yoshida, Senior Fellow for Energy and Technology, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

Jusen Asuka, Professor, Center for Northeast Asian Studies, Tohoku University

Frank Jannuzi, President and CEO, Mansfield Foundation

Chu Shulong, Professor, Tsinghua University

Benjamin Self, Vice President, Mansfield Foundation

Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum
Aiko Doden, Senior Commentator, NHK
Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Stanford University
Akiko Fukushima, Professor, School of Global Studies and Collaboration, Aoyama Gakuin University
Kelly Sims Gallagher, Professor of Energy and Environmental Policy, Director of the Center for International
Environment & Resource Policy, Tufts University
Clara Gillispie, Senior Director of Trade, Economic, and Energy Affairs, The National Bureau of Asian Research
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Sayuri Romei		Tim White		Mansfield Foundation (Program Director)
Mansfield Foundation (Rapporteur)

Acknowledgments
Special thanks to CIIS, and in particular to Dr. Rong Ying and his team in Beijing, for their continued partnership andeagerness to engage with U.S. and Japanese experts, even when U.S.-China relations are tense. Additional thanks toformer Mansfield Foundation staff Elly Cho for her contributions to this project.
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AT A GLANCE: ENERGY POLICY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The group at work in Honolulu, Hawaii (June 2022).

The group in Beijing in June 2019.

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NUCLEAR POWER, ENERGY SECURITY,AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
While the members of the Forum hold a variety of views on the use of nuclear power, all agreed that theUnited States, Japan, and China all have a deep stake in the future of nuclear power and the safeguarding of
nuclear materials. At present, nuclear safety practices and security measures are not harmonized. The Forum
participants concluded that the three countries should cooperate with one another and share valuable “lessons
learned” to promote best practices and advance our mutual interests on all aspects of nuclear power, fromconstruction to operations to decommissioning.
China, Japan, and the United States together account for 42% of greenhouse gas emissions and are also theworld’s three largest economies. They are collectively the biggest investors in the so-called “clean energy” (nonfossil fuel) innovation. They therefore have a moral and practical obligation to be part of the global solution toclimate change.
All three countries have incorporated large-scale nuclear power generation plans into their frameworks formeeting their Paris Accord climate change Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). The figures
drawn from the most recent Reference Data Series report published by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) on nuclear power illustrate that:1

Our Forum participants further recognized, at the outset of talks, that policy-makers from the three countries
must make decisions while coping with many unknowns and even some “unknown unknowns.” For example:• It remains unclear how economically competitive nuclear power will prove to be given recent
developments, including post-Fukushima safety standards, innovations in the extraction of oil andnatural gas through hydraulic fracturing, also known as “fracking,” and advances in renewable energy.
• We cannot be certain of projections for global economic growth and related power-consumption
demands. Even the best estimates by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) International Energy Agency (OECD/IEA) and other expert bodies have wide margins of error.

a) By 2050, world nuclear power capacity is expected to grow to 873 GW(e), accounting for roughly 17% of
total global electric output.

• Political support for nuclear power has proven to be fragile in some states (consider Germany’s,
Belgium’s, Switzerland’s or Italy’s response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster) and resilientin others (e.g. China, post Fukushima). We cannot reliably forecast long-term political support for
nuclear power given the multiple variables in play: competition from other energy sources, conservation
measures, and successfully addressing persistent safety and security concerns associated with nuclear
power.

b) The use of nuclear power has avoided about 70 gigatons of CO2
emissions over the past 50 years.

• Technological “Black Swan” events could either complicate the growth of nuclear power or provide
breakthroughs that make nuclear power more attractive as a source of energy.

c) Nuclear power currently provides about 3% of China’s electricity output, with coal responsible for morethan 50%. Wind power accounts for about 5% of electricity, and solar just 3%. By 2030, nuclear power is
projected to provide 8-10% of China’s energy needs.2d) Japan’s nuclear power generation was shut down after the Fukushima disaster, but Prime Minister
Fumio Kishida’s most recent energy plan calls for nuclear power to comprise 22% of Japan’s electricity
supply by 2030.3e) Nuclear power provides about 19% of the United States’ electric power. Nuclear power generation is
expected to grow modestly over the next 30 years.
Nuclear waste management is a common challenge that could benefit from a collaborative solution set.
For example, advanced reactor designs could reduce waste volume and burn minor actinide (MA) which iscontained in spent fuel, but power plants will still require both “long-term temporary” storage (for decades),“longer-term” storage (for hundreds of years), and final geological disposal.
As discussed by world leaders at four successive Nuclear Security Summits over six years (2010-2016), the world
cannot afford to wait for an act of nuclear terrorism before working together to collectively improve the global
nuclear security culture, share best practices, and raise global standards for nuclear security. As the February
2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown, the risk of nuclear terrorism is now more real than ever, andChina, Japan, and the United States have a common interest in promoting nuclear security.

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KEY UNKNOWNS

1

https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/RDS-1-42_web.pdf

2

http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx

3

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/23/fumio-kishida-nuclear-green-energy-fukushima/

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSAt the end of the first meeting in Montana, the Mansfield-CIIS Forum participants coalesced aroundthe following policy recommendations, and carried them back to their respective official and informal
policymaking communities:
I.

Launch a “Track One” Trilateral Dialogue on Civilian Nuclear Power Safety and Nuclear Security,
involving officials from the Chinese National Nuclear Security Administration (CNNSA), the Nuclear
Regulatory Agency of Japan (JNRA), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and such othergovernment ministries as each country determines appropriate. The key nuclear safety and security
stakeholders from each government should be represented.

II. Complement the official talks with a “Track Two” trilateral dialogue channel, with input from theprivate sector, think tanks, universities, and civil society groups, and identify a long-term sponsor for it.
These “Track One” and “Track Two” mechanisms should address shared nuclear safety and security concerns,
drawing on the following framework:• Develop a bottom-up trilateral coordination mechanism to align nuclear safety practices and disaster
response procedures, building off of the experiences of the NRC, JNRA, and the IAEA. This coordination
mechanism should engage civil engineers and private sector operators to drive the process forward, withthe goal of sharing knowledge, allowing each nation to enhance procedures and reach a common level ofsafety. This coordination mechanism should examine issues such as:a) Exchanging views from centers of excellence in each country;b) Sharing information on best practices and lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi disaster(e.g. seismic monitoring technology, sea wall design and construction, power supply redundancy
practices, location of spent fuel storage ponds, etc.);
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)c) Planning for emergency response and evacuations (e.g. Federal Emergency Management Authority
federal-level management, delineation of areas of operator and regulator responsibility, role of first
responders and local governments, etc.);d) Harmonizing training curricula for operators and sharing simulators and other training
technologies;e) Surfacing gaps/differences in safety standards (e.g. what level of radiation emission constitutes ahealth danger, how large to make potential evacuation zones, etc.);f) Exchanging views on the development of a “safety culture” and how to take safety issues from therealm of rhetoric to reality; andg) Ensuring adequate independence, transparency, and scientific competence of nuclear regulatory
regimes and oversight mechanisms, e.g. the role of legislatures, regulatory bodies, and the courts.
• Harmonize nuclear security practices, systems, measures, through dialogue involving civil nuclear
power operators, nuclear regulatory bureaucracies, and security services, examining issues such as thefollowing:

DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT: BROADENING OUT FROM TRILATERAL TO GLOBAL
Finally, in addition to embracing the above recommendations for multilateral collaboration, the members of
the Mansfield-CIIS Forum discussed how China, Japan, and the United States could coalesce around a few
high-level global diplomatic initiatives, and agreed to share these ideas with their colleagues in their respective
countries:
I.

Sustain the Nuclear Security Summit – perhaps under a new name – with a priority on both nuclear
safety and nuclear security. One track would focus on the safety of nuclear power generation and theother on security issues, including protecting fissile material, reprocessing spent fuel, managing highlevel waste, and countering unconventional threats (such as cyber security and terrorism).

II. Add civil nuclear power cooperation as an agenda item for APEC, perhaps as part of an APEC energy
ministerial, and to other international for as deemed appropriate. One advantage of APEC is that itbrings in other nuclear players – e.g. Russia and ROK – and allows China-Japan-US proposals to help
shape regional and even global norms.
III. Integrate Nuclear Security cooperation into existing ASEAN Regional Forum deliberations and otherappropriate governmental and track two regional security dialogues.

a) Sharing views on physical security requirements for nuclear facilities;b) Assessing the cyber dimension of nuclear security to reduce vulnerabilities;c) Comparing the education and training standards for operators and security personnel;d) Inculcating a security culture at facilities housing sensitive nuclear materials;e) Designing and implementing “force on force” training exercises to augment table top exercises, tobetter test the effectiveness of security procedures and identify weaknesses;f) Staging joint police/military exercises to respond to potential terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities;
andg) Promoting intelligence sharing on terrorism risk and other threats to nuclear security.
III. Link efforts to mitigate the generic threats posed by climate change to critical infrastructure withplanning to address the specific threats posed by climate change to nuclear facilities. Planning to adapt
and improve the resilience of nuclear facilities should address factors such as:a) Rising sea levels;b) Growing storm intensity;c) Shrinking inland freshwater resources due to climate change and glacier depletion;d) Rising sea temperatures and resulting loss of cooling efficiency; ande) Security implications of climate change, such as drought-induced famine, refugees, internal
dislocation, threats to infrastructure, etc.
IV. Collaborate to remove barriers to global diffusion of clean energy technology – addressing market
formation, financing instruments, and coherent policies through various instruments (AIIB, World
Bank, AID, One Belt One Road, and other technology transfer mechanisms).
V. Promote public education, transparency, and engagement with local communities to address lack ofpublic confidence in nuclear power. Two-way communication needed (listening and sharing). Doubts
about nuclear power post-Fukushima have endured in Japan despite the passage of time and thegovernment’s commitment to restart nuclear power plants.

The group at work in Montana in October 2016.

VI. Suggest that the existing Leaders’ Summit on Climate at sub-national levels add to its agenda issues ofnuclear power and share lessons learned by communities living alongside nuclear facilities.

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FOSSIL FUELS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY
The participants in Beijing opened the second meeting with a discussion on geopolitical trends and theimportance of terminology. In fact, in recent years, skepticism has been growing in the United States, Europe,and Asia about the virtues of “globalization,” with suspicions being fueled by many different factors, including
the perception of the unequal benefits of globalization. Moreover, many participants agreed that the rulesbased international order is under strain: the concept of reciprocity, which is often emphasized in internationallaw and international relations, has become increasingly vague and abstract when defining relations between
the developed and the developing world.
U.S.-Japan relations have been steadily improving despite Trump’s transactional policies and his attempts
to undermine the alliance during his tenure. However, an undeniable trend of the past five years is theincreasingly tense relationship between Washington and Beijing. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy(NSS) and the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) under the Trump administration, indeed, identify
China as a revisionist power, a rival, and an emerging threat. The 2017 NSS also mentioned that the UnitedStates was re-entering an era of great power competition, in which China and Russia “want to shape a world
antithetical to U.S. values and interests.” 4 Despite this rhetoric, the Trump administration officials struggled
to form a clear and cohesive approach to China that would have a balance of containment, competition, andconstructive engagement. Equally, China’s progress on its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its
creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016 has been described by some analysts
in Washington as a disturbing expansion of Chinese power. However, the U.S. grappled with offering thecountries in the region an alternative, more appealing economic vision. Despite former President Trump’s
vagueness on strategic with China and his highly inconsistent stance on technological issues, the U.S. Congress
gradually moved forward in executing the 2017 NSS and made efforts to protect American technology acrossmultiple domains. The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) also launched a controversial criminal justice campaign
called the “China Initiative” in November 2018, which aimed to counter Beijing’s theft of U.S. intellectual
property. The initiative was subsequently scrapped under the Biden administration in February 2022.

As far as macroeconomic trends are concerned, global growth has been slowing down and populations havebeen aging. The shifting patterns of population growth and urbanization are a valid motive for U.S.-China
cooperation toward the developing parts of the world. The participants of the Beijing meeting also agreed
that the imposition of tariffs was becoming more common, against World Trade Organization (WTO) rules,
thus exacerbating the threat of trade war between the United States and China. Tariffs distort supply chainsin negative ways and there would be no winners in such a war. In 2018, the U.S. Congress also expanded thescope of the government’s interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to
examine Chinese investments in companies with business in the United States and modify or block them ifnecessary. Participants concluded that, presently, the economic integration is insufficient powerful to overcome
the geopolitical rivalries.

ENERGY SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: KEY ISSUES
Despite global efforts to reduce emissions, global warming is undoubtedly accelerating. A major report
released by the United Nations in August 2021 states that human-caused emissions of greenhouse gases are
the overwhelming cause of this acceleration.5 The authors of the report warn that there is still time to avoid
catastrophic warming this century, however they urge all countries around the world to stop burning fossil
fuels as quickly as possible.
The United States is now the world’s top energy producer, while China is the largest energy importer, andis likely to remain in that position for decades to come. Moreover, the Trump administration famously
withdrew from the Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation in June 2017. During the workshop in 2019,
the participants raised concerns that the U.S. withdrawal from the accord might undercut collective efforts
to reduce carbon output. Its withdrawal would also hinder global efforts to transition to renewable energy
and stall climate talks in the future. This move was however countered by Trump’s successor, who signed an
executive order to rejoin the agreement upon inauguration in January 2021.

Furthermore, the post-Fukushima era poses the question of the future role of nuclear power. For over a decadesince the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Japan only had a handful operating reactors, with many others
undergoing a relicensing process under the safety standards imposed after the accident. In September 2022,
the Japanese government finally decided to move forward with revitalizing some dormant nuclear reactors andrelaunching nuclear power. Although nuclear power is still unpopular among many in the domestic public,
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s decision stems from the current global energy crisis and growing callto tackle climate change by embracing zero-emission generation technologies. In fact, the Executive Directorof the Paris-based IEA stated that Japan’s restart of more nuclear power plants could help ease Europe’s
energy supply fears during the coming winter as more liquefied natural gas (LNG) will become available to theglobal market.6 Even with the political will to move ahead with nuclear power, it will be difficult for Japan andother countries to ignore some of the important challenges that come with the choice, such as loss of publicconfidence, safety issues, nonproliferation concerns, as well as the spent nuclear fuel problem.

5
4

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https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/

6 https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/japans-restart-nuclear-reactors-will-help-europes-winter-energy-supply-iea-chief-2022-09-27/

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PLURILATERAL COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA: RATIONALE AND KEY TAKEAWAYS

The second priority area includes technical, policy, and infrastructure initiatives:

Presently, the multilateral mechanisms of the WTO are not functioning well, and bilateral mechanisms are
inadequate to deal with transnational issues such as energy security and climate change. However, an inclusive
approach to multilateralism – or plurilateralism, as some program participants prefer to call it, has proven to
be an effective mechanism in the Indo-Pacific region in order to address certain kinds of transnational issues.
Those initiatives include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
which then set up a Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATs), to name a few. Although the rules-based liberal
democratic order is certainly under strain, instead of replacing it with another system, the participants all
agreed that it is necessary to work to fix it rather than abandoning it.

 Prioritize investment in LNG infrastructure and regional market development (pipelines, LNG
transports, shipping terminals, hardening ports/terminals against extreme weather, ease financing,enhance market integration).

There are two main priority areas for plurilateral cooperation on challenges associated with energy security
and climate change.

 Strengthen joint research on methane gas releases, as well as standard approaches, and share bestpractices on remediation.

The first area includes the macro political and economic initiatives. The program participants urge a stronger
and more vocal high-level political endorsement of the “global commons” concept of planetary stewardship toinclude Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As a participant put it, we should strive for the “tiger who cameto tea,” rather than “watching the two tigers fight” or “watching the two elephants fight.”

 Strengthen joint research on artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced seismic imaging to enhance
efficiency of oil and gas exploration and extraction.

 These macro political and economic initiatives should be framed, designed, and celebrated to enhanceenergy efficiency and economic growth. They should also promote reciprocity, and balance trade, while
also promoting them as addressing climate change targets.
 The initiatives should also abide by the WTO and work to avoid trade war as well as the imposition ofvoluntary restraints and tariff and non-tariff barriers.
 The international stakeholders should continue holding periodic plurilateral Clean Energy Ministerial(CEM) meetings in an effort to accelerate the pace and scale of the clean energy transition on a global
level.
 The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) could do more to facilitate technology cooperation.

 Embrace Smart Specialization Strategies (S3) in former energy-intensive/CO2-intensive regions, andbuild more sustainable economic and energy economic systems.
 Buy time through investments in mitigation, adaptation, and resilience to climate change.
 Accelerate joint research and development on Carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS).

 Optimize nuclear power licensing and regulations pertaining to safety, waste disposal, operations, withgoal of common standards for regulatory framework that can restore public trust in nuclear power,
which is deemed indispensable to any realistic plan to limit global warming in the near-to-mid-term, andexplore the development of new types of small modular reactors.
 Strengthen cooperation and develop technology innovation in Offshore Wind partnerships.
 Intensify and expedite research on “green hydrogen” and “blue hydrogen” (Green hydrogen currently
makes up less than one percent of U.S. hydrogen production and is far more expensive than fossil
fuel-based hydrogen). Some participants, however, warned that pursuing green hydrogen – hydrogenproduced using renewable energy as a fuel source –is not the best solution for combating climate change
because of its inefficiency, and is often created with carbon-emitting energy sources. Moreover, a lackof infrastructure investment, along with cost, could be the main barrier to expanding the hydrogen
economy.

 The United States and Japan could join the AIIB and focus on energy infrastructure investments
pertaining especially to LNG with the aim to acceleration the transition, reduce U.S.-China trade
deficits, enhance Chinese and Japanese and ROK diversity of suppliers, reduce supply disruption risks,etc.) Advance research on Concentrating Solar-thermal Power (CSP) technologies, which can be used togenerate electricity by converting energy from sunlight to power a turbine. Space-based Solar Power(SBSP) is also an alternative that needs to be further explored.

 The United States and China should arrange a joint entry into the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), create the world’s largest trading block encompassing
more than 60% of global trade, and use the leverage to reenergize WTO mechanisms.

 Improve the transnational infrastructure, integration, and interoperability of EVs and Fuel cell electricvehicles (FCEVs), which are powered by hydrogen. FCEVs are more efficient than conventional internal
combustion engine vehicles and produce no tailpipe emissions: they only emit water vapor and warm air.

 Moving forward with a joint development project for a carbon neutral city in China.

 Share lessons learned on trade adjustment assistance across national boundaries –e.g. Energy Transition
Assistance for communities adjusting to new energy mix and/or consumption patterns.
 Build deep flexible markets for LNG in Asia and work to remove destination clause restrictions on
secondary trade and on transfer for LNG shipments and contracts; Reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to clean energy trade and investment (claw back the issue from theDoha Declaration of November 2001)
 Set standards for fast charging stations for electric vehicles (EV), and also work to set standards for
trading contracts in energy across markets at the regional level.
 Promote integration among ASEAN Power Grid, the BRI, and the Regional Grid

The group at work in Beijing in June 2019.

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LOOKING AHEAD: ENERGY EFFICIENCYAND CLIMATE ACTION
Although a few bilateral climate initiatives have emerged in the past three years, more needs to be done to encourageand promote initiatives on trilateral and subnational levels. The third Forum meeting, held in Honolulu, Hawaii in
June 2022, built upon previous discussions and focused on a roadmap for U.S.-Japan-China trilateral climate action.

MIND THE GAPS AND FIND THE OVERLAPAll the Forum participants shared the concern that the pace of change is not fast enough. The working group set
the objective to remind policymakers that we are not moving fast enough and point out areas and ways where we
could be doing more. The group agreed that they hope to shine a spotlight on the problems and some of the more
promising solutions, and mobilize collaborative, cooperative, or more parallel action. In this area of intersection
between technology and policy, the solutions are not top-down: implementation is going to happen at all levels.
Hawaii has always been fundamental to bilateral and multilateral relationships. It can be immune to politicaltensions, and science and technology are at the core of this quality. The local Hawaii-based participants noted thatHawaii is setting up technical exchanges with China even when nothing else is going on in the relationship. We
should indeed focus on basic and precompetitive knowledge-building, which can stay away from political tensions
and can happen under the radar. Climate has unfortunately become political in the United States, especially during
the Trump administration, who denied climate change; yet being competitive in technology and science should be
appealing to all stakeholders.
The Forum participants also disclosed their worry that the recent U.S.-Japan bilateral climate activities might not
be enough. In August 2021, on the occasion of Special Presidential Envoy for Climate (SPEC) John Kerry’s visit toTokyo, Japan and the United States issued a joint statement pledging to work together and with others to ensurethat the 26th UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) in Glasgow sent a clear signal that Parties to the Paris
Agreement are determined to make the necessary efforts to keep a 1.5 degree Celsius limit on warming within reach.
This was further solidified in a bilateral document, the U.S.-Japan Climate Relationship, in May 2022, where thetwo countries showed their intent to build on their cooperation to increase climate ambition and on acceleratinginternational climate action. Although these are two important and well-crafted statements, their implementationis still unclear. Another concern that was raised during the Forum is that the United States has a history of volatility
and inconsistency, particularly with regards to funding, when it comes to climate issues.
Bilateral climate partnerships, in fact, are easier to create than trilateral –however, as one of the participants noted,
including them in the context of multinational agreements may be more feasible and appealing, with peer reviews
and resource maps as a way to make this format work.
In Japan, some changes have been taking place at the local level: Tokyo governor Yuriko Koike, who used to be
Japan’s environment minister (2003-2006), announced carbon neutral goals ahead of the national government. Tokyo
is aiming to reduce the numbers by 50% by 2050, while Japan is looking for 46% reduction by the same year. Tokyo
does not have many power plants, and it is currently trying to mandate housing developers to put solar panels on
roofs.
Tokyo is also prioritizing hydrogen and is already using it for public transportation, such as buses. Starting with“grey hydrogen,” soon Tokyo plans to go blue and then green. Tokyo is also proud to have the first Asian carbon
trading market and is likely to tighten the target in the future.
The national government, on the other hand, is looking at how to generate electricity from different sources. After
COP26, Japan changed its energy mix plan for 2030: even the government officials (and certainly industry) werecaught by surprise when the Prime Minister announced this new target. The Japanese government is focusing more
on renewables, such as offshore wind and solar photovoltaic technology (PV). There is also an increased interest
in CCUS, which may be one area where all three countries can share legal and social acceptance strategies. The
14chemical industry in Japan is now focusing on the utilization (or carbon recycling) aspect, and Japanese chemicalcompanies may be the only ones looking at this. They are considering creating polymers or even fuel from recycled
carbon. While other companies are skeptical on its feasibility, gas companies do not have renewable industries but
want to make use of pipelines, so carbon-recycled methane may be a way to do this. There is U.S.-Japan cooperation
on hydrogen, but cooperation with China in this area needs to be explored further.
The U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center for Water-Energy Technologies (CERC), a pioneering research anddevelopment consortium, has received a significant amount of research and development funding in this area. Thisinitiative allows U.S. and Chinese researchers to work together to improve efficiency in new and existing buildings,
save energy, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce stress on the electric grid.
The Obama administration tried to start the CERC model in India, focusing on solar energy and building efficiency.
Because India used British scientific systems, it was familiar with IP protection, peer review, and competitive bidding.
Doing the same with China has proven harder because of different standards. U.S.-China cooperation on the nuclear
front has also been difficult because of security standards.
The Forum participants also discussed the importance of energy efficiency, even for existing buildings: reducing
demand for KWs reduces how many we must generate with carbon fuels.
The government of Japan is currently providing incentives to explore sustainable, energy-efficient building materials,
aiming at zero energy housing goals. This requires a combination of technologies and it is necessary to convince thedomestic industry that it is feasible at a reasonable cost.
A participant also remarked that labor costs are rising in China, but they are still lower than in Japan and in the
United States. In fact, a harmonization of norms and goals in energy efficient building materials could lead to an
opportunity to export these to Japan and America. The non-tradeable aspects of housing are what have sheltered itfrom politicization, however, if further import of the housing industry could spark pushback at the domestic level.
Building prefabricated houses could help reduce the impact of climate change further as we can save materials andavoid waste of resources and energy. Direct current (DC) is the standard for everything at present; however, we built
our grids on alternating current (AC). Everything has converters that are built for cost rather than efficiency, and weshould strive for more efficient DC utilization, such as DC homes. Therefore, collaboration on standardization in thisarea of efficiency could be useful.
The past few years have witnessed some dramatic events that have had serious consequences on the clean energy
transition in South and Southeast Asia. The war in Ukraine has been bringing a massive shock to energy prices, andthe pandemic shifted the global focus to recovery and social welfare. These conservative mid-term objectives havethus hindered the plans to a smooth transition and important opportunities, such as a reform of India’s electricity
sector. The discussion on critical supply chain has become increasingly central in the past three years: How are we
extracting minerals and where are they coming from? Does this create a new sense of energy insecurity?
Some participants also raised questions about the funding origin and reliability of infrastructure, and emphasized
the need to ensure that a functional human infrastructure is in place in our countries, as well as South andSoutheast Asia.
Indonesia has a new ban on nickel exports, and this shows some of the concern about critical minerals. Anotherissue is that multinational companies are privy to international standards, but national companies can often getaway with violating these standards.
Japan is currently facing criticism of ammonia as “just a way to keep the coal plants running” but this is an importantstage in keeping industries engaged in the move on energy efficiency. The United States is probably not considering
a carbon border adjustment, and Japan is also reluctant to do so, which contrasts with European countries. In fact,
Keidanren represented the whole of Japanese industry twenty years ago, but now, while it’s still a major figure, there
are IT firms and others that push Japan in other directions. Knowledge-sharing from United States to Asia is still notcoordinated: we could double or even triple the impact if NGOs and government agencies, such as USAID and JICA,
coordinated the resources our three countries are putting into the region. This area would be easier to coordinate
than economic opportunities or financing.
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SUBNATIONAL CLIMATE ACTION: FROM SMART GRIDS TO SMART CITIESA significant part of the actual progress on clean energy is happening below the state level: cities, companies,
even individual houses.
China is making progress toward carbon neutrality: 2021 saw 16% of energy from non-fossil (renewable andnuclear) sources. Goals were 15% by 2020, 20% by 2025, 25% by 2030, and over 80% by 2060. From 2019 to2020 and to 2021, the capacity of household photovoltaics in China roughly doubled annually from 5.31GW to10.32GW to 21.6GW. In China, the feed-in price from PVs is one fifth the price of buying power from the grid.
There is also an economic incentive to install solar PV at the household level. In Guangzhou, for example, anautomobile factory built a 7m kWh facility for 47m RMB, which should pay for itself in five or six years, withan estimated lifespan of twenty-five years.
How is China controlling demand when the power needs are after dark? Is carbon capture sequestration taking
place, and if so, at what speed and volume? PV is competitive in the market. There are a few different solutions
developing rapidly. The grid could take more electricity from solar PV during the day, or a “solar pump” could
be used so the power reaches areas of need from power storage. As for CCS, come in the working groupwarned that we should not be overly optimistic that it will provide a sustainable solution, as China does nothave the storage capacity for it.
CCS storage space is also a problem in Japan –even bigger than in China and the United States. Some addedthat they do not believe that nuclear power is not presently cost-competitive. Participants from China, infact, also noted that while China had an aggressive nuclear program before Fukushima, there are many morechallenges for nuclear power now, as people have strong objections on the domestic level. That is why nuclear
energy will not play a key role in a carbon-neutral strategy.
Cities and states are advancing net-zero pledges and carbon goals that are more accelerated than the U.S.
federal government. For example, California and China have an important bilateral and bidirectional
exchange, including with the Jiangsu province. There is a lot of progress in the collaboration between thestate of California and the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment on methane and carbon markets,and high-level dialogues and secretariats have been established between the two. It must be noted, however,that California might be a unique example because the state has prioritized climate consistently acrossadministrations.
One of the salient issues on the grid is energy storage and grid-forming inverter, used to sync the waveform.
U.S. technology consists in an iron-rust battery, which may provide opportunity for low-cost, long-term
storage. The power grid can be taken up to high-level penetration with storage for days. Weather is finicky,
therefore long-term storage is needed and requires technology and materials. This is a requirement for acomplete transition, but it also requires a lot of critical materials, such as lithium and cobalt, where privatecompanies (Panasonic, Tesla, and others) are leaders. There is also a need for investment in the transition,
because populations are often far from generation sites. The Biden administration is now investing in thesesystems, which are being built by utilities. In the Japanese case, the government is giving more subsidies to thestorage. Japan also needs to connect four main islands: wind is produced in northern islands, solar in southern
islands, but the demand is in the central (Honshu) island. Japan should enhance the currently small pipe.
Similarly, Texas has its own grid that is distinct from the rest of the United States.
Deep sea cables are another challenge. Deep sea and long distance require cables, which have more impedance
than open wires, and this implies the usage of DC, with inverters to AC at their ends. Private companies, suchas Siemens and Hitachi, and some Chinese companies are currently conducting research on these inverters.
For the project of an Asian grid, however, there are some complex political obstacles: the cable from Japanto the rest of East Asia has to pass through Korea, which can become challenging. Furthermore, the UnitedStates has concerns about an ASEAN grid that could be privy to Chinese influence and hostage-taking, as anintegrated grid also implies dependence. Unsurprisingly, these steps cannot be taken without first stabilizing
the situation of the Korean peninsula.

16

There are also social and environmental issues related to land use: Local populations can have intense
opposition to power projects, and solutions and models need to be tailored for each geographical area.
Distributed rooftop PV would work for rural areas, for example, but not for urban centers. There are issues, butthere are tools in our toolbox, grid codes can help make these tools more modular.
China is doing social Darwinism in the energy efficiency financing and is cutting off solar subsidies withimmediate effect (and is now doing the same with EV), which has caused many companies to go under.
Food is another important aspect of this issue. The food system accounts for 31% of greenhouse gas emissions(including materials and transportation). Food will likely be more a focus at the next COP.
Food waste in particular is another relevant issue, but in the past three years, due to the global pandemic, thisproblem has been reduced, because of the significant amount of people who cooked at home.

FREEWAYS AND SPEED BUMPS TO HIGH-TECH AND LOW-TECH CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITIONS
The future role of nuclear energy:
The participants discussed the importance of the role of nuclear energy in the energy transition for Asia andin the three countries. The majority of the experts responded that nuclear power will still be important for
all three countries in the future, as the existing capacity already makes up a critical component of the energy
mix. There are, nonetheless, undeniable challenges. In other countries like India, Taiwan, or ASEAN, there
is not currently a large nuclear capacity, as there are better, more practical opportunities. Some in the groupemphasized the importance of nuclear energy to counter climate change, but others were adamant that nuclear
power will always carry the burden of safety, both from natural disasters, as the Fukushima example showed,
and the fear of man-made disasters and risks of terrorism, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated.
However, energy security and energy independence, as well as prestige (like the cases of Saudi Arabia and theUAE) could drive countries toward pursuing nuclear.

Green transportation technologies:
Transportation is the largest source of U.S. greenhouse gases, and second-largest source in China. Are electricvehicles the silver bullet in helping the United States and/or Asia? Some participants emphasized that we needto think about commercial vehicles in addition to passenger vehicles on a global level. Electrification is only one
part of the solution, as a deep decarbonization of the power grid is necessary. There are roughly one million
cars in Hawaii at present, and thirty thousand of them are electric. There is currently a flat demand, but if
we replace one million cars with EVs, there will be growth in demand. Without changing the grid, this will
generate more emissions; right now, Hawaii does not have the capacity to power one million EVs.
Public education is one of the low-cost opportunities we should look at. There needs to be an increasing
number of stakeholders involved at the top of the impact of climate action plans. These stakeholders need tomake plans that are actionable, accountable, and verifiable. We need Advanced Metering Infrastructure datain conveying messages to the public. Looking ahead, we need to think of ways to convey the assurance thatpower will be there while also demonstrating the challenge of getting to an efficient energy mix.
The participants all agreed that greater harmonization is needed in some areas: more needs to be done to bring
the national and subnational threads together with clearinghouses and information sharing opportunities.
The information needs to be poured in and shared out, and having regulators involved would be very useful.
Looking ahead, policy officials setting up regulatory frameworks should discuss best practices, lessons learned,
and the process of setting rules, floors, and ceilings, thus moving the innovation towards impact. We need tofurther define approaches in areas where we think it is possible to cooperate among the three countries anddeepen our understanding on the ways these changes in great power rivalry have been impacting technology
and policy cooperation.

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MANAGING CLIMATE COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
The world cannot meet the challenge of mitigating climate change without aggressive action by the U.S. andChina to decarbonize their economies and overseas investments. Despite pendulum swings in the broader
bilateral relationship, climate and environmental cooperation have been an area of fairly sustained cooperation
for several decades. How can the United States and China accelerate positive climate action even without
formal cooperation? Is there a path in which constructive competition can drive needed action by bothcountries as they pursue national self-interest? What role do Japan and Europe have in this dynamic?
There is a need to talk more about how to go about cooperating and implementing the cooperation in all the
areas that were mentioned above.

 Constructive, not destructive dialogue, with protection of IPR. Joint research or collaboration supported
by governments, with political policy support would be an area for further exploration. Nonetheless,the political atmosphere has changed, but our working group participants are convinced that they
can pressurize our governments to look at this in a more balanced way. China reported that the green
transition would cost 100 trillion U.S. dollars globally: this can only be funded in a joint way.
 Third party collaboration needs greater emphasis: China-U.S.-plus, China-Japan-plus, China-U.S.Japan-plus relationships are more important now than ever. Those plurilateral groups can help othercountries achieve goals for low-carbon transition for sustainable development. Chinese academia is
proposing a comprehensive system focused on new energies like solar, wind, bio, and storage to give theprivate sector an instigating role, supported by the government. We need to grow a peer-to-peer learning
network, without looking at one country as a teacher or instructor to other countries.

Despite frictions between the United States and China, there has been an informal (different from governmentto-government) cooperation. Former U.S. President Barack Obama and current Chinese President Xi Jinping
were able to sign bilateral climate agreement because there was joint scientific research by NGOs and thinktanks, as well as some business-to-business work at the base. Agricultural exchanges deserve more credit aswell. Despite what governments say, they do disconnect climate from politics, and have done so for more thantwenty years.

 Change of narrative: There is too much talk about competition and not enough about cooperation tobalance competition. In areas such as climate change and energy transition, we need to de-securitize andde-politicize the issue. One suggestion would be avoiding talks about energy security and instead using“energy transition.”

That said, high requirements for non-Chinese NGOs to register in China have dramatically cooled
cooperation. A consistent narrative across all three of the Mansfield-CIIS Forum meetings has emerged: a callfor sustainable dialogue of information sharing and cross-fertilization. The climate crisis and the countries’
responses to it is a promising area for trilateral cooperation because we inhale cross-border air and live in
an inter-connected environment. We are struck by a multiplicity of items to address, requiring a myriadof solutions. Additionally, climate and energy security are closely linked, and are threat multipliers. The
modalities of cooperation can be versatile, and dialogues can be used both for general information sharing andspecific topics. Broader topics should focus on the sustainability to produce its values, and the narrower areas
can be shorter term and produce joint (track 1, 1.5, or 2) projects.

 Need to reassess the role of national laboratories and the U.S. Congress; states, cities, municipalities,
civil societies are equally important actors and are where the most exciting research is happening. We
will thus need to create and foster the right environment for this level of engagement to thrive.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have the moral obligation to pursue incremental change, but we must go faster. Education and information
sharing among expert groups, and sometimes the public, are good first steps. Secondly, joint research and basic
science must be strengthened and fostered further. This can be government-funded but the best research occurs
when basic results are shared openly. Thirdly, we need to establish norms, codes, and roles (subnational roles
can be taken as example, with the caveat that some schemes are not equitable or valid in all regions). It might
be too soon to say what the future holds for nuclear energy in the United States and in Japan, but leaders
have important decisions to make soon. All of this requires public engagement, information sharing, public
education.

 Some participants have agreed to take the initiative of using their organization as a platform to hostprivate and government in the future.

 Need for a change of narrative: U.S.-Japan discussions need to include China, and U.S.-China andChina-Japan conversations also need to include Japan and the United States respectively. Cooperation
might be in dyads, but we need to keep convening at trilateral as well and strengthen trilateralrelationships.
As challenging as it is to harmonize domestic policies to have trust in each other, we can explore what bilateraland trilateral relationships can do when they become plurilateral. There are opportunities to meet unmet
demand in Southeast Asia, and harmonization of the processes is necessary. There is presently no risk that one
country will take up all the bids over others, but as climate change affects everyone on this planet, if we don’t
work in a more transparent, cooperative frame of mind with greater pre-planning about what and why we areworking in the same direction, there is great risk of dooming those countries to power grids and codes that areincoherent, self-contradictory, or inefficient. Mansfield is also helping the United States and China to think
about how to harmonize clean transition and climate change mitigation efforts in Southeast Asia.

In order to maintain the momentum for cooperation, the participants advocated for:
 Creation of dialogue platforms, including multiple architectures. The private sector needs to beunleashed by the governments of these countries. If there are eighty different dialogues, nothing getsdone. We have to choose what is the most important. U.S.-China relations include a lot of talks, but
solutions are never reached. We have to be careful not to just ask for more dialogue.
 Better education: the model of the two climate assemblies in Hokkaido and Kawasaki city can be spread
more widely, and also be turned into global assemblies. The network of knowledge is now organized byprivate foundations with five hundred climate researchers participating in the project.
 Ensure that COP28 is successful , as well as the aftermath of the 30th anniversary of UNFCC. There isalso global interest for China to follow through on statements of the Special Envoy for Climate Change(forestry climate sequestration, policymaking, and energy transition to greener and more sustainable insteady and orderly way).
The working group in Honolulu (June 2022).

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19

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED
AC
AI
AIIB
APEC
ARF
BRI
CCUS
CERC
CFIUS
CNNSA
COP
CPTPP
CSP
DC
DOE
DOJ
EV
FCEVs
GHG
IAEA
IEA
INDC
IPR
JICA
JNRA
LNG
MA
METI
NDS
NRC
NSS
OECD
RATs
SCO
SDG
WTO
S3
SBSP
UNFCC
USAID

20

Alternating current
Artificial intelligence
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Regional Forum
Belt and Road Initiative
Carbon capture, utilization and storage
U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center for Water-Energy Technologies
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
Chinese National Nuclear Security Administration
UN Climate Change Conference
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific PartnershipConcentrating solar-thermal power
Direct current
Department of Energy
Department of JusticeElectric vehicles
Fuel cell electric vehicles
Greenhouse gas
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Energy Agency
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
Intellectual Property Right
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Nuclear Regulatory Agency of Japan
Liquefied natural gas
Minor actinide
Ministry of Energy, Trade, and Investment
National Defense Strategy
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Strategy
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Regional Anti-terrorist Structure
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Sustainable Development Goals
World Trade Organization
Smart Specialization Strategies
Space-based Solar Power
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
United States Agency for International Development

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