Illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive
materials and nuclear terrorism
Elena K. Sokova
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey
NagasakiJanuary 8, 2016

Four Scenarios of Nuclear Terrorism
 Theft and detonation (or threat of detonation) of an existing
nuclear weapon/bomb from one of the nuclear weapons
possessor states––

Incredibly catastrophic
Difficult for terrorists to accomplish Theft or purchase of fissile material leading to the fabricationof an improvised nuclear device (crude bomb)––

Incredibly catastrophic
For constructing a crude bomb, the most difficult task is toobtain nuclear materials

 Attack against and/or sabotage of a nuclear facility causing
the release of large amount of radioactivity––

From very catastrophic to limited impact
Difficult to accomplish yet not impossible

 Fabrication and detonation of a radiological dispersion device(RDD or dirty bomb) or radiation emission device (RED)––

Limited physical impact (similar to regular explosives) but
potentially billions of dollars in disruption, medical screening,and cleaning costs
Easy to accomplish
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Radiological incident/attack impact
Goiania, Brazil, 1987
Accidental dispersal of Cs-137 from aradiotherapy unit, 1,375 Ci

Hypothetical Cs-137 “dirty bomb” impact modeling(Congressional Research Service, Modeling by Sandia National
Laboratories, 2010)

4 deaths; 1 amputation; 28 people
with radiation burns; over
112,000 monitored; 3,500 cubic
meters of contaminated soil andother materials; over $20 million
in clean-up costs; 5 years toreturn to the level of economic
output prior to the accident3

Nuclear and radioactive materials• Radioactive Materials– Materials with isotopes with unstable atoms
that seek to become stable by breaking and thus
emit energy as radiation• Nuclear Materials– Materials or isotopes of materials that cansustain a chain reaction of fission of neutrons
Uranium (U)Plutonium (Pu)
Thorium (Th)• Special Fissionable or Special Nuclear
Materials – materials for nuclear explosive
devices– Highly enriched uranium (HEU) – contains morethan 20% of U235 isotope– Plutonium (Pu239 and– Plutonium “dual use”: can have weapons andpeaceful application

Radioactive material uses(over 8 million worldwide)• Medicine: diagnosis, sterilization, radiotherapy, researchin nuclear medicine• Industry and research• Agriculture: irradiators• Long-term energy sources
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Civilian and non-weapon uses of nuclear materials• Nuclear power
generation (over 437
reactors in 31 countries)• Research and testing(about 670 research
reactors in 69 countries)• Propulsion (nuclearicebreakers and nuclearsubmarines)• Medical and otherisotopes production

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Concerns over HEU• HEU-based bomb is relatively easier to pursue than a Pu-based• High level of confidence in “workability” of device – could skip testing• Crude or improvised nuclear device based on HEU is considered to bewithin the reach of “sophisticated” terrorist groups• HEU is available in the civilian nuclear fuel cycle• As little as 50 kg of HEU is needed for a crude gun-type device• Majority of known illicit trafficking cases of weapons-useable materials
involves HEU• HEU is easy to shield and thus hard to detect

Concerns over Pu•

Over 240 MT of separated military Pu and over 260 MT of separated civilianPu accumulated worldwide•

Non-military Pu can be weapon-useable (North Korea used plutonium
recovered from spent reactor fuel for its nuclear devices)•France, India, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom carry out large-scale
reprocessing and recovery of Pu from civilian spent nuclear fuel•Use of Pu in the civilian cycle may further increase availability of separated
Pu stocks (fast neutron reactors, spent fuel reprocessing, MOX fuel cycle,etc.)•While Pu-based bomb is technically more challenging than HEU, one can not
rule out that a technically sophisticated non-state actors could construct a
working device using Pu•

Only 6 kg of Pu is required
for a 1st generation implosion bombAvailability of nuclear and radioactive materials•~ 16,500 assembled nuclear weapons stored at over 100 sites globally•~1,884,000 kg of weapons-useable material (HEU and separated plutonium)
in 24 countries (down from 32 in 2012 and down from over 50 countries in1992) – equivalent of roughly 100,000 or more nuclear bombs worth•

Of this amount only 4.5% of weapons grade and weapons useable material isin countries without nuclear weapons programs•

Over 95% of HEU and Pu (both in weapons programs and in civilianapplications) is in the five nuclear weapons states (China, France, Russia,United Kingdom, United States) and four nuclear possessor states (India,Pakistan, Israel, DPRK) and are not subject to international oversight•

The United States and Russia account for ~85% of stocks of all nuclear
weapons useable materials•

Nuclear materials are present in over 1130 facilities and sites in ~70 countries•Radioactive sources and materials are used virtually by every country in theworld (8 million rad. sources worldwide)•Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, Chechen groups, and other extremists sought
nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear and radioactive materials

Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Radioactive Materials• Any unauthorized transactions involving Nuclear and Radioactivematerials• Acquisition, provision, possession, use, transfer or disposal, loss ofcontrol – any transaction/action outside of the legitimate
realm, including thefts, losses, illegal trade• Criminal or not• Intentional or unintentional• With or without crossing borders• Attempted transactions/actions• Scams10

Statistics
IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (1993-2014) – 131 countries reporting••••••Over 2700 confirmed incidents
Less than 1/3 involve nuclear materials (all forms, including natural anddepleted uranium)
Number of cases involving nuclear materials, particularly LEU, gradually
goes down (in the past couple of years – less than 10%)Majority of incidents involve radioactive materials and contaminatedmaterials
Reported thefts and losses primarily involve radioactive sources, such as
Cs-137, Am-241, Sr-90, Co-60, Ir-192
Geographical distribution of smuggling incidents (2007 data)
Russia – 24%
United States – 20%
Ukraine – 5%
Kazakhstan – 5%
Other FSU – 7%
Canada – 3%South Africa, India, Germany, Poland, Iraq – 2% each11

HEU and Pu Trafficking

June 2011 HEU Seizure in Moldova•Sting operation•4.4 grams HEU•Enrichment level – 72% U235
•Origin – reportedly Russian uranium enrichment or reprocessing facility•Six individuals arrested; three prosecuted•Reportedly at least 1 kg of HEU was available in addition to the sample(up to 10 kg per some reports)•Reportedly a buyer from North Africa (questionable)•Packaging and enrichment – similar to the 1999 and 2001 HEU incidents (!)

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HEU and Pu Trafficking(incidents with similarities are highlighted)

Current Patterns and Issues in Illicit Nuclear Trafficking– Fewer cases involving nuclear materials, including LEU & HEU (1991-2000 –110/year vs. 2001-2010 – 19/year, 2013-2014 – 10-12 incidents/year)– However, HEU seizures (2003, 2006, 2010, 2011) indicate continued nuclear
security vulnerabilities; persistent offers of HEU; disturbing similarities between
different incidents– In each HEU seizure case, larger amounts of HEU were promised– Mostly “intermediaries” or “middlemen” are arrested in HEU or othersignificant cases. Thieves or buyers/end users are not captured or known– Radioactive sources, including “orphan” sources, materials out of control,
constitute the bulk of incidents– ~10% of all incidents with radioactive sources and materials involve category I
and II sources– Cs-137 continues to lead the charts among radioactive sources– Contamination in the metal recycling industry continues (even HEU is found inscrap metal)– Persistent and repeating incidents in certain regions (Georgia, Moldova,Chernobyl area)
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Current Patterns and Issues in Illicit Nuclear
Trafficking (continued)• No visible nexus between traffickers and terrorists… yet– However, announced interest to nuclear and radioactive materials by terrorists is evident– Past cases of demonstration of capabilities (Chechen groups in the mid-1990s)– Willingness of smugglers to sell to terrorists is also confirmed• Possibility that nuclear smuggling goes undetected– We only learn about thefts and materials out of control by accident or when transactions are
unsuccessful and lead to arrest and seizure– Do smuggling operations go undetected? If so, what is the scope?

• Reporting of incidents involving nuclear and radioactive materials if very
uneven– Some countries do not report or underreport– Reporting is inaccurate and incomplete•

Low nuclear security culture in many countries– Nuclear safety is understood better than nuclear security– No legally binding international standards in the area of nuclear security or monitoringmechanism
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