Bull. Hiroshima Inst. Tech. Research Vol. 53 (2019) 39– 48

ArticleAssumptions of Linguistics

Naoki ARAKI*(Received Nov. 1, 2018)

Abstract
Linguistics has treated language as a system, which is based on telementation as Roy Harris calls it.
So thought is transferred from one person to another using a fixed code. However, communicationaccompanies extra-linguistic factors, which are eliminated from a fixed code. So it is not language thatmakes communication successful. Language is only a part of communication and serves as a medium
among people in communities. In other words, words do not have meanings, which are usually thought
to be conveyed from one person to another. Therefore, words serve as a medium to convey thoughtsfrom one person to another. Can modern linguistics be ready for seriously considering arguments
above? Or can it reject them as wrong ideas?
Key Words: telementation, a fixed code, langue, extra-linguistic factors, medium, meaning, integrational
linguistics, contexts

where facts of consciousness, which we shall call con-Introduction

cepts, are associated with representations of linguistic

Linguistics has a long history dating back tosigns or acoustic images, by means of which they may

ancient times. But its assumptions have rarely been

be expressed. Let us suppose that a given concept trig-

doubted by linguists across the world. Among thesegers in the brain a corresponding acoustic image: thislinguists are Roy Harris and Moore and Carling. They

is an entirely psychological phenomenon, followed in due

call in question the validity of orthodox linguistics

course by a psychological process: the brain transmits tofrom the viewpoint of communication. In short, it may

the organs of phonation an impulse corresponding to

be communication that makes language work in ourthat image; then sound waves are propagated from A’s

community. It may not be language that makes com-mouth to B’s ear—a purely physical process. Next, themunication successful in our society. In this paper, we

circuit continues in B in inverse order: from ear to brain

examine the protests against orthodox linguistics.

the physiological transmission of the acoustic image; inthe brain, the psychological association of this image

1. Telementation and a Fixed Codewith the corresponding concept. If B speaks in turn,According to Roy Harris, Saussure describes thethis new act will follow—from his brain to A’s—exactly

typical act of communication between two individuals

the same progression as the first, and will pass throughA and B as follows:

the same consecutive phases ... (Saussure, 1922: 28;
author’s [Harris’s] translation).

(Harris 1990a: 142)

The starting point of the circuit [circuit de laparole] is in the brain of one (person), call him A,

Harris refers to Saussure’s model of communica-* Department of Information Systems and Management, Faculty of Applied Information Science, Hiroshima Institute of TecŠology,
Hiroshima 731-5193, Japan. E-mail: araki@cc.it-hiroshima.ac.jp
─ 39 ─Naoki ARAKItion above as the ‘speech circuit’, which explains how

ory of communication, [...] the inevitable result is thatthoughts are transferred from one person to another.

it leaves only one option open for explaining what a

The model of communication is also called the ‘trans-

language is. The only option open is to construe a

port studies’ model (Harris 1990a: 142).

language as a fixed code, the fixed code known to both

Harris says that ‘Saussure adopted telementation

A and B.

(Harris 1990d: 28-29)

as his theory of communication’ (Harris 1990d: 26).
Harris also says the same thing as the above from

Telementation is ‘the theory which explains communication as the transference of thoughts from one per-a different perspective:

son’s mind to another person’s mind’ (Harris 1990d:
26). As we have seen above, telementation is illus-[...] construing a language as a fixed code is

trated in Saussure’s ‘speech circuit.’ It should be noted

demanded by the internal logic of Saussure’s speechthat Harris points out, ‘This simple scenario assumes

circuit [telementation model of communication].

that A and B are speaking the same language’ (Harris

Unless the code is fixed, then invoking linguistic

1990d: 26).

knowledge simply does not explain how speech com-

So, once Saussure’s idea is accepted, Harris

munication works. Given any utterance by A, it isclaims, then extra-linguistic factors are eliminatedessential that B must not only recognize this utterance

from communication:as an example of the words A intended to pronounce,but must also attach to those words the same meaning[...] the material circumstances in which linguistic

as A does. Otherwise speech communication between

activity takes place are of no significance. How such

A and B necessarily breaks down. (Harris 1990d: 29)

circumstances vary cannot affect, except in superficial
So Harris claims that a telementation theory pre-and incidental ways, the nature of what is taking place,since it is always the internalized system [langue] of

supposes a fixed code:

sound-meaning correlations which determines what
can take place. The theory of language itself implicitly[...] if speech communication is a telementation

dismisses communication as a mere by-product ofprocess, it demands a fixed code which A and B share.

something more permanent and more basic, the sys-

If A and B do not share this fixed code, [...] thentem of linguistic knowledge [langue].

speech communication between them must at some

(Harris 1990a: 143)

point break down, [...] So the theoretical assumption
must be that, somehow or other, those who manage to

Moreover, Saussure’s telementation theory ofcommunicate with each other via speech share andcommunication, Harris says (Harris 1990a: 143; 1990d:

operate a fixed code, [...] The fixed code is their com-

27-28), has been passed on to the present day as inmon language.

(Harris 1990d: 30)

Denes and Pinson (1963: 4-7), Katz (1966: 98, 103-4),
If Harris is right, then, what does the fixed-code

Chafe (1970: 15), and Cairns and Cairns (1976: 17-18).
According to Harris, the ancestry of Saussure’s

theory bring about?

‘speech circuit’ model of communication is the ‘transla[...] the fixed-code theory leads straight to whattion theory’ of understanding by John Locke (Harris

may be called the ‘paradox of inquiry’. [...] A asks

1990b: 153-154).
But Harris says that the English sentence, “Pass‘How many sides has a quadrilateral?’ and B replies

the salt, please” can be interpreted, depending on vari-‘Four’. If A and B share the same fixed code, then A

ous cultures (Harris 1990c: 205).

must already know the answer to the question; whereas

Then, what enables a telementation theory toin the alternative case A’s question is one which it isachieve successful communication? Harris insists that

impossible for B to understand correctly. [...] The
point is that a fixed-code theory of speech communica-[...] once any theorist adopts a telementation the-tion must attribute exactly the same linguistic knowl-

─ 40 ─Assumptions of Linguistics

edge to A and B if communication is to be successful.

fixed. [...] The failure to deal with it has a particular

On this theory, therefore, it is impossible for anyone

irony, since the development of linguistics has been

to come to know the meaning of a word by askingheavily dependent on the introduction of new terminol-

another person. But this conclusion is paradoxical,

ogy, and Saussure’s Cours [de Linguistique Générale]since asking the meaning of a word is commonly held

itself is a case in point. The work should have been

to be a normal and unproblematic function of speech

incomprehensible if the theory of communication it

communication; and furthermore this function is gen-advances is correct.

(Harris 1990d: 34)

erally regarded as essential for the usual processes oflanguage-learning.

So that may be the reason why Chomsky does not(Harris 1990d: 32-33)

think that language changes as time goes by.
Furthermore, it seems either that linguistics can-Not only that, but also the fixed-code theory poses

not deal with real languages like English, French, anda question of how la langue comes into existence:

German or that if it does it cannot be dealing with[...] if speech communication is indeed based on

fixed codes (Harris 1990d: 35).

a fixed code shared by speakers and hearers it

According to Harris, it is wrong that most lin-

becomes extremely difficult to explain in any plausible

guists assume that idealizations in linguistics are nec-

way how the fixed code comes to be established in theessary when they study languages (Harris 1990d: 37).

first place. [...] The larger the community the lessThen, what is the alternative to Saussure’s theory

chance there is that any two individuals will have had
the same opportunity to acquire exactly the same setof correlations between forms and meanings for pur-of language?

2. Integrational Linguistics

poses of communication. [...] In other words, the fixed

Harris proposes an integrationalist programme,

code with which A operates is presumably the uniquecriticizing the orthodox linguistics, which he calls a

product of A’s individual linguistic experience, while

segregationalist linguistics. Integrationalist linguistics

the fixed code with which B operates is likewise theattempts to integrate both extra-linguistic and linguis-

unique product of B’s individual linguistic experience.

tic factors into linguistic communication:

But this conclusion contradicts the telementational
account of speech communication itself; for we are left

An integrationalist redefinition is in a position towithout the essential guarantee that A and B share one

do this [to reject the whole mythology of language

and the same fixed code.

structure which derives from a telementational model(Harris 1990d: 33)

of communication] because it adopts a perspective
So that may be the reason why Chomsky insists

which, in Saussurean terms, is neither synchronic northat we are born with ideas, which is related to his

diachronic but panchronic. It considers as pertinent toinsistence that language structure (Universal Gram-

linguistic communication both the integration of simul-mar) is innate.

taneously occurring events and also the integration of

Moreover, the speech circuit depending on apresent events with past events and anticipated future

fixed code produces conflict between the demands ofevents. This integration is governed by a single ‘prin-a fixed code and the possibility of linguistic change:

ciple of contemporality’, which postulates a chronological parity between linguistic and non-linguistic[...] if the speech circuit depends on the operation

events in human experience.

(Harris 1990d: 47)of a fixed code then innovation becomes a theoretical
So integrationalist linguistics explains communi-

impossibility. If A attempts to introduce a new word, B
will certainly fail to understand it since ex hypothesi thecation as follows:

word is not part of the code they share. On the other
hand, if either A or B can introduce innovations which

This principle [of integrationalist linguistics],

are communicationally successful, then the code is notwhich orthodox linguistics fails to recognize, is of─ 41 ─Naoki ARAKI

What, then, do both the Keynesians and integra-

basic importance if we wish to have a theory of language which can explain how and why communication

tionalists insist on?

invariably proceeds on the assumption that every linguistic act is integrated into the individual’s experi-

The Keynesian strategy is to point out that theence as a unique event, which has never before

assumption that currency notes are pieces of paper

occurred and will never recur.

standing for quantities of precious metals fails to make(Harris 1990d: 48)

sense of economic reality, where in practice money
Hence Harris denies that words have meanings

functions as a complex of mechanisms which facilitate
the distribution of goods and services. Money does

based on his insistence above:

not in addition need to ‘stand for’ anything. Analo[...] this [that each sign has a meaning] is angously in the linguistic case, once we see that lan-assumption which the integrationalist neither needs

guage can be treated as a complex of mechanisms fornor endorses. By denying that words, or other signs,

facilitating communication there is no need to insist

have meanings what the integrationalist is rejecting isthat linguistic signs ‘stand for’ anything else in addi-

the orthodox claim that there is some invariant seman-tion.

(Harris 1990d: 52)

tic value which attaches to a linguistic sign in all cirFor Harris, words do not have meanings just as

cumstances, and from which its interpretation isderived by those who use it. This is the myth of mean-

money does not have value for the Keynesians.

ing institutionalized in dictionaries, and it is logically

Therefore Harris insists that integrationalism

required by the telementational account of how speech

does not pursue what Saussure or Chomsky attempts

communication works. For purposes of an integra-

to achieve (Harris 1990d: 50).
Next we shall examine how Moore and Carling

tional analysis, however, the concept of meaning may
be dispensed with and replaced by that of communicational function. The crucial difference is that the communicational function of a sign is always contextuallydeal with meanings.

3. The Container View of Meaning
Moore and Carling take up and criticize the con-determined and derives from the network of integra-

tainer view of meaning:tional relations which obtain in a particular situation.
(Harris 1990d: 48-49)

The container view of meaning, a view that underIn order to show that words do not have anylies both formal and informal theories of word mean-

invariant semantic value, Harris compares orthodox

ing, presupposes that meaning can be studied indepen-

linguistics with economics attacked by the Keynesians,

dently of language users. On the container view, people

pointing out similarities between them (Harris 1990d:

do not mean something by words, rather words them-51).

selves have meanings. From this starting point, aThen, what are the similarities between linguistics

three-term relation appears to have been assumed. It
is supposed that there are:and economics?
They [similarities between linguistics and eco-(i) words.

nomics] are similarities which hinge on a common(ii) the various classes of objects, events, situations,concept of ‘value’. Just as orthodox linguistics treats

etc. in the world which the words refer to or pick out.

sounds as having meanings by standing for concepts(iii) the meanings of words.
(Moore and Caring 1982: 150)

or for objects and persons in the external world, so thebasic idea of economic theory which the Keynesians

Thus, the container view treats meanings as acalled in question was the idea that a pound note had

relation between a word and a thing in the world,

a value by standing for a quantity of gold.
(Harris 1990d: 51)

eliminating language users:

─ 42 ─Assumptions of Linguistics

On this view, characerising word meaning may be‘reality’. [...] At the heart of the container view we havethought of as characerising a relation believed to exist

singled out its absolute presupposition that meaning is

between language and the ‘world’. It is further implied

an inherent property of words and sentences. Accom-that the world to which language may be related canpanying this view has been an idealisation wide-spreadbe assumed to be independent of language users’ per-in theoretical work on meaning in linguistics and phi-

ception of it. The difficulty with such a view is that it

losophy away from the speaker and the hearer, theignores the crucial active role of language users in

writer and the reader, and in general, the users of therelating the words they possess or produce each tolanguage with their supportive frameworks of expecta-

their own experience of the world.

tions, beliefs and categorised experience. Insofar as(Moore and Carling 1982: 151)

complex matters of this sort can be at all adequately
summed up, we might say that, despite the different

So according to Moore and Carling, in the con-guises they come in, container theorists have assumed

tainer view, languages are thought to be independentthat language is best studied as a self-contained,of language users:

largely autonomous system used by members of alanguage community to convey meaning.
(Moore and Carling 1982: 160-161)

The container view that words ‘have’ meanings,
however, assumes—misleadingly—that speakers andHere, needless to say, their criticism is directed tohearers are no more than passive users of a system
which may be revealingly characerised independentlyof them. It sees language as an object or entity rather
than a means whereby one language user is able toSaussure and Chomsky.

4. An Approach Called Epiphenomenalist
Moore and Carling propose an alternative approach,cause complex processing mechanisms to come into

which is called epiphenomenalist, to the study of lan-play within another language user.
(Moore and Carling 1982: 151)

guage:

If the container view of meaning is correct, ‘theIn our alternative approach to the study of lan-meanings of words may be specified—as in a diction-

guage, an approach we call epiphenomenalist, we lookary—objectively and definitively’ (Moore and Carlingat language as necessarily dependent upon language

1982: 151). But is it true?

users and their individual ‘states’.
We begin, then, with language users rather than

Clearly some words and expressions cannot eas-

language itself. We observe that they are familiar with

ily be thought of as containing their meaning without

their environment, that they have experienced or oth-reference to speakers and hearers and, in a broad

erwise learnt about a range of phenomena and thatsense of context, the context of utterance. Typicalthis knowledge and experience have somehow beencases of these have been held to be words such asassimilated. Within this perspective, language may be

here, now, today, and personal pronouns such as I, you,thought of as a medium whereby one language user

she, we and they. Such terms have been labelled index-

can cause another to access his own ‘store’ of accumu-

ical or deictic terms.

lated and generalised knowledge and experience, to(Moore and Carling 1982: 151)

locate what appears to make sense of the sounds he
Moore and Carling sums up a container view ofhears. Looked at this way, nothing is conveyed fromlanguage before proposing their alternative approach

one language user to another. Language enables peo-to the study of language:

ple to communicate—with different degrees of success—by enabling speakers to initiative within under-

A container view of language gives rise to preoc-

standers a complex series of processing mechanisms

cupations about the relation between language andwhich are intimately bound up with their states at thewhat is loosely known as the world, or sometimes, astime of processing.

─ 43 ─

(Moore and Carling 1982: 161)

Naoki ARAKI

Finally they explain the third conclusion as fol-

Here, Moore and Carling say the same thing as
Harris does. They say, ‘nothing is conveyed from one

lows:language user to another’, which is echoed in Harris’s
insistence that Saussure’s speech circuit (circuit de la

The third point that follows from adopting an epi-

parole) is a telementation theory of speech communi-

phenomenalist perspective on language is that the

cation and thought is transferred from one person toquestion of the relation between language and theanother.

world, or reality, or between the structure of language

Furthermore, Moore and Carling think of lan-and the structure of the world, simply does not arise.

guage as a catalyst and contrast their view with the[...] One of the reasons that the view of meaning as

container view:

somehow an entity in itself is so pervasive and difficult
to shake off may arise from the fact that language may

The perspective that sees language as a catalyst

be used metalinguistically. We are accustomed to use

or trigger serving to initiate a complex series of pro-language to talk about language, to talk about thecessing mechanisms has an important consequence.

meaning of words, the structure of sentences, theUnlike the container view, there is no longer a relation

articulation of sounds. This convenient, everyday cus-

to be established between language and the world, or

tom may well reinforce the view that language is an

between the structure of language and the structure ofobject or entity which may be isolated and studied in

the world.

itself. It requires a great deal of determination [...] to(Moore and Carling 1982: 162)

recognise the way in which utterances—combinations
Finally Moore and Carling reach three conclu-

of linguistic units—far from conveying messages orinformation from A to B, do no more than enable A tosions. The first conclusion is as follows:cause B to attempt to locate within his own ‘store’ ofFirst, language does not, indeed cannot, convey
meaning. From the epiphenomenalist perspective, lan-accumulated and generalised experience that whichappears to him to make most sense of A’s words.
(Moore and Carling 1982: 164)

guage acts as a locating medium enabling one individual to cause another to gain access to knowledge,

Furthermore, Moore and Carling point out effects

or to draw inferences from knowledge that he alreadyhas. On this view of language, meaning does notthat written language has on the study of language:

inhere in utterances but emerges from them. For the[...] it has seemed quite natural to isolate lan-

epiphenomenalist, meaning is not an inherent but anguage, that is written language, from the overall pro-emergent property of language.
(Moore and Carling 1982: 162-163)

cess of communication in which other factors, gestures, postures, vocal noises other than spoken sound,play a part. This is all the more understandable since,

Their second conclusion is as follows:

as these other factors are not present in written lanThe second point, and it is a corollary of the view

guage, ignoring them seems justified.
(Moore and Carling 1982: 166)

that meaning is an emergent property, is that users
and their supportive frameworks of expectations,beliefs and knowledge cannot be excluded from theHow, then, is successful communication achieved?

study of language and, in particular, from the study of

Moore and Carling explains how speech communica-

meaning. Meaning, what is understood as a result oftion is achieved successfully:

an utterance being processed, only emerges from thecomplex interaction of the sounds constituting the[...] language should be seen as a necessarily

utterance, the environment and the current state of theimperfect instrument by means of which interlocutors,

understander’s constantly shifting ‘data store’.

each with their own supportive frameworks of knowl-(Moore and Carling 1982: 163)edge, beliefs and expectations, are able to set in─ 44 ─Assumptions of Linguistics

motion within one another complex processing mech-

real reason, no doubt, for this exclusion is that there

anisms. As a result of the workings of these mecha-

are extremely great theoretical and practical difficul-

nisms, interlocutors feel, to a greater or lesser degree,

ties in handling context satisfactorily.

that they have understood one another. Understanding(Palmer 1981: 47-48)

is possible whenever one speaker is able to use thesounds uttered by another to locate some appropriate
area within his own ‘store’ of accumulated and generalised experience.

Moreover, there are other reasons than the above
why linguists exclude context:(Moore and Carling 1982: 168)First, it is argued that the meaning of a sentence,

According to Moore and Carling, important is theor the fact that it is ambiguous or anomalous, can be

relation between language and language users’ percep-

known in isolation from any context, and that as speak-tion of the world (Moore and Carling 1982: 168-169).

ers of a language we must know the meaning of a

For Moore and Carling, language use functions insentence before we can use it in any given context;
meaning is thus shown to be independent of context

extra-linguistic domains:and linguists can, and must study it without reference
We assume that the processing involved in lan-to context.

(Palmer 1981: 48)

guage use takes place within a complex framework of
But Palmer says that the argument above is not

the knowledge, experience, expectations, attitudes andbeliefs that language users have and, to a limited
extent, share.

convincing at all:(Moore and Carling 1982: 10)[...] there is no proof that knowing the meaning of

If meaning cannot be transferred from one person
to another just like a ball when playing catch, then how

a sentence does not entail knowing the context inwhich it is used.

(Palmer 1981: 48)

do we understand what other people say?
Furthermore, there is another reason why con[...] an understander [an individual hearing andtext is excluded from the study of language:

processing language] does not receive informationfrom an utterance, but rather uses the utterance to

A second and, at first sight, rather more plausible

gain access to information which in some form and toargument is that the world of experience must ofsome degree he already possesses.

necessity include the sum of human knowledge. If this(Moore and Carling 1982: 12)

is so, and if semantics is defined in terms of context,
the scope of semantics will be infinite.

As we have seen, Moore and Carling’s theory of(Palmer 1981: 48)

language is quite different from that of orthodox linguistics. On the other hand, their view of language isvery similar to Harris’s theory of language, which

However, there is no evading the problem above(Palmer 1981: 49).

Harris himself calls integrational linguistics.

After all, when we think about meanings, we cannot exclude from understanding them, extra-linguistic

5. Contexts in Meanings

factors such as knowledge of the world:

Then, why are contexts eliminated in understanding meanings? According to F. R. Palmer, some lin-

If, moreover, we think that we are concerned withguists exclude context from the study of language forthe speaker’s knowledge [...] it is, surely, almost cer-some reason:

tain that the speaker does not separate, in his use oflanguage, his knowledge of semantic structure and his[...] there are linguists who, explicitly or implic-

knowledge of the world.

itly, exclude context from the study of semantics. The
─ 45 ─

(Palmer 1981: 51)

Naoki ARAKISo Palmer cannot help thinking that extra-linguis-able part of the total meaning of the utterance, it can

tic factors are involved in understanding meanings justbe said to be meaningful. It follows that, not only

like Harris and Moore and Carling.

words and phrases, but also speech-sounds and theparalinguistic and prosodic features of utterances, are

6. Contextualization in Meanings

meaningful. [...] And the meaning of each compo-

John Lyons also mentions ‘context’ when discuss-

nent—paralinguistic, phonological, grammatical, lexical, etc.—is described in terms of its function as aning meanings:

element in the structure of units of the level above.
Asked by a child or a foreigner what a particular

The structures of the higher-level units are the con-word means, we are frequently unable to answer his

texts in which the lower-level units function and havequestion without first getting him to supply somemeaning. Semantics, in the Firthian use of the term,

information about the context in which he has encoun-

relates utterances to their context-of-situation; but all

tered the word in question. We will also say, pre-theo-branches of linguistics necessarily deal with meaning.

retically, that a certain lexeme, expression or utter-(Lyons 1977: 607-608)

ance is appropriate or inappropriate, or that it is more
Furthermore, Firth thinks that meaning is a mix-

or less effective than another, in a certain context.
(Lyons 1977: 572)

ture of linguistic and extra-linguistic factors:

According to Lyons, however, there are two lin-

“Meaning ... is to be regarded as a complex of

guistics camps, whose views of meaning are different

contextual relations, and phonetics, grammar, lexicol-

with regards to context:

ogy, and semantics each handles its own componentsof the complex in its appropriate context” (Firth, 1957:

Among linguists, two fairly extreme positions

19). The analysis of the meaning of an utterance con-have been defended on this question [of context]. At

sists in abstracting it from its actual context-of-utter-one extreme, Katz and Fodor (1963), though they did

ance and splitting up its meaning, or function, into a

not deny that contextual factors were relevant to theseries of component functions. This process of analy-

interpretation of actual utterances, argued that descrip-

sis is, on occasion, explained by way of analogy: “thetive semantics should be concerned with the meaningsuggested procedure for dealing with meaning is itsof sentences considered independently of their utter-

dispersion into modes, rather like the dispersion ofance in actual situations. At the other extreme, we findlight of mixed wave-lengths into a spectrum” (Firth,scholars like J. R. Firth, who built up his whole theory

1957: 192). [...] Firth thinks of the meaning of an utter-of semantics upon the notion of context, describing

ance as something within which the components arewhat he referred to as his “technique” for the analysis

blended in such a way that they are not recognizableof meaning in language as “a serial contextualization

as distinct until they have been dispersed into modesof our facts, context within context, each one being a

by linguistic analysis.

(Lyons 1977: 609)

function, an organ of the bigger context and all conFirth regards meanings as being involved in con-texts finding a place in what might be called the context of culture” (1935: 33).

(Lyons 1977: 573)

text, or more broadly as being involved in culture as
Harris insists, using “Pass the salt, please” (Harris

Furthermore, Lyons goes on to explain that Firth1990c: 205):

takes into account not only words and phrases but also
The key term in the Firthian theory of meaning

extra-linguistic factors:

is, of course, ‘context’. [...] The context-of-culture,
Every utterance occurs in a culturally determinedwhich Firth appeals to here, is postulated as thecontext-of-situation; [...] In so far as any feature of an

matrix within which distinguishable and socially sig-

utterance-signal can be said to contribute an identifi-

nificant situations occur. By invoking the concept of─ 46 ─Assumptions of Linguistics

the context-of-culture (which, like that of the context-[...] Firth’s initial and seemingly radical claim thatof-situation, derives from his collaboration with‘the central concept of the whole of semantics [...] isMarinowski), Firth commits himself, as many linguists

the context of situation [Firth 1957: 27]’. [...]

of his generation did, to the view that there is an inti-

Firth distinguishes explicitly between various lay-mate connexion between language and culture. [...]

ers or circles of contextualization. For him ‘context of

Their main purpose has been to emphasize that lan-situation’ is no more than the immediate circum-

guage-utterances, like other bits of socially significant

stances. Beyond that there lies a contextualization of

behavior, could not be interpreted otherwise than bythat context, which falls in the domain of what he calls

contextualizing them in relation to a particular culture‘sociological linguistics’. [...][as Harris insists].

[...] He [Firth] says: ‘In that context are the(Lyons 1977: 609)

human participant or participants, what they say, andIn this way, for Firth, contextualization can bewhat is going on [Firth 1957: 27].’ [...][...] As Firth rightly says, they [the participants]

considered from two points of view when dealing withcarry their culture with them wherever they go. And

meanings:

not only their culture but their previous experience ofContextualization can be looked at from twothis and other communication situations, together withpoints of view. We can think of it as the process

their anticipations (whether mistaken or not) about

whereby the native speaker of a language produces

how such a situation is likely to progress. For the inte-

contextually appropriate and internally coherent utter-grationist [like Harris], communication creates con-ances—a process which, as we have seen, involves atexts.

lot more than knowledge of the language-system[Saussure’s langue]. We can also think of it as a pro-(Harris 1996: 162-163)

Conclusion

cess which the linguist carries out in his description ofModern linguistics assumes that linguistic com-

particular languages. In so far as the semantic analysis

munication is successful without extra-linguistic fac-of a particular language is descriptively adequate, intors. But Roy Harris and Moore and Carling chal-

Chomsky’s (1965: 27) sense, there must be some cor-lenges this assumption of modern linguistics.

respondence between these two kinds of contextual-

Harris criticizes telementation and a fixed code,

ization: the factors identified by the linguist as contex-

on which modern linguistics, he claims, is based. Intual must be the factors that determine the native

other words, telementation and a fixed code eliminate

speaker’s production and interpretation of utterances

extra-linguistic factors from linguistic communication.

in actual situations of use. The term ‘contextualization’On the other hand, Moore and Carling call inis used by Firth with respect to what the linguist does

question the container view of meaning that words

in describing a language; [...] We shall continue to use

have meanings. They say that meanings emerge fromthe term ‘contextualization’ both of what the native

the context in which words are used. So for them,

speaker does in the use of language and of what thelanguage is something like a catalyst.

linguist does in describing the underlying system of

F. R. Palmer, John Lyons and J. R. Firth insist on

elements, rules and principles by virtue of which thethe same thing as Harris and Moore and Carling do.

native speaker is able to create (and interpret) what

For modern linguists, these researchers are heretics from the viewpoint of orthodox linguistics, but

Halliday (1970b) and others refer to as text.
(Lyons 1977: 610-611)

can modern linguists prove that orthodox linguistics isqualified for clarifying the mechanism of language? Or

According to Lyons, Firth regards meanings as

if we take into account extra-linguistic factors in mean-

being involved in context, extra-linguistic factors as

ings, will linguistics lose its own territory as one

Harris and Moore and Carling do. On the other hand,domain of science? This means that linguistics

Lyons is thought to be a weak segregationalist by

becomes a part of communication science. As is well

Harris (1996: 151). Also, Harris says about J. R. Firth:

known, Saussure manages to establish linguistics as─ 47 ─Naoki ARAKI

an independent branch of science in his Cours de Lin-

Twentieth-Century Linguistics and its Sources.”guistique Générale. In other words, Saussure sets

The Foundations of Linguistic Theory: Selectedlangue (a fixed code) as the object of linguistics

Writings of Roy Harris, edited by Nigel Love. pp.

although he does not think that langue is language

151-157. Routledge. 1990b.

(linguistic communication itself). As Saussure did, doHarris, Roy. “Language as Social Interaction: Integra-

we have no choice but to formulate linguistics as ationalism versus Segregationalism.” The Founda-

study of langue? Can linguistics be qualified for one

tions of Linguistic Theory: Selected Writings ofauthentic branch of science? Or should modern linguis-

Roy Harris, edited by Nigel Love. pp. 197-209.
Routledge. 1990c.

tics, which Saussure founded, revert to pre-Saussurean
linguistics, which treated language as what depended

Harris, Roy. “On Redefining Linguistics.” Redefining

on extra-linguistic factors? Or if we take into account

Linguistics, edited by Hayley G. Davis and Talbot

extra-linguistic factors such as context, will semantics

J. Taylor. pp. 18-52. Routledge. 1990d.
Harris, Roy. Signs, Language and Communication:

as a branch of linguistics collapse?

Integrational

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