2014/10/24

OVERCOMING US‐DRPK HOSTILITY:
The Missing Link Between a Northeast Asian Comprehensive Security
Settlement and Ending the Korean War
Peter Hayes
Nautilus Institutewww.nautilus.org
August 25, 2014
Draft paper for the workshop
Denucleariza on of Northeast Asia and of the World ― Developing aComprehensive Approach to a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon‐Free
Zone (NEA‐NWFZ): Workshop III
September 15, 2014Tokyo
peter@nautilus.org

Roadmap
This paper attempts to define what overcoming US hostility
might mean to the DPRK in the context of a comprehensive
security settlement in Northeast Asia.
Why is this important?

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NECESSARY ELEMENTS
OF COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY TREATY
1. Termination of state of war
2. Creation of a permanent council on security to monitor,
verify compliance, and decide on violations
3. A mutual declaration of no hostile intent
4. Provision of nuclear and other energy assistance
5. Termination of sanctions
6. A nuclear weapons‐free zone
We know approx. what the five blue items would look like.
We have no idea what a declaration of no hostile intent
might mean today if we struck agreement with the DPRK
tomorrow. If we want a NWFZ, we better find out.

“Koreans have a saying: 'Sword to sword: rice cake torice cake." It is time to throw away the sword andhold up the rice cake.““The relations between countries change withchanges in the structure of the situation. There are no
forever enemies and no forever friends.”
Kim Yong Sun, 1993
Part 1: proposes that the DPRK has sought a
relationship with the United States to offset
neighboring great powers since the end of the Cold
War. This geostrategic strategy intersected with but is
not necessarily the same as attempting to reduce
hostility in the relationship.

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Important to read what DPRK Says:
Part 2: reviews six milestone
documents that the DPRK highlighted
in a key Ministry of Foreign Affairs
statement concerning US‐DPRK
hostility on March 31, 2012 andreviews whether these were in fact
evidence of US (or DPRK) pursuit ofnon‐hostility“DPRK Terms U.S. Hostile Policy Main Obstacle in
Resolving Nuclear Issue,” KCNA, August 31, 2012
1. DPRK‐U.S. Joint Statement, June 11, 1993
2. DPRK‐U.S. Agreed Framework, October 21, 1994
“The great leader Comrade Kim Jong Il said on August 4, 1997 that we did
not intend to regard the U.S. as the sworn enemy but wished for thenormalization of the DPRK‐U.S. relations.”
3. DPRK‐U.S. Joint Communique, October 12, 2000
4. Joint Statement of the Six‐Party Talks, September 19, 2005
5. Six‐Party Talks Agreements, February 13 and October 3, 2007
6. Feb 29, 2012 Leap Year statement32014/10/24

3 phases of “non‐hostility” in DPRK line
First phase (1993‐2002), US‐DPRK joint statements did not
revolve around a search for non‐hostility at all but insteadreflected a North Korean attempt to reposition itself in theregional balance‐of‐power by changing its relationship with theUnited States, using nuclear threat;
Second phase initiated by the Bush Administration in 2002,“strategic maneuvering” in and out of 6PTs the DPRK placed ahigh priority on overcoming hostility but failed;
Third phase, since 2010, the DPRK has substituted a nuclear
force for a geo‐strategic strategy and for overcoming hostility,
an a‐strategic posture that prefigures further confrontation
based on opportunist search for compellence more thandeterrence, aimed at US, China, ROKPart 3: reviews more concrete, derivative meanings that could guide future
engagement from DPRK reference to “non‐hostility” in various contexts overthe last two decades with particular reference to what they mean by peace
regime, peace treaty, and ending the Korean Armistice Agreement.

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Part 4: where to construct a comprehensive security
settlement in this region, as it relates to the DPRK,
especially the creation of a regional treaty frameworkthat includes non‐hostility.
Find path of least resistance:
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Northeast Asia, ‐‐not a Korean peace treaty‐‐Achieve peace by normalizing relations between
belligerents;‐‐4 belligerents declare an end the Armistice,endorsed by UNSC‐‐Replace MAC with a UN multinational peacekeeping
force? USFK as pivotal deterrent force?

Follow SEA‐TAC Article 2, 1976 in a NEA‐TAC?
”In their relations with one another, the High Contracting
Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles:a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality,
territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;b. The right of every State to lead its national existence freefrom external interference, subversion or coercion;c. Non‐interference in the internal affairs of one another;d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;.”

f. Effective cooperation among themselves52014/10/24

How to get to a NEA‐TAC?
Whereas SEA‐TAC began with general statement ofpeaceful conflict resolution and renunciation of force
situation is more extreme and nuclear issue is inforefront
In NEA‐TAC, need to reverse the order, put nuclear
non‐aggression and non‐hostility at front, and startwith NEA‐NWFZ leading to NEA‐TAC, not like SEA‐TAC
that was followed by a SEA‐NWFZ

Step Ladder
1. Resume the Six Party Talks: although imperfect, the Six Party
Talks are now the only rubric that already includes Japan and isalready approved by the highest levels of the Chinese andKorean governments. Given historical issues, it is difficult tocreate a new body which includes Japan and have that body beapproved by Beijing and Seoul;62014/10/24

Step Ladder
1. Resume the Six Party Talks: although imperfect, the Six Party
Talks are now the only rubric that already includes Japan and isalready approved by the highest levels of the Chinese andKorean governments. Given historical issues, it is difficult tocreate a new body which includes Japan and have that body beapproved by Beijing and Seoul;
2. At the Six Party Talks, jointly examine closely the pros andcons of various permutations of a NEA‐NWFZ, as called for by
the UN Secretary General in July 2013, possibly by appointing
an expert eminent persons’ group to report back in short order;
if persuasive to states, commence the drafting a NEA‐NWFZ
text for review and adoption at the Six Party Talks;

3. At the Six Party Talks, have the institutional
working group examine in depth the legal, monitoring
and verification, and other critical issues in a regional
NWFZ that supports the systematic denuclearizationand dismantlement of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons
program;7

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3. At the Six Party Talks, have the institutional working groupexamine in depth the legal, monitoring and verification, andother critical issues in a regional NWFZ that supports thesystematic denuclearization and dismantlement of the DPRK’s
nuclear weapons program;
4. At the Six Party Talks, if sufficient political will emerges,
have the regional Nuclear Weapons States declare thatnegative security assurances with regard to nuclear threat andnuclear attack will be availed to all non‐nuclear parties who
become compliant with a NEA‐NWFZ, contingent upon theextent to which the parties are in accord with their NPT and
IAEA obligations;

5. At the Six Party Talks, in the context of regional energy network
investment, identify technical assistance to the DPRK that contributes toregional energy security;

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5. At the Six Party Talks, in the context of regional energy network
investment, identify technical assistance to the DPRK that contributes toregional energy security;
6. At the Six Party Talks, examine the rationale for regional uranium
enrichment consortia and spent fuel storage and disposal services, andpossible provision of small light water reactors to the DPRK in lieu of the
KEDO gigawatt‐sized LWRs;

5. At the Six Party Talks, in the context of regional energy network
investment, identify technical assistance to the DPRK that contributes toregional energy security;
6. At the Six Party Talks, examine the rationale for regional uranium
enrichment consortia and spent fuel storage and disposal services, andpossible provision of small light water reactors to the DPRK in lieu of the
KEDO gigawatt‐sized LWRs;
7. At the Six Party Talks, propose that the UN Security Council mandate theconvening in Geneva (or some other neutral venue) of a political conferenceof the four belligerent states (two Koreas, United States, China) to negotiate
and to declare the termination of hostilities and ending of the Armistice,and to define the post‐Armistice military management mechanisms,
including a reconstituted Military Armistice Commission to oversee
notification of exercises and major military movements, redeployment andreductions of military forces, and management of peaceful uses of the DMZ,
to be submitted back to the UN Security Council for final endorsement.

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8. For the United States at that time to inform the UN Security Council thatthe unified command mandate is no longer required and that UN Commandhas been dismantled;

8. For the United States at that time to inform the UN Security Council that the unified
command mandate is no longer required and that UN Command has been dismantled;

9. For the four parties to define a set of post‐Armistice military management
arrangements to manage the Demilitarized Zone, to settle the northern limit
line dispute (preferably by a joint management scheme as suggested in pastdialogues between the DPRK and ROK leaderships), to design theredeployment of conventional forces, limits on offensive conventional
forces, and to implement inspection arrangements including activating theinter‐Korean Military Commission inspectorate; and a role for areconstituted Military Armistice Commission including monitoring andverifying compliance on these military measures, and to report violations to
the Council of a NEA‐TAC if it exists, or to the UN Security Council if it does
not.
[requires // inter‐Korean rapproachment or “peace regime”]

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8. For the United States at that time to inform the UN Security Council that the unified
command mandate is no longer required and that UN Command has been dismantled;
9. For the four parties to define a set of post‐Armistice military management arrangements tomanage the Demilitarized Zone, to settle the northern limit line dispute (preferably by a joint
management scheme as suggested in past dialogues between the DPRK and ROK leaderships),
to design the redeployment of conventional forces, limits on offensive conventional forces, andto implement inspection arrangements including activating the inter‐Korean MilitaryCommission inspectorate; and a role for a reconstituted Military Armistice Commission
including monitoring and verifying compliance on these military measures, and to reportviolations to the Council of a NEA‐TAC if it exists, or to the UN Security Council if it does not.
[requires // inter‐Korean rapproachment or “peace regime”]
10. At the Six Party Talks, initiate dialogue on the pros and cons of a NEA‐TAC, especially theappropriate non‐hostility language modelled closely on the SEA‐TAC that five of six parties havealready signed in the SEA regional context, and review the design and implementation of aCouncil that would rule on disputes that cannot be resolved bilaterally arising from a NEA‐
NWFZ treaty, or from other regional security issues requiring peaceful resolution. If there issufficient consensus, draft a NEA‐TAC text for discussion and review by states and third parties
that would likely accede after a NEA‐TAC is established by the six “high contracting parties,”that is, the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.

8. For the United States at that time to inform the UN Security Council that the unified
command mandate is no longer required and that UN Command has been dismantled;
9. For the four parties to define a set of post‐Armistice military management arrangements tomanage the Demilitarized Zone, to settle the northern limit line dispute (preferably by a joint
management scheme as suggested in past dialogues between the DPRK and ROK leaderships),
to design the redeployment of conventional forces, limits on offensive conventional forces, andto implement inspection arrangements including activating the inter‐Korean MilitaryCommission inspectorate; and a role for a reconstituted Military Armistice Commission
including monitoring and verifying compliance on these military measures, and to reportviolations to the Council of a NEA‐TAC if it exists, or to the UN Security Council if it does not.
[requires // inter‐Korean rapproachment or “peace regime”]
10. At the Six Party Talks, initiate dialogue on the pros and cons of a NEA‐TAC, especially theappropriate non‐hostility language modelled closely on the SEA‐TAC that five of six parties havealready signed in the SEA regional context, and review the design and implementation of aCouncil that would rule on disputes that cannot be resolved bilaterally arising from a NEA‐
NWFZ treaty, or from other regional security issues requiring peaceful resolution. If there issufficient consensus, draft a NEA‐TAC text for discussion and review by states and third parties
that would likely accede after a NEA‐TAC is established by the six “high contracting parties,”that is, the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.

11. At some point in the negotiation, the DPRK and the United States would
announce their intention to normalize diplomatic relations, contingent upon bothparties acceding to the NEA‐TAC.

112014/10/24“The history of nations, as I have told you before, oneof making friends which later become hostile. Now is
the time for the US to make a change in our direction.
Regardless of the political system and ideas in the US,
the latter doesn't matter in relations between
countries.”
Kim Yong Sun, 1993

“If the other side has big guns, you do not want toturn a negotiation into a gunfight.” He continues:
The stronger they appear in terms of physical or
economic power, the more you benefit by negotiatingon the merits. To the extent that they have muscle
and you have principle, the larger a role you canestablish for principle the better off you are.”
Roger Fisher, William Ury, Getting to Yes, Negotiating
an agreement without giving in, Random House, New
York, 1991, p. 54, at:
http://6thfloor.pp.fi/fgv/gettingtoyes.pdf

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Conclusion:
Unless the leaders of US and DPRK movetoward a comprehensive strategy and lookbeyond narrow calculations of strategic options
based only on a realist worldview, neither will
be able to envision and take the steps
necessary to start a peace process that ends
bilateral hostility and creates comprehensive
security in Korea and beyond, let alone reduces
the threat of war, nuclear war, and further
nuclear proliferation

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