Heather Williams, Research Fellow
International Security Department

Remarks to be Delivered 14 September 2014
Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Workshop III‘Global nuclear disarmament and the role of nonnuclear weapon states’1
Introduction
A new nuclear discourse is emerging. It is diverse and inclusive, with a focus on facts
and the interface of nuclear weapons with human experiences. This new discourse,
embodied in the international initiative on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear
weapons, strives to provide a new forum for promoting nuclear disarmament andreframing the way all states conceptualize nuclear weapons. 2 After two years, theinitiative continues to build momentum, and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS),
particularly those that rely on nuclear deterrence, can contribute by promoting the new
nuclear discourse and a ‘humanitarian norm’; ensuring a successful 2015 Review
Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and engaging with
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), such as by encouraging them to attend the next
conference on humanitarian impacts in Vienna in December 2014.
Despite seven decades of non-use, nuclear weapons remain a threat to international
security. Not only does North Korea continue to test nuclear weapons and delivery
vehicles, but also prospects for further U.S.-Russia arms control remain unlikely, andnew research demonstrates that the risks of unintentional nuclear use are higher than
traditionally perceived. 3 Furthermore, as President Obama expressed in both Pragueand Berlin, global nuclear disarmament may not happen in the near future. Nonetheless,there are readily available options to promote the principles of disarmament anddevelop a new discourse on nuclear weapons beyond purely security-based paradigms tofacilitate and encourage the path towards disarmament.
The nexus between these ongoing threats and new discourses suggests an exciting
opportunity for the future of nuclear policy. The humanitarian impacts initiative has
also renewed talk of a legally-binding ban, which begs certain questions about the rolefor NNWS. What are the pros and cons of a nuclear weapons ban at this time? Should

1 The views expressed here are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Royal Instituteof International Affairs.

2 Patricia Lewis and Heather Williams, ‘The meaning of the Oslo Conference on humanitarian impacts ofnuclear weapons’ in John Borrie and Tim Caughley (eds.), Viewing Nuclear Weapons Through a
Humanitarian Lens (New York: UNIDIR, 2013), available at:
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/viewing-nuclear-weapons-through-a-humanitarian-lensen-601.pdf.
3 Eric Schlosser, Command and Control (New York: Allen Lane, 2013); and Patricia Lewis, Heather
Williams, Benoit Pelopidas, and Sasan Aghlani, ‘Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use andOptions for Policy,’ Chatham House Report, April 2013, available at:
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/199200.

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2 Heather Williams, Chatham Housedisarmament efforts proceed without NWS participation? And what role can NNWS
play in promoting this new nuclear discourse?
This paper and subsequent presentation at the Research Center for Nuclear WeaponsAbolition workshop will provide a background of the humanitarian impacts initiativeand its progress to date, discuss challenges for the way forward with the initiative andits relation to the NPT, and -- finally --outline recommendations for NNWS to engage
with NWS to promote participation in the initiative and disarmament.
The paper does not take a theoretical approach, though it does draw from literature on
norms, deterrence, and international law. Rather, the goal is to provide context forinternational disarmament efforts and situate NNWS opportunities, such as a nuclear
weapons free zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ), within that context. What I mosthope for, however, is to generate discussion about the direction of the initiative towards
disarmament, while taking the perspective of both NWS and NNWS into account. These
discussions can look at short-term steps, such as those suggested here, along with longterm questions about strategic thinking. For now, however, NNWS, especially those that
rely on nuclear deterrence, can maintain and increase momentum for the humanitarian
impacts initiative and pursue opportunities to engage and build trust with NWS.
Frustration and Distrust: Impetus for the Humanitarian Impacts Initiative
The humanitarian impacts initiative was born out of widespread frustration with the
NPT process. The NPT is an inherently imbalanced treaty, causing many of its members
to observe and bemoan the lack of progress by NWS towards fulfilling their Article VI
commitment to pursue ‘general and complete disarmament’, along with a sense of being
disempowered in NPT discussions. Nina Tannenwald summarized this view noting thatwhile the NPT was meant to be transformative, it instead has become a ‘status quo
treaty’ and developing countries acutely feel its unfairness. 4
This frustration has been manifested in the emergence of other forums, such as the New
Agenda Coalition (NAC), Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), andOpen-Ended Working Group (OEWG). These new forums endeavour to change theexisting structure and narrative. According to John Borrie of the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research, ‘Some governments have moved on fromlamenting their disempowerment and the state of the nuclear weapons control regime inforums such as the NPT and the deadlocked Conference on Disarmament (CD) to
actively considering how they can best strengthen momentum towards elimination
based on fresh assessments.’ 5 In addition to these structural frustrations, the initiative
was also inspired by increased attention on the humanitarian impact of other weapons,such as bans on land mines and cluster munitions, and the recent use of chemical
weapons. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 6 spoke to the issue of
4 Nina Tannenwald, ‘Justice and Fairness in the Nonproliferation Regime,’ Ethics & International Affairs,

27:3 (2013), pp. 299-300.

5 John Borrie, ‘Humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons and the logic of a ban,’ International Affairs,

90:3 (2014), p. 625.

6 For example, one excerpt from the ICRC statement reads, ‘Far more needs to be done to inform policy

makers, the media and public of the catastrophic human costs of these weapons, of the imperative thatthey are never again used and of the urgent need for a legally binding international instrument that will

3 Heather Williams, Chatham House

nuclear weapons in 2011, along with states that play a leadership role in the initiative,
including Norway, Ireland, Japan, and South Africa. In the NPT context, the principles
and objectives of the 2010 Action Plan include a ‘deep concern at the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all
States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international
humanitarian law.’ 7This interest in a humanitarian-based approach culminated in the March 2013 Oslo
Conference, where 128 states participated in a facts-based discussion about the effectsof nuclear weapons detonations, including testimony from survivors of Hiroshima andNagasaki, and those that lived near nuclear testing sites in the Soviet Union.
Participants included India and Pakistan, which are not part of NPT discussions, alongwith all members of NATO, except for Bulgaria, France, the United Kingdom, andUnited States. Civil society groups played a key role at Oslo in generating interest andvisibility for the conference, attracting a younger generation to nuclear weapons issues,
and building momentum for the initiative. In his closing remarks at the Conference,
Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barthe Eide stated, ‘We have succeeded in reframing
the issue of nuclear weapons by introducing the humanitarian impacts andhumanitarian concerns at the very centre of the discourse.’ 8
NWS chose not to attend. Their stated reason was that the initiative was a ‘distraction’from the ‘step-by-step disarmament process’ embodied in the NPT. In reality, each state
likely had its own reasons for not attending, e.g. concern that the initiative would turninto a slippery slope towards a legally-binding ban on nuclear weapons, lack of interestand the perception that there was nothing new to the initiative, and commitment tomaintaining a perception of ‘P5 unity’. The 2010 NPT Action Plan called on the NWS tomeet regularly to discuss steps for further disarmament, to reduce the salience of
nuclear weapons, to minimize nuclear risks, and to ‘further enhance transparency andincrease mutual confidence.’ As of the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, thesemeetings resulted in a common reporting form and progress on a common glossary of
nuclear terms. According to many involved in the ‘P5 process’, while some of the states
were interested in attending Oslo and Nayarit, they all declined and instead prioritized‘P5 unity’ in decision-making and participation in such forums. Given recent events in
Ukraine and other geopolitical shifts, this illusion of unity is unlikely to hold in the leadup to the Vienna Conference.
India, Pakistan, and the majority of NATO members again attended the second
conference in Nayarit, Mexico. Numerous topics distinguished Nayarit from Oslo. First,
participation was higher, with 146 states participating, and momentum continued tobuild with Austria announcing that it would hold a third conference in Vienna. 9 Civil
society again was highly visible. Second, a majority of speakers mentioned the need to
uphold the NPT and work in conjunction with it, which was not as frequently raised atprohibit their use and lead to their elimination’. ‘ICRC Statement to the United Nations’, General
Assembly, 66th session, First Committee, 11 October 2011.
7 Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, ‘Implementing the 2010 NPT Action Plan: Disarmament, 2013 Monitoring
Report,’ CNS, 5 April 2013.
8 Espen Barth Eide, final remarks to the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian
Impacts of Nuclear Weapons, 5 March 2013.
9 It has since been announced that the Conference will be 7-8 December.

4 Heather Williams, Chatham House

Oslo. Third, similarly, states expressed a stronger desire for NWS to participate in thenext conference. Finally, the Nayarit closing proved more dramatic than Oslo’s. To
elaborate, in the Chair’s summary, Mexico’s Vice Minister for Multilateral Affairs andHuman Rights, Ambassador Juan Manuel Gómez Robledo, stated ‘The broad-based andcomprehensive discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should leadto the commitment of States and civil society to reach new international standards andnorms, through a legally binding instrument. It is the view of the Chair that the Nayarit
Conference has shown that time has come to initiate a diplomatic process conducive tothis goal.’ 10 This closing highlighted a growing divide among states over 1) the future
direction of the initiative, 2) whether the initiative was working towards a ban on
nuclear weapons, and 3) whether or not to include NWS in the process.
A Ban versus the ‘Step-by-Step’ Approach
While NWS claim to be pursuing a ‘step-by-step’ approach towards disarmament, basedon slow and reciprocal reductions, NNWS are increasingly impatient with the paralysis
in the CD and are exploring other options for speedier disarmament, with or without the
NWS. One such option is a legally-binding nuclear weapons ban, as distinct from a
verifiable nuclear weapons convention, and as suggested in the closing remarks at the
Nayarit Conference. A ban, rooted in international law, could contribute to the pursuitof disarmament by setting a norm that promotes delegitimization of nuclear weapons onhumanitarian grounds while also strengthening the existing norm of non-use, an idea
which Ritchie observed is embodied in the humanitarian approach and initiative. 11
Freedman has similarly noted that given that the ‘declared goal of disarmament is toprevent nuclear war; therefore, in the meantime before achieving absolute disarmament,(we) can examine other means of preventing nuclear war.’ 12 The norm of non-use, basedon ‘basic prudence as well as moral inhibition’, can contribute to disarmamentendeavours. 13 Further strengthening the norms of non-use and disarmament cancontribute to rethinking the utility of nuclear weapons, particularly given the high costsof maintenance and modernization. This could contribute to reducing the salience of
nuclear weapons, a stated goal of President Obama’s Prague speech and the 2010 NPT
Action Plan.
In addition, a ban could empower the NNWS – particularly those in nuclear alliancessuch as Japan, South Korea, Australia and all NATO members – and allow them toproceed towards establishing the framework for a world free of nuclear weapons
without waiting for the NWS. Previous humanitarian disarmament initiatives havebegun with the establishment of a norm for a self-selecting group of states, many ofwhich did not possess the weapons system itself. The weapons possessors have often
joined a strong convention at a later date and then submitted the weapons for
dismantlement.
10 It is important to note that these were explicitly the Chair’s personal remarks and not necessarily thoseof the Mexican Government. The statement can be read in full:
http://www.sre.gob.mx/en/index.php/humanimpact-nayarit-2014
11 Nick Ritchie, ‘Waiting for Kant: devaluing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons,’ International Affairs,
90:3 (2014), p. 95.
12 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Disarmament and Other Nuclear Norms,’ Washington Quarterly, 36:2 (Spring
20130, p. 96.
13 Freedman, p. 97.

5 Heather Williams, Chatham House

A ban could provide a practical tool for promoting the interests of NNWS and the goal of
global disarmament. In a recent piece published by the European Leadership Network,
Kjolv Egeland and Torbjorn Graff Hugo argued that NWS seem to have no genuineinterest in disarmament and ‘if meaningful progress is to be made towards theprohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, it will have to
be initiated and driven by other states.’ 14 Therefore, they continued, ‘the international
community should agree on a legally binding instrument that prevents all states fromboth using and possessing them (nuclear weapons)’ and proceed to agree on a nuclear
weapons ban treaty.
Pursuing a ban at this time, however, could be premature and risky for at least threereasons. First, it could jeopardize progress to date on the humanitarian impacts
initiative. Given the lack of state-based support for a ban at present, the majority ofstates participating in the initiative might get cold feet and withdraw their support for
the initiative if it shifts to the pursuit of a ban. In this sense, NWS may not be the only
ones that must rethink the role of nuclear weapons, but NNWS must as well, specificallythose that rely on nuclear deterrence postures in their security policies (namely thestates in nuclear alliance with the United States in the Pacific and the NATO states).
Strengths of the humanitarian impacts initiative include its large and diverse
participation, along with its success already in shifting the discourse and promoting
normative change. These achievements, though perhaps more modest than some would
like, could be jeopardized if the initiative shifted to promote a ban and participation
dropped off.
Second, pushing a ban could further polarize the existing divide between NWS and
NNWS and deepen distrust. Introducing a ban without at least some NWS participation
could exacerbate this distrust and only serve to widen the divide, making NWS – andsome of their allies – feel alienated and NNWS further frustrated were NWS not toengage.
Third, a ban would not necessarily lead to disarmament, particularly without NWS
participation, for practical reasons. To state the obvious, it is NWS states that possessand control nuclear weapons, and their participation at some point be required if theweapons were to be abolished. Abandoning nuclear weapons would require a seachange in strategic thinking in these countries. There are various ways to go about this,
discussed below in greater detail, but a forced approach based on shaming NWS may
not be the most successful. In short, a nuclear weapons ban potentially could end up
preaching to the converted and failing to convince the NWS, especially if it does notwork in parallel with other efforts to change strategic thinking.
What options, then, exist for NNWS to promote nuclear disarmament given that a ban isrisky at present, and NWS remain committed to deterrence-based thinking of nuclear
weapons?
Role for Non-Nuclear Weapon States and Concluding Thoughts
14 Kjolv Egeland and Tobjorn Graff Hugo, ‘Banning the Bomb: Do Not Wait for Nuclear Armed States to
Being,’ European Leadership Network, 22 August 2014, available at:
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/banning-the-bomb-do-not-wait-for-the-nuclear-armedstates-to-begin_1800.html.

6 Heather Williams, Chatham House

Efforts to promote a humanitarian-based commitment to disarmament need not beseen as mutually exclusive from the step-by-step approach promoted by NWS. As
Egeland and Hugo rightly point out, promoting disarmament and changing the nuclear
discourse need not require NWS leadership. Instead NNWS can pursue two parallel
tracks, one of which continues to promote the humanitarian approach to nuclear
weapons, regardless of NWS participation, and another which strives to address theunderlying distrust by encouraging NWS to engage with the initiative and build
consensus. While such an approach is certainly no small task, it would demonstratecommitment to the ‘no stone unturned’ approach that has characterized many of the
NNWS in their quest to rid the world of nuclear weapons.
Even without a ban, this is an important opportunity for NNWS. For the past two years,
Chatham House has led a project with the support of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to conduct capacity-building workshops in London and abroad bringing together
humanitarian workers, civil society, and nuclear experts. One of the findings from theseworkshops, which took place in Pretoria, South Africa, and Buenos Aires, Argentina,
was the importance of a ‘moral authority’ in nuclear discussions. This was a key themein the Argentina meeting, where participants were proud to be part of the oldest NWFZ,
and saw themselves as responsible for maintaining international focus on disarmamentand demonstrating the potential and precedent of a NWFZ. Similarly, participants inSouth Africa saw their country as precedent-setting in relinquishing nuclear weapons.
This concept of a ‘moral authority’ can be applied to other NNWS, particularly Japan.
Another important measure for NNWS – specifically those in extended nuclear
deterrence relationships – is to examine and reduce the salience of nuclear weapons intheir own strategies. This will require consensus building within NNWS governments
between different stakeholders and serious consideration for long-term security
interests and the role of nuclear weapons in achieving those interests. In a recent bookchapter on extended deterrence in Northeast Asia, for example, Linton Brooks and Mira
Rapp-Hooper recommended the United States ‘develop new ways to reassure allies withregard to lower-level threats, given the change in strategic dynamics and threats, suchas cyber and conventional; such as, coordination and attribution assistance.’ 15 This is
not necessarily to say the time is right to end strategies of extended nuclear deterrence;but rather, the time is right to weigh these strategies in conjunction with the potentiallycompeting priority of global nuclear disarmament and/or a NEA-NWFZ, for example.
Extended deterrence and a NWFZ are not mutually exclusive if the NWFZ contains
exceptions and caveats. For example, the Treaty of Semipalatinsk established a NWFZ
in Central Asia, and at the 2014 NPT PrepCom, the NWS signed the Treaty’s protocol.
What is unique about this zone is that three of the five member states (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) are also under a nuclear ‘umbrella’ as part of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which relies on Russian extended nuclear
deterrence. This case demonstrates the increasing use of zones as a means of promoting
disarmament, which is possible in regions that continue to rely on the promise of
nuclear deterrence and, interestingly, the influence of the humanitarian norm and
15 Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, ‘Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the
Pacific during the Second Nuclear Age,’ in Ashley Tellis, braham M. Denmark, and Travis Tann (eds.),
Asia in the Second Nuclear Age (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013), pp. 295-296.

7 Heather Williams, Chatham House

discourse. If the long-held desire for a world free of nuclear weapons is to be realised,
the countries that incorporate extended nuclear deterrence can be working now to
reduce that reliance with a view to eventually relying on other strategic approaches.
This emerging humanitarian discourse does not undermine the NPT, and NNWS canplay an important role in promoting that message whilst also strengthening the NPT.
For those few who remain sceptical of the humanitarian impacts initiative, one concern
is that it will undermine and dilute the NPT by promoting another forum for discussing
nuclear issues and disarmament. In addition, this other forum focuses on only one of
the three NPT pillars. Nonetheless, this is not necessarily the case, for some would argue
that the humanitarian impacts initiative not only complements work being done in the
NPT and provides an opportunity for NWS and NNWS to engage as equals, it is also aninvaluable venue for discussion, considering the alternative is the CD which has notbeen able to agree on a programme of work to begin and sustain negotiations ineighteen years.
NNWS, particularly those that rely on nuclear deterrence in their defence postures, canengage with NWS to rebuild trust between the two sides and confidence in the NPT. In
the lead-up to the 2015 RevCon, there are three immediate steps the NNWS can take:
1. Encourage NWS to participate in the Vienna Conference, particularly the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, and China. Momentum and interest for thehumanitarian initiative remains high. Attendance at Vienna would provide an
opportunity for NWS to demonstrate responsibility as the possessors of nuclear
weapons, present their own research on humanitarian impacts, and introduce
topics of interest, such as the impacts of nuclear testing and consequence
management, which is also mandated as part of the ‘P5 process.’
2. Ask for observer status at P5 discussions. Lack of transparency with NWS proves
to be a continuing source of frustration and distrust. The ‘P5 process’ is proving
to exacerbate this problem and producing minimal tangible results. As thepossessor states continue to meet and explore options for reducing the salience of
nuclear weapons from a NWS perspective, allowing NNWS to sit-in on somediscussions would demonstrate a good faith commitment to rebuilding trust in
the context of the NPT and acknowledge that nuclear weapons are not only thebusiness of those who possess them, but also those who rely on them forextended deterrence and others that live in fear of their use, whether intentionalor accidental.
3. Establish an NPT cross-cultural working group. All countries have different
attitudes and interests in nuclear weapons. One option for capturing thesevarious interests in a more concentrated fashion would be to establish ahumanitarian working group with representatives from NWS, NNWS in nuclear
weapons free zones, and NNWS that rely on nuclear deterrence. The group would
address all three pillars of the NPT with the goal of exchanging information to
uphold the credibility of the NPT as the foundation of the global nuclear orderand promote transparency, whilst also demonstrating that the humanitarian
approach is not mutually exclusive from the NPT. The working group would also
be multi-disciplinary by incorporating international law, humanitarianorganizations, and nuclear experts.

8 Heather Williams, Chatham House

Humanitarian-based approaches inject a degree of morality, common sense, andfairness to the nuclear discourse, which is often missing in NPT discussions. The
humanitarian impacts initiative presents a unique and timely opportunity not only for
NNWS to express their frustration with the lack of progress towards disarmament andstrengthen a humanitarian norm, but also to rebuild trust with NWS and explore
continued reliance on nuclear weapons as a source of security. The Vienna Conference isbut the next step in a trend that continues to gain momentum and provide a venue formuch needed creative and practical ideas in creating a safe world for the next generation.
About the Author
Heather Williams has been a Research Fellow on Nuclear Weapons Policy in theInternational Security Department at Chatham House since January 2013. She has
attended both the Oslo and Nayarit Conferences, and is a co-author of the April 2014
report, ‘Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy.’
Heather is completing her PhD in the Department of War Studies at King’s College
London on trust in U.S.-Russia strategic arms control (expected November 2014), andpreviously worked for the Institute for Defense Analyses in Washington, DC, and in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program. She has an
M.A. in Security Policy Studies from The George Washington University and a B.A. in
International Relations and Russian Studies from Boston University.