Energy and Nuclear Cooperation in Comprehensive Agreement for
Security in Northeast Asia
Tatsujiro Suzuki
Vice Director, Professor, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA)
RECNA Workshop, Tokyo, September 2014

Introduction
One of the elements of the Comprehensive Agreement for Security in Northeast Asia
(from now “the Comprehensive Agreement”) proposed by Dr. Morton Halperin 1 is“assistance for nuclear and other energy”. The proposal states that “the right of allparties to the treaty have access to necessary sources of energy including nuclear power
need to be affirmed.” But he also states that “beyond a general commitment this willprobably need to be negotiated as a separate agreement.” It is true that energy assistancehas always been one important element for negotiation with DPRK (Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea). At the same time, there are complex technical, economic
and political issues associated with nuclear energy cooperation, especially involving
nuclear fuel cycle activities. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore what are potential
issues and possible common agenda for energy cooperation under the Comprehensive
Agreement. This paper is intended to identify key issues and potential areas ofcooperation to meet the criteria of the Comprehensive Agreement, especially on the one
involving DPRK and civilian nuclear fuel cycle issues.
Energy assistance as a “win-win” tool for DPRK and the security of the region
Energy assistance was always a part of the agreements between DPRK and the US
and six party talks, which was assured to DPRK in return for DPRK’s acceptance togive up and dismantle all its nuclear weapons programs. Under the 1994 Agreed
Framework between the US and DPRK, the US guaranteed the following in return for
DPRK giving up its nuclear weapon programs 2.
- two LWRs with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e),financed and supplied by an international consortium, by 2003;- 150,000 tons of heavy fuel oil by October 1995 for heating and electricity
production foregone due to the freeze of its graphite-moderated reactors, and1

Morton Halperin, “A Comprehensive Agreement for Security in Northeast Asia,” September 2014.
US-DPRK Agreed Framework, October 21, 1994.
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/us-dprk-agreed-framework/2

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500,000 tons annually thereafter until the completion of the first LWR; and- formal assurances from the United States against the threat or use of nuclear
weapons.
In order to implement this agreed framework, Korea Energy Development Organization(KEDO) was established in 1994 for providing finance, technical assistance andeventually providing two LWRs to DPRK. Unfortunately, when this Agreed Framework
was found to be no longer effective, KEDO suspended its activities in 2003.
And in 2005 Join Declaration of Six Party talks also included one item for energy
cooperation as follows 3;“#3 The Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields ofenergy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally. China, Japan,
R.O.K.(Republic of Korea), Russia and the U.S. stated their willingness toprovide energy assistance to the D.P.R.K. The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of
July 12th 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million kilowatts of electric power
to the D.P.R.K.”
Subsequently, in 2007, as a part of the initial phase of the implementation of the above
joint statement, the DPRK was guaranteed to receive economic, energy andhumanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO),
including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, in return for complete
declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities,
including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant 4.
Although such assistance was not enough for DPRK to abide by the agreement under
the Six Party Talks, it is clear that energy and economic assistance, especially meeting
humanitarian needs, can and should be a part of the items to be included for possibleenergy cooperation scheme in the Comprehensive Agreement.
In fact, most recent report by the Nautilus Institute on energy situation in DPRK
assures the need for such energy cooperation 5. The report, co-authored by David vonHippel and Peter Hayes, emphasizes the importance of energy assistance to DPRK asfollows;“One underlying aspect of the DPRK international situation, its ‘energy
insecurity’ or lack of reliable supplies of fuels to maintain and build its economy,
3

Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing 19 September 2005,
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm
4 Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, 13 February 2007,
http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/June_2008_6PT_Statement_of_the_Chair.doc
5 David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, “Energy Needs in the DPRK, and Opportunities for Collaboration on Energy
Sector Engagement and Redevelopment”, August 12, 2014.
http://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=0de7e0e84dc3aff619f936a70&id=49739881bf&e=8e42275c49

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has changed little in the past few years, and remains both an underlying driver ofthe DPRK’s behavior in discussions with other nations and a possible lever, if
used correctly, for other nations to use to begin and sustain the process ofengagement with the DPRK.”
And they conclude;“Overall, international projects involving the DPRK will be even more difficult tomanage than cooperative projects involving other Northeast Asian countries,
which pose significant challenges of their own. Involving the DPRK in suchprojects, however, can offer significant benefits in terms of engagement of the
DPRK with the international community, even apart from their energy andeconomic benefits.”
This conclusion is both assuring and alarming. If we successfully develop acooperative scheme with DPRK, it could bring significant benefits to DPRK and thestability of the region. But if not, instability of DPRK could be accelerated by its“energy insecurity.” It is essential for the countries in the region to understand the realneeds of DPRK and provide effective assistance. The above report suggests that suchassistance should be carefully crafted as the effective assistance would require not only
fuel and technologies, but require human and social infrastructure to support healthyenergy development in DPRK. Adequate power transmission system, for example, is
one of such urgently needed infrastructure in DPRK.
In order to achieve such “win-win” energy assistance, a special expert working groupon assistance to DPRK needs to be established under the Comprehensive Agreement tocraft careful and comprehensive strategy.
Possible regional energy cooperation scheme: “Asian Super Grid” and “Energy
Charter Treaty”
But energy assistance to DPRK should be coordinated in a way that would bring
benefits to the entire Northeast Asia region. In fact, the Northeast Asia is one of theregions with highest energy demand growth in the world and dependence on outside
region, especially on Middle East, is rapidly increasing. So energy security is a common
policy goal for the countries, especially for countries without energy resources such as
ROK, DPRK and Japan.
Most importantly, China is the largest consumer and now the importer of oil in theworld. On the other hand, Russian Far East is potentially the largest supplier of fossil
fuel and electricity in the region. Therefore, naturally, there have been series of
proposals for regional energy cooperation scheme since early 1990s. Unfortunately,3history suggests competition rather than cooperation over energy resource has become asource of concern in the region, and even such competition could lead to regional
tension over territorial issues where natural resources are at stake.
While energy market and private energy companies can work effectively based onmarket needs and mechanisms, it is argued that the governments in the region mustcooperate together to ensure stable and secure investment environment and ensure
reliable market mechanisms. In fact, energy cooperation among states in Europe hasenhanced regional confidence building and the Northeast Asian region can learn lessons
from them. This notion was recently confirmed by Vice Foreign Minister of ROK, whorecently told at Pacific Energy Summit in Seoul that "I believe that energy cooperation
among countries in Northeast Asia could also contribute to creating an environment
conducive to regional peace and security as it could help to build trust in the region," 6
While it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss specific proposal in detail, one
interesting proposal should be worth considering as it could involve all key countries in
the region, especially DPRK. The proposal is “Asia Super Grid Network” and possible“Energy Charter Treaty” in the region 7. The proposal, “Asia Super Grid”, has been
discussed by many experts in the region, to follow the idea of similar regional power
grid system in Europe. While economic and technical barriers may still exist for “AsiaSuper Grid”, it is worth considering the proposal to establish a legal framework like
“Energy Charter Treaty” which is intended to ensure transparent and fair trade in energy
goods/services in the region. Under the proposed project, five partners (Energy Charter
Secretariat as a lead partner, with Energy Economic Institute of ROK, Ministry ofEnergy of Mongolia, Renewable Energy Foundation of Japan, Energy Systems Instituteof Russian Federation) are working together for a feasibility study 8. One of theimportant findings is that DRPK is the key for success of this ambitious project.
According to Urban Rusnák, Secretary General of the Energy Charter organization,
integration of North Korea to the super-grid plan as “highly desirable” but, he said that
integration would have to start from the very beginning of the grid planning process 9.
In short, establishing a regional framework for energy cooperation, such as “Energy“S. Korean Vice FM urges energy cooperation in Northeast Asia”, Yonhap News Agency June 30, 2014,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140630/s-korean-vice-fm-urges-energy-cooperationnortheast-asia
7 Zafar Samadov, Senior Expert, Energy Charter Secretariat, “Intergovernmental Framework:
Key considerations,” at Expert Group Meeting on Conceptualising the Asian Energy Highway (AEH), 4 September
2013, http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/4.1Zafar_Samadov_ECS.pdf
8 “Gobitec and Asian Super Grid For Renewable Energies in Northeast Asia,” 2014,
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/Gobitec_and_the_Asian_Supergrid_2014_ENG.pdf
9 “North Korea holds key to East Asian "super-grid", Posted on 15 October 2013, World Energy Council web-site,
http://www.worldenergy.org/news-and-media/news/north-korea-holds-key-to-east-asian-super-grid/
64Charter Treaty for Grid Network”, can be a “win-win” proposal for all countries
involved, including DPRK and can contribute to confidence building in the region andto regional stability.
Nuclear cooperation in Northeast Asia: Emerging impacts of the Fukushima accident
Now, let’s turn to the nuclear energy cooperation. First of all, it is important torecognize the fact that Asia is the region where highest growth in nuclear power
capacity is expected in the coming decades, especially due to rapid growth in China.
As of August 31, 2014, 437 reactors are currently in operation worldwide, and 70
reactors are under construction. Out of 70 reactors under construction, 28 reactors are in
China 10. In this region, in the past, Japan and ROK were the leaders in expanding
nuclear power capacity, but after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, future of
nuclear power in Japan has become totally unclear.Due to lack of public trust, majorityof public opinion (~80%) is now in favor of phase out of nuclear power (either
gradually or immediately) 11. As a result, while the government confirms to keep nuclear
power as a “base load” energy source under the new Strategic Energy Plan 12, the futureof nuclear power is still uncertain.
ROK, still committed to maintain the policy of expanding nuclear power capacity, also
lowered its target share from 50% to 29% 13. Even in China, although still very
ambitious, target for nuclear expansion has been lowered. This trend is becoming global,
while still many countries committed to expand nuclear power, its pace is likely to be
slower. The recently published “The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014” 14 saysthat share of nuclear power has been in 30decline from its peak in 1995 (~17%) to only
10% or so in 2013 and this trend may continue. When Chernobyl and Three Mile
Accident happened, average age of global nuclear power plants was still relatively
young. But now the average age is 28.9 years and unless new construction of nuclear
plants could catch up with the pace of “decommissioning” of older plants, share of
nuclear power generation in global power production is likely to decline further.
Still, it is likely that many nuclear power plants will be operating in the Northeast Asia
in the coming decades. And needs for international cooperation in the field of nuclear
10

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), PRIS database. http://www.iaea.org/pris/home.aspx
Hirotada Hirose, “Changes of Public Opinion about Nuclear Power,” Presented at Japan Atomic Energy
Commission, July 17, 2013, (in Japanese) http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2013/siryo27/siryo2.pdf
12 “Strategic Energy Plan,” April 11, 2014.
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/4th_strategic_energy_plan.pdf
13 Simon Mundy, “South Korea cuts target for nuclear power”, Financial Times, January 14, 2014,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4e8c1872-7cf7-11e3-81dd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3C3e90UvF
14 Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, “The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014”,
http://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/201408msc-worldnuclearreport2014-hr-v4.pdf
11

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safety, nuclear security and non-proliferation will become stronger. Japan, ROK andChina has already agreed to enhance such cooperation and international framework canbe established under the Comprehensive Agreement. Most recently, President Park of
ROK proposed to establish regional nuclear safety organization in Northeast Asia withJapan and China 15. Although the detail of such proposal is still not clear, such initiatives
should be welcome and all parties should work together for possible regional scheme on
nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation.
Inequality issue in nuclear fuel cycle activities and plutonium stockpile management
Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) says that “Nothing in this Treaty
shall be interpreted as affecting the “inalienable right” of all the Parties to the Treaty todevelop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” Therefore, it isalso important to keep this principle for regional cooperation of peaceful use of nuclear
energy under the Comprehensive Agreement.
One sensitive issue is what to do with nuclear fuel cycle capability, especially uranium
enrichment and reprocessing which can be used to produce “weapons-usable material(WUM)” i.e. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium. At present, as a
non-nuclear weapon state, Japan is the only country with both enrichment andreprocessing capabilities as Japan maintains closed fuel cycle policy. China and Russia
also adopts closed fuel cycle policy and have both enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities. ROK and DPRK once had an agreement not to have enrichment andreprocessing facilities under the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of Korean
Peninsula in 1992. But DPRK operated small reprocessing plant and is believed todevelop enrichment capability. ROK maintains open fuel cycle policy and thus hasneither enrichment nor reprocessing facility. But ROK plans to develop nuclear fuelcycle capability and has built a small pilot reprocessing plant as a long term R&D plan
to develop Fast Breeder Reactor and its fuel cycle.
This leads to a question of “inequality” in fuel cycle capability especially between
ROK and Japan.
Under the 1973 US-ROK bilateral agreement on cooperation of peaceful use of
nuclear energy, ROK has not been allowed to have both enrichment and reprocessing
capability. Recently, ROK government negotiated with the US to renew such agreement
to remove such constraints. In April 2013, with little progress being made by the
15 “Park proposes Northeast Asian nuclear safety group”, World Nuclear News, August 15, 2014.

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Park-proposes-Northeat-Asian-nuclear-safety-group-1508145.html

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negotiatoin, a two-year extension of the existing arrangements was agreed, to March
2016, and this was confirmed by US Congress in January 2014 16.
Meanwhile, under the 30-year programmatic approval of the 1988 US-Japan bilateralagreement on peaceful use of nuclear energy, Japan has continued reprocessing
activities (commercial contracts with France and the UK) and constructed a largecommercial-size reprocessing facility (800 tons/y) in Rokkasho village in Aomori. The
Rokkasho plant is now under safety licensing and its operation date is not clear.
Japanese government stresses that all plutonium activities are under internationalsafeguards and has volunteered to disclose all stockpile data every year for bettertransparency. Japan also has a “no-plutonium surplus policy (i.e. not to have plutonium
without any specific purpose to use)” which was introduced in 1992 and has beenenhanced since 2003 when Japan Atomic Energy Commission issued a new policy thatelectric utilities publish “plutonium usage plan” every year before separating plutonium.
Still, past reprocessing activities resulted in about 44 tons of plutonium stockpile (35tons in Europe and 9 tons in Japan) 17. Given the uncertainty in reactor operation
schedules in Japan, if Rokkasho reprocessing plant starts up, more plutonium is likely tobe accumulated in Japan. This has caused significant international concern in the region.
Because of acute concern over increasing plutonium stockpile worldwide, Joint
Communique at Hague Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014 says that “Weencourage States to minimise their stocks of HEU and to keep their stockpile ofseparated plutonium to the minimum level, both as consistent with national
requirements.” 18 This is an important commitment made by participating countries,
including Japan, and thus Japan should develop a new policy to minimize its plutonium
stockpile.
In order to respond to international concern over stockpile of plutonium as well as
addressing to inequality issues in nuclear fuel cycle activities, it would be desirable todevelop a scheme to assure “equality” and better “transparency” in nuclear fuel cycle
activities to minimize such international concern as well as nuclear
proliferation/security risk associated with nuclear fuel cycle activities.
16 “Nuclear Power in South Korea”, World Nuclear Association, updated August 2014.
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/South-Korea/
17 Cabinet office, Secretariat of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, September 2013.
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/sitemap/pdf/130911e.pdf. But in June 2014, it was reported that 640kg was mistakenly
reported under the category of “plutonium included in spent fuel” and thus was removed from the category of“separated plutonium”. It was once loaded into Genkai nuclear power plant but the plant never operated since, andthus it should be included in the category of “separated plutonium.” So far, the government has not made any changesof the above data.
18 The Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communique. March 25, 2014.
https://www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/the_hague_nuclear_security_summit_communique_final.pdf

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I would like to propose three options below for nuclear fuel cycle arrangements in theComprehensive Agreement for possible considerations.
Possible cooperative scheme for nuclear fuel cycle in the Comprehensive Agreement(1) Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Proliferation of nuclear fuel cycle capability has been a source of international concern
and multilateral control over sensitive facilities have been proposed since the beginningof the nuclear development in 1950s. In 2003, then IAEA Director General ElBaradei
proposed to revisit the idea of “multilateral approaches” to nuclear fuel cycle activities.
Since then, various proposals have been made and now two of them have been
implemented so far. One is International Uranium Enrichment Center with LEU (Low
Enriched Uranium) Reserve proposed by Russia, and the other is IAEA LEU Fuel Bank
originally proposed by Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) of the US. 19 Although no specificarrangements have not been realized, International Framework for Nuclear Energy
Cooperation (IFNEC), originally proposed by the US government, has been discussing
similar ideas at the Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services Working Group (RNFSWG). 20
Similar arrangements can be made in the Northeast Asia. There are three basic
conditions for such arrangements to be successful. One is “universality.” Any right orlimitation applied to any country must be equally applied to other states. Without suchprinciple, any arrangement can be considered “discriminatory” and will not be
successful. Second is “transparency.” All arrangements must come with maximum
transparency so that confidence in such arrangements will not be lost. Third one is“accountability.” Any arrangements should be based on sound economic and social
rationale and thus accountable to the public. Public and social acceptance to such
scheme is essential for its success.
One possible arrangement is to establish LEU fuel bank in Northeast Asia and allparties under the Comprehensive Agreement should be eligible to access to the Bank.
But priority of such accessibility should belong to the country without nuclear fuel cycle
capabilities. Another possible proposal is to establish joint Enrichment Facility managed
by multilateral corporation, like URENCO. URENCO operation is supervised by

19 There are good references on multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle on the web-site of United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research.
http://www.unidir.org/programmes/weapons-of-mass-destruction/multilateral-approaches-to-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle
20 IFNEC Reliable Nuclear Fuel Services Working Group, http://www.ifnec.org/Meetings/RNFSWGMeetings.aspx.
IFNEC now has 32 member countries, including US, Russia, China, ROK, Japan, plus 4 observer organizations and
41 country observers. See more detail here; http://www.ifnec.org/Home.aspx8tri-lateral government committee under the Treaty of Almelo 21 to ensure such operation
will not lead to increase in proliferation risk.
It is more difficult to develop a scheme for back-end of fuel cycle. One possibility is todevelop multilateral R&D scheme on nuclear fuel cycle, so that all research facilities onfuel cycle in the region can be under multilateral control. It would be wise not to
encourage reprocessing, but R&D activities could be allowed only under themultilateral approaches.
For reprocessing and plutonium activities, the principle of “no-plutonium surplus
policy” by Japan should be strictly followed by all party countries. For example, a shift
from “supply driven” fuel cycle to “demand driven” fuel cycle activities should be
adopted. In other words, reprocessing must not take place unless clear plan to use
recovered plutonium is demonstrated and existing stockpile should be used before
further reprocessing. Transparency measures taken by Japan to disclose all existing
stockpile should also be followed by all parties involved.
(2) Mutual Inspection and Trust Building Scheme
The second option is to establish a mutual inspection and trust building scheme fornuclear fuel cycle activities in the region. EURATOM is certainly a good model andmany proposals have been made in 1990s to establish similar scheme (such as
ASIATOM) in the region, but none has been realized. 22 One of the primary reasons fornot being able to establish such scheme is the difference in priority in objectives of thescheme (“non-proliferation” vs “expansion of fuel cycle activities). In addition,“inequality” issue was also a major hurdle to overcome.
Another possible model is ABACC (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting andControl of Nuclear Materials). 23 The Agency was established by the two governments
for mutual inspection and trust building purposes. Similar organization can beestablished in Northeast Asia (initially between ROK and Japan and can be extended
further later). The Agency does not restrict peaceful activities but mutual inspection
would enhance trust and confidence in the region.
(3) International Plutonium Disposition Program

21

Treaty of Almelo was originally signed in 1970 by the government of UK, Netherland and West Germany when
URENCO was stablished. Similar treaty was signed between the US and three governments when URENCO
established the enrichment company in the US. 2005 version of the Treaty can be seen here.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228662/7046.pdf
22 Richard Speiere and Brian Chow, “Asiatom: Proposals, Alternatives and Next Steps,” Rand Corporation, July
1996, DRU-1367-DOE. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/drafts/2008/DRU1367.pdf
23 http://www.abacc.org.br/?page_id=5&lang=en

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The third option is to establish an international program to reduce plutonium stockpile.
This program can involve countries in other regions, such as UK and France, as partnercountries to deal with growing stockpile of separated plutonium.
There are various technical options to dispose plutonium stockpile, but there are two
fundamentally different philosophy in dealing with plutonium. One idea is to consider
plutonium as a “resource,” while the other is to consider plutonium as a waste. France,
Russia and Japan, belonging to the first group, plan to use plutonium as MOX in either
a conventional reactor or a fast reactor (so-called “MOX option”). UK, while it
currently plans to dispose plutonium as MOX fuel, along with the US explore otheroptions such as disposing plutonium as a waste (so-called “immobilization” option). But
all countries now share a common goal that stockpile of separated plutonium should besafely managed and should be reduced further. Therefore, it would be worthwhile todevelop technical programs jointly under the common goal of minimizing the plutonium
stockpile. In fact, the UK government suggested an option that UK will take ownershipof foreign-owned plutonium in the UK 24. This is an interesting proposal to pursue as it
can be a “win-win” arrangement for both Japan and the UK. Similarly, international
management of plutonium can be a “win-win” for all related parties to share facilities
and minimize cost and transportation of plutonium. While the amount is relatively small,separated plutonium in DPRK needs to be disposed of under the Comprehensive
Agreement.
Like energy cooperation, it is advisable to establish a working group to explore
various options for nuclear cooperation, in particular on nuclear fuel cycle.
Conclusion
Under the Comprehensive Agreement for Security in Northeast Asia, energy andnuclear energy cooperation can play an essential role for its success. Energy cooperation
with DPRK can and should be carefully crafted in order to meet the basic needs of
DPRK that could contribute to enhanced stability in the region. Larger energy
cooperation scheme, such as “Asia Super Grid” and “Energy Charter Treaty” are worth
considering under the Comprehensive Agreement.
For nuclear cooperation, it is important to maintain the basic principles of“universality”, “transparency” and “accountability” for establishing any international
scheme. In particular, multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle is a worth pursuingidea under the Comprehensive Agreement.
24

Written statement to the Parliament by Energy Minister Michael Fallon, “Management of overseas owned
plutonium in the UK,” 3 July 2014.

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Figure 1 Asia Super Grid For Renewable Energies in Northeast Asia

Source: “Gobite and Asian Super Grid For Renewable Energies in Northeast Asia,”
2014, http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/Gobitec_and_the_A
sian_Supergrid_2014_ENG.pdf
Table 1 Overview of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities in Asia Pacific Region

Source: James E. Platte, “Multilateral Cooperation in Asia's Nuclear Sector: Prospects
for Growth and Safety”, Working paper submitted to Pacific Energy Summit, July
2014. http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/ETA/PES_2014_workingpaper_platte.pdf

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