MANSFIELD NEXT GENERATION OF
U.S.-JAPAN NUCLEAR POLICY EXPERTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword and Acknowledgements.............................................................................................. 1
Nuclear Challenges in the 21st Century: Navigating Complex Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific............. 3“A Matter of Global Security:” How the United States and Japan Can Lead an International
Effort at Keeping Nuclear Facilities Safe from War....................................................................... 7
U.S., Japanese, and Chinese Perspectives on Mutual Vulnerability:
Recommendations for Washington and Tokyo............................................................................12
Forging a Unified Front: Institutionalizing Trilateral Cooperation Amidst Rising Tensions
in the Korean Peninsula............................................................................................................ 15
The U.S.-Japan Alliance and a Nuclear-Peer China: Lessons from Europe.....................................18
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................. 24
Participants............................................................................................................................ 25

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the viewsof the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, the program funder, or the organizations ofwhich participants are affiliated.

This program is administered by the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation with funding provided by the
U.S. Embassy in Tokyo through an open grant competition award.

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is my pleasure to present the newest publication from the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation.
Contributing to this volume are five binational teams of Japanese and U.S.-based young scholars who wereselected in February 2023 to be part of the Foundation’s inaugural cohort of the Mansfield Next Generation of
U.S.-Japan Nuclear Policy Experts program.
As the war in Ukraine draws on and concerns about a potential Taiwan Strait crisis grow, debates on nuclear
weapons and the importance of alliances are becoming increasingly relevant.
North Korea’s relentless nuclear threat and China’s stockpile buildup and its possible use in a Taiwan
contingency give renewed meaning to the study of deterrence mechanisms and the implications and evolutionof alliances, partnerships, and new multilateral frameworks. The Indo-Pacific region is at an inflection point
where actions today will determine if the region will maintain stability or devolve into a dangerous arms racethat will send shockwaves throughout the global order.
Senator Mansfield used to repeat that the U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important bilateral relationshipin the world, bar none. The Mansfield Next Generation of U.S.-Japan Nuclear Policy Experts program,launched in March 2023, focuses on the U.S.-Japan relationship, as for decades this partnership has provenvital to peace and prosperity in the two countries, the broader Indo-Pacific region, and the world. This
relationship is special due to how the two allies work closely together on issues across the nuclear space: tolearn from each other through a shared history of conflict and teach each other the horrors of nuclear war,to advance nuclear technology that can elevate the status of living and mitigate climate change, and to use
education as a tool to help develop enduring solutions to these challenges to humanity.
1This Mansfield program aims to bridge the knowledge gap of nuclear policy that exists not only between the
United States and Japan but also within the two countries. Although academic programs focusing on peacestudies have been popular in Japan since the end of World War II, programs on the U.S.-Japan alliance andsecurity studies have only started to grow in the past fifteen years. Nuclear experts are especially difficult
to raise in Japan, as nuclear weapons are still a controversial topic, and Japanese academia remains sharply
divided between those who advocate for disarmament and those who emphasize deterrence. In the UnitedStates, academic programs on nuclear issues tend to focus on Cold War politics and U.S. nuclear doctrine.
Some courses have started to tackle nuclear dynamics in the Korean peninsula, but not enough experts areyet focusing on ways the United States can leverage its East Asian alliances to jointly prevent contingencies in
the Indo-Pacific that could threaten the global order. As Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida repeatedly
warned since Russia’s aggression of Ukraine in February 2022: “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.” Asa Pacific power, the United States needs to keep a strong focus on the Indo-Pacific, and the U.S.-Japan alliancewill be key in guaranteeing peace and stability in the region.
This Mansfield program aims to address this lack of training and human capital in Japan and the risk of lack ofAsia experts in the United States. The Foundation launched its inaugural cohort in March 2023, and thanks togenerous funding from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, the program offered eight graduate students from Japan theopportunity to engage in discussions on nuclear issues with six U.S.-based peers.
Leveraging its extensive network of scholars and practitioners in the nuclear field, the Foundation invited
distinguished guest speakers from different backgrounds and held a series of interactive webinars and informal
meet-and-greets on a variety of topics, including the evolution of extended nuclear deterrence, Japan’s current
defense posture, fuel cycles and nonproliferation, as well as NATO’s deepening partnership with Japan.
In September 2023, the Foundation conducted a seven-day in-person training in Washington, D.C., where
the participants had the opportunity to engage in discussions on nuclear issues with academics, think tankresearchers, and former and current government officials (both civilian and military) from Japan and the UnitedStates. During the week-long training, the participants also gave group presentations on a topic of their choice.
After forming binational teams in April 2023, the participants collaborated for several months and co-authoredthe contributions collected in this volume. This volume not only tackles the pressing security issues the region
is currently grappling with, but also underscores how crucial it is to strengthen the U.S.-Japan relationship.
We are grateful to the U.S. Embassy of Japan, whose generous support made the implementation of thisinitiative a reality. We would also like to thank all the brilliant colleagues at U.S. and Japanese institutions
and elsewhere, who provided excellent content for our training, and who kindly engaged and continue tostay connected with each of our program participants. We are thankful for our Mansfield intern Yisag Kim’s
exceptional work in the successful implementation of the program.
I would like to thank our President and CEO, Frank Jannuzi, who has been very supportive of this new
initiative and who has encouraged me to pursue this idea from the beginning.
Last but certainly not least, I am immensely grateful to Peyton Goodman, Program Manager at theFoundation, for her meticulous and superb work since the inception of the program, for her passion for U.S.Japan relations, and for her warm personality, which set the tone of the program and was key in creating theprofessional yet friendly environment for all the participants.

Dr. Sayuri Romei
Associate Director of Programs
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
March 2024

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NUCLEAR CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY:NAVIGATING COMPLEX DYNAMICS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
Authors:

Nahoko Miki / University of Tokyo
Hiroki Watanabe / Tokyo Institute of Technology
Lily Wojtowicz / American University
Koichi Yoneda / National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

1. Introduction: The Resurgence of Nuclear Concerns
Nuclear weapons have drawn more attention as the 21st century has passed its first two decades. This renewed
focus is not about reducing the world’s nuclear arsenals and preventing rogue actors from obtaining theseweapons, as was the mood in the post-Cold War era of cooperation. Instead, it centers on the role of nuclear
weapons in an age of great power competition, posing both old and new challenges. The world expectedarms control treaties between Moscow and Washington to maintain a degree of stability in nuclear weapon
management during the Cold War, but those arrangements have been weakening in the past few years.
Dealing with China’s rising power, the issue of proliferation to other states, and the increasing complexity of
the calculations involved all contribute to a time of competition and instability.
In such a competitive and unstable era, how should we approach nuclear weapons owned by great powers?
This brief focuses on the Indo-Pacific, where tensions are escalating between the United States and China. It
aims to present several options for addressing nuclear weapons issues to serve as a basis for future discussions.
The brief begins by highlighting the asymmetry in non-strategic nuclear weapons in the regional competition
between the United States and China. It then examines the representative measures that contributed to addressing
this issue during the Cold War. Finally, it explores the contemporary significance of these measures, theirchallenges, and the efforts required to overcome those challenges, thus providing material for future discussions.

2. Escalating Tensions and Asymmetric Risks in the Indo-Pacific
The rivalry between the United States and China has raised tensions in the Indo-Pacific since the Cold War.
Its impact is also felt among neighboring countries, where maritime standoffs persist in the South China
Sea and the East China Sea. Moreover, the possibility of using military force to change the status quo has
been suggested. China’s declaration of its willingness to take any measures to protect what it considers “coreinterests” raises concerns that these measures may include a decision to use nuclear weapons.1 China currently
possesses approximately 500 nuclear warheads, including non-strategic nuclear weapons, and has shown
eagerness to expand its nuclear capabilities, planning to increase them to 1,500 warheads.2
On the other hand, the United States, which has been reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons since the postCold War period, does not currently deploy operational non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pacific, nor
are there effective measures to fill the gap between China.3 Additionally, there is no arms control framework
between the United States and China that is comparable to the one between the United States and the Soviet

1 Since 2010, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly used this phrase to emphasize the importance of various issues, including Taiwan, while also
implying that the solution to these issues could potentially involve the use of force.
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: A Report to Congress, Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2023,
https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLICOF-CHINA.PDF (Accessed on November 5, 2023).
3 There is an option of low-yield warheads for strategic nuclear weapons, which involves carrying the same nuclear warhead on the same delivery vehicle andadjusting its explosive power. However, this method does not eliminate the risk of unintended escalation due to misinterpretation of intentions. It is important toexercise caution against excessive expectations and to recognize the potential risks that could lead to the annihilation of humanity.

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Union during the Cold War.4 Russia’s demonstrated potential for limited use of nuclear weapons in the RussoUkrainian War has heightened the chilling recognition that nuclear weapons could be used in interstate wars,
adding a palpable dimension to tensions in situations like the Taiwan Strait.
In summary, security concerns exist that may necessitate considering the use of nuclear weapons, and there
is a general sense of instability due to the presence of asymmetry in non-strategic nuclear weapons between
the United States and China. There is no framework in place to stabilize this situation, and norms that once
assured that nuclear weapons would not be used are now wavering.

3. A Time-Focused Approach: Approaches to Prevent Nuclear Weapons Use
The thorny issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons imbalances between the United States and China could
potentially increase the likelihood of nuclear weapon use at the regional level, including nuclear coercion.
The immediate U.S. response to China’s intent to expand its nuclear arsenal may involve deterring its use
through a numerical balance of non-strategic nuclear weapons.5 Given geographical considerations, politicalcircumstances, and inherent non-vulnerability, the development of sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles
may be a primary choice. However, it is crucial to note that achieving a balance at the non-strategic nuclear
level through sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles does not guarantee the prevention of deterrence failure.
Establishing a fear-based balance of escalation from lower to upper tiers may raise the threshold for the use of
nuclear weapons. Once nuclear weapons are used, it could potentially lead to uncontrollable, instantaneousvertical escalation, culminating in inter-state thermonuclear exchanges. Additionally, it could trigger a security
dilemma through the spiral of an arms race by mutual fear.
To alleviate this fear, a medium-term approach involves
establishing arms control frameworks for nuclear
weapons.6 This brief recommends the re-establishmentof the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF),
one of the arms control frameworks developed between
the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold
War. The INF, in effect until recent years, was designed
to mitigate the risk of escalation. It acknowledged
the existence of non-strategic nuclear weapons withshort ranges and strategic nuclear weapons capable ofintercontinental flight while prohibiting intermediaterange nuclear weapons. The treaty aimed to sever thelink between regional nuclear weapon use and thepotential use of catastrophic nuclear weapons. By
Photo Credit: U.S. Air Forceachieving a balance in the number of nuclear weapons
at various levels while excluding intermediate-range ones, this artificial buffer can help prevent a global
catastrophe from occurring reactively.
Coordinating with other nuclear powers, such as Russia, is undeniably important. Initiating efforts is thefirst crucial step, as a lack of communication in this field presents a problem. Once these efforts commence,
they could open a window for negotiation, leading to the institutionalization of consultations that provide
transparent information about each country’s nuclear arsenal and intentions. This transparency could
significantly reduce the risk of miscalculation.

4 The news reports that a talk between the U.S. and China is scheduled to be held in Washington, but specific details are not yet clear, Michael R. Gordon,“China, U.S. to Meet for Rare Nuclear Arms-Control Talks Washington meeting comes as concerns grow over an arms race with Beijing and Moscow,” The WallStreet Journal, November, 1, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-agrees-to-arms-control-talks-with-u-s-87a44b38 (Accessed on November
1, 2023).CHINA.PDF (Accessed on November 5, 2023).
5 This way of thinking can also be seen in the report submitted by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the U.S., America’s Strategic Posture:
The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the U.S., by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,
Washington, D.C.: 2023), https://www.wicker.senate.gov/services/files/8F9BE603-032B-4B21-82D8-8E9A62A751C8 (Accessed on December 5, 2023).
6 To reference Cold War-era examples and clarify the objective, the term “Arms Control” is preferred over the recently used “De-Risking.”

4

Another necessary approach is nuclear disarmament, aiming to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons
and ultimately eliminate them. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), leading to the disposal of a substantial number of nuclear
warheads. However, this effort remains incomplete and will likely take considerable time to realize, given thecurrent nuclear landscape. Nevertheless, this approach has the advantage of widespread support, especiallyamong smaller nations, as it is rooted in the shared belief that the world should never again be subjected to thehorrors of nuclear weapons.7
It is worth noting that these three approaches are complementary. For example, if the United States
demonstrates an intent to increase its nuclear arsenal, it may encourage China to engage in arms control
discussions. The existence of norms supporting nuclear disarmament can have a significant impact on decisionmaking regarding the use of nuclear weapons and participation in arms control negotiations.

4. Identifying and Addressing Challenges in Advancing the Approaches
The recommendations draw inspiration from several approaches implemented during the Cold War to address
current challenges in the Indo-Pacific. These approaches include deterrence through nuclear balance, reducing
the risk of escalation through arms control, and decreasing the overall number of nuclear weapons throughdisarmament.8 All of these approaches work towards reducing the possibility of nuclear weapons being used
and are complementary in nature. However, when it comes to implementing specific policies, it is essential todelve deeper into whether there is a conducive environment for advancing these approaches.
Today, it seems that knowledge and discourse related
to nuclear weapons have been somewhat forgotten
since the end of the Cold War. Discussions amongscholars who advocate for nuclear disarmament
often demonize nuclear deterrence theory, while
those emphasizing the need for nuclear deterrence
view disarmament proponents as idealists. Suchdivisions pose substantial obstacles to actual policy
formulation. In other words, there is a lack offoundational knowledge regarding nuclear issues insociety, and the current discussions are marked bydivision. Addressing this issue is a societal challengethat must be overcome to work toward a world where
nuclear weapons are never used again.9

Photo Credit: U.S. NavyFirst, fundamental knowledge about nuclear weapons must be unearthed and disseminated to address
this challenge. Contemporary researchers should revisit Cold War-era nuclear matters from a third-party
perspective, transcending national and academic biases to reevaluate aims, policy processes, and outcomes.
Subsequently, it is essential to foster discussions based on the expertise acquired. Rather than confining these
discussions to specific countries or academic schools of thought, international forums and interdisciplinary
efforts are required. Emphasizing the premise of preventing future nuclear weapon usage, we must engage indebates that avoid rigid positions, promoting mutual understanding and shared perspectives.
Notably, the United States was the first to use nuclear weapons in warfare and Japan was the first victim
to feel the impact of them; as they share a history of their use, both countries bear the motivation and

7 The number of signatory countries to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has exceeded 90, and many of these signatory countries are also foundin the “Global South,” which has been gaining influence in international politics in recent years. ICAN, TPNW signature and ratification status, https://www.icanw.
org/signature_and_ratification_status (Accessed on December 5, 2023).
8 There are other initiatives such as non-proliferation efforts toward non-nuclear-armed states and nuclear security to ensure the security of various materials andfacilities, but these are not the focus of this paper, so they are not discussed here.
9 Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Stanford University Press, December 9, 2015, p. XXX.

5

responsibility to address these issues. Presenting the acquired expertise and discussing various cases andparadigms10 beyond nuclear deterrence, arms control, and disarmament should be part of ongoing educational
efforts, whether at the national, international, regional, or local level. Such efforts to educate society on
a broad range of expertise regarding nuclear issues should not only persist at all levels but should also besustained cross-generationally.

5. Conclusion: Forging a Path Towards a Nuclear-Free WorldIn this brief, we have explored how to address the challenges posed by nuclear weapons in an era ofcompetition and instability, focusing on the U.S.-China relationship. We have drawn attention to andpresented three approaches: nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nuclear disarmament. Additionally, we
have identified potential obstacles in advancing these approaches, the lack of fundamental knowledge, anddivisions in discourse. We have also proposed the importance of reflecting on history, activating discourse,
and advocating for sustained education beyond national boundaries, with the United States and Japan being
natural leaders in these efforts.
History contains numerous hints and lessons, but they may have been disrupted or forgotten due to theshifting focus of security environments. The path we should take must be chosen not reactively but responsibly.
During previous eras of competition, our predecessors embarked on monumental efforts to envision a world
where nuclear weapons were not used. American and Soviet leaders, Kennedy and Khrushchev, throughharrowing experiences, began to explore the path of cooperation sixty years ago. We can learn from them.
To do so, we must prioritize sharing unbiased knowledge, foster mutual understanding, and transcend theconfines of national borders. Perhaps it is in pursuit of a shared and vital goal for humanity: a world where
nuclear weapons are never used again.

Cohort 1 at the U.S. Naval Academy

10 For example, the international political scientist Joseph Nye argues the importance of combining policies based on various paradigms depending on the goals
and situations. by Joseph Nye Jr., David Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History (10th Edition), Pearson,
January 18, 2016, p. XXX.

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“A MATTER OF GLOBAL SECURITY:” HOW THE UNITED STATESAND JAPAN CAN LEAD AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AT KEEPING
NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFE FROM WAR
11

Authors:

Miho Kawamoto / Hitotsubashi University
Jordan Smith / American University

1. Introduction
Russia’s attacks on the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in 2022 marked the first time in history thata nuclear power plant has been a target of interstate conflict. This attempt at pushing the boundaries of
acceptable behavior around nuclear facilities has grave consequences for nuclear security, as Russia’s behavior
undermines the international community’s efforts to keep nuclear facilities safe. This is especially important as
more states turn toward nuclear energy as an effective tool for mitigating climate change. More nuclear power
plants are being constructed all over the world, and additional risks can arise if they are not properly managed.
However, it is important to recognize that Russia’s actions have not yet become irreversible. The danger Russia
poses to global nuclear security presents the world with an opportunity to increase legal protections for nuclear
facilities and firmly re-entrench international principles of nuclear facility safety. A movement as importantas this will require leaders, and this article argues that the United States and Japan may be perfectly suited toestablishing a joint initiative to enhance nuclear facility security worldwide.

2. Background
The war in Ukraine has upended long-held beliefs about nuclear weapons, nuclear facility security, and how
much influence the United States has on the global attitude towards both. The United States is presently
trying to stem the threat of nuclear war while simultaneously avoiding an arms race, a position the nation
has not been in since the Cold War. Despite enormous efforts—including sending $46.6 billion to Ukraine inmilitary aid alone—there is no end in sight.12 Furthermore, the new START treaty between Russia and theUnited States, the last bilateral agreement to reduce the size of American and Russian nuclear arsenals, is set
to expire in February of 2026, and Russia has suspended its participation until further notice. As such, the war“has put into doubt…international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.”13 The war has changed
the environment in which global nonproliferation policy is made and has serious implications for the futureof nuclear safety and security. Now, the United States must grapple with how to prevent nuclear facilities
from falling into the wrong hands in the wake of the first-ever state-led attack on one. This moment presents
a rare opportunity for the United States to lead a global effort at reaffirming a precedent for nuclear facility
safety moving forward, a movement that would be made much stronger by partnering with Japan due to its
familiarity with the consequences of nuclear accidents.
In Japan, nuclear fears were made very real in 2011 when the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami cut facility
power at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, causing three of its four reactors to go into fullmeltdown. It is estimated that several hundred site workers received high doses of radiation, and Japanese
authorities subsequently shut down 46 of 50 of the country’s power reactors in response. Public confidence in

11 Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the UN Security Council Open Debate, “Threats to international peace and security: Sea-level rise: implications forinternational peace and security.” Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations in New York, February 14, 2023. https://www.ukrinform.net/rubriceconomy/3679841-zaporizhzhia-npp-must-return-to-ukraines-control-zelensky.html.
12 Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, “How Much Aid Has the U.S. Sent Ukraine? Here Are Six Charts. Council on Foreign Relations, September 21, 2023 https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts.
13 Alexander Vershbow, “How the United States and NATO can deal with Russian nuclear coercion in Ukraine.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 23, 2023,
https://thebulletin.org/2023/06/how-the-united-states-and-nato-can-deal-with-russian-nuclear-coercion-in-ukraine/.

7

Cohort 1 at the Nuclear Threat Initiative

nuclear power was at “record low levels”14 and over a decade later, Japan is still working to improve public trustin nuclear security and safety. After Fukushima, Japan established the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) toenhance nuclear safety measures and put new regulatory requirements on nuclear operators.15 Under its new
requirements, ten reactors were put back into commission, and construction began on two new reactor sites.
More recently, in May 2023, the Japanese Diet passed a bill that allows nuclear reactors to be operated beyond
the 60-year limit.16 This new bill therefore extends the lifetime of operating reactors for the first time since a
cap was implemented following Fukushima, thus marking a significant change in Japanese policy.
Despite this progress, however, Japanese citizens are still wary of nuclear power, and another accident could
permanently turn the public away from nuclear energy. They are right to be concerned; nuclear facility safety
efforts in Japan are not a priority, as evidenced by when the Kishida administration was questioned on how todeal with a nuclear reactor attack and the administration’s answer was, “we are still figuring that out.”17 Sooner
or later, Japan needs to improve its nuclear security measures to assuage the public and increase protection
against nuclear accidents from a variety of threats. The gap between public opinion and facility security efforts
is unlikely to close anytime soon without serious domestic and international action, and these changes could
be made on a much larger scale if Japan were to work with its American ally.

3. Gaps in the Current Framework
Nuclear security is defined as the prevention and detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional,
unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities,
or associated activities.18 Early efforts at securing nuclear materials and facilities focused on domestic threats,
14 International Atomic Energy Agency, “ Nuclear Power 10 Years After Fukushima: The Long Road Back.” March 11, 2021, https://www.iaea.org/
newscenter/news/nuclear-power-10-years-after-fukushima-the-long-road-back.
15 Nuclear Regulation Authority, “Outline of New Regulatory Requirements.” April 3, 2013, https://www.nra.go.jp/data/000067117.pdf.
16 Kyodo News, “Japan enacts law for operating nuclear reactors beyond 60-yr limit,” Kyodo News, May 31, 2023, https://english.kyodonews.net/
news/2023/05/4e5e10940b30-japan-enacts-law-for-operating-nuclear-reactors-beyond-60-yr-limit.html.
17 The House of Representatives, Japan, “Question: Regarding Japan’s physical protection system in the event of a military attack on nuclear facilities.”
September 2, 2023, https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/shitsumon/a211006.htm.
18 International Atomic Energy Agency, “ IAEA World Fusion Outlook 2023.” October 16, 2023, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/
FusionOutlook2023_web.pdf.com/2023/03/26/asia/japan-paternity-leave-policy-challenges-intl-hnk-dst/index.html.

8such as sabotage and espionage.19 This shifted in the post-9/11 world, with widespread change occurring after
2010 when U.S. President Barack Obama gathered world leaders at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.20 Thissummit sparked a sudden interest in security against nuclear terrorism and 68 states made commitments totake tangible action to safeguard both facilities and materials. Several domestic and international actions
followed, including updates to:• The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). This document established alegal framework for signatory states regarding the safety of nuclear material in transport. CPPNM waslater expanded to add protections for nuclear facilities from non-state actors.
• The Geneva Conventions. Some aspects specifically address the security of nuclear facilities, such as
Article 1, which prohibits armed attacks on nuclear facilities, and Article 56, which protects “work or
installations containing dangerous forces,” including nuclear power plants.
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference (GC) Resolutions and Decisions. The
IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear
Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) offers best practices for nuclear security and is widely considered thestandard for nuclear facility safety, though it is nonbinding. Other IAEA GC Resolutions and Decisions
prohibit attacks against both operational facilities and those under construction.
However, the attack on ZNPP makes it clear that the above framework contains gaps. Specifically, theframework lacks the focus on keeping facilities safe from interstate conflict:• CPPNM is focused on domestic threats.
• Articles 1 and 56 of the Geneva Conventions prohibit nuclear attacks in theory, but Russia’s attack on
Ukraine has proved that a blanket statement of protection for nuclear facilities is insufficient, and Article
56 does not protect facilities that provide power in “regular, significant, and direct support of military
operations.”• IAEA’s Nuclear Security Recommendations offer best practices and technical guidance for nuclear
facilities, but they are not legally binding, and neither are GC Resolutions and Decisions.21
Future policy efforts should thus be directed at keeping facilities safe from interstate conflict specifically andthese protections should be established before the onset of conflict rather than after.

4. Recommendations
With these gaps in mind, there are several policy changes that the United States and Japan can makethemselves—and encourage other states to make—to better secure nuclear facilities both domestically andinternationally. These changes should all occur under the umbrella of a publicly-announced joint initiative
between the two countries, which would consist of various efforts to enhance the protections currently
afforded to nuclear facilities at the domestic and international level. The following recommendations offersome ideas for efforts the two countries can jointly implement to strengthen the physical protections of nuclear
facilities as well as reaffirm a global precedent for prioritizing nuclear facility security.

19 Karl Dewey et. al, “Nuclear Security Culture in Practice: A Handbook of UK Case Studies.” King’s College London, Centre for Science and Security
Studies, 2021, https://www.readkong.com/page/nuclear-security-culture-in-practice-a-handbook-of-uk-2932483.
20 William Tobey, “Planning for Success at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit.” The Stanley Foundation, December 2013, https://stanleycenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/TobeyPAB1213a.pdf.
21 Ali Alkis. “Nuclear Security During Armed Conflict: A contribution to the Nuclear Security Policy Menu series.” Stimson Center, October 19, 2022,
https://www.stimson.org/2022/nuclear-security-during-armed-conflict/.

9

Photo Credit: IAEA

I: The United States and Japan should encourage all nuclear states to develop country-level plans forprotecting nuclear infrastructure during natural or man-made disasters.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative’s 2023 Nuclear Security Index reported that 16 of 46 countries with nuclear
facilities do not require plans for protecting nuclear infrastructure during natural or man-made disasters.22 Thisis an enormous gap in protections for nuclear facilities in the face of unexpected threats to safety and security
which must be remedied. Especially as more states pursue nuclear energy, it should be standard for all statesthat possess nuclear power plants to establish plans for protecting nuclear infrastructure during natural or
man-made disasters. The United States and Japan should evaluate their own disaster plans and ensure thatthey are up-to-date, robust, and have as few gaps as possible. Simultaneously, the two allies should work
together to bring this issue up in security and energy-related conversations with other states and push for all
nuclear states to establish disaster plans. Furthermore, they should offer to assist these nuclear states withcreating and entrenching such plans into domestic security culture. Bringing awareness to this lack of disasterplans, and then pushing for change, is key to closing this gap.
II: The United States and Japan should work to enshrine nuclear facility security in international law byencouraging the establishment of bilateral pledges and the creation of a new IAEA protocol.
As discussed above, international law lacks protections for nuclear facilities especially when it comes tointerstate conflict and further efforts are needed. The United States and Japan should establish—and
encourage other states to establish—bilateral pledges to not attack the nuclear facilities of other states, similar
to the India/Pakistan pledge of 1989. Bilateral pledges would not pose a significant burden to policymakers,
but they would go a long way toward international recognition of the importance of prioritizing facility security
and acknowledging that the costs of attacking nuclear facilities far outweigh any potential benefits. This could
also be initiated by the United States and Japan in a multilateral setting.
Furthermore, the United States and Japan should consider encouraging the IAEA to create an additional,
optional protocol for NPT signatory states that would allow them to preemptively negotiate agreements with

22 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Security Index: Falling Short in a Dangerous World.” July 2023, https://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/
uploads/2023/07/2023_NTI-Index_Report.pdf.

10the IAEA focused on physically protecting facilities facing conflict. This agreement could take many forms,
but ideally it would allow signatories to receive additional IAEA support during times of crisis to mitigate
dangers posed to their nuclear facilities. This would look much like the IAEA’s current efforts in Ukraine, but
by negotiating assistance ahead of time, the creation of a protocol would allow for a more rapid, robust, andtailored response.
III: The United States and Japan should act as global leaders in changing norms surrounding nuclear
security culture.
The 2023 NTI Nuclear Security Index reported that security culture scores have stagnated along withgovernment support for legal and political commitments.23 There is a need to remind the international
community why nuclear facility security needs to always be a top priority, not just when a conflict occurs.
Governments, plant workers, and other actors across the globe need to take the security of their own plants
more seriously to be better prepared for future threats. Increased support for legal and political commitments
will not only help prevent accidents or attacks but will also aid in mitigating some existing issues surrounding
the enforceability of the international laws identified above. Widespread prioritization of facility safety means
fewer states would need incentives to fully adhere to international laws protecting said facilities.
The United States and Japan have an opportunity to reaffirm their commitments to nuclear security andencourage other states to follow suit, thus (1) becoming leaders in this cultural shift and (2) exemplifying what
nuclear security standards should look like by setting standards that ensure the protection of their facilities
from contingencies like war and natural disasters. By working together, they also demonstrate a cross-cultural
dedication to nuclear security, showing other states that nuclear facility security is an issue that transcends
national borders and is ultimately bigger, and more important, than any one state.

5. Conclusion
Russia’s attacks on ZNPP threaten to undermine several aspects of the international nuclear security
framework, particularly when it comes to protecting nuclear facilities. The conflict lays bare an important
fact: nuclear facilities are not well-protected under international or domestic law from interstate conflict.
This suggests there is a dire need to reevaluate how states around the world should establish and enforce
protections for nuclear facilities, especially when it comes to protecting them from the threat of war.
However, with all this risk also comes an opportunity to enhance legal protections for nuclear facilities andto reaffirm international standards of nuclear facility safety. The United States and Japan are both wellsuited to implement and encourage this change. As such, this article argues that the United States and Japan
should establish a publicly announced joint initiative consisting of a variety of efforts aimed at improving
nuclear facility security. A U.S.-Japan partnership would represent a strong, cross-cultural dedication toprotecting nuclear facilities from the threat of war, and to have a nuclear weapons state—as well as a statethat has recently faced a major nuclear disaster—implementing this change would incentivize other states tojoin these efforts.

23 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Security Index: Falling Short in a Dangerous World.” July 2023, https://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/
uploads/2023/07/2023_NTI-Index_Report.pdf.

11

U.S., JAPANESE, AND CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON MUTUAL
VULNERABILITY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WASHINGTON AND TOKYO
Authors:

Samanvya Hooda / Georgetown University
Eli Horton / Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey
Sayaka Shingu / Hitotsubashi University

1. Introduction
The international community faces an increasing need to reduce the risk of armed conflict and the threat ofnuclear war between the United States and China. These two powers face several obstacles in reducing the
likelihood of nuclear conflict, including a deadlock over “mutual vulnerability.” George Perkovich describes
mutual vulnerability as a situation where neither country can stop the other from causing damage thatexceeds the value of the contested issues.24 Some scholars argue that U.S. acknowledgment of mutual
vulnerability is a prerequisite for Beijing to engage in a continued bilateral dialogue with Washington sinceearlier efforts to engage China in dialogue on strategic issues have failed.25 Given the current impasse between
the United States and China on nuclear issues, it is necessary to compare the different perspectives on mutual
vulnerability between the United States, China, and Japan to identify areas of convergence and divergence andprovide recommendations for Washington and Tokyo.

2. “Mutual vulnerability” from the perspectives of the United States, China, and Japana) The United States
U.S. officials are reluctant to explicitly acknowledge mutual vulnerability because of its commitments toallies that depend on U.S. extended deterrence. Washington has historically rejected mutual vulnerability
with rising powers or rogue states due to the belief that deterrence cannot be maintained with suchactors. Another problem concerning mutual vulnerability with Beijing is that this acknowledgment is
contingent on future Chinese behavior: the United States will be less willing to reassure an increasingly
militarily assertive China.26 The United States is currently in two separate but entangled deterrence
relationships with China and Russia. These relationships have caused the United States and its allies todevelop plans and capabilities that can potentially deter and defeat both Russia and China.
b) China
China has not mentioned “mutual vulnerability” outright. Additionally, scholars believe China
has “genuine anxiety” about U.S. strategic intent, and that American acknowledgement of mutual
vulnerability would help assuage Chinese fears.27 However, the issue of mutual vulnerability is only one
aspect of Chinese views on nuclear relations with the United States. What China considers to be a “stable”
strategic balance is not limited to a balance of nuclear capabilities. Chinese analysts will take nuclear,conventional, space, cyber and other capabilities into account when assessing the U.S.-China strategic

24 George Perkovich, “Engaging China on Strategic Stability and Mutual Vulnerability,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 12, 2022,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/12/engaging-china-on-strategic-stability-and-mutual-vulnerability-pub-88142.; RAND Corporation, “Protecting
U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 1960s,” RAND, September 1, 1956, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2021/R290.pdf.
25 The Obama administration failed to initiate arms control talks with China, the Trump administration pursued a trilateral dialogue with Russia
and China that never got off the ground, and the Biden administration continues these efforts by encouraging China to join a dialogue to discuss
strategic issues.
26 Brad Roberts, ‘Rethinking Mutual Vulnerability in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition’, in US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the
Debate, vol. 22:3 (Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Forum, 2022), 16-25, https://pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Issues-Insights-Vol.-22-SR-2.pdf.
27 Tong Zhao, ‘Why the United States Should Discuss Mutual Nuclear Vulnerability with China’, in US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the
Debate, vol. 22:3 (Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Forum, 2022), 71-81, https://pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Issues-Insights-Vol.-22-SR-2.pdf

12

balance.28 Another view maintains that China has to focus on building its own power and engage with
the United States once it is undeniably seen as an equal.29 The United States acknowledging mutual
vulnerability may be a factor to consider for nuclear risk reduction with China, but it does not guarantee
it. If the United States wanted to continue to engage with China, it would have to change many things inaddition to acknowledging mutual vulnerability, as at this stage it would have a limited effect in changing
Chinese nuclear behavior, while also being a net negative for the United States and Japan.
c) JapanJapan’s primary concern is that an acknowledgment of mutual vulnerability will allow China to act
freely at the sub-strategic level, and further challenge the existing international order.30 China could
interdict U.S. intervention and enjoy its freedom of action on a regional level or could seek change andexpand its influence under global stability.31 It is also preferable for Japan that official acknowledgmentof mutual vulnerability be delayed, even if such a situation already inexplicitly exists between the
United States and China.32 Given other intensifying security situations in East Asia involving the
Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the East and South China Seas, regional instability poses a
strategic threat to Japan. The regional balance of power matters greatly to Japan, and there is an urgent
need to improve regional deterrence.

3. Recommendations
This analysis points to the divergence between the United States and China on the subject with the former
inclined to pursue “dialogue first, trust second,” while the latter prefers “trust first, dialogue second.” Mutual
vulnerability of nuclear forces is also only one area of U.S.-China competition as China appears to wantdialogue on the entire relationship. If the acknowledgment of mutual vulnerability is but one aspect of Beijing’s
security interests, such action would not result in a major change. Even though the two countries conducted a
dialogue on arms control and nonproliferation in November 2023, it will take considerably more work before
the two countries can collaborate on nuclear risk reduction. It is also clear that U.S. and Japanese views aboutmutual vulnerability are intertwined and that U.S. policymakers are aware of Japanese concerns. The benefitsof acknowledging mutual vulnerability are marginal, while the drawbacks are significant for Washington andTokyo. The optimal course of action for the United States is not to declare mutual vulnerability.

Photo Credit: Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Randi Brown

Photo Credit: Office of the President of the United States

28 Kaufman, Alison, and Brian Waidelich. ‘PRC Writings on Strategic Deterrence’. Washington, D.C: Center for Naval Analyses, (February 2023), https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/04/PRC-Writings-on-Strategic-Deterrence.pdf.
29 Zhao “Why the United States”, p.75.
’, Strategic Annual Review (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2020), https://www.jiia.
30 ‘or.jp/strategic_comment/pdf/StrategicAnnualReport2020jp03.pdf., 19.
31 Nobumasa Akiyama, ‘’, Diplomacy 80 (August 2023),98–103.

32 Masashi Murano, ‘archives/37723.

’, Japanese Institute for National Fundamentals, (September 2022), https://jinf.jp/news/

13However, dialogue needs to continue in East Asia. This brief recommends declaring “regional mutual
vulnerability” between the United States and China while strengthening American regional deterrence
capabilities in East Asia. This would expand on existing U.S. statements about a skewed balance of powerin favor of China in East Asia. It is important to remember that “theater-level” issues for the United Statesare “strategic-level” issues for Japan. Both the United States and Japan need to avoid the “stability-instability
paradox,” the coexistence of nuclear peace and lower levels of conventional war. This regional mutual
vulnerability can be used as a rallying call for U.S. and allied efforts to build deterrent capabilities in theregion. Acknowledging regional and military mutual vulnerability followed by bolstering regional deterrence
would be more beneficial for Washington and Tokyo, while also acknowledging some power parity with
Beijing.

4. Conclusion
Establishing “mutual vulnerability” between the United States and China is not an urgent priority for Beijing.
Such a move would not change China’s attitudes toward dialogue or its regional ambitions. Additionally,
Washington and Tokyo need to avoid the “stability-instability paradox.” Regional stability in East Asia is amore urgent necessity for the United States and its allies. Strengthening regional deterrent capabilities should
be prioritized while also seeking continued dialogue with China.

Cohort 1 with Asia and nuclear policy experts from the Congressional Research Service

Cohort 1 at the U.S. Capitol Building

14

Cohort 1 meeting with staffers from the
U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services

FORGING A UNIFIED FRONT: INSTITUTIONALIZING TRILATERALCOOPERATION AMIDST RISING TENSIONS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA
Authors:

Alice Dell’Era / Florida International University
Hiroko Kurosaki / Nagasaki University
Takanobu Sato / Waseda University
Jayden Thomas / George Washington University

In an era marked by the alarming advancements in North Korea’s missile capabilities and its relentless pursuitof nuclear weapons, fostering enduring trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the UnitedStates has never been more imperative. The persistent escalation of North Korea’s nuclear tests, including
six underground tests from 2006 to 2017 and the looming possibility of a seventh one, poses an imminent
threat to regional peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The gravity of the situation is further exacerbated by
Pyongyang’s overt displays of the expanding scale and range of its nuclear detonations, coupled with claims of
successfully testing a hydrogen bomb designed for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These endeavors
undermine global efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and make thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula unlikely in the short term. In the face of these challenges, the needto institutionalize collaborative efforts among Japan, South Korea, and the United States becomes paramount,serving as a crucial framework to address and counteract the evolving security landscape in the region.
In recent years, progress in this direction has been substantial and the three partners have redoubled theirefforts to deal with Pyongyang’s provocations. Amid increased missile tests conducted by the Kim Jong Un
regime,33 Japan, South Korea, and the United States have engaged in numerous high-level and working‑levelmeetings, as well as joint exercises to strengthen ballistic missile defense and anti-submarine warfare
capabilities.34 The revival of the trilateral
Pacific Dragon exercise, the restorationof the General Security Of Military
Information Agreement (GSOMIA), andthe commitment to initiate real-time
missile warning
data-sharing are noteworthy milestones
in enhancing cooperation.35 The threestates also recently established atrilateral security hotline connecting
their respective National Security
Councils in times of crisis and held theirfirst-ever joint air training exercise.
Moreover, they have also applied
unilateral and coordinated sanctions
Photo Credit: Adam Schultz
against North Korea and are exploring

33 As reported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea’s tests reached a record number in 2022. See: Nuclear Threat Initiative, “The CNS North
Korea Missile Test Database,” April 28, 2023, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/.
34 For a detailed chronology of high-level and working-level meetings, please refer to: Pacific Forum, “Japan - Korea Chronology,” Comparative
Connections, 2023, https://cc.pacforum.org/relations/japan-korea/?pt=date. On such occasions, the United States has reaffirmed its unwaveringcommitment to defend its two allies including, if necessary, through the nuclear option. Moreover, during a historic meeting in Camp David, the threepartners elevated trilateral defense cooperation by committing to regularize military training exercises and consult and coordinate responses during crises.
35 Presently, data tracking Pyongyang’s missiles can only be shared individually through the two US alliances but without a direct exchange between
Seoul and Tokyo. However, the establishment of a direct data-sharing system linking Japan and South Korea via the USINDOPACOM would enable
the partners to better leverage their respective strengths, thus enhancing the precision of launch and land data. See: Chae Yun-hwan, “Three-Way
Cooperation among S. Korea, U.S., Japan Takes Concrete Shape to Counter N.K. Threats,” Yonhap News Agency, June 4, 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/
AEN20230604002400325.

15

further areas of cooperation to curtail its ability to finance its nuclear and missile program. For example,
the three partners pledged to initiate ministerial-track meetings involving their finance ministers, as well as
commerce and industry ministers, and they launched a new trilateral working group aimed at curbing North
Korea’s illicit cyber activities.
A stepping stone in institutionalizing trilateral cooperation was the historic Camp David Summit, heldin August 2023. On this occasion, the three partners established a set of guidelines for mid- to long-termcooperation intended to promote and enhance peace and stability throughout the region. While cooperation
was historically centered around addressing challenges posed by North Korea, the recent Camp David meeting
underscored an expansive vision for trilateral security cooperation. The joint statement issued at the end of
the Summit illustrates a bold commitment to “advance a free and open Indo-Pacific based on a respect forinternational law, shared norms, and common values.”36 Notably, the document further emphasizes the criticalsignificance of fostering peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. This evolution signifies a strategic shift,signaling the trilateral cooperation’s growing role in addressing broader regional security dynamics and shaping
a collective vision for a stable and open Indo-Pacific. To achieve its vision, the three partners laid out plans toboost security cooperation, including through regularized trilateral high-level consultations and joint exercises.
These plans are a step in the right direction.
Despite this recent progress, trilateral cooperation still faces gaps and hurdles. Cooperation lacks a cohesiveframework of communication and remains rooted in two separate alliance structures with varying degrees ofintegration, strategic and operational planning, and crisis response mechanisms. Accordingly, cooperation does
not automatically translate into enhanced cohesion.37 For instance, in its present state, U.S.-Japan cooperation
lacks a mechanism to respond to military contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. While Tokyo could play a
critical role, there remains uncertainty about the circumstances or extent of Japan’s involvement in a Korean
crisis within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is a matter ofgrave concern for the U.S.-Japan alliance.38 Yet, efforts to integrate Japan-U.S. and U.S.-ROK cooperation tocreate a unified and cohesive response to a crisis have been slow to materialize.
For South Korea, the direct relationship with Japan on security matters has been complicated by historicaldisputes.39 Despite efforts by the United States to streamline cooperation among the three countries, these
historical issues have impeded trilateral collaboration. In light of the escalating tensions with North Korea, it
is imperative to supplement bilateral cooperation with more in-depth and coordinated trilateral engagement.
Optimizing trilateral cooperation to foster greater cohesion is thus crucial to effectively address Pyongyang’s
provocations and threats and ensure the effectiveness of extended deterrence.
While recent events signal a geopolitical climate that is primed for greater trilateral cooperation, concerns
remain that this progress will be halted if the liberal Democratic Party in South Korea wins the 2027
presidential elections, as they have historically taken a stronger anti-Japan approach. South Korea is not
the only nation subject to a potential political transition. A new U.S. president elected in 2024 who favors
a unilateral approach and undermines alliances could also hamper recent advances made toward trilateral
cooperation. Institutionalizing the trilateral relationship between Japan, South Korea, and the United States
36 The White House, “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” August 18, 2023,https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-theunited-states/.
37 For example, the absence of joint strategic and operational planning, as well as the lack of established crisis coordination mechanisms between Japanand South Korea may create gaps that Pyongyang could exploit. See: Fraser Jada, “The Cornerstone and the Linchpin: Reconstituting U.S.-ROK-Japan
Trilateral Security Cooperation,” in An Alliance Renewed? Future-Proofing U.S.-Japan Security Relations, ed. Christopher Lamont and Jeffrey Ordaniel, vol.
22, Issues & Insights (Pacific Forum International, 2022), 3.
38 The 1997 guidelines expanded the focus of the alliance from the defense of Japan to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and opened thedoor to planning for a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. It states specifically that the SDF will cooperate with U.S. forces in rear area support, searchand rescue operations, and other activities.
See: Przystup James J., “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Review of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation,” in Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic
Perspectives, No. 18, 2015, https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-18.pdf.
, March 2011.
See also:
39 For more details, see: Turker Hasim, “Shared Goals, Divergent Paths: US-ROK-Japan Relations”, in Geopolitical Monitor, August 7, 2023, https://www.
geopoliticalmonitor.com/shared-goals-divergent-paths-us-rok-japan-relations/.

16

Cohort 1 Giving Progress Presentations on their Policy Pieces at the Mansfield Foundation D.C. Officeis the strongest deterrent to counter North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and other ongoing security challenges
in the region. While historically the United States has engaged with both Japan and South Korea bilaterally
and both are protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it would be much more efficient and effective if thetrilateral relationship was further institutionalized to cooperate on shared priorities and security concerns.
Despite progress in establishing regular consultations, as exemplified by the creation of a trilateral hotlineof communication, more can be done to better ensure a coordinated response before and during potential
nuclear crises. Beyond existing formats, the three partners should consider establishing mechanisms thatdeal with a potential nuclear scenario. Given the existing differences in operational structure and capabilities,
trilateral discussions regarding each party’s roles and capabilities during a nuclear crisis should be encouraged.
Currently, such discussions tend to take shape bilaterally, in the form of the U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence
Dialogue (EDD), the U.S.-ROK Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group, or the newly added
U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). Creating new opportunities for an enhanced trilateralframework are among the objectives laid out in the Nuclear Posture Review released by the United States in2022.40 Given that a nuclear crisis in the region is likely to prompt a collective response, an institutionalizedtrilateral mechanism linking and complementing these existing frameworks would enable simultaneous
discussions on deterrence, preparedness, and response to a regional nuclear crisis.
While recognizing that institutionalizing the trilateral relationship through formal shared security mechanisms
and agreements is not an all-encompassing solution, it is a step in the right direction that could deter future
leaders from stepping away from these measures and serve to facilitate fruitful conversations and debates
before concrete action is taken. As regional challenges intensify, fostering a more robust and collaborative
approach will be instrumental in navigating threats and safeguarding the collective security interests of Japan,
South Korea, and the United States.

40 U.S. Department of Defense, “2022 Nuclear Posture Review.” 2022, https://s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.fas.org/2022/10/27113658/2022-NuclearPosture-Review.pdf.

17

THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE AND A NUCLEAR-PEER CHINA:LESSONS FROM EUROPE
Authors:

Ryo Kiridori / University of Toronto
Lily Wojtowicz / American University

1. Introduction
Although China has traditionally labeled its nuclear strategy as “minimum deterrence,”41 the last decade has
marked a significant shift in the Chinese nuclear posture. Soon after he came into office in 2012, Chairman
Xi Jinping positioned nuclear forces as China’s central strategic pillar for the first time in its history.42 As of2023, the U.S. Department of Defense estimates the number of Chinese nuclear warheads at around 500 withprojections estimating it to reach 1,000 by 2030. Further assessments indicate that China is accelerating its
modernization of land, air, and sea-based nuclear delivery platforms. The Department’s annual China review
states “compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current efforts dwarf previous
attempts in both scale and complexity.”43 This conclusion is echoed by experts who characterize the current
condition as a “tripolar nuclear system”44 or a “point analogous to the point reached by the Soviet Union andthe United States in the late 1950s.”45

Photo Credit: Estonian Foreign Ministry

41 Yao Yunzhu, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence,” Strategic Insights, vol. 6, no. 9 (September 2005); Oriana Skylar Mastro,“China’s Nuclear Enterprise: Trends, Developments, and Implications for the United States and Its Allies,” in Heather Williams et al. eds., Project Atom2023: A Competitive Strategies Approach for U.S. Nuclear Posture through 2035 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2023).
42 Brad Roberts et al., China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy (Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, March 2023), 13.
43 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving People’s Republic of China (Department of Defense,
October 2023), 103-104.
44 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The New Nuclear Age: How China’s Growing Nuclear Arsenal Threatens Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs (April 19, 2022).
45 Roberts et al., China’s Emergence, 14.

18

These assessments indicate a coming era of mutual nuclear vulnerability between China and the United States,
raising an important question for the U.S.-Japan Alliance: how does the alliance maintain credible extended
deterrence as China emerges as America’s nuclear peer? Stability between the three great powers at thestrategic level, whether formally-accepted or tacitly-existing, may conceptually pose at least two risks: the riskof “decoupling,” such that the United States would not defend its allies at the risk of homeland security, andthe risk of “stability-instability paradox,” in which a new nuclear peer becomes aggressive at the conventional
level with confidence in deterring allied intervention thanks to strategic stability.46 If the current state of the
U.S.-China nuclear balance is “analogous to the point reached by the Soviet Union and the United States in
the late 1950s,” it is useful to look back at developments in Europe during the Cold War, particularly Franceand West Germany which faced massive conventional threats from the East while the two superpowers had
roughly reached nuclear parity.

2. The Political Calculations of Credibility
U.S. allies pay costs for remaining under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Perhaps the highest is limiting their own
military capabilities in exchange for an agreement that the United States will defend them. Yet these allies
can never be certain that their benefactor will make good on its commitments.47 As China modernizes its
nuclear arsenal, scholars and practitioners in the United States have engaged in a debate on if and under what
conditions a conflict with China would escalate to nuclear use.
This moment is not the first in which the United States must assure an ally in the face of an adversary’s
technological advancements. In 1957, the Soviet Union successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM) and launched its Sputnik satellite. The debate in France over a national nuclear deterrent turned morefavorably toward proliferation.48 While there remained a gap between U.S. and Soviet capabilities, the UnitedStates and its European allies could take comfort in the belief that NATO could stop a large-scale invasion by
striking Moscow and other Warsaw Pact cities with a low risk of retaliation against the United States. This
fact alone made U.S. commitments more credible to both the Soviet Union and NATO allies. By the late 1950s,
Western allies could not count on the United States’ ability to strike the Soviet Bloc with impunity.
This development set off a series of schemes to bolster the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The biggest
issue was that given the new mutual vulnerability, allies believed that the United States was more likely to
decide it was not worth the risk to defend Europe and would abandon its allies in the face of a deterrence
failure. Making matters worse, if allies were making this calculation, they feared that the Soviet Union would
as well, challenging NATO’s credibility. China’s current nuclear modernization project threatens a very similarcalculation in both Tokyo and Beijing. As such, U.S. policymakers should heed lessons learned from France’s
1966 withdrawal of forces from NATO’s military command structure.
For much of NATO Europe, an automatic escalation to nuclear use in the face of a full-scale Eastern invasion
was the only guarantor against an existential threat.49 The United States would have an incentive to abandon
Europe in such a crisis as it would only face an existential threat if it entered the conflict. The continent hadbarely survived two World Wars in the same century, and in both instances, the United States had indicatedreluctance to join the fight. France in particular was wary of serving as the front line in the case of anotherconventional war on mainland Europe. Given this uncertainty, French President Charles de Gaulle worried that
whoever replaced U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had liberated France during the Second World
War, would not have the same full commitment to defending Europe.50

46 Brad Roberts, Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2013), 5-6.
47 Charles L. Glaser, “A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided,” International Security 43, no. 4 (2019): 66,
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00343.
48 Bruno Tertrais, “’Destruction Assurée: The Origins and Development of French Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1981,” in Getting Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured
Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004).
49 Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response : NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1991).
50 Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970, First Edition (New York: W W Norton & Co Inc, 1992).

19

De Gaulle’s concerns would prove founded in 1960 when John F. Kennedy won the presidential election against
Europe’s preferred candidate and Eisenhower’s Vice President, Richard Nixon. Franco-American relations
rapidly deteriorated between 1961 and 1965, in large part because the Kennedy administration viewed U.S.
strategy to be extremely reckless under Eisenhower.51 Yet, regarding nuclear use, many European leaders
wanted to make a political decision at the start of a war and then have all subsequent decisions out of theirhands completely.52 Making matters worse, the Kennedy administration took a very different view of how theUnited States should engage with its allies. As the stronger partner, they saw no need to consult allies during
the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises. Allies had no say in what measures the U.S. took in confronting the Soviet
Union, despite the implications for Europe.53 When the Kennedy administration made clear their intent to rely
more on conventional rather than nuclear deterrence, de Gaulle’s worst fears were confirmed.
This shift in strategy, known as Flexible Response, was a steep departure from the previous administration’s
nuclear-sharing proposals. Furthermore, Kennedy made this change without consulting allies. Coupledwith how little informed NATO was during the Cuban Missile Crisis, de Gaulle concluded that the UnitedStates intended to act unilaterally in the future.54 Coupled with Soviet advancements, France withdrew from
NATO’s integrated military command in 1966. Although the country did retain its political position in NATO,De Gaulle made it clear that only France could defend France. Soviet advancements in its nuclear program,coupled with American indications that it was uninterested in making policy decisions with its allies, played arole in France’s exit from integrated command.

3. Assuring Allies’ Defense
The United States, as a security guarantor, struggled to provide its European allies with a viable doctrine
at the non-strategic level that would exploit its advantage while offsetting a rival’s. In Cold War Europe,
two factors were crucial: U.S. forward-deployed troops and the option to use nuclear weapons. The twopillars were never abandoned, but priorities between them shifted as strategic conditions surrounding NATOchanged over time.

Photo Credit: Air Force Senior Airman Manuel G. Zamora

One way of signaling U.S. commitment is deploying
its own in-theater conventional forces. As Alexander
Lanoszka demonstrates, the presence of U.S. troops inallied territories during the Cold War served as a major
factor creating confidence in U.S. security commitments
and less keen on nuclear armament.55 By investing inforward-deployed forces, the United States showed thatit had “skin in the game,” with frontline troops working
as “hostages that convey commitment” enhancing
the security of European allies but also strengthening“deterrence-by-denial” capabilities, which would disrupt
a potential Warsaw Pact blitzkrieg by holding back fora long time with conventional means.56

Although the in-theater U.S. forces were always present in Europe, their roles nevertheless shifted fromtripwires to denial between the 1950s and 1980s. To reduce the role of the NATO troops and deter the Warsaw
Pact more economically, Eisenhower introduced the New Look strategy that relied on massive retaliation with
51 Robert McNamara, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; The Education of Robert McNamara, Video, 1986, https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/
V_57B0C41B71DF46678459A33505F76E87.
52 Wolf Graf von Baudissin, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Europe Goes Nuclear, Video, 1986, https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_5B6BF005FF414127B4E3460681A588F9.
53 Lacouture, 420-422.
54 Ibid., 422.
55 Alexander Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Cornell University Press, 2018).
56 Ibid., 15.

20

nuclear weapons to offset and deter overwhelming Soviet conventional ground forces.57 Despite Kennedy’s
1961 decision to replace New Look with Flexible Response with the goal of decreasing reliance on nuclear
deterrence, the Kennedy and subsequent Johnson administrations retained the logic of massive retaliation. It
was commonly understood that NATO’s troop numbers in Central Europe remained insufficient to hold off the
Warsaw Pact’s aggression. Instead, the relatively moderate size of U.S. ground troops was positioned so that
their defeat would trigger a nuclear exchange.58
It was not until the mid-to-late 1970s that the United States and NATO truly sought to establish conventional
denial capabilities over Soviet forces. As the growing pace of Soviet nuclear buildup made the logic of nuclear
response obsolete vis-à-vis Soviet conventional threats, the U.S. Department of Defense invented anotherasymmetric approach called “offset strategy” that, rather than initiating a tank-for-tank or soldier-tosoldier type of symmetric competition with the Warsaw Pact, exploited America’s technological advantages,
particularly in the area of precision-guided weapons.59 New intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance and longrange precision-guided capabilities, among other measures, now allowed the NATO forces to disrupt intruding
Soviet Bloc operations by targeting and striking its rear to cut them off from its front.60 These ideas wereincorporated into formal operational concepts, first in the U.S. Army’s 1982 Airland Battle and then in NATO’s
1984 Follow-On Force Attack (FOFA).61
This was an important breakthrough for NATO, especially for West Germany, because their conventional
military options were severely limited due to a dilemma between military rationality and political feasibility.
As prominent military scholars observed, the NATO members would effectively carry out defensive measures
if they either initiated them, engaged in a war of attrition deep into their territories, or launched an offensive
retaliation eastward, but these options were seen as politically unacceptable or too provocative.62 NATO’s new
FOFA concept sits somewhere in the middle as it was designed to hold back the first echelon of the Warsaw
Pact armies at the border of East and West Germany, while denying their follow-on forces from surging
through the use of conventional long-range precision strikes.63 Now, the United States actually reduced therelative role of nuclear deterrence by providing a more practical, and perhaps less destructive, military option
to its allies.64
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that conventional forces, no matter how improved, never replaced
nuclear deterrence. The debates over the role of nuclear weapons in deterring the Soviet attacks intensified
in the 1980s. The so-called “gang of four” former U.S. high officials publicly challenged the U.S. government’s
retention of a first-use nuclear option and called for strengthening conventional military posture topromote no-first-use (NFU) policy.65 Their proposal provoked critiques from Germans with varying politicalbackgrounds. They expressed serious concerns that NFU would render the currently complex, incalculable risks
of war far simpler, putting the Soviet Union “in a position where it could, once again, calculate its risk and thus
be able to wage war in Europe.”66 They made clear that NFU would not just make Western Europe vulnerable
to Soviet aggression but also “destroy the confidence of Europeans and especially of Germans in the European-

57 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 165-166.
58 Francis Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), Ch. 2.
59 Robert Martinage, Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability(Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2014), 13-16.
60 Bernard W. Rogers, “Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Reality,” NATO Review, Vol.32, No.6 (1984).
61 Martinage, Toward a New Offset Strategy, 14.
62 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Soviets Can’t Win Quickly in Central Europe,” International Security, Vol.7, No.1 (1982), 3-39; Samuel P. Huntington,“Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe [Assessment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategy Choices; Conference
Paper],” International Security, Vol.8 (1984), 32-56.
63 Bernard W. Rogers, “The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 5 (1982), pp. 1145-1156; Bernard W. Rogers,“Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Reality,” NATO Review, Vol.32, No.6 (1984).
64 Bernard W. Rogers, “The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 5 (1982), pp. 1145-1156.
65 McGeorge Bundy, et al., “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 4 (1982), 753-768.
66 Karl Kaiser, et al., “Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A Response to an American Proposal for Renouncing the First Use of Nuclear
Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 5 (1982), 1160.

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Cohort 1 at the Library of Congress

American Alliance as a community of risk.”67 Given this sensitivity, the U.S. government has never taken NFU
as a formal policy and has been cautious of even explicitly acknowledging mutual vulnerability with the Soviet
Union during the Cold War.68
Indeed, given that nuclear weapons are the “ultimate deterrent” with their ability to create a sense of horror,69
extending this deterrence to allies is a necessary condition for maintaining a credible U.S. commitment. This isparticularly the case for those states, such as West Germany, which sought to build a defensive force posturethat may not be strong enough to deter enemy attacks. As Richard Betts succinctly puts it, “[a] nuclear threat isthe best hedge against uncertainty about Soviet motives.”70

4. Implications for Japan-U.S. Alliance Facing a Nuclear-Peer China
From a political perspective, the United States can learn three lessons from its relationship with France during
this. First, reassuring Japan is more difficult than deterring China. The greater China’s nuclear capabilities,
the greater the threat posed to the United States. However, the United States will maintain a second-strikecapability which China will have to keep in mind. However, for Japan, it will be harder to trust the UnitedStates to respond to potential Chinese aggression. How Japan calculates the risk of U.S. abandonment isexacerbated by the costs it has paid to its own capabilities.
Second, current U.S. President Joe Biden can assuage Japanese doubts about his administration’s commitment
to maintaining Japanese security, but he cannot assure Japan of his successor’s commitment. U.S. presidents
hold power for at most eight years, but every four years candidates for the post have a very public debate over
U.S. policy, and the prominence of China’s military advancements all but guarantees that it will be a topic ofdebate in election cycles for the foreseeable future.

67 Ibid., 1162.
68 Heather Williams, “Ambiguous Acknowledgement: Mutual Vulnerability during the Cold War and Options for US-China Relations,” in David Santroed., US-China Mutual Vulnerability Perspectives on the Debate (Honolulu, Hawaii: Pacific Forum, 2022), 6-15.
69 John J. Mearsheimer, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe,” International Security, Vol.9, No.3 (1984-85), 20.
70 Richard K. Betts, “Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence,” World Politics, Vol.37, No.2 (1985), 178.

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And third, but perhaps the most important, any potential shifts in U.S. policy toward the region should bedone in consultation with U.S. allies. It is too tempting for the United States to conduct foreign policy first andinform its allies second. The Nixon Shocks are a prime example of this. The United States does not have toallow allies to dictate policy, but it should consult them nonetheless.
Militarily, U.S. forward-deployed forces would, if successful in creating a viable strategy, be able to reassure
Japan while simultaneously deterring China. Just as NATO frequently refined its military strategy during theCold War, the United States and Japan now need to update their military planning and doctrine to address andcounter current and future conventional threats from China. Fortunately, over the last decade and a half, thetwo allies have already been working on the development of new military doctrines—such as America’s MultiDomain Operations as well as Japan’s Multi-Domain Defense Force—that are intended to offset weaknesses of
one domain with strengths of others.71 More importantly, U.S. defense planners develop operational concepts
that stipulate how to counter military threats and project power from within the range of threats72 andJapanese defense observers have increasingly paid attention to this trend.73 These U.S. Pacific-theater forces are
not to make “presence for its own sake”74 but to provide the U.S.-Japan Alliance with denial capabilities that
could be most effective at the frontline at the early stage of conflict.
In addition to the conventional capabilities to deny Chinese fait accompli, retaining an option to use nuclear
weapons, including first-use, is also crucial. As there is no way to see what exactly deters others from initiating
aggression, it is highly risky to declare NFU or any policy that would potentially lower the threshold for theuse of conventional military forces. This is the reason why U.S. allies allegedly became concerned when the
Biden administration reportedly considered NFU as a formal policy.75 Moreover, the NFU debates in the
1980s indicate that missing allied capabilities to match a peer competitor at any of three levels—conventional,
tactical/non-strategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear—would make an ally feel vulnerable. Returning to the
U.S.-China military balance, the lack of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the U.S. nuclear posture may affectJapan’s confidence in the credibility of extended deterrence, not just because Japan has been one of leading
advocates for U.S. low-yield options,76 but because the lack of these options would significantly constrain allied
capacity to flexibly respond to China’s nuclear coercion or use. In short, the U.S. and its allies need to pursue
all possible efforts to strengthen deterrence; doing so will be far cheaper than the efforts to fight a war.

71 On U.S. Multi-Domain Operations Concept, see U.S. Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1: The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (December 6,2018). On the Japanese concept, see Ministry of Defense, Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond (December 18, 2018).
72 U.S. Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 19, 41; U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space Force, AFDP 3-99/SDP 3-99: The Department of the Air Force Role in Joint
All-Domain Operations (November 19, 2021), 1, 7-8, 20-21.
73 For example, Hiromu Arakaki and Ryo Kiridori, “Chapter 6: The United States: Implementing ‘Great Power Competition’ Strategy,” in National
Institute for Defense Study ed., East Asian Strategic Review 2020 (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2020); Shigeo Kikuchi, “Beirikugun Maruchi-domeinsakusen Konseputo: 21 Seiki-no Shoheikarengo to Aratana Tatakaikata no Mosaku [U.S. Army Multi-Domain Operations Concept: Combined Armsof 21st Century and Search for New Ways of War],” Boueikenkyujo Kiyo, Vol.22, No.1 (2019); “China as the “Pacing Threat”: Evolving U.S. Operational
Concepts and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2),” Security and Strategy Vol.2, No.2 (2022); Hiromu Arakaki, “The United States andCompetition with China,” Masuda Masayuki ed., The Shifting Dynamics of Great Power (Tokyo: Interbooks, 2023); “Chapter 3: U.S. Military Strategy for
Maintaining the International Order,” in NIDS ed., NIDS China Security Report 2024 (Tokyo: Interbooks, forthcoming).
74 Elbridge Colby, “Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee: Hearing on Addressing China and Russia’s Emergence as Great Power
Competitors and the Implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” January 29, 2019, 10
75 Demetri Sevastopulo and Henry Foy, “Allies Lobby Biden to Prevent Shift to ‘No First Use’ of Nuclear Arms,” Financial Times, October 30, 2021.
76 Matthew R. Costlow and Keith B. Payne, “TLAM-N and SLCM-N: Lessons for Extended Deterrence and Assuring Allies,” Information Series, No. 567(National Institute for Public Policy, November 15, 2023).

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CONCLUSION
Thank you for taking the time to read the insights of our Mansfield Next Generation of U.S.-Japan Nuclear
Policy Experts. Challenges once thought to be confined to the Cold War are now reemerging in prominencewith the addition of new factors and players. This will not only test the stability of the Indo-Pacific region but
also challenge the international order. In the face of this, strengthening the U.S.-Japan relationship will be vitalas it evolves into a global partnership that promotes a shared vision of progress and prosperity for the future.
With this program, the Mansfield Foundation is contributing to these difficult undertakings by nurturing
U.S.-Japan nuclear policy experts who are thoughtful, creative, and possess a comprehensive knowledge ofdifferent perspectives of the nuclear policy spectrum. Sayuri and I could not have asked for a better groupfor this inaugural cohort. We are grateful to have such brilliant and dedicated students and look forward tofollowing their professional advancements.
To further convey the impact of this program, I would like to end with a quote from a student on theirexperience with the program,Originally I participated in this program in order to solidify my knowledge foundations with regard tonuclear policy with an emphasis on deterrence, and I certainly achieved this goal through the webinars,
reading materials, and the exchange with the world’s leading experts and practitioners. That said,
what was even more precious in the program was the reminder that learning and thinking are fun,which I sometimes forget…This program provided us with a forum where we think about issues in groupand exchange views and opinions with other fellow participants even in a casual manner. Despite thecomplexity and elusiveness of nuclear issues, I enjoyed the interactions a lot and was inspired by this group.
Peyton Goodman
Program Manager
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation

Cohort 1 at the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C. with Counselor Tomonori Niho

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PARTICIPANTS

Cohort 1 at the U.S. Department of Energy

Students
Alice Dell’Era, Florida International University
Samanvya Hooda, Georgetown University
Alden “Eli” Horton, Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey
Miho Kawamoto, Hitotsubashi University
Ryo Kiridori, University of Toronto
Hiroko Kurosaki, Nagasaki University
Nahoko Miki, University of Tokyo
Takanobu Sato, Waseda University
Sayaka Shingu, Hitotsubashi University
Jordan Smith, American University
Jayden Thomas, George Washington University
Hiroki Watanabe, Tokyo Institute of Technology
Lily Wojtowicz, American University
Koichi Yoneda, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Mentors

Mansfield Foundation

Dr. Naoko Aoki, RAND Corporation
Elaine Bunn, Center for Strategic &International Studies
Dr. Patricia Kim, Brookings InstituteRoss Matzkin-Bridger, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Dr. Shane Smith, National Defense University

Dr. Sayuri Romei, Associate Director of Programs
Peyton Goodman, Program Manager

Acknowledgments
Special thanks to Mansfield Foundation Director of Communications, Timothy White, and Program AssistantIntern, Yisag Kim, for their contributions to this project.

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