A Psychological Approach to North Korea’s Nuclear Deterrence
Nuclear Discourse of the Kim Jong Un Regime

Koo, Kab Woo (University of North Korean Studies)

1. Nuclear Weapons in International Politics(1) From their inception, nuclear weapons have had a subversive effect on international politics. By
developing nuclear weapons in the early years of the Cold War, the five permanent members of theUnited Nations Security Council (UNSC) have effectively created a nuclear oligopoly. Nuclear
weapons state thus became synonymous with great power.

(2) Nuclear oligopoly also brought forward the concept of nuclear deterrence, aimed at preventing
future nuclear wars that lead only to mutual destruction. A nuclear weapon can be both ‘attraction’and ‘revulsion’ at the same time. 1 The relationship among the nuclear weapons states, as well as
between them and the non-nuclear weapons states, is not only determined by nuclear capability but
nuclear psychology. The same nuclear weapon can be attraction when it is in a friend’s possession,
but revulsion if it is held by a foe.

(3) <Table I> shows how nuclear weapons influence international politics<Table I>

1

D. Barash and C. Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies (London: Sage, 2002).

Int’lRelationship among nuclear

Relationshiprelationsweapons states

nuclear

Identity
FriendFoe

andbetweennon-nuclear

weapons states
Nuclear cooperation

Nuclear umbrella

Nuclear conflict and nuclear

Nuclear threat and nuclear

deterrence

development(nuclearproliferation)(4) Nuclear threat is a psychological state that a non-nuclear weapons state can slip into, when thestate’s relationship with a nuclear weapons state is hostile. When faced with nuclear threat, some will
respond with a nuclear program that can be successfully developed by not only strong resolve but
execution capability. However it is also possible that a development plan be frustrated by internationalpressure, even with strong resolve and high capability. If a nation without nuclear weapons is tocontinue defending itself by military means, it must either strengthen its defense posture or find afriend that has nuclear weapons, largely driven by a balance of power perspective. In the latter case,the friend will offer a nuclear umbrella to the non-nuclear weapons armed state in the form of amilitary alliance. A case in point is Sweden, which sought to develop a nuclear program on its own
during the period 1945-1968. 2 By discarding its program and cooperating with the U.S., Sweden
successfully countered the Soviet threat and maintained its non-alignment policy. Likewise,accommodating nuclear umbrella can be a replacement for being a nuclear weapons state.

2

T. Jonter, “Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1968,” Science and Global Security,

18 (2010).

(5) Non-nuclear weapons states can exercise yet another option, which is to move away from thebalance of power perspective as indicated in <Table I> to create a ‘nuclear-free zone.’ A state may
participate in a regional agreement or declare itself to be a ‘one-state Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
(NWFZ),’ as Mongolia did in 1992. A NWFZ is established through a treaty that bans production,
testing, deployment and storage of nuclear weapons. Moreover, before a NWFZ is established, nonnuclear weapons states may need negative security assurance from nuclear weapons states.
However it is questionable whether the NWFZ is can stand in parallel with a military alliance underwhich nuclear umbrella is provided to non-nuclear weapons states

2. Why Go Nuclear?

(1) In the early stages of state-making, nuclear discourse of North Korea (DPRK) was centered on‘anti-nuclear’ sentiments. The World Peace Conference, in which the DPRK delegation participated,
was convened in the late 1940s under the theme of prohibition of nuclear weapons. However, theSoviet nuclear test changed the landscape of nuclear discourse for DPRK. It accepted a binary
opposition of good weapons of the Soviet Union (USSR) versus bad weapons of the United States. It
was a sudden turnaround for DPRK, which regarded the Korean War and the subsequent Cold War to
be a consequence of imperialist policy based on supremacy of power. North Korea quickly aligned
itself to the new socialist policy based on supremacy of the Soviet power, and formed its nuclear
discourse on issues such as nuclear test ban and prohibition of pre-emptive strike.

(2) After U.S. deployed its first set of tactical nuclear weapons on south of the Korean peninsula in1957, DPRK began to construct a new discourse on nuclear threat. North Korea had the resolve, but
was lacking capability to initiate a nuclear program on its own. Formation of the DPRK-USSR militaryalliance in 1961 meant that North Korea would be under a de facto nuclear umbrella of the Soviet
Union, and Pyongyang simultaneously presented a peace zone concept to its counterparty. The
peace zone, according to DPRK, was defined as a “zone free of nuclear and rocket weapons,” to becreated through anti-imperialistic solidarity of the people in the region. However, as the bilateralrelations turned sour, DPRK turned to “the line of simultaneously carrying on the building up of theeconomy and defenses (simultaneous line)” in December 1962. It was a decision to replace the soviet
nuclear umbrella with strengthened military posture.

(3) In August 1963, Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed by the governments of the U.S., Great Britain
and the Soviet Union. DPRK immediately perceived this initiative to be the three nations’ attempt toprevent nuclear possession by other socialist states. When China (PRC) blasted its first nuclear bombin October 1964, strong words of support came from DPRK, indicating a hopeful expectation for a
new umbrella to be provided by China. In a statement released immediately following the nuclear test,
PRC argued that the test was carried out to disable nuclear monopoly of the superpowers andultimately to make nuclear weapons disappear. The same argument was repeated in North Korea’s
statement that was released right after its 1st nuclear test in October 2006.

(4) At the sixth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in 1980, DPRK argued that peace andsecurity would not be maintained by balance of power, and called for nuclear free zone and peacezone to be established not only on the Korean peninsula but the world as a whole. North Korea urged
the world to ban testing, production, storage and usage of nuclear weapons, and to realize theircomplete dismantlement. Pyongyang continues to propose for a nuclear free zone to this date.
Moreover, North Korea’s nuclear free zone was conceptualized to be “a zone free of foreign militarybases and facilities in which aircrafts and vessels are banned from passing territorial air and sea orusing airport and seaport.” 3 The definition indicates that denuclearization would not be possible
unless South Korea-U.S. alliance became defunct.

(5) In September1991, the U.S. announced withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea(ROK). Three months after in December of the same year, the DPRK leader Kim Il Sung met U.S.
Congressional Representative Stephen J. Solarz, and said that North Korea was neither capable nor
willing to develop nuclear weapons. This is a statement often quoted as the denuclearization“instruction of Kim Il Sung.” When the second nuclear crisis began in October 2002, DPRK’s position
was somewhat reluctant on nuclear development discourse. It was at the foreign spokespersonstatement of October 25, 2002, that North Korea first came up with deterrence, with nuclear
development message implicitly embedded in it. The spokesperson argued that non-aggression treaty
can be a reasonable and realistic solution to break nuclear impasse between DPRK and the U. S, andthat negotiation and deterrence can be alternated for the sake of autonomy and survival of the regime.
The focus, however, was on negotiations.

(6) North Korea began to mention deterrence from April 2003, as seen on the foreign ministry
spokesperson’s statement on April 6, 2003.

“The Iraqi war shows that to allow disarming through inspection does not help avert a war but
rather sparks it. Neither international public opinion nor the UN Charter could prevent the U.S.
from mounting an attack on Iraq. This suggests that even the signing of a non-aggression treaty
with the U.S. would not help avert a war. Only the physical deterrent force, tremendous military3

A Dictionary of International Law (Pyongyang: Publisher for Social Science, 2002).

deterrent force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack supported by any ultra-modern
weapons, can avert a war and protect the security of the country and the nation. This is a lessondrawn from the Iraqi war. …… (the DPRK) will have no other option but to beef up the deterrent
force for war by mobilizing all the potentials.”This statement shows a major shift in DPRK’s position, which believed that the U.S.-DPRK nonaggression treaty as a solution, even after the second nuclear crisis. The change in position camefrom the U.S. aggression against Iraq. This statement, more than anything, is interpreted to be a
discourse to justify nuclear development endeavors of North Korea. They regard military deterrence
capability, including nuclear power, to contribute more to their security than international cooperationor anti-war peace movement of the civil society. The Rodong Sinmun editorial dated June 14, 2003,
which commemorates the 2000 inter-Korean summit, also said that “our deterrence capability is a
victorious deterrence and legitimate exercise of defense power to protect the homeland territory
including South Korea and the 70 million compatriots.”(7) DPRK used “a foreign ministry statement” to declare nuclear weapons possession on February 10,
2005. The statement announced that North Korea “had already taken the resolute action of pulling outof the NPT and have manufactured nukes for self-defense to cope with the Bush administration’s
evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK.” However, the January 2003 “statementof DPRK Government” said that pulling out of the NPT doesn’t mean that they “have no intention to
produce nuclear weapons” and that their “nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only topeaceful purpose such as the production of electricity.” The government statement also argues that“the DPRK may prove through a separate verification between the DPRK and the U.S. that it does notmake any nuclear weapon.” If one is to take their words at face value, North Korea’s policymakers

came to believe that, since January 2003, there had been a radical change to the political ‘situation’that they were face with, a change big enough for them to believe that they needed nuclear weapons.
Pyongyang attributed their policy change to the U.S. invasion against Iraq of March 2003 and the U.S.
nuclear threat waged against them.

(8) DPRK’s motivation for nuclear development may not come from changes in the political situation,
but from its unique ‘disposition.’ In 2005, North Korea and the U.S. released the September 19 jointstatement to exchange the Korean peninsula denuclearization with the Korean peninsula peace
regime, In December of the same year, North Korea blamed the U.S. for a breakdown in the Agreed
Framework between the U.S. and DPRK, saying that “it was a right decision to maintain and notdisable nuclear facilities,” and that “it was a matter of time for the Agreed Framework to break down
and light-water nuclear reactor construction to come to a complete stop.” North Korea also applauded
itself for its foresight and for timely responses it took as a self-defense measure(9) Policymakers in North Korea often attribute their nuclear development to the surrounding politicalsituation. For example, DPRK once said that “it is none other than the U.S. that pushed the republicthat yearns denuclearization, to the path of nuclear weapons possession.” On the other hand, the U.S.
and the neighboring states have tended to cite the unique disposition of the policymakers as the maincause of nuclear development in North Korea. Generally speaking, one tends to regard politicalsituation as the cause of positive action by adversary. 4 When the action is negative, disposition isusually cited as the underlying cause. In other words, after the politics of identity determine a state to
be an enemy, friend or at least a friend candidate, DPRK’s motivation for nuclear possession will be

4

J. Mercer, Reputation & International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

determined to come from either disposition or political situation. If disposition is the case, thendenuclearization would not be possible unless there were a fundamental transition in the current
DPRK regime. However if the motivation came from political situation, then resumption of
denuclearization process would be possible. It is because the former is regarded as a variable, andthe latter a constant(10) DPRK insists that their nuclear possession is a “deterrent for self-defense under any
circumstances.” While realization of nuclear deterrence can begin with a declaration that one has
deterrence capability, it will not be created by declaratory statement alone. For the deterrence
capability to earn ‘credit,’ those who exercise it need to secure physical ‘capability.’ Necessary
conditions for nuclear deterrence include the ability to prevent and retaliate against any attack fromthe adversary party. To this end, test of nuclear bombs and delivery devices and reductions of thewarhead both in size and weight must be completed. Second, the deterrence capability was
powerless unless recognition came from the counterparty. Therefore, by recognizing nuclear
deterrence capability, conflicting states may begin to cooperate with each other. DPRK is engaging ina ‘recognition struggle,’ in a way that sends an expensive signal of nuclear threat to induce
cooperation. Third, one should be able to display a resolve that nuclear weapons could be used.
Those who strive for nuclear deterrence tend to display their deterrence capability with a firm stanceat low-level conflicts. Put another way, if one is to acquire nuclear deterrence capability, one needs tobuild a strong, and consistent ‘reputation’ in the counterparts.

3. A Stronger Discourse for Nuclear Deterrence(1) Despite internal complications incurred by power succession, North Korea struck an agreement on
February 29, 2012 with the U.S., to bring back the principles as laid out in the September 19 Joint
Statement of 2005. The February 29 Agreement called for implementation of the September 19 Joint
Statement, the U.S. provision of nutrition aid to DPRK exclusion of private use goods in the U.S.
sanctions list, bilateral discussion for light-water nuclear reactors following resumption of the six-party
talks, Pyongyang’s temporary stoppage of nuclear test, missile blasting and uranium enrichment
activities, and IAEA surveillance against the DPRK nuclear program. The two sides also disclosed
their intentions to continue with dialogue, as they share the understanding that “improving bilateralrelations to realize denuclearization bring “benefit” to both countries. The two sides placed
denuclearization on the agenda again, against the backdrop of the six-party talks that broke down in
December 2008. Around this time, Kim Il Sung’s instruction for denuclearization was an agenda itemthat North Korea can agree to, although it must be said that denuclearization is linked toestablishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula.

(2) On March 16, 2012, North Korean Committee for Space Technology announced that “the DPRK
is to launch a working satellite, Kwangmyongsong-3, manufactured by itself with indigenous
technology to mark the 100th anniversary of President Kim Il Sung.” The announcement immediately
threw the February 29 Agreement down the drain. It was a crisis situation. The U.S. warned that therocket launch by DPRK would destroy the bilateral agreement, making a strong case against testingof a de facto nuclear weapons carrier.

(3) This confrontation needs further explanation. Negotiators from both the U.S. and DRPK admitted
to having discussed the issue of rocket launch at the bilateral talks. North Korea insisted that they
were clear about their intention to launch satellite rocket during the course of discussion, but the U.S.

claimed that North Korea unofficially spoke of halting its launch plan. On March 27, 2012, the DPRK
foreign ministry released the following statement, in order to clarify the relationship between its
satellite launch and the Feb. 29 agreement.

“At the U.S.-DPRK high-level talks, the DPRK consistently maintained that a moratorium on longrange missile launch does not include satellite launch for the peaceful purposes. As a result, the U.S.DPRK agreement dated February 29 specified a moratorium on long-range missile launch, not“launch of long-range missile including satellite launch” or “launch with the use of ballistic missile
technology.”

As of now, there is no telling fact from fiction. However, this debate could have created a watershed
moment for DPRK’s nuclear discourse, as afterwards North Korea seemed to be distancing itself
more and more from denuclearization agenda. 5(4) Pyongyang described launch of its multipurpose satellite as fulfillment of “Kim Jong Il’s instruction”
as well as “an essential requirement for economic development.” On March 31, 2012, North Korea’s
foreign ministry spokesperson released a statement at the news of the U.S. calling off food aid plansfor its people. The statement began to develop a discourse based on argument that the U.S. wasusing North Korea’s rocket launch as “an excuse to set up a U.S. missile defense system” in this5

For more details, see Koo Kab Woo, “North Korea’s Foreign Policy and Peace in Northeast Asia (inJapanese),” The Journal of Peace and Community Studies, 4 (2014), published by Rikkyo Institute for
Peace and Community Studies.

region and it also argued that U.S. was taking a path toward “creation of a new cold war, which
disturbs peace and stability not only on the Korean peninsula but also in the Northeast Asian region.

(5) The fourth WPK Party Conference of April 11, 2012 elected Kim Jong Un as the First Secretary,
the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and a standing member of the Politburo. A few days
after on April 13, North Korea launched Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite, which failed to enter its preset
orbit. North Korea openly acknowledged its failure. Furthermore, at the 5th Session of the 12th
Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), Kim Jong Un was elected as the First Chairman of the National
Defense Commission. On April 13, DPRK’s Socialist Constitution was amended and renamed “Kim Il
Sung-Kim Jong Il Constitution.” The preamble was changed to include Kim Jong Il’s achievement,
which was transformation of DPRK into a “nuclear weapons state.” Although unofficial dialogue
continued between the two countries, DPRK commented on July 20 that “making the prospect ofdenuclearizing the peninsula all the more gloomy,” and that “the situation compels the DPRK tototally reexamine the nuclear issue.”(6) On August 31, 2012, the DPRK foreign ministry released a memorandum under the title “The U.S.
hostile policy towards DPRK the main obstacle in resolving the nuclear issue.” Here North Korea
admitted to “the similarity in technology, as a matter of fact, between satellite rocket launchers andnuclear warhead missiles.” In other words, Pyongyang was admitting that satellite launch test canalso be construed as a missile test to carry nuclear warhead to the U.S. territory, but also pointed totolerance exercised by the U.S. in similar tests conducted by other countries. Moreover, North Korea
also emphasized that the principle of words for words, action for action, as agreed at the September
19 Joint Statement of the Six-party Talks, will not function unless the U.S. departs from its“confrontational attitude toward DPRK.” Two paths were proposed to the U.S. here. The first was to“unroll its hostile policy towards the DPRK,” and the other path was for “the U.S. to maintain its
current hostile policy, in counter of which North Korea will continue expanding and strengthening its
nuclear arsenal.” If the latter path were to be chosen, DPRK would “inevitably” have to “prolong”
possession of the “treasured sword.” Nuclear possession, as explained at the memorandum, was nota tactical choice but a strategy for DPRK. To sum up in a short sentence, the memorandum wasinevitably calling for “prolonged” possession of nuclear arsenal by the North.

(7) North Korea came back with satellite tests right before South Korea’s presidential election, on
December 12, 2012. This time the satellite successfully entered at the orbit. Discussions for punitive
international sanctions ensued, and the DPRK foreign ministry released a memorandum which could
be the foundation of Kim Jong Un’s foreign policy on January 14,, 2013. Dissolution of the “United
Nations Command (UNC)” was put on the agenda. Without mentioning denuclearization, or creationof a nuclear free zone, Pyongyang was linking UNC dissolution with a peace treaty. The mainargument in this memorandum was that the U.S., under its pivot to Asia policy was trying to transformthe “UN Command” into a “multinational force command” which served as a matrix of the Asian
version of NATO.

(8) The UNSC adopted Resolution No. 2087 to impose sanctions against the DPRK launch ofsatellites on January 22, 2013. The DPRK argued that it drew “a final conclusion that denuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula is impossible unless the denuclearization of the world is realized, andreleased a statement declaring that “the September 19 joint statement adopted at the six-party talks
on the principle of respect for sovereignty and equality has now become defunct and the prospect for
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has become gloomier.” It was against this resolution that
Pyongyang responded with the 3rd nuclear test of February 12, 2013. Through the Korean Central

News Agency (KCNA), North Korea claimed that they now had nuclear weapons that were
“sufficiently small, light, and diverse.” The North Korean foreign ministry argued that its goal was “tofocus efforts on economic construction and the improvement of the standard of people’s living by dintof nuclear deterrence for self-defense” to justify its nuclear possession from economic perspective.

(9) On April 1, 2013, DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly passed the “Law on Consolidating Positionof Nuclear Weapons State,” as a follow-up to the constitutional amendment which includes nuclear
power status in the preamble. The new law could be interpreted as a commitment for possession of
nuclear deterrence without proliferation, until denuclearization was realized at a global scale(10) Although resolve for nuclear deterrence was being solidified through legal and systematic
framework to “perpetuate” nuclear weapons presence, North Korea seemed to question the economic
efficacy of the resolve. In the WPK Central Committee “report” of March 2013, Kim Jong Un said that“the most important and pressing challenge to the WPK is to accelerate economic power state
construction and improving quality of people’s lives, and that the republic rejects the threatening
blackmail that there will be no economic development unless it gives up nuclear weapons, and also
deceiving appeasement that help will be provided when it opts for another path.” Although the‘political situation’ of the first half of 2013 was one of the conditions for North Korea’s choice of the“simultaneous line,” it can also be said that North Korea’s disposition for self-reliance, based on its
peculiar security discourse, led it to the path for simultaneous line. On the domestic front, Pyongyangseeks to overcome the economic crisis through technical innovation and the introduction of
independent management system. Kim Jong Un feels that “active efforts should be made externally,to create a favorable environment for realization of the simultaneous line of economic development
and nuclear capability build-up.” However, such efforts still remain at ought-to-be ideas, such as

“diversification of external trade,” and exploration of underground resource to ease cash shortage
problems.

(11) Revisionist states with only a small number of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, tend tobelieve that the enemy’s resolve is not strong enough. They also believe that if deterrence capability
functions properly, then a large stockpile of nuclear weapons or arms race will not be necessary, andthat crisis and confrontation and can be reduced to the minimum level. Moreover, states with small
stockpiles could easily come to a self-assessment that through low cost highly efficient nuclear
weapons, they can reallocate some of their resources for economic development and thus maximize
their economic ‘benefits.’ However, looking at only a few nuclear weapons, the other party may
become tempted to forcefully remove them. Furthermore, a small stockpile may potentially bringvulnerability to those who own it, who may feel tempted to either blast them or give them up entirely.
This is a nuclear deterrence paradox for states with small number of nuclear weapons.

4. Prospects for Resumption of Denuclearization Process(1) Northeast Asia now stands at a crossroad that leads to a path for balance of power, and another
path for post-balance of power. How and whether the Korean peninsula denuclearization process will
be resumed would determine the future path for Northeast Asia.

(2) Since 2010, the U.S. has been pursuing rebalancing policy, which aims at strengthening bilateralalliance with South Korea and Japan, respectively, and at forging a triangular military alliance
between the three countries. Given the closely-woven economic network between China and the U.S.,
China containment seems unlikely, but the intention is to bring China under siege. In particular, North

Korea’s nuclear program brings justification to the U.S. in building a Terminal High Altitude Air
Defense System (THAAD). At a point in time when North and South Koreas are unable to resume
functionalist cooperation, the ROK government plans to import Kill Chain and KAMD as deterrence
against the DPRK nuclear weapons. Although the U.S. is actively reaching out to Japan forstrengthening of its bilateral alliance, even acknowledging collective self-defense right of Japan, theKorea-Japan relationship is deteriorating to the extent that the tripartite military alliance is not fully
realized between the U.S., Korea and Japan(3) PRC is urging for a new model of major power relations to the U.S., by recognizing vital interest ofeach other to create a respectful, cooperating international order. This proposal is similar to the fiveprinciples for peaceful coexistence, as agreed upon by China and India in 1954. At the Northeast
Asian level, China wants counter the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance by consolidating anti-Japanposture as part of its ‘anti-imperialistic’ balanced line. PRC wants to induce ROK’s participation.
China’s strategy also brings unwanted consequences, which is improvement of DPRK-Japan relations
even as nuclear weapons status of DPRK remains unchanged. Changes in DPRK-Japan relations
came in the midst of restructuring in the Northeast Asian order, as the political and economic interest
get aligned between the two countries. It should also be noted that China is not displaying thepresence of a major power, as seen in its inability to persuade other participants to the six-party talks
to resume discussion.

(4) Through denuclearization process, North Korea should evoke memories of anti-nuclear postureand nuclear free zone proposal. A meaningful breakthrough in denuclearization process that has
positive correlations for improving U.S.-DPRK relations can only be found in resumption of the U.S.DPRK dialogue. However, DPRK is holding on to its ‘nuclear peace theory,’ which would mean that“military aggression is not waged at nuclear weapons states.” The U.S., on the other hand, is
exercising strategic patience against DPRK. If countries in Northeast Asia pursue balance of power
policy, internally and externally, then ‘security dilemma’ will be intensified in Northeast Asia. Now weneed changes in both domestic and international politics to overcome the instability in the Northeast
Asian order. The following are some suggestions for change in Northeast Asia order.

(4-1) North Korea could acquire recognition as a nuclear weapons state. However, if recognition of
DPRK’s nuclear deterrence by neighboring states might not only weaken the foundation of the NPT
regime but also trigger nuclear race in Northeast Asia. China and the U.S. came to an official
agreement for non-recognition of DPRK’s nuclear weapons state status and pursuit for
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. However, the American position is to call for a dialogue withdenuclearization as a precondition, while the Chinese position is to call for a dialogue to enabledenuclearization. Also, North Korea’s simultaneous line, which the U.S. has no intention to accept,
has not been mentioned at all by China. The three principles in China’s North Korean policy,
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, promotion of peace and stability, and solving issues
through dialogue and negotiations, remain unchanged.

(4-2) China could extend nuclear umbrella to North Korea. A held view by the ‘fundamentalist’ elites in
China is that neither denuclearization nor unification would be possible unless the American forceswere withdrawn from Korea. Such stance calls for an exchange between denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula and breakdown of the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, Pyongyang may strongly rejectBeijing’s nuclear umbrella in fear of subordination to China. Therefore, nuclear umbrella may be asolution that North Korea cannot consent to. Another solution could be nuclear umbrella being

provided by the U.S. to DPRK. China is not likely to accept this solution, however, as it will turn North
Korea into a pro-American state.

(4-3) Going back to the September 19 Joint Statement once again, negotiations can be resumed todeal with the idea of exchanging the Korean peninsula denuclearization and the Korean peninsula‘peace system’ that includes functional cooperation under a peace regime. For resumption of the sixparty talks, the U.S. needs to withdraw strategic patience posture, and the two Koreas need to
improve relations. In other words, resumption of talks will only be possible when the U.S. and ROK
can implement a policy of benign engagement toward the North. At a point of time and in a space
where rebalancing policy of the U.S. collides with a new model of major power relations of China, thesix-party talks need to evolve into a venue for the Northeast Asian countries to overcome balance ofpower and have shared memory of peace for the future. The resumption of six-party talks could be achoice for the participants to reduce transaction cost for Northeast Asia security cooperation, more sothan initiating Ulaanbaatar process or even Jakarta process.