POLICIES FORMARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS& SPACE TECHNOLOGYPOLICIES FORMARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS& SPACE TECHNOLOGYCONTENTS
Overview: Purpose, Scope, and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Why Multilateralism Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Applying Space to Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Case Studies for Applications of Space Tech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Big Data, Big Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Building a Framework to Capture it All . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Photo Credit: Hurricane Lane seen from the ISS by ESA/Alexander Gerst
Cover Photo: U.S. Navy’s USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, Italian frigate ITS Virginio Fasan and the USNS Supply, by Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Merissa Daley

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OVERVIEW:PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND ASSUMPTIONSIn 2021, the Mansfield Foundation convened aworking group of practitioners and scholars toaddress how best to establish more effective maritime
domain awareness in the contested South China Sea(SCS). The spark for this working group came fromthe U.S.-Japan Space Forum, a standing committeeof American and Japanese space policy experts whichmeets twice yearly to examine critical developments
and opportunities for cooperation in space.
From its inception in 2015, the Forum has recognizedthat maritime domain awareness is a field ripe forpairing with space technology. Nowhere is thismore evident than in the South China Sea, the hotly
contested body of water traversed by some of theworld’s busiest shipping lanes and home to valuable
fisheries and undersea resources. Multiple nations
have laid competing claims on islands in this sea,
and the international community at large depends on
the peace and stability of these waters for economic
prosperity. Against this backdrop, our working group
aimed to: unite stove-piped initiatives in maritime
domain awareness; improve decisionmakers’ access tosophisticated tools from small satellites, big data andpredictive analytics; and develop the relationships
and processes needed to create a shared process formember nations to preserve the South China Sea as acommon good for all humankind.
The Mansfield Foundation selected ten experts fromfive countries: Australia, Japan, the Philippines, theUnited States, and Vietnam. Each of these nations
has significant economic and strategic interests inthe waters of the South China Sea. Moreover, eachnation struggles to some degree with sea blindness:an inability to fully appreciate the central role theoceans and naval power have played in securing
strategic security and economic prosperity.1 Most ofthese nations also have strong records of bilateral andmultilateral engagement with one another, leading
us to believe that cooperation on Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA) would prove technically andpolitically feasible.

For example, the United States has worked with
Australia and Japan from the earliest days of its push
into space, and is now leading the Artemis Accords,
an historic effort that will return humans to themoon for the first time in 50 years and land Japan’s
first astronaut on the moon. In addition, the Japan
Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) recently signed
a memorandum of understanding with the Philippine
Space Agency (PhilSA) to work together on providing
real-time data for disaster management and response
efforts.2 Although Vietnam’s entry into the realmof space is in its infancy, it has already cooperated
with both the United States and Japan on civil
space activities, and has launched a formal dialogue
with the United States on how to exploit celestial
capabilities to address terrestrial challenges suchas climate change and disaster response. Japaneseexperts have also recognized Vietnam’s advantageous
position for expanding the use of new satellite
technologies to ASEAN and the Pacific islands. The
combination of Vietnam’s ground infrastructure andsatellites with Japan’s technologies and services iscritical to opening more opportunities for mutual
development, according to presenters at a panel of
VNSC and Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, andIndustry (METI) professionals.3
As an ever-growing number of illegal activities
in the South China Sea harm economic growth,
infringe upon national sovereignty, and undermineinternational law, the group’s experts agreed thatthe first step to reversing this trend is improving ourcapability to detect and attribute maritime activities.
None of the stakeholder nations represented in our
working group possess all the capabilities needed
to fully understand the scope of these unwanted
activities and effectively direct law enforcement tocurtail them. Moreover, several of the stakeholder
nations lack the military or law enforcement muscle
needed to challenge illegal and grey-zone operations.
In the case of grey-zone operations, they are also
vulnerable to economic and political punishment if
they were to challenge another nation’s maritime
claims or operations directly.

1
Bracknell, Butch, and James Kraska. “Ending America’s ‘Sea Blindness.’” The Baltimore Sun, December 6, 2010. https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/bsxpm-2010-12-06-bs-ed-sea-treaty-20101206-story.html.
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Our working group members unanimously agreed
that clear goals must be established for any
multilateral cooperation on MDA to be effective, andthose goals must be flexible enough to address thediffering needs of each stakeholder. MDA is definedby the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as“the effective understanding of anything associatedwith the maritime domain that could impact security,
safety, the economy, or the maritime environment.” 4
Our working group agreed that “effective” awarenesscan be defined broadly as “that level of understanding
which guides decision-making.” However, we also
acknowledged that “effective” maritime domainawareness looks different to different players, evenones within the same nation’s armed forces andcivilian agencies. Its meaning is tightly tied to eachdecisionmaker’s role, responsibilities, and authority.
At the national or international levels, where
policy and operational decisions naturally affectmultiple stakeholders, “effective awareness” requires
recognizing and balancing competing interests. Anybilateral or multilateral initiative to improve maritime
domain awareness must thus begin by defining terms
and agreeing on shared objectives. Our working
group aimed to identify the most critical challenges
to establishing sufficient maritime domain awarenessin the South China Sea to enable more “effective”
management of challenges such as search and rescue,disaster response, illegal fishing, smuggling, andintrusions into territorial waters. The group was
tasked with generating practical policy proposals forboth multilateral processes and products to address
such challenges.

The proliferation of small satellite constellations in
low-earth orbit (LEO) and the growing accessibilityof algorithms for parsing big datasets has openeda new dimension of possibilities for maritime
domain awareness. We are far from the first groupto recognize this—the U.S. Government has alreadystarted the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime
Domain Awareness (IPMDA) with its fellow Quadmembers to address this issue—but we are one of
the first to look at this trend in the larger context ofmultilateral partnerships. A multilateral framework
built around the goal of resolving sea blindness via
the use of small satellites and big data would allow
participating nations to leverage the strengths ofthe group to cover the weaknesses of the individualstates. It would also allow member nations tofoster a process by which to address each other’sconcerns, build transparency, and create a sharedunderstanding of what is going on through publicdomain websites or databases.

Yet building such a framework to fill gaps
is rife with its own challenges. Foremost
among them are building mutual trust,defining and reaching consensus onpolicy and operational gaps, aligningand prioritizing research, development,
and acquisition of technical assets andanalytic capability to close those gaps, andestablishing the command-and-control
architecture needed to weave together an
effective network of public agencies andprivate companies to get the jobs done.

JAXA | Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. “JAXA | International Cooperation,” n.d. https://global.jaxa.jp/projects/activity/int/topics.html.

Vietnam National Space Center – VNSC. “Vietnam, Japan Reach Deal on Satellite Data Exchange,” September 19, 2017. https://vnsc.org.vn/en/activities/
international-cooperation/vietnam-japan-reach-deal-on-satellite-data-exchange/.
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Photo Credit: Office of the Prime Minister of Japan

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International Maritime Organization. “Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness in West Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden,” November 14, 2018. https://imo.
org/en/MediaCentre/Pages/WhatsNew-1203.aspx.

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THE PROCESS IS A PRODUCT:WHY MULTILATERALISM MATTERS

Multilateral, collective MDA is necessary to monitor
transboundary activities conducted by pirates,
smugglers, and other actors who seek to leverage
disconnects between South China Sea nations.
However, without a trusted process by which totake collective action and resolve disputes, mostnations will focus on unilateral action or bilateralsolutions due to a relative ease of implementation.
Thus, our working group’s first task was to address
the legitimate concerns around multilateralismand define a clear raison d’être for establishing a
multilateral MDA framework. Why would such asolution be preferable to bilateral options? How can
we address the reality that our participant nations
have competing claims to the South China Sea andstill produce strong, productive multilateral action?
The answer is twofold: first, we found great value
in creating a space to harmonize existing MDA
initiatives across diverse stakeholders to avoid the
duplication of labor and improve value propositions
for future initiatives. Nations like Australia, thePhilippines, and Vietnam experience choice overloadfrom multiple, competing proposals for MDA
programs being presented to them by the Quad, theEU, and others. We therefore recommend that the
governments of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, theUnited States, and Vietnam work together, at first,
to remove redundancies in existing MDA initiatives
and ensure each initiative comes with a uniquevalue proposition. Examples of initiatives that could
be synergized include the Quad’s IPMDA, the EU’s
CRIMARIO initiative, and India’s Indo-Pacific Ocean
Initiative. A multilateral forum is the most efficientvenue to harmonize existing proposals. It is also
important that the process be scalable and inclusive,and built on a shared set of norms and practices that
acknowledge the necessity of preserving the high seas
as a common good for humanity. Any and all who
can abide by these principles and bring their own
skills and resources to bear in the effort should be
welcomed in.
Second, we found that attempting to get every
country to the same level of technological andinformational proficiency is both unrealistic andimpractical. We must acknowledge that all nations

have relative advantages and disadvantages, and thatthe greatest efficiency is generated when these skills
are traded. We reject the notion that information
sharing can only flow from advanced spacefaring
nations to their more junior counterparts. The UnitedStates and Japan may have the edge on satellite
imagery, but they are at a relative disadvantage whenit comes to the contextualized knowledge needed
to tell harmful activities apart from harmless ones.
The localized expertise of Australian, Philippine, andVietnamese observers is valuable in the identificationand interdiction of bad actors. By trading these skills
amongst themselves, all nations are better off andhave more time to dedicate to their areas of relativeadvantage.
The same principle applies when considering how
best to operationalize MDA. Once nations haveidentified a maritime threat, a collective response
allows for optimization and a more efficient use of
scarce maritime patrol assets. A collective response
also has more normative power: it sets a model
for international conduct in the maritime domain.
Our working group recommends that their fivenations start by choosing a single, practical sharedchallenge, such as IUU fishing, narcotics and/or
human trafficking, or piracy, and build a process
to coordinate multilateral action against this issue.
International laws like the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provide a helpful baselinethat participant nations can then build out from as
they work together to address the issue.
A key element of making multilateral action work isbuilding public awareness of the need to protect theSouth China Sea as a common good for all nations.
Our working group identified insufficient public
understanding of the economic value of the South
China Sea’s ecosystems and species (and the roleof international law in protecting that value) as a
key cause of poor support for multilateral action. If
cooperation on a shared challenge like IUU fishingor piracy may be too ambitious of a first task tobuild this multilateral process, then we posit that acoordinated, multilateral public education campaign
to improve general understanding of these two issues
is a more manageable first step.

Interestingly, this “easy starting point”
may even have positive knock-on effects:
the recent Australia-Indonesia bilateralagreement to reduce IUU fishing across theirlong maritime border in the Timor Sea andArafura Sea5 identified poor understandingof maritime borders as a key cause of IUU
fishing by Indonesian ships. Targeting thesepublic awareness efforts at relevant parties,
such as fishermen, across our five participant
nations will produce gainful improvements inawareness and remove ignorance as an excuse
for conducting activities like IUU fishing.
Bringing more awareness to the value of theSouth China Sea as an ecological and economic
common good can also drive policy changes
between claimant states. While our brief is nottargeting or calling out any specific actor, it isimportant to note that much of the world’s IUU
fishing is perpetrated by vessels originatingfrom China. Therefore, increased awarenessamong ASEAN nations of the South China
Sea’s economic and ecological value may
help these nations resolve their overlapping
claims and build a more united front fromwhich to negotiate or regulate solutions to
IUU fishing. Further, visibility into maritime
activities is essential to not only internationallaw enforcement and norms-building but also
domestic enforcement. Countries that struggle
to identify their own illegal fishers due toinsufficient MDA capabilities would likely
welcome an agreement that gives them real-time information on where to deploy limited
law enforcement resources.
As a possible first step, we recommend thenegotiation of a multilateral agreement toregister fishing boats active in the South
China Sea, to include taking photos of fishingactivity to enable action against illegal fishers.
The Asian Regional Forum provides a readyplatform at which relevant nations could
explore such a step. At present, the main
problem is in tackling grey zone activity. If
relevant nations agreed to share and register
the information from fishing vessels around the
SCS, making clear the position and location of
IUU fishing, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia andother nations in the region would be better able
to take action.
Negotiating a multilateral MOU among
participant nations would have the advantage
of ensuring consensus rather than encouraging
a single actor to dictate the terms or set rulesof engagement and norms for gathering andusing information from pooled assets. Throughnegotiating the MOU, each nation can work topromote their own goals and values as part of
the new multilateral agreement. Participation ina multilateral framework would aid in fisheries
monitoring & management domesticallyas well. If, for example, Vietnam receives
information about Vietnamese boats conducting
illegal fishing, they can use this to find andprosecute those individuals for their actions.

Photo By: Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Samuel Osborn
5
Garda Bhwana, Petir, ed. “Indonesia-Australia to Strengthen Cooperation in Combating Illegal Fishing.” Tempo, October 2, 2022. https://en.tempo.co/
read/1640862/indonesia-australia-to-strengthen-cooperation-in-combating-illegal-fishing.

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We have identified several key obstacles to creating
an information sharing MOU based around themaritime domain. The first is simply figuring out
which organization in each country will take thelead. Given the variety of purposes for which nationsattempt to establish maritime domain awareness,there is bound to be competition among bureaucratic
actors, both civil and military, to determine who
leads and who gets priority access to any informationin the system. It is a situation ripe for internal andexternal confusion. In the United States, whichhas perhaps the most complex bureaucracy of thefive participant nations, it is easy to list a dozen or
more parties—the intelligence community (itself
comprised of dozens of organizations), the U.S.
Navy, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department ofState, the Department of Homeland Security, theDepartment of Transportation, the Department ofCommerce, NASA—all of which could reasonably
have a role in negotiating or contributing to an MDA
information sharing and analysis agreement. How
would these disparate agencies work together toclarify a command-and-control structure suited tothe operational requirements of each? What would
be the costs? How would staffing be assigned? Similar
coordination challenges will exist in each country
seeking to participate in any multilateral MDA
structure.
Adding an extra layer of complexity, our working
group also identified a role for the private sector
within this MDA framework. From mega-corporations
like Google to small non-profits monitoring illegal
fishing with open-source earth observation data,
many private sector actors can bring great value to an
information sharing and analysis agreement if theirinvolvement is given a clear purpose and guardrails.
This is already evidenced by the contributions ofprivate organizations like Windward and Oceana
to monitor dark vessels, illegal fishing, and otheruntoward maritime activities.6 When looping these
private entities into our framework, we must also
account for their constraints and motivations. If
Company A is contracted to provide frequent satellite
imaging data of the Strait of Luzon to the UnitedStates Government, which then goes on to share thatdata with its partner nations under an MOU, thecompany may lose those nations as potential clients.

There may still be motives strong enough to drive
companies to participate in these agreements, butthey must thoughtfully structure the incentives toensure participation is mutually beneficial.
As national legislation bodies and legal frameworks
differ significantly from country to country in thisregion, our working group anticipates that somegovernments will be reluctant to release data to theprivate sector under any circumstances. However,there are also nations that would benefit greatly fromthe support of the private sector and many that havealready integrated their private sectors through adefense contractor role, such as the United States andJapan. Looking at these examples, our working group
imagined that with proper incentives, productive
public-private partnerships could be achieved even incountries where the legal framework to support such
relationships does not yet exist. For example, thePhilippines may consent to make a limited amountof data available to private sector actors if it is forthe express purpose of monitoring illegal fishing or
island-building activities in the Luzon Strait. Thesetargeted approaches have better chances of successthan a general call for complete transparency.
Building a legal framework which allows for thisflexible, targeted involvement of the private sector
will be difficult, but our working group expects thatthe results will likely be worth the effort.

Ultimately, our working group members
remained convinced that the value of amultilateral solution outweighed the costs
and moved on to consider what forms itshould take. While a shared database whereparticipant nations could pool data andshare analyses was appealing at first glance,that would be costly and replicative of the
IPMDA effort if done at the governmentto-government level. As our primaryinterest is to build a mechanism for reducing
redundancies and generating new value, we
eventually moved in a different direction.
The “Building a Framework” section ofthis report gives a thorough explanation of
our thinking and recommendations for thenature of this multilateral mechanism.

Kurmanaev, Anatoly. “How Shady Ships Use GPS to Evade International Law.” The New York Times, September 3, 2022. https://www.nytimes.
com/2022/09/03/world/americas/ships-gps-international-law.html.

68Photo By: Esrageziyor on Pexels

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APPLYING SPACE TO SEA –A POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO MDA TECHNOLOGIESWe have compiled this section to give policymakers abaseline understanding of the technologies and tools
discussed throughout this report. The satellite data
used for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) can begenerally divided into two categories:
1.) data for monitoring ocean-surface ship
movements and2.) data for characterizing the marine environment,such as weather and oceanographic conditions.
These are both important to developing an
understanding of normal and abnormal maritime
activities, and to distinguishing lawful activities
from those that may be harmful, hostile, or illegal.
Space observations are generally considered the mostcost-effective way to collect global Maritime Domain
Awareness data given the vast scale of Earth’s oceans.

than identifying ship positions. The most widely
accepted definition of MDA defines it as the “effective
understanding” of anything associated with themaritime domain that impacts the security, safety,
environment or economy of a country. “Effective
understanding” refers to decision support; that is,understanding whether what we observe is normal
or abnormal, threatening or benign, legal or illegal.
The information this requires can be very complex,
involving weather, regulations, markets, and manyother factors that add context to ship positing
observations. Today’s computational analytics are an
essential part of MDA programs, making sense of the
global MDA data we collect.

Small commercial satellites, equipped with the
payload technologies discussed below, bring newearth observation capabilities to bear on the maritime
domain, and are good enough to detect virtually any
activity on the ocean’s surface with real-time coveragein their designated patrol areas. These satellites
produce terabytes of data every day, far more thanhuman analysts can handle. However, the highspeed, high-volume computer analytic capabilities
derived from image recognition and machine learningtechnologies can process the imagery, signals, andbroadcasts collected by satellites quickly enough to
be useful for strategic decision-making, operational
planning and tactical operations. On a somewhat
longer timeline, big data analytics, including network
analysis, helps connect the dots between bad actors
and the people benefitting from their actions. For
example, large Marine Protected Areas can, for the
first time, be continually surveilled from space todetect and track vessels that may be trespassing onthese delicate ecosystems. Law enforcement can use
this data to direct scarce government patrol vessels to
the right place at the right time to catch or deter thatillegal activity. Analysis of trends in that information
also serves to inform budget and force structure
decision-making to ensure that a nation’s maritime
forces are properly sized to ensure maritime safety
and security, and to protect that nation’s economy
and environment.

Several types of sensor payloads on satellites have
proven useful in detecting, tracking, and identifying
ships at sea. These include:

Maritime Domain Awareness, however, is more

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Monitoring ship movements by satellites– Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers– Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems– Electro-optical (EO) sensors– Radio Frequency (RF) receivers
We outline the key characteristics of each sensor’s
strengths and weaknesses:
Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers
Pros:– Already widely adopted by commercial vessels– Supply chains for producing them are wellestablished– Alerts ships to other nearby crafts, preventing
collisions– Acts as a digital credential to verify a ship’s
ownership info and travel history
Cons:– Can be falsified to make it seem like ships arein a different location than they really are,using tech similar to how a VPN allows users toaccess geofenced internet content– Their range is relatively localized without accessto an AIS-tracking satellite

Figures 1 and 2. Operation and Observation range of JAXA satellitewith AIS (SPAISE)

In 2004 the International Maritime Organization
published regulations that required certain vessels—
primarily large commercial vessels—to carry and use
AIS equipment as part of the international Safety ofLife at Sea convention. Prior to satellite AIS receivers,
those ships’ broadcasts were received only by otherships in the vicinity and by shore stations relatively
close to the broadcasting ship. In 2008, however, thefirst commercial satellite AIS receivers showed thatAIS broadcasts from ships anywhere at sea could bereceived, and the ships themselves could be tracked
everywhere they went. This formed the basis ofmodern global Maritime Domain Awareness.
AIS is a system that automatically sends signals
with information such as the ship’s name, type,position, course, speed, and destination, etc. WhenAIS receivers are mounted on a satellite, information
on ships within a range of about 5,000 km from thesatellite can be obtained. AIS is therefore a very widearea surveillance tool that also provides the ship’s
identity, a critical element of information that ties theship to its owner and beneficiaries, its history, and thekind of activity that it was designed for. Visual displaysof AIS’s wide-area coverage show trade routes, fishinggrounds, port facilities, and other features that add
context to the position report data from AIS.
AIS is vulnerable to “spoofing” (falsified position
reports broadcast to hide a vessel’s true position),but several technologies are available to detect
these attempts. Additionally, not all vessels are
required to broadcast AIS, and vessels engaged inillegal activities generally do not identify themselves.
Vessels that do not voluntarily identify themselves

are often called “dark vessels,” and other sensors are
required to detect, track, and identify them. Two suchtechnologies in commercial and civil use today are
SAR and RF geolocation.
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems
Pros:– Monitors ship locations regardless of whether
the ship wants to be seen
– Can cover large areas of over several hundred
kilometers in one image– Has a high probability of accurately detecting
steel-hulled ships; analytic tools can increase
the likelihood of differentiating non-steel-hulledships from other objects like islands.
– If controlled by an operator, can “zoom in” onsmaller areas to produce a higher resolution
image.
– Can detect “dark vessels” that have turned off
AIS
Cons:
– Wood and fiberglass are not as clearly reflected,
requiring additional analysis to differentiatethem from other reflective surfaces like islands
or waves.
Satellite SAR was first demonstrated in 1978 and has
become an important source of wide-area surveillancedata. Unlike AIS, SAR does not depend on thevoluntary cooperation of ships; instead, it is an active
satellite system that transmits pulses of radar energy
and receives the radar energy reflected by ships and11other reflectors. Steel ships reflect radar very well,while other reflectors, like waves, and non-metallic
materials such as wood or fiberglass reflect radar
less well. Ships generally show up as a bright spot
on a dark background, although other reflectors likeislands or ice can appear to be a ship. Analytics basedon computer vision and machine learning are used
to distinguish ships from other reflectors.7 SAR canbe used as a wide-area surveillance tool, coveringlarge areas of ocean up to several hundred kilometers
wide in a single image, with a high probability ofdetecting steel-hulled vessels. The same satellite radar
equipment that produces wide-area images can also
be commanded from the ground to refocus its radar
coverage to produce much higher resolution imagesof a smaller area. When combined with AIS, SAR
is often a valuable tool for law enforcement in thedetection of dark vessels.8

Electro-optical (EO) sensors
Pros:– Can produce photographic imagery on many
scales of distance, from hemisphere-wide
meteorological shots to pictures of a single ship
– Produces clear photographs of specific targets
which can be used as evidence of unwanted
activities
Cons:– Each EO payload can only produce images in
one set resolution and over one set geographic
area

Figure 3. Concept of ship observation using SAR

Satellites carrying EO payloads can produce
photographic imagery of all scales, frommeteorological images of entire hemispheres tohigh-resolution images of a single ship; however,each satellite’s area coverage and image resolution
are generally fixed (unlike SAR). High resolution
EO imagery is desirable because it can often show
evidence of unwanted activities, such as fishing in
restricted areas via visible net buoys or illegal shipto-ship transfers. Wide-area EO imagery serves anentirely different function: providing meteorological oroceanographic context that helps us understand ship
movements. For example, ships that veer off course
may be avoiding a storm. Sea color and temperature,observable from space, are oceanographic conditions
that serve as predictors of where fish are most likely
to be found, and where Coast Guard vessels are most
likely to find fishing vessels.
Radio Frequency (RF) receivers
Pros:– Can be used to detect ships across a wide area
– Can detect “dark vessels” that have their AIS
turned off
Cons:

RF geolocation is the most recent vessel detection
and tracking capability for commercial satellites. This
capability uses the difference in the time it takes asignal from a ship to reach each of several satellites
to calculate the ship’s position. These signals may befrom navigational radar or any one of several otherRF emissions. Like SAR, RF geolocation is helpful indetecting and tracking dark vessels. RF geolocation
generally does not identify a ship, but like SAR and
AIS, it is a wide-area detection capability that can beused to cue high-resolution EO imagery collection or
to cue patrol vessels and aircraft to the location of theemitter.
Very High Frequency (VHF) Data Exchange System(VDES): Next generation AIS
In addition to sensors used for detecting, tracking,and identifying ships, other satellite payloads
provide “over the horizon” (OTH) communications.
With increasing demand for maritime VHF data
communications, AIS, which can carry fairly shorttext messages not related to navigational safety, iscommonly used for messages between ships. In somegeographic areas this message traffic has createdthe need for additional VHF channels to carry thosemessages. One of the most modern of these maritime
communications systems is the Very High Frequency
Data Exchange System (VDES), which is intended togreatly expand the capabilities of AIS as a means ofcarrying maritime information to other ships and to
shore facilities.9 This information is considered criticalto the future of “e-navigation…intended to meetthe present and future needs of shipping throughharmonization of marine navigation systems andsupporting shore services” and “to enhance berthto-berth navigation and related services for safety
and security at sea and protection of the marine
environment.” 10 VDES is expected to be an important
improvement for maritime communications, including
AIS broadcasts and Application Specific Messages
sent via AIS.

– Cannot provide any identification or attributionof ships, only location

Figure 4. Concept of Combined Use of AIS and SAR for monitoring ship movements

7

For one such application, see “XView3 - Dark Vessels,” n.d. https://iuu.xview.us/.

For articles related to JAXA satellites with SAR and AIS payloads, see “Advanced Land Observing Satellite-2 ‘DAICHI-2’” at https://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/
alos2/ and “Advanced Land Observing Satellite-4” at https://global.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/alos4/
8

12

9

IALA AISM. “G1117 VHF Data Exchange System (VDES) Overview,” February 1, 2023. https://www.iala-aism.org/product/g1117/.

10International Maritime Organization. “E-Navigation,” n.d. https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Pages/eNavigation.aspx.

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CASE STUDIES FOR

Oil Spill Monitoring

APPLICATIONS OF SPACE TECH

The applications of these space observation tools
are only limited by our imagination, and span far
beyond the security-minded aspect of ensuring ships
observe sanctions and international law. They are alsovaluable tools for observing meteorological conditionsat sea, fisheries management and protection, oil spillmonitoring, identifying safe routes through Arctic
sea ice, and much more. We have provided a coupleof case studies of some of these applications below toillustrate how these tools work in reality.
Fishery and resource management
The use of satellite data makes it possible to know
fishing ground points, which enables efficient fishing,such as saving fuel for fishing vessels. On the other
hand, the decline in fish catches has been pointed

out in recent years, and there are concerns about the
decline of fishery resources themselves. Therefore,
it is required to properly manage fish catches sothat fishery resources can be used sustainably andmaximally. There is a growing emphasis on curbing
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishingthat undermines the effectiveness of such resource
management. In these circumstances, in order toassess fish catches in the open ocean, observation
data and vessel information from satellite AIS, SAR
and EO imagery, or RF collections from space, as
well as data from Japan’s Global Change Observation
Mission (GCOM) satellites, are helpful for fisheryresource management and monitoring illegal fishingvessels. Wide area surveillance can be used to cuehigh resolution EO imagery that documents illegal
activities (Figure 6).

Oil spills in the ocean have a significant impact oncoastal human activities, marine life and ecosystems,
resources, and the environment. Incidents such as
the August 2020 oil spill from a ship run around off
the coast of Mauritius (which resulted in significant
damage to animals and plants and fishing activities
across the Mauritian coast) are often apparent in SAR
imagery, where the oil spill appears darker than thesurrounding oil-free water.
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) observations allow
us to grasp a complete picture of the extent of suchan oil spill (Figure 7). In the case of the spill near
Mauritius, JAXA promptly provided information to
the relevant organizations and local response teams
to minimize damage, and mobilize oil clean-up workand support activities in the environmental field.13
Contribution to the Development of Arctic Sea
RoutesIn recent years, as Arctic Sea ice extent has been
decreasing because of global warming, shipnavigation through Arctic Sea routes during thesummer season has been attracting attention. In
cooperation with Japan’s National Institute forLand and Infrastructure Management, Ministryof Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism(MLIT), Hokkaido Development Bureau, andAomori Prefecture, JAXA is conducting research tounderstand the actual situation of ship navigation in
the Arctic Ocean. This coordination provides spacebased AIS Experiment (SPAISE) and sea ice data fromsatellites to assist port maintenance (Figure 8). In
addition, JAXA is also using satellites to plan optimalroutes by combining AIS data with observed marine
and meteorological conditions.14

Figure 5. Satellite observations are combined to meet users’ information requirements.11

Figure 7. ALOS-2 Observation images of oil spill

Figure 8. Ship distribution by JAXA satellite AIS (SPAISE) and sea
ice distribution by GCOM-W in the Arctic Ocean (September 2020)

Maritime safety and shipping logistics
Spaceborne AIS receivers and SAR enable us to obtain
global ship navigation information. In particular, thecapability to receive AIS data in open seas, where
ground-based AIS cannot, helps to understand thestatus of ship navigation in the open seas, investigate
the causes of marine accidents, and monitor
individual navigation performance (Figure 9).

Figure 6. Wide-area surveillance is used tocue high-resolution imagery collection.12

Figure 9. Annual ship density distribution in thevicinity of Japan (2019)15
13
JAXA Earth Observation Research Center (EORC). “Cooperation for the Oil Spill Incident in Mauritius Coast by Using ‘ALOS-2’ Observation,” September 29,
2020. https://www.eorc.jaxa.jp/en/earthview/2020/tp200929.html.

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11

JAXA. “Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) – JAXA Earth-Graphy / Space Technology Directorate I,” n.d. https://earth.jaxa.jp/en/application/mda/index.html.

14“Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) – JAXA Earth-Graphy / Space Technology Directorate I,” n.d.

12

Cutlip, Kimbra. “Taking the ‘Secret’ out of Rendezvous at Sea.” SkyTruth, March 13, 2023. https://skytruth.org/2017/02/taking-the-secret-out-of-rendezvous-at-sea/.

15“Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) – JAXA Earth-Graphy / Space Technology Directorate I,” n.d.

15BIG DATA,BIG PROBLEMS

The desirability of establishing a multilateralframework to share and analyze MDA data is driven
by the emerging capabilities of small satellites coupledwith big data and powerful data analytics. There
are both opportunities and risks associated withthe massive amounts of data now being collected,
data a multilateral MDA framework would have tosomehow manage. Our group unanimously agreed
that the “more is better” idea is a false premise
here: more data is simply more data. Whether it isgood or bad lies in the interim steps of cleaning,organizing, and analyzing it. These steps imply anunderlying human capital challenge facing eachmember nation, especially if we are to collaborate
effectively. Additional human capacity is needed foreach member nation to improve their ability to handle
these massive data sets and to provide strategic
oversight for its use.
While nations like Vietnam and the Philippines excel
in knowledge of localized ship movement patterns,
they do not yet have the capacity to use advanced
analysis tools like AI and machine learning to parse
gigantic datasets. Those who do, such as Australia,
Japan, and the United States, struggle to connect thepatterns they may find in data to value judgments
about the nature of a given activity. This set ofcomplementary capabilities supports our argument
for a multilateral information and capacity sharing
MOU.
It is important for the MOU to have clear goals andsafeguards in place when establishing protocols forthe collection and sharing of data and the use ofalgorithms. A massive amount of data on government
servers without a clear purpose is wasteful, bothfinancially and ecologically,16 and may lead to humanrights concerns related to privacy and government
oversight. There is also a growing body of literaturethat suggests that predictive technologies canbe biased by the worldviews of their creators,
leading to misclassification of individual actors or
misinterpretation of patterns. While the sheer scale

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of the maritime domain makes such tools a nearnecessity for analysts, practitioners must be awareof the limitations of their data and their tools whentrying to provide actionable intelligence to maritime
forces.
Simply recommending “data sharing” as a bestpractice is unhelpful; we must also address thequestion of what type of data should be shared.
Many senior officers have spoken openly on theimportance of interoperability and data-sharing withlike-minded nations, but implementing agencies
lack the operational clarity they need to act onthat recommendation. In less than ten minutes of
discussion, our working group generated the following
list of questions that implementing agents would
likely ask upon receiving a request to share data:– With what internal bureau of the partner
nation should this data be shared?
– Which datasets are to be shared?
– How much cleaning should be done to thedataset before it is shared?
– Should the source of collection be revealed
when sharing?
– Where does the burden for data verification
fall?
– What offices within my own agency must
review the data before it can be shared?
– If the data contains some error or bias that
affects the mission outcome, who will be held
accountable?
– Given that each country has its own“Information Sharing Protocol,” what would
be the legal basis of the body in information
sharing?
– Will the body determine/choose the agency
that will be responsible for the fusion
information?
These are only a small sample of the questions we
discussed and are meant to illustrate the complexityof the task at hand.

Keeping servers active has a large carbon footprint that may lead to a poor cost-benefit analysis. Further research into these implications is necessary.

Another fundamental premise our working
group scrutinized is whether transparency inthe maritime domain is desirable. While there
has been a large push towards making dataas transparent as possible on the premise thatdoing so improves performance or reduces
bias, transparency carries significant risks.
If, for example, a drug cartel is aware that its
illegal activities at sea are being monitored, it
will likely adopt even more clandestine tactics
to evade prying eyes. Alternatively, failure
to censure a state for unscrupulous behavior
at sea could lead to a loss of credibility forthe monitoring nation. Like a mischievous
student who becomes emboldened by ateacher’s lack of correction, an excess oftransparency may lead to bad behavior being
given tacit permission simply because the costof correction is too high. Our working groupmembers agreed that transparency must be
approached with caution.
At the same time, we also acknowledge thatsome level of transparency is necessary if
we are to be responsible caretakers of dataand if the private sector is to be involved inthis arrangement. There are already many
non-governmental organizations conducting
analysis of existing earth observation data
made available through NASA, JAXA,
and the other space agencies of the world.
This gives further credence to our plan of
introducing a university-led framework forthe participant nations to use as a basis fordelineating who receives what kinds andamounts of data. Given the existing hurdles
to sharing classified information, thisworking group recommends that efforts befocused on unclassified information, which
could be extended to include personallyidentifiable information or law enforcement
sensitive data. Safeguards can be put in placeso that only government actors can receive
unclassified information, while private actors
may be invited to work on specific datasets
when their capabilities mesh well with theneeds of the contributing nation.
Photo Credit: Creative Commons CC0

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Photo By: Kai Stachowiak

It is important to clarify what issues can and cannot
be resolved through the addition of larger amounts
and more types of data. For example, nations havean incentive to keep data private if their own law
enforcement or security services may be negatively
implicated by it. Data has clearer and more useful
applications in areas such as fisheries management,
where the number of fish is a critical indicator offishery health and overall sustainability for theenvironment. On the other hand, data has a verysmall role to play in determining which agencies
handle which types of enforcement on the sea
within a domestic government. Data sharing is mostsuccessful when there is a clear mission or goal tobe achieved and when contributors can be relatively
easily defined. It is important for contributing nations
to clarify and streamline their protocols for working
with international partners so that valuable time is
not lost on finding the correct point of contact.
Finally, our group needed to consider the practicalities
of how this data would be managed, classified,and shared. There are already existing initiatives
for sharing classified data, including the IPMDA,
and given the administrative burden involved,
we judged that the database used to implement
the recommendations of this working groupdeals primarily in unclassified earth observation
data. Our working group ultimately decided that
this framework should be hosted as a databaseestablished and maintained by the universities
taking part in the MOU described earlier. The field ofastronomy provides a useful example of how similar
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Photo Credit: StockSnap on Pixabay

databases have grown up, showing the consequencesof establishing a multilateral MDA mechanism inboth peaceful and warfighting scenarios. Whileno nation would agree to give sensitive data to
an untrusted actor, recent history shows many
examples of cyberattacks leading to leaks of criticalinformation. If a conflict were to erupt between aparticipant nation and another nation, perhaps evenanother participant nation, it is possible that the
information shared under this agreement could becompromised or put to uses not originally intended orcontemplated. While there is little a legal framework
can do to prevent this outcome, it is possible to build
a framework that establishes relatively low barriers to
exit, allowing nations to halt their cooperation within
the framework if it no longer serves their interests.

Data Management
Participant countries may consider coming
up with a database and/or software where
like-minded countries may share their data.
Layered security access is an option to ensure
information-sharing is still based on theneed-to-know basis. Similarly, the body may
consider the use of Artificial Intelligence andMachine Learning to process big data.
Data leaks are likely inevitable; participant
nations must get ahead of these leaks rather
than hyperfocusing on total prevention.
Building a resilient system that can politicallyand technologically survive leaks is key.
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BUILDING A FRAMEWORKTO CAPTURE IT ALL

Determining where to host the multilateral MOU
we have discussed in the sections above has been
the largest challenge our working group faced. Afterintense discussion in Tokyo, we ultimately agreed ona few criteria that a host must satisfy:1.

It must be a neutral body capable of getting
recognition from all participant nations
2. It must be able to sustain long-term action
towards building the sophisticated behavioral
analytics needed to support military/law
enforcement applications of satellite data to
MDA
3. It must be able to work with the public, privatecompanies, and governments to provide
products that address each group’s uniqueneeds for MDA information
Based on these criteria, we decided that a consortiumof top universities from each of the participant
nations would be the most effective host platform for
the MOU. On an organizational level, universities
have more leeway to make agreements and takequick action when compared to governments and law
enforcement agencies. They are also considered, atleast by this working group’s members, to be moreneutral than political or economic bodies such as the
Quad or ASEAN. At the same time, many universities
also maintain close relationships with their nation’s
private and public sectors such that they can develop
ideas and products that may eventually be picked up
by either sector. On an individual level, professors
benefit from longer and more stable careers thanpoliticians and political appointees in agencies andarmed services.
We propose that this consortium of universities work
together to build a tiered set of products:
1.

A shared database where universities, NGOs,
and civilian government agencies like NOAA
can share open-source datasets from a rangeof sensors.
2. A public education program on oceanic
ecosystems, maritime trade, and the valueof international law in protecting them fromharm. Using the database as a teaching
tool, mobilize public sentiment in support ofgovernment policies regarding maritime law.
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3.

Establish a fusion center focused on developing
the behavioral analytics algorithms needed
to parse the massive data sets collected bylow earth observation satellite constellations
and combine it with the local knowledge ofPhilippine and Vietnamese partners who canapply understanding of their local context tothe data analysis. This product would alsointerface with NGOs to centralize and improve
the quality of various datasets. The fusion
center would utilize data of participating
countries, process the data, and send analysis
back to partner nations via secure government
channels.
4. Create a symposium co-hosted by theuniversity consortium which brings together
private and public sector stakeholders to
identify the problems they need help insolving and showcase potential solutions
to existing challenges. As part of this, theconsortium should maintain a list of all active
and decommissioned MDA initiatives by orfor member governments. This can form thebasis of a high-level discussion group to beheld on the sidelines of the conference, where
governments work out ways to harmonize
and improve the value propositions of theirrespective programs.

Although universities cannot accessthe same datasets as military or law
enforcement agencies, they excel at beinga marketplace of ideas that can draw on
the experience of astronomers. Theseexperts leverage open-source datasets tocreate the analytical processes and tools,
such as algorithms for machine learningand artificial intelligence, that could
eventually be picked up by government or
the private sector for a multitude of uses.
The International Academy of Astronautics
Conference on Space Situational Awareness,
focused on the identification and monitoringof objects in low-earth orbit, is an exampleof how this concept has already been provento succeed in an adjacent field.17
17More on the ICSSA can be found at the website for IAA’s third suchconference: https://iaaspace.org/event/3rd-iaa-conference-on-spacesituational-awareness-icssa-2022/

Map Credit: Sangjinhwa
Photo By: Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Markus Castaneda

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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
environmentally sound practices. If anation can benefit from the platform,
then they should also contribute to it.

With the above considerations in mind, the working
group has identified nine policy recommendations forparticipant nations to pursue in advancing Maritime
Domain Awareness through space technology:
1.

2. Identify shared priorities in the maritime
domain where collaboration would havehighest impact. Our discussions indicatethat these would be in sharing access to data
(both satellite and ground-based) and sharing
analytic tradecraft.
3.

b. The stakeholder product would support
analysis to tackle specific issues, suchas illegal, unreported, and unregulated(IUU) fishing, trafficking in persons,search and rescue, etc. The products
would integrate open source andcommercial satellite data, as that iswhere we can get the most consistent,
persistent flow of data into the platform.

Participant nations should build a clear
definition of what it means to have an‘effective understanding’ of the maritime
domain in the South China Sea (SCS) basedon their collective roles and responsibilities.
Identify key stakeholders and understandwhat elements of information and analysis
are essential to their ability to fulfill theirroles.

Build a consortium of universities or research
institutes (e.g. national labs) from theparticipant nations which can act as neutral
brokers to develop three products—one forthe public, one for specific stakeholders, andone for government-to-government—that canutilize small satellites/big data and inputs
from each participant nation’s governments(coast guards, navies, etc.) to serve individual
strategic priorities and support the process ofmultilateral cooperation. By relying heavily
on open source and/or commercial data, we
can provide a consistent flow of information
and analysis.
a. The public product would cultivate
popular support for responsible ocean
management. The goal is to develop
strong public support for government
policies that will help ensure sustainable,c.

The government-to-government productwould create a fusion center to handle
sensitive information related to law
enforcement, sanctions enforcement, orother government activities.

4. This consortium should also oversee thecreation and development of a code of
conduct for how data is collected, formatted,
and shared so that apples-to-apples
comparisons are possible. Universities enjoy
access to expertise and public trust thatgovernments sometimes lack. Researchers
typically have longer, more stable careers
than politicians or military officers, allowing
them to prune and grow protocols over time.
5.

b. Consider the data privacy implications ofa government-to-government framework:
e.g. how will civilians be able to protect
personally identifiable information if itenters into the datasets being sharedacross borders? Would this become abarrier to multilateral cooperation?
6. Rather than investing in a single shared
database, consider following the example of
the Quad MDA fusion centers and create an
information framework based on memorandaof understanding (MOU) among theconsortium members. These MOUs should
be designed to promote efficient sharing of
information. Nations that may not have theeconomic or technical capacity to contributeto the construction of such databases canstill be essential partners in gathering thedata needed to populate them and providing
the understanding needed to distinguishharmless activity from harmful activity.

7.

Invest in systems to protect and filter shareddata and safeguard the mechanisms by whichdata is shared to ward off cyber-attacks andthe intentional fabrication of data.

8. Give stakeholder nations a common
language based on the concepts of “Levelsof Awareness,” “Pillars of Awareness,” and“Essential Elements of Information,” socivilian and military agencies and private
sector actors can all smoothly work together
at sea and ashore.
9. Engage private sector stakeholders, such as
international non-government organizations,
corporations, and non-profits, as contributorsof analysis and analytical tools to join theuniversity-led consortium initiative.

The consortium should accept boundaries—
recognizing that nations will inevitably bereluctant to share access to certain data sets,
and that legal frameworks may also makedata sharing difficult.
a. Determine the types of data that can beshared, the amount of data systems canprocess, and the willingness/ability ofeach nation to permit multilateral data
sharing.

Photo By: Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Riley Gasdia

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