FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Jan. 28, 2016

National Commission on the Future of the Army
Releases Final Report
The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) today released its final
report to the public. At its final open meeting, the eight commissioners each provided
oral remarks on the report’s findings and recommendations and then took questions
from the media. The report can be accessed at the NCFA’s website at:www.ncfa.ncr.gov.
The NCFA was charged by Congress with examining the structure of the Army andpolicy assumptions related to the size and force mix. The Commission was tasked withmaking recommendations on modifications to the structure of the Army based on
current and anticipated mission requirements and acceptable levels of national risk,consistent with available and anticipated future resources. The Commission also wasspecifically tasked with examining the transfer of Army National Guard AH-64 Apacheattack helicopters to the Regular Army from the Army National Guard. TheCommission was given until February 1, 2016 to issue its report.
The report contains 63 specific recommendations for action by policymakers inCongress and the administration. They are listed by responsible official in Appendix Bof the report.
On the two main issues before the Commission – force size/mix and the transfer of
Apaches to the Regular Army from the Army National Guard – the commission foundthe following.
An Army of 980,000 is the minimally sufficient force to meet current andanticipated missions at an acceptable level of national risk. Within that
980,000, the Commission finds a Regular Army of 450,000, an Army National Guard of335,000, and an Army Reserve of 195,000 represent the right mix of forces and, again,
the absolute minimum personnel levels to meet America’s national security objectives.
At these levels, the Army must be adequately resourced. The reserve components also
must be employed more frequently to provide the operational capability and strategic
depth the nation requires. Additionally, these forces should be maintained at currently
planned readiness levels, and every effort should be made to increase modernization
funding.
The Commission recommends the Army maintain 24 manned Apachebattalions – 20 in the Regular Army and four in the Army National Guard.
The Regular Army battalions should have 24 helicopters; the Army National Guardbattalions should have 18 helicopters with the understanding that deployed battalions
would plus up to 24 for operations. The Commission plan assumes the Army would add
only two Black Hawk battalions to the Army National Guard instead of the four planned
under ARI – a reduction of 3 percent in operational Black Hawks. Furthermore, under
the Commission’s recommendation, the Army would regularly activate and deploy Army
National Guard Apache battalions for steady state operations. Keeping attack
helicopters in the Army National Guard is important in meeting a key Commission goalof achieving one Army that works and trains together in peacetime and fights together
in war.
The report also contains several prominent themes based on the Commission’s factfinding and analysis. Here are the major themes of the report.
The All-Volunteer Force is a national treasure. Since its inception, the quality
and professionalism of the force has improved dramatically – but it is expensive. It is
hard to maintain an All-Volunteer Force in the face of economic pressures and socialconditions. However, the All-Volunteer Force is so essential to achieving the highest
possible level of capabilities and readiness, that the Commission considers sustaining
the All-Volunteer Force vital to the future of the nation. All budget and force
management decisions must be made with this goal in mind.
The Commission believes it is critically important to develop a true “oneArmy” Total Army culture. While the Regular Army, Army National Guard, andArmy Reserve are distinct, essential, and interdependent, they are meant to operate as
one force – with their efforts fully integrated. The Commission found that gaps andseams exist in the implementation of the Total Force Policy, and the report highlights
some of those and offers several recommendations to increase
The Commission recommends funding at the president’s FY16 level, which
would provide the Army with the minimum resources necessary to meet its
requirements at acceptable risk. However, given the strategic environment andpotential for growing instability, even that may prove inadequate. Furthermore, it
should be understood that even with budgets at the PB16 level, the Army would still
suffer from significant shortfalls, especially in aviation and short-range air defense.
The NCFA report contains many other important recommendations, including thefollowing.
The Commission recommends retaining a forward-stationed Combat
Aviation Brigade (CAB) in Korea. Right now, the Regular Army plans to go fromeleven CABs to ten, removing one from Korea, with requirements in Korea to be met on
a rotational basis beginning in 2019. The Commission is very concerned that thisapproach may present unacceptable risk, given terrain and aviation mission
complexities in Korea. The Commission recommends retaining a forward-stationed
CAB in Korea to ensure air crews have greater familiarity with the demanding
environment and better interoperability with our allies and partners for “fight-tonight”
readiness. The Commission also believes retaining an eleventh CAB would improvewartime capability and provide strategic peacetime aviation capability. However, theCommission recommends keeping a forward-stationed CAB in Korea even if the Army
reduces to ten CABs.
The Commission recommends the Army should forward station anArmored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Europe. The changing security
environment in Europe, its value as a stationing location for potential contingencies in
the Middle East, and the relatively lengthy timelines associated with deploying an ABCT
suggest the need to return to permanent stationing of this asset in the region. TheCommission believes forward stationing an ABCT in Europe would require minimal
additional staffing.
The Commission recommends consolidating and streamlining Armyeducation infrastructure and its recruiting and marketing. Being “one Army”
goes beyond training and fighting together; it should extend to the classroom and toactivities like marketing and recruiting. The Commission found Army training
institutes that were underutilized and soldiers traveling great distances to attend classes
that were being offered by a different component nearby. The Army should conduct athorough review of The Army School System and report to Congress within a year on
efficiencies that might be gained by consolidating under-used capacity. Furthermore,with Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve recruiters all vying for thesame potential recruits, the components are essentially competing against each other fora shrinking pool of qualified candidates. To integrate recruiting, Congress should
authorize and fund a pilot program to allow recruiters of all three components to recruit
for all three components. The Army also spends about $280 million annually onseparate marketing campaigns for the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. But
multiple marketing efforts weaken branding and are inherently less efficient. TheCommission therefore recommends consolidating Army marketing efforts under theArmy Marketing Research Group.
Interested parties with additional queries or seeking interviews should contact Col.
Kristen Dixon and 571-256-2651 or kristen.dixon@ncfa.ncr.gov.
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