2019

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Information cutoff date: August 2019.
Cover image: An Iranian Shahab 3 medium-range ballistic missile on parade in Tehran in September
2017. The placard on the front of the mobile launcher reads: “We will stand until the end.”
Source: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).
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INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKPREFACE
In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union’s military strength. The
purpose was to provide America's leaders, the national security community, and the public acomprehensive and accurate view of the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military
Power. DIA produced more than 250,000 copies, and it soon became an annual publication thatwas translated into eight languages and distributed around the world. In many cases, this reportconveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S. policymakers and the public
for the first time.
In 2017, DIA began to produce a series of unclassified Defense Intelligence overviews of the
major foreign military challenges facing the United States. This volume provides details on
Iran’s defense and military goals, strategy, plans, and intentions; the organization, structure,and capability of its military supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure andindustrial base. This product and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public,
our leaders, the national security community, and partner nations about the challenges we facein the 21st century.

IV

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s address to graduates of the Iranian Naval Academy,
9 September 2018:“Today, the policy that the Front of Arrogance—headed by the oppressive and cruel United States—
has adopted is a malicious policy. They have defined their interests in causing instability throughout
many parts of the world, particularly in our region…Their goal is to prevent an Islamic power in theregion from emerging and rising…The Islamic Republic has stood up against this policy with complete
power… My dear ones, what has astounded intelligent people around the world is that with relianceon Allah the Exalted and with reliance on national power, the Islamic Republic has managed to defeat
the United States in achieving its main goal in the region.”1
Throughout its 40-year history, the Islamic Republic of Iran has remained implacably opposed to theUnited States, our presence in the Middle East, and our support to Israel. While attempting to strengthen
its deterrence against foreign attack and influence, Tehran has committed itself to becoming the dominant
power in the turbulent and strategic Middle East. Its ambitions and identity as a largely Persian Shia
power in a region composed of primarily Arab Sunni states often put it at odds with its neighbors, most ofwhich look to the United States and the West to guarantee their security.

In more recent years, with the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, Iran has taken nascent steps toward developing
a limited expeditionary capability. Iran’s conventional forces are now in the regional power projection gameas well. At the same time, modern conventional capabilities will be open to Iran for the first time since
the revolution, as the UN arms embargo is scheduled to end by October 2020. With these opportunities,
we could begin to see significant changes in Iranian strategy and capabilities, as Iran becomes a more
traditional military force.
As Tehran expands its capabilities and role as both an unconventional and conventional threat in the
Middle East, it is more important than ever that we understand Iran’s military power and the threat it
poses to our interests, our allies, and our own security.

Rober t P. A shle y Jr
L ieut en a nt G enera l , U. S . A r my
D i r e c t or
D efen se I nt el l igence A genc y

I N T E L L I G E N C E

To achieve its goals, Iran continues to rely on its unconventional warfare elements and asymmetric capabilities—
intended to exploit the perceived weaknesses of a superior adversary—to provide deterrence and project power.
This combination of lethal conventional capabilities and proxy forces poses a persistent threat. The Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force leads Iranian power projection through a complex network of state andnonstate partners and militant proxies. Iran’s conventional military emphasizes niche capabilities and guerillastyle tactics against its technologically advanced adversaries. Its substantial arsenal of ballistic missiles isdesigned to overwhelm U.S. forces and our partners in the region. Its swarms of small boats, large inventory ofnaval mines, and arsenal of antiship missiles can severely disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz—astrategic chokepoint critical to global trade. Each of these forces are becoming increasingly survivable, precise,and responsive.

D E F E N S E

By applying a rigorous lessons-learned process during decades of conflict in the Middle East, Iran has
adapted its military capabilities and doctrine to account for developments by the United States and its
allies. Although still technologically inferior to most of its competitors, the Iranian military has progressed
substantially over the past few decades.

A G E N C Y

Iran sees itself as closer than ever to achieving its goals. Tehran has played the cards dealt it by the fall of
Saddam, the uprising in Syria, the rise and retreat of ISIS, and the conflict in Yemen. It leads a cohesive
if informal bloc of Shia and Alawi state and nonstate actors—its “Axis of Resistance” against the West.
Meanwhile, a perception that the United States is disinterested and disengaged pervades the region.

VINTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKIR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

CONTENTS
Introduction/Historical Overview .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

1

1921–1979: The Shah’s Army.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  1
1979–Present: The Guardians of the Revolution.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  3

National Military Overview.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  10
Threat Perceptions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 12
National Security Strategy.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 12
Stability Issues .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 13External Defense Relations.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 15

Perceptions of Modern Conflict.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 23
Military and Security Leadership .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 24
Major Military and Security Institutions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 24
National Military Command and Control .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 26
Key Military Leaders.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 28

Core Iranian Military Capabilities.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  30
Ballistic Missiles.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 30
Antiaccess/Area Denial.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 32
Unconventional Operations.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 33
Expeditionary Operations.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 34
Cyberspace .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 35
Intelligence.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 36

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Military Doctrine and Strategy.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  22

D E F E N S E

Nuclear Program .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 19

A G E N C Y

Defense Budget .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 18

VII

Space/Counterspace.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 37
Chemical and Biological Warfare.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 38
Denial and Deception.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 39
Underground Facilities .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 39

Outlook: Building a More Capable Conventional Force .  .  .  .  .  . 40
Appendix A: Missile Force.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  43
Appendix B: Naval Forces.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  48
Appendix C: Unconventional Forces .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  57
Appendix D: Air and Air Defense Forces.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  64
Appendix E: Ground Forces.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  72
Appendix F: Special Operations Forces.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 76
Appendix G: Reserves .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  78
Appendix H: Intelligence Services .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 81
Appendix I: Defense Industry and Modernization Programs .  .  . 83
Appendix J: Arms Transfers .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 88
Glossary of Abbreviations.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  92
References .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 95

VIII

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKINTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional DominanceP

ersia, as Iran was known before 1935,
was one of the great empires of theancient world. Its military history dates
back more than 2,500 years. The country in its
present form—the Islamic Republic of Iran—was established in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution. Iran is a theocratic republic with a supremeleader appointed for life as head of state andthe highest-ranking political, military, and religious authority under the principle of velayat-e
faqih (rule of the Islamic jurist), a philosophy in
Shia Islam reinterpreted by Iran’s first supremeleader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, that calls
for clerical oversight of elected institutions.

1921–1979: The Shah’s Army
The modern Iranian military originated in theearly 1920s after Reza Khan, a general in the
Persian Cossack Brigade, helped lead a coup
to strengthen the power of the Persian shah(king), Ahmad Shah Qajar. In 1921, Reza wasmade the commander of all of Iran’s disparate
military elements, which he combined to form
the basis of the modern Iranian military, theArtesh (“army” in Persian). As a top priority
for Ahmad Shah, the Imperial Iranian Armed
Forces then began a long-term effort to grow

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Introduction/Historical Overview

D E F E N S E

Iranian clerics watch a Shahab 3 MRBM launch in 2006.

A G E N C Y

Image Source: AFP

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

1and modernize.2,3 After becoming prime minister, Reza Khan orchestrated his own appointment as shah in 1925. Renamed Reza Shah
Pahlavi, the new king enacted a secular civil
code and set out on a broader modernization of
the country, to include the military.4
Events throughout the 20th century contributed
to Iran’s long-held suspicion of foreign powers.
During World War II, British and Soviet forces
invaded Iran to secure oil resources and protect Allied supply lines to the Soviet Union.
Although Iran was officially neutral in the war,
the Allied powers considered Reza Shah to be
too close to Nazi Germany and forced him to
abdicate, installing his son—Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi—as shah in 1941. A decade later, theelected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, nationalized the British-owned Iranian
oil industry. Britain imposed an economic
embargo, and a power struggle between the
shah and Mossadegh ensued. After the shahfled Iran, the United States and the United
Kingdom in 1953 organized a successful coup—
called Operation AJAX—with support from
Iranian royalists to overthrow Mossadegh andstrengthen the power of the shah.5,6

By the mid-1970s, Tehran became the largest
customer of U.S. military equipment. At thetime of the revolution, its military was one of
the most capable in the region, with more than
400,000 personnel. However, Iran still required
extensive U.S. training and technical support
to operate and maintain its advanced military equipment. Iran ordered other advanced
systems from Western suppliers before therevolution—including F-16s, F-18s, frigates,
destroyers, and submarines from the UnitedStates—but these were never delivered.12
The Iranian military was largely unproven incombat until the mid-1970s, when the shahdeployed Artesh forces to Oman alongside the
British at the request of the sultan to help
quell an insurgency. Iran first deployed special forces to Oman in late 1972, followed bya battalion of paratroopers in 1973. By 1974,
the Imperial Iranian Task Force numbered
more than 3,000 troops, with artillery, heli-

Iranian protestors during the 1953 coup.
Image Source: AFP

2

After the 1953 coup, Mohammad Reza Shah
accelerated efforts to transform Iran into a Westernized and dominant regional power. One of
his top priorities was to build a strong military,
leveraging close ties to the United States during
the Cold War. Funded by increasing oil revenue,
the Artesh acquired a wide range of advanced
weapon systems during the 1960s and 1970s,
primarily from the United States. Tehran’s procurement of American arms included F-4, F-5,
and F-14 fighter aircraft; AH-1 Cobra attack
helicopters; M60 tanks; HAWK and SM-1 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); and TOW antitank
guided missiles (ATGMs). Iran also purchased
British tanks and corvettes, French patrol craft,
and Soviet armored vehicles.7,8,9,10,11

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returns to Iran fromexile on 1 February 1979.

In a referendum on 1 April 1979, Iranians
approved a new constitution establishing a theocratic republic based on velayat-e faqih with
Khomeini as supreme leader, ending 2,500 yearsof monarchical rule. On 5 May, Khomeini established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps(IRGC), consolidating various militias that hadformed during the revolution into a single force
loyal to the new regime, in parallel with theArtesh.17 During the first few years after the revolution, fearing internal unrest stemming from
old-regime allegiances and antirevolutionary
activity, the regime conducted a series of purges
through arrests, trials, and executions that
affected as many as 4,500 military personnel
and nearly 6,000 activists, effectively eliminating any remaining opposition.18,19
On 4 November 1979, a group of Iranian students loyal to Khomeini took over the U.S.
Embassy in Tehran, taking 52 Americans
hostage and leading the United States tosever diplomatic relations with Iran. The crisis lasted 444 days before the regime returned
the hostages to the United States. On 24 April
1980, an attempted rescue by U.S. Special
Forces—called Operation EAGLE CLAW—
failed when two aircraft collided during asand storm at a staging area in the Iraniandesert, killing eight U.S. servicemembers.
The Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis left
Iran diplomatically isolated and militarily weakened. Iran also lost access to tens of thousands

A G E N C Y

Under Mohammad Reza Shah's rule, Iran became
increasingly autocratic. Public disapproval for the
regime grew, furthered by an economic recession
and public perceptions of the shah as a corrupt
U.S. puppet.15 In the late 1970s, widespread protests representing most segments of Iranian society increased across the country. By 1979, theunrest grew into a revolution. Popular Shia cleric
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had been in
exile, had become the central figure of the revolution and opposition to the shah, who then fled Iranin January 1979. Khomeini returned to Tehran on
1 February and called for nationwide demonstrations. Clashes between armed opposition groups
and government forces broke out. Ten days later,
the Artesh declared that it would remain neutral
to prevent further casualties, effectively ending
the revolution with Khomeini in power.16

1979–Present: The Guardians of
the Revolution

I N T E L L I G E N C E

copter, fighter aircraft, air defense, and naval
support. Tehran rotated its deployments every
3 months to maximize the number of returning personnel with combat experience. By thewithdrawal of most Iranian forces after 1975,
some 15,000 Iranian troops had served in
Oman with more than 500 killed in action.13,14

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Image Source: AFP

3

An Ideological Army
In establishing and equipping the defense forces of the country, it shall be taken into consideration that faith and ideology are the basis and criterion. Therefore, the Army of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the Revolutionary Guards Corps will be formed in conformity with theabove objective, and will be responsible not only for protecting and safeguarding the frontiers
but also for the ideological mission, that is, Jihad, for God’s sake and struggle for promoting
the rule of God’s law in the world ("And prepare against them whatever you are able of power
and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others
besides them whom you do not know but whom Allah knows." [Quran 8:60]).
-The Iranian Constitution, Preamble20

of foreign technicians to support the advanced
military equipment it had purchased under theshah, while deliveries for U.S. and British spareparts were canceled under an arms embargo.
Desertions and purges drained roughly 40–60
percent of the Artesh's manpower, leaving themilitary with a severe shortage of trained personnel and professional leadership.21

Iranians students scale the wall of the U.S. Embassyin Tehran on 4 November 1979.
Image Source: AFP

4

Saddam Hossein sought to capitalize on Iran’s
post-revolutionary turmoil after years of territorial disputes and competition for regional
influence. On 22 September 1980, Iraq invaded
Iran. Saddam justified the attack as necessary to
prevent Iran from exporting the revolution andoverthrowing his regime, which Iranian leaders
had advocated.
Initially disorganized and poorly trained, the
IRGC was forced to begin to professionalize torepel the Iraqi invasion, which the diminished
Artesh was unable to do on its own. The IRGC
and Basij, a volunteer paramilitary reserve force,
relied on guerrilla-warfare tactics and later usedextremely costly human wave attacks along thefront.22,23 By June 1982, Iran had pushed backIraqi forces and recovered nearly all of its lost
territory. Saddam proposed a ceasefire, but
Khomeini rejected the offer. Tehran’s goals had
shifted from liberating captured land to overthrowing Saddam and expanding the revolution.
The next month, Iran launched a counterattack
into Iraq and generally remained on the offensive for the remainder of the war.24

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Major Iran-Iraq War Events
1980

1805-17889

Sep: Iraq invades Iran
Nov: Iraq’s first use of chemical weapons

1981
1982

Jul: Iran invades Iraq
Oct: Iraq’s first use of ballistic missiles

1983
1984

Feb: Beginning of the War of the Cities
Mar: Iraq begins attacks on Gulf shipping (beginning of the Tanker War)
May: Iran begins attacks on Gulf shipping

1985

Mar: Iran’s first use of ballistic missiles

1988

Apr: USS Samuel B. Roberts mined; Operation PRAYING MANTIS
Jul: Iran Air Flight 655 shot down by USS Vincennes; Iran accepts UN ceasefire
Aug: War ends

IRGC-Artesh Tension
In the aftermath of the revolution, there was considerable tension between the IRGC
and Artesh at the outset of the war. The Artesh suffered from leadership purges andwas distrusted by the new regime and the IRGC. By the end of the war, however, theArtesh had demonstrated its worth and loyalty to the regime. Although today bothmilitaries provide essential security functions for Iran and coordinate regularly, somerivalry remains, resulting from their uneven access to resources, varying levels of
influence with the regime, and inherent overlap in missions and responsibilities.25
Iran struggled to contend with the deadly

ons as early as November 1980. Estimates of

facets of modern warfare, including chemical

the total casualties resulting from Iraqi chem-

weapons and ballistic missiles, which Bagh-ical weapons use vary widely, ranging fromdad used extensively throughout the war.26

about 7,500 to more than 25,000, with tens of

Iraq reportedly began using chemical weap-

thousands more injured.27,28 Iraq first began

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Jul: UN ceasefire (UNSCR 598); Operation EARNEST WILL starts

D E F E N S E

1987

A G E N C Y

1986

5

centers, launching its first ballistic missiles inMarch 1985. By the end of the war, however,Iran had acquired and launched significantly
fewer missiles than Iraq.30
Starting in 1984, attacks on merchant shipping and oil infrastructure in the Persian
Gulf—called the Tanker War—became anincreasingly significant part of the conflict.
In 1987, the U.S. Navy began to escort reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers as part of Operation EARNEST WILL. On 14 April 1988,
the USS Samuel B. Roberts was struck by
an Iranian naval mine. In response 4 days
later, the United States launched Operation
PRAYING MANTIS against Iranian naval
forces, sinking several Iranian vessels. On
3 July 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down
Iran Air Flight 655, mistaking the aircraft
for an attacking Iranian F-14. All 290 passengers and crew were killed. Tehran still
believes the United States deliberately shot
down the civilian airliner.31,32

Iraqi soldiers deface an image of Iranian Supreme
Leader Khomeini in 1988 near the end of the IranIraq War.
Image Source: AFP

using Soviet-supplied Scud missiles in October 1982 after Iran invaded Iraqi territory.
By 1984, Iraq had expanded its attacks on
population centers, using strategic air raids,
artillery shelling, and Scud missiles, in whatbecame known as the “War of the Cities.”29
Iran purchased its own Scuds from Libya andNorth Korea for use against Iraqi population

6

By mid-July 1988, Iraqi troops had driven
back into Iranian territory, and Tehran
had grown increasingly weary of the war’s
progress. Believing they lacked the supportand resources to defeat Saddam, militaryleaders convinced the supreme leader ofthe need to end the war. On 20 July, Khomeini accepted a UN ceasefire resolution
with great reluctance, stating publicly thedecision was more painful than drinking
from a “poisoned chalice.” The war officiallyended on 20 August 1988 with the ceasefire
observed across the front.33

Image Source: AFP

The Iran-Iraq War—which Iran refers to as
the “Imposed War” and the “Sacred Defense”—
lasted 8 years with more than 200,000 Iranian
troops and civilians killed.34,35 Although devastating for Iran, it helped solidify popularsupport for Khomeini’s new regime.36 The war
had a significant psychological impact on the
future of the Iranian military and Tehran’s
security policy. Tehran viewed Western support for Saddam as proof of efforts to counterthe Islamic Revolution. Syria was one of the
few countries to support Iran during the war,
establishing a key relationship that has persisted for decades. Heavy military and civilian losses, Saddam’s use of chemical weapons

and ballistic missiles, the West’s embargoof Iran and support for Iraq, and military
engagements with U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf all led the regime to emphasize asymmetric capabilities and reinforce the necessityof self-reliance for decades to come. The war
contributed to Tehran’s belief in the necessityof working with Shias, disenfranchised Sunnis, and nonaligned countries as an “Axis ofResistance” against the West.37,38
Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has
adapted its military thinking and approach
to modern conflict. During the 1990s, Iran
expanded its outreach to Shia communities andI N T E L L I G E N C E

U.S. naval forces escort oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in 1987 during the Tanker War.

A G E N C Y

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

7

other potential allies throughout the Middle
East—particularly Hizballah and Syria. Tehran
established the IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF), theclandestine external operations element of the
IRGC, in 1990 to better facilitate these networks

and strengthen its covert presence in the Middle
East and beyond. As Iran’s primary conduit of
support and guidance to nonstate partners, the
IRGC-QF provides training, funding, and equipment for militias and political groups with common anti-Western ideologies and objectives.

Evolution of the Iranian Military8

1805-17887

Year

Event

1921

Artesh established

1923

Imperial Iranian Ground Force (IIGF) established

1924

Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) established

1932

Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) established

1979

IRGC established; Imperial Iranian Armed Forces become Islamic Republic of Iran
Ground Force (IRIGF), Air Force (IRIAF), and Navy (IRIN)

1980

Basij formally established1981

Basij incorporated into the IRGC

1985

IRGC split into Ground Force (IRGCGF), Air Force (IRGCAF), and Navy (IRGCN)

1990

IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF) established2007

Basij comes under IRGC command

2008

Khatemolanbia Air Defense Headquarters (KADHQ) established from IRIAF

2009

IRGCAF renamed IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF); some Basij units integrated
with IRGCGF

2019

KADHQ elevated to Artesh HQ; Artesh air defense force renamed Islamic Republicof Iran Air Defense Force (IRIADF)

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Since the Arab Spring, the start of the Syrian
civil war, and the rise of the Islamic State of
Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), Tehran has become
increasingly involved in regional conflicts—
particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—as it
responds to new security threats and seeks to

In 2015, Tehran agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed
restrictions on its nuclear program in exchange
for sanctions relief. Although Iran saw some
improvement in its economy and a corresponding increase in government spending, including
the defense budget, the benefits of integration
into the world economy that Tehran and the
Iranian public expected after the JCPOA neverfully materialized. In May 2018, the UnitedStates withdrew from the JCPOA and began
reimposing unilateral sanctions on Iran.
In April 2019, the U.S. State Department formally designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist
organization (FTO) and announced it would notrenew exemptions for select countries to import
Iranian oil.43,44 In response to these actions,
Iran began its own counter-pressure campaign,
which has included gradually exceeding someof the nuclear-related limits stipulated in the
JCPOA and conducting provocative maritime
actions and unconventional warfare attacks
against U.S. allies and interests. Amid thistension, Iran also shot down a U.S. unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) and seized a British oiltanker.45

A G E N C Y

After the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in2001 and Iraq in 2003 and the 2006 Israel-Hizballah War, Tehran began to adjust its
military doctrine to better deter and counterthe threats from technologically advanced
Western militaries. Tehran concentrated on
equipping its armed forces with niche capabilities emphasizing asymmetric tactics. The
U.S. presence in the region created a senseof encirclement in Tehran, which continued
to believe that Washington ultimately sought
to overthrow the regime. During the Iraq
War, Iran established strong ties with Shia
militia groups, some of which have received
Iranian financial backing for decades. Using
Iranian-provided weapons, these groups were
responsible for at least 603 U.S. personnel
killed in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.40,41

strengthen its position as a regional power.
Iran has committed extensive resources anddeployed military forces to support key partners in these struggles, adapting its longstanding model of proxy warfare to incorporate a more conventional application of
military power.42

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Tehran also invested heavily in advancing its
conventional weapons capabilities, particularly
ballistic missiles, to better prepare itself against
future Iraqi attacks. Iran acquired significant
assistance from other countries, including
North Korea and China, to establish domestic
production capabilities for major weapons programs. In the late 1980s, Iran also establisheda nuclear weapons program, which it halted in
the early 2000s.39

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

9Image Source: AFP

IRGC soldiers during the September 2018 Holy Defense Week parade in Tehran marking the anniversary of theoutbreak of the Iran-Iraq War.

National Military Overview

I

ran’s armed forces consist of two separate, parallel militaries—the Artesh,or regular forces, and the IRGC. The
Artesh, which long predates the revolution, focuses on defense against external
threats; the mission of the IRGC, formed

10

from armed militias during the revolution,is to defend the regime and its Islamic system of government from any threat, foreign ordomestic. Iran’s national police force, the Law
Enforcement Force (LEF), is also consideredpart of the armed forces.

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Personnel

Active military: Approximately 600,000
Reserve: Approximately 450,000 active reserve, at least 500,000–1
million inactive reserve
LEF: Approximately 200,000–300,000

Recruit Base

Universal male conscription (18–24 months), some volunteer

Equipment Profile

Mostly legacy Western, Chinese, and Soviet-era weapon systems, withsome newer domestically produced systems

Core Strengths

Large ballistic missile inventory, littoral naval capabilities, andunconventional partners and proxies abroad

Key Vulnerabilities

Dual military structure and lack of access to modern technology
and weapons

Iranian Military Structure and Size Estimates
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

1805-17887

Regular Forces (Artesh)

IRGC Ground Force(IRGCGF)

150,000

Islamic Republic of
Iran Ground Force(IRIGF)

350,000

IRGC Navy (IRGCN)

20,000Islamic Republic of
Iran Navy (IRIN)

18,000IRGC Aerospace Force(IRGCASF)

15,000IRGC Qods Force(IRGC-QF)

5,000

Basij (Reserves)

450,000

Total (excl. Basij)

190,000

Total (incl. Basij)

640,000

Islamic Republic of
Iran Air Force (IRIAF)
Islamic Republic of
Iran Air Defense Force(IRIADF)
Total:

37,00015,000420,000

Total Military (Active): 610,000
Total Military (incl. Reserves): 1,060,000
Note: Basij number only includes estimated active reserve personnel; Iran may be able to mobilize an additional
500,000 to 1 million Basij in wartime.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Artesh: Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Force
IRGC: Ground Force, Navy, Aerospace Force, Qods Force, BasijLEF

D E F E N S E

ServicesA G E N C Y

The Iranian Armed Forces at a Glance11Threat Perceptions
Iran views the United States as its greatest
enduring threat and believes the United States
is engaged in a covert and “soft war” to subvert
the regime, undermining what Iran perceives
as its rightful place as a regional power.46,47,48
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei maintains a deep, long-standing distrust of U.S. intentions.49 Many regime elites view regional dynamics through the lens of perceived U.S. aggression,leading some to adopt the extreme view that theUnited States created ISIS in part to weaken
Iran and its allies.50 Distrust of the United States
predates the regime’s founding, dating back to
the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh that returned the shah to power.51
Iran has focused on preparing and equipping
its military forces for defense against air attackand ground invasion by a technologically superior adversary, primarily the United States.
The U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in
the early 2000s and international scrutiny of
Iran’s nuclear program raised Iran’s fears ofencirclement and potential Western attack.52,53
Tehran recognizes that it cannot compete with
the United States on a conventional level andhas prioritized the development of defensive
capabilities that emphasize asymmetric tactics
to protect the country and the regime.54
In recent years, Tehran’s immediate perceived
threats have shifted to those coming fromregional state and nonstate actors. Iran probably
views Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Sunni extremist groups, such as ISIS, as its next most dan-

12

An anti-U.S. mural on the wall of the former U.S.
Embassy in Tehran.
Image Source: AFP

gerous threats because of their immediacy andproximity to Iran’s territory, allies, and regional
influence.55 Iran’s expanding regional activities
have only exacerbated these views. The growthin militant Sunni extremism, particularly ISIS,and Iran’s perception of its regional adversaries’
growing military capabilities has prompted Tehran to adjust some of its military modernization
priorities.56,57 Iran’s latest national development
plan reflects this shift in threat perceptions byemphasizing a broader range of conventional
capabilities than previous plans.58,59

National Security Strategy
Tehran’s national security strategy aims toensure continuity of clerical rule, maintain stability against internal and external threats, secure
Iran’s position as a dominant regional power, andachieve economic prosperity.60 Iran has developed its security and military strategies based onthese four enduring strategic objectives.

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance• Become a Dominant Regional Power.
Tehran aspires to lead a stable regional
order in which it has dominant influence.
In Iran’s vision for the region, its allies
remain intact, the influence of the UnitedStates and U.S. regional partners isdegraded, and Sunni extremist groups are
defeated.65,66,67 In pursuit of these goals,
Iran provides extensive military, advisory,and financial assistance to allies and partners, seeking to protect its regional interests and pressure adversaries.
• Attain Economic Prosperity. Domestically,
President Hasan Fereidun Ruhani’s priority
is to achieve national economic prosperity by
reducing subsidies to the populace, curbing

Iran remains committed to modernizing its military, forging new partnerships, and building
the capacity of its partners across the region—
including designated FTOs—all while balancing a desire to benefit from integrating into theglobal economic system. Despite some internal
instability, Iranian military and security forces
have also proven able to manage public unrestand low-level insurgencies from several ethnic
opposition movements.74,75

Stability Issues
Since the 1979 revolution, the regime has regularly cracked down on dissent to maintain
political stability. Iranian political and ethnic
opposition groups are largely localized and lackunity, posing little threat to the regime. Iran’sinternal stability continues to be threatened bya growing schism between the country’s leaders, dominated by military and clerical elites,
and the common people. The past 40 years haveseen a growth in income inequality, increased
IRGC political influence and control of key
economic sectors, sustained sectarian and ethnic tension, violent suppression of dissent andreformists, persistent gender inequality, andtension stemming from the military’s involvement in regional conflicts.

A G E N C Y• Secure the Nation From Internal andExternal Threats. The regime uses its
military and security capabilities to counterinternal threats from political and ethnic
opposition movements and terrorist groups
and to prevent neighboring states’ instability from spilling over or causing violence inIran.63 The military defends Iranian territory from foreign adversaries—including
perceived existential threats, such as theUnited States, and regional rivals, suchas Israel and Saudi Arabia—and provides
support to allies and partners to counterregional threats.64

corruption, reforming the financial sector, andattracting foreign investment.68,69,70 Tehran
aims to balance foreign investment and partnerships with the priority it places on economic
self-sufficiency, in part to reduce the effectsof U.S. and multilateral sanctions.71,72,73

I N T E L L I G E N C E• Ensure Continuity of Clerical Rule. The
supreme leader’s position is based on the popular acceptance of velayat-e faqih. To ensure
the regime’s continued legitimacy with the
Iranian populace, Tehran attempts to control much of the domestic political, social,and cultural environment and promote its
interpretation of Islamic ideology.61,62

D E F E N S E

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13

In 2009, after the disputed reelection of conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a looselyorganized opposition called the Green Movement
emerged with large-scale protests demanding
democratic reforms. The demonstrations marked
the country’s most significant unrest since therevolution. Bolstered by the Internet, hundredsof thousands of protesters turned out across thecountry. The government responded by ordering
security services to crack down, which resulted indozens of deaths, hundreds of arrests, restricted
access to social media, and the closure of several
newspapers. The regime quelled the unrest andnearly eliminated the Green Movement.76
Between December 2017 and January 2018,
small incidents of civil disobedience converged
into widespread public protests, the largest
unrest Iran has faced since 2009. Some protestors challenged Iran’s foreign policy—including

Iranian protestors after the disputed 2009presidential elections.
Image Source: AFP

14

its involvement in regional conflict and support toproxy groups—but most focused on economic andsocial issues. Elected in 2013, President Ruhani
promised increased financial benefits and economic growth, but these have not translated into
an improved standard of living for everyday Iranians. While oil output had risen before the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, significant economic
growth did not follow, and domestic prices forboth food and fuel increased.77
Some longstanding opposition groups, mostly
originating from minority ethnic and religious
groups, continue to challenge Iran’s internal security. Along the western border, the regime faces
several militant Kurdish opposition groups—
including the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran(KDPI) and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan(PJAK)—which advocate for increased autonomy and the right to Kurdish self-determination.
Armed opposition from PJAK has been especiallyviolent, resulting in dozens of Iranian deaths
annually since 2005.78 Iran also faces periodic
violence from Baluchi militants in southeastern
Iran along the Pakistani border. The most prominent of these groups, Jaish ul-Adl (JAA), periodically attacks Iranian military facilities, border
posts, and security patrols and occasionally takes
military and security personnel hostage.79,80 JAA
hampers Iran-Pakistan relations, with Tehran
accusing Islamabad of failing to curb Baluchi
militants operating from Pakistani soil.81 The
Iranian military conducts counterinsurgency
campaigns against the Kurdish and Baluchi militants in these regions on a nearly annual basis.
The most well-known group opposed to theregime is the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Tehran maintains defense and security ties toboth state and nonstate actors to project powerand support Shia groups and Shia-led governments in the Middle East. Iran relies on its
regional partnerships to help counter perceived
threats from Sunni extremist groups, adversarial states, and Western military presence in theregion. Iran refers to its efforts to build a regional
network to counter Israeli and Western influence

Particularly in recent years, Tehran has committed extensive resources and deployed military
personnel to support key partners facing internal
conflicts. Since at least 2012, Iran has escalated
its involvement in the Syrian civil war to include
providing arms, training, advisers, and selectcombat personnel to support the Syrian regime.
Since at least 2014, Iran has also provided direct
military assistance—including IRGC advisers,
training, and materiel support—to Iraqi Shia
militias to help combat ISIS, which Tehran
views as a critical national security threat, andto strengthen its influence in Iraq.
Iran maintains strong defense ties to Hizballah in Lebanon—its most significant and oldest
nonstate partner and a core member of Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance”—and provides support to some Palestinian groups in an attempt
to pressure Israel. Iran also provides advanced

The “Axis of Resistance”
Iran uses the term “Axis of Resistance” to describe its loose confederation of like-mindedstate and nonstate actors across the Middle East to counter Western influence. These partners, proxies, and allies include the Asad regime in Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, the Huthis in Yemen, Bahraini militants, and some Palestinian groups. Mostof these are Shia entities, but select Sunni groups—like HAMAS—also align with Iran on
key issues. The axis helps Tehran extend its influence in the region and provides a degree ofstrategic depth for Iran.83

A G E N C Y

External Defense Relations

as the “Axis of Resistance,” which includes Iran,
Syria, Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, the Huthis,and some Palestinian militants. Beyond thesecloser allies, Tehran seeks to cultivate relations
with other countries; Iran is also a member of theNonaligned Movement and has observer status
with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

I N T E L L I G E N C E(MEK). The MEK, founded in 1965 by Muslim
students advocating a combination of Marxist
communism and Islamist ideology, is an Iranian political-militant organization in exile that
proposes the overthrow of the Iranian regime toestablish itself as a new government. After initially supporting the 1979 revolution, the MEK
fought on behalf of Saddam late in the Iran-Iraq
War and was responsible for a series of bombings and assassinations in the 1990s and early
2000s. Widely unpopular in Iran, the MEK
remains one of the regime’s foremost internal
security concerns. Formerly designated as an
FTO by the United States, the Iranian government still considers the MEK a terrorist group.82

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

15

weapons support to the Huthis in Yemen andcalibrated support to Shia militants in Bahrain
and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The IRGC-QF,
the IRGC’s external operations element, is
Iran’s primary conduit of support and guidance
to these nonstate partners and proxies.84,85
Tehran maintains particularly close military-to-military ties with Syria and Iraq andhas signed basic military cooperation agreements with Afghanistan, Belarus, China,
Oman, Russia, South Africa, Sudan, and Venezuela.86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93 Iran has also held discussions on defense and security issues with awider range of countries, including Azerbaijan,
Bolivia, Djibouti, India, Italy, Kazakhstan,
Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Tanzania, Turkey,
and Turkmenistan.94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105
Djibouti and Sudan have since severed diplomatic ties with Iran. Tehran has also purchased military equipment from Russia,
China, North Korea, Belarus, and Ukraine.106
Military cooperation between Russia and Iranhas grown significantly in recent years, despite
Tehran’s uncertainty about Moscow’s long-term
regional objectives.107 Iran and Russia have cooperated to support Asad’s regime in Syria sinceat least 2015. Iran has briefly allowed Russian
combat aircraft to use its Hamadan Airbase as astopover to launch strikes in Syria, marking thefirst time Tehran has permitted a foreign military to use its territory since the Islamic Revolution. Iran also seeks to procure Russian military
hardware. In 2016, it completed its high-profile
purchase of the Russian SA-20c air defense system, which provided Iran with its first capability
to defend against a modern air force.108

16

In 2011, the Iranian Navy transited the Suez Canalfor the first time since the Islamic Revolution.
Image Source: AFP

The Iranian military is also increasing its
defense diplomacy efforts, particularly throughnear-continuous naval deployments beyond its
immediate neighbors. Since 2009, Iran has sent
small naval groups to "show the flag" through aseries of port calls overseas and counterpiracy
operations in the Gulf of Aden. Intended toenhance its soft power, Iran’s use of naval diplomacy has demonstrated its capability to conduct out-of-area operations increasingly farther
from Iranian shores, extending from the Mediterranean Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait in thewest to the Indian Ocean and Strait of Malaccain the east.
In 2011, the IRIN made its first transit throughthe Suez Canal since the Islamic Revolution, followed by its first ever port visits to China in 2013
and South Africa in 2016. Sometimes in conjunction with these port calls, Iran has conductedbasic joint naval exercises—such as search andrescue drills—with China, Djibouti, India, Italy,
Oman, Pakistan, and Russia.109,110,111,112,113 Iranis also a member of the Indian Ocean NavalEnsuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Symposium (IONS), a 35-member regional
naval cooperation forum. Tehran participatedin the IONS’s inaugural International Maritime

Search and Rescue Exercise in Bangladesh in2017 and hosted the sixth biannual IONS conference in April 2018 in Tehran.114,115

Iranian Port Visits and Joint Naval Exercises

1805-17885

RUSSIA
Astrakhan

AZERBAIJAN

Baku

MuscatQATAR

OMAN
SalalahGulf of Aden

Djibouti

DJIBOUTI

INDIA
Chittagong

Mumbai

ArabianSea

Vishakhapatnam

Kochi
Colombo

Bay ofBengal

SRI LANKA

Zhanjiang
South
China
Sea

Strait of
Malacca

INDONESIA
Dar es Salaam

TANZANIA

JakartaGraphic Source: DIA, D3 Design

INDIAN
OCEAN

SOUTH
AFRICA

DurbanNOTE: Iran currently lacks diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Djibouti.

Port Visits
Joint Naval Exercises
Counterpiracy Operating AreaA G E N C Y

Bab elMandebStraitKarachi

Doha

Port Sudan

BANGLADESHPAKISTANI N T E L L I G E N C E

SUDANStrait of
HormuzSAUDIARABIA

Jeddah

CHINA

IRAN

SYRIA

D E F E N S E

Latakia
Mediterranean
Sea
Suez
Canal

KAZAKHSTAN

Aktau

Makhachkala

17for the major components of Iran’s security apparatus, including the IRGC, Artesh, and LEF, as
well as the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS),
the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and security forces pensions.
The decline in funding for 2019 is similar to thedecrease following the implementation of multilateral oil and financial sanctions in 2012. Iran’scurrent defense funding may face further cuts as
Iranian oil export revenue continues to decline.

Defense Budget
Following a significant increase in Iranian
defense spending from 2014 to 2018 after the
implementation of the JCPOA, Iran’s security
forces have experienced a funding decreasein 2019. Key drivers of this defense budget
decrease include the reimposition of U.S. oiland banking sanctions, the depreciation of the
Iranian rial, and chronic economic mismanagement. Iran’s official defense budget for 2019 isapproximately $20.7 billion, roughly 3.8 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP), as passed by
the Iranian Majles. This total includes funding

Although it is smaller in size, the IRGC
receives a greater proportion of the defense
budget than the Artesh. In 2019, Iran allocated29 percent of the defense budget to the IRGC,
compared with 12 percent for the Artesh.

Official Iranian Defense Expenditures 2011–2019

1805-17889

27.4

27.3

24.3

23.9
19.9

19.5
16.9

4.6
3.9

6.1

19.9

20.7

5.3
4.3

3.8

4.1

3.8

3.2

2011

18

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Real defense expenditure

Projected(Billions 2019 USD, Adjusted for Inflation)(Subject to change)

2017

2018
$

2019

% of GDP

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

The government allocated 34 percent of thebudget to pensions for all military personnel, and law enforcement personnel received
about a third of the budget.116,117,118 Iran also
distributes funding to its many partners andproxies, expenditures not fully accounted forin the official budget. Between 2012 and 2018,
Iran provided more than $16 billion to the Syrian regime, Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, theHuthis, and Palestinian groups.119

Official 2019 Iranian
Defense Spending

Tehran has a variety of off-budget sources offunding, making it difficult to accurately estimate the true size and scope of Iranian defense
spending. The supreme leader can authorize
transfers to defense and security organizations
from the National Development Fund, Iran’sreserve fund, as it reportedly has done to support military activities in Syria.120 Moreover,the IRGC runs numerous private companies—
most notably the wide-ranging Khatemolanbia(“seal of the prophets”) Construction Headquarters—and exploits its far-reaching political and social influence to raise additional revenue. The IRGC and IRGC-QF can also gain
extra income through smuggling and otherillicit activities in the region.121,122,123,124

LEF
17% $3.60B

Other
4% $0.67B

MODAFL
4% $0.86B
Artesh
12% $2.44B

Pensions
34% $7.08B

Nuclear Program
Iran’s overarching strategic goals of enhancing
its security, prestige, and regional influence
have led it to pursue nuclear energy and thecapability to build missile-deliverable nuclear
weapons, if it chooses to do so.
Iran has no nuclear weapons and, under the
JCPOA, agreed not to seek, develop, or acquire
nuclear weapons. The JCPOA limits Iran’suranium enrichment capabilities until at least
2026 and requires Iran to redesign its Arakreactor, making it more difficult to produce plutonium for weapons. Without a sufficient sourceof weapons-usable fissile material, Iran cannot
produce a nuclear weapon.

A G E N C Y

IRGC
29% $6.09B

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Iran’s new 5-year national development plan,
released in July 2017, emphasizes a broader
range of conventional capabilities than pastplans. The plan continues to prioritize missiles
and naval forces, but it also emphasizes air
power, including the first public reference tooffensive air capabilities in an Iranian strategic document. The plan also provides new focus
on electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.125

1805-17889

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

19

Iran’s interest in nuclear technology dates backto the 1950s, when it began receiving assistance through the U.S. Atoms for Peace program, which later included the Tehran Nuclear
Research Center and a 5-megawatt-thermal
research reactor. Iran signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonweapons state andratified the agreement in 1970. In the mid1970s, Iran unveiled ambitious plans to expand
the nuclear power program. These plans, however, did not come to fruition because of the
1979 revolution.
In the late 1980s, Iran established an undeclared nuclear program, managed through the
Physics Research Center (PHRC) and overseen
through a scientific committee by the Defense
Industries Education Research Institute. The
PHRC was subordinate to MODAFL. In the late
1990s, the PHRC was consolidated under the“Amad Plan,” Iran’s effort to develop a nuclear
weapon. Iran’s Project 111 was an attempt tointegrate a spherical payload into a Shahab 3
missile reentry vehicle. However, Iran halted
its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and subsequently announced the suspension of its
declared uranium enrichment program. Iranalso signed an Additional Protocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement in 2003.
The halt was primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny resulting fromthe exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared
nuclear work. After this halt, and in line with
its history of poor transparency, Iran continued
its efforts to develop uranium enrichment technology with gas centrifuges and constructed20

an undeclared uranium enrichment plant near
Qom, where it began producing near-20-percent
enriched uranium in mid-2011. The IAEA also
reported in 2011 that Iran may have conducted
some dual-use research relevant to nuclear
weapons after the 2003 halt. In late 2011, a
Department of State compliance report foundIran to be in violation of obligations under the
NPT because Iran’s past nuclear activities andits failure to report ongoing activities were
contrary to its Safeguards Agreement. Thatsame year, the IAEA began an effort to clarify
issues surrounding Iran’s lack of transparency
dating back to 2002, noting that by failing to
declare some nuclear activities, including theconstruction at Qom, Iran was not implementing the Additional Protocol. In 2015, the IAEA
concluded that it had no further indications ofundeclared work.

Then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tours the
Natanz Uranium Enrichment Facility in 2008.
Image Source: AFP

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Under the JCPOA, Iran must maintain a totalenriched uranium stockpile of no more than
300 kilograms of up to 3.67 percent enricheduranium hexafluoride (UF6) or its equivalent
in other chemical forms until 2031. Iran also
had reduced its low-enriched uranium stockpile of about 8,500 kilograms to below 300
kilograms by shipping the material to Russia and downblending the remaining scrap tonatural uranium.126,127
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
2231, which endorses the JCPOA but is separate from the nuclear agreement, sets out the

specific limitations on Iran’s nuclear programand places additional restrictions on Iran’sballistic missile program and its import andexport of conventional arms.128

In May 2018, the United States ceased participation in the JCPOA and began reimposing unilateral U.S. sanctions on Iran. Tehran
announced it would continue upholding its
commitments while negotiating with remaining JCPOA participants to try to sustain thedeal.129,130 However, Khamenei warned that
Iran would exit the deal if Iran were unable toachieve sufficient economic benefits from the
JCPOA absent the United States.131 In June
2018, Tehran announced that it would begin
taking steps to expand Iran’s enrichment infrastructure within the bounds of the JCPOA.132
Iran announced, in May 2019, that it would
begin to cease adhering to some of its JCPOA
obligations and warned it would take further
action if JCPOA members did not meet certain economic demands.133 In early July 2019,
the IAEA confirmed that Iran had exceeded
the JCPOA limit on the size of its low-enriched uranium stockpile and had produced
uranium with an enrichment level exceeding
the JCPOA limit of 3.67 percent.134,135 Tehran
threatened to continue gradually ceasing other
JCPOA commitments unless it receives sufficient sanctions relief.136

A G E N C Y

Recent Developments

I N T E L L I G E N C E

In April 2015, a framework was announced tolimit Iran’s nuclear program that built on theinterim Joint Plan of Action. Under the deal,
Iran would commit that under no circumstances
would it seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons, and it would limit its enrichment program and redesign a heavy-water reactor near
Arak; in exchange, all nuclear-related sanctions against Iran would be suspended. On 14
July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus
Germany) finalized the JCPOA, whereby Iranagreed to curtail its nuclear program significantly in exchange for sanctions relief. On 16
January 2016, the IAEA reported that Iran hadtaken the technical steps required to meet its
Implementation Day obligation. As long as Iranadheres to the agreement, the JCPOA limits
the pathways to a nuclear weapon and hampers
Iran’s ability to conduct activities that could
contribute to nuclear explosive device designand development.

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

21

Image Source: Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA)

Iranian ballistic missiles on display during the annual Holy Defense Week parade in Tehran on 22 September 2014.

Military Doctrine and StrategyTehran employs a complex set of military and security capabilities, including a combination of conventional andunconventional forces. Iran’s conventional
military strategy is primarily based on deterrence and the ability to retaliate against an
attacker. Its unconventional warfare operations and network of militant partners andproxies enable Tehran to advance its interests in the region and attain strategic depth
from its adversaries. If deterrence fails, Iranwould seek to demonstrate strength andresolve, impose a high cost on its adversary,

22

and reestablish deterrence using the fullrange of these capabilities.
This strategy is unlikely to change considerably
in the near term because of Iran’s perceptionthat its military remains technologically inferior to the United States—its primary adversary. However, since 2016, Khamenei and othersenior leaders have suggested that Iran be moreproactive in defending its territory and interestsabroad.137 Iran may seek to undertake other missions, such as small-scale expeditionary operations in the region and some participation in
multilateral peacekeeping missions overseas.138

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

The 8-year Iran-Iraq War underscored theimportance of strategic depth, ballistic missiles, and self-sufficiency in military capabilities—areas Iran continues to prioritize today.
Most of Iran’s senior military leaders fought in
the war, and their experiences have played acritical role in shaping Iranian military strategy and capabilities.140
During the past two decades, Iran has
gradually shifted its military thinking andapproach to warfare based on the 21st-century conflicts of the Middle East. It developed
its military doctrine to face technologicallyadvanced Western militaries, aiming to raise
the human and financial costs to a potential
adversary to deter an attack. Iran has sought
to build its armed forces with niche capabilities emphasizing asymmetric tactics intended
to exploit the perceived weaknesses of its enemies, such as an aversion to casualties andoverreliance on technology.141,142

Since at least 2014, Iranian senior officials havestressed the need to improve military capabilities
against a wider range of conventional and unconventional threats, such as terrorism and insurgencies, rather than focusing overwhelmingly on the
United States and Israel as Iran’s primary adversaries.147,148 Senior Iranian officials, including
Khamenei, have called publicly for the military
to better address these threats and support Iran’srising regional involvement.149,150 In 2016, Khamenei for the first time called on the military to boost
its offensive capabilities in addition to defensive
capabilities.151 Military officials have since noted
Iran’s need to invest more in offensive capabilities
and missions, such as combat air power and maintaining forward presence, areas it has traditionally neglected. Iranian leaders frequently describe
the Middle East’s instability as requiring a strategy of “active deterrence,” involving intervention
in regional conflicts to confront national security
threats before they endanger the homeland.152,153

A G E N C Y

Perceptions of Modern Conflict

Iran probably views modern warfare as a spectrum with multiple levels of conflict, including“soft” and “hard” war.143,144 Iranian decisionmakers realize the importance of engaging an adversary in competition short of armed conflict acrossall domains of state power: diplomacy with neighboring states and international bodies; information and psychological operations; conventional
and unconventional military posture and presence; and economics through its ability to influence global energy markets. Tehran believes
the United States is engaged in a hybrid war tosubvert the regime and its objectives, blending
conventional and unconventional tactics with allelements of state power. Iran views this situation as short of armed conflict.145,146

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Iran’s “way of war” emphasizes the need to
avoid or deter conventional conflict whileadvancing its security objectives in the region,
particularly through propaganda, psychological warfare, and proxy operations. Iran’s
deterrence is largely based on three core capabilities: ballistic missiles capable of long-range
strikes, naval forces capable of threatening
navigation in the Persian Gulf and Strait of
Hormuz, and unconventional operations using
partners and proxies abroad.139

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

23

Military and Security
Leadership
The regime often views political, cultural, andsocial dynamics as national security issues
because these domains can affect the regime’s
ability to maintain clerical rule. Iran’s power
structures and decisionmaking bodies reflect
this clerical oversight in all aspects of militaryand security policy.
Supreme Leader Khamenei, Iran’s head of statesince 1989, is the ultimate decisionmaker in the
Iranian political system. Khamenei is responsible for delineating and supervising "the generalpolicies of the Islamic Republic of Iran," according to the Iranian constitution, giving him theauthority to direct all of Iran's domestic andforeign policies. As commander in chief, thesupreme leader can declare war or peace. He has
the power to appoint and dismiss military officials and the head of the judiciary, and appoints
6 of the 12 members of the Council of Guardians,
which vets Iranian legislation and candidates for
public office.154,155
President Ruhani is a pragmatic conservative
cleric who serves as the popularly elected headof government. The president oversees the cabinet ministries, manages the budgetary process,and chairs the Supreme Council for National
Security (SCNS). However, the Iranian constitution limits the authority of the president, who
has no operational control of the military andcan operate only within the boundaries set by
the supreme leader.156

Major Military andSecurity Institutions
Supreme Council for
National Security

President Ruhani speaks in front of portraits ofSupreme Leader Khamenei and former Supreme
Leader Khomeini on the 25th anniversary of Khomeini’s death in 2014.
Image Source: AFP

24

The SCNS is the seniormost body for formulating foreign and security policy. The SCNS
is formally chaired by the president, who also
appoints the SCNS secretary, currently Vice
Admiral Ali Shamkhani. Its members also
include the speaker of the Majles; the headof the judiciary; the chief of the AFGS; thecommanders of the IRGC and Artesh; andthe ministers of defense, foreign affairs, theinterior, and intelligence. As SCNS chair, thepresident holds some influence in Iranian foreign and defense policy. The SCNS reports toEnsuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

The AFGS is the seniormost military bodyin Iran, setting military policy and strategic
guidance as directed by the supreme leader.
The Khatemolanbia Central Headquarters(KCHQ) is responsible for coordinating military operations. The AFGS and KCHQ monitor and coordinate the activities of Iran’s two
militaries. In 2016, the KCHQ was separated
from the AFGS as a standing independentcommand responsible for operational command and control (C2); previously, the KCHQ
would only be stood up in wartime. At thattime, the supreme leader appointed IRGC
Major General Mohammad Bagheri as the
AFGS chief—Iran’s chief of defense (CHOD)—
and IRGC Major General Gholam Ali Rashid
as the KCHQ commander.158

Regular Forces (Artesh)
The Artesh primarily focuses on defending
Iran’s borders from external threats. It consists of ground, naval, air, and air defense
components, which in total number about
420,000 personnel. Although generally not as
fervent in ideology as the IRGC, the Artesh
still adheres to velayat-e faqih and remains
loyal to the supreme leader. The Artesh commander, currently Major General Adolrahim
Musavi, reports to the AFGS chief.159

Supreme Leader Khomeini established the IRGC,
also known as the Sepah (corps) or Pasdaran(guard), shortly after the Islamic Revolution. It has
a broader mission to defend the Iranian revolution
from any foreign or domestic threat. The IRGC—
designated as an FTO by the United States—consists of ground, naval, aerospace, and unconventional components, which in total number about
190,000 personnel. Including the estimated active
personnel from Iran’s paramilitary reserve force,the Basij, the IRGC numbers roughly 640,000 personnel. The IRGC commander, currently Major
General Hossein Salami, reports to the AFGS
chief. Informally, however, IRGC leaders haveclose access to the supreme leader’s office and routinely advise the supreme leader and his advisers
on foreign policy matters.160

Law Enforcement Force
Iran’s national police force, the LEF, is responsible
for maintaining internal stability and other police
functions, such as counternarcotic operations andborder security. The LEF formally falls under the
Ministry of Interior, which reports to the president, but the supreme leader as commander inchief appoints the LEF commander, who is usuallyan IRGC general officer. In the event of escalating
domestic unrest, the Basij and IRGC would reinforce the LEF.161,162 In 2018, after the December
2017–January 2018 unrest, the LEF saw a substantial increase in its budget, even eclipsing theamount allocated to the Artesh.163 The LEF has
roughly 200,000–300,000 personnel nationwide,
though estimates vary.164,165

A G E N C Y

Armed Forces General Staff & Khatemolanbia Central Headquarters

Islamic Revolutionary Guard CorpsI N T E L L I G E N C E

the supreme leader, who makes all final security policy decisions and gives orders to thearmed forces.157

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

25

Iranian Armed Forces Organizations Insignia

AFGS

ARTESH

IRGC

Ministry of Defense and Armed
Forces Logistics
MODAFL is responsible for supporting andequipping the Iranian armed forces throughmilitary research, development, production,acquisition, and personnel support. Unlike
many ministries of defense, MODAFL does notdevelop Iran’s defense policy and is not in the
chain of command.166 The current defense minister is Artesh Brigadier General Amir Hatami.

Ministry of Intelligence and Security
The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
is Iran’s national-level civilian intelligence service.
It is responsible for domestic security and intelligence, foreign intelligence, counterintelligence,monitoring Iranian expatriate communities, liaising with foreign intelligence services, and conducting sanctioned lethal operations. The current
head of the MOIS is Mahmud Alavi-Tabar.167

1805-17889

MODAFLLEF

National Military Command
and Control
Iran’s constitution designates the supreme leader,
not the president, as commander in chief of thearmed forces, with the power to exercise militaryC2, declare war and peace, and approve military
operations. Khamenei traditionally issues orders
through the AFGS and KCHQ, which overseeand coordinate between the IRGC and Artesh,but sometimes bypasses these organizations togive orders directly to lower-level commanders.169
During a crisis, the supreme leader probably would
consult with the SCNS to coordinate national policy. The president chairs the SCNS, and its members include key ministers and military leaders,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is
nominally responsible for executing Iranian
foreign policy. However, in practice, other elements of the Iranian government, particularly
the IRGC-QF, have more control of Iranianaffairs in some countries.168 The current MFA
head is Mohammad Javad Zarif.

26

Supreme Leader Khamenei delivers a graduation
speech at a military academy in 2006.
Image Source: AFP

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Artesh Services Insignia

IRIAF

K ADHQ/IRIADF

including the head of the AFGS and the highestranking officials in the IRGC and Artesh, per the
Iranian constitution. The SCNS has an advisoryrole in policy decisions but no C2 authority.

manders are increasingly focused on improving
collaboration and joint operations as the militaries seek to undertake a wider range of missions
domestically and abroad.170

The AFGS and KCHQ command the Artesh andthe IRGC. Both militaries have their own ground,naval, air, and air defense forces; the IRGC also
operates Iran’s missile force and oversees its
external operations element. The Artesh and
IRGC usually conduct operations independentof each other. However, IRGC and Artesh com-

Although the supreme leader and political elites
depend on the IRGC more than the Artesh, thetwo organizations increasingly work together toconfront internal and external threats. The IRGC
is well connected within the Iranian government
and the economy, and the supreme leader uses it
to help maintain his authority.171,172

National Military Command and Control

1805-17889

Supreme Leader
Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS)
Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)

Khatemolanbia Central HQ (KCHQ)

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) HQ

Regular Forces (Artesh) HQ

IRGC Ground Force (IRGCGF)
IRGC Navy (IRGCN)IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF)
Al Ghadir Missile Command
IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF)
Basij Organization of the Oppressed (BOO)

Islamic Republic of
Iran Ground Force (IRIGF)
Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN)
Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)
Islamic Republic of
Iran Air Defense Force (IRIADF)
Formal C2

Informal C2

A G E N C Y

IRINI N T E L L I G E N C E

IRIGF

1805-17889

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Coordination

27

Image Source: AFP

Key Military Leaders

Major General
Mohammad Hossein Bagheri

IRGC Major General Mohammad Hossein
Bagheri has served as AFGS chief since June
2016. He is responsible for overseeing all Iranian military forces as Iran’s highest-ranking
military officer. Bagheri is tasked with overseeing and coordinating Iran’s two parallel military forces—the Artesh and the IRGC—andreports directly to the supreme leader.173

Image Source: AFP

AFGS Chief (CHOD)

IRGC Major General Gholam Ali Rashid has
served as commander of the KCHQ, Iran’s
top operational headquarters, since June
2016. He has longstanding connections withother IRGC leaders dating back to the IranIraq War.174

Major General
Gholam Ali Rashid

Image Source: AFP

KCHQ Commander

Major General
Hossein Salami
IRGC Commander

28

Promoted and appointed IRGC commander in
April 2019, IRGC Major General Hossein Salami
is a key decisionmaker on foreign and domestic
security issues because the IRGC retains a dominant role in the country’s affairs. He oversees
all IRGC activities, but has less control of the
IRGC-QF, whose commander has a separate
line of communication to Khamenei.175

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Image Source: AFP

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Major General
Abdolrahim Musavi

Appointed Artesh commander and promoted
to major general in August 2017, IRIGF Major
General Abdolrahim Musavi’s career in theArtesh dates back to before the Islamic Revolution. Musavi’s top priorities as Artesh commander include improving coordination ofArtesh and IRGC operations and advancing
Iran’s defense self-sufficiency. As Artesh commander, he also holds a position on the SCNS
and informs national security decisions.176

Image Source: AFP

IRGC-QF Commander

Brigadier General
Amir Hatami
Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics

IRIGF Brigadier General Amir Hatami—notably the first Artesh defense minister since
MODAFL’s inception in 1989—is responsible
for overseeing research, development, production, and personnel support for the Iranian
military. Although as defense minister Hatami
plays a significant role in military modernization and defense diplomacy, he has no authority in the military chain of command.178

A G E N C Y
I N T E L L I G E N C E

Major General
Qasem Soleimani

As commander of the IRGC-QF, IRGC Major
General Qasem Soleimani is a key architect
and chief executor of Iran’s foreign policy inregional conflict zones, including Afghanistan,Iraq, the Levant, and Yemen. He is one of themost recognized and popular military leadersin Iran and wields significant influence in Iranian foreign policy decisionmaking. His close
relationship with Khamenei allows him tooften directly advise and receive orders outside
the traditional chain of command.177

D E F E N S E

Image Source: AFP

Artesh Commander

29

Image Source: AFP

An Iranian Qiam-1 SRBM unveiled in 2010.

Core Iranian Military Capabilities
Ballistic Missiles

I

ran’s ballistic missiles constitute a primary
component of its strategic deterrent. Lacking a modern air force, Iran has embraced
ballistic missiles as a long-range strikecapability to dissuade its adversaries in theregion—particularly the United States, Israel,and Saudi Arabia—from attacking Iran. Iran
has the largest missile force in the Middle East,with a substantial inventory of close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs), short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs), and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) that can strike targets

30

throughout the region as far as 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders. Iran is also developing land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), which
present a unique threat profile from ballistic
missiles because they can fly at low altitude andattack a target from multiple directions.179,180
Decades of international sanctions have hampered Iran’s ability to modernize its militaryforces through foreign procurement, but Tehran has invested heavily in its domestic infrastructure, equipment, and expertise to develop

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Iran’s more-accurate systems are primarily shortrange, such as the Fateh-110 SRBM and its
derivatives. Iran’s longer-range systems, such as
the Shahab 3 MRBM, are generally less accurate.
However, Iran is developing MRBMs with greater
precision, such as the Emad-1, that improve
Iran’s ability to strike distant targets more effectively. Iran could also complicate regional missile
defenses by launching large missile salvos.
Iran lacks intermediate-range ballistic missiles(IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs), but Tehran’s desire to have a strategic counter to the United States could drive it
to develop and eventually field an ICBM. Irancontinues to develop space launch vehicles(SLVs) with increasing lift capacity—including
boosters that could be capable of ICBM ranges
and potentially reach the continental UnitedStates, if configured for that purpose. Progressin Iran’s space program could shorten a pathway to an ICBM because SLVs use inherently
similar technologies.181,182,183,184,185[For more details on Iran’s missile force, see
Appendix A.]

Other Long-Range Strike Options
To supplement its long-range strike capabilities, Iran could also attempt to use its regional
proxies and limited airstrike capability to attack an adversary’s critical infrastructure. Iranmaintains an aging inventory of combat aircraft—such as decades-old U.S. F-4 Phantoms—
which it could attempt to use to attack its regional adversaries. However, these older platforms would be more vulnerable to air defenses than modern combat aircraft.186 Iran could
also use its armed UAVs for limited long-range airstrikes, potentially in combination withmissiles, as it demonstrated during strikes against ISIS in Syria in 2018.187

A G E N C Y

Iran can launch salvos of missiles against largearea targets, such as military bases and population centers, throughout the region to inflictdamage, complicate adversary military operations, and weaken enemy morale. Although
it maintains many older, inaccurate missiles
in its inventory, Iran is increasing the accuracy of many of its missile systems. The useof improved guidance technology and maneuverability during the terminal phase of flightenables these missiles to be used more effectively against smaller targets, including specific military facilities and ships at sea. Theseenhancements could reduce the miss-distanceof some Iranian missiles to as little as tens ofmeters, potentially requiring fewer missiles

to damage or destroy an intended target andbroadening Iran’s options for missile use.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

and produce increasingly capable ballistic andcruise missiles. Iran will continue to improve
the accuracy and lethality of some of those systems and will pursue the development of new
systems, despite continued international counterproliferation efforts and restrictions under
UNSCR 2231. Iran is also extending the rangeof some of its SRBMs to be able to strike targets
farther away, filling a capability gap between
its MRBMs and older SRBMs. [For more details
on UNSCR 2231, see Appendix J.]

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

31

Antiaccess/Area Denial
Iran’s antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) strategy seeks to prevent an adversary from entering or operating in areas that it considers
essential to its security and sovereignty. Iranian A2/AD relies primarily on Iran’s naval
forces and geostrategic position along the
Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz—a criticalchokepoint for the world’s oil supply. Iran’slayered maritime defenses consist of numerous platforms and weapons intended, whenused in a combined fashion, to overwhelm
an adversary’s naval forces. Iran emphasizes asymmetric tactics, such as small boat
attacks, to saturate a ship’s defenses. The
full range of Iran’s A2/AD capabilities include
ship- and shore-launched antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), fast attack craft (FAC) andfast inshore attack craft (FIAC), naval mines,
submarines, UAVs, antiship ballistic missiles(ASBMs), and air defense systems.188,189

Maritime Threat Capabilities
Capitalizing on the strategic nature of its littoral, Iran’s maritime A2/AD strategy employs a
combination of surface combatants, undersea
warfare, and antiship missiles to deter naval
aggression and hold maritime traffic at risk.
Particularly with its large fleet of small surface
vessels—high-speed FAC and FIAC equippedwith machine guns, unguided rockets, torpedoes, ASCMs, and mines—Iran has developed amaritime guerrilla-warfare strategy intended to
exploit the perceived weaknesses of traditional
naval forces that rely on large vessels. Iran can

32

IRGCN FAC/FIAC attack a mock U.S. aircraft carrier
during an exercise in 2015.
Image Source: AFP

also use its undersea warfare capabilities, which
include Yono class midget submarines and Kilo
class attack submarines, to attack surface ships
in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulfof Oman. Iran operates coastal defense cruise
missiles (CDCMs) along its southern coast,
which it can launch against military or civilian ships as far as 300 kilometers away. Iranalso maintains an estimated inventory of morethan 5,000 naval mines, including contact andinfluence mines, which it can rapidly deploy in
the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz using
high-speed small boats equipped as minelayers.190,191,192 [For more details on Iran’s naval
forces, see Appendix B.]

Long-Range Strike
During a conflict, Iran probably would attempt
to attack regional military bases and possiblyenergy infrastructure and other critical economic targets using its missile arsenal. Even
with many of its missile systems having poor
accuracy, Iran could use large salvos of missiles
to complicate an adversary’s military operations

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Iran operates a diverse array of SAM and radarsystems intended to defend critical sites fromattack by a technologically superior air force.
Operational since 2017, Iran’s Russian-provided
SA-20c long-range SAM system is the most capable component of its integrated air defense system (IADS).194 Iran is also fielding more-capable,
domestically developed SAM and radar systems
to help fill gaps in its air defenses.195

Unconventional Warfare
Iran’s unconventional warfare capability serves
as a means of power projection and as part of its
A2/AD strategy. Iran could use its strong ties
to militant and terrorist groups in the region—such as Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, and the
Huthis—to target critical adversary militaryand civilian facilities. Proxy attacks against
adversary military bases in the region could
complicate operations in theater.196

Unconventional Operations
Iran has consistently demonstrated a preference for using partners, proxies, and covert campaigns to intervene in regional affairs becauseof limitations in its conventional military capa-

Iran’s reliance on unconventional operations—which is enabled by its relationships with awide range of primarily Middle Eastern militias,
militant groups, and terrorist organizations—iscentral to its foreign policy and defense strategy. The IRGC-QF is Tehran’s primary tool for
conducting unconventional operations and providing support to partners and proxies. The commander of the IRGC-QF, Major General Soleimani, has a close relationship with Khamenei,
often communicating with and taking orders
from him directly.
Through the IRGC-QF, Iran provides its partners, proxies, and affiliates with varying levelsof financial assistance, training, and materielsupport. Iran uses these groups to further its
national security objectives while obfuscating
Iranian involvement in foreign conflicts. Tehran also relies on them as a means to carry out
retaliatory attacks on its adversaries. Most ofthese groups share similar religious and ideological values with Iran, particularly devotion
to Shia Islam and, in some cases, adherence tovelayat-e faqih. However, Iran has also established relationships with more diverse groups
based on shared enemies, common threats, andmutually beneficial goals.
The strength of Iran’s relationship with thesegroups varies widely. Iran’s strongest and mostsuccessful regional partnership is with Hizballah, dating back to 1982. The relationship today
involves Iranian sponsorship, cooperation, andshared sectarian and political interests, espe-

A G E N C Y

Air Defenses

bilities and a desire to maintain plausible deniability, thereby attempting to minimize the riskof escalation with its adversaries.197

I N T E L L I G E N C E

in theater, particularly if some of Iran’s newer,
more-accurate systems are incorporated. Iran
has also developed short-range ASBMs basedon its Fateh-110 system. Iran could use these
ASBMs, in concert with its other countermaritime capabilities, to attack adversary naval
or commercial vessels operating in the Persian
Gulf or Gulf of Oman.193

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

33

cially against Israel and the United States.
However, Hizballah retains its decisionmaking in internal Lebanese affairs.198,199,200
In recent years, the conflicts in Syria, Iraq,
and Yemen have placed new demands on the
IRGC-QF to manage Iranian involvement in
multiple combat zones, including some support
from Iranian conventional forces. In Syria, Iranmaintains a strong relationship with the Asadregime, which it views as a critical ally andconduit to Hizballah.201 In Iraq, the IRGC-QF
has strong influence with Iranian-aligned Shia
groups operating within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), many of whom have cooperated with Baghdad to defeat ISIS.202 In Yemen,
Iran has supported the Huthi rebels with financial assistance, weapons, military training, andoperational advice.203
Iran also uses the IRGC-QF to provide varying levels of support to Shia groups in Bahrain, some Palestinian militant groups, andthe Taliban in Afghanistan.204 As active combat operations have drawn down in Syria andIraq, Tehran could choose to increase support
to historical unconventional lines of effort in
the region or pursue new opportunities.

lift, and UAV operators—into permissive alliedcountries to support larger operations. Since theoutbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran has
become increasingly involved in regional conflicts, with varying levels of military intervention in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The IRGC-QF
remains the lead for these operations, but Iran
has adapted its approach to external operations
by incorporating conventional Iranian forces in
addition to large numbers of Shia foreign fighters. Iran’s military has also revised professional
military education to emphasize lessons learned
from operations in Syria and Iraq, where it also
has gained its first experience conducting combined operations with allied military forces.
In Syria, Iran has worked to defeat ISIS and
defend the Asad regime against insurgent
groups, with Iranian and Iranian-affiliatedforces serving as critical force multipliers
for the regime. In the spring of 2016, Tehran
deployed a small number of ground forces fromthe Artesh to Syria—the first such deployment
outside Iran since the Iran-Iraq War.205[For more details on Iran’s unconventional
forces, see Appendix C.]

Expeditionary Operations
Iran has limited expeditionary warfare andforce projection capabilities. It has shown itself
capable of sending small groups of conventional
forces—including ground forces, military air-

34

Soldiers carry the caskets of IRGC personnel killed in
Syria in 2016.
Image Source: AFP

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional DominanceAs early as 2014, Iran deployed military advisers and some conventional ground forces to Iraq
to combat ISIS and prevent the state’s fragmentation, although Iran maintains a larger
conventional military presence in Syria. The
IRGC-QF has strong ties to many Iraqi Shia
groups that have participated in operations toretake Iraqi territory from ISIS.206,207

Iran can also conduct limited out-of-area naval
operations as far as China, South Africa, andthe Mediterranean Sea. The Islamic Republic of

Iran Navy (IRIN) maintains regular rotationsof deployed naval groups (DNGs) for counterpiracy, presence, and naval diplomacy missions
in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and sometimes
the Indian Ocean. Often plagued with maintenance issues, the DNGs are largely symbolic,showcasing Iran’s projection of force beyond its
territorial waters.212,213

Cyberspace
Iran uses cyberspace operations as a tool of statecraft and internal security, and it continues toimprove its capabilities. Tehran views these operations as a safe, low-cost method to collect information and retaliate against perceived threats. Tehran often masks its cyberoperations using proxies
to maintain plausible deniability. However, there
are often clear indications that link these operations to Iran’s security apparatus. Domestically,A G E N C Y

Image Source: AFP

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Iran does not participate meaningfully ininternational peacekeeping operations, contributing only a few personnel to the African
Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in
Darfur (UNAMID). However, Tehran has
expressed interest in expanding its military
support to international peacekeeping missions,potentially as a way to increase legitimacy, participate in multilateral initiatives, and develop
expeditionary-like capabilities through operations other than war.210,211

Then-IRIN Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah
Sayyari discussing Iranian naval operations during apress conference in 2010.

D E F E N S E

In Yemen, Iran provides military support to
the Huthis against the Saudi-led coalition,
enabling Tehran to indirectly pressure Riyadh
without entering into a direct military conflict.
Huthi missile launches against targets in Saudi
Arabia and attacks on Saudi-led coalition ships
demonstrate Iran’s provision of increasingly
lethal capabilities to the Huthis. Tehran’s provision of explosive boat technology and Iranian-made missiles, including the extended-range
Qiam SRBM, provides the Huthis with systems
exceeding the capabilities of the pre-conflict
Yemeni inventory.208,209

35

the Iranian government pursues dominationof the cyberspace environment to influence thepopulation’s ideological and cultural exposure.
Abroad, Tehran intimidates, harasses, and influences adversaries by conducting cyberoperations
and empowers its proxy networks to do the same.
Compared to more technologically advanced
states, such as the United States, China, andRussia, Tehran’s offensive cyberspace capabilities
remain underdeveloped. Although accounts of
Iranian hacking first emerged in the early 2000s,
state-sponsored cyberspace activities did notappear publicly until 2007. Prompted by the 2010
Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear centrifuges,
Iran recognized the need to develop its cyberspacecapability as a strategic priority. Tehran receives
technical assistance for cyberspace defense from
Russia and China, and Ruhani has repeatedly
made commitments to increase Iran’s cyberspacebudget. Iran has quickly evolved from using web
defacements and basic censorship to conducting
more-sophisticated internal information controls,
destructive attacks, and espionage campaigns.
Iranian cyberspace actors use phishing anddefacing campaigns against commercial enterprises, as well as cyberespionage against military and government data. Iranian cyberactors
frequently target aerospace companies, defense
contractors, energy and natural resource companies, and telecommunications firms for cyberespionage operations. Since at least 2014, Iranian cyberactors have stolen credentials andspread malware on business networks. Thesecyberespionage efforts can support Iran’s military research and development efforts and commodities industries.214,215,216

36

Iran has shown it is capable of disruptive anddestructive offensive cyberattacks, including
against U.S. targets. After a 2012 malware
attack targeting an Iranian oil facility, Iran
responded with a cyberattack on Saudi Aramcoand Qatari RasGas, using malware to cause
irreparable damage to thousands of computers.
During 2012–2013, Iranian hackers launched a
distributed denial of service (DDoS) campaign
against major U.S. banks and the U.S. Stock
Exchange, and in 2014 conducted a data-deletion attack on a U.S. casino. During the2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, Iranian cyberactors
launched a DDoS attack against Israel Defense
Forces infrastructure. From late 2016 to early
2017, Iran conducted another larger and moredamaging malware attack against Saudi targets, including the civil aviation authority,labor ministry, and central bank.217
Iranian cyberactors also conduct ongoing information operations aimed at promoting pro-Iranianpolitical interests via the use of a network of fakesocial media accounts. These accounts promoteanti-Saudi and anti-Western stances and support
policies that Tehran views as favorable.218

Intelligence
Iran’s intelligence services are capable of sophisticated operations worldwide to counter potential
threats to the regime, its revolutionary ideology,
and its interests. Iran’s intelligence community
is composed of 16 organizations charged with foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal monitoring and security missions.219 These
organizations include the MOIS and headquar-Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominanceters elements and subcomponents within the
IRGC and Artesh. Overlapping missions and parallel chains of command—particularly between
the MOIS and elements of the IRGC—fuel competition between the organizations for resources,
missions, and prestige. The Intelligence Coordination Council, chaired by the MOIS, is charged
with coordinating and deconflicting the operations of Iran’s intelligence organizations.

IRGC personnel, operations, and facilities fromespionage, information leaks, and other counterrevolutionary threats. The Artesh has a joint military intelligence capability tasked with tacticalintelligence gathering, counterintelligence operations, and internal security.221

The MOIS is Iran’s national-level civilian intelligence service. It is responsible for domestic security and intelligence, foreign intelligence, monitoring Iranian expatriate communities, liaising withforeign intelligence services, counterintelligence,and sanctioned lethal operations. The MOIS primarily collects information regarding the intentions and capabilities of foreign governments anddissidents Iran regards as hostile.220 The IRGC
Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) is Iran’s
foremost military intelligence service, capable ofall-source collection, analysis, and investigations.
The IRGC also operates a Counterintelligence
Organization that is charged with protecting

Space/Counterspace

IRGC-IO Chief Hossein Taeb.
Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

Iran has conducted several successful launchesof the two-stage Safir SLV since its first attempt
in 2008. It has also revealed the larger two-stage
Simorgh SLV, which it launched in July 2017
and January 2019 without successfully placing
a satellite into orbit. The Simorgh could serve
as a test bed for developing ICBM technologies.
Because of the inherent overlap in technology
between ICBMs and SLVs, Iran’s development

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Iran recognizes the strategic value of space andcounterspace capabilities. Tehran claims to havedeveloped sophisticated capabilities, including
SLVs and communications and remote sensing
satellites. Iran’s simple SLVs are only able tolaunch microsatellites into low Earth orbit andhave proven unreliable with few successful satellite launches. The Iran Space Agency and IranSpace Research Center—which are subordinate
to the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology—along with MODAFL, oversee the country’s SLV and satellite development
programs. Iran initially developed its SLVs as
an extension of its ballistic missile program,but it has genuine civilian and military spacelaunch goals.

A G E N C Y[For more details on Iran’s intelligence services,
see Appendix H.]

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

37

of larger, more-capable SLV boosters remains a
concern for a future ICBM capability. In 2005,
Iran became a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO),
which is led by China, in order to access spacetechnology from other countries.222,223

Iran’s counterspace capabilities have centeredaround jamming satellite communications andGPS, and Iran is reportedly making advancements in these areas.224,225 Iran is also seeking to
improve its space object surveillance and identification capabilities through domestic development and by joining international space situational awareness projects through APSCO.226

Chemical and Biological Warfare
Iranian leaders have long been concerned about
the threat of chemical and biological warfare
because of the considerable loss of life from chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Iranis a States party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological andToxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which ban
the development, production, and stockpilingof certain chemical and biological agents. Iranpublicly denounces the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and Khamenei has reportedly issued a fatwa (Islamic legal ruling) against
chemical weapons.227

An Iranian Safir SLV is prepared for launch in 2009.
Image Source: AFP

38

In November 2018, the United States foundIran noncompliant with its CWC obligations.
Iran failed to declare its transfer of chemical
weapons to Libya in the 1980s or its holdingsof riot control agents, such as the tearing agent
CR, and has not submitted a complete chemical weapons production facility declaration. The
United States is also concerned that Iran is pursuing central nervous system-acting chemicals
for offensive purposes. Although these chemicals have legitimate uses as pharmaceuticals,
they can be lethal at certain doses.228,229

Underground Facilities

Denial and deception (D&D) is a core component of Iranian military doctrine, and Iranuses D&D techniques extensively to reduce thevulnerability and increase the survivability ofits military forces. To apply these techniques
across the military, Tehran has establishedwhat it calls a “passive defense” doctrine. The
effort was based on lessons learned from past
military conflicts, including U.S. operations in
the Middle East and the 2006 Israel-Hizballah
conflict. Iran’s nationwide passive defense program comprises a wide range of D&D tactics tohinder foreign intelligence collection and ensure
the survivability of critical infrastructure andcore military capabilities. Key Iranian passive
defense measures include camouflage and concealment, force dispersals, underground facilities, and highly mobile units. For example, Iranconfigures some military vehicles to resemble
civilian trucks. Iran’s passive defense doctrine
also includes aspects of cyberdefense, mainly toprotect networks from cyberattack and intrusion from outside influences.

Iran has the largest underground facility (UGF)
program in the Middle East. Based on the central
pillars of Iran’s passive defense doctrine, Tehran
has invested heavily in constructing UGFs to conceal and protect critical military and civilian infrastructure throughout the country. Iran designed
and built these facilities to support various aspectsof its defense industries, key nuclear infrastructure, and military forces, including naval sites,
missile bases, and equipment storage.238

The National Passive Defense Organization(NPDO) sends guidance and regulations topassive defense offices embedded across Iranian industries and civilian organizations.
The NPDO has pressed the importance of thepassive defense doctrine beyond the militaryin public forums, including Friday prayers. In
2012, Iran established Passive Defense Week, anationwide effort to promote awareness for key
passive defense measures.230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237

In late 2009, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), stated Iranwould build nuclear facilities in mountains as a
response to international pressure for Tehran toabandon its nuclear ambitions.239 Iran houses
portions of its nuclear program within deep tunnels and underground bunkers at locations suchas Natanz and Fordow (Qom).240,241 However,both sites are subject to restrictions outlined in
the JCPOA and closely monitored by the IAEA.
UGFs support most facets of Tehran’s ballistic
missile capabilities, including the operational
force and the missile development and production program. Missile-related UGFs house weapons and equipment storage, underground basingof mobile missiles, and hardened launch sites.242
In recent years, Iran has used state media to
broadcast the launch of ballistic missiles fromunderground launch chambers and showcase
underground missile garrisons.243 Regional
media also indicates Iran is aiding proxies in the
Middle East by helping them construct underground missile production facilities.244

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Denial and Deception

A G E N C Y

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

39

Outlook: Building a More Capable
Conventional ForceI

ran will continue to use a combination of
conventional and unconventional capabilities to achieve its objectives at home
and abroad, as Tehran’s core national security
objectives are unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. Seeking to strengthen its regional
position, Tehran is attempting to bolster its
ties in the international community and build
the capacity of its partners in the Middle East,
while advancing its military capabilities athome for defense and deterrence. Recognizing
its inability to defeat an advanced Western military, such as the United States, Iran in the nearterm probably will continue to emphasize its
three core capabilities: ballistic missiles capableof striking targets throughout the region, littoral naval forces capable of threatening navigation in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz,
and support for partners and proxies capable ofunconventional operations abroad.
Although the IRGC-QF and its network of proxies
will remain central to Iran’s military power, Tehran will improve its conventional forces and seek
new capabilities. Iran’s latest 5-year development
plan continues priority for missiles, naval forces,
and air defenses, but it also adds new emphasison combat air power and EW capabilities. Iranprobably will continue to focus on domestic development of increasingly capable missiles, naval
platforms and weapons, and air defenses, while
it attempts to upgrade some of its deteriorating40

air and ground capabilities primarily throughforeign purchases. Under UNSCR 2231, Iran isprohibited from procuring most types of conventional weapon systems from abroad. However,these restrictions are set to expire by October
2020, providing Tehran with the opportunity toacquire some advanced capabilities that havebeen beyond its reach for decades.
• Missile Force. Iran will deploy an increasing number of more accurate and lethal theater ballistic missiles, improve its existing
missile inventory, and field new LACMs. It
will also pursue technical capabilities that
could enable it to produce an ICBM.
• Naval Forces. Iran’s naval forces will field
increasingly capable platforms and weapons, including improved naval mines, fasterand more lethal surface platforms, more-advanced ASCMs, larger and more-sophisticated submarines, and new ASBMs.
• Air and Air Defense Forces. Iran will
modernize its IADS with new air surveillance radars, SAMs, and command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
systems. Once the UN arms embargo ends,
Tehran can purchase advanced fourth-generation fighter aircraft. Iran will also
develop and field more-capable UAVs,
including armed platforms.

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

As Iran’s perception of the threats it faces
evolves during the coming years, the military
will be forced to contend with new roles andmissions. Iran’s current modernization plansemphasize a broader range of conventional
capabilities than in the past. Iranian leaders

As its capabilities improve and its approachto the region evolves during the next decade,Iran’s military could consider undertaking
broader missions, such as multilateral peacekeeping missions, expeditionary operations
elsewhere in the region, or permanent basing in allied countries. Nevertheless, Iran’s
conventional forces today remain primarilyoriented for defensive missions and continue

Evolving Military Training
Some recent Iranian exercises have begun to demonstrate changes in Iranian military doctrine. In December 2018, Iran conducted its first major amphibious assault exercise in many
years, NOBLE PROPHET 12. The IRGCGF commander described the exercise as Iran’s first
demonstration of offensive aspects of its defensive doctrine, noting that an ability to conduct
offensive operations is a key element of Iran’s deterrence. In January 2019, the IRIGF also
employed offensive tactics during its EQTEDAR 97 exercise. Officials noted the event displayed Iran’s resolve to proactively attack its enemies instead of waiting to respond.245,246,247

A G E N C Y

Despite these goals, ongoing financial constraints and sanctions will challenge Iran’s
military modernization efforts. Tehran will
be unable to meet all of its acquisition priorities and requirements in this environment.
The complex security situation of the Middle
East—with the continued presence of U.S.
forces, the superior force projection capabilities of Israel, and the growing military meansof Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states—will further complicate Iran’s efforts to build its conventional force.

have repeatedly noted that Iran must improveits capabilities against a wider range of conventional and unconventional threats, suchas terrorism and insurgencies, and be moreproactive in defending Iranian territory andinterests abroad. Since the supreme leader’smandate in 2016 for Iran to improve both its
defensive and offensive capabilities, military
officials have stressed the need to invest in
new capabilities and missions, such as combat
air power and maintaining forward presence,areas it has traditionally neglected. Beyond
Iran’s unprecedented deployment of conventional forces to Iraq and Syria, officials havetaken steps—including changes in force structure, training, and tactics—toward revising its
military doctrine.

I N T E L L I G E N C E• Ground Forces. The ground forces willcontinue structural changes, including thecreation of new rapid-response brigades,
which could enable them to become moreagile and effective in countering threats.
Iran also will be able to buy modern main
battle tanks after the UN embargo ends.

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

41

to rely on asymmetric tactics. More substantial and sustained institutional reforms
and investments in new equipment will be

required for Iran to develop a more balanced
military capable of both defensive and expeditionary operations.

Iranian Military Modernization Goals248,249

42

1805-17887

Capability

Stated Goals

MissileIncrease the accuracy, lethality, and production of ballistic and cruise missiles

Air Defense

Develop longer-range SAMs and improve short- and medium-range systems

Air

Develop advanced offensive and defensive air power

Navy

Attain regional and deterrent sea power

GroundStrengthen ground combat and rapid-reaction capability

EW/C4ISR

Improve EW and C4ISR posture, including space-based capabilities

Cyberspace

Increase cyberspace presence and hold adversary infratructure at risk

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional DominanceAppendix A: Missile Force
Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic
missile arsenal in the Middle East, with a substantial inventory of close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles(SRBMs), and medium-range ballistic missiles(MRBMs) that can strike targets throughout
the region up to 2,000 kilometers from Iran’sborders, as far as Israel and southeastern

Iranian Ballistic Missile Ranges

1805-17885

FRANCERUSSIAMONGOLIAUKRAINEKAZAKHSTAN

CHINA

TURKEY

Mediterranean
Sea

LIBYA

TURKM.
Tehran

SYRIA
IRAQ

IRAN

PAK.

AFG.

EGYPT

BURMA
INDIA

System (Max Range)
Shahab 1 (300 km)

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design

Fateh-110 (300-500 km)
Shahab 2 SRBM (500 km)
Zolfaghar SRBM (700 km)

OMAN

SAUDI
ARABIA

Arabian Sea

Bay ofBengalYEMEN
SOM.

INDIAN
OCEAN

Qiam-1 SRBM (750 km)
Shahab 3/Emad-1/
Sejjil MRBMs (2,000 km)

0500
1,000 Kilometers
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

D E F E N S EGREECEA G E N C YBlack Sea

I N T E L L I G E N C E

ROM.

43

Europe. Iran’s missile force—the Al-Ghadir
Missile Command (AGMC), which falls under
the control of the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF)—serves as a critical strategic deterrent
and a key tool of Iranian power projection.
The AGMC periodically conducts highly publicized national-level exercises demonstrating
the capabilities and readiness of the force, often
as part of the IRGC’s NOBLE PROPHET seriesof exercises. In 2017, Iran for the first time used
the name EQTEDAR-E VELAYAT for its major
AGMC exercise. These show-of-force events
typically include publicized missile launches
and statements highlighting Iran’s missile
capabilities and deterrent posture. Prior exercises have showcased launches against a mock
U.S. airfield and naval targets.250,251,252
Iran has also used its missiles in combat on
several occasions in recent years. In June 2017
and October 2018, Iran launched SRBMs fromwestern Iran in high-profile strikes against ISIS
targets in Syria. Iran conducted both operations
in direct response to terrorist attacks in Iran,although some officials noted the attacks werealso intended as a message to any of Iran’s potential adversaries.253,254,255 In September 2018, Iranlaunched SRBMs against Kurdish militant targets in Iraq, damaging the Kurdish Democratic
Party of Iran (KDPI) headquarters.256
Iran’s continued production of missiles andrefinement of ballistic missile technology posea growing threat to U.S. forces and allies in the
Middle East. Tehran is also a major proliferatorof ballistic missile technology to regional state
actors and proxy groups. Although Iranian44

leaders emphasize self-reliance, Iran continues
to depend on foreign suppliers for critical components and technology.
Iran has an extensive missile development
program, and the size and sophistication of its
missile force continues to grow despite decadesof counterproliferation efforts aimed at curbing its advancement. Iran continues to attempt
to increase the lethality, reliability, and accuracy of its missile force. In recent years, Iran
has unveiled SRBMs with increasingly greater
range and precision as well as MRBMs withclaimed accuracy and warhead improvements.
Iran is fielding an increasing number of theaterballistic missiles, improving its existing inventory, and developing technical capabilities that
could enable it to produce an intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM).257,258,259,260,261

Close- and Short-Range
Ballistic Missiles
Iran’s liquid-propellant SRBMs—the Shahab 1, Shahab 2, and Qiam-1—are based on
Scud technology. The Qiam-1 has a range of atleast 750 kilometers, and variants of the system have been used as part of Iranian strikes
on ISIS in Syria. Tehran has also supplied
extended-range Qiam-1 variants to the Huthis
in Yemen. These missiles, launched mostly at
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, have flown to a range ofmore than 900 kilometers.262,263,264
Iran’s solid-propellant CRBMs and SRBMs primarily consist of the many variants of the Fateh110 family of missiles. Most of these systems
have ranges up to about 300 kilometers, but Iran

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

A Shahab 3 MRBM is launched during an exercise
in 2016.

A Shahab 1 SRBM is launched during an exercise
in 2012.
Image Source: AFP

has unveiled a variant called the Fateh-313 witha 500-kilometer range. Iran has also advertised
several variants of these missiles configured withdifferent terminal seeker technologies, including
electro-optical and antiradiation homing, whichmakes them capable of targeting ships. Thesesystems—which include the Khalij Fars, Hormuz 1, and Hormuz 2—reportedly have ranges ofabout 300 kilometers.265 In September 2016, Iranunveiled the new Zolfaghar SRBM, a solid-pro-

The liquid-propellant Shahab 3 is the mainstay of Iran’s MRBM force. Iran has modified
the Shahab 3, which is based on the North
Korean No Dong MRBM, to extend its range
and effectiveness, with the longest range variant being able to reach targets at a distance ofabout 2,000 kilometers. In 2015, Iran publicized
the first launch of a Shahab 3 variant—called
the Emad-1—equipped with a maneuverable
reentry vehicle (MARV), which could allow thesystem to strike targets up to potentially 2,000
kilometers away with near-precision accuracy.
Iran has also conducted multiple launches of thesolid-propellant Sejjil MRBM, which also has arange of 2,000 kilometers. Iranian officials haveannounced plans for an Emad-2 with greater

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles

D E F E N S E

pellant system with a 700-kilometer range. Iranused these missiles in its 2017 and 2018 strikes
against ISIS in Syria.266

A G E N C Y

Image Source: AFP

45

precision as well as a new Sejjil variant, which
can also be guided all the way to the target.267
In September 2016, Iran claimed production of
the new Khorramshar MRBM would begin in2017. The Khorramshahr, which Iran states has
a 2,000-kilometer range, appears to be derived
from North Korean Musudan technology.268,269

the Soumar LACM, a ground-launched systemthat appears to be based on the Russian airlaunched AS-15. Iran claims the Soumar has
a 2,000-kilometer range. LACMs can provide
Iran with a precision-strike capability up to
MRBM ranges that could further complicate
missile defenses.270

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles

Space Launch Vehicles

In 2012, Iran announced the development of its
first land-attack cruise missile (LACM), called
Meshkat. In 2015, Iran displayed what it called

Since 2008, Iran has launched multi-stage spacelaunch vehicles (SLVs) that could also aid Iran’sdevelopment of longer-range ballistic missiles

The unveiling of the Simorgh SLV in 2010.
Image Source: AFP

46

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominancebecause SLVs use inherently similar technologies. Iran has conducted multiple launches of
the two-stage, liquid-propellant Safir SLV, a mix
of successes and failures. It has also launched
the larger two-stage, liquid-propellant Simorgh

SLV, which is designed to carry satellites higher
into orbit and could also serve as a test bed fordeveloping ICBM technologies. The Simorgh
could be capable of ICBM ranges if configured asa ballistic missile.271,272

300–500

300

500

700

At least
750

Up to
2,000

Up to
2,000

2,000

Propellant
Type

Solid

LiquidLiquidSolid

LiquidLiquidLiquidSolid

Deployment
Mode

Roadmobile

Roadmobile

Roadmobile

Roadmobile

Roadmobile,
Silo

Roadmobile,
Silo

Roadmobile

Roadmobile

Note: This chart does not include all systems in development. All ranges are approximate.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y

Emad-1 MRBM

Shahab 3 MRBM

Qiam-1 SRBM

Zolfaghar SRBM

Maximum
Range (km)D E F E N S E

System1805-17887

Shahab 2 SRBM

Fateh-110 SRBM (and variants)

Shahab 1 SRBM

Selected Iranian Ballistic Missiles 273

Sejjil (Ashura) MRBM

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

47

Appendix B: Naval Forces
Iran operates two independent naval forces—theIslamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN), the Artesh’s
naval branch, and the IRGC Navy (IRGCN). Iranestablished the IRGCN in 1985; the IRIN existed

as part of the Artesh before the 1979 revolution.
The commander of the IRIN is Rear Admiral
Hossein Khanzadi, and the commander of the
IRGCN is Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri.274

Iranian Naval Headquarters and Areas of Responsibility
ARM.

AZERBAIJAN

TURKEY

CaspianSea

1805-17885

TURKMENISTANIRIN 4th ND

Bandar-e Anzali

TehranIRIN HQ

AFGHANISTAN

IRAQ

IRAN
IRGCN 3rd ND

Bandar-e Mahshahr

IRIN 2nd ND*

Persian
Gulf

Bandar-e Bushehr

IRGCN 2nd ND

Bandar-e
Asaluyeh

IRIN HQ

IRIN AOR

BAHR.

600 Kilometers

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

48

Jask

Chah Bahar

IRIN 2nd ND*

QATAR
300

PAKISTANIRGCN 5th ND

Shared AOR
0

IRIN SNFHQ& 1st ND

Bandar Abbas

IRGCN 4th ND

IRGCN HQ
IRGCN AORIRGCN HQ
& 1st ND

Bandar-e
U.A.E. Lengeh

OMAN

IRIN 3rd ND

Gulf of Oman

Arabian Sea

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design

KUW.

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional DominanceAmid increased tension with the United Statesin mid-2019, Iran has used its naval forces todemonstrate resolve and threaten freedom ofnavigation. In May and June 2019, Iran conducted limpet mine attacks against several
merchant vessels in the Gulf of Oman. In July
2019, the IRGCN also seized a UK-flagged
oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz after theUnited Kingdom seized an Iranian-flagged oiltanker near Gibraltar. 279,280,281,282

The IRIN comprises approximately 18,000
personnel and is considered Iran’s “blue waternavy” with its larger and more traditionalsurface ships compared with the IRGCN. Iranis the only Persian Gulf nation with a submarine force, which the IRIN operates. The
service’s primary mission is to defend Iranian
territorial waters and protect the country’s
economic interests in the Caspian Sea, Gulfof Oman, and beyond. It consists of primarily
older, small surface combatants along withmostly small submarines and some logistic
support vessels. As part of Iran’s layered maritime defenses, the IRIN provides antisurface
warfare capabilities focused on the Gulf ofOman with coastal defense cruise missiles(CDCMs), naval mines, surface combatants,
and submarines. The IRIN is Iran’s first lineof defense in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The IRIN also aims to secure Iranian economic interests by safeguarding theflow of commerce in the region from piracy
and interdiction.283,284
The IRIN is geographically divided into four NDs,
with the central IRIN headquarters in Tehran.
• 1st ND: Headquartered at Bandar Abbas(Strait of Hormuz); also the location of the
IRIN’s Southern Forward Naval Headquarters (SFNHQ), which coordinatesacross all southern IRIN NDs• 2nd ND: Headquartered at Bushehr (Persian Gulf) and Jask (Gulf of Oman); 2ndND HQ moving to Jask following 2007
reorganizationA G E N C Y

U.S. and Iranian naval forces interact on aroutine basis in the Persian Gulf. Historically, more than 90 percent of such interactions have been deemed safe and professional,
and the vast majority continue to be.276,277
However, Iran has increased maritime surveillance of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf
using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), andthe potential remains for additional unsafe
and unprofessional interactions.278

Islamic Republic of Iran NavyI N T E L L I G E N C E

In 2007, the two naval forces reorganized, andIran assigned specific areas of operation for each.
Tehran assigned the IRGCN sole responsibility
for the Persian Gulf and assigned the IRIN the
Gulf of Oman and Caspian Sea. Both services
continued to share responsibility for the Straitof Hormuz. The geographic split helped streamline command and control (C2) while reducing
confusion, miscommunication, and duplicationof efforts. With the added responsibility, the
IRGCN established two new naval districts(NDs) in the central and southern Persian Gulf.
The reorganization also provided the IRIN witha greater mandate to operate farther from the
Iranian coast.275

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

49

IRIN Order of Battle 285

50

1805-17887

Class

Type

Inventory

Kilo

Attack submarine

3

Fateh

Coastal submarine

1

Yono (Ghadir)Midget submarine

14

NahangMidget submarine

1

Jamaran (Mowj)

Corvette

3

Vosper Mk 5

Corvette3

PF 103 (Bayandor)

Corvette

2

Combattante II (Kaman)

Fast attack craft, missile

13

HendijanPatrol craft, missile3

PGM-71 (Parvin)

Patrol craft, missile

3

Cape (Kayvan)

Patrol craft, missile

3

U.S. Mk II

Patrol craft, coastal

6

U.S. Mk III

Patrol craft, coastal

10

C-14

Patrol craft, coastal

9

FB 40

Patrol craft, inshore

6

HenghamLanding ship, tank3

KarbalaLanding ship, logistic

6

Wellington Mk 4

Hovercraft

2

Wellington Mk 5

Hovercraft

4

Kharg

Replenishment ship

1

Bandar Abbas

Fleet supply ship

2

DelvarSupport ship

6

HendijanTender7

Shahsavar

Training ship1

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional DominanceOne of the IRIN’s key missions is to conduct outof-area operations and naval diplomacy in theregion and beyond. Since 2009, the IRIN has
maintained near-continuous out-of-area naval
deployments for counterpiracy operations in the
Gulf of Aden, foreign port visits, and bilateral
exercises with regional navies.
Despite its aging platforms, the IRIN has beenmoderately effective in maintaining readinessand sustaining operations. If the IRIN is to fulfill its longer term ambitions to function as a true
blue-water navy, it will have to invest in more
modern combatants and support ships. Iran has
been able to domestically build corvettes andpatrol boats for the IRIN and upgrade legacy
platforms with new capabilities, including antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Despite its needfor new auxiliaries, Iran has given no indication
it is planning to invest in acquiring new support

The IRIN typically conducts a major national-level exercise each year called VELAYAT.
The event usually entails a series of naval
maneuvers involving IRIN surface combatants,
submarines, and CDCM forces.287,288

Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps NavyThe IRGCN, which comprises approximately
20,000 personnel, is tasked with protecting primarily the Iranian littoral. It employs an asymmetric doctrine that emphasizes speed, mobility,
large numbers, surprise, and survivability andtakes advantage of Iran's geography with theshallow and confined waterways of the Persian
Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Although the IRGCN
has significantly upgraded its fleet in terms ofsize and lethality since the end of the Iran-Iraq
War, it remains a force composed of smaller
platforms. Rather than acquire larger ships asa more traditional navy might, the IRGCN has
pursued smaller, faster vessels armed with avariety of weapon systems. Iran views acquiring
these types of vessels in sufficient numbers willallow it to threaten foreign navies and overcome
wartime attrition.
The IRGCN aims to overwhelm an adversary's
defenses by using multiple platforms and weapons together to achieve tactical surprise. These

Iran’s first domestically produced corvette,
the Jamaran.

A G E N C Y• 4th ND: Headquartered at Bandar Anzali(Caspian Sea)

vessels. Iran acquired three Russian Kilo classattack submarines in the 1990s and began domestically producing North Korean Yono class midget
submarines in the mid-2000s. Iran continues toinvest in domestically developing and producing
more-capable subsurface platforms, including
larger coastal submarines.286

I N T E L L I G E N C E• 3rd ND: Headquartered at Chah Bahar(Gulf of Oman)

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Image Source: AFP

51

• 2nd ND: Headquartered at Bushehr;
responsible for the north-central PersianGulf• 3rd ND: Headquartered at Bandar
Mahshahr; responsible for the northern
Persian Gulf
• 4th ND: Headquartered at Asaluyeh;
responsible for the central Persian Gulf
IRGCN small boats during a ceremony on 2 July 2012
to commemorate the downing of Iran Air Flight 655
by the USS Vincennes in 1988.
Image Source: AFP

systems include small boats armed with guns,
rockets, torpedoes, and missiles; CDCMs; naval
mines; and maritime special operations forces.
IRGCN units train to use hit-and-run attacks
against larger enemy naval vessels using
swarms of small boats. The IRGCN could also
restrict access or even attempt to fully close theStrait of Hormuz. Iran has modified a range ofsmall boats to be able to deliver naval mines rapidly. In support of these goals, IRGCN acquisition efforts have focused on fielding a large fleet
of faster and more-capable small boats; developing more-advanced ASCMs to be launched fromsea, ground, or air; and building a large inventory of more-sophisticated naval mines.289,290
The IRGCN is geographically divided into five
NDs, with the central IRGCN headquarters at
Bandar Abbas.
• 1st ND: Headquartered at Bandar Abbas(Shahid Bahonar); responsible for theStrait of Hormuz

52• 5th ND: Headquartered at Bandar Lengeh;
responsible for the southern Persian Gulf,
including the disputed islands of Lesser
Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa291
Many of Iran’s NOBLE PROPHET exercises—
the IRGC’s typical large-scale annual exercise—are naval-focused with IRGCN elements leading the activities. IRGCN NOBLE PROPHETs
are usually deterrent-themed events intended
largely for strategic messaging, primarily aimed
at the West and regional states.292,293

Major Naval Capabilities
Fast Attack Craft and Fast Inshore
Attack Craft

The IRGCN is the primary operator of Iran’s hundreds of fast attack craft (FAC) and fast inshore
attack craft (FIAC). These platforms have been
the mainstay of the IRGCN since its inception
in the 1980s, although the Iranian FAC/FIAC
inventory has grown significantly in terms ofsize and lethality since that time. Larger andmore-capable, Iranian FAC are usually armed
with ASCMs or torpedoes. The largest of thesevessels are Iran’s 10 Chinese-built Houdong missile boats acquired in the mid-1990s, which serveas the capital ships of the IRGCN fleet; theseEnsuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

IRGCN Order of Battle 294
Type

Inventory

Houdong (Thondor)

Fast attack craft, missile

10

Peykaap I

Patrol craft, coastal, torpedo

15

Peykaap II

Patrol craft, coastal, missile

25

Peykaap III

Patrol craft, coastal, missile

5

Mk 13

Patrol craft, coastal, missile

10

C-14

Patrol craft, coastal, missile5

Tir

Patrol craft

10

TarlanPatrol craft, inshore

15

Kashdom II

Patrol craft, inshore

15

AshooraPatrol craft, inshore

Unknown*

CougarPatrol craft, inshore

Unknown*

FB RIB-33

Patrol craft, inshore

Unknown*

GashtiPatrol craft, inshore

Unknown*

Kuch

Patrol craft, inshore

Unknown*

Bladerunner (Siraj)

Patrol craft, inshore

Unknown*

Boghammar

Patrol craft, inshore

20

Hormuz 21

Landing ship

2

Hormuz 24

Landing ship

3

Harth 55

Support ship

1

Safir Kish

Transport

3

Naser

Transport

3*Note: The exact numbers for many Iranian small boat types are unknown, but the IRGCN has hundreds ofsmall boats throughout the Persian Gulf.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

ClassA G E N C Y

1805-17887

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

53

vessels are frequently used in Persian Gulf andStrait of Hormuz patrols. Originally equippedwith C802 missiles, Iran has since upgraded the
Houdongs with extended-range Ghader ASCMs.
Iranian FIAC, which are smaller but far more
numerous, are lightly armed and usually fitted with only machine guns or rockets. Used en
masse, these vessels can harass merchant shipping and conduct swarm tactics during a forceon-force naval engagements.

An Iranian Yono class midget submarine.
Image Source: AFP

Surface Combatants

The IRIN operates Iran’s larger surface combatants, which include three 1960s-era British-built Vosper Mk 5 class corvettes and several French-built Combattante class patrol
craft acquired before the Islamic Revolution.
To expand the IRIN fleet, Iran has sincedomestically built several of its own Combattante patrol craft and three new Jamaranclass corvettes, which closely resemble Iran’s
Vospers with modifications, such as an added
helicopter flight deck. Iran has commissioned
three of the vessels, including one on the Caspian Sea, which was severely damaged in early2018.295 The IRIN has also expanded its number of missile combatants by upgrading older
auxiliaries and patrol ships with short- andmedium-range ASCMs.
Submarines

Submarines are a critical component of theIRIN, which has undertaken an ambitious
construction program to increase its subsurface production capabilities and expand its
fleet. Iran has four classes of submarines in54

its order of battle. Iran’s largest and mostcapable subsurface platforms are the three
Kilo class attack submarines it purchasedfrom Russia in the 1990s. The IRIN also has
14 North Korean-designed Yono class midget
submarines, which it can arm with Iranian
Valfajar heavy-weight torpedoes. In February 2019, Iran presented its first submarine-launched ASCM, the Jask-2, which canbe launched from the Yono.296 Iran also hasa single domestically designed and produced
Nahang midget submarine, which lacks torpedo tubes and may serve as a special operations platform.297 Also in February 2019, theIRIN officially commissioned its first coastal
submarine, the Fateh. Iran claims the Fateh
class, Iran’s largest domestically built submarine, can launch both torpedoes and ASCMs.298
Naval Mines

Mine warfare has been an integral part of
Iran’s naval strategy since the Tanker War.
Iran has an estimated inventory of more

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

than 5,000 naval mines, which include contact and influence mines. Both navies havedevised strategies to rapidly deploy mines
while improving force survivability. Iran
has a variety of vessels that can lay mines,
but the IRGCN has integrated its doctrine ofusing smaller, faster vessels into its mine-laying strategy. Iran has equipped many of its
Ashoora small boats with mine rails capableof holding at least one mine.299,300

Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles

CDCMs have been one of Iran’s primary layers of defense for both navies to protect thecountry’s littoral and maritime approaches.
Iran initially gained experience with CDCMs
using Chinese-built Silkworm missiles during
the Tanker War. Both the IRGCN and IRIN
operate CDCM forces, and Iran has invested
greatly in developing and producing more-capable ASCMs, primarily based on Chinese

Iranian CDCM Ranges

1805-17885

AFGHANISTANIRAQPAKISTAN
Persian
Gulf

SAUDI ARABIA

BAHR.
QATAR

C704 Nasr ASCM (35km)
Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design

C802 Noor ASCM (120km)
Ghader ASCM (200km)
Ghadir ASCM (300km)
All ranges shown frommainland coast

Claimed by
Iran and UAE

Greater
Tunb
Lesser
Tunb
Abu
Musa
Gulf of Oman

UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
OMAN
0150
300 Kilometers
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Arabian Sea

D E F E N S E

KUW.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y

IRAN

55

C802 and C700-series missiles. Based on its
domestic copy of the C802, called the Noor,
Iran has developed the 200-kilometer-range
Ghader and the 300-kilometer-range Ghadir
ASCMs.301 Iran also domestically produces
the 35-kilometer-range Chinese C704 ASCM
as the Nasr.302

An Iranian C700-series CDCM is launched during an
exercise in 2006.
Image Source: AFP

Antiship Ballistic Missiles

The IRGCASF has publicly announced andtested its ability to target ships with several ballistic missile models—including the
Khalij Fars, Hormuz 1, and Hormuz 2—
based on the Fateh-110 SRBM. These antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) have rangesof up to 300 kilometers and are equippedwith terminal seekers that steer the missile
to its target. These systems use a variety of
seekers, including electro-optical and antiradiation homing.303

56

Iran’s Khalij Fars ASBM.
Image Source: AFP

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional DominanceAppendix C: Unconventional Forces
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Qods Force

Major General Qasem Soleimani commands
the IRGC-QF and has a close relationship with
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, often communicating with and taking orders from him directly.
Soleimani oversees all IRGC-QF external operations, including support for active combat missions and clandestine activities. In recent years,
he has traveled frequently to Iraq and Syria tosupport Iran’s involvement in battlefield operations against ISIS and Syrian opposition groups,
and has become one of Iran’s most visible—andpopular—military leaders.
The IRGC-QF receives official funding from
Iran’s defense budget, but it augments its
operating budget through a network of
IRGC-QF-affiliated companies worldwide. The
IRGC-QF and some affiliated companies havecome under international sanctions becauseof their involvement in terrorist activities andweapons proliferation.304,305,306,307,308

A G E N C Y

Image Source: AFP

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Tehran uses the IRGC-QF to provide financial, training, and materiel support—including facilitating terrorist attacks—mainly toregional Shia militant groups ideologicallyaligned with Iran. These partner and proxygroups provide Iran with a degree of plausible
deniability, and their demonstrated capabilities and willingness to attack Iran’s enemies
serve as an additional deterrent.

IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani during Ten
Days of Dawn celebrations in 2016.

D E F E N S E

Iran depends on a variety of unconventional andproxy forces to bolster its conventional military.
The IRGC-QF (Qods meaning “Jerusalem”) is
Iran’s primary means for conducting unconventional operations abroad, with connectionsof varying degrees to state and nonstate actors
globally. It was founded in 1990 in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War as the IRGC unit
responsible for covert operations and unconventional warfare operations abroad. Before the
IRGC-QF’s creation, a variety of governmentorganizations, including the IRGC’s Office of
Liberation Movements, handled Iran’s support
to Islamic militant, terrorist, and resistancegroups. Since its establishment, the IRGC-QF
has become an increasingly professional unit
trusted by the supreme leader to conduct operations outside Iran, provide support to Islamic
militants, and collect intelligence against Iran’s
enemies. IRGC-QF personnel number roughly
5,000, though some estimates are higher.

57

Partners, Proxies, and Affiliates
The IRGC-QF maintains a wide and varied network of nonstate partners, proxies, and affiliates
primarily in the Middle East. Iran provides arange of financial, political, training, and materiel support to these groups. Iran’s provisionof military hardware has included small arms,

ammunition, explosives, improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), vehicles, antitank guided missiles(ATGMs), man-portable air defense systems(MANPADS), artillery, rockets, UAVs, andsome more-advanced systems, such as ASCMs
and ballistic missiles, despite UN resolutions
prohibiting Iranian arms exports.309

Selected Iranian Partners, Proxies, and Affiliates

1805-17885

LEBANON
SYRIA
IRAQ

IRAN

AFGHANISTAN

Palestinian
Territories
Hizballah

BAHRAIN

Iraqi Shia militias
HuthisPalestinian militants
Bahraini militants

YEMEN

Shia foreign fighters
Note: Numerous Iranianpartners and proxies
are active in Syria.

58

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design

TalibanIR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional DominanceHizballah

Hizballah is Iran’s most important and longest-standing nonstate partner and a core
member of Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance.”
Shared goals, ongoing personal relationships,
and enduring ideological, cultural, and religious ties have contributed to the strengthof the partnership. The IRGC-QF has collaborated closely with Hizballah to grow Iran’s
influence and capacity throughout the region
and beyond, using the group to help train andequip other proxies. Iran has attempted tohelp temper international perceptions of Hiz-

Supporters wave Hizballah flags in front of portraits of Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah (left)
and Supreme Leader Khamenei (right).

D E F E N S E

I N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y

Tehran’s partners, proxies, and affiliates
include Hizballah, Iraqi Shia militias, theHuthis, some Palestinian groups, the Taliban,
and Bahraini militants. The level and type of
support Iran provides to these groups depends
on the nature of the relationship and the objectives Iran seeks to achieve. Stronger partners,
such as Hizballah, are highly capable, reliable,
and receptive to Tehran. Other groups, suchas the Afghan Taliban, are less receptive to
Iranian guidance but still help further Iran’s
regional objectives because they combat common enemies.310,311,312

Image Source: AFP

59

ballah as a terrorist organization and increase
Hizballah’s legitimate political standing in
Lebanon. In recent years, both groups havefocused their cooperation on immediate needs
in Syria and Iraq.313
Hizballah, a highly adaptable and malleableorganization, has evolved from its insular origins as a sectarian actor in Lebanon into a far
more complex regional actor. Hizballah’s rolein Lebanon—in its formal political institutions,as a social provider for Shia society and as aself-proclaimed defender against Israeli aggression—primarily defines its reason for existence.
However, the group has increasingly defined its
other regional activities—including involvement
in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—as working in concert with its internal Lebanon-centric goals. This
concept of Hizballah as a regional power directly
contradicts Lebanon’s policy of disassociationand has increased sectarian tensions at home.314
Hizballah has steadily grown as a military power
during the past several decades. Asymmetricattacks against Israel in the 1980s and 1990s,
followed by a major conflict in 2006, initiallyconfirmed Hizballah’s self-imposed title as a“resistance” force against Israel. Since the 2006
Israel-Hizballah War, Hizballah has steadily
increased its military arsenal, promising thatany future conflict will be more devastating.
Hizballah’s concentration of power has allowed
it to transform from a hybrid guerilla force into
a nascent conventional military, with the capacity to deploy an expeditionary force in Syria in
support of the Asad regime and Iran. Hizballah
maintains a stockpile of approximately 120,000–
150,000 rockets, a massive expansion in capa-

60

bility compared with the approximately 13,000
it had available during the 2006 conflict.315 Hizballah has an estimated 45,000 fighters, divided
between as many as 21,000 full-time personnel
and a 24,000-person reserve force.316
Iraqi Shia Militias

One of Tehran’s strongest levers of influence in
Iraq is through the many Iran-backed Shia militias. Iran has provided financial backing for someof these groups for decades. The Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Kataib Hizballah
have long served as reliable partners for Tehran,including conducting attacks on U.S. military
personnel in Iraq from 2003 to 2011 using Iranian-provided munitions. Following ISIS’s widespread territorial gains in Iraq in mid-2014 andthe subsequent formation of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Iran sent IRGC advisers,
weapons, and other military support for the
PMF and Iraqi counter-ISIS operations.317
Since 2011, the IRGC-QF has also deployedthese Shia militants outside Iraq in supportof Iranian interests. Since at least 2013, Iraqi
Shia militias have greatly expanded theirstrength, influence, and combat capabilities,
owing largely to Iranian support and theirexperience fighting in Iraq and Syria. Shia
militias under the Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) played a leading role in counter-ISIS operations in Iraq, and the majorityof these groups have had elements fighting in
Syria at Iran’s behest as part of Syrian proregime forces. During the counter-ISIS campaign, Shia militias staffed more than 50 PMF
brigades under the PMC. There are an esti-

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Shia Foreign Fighters

Iran probably sees supporting the Huthi rebels
in Yemen as a low-cost, high-reward opportunity to indirectly confront Saudi Arabia, embarrass Riyadh militarily, and establish an ally on
the Arabian Peninsula.325 Iran provides a wide
range of support—including advisers, training,
and lethal aid—to the Huthis to support theiroperations against the Saudi-led coalition in the
Yemen conflict.326 Tehran claims Riyadh is theaggressor and the cause of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and has refuted accusations that it
is supporting the Huthis with missiles and otheradvanced military equipment.327
Estimates of Huthi fighters range from10,000 to 30,000 personnel consisting of core
believers, tribal supporters, and familial alliances.328,329 The Huthis seek to rule the northern Yemen region or, at a minimum, retain
a dominant role in northern Yemen and sub-I N T E L L I G E N C E

Huthisstantial political and military influence inany future government.330 Huthi leaders seek
to use negotiations, international pressure,military operations, and ballistic missile andmaritime attacks to pressure the Saudi-led
coalition into accepting settlement terms
favorable to the Huthis.

Debris from an Iranian Qiam SRBM provided by Iranto the Huthis that was fired into Saudi Arabia on
display at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling in Washington, DC. The numbered placards identify the uniquepositioning of valves on the missile’s propellant tanks.

D E F E N S E

mated 75,000–145,000 mainly Shia fighters
active in more than 35 Iraqi militias.318,319,320

A G E N C Y

To support its operations in Syria, Iran has employed a variety of Shia foreign fighters fromthe region, including the Fatemiyun, Zeinabiyun, and Heidariyun, who are fighters of Afghan,
Pakistan, and Iraqi origin, respectively. The Fatemiyun and Zeinabiyun are recruited primarily from refugee populations in Iran, while the Heidariyun generally come from established
Iraqi Shia militias. These groups have served as a proxy force to fight alongside proregime
forces in Syria under the direction of the IRGC-QF and Hizballah. Before being sent into
combat, these foreign fighters receive basic training in military skills from Iran or Hizballah.
Training usually lasts only 20–45 days, although some fighters reportedly receive additional
specialized training, such as sniper courses. Tehran is likely to continue using these fighters
in Syria, and it is unclear if there are plans to deploy them to other locations.321,322,323,324

Image Source: DVIDS

61

The Huthis depend on Iran for military equipment and support, including ballistic missiles,
UAVs, and explosive boat technology. Tehran
is using covert means to support this effort
while publicly denying its military involvementin Yemen. Although the Huthis have always
maintained a sense of identity as Shia Zaydis
and Yemenis, they probably are receptive tofurther strengthening ties with Iran.

arms attacks.332,333 The Huthis possess mostof the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) from
Yemen’s prewar stockpiles and have modified
air-to-air missiles (AAMs) for use as SAMs.
In 2018, Saudi-led coalition forces also seizedadvanced Iranian SAMs en route to the Huthis
during countersmuggling operations.334 The
Huthis have also used Iranian UAVs to attack
Saudi-led coalition Patriot batteries.335

Huthi forces hold and defend territory innorthern Yemen, disrupt Saudi-led coalition
movement and supply efforts, and conduct
retaliatory and offensive strikes against thecoalition. Huthi fighters are armed with smallarms, artillery, and tanks from preconflict
Yemeni stockpiles.331 Iranian-supported Huthi
missile forces have conducted multiple ballistic missile attacks against Saudi Arabia—withtargets including the capital, Riyadh, and a
Saudi oil refinery—using Iranian SRBMs.
Huthi maritime forces have ASCMs, naval
mines, manned and unmanned explosive
boats, and other small boats used for small-

Palestinian Militant Groups

Australian HMAS Darwin interdicts a dhow in the Gulfof Oman with Iranian arms intended for the Huthis.
Image Source: Commonwealth of Australia

62

Iran provides support—including training, funding, and military equipment—to HAMAS andother Palestinian groups because of their strategic location and shared hostility toward Israel.
Tehran seeks to increase international support
in favor of a Palestinian state and desires to be
seen as a stronger champion of Palestinians thanits Arab rivals, such as Saudi Arabia. However,these primarily Sunni groups are not always
receptive to Iranian guidance. During the past
year, some Palestinian militant groups, particularly HAMAS, have improved ties to Iran. Relations had deteriorated after 2011, as most Palestinian militant groups refused to support theAsad regime in the Syrian civil war.
HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ),
and the Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine–General Command (PFLP-GC)
share some common capabilities to conductboth limited conventional military operations, such as cross-border ATGM attacks androcket salvos, and terrorist attacks, such as
kidnappings and suicide bombings. HAMAS
is the best-armed Palestinian militant groupwith around 25,000 active members in its mil-Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Iran’s relationship with the Taliban has
evolved over the years. Following the Taliban’s rise to power in the 1990s, Iran refused
to recognize the group as a legitimate government. In 1998, Iran nearly went to war
with Afghanistan after the Taliban captured
and killed nine Iranian diplomats. However,relations began to thaw after the U.S. inva-

A G E N C Y

Talibansion of Afghanistan. Since at least 2007, Iran
has provided calibrated support—including
weapons, training, and funding—to the Taliban to counter U.S. and Western influencein Afghanistan, combat ISIS-Khorasan, andincrease Tehran’s influence in any post-reconciliation government. Iran balances this
support as part of its dual-track strategy forengaging both local groups and the Afghan
government in Kabul to achieve its broader
security goals. Tehran does not seek to return
the Taliban to power but aims to maintaininfluence with the group as a hedge in theevent that the Taliban gains a role in a future
Afghan government.340,341,342,343

I N T E L L I G E N C E

itary wing. PIJ has around 8,000 militants,
and PFLP-GC numbers around 800 militants.
These groups use a variety of small and heavyarms, including antiarmor weapons andsmall- to mid-range rockets.336,337,338,339

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

63

Appendix D: Air and Air Defense Forces
Iran’s air and air defense capabilities are
split primarily across three services: theIslamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)
and the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense
Force (IRIADF), both under the Artesh,and the IRGCASF. The Khatemolanbia
Air Defense Headquarters (KADHQ) is thenational-level command responsible for coordinating between the IRIADF and IRGCASF.

Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force
Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the shahinvested heavily in equipping the Imperial
Iranian Air Force with modern combat air
capabilities, viewing the service as a symbol of Iran’s strength and security. After
decades of international sanctions following
the revolution and combat losses during the
Iran-Iraq War, many of the U.S. aircraft Iranacquired during the 1960s and 1970s still

Iranian F-4s, which it acquired from the UnitedStates prior to the Islamic Revolution.
Image Source: AFP

64

constitute the most-capable platforms in the
IRIAF today. Iran later acquired some Soviet-made aircraft during the early 1990s.
The IRIAF has proven adept at maintaining these outdated aircraft to sustain routine flight operations. Despite some domestic efforts to upgrade older airframes, Iran’s
combat aircraft remain significantly inferior
to those of its regional adversaries equippedwith modern Western systems. Nevertheless, the IRIAF maintains a basic capability
to achieve its assigned missions.
The IRIAF has approximately 37,000 personnel and operates the majority of Iran’s
combat aircraft. The IRIAF operates multiple combat, transport, and tanker squadrons across 11 major fighter bases. The commander of the IRIAF is Brigadier General
Aziz Nasirzadeh.
The IRIAF operates a wide range of aircraft
sourced from the United States, Russia, andChina, including the U.S. F-14 Tomcat, F-4
Phantom II, and F-5 Tiger II; the RussianMiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-24 Fencer; and theChinese F-7 Airguard. Iran is the only country in the world still operating F-14s. IRIAF
missions include air intercept, ground-attack,and close air support, and some aircraft arecapable of mid-air refueling. The IRIAF’s F-4s
serve as Iran’s primary attack aircraft, but it
has increasingly incorporated use of its Su-24

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Iranian Fighter Bases

1805-17885

1st FB
Tehran-Mehrabad

TehranIRAQ
4th FB
DezfulKUW.
SAUDI ARABIAAFGHANISTAN

IRAN
8th FB
EsfahanOmidiyeh Air Base
Omidiyeh
7th FB
Shiraz
6th FB
Persian Bandar-e Bushehr
Gulf

BAHR.
QATAR

0
150 300 Kilometers
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

PAKISTAN

9th FB
Bandar Abbas
10th FB
Chah Bahar

U.A.E.

Gulf of Oman

1st FBMiG-29, C-130, B707 (cargo andtanker), B747 (cargo and tanker),
Falcon 20, Jetstar, RC-707, RC-130,
IL-76, An-74

8th FB

F-14A/AM, F-7/FT-7N,
PC-7

2nd FBMiG-29, F-5E/F, Saeghe I/II
(Iranian F-5 variants)

9th FB

F-4E, P-3

3rd FB

F-4E, RF-4E

10th FB

F-4D, Mirage F1

4nd FB

F-5E/F

Omidiyeh Air Base

F-7N

6th FB

F-4E

Mashhad Air Base

F-5E/F

7th FB

Su-24MK, C-130, P-3, IL-76, Su-22,
Y-12

A G E N C Y

3rd FB
HamadanMashhad Air Base
MashhadI N T E L L I G E N C E

SYRIAGraphic Source: DIA, D3 Design

TURKMENISTAN

CaspianSea

2nd FB
TabrizD E F E N S E

TURKEY65

Major Iranian Combat Aircraft 347
Platform

Delivered to Iran (Origin)

Role

F-4D/E Phantom II

1968-1978 (USA)Multirole Fighter

F-5E/F Tiger II (and later
Iranian variants)

1973-1976 (USA)Multirole Fighter

F-14A/AM Tomcat

1976-1978 (USA)Fighter

Su-22 Fitter1991 (Iraq)

Fighter-Bomber

Su-24MK Fencer

1990 (Russia); 1991 (Iraq)

Fighter-Bomber

MiG-29 Fulcrum A

1990 (Russia); 1991 (Iraq)

Multirole Fighter

Mirage F11991 (Iraq)

Multirole Fighter

F-7N Airguard

1987-1996 (China)

Multirole Fighter

fighter-bombers. Although less capable in an
attack role, Iran’s F-5s and F-7s have also
served as multirole platforms.344,345,346
The IRIAF usually conducts one major national-level air power exercise each year, called
DEVOTEES OF THE VELAYAT SKIES. The
event traditionally entails a ground-attack
competition among multiple fighter bases
and features fighter intercept, air-to-air
engagement, electronic warfare (EW), andintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) training.348,349

66

1805-17887

Once the UN arms embargo ends, the IRIAF
is likely to purchase advanced fourth-generation fighters, most likely from Russia. Tehran
and Moscow have already discussed the saleof Su-30s to Iran.350

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Aerospace ForceThe IRGCASF was founded in 1985 when
Supreme Leader Khomeini established the
IRGC’s three distinct ground, air, and naval
services.351 Previously named the IRGC Air

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

UAVs are Iran’s most rapidly advancing air
capability. Iran uses these versatile platforms
for a variety of missions, including ISR andair-to-ground strikes. The IRGCASF is the primary operator of Iran’s growing fleet of UAVs,
although most Iranian military services employ
them. Iran regularly conducts ISR flights
along its border and littoral, including the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The IRGCASF
has also deployed various armed and unarmed
UAVs to Syria and Iraq for ISR and strike missions to support counter-ISIS operations andthe Syrian regime. In 2018, Iran for the firsttime employed UAVs to conduct long-range,
cross-border strike operations, using armed

The aviation arm of the IRGCASF maintains
a fleet that includes Su-22 Fitters, EMB-312

An IRGCASF Su-25 during a naval exercise in 2006.
Image Source: AFP

A G E N C Y

The IRGCASF is a relatively small force ofaround 15,000 personnel. It provides close air
support and lift capabilities with military aircraft and helicopters as well as commerciallyowned aircraft under the IRGCASF’s control.
Although the IRGC’s manned aviation component historically focused on airlift and logistic
support, its mission evolved to include a squadron of its own combat aircraft after Iran began
incorporating Iraqi aircraft evacuated to Iranin 1991 during the First Gulf War. The commander of the IRGCASF is Brigadier General
Amir Ali Hajizadeh.

Tucanos, Y-12s, Dassault Falcon 20s, MFI-17s,
IL-76s, and An-74s. In 2014, Iran supplied Iraq
with most of the Su-25 Frogfoots that the IRGCASF had maintained since Iraq transferredthem to Iran in 1991. Iran still maintains a small
number of Su-25 aircraft.354,355,356, 357

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Force, Iran renamed the service in 2009 toreflect its broader mission.352 Dating backto the Iran-Iraq War, rivalries between the
IRGCASF and IRIAF have historically hindered cooperation between the two air services.353 The IRGCASF also operates Iran'sballistic missile force, the Al-Ghadir Missile
Command. [For more details on Iran’s missile force, see Appendix A.]

Newly built Iranian Shahed-129 armed UAVs on
display in September 2013.

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Image Source: AFP

67

Major Iranian UAVs 363,364
Platform Family

1805-17887

SystemRole

Ababil-2

Multirole

Ababil-3

ISR

Qasef-1

Multirole

Shahed-129

Multirole, including ISR and air-to-ground strike365,366

Shahed-123

ISR

Mohajer-2

ISR

SadeghMultirole

Mohajer-4

ISR

Mohajer-6

Multirole, including ISR and air-to-ground strike367

ToufanToufan 1

One-way attack

FotrosFotrosMultirole, including ISR and air-to-ground strike368,369

KarrarKarrarMultirole

HemasehHemasehMultiroleIRN-170

IRN-170 variantsMultirole

AbabilShahedMohajer68

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

UAVs in concert with ballistic missiles as partof a retaliatory attack against ISIS in eastern
Syria. Iran has also provided UAV platforms
and technology to Hizballah and the Huthis tochallenge its regional rivals.358,359,360,361,362

Islamic Republic of Iran
Air Defense Force
Iran originally established the Artesh’s air
defense force in 2008 as the KADHQ andrenamed it the IRIADF in 2019. In 2008, airdefense personnel were separated from the

IRIAF to form an independent service within
the Artesh, consistent with Tehran’s goal toexpand defense missions in response to a perceived increase in air threats. The IRIADF
maintains and operates most of the country’s
air defense systems and has approximately
15,000 personnel.377,378
As the KADHQ, the force was previously
responsible for overseeing Iran’s air defenses
at the national level and coordinating with
the IRGCASF. In May 2019, Tehran elevatedthe KADHQ to a higher echelon command andrebranded the remaining Artesh air defense
service as the IRIADF, separating the national
C2 responsibilities from the force. The supremeleader appointed Artesh Commander Major
General Abdolrahim Musavi to also serve as
commander of the KADHQ, raising it to theArtesh HQ level. Former KADHQ Commander
Brigadier General Alireza Sabahifard was
retained as the IRIADF commander.379

A G E N C Y

Image Source: AFP

I N T E L L I G E N C E

The IRGCASF sometimes participates in the
IRGC’s typical annual national-level exercise,
NOBLE PROPHET, although these usuallyfocus on demonstrating missile, naval, or groundforces capabilities.375 In 2017, the IRGCASF
conducted its own air defense exercise called
DEFENDERS OF VELAYAT SANCTUM.376

Iranian SA-20c mobile launcher on parade for Artesh
Day in 2017.

D E F E N S E

The IRGCASF also maintains its own air
defense assets and mission—conducted in parallel, but coordinated with the IRIADF and
KADHQ. The IRGC has been involved in thedomestic development and production of many
recent Iranian SAM systems—such as the Raadseries, Sayyad series, Tabas, and Third of Khordad—which reportedly have multi-target capabilities and ranges up to 120 kilometers.370,371 In
June 2019, the IRGCASF used a Third of Khordad SAM system to shoot down a U.S. RQ-4
UAV in international airspace over the Strait of
Hormuz.372,373 This followed an Iranian attempt
to shoot down a U.S. MQ-9 UAV in international
airspace over the Gulf of Oman a week earlier.374

69

Khatemolanbia Air Defense Headquarters
The KADHQ maintains responsibility for overseeing and coordinating Iran’s national-levelair defenses across both the IRIADF and IRGCASF. It controls the country’s air defense C2,
air surveillance radars, SAM systems, and network of visual observation posts. KADHQ C2
is centralized during peacetime at the national Air Defense Operations Center and can bedecentralized during crisis or conflict, transferring decisionmaking authority down to a network of fixed and mobile regional sector operations centers (SOCs). SOCs manage air defense
operations within their areas of responsibility and coordinate with adjacent sectors.380,381,382

Long-Range Air Defense Coverage

1805-17885

Caspian Sea

TURKEYTURKMENISTAN

TehranTehran-Mehrabad
Hamadan

IRAQ

AFGHANISTAN
EsfahanSAUDI
ARABIAIRAN

KUW.
Bandar-e Bushehr

SA-5 (300km)
0200

PAKISTAN
Bandar Abbas

400 Kilometers

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Gulf of Oman

NOTE: Only standard and fixed sites shown.

70

U.A.E.

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 DesignSA-20c (200km)

PersianGulf

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Iranian Air Defense Systems 391,392,393
Systems

Long-Range

SA-20c Gargolye (S-300 PMU2), SA-5 Gammon (S-200),
Bavar-373, Sayyad-3

Medium-Range

I-HAWK/Mersad, CSA-1, Third of Khordad, Raad, Talash,
Sayyad-1, Sayyad-2

Short-Range

SA-15 Gauntlet (Tor M1), Rapier

The IRIADF operates Iran’s most capable air
defense system, the SA-20c, which Russia soldto Iran in 2016. This system is highly mobileand designed to defend against aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. Iran is most
likely to use the SA-20c to protect its most critical infrastructure, such as its nuclear sites andTehran. Most of Iran’s other SAMs are a mix
of U.S., Russian, and Chinese legacy systems,
including the long-range SA-5, medium-range
I-HAWK and CSA-1, and short-range SA-15
and Rapier.383,384
In addition to procurements from abroad,
Iran has invested heavily in domesticallydeveloping and producing SAMs, radars,
and C2 systems.385 Iran is developing thelong-range Bavar-373 SAM system, which it

claims is more advanced than the Russian
S-300.386 Iran has also undertaken a numberof projects to domestically improve its legacy
SAMs, including the Mersad, a medium-range
air defense system that improves the tracking and engagement range of the U.S.-made
I-HAWK SAM.387 Iran has also worked extensively to upgrade its legacy C2 systems to amodern, software-based system.388
Iran’s typical annual national-level air defense
exercise is called DEFENDERS OF THE
VELAYAT SKIES. The event usually involves
testing and live fires of variety of SAMs, radars,
and ISR and EW equipment, along with a small
contingent of aircraft, to exercise a large-scale
defense of Iranian airspace.389,390

I N T E L L I G E N C E

TypeA G E N C Y

1805-17887

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

71

Appendix E: Ground Forces
Iran maintains two independent groundforces: the Islamic Republic of Iran Ground
Force (IRIGF) under the Artesh and the IRGC
Ground Force (IRGCGF) under the IRGC.
Despite deploying some ground forces to Iraq
and Syria in recent years, their mission continues to focus primarily on Iran’s territorial
defense and internal security.394 The IRGC also
oversees Iran’s reserve paramilitary force, theBasij, which comprises some units aligned with
the IRGCGF as well as the larger Basij Organization of the Oppressed. [For more details on
the Basij, see Appendix G.]

Islamic Republic of Iran Ground ForceThe IRIGF maintains approximately 350,000
soldiers and serves as Iran’s first line ofdefense against an invading force.395 Many of
its personnel consist of conscripts who servefor 2 years.396 The IRIGF consists of about
50 combat arms brigades, many of which arelight infantry units with a sizable contingentof armored and mechanized infantry units.
The IRIGF also has its own special operations
units and several artillery groups for fire
support. Most units are concentrated along

IRIGF soldiers march in formation during the Artesh Day parade in 2018.
Image Source: AFP

72

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

IRIGF Regional Headquarters

1805-17885

ARM.
AZERBAIJAN

TURKEYNW OPERATIONAL HQ

TURKMENISTAN

CaspianSea

Orumiyeh

NE OPERATIONAL HQ
IRIGF HQSYRIA

MashhadW OPERATIONAL HQ

IRAQ

Tehran

AFGHANISTAN

Kermanshah

IRAN

SW OPERATIONAL HQ

Ahvaz

SE OPERATIONAL HQ

BAHR.

0
150 300 Kilometers
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

the Iran-Iraq border, reflecting the force’s
primary mission to defend against foreigninvasion. The IRIGF commander is Brigadier
General Kiomars Heidari.
For more than a decade, the IRIGF has
focused on improving its abilities to defend
against a technologically superior enemy. In
2011, the IRIGF began a service-wide reorganization, transitioning from a division-centric to a brigade-centric structure. Thistransformation was intended to decentralize
C2 and enable main force units to operatewith greater flexibility and mobility. Under

U.A.E.

Gulf of Oman

this model, the IRIGF is better postured to
conduct counteroffensives against a superior
invading adversary, giving brigade commanders the ability to act independently while
decreasing response times. The IRIGF also
has five regional headquarters, each of whichis responsible for multiple provinces.397,398,399
IRIGF units generally are organized with threemain subordinate units per higher echelon unit.
For example, each infantry brigade usually consists of three infantry battalions, each armoredbrigade usually consists of two armored battalions and a mechanized infantry battalion, andI N T E L L I G E N C E

PAKISTAN

PersianGulf

D E F E N S EGraphic Source: DIA, D3 Design

SAUDI ARABIAA G E N C Y

KermanKUW.

73

each mechanized infantry brigade generally
consists of two mechanized infantry battalions
and an armored battalion.400,401
The IRIGF also has an Army Aviation (AA)component, called Islamic Republic of Iran
Army Aviation (IRIAA), which serves as
Iran’s primary helicopter force, with about
90 percent of the helicopters in the Iranianground forces. The IRIAA has several hundred attack, transport, and reconnaissancehelicopters in its inventory—including AH-1
Cobras, Bell 214s, CH-47 Chinooks, and AB
206s—nearly all of which are legacy U.S. platforms that predate the Islamic Revolution.402
In 2016, the IRIGF began deploying a small
number of personnel to support combat operations in Syria. Although Iran claimed they weresent in an advisory capacity, press reports indicate they have played an active role in combat
operations. This marked the first Artesh deployment abroad since the Iran-Iraq War.403,404

Iranian M-109 self-propelled artillery.
Image Source: Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA)74

The IRIGF usually holds two major annual exercises each year. The MUHAMMAD RASULOLLAH exercises occur along Iran’s border andcoastal regions, emphasizing either a defense
against a conventional military invasion or counterterrorism operations.405.406 The BEIT OL-MOQADDAS exercises typically occur in May near
Esfahan. The IRIGF often uses these events tounveil new ground forces equipment and as acapstone exercise for graduating cadets.407

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Ground ForceThe IRGCGF is the largest component of the
IRGC, consisting of approximately 150,000 personnel. In addition to its conventional militaryrole of protecting Iranian territory against external threats, the IRGCGF along with the IRGC’s
paramilitary reserve component, the Basij, also
have responsibilities to counter internal threats.
For many years, the IRGCGF has regularly
conducted counterinsurgency missions against
Kurdish militants along Iran’s northwest borderand Baluchi militants in the southeast. Sinceas early as 2012, IRGCGF units have deployed
to support combat operations in Syria and Iraq,
with a surge of IRGCGF soldiers sent to Syria in
2015.408,409410 The commander of the IRGCGF is
Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpur.411
The IRGCGF is structured with 31 provincial
corps and a Tehran city corps, which are postured
to counter ground invasion and internal unrest,
along with independent conventional maneuver formations, such as infantry and armor. The
IRGCGF consists of primarily light infantry andcommando units, fairly evenly distributed aroundIR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominancethe country, particularly owing to the internal
security aspects of its mission set. Its artillery
batteries employ towed- and self-propelled guns
and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) while

Key Ground Forces Equipment 416,417,418

1805-17887

SystemApprox. Total

Most Capable

Source

Tanks

1,900

T-72S

RussiaArmored Vehicles

2,600

BMP-2

RussiaSelf-Propelled
Artillery

400

M-109

USA

Towed Artillery

2,900

GHN-45Austria

Multiple Rocket
Launchers

2,000

Fajr-5Iran

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Image Source: AFP

Many iterations of the IRGC’s main annual
exercise series—NOBLE PROPHET—incorporate IRGCGF elements demonstrating
defensive operations against a potential
invading force. The IRGCGF also frequently
uses these exercises to test or display new
military hardware.414,415

D E F E N S E

An IRGCGF tank crew salutes from a T-72 during theannual Holy Defense Week parade in 2014.

A G E N C Y

its air defense groups mainly use Soviet-origin
mobile antiaircraft artillery. IRGCGF armoredunits use 1970s-era Soviet tanks and tracked
vehicles, as well as pre-1979 U.S.-imported tanks.
The IRGCGF also maintains special operations
forces, called Saberin (“patient ones”).412 In 2016,
the IRGCGF established its own AA component,
transferring helicopters from the IRGCASF. The
new unit provides the IRGCGF with its firstorganic helicopter support.413

75

Appendix F: Special Operations Forces
The Artesh and IRGC both maintain groundbased special operations forces (SOF) andmaritime special operations forces (MARSOF) of varying levels of capability. Within
the Artesh, IRIGF SOF include commando,
airborne, and special forces brigades, and theIRIN operates a Special Boat Service (SBS)
unit. Within the IRGC, IRGCGF SOF includecommando and special forces brigades in
addition to an elite special unit; the IRGCN
also operates a MARSOF unit.

Islamic Republic of Iran Ground
Force SOF
The IRIGF has three types of SOF units—
airborne, commando, and special forces.
These include several commando brigades,
the 55th Airborne Brigade, the 35th Special Forces Brigade, and the 65th Airborne
Special Forces Brigade. Of these units, the65th, also known as the NOHED (Persian
abbreviation for “airborne special forces”)
brigade, is the most elite. The 55th and 65th
are jump-qualified, and commando brigades
deploy via airmobile insertion.419 Several
commando brigades have recently transitioned into special forces and rapid reactionbrigades, including the 35th and 25th.420,421
Iran's first SOF units formed in the late 1950s
under the tutelage of U.S. advisers. During the
Iran-Iraq War, SOF units expanded to meet operational requirements. IRIGF SOF would regularly

76

conduct reconnaisance of enemy lines to identify
weak points and launch night attacks to initiate major offensive operations. Iranian airborne
brigades also conducted airmobile operations inadvance of Iranian offensives to seize key objectives and overrun enemy forces in rear areas.422
Based on their U.S. Army Special Forces lineage,
IRIGF SOF share similar mission sets, probably
including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action,and hostage rescue. Some of these units also
provide a quick-reaction force that can deploy
rapidly anywhere inside Iran or potentiallyabroad.423 As of April 2016, Iran had deployedpersonnel from the 65th Airborne Special Forces
Brigade to Syria, part of the IRIGF’s first external deployment since the Iran-Iraq War.424

Islamic Republic of IranNavy MARSOF
The IRIN operates an SBS based on the British Royal Navy SBS, which provided training
for IRIN special forces personnel before theIslamic Revolution. The IRIN SBS probably
is trained in a variety of capabilities, including combat diving, parachuting, amphibious
assault, airborne assault, underwater demolitions, special reconnaisance, and maritime
visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations. IRIN SBS personnel are also capableof covert insertion from the IRIN’s midget
submarines.425,426,427

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

The IRGCGF is upgrading select SOF units,transforming commando units into special
forces units. The 33rd Al Mahdi Brigade alsotransitioned from an airborne to a special forcesbrigade. With these changes, Iran is attempting
to create a more agile and responsive force, particularly following the rise of ISIS and Iranian
combat deployments to Syria.429,430
IRGCGF Saberin units are highly trained in
specialized capabilities, such as raiding, hostage
rescue, and heliborne assault. Some Saberin

IRGCGF SOF during an exercise in April 2006.

IRGC Navy MARSOF
The IRGCN has a MARSOF component known
as the Sepah Navy Special Force (SNSF). The
unit is based on Forur Island, strategicallylocated near the Strait of Hormuz. SNSF personnel train in combat diving, direct action,
counterterrorism, special reconnaissance,
underwater demolitions, amphibious assault,
hostage rescue, and maritime VBSS operations. Among the unit’s missions is to protect
Iranian commercial vessels, and SNSF personnel have deployed to the Gulf of Aden to assist
with Iranian counterpiracy operations.434

A G E N C Y

The IRGCGF maintains several SOF units—
called Saberin (“patient ones”)—including the110th Salman Farsi Commando Brigade, the33rd Al Mahdi Airborne Special Forces Brigade,and the elite Saberin Special Forces Brigade(or Saberin Special Unit). Some regular IRGCGF divisions and brigades at the provincial
level also have dedicated Saberin detachments
directly subordinate to them.428

personnel use ultralight aircraft and are capable of conducting operations in a wide range ofterrain and environmental conditions, including mountains, deserts, and swamps. Saberin
have also deployed to Syria to support Iranian
combat operations.431,432,433

I N T E L L I G E N C E

IRGC Ground Force SOF

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Image Source: AFP

77

Appendix G: Reserves
Iran established its volunteer paramilitaryreserve force, called the Basij (“mobilization” in
Persian), in April 1980 after Supreme Leader
Khomeini called for the creation of a 20 million-man army following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Basij
deployed alongside the IRGC and regular forces.
They became known for “human wave” assaults
and martyrdom and suffered a large proportionof the total combat casualties during the war.
It was incorporated into the IRGC structure in
1981, but it did not come under formal IRGC
command until 2007. These changes brought
about greater unit discipline and a formal rank
structure. In 2009, Iran further integrated themore militarily capable components of the Basijwith the IRGCGF, with the remaining personnel forming the much larger Basij Organization of the Oppressed (BOO), which focuses on
domestic security and social outreach. The force
is composed of mostly young male and female
Iranians who volunteer often in exchange for
official benefits.435,436
Today, the Basij forms a core part of the regime’s
internal security apparatus. On multiple occasions, Tehran has used the Basij to help quell
domestic unrest, including the widespread 2009
election protests. With branches in almost every
Iranian city and town, Basij units aid internal
security, law enforcement, suppression of dissent, and moral policing. The Basij has specialized branches for different segments of Iranian

78

Basij personnel during an exercise in September 2015.
Image Source: AFP

society, including the Labor Basij, Tribal Basij,
Public Servants’ Basij, Students’ Basij, andPupil Basij, which serves as a youth organization. In recent years, Basij personnel have also
been part of the contingent of deployed Iranianforces supporting operations in Iraq and Syria.
There are five types of Basij members—potential, general, regular, active, and special—withincreasing levels of capability and training,although the precise terms and descriptions
for these tiers vary. Potential Basij are not formally enrolled in the BOO but are firm believers in the revolution who participate in Basij
activities. General Basij are unpaid and receive
a minimum level of training. Regular members
are also unpaid part-time volunteers, but theyreceive more ideological indoctrination andrudimentary training to perform basic security
duties during peacetime. Active Basij receiveIR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Basij Types

1805-17889

TRAINING

Basic military and political-ideology training; optional
supplementary military and intelligence training

General Basij
Potential Basij(Nonmembers)

greater ideological training and are paid fulltime members under temporary contracts. The
Special Basij are the most highly trained andexperienced members, comparable to full-time
IRGC soldiers.437,438
The Basij has several core security components
with specific missions, including the Ashura,
Al Zahra, Beyt ol Moghaddas, Kowsar, Imam
Ali, Imam Hossein, and Fatehin battalions.
The Ashura (male) and Al Zahra (female) battalions provide local security, neighborhood
defense, infrastructure protection, and lowlevel antiriot support. The Beyt ol Moghaddas(male) and Kowsar (female) battalions are
rapid-reaction units, formed from the Ashura
and Al Zahra battalions, intended to help
defend cities and villages from potential invasion. The more-capable Imam Ali battalions
are primarily set up to counter more significant internal security threats and domestic

Introductory military training

Noneunrest. The Imam Hossein battalions train as
light infantry and work closely with the IRGCGF, including some deployments to Syria.
Finally, the Fatehin are Basij special forces
units, some of which have also deployed to
Syria to assist the IRGCGF.
There are widely varying estimates for thesize of the Basij, which are further complicated by the organization’s different capability levels, unit types, and social groups.
Some Iranian officials have claimed there
are as many as 22 million Basij, which would
constitute about a quarter of Iran’s population. Such large estimates, if remotely accurate, would include the many men, women,
and children who perform social service andoutreach functions as part of the BOO andhave little to no military or security training.
These members probably significantly outnumber the militarized Basij components.

A G E N C Y

Regular Basij

Additional political-ideology training

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Active Basij

Attend IRGC military academy

D E F E N S ESpecialBasij

79

Female Basij members during a ceremony in 2005.
Image Source: AFP

The Basij probably has around 450,000 active
reserve personnel—those with military training who serve in operational units on a semiregular basis and help staff much of the IRGC
provincial corps throughout the country. The
Basij may have another 500,000 to one million
inactive reserve personnel—those with at least
some military training who could be mobilized

80

in wartime. There may be an additional 3–4
million Basij within the BOO with at mostbasic military training, making roughly 4–5
million a more realistic estimate of the total
number of military-age Basij of all types. Estimates in the range of 10-20 million could bepossible if they include all nonmilitary components of the BOO.439,440,441,442,443

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional DominanceAppendix H: Intelligence Services

According to Iranian law, the MOIS’s functions are to:• Collect, analyze, produce, and categorize
internal and external intelligence.
• Uncover acts of conspiracy, subversion,
espionage, sabotage, and sedition against
the independence, security, and territorial
integrity of Iran.
• Protect the intelligence, news, documents, records, facilities, and personnelof the ministry.

Iranian Minister of Intelligence Mahmud Alavi-Tabar.

A G E N C Y

The MOIS was founded in 1984 to collect intelligence and lead Iran’s domestic security andcounterterrorism missions. Minister of Intelligence Mahmud Alavi leads the service, which
has about 30,000 officers and support staff.
The MOIS is the only Iranian intelligence andsecurity service that reports to both the president and the supreme leader.

Domestic activities are a priority for the MOIS,
unless the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) or the supreme leader deem itnecessary for the ministry to become involved
directly with Iran’s interests abroad. MOIS
intelligence officers conduct the majority of
their operations in the Middle East, Central
Asia, Europe, and the United States. MOIS
collection and influence operations beyond
Iran’s borders are typically embassy- andconsulate-based under official, commercial,academic, or nongovernmental organization
cover. The ministry liaises with other foreign
intelligence agencies, as well as organizations
such as Hizballah that protect and promote
Iran’s foreign agenda.445,446 During the 1980s
and 1990s, the MOIS was linked to an assas-

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Ministry of Intelligence and Security• Train and assist organizations and institutions in protecting their significant records,
documents, and objects.

D E F E N S E

The Ministry of Intelligence and Security(MOIS) and the IRGC are the most robust
intelligence services in Iran. The MOIS, as agovernment ministry, remains accountable
to the president, while the IRGC remains
accountable only to the supreme leader. Thisbifurcated intelligence structure is intended toensure that no single organization becomes too
powerful. However, tension between the IRGC
and MOIS has been a constant fixture of theirrelationship because their duties overlap andtheir responsibilities are poorly delineated.444

Image Source: AFP

81sination campaign that killed dozens of Iranian dissidents, many of them in Europe. Morerecently, it has been implicated in the murderof two dissidents in the Netherlands and afoiled plot last year against a People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK) rally in Paris.447,448,449
The MOIS changed its organizational structure in 2017 by elevating its Bureau for Foreign Intelligence, providing the organization
with a direct line of accounting in Iran’s annual
budget separate from the rest of the MOIS.450

IRGC Counterintelligence
Organization

IRGC Intelligence Organization

The Artesh maintains a joint military intelligence capability in the form of a Directorate
for Intelligence (or J2).454,455 It focuses on traditional tactical intelligence as well as intelligence and counterintelligence operations,security within the Artesh, and coordination
with other intelligence bodies.456

The IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO)—
Iran’s foremost military intelligence service,
capable of all-source collection, analysis, andinvestigations—exercises primary dominanceover internal Iranian military intelligence
responsibilities. Hossein Taeb has led the organization since its inception in October 2009.
Taeb reports directly to the supreme leader,although he must also coordinate with the IRGC
commander. Regime critics claim the IRGC-IO
includes more conservative and violent elements
than the MOIS, its parallel intelligence and security organization. However, despite evidence ofrivalries between the MOIS and IRGC-IO, both
services share the common goal of preserving
Iran’s clerical regime.451,452

82

The IRGC Counterintelligence Organization(IRGC-CIO) was created in 1983 and is charged
with protecting IRGC personnel, operations,and facilities from espionage, information
leaks, and other counterrevolutionary threats.
Brigadier General Mohammad Kazemi is thecommander of the IRGC-CIO.453

Artesh Intelligence

Law Enforcement Force
Iran’s Ministry of Interior controls the Law
Enforcement Force (LEF), created in 1991 toincorporate urban police, the rural gendarmerie, and various revolutionary committees.457 One of the LEF’s three main branches
is the Counterintelligence Organization, andit maintains an operational unit charged withintelligence gathering, the Intelligence andPublic Security Police.458

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional DominanceAppendix I: Defense Industry andModernization Programshas built a domestic defense industry capableof developing and producing select categories of
weapon systems, maintaining aging systems,
retrofitting older-generation platforms, andreverse-engineering captured technology to meet
Iranian military requirements.

Key MODAFL Subordinates 459,460,461
Key Fields of Activity

Defense Industries Organization (DIO)

Tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, small arms,
ammunition, explosives

Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)

Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, SAMs,
AAMs, ATGMs

Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO)

Light aircraft, UAVs

Marine Industries Organization (MIO)

Small boats, surface combatants, submarines

Iran Electronics Industries (IEI)

Radars, communications equipment,
EW equipment

Defense Industries Research and Training
Institute (DIRTI)

Oversees education and research to promote
defense science and technology and achieveself-sufficiency in military industries

Malek-Ashtar University of Technology (MUT)

Military research and development, includingin the fields of aerospace, marine, materials,
and applied science and engineering

I N T E L L I G E N C E

EntityA G E N C Y

1805-17887

D E F E N S E

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution—and the subsequent end of Western arms sales to Tehran—
Iran has developed domestic capabilities and fostered new relationships to supply and equip its
armed forces, as well as its partners and proxies
in the region. During the past few decades Iran

83

The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL) oversees Iran’s defense
industry. MODAFL’s mission is to arm andequip the armed forces through militaryresearch and development, production, acquisition, and personnel support. The major industrial organizations subordinate to MODAFL
are responsible for the research, development,
and production of nearly all types of military
hardware, including ballistic and cruise missiles, SAMs, radars, armored vehicles, UAVs,
naval vessels, small arms, ammunition, andcommunications equipment.462
Iranian officials and state media often exaggerate the capabilities of Iran’s defense industries, stressing the country’s self-sufficiency inmilitary production in the face of internationalsanctions. Tehran often showcases its militarycapabilities, highlighting new weapon systems
and platforms, with public displays that coincide with holidays and historic events.463 The
regime uses such propaganda to message its
adversaries and build popular confidence in
Iran’s capabilities.464

the negative effect of sanctions, reduce costs,
and enhance economic stability. Iran is slowly
increasing the domestic content of its weapon
systems and developing the ability to produce
key components and materials.466
Missile Sector

Within the Aerospace Industries Organization(AIO), the Shahid Hemmat Industries Group(SHIG) and Shahid Bakeri Industries Group(SBIG) are the primary entities responsible forballistic missile development and production.
Iran domestically develops and produces liquid- and solid-propellant CRBMs, SRBMs, and
MRBMs and continues to improve the range,lethality, and accuracy of its missile systems.
In recent years, Iran has unveiled SRBMs
with increasingly greater range and precision
as well as MRBMs with claimed accuracy andwarhead improvements.467

Major Modernization Programs
Through 2021, Iran has prioritized the development and production of missile, naval, airdefense, UAV, and EW systems, based on priorities published in its sixth 5-year development
plan (2017–2021). The plan lists specific defense
and security objectives designed to increase
Iran’s military capabilities.465 Tehran will also
strive to develop its domestic technologicalbase to rely less on foreign suppliers, mitigate

An Ashura MRBM at a production facility in 2009.
Image Source: AFP

84

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Iran is fielding an increasing number of theater ballistic missiles, improving its existing
inventory, and developing technical capabilities that could enable it to produce an ICBM.
Iran also continues to pursue development of
more powerful SLVs. In July 2017 and January 2019, Iran launched its liquid-propellant
Simorgh SLV, which could be capable of ICBM
ranges if configured as a missile. Tehran also ispursuing long-range, precision LACMs, which
present a new type of threat in the region.468,469
Naval Sector

An Iranian ASCM-equipped FAC manufactured by MIO.

Iran also produces a variety of naval weapon
systems, including ASCMs, mines, and torpe-

I N T E L L I G E N C E

MIO also builds small submarines and surface
combatants for the IRIN. After receiving at least
one Yono class midget submarine from North
Korea in 2004, Iran began domestic productionof the platform. Iran has since developed thelarger Fateh class coastal submarine, the firstof which the IRIN commissioned in February
2019. Iran also domestically produces patrol
craft and corvettes for the IRIN. Iran has completed three Jamaran class corvettes, including
one on the Caspian Sea. The Jamaran is Tehran’s largest naval construction project to date,and Iran has several more under construction.

D E F E N S E

The Marine Industries Organization (MIO)
and its subsidiaries are the primary domestic
producers of naval platforms for both of Iran’snavies. These industries build a wide range ofsmall high-speed boats equipped with guns,
rockets, and missiles primarily for the IRGCN.

Iran has built an inventory of hundreds ofsmall boats, and Tehran continues to invest in
producing increasingly faster and more-capable platforms armed with more-sophisticatedweapons and equipment.

A G E N C Y

Image Source: AFP

Iran’s naval programs are primarily aimed atdeterring adversaries from operating close to
Iranian territorial waters. As such, Tehran’snaval modernization efforts focus on providing
the IRIN and IRGCN with increasingly lethal
platforms and weapons—including advanced
mines and torpedoes, small submarines,
fast attack craft, and ship- and shore-based
ASCMs—that further complicate freedom ofnavigation throughout Iran’s littoral. Althougha somewhat lesser focus, Tehran also aims toestablish a more far-reaching, strategic naval
force. In order to progress toward a “blue water”
naval capability, Iran has also invested indeveloping and producing some larger surface
and subsurface platforms.

85

does. Iran’s domestically produced ASCMs are
based on the Chinese C704 and C802. AIO produces the 35-kilometer-range C704 as the Nasr
and the 120-kilometer-range C802 as the Noor.
It has also developed extended-range variantsof the C802/Noor. With these systems—the
200-kilometer-range Ghader and 300-kilometer-range Ghadir ASCMs—Iran has ASCM
coverage for nearly the entire Persian Gulf
and Gulf of Oman from its shores. In February 2019, Iran revealed footage of its first submarine-launched cruise missile, the Jask-2, avariant of the C704/Nasr ASCM, which can belaunched from the IRIN’s Yono class midget
submarines.470 During the next 5 years, newnaval weapons probably will include additional submarine-launched ASCMs, the Hootsupercavitating torpedo, and potentially asupersonic ASCM.471,472

Air Defense Sector

An Iranian C704/Nasr ASCM at a production facility.

An Iranian Sayyad-2 SAM at a production facility.

Image Source: AFP

86

Iran can develop and produce SAM systems andradars, including those reverse-engineered fromits legacy U.S. and Russian equipment. Irancontinues to improve its integrated air defense
system (IADS), which is concentrated around
Tehran and the nuclear sites, with new air surveillance radars, SAMs, and C4ISR systems.
In recent years, Tehran has unveiled several
domestically developed air defense systems,
incorporating new SAMs and radars, including
the medium-to-long-range Third of Khordad,the medium-range Sayyad-2, and the longrange Sayyad-3. Iran is also domestically developing a long-range air defense system called
the Bavar-373 that it claims is more capablethan the Russian SA-20c, which Iran acquiredin 2016.473,474 Iran has also announced it is producing more-capable long-range radars, including the Fath 14, with a reported range of 600
kilometers, and the Ghadir phased-array radar,with a reported range of 1,100 kilometers.475,476

Image Source: AFP

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

Iran has steadily expanded its domestic UAV
inventory by developing and producing a wide
range of lethal and nonlethal UAV platforms. Iran

Ground Arms Sector

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran
has invested relatively less in its ground arms
sector compared with missile, naval, and air
defense capabilities. Iran is unable to fully
produce main battle tanks (MBTs), but it has
proven able to maintain and upgrade its legacy armor equipment. Iran also produces awide range of basic ground forces equipment,
including small arms, artillery, ammunition,
and ATGMs.480,481

A G E N C Y

Iran is unable to produce complete combat aircraft, but it has established a robust capability to maintain, upgrade, and modify its aging
U.S. and Russian military aircraft. Iran has
demonstrated its capability to overhaul fixedwing transport and combat aircraft, including
the U.S.-made F-4, F-5, F-14, and C-130 and
the Russian Su-24 and MiG-29. Iran is similarly capable of maintaining and overhaulingits helicopter fleet, such as the Russian Mi-17.
Iran uses a combination of domestic and foreign components and seeks to modernize aircraft by procuring foreign technologies. Iranaims to be able to produce a modern jet aircraft but is unable to do so without significant
foreign assistance. Iran has displayed what it
claims are domestically built fighter aircraft,including platforms with low-observable technology, but these have been modifications
to existing airframes or mock-ups of aspirational designs.477

has reverse-engineered many of these systems
based on captured Western UAVs. Some of Iran’s
newer UAV platforms, such as the Shahed-129
and the Mohajer-6, can be armed and are capable of conducting precision air-to-ground strikes
with small guided munitions.478 However, despiteadvances in its UAV manufacturing capabilities,
Iran remains reliant on Western manufactured
engines and components to support its UAV
production. Iran is developing a domestic UAV
engine but is struggling with quality issues.479

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Aircraft Sector

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

87

Appendix J: Arms Transfers
Imports
Procurements for the IRGC and Artesh havelargely served to maintain aging systems
and modernize the military to be able to better defend against a technologically superior
adversary. After the Iran-Iraq War, combat
losses and a Western arms embargo made itdifficult for Iran to replace its military materielor obtain spare parts for equipment. However,during the 1990s, Tehran was able to purchasesome tanks and armored vehicles, combat aircraft, ASCMs, and attack submarines from
Russia, China, and North Korea.482,483,484 Iranwas also able to illicitly procure spare partsfor some of its U.S.-origin equipment sold tothe country under the shah.485 More recent
arms suppliers to Iran have included Russia,
China, North Korea, Belarus, and Ukraine.
In 2016, after canceling an earlier contract in2010, Russia delivered the SA-20c air defense
system to Iran—one of the most high-profile
Iranian weapons acquisitions in many years.486
Tehran continues to face significant procurement obstacles as it remains under an international arms embargo, and many countries
are unwilling to sell military equipment toIran. Passed in 2015, UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 2231, which endorses the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
extends ballistic missile and conventionalarms restrictions on Iran. Although Tehran
prefers to produce what it can domestically to88meet military acquisition requirements, Iranremains reliant on countries such as Russia
and China for procurement of advanced conventional capabilities.487
Under UNSCR 2231, the arms embargo on Iranis set to be lifted by October 2020, allowing Iranto purchase new advanced weapon systems fromforeign suppliers to modernize its armed forces,
including equipment it has largely been unable
to acquire for decades. Iran will be permitted topurchase conventional systems it is unable toproduce domestically, such as advanced fighter
aircraft and main battle tanks. Iran is alreadyevaluating and discussing military hardwarefor purchase primarily from Russia and, to alesser extent, China. Iran’s potential acquisitions after the lifting of UNSCR 2231 restrictions include Russian Su-30 fighters, Yak-130
trainers, and T-90 MBTs.488,489 Iran has also
shown interest in acquiring S-400 air defense
systems and Bastian coastal defense systems
from Russia.490

Exports
Under UNSCR 2231, as with its predecessor
resolutions, Iran is prohibited from exportingarms and related equipment without UN Security Council (UNSC) approval. Since UNSCR
2231 came into effect, no export proposals havebeen submitted to the UNSC. Since the Islamic
Revolution, Iran has transferred a wide range
of weapons and military equipment to state andIR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional DominanceUN Security Council Resolution 2231
UNSCR 2231 Annex B restricts Iranian ballistic missile activity and the provision of certain
weapons and technology to Iran unless preapproved by the UNSC. UNSCR 2231 endorses the
JCPOA but is separate from the nuclear agreement, which does not address ballistic missiles
or conventional weapons. Unlike the JCPOA, Iran does not accept UNSCR 2231 Annex B
restrictions as legitimate and has not agreed to abide by them. The various military-related
restrictions apply for 5 or 8 years from JCPOA Adoption Day—18 October 2015—or when theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reaches a Broader Conclusion that all nuclear
material in Iran is for peaceful purposes, whichever is earlier.491,492

The MTCR is a 35-member voluntary, multilateral agreement that establishes export control
standards for missiles and missile technology. The MTCR is not a treaty or legally binding,but UNSCR 2231 establishes it as a global standard for restricted transfers to and from Iran.
Member states enforce the MTCR regardless of the status of UNSCR 2231.

I N T E L L I G E N C E• Ballistic Missile Restrictions: Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related toballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches
using such ballistic missile technology. The United States uses Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Category I criteria to assert that missiles capable of delivering at least a
500-kg payload to a range of at least 300 kilometers are inherently capable of delivering
nuclear weapons. The UNSC must also preapprove the supply, sale, or transfer to or from
Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology set out in the MTCR or that
could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. These restrictions last for 8 years (October 2023) absent a Broader Conclusion.

D E F E N S E• Conventional Arms Restrictions: The UNSC must preapprove the supply, sale, ortransfer to Iran of seven categories of arms as defined by the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and related materiel, spare parts, training, financial resources,
advice, or other services. The seven UNROCA categories are battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships,
and missiles and missile systems, including MANPADS but excluding all other SAMs. All
states are also to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of arms or related materiel from Iranunless preapproved by the UNSC. These restrictions last for 5 years (October 2020) absent
a Broader Conclusion.

A G E N C Y• Designated Entities: All states are to freeze financial assets and economic resources
and block travel of entities and individuals on the 2231 List, drawn from past UNSCRs on
Iran. The 2231 List contains 23 individuals and 61 entities associated with Iran’s nuclear,
missile, and conventional arms programs. These restrictions last for 5 years (travel ban)and 8 years (asset freeze) absent a Broader Conclusion.

89

nonstate actors, including designated terrorist
organizations. Iran has also provided technicalassistance to help nonstate actors produce andassemble their own equipment. Although someIranian shipments have been interdicted,
Tehran is often able to get high-priority arms
transfers to its customers.
Over the years, Iranian transfers to state andnonstate actors have included: communications equipment; small arms—such as assault
rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, mortars,
and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)—and
ammunition; ATGMs; MANPADS; artillery
systems, including MRLs and battlefield rockets and launchers; armored vehicles; FAC;
equipment for unmanned explosives boats;
ASCMs; SAMs; UAVs, including ISR andattack platforms; ground-attack aircraft; andC/SRBMs and associated technology.

Iran’s biggest customers include Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, and Iraqi Shia militias, but
Iran has also provided weapons to the Huthis
in Yemen, Palestinian groups, and the Taliban
in Afghanistan. Since UNSCR 1747, which firstestablished the arms export ban on Iran, wasadopted in 2007, other state customers of Iranian military equipment have included Iraq,
Sudan, and Venezuela. In late 2013, Iran agreed
to a $195-million deal to sell arms to the Iraqi
government, including small arms, ammunition, artillery rounds, and communications
equipment.493,494,495,496,497,498,499 Significant quantities of Iranian small arms, light weapons, andammunition can also be found on the international gray arms market and have been identified in various war zones, including throughout
central Africa. However, it is difficult to determine if these are instances of direct transfers or
sales from the Iranian government.500

Recipients of Iranian Arms

VENEZUELA

1805-17885

HIZBALLAH(LEBANON)
Palestinian militants(Palestinian Territories)

SYRIA

IRAN

Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design

SHIA MILITIAS(IRAQ)

90

State recipient
Nonstate recipientState and nonstate recipients
Note: Does not include Iranian gray arms.

SUDAN

TALIBAN(AFGHANISTAN)
HUTHIS(YEMEN)INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKGLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

92

A2/AD

antiaccess/area denialAAarmy aviation

AAM

air-to-air missile

AEOI

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

AFGS

EW

electronic warfare

FAC

fast attack craft

FIAC

fast inshore attack craft

Armed Forces General Staff

FTO

foreign terrorist organization

AGMC

Al-Ghadir Missile CommandGDPgross domestic product

AIO

Aerospace Industries Organization

IADS

integrated air defense system

ASBM

antiship ballistic missile

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ASCM

antiship cruise missile

IAIO

Iran Aviation Industries Organization

ATGM

antitank guided missile

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

BOO

Basij Organization of the Oppressed

IED

improvised explosive device

BWC

Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention

IEI

Iran Electronics Industries

C2

command and control

IONS

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

C4ISR

command, control, communications,computers, intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance

IRBM

intermediate-range ballistic missile

IRGC

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

CDCM

coastal defense cruise missile

CHOD

chief of defense

IRGCASF

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Aerospace Force

CRBM

close-range ballistic missile

IRGC-CIO

CWC

Chemical Weapons Convention

Islamic Revolutionary Guard CorpsCounterintelligence Organization

D&D

denial and deception

IRGCGF

DIO

Defense Industries Organization

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Ground Force

DIRTIDefense Industries Research andTraining Institute

IRGC-IO

Islamic Revolutionary Guard CorpsIntelligence Organization

DNG

deployed naval group

IRGCN

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy

EFP

explosively formed penetrator

IRGC-QF

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Qods ForceIslamic Republic of Iran Air Defense
Force

IRIAF

Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force

IRIGF

Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Force

IRIN

NPDO

National Passive Defense Organization

NPT

Nonproliferation Treaty

PFLP-GC

Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine–General Command

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy

PHRC

Physics Research Center

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham

PIJ

Palestine Islamic Jihad

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance

PJAK

Free Life Party of Kurdistan

PMC

Popular Mobilization Committee

JAA

Jaish ul-Adl

PMF

Popular Mobilization Forces

JCPOA

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

RPGrocket-propelled grenade

KADHQ

Khatemolanbia Air Defense
Headquarters

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SBIG

Khatemolanbia Central Headquarters

Shahid Bakeri Industries Group

KCHQ

SBS

Special Boat Service

KDPI

Kurdish Democratic Party of IranSCNSSupreme Council for National Security

LACM

land-attack cruise missile

SHIG

Shahid Hemmat Industries GroupLEF

Law Enforcement Force

SLVspace launch vehicle

MANPADS

man-portable air defense system

SNSF

Sepah Navy Special ForceMARSOF

maritime special operations forces

SOC

sector operations center

MARV

maneuverable reentry vehicle

SOF

special operations forces

MBT

main battle tank

SRBM

short-range ballistic missile

MEK

People’s Mujahedeen of Iran

UAV

unmanned aerial vehicle

MFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

UF6

Uranium hexafluoride

MIO

Marine Industries Organization

UGF

underground facility

UN

United Nations

MODAFL

Ministry of Defense and Armed
Forces Logistics

UNAMID

MOIS

Ministry of Intelligence and Security

African Union-United Nations Hybrid
Operation in Darfur

MRBM

medium-range ballistic missile

UNSC

UN Security Council

MRL

multiple rocket launcher

UNSCR

UN Security Council Resolution

MTCR

Missile Technology Control Regime

VBSS

visit, board, search, and seizure

MUT

Malek-Ashtar University of Technology

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

I N T E L L I G E N C E

IRIADFA G E N C Y

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

D E F E N S E

IR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

93

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKIR AN M ILITARY P OWE R

Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance

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