Overview of the 2021 Edition
This year s stockpiles are characterized by a tan increasing trend in total fissile material quantities, which isvirtually the same as in previous years. Despite a decreasing trend in total highly enriched uranium (HEU) quantities,
HEU stockpiles for military use are increasing in India,
Pakistan, and North Korea, although these are far smaller
than the US and Russian stockpiles. With regard to plutonium, the increasing trend of overall stockpiles continues,
with conspicuous, albeit small, increases in stockpiles formilitary use being made by Israel, India, and Pakistan. With
regard to plutonium for non-military use, the surplus
plutonium for use in nuclear weapons is decreasing andthe amount of plutonium recoverd from nuclear power
plants for civilian use is increasing.

Trends in Separated Plutonium Stockpiles (2009-2019)Non-military use

Civilian useSurplus

245308(as of the end of 2019)(as of the end of 2019)

Highly Enriched Uranium around the World

Separated Plutonium around the World

8.4

India

0.41

Pakistan

0.98

Israel3.2

United Kingdom

2.9

China

6.0

France38.4

United States103.188.0

RussiaNon-militaryuse
非軍事用（㌧）(tons)

Military use(tons)Country

North Korea

Subtotal

49.3
74.8
0.04
115.8

45.5

148

Total (tons)

191.1
87.7
80.8
2.94
119.0
0.98
0.41

0.4

8.8
0.04

0.04

Japan
Other non-nuclear
weapon states*

8192

Total
Military use

148
148

45.5

50100

150

200300Non-military use
Military use

600

800 1000 1200 1400

Country

RussiaUnited States
FranceChina
United Kingdom
IsraelPakistan
India
North Korea
Subtotal

0.7

0.7

Military use(tons)

672.0
480.0
25.0
14.0
21.9
0.3

Non-military use(tons)

6.0
82.0
5.4
0.24
0.7
0.02

3.92

Total (tons)

678.0
562.0
30.4
14.24
22.6
0.32
3.92

5.2

5.2

0.7

0.7
15.0

1,220

15.0

110

Japan, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, South Africa, Italy, Belarus,

350

242

400

1,330

*13 non-nuclear weapon states are estimated to have at least 1 kg of HEU (Kazakhstan,

NB: The stockpile of fissile materials includes estimated ones with large uncertainties

250

Unit (tons)

44
77

Civilian use

200

Non-nuclear weapon states*Total

390

538*The Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Germany, Switzerland
and thus total quantities are expressed in rounded numbers.

02019
2009

Trends in Highly Enriched Uranium Stockpiles(2009-2019)66

Surplus1220
1230
0Unit (tons)

Plutonium that remains in spent nuclear fuel but is notseparated cannot be directly reused in nuclear weapons and therefore is not included. Estimates for military plutonium except those for the U.S. and U.K. contain large uncertainties. It is estimated that the Nagasaki bomb contained 6 kg of plutonium.
All of the five major nuclear powers (the U.S., Russia,China, France, the U.K.) have closed their military reprocessing facilities. However, India, Pakistan, Israel, andNorth Korea have small-scale military reprocessing facilities.
Three nuclear powers, namely the U.K., Russia, andFrance, operate large-scale reprocessing facilities forcivilian use, and China plans to import this technology fromFrance. Non-nuclear weapon states such as Germany andBelgium have operated research facilities in the past. Currently, only Japan has a large-scale reprocessing facility,
which is scheduled to open in 2022 . Other non-nuclearweapon states are abolishing reprocessing facilities andreducing plutonium quantities to virtually zero. However,South Korea is currently negotiating with the U.S. for theright to carry out reprocessing.

Norway, Iran, Australia, and Syria).
NB: The stockpile of fissile materials includes estimated ones with large uncertainties
and thus total quantities are expressed in rounded numbers. Uranium that could
potentially be used to produce nuclear weapons is highly enriched uranium (HEU)
that has a concentration of 20% or higher. In reality, it is estimated that virtually all HEU
used for nuclear weapons has a concentration of 90% or higher, but some use
low-concentration HEU and details have not been disclosed.

Estimates for military HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium)
except those for the U.S. and U.K. contain large
uncertainties. It is estimated that the Hiroshima
atomic bomb contained 64 kg of HEU with an average
concentration of 80%.
All five of the major nuclear powers (the U.S., Russia,China, France, the U.K.) have ceased producing military-use highly enriched uranium (HEU). However, India
and Pakistan s production facilities continue to be operational. Israel possesses some military-use HEU acquired
from other countries, but has no enrichment facilities ofits own.
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, the U.K.,
China, Japan, the U.S., Iran, Argentina, and Brazil haveenrichment facilities for civilian use. The U.S. has plans tobuild new non-military enrichment facilities.

PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (PCU-NC)

2019
2009

Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA)
June 2021

https://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/pcu-nagasaki-council
PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (PCU-NC)
1-14, Bunkyo-machi, Nagasaki 852-8521
TEL: +81-95-819-2252 FAX: +81-95-819-2165

110,470

CONTACT

The World s Fissile Material Inventory poster
is an illustration of the materials which can beused for nuclear weapons (namely highlyenriched uranium and separated plutonium),with the information organized by country andby purpose for easier understanding. This
poster was made by the Nagasaki Council forNuclear Weapons Abolition (PCU-NC) and theResearch Center for Nuclear WeaponsAbolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA) for allaudiences, from elementary school students toadults. As part of the peace education efforts
carried out every August at Hiroshima s andNagasaki s Atomic Bomb Memorials, we
present annual updates on the latest
information every June. The detailed data of
this poster, which was compiled by the Fissile
Material Data Monitoring Team, including
RECNA staff, has been published on ourwebsite(http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/en-fmdata). Please see the website for furtherdetails.
We hope this guide will aid those using theposter in understanding backgroundinformation and terminology in simple, plainterms. It should be especially useful in theeducation field, particularly in schools.

2021.6

Fissile Material Inventory

Poster & Guide

The World s Fissile Material Inventory

A Guide to the World sINTRODUCTION

Explosive device
Gunpowder

Plutonium

is an artificial radioactive element that
does not exist in

Neutron source nature and is generated from operation of a nuclear reac-

Fissile material(Plutonium 239)

tor. For example, spent nuclear fuel discharged from alight water reactor ̶ which is a type of nuclear reactor
most commonly used around the world̶contains about 1%

Tamperplutonium by weight. Plutonium can be recovered from(separator material)
spent nuclear fuel through so-called reprocessing , which
Length: 3.25 m; Diameter: 1.52 m;
Weight: 4.5 tons

Nicknamed “Fat Man”

separates plutonium leaving uranium and fission products.
The plutonium recovered from usual nuclear power plants
is called reactor-grade plutonium . There are people who
claim that this plutonium is unsuitable for use in theNagasaki atomic bomb: Implosion-type bomb made with plutonium. Deemed to require nuclear
weapons testing because of its complex design.

manufacturing of nuclear weapons compared with highpurity weapons-grade plutonium, but this is not accurate.
Even if nuclear weapons are made with reactor-grade
plutonium, they still have an explosive power that far sur-passes that of conventional weapons. Moreover, if even more advanced design technology is applied,
it is possible to build nuclear weapons using reactor-grade plutonium that have the same reliability
and destructiveness as weapons built using weapons-grade plutonium.

The Raw Materials Used in Making Nuclear Weapons

Plutonium

Uranium
Uranium

is a natural radioactive
element. In nature, most uranium is found as the lessfissionable uranium-238 (99.3%). Only 0.7% of uranium is thefissile uranium-235. Because uranium-235 cannot be usedas-is nuclear fuel for commonly used power reactors ormaterials for nuclear weapons, its concentration needs to be
increased in a process known as uranium enrichment .
Uranium enriched to 20% or more is believed to be usable
for weapons, and is referred to as Highly Enriched Uranium(HEU). Typical nuclear weapons use uranium enriched to90 % or higher. On the other hand, nuclear fuel used in a

nuclear power plant typically has a 3–5% concentration, andis referred to as low-enriched uranium (LEU). It is still
possible to produce highly enriched uranium, even in civilian
facilities that produce low-enriched uranium.

Explosive device

Gunpowder
Fissile material(Plutonium 239)
Tamper(separator material)
Neutron source
Length: 3.0 m; Diameter: 0.7 m;
Weight: 4.0 tons

Explosive force: equivalent to 16,000
ton of TNT

icknamed “Little Boy”
Hiroshima atomic bomb: Gunbarrel-type bomb made with
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU).
Deemed to not require nuclear
weapons testing because of its
comparatively simple design.

Highly enriched uranium(HEU) or plutonium are essential raw materials for producing nuclear weapons. The latest hydrogen bombs (H-bombs) are made using

Military and Non-military

both HEUand plutonium, and uranium enrichment or reprocessing facilities arePlutonium

required for obtaining these fissile materials. Even among non-nuclear weapon

Military: Plutonium used innuclear warheads or stored foruse in weapons; plutonium thatis reserved for possible militaryuses in the future

ment or reprocessing facilities̶even if these facilities are operated under Inter-

Non-military: Plutonium separated from spent nuclear fuelfrom a nuclear reactor for
non-military purposes; plutonium declared as excess fornuclear weapons

Existing Raw
Materials Can
Create Many
Atomic Bombs
It is estimated that the Hiroshimabomb contained 64 kg of HEU withan average enrichment of 80%, andthat the Nagasaki bomb had 6 kg ofplutonium. The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) deems it possible to build one implosion-type
nuclear weapon with 25 kg of uranium-235 or 8 kg of plutonium. Thegraph shown conversions for theHiroshima bomb (64 kg) and the Nagasaki bomb (6 kg). In reality, there
are many variables, and so thevalues shown are approximate.

Downward
Trend in HEU
and Upward Trend
in Plutonium
Military-use HEU accounts for 92%of all HEU. Since 2009, 10 tons ofmilitary HEU and 210 tons of
non-military-use HEU have been
eliminated.
In contrast, non-military-use plutonium accounts for 72% of all plutonium. Since 2009, the amount of military-use plutonium has been
reduced by 0.4 tons, but there has
been an increase in non-military-use plutonium of 53 tons.

states there are countries that possess either or both of these facilities for thepurpose of nuclear power generation. Having even small-scale uranium enrichnational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards̶gives a country the capability
to produce fissile materials for military purposes, significantly increasing the riskof nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the increasing stockpile of plutonium
recovered through reprocessing for civilian use is becoming a a serious international security issue.

Military and Non-military

Uranium (HEU)

Military: HEU used in nuclear
warheads or stored for use inweapons; HEU used in reactor
fuel for naval nuclear propulsion (including spent fuel)Non-military: HEU used in fuelfor research and testing reactors; HEU declared as excess
for military purposes

Japan is as the Largest
Stockpile owner ofPlutonium as aNon-Nuclear
Weapon State
Japan has almost 8% of the world sseparated plutonium, possessing thefifth largest amount of separated plutonium after Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France. Incontrast, the other non-nuclear
weapon states combined possess only
0.1% of the world s separated plutonium. From this one can tell that Japanis a very unique outlier.

Reducing Fissile
Materials is Also aHuge Challenge
All of the global fissile materials combined are equivalent to more than
100,000 of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
bombs. It is estimated that there are
13,000 nuclear warheads in the world.
In other words, the world is capable ofdeveloping many times more nuclear
weapons than it currently possesses.
Fissile materials will remain even if allof the world s nuclear weapons are
dismantled. They must therefore beprocessed and disposed of to ensurethat they are never again used to makenuclear warheads.