August 20191

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Contents
Convention on Nuclear Safety National Report of Japanfor the Eighth Review Meeting

Contents
A

Introduction....................................................................................................................................... 8
1

Overview of Nuclear Program in Japan..................................................................................... 82

Overview of Nuclear Energy Policy in Japan .......................................................................... 113

Long-Term Recovery of the Contaminated Areas After the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station Accident ................................................................................................ 11

4

Implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Japan ........................................... 16

5

Development of the National Report ....................................................................................... 16

B

Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period ............................................ 17
1

Activities Related to Nuclear Regulation ................................................................................ 17

2

Major Responses Based on the Findings Identified by the Integrated Regulatory Review
Service (IRRS) mission ................................................................................................................ 19

3

Vienna Declaration ..................................................................................................................... 21

4

Activities by Licensees ............................................................................................................... 23

5

Effort to Address the Challenges Identified in Country Group Discussions of the 7th
Review Meeting ........................................................................................................................... 24

6

Efforts to Address Challenges Stated in the Summary Report of the 7th Review Meeting
28

C

Outline of the Report for Each Article ....................................................................................... 34

ARTICLE 6

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS................................................................ 34

ARTICLE 7

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK............................................ 47

Article 7 (1)Establishment of a Legislative and Regulatory Framework................................. 48

Article 7 (2)Safety Requirements and Safety Regulations ......................................................... 52

ARTICLE 8

REGULATORY BODY .................................................................................................. 58

Article 8 (1)Establishment of a Regulatory Body........................................................................ 59

Article 8 (2)Status of the Regulatory Body .................................................................................. 67

ARTICLE 9RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENSE HOLDER .................................................... 69

ARTICLE 10

PRIORITY TO SAFETY ........................................................................................... 72

ARTICLE 11

FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES ......................................................... 78

Article 11 (1)Financial Resources ................................................................................................ 79

Article 11 (2)Human Resources .................................................................................................. 81

ARTICLE 12

HUMAN FACTORS .................................................................................................. 84

ARTICLE 13

QUALITY ASSURANCE ......................................................................................... 88

ARTICLE 14

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY .......................................... 92
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Contents
Article 14 (1)Safety Assessments ................................................................................................ 93

Article 14 (2)Verification of Safety ............................................................................................ 101

ARTICLE 15

RADIATION PROTECTION ................................................................................ 103

ARTICLE 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ......................................................................... 111

Article 16 (1)Emergency Plans .................................................................................................. 113

Article 16 (2)Information to the Public and Neighboring Countries ................................... 129

ARTICLE 17

SITING ...................................................................................................................... 131

Article 17 (1)Evaluation of Site-Related Factors ..................................................................... 133

Article 17 (2)Evaluation of Safety Impacts on Individuals, Society, and the Environment
Resulting from Reactor Facilities ....................................................................... 137

Article 17 (3)Re-Evaluation of Site-Related Factors ............................................................... 139

Article 17 (4)Discussion with Other Countries Likely to Be Affected by Reactor Facilities
142

ARTICLE 18

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION ...................................................................... 143

Article 18 (1)Implementing a Defense in Depth Strategy ..................................................... 144

Article 18 (2)Application of Proven Technologies .................................................................. 152

Article 18 (3)Design for Highly Reliable, Stable, and Easily Manageable Operations ...... 153

ARTICLE 19

OPERATION ............................................................................................................ 154

Article 19 (1)Initial Authorization ............................................................................................ 156

Article 19 (2)Limiting Condition for Operation...................................................................... 161

Article 19 (3)Procedures for Operation, Maintenance, Inspection, and Testing ................ 163

Article 19 (4)Procedures for Dealing with Events Occurring During Operation............... 169

Article 19 (5)Engineering and Technical Support................................................................... 171

Article 19 (6)Reporting of Accidents and Failures, etc. ......................................................... 171

Article 19 (7)Making Effective Use of Operational Experiences .......................................... 173

Article 19 (8)On-Site Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste .......................... 175

D

Annexes .......................................................................................................................................... 179
1

List of nuclear installations ...................................................................................................... 180

2

List of accidents and failures reported under the Reactor Regulation Act during thereporting period ......................................................................................................................... 182

3

Result of IAEA OSART Follow-up Mission taken by TEPCO ............................................. 184

4

Result of IAEA Mission on Mid-and-long-term Roadmap Towards the Decommissioningof TEPCO’S Fukushima Daiichi NPS (Fourth Mission) ....................................................... 186

5

References ................................................................................................................................... 196

4

List of Abbreviations
List of Abbreviations
ABWR

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor

AEC

Atomic Energy Commission

APWR

Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor

ATR

Advanced Thermal Reactor

BWR

Boiling Water Reactor

CAO

Cabinet Office

ConvExConvention Exercise

CSNI

Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations

CV

Containment Vessel

DBA

Design Basis Accident

DEC

Design Extension Condition

EAL

Emergency Action Level

ECCS

Emergency Core Cooling System

EPR

Emergency Preparedness and Response

EPREV

Emergency Preparedness Review

FBR

Fast Breeder Reactor

GCR

Gas Cooled Reactor

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICRP

International Commission on Radiation Protection

Implementation Plan

Implementation Plan Pertaining to Specified Nuclear Facilities at
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

INES

International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale

IRRS

Integrated Regulatory Review Service

IRS

Incident Reporting System

JAEA

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

JANSI

Japan Nuclear Safety Institute

JAPC

Japan Atomic Power Company

JEAC

Japan Electric Association CodeJNESJapan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, an incorporated
administrative agency (former TSO, merged into the NRA in
March 2014)

KEPCO

Kansai Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.

LOCA

Loss of Coolant Accident

METI

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

MEXT

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

MOE

Ministry of the Environment

MOFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

NAC

National Assistance Capability
5

List of Abbreviations
NCA
NISA

National Competent Authority
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (former nuclear regulator
resolved in September 2012)

Notification on Doses

Notification to Establish Dose Limits in Accordance with theProvisions of the NRA Ordinance on Activity of Refining Nuclear
Source or Nuclear Fuel Materials

NPP

Nuclear Power Plant

NPS

Nuclear Power Station

NRA

Nuclear Regulation Authority

NRA EPR Guide

NRA Guide for Emergency Preparedness and Response

NRA Ordinance on
Commercial Reactors

NRA Ordinance concerning the Installation and Operation, of

NRA Ordinance onStandards for
Installation Permit

NRA Ordinance prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure,

NRA Ordinance on
Quality Control
Methods
NRA Ordinance on
Technical Standards
NSC
Nuclear Emergency Act
NuRO
OECD/NEA

Commercial Power Reactors
and Equipment of Commercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary
Facilities
NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards for Quality Control
Methods Concerning the Design and Construction of Commercial
Power Reactors for Licensees of Power Reactor Operation and
Systems for their Inspection
NRA Ordinance prescribing Technical Standards for Commercial
Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities
Nuclear Safety Commission, former safety related governmentalorganization resolved on September 2013
Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness
Nuclear Reprocessing Organization
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
Nuclear Energy Agency

OIL

Operational Intervention Level

OSART

Operational Safety Review Team

PAZ

Precautionary Action Zone

PCCV

Pre-stressed Concrete Containment Vessel

PCV

Primary Containment Vessel

PPA

Plume Protection Planning Areas

PRA

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

PWR

Pressurized Water Reactor

QST
RANET

National Institute for Quantum and Radiological Science andTechnology
Response Assistance Network

6

List of Abbreviations
R/B

Reactor Building

RCCV

Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel

RPS

Reactor Protection System

Reactor Regulation Act
SCVSPEEDI

Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel
Material and Reactors
Steal Containment Vessel
System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose
Information

SSC

Structures, Systems and Components

SSF

Specialized Safety Facility

Supervision and
Evaluation Committee

Committee on Supervision and Evaluation of the Specified

T/B

Turbine Building

TEPCO

Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.

TRU Waste

Low Heat Production and a Long Half-life Waste

TSO

Technical and Scientific Support Organization

UPZ

Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone

USIE

Nuclear Facilities

Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents andEmergencies

7

A Introduction

A

1

Introduction

Overview of Nuclear Program in Japan

Based on the definition in the Convention on Nuclear Safety, there are a total of 51
reactors (20 PWRs and 31 BWRs) in Japan as of March 2019. TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi
NPS units 1 thru 6, Tohoku Electric Power Company’s Onagawa NPS unit 1, KEPCO’s
Ohi Power Station units 1 and 2, Shikoku Electric Power Company’s Ikata NPS unit 2,
ten reactors in total among them are permanently shut down for decommissioning, anddecommissioning of another eleven reactors (Chubu Electric Power Company’s
Hamaoka NPS units 1 and 2, KEPCO’s Mihama Power Station units 1 and 2, Chugoku
Electric Power Company’s Shimane NPS unit 1, Shikoku Electric Power Company’s Ikata
NPS unit 1, Kyushu Electric Power Company’s Genkai NPS unit 1, JAPC’s Tokai Power
Station and Tsuruga Power Station unit 1, JAEA’s ATR Fugen and Prototype FBR Monju)
are currently underway.
In Japan, following the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, the Atomic Energy
Basic Act, the Reactor Regulation Act, and related legislation were amended in 2012, andthe nuclear regulation regime was renewed and the NRA was established in September
2012. The new regulatory requirements for nuclear power reactors came into force inJuly 2013. Licensees are required to obtain authorization of the NRA through the
Conformity Review which assesses on whether the reactor meets the regulatory
requirements prior to resuming operation. The NRA accepted applications of the
Conformity Review for 27 units in 16 sites by the end of March 2019. Commercial
operation of KEPCO’s Takahama Power Station units 3 and 4, Ohi Power Station units 3
and 4, Shikoku Electric Power Company’s Ikata NPS unit 3, and Kyushu Electric Power
Company’s Genkai NPS units 3 and 4, and Sendai NPS units 1 and 2 have been resumed
after the Conformity Review was completed. Efforts are made to ensure transparency
and introduce an efficient method of overall assessment, thus the Conformity Review
Meeting are made open to the public by allowing their attendance and webcasting, andmaterials and minutes of the meeting is disclosed. After the meeting, interviews are heldwith licensees to share understanding of findings among parties concerned.
With the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in June 2012, the operational periodof a power reactor is limited to up to 40 years in principle. The NRA accepted
applications for extension of the operational period for four units in three NPSs by theend of March 2019. All four units (KEPCO’s Takahama Power Station units 1 and 2,
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A Introduction
Mihama Power Station unit 3, and JAPC’s Tokai No2 Power Station) were approved by
the NRA by 7th November 2018.
Figure A-1 shows the location and status of nuclear power reactors in Japan.

9A Introduction

Nuclear power station
BWR（in operation）

PWR（in operation）

BWR(under construction）

PWR（under construction）

BWR（under decommissioningor permanently shut down）

PWR (under decommissioningor permanently shut down）

Tomari NPS1

2 3

Ohma NPS

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS
1

2

3

Higashidori NPS

4 5 6 7

（Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.）

1

Shika NPS
2

1

Fugen NPS（TEPCO.）

Onagawa NPS

Tsuruga Power Staion

ATR (under decommissioning)

1

1 2

Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Monju NPS

1 2

FBR (under decommissioning)

Ohi Power Station
3

Tokai Power Station

4

GCR (under decommissioning)

Takahama Power Station
1

2 3

Tokai No2 Power Station

4

Shimane NPS
1Hamaoka NPS

2
1Genkai NPS
1 2

5 6

1 2 3 4

1 2 3
2

3 4

Fukushima Daini NPS

Mihama Power Station

1

2 3

2

3 4

Ikata Power Station

3 4

1 2

3

Sendai NPS
1Figure A-1

2

Location and Status of Reactor Facilities

10

5

A Introduction
2

Overview of Nuclear Energy Policy in Japan

The “5th Strategic Energy Plan,” which presents the basic direction of Japan's energy
policy, was formulated in July 2018. The Government expresses its unwavering resolve
to deal with a variety of issues surrounding nuclear power policy keeping the experience,
regrets, and lessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident
uppermost in mind as the followings;•

The Government will do its utmost to achieve the reconstruction and recovery of
Fukushima while reflecting on and responding to the pain felt by the people affectedby the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident.

•

The Government and nuclear operators must continue to reflect on the fact that theyfell into the trap of the so-called “myth of safety”, resulting in the failure toadequately deal with the severe accident and prevent a disaster like this.

•

It is essential to proceed with such measures as compensating for the damage doneby the nuclear accident, implementing decontamination work, constructing aninterim storage facility for radioactive waste, decommissioning damaged reactors,
disposing of contaminated water and controlling the damage caused by groundlessrumors.

•There is also a pile of other challenges related to nuclear power generation,
including what to do with spent fuels and final disposal of radioactive materials. In
order to address these challenges, the Government should play a more proactiverole in implementing preventive and multi-layered measures in order for thefundamental settlement of the contaminated water issue and decommissioning andthe other issues related to nuclear power generation by bringing together domestic
and international wisdom.

After the experience of the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, Japan is giving
top priority to nuclear power safety and expanding renewable energy initiatives. Japanis aiming for an energy mix of 20-22 % nuclear power by 2030 and to reduce its
dependency on nuclear power as much as possible by 2050.
3

Long-Term Recovery of the Contaminated Areas After the TEPCO’s Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident

TEPCO decided the “Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap Towards the Decommissioning ofFukushima Daiichi NPS Units 1-4, TEPCO,” in December 2011 and has been making
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A Introduction
efforts toward implementation of decommissioning while making continuous reviewsof the Roadmap.
TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS units 1 thru 4 have been designated as the Specified
Nuclear Facilities on 7th November 2012 by the NRA. Thereafter, TEPCO has obtained
the NRA’s approval on the “Implementation Plan” on 14th August 2013, and thus special
measures have been taken to secure safety based on the Implementation Plan.
Eight years have passed since the accident and the countermeasures, such as waste
management including contaminated water treatment and the decommissioning, havebeen proceeded in a planned manner. As for the status of observance of the
Implementation Plan, a staff of the NRA Regional Office is making daily patrol activities
and also monitoring TEPCO's activities based on Operational Safety Inspections, and the
NRA also conducts inspections such as Pre-service Inspections and welding inspections.
In December 2014, spent fuel assemblies stored in the spent fuel pool of the unit 4 R/B
were removed, and the work to move it to the common pool in the site was completed.
In unit 3, TEPCO started its work to remove fuel assemblies from its spent fuel pool in
April 2019.
As for the treatment of contaminated water accumulated in the buildings in TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi NPS, decontamination by the Advanced Liquid Processing System(ALPS) has been conducted, but the treated water, including tritium that cannot be
removed by this equipment, has been continuously stored in the site. The NRA
determined that it is important to remove contaminated water itself in order to reduce
the risk of leakage caused by contaminated water accumulated in the R/Bs of TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi NPS. At the Supervision and Evaluation Committee, for thecountermeasures of reducing contaminated water in the buildings proposed by TEPCO,
the NRA requested TEPCO to accelerate the treatment of the contaminated water in the
R/Bs before the target time (year 2020); to take countermeasures to suppress generationof radioactive dust in work; and to remove the contaminated water accumulated in thecondensers as early as possible. With these activities, especially, the removal ofcontaminated water in the condensers of units 1thru 3 was completed in December 2017.
Drying up of the unit 1 T/B was completed in March 2017.
To set forth a target related to measures to be taken at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPS,
the NRA formulated the "Measures for Mid-Term Risk Reduction"1 in February 2015,and has revised it according to progress of the decommissioning. In FY2018, the NRA
confirmed that the decontamination facility for large scale equipment had been installed;1

https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000265471.pdf
12

A Introduction
treatment of contaminated water accumulated in flange-type tanks had been completed;and measures to suppress inflow of the underground water into the R/Bs by recovery of
sub-drain pits had been implemented, and thus revised the “Measures for Mid-Term
Risk Reduction” in March 2019.
Matters regarding radioactive waste management were discussed in the Committee onRadioactive Waste Issues of the Specified Nuclear Facilities, but considering the progress,
the NRA decided to abolish the Committee and to discuss the matters in the Supervision
and Evaluation Committee in order to implement the oversight and evaluation morecomprehensively and effectively in February 2019.
The analysis of the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident is one of the important
activities of the NRA, and thus the NRA has conducted verification from the technicalaspect. In the NRA Commission Meeting in March 2013, it was decided that technicalissues to be clarified would be discussed in the Committee on Accident Analysis of
Fukushima Daiichi NPS, and this Committee started in May 2013. The Fukushima
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, set up by the National Diet,
requested the regulatory body to investigate seven unresolved issues. The NRA
analyzed these issues from a technical viewpoint based on the plant data, computer
analysis and site investigation and developed the "Analysis of the TEPCO’s Fukushima
Daiichi NPS Accident (Interim Report)" as its conclusion, and introduced it in the NRA
Commission Meeting in October 2014. In FY2018, the NRA participated in international
investigation research activities for the accident etc. Especially, the NRA has taken thelead in the establishment of investigation research activity in the OECD/NEA/CSNI,
which is the ARC-F(Analysis of Information from Reactor Buildings and Containment
Vessels of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station), and the relevant activities havestarted in January 2019 with participation of 12 countries (22 organizations). Moreover,
the NRA measured the dose distribution in the operation floor and the surrounding areaof the unit 3 R/B, reported the results to related domestic academic societies, anddiscussed measures to reduce radiation doses based on the result of the dose distribution
measurement in the Supervision and Evaluation Committee.
Radiation monitoring related to the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident has been
made by relevant government ministries and agencies, local governments, etc. incooperation based on the "Comprehensive Radiation Monitoring Plan" set up by theGovernment (decided in the Monitoring Coordination Meeting on 2nd August 2011 andrevised on 1st February 2019).
Decontamination has been implemented around TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS due
to radioactive materials discharged by the accident. The National Government is
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A Introduction
responsible for decontamination and waste disposal in the “Special Decontamination
Areas” and “Contaminated Waste Management Areas”. And in other areas, theGovernment designated the “Intensive Contamination Survey Area” in municipalities,
having the air dose rate of 0.23 micro Sv/h or more, after hearing of opinions from suchmunicipalities, and decontamination had been carried out by the municipalities with thesupport of the Government. As a result, whole area decontamination in the Special
Decontamination Areas was completed by the end of March 2017 except for the“Difficult-to-Return-Zones2”, and all the whole area decontamination were completed
in 100 municipalities of eight prefectures including Intensive Contamination Survey
Areas, by the end of March 2018. In accordance with the fact that whole area
decontamination was completed, the MOE published “Decontamination Projects Report”
for the purpose of keeping the records of experiences, findings, and the lessons learned
from the project. The Report was translated into English and posted on the MOE website3
in order to share with international communities.
In Fukushima Prefecture, “Interim Storage Facility” has been constructed to control andstore soil and wastes, etc. containing radioactive materials, which were generated in alarge amount from the decontamination, in a safe and concentrated manner until the
final disposal. And the removed soil etc. that were temporarily stored are now beingtransported, aiming to mostly complete by FY2021 (except in the Difficult-to-Return
Zones). Moreover, in order to reduce the volume of the final disposal, efforts are being
made for volume reduction and recycling of the removed soil with relatively low
radioactivity, while confirming safety. As for wastes with radioactive concentration
exceeding a certain level, existing managed disposal facilities in the relevant prefectures
have been nationalized and landfill disposal is being implemented on these facilities. As
it is important to carry out these efforts with obtaining understanding of wide range ofgeneral public including local residents, information is actively provided for local people
and foreign visitors by activities such as hosting facility tours on newly established two
facilities in Okuma Town and Tomioka Town in Fukushima Prefecture that serve as
exhibition bases.
In terms of evacuation status, the number of evacuees4 in Fukushima Prefecture was
Areas where the annual integral dose is more than 50 mSv as of 26th December 2011 while theannual integral dose may not decrease to less than 20 mSv in the long term, specifically evenafter five years have passed, which was set in the “Basic Concept and Future Agenda for
Review of the Restricted Zones and the Zones under Evacuation Orders where Step 2 wasCompleted” (Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, 26th December 2011).
3 http://josen.env.go.jp/en/
4 Including evacuation to emergency provisional housings, houses of relatives, friends, etc. in
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A Introduction
about 160,000 at the initial stage of the accident, but with progress of decontamination
etc., evacuation orders have been lifted in most areas except in the Difficult-to- Return
Zones, and shift to reconstruction and revitalization has come into full swing. The
number of evacuees as of January 2019 was about 40,000, and dismantlement ofdamaged houses and decontamination are now being implemented in sequence as partof development of the “Specified Reconstruction and Revitalization Base” in the
Difficult-to-Return Zone. For health management of residents, the "Fukushima HealthManagement Survey" has been continually commenced in Fukushima Prefecture,aiming to improve and maintain the health of the residents of the prefecture into the
future by means of understanding their health conditions and linking such data to theprevention, early detection, and treatment of diseases, while assessing their radiation
doses.
In terms of international cooperation, an environmental remediation is promoted in amanner open to the international communities, while obtaining support from various
countries and international organizations such as the IAEA. As for the environmental
remediation in Fukushima Prefecture, the IAEA has been cooperating since 2013 andadvices are given from experts’ point of view in the fields of decontamination, waste
disposal, and radiation monitoring that have been tackled by the Prefecture. Moreover,discussions are under way between the MOE, as the key party, and IAEA experts on
progress, results, and future efforts in environmental recovery activities in off-site areas.

Figure A-2

Result of Whole Area Decontamination

Fukushima Prefecture and evacuation to the outside of the Prefecture.
15

A Introduction
4

Implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Japan

Japan has been fulfilling its obligations described in from Article 6 to Article 19 of theConvention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), including improvements in nuclear regulation by
the revision of the Reactor Regulation Act, and the establishment of the NRA in order toensure the independence of the regulatory body. Situations regarding the fulfillments ofthese obligations of the CNS are reported respectively in Chapter C.
As for the obligation in the CNS Article 4, Japan accepts that the CNS has the same legalbinding power as domestic laws, through the approval and promulgation by the
National Diet of Japan. In addition, with domestic legal frameworks such as the Reactor
Regulation Act, necessary measures are taken, which are described in Chapter C. The
obligation of CNS Article 5 is fulfilled by this report documentation.
As for the Article 24, Japan has participated in meetings of the Contracting Parties of
CNS, and fulfills its obligation as a government.
5

Development of the National Report

The National Report of Japan for 8th Review Meeting is based on the guideline5, andconsists of “Introduction”, “Summary”, “Reporting article by article” and “Annexes”.
In principle, the reporting period is from 1st April 2016 to 31th March 2019.
For well-understandable review by the Contracting Parties, measures for identified
challenges and suggestions in the last review meeting are concentrated and reported in
Chapter B” Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period”.
Summary of various regulatory issues and measures in Japan is also included in this
Chapter.
Reports for each article of the CNS are mainly intended to explain the compliance statusof obligations of the CNS. These provide comprehensive information about a regulatory
system in Japan as well as complement the contents indicated in Chapter B.

5

INFCIRC/572/Rev.5
16

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting PeriodB1
1-1

Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
Activities Related to Nuclear Regulation

Review on Compliance to New Regulatory Requirements

The NRA developed new regulatory requirements related to commercial power reactors
which were significantly enhanced than the previous requirements in the light of lessons
learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, and put them into force inJuly 2013. The licensee must submit applications on compliance to the new regulatory
requirements to the NRA to obtain authorization for their operation of reactors.
To install and operate a new reactor in Japan, it is necessary to obtain the permit forreactor installation (“Reactor Installation Permit”) and make a specific design; obtain theapproval of plan for construction for a specific design (“Construction Plan”) and carryout construction work; and finally obtain the approval of Operational Safety Programs
prior to start of operation. For reactors on which authorization have been alreadyobtained, the Conformity Review is to be conducted based on the back-fitting system
introduced with the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2012; amendment toReactor Installation Permit is to be granted; and approvals of Construction Plan andOperational Safety Programs based on the amended permit are also to be obtained.
In the Conformity Review, reviews on amendments to Reactor Installation Permit,
Construction Plan, and Operational Safety Programs are conducted in parallel so as toreview effectiveness of both hardware and software in a unified manner.
The NRA implements the Conformity Review by holding the Conformity Review
Meeting where Commissioners participate. The Conformity Review Meeting is madeopen to the public by allowing their attendance and webcasting, along with materials forthe examination disclosed in principle, thus maintain transparency of the review. In aprocess of the review, there are chances to hear the opinions of manufacturers andexternal experts depending on judgment by Commissioners. The Conformity Review
Meeting started review on 16th July 2013, and since then it has been conducting review
on applications submitted to the NRA in order of precedence, holding 697 meetings asof the end of March 2019.
In addition to the Conformity Review Meeting where Commissioners participate,meetings and hearings with licensees are occasionally held as appropriate by the NRA
staff for the purpose of regulatory activities such as confirmation of facts related tomatters included in applications. While summaries of those proceedings are made open
along with related materials, to ensure more transparency in the future, the NRA has
17

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
considered a procedure to make more detailed minutes open than the summaries
previously disclosed, and it decided to disclose the transcription result by the automatic
speech-to-text software on a trial basis from April 2019.
As of the end of March 2019, applications for amendment to Reactor Installation Permit
on compliance to the new regulatory requirements have been submitted by licensees for
27 units in 16 NPSs. Among them, as of the end of March 2019, permit was given to total
15 units: TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS units 6 and 7, KEPCO’s Mihama Power
Station unit 3, Takahama Power Station units 1 thru 4, Ohi Power Station units 3 and 4,
Shikoku Electric Power Company’s Ikata NPS unit 3, Kyushu Electric Power Company’s
Genkai NPS units 3 and 4, Sendai NPS units 1 and 2, and JAPC’s Tokai No2 Power Station.
As for the Specialized Safety Facility required by the new regulatory requirements,
Conformity Review is being conducted in line with the progress of the review for theirown power reactors, as of the end of March 2019, amendment to Reactor Installation
Permit was granted for total seven units: KEPCO’s Takahama Power Station units 1 to
4 , Shikoku Electric Power Company’s Ikata NPS unit 3, Kyushu Electric Power
Company’s Sendai NPS units 1 and 2, and review of amendment to Reactor Installation
Permit is being conducted for 11 units: Hokkaido Electric Power Company’s Tomari
NPS unit 3, TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS units 1, 6 and 7, KEPCO’s Mihama
Power Station unit 3, Ohi Power Station units 3 and 4, Kyushu Electric Power
Company’s Genkai NPS units 3 and 4, and J-POWER’s Ohma NPS.
1-2

Review on Extension of Operational Period of Commercial Power Reactors

According to provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, the operational period of powerreactors is 40 years from the date they passed Pre-service Inspections. During this period,
it is possible to extend it once, for a period of no more than 20 years, if the approval is
obtained from the NRA.
The NRA received applications for approval of extension of operational period fromKEPCO for Takahama Power Station units 1 and 2 on 30th April 2015 and Mihama Power
Station unit 3 on 26th November 2015 and from JAPC for Tokai No2 Power Station on 24th
November 2017.
Along with filing the application, the licensee conducted the Special Inspection andtechnical evaluation of degradation conditions and developed the MaintenanceManagement Program.
These Special Inspection, technical evaluation of degradation conditions anddevelopment of Maintenance Management Program are reported in detail in Article 14.
The NRA approved operational period extension for Takahama Power Station units 1
18

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
and 2 on 20th June 2016, Mihama Power Station unit 3 on 16th November 2016, and Tokai
No2 Power Station on 7th November 2018.
1-3

Decommissioning of Power Reactors

As for decommissioning, with reference to the IAEA safety standards, in order to invite
licensees’ early considerations for decommissioning promptly after obtaining Reactor
Installation Permit, the licensees are required to prepare the early plans fordecommissioning policy (“Forward Planning of the Decommissioning Policy”) anddisclose them to the public, according to the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act
in 2017 and associated guides. Related regulations came into effect in October 2018 andlicensees made the Policies public by the end of 2018.
As fordecommissioningofcommercial

power

reactors,

approvalforthe“Decommissioning Plan” was already given to nine units and they are in the phase of
decommissioning: Chubu Electric Power Company’s Hamaoka NPS units 1 and 2,
KEPCO’s Mihama Power Station units 1 and 2, Chugoku Electric Power Company’s
Shimane NPS unit 1, Shikoku Electric Power Company’s Ikata NPS unit 1, Kyushu
Electric Power Company’s Genkai NPS unit 1, JAPC’s Tokai Power Station and Tsuruga
Power Station unit 1, and approval of the Decommissioning Plan is under review for
three units: KEPCO’s Ohi Power Station units 1 and 2 and Ikata NPS unit 2. As for powerreactors at the research and development stage, approval for the Decommissioning Plan
was given to two units and they are in the phase of decommissioning: JAEA’s ATR Fugen
and Prototype FBR Monju.
1-4

Continuous Review of Regulatory Requirements Based on the State-of-the-Art
Scientific and Technical Knowledge

Refer to B 5-4.
2

Major Responses Based on the Findings Identified by the Integrated Regulatory
Review Service (IRRS) mission

The NRA invited an IRRS mission by the IAEA in January 2016 with a view to strengthen
and enhance the effectiveness of regulatory infrastructure for nuclear safety and has
sorted action items based on self-developed action plans in addition to therecommendations and suggestions made by the IRRS mission, and is moving forwardwith the actions taking into account the evaluation and advice from the Reactor Safety
Examination Committee and the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee. After
19

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
implementing these actions, the NRA plans to invite the IRRS follow-up mission whichassesses the response status to the recommendations etc.
Among these action items, major issues the NRA is now addressing are as follows.
2-1

Inspection System Reform

Inspection of nuclear facility has been done in several types separately each of which isprescribed in the Reactor Regulation Act, focusing on, for example, checking pass or failaccording to the checklist. In April 2017, the Act was amended for further enhancementof safety, making the system flexible and covering the licensees’ whole activities relevant
to safety with a focus on safety issues and concerns. Concretely, the system in which the
NRA can check the overall licensees’ activities relevant to safety any time (the system inwhich the NRA can keep a close check “at any time” and “to anything”) has beendeveloped, putting an obligation on licensees to inspect compliance to the regulatory
requirements by themselves. In addition, the system was designed to implement
effective and performance-based regulation by rating the level of operational safety
activities comprehensively for each nuclear power station and reflecting the safety
performance to the next inspection properly. With this system, the NRA encourages
licensees to address the maintenance and improvement of the level of safety voluntarily.
Such new inspection system integrating the former segmented inspections has been
under trial operation from autumn in 2018, and is aimed at launching practical operation
as a systemized inspection program in FY2020 after examination and improvement of
the associated problems.
2-2

Securing and Developing Human Resource

The NRA has recruited more than 200 staff since 2013 to secure staff with skills andexperiences who carry out regulatory responsibility in nuclear and radiation safety,
through recruiting of person with practical experiences, for the work of safety review,inspection, nuclear emergency preparedness, and prevention of radiation hazards fromprivate sectors, etc. And as for newcomers, about 150 staff have been recruited since 2013
with a focus on person who will assume future nuclear regulation administration.
And the NRA is making effort to secure staff with administration experience or highexpertise through rotations among other ministries and agencies, promotion of
employment after retirement, etc. The NRA also encourages staff to study abroad
actively and to expand opportunity among universities, research institutes andinternational organizations to obtain various experience as an expert.
As for the human resource development, the NRA installed plant simulators which were20

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
developed to simulate the behavior of power reactor facilities (BWRs and PWRs). By useof these simulators, practical trainings such as oversights of operator actions at startup
and shutdown of reactors, and response to severe accidents, are carried out for NRA staff
to enhance capability of dealing with accidents and events at the scene. As for the
training programs for specific fields, the qualification system composed of five fields(nuclear inspection, nuclear safety review, safeguards inspection, emergency
preparedness and regulation for radiation) was introduced in 2017 and associatedtraining courses have been implemented since 2018.
3

Vienna Declaration6

The Vienna Declaration was adopted at the Diplomatic Conference to consider aproposal to amend the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) on 9th February 2015.
Elements of the Vienna Declaration are as follows:•

New nuclear power plants are to be designed, sited, and constructed, consistent
with the objective of preventing accidents in the commissioning and operation and,should an accident occur, mitigating possible releases of radionuclides causing longterm off site contamination and avoiding early radioactive releases or radioactive
releases large enough to require long-term protective measures and actions.

•

Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are to be carried out periodicallyand regularly for existing installations throughout their lifetime in order to identify
safety improvements that are oriented to meet the above objective. Reasonably
practicable or achievable safety improvements are to be implemented in a timely
manner.

•National requirements and regulations for addressing this objective throughout the
lifetime of nuclear power plants are to take into account the relevant IAEA Safety
Standards and, as appropriate, other good practices as identified inter alia in the
Review Meetings of the CNS.

In Japan, it had been required to take preventive measures on disaster caused by nuclear
power reactors up to the Design Basis Accidents as a regulatory requirement, and as aresult of the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2012, measures against severe
accidents were stipulated as regulatory requirements, resulting in enhancement ofregulations. The new regulatory requirements require to take measures such as

6

INFCIRC/872
21

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
prevention of core damage and prevention of containment vessel (CV) failure and tominimize the total amount of radioactive releases, as well as to evaluate effectiveness ofthe measures taken by using a combination of PRAs and deterministic analyses. It is
stated in its review guide that release amount of Cs-137 be less than 100 TBq for the
postulated CV failure mode (refer to 2-5, Article 18). Additionally, this amendment madeit newly mandatory to conduct evaluation for safety improvement, report its results, andmake them open to the public. Accordingly periodical implementation ofcomprehensive and systematic safety evaluation and timely implementation ofnecessary improvement measures have come to be ensured along with implementationof Periodic Facility Inspections, Periodic Safety Management Reviews, and Operational
Safety Inspections. Evaluation to enhance safety is reported in Article 14, and Periodic
Facility Inspections, Periodic Safety Management Reviews, and Operational Safety
Inspections are reported in Article 19.
Furthermore with the amendment of the Atomic Energy Basic Act in 2012, provision torefer to the established international standards was added to its basic policy, and, backfitting rule was introduced in the Reactor Regulation Act. With this rule, in the case that
regulatory requirements are revised, licensees have obligation to meet their existing
power reactors to the revised regulatory requirements. The NRA has enhanced theprocess to feedback operating experience and state-of-the-art knowledge based in thelessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident through discussions
in the Technical Information Committee. The NRA Ordinances where back-fitting isapplied are the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit and the NRA
Ordinance on Technical Standards, etc., which are reported in Articles 17, 18, and 19. The
back-fitting rule corresponds to measures taken to prevent operation of power reactors
where safety is not ensured, reported in Article 6.
The NRA developed regulatory requirements incorporating measures against severe
accidents and put them into force in July 2013, and in developing regulatory
requirements, the IAEA Safety Standards and other international standards have beentaken into account. Besides, the NRA participates in the IAEA’s Commission on Safety
Standards and its five Committees and is actively contributing to the Safety Standards
developing activities of the IAEA.
As stated above, Japan has already taken measures corresponding to elements of theVienna Declaration.

22

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
44-1

Activities by Licensees
Compliance to the Regulatory Requirements

In response to entering into force of the regulatory requirements in July 2013, licensees
have taken measures based on lessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS
accident in order to conform to the requirements. For example, they have taken necessary
measures to improve fragility of protection against tsunamis, including installation ofseawalls, installing watertight doors to important areas, enhancement of resistance topressure and the waterproof property of outside walls of buildings. As measures for thecase of water injection means at the time of station black out, they have arranged
alternative power sources, such as air-cooled gas turbine generator vehicles, to highground, increased the number of batteries, and constructed water reservoirs. In addition,
as measures to mitigate influences of core damage, they have taken measures such as
installation of top-vent facilities on R/Bs, top-head flange cooling lines to fill water into the
top part of CV, filtered vent facilities, etc. As for measures on the software side, emergencyresponse organizations have been reorganized so that they can respond to accidents whensevere accidents or the likes should occur simultaneously in two or more units, so that anecessary number of the personnel for immediate response are ensured to enable initial
response on emergency.
The regulatory requirements enforced in July 2013 require that preparation of necessaryfunctions (of facilities or procedures) should be completed based on the lessons learned
from the accident, and in addition require that preparation of backup facilities (theSpecialized Safety Facility and a permanent DC power supply facility as the third powersystem) to further enhance reliability should be completed within five years from thedate of approval of Construction Plan related to measures to deal with severe accidents
etc. For example, the Specialized Safety Facility is a facility for measures against acts ofterrorism such as intentional large-aircraft crash to a R/B. It is required that this facility
be installed at a location about 100 meters or more apart from a R/B or be housed in arobust building against intentional large-aircraft crash with equipment necessary to
prevent CV failure.
Besides, a power reactor licensee proposed measures such as to prevent CV failure due
to over-pressurization in case of severe core damage (Containment Vessel Alternate
Circulation Cooling System), to prevent negative effect due to steam generated fromspent fuel storage pool (clarification of procedures), and to ensure habitability of main
control room (enabling blowout panel to be closed manually with facility) in theapplication for amendment to Reactor Installation Permit of TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki23

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
Kariwa NPS units 6 and 7 in order to meet the regulatory requirements for severe
accidents. These measures were approved through the Conformity Review and added
to the regulatory requirements as knowledge obtained through regulatory experience.
4-2

Safety Improvement Activities

The NRA holds “Exchange of opinions with chief executive officers (CEOs) of major
nuclear utilities,” open to the public, to promote efforts fostering safety culture andenhancing safety, and to hear licensees’ basic policy for safety improvement activities
and perspectives on current regulatory system. In this Exchange, CEOs report theirvoluntary efforts to enhance safety, and the NRA and CEOs discuss licensees’ idea for
improving regulatory system, and licensees’ view on organization and framework ofvoluntary safety improvements based on the recommendations provided by the JANSI.
Also, the NRA holds “Exchange of opinions with chief nuclear officers (CNOs) of major
nuclear utilities,” open to the public, to contribute to smooth improvement andclarification of regulatory requirements and safety reviews for smooth introduction of
new regulation and enhancement of predictability. Furthermore, in response to the needsof both regulatory body and licensees in “Exchange of opinions with CNOs”, the NRA
also holds a dialog where to exchange specific technical matters at a staff level between
licensees and regulatory body. Through these activities, the NRA encourages licensees’
efforts on safety improvement.
5

Efforts to Address the Challenges Identified in Country Group Discussions of
the 7th Review Meeting

In the Country Group discussions of the 7th Review Meeting7, the following items wereidentified as the challenges for Japan:•

NRA to attract competent and experienced staff, and develop competencies relevant
to nuclear and radiation safety through education, training, research and effective
international cooperation.

•

NRA to improve the effectiveness of its inspections based on new regulation.

•

To continue and strengthen the promotion of safety culture including a questioning
attitude, to achieve a high level of safety. This is equally applicable to NRA andregulated entities.

•

7

Continuous improvement of ordinances and guides by NRA.

Country Review Report for JAPAN in Convention on Nuclear Safety 7th Review Meeting24

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period•

Continue to make progress towards decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi
NPS.

There were no identification of suggestions.
The following part explains how challenges are being addressed.
5-1

To attract competent and experienced staff, and develop competencies relevant tonuclear and radiation safety through education, training, research and effective
international cooperation

Based on the lessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, the
NRA set the objective of human resource development to bring up staff to fulfill themission of protecting the general public and the environment through rigorous andreliable implementation of nuclear regulation and to implement the guiding principles
for activities, and in 2014, established the “Basic Policy for Human Resource
Development of the NRA Personnel”.
To proceed this policy, the NRA considers the attractive working condition is essential
to secure competent and experienced persons, and therefore, the NRA implements
several measures to conduct personnel exchange programs between other governmentalorganizations, to formulate a special retirement program which extend retirement age
for unreplaceable experienced experts, to send staff to foreign universities, national
research institutes or international organizations, to provide internship programs, toimprove welfare programs and so on.
As for the human resource development, the NRA installed plant simulators which weredeveloped to simulate the behavior of power reactor facilities (BWRs and PWRs). By useof these simulators, practical trainings such as oversights of operator actions at startup
and shutdown of reactors, and response to severe accidents, are carried out for NRA staff
to enhance capability of dealing with accidents and events at the scene. As for the
training programs for specific fields, the qualification system composed of five fields(nuclear inspection, nuclear safety review, safeguards inspection, emergency
preparedness and regulation for radiation) was introduced in 2017 and associatedtraining courses have been implemented since 2018.
5-2

To improve the effectiveness of its inspections based on new regulation

As for inspection of nuclear facilities, the system to inspect prescribed items at prescribedtimings and intervals, etc. from each aspect of facility, operation and nuclear security will
be so changed as to inspect and assess the licensee’s activities comprehensively, not to limit
25

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
the items, timings and intervals, etc. and the NRA amended the Reactor Regulation Act inApril 2017.
The new inspection system clearly defines the prime responsibility being rested on thelicensee and places competent regulatory inspectors who have right to determine
inspection items and access freely to them.
The new inspection system, modeled after Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) of USNRC, isa risk informed and performance based system which is planned to come into force inApril 2020. The NRA has been developing the details of the system, by formulating
regulations and guides for quality management and inspection implementation,
establishing framework of regulatory inspection system, and creating relevant documents.
Also the NRA has been training inspectors with intensive training programs in accordancewith the systematic human resource development program and the competence
qualification system. The new inspection system was introduced on trial basis in autumn
in 2018, continuing for three phases, half-year each. The NRA will identify lessons learned
from these trial phases and feed them back to the new inspection system before actual
implementation in April 2020.
5-3

To continue and strengthen the promotion of safety culture including aquestioning attitude, to achieve a high level of safety in the NRA

The NRA issued the “Statement on Nuclear Safety Culture” consisting of eight codes ofconduct including that for questioning attitude in 2015, recognizing that the safety
culture should be fostered comprehensively throughout the organization.
Under the basic concept of the Statement, the NRA has been conducting the following
activities to promote and strengthen the safety culture;1.

To perform dialogues between the NRA Commissioners/senior executives of theSecretariat of the NRA and the NRA staff to exchange views on the safety culture,2.

To participate in workshops or study through e-learning and etc. for enhancing
knowledge and sensitivity to the safety culture,3.

To deliver a safety culture declaration card on which each personnel writes down
his/her own determinations and thought on the safety culture, and4.

To conduct questionnaire surveys on awareness and actions regarding the safety
culture in order to prevail and foster it in the overall organization.

In the amendment of Reactor Regulation Act in April 2017, it became newly required toestablish quality management system for the installation permit of nuclear facilities. Inline with this amendment, relevant NRA Ordinances will berevised to require thelicensee to foster and maintain safety culture, incorporating requirements of GSR Part 226

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
and related guides to describe viewpoints for regulatory review and inspection. The
guide will be set in force by April 2020 in accordance with the implementation ofconcerned NRA Ordinances.
Implementation status in Japan is described in Article 10.
5-4Continuous improvement of ordinances and guides by the NRA

The NRA has been conducting improvement of regulatory requirements and/or guides
to incorporate latest information positively gained through national and foreign
regulatory activities, operational information relating to incidents and troubles occurredat national or overseas nuclear facilities, results of safety research conducted by the NRA,
surveys of academic research and state-of-the-art technical and scientific knowledge
obtained from activities of international organizations such as the IAEA and theOECD/NEA. As for improved ordinances and/or guides since the last review meeting,there listed are toxic gas intake protection for staff in a control room etc., protection
against fire caused by high energy arcing faults (HEAF), evaluation on impact of volcanic
ashes, containment vessel alternate circulation cooling system (ACCS), regulation on
dual purpose cask for transportation and storage (DPC). Other than these items,
amendment of ordinances and/or guides which were to be revised based on the latest
knowledge gained through experiences in the Conformity Review have been carried out,
such as clarification of requirements for installation of fire detectors etc.
See details in Article 6.
5-5

To continue to make progress towards decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima
Daiichi NPS

The decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPS shall be conducted by TEPCO, theprime responsible entity. The NRA is responsible for the oversight of their activities andfrom this viewpoint the NRA developed “Measures for Mid-Term Risk Reduction” inAugust 2015 and has revised it according to the progress of the decommissioning. In
March 2019, the revision six was issued.
Removal of fuel assemblies from spent fuel pools (SFPs) has been carried out for each
unit one by one. It was finished for unit 4, while as for the removal for unit 3, TEPCO
experienced troubles in fuel handling system during its test operation so that they
carried out thorough checking of quality and safety of the said system with vendors andstarted in April 2019. In view of the importance of proceeding with the decommissioning,
the NRA asked a clear explanation on what happened and measures to be taken fromthe vendors as well. According to the “Measures for Mid-Term Risk Reduction”, the fuel27

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Periodremoval from the SFP of unit 3 is to be complete by 2020. And the fuel removal from the
SFP is to be launched for unit 1 and 2 in April 2023.
TEPCO has been working on dry-up of T/B and completed for unit 1 in March 2017 andcontinues to decrease its water levels gradually for unit 2 thru 4 and to complete for allbuildings except R/B for all units by September in 2020. In order to reduce risks as earlyas possible, the NRA instructs TEPCO to accelerate implementation of the work plan and
TEPCO is examining how to do it.
As the water used for cooling of nuclear fuel debris and the groundwater flowed into thebuildings are contaminated by radioactive materials, it has been stored in the tanks at
the site after treatment by the radioactive materials removal facility. Disposal of thesetreated water is subject of discussion at “Subcommittee for Handling for Treated Water
by Multi-Nuclide Removal Equipment”. The NRA recognizes that the national
government makes the basic policy based on the outcome of the discussion and TEPCO
determines the actual measures as the prime responsible entity.
The work for exploring the inside PCV by robots is ongoing. The photographs of theinside PCVs were taken for unit 1 in March 2017, for unit 3 in July 2017 and for unit 2 inJanuary 2018. The research maneuvering to contact sediments which seem to be nuclear
fuel debris underneath the reactor pressure vessel in unit 2 was conducted in February
2019.
6

Efforts to Address Challenges Stated in the Summary Report of the 7th Review
Meeting

In the Summary Report of the 7th Review Meeting, the following items were identified
as the “major common issues” in paragraphs 26 through 34:•

Safety Culture•

International Peer Reviews•

Legal Framework and Independence of Regulatory Body•

Financial and Human Resources•

Knowledge Management•

Supply Chain•

Managing the Safety of Ageing Nuclear Facilities and Plant Life Extension•

Emergency Preparedness•

Stakeholder Consultation and Communication

28

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
6-1

Safety Culture

Refer to B 5-3 and Article 10.
6-2

International Peer Reviews

The NRA invited an IRRS mission by the IAEA in January 2016 with a view to strengthen
and enhance the effectiveness of regulatory infrastructure for nuclear safety etc. Afterthe mission, the NRA has identified action items based on self-developed action plans inaddition to the recommendations and suggestions made by the IRRS mission and ismoving forward with the actions. The NRA decided to invite a follow up mission which
reviews the NRA’s progress in implementing the recommendations, suggestions andaction plans from 14th to 21st January in 2020. The NRA is preparing for inviting thefollow up mission.
TEPCO invited the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission for
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS units 6 and 7 in June through July 2015 and its follow up
mission in July through August 2017 and received a mission report in November 2017.
TEPCO also invited the “IAEA fourth Mission on Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap
Towards the Decommissioning of TEPCO’S Fukushima Daiichi NPS” in November 2018
and received a summary report on 13th November 2018 and a final report in January
2019.
6-3

Legal Framework and Independence of Regulatory Body

As for one of the root causes of the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, it waspointed out lack of independence of regulatory authority which had existed in apromotional organization. The Act for Establishment of the NRA was enacted in 2012 to
fundamentally improve the regulatory system, incorporating this lesson. Thus, theregulatory side was separated clearly from the promotional side of nuclear use and the
NRA was established as an external bureau of the MOE to conduct regulatory activity
solely depending on expertized knowledge with neutral and impartial position.
Chairman and Commissioners are appointed by Prime Minister with consent of the Dietand the NRA is obligated to report the state of activity to the Diet annually throughPrime Minister.
See in detail in Article 8.
6-4

Financial and Human Resources

Budgets allotted for the NRA are all financed from a national treasury. The NRA
estimates necessary expense for activities to be implemented in the next year and asks29

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
budget for the Ministry of Finance as the same as other governmental organizations do.
The budget for FY2019 of the NRA is 54.7 billion yen. As for human resource
development, the budget was increased from 1.4 billion to 2.2 billion yen for the year
2019. The number of staff is 1031 as of the end of March 2019, increased by 32, including
increase in the number of inspectors, from the previous year.
See in detail in Article 8.
6-5

Knowledge Management

The NRA developed the “Nuclear Regulation Authority Management Rules” in 2014
(revised in 2016) which describes that the knowledge to be managed is what is necessary
to conduct duties and the head of each division or department is required to identify suchknowledge and to establish and maintain a system for identifying, collecting, organizing
and utilizing the said knowledge.
The NRA issued the “Basic Policy for Human Resource Development of the NRA
Personnel” in 2014. Recognizing it needs a plenty of time to regain the highly expertizedknowledge once it was lost, it states that technical expertise on regulation andadministrative experiences such as those of accident responses, should be transferred fromsenior experts to younger staff in a planned manner, considering the work load change inthe future as well as the importance of maintaining the organizational capability. It alsomentions to proceed with the establishment of information infrastructure in addition to
identification of such knowledge as early as possible and the implementation of training
programs, in order to share those knowledge within the whole organization.
The head of each division designates a staff to deal with knowledge management andelaborates on establishment of knowledge management system, exchanging information
on good practices, good ideas or improvements and so on.
6-6

Supply Chain

The licensees are provided from vendors with information on potential difficulties ofprocurement of components due to discontinued production and share those
information among them. As such information is disclosed prior to discontinued
production, the licensee starts to survey availability of alternative ones or replacementof the system which uses the said components as soon as the information is provided.
The licensees stock components or equipment for replacement to take measures against
failures or troubles which may happen during operation, including the stock ofcomponents which would be expected unavailable in the future.
As for the non-conforming or quality problem issues, issues of carbon segregation in30

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
reactor vessel was revealed. This was reported from France in 2014 thatcarbonsegregation may exist in reactor vessels. The NRA ordered the licensees to report thepossibility that the same problem might exist for the forged iron used for reactor vessels
and so on. After receiving the reports from licensees, the NRA concluded that there wereno possibilities that the portion exceeding the limit of carbon content specified in theindustrial standards does exist in the forged iron for the NPPs operating in Japan.
After the data falsification cases at Kobe Steel, Ltd. (KOBELCO) and its affiliatedcompanies in October 2017, the similar falsification cases were disclosed intermittently
by the companies that supply materials or components used for nuclear facilities. The
NRA has been interviewing the licensees on the status of usage of such products andcontinuing to focus on the survey done by the licensees and confirms that the material
with falsified data is not utilized or, if it’s not confirmed, it has been replaced by thelegitimate one.
6-7

Ageing Management and Extension of Operational Period

The Reactor Regulation Act, which was amended in June 2012 following the TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, sets an operational limit of 40 years on the nuclear
power facilities and allows a one-time extension up to 20 years after approved by the
NRA. A total of four units (KEPCO’s Takahama Power Station units 1 and 2, Mihama
Power Station unit 3 and JAPC’s Tokai No2 Power Station), out of 15 units which havebeen approved for Construction Plan, have obtained the extension approval, while
having not restarted yet. After the enforcement of regulatory requirements, ten units
applied for approval of Decommissioning Plan and seven out of ten units have obtained
the approval, and Tohoku Electric Power Company’s Onagawa NPS unit 1 notified
decommissioning. Four units (Chubu Electric Power Company’s Hamaoka NPS units 1
and 2, JAPC’s Tokai Power Station, and JAEA’s Fugen) obtained approval of
Decommissioning Plan before TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident and six units
at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS, the total number of units at the decommissioning
phase comes to 21.
The Prototype FBR Monju applied for approval of Decommissioning Plan in December
2017 and obtained the approval in March 2018.
6-8

Emergency Preparedness

Learning from the lessons of the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, it isimportant to strengthen measures to be taken for nuclear accidents and establish EPR
system postulating the occurrence of accident and to enhance the capability of national31

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
government, local governments, and nuclear licensees to cope with nuclear emergencies
in no-emergency situation.
In the organizational reform in July 2017, the NRA established the Emergency
Preparedness and Response Office where staff would manage with an emergency
situation, while in no-emergency situation train themselves to enhance the responding
capability. The NRA has been carrying out to prepare emergency response manuals,
perform drills and evaluate its result, extract and resolve challenges, and enhance
information sharing network system. In order to enhance licensees’ capability to copewith the nuclear emergency, the NRA improves and strengthens the emergency drills
and the evaluation capability of licensees. It establishes and maintains night-and-day
duty system for coping with incidents or troubles at any time which enabled quick initial
response, investigation of causes and protective measures against recurrence incooperation with the Nuclear Regulation Department etc.
The range of the nuclear emergency planning zones for the nuclear fuel facilities wasestablished through the revision of the “NRA Guide for Emergency Preparedness andResponse (NRA EPR Guide)” in March 2017.
Since the last review meeting, the NRA has reviewed Emergency Action Level (EAL) andrevised the “NRA Ordinance Concerning the Events which Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Manager Shall Report Under the Provision of Nuclear Emergency Act”
and the NRA EPR Guide.
These were promulgated in August 2017 and come into force in October 2017. The pointsof revision are the change of criteria for Site Emergency (SE) and General Emergency(GE) for the power reactors, and the newly EAL for nuclear fuel facilities etc.
As for the SE and GE for the power reactor, the criteria of system unavailability which
had been based on that of SSCs for DBAs in the former regulation was changed to beextended to those for SAs, e.g., availability of mobile power supplies. It would beconsistent to the actual availability of SSCs which conforms to the regulatory
requirements. While in the plant not to be applied to the new regulatory requirements,
the applicable criteria is applied the radiation level, radioactive material concentration,and the water level of spent fuel pool, etc.
The NRA EPR Guide was amended to make description regarding the target formeasures taken against nuclear disasters consistent with that of international standard
and to newly designate “Core Advanced Radiation Emergency Medical Support Center”
in July 2018. The NRA designated the QST as the Center in March 2019.
As for intake of stable iodine tablets, the NRA EPR Guide will be revised regarding
efficacy or effectiveness of stable iodine tablets and appropriate timing of intake,32

B Summary of Major Activities During the 7th Reporting Period
consideration on the prioritization of intake, side effects, and methods for distribution
to be consistent with the contents of WHO Guideline revised in 2017.
6-9

Stakeholder Consultation and Communication

The NRA disclosed the “Explanation for the People on New Regulatory Requirement forCommercial Power Reactors” on the website8 for the people who are interested in thesaid requirement in a plain but precise manner. The NRA participates in public meetings
for local residents to make effort to obtain understanding to the nuclear regulatory
activities. The NRA started “Visits of nuclear facilities by NRA Commissioners andexchange of opinions with local parties” based on the discussion in the NRA
Commission Meeting in November 2017. As for communication with the licensees, the
NRA holds “Exchange of opinions with chief executive officers (CEOs) of major nuclear
facilities” and webcasted it. In addition to collecting public comments according to the
Act on Administrative Implementation, the NRA collects voluntarily public comments
and responds to them one by one. As such the NRA elaborates on stakeholders’communication.

8

https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000155788.pdf (Japanese only)
33

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
C

Outline of the Report for Each Article

This Chapter reports Japan’s implementation status of each Article of the Convention on
Nuclear Safety.

ARTICLE 6

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSEach Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear
installations existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party isreviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in the context of this Convention, theContracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as amatter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot
be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as soon aspractically possible. The timing of the shut-down may take into account the whole energy
context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environmental and economic impact.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 6
There are 38 commercial power reactors in Japan, which have been granted Reactor
Installation Permits, passed the Pre-service Inspections, and not been permanently shut
down. Among them, 15 reactors were confirmed their conformity to the NRA Ordinanceon Standards for Installation Permit and granted amendments to Reactor Installation
Permit, ten reactors are under review for amendment to Reactor Installation Permit, fivereactors are under consideration for decommissioning, and eight reactors have not been
decided yet.
As for TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS, it was designated as the Specified Nuclear
Facilities by the NRA, and accordingly, it has been under special control.
Nuclear facilities in Japan are required to conform to the regulatory requirements
stipulated in the NRA Ordinances, according to provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
When the regulatory requirements are amended, and if nonconformity is found even in
existing reactor facility, the NRA can order suspension for use of the facilities. Therefore,
there is no continuing operation of nuclear facilities in Japan that are in a state without
safety secured, so that conformity to the provision of Article 6 of the Convention isachieved.

34

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
1

Reactor Facilities in Japan

As of the end of March 2019, there were a total of 38 power reactors (17 PWRs and 21
BWRs) which have been granted Reactor Installation Permits, passed the Pre-service
Inspections and not yet permanently shut down in Japan. Among them, 15 reactors wereconfirmed as their conformity to the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation
Permit and granted amendments to Reactor Installation Permit, ten reactors are underreview for amendment to Reactor Installation Permit, five reactors 9 are underconsideration for decommissioning, and eight reactors 10 have not been decided yet.
Besides, ten reactors are permanently shut down to take decommissioning (six of which
are TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS units 1 thru 6), and the decommissioning ofanother 11 reactors is currently under way.
The Annex 1 provides a list of reactors for nuclear installation in Japan.
2

Accidents or Failures that Occurred During the Reporting Period

During the three-year period FY2016 -FY2018, 12 incidents were reported to the NRA bylicensees in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act. Two among above mentioned
12 incidents were occurred in TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS. The list of accidents or
failures that occurred during the reporting period is shown in the Annex 2.
3

Efforts to Secure Safety

3-1

Conformity Review

The NRA Ordinances stipulate that commercial power reactor facilities are required toconform to them which were put into effect in July 2013. The Conformity Review is aregulatory framework needed for operation of existing power reactors in Japan, which
consists of review procedures for grant of amendment to Reactor Installation Permit,
approval of Construction Plan, and approval of amendment to Operational Safety
Programs. The NRA checks the conformity to the regulatory requirements through theseprocedures.
Measures against severe accidents were added as regulatory requirements, as well as
those against earthquakes, tsunamis and so on were reinforced based on lessons learned
Fukushima Daini NPS units 1-4 and Genkai NPS unit 2
Onagawa NPS unit 3, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS units 1-5, Hamaoka NPS unit 5, and Shika
NPS unit 1
9

10

35

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident. Accordingly, existing reactors need
to be back-fit to them. In case of accidents or natural disasters that exceed postulated
level in the regulatory requirements, it is required to take measures for prevention ofcore damage, CV failure, and dispersion of radioactive materials. The review ofamendment to Reactor Installation Permit focuses on whether the reactor location,
structure, and equipment of the power reactor facilities as well as technical capability of
the licensees of power reactor meet these requirements.
The review on approval of Construction Plan focuses on whether detailed design ofpower reactor facilities, quality control methods related to design and construction arecomplying with the Reactor Installation Permit and conform to the regulatory
requirements.
The review on amendment to Operational Safety Programs focuses on whether
measures needed for safety of power reactor facilities specified in the Operational Safety
Programs are “not insufficient for prevention of disasters caused by nuclear fuel material,
items contaminated by nuclear fuel material, or the power reactor”.
By the end of March 2019, applications for granting amendment to Reactor Installation
Permit concerning conformity to the regulatory requirements were submitted for 27
nuclear power reactors, and 15 of which were granted amendment to Reactor Installation
Permit. 13 among the above mentioned 15 reactors obtained the approval ofConstruction Plan, and nine of which obtained approval of amendment to Operational
Safety Programs.
As for the Specialized Safety Facility (SSF), the NRA requires licensees to complete its
construction within five years from the date of the approval of Construction Plan, andapplications for granting amendment to Reactor Installation Permit were submitted for
18 power reactors by the end of March 2019. The review on the SSF focuses on whether
measures are taken to confirm that there is no risk that the functions necessary for
dealing with a severe accident etc. will be lost by the terrorism such as intentional aircraft
crashes. Seven reactors were granted Reactor Installation Permit so far. Applications of
the approval of Construction Plan were submitted for seven nuclear power reactors, andone of which obtained the approval by the end of March 2019.
3-2

Review on Approval of Extension of Operational Period

The Reactor Regulation Act amended in June 2012, after the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi
NPS accident, prescribes an operational period of 40 years, and it is possible to extend
this once, for a period of no more than 20 years, if approval is obtained from the NRA.
In September 2017, the NRA revised the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors and36

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
the “Guide for Extension of Operational Period on Commercial Power Reactors,” etc.,
and deleted the provision (one year and three months) related to the commencement of
the application period for approval of extension of the operational period where “oneyear or more but within one year and three months before expiration of the operational
period” had been specified. So far, applications for extension were approved for four
reactors.
As ageing measures, commercial power reactors that have been operated for 30 years
after commencement of operation are obliged to make evaluations of ageing degradationof SSCs and formulate long-term Maintenance Management Program in every 10 years
and are requested to reflect them to the Operational Safety Programs. In terms of eachattached document describing an evaluation of the ageing degradation in both theapplication for approval of amendment of the Operational Safety Programs related totechnical evaluation of ageing degradation and the application for approval of extensionof the operational period, it would be possible to make confirmation with only one ofthem if these evaluations were made in a unified manner. Therefore, the regulatory
process was simplified by amending provisions of the NRA Ordinance to avoid
duplication in July 2017.
3-3

Improvement of Regulatory Requirements Reflecting the State-of-the-Art
Technical and Scientific Knowledge

The NRA has been conducting improvement of regulatory requirements and/or guides
to incorporate latest information positively gained through national and foreign
regulatory activities, operational information relating to incidents and troubles occurredat national or overseas nuclear facilities, results of safety research conducted by the NRA,
surveys of academic research and state-of-the-art technical and scientific knowledge
obtained from activities of international organizations such as the IAEA and theOECD/NEA.
In the implementing process, the NRA collects information of incidents and troubles that
occurred at domestic or foreign nuclear facilities, studies them and selects important
items. The NRA decides whether to take regulatory actions or not on these selected
important items after the discussion at the Technical Information Committee and advices
from the Reactor Safety Examination Committee or the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination
Committee.
Improvements of regulatory requirements and/ or guides since the last review meetingare as follows.

37

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations•

Protective Measures against Toxic Gas Intake

In case of toxic gas releases inside or outside nuclear facility, measures against protectionof toxic gas intake should be taken for the staff in a control room, a control room for SSF,
or an emergency response facility or the staff in special important actions to cope with asevere accident. The NRA revised the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation
Permit and formulated the “Guide for Evaluation on Protection from Toxic Gas.” They
were promulgated and enforced in May 2017.
•High Energy Arcing Faults

As for high energy arcing faults (HEAF), the NRA conducted a series of test and obtained
a result which reveals shortening duration of arcing is effective to reduce impact of
explosion by the HEAF and avoid ensuing fire in a switchgear. Therefore the NRA
revised the NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards that requires the breaker, located in
the upstream line of power supply feeding short circuit current which causes arcing, tobe opened within an appropriate time to prohibit a large scale destruction of theswitchgear. Also, the NRA formulated the “Guide for Review on Design of Switchgear
Regarding the HEAF.” They were promulgated and enforced in August 2017.
•

Assessment of Volcanic Ash Effect

As for assessment of volcanic ash concentration in the air, the NRA received a publiccomment on the result of Conformity Review to the regulatory requirements for the NPS.
It stated that some observation data regarding volcanic ash concentration in the air had
exceeded those used for evaluation of impact on intake filter for emergency diesel
generators. The NRA studied this comment and another latest information regarding
volcanic ash concentration in detail and revised the “Guide for Evaluation on Volcanic
Hazards” so that the method of assessing volcanic ash concentration is to be either
estimation based on the thickness of tephra stratum or simulation of volcano eruption.
As for clogging of the intake filter of emergency diesel generators, measures such as
exchange of the filter are effective, and therefore considering the characteristics of
volcanic ash, implementing measures as well as equipment measures are admitted. The
NRA revised the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors and the Guide above. They
were promulgated and enforced in December 2017.
In addition, the NRA collects the information necessary for establishing the method ofassessing probability of volcanic activity in order to advance the safety regulation on
volcanic hazards on commercial reactors. In the safety research about the case of Mt.
38

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
Daisen, the NRA reconsidered the scale of volcanic ash caused by eruption of Mt. Daisen(Daisen Namadake Tephra), and explained that the scale must be bigger than that wasformerly estimated by the former references in academic articles and the NRA’s research
reports. In response to this result, the NRA requested KEPCO, which conducted thesimulation of evaluating volcanic effect considering Daisen Namadake Tephra in the
Conformity Review of NPSs in Wakasa area, to collect information about the distributionof Daisen Namadake Tephra as bases in June 2017. According to field investigations
referring to the report from KEPCO, the NRA acknowledged in a regulatory viewpoint,that the scale of Daisen Namadake Tephra is bigger than that was estimated before in
November, 2018.
Based on this new information, the NRA considered that there is some possibility that
preconditions in assessing the Reactor Installation Permit need to be changed because
the reassessment of the scale of Daisen Namadake Tephra may influence the maximum
thickness of volcanic ash on the NPSs which the NRA had already issued Reactor
Installation Permit (Takahama Power Station, Ohi Power Station and Mihama Power
Station). Therefore, the NRA ordered KEPCO in November 2018, to reassess the scale of
Daisen Namadake Tephra based on the thickness of volcanic ash at the point ofKoshihata (in Kyoto Prefecture), etc. and the maximum thickness of volcanic ash at these
NPSs based on this reassessed scale of Daisen Namadake Tephra by the same
simulations of volcanic ash as that was used in the review on Reactor Installation Permit,
and to report it by the end of March 2019. In March 2019, the NRA received the reportfrom KEPCO. The NRA will consider whether to take a regulatory action based on
discussion about the report at a disclosed meeting attended by Commissioners.
•

Containment Vessel Alternate Circulation Cooling System (ACCS)

For countermeasures against over-pressurization in CV after core damage at a severe
accident in the new regulatory requirements, CV pressure relief system (filtered venting
system) was originally required for BWRs etc. However by technical insight revealed in
the course of Conformity Review process, the NRA recognized that CV alternate
circulation cooling system (ACCS) is also effective to decrease the pressure andtemperature inside the CV, keeping the containment boundary intact. The NRA decided
to require to install the ACCS newly, and still requires filtered venting system as its
backup system. The NRA revised the NRA Ordinances for Installation Permit and NRA
Ordinance for Technical Standards and relevant guides. They were promulgated andenforced in December 2017.

39

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations•

Dual Purpose Cask for Transportation and Storage (DPC)As for dry storage of spent fuel at site by dual purpose cask (DPC) which could be usedboth for transportation and storage, the NRA established the reasonable regulation andprocedure based on stringent specifications for transportation. It requires that the DPC
is to be designed to cope with the seismic design conditions applicable to any candidate
site with sufficient margin. The NRA specified DPC as Type Certification for Design andType Designation. As far as the certified and designated DPC is applied, reviews on
Installation Permit and the approval of Construction Plan are carried out only for site
specific conditions such as site boundary radiation dose or separation distance from afire source. The NRA revised/established the NRA Ordinance on Standards for
Installation Permit, the NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards, and relevant guides,
and promulgated and enforced them in April 2019.
In addition, as for tsunamis caused by landslide for which Tsunami Warning might not
be issued such as tsunami caused by volcanic phenomenon in Sunda Strait in Indonesia,
in January 2019, the NRA decided to hear about assessments of Takahama Power Stationby KEPCO at the meeting open to the public where the NRA Commissioners and staff
participate. It is to confirm the assessments of tsunami run-up while the anti-tide gatesof inlet channels are open and the influences on essential equipment such as sea water
pumps in the case of “Submarine Landslide of Iki Trough”, for which Tsunami Warning
might not be issued.
Besides, the NRA accumulated the findings from their experiences of the reviewers
through the Conformity Review, and complied “Review Process for Regulatory
Documents Based on Experiences Through the Conformity Review” and reported theitems to be reviewed at the NRA Commission Meeting. Among them, the articles orprovisions for the fire protection related requirements were amended and enforced.
In connection with amending ordinances and/or relevant guides, the certain moratorium
period would be basically provided for the licensees to accommodate them. The
licensees have applied again to adopt them and the NRA has been deliberating on theirapplications equitably and appropriately.
3-4

Assessment to Enhance Safety

The Reactor Regulation Act amended in 2012 newly introduced a safety assessment
system named “Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement of Commercial
Power Reactors” which incorporated the former system of “Periodical Safety Review(PSR)”. In this system, in order to enhance the safety of power reactor facilities, licensees
40

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installationsof power reactor are requested to make an assessment by themselves in a period within
six months of the date when the Periodic Facility Inspection of the said facilities iscompleted, and after the assessment, they are requested to submit reports of theassessment (“Safety Assessment Reports”) to the NRA without delay and make them
open to the public. For practical operation of the system, the “Operational Guide for
Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement of Commercial Power Reactors”
was formulated in November 2013. Originally, the reassessment for earthquake andtsunami, as the site characteristic which might influence the risk for nuclear facilities,
were requested by the Operational Guide. The Operational Guide was revised in
February 2017, reflecting the result of IRRS etc., and the requirement of reassessment forsome site characteristics such as risk of volcano and external fire, etc. were added.
Moreover, the consistency with the IAEA Specific Safety Guide, “Periodic Safety Review
for Nuclear Power Plants (SSG-25)” was confirmed. Matters concerning the Operational
Guide are reported in Article 17(3).
Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement of Commercial Power Reactors
is the first activity for both the NRA and licensees, and the common understanding forthe actual operation of the system, and the continuous improvement is necessary. For
that purpose, the NRA held the meeting on the continuous improvement of the said
Assessment five times since July 2017, and the discussion about the contents of the Safety
Assessment Reports of Sendai NPS units 1 and 2 was conducted. The NRA summarized
the items to be improved and reported at the NRA Commission Meeting. Then the items
to be improved were approved:•

For depth of description of the Safety Assessment Reports, not only the result ofassessment etc., but also details of the method and process of investigation andassessment should be described as easily understandable.

•

As for the description of Chapter 1 of the Safety Assessment Reports, unified
document composed of contents of existing authorized documents is not satisfactory,
and licensees should describe the Safety Assessment Report so as to explain thelatest status of the plant, namely “as is” referring to USNRC’s UFSAR or IAEA Safety
Guides.

•As for the result of probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), licensees should disclose
not only the results of the PRAs but also the results of analysis of PRAs including
the differences between current and past PRAs results. And licensees should
evaluate appropriateness of the assessment methods in the light of the purpose of
PRAs, in the case that methods are not in line with the purpose, licensees should
modify them to meet the purpose and disclose them.
41

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
The NRA requests licensees to reflect the items to be improved into the Safety
Assessment Reports. The Safety Assessment Reports have been submitted for Sendai
NPS unit 1 (July 2017), unit 2 (September 2017), Takahama Power Station unit 3 (January2018), Sendai NPS unit 1 (January 2019; 2nd), unit 2 (March 2019, 2nd), Takahama Power
Station unit 4 (March 2019) so far. As the items to be improved are planned to be reflected
into their Safety Assessment Reports, the NRA is to confirm their improvement status.
The NRA holds “Exchange of opinions with chief executive officers (CEOs) of major
nuclear utilities,” open to the public, to promote efforts fostering safety culture andenhancing safety, and to hear licensees’ basic policy for safety improvement activities
and perspectives on current regulatory system. In this Exchange, CEOs report theirvoluntary efforts to enhance safety, and the NRA and CEOs discuss licensees’ idea for
improving regulatory system, and licensees’ view on organization and framework ofvoluntary safety improvements based on the recommendations provided by the JANSI.
Also, the NRA holds “Exchange of opinions with chief nuclear officers (CNOs) of major
nuclear utilities,” open to the public, to contribute to smooth improvement andclarification of regulatory requirements and safety reviews for smooth introduction of
new regulation and enhancement of predictability. Furthermore, in response to the needsof both regulatory body and licensees in Exchange of opinions with CNOs, the NRA also
holds a dialog where to exchange specific technical matters at a staff level between
licensees and regulatory body. Through these activities, the NRA encourages licensees’
efforts on safety improvement.
3-5Specified Nuclear Facilities

The NRA designated TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS as the Specified Nuclear
Facilities in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act. The NRA further gave TEPCO
a list entitled “Matters for Which Measures Should Be Taken” and ordered TEPCO to
submit an implementation plan to ensure operational safety and the protection of
specified nuclear fuel materials. The Implementation Plan was submitted on 7th
December 2012, and accordingly, the NRA approved it on 14th August 2013. Afterwards,
amendments were made in the Implementation Plan in accordance with progress ofwork in Fukushima Daiichi NPS, 217 applications for amendments are made as of theend of March, 2019.

42

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
4

Nuclear Installations Under Decommissioning

11 power reactors obtained approval of Decommissioning Plan, and are underdecommissioning. Seven reactors below obtained approval of Decommissioning Plan
during the reporting period.
NPS

ReactorShutdown

Type
Genkai NPS unit 1

Applied forApproved

Decommissioning

PWR

27/4/2015

22/12/2015

19/4/2017

PWR

27/4/2015

12/2/2016

19/4/2017

BWR

27/4/2015

12/2/2016

19/4/2017

BWR

30/4/2015

4/7/2016

19/4/2017

PWR

10/5/201626/12/2016

28/6/2017

FBR-

6/12/201728/3/2018(Kyushu Electric Power
Company)
Mihama Power Station
units 1 and 2 (KEPCO)
Tsuruga Power Station
unit 1 (JAPC)
Shimane NPS unit 1(Chugoku Electric Power
Company)
Ikata NPS unit 1(Shikoku Electric Power
Company)
Monju(JAEA)

JAEA’s Prototype FBR Monju shifted to decommissioning during its construction under
the following circumstances.
In November 2015, the NRA made the following recommendation on Monju, to the
MEXT:•

The MEXT should identify a party who is deemed to have an ability to perform theoutput operation of Monju safely in succession to JAEA.

•

If it is difficult to identify a party who has an ability to perform the power operationof Monju safely, the MEXT should thoroughly review whole concept of Monju as a
power reactor to clearly reduce the safety risks induced by Monju.

In response to the recommendation, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Scienceand Technology reported in December 2016 that Monju would shift to the stage ofdecommissioning, JAEA should be properly guided and supervised, and JAEA would
43

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
aim to complete removal of fuel assemblies within approximately five and a half years
after the development of the basic plan for decommissioning Monju. The Minister also
requested the NRA to consider measures to be able to submit an earlier application for
Decommissioning Plan of Monju.
The decommissioning of Monju has the following uniqueness: (i) the decommissioning
stage will commence during the construction stage, (ii) approximately five and a halfyears will be needed to complete removal of fuel assemblies from the reactor core and
JAEA has less experiences in such work, and (iii) this will be the first case for a sodiumcooled nuclear power reactor facility to be decommissioned in Japan. The NRAdeveloped necessary NRA Ordinances to take necessary measures to reduce risks earlier
such as approving the decommissioning plan under the conditions with the fuelassemblies not yet removed from the reactor core and enabling the eariercommencement of the decommissioning under NRA’s supervision.
In January 2017, the NRA set up the Safety Oversight Team for Prototype FBR Monju
Decommissioning to continuously check the state of Monju and the actions carried out
by the JAEA. 19 meetings of the Team were held by the end of March 2019. At thesemeetings, the application for approval of the Decommissioning Plan, which was
submitted by JAEA in December 2017, was reviewed and it was approved in March 2018.
It is planned to remove 530 fuel assemblies in total from a reactor core and an external
vessel storage tank in approximately five years until March 2022. The removal wasstarted from August 2018, and 86 fuel assemblies were transferred from an external
vessel storage tank to the spent fuel pool.
5

Nuclear Installations Decided to Be Decommissioned

Licensees decided to decommission the following power reactor facilities, which are inpermanent shutdown status. In this report, the decision of decommissioning by licensees
is defined as giving the notification of changes of electric facilities to the Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry according to the provision of Article 9, the Electricity
Business Act.
NPS

ReactorCommissioned

Shutdown

Type

Fukushima Daiichi NPS unit 1

Applied for
Decommissioning

BWR

26/3/1971

19/4/2012-

BWR

18/7/1974

19/4/2012-(TEPCO)
Fukushima Daiichi NPS unit 2(TEPCO)
44

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
Fukushima Daiichi NPS unit 3

BWR

27/3/1976

19/4/2012-

BWR

12/10/1978

19/4/2012-

BWR

18/4/1978

31/1/2014-

BWR

24/10/1979

31/1/2014-

PWR

27/3/1979

1/3/2018

22/11/2018

PWR

5/12/1979

1/3/2018

22/11/2018

PWR

19/3/1982

23/5/201810/10/2018

BWR

1/6/1984

21/12/2018-(TEPCO)
Fukushima Daiichi NPS unit 4(TEPCO)
Fukushima Daiichi NPS unit 5(TEPCO)
Fukushima Daiichi NPS unit 6(TEPCO)Ohi Power Station units 1(KEPCO)Ohi Power Station units 2(KEPCO)
Ikata NPS

unit 2(Shikoku

Electric Power Company)
Onagawa NPS unit 1 (Tohoku
Electric Power Company )The conditions of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS units 1 thru 6 are as follows.
In the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred on 11th March 2011 and thefollowing nuclear accidents such as core damage, TEPCO concluded that it was
impossible to further use units 1 thru 4 of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS as electric facilities
for business purposes, and submitted a plan on 30th March 2012, for theirdecommissioning as a commercial source of power on 19th April of that year, pursuant
to the provisions of the Electricity Business Act. In addition, TEPCO submitted a plan on
18th December 2013, for decommissioning units 5 and 6 of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS
as a commercial source of power on 31st January 2014.
After the accident, emergency measures pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act were taken at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS to deal with the dangerous
situation.
The NISA (as it was known at the time) published the “Concept of Securing Mid-Term
Safety”, which set out basic targets to be achieved before starting work on specificdecommissioning tasks. It instructed TEPCO to submit a facility operation plan and thenevaluated the validity of this emergency plan.
Because the safety of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS could not be guaranteed in the longterm by such emergency measures, the NRA designated it as the Specified Nuclear
45

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
Facilities requiring special management on 7th November 2012, as reported in 3-5 of
Article 6. It further gave TEPCO the “Matters for Which Measures Should Be Taken” andtold the company to submit an implementation plan. The Implementation Plan was
submitted on 7th December 2012, and accordingly, the NRA approved it on 14th August
2013.
Amendments were made in the Implementation Plan in accordance with working
progress in Fukushima Daiichi NPS, and the NRA reviewed TEPCO’s Implementation
Plan to ensure the prevention of disaster and the protection of specified nuclear fuelmaterials through the examination.
As a regulatory measure for decommissioning of nuclear facility, the NRA required thelicensees to prepare the plans for decommissioning policy (“Forward Planning of theDecommissioning Policy”) and disclose them to the public from the early stage of theiractivities, in order to ensure smooth transition to the decommissioning stage after shut
down considering the progress of ageing degradation of the nuclear facilities including
those shown in Section 4 and 5 above. Licensees prepared the Policies and made thempublic following the enforcement of related Act in October 2018.
6

Operation of ‘Safe’ Reactor Facilities

The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that “In the event that the location, structure, or
equipment of a nuclear power reactor facility does not comply with the requirements set
forth in the NRA Ordinances, the NRA can suspend the use of the reactor facility inquestion, or require its modification, repair, or relocation, or may designate a specificmethod of operating the reactor in question, or may order any other measure required
to ensure operational safety.”
When regulatory requirements are revised, the NRA can order the licensees to meet
revised regulatory requirements even for existing nuclear installations. In the case of
applying revised regulatory requirements, basically, the date of enforcement is set on a
day certain time after the revision of the regulatory requirements, or certain moratorium
period is set to meet the revised regulatory requirements. This period is decided on acase-by-case basis by the NRA considering the safety importance of revised regulatory
requirements, and the time period required for licensees to implement necessary
measures. However, it is possible to apply revised regulatory requirements at the sametime as the revision if necessary measures need to be taken immediately for ensuringsafety.
46

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
ARTICLE 7
1
2

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory
framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations.
The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:(i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations;(ii) a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the prohibition of theoperation of a nuclear installation without a license;(iii) a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to ascertain
compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of licenses;(iv) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licenses, including
suspension, modification or revocation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 7
The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates regulations on use of nuclear energy in Japan. The
NRA Ordinance details regulations stipulated in the Reactor Regulation Act and defines
regulatory requirements. To install a nuclear power plant, Reactor Installation Permit
shall be obtained based on the Reactor Regulation Act. The approval of Construction
Plan, Pre-service Inspections, and the approval of Operational Safety Programs areprocedures to check compliance to regulations and approval conditions.
The Reactor Regulation Act includes provisions to revoke permits and the ordersuspension of facility use in exercise of the NRA’s authority; it also provides
implementation methods for regulations and approval conditions within a legal
framework.
Therefore, Japan has a legal framework to regulate conditions for safety which defines
necessary regulatory requirements. It means that Japan conforms to the provisions ofArticle 7 of the Convention.

47

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
Article 7 (1)Establishment of a Legislative and Regulatory Framework

1

Outline of Major Legislation Relating to Nuclear Safety

1-1

The Atomic Energy Basic Act

Promulgated in 1955, the Atomic Energy Basic Act is the legal basis of nuclear energy
use in Japan.
The objective of the Act is to secure current and future energy resources, promoting
advanced learning and industrial development thus ensuring that nuclear energy willcontribute to improved standards of living and the overall welfare of mankind.
The Act’s basic principles ensure that the research, the development and the use of
nuclear energy shall be strictly limited to peaceful purposes, be dedicated to securingsafety democratically and voluntarily, and contribute to international cooperation.
The objects of securement for safety are protection of lives, health, and property of thepeople, conservation of the environment, and contribution to the security of Japan.
The Atomic Energy Basic Act stipulates the establishment of the NRA and the Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Commission, and it also provides the basis for theestablishment of the NRA as a government supervisory body for enforcement anddemocratic control of nuclear energy policies for the use of nuclear energy.
1-2

The Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority

The Act for Establishment of the NRA which was enacted on 19th September 2012
stipulates the foundation of the NRA as the nuclear regulatory body of Japan, its
authorities and responsibilities.
The object of the Act is to emphasize the importance for its powers to be exercised in aneutral, fair and independent manner.
The Act provides the organizational structure of the NRA, the appointment anddismissal of its Chairman and Commissioners, the duty of reporting to the national Dietand disclosure of information, and other authorities and responsibilities needed for the
NRA to carry out its mission. A report on the authorities and responsibilities which thisAct guarantees is to be provided in the reporting of Article 8.
1-3

The Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material
and Reactors (Reactor Regulation Act) and Relevant Ordinances

Promulgated in 1957, the Reactor Regulation Act is a law dealing with all regulations
concerning the use of nuclear energy.
48

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
In accordance with the spirit of the Atomic Energy Basic Act, this Act is enacted for the
purpose of providing necessary regulations on refining activities, fabricating andenrichment activities, interim storage activities, reprocessing activities and waste
disposal activities, as well as on the installation and operation of reactors while taking
into consideration the possibility of large scale natural disasters, terrorist attacks, orother criminal acts, in order to ensure that the usage of nuclear source material, nuclear
fuel material and reactors are limited to peaceful purposes, and to ensure public safety
by preventing hazards in the event that a severe accident at a nuclear facility causes
discharge of an abnormal level of radioactive materials outside the factory or place ofactivity where the nuclear facility is installed, and by protecting nuclear fuel material.
And it is also enacted for the purpose of providing necessary regulations on the usageof international controlled material in accordance with treaties or other international
agreements concerning the research, the development and the usage of nuclear energy
The Reactor Regulation Act establishes safety regulations and standards for granting
permits and approval, including Reactor Installation Permit, the approval ofConstruction Plan, Pre-service Inspections, Periodic Facility Inspections, the approval ofOperational Safety Programs and Operational Safety Inspections, and approval of
Decommissioning Plan. The regulations also establish administrative procedures suchas the suspension of operation (back-fitting) and the revocation of permits, as well as
criminal penalties, such as imprisonment or a fine, which can be imposed if an operator
does not comply with the provisions of this Act.
The Act also regulates the assessment to enhance safety, the type certification,
operational periods, and responsibilities of nuclear licensees (obligation of developing
necessary measures such as the installation of facility or equipment contributing tosafety improvement and fulfillment of safety education, based on the latest knowledge).
Furthermore, the Act specifies that when the NRA determines it especially necessary for
nuclear licensees to manage the facility in an appropriate manner according to thefacility situation, the NRA can designate the facility as the Specified Nuclear Facility. In
this case, it is stipulated that the licensees of the Specified Nuclear Facility have to submit
an implementation plan to the NRA for approval and that they have to receive anadditional approval every time a change is made.
In addition, it stipulates a system for an employee feedback system (whistle blowers)
whereby they can report any violation of the Reactor Regulation Act to the NRA without
fear of penalty. It also prohibits employers to fire employees or treat themdisadvantageously because of reporting violations.
Cabinet Orders, the NRA Ordinances, and other related ordinances are stipulated based
49

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Frameworkon the provision of the Reactor Regulation Act and to implement the provisions.
Of the NRA Ordinances established in response to the Reactor Regulation Act, those
covering the regulation of reactor facilities are as follows.
•

NRA Ordinance Concerning the Installation and Operation, of Commercial Power
Reactors (NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors)-•

Applies to the installation and the operation of commercial power reactors

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure, and Equipmentof Commercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities (NRA Ordinance onStandards for Installation Permit)-Standards relating to the location, the structure, and the equipment of reactor
facilities, which form one of the criteria for obtaining an approval for
Construction Plan on power reactors.

•

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Commercial Power Reactors
and their Auxiliary Facilities (NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards)-

Technical standards relating to an approval of Construction Plan and themaintenance of power reactor facilities.

•

NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards for Quality Control Methods Concerning
the Design and Construction of Commercial Power Reactors for Licensees ofPower Reactor Operation and Systems for Their Inspection (NRA Ordinance on
Quality Control Methods)-

Technical standards prescribing quality control methods and systems for theirinspection relating to the design and the construction for power reactors,
which are one of the criteria for approval of Construction Plan.

•

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Nuclear Fuel Material Being
Used as a Fuel in Commercial Power Reactors-

Technical standards relating to the inspection of fuel assemblies.

For facilities designated as Specified Nuclear Facilities, the Reactor Regulation Act
stipulates that those regulatory requirements may be only partially applied if proper
implementation of measures to achieve operational safety is ensured. The following
ordinances have been enacted for the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS designated asSpecified Nuclear Facilities to stipulate the measures to be taken to ensure safety, as thesituation there differs from that of ordinary reactor facilities.
•

NRA Ordinance on the Operational Safety of Reactor Facilities at the Tokyo ElectricPower Company's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and the PhysicalProtection of Specified Nuclear Fuel Material
50

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework

In response to the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, the Reactor Regulation Act
was amended in 2012, but some subjects such as the inspection system and the quality
assurance remained as the future challenges. In order to strengthen safety measures in
the use of nuclear power, part of the Reactor Regulation Act was amended in April 2017.
Under this Act, from the perspective of reinforcing measures taken by both licensees andthe NRA, with the aim of ensuring higher safety, licensees are obliged to confirm thenuclear facility's compliance to the regulatory requirements as well as to ensure theprimary responsibility for securing safety.
The Act also requires consistent quality assurance management from design andconstruction to use.
This amendment to the Act is scheduled to come into force in April 2020, and the NRA
is considering the establishment and/or the revision of Cabinet Orders, NRA Ordinancesand other related ordinances in response to this amendment.
1-4

The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness(Nuclear Emergency Act)

Because of the specific nature of nuclear disasters, the Nuclear Emergency Act waspromulgated in 1999 to protect lives health and property of citizens. Combined with theReactor Regulation Act, the Basic Act on Disaster Management, and other laws
concerning nuclear disasters, this Act has been designed to strengthen measures against
nuclear disasters by prescribing the responsibilities of licensees, the declaration of a
nuclear emergency situation, the establishment of the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters, and the implementation of emergency response measures, and otherspecial measures relating to nuclear disasters.
Under this law, licensees must take all possible actions to prevent nuclear disasters, andtake necessary actions faithfully for preventing the spread of the effects of a crisis andrepairing any damage caused by such an incident.
This law also stipulates that the national government must take all necessary actions to
implement emergency response measures, precautionary protective measures andrestorative measures for nuclear disasters.
Following the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, the Nuclear Emergency Act
was amended on 19 September 2012, to enhance precautionary protective measures andstrengthen the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters during nuclear emergency.
Measures relating to nuclear emergency preparedness are detailed in Article 16.

51

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
2

International Conventions

Japan is a contracting party of the following conventions relating to nuclear safety.
•

Convention on Nuclear Safety•

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety ofRadioactive Waste Management•

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident•

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency

Article 7 (2)1Regulatory Requirements and Safety Regulations

Regulatory Requirements

Considering lessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, the
NRA put into effect the new regulatory requirements in July 2013.
The regulatory requirements are based on the concepts of defense-in-depth, which are
to prepare multiple (or multi- layered) and effective countermeasures and do not rely onother levels of defense when preparing certain countermeasures. This requirements
reinforce the estimations and the countermeasures against natural phenomena and otherevents such as fire disasters that trigger common-caused failures. Moreover, they requiremeasures to prevent core damages and CV failures in case of a severe accident, measures
for suppression of dispersion of radioactive material, and protection measures against
intentional aircraft crashes. The basic policies for measures against severe accidents andacts of terrorism are as follows:•

Protective measures through multiple stages such as “prevention of core damage “,“securing of the containment function”, “controlled discharge through vents”, and“suppression of dispersion of radioactive material.”•

Further enhancement of reliability in combination with permanent facilities, while
primarily based on the use of portable facilities.

•

Reinforcement of preventive and protective measures in spent fuel storage pools.

•

Enhancement of durability of Emergency Response Center, reliability and durabilityof communication systems, and reliability and persistence of measurement systems
including those in spent fuel storage pools (reinforcement of command
communications and measurement systems).

•

Development of procedures, securement of personnel, and implementation of52

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
trainings are required since it is important for hardware (facilities) and software(on-site work) to function integrally.
•

As countermeasures against deliberate airplane crashes, distributed storage andconnection of portable facilities are required. The Specialized Safety Facility is
introduced as a backup measure for reliability enhancement.

2

Regulatory System

2-1

Licensing Systems

When constructing commercial power reactors, a permit must be obtained from the NRA,
pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
The Act stipulates the reasons of disqualification from obtaining a permit, such as thatanyone who has had Reactor Installation Permit revoked within the previous two years
may not obtain a new permit.
If a licensee wishes to change an already obtained permit he must obtain permit for any
amendment or, if the change is prescribed as a minor change in the law, must submit
notification of the change.
No expiry date is set for Reactor Installation Permit in Japan so there are no procedures
for renewing a permit. A 40-year operation limit is stipulated though this may be
extended by the authorization of the NRA only once for a maximum of 20 additional
years.
The Conformity Review for obtaining Reactor Installation Permit is carried out by the
NRA. In granting Reactor Installation Permit, the NRA must seek the opinion of the AEC
of Japan, in order to confirm that there is no risk that the facility will be used for anythingother than peaceful purposes.
Anyone who constructs a reactor without obtaining Reactor Installation Permit will be
subject to a penalty of imprisonment with labor for no more than three years, or a fineof no more than three million yen, or both, pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act.
Licensees shall submit the application for the approval of Construction Plan to the NRA
before commencing construction, and obtain NRA’s approval.
In the case of constructing new nuclear reactor facilities, the applicant shall describe all
matters required by the NRA Ordinances concerning detailed equipment design andattach explanatory documents as required for reactor units, nuclear fuel material
handling systems and storage systems, reactor cooling systems, instrumentations andcontrol systems, radioactive waste disposal systems, radiation controlled systems,
53

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
reactor containment systems, and so forth, on the application for the approval ofConstruction Plan.
When an existing nuclear reactor facility is modified, a licensee shall obtain the approvalof Construction Plan, or notify the NRA in accordance with the contents of the modifying.
When the NRA acknowledges that the applied construction plan complies with theapproved Reactor Installation Permit and the NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards,
and that the design and quality assurance method of the applicant complies with theregulatory requirements, it shall approve the construction plan.
The type certification was newly introduced by the revision of the Reactor Regulation
Act in 2012, and it is given by the NRA when the specified equipment regulated by the
NRA Ordinance Concerning the Installation and Operation of Commercial Power
Reactors, is applied and confirmed to be in compliance with the NRA Ordinance onStandards for Installation Permit. The equipment for which the certificate is given has
no need to prove compliance for every application because it has already been regarded
as compliant with the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit. Thiscertification is expected to contribute to a more efficient licensing process. For thecertified equipment, which is given the type certification, the NRA reviews theapplication, and if it is based on and equal to the type certified design, and is compliant
with the NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards, the type can be designated. The
specified equipment for which the type designation is given has no need to prove
compliance for every application for the the approval of Construction Plan because it has
already been regarded as compliant with the NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards.
This also is expected to contribute to a more efficient licensing process of the approvalof Construction Plan.
The NRA’s approval shall be obtained for the design of the fuel assembly to be loaded
into the reactor, except for imported fuel assemblies. And the approval shall be obtained
for the Operational Safety Programs of the fuel assembly before its operation.
In the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in April 2017, the approval ofConstruction Plan and the approval of Fuel Assembly Design were integrated, and thelicensee is required to apply for the approval of Construction Plan of design andconstruction, and to obtain NRA’s approval.
In addition, the licensee is required to carry out the activities based on the quality
management system from the Reactor Installation Permit stage, and it is recognized as
an subject for the review for the Reactor Installation Permit. The licensee is also required
to set the Operational Safety Programs before the start of construction, and to conduct
activities based on the Operational Safety Programs from the design and construction
54

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
stages consistently.
This amendment is scheduled to come into force in April 2020, and the NRA is
considering the establishment and/or revision of the Cabinet Orders, NRA Ordinances,and other related ordinances in response to this amendment.
2-2

Inspection Systems

In constructing a reactor facility, the licensee must undergo a Pre-service Inspection by
the NRA and may not use the reactor facility in question if it does not pass this inspection.
A Pre-service Inspection shall be conducted for every construction stages based on the
NRA Ordinances.
The fuel assembly to be loaded into the reactor must undergo a Fuel Assembly
Inspection by the NRA and may not be used if it does not pass this inspection.
As well as conducting inspections of welding parts, particularly in parts which mustwithstand high pressures and the CV itself, licensees must undergo a review by the NRA(Welding Safety Management Review). This will focus on the systems involved in
conducting the inspection, the inspection method, process controls, and other matters
stipulated in the NRA Ordinance.
After commencing operation, licensees must undertake Licensee’s Periodic Inspections,as well as undergoing Periodic Facility Inspections by the NRA, focusing on designated
key safety components.
Systems involved in conducting inspections, inspection methods, process controls andother matters stipulated in NRA Ordinances must undergo Periodic Safety Management
Review by the NRA.
Operational Safety Inspectors from the NRA will also periodically conduct inspections
to confirm compliance with Operational Safety Programs by licensees pursuant to theprovisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
In addition, regarding Specified Nuclear Facilities, the licensee must also undergo NRA’s
inspections to determine whether safety measures etc. are taken according to theimplementation plan.
If reactor facilities or fuel assemblies that have not passed a Pre-service Inspection or a
Fuel Assembly Inspection are used, or if a licensee is obstructionist they may be subject
to imprisonment with labor for not more than one year, a fine of not more than one
million yen, or both, pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. These
include a refusal or obstruction or evasion of a Pre-service Safety Management Review,
Welding Safety Management Review, Periodic Facility Inspection, or Periodic Safety
Management Review. Additionally, if a licensee has refused, obstructed, or evaded
55

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
granting entry to the site, an inspection, or submitting samples for an Operational Safety
Inspection or nuclear material physical protection inspection, or fails to respond toquestions, or makes false statements in response to questions.
In the revision of the Reactor Regulation Act in April 2017, Licensee’s Pre-service
Inspection is established, and the licensee is obligated to inspect the conformity tostandards, including the inspection of welds and fuel assemblies.
Nuclear facilities are able to be used only after the licensee has conducted Licensee’s Preservice Inspections and after confirmation by the NRA that the nuclear reactor facilities
conform the acceptance criteria for the inspections.
This amendment is scheduled to come into force in April 2020, and the NRA is
considering the establishment and/or revision of the Cabinet Orders, NRA Ordinances,and other related ordinances in response to this amendment.
2-3

Law Enforcement Measures

The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates law-enforcement measures for the NRA execution.
The NRA can revoke Reactor Installation Permit if a licensee does not start operation of
the power reactor without reasonable excuse within five years of the date of obtaining
the Permit or if it discontinues operation for more than a year.
The NRA can also revoke Reactor Installation Permit or order a licensee to shut down
the power reactor at for a period of one year or less if it has come to fall into a
disqualification state for the permit or if it violates a provision of the Reactor Regulation
Act or an order issued based on the Act.
In addition, the NRA can order licensees to take measures necessary for safety such as ahalt, remodeling, repair or transfer of power reactor facilities or designate a method of
operation if it finds that the power reactor facilities do not conform to the installation
permit standard rule or the technical standard rule, or that measures being taken related
to safety, operation. The NRA can order licensees to dismiss Chief Reactor Engineers ifthey violate provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
As for measures against dangerous situations, the NRA can order licensee to takemeasure against disaster prevention in the case of occurrence on disaster caused by areactor.
There are penalty provisions in the Reactor Regulation Act. For example, if anyone who
installed a power reactor without Reactor Installation Permit or an order relating to
shutdown of a power reactor which is issued by the NRA is not complied shall besentenced to imprisonment with labor for not more than three years or a fine of not morethan three million yen. However, these punishment provisions are not executed directly
56

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Frameworkby the NRA, but the judiciary authorities shall enforce them after receiving an accusationfrom the NRA.

57

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
ARTICLE 8
1

2

REGULATORY BODY

Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with theimplementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 7, andprovided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources tofulfill its assigned responsibilities.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation
between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization
concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 8
The NRA is a regulatory body entrusted with enforcement of legal framework, and the
Act for Establishment of the NRA guarantees its independence to execute of official
power. The NRA has the authority to establish the NRA Ordinance to execute laws, it
has the authority to grant permit and approval, implement of inspections, and issue
necessary orders. The NRA is financed by the national budget and its staffs are national
government officials.
The Chairman and Commissioners of the NRA are appointed by the Prime Minister with theconsent of the national Diet, and the NRA Chairman appoints the staff of the NRA.
Therefore, the NRA has authority, financial resources, and human resources needed topursue its mission, and secure effective separation from implementation organizations as
defined by the law, which means that it conforms to provisions of Article 8 of the Convention.

58

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
Article 8 (1)Establishment of a Regulatory Body

1

Nuclear Regulation Authority

1-1

Organization, Authority, and Duties

The NRA regulates nuclear-related activities in Japan, while the Secretariat of the NRA
deals with related administrative matters for the NRA.
The NRA is established as an external bureau of the MOE. The Chairman andCommissioners of the NRA are appointed by the Prime Minister, with the consent of theDiet, based on the provisions of the National Government Organization Act and the Act
for Establishment of the NRA. It exercises independent authority from a fair and neutral
standpoint.
The NRA will provide the Diet with a detailed report, via the Prime Minister, concerning
its activities. The appointment or dismissal of staff of the NRA rests with the NRA
Chairman.
The NRA has the authority to establish the NRA Ordinance to implement laws andCabinet Orders relating to the affairs under its jurisdiction. The term of office of the
Chairman and Commissioners is five year but they may be reappointed at the end of thisinitial term.
The duty of the NRA is to ensure safety in the use of nuclear energy, so it has the rightto review planned nuclear installations to confirm their location, structure, andequipment do not pose a disaster threat, and that being the case to give the permit for
their construction.
Moreover, as well as formulating the NRA Ordinance that includes regulations
concerning nuclear-related activities such as emergency, operational safety measuresand programs, and the physical protection of specified nuclear fuel material, the NRA
handles other issues such as the approval of the design and construction of facilities,
inspections, approval of Operational Safety Programs, and the approval of plans fornuclear reactor decommissioning. It also collects reports from licensees and conducts onthe-spot inspections, if necessary.
It has the authority to revoke Reactor Installation Permits or suspend the use of such
facilities; to order safety measures, the dismissal of Chief Reactor Engineers andmeasures covering decommissioning and disaster prevention.
In March 2014, following a notion that more enhancement of expertise is indispensable
for reinforcement of the NRA’s functions, JNES was integrated into the Secretariat of the
NRA.
59

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
As a result of the integration, the number of staff members of the NRA reached about
1,000 as of the end of March 2014, including Nuclear Safety Inspectors and Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Officers stationed at nuclear sites.
The Act for Establishment of the NRA specifies that the Reactor Safety Examination
Committee (for investigation and review of nuclear safety), the Nuclear Fuel Safety
Examination Committee (for investigation and review of nuclear fuel material safety),and the Radiation Council (for review of technical standards related to radiation damage
prevention) shall be established under the NRA.
In July 2017, the NRA has strengthened its organization in order to improve theinspection system, the strengthening of regulation for radiation source and radiation
protection, and the development and securing of human resources, those were identified
as Recommendation items in the IRRS mission by the IAEA. Specifically, the number of
NRA staff increased as well as Radiation Protection Department to strengthen regulationof radiation source, and the Oversight Planning and Coordination Division to operate a
new oversight program for nuclear facilities, were newly established.
The Secretariat of the NRA consists of the Departments of the Regulatory Standard andResearch Department in charge of preparation of standards and policies and research on
nuclear systems, severe accidents, nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, safety research related
to earthquakes and tsunamis, the Radiation Protection Department in charge of setup of
the systems of nuclear emergency preparedness and response, physical protection of
nuclear material, radiation monitoring, regulation for radiation sources, and safeguards
based on international commitments, and the Nuclear Regulation Department
consisting of the Nuclear Regulation Policy Planning Division, the Group of Licensing
for the nuclear facilities, and the Group of Oversight for the nuclear facilities including
Oversight Planning and Coordination Division, in addition to the Policy Planning andcoordination Division, the Personnel Division, the Division of

Budget and Accounting,the Division of Legal Affairs.
Moreover, as shown in Table 8-1, there are NRA Regional Offices at 22 nuclear sites, withsafety inspectors and nuclear emergency preparedness officers permanently stationed
there.

60

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
Table 8-1

NRA Regional Offices

Office Name
Tomari Nuclear Regulation Office
Higashidori Nuclear Regulation Office
Rokkasho Nuclear Regulation Office
Onagawa Nuclear Regulation Office
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Regulation
OfficeFukushima Daini Nuclear Regulation
OfficeTarget Facilities
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (BWR); research reactor; SF interim
storage
Uranium enrichment; reprocessing; disposal facility
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR); Specified Nuclear Facilities
Power plant (BWR)

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear
Regulation Office
Tokai and Oarai Nuclear Regulation
OfficeKawasaki Nuclear Regulation Office
Yokosuka Nuclear Regulation Office
Shika Nuclear Regulation Office
Hamaoka Nuclear Regulation Office
Tsuruga Nuclear Regulation Office
Mihama Nuclear Regulation Office
Ohi Nuclear Regulation Office
Takahama Nuclear Regulation Office
Kumatori Nuclear Regulation Office
Kamisaibara Nuclear Regulation Office
Shimane Nuclear Regulation Office
Ikata Nuclear Regulation Office
Genkai Nuclear Regulation OfficeSendai Nuclear Regulation Office

1-2

Resource for Regulation(1)

Funding

Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR, GCR); research reactor, fuelfabrication, reprocessing, and usage facilities;
disposal facility
Research reactor; usage facilities
fuel fabrication; research reactor
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (PWR, BWR, FBR, ATR)Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)
fuel fabrication; research reactor; usage facilities
fuel fabrication, usage facilities
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)

As a regulatory body, the national government funds the NRA which compiles a
proposed annual budget and submits it to the appropriate financial authorities via the
MOE.
This procedure is carried out in the same manner as all government departments.
The NRA budget in FY2019 is 54.7 billion yen.

61

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
(2)

Human resources

The NRA is composed of the Chairman and four Commissioners who are appointed by
the Prime Minister, and the Secretariat of the NRA was established with staff acceptedmainly from the NISA, the NSC, and the AEC of Japan in September 2012. In order tointegrate functions of safeguards and radiation protection in April 2013, the NRA acceptedstaff from MEXT. The NRA integrated JNES a technical and scientific support organization,in March 2014, and accepted staff from the Organization. Furthermore, it has employed
new graduates and mid-career with experiences in the industry and other R&D institutes,
so that the NRA has come to command human resources with various expertise.
In order to make scientific and technical judgments without relying on knowledge andexperiences of electricity utilities, the NRA needs to maintain a certain level of theamount and quality of human resources and continually enhance their technical ability.
With this in mind, the NRA formulated Basic Policy for Human Resource Developmentof the NRA Personnel in June 2014 so as to make clear the fundamental principles andthe outline policy of human resource development. In this basic policy, the following
points are identified as duties of the NRA: (1) to properly distribute resources needed
for learning, training, (2) to connect future challenges and strategies of the organization
with human resource development, and (3) to encourage staff to promote their voluntary
learning.
In addition, based on the recognition that it is important for the NRA to develop andsecure not only NRA staff members but also human resources who have the knowledge
necessary for nuclear safety and nuclear regulation widely in order to conduct nuclear
regulatory steadily, the NRA has been implementing a nuclear regulatory humanresource development project in collaboration with universities etc. since FY2016.
The NRA reviewed the contents of the project proposed by the applicants by documents
and interviews, and adopted 13 projects in 2016 and five projects in 2017. In thecontinuous implementation of the business adopted in the previous year, the NRA
evaluates the progress of the business and the plans for the next fiscal year, and strive
for the effective implementation of the business.
1-3

Ensuring Transparency and Openness(1)

Ensuring transparency

The “Policy on Ensuring the Operational Transparency of the NRA” stipulates that thebasic policy of the organization is (1) to be able to release information not subject todisclosure under the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs; (2)to adhere to the process of disclosure and discussion; and (3) to adhere to the principle
62

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Bodyof administration based on written documents. Accordingly, to ensure full transparency
it has been decided that details of the agenda, minutes and distributed materials at NRA
Commission and committee meetings and information from its study teams, shall be
publicized, as a general rule.
Following meetings concerning regulations attended by at least three Commissioners orinterviews between NRA Commissioners or Secretariat staff and those subject toregulation, it was decided that outlines of these proceedings will be published, together
with reference materials used. In addition, regarding the hearing from the licensees for
the Conformity Review, the NRA has considered a procedure to make more detailed
content open than the summary previously disclosed, and it decided to disclose thetranscription result by the automatic speech-to-text software on a trial basis from April
2019.
Based on such guidelines as the Policy on Ensuring the Operational Transparency of the
NRA and “Operational Guidelines for NRA Commission Meetings”, the proceedings of
NRA Commission Meetings and its study teams will generally be made available to the
public.
For this purpose, an official page has been set up on online video-sharing websites suchas YouTube, with the NRA Commission Meetings and study teams meetings being
broadcast live whenever possible; in addition, recordings and edited highlights of thesemeetings will also be made available.
Reference materials used in the NRA Commission Meetings and its study teams are
published on the NRA's website at the start of each meeting, increasing the ease andaccessibility of interested parties.
As a rule, minutes of NRA Commission Meetings are posted on the website the following
day while those of study team meetings are generally published within a week.
In addition, Technical Information Committee, in which examines whether the latest
findings require regulatory response, frequently used materials obtained from overseas
regulatory agencies on the premise of non-disclosure, so this meetings itself conducted
as closed. The transparency of such meetings have been ensured by publishing materials
as far as possible and summary of the meeting minutes. However based on theimportance of this meeting and further transparency, the NRA decided to make thismeeting disclosed to the public in principle, and the meetings may be treated as closed
meeting only if it handles non-disclosure information or if the meeting is deemed
appropriate not to be disclosed. The NRA started the policy from June 2018.
The NRA Chairman conducts weekly press conference. The Director of Policy Planningand Coordination Division of the Secretariat of the NRA, in his capacity as spokesman,
63

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
also conducts press conference twice a week. If necessary, extraordinary press
conferences are held.
These press conferences are made available as live broadcasts and recordings, in thesame way as the NRA Commission Meetings and study team meetings, while theminutes of the press conferences are made available on the NRA’s website on the same
day of the Chairman's press conferences, and the following day of the spokesman's press
conferences as far as possible.
(2)

Ensuring openness

One of the guiding principles in NRA’s Core Values and Principles is “We shall be open
to all opinions and advice from Japan and the international community and avoid bothself-isolation and self-righteousness.”
Based on these principles, the NRA has utilized the expertise of external experts,
including those serving on study teams, and has actively held discussions with otherexperts and relevant licensees.
The NRA has published information and conducted interviews with relevant experts
and licensees to ensure transparency, closer communications and stronger relationships
to facilitate a swift response to any emergency, encouraging a wider understanding of
regulations and gathering a wider knowledge from both domestic and overseas sources.
The NRA started Visits of nuclear facilities by NRA Commissioners and Exchange of
opinions with local parties based on the discussion in the NRA Commission Meeting inNovember 2017.
The NRA canvassed widespread public views to help formulate new regulatory
requirements and countermeasures in the event of nuclear disasters and published thosefindings.
Even before inviting public comment on the draft text of provisions, the NRA sought
public comment on the draft framework stage, further encouraging widespread public
participation.
The NRA established a website and call centers enabling the public to express theiropinions or questions via the internet or telephone whenever they wish.
1-4

Technical and Scientific Support(1)

Technical and scientific support organizations

As Technical and Scientific Support Organizations, the NRA has joint jurisdiction over
JAEA and QST with the MEXT.
JAEA is a body that, in accordance with the basic policy prescribed in the Atomic Energy
64

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
Basic Act, conducts basic and applied research into nuclear energy; the development of
FBRs and the nuclear fuel material required for this, in order to establish the nuclear fuelcycle. It also seeks the comprehensive, systematic, efficient development of reprocessingof nuclear fuel material techniques and the disposal of high-level radioactive waste. This
information is disseminated to help promote nuclear energy research which in turnshould help improve the standard of living and welfare of mankind.
Activities carried out by JAEA in the fields of ensuring the safety in nuclear energy
research, its development, and use fall under the joint jurisdiction of the MEXT and the
NRA.
QST’s mission is to raise the level of quantum and radiological sciences and technologies
through its commitment to research and development into quantum science andtechnology, the effect of radiation on humans, the prevention of human radiation
hazards, diagnosis and treatment, and the medical use of radiation.
Activities by QST in the fields of radiation effects on the humans, the prevention ofradiation hazards for humans, and diagnosis and treatment fall under the joint
jurisdiction of the MEXT and the NRA.
(2)

Input from external experts

The NRA has an opportunities to hear opinions from external experts working in Japanand abroad. There are various study teams where experts discuss individual regulatory
challenges, including formulation of new regulatory requirements, measures against
nuclear disasters, etc. For the Conformity Review, the Conformity Review Meeting isheld to hear opinions from external experts. In addition, the NRA has an opportunity to
get advice from international advisers consisting of experts overseas, in order to capture
a wide range of international knowledge on general issues including the NRA’s
organizational approach and safety regulatory activities, etc.
(3)

Safety research

For the NRA to adequately implement its activities, it is necessary to pursue safety
research to continue improving nuclear safety and to accumulate scientific/technicalknowledge. The NRA decided to review research fields to tackle in light of past progressof safety research. In July 2016, the NRA formulated the “Basic Policy of the Safety
Research in the NRA” and decided to formulate the “Safety Research Areas to Be
Promoted and the Implementing Policy” every year after FY2017.
The NRA states in the “Mid-Term Goal for the First Term of the NRA” (in February, 2015)that it should especially put emphasis on the following items:
65

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body•

Regulatory issues in the decommissioning process of TEPCO’s Fukushima
Daiichi NPS,•Countermeasures against natural phenomena that cause common-cause failure
leading to severe accidents,•

Enhancement of scientific/technical knowledge related to severe accident
measures, and•Development of technical bases that support the above stated issues.

As for evaluation of the safety research, the NRA performs evaluation at each phase fromprior evaluation in the research planning phase to follow-up evaluation after the
research based on the “Basic policy of the Safety Research in the NRA”
In addition, from a viewpoint of practical use for nuclear regulation, it is important tomake results of the safety research scientifically and technologically reliable while
securing traceability. It is also important to reflect results of safety research in efforts toaddress imminent challenges immediately. For this reason, the NRA promptly discloses
results of the safety research as NRA technical report.
Collaborative research is pursued in international agencies, because nuclear safety is a
global issue. Participation in such international collaborative research plays animportant role in grasping needs for future nuclear regulation and obtaining the latest
knowledge. Therefore, the NRA is actively joining international collaborative research
operated by international agencies such as the OECD/NEA and the IAEA or under theframeworks of bilateral/multilateral cooperation.
1-5

Management System

In order to carry out duties stipulated in the Act for Establishment of the NRA, the “NRAManagement Rules” was established in September 2014 for the purpose of maintaining
and improving work quality of the NRA and building, implementing, evaluating, andenhancing an integrated management system that enables development of robust andsound safety culture supported by effective leadership with reference to ISO 9001 (JIS Q
9001), a standard specified by the IAEA. Based on that rules, the NRA established the“Mid-Term Goal for the First Term of the NRA” in February, 2015, and full operation ofthis management system started in April 2015.
The NRA Management Rules stipulates that a PDCA cycle should be implemented as amanagement system in a unified manner where the cycle consists of periodical
formulation of a fiscal-year plan with items on special emphasis, implementation ofactivities, management review, and improvement. It also stipulates organizational
structure, leadership, and documentation and recording needed as a basis for66

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
implementation of the management system as well as management of resources needed
for securement, development, and effective use of high-quality human resources. In
addition, the Rule also includes provisions about processes to handle items where
improvement is needed, preventive measure, internal audits, aiming at promotion ofefforts by the whole organization toward improvement of activities for effective
implementation of them.
The NRA revised the “Mid-Term Goal for the First Term of the NRA” in March 2017, andthe following six goals have been set for the first mid-term target period from 1st April
2015 to 31th March 2020.
I. Securing trust in nuclear regulatory administration
II. Strict and appropriate implementation of regulations pertaining to nuclear facilities,
etc.
III. Monitoring of Efforts towards Decommissioning of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station
IV. Building a foundation of technology and human resources for securing nuclear
safetyV. Strengthening nuclear security measures and steadily implementing safeguards
VI. Enhancement and strengthening of radiation protection measures and crisis
management system
Article 8 (2)Status of the Regulatory Body

The NRA carry out its regulatory activities in a far, neutral and independent mannerbase on the approach to separate the regulation from the promotion of nuclear energy
use. The Chairman and Commissioners of the NRA are appointed by the Prime Ministerwith the consent of the Diet, and the NRA Chairman appoints the staff of the NRA, so
other authorities on the promotion side of nuclear energy have no involvement in theappointment and dismissal of staff.
From a fiscal perspective, the activities of the NRA are funded by the national budget,with budget proposals being submitted to the Ministry of Finance by the NRA via the
MOE.
The budget proposals undergo appraisal by the financial authorities, according to thefiscal situation of the Government as a whole, but the authorities tasked with promoting
nuclear energy are not involved from a financial perspective either.
The NRA has clear authority and competence over safety regulation, in accordance withthe provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, and it engages in independent decision67

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
making concerning regulatory activities focused on reactor facilities, such as permits,
approval, and inspections, including approval of nuclear reactor construction plan,
without any involvement by the authorities tasked with promoting nuclear energy.
Moreover, with the objective of ensuring the independence and neutrality of regulation,
Article 6, paragraph (2) of the Supplementary Provisions of the Act for Establishment of
the NRA stipulates that, following a five-year period of transitional measures after theentry into force of the Act, the NRA staff shall not be permitted to be redeployed toadministrative bodies with jurisdiction over administrative matters relating to the use of
nuclear energy (the so-called “no-return rule”).
In 2015, in order to clarify the “no-return rule”, the NRA designated offices in ministry
and agency where the NRA staff should not be transferred.

68

ARTICLE 9 Responsibility of the License Holder
ARTICLE 9RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENSE HOLDER

Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear
installation rests with the holder of the relevant license and shall take the appropriate steps toensure that each such license holder meets its responsibility.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 9
In Japan, nuclear energy use should be aimed to ensuring safety and be performed
independently under democratic management in accordance with the Atomic Energy
Basic Act, and it is basic policy that licensees has primary responsibility for ensuringsafety. For implementing this principle, the Reactor Regulation Act aims to enforce
nuclear-related activities and regulations and stipulates primary responsibility oflicensees to ensure safety.
The Reactor Regulation Act includes a system of penalties to be imposed on licensees ifthey violate the law or any orders based thereon.
Therefore, the provisions of the Act clearly state that those who have been granted
permits shall have total responsibility about safety and be requested to perform it, which
conforms to Article 9 of the Convention.

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ARTICLE 9 Responsibility of the License Holder
1

The Prime Responsibility to Ensure Safety

The Atomic Energy Basic Act establishes the most basic issues concerning the use of
nuclear energy in Japan. This Act stipulates that “The research, development andutilization of nuclear energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuringsafety and performed independently under democratic management. The results
therefrom shall be made public to contribute to international cooperation.”
Based on this provision, licensees bear the prime responsibility to ensure the safe andpeaceful use of nuclear energy.
Furthermore, the Atomic Energy Basic Act establishes that “Those wishing to build anuclear reactor must comply with the regulations imposed by the Government, asprescribed separately by law.”
In other words, those seeking or holding a license bear responsibility to comply withregulations imposed by the Government as set forth in the Reactor Regulation Act.
The Reactor Regulation Act explicitly states the legal responsibilities of licensees thatthey “shall be responsible for installing equipment or apparatus contributing to theimprovement of the safety of nuclear facilities, enhancing education on operationalsafety, or taking any other necessary measures for preventing disasters resulting from
nuclear source material, nuclear fuel material, and reactors, while taking into accountthe latest knowledge on safety at nuclear facilities.”
2

Measures to Ensure That Licensees Meet Their Responsibilities

In the Reactor Regulation Act, measures for operation and maintenance of reactor facility,
shipment, storage and disposal are stipulated as the measures licensees should take toensure operational safety.
These measures are detailed in the NRA Ordinance pursuant to the Reactor Regulation
Act.
To establish Operation Safety Programs and obtain NRA’s approval, licensees must also
undergo NRA’s inspections.
In addition, licensees must stipulate in their Operational Safety Programs that they will
disclose noncompliance information in the event that such noncompliance results in thenon- fulfillment of basic operational targets. Measures have thus been put in place toensure that licensees do not conceal noncompliance.
Licensees are liable to penalty if they fail to fulfill the legal responsibility for operationalsafety.
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ARTICLE 9 Responsibility of the License Holder
In case nuclear installations fails to meet legal technical standards or its operations
contravene regulatory requirements, the NRA may require the licensee to adopt
alternative operating methods or order it to take any other necessary measures pursuant
to the provisions of the Act. If the licensee violates this order, the NRA may revoke its
permit or order it to suspend operations for a specified period not exceeding one year.
If an operator establishes a power reactor without permit, it shall be sentenced to
imprisonment with work and/or a fine, pursuant to the provisions of the Act.
The same shall apply if licensee fails to obtain approval of Operational Safety Programs
or amends it without obtaining approval, or if a licensee and/or its employee(s) fails tocomply with those Operational Safety Programs.

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ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety
ARTICLE 10

PRIORITY TO SAFETY

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations
engaged in activities directly related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that givedue priority to nuclear safety.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 10
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors prescribes that Operational Safety
Programs established by licensees shall stipulate provisions fostering safety culture anddisclosing noncompliance, thereby focusing on the operational safety of reactor facilities.
Quality assurance plans have been established in Operational Safety Programs andincorporated into a quality management system to prioritize overall safety.
The NRA has been engaged in its activities along with NRA’s Core Values and Principles.
Furthermore, it has formulated the Statement on Nuclear Safety Culture, and setting
priority to safety, it has been engaged in its activities.
Therefore, in Japan, the regulatory body and licensees and their related organizations
are taking measures to set reasonable priority to safety, which means conformity to
Article 10 of the Convention.

72

ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety1

Regulatory Requirements Prioritizing Safety

The Reactor Regulation Act clearly states that licensees are responsible for installing
appropriate safety equipment and apparatus, enhancing operational safety education,and other appropriate measures, while incorporating the latest nuclear safetyknowledge.
It further stipulates that licensees must ensure safety in the maintenance and operationof nuclear installation, in the storage of waste and in other related activities.
In the event that a licensee contravenes these rules, the NRA may order to take othernecessary safety measures and, if the licensee violates this order, may revoke its Reactor
Installation Permit or order the licensee to suspend operation of the facility for a specificperiod not exceeding one year.
Moreover, licensees must establish and obtain NRA’s approval of Operational Safety
Programs before commencing reactor operations, in accordance with the Reactor
Regulation Act.
Operational Safety Programs are required to establish a system fostering safety culture
and a plan for quality assurance incorporating safety-first activities into the quality
management system.
Licensees and their employees must comply with Operational Safety Programs, as
stipulated by the Reactor Regulation Act. If the programs are violated, the NRA may
revoke its Reactor Installment Permit or order the licensee to suspend operations for aperiod not exceeding one year.
2

Measures to Prioritize Safety Taken by Licensees

In Operational Safety Programs, licensees must establish provisions to foster safety
culture wherein safety is the first priority of the nuclear energy business.
Further, licensees must establish the policy for fostering safety culture, develop annual
plan, and implement the activities for fostering safety culture, in order to realize
prioritize safety in their business operations.
They must evaluate the implementation of the plan, report the results to the company
president, and seek improvements in subsequent fiscal years.
Operational Safety Programs must comply with relevant legislation and the Operational
Safety Programs themselves at the same time as activities to improve complianceawareness are followed.
The quality assurance plan must assign the highest priority to nuclear safety under the73

ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety
direct responsibility of senior management. Duties must be clearly specified, andstructured in such a way to ensure that these requirements are met.
In addition, as part of such activities, the licensees are making voluntary efforts toimprove safety, and reports to the NRA in a timely manner. For example, as the lessons
learned from the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, TEPCO has established thenuclear safety advisory board of nuclear experts from abroad for seeking their adviseson the relationship with partner companies and strengthening risk management.
Moreover, the senior management directly visits the sites, receives voices from the field
workers who are responsible for safety, and correctly grasps the actual situation at thesite, resulting in effective support for nuclear safety reform and improvement. From theperspective of defense in depth, TEPCO holds the contest aims to enhance thecompetence of proposing a cost-effective safety measure through multilateral studies,and to acquire the competence of substantialize such ideas quickly. Since the accident,
TEPCO has selected 108 good proposals out of 1147 proposals applied. And among good
proposals, 76 safety measures are already substantialized such as placing loading trailers
for shorting time of installation of alternative heat exchanger, using high-intensity
luminous material for evacuation signals, and so on.
3

Efforts by the Regulatory Authority to Prioritize Safety

At its Commission Meeting on January 9, 2013, the NRA discussed its core values andprinciples, and decided that the organization’s mission was to “protect the general public
and the environment through rigorous and reliable regulation of nuclear activities.” Itestablished five guiding principles focusing on independence, effectiveness,transparency, expertise, and readiness, in order to achieve this mission (Table 10-1).
Table 10-1

The NRA’s Core Values and Principles

The Nuclear Regulation Authority was established to absorb and learn the lessons of TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on March 11, 2011. Such nuclear accidents should neverbe allowed to happen again. Restoring public trust, both within Japan and overseas, in thenation’s nuclear regulatory organization is of utmost importance, and the nuclear safetysystem and management must be rebuilt on a solid basis, placing the highest priority on public
safety and genuine safety culture.
Everyone involved in nuclear activities must have a high degree of responsibility and ethicalvalues, and seek to achieve the highest levels of global safety.
We hereby solemnly pledge our full commitment and unwavering efforts in regard to theforegoing.
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ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety

MissionOur fundamental mission is to protect the general public and the environment throughrigorous and reliable regulation of nuclear activities.
Guiding Principles for Activities
We in the NRA and its supporting Secretariat shall perform our duties diligently, acting inaccordance with the following principles.
(1) Independent Decision Making
We shall make decisions independently, based on the scientific and technologicalinformation, free from any outside pressure or bias.
(2) Effective Actions
We shall discard the previous formalistic handling of regulatory work and stress theimportance of a field-oriented approach in achieving genuinely effective regulations.
(3) Open and Transparent Organization
We shall ensure transparency and appropriate information disclosure on regulations,
including the decision-making process.
We shall be open to all opinions and advice from Japan and the international community
and avoid both self-isolation and self-righteousness.
(4) Improvement and Commitment
We shall be assiduous in learning and absorbing the latest regulatory know-how and bestpractices, enhancing individual capacity, and performing our duties, mindful of highethical standards, a sense of mission, and rightful pride.
(5) Emergency Response
We shall be ready to swiftly respond to all emergency situations while ensuring that in‘normal’ times a fully effective response system is always in place.

On 27th May 2015, the NRA formulated “Statement on Nuclear Safety Culture,” as asubordinate document related to NRA’s Core Values and Principles, which concretely
and clearly explains activity principles from a viewpoint of nuclear safety culture. The
NRA has pronounced that it will enhance awareness of importance for nuclear safety
and contribute to development of safety culture in Japan by taking initiative inaccordance with “Statement on Nuclear Safety Culture”
Table 10-2

Statement on Nuclear Safety Culture

Safety shall be given the overriding priority in the utilization of nuclear energy. Safety culture
is recognized as continued practices with an awareness of this principle. It is the duty of
everyone involved in nuclear energy to foster safety culture.
Recognizing its importance, the NRA has developed the code of conduct on safety culture
taking due account of the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear
Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company. The NRA will take the initiative in acting
75

ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety
based on it.
Thereby, the NRA will strive for raising awareness of the importance of safety culture among
everyone involved in nuclear energy and hence contributing to fostering safety culture in
Japan.
Code of conduct
1. Priority to safety
In lucid recognition that absolute safety is not achievable and the possibility of a serious
accident remains, the overriding priority shall be placed on safety for “protecting people andthe environment”.
2. Decision making taking into account the risks
Decision shall be made in an independent and objective manner taking due account of therisks. Anyone who makes a decision is responsible for explaining logically the rationale ofthe decision while clarifying its own roles, responsibilities, and authority.
3. Fostering, sustaining and strengthening safety culture
Managers shall take the initiative in fostering the attitudes and actions that place theoverriding priority to safety in their respective organizations. For sustaining and further
strengthening safety culture, they shall also be vigilant to any early warning signs of decline
in safety culture and shape and enhance the working environment so that the staff canmaintain high morale.
4. Maintaining high level of expertise and organizational learning
Recognizing the importance of scientific and technical expertise for safety, each organization
shall collect and analyze the latest information in Japan and overseas on regulatory
activities, operating experience, and failures to feedback the findings in its activities.
Managers shall shape and enhance the working environment to promote suchorganizational learning.
5. Effective communication
Open and frank discussion in the workplace shall be the basis in the pursuit of safety. Managers
shall create such working environment and promote active discussion in their respective
organizations.
Adequate communication shall be pursued both inside/outside the organization and withstakeholders for enhancing transparency and building trust by taking the initiative in
information disclosure and exchange of a wide range of opinions.
6. Questioning attitude
All the personnel shall always have one’s own “questioning attitude” without complacency
whether there are any weaknesses that may affect safety, as well as whether there is any
room for further improvement, and thereby identify safety issues.
7. Rigorous and prudent decisions and agile actions
In response to any challenges to ensuring safety, all the staff shall make conservativedecisions for safety taking into account even the worst-case scenario, and take necessary
actions with agility.
8. Harmonization with nuclear security
It is necessary to recognize that nuclear safety and security activities do not exist
independently, namely complement each other and interfere with each other. All the
personnel involved in nuclear safety and security activities shall respect each other’s way of
thinking and make efforts for harmonizing both activities. Senior managers shall take76

ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety
responsibility to select the most appropriate solution.

77

ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources
ARTICLE 11
1
2

FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate financial
resources are available to support the safety of each nuclear installation throughout its life.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbersof qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are available for all
safety-related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its life.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 11
In addition to the review of financial basis in the examination stage of Reactor
Installation Permits, a mechanism of ensuring financial reserves to cover the cost of
possible decommissioning as well as the cost of processing and disposal of all spent fueland radioactive waste even from the stage that the reactors are still in operation exists.
e for.
The deployment of competent personnel is a regulatory requirement, and licensees
secure enough personnel who have sufficient competent.
Therefore, the regulations are ensuring financial and human resources for securingsafety of nuclear installation, which means it conforms to Article 11 of the Convention.

78

ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources
Article 11 (1)1Financial Resources

Regulatory Requirements

The Reactor Regulation Act requires anyone who installs nuclear facilities to haveadequate financial resources, as one of criteria for permit.
In addition to a request for Reactor Installation Permit, anyone who installs nuclear
facilities must provide appropriate financial evidence of outlining funding which isnecessary for installation, such as details for acquiring the necessary fuel materials andlatest assets and balance sheets. The NRA will check and confirm that any applicant has
the appropriate financial resources.
2

Steps to be Taken by Licensees Regarding Decommissioning and Disposal of
High-Level Radioactive Waste

Licensees are obliged to estimate the total estimated costs (costs needed for dismantlingand those for waste processing and disposal) in each fiscal year. It is required fordecommissioning of each nuclear station through the “Reserve Account for Dismantling”
in accordance with the Electricity Business Act and to reserve a fund to coverdecommissioning with consent of the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
This is a system that reserves the total estimated costs necessary for dismantling a nuclear
power plant according to the proportion of actual power generation amount in theassumed total power generation amount from start-up to shut-down. In this system, therequired costs are fully accumulated when the actual accumulated power generation
amount reaches the assumed total power generation amount.
Reserve amount = (total estimated costs × 90% × (actual accumulated power
generation amount/ assumed total power generation amount) –amount of previous year reserve)※ assumed total power generated amount = authorized output × 40 years × 365
days × 24 hours × capacity factor (76%)※ The reason of multiplying 90% to total estimated costs is that for normal thermal
power generation facilities, the dismantling costs will be funded at the time ofdismantling, so the amount excluding the dismantling costs equivalent of thethermal power generating facility because it will be accumulated as costs specific todismantling nuclear power facilities.
As to the costs of disposal and reprocessing of spent fuel, it was funded by licensees to79

ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources
a deposit management company which designated by the Minister of Economy, Tradeand Industry, pursuant to the Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Fund Act.
After that, the Act was amended in September 2016 in order to continue to secure thenecessary funds for disposal and reprocessing business and the deposit system wasabolished, then new contribution system was formulated.
Before the amendment, the fund amount had to be determined by such factors as theamount of spent fuel generated, the capacity and operational status of reprocessing
facilities, and the cost of reprocessing. And the Act stated that the Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry could notify each licensee of change of the amount of needed
reserves if there are significant changes in the status of generation of spent fuel.
However, the spent fuel reprocessing is not completed unless the process at the
reprocessing plant and its related businesses which include MOX fuel processing areproperly implemented, so that the deposit system has been changed to a scheme inwhich the electricity utility contributes at the time of power generation. From theviewpoints of financial benefits and securing a sustainable company to complete thebusiness in the future, the council of the METI has resulted in its arguments that
establishment of authorized corporation that private sector mainly conduct withgovernment proper involvement is appropriate due to remain competitively neutral andensure that reprocessing projects will be implemented in the future without failure evenunder the circumstances where competition has progressed. In September 2016, as theauthorized corporation, NuRO was approved by the Minister of Economy, Trade andIndustry, and in October same year, it was established at the same time of the Act
amendment. With this amendment, the electricity utility contributes fund to the NuROat the time it generates electricity so that it become possible to secure necessary funds
stable no matter how the electricity utility financial health is worse.
With regard to the final disposal of high-level radioactive waste and radioactive wastewith low heat generation and a long half-life (TRU waste) generated by reprocessing, theSpecific Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Act stipulates that needed financial reserves
shall be calculated by multiplying the final disposal cost per unit of high-level
radioactive waste by the quantity of generated waste; and that the final cost of disposal
per unit shall be prescribed in an ordinance of the METI, based on these factors.
Funds designated for the final disposal of high-level radioactive waste generated
through spent fuel reprocessing shall be deposited with a Deposit Management Entity
designated by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
The legislation limits the ability to utilize these reserves which may not be used foranything other than their designated purpose. Furthermore, the Minister of Economy,
80

ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources
Trade and Industry may conduct on-the-spot inspections of electric utilities and Deposit
Management Entities.
Article 11 (2)1Human Resources

Regulatory Requirements

In applying for Reactor Installation Permit, licensee is required to submit the attachmentof certification for technical capability of installing and operating nuclear reactor
properly and of preventing and mitigating severe accident.
Licensee must take adequate measures for operational safety; such as operation shall beassigned to proper staff with adequate knowledge, operation shall be implemented withnecessary number of staff, responsible staff shall be with adequate knowledge andexperiments and be certificated according to the standard that the NRA had approved.
Proper deployment and accreditation of technical staff are regulatory requirements.
Licensee must set checks to be carried out before the reactor operation starts, during its
operation and after its shutdown, and make operators to ensure it.
Licensee should develop Operational Safety Programs and obtain its approval by the
NRA. It includes the content of operational safety education and its implementation for
personnel operating and managing reactor facilities.
It is required to develop a quality assurance plan in Operational Safety Programs, andmatters regarding human resources should be included in it. A quality assurance plan
outlines requirements on staff competence for operational safety and any supplemental
education or training to be implemented for staff to be deficient in such competency.
Licensee must appoint a Chief Reactor Engineer from among qualified applications,
including the provisions of the NRA Ordinance, to supervise the operational safety ofreactor.
When

implementing

decommissioning,

licenseesmust

establish

appropriate

Operational Safety Programs and obtain NRA’s approval.
Human resource provisions covering Operational Safety Programs follow the same
system as those for reactor operations, including operational safety education in suchfields as decommissioning and providing for competence management and similar
matters in the quality assurance plan as well.

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ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources2

Acquisition and Check by Licensees on Knowledge and Technical Competence

To secure safety of nuclear power plant, securing high awareness of nuclear safety andexcellent knowledge and technical competence held by on-site personnel involved inoperation and maintenance are important. Licensees are making effort on the educationand training of personnel involved in operation and maintenance in specialized facilities
inside and outside their companies on a long-term basis following their plans. For
operation training, the licensees have operation training facilities (simulators) toimplement emergency response training and training on failure and troubles. There are
specialized facilities for different reactor types outside their companies: the BWR Training
Center (BTC)11 for BWR and the Nuclear Power Training Center (NTC)12 targeting PWR,
both of which are used for basic education and simulator training for operators of nuclear
facilities of the licensees. In training in these Training Centers, curriculums designed
according to the level of competence of operators. The licensees periodically dispatch
operators to the facilities for re-training.
Persons responsible for operation are required to have not only knowledge and technicalcompetence directly needed for operation of reactor facilities but also leadership andcapability of crisis management. Accordingly, training for this purpose is provided forthem. Persons responsible for operation are also required to have a certain level of
performance that conforms to the following standards set up by the NRA,
• Have five year or more work experiences related to reactor operation.
• Have six month or more work experiences in operation of the same type ofreactors within the last one year.
• Have position state at a management or supervisory level in the nuclear power
station, and• Have knowledge and technical competence concerning reactors.
In response to designation by licensees in April 2009, JANSI has come to be engaged incompetence determination of persons responsible for operation that is subject to the code
related to assessment of persons responsible for nuclear power station operation(JEAC4804). The determination is made based on operation skill tests using a simulator,
training sessions, and an oral examination. When conformance to standards is confirmedwith a person, a certificate is granted. This certificate is valid for three years.
For maintenance staff, trainings through daily practical business or on-the-job training(OJT) applies and each licensee sets up a maintenance training center, thus providing its
1112

http://www.btc.co.jp/e_training.html
http://www.jntc.co.jp/en/index.html
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ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources
employees and employees of maintenance-related companies with education on
Operational Safety Programs and radiation protection as well as training on practical
maintenance work using actual models of equipment and facilities unique to the nuclear
industry. There are also various types of training courses on equipment produced bymanufacturers, and engineers are dispatched to these manufacturers for training.
In addition, with regard to human resource development, licensees are participating"Nuclear Human Resource Development Network (Human Resources Network)"aiming to promote efficient and effective encouragement of nuclear human resources
securing and development by industry-government-academia collaborating.
e Human Resources Network have five working groups (elementary to high school
education, universities and colleges education, human resource development forworking engineers, overseas human resource development, and internationalization ofnational human resources). Moreover, with the Strategy Working Group established in
April 2019, Overseeing both domestic and foreign activities, and formulating strategies
for securing and fostering nuclear human resources while making overall coordination,
strengthen the functions and structure of the Human Resources Network.

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ARTICLE 12 Human Factors
ARTICLE 12

HUMAN FACTORS

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities andlimitations of human performance are taken into account throughout the life of a nuclear
installation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 12
In Japan, licensees deal with both human and organizational factors in anticipatingproblems and managing any noncompliance with rules and regulations.
In a quality assurance plan set in the Operational Safety Programs, licensees set force
guidelines dealing with noncompliance. These include programs for the analysis,
prevention, detection, and correction of human errors, and for self-assessment ofmanagement and organizational problems.
Incidents of noncompliance due to human or organizational errors are shared within thelicensee organizations, as well as with other licensees to ensure a strong and effective
system.
Facility designs incorporate appropriate measures to prevent mis-operations by
operators.
Therefore, it is confirmed that consideration on human factors are included in theregulatory requirements, and facility design and safety activities subject to them are put
into practice, which means conformity to the provision of Article 12 of the Convention.

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ARTICLE 12 Human Factors
1

Regulatory Requirements

In the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit it is required in designing
nuclear reactors to take necessary measures to prevent operational error. In the NRA
Ordinance on Technical Standards, it is required in design of control rooms to installsystems in such a way as to ensure their safe operation and prevent any operational error.
It is required to set a quality assurance plan in Operational Safety Programs at a stage of
operation, so that nonconformance due to human error is a target of nonconformance
control in quality assurance activities. Licensees are required to undertake close analysis
and evaluation of human errors, and to take measures to prevent recurrence of humanerrors.
The NRA evaluates these licensee measures during Operational Safety Inspections.
Guidelines are described in the Guidelines for Evaluation by Regulatory Authorities ofAutonomous Initiatives by Business Operators for Rectifying Noncompliance Concerning Direct
Factors in Human Error (February 2008). The Guidelines state that clarity is essential inanalyzing the direct cause of any problem and whether human error was responsible.
The mechanism for sharing information with other licensees’ about noncompliance due
to human error must also be clear, as well as the system for enabling all licensees toeffectively utilize such information.
Noncompliance events are classified according to their impact on overall safety withcategories including accident/failure, deviation from operational conditions, violation of
Operational Safety Programs, and autonomous analysis of direct causes. Key points tobe checked in specific examples include:•that the condition of systems, equipment, and components and any changes therein;
and the behavior of individuals, relationships between individuals, andcommunications, are described logically, together with any associated problems.

•that factors surrounding any human error are summarized objectively in a way
easily understood by the third parties; that safety factors are identified anddescribed in specific detail; and•that proposed corrective safety measures are described in a concrete manner andthen applied if necessary.

Accumulating, analyzing and utilizing data from human error noncompliance arechecked during Operational Safety Inspections, taking into account the frequency andtiming of data analysis carried out by each licensee:•that data concerning direct causes of noncompliance resulting from human error arecollected and accumulated;
85

ARTICLE 12 Human Factors•that this accumulated data is analyzed;•

that when the analyzed data indicates actions are necessary, preventive measures
are formulated, evaluated, and implemented and the outcomes are checked; and•that information about noncompliance resulting from human error is shared withother licensees and utilized as appropriate.

The overall objective is not to assign individual responsibility but to construct a more
efficient operational management structure to try to eliminate human error or, if it occurs,
to reduce the severity of the impact. Based on this objective, the NRA conducts theaforementioned checks, while encouraging licensees to implement the PDCA cycle (Plan⇒ Do ⇒ Check ⇒ Act ⇒ make improvements and formulate another Plan), sharethe information with their own company and other licensees and implement continuous
improvement initiatives.
2

Prevention of Human Error

In NPSs in Japan, measures to prevent human error are taken not only with hardware
but also in operation management. As measures to prevent human error based on
hardware, man-machine interfaces on the control board have been improved forprevention of mis-operations, and interlock systems have been introduced to prevent
equipment or components from wrong operation. In addition, a fail-safe system has been
introduced which is designed to ensure operation of equipment or components on thesafe side in case that failure occurs in a part of the system.
For example, the Japan Electric Association formulated the “Rule on Equipment Designfor Preventing Mis-Operation in Reactor Control Rooms of Nuclear Power Stations”(JEAG-4624) that specifies required items for systems to be installed in such a way as toensure their safe operation and prevent any mis-operation in the reactor control roomsof nuclear power stations, which has become a guideline for licensees in their designingof control rooms.
As for measures licensees take to meet regulatory requirements related to prevent misoperation, such methods of preventing mis-operation are adopted as use of display
devices on the control board; arrangement of alarm system and operating devices;
identification by color for each type of liquid flowing inside the piping in local; locking
control of control panels of equipment and manual valves.
In terms of operation and control, licensees are required to set up a system to foster safety
culture and a quality assurance plan, and also provide provisions related to safety
education targeting staff in charge of operation and control of reactors in their
86

ARTICLE 12 Human Factors
Operational Safety Programs. In addition, as part of quality assurance activities, they areproviding accident prediction training, including case study based on past failure
examples, for staff in charge of operation and control by having them form small groups
as a target of the training, in order to have safety actions established in their work.

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ARTICLE 13 Quality Assurance
ARTICLE 13

QUALITY ASSURANCE

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance
programmes are established and implemented with a view to providing confidence thatspecified requirements for all activities important to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout
the life of a nuclear installation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 13
The NRA has requirements in place for quality assurance in the design phase of a nuclear
power plant and requires a licensee to develop a quality assurance plan in its Operational
Safety Programs. This ensures that a quality assurance plan will be developed andimplemented in all activities, from the design phase to the operational anddecommissioning phases, which are important to nuclear safety. Thus, the provision of
Article 13 of the Convention is achieved.

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ARTICLE 13 Quality Assurance
1

Regulatory Requirements and Measures

The Reactor Regulation Act requires that the quality control methods and inspection
systems comply with regulatory requirement of the NRA Ordinance13. In practice, thisordinance requires that a quality control supervision system be established for thedesign and construction of reactor facilities; that the responsibility of management
executives be clearly stated; and that management of human and other resources,
planning and implementation of specific duties, measurement, analysis, and continuous
improvement be carried out.
In the former system, the quality methods and inspection systems had been reviewed to
be technically appropriate through the licensing process of the approval of Construction
Plan. In accordance with the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in April, 2017,
the licensing process of the quality assurance is under revision in order to be includedin the earlier stage, i. e. that of Reactor Installation Permit, aiming to be enforced in
April 2020.
Concerning operational safety activities, licensees shall outline a quality assurance planin their Operational Safety Programs, and shall make continuous improvements to thisplan, as well as planning, implementing, evaluating, and improving operational safety
activities.
Quality assurance plans shall be dealt with an organizational unit managed by licensee’s
senior management; clearly identify responsibilities, authority, and duties; and settle
mechanisms for the formulation, implementation, evaluation, and continuous
improvement of the plans.
Operational safety plans shall establish appropriate management methods covering
goods or services procurement; procedures for the appropriate management ofoperational safety documents and records; and education and training courses in safety
activities.
It is necessary to clarify individual goals and requirements during operational safety
activities, and to check at appropriate times that these are being carried out in accordancewith the implementation plan.
To check this, licensees shall conduct requisite inspections and tests, and establish aneffective system to deal with incidents of noncompliance.
To evaluate operational safety activities, licensees must conduct systematic monitoringand implementation procedures; auditing should be carried out on a regular basis by

13

the NRA Ordinance on Quality Control Methods
89

ARTICLE 13 Quality Assurance
persons not directly involved in the items under review.
Licensees should establish procedures to ensure the continuous improvement ofoperational safety activities and to institute preventive measures to avoid
noncompliance situations or, should one occur, to introduce remedial measures toprevent recurrence. Preventive measures acquired at both their own plants and othernuclear facilities should be evaluated and, where appropriate, incorporated by licensees
in their operations.
Matters concerning the quality assurance in the licensing process are reported in Article
7 and 19.
2

Implementation Status of Quality Assurance by Licensees

Based on the private-sector quality assurance standard for ensuring safety at nuclear
power stations (JEAC 4111-2009), licensees formulate quality assurance plans andconduct quality assurance activities in order to meet the regulatory requirements
mentioned in the section above.
The technical adequacy of the JEAC 4111-2009 standard was endorsed by the former
regulatory authority, NISA, when it was published as a set of specifications and criteria
for meeting statutory performance standards; it complies with the quality assurance
requirements of the IAEA’s safety standard GS-R-3.
In terms of the general requirements in JEAC 4111-2009, licensees are required toestablish, document, implement, and maintain a quality management system, as well as
making continuous improvements. These regulations establish specific requirements fora quality management system including “responsibility of senior management,”“operational management of resources,” “planning and implementation of duties,” and“evaluation and improvement.”
Human resources requirements stipulate that a key personnel involved in nuclear safety
must be competent based on judgment in areas of education, training, skills andexperience.
Licensees shall identify necessary competences and, if necessary, provide further
education and training to ensure the designated personnel to reach the required level.
Licensees shall conduct procurement procedures having clearly identified therequirements for product approval procedures, processes, and equipment; personnel
competence checks, and quality management systems. Moreover, the standard stipulates
that the procured items must be inspected on the premises of the supplier, if possible, toensure that they meet set standards.
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ARTICLE 13 Quality Assurance
As for the operation of reactor facilities, reactor quality assurance programs are audited.
To guarantee its impartiality the audit should be conducted by an appropriate
department at the licensee’s head office which has no direct involvement with thedepartment running the nuclear facility. In general, the auditing department is directly
under control of the president in the company’s organizational structure so that thepresident can be quickly informed of any situation needing remedial action or
improvement.
In procurement management, it is common for licensees to conduct audits of suppliers
directly, to ensure that the suppliers satisfy requirements written in the specification.
The specification is provided to the supplier at the time of ordering and the products arethen checked upon delivery.
If checks are required during the product manufacturing process, the licensees candirectly check that process.
In the case of services, the specification is given to the service provider in advance inorder to ensure that a person with the requisite skills is dealt with.
These include checking to confirm that the provider has technicians with the required
specific skills i.e. welding.
The provider shall submit to the licensee a quality assurance plan to guarantee all
requirements are met.
Thus this prevents sub-standard outsourcing to providers with inappropriate quality
assurance systems.
As described above, licensees in Japan recognize steadily that quality assurance systems
constitute one of the major elements for maintaining their own quality assurance
systems; accordingly, mechanisms to enable licensees themselves to conduct audits ofproviders and suppliers are being developed, as required.

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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
ARTICLE 14

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the construction
and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life. Such assessments shallbe well documented, subsequently updated in the light of operating experience andsignificant new safety information, and reviewed under the authority of the regulatorybody;(ii) verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to ensure thatthe physical state and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in accordancewith its design, applicable national safety requirements, and operational limits andconditions.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 14
During the period of obtaining the Reactor Installation Permit, licensees must conduct
an evaluation to confirm that the basic reactor facility design does not interfere withprevention measures against disasters during the construction, licensees must evaluate
safety measures for facilities through the approval process of the construction plan. In
addition, licensees must obtain the approval of Operational Safety Programs whichclarify limitations and conditions for the operation of the reactor facility before the startof the operation, and the NRA needs to confirm that the operation is continuously
conducted under these limitations and conditions based on the Operational Safety
Programs. In the case of changing the safety programs, the licensees are to obtain an
approval of modification of equipment, as needed, after the evaluation on thecorrespondence of the safety programs.
After starting the operation of the nuclear power reactor facility, licensees are required
to conduct an evaluation for improvement in the safety of the facility as well as to reportto the NRA and disclose the results of the evaluation. The licensees must conduct aging
evaluation every 10 years after 30 years of the operation, and in the case of extending theoperational period, conduct an evaluation for a license application before 40 years of theoperation.
The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates the NRA to validate the evaluation conducted bylicensees in the licensing process of safety reviews, and to conduct Pre-service
Inspections at the construction stage, Periodic Facility Inspections and Operational
Safety Inspections during the operational stage, in order to check the safety of reactor
facilities from both hardware and software aspects.
Therefore evaluations are conducted throughout the installation phase and the92

ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
operational period of the nuclear power facility under the supervision of the regulatory
body, and the provision of Article 14 of the Convention is conformed.
Article 14 (1)Safety Assessments

1

Overview of regulatory requirements

1-1

Safety Assessments on Reactor Installation

Those who seek to construct reactor facilities, must provide the description that the basic
design and design principles of the reactor do not interfere with the disaster prevention,in addition to an installation permit application. Such documentation must be submitted
to the NRA, pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
To obtain Reactor Installation Permit, applicants are required to show the equipment
necessary for the response to abnormal transients during operation, design-basis
accidents, and severe accidents, conditions set to evaluate the scales and the impacts ofaccidents assumed to occur and to explain, and based on the results of these evaluation,
they are required to explain that the safety of these nuclear facilities is ensured.
After obtaining Reactor Installation Permit, licensees must obtain the approval ofConstruction Plan from the NRA before the commencement of the construction, as wellas an approval of the design of the fuel assembly to be loaded in the reactor, except forimported fuel assemblies.
When applying for the approval of Construction Plan, licensees must conduct anevaluation to confirm that the detailed design meets the conditions approved in theReactor Installation Permit. Licensees are required to append descriptions on the
durability, the earthquake resistance, safety-related design features specific to theapplied equipment and so forth, as the result of a safety evaluation conducted bylicensees, based on the detailed design for the reactor facilities.
When seeking an approval for the design of the fuel assembly, applicants must attach adocument covering features of the fuel assembly such as its resistance of the heat,radiation and corrosion, as well as a document featuring calculations of the strength of
the fuel assembly (or the fuel elements, if the assembly consists of a bundle of fuelelements), a structural drawing of the fuel assembly, a flow chart for fabrication, and adocument concerning quality assurance.
In addition, licensees must conduct welding inspections focusing specifically on parts
such as pressure boundaries and containment vessel, and licensee’s organizational
structure for these inspections must be reviewed by the NRA.
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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
Before beginning reactor operation, licensees must also obtain the approval ofOperational Safety Programs, which must comply to assure the operational safety.
Descriptions concerning Reactor Installation Permit, the approval of Construction Plan,
Pre-service Inspections, the approval of Fuel Assembly Design, the approval ofOperational Safety Programs are detailed in Article 7, 17 and 19.
1-2

Safety Evaluation on Reactor Operation

The safety evaluation during the operational phase of power reactors consist of (1)Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement, (2) Technical Aging Evaluation,and (3) the approval of extending operational period. Their relations in technicalevaluations and application documents are as follows.
(1)

Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement

Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement has been newly introduced by
the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2012, based on the TEPCO’s Fukushima
Daiichi NPS accident. With the former system of Periodical Safety Review (PSR)
incorporated, this system requires the licensee to conduct an evaluation of the safety ofthe power reactor facility by themselves no later than six months after the day when
Periodic Facility Inspection of the facility is finished. The licensee must report the resultsof the evaluation to the NRA and disclose the results to the public.
According to the Operational Guide, the licensee is required to make mid to long-term
evaluations on the aging of components and structures with safety functions of thenuclear power reactor. In mid to long-term evaluations of the aging (to be implemented
every 10 years in principle) among evaluations of Periodic Safety Assessment ofContinuous Improvement of nuclear facilities, it is possible to use the results of the mostrecent technical aging evaluation (see (2)).
See Article 17 (3) for the Operational Guide for Periodic Safety Assessment ofContinuous Improvement.
(2)Technical Aging Evaluation

Technical Aging Evaluation system is to evaluate the integrity of components andstructures with safety functions of a nuclear reactor in every 10 years after 30 years of its
operation. The licensee is required to extract aging events worth noting in terms of aging
measures against the components and the structures, make technical evaluation in termsof integrity, and then develop a long-term maintenance policy for the coming 10 years.
The long‐term maintenance policy is to be included in the Operational Safety Programs
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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
and must be approved by the NRA.
(3)

Approval of Extending Operational Period

The system of approval of extending operational period was introduced in the amended
Reactor Regulation Act of 2012. Nuclear power reactors can be operated for 40 years after
the start of their operation, but this system allows an extension of operational period
once, up to 20 years if approved by the NRA before the expiration of the operating periodof 40 years. Licensees must conduct Special Inspection indicated in Tables 14-1 and -2 toassess the condition of degradation caused by the operation of reactors and otherequipment, carry out a technical evaluation of any degradation while referring
requirements shown in Table 14-3, set out the Maintenance Management Program
during the extended period, and receive approvals from the NRA. If the evaluation of
degradation is conducted integrally with the Technical Evaluation of Aging, it is allowed
to use those results for the approval of extending operational period.
Table 14-1

Equipment and Areas Subject to Special Inspection at PWR Plants and theInspection Methods Used

Equipment
Targeted

Reactor vessel(RV)

Areas Targeted

Inspection Method- Base metal and welded parts (100%of the reactor core area)- Primary coolant nozzle corner (thepart with the highest fatigue usage
factor)- Check for defects using ultrasonicinspection- Check for cracks by means ofsurface inspection or eddy-current
testing- Check for cracks in the welded partsin question, using MVT-114, andcheck for defects on the innersurface of the bottom mounted
instrumentation nozzles by meansof surface inspection or eddycurrent testing- Visual check of the condition of thecoating- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration bymeans of core sampling- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration bymeans of core sampling- Bottom mounted instrumentation
nozzles (all)14
15

Containment
vessel(CV)- Steel plates for the SCV(all areas
which are possible to get closeenough to inspect)- PCCV

Concrete
structures- Concrete structures designed toensure the safety of reactor15(primary shield wall)

Visual inspection using a camera that can distinguish between wires with a width of 0.025mm
Support functions, shielding functions, leak-prevention functions, etc.

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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety

Table 14-2

Equipment and Areas Subject to Special Inspection at BWR Plants and theInspection Methods Used

Equipment
Targeted

Reactorpressure vessel(RPV)

Areas Targeted- Base metal and welded parts (reactor
core area and all areas which arepossible to get close enough toinspect)- Feed water nozzle corner (the partwith the highest fatigue usage
factor)- Control rod drive mechanism stubtubes and drive housing (all).

- Foundation bolts (all)Primary
containment
vessel(PCV)Concrete
structures- Suppression chamber vent pipes andvent pipe bellows (Mark I, modified
Mark I)- Steel plates for the SCV (all areas
which are possible to get closeenough to inspect)- RCCV- Concrete structures with functions
required to ensure the safety ofreactor (reactor pressure vesselpedestal or equivalent part, etc.)

Inspection Method- Check for defects using ultrasonicinspection- Check for cracks by means ofsurface inspection or eddycurrent testing- Check for cracks in the weldedparts in question, using MVT-1,
and check for defects on the innersurface of the housing by meansof surface inspection or eddycurrent testing- Check via ultrasonic inspection,
to ensure there are no anomalies
within the bolts- Check for hazardous defects or
cracks, by means of surface
inspection of all relevant surfaces,
using MVT-1- Visual check of the condition of
the coating- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration
by means of core sampling- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration
by means of core sampling

For the approval of operational extension period, all construction plans required to comply
with the technical standards need to already be approved or submitted by the time theoperational extension period is approved, and the results of technical aging evaluation mustcomply with the requirements16 in Table 14-3 during the extended operational period. If theresults of the technical evaluation do not comply with these requirements shown in Table
14-3, the implementation of the Maintenance Management Program may be considered inan evaluation for compliance with the requirements.

16

Examination criteria for the extension of the operational period of commercial power reactors

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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety

Table 14-3

Requirements for the Extension of the Operation Period

Events/issues to be evaluatedLow-cycle fatigue

Neutron irradiation embrittlement

Irradiation-assisted stress corrosion
cracking

Requirements
As a result of evaluation of integrity, the fatigue
usage factor for the area to be evaluated shall beless than one (1).
• As a result of evaluation of pressurized thermal
shock, the value of the static planar strain fracture
toughness in the area to be evaluated of thereactor pressure vessel shall exceed the value ofthe stress intensity factor.
• The following requirements shall be met
depending on the in-service state of the reactor
pressure vessel. This does not apply if the upper
shelf absorbed energy is equal or more than 68 J.
- As a result of evaluation of ductile crack
growth, in the area to be evaluated, the crack
growth resistance exceeds the crack-driving
force.
- As a result of evaluation of crack instability, inthe area to be evaluated, the crack growthresistance is equal to the crack-driving force andthe minimal change rate of the crack growthresistance exceeds that of the crack-driving
force.
- As a result of evaluation of crack depth, in thearea to be evaluated, the crack depth does notexceed 75% of the wall thickness of the reactor
pressure vessel.
- As a result of evaluation of a plastic instability
failure, it does not occur in the area to beevaluated.
• From the evaluation results above, it isdetermined that it is possible to set the limits ofthe temperature and the pressure range of the
primary coolant during normal heating andcooling of the primary coolant system that can becomplied with as operating limits, the leakage
during the operation from the reactor coolant
pressure boundary, or the minimum temperatureof the reactor coolant in a hydraulic test.
If, as a result of evaluation of integrity, it isdetermined that irradiation-assisted stress corrosion
cracking may occur in the area to be evaluated, thecriteria set forth in the Technical Standards shall be
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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
Events/issues to be evaluated

Thermal aging of duplex stainless steel

Decrease in electrical insulation ofelectrical and/or instrumentationequipment

Decrease inconcretestrength

Heat

Concrete structure

Radiation

Neutralization

Chloride
penetration

Alkali-silica

Requirements
met based on the assumption that an irradiationassisted stress corrosion crack is generated andgrows.
• As a result of evaluation of ductile crack growth,in the area to be evaluated, the crack growthresistance exceeds the crack-driving force.
• As a result of evaluation of crack instability, inthe area to be evaluated, the crack growthresistance is equal to the crack-driving force andthe minimal change rate of the crack growthresistance exceeds that of the crack-driving force.
• As a result of evaluation of integrity based on the
results of inspection, there is no significant
decrease in the electrical insulation of electricaland/or instrumentation equipment.
• As a result of evaluation of integrity based on the
results of environmental qualification testing,there is no significant decrease in the electricalinsulation of electrical and/or instrumentationequipment.
If the concrete temperature in the area to beevaluated has exceeded the limit (90°C for
penetrated parts and 650°C for other parts), a
strength evaluation shall be conducted and thestrength of materials or structures comprising thearea shall exceed the design load.
If the cumulative radiation dose of the area to beevaluated exceeds or may exceed a level that may
affect the strength of concrete, a strength
evaluation shall be conducted and the strength ofmaterials or structures comprising the area shallexceed the design load.
If it is determined that the neutralization of concretein the area to be evaluated has reached or may reacha depth where the corrosion of the reinforcing bars is
initiated, a strength evaluation shall be conducted
and the strength of materials or structurescomprising the area shall exceed the design load.
If significant cracking due to reinforcement
corrosion caused by chloride penetration has
occurred or may occur in the area to be evaluated,a strength evaluation shall be conducted and thestrength of materials or structures comprising thearea shall exceed the design load.
If significant cracking due to alkali-silica reaction
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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
Events/issues to be evaluatedreaction

Mechanicalvibration

Freezing andthawing

Degradationof shielding
performanceof concrete

Heat

Decrease in
the strength ofreinforcing
bars

Corrosion

Fatigue caused
by wind andother loads

Events to be evaluated other than theabove

Evaluation of seismic safety

Requirements
has occurred in the area to be evaluated, a strength
evaluation shall be conducted and the strength ofmaterials or structures comprising the area shallexceed the design load.
If significant cracking due to mechanical vibration
has occurred in the surface of concrete in theanchorage zone in the concrete foundation of theequipment to be evaluated, a strength evaluation
shall be conducted and the strength of materials or
structures comprising the area shall exceed thedesign load.
If significant cracking due to freezing and thawing
has occurred in the area to be evaluated, a strength
evaluation shall be conducted and the strength ofmaterials or structures comprising the area shallexceed the design load.
If the temperature of the concrete neutron radiation
shield has exceeded 88°C or the temperature of theconcrete gamma radiation shield exceeds 177°C, a
radiation shielding evaluation shall be conducted
and the shielding performance of materials or
structures comprising the area shall not be lower
than the level set forth in the reactor installation
permit.
If a loss of cross-section due to corrosion has
occurred in the area to be evaluated, a strength
evaluation shall be conducted and the strength ofmaterials or structures comprising the area shallexceed the design load.
If a fatigue failure caused by wind and other cyclicloads has occurred or may occur in the area to beevaluated, a strength evaluation shall be conducted
and the strength of materials or structurescomprising the area shall exceed the design load.
In an event not subject to degradation
management, such as degradation trend
monitoring, an evaluation of integrity shall be
conducted based on the assumption that it occurs
and progresses in case of the actual or the potential
occurrence or progress, and the results shall meetthe criteria set forth in the Technical Standards.
• For the components or the structure considering
aging events, the stress and the usage factor
caused by seismic forces shall be below the99

ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
Events/issues to be evaluatedEvaluation of tsunami safety

Requirementsallowable seismic design limit.
• For the components or the structure considering
aging events, the stress , the crack-driving force
and the stress intensity factor caused by seismic
forces shall be below the allowable fracture
mechanics evaluation limit on postulated cracks.
• For the components or the structure considering
aging events, that are required to function
dynamically in an earthquake the response
acceleration at the time of an earthquake shall beless than the level at which the components andthe structure have been confirmed to function.
• For the fuel assembly considering aging events,
the displacement in an earthquake is less than
the relative displacement at which the fuelassembly has been confirmed to function or thecontrol rod insertion time is less than the value
specified for the safety evaluation.
For the components or the structure considering
aging events, the stress caused by a tsunami shallbe below the allowable limit.

Degradation situations subject to evaluation and the evaluation techniques to be used
are outlined in technical evaluations of degradation. The evaluation focuses on situations
such as stress corrosion cracking, corrosion, embrittlement, abrasion, fatigue cracking,and other possibilities.
Licensees must submit the Maintenance Management Program covering all relevant
maintenance measures identified as a result of technical evaluation of degradation foran extended period.
For the maintenance during an extended operational period, a system for aging
management is used, thereby ensuring appropriate implementations such as making theMaintenance Management Program focused on the end of the extended operational
period effective for 10 years. Under this system, licensees are required to include in their
Operational Safety Programs a degradation evaluation for the equipment which is to bedone in every 10 years and the Maintenance Management Program, both for the reactors
being in operation for 30 years or more, and they must ensure their compliance..
The content of maintenance implemented in each operational cycle according theMaintenance Management Program is reflected in the inspections and the maintenanceplan of the individual equipment, taking into account past inspection performances andthe status of degradation, and these details are checked by the NRA.
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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
Under this system, an NRA Operational Safety Inspector checks the implementation of
the maintenance plan by such means as an Operational Safety Inspection. Figure 14-1
provides an outline.
Approval of Operational
Safety Programs

30th year

Technical evaluation of
aging facilities

Advancesubmission

Specify the timing of
implementation,
implementation plan, andprogress status

Operational Safety Programs
Maintenance & management policy(every 10 years)
Reflected

Substantial
maintenance
plan

Maintenanceplan

Substantial
maintenanceplan

Substantial
periodic
inspection

Periodic
inspection

Substantial
maintenanceplan

Substantial
periodic
inspection

Maintenance plan implementation status checked by means of an inspection (operational safety inspection, etc.)

Figure 14-1
Article 14 (2)Maintenance Activities at Reactor Facilities

Verification of Safety

Even though receiving the approval of Construction Plan, licensees shall not use thefacility until it passes a Pre-service Inspection. Also licensees shall not use the fuelassembly unless it passes the Fuel Assembly Inspection. As for welding, licensees must
conduct welding inspections on welds of the pressure parts, containment vessels, andother necessary parts, and also undergo a review by the NRA on a system related to theinspections. Based on the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in April 2017, these
inspections shall be conducted as Licensee’s Pre-service Inspection, and licensees shallnot use the facility unless licensees receive confirmation by the NRA on conformance tothe inspection criteria.
In addition, throughout the operating period of a nuclear facility, licensees are obliged
to undergo Licensee’s Periodic Inspections, to comply with the Operational Safety
Programs, as well as to receive Periodic Facility Inspection, Periodic Safety Management
Reviews, and Operational Safety Inspections (inspections on the status of compliancewith the Operational Safety Programs) conducted by the NRA. A report on details of101

ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
inspection systems is provided in Article 19.
It is determined, based on the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in April 2017,that these inspections by the NRA are conducted as Nuclear Regulatory Inspections andscheduled to be put into force in April 2020.

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ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
ARTICLE 15

RADIATION PROTECTION

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all
operational states the radiation exposure to the workers and the public caused by anuclear installation shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable and that noindividual shall be exposed to radiation doses which exceed prescribed national dose
limits.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 15
Working conditions of radiation workers at nuclear facilities ensure they are not exposed
to levels in excess of those prescribed in law.
Established release control targets for gaseous and liquid wastes are set lower than legal
concentration limits. Such waste is treated by filtration or allowing radioactive decay
over time to reduce the concentration of radioactive material that it contains, and ismanaged to ensure that radioactivity concentrations outside the supervised area do not
exceed the prescribed limits.
Activities to reduce the exposure dose include management of prior records of radiation
exposure and task management.
Thus, it is ensured that the dose of workers and those engaged in radiation work is kept
as low as reasonably achievable and does not exceed the dose limits. Thus, the provisionof Article 15 of the Convention is achieved.

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ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
1

Regulatory Requirements

Radiation control in commercial power reactor facilities is provided for in the NRA
Ordinance on Commercial Reactors under the Reactor Regulation Act. Baseline levels
for dose limits etc. are specified in the Notification to Establish Dose Limits in
Accordance with the Provisions of the NRA Ordinance Concerning the Installation,
Operation of Commercial Power Reactors (Notification on Doses).
Radiation controlled area, protection area and supervised area are required to be designatedin a commercial power reactor facility. Radiation doses, concentrations and density incontrolled areas and dose limits outside the supervised areas are specified in the Notification
on Doses.
Radiation controlled area must be clearly separated by a fence or wall from other areas
by placing an identification sign, and is subject to measures, such as access control andlock control, depending on the risk of radiation. A protection area is out of radiation
controlled area that requires special control to ensure the safety of a nuclear reactor
facility. The area must be clearly differentiated from other areas by placing a sign oroffering other means of identification and are subject to measures, such as access control,
lock control and a restriction on objects to be brought out in accordance with therequirements.
A supervised area is an area around a controlled area, outside of which the dose limits
set by the NRA are not likely to be exceeded. People are prohibited from living in thisarea. A fence must be placed along the boundary to restrict the entry of people other thanthose who enter the area to work.
For the purpose of radiation control of radiation workers, the commercial power reactor
licensee is required to ensure that the dose of radiation workers should not exceed thedose limits set by the NRA and the concentration of airborne radioactive material inhaledby radiation workers does not exceed the concentration limits set by the NRA. If it isunavoidable due to an emergency such as damage to a commercial power reactor, thelicensee is allowed to engage radiation workers in emergency work within the dose
limits set by the NRA. The dose limits set by the NRA are shown in the Table 15-1 below.

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ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
Table 15-1 Dose limits
Item
A Radiation worker(1) Effective dose limit(2) Women(3) Pregnant women(4) Equivalent dose limit for the lens of
the eye(5) Equivalent dose limit for the skin(6) Equivalent dose limit for the surfaceof the abdomen of pregnant women

Dose limits
100 mSv/5 years and 50 mSv/year
5 mSv/3 months in addition to the limit
specified in (1)1 mSv for internal exposure in addition to
the limit specified in (1); for the period after
the employee comes to know about the
pregnancy until the baby is born
150 mSv/year

500 mSv/year
2 mSv; for the period after the employee
comes to know about the pregnancy until thebaby is born
B Radiation workers to engage in emergency work
(1) Effective dose limit
100 mSv (250 mSv17 )(2) Equivalent dose limit for the lens of
300 mSv
the eye(3) Equivalent dose limit for the skin
1 Sv

For the purpose of discharge control of radioactive waste, in discharging gaseous waste,
the concentration of radioactive material in the discharge gas must be reduced as muchas possible in a exhaust air system by means such as filtering the gas, reducing theradiation level over time and diluting it with a large amount of air, and the concentrationof radioactive material in the discharge gas must be monitored at the discharge outlet orin the discharge gas monitoring system. In discharging liquid waste, the concentrationof radioactive material in the discharge water must be reduced as much as possible in adrainage facility by means of filtering the liquid, evaporating it, adsorption in an ion
exchange resin column etc., reducing the radiation level over time, and diluting it witha large amount of water, and the concentration of radioactive material in the discharge
water must be monitored at the discharge outlet or in the discharge water monitoring
system.

The dose rate limit in case any event described in any number of section 2, article 7th of the Notification
on Doses occurred.
17

105

ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
2

Licensee’s Radiation Protection Program

In addition to measures required by regulation, such as compliance with the designationof radiation controlled areas and other areas and the dose limits required by regulation,
licensees have detailed radiation control measures in place, such as the use of a personal
dosimeter with an alarm to measure a radiation dose at each entry into a radiation
controlled area. In Japan, the ALARA concept is widely accepted by licensees. Essentially,in conducting radiation works, it is understood that unnecessary exposure should be
avoided. In a nuclear power plant in operation, three elements (time, distance andshielding) in reducing exposure are implemented, such as controlling access to radiation
controlled areas, reducing the duration of work by performing radiation work in aplanned manner, ensuring the distance from radiation sources, and installing a shield.
In addition, the water quality of primary systems is fully controlled to reduce thegeneration of radiation sources by activation in primary systems.
Based on the Reactor Regulation Act, in our country, any nuclear reactor licensee isrequired to record the dose rate of the radiation workers and store the records during theperiod required by the NRA Ordinance.
The records as provided above shall be stored, provided, however, that this shall not apply
where the person who has lost his position as a radiation worker or where the said records
are to be passed to the organization specified by the NRA after they have been stored forfive years or longer, the Radiation Effect Association is designated as the specified
organization.
The Figure 15-1 shows the ten-year total and average dose of radiation workers innuclear power plants, excluding the Fukushima Daiichi NPS.
The Fukushima Daiichi NPS is currently in the process of recovery from the accident andthe working conditions there are different from those in other power plants. The total
number of radiation workers is about 47,900 in all power plants, excluding the
Fukushima Daiichi NPS, while there are about 20,700 radiation workers in the
Fukushima Daiichi NPS alone. In Fukushima Daiichi, a very large number of radiation
workers work and doses in the work environment are high. Therefore, if the data fromthe Fukushima Daiichi NPS is included, its contribution accounts for most of the total
and average dose data. In 2018, the total dose in Fukushima Daiichi was 27.62 personSv and the average dose was 2.4 mSv.

106

ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
3

Dose Reduction Efforts in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

In the early stages of the earthquake disaster in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, the systemsuch as that for worker access control and dose data collection and processing wasdamaged and electronic dosimeters and charging equipment were not available for use,making it difficult to fully perform individual dose control. Currently, the system is backin operation, and individual dose control has been in place and dose reduction efforts havebeen made.
TEPCO has made efforts to reduce the doses by providing a radiation shield for highly
radioactive equipment on the site of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, cutting trees, andperforming decontamination activities such as removing surface soil and plowing to
replace surface soil with subsoil.
Due to these efforts, in most of the site area of the power plant, workers can work withsimple respiratory protective equipment on, such as a half-face mask or dust respirator.
In dose control, significant improvements have been made to the work environment. For
example, the average dose has been reduced to about 1 mSv/month.

Person Sv

Total dose100

Average dose

mSv

1.5

80

1.2

60

0.9

40

0.6

20

0.3

0

0.0
2008

2009

2010

2011

Figure 15-1

2012

2013

Fiscal year

2014

2015

2016

Total Dose and Average Dose

107

2017

ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
4

Release Control of Gaseous/Liquid Waste
In accordance with the provisions of the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors,
licensees reduce the concentration of radioactive material in gaseous waste as far as
possible by such means as filtration in an exhaust air system, radioactive decay overtime, or dilution, and then, measure and monitor its release.
In the case of liquid waste, they reduce the concentration of radioactive material as far
as possible by filtration, evaporation, adsorbing with the ion exchange resin method,
radioactive decay over time, or dilution in a drainage facility, and then, they measureand monitor its release.
Licensees prescribe and manage in their own Operational Safety Programs to control
the release of gaseous and liquid waste ensuring that the legally-prescribed radioactive
material concentration limits outside supervised area shall not be exceeded.
To ensure that release levels are below the legal limits outside the supervised area,
licensees decide the control targets based on the annual release quantity evaluated in
the process of application for Reactor Installation Permit. They guarantee in their
Operational Safety Programs that they will not exceed those levels and the NRA checks
the status of compliance when conducting Operational Safety Inspections.
Figures 15-2 and 15-3 show the amount of gaseous and liquid waste discharged fromreactor facilities (BWRs and PWRs) in the past 10 years reported by licensees inaccordance with the Reactor Regulation Act.

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ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection

1.0E+11
1.0E+101.0E+09
1.0E+08
1.0E+07
kBq

1.0E+06

Radioactive Noble gases

1.0E+05

lodine 131

1.0E+04
1.0E+03
1.0E+022008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Fiscal year

Figure15-2 The Quantity of Gaseous Waste Released
1.0E+12Tritiumother

1.0E+101.0E+08
kBq1.0E+06

1.0E+04
1.0E+02
1.0E+00

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Fiscal year

Figure15-3 The Quantity of Liquid Waste Released

5

Environmental Radiation Monitoring
To evaluate the impact of radioactive release to the surrounding environment from thenuclear facility, licensees monitor air radiation does rates and environmental samples
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ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
with the aim of improving release control and facility management.
To help protect the health and safety of nearby public communities, local governments(in prefectures where reactor facilities are located) also conduct local radiation
monitoring.
As for the radiation monitoring related to the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS
accident, the Government conduct radiation monitoring in partnership with therelevant ministries and local governments based on “Comprehensive Radiation
Monitoring Plan (decided in August 2011, revised in February 2019, Radiation
Monitoring Coordination Meeting)”
Measurement results of the environmental radiation monitoring are uploaded on thewebsite of the “Disaster Prevention and Nuclear Safety Network for the Nuclear
Environment “(https://www.bousai.ne.jp/eng/), which is run by the NRA, enabling thegeneral public to see it in real time. Measurement results of air dose rates are releasedon the aforementioned Japanese-version website in real-time.

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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
ARTICLE 161

2

3

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSEach Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site andoff-site emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover theactivities to be carried out in the event of an emergency. For any new nuclear installation,such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences operation above a low power
level agreed by the regulatory body.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as they arelikely to be affected by a radiological emergency, its own population and the competentauthorities of the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation are provided withappropriate information for emergency planning and response.
Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear installation on their territory, insofar as
they are likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a nuclear
installation in the vicinity, shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testingof emergency plans for their territory that cover the activities to be carried out in the eventof such an emergency.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 16
In accordance with the Basic Act on Disaster Management and the Nuclear Emergency
Act, the Basic Disaster Management Plan includes sections on countermeasures related
to nuclear emergencies. The Plan defines basic issues about emergency responses andassigned roles of the national government, local governments, and nuclear operators(licensees) under emergencies. The Nuclear Emergency Act requires licensees to develop
the Nuclear Operator’s Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Plan. Relevant
local governments develop their own local disaster management plan and evacuation
plan. Drills and exercises are conducted complying with these plans at licensee, local
governments, and the national government levels.
For the purpose to improve and reinforce governmental organizations for the nuclear
emergencies preparedness and response, Nuclear Disaster Management Bureau wasestablished in the Cabinet Office on 14th October 2014. Nuclear Disaster Management
Bureau, CAO, is in charge to improve and reinforce off-site preparedness and response
under nuclear emergencies. It supports the relevant local government organizations todevelop their local disaster management plans and evacuation plans, supports theiremergency response during emergencies, and conducts drills at the national level etc.
In terms of the relationship with the neighboring countries, Japan’s domestic radiologicalemergencies are not expected to impact other countries because of its geographic
situation that Japan is separated by the ocean from neighboring countries. In light of the111

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
importance of information sharing, Japan, China and Korea have agreed to share
emergency information within the framework of the Japan-China-Korea Top Regulators
Meeting.
Thus, emergency response plans are in place, emergency drills and exercises are
conducted, and additionally an information sharing mechanism exists amongneighboring countries, which means that it conforms to the provision of Article 16 of theConvention.

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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
Article 16 (1)Emergency Plans

1

Outline of the Laws and Regulations on Nuclear Emergencies

1-1

Nuclear Emergency Response Under Nuclear Emergency Act.

(1)

Precautionary protective measures

Licensees are responsible to take actions to prevent, mitigate, and recover from nuclear
emergencies. They must develop EPR plans for their nuclear power stations respectively.
Prior to development or amendment, these plans must be consulted with governors ofprefectures and mayors of the municipalities which the nuclear facility is located at, andwhich are facing to them. After developing or amending the plan, licensee must submit
it to the Prime Minster and the NRA and disclose the summary. The Prime Minister andthe NRA may order licensee to make changes to the plan if it is considered to beinadequate for preventing occurrence and development of a nuclear emergency.
Licensee must establish a nuclear emergency preparedness organization for each nuclear
site, place nuclear emergency preparedness personnel, and provide an update of the statusof nuclear emergency preparedness personnel to the NRA and the governor of theprefecture and the mayor of the municipalities where the nuclear facility is located, as wellas to the governors of the neighboring prefectures. The NRA may order licensee toestablish a nuclear emergency preparedness organization or place nuclear emergency
preparedness personnel if it is considered that licensee is in violation of this requirement.
Licensee must appoint a nuclear emergency preparedness manager for each nuclear site
to manage the nuclear emergency preparedness organization and a deputy nuclear
emergency preparedness manager to assist the nuclear emergency preparedness
manager. After appointing the nuclear emergency preparedness manager and the
deputy nuclear emergency preparedness manager, licensee must report the appointment
to the NRA and the governor of the prefecture and the mayor of the municipalities where
nuclear facility is located, as well as the governors of the neighboring prefectures. The
NRA may order licensee to appoint or dismiss a nuclear emergency preparedness
manager or a deputy nuclear emergency preparedness manager if the licensee is inviolation of this requirement or the nuclear emergency preparedness manager or the
deputy nuclear emergency preparedness manager is in violation of this law or
requirements of an order in accordance this this law.
Upon occurrence of an event specified in the government ordinance, the nuclear
emergency preparedness manager must report it to the Prime Minister, the NRA and thegovernor of the prefecture and the mayor of the municipalities where the nuclear facility
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
is located, as well as to the governors of the neighboring prefectures involved. This
notification is commonly called Article 10 Notification because it is required by Article 10of Nuclear Emergency Act. Events subject to Article 10 Notification is called specified
events.
Licensees are required to install and maintain the necessary radiation measurement
instruments to make Article 10 Notification and to have in place the necessary nuclear
emergency prevention equipment for the nuclear emergency preparedness organization
to perform its duties, such as radiation hazard prevention equipment and emergency
communication equipment, and to inspect and maintain the equipment. Radiation
measurement instruments installed by licensee are subject to inspection by the NRA. The
Prime Minister or the NRA can order licensee to take necessary action if it is consideredthat the licensee is in violation of these requirements. Licensee must keep a record of thedoses detected by the installed radiation measurement instruments and disclose therecord.
The Prime Minister designates a facility for each nuclear site that will be used as thecenter for emergency response actions and post-nuclear emergency actions. This facility
is called an Off-site center. Licensees must provide the Prime Minister with the necessary
documents to take emergency response actions and post-nuclear emergency actions. The
documents will be available at the Off-site center.
The Government’s emergency exercises are conducted in accordance with the plandeveloped by the Prime Minister. Before developing the plan, the Prime Minister musthear opinions of the NRA.
Licensees must conduct emergency exercises, report the results of the exercises to the NRA
and disclose the summary. The NRA may order, through consultation with the Prime
Minister, licensee to take action, such as improving the exercise procedures, if the exercises
are considered to be inadequate for preventing occurrence or development of a nuclear
emergency.
Nuclear Emergency Act provides for the obligation of other licensees to strive to cooperate.
Licensees must strive to cooperate if emergency response actions are required in a nuclear
site of other licensees by sending nuclear emergency preparedness personnel and lending
nuclear emergency response equipment.
(2)

Emergency response actions

The Prime Minister declares a nuclear emergency situation.
If an event occurs that falls under the category of an emergency, the NRA will immediately
provide the Prime Minister with necessary information on the status of the event, the areas
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
where emergency response actions should be taken, a brief description of the event, a
proposed announcement on what needs to be communicated to residents in the areas, andproposed instructions on emergency response actions such as evacuation and sheltering-inplace. Following this, the Prime Minister will immediately declare a nuclear emergency
situation.
If a nuclear emergency is declared, Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters will be
set up. The Prime Minister will serve as the chief of the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters. The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters will develop a policy forthe implementation of emergency response actions and provide overall coordination of
the emergency response actions and the post- nuclear emergency actions. In a facility
that will be used as the center for emergency response actions, local nuclear emergency
response headquarters to perform some of the administrative work of the Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters will be set up within the Off-site center for
emergency response actions.
Following the declaration of a state of nuclear emergency, the emergency response
headquarters of the local government (prefecture, municipalities) will be set up by thegovernor of the prefecture and the mayor of the municipalities in charge of the areas
where emergency actions will be implemented. The local nuclear emergency response
headquarters and the emergency response headquarters of the local government will set
up a nuclear emergency joint response conference to exchange information on the
nuclear emergency and develop mutual cooperation in the implementation of
emergency response actions.
If a specified event occurs, the nuclear emergency preparedness manager must
immediately order the nuclear emergency preparedness organization to take emergency
actions necessary to prevent occurrence or development of a nuclear emergency.
Licensee must report the summary of the action to the Prime Minister, the NRA, thegovernor of the prefecture and the mayor of the municipalities where the nuclear facility
is located, as well as to the governors of the neighboring prefectures.
(3)

Measures following the nuclear emergency

Measures following the nuclear emergency include a survey of the concentration,
density and dose of radioactive material, medical procedures including a medical
examination of residents and a mental and physical health consultation, public relations
activities to prevent economic damage caused by rumors, and measures to prevent
development of the nuclear emergency or recover from the emergency. For measures
following the nuclear emergency taken by administrative agencies and the head of local
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
governments to be performed precisely and smoothly, licensees must take actions suchas sending nuclear emergency preparedness personnel and lending nuclear emergency
response equipment.
1-2

Basic Disaster Management Plan

The Central Disaster Management Council formulated the Basic Disaster Management
Plan based on the Basic Act on Disaster Management and the Nuclear Emergency Act.
The Basic Disaster Management Plan is a fundamental plan for the national
government’s disaster prevention measures to respond to various disasters in acomprehensive manner. The Basic Disaster Management Plan that describes nuclear
emergency preparedness defines basic issues on the nuclear emergency preparedness ofthe national government, licensees and local governments and their responsibility(sharing of responsibility). EPR Guide developed by the NRA applies to specialized andtechnical issues specific to nuclear emergencies.
Broadly, the following measures are set forth in Basic Disaster Management Plan:•

Precautionary protective measures: ensuring the safety of facilities; disseminatingknowledge of disaster prevention; promoting researches on nuclear emergency
prevention etc. ; implementing measures to prevent recurrence; preparing for
emergency response actions and recovery from a disaster; preparing for emergency
response to an accident during the transport of nuclear fuel material etc. outside a
nuclear site•

Emergency response measures: collecting and communicating information
immediately after the occurrence of an emergency; setting up an emergency contact
system and an activity system; activities to provide protection, such as evacuation andsheltering-in-place, and information; activities to assist the life of nuclear accident
sufferers; maintaining social order, including crime prevention; securing traffic for
emergency transportation and conducting emergency transportation activities; rescue,
first-aid, medical and fire extinguish activities; activities to procure and supply
materials; activities related to health and hygiene; accepting voluntary support;
emergency response to an accident during the transport of nuclear fuel material etc.
outside a nuclear site; response to the combination of natural disaster and a nuclear
emergency•

Measures to recover from a disaster: canceling the declaration of a nuclear
emergency situation; measures following the nuclear emergency; assisting nuclear
accident sufferers in reviewing their life; abolition of the Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
A local disaster management plan is developed by the related local governments within
the radius approximately 30 km range from a nuclear power plant, based on the Basic
Disaster Management Plan and the NRA EPR Guide. For a local disaster management
plan, materialization of the contents and the system performance are important, and it
is determined that the national government provides an aggressive support in the casethat local public bodies have hardship to progress local evacuation plan or measures for
persons needed for special treatments, etc.
In order to support the improvement and reinforcement of local disaster management
plans and evacuation plans and evacuation plans developed by local governments suchas prefectures, municipalities, based on the decision of the Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Council in September, 2013, the Nuclear Disaster Management

Bureau,CAO established Regional Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Committees (Hereinafter
it's called "Regional Committees".) as a task team and put a working group under it fora problem solution in every area where a nuclear power plant is located in March, 2015.
In the working group of each area, measures for the support of developing emergency
preparedness and response, coordinating measures among wide areas, supports by thenational government are studied, and the national government and local governments
are working to materialize and improve the local disaster management plans andevacuation plans together. In the area where the local disaster management plan was
admitted to be materialized and improved, the Regional Committees are required toconfirm that their “emergency response” including evacuation plans are concrete andreasonable, considering the NRA EPR Guide. In addition, the Nuclear Disaster
Management Bureau reports to Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council results of
examination and consultation for the plans by the Regional Committees, and then, will
ask to the Council for their approval.
In the area where the “emergency response” has been confirmed, in addition to the
support of materialization and improvement of the “emergency measures”, andconfirmation(Plan) of the “emergency response”, the exercise(Do) based on the“emergency response” confirmed by the Regional Committees is conducted, items to be
improved from the exercise results (Check) are extracted, and the “emergency response”
at the area are improved (Action), considering the items, so the PDCA cycle wasintroduced and the regional disaster prevention system is improved and enhanced
continuously.

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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
1-3

Guide for Emergency Preparedness and Response

Under the provisions of the Nuclear Emergency Act, the NRA must develop the NRA EPR
Guide to ensure smooth implementation of precautionary protective actions, emergency
response actions and measures following the nuclear emergency and make the guideavailable to the public without delay.
The purpose of NRA EPR Guide is to ask licensees, the head of designated administrative
agencies and designated local administrative agencies, local governments, designatedpublic organizations, designated local public organizations, and others to take nuclear
emergency actions in a smooth manner. The NRA EPR Guide went into effect on October
31, 2012 and, since then, they have been revised as necessary. The ultimate goal of the
NRA EPR Guide is to ensure that in the event of an emergency, protective actions will betaken to avoid or minimize the serious deterministic effects, and reduce the stochastic
effects of the radiation on residents etc. in the surrounding area of a nuclear facility.
Described below are the main provisions of the NRA EPR Guide(1)

Measures in Advance for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response•

Establishment of the Nuclear Emergency Planning Zone

In the event of a nuclear emergency, the magnitude of the effect that an unusually large
amount of radioactive material or radiation released has on the surrounding
environment and the time for the effect to come into play depend on the form of theabnormal event, the characteristics of the facility, the weather conditions, theenvironmental conditions in the surrounding area, the living conditions of residents, andother factors. Therefore, it is necessary to take the appropriate action for the event in a
flexible manner. To take action to protect residents etc. against radiation exposure
efficiently in a short time, it is necessary to in advance, assume the occurrence of an
unusual event, to define areas that may be affected by the event, taking into accountfactors, such as the characteristics of the facility, and to put in place measures,
particularly for nuclear emergencies.
Nuclear emergency planning zones for nuclear emergency response actions aredesignated for the type of nuclear facility based on the distance from the facility. For
power reactor facilities, a precautionary action zone (PAZ) is defined as an area where
precautionary protective actions, such as immediate evacuation depending on theemergency action level (EAL), should be prepared in the stage before radioactive
material is released into the environment in order to avoid or minimize the serious
deterministic effect of radiation exposure in a rapidly developing accident. The roughtarget of the PAZ is approximately within a radius of five (5) km from the power reactor
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
facility.
An urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ) is defined as an area where emergency
protective actions should be prepared based on the EAL and OIL to reduce the risk ofthe deterministic effect of radiation exposure. The rough target of the UPZ isapproximately within a radius of 30 km from the power reactor facility.
The designation of these nuclear emergency planning zones is based on the international
standards and the lessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident.
In addition, the range of the nuclear emergency planning zones for the nuclear fuelfacilities was established through the revision of the NRA EPR Guide in March, 2017.
•

Nuclear emergency category and Emergency Action Level (EAL)In Japan, emergencies phases are divided into three categories: an alert (AL), a site area
emergency (SE) and a general emergency (GE).
An alert level condition (AL) is a phase in which, in a nuclear facility, an unusual event
occurs or may occur that has or may have no immediate radiation effects on the public
and preparations need to be made to collect information, conduct emergency monitoringand implement protective actions such as the evacuation of those who need to evacuate
in a site area emergency. In this phase, licensee must immediately report the occurrenceof an event in the alert category and the state of the facility to the national government.
The national government must confirm the occurrence of the alert level event based on
the information from licensee and provide it to the local governments and the public andother stakeholders without delay. The national government and the local governments
must start to prepare for the implementation of relatively time-consuming protective
actions in the PAZ near the nuclear facility.
A site area emergency condition (SE) is a phase in which, in a nuclear facility, an eventthat may have radiation effects on the public occurs and preparations need to be madeto take main protective actions, such as evacuation in an emergency, in the surroundingarea of the facility. In this phase, licensee must immediately report the occurrence of anevent in the site area emergency category and the state of the facility to the national
government and the local governments. The national government must confirm theoccurrence of the site area emergency and provide information to the local governments,
the public and other stakeholders without delay. The national government, the local
governments and licensee must enhance the information collection activities to grasp thedevelopment of the event by emergency monitoring and other means and, mainly in the
PAZ, must prepare for the implementation of precautionary protective actions, such as
the evacuation of basically all residents etc., and implement evacuation those who need
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
to evacuate in a site area emergency.
A general emergency condition (GE) is a phase in which, in a nuclear facility, an event
occurs that is very likely to have radiation effects on the public and protective actions need
to be taken promptly to avoid or minimize the serious deterministic effect of radiation
exposure and reduce the risk of the stochastic effect. In this phase, licensee must
immediately report the occurrence of an event in the general emergency category and thestate of the facility to the national government and the local governments. In addition,
licensee must take emergency actions necessary to prevent occurrence or development of
a nuclear emergency, and report the outline of such actions. The national government
must confirm the occurrence of the general emergency and provide information to the
local governments, the public and other stakeholders without delay. The national
government and the local governments must take precautionary protective actions in the
PAZ, such as the evacuation of basically all residents and the administration of stableiodine tablets. As in the PAZ, precautionary preventive actions, such as evacuation, need
to be taken in the UPZ as well as sheltering-in-place being implemented, depending on
the scale of the event as well as on how much time has passed.
In the NRA EPR Guide, the EAL used to determine the category of an emergency isdefined for each of the three emergency categories for each reactor type (BWR and PWR),
as well as for the nuclear fuel facility, for Fukushima Daiichi NPS units 1thru 4, and for
different conditions in the reactor, such as the condition that no nuclear fuel material
exists in the reactor vessel.
Since the last review meeting, the NRA have reviewed the EAL and revised the NRA
Ordinance Concerning the Events which Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Manager
Shall Report Under the Provision of Nuclear Emergency Act and the NRA EPR Guide.
These were promulgated in August, 2017 and put into effect in October, 2017. The main
points of the revision are that conditions for triggering the SE and the GE in EAL ofcommercial power reactors were reviewed and that EAL of nuclear fuel facilities was
newly set.
As for the SE and GE generation for the power reactor, the criteria of system
unavailability which had been based on that of Design Basis Event Facility (DB Facility)
in the former regulation was changed to be extended to that of Beyond Design Basis
Event or Severe Accident Facility (SA Facility), e.g., availability of mobile power supplies.
It would be consistent to the actual availability of facility which conforms to the new
regulatory requirements. While in the plant not to be applied to the new regulatory
requirements, the applicable criteria is such as the radiation level or radioactive material
concentration or the water level of spent fuel pool and etc.
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness•

Operational Intervention Level (OIL)

In a general emergency, after release of radioactive material, due to the spread of theradioactive material, there are likely to become points arisen with a high air dose rate ina relatively wide area. To prepare for such an event, the national government, the local
governments and licensee need to conduct emergency monitoring promptly, determine
the necessary protective actions to be taken by evaluating the results of the monitoring
against the criteria for the implementation of protective actions and take the actions.
After release of radioactive material, in areas where the air dose rate is high, the zones
will be determined in a few hours and emergency protective actions, such as theevacuation of residents, will be taken to minimize the effect of exposure. In areas where
the air dose rate is relatively low, the zones will be determined in a day and earlyprotective actions, such as temporary relocation, will be taken in a week to avoid
unnecessary exposure.
Operational intervention levels (OILs), which are indicated measurable values, such as
the air dose rate and the concentration of radioactive material in environmental samples,
are specified as the criteria for determining whether these protective actions should betaken. Table 16-1 shows the relationship between the OIL and the protective actions.
Table 16-1
Classification

Description

OIL1

Criteria for advising local
residents to evacuate withina few hours or sheltering, inorder to prevent radiation
effects from surface soil,
inhalation of re-suspended
radioactive material, or
inadvertent ingestion

Urgentprotective
actions

Early
protective
actions

OILs and Protective Actions
Initial Values

OIL4

Criteria for conducting
decontamination to prevent
inadvertent ingestion andexternal exposure via skincontamination

OIL2

Criteria for restricting
ingestion of local productand advising local residents,
to temporarily relocate
within a week or so, inorder to prevent radiation
effects from surface soil,
inhalation of radioactive

121

500μSv/h(air radiation dose rate
when measured 1m
above the ground)βrays:40,000 cpm(Counting ratemeasured by detector
at several centimeters
off the skin)
βrays:13,000 cpm(Value
1 month later)(Counting ratemeasured by detector
at several cm off theskin)
20μSv/h(Air radiation dose ratemeasured at 1m fromground)Outline of Protective

actions
Identification of zones
and evacuation withina few hours (includingordering those who
cannot easily move toshelter indoors
temporarily)
Contamination
screening of those who
are ordered evacuation
or relocation andprompt primarydecontamination when
the results exceed thecriteria
Identification of zones
within a day or so andrestriction of ingestionof local produce, as
well as temporary
relocation within aweek or so

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
Classification

Restric
tion onintakeof foodanddrink

Food anddrink
screening
standards(corresponding to OIL3)

Description

Initial Values

material, or inadvertentingestion
Criteria for identifying areas
where measurement ofradionuclide concentrations
in food and drink should be
carried out in preparation
for possible food and drink
restrictions at OIL6

0.5μSv/h(Air radiation dose ratemeasured at 1m fromground)NuclideOIL6

Criteria when restricting
food and drink intake inorder to prevent radiation
exposure via ingestion

Radioactive
iodineRadioactive
cesiuma nuclide ofplutoniumandtransuranicelements
Uranium•

Drinking
water,
milk,
dairy
produ
cts
300Bq
/kg
200Bq
/kg

Vegetables,cereals,
meat,
eggs,
fish,
other
2,000Bq/
kg
500Bq/kg

1Bq/kg

10Bq/kg

20Bq/
kg

100Bq/kg

Outline of Protective

actions
Identification of zones
where radionuclide
concentrations in foodand drink should bemeasured
Measurement andanalysis ofradionuclide
concentrations in foodand drink within aweek, and prompt
restrictions on foodand drink intake if
results are in excessof the criteria

Development of an emergency monitoring system

In an emergency, information on the air dose rate from radioactive material in thesurrounding environment, the concentration of airborne radioactive material and theconcentration of radioactive material in environmental samples provides the basis forappropriately implementing protective actions for residents and those engaged indisaster prevention work. Measures will be taken to prevent loss of the emergency
monitoring function.
In the implementation of emergency monitoring, the national government will supervise
emergency monitoring; develop an implementation policy; develop a plan for
conducting emergency monitoring and a plan for the organization of monitoring
personnel; provide instructions on the implementation of the monitoring and overall
coordination; collect and disclose data; evaluate the results of the monitoring and change
the implementation plan as the event develops; and conduct wide-area monitoring inwaters and airspace. The local governments will develop the emergency monitoring planand conduct emergency monitoring in nuclear emergency planning zones
Licensee will provide information on the source of the radioactive material released andcooperate in emergency monitoring in the surrounding area of the facility and otherareas.
If the situation develops into the SE, the national governments will set up an emergency
monitoring center in the Off-site center with the necessary functions to conduct
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
emergency monitoring in the area where the nuclear facility is located, so that thenational government, the local governments and licensee can work together to conduct
emergency monitoring. The emergency monitoring center consists of the national
government, the local governments, licensees, and the designated public organizations18,
and is responsible for collecting information on environmental radiation levels due tothe nuclear emergency and providing information to be used to determine whether OILbased protective actions should be taken and information to be used to evaluate
radiation effects from the nuclear emergency on the residents etc. and the environment.
•

Development of medical care system in a nuclear emergency

Medical care to allow first-aid emergency health care institutions to provide health carein a nuclear emergency and a chain of command are in place even at ordinary times toallow for appropriate health care activities in a nuclear emergency. The national
government designates “Advanced Radiation Emergency Medical Support Centers” and“Nuclear Emergency Medical Support Centers”, and reviews them for compliance withthe facility requirements every three years roughly. The prefecture in the nuclear
emergency planning zone designates and registers “Nuclear Emergency Core Hospitals”
and “Nuclear Emergency Medical Cooperative Institutions”, and review them forcompliance with the facility requirements every three years roughly.
Since the last review meeting, the medical care system was reviewed, and it was decided
that when the national government designated several institutions as Advanced
Radiation Emergency Medical Support Centers, one of these institutions shall be
designated as the “Core Advanced Radiation Emergency Medical Support Center”
undertaking central and leading roles (QST was designated in March 2019).
•

Distribution and intake of the stable iodine tablets

For the purpose of intake of stable iodine tablets in a nuclear emergency, at ordinary times,
the local governments will provide stable iodine tablets to residents in the PAZ in
preparation for an emergency. When the tablets are provided in preparation, a physician
will explain the efficacy or effect of the tablet, the time to take it and its side effects. In theevent of the GE, protective actions, such as evacuation, will be taken in the UPZ,
depending on the state of the plant and the air dose rate. In addition, a system for the
supply and intake of stable iodine tablets will be put in place.
Since the last review meeting, discussions were made over efficacy or effects of stable
Japan Atomic Energy Agency and the National Institutes for Quantum and Radiological Science andTechnology
18

123

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
iodine tablets, the timing for appropriate intake of stable iodine tablets, attentions tothose who should be prioritized in taking stable iodine tablets, adverse effects,
distribution methods, etc., and the system for distribution and intake of stable iodine
tablets was reviewed, showing that priority subjects are pregnant women, nursing
mothers, and persons under age. Currently, the revision of the NRA EPR Guide is underway.
•

Setting-up of an Off-site center

While the Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters of the national government
and the emergency response headquarters of the local governments set up a nuclear
emergency joint response conference to exchange information in the event of a nuclear
emergency, an Off-site center serves as a center for implementing nuclear emergency
response actions in a coordinated manner. It is required that the Off-site center is locatedin an area, considering the guidelines for PAZ and UPZ and has the necessary systems
in place to maintain its function as the primary emergency facility to take the necessary
actions for radiation protection and emergency actions such as alternative facility andmultiple lines of communication channels. .
(2)Emergency response actions•

Comprehend an unusual state and taking emergency response actions

Upon being informed of an alert or a site area emergency by a nuclear operator, thenational government and the local governments will start to prepare for the
implementation of protective actions and provide information to residents in preparation
for a general emergency. Upon being informed of the GE by a nuclear operator, residents
in the PAZ will be required to evacuate and those in the UPZ will be required to takepreventive actions, such as sheltering-in-place. If an unusually large amount of radioactive
material is or may be released from the nuclear facility, residents will shelter in place asneeded in consideration of the condition of the facility and the release of radioactive
material in areas other than those where precautionary preventive actions are taken. In
consideration on the results of emergency monitoring, additional protective actions are
implemented, such as evacuation from areas other than those where precautionary
preventive actions and restrictions on eating and drinking.
•Emergency monitoring

In the event of the AL, the national government, the local governments, licensee, and therelevant designated public organizations will prepare for emergency monitoring. In the124ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
event of the SE, the national government will set up an emergency monitoring center,make a request for the necessary mobilization of personnel under the plan for theprovision of monitoring personnel and start emergency monitoring.
•

Evacuation, temporary relocation and sheltering-in-place

If an unusually large amount of radioactive material or radiation is or may be released
into the surrounding area of the nuclear facility, all residents in the PAZ will be required
to evacuate immediately, and residents in the UPZ will be required to shelter in placewhen the situation develops into the GE. Subsequently, a phased- evacuation will beconsidered depending on the state of the nuclear facility. In addition, after radioactive
material are released, areas exceeding OIL 1 will be determined based on emergency
monitoring and residents will be evacuated within a few hours, and areas exceeding OIL
2 will be determined and residents will be temporarily relocated within a day or so.
In the event of the GE, evacuation will be implemented in the PAZ depending on thepriority zones for nuclear emergency response actions. However, sheltering- in- place
will be implemented if it has a higher priority than evacuation. In the UPZ, shelteringin- place will be implemented until a phased- evacuation or other OIL- based protective
actions are taken.
2

Nuclear Emergency Exercises

Previously, nuclear emergency exercises had been carried out by the national and the
local governments and licensees, in order to check the effectiveness of emergency
response systems in accordance with the Nuclear Emergency Act. However, following
the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident these exercises have been under review.
Future exercises must now incorporate ‘lessons learned’ from the TEPCO’s Fukushima
Daiichi NPS accident including the possibility of a complex earthquake- tsunaminuclear accident disaster which had never been experienced before as well as
incorporating more realistic evacuation exercises. Such exercises range from large- scalenational government exercises to those carried out by licensees within their site. The
explanations on each item are following.
2-1

Exercises Planned by the National Government

Hitherto, local governments have planned nuclear emergency exercises. The national
government provided support and coordination. Following the enactment of the
Nuclear Emergency Act, for which the 1999 JCO criticality accident was the catalyst, the125ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
national government had planned and implemented exercises, taking the initiative.
The TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident marked the first accident when a nuclear
emergency situation had been declared in Japan. Based on this experience, theemergency management system, as well as nuclear emergency exercises were improved.
Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill is an exercise conducted by national
governmental organizations, local government organizations and nuclear operators inorder to verify the system and organizations against the nuclear disaster, based on the
Nuclear Energy Act, and the 2018 Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill was
conducted for KEPCO’s Ohi Power Station and Takahama Power Station in Fukui
Prefecture for the following purposes:•

Confirmation of performance of emergency response system of national
government, local governments and nuclear operator, and cooperation systemamong relevant organizations.

•

Confirmation of systems and procedures set as manuals in the central organizationand the site organizations in a nuclear emergency situation.

•

Verification of the emergency preparedness and response based on the "Emergency
measures in Ohi Area" and “Emergency measures in Takahama Area”•

Extraction of lesson-learned from the exercise results and improvement ofemergency measures etc.

•

Acquirement of personnels’ skill for nuclear emergency preparedness and response
and promotion of resident understanding for the nuclear disaster prevention.

Items to be improved were collected from the specialist's advice and questionnaire
results from the resident who participated in the 2018 Nuclear Energy Disaster
Prevention Drill , and the "Result report of the 2018 Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention
Drill" was issued in March, 2019. Amendment of the "Emergency measures in Ohi Area"and “Emergency measures in Takahama Area” and/or improvement of various plans
and manuals will be proceeded through the study in the Regional Committee, based on
the items pointed out in the result report from the view point of issues such ascommunication among relevant organizations. And for Nuclear Energy Disaster
Prevention Drill itself and other drills as well, methods and items of exercise (including
items which could not be implemented during the 2018 exercise) should be further
improved and enhanced to review them continuously, so that the exercise will become
more effective and practical.

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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
2-2

Exercises Planned by a Licensee

In accordance with Nuclear Emergency Act, licensees must conduct nuclear emergency
exercises, report the results of the exercises to the NRA and disclose the summary.
Activities in the exercises of a licensee include non-scenario-based training and sharingof good practice through mutual visits of licensees.
For example, in a power plant, component training programs on individual procedures toimprove the skills to perform work procedures and a comprehensive training program thatcombines several component training programs are conducted. The component training
programs include; for example, accident management training to ensure that a predictionof the development of an event and a judgment and selection of means of bringing the event
under control will be made in an appropriate manner; emergency response training toensure that in the event of a nuclear emergency, a power supply will be provided andemergency action to provide the sources of cooling water will be taken in a prompt andappropriate manner; nuclear emergency medical treatment training to ensure that those
who suffered from radiation injuries will be taken out of a controlled area anddecontaminated and will receive emergency treatment; and evacuation instruction training
to ensure that visitors in a nuclear power plant will be instructed to evacuate in the eventof an emergency and those other than the emergency response personnel will be instructed
to evacuate when a state of emergency is declared. Since the last review meeting, the EAL
was reviewed, and reporting training etc. has been conducted in light of the revision of the
NRA Ordinance Concerning the Events which Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Manager Shall Report Under the Provision of Nuclear Emergency Act and the revisionof the NRA EPR Guide.
In the comprehensive training program, more extensive training is conducted with theparticipation of the power plant as well as the head office. For example, in a power plant,
training is provided on accident management, emergency response, organization of
nuclear emergency preparedness personnel, reporting, emergency exposure medical
treatment, monitoring, evacuation instructions, and emergency operations. In the head
office, training is provided on reporting, emergency support organization activities,
power plant support activities, and media relations.
Nuclear Emergency Act requires that a nuclear operator report the results of emergency
exercises to the NRA. The NRA may order, through consultation with the Prime Minister,
licensee to improve the drill procedures and take other necessary actions if the results ofthe exercises are determined not to be adequate for preventing occurrence ordevelopment of a nuclear disaster. The Basic Disaster Management Plan states that the
NRA will evaluate the results of exercises for severe accidents. The NRA developed
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
performance indicator of nuclear operator emergency exercises (including nuclear fuelfacilities etc.) and evaluates the exercises by taking opportunities such as general
exercises and by holding a debriefing session of emergency exercises by nuclear
operators since 2013.
In the working group for development of training scenarios set under the debriefing
session of emergency exercises by nuclear operators since 2018, trainings have been
conducted to enhance the judgment ability of commanders in an Emergency Response
Center or the main control room in a power station and also to improve the ability ofstaff on site to respond to emergency. The former trainings have been conducted 12 times,
while the latter trainings have been conducted four times by March 2019.
2-3

The Exercise Planned by the Local Governments

Local governments which have jurisdiction over the area where the relevant nuclear site
is located and the neighboring local governments should put the drills and exercises into
effect based on the Basic Act on Disaster Management. In the drills and exercises
conducted by the relevant prefectures, the local governments (including the governor),
the actual working units, such as police, fire services, the Japan Coast Guard and Japan
Self-Defense Forces, and nuclear operator should participate. And, exercises on
evacuation of residents and contamination screening for evacuation from emergency
zones are carried out, with residents’ cooperation and the actual working units’
participation.
More concretely describing, exercises of evacuation from the PAZ and UPZ those for
emergency communications and, in several areas, exercises for emergency public
communication using an emergency broadcast system and public information vehicles.
Moreover, in some cases, exercises for sending emergency alert emails are conducted.
In order to materialize local disaster management plans and evacuation plans and to
study these effectiveness, for the areas in which the plans’ improvement are confirmed,
the Regional Committees will be supporting to plan and carry out the exercises, topropagate methods of evaluation, to practice the PDCA cycle for the plans etc.
Besides, to personnel belonging to local government’s organs for nuclear emergency
preparedness, several trainings (for the beginners, for the core personnel, and for nuclear
emergency preparedness headquarter staff and map exercises at headquarters, fordrivers of transport services (e.g. bus drivers)) are carried out.
2-4

Participation in International Exercises

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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
Japan is a contracting party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident orRadiological Emergency. In order to be prepared to certainly send out notification under
the provisions of these conventions in case of emergencies, Japan continuously
participates in the ConvEx organized by the IAEA.
Article 16 (2)1Information to the Public and Neighboring Countries

Measures for Providing Public Information
To enhance widespread public dissemination of disaster response plans, local
residents participate in central and local government emergency exercises. Local
authorities explain a disaster response plan to local residents who then simulate
evacuations to actual refugee facilities and radiation surveys are carried out.
NISA, the former nuclear regulator, launched its emergency information mailingservice in July 2008. People who registered their mobile phone e-mail addresses inadvance promptly receive emergency information. This system was inherited by the
NRA in September 2012 as N-alert.
During a nuclear emergency, the mass media will also provide information to local
residents. Press briefings, highlighted by television and radio broadcasts, will be held
as required at the local Off-site centers which are for disaster prevention and at theEmergency Response Center in the national government (the NRA), and these will
provide local residents with relevant information.
Information posted on websites provides emergency information as well.

2

Providing Information to Neighbor Countries
Japan is an island nation located in the East Asia region and shares no land borders
with its neighboring countries. However, its geographical neighbors across the sea –China and the Republic of Korea – also have reactor facilities. Considering theexperience of the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, sharing information incase of nuclear emergency is an issue of mutual importance. In August 2009, Japan,
China and the Republic of Korea established Top Regulators Meeting (TRM) for the
purpose of information exchange in the fields of nuclear safety regulation. At the TRM
in November 2011, the three countries agreed on Cooperative Nuclear Safety Initiative
among Japan, China and the Republic of Korea, which includes enhancement of129

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
information exchange, cooperation for responding to severe accidents, as well as
nuclear emergency preparedness and response capacity. In addition, the three
countries organized a working group for emergency response in 2015 to establish asystem for prompt sharing of emergency information within the framework, and havediscussed to achieve smooth information sharing during emergency. The three
countries also perform communication exercises using opportunities of emergency
exercises in their own countries. The three countries verified the communicationmeans available during emergency (such as effectiveness of dispatch of liaison) withJapan serving as a host country in 2018.
Besides the aforementioned trilateral cooperation mechanism, Japan proactively uses
the Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies (USIE)
web portal run by the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC). As of 2019, Japanis preparing to provide monitoring data to the International Radiation Monitoring
Information System (IRMIS) operated by the IAEA’s IEC, and is trying to disseminate
information by proactively utilizing these systems.
3

Response in the Event of a Nuclear Accident and a Radiological Emergency in
Neighboring Countries
To carry out the provisions of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident orRadiological Emergency, the Government designated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as the National Warning Point (NWP) and National Competent Authority for an
Emergency Abroad (NCA(A)), in the event of a nuclear accident or radiologicalemergency occurring outside the territory of Japan. In the event of a radiologicalemergency outside the territory of Japan, including that in a neighboring country, theMinistry of Foreign Affairs will receive the notification provided through all kinds ofchannels, share it immediately with the National Competent Authority for a Domestic
Emergency (NCA(D)) and other relevant authorities, and take any necessary action.
When international emergency assistance is requested, Japan will provide assistanceafter discussing and agreeing bilaterally on terms of the assistance. Moreover, Japan
registers its assistance capabilities (NAC: National Assistance Capabilities)to the IAEA
Response Assistance and Network (RANET), and thus recognizes that Japan meets the
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency.

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ARTICLE 17 Siting
ARTICLE 17

SITING

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures
are established and implemented:(i) for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear
installation for its projected lifetime;(ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals,
society and the environment;(iii) for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii)so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation;(iv) for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear installation, insofar
as they are likely to be affected by that installation and, upon request providing thenecessary information to such Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate andmake their own assessment of the likely safety impact on their own territory of the nuclear
installation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 17
In installing a nuclear facility, the majority of “Evaluation of Site-Related Factors” and“Evaluation of Safety Impacts on Individuals, Society, and the Environment Resulting
from Reactor Facilities” is reviewed as part of the review process of application for
Reactor Installation Permit. Under the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation
Permit, the regulatory requirements for external events (natural phenomena and humaninduced events) were significantly reinforced. Furthermore, based on the amendment of
the Reactor Regulation Act in 2012, measures against severe accidents became subject tolegal requirements, and thus it was required to take measures for prevention andmitigation of the consequences of severe accidents and to evaluate the effectiveness ofsuch measures. As part of it, it has been evaluated not to give rise to significant radiation
risks to the public in the surrounding area.
Regarding “Re-Evaluation of Site-Related Factors,” the back-fitting system wasintroduced due to the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act, and the re-evaluationis required in the case where the NRA Ordinance is amended based on new knowledge
etc. Additionally, Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement was
introduced, and licensees are required to conduct evaluation consistent with the IAEA
Safety Guide SSG-25, “Periodic Safety Review for Nuclear Power Plants,” including
evaluation related to external events every five years in principle.
In terms of evacuation of residents etc., as prescribed in Article 16 (1), a framework fordevelopment of local disaster management plans by local governments such as
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ARTICLE 17 Siting
prefectures, cities, towns and villages, based on the Basic Act on Disaster Management,
has been established.
As for a nuclear facility in Japan, since Japan is surrounded by water, the neighboring
member states will not be affected and therefore there are no systems in place, such as
consultation on the installation of a nuclear facility, but the framework for information
sharing with the neighboring countries has been established as described in Article 16(2).
Therefore, the measures of the Japanese Government are in compliance with theprovisions of Article 17 of the Convention.

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ARTICLE 17 Siting
Article 17 (1)Evaluation of Site-Related Factors

Site-related factors that may affect the safety of reactor facilities are evaluated as part of
the review process of application for the reactor installation permit. Applicants are
required to conduct adequate review and analysis of external events that could occur
around the site and to take these into account in the designs of such facilities. It is
required to conduct evaluation to show the adequacy of basic designs in terms of eachof normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, design-basis accidents, andsevere accidents (design extension conditions: those without significant fuel degradationand those with core melting), and as part of it, evaluation is to be made on “safety
impacts on individuals, society, and the environment resulting from the reactor facilities”
that is described in (2).
In order to apply for the reactor installation permit, the applicants shall submit theapplication documents to the NRA, describing the following items:•

The name and address and, in the case of a juridical person, the name of its
representative•

The purpose for which the reactors are to be used•

Types, thermal powers and number of the nuclear power reactors•

The name and location of the site for the nuclear power reactors•

Locations, and structures, systems and components of the nuclear power reactors
and affiliated facilities.

•

The construction plans of the nuclear power reactor facilities•

The types and planned consumption amounts per annum of nuclear fuel materials•

Method for disposal of spent fuel•Radiation control management in the nuclear reactor facilities•

Implementation of facilities and organizations to cope with an accident

And, the following instructions are required as attachments:•

The purpose to use nuclear power reactors•

Thermal powers of the nuclear power reactors•

Funds required for the construction and the procurement plan.

•

Procurement plan of a nuclear fuel materials•

Technical capability of the installation and operation of nuclear reactor facilities•

Status of the weather, ground, hydrology, earthquakes and social environment of
the site where the nuclear reactor facilities are installed (social environment
includes population distribution, transportation, industry, and public facilities
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ARTICLE 17 Siting
such as hospitals etc.)•

Map around the site of nuclear reactor facilities•

Safety designs of the nuclear reactor facilities•

Radiation control in the nuclear reactor facilities•

Implementation of facilities and organizations to cope with an accident•

Applicant’s articles of incorporation, certificate of registered matters, inventory ofproperty, balance sheet and statement of profit and loss

In consideration of the above, the NRA determines that the reactor will not be used for
non-peaceful purposes; the applicant has the necessary technical competence andfinancial basis; the applicant has the necessary technical competence to implement thenecessary measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of severe accidents; andthe locations, structures and equipment of the reactor facilities are in compliance with
the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit, which provides for the
regulatory requirements of the NRA. The NRA grants the reactor installation permit if
the power reactor facilities conform to the NRA’s regulatory requirements.
Under the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit, the regulatory
requirements for external events (natural phenomena and human induced events) weresignificantly reinforced in response to the lessons learned from the TEPCO’s Fukushima
Daiichi NPS accident, as follows:•

To cope with displacement and deformation of the grounds, in addition to tremorsof earthquakes, buildings, structures, etc. with importance in terms of a seismic
design are required to be installed on the ground surface without an outcrop of acapable fault, because buildings and internal equipment, etc. may be damaged
when a capable fault moves. Additionally, the standards for determining capable
faults (faults having a possibility of becoming capable in the future) were clarified
as follows. The faults are identified as capable if it is not possible to deny fault
activities after the Late Pleistocene (about 120,000 to 130,000 years ago). If necessary,evaluation of fault activities shall be made by going back to the Middle Pleistocene(about 400,000 years ago).

•

For prevention of damage caused by earthquakes, it is required that safetyfunctions of the buildings, structures, etc. with importance in terms of aseismic
design are not lost against the seismic force and potential slope collapses generated
by the design basis ground motion. The design basis ground motion is to be
expected in light of the latest scientific and technical knowledge from a
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ARTICLE 17 Siting
seismological and earthquake engineering point of view such as geology,
geological structure, soil structure, earthquake activities, etc. on and around thesite, and it is required to formulate each of “seismic ground motions to be
formulated by identifying seismic sources in each site” and “seismic groundmotions to be formulated without identifying seismic sources.” For the former type,
formulation is to be made by selecting several earthquakes, out of continental-crustearthquakes, inter-plate earthquakes, and oceanic intraplate earthquakes, that are
expected to have large influence on the site, taking into account the uncertainties
and reflecting the propagation characteristics of earthquake waves. For the latter
type, formulation is to be made by collecting the observation records from the pastearthquakes that occurred in the continental crust with seismic sources difficult tobe related to capable faults and by taking into account the ground characteristicsof the site. In terms of propagation characteristics of earthquake waves, it isrequired to evaluate the subsurface structure under a site three-dimensionally inlight of a possibility that a seismic ground motion is amplified due to thesubsurface structure under the site. For the design basis ground motion, it isrequired to assess what level of exceedance probability the design basis groundmotion corresponds to.
•

For prevention of damage caused by tsunamis, it is required to formulate a tsunami
of a level exceeding the past maximum value as the design-basis tsunami and to
install tsunami protective facilities such as protective seawalls to prevent water
inundation into sites or tide gates to prevent water inundation into buildings asmeasures against the design-basis tsunami. Tsunami protective facilities shall be of
the S class, the highest class in the aseismic design classification, so that theflooding prevention functions etc. are not lost due to earthquakes. For the designbasis tsunami, formulation should be made, in light of the latest scientific andtechnical knowledge, of tsunamis that should be postulated from a seismologicalperspective such as ocean floor topography, geological structure, seismic activities,
etc. from the sea area with wave sources to that around the site. As for themechanisms that may cause Tsunamis, in addition to the earthquakes (inter-plate
earthquakes, oceanic intraplate earthquakes, and continental-crustal earthquakes
due to capable faults in a relevant sea area), landslide, slope collapse, and othermechanisms and a combination of these should be selected, and formulation
should be made by making numerical analyses while taking into account theuncertainties. It is also required to identify what level of exceedance probability theformulated design-basis tsunami corresponds to.
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ARTICLE 17 Siting•

It is required not to lose the safety functions in case of occurrence of natural
phenomena other than earthquakes and tsunamis such as floods, winds (typhoons),
tornados, freeze, precipitation, accumulation of snow, lightning, landslides,
influences of volcanos, biological events or forest fires, or a combination of them.
For human induced events (except intentional ones), it is also required not to lose
the safety functions in case of occurrence of missiles (airplane crash etc.), collapseof dams, explosions, fires of nearby factories and the like, toxic gas, collision ofships, electromagnetic interferences, etc., based on situations on and around a site.

•

Specialized Safety Facility must be built to suppress the unusual releases ofradioactive materials in the event of an intentional large airplane crash or the otherterrorism. The Specialized Safety Facility is a facility that can be used until external
support becomes available in the events such as intentional air crash, having
necessary equipment for preventing damages to the containment vessel, and mustensure that it does not lose its function even in the event of an air crash into the R/B.
Moreover, robustness must be enhanced against motions exceeding the designbasis ground motion to a certain degree.

The NRA has developed guides and the like such as the Guide for Review on DesignBasis Earthquake and Seismic-resistance Design, the Guide for Review on Design-Basis
Tsunami and Tsunami-resistance Design, the Guide for Review on Foundation
Grounds and Slope Stability Assessment, the Guide for Assessment of Volcanic
Hazards, the Guide for Assessment of Tornado Hazards, and the Guide for Assessmentof External Fires, etc.
For example, in the Guide for Evaluation on Volcanic Hazards, the volcanos, among
those within a 160 km radius from a nuclear power station and active in the Quaternary
period19* , which had been active in the Holocene epoch20* were certified as the volcanoswith a possibility of whose activity in the future cannot be denied (capable volcanos),and it is required to evaluate the possibility of impacts on the site from the capable
volcanos during a period of facility operation, in particular impacts of the five volcanic
phenomena (pyroclastic density currents, lava flow, debris avalanche/landslide/slope
collapse, opening of new vents, and ground deformation) against which design
measures cannot be taken. It is clearly stated that if the possibility is evaluated to besmall enough, it is required to conduct monitoring of the volcanic activities and to
19
20

A period from about 2.58 million years ago to the present
A period from about 11,700 years ago to the present
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ARTICLE 17 Siting
formulate a policy for the case of finding the volcanic unrest; if it is not evaluated to besmall, it should be judged to be unsuitable for siting.
Article 17 (2)Evaluation of Safety Impacts on Individuals, Society, and theEnvironment Resulting from Reactor Facilities

The evaluation of safety impacts on residents and the environment around nuclear
facilities has been done separately for during normal operation and for at the accident.
At the accident, measures against severe accidents have become subject to legal
requirements due to the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2012, and the NRA
Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit requires to take measures for prevention
and mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents and to conduct an evaluation(effectiveness evaluation) through combined use of the probabilistic risk assessment
method and deterministic safety assessment method to confirm the effectiveness of themeasures to be taken (see 2-4 and 2-5 of Article 18 ). During normal operation, the NRA
Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit shows the basic regulatory requirements.
Hereinafter, the summary of the safety impact evaluation is shown for each of at theaccident and during normal operation.
2-1

Evaluation of Safety Impacts of Nuclear Facilities

2-1-1

At the accident

The NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit requires to take necessary
measures to prevent significant core damage when an accident which may lead to asevere accident occurs, and furthermore to take necessary measures to prevent failure of
the containment vessel and an abnormal level of discharge of radioactive materials tothe outside of the facilities when a severe accident occurs. The effectiveness evaluationis also required to confirm that the measures taken are effective for each and its
regulatory guide shows the acceptable examples. For example, confirmation shall bemade that the following evaluation items are basically satisfied by measures against
containment vessel failure and an abnormal level of discharge of radioactive materials
to the outside of the facilities.
(a) The pressure to the containment vessel boundary is below the maximum designpressure or the limiting pressure.
(b) The temperature of the containment vessel boundary is below the maximum designtemperature or the limiting temperature.
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ARTICLE 17 Siting(c) The total amount of discharged radioactive materials is such that it would keep
influence on the environment as small as possible, including a point of view ofcontamination of the environment by radioactive materials.
The NRA implemented the guide for reviewing the results of the above-statedeffectiveness evaluation, and the guide specifies that it is confirmed that the amount ofdischarged Cs-137 is less than 100 TBq for the postulated containment vessel failuremode (see 2-5 of Article 18), in order to confirm the above item (c). The guide also
stipulates that the effectiveness evaluation of the measures to prevent core damage in
the accident sequence group using the containment vessel pressure relief system (filteredventing system) evaluates the effective dose at the site boundary and thus confirms thata risk of significant radiation exposure is not given to the nearby public (approximately
five (5) mSv or less per accident occurred).
Additionally, the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit requests not only
the effectiveness evaluation of the above-stated measures to prevent core damage andcontainment vessel failure but also the effectiveness evaluation of the measures toprevent fuel damage in the spent fuel storage pool/pit and fuel damage during
shutdown of a reactor.
Although the above-stated items are requirements for facility design etc., theorganizational structure etc. of applicants for installation permits are also important for
prevention and mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents. In the amendment of
the Reactor Regulation Act in 2012, it was added as criteria for installation permits thatapplicants shall have the necessary technical capability to implement necessary
measures for prevention and mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents. Its
review standards show securement of access routes, securement of spare articles, etc.,
securement of storage areas in consideration of positional distribution etc., and items to
be confirmed in relation to support from the outside of the site etc. in addition todevelopment of procedures, implementation of trainings, and development of theorganizational structures. As for the support, it is specified to confirm that it is a policy
to receive support within six days after the occurrence of an event. In terms ofdevelopment of procedures, implementation of trainings, and development of theorganizational structures, the NRA confirms through inspection of trainings theireffectiveness and also adequacy of the conditions, etc. related to operator actions etc.
adopted by applicants for installation permits in their effectiveness evaluations.

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ARTICLE 17 Siting
2-1-2

During normal operation

The NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit requires for the facility todispose of radioactive waste during normal operation to have the ability to dispose ofradioactive waste generated in commercial power reactor facilities so as to fully reduceradioactive material concentration in air outside the supervised area and in water at theboundary to the supervised area, and for the facility to dispose of liquid radioactive
waste to prevent leakage of liquid radioactive waste from facilities to dispose ofradioactive materials. According to the regulatory guide on this requirement, the above
expression “to fully reduce” is to mean that the dose objective (50 μSv/year) stipulated
in the guide developed by the former NSC can be achieved, under ALARA (as low asreasonably achievable) concept.
2-2

Development and Continuous Improvement of Local Disaster Management

Plans
As shown in Article 16 (1), each prefecture and each municipality have developed the
local disaster management plan for the prefecture and that for the municipality,
respectively, based on the Basic Disaster Management Plan and the NRA EPR Guide.
Trainings are periodically implemented at each level of the national government,
licensees, local governments while promoting continual improvement of the NRA EPR
Guide, development of an emergency monitoring system, development of a medical
system to be operated during a nuclear disaster, development of systems for distribution
and intake of stable iodine tablets, development of the Off-site centers, etc. Throughtrainings etc., improvement of local disaster management plans developed by local
governments such as prefectures, cities, towns and villages are continually promoted.
Article 17 (3)Re-Evaluation of Site-Related Factors

As the back-fitting system was introduced due to the amendment of the Reactor
Regulation Act in 2012, for example, if new knowledge on evaluation of capable faults is
obtained and the regulatory requirements are revised, it is necessary for licensees tomake re-evaluation and show conformance to the revised regulatory requirements.
Additionally, as Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement was
introduced due to the amendment of the said Act, it was stipulated that licensees should
periodically evaluate safety of the facilities by themselves, notify its results to the NRA
and make them public.
In the Operational Guide for Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement, it
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ARTICLE 17 Siting
is stipulated that the timing for evaluation should be at the time of completion of aperiodic facility inspection and evaluation should be made within six months after
completion of the inspection. The contents of evaluation to be conducted are largely
divided into two, and one of them is for development of documents describing the latest(as is) status of a plant. The Operational Guide requests explanation on the following
items.
•

Summary of power reactor facilities•

Site characteristics: Description should be made on facility location andcharacteristics

such

as

meteorologicalphenomena,

ground,hydrology,

earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanos, external fires, social environment, etc.
•

Structures, systems, and components: Description should be made on their latest
states, using descriptions of permitted contents and contents of the approved or
submitted construction plan as the bases.

•

Management systems and items for safety: Description should be made on theirlatest states, using operation management described in the Operational Safety
Program as the bases.

•

Results of safety assessment to confirm conformance to laws and regulations:
Description should be made on their latest status, using as bases the safetyassessments (including the exposure assessment during normal operation) for
normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, design basis accidents, andsevere accidents.

In development of these documents, reference should be made to the Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
IAEA Safety Guide GS-G-4.1, “Format and Content of the Safety Analysis Report for
Nuclear Power Plants,” etc.
The other content of evaluation is corresponding to a periodic safety review (PSR). The
Guide was revised in light of findings by the IRRS in February 2017, and in terms of reevaluation of site characteristics, volcanos, external fires, etc. were added, and at thesame time, consistency with the IAEA Safety Guide SSG-25, “Periodic safety review fornuclear power plants,” was clarified. According to the Operational Guide, licensees shalltake measures for safety improvement and conduct the following evaluation in every
five years in principle to evaluate effectiveness for their safety improvement. However,when evaluation results are expected to be changed, such as in the case of large-scaleconstruction, re-evaluation shall also be conducted.
•

Evaluation related to internal and external events (re-evaluation of external and140

ARTICLE 17 Siting
internal hazards): Internal and external events should be re-evaluated as premises
for safety assessment, based on the latest scientific and technical knowledge at thetiming of evaluation. If a need for change arises in terms of installation(amendment) permits as a result of confirmation of the adequacy of protection
measures in light of the necessity for review from previous evaluation results(those related to the latest notification or those related to installation (amendment)
permits, whichever the later) and the evaluation results, the procedures forapplication for amendments to Reactor Installation Permit, etc. should be promptly
implemented.
•

Deterministic safety assessment: The assessment method (analysis codes etc.)
should be applied in light of the latest knowledge.

•

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) related to internal and external events: Level 1
PRA and level 2 PRA should be implemented for both internal and external events.
The scope of PRAs shall be expanded step by step according to the maturity of each
PRA method, and internal flooding and internal fires are written as examples ofinternal events to be developed in the future, and a combined event with anearthquake and a tsunami, external events other than earthquakes and tsunamis,
events that occur in the spent-fuel storage pool/pit, events that occur
simultaneously in multi units are also written as examples of external events to be
developed in the future.

•

Safety margin assessment: It is written that EU “Stress tests” specifications etc. shallbe referred to.

In addition, evaluation of effectiveness from a medium- to long-term point of view is to
be made every 10 years in principle on the following 11 safety factors out of the 14 safety
factors shown in the IAEA Safety Guide SSG-25, except for three safety factors to betargeted in the above assessments.
•

Plant design•

Actual condition of structures, systems and components•

Equipment qualification•

Aging degradation•

Safety performance•

Use of experience from other plants and research findings•

Organizations, the management systems and safety cultures•

Procedures•

Human factors
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ARTICLE 17 Siting•

Emergency planning•Radiological impact on the environment

Article 17 (4)Discussion with Other Countries Likely to Be Affected by Reactor
Facilities

Japan is an island country surrounded by water and has no land border with theneighboring countries. All nuclear facilities in Japan are located along the coastline
because they use seawater as the ultimate heat sink. However, the closest nuclear power
plant to the closest neighboring country is more than 100 km away from the land of thecountry. Therefore, it is understood that the location of nuclear facilities does not affectthe neighboring countries. For this reason, there is no system of consultation with theneighboring countries and there is no need to make arrangements for consultation withthem.
From the perspective of information sharing, Japan has a framework for informationexchange among Japan and the two neighboring countries: China and the Republic ofKorea.

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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
ARTICLE 18

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several reliable levels
and methods of protection (defense in depth) against the release of radioactive materials,
with a view to preventing the occurrence of accidents and to mitigating their radiologicalconsequences should they occur;(ii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear installation areproven by experience or qualified by testing or analysis;(iii) the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable
operation, with specific consideration of human factors and the man-machine interface.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 18
Japanese regulations require the integration of defense-in-depth into the design of a
nuclear reactor facility. In addition to the requirement for first to third layers, measuresfor prevention of core damage, Containment Vessel (CV) failure, suppression ofdispersion of radioactive material, and loss of large area of nuclear facilities in the Design
Extension Condition (DEC) are required. To obtain approval of the design of a nuclear
reactor facility, the licensee must demonstrate compliance with the standards by using
proven technologies or conducting demonstration testing. In addition, high reliability
and sure operability are required for safety equipment and systems.
Thus, the provision of Article 18 of the Convention is achieved.

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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
Article 18 (1)1Implementing a Defense in Depth Strategy

Basic policy on Defense in Depth in Japan

In the past, before the NRA’s regulatory requirements were developed, Defense in Depth
concept was stated in the Reactor Regulation Act and Regulatory Guides issued by the
NSC, and requested as follows; for the 1st layer, to ensure high reliability sufficient tomeet importance of the SSC to prevent occurrence of abnormality; for the 2nd layer, totake necessary measures for early finding of abnormality and shut-down nuclear reactor
to prevent expansion of abnormality; for the 3rd layer, to get core not severely damaged
and be sufficiently cooled in case of Design Basis Accident (DBA) occurred to mitigate
its consequence.
In the new regulatory requirements issued by the NRA, measures to eliminate common
cause failure are significantly strengthened, based on the lessons from the TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident. In addition to the requirements mentioned above,measures to prevent severe core damage in case of loss of function of equipment foraddressing DBA, and measures to prevent CV failure in case of severe core damage, arerequired. Further, new regulatory requirements require measures against CV failure
because Japan experienced the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident. The new
regulatory requirement also requires measures against loss of large area of nuclear
facilities due to extreme natural disaster, intentional airplane crash or other terrorism.
It is required in the regulatory requirements that each layer of Defense in Depth
independently performs its function effectively.
2

Requirements in the Each Layer of Defense in Depth

2-1Prevention of Abnormality

For the purpose of prevention of abnormality, it is required to ensure high reliability
sufficient to meet importance of the SSC to prevent occurrence of abnormality, to design
sufficient safety margin, to have core stability characteristics, and to prevent misoperation. Failsafe design and interlock function, etc. are designed to deal with misoperation or a failure.
In the new regulatory requirements, measures for seismic safety, tsunami safety,
reliability of power supply, and fire protection are strengthened and introducing
measures for internal flooding, volcano, tornado, forest fire, etc. are newly required.
Requirements for external events are reported in Article17.
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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
2-2

Prevention of Expanding Abnormality

In order to detect deviation from normal operation state and make it under control,
measures to prevent anticipated transient, i.e., an anticipated event in the nuclear power
plant during operation, from expanding to an accident such as preparing specific system
and mechanism in the design, and establishing operational procedure to regain safety
state of nuclear power plant, are required.
2-3

Mitigation of Design Basis Accident

In case of expansion of anticipated transient or postulated initiating event which cannot
be under control in the previous layer and allow to progress to DBA, it is required thatthe core is not severely damaged and be able to maintain sufficient cooling by theEngineered Safety Features and core stability characteristics.
2-4

Prevention of Core Damage in the Design Extension Condition Without SevereCore Damage

Licensees are required to confirm effectiveness of measures to prevent severe damage ofcore in the case of the DEC without severe core damage.
The DEC without severe core damage is identified as “Postulated Accident SequenceGroups”. The Guide for the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit, taking
research results into account, stipulates accident sequence groups which cover most of
accident sequences with significant core damage as “Designated Accident SequenceGroups” as is shown in Table 18-1..
Table 18-1

Designated Accident Sequence Groups

BWR
Loss of high-pressure and low pressure
water injection function
Loss of high-pressure water injection anddepressurization function
Loss of all AC power
Loss of decay heat removal function
Loss of reactor shutdown function
Loss of water injection during LOCA
CV bypass(Interface system LOCA)

PWR
Loss of heat removal function of secondary
cooling system
Loss of AC power
Loss of component cooling function
Loss of CV heat removal function
Loss of Reactor shutdown function
Loss of ECCS water injection function
Loss of ECCS recirculation function
CV bypass(Interface system LOCA, steam generator
tube rapture)

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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
Considering the difference of each plant, internal events are evaluated by applying PRA
and external events are evaluated by PRA or other applicable means. As a result, in casethat the accident sequence group which has significant frequency or impact is identified
although it is not included in the “Designated Accident Sequence Group”, it is required
to add it into “Postulated Accident Sequence Group”.
In the next step, important accident sequences are identified in each of the Postulated
Accident Sequence Group from the point of the number of equipment which loses its
function simultaneously, length of time of margin, level of equipment capacity necessary
to prevent core damage, and whether represent the characteristic of the accident
sequence group in question. Evaluation of effectiveness are performed to confirm that
equipment against severe accident meets the evaluation requirements (e.g., maximum
temperature of fuel cladding is below 1,200 degree Celsius) obtained by simulation codeanalysis, and sufficiency of plan regarding necessary man-power and fuel etc., from theview point of whether equipment required as severe accident measures can prevent
severe core damage in the important accident sequence.
Equipment required to address the DEC have to meet following regulatory
requirements; the equipment do not lose its function simultaneously with safetyfunction of equipment to address the DBA caused by common cause; the equipment be
furnished with anti-seismic function, etc. In addition to these requirements, highreliability is required to permanently installed equipment. For mobile equipment,
meeting general industrial standards and multiple deployment of equipment (water
injection, power source, etc.) are required.
2-5

Prevention of Containment Vessel Failure in the Design Extension Condition
with Core Melt

Licensees are required to confirm effectiveness of measures to prevent CV failure in thecase of the DEC with core melt.
The DEC with core melt is identified as “CV failure mode”. The Regulatory Guide of the
NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit, taking research results into
account, stipulates “Designated CV failure mode” as the typical CV failure mode.
Practical items stipulated as CV failure mode make certain of assuming are; Static loads
by internal atmospheric pressure/temperature (damage by CV over-pressurization/overheating); High pressure melt ejection/direct heating of CV atmosphere; Ex-vessel fuelcoolant interaction; Hydrogen explosion; Direct contact with CV (shell attack); Melted
core and concrete interactions (MCCI). Considering the difference of each plant, internal
events are evaluated by applying PRA and external events are evaluated by PRA or other146

ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
applicable means to identify CV failure mode based on the characteristics of each plant.
As a result, in case of the CV failure mode which has significant frequency of occurrence
or impact is identified although it is not included in the “Designated CV failure mode”,
it is required to add it into “Postulated CV failure mode”.
In the first step, for every Postulated CV failure mode, a severe accident sequence fromthe point of load etc., against CV is identified as an evaluated accident sequence among
CV failure sequences based on the results of PRA. Subsequently, evaluation ofeffectiveness is conducted to confirm that equipment against severe accident meets thecriteria such as maximum operating pressure or limiting pressure, provided bysimulation code analysis, and sufficiency of plan regarding necessary man-power, fuel,etc., from the view point of whether equipment required as severe accident measures
can prevent CV damage. The NRA Guide for Evaluating Effectiveness requires toconfirm the release amount of Cs-137 be less than 100 TBq.
Equipment required to address the DEC with core mel have to meet following regulatory
requirements; the equipment perform its function under the accident conditions;
redundancy or diversity, independence and dispersion in the different locations have to
be ensured in case that equipment to address DBA have no similar function, e.g., water
injection to CV bottom, hydrogen explosion, etc.; the equipment have anti-seismic
function, etc. In addition to these requirements, high reliability is required topermanently installed equipment. For mobile equipment, meeting general industrial
standards and multiple deployment of equipment (water injection, power source, etc.)
are required.
2-6

Measures to Suppress Dispersion of Radioactive Material

As stated in 2-4 and 2-5, the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit
requires measures to prevent severe core damage and CV failure, as measures to address
the DEC. The NRA Ordinance requires equipment to suppress dispersion of radioactive
material to outside of the site based on appropriate analysis of dispersion mode from thepoint of preventing abnormal level of release of radioactive material into theenvironment, even if assuming severe core damage and CV failure occur beyond DEC.
For example, water cannon is required to suppress dispersion of radioactive material inaerosol form leaking from the R/B.
2-7

Measures to Address Loss of Large area of Nuclear Facilities

Loss of large area of nuclear facilities is the large-scale destruction of nuclear installation
caused by extreme natural disaster, intentional airplane crash or other terrorism.
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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
Extreme natural disaster means the natural disaster beyond design basis in the NRA
Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit.
In the NRA Ordinance, measures with mobile equipment and Specialized Safety Facility(SSF), as installed facility, are required.
(1)

Measures with Mobile Equipment

Airplane crash etc., leads to severe destruction of certain area of nuclear installation, i.e.
loss of large area of nuclear facilities. In this case, it is important to take measures not bybased on assumption of certain accident sequence but to avoid losing all measures for
decreasing release of radioactive material, provided the destruction occurred.
In case of natural disaster extremely beyond design basis or large airplane crash, it isrequired mobile equipment does not become unavailable simultaneously by taking
measures of dispersed deployment, etc.
In practical; access route have to be repaired by heavy machinery stored in dispersed
locations when access route such as road etc., are destroyed by natural disaster beyond
design basis, etc.; ensuring to prepare connection points in the opposite side of damaged
side to be able to connect mobile equipment such as feed water pump or power sourcein case of connection points are lost by airplane crash into one side of the R/B, arerequired.
(2)

Measures with Specialized Safety Facility

SSF “shall be equipped with adequate measures for preventing the loss of necessaryfunction due to the intentional crashing of a large airplane into the R/B”. Practicalrequirements are; to ensure enough distance, e.g., more than 100m, between the SSF and
the R/B to prevent simultaneous failure of both facilities; or the SSF have to be equippedin robust structure that can withstand the intentional airplane crash or facilities which
has equivalent or more effective. Licensees have to prove that evaluated equipment has
to keep its necessary function by performing structural evaluation of building andfunctional evaluation of equipment at the event of airplane crash, with specifying
characterization of airplane and identifying exact point of crash.
“Equipment to prevent CV failure” shall be equipped in the SSF. Practical requirements
are; depressurization function for reactor coolant pressure boundaries, e.g., equipment
for reactor depressurization operation from emergency control room; cooling functionof molten core in the reactor, e.g., equipment for injecting low pressure water into thereactor; function for cooling molten core that has fallen outside the bottom of the CV, e.g.,equipment

forcoolingwater

injection
148

into

the

bottom

of

the

CV;

CV

ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
cooling/depressurization/radioactive material reduction function, e.g., equipment for
injecting water into CV sprays; CV heat removal/depressurization function, e.g., filteredvent; function of prevention of CV failure by hydrogen explosion, e.g., hydrogenconcentration control equipment; support function , e.g., equipment for power source,
instrumentation, and communication. And installing the emergency control room tocontrol above mentioned functions is also required.
3

Regulatory Procedures Relating to Design and Construction of Reactor
Facilities

3-1

Regulation in the Design and Construction Phase

There are licensing process for Reactor Installation Permit, the approval of Construction
Plan, Pre-service Inspection, Fuel Assembly Inspections, etc. and these processes are
explained in Article 7.
3-2

Regulatory Requirements

The NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit and the NRA Ordinance on
Technical Standards stipulate the requirements reported in Article17 and 18.
Table 18-2 is a list of facilities (facilities subject to the design standards) to prevent
occurrence or propagation of a design basis accident are classified into classes, andstructures and strength are stipulated for each operating condition as shown in Table 183 by the NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards.
Table 18-2

Class 1

Class 2

Vessels,
pipes,
pumps,
valvesSupportstructures

Vessels,
pipes,
pumps,
valvesClassification of facilities subject to the design standards
Components comprising the reactor coolant pressure boundary
Structures to support Class 1 components
Components required to safely shut down a power reactor or ensure
the safety of a power reactor facility in an environmental condition,such as a design basis accident or until the period fall in to design basis
accident, that may indirectly cause radiation hazards to the public as aresult of damage or failure and other error.
Components that are for a circuit in which a fluid (steam, feed water)
circulates with the main purpose of driving a steam turbine and arelocated between a Class 1 component in the steam line downstream of
a Class 1 component and the stop valve closest to the component andbetween a Class 1 component in the feed water line upstream of aClass 1 component and the stop valve closest to the component
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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction

Supportstructures

Class 3Vessels,
pipes

Class 4

Pipes

Reactor CV support
structures

Components other than the above that are located between apenetration in the reactor CV and the isolation valve inside or outsideof the vessel
Structures to support Class 2 components
Vessels( which are belong to subjected to design standard facilities) or
pipes (limited to pipes containing a fluid in which the concentration ofradioactive material is more than 37 mBq/cm3 (37 kBq/cm3 if the fluid
is a liquid or pipes with a maximum operating pressure of more thanzero MPa), other than ducts, that are for a Class 1 component, a Class 2
component, a reactor CV, a radiation control facility, or a reactor
containment facility (limited to emergency gas treatment systems)
Ducts that are for a radiation control facility or a reactor containment
facility (limited to emergency gas treatment systems) and contain a
fluid in which the concentration of radioactive material is more than 37
mBq/cm3 (excluding Class 2 pipes)
Structures to support the reactor CV

Table 18-3
OperatingCondition I
OperatingConditionII
OperatingCondition
III
OperatingCondition
IV
Testing
Condition

Classification of operating conditions

Normal operating condition of a power reactor facility
Under an environmental condition anticipated at a design basis accident or during
a situation develops into it, a condition other than Operating Condition I,
Operating Condition III, Operating Condition IV and Testing Condition
Under an environmental condition anticipated at a design basis accident or during
a situation develops into it, a condition that requires an emergency shutdown of
the power reactor due to an unusual event, such as a failure or malfunction etc. of
the power reactor facility
Under an environmental condition anticipated at a design basis accident or during
a situation develops into it, a condition in which an emergency anticipated in thesafety design of the power reactor facility occurs
A condition in which a power reactor facility is being subjected to the maximum
operating pressure in a hydrostatic test

As shown in Table 18-4, severe accident management installments are classified intoclasses and regulatory requirements are set for each class.
Table 18-4
SevereAccident
Class 1
SevereAccident
Class 2

Classification of severe accident management facilities

Vessels, pipes,
pumps, valves
Supportstructures
Vessels, pipes,
pumps, valves
Support

Vessels which are subjected to treatment installments
for severe accident , pipes, pumps (Limited to facilities
to manage specified severe accidents)
Structures to support Severe Accident Class 1
components
Vessels, pipes, pumps or valves for permanent severe
accident management systems (excluding those for
specified severe accident management facilities)
Structures to support Severe Accident Class 2
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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction

SevereAccident
Class 3structures
Vessels, pipes,
pumps, valves

components
Vessels, pipes, pumps or valves for portable severe
accident management systems

In addition to the above, method of quality assurance and the organization for its
inspection in the licensee of power reactor operation are reviewed to be technicallyappropriate through the licensing process of the approval of Construction Plan in order
to confirm the licensee’s quality control methods etc. from the stage of design andconstruction of nuclear facilities.
With the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in April, 2017, requirement
regarding the quality assurance in the licensing process of the approval of Construction
Plan is under revision in order to be included in that of Reactor Installation Permit in theearlier stage.
3-3

Compliance to the Regulatory Requirements

The licensee is conducting modification such as addition of necessary facility in order tocomply with regulatory requirements set forth by the NRA. For example, they takemeasure to install a protection wall around the sea water pump assuming higher
tsunami, and install a protection bank around the said area.
And the weir for storage is installed at the water intake port to secure cooling water
during a certain period of time in case of undertow of tsunami. The additional fuelstorage tank for emergency diesel generator is installed to increase the capacity of morethan 7 days for continuous operation in order to improve reliability of emergency powerin case of loss of off-site power.
As measures for the case of failure of emergency shutdown, an automatic actuation
panel is newly installed to enable to close Main Steam Isolation Valve and inject
emergency boric acid water to place a reactos in a subcritical condition even if control
rods cannot be inserted.
As measures for cooling, reliability is improved by increasing permanent cooling water
pumps to diversify the function of water injection into the reactor pressure vessel andthe primary CV.
In order to prevent the hydrogen explosion, measures to prevent failure of the CV are
taken such as additional installation of equipment to enable to ignite hydrogen or
recombine it to water.

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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
Article 18 (2)Application of Proven Technologies

Though the Reactor Regulation Act and other regulatory requirements does not force
licensees to use only technology proven by the experience or test/analysis, it is a regularmanner to use proven technology for application for the Reactor Installation Permit or
the approval of Construction Plan, and if licensees adopt a new technology, they shallprove that the technology complies with the technical standards endorsed by the NRA
by conducting verification test, or they shall explain that they can secure safety in using
the technology without not mentioning to the technical standards .
Measures that Licensees should take in the Application of Proven Technologies, the NRA
Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit requires the highest standards ofreliability for safety SSCs with safety functions, and that their design is such that this canbe maintained.
This should not impede the application of new technologies, but licensees are required
to ensure the reliability of these technologies when designing reactor facilities.
In the licensing process of the approval of Construction Plan, licensees are required tosecure quality and to apply the proven technology.
Safety facilities should function in all envisaged environmental conditions up to theoccurrence of a design basis accident; moreover, in order to check their soundness andcapabilities, they can be tested or inspected while the reactor facility is operating or shut
down.
More specifically, in obtaining Reactor Installation Permit and the approval ofConstruction Plan, it is necessary for licensees to verify the technologies used in thedesign of reactor facilities.
When using the digital Reactor Protection System (RPS), for example, licensees aretaking the following measures.
•

The hardware of RPS is physically and functionally separated, by measures thatsignals from the RPS are only transmitted from the RPS, and any signal from theoutside is not received by the RPS, and any hardware is not allowed to connect the
RPS directly. And access from the outside is protected by the measure that signal
from the RPS is limited only to transmit.

•

As the measure to limit access, physical access is limited by the access control at theentrance of the nuclear facility, and access to the software is limited by the
maintenance tool of RPS Panel control device and by key control of connector to themaintenance tools to prevent unauthorized change.

•

For the software of the RPS, a specific software of which verification and validation
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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
have been done in every phase of design, fabrication, test and design change control
in accordance with the industrial standards21,22, so that a general computer virus
can’t activate.
•

As measures to protect the RPS from the disturbance by thunder, induction surgeand electromagnetic waves etc., isolation circuits etc. are installed at the point ofconnection of power or signals to RPS panels.

•

A licensee requires the vendor to take the protective measure for virus, security
measures to prevent sabotage to the RPS design. The vendor takes measures such as
to prohibit connection with the internet directly, and use only the limited tools forconnection for the maintenance.

Article 18 (3)Design for Highly Reliable, Stable, and Easily Manageable Operations

Safety facilities should be designed that they function in all envisaged environmental
conditions up to the occurrence of a design basis accident by the regulatory requirement,so high reliability is requested.
Moreover, it is requested that safety facilities can be operated easily.
Facilities for taking response in the event of the severe accident are required to function
effectively and can be operated certainly in the environmental condition when an
envisaged severe accident occurs.
Licensee adopts design for the main control room that has main instrument and control
equipment for safety facility, and enables to concentrate to monitor and control the plant.
Considering good monitoring capability and surveillance to prevent mis-operation andmis-judgement and to operate easily, the control panel is so designed that the display,
alarm and central equipment are properly located from the view point of humanengineering.
For the local operation, identification managements such as color classification andlocking management are adopted to prevent mis-operation.
In order to improve operability, proper tools for a local manual operated valve or aplatform for local operation is provided near the main control room or inside theradioactive controlled area.

21
22Standard for adopting RPS on digital calculator（JEAC4620）
Guide for digital RPS on verification and validation（JEAG4609）

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ARTICLE 19 Operation
ARTICLE 19

OPERATION

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an appropriate
safety analysis and a commissioning programme demonstrating that the installation, as
constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;(ii) operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analysis, tests and operational
experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for
operation;(iii) operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are conducted inaccordance with approved procedures;(iv) procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational occurrences and to
accidents;(v) necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields is available
throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation;(vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the relevant
license to the regulatory body;(vii) programmes to collect and analyse operating experience are established, the results
obtained and the conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing mechanisms areused to share important experience with international bodies and with other operatingorganizations and regulatory bodies;(viii)
the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear
installation is kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both in activity
and in volume, and any necessary treatment and storage of spent fuel and waste directly
related to the operation and on the same site as that of the nuclear installation take into
consideration conditioning and disposal.

Outline of the implementation of Article 19
In order to use the nuclear facilities, the licensee has to pass the pre-service inspection toconfirm that the construction work has been carried out in compliance with theapproved plan for construction work and that the nuclear facilities conform to thetechnical standards set forth in the NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards.
Moreover, the licensee shall obtain the approval for the Operational Safety Programs
which specifies rules concerning in–service safety preservation activities. The
Operational Safety Programs specifies the limiting conditions for operation andmeasures to cope with accidents, in addition to the operation and the maintenance.
The licensee obtains technical supports from the plant vendors and its sub-vendors forinspections or construction works throughout the operational period.
The licensee is obliged to report to the NRA about accidents based on the Reactor
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ARTICLE 19 Operation
Regulation Act.
The licensee manages the "Nuclear Information Archives (NUCIA)", database fornuclear facilities' information which is disclosed to the public, for the purpose of sharing
operating experiences.
The NRA utilizes the nuclear information notification system for sharing operating
information internationally.
Spent nuclear fuels and radioactive waste are stored inside the nuclear site temporally.
Necessary treatments and volume reductions will be made for radioactive waste, andthese wastes will be transferred to the final disposal site. As the clearance system isadopted in Japan, waste whose radiation level under the criteria can be treated as generalindustrial waste contributing to the volume reduction of radioactive waste.
Therefore, Japan conforms to the provision of Article19 of the Convention.

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ARTICLE 19 Operation
Article 19 (1)Initial Authorization

In Japan, the licensee who obtained Reactor Installation Permit can use the nuclear
facilities after they obtained the approval of Construction Plan, completed construction
works and passed Pre-service Inspections. Moreover, the licensee must set forth their
Operational Safety Programs to ensure the operational safety of the facility, and obtain
NRA’s approval before commencing operation.
The NRA conducts Pre-service Inspections in order to confirm that the nuclear facility
has been constructed in accordance with the approved construction plan at the transition
from the construction to the operation phase. A Pre-service Inspection is the inspection
prescribed in the Reactor Regulation Act, and the licensee shall not use the nuclear
facility until they pass this inspection. A Pre-service inspection is the approval act for the
nuclear reactor facilities to get into the operational phase. The acceptance criteria for the
Pre-service Inspection are that the construction work has been carried out in compliancewith the approved plan for the construction work and that the power reactor facilities
conform to the NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards. The NRA Nuclear Facility
Inspector conducts the Pre-service Inspection at the construction phase described in the
Table 19-1.
When the NRA receives an application, it shall set forth the inspection implementation
procedures specifying the method of inspection as well as other necessary matters. This
inspection implementation procedure is set forth for each application.
As the safety analysis is conducted and approved by the NRA at the design stage, in the
Pre-service Inspection, it is confirmed if the conditions of the safety analysis is being
secured in accordance with the construction plan.
When the NRA acknowledges that a licensee passes the Pre-Service Inspection, it shalldeliver a Pre-service Inspection certificate.
Design of nuclear fuel assemblies, except for imported ones, shall be reviewed andapproved by the NRA in advance. Any nuclear fuel assembly with the approved design
shall be inspected by the NRA at each engineering process, and the licensee of powerreactor operation shall not use it until it passes the inspection.
When the NRA inspects and acknowledges that the fabrication and enrichment of thefuel assembly is carried out in compliance with the approved design, and that the fuelassembly conforms to the technical standards23 specified by the NRA, it shall deliver a
Pre-service Inspection certificate.
The NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards of Fuel Assembly used for Commercial Power Reactors(NRA Ordinance, No.7 dated June 28, 2013)
23

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ARTICLE 19 Operation
Inspection items for nuclear fuel assembly at each engineering process are described in
the Table 19-2.
Table 19-1

Items Inspected in Each Construction Process during the Pre-service
Inspection
Construction Process

Matters Inspected

1. For the reactor unit, nuclear fuel material handling

The following inspections relating to the structure,and storage facilities, reactor cooling system

functions, or performance of the reactor unit, nuclear fuelfacilities

material handling and storage facilities, reactor cooling(excluding

steam

turbines),

instrumentation and control system facilities

system(excluding power reactor operation control

instrumentation and control system facilities (excluding

devices), radioactive waste disposal facilities

power reactor operation control devices), radioactive(excluding

waste

vent

stacks),radiation

controlfacilities

disposal(excluding

facilities

steam(excluding

turbines),

vent

stacks),facilities or reactor containment facilities, whenradiation control facilities or reactor containment

it is possible to carry out tests relating to theirfacilities:

structure, strength, or leakage(1) Inspection of the material(2) Inspection of dimensions(3) Inspection of external appearances(4) Inspection to check assembly and mounting(5) Inspection of the pressure resistance(6) Inspection for leakages(7)Inspection to check the status of foundations on which
the reactor containment facility will be directly
installed

2. When the mounting of the lower half of the steam(1) The following inspections to check the structure,

turbine casing has been completed and thefunctions, or performance of the steam turbine:

assembly of the auxiliary boiler unit has been(a) Inspection of the materials

completed(b) Inspection of dimensions(c) Inspection of external appearances(d) Inspection to check assembly and mounting(2) The following inspections to check the structure,functions, or performance of the auxiliary boiler:(a) Inspection of the material(b) Inspection of dimensions(c) Inspection of external appearances(d) Inspection to check assembly and mounting(e) Inspection of pressure resistance(f) Inspection for leakages

3. When the state of the power reactor allows the fuelto be loaded

Inspection

to

check

the

necessaryfunctionsorperformance of the nuclear fuel material handling andstorage facilities, reactor cooling system facilities,
instrumentation and control system facilities, radioactive
waste disposal facilities, radiation control facilities,
reactor containment facilities, emergency power supply

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ARTICLE 19 Operation
Construction Process

Matters Inspected
systems, normal power supply systems, the fire
protection equipment, flood protection facilities, the fuelequipment for driving auxiliaries (excluding that
relating to the emergency power supply system and theauxiliary boiler), the emergency water intake equipment,
on-site civil engineering structures, and the Office for
Emergency Response, while fuels are inserted

to thepower reactor
4. When the power reactor criticality operation cancommence

Inspection

to

check

the

necessaryfunctionsorperformance of the reactor unit, reactor cooling systemfacilities, instrumentation and control system facilities(excluding power reactor operation control devices), andgenerators, when the reactor reaches criticality

5. When all construction works in the construction
plan are completed

Inspection to check the overall performance of the powerreactor facilities when the reactor is generating output
and any other inspections required in order to check thecompletion of the construction works

Table 19-2

Items Inspected in Each Engineering Process during the Fuel Assembly
Inspection
Engineering Process

Matters Inspected

1. For the fuel material, cladding material, and othercomponents, when they are in a state in whichtests relating to their composition, structure, or
strength can be carried out

Inspection to check the results of analysis of the chemicalcomposition of the fuel material, cladding material, andother components, and other inspections relating to thecomposition, the structure, or the strength of thesecomponents
The following inspections relating to the fuel assembly:(1) Inspection of dimensions(2) Inspection to check the degree of the bend(3) Inspection of external appearances(4) Inspection of the surface contamination density(5) Non-destructive inspection of welded areas(6) Helium leak inspection (excluding cases which an
inspection will be carried out in relation to (3) initem 3. below)
The following inspections of the assembled fuelassembly:(1) Inspection of dimensions(2) Inspection of external appearances(3) Helium leak inspection (excluding cases which an
inspection will be carried out in relation to (6) initem 2. above)

2. For the fuel assembly, when processing of the fuelelements has been completed

3. When engineering process is completed

The licensee shall specify Operational Safety Programs before commencing theoperation of the power reactors and obtain the approval of the NRA. Operational Safety
Programs also prescribe the measures that should be taken under conditions that could
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ARTICLE 19 Operation
have a direct impact on safety, such as the establishment of limiting conditions for
operation to ensure the safe operation of reactor facilities, and measures in the event ofdeviation from limiting condition for the operation.
The licensees must comply with their Operational Safety Programs when operating andmaintaining reactor facilities.
The matters that should be regulated in the Operational Safety Programs are prescribedin the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, as shown below:•

Matters relating to systems for compliance with relevant legislation and Operational
Safety Programs (including involvement of senior management)•

Matters relating to systems for fostering safety culture (including involvement ofsenior management)•

Matters relating to the quality assurance at reactor facilities (including mattersrelating to root cause analysis methods and its implementing system, thepositioning of procedure manuals in Operational Safety Programs, and the periodic
evaluation of reactor facilities)•

Matters relating to the duties and the organization of those who operate and manage
reactor facilities (excluding those listed in the next item)•

Matters relating to the scope and contents of the duties of Chief Reactor Engineers,their accredited authority in supervising operational safety, and their organizational
positioning•

Matters relating to the scope and contents of the duties of Chief Electrical Engineers,their accredited authority in supervising operational safety, and their organizational
positioning•

Matters relating to the scope and contents of the duties of Chief Engineers of Boilers
and Turbines, their accredited authority in supervising operational safety, and theirorganizational positioning•

The following matters relating to operational safety education among those who
operate and manage reactor facilities:
Matters relating to the policy on implementing operational safety education(including the formulation of implementation plans)
The following matters relating to the content of operational safety education:(1) Matters relating to compliance with relevant legislation and Operational
Safety Programs(2) Matters relating to the structure, the performance, and the operation ofreactor facilities(3) Matters relating to the radiation control
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ARTICLE 19 Operation(4) Matters relating to the handling of the nuclear fuel material and items
contaminated with such material(5) Matters relating to measures that should be taken in an emergency
Other matters required in relation to operational safety education concerning
reactor facilities•

Matters relating to the operation of reactor facilities•

Matters relating to the operational period of reactors•

Matters relating to safety reviews of the operation of reactor facilities•

Matters relating to the establishment of controlled areas, conservation areas, andsupervised areas, and restrictions on entry to these areas•

Matters relating to venting and effluent monitoring equipment•

Matters relating to the monitoring of dose, dose equivalent, radioactive material
concentrations, and the surface contamination density as well as matters concerning
decontamination•

Matters relating to management of radiation detectors•

Matters relating to patrols and inspections of reactor facilities and procedures
arising from them•

Matters relating to receiving, sending, transporting, and storing of nuclear fuelmaterial, and other matters relating to them•

Matters relating to a disposal of radioactive waste•

Matters relating to measures that should be taken in an emergency•

Matters relating to development of systems for conducting activities to maintain the
integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident or loss of large area of
nuclear facilities caused by fire, internal flooding, volcanic eruptions and so on.

•

Matters relating to appropriate recording and reporting of operational safety atreactor facilities (including the status of compliance with Operational Safety
Programs)•

Matters relating to the maintenance management of reactor facilities (including
matters relating to systems for the implementation of licensee’s welding inspections
and Periodic Licensee’s Inspections, matters relating to the technical evaluation ofage-related degradation, and the long-term maintenance management policy)•

Matters relating to sharing of information with other licensees, focused on technicalinformation concerning operational safety obtained from contractors who havecarried out maintenance checks•

Matters relating to disclosure of information concerning noncompliance, in theevent that such noncompliance occurs
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ARTICLE 19 Operation•

Other necessary matters in relation to the operational safety of reactor facilities

Operational Safety Programs can be revised after being approved, due to such factors as
those relating to organizational change of the licensee or modification of the reactor
facilities.
If licensees intend to change their Operational Safety Programs, they must obtain theapproval of the NRA for the amended programs.
Moreover, the NRA may order the amendment of Operational Safety Programs inaccordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, if it deems this to benecessary in order to prevent a disaster resulting from the nuclear fuel material, thematerial contaminated by nuclear fuel material, or reactors.
The Operational Safety Programs are the most important documents in the operation ofa reactor facility, so licensees put together various operating procedure manuals and test
manuals that set forth the procedures for the actual operation and maintenance of reactor
facilities.
These provisions subordinate to the Operational Safety Programs are managed
appropriately under the quality management systems of licensees, while keeping
consistency with their Operational Safety Programs.
With the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2017, licensees must specify their
Operational Safety Programs before construction of the power reactors, and licensees
must carry out activities consistently from the design and construction stage. The
approval of Construction Plan is integrated with the approval of the design of the nuclear
fuel assembly, and licensees shall apply for the approval of Design and Construction
Plan and obtain the NRA’s approval.
Licensee’s Pre-service Inspection is newly established, and licensees are obliged to
conduct inspections to confirm compliance with the requirement, including theinspections of welding and nuclear fuel assemblies. Licensees shall not use the nuclear
facilities until they conduct Licensee’s Pre-service Inspection and the NRA acknowledges
that the nuclear facilities are in compliance with the acceptance criteria. This amendment
will be enforced in April 2020, and developing and/or revising of relevant Cabinet
Orders, NRA Ordinances, and other related ordinances is under way.
Article 19 (2)1Limiting Condition for Operation

Regulatory Requirements Concerning Limiting Conditions for Operation

In Japan, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, licensees must
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ARTICLE 19 Operation
set forth their Operational Safety Programs and obtain the NRA’s approval before
commencing operation of a reactor facility.
The limiting value for operating reactor facilities includes such values as the shutdown
margin and thermal and hydraulic limiting value of the reactor which are all prescribedin the Operational Safety Programs.
If a licensee fails to comply with the limiting conditions for the operation, the NRA mayorder the licensee to take such action as shutting down the reactor, in accordance withthe provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
In the event that a reactor facility deviates from its limiting conditions for the operation,
a licensee is required to immediately declare a deviation from the limiting conditions for
operation and report this to the NRA.
A licensee must take measures to revert from a state of the deviation within the allowed
time of the operation permitted during the deviation. However, if the licensee cannot
resolve the deviation within the time allowed, they must return the reactor to such a stateas the limiting conditions for operation is not applied. This state includes shutting down
the reactor.
If the NRA receives a report of a deviation from a licensee, it examines the root cause
and provides other licensees with its feedback if necessary.
2

Establishment, Implementation, and Revision of Limiting Conditions forOperation

Operators at reactor facilities take turns to operate and monitor the reactor, and are
responsible for such practical duties as ensuring compliance with the limiting conditions
for operation and taking the necessary steps in the event of deviation from these.
The limiting conditions for operation and measures to be taken in the event of a deviationfrom them are specifically documented in Operational Safety Programs and operators
are required to implement those procedures correctly.
The limiting conditions for operation are conditions relating to the safe operation ofreactor facilities, and there are cases which it is necessary to alter them, such as whenrelated equipment is modified.
As described above, the limiting conditions for operation are detailed in Operational
Safety Programs and it is necessary to obtain the approval from the NRA for the revision.
To be more precise, when revising the limiting conditions for operation, licensees must
not only conduct their own review, including a safety evaluation, but also undergo areview by the NRA.
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ARTICLE 19 Operation
Article 19 (3)1Procedures for Operation, Maintenance, Inspection, and Testing

Establishment, Implementation, and Revision of Operation Manuals

Licensees shall regulate matters relating to the operation, the maintenance, and thetesting of reactor facilities in their Operational Safety Programs as written in Article 19(1).
Licensees shall set forth general procedures, procedural manuals, and otherdocumentation relating to the operational safety, based on their Operational Safety
Programs, and comply with these documents.
As for the maintenance, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act,
licensees shall conduct the Licensee’s Periodic Inspections which are regulated in their
Operational Safety Programs.
Procedural manuals are required to be documented, following an approval procedure
within the nuclear power station, and applied to the operation and the maintenance ofeach reactor facility.
Moreover, in the event that the procedure is altered due to such reasons as themodification of the equipment, licensees are required to ensure that those carrying out
tasks do not follow the incorrect procedure.
Procedural manuals are made available to ensure that all staff involved in the operationand the maintenance of a reactor facility can make appropriate use of them, in the way
such as placing them in the control room.
Procedural manuals are documents put in place on the basis of Operational Safety
Programs, so they are included in the scope of application of quality management
systems.
Procedural manuals are reviewed regularly and revised if necessary.
The Reactor Regulation Act requires licensees to make and keep operational records, andthese records to include those concerning fuel assemblies, reactor inspections, theoperation, the radiation control, the maintenance, anomalies or accidents..
Moreover, the Reactor Regulation Act stipulates the results of Licensee’s Periodic
Inspections to be recorded and saved, covering such matters as the subjects, the methods
and the results of inspections.
Among the items prescribed in the Operational Safety Programs, Chief Reactor
Engineers, Operation Supervisors, the maintenance management of reactor facilities,
and Licensee’s Periodic Inspections that are stipulated in the NRA Ordinances aredetailed as follows;

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ARTICLE 19 Operation(1)

Chief Reactor Engineers and Operation Supervisor

Chief Reactor Engineers, who are deployed at each reactor by the licensee, are selectedfrom those who have qualifications certified through a national examination, and havethe practical experience24 stipulated in the NRA Ordinances. It is necessary to formallynotify the NRA of their appointment and dismissal.
If deemed necessary in terms of operational safety, Chief Reactor Engineers may give
their opinions to the general manager of the station, provide staff at all levels withadvices and recommendations, and participate in the formulation of plans for theoperational safety.
Operation Supervisors are appointed by the licensee and deployed for each shift.
(2)

Maintenance management of reactor facilities

The licensee shall take the following measures in relation to checks, tests, inspections,repairs, replacements, modifications, and any other measures deemed necessary to themaintenance of reactor facilities (the maintenance management), both while the reactor
is operating and shut down, in accordance with the provisions of the NRA Ordinanceon Commercial Reactors.
•

Set forth a policy concerning the maintenance management of reactor facilities(hereinafter referred to as the “maintenance management policy”) to ensure thatthe reactor facility performance detailed in the Reactor Installation Permit is being
maintained.

•

Set out targets for the maintenance management that should be achieved inaccordance with the maintenance management policy.

•

Formulate a plan for the implementation of the maintenance management thatsets out the following matters, in order to achieve the maintenance managementtargets, and implement the maintenance management in accordance with thisplan.
-

Matters relating to the timing of the commencement and the duration of theplan concerning the implementation of the maintenance management

The Rules on Commercial Reactors stipulate that at least three years of practical experience are required,adding together the periods listed below.
(i) Period of involvement in duties relating to construction work on or maintenance management of
power reactor facilities(ii) Period of involvement in duties relating to the operation of power reactors(iii) Period of involvement in duties relating to the analysis and evaluation of the safety of power reactor
facility design(iv) Period of involvement in duties relating to the design or management of power reactor fuelassemblies
24

164

ARTICLE 19 Operation-

Matters relating to methods used for conducting checks, tests, inspections,repairs, replacements, and modifications, other measures of reactor facilities,
and the frequency and the timing thereof-

Matters relating to measures to ensure operational safety taken when
conducting inspections and other measures of reactor facilities-

Matters relating to checks of the results of inspections and other measures ofreactor facilities and methods of evaluating them-

Matters relating to corrective and preventive measures concerning methodsof conducting the inspections and other measures that should be carried out
at reactor facilities, based on checks of the results of such reactor facility
inspections and the results of the evaluation thereof, as well as the frequency
and the timing thereof-

Matters relating to records of the maintenance management at reactor
facilities•

Periodically evaluate the reactor facility maintenance management policy, themaintenance management targets, and plans for the implementation of themaintenance management.

•

Reflect the results of the evaluation referred to in the item above in the reactor
facility maintenance management policy, the maintenance management targets, orplans for the implementation of the maintenance management.

•

Take special measures in relation to the steps referred to in the foregoing items,
tailored to the particular condition of the reactor facility in question, in the eventthat operation of the reactor is suspended for a considerable period of time or inother extraordinary situations from the perspective of the maintenance managementof a reactor facility.

In addition, if a licensee has formulated or amended the Long-Term MaintenanceManagement Program based on technical aging evaluation, these revisions shall bereflected in the Maintenance Management Program.
(3)

Licensee’s Periodic Inspections

A licensee is obligated to conduct the Licensee’s Periodic Inspection to confirm
compliance with the provisions of the NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards.
Nuclear Facilities for which Licensee’s Periodic Inspection should be performed by thelicensee are reactors, nuclear fuel material handling and storage systems, reactor coolingsystems, instrumentation and control systems, radioactive waste disposal systems,
radiation control systems, reactor containment systems, emergency power supply
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ARTICLE 19 Operation
systems, auxiliary boiler systems, fire protection systems, inundation protective systems,
components driving machine fuel systems, emergency water intake systems and main
bodies and accessory equipment of steam turbines.
A Licensee’s Periodic Inspection shall be implemented by the following methods such as
open-up, overhaul, non-destructive inspections or any other methods to sufficiently
confirm the occurrence of any damage, deformation, wear, and abnormality in any part,or by test operations or any other methods to sufficiently confirm functions and theoperation, and any other methods sufficient to confirm any sign of the occurrence ofabnormality due to damages, deformations, wears or the likes in each part during inoperation.
When licensees who carry out Licensee’s Periodic Inspection finds, at the time of its
inspection, parts that are likely to cease to conform with the technical standards25 after
the elapse of a certain period of time, they shall evaluate the time when these parts are
expected to cease to conform with the technical standards, record and preserve theresults thereof, and at the same time, report to the NRA.
Targets to be evaluated are the core shroud and the shroud support, out of the vessel,
piping and core support structure which belong to Class 1 Components defined in the
NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards.
Licensees evaluate the time when these parts cease to conform to technical standards by
presuming the cause of crack generation, specifying its shape and size, and predicting
the development of the crack in a fixed period based on its size, while taking into accountthe assumption that the crack develops as expected.
If it's necessary to repair as a result of this evaluation, the time, its scope and its method
to repair shall be evaluated and confirmed to be appropriate.
2

Confirmation of Activities of Licensees by the NRA(1)Periodic Facility Inspection and Periodic Safety Management Reviews

In the nuclear facility, reactors, nuclear fuel material handling and storage systems,
reactor cooling systems, instrumentation and control systems, radioactive waste
disposal systems, radiation control systems, reactor containment systems, emergency
power supply systems and steam turbines and its accessory equipment shall beinspected in the Periodic Facility Inspection by the NRA. The Periodic Facility Inspection

Article 18th of Technical standard Rules prescribes specifically, Class 1 Components, Class 1 Support
Structures that are being used must not have any cracks or other defects that may trigger damage thereof,
and the pressure part of Class 1 Components that are being used must not have any cracks penetrating
said pressure part or other defects.
25

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ARTICLE 19 Operationis conducted by the NRA Nuclear Facility Inspector attending some part of licensee’s
inspections, or reviewing licensee’s inspection records.
In accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, the timing of the Periodic Facility
Inspection is stipulated in the NRA Ordinance, which prescribes that reactors and theirauxiliary equipment are to undergo inspections at intervals of 13, 18, or 24 months, as
specified by the NRA in a notification.
When an application for Periodic Facility Inspection was submitted from a licensee, the
NRA shall set forth the Inspection Implementation Procedures by stipulating inspection
methods and other necessary matters. This procedure is prepared for every applicationof each nuclear facility to be inspected.
Through the Periodic Facility Inspection, compliance to the NRA Ordinance on TechnicalStandards is confirmed.
The licensee has to be inspected on the organization for its Licensee’s Periodic Inspection
through the Periodic Safety Management Inspection by the NRA.
This inspection is conducted on the items specified by the NRA such as licensee’sorganization to conduct periodic self-inspections, inspection methods, and the schedulemanagement.
With the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2017, the Periodic Facility
Inspection and the Periodic Safety Management Reviews were abolished and integrated
with other inspections as the Regulatory Inspection that comprehensively monitors andoversees activities of licensees. This amendment will be enforced in April, 2020, anddeveloping and/or revising of relevant Cabinet Orders, NRA Ordinances, and otherrelated ordinances is under way.
(2)

Operational Safety Inspections

Operational Safety Inspections are designed to check that licensees comply with the
Operational Safety Programs already approved by the NRA in the operation andmaintenance of reactor facilities. They are carried out four times a year, with eachinspection taking about two weeks.
Operational Safety inspectors of NRA are permanently stationed in the Nuclear
Regulation Office near nuclear sites. As explained in the Article 8th, a senior safety
inspector is assigned as an office chief, and a nuclear emergency preparedness officer isassigned as a deputy office chief, and adequate number of nuclear safety inspectors forthe nuclear facility is designated according to the size of the station.
During the Operational Safety Inspections, Operational Safety Inspectors may, in
accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, enter in buildings, inspect
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ARTICLE 19 Operation
documents and equipment, ask questions of relevant personnel, and request thesubmission of the requisite samples.
Furthermore, as well as the quarterly inspections in accordance with the provisions of
the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, inspections are conducted in the event thatthe following operations will be carried out.
•

When following operations are carried out in the Periodic Facility Inspectionsprescribed in the Reactor Regulation Act
Operations relating to the startup or the shutdown of a reactor
Operations relating to refueling
Operations relating to the switchover of the residual heat removal seawater
system in the BWR
Operations relating to the lowering of the water level in the reactor vessel andoperations of residual heat removal system while the water level are in the above
condition in the PWR•When exercises which are recognized by the NRA as necessary to inspect are carriedout for key response personnel who would be involved in dealing with a severe
accident or loss of large area of nuclear facility

As the Operational Safety Inspection is conducted to confirm that the operation andmaintenance of licensees is performed in accordance with their Operational Safety
Programs, a certain activity is focused out of all activities, and each process of its
planning,

enforcement,

evaluation

andimprovementareexamined,which

complementally confirms compliance status of requirements of Operational Safety
Programs.
The Senior Nuclear Safety Inspector develops an inspection policy every year, based on
the NRA policy for operating safety inspection and evaluation result of the last year’s
inspection, and furthermore, develops a plan for operational safety inspection. The
Operational Safety Inspection is conducted based on this yearly plan.
If a fact which is thought to be a violation is found through the inspection, the Senior
Nuclear Safety Inspector makes a judgment of degree of violation based on the judgment
criteria of Operational Safety Programs violation. The judgment is conducted from theviewpoints of influence to the safety function, radiation exposure and quality assurance.
There are three levels of violation (“violation1, 2, 3”) and one observation for theclassification, and if the result is judged as any of violation1, 2, 3, it must be reported
promptly to the NRA. The NRA receives information from the licensee, requests thereport including measure to prevent recurrence and make an additional inspection inaccordance with the violation level.
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ARTICLE 19 Operation
By the Reactor Regulation Act, the violation of Operational Safety Programs is placed as
the important violation by which the licensing permit may be rescinded or thesuspension of operation may be ordered for a period not exceeding one year. Because ofthis strong impact, the Senior Nuclear Safety Inspector carefully judges the violationlevel by taking licensee’s opinion into account.
The result of the Operational Safety Inspection is summarized and reported to the NRA
every quarter of the year, and disclosed to the public through the website of the NRA.
With the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2017, Operational Safety
Inspections were abolished and integrated with other inspections as Regulatory
Inspection that comprehensively monitors and oversees activities of licensees. This
amendment will be enforced in April, 2020, and developing and/or revising of relevant
Cabinet Orders, NRA Ordinances, and other related ordinances is under way.
(3)

On-the-Spot Inspections

In accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, the NRA may conduct
on- the-spot inspections to the extent necessary for enforcing the Act.
During the on-the-spot inspections, the NRA staff may enter the offices or buildings oflicensees and inspect documents, records, and other articles, as well as questioning thepersonnel there.
These inspections include inspections of vendors. The NRA may directly inspect those
involved in the design or construction of nuclear facilities, as well as those involved in
the manufacture of equipment for the facilities in question.
Article 19 (4)1Procedures for Dealing with Events Occurring During Operation

Regulatory Requirements Concerning Responses to Abnormal Events

In the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, the licensee is obliged to take thenecessary steps, in the form of emergency measures, to prevent radiation hazards.
This is prescribed in the Operational Safety Programs as a measure that should be taken
in an emergency.
Furthermore, the licensee is obliged to detail “matters relating to the operation of reactor
facilities” in their Operational Safety Programs.
These matters include procedures relating to handling operation in the event of an
accident or other abnormal situation, as well as procedural manuals focused on thehandling of normal operation, and thereby ensuring a smooth response to accidents and169

ARTICLE 19 Operation
abnormal events.
Matters prescribed in relation to “steps in the event of an abnormal situation” include
status checks, the removal of root causes, the necessary measures in order to prevent
escalation, and measures following reactor scram.
The operating procedures in an emergency are one of the operating procedures basedon the Operational Safety Programs. During the Operational Safety Inspection, the NRA
checks these procedures and the system for their implementation.
2

Operating Procedures in an Emergency

The emergency operating procedures are put in place as subordinate provisions basedon the Operational Safety Programs; they include procedures formulated as standards
based on events such as the occurrence of an earthquake or a fire, as well as thoseformulated as standards based on changes in the operational parameters of the reactor.
3

Responses to Severe Accidents

As well as stipulating the following with regard to responses to severe accidents, The
NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors stipulates as follows with regard to responses
to severe accidents, and that these measures shall be evaluated periodically, with therequisite measures being taken on the basis of the results:•

Formulating the plans required in order to carry out activities to maintain the
integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc.

•

Deploying the personnel required in order to carry out activities to maintain the
integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc. (this personnel
is called as “key response personnel”)•

Implementing regular education and exercises at least once a year for key
response personnel•

Furnishing mobile generators, fire engines, fire hoses, and other materials andequipment required in order to carry out activities to maintain the integrity ofreactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc.

•

Setting forth the following matters required in order to carry out activities tomaintain the integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc. andensuring that key response personnel comply with these-

Matters relating to measures to prevent significant core damage-

Matters relating to measures to prevent the containment failure
170

ARTICLE 19 Operation-

Matters relating to measures to prevent damage to fuel assemblies stored in
the spent fuel storage facilities-

Matters relating to measures to prevent damage to fuel assemblies when thereactor is shutdown•

Putting in place the systems required in order to carry out activities to maintainthe integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc., other thanthose listed above

Moreover, the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors stipulates that matters relating
to putting in place systems for carrying out activities to maintain the integrity of reactor
facility in the event of fire, internal flooding, volcanic eruptions, a severe accident, or lossof large area of nuclear facility should be detailed in the Operational Safety Programs,
and accordingly, licensees take measures to prepare for these events.
Article 19 (5)Engineering and Technical Support

The licensee can act flexibly, at their own discretion, if they require engineering or
technical support to ensure the safety of reactor facilities.
If the licensee outsources technical support for duties relating to the operation andmanagement of reactor facilities to a specialized contractor, it is vital that the contractor
to which the work is outsourced is equipped with the necessary capabilities andconditions to ensure the safety of reactor facilities; accordingly, the Operational Safety
Programs require the licensee to monitor and manage the contractor appropriately, on
the basis of their own quality management systems, and the licensee’s performance inthis regard is checked by the NRA in inspections such as Operational Safety Inspections.
Article 19 (6)1Reporting of Accidents and Failures, etc.

Regulatory Requirements

In the event of an accident or a failure at a reactor facility, the licensee is obliged to report
the fact immediately to the NRA, in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, andalso have an obligation to provide the NRA with a report on the situation and themeasures taken to deal with this event within ten days from its occurrence.
Moreover, in the event of a specified event or emergency prescribed in the Nuclear
Emergency Act, the licensee is required to notify the Prime Minister and the NRA of thisfact immediately.
171

ARTICLE 19 Operation
2

Outline of Reporting Criteria and Reporting Procedures for Accidents, Failures,etc.

The criteria for reporting events in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act are prescribed in the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors.
The licensees is required to report such events to the NRA, based on these criteria.
The NRA has constructed a system that enables reports of events to be accepted 24 hours
a day, 365 days of the year. In the events that should be reported, the licensee
immediately provides an initial report to the NRA’s duty officer and continues to provide
reports thereafter in accordance with the legislation.
Upon receiving reports from licensees, the NRA releases such information as the detailsof the events, the NRA’s response, and the provisional INES rating without delay.
3

Reporting of Accidents and Failures, etc. during the Past Three Years

The annex two provides the list of events reported by licensees to the NRA during theperiod FY2016-2018, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
There were five events in FY2016, three events in FY2017, and four events in FY2018.
4

Investigation of the Causes of Accidents or Failures, etc. and Measures toPrevent Their Recurrence

The licensee has a prime responsibility to deal with events that occur at their reactor
facilities and must take responsibility for everything from investigating the root cause of
the event to implementing measures of preventing recurrence.
The NRA checks that this process is being carried out appropriately, or leads them to doso.
As well as investigating the event, compiling a report outlining the root cause andmeasures to deal with it, and submitting the report to the NRA, the licensee also
publishes their reports.
The NRA examines the details reported by the licensee concerning the root cause andmeasures to prevent recurrence, in order to check the validity of the investigation andthe measures formulated by the licensee.
Moreover, with regard to measures to prevent recurrence of the event in question, thelicensee is required to take preventive measures not only in regard to knowledge gained
from events occurred at their own reactor facilities, but also knowledge gained from172

ARTICLE 19 Operation
events that have occurred at other facilities, in accordance with the provisions of theReactor Regulation Act.
The NRA started to hold Meetings for Dealing with Accidents and Failures at Nuclear
Facilities which is open to the public to share information and discuss among licensees
in order to improve the transparency in the process of dealing with accidents and failures,and five meetings were held in 2018.
5

Use of INESIn July 1989, Japan began to use its own nuclear event evaluation scale to assign ratings
to events that occurred in Japan, but since August 1992, it has used INES to evaluate an
event.
The NRA accepts the report from the licensee of an accident or a failure in accordancewith laws such as the Reactor Regulation Act, and after judging that the cause andmeasures in the report is appropriate, decide the INES rating based on the report. For
the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS, INES rating is not applied for the event occurred
after approval of its Implementation Plan and assumed of INES level to be less than
6.This is because the criteria of the defense in depth and the standards to manage
radiation barrier for the facility are considered not appropriate to apply.
INES is the communication tool to convey importance of the safety of an event in nuclear
facilities, and its rating is announced at a website of the NRA. An event which INES
rating is level 2 or higher will be registered on the NEWS website that the IAEA manages,
and if necessary, event which INES rating level is lower than level 2 is also registered.
Article 19 (7)1Making Effective Use of Operational Experiences

Measures for Effective Use of Operational Experiences

If a safety significant event occurs, the licensee is required to report this to the NRA
without delay, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. Once inreceipt of the report concerning the event, the NRA immediately discloses the details
and checks the response of the licensee to the event. Moreover, once the root cause has
been identified and measures to prevent recurrence have been decided, theseinformations are also published.
Having received advice from experts in operation management, inspection, andradiation control, the NRA scrutinizes information concerning the event, strives to173

ARTICLE 19 Operation
identify safety lessons from it, and if necessary, requests licensees to reflect these lessons
in their operation and maintenance activities, or reflects them to its own regulatory
activities.
The NRA has been conducting improvement of ordinances and/or guides to incorporate
latest knowledge gained through national and foreign regulatory activities, operational
information relating to incidents and troubles occurred at domestic or overseas nuclear
facilities, results of safety research conducted by the NRA, surveys of academic researchand state-of-the-art technical and scientific knowledge obtained from activities ofinternational organizations such as the IAEA and the OECD/NEA.
In the implementing process, the NRA collects information of incidents and troubles
occurred at national or foreign nuclear facilities, studies and scrutinizes them. The NRA
decides whether to take regulatory actions or not on these items after the discussion at
the Technical Information Committee and advices from the Reactor Safety Examination
Committee or the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee.
Prescribed in the NRA Ordinance as the obligation, the licensee shall define the
Operational Safety Programs to cover the matters related to sharing of technicalinformation on operational safety among licensees when such knowledge is gained by
the licensee that conducted maintenance or inspection.
This regulation is a measure for the licensee to share event information among licensees
and utilize for nuclear safety, even if it has only small influence.
Licensees manage the "Nuclear Information Archives (NUCIA)", a database for nuclear
facilities' information which is disclosed to the public, cooperating with JANSI.
The database of NUCIA contains operating information from the first nuclear reactor in1966 to the current reactors or reprocessing plants, and is shared not only by licensees
but also the public for the transparency.
In addition to that, as for the collection, analysis, assessment and utilization of operating
information among licensees, JANSI, as a third party which is independent fromelectricity utilities, collects domestic and overseas information such as events at nuclear
facilities, analyzes, assesses and provides the result for the domestic electricity utility.
Also during its review process, the NRA instructs licensees to share the information andtake necessary measures for evens that should be reported to the NRA, in accordancewith legislation.
2

International Sharing of Operational Experiences

As a country that has experiences of operating many reactor facilities, Japan believes that
174

ARTICLE 19 Operation
it is vital to share these experiences internationally with a wide range of countries, andthat it has a responsibility to do so in order to improve global nuclear safety.
The NRA shares information internationally via mechanisms of internationalorganizations such as the IAEA and the OECD/NEA, as well as through bilateral
cooperation.
Mechanisms relating to the sharing of operational experiences with internationalorganizations include the proactive provision of information via the IAEA Incident
Reporting System (IRS), the IAEA Fuel Incident Notification and Analysis System(FINAS) and the IAEA Incident Reporting System for Research Reactors (IRSRR). In
Japan, the NRA gathers information about operational experiences within Japan,
compiles it as a database, and provides these data for the IRS, the FINAS, and the IRSRR.
In terms of bilateral activities, information is shared through regular meetings etc., toexchange information.
Article 19 (8)1On-Site Management of Spent Fuels and Radioactive Wastes

On-Site Management of Spent Fuels

In addition to the spent fuel pools used at many reactor facilities, dry storage casks areused to store spent fuels at some power stations.
In storing the spent fuel, a licensee is required to take the necessary measures to cool the
spent fuel, and to ensure that the design of the storage system is such that the spent fuelis kept subcritical in accordance with the provisions of the NRA Ordinance on
Commercial Reactors. The Pre-service Inspections check that construction work has been
carried out according to this design, while the Licensee’s Periodic Inspections carried out
by licensees to check that the soundness of the storage facility is being maintained during
the lifetime of the reactor facility.
The on-site management of spent fuels is positioned in safety regulations as part ofmeasures to ensure the operational safety of reactor facilities, so its implementation
status is checked in Operational Safety Inspections.
As for dry storage of spent fuels at site by a dual purpose cask (DPC) which could be
used both for transportation and storage, the NRA established the reasonable regulationand procedure based on stringent specifications for transportation. It requires that the
DPC is to be designed to cope with the seismic design condition applicable to any
candidate site with a sufficient margin and added DPC to Type Certification for Designof Specified Equipment and Designation of Type of Specified Equipment. As far as the175

ARTICLE 19 Operation
certified and designated DPC is applied, reviews on Reactor Installation Permit and theapproval of Construction Plan are carried out only for site specific conditions such assite boundary radiation dose or separation distance from a fire source. The NRA willrevised/established the NRA Ordinance on Standards for Installation Permit, the NRA
Ordinance on Technical Standards, and relevant guides, and promulgated and enforced
them in April 2019.
2

On-Site Management of Radioactive Waste

The licensee is required to take appropriate measures in relation to the transport, storage,
and/or on-site disposal of radioactive waste as a part of the measures required for
operational safety in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
If disposing of radioactive waste at a site, the licensee is required to ensure that this takes
place under the supervision of personnel who has the requisite knowledge concerning
disposal and radiation protection associated with disposal.
The measures that should be taken to dispose of radioactive waste are prescribedaccording to the nature of waste.
Gaseous radioactive waste is required to be discharged using an exhaust facility, or to beretained as waste in disposal tanks.
Liquid radioactive waste is required to be discharged using a drainage facility, retained
as waste in disposal tanks, or placed in containers or solidified along with the containerand stored at a retained waste facility, or incinerated at an incineration facility.
Solid radioactive waste is required to be incinerated at an incineration facility, and its
residue to be placed in containers, or solidified along with the container and stored at aretained waste facility. Alternatively, radioactive waste that is extremely difficult todispose of using these methods, such as large items of machinery, and radioactive wastethat requires the decay of radioactivity over time is required to be stored at a retained
waste facility.
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors prescribes requirements and criteria foreach disposal method in relation to the type of radiation monitoring necessary to prevent
radiation hazards and the containers required for disposal, thereby ensuring theappropriate handling of radioactive waste. The licensee stores radioactive waste
generated by their own reactor facilities at on-site storage facilities until it can be takenout to a disposal facility.
Radioactive waste is classified into gaseous, liquid, and solid waste. Gaseous radioactive
waste is exhaust gas generated by ventilating components and rooms in the radiation
176

ARTICLE 19 Operation
controlled area, and it is discharged via vent stacks while using exhaust radiation
monitors to monitor it.
Liquid radioactive waste is effluent generated within the controlled area, which isfiltered, demineralized, and concentrated, and apart from what has an extremely low
level of radioactivity, the treated liquid is generally re-used in the facility rather thanbeing discharged into the environment.
Solid waste such as scrap material generated in the course of maintenance and repair
work during the period of Periodic Facility Inspections is either placed as it is into drums,
or incinerated, melted, or compressed in order to reduce the volume before being placed
into drums, and is then stored at the on-site radioactive waste storage facility.
In Japan, there are no legal provisions imposing an obligation to minimize the volumeof radioactive waste generated, but as there is a limit to the quantity of radioactive wastethat can be stored on-site, and it costs to treat and dispose of waste, licensees voluntarily
strive to minimize the amount of radioactive waste by such means as evaporative
concentration of liquid waste and the compression or melting of solid waste.
The on-site management of radioactive waste is positioned as part of measures to ensure
the operational safety of reactor facilities under safety regulations, so its implementation
status is checked in Operational Safety Inspections.
The above-mentioned procedures have been carried out from the past. However, it isimportant to continuously improve such measures without interruption for ensuringsafety, and reviews on these measures will be continued.
3

Clearance System

In Japan, regarding the scrap material generated due to the operation and maintenanceof reactor facilities or decommissioning, radioactive waste with an extremely low
radioactivity concentration is classified as “material not required to be handled asradioactive waste” after the approval and confirmation by the NRA so that it can beappropriately and rationally recycled or disposed of (this framework is called as“Clearance system”).
The NRA is involved at the following two stages.
Stage 1: The NRA reviews and approves the validity of the radioactivity
concentration measurement and evaluation methods formulated by thelicenseeStage 2: The NRA confirms that the licensee is carrying out radioactivity
concentration measurement and evaluation using the approved methods
177

ARTICLE 19 Operationin Stage 1, and that the objects that the licensee classified as “material not
required to be handle as radioactive waste” are actually below the clearance
level in the Clearance system using records and sampling inspection.
In addition, this system targets not only reactor facilities, but also other nuclear fuel cycle
facilities.
During the reporting period, the NRA approved radioactivity concentration
measurement and evaluation methods for three cases: JAEA’s Fugen, Ningyo-toge
Environmental Engineering Center, and Chubu Electric Power Company’s Hamaoka
NPS units 1 and 2. The NRA will revise the review criteria for the approval in order tomake it more reasonable.

178

D AnnexesDAnnexes1

List of nuclear installations

2

List of accidents and failures reported under the Reactor Regulation Act during
the reporting period

3

Result of IAEA OSART Follow-up Mission taken by TEPCO

4Result of IAEA Mission on Mid-and-long-term Roadmap Towards theDecommissioning of TEPCO’S Fukushima Daiichi NPS (Fourth Mission)

5

References

179

D Annexes
1

List of nuclear installations
Licensee
Hokkaido
Electric Power
Co., Inc.

Tohoku ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Power Station
TomariOnagawa

Higashidori

Fukushima Daiichi

Tokyo ElectricPower Co. Inc.

Fukushima Daini

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa

Higashidori
Chubu ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Hamaoka

Hokuriku
Electric Power
Company

Shika

MihamaKansai ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Takahama

Ohi

unit

ReactorType

Output(MWe)Commissioned

Status

1
2
3

PWR
PWR
PWR

579
579
912

Jun 22, 1989
Apr 12, 1991
Dec 22, 2009

1

BWR4

524

Jun 01, 1984

2
3
1
2

BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
ABWR

825
825
1,100
1,385

Jul 28, 1995
Jan 30, 2002
Dec 08, 2005

1

BWR3

460

Mar 26, 1971

2

BWR4

784

Jul 18, 1974

3

BWR4

784

Mar 27, 1976

4

BWR4

784

Oct 12, 1978

5

BWR4

784

Apr 18, 1978

6

BWR5

1,100

Oct 24, 1979

1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
1
2
3
4
5
1

BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
ABWR
ABWR
ABWR
BWR4
BWR4
BWR5
BWR5
ABWR
BWR5

1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,356
1,356
1,385
540
840
1,100
1,137
1,380
540

Apr 20, 1982
Feb 03, 1984
Jun 21, 1985
Aug 25, 1987
Sep 18, 1985
Sep 28, 1990
Aug 11, 1993
Aug 11, 1994
Apr 10, 1990
Nov 07, 1996
Jul 02, 1997
Mar 17, 1976
Nov 29, 1978
Aug 28, 1987
Sep 03, 1993
Jan 18, 2005
Jul 30, 1993

In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
Permanent
Shutdown
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Planning
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
Under Construction
Decommissioning
Decommissioning
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation

2

ABWR

1,206

Mar 15, 2006

In Operation

1
2
3
1
2
3
4

PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR

340
500
826
826
826
870
870

Nov 28, 1970
Jul 25, 1972
Dec 01, 1976
Nov 14, 1974
Nov 14, 1975
Jan 17, 1985
Jun 05, 1985

1

PWR

1,175

Mar 27, 1979

2

PWR

1,175

Dec 05, 1979

3

PWR

1,180

Dec 18, 1991

Decommissioning
Decommissioning
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
In Operation

180

D Annexes
Licensee

4
1
2
3
1
1

Reactor
Type
PWR
BWR3
BWR5
ABWR
ABWR
PWR

Output
(MWe)
1,180
460
820
1,373
1,373
566

2

PWR

566

Mar 19, 1982

3

PWR

890

1

PWR

2
3
4
1
2
3

Commissioned

Status

Feb 02, 1993
Mar 29, 1974
Feb 10, 1989

Dec 15, 1994

In Operation
Decommissioning
In Operation
Under Construction
In Planning
Decommissioning
Permanent
Shutdown
In Operation559

Oct 15, 1975

Decommissioning

Tsuruga

559
1,180
1,180
890
890
1,590
166
1,100
357
1,160
1,538
1,538

Mar 30, 1981
Mar 18, 1994
Jul 25, 1997
Jul 04, 1984
Nov 28, 1985

1
2
3
4

PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
APWR
GCR
BWR5
BWR2
PWR
APWR
APWR

In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Planning
Decommissioning
In Operation
Decommissioning
In Operation
In Planning
In PlanningElectric Power
Development
Co.,Ltd. (JPOWER)

Ohma

1

ABWR

1,383

Japan Atomic
Energy Agency

Advanced Thermal Reactor“Fugen”
Prototype Fast Breeder
Reactor “Monju”

ATR

165

FBR

280

ChugokuElectric Power
Co., Inc.
ShikokuElectric Power
Co., Inc.

Power Station

unit

ShimaneKaminoseki
Ikata

GenkaiKyushu ElectricPower Co., Inc.
SendaiJapan Atomic
Power
Company

Tokai
Tokai No2

Sep 30, 1977

Jul 25, 1966
Nov 28, 1978
Mar 14, 1970
Feb 17, 1987

Under Construction

Mar 20, 1979

Decommissioning
Decommissioning

Notes:In Planning：

NPS for which the operator submitted a license application,
but not yet approved

Under Construction：

NPS has been authorized, but has not yet passed a pre-service
inspection

In Operation：

NPS that has passed a pre-service inspection

Permanent Shutdown：

NPS

that

where

operations

have

been

ceasedfordecommissioning
Decommissioning：

NPS whose decommissioning plan has already been
approved181

D Annexes
2

List of accidents and failures reported under the Reactor Regulation Act during
the reporting period

Accidents and failures reported in FY2016
Power Station
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Tokai No2 Power
StationShimane NPS
Takahama Power
StationTsuruga Power
StationAccidents and Failures
Leakage of Cesium/ Strontium-treatedwater from transfer piping into the G6tank area
Setting of limited Access Area in the
Waste Treatment Building due to theleakage of radioactive liquid
Corrosion of duct of HVAC system for
Main Control Room of unit 2
Indication of flaw of heat transfer tube
for unit 3 Steam Generator, foundthrough the Periodic Inspection
Damage of a pump shaft for coolingthe unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator
Cylinder

Date

INES

20th Apr 2016

Below
scale26

2nd Jun 20160

8th Dec 2016

1

12th Jan 20170

3rd Feb 2017

0

Date

INES

2nd May 20170

2nd Nov 2017

Below
scale26

18th Jan 2018

0

Date

INES

5th Jun 20180

22nd Jun 2018026

Accidents and failures reported in FY2017
Power Station
Hamaoka NPS
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Hamaoka NPS

Accidents and Failures
Setting of limited Access Area due tothe leakage of radioactive material in
the Waste Volume Reduction Facility
Building
Failure of speed governor for unit 6
Emergency Diesel Generator （A）
Setting of limited Access Area in the
Waste Volume Reduction Facility
Building due to the leakage ofradioactive material

Accidents and failures reported in FY2018
Power Station
Hamaoka NPS
Takahama Power

Accidents and Failures
Deviation from limiting condition for
operation due to the failure of unit 5
Emergency Diesel Generator (B)Indication of flaw of heat transfer tube

In the case of judging level of event occurred at Fukushima Daiichi NPS, INES rating is notapplied for the event less than INES 6 level.
26

182

D Annexes
StationKashiwazakiKariwa NPS
Takahama Power
Stationfor unit 4 Steam Generator, foundthrough the Periodic Inspection
Locked rotor of supercharger for unit
1 Emergency Diesel Generator (B)Indication of flaw of heat transfer tube
for unit 3 Steam Generator, foundthrough the Periodic Inspection

183

6th Sep 20180

12th Sep 20180

D Annexes
3

Result of IAEA OSART Follow-up Mission taken by TEPCOThe IAEA conducted an OSART follow-up mission to units 6 and 7 of the TEPCO KashiwazakiKariwa Nuclear Power Plant between 31 July and 4 August 2017. The team considered the plant’s
response to the issues identified in the original mission and conducted interviews, reviewed
documents and performed field inspections to judge progress. 15 issues were identified during
the OSART mission in 2015. The team concluded that the plant had resolved 8 of these regarding:•

Pass/fail criteria for evaluation of Main Control Room personnel.

•

Gaps in documentation governing the conduct of operations•

Arrangements and practices for contamination control•

Arrangements for consistent application of the ALARA principle•

Completeness and consistency of the emergency plan arrangements and concepts•

Configuration and layout of the Technical Support Centre•

Update of emergency operating procedures and accident management guidance to cover all
plant states and the spent fuel pools•

Enhanced validation of time critical operator actions

The team also concluded that the plant had made satisfactory progress to date in the other 7
identified issues. The status of these is briefly described below:
LAM 1.2(1): Set standards for work safety policies. Clearly communicate risk-compatible
standards to the leadership, make them understand and conduct. Report, record, and analyze
the trends of near-miss and low-level events.
The plant has put in place a credible action plan that includes enhancements to standard setting,management oversight and the setting and monitoring of performance indicators. There areseveral indicators that show favorable trends. However, some of trends do not show
improvement and, while adherence was notably better than in 2015, the team observed minor
non-compliance with the safety expectation on holding the hand rail on stairways. On that basis
the team expects the plans will eventually be successful but that more time is needed before theissue can be considered resolved.
TQ 2.2(1): Adopt the training methods suitable for training to maintain effective training.
The team noted some improvement in the lecture skills of external instructors and use of
didactic tools. However although the team believes that the issue will be resolved once theaction plan is more fully implemented this requires more time.
184

D Annexes

TQ 2.2(3): Establish an official continued training program based on systematic
education/training methods related to maintenance and other technological staff (for radiation
protection, chemical and fuel management).
The TEPCO Education and Training department was reorganized at the end of 2016 and theresources available have been increased. New training programmes have been developed insome, but not all, areas and new performance indicators have been in place for several months.
These changes are expected to lead to resolution of this issue but more time is required.
OP 3.6(1): Review arrangements related to organization of fire brigades at sites, practical retraining for and guards to special fire brigades at sites, to ensure effective actions for firewarnings.
The plant has implemented an enhanced annual fire drill schedule and improved thecoordination of the onsite fire brigades to minimize the waiting time before the offsite firebrigade gains access to the site. However the total time before firefighting teams reach thelocation of fires is still long. The plant has plans to improve this aspect further which require
more time before the issue can be considered resolved.
MA&TS 4.6(1): Officially approve design authority functions, and establish procedures toenable complete, reliable and important plant design data availability, including long-termsaving and storage of detailed design documents through the entire power station operation
period.
The team noted progress in reconstitution of design basis documentation and associatedguidelines and the intent to establish a design authority function at the corporate office. This isin progress but will take some considerable time to complete and for the required training to bedelivered. The team also heard that a new engineering centre of about 400 enngineers, including
about 120 design engineers will be established to implement engineering activities for specificplants and units. The team acknowledged that these plans exceed the original scope of the
OSART suggestion and is confident that, once implemented, the issue will be resolved.
MA&TS 4.10(1): Establish and implement a comprehensive equipment approval program.

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The team noted progress in developing a comprehensive equipment qualification programme.
Some of the data required to provide qualification evidence is held by the original plantdesigners and vendors and acquiring this will take time. The plant is at an advanced stage ofdeveloping a configuration management and document system, which will integrate theequipment qualification programme in the first half of 2018. Training of TEPCO personnel inthe EQ programme has started but still has some way to go. Because these good initiatives havestarted, but are not yet complete, the team concluded that satisfactory progress has been madeto date.
OEF 6.9(1): Introduce an integrated system to manage all operation experience information, andestablish and implement OE program elements related to report, selection, analysis, corrective
actions, trend analysis, and effectiveness evaluations.
The analysis of the OE issue identified during the OSART revealed a significant number ofgaps. Many of these have been addressed but in some areas the expected elements of aneffective OE programme have only been started relatively recently. These have yet to mature
and achieve the levels of performance expected. One key aspect of the original finding was thelack of integration of OE and corrective action programmes across the site and the company.
The planned activities are judged likely to be successful as long as they are pursued rigorously
to completion.

4

Result of IAEA Mission on Mid-and-long-term Roadmap Towards theDecommissioning of TEPCO’S Fukushima Daiichi NPS (Fourth Mission)

The fourth Mission of the International Peer Review of Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards
the Decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station units 1-4 took
place from 5 to 13 November 2018. The report offers 17 Acknowledgments and 21 Advisory
Points. Following is a summary of Acknowledgments and Advisory Points:
Current Situation of Fukushima Daiichi NPS and Roadmap Implementation
Acknowledgement 1
The IAEA Review Team acknowledges the efforts by Japan in the development, implementationand communication of the Roadmap activities including incorporation of regular revisions. The
establishment of advisory committees and consultations with Japanese and international experts
bring useful contribution to the definition of the programme.

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Follow-up of the Previous IAEA Review Mission Conducted in 2015
Acknowledgement 2
The IAEA Review Team appreciates the consideration given to the Advisory Points from theprevious Review missions and acknowledges the efforts of NDF, TEPCO and other Japaneseorganizations and institutions to effectively implement them into the arrangements and practices
related to the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS.
Management of ALPS Treated Water Stored in Tanks
As stated in the previous Review missions, the IAEA Review Team is of the opinion that thepresent plan to store the ALPS treated water containing tritium and other radionuclides in above
ground tanks, with the current capacity of 970,000 m3, can only be a temporary measure while amore sustainable solution is needed. Currently, the Government of Japan is considering fivesolutions including the possible resumption of controlled discharges to the sea, which areroutinely used by operating nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities in Japan and worldwide,and for which a large amount of information is readily available.
Acknowledgement 3
The IAEA Review Team acknowledges the work done by METI to identify possible technologies
to remove tritium and assess possible disposition paths. The IAEA Review Team also
acknowledges ongoing dialogue with all stakeholders, and especially with the local communities.
The IAEA Review Team also takes note of the statements issued by the Nuclear Regulation
Authority (NRA) on the management of ALPS treated water.
Advisory Point 1
The IAEA Review Team holds that a decision on the disposition path for the stored ALPS treatedwater containing tritium and other radionuclides, after further treatment as needed, must be
taken urgently, engaging all stakeholders, to ensure the sustainability of the decommissioning
activities and of the safe and effective implementation of other risk reduction measures.
After the decision on the disposition path is made, TEPCO should prepare and submit to the NRA
for authorization a comprehensive proposal for its implementation in conformity with laws andregulations, supported by such items as a safety assessment and analysis of the environmental
impacts, including control of the water before disposition, to address radiation safety of the public,
workers and environment.
To support the implementation of the chosen disposition path, a robust comprehensive
monitoring programme developed by TEPCO and approved by the NRA, supported by acommunication plan ensuring a proactive and timely dissemination of information to187

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stakeholders and general public are necessary.
Public Communication
Acknowledgement 4
The IAEA Review Team recognizes that TEPCO has strengthened its process for sharing
information with the public, including by publishing radiation data on its website. In addition,
the Government of Japan has set up the Sub-committee on handling of ALPS treated water whichholds hearings for the public to ask questions and voice concerns, providing important feedback
for members of the Sub-committee and officials.
Advisory Point 2
The IAEA Review Team advises to the Government of Japan and TEPCO to take a proactive andtimely approach to communicating with the public on matters directly relevant to public concerns.
This includes not only disclosing relevant information and data on a regular basis, but providing
the general public the information in an easy-to-understand manner, including an explanation of
its potential impact on the health and safety of the workforce and public as well as the protectionof the environment.
Strategy and Planning for the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Site
STRATEGY AND PLANNING
Acknowledgement 5
The IAEA Review Team acknowledges the improvement that the Government of Japan, NDF,TEPCO and other organisations have made on revising and developing the strategy for thedecommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS. There is evidence of a risk prioritisation
based on the radioactive content of the waste materials, as well as on their physical properties
and the conditions and environment in which they currently exist. This resulted in refocusing
efforts on the removal of spent fuel and fuel debris retrieval, and aids the long-term planning andrisk assessment of implementation activities.
Advisory Point 3
The IAEA Review Team advises the Government of Japan and NDF to prepare themselves now
in order to develop during Phase 3 an integrated plan for the completion of decommissioning of
the entire Fukushima Daiichi site; including all six units, the ancillary radioactive waste treatment
and storage facilities, and the management of all forms of radioactive waste arisings during thedecommissioning activities. Careful consideration should be given to the assumptions used and188

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how to express the inherent uncertainties involved. In order to successfully produce such a plan,significant effort is expected to be required to determine the options and scenarios that lead to acredible plan for the long term.
PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Acknowledgement 6
The IAEA Review Team is of the opinion that the establishment of the Project Management
Organization (PMO) is a good decision and the use of more sophisticated project management
tools will improve TEPCO’s project delivery and analysis capabilities.
Advisory Point 4
The IAEA Review Team recommends that TEPCO uses project management tools to their fullpotential, for example by developing a resource loaded schedule for each individual project or
activity identified in the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) and integrating those schedules intoa master Fukushima Daiichi project schedule. Integrating individual project activities into amaster schedule will help identify constraints on resources, potential conflicts and insertion
points for new technology from R&D activities.
Advisory Point 5
The IAEA Review Team advises that programme and project decision making focus on
management of the uncertainties, and hence risks to delivery of the schedule and overall
programme.
R&D TO SUPPORT DECOMMISSIONING PROJECT
Acknowledgement 7
The IAEA Review Team appreciates the substantial efforts being undertaken to plan and carryout
research and development (R&D) activities to support the Fukushima Daiichi decommissioning.
Substantive R&D project outcomes have been produced thus far and capable state-of-the-art
facilities with strategic domestic and international cooperation have been established. In
particular, the Decommissioning R&D Partnership Council structure appears to be an adequate
approach to identify and prioritize R&D needs with input from all relevant parties.
Advisory Point 6
TEPCO has demonstrated a robust approach to technology selection, development anddeployment, and is aware of the challenges and risks associated with first-of-a-kind technology
deployment that inevitably give rise to schedule uncertainties. The IAEA Review Team advises
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TEPCO to consider implementation of international good practice approaches to technology
maturation and deployment as well as development of contingency plans to accommodate anyschedule delays.
SUPPLY CHAIN AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Advisory Point 7
The IAEA Review Team recommends that TEPCO review and strengthen their interface
management processes especially for complex situations involving multiple parties andinternational suppliers. Emphasis should be placed on ensuring the parties understand thetechnical specifications and programmatic requirements. Periodic joint progress reviews
including reviews and inspections at the locations where work is performed are essential toensuring that interface issues are identified and managed at the earliest possible time to avoid
impacts later in the project.
Institutional and Organisational Issues
ROLE AND INTERACTION BETWEEN NDF AND TEPCO
Acknowledgment 8
The IAEA Review Team acknowledges the establishment and full operational status of the NDF
and of the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination and Decommissioning Engineering
Company. The IAEA Review Team acknowledges the clarification of the roles and responsibilitiesof the main actors: METI, NDF, TEPCO (FDEC), IRID, JAEA, and the attention given to thecoordination of their respective roles and responsibilities.
Advisory Point 8
The IAEA Review Team takes note of the additional roles given to NDF, and the corresponding
interactions between NDF and TEPCO. In the current scheme, NDF has an operational role ofstrategic planning and the role of oversight of TEPCO, while TEPCO has the responsibility forthe implementation as a licensee. The IAEA Review Team advises Japan to ensure clear
accountability of respective roles and responsibilities between and among NDF and TEPCO, andto create the condition for TEPCO to have the necessary ownership of the solutions that it will
implement.
LICENSING PROCESS
Acknowledgement 9
The IAEA Review Team acknowledges that TEPCO has a now well established monthly andweekly communication with NRA, organized within a transparent framework.
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Advisory Point 9
In complex situations such as the post-accident situation of the Fukushima Daiichi site, somespecific regulatory and licensing criteria may need to be defined when the criteria used in normal
situations cannot readily be applied. The IAEA Review Team advises METI, NDF and TEPCO tomaintain engagement with NRA to develop a common understanding of the safety requirements
for the performance of the decommissioning of the site and to optimize the risk reduction strategy.
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
Advisory Point 10
The IAEA Review Team encourages TEPCO to develop knowledge management systems thatencompass all facets of the relevant workforce (TEPCO and subcontractors) considering thespecific requirements of the conditions and life-cycle stage of the site’s facilities for the next
several decades.
TRAINING AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
Acknowledgment 10
The IAEA Review Team endorses the creation of the Nuclear Education and Training Centre tofacilitate the human resource development function, and which is now consolidated into anorganization directly under the control of Director of the Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Divisionof TEPCO, thereby utilizing resources more efficiently. The IAEA Review Team also
acknowledges that the education and training programme is designed following the Systematic
Approach to Training.
Advisory Point 11
The IAEA Review Team recommends that TEPCO and the PMO utilize the integrated project
management tool to maintain an estimate of the number and categories of workers required
during different phases of the Fukushima Daiichi decommissioning project. This would include
tracking worker demographics to identify recruitment and training requirements.
SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION
Acknowledgement 11 (Safety leadership and safety culture)
The IAEA Review Team recognises the safety leadership that TEPCO, who has primary
responsibility as Operator and Licensee, has shown in the period since the last IAEA Review
Mission in developing a safety culture at the Fukushima Daiichi site. They have made significant
progress in addressing their understanding of the expectations and requirements of the nuclear
safety culture in a decommissioning environment. In addition, the IAEA Review Team applauds
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the adoption of the WANO Traits of a Nuclear Safety Culture and the implementation of systems
to measure their organizational performance, with review of the results of the safety culture
programme.
Acknowledgment 12 (Occupational Radiation Protection Programme)
Measures for occupational safety and health management have been enhanced at the TEPCO
Fukushima Daiichi NPS as required by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare guidelines
from August 2015. Radiation Protection Programme, Guidelines for dose exposure reduction
management and Guidelines for organization and operation of ALARA committee has beenreviewed and revised. Those guidelines are in full practical implementation under the TEPCO’s
Committees responsible for risk management.
The site working conditions are improved because of the paving action at the site, better work
planning by the ALARA Committee, improvement on the protective gear and real-time radiation
monitoring. The workers dosimetry and health surveillance programme takes into consideration
the demanding and difficult working conditions.
Advisory Point 12 (Safety leadership and safety culture)
The IAEA Review Team encourages TEPCO to promote the safety culture of all workers on site
including its contractors, and to continue to consider the specific requirements of the conditions
and life-cycle stage of the site’s facilities that differ from a normal operating environment, andcontinue to develop a safety culture management system appropriate to radioactive waste
management and decommissioning.
Advisory Point 13 (Occupational Radiation Protection Programme)
TEPCO is encouraged to provide for further optimization of radiation protection exposure byanalysing the workers’ exposure data for all facilities and types of operation, so as to identify
optimization options and dose reduction factors. This is valuable information for current andfuture actions at the site.
International Cooperation
Acknowledgement 13
The IAEA Review Team acknowledges the development of bilateral cooperation on a number ofimportant topics such as Research and Development, risk assessment and prioritization orcommunication, and the adoption of internationally recognized practices. The IAEA Review
Team also acknowledges the proactive stance of Japan to share with international community thestatus of decommissioning activities.
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Advisory Point 14
The IAEA Review Team advises Japan to further develop a broad array of international
cooperation in all domains. Such international cooperation has the potential to bring significant
benefits to the safe decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi site and to increase knowledge
sharing with the international community. The IAEA Review Team encourages Japan to draw
upon the global diversity of international good practices, and to integrate and adapt them to fit
the unique Fukushima Daiichi site situation.
Specific Topics
MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATED WATER AND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINSTGROUNDWATER INGRESS
Acknowledgement 14
The IAEA Review Team commends TEPCO for implementing the full set of the countermeasuresagainst the groundwater ingress into the damaged facilities and against leakage of contaminatedwater from the buildings and from the site, thus contributing to reduction in the generation ofcontaminated water and to the protection of the workers, public and the environment, and the
management of the site boundary dose.
Advisory Point 15
The injected water cooling of the fuel debris mixes with ingressed water and contributes to thegeneration of contaminated water. The IAEA Review Team encourages TEPCO to perform
analyses of the needs for continuous cooling and, depending on the results, to consider further
reducing the amount of injected water, ending injected water cooling at some point, or
establishing a closed cooling loop.
SPENT FUEL REMOVAL AND FUEL DEBRIS RETRIEVAL
Acknowledgment 15 (Spent fuel)The IAEA Review Team acknowledges the careful and deliberate approach to the spent fuelremovals across the site. The team recognizes the many good practices such as the adaptation ofsafety controls to the conditions in each unit, providing hands-on training of the workers, using
dummy fuel and casks on the remote operation of the new FHM (Fuel Handling Machine) andcrane in unit 3 before starting the real operations, and measures taken to reduce dust arisingduring rubble and spent fuel removal operations for the radiological protection of the workers
and the environment.
Acknowledgment 16 (Fuel debris)
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The IAEA Review Team also acknowledges significant progress is being achieved in clarificationof the fuel debris distribution inside the reactor building of units 1-3 since the 3rd

Review

Mission, and the step-by-step approach (from internal PCV investigation, fuel debris sampling
and characterization, small scale retrieval to bulk retrieval) currently considered for the fueldebris retrieval.
Advisory Point 16 (Spent fuel)The IAEA Review Team advises TEPCO to take measures to ensure enough storage capacity will
exist among the common spent fuel pool and dry cask storage areas to accommodate all spent
fuel on site from units 1-6.
Advisory Point 17 (Spent fuel)The IAEA Review Team advises that all the different categories and characteristics of all fuelassemblies on the site be fully considered with regard to conditions affecting its safe management(retrieval, transport and storage). Substantial international experience is available in the
management of both intact and damaged BWR spent fuel (e.g. USA, Germany, etc.) that may be
drawn upon. While there are as yet no indications of fuel assemblies damaged by the accident,
the plan should incorporate the ability to design and store, in the pool and casks, all anticipated
fuel assembly conditions.
Advisory Point 18 (Fuel debris)
The IAEA Review Team advises that before the commencement of the fuel debris retrieval
activities, there should be a clear implementation plan defined to safely manage the retrieved
material. TEPCO should ensure that appropriate containers and storage capacity are available
before starting the fuel debris retrieval. Sufficient characterization (e.g. estimation of criticality,hydrogen emission, neutron activity, thermal condition, parameters of neutron-multiplying
medium, etc.) of the fuel debris environment will support successful safe debris retrieval anddesign of related facilities and equipment including containers and any treatment and storage
facilities.
Advisory Point 19 (Fuel debris)
Whilst significant progress has been achieved in estimation of the fuel debris distribution inside
the reactor building of units 1-3, there is recognition that more must be done. The IAEA Review
Team supports continuing efforts to more precisely understand the fuel debris distribution insideeach unit, the associated level and distribution of radiation encountered.

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MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE
Acknowledgement 17
The IAEA Review Team is of the opinion that good progress has been made with this very
complex series of decommissioning and waste management projects in the face of many
significant challenges and constraints. Good progress has been made in establishing strategies toreduce the volume of radioactive wastes, create storage capacity and enhance the stability of
wastes by using methods such as incineration and dewatering.
Advisory Point 20
The IAEA Review Team recommends that, in considering the overall duration of the Fukushima
Daiichi decommissioning activities, the Roadmap and other planning documents address
operational radioactive waste present on site at the time of the 2011 accident and the present
arising of radioactive waste from the initial site decontamination and fuel retrieval preparations.
In addition, the IAEA Review Team encourages to envisage the generation of waste arising fromthe decommissioning of 6 units and supporting facilities through the completion of
decommissioning, recognizing that at this point in time, significant uncertainty exists in thedecommissioning approach and thus the volumes involved. This will help ensure there is anadequate allocation of resources to manage, characterize, treat and dispose of these radioactive
wastes and that the work activities for these wastes can be properly sequenced with otheractivities.
Advisory Point 21
The IAEA Review Team encourages the NDF and TEPCO to continue to actively explore theapplication of waste hierarchy principles to minimize the volume of material consigned for
disposal. Routine use of pre-treatment techniques of sorting, segregation and decontamination ofsolid material after collection will create opportunities for the recycling of material as well as
providing the possibility to remove material from regulatory control. The IAEA Review Team
encourages the Government of Japan to support TEPCO in such approach.

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5

References

The following documents are references for writing national report.
In General•

The Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material andReactors, Act No.166, 1957•

NRA Ordinance Concerning the Installation and Operation, of Commercial Power
Reactors, Ordinance of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry No. 77, 1978•

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure, and Equipment ofCommercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities, NRA Ordinance No. 5, 2013•

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Commercial Power Reactors andtheir Auxiliary Facilities, NRA Ordinance No. 6, 2013

A

INTRODUCTION•

The 5th Strategic Energy Plan, July, 2018

B

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACTIVITIES DURING THE 7TH REPORTNG PERIOD•REPORT OF THE INTEGRATED REGULATORY REVIEW SERVICE (IRRS) MISSION
TO JAPAN

Article 6•

Improvement items concerning the submit of Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous
Improvement of Commercial Power Reactors, 17th January 2018, the Nuclear Regulation
Authority•

Recommendation to the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
concerning Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju, 13th November 2015, the Nuclear
Regulation Authority

Article 8•

The Basic Policy on Human Development for the Nuclear Regulation Authority Personal,
the Nuclear Regulation Authority•

The Nuclear Regulation Authority Management Rules, 10th October 2014, the Nuclear
Regulation Authority•

The Mid-Term Goal for the First Term of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, March2017 amended, the Nuclear Regulation Authority
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Article 14•

The Guideline for Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement ofCommercial Power Reactor, March, 2017 amended, the Nuclear Regulation Authority

Article 15•

Report on radiation control in nuclear installations, 2015, 16th November 2016, theSecretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority•

Report on radiation control in nuclear installations, 2016, 4th October 2017, theSecretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority•

Report on radiation control in nuclear installations, 2017, 27th February 2019, theSecretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority

Article 16•

The Basic Act on Disaster Management, 1961, Act No.223•

The Nuclear Emergency Act, 1999, Act No.156•

Basic Plan for Disaster Preparedness, part 12 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, 29th
June 2018 amended, the Central Disaster Management Council•

NRA EPR Guide, 1st October 2018 amended, the Nuclear Regulation Authority•

The Installation Guideline for Emergency Monitoring Center, 31th March 2017, theNuclear Regulation Authority

Article 19•

Accidents and failures reported in FY2016, the Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation
Authority•

Accidents and failures reported in FY2017, the Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation
Authority•

Accidents and failures reported in FY2018, the Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation
Authority•

Challenges and actions regarding the improvement of regulatory requirements, 22th
November 2016, the Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority•

Operation of the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale for Events occurredin nuclear facilities, 18th March 2015, the Nuclear Regulation Authority

197