DEFENSE
WHITE PAPER

Message from the Minister of National Defense

The year 2010 marked the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. Since the end of the war, the Republic ofKorea has made such great strides and its economy now ranks among the 10-plus largest economies in the world. Out of
the ashes of the war, it has risen from an aid recipient to a donor nation. Korea’s economic miracle rests on the strength andcommitment of the ROK military.
However, the threat of war and persistent security concerns remain undiminished on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea
is threatening peace with its recent surprise attack against the ROK Ship Cheonan DQGLWV¿ULQJRIDUWLOOHU\DW<HRQS\HRQJ
Island. The series of illegitimate armed provocations by the North have left a fragile peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Transnational and non-military threats coupled with potential conflicts among Northeast Asian countries add anotherelement that further jeopardizes the Korean Peninsula’s security.
To handle security threats, the ROK military has instituted its Defense Vision to foster an ‘Advanced Elite Military,’ which
will realize the said Vision. As part of the efforts, the ROK military complemented the Defense Reform Basic Plan and has
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strengthening the current training system by extending the basic training period and by taking other measures. The military has
also endeavored to invigorate the defense industry as an exporter so the defense economy may develop as a new growth engine
for the entire Korean economy. To reduce any possible inconveniences that Koreans may experience, the military has reformed
its defense rules and regulations to ease the standards necessary to designate a Military Installation Protection Zone.
Considering the current strategic environment, we reached an agreement to adjust the date of Wartime OPCON (Operational
Control) transition with the U.S. In addition, we succeeded in holding the first ever ROK-U.S. Foreign and Defense
Ministers’ Meeting, which is a testament to both nations’ dedication to have a strong alliance. At the Meeting, the two nations
agreed to sustain and further develop a future-oriented strategic alliance. The 42nd ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting(SCM) held in 2010 resulted in critical agreements concerning the Strategic Alliance 2015, the Guidelines for ROK-U.S.
Defense Cooperation, and the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). The ROK’s overseas troops, including the Dongmyeong
Unit in Lebanon, the Cheonghae Unit in the Gulf of Aden, the Danbi Unit in Haiti and the Ashena Unit in Afghanistan, havecontributed to world peace through successful local operations.
However, further reform remains to be achieved in many areas. The ROK Ship Cheonan incident and the North’s
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these incidents caused many Koreans to question the ROK military’s immediate response to these threats.

The ROK military will continue its commitment to a high readiness posture to exact swift, immediate punishment against the Northfor any provocative act it may seek to perpetrate. In addition, we will set conditions that only allows for a military that is respected by its
combat skills and operational results through the elimination unnecessary administrative elements, bureaucratic cultures, and mannerism
prevailing throughout all corners of National Defense. Also, we intend to equip a ‘Combat Oriented Military’ armed with highly
proficient warfighting capabilities, and a ‘Warrior of Warriors Ideal’ filled with the willingness to fight in a well disciplined manner.
We will upgrade our combat capabilities that set forth conditions suitable for effectively executing Network Centric:DUIDUH 1&: DQGZLOOHVWDEOLVKDQDGYDQFHGZDU¿JKWLQJV\VWHPWKDWSUDFWLFDOO\LQGRFWULQDWHVMRLQWQHVVDFURVVWKHVHUYLFHVin any impending situations.
Within the framework of the Strategic Alliance 2015, we will closely cooperate with the U.S. on major issues between
the two countries, while endeavoring to achieve a stable and sustainable ROK-U.S. alliance. We will also involve ourselvesin military diplomacy and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) as part of the efforts to lift the nation’s prominence and increase
national interest. Moreover, the ROK military will take a leading role in accomplishing ‘a Fair Society’ moving toward ‘a
Greater Korea,’ which is the core policy slogan of the ROK Government.
The Defense White Paper 2010 will discuss the defense policy directions designed to realize the National Security Strategy(NSS), while providing up-to-date and candid information about the progress and plans of the policies. This Defense White
Paper will also deal with major defense issues in great detail, with appendices on defense-related data, including a memoir of
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We hope that the Defense White Paper 2010 will deftly guide you through the ROK military’s moves as a peace keeper on
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with utmost sincerity to establish ‘a strong military capable of gaining victory in any immediate skirmishes’ by ‘reshaping
itself for victory.’ We look forward to the continued attention and support of Korean readers.

December 31, 2010

Kim, Kwan Jin
Minister of National Defense, Republic of Korea

Contents

1

Chapter

Changes in the Security Environment and Challenges Ahead
Section 1. Global Security Landscape

8

Section 2. Security Landscape in Northeast Asia

13

Section 3. North Korean Situation and Military Threat

24

Chapter2

National Security Strategy and Defense Policy
Section 1. National Security Strategic Guidance

38

Section 2. Objectives and Tenets of the National Defense Policy

41

Chapter3

Defense Posture for Comprehensive Security
Section 1. All-Directional Military Readiness Posture

50

Section 2. Integrated Civilian-Government-Military-Police Defense Posture

63

Section 3. Development of a Readiness Posture against

69

Transnational and Non-military Threats

Chapter

4

The Development of the ROK-U.S. Military Allianceand Expansion of Defense Diplomacy and Cooperation
Section 1. The Development of a Future-oriented ROK-U.S. Military Alliance

76

Section 2. Adjustment of the Timing for the Wartime OPCON Transition80

and Building a New Alliance Military Structure
Section 3. Ensuring Secure Stationing Conditions for the87

United States Forces in Korea (USFK)
Section 4. Expanding the Boundaries of Defense Diplomacy and Cooperation

92

Section 5. Contributions to International Peacekeeping Operations

106

5

Chapter

Military Support to Advance Inter-Korean Relations
Section 1. Inter-Korean Military Confidence Building and Arms Control

118

Section 2. Repatriation of ROK POWs and Joint Remains Recovery

127

6

Chapter

Appendix

Establishing Advanced Military Capabilities
Section 1. National Defense Reform to Build Advanced Elite Military Forces

134

Section 2. Streamlining the Military Structure

138

Section 3. Improving the Force Structure

144

Section 4. Building Up Strong Reserve Forces

149

Section 5. Establishing a Network-Centric Defense Informatization Environment

158

7Special Appendix

2. North Korea’s Infiltrations and Provocations against South Korea
and Naval Campaigns at the Northern Limit Line (NLL)
3. Attack Against ROKS Cheonan
4. Artillery Firing at Yeonpyeongdo (Island)

Appendix

Chapter304

1. Recollections about the Korean War

337

1. Status of Neighboring Countries’ Military Strength

Improving the Cultivation, Educational andTraining Systems for Defense Personnel

2. Comparison between Major Countries’ Defense Budgets
3. Comparison of the Military Strength of the Two Koreas

Section 1. Developing Defense Personnel Operations and Management System

168

4. Comparison of the Economic Indicators of the Two Koreas

Section 2. Realignment of the Mental Strength Education System

181

5. Negotiation Process in North Korea’s Nuclear Program

Section 3. Cultivating Strong Warriors by Concentrating Efforts

184

6. History of North Korea’s Missile Development Program andSpecifications

198

7. Chronology of South-North Military Talks

on Training and Education
Section 4. Improving the Educational System for Officers to

8. Chronicle of Inter-Korean Relations

Boost Jointness and Efficiency

8

9. Status of UN Peacekeeping Operations
10. Budget for ROK military units dispatched overseas

Chapter

11. Status of Dispatch of ROK Troops Overseas

Enhancement of Management Efficiency

12. Status of Countries Participating in the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF)

Section 1. Enhancing the Efficiency of National Defense Resource Management

202

Section 2. Optimizing Defense Resources through the Use

213

of Public and Private Resources
Section 3. Improving the Procurement and Acquisition System of Weapons

217

Section 4. Developing the Defense Economy into a Growth221

Engine for the National Economy

14. Joint Communiqué of The 41st ROK-U.S. Security Consultative
Meeting
15. Joint Communiqué of The 42nd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative
Meeting
16. The Guidelines for ROK-U.S. Defense Cooperation

917. Joint Statement of ROK-U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministers'
Meeting on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Outbreak of
the Korean War

Chapter

18. Major Arms Control Conventions and Organizations

Attractive Military, Rewarding Military
Section 1. Improving the Welfare of Service Members

238

Section 2. Modernizing the Military Facilities

252

Section 3. Advancing the Military Medical Service System

256

Section 4. Invigorating Productive Military Service Conditions

259

10

13. The Act on Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations

19. National Defense Organizations
20. Annual Defense Budgets
21. Defense Industrial Cooperation Agreements with OtherCountries
22. Changes in Compulsory Military Service Period
23. Alternatives to Military Service
24. Combined/Joint Military Exercises and Training

Chapter

25. Composition and Major Activities of National Assembly Defense
Committee

The Armed Forces Serving the People
Section 1. Enhancing Public Benefit and Protecting Public Rights

266

Section 2. Efficient Relocation of Military Installations

281

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the People285

26. Revision Details of Laws and Ordinances Related to the Ministryof National Defense (MND)

The First Nuclear Security Summit (Washington D.C., April 2010)

1

Chapter 

Changes in
the Security
Environment andChallenges Ahead
Section 1. Global Security Landscape
Section 2. Security Landscape in Northeast Asia
Section 3. North Korean Situation and Military Threat

1SectionGlobal Security LandscapeBesides the persisting conventional military threats, today’s global security environment is alsocharacterized by concerns over increased transnational and non-military threats, including theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, piracy at sea, and natural disasters.
To make matters worse, security threats have become more complicated and multifarious involving
DISPUTESANDCONÝICTSPERTAININGTOTERRITORIES RESOURCES RELIGIONS ANDRACES&ACEDWITHTHISNEW
security environment, countries around the world have endeavored to maximize their national interests
by strengthening their security capabilities at the comprehensive level and cooperating strategicallywith other nations while at the same time keeping them in check.

1. Changes in Security Threats
In addition to the traditional military threats, the nature of today’schanging security threats can be summed up as being complicated andmultifarious due to the increase of transnational and non-military threats.
Locations of the Major Areas of Conflict

Borderless threats that encompass the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs), terrorism, piracy at sea and cyber attacks have been

Georgia

continually increasing, while non-military threats, including communicable

Lebanondiseases, natural disasters, global warming, and environmental pollution

Iraq
IsraelChadhave also emerged as major security issues.

Sudan
Somalia

Multifaceted local conflicts caused by a combination of factors, e.g.,
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and independence movements continue to plague the world, although thelikelihood of a large scale war has diminished in this post-Cold War era.
For instance, the Israel-Lebanon War in the Middle East ended in August
2006, but the seeds of dispute remain unabated. In the conflict between

8 2010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 1.

Israel and Palestine, the international efforts to mediate the dispute havefailed to narrow the distance between the two countries, in which the issues
remain unresolved. Iraq continues to be unstable because terrorism could
spread in the country. In Europe, war between Russia and Georgia brokeout in August 2008 over the separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The war came to an end relatively quickly thanks to the European Union’s
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Sudan, Somalia and Chad have yet to be resolved.
In the proliferation of WMDs, which include nuclear, biological, andchemical weapons, and their delivery vehicles, ballistic missiles present a
primary threat to global security. They are particularly damaging to global
security since some countries spur the development of the technology for
nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and thus the parts and materials
for those WMDs are easily acquired through the international black market.
Biochemical weapons, such as anthrax and sarin gas, are feared to beeasily manufactured at low cost, allowing terrorist groups to procure thoseweapons quite easily.
Since the 9/11 attacks, terrorism has posed a major threat to the global
security environment. Furthermore, globalization and advances in
information technology have given international terrorist organizations themeans of acquiring weapons. Moreover, unlike regular military units, they
are organized as in the manner of a distributed network that spans borders
DQGQDWLRQVZKLFKPDNHVLWGLI¿FXOWWRWDFNOHWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVDQGSUHYHQWtheir attacks. Terrorist organizations are dispersed across the globe, andthey have no constituents of their own to protect. Once nuclear weapons fall
into their hands, it is highly likely that they would use them. Thus, terrorist
threats have surfaced as a prime security issue internationally.
Piracy at sea is also a key security issue threatening the safety of thesea lanes. According to statistics released by the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB),1 a total of 406 cases of piracy in the world were reported in2009 alone, representing a 39% increase over the 293 cases reported in theprevious year. Of these, pirates off the coast of Somalia accounted for 217
cases or 53% of the total.

1. International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
A specialized agency of the International
Chamber of Commerce. The IMB wasestablished in 1981 to act as the focal
point in the fight against all types ofmaritime crime and malpractice,including piracy.

9

Section 1. Global Security LandscapeAs information and communications technologies have advanced, cyberterror and attacks have been on the rise, and each nation is struggling to
defend against them. Considering that attacks in cyber space target not only
individuals or companies but also governments, proper countermeasures at
the governmental level are essential to ensure national security.
Communicable diseases, including SARS and the H1N1 virus, arespreading around the world. At the same time, mega-class natural disasters,such as the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, have also emerged as new
security threats. To meet these challenges requires joint international efforts.
The recent competition between nations to secure energy resources has
become a new factor in shaping the world order. Consequently, the major
powers have been vying with one another for new energy sources in Central
Asia, South America, Africa, and the Caspian Sea, thus attributing todestabilizing the security conditions in these regions.

2. International Efforts for Peace and Stability
As potential global security threats become increasingly complex anddiverse, new countermeasures are required. Considering the transnationaland non-military nature of some threats, a countermeasure employed by asingle country has limitations. In this regard, collaboration between allies
and like-minded countries, as well as joint efforts by the international
community, cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, comprehensive
countermeasures are vital through non-military approaches, including
diplomacy, judicial reviews, information, and the economy, rather than
through military-oriented responses. Further, when the culprit behindthe 9/11 attacks was shown to be an international terrorist network,
the importance of a joint international effort was given great weight inpreventing terrorist attacks and the proliferation of WMDs. Accordingly,international cooperation has been increasingly reinforced in such areas as
information exchange, freezing of assets, criminal investigations, and search
for and extradition of terrorists.
International conventions and organizations spearhead activities to102010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 1.

prevent the proliferation of WMDs. These international conventions include
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and theHague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is one such internationalorganization focusing on these issues. In addition, the United States has
stepped up its efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, which could
be used in international terrorist activities, by launching the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI).2 The ROK Government also officially joined
the PSI in May 2009. As of August 2010, a total of 98 countries wereparticipating in the international Initiative.
Together with the efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, the2. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
To prevent the proliferation of WMDs
and the materials necessary for theirdelivery, the PSI was initiated by the U.S.
and eleven major European and Asian
countries, as founding members, inJune 2003.

international community is striving for nuclear weapons reduction. Asa follow-up to the ‘Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’ (START I),3 the‘New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’ (New START)4 was signed by
the United States and Russia in August 2010. Further, in April 2010, to
set up an international (arms control) regime to prevent nuclear terrorism,
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3. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START *)START , is a bilateral treaty that was
signed in 1991 by the United States
and the USSR to reduce and limit theirstrategic weapons, including nuclear
warheads and their delivery vehicles,
missiles.

time and was attended by 47 heads of states. At the Summit, these leaders
adopted a joint communiqué consisting of twelve items, and the ROK

4. New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(New START)New START was signed by the U.S.
and Russia to replace the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty as START ,,which sought to reduce the numberof strategic weapons held by the twonations, expired in December 2009.
New START has a new reduction target(valid for ten years after its entry into
force).

President Lee Myung-bak participating in the first Nuclear Security Summit (Washington D.C., April 2010)11

Section 1. Global Security Landscape5. International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF)The ISAF consists of multi-national
forces (MNF) authorized by the UN
Security Council. As of March 2010, a
total of 85,000 military personnel from43 countries have been maintaining
public order and supporting post-war
reconstruction work in Afghanistan.

Government was selected to host the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit in 2012.
After the 9/11 attacks, the United States and the rest of the world began the‘Global War on Terror (GWOT).’ The International Security Assistance
Forces (ISAF),5 a force of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
continues to operate in Afghanistan to eradicate the remnants of Al Qaeda
and the Taliban, in cooperation with the Afghan troops. In July 2010, theROK Government also dispatched a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)6

6. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)This organization supports
reconstruction work in Afghanistan.
The PRT is located in the state ofParvan.

protect the PRT and help them to achieve their reconstruction mission.

7. Ashena Unit
In Dari, the official language ofAfghanistan, Ashena means “friend” or“coworker.”

to resolve local disputes in the Middle East. Israel and Palestine began

to join the international efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan.
Along with this, the ROK Government sent the country its Ashena Unit7 to

The international community also continues its peacemaking activities
dialogues at the ‘Middle East Peace Conference’ held in Annapolis, U.S.,

8. Dongmyeong Unit
Named after the founding father of theGoguryeo Dynasty, the Dongmyeong
Unit refers to a unit being dispatchedfrom the East in the hopes of bringing abright and peaceful future to the region.

in November 2007. In September 2010, with the U.S. as mediator, theheads of both parties met in Washington to discuss possible solutions to the,VUDHOL3DOHVWLQLDQFRQÀLFW)XUWKHUDVRI0DUFKDVWURQJ81
Peacekeeping Force (PKF), from 29 countries, was stationed in Lebanon
to ensure public safety and security. The ROK Government dispatched its
Dongmyeong Unit8 to Lebanon in July 2007.
The African Union (AU) and the UN have both mediated efforts for peaceand stability in the Darfur region of Sudan. Nonetheless, social conflictand bloodshed have been ongoing in the unchecked civil war. On the coast

The Dongmyeong Unit conducting
surveillance (Lebanon, March 2010)of Somalia, a protracted civil war area, repeated piracy has caused the

9. Danbi Unit
The Korean word Danbi literallytranslates as 'Sweet Rain,' whichrefers to 'Welcomed or Timely Rain.'
Therefore, the name of the Unit, Danbi,
suggests that it will bring hope to Haiti
like a welcomed rain.

March 2009, the ROK Government sent one destroyer and the 300-strong

Ě For more information, see Section 5of Chapter 4, International Peacekeeping
Operations

international community to step up its joint efforts to tackle the problem. In
Cheonghae Unit to the region to secure the sea lanes of communications.
The international community also joined forces to help the victims ofthe mega-class natural disasters that hit Haiti in January 2010 and Chilein March 2010. In Haiti, not only non-military support, including relief
supplies and medical aid, but also military support for reconstruction, public
safety and security was provided. In March 2010, the ROK Government
also dispatched its Danbi Unit9 to Haiti to help the region recover from theearthquake.

122010 Defense White Paper

Security Landscape inNortheast Asia

2

SectionWithin Northeast Asia, mutual exchanges and multilateral cooperation have been increasing. Yet the causes for
POTENTIALCONÝICTS SUCHAS.ORTH+OREAmSNUCLEARWEAPONS CROSS STRAITRELATIONS HISTORICALDISPUTES TERRITORIAL
disputes and the maritime demarcation issue, still exist leading concerned nations to compete against one
another in bolstering their military power, which destabilizes the region.

1. The Regional Security Structure
Northeast Asia has many major economic and military powers that both
confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Within this security
structure, the major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative
activities while competing one another in order to secure a dominantposition in the region.
Solidifying its security ties with major Asia-Pacific alliances the ROK,Japan, Australia, and the United States have been trying to establish a more
effective multilateral security system within the region based on alliances.
After ‘the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’1
ZDVVLJQHGLQ0DUFKWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVFRQGXFWHGLWV¿UVWFRPELQHG
maritime exercise with Japan and Australia in October of the same year.
Since then two more drills of the same kind took place in September 2009

1. Japan –Australia Joint Declaration on
Security Cooperation
The first security cooperative
agreement that Japan has with acountry other than the U.S.

and June 2010, totaling three military exercises. The military cooperation
between the three countries was strengthened through the Foreign and
Military Director-General-Level Trilateral Talks held in April 2008.

13

Section 2. Security Landscape in Northeast Asia

China and Russia, too, have been strengthening their strategic partnership.
2.Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO)
An intergovernmental mutual-security
organization that was founded on June15, 2001, by the leaders of six countries:
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to strengthen
mutual cooperation and increase
regional security. A summit meeting isheld every year.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 2 formed under theleadership of China and Russia, held its first joint exercise, code-namedthe ‘Peace Mission,’ in 2005. The second exercise was held in August
2007, the third in July 2009 and, finally, the fourth in September 2010.
Meanwhile, neighboring countries have been running parallel ventures inan effort to resolve their security uncertainties. A notable advance is thatthe summits involving the ROK, China and Japan were set up to discuss
the security issues in the region. The summit, which had been held within
WKHIUDPHZRUNRI$6($1VLQFHWRRNSODFHIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHDVD
stand-alone dialogue in Japan in December 2008. The second meeting washeld in China in October 2009 and the third in the ROK in May 2010.
At the same time, military exchanges in the region are actively taking

Peace Mission 2010 (Kazakhstan,
September 2010)

place. China and Japan are expanding their military exchanges throughmutual visits of high-ranking officials and navy vessels. The Chinese
Minister of National Defense visited Japan twice in September 2007 andDecember 2009. In February 2010, Chief of Staff of the Japan Ground SelfDefense Force also visited China. In November 2007, a Chinese navy vessel
PDGHLWV¿UVWSRUWFDOOLQ-DSDQIROORZHGE\DUHFLSURFDOYLVLWWR&KLQDE\D-DSDQHVH0DULWLPH6HOI'HIHQVH)RUFHVKLSLQ-XQH7KLVZDVWKH¿UVWThe Third Korea-Japan-China Summit(Jeju Island, May 2010)

time a Japanese ship had docked in China since the end of World War II.

2. Security Issues in the Region
The multifarious threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear development, the3. The cross-strait issue
States the overall issues between China
and Taiwan.

cross-strait issue,3 the territorial disputes and the maritime demarcation line
issues in Northeast Asia demonstrate that Asia suffers more from disputes
than any other region in the world.
North Korea’s nuclear issue poses a serious threat to global security
beyond Northeast Asia. The Six-Party Talks for peaceful resolution of theNorth Korean nuclear issue has remained in a stalemate since December
2008, when a North Korean nuclear verification agreement failed to be
adopted. Under these circumstances, North Korea launched a long-range

Long-range missile launch (April 2009)142010 Defense White Paper

missile in April 2009 and, in May of the same year, conducted a second

Chapter 1.

round of nuclear test that demonstrated its intention to possess nuclear
weapons. The Six-Party Talks fell into a stalemate after the UN Security
Council adopted a resolution against the North’s long-range missile
launches to which the North responded by denouncing the UN’s resolution
and completely refusing to resume the Talks. The parties of the Talks, theROK, the U.S., Japan, China and Russia, have since continuously strived
to have them resumed, but a NK's ambush torpedo attack on the ROK Ship
Cheonan, in March 2010, was a major blow to these efforts and resulted in
the Talks reaching a standstill once again.
To make the matters worse, the North disclosed its HEU facility
in November 2010, followed by indiscriminate artillery shelling at
Yeonpyeong Island in the West Sea, causing a security crisis on the Korean
Peninsula. As a result, the resumption of the Six-Party Talks to resolve theNorth’s nuclear issues still remains uncertain.
Cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan also pose a major
threat to the security of Northeast Asia. With the rise of the Ma Yingjeou government, whose core campaign was to improve cross-strait
relations during the Taiwanese presidential elections held in March 2008,
tensions appear to have eased between China and Taiwan. Soon after his
inauguration, two cross-strait talks were held in June and November 2008.
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available beginning in July, and in December of the same year, three typesof exchanges4 between the two parties took place, thus creating an amicable
UHODWLRQVKLS1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUFURVVVWUDLWFRQÀLFWVWLOOSHUVLVWV

4. Three exchanges
Cross-strait economic exchange,
exchange of people and material
through ports, and post exchange.

Differing historical views within neighboring countries, distortions inschool textbooks and sovereignty disputes over some islands between
China and Japan, as well as between Japan and Russia, remain factors thatdestabilize the Northeast Asian region. Besides, the establishment of the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to use oceanic resources has become apotential cause for disputes as the nations in the region stick with thosepositions considered most advantageous to their own interests.

15

Section 2. Security Landscape in Northeast Asia3. Military Trends Exhibited by the Major Countries in
the Region
Northeast Asia is the seat of global military power in which the combined
military budgets in the region represent more than half of the global military
budget. China and Japan are vying with each other to build up their navies
and air forces, while the U.S. stays on top in military strength. Competition
is becoming increasingly intense among the countries in the region as
they attempt to gain dominance in the space race, with China emerging
ĚSee Appendix 1: Military capabilities ofneighboring countries.
Figure 1-1. Military Postures of the Four
Major Powers Surrounding the Korean
Peninsulaas the third top space powerhouse following the U.S. and Russia. The
current military postures of the four major powers surrounding the Korean
Peninsula are outlined in Figure 1-1.

RussiaTroops: approx.1.027 million
Main weapons: One aircraft carrier, 66 submarines,
1,996 fighters (bombers)
Military expenditure: USD 41.1 billion
Military modernization: Nuclear submarines, intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM), fifth-generation fighters

China
Troops: approx. 2.285 million
Main weapons: 65 submarines, 1,755 fighters (bombers)
Military expenditure: USD 78 billion
Military modernization: new strategic missiles, strategic
nuclear submarines, strengthening of space military powerJapan
Troops: approx. 0.229 million
Main weapons: Six Aegis-class destroyers, 16 submarines,
one helicopter aboard frigate, 359 fighters (bombers)
Military expenditure: USD 45.6 billion
Military modernization: MD system, new submarines,
helicopter aboard frigates, air refueler planes

United States
Troops: approx. 1.459 million
Main weapons: 11 aircraft carriers, 71 submarines, 4,058 fighters (bombers)
Military expenditure: USD 690.3 billion
Military modernization: MD system, new fighter andnew navy vessel development and deployment*Source: The Military Balance 2010 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2010) and other relevant data.
The defense budget was set as of 2009.

162010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 1.

| The U.S.: Military trends | Based on the lessons learned fromthe 9/11 attacks, and the Afghanistan and Iraqi wars, the United States has
been building its military capabilities to respond to diverse array of new
threats, including irregular wars and terrorism, as well as traditional threats.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in February 2010,
which outlines the defense policies of the Obama Administration, points
out the necessity of maintaining dominance and superior capability to
win the ongoing wars as well as being able to respond to potential threats.
Consequently, the U.S. is prioritizing its ongoing wars, including the one in
Afghanistan, when it allocates its defense resources.
The U.S. Army is increasing the number of troops to complement the
shortage that has arisen due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) announced in 2007 that it would increase
the number of Army troops by 65,000 to 547,000 by 2012. In addition,
the DOD said that it would increase the number of troops by 22,000 for
three years in total, from July 2009, to reach 569,000. Following theannouncement of the end of the U.S. troops’ combat mission in Iraq in
August 2010, a huge number of U.S. troops that were stationed in Iraq are
likely to be transferred to Afghanistan.

The U.S. Forces withdrawing from Iraq
after the announcement of the end of the
U.S. troops’ combat mission in Iraq (theIraq-Kuwait border, September 2010)

Considering the strategic importance of the Asia Pacific region, theUnited States has increased its Navy and Air Force presence in the area. The
Navy replaced its conventional aircraft carrier, the USS Kitty Hawk, with
the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington, in August
2008. The Navy deployed a new Virginia-class strategic nuclear submarine
LQWKH3DFL¿FZLWKDSODQWRFRQFHQWUDWHSHUFHQWRILWVVXEPDULQHVLQWKDW
region by 2010. The Air Force is pushing ahead with the automation of its
aircraft as it improves its stand-off strike capabilities. In addition, the U.S. is
LQFUHDVLQJWKHQXPEHURILWVPRVWFXUUHQW¿JKWHUVWKHVWUDWHJLFDLUOLIWHUWKH
air refueler and unmanned surveillance planes, placed in Guam and Hawaii,
ZKLFKDUHSRZHUSURMHFWLRQKXEVLQWKH$VLD3DFL¿FUHJLRQ

17

Section 2. Security Landscape in Northeast AsiaCoupled with its combat capacity build-up, the U.S. is also rearranging
its military forces stationed in Northeast Asia. According to the ‘Roadmap
to Realign US Forces’ agreed upon in May 2006, the U.S. and Japan have
EHHQUHVKXIÀLQJWKH86WURRSVLQ-DSDQ$QH[DPSOHRIVXFKZDVZKHQLQ
December 2007, the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) established the U.S.
1st Corps Forward Command at Camp Zama in Japan in order to executeintegrated U.S. Forces’ missions in Japan. The 8,000 Marines stationed in
Okinawa are scheduled to be relocated to Guam by 2014.
The ROK and the U.S. decided to relocate the U.S. Forces in Korea(USFK) to two different regions in order to safeguard a stable U.S.
stationing. The USFK plans to maintain its troop strength at 28,500 asagreed upon at the ROK-U.S. Summit in April 2008. At another bilateralsummit, held in June 2010, and in consideration of the changes in the
security environment, the two countries agreed to adjust the timing of the
OPCON transition from April 17, 2012, to December 1, 2015.

| Japan: Military trends | Japan set up its defense policy goals,
which contained international peace cooperative activities, to ensure more
effective responses to new threats and various incidents; to be ready forexternal attacks; and to improve its security environment. Therefore, theJapan Self-Defense Forces are seeking to strengthen their joint operational
and intelligence capabilities. They are also striving to build an efficientsystem equipped with advanced science and technology while securing
talented personnel.
The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force formed the Central Immediate
Response Group in March 2007 to promptly respond to urgent incidents
and to contain them from spreading. Considering the length of the country
and its topological nature, some divisions and brigades were redeployedbased on the mission so that units could operate flexibly. Within thisintegrated operational structure, the creation of the Integrated Ground Force
LVWDNLQJSODFHLQRUGHUWRDFKLHYHDQHI¿FLHQWFRPPDQGVWUXFWXUHDQGWKH
development of a new tank, the TK-X, which was completed in June 2010,
Newly developed TK-X tank182010 Defense White Paper

is scheduled to be deployed in the second half of 2011.

Chapter 1.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has systems that enable rapid and
VXVWDLQDEOHUHVSRQVHVWRYDULRXVLQFLGHQWV,Q0DUFKWKUHHÀHHWHVFRUWIRUFHVZHUHUHDOLJQHGDVIRXUHVFRUWÀRWLOODV5 and the escort squadrons undereach local unit were incorporated into the Escort Flotilla Command, thereby
unifying the command system. In March 2009, the 13,500 ton Helicopter
Aboard Frigate was deployed and the number two frigate is scheduled to bepositioned in March 2011. In addition, the number three and number four
frigates will have even a larger displacement of 19,500 tons, thereby four
FFH being available in total. The submarine units were also reorganized tofour units from six. P-1 maritime patrol aircraft to be developed by its own
technologies will replace the old P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft.

5. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forceand Escort Flotilla
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force, a mobile unit that is capableof independent surface warfare,anti-submarine warfare and antiair warfare, has four escort flotillas
made up of two escort squadrons (eachescort squadron is composed of four
frigates). Additionally, a Hyuga-class
Helicopter Aboard Frigate is being built
to be used as a flagship for each escort
flotilla.

The Japan Air Self-Defense Force is comprised of seven air wings. To
maintain the combat capability while reducing the number of fighters,
the Japan Air Self-Defense Force is implementing its next fighter project(FX) while improving the performance of the F-15 and F-2. To effectively
respond to attacks on remote isles and to support the international
cooperative peacekeeping activities of the Self-Defense Forces, in March
2009, it introduced four air refuelers (KC-767) and has operated these sinceApril 2010. Furthermore, Japan is developing a new transport aircraft, theXC-2, to replace the old C-1.
To further enhance its intelligence collection capabilities, the Japan Air
Self-Defense Force completed its four intelligence satellites in February
2007 and passed the Space Basic Act6 in May 2008 establishing a legal
basis for military use of space in the future and for the development of ahigh performance reconnaissance satellite.
On the other hand, in response to the North Korean missile threat, Japan

6. The Space Basic Act
The Act was enacted in May 2008 in
Japan to ensure the development anduse of space. It is composed of the basic
guidelines for space development, therelated organizations, and the generalplanning and space activities.

has made continuous efforts to establish a joint missile defense (MD)system with the U.S. To this end, Japan deployed ground-based interceptor
missiles (PAC-3) at 16 locations, including Japan Air Self-Defense Force(JASDF) bases and training and educational camps, from March 2007
to April 2010. From 2007 to 2009, Japan loaded a total of three Aegis
destroyers with SM-3 missiles, SM-3 was loaded on an Aegis per year. An

19Section 2. Security Landscape in Northeast Asia7. FPS-5
A missile detection and tracking radardeveloped by Japan in 2003 and usedby the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.
As the threat of missile attack by North
Korea has increased, multi-ballistic
missiles and aircraft can now be
simultaneously tracked and detectedwith much improved performance.
8. Defense Budget of China
At the 3rd Convention of the 11th Term
National People’s Congress in March
2010, China announced an increase
in its defense budget by 14.9% to USD
78 billion (RMB 532.1 billion), which
accounted for 6.3% of its total national
budget and 1.4% of its GDP. The Military
and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China, releasedby the U.S. Department of Defense
in August 2010, estimated the actual
Chinese defense budget has doubled theamount in real terms that was officiallyannounced by the Chinese Government.

FPS-57 radar for the surveillance and tracking of ballistic missiles was alsoloaded on each Aegis.

| China: Military trends | China is pushing ahead with themodernization of its military through continuous increase in its national
defense budget8 backed by its rapid economic growth. This is part ofits efforts to pursue a military strategy aimed at ‘winning in limited
warfare under modern conditions.’ Within this strategy, China is pursuingstrengthening its PLA Navy and Air Force with state-of-the-art weaponry,
in preparation for local wars, and active defense against any attack to
DFFRPSOLVKLWVJRDOVRIQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHDQWLLQYDVLRQDQGXQL¿FDWLRQ7R
this end, the PLA Army is enhancing its rapid-response capability, the PLA
Navy on its stand-off strike capabilities, and the PLA Air force on its longdistance operational capability.
To strengthen its timely response capability, the PLA Army successfully
carried out experimental airdrops of tanks by airborne units, using a newtank airlift and drop system, in Guangzhou, in April 2007. It also completeddevelopment of a new armored vehicle, the VN-3, in January 2008, and in
the same year, deployed the Z-10 attack helicopter for use in war.
Between 1995 and 2007, the PLA Navy introduced four Sovremennyclass destroyers (7,900 tons) and 12 Kilo-class submarines (3,000 tons)
obtained from Russia in order to enhance its stand-off strike capabilities.
In 2007, it deployed two Chinese Aegis-class destroyers (6,500 tons) and,currently, is building three more destroyers. Furthermore, in 2008. the
PLA Navy also deployed two new Jin-class strategic nuclear submarines
equipped with Julang (็ᇞ)-II ballistic missiles with a range of over 8,000NP)XUWKHUWHVWUXQVZHUHVFKHGXOHG,WSODQVWRGHSOR\DWRWDORI¿YH-LQ
class strategic nuclear-powered submarines by 2012.
7KH3/$$LU)RUFHGHSOR\HGLWVLQGLJHQRXV-¿JKWHUVLQDQGLVQRZGHYHORSLQJWKHPRGL¿HGYHUVLRQVRIWKH-WKH-DQG-VWHDOWK
type fighters. In addition, while introducing its most advanced fighters,

202010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 1.

including the Su-27/30 from Russia, the PLA Air Force is concentrating
its efforts on licensed production via technology transfer and indigenous
aircraft production. It also has four Airborne Warning and Control Systems(AWACS), the large KJ (༜ີ)-2000, and four small KJ-200 aircraft. In
addition, the Air Force possesses 18 air refuelers and has expanded its
operational radius of fighters by complementing its existing refuelingfacilities and equipment.

The J-10 Fighter in the 60th Anniversaryof the PLA Air Force (Beijing, 2009)

In January 2007, China successfully carried out an anti-satellite test inwhich a ballistic missile destroyed a satellite. In October of the same year,
the country launched a satellite to carry out surveillance of the moon, which
was followed by another in October 2010. All of this shows the country’s
determination to become a major player in space exploration.

| Russia: Military trends | Since October 2008, Russia has beenreforming its military to nurture a force capable of rapidly responding tofuture security threats. Russia announced its amended National Security
Strategy (NSS) 20209 and Military Doctrine,10 the blueprint for the midto long-term Russian defense policies, in May 2009 and February 2010,
respectively. The gist of the defense reform is to maintain the total numberof troops at one million and to integrate the military units, reorganizingthem into a standing military system. The existing four-tier command
structure, which is comprised of a Military District – Army – Division –Regiment structure will be replaced with the three-tier structure of military

9. National Security Strategy (NSS) 2020
A policy document to replace the
National Security Concepts of the
Republic of Russia (2000). The
document outlines Russia’s national
security objectives: ‘Russia enhances
its status as a world power’ andsuggests the directions necessary to
become a top five global economy and toachieve stable economic developmentin this multipolar international order.

district – operational command – brigade, while closing six military
districts. In addition, Russia plans to establish regional headquarters in four
districts to ensure its joint combat capability depending on the direction of
any threats.
To continue to deter nuclear threats and prepare for low-intensity
conflicts, Russia is modernizing its conventional weaponry. Every year,
9-10% of its military equipment is being replaced. Russia also plans to
upgrade 30% of its military equipment by 2015 and 70% by 2020.

10. Military doctrine
The Guidelines for National Defense
Strategy, which was revised for thethird time following revisions in 1993
and 2000. Current list of military
doctrine contains a number of clausesthat include: overseas deployment
for protective purposes on Korean
citizens residing abroad; prepare
for low-intensity conflict whileconsidering nuclear arsenals as a war
deterrence mechanism; state-of the art
conventional weapons regarded as ahallmark of force build up.etc.

21

Section 2. Security Landscape in Northeast Asia

Russia possesses ground-based, sea-based, and air-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Russia has deployed the Topol-M (SS-27)
and multi-warhead RS-24 guided missiles, all of which are groundbased ICBMs. Submarine-based ICBMs (SLBM) will use the SS-N23, a guided missile (Sineva), while in the Borei-class strategic nuclearpowered submarines, the SS-NX-30, the guided missiles (Bulava) underdevelopment will be mounted.
The Dolgorukiy, a Borei-class strategic
nuclear-powered submarine

For its ground forces, Russia has modernized its conventional equipment,
while deploying T-90 tanks, new armored vehicles and an air defense
system. Combat units have been reorganized to place a brigade at theircenter, instead of a division. In addition, Russia has established the Rapid
Response Forces.
The Navy has focused on modernizing its old system for littoral
operations, while improving its blue-ocean projection capabilities.
Currently, multi-purpose surface combatants, Lada-class conventional
submarines, Borei-class strategic nuclear-powered submarines, Yasen-classnuclear submarines and Aegis destroyers are being built. Russia is alsoplanning to build a new aircraft carrier. In addition, it is trying to procurea large Mistral-class amphibious assault ship from France, while the Navy
Command, located in Moscow, is scheduled to relocate to St. Petersburg.
Equipped with long-range precision strike capability, the Air Forcehas been improving its air defense capabilities. To this end, it has been
upgrading its Tu-95/160 strategic bomber and developing stealth strategic
bombers. It is planning to deploy Su-35 fighters and fifth-generation
fighters. S-400 ground-to-air missiles are being deployed around theoutskirts of Moscow and major areas.

Heads of member states participatingin the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) talks(Erivan in Armenia, August 2010)

Russia is strengthening its multiple military cooperative relationships
with its former Soviet Republics. Since 2005, it has been carrying out ajoint exercise called the 'Peace Mission' with the member nations of the222010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 1.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In June 2009, Russia alsoestablished the 10,000-strong Rapid Response Force of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).11 Depending on the issue, Russia
cooperates with the international community while, at other times, keeping
it in check. Russia stays within the international collaborative systemagainst transnational threats but cautiously views NATO’s Look-East Policy
and the U.S. establishment of the Missile Defense (MD) system in Eastern

11. The Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO)
A collective security organization
formed by Russia with other former
Soviet Republics: Belarus, Armenia,
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, andUzbekistan.

Europe, regarding them as a security threat against Russia.

23

Section 2. Security Landscape in Northeast Asia3

SectionNorth Korean Situation and
Military Threat
Despite the sanctions levied by the international community and its economic hardships, North Korea has
put its utmost effort into constructing a strong and prosperous nation by the year 2012. The fact that North
Korea has the world’s fourth largest conventional military force and that it has developed WMDs, including
nuclear weapons, poses a serious threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula.

1. North Korean Situation| Domestic front | North Korea is ruled by a dictatorship controlled
by the Korea Worker’s Party: the one and only party in the nation. It
claims to be a socialist country, under the banner of the Juche ideology
and the Military First Policy. Since the 1990s, when the instability of theregime intensified due to the inherent problems in socialism, worsening
economic problems and isolation from the international community, theNorth has strengthened its ‘Military First Policy’ and has utilized all of its
resources and skills to build “a strong and prosperous nation” by 2012.
Since Kim Jong Il’s health began to deteriorate in 2008, the North hasconcentrated its efforts on consolidating the regime and carrying out largescale personnel and organizational changes. It also announced a dynastystyle power succession over three generations, with Kim Jong Il’s third son
Kim Jong Un designated as the heir-apparent, at the conference of Party
5HSUHVHQWDWLYHV0HHWLQJKHOGRQ6HSWHPEHUWKH¿UVWVXFKPHHWLQJ
in 44 years.
1. July 1 Measures
An economic reform was implemented
on July 1, 2002, to rebuild the economy,
which was facing further hardships
during the 1990s, by partially adopting
elements of a market economy

242010 Defense White Paper

After the ‘July 1 Measures’1 in 2002, the North has promoted reforms andopening up policy albeit limited, still adhering to their socialist economic
system. Nonetheless, the North Korean economy has sputtered and stalled,
rather than attaining the economic strength sought.

Chapter 1.

Moreover, the economic sanctions imposed on the country by theinternational community, due to a second nuclear test and continued missile
launches, have exacerbated its economic situation and pushed its plannedsocialist economy to a near collapse. To overcome this crisis, North Korea
came up with general mobilization plans, such as the ‘150-Day Battle’ and‘100-Day Battle’2 conducted in 2009. These, however, did not come to3

fruition. In November 2009, North Korea launched a currency reform that
RQO\IXUWKHUDJJUDYDWHGWKHLQVWDELOLW\E\UHVXOWLQJLQLQÀDWLRQDUHGXFWLRQ
in economic activity and the estrangement of public sentiment.
As external ideas, including capitalist ideology, are introduced, North
Koreans’ belief in the Juche Ideology and their sense of loyalty to theregime have been weakening. As a result, more North Koreans havecomplained about the regime, and the number of North Korean defectors

2. 150-Day Battle and 100-Day Battle
The national ‘Labor Mobilization
Movement’ to overcome the economiccrisis in 2009.
150-Day Battle: April 20 to September
16 (presumed).
100-Day Battle: September 23 to
December 31(presumed).
3. Currency Reform
A measure to exchange the oldcurrency with a new one at a ratio of100: 1 was taken on November 30, 2009.

DURXQGWKHERUGHUDUHDVLVRQWKHULVH+RZHYHU1RUWK.RUHDQVGLVVDWLV¿HGZLWKWKHUHJLPH¿QGWKHPVHOYHVXQDEOHWRJHWVXI¿FLHQWO\RUJDQL]HGLQRUGHU
to defy the regime. Indeed, the authorities have tightened their grip on the
population by rounding them up for various events and making them attend
daily ideological sessions in an effort to solidify Kim Jong Un’s position as
the heir apparent.

| Policies toward the South | The North has adopted thetactic of obtaining economic aid from the South, stressing the need forcollaboration between the two Koreas (expressed in the slogan “Uri Minjok
Kiri”) and asking the South to fulfill promises contained in the June 15
Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration. However, right after
the launching of the Lee Myung-bak Administration, the North started
denouncing the South’s policies as being hostile, taking a hard-line stancetoward the South, and halting all dialogues.
Since early 2008, North Korea has taken extreme measures: the North
unilaterally deported the South Koreans in charge of the Office of InterKorean Economic Cooperation in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (March
27, 2008), cut off the Panmunjom hot line (November 12, 2008), andblocked crossing of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) (December
1, 2008). Following those moves, up to the first half of 2009, when it

A spokesperson of the Korean People’s
Army (KPA) declares a posture of allout confrontation (January 17, 2009)25

Section 3. North Korean Situation and Military Threatconducted its second round of nuclear tests, the North had continuously
employed a hard line stance. It made various threats and declared a
posture of all-out confrontation (January 17, 2009). It also announced thecancellation of the military and political agreements (January 30, 2009)ZKLOHVWDWLQJWKDWLWZRXOGµWXUQ6HRXOLQWRDVHDRI¿UH¶ -XQH 
The North made brief conciliatory gestures toward the South in thesecond half of 2009 in order to avoid the economic hardships and further
isolation caused by the international community’s sanctions. But it turned
hawkish again in late 2009, after it failed to achieve its goals.
As a result, North Korea has taken provocative actions and hard-line
measures, including a navy clash near Daecheong Island, the so-called
4. Daecheong Naval Campaign
A North Korean patrol boat crossed
the NLL east of Daecheong Island on
November 10, 2009. A ROK PKM fired
warning shots. In response, the North’s
boat began aiming shots at the ROK
patrol craft, resulting in a battle.

Daecheong Naval Campaign4 (November 10, 2009), establishing a ‘no-sailĚSee special Appendix 2 The North’s
infiltrations... at the Northern Limit
Line (NLL)

Baengnyeong Island on March 26, 2010. A total of 46 ROK sailors perished]RQH¶LQWKH1//LQWKH:HVW6HDDQG¿ULQJDWFRDVWDODUHDV -DQXDU\ 
and freezing South Korean assets in Mt. Kumgang (April 2010). In addition,
the North orchestrated a torpedo attack on the ROK Ship Cheonan, which
was conducting patrol operations before being sunk 2.5km southwest of
in this attack, which heightened the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula
and in Northeast Asia. Regarding this attack by the North, on July 9, 2010,
the UN Security Council adopted a Presidential Statement that condemned
North Korea for the provocative action. Yet, the North threatened the Southby stating that it would conduct an all-out war and a third round of nuclear
tests in response to the South’s measures against the North that werecoordinated with the international community. Furthermore, on NovemberWKH1RUWKLQGLVFULPLQDWHO\¿UHGDSSUR[DUWLOOHU\VKRWVDWD
ROK Marine detachment and the civilian residential area on Yeonpyeong,VODQG,QUHVSRQVHWRWKLVDWWDFNWKH52.0DULQHLPPHGLDWHO\¿UHGEDFN
with K-9 self-propelled guns at the North. Two ROK Marines and two
civilians were killed while 16 Marines and many other civilians were
wounded, including some severely injured. The rest of the world, including
the U.S., Japan, Germany, the U.K., and Russia, denounced the North forthis brutal act that had killed and injured civilians.
As well illustrated in the above instances, to unify the two Koreas

262010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 1.

under Communist control, North Korea has sought to create tension in the
ROK-U.S. alliance and divisions in public opinion within South Korea. It
also continues to make military threats against the South, including those
based on its nuclear development program, and does not make any effort to
EXLOGPLOLWDU\FRQ¿GHQFHZLWKWKH6RXWKWRHDVHWKHWHQVLRQDQGHVWDEOLVKlasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

| Foreign policies | North Korea regards WMDs, including nuclear
weapons, as a means of survival. Despite UN Security Council Resolution
18745 and the economic sanctions prompted by a second round of nuclear
tests in May 2009, the North is still holding its nuclear program as anegotiating card in its brinkmanship tactic6 with the rest of the world and is
focusing every resource available on the survival of the regime. However,the cut off of economic aid by the international community has severely
aggravated its already ailing economy, and the Six-Party Talks that were
designed to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue have been halted since

5. UN Security Council Resolution 1874
The UN Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1874 on June 12,2009, in condemnation of the second
round of nuclear tests by North Korea.
6. The Brinkmanship tactic
An extreme and intimidating tactic that
North Korea has exerted at nuclear
negotiation tables with the U.S.

December 2008.
Highly dependent on China’s support, North Korea has been struggling
to maintain its regime and to recover its economy. As part of its efforts, theNorth has tried to strengthen the traditional alliance with China throughsuch events as Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to North Korea
in October 2009, and the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s visits to China
in May and August in 2010. Pyongyang has been demanding Washington
to recognize it as an official nuclear power and ensure the regime’s
security through their bilateral talks. However, the U.S. has taken theconsistent stance of demanding that the North abandon its nuclear program
through dialogues and sanctions in parallel. Hence, the North has failed
to accomplish its goals. As for its relations with Russia, North Korea has
maintained this relationship in order to earn both economic and strategic
VHFXULW\EHQH¿WV0HDQZKLOHOLWWOHSURJUHVVKDVEHHQPDGHLQLWVUHODWLRQV
with Japan since Japan applied a higher level of economic sanctions against
the North following its lukewarm attitude toward the Japanese abduction
issue and its nuclear tests.
North Korea seeks friendly relationships with the non-Western world,

27

Section 3. North Korean Situation and Military Threatincluding Africa and the Middle and South America, while continually
striving to attract more investment from European countries.

2. Military Threats| Military strategy | Under the cloak of the Juche ideology, North
Korea sticks to the Self-Defense Principle to justify its continuous buildup
7. Four-Point Military Lines·Instilling cadre potential in every
soldier·Modernizing the entire military·Arming the entire population·Turning the whole nation into a fortressof military power. Since adopting the Four–Point Military Lines7 in 1962,
the North has continued to put military power first. Since Kim Jong Il
attained power, under the banner of the Military First Policy, the top priorityof the North has been to possess a military capacity superior to that of South
Korea.
7KHEDVLFQDWLRQDOJRDORI1RUWK.RUHDLV³XQL¿FDWLRQRIWKHWZR.RUHDVunder communist control,” which is unlikely to change as long as thecurrent Kim Jong Il and the Kim Jong Un regime retains power. To realize
this goal, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) has used surprise attacks,
composite warfare and a short-term blitzkrieg strategy, while seeking
various tactics and mixed warfare in consideration of the ROK forces’ hightech weaponry and the nature of modern warfare. In addition, the Northhas been concentrating on its asymmetric military capabilities, including
WMDs, special forces, long-range artillery, underwater forces and cyberattacks, while selectively increasing its conventional weapons. The KPA’s
asymmetric forces, in particular, pose a serious threat to the ROK military
because they can be used as a core means of attack during war time and for
local provocations during peace time.

| Military command organizational structure | The National
Defense Commission (NDC) is the highest-ranking military commandorganization in North Korea. It directs overall military matters and defenserelated construction programs. (The Socialist Constitution of North Korea,
Articles 106 and 109). As the Chairman of the NDC, the Chairman of theControl Military Committee of the Worker's Party, and a Presidium memberof the Worker's Party, Kim Jong Il controls military organizations, suchas the General Political Bureau, the General Staff Department, and theMinistry of the People’s Armed Forces.

282010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 1.

The military organizations that Kim Jong Il's directions directly receive
are the Body Guard Command and the Military Security Command. The
former is in charge of protecting Kim Jong Il, his family and high-ranking
officials of the Worker's Party as well as guarding Pyongyang. The latter
serves as the secret police within the military that remains vigilant for
anti-Kim Jong Il factions. The General Political Bureau controls mattersconcerning the organization of the party within the military and political
ideology. The General Staff exercises military command authority, i.e.,
the right to conduct military operations. The Ministry of the People’s
Armed Forces represents the military externally and exercises militaryadministrative rights, i.e., rights concerning military diplomacy, logistics,
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQDQG¿QDQFHV7KH1RUWK¶VPLOLWDU\FRPPDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQLV
as shown in Figure 1-2.
Figure 1-2. North Korea’s Military Command Organization
National Defense
Commission (NDC)㹑㥉㾌ạ

Body Guard
Command(BGC)
General Political
Bureau(GPB)

Military Security
Command(MSC)
Ministry of People’s
Armed Forces(MPAF)

General Staff
Department(GSD)









Regulars

MechanizedPyongyang
DefenseCommand

Border
Security
Command

(9)

(2)



11th Corps

MissileGuidance
Bureau

Armor





Mechanized
Infantry

Artillery

Navy
Command

Air Force
Command(4)

××× : Corps, ×× : Division
11th Corps: Previously known as the Light Infantry Training & Guidance Bureau| Military capabilities | Under the General Staff Department, theground forces are organized into nine regular corps, two mechanized corps,
the Pyongyang Defense Command, the Border Security Command, the 11th
corps previously known as the Light Infantry Training & Guidance Bureau(LITGB), and the Missile Guidance Bureau, numbering a total of 15 corps
level units.
North Korea has deployed about 70 percent of its ground forces to southof the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, and some of its forces are ready to makea surprise attack from secure positions around the Northern Boundary of
the MDL. The 170mm self-propelled artillery and 240mm multiple rocket

Firing 170mm self-propelled artillery

29

Section 3. North Korean Situation and Military Threatlaunchers have been kept in place, and with those weapons, the KPA iscapable of carrying out a massive surprise artillery attack on the Greater
Seoul metropolitan area.
The mainstay of the armored and mechanized units now involves the
T-54 /55 tanks and the 'Cheonmaho' tank that is an upgrade over the T-62
tank. Recently, some of the units subordinate to the mechanized corps weremoved to the frontline and new tanks replicated after the T-72 tank weredeveloped and operationally deployed. Due to the deployment of the newtanks, the replaced ones are being used in the rear areas. Likewise, North
Korea is maintaining the short-term blitzkrieg strategy and is improving its
RSHUDWLRQDOÀH[LELOLW\E\UHLQIRUFLQJWKHPRELOLW\DQGVWULNHFDSDELOLWLHVRI
its mobile units.
The North has been strengthening its special warfare capabilities by
8. Light infantry division
Organized under the frontline corps,
this division for special warfare
contributes to the operations of theregular corps by infiltrating into
mountainous regions. In addition,
it conducts large-scale composite
operations and operations to disrupt
rear areas.

deploying light infantry divisions8 to the frontline corps and adding an
infantry regiment to the frontline. The number of special force troops isestimated to reach approximately 200,000. It is assumed that these troops
have been trained to conduct composite operations, such as major target
VWULNHVDVVDVVLQDWLRQRILPSRUWDQW¿JXUHVDQGGLVUXSWLRQRIUHDUDUHDVDIWHU
LQ¿OWUDWLQJWKHUHDUDUHDVRIWKH6RXWKWKURXJKHLWKHUXQGHUJURXQGWXQQHOVor AN-2 planes. The current major weapons possessed by the North Korean
ground forces are shown in Figure 1-3.

Figure 1-3. The North Korean Ground Forces’ Major Weapons

March of special warfare units

Tanks
approx. 4,100302010 Defense White Paper

ArmoredvehiclesField artillery

approx. 2,100

approx. 8,500

MRL

River-crossing
equipment
K-61/S type pontoon bridge

approx. 5,100

approx. 3,000Chapter 1.

The NavyFRQVLVWVRIWZRÀHHWFRPPDQGVVTXDGURQVEDVHVDQG
two maritime sniper brigades for special operations organized under the
Naval Command.
While it is assumed that there have not been major changes in the Navy’s
operational capabilities, new submarines and torpedoes are believed to beunder development. About 60 percent of the Navy is deployed in forward
naval bases south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Thus, the North is capableof springing ambush attacks. However, rather than operating independently,
the Navy conducts operations in tandem with the ground forces by
supporting the deployment of ground forces and by defending coastal areas.
As for its military capabilities for surface warfare, the Navy is equipped withthe surface battle group consisting of guided missile patrol boats (PTG), torpedo
ERDWVVPDOOSDWUROERDWVDQG¿UHVXSSRUWSDWUROFUDIW 3&)6 WKDWDOOKDYHWKH
DELOLW\WR¿JKWDVLQGLYLGXDODWWDFNVKLSV+RZHYHUWKHVHVXUIDFHFRPEDWDQWV
are mostly comprised of small high-speed vessels that have poor mobility under
bad weather conditions and limited operational capabilities at sea.
As for underwater warfare, the Navy possesses 70 submarines, including
Romeo-class, Sang-o (Shark)-class and Yeon-o (Salmon)-class submarines,
and its missions are to lay mines, attack surface ships and support the
infiltration of corps for special warfare. As witnessed in its attack on the
ROK Ship Cheonan, when it used new torpedoes to attack the ROK ship,
North Korea will continuously develop asymmetric tactics to attack ROK
naval vessels that feature weapons systems far superior to those of theNorth.
The North Korean Navy also operates landing vessels produced since
the early 1970s, including a total of 260 vessels such as Landing Craft Air
Cushion and personnel landing craft and 30 mine sweeping boats. The
maritime sniper brigades and the navy reconnaissance battalions strike at
PDMRUIDFLOLWLHVVXFKDVUDGDUVDQGQDYDOEDVHVE\VHFUHWO\LQ¿OWUDWLQJLQWR
those target facilities. In addition, they will secure major strategic groundareas along with coastal lines to support short-range amphibious operations
that do not require large landing craft. The number of vessels possessed by
the North Korean Navy is shown in Figure 1-4.

31

Section 3. North Korean Situation and Military ThreatFigure 1-4. The number of vessels possessed by the North Korean Navy

Surfacecombatants

Submarines

Landing
vessels

Mine sweeping
boats

Othersapprox. 420

approx. 70

approx. 260

approx. 30

approx. 30

The Air Force is comprised of four air divisions, two tacticaltransportation brigades, two sniper brigades, and air defense units all ofwhich are under the direct control of the Air Force Command. Except for
the aircraft introduced after 1980, most North Korean aircraft are decrepit.
However, an apparent change in its military capacity has not been seen with
WKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIDQHZ¿JKWHUThe Air Force divided the entire territory into four districts when
deploying its units. Of the total force size, 40 percents are deployed
to forward bases located south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, thus
guaranteeing a readiness to launch surprise attacks on the South’s major
facilities.
The North Korean Air Force will carry out surprise attacks at the
beginning of a war so as to destroy South Korea’s air defense assets, supply
routes, industrial and military facilities and national infrastructure. In
particular, with AN-2s and helicopters, the North is capable of dropping its
special warfare forces deep in the South’s rear areas.
The North’s air defense system is centered on the Air Force Command,in which are the integral parts of the system: aircraft, ground-to-air missile
units, anti-aircraft artillery units and radar units. Dividing the air space into
four zones, the first stage of air defense is assigned to the Air Division.
SA-3 missiles have been placed in the Pyongyang area and major militaryfacilities and SA-2/5 ground-to-air missiles have been deployed in defense
KN-06 Ground-to-Air Missilesof the whole Military Demarcation Line (MDL) area and the east and west
coasts. Anti-aircraft artillery has been heavily deployed in mobile units toprotect major cities, ports and military-industrial facilities.

322010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 1.

Radar units, including ground controlled interception bases and early
warning bases, are spread evenly across North Korea to cover not only theentire Korean Peninsula but also parts of China. In addition, the automatedair defense control systems have been enhanced so as to shorten responsetime and improve accuracy. The North Korean aircraft inventory is shownin Figure 1-5.

Figure 1-5. North Korea’s Air Force AircraftFighters

Reconnaissance Transport aircraft(AN-2 included)
aircraftapprox. 820

approx. 30

approx. 330

Helicopters

Trainers

approx. 300

approx. 170

The reserve forces are comprised of the Reserve Military Training Unit,
the Worker and Peasant Red Guard, the Red Youth Guard, and para-military
units. Civilians between the ages of 14 and 60, approximately 30 percent(7.7 million) of the entire population, are subject to wartime mobilization in
North Korea. The status of the reserve forces is shown in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1. The Reserve Forces of North Korea
Division

Strength

Note

Reserve Military
Training Unit

approx. 0.6 million

ǩ6XEMHFWWRFRPEDWPRELOL]DWLRQ- men between 17 and 50- women between 17 and 30

Worker and Peasant
Red Guard

approx. 5.7 million

ǩ(TXLYDOHQWWRWKH52.ǢV+RPHODQG
Reserve Forces

Red Youth Guard

approx. 1 million

ǩ0LOLWDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQRIPLGGOH
school students

Para-military units

approx. 0.4 million

ǩ%RG\*XDUG&RPPDQG0LQLVWU\RI
People’s Security
ǩ/RJLVWLFV0RELOL]DWLRQ*XLGDQFH%XUHDX
Speed War Youth Shock Troops

Total

approx. 7.7 million

33

Section 3. North Korean Situation and Military ThreatAmong all of these units, the Reserve Military Training Unit is the corereserve force, and its training is as intense as that of the standing forces.
In addition, the Unit continuously enhances its combat capabilities byreceiving old equipment from the regular army whenever their equipment is
upgraded. The Reserve Military Training Unit undergoes intensive training
to enable it to replace the regular forces, if need be, during wartime.
To secure strategic weapons, North Korea has been continuously
developing nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons.
In the 1960s, North Korea constructed a nuclear complex in Yongbyon
and, in the 1970s, concentrated its nuclear research on nuclear fuel milling,
conversion, and fabrication technologies. From the 1980s to 2009, it has
extracted nuclear material from a 5-megawatt reactor and reprocessed
spent fuel rods four times. Pyongyang is now presumed to have acquired
approximately 40 kilograms of plutonium. Indeed, the North conductednuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009. In an announcement by
a foreign affairs department spokesperson in April 2009, North Korea
suggested that it had completed the ‘enrichment of uranium,’ followed byits claim in November 2010 that it was running around 2,000 centrifuges.
Considering the above mentioned, it is suspected that the North has pursued
a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program.
North Korea embarked on the development of ballistic missiles in the
1970s, and by the mid-1980s, it had produced and operationally deployed
9. Musudan
Named after Musudan, Hwadae-gun,
Hamgyeongbuk-do, where the North’s
missile development facilities arelocated.

300km-range Scud-Bs and 500km-range Scud-Cs.
In the 1990s, North Korea deployed 1,300km-range Rodong missiles for
operational purposes. In 2007, it began to develop new intermediate range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) called the Musudan9 with a range that extended
beyond 3,000km and which were capable of direct strikes on neighboring
countries, including South Korea, Japan and Guam. Since the 1990s, North
Korea has been carrying out ICBM development and conducted a testlaunch of the Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 missiles in 1998 and 2006,

Musudan missiles on display at theanniversary of the KWP (October 2010)342010 Defense White Paper

respectively. In April 2009, the North launched a long-range missile. The
ranges of the missiles are shown by type in Figure 1-6.

Chapter 1.

Figure 1-6. The Ranges of the North’s Missiles by Type

AlaskaMoscow

Scud
China
500km

Japan

RodongMusudan1,300kmIndia
3,000km

Guam

HawaiiTaepodong

6,700kmAustralia

It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons
remain stored in the facilities scattered across the country. The North isalso suspected of being able to independently cultivate and produce suchbiological weapons as anthrax, smallpox, and cholera.
To maintain its war sustainability and logistical mobilization capabilities,
North Korea has prioritized its military industry, despite its energy andeconomic crises.
The North retains about 300 logistics factories. In addition, non-military
production facilities that are designated as logistics factories can also, on short
notice, be used for logistical mobilization during wartime. Most of the war
stockpile is kept in hardened underground storage facilities, and the quantity of
WKHZDUVWRFNSLOHKDVEHHQHVWLPDWHGWREHVXI¿FLHQWIRUWZRWRWKUHHPRQWKV
However, without additional purchases from the outside or external support,
North Korea’s ability to engage in a protracted war would be limited.

35

Section 3. North Korean Situation and Military ThreatROK Armed Forces Major Commanders
General Meeting (MND, May 2010)

2

Chapter

National Security
Strategy and
Defense Policy
Section 1. National Security Strategic Guidance
Section 2. Objectives and Tenets of the National
Defense Policy

1SectionNational Security Strategic
Guidance
As a national action plan, the National Security Strategy (NSS) is designed to utilize available resources andmeans in a comprehensive and systematic manner in order to assure national security. Setting its national
vision of a 'World Class Nation through National Advancement,' the Lee Myung-bak Administration is moving
1

towards a Global Korea. As part of realizing this vision on the security front, the Administration has issued
the National Security Strategic Guidance. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has been concentrating
all of its capabilities to attain its national security objectives and to support relevant national policies.

1. Global Korea
This concept, which is high on the
Government’s agenda, is a vision
aimed by the Government towards
the national security sector. It asks
for the country to contribute to world
peace and seek co-prosperity throughproactive and open foreign policy that
pursues exchanges and collaboration
with the rest of the world on a varietyof global issues, including economic,
cultural and environmental ones,
rather than relying on a diplomatic andsecurity solution confined to the Korean
Peninsula and North Korea’s nuclear
issues.

1. National Vision and National Security Objectives
The Lee Myung-bak Administration established the national vision of
becoming a 'World-Class Nation through National Advancement' basedon the principles of having free democracy and market economy, which
are the fundamental ideas of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. A
World-Class Nation would achieve both economic development and social
integration built upon world-class civil consciousness and culture as well as
top-notch science technologies and industries.
The national security objectives must be achieved to ensure national
security by considering the current security environment and evaluating
the available national power. Keeping security in the forefront of the mind,
the ROK Government set its national security objectives as maintaining
stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula; establishing the foundation
for citizens’ safety and national prosperity; and enhancing the country’s
international capacity and stature.

38 2010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 2.

President Lee Myung-bak delivering his new year’s address (January 2010)

First, 'maintaining stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula' meansthat the ROK Government will ensure the constant stability and peace on
the Korean Peninsula, based on its own defense capability and the ROK-U.
S. alliance, by engaging in inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, alongwith multifaceted collaboration with its neighboring countries.
Second, 'establishing the foundation for public safety and national
prosperity' signifies that the Government will ensure public safety frommultifarious security threats and will achieve the social and economic
security on which national prosperity can be grounded.
Third, 'enhancing the country’s international capacity and stature' refers to
the ROK making such great strides towards becoming a Soft Strong Powerby actively contributing to world peace, freedom and democracy, and coprosperity while strengthening its collaborations with the international
community.

2. Tenets of the National Security Strategy (NSS)
7KH.RUHDQ*RYHUQPHQWKDVVSHFL¿HGWKHIROORZLQJWKUHHWHQHWVRIWKH
National Security Strategy (NSS): first, creating a new peace structure;second, carrying out pragmatic diplomacy and openness; and third, seeking
advanced security that reaches out to the world.

39

Section 1. National Security Strategic GuidanceFirst, the goal of ‘creating a new peace structure’ will be achieved by
the following: advancing the inter-Korea relationship in a future-oriented
way to arrive at mutual benefits; pushing forward with the ‘Strategic
2. Strategic Alliance towards the 21stCentury
Under the Strategic Alliance towards
the 21st Century, the ROK and the U.S.
agreed to abide by, first, claiming tostand for a liberal democracy, market
economy and humanitarianism, andpromote such ideals befitting of the
Korean Peninsula, Notheast Asia andthe World, second, broadening anddeepening their mutually-dependent
relationship on the social, economic
and cultural fronts on the basis of theirsolid, long-lasted military alliance,
and third, developing the alliance suchthat it can contribute to regional andglobal peace and confidence building,while bolstering strategic cooperation
with other neighboring countries in theregion.

Alliance towards the 21st Century’2 with the United States in a manner thatwill contribute to bringing about peace on the Korean Peninsula, regional
stability, and also world peace; and constructing a close and cooperative
relationship with neighboring countries.
Second, in order to carry out ‘pragmatic diplomacy and active openness,’the ROK will implement a pragmatic foreign affairs campaign that could
revitalize the economy and energy diplomacy; pursue international
cooperation and contribution diplomacy that commensurate with Korea's
economic and diplomatic capabilities.
Third, in seeking advanced security that reaches out to the world, theROK will build its military capabilities and advanced defense operational
systems that proactively respond to the changes in the security environment
and future warfare; enhance the competence of its comprehensive security
to ensure its responsiveness to multifarious security threats; actively engage
in international peacekeeping operations and reconstruction activities.
In order to realize the tenets of the NSS, the Government has been
implementing strategic tasks by sectors. The core strategic task in thenational defense sector is to build a ‘future-oriented security capability.’ To
achieve this goal, the MND has been concentrating its resources to attain
Defense Vision of fostering an ‘Advanced Elite Military.’ In addition, it
established the Defense Reform Basic Plan in December 2005 and has sinceperiodically evaluated and improved the Plan.

402010 Defense White Paper

2

Objectives and Tenets of the
National Defense Policy

Section

The MND has proclaimed an ‘Advanced Elite Military’ as its Defense Vision to realize its national security andnational defense objectives in this fast changing security environment. To this end, the MND set up eight key
defense policy tenets to ensure consistent implementation of the defense policies across different sectors.

1. National Defense Objectives
There are three national defense objectives: defending the nation fromexternal military threats and invasion ; upholding the principle of peacefulunification ; and contributing to regional stability and world peace. The
VSHFL¿FGHWDLOVRIWKHVHREMHFWLYHVDUHDVIROORZVFirst, ‘defending the nation from external military threats and invasion’
VLJQL¿HVWKDWWKH01'ZLOOSURWHFWWKHQDWLRQIURP1RUWK.RUHD¶VH[LVWLQJ
military threat and, further, from all other potential threats to the peace andsecurity of the ROK. The North has posed serious threats to the South’s
security with its large-scale conventional military forces, development
and enhancement of WMDs, including nuclear weapons and missiles, andconstant armed provocations as shown by the attack on the ROK Ship
Cheonan and the artillery firing at Yeonpyeong Island. As long as suchthreats continue, the main agents of the provocative acts, which are theNorth Korean regime and its military, will remain enemies of the South.

41

Section 2. Objectives and Tenets of the National Defense Policy

6HFRQGµXSKROGLQJWKHSULQFLSOHRISHDFHIXOXQL¿FDWLRQ¶PHDQVWKDWWKH
01'ZLOOFRQWULEXWHWRSHDFHIXOXQL¿FDWLRQRIWKHWZR.RUHDVE\GHWHUULQJ
war, easing the military tension, and bringing permanent peace to the
Korean Peninsula.
Third, ‘contributing to regional stability and world peace,’ based on the
ROK’s national power and defense capabilities, entails that the MND will
promote cordial and cooperative military relations with neighboring countries
while actively participating in international peacekeeping activities.

2. Tenets of the National Defense Policy
With its vision, the development of an Advanced Elite Military, designed
to meet the objectives of national security and national defense, the MND
1. Eight Key Tenets of the National
Defense Policy·Defense posture for comprehensive
security·The development of the ROK-U.S.
military alliance and expansion of
defense diplomacy and cooperation·Military support to advance interKorean relations·Establishing advanced militarycapabilities·Improving the cultivation, educational
and training systems for defense
personnel·Enhancement of management
efficiency·Attractive military, rewarding military·The armed forces serving the people

has come up with eight key tenets of the national defense policy1 in order toensure consistency in the policy implementation process.

| Defense posture for comprehensive security | The ROK
military will prepare to take immediate action and conduct complete
operations against any incidents no matter when, where or what situation
occurs. It will also ensure an all-directional defense posture against all
forms of threat, including the North, to realize comprehensive security.
To this end, the ROK military will firmly establish an all-directional
defense posture to deter the North’s military provocations and to become
victorious in any battle. In addition, the MND will develop an integrated
defense posture that allows civilians, government, military and police towork together so that all of the nation’s capabilities can be fully synthesized
during a national crisis or emergency.
The MND will adopt a rapid response posture and hone the capability
to cope with transnational and non-military threats, including terror
attacks and disasters, whenever they occur. In addition, it will establish aclose collaborative base with the international community so as to share
information and reinforce the joint response structure.

422010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 2.

| The development of the ROK-U.S. military alliance andexpansion of defense diplomacy and cooperation | The ROK
and the U.S. will creatively develop a future-oriented alliance based onshared values, mutual trust, and the legitimacy of the alliance.
The scope of the ROK-U.S. alliance will broaden and deepen so as tocover cooperation on the political, economic, social and cultural fronts
beyond military and security concerns. Furthermore, the two nations will
foster the alliance in a way that contributes to regional and global peace andprosperity.
The United States Forces in Korea (USFK) will be guaranteed stablestationing conditions, and the ROK and the U.S. will invigorate policy
coordination to solidify their mutual trust. The two nations will also create
a new alliance military structure that takes into account the aftereffects ofwartime OPCON transition.
Based on the ROK-U.S. alliance, the MND will enhance its cooperative
military relationship with neighboring countries, expand its military
diplomacy to the global level and bolster international peacekeeping
operations. While pushing ahead with pragmatic, future-oriented defense
diplomacy, which contributes to national interests, the MND will take active
part in internationally directed operations to stabilize the countries underFRQÀLFWDQGWRVXSSRUWUHFRQVWUXFWLRQLQWKHVWULIHULGGHQDUHDV| Military support to advance inter-Korean relations |The MND will take military assurance measures in a timely manner inaccordance with the development of the inter-Korean exchanges andcooperation, while developing and implementing creative agendas andstrategies to relieve military tension and to build trust with North Korea.
While providing military assurances for inter-Korean exchanges andcooperation, the MND will maintain a solid military readiness posture. The
Ministry will also build military trust and pursue step by step measures inarms control to allow peace to take root on the Korean Peninsula.

The ROK ship Munmu the Great of theCheonghae Unit escorting a merchantvessel (the Gulf of Aden, April 2009)43

Section 2. Objectives and Tenets of the National Defense PolicyGiven that the issue of ROK POWs, together with the inter-Korean joint
search mission for remains of those killed during the Korean War, has to beaddressed as a matter of national responsibility, relevant action plans andnegotiations with North Korea must be conducted with the concerted effort
through inter-agency coordination.

| Establishing advanced military capabilities | In order toeffectively cope with the strategic environment and the possible warfare
scenarios of the 21st Century, the MND will shift the ROK military structure
to one that is more information and technology-intensive.
The MND will progressively complement the Defense Reform Basic
3ODQFRQVLGHULQJWKHFKDQJHVLQWKHVHFXULW\FLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGWKH¿QDQFLDO
support plan of the Government. In addition, when reevaluating the current
DQGIXWXUHWKUHDWVWKH01'ZLOOUHVKXIÀHWKHPLOLWDU\VWUXFWXUHWRHQDEOH
the military to proactively respond to the changing security environment,
while developing the structure as a tailored unit befitting the varying
operational conditions that characterize the Korean Peninsula. A jointnessbased, top-down chain of command will strengthen the nation’s military
power, thereby improving the efficiency of its force structure. In termsof the reserve forces, the mobilization system will be innovated and theeducation and training systems will also be meliorated to enhance their
combat capability to the level of the standing forces.

| Improving the cultivation, educational and training
systems for defense personnel | Based on an efficient military
personnel recruiting and managing system, the MND will improve theeducation system for officers and working conditions for career service
members so as to foster an elite defense workforce capable of meeting thechallenges of future warfare.
,QDGGLWLRQWKH01'ZLOODOLJQWKHFXUUHQWWUDLQLQJSURJUDPVIRURI¿FHUV
to secure elite defense human resources that are suitable for a technologyintensive military structure, while improving the educational system for
RI¿FHUVLQDZD\WKDWUHLQIRUFHVWKHHI¿FLHQF\DQGMRLQWQHVVRIWKHPLOLWDU\
In order to prevent the possible weakening of force levels attributed by442010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 2.

the shortened military service period for enlisted service members, boottraining as well as the general training systems will be reinforced to ensure
the existing combat forces are primed to their optimal level. The MND
will also introduce a technologically advanced security system in phases
and expand outsourcing, thus reducing the cost and workload pertaining tosecurity and unit management and creating an environment that allows themilitary to focus on education and training.
In terms of the mental strength education system, the military will
invigorate these kinds of routine training focused on the internalization of
the military spirit and duties as a way of life. At the same time, together
with other appropriate government agencies, the MND will establish a‘public security education network’ to help the public to share a sense ofnational security.

| Enhancement of management efficiency | The MND
will enhance defense resource management by improving colligation,
adjustment and control of goods and services in the military. The Ministry
will not only improve efficiency in the national defense architecture andmanagement but will also maximize the functional contributions of the
defense industry and defense budget to the national economy.
The MND will improve the national defense managerial system to

The Vice Minister of Defense inspecting
the status of a K-series tracked vehicle
for an efficient defense budget plan (20thDivision of the Army, September 2010)

enhance organizational and human resources management, while promoting
transparency and efficiency in the contract system regarding military
supplies and facilities. In addition, it will reduce supply expenditure to aminimum through a military supply policy grounded on the Total Life Cycle
Systems Management (TLCSM). The MND will also optimize the nation’s
defense resources by preventing overlapping investments in the national
budget and maximizing the use of good-quality resources from the private
sector. It will improve the weapon procurement and acquisition systemand promote the defense industry as an exporter through its enhanced
capabilities in the defense science and technology area. In this way, thenational defense economy will become a growth engine for the national
economy.

45

Section 2. Objectives and Tenets of the National Defense Policy

| Attractive military, rewarding military | The MND will
make the military attractive and rewarding by ensuring the service period isspent productively and rewardingly by combining its physical and mental
training, including training to promote a collective spirit.
The Ministry will also train newly enlisted service members to become
strong warriors and, on the other hand, provide self-development programs
WKDWZLOODOORZWKHPWRHDUQFROOHJHFUHGLWVRUFHUWL¿FDWLRQVWKXVPDNLQJ
military service more holistically productive. Besides, the MND willrenovate the current narrow and old living quarters to provide a pleasantenvironment thereby enhancing the service members’ quality of life.
The Ministry will upgrade the military medical support system in order toenhance the health and combat capability of soldiers and will implement the
Basic Military Welfare Plan to heighten the career soldier’s quality of life.

| The armed forces serving the people | The MND will enable
the armed forces to focus on their original missions and strengthen theirability to garner the trust of the nation, guarantee people’s convenience, and
UHDOL]HJRYHUQPHQWSROLFLHVWR¿UPO\HVWDEOLVKWKHLPDJHRIWKHµFLWL]HQLQ
uniform.’
The disaster relief system will be improved and the rules and regulations
imposed by the military eased to enhance the benefits to the public andprotect its rights. Especially, in case of disaster, the MND will provide
active support for disaster-stricken civilians to assure their survival andreduce their hardship. The MND will mitigate the regulations over the
Joint Burial Ceremony for the Korean
War KIAs (Seoul National Cemetery,
December 2009)

Military Installation Protection Zones to an extent to which military
operations are not hampered.
As for the military service and conscription system, the MND will
improve the system to better utilize the nation’s human resources and ensure
the principle that every man of fit body and mind, no matter his social
EDFNJURXQGVKDOOIXO¿OOKLVPLOLWDU\GXW\ZLWKRXWH[FHSWLRQ

462010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 2.

At the same time, the MND will expand the compensation and honor
benefits for those service members and their families, who sacrificed
themselves for the nation, while exalting their spirit of self-sacrifice. In
addition, the Ministry will reinforce its promotional efforts for the national
defense policy and will solidify its relations with the public, the national
assembly and the media, thereby expanding its support base. It will also
strive to achieve a ‘fair military’ in line with the Government’s campaign
to make a ‘fair society.’ The Ministry, in line with this objective, will
adhere to the principles of ‘more autonomous and creative defense’; ‘a
IDLUHUPLOLWDU\¶DQGµDPLOLWDU\WKDWIXO¿OOVLWVVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶ZKHQ
selecting its new policy agenda items.

47

Section 2. Objectives and Tenets of the National Defense Policy3

Chapter

Defense Posture
for Comprehensive
Security
Section 1. All-Directional Military Readiness Posture
Section 2. Integrated Civilian-Government-MilitaryPolice Defense Posture
Section 3. Development of a Readiness Postureagainst Transnational and Non-militaryThreats

F-15K Air Patrol

1

Section

All-Directional Military
Readiness Posture
The ROK forces has been supplementing its military readiness posture in consideration of the diverseand complex threats from North Korea. The priority, in the complementation process, is given to
THEWEAKAREASOFTHECOMBATPOWERINCURRENTOPERATIONTOMAXIMIZETHEOPERATIONALEFÜCIENCYOF
THEEXISTINGFORCES)NADDITION THEMILITARYMAINTAINSAÜRMMILITARYREADINESSPOSTUREBASEDONTHE
ROK-U.S. combined defense posture.

1. Military Organization and Retaining Forces| Reinforcement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff | The Joint Chiefs ofStaff (JCS) is comprised of a vice chairman, three Central Directorates and four
2I¿FHVDVVKRZQLQ)LJXUH7KHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIWKH-&6LVWRFDUU\RXWMRLQWDQGFRPELQHGRSHUDWLRQVE\FRQGXFWLQJRSHUDWLRQDOFRPPDQGVXSHUYLVLQJWKH
1. Joint unit
A unit that is comprised of two or more
Services.

RSHUDWLRQDOXQLWVRIHDFKWURRSDQGRUFKHVWUDWLQJMRLQWXQLWV1
In preparation for the Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) transition and

2. Joint combat development system
A rational and scientific system thatstrengthens jointness and generates
the requirements for the future
development of military strength.
3. Jointness
The unified management of the militaryforces and the activities carriedout by each of the services towards
maximizing the synergy between theservices that comprise the combat
strength and ensuring victory in war.

50 2010 Defense White Paper

WRVXEVHTXHQWO\HVWDEOLVKWKH52.IRUFHVOHGZDUILJKWLQJV\VWHPWKH-&6
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.25&20ZKLOHVWUHQJWKHQLQJLWVRZQRUJDQL]DWLRQChapter 3.

Figure 3-1. Organizational Chart of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Office of Secretariat

Office of Judge Advocate Office of Public Affairs

Combat Readiness
Inspection OfficeCentral Directorate for Central Directorate for Central Directorate for
Joint Operations (J-3)
Military Support
Strategic Planning (J-5)*Effective on January 1, 2011

| Organization of individual Services and retaining forces |The ArmyLVRUJDQL]HGLQWRWKH$UP\+HDGTXDUWHUV +4 WZR)LHOG$UP\+4V
one Operations Command, the Capital Defense Command, the Special Warfare&RPPDQGWKH$UP\$YLDWLRQ2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQGWKH$UP\0LVVLOH&RPPDQG
DQGRWKHUVXSSRUWXQLWV,WVRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFKDUWDQGUHWDLQLQJIRUFHVDUHVKRZQLQ)LJXUH
Figure 3-2. The ROK Army: Organizational Chart and Retaining Forces
Army Headquarters

Field Army HQ (2)Operations Command (1)Capital Defense
Command

Army Aviation Operations
Command

Logistics
Command

Corps (8)Special Warfare
Command

Army Missile
Command

Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC)

TroopsTanks

ArmoredvehiclesField artillery/
Multi-launchRocket System(MLRS)

Guidedweapons

Helicopters

approx. 520,000

approx. 2,300

approx. 2,500

approx. 5,200

approx. 30

approx. 600

K1A1 Tank

51

Section 1. All-Directional Military Readiness Posture7KHGHIHQVHPLVVLRQRIWKH)LUVWDQG7KLUG)LHOG$UP\FRYHUVWKHDUHDUDQJLQJIURPWKH0LOLWDU\'HPDUFDWLRQ/LQH 0'/ WRWKHIURQWOLQHDUHDRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\$25 7KH6HFRQG2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQGPDLQWDLQVVWDELOLW\LQWKHUHDUDUHDVDQG
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FDSLWDODUHDZKLFKLQFOXGHVPDLQWDLQLQJWKHIXQFWLRQVRI.RUHD¶VFDSLWDO6HRXODQG
SURWHFWLQJPDMRUIDFLOLWLHVLQWKHDUHD7KHRWKHUXQLWV¶PLVVLRQVDUHWRFDUU\RXWVSHFLDOZDUIDUHDYLDWLRQVRSHUDWLRQVORJLVWLFDOVXSSRUWWUDLQLQJDQGHGXFDWLRQDQGRWKHUV,QWKHIXWXUHWKH$UP\ZLOOSODFHSULRULW\RQIXUWKHUUHLQIRUFLQJLWVPLOLWDU\VWUHQJWKDJDLQVWSRVVLEOHLQ¿OWUDWLRQDQGORFDOSURYRFDWLRQVE\1RUWK.RUHDWKHUHE\
PD[LPL]LQJLWVH[LVWLQJIRUFHVDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHDWWDLQLQJWKHDELOLW\IRU
RIIHQVLYHPDQHXYHUZDUIDUHWKDWZLOOSXWLQWRSUDFWLFHWKHMRLQWRSHUDWLRQDOFRQFHSW
7RWKLVHQGWKH$UP\ZLOOEHHTXLSSHGZLWKVXUYHLOODQFHⰒstrikeⰒmaneuver
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4. Multiple Launch Rocket System(MLRS)
A launch system that has numerous
rocket ammunition arranged in abox-like or cylindrical shape. It is aweapon that concentrates massivesynchronized firepower and is typicallymounted on and operated from avehicle.

0/56 4QH[WJHQHUDWLRQWDQNV ;. DQGQH[WJHQHUDWLRQDUPRUHGSHUVRQQHOYHKLFOHVThe Navy LVRUJDQL]HGLQWRWKH1DY\+4WKH1DYDO2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQGWKH
0DULQH&RUSV+4DQGRWKHUVXSSRUWXQLWV,WVRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFKDUWDQGUHWDLQLQJ
IRUFHVDUHVKRZQLQ)LJXUH

Figure 3-3. The ROK Navy: Organizational Chart and Retaining Forces

Navy Headquarters

Operations Command

Marine Corps Hqs

Logistics Command

Fleet Command (3)Division (Brigade) 2(1)Navy Education andTraining Command

ROKS Yulgok Yi Yi (Aegis destroyer)

522010 Defense White Paper

TroopsSubmarines

Surface
Combatants

Auxiliary
vessels

Helicopters /Maritime
patrol aircraft

approx. 68,000

approx. 10

140

20

approx. 50

Chapter 3.

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5. Anti-surface ship operations
Operations intended to secure or
maintain control of the seas or todestroy or incapacitate an enemy's
surface forces through the use of
surface combat ships, submarines andaircraft.
6. Anti-submarine operations
Operations to ensure free use of theseas by destroying or neutralizing theenemy's submarines.
7. Mine operations
Operations whereby the enemy's naval
forces are blocked or neutralized byusing mines or where the enemy's useof mines is denied.

PLVVLRQVFDUULHGRXWXQGHUZDWHURQWKHZDWHUDQGLQWKHDLU7RWKLVHQGLWZLOOSURFXUHQHZ
GHWHFWLRQUDGDUVPDULWLPHRSHUDWLRQKHOLFRSWHUV$HJLVGHVWUR\HUV8DQGQH[WJHQHUDWLRQIULJDWHV )); QH[WJHQHUDWLRQSDWUROFUDIW 3.; DQGQH[WJHQHUDWLRQVXEPDULQHV7KH
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8. Aegis destroyer
A naval vessel whose superiority isunmatched and that stands head andshoulders in defensive power above
any other type of surface combatants.
In particular, it has the ability to detect,
track and strike at several hundred
enemy aircraft and naval vessels
simultaneously.

The Air ForceLVRUJDQL]HGLQWRWKH$LU)RUFH+HDGTXDUWHUVWKH$LU)RUFH2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQGDQGVXSSRUWXQLWV,WVRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFKDUWDQGUHWDLQLQJIRUFHVDUHVKRZQLQ)LJXUH
Figure 3-4. The ROK Air Force: Organizational Chart and Retaining Forces
The Air Force
Headquarters

Operations CommandSouthern Air
CombatCommand

Air Defense
Artillery
Command (ADAC)

Air Force Education
and Training Command

Logistics Command

F-15K

Air Defense
and Control
Wing

Fighter Wing

Fighter Wing

Training Wing

Airlift Wing
Composite Wing

TroopsCombataircraft

ISR aircraft

Air mobility
aircraftTrainers

Helicopters

approx. 65,000

460

approx. 40

approx. 40

180approx. 40

53

Section 1. All-Directional Military Readiness Posture7KH$LU)RUFH2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQGDVDFHQWUDOL]HGSRZHUFRQWUROVDLU
9. Counter air operations (CA)Operations that destroy or neutralize
the aerospace power and air defense
systems of an enemy in order to secureand maintain air superiority.
10. Strategic attack operations (SA)Operations that destroy the enemy's
will to engage in war by striking at its
core strategic targets.
11. Air interdiction operations (AI)Operations that block, disturb, delay, or
destroy the enemy's potential militaryforces. This therefore limits an enemy's
reinforcement of its forces, re-supplyof its troops and the reinforcement of
its mobility, before the enemy’s forces
can be effectively used against the ROK
Army and Navy.

RSHUDWLRQVZKLOHFDUU\LQJRXWFRXQWHUDLURSHUDWLRQV9VWUDWHJLFDWWDFNV10 air
interdictions,11DQGFORVHDLUVXSSRUWRSHUDWLRQV12
7KH6RXWKHUQ$LU&RPEDW&RPPDQGXQGHUWKHFRPPDQGRIWKH$LU)RUFH
2SHUDWLRQV&RPPDQGSHUIRUPVGHFHQWUDOL]HGPLVVLRQVXQGHUWKHFHQWUDOL]HG
control of the operations command in order to defend the territorial spaces for
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12. Close air support operations (CAS)
Operations that attack enemy forcesthat confront allied troops at close
range, creating favorable operational
conditions for the ROK Army and Navy,or which support the operational goals
and survival of the ROK Army and Navy.

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forces | 7KH 86). +HDGTXDUWHUV FRQVLVWV RI WKH (LJKWK 86$UP\(86$ WKH861DYDO)RUFHV.RUHD &1). WKH0DULQH)RUFHV.RUHD
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WKH52.86&RPELQHG)RUFHV&RPPDQG &)& ,WVRUJDQL]DWLRQDOFKDUWDQGUHWDLQLQJIRUFHVDUHVKRZQLQ)LJXUH

542010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 3.

Figure 3-5. The USFK: Organizational Chart and Retaining Forces
USFK Headquarters

Eighth U.S. Army

U.S. Naval
Forces-Korea

U.S. Marine
Forces-Korea

Special Operations
Command Korea (SOCKOR)

U.S. Air
Forces- Korea

2nd Infantry
Division

19th Expeditionary
Support Command

501st MilitaryIntelligence Brigade

1st Signal
Brigade7th Air Force

8th Fighter Wing

51st Fighter Wing

18th Medical
Command

TroopsFighters

Attackhelicopters

Tanks

ArmoredvehiclesATACMS/
Patriots

approx. 28,500

approx. 90

approx. 20

approx. 50

approx. 110

approx. 40/60

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13. Time Phased Force Deployment Data
(TPFDD)
The type and specifications of the units
to be deployed to augment U.S. troops
as part of the operational plans of the
ROK-U.S. combined forces.

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55

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562010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 3.

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57

Section 1. All-Directional Military Readiness PostureThe territory of the Republic of Korea

East Sea
Northern
Limit Line (NLL)
Military Demarcation
Line (MDL)

Northern
Limit Line (NLL)

38° 37´N 133° 00´E

38° 03´N 123° 45´E

Dokdo

Anti-submarine training
in the northwesternwatersWest Sea

Patrolling of Dokdo

South Sea
MaradoPatrolling of Marado* Source: National Geographic Information Institute582010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 3.

3. Establishing Rapid Response Mobilization Posture
0RELOL]DWLRQ14FDSDELOLW\UHIHUVWRWKHHIILFLHQWRUJDQL]DWLRQUHJLPHQWDWLRQDQGXQL¿FDWLRQRIWKHQDWLRQ VDYDLODEOHKXPDQPDWHULDODQGRWKHUUHVRXUFHVWRZDUGVDFKLHYLQJWKHJRDOVRIZDULWLVDQHVVHQWLDOIDFWRULQPHHWLQJWKH
QHFHVVLWLHVRIZDUDQGHQVXULQJZDUVXVWDLQDELOLW\7KHUHIRUHWKH52.
*RYHUQPHQWPDLQWDLQVDQLPPHGLDWHPRELOL]DWLRQSRVWXUHLQRUGHUWREHDEOHWR

14. Mobilization
The Government's general activities toefficiently manage and control national
resources, such as human resources,material resources, goods and services,during wartime or in a national
emergency equivalent to a war.

HI¿FLHQWO\PRELOL]HWKHQDWLRQ VDYDLODEOHUHVRXUFHVLQWLPHVRIZDU

| Personnel mobilization | 3HUVRQQHOPRELOL]DWLRQLVGLYLGHGLQWR
WKHIROORZLQJWKUHHPDQSRZHUPRELOL]DWLRQWRVXSSO\WKHWURRSVQHHGHGE\
PLOLWDU\XQLWV ZDUWLPHODERUVHUYLFHPRELOL]DWLRQ WRVHFXUHWKHSHUVRQQHOQHHGHGWRVXSSRUWPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVDQG WHFKQLFLDQPRELOL]DWLRQ µ0DQSRZHUPRELOL]DWLRQ¶UHIHUVWRWKHPRELOL]DWLRQRIUHVHUYHIRUFHVDQG
WKHLUXVHDVFRPEDWSHUVRQQHOE\PLOLWDU\XQLWVDVUHTXLUHGIRUWKHH[SDQVLRQUHLQIRUFHPHQWRUHVWDEOLVKPHQW RIPLOLWDU\XQLWVRUIRUUHSOHQLVKLQJORVVHV7KH01'GHVLJQDWHVDQGPDQDJHVHOLWHSHUVRQQHOWRHQJDJHDQHQHP\LQ
DWLPHO\PDQQHULQWLPHVRIZDU:LWKUHVSHFWWRHDFKXQLW¶VPRELOL]DWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVWKH52.PLOLWDU\DVDSULRULW\GHVLJQDWHVILUVW\HDUWRIRXUWK\HDUPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHORIRSWLPXPVSHFLDOWLHVIRURSWLPXPSRVLWLRQV15 andsimilar specialties, DQGWKHUHVRXUFHVDUHHIILFLHQWO\PDQDJHGWKURXJKWKH
16'HIHQVH0RELOL]DWLRQ,QIRUPDWLRQ6\VWHP,IWKHODZVDUHDPHQGHGVRWKDWSDUWLDOPRELOL]DWLRQLVSRVVLEOHGXULQJSHDFHWLPHLWLVH[SHFWHGWKDWHFRQRPLF
ORVVHVGXHWRWKHGHFODUDWLRQRIWKHPRELOL]DWLRQRUGHUPD\EHUHGXFHGDQGWKH
PLOLWDU\PD\VHFXUHVXI¿FLHQWWLPHWRSUHSDUHIRUDEDWWOH:DUWLPHODERUVHUYLFHPRELOL]DWLRQUHIHUVWRWKHPRELOL]DWLRQRIODERUUHVRXUFHV IRU GDPDJH UHFRYHU\ DQG WKH WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ RI VXSSOLHV DQG

15. Military Optimum Specialty in
Optimal Position
The same specialty as that required in
mobilization.
16. Similar Specialty
A specialty similar to that requiredin mobilization; when there is aninsufficient number of resources thatare categorized as being the optimum
specialty for an optimal position, a
specialty in a similar area is designatedinstead.

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17. 2nd conscription
Citizens who have been determinedunable to serve in active duty or
replacement duty as a result of their
physical examinations, but who can
perform military operational support
services when wartime labor service
mobilization takes place.

59

Section 1. All-Directional Military Readiness Posture7HFKQLFLDQPRELOL]DWLRQUHIHUVWRWKHPRELOL]DWLRQRIOLFHQVHGRUTXDOLILHG
WHFKQLFLDQVLQWKHWHFKQLFDODQGVSHFLDOL]HGDUHDVZKHUHDFWLYHVROGLHUVRUPRELOL]HGIRUFHVDUHQRWDEOHWRSHUIRUPGXWLHVRUZKHUHWKHDYDLODEOHUHVRXUFHV
DUHLQVXIILFLHQW7KHPRELOL]HGSHUVRQVRSHUDWHRUPDLQWDLQHTXLSPHQWXVHG
IRUFRPEDWRUFRPEDWVHUYLFHDFWLYLWLHV7KH01'FRRSHUDWHVFORVHO\ZLWKWKH0LQLVWU\RI3XEOLF$GPLQLVWUDWLRQDQG6DIHW\DQGORFDOJRYHUQPHQWDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRIILFHVVRWKDWOLFHQVHGWHFKQLFLDQVLQQHZWHFKQRORJ\DQG
LQIRUPDWLRQVHUYLFHDUHDVFDQEHPRELOL]HG| Mobilization of materials | 0RELOL]DWLRQRIPDWHULDOVVDWLVILHVWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVDQGPD[LPL]HVZDUVXVWDLQDELOLW\E\WKHWLPHO\DOORFDWLRQRIUHVRXUFHVLQFOXGLQJPDWHULDOVHTXLSPHQWIDFLOLWLHVDQGVXSSOLHUVZKHUHQHHGHG,WLVEURNHQGRZQLQWRWKHPRELOL]DWLRQRILQGXVWU\WUDQVSRUWDWLRQFRQVWUXFWLRQDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQV,QFROODERUDWLRQZLWKWKH0LQLVWU\RI3XEOLF$GPLQLVWUDWLRQDQG6DIHW\WKH01'YHUL¿HVWKH
HIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKH&KXQJPX3ODQWKURXJKDFWXDOWUDLQLQJLQWKHDUHDVRIWHFKQLFDOPDQSRZHUYHKLFOHVFRQVWUXFWLRQHTXLSPHQWDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQVPRELOL]DWLRQGXULQJWKH&KXQJPXH[HUFLVHVKHOGHYHU\\HDU,QGXVWULDOPRELOL]DWLRQUHIHUVWRWKHFRQYHUVLRQRILQGXVWU\WRDZDUWLPHLQGXVWULDOVWUXFWXUHLQRUGHUWRPHHWZDUWLPHQHHGVDQGWKHFRQWURODQG
RSHUDWLRQRIVRPHSDUWRIWKHPDQXIDFWXULQJUHSDLULQJSURFHVVLQJDQG
GLVWULEXWLRQ SURFHVVHV E\ PRELOL]LQJ PDWHULDOV DQG SURYLGHUV LQ FHUWDLQ
EXVLQHVVHV ,Q WKH IXWXUH GXULQJ &KXQJPX WUDLQLQJ WKH 01' SODQV WRJUDGXDOO\DXJPHQWWKHPDQXIDFWXULQJWUDLQLQJIRUWKRVHVXSSOLHUVVXEMHFWWRWKH
PRELOL]DWLRQRIYHKLFOHVFRQVWUXFWLRQHTXLSPHQWDQGLQGXVWULDOPRELOL]DWLRQVR
WKDWWKH\ZLOOEHZHOOYHUVHGLQWKHLUZDUWLPHPLVVLRQSURFHGXUHV)XUWKHUPRUH
LWSODQVWRLGHQWLI\DQGGHVLJQDWHWKHFLYLOLDQLWHPVIRUPRELOL]DWLRQZKLFKDUH
DOVRFRPSDWLEOHIRUXVHE\WKHPLOLWDU\7KHGHVLJQDWHGFLYLOLDQLWHPVDUHVKRZQLQ7DEOH
Table 3-1 Civilian Items Designated for Mobilization
Unit: EA.

602010 Defense White Paper

Classification

2008

2009

2010

Number of Items

379

385

365

Chapter 3.

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SURYLQFHV&RQVWUXFWLRQPRELOL]DWLRQUHIHUVWRWKHPRELOL]DWLRQRIEXLOGLQJVODQG
FRQVWUXFWLRQHTXLSPHQWPDLQWHQDQFHVHUYLFHSURYLGHUVDQGFRQVWUXFWLRQFRPSDQLHVDPRQJRWKHUV,QRUGHUWRVKRUWHQPRELOL]DWLRQWLPHWKH01'KDVGHVLJQDWHGDQGPDQDJHGWKHODWHVWHTXLSPHQWZKHHOHGPRELOHHTXLSPHQWDQG
HTXLSPHQWLQQHLJKERULQJDUHDVRIWKHXQLWLQQHHGDVWKHVXSSOLHVIRULQLWLDO
PRELOL]DWLRQ,QWKHIXWXUHIRUZDUWLPHXVHLWSODQVWRGHVLJQDWHFLYLOLDQVHUYLFHSURYLGHUVIRUPRELOL]DWLRQLQRUGHUWRRXWVRXUFHUHSDLUDQGWUDQVSRUWXQLWVPDQDJHGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHFLYLOLDQRXWVRXUFLQJH[SDQVLRQSODQ0RELOL]DWLRQ RI FRPPXQLFDWLRQV UHIHUV WR WKH PRELOL]DWLRQ RI WKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVOLQHVHUYLFHVDQGWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVFRPSDQLHVVRIWZDUHEXVLQHVVHVDQGNQRZOHGJHDQGLQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\FRQVXOWLQJEXVLQHVVHVWKDWDUHQHFHVVDU\IRUPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQV7KH01'LVH[WHQGLQJWKHVFRSHRILWV
PRELOL]DWLRQGHVLJQDWLRQWRLQFOXGHFLYLOLDQEURDGEDQGVHUYLFHSURYLGHUV,7
FRPSDQLHVDQGNQRZOHGJHDQGLQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\FRQVXOWLQJEXVLQHVVHVLQRUGHUWRVHFXUHVPRRWKFRPPDQGFRQWURODQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQVFDSDELOLWLHVGXULQJZDUWLPH

| Ensuring timely mobilization | 7KHWLPLQJRIDGHFODUDWLRQRIWKH
PRELOL]DWLRQRUGHUZLOOEHGHFLGHGLQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHLQLWLDORSHUDWLRQDOFDSDELOLW\FRPEDWVXVWDLQDELOLW\DQGWKHQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFFRVWIRUGHFODULQJWKHQDWLRQDOPRELOL]DWLRQRUGHU7LPHO\PRELOL]DWLRQFDQPLQLPL]HHFRQRPLF
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61

Section 1. All-Directional Military Readiness Posture

$FFRUGLQJO\WKH01'SODQVWRLPSURYHWKHFXUUHQWPRELOL]DWLRQV\VWHPZKHUHPRELOL]DWLRQLVSRVVLEOHRQO\LQZDUWLPHVRWKDWPRELOL]DWLRQLVSRVVLEOH
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01'LVPRGLI\LQJWKHVWDWXWHVUHODWHGWRPRELOL]DWLRQ622010 Defense White Paper

Integrated Civilian-GovernmentMilitary-Police Defense Posture2

SectionAmid the persistent threat from North Korea, transnational and non-military threats are on the increase.
Against these threats, the integrated efforts and actions of the civilian-government-military-police
entities are of utmost importance. Accordingly, the MND has continually endeavored to establish an
integrated civilian-government-military-police defense system and an integrated defense operational
posture by amending the relevant laws and taking the necessary measures.

1. Integrated Defense System
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1.National key facilities
Facilities that will have a significant
impact on national security and thelives of citizens if they are captured,
destroyed or neutralized, e.g., public
institutions, airports, harbors, andmilitary-related transportation facilities

63

Section 2. Integrated Civilian-Government-Military-Police Defense PostureFigure 3-6. Integrated Defense Command and Coordination Structure
President
Cabinet Meeting(vote)

National Security
Council

Prime
Minister

Central Integrated
Defense Council

Each Ministry andGovernmental Agency

Command
SupportCooperation

Ministry of Public
Administration and Safety

Ministry of National
Defense (MND)

The Joint Chiefsof Staff

Integrated Defense
Headquarters
Local
government
Regional Integrated
Defense Committee

Local
government

Major State
Facility

Operations
CommandRegional MilitaryCommander /Commissioner of Local
Police Agency

National
mobilization,
Disastermanagement,
Damage recovery

Facilities
Protection

Military
Operation

Integrated
DefenseOperation

Integrated Defense
Supporting Headquarters(metropolitan city /province, si/ gun/ gu)

Support for
Integrated
DefenseOperations

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642010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 3.

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2. Integrated Defense Condition
A condition declared in phases against
enemy infiltration, provocation or
threats. This posture is divided into Gaptype, Eul-type, and Byeong-type and in
metropolitan cities and provinces only
the Eul-type or Byeong-type condition
can be declared.
·Eul-type: Declared when an enemy has
infiltrated or committed provocative
actions in several regions at the sametime, hence restoring security in ashort period of time would be difficult,subsequent integrated defense
operations must be carried out under
the command and control of theregional military commander.
·Byeong-type: Declared when enemy
infiltration or provocation is expectedor there has been only small-scale
infiltration, hence security may berestored within a short period oftime with the implementation of
integrated defense operations under
the command and control of the local
police commissioner, regional militarycommander or fleet commander.

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Central Integrated Defense Meeting(Central Government Complex, January
2010)

65

Section 2. Integrated Civilian-Government-Military-Police Defense Posture2. Integrated Defense Operational Posture
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Inspection of underground conduit
protection (May 2010)

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662010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 3.

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3. Homeland Defense Operations Posture+RPHODQG'HIHQVH2SHUDWLRQVDUHFLYLOLDQJRYHUQPHQWPLOLWDU\SROLFHLQWHJUDWHG RSHUDWLRQV WKDW SURWHFW WKH DUHDV RI UHVSRQVLELOLW\ $25  E\PRELOL]LQJUHVHUYHIRUFHV7KHVHRSHUDWLRQVPDLQWDLQVWDELOLW\LQWKHUHDUDUHDVE\FUDFNLQJGRZQRQDUPHGLQ¿OWUDWRUVDQGVSHFLDORSHUDWLRQVIRUFHV
in the event of armed riots and to protect important facilities and lines of
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ
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IRUFHV WURRSV WKH UHJLRQDO SHFXOLDULWLHV DQG IXWXUH UHVWUXFWXULQJ RI WKH67

Section 2. Integrated Civilian-Government-Military-Police Defense PostureDGPLQLVWUDWLYHGLVWULFWV
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682010 Defense White PaperDevelopment of a Readiness
Posture against Transnationaland Non-military Threats

3

SectionThe security environment today is characterized not only by traditional military threats but also
increasingly diverse types of transnational and non-military threats. To effectively prepare for these new
threats, the ROK military has equipped itself with immediate response capabilities and a readinessposture, while maintaining a close coordination system with the international community.

1. Maintaining Rapid Response Capabilities and a
Readiness Posture
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1. Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
All types of improvised explosives
formed by a combination of explosive
parts that can be used for killing,
destroying and attacks.

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69

Section 3. Development of a Readiness Posture against Transnational and Non-military Threats

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EHHQLQFUHDVLQJLQUHFHQW\HDUVLQFOXGLQJWKHPDVVLYH'LVWULEXWHG'HQLDO
2. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
Methods of hacking whereby a
website is attacked by making
several computers perform an action
simultaneously.

of Service (DDoS)2DWWDFNVRQWKHZHEVLWHVRI52.JRYHUQPHQWDOERGLHVWKDWRFFXUUHGLQ,Q6HSWHPEHUWKH&RPSUHKHQVLYH'HIHQVH
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3. Safe Korea Exercise (SKX)
An exercise held every year, in which
over 398 organizations and groups(central governmental agencies, local
governments, public institutions,and other concerned organizations)participate, for the purpose ofstrengthening the disaster management
system operations, inspections of thecommand structure, and civilian andgovernmental cooperation.

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Safe Korea Exercise (SKX) (Daegu,May2009)

702010 Defense White Paper

ZLGHFRPSUHKHQVLYHSHUIRUPDQFHDELOLWLHVFRXOGEHUHYLHZHG

Chapter 3.

2. Maintaining a Close Coordination System with theInternational Community
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Cheonghae Unit rounds up pirates (Gulf of Aden, August 2009)71

Section 3. Development of a Readiness Posture against Transnational and Non-military Threats

The Danbi Unit celebrates giving medical check-ups to over 10,000 local residents (Haiti, September 2010),Q)HEUXDU\WKH52.PLOLWDU\GLVSDWFKHGWKH'DQEL8QLWFRPSULVHG
RIRYHUWURRSVPRVWO\IURPWKHHQJLQHHULQJXQLWWR+DLWLLQRUGHUWR
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4. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
The main governmental level
multilateral security consultative body,in which 26 countries from the AsiaPacific region and the EU chair country
participate. Overall regional security
issues are discussed.

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'HIHQVHMRLQWO\KRVWHGWKH'HIHQVHRIILFLDO V'LDORJXHZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKH$6($15HJLRQDO)RUXP $5) 4 for parties to discuss their
PLOLWDU\ VHIIRUWVLQUHVSRQGLQJWRF\EHUWHUURUDWWDFNVDQGRWKHUWUDQVQDWLRQDOWKUHDWVDQGWKHSRVVLEOHMRLQWFROODERUDWLYHPHDVXUHVWREHWDNHQE\WKHUHJLRQ VQDWLRQVDJDLQVWDIRUHPHQWLRQHGWKUHDWV

5. The Annual Asia-Pacific Chiefs ofDefense (CHOD) Conference
An annual conference to strengthen
multilateral military collaboration at
the senior level within the Asia-Pacificregion. In odd years, the Conferenceis hosted by the U.S. alone whereas ineven years it is co-hosted by a nation in
the region and the U.S.

722010 Defense White Paper,Q2FWREHUWKHth$QQXDO$VLD3DFL¿F&KLHIVRI'HIHQVH &+2' Conference5 ZDV KHOG LQ 6HRXO &RKRVWHG E\ WKH 52. DQG WKH 86
WKLVODUJHVWHYHUFRQIHUHQFHRIKLJKUDQNLQJRIILFHUVLQWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH
52.PLOLWDU\ZDVDWWHQGHGE\&KDLUPHQRIWKH-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDIIOHYHORIILFHUVIURPQDWLRQV,QWKLV&RQIHUHQFHYDULRXVDJHQGDVLQFOXGLQJChapter 3.

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FRKRVWHG WKH$6($1 5HJLRQDO )RUXP V $5)  ILUVW HYHU FRPELQHG
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LQ,QGRQHVLDLQ0DUFK
$WWKH&REUD*ROGH[HUFLVHWKDWZDVKHOGLQ7KDLODQG)HEUXDU\6
WKH01'VHQWDWRQODQGLQJFUDIWDQGEDWWDOLRQOHYHOWURRSVWKXVHQKDQFLQJWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIMRLQWRSHUDWLRQVE\WKHPXOWLQDWLRQDOFRDOLWLRQIRUFHV$VLGHIURPWKLVWKH01'WKURXJKUHJXODUO\KHOGGHIHQVHSROLF\WDONVDQGRWKHUGLVFXVVLRQVHVVLRQVVKDUHVZLWKWKHGHIHQVHDXWKRULWLHVRIRWKHUQDWLRQV WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ  UHJDUGLQJ VHFXULW\ WKUHDWV ZKLOH FRQGXFWLQJROK participants in the ARF disaster
relief combined exercise (Philippines,
May 2009)

6. Cobra Gold exercise
Combined exercises that have been
held every year, since 1981, for multinational peacekeeping operations.
Multi-national forces, which haveassumed authority delegated fromthe UN, engage in humanitarian andpeaceful training. In these exercises,
the forces are sent to the virtual nationof Arcadia in which an armed disputehas arisen, and they have to end theconflict and help stabilize the nation.

FRPELQHGH[HUFLVHVWRJUDGXDOO\H[SDQGWKHVFRSHRIELODWHUDOFRRSHUDWLRQ$VWUDQVQDWLRQDODQGQRQPLOLWDU\WKUHDWVFRQWLQXHWRHVFDODWHWKHUROH
RIWKHPLOLWDU\LVH[SHFWHGWRIXUWKHULQFUHDVH,QVWHSZLWKWKLVWKH01'
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LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\E\DFWLYHO\DQGSRVLWLYHO\SDUWLFLSDWLQJLQELODWHUDO
DQGPXOWLODWHUDOVHFXULW\FRRSHUDWLYHDFWLYLWLHVMarine Corps participating in the
Cobra Gold exercise held in Thailand(Thailand, February 2010)

73

Section 3. Development of a Readiness Posture against Transnational and Non-military Threats

ROK-U.S. Combined Exercise 'Invincible Spirit' (East Sea, July 2010)

4

Chapter

The Developmentof the ROK-U.S.
Military Allianceand Expansionof Defense
Diplomacy andCooperation
Section 1. The Development of a Future-oriented
ROK-U.S. Military Alliance
Section 2. Adjustment of the Timing for the Wartime
OPCON Transition and Building a New
Alliance Military Structure
Section 3. Ensuring Secure Stationing Conditions
for the United States Forces in Korea(USFK)
Section 4. Expanding the Boundaries of Defense
Diplomacy and Cooperation
Section 5. Contributions to International
Peacekeeping Operations

1

SectionThe Development of a Futureoriented ROK-U.S. Military Alliance
Based on the traditionally friendly relations that have been maintained over the past 60 years, the
ROK-U.S. Alliance has made contributions to ensure stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula andto increase national interest. The ROK-U.S. Alliance will, based on its shared values and trust, continue
to develop into a comprehensive strategic alliance.

1. Development of the ROK-U.S. Alliance
The ROK-U.S. Alliance has steadily evolved in response to changes in the
security environment and, over the past 60 years, has contributed to peaceand security on the Korean Peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region.
Today, the world faces not only traditional military threats but also
various types of security threats, including weapons of mass destruction(WMD), terror, natural calamities and disasters, climate change, andenergy problems. The United States has been readjusting military strategy
concept, as well as the structure and size of its military force, in order toeffectively deal with such threats. In addition, the U.S. has been reinforcing
cooperation with its allies in order to effectively respond to the complex and
uncertain security environment that we currently face and may face in the
future.
Korea has become one of the key nations of the international communityfrom its economic development and the settlement of liberal democracy, andwith this heightened national power, Korea is developing its comprehensive
strategic alliance with the United States based on shared values and trust.

76 2010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

The two nations, Korea and the United States, are readjusting the
ROK-U.S. Alliance in order to actively respond to the diverse types of
security threats that may arise in the future. Under mutual agreement,
the two nations are pursuing OPCON transition and USFK relocation.
In the meantime, they are mutually cooperating in various areas, suchas international peacekeeping operations (PKOs), stabilization andreconstruction operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

ROK-U.S. Summit Joint Press Conference (Washington, D.C., June 2009)

The number of United States Forces in Korea (USFK) troops graduallyscaled down from 37,500 in 2003 to 32,500 in 2004 and to 28,500 in 2007.
At the end of 2008, it was expected that the number would be reduced to
25,000. However, at the ROK-U.S. Summit in April 2008, the leaders of
the two nations agreed to maintain the number of troops at 28,500 and
UHFRQ¿UPHGWKLVDJUHHPHQWLQ$SULODWWKH/RQGRQ6XPPLW7DONV
Through such adjustments of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, the two nations
have expanded the scope of their roles and cooperation in diverse areas,
going beyond mere security issues, and have provided a foundation uponwhich their relationship can develop into a reciprocal and mature alliance.

77

Section 1. The Development of a Future-oriented ROK-U.S. Military Alliance2. The Future Direction of the ROK-U.S. Alliance
The two nations, the ROK and the U.S., share universal humanvalues, such as liberal democracy, human rights, and a market economy.
Further, based on a mutual trust and respect, they have developed a close
collaborative structure for military and security issues. Today, the twonations are taking further steps to enhance mutual cooperation in theeconomic, social and cultural areas and are seeking to construct the alliance
1. The Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S.
Alliance
This is the strategic master plan thatprovides the blueprint for the futureoriented development of the ROK-U.S.
Alliance. It lays out in detail thedevelopmental goals of the strategic
alliance in the 21st century as well as
the direction for future cooperation atbilateral, regional and global levels.

at bilateral as well as regional, and global levels.
In April 2008, the two nations agreed, through the Summit, to strengthen
relationship into a 'Comprehensive Strategic Alliance in the 21st Century'that would contribute to peace and security at regional and global levels.
2QWKLVEDVLVLQ-XQHWKHWZRQDWLRQVDGRSWHGWKH -RLQW9LVLRQIRUWKH
ROK-U.S. Alliance,' which provided the future-oriented blueprint for thedevelopment of the alliance.1

ROK-U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministers Meeting (Seoul, July 2010)782010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

,Q WKH -RLQW9LVLRQ IRU WKH$OOLDQFH RI WKH 52. DQG WKH 86$  WZRcountries laid out in writing that the two nations will continuously provide
extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella of the U.S., thereby
maintaining a strong combined defensive posture and that they will pursue¿UPSHDFHRQWKH.RUHDQ3HQLQVXODDVZHOODVSHDFHIXOXQL¿FDWLRQRIWKH
Koreas, based on liberal democracy and a market economy. With respect
to North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the two nations

USS George Washington during ROK-U.S.
Combined Exercises (East Sea, July2010)

agreed to maintain a close mutual cooperative structure under the principleof complete and verifiable abandonment thereof. In addition, the twonations agreed to engage in close talks to respond to global challenges, suchas the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terror, piracy,organized crime and drugs, climate changes, poverty, infringement of
human rights, energy security and contagious diseases.
$WWKH52.866XPPLWKHOGLQ6HRXOLQ1RYHPEHUWKHOHDGHUV
of the two nations agreed to hold a '2 plus 2 Talks,' and consequently, the
ROK-U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting were held in Seoul for
WKH¿UVWWLPHLQWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH52.86$OOLDQFH7KURXJKWKLVPHHWLQJthe two nations exercised a suppressive strategy against North Korea, in
response to the attack on the ROKS Cheonan, in the diplomatic and defense
DUHQDWKHUHE\¿UPO\ZDUQLQJ1RUWK.RUHDDJDLQVWDGGLWLRQDOSURYRFDWLYH
actions, in the following ways: strengthening the United States' independent
financial sanctions against North Korea and holding massive ROK-U.S.
combined maritime exercises. The two nations also discussed various
means of enhancing cooperation between the ROK and the U.S., such as
pursuing the ratification of the ROK-U.S. FTA within the year, making
efforts regarding amendment to the Nuclear Energy Treaty, and advancing
the alliance to a partnership so as to resolve regional and global issues.
In the future the two nations will develop the ROK-U.S. Alliance into acomprehensive strategic alliance to expand their common interests and tocontribute to world peace; the two nations will also act to strengthen theircooperation with regional organizations or nations and thereby promote
SHDFHDQGSURVSHULW\LQWKH$VLD3DFL¿FUHJLRQ

79

Section 1. The Development of a Future-oriented ROK-U.S. Military Alliance2

SectionAdjustment of the Timing for the
Wartime OPCON Transition and
Building a New Alliance Military
Structure
The ROK and the U.S. have agreed to adjust the date for the OPCON Transition from April 17, 2012,
to December 1, 2015. The two nations will construct a strong new combined defense system for postOPCON Transition to replace the current combined defense system for the purpose of deterring war
on the Korean Peninsula, national security and protection of the territory should a relevant event arise.

1. Operational Command (OPCOM)The authority exercised by acommander to a subordinate unit
in order to carry out an operational
mission.
2. Operational Control (OPCON)The authority delegated to acommander to carry out a mission ortask as specified in an operational planor operational order.
3. Nunn-Warner Amendment
This refers to the bill that contained
the U.S. Congress' proposal regarding
ROK-U.S. relations, which was added
to an existing bill that had been
submitted to Congress for approval of
the U.S. defense budget and regulationof the number of troops for the years
1990-1991.
4. East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI)A report submitted to the U.S. Congressby the U.S. Department of Defense incompliance as requested under the
Nunn-Warner Amendment (submitted
on three occasions: 1990, 1991, and1992).

802010 Defense White Paper

1. Chronology of OPCON Transition 1950-2005,Q -XO\  3UHVLGHQW 6\QJPDQ 5KHH KDQGHG RYHU RSHUDWLRQDO
command1 of the ROK military to the Commander-in-Chief of the United
Nations Command (UNC), General Douglas MacArthur. This choice wasinevitable in order to protect and defend the country from extreme crises
during the Korean War. After the Armistice Agreement, the ROK and the
U.S. agreed to keep the ROK forces under the UN Commander's operational
control2 to ensure the UNC's commitment toward defending the ROK.
With the establishment of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command&)& LQ1RYHPEHURSHUDWLRQDOFRQWUROZDVWUDQVIHUUHGIURPWKH81
Commander to the CFC Commander.
'LVFXVVLRQVUHJDUGLQJWKHUHWXUQRI23&21EHJDQLQ$XJXVWwhen the then Presidential candidate Roh Tae-woo proclaimed 'OPCON
Transition and relocation of the Yongsan garrison' to be his campaign
pledge. The matter of returning OPCON was also discussed in the U.S.
through the Nunn-Warner Amendment 3 and the East Asia Strategic
Initiative4 ($6, $VDUHVXOWWKHWZRQDWLRQVEHJDQWRSXUVXH
research and consultations regarding OPCON Transition in earnest.

Chapter 4.

During the 13th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting5 in NovemberWKHWZRQDWLRQVDJUHHGWRUHWXUQSHDFHWLPH23&21WRWKH52.
EHWZHHQDQGDQGWRGLVFXVVZDUWLPH23&217UDQVLWLRQDIWHU,QDFFRUGDQFHZLWKSHDFHWLPH RUGXULQJDUPLVWLFH 23&21ZDV
transferred to the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at the

5. ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting(MCM)
The highest body for military
cooperation between the ROK and the
U.S. and in which the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior
general and flag officers participate.

HQGRI&XUUHQWO\WKH&)&&RPPDQGHUH[HUFLVHVZDUWLPH23&21
as well as Combined Delegated Authority.6 The evolution of operational
control is shown in Figure 4-1.
Figure 4-1. Changes in Operational Control

1950. 7. 14.

ⶺ President Syngman Rhee transfers OPCOM to the UN Commander.

’54. 11. 17.

ⶺ UN Commander is given OPCON.

’78. 11. 7.

ⶺ CFC is established; OPCON is transferred to the CFC Commander.

’94. 12. 1.

ⶺ Peacetime operational control is transferred to the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff.

2006. 9. 16.

6. Combined Delegated Authority(CODA)
The authority delegated to the CFC
Commander during peacetime forexercise over units of the Korean
forces placed under wartime OPCON.
It encompasses six areas: combinedcrisis management, operational plansestablishment, combined exercises,combined joint doctrines development,
ROK-U.S. combined intelligence
management, and C4I interoperability.

ⶺ ROK-U.S. Summit Talks in which OPCON Transition is agreed.

’07. 2. 23.

ⶺ ROK Minister of National Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense agree to the timing(April 17, 2012) for wartime OPCON Transition.

’07. 6. 28.

ⶺ ROK-U.S. agree on the Strategic Transition Plan.

’10. 6. 26.

ⶺ ROK-U.S. Summit Talks in which the two nations agree to adjust the timing oftransition by the end of 2015.

2. Wartime OPCON Transition Timeline 2005-Present
Since the ROK Minister of National Defense and the U.S. Secretary of
Defense agreed to 'appropriately accelerate discussions on wartime OPCON
Transition' during the 37th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)
in October 2005, the discussions have gained momentum.
During the ROK-U.S. Summit in September 2006, the two Presidents
agreed to the basic principle that Wartime Operational Control (OPCON)
would, indeed, be transferred. At the 38th SCM in October of the same year,
the two heads of national defense agreed on the 'Roadmap for the New

81

Section 2. Adjustment of the Timing for the Wartime OPCON Transition and Building a New Alliance Military StructureAlliance Military Structure in the post-OPCON Transition Era' (Roadmap).
The agreement included a plan to disestablish the ROK-U.S. Combined
Forces Command and complete the wartime OPCON Transition to the52.IRUFHVDIWHU2FWREHUEXWQRODWHUWKDQ0DUFK
In January 2007, the permanent ROK-U.S. Military Committee(MC) signed the 'TOR on the Operation of the ROK-U.S. Combined
7. TOR on the Operation of the ROK-U.S.
Combined Implementation Working
Group (CIWG)
TOR signed on January 19, 2007,
between the ROK and the U.S.
regarding the basic elements (purpose,
principle, key players, milestone, etc.)
required for the study and report ofcommand relationships, such as thewartime OPCON Transition.

Implementation Working Group,'7ZKLFKZDV¿QDOL]HGLQD)HEUXDU\
agreement during the Defense Ministerial Meetings, to complete wartime
OPCON Transition on April 17, 2012. In accordance with this agreement,
the Combined Implementation Working Group (CIWG) was formed toestablish a Strategic Transition Plan (STP) to transfer wartime OPCON
from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command to the Joint Chiefs ofStaff; in June 2007, the plan was signed by the ROK Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Senior U.S. Military Officer Assigned to Korea(SUSMOAK).
The ROK and the U.S. formed a joint verification group comprised of
H[SHUWVDQGGXULQJWKH8)*H[HUFLVHLQWKHJURXSYHUL¿HGWKHVWDWXV
of the preparations being made for wartime OPCON Transition and theinitial operational capabilities (IOC)8 of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

Agreement on the Strategic Transition
Plan (STP) for the implementation of
the wartime OPCON Transition (Seoul,
June 2007)
8. Initial Operational Capability (IOC)verification
This refers to the confirmation andevaluation of definitive operational
concepts and the extent of achievementof the required operational capabilities
regarding newly acquired weaponssystems to be deployed in the field, andthe extent of readiness of developed
fielded support elements.
Scene after tank combat training during the UFG Exercises in 2010 (August 2010)822010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

¿QGLQJVZHUHUHSRUWHGDV 1RUPDOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ DWWKH52.866HFXULW\Consultative Meeting (SCM) and the ROK-U.S. Military Committee
Meeting.
The Strategic Transition Plan that the ROK and the U.S. had initiallyagreed upon was replaced by the Change Two of the Strategic Transition
Plan (March 2010), which was prepared based on the supplementary
requirements brought to light when the new combined defense system wasapplied during the UFG exercise.
On June 26, 2010, the Presidents of the ROK and the U.S. agreed tothe stable management of security on the Korean Peninsula, assuranceof an internally stable wartime OPCON Transition, and the deferral of
the wartime OPCON Transition from April 17, 2012, to the end of 2015,
in order to alleviate national concerns regarding security issues. Thisagreement was followed by the ROK-U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministers'
Meeting (2 + 2) of the ROK and the U.S. to discuss stable wartime OPCON
Transition.

ROK-U.S. Summit Talks (Toronto,
Canada, June 2010)

3. Backdrop and Significance of the Adjustment of
the Date for the Wartime OPCON Transition
Throughout the years the ROK and the U.S. have kept a close watch
RQWKHPLOLWDU\WKUHDWSRVHGE\1RUWK.RUHDDQGKDYHMRLQWO\YHUL¿HGDQG
evaluated the progress of the wartime OPCON Transition. In the process,they became aware of the need to adjust the timing of the transition in lightof the increased threat of North Korea and other changes in the security
environment. Consequently, the ROK Government requested that the U.S.
Government adjust the timing of wartime OPCON Transition. The backdrop
to this is as follows:First, there has been an increased uncertainty around the security andinstability on the Korean Peninsula, including the rise of the North Korean
threat. North Korea has continued with its development of nuclear andballistic missiles and has increased the risk of threat of military provocation
through incidents such as the ROKS Cheonan attack, and consequently, the6RXWK1RUWK.RUHDUHODWLRQVKLSFRQWLQXHVWREHRQHRIFRQÀLFWDQGWHQVLRQ
The instability of the North Korean regime is also worsening: the failure ofcurrency reform, the worsening health of Kim Jong Il (the Chairman of the83

Section 2. Adjustment of the Timing for the Wartime OPCON Transition and Building a New Alliance Military StructureNational Defense Commission), and the attempt to pass power to his son(3rd generation power succession).
Second, the fact that 2012 will be a period of high mobility in terms ofpolitics and security, with a change of leaders in several countries in theregion, was taken into consideration. The year 2012 sees the occurrenceof several politically sensitive events: general elections (April) andpresidential elections (December) in the ROK, presidential elections in the
U.S. (November), the fact that it is North Korea's target year for achieving
its goal of becoming a "strong and prosperous nation," transfer of leadershipwithin China's Communist Party (October), and presidential elections in
Russia (March).
Third, over half of the Korean population wished for the deferral of thewartime OPCON Transition due to the unstable security environment. Overten million people participated in the campaign to collect signatures, heldin May 2010, in opposition of the dissolution of the ROK-U.S. Combined
9. Opinion Polls·The Munwha Ilbo (November 2, 2009)·The Donga Ilbo (May 22, 2010)

Forces Command. Based on opinion polls,9 over 50% of the people wereagainst the wartime OPCON Transition or were of the opinion that it should
be delayed.
Against this backdrop, the Governments of the ROK and the U.S., while
respecting the decisions of the previous administrations, agreed to readjust
the timing of the transition in light of the security environment and thegeneral strategic conditions being demonstrated.

4. Major Content of the Wartime OPCON Transition
Wartime OPCON Transition signifies the transition from a command
system centered on the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command to a
new combined defense system 'led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)and supported by the US KORCOM.' The ROK and the U.S. have built
a joint implementation system in order to achieve such a new combined
defense system. The ROK and U.S. also selected detailed tasks in six
areas and are systematically preparing for the wartime OPCON Transition:commissioning a theater operation command system, inaugurating the
ROK-U.S. military coordination system, establishing a new OperationalPlan, constructing a theater operation execution system, establishing a
combined exercise system, and building the foundation and basis for the842010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

wartime OPCON Transition.
7KH¿UVWWDVNLVWRHVWDEOLVKWZRLQGHSHQGHQWDQGPXWXDOO\FRPSOHPHQWDU\Theater-level Combatant Commands to enable command of theater
operations 'led by the JCS and supported by the US KORCOM.' For
WKLVSXUSRVHLQ$SULOWKH-&6UHVKXIIOHGLWVRUJDQL]DWLRQLQRUGHU
to be able to carry out the functions of a Theater-level Command. The
USFK Command Headquarters is also preparing for its transition to the
US KORCOM. The JCS Theater Command Facility is being built andis scheduled to be completed in 2012, and the US KORCOM theatercommand facility is expected to be completed in 2015, in step with theYongsan Relocation Plan (YRP).
The second task involves ensuring the supported-supporting command
relationship between the ROK and the U.S. and constructing a strong
military coordination system for all units and over all functions for theHI¿FLHQWLQWHJUDWLRQRIRSHUDWLRQV7RWKLVHQGWKH52.DQGWKH86ZLOO
form various military coordination bodies and liaison bodies at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels, and the use of these bodies will be expanded
even during peacetime.
The third task involves the development of operational plans through a
joint planning system for operational planning during armistice and war andestablishing a new operational plan to be applied after the wartime OPCON
Transition. To this end, since 2008, the ROK and the U.S. have been
establishing a new operational plan by setting up a joint planning system.
The fourth task involves the construction of a system that allows the JCS
to lead theater operations. To this end, SOPs and directives for executing
theater operations, crisis management systems, and an intelligence
cooperative structure are being developed, and the ROK and the U.S. arealso developing the Alliance Korean Joint Command Control System(AKJCCS) for their joint use.
The fifth task involves preparing a foundation for training exercises toensure that the Korean forces are equipped with the ability to lead combined
exercises. To this end, the ROK and the U.S. have been establishing
exercise structures for pre- and post-OPCON Transition and developing
their exercise planning and control capabilities, constructing new opposition
force simulation facilities, operating after action review teams, andwargame models.

85

Section 2. Adjustment of the Timing for the Wartime OPCON Transition and Building a New Alliance Military StructureThe sixth task involves providing the personnel, material and legal bases
and the foundation needed to construct the new combined defense system.
6SHFL¿FDOO\SHUVRQQHOPDQDJHPHQWZLWKLQWKH-&6DQG52.86&RPELQHG
Forces Command (CFC) will be improved in order to recruit humanresources and replace the standards applied under the CFC, such as theTerms of Reference (TOR)/Strategic Directive No. 2 with the TOR/Strategic
Directive No. 3 to be applied under the new combined defense system.
7KH52.DQGWKH86LQWHQGWRHVWDEOLVKDMRLQWYHUL¿FDWLRQVWUXFWXUHWR
verify whether the preparations for the wartime OPCON Transition and thefurnishing of mission execution capabilities are meeting their targets.

5. The Way Ahead
10. ROK-U.S. Security Consultative
Meeting (SCM)
An annual consultative body held
since 1968 in the areas of defense andsecurity between the ROK and the U.S.
defense ministers.

At the 42nd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)10 in October
2010, the ROK and the U.S. agreed to the 'Strategic Alliance 2015,' which
covers the main alliance issues related to the wartime OPCON Transition.
The Strategic Alliance 2015 is a comprehensive implementation plan
aimed at creating stable conditions for the wartime OPCON Transition by

11. ROK-U.S. Security Policy Initiatives(SPI)
A consultative group among thenational defense and foreign affairs
authorities of the ROK and the U.S. The
top representatives of this body are the
Deputy Minister for National Defense
Policy of the MND and the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for East Asia of the
U.S. Department of Defense.

862010 Defense White Paper

successfully pushing ahead with the wartime OPCON Transition and all
the related issues. A joint working group participated in by related bodies,including the defense and foreign affairs officials of the ROK and the
U.S., will evaluate and verify the status of the alliance’s implementation
through the ROK-US Security Policy Initiatives (SPI),11 ROK-US MilitaryCommittee Meetings (MCM), and ROK-U.S. Security Consultative
Meetings (SCM).

Ensuring Secure Stationing
Conditions for the United States
Forces in Korea (USFK)

3

SectionThe ROK Government is making every effort to provide a stable stationing environment for the UnitedStates Forces in Korea (USFK) and to promote mutual trust in order to solidify and maintain the
ROK-U.S. Alliance. The two nations consult closely to ensure seamless implementation of the USFK
realignment and the appropriate level of defense cost-sharing. Also, they engage in various activities
to reinforce policy consultations and promote trust.

1. USFK Realignment and Tour Normalization
The ROK and the U.S. Governments are consolidating, closing and relocating
the U.S. military bases scattered nationwide in order to ensure the balanced
development of the territory and a stable stationing environment for the U.S.
forces in Korea. The USFK base relocation project is divided into two plans: the/DQG3DUWQHUVKLS3ODQ  /33 1 which seeks to relocate the U.S. bases nationwide,
and the 'Yongsan Relocation Plan' (YRP) for the relocation of U.S. bases
nationwide. The relocation of Yongsan Garrison has been discussed since MarchDQGZDVDJUHHGXSRQGXULQJWKH52.866XPPLWLQ0D\,Q
the relocation gained momentum with the conclusion of the Yongsan Relocation
3ODQ$JUHHPHQW7KH/33EHJDQZLWKWKHVLJQLQJRIWKH/33$JUHHPHQWLQ
,QWKH/33$JUHHPHQWZDVDPHQGHGWRLQFOXGHWKH86nd Infantry

1. Land Partnership Plan (LPP)
This plan spells out the details forconsolidating and closing USFK
facilities nationwide and for the returnof unnecessary facilities and land. A
letter of intent was signed during the33rd SCM held in November 2001. The
LPP Agreement and its amendment
were ratified by the National Assemblyin January 2002 and December 2004,
respectively.

Division relocation plan, and this version is in force today.
Thereafter, in March 2007, the ROK and U.S. agreed on the Facility Master
Plan that provided for the relocation of the major USFK bases to Pyeongtaek
City, and in November of the same year, the two nations held a groundbreaking
ceremony in Pyeongtaek. Currently, land development and the construction of

87

Section 3. Ensuring Secure Stationing Conditions for the United States Forces in Korea (USFK)

infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, gas and waterworks, are in progress.
In accordance with the Special Act on the Assistance to Pyeongtaek City, for
the Relocation of USFK Bases, the ROK is simultaneously pushing ahead withthe construction of residential support facilities for the affected residents in therelocation area, such as building roads, constructing waterworks and seweragefacilities, and constructing town halls.
Meanwhile, in the process of USFK realignment, a total of 47 U.S. bases,
with an area of approximately 138 million ⽋, have been returned to Korea
and an additional 33 U.S. bases, with an area of approximately 40 million
⽋DUHVFKHGXOHGWREHUHWXUQHG,Q0DUFKWKHWZRQDWLRQVDJUHHGWR
apply the 'Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure,' an improved versionof the existing environmental investigation procedure, in order to resolve
environmental pollution issues in the USFK bases that are to be returned.
Based on this, the two nations are in close coordination for environmental
remediation within the U.S. bases that are scheduled to be returned.
Tour normalization of USFK service members is currently in progress, scheduled
to be completed by the year 2020. The system will be changed such that a service
member can extend his/her service in Korea for up to three years, while staying
together with his/her family, as opposed to one to two years of service apart from
his/her family. Such measures by the U.S. Government will improve the working
conditions and, therefore, the stable stationing conditions for the USFK; this, in turn,will enhance the strength of the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture and is also
2. Defense cost-sharing
This refers to the Korean Government's
fiscal subsidies in relation to USFK
stationing expenditures based on theSpecial Measures Agreement (SMA).
3. Items of support under defense costsharing (as of 2010)

Item

Content

Labor costs for Korean
Labor Costs employees hired by the
USFKMilitary
Construction of facilities
Construction for the USFK

Logistical
SupportService and material
support for the USFK,
including storage of
ammunitions, aircraft
repair and maintenance882010 Defense White Paper

expected to contribute to an increase in exchanges between the citizens of the twocountries and to the steady growth of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

2. Defense Cost-Sharing6LQFHWKHVLJQLQJRIWKH6SHFLDO0HDVXUHV$JUHHPHQW 60$ LQWKH52.
Government has shouldered a portion of the USFK stationing costs. The amountof such a portion is decided in overall consideration of such factors as the ROK*RYHUQPHQW V¿QDQFLDOFDSDFLW\DQGDVWDEOHVWDWLRQLQJHQYLURQPHQWIRUWKH86).
One such defense cost-sharing 2 item is the Combined Defense
Improvement Project, a supported item3 until 2008. As its needs have been
DOPRVWFRPSOHWHO\VDWLV¿HGLWKDVWKHUHIRUHEHHQLQWHJUDWHGLQWRWKHPLOLWDU\FRQVWUXFWLRQLWHPVWDUWLQJLQ
The Ministry of National Defense (MND) was in charge of negotiations forChapter 4.

defense cost-sharing up to 2004, but since this time, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) has taken the lead, with the participation of
the MND. Defense cost-sharing had been paid partly in U.S. Dollars and in
Korean Won, but since 2005, payments have been made entirely in Korean
Won. Thus, it has become possible to manage a stable budget, independent
from changes in foreign exchange rate.
In December 2008, the ROK and U.S. agreed to a new settlement of defense
FRVWVKDULQJDUUDQJHPHQWIRUWKURXJK7KHUHDIWHUWKHDUUDQJHPHQW
FDPHLQWRHIIHFWXSRQUDWL¿FDWLRQE\WKH1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\LQ0DUFK
7KLVQHZDUUDQJHPHQWZKLFKLVHIIHFWLYHIRUWKHILYH\HDUVIURP
to 2013, states that defense cost-sharing would be increased reflecting theconsumer price index two years prior but, in any event, would not exceed four
percent. Accordingly, Korea paid 760 billion Korean Won (applying the 2.5%
LQÀDWLRQUDWHRI DQGELOOLRQ.RUHDQ:RQLQ WKHLQÀDWLRQ
rate in 2008 was 4.7% but the ceiling of 4% was applied).
An appropriate level of defense cost-sharing by the ROK Government
achieves the following: it fosters a stable stationing environment for USFK
service members and it solidifies the ROK-U.S. combined defense postureand thereby contributes to the security of and peace on the Korean Peninsula.
In addition, the monetary support for USFK stationing helps the local
economy and boosts domestic demand because it generates the USFK's
demand for equipment, services and construction, which in turn creates jobs.

3. Enhancing Mutual Trust| Stimulating policy consultations | The two countries operate various
policy consultative bodies to closely discuss alliance issues and the direction of
VHFXULW\SROLFLHV7KH6&0ZKLFKKDVEHHQKHOGVLQFHDQGWKH52.86
Security Policy Initiative (SPI), held since 2005, have contributed greatly to theenhancement of mutual trust and to resolving major alliance issues.
At the 41st6&0KHOGLQ6HRXOLQ2FWREHUWKHWZRQDWLRQVUHFRQ¿UPHG
the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Korean Peninsula and agreed tomaintain a solid combined defense posture and policy cooperation against
the threat of North Korea. The two nations evaluated the progress of thewartime OPCON Transition, and checked for supplementary requirements,
and also agreed to strengthen their defense cooperation in order to construct a

89

Section 3. Ensuring Secure Stationing Conditions for the United States Forces in Korea (USFK)

comprehensive strategic alliance.
As of November 2010, the ROK and the U.S., through three SPI sessions,agreed to strengthen cooperation against military provocation by the North;they inspected the progress of the relocation of USFK bases and the OPCON
Transition and consulted one another regarding coordination of the two nations
over regional and global security issues facing them, such as the Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan.
The 42nd U.S.-ROK SCM was held in Washington, D.C. in October 2010. At
this meeting, which was held at a sensitive period in terms of security, in lightof NK's attack on the ROKS Cheonan and the full-blown start of the passingof power in North Korea, the two nations agreed to and signed three strategic
documents that have important significance in the future development of thealliance. First, by agreeing to and signing the 'Guidelines for ROK-U.S. Defense
The 41st ROK-U.S. Security Consultative
Meeting (SCM) joint press conference(Seoul, October 2009)

Cooperation Directive,' the blueprint for defense cooperation between the two
QDWLRQVZDVVHWSXUVXDQWWR7KH-RLQW9LVLRQIRUWKH$OOLDQFHRIWKH52.DQGWKH
USA. Second, the two nations completed the Strategic Alliance 2015, which isthe new wartime OPCON Transition plan for implementing the agreement on
the readjustment of the timing of the wartime OPCON Transition. Third, the twoparties advanced the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), which provides thestrategic guidelines and authority required to advance operational planning to the
ROK-U.S. Military Committee, and also agreed to regularly hold a ROK-U.S.
consultative body called the 'Extended Deterrence Policy Committee' to discuss
nuclear issues and conceive effective means of preparing against the North

The 42nd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) (Washington, D.C., October 2010)902010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

Korean nuclear threat. In addition, the two parties discussed means of working
together against North Korea in the aftermath of the ROKS Cheonan incident
and how to strengthen cooperation on regional and global issues, such as thereconstruction aid in Afghanistan.
The two nations have also been discussing various security issues throughROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) sub-committees: the0LOLWDU\&RPPLWWHH 0& WKH6HFXULW\&RRSHUDWLRQ&RPPLWWHH/RJLVWLFV&RRSHUDWLRQ&RPPLWWHH /&& DQGWKH'HIHQVH7HFKQRORJ\DQG,QGXVWULDOCooperation Committee (DTICC)| Strengthening friendship activities | Every spring and fall,
through eight events, the MND exposes USFK service members to the
Korean culture by showing them the old palaces in Seoul, the Korean Folk
9LOODJHDQGWKH:DU0HPRULDORI.RUHD7KURXJKWKH )ULHQGV)RUHYHU
Program,' around 600 U.S. service members experience the Korea’s cultural
heritage, traditional folk games, dance and traditional music every year.
The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command encourages cultural exchanges
between the two nations and friendship activities within local communities
through the 'Good Neighbor Program.' The exchange programs directly led
by the USFK under this Program include: the Executive Orientation Program,which introduces the role, issues and tasks carried out by the ROK-U.S.
Combined Forces Command to leaders of the community, such as the Korean
Government, the press, businesses, and academia; Good Neighbor English
Camps for Korean students; the Good Neighbor Award Ceremony; operationof an advisory council for the CFC Commander; and meetings between highschool students and war veterans.
The exchange programs led by the Korean military include: a program
introducing Korean culture to USFK members; visits to battle sites, military units,
war tactics discussions, and cultural tour programs for generals; a ROK-U.S.
Combined Forces Command establishment commemoration event; and support
for various social welfare facilities and the provision of aid to residents.
6LQFHWKH8QLWHG6HUYLFH2UJDQL]DWLRQ.RUHD 862.RUHD KDVannually honored around 80 model service members of the U.S. military,
ROK forces, and UN forces through the 'six-star salute ceremony.'
Such activities to strengthen ties have contributed to a greater understandingof each country’s culture and to creating closer friendly relations.

91

Section 3. Ensuring Secure Stationing Conditions for the United States Forces in Korea (USFK)

4

Section

Expanding the Boundaries
of Defense Diplomacy andCooperation
The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is enhancing its cooperative military relationships with Japan,
China and Russia by building upon the foundation provided by the ROK-U.S. Alliance, thereby creatinga favorable strategic environment for security on the Korean Peninsula. The MND is expanding theboundaries of defense diplomacy from Northeast Asia to the global arena, including Southeast
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Through the expansion of defense exchanges andcooperation, it is contributing to the advancement into government-run projects and increasing exportsby the defense industry. It is actively participating in multilateral security consultative bodies and
INTERNATIONALCOOPERATIVEORGANIZATIONS ANDTHROUGHSUCHEFFORTS ITWILLPERFORMINAMANNERBEÜTTING
Korea's status in the global community.

1. Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with Neighboring
Countries
1. Development of ROK-Japan
relations·21st century Korea-Japan Joint
Partnership (1998)·Future-oriented Korea-Japan
relations (2005)·Future-oriented mature partnership(2008)| Exchange and cooperation with Japan | As allies of theUnited States, the Republic of Korea and Japan1 share the same basic valuesof liberal democracy and a market economy. Based on this, they havecontinued to raise the level of cooperation in various areas. In the security
area, the two countries cooperate through bilateral and multilateral talks toresolve the North Korean nuclear issue and to ensure regional security andpeace.
The defense authorities of the two nations have held periodic Defense
0LQLVWHUV 0HHWLQJVVLQFH$WWKHth Defense Ministers' Meeting
KHOGLQ$SULOLQ-DSDQWKHWZRQDWLRQVVLJQHGWKH /HWWHURI,QWHQW
on Defense Exchanges between the Republic of Korea and Japan,' which
comprehensively outlined the operation of a periodic consultative body,personnel exchanges, educational exchanges, and joint training.
$WWKH9LFH0LQLVWHUV 0HHWLQJKHOGLQ-XQHLQ6HRXOWKHWZRQDWLRQV
discussed ways of implementing defense exchanges and cooperation,
including the expansion of joint exercises for humanitarian purposes. At

922010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

the Asia Security Summit2 held in June 2010 in Singapore, the National
Defense Ministers from the two nations exchanged their views regarding
major security and cooperative issues. The two nations also hold workinglevel talks, such as the Defense Policy Talks, Security Policy Dialogue(foreign affairs and defense officials), and Working-level Meetings on
Defense Exchanges and Cooperation, to enhance mutual understanding andexpand the scope of cooperation.

2. Asia Security Summit
The Asia Security Summit is thehighest-level forum for defense
dialogue in which Defense Ministers
as well as security experts from 27
countries in the Asia-Pacific region
and Europe participate. It is held at the
Shangri-la Hotel in Singapore every
year and is otherwise known as the
Shangri-la Dialogue.

0HHWLQJVDPRQJVHQLRUOHYHORI¿FHUVVXFKDVWKH&KDLUPDQRIWKH-RLQW
Chiefs of Staff and the chiefs of each Service, also take place frequently.
Also, personal exchanges take place regularly, including working-levelmeetings for each of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, exchanges among
units, exchange visits of cadets, and exchange of military students foroverseas studies. Recently, the two nations have been expanding exchanges
and cooperation to, among others, Korea-Japan maritime search andrescue exercises, reciprocal visits between transport aircraft, and mutual
cooperation in international peacekeeping activities.
However, the different historical perspective held by Japan, and its unjust

ROK-Japan joint maritime search andrescue exercise (on the waters near Oki
Islands, Japan, July 2009)claim to territorial sovereignty over Dokdo, which is ROK sovereign
territory, remain factors that must be overcome to ensure the developmentof future-oriented defense exchanges and cooperation between the twocountries. In the future, the MND will solidify the existing military trust
and ties with Japan and will strive to further develop the relationship asa 'future-oriented and mature partnership' as provided at the ROK-Japan
Summit in April 2008.

| Exchange and cooperation with China | Since theirGLSORPDWLF UHODWLRQV ZHUH HVWDEOLVKHG LQ  WKH 52. DQG &KLQD 3
have been making rapid progress in diverse sectors, such as the political,
economic, social and cultural areas. In May 2008, the relationship between
the two nations was elevated to a 'strategic cooperative partnership,' leading
to active exchanges and cooperation in the defense area, as well.
,Q0DUFKWKH*HQHUDO&KLHIRI6WDIIRI&KLQD V3HRSOH V/LEHUDWLRQ
Army visited Korea to discuss with the ROK JCS ways of strengthening

3. Development of ROK-China relations·Friendly cooperative relationship(1992)·Cooperative partnership (1998)·Comprehensive cooperative
relationship (2000)·Comprehensive Cooperative
Partnership (2003)·Strategic Cooperative Partnership(2008)

WKHH[FKDQJHVDQGFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWZRFRXQWULHV,Q0D\
Korean Minister of National Defense visited China the day after North
Korea's second nuclear test and agreed with his Chinese Counterpart to93

Section 4. Expanding the Boundaries of Defense Diplomacy and Cooperationcooperate closely toward resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. In$SULODQG1RYHPEHUUHVSHFWLYHO\WKH&KLHIRI1DYDO2SHUDWLRQVDQG
the Air Force Chief of Staff each participated in the international celebration
for the 60thDQQLYHUVDU\RIWKH3/$1DY\DQG$LU)RUFH
In October 2010, at the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus
4. ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting
Plus (ADMM-Plus)
A new security consultative bodylaunched in 2010 that expanded theprevious ASEAN Defense Ministers'
Meeting, held since 2006, and which
included 10 countries, to include eight
major countries in the Asia-Pacificregion (ROK, U.S., Japan, China, Russia,
India, Australia and New Zealand).

(ADMM-Plus)4 KHOG LQ9LHWQDP WKH GHIHQVH PLQLVWHUV IURP WKH 52.and China both expressed their sympathy regarding the need for close
cooperation between the nations for stability and peace on the Korean
Peninsula.
At the working level, exchanges are taking place through not only
the Defense Policy Talks but also through exchanges between regionalcommand headquarters, such as the 3rd52.)LHOG$UP\DQGWKH3/$
Jinan Military District, the 2nd)OHHW&RPPDQGDQGWKH3/$1RUWK6HD
Fleet Command, and the 3rd)OHHW&RPPDQGDQGWKH3/$(DVW6HD)OHHW&RPPDQG,QDGGLWLRQLQ$SULOD.RUHDQQDYDOYHVVHOYLVLWHG&KLQD
LQFHOHEUDWLRQRIWKHth anniversary of the establishment of the Provisional.RUHDQ*RYHUQPHQWLQ6KDQJKDL,Q2FWREHURIWKHVDPH\HDUWKH3/$
Navy ship Zheng He visited Jinhae. In addition, exchanges between military

Friendly Visit of the PLA Navy ship
Zheng He (Jinhae, October 2009)

athletic units, military research institutions and educational institutions havebeen active.
In the future the defense ministries of the two nations will continue to
H[SDQGWKHLUH[FKDQJHVDQGFRRSHUDWLYHSURJUDPVDVEH¿WWLQJRID VWUDWHJLF
cooperative partnership' and will contribute to peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

| Exchange and cooperation with the Russian Federation |5. Development of ROK-Russia relations·Constructive and mutuallycomplementary partnership (1994).
·Comprehensive partnership of mutual
trust (2004).
·Strategic cooperative partnership(2008).

Relations between the ROK and Russia,5 for which 2010 signals the 20th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, are steadily
developing in various areas. In September 2008, the relationship between
the two nations was elevated to a 'strategic cooperative partnership,' and instep with this, the level of cooperation in various sectors including politics,
economy, energy and space technology are being reinforced.
,QWKH52.0LQLVWHURI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVHDQGWKH3UHVLGHQWRIWKH
Army College visited Russia, and in turn, the Russian Commander of the$LU)RUFHWKH&RPPDQGHURIWKH3DFL¿F)OHHWDQGWKH&KLHIRIWKH5XVVLDQGeneral Intelligence Directorate visited Korea. Meetings between the ROK

942010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

and Russian Air Forces, academic seminars between the ROK Institute for
Military History Compilation and the Russian Institute of Military History
were held in Seoul and Moscow, respectively.
In 2010, a number of events were held in both countries in celebration of
the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the ROK and Russia.
In November, the defense conferences sponsored by the Korea Institute for
Defense Analyses were held in Seoul, where evaluations and forecasts weremade regarding military cooperation between the ROK and Russia, andCourtesy Visit from the Commander ofthe Russian Air Force to the Air Force
Chief of Staff (Seongnam, October 2009)

in the future, the two nations will continue to expand their exchanges andcooperative programs in the defense area.

2. Defense Cooperation with Countries outside the Region| Southeast Asia and Oceania | Through the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southeast Asian region maintains
dynamic regional cooperation in the political, economic, and security
sectors. This region is gradually becoming more important in terms of
LVVXHVVXFKDVLQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLDOFULVHVFOLPDWHFKDQJHIRRGHQHUJ\Andaman Sea

Thailandand security, and also accounts for the third largest volume of trade withMa

Korea, ffollowed by China and the EU. In particular, with more than 30

Malaysia

lay

Pe
n.

SHUFHQWRI.RUHD VWUDGHYROXPHDQGSHUFHQWRIWKHSHWUROHXPLPSRUWHG

SingaporemBorneo SearaatStrait of Malacca

Suinto Korea passing through the Strait of Malacca, cooperation with theSouth China SealaIs

The ROK Government is seeking to enhance friendly relations with Asian
countries and the common prosperity of Asia-Pacific countries under thepolicy tenet of 'New Asia Diplomacy.'6,QSDUWLFXODULQ0DUFKWKH
ROK president toured Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, and in June,
KHDOVRDWWHQGHGWKH.RUHD$6($16SHFLDO6XPPLWEHIRUHWRXULQJ9LHWQDP
and Cambodia in October, thereby forming close relations with Asian
countries.
$WWKH52.9LHWQDP6XPPLWLQ2FWREHUWKHUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ
the two nations was elevated to 'strategic cooperative partnership,'7 and thetwo nations agreed to open strategic dialogues regarding foreign affairs
and security. The two nations' assessment of their past defense industrial
cooperation and military exchanges was positive, and it was agreed thatmilitary exchanges would be expanded in the future. At the ROK-ASEAN

ndrelevant countries is vital to securing stable sea lanes of communication.
Indian Ocean

Indonesia

Strait of Malacca
6. The New Asia Diplomacy
This refers to the principle in which the
Asian nations develop a comprehensive
cooperative relationship that spans all
sectors, such as the political, economic,
security and social areas, and thereby
take a leading role in resolving global
issues including the global financial
crisis and climate change.
7. Development of ROK-Vietnam
Relations·21st century comprehensive
partnership (2001).
·Strategic cooperative partnership(2009)

95

Section 4. Expanding the Boundaries of Defense Diplomacy and Cooperation8. MOU on Korea-Singapore Defense
Cooperation
This memorandum of understanding(MOU) enhances comprehensive
cooperation in the defense area,
including reciprocal visits by seniorlevel military officers, training andeducational exchanges, military
medicine, military sports, etc.
9. MOU on Korea-Philippines Mutual
Logistics Cooperation
This memorandum of understanding(MOU) lays out the entities eligible
for reciprocal logistical support, andthe procedure thereof, in the eventof combined operations by the twonations' military, PKOs, or disaster
relief activities or contingency
situations

Summit in October 2010, the relations between the two nations were
elevated to that of a 'strategic partnership,' thereby building the foundation
for the future-oriented development of the relationship.
,Q2FWREHUWKH'HIHQVH0LQLVWHURI0DOD\VLDYLVLWHG.RUHDDQG
agreed to promote increased defense exchange and cooperation between thetwo countries. In December, the ROK Minister of National Defense visited
Singapore and the Philippines and signed an MOU on Korea-Singapore
Defense Cooperation8DQGDQ028RQ.RUHD3KLOLSSLQHV0XWXDO/RJLVWLFVCooperation.9 Also, the Minister visited Indonesia in August 2010 and
9LHWQDPLQ2FWREHUWRH[FKDQJHYLHZVRQUHJLRQDOVHFXULW\FRQGLWLRQV
and discuss measures to enhance exchanges and cooperation and defense
industrial cooperation.
Defense diplomacy with the Oceania nations is centered on Australia and
New Zealand. The MND holds Defense Policy Talks every year to discuss
mutual security interests and measures to broaden defense cooperation
with the ministries of defense of Australia and New Zealand, and is also
strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation regarding international
security issues, such as counter-terrorism and anti-proliferation activities.
,Q0DUFK3UHVLGHQW/HH0\XQJEDNYLVLWHG$XVWUDOLDDQGDGRSWHG

Korea-Australia Defense Policy Talks(Seoul, August 2010)

the 'Joint Statement on Enhanced Global and Security Cooperation between
Australia and the Republic of Korea,'10 whereby the two nations agreed
to reinforce cooperation with respect to overcoming economic crises and

10. ROK-Australia Joint Statement on
Global and Security Cooperation
In this joint statement, the two nations
agreed to reinforce cooperation
regarding major security issues, suchas joint actions to be taken against
transnational and non-military threats,
global financial crises, international
peacekeeping operations, etc.

UHVSRQGLQJWRWUDQVQDWLRQDODQGQRQPLOLWDU\WKUHDWV,Q0D\WKH
ROK and Australia signed the 'General Security of Military Information
Agreement (GSOMIA)' and the two countries will continue to enhancecooperation in areas such as international peacekeeping operations, militaryeducational and training exchanges, and the defense industry.

| Southwest Asia | The ROK Government is enhancing its defense
exchanges and cooperation with Southwest Asian nations such as India andPakistan through the exchange of visiting graduate students at the National
Defense University, dispatching military officers for entrusted education,
DUUDQJLQJYLVLWVE\WKHFUXLVHWUDLQLQJÀHHWHWF
Due to its rapid economic growth, India has recently emerged as aregional leader. In 2010, the ROK Government and the Government ofIndia entered into the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement962010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

(CEPA). In September 2010, the MND held the ROK-India Defense
Ministers' Meeting, where the two nations entered into an MOU regarding
defense cooperation and an MOU on defense research and development
cooperation, thereby providing the foundation for building strategic defense
cooperative relations.
,Q$SULO  WKH 52. *RYHUQPHQW SDUWLFLSDWHG LQ WKH )ULHQGV RI
Democratic Pakistan (FODP) Meeting and made clear its support ofPakistan's important role in the implementation of anti-terrorist actions andSigning of the ROK-India Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreement (Seoul,
September 2010)

promised humanitarian aid of 200 million US dollars. In the future, it plansto gradually expand personal exchanges, such as educational exchange
SURJUDPVIRUVWXGHQWRI¿FHUV| The Middle East | The Middle East is the region from which
Korea imports petroleum and where Korean companies take on large-scale
JRYHUQPHQWSURMHFWV,QSDUWLFXODULQ'HFHPEHUWKH.RUHD(OHFWULF
Power Corporation (KEPCO) won the bid for building a nuclear power
plant in the UAE.
The MND is actively promoting exchanges between senior-level military
officers and those of Middle Eastern countries in order to strengthen
IULHQGVKLSDQGGHIHQVHLQGXVWULDOFRRSHUDWLRQ,Q-DQXDU\WKH,UDTL
Minister of Defense visited Korea for the first time, and the two nations
discussed the enhancement of their defense industrial cooperation throughthe Defense Ministers' Meeting, thereby paving the way for Korea's
GHIHQVHLQGXVWU\WRFRPPHQFHH[SRUWLQJWR,UDT,Q2FWREHUVHQLRUOHYHORI¿FHUVIURP-RUGDQYLVLWHG.RUHDIRUWKH 6HRXO,QWHUQDWLRQDO$HURVSDFH 'HIHQVH([KLELWLRQ  6(28/$'(; DWZKLFKWLPH
the two nations entered into the Defense Cooperation Agreement. In
1RYHPEHUWKH52.0LQLVWHURI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVHYLVLWHGWKH8$(WR
discuss measures for promoting defense cooperation; in February 2010, theGeneral Chief of Staff of the UAE visited Seoul, and the two nations agreed
to defense exchanges and cooperation, to enhancing defense industrial
cooperation and to holding regular senior-level military talks. In the future,
the ROK plans to expand defense cooperation with not only Saudi Arabia,
DVWKHFRUHEXWDOVR/LE\D4DWDUDQGRWKHU0LGGOH(DVWHUQFRXQWULHV

Courtesy Visit of the UAE General Chiefof Staff to the ROK Defense Minister(Seoul, February 2010)

97

Section 4. Expanding the Boundaries of Defense Diplomacy and Cooperation| Europe | The MND is deepening its defense exchanges andcooperation with major European countries with whom the ROK has
WUDGLWLRQDOO\PDLQWDLQHGIULHQGO\UHODWLRQVWKHUHE\¿UPO\HVWDEOLVKLQJWKH
foundation for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast
Asia.
The Turkish Defense Minister visited the ROK in order to enter into
DQDJUHHPHQWRQHOHFWURQLFZDUIDUHWUDLQLQJHTXLSPHQWLQ$SULODQG
during this visit, the two nations reconfirmed their traditionally robust
ROK-Turkey Defense Ministers' Meeting(Seoul, April 2009)

alliance and discussed measures to promote cooperation in the defense
industry.
,Q0DUFKWKH%ULWLVK9LFH&KLHIRI6WDIIRI'HIHQVHYLVLWHG6HRXO
in July the 7th'HIHQVH3ROLF\7DONVZHUHKHOGDQGLQ2FWREHUWKH9LFH
0LQLVWHURI3URFXUHPHQWYLVLWHG6HRXO,Q-DQXDU\WKH52.9LFH
Minister of Defense visited the United Kingdom and France, where heexchanged views with his counterparts regarding the defense acquisition
system, defense industry policies, and overseas export subsidies.
The Defense Policy Talks that had been held at the director-general level
between the ROK and France, over the course of nine meetings, were
elevated to strategic talks at the deputy minister level in 2007 and defense
issues were discussed. During the 3rd ROK-France strategic talks in'HFHPEHUWKHWZRQDWLRQVH[FKDQJHGYLHZVUHJDUGLQJWKHGLVSDWFKRI
the ROK's protective units to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in

Lithuanian Defense Minister's visit to
Korea (MND Welcoming Reception,
February 2010)

Afghanistan.
The ROK is expanding the boundaries of its defense diplomacy to Eastern
European countries by engaging in comprehensive defense cooperation. In
6HSWHPEHUWKH52.DQG3RODQGHQWHUHGLQWRWKH*HQHUDO6HFXULW\RI

11. Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)The CIS is a union of independent
nations that until 1991 were part of theformer USSR.

Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), and at the end of 2010, thetwo nations intend to enter into the Defense Cooperation Agreement. In)HEUXDU\WKH52.DQG/LWKXDQLDKHOG'HIHQVH0LQLVWHUV 0HHWLQJV
for the first time and signed an MOU on defense cooperation. In the

12. Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum
A consultative body to support theeconomic development of Central Asian
countries by sharing Korea's experiencein economic development, and to
discuss ways of reinforcing cooperationin various sectors including informationand communications, construction, pop
culture, education and tourism.

982010 Defense White Paper

future the MND will continue to expand comprehensive exchanges andcooperation with countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS)11 and other Eastern European countries.

| Other Regions |,Q'HFHPEHUWKH52.*RYHUQPHQWKHOGWKH
3 Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum12 in Seoul; in February 2010, therdChapter 4.

Uzbek President visited Korea; and in April the Kazakh President visited
the ROK. Through these events, the ROK and the countries of Central Asia
are expanding their cooperative relations beyond the energy and resource
sectors to include various sectors, such as the military, construction, culture
DQGWRXULVPVHFWRUV,Q'HFHPEHUWKHst ROK-Uzbekistan defense
policy talks were held in Seoul. In February 2010, the defense ministries of
the two nations signed the 'Korea-Uzbekistan MOU on Defense Industrial

ROK-Kazakhstan MOU on Defense
Cooperation (Seoul, September 2010)

Cooperation.' In September 2010, the Defense Minister of Kazakhstan
visited Korea, for the first Defense Ministers' Meeting between the twocountries, at which they consulted one another about the development ofdefense exchanges and cooperation.
In October 2010, the second defense policy talks were held with
Uzbekistan and Ukraine, respectively.
The ROK donated eight A-37 aircraft to Peru and is in other ways
JUDGXDOO\H[SDQGLQJLWVGHIHQVHH[FKDQJHVDQGFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK/DWLQ

Visit by MND On-Site Investigation Team
(Equatorial Guinea, September 2010)

American countries as well. In February 2010, it sent the Danbi Unit toHaiti, contributing to the expansion of exchanges and cooperation with
/DWLQ$PHULFDQFRXQWULHV
Pursuant to the ROK Government's policy of expanding its cooperation
with African nations, it is pursuing exchanges in the defense areawith such nations as well. In September 2010, it sent an MND on-site
investigation team to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea in West Africa to assess
the possibility of exchanges and cooperation and to build a channel forcooperation regarding defense industry exports.

3. Multilateral Security Cooperation, International
Disarmament and Non-proliferation Activities| Multilateral Security Cooperation | Multilateral security
cooperation is becoming increasingly more necessary in order to handle
traditional threats as well as transnational and non-military security threats.
The MND is expanding its cooperation with major multilateral security
consultative bodies within the Asia-Pacific region and is participating
actively in regional and international joint efforts to respond to various
security threats. The major multilateral security consultative bodies inwhich the MND participates are shown in Table 4-1.

99

Section 4. Expanding the Boundaries of Defense Diplomacy and CooperationTable 4-1. Multilateral Security Consultative Bodies in the Asia-Pacific in which the MND Participates
Inter-governmental

13. Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue(NEACD)
Consultative body in which themembers exchange views on Northeast
Asian security issues and discussmeans of building confidence.

· Northeast Asia Peace and Security
Mechanism Working Group (NEAPSM W/G)
within the Six Party Talks framework· ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)· Tokyo Defense Forum (TDF)· ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus
(ADMM-Plus)

Semi-governmental, non-governmental· Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue(NEACD)13· Asia Security Summit (The IISS Shangrila Dialogue)

The 3rd session of the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism
Working Group (NEAPSM), one of the five working groups within the6L[3DUW\7DONVIUDPHZRUNZDVKHOGLQ0RVFRZLQ)HEUXDU\DWWKLV
meeting, views were exchanged in order to draft the Basic Principles on
Northeast Asian Peace and Security. The 21st Northeast Asia Cooperation
Dialogue (NEACD) was held in Seoul in October 2010, during which
Northeast Asian security trends were discussed, views were sharedregarding military training in Northeast Asia, as well as the prevention andmanagement of maritime accidents in Northeast Asia.
The ROK Government is increasing its level of participation in the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is becoming the major multilateral
VHFXULW\FRQVXOWDWLYHERG\LQWKH$VLD3DFL¿F5HJLRQ,QOLQHZLWKWKLVWKH
MND has been strengthening its role, jointly hosting the meeting of the$5),QWHUVHVVLRQDO6XSSRUW*URXSRQ&RQ¿GHQFH%XLOGLQJ0HDVXUHVDQG
Preventive Diplomacy with the Singaporean Ministry of Defense in April
LQ6HRXODQGLQ0DUFKKRVWLQJWKH $5)3.2([SHUWV0HHWLQJ 
in Bangkok, jointly with the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Every year the MND participates in the Tokyo Defense Forum (TDF), an$VLD3DFL¿FUHJLRQGLUHFWRUJHQHUDOOHYHOVHFXULW\FRQVXOWDWLYHERG\LQDQHIIRUWWRSURPRWHPLOLWDU\FRQ¿GHQFHDQGFRRSHUDWLRQDPRQJWKHFRXQWULHVin the region.
,Q-XQHWKHth IISS Asia Security Summit, jointly sponsored by
the Singaporean Government and the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) of the UK, was held in Singapore. The Minister of National'HIHQVHLQWURGXFHGLQGHWDLO.RUHD VHIIRUWVWRZDUG$VLD3DFL¿FUHJLRQDO
security cooperation through the presentation at the plenary session, titled1002010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

'Alliances and Partnership in Asia-Pacific Security.' In this speech, healso stressed the importance of constructing partnerships at the regional
and international levels. Also, during bilateral talks (with 11 nations) andluncheon discussion sessions, the Minister of National Defense detailed
the findings of the investigation into the attack on the ROKS Cheonan
and the ROK Government's intended response, and requested support andcooperation from the participant nations.

Minister Kim's Presentation at Plenary Session, Asia Security Summit (Singapore, June 2010)

In October 2010, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMMPlus), in which defense ministers from 18 nations participated, was held for
WKH¿UVWWLPHLQ9LHWQDP7KH0HHWLQJZDVYHU\VLJQL¿FDQWLQWKDWLWZDVWKH
¿UVWVXFKERG\FRPSULVHGRIGHIHQVHPLQLVWHUVLQWKH$VLD3DFL¿FUHJLRQ,W
is expected to take root as a forum for regular discussions about common
security interests within the region. The participant nations have first of
all agreed to cooperate in five areas in the future, namely humanitarianassistance and disaster relief, maritime security, military medical support,
counter-terrorism, and peacekeeping operations. ADMM-Plus should not
only remain as a means of discussing joint responses to transnational andnon-military security threats but should also develop into a mechanism
for multilateral security cooperation within the region so that traditional
security issues, such as the Cheonan incident, can be discussed.

101

Section 4. Expanding the Boundaries of Defense Diplomacy and CooperationRecently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established theprinciple of 'expansion of cooperation between NATO and non-member
states' and designated the ROK, Japan, Australia and New Zealand as nonmember states to cooperate with (contact countries). The ROK Government
also recognizes the importance of cooperation with NATO in light ofsteadily increasing transnational and non-military threats, such as energy
security, proliferation of WMDs, terror and cyber attacks.
Moreover, the MND is first pursuing cooperation in areas that are less
EXUGHQVRPHIURPDPLOLWDU\DQG¿VFDOSHUVSHFWLYHDQGHDVLHUWRLPSOHPHQWtaking into account the uniqueness of the security situation. It is focusing on
personal exchanges while gradually increasing the scope of its participationin various educational programs and relevant personnel within NATO.
,Q'HFHPEHUWKH52.HQWHUHGLQWRWKH.RUHD1$726HFXULW\RI
Military Information Agreement in relation to the dispatch of the Provincial
Reconstruction Team (protective unit) to Afghanistan. With the ROK's
participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), we
expect that cooperative relations with NATO will strengthen even further inthe future.

| International arms reductionⰒNon-proliferation activities | Theinternational community is strengthening its control towards countering
the proliferation of WMDs and delivery vehicles through the existing nonproliferation regimes, such as international organizations and regulations.
It is also pursuing the establishment of new international norms, suchDV816HFXULW\&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQDQGRWKHUV7KHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
community is also continuing its efforts against the proliferation of
conventional weapons and has reinforced export control so that smallarms and strategic items or commodities14 related to defense are not used
14. Strategic Items or Commodities
This refers to not only WMDs,conventional weapons and transportsystems, but to goods, software andtechnology in general that can be usedin their development and manufacture.

1022010 Defense White Paperto threaten international peace and safety. The ROK Government has
participated actively in the international community's arms reduction and
QRQSUROLIHUDWLRQUHJLPHVVLQFHMRLQLQJWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVLQ7KH
extent of its participation is shown in Table 4-2.

Chapter 4.

Table 4-2. ROK's Participation in International Arms Reduction and Non-proliferation Activities

Nuclear
Disarmament/
Non-proliferation
Biological/
Chemical Weapons
Disarmament/
Non-proliferation
MissileNon-proliferation
Conventional
Weapons

Multilateral Export
Control Regimes

UN and Other
Activities.

Classiﬁcation

Joining Date

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Aug. 1957.
Apr. 1975.
Sep. 1999.

Biological Weapon Convention (BWC)

Jun. 1987.

Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC)

Apr. 1997.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation (HCOC)
UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA)
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons(CCW)
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
Zangger Committee (ZC)
Wassenaar Arrangements (WA)Australia Group (AG)UN General Assembly 1st Committee/
UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
Conference on Disarmament (CD)Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI)

Mar. 2001
Nov. 2002.
Mar. 1993.
May 2001.
Oct. 1995.
Oct. 1995.
Jul. 1996.
Oct. 1996.
Sep. 1991
Jun. 1996.
May 2009.

:LWKWKHGHFODUDWLRQRILWVRI¿FLDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH36,LPPHGLDWHO\IROORZLQJ 1RUWK .RUHD V VHFRQG QXFOHDU WHVW LQ 0D\  WKH 52.Government has started to actively participate in international nonproliferation efforts.
In order to support the government's PSI activities, the MND participatesin the Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting, workshops, and maritime
interdiction exercises. In October 2010, Korea sponsored maritime

Maritime interdiction exercises (Busan,
October 2010)

interdiction exercises in which Korean, U.S., Japanese and Australian naval
vessels and aircraft participated and a PSI seminar with 14 nations in Busanand the nearby seas.
The MND has participated in the ROK Government's preparations for the
NPT in 2010, thereby showing the international community the seriousnessof the North Korean nuclear issue and reaffirming the principle of nonrecognition regarding North Korean nuclear arms.
Also, every year since 2005, the MND, jointly with the Organization for
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), has held OPCW International
Assistance and Protection Courses designed to convey techniques to be
used in the event of chemical accidents or terror to Asian member states.

NBC Anti-terrorist demonstration(Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense
Command, May 2010)

103

Section 4. Expanding the Boundaries of Defense Diplomacy and CooperationThe MND also takes part in international arms reduction discussions
regarding conventional weapons. In order to implement the CCW Protocol Ⳗunder the CCW, which the ROK joined in January 2008, the MND enacted
DGLUHFWLYHLQ-XO\DFWLYHO\SDUWLFLSDWLQJLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOHIIRUWVWR
minimize civilian losses and damages caused by explosive remnants of pastwars.
To prevent civilian damages and losses, the international community hascompletely forbidden the use of cluster bombs through the signing of theConvention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in December 2008. However, it
would be problematic for the ROK to enter into this convention until the
military threat from North Korea has been completely eliminated, because
the convention, focused only on the humanitarian perspective, states that
all cluster bombs currently in possession also be completely disposed of, inaddition to prohibiting their production, use, storage and transfer. Instead,the ROK actively participates in discussions to restrict cluster bombs under
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), in which thehumanitarian perspective is balanced with military effectiveness.

4. Constructing International Logistics Cooperation Systems
The MND is strengthening its international logistics cooperation in
RUGHUWRHQVXUHVWDEOHORJLVWLFVVXSSRUWWKURXJKHI¿FLHQWXVHRIWKHORJLVWLFVsupport capabilities of its allies and friendly nations.
15. Demilitarization
Demilitarization refers to measuresthat prevent equipment and supplies
being used for their original military
purpose, such as amputation,
destruction, modification ordefacement such that their original
shape is altered or military markings
are removed; disposal and removalof ammunitions is the most common
example of demilitarization.
16. Melt-out system
A warhead is put into a smelting
furnace after being separated fromthe propellant in mid- and large-size
caliber bullets and, at 90 degrees
centigrade, the melted gunpowder iscollected.

1042010 Defense White Paper| Logistics cooperation with the U.S. | The MND is strengthening
its mutually reciprocal logistics cooperative ties with the U.S. in step withthe changes in the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula.
It took over the United States' 'War Reserve Stocks for Allies' (WRSA)in December 2008, and to ensure speedy redeployment of U.S. military
reinforcements in contingencies. It is also preparing a Memorandum of
Agreement on Wartime Host Nation Support in Korea (WHNS).
The ROK and the U.S. are jointly pursuing ammunition demilitarization15
programs for disposal of ammunition subject to demilitarization in an
eco-friendly manner. One relevant facility is the incinerator, which wascompletely constructed in December 2007 and is currently in operation;
another is the melt-out system,16ZKLFKZDVFRPSOHWHO\FRQVWUXFWHGLQ

Chapter 4.

To procure equipment and repair parts from the U.S. in a prompt manner,
the MND and the U.S. DoD held a senior-level procurement promotion
PHHWLQJIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQ0DUFK8QWLOWKLVWLPHPHHWLQJVUHODWHG
to procurement between the ROK and the U.S. were limited to improving
the procurement systems for particular items at the level of the Defense
Acquisition Program Administration and each Service. At this meeting,however, the two nations settled on means of improving the procurement of
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) as well as commercial purchase items, so as
to span all procurement items. Furthermore, they discussed the necessity of
introducing a speedy private enterprise procurement system. In particular,
the two nations will continue efforts toward shortening the time required forthe procurements originating from the United States.

| International logistics cooperation | The MND is expanding
its mutual logistics cooperation with major countries in order to ensure
the smooth execution of missions with assistance from friendly nations
that offer aid to the ROK in contingencies and support the activities of
GLVSDWFKHG52.IRUFHV8QWLOQRZ0XWXDO/RJLVWLFV6XSSRUW$JUHHPHQWVKDYHEHHQVLJQHGZLWKWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV  7KDLODQG  1HZ
=HDODQG  7XUNH\   3KLOLSSLQHV   ,VUDHO $XVWUDOLD
/ Canada (2010), and the MND is also in talks with Japan, the United
Kingdom, Spain, Indonesia, Singapore and Saudi Arabia over entering intosuch agreements.
The MND also contributes to military cooperation and defense industry
exports by transferring obsolete defense articles generated by themodernization of ROK weapons system to friendly nations. The MND has
transferred naval vessels, amphibious armored vehicles, aircraft, trucks andsimilar out-of-date equipment to the Philippines, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan,
Indonesia, Peru, Ghana and Cambodia and also plan to transfer obsolete
ammunition that is no longer in use to Colombia .

105

Section 4. Expanding the Boundaries of Defense Diplomacy and Cooperation5

SectionContributions to International
Peacekeeping Operations
Historically, the ROK holds precious experience in overcoming national crises with the aid of theinternational community and grew to become a responsible member of international society. President
Lee Myung-bak established the goal of 'contributing actively to resolving global issues' and has
DISPATCHED2/+MILITARYSERVICEMEMBERSTOTHEWORLDSMAJORCONÝICTREGIONS ANDTHROUGHSUCH
service members, the ROK engages in cease-fire monitoring, reconstruction aid, and anti-piracy
operations. As of November 2010, 1,195 ROK service members have been deployed to 17 regionsin 14 countries to engage in UN and multi-national forces peacekeeping operations. The ROK
Government intends to gradually expand the scale of its participation in international peacekeeping
operations.

Classification

Host

UN PKOMNF PO

Led by the UN

Led by aregional
security
organization
or a particularnationPeacekeeping
ForcesCommandCommander
andappointed by theControl
UN Secretary
General

MNF
Commander

Reimbursementby the UN

Borne byparticipating
nations

Expenses

1. Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations
UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) began when the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine was established inIRUWKHSXUSRVHRISHDFHIXOO\UHVROYLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOGLVSXWHV2YHU
the course of sixty years, a total of one million men and women from 120
nations have been deployed to 60 regions to perform tasks such as truce
VXSHUYLVLRQLQFRQÀLFWUHJLRQVUHFRQVWUXFWLRQDLGDQGRWKHUVLPLODUWDVNVDQGDVRI1RYHPEHUDERXWPHQDQGZRPHQDUHGHSOR\HGWRⶺA ppendix 9 Status of UN

Peacekeeping Operations
ⶺAppendix 10 Budgets per Dispatched

UnitⶺAppendix 11 Status of Overseas
Dispatch of the ROK ForcesUHJLRQVLQFRXQWULHVWRSHUIRUPWKHLUPLVVLRQV$IWHUMRLQLQJWKH81LQWKH52.EHJDQSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQ813.2V
LQ-XO\ZKHQLWVHQWDQHQJLQHHULQJXQLWWRWKH812SHUDWLRQVLQ
Somalia (UNOSOM II). The ROK has dispatched around 5,000 service
PHPEHUV WR  FRXQWULHV VLQFH  ,Q 1RYHPEHU  LW VHQW WKHVWURQJ'RQJP\HRQJ8QLWWR/HEDQRQDQGWKHVWURQJ'DQEL8QLWWR
Haiti; a total of 640 Korean service members are active in UN peacekeeping
operations. The ROK's participation in PKOs is shown in Figure 4-2.

1062010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

Figure 4-2. Current Status of ROK Armed Forces' UN PKO Participation

Afghanistan
UNAMA (1)

LebanonWestern Sahara
MINURSO (2)Dongmyeong Unit (359)
UNIFIL Staff (10)India, Pakistan
UNMOGIP (9)Nepal
UNMIN (4)Haiti
The Danbi Unit (240)
MINUSTAH Staff (2)Liberia

Cote d'Ivoire

Sudan, Darfur

UNMIL (4)UNOCI (2)UNMIS/UNAMID (9)| Lebanon - the Dongmyeong Unit | ,QDFLYLOZDUHUXSWHG
EHWZHHQWKH&KULVWLDQVDQG0XVOLPVLQ/HEDQRQ7KH6\ULDQPLOLWDU\LQDQGWKH,VUDHOLPLOLWDU\LQZHUHHDFKGHSOR\HGDQGFDPSHG
LQ/HEDQRQXQGHUWKHSUHWH[WRIVHWWOLQJWKHFLYLOZDU$VDUHVXOWWKHUH
were frequent conflicts between the Christian militia, Islamic militia, the/HEDQHVH*RYHUQPHQW VIRUFHV6\ULDQPLOLWDU\DQGWKH,VUDHOLPLOLWDU\Consequently, the UN passed UN Security Council Resolutions 425 andLQ0DUFKDQGHVWDEOLVKHGWKH81,QWHULP)RUFHVLQ/HEDQRQ
81,),/  ZKLFK WKHQ EHJDQ LWV VXSHUYLVLRQ RIWKHFHDVHILUHEHWZHHQ
/HEDQRQDQG,VUDHO
,Q  LQ WKH VRXWKHUQ UHJLRQ RI /HEDQRQ WHUURU DQG DWWDFNVZHUH
occurring continuously, and more than 1,000 civilian casualties occurred
GXHWRWKHFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQ,VUDHODQG+H]EROODKDVWKHVLWXDWLRQZRUVHQHG
the UN adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on August 11, 2006,
ZKHUHE\WKH81VKDUSO\LQFUHDVHGWKHQXPEHURI/HEDQRQSHDFHNHHSLQJ
forces from 2,000 to 15,000 and requested the active participation of its
member states.
In July 2007, the ROK Government sent 350 troops to the United Nations,QWHULP)RUFHVLQ/HEDQRQ 81,),/  WKH'RQJP\HRQJ8QLW ZLWKWKH
approval of the National Assembly. The Dongmyeong Unit began cease-

The Dongmyeong Unit participatingin truce supervision in Lebanon (Tyre,
Lebanon, March 2010)

107

Section 5. Contributions to International Peacekeeping Operations¿UHPRQLWRULQJZLWKUHVSHFWWR,VUDHODQG/HEDQRQLQ7\UHLQWKHVRXWKHUQUHJLRQRI/HEDQRQIn addition to its truce supervision activities, the Dongmyeong Unit has been
1. Peace Wave
This is DongMyeong Unit's Multifunctional Civil Operations, which
include:ⴘrepairing and refurbishing
dilapidated School buildingsⴙbuilding
and repairing roadsⴚproviding
medical assistance to local residents.

engaging in multi-functional civil operations called the Peace Wave.1 Under thisprogram, the Dongmyeong Unit attends to the needs of local residents, provides
medical and quarantine services, paves roads, improves schools and public
facilities, etc. The unit has also opened Taekwondo, Korean, and computerclasses in order to strengthen the nation’s ties with the local residents. The majorachievements of the Dongmyeong Unit are shown in Table 4-3.
Table 4-3. Major Activities of the Dongmyeong Unit (as of November 2010)

Operational
Activitiesǩ2SHUDWLRQDODFWLYLWLHVVXSHUYLVLRQDQGUHFRQQDLVVDQFHRIWKHVLWHRI
operational activities: 11,676
ǩ&RPELQHGUHFRQQDLVVDQFHZLWKWKH/HEDQRQPLOLWDU\
approximately 637, joint guard support for checkpoints:1,931

Reconstruction
Aidǩ0HGLFDOVXSSRUWIRUORFDOUHVLGHQWVSHUVRQVWLPHVZHHN
ǩ7UHDWPHQWRIOLYHVWRFNDQGTXDUDQWLQHDFWLYLWLHVWLPHVZHHN
ǩ&RPSXWHU+DQJXO7DHNZRQGRDQGVHZLQJFODVVHVVLWHVǩ6XSSRUWRIHGXFDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVZLWKLQWKHDUHDRIRSHUDWLRQVschools

Military
diplomacyǩ([FKDQJHVZLWK81,),/SDUWLFLSDQWQDWLRQV
ǩ3XEOLFDIIDLUVFDPSDLJQWKURXJKORFDODQG.RUHDQGRPHVWLFSUHVVavg. 32 per month| Haiti - the Danbi Unit | In February 2004, public order in Haiti, anation in the Caribbean Bay in Central America, deteriorated due to massive
riots. In response, the United Nations (UN), pursuant to UN Security
Council Resolution 1542, sent a multi-national force led by the UnitedStates and quickly resolved the matter. In June 2004, the UN establishedthe United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which has
since been maintaining public order.
On January 12, 2010, an earthquake that measured 7.0 on the Richterscale occurred in Haiti and the capital city of Port-au-Prince and thesurrounding areas were reduced to ruins, which gave rise to millions of
UHIXJHHV7KH81WKURXJK816HFXULW\&RXQFLO5HVROXWLRQLQFUHDVHG
WKHQXPEHURIWURRSVGHSOR\HGWR0,1867$+IURPWRDQG
requested the active participation of its member states.
A Danbi Unit campsite (April 2010)1082010 Defense White Paper

The ROK Government decided to dispatch an engineering unit to Haiti inChapter 4.

order to assist in the recovery and reconstruction of the nation. With consent
from the National Assembly, on February 27, 2010, the ROK sent the 'Haiti
Reconstruction Support Group' (Danbi Unit) comprised of 240 personnel.
The Danbi Unit is organized as shown in Figure 4-3.
Figure 4-3. Organization of the Danbi Unit

Commanding
OfﬁcerCommand Headquarters/ Staff Ofﬁce

Recovery Platoon

Engineering Corps

Civil Engineering
PlatoonConstruction
PlatoonSecurity and Reconstruction Support Corps

Operational
Support Corps

Well Drilling Team

Medical TeamThe Danbi Unit engages in activities such as removing the debris fromdamaged buildings, restoring roads, drilling wells, dredging waterways,
SURYLGLQJPHGLFDODVVLVWDQFHDQGTXDUDQWLQHDVVLVWDQFHLQWKH/HRJDQH
region, where almost all the buildings were destroyed by the earthquake.
Also, the Danbi Unit has been actively engaging in military cooperative
activities with the units deployed by other nations, such as removing the debris
from the Notre Dame de Petit Elementary School in tandem with the engineering
unit sent from Japan. Major activities include those shown in Table 4-4.

The Danbi Unit performing restoration
work (June 2010)

Table 4-4. Major Activities of the Danbi Unit (as of November 2010)
Reconstruction
assistanceǩ5HFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH/HRJDQH-DFPHO5RDGVLWHVǩ5HPRYDORIEXLOGLQJGHEULVVLWHVǩ'ULOOLQJRIGHHSZHOOVVLWHVǩ'UHGJLQJRIZDWHUZD\VWLPHV

Medicalassistanceǩ0HGLFDODVVLVWDQFHWRORFDOUHVLGHQWVSHUVRQVǩ$VVLVWLQJLQTXDUDQWLQLQJDFWLYLWLHVLQUHIXJHHFDPSVWLPHVMilitary
diplomacyǩ0LOLWDU\H[FKDQJHDQGFRRSHUDWLRQZLWKXQLWVGLVSDWFKHGIURPRWKHU
nations: 47 times| Activities as observers and staff in UN Missions | The ROK*RYHUQPHQWKDVGLVSDWFKHGDURXQGREVHUYHUVDQGVWDIIRI¿FHUVWR81
PLVVLRQVLQPDMRUDUHDVRIFRQIOLFWVXFKDVLQ,QGLD3DNLVWDQ/HEDQRQ6XGDQ$IJKDQLVWDQDQG+DLWL2EVHUYHUVPRQLWRUFHDVH¿UHYLRODWLRQVDQG

109

Section 5. Contributions to International Peacekeeping Operationstake part in patrols, investigations, reports and mediation efforts, under the
FRPPDQGRIWKHORFDOPLVVLRQ7KHVWDIIRI¿FHUVDUHDSDUWRIWKHVWDIIRI¿FH
of each command headquarters and perform staff duties regarding certain
areas, such as intelligence, operations, and logistics.

2. Peace Operations of Multi-National Forces
The multi-national forces peace operations include conflict resolution,
establishment of peace, reconstruction assistance, etc., which are carriedout by a multi-national force formed by regional security organizations, ora particular country, pursuant to a UN Security Council Resolution or the
support and resolution of the international community; together with the
UN PKO, it plays an important role in the stabilization and reconstructionof a troubled region.
As of November 2010, the ROK Government has deployed a total of
555 personnel to the Cheonghae Unit in the waters of Somalia and to the
Ashena Unit in Afghanistan, thus contributing to MNF PO. The details of
the ROK’s participation are shown in Figure 4-4.

Figure 4-4. Details of the ROK Military’s participation in MNF POs

Bahrain Combined
Maritime Forces

Afghanistan
Ashena Unit (232)
Coordination /Staff Ofﬁcers (7)Coordination/Staff Ofﬁcers (3)U.S. Central Command
Somali waters
Cheonghae Unit (306)
Djibouti Coordination /Staff Ofﬁcers (4)

Yemen
en
of Ad
Gulf

Somalia1102010 Defense White Paper

The Gulf of Aden where the Cheonghae
Unit performs operations

Coordination /Staff Ofﬁcers (3)Chapter 4.

| The Cheonghae Unit in the Somali waters | Somalia haslong been undergoing civil strife, which has destabilized public order andbrought about chronic economic difficulties. As a result, since 2004, the
ORFDO¿VKHUPHQXQGHUWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHUHJLRQDOZDUORUGVFUHDWHGSLUDF\organizations and have begun to engage in piracy in the Somali waters.
Following a sharp increase in piracy, the UN Security Council passed
Resolution 1816 in June 2008 by which the UN decided that member
states would dispatch naval vessels and aircraft and also requested theparticipation of its member states. The ROK Government, with the approvalof the National Assembly, dispatched the Cheonghae Unit to the Gulf of$GHQRII6RPDOLDRQ0DUFK
The Cheonghae Unit's mission is to assist in the safe passage of ROK
Ships and to perform anti-piracy operations by participating in the Combined

The Cheonghae Unit undergoing
maritime exercises (April 2010)

Maritime Forces. The Cheonghae Unit is comprised of one 4,500t destroyer,
RQHKHOLFRSWHUWKUHH5,% 5LJLG,QÀDWDEOH%RDWV DQGDERXWSHUVRQQHO
6LQFHWKH52.6KLS0XQPX7KH*UHDWZDVGLVSDWFKHGLQ0DUFK52.
naval vessels have been rotating every six months.
The Cheonghae Unit performs round-trip convoys once every week,
mainly for Korean ships that pass through the Gulf of Aden. It participatesin CTF-1512 and engages in anti-piracy operations. In the course of these
operations, it has rescued 10 civilian ships that were under threat frompirates.
The Cheonghae Unit also contributes to the expansion of the outer

2. CTF-151 (Combined Task Force-151)
This unit is under the control of the
Combined Maritime Forces, which
is solely responsible for anti-piracy
operations in the Gulf of Aden and theSomali waters.

boundaries of military cooperation by reciprocating visits with naval
vessels from other dispatching nations, such as the U.S., Turkey, Japan,
China, India, and France, and also takes part in conferences to exchange
information regarding piracy.

| The Ashena Unit in Afghanistan | After the dissolution of the
Taliban Government in 2001 and the indiscriminate terror instigated by
the Taliban, public order in Afghanistan worsened drastically, and the UN
therefore passed UN Security Council Resolution 1383 and established theⶺSee Appendix 12 Nations

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to support the stabilization

Participating in the ISAF

and restoration activities in Afghanistan. Through UN Security Council
Resolutions, the UN has annually pressed its member states to support the,6$)DQGWKURXJK5HVROXWLRQSDVVHGLQ2FWREHULWUHTXHVWHG

111

Section 5. Contributions to International Peacekeeping Operationsthat member states contribute personnel, equipment and materials to the
ISAF.
7KH52.*RYHUQPHQWDQQRXQFHGDWWKHHQGRI2FWREHULWVSODQVWR
operate the Korean Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and to dispatch
protective units, and with the approval of the National Assembly in February
2010, the ROK Government sent the Ashena Unit, as a reconstruction aid
team, to Parwan Province, Afghanistan, in July 2010. Beginning in July
2010, the Korean PRT has been performing reconstruction work in various
areas, such as public health, medical aid, education, administrative systems
and rural development, under the lead of civilian experts. The Ashena
Unit patrols the sites of PRT deployments and protects PRT activities. The
The Ashena Unit protecting membersof the Provincial Reconstruction Team
(July 2010)

organization of the Afghan Ashena Unit is shown in Figure 4-5.

Figure 4-5. Organization of the Afghan Ashena Unit

Commanding Ofﬁcer
Liaison / Coordination Team

Command Unit /Headquarters

Security / Patrol Unit

Headquarters
company

Security
company

Operational
Support Unit

Aviation
Support Unit

Patrolcompany

Embassy
Patrol Team| Multi-national forces staff and coordination officers | The
ROK military has sent 17 staff and coordination officers to support themulti-national forces in each military unit. Seven service members have
CJTF-HOA The Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa

been sent to the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain and CJTF-HOA in
Djibouti in order to support the Cheonghae Unit. Seven service members
have been sent to Bagram and Kabul in Afghanistan in order to support the
Ashena Unit. Three have been sent to the US Central Command.
In addition, from April 21 to August 31, 2010, a ROK Navy Admiral, as
commanding officer, has successfully led the MNF CTF-151 unit, a unit
dedicated to carrying out anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and theeastern Somali waters.

1122010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 4.

3. Expansion of PKO Participation
7KH52.*RYHUQPHQWLQWHQGVWR¿UPO\HVWDEOLVKLWVPLOLWDU\UHDGLQHVV
posture and, at the same time, steadily expand its participation ininternational peacekeeping operations. To this end, it is establishing thefoundation for the dispatch of troops and is expanding its participation in
PKO-related, multi-national exercises.

| Establishing the basis and system for overseas dispatch of troops |The ROK Government's efforts at establishing the basis and system forthe dispatch of troops can be summarized into the following: the operationof standing units for overseas deployment, enactment of the UN PKO
Participation Act, and reinforcing the functions of the Military PKO Center.
First, the standing units for overseas deployment have been designated
DQG RSHUDWHG VLQFH 'HFHPEHU  DQG UHPDLQ  VWURQJ7KHVH
units are comprised of one unit dedicated to overseas deployment, one
designated reserve unit, and one unit designated separately; each type ofunit is comprised of 1,000 service members. The unit dedicated to overseas
GHSOR\PHQWLVWKH¿UVWWREHGHSOR\HGLQWKHHYHQWRIVXFKUHTXHVW8QWLOJune 2010, a special mission team, under the Special Warfare Command,
was designated and operated as such a unit; in July 2010, this unit wasdissolved and the International Peace Support Force (Onnuri Unit)3 wasestablished, resulting in a stronger readiness posture for the deploymentof troops. The unit designated in advance prepares its members to replace
previously deployed troops or to be sent as reinforcements; four battalions

3. The Onnuri Unit
'Onnuri ' is a Korean word which is acombination of 'on ' meaning 'all' or'whole' and 'nuri ' meaning 'the world'
where we are living in. This unit spans
the world, opting for peace and hope.

have been so designated under the Special Warfare Command. The units
designated separately are those that remain ready for various deployment
related activities, including engineering units, medical units, and military
police, and the Navy and Air Force transport units that have been designatedfor such a purpose. The International Peace Support Group prepares for andtrains itself to be ready for deployment within one month after a request
is made to deploy; once deployment has been decided, a new unit for
deployment is established within the original unit and dispatched upon theapproval of the National Assembly. The organization of the standing units
for overseas deployment is shown in Figure 4-6.

113

Section 5. Contributions to International Peacekeeping OperationsFigure 4-6. Organization of the standing units for overseas deployment

Joint Chiefs of Staff
Standing unit foroverseas deployment

Unit dedicated tooverseas dispatch

Designatedreserve unit

Unit designatedseparately* Unit designated separately : engineering, medical aid,
military police, security guards, Navy and Air Force transport, etc.

6HFRQGLQ'HFHPEHUWKH$FWRQ3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQ813HDFHNHHSLQJOperations (Appendix 13) was enacted to provide the legal basis forHI¿FLHQWO\FDUU\LQJRXWWKHGHSOR\PHQWRIWURRSVWR813.2V3XUVXDQWWR
this act, the ROK Government has the authority to tentatively agree with
the UN to send up to 1,000 troops prior to the approval of the National
Assembly; this is expected to shorten the period of time required to prepare
for a deployment.
Third, the mission of the PKO Center, which is in charge of training
the personnel to be deployed overseas, has been strengthened. The MND
moved the PKO Center from the Joint Staff College to the National Defense
University on January 1, 2010. Also, it plans to increase the number of PKO&HQWHUVWDIIIURPWRE\DQGLQFUHDVHLWVHGXFDWLRQDODQGUHVHDUFKfunctions. The organization of the PKO Center is shown in Figure 4-7.
Figure 4-7. Organization of the PKO Center

PKO Center

Planning andOperations Division

Research andDevelopment Division

Training and
Education Division| Expansion of participation in multilateral PKO training and exercise |4. Khann Quest
Khann Quest refers to multilateral PKO
training and exercises that focus onhumanitarian civil affairs operations,
held in Mongolia.

1142010 Defense White Paper

The MND is expanding its foreign exchange and cooperation activities byparticipating actively in international PKO-related multi-national training
and exercises. Every year, since 2006, Korea has participated in the 'Khann
4XHVW 4 Multilateral PKO Exercise led by the Mongolian GovernmentChapter 4.

and has applied the UN PKO training directives and the standard training
model. Also, every year since 2008, it has participated in the GPOI
Capstone Exercise5 DQG HQJDJHG LQ 3.2 &3;DQG)7;WRJHWKHUZLWKthe other participants. In February 2010, our Navy and the Marine CorpsSDUWLFLSDWHGIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQWKHVL[QDWLRQ&REUD*ROG([HUFLVHDQG
engaged in multi-national combined operations and humanitarian civil
affairs operations training together with other countries, including the U.S.
and Thailand.

5. GPOI (Global Peace Operation
Initiative) Capstone Exercise
It is a PKO multi-national training andexercise that focuses on humanitarian
activities. It has been held every year
since 2008, pursuant to U.S. President
George W. Bush's June 2004 proposalof the Global Peace Operation Initiative.

115

Section 5. Contributions to International Peacekeeping Operations116 ǎႊ႒ᕽ

Joint Administrative Area in the Western Corridor

5

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1

3ECTIONInter-Korean Military Confidence
Building and Arms Control!IMINGTOBUILDAPRACTICALFOUNDATIONFORPEACEANDUNIFICATIONOFTHE+OREANPENINSULA THE2/+
'OVERNMENTHASADHEREDTOABASICPRINCIPLETHATTHROUGHSINCEREDIALOGUEANDCOOPERATIONITWILLRESOLVEINTER +OREANISSUES WHILEPURSUINGA.ORTH+OREAPOLICYTHATBRINGSMUTUALBENEFITSAND
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PEACEREGIMEONTHEDEFENSEFRONT

1. Military Confidence Building through South-North
Military Talks| South-North military talks | From the beginning of the Lee
Myung-bak Administration, North Korea has continued to take toughmeasures against the South as it deemed the North Korea Policy of the ROK
Government hostile and offensive. For instance, North Korea defined the
ROK-U.S. combined exercise (KR/FE) conducted beginning on March 9,
2008, as "war provocative schemes." Concurrently, the North cut off SouthNorth military communications lines and restricted land crossing to theNorth. On March 29 of the same year, the North unilaterally notified theSouth that it would cease all contact and dialogue with the ROK Governmentand completely ban South Korean officials from crossing the Military
Demarcation Line (MDL). In the meantime, an incident added to the tension
between the two Koreas; a South Korean tourist was shot and killed on Mt.
Kumgang by a North Korean soldier on July 11.
On October 2, 2008, the 37th South-North Military Working-Level Talks

118 2010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

was held at the request of the North. However, the North threatened
that ongoing inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects would not
SURFHHGDVSODQQHGGXHWRFLYLOLDQJURXSV À\LQJOHDÀHWVLQWR1RUWK.RUHDIn fact, on December 1, the North took several measures to limit crossings
between the South and the North; it restricted the crossing of the Military
Demarcation Line (MDL), suspended the Kaesong tourism, ceased theoperation of the South-North railway and restricted inter-Korean landcrossing.1
In 2009, North Korea continued its hard-line stance against the South.
On January 30 of the same year, a statement by a spokesperson of the&RPPLWWHHIRUWKH3HDFHIXO5HXQL¿FDWLRQRIWKH)DWKHUODQGDQQRXQFHGWKDW
it would nullify all agreements concerning the resolution of inter-Koreanpolitical and military confrontation while terminating the provision on theWest Sea Military Demarcation Lines, which are contained in both the InterKorea Basic Agreement and the Auxiliary Agreement on Non-aggression.
In addition, North Korea took provocative actions, including the launch of along-range missile on April 5, a second round of nuclear tests and the launch

1.December 1 Restrictive Measures
·A reduction in the number of South
Korean residents in the North:restricted to 880 people in Kaesong
and 100 on Mt. Kumgang.
·Suspension of railway cargo transport
between Munsan and Bongdong and of
the Kaesong tourism.
·Reduction of other forms of landcrossing: Across the Western Corridor,
nineteen crossings per day went to six
crossings per day. Across the Eastern
Corridor two crossings per day went to
one crossing per week.
·Heightened emphasis on the order ofcrossing and customs clearance.

of a short-range missile on May 25, which increased the tension between
WKHWZR.RUHDV$OWKRXJK1RUWK.RUHDEULHÀ\VRIWHQHGLWVVWDQFHLQ$XJXVW
2009, it staged the Daecheong Naval Campaign on November 10. After
this provocation, it designated an area so-called the Maritime Firing Zone
established in the West Sea on December 23.
The North’s provocative actions persisted into 2010. In January andFebruary, it declared a "No-Sail Zone" in the West Sea and fired artillery,
which led to an escalation of military tension. Meanwhile, on March 2,
a South-North Military Working-Level Talks to discuss 3Cs (crossing,communications, and custom clearance) concerning the Kaesong Industrial
Complex was held at the North’s request. However, on March 26, theROK Ship Cheonan was sunk by torpedo attack of a North Korean midget
submarine, resulting in a reduction in inter-Korean trade and exchanges alongwith the suspension of dialogues and contact between the authorities of thetwo Koreas.
The ROK Government urged North Korea to reveal the truth behind the119

Section 1. Inter-Korean Military Confidence Building and Arms Controldeath of the South Korean tourist on Mt. Kumgang while demanding that theNorth give assurances that similar incidents would not occur and measures toguarantee the safety of South Korean visitors would be taken.
Nevertheless, on April 23, North Korea confiscated ROK state-owned
2. Real estate in the Mt. Kumgang
Tourist Region confiscated or frozen by
North Korea·Confiscated: ROK Government-owned
family reunion center and fire station;
the Korea Tourism Organizationowned arts performing and cultural
center; a hot spring resort; and duty
free shops.
·Frozen: All private properties owned
by South Koreans.

properties in the Mt. Kumgang Tourist Region while freezing2 private
property owned by South Koreans on April 27. In addition, the North
SXEOLFO\FRQ¿UPHGWKHFRPSOHWHVHYHUDQFHRI6RXWK1RUWKUHODWLRQVRQHGD\after the ROK Government announced its countermeasures against North
Korea's attack on the ROKS Cheonan on May 24. In addition, North Korea¿UHGDUWLOOHU\WRZDUGVWKHVRXWKRI1// 1RUWKHUQ/LPLW/LQH LQWKH:HVW
Sea on August 9, heightening military tension on the Korean Peninsula.
However, North Korea replaced its hard-line policy with a softened stanceas the ROK's humanitarian assistance for the North's food victims started
in mid-August. The North proposed a new round of reunion for separated
families. Accordingly, inter-Korean Red Cross talks proceeded to arrangeÀRRGDLGDQGDIDPLO\UHXQLRQZKLOHWKHth South-North Military WorkingLevel Talks was held on September 30 at the North’s request.

The 38th South-North Military WorkingLevel Talks (Peace House, Sept. 30,
2010)

At the meeting, South Korea strongly urged North Korea to acknowledge
its responsibility for the sinking of the ROK Ship Cheonan; to apologize; topunish the personnel in charge; and to set up preventive measures to avoid
reoccurrences. In addition, the ROK Government demanded that the North
immediately put an end to its hostile acts toward South Korean maritime
territories and cease slandering and defaming the ROK Government.
North Korea demanded that South Korean civilian groups cease flyingOHDÀHWVLQWR1RUWK.RUHD)XUWKHUWKH\LQVLVWHGWKDW52.QDYDOYHVVHOVZHUH
intruding into North Korean waters. With regard to the attack against the
ROK Ship Cheonan, the North reiterated its existing position “a National
Defense Commission inspection team should be dispatched for investigation.”
A military working-level talks, which resumed two years after the previous
PHHWLQJLQHQGHGXSVHUYLQJDVDYHQXHIRUHDFKVLGHWRVLPSO\UHDI¿UP
its position on the pending issues without yielding any agreement.

1202010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

Even after the military working-level talks, the North has evaded its
responsibility for the ROKS Cheonan incident by announcing the so-called
the ROKS Cheonan Fact Sheet and continuing its provocations against the
6RXWK2Q1RYHPEHU1RUWK.RUHDLQGLVFULPLQDWHO\¿UHGDUWLOOHU\URXQGVDW<HRQS\HRQJ,VODQG6RXWK.RUHDFLWLQJWKH6RXWK¶VUHJXODU¿ULQJ
exercise as the reason. This act of provocation directly threatened and took
the lives and properties of South Korean civilians. As an illegal act, the attack
LVQROHVVWKDQDGH¿QLWHYLRODWLRQRIWKH&KDUWHURIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVWKH
Armistice Agreement and the Inter-Korean Non-Aggression Agreement.

| North Korea’s non-implementation of inter-Korean
agreements and provocations against the South | Thus far,
the two Koreas have adopted a total of 12 agreements through a series of
military meetings. During the process, the North has selectively implemented
agreements that serve its interest, whereas it has ignored those measures
GHVLJQHGWRUHOLHYHPLOLWDU\WHQVLRQDQGEXLOGPLOLWDU\FRQ¿GHQFH
On June 4, 2004, the 2nd,QWHU.RUHDQ*HQHUDO2I¿FHU/HYHO7DONV6RXWK
and North adopted the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval
Clashes in the West Sea, the Cessation of Propaganda Activities and theRemoval of Propaganda Related Equipment from the Military Demarcation
Line (MDL) Areas (June 4 Agreement). In compliance with this Agreement
so as to prevent any accidental armed clashes in the West Sea, South Korea
maintained communications between the South and North Korean naval
vessels through the International Merchant Marine Common Network. In
addition, South and North Korea shared information about illegal fishingactivities of third party nations, while ceasing its propaganda activities andremoving all of the relevant equipment along the Military Demarcation Line
(MDL) as agreed upon in the above Agreement.
North Korea, however, implemented only the issues it had raised—the
removal of propaganda-related activities and equipment—while ignoring
the agreement on the prevention of accidental naval clashes. Moreover,on condemning those South Korean civilian groups who had been flyingOHDÀHWVLQWR1RUWK.RUHDZKLFKZDVQRWVWLSXODWHGLQWKH-XQH$JUHHPHQW
the North threatened to re-examine the agreement on military assurance for

121

Section 1. Inter-Korean Military Confidence Building and Arms Controlcrossing at the South-North Joint Administrative Area.
From May 19, 2008, North Korea unilaterally stopped sharing information
DERXWWKHLOOHJDO¿VKLQJDFWLYLWLHVRIWKLUGSDUW\QDWLRQVZKLFKZDVSDUWRI
the Agreement aimed at preventing accidental armed clashes in the West
Sea. In addition, since June 2008, the North has not responded to the South’s
calls made through the International Merchant Marine Common Network.
Above all, the recent incidents caused by North Korea: the Daecheong Naval
Campaign in November 2009; the attack against the ROK Ship Cheonan in
March 2010; and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 have
3. Article 2.2, The June 4 Agreement
The two Parties shall not undertake
unjust physical actions against thenaval and civilian vessels of the otherParty.

clearly violated Article 2.2 of the June 4 Agreement.3
On May 24, 2010, in response to the North’s military provocations, the ROK
Government announced a series of measures to ban the navigation of North
Korean vessels into South Korean waters; to suspend inter-Korean trade andexchanges; and to refer the North’s provocation to the UN Security Council.
Along with these measures, it also demanded that the North apologize forthe incident, punish those in charge, and promise to prevent the reoccurrenceof similar events. The Ministry of National Defense also announced

4. The May 24 Countermeasuresagainst North Korea·Resumption of psychological warfare
against the North·Ban on North Korean vessels entering
South Korean waters·Implementation of ROK-U.S. combined
anti-submarine exercises

countermeasures against North Korea,4 including the resumption of anti-North
Korean psychological warfare, in order to hold Pyongyang accountable, pay
the price for its provocative actions and to deter further acts of provocation.
The resumption of anti-North Korean psychological warfare was a legitimate
measure that sent a stern warning to the North for its obvious violations against
the Armistice Agreement and several inter-Korean agreements, including, theInter-Korean Non-aggression Agreement, and other agreements pertaining to
the prevention of mutual slander and defamation.
On May 8, 2007, the North and South issued a joint press release at theth

5 Inter-Korean General Officer-Level Talks. In that release, North Korea
DJUHHGWRMRLQWKH6RXWKLQWKHHIIRUWVWRSUHYHQWWKHÀRRGLQJVRIWKH,PMLQ
River. However, later on September 6, it initiated, without a prior notice, adischarge of the Hwanggang Dam located in the upstream of the Imjin River.
Water discharged downstream has resulted in the killing of innocent South
Korean civilians. In addition, despite the agreement reached on December

1222010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

13, 2007 at the 7th,QWHU.RUHDQ*HQHUDO2I¿FHU/HYHO7DONVDQDJUHHPHQWWR
provide military assurance for 3Cs (crossing, communications, and customs
clearance), the North has continually ignored its obligations by frequently
restricting land crossing.

| Future directions of South-North military talks | The ROK
Government has pursued consistent and principle-based North Korea policies
in order to achieve mutually respectful and cooperative, sound, and normalinter-Korean relations.
In future South-North military talks, the Ministry will negotiate therelevant issues in phases, beginning with agenda that can be easily agreed
upon and implemented. Military assurances for inter-Korean exchanges
and cooperative projects and the alleviation of military tension will occupy
WKHQHJRWLDWLQJWDEOHDVWKH¿UVWSULRULW\)ROORZLQJWKLVDQGGHSHQGLQJRQ
the progress made in the negotiations on the denuclearization and the peace
regime on the Korean Peninsula, operational and structural arms control
issues will be discussed.

2. Military Assurance Measures for Inter-Korean
Exchanges and Cooperative Projects
The Ministry has developed military assurance measures for interKorean exchanges and cooperative projects and postured to respond to any
contingencies.
Since the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, inter-Korean exchanges andcooperative projects have developed with a focus on three major economic

Trucks carrying aid shipments of rice
to North Korea pass through the InterKorean Transit Office in the Western
Corridor (Paju, September 2010)

cooperative projects: inter-Korean railway and road connections, constructionof the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and the Mt. Kumgang tourism
project. Since these projects were arranged through the South-North Joint
Administrative Area within the DMZ, the Ministry ensures the safe crossingof the border through consultations with the United Nations Command(UNC) and the North Korean military.

Inter-Korean Transit Office, Eastern
Corridor

123

Section 1. Inter-Korean Military Confidence Building and Arms Control| Military assurance for inter-Korean crossing |Inter-Korean crossing is possible by land, air and sea asshown in Figure 5-1. Land crossing is enabled via the
Pyongyangroads and railways that exist within the South-North Joint

Mountain
Kumgang

Administrative Area in the Eastern and Western corridors.

MDL

Kaesong

SokchoEastern corridor

In accordance with the Armistice Agreement and the Inter-

Panmunjom
Western corridor

Korean Agreement, the ROK military implements the passage

Seoulplans in consultation with the United Nations Command(UNC) and the North Korean military while operating aguard post inside the South-North Joint Administrative Area
and providing escort and guard services.
As for the sea crossing, 5 the South-North Navigation
Air route

Route, which conforms to the South-North Agreement on

Sea routeLand route

Maritime Navigation (signed on May 28, 2004, and effectiveon August 1, 2005), is utilized. When approving the crossingof a North Korean vessel, the ROK military cooperates with relevant
Figure 5-1. South-North crossing
5. Designated ports for inter-Koreannavigation route·South Korea: Incheon, Gunsan, Yeosu,
Busan, Ulsan, Pohang, Sokcho·North Korea: Nampo, Haeju, Kosong,
Wonsan, Hungnam, Chongjin, Najinministries and agencies, inspects communications check, and maintains alertand surveillance posture, whenever a North Korean vessel crosses the NLL.
However the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan caused the ROK Government toban all North Korean vessels on South Korean waters as of May 24, 2010.
The air crossing between the two Koreas is taking place along the WestSea direct route. When a North Korean aircraft requests permission to crossthe South Korean air-space, the ROK military decides whether to approveor deny the request considering the relevant military and national security
aspects. Once approved, the ROK military ensures the safe crossing of theNorth Korean aircraft and prepares for possible contingencies.

| Improvement of the inter-Korean military communications
line | The two Koreas agreed to establish a communications line in
the Agreement on Military Assurances for the Designation of the Joint
Administrative Area in the Eastern and Western corridors and the Constructionof Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North signed on September
17, 2002. In accordance with this Agreement, a telephone line, a fax line, andan alternate line were installed in the Western corridor on September 24, 2002;

1242010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

while in the Eastern corridor, the same equipment was set up on December
5, 2003. On August 13, 2005, in accordance with provisions in the June 4
Agreement, a telephone line, a fax line, and an alternate line were established
LQRUGHUWRSUHYHQWDQDFFLGHQWLDOFROOLVLRQRUFRQÀLFWRQWKH:HVW6HD6HSDUDWH
from crossing via the Kyeongui railway, they installed these communicationslines in the Western corridors.
However, the copper cable communication lines connecting the Southand the North were often disrupted due to the North's power shortages andunderdeveloped infrastructure. Hence, at the Second South-North Defense
Ministerial Talks held on November 29, 2007, the two sides agreed to
upgrade the communication system. At the Seventh Inter-Korean General
2I¿FHU/HYHO7DONVKHOGRQ'HFHPEHURIWKHVDPH\HDUWKHWZR.RUHDVsigned the Military Guarantee Agreement for Crossing, Communication,
and Customs Clearance in the South-North Korea Administrative Area in the
Eastern and Western Corridors.
As the communication line in the Western corridor was out of service on May1RUWK.RUHDUHTXHVWHGWKDW6RXWK.RUHDSURYLGHWKHQHFHVVDU\¿EHURSWLF
cables and equipment to make the repairs. The 204th Inter-Korean Exchange andCooperation Promotion Council, which belongs to the ROK Government, agreed
to carry out the Project to Improve the Inter-Korean Military CommunicationLines. However, the project stalled in July when a South Korean tourist to Mt.
Kumgang was shot to death by a North Korean soldier.
In October 2009, the ROK Government commenced upgrading the militarycommunications lines in response to repeated requests by North Korea. From
October 28 to November 19, 2009, the ROK Government provided, on fiveoccasions, the materials and equipment necessary to establish and operate afiber optic cable-based communications system in North Korea, while thetwo Koreas proceeded with the construction in their respective zones. Finally,on December 22, the fiber optic communications line over the Military
Demarcation Line (MDL) was put into operation to connect the South andNorth military authorities. It has been in service since December 26, 2009,
following two days of test runs that were conducted on December 24 and 25.

Construction to Upgrade inter-Korean
Military Communications Lines

125

Section 1. Inter-Korean Military Confidence Building and Arms Control3. Maintaining Readiness for Arms Control Implementation
between the Two Koreas
6. Arms Control
Arms control is a strategic concept
designed to enhance security anddiminish the risk of war by promoting
military transparency and stability
through a series of measures underunilateral, bilateral, or multilateral
consultations between concerned
nations. These measures include
reviewing, restricting, banning, andreducing the construction, deployment,
relocation, operation, and use of certain
military forces.

Arms control between the South and the North6 is a strategic concept
designed to enhance security and reduce the risk of war by promoting militarytransparency and stability. In advancing arms control, the ROK Government
has maintained its position to pursue gradual and phase-based arms control inline with the progress being made in the negotiations on the denuclearizationand the peace regime of the Korean Peninsula. It also has maintained certain
principles: to prioritize the common interests in implementing arms control;
to apply the principle of reciprocity; and to increase the likelihood ofagreements being implemented.
,QWKHWZR.RUHDVDOUHDG\DJUHHGWREXLOGPLOLWDU\FRQ¿GHQFHDQG
implement arms control through cooperative discussions as stipulated inboth the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement and the Auxiliary Agreement on NonAggression. In 2004, they adopted the Agreement on Preventing Accidential
Clashes in the West Sea and Discontinuing Propaganda Activities. Despite
such meaningful progress, arms control between the South and the North has
QRWEHHQPDWHULDOL]HGHYHQDWWKHHOHPHQWDU\OHYHORIPLOLWDU\FRQ¿GHQFH
The Ministry has been preparing for possible discussions pertaining todisarmament depending on the progress of the negotiations on North Korean
denuclearization and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. It has therefore
engaged in multi-faceted discussions and research that have encompassed
hosting arms control seminars and publishing the Arms Control in the
Korean Peninsula booklet. In addition, with its Korea Arms Verification
Agency spearheading the efforts, the MND has held workshops to improvedisarmament verification; simulated inspection training; nuclear verification
WUDLQLQJDQGHGXFDWLRQDODQGWUDLQLQJSURJUDPVIRUGLVDUPDPHQWYHUL¿FDWLRQ1262010 Defense White Paper

Repatriation of ROK POWs andJoint Remains Recovery

2

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1. ROK POWs from the Korean War
At the time of the Korean War, the UNC and Communist forces
exchanged POWs on three occasions between April 1953 and January 1954.
At that time, the UNC forces estimated that 82,000 ROK soldiers were
missing in action. However, only 8,343 ROK soldiers had been repatriatedfrom the Communist forces. It is assumed that a considerable number of
ROK POWs were not repatriated but forcefully detained in the North.

The UNC forces and the Communist forces
signing the agreement for the exchange ofwounded POWs (April 11, 1953).

From shortly after POWs were exchanged to the 1960s, through theMilitary Armistice Commission, UNC forces have demanded that North
Korea resolve the issue of unrepatriated ROK POWs. However, North
Korea has simply reiterated its position that “all of the ROK POWs had
been handed over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and nota single ROK POW remained in the North.” Even during the intermittent
inter-Korean dialogues that have been held since the 1970s, this issue has
IDLOHGWREHRI¿FLDOO\GLVFXVVHG

UNC POWs returning to the Souththrough the Gate of Freedom after theconclusion of the Armistice Agreement

127

Section 2. Repatriation of ROK POWs and Joint Remains RecoveryAs of June 2010, based on the statements of North Korean defectors andrepatriated war prisoners, the ROK Government has come up with a list of
500 ROK POWs who are believed to remain alive in the North.

| Identification, reunion, and repatriation of ROK POWs |After the return of the late Lieutenant Chang-ho Cho, a ROK POW in
1994, the ROK Government established government-wide measures for
ROK POWs detained in North Korea. In addition, through various inter.RUHDQGLDORJXHVWKH52.*RYHUQPHQWSODFHGWKHLVVXHRILGHQWL¿FDWLRQ
and repatriation of ROK POWs as its top priority in light of inter-Korean
reconciliation and humanitarian efforts.
At the South-North Ministerial Talks and the Inter-Korean Red Cross
talks that followed the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, the two Koreas
reached an agreement to discuss and resolve the issue of ROK POWs,
alongside the separated family issue. Afterwards, at the Seventh InterKorean Red Cross talks in February 2006, the two sides reached an accord
to 'include identification of those missing during and after the Korean
War on the agenda of separated families.' Furthermore, this principle was
FRQ¿UPHGDWWKHth South-North Ministerial Talks in February 2007 andthe Eighth Inter-Korean Red Cross talks in April 2007. As a result, 28 ROK
32:VZHUHLGHQWL¿HGDVEHLQJDOLYHRIZKRPZHUHUHXQLWHGZLWKWKHLU
families in the South through family reunion sessions.
The ROK Government has endeavored to safely repatriate the ROK
POWs and families who defected from the North to a third country. Upon
WKHFRQ¿UPHGGHIHFWLRQRID52.32:DQGKLVRUKHUIDPLO\WKH52.
Government protects them as it would do with a South Korean nationalabroad, while exerting diplomatic efforts toward their expeditious and safe
repatriation. A total of 80 ROK POWs have been repatriated to the Southvia third countries between 1994 and November 2010. And the numberof their family members who have been repatriated totals 210. For moredetailed data, refer to Table 5-1 below.

1282010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

Table 5-1. Number of POWs and Their Family Members Repatriated via Third Countries(As of November 2010, Unit: No. of Persons)
Year

’94

’97

’98

’99

’00

’01

’02

’03

’04

’05

’06

’07

’08

’09

’10

Total

POW

1

1

4

2

9

6

6

5

14

11

7

4

6

3

1

80

Family

-

2

5

8

9

12

9

10

34

18

32

23

9

26

13

210

| Assisting in the settlement of repatriated ROK POWs | Since
the end of 2008, the Ministry has been running a South Korean society
adaption program to settle repatriated POWs in the South. Through theeducation and training provided by civilian expert organizations, repatriated
POWs not only acquire the basic knowledge necessary to live in the Southbut also receive emotional support. The MND also frequently visits thefamilies of the repatriated ROK POWs to identify any difficulties theymight be experiencing in the settlement process and to provide practical
help. Besides, the MND also holds events for returned war veterans androundtables for repatriated POWs and their families in order to foster afavorable social environment for them.
In addition, the MND has tried to amend the Act on Repatriation andTreatment of Prisoners of War recognizing that social environments havechanged since its first enactment in 2007. The amendment stipulates thatreasonable improvements should be made to the assistance system forrepatriated ROK POWs and that safety assurances and their respectfultreatment should be ensured. Employment support for their families is also
stipulated.

| Future directions | The Ministry will exert its utmost efforts
to help ROK POWs safely return and settle in the South through wellorganized and systematical cooperation across government.
First of all, the MND will continuously raise the issue of ROK POWs
during inter-Korean dialogues to induce North Korea to admit to the factthat POWs still remain in the North, and to cooperate for resolving thisissue. Along with the efforts for family reunion, the MND will also do its
best to seek creative solutions for the issue of ROK POWs.

129

Section 2. Repatriation of ROK POWs and Joint Remains RecoveryIn addition, the MND will ensure the safety of ROK POWs and theirfamily members who have defected from North Korea to third countries
by exerting every effort to repatriate them quickly and safely to the South.
To this end, the MND will continue its diplomatic efforts by reinforcing
coordination and cooperation with third countries.
Considering the challenges faced by repatriated ROK POWs during
settlement in the South, due to their long years of living in the North, the
MND will tailor policies toward their successful settlement. Currently,
repatriated POWs in the South may run into various difficulties, e.g., a
IDLOXUHWRDGDSWWR6RXWK.RUHDQVRFLHW\DQGFXOWXUHGLI¿FXOWLHVLQREWDLQLQJ
medical treatment for illnesses related to forced labor and aging, concern
for their family members left behind in the North, and communication
problems with their current family members in the South. The ROK
Government will seek to amend the related laws and institutions, while also
encouraging the private sector to develop and organize support systems
which will solve the problems the Government cannot fully address.

2. Inter-Korean Joint Remains Recovery
Currently, the remains of approximately 39,000 ROK soldiers arepresumed to be buried across North Korea and about 13,000 buried in the
DMZ. The joint remains recovery by South and North Korea would senda clear signal that the war has truly ended and that the two Koreas value
human dignity over ideology.
At the Second South-North Ministerial Talks in November 2007, the two
Koreas agreed to 'discuss and resolve the issue of remains recovery, based
RQWKHVKDUHGYLHZWKDWWKHLVVXHLVUHODWHGWREXLOGLQJPLOLWDU\FRQ¿GHQFH
and ending the war.' In his New Year’s address in January 2010, President
Lee Myung-bak expressed his strong commitment to implementing aremains recovery program through dialogues with the North so as to markthe 60th anniversary of the Korean War. President Lee also called for North
Korea’s active cooperation.

1302010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

In order to launch this program as early as possible, the MND will
establish detailed recovery plans. In addition, it will complete a map ofpotential locations where remains may be buried in the North by the endof 2010, based on Korean War records and various testimonies. If the two
Koreas join hands in recovering these war remains, it will symbolize thealleviation of tension and inter-Korean reconciliation.

131

Section 2. Repatriation of ROK POWs and Joint Remains RecoveryTank Field Training (September 2010)

6

Chapter

Establishing
Advanced Military
Capabilities
Section 1. National Defense Reform to Build Advanced
Elite Military Forces
Section 2. Streamlining the Military Structure
Section 3. Improving the Force Structure
Section 4. Building Up Strong Reserve Forces
Section 5. Establishing a Network-Centric Defense
Informatization Environment

1

SectionNational Defense Reform to Build
Advanced Elite Military Forces
The Ministry of National Defense (MND) strives to reform national defense by building slim but strong
advanced ROK military forces capable of meeting the challenges posed by the changing strategic
environment of the 21st century and future warfare in general. The basic policy direction for national
military reform is to change the military structure and develop a pragmatic, advanced defense operational
system to counter various security threats posed at home and abroad.
The Ministry of National Defense has been revising its Defense Reform Basic Plan, incorporating the opinions
garnered from defense experts and public hearings, considering the changed security environment on the
Korean Peninsula and beyond, and evaluating the defense reforms that have been implemented since 2006.

1. Progress in National Defense Reform
The Ministry established the National Defense Reform Basic Plan in DecemberLQRUGHUWRIRUWLI\LWVGHIHQVLYHFDSDELOLWLHVDQGSRVWXUHLQDZD\WKDWEHVWEH¿WVWKH
changing security environment and future warfare in general. This Plan is anchored in theoutlook that inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation will increase and military tension
will subside on the Korean Peninsula while the insecurity and uncertainty in Northeast
Asia will increase due to an escalating arms race among the nations in the region.
As future warfare is expected to be network-centric warfare (NCW) born from thedevelopment of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
and the expansion of weapons systems with enhanced precision and destructive power,
the Plan calls for an advanced military force that does not simply rely on troop numbers.
The ROK is experiencing a dwindling military manpower caused by decreasing
birthrate. It also faces a growing demand for improved living conditions for servicemen;
the type of which would include better barracks to suit increased income levels and caterfor rapid social development, improved human rights of service members and ensure
circumstances for self-study for service members.

134 2010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 6.

Building a sophisticated defense mechanism and improving the service environment
require an enormous budget. However, the reality of limited defense resources calls
for prudent spending and innovative operations. As a result, the MND announced the
National Defense Reform Basic Plan (2006-2020), which is composed of four reformareas for further implementation: expanding civilian involvement in national defense,
establishing a force structure and defense system suitable for future warfare, building
a low cost, high efficiency defense management system and improving the military
barracks environment to suit the changing times.
After mapping out the National Defense Reform Basic Plan, the MND drew up the
National Defense Reform Act in December 2006, the Enforcement Decree of the National
Defense Reform Act in March 2007 and the Defense Reform Initiative Directive in January,WDOVRHVWDEOLVKHGWKH1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH5HIRUP2I¿FHXQGHUGLUHFWFRQWURORIWKH
National Defense Minister in July 2007, to take charge of national defense reform.
7KHPDMRUDFKLHYHPHQWVIURPWKH¿UVWSKDVHRIGHIHQVHUHIRUPZKLFKVSDQQHGWKHIRXU
years between 2006 and 2010, are as follows: In terms of military structure, the number of
WURRSVKDVEHHQFXWE\DERXW7KH¿UVWSKDVHRIRUJDQL]DWLRQDOUHIRUPRIWKH-RLQW
Chiefs of Staff has been conducted and 11 troop units have been disbanded to establish a
WKHDWHURSHUDWLRQVFRPPDQGV\VWHP,QWHUPVRIGHIHQVHPDQDJHPHQW¿YHRUJDQL]DWLRQV
including the Printing Depot, have been designated as Military Executive Agencies.1
Military units with similar functions,2VXFKDVWKH:HOIDUH$JHQF\)DFLOLWLHV2UJDQL]DWLRQ
Accounting Group and Printing Depot have been incorporated into one streamlined unit.
$PLOLWDU\EDVHPRGHUQL]DWLRQSURMHFWWRIXUQLVKEDUUDFNVZLWKLQGLYLGXDOEHGVZDVFRPSOHWHDVRI6HSWHPEHU7KHPRGHUQL]DWLRQHIIRUWVVODVKHGPDQSRZHUE\1,600 and the budget by about 46 billion Korean won. Encouraged by such achievements,
the Military Executive Agency scheme will be gradually expanded.
The MND has regularly been amending and complementing the National Defense
Basic Plan according to the National Defense Reform Act.3 The plan was amended for
WKH¿UVWWLPHVLQFHWKHLQDXJXUDWLRQRIWKHFXUUHQWJRYHUQPHQWLQ-XQH,QWHUPVRI
military structure, the MND not only changed the defense system to better counter military
threats, including the launch of long-range rockets by North Korea and the implications of
LWVVHFRQGQXFOHDUWHVWEXWDOVRPRGL¿HGWKH52.86FRPELQHGGHIHQVHV\VWHPLQWKH
aftermath of wartime OPCON transition. In terms of defense management reform, the plan
KDVEHHQDOWHUHGWRPDWFKWKHQHZVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQWDQGWKHQDWLRQ¶V¿VFDOFDSDFLW\E\

1. Military Executive Agency
A system in which military personnel
or civilians are appointed to takecharge of an autonomous organization
dealing with the military’s organization,
personnel affairs and financial mattersand who is then held accountable forthe performance of the organization.
Thus, management efficiency andthe promotion of service quality are
ensured.
-Organizations implementing thesystem: Armed Forces Capital
Hospital, Printing Depot, Army 2
Logistics Unit, Navy Supply Depot and
Air Force Supply Depot 40.
2. Incorporation of military units withsimilar functions
Military units with similar or
overlapping functions in each branchof military service are combined
to enhance efficiency in terms of
manpower and budget.
3. Article 5, The National Defense Reform Act
The The Minister of National Defense
modifies the National Defense Basic
Plan based on an assessment of the
defense situation at home and abroad
and the results of national defense
reform efforts every two and a halfyears.

135

Section 1. National Defense Reform to Build Advanced Elite Military Forcestaking into account new initiatives, including the expanded use of civil resources.
In 2010, the MND strived to supplement the National Defense Reform Basic Plan, one
WKDWERWKFLYLOLDQVDQGWKHPLOLWDU\FDQFRQVHQWE\DQDO\]LQJWKHSUREOHPVLQLPSOHPHQWLQJ
the Plan. The new Plan is aimed at building defense capabilities that can offset the present
DQGSRWHQWLDOWKUHDWVIURP1RUWK.RUHDDQGLPSURYHWKHHI¿FLHQF\DQGHFRQRP\RIWKH
nation’s defense readiness. The MND is committed to making such a plan feasible.

2. National Defense Reform Basic Plan 2009-2020| Military structure reform | Reforming the structure of the military is intended
to build the military suitable to proactively cope with the security environment on the
3HQLQVXODDQGHI¿FLHQWO\FRQGXFWIXWXUHZDUIDUH7KHUHIRUPKDVEHHQFRQGXFWHGLQIRXU
areas: command structure, unit structure, troop structure, and force structure.
&RPPDQGVWUXFWXUHUHIRUPLVWRHVWDEOLVKDQHI¿FLHQWPLOLWDU\FRPPDQGV\VWHPWKDWallows ROK forces to take the initiative in war planning, preparing for theater operations
after wartime OPCON transition, and to establish a new combined defense system by
VHWWLQJXSDPLOLWDU\FRRSHUDWLYHRUJDQL]DWLRQIRU52.86FRPELQHGRSHUDWLRQV
8QLWVWUXFWXUHUHIRUPUHGXFHVWKHQXPEHURIXQLWVDQGVWUHDPOLQHVWKHPLGWLHU
command elements, in view of the future operational environment, so that operations canbe conducted in a prompt manner. The reform will foster completeness and improve the
FDSDELOLWLHVRIWKHFRPEDWWURRSRUJDQL]DWLRQVZLWKDUHGXFHGQXPEHURIWURRSV
Troop structure reform allows for a shift to a technology-intensive structure supported mainly
by officers and NCOs since securing skilled soldiers has become problematic after the decision
to reduce soldier’s service terms. Combat forces will be mostly composed of active duty
personnel whereas non-combatant functions will increasingly replaced by civilian resources.
7KHVL]HRIDVWDQGLQJIRUFHZLOOEHJUDGXDOO\DGMXVWHGLQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHFDSDELOLWLHVRIWKH
existing weapons and equipment. Reserve forces will be streamlined by improving its training
V\VWHPDQGEHSRVWXUHGWRPRELOL]HLPPHGLDWHO\LQRUGHUWRPDLQWDLQFRPEDWUHDGLQHVV
Force structure reform seeks to secure the optimum forces by equipping the ROK army
WRFRSHZLWKIXWXUHWKUHDWVDVZHOODVWKRVHRIWKHSUHVHQWVXFKDVLQ¿OWUDWLRQDQGORFDO
provocations by the North. Force structure reform is focused on reinforcing jointness andsecuring the necessary war capabilities.

1362010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 6.

| Defense management reform | Defense management reform will shift
DOORIWKHGHIHQVHPDQDJHPHQWDUHDVLQFOXGLQJRUJDQL]DWLRQSHUVRQQHODQGEXGJHWWRD
pragmatic and advanced defense operational system that will be operated at lower cost
DQGKLJKHUHI¿FLHQF\7KHUHIRUPZLOOIRFXVRQRSWLPL]LQJGHIHQVHUHVRXUFHVHQKDQFLQJ
GHIHQVHHI¿FLHQF\HVWDEOLVKLQJDFXVWRPL]HGSHUVRQQHOPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHPWRWUDLQDQG
secure the necessary personnel, improving the barracks environment and welfare, pursuing
GHIHQVHLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQDQGHVWDEOLVKLQJD¿UPIRXQGDWLRQIRUGHIHQVHVFLHQFHWHFKQRORJ\
and capabilities. The directions being taken by defense management reform are as follows:First, the reform will establish an efficient management and maintenance system for
HTXLSPHQWE\LPSURYLQJWKHORJLVWLFVDQGWUDQVSRUWDWLRQV\VWHPVDQGXWLOL]LQJFLYLOLDQ
resources. Advanced private management techniques will be introduced to the defense
management and military executive agency systems in which a consigned management
V\VWHPZLOOEHDFWLYHO\LPSOHPHQWHG8QLWVZLWKVLPLODURURYHUODSSLQJIXQFWLRQVLQHDFKService will be consolidated and streamlined. Excessive and superfluous troops will bemerged into the combat contingent. Military units across the nation will be relocated toincrease efficiency. Efforts will be made to increase the economic value of the land formilitary use.
Second, the MND will improve the recruitment system to ensure expert personnel
DUHVHFXUHGDQGHVWDEOLVKDFXVWRPL]HGSHUVRQQHOH[SHUWLVHUHVRXUFHVV\VWHP,WZLOO
also reinforce education on jointness in the curriculum of Service colleges, improve thestandard of education in the Joint Staff College and rebuild the mental strength education
system.
Third, the MND will continue to furnish barracks with beds and improve the welfare
system for service personnel in line with the development of the nation. A productive
military service for service members will be fostered by providing them with opportunities
for self-development by obtaining academic credits and vocational credentials. It will also
develop a military medical service system providing quality medical care both in war and
SHDFHWLPHV,WZLOOSD\KHHGWRLPSURYLQJWKHZHOIDUHEHQH¿WVIRUIDPLO\PHPEHUVRI
service members as well.
)RXUWKWKH01'ZLOOHVWDEOLVKDQDGYDQFHGGHIHQVHLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQHQYLURQPHQW
in preparation for future warfare based on the defense architecture.4 The Ministry
will expand the joint participation of academic, industrial and research institutes to

4. Defense architecture
Defense architecture is thecomprehensive informatization designthat presents the vision and goals ofnational defense based on the scientific,
structural and integrated analysis of
the nation’s defensive capabilities. The
defense architecture is to be used asa tool for identifying the priorities in
informatization, preventing overlapping
investment and guaranteeing mutual
operation.

independently develop cutting-edge weapons system and the core technology necessary
to strengthen the defense industry.

137

Section 1. National Defense Reform to Build Advanced Elite Military Forces2SectionStreamlining the Military
Structure
Military Structure Reform,1 part of the Defense Reform Basic Plan, is a prerequisite for establishing anelite (slim but strong) military. The ROK military will be shifted towards becoming a technology-intensive
organization in preparation for various and complex security threats. In terms of command structure,
the MND will fortify the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish the ideal theater operations
execution system for the new combined defensive system that has been established in preparation forwartime OPCON transition. In terms of troop structure, the MND will reinforce the troops by reinforcing
THEOFÜCERSCAPABLEOFMANAGINGSTATE OF THE ARTMILITARYCOMBATEQUIPMENTEFÜCIENTLY4ROOPSIZEWILLBE
curtailed gradually in line with the yearly Military Structure Reform Plan. Unit structure will be optimized
INTERMSOFTHEBATTLEÜELDENVIRONMENTANDTHEMISSIONANDROLEOFEACH3ERVICE

1. Command Structure
1. Military Structure
Military structure refers to the overall
organization of the nation’s defensive
resources concerned with conducting
military missions. It is classified ascommand structure, unit structure,
troop structure and force structure.

| Establishing a theater operations execution systemafter wartime OPCON transition | The new combined defense
system, following the transition, will evolve into an ROK-supported and86VXSSRUWLQJRSHUDWLRQDOV\VWHP7KHH[HFXWLRQRIWKHWKHDWHURSHUDWLRQV
system is shown in Figure 6-1.
Figure 6-1. Execution of the Theater Operations System after wartime OPCON Transition[ ROK ][ United States ]President

President

Ministry of National
Defense (MND)

Joint Chiefsof Staff(Theater Operations
Command)Operations
Command1382010 Defense White Paper

ROK-U.S. Security
Consultative Meeting (SCM)

Departmentof Defense(DoD)

Military Committee(MC)

Joint Chiefsof Staff

Functional Coord.
Element

US Korea Command(US KORCOM)

Operational Cooperation
Organizations

Component
CommandChapter 6.

8QGHU WKH QHZ FRPELQHG GHIHQVH V\VWHP YDULRXV FRRSHUDWLYHRUJDQL]DWLRQVZLOOEHHVWDEOLVKHGE\IXQFWLRQRUHFKHORQLQRUGHUWRGHWHU
the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula and execute theater operations
LQZDUWLPH7KHH[LVWLQJVWUDWHJLFFKDQQHOVRIGLDORJXHVXFKDVWKH52.86
Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and the Military Committee, will bemaintained. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in command of theater operations,will operate cooperative bodies in the areas of information, operations
DQG ORJLVWLFV VR DV WR VHFXUH VPRRWK RSHUDWLRQDO FRRSHUDWLRQ ZLWK 86
KORCOM. Operational commands, such as the Ground Operations
Command, Naval Operations Command and Air Force Operations
Command, and the units under each Command, will operate cooperative
ERGLHV ZLWK WKHLU FRXQWHUSDUWV LQ WKH 86 PLOLWDU\ WR VHFXUH HIILFLHQW
combined operations.

| Strengthening the function and jointness of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff | 7KHRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGIXQFWLRQVRIWKH-RLQW&KLHIV
of Staff have been gradually reinforced so that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff can now command all operations during war and peace
times following wartime OPCON transition. Two Vice Chairmen will beplaced under the command of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
one in charge of supporting operational command and the other in chargeof supporting military command, 2 outside of operational command,
respectively.
Considering the changing security environment, including the wartime
23&21WUDQVLWLRQWKH-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDIIZLOOUHLQIRUFHLWVVWDIIRI¿FHWR
take the lead in the execution of theater operations and to increase jointness.

2. Military Command
Military command refers to theemployment of forces, the planning ofmilitary strategies, the generation offorce requirements, the establishmentof operational plans, and the commandof operations and operational units toachieve defense objectives.

The changed command structure for the Joint Chiefs of Staff is shown
Figure 6-2.

139

Section 2. Streamlining the Military StructureFigure 6-2. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Supporting MilitaryCommand except for
operational command

Supporting
Operational Command

First Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Central Directorate
for IntelligenceCentral Directorate
for Operations

Second Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Central Directorate
for Military Support

Central Directorate
for Strategic Planning* Chief of Central Directorate of Intelligence concurrently serves as Director of Korea Defense Intelligence Agency

2. Troop Structure
The ROK forces are 648,000 strong as of 2010. The number of troops has
been reduced by 33,000 since defense reform started in 2005. The original
Defense Reform Basic Plan purported to reduce troop number to 500,000
E\7KH'HIHQVH5HIRUP%DVLF3ODQZDVUHYLVHGLQVRWKDWWURRS
number would instead be reduced to 517,000 by 2020 in consideration of
WKHFKDQJHGVHFXULW\DQGGHIHQVHHQYLURQPHQWV7KH\HDUO\WURRSVL]HZLOO
remain adjustable in tandem with the military’s structural reform. Troop

Figure 6-3. Scheduled Target Troop Size According to the Defense Reform Basic Plan
Unit: 10 thousand75

The 2005 plan
The 2009 plan

70
65

64.8

68.1
65.2

64

60
55

59.9

56

50

0

1402010 Defense White Paper

51.7
50

2006

2009 2010

2015

2020

Chapter 6.

VL]HE\\HDULVVKRZQLQ)LJXUH
7URRSVWUXFWXUHZLOOEHUHRUJDQL]HGWRFUHDWHDOHDQIRUFHFHQWHUHGRQ
RI¿FHUVDQG1&2VZKLFKZRXOGDOORZVRSKLVWLFDWHGGHIHQVHFDSDELOLWLHVWR
EHPDQDJHGHI¿FLHQWO\DQGFRPEDWFDSDELOLWLHVPD[LPL]HG8VHRIDFWLYHGXW\SHUVRQQHOLQQRQFRPEDWDUHDVZLOOEHFXUWDLOHG2UJDQL]DWLRQVZLWKVLPLODUIXQFWLRQVDQGUROHVZLOOEHLQWHJUDWHG8QLWFRPSRVLWLRQZLOOEH
adjusted in light of the evaluation of individual threats that may require
additional troops and troop-based missions.

3. Unit Structure| Army | The ROK Army is transforming its force structure by
reinforcing its command and control capability so that target detection,
decision making, and strikes can be executed in real time. The army is
DOVRVWUHQJWKHQLQJLWVPRELOLW\VXUYLYDELOLW\¿UHSRZHUDQGSUHFLVLRQOHYHO
so that network-centric warfare can be performed. The scheduled majorchanges in the unit structure of the army are shown in Figure 6-4.
Figure 6-4. Changes of the Unit Structure of the ROK Army(from 2010 to 2020)

Army

First and Third
Field Army
(FROKA, TROKA)

Second Operations
Command(2OC)

Army

Capital Defense
Command(CDC)

Ground Operations Second Operations
Command(GOC) Command(2OC)

Special Warfare
Command(SWC)
Regional
Corps

Mobile
Corps

(7)

(1)

Capital Defense
Command(CDC)

Special Warfare
Command(SWC)
Regional
Corps

MobileCorps

Army Aviation
Operations Command

Army Aviation
Command

Army Missile
Command

Army Missile
Command

The ROK Army will replace the First and Third Field Army with the Ground
Operations Command in 2015. In 2005, two out of ten corps were disbanded.
Currently, there are eight corps, including seven regional corps and one mobile
corps. In the future, the optimum number of regional corps and mobile corps
ZLOOEHPDLQWDLQHGEDVHGRQWKHHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHVSHFL¿FWKUHDWV141

Section 2. Streamlining the Military Structure| Navy | The ROK Navy is bolstering its surface, submarine, andaerial operational capabilities. The Navy will not only protect the nation’s
territorial waters but also safeguard national interests, such as the sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) and marine resources in the high seas.
The naval force structure will be composed of three Fleet Commands,
3. Maritime Task Flotilla
Maritime Task Flotilla acts to deterNorth Korea and also carries out
offensive operations, the defense ofcore territorial waters against potential
threats, the safeguarding of SLOCs,
strikes against strategic targets andthe support of flotillas.

a Maritime Task Flotilla,3 a Submarine Flotilla, and an Air Wing. The
Submarine Flotilla will be replaced by the Submarine Command in the
future. The scheduled force structure of the Naval Operations Command isshown in Figure 6-5.
Figure 6-5. Scheduled Change in the Force Structure of the Naval Operations Command(from 2010 to 2020)

Naval Operations
Command

Fleet
CommandSubmarine
Flotilla

Naval Operations
Command

Air Wing(3)
Establishment ceremony of the
Maritime Task Flotilla Seven of theNavy (Busan, Feb. 2010)

Fleet
CommandSubmarine
Command

Air Wing(3)
Maritime
Task Flotilla

Maritime
Task Flotilla

The nation’s Navy will shift towards obtaining a mobile force structure by
reducing the number of surface ships and dispatching its middle- and heavyclass ships to counter various threats, including the threat of the North.
The capacity for submarine and air warfare will also be reinforced. Marine&RUSVZLOOEHUHRUJDQL]HGLQWRDQDLUWRODQGPRELOHIRUFHVWUXFWXUHWKDW
is applicable to a range of mission types, such as three-dimensional highspeed landing operations, rapid response operations and ground operations.

| Air Force | The ROK Air Force is being developed to achieve air
supremacy at the initial phase and to develop precision strike capabilities.
To fulfill its mission, the Air Force will gain the ability to conduct
surveillance of enemy movements and launch punitive retaliation. It will
also secure an operational capability that encompasses the entire Korean
Peninsula. The scheduled changes in the unit structure of the ROK Air
Force Operations Command are shown in Figure 6-6.

1422010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 6.

Figure 6-6. Scheduled Changes in the Unit Structure of ROK Air Force Operations
Command (from 2010 to 2020)

Air Force
Operations Command

South
CombatCommandNorth
Air Defense
CombatArtillery
Command Command

Fighter
Wings

Fighter
Wings

O[P

O\P

Air Force
Operations CommandControl
Wing

Tactical Air
Control
Group

South
CombatCommandNorth
Air Defense
CombatArtillery
Command Command

Fighter
Wings

Fighter
Wings

O[P

O\P

Control
Wing

Tactical Air
Control
Wing* Established in December 2010

As for the unit structure of the Air Force, the North Combat Command
will be established in consideration of the optimum scope of command of
the ROK Air Force Operations Command. The ROK Air Force Operations
Command will be in charge of combined intelligence operations. The Southand North Combat Commands will conduct commissioned operations aswell as command and control sub-units and supervise their training. The
Tactical Air Control Group will be replaced with the Tactical Air Control
Wing in order to improve its ability to support army and naval operations.

143

Section 2. Streamlining the Military Structure3

SectionImproving the Force Structure

The Ministry is building advanced military capabilities capable of ensuring deterrence and victory incases of an all-out war as well as coping with the threat of local provocations by North Korea by making
EFÜCIENTUSEOFTHEAVAILABLEDEFENSIVERESOURCES4OACHIEVETHEGOALS EARLYWARNINGANDSURVEILLANCEsystems, the C4I system, which enables network-centric warfare, and a mobile strike capability will beobtained.

1. Directions of Force Structure Development
The MND will establish a sophisticated force system based on
information and knowledge, which will guarantee victory in war, and secure
ZHDSRQU\DQGHTXLSPHQWZLWKKLJKFRPEDWHI¿FLHQF\7KLVZLOOEHDFKLHYHG
in the following ways.
First, following a reevaluation of the priority of the threat, it will develop
a force structure composed of forces to combat local provocations, those toserve in an all-out war and forces to combat potential threats by order.
Second, it will enhance its early warning capabilities and real time
battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities not only on the
Korean Peninsula but also in the surrounding areas.
Third, it will boost its network-centric warfare capabilities by establishinga command, control, communications, computer & intelligence (C4I) system
DQGEDWWOH¿HOGQHWZRUNLQRUGHUWRVHFXUHWKHFDSDFLW\IRULQWHJUDWHGFRPEDW

1442010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 6.

Fourth, it will improve its ability to execute long-range precision strikes
and prompt three dimensional operations on land, at sea, and in the air andreinforce its defensive capability.
Fifth, it will gradually expand investment in research and development toshape the defense industry into an economic growth engine, mount various
types of equipment on the same vehicle and lengthen the lifespan of old

K-21 infantry fighting vehicles

equipment by improving its performance.

2. Strengthening Combat Capabilities| 2010 Force Improvement Program | The entire defense
EXGJHWIRULVLQFUHDVHGE\WR.5:WULOOLRQIURP

K-9 self-propelled artillery

7KHIRUFHLPSURYHPHQWEXGJHWLVLQFUHDVHGE\WR.5:WULOOLRQ
IURP7KHFRVWRIWKHPDMRUSURMHFWV SURMHFWV WKDWZLOOFRQWLQXH
LQWRLV.5:WULOOLRQ7KHEXGJHWIRUQHZSURMHFWV SURMHFWV 
is KRW 77 billion. As part of the follow-up measures to the attack on the
ROK Ship Cheonan, an additional KRW 14 billion was earmarked for four
projects, including an underwater surveillance sonar project. The major
combat capability reinforcement projects are shown in Table 6-1.

Kwanggaeto the Great III class destroyer

Table 6-1. Major Force Improvement Projects (as of 2010)
Classiﬁcation

Continuing projects

New projects

Surveillance,
Reconnaissance,
Command and Control
Capabilities-Airborne Warning and Control
System-Ground Tactical C4I System-Harbor Surveillance System-Mobile Underwater
Surveillance Sonar-K21 Infantry Fighting Vehicles-K-9 Self-propelled artillery-Korean Utility Helicopter-Improving the performance of
K-55 Self-propelled artillery-Kwanggaeto the Great III classdestroyer (Aegis)-Jangbogo II class submarine-The 2nd Minesweeper Project-Next-generation mine laying
ship-F-15K Fighter-Advanced Trainer (T-50)-Improving the performance of
the C-130H

Maneuver and Fire
Capabilities

Marine and Landing
Capabilities

Air Combat Capabilities
Research andDevelopment

Intermediate-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle,
division-level UAVs

Jangbogo II class submarine

Advanced trainer (T-50)

145

Section 3. Improving the Force Structure| Mid-term Force Improvement Plan | The MND will pursue
DWRWDORIIRUFHLPSURYHPHQWSURMHFWVIURPWR,WFRQWLQXHV
its 183 existing projects, including the K-2 tank project, next-generation
landing ship project and F-15 project (2nd project), and sets about 110
new projects, including the Battalion Battle Command System, personnel
landing craft project (2nd project) and the Boramae project. The objectivesof these projects are shown in Figure 6-7.
Figure 6-7. Force Buildup Programs
Surveillance andReconnaissance System
SensorCommand, Control, Communications,
Computers & Intelligence
C4I

Army
C41

Strike System
Shooter

K-9, MLRSUAV
K-2 tank

Airborne Warning and Control System(AWACS): early warning, aerial control
and real time intelligence disseminationis possible across the entire Korean
Peninsula.

Strategic C4I
KJCCS
F-15K

AWACS
Navy
C41

Air Force
C41

Kwanggaeto the Great III
class destroyer
Maritime
Patrol AircraftIntelligence Communications
Infrastructure

Jangbogo II classsubmarineFirst, the MND will upgrade the sonar equipment on patrol combat
corvettes (PCC) and frigates in order to detect encroaching enemy
submarines and install sonar sensors suitable for long-range detection.
It will also field improved TOD, monocular night vision devices, day
and night scopes or sights for personal weaponry and machine guns in
SUHSDUDWLRQIRUHQHP\LQ¿OWUDWLRQE\ODQG
Second, surveillance and reconnaissance assets will target the capacity toobtain early warnings, to conduct real time surveillance on and around the.RUHDQ3HQLQVXODDQGHVWDEOLVKUHDOWLPHEDWWOH¿HOGVXUYHLOODQFHWKDWZLOO
meet the strategic requirements of each echelon within individual units.

1462010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 6.

Projects related to the airborne warning and control system (AWACS),
tactical reconnaissance intelligence collection system and medium-altitude
unmanned aerial vehicles will be carried out to enable surveillance andHDUO\ZDUQLQJDWWKHVWUDWHJLFOHYHO,QDGGLWLRQGLYLVLRQOHYHO8$9VZLOOEH
developed to bolster the surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of thedivisions.
Third, the Command, Control and Communication System is aimed at
supporting jointness and the smooth operation of network-centric warfare.
The Joint Tactical Data Link System (JTDLS)1 and Theater level Joint Fire
2

Operation System (JFOS-K) will be developed to ensure the distribution
RIGLJLWL]HGWDFWLFDOLQWHOOLJHQFHLQMRLQWRSHUDWLRQV7KH*URXQG7DFWLFDOC4I System will undergo a second round of improvements. Also, the Battle
Command System for battalions or lower level units and Ground Tactical
Data Link will be developed to ensure real-time distribution of real-timetactical intelligence to small units. The Tactical Communication System will
XWLOL]HWKH7DFWLFDO,QWHOOLJHQFH&RPPXQLFDWLRQ1HWZRUN 7,&1 3 which
will allow for the distribution of large volumes of multimedia information.
Fourth, long-range precision strikes and three dimensional air-sea-land
rapid mobility will be improved, and war capabilities to reinforce protection

1. Joint Tactical Data Link System(JTDLS)
A tactical information distribution
system between the Army, Navy and Air
Force, which employs major weaponssystems, including tanks, helicopters,
destroyers and fighters.
2.Joint Fire Operation System-Korea(JFOS-K)
A counter fire operational systemcentering on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. Tactical Information Communication
Network (TICN)
A tactical intelligence communications
system that combines wired andwireless mobile communications.

ZLOOEHVHFXUHGDVZHOO,QWHUPVRIJURXQGIRUFHVWKH.VHOISURSHOOHGDUWLOOHU\ODUJHFDOLEHU0/56.LQIDQWU\¿JKWLQJYHKLFOHV.DVVDXOWULÀH JUHQDGHODXQFKHU.WDQNDQGDQWLDUWLOOHU\GHWHFWLRQUDGDUZLOOEH
¿HOGHG1HZZKHHOHGFRPEDWYHKLFOHVDQGXSJUDGHG0/56SURJUDPVZLOO
be developed. In terms of maritime power, next generation frigate (FFX),
next generation patrol craft (PKX), next generation landing ship and anamphibious assault vehicle will be secured. A Kwanggaeto the Great III
class destroyer (Aegis combat system), Jangbogo II class submarine (1,800

K-11 Assault Rifle & Grenade Launcher-Capable of precision strikes with theuse of a laser distance measurer.
-Capable of precise aiming at nightwith the use of a thermal observation
scope.

tons), and ship-to-ship guided missiles will be acquired. Landing platform
helicopter and landing ships fast (LSFs) will be additionally obtained.
In terms of aerial combat capabilities, air-to-ground missiles, the F-15K(2nd SKDVH  .RUHDQ 8WLOLW\ +HOLFRSWHU 6XULRQ  WUDQVSRUW DLUFUDIW DQGlight attack aircraft (FA-50) projects will be continued. New projects for aheavy attack helicopter and the Korean attack helicopter, and the Boramae

Korean Utility Helicopter (Surion)

147

Section 3. Improving the Force Structureproject will be launched. Short range anti-air guided missiles, next surface
to air missile (SAM-X), and a newly developed decontamination vehicle
will commence service in order to reinforce the nation’s protection against
chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear threats.
Fifth, outdated and obsolete combat weaponry will be upgraded. The
Army will improve its K-1/K1A1 Tanks, K-200 Armored Vehicles, andK-277 Armored Command Vehicles, K-55 Self-propelled Artillery, andcounter-battery detection radars. The Navy will improve the submarine
warfare capabilities of its surface combatants (beyond the patrol combat
corvette (PCC) level). And the Air Force will improve the war capabilities
Counter-battery Detection Radar: asystem that locates enemy launchers
by detecting enemy shells whilst in
flight.

1482010 Defense White Paper

RILWV)DQG.)¿JKWHUVBuilding Up Strong Reserve
Forces4

SectionThe reserve forces and standing forces, which act to as a deterrent to war, are a prerequisite for any
nation’s survival. The Ministry is modifying the laws and institutions concerned and improving themobilization system in order to streamline the reserve forces and have them become just as strong as
the standing forces.

1. Modifying the Statutes Related to Mobilization
7KHVWDWXWHVUHODWHGWRPRELOL]DWLRQHQFRPSDVVWKH(PHUJHQF\5HVRXUFHVManagement Act governing the establishment of peace time emergency
UHVSRQVHSODQVWKHPRELOL]HGUHVRXUFHVVXUYH\DQGWUDLQLQJGULOOVWKH
0LOLWDU\6HUYLFH$FWJRYHUQLQJSHUVRQQHOPRELOL]DWLRQDQGWUDLQLQJDQGWKH
%LOORQ:DUWLPH5HVRXUFHV0RELOL]DWLRQJRYHUQLQJWKHPRELOL]DWLRQFRQWURO
and operation of personnel and material resources during a war. The Bill
RQ:DUWLPH5HVRXUFHV0RELOL]DWLRQLVD:DUWLPH6WDQGLQJ$FWWKDWFDQEH
declared by the deliberation and resolution of the National Assembly or by
Presidential Emergency Order if the convening of the National Assembly is
LQIHDVLEOH$VWKHPRELOL]DWLRQRIKXPDQDQGPDWHULDOUHVRXUFHVFDQEHFRPH
protracted during war, the bill is limited to times of peace only. Efforts tomodify the bill are under way in consultation with the Ministry of Public
Administration and Safety and the Ministry of Government Legislation. The
PRGL¿FDWLRQVZRXOGDOORZWKHQDWLRQWRFRSHZLWKDQ\QDWLRQDOHPHUJHQF\WKDWPLJKWDULVHGXULQJSHDFHWLPHWKURXJKWKHPRELOL]LQJRIKXPDQDQG
material resources for a limited duration and scale. In addition, the nation’s

149

Section 4. Building Up Strong Reserve Forcesability to respond to security threats would be enhanced in times of enemy
military provocations or terror attacks during peace and times of war.

2. Initial Operational Response and the Establishmentof the Mobilization Support System for Stabilization
Operations.
7KH0LQLVWU\RI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVHLVPRGLI\LQJWKH0RELOL]DWLRQ6XSSRUW
1. Stabilization Operations Unit
The unit responsible for stabilizing theoperational zones in the face of militaryor non-military threats to national
security during peace or war times.
2. Precision Replenishment Battalions
The units responsible for mobilizing
and forming troops, from the Homeland
Reserve Divisions, in to battalions in
the event that the frontline divisions orcorps were to suffer heavy casualties.

6\VWHPIRUWKH6WDELOL]DWLRQ2SHUDWLRQDO8QLWV1 in the aftermath of the
expansion of the operational areas, the establishment and enlargement of
0RELOL]HG5HVHUYH'LYLVLRQVDQG3UHFLVLRQ5HSOHQLVKPHQW%DWWDOLRQV2
required to conduct initial operations.
0RELOL]HG5HVHUYH'LYLVLRQVDQG3UHFLVLRQ5HSOHQLVKPHQW%DWWDOLRQVare responsible for augmenting the frontline units during the initial phase of
RSHUDWLRQV6RIDU0RELOL]HG5HVHUYH'LYLVLRQVKDYHEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGDQG
augmented to support frontline units. In 2010, the Precision Replenishment%DWWDOLRQVUHSODFHGWKH0RELOL]HG5HVHUYH'LYLVLRQV$VZDUWLPHRSHUDWLRQDO
areas are extended to cover the entire North Korean region, the MND has
EHJXQWRXSJUDGHWKH0RELOL]DWLRQ6XSSRUW6\VWHPWRHQVXUHEHWWHUH[HFXWLRQRIZDUWLPHRSHUDWLRQVRIVWDELOL]DWLRQRSHUDWLRQXQLWVDQGUHDUDUHDXQLWV
of Homeland Reserve Divisions. The former is engaged in civil-military
operations, while the latter is responsible for security in rear areas.

3. Managing Mobilized Resources and Improving the
Execution System| The Mobilization of Troops and Materials | The MND
LV LPSURYLQJ WKH PRELOL]DWLRQ RI 5HVHUYH 'LYLVLRQV DQG 3UHFLVLRQ
5HSOHQLVKPHQW%DWWDOLRQVLQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHPRELOL]DWLRQGHVLJQDWLRQ
3. Mobilization Designation Ratio
The ratio of personnel and material
resources designated according to therequirements of wartime mobilization

ratio,3PRELOL]DWLRQGHVLJQDWLRQPHWKRGDQGGHVLJQDWLRQSULRULWLHVSHUWDLQLQJWRWKHIXWXUHPRELOL]DWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVWKDWPD\UHVXOWIURPPLOLWDU\IRUFH
restructuring. It is also anticipating the scope of the resources that could
EHPRELOL]HGWKURXJKVLPXODWLRQVDWHDFK5HJLRQDO0LOLWDU\0DQSRZHU
Administration.

1502010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 6.

7KH 01' LV UHYLVLQJ WKH 3HUVRQQHO 0RELOL]DWLRQ 6\VWHP VR WKDWPRELOL]HGWURRSVFDQEHSXWLQWRRSHUDWLRQLPPHGLDWHO\6RIDUWURRSVKDYHEHHQPRELOL]HGWRXQLWVLQWKHYLFLQLW\RIWKHLUUHVLGHQFHVRUWRRWKHUGHVLJQDWHGXQLWV8QGHUWKHQHZV\VWHPWURRSVZLOOEHPRELOL]HGWRWKH
units they used to serve in when they were active in the military. The
0RELOL]DWLRQ 'HVLJQDWLRQ 5DWLR RI VXLWDEOH 026 KROGHUV DQG UHVHUYH
forces – for those who have been reservists for four or less years – will be
increased by expanding the designated areas to include the entire nation. In
addition, the scope of similar specialties will be expanded.
0HDVXUHVDUHEHLQJVWXGLHGWRVWUHQJWKHQWKHYHUL¿FDWLRQRIWKHVXLWDELOLW\RIWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVWRHIIHFWPRELOL]DWLRQDQGWRPDNHHIILFLHQWXVHRITXDOLW\UHVRXUFHVLQWKHSULYDWHVHFWRUWRERRVWWKHPRELOL]DWLRQHIIRUWVCorporations with excellent production rates, or new products or new
WHFKQRORJ\ZLOOEHGHVLJQDWHGIRUPRELOL]DWLRQ'HVLJQDWHGHQWHUSULVHVIRU
PRELOL]DWLRQZLOOJRWKURXJKWUDLQLQJWRDGMXVWPRELOL]DWLRQDQGWRLPSURYHWKHLUSURGXFWLRQUDWHV)XWXUHPRELOL]DWLRQLQWKHFLYLOLDQVHFWRUZLOORFFXUWRDOORZIRUWKHVLPXOWDQHRXVPRELOL]DWLRQRISHUVRQQHODQGPDWHULDOV| Defense mobilization information system | The MND
LVJUDGXDOO\GHYHORSLQJWKH'HIHQVH0RELOL]DWLRQ,QIRUPDWLRQ6\VWHP
The first phase of system development, concerning the management andtraining of reserve forces, was completed in June 2006. This resulted
in a more efficient reserve forces by establishing the Daily Resource
6HWWOHPHQW6\VWHPDQGWKHFRPSXWHUL]HGWUDLQLQJV\VWHPIRUWKHUHVHUYH
IRUFHVLQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKWKH2I¿FHRI0LOLWDU\0DQSRZHU$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ
The first phase also laid the foundation for establishing a battalion leveltraining and management system. The second phase of the system, which
completed in August 2008, helped simplify the relevant administrative
ZRUNVXFKDVGHWHUPLQLQJWKHPRELOL]DWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWVYHULI\LQJWKH
available resources, coordinating and consulting, reporting the outcome of
PRELOL]DWLRQDQGGHVLJQDWLQJDQGPDQDJLQJHOLWHSHUVRQQHO
7KHWKLUGSKDVHRIV\VWHPGHYHORSPHQWZKLFKLQYROYHVWKHPRELOL]DWLRQRIPDWHULDOVVLQFH1RYHPEHULVWRHVWDEOLVKDQDWLRQZLGHPRELOL]DWLRQmanagement system in conjunction with the agencies concerned. Such a151

Section 4. Building Up Strong Reserve Forcessystem would support the Emergency Information System of the Ministryof Public Administration and Safety. By 2011, the foundation will beestablished on which national resources can be managed efficiently and
PRELOL]HGDWVKRUWQRWLFH

4. Managing the Reserve Forces and Establishing an
Operational System| Organization and resource management | The reserve
IRUFHVDUHFODVVL¿HGDVWKH0RELOL]HG5HVHUYH)RUFHDQG+RPHODQG'HIHQVH
5HVHUYH)RUFHGHSHQGLQJRQWKHPLVVLRQ7KH0RELOL]HG5HVHUYH)RUFHLV
composed of reserve force personnel that are discharged from active duty
The Establishment Ceremony of the50th Division Reserve Forces (Daegu,
Dec. 2009)

within four years. They function as augmenters to reinforce active units in
FDVHVZKHQXQLWVDUH¿UVWHVWDEOLVKHGDXJPHQWHGRUORVW7KH+RPHODQG
Defense Reserve Force is composed of reserve forces that are discharged
IURPDFWLYHGXW\IURP¿YHWRHLJKW\HDUV,WFRQGXFWVKRPHODQGGHIHQVHRSerations in the respective areas of responsibility (AOR).
Retired officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers are

4. Retirement Age
The retirement ages of active duty
personnel by rank: Sergeant First Class(E7) 45, Master Sergeant (E9) 53, Major
45, Lieutenant Colonel 53, Colonel 56.

obliged to attend reserve forces training they reach the retirement age,4 andeight years for enlisted service members as stipulated in the Military Personnel Management Act.
0DOHDQGIHPDOH.RUHDQFLWL]HQVDJHGRUDERYHFDQYROXQWHHUWRVHUYH
in the reserve forces. About 10,000 volunteers, including women, as ofMarch 2010 were enrolled as members of the Homeland Defense Reserve)RUFHV7KHVL]HRIWKHUHVHUYHIRUFHVVWRRGDWPLOOLRQDVRI0DUFK2010 and are composed of reserve forces at the Eup , Myeon and Dongregional level and reserve forces in workplaces. The status of the reserve
forces is shown in Table 6-2.

Table 6-2. Status of the Reserve Forces (As of March 2010)
Years passed following discharge from active duty

1522010 Defense White Paper

Unit: 10 thousand
Composition

Within one
to four years
followingdischarge from
active duty

Within ﬁve toeight years
followingdischarge from
active duty

Total

Reserve forcesat regional
level

Reserveforces in theworkplace

Total

132

161

293

225

68

293

Chapter 6.

| Establishing reserve forces management organization | As
SDUWRIPLOLWDU\UHVWUXFWXULQJWKH0RELOL]DWLRQ6XSSRUW*URXS+RPHODQG
Defense Reserve Battalion, and Reserve Force Education and Training
Group will be established to manage the reserve forces more efficiently.
7KH 0RELOL]DWLRQ 6XSSRUW *URXS ZKLFK ZLOO EH HVWDEOLVKHG LQ HDFKHomeland Reserve Division, will manage the resources, equipment
and materials related to the precision replenishment battalion, conduct
PRELOL]DWLRQWUDLQLQJGXULQJSHDFHWLPHSURYLGHVXSSRUWIRUHVWDEOLVKLQJWKH

The Establishment Ceremony of the
32nd Division Mobilization Support
Group (Yeongi-Gun, Chungnam
province, Oct. 2009)

Replacement BN and augment the frontline forces in wartime. As of 2010,
WKH0RELOL]DWLRQ6XSSRUW*URXSZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQWKUHHGLYLVLRQV$WRWDORIHOHYHQGLYLVLRQVZLOOEHKRPHWR0RELOL]DWLRQV6XSSRUW*URXSVE\
The Homeland Defense Reserve Battalion will start being establishedin 2014. It will replace the Resources Management Battalion, whichis composed of active duty personnel in each city-gun-gu level local
government, under the command of Homeland Reserve Division. The
Homeland Defense Reserve Battalion is to conduct homeland defense andregional stability operations, during war and peace times, such as in areas
UHODWLQJWRWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQWRIUHVHUYHIRUFHVFRPPDQG
and control of regional reserve forces, and preparation against terror attacks
and natural disasters. The Reserve Force Education and Training Group willtrain the reserve forces after the consolidation of some 200 training centers
to 46 advanced Reserve Force Education and Training Centers starting in
2014. The facilities of the Reserve Force Education and Training Group will
become user-friendly public places, taking the form of public parks, sports
facilities, experience learning centers, and security educational centers.

| Implementation of a Cadre Reservist Service System |The MND has laid the foundation for recruiting managers to oversee themanagement of the Reserve Forces Center by revising the regulations
pertaining to the recruitment of reserve forces managers.5 The recruitment
DQGPDQDJHPHQWRIUHVHUYLVWRI¿FHUVZDVDOVRGHWHUPLQHGE\PRGLI\LQJWKH
Cadre Reservist Service System.
Management of the reserve forces will entail recruiting military civilians
RQDFRQWUDFWEDVLVWRZRUNIRUWKH0RELOL]DWLRQ6XSSRUW*URXS+RPHODQG
Defense Reserve Battalion or Reserve Force Education and Training

5. Major points of the regulations
pertaining to the recruitment ofmanagers for the reserve forces·Qualifications required to apply foreach commanding officer position andreason for disqualification·Organizations in charge ofadministering recruitment exams andoutlining the exam procedures·Recruitment exam subjects andevaluative standards·Management of the Committee for
Screening and Review of Reserve
Force Unit Commanding Officers

153

Section 4. Building Up Strong Reserve ForcesGroup from July 2010. The status of the military civilians involved in the
management of the reserve forces is shown in Table 6-3.

Table 6-3. The Status of Military Civilians Involved in the Management of the Reserve Forces(As of July 2010)
Unit: person
Classiﬁcation

Regional company
commander

Mobilization supportgroup

Administrator

Army

3,602

64

360

Navy

138

-

-

Total

3,740

64

360

| Modernizing the reserve forces’ weaponry andsecuring combat gear | The Ministry is planning to replace obsolete
LQGLYLGXDO¿UHDUPVDQGFUHZVHUYHGZHDSRQVRIUHVHUYHIRUFHVZLWKQHZHUHTXLSPHQW2OGLQGLYLGXDO¿UHDUPVZLOOEHUHSODFHGZLWKWKH0$LQOLQH
with the Individual Firearm Replacement Plan for active units. Old crewserved weapons will also be gradually replaced.
50 percent of the combat gear for homeland defense will be secured by
2012, 70 percent by 2015, and 100 percent by 2020. Essential items forcombat and survival, such as bulletproof helmets and gas masks, will be
secured by acquiring active service supplies or drawing on the defense
budget and the budget for cultivating and supporting the reserve forces.

5. Reserve Force Educational and Training System
and Its Improvement
Most of the reserve forces undergo reserve force education and training to
EHFRPHIXOO\SUHSDUHGIRUZDUWLPHPRELOL]DWLRQDQGFDSDEOHRIFRQGXFWLQJ
homeland defense operations. Reserve Force Education and Training is
FODVVLILHGDVPRELOL]DWLRQWUDLQLQJVXSSOHPHQWDU\PRELOL]DWLRQUHVHUYH
training and homeland defense training. The training schedule by type andhour is shown in Table 6-4.

1542010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 6.

Table 6-4. Training Schedule by the Type (of Recipient)Classiﬁcationst(as of 2010)

Supplementary Basic training Training under
Mobilization
mobilization reserve for homeland homeland defense Roll calltraining
training
defenseoperational plans

Designated formobilization

Two nights
and three
days

-

-

-

Non-designatedmembers formobilization-

24 hours-

12 hoursth-

1 to 4

Exenlisted
soldiers

Designated formobilization
5th to 6th--

Non-designatedmembers formobilization
7th to 8th
Designated formobilization

Exofﬁcers

1st to 6th
Non-designatedmembers formobilization

8 hours

6 hours

8 hours

12hours

4
hours

Mobilization training (infantry-tank
combined arms training)

Organized without training
Two nights
and three
days

-

-

-

Mobilization training (artillery firetraining)

Two nights
and threedays

7th to 8thOrganized without training

Volunteers

6 hours| Training system and its improvement | The MND is improving
the reserve forces educational and training system to make its programs
more accessible to individuals and to yield greater results. Supplementary
PRELOL]DWLRQUHVHUYHWUDLQLQJDQGKRPHODQGGHIHQVHWUDLQLQJDUHFRQGXFWHG
using survival game equipment to mimic real combat situations at thereserve force educational and training centers. A measurement-based
passing system has been introduced to instill motivation.
A weekend reserve training institution has been introduced to help selfemployed businessmen and college students. Optional training schedules
offered online enable reservists to undergo training at their convenience.
The National Reserve Force Training System allows reservists to receive
training at a location of their choice. The training schedule, including theweekend schedule, is shown in Table 6-5.

155

Section 4. Building Up Strong Reserve ForcesTable 6-5. Training Schedule, including the Weekend Schedule

Unit: person (%)

Classiﬁcation

Total number oftrainees

Weekend training

National reserve
force training system

2007

1,616,808

12,070 (0.75)

-

2008

1,604,529

15,240 (0.95)

21,843 (1.36)

2009

1,561,259

15,561 (1.00)

71,789 (4.60)

The MND is making progress in improving food rationing andtransportation and training facilities associated with the education andtraining of the reserve forces. To this end, the MND is working on thefollowing: the expansion of dining provided by the training units, stricter
monitoring of the safety and hygienic standards for lunch box suppliers,
extension of public transportation routes, expansion of the shuttle bus
service to and from the training units, and installation of more fermentationbased latrines.

| Directions of reserve forces training and educational
development | It is necessary to keep the reserve forces strong byextending their educational and training hours to make up the fallingnumber of standing forces and shortening of the service period of active
duty personnel. The MND is planning to gradually extend the training hours
to the extent that training activities do not discomfort the public.
As of 2010, reserve force education and training is composed of
PRELOL]DWLRQ VXSSOHPHQWDU\ PRELOL]DWLRQ UROO FDOO EDVLF WUDLQLQJ IRUhomeland defense and training under the Homeland Defense Operational
Plans. From 2016, these five areas of training will be condensed into
WZRDUHDVPRELOL]DWLRQDQGKRPHODQGGHIHQVHWUDLQLQJZLWKDIRFXVRQ
preparation for war.
Part of the training program, including security education, will beavailable online and conveniently accessible from home. Voluntary training
will also be encouraged. The training schedule and its hourly increases by
year are shown in Table 6-6.

1562010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 6.

Table 6-6. Scheduled Hourly Increases by Year to the Reserved Forces Training Schedule-No training for members of the reserve forces who have been discharged from active duty for seven or more years

Classiﬁcation

2009-2010

Mobilization
training

Two nights and three days

Homelanddefense training

20-36 hours

2011-201520-36 hours(including a
two hour online
educationalsession from2012)

2016-2019

After 2020Three nights
and four days

Four nights andﬁve days

36 hours (including a four hour
online educational session)

The compensation for reserve forces education and training will be
increased over the short term to meet the real cost of participation. Over thelong haul, the compensation will be increased to the minimum wage level.
The trend in compensation by year is shown in Table 6-7.
Table 6-7. Cost of Supplementary Mobilization Reserve Training and Basic Training forHomeland Defense (Transportation + lunch/per day)

Unit: Won

Classiﬁcation

2007

2008

2009

2010

Sum

5,300

6,000

7,000

9,000

157

Section 4. Building Up Strong Reserve Forces5SectionEstablishing a Network-Centric
Defense Informatization
Environment
Defense informatization seeks to establish the network-centric operational environment that is requiredin the future battlefield. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has been establishing battlefieldmanagement by information superiority and efficient defense management as well as ubiquitous
information communications infrastructure that allows on-demand information to be accessed atanytime and anyplace through defense informatization. The MND is improving the informatization
promotion framework based on the Defense Informatization Act to advance its informatization
environment and reinforcing its information security systems to more effectively cope with transnational

1. Defense Information Resource
Defense information and anciliary
resources required for defense
informatization such as equipment,
technology, manpower, budget and soforth
2. Major points of the Act of Foundation
for Defense Informatization and Defense
Information Resource Management·Establishing the strategic plan,
enterprise architecture, and integrated
decision making system·Timely adoption of new IT technology
to national defense and appointing
organizations to take exclusive chargeof informatization·Enhancement of interoperability,
reinforcement of standardization, andstrengthened protection of information
security·Acquiring and systematically managing
defense information resources·Establishing project management
strategy and procedure for defense
informatization in consideration of IT
technology characteristics·Improving the evaluation system toenhance transparency and boost theeffect of policies and projects
st*Effective on 1 Jan. 2011. Composition:
Preamble, 7 chapters, 28 articles and2 riders.

1582010 Defense White Paper

cyber threats.

1. Defense Informatization Promotion Framework| Defense Informatization Act established | The Act Regarding
WKH )RXQGDWLRQ IRU 'HIHQVH ,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQ DQG 'HIHQVH ,QIRUPDWLRQResource1 Management was established on February 4, 2010 to pursue
GHIHQVHLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQDFRUHORFRPRWLYHIRUEXLOGLQJPLOLWDU\FDSDELOLW\
DQGDQHI¿FLHQWPHDQVRIQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHPDQDJHPHQW
7KH 'HIHQVH ,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQ$FW2 has reflected the changes in the
GHIHQVHLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQHQYLURQPHQWDQGWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRILQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\ 7KH 01' ZLOO GHYHORS GHIHQVH LQIRUPDWL]DWLRQ V\VWHPDFFRUGLQJ WR WKH 'HIHQVH ,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQ$FW E\ LQWHJUDWLQJ ZHDSRQV
systems and non-weapons systems, which have been developed separately
7KH'HIHQVH,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQ$FWLVH[SHFWHGWREULQJDERXWWKHWLPHO\establishment of a network-centric defense information systems. Thesesystems would be capable of collecting advanced defense information

Chapter 6.

technology, managing defense information resources systematically,
GHYHORSLQJGHIHQVHLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQLQWDQGHPZLWKWKHQDWLRQDOGULYHIRU
LQIRUPDWL]DWLRQDQGDFTXLULQJWKHUHVRXUFHVQHFHVVDU\WRSXUVXHGHIHQVH
LQIRUPDWL]DWLRQ| Developing defense informatization governance | The
01' HVWDEOLVKHG DQG KDV EHHQ GHYHORSLQJ 'HIHQVH ,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQGovernance 3 in consideration of the military characteristics and the
GHYHORSPHQWDOWUHQGVLQLQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\'HIHQVH,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQ*RYHUQDQFHLQFRUSRUDWHVUHODWHGLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQVWRJHWKHUZLWKthe management, operation and maintenance of information systems and is
VSHFL¿HGLQWKH'HIHQVH,QIRUPDWLRQ6HUYLFH$FWDQGGLUHFWLYHVRURUGHUVRI
the MND.

3. Defense Informatization Governance
A formalized system to govern theestablishment of an informatization
strategy and plan that matches thevision and objectives of national
defense. The decision making
mechanism, institutions involved andprocedures are based on participationand communication.

The vision of the MND is network-centric knowledge-based defense
LQIRUPDWL]DWLRQ WR SURPRWH WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI JRDORULHQWHG GHIHQVH
LQIRUPDWL]DWLRQ7KHPDVWHUSODQIRUWKHFRPSUHKHQVLYHGHYHORSPHQWDQG
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIVXFKDV\VWHPKDVDOUHDG\EHHQHVWDEOLVKHGWRUHDOL]HWKHYLVLRQ7KHPDVWHUSODQIRUWKHGHIHQVHLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQLVFRPSRVHG
RIWKH'HIHQVH,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQ3ROLFLHVDQGWKH6WUDWHJLF3ODQIRU'HIHQVH,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQDQGWKH,QWHJUDWHG(QWHUSULVH$UFKLWHFWXUH4 The Defense,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQ3ROLFLHVSXEOLVKHGLQVHWWKHSROLF\GLUHFWLRQVIRU
GHIHQVHLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQDQGHQFRPSDVVWKHORQJWRPLGWHUPGHYHORSPHQW
SODQV7KH6WUDWHJLF3ODQIRU'HIHQVH,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQDQGWKH,QWHJUDWHG

4. Integrated Enterprise Architecture
A comprehensive design that contains
the structure and interrelations of thesystem components, its current status,
future objectives and implementationplans to achieve the set goals.

Enterprise Architecture was established at the end of 2010.
7KH GHIHQVH LQIRUPDWL]DWLRQ SROLF\ LV DLPHG DW LQWHJUDWHG DQG JRDORULHQWHGLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQLQIRUPDWLRQVKDULQJEDVHGRQLQWHURSHUDELOLW\
improving the effectiveness of information systems and promoting
cooperation between civilians, the government and the military. What will
result is a network centric operational environment that allows information
WREHVKDUHGDQGXWLOL]HGLQUHDOWLPH$VWUDWHJ\KDVEHHQPDSSHGRXWWRDGYDQFHWKHµ,QIRUPDWLRQ6HUYLFHV,QIUDDQG,QIRUPDWL]DWLRQ3URPRWLRQFramework’ that is provided through defense information systems. The
defense information systems are shown in Table 6-8. The systems arecomposed of advancement in five areas, 5 the implementation of four

5. Five Areas where the defense
information systems are to be advanced
Infrastructures, Applications, Modelingand Simulation, Interoperability
and Standardization, Information
Assurance

159

Section 5. Establishing a Network-Centric Defense Informatization Environment6. Four Initiatives·Providing the legal basis for pursuingdefense informatization·Establishing the blueprint for
informatization·Establishing an integrated information
management system·Expanding soft infraware

initiatives6WRERRVWLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQDQGDGYDQFHPHQWVLQWKUHHPDQDJHPHQWsystems7WRERRVWPDQDJHPHQWDQGRSHUDWLRQDOHI¿FLHQF\
Table 6-8. Structure of the Defense Information System
Classiﬁcation

Major system
Joint Strategic C4I Systems (KJCCS)

7. Three Management Systems
Information Resources Management,
Informatization Performance
Management, and Information
Communications Service Management

Battleﬁeld
Management
Information
Systems

Business
Management
Information
Systems

8. Modeling & Simulation (M&S)
Simulation of natural phenomena byutilizing computers.

Command andControl Systems

Combined C4I Systems (AKJCCS)
Tactical C4I Systems (ATCIS, KNCCS, AFCCS)

Military Intelligence
Systems

Military Information Management System (MIMS)

Combat Command
Systems

Combat Command Systems (BTCS, KNTDS, MCRC)

Planning and
Financing
Information Systems

Integrated Defense Financial Information System andOthersInformation System
for Logistics andFacilities

Logistics Information System and Facilities Information
System and Others

Information System
for Personnel andMobilization

Personnel Information System and Mobilization
Information System and Others

Information System
for Electronic
Administration

Onnara System and Archives Management System andOthersInfrastructure

Satellite Communication Networks and Broadband
Convergence Network Tactical Communication
Networks, Hardware, such as Servers and PCs, andEncryption Equipment and Others

Modeling and Simulation Systems

War Game Models, Analysis and Acquisition M&S8
Models and Others.

| Establishing the integrated architecture for the defense
information systems | The MND is establishing enterprise architecture
for the defense information systems to systematically maintain information
resource management and ensure interoperability between information
systems. As shown in figure 6-8, the Defense Information System$UFKLWHFWXUHLQFOXGHVEDWWOH¿HOGPDQDJHPHQWEXVLQHVVPDQDJHPHQWDQG
joint war games. The Integrated Defense Information System Architecture
presents the systems currently being operated, the future objectives of the
V\VWHPDQGWKHWUDQVLWLRQSODQVWRDFKLHYHWKHREMHFWLYHVLQDVWDQGDUGL]HG
manner that can be easily understood by all users.

1602010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 6.

Figure 6-8. Plan to Establish the Integrated Defense System Architecture
Establishment ofInfrastructure
2007

2008

Establishing
EnterpriseArchitecture for the
Ministry of National
DefenseHeadquarters

Establishing the Integrated
Architecture for the Defense
Information Systems
2009

2010

Establishing Integrated
Architecture centeringon the Business
Management System

Advancement
After 2011

Combined
Business /Battleﬁeld
EnterpriseArchitecture

Advancement ofEnterpriseArchitecture

EstablishingArchitecture on
the Unique Functionsof Each Services
Establishing
Battleﬁeld
EnterpriseArchitecture

Establishing Enterprise Architecture
for the Battleﬁeld Management System

Studying the Concept of
War Game EnterpriseArchitecture

Establishing War
Game EnterpriseArchitecture

Program Management Ofﬁce(PMO)

The Business Management Information System Architecture wasestablished and is supervised by the MND on information systems for the
consolidated defense business management and the unique functions of
HDFK6HUYLFH7KH%DWWOH¿HOG0DQDJHPHQW,QIRUPDWLRQ6\VWHP$UFKLWHFWXUH
was established and is supervised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was
integrated with the Business Management Information System Architecture
to form the Integrated Defense Information System Architecture in 2010.
In modeling and simulation area, war game enterprise architecture is being
established mostly for exercise and training models and will be incorporated
in the integrated architecture for information systems. The integrated
architecture for the Defense Information Systems will be further developed
and refined from the viewpoint of national defense comprehensively from,WZLOOSURYLGHWKHEOXHSULQWIRUIXWXUHGHIHQVHLQIRUPDWL]DWLRQ
7KH01'FDUULHVRXW3URJUDP0DQDJHPHQW2I¿FHWRJXDUDQWHHSURIHVVLRQDO
project management and product quality in order to pursue successful
implementation of The Integrated Defense Information System Architecture.
Integrated Architecture for the Defense Information contributes to determining
the requirements of the Defense Information Systems and improving its

161

Section 5. Establishing a Network-Centric Defense Informatization Environment9. MND-ARMS (Architecture Repository
Management System)
A system that efficiently uses andmanages architectural products.

SHUIRUPDQFH7KH'HIHQVH(QWHUSULVH$UFKLWHFWXUHXWLOL]HV01'$5069 as acomprehensive tool to manage its products.

2. Advancement of the Defense Information System
and Guaranteeing Its Interoperability| Information communications service and infrastructure
improvements | The MND is seeking to create a user-oriented Defense
Information Systems and to improve the system’s infrastructure through the
10. Virtualization
Technology that logically combines ordivides systems with different physicalcharacteristics, such as hardware andsoftware, to ensure the efficient use of
information resources.

XVHRIYLUWXDOL]DWLRQWHFKQRORJ\10
For these purposes, the MND will seek the investment of the private
sector to establish a broadband convergence network for national defense
by the end of 2010. The broadband convergence network will lay thegroundwork for fixed and mobile convergence network by providing up

11. Broadband convergence network
bandwidth
10Gbps for the operational command
level and beyond, 2.5 Gbps for the corps
level, 622Mbps for the division level,and 155Mbps for the regiment level andbelow.
12. IP (Internet Protocol)
International standard data
communications protocol. It is thestandard for Internet use.

to 10 Gbps bandwidth11 to each echelon of individual units. As a result,the strategic and tactical networks, including ground and aerial/satellite
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVQHWZRUNVZLOOEHVWDQGDUGL]HGDVDQ,312 and develop into
an integrated wired and wireless network. The composition of the Defense,QIRUPDWLRQDQG&RPPXQLFDWLRQV1HWZRUNLVVKRZQLQ)LJXUH
Figure 6-9. Composition of the Defense Information and Communications Network
Satellite
communications
systems

Commercial
satellite

All-IP convergence network

Stratosphererepeater

Militarysatellite

Airborne
data relay
UAV

Airborne
communications
systemLINK-K

Tacticalcommunications
systemLINK-K

TICN

Fixed
communications
system1622010 Defense White Paper

Satellite with both
civilian and military
purposes

LINK-K
Satellite network for
Sensormaritime operations
network Combat wireless network
Microwave network
Optical communications network

Submarine
networkChapter 6.

An indigenously developed WiBro13 Communication Network was
established in an Air Base for demonstrative purposes, and has expanded
into another Services. The defense IPTV network’s 30,000 or so circuits
were in operation in the barracks as of 2010 to provide various cultural

13. WiBro (Wireless Broadband)
Locally developed mobile wireless data
communications technology developedin Korea that makes Internet use andvoice calls possible.

contents to service members and make distance learning possible.
The MND will consolidate currently operational computing centers in eachlevel of the services and units into two Consolidated Defense Information
services can be easily accessed. The Consolidated Defense Information
Data Center, a data center serving as an infrastructural environment, will be
HTXLSSHGZLWKYLUWXDOL]DWLRQWHFKQRORJ\WRDFFRPPRGDWHYDULRXVDSSOLFDWLRQV
composed of various software and hardware devices, such as servers andstorage devices.
In addition, and in line with the eco-friendly green growth policy of thegovernment, green IT technology will be applied to the power and heat
management system of the Consolidated Defense Information Data Centerin order to reduce energy consumption.

| Strengthening the interoperability of the defense
information systems | The Defense Information Systems haveto undergo interoperability verification and evaluation at every major
stage from the proposal of requirements to deployment. The MND
will develop the relevant interoperability policies and institution. The
Joint Interoperability Technology Center of the Defense Command/&RPPXQLFDWLRQV&RPPDQGHYDOXDWHVDQGFHUWL¿HVLQWHURSHUDELOLW\
In 2010, the Joint Interoperability Technology Center established a
Test Facility, which reinforced its evaluation methods according to thecharacteristics of objective systems and improved levels of interoperability,
including the Level of Information System Interoperability (LISI)Assessment. 14 It is also upgrading the functionality of the Defense
Interoperability Portal (DIPS)15 established in 2008.
7KH LQWHURSHUDELOLW\EDVHG WHFKQRORJ\ WR EH XWLOL]HG E\ WKH 'HIHQVH
Information System is being developed based on the Common Operating

14. Levels of Information System
Interoperability (LISI)
A procedure that evaluates a
specific information system or theinteroperability level between systems
to determine the performance of thesystem.
15. Defense Interoperability Portal
System (DIPS)
A portal system that oversees theintroduction, testing and evaluation of
defense interoperability businesses.

163

Section 5. Establishing a Network-Centric Defense Informatization Environment16. Common Operating Environment(COE)
An environment in which existing
software is recycled to reducethe developmental period for an
information system and to improve its
interoperability.
17. Shared Data Environment (SHADE)
An environment that allows for the
standardization of commonly used dataso as to improve interoperability.

Environment (COE)16 and Shared Data Environment (SHADE).17 The
Common Operating Environment (COE) improves interoperability andshortens developmental periods by registering the major functions ascomponents that are shared in the Defense Information Systems andrecycling them. The Defense Component Management System wasRYHUKDXOHGDQGWKHOLVWRIFRPSRQHQWVPRGLILHGLQWRDOORZIRUWKH
systematic registration and addition of new components.

:LWKUHJDUGWRWKHGDWDVKDULQJHQYLURQPHQWWKHGDWDXVHGIRUEDWWOH¿HOGDQG
EXVLQHVVPDQDJHPHQWLQIRUPDWLRQV\VWHPVDUHEHLQJVWDQGDUGL]HGDQGGHIHQVH
modeling and simulation data are being expanded. The Defense Information
18. Defense Information TechnicalStandard (DITS)
A system that standardizes by typeand method the classification of theinformation technology related todefense.

Technical Standards18 for the Defense Information Systems and Technical
6WDQGDUGL]DWLRQZHUHUHYLVHGDFURVVWKHERDUGLQDQGDUHQRZDFFHVVLEOH
on the Internet. The Defense Information Technical Standards is established inline with the international and national standards and revised twice a year inorder that new technologies can be applied to the defense sector.

3. Strengthening the Capability to Respond to Cyber
Threats| Advancing the information protection system andsecuring cyber response technology | The Ministry of National
Defense is strengthening its information assurance systems to guarantee
mission completeness of military operations during times of peace and war,against cyber threats, which have been becoming increasingly intelligent
and virulent. The MND revised the Directive on Information Assurance
LQWRHVWDEOLVKDQLQIRUPDWLRQDVVXUDQFHV\VWHPDQGV\VWHPDWLFDOO\manage the response process in preparation for cyber threats. Computer
19. Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT)
An organization that prevents or
responds immediately to computer andnetwork-based attacks. It is equippedwith an information security integrated
control system.

Emergency Response Teams (CERT)19 have been established at the corps
level and oversee the Defense Information Systems 24 hours a day, and areon constant alert for threats.
The MND is redefining missions of each agency for information
assurance and has established a Cyber Warfare Response Center inaccordance with the establishment of the Cyber Command.
Every computers connected to the Defense Information Network have1642010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 6.

HTXLSSHG ZLWK YLUXV LPPXQL]DWLRQ V\VWHPV GHWHFWLRQ DQG SUHYHQWLQJ
systems for hacking attempts and hacking mail protection systems to
PLQLPL]H GDPDJH IURP KDFNLQJ DQG YLUXV LQIHFWLRQV7KH LQIRUPDWLRQFRPPXQLFDWLRQHTXLSPHQWEHLQJXWLOL]HGLQWKH%DWWOHILHOG0DQDJHPHQW
Information Systems are operated in a separate encrypted network to
PLQLPL]HWKHFKDQFHVRISRVVLEOHDWWDFNVThe Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Protection System wasestablished in the major information systems in 2010. The right to access
important data has been classified in various levels to ensure stable
operation of the information sharing environment, which is protected by the&ODVVL¿HG'DWD0DQDJHPHQW6\VWHP6\VWHPVWRGLDJQRVHDQGSUHYHQWWKH
release of personal information have been implemented to better protect of
personal information.

| Strengthening cooperation in order to respond to cyberthreats | International coordination and information exchanges are
becoming increasingly important to respond to cyber threats, which have
EHFRPHDJOREDOLVVXH7KH01'FRQFOXGHGLQ$SULOD0HPRUDQGXPRI8QGHUVWDQGLQJRQ,QIRUPDWLRQ$VVXUDQFHDQG&RRSHUDWLRQRQ&RPSXWHU
1HWZRUN'HIHQVHZLWKWKH86'HSDUWPHQWRI'HIHQVH,WLVDLPHGDWVWUHQJWKHQLQJFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQWKH52.DQGWKH86LQGHDOLQJZLWKcyber threats.
6LQFH  WKH 01' KDV EHHQ KROGLQJ WKH 52.86 ,QIRUPDWLRQAssurance Working Group Meetings in accordance with the Agreement
RQWKH&RPSRVLWLRQDQG2SHUDWLRQRIWKH52.86,QIRUPDWLRQ$VVXUDQFH
:RUNLQJ*URXSWKDWZDVVLJQHGE\ERWKSDUWLHVLQ1RYHPEHU$OVRVLQFHWKH01'KDVSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&\EHU'HIHQVH:RUNVKRSVXSHUYLVHGE\WKH86'HSDUWPHQWRI'HIHQVHWZLFHD\HDUWR
enhance its cyber warfare capability and increases bilateral cooperation on
information assurance.
The MND has also bolstered its cooperation with the nation’s
governmental agencies by sharing information on responding to cyberthreats. It has hosted seminars on the defense information assurance every
year and has trained experts in information assurance.

165

Section 5. Establishing a Network-Centric Defense Informatization Environment

7

Chapter

Improving theCultivation,
Educational andTraining Systems for
Defense Personnel
Section 1. Developing Defense Personnel Operations
and Management System
Section 2. Realignment of the Mental Strength
Education System
Section 3. Cultivating Strong Warriors by Concentrating
Efforts on Training and Education
Section 4. Improving the Educational System for/FÜCERSTO"OOST*OINTNESSAND%FÜCIENCYMarine Corps Amphibious Training (May 2009)

1

SectionDeveloping Defense Personnel
Operations and Management
SystemThe Ministry of National Defense (MND) is establishing a defense personnel procurement system
and an excellent human resources procurement system in order to cope proactively with changes
in the environment of securing, on a stable basis, excellent human resources who will play a majorrole in the battlefields. It guarantees optimized tracts for promotion to ensure job security, while
maintaining a personnel structure centering on cadres and is expanding the opportunities for excellent
personnel to choose military service as their career. It has also established and developed a personnel
management system based on expertise building so that exemplary human resources can be selected
and appointed to those positions at which they are most required.

1. Procuring and Managing Defense Personnel
The MND is shifting the focus of personnel structure from enlisted men
WRRI¿FHUVZLWKWKHUHTXLVLWHH[SHUWLVHVRDVWRIRVWHUDWHFKQRORJ\LQWHQVLYHSHUVRQQHOVWUXFWXUH,WLVSXUVXLQJDSROLF\IRUSURFXULQJDQGPDQDJLQJ
GHIHQVHSHUVRQQHODQGSODFLQJHPSKDVLVRQLPSURYLQJSHUVRQQHOVWUXFWXUH
DQGWKHSHUVRQQHOSURFXUHPHQWV\VWHPIRURI¿FHUVDQGQRQFRPPLVVLRQHG
RI¿FHUVDQGRQXWLOL]LQJIHPDOHUHVRXUFHV| Designing an optimum personnel structure | The MND
LVUHYLVLQJWKHSHUVRQQHOVWUXFWXUHWRPDLQWDLQWKHRSWLPXPOHYHORIVHUYLFHSHULRGIRUHDFKUDQNDQGHQVXUHSURPRWLRQWRWKHXSSHUUDQNVWKXVHQVXULQJ
WKHMREVHFXULW\RIRI¿FHUVDQGQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRI¿FHUV
7KHFXUUHQWSHUVRQQHOVWUXFWXUHLVWKHLQHI¿FLHQW0DVVLYH3URFXUHPHQW6KRUWWHUP6HUYLFHDQG0DVVLYH/RVVV\VWHP)LUVWDQGVHFRQGOLHXWHQDQWV
FRQVWLWXWHDGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHVKDUHRIWKHHQWLUHPLOLWDU\VWUXFWXUHDQGUHWLUHDIWHUWZRWRWKUHH\HDUVRIVHUYLFHPDNLQJLWGLI¿FXOWWRVHFXUHWKHH[SHUWLVH

168 2010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 7.

RIPLOLWDU\RIILFHUV,IWKHV\VWHPLVFKDQJHGWRWKHµ/RZ3URFXUHPHQW
DQG/RQJWHUP6HUYLFH¶V\VWHPWKHQH[SHUWLVHFRXOGEHEHWWHUVHFXUHG+RZHYHU VXFK D FKDQJH FDQ OHDG WR D EXGJHW LQFUHDVH DV WKH QXPEHURIXSSHUOHYHORIILFHUVLQFUHDVHV,QDGGLWLRQWKLVLQFUHDVHGQXPEHURIKLJKUDQNLQJRIILFHUVZRXOGZHDNHQWKHPLOLWDU\VWUXFWXUHFHQWHULQJRQ
FRPPDQGLQJRI¿FHUV7KHUHIRUHWKHSHUVRQQHOVWUXFWXUHZLOOEHUHYLVHGWRHQVXUHWKHRSWLPXPOHYHORISURPRWLRQZLWKLQHDFKUDQNDQGWRVHFXUHMREVHFXULW\)RULQVWDQFH
DVIRURI¿FHUVWKHUDWLRRIFRPSDQ\JUDGHVZLOOEHORZHUHGZKLOHWKHUDWLR
RI¿HOGJUDGHVZLOOEHUDLVHG$VIRUQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRI¿FHUVWKHUDWLRRIVWDIIVHUJHDQWVZLOOEHUHGXFHGZKLOHWKHUDWLRRIVHUJHDQWV¿UVWFODVVDQG
DERYHZLOOEHH[SDQGHGVRWKDWH[SHUWLVHZLWKLQHDFKUDQNDQGSHUVRQQHOHI¿FLHQF\FDQEHIRVWHUHG| Improving the procurement system and recruitment
methods for excellent personnel | ,WLVSDUDPRXQWWRHVWDEOLVKYDULRXVSURFXUHPHQWDQGHGXFDWLRQDOSURFHVVHVLQDUDWLRQDOPDQQHUDQG
WRVHFXUHDFXVWRPL]HGSHUVRQQHOSURFXUHPHQWV\VWHPWRUHFUXLWH[FHOOHQWPLOLWDU\RI¿FHUV)LUVWWKHFXUUHQWYDULRXVRI¿FHUWUDLQLQJFRXUVHVLQFOXGLQJWKH0LOLWDU\$FDGHPLHVDQG527&DUHH[SHQVLYHDQGLQHI¿FLHQWIRUVHFXULQJH[FHOOHQWSHUVRQQHOEHFDXVHRIWKHZLGHGLVFUHSDQF\EHWZHHQWKHRIILFHUVIURPWKH
GLIIHUHQWWUDLQLQJFRXUVHVLQWHUPVRIWKHLUFDSDELOLWLHV7KHWUDLQLQJFRXUVHVZLOOWKXVEHFRPELQHGWRDUHDVRQDEOHGHJUHH
6HFRQGDSODQWRUHFUXLWIHPDOH527&FDQGLGDWHVLVXQGHUZD\7KH
\HDUO\JRDOIRUUHFUXLWLQJIHPDOHRI¿FHUVFDQGLGDWHVE\WKH$UP\VWDQGVDWDERXW6RPHSRUWLRQRIWKLVTXRWDZLOOEHSURFXUHGIURPWKH527&
6HYHQ FROOHJHV ZHUH FKRVHQ RQ D WULDO EDVLV LQ 6HSWHPEHU  DQG
VL[W\527&FDQGLGDWHVZLOOLQLWLDOO\EHFKRVHQDQGXVHGDVWKHEDVLVIRU
GHWHUPLQLQJIXWXUHH[SDQVLRQRIWKH527&IRUIHPDOHFDQGLGDWHV
7KLUG PLOLWDU\UHODWHG GHSDUWPHQWV KDYH EHHQ HVWDEOLVKHG LQ FHUWDLQXQLYHUVLWLHVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHDJUHHPHQWUHDFKHGEHWZHHQWKHDFDGHPLDDQG

169

Section 1. Developing Defense Personnel Operations and Management SystemWKHPLOLWDU\7KLVLVDFXVWRPL]HGSURFXUHPHQWV\VWHPZKLFKFDQUHGXFHWKH
FRVWDQGWLPHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKFXOWLYDWLQJWKHUHTXLUHGSHUVRQQHOFRPSDUHGZLWKSURFXULQJSHUVRQQHOE\WKHPLOLWDU\DORQH0LOLWDU\UHODWHGGHSDUWPHQWV
ZHUHHVWDEOLVKHGLQIRXUXQLYHUVLWLHVIURPWRLQHLJKWXQLYHUVLWLHV
LQDQGPRUHDUHSODQQHGDIWHUZKLFKZRXOGUHVXOWLQDWRWDO
RIWHQXQLYHUVLWLHV'HSDUWPHQWVIRUWKHWUDLQLQJRIQRQFRPPLVVLRQHG
RIILFHUVZHUHHVWDEOLVKHGLQMXQLRUFROOHJHVLQDQGWKLVQXPEHUZLOOLQFUHDVHWRDIWHU7KHRI¿FHUVDQGQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRI¿FHUVSURGXFHGE\WKHVHXQLYHUVLWLHVDQGMXQLRUFROOHJHVDUHHVWLPDWHGWRSHUIRUP
EHWWHUWKDQWKRVHIURPJHQHUDOGHSDUWPHQWVLQWHUPVRIWKH2I¿FHU¶V%DVLF
&RXUVH 2%& DQGWKHLU¿HOGPLVVLRQFDSDELOLWLHV7KHDJUHHPHQWVEHWZHHQ
WKHDFDGHPLDDQGWKHPLOLWDU\ZLOOEHH[SDQGHGEDVHGRQWKHPHULWVRIWKH
FXVWRPL]HG SHUVRQQHO SURFXUHPHQW V\VWHP7KH VFKHGXOHG DJUHHPHQWV
EHWZHHQWKHDFDGHPLDDQGWKHPLOLWDU\DUHVKRZQLQ7DEOH
Table 7-1. Scheduled Agreements between Academia and the Military
Classiﬁcation

2010

After 2015

Military
departments

Eight universities(320 students)

Ten universities(400 students)

Departments forNonthe training of noncommissioned
commissioned
ofﬁcersofﬁcers

37 junior colleges(3,640 students)

45 junior colleges(4,500 students)

Ofﬁcers)RXUWKWKHUDWLRRIFROOHJHVWXGHQWVDSSO\LQJWREHFRPHRIILFHUVKDV
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1702010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 7.

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| Increasing the efficiency and stability of personnel
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Table 7-2. Extension of the Retirement Age According to the Amended Military Personnel
Management Law in 1989 and 1993
Rank

Before 1989

1989 to 1993

After 1993

Note

Colonels

50 years of age

53 years of age(+ 3 years)

56 years of age(+ 3 years)+ 6 years

Lieutenantcolonels

47 years of age

49 years of age(+ 2 years)

53 years of age(+ 4 years)+ 6 years

Majors43 years of age

45 years of age(+ 2 years)

45 years of age+ 2 years

Sergeant
majors

50 years of age

53 years of age(+ 3 years)

55 years of age(+ 2 years)+ 5 years

171

Section 1. Developing Defense Personnel Operations and Management System,QRUGHUWRHDVHWKHSUREOHPRIRIILFHUVVHUYLQJIRUH[FHVVLYHO\ORQJSHULRGVDWWKHVDPHUDQNDVDUHVXOWRIWKHH[WHQGHGUHWLUHPHQWDJHWKH
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personnel.
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VSHFLDOW\| Expanding female resources and improving service
conditions | 7KH01'LVH[SDQGLQJWKHXVHRIIHPDOHUHVRXUFHV,Q
1. Female Defense Personnel
Female public servants working at the
MND, female soldiers in each Service
and female military civilians.

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Table 7-3. Status of Female Soldiers
Officers

Unit: No. of soldiers
Non-commissioned officers
Total1722010 Defense White Paper

Army

Navy

Air Force

Sub-total

Army

Navy

2,328

324

398

3,050

1,996

457

Air Force Sub-total
700

3,153

6,203

Chapter 7.

Table7-4. Status of Female Public Servants and Female Military Civilians
Unit: No. of persons
Female public servants

Female military civilians

Level
4-5

Level
6-7

Level
8 and
under

Subtotal

Level
3-5

Level
6-7

Level
8 and
under

Subtotal

Total

44

102

158

304

173

1,245

2,918

4,336

4,640

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Table 7-5. Goal to Expand the end-strength of Female Soldiers (by 2016)
Classification

Original plan

Revised upward

Female officers

5 % of the end-strength of
officers

5.5%

Female NCOs

7 % of the end-strength of
NCOs

7.7%

Table 7-6. Female Soldiers Expansion Target by Year

Female soldiers conducting their
missions

Unit: No. of persons

Classification

Army

Navy

Air Force

Total

2010

4,700

834

1,108

6,642

2016

7,224

1,725

1,603

10,552

2020

7,976

1,866

1,728

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173

Section 1. Developing Defense Personnel Operations and Management System)HPDOHVROGLHUVKRZHYHUDUHSURKLELWHGIURPDVVXPLQJSRVLWLRQVWKDWLQYROYHJURXQGFORVHFRPEDWDWWKHEDWWDOLRQOHYHORUXQGHUDQGIURPEHLQJGLVSDWFKHGWRXQLWVHQJDJLQJLQVSHFLDORSHUDWLRQVRUORQJUDQJHUHFRQQDLVVDQFHPLVVLRQV
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2. Gender recognition
An ability to recognize and consider
the impact of sexual (biological)
differences and social and culturalgender differences on the life of men
and women.

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3. Counselor System for Addressing
Female Grievances
Operation: a total of 542 counselors(female soldiers and military civilians)
at the division and brigade level andabove.
Mission: counseling for and solving
complaints, education about preventing
sexual harassment and support foradapting to the units.

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4. Assessment of impact by gender
The possible impact of government
policies on men and women is analyzed
to reduce the social cost that may arise
from sexual and gender discrimination.

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Chapter 7.

2. Securing a Fair and Rational Personnel Management
System
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Professional areas of officers

175

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1762010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 7.

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177

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1782010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 7.

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3. Education and Management of Professional
Defense Personnel
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179

Section 1. Developing Defense Personnel Operations and Management SystemIURPLQWRLQWRFXOWLYDWHSURIHVVLRQDOVNLOOVRIORQJWHUPVHUYLQJRI¿FHUVDQGVDWLVI\WKHLUGHVLUHIRUVHOIGHYHORSPHQW

| Military education overseas | (QWUXVWLQJHGXFDWLRQWRPLOLWDU\HGXFDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGUHVHDUFKLQVWLWXWHVRYHUVHDVLVEHLQJH[SDQGHGWRSURGXFHUHJLRQDOVSHFLDOLVWVZLWKH[SHUWLVHLQYDULRXVFRXQWULHVDQGWRKHOSRI¿FHUVJDLQDGYDQFHGPLOLWDU\NQRZOHGJH7KHQXPEHURIRI¿FHUVHQWUXVWHG
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1802010 Defense White Paper

2

Realignment of the Mental
Strength Education System

Section4HE-INISTRYISCOMMITTEDTOINSTILLINGAÜRMSENSEOFTHEIRNATION ACORRECTVIEWONSECURITYANDTHE
military spirit (esprit de corps) in service members. It is developing the Mental Strength Education
System, under which service members will be provided with education commensurate with their
specialties and levels. This system will also allow for the content and educational strategies to be
cultivated and the ideal preparation and support for the educational materials to be executed.

1. The Meaning and Contents of the Mental Strength
Education System
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181

Section 2. Realignment of the Mental Strength Education System$¿UPVHQVHRIVHFXULW\DQGDZDUHQHVVRIWKHHQHP\FRPHIURPDFOHDUSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHPLOLWDU\PLVVLRQ7KHPLOLWDU\PLVVLRQLVDERXWSURWHFWLQJWKHQDWLRQIURPHQHPLHVZKRSRVHDJUDYHWKUHDWWRWKHH[LVWHQFHDQG
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2. Developing an Educational System Befitting
the Characteristics of a New Generation of Service
Members
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1. Practical education
Training and education for soldiers
to naturally acquire and internalize
military spirit in their daily routines,
which encompass life in their living
quarters, daily duties, unit activities
to increase a sense of unity, military
ceremonies and sports activities.

1822010 Defense White Paper

YLHZRQQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\DQGWKHRWKHUGHVLUDEOHYDOXHVUHTXLUHGRIVHUYLFH
members.
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2. Character building educational
program
A program designed to help service
members develop a positive mental
attitude, new value system and modeof behavior by appealing to their
sensibilities and rationality.

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183

Section 2. Realignment of the Mental Strength Education System3SectionCultivating Strong Warriors
by Concentrating Efforts on
Training and Education
The purpose of military training and education is to 'cultivate a strong military and strong warriors capableof fending off an enemy.' To that end, all service members and all units take part in combat-mission
ORIENTEDTRAININGOFREALBATTLEÜELDSITUATIONSWITHTHEMOTTOTRAINASINÜGHTING ANDÜGHTASTRAINEDTOFULÜLLTHEIRMISSIONDURINGWARTIMEANDPEACETIME4HE-.$ISREINFORCINGTHETRAININGANDEDUCATIONAL
structure by reinforcing solider-focused training programs; developing scientifically-advanced training
systems; and providing the conditions that allow the military to concentrate on training and education
without disturbance.

1. Strengthening the Training and Educational
System for Service Members| The need to reinforce the training and education ofservice members | 7UDLQLQJDQGHGXFDWLRQLVWKHEHGURFNRIFRPEDWFDSDELOLWLHV5REXVWDQGZDUOLNHWUDLQLQJDQGHGXFDWLRQPXVWEHFRQGXFWHG
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1842010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 7.

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1. Scientific Training and Education
Training and education drawing
on advanced information, scienceand technology innovations in theform of digital devices, networks,
cyber material, cyberspace, remotecommunication videos and distancelearning equipment.

185

Section 3. Cultivating Strong Warriors by Concentrating Efforts on Training and EducationVKLIWVWRDVWDWHRIWKHDUWWHFKQRORJ\LQWHQVLYHVWUXFWXUH7KHUHIRUHWKH
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| Scientific training and education of the field units |7KH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI D 6\QWKHWLF %DWWOHILHOG 6\VWHP /LYH9LUWXDO&RQVWUXFWLYH 2LQWKH¿HOGXQLWVLVQHFHVVDU\WRERRVWWKHLUMRLQWRSHUDWLRQDO
2. Synthetic Battlefield System (LVC)
A training and educational systemthat enables maneuver training (Live),
virtual exercises (Virtual) and war
games (Constructive) to be carried out
in a linked or separate manner.
·Maneuver training- field trainingthat rely on training aids, training
aid equipment, simulators, tacticaldevices fortified by simulation and atactical engagement simulator.
·Virtual training - training thatsimulates real battlefields by using asimulator for various weapons systems
and equipment.
·Battle Command Training Program(BCTP) - training for commanding
officers and staff at levels between
battalion and corps that incorporate
war game models and simulation
technology.

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WRWDNHSODFHDWWKHVDPHSODFHXQGHUWKHFRPPDQGRIDVLQJOHXQLWFigure 7-1. Conceptual Organization of the Synthetic Battleﬁeld System (LVC)
Urban Operations
training range

Live firetraining range

Maneuvertraining range
Live target
(L)

Live
target(L)
Simulated
exerciseInter-linked
systemSimulator(V)

Maneuver(training)(L)

Battle Command
Training Program (BCTP)
War game(C)

Participation of otherServices (Joint)

1862010 Defense White Paper

Virtual reality

Chapter 7.

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01'LVFXUUHQWO\LQWKHSURFHVVRIGHYHORSLQJWKLVV\VWHPIRU¿HOGXQLWV| Scientific training and education at educational
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3. Distance Education
An on-line educational system thatallows individuals or units to learn attheir computers and from available
information networks, without theconstraints of time and space.
CBT Computer Based Training

Figure 7-2. The Conceptual Organization of Scientific Training and Education at
Educational Institutions

Digital class

Cyber shooting
range

Call-upeducation

Simulator

Cyber instructor

Electronic
library

Distance
Educational
CenterDistance
education

Exercise site/
Battlefieldsituation
Three
dimensional CBT

Portals

Educational
management
system187

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4. Integrated Distance Defense
Educational System
An integrated portal that is designed to
manage military training and educationin an integrated manner and support
distance learning for each Service. The
study over its concept was completed
in 2009 and, currently, the preparatory
work for system development is inprocess.

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and Education| Increasing the efficiency of training ranges | The MND isPDUVKDOOLQJLWVUHVRXUFHVWREXLOGDQDGYDQFHGHOLWHPLOLWDU\E\SXUVXLQJWKH1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH5HIRUP%DVLF3ODQZKLFKLQYROYHVUHVWUXFWXULQJWKHPLOLWDU\RUJDQL]DWLRQDQGLQWURGXFLQJVRSKLVWLFDWHGZHDSRQU\-XVW
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1882010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 7.

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| Operating a technologically advanced security system |5. Training Range Integration by Area
Under the training range integration by
area plan, the scattered training ranges
will be merged into other larger-scaletraining ranges or combined withnearby sites in consideration of the
distance to the training ranges frommilitary bases, number of trainees,
training frequency and similarities
between the training ranges.

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4. Exercise and Training Simulating Actual Combat
6. Exercise
A process that adapts service members
to the operational procedures
involving planning, preparing forand implementing simulated war
operations and maneuvers.
In this process, all procedures andtheoretical principles are as close to
those applied in real operations as
possible.
7. Training
An organized procedure that endows
individuals and units with the technicalknowledge and practical skills required
to efficiently perform their designatedmission.
·Combined training – training
performed cooperatively by the
military forces of two or morecountries to accomplish a common
objective.
·Joint training - training conductedunder a mutually cooperative
command structure, or a single
commander, by two or more Servicesof the Army, Navy and the Air Force.

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8. Command Post Exercise (CPX)
Exercises designed to help thecommanding officers and staff ofeach echelon within a unit to fulfill
their missions. They are trained,
maintaining communication undervarious situations, on moving command
posts, the operational proceduresfor commanders and staff to follow,
operational plans and application of
established operational rules.

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191

Section 3. Cultivating Strong Warriors by Concentrating Efforts on Training and Education

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9. The Changjo 21
The BCTP Model for the Corps andStanding Divisions.
10. The Jeontu 21 Model
The BCTP Model for Regiments andBattalions.
11. The Hwarang 21 Model
The BCTP Model for the Homeland
Reserve Division.

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1942010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 7.

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Chapter 7.

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197

Section 3. Cultivating Strong Warriors by Concentrating Efforts on Training and Education4

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System for Officers to Boost
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Academies
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1982010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 7.

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199

Section 4. Improving the Educational System for Officers to Boost Jointness and Efficiency

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1. Operational System of the National Defense Organizations| Rearrangement of upper level organizations and directly
controlled organizations | As the number of troops is reduced in line with thedefense reforms, the complete formation of combat units would require converting
the manpower of non-combat units into combat units. Hence, the MND has beenrearranging the upper-level organizations and directly controlled organizations.
In 2008, the MND reshuffled the headquarters of each Service in order to help
them function more suitably for administrative military work, such as for the buildup and maintenance of military power and the support for military operations during
wartime. In 2009, it rearranged four directly controlled organizations. In the Korea
National Defense University, academic administration and student management
functions were integrated, and the Railway Transportation Support Team, under the
Defense Transportation Command, was dissolved so as to achieve a leaner structure.
Outsourcing of welfare facilities contributed to streamlining the Gyeryongdae Service

2022010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

Support Corps and reinforcing the support capacity of the Corps. The headquarters
RIHDFK6HUYLFHKDYHDOVREHHQPDNLQJHIIRUWVWRUHDOLJQWKHLULQHI¿FLHQWQRQFRPEDW
organizations through internal evaluations of each.
Therefore, the MND cut the number of troops by approximately 10,000 from 2008
to 2009. Since 2010, as part of such efforts, it has also evaluated around 20 units under
its direct control, including the Korea Defense Intelligence Agency (KDIA) and the
Defense Security Command. In the future, the MND will continue to restructure its
GLUHFWO\FRQWUROOHGRUJDQL]DWLRQVWRLQFUHDVHWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIERWKRUJDQL]DWLRQDQG
human resources management.

| Shaping a capable organization by realizing a model of creative
administration | The MND has been striving to achieve open defense
administration by becoming a 'model of creative administration.' In one area of its
HIIRUWVLWKDVLGHQWL¿HGWKHNH\LVVXHVIDFLQJWKHSXEOLFDQGRIIHUHGSUDFWLFDOVROXWLRQV
that address their problems and improve their living standards. In so doing, anenormous budget and a grand campaign are not necessarily required. Instead, smallchanges can make a big difference in the lives of the public. In 2010, by meetingwith local governments, including the Gyeonggi Provincial Government and the
Gangwon Provincial Government, the MND managed to ease the inconvenience
experienced by local residents living near military bases due to the military operations
and training.
Within the military, the MND has also improved various systems and institutions,such as the previously unreasonable administrative process. It is also canvassing soundpolicy alternatives from front line units by encouraging them to make suggestions
regarding military polices as shown in Table 8-1. In this way, the MND is attempting
to establish a culture of communication with its troops.

Table 8-1. Defense and Military Policy Suggestion

Unit: No. of cases

Result of Evaluation
Classification

Received

Gold Prize (Order Silver Prizeof National (National Security
Medal)
Security Merit)

Bronze Prize Outstanding Effort Participation
Prize (Prime Prize (Defense(Presidential
Minister’s Citation) Minister’s Citation)
Citation)

Unaccepted
Total

2008

70

1

2

3

5

25

36

34

2009

86

1

2

3

5

29

40

46

203

Section 1. Enhancing the Efficiency of National Defense Resource ManagementAside from this, the MND has held open contests on certain themes, altered
the authorization procedures to make them more reasonable, invigorated
1. National Defense Knowledge
Management (e-jisaem)
A management system that produces
and enables the use of the knowledge
required for creating new values when
conducting national defense-related
tasks.

e-jisaem1 and study clubs, and provided incentives to those who have exhibited
exemplary or creative job performances and accomplished good results based onthat creativity. In addition, in March, 2010, the Joint Chiefs of Staff introduced
the Government’s standard business management system, the ‘Onnara System,’
which has been used by central government agencies since 2007, with theintention being to extend the system to the entire military by 2012 in order to
HQKDQFHWKHHI¿FLHQF\DQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIDGPLQLVWUDWLYHPDQDJHPHQW

| Enhancing expertise in the MND Headquarters | To alter the
defense policies to align with the policy directions of the Government in areasonable way and to deal with the different interests of each Service in an
objective and a balanced manner, the MND has been annually increasing the
proportion of civilian public employees in its headquarters and implementing aseries of policies to enhance their expertise.
First, the MND set up the MND Plan for Promoting Civilian Control, whichis essentially a plan to increase the proportion of civilian public servants until
they account for up to 70 percent of the total MND employees, and it hasenacted this plan in the National Defense Reform Act and its enforcement
ordinance. Consequently, the civilian employee ratio increased to 65 percent
as of October 2010 from 52 percent in 2005, with the proportion of civilians
at the senior and junior director level reaching 70 percent. Still, the MND has
not yet met its original goal of over 70 percent civilian employees in each levelby 2009, and due to a government policy that limits increases in the number
RISXEOLFVHUYDQWVDQGWKHIDLOXUHWR¿QGTXDOL¿HGFLYLOLDQSHUVRQQHOWR¿OOWKH
YDFDQWSRVLWLRQVVRPHGLYLVLRQFKLHIOHYHOSRVLWLRQVDUHQRZ¿OOHGZLWKDFWLYH
duty personnel, rather than civilians. However, the MND expects such issues tobe addressed in the near future.
6HFRQGWKH01'KDVFRQVLVWHQWO\UHYLHZHGHDFKMREGHVFULSWLRQWR¿JXUHRXW
which jobs require civilian administrative know-how and which require military
expertise in order to meet the goal of the MND Headquarters’ policy tenet of2042010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

enhancing expertise. Under the tenet, it has aligned the proportion of civilian
public employees and military personnel within the organization.
Third, the MND has also increased the hiring of military experts, specialists
with Master’s and Doctoral degrees and outstanding personnel selected throughan open recruitment process for Level 5 positions. At the same time, it has
introduced the Career Development Program (CDP) and designated specialized
positions, thereby rearranging the position management-related systems into a
more structured organization. In addition, the MND has been operating around20 military specialized educational courses, while refining the training andeducational systems according to the position levels and specialized assignment.

2. Contract for Logistics and Facilities| Realignment of contracting entities in the military | Whencontracting logistics supplies and facility construction projects from outsidebusinesses, multiple organizations, such as the Defense Acquisition Program
Administration, the Defense Installations Agency, the Central Finance corps ofeach Service, the Logistics Command of each Service, and their units have all
EHHQLQYROYHG+RZHYHUWKLVGHFHQWUDOL]HGV\VWHPKDVFUHDWHGLQHI¿FLHQF\LQ
the contracting process. Hence, the MND is planning to streamline the numberof organizations in charge of the contracting process to include the Defense
Acquisition Program Administration, the respective Central Finance Corps andthe respective Logistics Commands of each Service, as shown in Figure 8-1, in
RUGHUWRLQFUHDVHWKHH[SHUWLVHWUDQVSDUHQF\DQGHI¿FLHQF\RIWKHFRQWUDFWLQJ
procedures.
Figure 8-1. Realignment of Contracting Entities and Specialization Plan
Defense Acquisition
Program Administration

Central Finance corps

Defense Installations
AgencyLogistics Command of
Each Service

Facility Construction Project

Units under the Logistics
Command

Supplies

Facility Construction ProjectⰒSupplies

205

Section 1. Enhancing the Efficiency of National Defense Resource ManagementThe Defense Acquisition Program Administration will be responsible for thecontracts pertaining to military weapons systems and repair parts; the Central
Finance corps will handle the contracts for facility construction projects and item
supplies; and the Logistics Command of each Service will be in charge of thecontracts related to supply procurements for its units. Meanwhile, each unit will takecare of minor contracts, such as small-scale facility maintenance and item supplies.
7KH'HIHQVH,QVWDOODWLRQV$JHQF\ZLOOEHLQFKDUJHRIWKHSULYDWH¿QDQFLQJ%XLOG7UDQVIHU/HDVH %7/ SURMHFWWKHSXUFKDVHRIUHDOHVWDWHWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRI
construction projects, and follow-up management tasks.
The MND also intends to trim labor and reduce its budget by integrating theCentral Finance corps of each Service. The integrated ROK Central Accounting
Group (proposed name) will take full charge of those contracts regarding military
construction for the entire military and the supplies procurement contracts requiring
specialized knowledge and skills, such as cost accounting.

| Expansion of competitive contracting cases | The MND has
expanded competitive contract bids regarding logistics and facility construction
SURMHFWVWRHQKDQFHWUDQVSDUHQF\DQGHI¿FLHQF\LQWKHFRQWUDFWLQJSURFHVV,QIDFWLWKDVDYRLGHGXVLQJUHJXODUFRPPHUFLDOLWHPVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHVSHFL¿FDWLRQVIRU
FLYLOLDQFRPPHUFLDOJRRGVDQGKDVSXUFKDVHGLWHPVXVLQJWKHPLOLWDU\VSHFL¿FDWLRQV
in most cases. Hence, regular suppliers were not able to participate in thebidding process. However, going forward, the MND plans to apply commercial
VSHFL¿FDWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQPLOLWDU\VSHFL¿FDWLRQVWRDZLGHUDQJHRIPLOLWDU\VXSSOLHV
except for items that directly affect combat strength or items exclusively for militaryuse. While logistics supplies are being procured through competitive contracts, the01'SODQVWRPLQLPL]HWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIPLOLWDU\VSHFL¿FDWLRQVWRQHZORJLVWLFVsupplies.
The MND also plans to expand the Public Procurement Service entrustment
to include commercial items, such as various office supplies and fixtures, whosepurchase was not entrusted to the Service, and items for which quality assurance isstraightforward.

2062010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

3. Supply, Transportation and Maintenance Support
System| Supply | 7KH01'LVVWULYLQJWRHQKDQFHWKHPDQDJHPHQWDQGFRVWHI¿FLHQF\of national defense operations by making use of governmental and civilian
resources and by actively introducing advanced management methods. As partof these efforts, it plans to establish a Consolidated Military Logistics Center inconnection with governmental and civilian logistics systems. Developed into a
supply base, the Consolidated Military Logistics Center will integrate a variety oflogistics facilities for supply, maintenance and transportation. The Center will befurnished with cutting-edge information systems, including modern, standardized
facilities and equipment that are linked with the Integrated Logistics Information
System. The implementation of this plan will enable a speed-oriented, onestop supply system, which will reduce inventory stocks and related expenses by
JXDUDQWHHLQJWKDWVXSSO\UHTXHVWVZLOOEHIXO¿OOHGZLWKLQRQHGD\DFURVVWKHHQWLUH
military. The conceptual organization of the Military Consolidated Logistics Centeris shown in Figure 8-2.

Figure 8-2. The Conceptual Organization of the Military Consolidated Logistics Center
Consolidated Logistics Center

Information System Integration

SupplyRation Support

The Army

Facility Integration

Maintenance Transportation

The Navy The Air ForceModernization

Standardization

Integrated Logistics
Information System
Defense Transportation
Information System
Ware house Management
SystemInformatization

207

Section 1. Enhancing the Efficiency of National Defense Resource ManagementIn addition, the MND has implemented the Comprehensive Plan for Clothing and
2XW¿WVWRLPSURYHWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHVHLWHPVLQRUGHUWRPD[LPL]HWKHVXUYLYDELOLW\DQGFRPEDWFDSDELOLWLHVRIFRPEDWDQWVLQIXWXUHEDWWOH¿HOGHQYLURQPHQWVHQKDQFH
the level of welfare for service members and boost their morale.
7KHSODQWRXSJUDGHWKHEDWWOHGUHVVXQLIRUPV %'8V WRWKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQW\SH
is a prime project that the MND and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy began toimplement since signing the Memorandum of Understanding on Next Generation'HIHQVH7H[WLOH'HYHORSPHQWLQ0DUFK7KHQHZ%'8ZDVGHVLJQHGLQD
way that the shirt overlays the pants without being tucked into to enhance combat
Next-Generation Functional Winter
BDU
Clothing

HI¿FLHQF\DQGDWWDFKPHQWVDUHHDVLO\DWWDFKHGRUGHWDFKHGIURPWKHXQLIRUPWKURXJK9HOFURIDVWHQHUV7KHXQLIRUPIHDWXUHVµJUDQLWHSDWWHUQVLQ¿YHGLJLWDOFRORUVKDGHV¶which easily blend in with the natural environment of the Korean Peninsula, where
JUDQLWHLVWKHPRVWFRPPRQURFNWKXVPDNLQJFDPRXÀDJLQJHDVLHUThe Color of the NextGeneration BDU%HVLGHVWKHWRSTXDOLW\IXQFWLRQDOZLQWHUFORWKLQJ²PDGHRIHQKDQFHGWKHUPDOPRLVWXUHUHVLVWDQWDQGYHQWLODWLYHWH[WLOHV²ZDVGHYHORSHGIRUWURRSVWKDWFDUU\
out ambush operations in areas with extreme temperatures and the distribution offunctional combat boots will be expanded. The quality improvement of individual
tents, combat backpacks and is in process, and all future military supplies will also
have the newly developed digital pattern.

| Transportation | The Defense Transportation Information System, whichenables the integrated operation of civilian, public organization and militarytransportation assets, is under development to efficiently support joint andcombined special operations and establish the fundamental system for an integrated
transportation system of the armed forces. The Defense Transportation Information
System enables the integrated command and control of the transportation assets of
the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. It also allows tracking information regarding
the locations of troops and movement of cargo between a point of departure and apoint of arrival, thus it enables a speed-oriented Integrated Transportation Support
2. Commercial Vehicle
Vehicles for general use, such as
regular passenger vehicles, buses andtrucks.
3. Lease System
The system allowing for one to renta vehicle from its owner by paying anagreed upon rental fee.

2082010 Defense White Paper

System for the Armed Forces.
At the same time, the military plans to introduce a commercial vehicle2 leasesystem3 that would allow up-to-date vehicles to be rented from private car suppliers
ZKLOHNHHSLQJLWVWUDQVSRUWDWLRQDVVHWVWRDPLQLPXP7KHSODQZLOOEH¿UVWSLORWHG
and evaluated by administrative and support units, and based on the results of theevaluation, it will be gradually expanded to other units. With the introduction of the#HAPTER

lease system, the dissatisfaction of users over the decrepit vehicles will be lessened,
and the cost and workload for vehicle management and maintenance will be
reduced, thereby ensuring safe driving and cost savings.

| Maintenance | The MND is building a National Maintenance Support
System that makes full use of outstanding governmental and civilian resourcesin order to improve the maintenance of combat gear and the operational rate ofequipment in light of the fact that as the cutting-edge precision weapons systems
with multiple-functions increase in number so too are the maintenance environmentschanging. To shift the current military-centered maintenance system to a national
maintenance support system, governmental and civilian facilities and overseas
specialized facilities will be utilized for the maintenance of the new types of the
cutting-edge precision gear to be introduced, while the conventional gear currently
in operation will still be maintained using current military maintenance assets. The
plan to improve the current maintenance support system is shown in Figure 8-3.
Figure 8-3. Improvement of the Maintenance Support System
FutureCurrent

Conventional Gear
ⳒUser (Individual)

Militaryⳓ. Maintenance by Unit
(Regimental and Battalion Level)
ⳔDirect Support for Maintenance(Division and Logistics Support
Command)ⳕGeneral Support for
Maintenance (Logistics Support
Command)Maintenanceby Military ⳖDepot Maintenance (overhaul/
and Civilian repairs)
Suppliers

Military

Cutting-Edge
Precision Gear

ⳒOn-Site Maintenance (On-Site)
Maintenance(Regimental andUnits:
Battalion Level + Division by
Replacement, Oneand Brigade)
day basis

ⳓField MaintenanceUtilization (Logistics Supportof theCommand)Governmental
MaintenanceⳔDepot MaintenanceSupport(overhaul/repairs)
System

Depot andOutsourced
Maintenance(Depot, Civilian
Suppliers,
Overseas
Maintenance)

For malfunctioning equipment, on-site maintenance capability will bestrengthened with a focus on parts replacements to ensure early recovery of

4. Remote Maintenance Support
The provision of support for
maintenance or undertaking themaintenance itself through remote
access to the concerned (problematic)
system in a manner that allows theoperational units and the maintenance
units to communicate with one anothervia video, text or voice using theSatellite Communications Network orother information and communications
systems.

equipment at combat sites. As shown in figure 8-4, the Remote MaintenanceSupport System,4 which uses the high-speed information network, is underconstruction. With respect to the maintenance depots of each Service, advanced
technologies in the private sector will be benchmarked, while developing andexpanding the military’s own maintenance technology, so as to enhance theefficiency of depot maintenance5 in tandem with the innovative management of

5. Depot Maintenance (overhaul/
repairs)
Maintenance that cannot be handled
by the field units, such as disassembly,
inspection, repair, regeneration,
renovation, and manufacturing that
require special maintenance facilities,
special equipment and tools.

maintenance work.

209

Section 1. Enhancing the Efficiency of National Defense Resource ManagementIn order to increase the operational ratio of equipment by steadily procuring
PRUHLQH[SHQVLYHSDUWVWKH01'WRJHWKHUZLWKWKH6PDOO 0HGLXP%XVLQHVV$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ 60%$ KDVLPSOHPHQWHGWKH-RLQW3URMHFWIRU'HIHQVH7HFKQRORJ\Development for the development of maintenance technology, while replacing
imported parts with locally produced parts. In terms of special and sophisticated
HTXLSPHQWZKLFKWKHPLOLWDU\KDVWURXEOHPDLQWDLQLQJWKH3HUIRUPDQFH%DVHG
6. PBL (Performance-Based Logistics)
A system whereby suppliers ofequipment are paid according to how
well their supplied equipment performs
and their maintenance services areprovided, based on a Result Index (e.g.,target operational ratio) made by the
military that uses such equipment.

/RJLVWLFV 3%/ 6 Support System will entrust maintenance to specialized civilian
manufacturers in consideration of the characteristics and operational environmentsof each piece of equipment and its cost.
Figure 8-4. The Conceptual Organization of the Remote Maintenance Support System (exampleof naval vessel)

Naval Vessel

Remote Control Center

Special Agent for Vessel
Maintenance

Remote Maintenance Group
Support via Video

Remote Maintenance System

CPU

Terminal

SCU

Remote Access

LaptopComputerEquipment to be Maintained
Supplier

History Record Stored

Information System

Integrated Managementof Maintenance Records

4. Establishment of the Total Life Cycle Management
System (TLCM)| Integrated management throughout the total life cycle | The
MND set up the Total Life Cycle Management (TLCM) System to manage theentire life cycle of military supplies, from the initial development, procurement,
and operation/maintenance through to disposal, in an efficient and cost-effective
manner. Currently, the ROK military’s weapons systems are operated by different
organizations and under different budgeting systems, depending on its life cycle
stage. This easily helps partial optimization at each stage but not throughout the2102010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

entire life cycle from a holistic perspective. Therefore, the TLCM System is
now under construction to strengthen the link between different stages of needs
assessment, procurement and operations. For example, under the System, an
optimal development plan, in consideration of the operational/maintenance factors,
can be produced during the initial stages. The conceptual organization of the TLCM
is shown in Figure 8-5.
Figure 8-5. The Conceptual Organization of the Total Life Cycle Management System
The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Defense Acquisition Program Administration

Requirement Planning

Development/Procurement

No Connection

Army, Navy, Air Force
Operation and MaintenanceDisposal

No Connection

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Defense Acquisition Program Administration

Requirement Planning

Development/Procurement

Army, Navy, Air Force
Operation and MaintenanceDisposal

Total Life Cycle Management(Assurance of Combat Readiness Posture, Budget Saving)* Total Cost of TLCM: Development (10 percent), Procurement (30 percent), Operation /Maintenance/Disposal (60 percent)| Reinforcing the links between requirements, procurement
and operation/maintenance | The basic purpose of the TLCM System
is to reinforce the links between the different work stages: (force) requirement
generation, procurement, operation and maintenance, and disposal in order toensure a combat readiness posture and reduce the total cost of the TLCM. The basic
direction of the TLCM System is shown in Figure 8-6.

Figure 8-6. The Basic Direction of the TLCM System

Needs Assessment and(Procurement) Planning

Development/Procurement
Precedent
Research

Ministry of National
Defense (MND)

Joint
Chiefsof Staff
Logistical Support
Elements Included

Search-Based System
Mass Production
Development Development and Distribution

Operation/MaintenanceDisposalRequirement Veriﬁcation (Set-up and Operation of the Requirement Veriﬁcation Committee)
Logistics Supplies, TLCM Policy and Institution Development
Adjustment, Control, Integrated Management of the Procurement and Operation/Management of Logistics Supplies

Defense Acquisition Establishment and Implementation
Program Administration of the TLCM Plans for Each Project
Each Active Involvement in
Service and Support for Procurement ProjectManagement, Reﬂection of Opinions

Logistical Support Assurance

Evaluation and Veriﬁcation of Operational Supporting Capability
Collection, Analysis and Feedback of Field Operational Speciﬁcations

211

Section 1. Enhancing the Efficiency of National Defense Resource ManagementTo this end, the MND will verify the validity and accuracy of the needs (ofthe military); develop TLCM-related policies and institutions; and adjust andcontrol the procurement and operation/maintenance for life cycle management in
an integrated manner by establishing the Requirement Verification Committee.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff will identify the relevant logistical needs and create aplan for logistics support, which is necessary at the operation/maintenance stage
when the target operational ratio and cost throughout the life cycle of military
supplies are determined. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration is
responsible for optimizing the performance of a weapons system, its developmental
period and cost throughout its life cycle. It is also in charge of mapping out andimplementing a life cycle maintenance plan for each project to ensure logistical
VXSSRUWDWWKHRSHUDWLRQDOPDLQWHQDQFHVWDJH(DFK6HUYLFHHYDOXDWHVDQGYHUL¿HV
its operational support capability; collects and analyzes information and data related
to malfunctions, maintenance and operations; and provides feedback based on theanalysis during the next development and procurement stage.

2122010 Defense White Paper

Optimizing Defense Resources
through the Use of Public andPrivate Resources

2

3ECTION

4HE2/+MILITARYISCONVERTINGTOASYSTEMTHATMAXIMIZESTHESUPPORTANDUSEOFPRIVATEANDOTHERNATIONALRESOURCESFROMITSCURRENTSELF SUPPORTINGSYSTEM INWHICHALLNEEDSARETAKENCAREOFWITHINTHEMILITARY7HENTHEMILITARYACTIVELYUTILIZESTHEADVANCEDFACILITIES SUPERBMANPOWER ANDOUTSTANDINGMANAGEMENTMETHODSOFPRIVATESECTORSANDOPTIMIZESMILITARYRESOURCES INCLUDINGTROOPSANDFACILITIES ITWILLBEABLETOESTABLISHALOW COST HIGHLYEFÜCIENTOPERATIONALSUPPORTSYSTEM)N
ADDITION THERELATEDINDUSTRIESWILLBEINVIGORATED ANDTHEOVERLAPPINGINVESTMENTBETWEENTHEMILITARYANDCIVILIANSORGOVERNMENTAGENCIESWILLBEMINIMIZEDATTHENATIONALLEVEL

1. Expanding the Use of Civilian Resources
7KHPLOLWDU\¶VXVHRISULYDWHUHVRXUFHVXVHGWREHFRQ¿QHGWRFHUWDLQDUHDVVXFKas education, maintenance and facility management to a limited extent. However,
ZLWKWKHUHFHQWIXOOÀHGJHGGHIHQVHUHIRUPHIIRUWVWKHPLOLWDU\KDVEHHQH[SDQGLQJthe scope of its use of private resources to encompass supply, transportation, training
and other core non-combat areas. In addition, unlike the simple outsourcing of
the past, it has been diversifying the means such as operating Military Executive
Agencies and entrusting some areas to private entities.

| Operation of the military executive agencies | The MND
has established Military Executive Agencies to introduce private management
techniques to non-combat management activities. The Military Printing Depot, theArmed Forces Capital Hospital, the Army 2nd Supply Group, the Navy Supply
Depot and the Air Force Supply Depot 40 were selected for pilot operations, andsince January 1, 2009, the Military Executive Agencies have been running in earnest
in these military organizations. The pilot operations in 2009 yielded positive results
as shown in Table 8-2. The MND plans to expand the Military Executive Agency
System to other organizations, following the evaluation of the pilot operations in the213

Section 2. Optimizing Defense Resources through the Use of Public and Private ResourcesThe Plan to Implement the Military
Executive Agency System
First Phase (2009)¿YHDIRUHPHQWLRQHGRUJDQL]DWLRQVTable 8-2. Major Accomplishments of the Military Executive Agencies

Pilot Operation (Five
Organizations)

AgencyMajor Accomplishments

Second Phase (2010)

Military Printing
Depot·Reduction in the cost of outsourced printing: KRW 2.7 billion ⳨KRW 1.5
billion (KRW 1.2 billion saved)·Reduction in the lead time of printed materials: 15 days ⳨ 2.5 days (12.5
days saved)

Armed Forces
Capital Hospital·Increase in patient satisfaction: 75.7 points (out of 100) ⳨ 81.9 points (6.2
point improvement)·The first military hospital to pass the Hospital Credibility Evaluation of
the Korean Hospital Association

Supply Depot of
Each Service·Reduction in the handling period for imported goods: 9.7 days⳨ 4.2 days
(5.5 days saved)·Reduction in the handling of distributed goods: 7.6 days⳨3.8 days (3.8
days saved)

Evaluating the Pilot
Project (2009), Improving
Concerned Institutions(e.g., amending laws andorders)Third Phase (After 2011)
Expanding Organizations
Affiliated with the Military
Executive Agency,
Improving Operational
Methods| Discovery and use of civilian resources | In 2009, the MND
established the Comprehensive Plan to Fully Utilize Civilian Resources1 by

1. Comprehensive Plan to Fully Utilize
Civilian Resources
Area

Business

Non-core Area

Outsourcing of General Low
Level Jobs, Such as Facility
Management

SupplyEstablishing a Consolidated
Logistics System throughthe Use of the Public andPrivate Logistics Systems

Core
Area

VehicleTransportation Commercial
Leasing
WelfareOutsourcing of Catering for
Officers’ Dining Halls

Training and Expanding the Hiring of
Education Civilian Instructors

identifying businesses in which civilian resources could be used across general nonFRPEDWDUHDVVXFKDVVXSSO\DQGWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ,QWKH¿UVWKDOIRIWKH01'
solicited ideas for the best use of private resources internally and externally to themilitary, and it plans to continue exploring new projects that will complement theComprehensive Plan.
The Ministry also plans to dramatically increase the use of civilian professors
DQGLQVWUXFWRUVIRUWUDLQLQJDQGHGXFDWLRQ$VSDUWRIWKLVHIIRUWLWZLOOKLUHTXDOL¿HG
civilian specialists as professors for the military academies, rather than fostering
faculty members within the military, both to enhance the quality of education andto reduce its budget. Furthermore, the MND will replace those instructors on active
GXW\ZRUNLQJDWVFLHQWL¿FDOO\DGYDQFHGWUDLQLQJVLWHVZLWKUHVHUYLVWVDQGWKHUHE\expand the employment opportunities of veterans or discharged soldiers.
In the supply area, the current logistics system has suffered from decrepit
facilities, labor-intensive operations and logistics hubs that geographically overlap
with one another due to the fact that each military has its own logistics center.
Therefore, the MND has a plan to link the existing logistics system with the public
and private logistics systems to the greatest degree possible in order to convert thesystem to a Joint-Military Consolidated Logistics Support System.

2142010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

In terms of transportation, a commercial vehicle lease system will be introduced
in some areas in order to optimize the use of military vehicles. In addition, a Fleet
Management System (FMS)2 will be introduced for the vehicles owned by the
military in order to increase the operational ratio of those vehicles.

2. Fleet Management System (FMS)
A control system that provides realtime information about vehicles, suchas the location and status of a vehicle.

)XUWKHUWKHRXWVRXUFLQJRIFDWHULQJIRURI¿FHUV¶GLQLQJKDOOVZLOOEHH[SDQGHGWR
minimize the number of non-combat troops who work as unskilled labor. However,H[SDQGLQJWKHXVHRISULYDWHUHVRXUFHVRQO\WRERRVWPDQDJHPHQWHI¿FLHQF\GXULQJ
peacetime may impede the full extent of combat strength being realized during
wartime due to a possible delay in the mobilization of manpower and materials.
7KHUHIRUHWKH01'ZLOODQDO\]HWKHYLDELOLW\E\FRQGXFWLQJSLORWRSHUDWLRQV¿UVW
and expanding the use of public and private resources in phases, beginning in
those areas where direct support through manpower and industrial mobilization ispossible.

2. Expanding Joint Projects with Government Agencies
7KH01'KDVEHHQHQKDQFLQJWKHHI¿FLHQF\RILWVGHIHQVHUHVRXUFHVRQWKHRQH
hand, it uses the military-owned assets for combat-related functions and, on theother hand, it uses governmental and civilian resources when providing support andother functions. Accordingly, the MND has been implementing joint-projects withconcerned government agencies since 2009, and a Defense Cluster consisting ofindustrial, academic, research and military institutes3 is under construction as part ofthe efforts to expand such cooperative projects.
Since 2009, the MND has been conducting joint-business ventures in cooperation
with government agencies in the areas of equipment, textiles and clothing. Suchjoint projects have increased combat strength and enabled the introduction ofadvanced technologies and investments from the governmental and civilian sectors.

3. Defense Cluster Consisting ofIndustrial, Academic, Research and
Military Institutes
An information exchange system
regarding technology and research
activities in which the industrial,academic, and research sectors
communicate with the military formutual technology and information
sharing.

Those civilian businesses and government agencies that provide resources, including
FXWWLQJHGJHWHFKQRORJLHVIRUQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHZLOODOVREHQH¿WE\PDNLQJSUR¿WV
thus contributing to the national economy.
The MND, in collaboration with the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, the0LQLVWU\RI(GXFDWLRQ6FLHQFHDQG7HFKQRORJ\DQGWKH6PDOO 0HGLXP%XVLQHVV
Administration, is carrying out joint-business ventures in the area of equipment

215

Section 2. Optimizing Defense Resources through the Use of Public and Private Resources

in order to improve the maintenance capability of the companies and to facilitate
the research and development. This collaborative business venture system aims
to actively engage investment by government agencies and establish a process
in which the test equipment retained by each organization can be used in a jointmanner, thus supporting the small and medium sized enterprises participating in thedevelopment of logistics parts.
Further, the MND has employed research and development support projects,
research infrastructure and experts from the Ministry of Knowledge Economy todevelop clothing and gears that meet the demands of the military.

2162010 Defense White Paper

Improving the Procurement andAcquisition System of Weapons

3

3ECTION

4HE-.$HASBEENREÜNINGITSWEAPONSPROCUREMENTSECTORANDTHE$EFENSE!CQUISITION3YSTEM
TOENSUREATIMELYSUPPLYOFWELL FUNCTIONINGWEAPONS EQUIPMENTANDOTHERMATERIELSTHATMEETTHE
NEEDSOFUSERSATTHELOWESTPOSSIBLECOST4HISEFFORTWILLENHANCETHEEFÜCIENCY COST EFFECTIVENESS
ANDTRANSPARENCYOFA-ILITARY"UILDUPAND.ATIONAL$EFENSE-ANAGEMENT

1. Weapons Procurement Sector
The MND has endeavored to provide optimal services to the public and the
PLOLWDU\E\DSSO\LQJDGYDQFHGLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGVFLHQWL¿FPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHPVWR
the projects for the improvement of defense capability. In the future, the MND willcontinue to improve the relevant institutions and systems in order to increase the
FRQ¿GHQFHRIWKHSXEOLFLQDQGWKHWUDQVSDUHQF\HI¿FLHQF\DQGSURIHVVLRQDOLVPRI
weapons procurement.
First, government agencies and the defense industry will set up a cost
information-sharing system, while imposing stronger sanctions on illegal or
unscrupulous vendors.1 In addition, the MND will continue to develop institutional
mechanisms to ensure that employees in the procurement area refrain from taking
bribes or engaging in corrupt practices and conduct themselves with integrity in all
procurement dealings.

1. Illegal or Unscrupulous Vendors
A vendor that is considered unqualified
to participate in contract bids because
it might impede fair competition or failto properly implement its contractual
obligations.

Second, the MND will improve research and development (R&D) and purchase
V\VWHPWRHQKDQFHHI¿FLHQF\LQZHDSRQVSURFXUHPHQW)RUWKLVSXUSRVHWKH01'
will invigorate the defense R&D structure, open it to collaboration with non-military

217

Section 3. Improving the Procurement and Acquisition System of Weapons2. Open R&D Structure
A defense research and development
structure that expands technologicalcooperation with civilians and involves
the participation of the industrial,academic and the research sectors.
It also reinforces the link with thenational research and development
sectors.

entities2 and expand investments in the R&D, upgrading the Agency for Defense
Development (ADD), which is the nation’s defense science R&D center, to a worldclass R&D center. In addition, the MND will reinforce its bargaining power innegotiations with overseas sellers of goods and services by hiring a greater numberof civilian specialists who are skilled in such negotiations.
Third, the MND will operate the Integrated Defense Program Information

3. Integrated Defense Program
Information Management System
An information system that integrates
those tasks related to defense projects
and procurement management, whileproviding services inside and outsideof the military. This system is operated
in connection with the national defense
and integrated governmental computer
networks.

Management System3 to quantitatively manage the achievements of the defense
SURJUDPVDQGDSSO\6FLHQWLILF%XVLQHVV0DQDJHPHQW6\VWHPV4 to enable early
identification and response to possible risk factors in projects through real-time(project) monitoring. At the same time, the Defense Technology Information
Management Service (DTiMS)5 will be built up to ensure that the technologicalinformation, which is individually managed by a defense-related organization canbe shared with one another.

4. Scientific Business Management
System
A scientifically based business
management system that utilizes
such techniques as the Earned ValueManagement System, Systems
Engineering, Simulation Based
Acquisition, and Cost as Independent
Variable.

Fourth, the MND will install and operate educational programs, such as courses
tailored to different jobs and cyber courses, in order to enhance professionalism of
LWVVWDII,QDGGLWLRQWKH01'SODQVWRHQDFWD3RVLWLRQ4XDOL¿FDWLRQ6\VWHP

2. National Defense Acquisition System
5. Defense Technology Information
Management Service (DTiMS)
An integrated information systemthat provides a one-stop service forusers by managing the domestic andinternational information about thelatest weapons systems and defense
science and technology.
6. National Defense Acquisition System
A business system that aims to procure
defense materiels (weapons plus nonweapons).

In the past four decades since 1972, when it introduced the Defense Acquisition
Management Institution, the MND has endeavored to establish a Defense
Acquisition System6 that facilitates the rapid acquisition of better functioning
weapons at a lower cost. In January 2006, the MND set up the Defense
Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) that integrated the acquisition-relatedorganizations, which then belonged to eight different bodies, such as the MND, theArmy, the Navy, the Air Force and so on. However, since the launch of the DAPA,
institutional problems have occurred due to the budget of the projects improvementof defense capability and ordinary operating cost being separately planned and
PDQDJHGZKLFKKDVOHGWRWKHHI¿FLHQWXVHRIWKHQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHEXGJHWQRWEHLQJ
fully realized. Further, it has become difficult to concentrate national energy andcapabilities on national defense-related R&D and defense industry exports.

2182010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

| Achievements of the defense acquisition programadministration | Since its launch in 2006, the DAPA has been striving
to enhance the transparency of the organization by introducing the Integrity
Pledging System and an Ombudsman System and by adopting an open decisionmaking system that outside experts participate in. In addition, it has introduced
the competition system in the defense industry. For example it eliminated theSpecialization and Systematization System,7 thus lowering the market entry barriers
for the defense industry.

| Difficulties in optimizing defense policies due to theseparation of acquisition policies | Despite such achievements, the DAPA
has been exposed to one constant issue: the Administration has been completely
responsible for various areas that were originally under the jurisdiction of the MND
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such as setting-up acquisition policies, formulation
RI0HGLXP7HUP1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH3ODQDQG%XGJHWUHJDUGLQJWKHSURMHFWVIRUWKH
LPSURYHPHQWRIGHIHQVHFDSDELOLW\WKH¿QDOMXGJHPHQWRQWKHUHVXOWVRI7HVWDQG
Evaluation.
First, acquisition policies, as a part of the entire national defense policy, should beorganically linked with other defense-related policies. However, the policies havebeen independently implemented by the DAPA.

7. Specialization and Systematization
System
A system that was introduced in 1983
to facilitate technology development
and to prevent defense businesses
from inefficiently and overly competingwith one another that could result inoverlapping investments. Under thissystem, weapons systems are divided
into subsystems according to thetechnology needed and the similarityof the platform. In the subsystems,
finished equipment are further
classified as specialized items, while
components and parts are classified
as systematized items. Suppliers
that produce the items that fall withinclassification are selected within thesystem’s guidelines, and the chosen
suppliers win the right to participate
in research and development, andproduction through the international
technology cooperation.

6HFRQGWKHHI¿FLHQF\LQPDQDJLQJWKHQDWLRQDOGHIHQVHEXGJHWKDVEHHQUHGXFHG
because the budget regarding the projects for the improvement of defense capability
and ordinary operating costs are separately managed.
Third, policies related to research and development and the defense industry
should be adjusted and controlled by the MND. However, the DAPA has beenorganizing these policies, and as a result, it has become harder to concentrate thenational resources and efforts on collaborations with other government agencies andinternational cooperation.

| Establishing an economical and efficient national defense
acquisition system | The MND has improved the Defense Acquisition System
in a future-oriented direction in light of national interest enhancement and defense

219

Section 3. Improving the Procurement and Acquisition System of Weaponsmanagement efficiency. The purpose of this effort is to enhance the consistency
DQGHI¿FLHQF\RIWKHGHIHQVHSROLFLHVE\UHLQIRUFLQJLQWHJUDWLRQDQGDGMXVWPHQWRI
the defense acquisition programs, and to secure transparency and professionalism
in defense acquisition by ensuring the autonomy of the executive process to thegreatest possible degree.
Further, while continually developing some systems that have been efficiently
operated since the launch of the DAPA, other systems will be improved in a waythat ensures acquisition-related organizations, such as the MND, the Joint Chiefsof Staff, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the DAPA, can smoothly carry out
their own original functions, while maintaining the collaborations between theseorganizations.
In the future, the MND will adjust and control the defense acquisition policies inline with the other defense policies, while establishing mid-term plans for defense
acquisition, conducting research and development, and implementing policies
related to the defense industry. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will determine the needs of
WKHPLOLWDU\DFFRUGLQJWRWKHW\SHRIFRPEDWZKLOHDFWLQJDVWKH¿QDOMXGJHRQWKH
results of the test and evaluation. The DAPA will be developed into an organization
primarily responsible for the execution of polices, such as the management ofconcerned projects and contracts.

2202010 Defense White PaperDeveloping the Defense
Economy into a Growth Engine
for the National Economy

4

3ECTION

4HE-.$ TOTHEBESTOFITSABILITY HASMAXIMIZEDTHEACHIEVEMENTSOFNATIONALDEFENSEMANAGEMENT
)NSPITEOFTHEDIFÜCULTIESFACINGGOVERNMENTÜNANCING ITHASSECUREDAPROPERLEVELOFFUNDINGINTHE
DEFENSEBUDGETANDALLOCATEDITINAREASONABLEMANNERTOEFFECTIVELYRESPONDTOMULTIFARIOUSSECURITYTHREATSANDTOSUCCESSFULLYIMPLEMENTTHEDEFENSEREFORMPLAN4HEDEFENSEBUDGETHASBEENSPENTONDEVELOPINGTHEENTIRENATIONALECONOMY BEYONDITSMAINTASKOFNATIONALSECURITY4HEBUDGET FOR
INSTANCE HASBEENALLOCATEDTODEVELOPTECHNOLOGIES INVIGORATETHEECONOMY VITALIZEINDUSTRIES 
ANDPRODUCETECHNOLOGYEXPERTS4HE-.$HASALSOBEENREINFORCINGITSEFFORTSONTHEPOLICYFRONTINVARIOUSWAYS INCLUDINGITSEFFORTSTOFACILITATEDEFENSEITEMEXPORTSINORDERTOREALIZETHENATIONALGOAL
OFDEVELOPINGTHEDEFENSEINDUSTRYINTOANEWECONOMICGROWTHENGINE&URTHER ITHASTAKENALEADING
ROLEINADVANCINGGREENGROWTHANDENERGYCONSERVATION

1. Importance of Securing a Proper Level of Defense
Budget| Changes in defense budget allocation | The defense budget as a
UDWLRRIWKH*'3DQG*RYHUQPHQW¿QDQFLQJKDVFKDQJHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQWDQGWKH¿VFDOVWDWXVRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW8QWLOWKHHDUO\VWKH
defense budget accounted for 5 percent of the GDP and reached 30 percent of thegovernment budget. This was possible thanks to budget allocation that allowed
the steady implementation of the mid-1970s military’s self-reliant combat
reinforcement plan, the Yulgok Project.10HDQZKLOHGXHWRWKH¿QDQFLDO
crisis and the increased demand for social welfare, the defense budget continued
WRGHFOLQHIURPWKHODWHVXQWLOWKHHDUO\V:LWKWKHIXOOÀHGJHGSXUVXLW
of military reform in the late 2000s, the defense budget exhibited a slight upward
trend; however, the ratio of defense budget as a percent of total government

1.Yulgok Project
An initiative that was implemented
from 1974 until 1992 to modernize themilitary. This initiative contributed toreinforcing combat power by developing
and mass-producing M16 rifles and the
Korea-type K-1.

spending is still decreasing. As of 2010, the defense budget stood at 2.62 percentof the GDP and 14.7 percent of the total national budget. The changes in defense
budget allocation are shown in Figure 8-7.

221

Section 4. Developing the Defense Economy into a Growth Engine for the National EconomyⶺSee Appendix 20: The Status of theAnnual Defense Budget

Figure 8-7. Proportion of Defense Budget to GDP and Government Budget
OLP

34.7
29.4

30
20

24.2

5.8

4.4

1980

1985

15.6

14.7

2.8

2.5

2.6

2.62

1995

2000

2005

2010

3.6
1990

Percentage of Government Budget
16.3

Percentage of GDP

10
0

21.4

|Importance of securing a defense budget corresponding to security conditions| It is desirable to strike a balance between
the needs of the military in consideration of the current security threats andthe government’s spending capacity, when determining the size of the defense
budget. Hence, a country like the ROK, facing military confrontations, needs
WRHQVXUHWKDWDVXI¿FLHQWDPRXQWRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VEXGJHWLVDOORFDWHGWRGHIHQVH
in order to meet the military needs. Compared to various countries around theworld, the ROK’s defense budget measured against the GDP represents a relatively low level of investment, despite the high level of security threats. The
defense budget as a percentage of the GDP of major countries facing militaryconfrontations is shown in Table 8-3.
Table 8-3. The GDP-Defense Budget Ratio of Major Countries in Conflict (as of 2009)
Unit: percent
Jordan Georgia Israel

U.S.

Cuba

Syria

RussiaIran

ROK Pakistan China

11.0

5.0

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.8

2.8

8.0

6.5

2.6

1.6

* Source: The Military Balance 2010 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
February 2010) and other relevant sources.
* The percentages for Georgia, Iran, and Cuba were reported as of 2008

The defense budget per service member, which represents the quality of a nation’s military power, also remains extremely low. As of 2008, OECD member
countries were reported to spend USD 182,782 per service member, while the
ROK spent USD 35,677 or a mere 19.5 percent of the OECD’s average to giveit a rank of 28th among the total 30 member countries.

2222010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

| Expected beneﬁts of securing a proper level of defense
budget | 7RHQVXUHVWDEOHVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWD¿UPVHFXULW\posture based on a proper level of defense funding needs to be maintained.
Considering the military confrontations between the South and the North, inparticular, the uncertainty surrounding the Korean Peninsula could yet give rise
to a direct and fatal impact on the national economy.
Therefore, securing a proper level of defense budget may form a virtuous
circle between security and the economy. That is, a proper level of defense
spending can help establish a solid security posture, which would result insocial stability and the nation’s market economy being held in high esteem by
the international community, bringing about economic growth. In addition, as
shown in Figure 8-8, economic growth leads to an increase in tax revenue andexpansion of government spending that would help secure a proper level of defense spending.
Figure 8-8. Virtuous Circle Involving National Security and the Economy in relation to Defense Budget
Maintaining a
Solid Security
PostureSocial Stability

Securing a Proper
Level of Defense Budget
Increase in
Defense Budget

Enhancement of National Credibility
Investment Facilitation
Economic Growth

Expansion ofGovernment
Finance

Increase in Tax Revenue

The expenditure of the defense budget is creating various economic ripple effects beyond its original purpose; maintaining a solid national security posture.
Defense expenditure allocated to labor costs, including salaries for military
personnel and military civilians, invokes consumer spending that in turn creates effective demand which invigorates industrial activities. Spending for theconstruction of military installations heightens the production and employment
levels in various industries, such as the manufacturing and construction sectors,
while increasing national income.
Cutting-edge technologies secured in the process of researching and developing the national defense arena have been extended to the private sector,

223

Section 4. Developing the Defense Economy into a Growth Engine for the National Economycontributing to enhancing the productivity of civilian industries, including theelectronics, telecommunications, and machinery industries. Major examples areshown in Table 8-4.
Table 8-4. Examples of Defense Science and Technology Applications in the Private Sector
Industrial Sector

Defense Science and Technology

Spin-off Examples in Private Sector

Information

Satellite Imagery Map Production

Navigation

Transportation

ǩ:HOGLQJDQG3URFHVVLQJWR3URGXFH
Tanks
ǩ0LOLWDU\9HKLFOHVǩ6XEZD\7UDLQVDQG5DLOZD\9HKLFOHVǩ&DUJR7UXFNVǩ(OHFWURQLFDQG*XLGHG:HDSRQVDQG
Radar Technology
ǩ:LUHOHVV&RPPXQLFDWLRQV
Telecommunications
Equipment
and Electronics
ǩ6SUHDG6SHFWUXPDQG
Synchronization Technologyǩ(OHFWUR2SWLF'HWHFWLRQ7HFKQRORJ\
OthersTank Gunnery Simulator

ǩ$QWL&DU&UDVK5DGDUǩ:LUHOHVV3KRQHVǩ0RELOH7HOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV6HUYLFHVǩ9LGHRV'LJLWDO&DPHUDV

Subway Train Simulator

The military has produced state-certified technicians and played the roleof provider of national tech manpower through its own MOS training. It has
produced a total of 41,871 state licensed technicians, including industrial andfunctional specialists, across the approximately 120 areas that encompass mechanics, chemicals, electricity and electronics (National Defense Statistics Year
%RRN ,QDGGLWLRQDURXQGWHFKQLFDOH[SHUWVLQWKH¿HOGVRI
communications, aviation, and maintenance are produced every year, following
their years of service in those areas of the military.

2. Defense Budget and Mid-term Defense Program| The 2010 defense budget | The 2010 defense budget was set at
KRW 29.6 trillion with a focus on promoting the welfare of service members
and reinforcing combat strength in consideration of the North’s nuclear andmissile threats. It has increased 3.6 percent year on year. The size of the defense
budget and its allocation status is shown in Table 8-5.

2242010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

Table 8-5. Defense Budget and Allocation
Unit: KRW trillion
Increase/Decrease(%)

Program

2009

2010

Defense Budget

28.5326

29.56271.0301(3.6%)

11.909612.12040.2108(1.8%)

8.00838.33930.3310(4.1%)

19.9179

20.4597

0.5418(2.7%)

8.61479.10300.4883(5.7%)

Troop
Operating
Costs

Ordinary
Operating Operations and
Costs
Maintenance(O&M) Costs
Total
Force Improvement Budget

The ordinary operating costs were set at KRW 20.5 trillion, an increaseof 2.7 percent from the previous year. This budget will be spent mainly toincrease the welfare of service members, assure the maximum performanceof the existing forces, and produce elite standing forces. First, to enhance
the welfare of service members, residential facilities, such as living quarters,
PLOLWDU\UHVLGHQFHVDQGEDFKHORURI¿FHU¶VDFFRPPRGDWLRQIDFLOLWLHVKDYHEHHQ
targeted for improvement as early as 2012. To prevent early retirements of Air
Force pilots, extended service benefits were introduced and private soldiers'
allowances for sick-leave and holidays increased. Second, to assure that theexisting forces are at the peak of their abilities, the need for major combat gearand maintenance were also reflected in the budget. In addition, the budget
includes the costs required to improve the operational ratio of major combat
gear, lower the superannuation ratio by replacing decrepit standard vehicles,
and reduce the backlog of maintenance jobs. Third, to prevent a decline incombat strength, non-commissioned officers and paid support troops will be
increased and practical training and education will be reinforced. To that end,
the 2010 defense budget accounted for the needs of scientifically advanced
WUDLQLQJZKLFKLQFOXGHVWKHXVHRI&%7HTXLSPHQW
The force improvement budget stood at KRW 9.1 trillion, an increase of 5.7
percent from 2009, with a focus on responding to the North’s military threats,
meeting the needs of military restructuring, and conducting national defense
R&D.

225

Section 4. Developing the Defense Economy into a Growth Engine for the National EconomyFirst, the need for combat strength matching the recently increased military
WKUHDWVIURPWKH1RUWKZDVUHÀHFWHGLQWKHEXGJHW7KHEDOOLVWLFPLVVLOHHDUO\warning radar, the Aegis destroyer, 2nd round of F-15 K business, the nextgeneration ground-to-air guided weapons (SAM-X) and the other necessary
systems will be procured within the budget. Second, theater operationscommand facilities, the K-21, and infantry combat vehicles will also be
procured to meet the needs generated by military restructuring. Third, as part ofthe effort to 'develop the defense industry into a new economic growth engine,'
the budget for weapons systems R&D was expanded to secure systemsdevelopment within the nation’s capability.
In order to take follow-up measures in response to the attack on the ROKS
Cheonan, the MND secured reserve funds totaling KRW 35.2 billion. Out of
this fund, KRW 21.2 billion is being spent on reinforcing the search and rescue
equipment and KRW 14 billion is being currently disbursed to upgrade thepatrol combat corvette (PCC) and the Frigate each.
MND-related special accounting includes Special Accounts for theRelocation of Defense and Military Facilities, Special Accounts for Relocating86).%DVHVDQG6SHFLDO$FFRXQWVIRU&RQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH,QQRYDWLRQ&LW\
The 2010 budget for special accounts administered by the MND increased 133
percent from 2009 to total approximately KRW 1 trillion and 48.8 billion. The
status of the budget for special accounts is shown in Table 8-6.

Table 8-6. Budget for the Special Accounts Administered by the MND
Unit: KRW 100 million

2262010 Defense White Paper

Status20092010

Increase/Decrease (%)

Special Accounts for
Relocation of Defense and
Military Facilities

2,218

2,600

382 (17.2%)

Special Accounts for
Relocating USFK bases

2,130

6,967

4,837 (227.1%)

Special Accounts forConstruction of theInnovation City

145

921

776 (535.2%)

Total

4,493

10,4885,995 (133.4%)

#HAPTERThe Special Accounts for the Relocation of Defense and Military Facilities
was created to enable inner city military bases and facilities to be moved to thesuburbs and to purchase private land that has been occupied by the military.
In 2010, a total of KRW 260 billion was allocated to relocate the 1st Logistics
Support Command and Seoul District Hospital. Regarding the Special$FFRXQWVIRU5HORFDWLQJ86).%DVHV.5:ELOOLRQZDVHDUPDUNHG
for facility construction in 2010 in accordance with the relocation of the
USFK to Pyeongtak by integrating the USFK bases. The Special Accounts
for Construction of the Innovation City was established in line with the Plan
to Relocate Public Institutes to Local Cities (June 24, 2005). The costs ofrelocating the National Defense University fall under this Special Accounts
allocation. In 2010, a total of KRW 92.1 billion was set aside to purchase thesite and construct the necessary facilities for the University.

| The 2011-2015 mid-term defense program (draft) | The 20112015 Mid-term Defense Program (draft) focused on securing a stable budget
EDVHLQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHPLGWHUP¿QDQFLDOSRVLWLRQRIWKH*RYHUQPHQWLQRUGHUWRHQVXUHFRQWLQXRXVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH'HIHQVH5HIRUP%DVLF3ODQand other national policies, and to meet the needs of existing forces to havetheir peak performance.
The size of the 2011-2015 mid-term defense budget (draft) is shown in Table
8-7. As noted in the table, the annual increase of the budget averages 6 percent,with ordinary operating costs and the force improvement budget increasing 4
percent and 10 percent, respectively.

Table 8-7. 2011-2015 Mid-term Defense Budget (draft)

Unit: KRW 100 million, %Year
Status

2010

Total
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

DefenseBudget(Increase)

29.6
(3.6)

31.4
(6.3)

33.1
(5.4)

35.1
(5.9)

37.1
(5.8)

39.6
(6.6)

176.2
(6.0)

Ordinary
Operating Costs(Allocation)(Increase)

20.5(69.2)(2.7)

21.4(68.2)(4.7)

22.2(66.9)(3.5)

23.1(65.8)(4.0)

24.0(64.6)(3.9)

24.9(63.0)(4.0)

115.5(65.5)(4.0)

Force
Improvement
Budget(Allocation)(Increase)

9.1(30.8)(5.7)

10.0(31.8)(9.8)

10.9(33.1)(9.5)

12.0(34.2)(9.6)

13.1(35.4)(9.5)

14.7(37.0)(11.5)

60.7(34.5)(10.0)

227

Section 4. Developing the Defense Economy into a Growth Engine for the National EconomyAs for ordinary operating costs, the budget was set with a focus onestablishing an advanced national defense operations system, ensuring that theexisting force operates to its full combat potential, addressing the grievances
RIWKH¿HOGXQLWVLPSURYLQJWKHFRQGLWLRQVRIWKHEDUUDFNVWREULQJWKHOLYLQJ
environment in line with the improved social conditions, and enhancing
welfare of service members.
The force improvement budget was planned mainly to equip the military
with the core and foundational combat strength necessary to enable proactive
responses to varied future threats while effectively deterring the North. In
addition, the need for combat reinforcements to implement the defense
reforms were taken into account in budget planning, in consideration of thegovernment’s financial situation, and defense R&D was also highlighted inorder to secure Korean indigenous weapons systems.

3. Developing the defense industry into a new economic
growth engine
As an integral security asset to assure national value and interests, thedefense industry shares in the history of laying the nation’s industrial
foundation and is bringing about a tremendous technological ripple effect toother industries as defense research and development increasingly involves
FXWWLQJHGJHWHFKQRORJLHV%\DGYDQFLQJWKHGHIHQVHLQGXVWU\WKH01'ZLOO
secure a cutting-edge force and further contribute to the national economy andindustrial growth.

| Defense industry exports | In 2009, defense industry exports
amounted to USD 1.16 billion, increasing 16 percent from USD 1 billion
in 2008. In addition, the export market has jumped from 59 in 2008 to
74 countries in 2009, with exports diversifying to include electronics,
telecommunications and vessels rather than the ammunition and maneuver
equipment that were the main exports in the past. Defense industry exports
RYHUD¿YH\HDUSHULRGIURPDUHVKRZQLQ)LJXUH

2282010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

Figure 8-9. Defense Industry Exports over a Five Year Period (from 2005)
Unit: USD 100 million
12
10

11
11.6
16

10

8

8.45

6
4
2
0

2.62
.

2.55
.

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Year

Amount(USD 100
million)

2005

2.62

F-15 K Parts, Self-Propelled
Artillery Parts, KT-1 Trainers

34 countries, including theU.S., Turkey and Indonesia

2006

2.55

F-15 K Parts, Self-Propelled
Artillery Spare Parts, Aircraft
Maintenance Spare Parts,
Unmanned Surveillance Robots

44 countries, including theU.S., Turkey and UAE

2007

8.45

KT-1 Trainers, K-3 Automatic rifles,
Manufacturing service for the main
wing of A-10 aircraft

46 countries, including Turkey,
Philippines and U.S.

2008

10.0

Next-Generation Tank (XK-2)
Production Technology, 155 mm
Ammunition Parts, K-9 SelfPropelled Artillery Spare Parts

59 countries, including Turkey,
U.S. and Egypt

2009

11.6

Ammunitions, Communication
Equipment, Depot Maintenance on
Submarines, Submarine Combat
System74 countries, including U.S.,
Iraq and Germany

Main Items

Major Countries

The increase in defense industry exports is also a result of its active
marketing efforts. The 2009 Seoul International Aerospace & Defense
Exhibition (ADEX) held in October was attended by 273 businesses from 27
FRXQWULHVDQGPDMRU¿JXUHVIURPFRXQWULHV¿OOLQJRUGHUVZRUWK86'
360 million. The MND has also beefed up its efforts to penetrate overseas
defense markets. In 2010, it held the Defense Industry & Military Logistics
Joint Committee with 12 countries participating. Furthermore, it took part insix exhibitions held abroad, including Langkawi International Maritime andAerospace Exhibition (LIMA).

229

Section 4. Developing the Defense Economy into a Growth Engine for the National EconomyIn the future, the MND will strive to realize the national goal of 'developing
the defense industry into a new economic growth engine' capable of playing anactive part in developing the national economy. As for future defense industry
exports, the MND will seek to achieve its target rank in the world’s export
market of the 10th position in 2012 and the 8th in 2015.

| Improving the conditions to foster the defense industry andencouraging its participation | National and international competitivenessand systematic development of the defense industry requires advancing defense
science and technology as a pre-condition. Considering this, the MND will increase
its investment in defense research and development to 6.1 percent of the total
defense budget in 2010 and 7.0 percent in 2012 in order to lay a foundation for thestrengthening of defense R&D and future procurement. The Agency for Defense
Development (ADD) will stimulate basic research in the core areas, such as aerospacetechnology and satellite navigation, while focusing on developing strategic andcutting-edge weapons technology as well as core and source technology. In addition,
2. Technology Transfer (spin-on/off/up)·Spin-on: Transfer of civilian technology
to the military·Spin-off: Transfer of military-owned
technology to the private sector·Spin-up: Joint development oftechnology commonly needed by boththe private sector and the military

the MND will spur technology transfer (spin-on/off/up)2 between itself and the private

3. Defense Industry Promotion Funds
A system for the Government to provide
long-term loans to defense businesses
at low interest rates to promote thedefense industry

support. To enhance the production capacity of the defense industry, the MND

sector by strengthening their collaborations to ensure the market competitiveness ofthe defense industry and to attract investment for related enterprises.
The MND will provide funds3 to the defense industry without delay to facilitate
WKHGHIHQVHH[SRUWVZKLOHJUDGXDOO\H[SDQGLQJWKHVFRSHDQGDUHDVRI¿QDQFLDO
will increase the use of domestically produced parts. To this end, it will continue
to share information about different (defense-related) parts and strengthen its
support of the development of core parts that have tremendous technological andeconomic ripple effects in other sectors.

| Strengthening the foundation of the defense industry
by fostering defense-related small and medium sizedenterprises | Accounting for 70 percent of the entire defense industry, smalland medium-sized enterprises (SME) have laid a solid foundation for the defense
industry through its original and differentiated technology developed in its coretechnology research and utilized in its development and weapons systems. To
nurture defense-related SMEs, the MND will list the R&D fund for the Small and
0HGLXP%XVLQHVV$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ 60%$ DWWKHWRSRILWVEXGJHWDOORFDWLRQVR

2302010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

as to support the production of domestic parts and the development of weaponssystems as well as to provide consulting services regarding technology andmanagement. At the R&D stage, SME-preferred items4 will be selected andthe supplier selection process will be refined to a 'one item-multiple suppliers'
from the 'one item-single supplier' system. Further, the MND will make surethat information and news about the defense industry are always posted andXSGDWHGRQWKHZHEVLWHVRIWKH60%$DQGWKH'HIHQVH$FTXLVLWLRQ3URJUDP

4. SME-Preferred Item Designation
System
A system that endows preferredvendor status to SMEs that take directpart in the development of specificitems to foster outstanding SMEs withtechnological prowess.

Administration. The MND will also organize an exhibition designed to facilitate
the development of defense parts together with the SME Win-Win Association.

| Stimulating defense industry exports | As the international
defense market is continually growing, developed countries have strengthened
their defense export support systems. Over recent years, the ROK’s defense
industry has seen a dramatic increase. Hence, the ROK Government is enhancing
its efforts to support exports and is implementing strategies to systematically
expand such support.
First, the MND will strengthen the competitiveness of the defense industry and its
products. It will discover promising export areas with world-class competitiveness,such as the ship-building, automobile, steel and IT industries, while diversifying
WKHLWHPVDQGVXEMHFWVRILWV¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUW7RH[SDQGJRYHUQPHQWDOVXSSRUWIRU
defense-related exports, the MND will provide quality assurance, while applying
the royalty exemption system to items that have low price competitiveness. Further,
the MND will cultivate export experts, sponsor meetings for CEOs, and expand its¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWRIH[SRUWEXVLQHVVHVLQWKHGHIHQVHLQGXVWU\Second, the MND will pioneer overseas export markets and increase its marketing
activities. For this purpose, the MND will map out export strategies tailored to eachregion and provide information regarding export support based on market analysis.
In addition, it will increase military exchanges and cooperation among high-ranking
officers, while expanding (international) collaboration in the defense industry andlogistics sector. Further, the MND will strengthen governmental support for overseas
marketing activities, take a leading role in penetrating new international markets,
upgrade the Seoul International Aerospace & Defense Exhibition (ADEX) to become aworld class defense-related event and foster the defense industry as a high value addedindustry. The export strategies and key export fields by region are shown in Figure 8-10.

231

Section 4. Developing the Defense Economy into a Growth Engine for the National EconomyFigure 8-10. Defense Industry Export Strategies and Key Export Fields by Region

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Third, the MND will secure and expand the infrastructure to support
defense industry exports. As part of the efforts to reinforce the support ofexports, it will make full use of the Export Support Council for Defense
Commodities and the Support Center for Defense Commodity Trade at the
government-level. In addition, in the mid- and long-term, a special Defense
Commodity Export Support Agency will be installed to increase the exports
of defense supplies. Export Support Institutions, such as the Government5. Government-to-Government Sales
System (FMS)
A system in which the Defense
Acquisition Program Administration or
the Korea Trade Investment Promotion
Agency mediates or handles defense
industry exports for local suppliers
by dealing with overseas client
governments.
6. Defense Exports Follow-up Logistics
Support System
A system in which the Government
provides logistics support, such as
defense commodities, faculties andmanpower, to client governments to
help them operate and maintain the
defense items they have procured fromlocal suppliers.

to-Government Sales System (FMS)5 and the Defense Exports Follow-up
Logistics Support System,6 will be created as early as possible. In addition,with the development of the Defense Export Control System and the Industry
Export-Import Support Information System, information exchanges between
concerned government agencies will be enhanced.

4. Green Growth and Energy Conservation in National
Defense| Green growth in national defense | The ROK Government
declared 'Low-Carbon, Green Growth' as its new national vision and mappedout three major green-growth strategies. To live up to the Government’s
policy line, the MND has been endeavoring, since June 2009, to meet threemajor challenges: the development of green technology, a reduction ingreenhouse gases, and public awareness-raising about green life.

2322010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

First, green technology development in national defense is aimed at using
eco-friendly and low-carbon energy for the operation of military equipment
and facilities. The three major technologies in the initiative are as follows:
applied eco-friendly green energy technology; low carbon future energybased technology; and M&S-based technology for military operations andtraining systems. Applied eco-friendly green energy technology refers totechnologies that produce, store and manage eco-friendly energy, such as
photovoltaic energy, for use in field of national defense. The fuel cell for
combat vehicles is a prime example of this technology. The technology
for a low carbon future energy-based weapons system will transform thecurrent weapon system to one that minimizes carbon emissions and pollution
whilst neutralizing enemy combat capability. Its representative example ishybrid electric combat vehicles. The M&S-based (simulation) technology
for military operations and training systems has an effect equivalent to real
military training while reducing energy consumption to a minimum. Fighter
combat simulation technology serves as an example.
Second, the reduction and control of greenhouse gases initiative isbeing implemented in four areas: establishing and utilizing the Carbon
Management Information System for Military Units; replacing the current
electric lamps with LED ones; establishing and using renewable energy
facilities; and expanding the distribution of low-carbon vehicles, following
the Government’s announcement of the national objective to reducegreenhouse gas emissions in November 2009. The Carbon Management
Information System for Military Units analyzes greenhouse gas emissions
and sets a reduction target for each unit to help reduce greenhouse gases. This
V\VWHPLVWREHDSSOLHGWRWKHHQWLUHPLOLWDU\E\%\SHUFHQW
of the electric lamps in the military will be replaced with LED lamps. As
for renewable energy generation, a total of 100 facilities are scheduled to beinstalled by 2015. As for the promotion of low-carbon vehicle utilization, 50
percent of the passenger vehicles used in the military will be replaced withhybrid or compact vehicles by 2013.
Third, the public awareness-raising on green life initiatives aims to letenlisted service members (250,000 per year) spread green awareness which
was learned from their stay in barracks while maintaining a green lifestyle,

233

Section 4. Developing the Defense Economy into a Growth Engine for the National EconomyLED Lamp Installed on an Army GOP Barbed-Wire Fence

after being discharged from service. To that end, lectures of distinguishedguests and related professionals will be provided through the national defense
PR media, and the commanding officers and staffs of each unit will also
educate their service members about green life. To reduce domestic waste,
the military is curtailing unpopular menus, applying an incentive system anda self-directed food service system.
In order to encourage the use of bicycles, bicycle racks will be installed
within bases and other facilities to promote their use when commuting or
moving within a unit. In addition, the effort to acquire bicycles for public use
is also being made.

| Energy conservation | Energy savings in national defense arebeing instituted in connection with the Government’s energy policies and inconsideration of the unique nature of the military. Through a whole-of-government
approach, various campaigns are underway: maintaining room temperature ata proper level (for heating, lower than 18ç; for air-conditioning, higher than28Ⳅ SURKLELWLQJWKHRSHUDWLRQRIHOHYDWRUVEHORZWKHIRXUWKÀRRUWKHXVH
of bicycles, and non-driving days based on license plates. At the same time,the military is trying to realize daily living habits based on green mind set: an
eco-driving campaign for no idling wheels, no abrupt engine stops or starts,
ZDWHUDQGHOHFWULFLW\VDYLQJVDQGWKHHI¿FLHQWRSHUDWLRQRIHTXLSPHQW

2342010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

Each Service sets its own energy saving objectives, thus reducing thedefense budget. The targets are set in three areas in consideration of the priceof oil: a combat readiness posture, education and training, and unit operations.
In addition, ideas to save energy in daily life without compromising combat
strength are continually being explored and publicized. Furthermore, oilsaving training and educational practices, such as the integration of similar
WUDLQLQJWKHXVHRIVLPXODWHGDQGVFLHQWL¿FDOO\DGYDQFHGWUDLQLQJHTXLSPHQW
and cyber education and video conferences in place of face-to-face meetings
are being actively pursued.

| Creating an eco-friendly green camp | The MND has realized
the concept of eco-friendly green growth across all of its projects ranging
from the planning stage as relocating military bases and creating new bases tothe construction stage, which involves equipment, facilities, and surrounding
environments. For example, during the construction of the naval base on
Jeju,7 all of the following measures will be implemented: use of renewableenergy, such as solar and tidal energy; use of eco-friendly vehicles, such as
bicycles and electric cars; use of low-carbon heating and cooking facilities,
using solar heat and geothermal energy; and implementation of waste
recapture engineering methods that use natural-circulation resources.

7.Naval base, Jeju, (construction to becompleted in 2014)·Size of Base: 480,000⽋·Length of Pier: 1,950m (approximately
20 large vessels can moor at the pier)

235

Section 4. Developing the Defense Economy into a Growth Engine for the National Economy9

Chapter

Attractive Military,
Rewarding Military
Section 1. Improving the Welfare of Service
Members
Section 2. Modernizing the Military Facilities
Section 3. Advancing the Military Medical Service
SystemSection 4. Invigorating Productive Military Service
Conditions

Boot Camp Training (April 2009)

1

SectionImproving the Welfare of Service
Members
Military personnel welfare determines the quality of life and morale of service members, and further, it
constitutes an integral part of the efforts to maintain intangible combat power. Based on surveys andresearch pertaining to overall military life, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has established andcarried out military welfare policies that have tangibly enhanced the daily lives of service members.

1. Development of the Basic Plan for Military
Personnel Welfare
1. Basic Plan for Military Personnel
WelfareAccording to Article 6 of the Basic Law
for Military Personnel Welfare (effective
on March 1, 2008), the Minister of the
National Defense sets up a Basic Planfor Military Personnel Welfare every
five years and finalizes it in consultation
with the heads of central government
agencies. An effective plan is confirmed
after receiving presidential approval.

By finalizing the Basic Plan for Military Personnel Welfare1 (April
21, 2009), following presidential approval, the MND suggested a future
vision of military welfare and laid the foundation for systematic andcomprehensive welfare policies.
Basic Plan for Military Personnel Welfare: Key Points
ǩBasic Welfare: to provide basic living conditions of such quality as to allow
service members to concentrate on their military missions.
* Improvement in the remuneration system, amendment of the militarypension system.
ǩFamily Welfare: to alleviate the difficulties facing the family members ofmilitary personnel.
* Guarantee of academic support for children of military personnel, provisionof lifecycle-tailored welfare services.
ǩAdvanced Cultural Welfare: to realize a culturally enriched life that matches
the development of the society.
* Support for self-development, guarantee of all-round conditions whereservice members can enhance their physical strength.
ǩWelfare Infrastructure: to establish an efficient welfare support system thatmeets the needs of service members.
* Management of amenities, enhancement of welfare fund management
efficiency.

238 2010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 9.

| Basic welfare realization | Military services feature unique
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVDVIROORZV¿UVWVHUYLFHPHPEHUVVKRXOGULVNWKHLUOLIHLQHPHUJHQFLHV
and national crises in order to defend the nation and protect the lives and properties
RILWVSHRSOH6HFRQGVLQFHVHUYLFHPHPEHUVVKRXOGPDLQWDLQDKRXUVWDQGE\SRVWXUHZRUNPRVWO\LQUHPRWHDUHDVDQGIUHTXHQWO\UHORFDWHWKH\RIWHQKDYHWRFRPSURPLVHWKHSOHDVXUHVRIIDPLO\OLIH7KLUGFDUHHUVHUYLFHPHPEHUVLQPRVW
cases, retire early at Ages When Expenditure Is the Highest in the Life Cycle (aged
EHWZHHQDQG 2)RXUWKPLOLWDU\GXW\DQGLWVDVVRFLDWHGVNLOOVODFNVLPLODULWLHVZLWKRWKHUFLYLOLDQMREVZKLFKUHVWULFWVWKHMRERSSRUWXQLWLHVRSHQWRIRUPHUPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHOLQVRFLHW\&RQVLGHULQJWKHVHSRLQWVVRDVWRWDNHVXFKGLVDGYDQWDJHVLQWRDFFRXQWLQWKHSROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVUHODWHGWRPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHOWKH01'KDV
maintained close consultations with the concerned governmental agencies and the

2. Ages When Expenditure Is theHighest in the Life Cycle
The age range when expenditure
increase to the highest in the life cycle
due to child support and other living
expenses associated with the relevant
stage of life.

1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\The MND has also refined the military remuneration system so that it now
UHIOHFWVWKHUDQNGXWLHVDQGZRUNLQJHQYLURQPHQWRIGLIIHUHQWVHUYLFHPHPEHUVIn addition, the MND aims at increasing the salary of career soldiers to match
WKRVHEHLQJRIIHUHGE\ODUJHSULYDWHHQWHUSULVHV,QLWQHZO\LQWURGXFHGDQ
incentive (KRW 12 million per year) for pilots extending their service period and
DEROLVKHGWKHUHVWULFWLRQRQDGGLWLRQDOSD\ULVHVEDVHGRQVHUYLFHSHULRG3WRHQDEOH
DFRQWLQXRXVSURPRWLRQLQSD\JUDGHXQWLOVHUYLFHPHPEHUVUHWLUH$VIRUWKHSD\JLYHQWROLHXWHQDQWFRORQHOOHYHORI¿FHUVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHSDUWLFXODUWDVNVRIHDFKSRVLWLRQFRPPDQGLQJRIILFHUVDQGWKHKHDGVRIGHSDUWPHQWVKDYHEHHQJLYHQ
priority since 2009. Yet, the MND plans to expand the pay in phases to lieutenant
FRORQHOOHYHORI¿FHUVKROGLQJDORQHSRVLWLRQDQGPDMRUV$VLGHIURPWKHVHHIIRUWVWKH01'LQWHQGVWRHVWDEOLVKDQHZEHQH¿WVV\VWHPWKDWSURYLGHVPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHOZLWKVHUYLFHPHPEHUDOORZDQFHVIDPLO\VHSDUDWLRQDOORZDQFHVDOORZDQFHVIRUWKH
FROOHJHVWXGHQWFKLOGUHQRIVHUYLFHPHPEHUVDQGGXW\VHUYLFHDOORZDQFHVZKLOHDOVRRIIHULQJDOORZDQFHVIRUVHUYLFHPHPEHUVZRUNLQJLQFORVHFRQWDFWDUHDVRQVKLS
service allowances, air service allowances and hazardous duty allowances to ensure

3. Additional Pay-rises Based on Service
PeriodA system that restricts the number of
pay-grade promotions to between fourand six as a form of additional payrises, since the maximum salary ofa given rank is reached eight to nine
years before the retirement age. The
pay-grade of career military personnel
increases by one grade every year.
*The Additional Pay-Rises Restriction
System was abolished on January 1,
2010, through the amendment of therelevant law, in accordance with theruling of the Supreme Court (May 21,2009).

UHDOLVWLFFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUVHUYLFHPHPEHUVLQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHGDQJHURIWKHLU
duties and areas in which they are stationed.
7KHPRQWKO\VDODU\IRUHQOLVWHGPHQRQWKHEDVLVRIDFRUSRUDO¶VVDODU\FXUUHQWO\VWDQGVDW.5:7KH01'SODQVWRVHWXSDUHDOLVWLFSD\OHYHOWKDWPHHWVWKH
QHFHVVDU\H[SHQVHVIRUWKHLUGDLO\DFWLYLWLHVLQDQGRXWVLGHWKHEDVH,QDGGLWLRQWKH

239

Section 1. Improving the Welfare of Service Members01'KDVVWDUWHGSURYLGLQJDQDOORZDQFHIRU¿OLDOYLVLW .5: WRHQOLVWHG
PHQZKHQWKH\WDNHUHJXODUOHDYH6DODU\DQGWUDYHOH[SHQVHVDUHRIIHUHGLQDOXPSVXPE\PHDQVRIWKH1DUDVDUDQJFDUGLVVXHGE\WKH&HQWUDO$FFRXQWLQJ*URXSZKLFKGUDVWLFDOO\UHGXFHVWKHZRUNORDGRIHDFKXQLW6LQFH0DUFKWKHDFFLGHQW
4. Accident Insurance Service
An insurance service that provides
up to KRW 10 million to active duty
personnel or switchover service
members (conscripted police, combat
police, voluntary fire fighters, prison
guards working for the Ministry ofJustice) in the event of injury or death
while they are outside the base, forexample on their leave or one-nightstay-outs. This insurance automatically
becomes effective when they register
the Nara-sarang card as the accountinto which their wages are paid.

insurance service4KDVEHHQDYDLODEOHIRUOHDYHKDOIGD\RIIDQGRQHQLJKWVWD\outs as an optional and additional service of the 1DUDVDUDQJ [patriotic] card. Aside
IURPVXFKEHQH¿WVHQOLVWHGVWXGHQWVDUHDOORZHGWRGHIHULQWHUHVWSD\PHQWVZKLOH
on a student loan, and the exemption from interest payments for those enlisted who
DUHRQDVWXGHQWORDQLVFXUUHQWO\EHLQJGLVFXVVHGEHWZHHQWKH01'DQGFRQFHUQHG
governmental agencies.
$VSDUWRIWKHWDLORUHGZHOIDUHV\VWHPWKH01'KDVEHHQRIIHULQJKRVSLWDOL]DWLRQ
insurance to children under 20 and spouses of military personnel, since 2010. In the
IXWXUHWKH01'ZLOODOVRH[SDQGWKHFXUUHQWRQOLQHUHFHLSWUHJLVWUDWLRQV\VWHPWRPLQLPL]HWKHDPRXQWRIQRQXVHGDOORZDQFHIRUGLVFUHWLRQDOXVHE\WKRVHZKRDUH
QRWDEOHWRXVHHOHFWURQLFFDUGVGXHWRZKHUHWKH\DUHVWDWLRQHGVXFKDVLQIRUHLJQ
countries and remote areas.
7RKHOSORQJWHUPVHUYLFHPHPEHUVRZQDKRXVHWKHUHOHYDQWODZZDVDPHQGHG
LQWKHUHE\DEROLVKLQJWKHWZR\HDUPDQGDWRU\UHVLGHQFHV\VWHPZKHQRQH

5. Abolishment of the Mandatory
Residence System for Newly Purchased
Private Apartments
The Apartment Purchasing System
run by each local government, under
the Rule of Housing Supply set by the
Ministry of Homeland and Maritime
Affairs, applies only to local residents
who have lived in the city for over two
years. The amendment to the rule on
September 17, 2009, now stipulates
that military personnel can apply forinclusion to the system regardless of
how long they have resided in a city.
* The amendment was madein consideration of the uniquecharacteristics of military service,
which leads to relocation of service
members every one to two years.

2402010 Defense White Paper

wishes to purchase an apartment.5)XUWKHULWZDVGHFLGHGWKDWWKHVXSSO\RISXEOLFKRXVLQJVLWHVE\WKH0LOLWDU\0XWXDO$LG$VVRFLDWLRQZRXOGEHIXUWKHUH[SDQGHG
as part of its special supply plan. To increase the supply of housing to active
GXW\SHUVRQQHOE\XSWRSHUFHQWRIWKHWRWDOPLOLWDU\KRXVHKROGVWKH01'LV
SODQQLQJWRDQQXDOO\SURYLGHKRXVHVWREHRIIHUHGE\WKH0LOLWDU\0XWXDO$LG
$VVRFLDWLRQE\)RUWKLVSXUSRVHWKH01'KDVPDSSHGRXWWKH6HYHQ<HDU
3ODQRQ+RXVLQJ6XSSO\7KHVXSSO\SODQE\\HDULVVKRZQLQ7DEOH

Table 9-1. Seven-Year Plan on Housing Supply for the Home-Owning Program of the Military
Mutual Aid Association
Classification

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

No. ofHouseholds

442

2,881

2,635

3,048

2,600

2,600

2,000

Chapter 9.

)URPWKH01'GUDPDWLFDOO\LQFUHDVHGWKHKRPHOHDVHIXQGIRUORQJ

Ratio of Home Owners (As of 2008)

WHUPVHUYLFHPHPEHUVQRWOLYLQJLQPLOLWDU\TXDUWHUV)RULQVWDQFHLWKDV(%)

RIIHUHGDQLQWHUHVWIUHHORDQRIXSWRRIWKHWRWDOOHDVHDQGZLOOIXUWKHU80

LQFUHDVHLWWRLQWKHIXWXUH,QDGGLWLRQIRUVHUYLFHPHPEHUVZRUNLQJ
in areas other than where their newly purchased apartment is located, the01'KDVEHHQGLVFXVVLQJZLWKWKHFRQFHUQHGJRYHUQPHQWDODJHQFLHVWKH
SRVVLEOHH[FOXVLRQRIWKRVHVHUYLFHPHPEHUVIURPWKH0DQGDWRU\5HVLGHQFH
3HULRG ILYH\HDUV WKDWDSSOLHVWREX\HUVRIDQHZDSDUWPHQWWKURXJKWKH
*RYHUQPHQWOHGBogeumjari [sweet home] program.

| Enhancement of family welfare | The challenges facing service

65.1%

62.9%

60

40

33.7%

20

Military
Personnel

PublicEntireServants Population

PHPEHUVDQGWKHLUIDPLO\LQWKHLUGDLO\OLYHVKDYHOHGWRRXWVWDQGLQJPLOLWDU\personnel retiring early.
7RSURYLGHZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGZHOIDUHVXSSRUWZKLFKKHOSVVHUYLFHPHPEHUVVWULNH D KDUPRQLRXV EDODQFH EHWZHHQ WKHLU ZRUNSODFH DQG KRPH DQGEHWZHHQZRUNDQGOHLVXUHDFWLYLWLHVWKH01'VLJQHGWKH$JUHHPHQWIRU
Providing Professional Family Support Service6WR6HUYLFHPHQ¶V)DPLO\ZLWKWKH0LQLVWU\RI+HDOWK:HOIDUHDQG)DPLO\$IIDLUVRQ2FWREHU
In addition, various programs related to culture and education as well as

6. Family Support Service
A service that helps to prevent
family conflicts and improve family
relationships by offering counselingservices and educational and cultural
programs. It also provides customized
services, such as baby sitting and daycare services, for two-income families
in preparation for emergencies.

FRQVXOWLQJVHUYLFHVDUHDYDLODEOHWKURXJKWKH+DSSLQHVV6XSSRUW6HUYLFHIRU
6HUYLFHPHQ¶V)DPLOLHVZKLFKOLQNVWKH/RFDO)DPLO\6XSSRUW&HQWHUVZLWKFRQFHUQHGORFDOXQLWVQDWLRQZLGH7KHVHUYLFHSURJUDPZDVSLORWHGE\Proportional Distribution by Typeof Work Location of Career Service
Members (As of 2008)

XQLWVIURPWRDQGLWKDVEHHQH[SDQGHGWRRWKHUXQLWVVLQFH
,QDGGLWLRQDWRWDORIGRUPLWRULHVLQWHQFLWLHVKDYHEHHQSURYLGHGIRU

Metropolitan
CitiesSmaller than myeon
17.9%(remote areas)
29.6%

approximately 2,200 children separated from their parents while attending
VFKRROVLQYDULRXVFLWLHV$QRWKHUGRUPWKDWFDQDFFRPPRGDWHVWXGHQWVLVDOVRSODQQHGWREHEXLOWLQ6RQJSD1HZ7RZQ&DUHHUVROGLHUVKDYHORQJIDFHGWKHFKDOOHQJHRIREWDLQLQJTXDOLW\HGXFDWLRQIRUWKHLUFKLOGUHQDVWKH\

Small andMediumSized Cities
33.2%

Eup
19.3%

IUHTXHQWO\UHORFDWHDQGRIWHQZRUNLQVPDOOUHPRWHDUHDVVXFKDVHXSP\HRQRUHYHQVPDOOHUYLOODJHV7KDQNVWRWKH6SHFLDO$GPLVVLRQV6\VWHP
that was introduced in consideration of such educational disadvantages,
HYHU\\HDUDURXQGFKLOGUHQRIPLOLWDU\SHUVRQQHODUHDGPLWWHGWRFROOHJHVDQGJDLQWKHEHQHILWIURPWKHV\VWHP,QWKH01'H[SDQGHGWKLV
EHQH¿WWRLQFOXGHPLGGOHDQGKLJKVFKRRODGPLVVLRQVDQGLWZLOODOVRRIIHU

A total of 48.9% of career soldierswork in remote areas that lack basic
living infrastructure, including cultural
facilities, which demonstrates alarge contrast compared to the living
conditions of most non-military
personnel (public servants: 15.6%,
general citizens: 18.5%).

241

Section 1. Improving the Welfare of Service Members

FROOHJHDGPLVVLRQZRUNVKRSWRXUVDQGFROOHJHHQWUDQFHFRQVXOWLQJVHUYLFHV
while expanding the Special Admissions System to ensure that more children
IURPPLOLWDU\IDPLOLHVDOVRHQMR\WKLVEHQHILW7KH'HIHQVH6FKRODUVKLS+RJXN6FKRODUVKLS WKDWKDVEHHQRIIHUHGWRIUHVKPHQDQGHQUROOHGFROOHJHVWXGHQWVVLQFHZDVUHYLVHGLQ,WLVQRZJLYHQWRHQUROOHGVWXGHQWV
RQO\LQWKHIRUPRIPHULWVFKRODUVKLSVDQGVHSDUDWHIURPWKLVWKH$UPHG
Forces Welfare Agency offers freshmen cash prizes to congratulate them on
Dormitory for the Children of Military
Personnel

their admission to college.
,Q OLQH ZLWK WKH SROLFLHV RI WKH 1DWLRQDO *RYHUQPHQW WKH 01' KDV

7. Childbirth Encouragement Policy of
the MND (applied to multiple-children
families)·Provision of priority for military
housing·Allocation of large quarters·Preferred offer of home lease-funds·Expansion of welfare benefits to coverfacilities

LPSOHPHQWHGYDULRXVSROLFLHVWRHQFRXUDJHFKLOGELUWK7 The MND revised the
9HWHUDQ¶V3HQVLRQ$FWWRLPSOHPHQWDPDWHUQLW\OHDYHSHULRGIRUFKLOGELUWKand childcare that counts as part of the regular active service period when
FDOFXODWLQJ RQH¶V VHYHUDQFH DOORZDQFH ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH DPHQGHG$FW
DOORZVIRUWKHSURYLVLRQRIEHQH¿WVWRWKHUHSODFHPHQWVRIWKRVHZKRDUHRQPDWHUQLW\OHDYH7KH01'ZLOODOVRIXUWKHUSURPRWHZHOIDUHVHUYLFHVE\continually securing childcare facilities for the children of military families.
7KHSODQWRVHFXUHFKLOGFDUHIDFLOLWLHVE\\HDULVVKRZQLQ7DEOH

Table 9-2. The Plan to Secure Childcare Facilities by Year
Unit: No. of facilities
Classification

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

Childcare
Facility

5

10

23

23

21

2

1

85

| Support for advanced cultural welfare | Physical and mental
powers is an essential element for uniformed men and women to carry out
their duties and missions. Bearing that in mind, the MND has endeavored
to provide support for their sporting and cultural needs and leisure activities
WKURXJKZKLFKWKH\FDQUHFRYHUIURPWKHIDWLJXHOHGE\UHSHDWHGWUDLQLQJZRUNLQJLQUHPRWHDUHDVDQGPDLQWDLQLQJDVWDQGE\SRVWXUH
*LYHQWKDWPLOLWDU\EDVHVDUHVKRUWRQVWDQGDUGVSRUWLQJDPHQLWLHVDQG
ILWQHVVHTXLSPHQWWKH01'SODQVWREXLOGLQGRRUJ\PQDVLXPVLQHYHU\XQLWDWWKHUHJLPHQWOHYHODQGLQWKHORQJWHUPODUJHUVSRUWLQJIDFLOLWLHVWKDWRegiment-Level Indoor Gymnasium2422010 Defense White PaperHQDEOHFDUGLRYDVFXODUH[HUFLVHVEDVNHWEDOOYROOH\EDOODQGRWKHUSRSXODUChapter 9.

VSRUWVDWWKHEDWWDOLRQOHYHOThe MND, together with the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism,
has offered opportunities to soldiers to relax, recharge and enjoy their daily
lives. For instance, art professionals are invited to provide art and cultural
HGXFDWLRQIRUVHUYLFHPHPEHUVDQGDUWFRPSDQLHVWDNHWRXUVDURXQGXQLWV'XULQJWKHYDFDWLRQVVHUYLFHPHPEHUVFDQEHQH¿WIURPGLVFRXQWHGVHUYLFHVE\XVLQJWKHDGGLWLRQDOVHUYLFHVRIIHUHGE\WKH1DUDVDUDQJ [patriotic] card,
VXFKDVIRUWKHDWHUVDPXVHPHQWSDUNVDQGFXOWXUDOHYHQWV7KH01'SODQVWREXLOGD&LYLOLDQ0LOLWDU\,QWHJUDWHG:HOIDUH7RZQ8 insome areas short on welfare infrastructure, including frontlines and islets,
LQFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKORFDOJRYHUQPHQWV7RWKDWHQGDSLORWSURMHFWZLOOEH
LPSOHPHQWHGLQRQHIURQWOLQHFRUSVE\DQGGHSHQGLQJRQWKHUHVXOWWKLVSURMHFWZLOOEHH[SDQGHGWRLQFOXGHRWKHUFRUSV

8. Civilian-Military Integrated Welfare
Town
A welfare town that will be constructedwith cooperation between the militaryand local governments to enhance
the welfare and cultural amenities
available to local residents and service
members stationed in less developed
frontline areas.

,QDGGLWLRQWRKHOSVHUYLFHPHPEHUVUHOD[DQGUHFKDUJHZKLOVWRQOHDYHDQ
agreement to guarantee free admission to private welfare facilities, such as
DPXVHPHQWSDUNVDQGVSRUWVVWDGLXPVZDVPDGHEHWZHHQWKHPLOLWDU\DQG
WKHFRQFHUQHGDPHQLWLHV7KHQXPEHURIIDFLOLWLHVRIIHULQJIUHHDGPLVVLRQWRVHUYLFHPHPEHUVLVDOVRLQFUHDVLQJ| Establishment of an efficient welfare infrastructure |7KHZHOIDUHIDFLOLWLHVIRUHDFKXQLWKDYHEHHQLQHI¿FLHQWO\RSHUDWHGGXHWRDQRYHUODSSLQJRULPEDODQFHLQWKHIDFLOLWLHVDFURVVWKHQDWLRQ$VDUHVXOWWKHSUHIHUHQFHVRIVHUYLFHPHPEHUVZHUHQRWIXOO\UHÀHFWHGLQWKHZHOIDUH
management process, which thus failed to offer satisfactory services. Hence,
the MND will operate an integrated management system encompassing
WKHZHOIDUHIDFLOLWLHVWRLPSURYHWKHLURSHUDWLRQWKHUHE\RIIHULQJEDODQFHGZHOIDUH VHUYLFHV DQG LQFUHDVLQJ WKH VDWLVIDFWLRQ RI WKH EHQHILFLDULHV LQ
uniform.
$VSDUWRIWKHVHHIIRUWVWKH01'EXLOWWKH$UPHG)RUFHV:HOIDUH$JHQF\
LQ6HSWHPEHUDQGGLVRUJDQL]HGWKHUHVSHFWLYHZHOIDUHDJHQFLHVUXQE\HDFKVHUYLFHLQ-DQXDU\7KH$UPHG)RUFHV:HOIDUH$JHQF\VHW
up an integrated management system to cover the welfare facilities, while

243

Section 1. Improving the Welfare of Service Membersimproving the management each facility according to its type to achieve
HDUO\VWDELOL]DWLRQRIWKHV\VWHP
To enhance its competitiveness, the Military Mutual Aid Association has
UHDOLJQHGLWVRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGEHHQUXQQLQJWKH5HVSRQVLEOH0DQDJHPHQW
System and Open Competition for Assignments System since 2009. In
DGGLWLRQ WR LPSURYH LWV EDODQFH VKHHW LW DGMXVWHG WKH PHPEHUVDYLQJV
LQWHUHVWUDWHWRDUHDOLVWLFOHYHOIURPDQQXDOSHUFHQWWRSHUFHQW7KH
MND has tried to achieve its target housing supply — over 2,000 houses on
DQDQQXDOEDVLV²LQRUGHUWRHQDEOHVHUYLFHPHPEHUVWRSXUFKDVHKRXVHVSURYLGHGWZR\HDUPDWXULW\LQVWDOOPHQWGHSRVLWSURGXFWVEHVLGHVWKHFXUUHQW
RQH\HDUPDWXULW\SURGXFWDQGKDVLPSOHPHQWHGWKH5HDO1DPH%XVLQHVVSystem and the Integrity Pledging System.
,QDGGLWLRQLQRUGHUWRHQVXUHWKDWVHUYLFHPHPEHUVHQMR\VRXQGOHLVXUHDFWLYLWLHVDQGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRUHVWFRPIRUWDEO\WKH01'SODQVWRUHQRYDWH
LWVZHOIDUHIDFLOLWLHVDQGUHVRUWVZKLOHLQFUHDVLQJWKHDFFRXQWQXPEHUV
allocated to condominiums located in areas that are popular among service
PHPEHUV,QWKHIXWXUHLQWHJUDWHGZHOIDUHIDFLOLWLHVFRQWDLQLQJUHVRUWVFRQGRPLQLXPVDQGJ\PQDVLXPVZLOOEHVHFXUHGWRHQVXUHVHUYLFHPHPEHUVGreen Narae Hotel (Military Resort)

can enjoy rest and leisure activities in a single location.

$0LOLWDU\3HQVLRQ6\VWHP5HÀHFWLQJWKH'LVWLQFWLYH
Characteristics of Military Service
7KH 0LOLWDU\ 3HQVLRQ 6\VWHP FRQWULEXWHV WR GHFHQW OLYLQJ DQG WKHHQKDQFHGZHOIDUHVHUYLFHVSURYLGHGE\WKH01'E\GLUHFWLQJWKHEHQH¿WVWRSROLF\KROGHURUWKHLUIDPLO\VKRXOGDFDUHHUVHUYLFHPHPEHU SROLF\KROGHU UHWLUHDIWHUWKHLUIDLWKIXOVHUYLFHSHULRGUHWLUHRUGLHGXHWRSK\VLFDORUPHQWDOSUREOHPVRUUHFHLYHPHGLFDOWUHDWPHQWGXHWRGLVHDVHVRULQMXULHVLQÀLFWHGZKLOHRQGXW\,QOLQHZLWKWKH3XEOLF3HQVLRQ5HIRUPRIWKH*RYHUQPHQWWKH01'SODQVWRLPSURYHWKH0LOLWDU\3HQVLRQ6\VWHPE\UHIOHFWLQJWKH
distinctive characteristics of military service, reviewing the military pension
V\VWHPVLQDGYDQFHGFRXQWULHVDQGVWDELOL]LQJWKHILQDQFLDOVWDWXVRIWKH
pension system.

2442010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 9.

| Characteristics of the military pension system |During its early stages, the Military Pension System was operated under
WKH*RYHUQPHQW(PSOR\HHV3HQVLRQ6\VWHP HQDFWHGLQ-DQXDU\ +RZHYHUVLQFHLWKDVEHHQLQGHSHQGHQWO\RSHUDWHGLQDPDQQHUWKDWVHSDUDWHVLWIURPWKH*RYHUQPHQW(PSOR\HHV3HQVLRQ6\VWHP
The Military Pension System is a form of national compensation and thecost to run the system is considered a security cost. In consideration of such
XQLTXHQHVVDGYDQFHGQDWLRQVKDYHEHHQRSHUDWLQJPLOLWDU\SHQVLRQV\VWHPV
separately from their pension fund for government employees. These major
FRXQWULHVDOVRSURYLGHSUHIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWRYHURWKHUSXEOLFSHQVLRQ
systems, to the military pension when it comes to minimum service years
WREHHOLJLEOHIRUWKHSHQVLRQWKHSUHVFULEHGDJHDWZKLFKWKHLQLWLDOSHQVLRQ
SD\PHQWFDQEHPDGHFRQWULEXWLRQUDWLRSD\PHQWOHYHODQGWKHSHULRGRIVXSHUDQQXDWLRQ7KHPLOLWDU\SHQVLRQV\VWHPVE\QDWLRQDUHFRPSDUHGLQ
7DEOH

Table 9-3. Comparison of the Military Pension Systems of Major Nations
Classification

Military
Personnel

PublicServants

UK

Germany

U.S.

Australia

Indonesia

Italy

France

Korea

Retirement Age

55

55~61

40~60

55

53~58

40~60

45~48

45~56

Age for Initial
Pension Payment

55

Retirement
Age
ReachedUpon Being
Discharged

55

Upon Being
Discharged

60

Upon Being
Discharged

Upon Being
Discharged

Individual
Contribution ratio
(%)

×

×

×

×

4.75

8.8

7.85

8.5

Governmental
EntireContribution ratio Amount(%)

EntireAmountEntireAmountEntireAmountShortage of
Pension N/A

24.2

Shortage of
Pension N/A

8.5

Retirement Age

65

60~65

×

×

56~65

60~65

65~70

60

Age for Initial
Pension Payment

60

Retirement
Age Reached

60

55

Upon
Retirement

60

60

60~65

Individual
Contribution ratio
(%)

3.5

×

0.8

2~10

4.75

8.8

7.85

7

EntireAmount0.8

Shortage of
Pension N/A

Shortage of
Pension N/A

24.2

Shortage of
Pension N/A

7

Governmental ShortageofContribution ratio Pension(%)
N/A3FWJTFENPOUIMZQBZJTBQQMJFEUPQVCMJDTFSWBOUTJOBDDPSEBODFXJUIUIFBNFOEFEQFOTJPOMBX5IFJOEJWJEVBMDPOUSJCVUJPOSBUJPPGJTFRVJWBMFOUUPPGSFWJTFENPOUIMZQBZNFOU

245

Section 1. Improving the Welfare of Service Members| Efforts to stabilize the financial status of the pension
system | Due to too many pension recipients at its early stage, the Military
Pension System failed to secure the proper level of funding to meet the
QXPEHURILWVUHFLSLHQWVWKLVIXQGLQJVKRUWDJHKDVVRIDUEHHQVXSSOHPHQWHGE\WKH1DWLRQDO*RYHUQPHQW7KLVVKRUWDJHLQIXQGLQJFDQEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHSHQVLRQEHLQJRIIHUHGZLWKRXWWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIVXSHUDQQXDWLRQRQVHUYLFHPHPEHUVZKRVHUYHGLQWKHSUH\HDUVZKHQWKHFXUUHQWSHQVLRQV\VWHPKDGQRWEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGDQGLQPDMRUFRPEDWSHULRGVVXFKDVWKH
Korean War and the Vietnam War, which were counted, in service terms, as
EHLQJWKUHHWLPHVORQJHUWKDQWKH\DFWXDOO\ZHUH7RFUHDWHDQLQVWLWXWLRQDOPHFKDQLVPWRVWDELOL]HWKH¿QDQFLDOVWDWXVRIWKHSHQVLRQV\VWHPWKH01'
KDVDPHQGHGWKH9HWHUDQ¶V3HQVLRQ$FWDQGZLOOFRQWLQXHWRLPSURYHWKH
relevant institutions.
7KH01'LQFUHDVHGWKHLQGLYLGXDODQGJRYHUQPHQWDOFRQWULEXWLRQUDWLRWRSHUFHQWIURPSHUFHQW6WDUWLQJLQ-DQXDU\LWDOWHUHGWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKWRLQFUHDVHWKHSHQVLRQIURPRQH¶VVDODU\EDVHGWRFRQVXPHUSULFHVEDVHGDQGWKHFDOFXODWLRQRISHQVLRQVZDVFKDQJHGIURPEHLQJEDVHGRQWKHODVWVDODU\WREHLQJEDVHGRQDQDYHUDJHRIWKHVDODU\UHFHLYHGRYHUWKH
ODVWWKUHH\HDUVRIVHUYLFH,QDGGLWLRQWRHQVXUHWKH¿QDQFLDOVWDELOLW\RIWKH
9. Mandatory Reserve System
A reserve fund that functions to cover
any unexpected shortages in thepension fund.
(Article 37, Paragraph 2 of the Veterans’Pension Act)pension fund, a Mandatory Reserve System9ZDVOHJLVODWHG)URP-DQXDU\2007, the System has stipulated that in cases where the mandatory reserve isused to pay pensions, the amount appropriated from the mandatory reserve
PXVWEHUHSOHQLVKHGZLWKLQWZR\HDUV:LWKWKH,QFRPH$VVHVVPHQW6\VWHPEHLQJLPSOHPHQWHGLQ1RYHPEHU
WKH01'KDVGLVFRQWLQXHGSD\LQJDSDUWLDODPRXQWRIWKHSHQVLRQWREHQHILFLDULHVZKRKDYHEHHQVKRZQWRKDYHH[WUDLQFRPHEHVLGHVWKH
SHQVLRQ7KHVWDWXVRISHQVLRQUHFLSLHQWVE\\HDULVVKRZQLQ7DEOH

2462010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 9.

Table 9-4. The Status of Pension Recipients by Year

Year

Year Recipients(No. of Persons)Payment(KRW 100 million)

Governmentsupplemented fund
(KRW 100 million)

2005

65,566

16,075

8,564

2006

67,051

16,748

8,755

2007

69,096

18,065

9,536

2008

71,37819,319

9,492

2009

74,111

20,566

9,409

1BZNFOUDPOTJTUTPGSFUJSFNFOUQFOTJPO BSFUJSFNFOUMVNQTVNQBZNFOUBOESFUJSFNFOUBMMPXBODF

7KH0LOLWDU\3HQVLRQ6\VWHPLVSXUVXLQJDQLQFUHDVHLQIXQGDQGSUR¿WVWKURXJK WKH$VVHWV 2SHUDWLRQ *XLGHOLQHV 10 The MND amended the*XLGHOLQHVLQWRLQFUHDVHWKHWDUJHWSURILWUDWHZKLOHVHWWLQJXSWKH
µ5LVN0DQDJHPHQW6WDQGDUG¶WRUHYLHZDQGPDQDJHULVNVLQWULQVLFWRIXQG
management.
,QWKHSDVWWKRVHZKRVHUYHGIRUOHVVWKDQ\HDUVDQGPRQWKVZHUHQRWHOLJLEOHIRUDPLOLWDU\SHQVLRQEXWIURP$XJXVWZLWKWKHLQWURGXFWLRQ
RI WKH 6\VWHP ,QWHUFRQQHFWLQJ WKH$FFXPXODWHG 3HULRGV DPRQJ 3XEOLF

10. Assets Operation Guidelines
A document that stipulates theinvestment policies, investment
objectives, investment guidelines
and performance evaluation criteria
concerning the management of themilitary pension. These guidelines were
mapped out to enhance the stability,transparency and profits generated
through fund management.
(Article 79 of the National Finance Act)

3HQVLRQVUHWLUHGVHUYLFHPHPEHUVFDQDOVRUHFHLYHSHQVLRQVWKURXJKLWV
integration with the national pension.

| Increase of compensation payment for military
personnel sacrificed in the line of duty | The MND has
FRQWLQXHG LWV HIIRUWV WR VWUHQJWKHQ WKH QDWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WRZDUGVVHUYLFHPHPEHUVZKRVDFULILFHGWKHPVHOYHVIRUWKHQDWLRQ)RUH[DPSOH
WKHGHDWKEHQHILWVWDQGDUGWKDWZDVHTXDOO\DSSOLHGWRGHDWKERWKLQWKH
OLQHRIJHQHUDOGXW\DQGGXULQJZDUWLPHZDVUHHYDOXDWHGLQWRRIIHU
PRUHEHQH¿WVWRWKRVHZKRGLHGLQZDUWLPHDFWLRQ,QDGGLWLRQLQOLQHZLWKWKHQHHGWRXSJUDGHWKHFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUVDFUL¿FHGVHUYLFHPHPEHUVWKH
Enforcement Decree of the Military Pension Act was amended in 2010 to
LQFUHDVHWKHPLQLPXPEHQH¿WDPRXQWIRUWKRVHZKRJLYHWKHLUOLYHVDQGWKH
Compensation System for Death in the Line of Special Duty was set up for
those who perish while carrying out highly dangerous mission at their perils.
7KHGHWDLOVRIWKHDPHQGPHQWVDUHVKRZQLQ7DEOH

247

Section 1. Improving the Welfare of Service Members

Table 9-5. Death Benefits for Service Members Who Died in the Line of Duty (as of 2010)
Classification

Before Amended

After Amended

Killed in Action

72 times as high as the 10 pay grade at major level (around KRW 200
million): amended in 2004

Death during
General Duty

36 times as high as one’s own
monthly pay* Minimum: 1st pay grade at
staff sergeant level is applied(KRW 36 million-210 million)

36 times as high as one’s own
monthly pay* Minimum: 18 th pay grade atmaster sergeant level is applied(KRW 90 million-210 million)

Death during
Special Duty

Same as Death during GeneralDuty

55 times as high as the 10th pay
grade of a major (around KRW
150 million)th| Provision of Internet services | 6WDUWLQJLQ0D\WKH
MND has made the Military Pension Information System (http://www.mps.
JRNU DYDLODEOHRQWKH,QWHUQHW7KH6\VWHPSURYLGHVXSWRGDWHLQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJ WKH SHQVLRQ DQG HQKDQFHV FRQYHQLHQFH E\ DOORZLQJ SHQVLRQ
recipients to print out various civil affairs documents, including a letter to
YHULI\RQH¶VVWDWXVDVDPLOLWDU\SHQVLRQUHFLSLHQW

(QKDQFLQJ-RE2SSRUWXQLWLHVIRU5HWLULQJ0LOLWDU\Personnel
7RVXSSRUWMREWUDQVIHURIUHWLULQJVHUYLFHPHPEHUVWRWKHVRFLDOZRUNIRUFH
WKH01'KDVPDGHYDULRXVHIIRUWVWRH[SDQGDQGGLVFRYHUMRESRVLWLRQVDQG
WRSURYLGHFXVWRPHUFHQWHUHGDQGWDLORUHGYRFDWLRQDOHGXFDWLRQWRJHWKHUZLWKother forms of support.

| Expansion and discovery of job opportunities | The MND
No. of Secured
No. ofPositions
Positions
12,066
Total
Unable to(53%) Requirements Meet Job
Demand
22,80010,734(47%)

VHFXUHGMRESRVLWLRQV DVRI6HSWHPEHU WKDWOHYHUDJHPLOLWDU\H[SHUWLVHDQGH[SHULHQFHIRUGLVFKDUJHGORQJWHUPVHUYLFHPHPEHUV
who have served for over 10 years.
)RU GLVFKDUJHG VHUYLFH PHPEHUV ZLWK PLOLWDU\VSHFLDOL]HG H[SHUWLVH
DQGULFKH[SHULHQFHWKHIROORZLQJMRESRVLWLRQVZHUHVHFXUHGFRQWUDFW

Employment Status of Discharged
Long-Term Service Members(as of 2010)2482010 Defense White Paper

PLOLWDU\FLYLOLDQSRVLWLRQVIXOOWLPHIDFXOW\SRVLWLRQVLQPLOLWDU\HGXFDWLRQDO
institutions and faculty positions in the security departments and military
departments of private colleges. For those who are highly experienced

Chapter 9.

with regards to training, the MND secured supervisor or control instructors
RI.RUHD&RPEDW7UDLQLQJ&HQWHUUHVHUYLVW527&RIILFHUSRVLWLRQVDQG
teaching positions in specialized high schools. The MND in the future will
FRQWLQXHWRH[SDQGWKHMRERSSRUWXQLWLHVRSHQWRYHWHUDQVLQWKHSXEOLFDQG
SULYDWHVHFWRUVDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWZLGHOHYHOLQFORVHFRRSHUDWLRQZLWKthe concerned governmental agencies and organizations. The employment
VWDWXVRIGLVFKDUJHGORQJWHUPVHUYLFHPHPEHUV RYHUWHQ\HDUVRIVHUYLFH LVVKRZQLQ)LJXUH
Figure 9-1. Job Positions Secured for Discharged Long-Term Service Members (as of 2010)
Unit: No. of persons

3FUJSFFSFGFSTUPUIPTFXIPIBWFSFUJSFEXJUIJOUIFHJWFOZFBS&NQMPZFESFGFSTUPUIPTFXIPXFSFFNQMPZFEXJUIJOGJWFZFBSTPGUIFJSSFUJSFNFOU

| Customer-centered vocational education for job
transfer | 7KH01'KDVH[SDQGHGLWVHGXFDWLRQDOSURJUDPVLQDELGWRHQKDQFHWKHFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVRIUHWLULQJRI¿FHUV,WDOVRSURYLGHVWKH7DLORUHG
-RE7UDQVIHU(GXFDWLRQDO3URJUDPLQSDUWLFXODULQFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKH
0LQLVWU\RI(PSOR\PHQWDQG/DERU$IIDLUVWKH0LQLVWU\RI3DWULRWVDQG
Veterans Affairs, and the Korea Polytechnics College.
7KH01'LQFUHDVHGWKHQXPEHURILWVWDLORUHGDQGVSHFLDOL]HGFRXUVHV11 to
20 in 2009 from 12 in 2008. In addition, it will improve the employment rate
RIGLVFKDUJHGVHUYLFHPHPEHUVE\GLYHUVLI\LQJLWVHGXFDWLRQDOFRXUVHVEDVHG
on its annual research on the employment trends of companies and its own
customer surveys.

11. Tailored and specialized educationalcourses (2009)
The job categories specialized by thecourses include security instructor,
logistics manager, character-building
educator, career adviser, building
operations manager, housing manager,
medical service instructor, judicial
scrivener, defense architect, marine
officer, computer/internet expert,
building automation expert, electrician,gas technician, landscape designer,computers and accounting, online
shopping malls, online education foreach self-employed business, andsmall businesses with limited capital.
*Other college-entrusted courses arealso available.

249

Section 1. Improving the Welfare of Service Members7KH01'KDVDOVRUHLQIRUFHGWKHEDVLFHGXFDWLRQDOSURJUDPVIRUUHWLULQJ
PLGWHUPRI¿FHUVZKRKDYHVHUYHGIRU¿YHWRWHQ\HDUV)RUIURQWOLQHXQLWVLWLQHUDQWHGXFDWLRQLVEHLQJSURYLGHGDQGHQWUXVWHGFRXUVHVDUHDOVREHLQJ
RIIHUHG E\ WKH 01' (PSOR\PHQW 6XSSRUW &HQWHU DQG WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI
(PSOR\PHQWDQG/DERU$IIDLUV&XUUHQWO\PRVWRIWKHYRFDWLRQDOHGXFDWLRQIRUMREWUDQVIHULVEHLQJFRQGXFWHGE\HQWUXVWHGSULYDWHLQVWLWXWLRQV7KH
01'KRZHYHUSODQVWRHVWDEOLVKDQGRSHUDWHLWVRZQVSHFLDOL]HGHGXFDWLRQDO
institutions.

| Development of the job transfer support system | The
01'KDVGHYHORSHGD-RE7UDQVIHU6XSSRUW6\VWHPZKLOHVXSSRUWLQJWKH
HPSOR\PHQWRIUHWLULQJRI¿FHUVDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWZLGHOHYHOLQFROODERUDWLRQ
with the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs and the Ministry of Strategy
and Finance.
,Q-XO\WKH01'LQFUHDVHGWKHQXPEHURIMREWUDQVIHUFRQVXOWDQWVIURPWZRWR¿YH IRUORFDO9HWHUDQV6XSSRUW&HQWHUVDVXEVLGLDU\DJHQF\RI
the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans. In 2010, the MND renovated the MND
Employment Support Center and, in so doing, made it a larger complex,
WKHUHE\FUHDWLQJDVWDEOHHGXFDWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQW7KH%RQXV3RLQW6\VWHP
12. Opinion Poll about the Bonus Point
System for Military Service
Demonstrated that 83% of respondents
supported the System (conducted by
Korea Gallop, December 2009)

for Military Service was revived12 to promote employment opportunities
IRUUHWLULQJVHUYLFHPHPEHUVDQGWKHDPHQGPHQWRIUHOHYDQWODZVLVXQGHUGLVFXVVLRQWRHQVXUHEHWWHUHGXFDWLRQDORSWLRQVIRUPLGWHUPRI¿FHUV| Other employment support services | The MND Employment
6XSSRUW&HQWHUDQ01'DI¿OLDWHGDJHQF\KDVKHOGMREIDLUVHYHU\0D\DQG
SURPRWHGWKH'D\RI(PSOR\PHQWWRSURYLGHMRERSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGFKDQFHVWRRSHQDQHZEXVLQHVVRQDTXDUWHUO\EDVLV,QDGGLWLRQWKH(PSOR\PHQW
Information System provides online consulting services as well as various
W\SHVRILQIRUPDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJMRERSSRUWXQLWLHVQHZEXVLQHVVVWDUWXSV
Job Fair for Retiring Officers (April
2009)2502010 Defense White Paperand enterprises. The employment support procedure of the Center is shown in)LJXUH

Chapter 9.

Figure 9-2. Employment Support Procedure by the MND Employment Support Center
Job Seekers·Registration·Filling Out the Resume

Recruiting Companies·Job Information·Company Profile

MND Employment
Support Center·Consulting Service/
Recommendations·Information
Provisions

Computer Network

7RSURPRWHWKHRXWVWDQGLQJDELOLWLHVRIGLVFKDUJHGVHUYLFHPHPEHUVWKH
01'KDVDOVRRIIHUHGFRQVXOWDWLRQVUHJDUGLQJFRPSDQ\SROLFLHVE\LQYLWLQJ
the HR managers of different companies, and it has carried out various PR
activities through media outlets, including radio and TV programs.

251

Section 1. Improving the Welfare of Service Members2SectionModernizing the Military
Facilities
The MND has dramatically improved the old and narrow military facilities in line with the enhanced
societal living standards and popular expectations for more comfortable living environments. The
modernization of the barracks is intended to upgrade service members’ quality of life by addressing
the discrepancy between the living environment in which new-generation service members grew up
and the current living environments in the military. The project to modernize the military residences
ANDBACHELOROFÜCERSQUARTERS"/1 WASDESIGNEDTOIMPROVERESIDENTIALFACILITIESUPTOTHELEVELOF
THOSEOFCIVILIANRESIDENCES THEREBYCREATINGANENVIRONMENTINWHICHOFÜCERSCANTAKEPRIDEINTHEIRoccupation. The MND plans to promote the “Attractive Military, Rewarding Military” image of the military
by modernizing the military bases, with the completion of this project scheduled for 2012.

1. Military Barracks
7KHPRGHUQL]DWLRQRIWKHEDUUDFNVKDVEHHQLPSOHPHQWHGLQSKDVHVEDVHGRQ
1. Military Installations Relocation Plan
This plan involves the integration
and relocation of units by region,in consideration of the number ofsoldiers and the resulting demand forunit facilities, in accordance with the
National Defense Reform Basic Plan.

the Military Installations Relocation Plan.1'XULQJ3KDVH  WKRVHEDUUDFNVFRQVWUXFWHGEHIRUHDPRQJWKHROGDQGFUDPSHGIDFLOLWLHVLQWKH
IURQWOLQHDQGUHPRWHDUHDVZHUHILUVWLPSURYHGDQGGXULQJ3KDVH 
 EDUUDFNVEXLOWDIWHUZLOOEHUHQRYDWHGRULQFUHDVHGLQVL]H'HWDLOVDUHDVIROORZVWKHÀRRUDUHDSHUSHUVRQLVEHLQJLQFUHDVHGWR̅
IURP̅ZKLOHWKHSODWRRQVL]HGQRQEHGEDUUDFNVDUHEHLQJUHQRYDWHGWREHGILOOHGDFFRPPRGDWLRQVIRUVTXDGVL]HGHOHPHQWV,QDGGLWLRQDPHQLWLHVVXFKDVFRPSXWHUODEV &\EHU,QIRUPDWLRQ&HQWHU ILWQHVVIDFLOLWLHVDQG
FRPPRQURRPVDUHEHLQJVHFXUHGZLWKIHPDOHRQO\DPHQLWLHVEHLQJVHSDUDWHO\FRQVWUXFWHG7KHGHYHORSPHQWDOSURFHVVRIWKHEDUUDFNVLVVKRZQLQ)LJXUH

2522010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 9.

Figure 9-3. Developmental Process of the Barracks
Pre-1960
Period1960-1970

1970-1982

1983-2003

Post-2004 Period

Tents/
QuonsetBarracks

Type A Barracks
Constructed(concrete blocks
with a slate roof)ǩAccommodated
at Platoon LevelǩSmoke-Free
Coal Heating

Integrated
Barracks
Constructed(Rahmen blocks
with a flat roof)ǩTwo Squads to
One Platoon
AccommodatedǩRadiator
Heating

ModernBarracks
Constructed(Rahmen blocks
with a tilted roof)ǩOne to Two
SquadsAccommodatedǩNon-bed
Barracks
ǩAmenities
Increased

Living Barracks
Constructed(Rahmen blocks
with a tilted roof)ǩAccommodated
at Squad LevelǩBed-Filled
Barracks
ǩFemale-Only
Amenities

7KHPRGHUQL]DWLRQRIWKHEDUUDFNVKDVEHHQLPSOHPHQWHGE\PHDQVRI%XLOG7UDQVIHU/HDVH %7/ 2LQSDUDOOHOZLWKJRYHUQPHQWDOLQYHVWPHQW)URPWR

2. Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL)DWRWDORI.5:WULOOLRQZDVVSHQWRQXSJUDGLQJEDWWDOLRQVOLYLQJ

5IFNFUIPECZXIJDIBQSJWBUFCVTJOFTTEDUUDFNV,QWKH01'LQYHVWHG.5:ELOOLRQWRLPSURYHWKHEDUUDFNVLQ

UIBUJUIBTDPOTUSVDUFEUPUIFHPWFSONFOU PS

$UP\EDWWDOLRQVDQGEDUUDFNVIRU$LU)RUFHSHUVRQQHO)URPWKH%7/.5:
ELOOLRQZDVLQYHVWHGWRXSJUDGHWKHEDUUDFNVRI$UP\EDWWDOLRQVDQG

USBOTGFSTPXOFSTIJQPGBCVTJOFTTGBDJMJUZHPWFSONFOUBMBHFODZ VQPOUIFDPNQMFUJPOPGJUTDPOTUSVDUJPO5IFQSJWBUFCVTJOFTTSFDPWFSTUIFDPOTUSVDUJPODPTUCZCFJOH

Navy and Air Force units. By using Other Accounts3 to enhance defense strength,

QBJESFOUBOENBOBHFNFOUDPTUTCZUIFWKHEDUUDFNVRI$UP\EDWWDOLRQVZHUHLPSURYHG&RPPHQFHGLQDQG

HPWFSONFOUFRPSOHWHGLQVRPH*23DQGJXDUGSRVWEDUUDFNVIRUVHDULYHUVKRUHXQLWVZHUHUHQRYDWHG,QDWRWDORI.5:WULOOLRQZDVLQYHVWHGLQLPSURYLQJWKHEDUUDFNVRI$UP\EDWWDOLRQVDQG1DY\DQG$LU)RUFHXQLWV,QDGGLWLRQWKH
modernization project is scheduled for completion in 2012 following the investment
RIDQDGGLWLRQDO.5:WULOOLRQ7KHWLPHOLQHIRUWKHPRGHUQL]DWLRQRIWKHEDUUDFNVLVVKRZQLQ7DEOH

Table 9-6. Timeline for the Modernization of the Barracks (as of December 2010)
In
Progress*

Completed
Classification

3. Other Accounts·Improvement of Defense Strength:
to improve the military barracks as a
key part of the defense enforcement
project.
·Donations–Transfers: to give a
counterpart a military site (transfer)and receive alternative facilities in
return from the counterpart (donation).
·Special Accounts: accounts thatconsist of the payment made by sellingthe existing facilities to relocate units.

PlannedTotal

2003~2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Army Barracks(Battalions)

325

111

118

61

51

666

Navy/Air Force Barracks

460

122

70

159

110

921

GOP/Sea and River Shore
Guard Post Barracks

682

275

-

-

-

957

Total

1,467

508

188

220

161

2,544

Total Project Cost
(unit: KRW 100 million)

38,664

11,09910,389

8,034

2,821

71,007

Cumulative Improvement
Rate (%)

58

77

85

93

100

100

* The projects initiated or implemented in 2010 will be continuing into 2011.

253

Section 2. Modernizing the Military Facilities2. Military Accommodations| Military residences | 7KH01'KDVEHHQLPSURYLQJLWVROGDQG
cramped military residences to match the average level of civilian housing
E\H[WHQGLQJWKHIORRUDUHDVWRDWRWDORIEHWZHHQDQG̅. Concerning
this plan, the MND intends to refrain from employing the residence provision
polices of the past that relied mainly on government funding. Rather, it will
XWLOL]HERWKJRYHUQPHQWIXQGVDQGSULYDWHLQYHVWPHQWV %7/ ZKLOHH[SDQGLQJLWV¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWSODQIRUDSDUWPHQWSXUFKDVLQJDQGKRPHOHDVHV,QZLWK.5:ELOOLRQLQYHVWHGPLOLWDU\KRXVHKROGXQLWVZHUHLPSURYHGDQGLQ.5:ELOOLRQZDVVSHQWRQXSJUDGLQJ
KRXVHKROGXQLWV7RDGGUHVVWKHLVVXHRILQFUHDVHGRI¿FHUQXPEHUDQGVKRUWDJH
RIUHVLGHQFHVWKH01'ZLOOSURYLGHDQDGGLWLRQDOKRXVHKROGXQLWVE\7KHWLPHOLQHIRUPLOLWDU\UHVLGHQFHLPSURYHPHQWLVVKRZQLQ7DEOH

Table 9-7. Timeline for the Modernization of Living Quarters (as of December 2010)
Unit: Household
In
Progress*

Completed
Classification

Yongin Military Residence built throughthe BTL project

PlanedTotal

Pre-2008
Years

2009

2010

2011

2012

Built

29,671

188

240

178

73

30,350Purchased

9,895

2,074

-

-

-

11,969BTL

13,186

1,727

6,910

-

-

21,823Home-Lease

4,935

356

416

384

367

6,458

Other Accounts

-

1,095

125

71

-

1,291

57,687

5,440

7,691

633

440

71,891

44,317

4,637

7,858

407

453

57,672

80

88

98

99

100

100

Total
Total Project Cost
(unit: KRW 100
million)Cumulative
Improvement (%)* The projects in progress as of 2010 will be continuing into 2011 (excluding home-leases)| Bachelor officers quarters (BOQ) | The MND plans to secureEDFKHORURIILFHUVTXDUWHUV %24V E\LQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKH
SRVVLEOHLQFUHDVHLQWKHQXPEHURIHQWU\OHYHORIILFHUVGXHWRWKHPLOLWDU\UHVWUXFWXULQJSODQ5HVLGHQFHWKDWDUHRUPRUH\HDUVROGZLOOEHUHQRYDWHG
WREHXVHGDV%24VDQGWKHVKRUWDJHRI%24VZLOOEHDGGUHVVHGWKRURXJK

2542010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 9.

WKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDGGLWLRQDO%24V XSWRWKHUHVLGHQFHWKDWKDGEHHQUHQRYDWHGZHUHRUPRUH\HDUVROG 
7RVHFXUHDSULYDWHVSDFHWKH%24VIRUXQPDUULHGRI¿FHUVZLOOEHUHQRYDWHG
WRRQHEHGURRPTXDUWHUVIURPWKHFXUUHQWWZRWRWKUHHEHGTXDUWHUVDQG
DSDUWPHQWW\SHUHVLGHQFHVZLOOEHSURYLGHGWRPDUULHGRIILFHUVWRHQVXUHWKH
H[SHFWHGOHYHORIFRPIRUWZKHQWKHLUIDPLOLHVYLVLWRYHUWKHZHHNHQG
7RLPSURYHWKH%24VDWRWDORI.5:ELOOLRQZDVLQYHVWHGZKLFKUHVXOWHGLQ%24XQLWVEHLQJUHQRYDWHGLQ,QDIXUWKHU%24XQLWVZHUHLQWKHSURFHVVRIEHLQJVHFXUHGWKDQNVWRDQDGGLWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWRI.5:ELOOLRQ7KHWLPHOLQHIRU%24LPSURYHPHQWLVVKRZQLQ7DEOH
Table 9-8. Timeline for BOQ Improvement (as of December 2010)
In
Progress*

Completed
Classification

Unit: BOQ unit
PlanedTotal

Pre-2008
Years

2009

2010

2011

2012

Built

56,596

2,581

6,669

1,950

3,225

BTL

5,623

5,140

9,550

Renovated

2,351

2,708

4,762

-

928

351

64,57011,357

21,332

5,182

9,005

111,446

17,329

3,556

5,978

1,265

3,242

31,370

58

71

90

95

100

100

Other Accounts
Total
Total Project Cost
(unit: KRW 100
million)Cumulative
Improvement (%)

Apartment-type BOQ for married
officers

71,021
20,313

3,232

5,780

18,833
1,279Stand-alone type BOQ for unmarried
officers* The projects in progress as of 2010 will be continuing into 2011 (excluding home-leases)

255

Section 2. Modernizing the Military Facilities3

Section

Advancing the Military Medical
Service System
The MND has modernized the Military Medical Service System to provide more advanced care of
the health to service members and to ensure their combat capabilities. The MND has focused its
reinforcement efforts on eight major areas, including manpower, equipment and the facilities of clinics
at the division level, in accordance with the Mid- and Long-term Comprehensive Plan for Developmentof the Military Medical Service that was established in July 2008. In addition, the Framework Act on
Military Personnel Welfare provides the legal basis to guarantee the basic right of individual service
members to proper medical treatment.

5HLQIRUFLQJWKH0LOLWDU\+RVSLWDO6\VWHP
To reinforce the Military Hospital System, the MND has endeavored to
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1. Civilian Contracted Doctor
The system in place for the hiring of
medical specialists, with doctorate
degrees, as contracted doctors in order
to complement the shortage of medical
personnel within the military and toprovide high quality medical services.

enhancing the medical support capacity.
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EXLOW+DPS\HRQJ+RVSLWDO3RKDQJ+RVSLWDOWKH0DULWLPH0HGLFDO&HQWHUDQG
the Korea Army Training Center District Hospital, whilst the remodeling of the$UPHG)RUFHV&DSLWDO+RVSLWDODQG%\HRNMH+RVSLWDOLVLQSURJUHVV,QDGGLWLRQWKH01'SURYLGHVPHGLFDOWUHDWPHQWDOORZDQFHVWRPHGLFDORI¿FHUVLQRUGHUWRVHFXUHDVWDEOHPHGLFDORI¿FHUZRUNIRUFHDQGSURPRWHWKHLUZLOOLQJQHVVWRZRUN,Q)HEUXDU\WKH01'VLJQHGDQDJUHHPHQWZLWK6HRXO1DWLRQDOUniversity Hospital. The timeline for the employment of civilian contracted

Surgery being conducted by civilian
contracted doctors

2562010 Defense White Paper

doctors,1IROORZLQJWKLVDJUHHPHQWLVVKRZQLQ7DEOH

Chapter 9.

Table 9-9. Timeline for the Employment of Civilian Contracted Doctors (as of November 2010)
Unit: No. of persons
Internal Surgery Orthopedic Neurosurgery Anesthesiology Pathology Ophthalmology Emergency Others
Classification Medicine
Surgery
Medicine

1

2008
2009

4

2010

2

Total

6

1

1

2

1
1

1

3

2

2

4

3

4

1
1

1

1

Total

1

5

1

1

10

2

2

13

3

4

28

Medical Evacuation Helicopter

The MND plans to adjust the roles and functions of 20 military hospitals
GLVSHUVHGDFURVVWKHHQWLUHPLOLWDU\WKHUHE\UHGXFLQJWKHQXPEHUWRE\
According to this plan, Masan Hospital was dissolved in 2009 and the scope of
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LQWRWKH*\HU\RQJGDH6HUYLFH6XSSRUW&RUSVTo improve the capacity to evacuate patients during wartime and peacetime
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medical systems2ZLOOEHXVHGIRURYHUVHDVRSHUDWLRQVDQGGXULQJSHDFHWLPH
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Facilities of Clinics at the Division Level

2. Deployable Medical System
A container or tent type medical facility
that enables rapid deployment andremoval. This facility can be easily
loaded onto vehicles and enables theprovision of close medical support
for combat units while ensuring rapid
mobility and deployment.

7KH01'KDVUHLQIRUFHGWKHPDQSRZHUHTXLSPHQWDQGIDFLOLWLHVRILWVGLYLVLRQOHYHOFOLQLFV±WKRVHPRVWXVHGE\VHUYLFHPHPEHUVWRVWUHQJWKHQWKHSULPDU\medical support capacity.
To create a pleasant environment for medical treatment, the MND has upgradedthe medical facilities at the division level and reinforced the necessary diagnostic

Deployable Medical System

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WKH01'SURFXUHGDQGGHSOR\HGQHZPRGHODPEXODQFHVHTXLSSHG
ZLWKDFRROHUKHDWHUDQG¿UVWDLGHTXLSPHQWIRU¿HOGXQLWV)XUWKHUPRUHOLFHQVHG
nurses, dental hygienists, physical therapists and emergency medical technician
ZHUHDOVRRUJDQL]HGDVPHGLFDOQRQFRPPLVVLRQVRI¿FHUV7KHSODQWRLPSURYH

257

Section 3. Advancing the Military Medical Service SystemWKHPHGLFDOIDFLOLWLHVDWWKHGLYLVLRQOHYHOLVVKRZQLQ7DEOH
Table 9-10. Plan for Improving the Medical Facilities at the Division Level
Unit: No. of units
Classification

Completed (as of 2009)2009-20102010-2011

After 2012

Total

Army

6

6

5

8

25

Navy

14

Air Force

7

1

2

4

14

Total

27

7

9

12

55

2

16

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2582010 Defense White Paper

Invigorating Productive MilitaryService Conditions

4

SectionToday, the social consciousness about military service is changing. In the past, military service
was mainly considered a noble duty pertaining solely to national defense alone, but it is now
also considered a period during which service members can develop the skills needed for their
future economic activities. Bearing this in mind, the MND has ensured the basic rights of officers
and enlisted men by improving their working conditions and has taken the lead in creating a new
BARRACKSENVIRONMENTTYPIÜEDBYITSSCIENTIÜCACCIDENTPREVENTIONMEASURESINCONSIDERATIONOFTHE
characteristics of the new generation service members. In addition, the MND has enhanced individual,
military and national competitiveness by encouraging its service members to undertake life-long
education to further develop their economic capabilities; MND supports programs for academic creditEARNINGDURINGTHESERVICEPERIOD QUALIÜCATIONEXAMINATIONEQUIVALENTTOGENERALEQUIVALENCYDIPLOMA
'%$ APPLICATION AND/NE3ERVICE-EMBER /NE1UALIÜCATION WHICHMEANSTHATALLOFÜCERSANDEMPLOYEESAREENCOURAGEDTOACQUIREONEQUALIÜCATIONEACH

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,PSURYLQJ:RUNLQJ&RQGLWLRQV
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command. The MND revised the Regulation on Military Human Rights Education
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Counseling session with a professionalcounselor for soldiers259

Section 4. Invigorating Productive Military Service Conditions

%DVLF3ODQRI'HIHQVH+XPDQ5LJKWV3ROLF\DEOXHSULQWRIWKH01'KXPDQULJKWVSROLFLHVDQGGLVWULEXWHGLWWRHDFK6HUYLFH
The MND has run the Professional Counselor for Soldiers System. Professional
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service men under their command. The System was piloted for two years fromWRDQGLWLVFXUUHQWO\EHLQJLPSOHPHQWHGDFURVVWKHHQWLUHPLOLWDU\7KH
$UP\KDVGHSOR\HGSURIHVVLRQDOFRXQVHORUVLQXQLWVDWWKH'LYLVLRQDQG%ULJDGH
level, the Korea Army Training Center, Drafting Review Management Corps, and/LIH &RQVXOWLQJ 3KRQHWKH1DY\KDVWKHV\VWHPLQWKH2SHUDWLRQ&RPPDQGHDFKFRPPDQGRIDÀHHWHDFK'LYLVLRQRIPDULQHFRUSVDQGWKH7UDLQLQJ*URXSDQG
the Air Force has deployed counselors in the Operations Command, the Logistics
Command, and the Training Command. From 2011 onward, the System will
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| Capacity-building of service members | Recently enlisted men see
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2602010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 9.

LQVHOIGHYHORSPHQW%HDULQJWKDWLQPLQGWKH01'KDVVXSSRUWHGWKHDFDGHPLF
FUHGLWHDUQLQJSURJUDPDSSOLFDWLRQDQGSUHSDUDWLRQIRUTXDOL¿FDWLRQH[DPLQDWLRQV
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actively strengthened the cooperation among industrial, academic and military
institutions, with respect to fostering technical professionals.

| Credit earning during the military service period | To provide
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Rooms in units, including up to squadron level units and units located in small
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IURPLQZLWKWKHSODQWRH[SDQGWKHQXPEHUWRDIWHU

A service member taking a distancelearning course,QWKLVVXSSRUWLYHHQYLURQPHQWVHUYLFHPHPEHUVFDQDFTXLUHWKUHHFUHGLWVSHU
VHPHVWHUDQGVL[SHU\HDU7RUHOLHYHWKH¿QDQFLDOEXUGHQRIWXLWLRQIHHVWKH01'
LQFROODERUDWLRQZLWKWKH0LQLVWU\RI(GXFDWLRQ6FLHQFHDQG7HFKQRORJ\LQWURGXFHG
a student loan system named 1' DUDMLNLPL ' that offers loans of up to KRW 90,000 toSHUVHPHVWHUIRULQGLYLGXDOV| Support for qualification examinations | $URXQGPHQHYHU\year join the military without having received a high school diploma or even a
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EHHQLQWKHSURFHVVRILPSURYHPHQWVLQFH)RULQVWDQFHVWXG\URRPVDUHQRZ
DYDLODEOHLQHDFKXQLWDQGPHQWRUVDUHGHVLJQDWHGIURPDPRQJTXDOL¿HGSHUVRQQHOZKRFDQVXSSRUWWKHOHDUQLQJSURFHVV,QDGGLWLRQWKH&\EHU.QRZOHGJH1HWZRUN5RRPVSURYLGHHGXFDWLRQDOFRQWHQWVDQGUHVRXUFHV7KHQXPEHURIWKRVHZKRSDVVHGDTXDOL¿FDWLRQH[DPLQDWLRQIRUWKHKLJKVFKRROGLSORPDLQFUHDVHGWRLQIURPLQDQGWKH01'LQWHQGVWRFRQWLQXHWKLVHIIRUWPRUHDFWLYHO\E\OLQNLQJWKLVVXSSRUWZLWKWKHOLIHORQJOHDUQLQJSROLF\| One service member, one qualification | In 2009, the MND
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PHPEHUVDFTXLUHVSHFLDOL]HGRFFXSDWLRQDOVNLOOVLQSUHSDUDWLRQIRUIXWXUHMREV7KH
01'WDUJHWVRYHUSHUFHQWRIWKHWRWDOGLVFKDUJHGVHUYLFHPHPEHUVWRKDYHRQH

261

Section 4. Invigorating Productive Military Service ConditionsRUPRUHVSHFLDOL]HGOLFHQVHVDGYDQWDJHRXVO\DSSOLFDEOHWRWKHMREPDUNHWIURPWKH
end of 2010, while setting a target of 100 percent from the end of 2012. To this
HQGWKH01'KDVH[SDQGHGWKHPLOLWDU\HGXFDWLRQDOFRXUVHVWKDWDOORZWKHFRXUVHWDNHUVWREHH[HPSWHGIURPWKHZULWWHQWHVWLQWKH1DWLRQDO9RFDWLRQDO4XDOL¿FDWLRQ
194 H[DPVZKHQWKH\WDNHWKHH[DP,WKDVDOVREHHQLQFUHDVLQJWKHQXPEHURIVWDWHDXWKRUL]HGFLYLOLDQFHUWL¿FDWLRQWHVWVWKDWRIIHUDGLVFRXQWHGH[DPIHHWRVHUYLFH
Performance test of the MND-entrusted
National Vocational Qualification Exam

PHPEHUV6LQFHWKH01'KDVEHHQGHYHORSLQJWKH.RUHDQ6NLOO6WDQGDUG .66 LQRUGHUWKDWWKHVSHFLDOL]HGVNLOOVDFTXLUHGGXULQJPLOLWDU\VHUYLFHEHUHFRJQL]HGDVQDWLRQDOFHUWLILFDWHVDWSUHVHQWWKH.66GHYHORSPHQWRIWKUHHFDWHJRULHVGHHSVHDGLYLQJKHOLFRSWHUPDLQWHQDQFHDQGDYLDWLRQHTXLSPHQWPDLQWHQDQFHKDVEHHQFRPSOHWHGDQG
WKHVHWKUHHDUHDVDUHQRZLQWKHSURFHVVRIEHLQJGHYHORSHGLQWRQDWLRQDOFHUWL¿FDWHV

| Fostering technical professionals through concerted efforts
among industrial, academic and military institutes | To ensure a
UHJXODUVXSSO\RIPLOLWDU\WHFKQLFDOSURIHVVLRQDOVWKH01'KDVVHOHFWHGPLOLWDU\specialized students from ten vocational high schools across the nation. ThoseFKRVHQE\WKH01'ZLOOEHWUDLQHGIRURQH\HDUWKURXJKSUDFWLFXPFRXUVHVIRFXVLQJ
on military equipment operation and maintenance, and they join the military
DVWHFKQLFDOSHUVRQQHOUHVSRQVLEOHIRUPDQDJLQJVSHFLDOL]HGWHFKQLFDODUHDVRU
On-the-job training for military
specialized high school students in
preparation for joining the military.

PDLQWDLQLQJDGYDQFHGHTXLSPHQW,QWKHIRXQGDWLRQWRHQDEOHWKHPWRWDNHEDFKHORU¶VGHJUHHFRXUVHVLQWKHLUVSHFLDOL]HGDUHDVZDVVHWXSDQGWKHVHFRXUVHVZLOO
EHDYDLODEOHIURP0DUFK
8QGHUWKLVV\VWHPWKHDFWXDOMREVWKH\FRQGXFWLQWKHLUPDLQVSHFLDOL]HGDUHDVGXULQJWKHVHUYLFHSHULRGZLOOEHFRXQWHGDVSUDFWLFXPFUHGLWVDQGE\WDNLQJRQOLQH
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$WWKHVDPHWLPHLQFRRSHUDWLRQZLWKWKH0LQLVWU\RI(PSOR\PHQWDQG/DERUDQG
the Small and Medium Business Administration, the MND is proactively planningWRHVWDEOLVKDQHPSOR\PHQWVXSSRUWV\VWHPIRUWKHVHWHFKQLFDOSHUVRQQHOE\
in consideration of the time when they are discharged. This system that fosters and
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the nation.

2622010 Defense White Paper

Chapter 9.

(VWDEOLVKLQJWKH6FLHQWL¿F$FFLGHQW3UHYHQWLRQ6\VWHP
9DULRXVKXPDQDFFLGHQWVWKDWRFFXULQWKHPLOLWDU\QRWRQO\UHGXFHLWVFRPEDWVWUHQJWKEXWDUHDOVRWKHELJJHVWSRVVLEOHFDXVHRISXEOLFPLVWUXVWRIWKHPLOLWDU\Hence, the MND has systemized scientific methods and procedures to prevent
DFFLGHQWVDQGLPSOHPHQWHGDSUHYHQWLRQV\VWHPE\FRQVLGHULQJWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHQHZJHQHUDWLRQVHUYLFHPHPEHUV,QODWHWKH01'EHJDQGHYHORSLQJDQGRSHUDWLQJQHZDQGKLJKO\UHOLDEOH
personality test instruments designed in consideration of the characteristics of the new
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WKHKDQGOLQJRIWKHUHOHYDQWGDWDWRHIILFLHQWO\WDNHFDUHRIWKRVHZKRQHHGVSHFLDOFDUH
The MND also developed diagnostic inspection instruments for military personnel
stress and a scientific educational program to prevent suicide that matches thecharacteristics of the military. The instruments and the educational program wereapplied across the entire military following their pilot application at the end of$QGVLQFH-XO\WKH,QWHJUDWHG6XLFLGH3UHYHQWLRQ6\VWHP1KDVEHHQLQRSHUDWLRQ7KURXJKWKLVVFLHQWL¿FDFFLGHQWPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHPWKH01'KDVEHHQ
collecting various accident case data and accident prevention information in an
LQWHJUDWHGPDQQHUZKLFKFRQWULEXWHVWRDFFLGHQWSUHYHQWLRQ

1. Integrated Suicide Prevention System
An integrated system that uses
scientifically based ‘identificationmanagement-screening' methods toprevent suicide within the military.

The MND also launched the Enlistment Interdiction and Early Separation System,ZKLFKHQDEOHVDV\VWHPDWLFPDQDJHPHQWRIWKRVHZKRDUHFRQVLGHUHGLQDGHTXDWHIRU
active duty positions (throughout all stages from drafting to actual duty servicing). At
WKHGUDIWLQJVWDJHWKRVHFDQGLGDWHVQRW¿WIRUPLOLWDU\VHUYLFHDUHLGHQWL¿HGDQGQRWDOORZHGWRMRLQWKHPLOLWDU\$WWKHERRWFDPSWUDLQLQJVWDJHWKH$FWLYH'XW\6HUYLFH(OLJLELOLW\5HYLHZ6\VWHPLVUXQWRHQVXUHDWLPHO\KDQGOLQJRIWKHLQDGHTXDWH
candidates. During the actual service period, the military determines those whoare not adequate for their assigned military positions. In addition, the relevant laws
KDYHEHHQDPHQGHGWRDOORZLQDGHTXDWHSHUVRQQHOWREHWUDQVIHUUHGWRUHSODFHPHQWSRVLWLRQV HJSXEOLFVHUYLFHSHUVRQQHO RUEHGLVFKDUJHGLIQHFHVVDU\6KRXOGDVHUYLFHPHPEHUSHULVKHGLQDQXQIRUWXQDWHDFFLGHQWWKH01'VHQGVDGHDWKQRWL¿FDWLRQWRWKHKRPHRIWKHVHUYLFHPHPEHUWRGLUHFWO\QRWLI\WKHIDFWRIKLVKHUGHDWKWRWKHEHUHDYHGIDPLO\263

Section 4. Invigorating Productive Military Service ConditionsCeremony for 60th Anniversary of Seoul Recapture
and 62nd ROK Armed Forces Day(Gwanghwamun, Sep 2010)

10#HAPTER

4HE!RMED&ORCES3ERVINGTHE0EOPLE
Section 1. %NHANCING0UBLIC"ENEÜTAND0ROTECTING
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Section 2. %FÜCIENT2ELOCATIONOF-ILITARY)NSTALLATIONS
Section 3. .ATIONAL$EFENSE0OLICY4HAT'OES
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1

3ECTION

Enhancing Public Benefit andProtecting Public Rights-AINTAININGAÜRMALL DIRECTIONALMILITARYREADINESSPOSTURE THE2/+MILITARYEXTENDSEFFORTSTOSUPPORT
THEPEOPLEWHENEVERNECESSARY!TTHESAMETIME ITSTRIVESTOREALIZE.ATIONAL$EFENSETHAT3ERVES
THE0EOPLEBYEASINGTHEREGULATIONSONTHE-ILITARY)NSTALLATION0ROTECTION:ONES OPERATINGECOFRIENDLYMILITARYFORCES ANDESTABLISHINGANATIONWIDEDISASTERREADINESSPOSTURE

1. Easing of the Regulations on the Military Installation
Protection Zones
The Ministry of National Defense (MND) continues to ease the regulations

Lifting or Easing of theMilitary Protection Zones(Unit: ⽋)on the Military Installation Protection Zones to the extent that military

Classification

LiftedEased

operations will not be disturbed. On September 22, 2008, the Act on

2009

12,810,000

189,000

2010

25,220,000 2,670,000

Protection of Military Bases and Installations came into effect, integrating
three separate pieces of legislation that had been applied by each of the threeservices within the military: the Military Installations Protection Act, theNaval Bases Act, and the Military Air Bases Act. This Act ensures rights
of civilians with regards to their property and resolves the inconveniences
stemming from the use of land by the military.
In the past, in consultations regarding construction and land use within thereservation zones, the operational review standards differed depending on
the unit in question and the commanders, which was problematic because it
gave rise to differences in consultation results even for identical requests. To

266 2010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

UHVROYHWKLVLVVXHWKHRSHUDWLRQDOUHYLHZVWDQGDUGVZHUHXQL¿HGDQGVLQFH
0DUFKWKH\KDYHEHHQUHÀHFWHGLQWKH'LUHFWLYHRQWKH0DQDJHPHQWRI
Military Bases and the Military Facility Protection Zones and implemented
accordingly. The main contents of the operational review standards are as
follows.
First, operational zones that are within 25km of the Military Demarcation
Line (MDL) were divided into 'zones that must be protected' and 'otherzones' in order to ensure conditions for carrying out military operations. To
minimize control over the protection zones by the military, civilians willbe allowed to develop the land in the 'zones that must be protected' if themilitary’s defensive strength is not weakened by such development. As for'other zones,' the regulations pertaining to the existing protection zones havebeen relaxed as much as is feasible or they have been entrusted to the local
governments.
Second, as for the areas beyond 25km of the MDL, the standards applied tothe protection zones near military bases have been eased even further within
the scope of the current laws. As shown in Figure 10-1, in the past, protection
zones were designated by calculating the distance from ‘the most outward
fence’ in the unit; this has been adjusted so that the distance is calculated
from the ‘core facility’ within the unit, thereby reducing the area of military
protection zones.

Figure 10-1. Adjustment of the Military Facility Protection Zones (March 2010)

300m

500m

300m

500m

Base facility
Core facility
Control
Protection Zone

Control
Protection Zone
Limited protection zone

Limited protection zone

267

Section 1. Enhancing Public Benefit and Protecting Public RightsThird, the operational review standards no longer take into account
whether the military installations are visible from the developed area andnewly constructed buildings, nor do they limit the height or direction of thestructures near the units based on the reason that activities within the unit will
be exposed.
Fourth, deliberations on military installations are now fairer and moretransparent. When the Military Facility Protection Review Committee is held,
the local government or the interested parties are given the opportunity to
explain the related matters prior to the deliberations if they so demand. The
UHVXOWVRIWKHGHOLEHUDWLRQVDUHDOVRQRWL¿HGLQGHWDLOWRKHOSFRQFHUQHGSDUWLHV
easily understand them.
1. Entrusted area
An area designated by the military
unit with jurisdiction such that whena person builds new structuresor engages in other development
activities, the local government candeal with the matter directly without
having to engage in administrative
consultations with the respective
military unit.

The MND has designated for entrustment a 140 million m area of land,1
2

ZKLFKLV¿YHWLPHVWKHDUHDRI<HRXLGRVFDWWHUHGRYHUFLWLHVDQGFRXQWLHVso that private owners can exercise property rights, such as the constructionof buildings within the protection zones, without having to consult the
military, and the MND plans to continue to expand this entrusted area. The
Standards and Procedures for the Assessment of Aviation Safety Impact was
HVWDEOLVKHGLQ-DQXDU\VRWKDWWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIHDFKPLOLWDU\DLU¿HOG
ZRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGZKHQOLPLWLQJWKHKHLJKWVRIEXLOGLQJVLQÀLJKWVDIHW\zones. In the future, the Standards and Procedures will apply to all military
air bases, and they are currently being implemented in the regulations of eachservice.
The MND plans to increasingly ease the regulations on the Military
Installation Protection Zones to the extent that military operations are not
impeded. This will ensure that citizens can exercise their property rights and
XWLOL]HODQGHI¿FLHQWO\

2. Eco-Friendly Military Management
The environment is an important factor in determining the quality of life.
In the 21st century, we must strike a balance between environment protectionand economic and social development. Additionally, the government's strong
policy aimed towards 'Low-Carbon Green Growth' is imperative in assuring2682010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

the survival and prosperity of future generations.
In line with these current needs, the MND is pushing forward withseveral projects: developing the military environment management system;
expanding projects to prevent environmental pollution; engaging inenvironmental conservation activities; establishing airfield and shooting
range noise prevention measures; and managing the environment in returned
USFK bases. In addition, it has applied the low-carbon green growth concept
to its operating military units, serving as a pattern for energy-reduced, lowcarbon management.

| Developing military environment management system |The MND is reinforcing the environmental organization within the militaryand developing an educational and training system to strengthen the expertiseof those personnel specializing in environmental issues. First of all, it hasestablished environmental management groups and organizational standards
that are appropriate in light of the characteristics of each Service and the units
thereunder, and has been securing experts in the relevant areas. In June 2007,
two Environment Battalions were established, followed by the establishmentof two companies dedicated to environmental issues in December 2009.
These units support the initial action to be taken in the event of environmental
accidents and also support the environmental clean-up of USFK bases thathave been returned.
The MND has entrusted the environmental management education of
the troops of the units dedicated to environmental issues to specialized
institutions that also tour the military units twice a year to give environmental
training to the relevant personnel of each unit. All military schools also haveclasses on environmental issues to instill an eco-friendly mindset in theservice members.
The MND carries out its environmental work by establishing a mutual

Practical on-site training during anenvironmental educational tour of themilitary (May 2009)

support and coordination system with the Ministry of Environment. Twice ayear, since 1998, the MND and the Ministry of Environment have together
held the ‘Central Military and Government Environment Council,’ and local
unit commanders and local environmental agencies have held the ‘Military

269

Section 1. Enhancing Public Benefit and Protecting Public Rightsand Government Environment Council.’ In addition, the MND and theMinistry of Environment jointly make biannual instructional visits to themilitary units and assess their environmental management status and uncovermatters for improvement.
Since 2010, a regularized consultative body comprised of militaryenvironment authorities has been holding meetings every month to strengthen
the expertise of the personnel dedicated to environmental issues within
the military and to build a close cooperative system among the military's
environmental departments, thus resolving major issues.

| Expanding projects to prevent environmental pollution |The ROK military operates environmental facilities in accordance with theenvironmental laws and regulations and improves dilapidated facilities.
As of the end of 2009, the ROK military was operating 6,573 environmental
basic facilities, such as water pollution prevention facilities. Projects arebeing expanded toward treating the domestic sewage from military units byconnecting the sewage pipelines to the public sewerage treatment plants run
by the local governments. It has also strengthened the preventive measures
regarding water pollution by outsourcing the operation and management of
the military units' sewage disposal to specialist companies.
To satisfy the strict standards on the quality of discharged water as provided
under the Sewerage Act, amended in September 2007, the ROK military has¿UVWRIDOOXSJUDGHGWKHZDVWHZDWHUIDFLOLWLHVWKDWKDYHGDLO\FDSDFLW\RI
tons or more and is planning the phased upgrade of other facilities by theyear 2011. The status of the efforts to secure and upgrade the military's basic
environmental facilities is shown in Table 10-1.

2702010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

Table 10-1. Status of the Efforts to Secure and Upgrade Basic Environmental Facilities
Units: number of establishments
11-15 yr MidTerm Plan

Total number
required2009 (%)

2010

Water Pollution
Prevention Facilities

4,457

4,280 (96)

42

135

Soil Pollution
Prevention Facilities

3,707

2,083 (56)

195

1,429

Air Pollution
Prevention, Noise
Prevention, andIncineration Facilities

233

210 (90)

2

21

Total

8,397

6,573 (78)

239

1,585

Water Pollution
Prevention Facilities

1,180

189 (16)

191

800

Contaminated Soil
Remediation

271

138 (51)

36

97

Hazardous Work Sites

382

166 (44)

10

206

Total

1,833

493 (27)

237

1,103

Classification

SecuredUpgradedWith respect to the protection of the soil, emphasis is placed on preventing
the occurrence of pollution. Automated oil leak detectors are being installedin underground oil storage facilities. With respect to the aboveground oil
storage facilities, concrete dikes are being installed to prevent oil leakages
should the storage tanks be damaged. Oil pipelines are also being installed
aboveground in order to reduce the possibility of oil leaks underground andWRHQDEOHOHDNVWREHYHUL¿HGLPPHGLDWHO\XSRQRFFXUUHQFH)XUWKHUPRUHWKH
soil surrounding the oil storage facilities is periodically investigated, and once
soil contamination is detected, remediation work is carried out for the area.
The waste ammunition in shooting ranges is collected periodically andfacilities preventing the spread of contamination are constructed. The waste
ammunition in shooting ranges is retrieved by either the service members of therelevant unit or handled by companies to which the work has been outsourced.
The surrounding area of the shooting ranges is investigated on a regular basis,

Storage of Collected Ammunitionand contamination prevention measures are established if needed. Depending on
the topography of the area near the shooting range, the spread of contamination
is prevented by installing water detention ponds, regulating reservoirs or dams,
which have the effect of improving the water quality, growing plants that are
effective in removing contaminants from the soil, or appropriately managing thewetlands where wild reeds grow on their own.
Regulating Reservoir Dam

271

Section 1. Enhancing Public Benefit and Protecting Public Rights

The MND is actively enforcing the lawful disposal, reduction and recyclingof the military's waste. The handling of the daily trash produced by the
military is outsourced to local governments and private waste treatment
entities, and only in those areas, such as islets, where outsourcing is notpossible, the military handles its own waste by installing military incineration
facilities and food treatment equipment. Designated waste and constructionwastes that can pollute the environment, such as waste oil and waste acid, aretreated by specialized waste treatment companies. The status of military waste
treatment is shown in Table 10-2.

Table 10-2. Status of Military Waste Treatment (as of 2009)
Unit: Ton
Amount treatedClassiﬁcation

Amount of waste

Disposal

Recycled (%)(including
outsourced andself-treated waste)

Outsourced

Self-treated by
the military

Daily trash

98,847

24,897(25.2)

73,153797

Food waste

35,641

34,627(97.2)

692

322

Designated waste

12,4997,779(62.2)

4,720

-

Construction
waste

394,015

381,434(96.8)

12,581-

Total

541,002448,737(82.9)

91,146

1,119| Engaging in environmental conservation activities | The
ROK military supports environmental conservation activities in various ways
by participating in the government-wide National Land Grand Cleaning
Campaign. For example, the military has initiated the New Spring National
Grand Cleaning Campaign and the One Mountain and One Stream Care
Campaign, while supporting the Han River cleanup, joining the environmental
conservation activities in remote islets, and retrieving waste from flooded
Han River cleanup efforts by the Army
Special Warfare Command service
members (September 2009)2722010 Defense White Paper

areas. The number of participants and major results of these environmental
conservation activities are shown in Table 10-3.

#HAPTER

Table 10-3. Status of Environmental Puriﬁcation Activities
Civil/Government/Military
cooperative support

Environmental conservation activities
Classiﬁcation

Number ofactivities

Number ofparticipants

Waste
retrieved(tons)

Number ofactivities

Number ofparticipants

2008

10,580918,555

8,464

1,079

117,398

2009

12,823765,116

7,674

1,031

99,497

In addition, an average of over 50,000 service members per year participate
in activities to conserve the ecosystem by feeding wild animals during thewinter and retrieving poaching tools, such as snares and traps. The status ofthese activities to protect wildlife is shown in Table 10-4.
Table 10-4. Status of Activities to Protect Wildlife
Retrieval of tools
Classiﬁcation

Feeding (ton)Snares/Traps(pcs)

Agriculturalchemicalsbottles (pcs)

Snake nets (m)

2008

1,533

549

1,717

2,253

2009

1,549

287

437

1,818

| Preventing noise from airbases and shooting ranges | Dueto the territorial circumstances evident in the Republic of Korea, military
airbases and shooting ranges are situated in locations that are not too far
from residential areas and, therefore, local residents often suffer from noise
pollution. To resolve this issue, the MND is seeking to establish noise
reduction measures, secure noise prevention facilities, and introduce the Act
on Noise Prevention at Military Airbases and Support of Areas Requiring
Noise Control Measures.
Efforts have been exerted toward reducing noise by adjusting the air routes
and altitudes of aircraft during take-off and landing and minimizing the numberof late-night flights. To reduce the noise from shooting ranges, the shooting
KRXUVDQGWKHORFDWLRQRI¿UHDUPVKDYHEHHQDGMXVWHGDQGQLJKWWLPHVKRRWLQJ
has been restricted. In addition to these efforts, noise prevention facilities have
EHHQVHFXUHGLQFOXGLQJWKHVRXQGSURR¿QJPDLQWHQDQFHVKRSV +XVK+RXVHV LQDLU¿HOGVDVZHOODVVRXQGSURRIZDOOVDQGQRLVHEXIIHUIRUHVWV

Inside View of a Soundproof
Maintenance Shop

273

Section 1. Enhancing Public Benefit and Protecting Public Rights

To support those residents who suffered from noise pollution, the MND
has also been promoting the enactment of the Act on Noise Prevention at
Military Airbases and Support of Areas Requiring Noise Control Measures.
This proposed act was submitted to the National Assembly in 2009 after
undergoing the requisite procedures, such as consultations among the relevant
departments and agencies and preliminary announcement of the legislation,and is currently being deliberated on by the National Assembly. Its mainconcerns include the following: should the effect of the noise on areas near
WKHPLOLWDU\DLU¿HOGVDQGVKRRWLQJUDQJHVEHDWRUDERYHDFHUWDLQOHYHOWKH
area will be designated and announced as a Noise Countermeasure Area; noise
prevention projects will then be implemented in the Countermeasure Areas;
and mid-term plans for noise countermeasure projects will be establishedevery five years. The law includes provisions obligating the military to
LQVWDOOQRLVHPHDVXULQJLQVWUXPHQWVLQPLOLWDU\DLU¿HOGVDQGVKRRWLQJUDQJHV
to measure the noise level constantly, and to reduce noise during militarytraining. If the proposed law is passed by the National Assembly, noise impact
assessments will be made regarding military airbases and shooting ranges
and noise countermeasures will be taken by investing a certain amount of thebudget on the annual basis.

| Managing the environment in returned USFK bases |The bases that were used by the USFK in the past are being returned pursuant
WR WKH 52.86 /DQG 3DUWQHUVKLS 3ODQ /33  WKH<RQJVDQ 5HORFDWLRQ
3ODQ <53 DQGWKH6WDWXVRI)RUFHV$JUHHPHQW 62)$ 2IWKHWDUJHWHG
bases that are due to be returned, 47 were handed over as of January 2010.
The returned USFK bases are passed down to local governments once thenecessary procedures have been carried out, such as the examination of the
facilities inside the returned bases; establishing a plan for managing thereturned base; reporting to the National Assembly; clean-up of pollution; andtearing down facilities.
Of the returned bases, 29 have been found to require environmental
remediation in accordance with domestic environmental laws. The MND
plans to openly promote remediation projects pertaining to returned USFK
bases while coordinating with the relevant local governments regarding the2742010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

remediation goals, which depend on the use of the base after its return, and themethods of the investigation and remediation for the surrounding area of the
returned base.

3. Establishing a Readiness Posture against National
Disasters| Reinforcing disaster readiness and support capabilities |Recently there have been frequent outbreaks of new epidemics, and a growing
trend in the occurrence of large-scale typhoons, downpours, snowstorms
and other natural disasters due to climate change, which have resulted in
an increasing number of requests for military support of prevention andrestoration efforts. The MND, as a 'Military of the People,' has establishedthe principle to prioritize providing support to civilians before restoringdamage within the military and then tends to the restoration of damage within
the military. Under this principle, it has been making diverse efforts toward
UHVROYLQJWKHGLI¿FXOWLHVIDFHGE\SHRSOHGXULQJWKHHDUO\VWDJHVRIDQDWLRQDO
disaster.
First, it has been strengthening its cooperative ties with relevant agencies.
In November 2007, it designated, in advance, the support units for each local
government, and 197 units have signed a ‘Memorandum of Implementationof Particulars’ with 248 local governments. In December 2007, it signed
an agreement with the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs(MLTM) and the Korea Coast Guard regarding search and rescue efforts
following aircraft accidents. In May 2009, it signed an agreement with the
MLTM for joint use of disaster- related video transmission systems.
Second, it has been modifying disaster management manuals, thereby
preparing for various types of disasters. In 2008, it supplemented the practicalmanuals, in connection with the standard crisis management manual of the
JRYHUQPHQWIRUHDFKRIWKHW\SHVRIGLVDVWHUVVXFKDVVWRUPVDQGÀRRGVHDUWKTXDNHVDQGZLOG¿UHVDQGLQPRGL¿HGWKHRQVLWHDFWLRQPDQXDOWKDWis being used in the event of a disaster.

275

Section 1. Enhancing Public Benefit and Protecting Public RightsThird, it has been putting more importance of education in disastermanagement. It offers lectures and seminars given by invited experts tocommanders, service members and disaster-related officials and provides
educational tours on damage recovery procedures for personnel responsiblefor disaster management and damage recovery. Recently, the MND has been
providing education for users of the government-wide disaster management
network to ensure swift communication of the situation and information
sharing following a disaster.
)RXUWKLWKDVEHHQVHFXULQJVXI¿FLHQWPLOLWDU\WHFKQLFDOSHUVRQQHOWRSUHSDUH
for functional paralysis of the nation's core infrastructure. In the event of an
unlawful strike by the subway labor union, technical personnel who have been
trained in the relevant areas are sent to protect the national infrastructure andto minimize the inconvenience experienced by citizens. Beginning in 2010,
Preparing to mobilize container
vehicles (Defense Transportation
Command, June 2009)

over 500 additional technical personnel in areas of rail, power generation, andgas have been trained, and through consultations with the relevant agency, themilitary's technical personnel that are dispatched upon a strike will have the
EHQH¿WRIFDVXDOW\LQVXUDQFH
Fifth, the MND has built a system that enables the immediate support of
the government-led humanitarian relief activities in the event of an overseas
disaster. When a large-scale overseas disaster occurs, the governmentorganizes and mobilizes an overseas emergency relief team centered

The Send-Off Ceremony for theOverseas Emergency Relief Unit toHelp Haiti Recover from the Earthquake(January 2010)

on international rescue teams, medical support teams and the KoreanInternational Cooperation Agency, while providing aid in terms of relief funds
and relief supplies. The MND has incorporated the task manual and otherrelevant contents in the enforcement ordinance, which is the Act on Overseas
Emergency Support, which were amended at the undertaking of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) for the purpose of supporting theGovernment. It also published a task manual for the military transport aircraft
used in the government's emergency relief activities for overseas disasters.
This manual establishes the organic, cooperative procedures in relation to
the relevant domestic and foreign organizations, such as the emergency

2762010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

response guidelines for immediate mobilizations, the measures to be taken ateach stage, and the reference materials for various task, thereby building an
emergency support system.
Lastly, the MND and each Service are responsible for organizing andmanaging disaster rescue teams in order to implement these policies andvarious other measures and put highest priority on acquisition of the supplies
and equipment needed for rescuing people. Furthermore, standards pertaining
to having in place disaster management supplies and equipment have been
provided in consideration of the type of disaster and the characteristics of eachmilitary unit. The supplies and equipment have been secured and managedwith the cooperation of the relevant local governments.

| Supporting emergency rescues and disaster recovery| The MND maintains a 24-hour emergency rescue support and a disasterreadiness posture by operating 35 disaster search and rescue units and 412'LVDVWHU6LWXDWLRQ2I¿FHV7KHSURFHGXUHIRUSURYLGLQJVXSSRUWWRFLYLOLDQVLQ
the event of a disaster is shown in Figure 10-2.
Supporting snowfall damage recovery(Dangjin, Chungnam, January 2009)

Figure 10-2. Procedure for Civilian Support in the Event of a Disaster
MND Disaster Prevention
and Countermeasures HQ
Search and Rescue HQ(the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

National Disaster Prevention
and Safety Center
Central Emergency Rescue
Control Group

Request for
supportDisaster Countermeasures HQof each Service
Operational units,
the nearest unit

Regional Disaster
Countermeasures HQ
Regional Emergency Rescue
Control Group

Take action ﬁrst then give
brieﬁng in emergencies

Receipt of report
Disaster support
Emergency rescue activities

Dispatch units/support(troops/equipment)

ReportOccurrence of a disaster

Support fromthe nearest unit

Securing support ofthe entire military (nation)

277

Section 1. Enhancing Public Benefit and Protecting Public Rights

The major disaster recovery support activities, domestic and overseas,
supported by the military over the past five years are as follows: damage
UHFRYHU\IURPDZLOGILUHLQWKH<HRQJGRQJDUHDDQGKHDY\VQRZIDOOLQWKH
Honam area in 2005; damage recovery from a landslide in the Philippines
and an earthquake in Indonesia in 2006; damage recovery from Typhoon‘Nari’ and involvement in the efforts to prevent the spread of oil in Taean inSUHYHQWLYHDVZHOODVEXULDOHIIRUWVLQUHVSRQVHWRDYLDQLQÀXHQ]DDQG
involvement in the recovery efforts in response to the earthquake in Szechuan,
China, in 2008; and support of damage relief efforts connected with droughts,
wildfires, Swine flu and the Cambodia typhoon in 2009. The results of
HPHUJHQF\UHVFXHDQGGLVDVWHUUHFRYHU\DFWLYLWLHVRYHUWKHODVW¿YH\HDUVDUH
shown in Table 10-5.
Table 10-5. Results of the Emergency Rescue and Disaster Recovery Efforts
Support

Recovery performance

Classification Troops Equipment Human Organization
Quarantine
Farmland Road/ Greenhouseof/Stable /Disinfection
rescue residences
(1000
(ha)
Dike
(km)
(pcs)
(ha)
(bldg)(persons) (bldg)
persons)
2005

5,590

2006

337 13,833

2007

182

2008

2009

2782010 Defense White Paper

214

188

157

2,607

3,286

10

1,182 3,980 2,192

Major content

9,737

6DQGZDVWHUHPRYDO
25 ǩ14,428
tons

1

2,019

245

395

3,934

ǩ)XPLJDWLRQUHPRYDO
of pine trees: 4,777
170 ǩ2YHUVHDVGLVDVWHU
relief airlifts: twice,14.5 tons

182

4,296

945

7

4,252

ǩ6DOYDJHRIILVKLQJ
16 boats
53 ǩboats:([WLQJXLVKLQJ
wildfires: 26.4ha

370ǩ6ODXJKWHURIDYLDQ
influenza-infectedanimals: 1,890,000
6]HFKXDQ
27 ǩearthquake:
26.6 tons
Provisionof daily*necessities and airtransport

18537

ǩ4XDUDQWLQLQJ+$
8,972,000 persons
ǩ&DPERGLDW\SKRRQ
damage: 7 tons
- * Transport of relief
suppliesǩ3URYLVLRQRIZDWHU
during droughts:
7,597 tons

8,052 5,249 2,646

18,830

11

4,201

6

Total 1,078 29,517

210

295

260

7

72

34

275

#HAPTER

| Future direction of defense disaster management |The MND, as a responsible agency for disaster management, as well as the
supporting agency for emergency rescues, is making every possible effort
to minimize potential threats to life and damage to property. In order toprepare for the ever diversifying and increasing in scale disasters, defense

Disaster and Safety Management
Budget Trends (Unit: KRW 100 million) ([SHFWHG

35
30

25.97

25

21.27

20

disaster management capabilities must be further strengthened and civil/

15

governmental/military entities must cooperate closely with one another.

10

12.72
8.14

5

With this awareness, the MND has secured the personnel required to takeexclusive control of military disaster management and the yearly budget

2007

2008 2009 2010 2011and has been developing its capabilities focused not merely on efficientuse, response and recovery of resources but also prevention, through thecooperation of the civil, governmental and military sectors. The ‘disasterand safety management’ budget, which was drawn up in 2007, has increased
every year, and in 2010, approximately KRW 2.6 billion was used toward
acquiring and maintaining disaster management equipment and supplies aswell as preventive construction and repair work. In 2015, the MND plans tosecure at least KRW 7 billion.
In light of the current situation, which has seen a frequent occurrence oftransnational disasters, the MND is making efforts toward governmentwide domestic and overseas emergency activities by cooperating with therelevant Ministries and agencies. The MND and the military have built aninternational cooperation and military support structure for the government's
efforts toward emergency relief should a large-scale disaster occur overseas.
By actively participating in such efforts, the nation's image and status will
be enhanced in the international community.

Support to overcome a drought(Jeongseon, Gangwon-do, January
2009)

4. Strengthening Civil Support in Agricultural Areas
The MND offers active civil support by leveraging its available personnel,
equipment, and skills to the maximum extent possible without impeding theperformance of its basic duties.
During the farming season, the MND provides manpower for transplanting
and harvesting in the farms situated in regions suffering from a lack ofSupport to make rice stalks standupright (Pocheon, Gyeonggi-do, July
2009)

279

Section 1. Enhancing Public Benefit and Protecting Public Rightsfarm hands. It also provides support in terms of personnel and equipment
to upgrade the agricultural infrastructure related to structural changes in therural villages by maintaining waterways and improving rivers. It has alsoorganized the ‘Agro-machinery Rotating Servicing Teams’ to provide repairs
on agricultural equipment in areas without agricultural equipment service
centers.
As part of the Love the Rural Village Campaign, the MND has conducted a‘One Unit One Village Sisterhood Campaign’ to assist in farm work, such as
harvesting potatoes and picking apples. The results of the assistance given to
IDUPVDQG¿VKLQJYLOODJHVRYHUWKHSDVW¿YH\HDUVDUHVKRZQLQ7DEOH

Table 10-6. Results of the Assistance Given to Farms and Fishing Villages
Major support activities
Support per- Support
Classiﬁcation sonnel (no. of equipment
persons)(pcs)

Farming
support(⽌)

Agricultural
machine repairs(pcs)

Waterway
repairs(km)

Others(no. of persons)2005

155,466

2,556

24.6

2,365

76

8,083

2006

146,794

3,089

46.7

7,278

176

11,335

2007

180,103

2,800

18.6

4,491

820

10,6602008

107,849

1,785

188.5

1,727

31

6,740

2009

98,074

2,453

34.1

1,126

41

24,916

Total

688,286

12,683

312.5

16,987

1,144

61,734* Others: medical/quarantine support, providing drinking water, cleaning up the environment,
and other volunteer work.

2802010 Defense White Paper

Efficient Relocation of Military
Installations

2

3ECTION

4HE-.$INTENDSTORELOCATETHELANDFORMILITARYUSE WHICHTAKESUPPERCENTOFTHE2/+mSENTIRETERRITORY BYTHEYEAR ANDTHEREBYCONTRIBUTESTOTHEEFFICIENTOPERATIONOFUNITSANDREGIONALDEVELOPMENT4HEÜNANCIALRESOURCESNEEDEDFORSUCHRELOCATIONWILLBEOBTAINEDTOTHEGREATESTEXTENTPOSSIBLEFROMTHESURPLUSLANDFORMILITARYUSETHATWILLCOMEINTOBEINGINTHEPROCESSOFRELOCATION
4HUS THEBURDENONTHEDEFENSEBUDGETWOULDBEREDUCED

1. Planning the Relocation of Military Installations
At the end of 2009, the MND established and has been putting into
practice its plan to decrease the number of military installations. The planentails a reduction from the current 1,900 to 700 by the year 2020 when the
restructuring of the military will be completed in accordance with the defense
reform. The key map for relocation of military installations is shown in Figure
10-3.

Figure 10-3. Key Map for Relocation of Military Installations
Land for continued
use
Future locations

Scattered nationwide

Current

Combined deployment foreach operational task unit
End state (2020)

281

Section 2. Efficient Relocation of Military Installations| Backdrop to and standards for establishing the relocation
plan | The relocation plan was established in consideration of manybackground factors. First, a large number of troops and units will be removed
following the restructuring of the military from its current quantitative,
conventional form centered on troops to a qualitative, high-tech military force
structure that is information and technology-intensive. Second, the existing
scattered military installations are now considered to interfere with urban
development of nearby cities as cities are growing and expanding, which has
UHVXOWHGLQFRQÀLFWVZLWKWKHUHVLGHQWV7KLUGWKHH[LVWLQJPLOLWDU\LQVWDOODWLRQVare small in scale and disperse in order to secure the ability for immediate
response and survivability at each post, but due to the advances in the early
warning system and the introduction of the unmanned security system, it
becomes possible to combine military installations on a large scale.
In consideration of these internal and external environmental changes, in 2009
the MND has established a military installation relocation plan reflecting theamended draft of Defense Reform Basic Plan. The focal points of the plan are
as follows: the units located downtown at the time of the establishment of therelocation plan will be moved to the outskirts if possible, the existing land formilitary use will be used to the greatest extent possible so as to minimize having
to purchase new land, and local governments' urban planning will be referenced
WRSUHGLFWDQGPDQDJHSRWHQWLDOFRQÀLFWLQJIDFWRUV| Implementing the relocation program | The relocation program
will take place in phases and be timed in link with military restructuring.
Training facilities will be combined and installed by categorizing them intofunction, thereby decreasing the requirement for lands and security. Training
facilities, such as military training grounds, will be shared by scheduling the
WLPHVZKHQHDFKXQLWFDQXVHWKHIDFLOLWLHVWRLQFUHDVHHI¿FLHQF\By 2020, when the relocation of military installations is complete, thecurrently small-scale and scattered military installations will be combined intoODUJHVFDOHLQVWDOODWLRQVDQGWKHLUHI¿FLHQWPDQDJHPHQWZLOOEHSRVVLEOHE\combining the facilities and functions within the installations. Those locateddowntown will be moved to the outskirts; the military relocation programs
will reflect urban planning, and military amenities will be opened to local
residents in underdeveloped areas.

2822010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

The relocation program of military installations is a long-term plan that
requires a massive amount of financial resources. Using national resourcesmeans that citizens will have to bear the burden, so in order to minimize thisburden, the MND will use the financial resources derived from adjusting
the land for military use, and cautiously apply them to purchasing land andconstructing facilities.

(I¿FLHQW8VHRI/DQGIRU0LOLWDU\8VH| Status of land for military use | Land for military use refers to theland that is a state property1 that the MND manages for the purpose of carryingout military operations and for the stable stationing of units. Land for military use
amounted to approximately 1,205ʟ as of November 30, 2010, and comprised
1.2 percent of the total area of the ROK (5.0 percent of state property). The statusof land for military use is shown in Table 10-7. The status of land for military use
per region and type of land is shown in Figure 10-4.

1. State properties
All properties owned owned by thestate to carry out administrative tasks(broad meaning) and properties thathave been nationalized at the state's
H[SHQVHE\GRQDWLRQRIWKHODQGWRWKH
state, or by laws or treaties (narrowmeaning).

Table 10-7. Status of Land for Military Use (as of November 30, 2010)
Total state property

Land for military use

Area of ROK
territory (⽌)

Area (⽌)

Compared tothe total ROK
territory (%)

Area (⽌)

Compared tothe total ROK
territory (%)

100,210

23,895

23.8

1,205

1.2 (5.0% of state
property)

Figure 10-4. Status of Land for Military Use Per Region and Type of Land (as of November 30, 2010)

Chungcheong
region 155
Honam(12.9%)
region 123(10.2%)
Yeongnamregion 199(16.5%) Total area
1,205LN
Gangwonregion 275(22.8%)

Greater Seoul
Metropolitan
Area 453(37.6%)

Status per region

Unit:LN

Rice
paddies
64(5.3%)
Other
52(4.3%)

Fields81(6.7%)0L[HGW\SH
224(18.6%)

Total area
1,205LN

Forests
770(63.9%)

Roads
14(1.2%)
Status per type of land

283

Section 2. Efficient Relocation of Military Installations| Efficient use of land for military use | The ROK military
SURPRWHVHI¿FLHQWXVHRIWKHODQGIRUPLOLWDU\XVHLQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIEDODQFHG
development of the land and urban planning in the regions, as long as it does not
impede military operations.
According to the Defense Reform Basic Plan, many units have been moved
or relocated, and with the return of a total of 178NP  of USFK bases, in
2

DFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKH<RQJVDQ5HORFDWLRQ3ODQ <53 DQGWKH/DQG3DUWQHUVKLS
Plan (LPP), there has been an increased need to raise the management and land
XVHHI¿FLHQF\E\WKHPLOLWDU\&RQVHTXHQWO\WKH01'KDVVHWWKHGLUHFWLRQIRU
WKHHI¿FLHQWXVHE\WKHPLOLWDU\LQDZD\WKDWEHVWEHQH¿WVWKHVWDWHWKHORFDO
government and the citizens, as opposed to just managing the land for military
use as in the past, so far as military operations are not impeded.
In January 2008, the MND signed an MOU on Cooperation for EfficientManagement of Land for Military Use with the Korea National Housing Corporation,
the Korea Land Corporation and the Korea Appraisal Board and is actively introducing
the advanced management techniques used by the private sector.
In addition, it is clearing out the private land currently being used by the
military in order to ensure the property rights of citizens and is seeking ways topromote the use of the land for military use.

2842010 Defense White Paper

National Defense Policy That Goes
Together With the People

3

3ECTION

4HE-.$ACTIVELYPROMOTESPOLICIESTHATAREDIRECTLYRELATEDTOANDHELPTHEDAILYLIVESOFTHEPEOPLE 
SUCHASIMPROVINGTHEMILITARYSERVICEANDCONSCRIPTIONSYSTEMS4HE-.$ALSOATTEMPTSINVARIOUS
WAYSTOBETTERCOMMUNICATEWITHTHEPUBLICBYSHARINGINFORMATIONANDSTRENGTHENINGPUBLICRELATIONS02 )NPARTICULAR WITHTHEADVENTOFTHETHANNIVERSARYOFTHE+OREAN7AR ITHASBEENWIDENINGITS
BONDOFSYMPATHYWITHTHEPEOPLETHROUGHRE ENACTMENTSOFBATTLES EXTENSIONOFINVITATIONSTOFOREIGNWARVETERANSTO+OREA ANDCULTURAL SPORTINGEVENTSANDOTHERVARIOUSPROGRAMS

1. Improving the Military Service and Conscription Systems
The MND has been working to improve the military service andconscription systems to contribute to the upgrading of the military's combat
capabilities and to promote equality and efficiency in the performance ofmilitary service. Major areas of improvement include shortening the service
period, introducing paid volunteer system, improving the alternative service
system, and promoting the community service system.

| Shortening the military service period | The military service
period is being gradually shortened in order to resolve the problem of thesurplus in military personnel due to the reduction of troops, to alleviate
the burden of compulsory military service on citizens, and to allow men toenter society earlier and therefore engage longer in economic activities. The
shortened period per type of service is shown in Table 10-8.

285

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the PeopleTable 10-8. Shortened Period by Type of Service
Applicable toCurrent

Shortened toArmy, Marine Corps, combat andconscripted police, security personnel incorrectional facilities, full-time reservists

24 months

18 months

Navy, Marine combat police, Conscripted
ﬁreﬁghters

26 months

20 months

Air Force

27 months

21 months

Over a projected period of eight years and seven months (January 2006 to
July 2014), the service period will continue to be gradually shortened. The
method for shortening the military service period is shown in Figure 10-5.
Figure 10-5. Method for Shortening the Military Service Period
Enlistees of Jan. '06

Enlistees of Jul. ’14

Shorten by one day every three weeks

2006

2 0 07

2008

2009

2 010

Shorten by one day every two weeks

2 011

2 012

2 013

2 014

2 015

However, the shortening of the service period is being reviewed because,
following the shortening of the military service period, proficiency andexpertise of the troops have fallen. Military combat capabilities have thus been
more difficult to maintain and problems in supply and demand of military
service resources are expected to arise.

| Implementation of the paid volunteer system | Shortening
the military service period has the positive effect of resolving the problem
of surplus military resources caused by the reduction in troops and relieving
the burden on citizens. However, it can lead to a decline in military combat
capabilities due to a lack of skilled service members, which results from theirrapid turnover rate. In order to prevent the deterioration of military combat
FDSDELOLWLHVIROORZLQJWKHVKRUWHQLQJRIWKHVHUYLFHSHULRGDQGWRHI¿FLHQWO\
1. Paid volunteer system
A system where active duty personnel
or other applicants may apply and
VHUYHIRUDQH[WHQGHGSHULRGRIWLPH
and receive a prescribed salary.

2862010 Defense White Paper

use national human resources, the MND introduced and implemented the paid
volunteer system1 in January 2008.
The basic operating policy of the paid volunteer system is as follows. First,

#HAPTER

during the conscripted service period, they are paid and managed in the samemanner as the enlisted men. Second, during the extended period they arepromoted to staff sergeants and receive the treatment due a noncommissioned
RI¿FHUWRJHWKHUZLWKWKHDSSURSULDWHOHYHORIVDODU\LQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHLU
level of skills and expertise.
Combat or skilled soldiers (TypeȎ) are selected from experienced enlisted
service members and serve as staff sergeants for a six to 18 month period once
they have completed their conscription. State-of-the-art-equipment operating
specialized soldiers (Type ȏ) are selected from civilian resources prior to
WKHLUFRQVFULSWLRQDQGVHUYHIRUWKUHH\HDUVIURPZKHQWKH\¿UVWHQOLVW7KH\serve as enlisted service men during the conscription period and as staff
sergeants during the remaining period. The status of the paid volunteer system
per type is shown in Table 10-9.
Table 10-9. Status of the paid volunteer system per typeClassiﬁcation

Selected byServiceperiodService area

SalaryType 1(skilled soldiers)

Chief of Staff ofeach Service

6-18
months ofadditional
service

Posts related tocombat and technicalskills (squad leader,radar, etc.)

KRW 1.2 million per
monthType 2(specialized
soldiers)

Commissionerof the Ofﬁce ofMilitary Manpower Administration

Three
years ofservice

Posts related to stateof-the-art equipment
RSHUDWLRQV QH[W
generation tank (XK2), KDX-Ⳕ, etc.)

KRW 1.2 million (incentive pay of KRW
600,000 per month
not included)

The pilot operations, which have been carried out since 2008, found that
paid volunteers are useful immediately upon commission and contribute to the
management of units with their diverse experience. This system is therefore
useful in developing the military into a technology-intensive structure centeredon high-tech combat capabilities. However, the original goal of recruitingPHPEHUVE\WKH\HDUKDVEHHQGHWHUPLQHGDVGLI¿FXOWWRDFKLHYH
because of the public’s sense of burden regarding the extended service period
and the insufficient compensation. Therefore, mindful of the possibility ofachievement as well as cost-effectiveness, the MND has readjusted its goal
downward to 16,000 service members.

287

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the People2. Alternative service system
A system that allows for the efficientuse of surplus military manpower after
active duty service positions have been
ILOOHG8QGHUWKLVV\VWHPWKHH[FHVV
personnel may serve in a national
capacity comparable to active military
service.
3. Switchover service personnel
Active duty personnel whose statuseshave been changed so they can serve as
conscripted combat police, personnel
in correctional facilities or security
personnel in correctional facilities, etc.

| Operation of the switchover service and alternative
service systems2 | Switchover service personnel3 have contributed tosecuring national security power, but it has been decided that the switchover
service system will be reduced and then abolished because of the increase in the
GLVFRQWHQWRIWKHVHUYLFHPHPEHUVDQGWKHVFLHQWL¿FV\VWHPL]DWLRQRIVHFXULW\facilities. Under this decision, the MND will reduce the number of switchover
service personnel by 20 percent each year until 2011 and will abolish the system
in 2012. Combat and conscripted police members will be maintained from 2010
to 2011 at the same level as in 2009 to secure public safety, but the assignment
to this service will be abolished in 2012.
Meanwhile, although alternative service personnel have contributed to theprovision of services to citizens and the development of national industries,
there have been some equality issues pertaining to the fulfillment of military
services and efficient use of human resources. In order to improve this, the
MND is phasing out alternative services, such as skilled industry personnel. Of
the skilled industry personnel, 4,500 will be annually assigned to active duty
services until 2011 while replacement personnel will be reduced every yearby 20 percent until 2012, when the assignment will cease. The timing of the
reduction and abolishment of the switchover service personnel and alternative
service personnel will be reviewed and carried out after a comprehensive
consideration of the supply and demand forecasts regarding military personnel
resources.
In addition, improvements were made to the alternative services provided by
the public service personnel, skilled industry personnel and specialized research
SHUVRQQHOWRHQDEOHHI¿FLHQWXVHRIKXPDQUHVRXUFHV7KHVSOLWVHUYLFHV\VWHP
was introduced to allow public service personnel to treat an illness or tend totheir household affairs by allowing them to defer service for a certain period
and to return to serve their remaining time. Furthermore, it allowed public
service personnel to serve as skilled industrial personnel if they wished to be
HPSOR\HGLQRUGHUWR¿QDQFLDOO\VXSSRUWWKHLUKRXVHKROG7KHPLQLPXPVHUYLFH
time required before transferring posts, as applicable to specialized researchpersonnel serving in national research institutes and university/corporate
research institutes, has been shortened from 24 months to 18 months. The choice
RILQVWLWXWLRQVWRVHUYHLQKDVEHHQEURDGHQHGLQRUGHUWRSURPRWHHI¿FLHQF\LQ
the use of human resources.

2882010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

| Promoting the community service system | The MND has beenpromoting the community service system4 to supplement the above-mentioned
problems of the alternative service system and to respond to the increasing
demand for community services.5 In the public service area, the MND has
gradually reduced simple administrative assistance work and expanded thecommunity assignments that were found to be in demand. The major details of
the community service system are as follows.
First, the system seeks to promote equality regarding the military service
by adjusting the current conscription standards so that individuals with partial

4. Community Service System
A system allowing men to serve incommunity service areas instead of on
active duty.
5. Community services
The services provided by a society
to improve an individual's and thecommunity's welfare. They include
services in the areas of social welfare,public health, education and culture,and environmental safety.

physical limitations are assigned community services if they are capable ofsocial activities.
Second, the system seeks to promote efficient use of human resources byadjusting the public service personnel's areas of service and committing them
primarily to work in areas that require manpower but is experiencing hardship¿QGLQJLWVXFKDVSURYLGLQJDVVLVWDQFHWRWKHGLVDEOHGRUWKHHOGHUO\Third, to reinforce the community service personnel's sense of responsibility
and expertise the MND offers cultural and functional education. Throughsuch education, the alternative service personnel will be able to meet society's
demands and will have more pride in their military service.

2. Improving Military Manpower Administration
The MND has been improving various systems to prevent individuals
evading their military service and has been creating a climate conducive to the
IDLWKIXOIXO¿OOPHQWRIWKHPLOLWDU\VHUYLFH%HVLGHVWRLPSURYHWKHDFFXUDF\RI
the physical examinations it has provided precise examination systems and has
improved the civic services for the candidates for the military service.

| Countermeasures against military service evaders | The
MND established the Comprehensive Measures for Preventing Military Service
Evading6 to fundamentally prevent individuals from avoiding their compulsory
military service. It has been promoting the amendment of related laws to enable
WKHYHUL¿FDWLRQRISK\VLFDOH[DPLQDWLRQVIRUWKRVHVXVSHFWHGRIDWWHPSWLQJWR
evade military service.

'UDIWLQJH[DPLQDWLRQ 6HRXO5HJLRQDO
Military Manpower Administration,
February 2010)

6. Military service evading
Acts such as deliberately imposing
physical injury on oneself, deferring
enlistment based on fake illnesses,
and deferring enlistment dates falsely
LQRUGHUWREHH[HPSWHGIURPRUEH
allowed a reduced period of military
service.

289

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the PeopleFirst, to prevent and efficiently respond to the ever more intelligent anddiverse ways of military service evading, the MND has provided the Measuresfor Preventing Military Service Evading Crimes, which include the items
regarding the operation of the Military Service Evading Prevention and
Investigation Team. In the future, it will continue to enhance fairness andequality regarding the fulfillment of the military service by adjusting various
systems to prevent the crime of military service evading, such as improving theenlistment deferral system.
Second, the MND is pushing forward an amendment to the Military Service
Act that would mainly extend the physical reexamination period (from one
to two years) in order to increase the accuracy of the reexaminations of thoseZKRVHSK\VLFDOUDWLQJVKDYHEHHQXQFRQ¿UPHG /HYHO | Providing a precise examination system | To ensure fairjudgment regarding military service, the MND has built a precise examination
system with the acquisition of high-tech equipment and by assigning moreexamination personnel. It has appointed outside medical experts as ‘military
conscription judgment ombudsman’ to collect complaints, grievances andviews regarding matters for improvement of the system and has strengthened its
surveillance and control functions.
For precise physical examinations, it has reinforced its expert personnel
and secured high-tech medical equipment as needed. In 2009, it brought inadditional AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) virus testing
equipment (one in 2006, nine in 2008, five in 2009; a total of fifteen havebeen secured) and carries out AIDS testing on all examinees in the drafting
examination. Examinations regarding rare and incurable diseases are outsourced
to civilian medical institutions.

| Creating a climate conducive to faithfully fulfilling themilitary service | The MND has been carrying out diverse policies to create
DFOLPDWHFRQGXFLYHWRWKHIDLWKIXOIXO¿OOPHQWRIWKHPLOLWDU\VHUYLFH
It has stably operated a system for disclosure regarding the military serviceof public officials ranked level 4 or above, thus enhancing the transparency

2902010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

DQGFRQ¿GHQFHLQPLOLWDU\VHUYLFHIXO¿OOPHQWVDVZHOODVVDWLVI\LQJWKHSHRSOH V
right to know. However, to protect personal information, the Military Service
QXPEHUVRIWKRVHZKRKDYHIXO¿OOHGWKHLUPLOLWDU\GXWLHVKDYHEHHQH[FOXGHG
from disclosure by an amendment to the Act on the Notice and Disclosure of the
0LOLWDU\6HUYLFH0DWWHUV5HODWHGWR3XEOLF2I¿FLDOV0LOLWDU\6HUYLFHQXPEHUV
are personal information that can be used as PIN numbers for bank accounts
and Internet sites. Hence, the Act was amended to prevent illicit use of suchinformation.
In addition, the MND began the Program to Promote Families Renowned for
Outstanding Military Service in 2004 to instill greater pride in those persons
ZKRKDYHIDLWKIXOO\IXO¿OOHGWKHLUGHIHQVHUHODWHGGXWLHVDQGWRH[SUHVVUHVSHFWIRUWKHLUVDFUL¿FHDQGGHYRWLRQ$IDPLO\UHQRZQHGIRULWVRXWVWDQGLQJPLOLWDU\service is selected from families that have had three generations in active duty.
In 2010, a total of 192 families were selected.

| Improving the convenience of military service membersin their duties | The MND has improved its civic services processing
system regarding military manpower administration and has eased the rules andregulations applied to the candidates for military duty, thereby increasing theirconvenience.
First, it abolished the Overseas Travel Departure Declaration System. In July
2008, as overseas travel by candidates for military service increased, a system
ZDVIRUPHGEHWZHHQWKH2I¿FHRI0LOLWDU\0DQSRZHU$GPLQLVWUDWLRQDQGWKH
Ministry of Justice to share data related to the permission for overseas travel
and the step of departure checks was eliminated to minimize the inconvenience
experienced by these travelers. Thereafter, the Military Service Act wasamended and the departure check system was completely abolished (December
10, 2009). Consequently, around 60,000 annual civil petitions and grievances
regarding departure checks have been resolved and the workload reduced.
Second, in 2010, it introduced and implemented the enlistment and drafting
date deferral system for the candidates of military service who are already
employed after graduating from vocational schools. If a person wishes, he candefer enlistment or drafting until the age of 24.

291

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the PeopleThird, the recruiting system of active duty members has been improved. In the
SDVWLIDSHUVRQUHFUXLWHGIRUDFWLYHGXW\ZDVXQDEOHWRHQOLVWRQWKHVSHFL¿HG
date, recruitment was cancelled, but in 2009, the enlistment date deferral system
was introduced, which made it possible to adjust the enlistment date within athree-month period from the original enlistment date. The status of enlistment
date adjustments (deferrals) is shown in Table 10-10.
Table 10-10. Status of Enlistment Date Adjustments (deferrals) (as of 2009)Classification

Recruited service
members

Adjustment (deferral)

Ratio

No. of persons

130,329

1,494

1.1%

3. Expanding Communication with the Public
The MND has been making various efforts, such as sharing more information,
strengthening PR using many types of media such as the Defense Media Agency
and new media, and engaging in various cultural activities in order to raise thesatisfaction level regarding its civic services and to satisfy the public's right toknow.

| Improving civil services | The number of civil petitions related todefense has been steadily declining since 2006, and around 3,200 to 4,000 cases
are received per month. The number of civil petitions received is shown in
Figure 10-6.

Figure 10-6. Number of Civil Petitions Received
Unit: cases
60,00055,60652,574

11,812

23,38240,000Internet

47,11745,910
10,20036,9179,410

36,25833,68420,0002005

2922010 Defense White Paper

2006

2007

2008

Total

43,0949 652
9,652

43,79429,192Documents

2009#HAPTER

According to a survey on the level of satisfaction regarding the civil services,carried out by the Korea Public Administration Research Institute at the behest of
WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU V2I¿FHWKH01'ZDVVHOHFWHGDVDQRXWVWDQGLQJRUJDQL]DWLRQfor two consecutive years in 2008 and 2009. Due to its characteristics, defense
UHODWHGFLYLOSHWLWLRQVDUHGLI¿FXOWWRUHVROYHLQPDQ\FDVHVDVWKH\UHTXLUHODUJH
scale budgets or have operational restrictions, so the fact that the satisfaction level
for its civil petitions services has risen is appraised as being the result of active
efforts of the MND. The trends in the satisfaction level for defense related civil
petition services are shown in Figure 10-7.

Figure 10-7. Trends in Satisfaction Level for Defense-Related Civil Services
MND

All ministries and agencies

6

5.62

5.5

4.87

4.5

5.15

4.95

4.94

5

5.29
5.34
5.02

4.73

4.49

4
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

* On a scale of 0 to 7, the level of satisfaction regarding defense related civil services has
been steadily increasing above the average for all of the ministries and agencies since 2008.

With the public’s increased desire to know more about the nation’s defense
policies, there have been more requests for information disclosure. The statusof requests for information disclosure over the past five years is shown in
Table 10-11.
Table 10-11. Status of Requests for Information Disclosure Per Year

Unit: cases

Year

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Number ofrequests

492

468

677

748

641

In 2006, the institutional foundation for information disclosure wasprovided by amending the guidelines for the ‘Instruction to Disclose Defense
Administration Related Information,’ setting forth the main information
produced in the process of the performance of duties and listing the types of293

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the Peopleinformation that can be obtained prior to a request for information disclosureand also details the scope of information that is to remain undisclosed under
Article 9 of the Information Disclosure Act. These are supplemented in a timely
manner when major existing policies are changed or the department in charge
is changed. In addition, to enhance the competence of the persons responsiblefor information disclosure practical training is offered every year to those incharge. Outstanding cases are shared with the entire organization and the person
who performed the work is awarded based on an assessment of the operation of
information disclosure tasks by defense-related agencies.
The MND has improved the information disclosure menu on its website
and has changed the method of providing information lists, among otherimprovements made on the operation system, to make it easier and moreconvenient for the public to access information. Thus, in advance, the MND
makes public those matters that interest the public, such as the start-of-the-year
GHIHQVHEULH¿QJDQGHDVLQJRIUHJXODWLRQVWKHUHE\UHLQIRUFLQJFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
with the public. It also provides the public, with the requested information
within the designated period through prior notice of the handling period.

| Public relations through the Defense Media Agency | The
MND conveys national defense policies to the public through the Korea Forces
Network (KFN) TV and Radio, the Korea Defense Daily and the Defense
Journal under the Defense Media Agency, which is operated as an affiliatedresponsible agency.
KFN TV delivers military news to service members and citizens throughRecording a KFN program

satellite TV and local cable broadcasting. KFN Radio focuses on daily lifein the military and national defense policies in an easy-to-understand way
through a popular publicity supporting crew and provides general cultural andentertainment programs. In particular, its entertaining train shows contribute
greatly to boosting the morale of service members working in remote areas.
The Korea Defense Daily, with a circulation of 150,000 copies daily, andthe Defense Journal, with a circulation of 20,000 copies per month, provide
various military information. The Korea Defense Daily has now changed fromits previous broadsheet format to a smaller tabloid-style format for which it has
been getting positive response from its readers.

2942010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

| Policy PR using the new media | The MND also engages in online
PR activity, in line with the so-called Web 2.0 era. The MND has improved its
website interface to be more user-friendly and communicates with netizens on its
lead blog ‘Donggodonglak (http://mnd9090.tistory.com).’ In 2009, it consecutively
opened a themed blog site for its career soldiers called ‘Captain Park,
Permanent (maldduk) 3rd year’ and a policy blog called the ‘Passionate Defense(yeolhyeolgukbang)’ that specializes in introducing national defense policies.
‘Donggodonglak’ was chosen as the best public service sector blog in 2009 at theBlog Award Ceremony organized by the Korea Blog Industry Association, and
LQ$SULOWKHQXPEHURIYLVLWRUVWRWKHVLWHSDVVHGWKH¿YHPLOOLRQWKUHVKROG
setting a new milestone in Internet PR within the public sector.
In 2010, the MFN actively pursued PR using social network services (SNS),such as Twitter and me2day, in addition to blogs, thereby gaining various
channels of direct communication with the public without having to go throughthe existing mass media, such as broadcasting or newspapers. The MFN canthus explain national defense policies directly to the public and avoid any
distortion of the facts that may result from indirect conveyances by the mass
media. In addition, it is able to receive the diverse opinions of the public asreal-time feedback. In addition, the policy customer service,7 which has been
implemented since 2003, is being improved continuously.

7. Policy customer service (PCRM: Policy
Customer Relationship Management)
Obtaining the understanding andsupport of previously registered policy
customers, regarding defense policies,
by sending PR mail and gathering
opinion.

| Expanding various cultural activities | The MND holds various
cultural events in June, the Month of Patriots and Veterans, and on October 1,
the Armed Forces Day. In 2009, in commemoration of the 61st Armed Forces
Day, over 30 photos by military photo specialists and over 80 photos held by
the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and the Defense Media Agency were
exhibited at the War Memorial of Korea for a two week period, drawing over
30,000 visitors. In April 2010, the ‘Exhibition of Photos of Korean Soldiers
Overseas’ was held in COEX and seen by 60,000 visitors.
In 2010, commemorating the 60th year since the outbreak of the Korean
War, the MND together with ten leading Korean photographers held thephoto exhibition ‘On the Line,’ a Korean War Special Photo Exhibition, in
Daelim Contemporary Art Museum. The same exhibition was also held in the
United Kingdom and the United States, which recorded the highest number of

The poster for the special photo
H[KLELWLRQǡ2QWKH/LQHǢLQPHPRU\RI
the Korean War

295

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the Peoplecasualties of the 16 participating nations in the Korean War.
In January 2010, the Armed Forces Symphony Orchestra was launchedfrom its parent, the Armed Forces Band, which primarily featured wind andpercussion instruments, by recruiting string instrument majors. The Armed
Forces Symphony Orchestra held the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War
Commemoration Concert and is going to participate in cultural exchange eventswith foreign armed forces.

4. The 60th Anniversary of the Korean War Project| Establishment of the task force for the 60th anniversary of
the Korean War project | 2010 marks an important year where the ROK,
once a nation in ruins due to the sudden attacks by the North, swells with pride
as a nation to host the G20 Summit. The MND sought to express its respect
for the dedication of the ROK and foreign Korean War veterans who made it
The 60th Anniversary Emblemof the Korean War

possible for the ROK to gain this prosperity; in addition, it sought to raise thenation's image as a nation that contributes to world peace and prosperity and inturn raise the nation’s prestige. For this purpose, the ROK government formedthe ‘the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee’ topush forward with the initiative at a government-wide level.
The MND, in cooperation with the government, actively assisted in theactivities of governmental agencies, such as the Korean War Commemoration
Ceremony, the Armed Forces Day Event commemorating the 60th Anniversaryof the Korean War and the Recapture of Seoul, the Grand March for Peace
DQG8QLILFDWLRQDQGWKH3HDFH&DPSIRU<RXWKIURP3DUWLFLSDQW1DWLRQVLQ
the Korean War. In addition, it has engaged in various events and activities
by establishing the ‘Korean War 60th Anniversary Office, MND’ and placing
a project team in each service for the purpose of instilling a sense of national
security, thanking and honoring the ROK and foreign veterans of the Korean
War, and increasing cooperative security relationships by reinforcing the ties
with nations that fought in the Korean War.

| Projects carried out by the MND | The MND has carried out 13
projects (19 sub-programs), in commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the2962010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

Korean War, under the following three themes: ‘Memory and Legacy,’ ‘Honorand Gratitude,’ and ‘Harmony and Cooperation.’‘Memory and Legacy’ seeks to convey the reality of the Korean War and themeaning of the veterans' sacrifice to the post-war generations to enable themto perpetuate their noble spirit. Major battle events include a reenactment andexperience of selected events at their original sites, such as the Incheon Landing

Reenactment of the Incheon Landing
Operations (September 2010)

Operations, the Hwaryongjang / Nakdong River Battles, the Korea Strait Naval
Battle, the victorious Air Force Operation, and the United Nations Commandengaged Jipyung-ri, the Imjin River, and the Jangjin Reservoir Battles. With
the period from June 21st to 25th being designated as the ‘Week of Recalling the
Korean War,’ all units resolved to protect the stronghold, visited battlegrounds,
received intensive mental training and engaged in activities to invite and thankveterans, thus promoting security awareness within the military. In addition, in
collaboration with the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the MND
carried out a seminar titled ‘Telling the Truth about Korean War ’for students

Reenactment of the Nakdong River
battle (Chilgok-gun, Gyeongsangbukdo, September 3, 2010)

all over the nation and raised the awareness of service members and the youth
regarding national security. For the security training of service members, thefollowing materials were used: "In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953," by John
Toland; the memoirs of General Paik Sun-yup titled "No Me Without Fatherland”;
and the video clip "Never Forget." Besides, a ‘Special Exhibition on the KoreanWar’ was held in the War Memorial of Korea, drawing more than 250,000 visitors.
‘Honor and Gratitude’ consists of programs, including ‘Locating the bereavedof Korean War KIAs,’ ‘A consolation visit to the nations that fought in the
Korean War,’ and other events to express gratitude to those who gave their life to
XSKROGOLEHUW\ZLWKQREOHFRXUDJHDQGSULFHOHVVVDFUL¿FH7KURXJKWKHµ/RFDWLQJthe bereaved of Korean War KIAs,’ about 316 bereaved family members out of a
total of 18,631 KIAs during the Korean War were found, honored and provided
ZLWKYHWHUDQV EHQH¿WV7KHVHHIIRUWVZLOOFRQWLQXHLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHHIIRUWV
to recover the remains of the Korean War KIAs. Korean War commemoration
events were held at locale in the 21 nations that fought in the Korean War, andthe Korean War 60th$QQLYHUVDU\2I¿FH01'YLVLWHG%HOJLXPDQG&RORPELDto express its gratitude and encouragement. The Naval Academy Midshipmen's
Cruise Training Flotilla invited local Korean War veterans and residents duringports of call at nations that fought in the Korean War, in six countries and seven

297

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the Peopleports, holding ceremonies of consolation and gratitude. The MND has also beenpromoting the initiative called 'Donate Wusuri [Small Change]' to provide aid
to the scholarship project for descendants of UN Korean War veterans and for
SURMHFWVGHVLJQHGWRLPSURYHUHVLGHQWLDOFRQGLWLRQVZLWKWKH¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVcollected from MND employees.
Under the theme of ‘Harmony and Cooperation,’ programs were designed
to deepen and expand mutual understanding and cooperation for world peace
based on blood alliances. For example, cultural and sporting events, suchas the Armed Forces Day Event commemorating the 60th Anniversary of
the Korean War and the Recapture of Seoul, the Korea-Turkey War Victory
Commemoration and the Military's Friendship Soccer Matches, a militaryproduced musical, and an international cycling competition, were held. The
Armed Forces Day Event commemorating the Recapture of Seoul was held asa citizen's festival in the Gwanghwamun area to reenact the joy of recapturing
Seoul. ‘The Korea-Turkey War Victory Commemoration and Soldiers'
Friendship Soccer Matches’ were held during reciprocal visits between Turkey(June 24 to 27) and Seoul (September 14-19). The ROK national delegation,
visiting Turkey, engaged in activities such as the commemoration of Turkey's
participation in the Korean War, soccer matches, and an event inviting andexpressing appreciation to Korean War veterans; in Korea, the two nations
reconfirmed their blood brotherhood by observing a reenactment of theLaying of wreaths at the Turkey War
Victory Commemoration Event (Korea
Park, Ankara, June 2010)

Incheon amphibious operations, playing a soccer match, paying respects at
the Busan UN Memorial Cemetery, and tours of Korean military equipment
manufacturing facilities. The military musical ‘Sailing for Life’ is a nonfiction drama about the ship ‘Meredith Victoria,’ which transported 14,000
refugees during the evacuation of Hungnam operations; it was performed
in Seoul and six regional cities. The ‘2010 Tour de Military Demarcation
Line-Seoul International Cycling Competition’ involved a 476km-long routeby the Military Demarcation Line. This informed the world of the ROK's

Friendship Soccer Match between the
Korean and Turkey military (Seongnam
7DQFKRQ6SRUWV&RPSOH[6HSWHPEHU
2010)

developments and enhanced the ROK's peace-seeking image through coverageby the domestic and foreign mass media.
In addition, the MND supported the production of the Korean War based
movie 'Into the Fire,' the KBS drama 'War Comrades' and the MBC drama 'Road
1XPEHU2QH DQGDOVRSURGXFHGSRVWHUV35OHDÀHWVVWDQGLQJ35PDWHULDOVDQG

2982010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

the bus and subway advertisements 'M-Kiss on the Korean War'8 (40 pieces).
In particular, the MND operates an Internet blog called 'Ah! The Korean War'(www.korean60.tistory.com) for the new generation of service members and the

8. M-kiss (Military Knowledge-Welfare
Integrated Service System)
The new concept knowledge-welfare
service for military service members.

youth, making known to more than one million netizens the truth about the war
and instilling in them the meaning of the 60th Anniversary.
The MND has organized and safely preserved as records all documentsthat were produced during the organization and implementation of the 60th
Anniversary of the Korean War Project (planning, programs, progress, reports
on outcomes) as well as books, PR materials, videos and special feature
productions of each media company and the results of the media coverage.

5. Efforts to Exhume the Remains of Veterans Killed in Action| Significance and progress of the project | The project toexhume the remains of Korean War veterans killed in action is a national veteran
DQGSDWULRWSURWHFWLRQUHODWHGSURMHFWWR¿QGWKHERGLHVRIVRPHKHURHV
who gave their lives to protect their country during the Korean War, but remainon the battlegrounds, and to bring them home to rest in the National Cemetery.
This project helps comfort and honor the souls of such soldiers and resolves
the bereaved families’ deep resentment and sorrow that have been ingrained intheir hearts over the past 60 years. By doing so, the project seeks to realize thenation's unlimited sense of responsibility to ‘be responsible to the end for thoseZKRZHUHVDFUL¿FHGIRUWKHFRXQWU\¶
This project began as one initially led by the Army as part of the 50th
Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration projects and, in 2003, wasdivided into the following groups within the Army Headquarters: the KIA(Killed in Action) Remains Excavation Division and the Remains Excavation
7HDP+RZHYHUGXHWRWKHUHEHLQJLQVXI¿FLHQWUHFRUGVUHJDUGLQJWKHVROGLHUVNLOOHGLQDFWLRQWKHHIIRUWVWR¿QGWKHORFDWLRQVRIWKHUHPDLQVZHUHGHSHQGHQWmainly on the information provided by residents of former battle areas andveterans who had themselves buried bodies or had witnessed such an event. In
January 2007, the MND Agency for Killed in Action Recovery & ID (MAKRI)
was established, comprised of four teams and 85 people, in order to continue theproject on a permanent basis at the national level.

299

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the People| Exhuming and identifying remains | The size of the MND’s
Agency for Killed in Action Recovery & ID (MAKRI) increased to 179 people
in two increments from 2008 to 2009 and, as of December 2010, is made up of
five departments (planning, investigation, excavation, identification, support) andeight excavation teams. To systematically carry out the entire process, from the
LQYHVWLJDWLRQRIUHPDLQVWRWKHLUUHFRYHU\DQGLGHQWL¿FDWLRQWKH01'EHQFKPDUNHG
the United States' 'Joint POW / MIA Accounting Command (JPAC).' As a result,shown in Figure 10-8, the recovery of the remains of those KIAs increased
significantly. In 2010, more than 1,000 remains were recovered, carrying on the
results seen in 2009. From the year 2000, when recovery first began, the total
number of remains recovered up to date, amounts to 4,713 bodies.

1,442

Figure 10-8. Status of Remains Recovery
1,278

South
North
837

1,333
534
673

344
211

226
165

10

202
9

2000

2001

334

1,139

378

203

175

61

152
118
34

173
138
35

141
62

92
83

156

164

139

109

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Moreover, the number of DNA samples, which are necessary to identify
recovered remains, gathered from bereaved family members increased
significantly from 2007 onwards. Up to 57% of the total 13,597 samples,GHQWLI\LQJH[FDYDWHGUHPDLQVXVLQJ
advanced technological equipment,such as a 3D scanner

were collected in 2009 and 2010, since blood samples were first gathered in,QWHUPVRILGHQWL¿FDWLRQRYHUWKHODVWWZR\HDUVERGLHVKDYHEHHQ
identified and the surviving families verified, amounting to 63 percent of theWRWDOVXFFHVVIXOFDVHV UHPDLQVLGHQWL¿HGUHPDLQVFRQ¿UPHGE\VXUYLYLQJIDPLOLHV 7KHUHPDLQVIRUZKLFKWKHVXUYLYLQJIDPLOLHVZHUHYHUL¿HGKDYH
EHHQODLGWRUHVWLQWKH1DWLRQDO&HPHWHU\DQGWKRVHWKDWFRXOGQRWEHYHUL¿HG
were placed to rest in the Chunghondang within the National Cemetery. The
obtained blood samples, verification of identity, and verification of survivingfamilies are shown in Table 10-12.

3002010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

Table 10-12. Obtained Blood Samples and Verification of Identity and Surviving Families
Unit: persons
Classification

2000 2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Total

1,418 2,560 4,452 3,349 13,620

Bloodsamples

-

-

-

357

359

609

516

Verification
of ID

3

36

3

2

7

0

1

9

13

11

5

90

Verificationof survivingfamily

3

1

9

2

3

2

2

9

13

11

5

60

| Laying the foundation for the permanence of the project |Recovering remains is not a project to be continued for a limited period of time.
Rather, it is a precious national responsibility that should be carried out until every
last soldier killed in action is found. To lay the (legal) foundation for the efforts,
the Act on Recovery of Korean War KIAs was enacted on March 21, 2008. In
March 2009, a directive by the Prime Minister was enacted and 11 departments
and agencies formed a consultative body to support the project at a governmentwide level. Furthermore, the expertise of the remains recovery project is being
reinforced in order to raise the ratio of verified identities. The MND has taken
WKHIROORZLQJPHDVXUHVWKH1DWLRQDO,QVWLWXWHRI6FLHQWL¿F,QYHVWLJDWLRQZLWKLQthe Defense Investigation HQ is now equipped with DNA testing facilities toallow it to independently analyze DNA samples, rather than depending on private
universities or institutes. In addition, the MND has sent specialists on domestic
and overseas training programs and has appointed advisory professors in relevant([FDYDWLRQRIUHPDLQVE\WKH01'
Agency for Killed in Action Recovery &ID (MAKRI)

areas.
,Q-DQXDU\WKHRI¿FHIRUWKH0$.5,ZDVRSHQHGDQGLQFOXGHGDQDO\VLV
rooms, analysis equipment, and remains preservation rooms. With the help of thelatest technology, it is expected that the ratio of DNA samples obtainable from
VHYHUHO\GDPDJHGUHPDLQVZLOOLQFUHDVHWKHUHE\VLJQL¿FDQWO\LQFUHDVLQJWKHUDWLR
RI,'YHUL¿FDWLRQVIn December 2009, the Institute for Military History Compilation analyzed
the war history of 323 regions in South Korea and drew up a 1:50,000 scale map
marking those regions where soldiers killed in action were likely to have beenburied. It then created and distributed 2,700 CDs to battalions and higher level
units.

301

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the People| Future tasks and directions | In view of the trend towards an aging
VRFLHW\WKHQH[W¿YH\HDUVZLOOEHWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWSHULRGIRUWKHSURMHFWWR
recover remains. Therefore, the MND will build a ‘Comprehensive Information
System Regarding KIAs’ to scientifically and systematically manage and use
related materials, such as the results of preliminary investigations of the locales inregions where remains were found and the genetic information of the recovered
remains and surviving family members, thus spurring progress in the recovery ofremains.
Through these efforts, the MND will do its utmost to reunite a greater numberof soldiers that were killed in action with their surviving families and to thus carry
RXWLWVXQOLPLWHGUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRWKRVHZKRVDFUL¿FHGWKHPVHOYHVWRSURWHFWWKHLU
country.

6. Efforts of the Military to Realize a 'Fair Society'| Basic concept | The ROK government has drawn up and is putting
into practice policy initiatives in three categories, namely 'a more liberal andcreative society,' 'a fairer society,' and 'realizing social responsibility,' based on
the awareness that the value of a 'fair society' must take root in our society inorder for it to continue sustainable growth and co-prosperity and, further, todevelop into an advanced nation.
President Lee Myung-bak stressing
a 'Fair Society' at the Liberation Day
Commemoration Ceremony (August 15,
2010, Gwanghwamun, Seoul)

To realize the above in the defense area, the ROK armed forces have beendetailing policy initiatives that will contribute towards a 'fair military' being
put into practice internally and a 'fair society' being realized externally.

| Future directions | The MND hopes to emphasize the following
policy directions and initiatives in the future.
First, it will seek to realize 'more autonomous and creative defense'
overflowing with creativity and autonomy and where combat andmanagement efficiency are increased. For this purpose, it will create adynamic defense culture that will permit closer communication with thepeople; it will provide various opportunities and conditions through training
and education whereby service members may display their abilities and3022010 Defense White Paper#HAPTER

energy to their heart's content; and it will expand the introduction andapplication of creative civilian management methods and excellent humanresources, equipment and facilities in order to raise efficiency in defenserelated tasks.
Second, it will seek to realize a 'fairer defense' by ensuring the principleof equal opportunity and transparency. It will reinforce the surveillance ofmilitary service dodgers and establish a culture where every man, who is a
citizen of the Republic of Korea, will perform his military service without
exception and also take pride in it; it will develop meritocratic HR policies
to make use of talented human resources at the right time and place; andsupplement the current cost management system to enhance transparency andtrustworthiness in the defense procurement process and expand the foundation
for competitive contracts.
Third, it will seek to realize a 'socially responsible defense' that will
repay individuals for their dedicated service, be considerate of the weak,
and become one with the people. It will improve the respect paid to and
DOORZDQFHVIRUWKRVHZKRVDFUL¿FHGDQGGHGLFDWHGWKHPVHOYHVWRWKHLUFRXQWU\such as persons of merit during a war, ROK POWs and their families, andsoldiers killed in action; it will strengthen aid to marginalized social groups
that require care from in and outside of the military, such as residents neara unit or enlisted service members from multicultural families; also, in the
defense industry, it will seek institutional support measures to enable winwin cooperation between small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs) and large
cooperations.
In addition, the MND will become more active in the sharing and volunteer
activities it has engaged in, such as volunteer work at farms through a one
unit, one village, one school sisterhood relationship, operation of directtransaction marketplaces, assisting in security training for nearby schools and
UHVLGHQWVDQGRWKHUVSHFL¿FSURMHFWVWKDWFDQEHFDUULHGRXWLQHYHU\GD\OLIH
as they are steadily discovered. The ROK forces will, through these efforts,
HQKDQFHLWVFRPEDWFDSDELOLW\DQGHQKDQFHWKHHI¿FLHQF\RILWVRUJDQL]DWLRQ
as well as gaining even greater love and trust from the public.

303

Section 3. National Defense Policy That Goes Together With the PeopleAppendix
Special Appendix

1. Recollections about the Korean War
2. North Korea’s Infiltrations and Provocations against South Korea andNaval Campaigns at the Northern Limit Line (NLL)
3. Attack against the ROKS Cheonan
4. Artillery Firing at Yeonpyeongdo (Island)

Appendix
1. Status of Neighboring Countries’ Military Strength
2. Comparison between Major Countries’ Defense Budgets
3. Comparison of the Military Strength of the Two Koreas
4. Comparison of the Economic Indicators of the Two Koreas
5. Negotiation Process in North Korea’s Nuclear Programs
6. History of North Korea’s Missile Development Program andSpecifications
7. Chronology of South-North Military Talks
8. Chronicle of Inter-Korean Relations
9. Status of UN Peacekeeping Operations
10. Budget for ROK Military Units Dispatched Overseas
11. Status of Dispatch of ROK Troops Overseas
12. Status of Countries Participating in the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF)
13. The Act on Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations
14. Joint Communiqué of The 41st ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting
15. Joint Communiqué of The 42nd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting
16. The Guidelines for ROK-U.S. Defense Cooperation
17. Joint Statement of ROK-U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting on
the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Korean War
18. Major Arms Control Conventions and Organizations
19. National Defense Organizations
20. Annual Defense Budgets
21. Defense Industrial Cooperation Agreements with Other Countries
22. Changes in Compulsory Military Service Period
23. Alternatives to Military Service
24. Combined/Joint Military Exercises and Training
25. Composition and Major Activities of National Assembly Defense
Committee
26. Revision Details of Laws and Ordinances Related to the Ministry of
National Defense (MND)

War Memorial of Korea

Special Appendix 1

Recollections about the Korean Warof the North Korean regime and its
1945 - 1950 Establishment
preparations to invade the SouthWith Japan’s unconditional surrender in World War II on August 15, 1945, Koreans looked forward to the restoration of their country’s sovereignty. However,
the homeland was instead divided into two at the 38th parallel. Even before the establishment of the regime, Kim Il Sung, the North’s leader, started making
preparations for war in order to gain control of the South. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) of the North was mobilized with the support of the Soviet Union.
August 15, 1945
The country’s
liberation fromcolonial rule

October 14, 1945
Rallies to welcome
Kim Il Sung in
Pyongyang

November 1945
Launch of the
Security Squads

September 9, 1948
Establishment ofNorth’s regime

February 8, 1948
Establishment ofNorth’s regular army

April 3, 1950
USSR leader Joseph Stalin
approves the North’s plan
to invade the South

June 22, 1950
The North’s troops
deployed along the 38th
parallelComparison of the military strength of the two Koreas right before the outbreak of the Korean War
The South

The North

103,827

201,050

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unitsǩ$LU)RUFHRQHIOLJKWZLQJ
and seven bases
7DQNVTanks andarmoredvehicles$UPRUHGYHKLFOHV
Rallies welcoming Kim Il Sung (October 14, 1945)
USSR establishes a Communist regime led by Kim Il Sung, an exSoviet Army major, upon entering into the North.

Troops$UPRUHGYHKLFOHV
2,492

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Anti-tankartillery

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North’s troops at ceremony commemorating the 4th anniversary of the country’s
liberation (August 15, 1949)
In December 1948, the leaders of the Soviet Union, China and the North agreed to enhance
the North’s forces extensively at a confidential military meeting in Moscow.

Anti-tank guns (45⽆ 110
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223062010 Defense White Paper

7DQNV

1,051

2,040

Mass rally congratulating the founding of the North Korean
regime (September 9, 1948)
Kim Il Sung starts making preparations to invade the South throughrigorous steps, including the founding of the KPA..

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support unitsǩ1DY\0DULQH&RUSV:DWHUVDefense Command, Marine Corpsǩ$LU)RUFHRQHDLUGLYLVLRQ

Aircraft

YAK-9, IL-10, TU-2, Reconnaissanceaircraft

The North’s invasion plan upon the South
Yonhap News Agency obtained this from the Russian
Academy of Military Science in 1992.

North’s invasion upon theJune 25-28, 1950 The
South and occupation of Seoul
The North’s forces launched a surprise attack on the South, along the entire border, at daybreak on June 25 (Sunday), 1950. Totally unprepared, the South, led
by President Syngman Rhee, lost its capital Seoul in only three days. The main forces of the South’s military had collapsed even before they had retreated southof the Han River, endangering the South.
June 25, 1950
The North launches surprise
attack on the South, along theentire border

June 25, 10:00
The North occupies
Dongducheon andPocheonJune 26, 13:00
The North occupies
Euijeongbu

June 28, 10:00
The North breaks
through the Miari, Seoul,
defense line.

June 27, 10:00
The North breaks throughthe Chang-dong, Seoul,
defense line.

June 28, 11:30
The North occupies
all of Seoul.

A North Korean tank entering downtown Seoul(June 28, 1950)
The North’s tanks break through the Miari, Seoul,
GHIHQVHOLQHDQGHQWHUGRZQWRZQ6HRXODURXQG
on June 28.

North’s guns firing shots at the South (June 25, 1950)
The North’s 85mm howitzers deployed along the 38th parallel start firing
shots at the South, signaling the outbreak of the three-year Korean War.

1 The Euijeongbu Corridor
Attack force: the North’s 3rd and 4th Divisions
and a tank brigade
Defending force: the South’s 7th Division

4 The Chuncheon-Hongcheon Corridor
Attack force: the North’s 2nd and 12th Divisions
and a motorcycle regiment
Defending force: the South’s 6th Division

Hungnam
5 The East Coast Corridor
Attack force: the North’s 5th Division and 1st
Security Brigade
Defending force: the South’s 8th Division

2 The Munsan Corridor
Attack force: the North’s 1st Division
Defending force: the South’s 1st Division

The Han River Bridge destroyed (June 28, 1950)
7KH+DQ5LYHU%ULGJHEORZQXSDW$0RQ-XQH
28, 1950 as ordered by ROK Army Chief of Staff Gen.
Chai Byeong-deok, upon hearing the report that theNorth’s tanks have entered Seoul.

Wonsan6 The attack from the East Sea
Attack force: the North’s 549th Marine Corps
and 766th Rangers Regiment, and naval vessels
Defending force: the South’s Navy 2nd
Amphibious Unit 2nd Flotilla

Pyongyang
3 The Gimpo Corridor
Attack force: the North’s 6th Division, a tank battalion, and3rd Security Brigade
Defending force: the South’s Gimpo Combat Command(temporarily organized)

3

2

1

4

Seoul

5

6

Chuncheon

Gangreung

IncheonSuwon

DaejeonPohangA soldier on watch from the South of the Han River(June 28, 1950))ROORZLQJWKHGHVWUXFWLRQRIWKH+DQ5LYHU%ULGJHWKH
South’s troops that were isolated in north of the Han
River, were reorganized and kept a defensive line southof the Han River until July 3, 1950.

Daegu

Gwangju

Busan

307

Recollections about the Korean WarJune 29, 1950forces’ participation and delay
September 14, 1950 UN
operations in the war
8UJHQWO\KHOGDGD\DIWHUWKH1RUWKǢVDOORXWDWWDFNRQWKH6RXWKRQ-XQHWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLOGHPDQGHGWKH1RUWKWRLPPHGLDWHO\FHDVHLWVDJJUHVVLRQ2Q-XQH
the UN Security Council decided to take military sanctions against the North. Thus, the militaries of the liberal democratic countries friendly with the South, including the U.S.,
came to the South’s aid, under the UN flag. In the beginning, they could not deter the North’s troops and had to retreat down to the south of the Nakdong River near Busan.
June 29, 1950, 11:45
General MacArthur’sinspection of thefrontline

June 30, 05:00
U.S. President Harry S Truman’s
approval of the dispatch of U.S.
ground forces to Korea

July 1-July 4.
Deployment of the U.S.
Army 24th Division in
Korea

July 1, 14:00
Arrival of a U.S. Army unit
from Japan led by Lt. Col.
Charles Smith in Busan

7KHFRXQWULHVWKDWGLVSDWFKHGFRPEDWWURRSVWRDLG
6RXWK.RUHDXQGHUWKH81IODJWKH868.&DQDGD
Turkey, Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, thePhilippines, Thailand, Colombia, Greece, Ethiopia,%HOJLXP)UDQFH6RXWK$IULFDDQG/X[HPERXUJUN Security Council meeting (June 28,
1950)
The UN Security Council decides torestore peace on the Korean Peninsula
by means of military sanctions against
North Korea when it did not comply with
the UN’s demand that it cease its acts ofaggression.

The five countries that dispatched medical corps or
VXSSOLHVIRU6RXWK.RUHD'HQPDUN,QGLD1RUZD\Sweden, and Italy

CanadaThe
U.K.
Netherlands
Belgium)UDQFH
Luxembourg

August 1-September 14
Battles at the defense line
along the Nakdong River

July 20
The North’s occupation ofDaejeonGreeceU.S.

TurkeyThailand the Philippines
Ethiopia

Colombia

Australia
South Africa
New Zealand

North’s troops entering Daejeon, astrategically important location in the
country’s central area (July 20, 1950)
Members of the U.S. Army 24th Division
stationed in Japan were urgently
dispatched to South Korea, but they
were defeated in one battle after anotheragainst the North in Osan, Cheonan,
Geumgang and Daejeon.

SangjuThe defense line
along the Nakdong River(September 14, 1950)

Gimcheon

Dabudong

ROK 6th Division

UN aircraft carpet bombing enemy
positions (11:58 ~ 12: 24, August
16, 1950)
81)RUFHV%ERPEHUVGURSSHGWRQVRIERPEVRYHU
enemy positions to the northwest of
Waegwan.

Waegwan

ROK 1st Divisionn

U.S. 1st Cavalry Division
U.S. 24th Division

AngangYeongcheon
Yeo
cheon
che
on

Daegu

ROK 8th Division

ROK Capital Division

Goryeong
Changnyeong

U.S. 2nd Division

Major battle positions along the Nakdong River
defense line (August 1-September 14, 1950)
Between August 1, 1950, and mid-Septemberof the same year, ROK and UN troops were
engaged in a life-or-death struggle against
the enemy along the Nakdong River andmountainous areas near the East Coast.

3082010 Defense White Paper

U.S. 25th Division
Jinju

Masan

Pohangg

ROK 3rd Division

Miryang
Th
eN
ak
do
ng
Riv
er

Busan

September 15-30, 1950

Incheon Landing Operations /Reclaiming the lost area southof the 38th parallel

The UN forces landed at Incheon on September 15, succeeded in cutting off enemy logistics routes, and reclaimed Seoul on September 28. Thus, themain force of the North’s troops collapsed. The South's allies reclaimed the entire area south of the 38th parallel, which had been lost to the enemy.
September 15, 1950, 06:33
UN advance forces land on
Wolmido(Island)

September 16, 18:00
Incheon retaken

September 28
Seoul retaken

September 26, 22:26
The landed force joined up
with friendly troops advancing
northward.

September 18, 08:00
Gimpo Airfield near Seoul
retaken

September 30
Restoration of 38th
parallel as frontline

Route used by U.S. Army 10th Corps

The passage used by the invading UN forces(i.e., the waterway at Incheon Port)
GyodongIslandGanghwa Gimpo
Se
Peninsula
Isl okm Island
Han Riveran odHaengju
Gimpo
Gimpo Airﬁeld
Yeongjong㜵㦹⓸IslandWolmi
IslandSosa

Pyongyang
38
38

Seoul

Yeongdeungpo

Incheon␴⺴⓸Island
Daebu

Hamhung

Seoul

Bupyeong

Palmi Island
Bukjangseo
Deokjeong
IslandSinuiju

Point
California

Tokyo
Yokohama

Daegu
Busan

Anyang

Kobe

Suwon

Do
ng
su
Isl
an
d

Seongap
IslandS
Isl eosu
andSaseboThe Asan Bay

Osan

Daenanji Island

Point Arkansas
Point Iowa

Yokohama - U.S. Army 7th Infantry Division
Kobe - U.S. Marine Corps 1st Division
Sasebo - Flag ship, escort ships and ﬁre support ships
Busan -U.S. Marine Corps 5th Regiment

General Douglas MacArthur,Supreme Commander of the United
Nations Forces in Korea, during
the Incheon Landing Operation(September 15, 1950)
The landing UN forces were comprised
RIDSSUR[WURRSVDQGQDYDO
ships. The operation was joined by the
ROK fleet led by Admiral Son Won-il,
Chief of ROK Naval Operations, the ROK
Marine Corps 1st Regiment, and theROK Army 17th Regiment.

ROK Marine Corps landing at Incheon (September 15, 1950)
Col. Shin Hyeon-jun led the 3,000-troop ROK Marine Corps 1st Regiment(recruited on Jeju Island) to join the UN forces that had landed at Incheon.

Hoisting the ROK national flag after
reclaiming Seoul from the enemy(September 28, 1950)
Members of the ROK Marine Corps’ 1st
Regiment, 2nd Battalion, hoisted theTaegeukgi, the national flag of South
Korea at the Jungangcheong (Capitol
Building) in Seoul, which had been
occupied by the enemy for 90 days.

UN forces advancing toward the 38th parallel (September 19, 1950)
Allies started counteroffensives in Waegwan to reclaim the land south of the
38th parallel that had been lost.

309

Recollections about the Korean Warforces advance northward acrossOctober 1-24, 1950 UN
the 38 parallelth

The ROK Army’s 1st Corps broke through the 38th parallel in an area close to the East Coast on October 1, at the order of President Syng-man Rhee, dreaming of
unification of the country. The UN forces advanced northward toward the Amnok (Yalu) River and the Duman (Tumen) River, in accordance with a UN Security
Council resolution, after crossing the 38th parallel in a central region and an area near the West Coast on October 9.
October 1, 1950, 08:10
The ROK Army’s 23rd Regimentmarches northward past the 38th
parallel ahead of the other units.

October 9, 09:00
The UN forces
advance past the
38th parallel.

October 10, 10:00
The ROK 3rd and Capital
Division retake Wonsan.

October 20, 10:00
The ROK Army’s 1st Division
captures Pyongyang.

October 26, 14:15
The ROK Army’s 7th Regimentreaches a section of the Amnok(Yalu) River north of Chosan.

A map showing the status of the UN forces’advance toward the border with China
China

n
ma
Du

Soviet Union

er
Riv
n)
me
u
(T

ManpojinChongjin
Hyesanjin

Chosan

r
ive
)R
alu
Y
(
k
no
Am

SongjinIwon
U.S. X CorpsROK 1st Corps

Sinuiju

U.S. 7th Division

JongjuU.S. 3rd Division
U.S. 8th Army
ROK 2nd Corps
Pyongyang

U.S. Marine 1st Division
WonsanMembers of the ROK Army’s 23rd Regiment reach the 38th parallel ahead of the other units (October 1, 1950)
Troops of the ROK Army’s 23rd Regiment, 3rd Division setting up a signboard commemorating theircrossing of the 38th parallel in Yangyang, near the East Coast, as the first unit to reach the parallel.

North Koreans welcoming ROK troops(October 24, 1950)
Local residents in Hichon, Pyonganbuk-do,
ROK BG Paik Sun-yup and U.S. MG Frank W. Milburn
1RUWK.RUHDZHOFRPHWURRSVRIWKH52.th(October 20, 1950)
Division advancing northward.
BG Paik, Commander of the ROK 1st Division explains
the status of the advance near the Daedong River to
MG Milburn, Commander of the U.S. 1st Corps. MG
Milburn meets with BG Paik after the South Korean
general led his troops to Pyongyang ahead of theother units.

President Syng-man Rhee in Pyongyang(October 29, 1950)
North Koreans in Pyongyang cheer President
Rhee at a rally celebrating ROK troops’ taking
the city.

3102010 Defense White PaperA ROK soldier filling his canteen with water from the Amnok(Yalu) River (October 26, 1950)
2Q2FWREHUDWWKHst Company, 7th Regiment,
52.th Division, as an advance unit reaches a section of theAmnok (Yalu) River in Yangtori, north of Chosan.

October 25, 1950Intervention of Communist Chinese
July 9, 1951
troops: a new phase in the war
On October 19, 1950, Communist Chinese troops stealthily crossed the Amnok (Yalu) River and carried out a surprise attack on the ROK and UN forces. They
pushed the ROK and UN forces down to the 37th parallel (the Pyeongtaek-Samcheok line) in three large-scale offensives. After withstanding later offensives by
the Chinese troops (4thWKURXJKth offensives), the Allies carried out a series of counteroffensives, pushing the Chinese forces back to the 38th parallel.
October 25-November 7, 1950
The Communist Chinese
troops’ 1st offensive

November 25-December 22
The Communist Chinese troops’
2nd offensive/The UN forces’
withdrawal from Pyongyang

December 31, 1950-January 8, 1951
The Communist Chinese troops’
3rd offensive and occupationof Seoul

January 15-22, 1951
The UN forces’ 1st
counteroffensive

March 15, 1951
The UN forces’
restoration of Seoul

June 23, 1951
The Soviet Union’s proposalof a ceasefireCommunist Chinese troops crossing the
China-Korea border (October 19, 1950)
Subordinate units of Communist China’s 4th)LHOG$UP\ZHUHGHSOR\HGLQWKHQRUWKHDVWHUQ
provinces of China in April 1950, i.e., rightbefore the outbreak of the Korean War.

Chinese General Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung (date unknown)
Kim Il Sung (center) and Peng Dehuai (to Kim’s right) pose
for a picture when the former paid a visit to Communist
China’s Command Headquarters in an underground cave.

Refugees on destroyed railroad bridgeover the Daedong River (December 1950)
North Koreans moving southward for
freedom

Second retreat from Seoul on a piercingly cold
January day in 1951 (January 4, 1951)
Seoulites seeking refuge southward due toCommunist Chinese troops’ 3rd offensive.
The location is near present-day Gwacheon.

The ROK 1st Division crossing the Han River (March 14, 1951)
The ROK 1st Division advances toward Mapo after
crossing the river to liberate Seoul for the second time
during the Korean War.

Street skirmishes in Seoul (March 15, 1951)
Troops of the ROK 1st Division engaged in street
skirmishes against the enemy in present-day Mapo,
Seoul.

311

Recollections about the Korean WarJuly 10, 1951negotiations, struggles
July 27, 1953 Ceasefire
to occupy hilltops, Armistice
The first ceasefire meeting was held in Kaesong on July 10, 1951. The Communist side delayed the negotiations in an attempt to rebuild its military power.
The ROK and UN forces countered such a tactic with strong military operations. After two years of long negotiations amid fierce combats, the two sides
finally signed the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953.
July 10, 1951
Commencement of theceasefire meeting

July 3-July 20.
Communist Chinese
troops’ last offensive

July 27, 22:00
Effectuation of theArmistice Agreement

Christmas Hill

Major combat areas toward the end of
the Korean War and the final Military
Demarcation Line (MDL)(July 10, 1951-July 27, 1953)

Porkchop Hill

Capital Hill

351 Hill

River
Nam

Finger Ridge

Geumseong
Stream

er
n Riv
Imji

r
Yeseong Rive

Haeju
OngjinHeartbreak Ridge

WonsanBulmo Hill

Yeokgok Stream

Pyongyang
Nampo

38°

June 18
The South’s release ofanti-Communist POWs

April 2, 1953
Exchange of ill andinjured POWs

December 11
Commencement ofnegotiations for theexchange of POWs

October 25
Agreement to theinstallation of thetruce line

Sniper(Jeogyeok)
Ridge

Military Demarcation Line, (July 27, 1953)
Military Demarcation Line, (July 10, 1951)

Ganseong
CheorwonBeti Hill
SeohwaBaekma(White Horse) Hillr
iveRiverBloody Ridge ng R
ntanya
MunsanHaoS
Chuncheon
Euijeongbu er Punchbowl Gangreung
iv
Seoul
R
an
kh
Incheon
Bu

38°

r
ive
nR
ha
m
Na

The 1st ceasefire meeting (July 10, 1951)
The two sides met for discussions about a ceasefire at the Naebongjang
Hotel in Kaesong but the meeting ended with no progress.

The South’s civilian carrier team members help
troops carry recoilless rifles (date unknown)
Many civilians, including bogukdae (defense
militia) civilian carrier teams and nomudan(Korean Service Corps) provided conspicuous
support for the troops during the Korean War.

3122010 Defense White Paper

Meeting to set the MDL (November 1951)
Representatives of the two sides are setting the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).

U.S. troops at Old Baldy Hill (June 1952)
Soldiers of U.S. Army 45th Division are building adefense position on Old Baldy Hill northwest of
Yeoncheon, Gyeonggi-do.

The Armistice Agreement signed by the two sides

June 25, 1950July 27, 1953.

Results and evaluation of the war

Deep scars of the war still remain in the hearts of Koreans. The 37-month-long war turned the entire country into rubble. It left an indelible scar in theminds of all Koreans, including the more than 3 million lives lost, more than 10 million separated family members, and numerous war orphans.

War casualties for the ROK and UN forces

XQLWQRRISHUVRQVClassification

KIAs and those who later
died as a result of wounds
received in action

ROK forces
UN forces
Total

WIAs

MIAs and POWs

Total

137,899

450,742

32,838



104,280

9,931

154,881

555,022

:DUFDVXDOWLHVIRUWKH&RPPXQLVWIRUFHV HVWLPDWLRQ  7KRVHNLOOHGLQDFWLRQDQGZRXQGHGDQGWKRVHPLVVLQJLQDFWLRQDQG32:V
Civilian casualties

XQLWQRRISHUVRQVThose massacred orotherwise killed

Those woundedThose kidnapped or missing

Total

Other victims

373,599

387,744

5HIXJHHVPLOOLRQZDUZLGRZVZDURUSKDQV
approx.100,000

1RUWK.RUHDQFLYLOLDQFDVXDOWLHV HVWLPDWLRQ PLOOLRQ
Civilians massacred by the North’s troops(date unknown)
In most of the areas occupied by the North’s
troops, a large number of civilians weremassacred.

A medical officer helps a disabled solider witha wooden artificial leg
The war left a total of 550,000 wounded soldiersin the South.

A ruined area near Jungangcheong(Capitol Building) in Seoul (September 1950)

War orphans on Jeju Island(December 20, 1950)
The war left approx. 100,000 war orphans.

Historic Evaluation of the Korean War
ǩ,WZDVDZDUVWDUWHGE\.LP,O6XQJZLWKWKHVXSSRUWRI-RVHSK6WDOLQIURPWKH6RYLHW8QLRQDQG0DR=HGRQJIURPChina, amidst the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that had come about following the end of
WWII. It was an international war but close to internal strife in nature.
ǩ,WZDVDWUDJLFLQWHUQHFLQHZDU7KH52.KDOWHGWKHVSUHDGRI&RPPXQLVPZLWKWKHVXSSRUWRIWKH81PHPEHU
countries. It was a war that defended the free world and brought victory for liberal democracy.

313

Recollections about the Korean WarSpecial Appendix 2

North Korea’s Infiltrations and Provocations against South Korea
and Naval Campaigns at the Northern Limit Line (NLL)
Infiltrations and Provocations against South Korea
General Status (1954-November 2010)
Classification

Number of cases

Infiltrations

Approx. 1,640

720 cases by land, 920 cases by sea

Over 1,020-470 cases by land (90 cases of shootings and artillery fires, 70 cases of raids andabductions, etc.)-510 cases by sea (490 cases of naval ships/fishing boats crossing the border, 20 naval
engagements)-40 cases by air (20 cases of infiltrations into South Korean airspace / 10 cases of
missile-launching, etc.)

Local
provocations

Description

Major Cases of Infiltrations and Provocations against South Korea
February 16, 1958

KNA commercial airliner on domestic flight from Busan to Seoul with 34 passengers aboard is hijacked
by North Korean agent (only 26 sent back to South on March 6, same year).

January 14, 1964

ROK F-86D fighter on training mission crosses into the North’s airspace due to radio malfunction andwas shot down (North returned pilot’s body on January 17, 1964).

January 19, 1967

NK's coastal artillery deployed along East Coast fires on and sinks ROKS Dangpo (PCE-56) while itguarded fishing vessels (39 crew members killed and 12 severely wounded).

January 21, 1968

31 commandos from North’s 124th Unit mounts assault near Cheongwadae (residence of South’spresident) (29 guerrillas killed, one caught alive, and one escaped).

January 23, 1968

USS Pueblo, a U.S. Naval intelligence ship, captured by North in international waters (all crew
members, except for one who was killed, returned home on December 23, 1968).

October 30 ~November 3, 1968

120 armed members from NK's Special Forces infiltrate Uljin and Samcheok (killed 107, caught 4,surrendered 3, and escaped 6).

April 15, 1969

US EC-121 reconnaissance plane is shot down while carrying out a reconnaissance mission above
international waters southeast of Cheongjin (all 31 crew members killed).

June 22, 1970

Accidental detonation of explosive planted on roof of entrance to National Cemetery in Seoul (oneNorth Korean agent killed instantly, two fled).

August 15, 1974

Mun Se-kwang, a pro-Pyongyang resident from Japan, attempts to assassinate President Park Chunghee in Seoul’s National Theater during ceremony commemorating the country’s liberation. (first lady
Yuk Yeong-su killed).

November 15, 1974
March 24, 19753142010 Defense White Paper

First NK's infiltration tunnel under DMZ is found in Gorangpo, Yeoncheon-gun, Gyeonggi-do.
Second NK's infiltration tunnel under DMZ is found in Cheolwon-gun, Gyeonggi-do.

August 18, 1976

Axe murder incident at Panmunjom (two U.S. officers are hacked to death and four U.S. enlisted men
and four KATUSA soldiers injured).
* The North suggests that the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) should be enforced throughout the
Joint Security Area (JSA), on August 25, effective September 16, 1976.

July 14, 1977

U.S. CH-47 strays into North’s airspace near east coast and is shot down (three U.S. servicemen killed
and one survivor returned).

October 17, 1978

Third NK's infiltration tunnel under DMZ is found near Panmunjom.

December 3, 1983

NK's Spy ship was caught and sunk while trying to infiltrate Dadaepo Beach, Busan (two crew members
captured).

September 14, 1986

Arrival area (1st floor) of Gimpo Airport partially destroyed by explosives.

January 15, 1987

Fishing vessel No.27 Dongjin-ho, with 12 fishermen aboard, is hijacked forcefully to NK's while fishingin international waters off Baengnyeong Island.

November 29, 1987

Korean Air flight (KAL 858) is blown up in midair by NK (All 115 aboard, including crew, killed).

January 28, 1989

Fishing vessels No. 37 Taeyang-ho (with 12 fishermen aboard) and No.38 Taeyang-ho (with 10
fishermen aboard) taken forcefully to North while fishing in international waters off the northwest of
Baengnyeong Island in West Sea.

March 3, 1990

Fourth NK's infiltration tunnel under DMZ found in Yanggu-gun, Gangwon-do.

September 2, 1995

Two agents belonging to North’s Worker’s Party infiltrate beach at Onpyeong-ri, Jeju Island.

April 5, 1996

NK soldiers (estimated between one or two companies) demonstrate their military power in the Joint
Security Area at Panmunjom.

September 16, 1996

Sango-class submarine from the NK's Reconnaissance Bureau captured while infiltrating beach in
Daepodong, Gangneung (One caught, 13 shot and killed, 11 committed suicide, and one submarine
captured).

August 2, 1997

Two agents assigned to North’s Workers’ Party infiltrated beach in Galgot-ri, Geoje Island.

October 17, 1997

Two South Korean residents in Daeseongdong Village close to border taken forcefully to North whileworking in field (returned to South on October 20 after the matter raised at secretary’s meeting at
Panmunjom).

June 21, 1998

Yugo-class submarine from North’s Workers’ Party captured while infiltrating beach in Susan-ri,
Yangyang-gun, Gangwon-do (all nine aboard committed suicide, one submarine captured).

November 20, 1998

A small speed boat assigned to the Workers’ Party attempts to infiltrate beach in Seonsu-ri, Ganghwa
Island but fled when spotted.

December 17, 1998

NK's submersible boat sunk while trying to infiltrate beach on Dolsan Island, Yeosu (bodies of its six
crew members recovered, one submersible boat captured and salvaged).

June 15, 1999

1st Yeonpyeong Naval Campaign breaks out after NK's patrol boat crosses the south of NLL and starts
to shoot first to ROK navy ship.

June 29, 2002

2nd Yeonpyeong Naval Campaign breaks out after NK's patrol boat crossed the south of NLL and carries
out a surprise attack to ROK's navy ships.

November 10, 2009
March 26, 2010
November 23, 2010

Daecheong Naval Campaign breaks out after NK's patrol boat crosses NLL and launched surprise
attack on ROK's navy ships.
ROK Ship Cheonan, from the 2nd Fleet, sunk by North-instigated torpedo attack 2.5km south of
Baengnyeong Island (46 crew members killed).
Coastal artillery guns and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) of the North’s 4th Corps fire shells at
Yeonpyeong Island (two soldiers and two civilians killed, sixteen soldiers and many civilians wounded).

315

Special AppendixNaval Campaigns in the Northern Limit Line (NLL)
WatersJangsan CapeThe Northern Limit Line (NLL)
Haeju

The Neutral Zone
at Estuary of
the Han River

Baengnyeongdo(Island)
The Daecheong
Sa Cape
Naval Campaign
Girindo(Island)
Socheongdo(Island) Sunwido(Island)

Daecheongdo(Island)

Daesuapdo(Island)

Yukdo(Island)Mudo(Island)

Gyodongdo(Island)nd

Daeyeonpyeongdo
Mal Island(Island)
Seokmodo
The First Yeonpyeong
Wudo(Island) (Island)
Naval Campaign Soyeonpeyongdo

Deungsan Cape

The Second Yeonpyeong
Naval Campaign(Island)First Yeonpyeong Naval Campaign
OutlineOn June 15, 1999, patrol boats from the North carried out a surprise attack on ROK navy ships at an area
8NM (or 15⽈) southwest of Yeonpyeong Island and 4.3NM (8⽈) south of the NLL. The South’s speed boats
shot back. Between June 7 and June 15, many NK's patrol boats and fishing vessels crossed the NLL tothe southwest of Yeonpyeong Island. The ROK navy ships tried to make them return to their area without
using force. When the NK's patrol boats shot first at 09:28 on June 15, the ROK naval vessels returned fire
immediately and drove them away.
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3&&V 1RUWK.RUHDǞIRXUSDWUROERDWVDQGWKUHHWRUSHGRERDWVDevelopment of the operation
ǩ%HWZHHQ-XQHDQGWKUHHWRVHYHQ1. VSDWUROERDWVFURVVHGWKH1//LQWRWKH52. VZDWHUVE\WRNM (or 3 to 9⽈) at an area 5.5 NM (10⽈) southwest of Yeonpyeong Island, under the pretext of protecting
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side in compliance with Rules of Engagement and relevant international laws. The North’s navy ships did
not comply with the request and continued hostile actions, including damaging the ROK's navy ships by
conducting a ramming operation.

3162010 Defense White Paperǩ2Q-XQHWKH52. V3.0FRXQWHUHGWKH1RUWKǢVSURYRFDWLYHDFWVE\UDPPLQJWKHVWHUQRIWKH1RUWKǢV
SDWUROERDWV7KH1RUWKǢVSDWUROERDWVFRQWLQXHGWRFURVVWKH1//DQGSK\VLFDOO\UDPWKH52. V3.07KH
52. V3.0ZKLFKIHDWXUHVVZLIWPDQHXYHUDELOLW\FRXQWHUHGWKH1RUWK VERDWVE\PHDQVRIWDFWLFDOHYDVLYH
and siege maneuvers.
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ramming operation, crashing into the stern of one of the North’s patrol boats.
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campaign lasted for 14 minutes until 09: 42.
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damaged vessel out of humanitarian consideration. In addition, the ROK ordered its patrol craft to movesouthward to ensure the safety of its vessels and prevent a possible escalation.

Consequencesǩ2QH1. VWRUSHGRERDWZDVVXQN)RXUSDWUROERDWVDQGRQHWRUSHGRERDWZHUHGDPDJHG7KHUHZHUH
many casualties. Being severely damaged, the NK's ships returned to their area.
ǩ7KH52. VILYH3.0VJRWVOLJKWGDPDJHDQGQLQHVDLORUVZHUHVOLJKWO\ZRXQGHG

Lessons learned
ǩ7KHLQFLGHQWGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKHUHKDVEHHQQRFKDQJHLQWKH1RUWK VKRVWLOHQDWXUHDQGLWVORQJKHOGEDVLFSROLF\WRZDUG6RXWK.RUHDDIRUFHIXOXQLILFDWLRQHYHQLQDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHSULYDWHVHFWRULQWHU
Korean exchanges are growing and the ROK Government is implementing a policy of providing economic
aid to the North. The incident, consequently, offered a chance for South Koreans to raise their sense ofnational security.
ǩ7KH52.1DY\UHVROXWHO\FRXQWHUHGWKH1RUWKǢVVXUSULVHDWWDFNVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK5XOHVRI
Engagement, and dominated the enemy. It displayed its qualitative superiority and came to have a sense ofconfidence in its ability to defend against NK's attacks.

317

Special AppendixAn ROK navy PKM rams the stern of a patrol boat from the North to make it return to the North’s waters after it intruded south of
the NLL.

Second Yeonpyeong Naval Campaign
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09:54, on June 29, the North’s two patrol boats crossed the NLL in an area to the west of Yeonpyeong Island,
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boats carried out preemptive surprise firing toward the ROK Navy ships. Even under the North’s preemptive
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retreat to their territory.
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two patrol boats

3182010 Defense White PaperDevelopment of the operation
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WKHRWKHURQ<XN,VODQG FURVVHGWKH1//6HHLQJWZR3.0'LYLVLRQVIURPWKH6RXWKDSSURDFKLQJIRUDQ
interdiction maneuver, the one from Yuk Island moved northward.
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ǩ%HWZHHQDQGWKHWZR3.0'LYLVLRQVDQGWZR3&&VIURPWKH6RXWKZKLFKKDGFRPHWRWKH
aid of those that were at the scene, fired shots, delivering severe damage to the North's patrol boat andforcing it to retreat.
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flooded, while being towed toward its home base.

Consequences
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ǩ2QH52. V3.0VXQNZKLOHEHLQJWRZHGWRZDUGLWVKRPHEDVH6L[FUHZPHPEHUVZHUHNLOOHGDQG
wounded.

Lessons learned
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the NK's intention to invalidate the NLL.
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1//WRUHLQIRUFHWKHILUHSRZHURILWVQDYDOYHVVHOVLQFORVHUDQJHUHVSRQVHPDQHXYHURSHUDWLRQVDJDLQVW
enemy surprise attacks, and to set up countermeasures to ensure crew member survival.

319

Special AppendixDaecheong Naval Campaign
Outline2Q1RYHPEHUSDWUROERDWVIURPWKH1RUWKILUHGDLPHGVKRWVDWDQDUHD10 ⽈) to the east
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ROK Navy gave a warning radio message three times and fired warning shots three times in accordancewith the Rules of Engagement. The North’s patrol boat fired approx. 50 rounds intentionally aimed at ROKVKLSVDQGWKH6RXWKǢV3.0'LYLVLRQUHWXUQHGILUHLPPHGLDWHO\LQVHOIGHIHQVH
ǩ3DUWLFLSDWLQJQDYDOYHVVHOV2QH52. VIULJDWHWZR3&&VDQGIRXU3.0V7KH1RUWKǞDSDWUROERDW

Development of the operation
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immediately.
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,VODQG$QRWKHU52. V3.0'LYLVLRQVWDUWHGPRYLQJWRZDUGWKHVFHQHǩ$WWKH1. VSDWUROERDWFRQWLQXHGWRPRYHLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWKH1//DIWHUWKHXQLGHQWLILHGYHVVHOKDGUHWXUQHGWRLWVDUHD2QH52. V3.0'LYLVLRQZLWKWKHVXSSRUWIURPDIULJDWHDQGWZR3&&VEHLQJ
maintained, gave warning radio messages twice prior to the NK's patrol boat crossing the NLL.
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that the South would fire warning shots. The NK's patrol boat ignored the radio message and continued
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40mm naval gun in accordance with the instruction of the 2nd)OHHW&RPPDQG7KH1RUWKǢVSDWUROERDWILUHGDSSUR[URXQGVDLPHGDW52. V&KDPVXULZKLFKZDVSRVLWLRQLQJLWVHOIIRUDUHVSRQVHLI
QHHGHG7KH52. V3.0UHWXUQHGLPPHGLDWHO\LQVHOIGHIHQVH7KHIULJDWHDQGWKH3&&VDOVRILUHGVKRWVLQVXSSRUWRIWKH3.0
ǩ$WWKH1.ǢVVHYHUHO\GDPDJHGERDWUHWUHDWHGQRUWKRIWKH1//

3202010 Defense White Paper

Consequencesǩ2QH1. VSDWUROERDWZDVVHYHUHO\GDPDJHGZLWKPDQ\FDVXDOWLHVHVWLPDWHG
ǩ7KH52. V&KDPVXULUHFHLYHGVOLJKWGDPDJHLQFOXGLQJEXOOHWKROHVLQLWVERG\ZLWKQR
casualties.

Lessons learned
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provocative acts. The ROK Navy was able to control this as a result of thorough preparations basedon the lessons learned from the 1st and 2nd<HRQS\HRQJ1DYDO&DPSDLJQVLQFOXGLQJDVWUHDPOLQHG
procedure for coping with the North’s intrusions across the NLL and the reinforced firepower of thenaval vessels.
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with commanding procedures, training and education aimed to secure absolute superiority over the
HQHP\ZLWKWDQJLEOHLQWDQJLEOHFRPEDWVWUHQJWK321

Special AppendixSpecial Appendix3

Attack against the ROKS Cheonan* Source: Joint Investigation Report on the Attack against the ROKS Cheonan

Situation Overview
5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD6KLS&KHRQDQ 3&& RIWKHnd)OHHW52.1DY\VDQNE\D1RUWK.RUHDQWRUSHGRDWWDFNZKLOHFRQGXFWLQJDQRUPDOPLVVLRQLQWKHYLFLQLW\RI%DHQJQ\HRQJ,VODQGRQ)ULGD\0DUFK
DW7KLVDWWDFNUHVXOWHGLQWKHGHDWKRIRXWRIFUHZPHPEHUVDQGFUHZPHPEHUV
survived from the incident.

PRC

ǩ7LPHRQ)ULGD\0DUFK
ǩ/RFDWLRQrǢ1rǢǥ((2.5km SW of Baengnyeong Island)* Within Republic of Korea territorial waterNorth Korea

Pyongyang

NLL

NLL

NLL

Seoul

Baengnyeongdo(Island)Republic of
Korea)LJXUH7KHORFDWLRQRI52.6&KHRQDQLQFLGHQW

ROKS Cheonan’s Mission
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ǩ7KXUVGD\0DUFK+HDY\VHDVZDUQLQJDFWLYDWHGLQWKH:HVW6HD/HIW:HVWHUQ%DHQJQ\HRQJ
,VODQG3DWURO=RQH$YHUWHGWR6(RI'DHFKHRQJ,VODQG
ǩ$SSUR[LPDWHO\DWRQ)ULGD\0DUFKVWDUWHGWRUHWXUQEDFNWRWKHSDWURO]RQHDIWHUWKH
LQFOHPHQWZHDWKHU$UULYHGDWWKHSDWURO]RQHDWDERXWDQGFRQGXFWHGQRUPDORSHUDWLRQV$W
20:00, there was a duty shift (29 personnel), while others taking a rest or involved in maintenance.

3222010 Defense White Paper

Situation Development| Before the Incident | Before the incident, there were 7 personnel on the bridge; 7 personnel at the&RPEDW,QIRUPDWLRQ&HQWHUSHUVRQQHODWWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQFHOOSHUVRQQHODWWKHERZJXQ5
S; 7 personnel at the machinery control room; 1 at the harpoon control room; and 2 personnel at the
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PHVVKDOORUWKHLUEHUWKLQJ7KH&RPPDQGLQJ2IILFHU &2 RIWKHVKLSILQLVKHGKLVSDWURODWDERXWUHWXUQHGWRWKH&2ǢVFDELQDQGZDVFKHFNLQJHPDLOVPHVVDJHERDUGVDQG.17'61$WWKHWLPHRIWKHLQFLGHQW RQ0DUFK 52.6&KHRQDQZDVFDUU\LQJRXWLWVQRUPDORSHUDWLRQ| After the Incident | 7KHVXUYLYRUVVWDWHGWKDWWKH\KHDUGORXGEODVWVIRUVHFRQGVVRXQGVDV
they felt an impact in the rear, and a blackout occurred. The influx of seawater to sections of the ship
VXGGHQO\WLOWHGWKHVKLSWRWKHVWDUERDUGVLGHE\GHJUHHV7KHLPSDFWFDXVHGWKH&RPPDQGLQJ2IILFHU
WREHORFNHGLQVLGHWKH&2ǢVFDELQ+HVWUDSSHGDILUHKRVHWKDWRUFUHZPHPEHUVKDGORZHUHGWRKLVZDLVWDQGHVFDSHGWRWKHSRUWVLGHGHFN$WWKLVWLPHDERXWFUHZPHPEHUVKDGJDWKHUHGDWWKHGHFNǩ52.6&KHRQDQEHJLQVWRVLQN WKHWLPHRIWKHLQFLGHQW ǩnd FLT receives a situation report on the sinking of ROKS Cheonan.
ǩnd FLT orders the immediate departure of 5 PKMs Division in Daecheong Island to theincident location.
ǩnd FLT instructs ROKS Sokcho to sail to the incident location at full speed.
ǩnd FLT requests emergency support to Incheon maritime police (ships 501, 1002) andgovernment ships.
ǩnd FLT activates crisis response element.
ǩnd FLT activates crisis action team and deploys all operation elements for combat.
ǩnd FLT orders deployment of LYNX helicopter in Deokjeok Isl. to Baengnyeong Island.
ǩ$UULYDORI3.0VFRPPHQFHPHQWRIUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQVǩnd FLT declares anti-submarine alert posture.
ǩnd FLT requests Air Force search and rescue support.
ǩnd FLT requests Incheon maritime police RIBs2 (501, 1002) support.
ǩ$GGLWLRQDODUULYDORI3.0VFRPPHQFHPHQWRIUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQVǩ5HVFXHRIVDLORU 2SHUDWLRQVRIILFHURI52.6&KHRQDQ E\&KDPVXUL
ǩ$UULYDORI0DULWLPH3ROLFH6KLSDQG5,%VFRPPHQFHPHQWRIUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQVǩ&RPPHQFHPHQWRIUHVFXHRSHUDWLRQVE\*29VKLSV  ǩ5HVFXHRSHUDWLRQVFRPSOHWHGVXUYLYRUVUHVFXHG
ǩ0DUFK1LJKWVHDUFKRILQFLGHQWORFDWLRQWUDQVSRUWDWLRQRISDWLHQWV

1. KNTDS: Korea Naval Tactical Data System
2. RIB (Rigid-hulled inflatable boat): The bottom section is consisted of glass-fiber stiffened plastic, and the upper section iscomposed of expandable tube. RIB is light and rigid, allowing for operation in long distance maneuver and high waves incomparison to other small vessels.

323

Special Appendix:KHQWKH&RPPDQGLQJ2IILFHUORRNHGWRZDUGVWKHDIWVLGHVWDQGLQJIURPWKHERZVHFWLRQRIWKH
separated ship, the stack and the stern part aft of the stack were not visible (he also sensed a slightsmell of fuel). Seeing that the bow side, where the surviving crew members had gathered, was tilted
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H[HFXWLYHRIILFHU /&'5 WRUHVFXHWKHFUHZPHPEHUVORFNHGLQVLGHWKHVKLSDQGWKHRSHUDWLRQVRIILFHU(LT) to count the number of crew members and check for a suitable disembarking location once the
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between 22:32 and 22:42. The key points of the conversation included the following: “It seems that
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TXLFNO\ǥǤ:KDWDERXWVXUYLYRUV"ǥǤ$WRWDORIVXUYLYRUV0DQ\DUHEOHHGLQJ7ZRRIWKHPDUHVHYHUHO\ZRXQGHGDQGQRWDEOHWRVWDQGXSǥ| Situation Report and Dissemination | $WDSSUR[LPDWHO\WKHJXQQHU\RIILFHURI52.6&KHRQDQcalled the watch officer of 2nd)OHHWE\KLVFHOOSKRQHWRUHTXHVWUHVFXH WKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQPHWKRG
within the ship was limited from the power outage). The call was forwarded to the chief of the 2nd )OHHWVLWXDWLRQFHOOZKRKDGKHDUGWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHFRQYHUVDWLRQ+HZDVWROGWKDWǤWKHVKLSLVWLOWHGWRWKHULJKWDQGZHQHHGWREHUHVFXHGǥ+HXWLOL]HGDWH[WPHVVDJHLQIRUPDWLRQQHWZRUNDWWRRUGHU
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the situation to the chief of the situation room. Then, he made a phone call to an Inspector, the deputy
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3. Upon the occurrence of the incident, the urgency of the situation led some survivors to use words such as grounding
instead of using precise terms.

3242010 Defense White Paper

7KHGHSXW\FKLHILQVWDQWO\LQVWUXFWHGWKHZKLFKZDVORFDWHGVRXWKRI'DHFKHRQJ,VODQGDQGWKH
1002, which was located south of Socheong Island, to depart for the incident location immediately.
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Ongjin county of the incident and set sail at approximately 21:50.
| Rescue of Crew Members | $OORSHUDWLRQDOHOHPHQWVLQFOXGLQJ52.13.0VPDULWLPHSROLFHVKLSV
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rescued 2 wounded crew members and transported them to Baengnyeong Island around 23:08. The
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gathered by the aft gun to be transported first and ordered that “the wounded go first and help the
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325

Special AppendixInvestigation Activities| Joint Investigation Group (JIG) operations | 7KH&,90,/-,*ZDVLQLWLDOO\RUJDQL]HGRQ0DUFK
DQGLQFOXGHGSHUVRQQHO DFWLYHVHUYLFHPHPEHUVJRYHUQPHQWSHUVRQQHODQGFLYLOLDQV ,WZDVWKHQUHRUJDQL]HGDVWKH&LYLOLDQ0LOLWDU\-RLQW,QYHVWLJDWLRQ*URXSRQ$SULODQGLQFOXGHGSHUVRQQHO 52.)RUHLJQH[SHUWV WRLQLWLDWHLQYHVWLJDWLRQDFWLYLWLHV)LJXUH7KHRUJDQL]DWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHRIWKH-RLQW,QYHVWLJDWLRQ*URXS -,*ROK 49 (CIV: 27, MIL: 22) *Including advisors
recommended by the National Assembly
Foreign 24 (US:15, SWE: 4, AUS: 3, UK: 2)

CIV-MIL JIG Chairman
CIV: Dr. Yoon, Duk-Yong
MIL: LTG Park, Jung-I

Deputy Chairman

Spokesperson

MajGen Lee, Chi-Eui

Scientific
Investigation

CIV: 7
MIL: 7

CIV: Jung, Hee-Sun
MIL: BG Yoon, Jong-Sung

Ship StructureManagement

RDML Moon, Byung-Ok
CIV: 7
MIL: 5

CIV: Cho, Sang-Rae
MIL: RDML Park, Jung-Su

Explosive Analysis

CIV: 7
MIL: 5

Intelligence
Analysis

CIV: 2
MIL: 2

CIV: Lee, Jae-Myung
MIL: BG Lee, Gi-Bong

CIV: Kim, Ok-Su
MIL: BG Sohn, Ki-Hwa

Intelligence /Underwater Terrain

Photo/Video

Hull Strength

TorpedoEvidence Collection

Hull Whipping

Mine

Evidence Analysis

Stability

Underwater Objects

Medical Examination

Ship Management

Other Explosives

US : 7, AUS : 1
UK : 1, SWE : 2

US : 5, AUS : 2
UK : 1, SWE : 2

US : 2Advisory Agency/School : ADD, DAPA,
KIMM, NISI, Korean Registry, KORDI,
KHOA, Samsung/Hyundai Heavy
Industry, Chungnam Univ., Ulsan
Univ., KAIST*Supporting Personnel :98 (CIV: 16, MIL: 82)

Foreign Investigation Team(24)* Including 1 US Public Affairs Officer

7KH-,*ZDVLQRSHUDWLRQIRUDWRWDORIGD\VXQWLO-XQH'XULQJWKLVWLPHLWKHOGSUHVVFRQIHUHQFHVRQLWVLQYHVWLJDWLRQDFWLYLWLHVRQIRXUGLIIHUHQWRFFDVLRQV $SULODQG0D\ DQG
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investigation results.
The objective of the JIG was to find the exact cause of the sinking through a detailed investigation
conducted in a scientific and objective manner. The focus was first, to form a civilian and military joint
investigation group in order to improve the transparency and credibility of the investigation process;second, to secure international credibility through the participation of foreign experts from the US andother nations; third, to conduct the investigation in phases, with the recovery of the ship as the dividing
point; and fourth, to conduct the investigation in a scientific and systematic manner.

3262010 Defense White Paper

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JIG recruited personnel from the private sector and concurrently held discussions with relevant
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was highly unlikely. The summary of the maintenance records also indicated that the possibility ofmaintenance failure causing the sinking was very slim as well. In addition, a fuel tank explosion wasassessed to be highly unlikely, because such an explosion would not satisfy the necessary conditions
for the splitting of the ship.
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whereas an explosion of North Korean torpedoes and mines, on the other hand, was assessed to bepossible, according to the expert opinions and assessment by the JIG. There were no reefs on thesea charts of the incident location, and according to expert opinions, chopping waves would be highly
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posts near the spot of the incident showed no other ships, indicating that sinking by a collision was
highly unlikely as well.
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plate) from the surface and coast of Baengnyeong Island also showed no trace of fire.
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sinking was highly unlikely. This assessment was based on the lack of burn damage on the interior
structure, the good condition of the wires, and the upward deformation of the hull bottom plating.
Grounding was also assessed to be highly unlikely given that the hull bottom was found in relatively
good condition and that the fractured surface on the bottom of the stern was bent in an upward
direction.
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bottom was bent upward with an 80° angle and that the stiffeners located at the after bulkhead of thegas turbine room were rolled up.
Therefore, it was concluded that an external explosion was the most likely possibility given that thehull fracture occurred from the port bottom toward the starboard side in an upward direction; notrace of fragments was found at the fractured surface; the bending of the hull was caused by external
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327

Special Appendixfrom the scene, which consisted of 10 samples including interior materials from the fractured surface,
was conducted to detect explosive residue and aluminum components.
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of the damaged locations and deformations. The onsite investigation during the recovery of the stern,
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25, led to the assessment that an external explosion was more likely than an internal explosion.
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condition and the sonar dome located at the hull bottom did not show any damage.
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fractured surface was significantly deformed in an upward direction due to external pressure, and
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to heat on the wires and interior materials at the fractured surface.
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on the severe inward bending and severance of the hull due to shockwave and bubble effect generated
by an underwater explosion.
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damage seen.
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site investigation during the recovery of the bow and the detailed investigation following the recovery
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7KH5HFRYHU\RIWKH7RUSHGR3URSXOVLRQ0RWRU0D\The propulsion motor and propellers of a3282010 Defense White Papertorpedo propulsion system were recovered on May 15, during a detailed search of the seabed using a
special net that began on May 10.
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confirm through composition analysis that the adhered materials found on the torpedo propulsion
VHFWLRQDQG52.6&KHRQDQZHUHLGHQWLFDO,QDGGLWLRQWKH.RUHDQDOSKDEHWLQVFULSWLRQLQWKHUHDURIWKHSURSXOVLRQVHFWLRQ ǤEHRQǥRU1XPEHULQ(QJOLVK LVVLPLODULQVW\OHZLWKWKH.RUHDQDOSKDEHW
LQVFULSWLRQPHWKRGRQD1RUWK.RUHDQWRUSHGR ǤKRǥXQLWLQ(QJOLVK REWDLQHGLQQHDUZDWHUVLQWKHYLFLQLW\RI3RKDQJ

Figure 3. Rear section of torpedo

Figure 4. Marking on North Korean test torpedo)LJXUH&+7'WRUSHGRPDQXIDFWXUHGE\1RUWK.RUHD

3UHVV&RQIHUHQFHRQ,QYHVWLJDWLRQ5HVXOW0D\'XULQJDSUHVVFRQIHUHQFHDWWKH01'FRQIHUHQFH
URRPZLWKPHPEHUVRIWKHORFDODQGIRUHLJQSUHVVFRUSVLQSUHVHQFH'U<RRQ'XN<RQJ &LYLOLDQ&R
chairman) announced the investigation result.
$IWHUWDNLQJWKHHQWLUHW\RIWKHDQDO\VLVUHVXOWVRI.RUHDQDQGIRUHLJQH[SHUWVRQWKHIROORZLQJ
factors into consideration⾉the torpedo propulsion system recovered from the incident location,
deformation of the hull, statements by related personnel, medical examination of the deceased andwounded service members, seismic and air acoustic waves, simulations of underwater explosions,tidal currents in the vicinity of Baengnyeong Island, and analysis of explosive components⾉the JIG
confirmed the following:

4. Sonar dome: The cover for the sonar that consists of special material to allow the transmission of the sound waves

329

Special Appendix52.6&KHRQDQZDVVSOLWDQGVXQNGXHWRVKRFNZDYHDQGEXEEOHHIIHFWJHQHUDWHGE\WKHXQGHUZDWHU
explosion of a torpedo. The detonation location was 3m to the port from the center of the gas turbine
URRPDQGDWDGHSWKRIaP7KHZHDSRQV\VWHPXVHGZDVD&+7'WRUSHGRZLWKURXJKO\NJRI
explosives made by North Korea.

Conclusion
52.6&KHRQDQZDVVXQNE\D1RUWK.RUHDQWRUSHGRDWWDFNZKLOHFRQGXFWLQJLWVQRUPDOPLVVLRQLQ
YLFLQLW\RI%DHQJQ\HRQJ,VODQGDWKRXUVRQ0DUFK,PPHGLDWHO\IROORZLQJWKHVLQNLQJ
RIWKHVKLSWKH52.PLOLWDU\FRQGXFWHGDVXUIDFHFRDVWDODQGXQGHUZDWHUVHDUFKXQWLO$SULODQG
WUDQVLWLRQHGIURPDSHUVRQQHOUHFRYHU\RSHUDWLRQWRDVDOYDJLQJRSHUDWLRQRQ$SULO
7KHVDOYDJHDQGWUDQVSRUWDWLRQRIWKHVHSDUDWHGERZDQGVWHUQVHFWLRQZHUHFRPSOHWHGRQ$SULO'XULQJWKHVDOYDJHRIWKHVKLSERGLHVZHUHUHFRYHUHGDVZHOO)ROORZLQJWKHVDOYDJHRIWKHVKLSemphasis was placed on search operations and a detailed search was conducted focusing on the
DUHDVZKHUHWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIFROOHFWLQJGHEULVZDVDVVHVVHGWREHWKHKLJKHVW$GHWDLOHGVHDUFKRIWKH
seabed using special nets commenced on May 10 and parts of a torpedo propulsion section, including
a propulsion motor and propellers, were recovered on May 15.
The analysis on the cause of the sinking initially left open every possibility and explored the
SRVVLELOLWLHVRIDQRQH[SORVLRQLQWHUQDOH[SORVLRQRUH[WHUQDOH[SORVLRQIRUFDXVLQJWKHVLQNLQJ
+RZHYHUDGHWDLOHGLQYHVWLJDWLRQIROORZLQJWKHVDOYDJHRIWKHVKLSHOLPLQDWHGWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVRIDQRQ
explosion and internal explosion, leading the JIG to conclude that an external explosion, and more
specifically an underwater explosion, was the most likely cause behind the sinking.

Figure 6. 3D laser scan image of the fractured bow and stern

CVK
Fractured Bow

3302010 Defense White Paper

Fractured Stern

7KHSRVVLELOLW\RIDQRQFRQWDFWWRUSHGRJHQHUDWLQJDQXQGHUZDWHUH[SORVLRQZDVDVVHVVHGWRKDYH
the highest likelihood and the possibility of a moored mine was not ruled out despite its low likelihood.
The basis of our assessment that a torpedo attack caused the sinking is as follows:)LUVWSUHFLVHPHDVXUHPHQWDQGDQDO\VLVRIWKHGDPDJHGKXOOVKRZHGWKDWDVKRFNZDYHDQGEXEEOH
HIIHFWFDXVHGVLJQLILFDQWXSZDUGEHQGLQJRIWKH&HQWHU9HUWLFDO.HHOFRPSDUHGWRLWVRULJLQDOVWDWH7KH
shell plating was steeply bent with parts of the ship fragmented. On the main deck, fractures occurredalong the large openings used for the maintenance of equipment in the gas turbine room and theportside was deformed significantly in an upward direction. The bulkhead of the gas turbine room wassignificantly damaged and deformed. The upward bending of the bottom of the stern and bow provesthat an underwater explosion occurred.
Second, a thorough investigation of the interior and exterior of the ship found evidence of extreme
SUHVVXUHRQWKHILQVWDELOL]HU ZKLFKSUHYHQWVVLJQLILFDQWUROOLQJRIWKHVKLS WUDFHVRIKLJKZDWHU
pressure and bubble effect on the bottom of the hull; and wires cut with no traces of heat; and tracesof spherical pressure on the gas turbine room. The above indicate that a strong shockwave and bubble
effect caused the splitting and sinking of the ship.

)LJXUH7UDFHVRIVKRFNZDYHDQGEXEEOHHIIHFW

Pressure on the stabilizer

Pressure & bubble effect

Wires cut clean with no trace of heatTrace of spherical pressure

7KLUGWKH-,*DQDO\]HGVWDWHPHQWVPDGHE\VXUYLYRUVWKDWWKH\KHDUGDQHDUVLPXOWDQHRXVH[SORVLRQonce or twice and water was splashed on the face of the port lookout who fell from the impact.
)XUWKHUPRUHWKHVWDWHPHQWVZHUHPDGHE\FRDVWDOVHQWULHVRQ%DHQJQ\HRQJ,VODQGWKDWWKH\VDZ
DPHWHUKLJKSLOODURIZKLWHIODVKIRUVHFRQGV7KHDQDO\VLVRIWKHVHWHVWLPRQLHVLQGLFDWHG
that the aforementioned phenomena are consistent with the occurrence of a water plume resulting
IURPDVKRFNZDYHDQGEXEEOHHIIHFW$OVRQRWUDFHVRIIUDJPHQWDWLRQRUEXUQLQMXU\ZHUHIRXQGIURPour examination of the wounded survivors and the deceased service members, while fractures andlacerations were observed. These observations are consistent with phenomena resulting from ashockwave and bubble effect.
)RXUWKWKHVHLVPLFDQGDLUDFRXVWLFZDYHDQDO\VLVFRQGXFWHGE\WKH.RUHD,QVWLWXWHRI*HRVFLHQFH
DQG0LQHUDO5HVRXUFHV .,*$0 VKRZHGWKHIROORZLQJ$VHLVPLFZDYHRIPDJQLWXGHZDVGHWHFWHG
at 4 stations. Two air acoustic waves with a 1.1 second interval were detected at 11 stations. The
VHLVPLFDQGDLUDFRXVWLFZDYHVRULJLQDWHGIURPDQLGHQWLFDOVLWHRIH[SORVLRQ$OOWKHVHDUHFRQVLVWHQW

331

Special Appendixwith the phenomena that arise from a shockwave and bubble effect produced by an underwater
explosion.
)LIWKWKHst analysis result by US team, from the hull deformation showed that the possible
H[SORVLRQW\SHLVDQH[SORVLRQRI717HTXLYDOHQWRINJFKDUJHVL]HDWDSRLQWRIPWRWKH
SRUWIURPWKHFHQWUDOERWWRPRIWKHJDVWXUELQHURRPDQGDWDGHSWKRIPnd analysis result on
VLPXODWLRQE\WKH52.UHVXOWHGLQWKHLGHQWLFDOORFDWLRQZLWK717HTXLYDOHQWNJFKDUJHVL]HThe efforts on this was also supported by the UK Investigation Team.
Sixth, based on the analysis of tidal currents in the vicinity of Baengnyeong Island, the JIG
determined that although the currents would have had a minimal influence on the launch of a torpedo,
they were strong enough to limit the emplacement of mines.
6HYHQWKDQDO\VLVRIWKHH[SORVLYHUHVLGXHIRXQG+0;IURPORFDWLRQVLQFOXGLQJWKHVWDFNDQG
IUDFWXUHGVXUIDFH5';IURPORFDWLRQVLQFOXGLQJWKHVWDFNDQGVHDEHGDQGWUDFHVRI717IURPORFDWLRQVLQFOXGLQJWKHILQVWDELOL]HU%DVHGRQWKLVDQDO\VLVWKHXVHRIDQH[SORVLYHFRPSRXQG
FRQWDLQLQJ+0;5';DQG717ZDVFRQILUPHG
Lastly, on May 15, 2010, the JIG recovered conclusive evidence that confirmed the use of a torpedo
while conducting a detailed search in the vicinity of the incident location using special nets. The
conclusive evidence was a torpedo propulsion motor system including propellers, a propulsion motor
DQGVWHHULQJVHFWLRQ7KHHYLGHQFHLVFRQVLVWHQWLQLWVVL]HDQGGHVLJQWRWKHWRUSHGRVFKHPDWLFV
included in an introductory brochure produced by North Korea for export purposes.

Figure 8. Schematic of torpedo and recovered rear section of torpedo3322010 Defense White Paper

$FRPSRVLWLRQDQDO\VLVRIWKHDGKHUHGPDWHULDOVIURP52.6&KHRQDQVKRZHGWKDWWKHPDWHULDOVDUH
LGHQWLFDOWRWKDWIRXQGRQWKHUHDUVHFWLRQRIWKHWRUSHGR7KH.RUHDQPDUNLQJǡEHRQ 1RLQ(QJOLVK Ǣinside the rear section of the propulsion system is also consistent with the marking of a North Korea
test torpedo obtained in 2003. The above evidence confirm that the recovered torpedo parts were
manufactured by North Korea.
,QFRQFOXVLRQWDNLQJWKHHQWLUHW\RIWKHDQDO\VLVUHVXOWVRIWKH&,90,/-RLQW,QYHVWLJDWLRQ*URXS
DQG0XOWLQDWLRQDO&RPELQHG,QWHOOLJHQFH7)RQWKHIROORZLQJIDFWRUVLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ⾉the torpedo
propulsion system recovered from the incident location, deformation of the hull, statements byrelated personnel, medical examination of the deceased and wounded service members, seismic andinfrasound waves, simulations of underwater explosions, tidal currents in vicinity of Baengnyeong
Island, analysis of explosive components, recovered torpedo parts, and the identification of theperpetrator⾉WKH-,*DQG0&,7)FRQFOXGHGWKHIROORZLQJ
52.6&KHRQDQZDVVSOLWDQGVXQNGXHWRVKRFNZDYHDQGEXEEOHHIIHFWJHQHUDWHGE\WKHXQGHUZDWHU
explosion of a torpedo. The detonation location was 3m to port from the center of the gas turbine room
DQGDWDGHSWKRIaP7KHZHDSRQV\VWHPXVHGZDVD&+7'WRUSHGRZLWKDSSUR[LPDWHO\NJ
of explosives manufactured and used by North Korea.

333

Special AppendixOverall Shape and Structures of ROKS Cheonan52.6&KHRQDQZDVFRQVWUXFWHGE\.RUHD7$&20$0DULQH,QG PHUJHGZLWK+DQMLQ+HDY\,QG &RQVWUXFWLRQ+ROGLQJV&2LQ DQGDIWHULWVDFTXLVLWLRQWR52.1DY\LQLWKDG
been in operation for approximately 22 years before the incident.
52.6&KHRQDQFRQVLVWHGRI2GHFNDQG2GHFNDERYHWKHPDLQGHFNDQGRIst3ODWIRUP
and 2nd3ODWIRUPEHORZWKHPDLQGHFN2QWKHPDLQGHFNIURPWKHERZVLGHWRVWHUQVLGHWKHUH
ZHUHDZDUGURRPRIILFHUVǢEHUWKLQJ&32VǢPHVVPDFKLQHU\FRQWUROURRPDQGFUHZǢVPHVV
7KH&2ǢVFDELQ&RPEDW,QIRUPDWLRQ&HQWHUFRPPXQLFDWLRQURRPGHPLVW5 and stack6 are
ORFDWHGRQWKH2GHFN7KHEULGJHDQGPDVW7DUHORFDWHGRQWKH2GHFN2QWKHERZVLGH
of the 1st3ODWIRUPWKHUHDUHDGHFNDGPLQURRPVDLOJXQQHU\RSHUDWLRQFUHZVǢEHUWKLQJDQG
&32VǢEHUWKLQJ7KHPDFKLQHU\FUHZVǢEHUWKLQJ&32VǢORXQJHDIWKHDGGHFRQWDPLQDWLRQURRPPDFKLQHU\VWRUDJHVWHUQJXQ56DQGVWHHULQJJHDUURRPDUHORFDWHGRQWKHVWHUQVLGH2Q
the 2nd3ODWIRUPILUHDUPVDGPLQURRPHOHFPDLQWHQDQFHURRPDQGJ\URURRPDUHORFDWHGRQ
WKHERZVLGHDQGWKHJDVWXUELQHURRPDQGGLHVHOHQJLQHURRPDUHRQWKHVWHUQVLGH2QWKH
VKLSERWWRPDVRQDUGRPHILQVWDELOL]HUDQGELOJHNHHO8 are located.

Figure 9. Overall shape and structures of ROKS Cheonan

Mast
Stack
Bow

BridgeNaval gun
Main deck

Sonar dome

HarpoonDemistGas
Turbineroom

fin stabilizer

Dieselengineroom

Main deck

Bilge Keel$GHPLVWLVDGHYLFHZKLFKLQKDOHVDLUWKDWWKHHQJLQHQHHGVDQGH[FOXGHVPRLVWXUHDQGGXVW$VWDFNLVDFKLPQH\ZKLFKDFWVDVDQH[KDXVWSDUWRIDQHQJLQH$PDVWLVORFDWHGDWWKHFHQWHURIDVKLS$ELOJHNHHOLVORFDWHGRQWKHOHIWDQGULJKWVLGHRIDVKLSERWWRPPLWLJDWLQJEOXUULQJRIDVKLS

3342010 Defense White Paper

Naval gun
Stern

Special Appendix 4$UWLOOHU\)LULQJDW<HRQS\HRQJGR ,VODQG

Outline$URXQGRQ1RYHPEHUWKH1RUWKǢVPLOLWDU\ .RUHDQ3HRSOHǢV$UP\.3$ ILUHG
artillery shots at Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea. In response to this attack, the Yeonpyeong unit of
WKH52.0DULQH&RUSVLPPHGLDWHO\UHWXUQHGILUHDJDLQVWWKH1RUWKXVLQJ.VHOISURSHOOHGDUWLOOHU\Such illegitimate and inhumane provocation by the North, which was aimed at a civilian residential
area as well as the ROK marine base, resulted in the deaths of two civilians and two ROK marines andmany other civilians and marines being severely or slightly injured.

Jangsan CapeNorthern Limit Line (NLL)

Wollaedo(Island)
Haeju

Baengnyeongdo(Island)
Mahapdo(Island)
Sa CapeDaecheongdo(Island)

Daesuapdo(Island)

Girindo(Island)
Socheongdo(Island)
Sunwido(Island)

GaemoriMudo(Island)

Deungsan Cape
Daeyeonpyeongdo(Island)Wudo(Island)
Soyeonpeyongdo(Island)

Development of the operation
%HWZHHQDQGRQ1RYHPEHUWKH<HRQS\HRQJXQLWFDUULHGRXWDUHJXODUPDULWLPHVKRRWLQJWUDLQLQJH[HUFLVHLQWKH52.0DULWLPH)LULQJ=RQHVRXWKRIWKH1RUWKHUQ/LPLW/LQH 1// %HWZHHQDQGWKH.3$LQGLVFULPLQDWHO\ILUHGPXOWLSOHURFNHWODXQFKHUV 05/ located on Gaemori coast and its coastal artillery guns on Mudo (Island), North Korea, at the
ROK marine base (Yeonpyeong unit) and civilian residences. Sixty out of around 150 shots from
the MRL and the coastal artillery launcher bombarded the ROK base and civilian residences on
Yeonpyeong Island. The other 90 shots fell into the sea.
%HWZHHQDQGDQGDIWHULVVXLQJDZDUQLQJWRWKH1RUWKWZLFHWKH<HRQS\HRQJXQLWUHVSRQGHG

335

Special AppendixWRWKLVDWWDFNE\ILULQJURXQGVRILWV.VHOISURSHOOHGDUWLOOHU\DWWKH1RUWKǢVFRVWDODUWLOOHU\EDVH
%HWZHHQDQGWKH.3$FDUULHGRXWDVHFRQGDWWDFNǞWKLVWLPHRQWKH&RPPDQG3RVWRIWKH
<HRQS\HRQJXQLWDQGWKH52.UDGDUEDVHE\ILULQJURXQGVIURPLWV05/VDQGFRDVWDODUWLOOHU\%HWZHHQDQGLQUHVSRQVHWRWKH1RUWKǢVVHFRQGDWWDFNWKH<HRQS\HRQJXQLWUHVSRQGHGE\ILULQJURXQGVIURPLWV.VHOISURSHOOHGDUWLOOHU\DWWKH1RUWKǢVFRDVWDODUWLOOHU\position on the Gaemori coast.

Consequences
7KH.3$LVDVVXPHGWREHVHYHUHO\GDPDJHGE\WKHFRQFHQWUDWHGILULQJE\WKH52.
7ZR52.PDULQHVDQGWZRFLYLOLDQVSHULVKHGZKLOHRWKHUVZHUHZRXQGHGLQFOXGLQJVRPH
severely injured. In addition, a total of 133 buildings (33 completely destroyed, 9 half destroyed,
and 91 partially destroyed) and power and communications facilities were damaged. Wildfires
broke out at ten sites.

Lessons learned
7KH1RUWKǢVILULQJRIDUWLOOHU\DW<HRQS\HRQJ,VODQGZDVWKHILUVWGLUHFWDWWDFNDLPHGDW52.
territory since the end of the Korean War, which suggests the possible elevation of provocative
actions from the North. In that regard, the incident led the ROK to reassess its need for further
exhaustive military preparedness against the North.
7KHLQFLGHQWUHDIILUPHGWKDW1RUWK.RUHDLVDUHJLPHWKDWLVQRWDIUDLGWRSHUSHWXDWHDQ\W\SHRI
provocation, even including indiscriminately firing at civilian residences and violating international laws,
VXFKDVWKH81&KDUWHUDQGWKH$UPLVWLFH$JUHHPHQWWRDFKLHYHLWVSXUSRVH

Following surprise bombardment by the North, ROK marines of the Yeonpyeong unit prepare to counter-attack using K-9
self-propelled artillery (Yeonpyeong Island, November 23, 2010).

3362010 Defense White Paper

Appendix 1

Status of Neighboring Countries’
0LOLWDU\6WUHQJWK* Source: Relevant materials, including the Military Balance 2010,
International Institution for Strategic Studies (IISS) in the UK, February 2010

1XPEHURI7URRSVClassification

U.S.

Russia

China

Japan

Army

553,044

360,000

1,600,000

140,251

Navy

329,390

142,000

255,000

42,431

Air Force

334,342

160,000

330,000

43,652OthersMarine Corps 198,513
Coast Guard 43,598

Airborne 35,000
Strategic 80,000
Command /Support 250,000

2nd Artillery
10,000

Joint Staff
2,202

Total

1,458,887

1,027,000

2,285,000

228,536$UP\Classification
Divisions

U.S.

Russia

China

Japan

10

6

60

9

Tanks
Light tanks
Infantry combat vehicles
Recon tanks
Armored vehicles

5,850
0
6,452
96
19,63723,000150
15,180
2,000
9,900

6,550
1,000
1,140
800
3,300

880
0
70
100
960

Towed artillery
Self- propelled artillery
Multiple launch rocket systems
Mortar

1,780
1,594
830
2,066

12,765
6,010
3,976
2,550

14,000
1,280
2,400
150

420
230
100
2,020

Anti-tank guided weapons

SP 2,005
Portable 19,950

0

SP 24
Portable 7,176

SP 56
Portable 1,273

Ground-to-air missiles

1,281

2,465

290

640

Helicopters

3,877

1,278

499

458

Aircraft

314

0

0

20

* SP: Self-propelled

337

Appendix1DY\Classification

U.S.

China

Japan

66
14
1
5
14
14
98
37
23
19
105
259
250
1 (3 Brigades)

65
3
0
0
28
52
253
69
83
160
182
290
78
(2 Brigades)

16
0
0
0
44
8
7
30
5
8
30
0
108
0

Included in Navy

Included in NavyNo Marine Corps

71
14
11
22
56
21
18
9
31
269
291
900
512
3

Submarines
Strategic nuclear submarines
Aircraft carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates
Patrol and coastal combatants
Mine sweepers
Amphibious ships
Amphibious craft
Support & Aux. ships
Fighters
Helicopters
Marine Corps divisions

Marine Corps

RussiaTanks: 403
Armored vehicles: 1,563
Towed guns: 1,282
Mortar: 585
Anti-tank weapons: 2,299
UAVs: 1,072,
Aircrafts : 371
Helicopters: 573

Air Force
Classification

U.S.

Russia

China

Japan

Strategic bombers
Bombers
Recon. aircraft
Command and Control aircraftFighters
Transport aircraft
Tankers
AWACS
Trainers
Helicopters
Civil Reserve Air Fleet

154
0
106
37
2,650
844
512
17
1,141
167
1,413

205
807
119
0
725
293
20
20
1,072
60
0

0
365
120
0
1,100
296
18
13
522
80
0

0
0
13
0
359
42
4
17
270
49
0

3382010 Defense White Paper

Appendix 2

Comparison between Major countries’
Defense Budgets(As of 2009)&RXQWU\GDP(USD billions)

Defense Budget(USD billions)'HIHQVH%XGJHW*'3
Ratio (%)

7URRSV
8QLW

3HUFDSLWDGHIHQVH
budget (USD)

ROK

882

24.5

2.8

650

505

U.S.

13,800

690.3

5.0

1,459

2,270

Japan

5,300

45.6

0.9

229

359

China

4,860

78.0

1.6

2,285

58

Russia

1,370

41.1

3.0

1,027

293

Taiwan

349

9.7

2.8

290

425

UK

2,670

60.8

2.3

175

998

France

2,860

67.2

1.3

353

1,049

Germany

3,650

46.9

1.3

251

570

Israel

198

12.9

6.5

177

1,791

Egypt

157

4.6

2.9

469

59

Saudi Arabia

410

41.2

10.0

234

1,436

Australia

1,119

27.6

2.5

55

1,298

Turkey

731

13.5

1.9

511

179

Malaysia

222

4.4

2.0

109

173

Thailand

259

5.1

2.0

306

78

Singapore

170

8.2

4.8

73

1,767

Canada

1,470

20.2

1.4

65

603

* Source: Relevant materials, including the Military Balance 2010, International Institution for Strategic Studies (IISS) in the UK, February 2010
* Those for the UK, France, Germany, Turkey, Egypt, and Malaysia are 2008 figures.

339

Appendix

&RPSDULVRQRIWKH0LOLWDU\
6WUHQJWKRIWKH7ZR.RUHDVAppendix 3(As of November 2010)

Classification

South Korea

North Korea

Army520,000

1,020,000

Navy

68,000 (including 27,000
Marine Corps troops)

60,000Air Force

65,000110,000

Total

650,000

1,190,000

Corps(level)

10 (including Special Warfare
Command)15

Division

46 (including Marine Corps)

90

Mobile brigade

14 (including Marine Corps)

70 (not including 10 Reserve
Training Units)Tanks

2,400 (including Marine Corps)

4,100

Armoredvehicles

2,600 (including Marine Corps)

2,100

Field artillery

5,200 (including Marine Corps)

8,500

MLRS/MRL

200

5,100

30 launchers

100 launchers

Combatants

120

420

Amphibious
ships(LST/LSM)

10260

Mine warfare
vessels

1030

Support & Aux.
vessels

2030

Submarines

1070

Combat aircraft

460

820

50 (including thosebelonging to the Navy)

30

Transport aircraft

40

330

Trainers

180

170

680

300

3.2 million

7.7 million (including Reserve
Military Training Unit, Worker
and Peasant Red Guard, andRed Youth Guard)

Troops(in peace time)

Units

Army

Equipment

Ground-toground missiles
Major
combatstrength
Surface
ships

Navy

Air
Force

Surveillance&Reconnaissance

Helicopters (Army/Navy/Air Force)

Reserve troops* The number of units and equipment of the Army include those of the Marine Corps to compare military strength between the two Koreas.
* North Korean Army field artillery numbers do not include 76.2⽆ guns deployed at the regiment level.
* The table above provides quantitative comparisons for public discretion as qualitative assessments are limited.

3402010 Defense White Paper

Appendix 4

Comparison of the Economic Indicators
RIWKH7ZR.RUHDVSouth Korea

North Korea

Comparison

Classification






GNI (USD billions)

934.7

837.2

24.8

Per-capital GNI (USD)

19,227

17,173

Economic growth rate (%)* Based on GNI

2.3

Trade volume(USD billions)
Total population(Unit: millions)







22.4

South’s GNI 37.7
times higher

South’s GNI 37.7
times higher

970.4

960

South’s 19.8
times higher

South’s 17.9
times higher

0.2

3.1

-0.9

-

-

857.3

686.6

3.82

3.41

South’s 224.4
times higher

South’s 201.4
times higher

48.60

48.75

23.30

23.38

South’s 2.1
times higher

South’s 2.1
times higher* Source: Bank of Korea- GNI (Gross National Income): in 1993, major countries and international organizations (such as the UN and IMF) replaced GNP with this measurement.

Appendix 5&KURQRORJ\

Negotiation Process
in North Korea’s Nuclear Programs
Major Developments

2005
January 29

U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher clearly states U.S. position at regular press briefing:- U.S. ready to soon resume Six-Party Talks with no preconditions

February 10

North Korean Foreign Ministry announces North’s possession of nuclear weapons and its interminable
withdrawal from Six-Party Talks.

February 21

Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, meets Wang Jiarui, Minister of International
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China-Kim supports principle of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and identification of peaceful solutions toproblems through dialogue.
-Kim denies opposition to Six-Party Talks and expressed commitment to their success.

March 23

Chinese President Hu Jintao offers three principles (below) concerning North’s nuclear program at a meetingwith North Korean Prime Minister Park Bong-joo.
-ⴘ Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula,ⴙ North’s reasonable solutions to matters of common interest andⴚ Peace and stability are a matter of common interest

March 30

Former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci addresses that the U.S. may take military actions against
North Korea once the nuclear material is exported.

341

Appendix

&KURQRORJ\

Major Developments

May 11

North Korean Foreign Ministry claims North has completed
work to withdraw spent fuel rods.

June 10

At a summit ROK and U.S. leaders agree to promote improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations, if North Korea
dismantles its nuclear program.

June 17

In meeting with ROK presidential envoy Chung Dong-young, Kim Jong Il indicates that North would return to SixParty Talks if U.S. establishes diplomatic relations with North.

July 12Chung Dong-young, ROK Unification Minister, announces ‘important proposal to the North.’-Supply of 2 million kW of power in exchange for North agreeing to scrap its nuclear programs

July 26-August 7
September 15

First session of the Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks commences.
U.S. Treasury Department freezes North Korean accounts in Macau bank BDA.

September 13-19

Second session of the Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks held, adopting September 19 Joint Statement.

October 24

North Korean Foreign Ministry announces it would participate in Six-Party Talks in early November.

November 9-11

First session of the Fifth Round of Six-Party Talks held.

December 2

North Korean Foreign Ministry requests urgent bilateral meeting with U.S. to discuss lifting financial sanctions
against North.

2006
January 18

Christopher Hill of U.S. and Kim Gye-gwan of North meet and agree on need for early resumption of Six-Party
Talks.

March 7

Representatives of U.S. and North meet in New York. The North repeats its position that it would not participate
in Six-Party Talks unless measures are taken to unfreeze its BDA accounts.

April 27-28

Kim Jong Il tells Tang Jiaxuan of China that North would not return to Six-Party Talks until its BDA accounts areunfrozen.

June 19

Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, issues a warning against North’s preparation to launch long-range
missile.
Rice declares that launch of long-range missile by North would violate its moratorium obligation contained in
the September 19 Joint Statement and be regarded as act of clear provocation.

July 5

North fires total of seven long-range missiles, including a Daepodong 2 missile.

July 15

UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 1695.

July 25

U.S. Senate unanimously passes the North Korea Non-Proliferation Act.

September 13

International Relations Committee of U.S. House of Representatives unanimously passes the North Korea NonProliferation Act .

September 15

Leaders of ROK and U.S. agree to make joint efforts for comprehensive approach to North Korea at Summit.

October 3

North Korean Foreign Ministry announces North’s intention to carry out ‘nuclear test.’

October 5

Wang Guangya, Chinese Ambassador to UN, openly warns that "a nuclear test by the North will result in serious
repercussions."

October 6

UN Security Council issues presidential statement urging North to "abandon its plans" for nuclear test.

October 9

North’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announces "a successful nuclear test."

October 11

North Korean Foreign Ministry hints additional nuclear tests.

3422010 Defense White Paper

&KURQRORJ\

October 14

October 18-19

Major Developments
UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1718:- Ban on the provision of materials and technology related to WMDs (such as nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles) to North-Ban on export of luxurious goods to the North-Blocking transfer of WMD-related funds to North and banning pertinent people from visiting the North-Searching cargo to prevent transfer of WMDs
Tang Jiaxuan of China visits the North and comments on its plan for additional nuclear tests.
-Kim Jong Il reveals that the North has no plans for additional nuclear tests but would not condone U.S. pressure.

October 31

Chinese Foreign Ministry announces resumption of Six-Party Talks after informal tripartite meeting(between U.S.-China-North Korea) in Beijing.

November 1

North Korean Foreign Ministry announces it would return to Six-Party Talks if imposed financial sanctions on it
were discussed and settled.

November 28-29

Six-Party Talks senior representatives of the U.S. and North met in Beijing.
-U.S. suggests North to take initial actions

December 18-22

Second session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks convenes at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing.
-North strongly calls for nuclear armament reduction talks (December 18).
-Representatives discuss concrete initial actions, since North insists on first settling the matter of its frozen BDA
account.

2007
January 16-18

Representatives of the U.S. and North (Christopher Hill and Kim Gye-gwan) meet in Berlin.
-Meetings are held at each country’s embassy.
-Working-level discussions about freeze of North’s BDA account and resumption of Six-Party Talks.

February 8-13

Third session of the Fifth Round of Six-Party Talks is held at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing.
-Outcome of the Berlin meetings between U.S. and North explained-Appropriate initial actions and establishment of five working-level groups discussed

February 13

Six parties agree to initial actions for implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement (“February 13
Agreement”):-Implement initial actions within 60 days
-Establish working groups to implement initial actions-Discuss Sixth Round of Six-Party Talks and Six-Party Ministerial Meeting and measures to be taken in following
phase

March 5-6

U.S. and North hold a working-group meeting for normalization of relations in New York.
-The North promises to close and seal its nuclear facilities following settlement of BDA account issue, receipt of
50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), and the IAEA Director General’s visit to the North (March 13~ 14).
-The Nuclear weapons issue should be discussed at the final phase of negotiations in consideration of the factthat relations between the North and U.S. are hostile.

March 6-7

Japan and North hold a working-group meeting for normalization of relations in Hanoi, Vietnam.
-Japan insists on settling problem concerning abduction of its people by the North, while the North insists on
settling colonial history-related issues.

March 15First working-group meeting on Economic and Energy Cooperation convenes at Korean Embassy in Beijing.
-ROK and U.S. reaffirm willingness to provide initial energy to the North. The North explains status of its energy
needs.

March 16

Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group (NEAPSM) meets at Russian Embassy in Beijing.
-Each country expresses its view on establishment of trust in region.

343

Appendix

&KURQRORJ\

Major Developments

March 17-18

Working group meeting on Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula convenes at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in
Beijing.
-Discussions about implementing measures in initial and ensuing phases and IAEA activities

March 19-22

First session of Sixth Round of Six-Party Talks at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing-Adjourned without substantial discussion due to issue of North’s BDA accountMarch 14-June 13

June 26-30

Issue concerning North’s BDA account settled-North asks for remittance of a total $23 million in 40-plus BDA accounts to its account in Russian Commercial Bank.
-North officially confirms settlement of BDA issue.
Group of working-level IAEA representatives (4 people, including Director General) visit the North.
-Discussions about how to supervise and verify closure and sealing of five nuclear facilities in the North

July 12-August 2

ROK supplies 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to the North as part of implementation of initial actions.

July 14-August 11

10-member IAEA supervision and verification team visits the North to verify closure and sealing of its nuclear
facilities and to oversee installation of surveillance cameras.

July 18-20

Senior representatives to Six-Party Talks meet in Beijing, China.
-Confirmation of North’s intention/position concerning its report on, and disablement of, its nuclear facilities andsupply of 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil-Discussions about holding meetings of five working groups by the end of August and following round of SixParty Talks and foreign ministers’ meeting

August 7-8

Second working-group meeting on Economic and Energy Cooperation convenes at Panmunjom.
-Discussions about how to supply 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil in next phase-Supply of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil on monthly basis-Supply of energy-related facilities and materials for equivalent of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil

August 16-17

At Second Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula working-group meeting (in Shenyang, China), the North offers
its basic position on report on, and disablement of, its nuclear facilities.
-Subject to report: nuclear facilities, materials, and UEP (Uranium Enrichment Project) included; nuclear
detonation device not included-Subject to disablement: 5MWe nuclear reactor, reprocessing facilities, fuel rod production factories

August 20-21

Second Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism working-group convenes in Moscow.
-Each country expresses its opinion on issues of setting principles for security cooperation and promoting
establishment of trust in Northeast Asia.

September 1-2

Second Normalization of DPRK-US relations working-group convenes in Geneva.
-Agreements on North declaring and disabling its nuclear facilities and U.S. lifting sanctions placed on the North within a year

September 5-6

Second Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations working-group meeting convenes in Ulan Bator, Mongolia.
-Agreement to continue discussions about pending issues, including the North’s abduction of Japanese citizens

September 11-15

American, Russian and Chinese nuclear experts visit nuclear facility in Yongbyon, North Korea.
-Their findings go into a report for Six-Party Talks that covers discussions with the North about technologicalproblems and expenses required for disablement of nuclear facilities and suggested detailed stages for project.

September 27-30

At the second session of Sixth Round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing, parties agree on second-phase actions
for denuclearization (October 3 Agreement):-The North to disable and declare its nuclear facilities (second disablement investigation team to visit the North
within two weeks)-U.S. government to determine when to terminate application of Trading with the Enemy Act and lift North’s
designation as state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with measures taken by the North-Economic and energy support equivalent to one million tons of heavy fuel oil on humanitarian grounds-Reconfirmation of Six-Party Ministerial Talks at opportune time in Beijing3442010 Defense White Paper

&KURQRORJ\

Major Developments

October 11-18

Delegation of U.S. experts visits North and adopted agreement on measures of nuclear disablement with the North:-11 items of disablement for three nuclear facilities in Yongbyon to be supervised by U.S. and completed within ayear-Safekeeping and supervision of relevant sealed devices and materials separated or removed in mutuallyacceptable areas in the North

October 29-30

Third working-group meeting on Economic and Energy Cooperation convenes in Panmunjom.
-Supply of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and the relevant facilities and materials-Set standard heavy fuel oil price at USD400/ton and ancillary expenses at USD21/ton

November 1-15

First Team to Oversee North Korea Nuclear Disablement visits the North.
-Simultaneous disablement measures taken for a total of 11 items of 3 nuclear facilities

November 10-13

First tripartite (ROK, North Korea, and China) meeting convenes in Shenyang, China.
-Discussions about how to supply facilities and materials for shipments equivalent to 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil

November 27-29

Disablement Observer team composed of South Korean, Russian, Chinese and Japanese members visits the North.
-Monitors the site where disablement of three Yongbyon nuclear facilities was being implemented

2007
December 3-5

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill delivers President George Bush’s personal letter to the North.
-Conveys U.S. position on status of nuclear facility disablement and report on North’s nuclear program

December 11-12

Fourth working-group meeting on Economic and Energy Cooperation convenes in Beijing.
-Discussions of formalizing HFO and non-HFO supply to the North

December 25-27

Second tripartite (ROK, North Korea, and China) meeting convenes in Pyongyang.
-Three-party agreement on supply of the second portion of the facilities and materials to the North

2008
January 4

North Korean Foreign Ministry issues statement concerning its nuclear program.
-Makes a declaration of nuclear programs and stresses that it informed the U.S. in November 2007
-Denies allegations about its uranium enrichment and nuclear program-related cooperation with Syria

January 7-12

Christopher Hill visits countries participating in Six-Party Talks, i.e., ROK, Russia, China and Japan.
-Stresses the need for concerted efforts of relevant countries as well as complete and accurate reporting fromthe NorthJanuary 31February 1

Sung Kim, head of U.S. State Department's Korea Desk, visits the North.
-Coordinates content of North’s declaration of its nuclear program and discussions about holding meeting
involving senior Six-Party Talks representatives-Urges the North to early implement the October 3 Agreement

February 18-21

Christopher Hill visits the ROK, China and Japan.
-Provides video evidence concerning nuclear-related collusion between North and Syria to ROK and China

February 21-22

Third tripartite (ROK, North Korea, and China) meeting (Beijing)-Discussed supply of the third portion of the facilities and materials to the North and assessment of current
situation

March 13

U.S.-North Korea Talks convenes in Geneva.
-U.S. suggests the North acknowledge its possession of highly enriched uranium indirectly by having secretagreement attached as separate document.
-North delegation rejects U.S. suggestion, stressing that it is following instructions from Pyongyang.

March 24

U.S.-North working-level meeting convenes in New York.
-The North offers a proposal for declaration of its nuclear program to the U.S..

March 27-28

Bilateral meeting between the two Koreas convenes at Panmunjom on ROK’s economic aid to the North.
-Exchanges opinions on how to supply the third portion of the facilities and materials and overall support to beprovided at the Six-Party level

345

Appendix

&KURQRORJ\

Major Developments

April 8

U.S.-DPRK meeting convenes in Singapore.
-Acknowledge nuclear collusion between North and Syria, past UEP-related acts and inclusion of pledge againstrecurrence of such events-U.S. accepts uncertainties in progress toward next phase, although North’s declaration of its nuclear program
is considered not complete and accurate.
-The two sides reaches tentative agreement on formality of the North’s declaration of its nuclear program.

April 10

Second phase of third tripartite (ROK, North Korea, and China) meeting convenes in Beijing.
-Reaches tentative agreement on supply plan of the third portion of facilities and materials (ROK: 35,000 tons/
China: 15,000 tons)

April 22-24

Experts from the U.S. (five, including Sung Kim) and the North meet in Pyongyang .
-Discusses draft of North’s declaration of its nuclear program. U.S. asks for additional information pertaining to
nuclear waste stockpile sites and isotope production lab-The two sides agree to destroy a nuclear cooling tower within a day or two, following the submit of declaration of
its nuclear program, as a symbolic gesture concerning the disablement measure.
-The two sides discuss the North’s substantial declaration of its nuclear program and how to verify it.

April 28

Meeting between senior representatives of the ROK and U.S. convenes in Washington, D.C.
- Stresses the need to control verification and monitoring within Six-Party Talks- Briefs on meeting between experts of the U.S. and North and discussions about how to push ahead with thematterMay 8-10

Five-member U.S. delegation (including Sung Kim) makes second visit to the North.
-The North submits 314 volumes (18,822 pages in seven boxes) of supplementary data concerning its nuclear
program report.
-Concerning lifting of its status as a state sponsor of terrorism, the North expresses its intention to submit its
nuclear program report to China.
-Reconfirms the North’s intention to destroy nuclear cooling tower within 24 hours, following North’s submittalof its declaration of nuclear program and U.S. removal of North from its list of state sponsors of terrorism-Suggests final coordination of the declaration draft and review on its agenda the U.S.

May 13

Meeting between senior representatives of the ROK and China convenes in Beijing.
-Confirms that positive progress has been made concerning the North’s declaration of its nuclear program anddiscusses how to process the North’s unspent fuel rods
-Discusses how to make progress in the next session of the Six-Party Talks

May 19Meeting among senior representatives of the ROK, U.S. and Japan convenes in Washington, D.C.
- Assesses progress of the Six-Party Talks and discusses future directions of promotion

May 27-28

Meeting between senior representatives of the U.S. and the North convenes in Beijing.
-Discusses holding group meeting among technology experts before the North submittes declaration of its
nuclear programMay 27-31

Christopher Hill visits China and Russia.
-Discusses problems related to the North’s declaration of its nuclear program and resumption of the Six-Party
Talks

June 10

Meeting among five donor countries convenes in Seoul.
-Preliminary discussions of working-group meeting on Economic and Energy Cooperation

June 11

Fifth working-group meeting on Economic and Energy cooperation convenes at Panmunjom, resulting intentative consent on the Agreed Minutes.
-Supply of remainder of heavy fuel oil to North by October 2008
-Drawing up agreement for supply of remainder of planned facilities and materials by August 2008
-Prioritizing supply of anthracite gas facilities to the North3462010 Defense White Paper

&KURQRORJ\

Major Developments

June 11-12

Third working-group meeting for normalization of DPRK-Japan relations convenes in Beijing.
-The North says it would cooperate for the reinvestigation of abducted Japanese citizens and hijackers of acivilian airline (JAL-351) in 1970.
-Japan hints at partial lifting of sanctions against the North.

June 12

North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that discussions have been carried out successfully .
-Sung Kim, head of the U.S. State Department's Korea Desk, arrived in ROK on June 9, moved overland to
Pyongyang on following day, returned to ROK on June 11, and held press briefing on June 12.

June 20

Tripartite meeting among senior representatives of the ROK, U.S. and Japan from Six-Party Talks (Tokyo)

June 26

The North submits declaration of its nuclear program to China.
-U.S. President George Bush submits to Congress a report on changing the North’s status as state sponsor of
terrorism (measure to take effect on August 11, i.e., 45 days later).

June 27

The North destroys cooling tower for 5MWe nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and the U.S. cancels application of
Trading with the Enemy Act against the North.
-Sung Kim visits the North on June 27 and 28 and watches cooling tower being destroyed.

June 30

Number of spent fuel rods daily taken out increases from 15 to 30

July 10-12

Second meeting among the Sixth Round of Six-Party Talks’ senior representatives and third working-groupmeeting for Korean Peninsula denuclearization convene in Beijing.
-Assess the North’s declaration of its nuclear program; establish a verification system; discuss closure ofsecond phase of denuclearization and commencement of third phase-Establish a denuclearization-related verification system, complete disablement and provision of economic aid
to the North by end of October-Denuclearization working-group meeting fails to agree on how to draw up verification protocol.

July 23

Unofficial Six-Party Foreign Ministers’ meeting convenes in Singapore.
-Participating countries consent to an six-item agreement on the second phase of the North’s denuclearization
process.

July 30-August 1

Sung Kim visits China, discusses how to verify the North’s declaration of its nuclear program and meets with theNorth’s representatives.

July 31-August 1

Sung Kim and Lee Geun, foreign ministry official from the North, meet twice in Beijing.
-The North fails to explicitly say that it would allow sampling at its facilities.
-The North re-stresses that IAEA should not take high-profile role.

August 11-12

Fourth working-group meeting on Normalization of DPRK-Japan Relations convenes in Shenyang, China.
-Discusses reinvestigation on abduction of Japanese citizens, early lifting of sanctions on the North, early
handover of hijackers of JAL 351 (1970 incident), and settlement of historical issues* Reaches agreement on second day of discussion, brightening prospects for ensuing sessions

August 14

North Korean Embassy in Beijing informs Chinese Foreign Ministry that it would stop taking out spent fuel rods.

August 14-16

Sung Kim visits China for discussions about how best to verify the North’s declaration of its nuclear program.
* Representatives of the North are absent from these discussions.

August 17

The U.S. delivers 6,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to Songrim, North Korea. Remaining balance of 10,000 tons would.
be delivered to Sonbong

August 22

Bilateral meeting between the U.S. and North convenes in New York.
-The U.S. presents proposal for execution of complete and accurate nuclear verification to the North and asks forprompt reply.
* Representatives unnamed but most likely Sung Kim (U.S. Special Envoy to Six-Party Talks) and Kim Myong-gil(Political Minister at North’s UN Delegation)

347

Appendix

&KURQRORJ\
August 26
September 2Major Developments
North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that North stopped disabling its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon on
August 14 and that it is considering restoring the facilities.
The North begins restoring its nuclear facilities.

September 5-6

Meeting of Six-Party Talks senior representatives of the ROK, U.S., China and Japan convenes in Beijing.
-Exchanges opinions on drawing up verification implementation plan
-Discusses on how to deal with the North’s threat to cease disablement process and restore its nuclear facilities

September 19

North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that the North has restored its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.
-Inter-Korean working-level meeting on Economic and Energy Cooperation to North convenes at Panmunjom.
-Hwang Jun-guk (head of NK Nuclear Planning Group at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT)) .
represents the South, and his counterpart is Hyon Hak-bong (Deputy Director General in charge of the U.S. at
the North’s Foreign Ministry).
-Meeting ends with no concrete agreement on South-provided aid.

September 21

Bilateral meeting of Six-Party Talks’ senior representatives from the ROK and U.S.
-Agrees to work together to prevent deterioration of situation related to the North’s nuclear program anddiscusses how to conclude the second phase of the disablement process

September 22

Phone conversation between U.S. President George Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao-Agree to try and persuade the North to comply with what has been decided at Six-Party Talks
IAEA Director General says that the North has asked IAEA personnel to remove surveillance cameras and seals
from its nuclear facilities.
-IAEA inspectors confirm that the North has restored some of its nuclear equipment to its original condition.

September 23

U.S. President George Bush gives a speech at UN General Assembly.
-Saying that UN member countries should adopt firm attitude concerning reinforcement of sanctions against
North Korea and Iran

September 24

IAEA inspectors remove seals and surveillance equipment from Yongbyon nuclear reprocessing facilities as per
the North’s request.
The North announces plan to reintroduce nuclear materials into its facilities.

October 1-3

Christopher Hill visits North and discusses the North’s nuclear program with Foreign Minister Park Ui-chun,Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan, and Lt. General Lee Chan-bok.
-First, method for Yongbyon nuclear facility-related verification is submitted and, then, proposal to separate
issues concerning North’s UEP and its collusion with Syria is made.

October 11

U.S. State Department removes North from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

October 12

North Korean Foreign Ministry welcomes measure taken by the U.S. State Department.
-Announces resumption of disablement process (October 14) and allows U.S. and IAEA monitors to carry out
their duties in the North

October 25

The North’s Korean Central News Agency reports that Japan should be deprived of its status as a member of the
Six-Party Talks.

October 28

Meeting between Six-Party Talks senior representatives of the U.S. and Japan convenes in New York fordiscussions about the North’s nuclear program.

October 31

Steps are taken to decrease the number of spent fuel rods from 30 to 15 a day.

November 6

Director General of North Korean Foreign Ministry visits New York for discussions on verification protocol with
the U.S.
-Reconfirms what has been verbally understood concerning verification-related core points

3482010 Defense White Paper

&KURQRORJ\

Major Developments

November 12

North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that it denies verification-related agreement with the U.S.

November 24

Sung Kim meets Hwang Jun-guk (head of NK Nuclear Planning Group at South’s MOFAT).
-Discusses Six-Party Talks’ senior representatives meeting

November 27

U.S. provides 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, bringing the accumulated total to 546,000 tons (broken down to 400,000
tons, plus relevant facilities equivalent of 146,000 tons).

December 3

Tripartite pre-consultation among the ROK, U.S. and Japan prior to the Six-Party Talks is held in Tokyo.
-Agrees to include sampling in verification process

December 8-11

Meeting of Six-Party Talks senior representatives convenes in Beijing.
-Discusses documentation related to verification, including sampling, and timetable for economic and energy
assistance-Reaches no agreement concerning U.S. request for the North’s entry into Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT)2009
January 15-19

ROK fact-finding team visits the North in regard to processing of unspent fuel rods.
-Team is comprised of six people, i.e., head of MOFAT’s NK Nuclear Planning Group and five others from the
Ministry of Unification, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd.
-14,800 unspent fuel rods are worth about USD11 million-14 million.
-Price offered by the North is about USD71 million.

February 2

The North’s General Staff Department issues a statement on “Korean Peninsula denuclearization”:
1. Korean Peninsula denuclearization should cover the entire Korean Peninsula rather than only the North.
Denuclearization of the North would never occur unless the U.S. completely withdraws nuclear weapons fromthe South.
2. Korean Peninsula denuclearization should be realized through peninsula-wide verification.
3. Under current hostile relations between the two Koreas, the only possible way to remove nuclear weapons
from the peninsula is for the nuclear powers to realize nuclear disarmament.

February 19-20

Third working-group meeting on Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism convenes in Moscow.
-Second round of discussions about basic principles concerning peace and security in region-Participants: Huh Chul (head of Peaceful Diplomacy Planning Group at MOFAT) and five others from ministries
concerned-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits ROK.

March 7-10

U.S. special envoy to North Korea, Stephen Bosworth, visits South Korea.

March 12

Meeting between senior representatives of the ROK and Russia convenes.

March 16

Meeting between senior representatives of the ROK and Japan convenes.

March 26

North Korean Foreign Ministry issues statement:-The world would not see the North at Six-Party Talks and the North would restore its nuclear facilities if UN
Security Council issues presidential statement on its launch of a satellite or a country submits any Northrelated agenda to UN Security Council.

March 27

Tripartite (ROK, U.S. and Japan) meeting convenes.

April 5The North launches a long-range rocket (at 11: 30: 15 AM).

April 14

UN Security Council unanimously adopts presidential statement against the North, concerning its launch of along-range rocket.
North Korean Foreign Ministry issues statement rejecting the Six-Party Talks and publicizing its intention toreinforce its nuclear deterrence. North orders IAEA personnel at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities to leave thecountry.

349

Appendix

&KURQRORJ\

Major Developments

April 16

IAEA monitoring team (2) is expelled from the North.

April 17

Four U.S. members of monitoring team are expelled from the North.

April 24

UN Security Council Sanctions Committee selects and imposes sanctions on businesses in the North: Tanchon
Commercial Bank, Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, and Korea Ryongbong General Corporation.

April 25

The North announces that it starts reprocessing spent fuel rods from pilot nuclear power plant.

April 29

North Korean Foreign Ministry announces the country’s decision to construct light water reactor and carries out
technological testing for production of nuclear fuel.

May 25The North carries out its second nuclear test.

May 25-29

The North test-fires short-range missiles:-Two surface-to-ship missiles on May 25; a surface-to-ship missile and a surface-to-air missile on May 26; and asurface-to-air missile on May 29

June 12

UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1874:-Expressing gravest concern at North’s nuclear test and at the challenges such a test constitutes to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the
global non-proliferation regime-Referring to Article 41, Chapter VII, United Nations Charter (“The Security Council may decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions.”)

June 13

North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement:-It flatly rejects the UN resolution.
-It would start uranium enrichment and weaponize all newly extracted plutonium.
-It would consider any blockade attempt as an act of war to be met with a decisive military response.

July 2The North test-fires four surface-to-ship missiles from Sinsang-ri, Hambuk Province .

July 4The North test-fires five Scud missiles and two Rodong missiles from Kittaeryong, Kangwon Province.

July 27

ROK government submits its implementation plan concerning UN Security Council Resolution 1874:-Control of weapons and strategic commodities trade with the North, a ban on transfer of technology, training
and advice to the North-Effectuation of governmental sanction, including cargo searches, financial/economic sanctions and additional
future measures under relevant law-Sanctions against the following five businesses, five individuals, and two (additional) commodities:-Businesses: Namchongang Trading, General Bureau of Atomic Energy, Hong Kong Electronics, Korea Hyoksin
Trading Corporation, and Korea Tangun Trading Corp
-Individuals: Yun Ho-jin (Namchongang Trading), Ri Je-son (Director of General Bureau of Atomic Energy),
Hwang Sok-hwa (General Bureau of Atomic Energy), Ri Hong-Sop (former head of Yongbyon Nuclear ResearchCenter), and Han Yu-ro (Korea Yongaksan Trading Company)

September 4

Head of North Korean delegation to UN sends a letter to President of UN Security Council saying that his country
is in the final stage of reprocessing spent fuel rods and successfully carries out enrichment of uranium.

November 3

North’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announces that the country completed reprocessing spent fuel
rods.

2010
January 11

North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement proposing a meeting for peace treaty between signatories ofArmistice Agreement.
-For first time since it announced withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks in April 2009, it comments on a possible
return to the Six-Party Talks in connection with lifting the international community’s sanctions.

3502010 Defense White Paper

&KURQRORJ\March 29

Major Developments
KCNA says that the country’s reply to the international community would be a light-water reactor power plant
operating on self-generated nuclear fuel in the 2010s.

May 12Rodong Sinmun reports that the country succeeds in nuclear fusion with its own technology.

May 24

North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that the country has the right to continue to expand and reinforce its
nuclear deterrence.

June 15

U.S. President Barack Obama announces extension of economic sanctions against the North for another year toJune 26, 2011.

June 28

North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that the country strengthens its nuclear deterrence to that of a moreadvanced state.

July 9UN Security Council unanimously adopts a presidential statement on the Cheonan Incident.

July 26

Minister of the People's Armed Forces, Kim Yong Chun, says, “We will reinforce our nuclear deterrence
even further in response to the aggravating nuclear threat from the U.S.,” at a press conference for the 57th
anniversary of the signing of the Armistice Agreement.

August 2

Robert J. Einhorn, U.S. Coordinator for Iran and North Korea Sanctions, says that the U.S. would impose
additional sanctions against more businesses and individuals involved in the North’s activities related to WMDs
and missiles.

August 8

Rodong Sinmun reports that the country would bolster its nuclear deterrence even further to face enemies on
equal footing.

September 30

The North’s UN Ambassador says that his country would never give up its nuclear deterrence.

October 8

Institute for Science and International Security in the U.S. says that the North’s highly enriched uranium ( HEU)
development program has gone beyond lab level.

November 17

President Charles Jack Pritchard of the Korea Economic Institute (KEI) in the U.S. says, “North Korea is building
a 100MW experimental light water reactor in Yongbyon slated for completion by 2012.”

November 21

Siegfried Hecker, Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, reports
seeing hundreds of centrifuges installed at Yongbyon nuclear facility during his visit from November 9 to 13.

351

AppendixAppendix 6+LVWRU\RI1RUWK.RUHDǢV0LVVLOH
Development Program and Specifications&KURQRORJ\Early 1970s

North Korea obtains missile technology, (possibly) from participation in the People’s Republic of China’s missile
development program

1976-1981

Initiates development efforts working from an imported Soviet-made SCUD-B missile and an Egyptian launch pad

April 1984

First SCUD-B missile test-firing

May 1986

SCUD-C missile test-firing

1988

Operational deployment of SCUD-B/C missiles

May 1990

First Rodong missiles test-firing

June 1991

SCUD-C missiles firing

May 1993

Rodong missiles test-firing

January 1994

First identification of a Daepodong-1 missile

1998

Operational deployment of Rodong missiles

August 1998

Daepodong-1 missile test-firing (North insists it was a satellite.)

July 2006

Daepodong-2, Rodong and SCUD missiles test-firing

2007

Operational deployment of Musudan missiles (IRBMs)

April 2009

Firing of a long-range rocket (improved version of the Daepodong-2) (North insists it was a satellite.)

July 2009Rodong and SCUD missiles firing

Speciﬁcations
6&8'%

6&8'&

RodongMusudan(IRBM)'DHSRGRQJ'DHSRGRQJ

Range (km)

300

500

1,300

Over 3,000

2,500Over 6,700

Warheadweight (kg)

1,000

700

700

650

500

650-1,000 (est.)

Remarks

Operational
deployment

Operational
deployment

Operational
deployment

Operational
deployment

Test-firing

Under
development3522010 Defense White Paper

Appendix 7

No.

&KURQRORJ\RI6RXWK1RUWK
0LOLWDU\7DONVClassification

Date

Place

Details of Major Consultations/Agreements

1 Round of the InterKorean Defense
Ministerial Talks

September 24- 26, 2000

Jeju Island

ǩ$GRSWLRQRIWKHILYHSRLQWMRLQWSUHVVUHOHDVHRIWKHLQWHU
Korean Defense Ministerial Talks

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ0DMRUGHWDLOVRIWKHGLVFXVVLRQ SURSRVHG ,QWHU.RUHDQAgreement on Military Assurances-Designation of the timing and scope of the Joint
Administrative Area (JAA), location of the roads, andconstruction of facilities in the JAA-Security assurance issue for DMZ construction works-Simultaneous commencement of landmine removal in
the DMZ

Panmunjom
House ofPeaceǩ0DMRUGHWDLOVRIWKHGLVFXVVLRQ SURSRVHG ,QWHU.RUHDQ
Agreement on Military Assurances-Finalization of the routes of the inter-Korean roads-Discussion of the designation and operation of the JAA
as well as joint regulations-Agreement of signature/entry into force of theagreements regarding safety issues during constructionin the ministerial talks-Narrowing the differences regarding the simultaneouscommencement of landmine removal in the DMZ

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ&HQWHULQJDURXQGWKH6RXWKǢVUHVSRQVHWRWKHLVVXH
regarding the concept of main enemy posed by the North-The meeting ends after the South explains and delivers
its proposed agreement to the North. The two sides
decide to discuss the proposed agreement in ensuingtalks.

Panmunjom
House ofPeaceǩ0DMRUGHWDLOVRIWKHGLVFXVVLRQ SURSRVHG ,QWHU.RUHDQAgreement on Military Assurances-Designation and operation of the JAA-Mine removal in the DMZ, method of road & railway
reconnection works, and the method of contact andcommunication between the military personnel incharge of the construction sites-Security on construction personnel & equipment andsafety assurance issues

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilion

ǩ$JUHHPHQWRQ0LOLWDU\$VVXUDQFHVIRU'HVLJQDWLRQRIWKH
Joint Administrative Area in the East/West Coast Districts
and the Construction of Railways and Roads Connecting
the South and North
ⲼSignature/entry into force is delayed due to the excuseof the concept of main enemy.

st

1

2

1st Round of theinter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

3

2nd Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

4

3rd Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

5

4th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

6

5th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

November 28,
2000

December 5,
2000

December 21,
2000

January 31,
2001

February 8,
2001

353

Appendix

No.

Classification

Date

Place

Details of Major Consultations/Agreements

7

6 the Inter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

September 14,
2002

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ$GRSWLRQRIWKH$JUHHPHQWRQ0LOLWDU\$VVXUDQFHVIRU
Designation of the Joint Administrative Area in the East/
West Coast Districts and the Construction of Railways andRoads Connecting the South and North→agrees to sign/exchange/come into force agreement
through additional two rounds of talks (September 16/17)

8

7th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

September 16,
2002

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ&RQILUPDWLRQDQGLQLWLDOH[FKDQJHRIWKHWH[WRIWKH0LOLWDU\Assurance Agreement, and discussion of the proceduresof the 7th Inter-Korean Military Working-level Talks

9

8th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

September 17,
2002

Panmunjom
House ofPeaceǩ([FKDQJHDQGHIIHFWXDWLRQRIWKH$JUHHPHQWRQ0LOLWDU\Assurances for Designation of the Joint Administrative
Area in the East/West Coast Districts and the Constructionof Railways and Roads Connecting the South and North10

9th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

October 3,
2002

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ([FKDQJHDQGGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHPXWXDOFRQVWUXFWLRQ
plans by timeline and route diagrams for the reconnectionof railways and roadsǩ1HJRWLDWLRQRQWKHVXSSRUWRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQHTXLSPHQW

11

10th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

October 11,
2002

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ%DODQFLQJFRQVWUXFWLRQZRUNVIRULQWHU.RUHDQUDLOZD\ road reconnection and providing equipment for demining
in DMZ

12

11thRound of the InterKorean Military
Working-level Talks

October 16,
2002

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ&RQVXOWDWLRQRYHUWKHEDODQFHGFRQVWUXFWLRQZRUNVIRU
inter-Korean railway & road reconnection in DMZ

13

12th
Round of the InterKorean Military
Working-level Talks

October 25,
2002

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ'LVFXVVLRQRIPDWWHUVUHJDUGLQJYHULILFDWLRQRIEDODQFHG
construction of road & railway construction, joint survey
and communication line connection for the Donghae Line

14

13th
Round of the InterKorean Military
Working-level Talks

November 13,
2002

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ'LVFXVVLRQRIPDWWHUVUHJDUGLQJYHULILFDWLRQRIEDODQFHG
construction of road & railway construction, joint survey
and communication line connection for the Donghae Line

15

14th
Round of the InterKorean Military
Working-level Talks

December 23,
2002

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ&RQVXOWDWLRQVRYHUWKH SURSRVHG PDNHVKLIWURDG
passage agreement regarding the Gyeongeui Line andDonghae Line, and connection of the communication lines
concerning the Donghae Line

16

15th
Round of the InterKorean Military
Working-level Talks

January 27,
2003

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ$GRSWLRQDQGHIIHFWXDWLRQRIWKH3URYLVLRQDO$JUHHPHQW
on Military Assurances for Passage of Makeshift Roads
in the Joint Administrative Area in the East and West
Corridorsth3542010 Defense White Paper

No.

Classification

Date

Place

Details of Major Consultations/Agreements

17

16
Round of the InterKorean Military
Working-level Talks

June 4, 2003

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilion

ǩ$JUHHPHQWRQPXWXDOYLVLWVWRWKHWHPSRUDOURDG
construction sites for inspections (Number of personnel:
10 persons each for the east and west coast districts on
June 11)18

17th
Round of the Inter
Korean Military
Working-level Talks

September 17,
2003

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ$GRSWLRQDQGHIIHFWXDWLRQRIWKH6XSSOHPHQWDU\Agreement on the Provisional Agreement on Military
Assurances for Passage of Makeshift Roads in the Joint
Administrative Area in the East and West Coast Districts

19

18th
Round of the InterKorean Military
Working-level Talks

November 14,
2003

Panmunjom,
House ofPeaceǩ([SUHVVLRQRIPXWXDOSRVLWLRQVRQWKHSURSRVHG
Agreement on Installation and Operation of Guard Posts
in the Joint Administrative Area
ǩ&RQVXOWDWLRQRIGDWHIRUWKHFRQWDFWEHWZHHQSHUVRQVin charge of communication in relation to connection ofcommunication lines of Donghae line

20

19th
Round of the InterKorean Military
Working-level Talks

November 28,
2003

Panmunjom,
Unification
Pavilionǩ&RQVXOWDWLRQRYHU$JUHHPHQWRQ,QVWDOODWLRQDQG
Operation of Guard Posts

21

20th
Round of the InterKorean Military
Working-level Talks

December 23,
2003

Panmunjom
House ofPeaceǩ([FKDQJHDQGHIIHFWXDWLRQRIWKH$JUHHPHQWRQDQG
Installation Operation of Guard Posts in the Joint
Administrative Area in the East and West Coast Districts

22

1st Round of theInter-Korean
General Officerlevel Talks

May 26, 2004

Mt.
Kumgang,
North Korea

ǩ([SUHVVLRQRIPXWXDOSRVLWLRQVUHJDUGLQJPHDVXUHVWR
prevent accidental Naval clashes in the West Sea andto stop propaganda activities and remove propaganda
apparatus from the DMZ

23

2nd Round of theInter-Korean
General Officerlevel Talks

June 3-4,
2004

Mt. Seorak,South Korea

ǩ$GRSWLRQDQGHIIHFWXDWLRQRIWKH$JUHHPHQWRQWKH
Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea,
Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus from the DMZ

24

21st Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

June 10-12,
2004

Kaesong,
North Korea

ǩ$GRSWLRQDQGHIIHFWXDWLRQRIWKH6XEVHTXHQW$JUHHPHQW
on the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Navalclashes in the West Sea, and the Cessation of Propaganda
Activities and the Elimination of Propaganda Apparatus
from the DMZ

25

22nd Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

June 29-30,
2004

Paju,
South Korea

ǩ$VVHVVPHQWUHJDUGLQJSUHYHQWLRQRIDFFLGHQWDOQDYDO
clashes in the West Sea and first-stage propaganda
apparatus removal

26

23rd Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

July 5, 2004

Kaesong,
North Koreathǩ&RQVXOWDWLRQRYHUGLIIHUHQFHVUHJDUGLQJWKHVXEMHFWVRI
first-stage propaganda apparatus removal, agreement
to implement second-stage works. ROK suggests
improvement measures to prevent accidental clashes in
the West Sea.

355

Appendix

No.

Classification

Date

Place

Details of Major Consultations/Agreements

27

24th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

July 20, 2005

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ&RQVXOWDWLRQRYHUGLIIHUHQFHVUHJDUGLQJWKHVXEMHFWVRI
first-stage propaganda apparatus removal
ǩ&RQVXOWDWLRQRYHULQLWLDWLQJWKLUGVWDJHSURSDJDQGD
apparatus removal (July 25-August 13)ǩ$JUHHPHQWWRVHWWLQJXSWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQOLDLVRQRIILFH
to prevent accidental naval clashes in the West Sea (sinceAugust 13)ǩ6XJJHVWLRQRIWKH6XSSOHPHQWDU\$JUHHPHQW3HUWDLQLQJ
to Improvement Measures to Prevent Accidental Clashes
in the West Sea

28

25th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

August 12,
2005

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ&RQVXOWDWLRQRYHUGLIIHUHQFHVUHJDUGLQJWKHVXEMHFWVRI
third-stage propaganda apparatus removal

29

26th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

November 3,
2005

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ$JUHHPHQWWRGLVFXVVWKH$JHQGDIRU*HQHUDO2IILFHU
level Talks and the Military Assurances Agreement on
Railway/Road Passage

30

27th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

February 3,
2006

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilion

ǩ$JUHHPHQWWRFRQYHQHWKHWKLUGURXQGRIWKH*HQHUDO
Officer-level Talks
ǩ$JUHHPHQWWRGLVFXVVWKH0LOLWDU\$VVXUDQFH$JUHHPHQW
on Railway/Road Passage

31

3rd Round of theInter-Korean
General Officerlevel Talks

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ52.WRPDNHSURSRVDOVRQSUHYHQWLRQRIDFFLGHQWDO
clashes in the West Sea and establishment of Joint fishingarea, and conclusion of the Military Assurance Agreementon Railway/Road Passage
ǩ1RUWK.RUHDWREULQJXSLVVXHVRQUHHVWDEOLVKLQJWKH
West Sea Maritime Borderline

March 2-3,
2006

32

4th Round of theInter-Korean
General Officerlevel Talks

May 16-18,
2006

Panmunjom
House ofPeaceǩ52.H[SUHVVLRQRIWKHLQWHQWLRQWRGLVFXVVLQWKH,QWHU
Korean Defense Ministerial Talks on the basis of following
two principles as regards Maritime Borderline in the West
Sea
ⴘRespect/observe NLL as agreed in the Basic-Agreement
ⴙComprehensive implementation as for agreed items of
military area in the Basic Agreementǩ1RUWK.RUHDWRGHQ\LQVLVWLQJWKDWUHHVWDEOLVKLQJ:HVW
Sea Maritime Borderline is the basic problem that must
be resolved first

33

28th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

October 2,
2006

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ1RUWK.RUHDWRSURWHVWDJDLQVWVFDWWHULQJOHDIOHWVDQG
violation of East/West area transportation orderǩ52.WRUDLVHPLOLWDU\DVVXUDQFHPHDVXUHVIRUHFRQRPLF
cooperation project and expansion of confidence-building3562010 Defense White Paper

No.

Classification

Date

Place

Details of Major Consultations/Agreements

34

5 Round of theInter-Korean
General Officerlevel Talks

May 8-11, 2007

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ-RLQWSUHVVUHOHDVHIRUWKH*HQHUDO2IILFHUOHYHO7DONV
ǩ$GRSWLRQRIWKH3URYLVLRQDO$JUHHPHQWRQ0LOLWDU\Assurances of Railroad Test Runs

35

29th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

June 8, 2007

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ'LVFXVVLRQDERXWLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIDJUHHPHQWVIURPthe joint press release of the fifth round of the General
Officer-level Talks

36

30th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

July 10, 2007

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ'LVFXVVLRQDERXWLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIDJUHHPHQWVIURPthe joint press release of the fifth round of the General
Officer-level Talks

37

31st Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

July 16, 2007

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ'LVFXVVLRQDERXWGUDIWIRUWKH$JUHHPHQWVWREH
addressed in the 6th round of the General Officer-level
Talks

38

6th Round of theInter-Korean
General Officerlevel Talks

July 24-26,
2007

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ'LVFXVVHGSUHYHQWLRQRIZHVWVHDFODVKHVHVWDEOLVKPHQW
of joint fishing area, and military assurances to interKorean economic cooperation but ended with no progress

39

32nd Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

November 12,
2007

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ'LVFXVVLRQDERXWZRUNLQJOHYHOLVVXHVRQWKHVHFRQG
round of inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks

40

33rd Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

November 20,
2007

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ'LVFXVVHGZRUNLQJOHYHOSURFHGXUHV\HWWREHDJUHHGDQG
fine-tuned drafts for agreements for the second round of
the Defense Ministerial Talks

41

34th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

November 24,
2007

Panmunjom
House ofPeaceǩ)LQHWXQHGGUDIWVIRUDJUHHPHQWVIRUWKHVHFRQGURXQGRI
the Defense Ministerial Talks

42

2nd Round of InterKorean Defense
Ministerial Talks

November 2729, 2007

Pyongyang
Songjeon
Pavilionǩ$GRSWLRQRIWKH$JUHHPHQWVIURPLQWHU.RUHDQ'HIHQVH
Ministerial Talks to implement the Declaration for interKorean Development and Peaceful Prosperity, consistingof seven Sections and 21 Paragraphs

43

35th
Round of the InterKorean Military
Working-level Talks

December 5,
2007

th

Panmunjom
Unification
Pavilionǩ0LOLWDU\$VVXUDQFH$JUHHPHQWRQ5DLOZD\)UHLJKWTransport between Munsan and Bongdong

357

Appendix

No.

Classification

Date

Place

Details of Major Consultations/Agreements
ǩ$GRSWVWKH$JUHHPHQWVRQ0LOLWDU\$VVXUDQFHVIRU&V
for Joint Administrative Area in East/West Area, but it
failed to be implementedExtending passage time (07:00-22:00) andguaranteeing passage everydayAllowing wire/wireless communication and internet
communication from 2008Simplifying procedures to shorten passage time, etc
ǩ'LVFXVVHVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIMRLQWILVKLQJDUHD
and peace zone but it ended with no progress due tocontentions on location of joint fishing areas

44

7th Round of theInter-Korean
General Officerlevel Talks

December 1214, 200745

36th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

January 25,
2008

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ'LVFXVVLRQDERXWUDLOURDGFDUJRWUDQVSRUWDWLRQEHWZHHQ
Munsan and Bongdong

46

37th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

October 2,
2008

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

ǩ'LVFXVVLRQDERXWLPSOHPHQWDWLRQLVVXHVEHWZHHQWKHWZR
militaries
ⲼNorth Korea persistently focuses on the South’s civilian
organizations' flying leaflets to the North

Panmunjom
House ofPeaceǩ52.XUJHV1RUWK.RUHDWRWDNHUHVSRQVLEOHPHDVXUHVIRU
the sinking of ROKS Cheonan, to cease military threatsand provocation against ROK territorial waters, to put an
end to the slandering against ROK authorities
ǩ1RUWK.RUHDUHIXVHVWKHILQGLQJVRQWKHVLQNLQJRI52.6
Cheonan by the ROK side and reiterates its assertion of
dispatching an inspection group while making the issueof the leaflet flying by civilian groups and intrusion of ROKNavy vessels into territorial water claimed by the North

47

38th Round of theInter-Korean
Military Workinglevel Talks

3582010 Defense White Paper

September 30,
2010

Panmunjom
House ofPeace

Appendix 8&KURQLFOHRI,QWHU.RUHDQ5HODWLRQV
7KH1RUWK

Date
2008
February 25

Telefax message to the South:“North ceases all contact and dialogue with South. andbans South Korean officials crossing MDL.”March 29

Rodong Sinmun, the North’s official newspaper, starts
virulently condemning the ROK government, evenattacking the South’s new president by name.

April 1

7KH6RXWK
The Lee Myung-bak administration inaugurates

April 2

Telefax message to the North:“South regrets North’s recent stance and urges theNorth to refrain from behavior that will cause tension
on the Korean Peninsula.”

July 11

North Korean guard shoots and kills South Korean
tourist at Mt. Kumgang resort.

July 12

Telefax message to the North:“South will temporarily halt tourism to Mt. Kumgang.”* North refuses to acknowledge message.

July 13

Spokesperson for the South’s Ministry of Unification:“South urges the North to accept its fact-finding team
to investigate fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist;
and to take measures to prevent recurrence of similar
incidents.”

July 15

Telefax message to the North:“South urges the North to accept dispatch of its factfinding team South to the site of fatal shooting.”* North refuses to acknowledge message.

Spokesperson for the North’s military unit in charge of
Mr. Kumgang region (special statement):“North will expel any unnecessary South Korean andstrictly limit the number of South Koreans crossing the
MDL.”

August 3

Spokesperson for the Ministry of National Unification:“South regrets about unreasonable behavior of theNorth and urges acceptance of its fact-finding team toinvestigate.”

Telefax message sends to the South:“North will expel South Koreans from Mt. Kumgang
Tourism Region, effective August 10.”

August 9

Spokesperson for North’s Bureau for Guiding theGeneral Development of Tourist Resorts:“It is regrettable that the South has stopped the Mt.
Kumgang tourism program. An apology from theSouth is called for as are measures in case of similar
occurrences.”

359

Appendix7KH1RUWK

Date

7KH6RXWK

37th South-North Military Working-Level Talks* North strongly objects to issue of South Korean
civilian groups flying leaflets across border into Northby balloons and other means.

October 2

37th South-North Military Working-Level Talks* South urges North to stop slandering ROK President,
fully resume dialogue, settle tourist shooting incident
on Mt, Kumgang, and make access to Kaesong
Industrial Complex more convenient for South Koreans.

Rodong Sinmun warns:“possibility of relinquishing all relations with South.”

October 16

Inter-Korean military working-level contact held
*North objects to private South Korean groups sending
leaflets into North and warns it could have adverse
impact on Kaesong Industrial Complex and Kaesong
tours.

October 27

Spokesperson for North’s delegation to Inter-Korean
Military Talks warns:“Military action might be taken against flying of
leaflets.”

October 28

North’s military, Korean People’s Army (KPA) inspection
team checks status of Kaesong Industrial Complex.

November
6

Telefax message to the South:“North will limit or stop South Koreans crossing
the inter-Korean border (land crossing), effective
December 1.”

November
12

November
13

Telefax message to the South:“North will limit the crossing of South Koreansto and from the MDL, stop Kaesong tours and theoperation of trains between the two Koreas, and close
the Consultative Office for Inter-Korean Economic
Cooperation, effective December 1.”

November
24

Bureau for Guiding the General Development of Tourist
Resorts:“North will reduce the number of South Koreans in Mt.
Kumgang District by half.”

November
26

Telefax message to the South:“North will reduce the daily hours for the land crossing ofSouth Koreans through the MDL, effective December 1.”

November
27

North implements “December 1 Measure”* Limits crossing of South Koreans through MDL stops
Kaesong tours, ceases the operation of the South-North
railway, and restricts land crossing between the two
Koreas

December 1

3602010 Defense White Paper

Inter-Korean military working-level contact held
*South urges North to resolve issues, like delays in
granting South Koreans permits to travel in SouthNorth Joint Administrative Area (JAA), and stop limiting
work hours for South Korean commuters.

Telefax message to North: South expresses its position
on continuing operation and development of Kaesong
Industrial Complex, and proposes the discussion ofmaterials and equipment supply for normalization of
military communications line.

7KH1RUWK

Date

North releases New Year’s Editorial:“2009 is the year to heighten the revolutionary spirit forthe construction of a strong and prosperous nation.”

2009
January 1

January 2

North’s General Staff says:“North will assume all-out confrontational postureagainst South.”7KH6RXWK

President Lee Myung-bak’s New Year’s Address
stresses:“We will settle relations with the North in a resoluteand flexible manner.”

January 17

North’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of
the Fatherland (CPRF) says: “All political and militaryagreements with the South are now invalid.”

January 30

KPA says at a press conference:“North supports nuclear disarmament.”

February 2

North’s Korean Aerospace Technology Committeeannounces:“North is preparing a satellite launch.”

February 24

Ministry of Unification Spokesperson says:“The North’s statement is regrettable. The South willtake strong countermeasures if the Northern Limit Lineis violated.”

North at General-Level Military Talks between UN
Command (UNC) and KPA demands cancellation of KR/
FE combined exercises.

March 2

General-Level Military Talks between UN Command(UNC) and KPA* UNC defends need for KR/FE combined exercises.

CPRF statement threatens:“North cannot guarantee safety of South Korean
commercial airliners.”
North’s General Staff statement threatens: “InterKorean military communications line may be severed.”

March 52009 ROK-U.S. KR/FE combined exercises will be
conducted until March 20.

UNC-KPA General Officer-Level Military Talks held
* North defends launch of long-range rocket(Kwangmyongsong -2) as a right of sovereign state
under international law.

March 6

UNC-KPA General Officer-Level Talks* UNC urges North to cease missile launches.

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announces: Northhas joined International Space Convention.

March 12

North detains two U.S. female reporters.

March 17

CPRF statement goes:“North will take resolute countermeasures if Southtakes part in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).”*North detains one South Korean employee working in
Kaesong Industrial Complex.

March 30

North’s General Staff issues critical statement: “North
has assumed a high-level combat posture.”

April 2

ROK-U.S. Summit at G20 in the UK

361

Appendix7KH1RUWK

Date

7KH6RXWK

North launched improved version of long-range missile(Daepodong 2).

April 5

ROK government statement announces:“North’s launch of a long-range missile is in clear
violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718.
ROK expresses serious concern over North’s suchaction. Concrete countermeasures would be taken in
consultation with UN and countries concerned.”

North’s Foreign Ministry says:“North will withdraw from the Six-Party Talks andrestore its nuclear facilities.”

April 14

General Bureau for Central Guidance to theDevelopment of the Special Zone proposes“Inter-Korean meeting on April 21 (April 21 Meeting).”

April 16

North’s General Staff Spokesperson criticizes: “South’s
participation in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) will
be regarded as a declaration of war.”

April 18

Both sides meet to discuss Kaesong Industrial Complex.
* North announces it would reconsider mattersconcerning land lease agreement and it will adjust
wages for North Korean workers.

April 21Both sides meet to discuss Kaesong Industrial Complex.
* South urges North to release South Korean detainedat Kaesong Industrial Complex and proposes efforts forprompt settlement of issue related to 3Cs (Crossing,Communications and Customs Clearance).

KCNA reports:“South has taken provocative military action by
relocating MDL markers.”

April 22

South’s Joint Chiefs of Staff denies KCNA report.

North’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson:“North has started reprocessing spent fuel rods.”

April 25

North’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson threatens:“North will resume nuclear testing and test-launch an
ICBM.”

April 29

North carries out its second nuclear test and test-fires
two short-range missiles.

May 25

ROK government statement condemns:“Such an act poses a serious threat to world peace,
is a grave challenge to the international NPT system,
and constitutes a clear violation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1718.”* South urges North to return to NPT regime.

North test-fires three short-range missiles

May 26

ROK government announces its full participation in PSI.

- North test-fires two short-range missiles
North’s delegation to Panmunjom threatens:“The South’s participation in PSI is a declaration of war, andwe will counter this with a military strike, reject the binding
power of the Armistice Agreement, contest the legal statusof the five West Sea islands and no longer guarantee thesafety of South Korean ships traveling in our waters.”
CPRF statement threatens:“Any inspection on the North’s ships by the South will faceresolute and merciless wartime-like retaliation.”

May 273622010 Defense White Paper

7KH1RUWK

Date

North’s Foreign Ministry says:“The North’s nuclear test is a self-defensive measure,and the UN Security Council should withdraw its
resolution against the North.”

May 29First Inter-Korean working-level talks concerning
Kaesong Industrial Complex* North asks for land lease fee to be raised by USD 500
million and its workers’ monthly wage to be raised by
USD 300.

June 11First inter-Korean working-level talks concerning
Kaesong Industrial Complex* South indicates North’s demands unrealistic

June 12

UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1874 against
North Korea.

North’s Foreign Ministry statement goes:“The North is enriching uranium, will weaponize all
plutonium produced and take military countermeasuresin the event of a blockade against it.”

7KH6RXWK

June 13.

June 16.

ROK-U.S. Summit* ROK-U.S. Vision for Strategic Alliance adopts

June 19.

Second inter-Korean working-level talks concerning
Kaesong Industrial Complex* South presents three principles (i.e., observanceof agreements, economic principles, and futureorientedness) for development of Kaesong Industrial
Complex. South also proposes joint inspection offoreign-invested industrial units in the Complex .

Third inter-Korean working-level talks concerning
Kaesong Industrial Complex held
* North requests USD 500 million in increased landlease fee as precondition to mitigation of restrictions on
crossing of South Koreans across MDL.
-North test-fires four short-range missiles.

July 2

Third inter-Korean working-level talks concerning
Kaesong Industrial Complex* South urges North to immediately release South
Korean employees detained at Kaesong Industrial
Complex.

North test-fires Rodong missiles and SCUD missiles,
a total of 7 missiles.

July 4

Second Inter-Korean working-level talks concerning
Kaesong Industrial Complex held
* North reiterates previous demand.

July 6

UN Security Council presidential statement criticizes
North’s test-firing.

Kim Yong-nam, Standing Committee Chairman ofSupreme People’s Assembly:“No more Six-Party Talks needed permanently.”* Conference of Nonaligned Countries held in Cairo

July 16

UN Security Council finalizes list of those in Northsubject to sanctions under Resolution 1874:* Five businesses and institutions, five individuals, andtwo commodities

North’s UN Ambassador Sin Son-ho says:“North will not oppose dialogue with the U.S.”

July 25

North’s Foreign Ministry issues statement: The North
proposes bilateral dialogue with the U.S.

July 27

363

Appendix7KH1RUWK

Date

7KH6RXWK

July 29

U.S. State Department Spokesperson says:“U.S. will enter into a dialogue with North Korea within
the framework of the Six-Party Talks.”

North seizes South Korean fishing vessel the Yeonan
800.

July 30

Telefax message to North from Ministry of Unification:“North should immediately repatriate the Yeonan 800.”

Telefax message to South:“South Korean vessel being investigated and will behandled according to results of investigation.”

July 31

Telefax message to North from Ministry of Unification:"We demands Immediate repatriation of the Yeonan
800.”

Kim Jong Il and former U.S. President Bill Clinton meetin Pyongyang.

August 4

Former U.S. President Bill Clinton visits Pyongyang.

August 5

Former President Clinton secures release of two
female U.S. reporters detained by North and returns.

August 10

Hyundai Asan CEO Hyun Jeong-eun visits Pyongyang.

North releases South Korean previously detained at
Kaesong Industrial Complex as official expulsion.

August 13

August 15

Hyundai and North’s Asia Pacific Peace Committee issue
joint press release after Kim Jong Il and Hyundai Asan
CEO Hyun Jeong-eun meets:* Resumption of Mt. Kumgang tours; normalizationof MDL crossing and overnight stay; resumption of
Kaesong tours; invigoration of Kaesong Industrial
Complex; promotion of Mt. Baekdu tours; promotion ofreunions for separated families during Chusok
North’s Panmunjom delegation:“North will retaliate mercilessly against South’s UFG
exercises.”

August 16

August 20
North lifts restrictions on land crossing through MDL
and on stays.
North sends funeral delegation to Seoul to pay
condolences to bereaved family of former President
Kim Dae-jung until August 23.

3642010 Defense White Paper

President Lee Myung-bak announces new peace
initiative for Korean Peninsula in Liberation Day (August15) address .

ROK government proposes inter-Korean contact forreunion of separated families.

August 21

August 23

President Lee Myung-bak meets funeral delegationfrom North.

August 26

Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks at Mt. Kumgang Hoteluntil August 28

7KH1RUWK

Date

North notifies release of South Korean fishing vessel
the Yeonan 800.

August 28

Both sides agree to reunion of separated families on
Chusok during Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks.

August 29

The Yeonan 800 returns to South.

Normalization of land crossing via Kyeongui Line, andcommunications line in Western corridor

September 1

North’s UN Ambassador Sin Son-ho sends letter to UN
Security Council President, saying:“North is in final stage of its enrichment of uranium,
and will reprocess and weaponize all of the plutonium
produced.”

September 4

North opens Hwanggang dam floodgates without
notification causing death of six South Korean campers.

September 6

Telefax message to the South:“Water urgently discharged from the dam due to highwater levels. Notice will be given in future when opening
floodgates.”
Consultative Office for Inter-Korean Economic
Cooperation resumes normal operations.

7KH6RXWK

September 7

Telefax message to the North from Minister of Land,
Transport and Maritime Affairs:“The Minister expresses deep regret and asks theNorth to explain over the tragic incident.”

September 8

ROK government demands for formal apology from
North over death of South Koreans caused by North’s
abrupt release of water from Hwanggang Dam.

September
21

President Lee Myung-bak proposes a “Grand Bargain”
to the North .

September
26

President Lee Myung-bak states clearly: “South denies
North’s status as nuclear power.”

North’s Vice Foreign Minister Park Gil-yon says:“North will respond in kind, dialogue for dialogue,
nuclear deterrence for sanctions.”

September
29

11 North Koreans defect to South via East Sea

October 1

Telefax message to the South:“Repatriation of North Korean defectors urged.”

October 2

Telefax message sends to South:“Repatriation of North Korean defectors strongly
urged.”
North’s UN Ambassador Sin Son-ho flatly rejects UN
Security Council Resolution of A World without Nuclear
Weapons.

October 8

Telefax message to the North:“11 North Koreans have confirmed desire to defect toSouth. North can verify their decisions upon request.”

October 12

ROK government proposes working-level contact forInter-Korean talks* Discussions over prevention of tragic flood-related
incidents on Imjin River and Red-Cross Talks

North test-fires five short-range missiles

365

Appendix7KH1RUWK

Date

7KH6RXWK

Telefax message to the South:“Proposal for working-level contact is accepted.”

October 13

North expresses regret over death of South Koreanscaused by its abrupt discharge of water into Imjin Riverand expresses condolences to the bereaved relatives
Rodong Sinmun urges “resumption of Mt. Kumgang/
Kaesong tours.”

October 14

North’s Navy Command statement argues:“South Korean naval vessel intrudes into our territorial
waters.”

October 15

Inter-Korean Red Cross working-level talks held
* North’s Red Cross formally asks South forhumanitarian support

October 16

Inter-Korean Red Cross working-level talks

October 19

ROK Government informs the North that it is ready toreconnect military communications line linking the twosides.

Telefax Message to the South:“North agrees on upgrading work for militarycommunications line linking two sides.”Inter-Korean working-level contact for discussions ofImjin River floodings hand

October 20

October 26

ROK government offers to send 10,000 tons of corn and
20 tons of powdered milk

October 28

South supplies materials required for connecting
military communications line.

KCNA announcement:“The North has finished reprocessing 8,000 spent fuelrods for weaponization.”

November 3South’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson says: “North’s
reprocessing of spent fuel rods is clear violation of UN
Security Council resolutions.”

North’s Supreme Command asks for apology fromSouth and for measures to prevent recurrence of naval
conflict

November
10

Daecheong naval campaign occurs in the West Sea

November
11

Cheongwadae (the Blue House) spokesperson says:“South does not want Daecheong naval campaign tonegatively impact inter-Korean relations.”

North enforces currency reform.

North’s Navy Command Spokesperson designates anddeclares “Peacetime maritime firing zone.”3662010 Defense White Paper

November
30
December 8

U.S. special envoy Stephen Bosworth visits to the North
until December 10.

December
21

South’s Navy Headquarters Spokesperson says:"The NLL has served as the effective sea border
between the two Koreas for the past 50 years. The
North should cease instigating acts that elevate tension
near the NLL.”

7KH1RUWKNorth releases New Year’s editorial.
-Expresses its commitment to improving inter-Korean
relations

Date

7KH6RXWK

December
22

Military communications line installation completes .

January 1,
2010

January 4

North’s Foreign Ministry statement: “North proposesmeeting of Peace Treaty for signatories to 1953
Armistice Agreement state parties.”

President Lee Myung-bak delivers New Year’s Speech:*Proposes establishment of inter-Korean liaison office
and joint-recovery of unidentified remains of Korean
War KIAs

January 11

North’s UN Ambassador Sin Son-ho: “Lifting of all
sanctions against the North is a precondition to the SixParty Talks and meetings for the Peace Treaty at thesame time.”

January 12

Telefax message to the South:“South Korea should punish those flying leaflets into
North Korea.”

January 13

North’s Asia Pacific Peace Committee proposes
working-level meeting for resumption of Mt. Kumgang/
Kaesong tours.

January 14

North’s National Defense Commission Spokesperson
warns: Concerning “a sudden changes surrounding the
Korean Peninsula, the South’s Ministry of Unificationand the National Intelligence Service should bedismantled. The North will initiate a retaliatory holy
war and exclude the South Korean authorities from all
dialogue.”

January 15

North’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson says: “Sanctions
against the North should be lifted prior to its return to
the Six-Party Talks.”

January 18

South’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson announces:“It would be possible to start negotiations for a peace
regime on the Korean Peninsula at a separate forum, if
the Six- Party Talks resumes and the denuclearizationof the North makes progress .”In response to warning from North’s National Defense
Commission, Ministry of Unification expresses deep
regret over threatening remarks and actions based on
unsubstantiated media reports.

January 19

Meeting holds in Kaesong to evaluate inter-Korean joint
inspection of foreign-invested industrial complexes
until January 20

State Development Bank and Chosun Taepung
International Investment Group established

January 20

South’s Minister of National Defense warns:“The South would make a preemptive strike if it wereascertained that the North was preparing a nuclear
attack.”Telefax message to the South:“North requests for military working-level talks.”

January 22

367

Appendix7KH1RUWK

Date

CPRF Spokesperson threatens: “The South’s Ministriesof Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and National
Defense together with the National Intelligence Service
are the Four Gyeongin (2010) Traitors.”

January 23

7KH6RXWK

January 25

Telefax message to the North:“We propose Inter-Korean working-level talks
concerning Kaesong Industrial Complex on February 1,
and subsequent military working-level talks.”

North declares “no-sail zone” in the West Sea fromJanuary 25 to March 29 and proposes meeting with UNC
about remains recovery of U.S. KIAs in its areas

January 26

Navy HQ Spokesperson says:“South urges North to stop unnecessary acts causing
tension near the NLL and South reaffirms commitment
to the defense of NLL.”

North fires artillery rounds near NLL. General Staff
announces “continuation of artillery firing exercises.”
UNC-KPA Working-level talks for remains recovery for
U.S. KIAs.
*North proposes resuming remains recovery for U.S.
KIAs.

January 27

Telefax message to the North:“We strongly urge to halt unnecessary acts causing
tension.”North fires artillery shots near NLL .

January 28

North fires artillery shots near NLL .

January 29

North announces five additional no-sail zones fromJanuary 31 to February 2.

January 31

Fourth inter-Korean working-level talks for Kaesong
Industrial Complex held
* North points to the need to raise wages for its workers.

February 1

North designates two maritime artillery firing zones
near Baengnyeong and Daecheong islands.

February 3

North announces five additional artillery firing zones inWest and East Seas, February 6-28.

February 4

North’s Ministry of People’s Security and State Security
issue joint statement denouncing attempt to overthrow
the regime

February 8

February 12

North designates artillery firing and no-sail zones in in
the West and East Seas,February 20-22.

3682010 Defense White Paper

February 18

Fourth inter-Korean working-level talks for Kaesong
Industrial Complex*South expresses regret over North’s firing of artillery
in the West Sea. The two sides agree to hold workinglevel military talks about the “3Cs.”

Telefax message to the North:“We propose South-North military working-level talks
to discuss the ‘3Cs’ on February 23.”

7KH1RUWKTelefax message to the South:“We propose working-level military talks on March 2 in
Kaesong.”
Telefax message to the South:“Kaesong is proper place for discussions in
consideration of characteristics of the 3Cs.”
General Staff statement: “North denounces South’s KR/
FE exercises and signals mobilization of all attack anddefensive capabilities, including nuclear, if required.”
Telefax message to the South:“We accept working-level contact on March 2 to discuss
3Cs.”

Date

7KH6RXWK

February 20

Telefax message to North:“North’s designation of no-navigation and artillery
firing zones in West and East Seas an act of provocationin defiance of the Armistice Agreement and the InterKorean Non-Aggression Agreement.”

February 22

February 25

Telefax message to North:“North-proposes date of March 2 for military workinglevel talks accepted, but Panmunjom Peace Housepreferred venue.”

February 28

Telefax message to North:“Kaesong accepts as venue for the talks, but talks
should be a working-level contact between theauthorities, not a military talks.”

Inter-Korean working-level contact for discussion about
3Cs in regard to Kaesong Industrial Complex held
* North asks for compliance with the June 15 andOctober 4 Declarations, cessation of confrontationaland hostile acts against it, and compliance with existing
agreements concerning 3Cs.

March 2

North’s Asia Pacific Peace Committee Spokesperson
announces:“The North will scrap all existing projects andcontracts, if the South blocks Mt. Kumgang/Kaesong
tours.”March 4

North’s delegation to Panmunjom:-Denounces KR/FE exercises-Reiterates it would not be bound by ArmisticeAgreement and would counter any actions taken by
South with its nuclear deterrence-Threatenes to end military dialogues with South andU.S.

March 7

KCNA issues announcement, denouncing KR/FE
exercises.

March 17

North’s Asia Pacific Peace Committee informs Souththat North would inspect South’s real estate on Mt.
Kumgang, starting March 25.
* Also Mt. Kumgang tours would be handed over to new
corporation if South failed to resume tours by April .

March 18

Inter-Korean working-level contact for discussions
about the 3Cs in regard to Kaesong Industrial Complex*South demands North assure free crossing of South
Koreans whenever needed through RFID technology,
adopt selective inspection methods for more prompt
customs clearance, and provide Internet andtelecommunications services for mobile phones toensure free communications.

369

Appendix7KH1RUWK

Date

Bureau for Guiding the General Development of Tourist
Resorts denounces South Korean authorities forblocking Mt. Kumgang/Kaesong tours

March 19

Inspectors from North conducts survey over South’s
real estate on Mt. Kumgang.

March 25
March 26

North’s delegation to Panmunjom issues statement:“The South, by allowing civilians to tour the DMZ andreporters to have access to the DMZ for coverage, canbe considered to be engaging in psychological warfare
against the North. This could result in unexpected
events.”March 29

Bureau for Guiding the General Development of Tourist
Resorts mentions:"The North will freeze South Korean governmentowned assets such as the Mt. Kumgang Visitor
Center and fire station for failure to allow real estate
inspections."

March 31

North’s delegation at Panmunjom urges to recoverremains of U.S. soldiers killed during Korean War

April 5

Bureau for Guiding the General Development of Tourist
Resorts issues statement:
Freezes South Korean government/KTO-owned assets
on Mt. Kumgang; expels maintenance personnel;
commences Mt. Kumgang tourism for Koreans andforeigners under new management; conducts all-out
review of Kaesong Industrial Complex project

April 8

Telefax message to the South notifies:“South Koreans passing through South-North JAA
are also bringing leaflets into North Korea. North willreconsider implementation of military assurance of
their safe crossing.”

April 10

April 12
North takes measures to freeze South Korean realestate on Mt. Kumgang.

April 13KCNA broadcasts North’s first official response tosinking of ROKS Cheonan:“It is a trick perpetrated by the South and have nothing
to do with us.”

April 17

Director General Park Lim-su, Policy Bureau, National
Defense Commission, conducts inspection tour of
Kaesong Industrial Complex.

April 193702010 Defense White Paper

7KH6RXWK

The sinking of ROK Ship Cheonan

Ministry of Unification Spokesperson expresses regret
over unilateral measures taken by North.

Telefax message to North:‘Adherence to June 4 Agreement.’

7KH1RUWK

Date

7KH6RXWK

North’s Foreign Ministry issues memorandum
announcing “North would produce nuclear weapons asneeded.”April 21

Director General Park Lim-su, Policy Bureau, National
Defense Commission, inspects South’s real estateholdings on Mt. Kumgang, until April 23.

April 22

Bureau for Guiding the General Development of Tourist
Resorts Spokesperson issues statement:“The North will confiscate currently frozen South
Korean government/KTO-owned assets.”

April 23

People’s Army Chief of Staff Lee Yong-ho threatens:“We will destroy the enemy’s stronghold completely,
mobilizing all of our means, including our nuclear
deterrence, if the enemy intrudes even 0.001 mm into
our land, waters or air space.”

April 24

North takes measure to freeze South Korean real estateholdings on Mt. Kumgang

April 27

Kim Jong Il visits China until May 7.

May 3

North announces its successful nuclear fusion.

May 12

Telefax message to South warns:“North will limit land crossing for South Koreans andtake more substantial measures – harsher than merely
stopping crossing – if Civilian Groups continue to spread
leaflets in our territory.”

May 16

North’s CPRF issues a “letter of charge” concerning
ROKS Cheonan sinking* It is a planned and intentional provocation on the partof the South designed to ruin inter-Korean relations.”

May 19National Defense Commission Spokesperson maintains
that concerning the Cheonan incident, the NDC will
dispatch an inspection team to the South Telefax
message to the South urges its acceptance of visit.

May 20

Joint civil-military investigation group announces resultof its investigation of the ROKS Cheonan incident .

CPRF Spokesperson argues that “The North regards
the present situation as a state of war and will shut
down all relations with the South, scrap the InterKorea Non-Aggression Agreement completely, stop all
cooperative projects with the South, if the South takes
countermeasures and retaliations.”

May 21

Telefax message to North:“Cheonan attack violation of Armistice Agreement andSouth-North Basic Agreement. This provocative act
will be dealt with within the framework of ArmisticeAgreement management system.”

Telefax message to the South urges again that theSouth should accept visit of its inspection team.

May 22

371

Appendix7KH1RUWK

Date

7KH6RXWKMay 24In response to Cheonan sinking, President Lee Myungbak public statement:*Close Navigation Route; halt exchanges andcooperation with the North; invoke right to self-defensein event of armed invasion by North; refer incident to
UN Security Council; and demand North to apologize
and punish those involved in Cheonan attack
South’s Defense Minister announced measures to betaken against North:*Resumption of psychological warfare against theNorth; Closure of sea lanes for merchant ships;
holding of ROK-U.S. joint anti-submarine exercises;and preparation for PSI-related maritime interdiction
exercises within and outside the country’s territorial
watersCPRF Spokesperson announces an 8-item statement on
all-out severance of inter-Korean relations*Sever all relations with the South*Immediate end to all dialogue and contact withcurrent South Korean Administration and government
agencies during its term*Complete halt to all activities carried out by Red Cross
liaison office at Panmunjom*Severing all communications channels with South*Closing Consultative Office for Inter-Korea Economic
Cooperation and expelling South Koreans from the
Kaesong Industrial Complex*Counterattack against South’s anti-North
psychological warfare*No crossing for South Korean ships/airplanes throughNorth’s territorial waters and airspace*Issues concerning relations with South handled as instate of war

May 25

Minister of National Defense:“South would invoke right to self-defense in eventof North attacking South’s psychological warfare
equipment.”

Telefax message to South threatens:“North will respond strongly, including blocking South
Korean personnel and vehicles in the Western corridor
from entering its territory, should South resume
psychological warfare.”May 26

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits ROK: "TheNorth Korean leaders responsible for the attack on
ROKS Cheonan will be held accountable."

North’s General Staff announces:*Reviewing complete ban on land crossing*Merciless countermeasures against South’s anti-North
psychological warfare*Invalidation of Agreement on Prevention of Incidental
Collision in the West Sea*Cessation of International Maritime Merchant Vessel
Network*Readiness for immediate physical retaliation against
intrusions into territorial waters*Complete ban on crossing of South’s ships, airplanes orother mobile means through territory, waters or airspace.

May 27

North’s Central District Frontline Commander warns:“The North will conduct destructive firing directly at
the South’s psychological warfare facilities should theSouth activate one.”3722010 Defense White Paper

7KH1RUWK

Date

NDC repels the Cheonan investigative report atinternational press conference saying that “The Northrenounces the findings of the South’s investigation of
the attack on the ROKS Cheonan.”
North holds a rally attended by about 100,000 people in
Pyongyang.

May 28

7KH6RXWK

May 30MND issues statement refuting assertions from North’s
National Defense Commission.

North’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson says:“If the international community tries to refer theCheonan attack to the UN Security Council, based solely
on the findings of the South’s unilateral investigation,
the nefarious intent will be obviously demonstrated.”

June 4

ROK government referred Attack against the ROKS
Cheonan to UN Security Council.

CPRF Secretariat denounces UN Security Council for
letter indicting North Korea’s likely involvement insinking of ROKS Cheonan.

June 6

North’s UN Ambassador Sin Son-ho denounces in his
letter to UNSC President:“The North’s inspection group should have been
allowed to verify the findings of the South’s investigation
prior to the matter being discussed by the UN Security
Council.”June 9NDC states at a press conference:“The North will take merciless countermeasuresagainst the South concerning the North’s referral to the
UNSC over the Cheonan incident.”

June 11

North’s General Staff threatens in a “critical”
announcement:“The South’s resumption of psychological warfare isa direct declaration of war, and we will respond with amerciless military strike against the South that will turnSeoul into a sea of fire.”

June 12June 14
North’s UN Ambassador Sin Son-ho mentions that
“If UN moves to take measures against the North,
North’s military will take countermeasure.”

June 15Chairman of Supreme People's Assembly, Choi Tae Bokargues that “The North will mercilessly strike sanctions
with a merciless blow.”

June 19

June 23

South finishes installing loudspeakers for psychological
warfare against the North.

The South’s Joint Civil-Military Investigation Group
briefs UNSC on results of its investigation.

Defense Committee of National Assembly passes
resolution denouncing North over ROKS Cheonan
incident.

373

Appendix7KH1RUWKNorth rejects UNC proposal reiterating its insistence
on dispatch of inspection team to the West Sea andproposes high-level inter-Korean military meeting.

Date

7KH6RXWK

June 26

UNC proposes working-level talks for UNC-KPA
General officer-Level Talks.

June 27

South and U.S. announce agreement to postpone returnof wartime operational control to the ROK military until
end of 2015.

June 28

Deputy Minister for Policy at ROK MND:
“The North’s proposal for a high-ranking SouthNorth military meeting for discussing its dispatch of
an inspection team was an attempt to invalidate theArmistice System.”June 29

Plenary meeting of National Assembly adopts
resolution denouncing North over ROKS Cheonan
incident.

Letter to UNSC requests joint South-North investigationof the ROKS Cheonan incident .

June 30

CPRF Spokesperson threatens that “The North is readyto wage a life and death struggle if the UNSC fabricates
any form of slandering document targeting North.”

July 7

KCNA reports that “The North will not raise objects tothe formality or method of the UNC-KPA General officer-level Talks so long as the military talks helps find truth
about the ROKS Cheonan incident.”

July 9North’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson argues that
“The Six-Party Talks should be used to secure a Peace
Treaty.”July 10

North proposes rescheduling working-level talks for
UNC-KPA General Officer-Level Talks to July 15 from
July 13

July 13First working-level military talks for UNC-KPA General
Officer-Level Talks held:*North insists it should have been allowed to dispatch
inspection team prior to General-Level Military Talks.

July 15First working-level military talks for UNC-KPA General
officer-Level Talks:*South proposes UNC-KPA General officer-Level Talks .

July 23

Second working-level military talks for UNC-KPA
General officer-Level Talks:*South urges North to observe Armistice Agreement
and proposes formation of joint evaluation team.

Second working-level military talks for UNC-KPA
General officer-Level Talks held:*North proposes composition and operation of Defense
Committee inspection group.
*Spokesperson for North’s ARF threatens physicalcounter response to ROK-U.S. combined exercises.

3742010 Defense White Paper

UNSC adopts presidential statement denouncing
Cheonan attack.

7KH1RUWK

Date

NDC maintains:North will counter ROK-U.S. combined exercise withstrong nuclear deterrence;
North will launch retaliatory holy war at time of its
choosing based on its nuclear deterrence; and North isnot culpable in any way for ROKS Cheonan incident.

July 24

July 25

Kim Young-chun, North’s Minister of the People`s
Armed Forces says that “The North will reinforce its
nuclear deterrence in a new and developed way against
the mounting U.S. threat.”

The third working-level talks for UNC-KPA General
Officer-Level Talks held:*North reiterates insistence on dispatch of its NDC
inspection team.

7KH6RXWK

ROK-U.S. combined maritime exercise “Invincible
Spirit” conducted (until July 28)

July 26

July 27

The third working-level talks for UNC-KPA General
officer-Level Talks:*South says it would not accept North’s dispatch ofinspection team. The South explains its proposed
procedures regarding a joint evaluation team. UNC
Commander Walter Sharp says that Cheonan attack isclear violation of Armistice Agreement.

August 1

Telefax message to North:"South urges North to apologize for accidents causedby its landmines and to prevent the recurrence ofsimilar accidents."

North’s West District Frontline Commander threatens:“The North will deal a physical blow to the South’s plan
to conduct a firing exercise in the West Sea.”

August 3

CPRF Secretariat threatens in a statement:“The North will crush the South mercilessly with themost formidable means of attack and methods of
warfare in response to the South’s anti-submarine
exercises in the West Sea.”

August 5Rodong Sinmun threatens that physical strike from
North is more than a verbal warning.

August 7

North seizes South Korean fishing vessel the Daeseung 55.

August 8

North fires artillery shots to south of the NLL.

August 9South carries out anti-submarine exercises (until
August 9).

375

Appendix7KH1RUWK

Date

7KH6RXWK

August 10

The fourth working-level military talks for UNC-KPA
General officer-Level Talks:*UNC points out inappropriateness of name “a joint
North-U.S. inspection group.”
Telefax message to North:“North’s artillery shots in West Sea violation ofArmistice Agreement and Non-Aggression Agreement.”

August 11

Telefax message to North’s Red Cross asking for early
repatriation of Daeseung-ho

North’s General Staff threatens that “The North willcounter South’s UFG exercises with merciless military
measures.”

August 15

President Lee Myung-bak makes the following proposalin August 15 speech commemorating anniversary ofcountry’s 1945 liberation:*Proposed peaceful, economic unification under acommunity of one people. Proposed discussions on
imposing unification tax

CPRF statement denounces that “South Korean
President Lee Myung-bak’s suggestion of a unification
tax is tantamount to declaring full-blown hostilities
against the North as it alludes to the possibility of an
abrupt change in the North’s situation.”

August 17

KCNA reports on the North’s seizure of South Korean
fishing vessel the Daeseung 55.

August 19

The fourth working-level military talks for UNC-KPA
General officer-Level Talks held:*North proposes to form a joint North-U.S. inspectiongroup.

August 20

Telefax message to North’s Red Cross: Again urges
early repatriation of Daeseung.

Chairman Kim Yong-nam of the North’s Standing
Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly
threatens that “The North will initiate a retaliatory holy
war based on its nuclear deterrence in response to
ROK-U.S. combined exercises.”

August 25

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visits Pyongyang.
*Returned to U.S. on August 27 with American
missionary detained in North

Kim Jong Il visits China until August 30.

August 26

Telefax message to North’s Red Cross:“South offers relief supplies for flood victims in North.”

August 31

U.S. announces administrative order for additionalsanctions against North.
Telefax message to North’s Red Cross:“South offers relief supplies worth about KRW 10 billion
upon North’s request.”

Telefax message to Korean Red Cross says that they
acccept proposal for provision of relief supplies*North requests rice, cement and construction
equipment.

September 4

Telefax message to Korean Red Cross announces“repatriation of fishing vessel the Daeseung 55 on
September 7.”

September 63762010 Defense White Paper

7KH1RUWKTelefax message to Korean Red Cross proposes“reunion of separated families on the occasion of
Chusok.”Date

7KH6RXWK

September10

Telefax message to North’s Red Cross:“Red Cross Working-level contact to discuss reunion of
separated families proposed for September 17.”
*South decides to provide relief supplies (rice, cement
and noodles) worth 10 billion won to North.

Telefax message to Korean Red Cross: “We agree toSouth’s proposal of a meeting on September 17, andproposes the Mt. Chanam Hotel in Kaesong as location.”

September13

Telefax message to the South proposes “military
working-level talks to be held on September 24.”

September
15

Fifth working-level military talks for UNC-KPA General
officer-Level Talks:*North reiterates its insistence about the compositionof North-U.S. joint inspection team.

September
16

Fifth working-level military talks for UNC-KPA General
officer-Level Talks:*UNC proposes holding General officer-Level talks
before carrying out joint inspection.

Inter-Korean Red Cross working-level talks*North proposes location and number of families be
fixed later.

September
17

Inter- Korean Red Cross working-level talks* South proposed reunions take place on Mt. Kumgang.

September19

Telefax message to North:
Proposed postponement of “military working-leveltalks to September 30.”

September
27

ROK-U.S. joint anti-submarine exercise (until October 1)
in West Sea

Conference of Party Representatives to reappoint Kim
Jong Il as General Secretary of Korean Workers’ Party
held:*Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s third son, is elected asCentral Member of the Party and Vice Chairman ofCentral Party Military Committee.

September
28

38th Inter-Korean Military Working-Level Talks held:*North asks South to stop its civilian groups fromspreading leaflets and to have its naval vessels refrainfrom intruding into North Korean territorial waters.

September
30

38th Inter-Korean Military Working-Level Talks:*South asks North to take responsible measuresconcerning ROKS Cheonan incident.

Inter-Korean Red Cross working-level talks held:*North urges the need for contact between authoritiesof the two sides for resumption of Mt. Kumgang tours.

October 1

Inter-Korean Red Cross working-level talks*Both sides agree to reunion of 100 separated families
from each side to take place on Mt. Kumgang on
October 30 through November 5.

Telefax message to South North’s Bureau for Guiding
General Development of Tourist Resorts proposes that“Working-level talks between authorities of two sides
be held to discuss resumption of Mt. Kumgang tours.”

October 2

377

Appendix7KH1RUWK
Sixth working-level military talks for UNC-KPA General
officer-Level Talks held:*North proposes joint investigation at Panmunjom
followed by General Officer-Level Talks.

Date

7KH6RXWK

October 5

Sixth working-level military talks for UNC-KPA General
officer-Level Talks:*South insists on holding General officer-Level Talks
first, followed by joint inspection.

October 13

South carries out first ROK-led PSI exercise (until
October 14 in Busan).

Telefax message to the South (Bureau for Guiding
General Development of Tourist Resorts) urges that
“Early working-level talks between authorities fromthe two sides be held to discuss resumption of the Mt.
Kumgang tours.”

October 14

Telefax message to the South threatens that “physicalstrike is imminent if South Koreans do not stopspreading leaflets in our territory.”

October 15

North informs South of resumption of communications
between inter-Korean aviation authorities.

October 16

Telefax message to the South proposes that“SouthNorth Military Working-level Talks be held for
discussions on pending military issues.”

October 19

October 21

Telefax message to North:“North must take responsible steps concerning ROKS
Cheonan incident before North-proposed South-North
Military Working-Level Talks could be held. Agenda forsaid meeting should be disclosed.”

Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks held until October 27*North asks South to supply 500,000 tons of rice and300,000 tons of fertilizer.

October 26

Inter-Korean Red Cross Talks (until October 27)*South proposes making family reunions regularoccurrence

Seventh working-level military talks for UNC-KPA
General officer-Level Talks held
*North announces its position to discontinue theGeneral Officer-Level Talks and blames UNC for
breakdown in talks.

October 27

Seventh working-level military talks for UNC-KPA
General officer-Level Talks

October 28

Telefax message to North:“North’s proposal for military working-level talks
rejects.”*North displayed consistent attitude concerning ROKS
Cheonan attack.

Telefax message to the South says that “The South’s
rejection of our proposal for talks will result in painful
outcome.”*North fires shots at a mid-Eastern frontline GP. Shotsconcluded accidental.

3782010 Defense White Paper

October 29

7KH1RUWKDate

NDC Inspection Group issues a “fact sheet” on thesinking of ROKS Cheonan

November 2

Telefax Message to South (Bureau for Guiding theGeneral Development of Tourist Resorts) urges“inter-Korean working-level talks on November 19 inorder to discuss resumption of Mt. Kumgang tours.”

November
11

North discloses uranium enrichment facility to
Professor Siegfried Hecker, U.S. Nuclear Specialist of
Stanford University.

November
12

7KH6RXWK

G-20 Seoul Summit (until November 12)

Telefax message to North:“Cease shelling of Yeonpyeong Island immediately.”

Telefax message to the South warns that “We will takean immediate physical action if a single artillery shellfrom the South falls on our sacred territorial waters.”
North fires artillery shots at Yeonpyeong Island.
*North’s Supreme Command announces that “TheNorth Korean military has taken a courageous military
step in responding to the South’s military provocation.”

November
23

North’s Foreign Ministry announcement says:“North Korean military could strike South again at any
moment.”November
24

South’s Red Cross cancels Inter-Korean Red Cross
Talks scheduled for November 25.

North’s Panmunjom delegation rejects UNC’s proposal
for UNC-KPA General Officer-Level Talks concerning
North’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island*North states that it will not hesitate to instigate secondor third physical retaliatory strike against South if
provoked again.

November
25

UNC informs North of plan for ROK-U.S. combined
exercise between November 28 and December 1.

Rodong Sinmun threatens that “Those that provoke
cannot avoid merciless punishment.”

November
28

ROK-U.S. combined maritime exercise (until December
1) on West Sea
Telefax message to North:“Accidental firing occurred near the MDL.”

UNC proposes UNC-KPA General-Level Talks in regard
to North’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.
Ministry of Unification takes control of South Koreansvisiting Kaesong Industrial Complex and stops supply ofrelief aid for flood victims in North.

379

AppendixAppendix 9

Status of UN Peacekeeping Operations(As of November 2010))

Number of those dispatched
Name of group

Stationing
location

Stationing period

Major assignment

1

UNTSO

PalestineMay
1948-Present

Truce supervisionand reconnaissance

-

-

152

152

2

UNMOGIP

Kashmir

January
1949-Present

Truce supervisionand reconnaissance

-

-

42

42

3

UNFYCIP

CyprusMarch 1964Present

Truce supervisionand reconnaissance

859

68

-

927

4

UNDOF

The Golan Heights

June
1974-Present

Truce supervisionand reconnaissance

1,043

-

-

1,043

5

UNIFIL

LebanonMarch
1978-Present

Truce supervisionand reconnaissance

11,881--

11,881

6

MINURSOWest Sahara

April
1991-Present

Truce supervisionand election support

20

6

204

230

7

UNMIK

KosovoJune
1999-Present

Support for peaceand stability

-

8

8

16

8

UNAMA

Afghanistan

March
2002-Present

Peace building
support

-

4

14

18

9

UNAMI

Iraq

August2003-Present

Peace building
support

221

-

12

233

10

UNMIL

Liberia

September2003-Present

Truce supervision(surveillance) andreconnaissance

7,931

1,304

134

9,369

11

UNOCI

Cote-d'IvoireApril
2004-Present

Peace building
support

7,572

1,316

192

9,080

12

MINUSTAH

Haiti

June
2004-Present

Peace building
support andreconstruction aid

8,651

3,146

-

11,797

13

UNMIS

Sudan

March
2005-Present

Truce supervisionand stability building
support

9,451

655

486

10,592

14

UNMIT

East Timor

August2006-Present

Peace building
support

-

1,485

33

1,518

15

BINUB

BurundiJanuary
2007-Present

Truce supervision

-

8

5

13

16

UNMIN

Nepal

January
2007-Present

Truce supervision

-

-

72

72

17

UNAMID

Darfur, Sudan

July
2007-Present

Truce supervisionand peace building
support

17,0504,747

264

22,06118

MINURCAT

Central Africa

September2007-Present

Reconstruction aid

1,327

109

20

1,456

19

MONUSCOThe Democratic
Republic of the
Congo

May
2010-Present

Peace building
support17,112

1,181

715

19,008

83,11814,0372,353

99,508Total* Source: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors

3802010 Defense White Paper

MEM

7URRSV

0LOLWDU\Experts on
Mission)

Police7RWDO

$SSHQGL[%XGJHWIRU52.0LOLWDU\Units Dispatched Overseas(Unit: Billion Won)

7KH'RQJP\HRQJ8QLWLebanon

7KH&KHRQJKDH8QLWSomalia

7KH'DQEL8QLW+DLWL

7KH$VKHQD8QLW
Afghanistan

2007

37.0

-

-

-

2008

19.6

-

-

-

2009

21.5

28.4

-

-

2010

22.9

34.2

28.2

47.1

Total

101.0

62.6

28.2

47.1

Appendix 11

6WDWXVRI'LVSDWFKRI52.7URRSV2YHUVHDV(As of November 2010)

1DPHRIWKH52.PLOLWDU\XQLW

Number oftroopsDestination

Date of firstdispatch

The Dongmyeong Unit, Lebanon

359

Tyre

July 2007

The Danbi Unit, Haiti

240

LeoganeFebruary
2010

UN Military Observer Group in India andPakistan (UNMOGIP)

9

Rawalpindi

November
1994

UN Mission In Liberia (UNMIL)

2

Monrovia

October 2003

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan(UNAMA)

1

Kabul

July 2003

UN Mission In Sudan (UNMIS)

7

Khartoum

January 2005

African Union – UN Hybrid Operation in
Darfur (UNAMID)

2

DarfurJune 2009

Command staff

5

NakuraJanuary 2007

Staff of the West
Brigade5

Tibnin, Al JanubMarch 2008

4

Kathmandu

February
2009

Period ofrotation

6 months

UN PKOUN Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL)

UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)

1 year381

Appendix1DPHRIWKH52.PLOLWDU\XQLW

Number oftroopsDestination

Date of firstdispatch

UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)

2

Abidjan

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western
Sahara (MINURSO)

2

Laayoune

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

2

Port-an-Prince

November
2009

Period ofrotation

July 2009
UN PKO

1 year

Sub total

640

The Cheonghae Unit off Somalia

306

The Gulf of Aden

March 2009

The Ashena Unit, Afghanistan

232

BagramJune 2010

6 months

Combined Maritime
ForcesStaff officers

2

Coordination officer

1

Coordination
officers

3

Afghanistan

6 months
Djibouti
February
2003

Staff officer

1

Information
coordination
officers

2BagramJune 2010

1 year

CSTC - A staff
officers

4

Kabul

June 2009

6 months

Engineering
coordination officer

1

BagramApril 2010

Not fixed

Coordination Group

2
FloridaNovember
2001

1 yearUS Central Command
Staff officer3822010 Defense White Paper

1 yearMarch 2009

CJTF - HOA
MultiNational
Forces PO

January 2008
Manama1

Sub total

555

Grand total

1,195

17 areasAppendix 12

Status of Countries Participating in the,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\$VVLVWDQFH)RUFH ,6$)(As of November 2010)&RXQWU\RIRULJLQ

Numberof troops
dispatched&RXQWU\RIRULJLQ

Numberof troops
dispatched&RXQWU\RIRULJLQ

Numberof troops
dispatched

Georgia

924

Bosnia & Herzegovina

45

Jordan0

Greece80

Bulgaria

516

Ukraine16

Norway353

Belgium

491

Estonia140

New Zealand234

Sweden

500

Italy

3,688

Netherlands

242

Spain

1,576

Czech Republic

468

Germany

4,341

Slovakia

250

Canada2,922

Denmark

750

Slovenia

78

Croatia299

Latvia189

Singapore38

Turkey1,790

Rumania

1,648

United Arab Emirates

35

Portugal

95

Luxembourg

9

Armenia

40

Poland2,519

Lithuania

219

Iceland

4

France3,850

The Former
Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia

163

Ireland7

Finland150

Malaysia

30

Azerbaijan

94

Republic of Korea

246

Montenegro

31

Albania

258

Hungary

502

Mongolia

47

United Kingdom

9,500

Australia

1,550

Total

130,930

United States

90,000Austria3383

AppendixAppendix 13

7KH$FWRQ3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQ
UN Peacekeeping Operations

Article 1 (Purpose) 7KHSXUSRVHRIWKLV$FWLVWRDOORZWKH5HSXEOLFRI.RUHDWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQ813HDFHNHHSLQJ2SHUDWLRQVPRUH
expediently and actively to contribute to creating and maintaining world peace by stipulating the matters
FRQFHUQLQJWKHGLVSDWFKDQGZLWKGUDZDORIPLOLWDU\XQLWVWDNLQJSDUWLQ813HDFHNHHSLQJ2SHUDWLRQVArticle 2 (Definition)
 7KHWHUPVXVHGLQWKLV$FWVKDOOKDYHWKHIROORZLQJPHDQLQJV Ǥ7KH8QLWHG1DWLRQV 81 3HDFHNHHSLQJ2SHUDWLRQV 3.2 ǥ KHUHLQDIWHUǤ3HDFHNHHSLQJ2SHUDWLRQV 3.2 ǥrefers to a series of activities, including support for the execution of peace treaties, surveillance of armisticeagreements, maintenance of public order and stability, support for elections, humanitarian relief, and support
for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, which are carried out in specific countries (or regions) , under
WKHFRQWURORIWKHFRPPDQGHUDSSRLQWHGE\WKH816HFUHWDU\*HQHUDOLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKDUHVROXWLRQDGRSWHGE\WKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLOILQDQFHGE\WKH81+RZHYHU3HDFHNHHSLQJ2SHUDWLRQVRURWKHUPLOLWDU\DFWLYLWLHV
carried out independently by an individual country or a group of countries, under the approval of the UN, shall not
be included herein.
 $ǤGLVSDWFKHGPLOLWDU\XQLWǥUHIHUVWRDFRXQWU\ǢVPLOLWDU\XQLW QRWLQFOXGLQJDJURXSRUDFRDOLWLRQRIXQLIRUPHG
service people carrying out activities on an individual basis) that has been dispatched out of the country for
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military unit), the police, and other governmental personnel or civilians that have been dispatched out of the
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Article 3 (Establishment and Operation of Standing Units) ⴘ The Government may establish and operate a military unit that is ready at all times for dispatch out of the
FRXQWU\IRUSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQD3.2 KHUHLQDIWHUDǤVWDQGLQJXQLWǥ  ⴙThe matters concerning the establishment and operation of a standing unit, as stated in the foregoing
3DUDJUDSKⴘ, shall be fixed under the relevant presidential decree.

3842010 Defense White Paper

Article 4 (Basic Principles of Performance of Duties) 'LVSDWFKHGPLOLWDU\XQLWVDQGSDUWLFLSDWLQJSHUVRQQHOVKDOOREVHUYHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZVDQGFDUU\RXWWKHLUGXWLHVLQ
good faith in accordance with the rights endowed by the UN and the relevant guidelines.
Article 5 (Decision on Participation in a PKO) ⴘ:KHQWKH81UHTXHVWVWKH52.ǢVSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQD3.2WKH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHUVKDOOLQIRUPWKH1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH
Minister of the request, and the two shall discuss the matters concerning the dispatch, including the dispatch ofa standing unit.
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relevant country or region to ascertain the overall local situation, including the local political situation and
VDIHW\UHODWHGPDWWHUV$UHSRUWRQWKHVLWXDWLRQ KHUHLQDIWHUǤDORFDOVLWXDWLRQLQYHVWLJDWLRQUHSRUWǥ ZLOOWKHQEH
drawn up.
 ⴚThe Government shall make a decision on whether to accept the UN’s request; and determine the purpose and
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FDELQHWPHHWLQJDQGRQWKHDSSURYDORIWKH3UHVLGHQW$UWLFOH 1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\ǢV&RQVHQWWR'LVSDWFKD0LOLWDU\8QLW
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IRUHJRLQJ3DUDJUDSKⴘ, it shall attach the following:
1. The local situation investigative report.
2. Information on the destination.
3. Explanation on why a military unit needs to be dispatched.
 7KHVL]HRIWKHGLVSDWFKHGXQLW
5. The period of the dispatch.
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7. Other information related to the dispatch of ROK military units stipulated under the presidential decree.
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2. When the period for dispatch does not exceed one year.
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reconstruction, or it is judged that there is only a slim possibility of direct involvement in actual combat or of useof armed forces while carrying out the duty.

385

Appendix4. When the UN requests prompt dispatch.
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LQ$UWLFOHKHUHLQWKH*RYHUQPHQWVKDOOGRLWVEHVWWRHQVXUHWKHSURPSWGLVSDWFKRIDVWDQGLQJXQLWLQFORVH
cooperation with the UN and the governments of the relevant countries.
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IRUHJRLQJ3DUDJUDSKⴘ and sign the relevant international agreement.
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GLVSDWFKRIDPLOLWDU\XQLWIRUD3.2DIWHUGHWHUPLQLQJWKHDSSURSULDWHW\SHDQGVL]HRIWKHXQLWArticle 8 (Extension of the Period of Dispatch) ⴘ
 When there is a need to extend the period of dispatch of a military unit, the Government shall obtain the prior
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JRYHUQPHQWǢVVXEPLWWDORILWVUHTXHVWIRUDQH[WHQVLRQWRWKH1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\$UWLFOH3DUDJUDSKⴙ, shallapply mutatis mutandis.
Article 9 (End of Dispatch)
The Government may bring to an end the dispatch of a military unit if one of the following is applicable:
1. The mission assigned to the dispatched unit is completed.
2. Operating a dispatched military unit is decided to be no longer required prior to the end of the period of dispatch.
$UWLFOH 'HPDQGIRUWKH(QGRI'LVSDWFK ⴘ7KH1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\PD\GHPDQGWKH*RYHUQPHQWWKURXJKDUHVROXWLRQIRUDGLVSDWFKWREHEURXJKWWRDQ
early end, even if the military unit has not completed its assigned mission or its period of dispatch.
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WKHIRUHJRLQJ3DUDJUDSKⴘ unless there is a special reason not to.
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The Government shall submit a detailed report on any change to the unit, including activity achievement, activity
status, end of mission, and withdrawal of dispatched military unit to the annual regular session of the National$VVHPEO\$UWLFOH (GXFDWLRQDQG7UDLQLQJ  +HDGVRIHDFKFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWDJHQF\PD\HQWUXVWRUVHQGJRYHUQPHQWHPSOR\HHVSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQ3.2WRD
relevant institution, either in or out of the country, for the education or training so that they may be equipped with3862010 Defense White Paper

the quality and ability required as participating personnel.
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ⴘ3DUWLFLSDWLQJSHUVRQQHOVKDOOQRWEHVXEMHFWWRDQ\GLVDGYDQWDJHRXVWUHDWPHQWGXHWRWKHLUSDVWRURQJRLQJSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQD3.2
ⴙ$JRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDO LQFOXGLQJDQDFWLYHGXW\VHUYLFHSHUVRQRUSROLFHRIILFHU WDNLQJSDUWLQD3.2VKDOOEH
GHHPHGWRKROGDGXDOVWDWXVLHDVDPHPEHURID3.2DQGDQ52.*RYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOⴚ$OO.RUHDQFLYLOLDQVSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQD3.2VKDOOEHGHHPHGWRKROGDGXDOVWDWXVLHDVDPHPEHURID3.2DQG
DQ52.FLWL]HQ7KH\ZLOOUHFHLYHHYHU\PHDVXUHRISURWHFWLRQXQGHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ
$UWLFOH 3D\PHQWRI$OORZDQFH 
The Government may pay an allowance to participating personnel, in accordance with what is stipulated in therelevant laws, in consideration of the work environment of the dispatched area and the nature of the mission.
Article 15 (Prevention of Accidents/Disaster Damage)
The Government shall prepare and implement disaster damage preventing measures and comprehensive
measures for safety protection and prevention of accidents of the dispatched military service members andparticipating personnel.
$UWLFOH ,QVWDOODWLRQDQG2SHUDWLRQRI3.23ROLF\&RQVXOWDWLRQ0HHWLQJV 
ⴘ7KH0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUVDQG7UDGH 02)$7 VKDOORSHUDWHD3.23ROLF\&RQVXOWDWLRQ0HHWLQJ KHUHLQDIWHU
Ǥ3ROLF\&RQVXOWDWLRQǥ IRUHIILFLHQWH[HFXWLRQRIJRYHUQPHQW3.2SROLFLHVDQGWRHQVXUHFROODERUDWLRQDQG
coordination between the relevant ministries.
 ⴙ7KH3ROLF\&RQVXOWDWLRQVWDWHGLQWKHIRUHJRLQJⴘ shall be comprised of 10 (ten) or less members, including the&KDLUZKLFKVKDOOEHDVVXPHGE\WKH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHUⴚ7KH*RYHUQPHQWVKDOORSHUDWHDZRUNLQJOHYHOFRPPLWWHHFRPSULVHGRIVHQLRURIILFLDOVIURPWKHFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWDJHQFLHVFRQFHUQLQJWKH3ROLF\&RQVXOWDWLRQ7KLVFRPPLWWHHVKDOOEHFKDLUHGE\WKH9LFH)RUHLJQMinister.
ⴛ2WKHUGHWDLOVFRQFHUQLQJWKHFRPSRVLWLRQDQGRSHUDWLRQRIWKH3ROLF\&RQVXOWDWLRQDQGZRUNLQJOHYHO
committee shall be regulated by the presidential decree.
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promulgation.
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387

AppendixAppendix 14

Joint Communiqué
7KHst52.866HFXULW\&RQVXOWDWLYH0HHWLQJ

October 22, 2009, Seoul

1. The 41st5HSXEOLFRI.RUHDǞ8QLWHG6WDWHV6HFXULW\&RQVXOWDWLYH0HHWLQJ 6&0 ZDVKHOGLQ6HRXORQ2FWREHU
52.0LQLVWHURI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH.LP7DH<RXQJDQG866HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVH5REHUW0*DWHVOHGWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHGHOHJDWLRQVZKLFKLQFOXGHGVHQLRUGHIHQVHDQGIRUHLJQDIIDLUVRIILFLDOV%HIRUHWKH6&0WKH
&KDLUPDQRIWKH52.-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDII*HQHUDO/HH6DQJHXLDQGWKH&KDLUPDQRIWKH86-RLQW&KLHIV
RI6WDII$GPLUDO0LFKDHO*0XOOHQSUHVLGHGRYHUWKHst52.860LOLWDU\&RPPLWWHH0HHWLQJ 0&0 RQOctober 21, 2009.
 7KH0LQLVWHUDQGWKH6HFUHWDU\UHDIILUPHGWKHFRPPLWPHQWRIWKH52.DQG863UHVLGHQWVWREXLOGDFRPSUHKHQVLYHVWUDWHJLF$OOLDQFHRIELODWHUDOUHJLRQDODQGJOREDOVFRSHEDVHGRQFRPPRQYDOXHVDQG
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agreed to closely cooperate to implement and build upon the Joint Vision through continued development of
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the 21st&HQWXU\
3. The Minister and the Secretary reiterated that the ROK and the U.S. will not accept North Korea as a nuclear
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regime; and constitute direct and grave threats to peace and stability not only for the ROK and regional
neighbors, but also the entire international community. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to closely
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4. Secretary Gates reiterated his support for the ROK Government’s efforts to reduce tensions on the Korean
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to further strengthen defense cooperation, ensuring combined readiness to effectively address future3882010 Defense White Paperchallenges and emerging needs in the security environment. They reaffirmed the important role that the52.86$OOLDQFHKDVLQPDLQWDLQLQJSHDFHDQGVWDELOLW\RQWKH.RUHDQ3HQLQVXOD
5. The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed the two nations’ mutual commitment to the fundamental mission
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HQKDQFHPHQWRIPXWXDOVHFXULW\EDVHGRQWKH0XWXDO'HIHQVH7UHDW\7KH\DOVRDJUHHGWKDWWKH52.86
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combined forces for the security of the Republic of Korea. Secretary Gates reiterated the firm and unwavering
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globally available U.S. forces and capabilities that are strategically flexible to deploy to augment the combined
defense in case of crisis. Minister Kim and Secretary Gates acknowledged this commitment is further
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to Korea to three years, along with the commitment to maintain the current U.S. troop level in Korea.
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range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense
capabilities. Minister Kim conveyed his appreciation for the U.S. commitment and both sides agreed to work
closely together to enhance the effectiveness of extended deterrence.
7. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to consult closely on the future combined force posture, making
enhancements as necessary, to ensure that robust forces and capabilities are available to deter aggression
against the ROK and defend against that aggression should deterrence fail. They also agreed to cooperate
to maintain appropriate preparedness to implement the shared vision of regional and global contribution in
support of mutual security interests.
 7KH0LQLVWHUDQGWKH6HFUHWDU\DJUHHGWKDWWKH52.86$OOLDQFHSOD\VDVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQIRVWHULQJWKH
peace, stability and prosperity in the region. They further agreed to work jointly to develop cooperative
relations and to promote multilateral security cooperation in the region and globally, highlighting theimportant role that regional partners play in helping advance mutual interests of both the ROK and the U.S.
 7KH0LQLVWHUDQGWKH6HFUHWDU\DJUHHGWKDWWKH52.DQGWKH86ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRHQKDQFHFORVH$OOLDQFH
FRRSHUDWLRQWRDGGUHVVZLGHUDQJLQJJOREDOVHFXULW\FKDOOHQJHVRIPXWXDOLQWHUHVWLQFOXGLQJWKURXJKSHDFHNHHSLQJDFWLYLWLHVVWDELOL]DWLRQDQGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQHIIRUWVKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFHDQGGLVDVWHUUHOLHI
In this regard, Secretary Gates expressed appreciation for the ROK’s continued support to promote peace
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389

AppendixWKH86ǢDFWLYHVXSSRUWWRHQDEOHWKH.RUHDQPLOLWDU\XQLWGHSOR\HGWRWKH*XOIRI$GHQWRVXFFHVVIXOO\FRQGXFWLWVPLVVLRQV6HFUHWDU\*DWHVQRWHGZLWKDSSUHFLDWLRQWKH.RUHDQJRYHUQPHQWǢV0D\HQGRUVHPHQW
RIDQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH3UROLIHUDWLRQ6HFXULW\,QLWLDWLYH 36, DVDVLJQLILFDQWGHPRQVWUDWLRQRIFRRSHUDWLRQLQWKHJOREDOHIIRUWWRSUHYHQWWKHSUROLIHUDWLRQRIZHDSRQVRIPDVVGHVWUXFWLRQ :0' DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIPXWXDOVXSSRUWDQGFRRSHUDWLRQRQ36,UHODWHGDFWLYLWLHVLQFOXGLQJH[HUFLVHVDQGLQIRUPDWLRQVKDULQJ7KH0LQLVWHUDQGWKH6HFUHWDU\UHFHLYHGDUHSRUWRQWKHUHVXOWVRIWKH52.860LOLWDU\&RPPLWWHH0HHWLQJIURPWKH&RPPDQGHURIWKH52.86&RPELQHG)RUFHV&RPPDQG &)& *HQHUDO:DOWHU/6KDUSZKLFKKLJKOLJKWHGWKDWWKHFRPELQHGGHIHQVHSRVWXUHLVFDSDEOHDQGUHDG\WR)LJKW7RQLJKWDQGWKDWLWLVSUHSDUHG
to effectively respond to any threat or provocation.
+DYLQJDJUHHGZLWKWKH&)&&RPPDQGHU VUHSRUWWKDWWKHWUDQVLWLRQRIZDUWLPHRSHUDWLRQDOFRQWURO 23&21 of ROK military forces is proceeding smoothly and on schedule, and in accordance with the Strategic
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7KH\DOVRUHDIILUPHGWKDWWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH673ZLOOEHUHJXODUO\DVVHVVHGDQGUHYLHZHGDWWKHDQQXDO6&00&0ZLWKDFORVHH\HRQ1RUWK.RUHDQWKUHDWVDQGUHIOHFWHGLQWKHWUDQVLWLRQSURFHVV,QWKLVUHJDUGWKH\IXUWKHUQRWHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH23&21&HUWLILFDWLRQ3ODQLQHQVXULQJWKHWUDQVLWLRQ
is implemented methodically to validate that the combined defense posture remains strong and seamless.
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12. To ensure that the combined defense remains robust, the Secretary reaffirmed that the U.S. will provide
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substantial progress on the development of military plans and strategic documents related to a range ofsituations to ensure the combined defense is prepared for an effective response. They agreed to continuallyconduct combined exercises for the maintenance, development, and readiness of a strong combined defense
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3902010 Defense White Paper

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Minister and the Secretary agreed to work closely together to complete successfully base relocation andcamp returns, noting that the efficient and effective completion of these cooperative joint efforts are in the
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end of the year.
15 The Minister and the Secretary expressed satisfaction with the 8th6SHFLDO0HDVXUHV$JUHHPHQW 60$ 
signed on January 15, 2009, effective from 2009 to 2013. Secretary Gates offered his appreciation to the ROK,HPSKDVL]LQJWKDWWKH52. VKRVWQDWLRQVXSSRUWVLJQLILFDQWO\FRQWULEXWHVWRDVWDEOHVWDWLRQLQJHQYLURQPHQW
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him and his delegation by the Government of the Republic of Korea, and for the excellent arrangements which
contributed to the success of the meeting. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the discussions during
the 41st6&0DQGst0&0FRQWULEXWHGVXEVWDQWLYHO\WRVWUHQJWKHQLQJWKH52.86$OOLDQFHDQGIXUWKHUHQKDQFHGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHELODWHUDOGHIHQVHUHODWLRQVKLSLQWRDFRPSUHKHQVLYHVWUDWHJLF$OOLDQFH%RWK
sides agreed to hold the 42nd6&0LQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&DWDPXWXDOO\FRQYHQLHQWWLPHLQ

391

AppendixAppendix 15

Joint Communiqué
7KHnd8652.6HFXULW\&RQVXOWDWLYH0HHWLQJ

October 8, 2010, Washington D.C.

1. The 42nd8QLWHG6WDWHVǞ5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD6HFXULW\&RQVXOWDWLYH0HHWLQJ 6&0 ZDVKHOGLQ:DVKLQJWRQ'&
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Tae Young led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before
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 7
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 7
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0LQLVWHUVǡ0HHWLQJLQ-XO\WKDWERWKVLGHVDFNQRZOHGJHGWKHFORVHELODWHUDOFRRSHUDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKH1RUWKKorean nuclear issue, and urged North Korea to carry out the complete and verifiable abandonment of all its
nuclear programs and pursuit of nuclear weapons and demonstrate through concrete actions its genuine
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weapon state. The Secretary and the Minister also confirmed that they would continue to cooperate closely
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against North Korea.
4. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed that North Korean aggression and provocation are not to be
tolerated and that the U.S. and ROK intend to work shoulder to shoulder to demonstrate our combined
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3922010 Defense White Paper

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Seas. Both sides agreed to increase the combined watch activities on the North Korean situation, especiallyleading up to the G20 Summit in Seoul this year. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed that close
continued bilateral planning for various situations, as well as an extensive combined training and exercises,
were critical to adequately prepare for future challenges on the peninsula.
5. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed the two nations’ mutual commitment to the fundamental mission
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of the combined forces for the security of the Republic of Korea. Secretary Gates reiterated the firm andunwavering U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK using both capabilities postured on the Korean
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defense in case of crisis. Secretary Gates and Minister Kim acknowledged that the U.S. commitment is to be
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assigned to Korea, along with the commitment to maintain the current U.S. troop level in Korea.
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for the ROK, using the full range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional
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effectiveness of extended deterrence.
7. The Secretary and the Minister pledged that the ROK and the U.S. are to continue to enhance close$OOLDQFHFRRSHUDWLRQWRDGGUHVVZLGHUDQJLQJJOREDOVHFXULW\FKDOOHQJHVRIPXWXDOLQWHUHVWLQFOXGLQJWKURXJKSHDFHNHHSLQJDFWLYLWLHVVWDELOL]DWLRQDQGUHFRQVWUXFWLRQHIIRUWVKXPDQLWDULDQDVVLVWDQFHDQG
disaster relief. Secretary Gates expressed appreciation for the ROK’s past contribution in Iraq as well as
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10 later this month is expected to be a significant step forward in the global cooperative effort to prevent the
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393

Appendix 7
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to effectively respond to any provocation, instability or aggression.
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ensuring the transition is implemented methodically to validate that the combined defense posture remains
strong and seamless. The Secretary reaffirmed that the U.S. will provide specific and significant bridging
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defense and strategic contribution to the regional and global security in the 21st century.
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of operational planning. The Secretary and the Minister confirmed that this strategic planning guidance wasa useful measure in deterring a wide range of threats against the Republic of Korea and establishing military
preparation plans. The Secretary and the Minister noted that the two militaries have made substantial
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14. Minister Kim expressed sincere appreciation to Secretary Gates for the courtesy and hospitality extended tohim and his delegation by the U.S. Government, and for the excellent arrangements which contributed to thesuccess of the meeting. The Secretary and the Minister affirmed that the discussions during the 42nd6&0
and 32nd0&0FRQWULEXWHGVXEVWDQWLYHO\WRVWUHQJWKHQLQJWKH8652.$OOLDQFHDQGIXUWKHUHQKDQFHGWKH
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to hold the 43rd6&0LQ6HRXO52.DWDPXWXDOO\FRQYHQLHQWWLPHLQ

395

AppendixAppendix 16

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Defense Cooperation

October 8, 2010

I. Purpose of the Guidelines
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Treaty signed on October 1, 1953.
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this alliance matures, our two countries will continue to pursue fully the principles and objectives of our mutual and common
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efforts for collective defense and the preservation of regional peace and security.

II. Strengthening the Alliance
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In support of the June 2010 bilateral presidential decision and supporting defense consultations, both countries are fully
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posture to deter and defeat any North Korean and other threats and enables future peaceful reunification of the Korean
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2XU$OOLDQFHZLOOUHPDLQYLJLODQWDQGUHDG\WRDGGUHVVWKHXQFHUWDLQWLHVRIWKHIXWXUHVHFXULW\HQYLURQPHQWRQWKH.RUHDQ3HQLQVXODZKLOHLWEXLOGVDFRPSUHKHQVLYHVWUDWHJLFDOOLDQFHRIELODWHUDOUHJLRQDODQGJOREDOVFRSHEDVHGRQFRPPRQ
values and mutual trust.
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continue to uphold its firm resolve in its commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea, maintaining a U.S. military
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LVGHPRQVWUDWHGE\WKHHQGXULQJ86IRUFHSUHVHQFHWKURXJKWRXUQRUPDOL]DWLRQWKHSURYLVLRQRIEULGJLQJDQGHQGXULQJ
capabilities as well as augmentation forces in contingencies, and the continued provision of extended deterrence.
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and following the transition of wartime operational control, thereby strengthening deterrent capabilities on the Korean
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military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities.
North Korea’s nuclear weapons technology and ballistic missile development, production, possession, and proliferation
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messages.
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implement the following set of enabling measures necessary for an effective combined defense posture:ǩEnhance intelligence and information sharing , which will serve as the basis for ensuring combined readiness,
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national security;ǩStrengthen operational planning, through clear strategic guidance, for a range of scenarios and contingencies that
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397

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agencies within our respective governments;ǩ)XUWKHUGHYHORSFDSDELOLWLHV to address the ballistic missile threats from North Korea through enhanced
cooperation, which will contribute to combined defense capabilities;ǩ,QVWLWXWLRQDOL]HDQ([WHQGHG'HWHUUHQFH3ROLF\&RPPLWWHH , which is to serve as a cooperation mechanism toenhance the effectiveness of extended deterrence;ǩEnhance interoperability between our militaries through maturing defense cooperation, including military doctrine,
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&, V\VWHPVǩEnhance the combined exercise programs tailorable to both current and emerging security challenges facing the$OOLDQFHZKLOHLQFRUSRUDWLQJWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV&RPPDQGDQGLWV6HQGLQJ6WDWHVDVQHFHVVDU\DQG

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ǩ&ROODERUDWHRQOHVVRQVOHDUQHG across the full range of operational functions, including stability and reconstruction
operations, in order to build partnership capacity.

IV. Regional and Global Security Challenges
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promote regional and global peace and stability.
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contributions toward global peace and security, both now and in the future.
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enhancing regional and global security, including:ǩStrengthen capabilities to contribute to regional and global peace and stability, while ensuring a robust combined
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ǩ6XSSRUWQRQSUROLIHUDWLRQRIZHDSRQVRIPDVVGHVWUXFWLRQ , related materials and technologies, and the meansof delivery through active participation in broader intergovernmental and intragovernmental efforts, including the3982010 Defense White Paper

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security cooperation with regional partners and to contribute to multilateral security efforts;ǩStrengthen cooperation for international security and peacekeeping efforts to promote regional and global peaceand stability, including close coordination on maritime security activities of mutual interest; and,ǩ&RRSHUDWHFORVHO\ RQRWKHUWUDQVQDWLRQDODQGQRQWUDGLWLRQDOVHFXULW\FKDOOHQJHVLQFOXGLQJWKURXJKPXWXDOHIIRUWV
to combat terrorism, provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and prevent cyber attacks.

V. Implementation
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government efforts, undertake continually to calibrate bilateral priorities to advance mutual policies and security efforts
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factors necessitate such revisions.

399

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Outbreak of the Korean War
July 21, 2010, Seoul

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The Ministers reflected on the shared sacrifice and dedication to defend freedom and democracy during the Korean War,
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adopted by the two leaders in June 2009 and pledged to continue to advance the alliance cooperation bilaterally, regionally, and globally.
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combined defense posture capable of deterring and defeating any and all North Korean threats, including through recently
announced bilateral plans to conduct a series of joint military exercise over the coming months in the ROK and off the east andZHVWFRDVWVRIWKH.RUHDQ3HQLQVXOD7KH\DOVRSOHGJHGWRGHYHORSWKHDOOLDQFH VYLVLRQIRUIXWXUHGHIHQVHFRRSHUDWLRQ,QVXSSRUWRIWKHLU3UHVLGHQWV UHFHQWGHFLVLRQWKH0LQLVWHUVDOVRGHFLGHGWRFRPSOHWHDQHZSODQ6WUDWHJLF$OOLDQFH
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urged North Korea to take responsibility for the attack. They also called upon North Korea to refrain from further attacks or
hostilities against the ROK and underscored there would be serious consequences for any such irresponsible behavior.
The Ministers urged North Korea to abandon all its nuclear programs and its pursuit of nuclear weapons in a complete andYHULILDEOHPDQQHUDQGWRGHPRQVWUDWHLWVJHQXLQHZLOOIRUGHQXFOHDUL]DWLRQZLWKFRQFUHWHDFWLRQV7KH\DOVRXUJHG1RUWK

4002010 Defense White Paper

Korea to improve human rights conditions and living standards for its people in cooperation with the international community.
Building on the June 2009 Joint Vision, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to broaden and deepen the scope of$OOLDQFHFRRSHUDWLRQ7KH\VKDUHGWKHYLHZWKDWJURZLQJSROLWLFDOHFRQRPLFVRFLDOVFLHQWLILFWHFKQRORJLFDODQGFXOWXUDOELODWHUDOFRRSHUDWLRQZLOOLQFUHDVHWKHPXWXDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGUHVSHFWEHWZHHQRXUFLWL]HQVRQWKHEDVLVRIFRPPRQ
values and trust. They also committed to work together more closely and comprehensively at the regional and global levels.
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Meanwhile, the Ministers exchanged ideas about ways to meet the global challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, financial crisis, transnational crimes, climate change, epidemic disease, energy security, and promotionof green growth, and decided to continue joint efforts in this regard. They also exchanged views about how development
assistance can increase stability and security, and decided to increase coordination of development assistance programsaround the world to help achieve our shared goals.
The Ministers shared the view that they would draw on the lessons learned through the rebuilding of the ROK in the decades
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previously hosting the Nuclear Security Summit and the G20 summit, and the ROK hosting these events in the future.
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WRGHYHORSWKHH[LVWLQJPLQLVWHULDOFRQVXOWDWLRQVRI6WUDWHJLF&RQVXOWDWLRQIRU$OOLHG3DUWQHUVKLS 6&$3 DQG6HFXULW\&RQVXOWDWLYH0HHWLQJ 6&0 DQGWRFRQVLGHUKROGLQJIXUWKHU)RUHLJQDQG'HIHQVH0LQLVWHUV PHHWLQJVDVQHFHVVDU\

401

AppendixAppendix 18

Major Arms Control&RQYHQWLRQVDQG2UJDQL]DWLRQV(As of November 2010)

Classification

UN General Assembly First
Committee

UN organizations

UN Disarmament Commission(UNDC)

Conference on Disarmament (CD)

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT)

Nuclearweapons

International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT)

4022010 Defense White Paper

Number of member
VWDWHV WKH\HDURI -RLQHGE\6RXWK
North Korea
establishment/
effectuation)

Description

192(1945)

S. Korea(September
1991) /
N. Korea(September
1991)ǩ2QHRIVL[81*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\FRPPLWWHHV
for discussions concerning disarmament andinternational securityǩ5HFRPPHQGVGUDIWUHVROXWLRQVSHU
year to UN General Assembly (UNGA), mostly
adopted by UNGA
ǩ&RPSULVHGRIDOO81PHPEHUVWDWHV

192(1952)

S. Korea(September
1991) /
N. Korea(September
1991)

ǩ&DUULHVRXWDQLQGHSWKUHYLHZRIWKHWKUHH
major issues concerning disarmament andnon-proliferation and submits a report to theupcoming UNGA
ǩ$ERG\WKDWGHOLEHUDWHVRQWKHGLUHFWLRQVDQG
principles concerning major issues being
discussed by the international community
ǩ&RPSULVHGRIDOO81PHPEHUVWDWHV

65(March 1960)

S. Korea(June 1996) /N. Korea(June 1996)

ǩ2QO\PXOWLQDWLRQDOGLVDUPDPHQWQHJRWLDWLRQ
body in the worldǩ0RVWPDMRUGLVDUPDPHQWUHODWHGPXOWL
national treaties are made through this body.
ǩ7KH81*$GRHVQRWGLUHFWO\FRQWUROWKLVERG\but it is regularly funded by the UN. CD fixes
its own agenda and proceeding rules.
ǩ&'VXEPLWVDQDQQXDOUHSRUWWRWKH81*$

190(March 1970)

S. Korea(April 1975) / N.
Korea
(December1985)

ǩ3UHYHQWVWKHVSUHDGRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDQG
to promote peaceful use of nuclear power

151(July 1957)

S. Korea(August 1957) /N. Korea(June 1974, but*withdrew inJune 1994)

ǩ&DUULHVRXWLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRQ
initiatives to promote the peaceful use of
atomic energy and prevent its transfer for
military purposes

182(Not effectuatedyet)

S. Korea(September
1999)ǩ%DQVDOOQXFOHDUWHVWVLQDOOHQYLURQPHQWV
under the ground, in the water, in the air andspaceClassification

MissilesBiological/
chemicalweapons

Number of member
VWDWHV WKH\HDURI -RLQHGE\6RXWK
North Korea
establishment/
effectuation)

Description

Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation(HCOC)

130(November 2002)

S. Korea(November
2002)

A body encouraging voluntary control ofballistic missiles under the recognition that
MTCR alone cannot sufficiently prevent theirspread*Bans support for missile development
programs in states feared to be developing or
procuring WMDs

Biological Weapons Convention

163(March 1975)

S.Korea(June 1987) /N.Korea(March 1987)

ǩ&RPSOHWHO\EDQVGHYHORSPHQWSURGXFWLRQ
and stockpiling of biological weapons, agentsand toxins

Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC)

188
(April 1997)

S.Korea(April 1997)ǩ&RPSOHWHO\EDQVWKHGHYHORSPHQW
production, stockpiling and use of chemical
weaponsǩ6WLSXODWHVWKDWDOOPHPEHUVWDWHVVKRXOG
scrap all chemical weapons in theirpossession within 10 years of joining theConvention.
*The said deadline may be extended for up to
five years when unavoidable. (All member
states should scrap all of their chemical
weapons by April 2012.)

Organization for the Prohibitionof Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

188(May 1997)

S.Korea(April 1997)ǩ$QH[HFXWLYHRUJDQL]DWLRQYHULI\LQJDQG
inspecting to see whether member states
have implemented their CWC obligations

S.Korea
Protocols I & II
(May 2001)
Protocol III(January 2008)ǩ&RQYHQWLRQWRSURKLELWRUUHVWULFWXVHRI
certain conventional weapons which cause
excessive injury or indiscriminative results-CCW Protocol I prohibits use of any weapon,
the primary effect of which is to inflict injury
with fragments that escape x-ray detection.
-CCW Protocol II prohibits or restricts use ofmines, booby-traps and other devices.
-CCW Protocol III prohibits or restricts useof incendiary weapons.
-CCW Protocol IV prohibits use of blinding
laser weapons.
-CCW Protocol V regulates explosive
remnants of war.

S.Korea(1993)

ǩ6WLSXODWHVWKDWDOOPHPEHUVWDWHVDQQXDOO\submit registered data on their imports andexports of conventional arms with available
background informationǩ$LPVWRSURPRWHHQKDQFHGOHYHOVRI
transparency in armaments, thereby
contributing to confidence-building
measures

Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW)108(December 1983)

Conventional
weapons

UN Register of ConventionalArms (UNRCA)

173(December 1991)

403

AppendixClassification

Zangger Committee (ZC)

Number of member
VWDWHV WKH\HDURI -RLQHGE\6RXWK
North Korea
establishment/
effectuation)

36(August 1974)

S.Korea(October 1995)

ǩ$QXFOHDUH[SRUWFRQWUROUHJLPHWKDWHQVXUHVimplementation of Article 3, Paragraph2 of
the NPT, which prohibits export of nuclear
material or equipment to any non-nuclear
powers that have failed to comply with
relevant safety measuresǩ2QO\137PHPEHUVWDWHVPD\MRLQWKH
Committee

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

45(January 1978)

S.Korea(October 1995)

ǩ$QH[SRUWFRQWUROUHJLPHFRQFHUQLQJQXFOHDU
materials, equipment, and technologyǩ1RQ137PHPEHUVWDWHVPD\MRLQ*URXSǩ&RQWURORIH[SRUWRQDOOQRQQXFOHDUSRZHUV
regardless of their NPT membershipǩ&RQWUROVH[SRUWRIQXFOHDUSRZHUUHODWHG
“dual-use” equipment and technology

Australia Group (AG)41
(June 1985)

S.Korea(October 1996)

ǩ&DUULHVRXWDFWLYLWLHVWKDWSUHYHQWWKHVSUHDG
of chemical and biological weapons-relatedmaterials and technology to countries feared
to possess biological and chemical weapons

Multilateralexport control
systemPrevention of
WMD
proliferation

4042010 Defense White Paper

Description

Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR)

34(April 1987)

S.Korea(March 2001)ǩ$YROXQWDU\LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHJLPHWKDWprevents the proliferation of rockets thatcarry WMDs, unmanned aerial vehicles; theexport of relevant equipment; and technology
transfer

Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)40
(April 1996)

S.Korea(April 1996)ǩ$QH[SRUWFRQWUROUHJLPHFRQFHUQHG
with conventional weapons and dual-use
equipment and technology

Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI)

95
(June 2003)

S.Korea(May 2009)ǩ$JOREDOHIIRUWWKDWDLPVWREORFNLOOHJDOWUDGH
of WMDs, missiles and , related materials byrogue states and terrorist groups

Appendix 19

1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH2UJDQL]DWLRQV
1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH2UJDQL]DWLRQV
0LQLVWU\RI1DWLRQDODefense (MND)

Subsidiary Institutions(3) : The Seoul National Cemetery, Defense Media
Agency, Defense Computing and Information
AgencyTemporary Institutions(2) : MND USFK Base Relocation Office,Compensation Support Team for Persons
Engaged in Special Military Missions
Joint Chiefs of

Staff

Army

Military Manpower
Administration

Navy

Defense Acquisition
Program Administration

Air Force

Military units and defense institutions
directly controlled by MND
ǩ*\HU\RQJGDH6HUYLFH6XSSRUW&RUSV
ǩ+LJK&RXUWIRU$UPHG)RUFHVǩ'HIHQVH6HFXULW\&RPPDQG
ǩ01':HOIDUH$JHQF\
ǩ'HIHQVH7UDQVSRUWDWLRQCommandǩ3V\FKRORJLFDO2SHUDWLRQ*URXSǩ$UPHG)RUFHV0HGLFDO
Commandǩ$UPHG)RUFHV3ULQWLQJ'HSRW
ǩ'HIHQVH&RPPDQG
Communication Forceǩ.RUHD$UPHG)RUFHV$WKOHWLF&RUSVǩ7KH$UPHG)RUFH&%5'HIHQVH
Commandǩ.RUHD1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH
University
ǩ3URVHFXWRUCV2IILFH0LQLVWU\RI
National Defense
ǩ.RUHD$UPV9HULILFDWLRQ$JHQF\
ǩ,QVWLWXWHIRU0LOLWDU\+LVWRU\Compilation
ǩ01'6HUYLFH6XSSRUW*URXSǩ01'$JHQF\IRU.LOOHGLQ$FWLRQRecovery & ID (MAKRI)ǩ&ULPLQDO,QYHVWLJDWLRQ&RPPDQG
ǩ'HIHQVH,QVWDOODWLRQV$JHQF\
ǩ'HIHQVH,QWHOOLJHQFH$JHQF\

MND Headquarters
Minister of National Defense

Office ofthe Minister

Office of
Spokesperson

Policy Advisor to
MinisterVice Minister of National
DefenseDefense Reform
OfficeMilitary Structure
Reform Bureau
DefenseManagement
Reform Bureau

GeneralServices
Division

General Counsel
BureauInspection Bureau

Office of Planning and
Coordination

Office of National
Defense Policy

Office of Personnel
and Welfare

Office of Military Force andResources Management

Planning and Coordination
BureauPolicy Planning Bureau

Personnel Planning Bureau

Logistics Management
BureauProgramming andBudgeting Bureau

International Policy Bureau

Mobilization Planning Bureau

Military Installations
Planning Bureau

Information Planning
BureauNational Defense Education
Policy Bureau

Health and Welfare Bureau

Military Force Policy
Bureau405

Appendix$VVLJQPHQWVDQGIXQFWLRQVRI01'VXEVLGLDU\LQVWLWXWLRQVLQFOXGLQJQRQSHUPDQHQWJURXSV
2UJDQL]DWLRQ

Subsidiaryinstitutions

Temporary
institutions

Assignments and functions

Seoul National
CemeteryǩManagement and operation of the cemetery, facilities and surrounding forestǩPlanning and executing memorial rituals
ǩGiving tours to visitors and managing specially designated boundaries for gravesǩPlanning and executing educational initiatives about those who sacrificed their lives
for their homelandǩPublicizing its activities

Defense Media
AgencyǩPR for the military and education of service members through Korea Defense Daily,
Armed Forces Broadcast, TV and radioǩSelection and operation of Armed Forces PR Support TeamǩProduction of defense news and cyber-based PR activities
ǩPhotograph and records management related to defense-related events

DefenseComputing andInformation
AgencyǩDevelopment, operation and maintenance of Defense Resources Management
Information System
ǩProcurement and operation of communications network and computer equipment
for MND and its subsidiary institutionsǩResearch, spread and management of new information technologyǩPlanning and executing information educational programs

MND USFK Base
Relocation Office(MURO)

ǩPlanning and execution of USFK facility-related projects
ǩExecution, management and supervision of USFK facility-related projects
ǩProvision of support for management and operation of Special Accounts for
Relocating USFK BasesǩOther matters concerning promotion of USFK facility-related projects

Compensation
Support Team for
Persons Engaged
in Special Military
MissionsǩPreparations and assistance for deliberations of Special Military Mission Performers
Compensation Deliberation Committee and its sub-committeesǩBudget compilation and execution of compensatory payments
ǩChecking applicants’ submitted materials for compensation payments
ǩHandling of lawsuit and responding to civil grievance concerning compensation

Assignments and functions of public institutions
Assignments and functions

Publicinstitutions

4062010 Defense White Paper

Korea Institute for
Defense Analyses(KIDA)

ǩResearch on security environment and basic defense policies
ǩResearch on military strategies and buildup/evaluation of military strengthǩResearch on defense human resources, personnel affairs, welfare and mobilization
ǩProvision of survey statistics, information and consulting related to defense issues

The War Memorialof KoreaǩConstruction and operation of war memorials and monumentsǩCollection, preservation, management, exhibition, surveys and research concerning
military war relicsǩResearch on war history, search for patriot-related stories and other academic
research activities
ǩPR for commemorative projects and educational programs and distribution of
relevant publications

Ho-GukFoundation

ǩPayment of undergraduate tuition fees for children of MND military and civilian
personnel
ǩSpecial consideration provided to children of service members applying for college
admissionǩProvision of administrative services for loans from military personnel welfare fund$SSHQGL[Annual Defense Budgets'HIHQVHEXGJHW XQLW
billion won)

'HIHQVHEXGJHW*'3
ratio (%)

'HIHQVHEXGJHWJRYHUQPHQW
expenditure ratio (%)

Rate of increase of the
defense budget (%)

1981

2,697.9

5.54

33.6

20.1

1982

3,120.7

5.60

33.5

15.7

1983

3,274.1

4.99

31.4

4.9

1984

3,306.1

4.40

29.6

1.0

1985

3,689.2

4.39

29.4

11.6

1986

4,158.0

4.24

30.1

12.7

1987

4,745.4

4.12

29.6

14.1

1988

5,520.2

4.03

30.0

16.3

1989

6,014.8

3.89

27.3

9.0

1990

6,637.8

3.56

24.2

10.4

1991

7,476.4

3.31

23.8

12.6

1992

8,410.0

3.27

25.1

12.5

1993

9,215.4

3.17

24.2

9.6

1994

10,075.3

2.96

23.3

9.3

1995

11,074.3

2.78

21.4

9.9

1996

12,243.4

2.73

20.8

10.6

1997

13,786.5

2.81

20.7

12.6

1998

13,800.0

2.85

18.3

0.1

1999

13,749.0

2.60

16.4

-0.4

2000

14,477.4

2.50

16.3

5.3

2001

15,388.4

2.47

15.5

6.3

2002

16,364.0

2.39

14.9

6.3

2003

17,514.8

2.42

14.8

7.0

2004

18,941.2

2.43

15.8

8.1

2005

21,102.6

2.60

15.6

11.4

2006

22,512.9

2.66

15.3

6.7

2007

24,497.2

2.72

15.5

8.8

2008

26,649.0

2.76

15.2

8.8

2009

28,532.6

2.79

14.5

7.1

2010

29,562.7

2.62

14.7

3.6

407

AppendixAppendix 21

Defense Industrial Cooperation
Agreements with Other Countries
Number of countries with which ROK has signed defense industrial cooperation agreements
RU028V &RXQWU\

Signed in&RXQWU\

Signed in&RXQWU\

Signed in&RXQWU\

Signed in

Malaysia

1981.6.

Israel1995. 8.

Turkey1999.11.

South Africa

2007.8.

U.S.

1988.6.

Indonesia

1995. 10.

Venezuela

1999.12.

Columbia

2008.5.

Thailand

1991.4.

Canada1996. 5.

Australia

2001.8.

Ecuador2009.1.

France1992.3.

Germany

1997. 11.

Vietnam

2001.8.

Egypt

2009.12.

Spain

1992.3.

Russia1997. 11.

Bangladesh

2004.1.

Uzbekistan

2010.2.

U.K.

1993.9.

Rumania1997. 11.

India

2005.9.

Peru

2010.5.

Italy

1993.9New Zealand1998. 11

Pakistan

2006.5.

Philippines

1994.5

Netherlands

1999.6

Ukraine2007.82WKHUGHIHQVHLQGXVWULDOFRRSHUDWLRQDJUHHPHQWV DVRI1RYHPEHU
Agreements for technologicalcooperation (9 countries)$JUHHPHQWVIRUTXDOLW\JXDUDQWHHV FRXQWULHV

Agreements for provision of priceinformation (4 countries)

U.S., France, UK, Italy,
Israel, Russia, Turkey,
Norway, Sweden

U.S., UK, France, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, Italy,
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Australia, Philippines,
Germany, Israel, Turkey, Indonesia, New Zealand, Greece

U.S., UK, Germany,
Netherlands4082010 Defense White Paper

Appendix 22&KDQJHVLQ&RPSXOVRU\0LOLWDU\6HUYLFH3HULRG
Compulsory military service period (unit:
Months)Reason for adjustment

Year
Army/Marine
Corps

Navy

Air Force

pre-1952

No discharging from active service

Inability to execute Military Service Act normally due to
Korean War

1953

36

36

36

Those who perform service on long-term basis during
the Korean War are discharged following ArmisticeAgreement.

1959

33

36

36

Alleviate the burden of compulsory service of Army

1962

30

36

36

Alleviate the burden of compulsory service of Army

1968

36

39

39

Service period is extended following attempted attack on
Cheongwadae (presidential residence) by North Korean
armed guerrillas on 21 January, 1968.

1977

33

39

39

Amid surplus military personnel resources, shorten
the service period of Army to support those with special
industrial skills in businesses as an alternative tocompulsory military service.

1979

33

35

35

Shorten the service period of Navy and Air Force to makerecruiting easier.

1984

30

35

35

Alleviate the burden of compulsory service of Army.

1990

30

32

35

Shorten the service period of Navy to make recruiting
easier.

1993

26

30

30

Shorten the service period to solve surplus of military
personnel resources

1994

26

28

30

Shorten the service period of Navy to make recruiting
easier.

2003

24

26

28

Alleviate the burden of compulsory military service ofArmy, Navy and Air Force

2004

24

26

27

Shorten the service period of Air Force to make recruiting
easier.
Reduce troop numbers and shorten service period to settle the2008

24 → 18

26 → 2027 → 21

problem of surplus military service resources.
* Gradual reduction of service period for those enlisted during
January 2006 ~ July 2014.

* The ‘military service period’ refers to the period fixed under the Military Service Act.

409

AppendixAppendix 23$OWHUQDWLYHVWR0LOLWDU\6HUYLFHServiceperiodAlternatives

Community
service-Social welfare-Health/medicalAdministrative services
22~26
support-Education/months*personnel
culture-Environment/
safetyQualifications

Replacement
resource

SelectionDXWKRULW\

Arts andathletics
personnel

International cooperation
personnel

Active-duty personnel
Skilledindustry
personnel

Replacement personnel

Silver medal or higher
at international sports
competition

34
months Bronze medal or higher
at Olympics; Gold
medal at Asian Games30
months

Ministerof Culture,
Sports andTourism

Recommended byForeign Affairs andTrade Minister andselected by Military
Affairs Deliberation
Committee

Foreign
Affairs andTrade Minister

Technician license
holders

Head ofmilitary
servicerelated
designatedbusiness

Arts

Athletics

International
cooperation

Businesses in
Employment manufacturing,and Labor mining, energy,
construction,
Ministerfisheries, ocean
Those inheriting
City or county transportation,
agricultural assets oragriculture,mayor
fisheries
and defense
Head ofindustry
military
No restrictions onservice26
academic backgroundrelatedmonthsor skills qualifications
designatedbusiness

34
monthsBronze medal or
higher at World Skills
Competition* As for public service personnel, their service period has been reduced gradually from 26 months to 22 months, from 2008 onwards.

4102010 Defense White Paper

Legal basis

Military
Service Act

Administrative
supportArts

Athletics

Workplace

Support forsocial welfare
facilities;
health; patient Governmenttransportation; institutions;
local
support foradministrative
MMA
education
units; public
Administratorof disabledorganizations;children;environmental social welfare
facilities
monitoring; etc.

Administrative
business

Publicservicepersonnel

Service sectors

Minister ofCulture, Sports
and Tourism

Military
Service Act

MOFATAct onInternational
Cooperation
Personnel

Designatedbusinessand defense
industrybusinesses

Military
Service Act

Alternatives

ServiceperiodQualifications

Replacement personnel

Service sectors

Head ofThose holding
relevant
master’s degree orcentralhigher working atgovernmental
Academic/
research institute36
institution
technologicalmonths designated as militaryresearch
service institute andrecommended by
ADD President
relevant authorities
Education,
Science andTechnology
Minister

Public health doctors

Medical doctors,
dentists, herbal doctors

Medical doctors formilitary conscription

Medical doctors,
dentists

Medical doctors forinternational cooperation

Public service Advocates

Public service veterinarian

36
monthsHealth andWelfareMinisterWorkplace

Legal basis

Research
institutions innatural science
sector

Education,
Science andTechnology
Minister

Active-duty personnel

Specialized
researchpersonnel

SelectionDXWKRULW\

Research
institutions inhumanities andsocial science
sectors
Defenseindustry
research
institutions

Military
Service Act

University
research
institutions

Medicalservices inrural areas

MMA’s military
MMA
draft physical
Administrator
examination

Ministry of
Health andWelfareAct onSpecialMeasures for
Public HealthServices in
Rural Areas

MMA

Military
Service Act

Medical doctors,
dentists, herbal doctors

Foreign
Affairs andTrade Minister

Medicalservices indeveloping
countries

MOFAT

Act onInternational
Cooperation
Personnel

Attorneys-at-law

Justice
Minister

Korea Legal Aid
Corporation

Ministry ofJustice

PubicService
Advocates
Act

Veterinarians

Health andWelfareMinister

Cattlequarantine

PublicMinistry of Food,
Service
Agriculture,
Forestry and Veterinarians
Act
Fisheries

411

AppendixAppendix 24&RPELQHG-RLQW0LOLWDU\([HUFLVHVDQG7UDLQLQJ
52.86FRPELQHGH[HUFLVHV
NameUlchi Freedom
Guardian (UFG)

Key Resolve/
Foal Eagle(KR/FE) Exercise

7\SH

PurposeMilitary
commandpost andgovernment
exercisesǩ'HYHORSLQJ52.-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDII
and U.S. KORCOM’s theater operationscommanding and executing abilities in
preparation for transition of wartimeOPCON
ǩ%HFRPLQJSURILFLHQWZLWKFRQGXFWLQJ
procedure of Chungmu Plan andwarfighting SOP

Command post
exercises/
Field training
exercisesǩ([HUFLVHWKHDWHURSHUDWLRQV
commanding and conducting
procedure under current combined
defense system
ǩ*XDUDQWHHLQJGHSOR\PHQWRI86
augmentation forces on Korean
Peninsula and maintaining ROK Armed
Forces’ warfighting sustainability

Description
ǩ&ULVLVPDQDJHPHQWH[HUFLVH
ǩ:DUWLPHWUDQVLWLRQSURFHGXUHH[HUFLVHǩ23/$1FRQGXFWLQJSURFHGXUHH[HUFLVH
ǩ6HQLRU/HDGHUVVHPLQDU
ǩ0LOLWDU\&RRUGLQDWLRQ(OHPHQWVRSHUDWLQJ
exerciseǩ&ULVLVPDQDJHPHQWH[HUFLVHǩ:DUWLPHWUDQVLWLRQH[HUFLVHǩ23/$1FRQGXFWLQJSURFHGXUHH[HUFLVHǩ%HFRPLQJSURILFLHQWZLWK5HFHSWLRQ
Staging, Onward movement, andIntegration procedure within combined
operational areas
ǩ6HQLRU/HDGHUVVHPLQDUROK forces’ joint exercise and training
Name

7\SH

PurposeDescription

Taegeuk
Exercise

Theater-levelcommand post
exercises

Possessing theater operations
conducting capability of Joint
Chiefs of Staff

ǩ-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDIIH[HUFLVHVFULVLV
management, transition to war, and operations
conducting procedureǩ([HUFLVHMRLQWPLVVLRQHVVHQWLDOWDVNDQGUHOHYDQWstaff offices’ supporting tasksǩ2SHUDWLQJ52.860LOLWDU\&RRUGLQDWLRQ
Elements

Hoguk Exercise

Large scale
unit (theaterand operationalcommand level)
Joint Exercise

Enhancing jointness-centeredoperational conducting
capabilityǩ6\QFKURQL]HGDQGLQWHJUDWHGH[HUFLVHRIDOO
Services under theater operational planǩ%HFRPHSURILFLHQWZLWKNH\H[HUFLVHWDVNV
requiring jointness at each operational commandlevelǩ9HULI\LQJMRLQWRSHUDWLRQVV\VWHP

Comprehensive
Rear Area
Exercises

Enhancing operational
conducting capability withinrear areas during wartime/
peacetimeǩ%HFRPHSURILFLHQWZLWKZDUWLPHSHDFHWLPH
operational plans conducting procedureǩ,QVSLULQJORFDOUHVLGHQWVZLWKVHFXULW\consciousness
ǩ9HULI\FLYLOLDQVJRYHUQPHQWPLOLWDU\DQGSROLFH
integrated defense posture

Hwarang
Exercise4122010 Defense White Paper

Combined exercises
Frequency

Participating
countries

Descriptions

Combined antiterrorism exercise

Once a year

South Korea, U.S.,
and Russia

ǩ5HSHOFOLPELQJH[HUFLVH
ǩ$QWLWHUURULVPFRPPDQGRILULQJ
ǩ,QVLGHFOHDULQJH[HUFLVHV EXLOGLQJVWUDLQVDLUSODQHVHWFǩ3ULYDWHO\PDGHH[SORVLYHVGLVSRVDO
ǩ&RPSUHKHQVLYHPRFNH[HUFLVHVKhann Quest

Once a year

South Korea, UK,
Germany, Japan, andChina etc.

ǩ)LHOGWDFWLFDOH[HUFLVH
ǩ&RPPDQGSRVWH[HUFLVH
ǩ0HGLFDOVXSSRUWH[HUFLVH

Rim of the Pacific
Exercise (RIMPAC)

Biennially(June-Augustin evennumberedyears)South Korea, U.S.,
Australia, Chile, UK,
Japan, Canada, andPeru etc.

ǩ2IIHQVLYHGHIHQVLYHVHDEDWWOH
ǩ3URWHFWLQJVHDURXWHV
ǩ0DULWLPHLQWHUGLFWLRQDQGDLUDVVDXOWǩ1DYDOILULQJH[HUFLVHǩ*XLGHGPLVVLOHDQGWRUSHGRODXQFKLQJH[HUFLVH

Pacific Reach

Triennially

South Korea, U.S.,
Australia, Japan, andSingapore etc.

ǩ6XEPDULQHFUHZHVFDSLQJUHVFXLQJH[HUFLVHVWestern
Pacific Mine
Countermeasures
Exercise (MCMEX)

Biennially(on evennumberedyears)South Korea, Japan,
Australia, Singapore,
Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Thailand etc.

ǩ$QWLPLQHZDUIDUHH[HUFLVH PLQHVHDUFKFOHDULQJ
ǩ(2' H[SORVLYHRUGQDQFHGLVSRVDO H[HUFLVH
ǩ0HGLFDOH[HUFLVH

ROK-US ASW
Exercise(GUAMEX)

Biennially (onodd-numberedyears)South Korea and U.S.

ǩ6XEPDULQHEDWWOHH[HUFLVHVǩ&62)6/2&SURWHFWLRQH[HUFLVH
ǩ2IIHQVLYHPLQHOD\LQJ

Cobra Gold Exercise

Once a year

South Korea, U.S.,
and Thailand

ǩ&RPELQHGDPSKLELRXVRSHUDWLRQVǩ&RPPDQGSRVWH[HUFLVHǩ7DFWLFDOPDQHXYHULQJH[HUFLVH
ǩ6WDELOL]DWLRQRSHUDWLRQVǩ$LUOLIWLQJRQWKHVHD

Combined
Amphibious
Operations Exercise

Once a year
along with FE(Foal Eagle)

South Korea and U.S.

ǩ/RDGHGDGYDQFHGWURRSVRSHUDWLRQVǩ7KUHHGLPHQVLRQDODPSKLELRXVDWWDFNǩ2QWKHVHDPDQHXYHULQJDQGILUHVXSSRUWLQJH[HUFLVH
ǩ/DQGRSHUDWLRQV VHFXULQJDQGGHIHQGLQJDEHDFKKHDG
ǩ,QWHJUDWHGILUHSRZHURSHUDWLRQV

ROK-Japan Searchand Rescue Exercise

Biennially (onodd-numberedyears )South Korea andJapan

ǩ%DVLFWDFWLFDOH[HUFLVHVǩ6HDUFKLQJDQGUHVFXLQJH[HUFLVHIRUDLUSODQHVVKLSVLQGLVWUHVV

Name

Combined Large
Force Employment(CLFE) exercise

Six times a year

South Korea and U.S.

ǩ2IIHQVHIRUPDWLRQPLGDOWLWXGHLQILOWUDWLRQDQGLQWHUFHSW
exercisesǩ(QKDQFHPHQWRIVXUYLYDOFDSDELOLW\DQGRSHUDWLRQDO
performance during infiltrations
ǩ%HFRPHSURILFLHQWZLWKSHDFHWLPHVWULNHSURFHGXUHV
selecting virtual targets

Cooperative CopeThunder (REDFLAG-Alaska)

Biennially

South Korea, Japan,
Singapore, Thailand,
Australia, UK, andFrance etc.

ǩ/RZDOWLWXGHLQILOWUDWLRQDQGFDUJRGURSSLQJH[HUFLVH
ǩ7DFWLFDODHULDOUDLGH[HUFLVHXVLQJDQXQSDYHGUXQZD\ǩ$LULQILOWUDWLRQH[HUFLVHIRUSLORWVDQGFUHZPHPEHUVMax Thunder

Twice a year

South Korea and U.S.

ǩ0LGDOWLWXGHLQILOWUDWLRQDQGLQWHUFHSWH[HUFLVHE\VWULNLQJ
package forcesǩ%HFRPHSURILFLHQWZLWKUHDOLVWLFZDUIDUHDWWDFNSURFHGXUHV
selecting virtual targets

413

AppendixAppendix 25

Composition and Major Activities
RI1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\'HIHQVH&RPPLWWHH
Defense Committee members
Specialist
Gu Byeonghoe (Grade-2)

SeniorSpecialist
Gwon Gi-yul(Grade-1)

Chairman
Name

rd

Won
Yoo Chul

Name

Kim Dong Sung

Academic background and experience
6HRQJGRQJJX%6HRXOst term
-Born in 1971
-Seoul National University, Collegeof Law; Yonsei University, Business
School; legal counsel for City ofSeoul; Head of GNP, Seongdong-B
Chapter; Secretary of NA Defense
Committee (currently)

(OHFWHGEDVHGRQSURSRUWLRQDO
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQst term
-Born in 1947
-Dong-A University, Department of
Public Administration-Chief of the 15th Women`s Army
Corps; member of Gyeonggi-do
Council; Chair of Women's Army
Corps Veterans' Association

(OHFWHGEDVHGRQSURSRUWLRQDO
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQst term

Kim Jang Soo

4142010 Defense White Paper-Born in 1948
-Korea Military Academy (class 27);
Commanding General of 6th Divisionand 7th Corps; Director of Operationsof Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); Deputy
Commander-in-Chief, ROK-U.S.
Combined Forces Command; Army
Chief of Staff; Defense Minister-Pyeongtaek-A, Gyeonggido; 3 term
-Born in 1962
-Korea University, Department of Political
Science and International Relations; Visiting
researcher at Stanford University-GNP, Gyeonggi-do Chapter; member of Public
Administration and Security Committee;
Chairman of NA Special Committee on
Safeguarding Dokdo

Office/contact
numberName

The Members’ Hall:
Room 217
Phone: 784-3873
788-2491
Fax: 788-3217

The Members’ Hall:
Room 304
Phone: 784-5287
788-2874
Fax: 788-3304

The Members’ Hall:
Room 534
Phone: 784-5277
788-2835
Fax: 788-3534

Shin Hak Yong

Democratic Party

Grand National Party (GNP)

Kim Ok Lee

Academic background and experience

Park Sang Cheon

Seo Jong Pyo

Office/contact
numberHeadquaters
Room 421
Phone: 784-1364
788-2721
Fax: 788-3685*From overseas,
dial +822

Academic background and experience*\H\DQJ$,QFKHRQnd term
-Born in 1952
-Seoul National University,
Department of Politics; Passed
State Examination for Court
Administration; Secretary for
NA Political Affairs; Chairmanof Korean Business Table Tennis
Federation (KBTTF); Chairmanof NA Fiscal Policy Research
Association; Secretary for NA
Defense Committee (currently)
*RKHXQJJXQ%RVHRQJJXQ&KHRQQDPGRth term
- Born in 1938
- Seoul National University,
Department of Law; Passed StateBar Examination; Spokesperson for
Democratic Party; Representativefor Democratic Party of Political
Reform Negotiation; Justice
Minister; Chairman of NA Health& Welfare Committee; memberof NA Foreign/Unification/Trade
Committee
(OHFWHGEDVHGRQSURSRUWLRQDO
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQst term
-Born in 1945
- Korea Military Academy (class 25);
Commanding General of 25th Division,
6th Corps, and 3rd Army; Inspector
General at Army Headquarters;
President of National Defense
University; Vice President, Hanbuk
University

Legislative
researchers
Lee Jeong-deuk(Grade-3)
Gye Jun-ho(Grade-3)
Jo Mun-sang(Grade-4)
Gong Chun-taek(Grade-4)
Jeong Gyeongyun (Grade-4)

Office/contact
number

The Members’ Hall:
Room 810
Phone: 784-6086
788-2165
Fax: 788-3810

The Members’ Hall:
Room 721
Phone: 784-5075
788-2709
Fax: 788-3721

The Members’ Hall:
Room 743
Phone: 784-2972
788-2421
Fax: 788-3743

Name

Academic background and experience-LQKDHJX&KDQJZRQVL
*\HRQJQDPGRrd term

Kim Hak SongThe Members’ Hall:
Room 531
Phone: 784-3852
788-2385
Fax: 788-3531

'RQJJX%'DHJXnd termYoo Seong Min-Born in 1958
- Seoul National University,
Department of Economics;
Wisconsin University; Director,
Yeoeuido Institute; Advisor to Fair
Trade Commission; Professor
at Hallym University; Chairmanof GNP 3rd Policy Coordination
Committee

The Members’ Hall:
Room 434
Phone: 784-5705
788-2919
Fax: 788-3434

Grand National Party (GNP)

Chung Mi Kyung

The Members’ Hall:
Room 201
Phone: 784-3880
788-2514
Fax: 788-3201

Ahn Gyu Baek

Chung Sye Kyun

Liberty Forward Party (LFP)*ZRQVHRQJX6XZRQVLst term
-Born in 1965
- Korea University, Departmentof Law; Passed 38th Judicial
Examination; Prosecutor in
Euijeongbu, Bucheon and Suwon;
member of NA Health and Welfare
Committee; Legal advisor to
Minister of Gender Equality

Name

Democratic Party-Born in 1952
-Konkuk University, Department of
Politics-Member of Gyeongnam-do Council;
Secretary for Special Committee
on Budget and Accounts; GNP
deputy whip; GNP Deputy Secretary
General; Head of GNP Gyeongnamdo Chapter; Chairman of NA
Defense Committee

Office/contact
numberLee Jin Sam

-XQJJX'RQJJX%XVDQth term

The Members’ Hall:
Room 337
Phone: 784-2174
788-2252
Fax: 788-3337

People First Union (PFU)

Han Ki Ho

&KHRUZRQJXQ+ZDFKHRQJXQ<DQJJXJXQ,QMHJXQ*DQJZRQGRst term
-Born in 1952
- Korea Military Academy (class 31);
Commanding General of 2nd Infantry
Division; Chief of Information
Operations at Army Headquarters;
Commanding General of 5th Corps;
Commander, Army Training Doctrine
Command; Advisor to GNP Special
Committee on Countermeasuresconcerning Cheonan Incident

The Assembly Hall:
Room 306
Phone: 784-2051
788-2216
Fax: 788-3306

Future Hope Alliance (FHA)

Chung Ui Hwa-Born in 1948
-Master’s degree from Yonsei
University, Medical College; Ph.D.
degree from Inje University, Medical
College; Neurosurgery specialist;
NKP deputy spokesperson;
GNP deputy whip; Chair of NA
Science & Technology Committee;
member NA Foreign/Unification/
Trade Committee; Vice Speaker(currently)

Song Young Sun

Sim Dae Pyung

Academic background and experience(OHFWHGEDVHGRQSURSRUWLRQDO
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQst term
-Born in 1961
-Sungkyunkwan University,
Graduate School of Foreign Trade;
Chairman of Democratic Party
Organizing Committee; Head of 17th
Election Headquarters; Chairmanof Democratic Party 2nd Policy
Coordination Committee (currently)

-LQDQJXQ0XMXJXQ-DQJVXJXQ,PVLOJXQ-HRQEXNGRth term
- Born in 1950
-Korea University, Departmentof Law; Ph.D. in Business
Administration from Kyunghee
University; Chairman of Student
Association at Korea University;
Floor leader of Uri Party; Industrial
Minister; member of NA Foreign/
Unification/Trade Committee;
Representative of Democratic Party
%X\HRJXQ&KHRQJ\DQJJXQ&KXQJQDPGRst term
-Born in 1937
-Korea Military Academy (class 15);
Commanding General of 9th Airborne
Special Forces Brigade, 21st Division,
3rd Corps, and 1st Army; Army Chiefof Staff; Minister of Youth and Sports

(OHFWHGEDVHGRQSURSRUWLRQDO
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQnd term
-Born in 1953
-Ph.D. in international politics
from Hawaii University; Seniorresearcher at KIDA; Director at
Korean Institute for Women &Politics; Director of Center for
Security and Strategy, KIDA;
member of NA Foreign/Unification/
Trade Committee

*RQJMXVL<HRQJJLJXQ&KXQJQDPGRnd term
-Born in 1941
-Seoul National University,
Department of Economics; Senior
Secretary to the President on
Administrative Affairs; Chungnamdo Governor; Representative of the
PFU (currently)

Office/contact
number

The Members’ Hall:
Room 705
Phone: 784-4181
788-2601
Fax: 788-3705

The Members’ Hall:
Room 610
Phone: 784-5716
788-2895
Fax: 788-3610

The Members’ Hall:
Room 714
Phone: 784-3279
788-2181
Fax: 788-3714

The Members’ Hall:
Room 741
Phone: 784-5272
788-2816
Fax: 788-3741

The Members’ Hall:
Room 842
Phone: 784-2070
788-2980
Fax: 788-3842

415

Appendix0DMRUDFWLYLWLHVRI1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\'HIHQVH&RPPLWWHH
-DQXDU\1RYHPEHU
Classification

Date

Activities

280th extraordinary session of
National Assembly (January 9,
2009-January 31, 2009)

January 12,2009ǩReceives report on pending issues, including construction of the second
Lotte World theme park

February 3

ǩPublic hearing on construction of second Lotte World theme park

February 19ǩReceives MND’s business report. Passes Motion for Dispatch of ROK
Troops to the Sea off Somalia

February 24ǩPasses seven amendments of relevant laws, including partial
amendments of the Defense Acquisition Act

281st extraordinary session of
National Assembly (February 2,
2009-March 3, 2009)

282nd extraordinary sessionof National Assembly (April 1,
2009-April 30, 2009)

April 1ǩReceives report on pending issues concerning North Korea’s test-firing of
missilesApril 5

ǩPasses Resolution Denouncing North’s Test-firing of Long-range Rockets

April 14ǩReceives report on pending issues concerning new city Songpa

April 17

ǩPasses first supplementary budget for 2009

April 30ǩReceives report on revised version of Defense Reform Basic Plan

May 25

ǩReceives report concerning NK’s nuclear testǩPasses resolution denouncing North’s nuclear test, ‘a provocative act.’

June 30ǩReceives MND’s report on pending issues, including defense-related
content discussed at ROK-U.S. Summit

July 9ǩReceives MND’s report on cyber terrorismnd

282 extraordinary session of
National Assembly(while Assembly was out ofsession)283rd extraordinary session of
National Assembly (June 26,
2009-July 25, 2009)

284th regular session of
National Assembly(September 1, 2009December 9, 2009)4162010 Defense White Paper

September 18

ǩHolds confirmation hearing for Defense Minister-designate Kim Tae-young

September 24ǩHolds confirmation hearing for Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff-designate
Lee Sang-eui

September 25ǩPasses revenue/expenditure accounts settlement for 2008

October 5October 24ǩOversees functioning of 53 Governmental institutions, including MND and
Joint Chiefs of Staff

October 29ǩReceives report on South Korean civilian defecting to North and plan for
dispatch of ROK troops to Afghanistan

November 10

ǩReceives report on South’s action against provocative act perpetrated bypatrol boat from North

November 16ǩReceives MND’s report on pending issues, including defense budget for 2010

November 23ǩPasses Motion to Extend dispatch of ROK troops in the sea off SomaliaǩPasses bill for 2010 budget and fund operation plan

November 27ǩPasses 15 bills, including partial amendment to Armed Forces
Organization Act
ǩReceives report on pending issues concerning K2 Black Panther tank

December 4ǩHolds public hearing for partial amendment to Military Service Act

Classificationth287 extraordinary session of
National Assembly(February 2, 2010-March 2, 2010)

288th extraordinary session of
National Assembly(March 3, 2010-March 31, 2010)

289th extraordinary session of
National Assembly(April 1, 2010-April 30, 2010)

291st extraordinary session of
National Assembly(June 1, 2010-June 30, 2010)rd

293 extraordinary session of
National Assembly(August 1, 2010-August 31, 2010)

294th regular session of National
Assembly (September 1,
2010-December 9, 2010)

Date

Activities

February 18,
2010ǩDiscusses 12 items, including partial amendment of Military Personnel
Management Act, and refers them to Subcommittee for bill deliberation

February 19

ǩReceives report on status of business from MND, Defense Acquisition
Program Administration (DAPA), and Military Manpower Administration(MMA)ǩConsents to dispatch the ROK military unit to Afghanistan

February 24

ǩPasses six items, including partial amendment of Defense Acquisition
Program Act
ǩHolds public hearing on bill concerning areas adjacent to military
installations

March 27

ǩReceives report on sinking of a naval vessel

March 29

ǩReceives additional report on sinking of a naval vessel

April 14

ǩReceives MND’s report on pending issue (i.e., attack on ROKS Cheonan)

April 19

ǩDiscusses 20 bills, including partial amendment of Military Personnel
Management Act, and refers them to Subcommittee for bill deliberation
ǩReceives the MND’s report on a pending issue (i.e., attack on ROKS
Cheonan)April 30

ǩReceives MND’s report on pending issue (i.e., attack on ROKS Cheonan)ǩReceives report on crash of an F-5 fighter and a 500MD helicopter

June 21

ǩReceives MND’s report on current status of its business

June 22ǩAdopts plan to execute confirmation hearing about Chairman of Joint
Chief of Staff appointee
ǩReceives MMA’s report on current status of its business

June 23

ǩAdopts Resolution Denouncing North Korea for its attack on ROKS
Cheonan and urges the ROK government to take Countermeasures
ǩReceives DAPA’s report on current status of its business

June 30

ǩHolds confirmation hearing about Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff
appointee Han Min-kooǩAdopts a progress report on confirmation hearing about Chairman of
Joint Chief of Staff appointee

August 24

ǩReceives MND’s report on pending issue (i.e., countermeasuresconcerning attack on ROKS Cheonan) and readjusts schedule for return ofwartime operational control

August 27

ǩReceives accounts settlement for 2009 fiscal yearǩPasses account settlement for 2009 fiscal year

October 4October 22ǩOversees functioning of 54 Governmental institutions, including MND and
Joint Chiefs of Staff

November 11ǩReceives MND’s report on pending issues, including plan to dispatch
military cooperation corps to U.A.E.

November 30

ǩPasses bill for 2010 budgetǩReceives MND’s report on pending issues, including countermeasurestaken against North’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island

417

AppendixAppendix 26

Revision Details of Laws and Ordinances
5HODWHGWRWKH0LQLVWU\RI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH 01'/DZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVRYHUKDXOHG -DQXDU\WKURXJK1RYHPEHU
Laws

Presidential decrees

Ministerial ordinances

7RWDO

34

58

55

147

Laws
Name

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Military Civilian Personnel
Management Act- Partially amended
No. 9558(April 1, 2009)ǩ&RQFHUQLQJSXQLVKPHQWRIPLOLWDU\FLYLOLDQVGHPRWLRQLVLQVHUWHG
between dismissal and suspension from dutyǩ2YHUKDXOODZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVWRPDNHWKHPHDVLHUWRXQGHUVWDQG- Partially amended
No. 9559(April 1, 2009)ǩ:LWKUHVSHFWWRFRPPRGLWLHVDFTXLUHGE\WKH&RPPLVVLRQHURIWKH
Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) and supplied foruse or management by national defense agencies or respective services,
the management of such commodities shall be deemed transferred
when such commodities are delivered to national defense agencies orrespective servicesǩ([SDQGULJKWIRUOHDVHRIFRPPRGLWLHVǩ([SDQGOLVWRIFRPPRGLWLHVIRUHPHUJHQF\OHDVH
ǩ2YHUKDXOSURYLVLRQVIRULQYHQWRU\LQVSHFWLRQDQGDGMXVWPHQW
ǩ$EROLVKFRPPRGLW\SULFHDGMXVWPHQWV\VWHPAct on the Management of
Logistics Supplies

Revised Contents

ǩ$GRSW0LOLWDU\$LUZRUWKLQHVV&HUWLILFDWLRQ6\VWHP
ǩ6WDQGDUGL]HG$LUZRUWKLQHVV&HUWLILFDWLRQ&ULWHULD $UWLFOH
ǩ$LUZRUWKLQHVVFHUWLILFDWLRQSURFHGXUH $UWLFOHǩE stablish Airworthiness Certification Deliberation Committee(Article 7)ǩDesignate military airworthiness certification expert institution(Article 11)

Act on Flight Safety
Certification of Military
Planes- Enacted
No. 9560(April 1, 2009)

Defense Acquisition
Program Act- Partially amended
No. 9561(April 1, 2009)ǩ0DNHVXEPLVVLRQRI0LG7HUP'HIHQVH3URJUDPREOLJDWRU\ǩ*LYH60(VSULRULW\LQVHOHFWLRQRIDQRUJDQL]DWLRQLQFKDUJHRI5 'RUD
prototype manufacturer
ǩ$GRSWEXVLQHVVFRRUGLQDWLRQDSSOLFDWLRQV\VWHP
ǩ([SDQGVFRSHRIVXSSRUWIRUH[SRUWSURPRWLRQLQGHIHQVHLQGXVWU\VHFWRU

Act on Compensation ofSpecial Mission Performers- Partially amended
No. 9562 (April 1, 2009)ǩ([WHQGSHULRGRIDSSOLFDWLRQIRUFRPSHQVDWLRQWR2FWREHU

Act on Invalidation of theSuspended Court Marshall
Ruling- Abolition
No. 9655(May 8, 2009)4182010 Defense White Paper

ǩ$EROLVKDIWHUUHOHYDQWLVVXHVZHUHDGGUHVVHG

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Description

Special Act on Support for
Pyeongtaek Concerning
Relocation of USFK Bases- Partially amended
No. 9674(May 21, 2009)ǩ7KH'HIHQVH0LQLVWHUǢVDSSURYDORID86).LQVWDOODWLRQVUHODWHG
business execution plan shall be deemed equal to having received thepermission to use administrative assets under the State Properties Actǩ3ODFH3URMHFW*URXSIRU5HORFDWLRQRI01'86).%DVH5HORFDWLRQ2IILFH
under control of Defense Ministerǩ,QFOXGHUHYHQXHIURPHQWUXVWHGGHYHORSPHQWRIVWDWHSURSHUW\UHWXUQHG
from USFK as part of revenue from Special Accounts for Relocating
USFK Bases

Integrated Defense Act- Partially amended
No. 9675(May 21, 2009)ǩ3URYLGHOHJDOEDVLVFRQFHUQLQJLVVXDQFHRIZDWFKVWDWXVRUGHUZKLFKKDV
been operated under Presidential directives, to implement integrated
defense measures more efficientlyǩ2YHUKDXOODZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVWRPDNHWKHPHDVLHUWRXQGHUVWDQG

- Partially amended
No. 9754(June 9, 2009)ǩ3URYLGHEDVLVIRUUHDGMXVWPHQWRIVHUYLFHDUHDVDQGHQWUXVWLQJUHSDLURI
detailed service areas to public service personnelǩ3URYLGHEDVLVIRUSRVWSRQLQJGLVFKDUJHRIDFWLYHGXW\SHUVRQQHO
receiving medical treatmentǩ3URYLGHEDVLVIRUPDNLQJLWUHTXLUHGIRUPLOLWDU\YROXQWHHUVWRVXEPLW
school transcripts
ǩ'HILQHUHDVRQDQGSURFHGXUHIRUH[WHQVLRQRIVHUYLFHFRQFHUQLQJ
switchover serviceǩ3XEOLFVHUYLFHSHUVRQQHODUHUHTXLUHGWRUHSRUWFKDQJHVRIWKHLUVWDWXV
and are subject to disciplinary measures if they fail to file such reportsǩ3URYLGHEDVLVIRUSD\PHQWRIDOORZDQFHIRU527&FDGHWVǩ3URYLGHEDVLVIRUHDUO\GLVFKDUJHRIDFWLYHGXW\SHUVRQQHOIRXQG
unqualified for military service-Wholly amended
No. 9819(November 2, 2009)ǩ,QVHUWDSURYLVLRQIRUUHVSHFWLQJKXPDQULJKWVRIDQGSURKLELWHG
discrimination against, military confinesǩ,PSURYHK\JLHQHDQGPHGLFDOWUHDWPHQWIRUPLOLWDU\FRQILQHVǩ(QKDQFHPLOLWDU\FRQILQHVǢULJKWWRDQDWWRUQH\DQGLPSURYHGOHWWHU
censorship systemǩ3URYLGHOHJDOEDVLVIRUDOORZLQJSKRQHFRQYHUVDWLRQVVXEVFULSWLRQWR
newspapers, access to broadcast and writingǩ,QVHUWSURYLVLRQRQHGXFDWLRQDQGFRUUHFWLYHSURJUDPVIRUPLOLWDU\inmates’ for social adaptionǩ(DVHOHDYHUHTXLUHPHQWVDQGSURYLGHGOHJDOEDVLVIRUVSHFLDOOHDYHǩ3URYLGHOHJDOEDVLVIRUDUUHVWLQJHVFDSHGPLOLWDU\FRQILQHVǩ2YHUKDXOSXQLWLYHUHJXODWLRQVLQFOXGLQJDGRSWLRQRISUREDWLRQV\VWHP- Partially amended
No. 9820(November 2, 2009)ǩ6HSDUDWHSURYLVLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKHVFRSHRIVSDWLDODSSOLFDWLRQǩ5HGXFHVWDWXWRU\SXQLVKPHQWFRQFHUQLQJGHVHUWLRQǩ5HGXFHVWDWXWRU\SXQLVKPHQWFRQFHUQLQJYLROHQWFULPHLQWLPLGDWLRQ
assault and other crimesǩ5HDGMXVWVWDWXWRU\SXQLVKPHQWLQFOXGLQJDEROLWLRQRISHDFHWLPHFDSLWDO
punishment in the case of offenses aggravated by consequenceǩ5HDGMXVWVWDWXWRU\SXQLVKPHQWLQWKHFDVHRIWKHPXUGHURIDVXSHULRUǩ([SDQGVFRSHRIRIIHQVHVVXEMHFWWRILQHVǩ,QVHUWSURYLVLRQIRUSXQLVKPHQWIRUFUXHOW\DVZLWKXVHRIYLROHQWIRUFH
ǩ2YHUKDXOSURYLVLRQFRQFHUQLQJPRUHVHYHUHSXQLVKPHQWRIPLOLWDU\supply-related crimesǩ,QVHUWSURYLVLRQIRUSXQLVKPHQWRIUDSHRIRUIRUFHIXOVH[XDOKDUDVVPHQW
against female soldiers

Name

Military Service Act

Act on Implementation of
the Ruling of the Military
Court and Treatment ofMilitary Confinees

Military Penal Code419

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Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Military Court Act- Partially amended
No. 9841(December 29, 2009)ǩ$EROLVK$FWRQWKH0LOLWDU\&RXUWǢV7ULDO5LJKWǩ2YHUKDXOSURYLVLRQFRQFHUQLQJSURWHFWLQJWKHYDOXHRIFRQILVFDWHG
articlesǩ2YHUKDXOSURYLVLRQFRQFHUQLQJIRUFHIXOGLVSRVLWLRQZLWKRXWZDUUDQWǩ2YHUKDXOUHTXLUHPHQWVIRURSHQLQJDFRXUWVHVVLRQ

Act on Special Measuresconcerning Military Supplyrelated Crimes- Partially amended
No. 9842(December 29, 2009)ǩ$SSO\UHDOLVWLFPHDVXUHVWRSK\VLFDOVFRSHRIPLOLWDU\VXSSOLHVǩ5HDGMXVWVFRSHRIFULPHVVXEMHFWWRPRUHVHYHUHSXQLVKPHQW
ǩ$SSO\UHDOLVWLFPHDVXUHVWRDPRXQWRIILQHV

Veterans’ Pension Act- Partially amended
No. 9904(December 31, 2009)

ǩ&RQFHUQLQJWKHVWLSXODWLRQWKDWSHQVLRQSD\PHQWVVKDOOEHSDUWLDOO\reduced for a defendant sentenced to imprisonment or heavier while
in service, the said stipulation shall not apply in the event of an offense
perpetrated due to negligence not associated with the duty or as theresult of following a standard order from a commanding officer-Partially amended
No. 9945(January 25, 2010)ǩ$QRWLFHRIWKH+RPHODQG5HVHUYH)RUFHVWUDLQLQJVHVVLRQFDQEH
delivered to the head or a member of the same household, when thereservist is not available. The provision concerning the delivery of anotice in the Civil Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis, if requiredǩ'HOHWHSURYLVLRQWKDWUHTXLUHGWKH+RPHODQG5HVHUYH)RUFHVǢFRPSDQ\commanding officers to submit their men’s applications for nonparticipation in ordinary/mobilization training sessions to the relevant
military unitsǩ,QFOXGHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHUHVRXUFHVXUYH\FRQFHUQLQJSHUVRQQHODQG
supplies under the Emergency Resources Management Act in the duty of
the Homeland Reserve forces’ commanding officers
ǩ5HDGMXVWSXQLWLYHPHDVXUHV LQFOXGLQJDILQHLQDGGLWLRQWRLPSULVRQPHQW
with hard labor) against Homeland Reserve Forces’ company
commanding officers involved in political activities

Military Service Act-Partially amended
No. 9946(January 25, 2010)

ǩ$OORZUHJLRQDOPLOLWDU\PDQSRZHUDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVWRGLVSDWFKPLOLWDU\service duty-related notices via the information networkǩ6HSDUDWHPLOLWDU\UHJLVWHURIWKRVHWUDQVIHUUHGWRRQWKHVKLSUHVHUYH
service statusǩ3URYLGHFRQFUHWHFULWHULDIRUHQUROOPHQWDVUHWLUHGRIILFHUVLQFOXGLQJ
those who have finished ROTC courses, but not enrolled as active-duty
officersǩ6WLSXODWHFRQGLWLRQVIRUFDQFHOODWLRQRIWUDQVIHUWRVWDWXVRIRQWKHVKLS
reserve service, the return to pre-transfer status, and the need to carryout military service duty
ǩ'HOHWHSURYLVLRQRQWUDQVIHURIWKRVHMXGJHGWRKDYHDVHULRXVSUREOHPLQ
carrying out military service due to the race or skin color to replacement
or the 2nd conscriptionǩ([WHQGDJHOLPLWIRUGLVFKDUJHRUH[HPSWLRQIURPWKHSK\VLFDO
examination for conscription, enrollment as an active-duty personnel
or public service personnel to 36 and the age for such an exemption fordraft-dodgers to 38

Act on Recovery of Honor of
Religious Victims of October
27, 1980- Partially amended
No. 9947(January 25, 2010)ǩ7KHYDOLGLW\RIWKH$FWLVH[WHQGHGWR-XQHDVLWZDVGLIILFXOWWR
finish the objectives intended by the Act within the original timeline.

Establishment of theHomeland Reserve ForcesAct

4202010 Defense White Paper

Description

Name

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses (KIDA) Act- Partially amended
No. 9994(February 4, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOODZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVWRPDNHWKHPHDV\WRXQGHUVWDQG

Act on Formation of Basis for
Defense Informatization andManagement of Relevant
Resources- Enacted
No. 9995(February 4, 2010)ǩ,QFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKH*RYHUQPHQWǢVLQWHQWLRQWRSURPRWHVWUDWHJLF
informatization for national security in an information-based society andeconomic informatization, through efficient management of national
defense intelligence resources as part of defense informatization policyǩ7KH$FWDOORZVWKH'HIHQVH0LQLVWHUWRHVWDEOLVKWKH'HIHQVH
Informatization Basic Plan and ask the heads of the relevant
administrative agencies to weigh the objectives of the basic plan whenestablishing and executing major policies.

Military Personnel
Management Act- Partially amended
No. 9996(February 4, 2010)ǩ6KRUWHQPLQLPXPPDQGDWRU\VHUYLFHSHULRGIRUFDQGLGDWHVIRU
promotion to Major General

Act on Report and Discloseof Public Officials’ MilitaryService Record- Partially amended
No. 10099(March 17, 2010)ǩ([FOXGHVHULDOQXPEHUVIURPLWHPVWREHGLVFORVHGFRQFHUQLQJSXEOLF
officials’ military service record

Requisition Act- Partially amended
No. 10100(March 17, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOODZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVWRPDNHWKHPHDVLHUWRXQGHUVWDQG

Act on Regulation of the
Use and Transfer of SpecificConventional Weapons,
including Landmines- Partially amended
No. 10101(March 17, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOODZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVWRPDNHWKHPHDVLHUWRXQGHUVWDQG

Armed Forces Organization
Act- Partially amended
No. 10102(March 17, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOODZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVWRPDNHWKHPHDVLHUWRXQGHUVWDQG

Act on Establishment of
the Armed Forces Nursing
Academy- Partially amended
No. 10103(March 17, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOODZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVWRPDNHWKHPHDVLHUWRXQGHUVWDQG

Military Telecommunications
Act- Partially amended
No. 10104(March 17, 2010)ǩ7KHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIDEXVLQHVVZKRKDVIXOILOOHGKLVREOLJDWLRQVIRU
management and supervision of employees, is exempt from punishment
so that the principle of liability is applied in the joint penal provision.

War Memorial Korea Act- Partially amended
No. 10105(March 17, 2010)ǩ$OORZLQGLYLGXDOVFRUSRUDWLRQVRURUJDQL]DWLRQVWRGRQDWHRUFRQWULEXWH
to War Memorial-Partially amended
No. 10106(March 17, 2010)ǩ7KHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIDEXVLQHVVZKRKDVIXOILOOHGKLVREOLJDWLRQVIRU
management and supervision of employees, is exempt from punishment
concerning the business in which his employees have perpetrated
violations. (Overhaul of the joint penal provision).
ǩ$EROLVKKDQGOLQJIHHFROOHFWHGDWWKHWLPHRIUHFHLYLQJRUFKDQJLQJD
permit for businesses in production and sale of military uniforms andoutfits

Act on Prohibition of
Unauthorized Use of Military
Uniforms and Outfits

Description

421

AppendixName

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Description

Military Civilian Personnel
Management Act- Partially amended
No. 10192(March 26, 2010)ǩ3URPRWHRUGLQDU\PLOLWDU\FLYLOLDQVWR*UDGHVKDOOEHDGGUHVVHGE\WKH
personnel committee, if required

National Defense ReformAct- Partially amended
No. 10214(March 31, 2010)ǩ([SDQGFRPPRQSRVLWLRQVDWWKH-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDIIZKLFKKDYHEHHQ
assumed by general-level officers from each service on a rotational
basis, to colonels

Agency for Defense
Development (ADD) Act- Partially amended
No. 10215(March 31, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOODZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVWRPDNHWKHPHDVLHUWRXQGHUVWDQG

Act on Installation of the
Korea Army Academy at
Yeongcheon- Partially amended
No. 10216(March 31, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOODZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVWRPDNHWKHPHDVLHUWRXQGHUVWDQG

Military Personnel
Management Act- Partially amended
No. 10217(March 31, 2010)

ǩ*HQHUDOOHYHORIILFHUVVKDOOEHDVVLJQHGWRGHVLJQDWHGSRVLWLRQV
available, but may be exceptionally assigned to positions in units
dispatched to foreign countries. One not assigned to another position at
the same level or higher after being dismissed from a position or end of
the term of assignment shall be dismissed from active dutyǩ0DNHUHVSHFWIXOH[SUHVVLRQIRUIHPDOHPHPEHUVRIPLOLWDU\PDQGDWRU\(i.e. from yeoja to yeosung)Defense Acquisition
Program Act- Partially amended
No. 10218(March 31, 2010)

ǩ$GGGHIHQVHLQGXVWU\ǢVFRQWULEXWLRQWRQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWWR
purpose and basic philosophy of the Act
ǩ7LJKWHQ1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\FRQWURORIGHIHQVHDFTXLVLWLRQSURJUDPVǢpromotion
ǩ'HILQHTXDOLILFDWLRQRIRPEXGVPHQǩ3URYLGHOHJDOEDVLVFRQFHUQLQJ5 'DQDO\VLVDQGDSSUDLVDO

Name

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Description

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Service Act- Partially amended
No. 21255(January 7, 2009)ǩ7KHWUDQVIHURIGHIHQVHVFLHQFHDQGWHFKQRORJ\GRHVQRWKDYHWRJR
through the deliberation of the Defense Acquisition Program Promotion
Committee.
ǩ0DNHLWSRVVLEOHWRVHFXUHUDZPDWHULDOVDQGSDUWVZLWKWKHDSSURYDORI
the DAPA prior to signing the contract, concerning a long-term contract
between the DAPA and a defense contractor

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Service Act- Partially amended
No. 21256(January 7, 2009)ǩ([WHQGSRVWSRQHPHQWSHULRGIRUFDUU\LQJRXWPLOLWDU\VHUYLFHGXW\
for those who have taken a job after graduation from a professional
high school in consideration of fairness in comparison with university
students

Presidential decrees4222010 Defense White PaperName

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Description

Provision on payment ofoverseas allowance touniformed soldiers andmilitary civilians- Partially amended
No. 21257(January 7, 2009)ǩ0DNHDGGLWLRQDORIILFHUOHYHODOORZDQFHVWRZDUUDQWRIILFHUVQRQ
commissioned officers and military civilians in charge of healthmandatoryǩ%DVHDOORZDQFHSD\PHQWRQDYHUDJHDQQXDOZRQGROODUH[FKDQJHUDWHLQ
previous year to reduce gap

Enforcement Decree of theSpecial Act on Fact-finding of
Dubious Death of Uniformed
soldiers- Partially amended
No. 21266(January 16, 2009)ǩ2YHUKDXOVHFUHWDULDWRUJDQL]DWLRQGHVLJQHGWRJXDUDQWHHQHXWUDOLW\DQG
expertise of Uniformed Soldiers Dubious Death Fact-Finding Committeeǩ$GRSWV\VWHPRIFORVLQJDFDVHLQZKLFKWKHUHOHYDQWSDUW\KDVZLWKGUDZQ
its request for investigation after commencement of investigation

Enforcement Decree of the
Act on Repatriation andTreatment of Prisoners ofWar- Partially amended
No. 21378(March 31, 2009)ǩ3URYLGHFRXQVHOLQJDQGWUDLQLQJIRUWKRVHKHOGDV32:VLQ1RUWK.RUHD
promotion of overall understanding of social, cultural and economic
activities in the ROK under the amendment to the Act on Repatriation andTreatment of Prisoners of War (Law No. 9289 promulgated on December
31, 2008 and implemented in April 1, 2009)

Organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Act- Partially amended
No. 21379(March 31, 2009)ǩ5HDGMXVWGXWLHVRIWKH-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDIIǩ5HRUJDQL]HVWDIIRIILFHVRIWKH-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDIIǩ5HDGMXVWVWDIIRIILFHDVVLJQPHQWVAct on the Organizationsof the Office of Military
Manpower Administration(MMA) and Its Subsidiary
Institutions-Partially amended
No. 21393(March 31, 2009)ǩ5HRUJDQL]HVXEXQLWVLQWRODUJHUGHSDUWPHQWVǩ5HGXFHQXPEHURIKLJKUDQNLQJRIILFLDOVE\RQHǩ5HGXFHQXPEHURIGLUHFWRUJHQHUDOOHYHOSRVLWLRQVWKDWFRXOGEHILOOHGE\contract-based officials from 3 to 2

Decree concerning
military attachés in foreignembassies-Partially amended
No. 21426(April 20, 2009)ǩ5HTXLUH'HIHQVH0LQLVWHUWRFRQWURODQGVXSHUYLVHPLOLWDU\PDWWHUVWKDWshould be fixed in consultation between Defense Minister and Foreign
Ministerǩ5HTXLUHVHWWLQJWDEOHVRIRUJDQL]DWLRQRIPLOLWDU\DWWDFK«VLQ52.
embassies in foreign countries and for the Defense Minister to consult
with the Foreign Minister concerning (a change in) the tables oforganization for military attaches in individual embassies

Act on the Organization of
the MND and Its Subsidiary
Institutions-Partially amended
No. 21472(May 6, 2009)ǩ5HRUJDQL]HVXEXQLWVLQWRODUJHUGHSDUWPHQWVWRLQWHJUDWHVLPLODU
functionsǩ5HRUJDQL]H01'RUJDQL]DWLRQDQGIXQFWLRQVLQFOXGLQJUHLQIRUFHPHQWRI
functions related to North Korea, the U.S. and international policies, toimprove efficiency

Enforcement Decree of the
Act on Compensation toSpecial Mission Performers-Partially amended
No. 21504(May 28, 2009)ǩ$VVLJQ6SHFLDO0LVVLRQ3HUIRUPHUV&RPSHQVDWLRQ'HOLEHUDWLRQCommittee’s administrative matters to the Support Team forCompensation to Persons Engaged in Special Military Mission of the
MND handles aǩ0DNHVHFUHWDU\RIVDLGFRPPLWWHH&KLHIRIWKH6XSSRUW7HDPIRU
Compensation to Persons Engaged in Special Military Mission

Act on the Organizationsof the Office of Military
Manpower Administration(MMA) and Its Subsidiary
Institutions- Partially amended
No. 21521(June 2, 2009)ǩ*UDGHRURIILFLDOVDWWKHKHDGTXDUWHUVRIWKH00$FDQEHDVVLJQHGWR
the positions of subsidiary institutions.
ǩ'HOHWHSURYLVLRQRQKRZPDQ\SRVLWLRQVFDQEHILOOHGE\FRQWUDFWEDVHG
officials

423

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Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Civilian Personnel
Act- Partially amended
No. 21595(July 1, 2009)ǩ&KDQJHFDOFXODWLRQRIPLQLPXPSHULRGUHTXLUHGIRUSURPRWLRQǩ/LPLWRSSRUWXQLW\IRUSURPRWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKRVHZLWKUHFRUGVRI
punishment with demotionǩ5HDGMXVWVFRUHVVFRULQJIDFWRUVFRQFHUQLQJFDQGLGDWHVIRUSURPRWLRQǩ3URYLGHEDVLVIRUUHHPSOR\PHQWVFUHHQLQJIRUFLYLOLDQSURIHVVRUVEnforcement Decree of
the Defense Acquisition
Program Act- Partially amended
No. 21596(July 1, 2009)ǩ6WLSXODWHGHWDLOHGUHTXLUHPHQWVIRURIIVHWWUDGHǩ$GRSWSHUIRUPDQFHEDVHGORJLVWLFDOVXSSRUWV\VWHP
ǩ([SDQGVFRSHRIGHIHQVHVXSSOLHVǩ'HWDLOIDFWILQGLQJSURFHGXUHIRUSURMHFWFRRUGLQDWLRQV\VWHP

Decree concerning theArmed Forces Printing
Depot- Enacted
No. 21597(July 1, 2009)ǩ(VWDEOLVK$UPHG)RUFHV3ULQWLQJ'HSRWE\LQWHJUDWLQJSULQWLQJGHSRWVRI
respective services to improve operation of non-combat management
military units under Defense Reform Basic Plan

Enforcement Decree ofthe Act on Designation
and Operation of Military
Executive Agencies- Partially amended
No. 21598(July 1, 2009)ǩ3URYLGHOHJDOEDVLVIRUHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI$UPHG)RUFHV3ULQWLQJ'HSRWDVMilitary Executive Agency

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Personnel Act- Partially amended
No. 21651(July 30, 2009)ǩ$GRSW5HVHUYH2IILFHU&DQGLGDWHV6\VWHPǩ$OORZZDUUDQWRIILFHUVDQGQRQFRPPLVVLRQHGRIILFHUVWRWDNHSDUWLQ
Deliberation Committee on Discharge from Active Dutyǩ0DNHLWSRVVLEOHWRXVHWKHPDWHUQLW\OHDYHSHULRGRQVHYHUDORFFDVLRQV
and fill in the void caused by those on maternity leave

Enforcement Decree ofthe Act on Flight Safety
Certification of Military
Planes- Enacted
No. 21652(July 30, 2009)ǩ'HWDLODLUZRUWKLQHVVFHUWLILFDWLRQW\SHVǩ([FOXGHDSSOLFDWLRQRIVWDQGDUGDLUZRUWKLQHVVFHUWLILFDWLRQVWDQGDUGVǩ6HWPDWWHUVFRQFHUQLQJFRPSRVLWLRQDQGRSHUDWLRQRI$LUZRUWKLQHVV
Certification Deliberation Committee and Working-level Technological
Committee

Enforcement Decree of The
Special Act on Support for
Pyeongtaek concerning
Relocation of USFK Bases- Partially amended
No. 21733(September 17, 2009)ǩ6WLSXODWHPDWWHUVFRQFHUQLQJRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGRSHUDWLRQRISURMHFW
group entrusted under the amended laws and the criteria for impositionof fines on Pyeongtaek Development Project contractors

MURO (MND USFKBase Relocation Office)Regulations- AbolishedNo. 21733(September 17, 2009)ǩ$EROLVKUHJXODWLRQVZLWKLQ$GGLWLRQDO5XOHVRIWKH(QIRUFHPHQW'HFUHH
of The Special Act on Support for Pyeongtaek concerning Relocation of
USFK Bases

Military Personnel Service
Discipline- Partially amended
No. 21750(September 29, 2009)ǩ&OHDUO\GHILQHWKHFRQFHSWRIVXSHULRUVLQWKHPLOLWDU\FRPPDQGV\VWHPǩ,PSRVHGREOLJDWLRQRIKRQRULQJDQGUHVSHFWLQJRWKHUVZKHQXVLQJ
military information networkǩ0DQGDWRU\IRUERWKFRPPDQGLQJRIILFHUVDQGVXERUGLQDWHVWRUHVSHFW
each other when carrying out duties

Enforcement Decree ofthe Logistics Supplies
Management Act- Partially amended
No. 21751(September 29, 2009)ǩ3URYLGHEDVLVRISHUIRUPDQFHEDVHGORJLVWLFDOVXSSRUWV\VWHP
ǩ'HWDLOFDVHVLQZKLFKVFUDSSLQJRIDPPXQLWLRQLVLPSURSHUDW
ammunition demilitarization facilitiesǩ([SDQGVFRSHRIWKHULJKWVIRUOHDVHRUWUDQVIHURIPLOLWDU\VXSSOLHVǩ2YHUKDXO0LOLWDU\6XSSO\,QVSHFWLRQ&RPPLWWHH

4242010 Defense White Paper

Description

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Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Act on the Organizationsof the Office of Military
Manpower Administration(MMA) and Its Subsidiary
Institutions- Partially amended
No. 21754(September 29, 2009)ǩ7KRVHRIILFLDOV LHILYH*UDGHDQGWKUHH*UDGH QHHGHGWR
reinforce the military draft physical examination, including a precision
psychological test through a clinical psychologist, are reflected in thetables of organization of the subsidiary institution of the MMA.

Regulations on Militaryentrusted Students- Partially amended
No. 21779(October 19, 2009)ǩ5HDGMXVWVFRSHRIH[SHQVHVSDLGWRPLOLWDU\HQWUXVWHGVWXGHQWVLQ
foreign countriesǩ5HLQIRUFHFULWHULDIRUFDOFXODWLRQRIH[SHQVHVWREHUHWXUQHGWRWKH
state concerning those dismissed while attending a military-provided
educational program

Enforcement Decree of the
Act on Establishment of the
Korea National Defense
University- Partially amended
No. 21780(October 19, 2009)ǩ([SDQGVFRSHRIWKRVHHOLJLEOHIRUGLSORPDFRXUVHVRIIHUHGE\WKH
National Defense University to active-duty warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and military civilians, in addition to officers andpublic officials

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Personnel Act- Partially amended
No. 21821(November 13, 2009)ǩ,QWKHFDVHRIWKRVHKLUHGE\DQLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQLQFOXVLRQRIWKH
original temporary retirement period in the service period is not required.
ǩ6XSSOHPHQWSURFHGXUHIRUGHVLJQDWLRQRIWKHSRVLWLRQVRISURIHVVLRQDOV- Partially amended
No. 21826(November 17, 2009)ǩ5HDGMXVWVFRSHRIPLOLWDU\LQVWDOODWLRQSURWHFWLRQ]RQHVDWWLPHRIDQ
administrative disposition that requires consultation with Defense
Ministerǩ/LIWGHVLJQDWLRQRI+HOLFRSWHU%DVHLQ&KXQFKHRQDVPLOLWDU\LQVWDOODWLRQ
protection zoneǩ,PSURYHVL]HVKDSHRIPLOHVWRQHVIRUPLOLWDU\LQVWDOODWLRQSURWHFWLRQzones

Enforcement Decree of theIntegrated Defense Act- Partially amended
No. 21827(November 17, 2009)ǩ3URYLGHEDVLVIRULQWHJUDWHGGHIHQVHPHHWLQJ
ǩ%HVWRZUHJLPHQWFRPPDQGHUOHYHOPLOLWDU\RIILFHURUSROLFHFKLHIRU
higher the right to issue an order for a “watch” status and specified
Class-I/II/III watch statusesǩ6WLSXODWHKRZFKDLQRIFRPPDQGVKRXOGEHHVWDEOLVKHGDQGPXWXDO
cooperation should be made when integrated defense situation isannounced

Enforcement of Decree ofthe Act on Establishment ofHomeland Reserve Forces-Partially amended
No. 21859(November 30, 2009)ǩ/DXQFKUHJLRQDOXQLWVDVSDUWRI+RPHODQG5HVHUYH)RUFHVǢORFDOXQLWVǩ3HUPLWUHVHUYLVWVWRWDNHSDUWLQWUDLQLQJFDUULHGRXWRXWVLGHKLVDUHD
ǩ6HWQXPEHURIKRXUVIRUWUDLQLQJ+RPHODQG5HVHUYH)RUFHVDQGWKH
procedure for delivery of the notice concerning training sessions via
electronic means- Partially amended
No. 21867(December 7, 2009)ǩ3RVWSRQHGLVFKDUJHRIDFWLYHGXW\SHUVRQQHOUHFHLYLQJPHGLFDO
treatmentǩ6WLSXODWHHGXFDWLRQFDUULHGRXWIRUWKRVHQHZO\WUDQVIHUUHGWRRQWKH
ship reserve serviceǩ6XEFDWHJRUL]HVHUYLFHDUHDVIRUSXEOLFVHUYLFHSHUVRQQHOǩ(DVHFRQGLWLRQVIRUWUDQVIHURIVSHFLDOL]HGUHVHDUFKSHUVRQQHODQG
skilled industry personnel

Enforcement Decree of the
Act on Protection of Military
Base and Installations

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Service Act

Description

425

AppendixName

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Regulations on paymentof honorable retirement
allowance- Partially amended
No. 21884(December 15, 2009)

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Personnel Act- Partially amended
No. 21893(December No. 21, 2009)

Decree concerning the
Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA)- Partially amended
No. 21915(December 30, 2009)ǩ/LVWWDVNVWKDW',$VKRXOGFDUU\RXWLQSUHSDUDWLRQIRUUHWXUQRI:DUWLPH
Operational Controlǩ(VWDEOLVK52.&\EHU&RPPDQGDVVXEVLGLDU\XQLWRI',$

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Pension Act- Partially amended
No. 21993(January 18, 2010)ǩ5HSODFHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUVXEPLWWDORIVHDOLPSUHVVLRQSRZHURIDWWRUQH\
with copy of public institution-issued ID and signature at the time of
applying for bereaved family allowance

Decree concerning the
Defense Security Command(DSC)- Partially amended
No. 22007(February 4, 2010)ǩ(QKDQFHGHFUHHUHODWHGV\VWHPLQFOXGLQJVHWWLQJVFRSHDQGFRQWHQWRI
DSC duties

Decree concerning Defense
Transportation Command- Partially amended
No. 22078(March 23, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOUHJXODWLRQVIRUDVVLJQPHQWRI'HIHQVH7UDQVSRUWDWLRQCommand as a joint unit and operation of its subsidiary units

Regulations on theoperational units of eachservice whose main duty is
combating under the Armed
Forces Organization Act,
Article 9, Paragraph 3- Partially amended
No. 22079(March 23, 2010)

ǩ,QFOXGH'HIHQVH7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ&RPPDQGLQMRLQWXQLWVIRUHIILFLHQW
provision of support for joint operations
ǩ2YHUKDXOODZVDQGRUGLQDQFHVWRPDNHWKHPHDVLHUWRXQGHUVWDQG

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Civilian Personnel
Act- Partially amended
No. 22089(March 26, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOMREJURXSVMREOLQHVV\VWHPDQGHYDOXDWLRQV\VWHPRIPLOLWDU\employed civiliansǩ([WHQGUHWLUHPHQWDJHPLOLWDU\FLYLOLDQVLQVSHFLDOSRVLWLRQV

Enforcement Decree of the
Act on Implementation of the
Ruling of the Military Court
and Treatment of Confines- Wholly amended
No. 22137(April 29, 2010)ǩ6XEFDWHJRUL]HVROLWDU\FRQILQHPHQWǩ,PSURYHV\VWHPIRUVXSHUYLVLRQRIWKRVHLQVROLWDU\FRQILQHPHQW
ǩ3URYLGHLPSURYHGK\JLHQHDQGPHGLFDOVHUYLFHFRQGLWLRQVWRPLOLWDU\confinesǩ*XDUDQWHHGPLOLWDU\SULVRQHUVǢULJKWWRDQDWWRUQH\DQGLPSURYHGOHWWHU
censorship system

Enforcement Decree of theSpecial Act on Fact-finding of
Dubious Death of Uniformed
Soldiers- AbolishedNo. 22165(May 25, 2010)ǩ7KHVDLGHQIRUFHPHQWLVDEROLVKHGZKHQWKH$FWH[SLUHGRQ'HFHPEHU
31, 2009

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Personnel Act- Amended
No. 22215(June 28, 2010)ǩ6HWWKHSRVLWLRQVWRZKLFKJHQHUDOOHYHORIILFHUVFDQEHDVVLJQHGXQGHU
amended Military Personnel Management Actǩ([SDQGHOLJLELOLW\IRUDSSOLFDWLRQIRUVHOHFWLRQRIVHUYLFHDFDGHP\FDGHWV
to equivalent of four-year college graduates and those holding similar
academic background4262010 Defense White Paper

Descriptionǩ([SDQGVFRSHRISXEOLFRIILFLDOVIURPZKRPKRQRUDEOHUHWLUHPHQW
allowances should be withdrawn
ǩ&KDQJHFULWHULDIRUFDOFXODWLQJDPRXQWRIZLWKGUDZDOǩ5HDGMXVWGHPXUUDJHUDWHLQUHJDUGWRDPRXQWRIZLWKGUDZDOǩ5HDGMXVWSRVLWLRQVVXEMHFWWRWHUPEDVHGSURPRWLRQName

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Regulations on the Advanced
Defense Promotion
Committee- Enacted
No. 22271(July 12, 2010)ǩ&RPSRVLWLRQDQGRSHUDWLRQRIWKH3UHVLGHQWLDO$GYDQFHG'HIHQVH
Promotion Committee launched as a body providing advice to the
President on matters concerning advanced defense posture

Enforcement Decree of theRequisition Act- Amended
No. 22272(July 12, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOGHWDLOHGFULWHULDIRUFRPSHQVDWLRQRILWHPVUHTXLVLWLRQHG
ǩ6SHFLI\FRPSRVLWLRQDQGRSHUDWLRQRI5HTXLVLWLRQ&RPSHQVDWLRQDeliberation Committee

Act on the Organization of
the MND and Its Subsidiary
Institutions- Amended
No. 22287(July 21, 2010)ǩ2IILFHRI1DWLRQDO'HIHQVH5HIRUPH[WHQGHGE\RQHPRUH\HDUǩ,QFUHDVHQXPEHURIHPSOR\HHVZKRVHHPSOR\PHQWVWDWXVZDV
confirmed according to need of military for 2010 by 13ǩ7UDQVIHURIVHYHQVSHFLILHGSRVLWLRQVWKDWFRXOGEHILOOHGRQO\E\administrative officials with the proper status to ordinary or multiple
special positions that can be filled with any candidate possessing
sufficient administrative or technical skills
ǩ&RPSUHKHQVLYHO\VWLSXODWHDOORFDWLRQRIDVVLJQPHQWVIRUDQFLOODU\advisory institutions

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Civilian PersonnelAct- Amended
No. 22345(August 17, 2010)ǩ6WLSXODWHSURPRWLRQRIRUGLQDU\PLOLWDU\FLYLOLDQVWR*UDGHWRSXW
procedures in line with those from Public Official Employment Decree

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Pension Act- Amended
No. 22355(August 25, 2010)ǩ3URYLGHSURSHUOHYHORIFRPSHQVDWLRQWKURXJKXSZDUGDGMXVWPHQWRI
military death depending on cause

Enforcement Decree of the
National Defense ReformAct- Partially Amended
No. 22412(October 1, 2010)

ǩ([SDQGFRPPRQSRVLWLRQVRI-RLQW&KLHIVRI6WDIIKHUHWRIRUHJHQHUDO
level officers from each service on a rotational basis, to include colonels,in step with amendment to the law

Enforcement Decree of
the Defense Acquisition
Program Act- Partially amended
No. 22413(October 1, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXORPEXGVPDQSURYLVLRQVDQGW\SHVRIVWUDWHJLFZHDSRQV
businesses subject to approval and matters to be entrusted, including
approval procedures, in step with amendment to Defense Acquisition
Program Act
ǩ6WLSXODWHPHWKRGVDQGSURFHGXUHIRUSXUFKDVHRIPLOLWDU\VXSSOLHV

Enforcement Decree of theMilitary Service Act- Partially amended
No. 22414(October 1, 2010)ǩ,QFOXGH3K'FRXUVHVQHZO\FRPPHQFHGE\'DHJX*\HRQJEXN,QVWLWXWH
of Science & Technology, on the list of research programs in which
specialized research personnel may be engaged
ǩ&ODVVLI\IXOOWLPHUHVHUYLVWVDVGHSHQGHQWVZKHQLQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRnd
conscription category due to household situationǩ6WULNHWKRVHMXGJHGLPSURSHUIRUUHSODFHPHQWVHUYLFHGXULQJVFUHHQLQJ
from list of those subject to service callPresidential Decree on
Resident Military Attaches
Assigned to Overseas
Diplomatic and Consular
Missions- Partially amended
No. 22415(October 1, 2010)ǩ,QFUHDVHQXPEHURIPLOLWDU\DWWDFKHVDVVLJQHGWRRYHUVHDVGLSORPDWLF
and consular missions so as to reinforce military diplomatic relations
with foreign countries

Description

427

AppendixName

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Description

Air Force Headquarters
Organization- Wholly amended
No. 22430(October 13, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOUHJXODWLRQVLQFOXGLQJGLYLVLRQRI3ROLF\352IILFHWR3ROLF\
Office and TI&E Office, and added medical services to responsibilities of
Personnel Staff Office

Armed Forces Medical
Command Decree-Partially amended
No. 22431(October 13, 2010)ǩ&RPSOHWHEDVLVIRUHVWDEOLVKLQJ$UPHG)RUFHV0HGLFDO6FKRRODQG
Military Combined Hospital under direct control of Armed Forces
Medical Commandǩ$EROLVK$UPHG)RUFHV0HGLFDO6FKRRO'HFUHHDQG0LOLWDU\&RPELQHG
Hospital Decree

Army Logistics Command
Decree-Wholly amended
No. 22432(October 13, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXO$UP\/RJLVWLFV&RPPDQGǢVV\VWHPGHOHWLQJIURPLWVGXWLHV
matters concerning military assistance and improvement of equipment
and supplies – other than logistical support

The Army Combat
Development Corps Decree-Abolished No. 22433(October 13, 2010)ǩ$EROLVK$UP\&RPEDW'HYHORSPHQW&RUSVDQGWUDQVIHUUHGLWVGXWLHVDQG
organization to Army Training Command

Army Headquarters
Organization-Wholly amended
No. 22434(October 13, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOV\VWHPGLYLGLQJ3ROLF\352IILFHGXWLHVEHWZHHQ3ROLF\2IILFH
and TI&E Office,ǩ$GG$UP\5HIRUP2IILFHDQGWUDQVIHUUHGYHWHUDQVXSSRUWIURPPersonnel Staff Office to Army Personnel Command

Navy Headquarters
Organization-Wholly amended
No. 22435(October 13, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOV\VWHPGLYLGLQJ3ROLF\352IILFHGXWLHVEHWZHHQ3ROLF\
Office and TI&E Office and made medical services the responsibility of
Personnel Staff Office

Marine Corps Command
Organization- Wholly amended
No. 22436(October 13, 2010)ǩ2YHUKDXOV\VWHPLQFOXGLQJLQWHJUDWLQJFRPEDWUHODWHGIXQFWLRQV
creating Chief of Staff position to supervise general staff functions, andreorganizing Personnel Staff Office

Organization of the Defense
Acquisition Program
Administration and its
affiliated institutions- Partially amended
No. 22438(October 13, 2010)ǩ$GGIRXUZRUNLQJOHYHOHPSOR\HHVWR&RPPXQLFDWLRQV2IILFHIRUUHFRUGVmanagement
ǩ&KDQJH&RVW0DQDJHPHQW'HSDUWPHQWLQWKH&RQWUDFW0DQDJHPHQWDivision into Cost Accounting Verification Corps that reports directly tohead of Contract Management Division

Enforcement Decree of the
Act on Compensation toSpecial Mission Performers-Partially amended
No. 22460(October 27, 2010)ǩ&OHDUO\GHILQHWUDLQLQJDQGHGXFDWLRQDOSHULRGFRQFHUQLQJVSHFLDO
missions, which form the basis for eligibility for special missions

4282010 Defense White Paper

Ministerial ordinances
Name

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Description

Enforcement Rules of
the Defense Acquisition
Program Act- Partially amended
No. 668(January 7, 2009)ǩIn regard to long-term contracts between DAPA and defense contractors: a
defense contractor can ask for confirmation of quality by securing raw materials
and parts with DAPA approval prior to signing the contract, as part of theoverhaul of the relevant provisions in accordance with the amendment to therelevant enforcement decree

Enforcement Rules of the Act
on Flight Safety Certificationof Military Planes- Partially amended
No. 669(January 23, 2009)ǩE
 ase criteria for more severe punishment concerning repeated offencesǩE ase criteria for disposition concerning a case involving danger of mid-air
collision

Rules on the military draft
physical examination- Partially amended
No. 670(January 28, 2009)ǩA
 bolish method of judging examinees’ physical status based on points totaledǩE nd practice of measuring height and weight at boot camp and at time of physicalexamination in order to change military service-related statusǩA dd more stringent criteria for judgment of physical status rather than relying
merely on height and weight

Enforcement Rules of theMilitary Civilian Personnel
Management Act- Partially amended
No. 671(February 10, 2009)ǩD elete appearance as a factor of judgment of an interviewee in recruitment
ǩR eadjust written test subjects in recruitment of ordinary military civiliansǩO verhaul criteria for giving bonus points to holders of licenses and qualification
certification in promotion

Enforcement Rules of
the Act on Prohibition of
Unauthorized Use of Military
Uniforms and Outfits- Partially amended
No. 672(February 10, 2009)ǩD
 etail factors for imposing more severe/lighter administrative disposition
ǩA dd alleviation criteria concerning cancellation of business permits

Rules on Special Allowance
Paid to Uniformed Soldiers- Partially amended
No. 673(February 19, 2009)ǩU pward adjustment of allowance for submarine crews

Rules on payment of down
payment and interim
payment to defense industry
contractors- Partially amended
No. 674(March 25, 2009)ǩE xpand down payment period from 90 days to 180 days for earlier budget
executionǩIncrease interim payment from 20% to 30% for contracts in excess of 1 billion
won

Enforcement Rules of the
Act on Repatriation andTreatment of Prisoners ofWar- Partially amended
No. 675(April 1, 2009)ǩA
 mend law, enforcement decree and measures required for execution,
including designation of application form for social adaptation education, underamendment to Act

Enforcement Rules of the Act
on the Organizations of the
Office of Military Manpower
Administration (MMA) and
Its Subsidiary Institutions- Partially amended
No. 676(April 8, 2009)ǩChange department names following reorganization and reallocatedassignments
ǩR eorganize regional military manpower administrations and reallocatedassignments

Military Act Enforcement
Regulation

Partially amended
No. 677(May 25, 2009)ǩA
 llow public service personnel who submit justifiable reasons for returning toschool to flexibly adjust annual leave periods according to year of service, within
the total number of annual leave days set by different service requirements

Enforcement Rules of the
Act on the organization of
the DAPA and its subsidiaryinstitutions- Partially amended
No. 678(May 26, 2009)ǩS
 tipulate assignments for newly launched Certification Planning Division andExport Promotion Division in detailǩC hange names from Office of Business Consultation to Customer Service Centerand from Financial Officer to Financial Operation Officer

429

AppendixName

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Enforcement Rules of the
Act on the Organization of
the MND and Its Subsidiary
Institutions- Partially amended
No. 679(May 26, 2009)ǩStipulate assignments for newly launched positions, i.e. Budget Compilation
Officer and Private Investment Officer, in detail; and readjusted assignmentsof relevant departments in connection with reorganization of the MND and
its subsidiaries (under Presidential Decree No. 21472 promulgated andimplemented on May 6, 2009)

Enforcement Rules of the Act
on the Organizations of the
Office of Military Manpower
Administration (MMA) and
Its Subsidiary Institutions- Partially amended
No. 680(June 25, 2009)ǩOverhaul relevant regulations in connection with reorganization of MMA andits subsidiaries, including making it possible to reassign Grade-3/4 officials at
MMA headquarters as heads of regional military manpower administrations in
Gyeongnam-do or Gyeonggi-doǩAmend General Rules on the Organization and Tables of Organization of
Administrative Institutions to make it possible to fill vacancies with contract–based
officials by means of the Prime Minister’s Ordinance or ministerial ordinance

Enforcement Rules of
the Defense Acquisition
Program Act- Partially amended
No. 681(July 1, 2009)ǩOverhaul relevant regulations under amendment to Defense Acquisition
Program Act (Law No. 9561 promulgated on April 1, 2009, and implemented on
July 2 the same yearǩStipulate form of program coordination agreement and documents to be
attached to program coordination application
ǩStipulate details required for promotion and use of locally produced parts

Rules on the Military
Prosecutors Office’s
handling of cases- Wholly amended
No. 682(July 6, 2009)ǩChange the Rules on the Military Prosecutor’s Office’s handling of administrative
matters to the Rules on the cases handled by the Military Prosecutor’s OfficeǩOverhaul case investigation proceduresǩStipulate the procedure for handling cases and public trials
ǩStipulate appealing to the Supreme Court, whistle blowing, the procedure at
the Military Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, the procedure for appealing to theConstitution Court, and a measure taken to limit communication

Rules on the Defense
Minister’s authority overthe heads of the subsidiaryadministrations- Partially amended
No. 683(July 6, 2009)ǩReorganize MND subsidiaries and their assignments for smoother information
sharingǩRequire MND’s subsidiary administration heads to report overseas travel plans
to Defense MinisterǩRequire notification of a change in personnel affairs concerning high-ranking
aids to Defense Minister

Enforcement Rules of the Act
on Flight Safety Certificationof Military Planes- Enacted
No. 684(August 5, 2009)ǩStipulate enforcement and implementation in connection with Act on Flight
Safety Certification of Military Planes (Law No. 9560 promulgated on April 1,2009 and implemented on August 1 the same year)

Description

Enforcement Rules ofthe Military Personnel
Management Act- Partially amended
No. 685(August 13, 2009)ǩRequirements for implementation of amendment to relevant Enforcement Decree(Presidential Decree No. 21651 promulgated and implemented on July 30, 2009),
which made it possible for warrant officers and non-commissioned officers to takepart in committees, including Long-Term Service Eligibility Screening Committee
and adopted reserve officer candidates system to secure talented military officers
ǩDelete appearance as review category when interviewing female recruits forofficer positions

Rules on selection of reserve
force commander- Partially amended
No. 686(August 31, 2009)ǩInclude Navy and Air Force military police in regard to applicable branches in
examination for Reserve Forces commanding officer recruitment to promote
equity between each serviceǩImprove conversion methods for active-duty personnel performance scoresǩPhysical examination mandatory only for those who passed written test

4302010 Defense White PaperName

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Description

Rules on administrative
measures for preservationof records of the Military
Prosecutor’s Office- Enacted
No. 687(October 5, 2009)ǩSpecify record preservation procedures for court rulings, unprosecuted cases,
and cases associated with complaints or internal investigation at Military
Prosecutor’s Office

Rules on inspection andreproduction of militarycriminal case records andhandling charges- Enacted
No. 688(October 5, 2009)ǩStipulate handling fees and methods of certification for perusal and reproductionof military criminal case records, issuance of photocopies or abstracts of court
rulings, or certifications concerning specific cases

Enforcement Rules of theRegulations on Militaryentrusted Students- Partially amended
No. 689(October 19, 2009)ǩProvide legal basis for Defense Minister’s instruction requiring chiefs of staff ofeach service to comply with request for submittal of documents, such as physicalcheckup results, concerning military-entrusted students studying abroadǩDelete regulation concerning matters to be observed and reported by militaryentrusted students in connection with fact that they are covered by Militaryentrusted Students Regulations

Rules on Recruitmentof Students for National
Defense University andcollection of tuition fees

- Partially amended
No. 690(October 19, 2009)ǩOverhaul relevant regulations to make it possible to adjust number of thoseadmitted to diploma courses offered by National Defense University annually inaccordance with prevalent situation

Enforcement Officeof Military Manpower
Administration and its
subsidiary institutions rules- Partially amended
No. 691(October 22, 2009)ǩIncrease number of junior medical technicians by 8
ǩProvide basis for converting 22 menial function positions to general positions

Enforcement Rules on the
Organization of the MND and
Its Subsidiary institutions- Wholly amended
No. 692(October 23, 2009)ǩProvide basis of converting status of 19 menial function positions to general
positions under amendment to Public Official Employment Decree (Presidential
Decree No. 21717 promulgated and implemented on September 8, 2009)

Enforcement Rules of the
Act on the organization of
the DAPA and its subsidiaryinstitutions- Partially amended
No. 693(October 23, 2009)ǩExpand positions that can be filled in with either Grade-6 administrative officials
or Grade-6 technological officialsǩProvide basis of converting status of 10 menial function positions to general
positions

Enforcement Rules of
the Logistics Supplies
Management Act-Partially amended
No. 694(November 6, 2009)ǩComputerize hand-written supply management /supply operation log books ofasset files operated under Military Logistics Information System
ǩOverhaul of terminologies and expression to make them easy to understandRules on Special Allowance
Paid to Uniformed Soldiers- Partially amended
No. 695(November 6, 2009)ǩIn regard to basic (300,000 won/month) allowance included in incentive pay forvolunteer enlisted soldiers, recipients can claim the sum of basic allowancepayments for the extended service period on the first remuneration pay day uponrequest-Partially amended
No. 696(November 12, 2009)ǩChange name of existing rules so they may be applied to recruitment ofManagement of Reserve Forces personnelǩChange rank of Homeland Reserve Forces company commanding officers fromretired major/captain to retired majorǩRequire applicants for Management of Reserve Forces positions to pay handlingfees based on the category and position
ǩReadjust subjects of the written test and points allocatedRules on Recruitment of
Personnel in charge ofManagement of Mattersconcerning Reserve Forces

431

AppendixSerial number of
promulgation (date)

Description

Enforcement Rules of the
Act on Protection of Military
Base and Installations- Partially amended
No. 697(November 24, 2009)ǩReflecte amendment to following Act, mutatis mutandis, in defense minister’s
consultations with chiefs of relevant administrative institutions, concerningpermission to enter military installation in protected zones associated with
explosives
ǩThe Act on Special Measures for Designation and Management of Areas ofRestricted Development, its Enforcement Decree, Schedule 1-2 (the Presidential
Decree No. 21670 promulgated on August 5, 2009 and implemented on August 7
the same year)

Enforcement Rules of
the Establishment of theHomeland Reserve Forces- Partially amended
No. 698 (November
30, 2009)

ǩRequire recruit reserve forces commanding officers to pass test for reserve
forces management business

Military Service Act
Enforcement Regulations- Partially amended
No. 699(December 10, 2009)ǩIn regard to matters (such as notification for refresher training of public service
personnel), required for implementation of amendment to Military Service Act(Law No. 9754 promulgated on June 9, 2009 and implemented on December
10 the same year) and its Enforcement Decree (Presidential Decree No. 21867
promulgated on December 7, 2009 implemented on December 10 the same year)ǩConcerning application for split military service made by a member ofadministrative support personnel: replaced requirement for submitting
diagnosis issued by military authorities with diagnosis issued by medical
institution

Enforcement Rules ofthe Military Personnel
Disciplinary Punishment
Ordinance- Partially amended
No. 700(December 30, 2009)

ǩLay out different types of major misconducts, such as violation of obligation
for faithfulness, obedience, staying in a designated service place and keeping
dignity, involving officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers
stated in Schedule-1 in said Rules

Rules on Safe Operation of
Ships- Partially amended
No. 701(January 14, 2010)ǩForm Fishing Protection Headquarters and coordination of matters concerning
its operation
ǩReadjust scope of Report Post functions and converted Joint Report Posts toReport Posts
ǩEase procedure for reporting a ship’s departure from and return to a portǩExpand legitimate reasons for breaking from a group of fishing vessels during
fishing operation
ǩAbolish identification signal system

Rules on military draft
physical examination- Partially amended
No. 702(February 17, 2010)

ǩRationally and objectively categorized mental/physical illnesses or disorders
weighed as part of a judgment of physical condition

Rules on Military
Prosecutors Office’s
administrative measuresfor depriving offender’s
property- Enactment
No. 703(February 17, 2010)ǩSet out detailed procedures for implementation of measures for seizing
offender’s property
ǩStipulate procedure for Military Prosecutor’s Office handling fines paid tonational treasury and payment of fines prior to coordination
ǩStipulate matters, such as forceful implementation procedure and payment offines
ǩStipulate matters, such as adjustment of time-based fines and matter related:
required payment, procedure for payment, appeal process, and procedure forrefunds

Rules on establishment andsupervision of non-profit
corporations under thecontrol of the MND and its
subsidiary institutions- Partially amended
No. 704(March 9, 2010)ǩStipulate mandatory period within which to handle the business of nonprofit corporations in accordance with relevant provisions and stipulated the
documents to be submittedǩSimplify wording of rulesName4322010 Defense White PaperName

Serial number of
promulgation (date)

Rules on Recruitment of
Personnel in charge ofManagement of Mattersconcerning Reserve Forces- Partially amended
No. 705(March 10, 2010)ǩChange term reserve troops management to reserve forces management inconnection with establishment of Reserve Forces Management Authority
ǩClearly define the scope of the recruitment test for the officials in charge ofreserve forces management

Enforcement Rules on the
Organization of the MND and
Its Subsidiary Institutions- Partially amended
No. 706(March 12, 2010)ǩProvide basis for changing status of 19 menial function positions at MND and its
subsidiaries to general positions

Enforcement Rules of theMilitary Civilian Personnel
Management Act- Partially amended
No. 707(March 29, 2010)ǩOverhaul of the performance evaluation system concerning military civilians of
Grade-4 or lower (Article 23)ǩImprove the evaluation system of the result of training and education

Rules on the Recruitmentof Medical/Veterinarian
Medical Officers- Partially amended
No. 708(April 2, 2010)

ǩRequire administrator of MMA to inform Defense Minister about list of preselected recruits
ǩSet out how to choose successful candidates for medical/veterinarian officers
along with criteria for screening candidatesǩRequire candidate selection to include entire document-based and physicalexam screeningǩMandatory for Medical/veterinarian officers to be hired after completing job
orientation training

Enforcement Rules of the
Act on the organization of
the DAPA and is subsidiaryinstitutions- Partially amended
No. 709(April 27, 2010)ǩThe position that can be set aside as open recruitment type is changed from
Director General of the Analysis Test & Evaluation Bureau to the Auditor, which isthought to be more relevant

Enforcement Rules of the
Act on Implementation of the
Ruling of the Military Court
and Treatment of Confines- Wholly amended
No. 710(May 3, 2010)

ǩLay out matters entrusted by relevant enforcement decree and measuresrequired for implementation, such as the duties of military correctional officers,
criteria for provision of clothes, bedding and food for inmates, religious
sessions/educational programs for military prisoners

Rules on Special Allowance
Paid to Uniformed Soldiers- Partially amended
No. 711(May 13, 2010)ǩStipulate raise for military judge advocates agreeing to long-term service
ǩExpand those eligible for payment of additional allowances, such as incentive
allowance/air service allowance for uniformed soldiers

Enforcement Rules of
the Act on Prohibition of
Unauthorized Use of Military
Uniforms and Outfits- Partially amended
No. 713(June 30, 2010)

ǩRevise handling fee-related provision in connection with abolition of handlingfee which used to be collected at the time of receiving or changing a permit forbusinesses involved with the production and sale of military uniforms and outfits

Enforcement Rules of theRequisition Act- Wholly amended
No. 714(July 16, 2010)

ǩLay out formats related to requisition and compensation for requisition
stipulated in Enforcement Decree of the Requisition Act and details of survey ofthe status of the objects subject to requisitionǩStipulate that the loss of, or damage to, the requisitioned objects should bereported- Partially amended
No. 715(July 21, 2010)

ǩReflect the increase in the number of employees by 13 under the authorized
strength for 2010ǩIncrease the number of employees whose employment status was confirmed
according to the need of the military for 2010 by 13 in connection with the change
in the horizontal and vertical structure of the organization of the MND and its
subsidiary institutions
ǩReadjust several functions, including the transfer of the Department of Religion
from the Office of National Defense Policy to the Office of Personnel and Welfare

Enforcement Rules on the
Organization of the MND and
Its Subsidiary Institutions

Description

433

AppendixSerial number of
promulgation (date)

Description

Enforcement Rules of theMilitary Service Act-Partially amended
No. 716(July 21, 2010)ǩOverhaul regulations concerning period for permission to travel overseas
ǩDetaile regulations pertaining to survey of those listed as being in on-the-ship
reservesǩOverhaul provision concerning abolition of system for incorporation of those clearly
distinguished from others in terms of race and skin color into 2nd conscription
ǩRequire those listed as disabled to undergo military conscription physical exam

Wholesale Amendment to
the Enforcement Rules of theVeterans` Pension Act- Partially amended
No. 717(August 12, 2010)

ǩAmend relevant provisions, in line with amendment to the Electronic
Government Act, which makes it mandatory to obtain prior consent before any
personal information submitted to an administrative institution can be publicly
disclosed (this must be confirmed directly by the public official in charge throughthe network for the joint use of administrative information)

Enforcement Rules of theMilitary Civilian Personnel
Management Act-Partially amended
No. 718(August 17, 2010)

ǩRelevant readjustment of military civilian tests in accordance with changes in
job groups and job lines and readjustment of test subjects

Enforcement Rules of the
Act on Report and Disclosureof Public Officials’ MilitaryService Records-Partially amended
No. 719(August 31, 2010)ǩSimplify wording in forms, including military service records

Rules on Special Allowance
Paid to Uniformed Soldiers-Partially amended
No. 720(September 16, 2010)ǩChange description from air service allowance to incentive allowance in regard tofighter, cargo pilot and wing pilot whose total service falls between 16 and 22 years in connection with amendment to Regulations on Allowance for Public Officials

Enforcement Rules of theMilitary Service Act-Partially amended
No. 721(October 8, 2010)ǩChange name of public organizations that may use services provided for public
service personnelǩAdjust length of annual holidays for public service personnel to match those foractive-duty enlisted soldiersǩProvide basis for Duty Call Revocation Committee in regional Military Manpower
Administration offices to screen out those ineligible for replacement service

Enforcement Rules of
the Defense Acquisition
Program Act- Partially amended
No. 722(October 12, 2010)ǩOverhaul weapons system-related R&DǩImplement logistical support for export of defense materielǩOverhaul procedure for consent or permits concerning manufacture, import,
transfer, possession, storage and scrapping of military firearms
ǩSet bidding participation time period

Enforcement Rules of theOrganization of the Officeof Military Manpower
Administration and its
affiliated institutions- Partially amended
No. 723(October 22, 2010)ǩTransfer publication of annual report on military manpower administration,knowledge management and suggestion system to Regulation Reform & Legal
Affairs Divisionǩ24 office employees transfer to menial function positions as working-levelmanpower resources

Enforcement Rules of theOrganization of the Defense
Acquisition Program
Administration and Its
subsidiary institutions- Partially amended
No. 724(October 29, 2010)ǩPlace increased manpower in Defense Acquisition Program Administration
ǩReorganize Cost Accounting Verification Corps and provided basis for changing
the status of nine menial function positions to general positions, in step with theamendment to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration

Enforcement Rules of theOrganization of the MND and
Its subsidiary institutions- Partially amended
No. 725(November 8, 2010)ǩTransfer radioactive ray safety management from Office of Military Force andResources Management to Office of Personnel and WelfareǩRedefine MND general public official positions (Grade-3 or lower) to permit any
candidate with proper administrative or technical skills to applyName4342010 Defense White Paper

IndexIndex
A

Cobra Gold exercise

73

Abolishment of the Mandatory Residence System for

Combined Delegated Authority (CODA)

81

240

Command Post Exercise (CPX)

191

Accident Insurance Service

240

Commercial Vehicle

208

Additional Pay-rises Based on Service Period

239

Common Operating Environment (COE)164

Ages When Expenditure Is the Highest in the Life Cycle

239

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

98

Aegis destroyer

53

Community Service System289

Air interdiction operations (AI)54

Community services

289

AKJCCS Alliance Korean Joint Command Control System

85

Comprehensive Plan to Fully Utilize Civilian Resources214

Alternative service system

288

Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)

164

Anti-submarine operations

53

Counselor System for Addressing Female Grievances

174

Anti-surface ship operations

53

Counter Air Operations (CA)54

Arms Control

126

CTF-151 (Combined Task Force-151)

111

Article 2.2, The June 4 Agreement

122

Currency Reform25

Article 5, The National Defense Reform Act

135

CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention

11

ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)

94

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)72

D

Ashena Unit

12

Daecheong Naval Campaign

26

Asia Security Summit

93

Danbi Unit

12

Assessment of impact by gender174

December 1 Restrictive Measures

119

Assets Operation Guidelines

247

Defense architecture

137

Defense Budget of China

20

Newly Purchased Private Apartments

Defense Cluster Consisting of Industrial, Academic,

B
Basic Plan for Military Personnel Welfare

238

Research and Military Institutes

215

Broadband convergence network bandwidth

162

Defense Cost-Sharing

88

Build-Transfer-Lease (BTL)

253

Defense Exports Follow-up Logistics Support System

232

BWC: Biological Weapons Convention

11

Defense Industry Promotion Funds

230

Defence Information Resource

158

Defense Information Technical Standard (DITS)

164

C
CBT: Computer Based Training

187

Defense Informatization Governance

159

Character building educational program

183

Defense Interoperability Portal System (DIPS)

163

Childbirth Encouragement Policy of the MND

Defense Technology Information Management Service (DTiMS) 218(applied to multiple-children families)242

Demilitarization

104

Civilian Contracted Doctor

256

Deployable Medical System

257

Civilian-Military Integrated Welfare Town

243

Depot Maintenance (overhaul/repairs)

209

Close air support operations (CAS)54

Designated ports for inter-Korean navigation route1244362010 Defense White PaperDevelopment of ROK-China Relations

93

I

Development of ROK-Japan Relations

92

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

11

Development of ROK-Russia Relations

94

Illegal or Unscrupulous Vendors

217

Development of ROK-Vietnam Relations

95

IMB: International Maritime Bureau

9Distance Education

187

Improvised Explosive Device (IED)

69

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

70

Incorporation of military units with similar functions

135

Dongmyeong Unit

12

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) veriﬁcation

82

Integrated Defense Program Information Management System 218

E

Integrated Distance Defense Educational System

188

East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI)

80

Integrated Enterprise Architecture

159

Eight Key Tenets of the National Defense Policy

42

Integrated Suicide Prevention System

263

Entrusted area

268

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force

12

Exercise190

IP: Internet Protocol

162

F

J

Family Support Service

241

Japan –Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

13

Female Defense Personnel

172

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and Escort Flotilla

19

Joint combat development system

50

159

Joint Fire Operation System-Korea (JFOS-K)

147

Fleet Management System (FMS)215

Joint Tactical Data Link System (JTDLS)

147

Four Initiatives

160

Joint unit

50

Four-Point Military Lines

28

Jointness

50

FPS-5

20

JOS: Joint Operation Simulation

192

JPAC: Joint POW / MIA Accounting Command

300

Five Areas where the defense information systems areto be advanced

G
Gender recognition

174

K

Global Korea

38

KCTC: Korea Combat Training Center

193

Government-to-Government Sales System (FMS)232

Khann Quest

114

GPOI (Global Peace Operation Initiative) Capstone Exercise

115

Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum

98

H

L

HCOC: Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation

11

Land Partnership Plan (LPP)

87

Lease System

208

Levels of Information System Interoperability (LISI)

163

Light infantry division

30

437

AppendixIndexLIMA Langkawi International Maritime andAerospace Exhibition

229

NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

11

Nunn-Warner Amendment

80

M

O

Major points of the Act of Foundation for Defense Informatization

Open R&D Structure

218

and Defense Information Resource Management

Operational Command (OPCOM)80

Operational Control (OPCON)

80
84

158

Major points of the regulations pertaining to therecruitment of Managers for the reserve forces

153

Opinion Polls

Mandatory Reserve System

246

Opinion poll about the Bonus Point System for Military Service 250

Maritime Task Flotilla

142

Other Accounts

Melt-out system

104

Military Command

139

P

Military doctrine

21

Paid volunteer system

286

Military Executive Agency

135

PBL (Performance-Based Logistics)

210

Military Installations Relocation Plan

252

Peace Wave

108

Military Optimum Specialty in Optimal Position

59

Policy customer service

Military service evading

289(PCRM: Policy Customer Relationship Management)

295

Military Structure

138

Practical education

182

Mine operations

53

Precision Replenishment Battalions

150

M-kiss: Military Knowledge-Welfare Integrated

253

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

11

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

12Service System299

MND-ARMS: Architecture Repository Management System

162

Mobilization

59

R

Mobilization Designation Ratio

150

Real estate in the Mt. Kumgang Tourist Region

Modeling & Simulation (M&S)

160

conﬁscated or frozen by North Korea.

120

MOU on Korea-Philippines Mutual Logistics Cooperation

96

Remote Maintenance Support

209

MOU on Korea-Singapore Defense Cooperation

96

Retirement Age

152

Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)

52

ROK-Australia Joint Statement on Global andN

Security Cooperation

96

ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM)

81

National Defense Acquisition System

218

ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)

86

National Defense Knowledge Management (e-jisaem)

204

ROK-U.S. Security Policy Initiatives (SPI)86

National Security Strategy (NSS) 2020

21

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)

11S

Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)

100

Safe Korea Exercise (SKX)

4382010 Defense White Paper

70

SAM-X: Surface to Air Missile

226

The Jeontu 21 Model

194

Scientiﬁc Business Management System

218

The Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance78

Scientiﬁc Training and Education

185

The May 24 Countermeasures against North Korea

122

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

14

The Musudan

35

Shared Data Environment (SHADE)

164

The New Asia Diplomacy

95

Similar Specialty

59

The Onnuri Unit

113

SME-Preferred Item Designation System

231

The Space Basic Act

19

SNS Social Network Service

295

Three exchanges

15

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement

274

Three Management Systems

160

Specialization and Systematization System

219

Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD)

55

Stabilization Operations Unit

150

TLCM Total Life Cycle Management

210

State properties

283

TOR on the Operation of the ROK-U.S.

Strategic Alliance towards the 21st Century

40

Combined Implementation Working Group (CIWG)

82

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START- I)

11Training

190

Strategic attack operations (SA)54

Training Range Integration by Area

189

Strategic Items or Commodities

102

Switchover service personnel

288

U

Synthetic Battleﬁeld System (LVC)186

UN Security Council Resolution 1874

T

27

V

Tactical Information Communication Network (TICN)

147

Virtualization

Tailored and specialized educational courses (2009)

249

TDF: Tokyo Defense Forum

100

W

Technology Transfer (spin-on/off/up)

230

WiBro (Wireless Broadband)

The Annual Asia-Paciﬁc Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference

72

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Brinkmanship Tactic

27

The Changjo 21

194

Y

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

23

Yulgok Project

The cross-strait issue

14

The Hwarang 21 Model

194

150-Day Battle and 100-Day Battle

25

2nd conscription

59

July 1 Measures

24

162

163
8

221

439

Appendix2 0 1 0 DEFENSE
WHITE PAPER

First edition published on March 31, 2011
Edited by Defense Policy Division, Policy Planning Bureau
Published by Ministery of National Defense, Republic of Korea
www.mnd.go.kr
Point of Contact : 02-748-6231~7