This page left intentionally blankTHE DEPARMENT OF DEFENSE

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report
Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region

June 1, 2019

The estimated cost of this report or study for the
Department of Defense is approximately $128,000 for
the 2019 Fiscal Year. This includes $18,000 in expenses
and $110,000 in DoD labor.
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MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEThe Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense’s priority theater. The UnitedStates is a Pacific nation; we are linked to our Indo-Pacific neighbors
through unbreakable bonds of shared history, culture, commerce, andvalues. We have an enduring commitment to uphold a free and open IndoPacific in which all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and able topursue economic growth consistent with accepted international rules, norms, andprinciples of fair competition.
The continuity of our shared strategic vision is uninterrupted despite an increasingly
complex security environment. Inter-state strategic competition, defined bygeopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions, is the primaryconcern for U.S. national security. In particular, the People’s Republic of China, under
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to reorder the region to its
advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory
economics to coerce other nations.
In contrast, the Department of Defense supports choices that promote long-term
peace and prosperity for all in the Indo-Pacific. We will not accept policies or actions
that threaten or undermine the rules-based international order – an order that benefits
all nations. We are committed to defending and enhancing these shared values.
The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy articulate our vision tocompete, deter, and win in this environment. Achieving this vision requires combining
a more lethal Joint Force with a more robust constellation of Allies and partners.
Increased investments in these imperatives will sustain American influence in theregion to ensure favorable balances of power and safeguard the free and open
international order.
This 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) affirms theenduring U.S. commitment to stability and prosperity in the region through the pursuitof preparedness, partnerships, and the promotion of a networked region.

 Preparedness – Achieving peace through strength and employing effective
deterrence requires a Joint Force that is prepared to win any conflict from its
onset. The Department, alongside our Allies and partners, will ensure ourcombat-credible forces are forward-postured in the region. Furthermore, theJoint Force will prioritize investments that ensure lethality against high-end
adversaries.
 Partnerships – Our unique network of Allies and partners is a force multiplierto achieve peace, deterrence, and interoperable warfighting capability. The
Department is reinforcing its commitment to established Alliances andPartnerships, while also expanding and deepening relationships with newpartners who share our respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, andthe rule of law.
 Promotion of a Networked Region – The Department is strengthening andevolving U.S. Alliances and Partnerships into a networked security architecture
to uphold the international rules-based order. The Department also continues
to cultivate intra-Asian security relationships capable of deterring aggression,
maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.
Advancing this Indo-Pacific vision requires an integrated effort that recognizes thecritical linkages between economics, governance, and security – all fundamental
components that shape the region’s competitive landscape. The Department of
Defense, in partnership with other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies,
regional institutions, and regional Allies and partners, will continue to diligently upholda rules-based order that ensures peace and prosperity for all.

Patrick M. Shanahan
Acting Secretary of Defense

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Contents
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
1.1. America’s Historic Ties to the Indo-Pacific ............................................................ 2
1.2. Vision and Principles for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific....................................... 3
2. Indo-Pacific Strategic Landscape: Trends and Challenges............................................ 7
2.1. The People’s Republic of China as a Revisionist Power........................................ 7
2.2. Russia as a Revitalized Malign Actor ...................................................................... 11
2.3. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a Rogue State .......................... 122.4. Prevalence of Transnational Challenges ................................................................ 13
3. U.S. National Interests and Defense Strategy............................................................... 15
3.1. U.S. National Interests ............................................................................................. 15
3.2. U.S. National Defense Strategy ............................................................................... 16
4. Sustaining U.S. Influence to Achieve Regional Objectives......................................... 174.1. Line of Effort 1: Preparedness ................................................................................ 174.2. Line of Effort 2: Partnerships ................................................................................. 21
4.3. Line of Effort 3: Promoting a Networked Region ............................................... 44
Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 53
Acronyms .............................................................................................................................. 55

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1. IntroductionT

he Indo-Pacific is the single most consequential region for America’s future. Spanning a vast
stretch of the globe from the west coast of the United States to the western shores of India,
the region is home to the world’s most populous state, most populous democracy, and largest
Muslim-majority state, and includes over half of the earth’s population. Among the 10 largest
standing armies in the world, 7 reside in the Indo-Pacific; and 6 countries in the region possess nuclear
weapons. Nine of the world’s“The story of the Indo-Pacific in recent decades is 10 busiest seaports are in thethe story of what is possible when people take region, and 60 percent of global
ownership of their future…this region has emerged maritime trade transits throughas a beautiful constellation of nations, each its own Asia, with roughly one-third ofglobal shipping passing throughbright star, satellites to none.”
the South China Sea alone.
-

President Donald J. Trump, speech at the APEC CEO Summit,
November 10, 2017

The United States is a Pacificnation and has five Pacific states: Hawaii, California, Washington, Oregon, and Alaska, as well as
Pacific territories on both sides of the International Date Line, including: Guam, American Samoa,
1Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

Wake Island, and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). American businesses
have traded in Asia since the 18th century, and today, within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC), America’s annual two-way trade with the region is $2.3 trillion, with U.S. foreign direct
investment of $1.3 trillion in the region – more than China’s, Japan’s, and South Korea’s combined.
The Indo-Pacific contributes two-thirds of global growth in gross domestic product (GDP) andaccounts for 60 percent of global GDP. This region includes the world’s largest economies – theUnited States, China, and Japan – and six of the world’s fastest growing economies – India, Cambodia,
Laos, Burma, Nepal, and the Philippines. A quarter of U.S. exports go to the Indo-Pacific, and exports
to China and India have more than doubled over the past decade. This is made possible by free andopen trade routes through the air, sea, land, space, and cyber commons that form the current global
system.

1.1. America’s Historic
Ties to the Indo-Pacific
The United States is a Pacific nation. Ourties to the Indo-Pacific are forged by “Starting in the Indo-Pacific, our priority
history, and our future is inextricably theater, we continue to pursue many belts
linked. We have contributed both blood and many roads by keeping our decades-old
and treasure to sustain the freedoms, alliances strong and fostering growing
openness, and opportunity of this region. partnerships.”
Our presence secures the vital sea lanes of- Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan,
the Indo-Pacific that underpin global
testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee,
March 14, 2019
commerce and prosperity. Our leaders,
diplomats, military forces, and businesses
helped frame and strengthen the international system of clear and transparent rules; peacefulresolution of disputes; and the rule of law that has been vital to the region’s relative security andgrowing prosperity.
The past, present, and future of the United States are interwoven with the Indo-Pacific. Our
engagement in the Indo-Pacific dates back more than two centuries, based on the pursuit of the sharedprosperity that comes from fair and reciprocal trade, open commerce, and freedom of navigation. In
1784, within months of signing the Treaty of Paris, the United States sent a trading ship, the
EMPRESS OF CHINA to inaugurate commercial ties with China. In 1804, President Thomas
Jefferson sent the explorers – Lewis and Clark – on an expedition to our Pacific Coast, which Jefferson
recognized as the gateway for increased trade and commerce. By 1817, Congress approved the firstfull-time Pacific deployment of a U.S. warship. In the early 19th century, we began our relationshipwith the Kingdom of Thailand and thereafter negotiated to open Japan to global trade in the 1850s.

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

At the close of the 19th century, the United States established an “Open Door” policy towards China,
promoting equal opportunity for trade and commerce in China, and respect for China’s sovereignty.
In the 20th century, the United States expanded its role in the region as we confronted imperialism
and fascism and held the line against communism during the Cold War. The early 1950s marked
several milestones – the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States in August 1951 and the signing of the Australia, New Zealand, and United States
Security Treaty in September 1951 – both of which sought to bring stability to the region. In theseven decades that followed the Second World War, based on a foundation of the U.S. system ofalliances and our forward deployed forces, the Indo-Pacific was largely peaceful, and we helped create
the stability necessary for economic prosperity in the United States and the region.
In pursuit of partnership, not domination, the United States worked with Japan and South Korea after
the Second World War to forge alliances and stimulate an economic boom in both countries. In
Taiwan, U.S. aid helped create an open, democratic society that allowed the island to blossom into ahigh-tech powerhouse. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States invested in Hong Kong, Singapore,and other Southeast Asian economies and supported foundational institutions like the Association forSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the APEC Forum, and the Asian Development Bank, allcontributing to growth in the region. Simultaneously, the United States established formal diplomatic
relations with China in 1979, which facilitated economic exchange and extended America’s consistentpolicy approach of a free, open market and equal trading opportunity for merchants of all nationalities
operating in the region. At the turn of the 21st century, the United States advocated for China’s
admission into the World Trade Organization, with the belief that economic liberalization would bring
China into a greater partnership with the United States and the free world.
As history has demonstrated and the future necessitates, the United States will continue to play a keyrole as a force for regional stability in the Indo-Pacific in support of U.S. diplomatic and economic
aspirations. To do so, the United States must be prepared by sustaining a credible combat-forward
posture; strengthening alliances and building new partnerships; and promoting an increasingly
networked region. These actions will enable the United States to preserve a free and open IndoPacific where sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity are safeguarded.

1.2. Vision and Principles for a
Free and Open Indo-Pacific
In 2017, President Trump announced our nation’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific at the
APEC Summit in Vietnam, and our commitment to a safe, secure, prosperous, and free region that
benefits all nations. This vision flows from common principles that underpin the current international
order, which has benefited all countries in the region – principles we have a shared responsibility to
uphold:3

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

1. Respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations;
2. Peaceful resolution of disputes;
3. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade based on open investment, transparent agreements, andconnectivity; and,
4. Adherence to international rules and norms, including those of freedom of navigation andoverflight.
Our vision for a free Indo-Pacific is one
in which all nations, regardless of size, “The U.S. offers strategic partnerships, notare able to exercise their sovereignty free strategic dependence. Alongside our allies
from coercion by other countries. At and partners, America remains committed
the national-level, this means good to maintaining the region’s security, its
governance and the assurance that stability, and its economic prosperity.”
citizens can enjoy their fundamental- Then-Secretary of Defense James N.
rights and liberties. Our vision for an
Mattis, speech at the Shangri-La
open Indo-Pacific is one that promotes
Dialogue, June 1, 2018sustainable growth and connectivity inthe region. This means all nations enjoy access to international waters, airways, and cyber and spacedomains, and are able to pursue peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes. On an
economic level, this means fair and reciprocal trade, open investment environments, and transparent
agreements between nations.
Our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific recognizes the linkages between economics, governance,and security that are part of the competitive landscape throughout the region, and that economic
security is national security. In order to achieve this vision, we will uphold the rule of law, encourage
resilience in civil society, and promote transparent governance – all of which expose malign influencesthat threaten economic development everywhere. Our vision aspires to a regional order in which
independent nations can both defend their interests and compete fairly in the international
marketplace. It is a vision which recognizes that no one nation can or should dominate the IndoPacific.
In recognition of the region’s need for greater investment, including infrastructure investment, theUnited States seeks to invigorate our development and finance institutions to enable us to become
better, more responsive partners. U.S. Departments and Agencies will work with regional allies andpartners to provide end-to-end solutions that build tangible products and transfer experience.
Ultimately, the maintenance of a free and open order sustains regional development because a wellfunctioning and transparent marketplace incentivizes global commercial investments that outpaces
any state’s unique resources. The United States is not alone in its pursuit of a free and open IndoPacific – many of our allies and partners share these principles and values:4Indo-Pacific Strategy Report“We must ensure that these waters are a public good that bringpeace and prosperity to all people without discrimination into
the future.”-

Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, policy speech to the 196th session of the Diet
January 22, 2018

“Now what is important is to preserve a rules-based
development in the region. It’s to preserve the necessarybalances in the region.”-

President of France, Emmanuel Macron, speech during a state visit to Australia
May 2, 2018“…rules and norms should be based on the consent of all, noton the power of the few.”-

Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue
June 1, 2018

“We want a rules-based system that respects the sovereignty andthe independence of every single country and a commitment
then to regional security that is always the precondition forprosperity.”-

Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, address at the APEC CEO Summit
November 17, 2018

“Collective solutions to shared challenges in the Pacific require
strong and vibrant regionalism, with institutions that canconvert political will into action, supported by partners whoalign their efforts with the region’s priorities.”-

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for New Zealand, Winston
Peters, address at Georgetown University
December 15, 20185

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

A free and open Indo-Pacific rests on a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, andaccountability. While we unapologetically represent U.S. values and beliefs, we do not seek to impose
our way of life on others. In order to maintain the regional dynamism that benefits all, each country
in the region has a shared responsibility to contribute and sustain it – for the regional order will notsurvive on its own. We will uphold our commitments, but we will rely on allies and partners tocontribute their fair share, including by investing to modernize their defense capabilities.
Advancing this vision is a whole-of-government priority that draws on the strengths and values ofAmerican society. As Secretary of State Michael Pompeo has said, “The American people and thewhole world have a stake in the Indo-Pacific’s peace and prosperity. It’s why the Indo-Pacific must
be free and open.”
Our whole-of-government commitment was reflected at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in 2018, as
Secretary of State Pompeo, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, U.S. Agency for International
Development Administrator Mark Green, and other Cabinet-level officials launched new initiatives toexpand U.S. public and private investment in Indo-Pacific infrastructure, energy markets, and digital
economy. We also established new development finance partnerships with Japan, Australia, Canada,
and the European Union, supported by significant new resources and authorities in the Better
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act or the BUILD Act, which President Trump
signed into law in October 2018. The following month, Vice President Michael Pence announced
efforts to coordinate with Japan on $10 billion in regional energy investment, establish a U.S.-ASEAN
Smart Cities Partnership, and launch a five-country partnership for electrification in Papua New
Guinea. The Vice President also announced the Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative to help countries
attract high-quality investment and counter corruption and coercive threats to their sovereignty, bystrengthening civil society and good governance. Furthermore, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, amajor bipartisan legislation, was signed into law by President Trump on December 31, 2018. Thislegislation enshrines a generational whole-of-government policy framework that demonstrates U.S.
commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and includes initiatives that promote sovereignty,
rule of law, democracy, economic engagement, and regional security.
As the region grows in population and economic weight, U.S. strategy will adapt to ensure that the
Indo-Pacific is increasingly a place of peace, stability, and growing prosperity – and not one ofdisorder, conflict, and predatory economics. Embedding these free and open principles will require
efforts across the spectrum of our agencies and capabilities: diplomatic initiatives, governance capacity
building, economic cooperation and commercial advocacy, and military cooperation.

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

2. Indo-Pacific Strategic
Landscape: Trends and Challenges
2.1. The People’s Republic of China
as a Revisionist Power
China’s economic, political, and military rise is one of the defining elements of the 21st century.
Today, the Indo-Pacific increasingly is confronted with a more confident and assertive China that is
willing to accept friction in the pursuit of a more expansive set of political, economic, and security
interests.
Perhaps no country has benefited more from the free and open regional and international system thanChina, which has witnessed the rise of hundreds of millions from poverty to growing prosperity andsecurity. Yet while the Chinese people aspire to free markets, justice, and the rule of law, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), undermines
the international system from within by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously eroding the values
and principles of the rules-based order. With more than half of the world’s Muslim population living

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportin the Indo-Pacific, the region views the PRC’s systematic mistreatment of Uighurs, Kazakhs, andother Muslims in Xinjiang – including pervasive discrimination, mass detention, and disappearances– with deep concern. China’s violation of international norms also extends abroad. Chinese nationals
acting in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security were recently indicted for conducting
global campaigns of cyber theft that targeted intellectual property and confidential business andtechnological information at managed service providers. China has continued to militarize the South
China Sea by placing anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on the disputed
Spratly Islands and employing paramilitary forces in maritime disputes vis-à-vis other claimants. In
the air, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increased patrols around and near Taiwan using
bomber, fighter, and surveillance aircraft to signal Taiwan. China additionally employs non-military
tools coercively, including economic tools, during periods of political tensions with countries that
China accuses of harming its national interests.

The People’s Republic of China’s Military Modernization
and Coercive Actions
As China continues its economic and military ascendance, it seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony inthe near-term and, ultimately global preeminence in the long-term. China is investing in a broad rangeof military programs and weapons, including those designed to improve power projection; modernize
its nuclear forces; and conduct increasingly complex operations in domains such as cyberspace, space,and electronic warfare operations. China is also developing a wide array of anti-access/area denial(A2/AD) capabilities, which could be used to prevent countries from operating in areas near China’s
periphery, including the maritime and air domains that are open to use by all countries.
In 2018, China’s placement of anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on thedisputed Spratly Islands violated a 2015 public pledge by the Chairman of the CCP Xi Jinping that
“China does not intend to pursue militarization” of the Spratly Islands. China’s use of militarypresence in an attempt to exert de facto control over disputed areas is not limited to the South China
Sea. In the East China Sea, China patrols near the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands with maritime
law enforcement ships and aircraft. These actions endanger the free flow of trade, threaten thesovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. Such activities are inconsistent withthe principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Simultaneously, China is engaged in a campaign of low-level coercion to assert control of disputed
spaces in the region, particularly in the maritime domain. China is using a steady progression of small,incremental steps in the “gray zone” between peaceful relations and overt hostilities to secure its aims,
while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict. Such activities can involve the coordinationof multiple tools, including: political warfare, disinformation, use of A2/AD networks, subversion,and economic leverage.
During the last decade, China continued to emphasize capabilities for Taiwan contingencies. China
has never renounced the use of military force against Taiwan, and continues to develop and deploy
8Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportadvanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign. PLA modernization is also
strengthening its ability to operate farther from China’s borders. For example, the PLA is reorganizing
to improve its capability to conduct complex joint operations, and is also improving its command andcontrol, training, personnel, and logistics systems. Key weapon systems deployed or in development,
include: cruise and ballistic missile systems, modern fighter and bomber aircraft, aircraft carriers,
modern ships and submarines, amphibious assault ships, surface-to-air missile systems, electronic
warfare systems, direct-ascent, hit-to-kill anti-satellite missiles, and autonomous systems.

China’s Use of Economic Means to Advance Its Strategic Interests“Beijing is leveraging its economic
instrument of power in ways that canundermine the autonomy of countries acrossthe region…easy money in the short term,
but these funds come with strings attached:unsustainable debt, decreased transparency,
restrictions on market economies, and thepotential loss of control of natural
resources.”-

Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander, U.S. Indo-PacificCommand, posture testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, February 12, 2019

China is using economic inducements
and penalties, influence operations, andimplied military threats to persuade
other states to comply with its agenda.
Although trade has benefitted both
China and its trade partners, Chinese useof espionage and theft for economic
advantage, as well as diversion of
acquired technology to the military,
remains a significant source ofeconomic and national security risk to allof China’s trading partners.

While investment often brings benefits
for recipient countries, including the United States, some of China’s investments result in negative
economic effects or costs to host country sovereignty. Chinese investment and project financing thatbypasses regular market mechanisms results in lower standards and reduced opportunities for local
companies and workers, and can result in significant debt accumulation. One-sided and opaque deals
are inconsistent with the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and are causing concern in theregion. For example, in 2018, Bangladesh was forced to ban one of China’s major state firms forattempted bribery, and in the same year, Maldives’ finance minister stated that China was building
infrastructure projects in the country at significantly inflated prices compared to what was previously
agreed. Furthermore, a Chinese state-owned enterprise purchased operational control of Hambantota
Port for 99 years, taking advantage of Sri Lanka’s need for cash when its government faced daunting
external debt repayment obligations.
The United States does not oppose China’s investment activities as long as they respect sovereignty
and the rule of law, use responsible financing practices, and operate in a transparent and economicallysustainable manner. The United States, however, has serious concerns with China’s potential toconvert unsustainable debt burdens of recipient countries or sub-national groups into strategic andmilitary access, including by taking possession of sovereign assets as collateral. China’s coercive
behavior is playing out globally, from the Middle East and Africa to Latin America and Europe.
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A lack of transparency also clouds China’s activities in thepolar regions. In 2018, China announced the inclusion of theregion in One Belt One Road as the “Polar Silk Road” andemphasized its self-declared status as a “Near-Arctic State.”
China is also expanding its engagement and capabilities in the
Antarctic, in particular by working to finalize a fifth researchstation, which will diversify its presence across the continent.

Risk Reduction: Engaging China

One of the most far-reaching objectives of the
National Defense Strategy is to set the military
relationship between the United States and China on
a long-term path of transparency and non-aggression.
Pursuit of a constructive, results-oriented relationshipbetween our two countries is an important part of
U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
As the scope of China’s military modernization andthe reach of China’s military activities expands, theneed for strategic dialogue and safe and professional
behavior consistent with international law is crucial.
When China and the PLA operate in a mannerconsistent with international norms and standards,
the risk of miscalculation and misunderstanding is
reduced. Recognizing this, our bilateral military
engagements with China, which include high-level
visits, policy dialogues, and functional exchanges, arecentered on building and reinforcing the procedures
necessary to reduce risk and prevent and manage
crises.
Through our military-to-military engagements, theDepartment of Defense will continue to encourage
China to engage in behaviors that maintain peace andstability in the region and that support – rather thanundermine – the rules-based international order. We
will not accept policies or actions that threaten toundermine this order, which has benefited all
countries in the region, including China. The UnitedStates is prepared to support China’s choices to theextent that China promotes long-term peace andprosperity for all in the Indo-Pacific, and we remain
open to cooperate where our interests align.

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THE BUILD ACT
On October 5, 2018, President
Trump signed into law the Better
Utilization of Investments Leading
to Development (BUILD) Act. The
BUILD Act establishes a new U.S.
International Development FinanceCorporation.
Thislegislation
consolidates, modernizes, andreforms the U.S. Government’s
development finance capabilities.
Backing from the U.S. Government
can catalyze significant amounts ofprivate capital into emerging
markets. This model of mobilizing
private investment is vital as theneeds of developing countries are
too great to meet with official
government resources alone. The
BUILD Act prioritizes low-income
and lower middle-income countries,
where the Development FinanceCorporation’s services will have thegreatest impact.
It more thandoubles the U.S. development
finance capacity from $29 billion to$60 billion. The new authorities andflexibility provided under the
BUILD Act will give the UnitedStates greater agility to offer
financiallysound,
transparent
investment alternatives.

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

2.2. Russia as a Revitalized Malign Actor
Russia’s interest and influence in the region continue to increase through national outreach andmilitary modernization – in both its conventional forces and strategic forces. Despite slow economic
growth due to Western sanctions and decreasing oil prices, Russia continues to modernize its militaryand prioritize strategic capabilities – including its nuclear forces, A2/AD systems, and expanded
training for long-range aviation – in an attempt to re-establish its presence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Russia’s operations and engagement throughout this region are consistent with its global influence
activities, which seek to advance Moscow’s strategic interests while undermining U.S. leadership andthe rules-based international order.
Russia’s efforts include using economic, diplomatic, and military means to achieve influence in the
Indo-Pacific region. Moscow seeks to alleviate some of the effects of sanctions imposed, following
its aggressive actions in Ukraine, by diplomatically appealing to select states in Asia and seeking
economic opportunities for energy exports. Russia also seeks to increase defense and trade relations
through arms sales in the region.
Russia is re-establishing its military“For decades, the U.S. led the world in presence in the Indo-Pacific byhypersonics research – and deliberately chose regularly flying bomber andnot to weaponize these systems. China and reconnaissance missions in the Sea of
Russia have chosen differently. Our nation Japan and conducting operations as far
does not seek adversaries, but we will not east as Alaska and the west coast of theignore them either. We refuse to be bound by continental United States. Russia hasgeography. Our new, space-based sensor also intensified its diplomatic outreachlayer will give us persistent, timely, global in Southeast Asia, seeking to capitalize
on U.S.-China tensions in order toawareness.”
present itself as a neutral “third- Acting Secretary Shanahan, remarks on the 2019
Missile Defense Review, January 17, 2019
partner.” The Russian Navy has
increased its operations and reach, with
the Russian Pacific Fleet deploying ships to support operations in the Middle East and Europe, andthe Russian Baltic and Black Sea Fleets deploying to the Indo-Pacific. Russian ballistic missile andattack submarines remain active in the region, while Russia is also undertaking efforts to modernize
its conventional forces and nuclear strike capabilities.
China and Russia collaborate across the diplomatic, economic, and security arenas. China has
increased investment in Russia's economy and Russia is one of China's top sources for energy imports.
In the security realm, China purchases advanced equipment such as Su-35 fighter aircraft and the
S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia. The two countries participate in bilateral andmultilateral military exercises together, including China's 2018 participation for the first time in
Russia's annual strategic command and staff exercise, VOSTOK (East) 2018. China and Russia

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportfrequently jointly oppose U.S.-sponsored measures at the United Nations Security Council. Broadly,
they share a preference for a multipolar world order in which the United States is weaker and lessinfluential. Russia has Arctic interests linked to its significant Arctic Ocean coastline and theextraction of natural resources. This is witnessed by Russia’s extended continental shelf claim, and an
uptick in its military posture and investments to develop the region and the Northern Sea shipping
route, including with Chinese involvement. However, an interest in reserving Arctic resources forlittoral states may ultimately limit the extent and depth of Sino-Russian cooperation.

2.3. The Democratic People’s Republicof Korea as a Rogue StateThe Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) will remain a security challenge
for DoD, the global system, our allies and partners, and competitors, until we achieve the final, fully
verifiable denuclearization as committed to by Chairman Kim Jong Un. Although a pathway to peaceis open for a diplomatic resolution of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, other weapons ofmass destruction, missile threats, and the security challenges North Korea presents are real anddemand continued vigilance. North Korea’s history as a serial proliferator, including conventionalarms, nuclear technology, ballistic missiles, and chemical agents to countries, such as Iran and Syria,
adds to our security concerns. Furthermore, the DPRK’s continued human rights violations and abuseagainst its own people, including violations of individuals’ freedom of expression, remain an issue ofdeep concern to the international community. The United States also continues to support Japan's
position that North Korea must completely resolve the issue of Japanese abductees, and has raised
this with North Korean authorities.
North Korea has developed an intercontinental ballistic missile intended to be capable of striking thecontinental United States with a nuclear or conventional payload. In 2017, North Korea conducted aseries of increasingly complex ballistic missile launches eastward toward the United States. North
Korea did so by overflying Japan with long-range ballistic missiles. Some tests were done at highly
lofted trajectories designed to simulate flights at ranges that could reach the United States.
North Korea poses a conventional threat to U.S. allies, such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) andJapan. North Korea has long-range artillery arrayed against the ROK – particularly the Greater Seoul
Metropolitan Area – capable of inflicting catastrophic damage on ROK civilians and large numbersof U.S. citizens. North Korea has demonstrated willingness to use lethal force to achieve its ends. In
2010, North Korea sank the ROK corvette CHEONAN and killed 46 sailors in an unprovoked attack.
In 2010, it also shelled the ROK Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, killing 2 civilians and 2 military
personnel and wounding 22 more.
North Korea continues to circumvent international sanctions and the U.S.-led pressure campaign
through diplomatic engagement, counter pressure against the sanctions regime, and direct sanctions

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportevasion. Early in 2018, North Korea exceeded its sanctioned limit on refined petroleum imports
through illicit ship-to-ship transfers. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) is working
with allies and partners to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) by
disrupting illicit ship-to-ship transfers, often near or in Chinese territorial waters, and in the Yellow
Sea. North Korea is also engaged in cross-border smuggling operations and cyber-enabled theft togenerate revenue, while simultaneously circumventing United Nations Security Council prohibitions
on coal exports.
The Trump Administration has pursued leader-level diplomacy with North Korea for the first time,
which has highlighted unique opportunities for a brighter future for North Korea. Until North Korea
clearly and unambiguously makes the strategic decision to take steps to denuclearize, the United States
will continue to enforce all applicable domestic and international sanctions, and DoD will remain
ready to deter, and if necessary, defeat any threats to the United States, the ROK, Japan, or our otherallies and partners.

2.4. Prevalence of Transnational
Challenges
The Indo-Pacific region continues to experience a myriad of security challenges from a range oftransnational threats, including: terrorism; illicit arms; drug, human, and wildlife trafficking; and piracy,
as well as dangerous pathogens, weapons proliferation, and natural disasters. Multiple terrorist
organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), operate in countries throughout theregion. The heavily-traveled Indo-Pacific sea lanes are targets for pirates seeking to steal goods or
hold ships and crews for ransom. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing further challenges
regional peace and prosperity. A region already prone to earthquakes and volcanoes as part of the
Pacific Ring of Fire, the Indo-Pacific region suffers regularly from natural disasters including
monsoons, hurricanes, and floods to earthquakes and volcanic activity, as well as the negative
consequences of climate change.
Another issue of concern is weak and illiberal governance in countries. Governments that are notresponsive to the will of their people are more susceptible to malign external influence. For example,
democratic backsliding in Cambodia has taken place since 2017, when the ruling party banned
independent media and dissolved the main opposition party. Additionally, we remain concerned about
reports that China is seeking to establish bases or a military presence on its coast, a development thatwould challenge regional security and signal a clear shift in Cambodia’s foreign policy orientation. In
Burma, the lack of a robust democracy has set conditions for human rights atrocities committed by
Burmese security forces in northern Rakhine State since August 2017, and has created regional
instability, with more than one million Rohingya refugees currently in Bangladesh.

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The United States is encouraged by positive indicators within South and Southeast Asia that
democratic institutions are on an upward trajectory and steadily improving transparency,
responsibility, and democratic values. These indicators include freedom of the press, civilian controlof the military, and free and fair elections in countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia,
each of which experienced autocratic rule in the past.
In South Asia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives are also on a positive trajectory. In Sri Lanka, after 25 yearsof conflict, the government has transitioned to a constitutional, multiparty republic with a freelyelected President and Parliament. The political system was challenged with a constitutional dispute inlate 2018. Ultimately, however, all parties respected the Supreme Court ruling that returned
democratic processes and norms, and the military remained uninvolved throughout the dispute. The
Republic of Maldives’ historic election in 2018 – with 90 percent of the eligible population voting –ushered in the new president, who has outlined an agenda for sweeping reforms to promote free
media, an independent judiciary, and transparent public financial management.

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3. U.S. National Interests
and Defense Strategy

T

3.1. U.S. National Interests

he 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy is based upon the view that peace, security, and prosperity
depend on strong, sovereign nations that respect their citizens at home and cooperate toadvance peace abroad. It is grounded in the belief that U.S. leadership in promoting thesewidely held principles is a lasting force for good in the world. As such, DoD is working to support
enduring U.S. national interests, as articulated in the National Security Strategy:
1. Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life;
2. Promote American prosperity through fair and reciprocal economic relationships to address
trade imbalances;
3. Preserve peace through strength by rebuilding our military so that it remains preeminent,
and rely on allies and partners to shoulder a fair share of the burden of responsibility to protect
against common threats; and,15

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

4. Advance American influence by competing and leading in multilateral organizations so that
American interests and principles are protected.
While these interests are global in nature, they assume a heightened significance in a region as
strategically and economically consequential as the Indo-Pacific.

3.2. U.S. National Defense Strategy
The 2018 National Defense Strategy guides the Department of Defense to support the National Security
Strategy in order to:
1. Defend the homeland;
2. Remain the preeminent military power in the world;
3. Ensure the balances of power in key regions remain in our favor; and4. Advance an international order that is most conducive to our security and prosperity.
Both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy affirm the Indo-Pacific as critical for
America's continued stability, security, and prosperity. The United States seeks to help build an IndoPacific where sovereignty and territorial integrity are safeguarded, the promise of freedom is fulfilled,
and prosperity prevails for all. We stand ready to cooperate with all nations to achieve this vision.
The National Defense Strategy informs how we work with our neighbors in the Indo-Pacific and beyond,to address key challenges in the region. The core diagnosis of the National Defense Strategy is that DoD’s
military advantage vis-à-vis China and Russia is eroding and, if inadequately addressed, it will
undermine our ability to deter aggression and coercion. A negative shift in the regional balance ofpower could encourage competitors to challenge and subvert the free and open order that supports
prosperity and security for the United States and its allies and partners. To address this challenge,
DoD is developing a more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, and is increasingcollaboration with a robust constellation of allies and partners.
The challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific extend beyond what any single country can address alone.
The Department seeks to cooperate with like-minded allies and partners to address common
challenges. The United States acknowledges that allies and partners are a force multiplier for peace
and interoperability, representing a durable, asymmetric, and unparalleled advantage that nocompetitor or rival can match. We seek to provide the structure that allows our respective militaries
to work together – leveraging our complementary forces, unique perspectives, regional relationships,
and information capabilities. Taking deliberate steps in these areas will allow us to improve ourcollective ability to compete, deter, and if necessary, fight and win together.

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4. Sustaining U.S. Influence toAchieve Regional Objectives

T

he National Defense Strategy directs the Department to increase lethality, to strengthen alliances,and to expand the competitive space. In the context of the Department’s Indo-PacificStrategy, this translates into the pursuit of Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a
Networked Region .

4.1. Line of Effort 1: Preparedness
The National Defense Strategy directs the Department to employ its resources in ways that enhance thelethality, resilience, agility, and readiness of the Joint Force. This resourcing must span near-term
force employment activities and longer-term investments to modernize and redesign the U.S. military.
The Department is developing innovative capabilities and operating concepts to address specificoperational problems. This also involves identifying new, asymmetric ways to upgrade and employ
legacy systems. Experimentation and exercises to test evolving warfighting concepts and capabilities
help create a virtuous cycle that spurs additional ideas and innovations. Many of these experiments

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportand exercises are being conducted alongside allies and partners to ensure we can test and improve
interoperability for joint and combined operations.
The National Defense Strategy implicitly
acknowledges the most stressing potential “The 2018 National Defense Strategy ’s
scenarios will occur along our competitors’ unified framework enables a potent
peripheries. If our competitors decide to combination of teamwork, resources, andadvance their interests through force, they an unmatched network of allies andare likely to enjoy a local military advantage partners stepping up to shoulder theirat the onset of conflict. In a fait accompli share of the burden for international
scenario, competitors would seek to employ security. The National Defense Strategy
their capabilities quickly to achieve limited also
fosters alignment within theobjectives and forestall a response from the Department, the Interagency, industry,
United States, and its allies and partners. and Congress.”
DoD initiatives on force employment, crisis- Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, testimony to the
response, force and concept development,
House Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2019and collaboration with allies and partners
are aimed to help address this critical challenge.
The National Defense Strategy directs the Department to posture ready, combat-credible forces
forward – alongside allies and partners – and, if necessary, to fight and win. This approach
intentionally presents competitors with a dilemma by ensuring they cannot quickly, cheaply, or easily
advance their aims through military force.
Competitors are compelled to advance “We are adapting to fight against near-peer
their interests through other, more benign competitors. Our armed forces are learningmeans – which are often subject to to expect to be contested throughout theinternationally recognized rules or widely- fight...We are changing our mindset,
accepted state practices.
working to regain our advantages, andThe Department is undertaking a range ofefforts to enhance Joint Force
preparedness for the most pressing
scenarios. Examples of DoD initiatives
include:playing to our strengths. Alliances andpartnerships are at the heart of thiscompetitive effort.”-

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security
Affairs, Randall G. Schriver, speech at the Elliot Schoolof International Affairs, February 7, 2019

 Investments in Advanced Training Facilities at the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex topresent a more a realistic and representative training environment; Investments in unit and depot maintenance across Air Force and Naval Aviation to achieve
an 80 percent fighter readiness goal by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2019; and,
 Investments in advanced missile defense systems interoperable with allied systems in Japanand Australia.
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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

The Department is also modernizing the force to meet the demands of high-end competition.
Illustrative examples of key investments include: Acceleration of the development and forward presence of U.S. land forces’ Multi-Domain
Task Force, utilizing Security Force Assistance Brigades to build partner capacity andstrengthen multinational teams, and expanding Pacific Pathways to deepen relationships with
U.S. allies and partners;
 Strategic deterrence enhancements associated with investments in the new Columbia-classballistic missile submarine; Purchase of 110 4th- and 5th-generation aircraft which will result in both capability andcapacity improvements;
 Purchase of approximately 400 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles; Purchase of more than 400 Joint Air-Surface Missiles – Extended Range;
 Investments in two Unmanned Surface Vehicles, additional Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles,
and additional Maritime Strike Tactical Tomahawks;
 Increased capacity in Anti-Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, and Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) by purchasing 10 more destroyers within the FY 2020-2024 Future Years
Defense Program; Investment in resources to support offensive and defensive cyberspace operations; and,
 Efforts to unify, focus, and accelerate the development of space doctrine, capabilities, andexpertise to outpace future threats, institutionalize advocacy of space priorities, and further
build space warfighting culture.

Current Posture in the Indo-PacificDefense posture is a visible manifestation of U.S. national interests and priorities abroad, and makes
up the network of U.S. forces and capabilities that are forward-deployed in the region, as well as theinterconnected bases, infrastructure, installations, and international agreements that support both dayto-day and wartime employment of the force.
In the region, USINDOPACOM currently has more than 2,000 aircraft; 200 ships and submarines;
and more than 370,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, DoD civilians, and contractors assigned
within its area of responsibility. The largest concentration of forces in the region are in Japan and the
ROK. A sizable contingent of forces (more than 5,000 on a day-to-day basis) are also based in the
U.S. territory of Guam, which serves as a strategic hub supporting crucial operations and logistics for
all U.S. forces operating in the Indo-Pacific region. Other allies and partners that routinely host U.S.
forces on a smaller scale include the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom
through the island of Diego Garcia.

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Future Posture in the Indo-Pacific
To achieve our strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific, we seek to evolve our posture and balance key
capabilities across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania to have a more dynamic and distributed
presence and access locations across the region. For example, as announced by Vice President Pence
on November 16, 2018, the United States seeks to partner with Papua New Guinea and Australia on
their joint initiative at Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island.
In order to overcome the tyranny of distance, posture that supports and enables inter- and intratheater logistics must be flexible and resilient, and the pre-positioning of equipment is critical.
Specifically, we are exploring expeditionary capabilities; dynamic basing of maritime and air forces;
special operations forces capable of irregular and unconventional warfare; anti-submarine capabilities;
cyber and space teams equipped for multi-domain operations; and, unique intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities – among other investments. From leveraging existing access in
the Compact States, to pursuing co-development with our most capable allies and partners, we willcontinue to forward-station leading edge technologies, such as 5th generation fighters in the IndoPacific.
DoD is also developing new operating
concepts to increase our lethality, agility, and “DoD’s participation in combined
resilience that will be further implemented military exercises has increased bythrough our evolving posture. For example, seventeen percent in the last two years,
as part of the Multi-Domain Operations and our Foreign Military Sales haveconcept, the U.S. Army will test Multi- increased by more than sixty-five percent
Domain Task Forces intended to create in the last three years.”
temporary windows of superiority across- Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, testimony to themultiple domains, and allow the Joint ForceHouse Armed Services Committee, March 26, 2019
to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The
U.S. Army will test the Multi-Domain Task Forces through the Pacific Pathways program to determine
the right capability mix and locations. Furthermore, the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations is
an emerging U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operating concept to provide resilience and support tomaritime operations inside contested environments. It is intended to deny adversary freedom ofaction; control key maritime terrain; and support Joint Force air and maritime requirements by
operating from austere locations at a tempo that complicates adversary targeting.
In addition, DoD will continue to ensure a force posture that enables the United States to undertakea spectrum of missions including security cooperation, building partner capacity, collaboration ontransnational threats, and joint and combined training.

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4.2. Line of Effort 2: Partnerships
U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific is rooted in our long-standing security alliances – the bedrock onwhich our strategy rests. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy,
providing a durable, asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.
Expanding our interoperability with allies and partners will ensure that our respective defense
enterprises can work together effectively during day-to-day competition, crisis, and conflict. Throughfocused security cooperation, informationsharing agreements, and regular exercises, we“Our network of allies andare connecting intent, resources, andpartners is a force multiplier foroutcomes and building closer relationships
peace and interoperability.”
between our militaries and economies.
Increasing interoperability also involves- 2018 National Defense Strategy
ensuring our military hardware and software
are able to integrate more easily with those of
our closest allies and partners, offering financing and sales of cutting-edge U.S. defense equipment tosecurity partners, and opening up the aperture of U.S. professional military education to more IndoPacific military officers.
To this end, we have strengthened our allianceswith Japan, South Korea, Australia, thePhilippines, and Thailand. These alliances are
The National Security Strategy calls on theindispensable to peace and security in the region
United States to pursue cooperation andand our investments in them will continue to pay
reciprocity together with our allies,
dividends for the United States and the world,
partners, and aspiring partners.
far into the future. We have also taken steps toexpand partnerships with Singapore, Taiwan,
Cooperation means sharing responsibilities
New Zealand, and Mongolia. Within Southand burdens. The United States expects
Asia, we are working to operationalize our Major
our allies and partners to shoulder a fair
Defense Partnership with India, while pursuingshare of the burden of responsibility toemerging
partnerships with Sri Lanka, theprotect against common threats. When we
Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal. We are alsopool resources and share responsibility forcontinuing to strengthen security relationships
our common defense, our security burdenwith partners in Southeast Asia, including:becomes lighter and more cost-effective.
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, andsustaining engagements with Brunei, Laos, andCambodia. In the Pacific Islands, we are enhancing our engagement to preserve a free and open IndoPacific, maintain access, and promote our status as a security partner of choice. Efforts to maintain afree and open Indo-Pacific have also brought us closer to key allies, including the United Kingdom,France, and Canada, each with their own Pacific identities.

BURDEN SHARING

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

Modernizing Alliances
JAPAN
The U.S.-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, with the UnitedStates remaining steadfast in its commitment to defend Japan and its administered territories. As the
security dynamic in the Indo-Pacific evolves, however, it is imperative that the U.S.-Japan Allianceadapt to meet the challenges thatthreaten our security and sharedvalues.
Whether countering
North Korea’s rogue behavior, orActing Secretarylong-term strategic competition
Shanahan with
with China and Russia, we must
Japanese Minister
pursue concrete objectives thatof Defense
preserve the alliance as ourTakeshi Iwaya, at
asymmetric advantage.
the Pentagon,
January 16, 2019.

The National Defense Strategy clearly
articulates that the Department
will prioritize and strengthen ouralliances, identifying the U.S.Japan Alliance as a critical
relationship. Japan’s 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines echoes a similar message, reinforcing
the fundamental fact that the security interests of both the United States and Japan are closelyintertwined. Given the urgency to address new threats, trends, and technologies, we have already seen
progressin
operational
cooperation,
mutualasset
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
protection, and bilateral planning.
The National Security and National Defense Strategies have
Maintaining the technologicalelevated FMS as a tool of first resort in strengthening
advantage the alliance needs toalliances and attracting new partners. Conventional Arms
fight and win against our
Transfer Policy and Security Cooperation reforms haveadversaries is also a top-tierpriority, with the Department
focused our ability to improve the efficiency andcontinuing to streamline Foreign
effectiveness of FMS. We have been successful in
Military Sales (FMS) to Japan andreducing costs, improving processing times, andotherallies,pursuecominimizing policy hurdles to make technology moredevelopment opportunities, andavailable to a larger group of partners.
deepen cooperation in the cyberand space domains.

Photo by Master Sgt. Angelita
Lawrence

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

POSTURE: JAPANU.S. forces in Japan are an essential component of our posture in the region. To meet shared threats,advance common interests, and fulfill our obligations under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security – a key enabler for maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region – theDepartment remains steadfast in its commitment to deploy our most capable and advanced forces toJapan. The Government of Japan
contributes financially to the
GUAM AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF
stationing of U.S. forces in Japan
THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
through a Special Measures(CNMI)
Agreement.
This strategic
contribution directly supports the
The Department is modernizing its force posture in
operational readiness of U.S. forces
Guam, in keeping with Guam’s position as thein Japan.
westernmost territory of the United States and a strategic

hub for our joint military presence in the region. We areestablishing a Marine Air Ground Task Force of 5,000
U.S. Marines in Guam starting in the first half of the2020s as a central feature of the U.S.-Japan realignmentplan. In Guam, we have some of the most significant
ammunition and fuel storage capabilities in the IndoPacific. The addition of rotational maritime lift in Guamwill increase the reach of our combat power in theWestern Pacific. At Anderson Air Force Base, we haveestablished an active Army Missile Defense capability inresponse to increasing threats, and maintain a continuous
bomber presence and ISR capability. In the CNMI wehave air, surface, and subsurface training capabilities and
we are taking steps to ensure we will have ready joint
forces and opportunities for increased multilateraltraining.
The Government of Japan has already provided morethan $2 billion of a $3.1 billion commitment for
construction of facilities for the U.S. Marine Corps
realignment. The U.S. Government will fund the balanceof construction, estimated at $8.6 billion, and is working
toward an outcome that enhances our Indo-Pacificposture, bolsters our security commitments in the region,and directly benefits Guam.

23

The
Department
assigns
approximately 54,000 military
personnel to Japan, in the U.S.
Navy’s Seventh Fleet, U.S. Marine
Corps’ III Marine Expeditionary
Force, 3 Air Force wings, andsmaller U.S. Army and Special
Operations units. Some of the moreadvanced capabilities stationed inJapan include the F-35, MV and
CV-22, and the USS RONALDREAGAN, our only forward
deployed aircraft carrier. BMD
assets are also tightly woven into ourforce posture in Japan, including
AEGIS Destroyers, sophisticated
BMD radar systems, and a
PATRIOT firing unit to counter theballistic missile threat. Enhancing
operational cooperation between
the U.S. forces and Japan Self
Defense Forces (JSDF) is also apriority, as outlined in the 2015
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation.
Bilateral presence
operations throughout the IndoPacific region, mutual asset

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

protection missions, and bilateral exercises are just a few areas of operational cooperation that U.S.
forces and the JSDF collaborate on to advance our shared objectives.
The realignment of U.S. forces in Japan contributes to a regional force posture that is geographically
distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. We have already made substantial
progress on this initiative. Examples include the movement of the U.S. Navy’s Carrier Air Wing Five
to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, the stationing of JSDF units on U.S. Air Force and Army bases,
and the return of more than 10,000 acres of land in Okinawa to the Government of Japan. Future
steps include the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility and the return of U.S. Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma, as well as the consolidation of our remaining bases and the return ofadditional land in Okinawa, Japan.

REPUBLIC OF KOREAThe United States remains steadfast in its
commitment to the defense of the
Republic of Korea (ROK). The U.S.ROK Alliance is the linchpin of peace andprosperity in Northeast Asia, as well as the
Korean Peninsula.

“The alliance between South Korean andAmerican forces is ironclad – forged inblood, shaped over 65 years of combined
military operations and training, andhardened by the crucible of war. Sharedsacrifice and mutually agreed principles
underpin our alliance and ensure it
endures the winds of change.”

The Department is continuing its workwith the ROK Ministry of National
Defense to transition wartime operational- Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, General Robert B.
control for Combined Forces Command
Abrams, testimony to the Senate Armed Services(CFC) from a U.S. Commander to a ROK
Committee, February 12, 2019
Commander. To achieve this, the DoD
and the ROK Ministry of National Defense are investing in critical military capabilities to ensure our
combined readiness to meet any threat to the alliance. The United States and the ROK are also
working to enhance alliance capabilities in the fields of space, cyberspace, and missile defense, alongwith efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.
Together, the United States and the ROK are constantly improving our ISR capacity; developing arobust, tiered BMD; fielding appropriate command and control assets; acquiring necessary inventories
of critical munitions; and enhancing the tools to prevent, deter, and respond to cyber attacks.
The United States and the ROK continue combined training through command post exercises, as wellas field training exercises to ensure the readiness and combat proficiency of combined forces on the
Peninsula and in the region. The Department is also working to revitalize the United Nations
Command, which contributes to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through oversight andmaintenance of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

POSTURE: REPUBLIC OF KOREAThe U.S-ROK combined force – unique among bilateral U.S. military relationships – is a robust
deterrent to aggression on the Korean Peninsula. As we sustain readiness for any conflict, the UnitedStates and the ROK also remain committed to the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea
and enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula.
The Department has threeunique commands on the
Korean Peninsula: U.S. Forces
Korea (USFK), the CFC, andActing Secretary of
the United Nations Command.
Defense Shanahan
The ROK hosts 28,500 U.S.
hosts the South
service members and their
Korean Minister of
National Defense
families to units including theJeongKyeong-doo
U.S. Eighth Army and 2ndat the Pentagon,
Infantry Division, Seventh Air
April 1, 2019.
Force, U.S. Marine Corps
Photo by Master Sgt. Angelita
Forces Korea, U.S. Special
Lawrence
Operations Command-Korea,
and Commander, Naval Forces
Korea. Advanced capabilities
stationed in South Korea include two fighter wings of F-16 and A-10 aircraft; a major U.S. Army
prepositioned stockpile; a combat aviation brigade; a field artillery brigade; advanced ISR units; and aheadquarters for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The ROK continues to invest more in its defense
over the past 15 years than it did in decades
before, spending over 2 percent of its gross“The force is sufficiently postured to domestic product on defense and increasing
deter aggression and defeat any foreign military procurements from the United
adversary, if necessary. We continue to States, such as the KF-16 and PATRIOT
train at echelon to maintain the battery upgrades, AH-64E Apaches, thereadiness required to translate a strong F-15K, RQ-4 Global Hawk variants, and themilitary posture into decisive victory on F-35A Joint Strike Fighter. Seoul also has
short notice.”future procurement plans for the P-8, advanced
munitions, upgrades to PAC-3 missiles, and- General Abrams, testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee, February 12, 2019
F-16 fighters – all of which will increaseinteroperability with the United States.
Significant improvements in U.S. Force posture during 2018 include adding essential munitions, BMD
systems, and pre-positioned wartime stocks. The United States continues to work with the ROK tocreate an interoperable BMD architecture that addresses the ballistic missile threat from North Korea.
In 2017, the United States deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery to the ROK.
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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

The United States and the ROK have agreed to a 10th Special Measures Agreement that will enable
the ROK to help offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. The Special
Measures Agreement will ensure essential readiness related personnel and activities, including thecontributions of 9,000 South Korean national employees of USFK serving in crucial roles of public
safety, health care, emergency response, and quality-of-life delivery operations.
Our joint efforts in military construction and modernization ensures our forces are postured, prepared,
and properly set for the future. The Land Partnership Plan and the associated Yongsan Relocation
Plan are bilateral agreements that provide the foundation for streamlining USFK’s footprint while
returning facilities and valuable land to the ROK Government for future development. In 2018,
USFK and United Nations Command Headquarters relocated both commands from U.S. Army
Garrison Yongsan to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, joining U.S. Eighth Army and2nd Infantry Division in new state-of-the-art facilities on the largest DoD facility outside of thecontinental United States. By consolidating capability in Pyeongtaek, on facilities built mostly with
ROK funds, we maximize our ability to uphold U.S. security commitments, return large portions ofdowntown Seoul to the Korean people for economic development, and improve the quality of life for
our Service members and their families. Since 2003, USFK has returned 49 sites to the ROK while
simultaneously moving the majority of our forces and families away from the demilitarized zone andcloser to major air and sea ports.

AUSTRALIA
U.S. and Australian forces have shared the battlefield in every major conflict since the First World
War and celebrated their “First Hundred Years of Mateship” in 2018. For more than a century, we
have conducted joint and coalition operations, training and exercises, intelligence cooperation, andcapability development. The United States and Australia share a commitment to building on theinteroperability of our armed forces, collaborating to ensure the security of the Indo-Pacific region
into the future, and seeking innovative ways to adapt to new threats.
Australia is providing forces in Iraq for the counter-ISIS fight as trainers, force protection, andadvisors. Australia’s significant commitment to a stable and secure Afghanistan is also helping
modernize our alliance through its contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)led Resolute Support Mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces. Australia is also a key contributor to the UNSCR enforcement operations to bring North
Korea into compliance with its international obligations and serves as a significant partner to thePhilippines in building counter-terrorism capacity.
Both the United States and Australia are strengthening security in the Indo-Pacific through moredeliberate coordination of the policies and priorities underlying regional engagements by promotinginteroperability to address new threats, increasing focus on the Pacific Islands, and leveraging the U.S.Australia force posture initiatives and the unique exercising and training opportunities created in theprocess.

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The Department is also partnering with Australia in cyber, space, and defense science and technology
domains. Together, we are building upon our long-established defense intelligence partnership
through the regular exchange of information and assessments – which strengthens our situationalawareness and capability and enhances our ability to operate together in support of regional stability
and the rules-based international order. The United States and Australia intend to explore new models
of development, acquisition, and sustainment and continue to transform our defense organizations
and processes to meet new challenges.

POSTURE: AUSTRALIAIn 2014, the United States and Australia signed the Force Posture Agreement, a 25-year plus agreement
governing our Force Posture Initiatives and providing our forces more opportunities to work
bilaterally, and in trilateral and regional activities, in areas including maritime capacity building andhumanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).
There are two Force Posture Initiatives in northern Australia: (1) the Enhanced Air Cooperation,
improving interoperability through longer duration, more sophisticated training; and (2) Marine
Rotational Forces-Darwin, an annual rotational presence of up to 2,500 U.S. Marines. The Force
Posture Initiatives promote a combined capability to respond to crises and contingencies, strengtheninteroperability, and further
engagement with regional
partners.
In 2018, the U.S. Marine
Rotational Forces-Darwin
completed its seventhrotation, training withforces from Australia and12 other regional countries
and deploying as part ofAustralia’s
Indo-PacificEndeavor – a flotilla that
conducted
security
cooperation activities inSoutheast Asia and thePacific Islands.

Australian Defence Forcemembers with Charlie
Company, 5th Royal
Australian Regiment, firesquad automatic weapons
during Marine Rotational
Force - Darwin's Exercise
KOOLENDONG at
Mount Bundey Training
Area, Australia,
August 22, 2018.
Photo by the U.S. Department of Defense

In 2019, the Marine
Rotational Forces-Darwin is expected to grow to 2,500 U.S. Marines. Enhanced Aircraft Cooperation
will deepen as well in 2019, with a robust set of activities planned, and deployment of new capabilities
for these engagements.

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

THE PHILIPPINESThe 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty provides the foundation for our bilateral security
cooperation, along with the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, and 2014 Enhanced Defense
Cooperation
Agreement(EDCA). These foundational
The United States officiallyagreements and our longstanding
returned the Bells ofBalangiga to thehistory enabled U.S. forces toPhilippines, December 11,
support the Philippines during its
2018. (Left to right)
battlesagainstISIS-aligned
Philippines' Defense
Secretary Delfin Lorenzana,extremists that captured the city
the Executive Secretary ofof Marawi in 2017. U.S. Special
the Philippines Salvador
Medialdea, U.S. Deputy
Operations Forces advisors
Assistant Secretary ofremain in the country to date andDefense Joseph H. Felter,
provide our continued support toand U.S. Ambassador to thePhilippines Sung Kim.
the Armed Forces of thePhilippines.
Photo by the U.S. Department of StateWe have 280 bilateral defense
activities planned with the Philippines in 2019, and the Philippines hosts the most bilateral exercisesin the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility. This robust annual cooperation ensures our forces
maintain a sufficient level of interoperability to respond in times of crisis.
The Department is partnering with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in its 15-year
modernization plan to upgrade its capabilities
for territorial defense. The main areas ofemphasis are maritime security, ISR, andaviation. The United States and the Philippines
are also partnering on reconstituting counterterrorism forces following the Marawi siege.

“In returning the Bells of Balangiga to
our ally and friend - the Philippines - wepick up our generation's responsibility
to deepen the respect between our two
peoples.”-Then-Secretary of Defense Mattis, F.E.
Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming,
November 15, 2018

In December 2018, then-Secretary James
Mattis, with authority delegated by the
President, returned the Bells of Balangiga to the Philippines. The Bells were seized during the U.S.Philippine War in 1901 and are venerated as religious artifacts by the people of the Philippines. In
returning the Bells of Balangiga to the people of the Philippines, the United States cements the tightbond between our two countries and peoples, which is based on respect and shared sacrifice.
In March 2016, the United States and the Philippines began to implement the EDCA to give ourforces access to key facilities and allow our militaries to work even more closely together. As part ofthis implementation, we are supporting the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

28

Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportand strengthening mutual defense. There are five EDCA Agreed Locations arrayed throughout thearchipelago: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation, Lumbia
Air Base, and Mactan Benito Ebuen Air Base. The first projects under the agreement were completed
in 2018 and an additional 12 projects have been approved for implementation for 2019 and 2020.
These investments provide force posture enhancements, improve our future readiness, and improve
the operational flexibility of the alliance during contingencies.
In March 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo reaffirmed our commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty,
providing assurances that, “as the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on
Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense
obligations under Article IV of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”
The United States and the Philippines continue to find new ways to meet our shared goals. For
example, at the invitation of the Government of the Philippines, we concluded a bilateral air exercise
at Basa Air Base that incorporated fighter aircraft of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the U.S.
Air Force.

THAILANDThe United States and Thailand established relations in 1818 and shortly thereafter, Thailand became
an ally after signing the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1833. Our deep and longstanding militaryto-military ties with Thailand were formalized in 1954 with the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty (Manila Pact), and in 2003 we reaffirmed our commitment to Thailand by designating
it a major non-NATO ally. The 2014
military coup created significant challenges.
MILITARY EXERCISES IN THE
As Thailand continues to take steps toward
INDO-PACIFIC
democracy, DoD looks forward tostrengthening our longstanding defense ties.

The United States holds some 90 named military
exercises in the Indo-Pacific each year, with thevast majority of these exercises being conductedjointly or combined with our allies and partners.
These forces and exercises cooperate withmilitaries across the region in a range of activities
from real time HA/DR to the full spectrum of
conventional warfare skills to deter our
adversaries.

Together we are advancing shared goals ofenhancing regional security; confronting
public health challenges; counteringtransnational crime; combating trafficking inpersons, wildlife, and narcotics; and assisting
refugees and displaced persons.
Wecurrently hold more than 130 military-tomilitary engagements each year, including
the Indo-Pacific’s largest military exercise,
COBRA GOLD.

As a U.S. ally that is both central to ASEAN and positioned between South Asia and Southeast Asia,
Thailand plays a key geostrategic role in the Indo-Pacific region. The access provided to Utapao Royal
Thai Naval Air Station and the associated deep-water port at Sattahip is a critical enabler for U.S. force
29Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportprojection. Utapao supports logistics activities and HA/DR operations such as support to efforts
surrounding the 2015 earthquake in Nepal.
The United States currently enjoys information sharing with Thailand enabled by a General Securityof Military Information Agreement, communications security via a Communications and Information
Security Memorandum of Agreement, and logistics sharing via an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreement. Our future efforts in Thailand will focus on maintaining and enhancing access atcooperative security locations, expanding the scope and complexity of our current exercises, andsupporting the Royal Thai Armed Forces’ modernization efforts, most notably the Royal Thai Army’s
intent to update its Brigade Combat Team construct centered on the U.S. Stryker vehicle.

Strengthening Partnerships
As democracies in the Indo-Pacific, Singapore, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Mongolia are reliable,
capable, and natural partners of the United States. All four countries contribute to U.S. missions
around the world and are actively taking steps to uphold a free and open international order. The
strength of these relationships is what we hope to replicate in our new and burgeoning relationships
in the Indo-Pacific.

SINGAPORE
Singapore remains a steadfast partner in Southeast Asia with a strong commitment to promote
regional and global stability. Our long-standing defense relationship is underpinned by the 1990
Memorandum of Understanding, the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, and the 2015 U.S.Singapore Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. In the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement,
the United States designated Singapore a “Major Security Cooperation Partner.” Singapore provides
access to U.S. Navy ships, as well as U.S. military aircraft, including most recently littoral combat ships
and P-8 Poseidon aircraft, whose presence has contributed to the security and stability of Southeast
Asia, and continues to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The Department has long hosted training detachments of fighter aircraft from Singapore to train
alongside the U.S. Air Force in the United States, which helps to further deepen our security ties andboost interoperability. Singapore annually sends approximately 1,000 personnel to training andeducation courses in the United States, representing the largest training presence in the United Statesfrom any foreign military.
Singapore was the first and only Asian country to contribute assets and personnel to the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and has participated in Operation Gallant Phoenix since May 2017.
Singapore has commanded Combined Task Force 151 in the Gulf of Aden five times.

30

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

TAIWANThe United States has a vital interest in upholding therules-based international order, which includes a “America will always believe thatstrong, prosperous, and democratic Taiwan. The Taiwan’s embrace of democracy
United States is pursuing a strong partnership with shows a better path for all the
Taiwan and will faithfully implement the Taiwan Chinese people.”
Relations Act, as part of a broader commitment to the- Vice President Pence, remarks at the
security and stability of the Indo-Pacific. Our
Hudson Institute, October 4, 2018
partnership is vital given China's continued pressure
campaign against Taiwan. Taiwan lost three diplomatic partners in 2018, and some international fora
continued to deny the participation of representatives from Taiwan. Although China advocates forpeaceful unification with Taiwan, China has never renounced the use of military force, and continues
to develop and deploy advanced military capabilities needed for a potential military campaign.
The salience of defense engagements has increased as the PLA continues to prepare for contingencies
in the Taiwan Strait to deter, and if necessary, compel Taiwan to abandon moves toward
independence. The PLA is also preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland byforce, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s
behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan, China has increased military
exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan, including circumnavigation flights by the PLA Air Force and naval
exercises in the East China Sea.
The objective of our defense engagement with Taiwan
is to ensure that Taiwan remains secure, confident, free “A strong and secure Taiwan canfrom coercion, and able to peacefully and productively deter aggression, defend theengage the mainland on its own terms. The Taiwan people and their hardDepartment is committed to providing Taiwan with won democracy, and engage on
defense articles and services in such quantity as may be its own terms with the PRC.”
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indoself-defense capability. DoD is continually engaged in
Pacific Security Affairs Randall G. Schriver,
remarks at Stanford University, April 10, 2019evaluating Taiwan’s defense needs to assist Taiwan in
identifying capabilities that are mobile, survivable, andeffective in resisting the use of force or other forms of coercion. Since 2008, U.S. Administrations
have notified Congress of more than $22 billion in FMS for Taiwan.

NEW ZEALAND
Since the Washington Declaration in 2012, the United States and New Zealand continue to deepenand broaden their defense relationship. The U.S.-New Zealand defense partnership will remain
focused on building maritime security presence, capabilities, and awareness; cooperation to develop
expeditionary defense capabilities; and sharing information to enable security cooperation and to31

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

prepare to respond to a range of contingencies. New Zealand contributes forces to coalition
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, to three United Nations peacekeeping missions, and to UNSCR
enforcement operations.
Besides these global contributions,
New Zealand plays a critical role as a
On December 10, 2018,
regional leader promoting stability,
the U.S. Memorial forbuilding capacity, and responding toPukeahu was unveiled
crises and contingencies in the Pacificin the presence of the
Minister of Defence
Islands, such as natural disasters. In
Ron Mark, U.S.
2018, New Zealand announced theAmbassador to New“Pacific Reset,” its new whole-ofZealand Scott Brown,
and Randall G.
government policy to engage in the
Schriver, AssistantPacific Islands, building capacity andSecretary of Defense
for Indo-Pacificresilience in response to a range of
Security Affairs.
threats. By collectively stepping up in
Photo by the U.S. Department of State
partnership with Pacific Island nations
and other likeminded allies andpartners, New Zealand’s Pacific Reset
directly complements DoD’s efforts in the Indo-Pacific and our efforts to renew engagement in the
Pacific. The overlap in our respective strategies creates synergies, as we collectively step up to pool
our resources and respond to the Pacific’s need for greater investment, infrastructure, and capacity
building efforts that match the region’s highest-priority needs.

MONGOLIA
Since the inception of formal bilateral defense cooperation in 1996, the U.S.-Mongolia defense
relationship has developed significantly. Mongolia regards the United States as its most important“third neighbor” and primary
security partner. The United StatesandMongolia
haveaU.N. Peacekeepers
comprehensive partnership based
from Mongolia
on common values and sharedpatrol as part of astrategic interests in protecting andfield training
promoting freedom, democracy,
exercise during
Exercise SHANTI
economic openness, and human
DOOT 4 inrights worldwide.
Mongolia
Bangladesh,remains regionally and globally
March 6, 2018.
engaged as a net security exporter
Photo by Lance Cpl. Adam
through the Mongolian Armed
MonteraForces’ contributions to the United
Nations peacekeeping operations in

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

Africa, and its continued deployment in Afghanistan to support coalition operations. Moreover,
Mongolia continues to enforce U.N. Security Council sanctions that have been unanimously adopted
in response to North Korea’s unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The United States
supports Mongolia's efforts to maintain and further develop a modern, professional, and selfsustaining military capable of serving as a fully integrated coalition and U.N. Peacekeeping partner.
The United States also assists Mongolia with expanding its capacity to respond to domestic andregional disasters and humanitarian crises. The United States and Mongolia share a vision for a free
and open Indo-Pacific that safeguards sovereignty and freedom from coercion for all countries.
Mongolia’s regional cooperation and support for multilateral institutions contributes to peace,stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and serves as a stabilizing influence in the region.

Expanding Partnerships in the Indian Ocean Region
The United States and India share acommon outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Both “To advance our vision of a free and open
countries recognize the importance of the Indo-Pacific, we are building new and
Indo-Pacific to global trade and commerce stronger bonds with nations that shareand acknowledge that developments in this our values across the region, from India toregion will shape the larger trajectory of the Samoa. Our relationships will flow from arules-based international order.
India, spirit of respect built on partnership, notthrough its “Act East” policy, continues to domination.”make significant security, economic, and- Vice President Pence, remarks at thedevelopment investments to secure the
Hudson Institute, October 4, 2018
vision of a free and open Indo-Pacificregion. The Indian Ocean Region is at the nexus of global trade and commerce, with nearly half of
the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes.
The region boasts some of the fastest-growing economies on Earth, and is home to a quarter of theworld’s population. While the region offers unprecedented opportunity, it is also confronting a myriadof security challenges, including terrorism, transnational crime, trafficking-in-persons, and illicit drugs.
To combat these challenges, the United States seeks opportunities to broaden and strengthen
partnerships with India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal to respond to shared regional
challenges.

INDIA
The United States and India maintain a broad-based strategic partnership, underpinned by sharedinterests, democratic values, and strong people-to-people ties. The U.S.-India strategic partnershiphas strengthened significantly during the past two decades, based on a convergence of strategicinterests, and the United States and India continue to use their deepening relationship to build new
partnerships within and beyond the Indo-Pacific.

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

In June 2016, the United States
designated India a “Major Defense
Partner,” a status unique to India.
The designation seeks to elevate theU.S. defense partnership with India
to a level commensurate with that of
the United States’ closest allies andpartners. The establishment of the
U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue
in September 2018 also serves as atangible demonstration of ourcommitment to promoting theshared principles of a free and open
Indo-Pacific.

Then-U.S. Secretary of
Defense Mattis with
the Indian Minister ofDefence Nirmala
Sitharaman during thesigning of theCommunications,Compatibility andSecurity Agreement,
September 6, 2019.
Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class
Lisa Ferdinando

The United States continues to pursue a range of initiatives with India to enable cooperation,
strengthen our interoperability, and establish a strong foundation for defense trade, technology
sharing, industrial collaboration, and broader cooperation on defense innovation. The signing of theCommunications, Compatibility and Security Agreement in 2018 represents a significant developmentin our military-to-military relationship, facilitating greater interoperability and real-time secure
information-sharing. DoD and theIndian Ministry of Defence are
increasing the scope, complexity, andfrequency of our military exercises.
During MALABAR 2018,
Later this year, the United States andan Indian Navy oiler
India will conduct our first tri-service
conducts an underway
replenishment training
exercise, and we continue toexercise with a U.S.
collaborate on maritime security andwarship, enabled by the
implementation of thedomain awareness, HA/DR, counterU.S.-India Logistics
Exchange
piracy, counter-terrorism, and other
Memorandum oftransnational issues.
Agreement.
As our shared interests and security
cooperation have expanded, U.S.India bilateral defense trade andtechnology cooperation have also
grown, with approximately $16 billion in defense trade since 2008. Through the Defense Technology
and Trade Initiative, we are increasing cooperation in defense technology, building industry-toindustry ties, and identifying opportunities for the co-development and co-production of defense
systems for the sustainment and modernization of military forces.

Photo by Mass Communication
Specialist 2nd Class William McCann

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

SRI LANKA
Since 2015, DoD has strengthened its relationship with Sri Lanka and increased military engagements
significantly, particularly with the Sri Lankan Navy. In 2017, we conducted the first port visit in 30
years by a U.S. aircraft carrier – the USS NIMITZ Carrier Strike Group – and the first ever bilateral
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Exercise. In 2019, we increased cooperation
on mutual logistics arrangements in support of Indian Ocean security and disaster response.

THE MALDIVES
Following the recent democratic transition in the Maldives, the United States has begun to explore
avenues to expand security cooperation, with particular emphasis on providing capacity-building
opportunities to the Maldives National Defence Forces and Maldivian Coast Guard. Key areas offocus include: maritime domain awareness (MDA) – to enable Maldivian forces the ability to monitor
and patrol its sovereign maritime area and contribute to regional efforts to protect sea lines ofcommunication; HA/DR readiness; and counter-terrorism capability. An additional $7 million in FY
2018 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will support these efforts.

BANGLADESHThe United States enjoys a strong defense relationship with Bangladesh, an important partner forregional stability and security. Security cooperation focuses on key areas such as maritime security
and domain awareness, counterterrorism,
HA/DR,
peacekeeping,andbordersecurity. The annual Bilateral
Defense Dialogue between
United States and
USINDOPACOM and the
Bangladesh naval
Bangladesh
Armed
Forcesofficers pilot a P-8
Division sets the strategic
during the CARAT
Exercise in 2018.
direction of our defense
relationship. In addition, recent
Photo by Petty Officer 3 Class
Tristin Barthincreases in FMF, International
Military Education and Training(IMET), and the inclusion of
Bangladesh in the Maritime
Security
Initiative(MSI)
underscores not only the value the United States places on its defense partnership with Bangladesh,but also Dhaka’s contributions towards regional stability in support of upholding a rules-based
international order in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
rd35

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

NEPAL
The United States seeks to expand our
defense relationship with Nepal, focused on
HA/DR, peacekeeping operations, defense
Commander of the U.S.
professionalization, ground force capacity,
Indo-Pacific Commandand counter-terrorism.
Our growing
Admiral Phil Davidson
defense partnership can be seen in thevisits Nepal,
establishment of the U.S. Army Pacific-led
January 11, 2019.
Land Forces Talks in June 2018, our seniorPhoto by Petty Officer 1st Class Robinmost military dialogue with Nepal. This
Peak
year has already seen several senior-level
visits to Nepal by the USINDOPACOM
Commander and Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for South andSoutheast Asia to further advance our defense relationship.

Expanding Partnerships in Southeast Asia
Through the implementation of the
National Defense Strategy in the IndoAfter nearly 50 years ofPacific, the United States is prioritizing
service in the U.S. Coast
new relationships with Vietnam,
Guard, the Hamilton-classcutter (WHEC-722) was
Indonesia, and Malaysia – key players in
officially transferred to the
ASEAN that remain central in our
Vietnam Coast Guard
efforts to ensure peace and underwrite
under the name CSB-8020.
prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. All three
A transfer ceremony took
countries represent engines of economic
place at Coast Guard Base,
Honolulu, May 25, 2017.
growth that are strategically located on
key sea lanes between the Indian andPhoto by Petty Officer 2nd Class Melissa
McKenzie
Pacific Oceans.
While maintaining
independent foreign policies, Vietnam,
Indonesia, and Malaysia are aligned with the region’s shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacificand are focused on maintaining peace, stability, and prosperous economic development in the region.

VIETNAMThe Department is building a strategic partnership with Vietnam that is based on common interestsand principles, including freedom of navigation, respect for a rules-based order in accordance withinternational law, and recognition of national sovereignty. The U.S.-Vietnam defense relationship has

36

Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportgrown dramatically over the past several years, as symbolized by the historic March 2018 visit of aU.S. aircraft carrier for the first time since the Vietnam War.
The Department is working to improve Vietnam’s defense capabilities by providing security assistance,
including Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, T-6 trainer aircraft, a former U.S. Coast Guard highendurance cutter, and small patrol boats and their associated training and maintenance facilities. The
U.S. military also engages in numerous annual training exchanges and activities to enhance bilateral
cooperation and interoperability with the Vietnam People’s Army, Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard.
Additionally, DoD has provided training and technical assistance to support Vietnam’s 2018
deployment of a medical unit to the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan, and will continue toprovide assistance to facilitate future deployments.
Our increasingly strong defense ties are based on a foundation of close cooperation to address legacyof war and humanitarian issues, which predates the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1995. As welook to celebrate 25 years of diplomatic relations in 2020, DoD remains committed to supporting U.S.
efforts to clean up dioxin contamination and remove unexploded ordnance, and appreciates Vietnam’s
continued assistance to account for U.S. personnel missing from the Vietnam War.

INDONESIAAs the world’s second and third
U.S. Air Force members
largest democracies, the United
escort displaced people off
States and Indonesia share manya U.S. C-130 Hercules
common strategic interests, and thisaircraft in Balikpapan,
year celebrate 70 years of diplomaticIndonesia,
October 9, 2018.
relations.
The United States
Thousands were displaced
supports Indonesia’s vision toafter a 7.5 magnitude
become a “global maritime
earthquake and tsunami
fulcrum” straddling the Indian andstruck Indonesia’s
Sulawesi Island.
Pacific Oceans. Indonesia and theUnited States cooperate on defense
Photo by Master Sgt. James May
issues under the auspices of the
U.S.-Indonesia
Comprehensive
Partnership, reaffirmed in October 2015. The Strategic Partnership focuses on six areas for advancing
defense cooperation: maritime security and domain awareness; defense procurement and joint
research and development; peacekeeping operations and training; professionalization; HA/DR; andcountering transnational threats such as terrorism and piracy.
The United States and Indonesia conduct an active exercise program that enhances our respective
capacity and interoperability based on common platforms such as F-16 fighters and Apache attack
helicopters. Our bilateral defense activities include more than 200 bilateral military engagements ayear, one Joint Staff sponsored exercise, and several service-level maneuver exercises annually.

37

Indo-Pacific Strategy ReportIndonesia is a major recipient of IMET funds in the Indo-Pacific, which are used to enhance themilitary professionalization of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. Future areas ofcollaboration include developing defense industry partnerships that will expand coordination on
acquisition, technology transfer, cooperative research, industrial collaboration, and logistics support.

MALAYSIA
Malaysia is a key player in Southeast Asia
and we will continue to deepen our security
and defense cooperation. Our ties haveremained strong for many years, and we areworking with the Pakatan Harapan
Government to further strengthen thisimportant relationship. Malaysia’s regional
leadership role, technologically advanced
industry, sizeable economy, and capable
military make it an important partner insecuring peace and prosperity in Southeast
Asia.
Malaysia has demonstrated thecapacity and resolve to contribute toregional security, and we continue tosupport Malaysia’s emerging security
requirements.
We conduct more than 100 defense
engagements with Malaysia annually,
including exercises, subject matter expert
exchanges, and partner on common
objectives such as maritime security andcounter-terrorism.
We improve ourinteroperability through combined air,maritime, and amphibious training in
multiple locations across the country. At sea
we participate in both the CARAT andSoutheast Asia Cooperation and Training(SEACAT) Exercises and are increasing
cooperation with Malaysia’s maritime law
enforcement agency, in coordination with
the U.S. Department of State. Through the
MSI, we are helping Malaysia improve its
MDA by providing sensors on existing
platforms.
We are deploying a U.S.

THE STATE PARTNERSHIPPROGRAM IN THE INDO-PACIFICThe State Partnership Program began in 1993
with partnerships between the National Guardof designated U.S. States and newly
independent Eastern European countries.
The State Partnership Program has since
expanded to other regions, including the
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Western
Europe, and the Indo-Pacific.
By the end of FY 2019, the United States will
have 79 partnerships with 86 nations, 12 ofwhich are in the Indo-Pacific:
Bangladesh / Oregon (2008)



Cambodia / Idaho (2009)

Indonesia / Hawaii (2006)



Malaysia / Washington (2017)

Mongolia / Alaska (2003)



Philippines / Hawaii, Guam (2000)

Thailand / Washington (2002)



Tonga and Fiji / Nevada (2014 & 2018)Vietnam / Oregon (2012)

Recently Added: Nepal (2019)38

Sri Lanka (2019)

Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportmaritime advisor to Malaysia to improve our partnership and coordination on maritime security and
MDA. Malaysia also actively partners in international counter-terrorism efforts, adding its regional
perspective to support the global effort to defeat ISIS.
Malaysia has been a critical partner of increasing importance in the region ever since the United Stateselevated the relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership in 2014. Malaysia is a leader on several key
regional security challenges in Southeast Asia, particularly maritime security and countering violent
extremism. For example, Malaysia participates in multilateral air and maritime patrols in the Malacca
Strait with Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, focused on countering threats to international shippingin that vital waterway. Malaysia also participates in similar patrols in the Sulu and Celebes Seas withIndonesia and the Philippines aimed at countering violent extremists. The Malaysia Maritime
Enforcement Agency formally committed to host the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement
Initiative (SEAMLEI) Commanders’ Forum in December 2019. Malaysia plays a leadership role on
HA/DR, and currently co-chairs the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)
HA/DR Experts’ Working Group with the United States.
The Malaysian Armed Forces have demonstrated the professionalism, capacity, and resolve tocontribute to regional security and international U.N. missions. We will continue to work closely with
Malaysia to advance these and similar efforts which support a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Sustaining Engagements, Strengthening Foundations
As outlined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976, Brunei, Laos, andCambodia embrace ASEAN values including, but not limited to, the mutual respect for the
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the rightof every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion;and the settlement of differences or disputes in a peaceful manner. These principles underscore theimportance of the sovereignty of all nations, and are in line with the U.S. vision for a free and open
Indo-Pacific. While the United States maintains measured engagements with Brunei, Laos, andCambodia, we continue to seek opportunities to enhance defense relations as conditions permit.

BRUNEI
Military-to-military ties have become a mainstay of the U.S.-Brunei bilateral relationship. The
Bruneian Government has welcomed the growth of military ties with the United States and likeminded nations, including with respect to enhancing MDA. In 2018, in addition to the Brunei Navy's
participation in the RIM OF THE PACIFIC Exercise and holding our annual bilateral CARAT
Exercise, the Royal Brunei Land Forces and U.S. Army conducted their first bilateral exercise –PAHLAWAN WARRIOR – in Brunei. This year the United States co-hosted with Brunei amultilateral Cooperation Against Transnational Threats workshop. We continue to look for ways toexpand our military-to-military cooperation, including through increased information sharing.

39

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

LAOS
Strategically located in the geographic heart of ASEAN and the Mekong sub-region, Laos presents
opportunities for deepening security, economic, and diplomatic engagement. China is increasingly
focused on Laos, and Beijing continues efforts to expand its strategic footprint through large debtfueled investments, especially in infrastructure and energy. However, Laos is wary of overdependence
and is seeking to diversify its partners andoptions. At the same time, Laos is
experiencing a significant demographic shift
Deputy Assistant– with a large majority of its population
Secretary ofunder the age of 35 – which presents a
Defense Joseph
H. Felter with aunique opportunity to engage a new,
Lao Unexploded
outward looking generation. The Lao
Ordnance
military prioritizes Vietnam, Russia, and to
disposal team at acleanup site ina lesser degree China as its primary security
southern Laos,partners. At the same time, the LaotianJanuary 18, 2019.
military is slowly expanding its international
Photo by the U.S. Departmentof Defense
engagement portfolio, first to ASEAN andto a lesser degree to countries in the region
such as Japan, Australia, and India.
The United States supports activities that advance Laos’ integration into ASEAN, such as defense
modernization, interoperability, English language proficiency, and respect for a rules-based
international order. In the meantime, we are working to move past war legacy issues related to theVietnam War and aim to conclude Prisoner of War/Missing in Action recovery operations honorably,and by 2030 to make Laos substantially risk-free of U.S.-sourced unexploded ordnance.

CAMBODIADoD seeks to build a productive military-to-military relationship with the Kingdom of Cambodia that
protects its sovereignty, promotes military professionalism, and helps it become a responsible andcapable contributor to regional security. In early 2017, Cambodia suspended all military-to-military
exercises with the United States. We, however, continue to cooperate in peacekeeping operations,humanitarian mine action, medical research, and U.S. Missing in Action personnel accounting.

Revitalized engagements in the Pacific Islands
We are revitalizing our engagement in the Pacific Islands to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacificregion, maintain access, and promote our status as a security partner of choice. The Pacific Islands
represent a region distinct from other regions in the Indo-Pacific because of the relatively small sizeof states, unique geography, and challenges to promote economic prosperity. As a Pacific nation itself,

40

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

the United States views the
Pacific Islands as critical to
the U.S. strategy because of
our shared values, interests,
andcommitments,
including U.S. security
guarantees to the Freely
Associated States.
Our
shared interests with the
Pacific Islands underscorefour important components
special to this region.

U.S. Coast Guard Cutter
Mellon was in Fiji fromJanuary 22-25, 2019, to
exercise the bilateral
Shiprider Agreement
recently signed between
Fiji and theUnited States.
Photo by the U.S. Department of Defense

COAST GUARD PARTNERSHIPSWITH THE PACIFIC ISLANDSFirst, we share a long history, born fromcommitments and support during the Second
World War that compels a renewed U.S.
commitment to stay. Second, we believe
strongly in respect for a safe, secure, andprosperous, free and open Indo-Pacific thatmust preserve small states’ sovereignty. Third,
we aim to focus on building capacity andresilience to address maritime security; Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; drugtrafficking; and resilience to address climatechange and disaster response, as signified by the2018 Boe Declaration. Fourth and finally, weare committed to continued engagement in theregion, by reaffirming and renewing
partnerships.

The U.S. Coast Guard operations within the PacificIslands have been steady over the past half century.
The Coast Guard’s presence is permanent and its
partnerships enduring. The Coast Guard provides
unique access, influence, and trust due to its routineinteractions with the Pacific Islands to address
shared maritime safety, security, and governancechallenges.
 The

U.S.
Coast
Guard
represents
USINDOPACOM at the Pacific Quadrilateral
Defense Coordinating Group, a PacificConsortium (the United States, France,
Australia, and New Zealand) that supports
counter-Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
fishing enforcement through multilateral andbilateral operations with 15 Pacific Island
nations, bringing considerable economic andsecurity benefits to the participant nations.

Of the Pacific Islands, three have militaries:
Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga. The
United States works with each to support
improved capability within partner armed
forces and, consistent with a partner-centric
approach, often in support of efforts from allies
and partners such as Australia and New
Zealand.

 The U.S. Coast Guard shiprider agreementsallow 11 Pacific Island nations to exercise
sovereignty in their exclusive economic zone
through U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy ship
deployments.
 The U.S. Coast Guard partners with the U.S.
Navy on Oceania Maritime Security Initiative
deployments.

The United States has a unique relationship with
the Freely Associated States. The Compacts ofFree Association are treaty-like agreements

41

Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportwhich provide security and financial support to the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of
the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. These nations are important and historic U.S. partners
in the Pacific, with deep ties to the United States.
U.S. security support to the PacificIslands comes in many other forms as
Assistant Secretaryof Defense for Indowell. Many Pacific Island countries
Pacific Security
participate in various regional exercises
Affairs Randall G.
andtraining
events,including
Schriver announces
a new partnership
USINDOPACOM’s KOA MOANA
between the Nevada
and PACIFIC PATHWAYS Exercises.
National Guard andWe have increased the number of ship
Fiji in Suva,
December 14, 2018.
visits and, in turn, shiprider agreements
Photo by the U.S. Department ofthat we have exercised.
We areDefenseincreasingly supportive of capacity
building across the Pacific Islands, which
includes at least $7 million in FMF in2018 to support Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga. Additionally, the United States is working with
Palau to improve its MDA to enhance Palau's maritime law enforcement capability.

Engagements with Other Allies
THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND CANADA
Allies such as the United Kingdom, France, andCanada play a critical role in maintaining a free andopen Indo-Pacific.
In addition to militarycapability and regional presence, these allies
contribute vital support to upholding free andopen principles in the region and globally.
For example, the United Kingdom has increased
deployments and operations in the region since“The U.S. military is active on adaily basis to safeguard freedom ofnavigation and overflight in the
Indo-Pacific, demonstrating ourcommitment to fly, sail and operate
wherever international law allows.”

In FY 2018, the Department
challenged 40 different maritime
claims of 26 claimants. Many of theseexcessive claims were challenged
persistently, throughout the year, inthe course of routine, daily operations.
42-

Assistant Secretary of Defense Randall G.
Schriver, speech at American EnterpriseInstitute, August 7, 20182017, contributed to the coordinated,
multinational initiatives to enforce
UNSCR sanctions on North Korea, andperformed its first naval operation
aimed at asserting navigational rights
and freedoms in the South China Sea in2018 with the transit of its frigate

Indo-Pacific Strategy ReportHMS
SUTHERLAND
andamphibious transport HMS ALBION,
followed by the transit of its frigate
HMS ARGYLL in 2019. The United
Kingdom shares our holistic view of
the region as the “Indo-Pacific,” aswell as the importance ofstrengthening
alliancesandpartnerships with countries in theregion.

Arleigh Burke-classguided-missile
destroyer USS
SPRUANCE andArleigh Burke-classguided-missile
destroyer USS
PREBLE conduct
freedom of navigation
operations in the South
China Sea.

The United States and France haverestarted the Indo-Pacific Security
Dialogue, and recognized thesignificanceoftheextended

Photo by the U.S. Department of
DefenseUPHOLDING FREEDOM AND ACCESS TO GLOBAL COMMONS

Throughout our history, the United States has asserted a key national interest in preserving the freedom of theseas, and has often relied on the U.S. military forces to protect that interest. As President Ronald Reagan said in
releasing the U.S. Oceans Policy in 1983, “we will not acquiesce in unilateral actions of other states designed torestrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight.” Today, in places
like the South China Sea, excessive maritime claims are attempts by coastal States to unlawfully restrict the exercise
of freedoms afforded to all seafaring nations to operate in waters beyond territorial limits. The United States willcontinue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, and encourage our allies and partners to do
the same.
Excessive maritime claims inconsistent with international law, if left unchallenged, threaten the international rulesbased order and U.S. interests and those of our regional allies and partners. Freedom of the seas is essential toensuring the global mobility of U.S. forces in the event of a crisis and the worldwide security of civilian shipping
on a daily basis. DoD, therefore, is committed to ensuring free and open maritime access, including throughfreedom of navigation (FON) assertions (commonly called Freedom of Navigation Operations, or FONOPs), toprotect the stable economic order and to maintain the ability of U.S. forces to respond, as needed. The FON
program is carefully designed to challenge coastal states’ excessive maritime claims while respecting their rights
under international law.
The FON program protects long-standing principles of freedom of navigation for civilian and military vessels
through both diplomatic and operational challenges, refusing to acquiesce to excessive maritime claims wherever
they are made. FONOPs serve to protect the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed
to all nations under international law. They are not targeted at any particular country, and they have no bearing
on sovereignty disputes over land features. FONOPs are conducted peacefully and impartially, in accordancewith international law. Consequently, U.S. forces routinely challenge excessive maritime claims asserted by allies
and partners, as well as those made by potential adversaries and competitors.

43

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

deployment of the aircraft carrier FNS CHARLES DE GAULLE to the Indo-Pacific in 2019,accompanied for portions of its deployment by ships from other NATO countries, Australia, and theUnited States. France additionally supports UNSCR enforcement and shares our emphasis on
developing a network of strategic partnerships, contributing to the building of a regional security
architecture, and engaging in multilateral dialogue platforms, in its strategy on France and Security in the
Indo-Pacific.
Canada is contributing to UNSCR enforcement, to include providing a maritime patrol aircraft during
summer 2018. A Canadian officer was also appointed the first non-U.S. Deputy Commander ofUnited Nations Command in 2018. Canada is also expanding defense cooperation with partners in
the region such as Vietnam, with future efforts expected to focus on advancements in personnel
training, U.N. peacekeeping operations, and increased defense industry ties.

4.3. Line of Effort 3:
Promoting a Networked Region
Shared security in the Indo-Pacificcontinues to rest on U.S. military presence
and a growing network of alliances and close
partnerships that promote interoperability
and coordination.
As the Indo-Pacific changes, the UnitedStates is augmenting its bilateralrelationships with trilateral and multilateralarrangements, and encouraging intra-Asian
security relationships for partnerships withpurpose. As articulated in the National
Defense Strategy, DoD will strengthen andevolve our alliances and partnerships into an
extended network capable of deterring or
decisively acting to meet the sharedchallenges of our time. In the Indo-Pacific,
this includes a networked security
architecture capable of deterring aggression,
maintaining stability, and ensuring freeaccess to common domains.

PARTNERSHIPS WITH PURPOSE
An important example of partnerships withpurpose is the Enforcement Coordination Cell
(ECC) in Yokosuka, Japan. Commanded by
USINDOPACOM and executed by U.S.
Seventh Fleet, the United States is working sideby-side with South Korea, Japan, Australia,
New Zealand, Canada, France, and the United
Kingdom at a single headquarters to enforce the
UNSCR sanctions regime against North Korea
and the illicit transfer of oil and ship-to-shiptransfers in the East China Sea and Korea Bay.
The ECC allows us to work closely with ourallies and partners to manage, coordinate, andde-conflict our efforts and is an importantfacilitator of transparent collaboration between
our allies and partners at sea and in the air.

In a large and interconnected region, especially one with so many strong, capable, and dedicatedplayers, it is prudent to network and link relationships to produce gains for all. As we weave together

44Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportthese partnerships with purpose, a networked security architecture – with its shared values, habits ofcooperation, and compatible and complementary capabilities – will form a strong free and open fabricthat knits the region together, preserving sovereignty and regional peace and stability for years tocome. This is a vision the United States has long advanced in the Indo-Pacific, and one we believe
will continue to benefit the region in terms of stability and prosperity.

TRILATERAL PARTNERSHIPSFirst, the Department is strongly emphasizing trilateral mechanisms to bring together like-minded
allies and partners to maximize individual contributions to regional peace and security and link
together nations that previously worked with us mostly separately. The region is more secure when
we combine efforts in this way and we will continue to prioritize these important mechanisms.
The ROK, Japan, and the UnitedStates trilateral partnership is critical
Then-U.S. Secretary of
to peace and security in the IndoDefense Mattis meets
Pacific region.
Our threeJapan’s Defense
democracies share the common goals
Minister Takeshi
Iwaya and the ROKofupholdingarules-based
Defense Ministerinternational order; achieving theJeong Kyeong-doo for
the U.S.-Japan-South
final fully-verified denuclearization of
Korea trilateral at theNorth Korea; and strengthening theASEAN Defense
network of like-minded nations in the
Ministers’ Meeting
Plus, October 19, 2018.
region. Toward these ends, thePhoto by Lisa Ferdinando
ROK-Japan-United States trilateraldefensepartnership
continues
practical cooperation on UNSCR
enforcement; information sharing; anti-submarine warfare; BMD; mine counter-measure warfare; andHA/DR efforts. The United States is committed to further strengthening and growing our trilateraldefense cooperation to meet future regional and international challenges.
The United States is also developing its trilateral partnership with Japan and Australia. Together, weare cooperating in tangible ways to enhance security across the region and increase our interoperability,in part, by augmenting our exercises and training; increasing information sharing; and building
capabilities. For example, we are taking what would otherwise be separate or bilateral capacitybuilding initiatives in Southeast Asia and ensuring that they not only complement one another, but
are also tailored to assist in building up more comprehensively capable partners. This grouping is also
effectively improving our interoperability by trilateralizing and multilateralizing key military exercises,
including COPE NORTH GUAM and SOUTHERN JACKAROO.
The United States, India, and Japan also enjoy a robust trilateral partnership. The annual naval
exercise, MALABAR, which began as a U.S.-India exercise, has included Japan as a participating45

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

partner since 2014. The exercise has
increased our ability to operatetrilaterally, including via real-time
information sharing, and has increased
MALABAR 2018 wasin complexity over time to incorporate
the 22nd rendition of thesurface,amphibious,andairexercise and the firsttime hosted off thecomponents.
Underpinning thiscoast of Guam.
cooperation is the State DepartmentPhoto by the U.S. Department of
led trilateral dialogue which completedDefenseits 9th iteration in April 2018. Thisdialogueenhancestrilateral
cooperation in the areas ofconnectivity
andinfrastructuredevelopment, counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, maritime security and domain awareness, and
HA/DR. The first-ever trilateral meeting between the leaders of the United States, India, and Japan
took place in November 2018 at the G20 meeting.

STRENGTHENING REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS THROUGH
MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENTThe United States continues to support ASEAN centrality in the regional security architecture, andthe U.S. free and open Indo-Pacific strategy seeks to further empower it. The United States and
ASEAN share common values, and ASEAN is a key partner in promoting the values and policies
enshrined in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy:
freedom of the seas; market economics;
good governance; and respect for an order
based on clear and transparent rules. As
Commander of U.S.
ASEAN nations support one another to
Indo-Pacificmaintain the freedom, sovereignty, andCommand AdmiralDavidson delivers aterritorial integrity of countries within the
speech on the free
region,thiscohesionstrengthens
and open IndoPacific in Singapore,
ASEAN’s voice.
The United States
March 7, 2019.
respects ASEAN’s consensus based
Photo by the U.S. Department ofdecision-making model, and we believe the
Defensemore ASEAN speaks with one voice, themore it is able to maintain a region freefrom coercion.
A critical part of our engagement is meaningful work with various ASEAN-based institutions. At thegroup’s invitation, the United States joined the East Asia Summit (EAS) – chaired by the rotating headof ASEAN – and together we have made it the region’s leading forum for addressing political and46

Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportsecurity challenges. Since
1994, the United States has
been an active member andcontributor to the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF),
utilizing the forum tostrengthenfunctional
multilateral
cooperation
acrossarangeoftransboundary
traditionaland non-traditional security
challenges facing the Indo-Pacific. The ARF,
led by ministers of foreign affairs, is an ideal
platform for a truly networked region. The
Department has made significant progress inrecent years to enhance our defense and security
relationship with ASEAN. Through these
efforts, we are continuing to build on the desireof ASEAN countries to better share
information with one another and pursue aframework to enhance regional MDA.

Admiral Davidson,
Commander of U.S. IndoPacific Command, providing
opening remarks at the 14th
ASEAN Defense Ministers’Meeting Plus Experts’
Working Group on HA/DR
co-hosted by the United Statesand Malaysia at the Daniel K.
Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies. 72
participants from 16 nations
participated.
Photo
by the U.S. Department of Defense

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY,
STRENGTHENING REGIONAL SECURITY
NETWORKS, AND ENHANCING SHARED
UNDERSTANDING
Since its inception in 1995, the Daniel K. Inouye AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) has
promoted a networked region through its executive
education programs, and a network of now more than
12,000 alumni.
During in-resident courses eachinvolving over 100 fellows from more than 35 countries,
multinational cohorts have developed action plans suchas enhancing cross-border law enforcement informationexchange, mitigating migration emergencies at sea andreducing human trafficking.

The Department has enjoyed constructive
engagement with our ASEAN colleagues in the
ADMM-Plus and subordinate mechanisms,
such as the Experts’ Working Group, since theformal establishment of the ADMM-Plus in2010. U.S. Secretaries of Defense have attended
every ADMM-Plus ministerial meeting since2010, and we have matched this participation
with active engagement in the ADMM-Plus
subordinate mechanisms.

As part of MSI, the center brought together
representatives from the maritime focal points andinformation-sharing hubs across ASEAN to develop
their national and regional information sharing
mechanisms, share best practices, and outline theirinteragency action plans to enhance maritime sharedawareness in their nations and the region.

In working with the ADMM-Plus, we seek tocomplement U.S. efforts in the EAS, the ARF,
and other ASEAN fora. We use this formal
multilateral engagement mechanism with
ASEAN to complement our bilateral andtrilateral engagements. We have bolstered ourties further by continuing to host informal U.S.ASEAN defense ministers meetings in

In 2019, DKI APCSS also co-hosted the Oceania
National Security Policy workshop with the PacificIslands Secretariat, which focused on theimplementation of the Boe Declaration, anddevelopment of national security polices by Oceania
nations. This event highlighted the importance of
supporting intra-regional security relationships to share
best practices and align sub-regional priorities.

47

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

September 2016, and in June and October 2018 building on the success of our 2014 meeting.
Thailand is the ASEAN Chair for 2019, and we continue to work with Bangkok to co-organize theASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise (AUMX), approved by the Defense Ministers during the ADMM in
October. The AUMX will take place in September 2019 in Bangkok and international waters inSoutheast Asia. This type of forward-leaning action by Thailand is a key example of its intent andresolve to be a sub-regional leader. We continue to look for other ways and means to support thistype of effort through the SEAMLEI, previously known as the Gulf of Thailand Initiative on Maritime
Law Enforcement, which convenes the Coast Guards or maritime law enforcement agencies of
ASEAN member states to increase maritime law enforcement cooperation and information sharing.
SEAMLEI builds technical capacity using the latest technology for MDA, while also providing aplatform for dialogue among decision-making officials.
In October 2018, the ASEAN
Defense Ministers agreed to
conduct the first AUMX,
which Thailand agreed toorganize.
To fulfill thisASEAN Defense
commitment, the United
Senior Officials’
States intends to focus on the
Meeting-Pluspromotionof maritime
Sustainable
Security, Thailand,
security and safety via shared
April 4, 2019.
awareness,
technical
Photo by the U.S. Department ofcooperation, and sharing of
Defenseknowledge and expertise
between the United Statesand ASEAN. The UnitedStates is also examining theviability of working with a willing ASEAN member state and ADMM-Plus partners to increase theEnglish language training (ELT) capacity for ASEAN military and defense officials. This concept
proposes joining efforts among ELT stakeholders to support a multinational ELT venue thatfacilitates common learning, cultivates trust and confidence, and helps build a cadre of English
speaking counterparts across ASEAN defense establishments.
The Department also supports the recent re-establishment of the diplomatic quadrilateral
consultations – or Quad – between the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, which has convened
three times at the Assistant Secretary-level since November 2017. The Quad is an important forum
to discuss the respective Indo-Pacific visions of the four countries, all grounded in an affirmation of
ASEAN centrality and building on existing trilateral relationships. Consultations focus on upholding
the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, increasing connectivity consistent with international law andstandards, and coordinating on counter-terrorism and maritime security efforts.

48

Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

EMERGING INTRA-ASIAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS
Improving security relations among Indo-Pacific countries is critical to regional integration. The
Department encourages our allies and partners to develop interconnected security relationships. In
some cases, and in recognition of the changing security environment, countries are strengthening theirbilateral, trilateral, and multilateral security relationships on their own, and in others, the Department
is more directly encouraging new cooperation. As part of these growing ties, countries are signing
new defense agreements and arrangements; enhancing training, exercises, and operations; and building
partner capacity, helping stabilize the Indo-Pacific.
Countries in the region are recognizing the need to formalize closer security ties to safeguard sharedprinciples, including the peaceful resolution of disputes, as the region saw with Vietnam and Australia
elevating their relationship to a strategic partnership, and Japan and India significantly expanding theirdefense and security ties. Key countries are also working together more closely on conducting training,
exercises, and even joint operations. Recent examples include, expanded Japan-Vietnam maritime
exercises and Indonesia’s proposal to conduct joint operations with Malaysia and the Philippines –MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVE: YEAR FOUR
DoD’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) – Section 1263 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2016 – was originally established as a five-year authority focusedon building partners’ maritime capacity. The NDAA for FY 2019 extended the authority throughDecember 2025 and expanded the scope of the initiative – now designated the Indo-Pacific MSI – into
South Asia. MSI authorizes the provision of training, equipment, supplies, and small-scale construction
to the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh to enhance theirability to “sense, share, and contribute” to maritime security and MDA; to create a common Regional
Maritime Picture; and to empower them to observe and control more effectively their own sovereign
maritime spaces, both individually and jointly.
In MSI’s first three years, DoD focused on enhancing information-sharing, interoperability, andmultinational maritime cooperation. To increase information-sharing, DoD has connected the MSI
recipient nations’ Maritime Command and Control centers through the installation of secure
information-sharing networks, and Field Information Support Tool communications systems. MSI
funding has also been used to field common ISR platforms such as an Aerostat, SABIR ISR sensor
packages, unmanned aerial systems, and upgrades to High Endurance Cutter (WHEC) vessels to foster
interoperability among the region’s maritime forces. For example, the Philippines and Vietnam operate
and maintain their WHECs while conducting MDA missions in the South China Sea and multinational
training exercises.
With MSI support, the U.S. Navy has increased the scope of the SEACAT Exercise to make it a truly
regional maritime security exercise in which partners operationalize key skills – such as interdiction –and communications systems provided through MSI. MSI has also enabled DoD to contract civilian
vessels for the exercise to simulate real-world interdiction and boarding scenarios more effectively.
One of MSI’s primary goals in FY 2019 is to enhance interoperability through common platforms.

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

including maritime counter-piracy patrols in the Sulu Sea. Regional capacity-building is increasing as
well, as seen with Japan’s efforts to improve Philippine maritime forces and India’s steps to deepen
its exchanges with Vietnam.
These closer relationships are notlimited to bilateral ones. Last
A Royal Thai Coastyear, India hosted Japan andGuardsman (left), a
Australia for its first ever highPhilippine Navy Sailor
level trilateral dialogue in New(center), and a Philippine
Coast Guardsman practice
Delhi, where they discussed
tactical procedures during
maritime security, and othera Visit, Board, Search, andsecurity issues.
Seizure seminar as part of
the SEACAT Exercise in
Manila, August 28, 2018.

Singapore’s Information Fusion
Centre (IFC) is also an example of
Photo by Petty Officer 1 Class Micah
Blechner
how countries in the region arecollaboratingtofacilitate
information sharing and enhancemaritime security.
Since its
inception in 2009, Singapore’s
IFC has served as a maritime
information hub for the region,
Rear Adm. Joey Tynch,commander, Task
contributing
actionable
Force 73, greets
information to regional andinternational liaison
global navies and coast guards toofficers during a tour
cue timely operational responsesof Singapore's IFC for
to maritime threats such as piracy
the SEACAT Exercise,
August 30, 2018.
and drug smuggling. The IFC has
hosted over 100 international
Photo by Petty Officer 3 Class
Christopher Veloicaza
liaison officers from over 20
countries.
We are also
encouraged by the region’s efforts
to establish the “Our Eyes”
initiative, a platform to improve strategic information sharing between member countries.
strd

Last December, the United States also welcomed the inauguration of India’s maritime IFC, which willfunction as a regional platform for the exchange of information in the maritime domain among partner
nations. Likewise, Sri Lanka, whose strategic location in the Indian Ocean through which 70 percent
of maritime traffic passes, has outlined a vision to become a regional hub for logistics and commerce.
Supporting this vision, the U.S. Navy recently initiated a series of temporary cargo transfer initiatives
enabling non-lethal re-supply of passing naval vessels in Sri Lanka. These engagements serve as proofof principle for a range of initiatives that would benefit regional connectivity and security, including
support to HA/DR. DoD also fully supports countries pursuing multilateral agreements and50

Indo-Pacific Strategy Reportarrangements to enhance regional security, including the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration of Conduct
to lower tensions in the South China Sea.
The Department is also taking steps to support the law enforcement capacity and riparian domainawareness of partner countries in the Mekong region to enhance border security and combat thetrafficking of drugs, wildlife, arms, and people.
Closer security relations in the region also benefit the United States’ ability to resource and implement
this strategy. Our National Defense Strategy states that “when we pool resources and share responsibility
for our common defense, our security burden becomes lighter.” Greater burden-sharing will
strengthen our ability to deter conflict and increase our flexibility in responding to challenges.

GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE (GPOI)The Indo-Pacific contributes more than one-third of all U.N. peacekeeping personnel, and many
countries have pledged additional contributions. India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Indonesia areconsistently among the top 10 U.N. peacekeeping contributing countries. These and other regional
partners, such as Mongolia, provide critical enabling capabilities to U.N. operations. These
contributions help promote peace and security while advancing regional cooperation, confidencebuilding, and professionalization of security forces.
In partnership with the U.S. Department of State, USINDOPACOM will maintain strong regional
partnerships through Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which is the U.S. Government’s
primary tool to build partner capacity to support U.N. peace operations. GPOI’s 12 Indo-Pacificpartners include Bangladesh, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, and Vietnam. Since 2016, GPOI has supported the U.N. Peacekeeping
Course for African Partners, which brings together Indian and U.S. Army instructors annually to train
African peacekeepers. Through GPOI, we will support training, exercises, equipment, and training
facility enhancements with a goal of strengthening partners’ preparation, deployment, and sustainment
capabilities.

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Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

ConclusionT

he United States is a Pacific nation and has a natural and enduring interest in the Indo-Pacific.
For more than 70 years the United States, along with our like-minded allies and partners, hashelped underwrite a stable security environment that allowed the people, economies, andnations in the Indo-Pacific to rise and prosper. Our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacificencompasses values shared by our allies and partners in the region – one that emphasizes upholding
a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, transparency, and accountability.
As great power competition returns, we will continue to invest, act, and orient ourselves to ensure thatthe principled international order from which all countries in the region benefit endures. To upholda free and open Indo-Pacific, we will base our outreach and activities in the region on our strong
alliances and partnerships. We will also enhance our posture and presence while building thecapabilities of like-minded countries, as we promote a networked and more integrated region, engage
our burgeoning set of partners, and invest for the future.

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The United States will uphold our commitments and will act to defend our interests and those of ourallies and partners. At the same time, we maintain our expectation that our allies and partners willcontribute their fair share to security by: Resourcing and investing sufficiently for their own defense to ensure deterrence and mitigate
vulnerabilities;
 Cooperating in building partner capacity for third party partners in the region;
 Upholding a rules-based international order (i.e., flying, sailing, and operating to upholdinternational laws and norms);
 Providing access needed for contingency response and resiliency; Strengthening interoperability, including information sharing, with the United States and otherlike-minded countries in the region; and,
 Promoting and actively participating in region-led initiatives to uphold a free and open IndoPacific.
The United States, along with our like-minded allies and partners, will continue to be engaged in thisdynamic and rapidly growing region. The Department of Defense, in conjunction with other U.S.
Government Departments and Agencies, regional institutions, and regional allies and partners, willcontinue to ensure that the rule of law – not coercion and force – dictates the future of the IndoPacific. We will build on our successes to ensure that this region remains peaceful, prosperous, andsecure for decades to come.

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ACRONYMS
A2/AD
ADMM
APEC
ARF
ASEAN
AUMX
BMD
BUILD Act
CARAT
CCP
CNMI
CFC
DoD
DPRK
EAS
ECC
EDCA
ELT
FMF
FMS
FONOP
HA/DR
IFC
IMET
ISIS
ISR
JSDF
MDA
MSI
NATO
PLA
PRC
ROK
SEACATSEAMLEIUNSCRUSFKUSINDOPACOM
WHEC

Anti-Access/Area-Denial
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Regional Forum
Association for Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise
Ballistic Missile Defense
Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
Chinese Communist Party
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Combined Forces Command
U.S. Department of Defense
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
East Asia Summit
Enforcement Coordination Cell
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
English Language Training
Foreign Military Financing
Foreign Military Sales
Freedom of Navigation Operations
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Information Fusion Centre
International Military Education and Training
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
Intelligence, Surveillance and ReconnaissanceJapan Self Defense Forces
Maritime Domain Awareness
Maritime Security Initiative
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
People’s Liberation Army
People’s Republic of China
Republic of Korea
Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training
Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative
United Nations Security Council Resolution
United States Forces Korea
United States Indo-Pacific Command
United States Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter

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