2019

This report is available online at www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications.
For media and public inquiries about this report, contact DIA-PAO@dodiis.mil.
For more information about the Defense Intelligence Agency, visit DIA's website at www.dia.mil.
Information cutoff date, November 2018.

Cover image, Navy frigate Yantai of the 11th Chinese naval escort flotilla. Source: Shutterstock.
DIA-02-1706-085

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKPREFACE
In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to
produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union’s military strength. The purpose was to provide
America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a comprehensive and accurate viewof the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA produced over 250,000 copies, andit soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages and distributed aroundthe world. In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S.
policymakers and the public for the first time.
In the spirit of Soviet Military Power, DIA began in 2017 to produce a series of unclassified DefenseIntelligence overviews of major foreign military challenges we face. This volume provides details on
China’s defense and military goals, strategy, plans, and intentions; the organization, structure, andcapability of its military supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure and industrial base.
This product and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public, our leaders, the national
security community, and partner nations about the challenges we face in the 21st century.

IV

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

The 2015 Chinese white paper China’s Military Strategy, issued by China’s State Council Information Office,states: “It is a Chinese Dream to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Dream is tomake the country strong….Without a strong military, a country can neither be safe nor strong.”
The Defense Intelligence Agency—indeed the broader U.S. Intelligence Community—is continually asked, "Whatdo we need to know about China?" What is China’s vision of the world and its role in it? What are Beijing’s strategic
intentions and what are the implications for Washington? How are the PLA’s roles and missions changing as it
becomes a more capable military force?
Since Mao Zedong’s Communist Revolution in October 1949 brought the Chinese Communist Party to power, China
has struggled to identify and align itself with its desired place in the world. Early factional struggles for control of party
leadership, decades of negotiations to define territorial boundaries, and continued claims to territories not yet recovered
have at times seemed at odds with the self-described nature of the Chinese as peace-loving and oriented only toward
their own defense. Chinese leaders historically have been willing to use military force against threats to their regime,
whether foreign or domestic, at times preemptively. Lack of significant involvement in military operations during thelast several decades has led to a sense of insecurity within the PLA as it seeks to modernize into a great power military.

This report offers insights into the modernization of Chinese military power as it reforms from a defensive, inflexible
ground-based force charged with domestic and peripheral security responsibilities to a joint, highly agile, expeditionary,and power-projecting arm of Chinese foreign policy that engages in military diplomacy and operations across the globe.

R ober t P. A shl e y, Jr.
L ieut en a nt G ener a l , U. S . A r my
D i r e c t or
D efen s e I nt el l igenc e A genc y

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Chinese leaders characterize China’s long-term military modernization program as essential to achieving great
power status. Indeed, China is building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air, maritime, space andinformation domains which will enable China to impose its will in the region. As it continues to grow in strength andconfidence, our nation’s leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions, which attimes may be antithetical to U.S. interests. With a deeper understanding of the military might behind Chinese economic
and diplomatic efforts, we can provide our own national political, economic, and military leaders the widest range ofoptions for choosing when to counter, when to encourage, and when to join with China in actions around the world.

D E F E N S E

China’s double-digit economic growth has slowed recently, but it served to fund several successive defense
modernization Five-Year Plans. As international concern over Beijing's human rights policies stymied the PLA’s
search for ever more sophisticated technologies, China shifted funds and efforts to acquiring technology by anymeans available. Domestic laws forced foreign partners of Chinese-based joint ventures to release their technology
in exchange for entry into China’s lucrative market, and China has used other means to secure needed technology
and expertise. The result of this multifaceted approach to technology acquisition is a PLA on the verge of fielding
some of the most modern weapon systems in the world. In some areas, it already leads the world.

A G E N C Y

Still, the United States has at times found itself in direct conflict with China or Chinese forces. China supported two
major conflicts in Asia after the Second World War, introducing Chinese volunteer forces in Korea and providing
direct Chinese air and air defense support to Hanoi in Vietnam. In addition, China fought border skirmishes with
the Soviet Union, India, and a unified Vietnam. In all three cases, military action was an integral part of Chinese
diplomatic negotiations. Since then, China has concluded negotiations for most of its land borders (India andBhutan being the outliers) but remains in contention with Japan, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Vietnam over maritime borders, which may in part explain motivation for the PLA Navy’s impressive growth
and the new emphasis on maritime law enforcement capabilities.

VINTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKCH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

CONTENTS
Introduction/Historical Overview.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1
1978–Present: China’s Military Rise.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2

National Military Overview .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7

Core Elements of Command and Control Reform. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 25
Modernizing Joint Command and Control . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 27

Regional and Global Operations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  28

Core Chinese Military Capabilities .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

31

Power Projection and Expeditionary Operations.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  33
Nuclear Forces and Weapons.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  36
Biological and Chemical Warfare.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  39
Space/Counterspace.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  40
Satellites . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 41
Counterspace. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 43
Human Spaceflight and Space-Exploration Probes. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 43

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Perceptions of Modern Conflict.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  24
National Military Command and Control.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 25

D E F E N S E

Military Doctrine and Strategy .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 23

A G E N C Y

Threat Perceptions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 7National Security Strategy.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  12
The PLA’s Role in National Security.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  13
Military Leadership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Stability Issues .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  17
External Defense Relations.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  19
Defense Budget .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  20

Space Launch .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 44
VIICyberspace .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 45
Denial and Deception.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  46
Logistics and Defense-Industrial Modernization.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  47
Logistics.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 47
Defense-Industrial Base . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 48

Underground Facilities.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  50
Missions Other Than War.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 50

Outlook: Developing a Robust Force.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  52
APPENDIX A: PLA Army .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  55
APPENDIX B: PLA Navy.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 63
APPENDIX C: PLA Air Force.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  83
APPENDIX D: PLA Rocket Force.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  91
APPENDIX E: PLA Strategic Support Force .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  97
APPENDIX F: Chinese Intelligence Services .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 99
APPENDIX G: Military Resources,
Infrastructure, and Logistics .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 101
APPENDIX H: Defense Industry.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  105APPENDIX I: Arms Sales.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  107APPENDIX J: Glossary of Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

VIII

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKINTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANKWith more than 5,000 years of civilized history, the Chinese nation created abrilliant Chinese civilization, made outstanding contributions to mankind, andbecame a great nation of the world.
—Chinese President Xi Jinping1

China’s history dates back nearly fivemillennia. Historians credit the armiesof numerous dynasties throughout
those many centuries with unifying the early
warring states, building the Great Wall, sending the fleets of early Ming Dynasty maritime
explorer Zheng He to far-off foreign lands, anddefending against foreign incursions. However,the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has existed
for less than a century. Initially referred to as
the “Red Army” under Mao Zedong, the PLA is
not a national institution but rather the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP). Established in 1927, the army spentmuch of its first two decades engaged in fighting the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Introduction/Historical Overview

D E F E N S E

PLA honor guard.

A G E N C YModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Image Source: DIMOCCH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

1during the intermittent Chinese Civil War aswell as fighting against the Japanese during
World War II (which China refers to as the
War of Resistance Against Japan).
Mao’s Red Army declared victory over the
Nationalists in October 1949, even as combat
continued. That same year, the PLA expanded
to include the PLA Navy and the PLA Air
Force. The PLA remained technologicallyinferior to Western militaries during its early
decades, but China’s leaders readily employed
PLA forces against the United States in Korea
and Vietnam. Beijing’s willingness to rely on
the PLA as a tool of foreign policy strengthened
the PLA’s position in China. Even as Mao led
China through the upheaval of the Great Leap
Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the PLA
endured. Although the PLA emerged from the
Cultural Revolution in the mid-1970s as oneof the stronger pillars of CCP power, its combat power was not commensurate with that ofother large states’ armed forces.

1978–Present: China’s
Military Rise
After Deng Xiaoping’s assumption of power in
1978, the path to today’s PLA was set whennational defense was included as the fourth of
China’s four “modernizations” (the others being
industry, science and technology, and agriculture). National defense was accorded the lowest priority, which carried implications for military funding and development. The failure toachieve comprehensive modernization during2

Mao’s rule was brought home during the 1979
conflict between China and Vietnam, when the
PLA’s performance exposed grave weaknesses
in operational planning, tactics, commandand control (C2), logistics, and weaponry. The
persistent exchanges of fire with Vietnameseforces during the 1980s highlighted the needfor changes even as large numbers of PLA
ground troops from around the country wererotated to the border to gain combat experience. Meanwhile, the PLA began to study
contemporary foreign, particularly Western,
military operations more closely, such as the
Falklands War (1982) and the bombing of
Libya (1986), for insights on how to modernize
China’s combat forces.
In 1989, PLA units intervened with lethal
force on behalf of the CCP to suppress politicaldemonstrations in Tiananmen Square, which
considerably damaged the PLA’s domestic andinternational image. World events in 1991 further shook CCP leaders’ confidence in the PLA.
The U.S. military’s performance in the Persian Gulf War provided the PLA stark lessons
regarding the lethal effectiveness of information-enabled weapons and forces, particularly
mobility and precision-strike capabilities, that
had become the standard for effectively waging
war in the modern era. As a result, in the early
1990s Beijing altered its military doctrine,
concluding that the most likely conflict that
China would face would be a “local war underhigh-technology conditions” (later amended to“conditions of informatization,” referring to
warfare in the digital age). This differed markedly from the Mao-era mindset that the PLA

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Entering the 21st century, China’s leaders recognized the confluence of several factors that
led them to expand the scope and quicken thepace of PLA development: China’s growing

To accelerate the PLA’s modernization andaddress capability shortfalls, Beijing increased
the PLA’s budget by an average of 10 percent
per year from 2000 to 2016. Beijing also established a PLA General Armaments Department in 1998 to rationalize equipment modernization and acquisition processes, andinstituted several broad scientific and technical programs to improve the defense-industrial base and decrease the PLA’s dependence on foreign weapon acquisitions. The
PLA also revamped its training programs,with all services attempting to prepare more
realistically for conflict by emphasizing mission-focused exercises, multiservice operations, mobility, better C2 and staff work, andenhanced logistic support, as well as achieving battlefield advantage by applying “informatized” warfare (regional conflicts definedby real-time, data-networked C2) methods.
[For more on “informatized” warfighting, pleasesee Military Doctrine and Strategy, page 23].

A G E N C Y

China’s changing strategic threat perceptions also shaped military doctrine and the
direction of PLA development. Although theSoviet Union had loomed large as a potential
military opponent, the threat of a Soviet invasion diminished during the 1980s, shifting the
focus away from preparing for a World War II–
style conflict. Furthermore, the U.S. 7th Fleet
aircraft carrier intervention during the 1996
China-Taiwan “missile crisis” and the accidental NATO strike against China’s Embassy in
Serbia in 1999 led Beijing to focus on building
capabilities to counter U.S. forces in addition
to capabilities to dissuade Taiwan from any
political activity Beijing deemed unacceptable.

global economic and political interests, rapid
technology-driven changes in modern warfare,and perceptions of increased strategic-level
external threats, including to China’s maritime interests. At this time, Chinese leaders
perceived a “period of strategic opportunity”
wherein the country presumably would not
be involved in a major military conflict before
2020, allowing time for economic and militarydevelopment. As a result, throughout the late
1990s and early 2000s, China’s leaders initiated several practical steps to modernize the
PLA as a warfighting instrument.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

would need to be prepared to fight a war moreakin to World War II. The PLA’s strategy alsochanged, moving away from the Maoist paradigm of luring an enemy into China to fight a“people’s war” with regular troops, irregular(guerrilla) forces, and the general populace.
Instead, the PLA began to emphasize a more
offensive version of the PLA’s historical strategic concept of “active defense”: take advantage
of longer range, precision-guided munitions(primarily ballistic and cruise missiles) to keepa potential enemy as far as possible from theeconomically fast-developing Chinese coastal
areas by fighting a “noncontact,” short, sharp
conflict like the Persian Gulf War.

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

3

4

Beijing also implemented personnel changes
to professionalize the PLA. While Beijing was
focused on economic development in the late1970s, the PLA had been allowed to operatenonmilitary businesses to offset limited investment and resources. This led to widespread corruption and drew attention away from training
for actual military operations. In 1998, Chinese leaders ordered the PLA to stop operating nonmilitary businesses and focus solely
on professional military tasks. As a result, the
PLA divested from a number of business ventures but still remains to some extent involvedin business schemes. The PLA developed anoncommissioned officer corps and began programs to recruit more technically competent
university graduates to operate its modern
weapons. PLA political officers assigned to alllevels of the military acquired broader personnel management responsibilities in addition totheir focus on keeping the PLA ideologicallypure and loyal to the CCP.

had become substantial drivers of Beijing’s
foreign policy, signified a critical inflection
point in the PLA’s assumption of a global roleand transition away from a force bound only
to defending China’s immediate territorial andsovereignty interests.

In 2004, then-President Hu Jintao outlined
for the PLA the “Historic Missions of theArmed Forces in the New Period of the New
Century,” more commonly referred to as the“New Historic Missions of the PLA,” to augment the PLA’s role as a diplomatic and military instrument and as a guardian of China’s
global interests. These new missions included
ensuring China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security; preserving the“period of strategic opportunity” for China’s
development; safeguarding China’s expanding
national interests; and helping ensure world
peace. Hu’s endowment of the PLA with thesemissions, at a time when economic interests

The PLA’s evolution since President Xi Jinping’stransition to power in 2012 has built on the Hu
era but also marked a shift, with Xi concurrently
taking the helm of the party, military, and state,
enabling him to shape the direction of the PLA
earlier during his tenure. Xi has focused onstrengthening the PLA as a force, underscoring the themes of party rule over the military,
improving military capabilities, and enhancing the military’s professionalism.2 Xi has also
expanded the scope and ambition of PLA modernization, clearly affirming the PLA’s overseasrole and providing the institutional framework
to enable substantial military growth beyond the
PLA’s traditional security threats.

Subsequent PLA activities, such as counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since2009, international training and exercises,
noncombatant evacuations in Libya andYemen, and expanded peacekeeping operations in Africa under UN auspices, have all
been part of China’s increasingly ambitious
vision for expanding PLA activities to support
its growing global clout. China’s establishmentof its first overseas military base in Djibouti
in 2017—overturning Beijing’s insistence fromits first defense white paper issued in 1998
that China “does not station troops or set up
military bases in any foreign country”—is only
the latest development in this progression.

Image Source: Shutterstock

In late 2015, President Xi Jinping unveiled
the most substantial PLA reforms in at least
30 years. The reforms were designed in partto make the PLA a leaner, more lethal force
capable of conducting the types of joint operations that it believes it must master to compete with the U.S. military. Initial reforms
established joint theater commands and a
new Joint Staff Department while reorganizing the 4 general departments that previously
ran the PLA into 15 Central Military Commission (CMC) departments and offices. These
efforts aimed to clarify command authorities,
integrate China’s military services for joint
operations, and facilitate Beijing’s transition
from peace to war.

The structural reforms also established a separate Army headquarters, elevated China’s
missile force to a full service by establishing
the PLA Rocket Force, unified China’s spaceand cyber capabilities under the Strategic Support Force, and created a Joint Logistics Support Force to direct precision support to PLA
operations.3,4,5 The decision to place the Army,
which has traditionally played a dominantrole in PLA leadership, on equal footing with
the PLA’s other services underscores a postreform emphasis on jointness. Overall reforms,
which the CMC aims to complete by 2020, areexpected to touch all levels of the PLA, including cutting approximately 300,000 personnel
and refining military doctrine and policies.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

PLA troops preparing for parade commemorating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA– September 2017.

A G E N C YModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

5[For a more detailed breakdown of PLA services
and activities, please see Appendixes A–I.]
In October 2017, China’s leaders used theopportunity of its once-in-5-years Party Congress to reduce the size of the CMC, shifting
toward a more joint command structure andaligning the military’s highest body to its postreform C2. Reducing the size of the CMC will
help Beijing streamline strategic decisionmaking, bolster political oversight of the military,and build a more integrated and professional
force. The move also highlights Xi’s focus on
eliminating corruption, improving party loyalty, and incentivizing operational experience. The CMC now represents a capable anddiverse generation of officers with operational
experience, which as a whole has the most joint
representation in the PLA’s history.
In his work report to the 19th Party Congressin October 2017, Xi Jinping called on the PLA
to “prepare for military struggle in all strategic
directions,” and said the military was integral
to achieving China’s national rejuvenation. In
his speech, Xi set three developmental benchmarks for the PLA, including becoming a mechanized force with increased informatized andstrategic capabilities by 2020, a fully modernized force by 2035, and a worldwide first-classmilitary by midcentury.6 The latter two goals
build on the call in China’s 2013 defense white6

paper, also issued under Xi, for China’s armed
forces to achieve a status “commensuratewith China’s international standing.” Viewed
in sum, Xi’s vision for the PLA constitutes alogical outgrowth of CCP instructions to the
PLA since 2004 to protect China’s expanding“development interests” at home and abroad.
The extent to which the PLA can progress in
its transformation into a world-class militarydepends on the favorable resolution of several
key issues, some of which are longstanding
institutional barriers. The PLA’s traditional
identity as a party army with a military culturethat is hierarchical and where decisionmaking is top-down and centralized in some ways
is incongruous with efforts to professionalize
the PLA and imbue it with a culture that values individual decisionmaking and embraces
mission delegation. The PLA also will needto refine newly established C2 structures toenable the execution of dynamic, fast-paced
joint military operations and effectively integrate new technologies and processes. Perhaps
one of the most difficult challenges of the ongoing reforms is that they represent the institutionalization of a cultural shift within the PLA
away from its traditional ground-force-centric,
inward-facing model to one that lays the foundation for coequal, professional services capableof joint operations across the globe.

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

National Military Overview
The People’s Liberation Army at a Glance
Services: Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force.
Personnel: Approximately 2 million in regular forces.
Recruit base: Conscription, some volunteer.
Equipment profile: Primarily domestic systems heavily influenced by technology derived
from other countries; modern weaponry in each service; some advanced weaponry.
Core strength: Long-range precision strike, information warfare, nuclear retaliatory capability.
Developing strengths: Maritime power projection, special operations.

The party’s perception that China is facing
unprecedented security risks is a driving factor in China’s approach to national security.7
In May 2015, China’s State Council Information Office published a white paper titled China’s Military Strategy, which outlined how Beijing views the global security environment,
China’s role in that environment, and how
the PLA supports that role. The document
presented a vision for the PLA’s services andemerging security domains that would transform the PLA from its legacy posture to one
focused more on long-range mobility. Within
the context of Beijing’s “period of strategic
opportunity,” Beijing calculates in China’s
Military Strategy that world war is unlikely

Authoritative Chinese publications typically
avoid explicitly listing direct threats, but thesethreats can be gleaned from several documentsthat point to Beijing’s security concerns.8 Beijing’s primary threat perceptions include sovereignty and domestic security issues thatit believes could undermine the overriding
strategic objective to perpetuate communist
rule. These include longstanding concerns
regarding Taiwan independence, Uighur andTibetan separatism, and perceived challenges
to China’s control of disputed areas in the
East and South China Seas. Authoritative
documents also highlight the Korean Peninsula as an area of instability and uncertainty,
and express concern regarding unsettled ter-

I N T E L L I G E N C E

in the immediate future, but China should be
prepared for the possibility of local war.

D E F E N S E

Threat Perceptions

A G E N C Y

Key vulnerabilities: Logistics, rigid command structure, joint warfare.

78

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

China’s Territorial Claims

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

move away from the U.S.-led regional security
system and has pursued its own regional security initiatives in support of what it views as
a natural transition to regional predominance.

In today’s world, the global trends toward multipolarity and economic globalization areintensifying, and an information society is rapidly coming into being. Countries are increasingly bound together in a community of shared destiny. Peace, development, cooperation,and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide of the times.
Profound changes are taking place in the international situation, as manifested in the historic changes in the balance of power, global governance structure, Asia-Pacific geostrategic
landscape, and international competition in the economic, scientific and technological, andmilitary fields. The forces for world peace are on the rise; so are the factors against war. In
the foreseeable future, a world war is unlikely, and the international situation is expected
to remain generally peaceful. There are, however, new threats from hegemonism, power
politics, and neointerventionism. International competition for the redistribution of power,rights, and interests is tending to intensify. Terrorist activities are growing increasingly
worrisome. Hotspot issues, such as ethnic, religious, border, and territorial disputes, arecomplex and volatile. Small-scale wars, conflicts, and crises are recurrent in some regions.
Therefore, the world still faces both immediate and potential threats of local wars.
—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015

A G E N C Y

China’s Military Strategy reflects Beijing’s
drive to establish a coherent, unified approachto managing national security in a world where
Beijing perceives that China’s expanding interests have made it more vulnerable at home andabroad. The following excerpt from the document illustrates Beijing’s perception of thissecurity environment:

I N T E L L I G E N C E

ritorial disputes along China’s border with
India, which periodically result in tense standoffs like the one that occurred in the summer of 2017 in the disputed Doklam region.9
Finally, while it calls for a peer-to-peer cooperative relationship with the United States,
China also believes that U.S. military presenceand U.S.-led security architecture in Asia seeks
to constrain China’s rise and interfere with
China’s sovereignty, particularly in a Taiwan
conflict scenario and in the East and South
China Seas. Since at least the 1990’s, Beijing
has repeatedly communicated its preference to

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

9China’s Military Strategy is directed primarily at an internal audience. Thus, it is repletewith party jargon, but it does contain the broad
underpinnings of China’s military decisionmaking calculus. For example, Beijing sees
both threats and opportunities emerging fromthe evolution of the international community
beyond the U.S.-led unipolar framework toward
a more integrated global environment shapedby major-power dynamics. Furthermore, China
sees itself as an emerging major power that will
be able to gain influence as long as it can maintain a stable periphery. As it emerges, Beijing
will use its growing power to shape the regional
environment in the face of interconnected

threats while trying to avoid conflict over coreinterests: sovereignty, development, and unification. More specifically, China believes it mustplan to address the many threats to regional
stability because they are individually complex
and at the same time contain a potential for
external actors, most importantly the UnitedStates, to become involved. Nevertheless, China
must also look to safeguard its international
interests as they multiply and incur additional
threats. Finally, as new threats emerge and asother militaries adjust their acquisition, strategies, and structure, China knows the PLA must
be prepared to fight in new realms and adapt tothe modern, high-tech battlefield.

With a generally favorable external environment, China will remain in an important periodof strategic opportunities for its development, a period in which much can be achieved. China’s comprehensive national strength, core competitiveness and risk-resistance capacity arenotably increasing, and China enjoys growing international standing and influence. Domestically, the Chinese people’s standard of living has remarkably improved, and Chinese society remains stable. China, as a large developing country, still faces multiple and complex
security threats, as well as increasing external impediments and challenges. Subsistence anddevelopment security concerns, as well as traditional and nontraditional security threats,
are interwoven. Therefore, China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification,
territorial integrity and development interests.
As the world economic and strategic center of gravity is shifting ever more rapidly to theAsia-Pacific region, the U.S. carries on its ‘rebalancing’ strategy and enhances its militarypresence and its military alliances in this region. Japan is sparing no effort to dodge thepostwar mechanism, overhauling its military and security policies. Such development hascaused grave concerns among other countries in the region. On the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors
take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China’s reefs and islands

10CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015

I N T E L L I G E N C E

The world revolution in military affairs (RMA) is proceeding to a new stage. Long-range,
precise, smart, stealthy, and unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly
sophisticated. Outer space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights in strategic competition among all parties. The form of war is accelerating its evolution to informatization. World major powers are actively adjusting their national security strategies anddefense policies and speeding up their military transformation and force restructuring. The
aforementioned revolutionary changes in military technologies and the form of war have not
only had a significant impact on the international political and military landscapes but also
posed new and severe challenges to China’s military security.

D E F E N S E

The Taiwan issue bears on China’s reunification and long-term development, and reunification is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation. In recent years, cross–Taiwan Strait relations have sustained a sound momentum of peaceful development, but
the root cause of instability has not yet been removed, and the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development ofcross-strait relations. Further, China faces a formidable task to maintain political security
and social stability. Separatist forces for ‘East Turkistan independence’ and ‘Tibet independence’ have inflicted serious damage, particularly with escalating violent terrorist activities
by East Turkistan independence forces. Besides, anti-China forces have never given up theirattempt to instigate a ‘color revolution’ in this country. Consequently, China faces more challenges in terms of national security and social stability. With the growth of China’s national
interests, its national security is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, serious natural disasters, and epidemics, and the security of overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), as wellas institutions, personnel, and assets abroad, has become an imminent issue.

A G E N C Y

that they have illegally occupied. Some external countries are also busy meddling in South
China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China. It is thus a longstanding task for China to safeguard its maritime
rights and interests. Certain disputes over land territory are still smoldering. The Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia are shrouded in instability and uncertainty. Regional terrorism, separatism, and extremism are rampant. All these have a negative impact on the
security and stability along China’s periphery.

11

National Security Strategy
Making progress while maintaining stability.
—Xi Jinping in his address to the 19th Party Congress10
China’s leaders see China as a country that is“moving closer to center stage” to achieve the“great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”11This ambition permeates China’s national
security strategy and the PLA’s role in supporting the party. Since the early 1980s, when
China initiated its Reform and Opening policy, China’s economy has grown rapidly. The
CCP remained focused primarily on economic
growth throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and in
the early 2000s it identified the initial decadesof the 21st century as a “period of strategic
opportunity” in the international environmentthat would allow China to focus on building“comprehensive national power.” The CCP’scontemporary strategic objectives are to:• Perpetuate CCP rule.
• Maintain domestic stability.
• Sustain economic growthand development.
• Defend national sovereignty andterritorial integrity.
• Secure China’s status as a great power.
China has taken deliberate steps to modernize the CCP, its military, the government, andother institutions in an attempt to improvecoherence. Before 2015, departments across12

the government formulated separate security
strategies, but in early 2015, China’s leaders
adopted China’s first publicly released national
security strategy outline, a framework to guide
China’s approach to addressing both domestic and international security threats, andcalled for international engagement to address
shared security problems.12
The strategy outlines Beijing’s aim to ensure
security, promote modernization, as well as
preserve China’s socialist system. In addition
to the strategic objectives above, the document emphasized the necessity of contributing to world peace and development andcalled for attention to promoting “rule of law”
in support of national security.13 This led the
National People’s Congress to pass a packageof laws in 2015 and 2016 intended to addressnational security concerns, including harsher
punishments for crimes involving terrorism
and extremism, cybersecurity measures, andincreased restrictions for foreign nongovernmental organizations.14,15
Although China’s national security strategy outline contained both inward- and outward-looking elements, Beijing’s view of China’s role in
the international community was further elaborated in an article on Xi Jinping’s thoughts
on diplomacy published in mid-2017 by one ofModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

China’s Military Strategy built on a series ofbiennial defense reviews that Beijing published
beginning in 1998 to mitigate international concern about the lack of transparency of its military modernization. What differentiated the
document from its predecessors was that it, forthe first time, publicly clarified the PLA’s rolein protecting China’s evolving national security
interests and shed light on policies, such as the
PLA’s commitment to nuclear deterrence. The
report affirmed many of China’s longstanding
defense policies but also signaled a shift toward
emerging security domains, such as cyber andspace, and also emphasized the need to focus on
global maritime operations.
The report outlined eight “strategic tasks,”
or types of missions the PLA must be readyto execute:17• Safeguard the sovereignty of
China’s territory.
• Safeguard national unification.

• Safeguard China’s overseas interests.
• Maintain strategic deterrence.
• Participate in international
security cooperation.
• Maintain China’s political security
and social stability.
• Conduct emergency rescue, disaster relief,and “rights and interest protection” missions.
Beijing almost certainly views these missions
as necessary national security tasks for China
to claim great-power status. In 2017, Beijingemphasized several of these tasks in its “White
Paper on China’s Policies on Asia Pacific Security Cooperation,” stressing the need for a PLA
that is able to conduct expeditionary operations
and other activities to defend and secure growing Chinese national interests overseas from“destabilizing and uncertain factors.”18 The
PLA coordinates with China’s law enforcement,
Foreign Ministry, and other security entities asneeded on military-related activities, particularly operations beyond China’s borders.

Military Leadership
China’s military leaders are influential in
defense and foreign policy. As the CCP’s armed
wing, the PLA is organizationally part of theparty apparatus. Career military officers forthe most part are party members, and units atthe company level and above have political offi-

A G E N C Y

The PLA’s Role in
National Security• Safeguard China’s interests in new
domains, such as space and cyberspace.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

China’s top diplomats, Yang Jiechi. Yang paints
a picture of Chinese diplomacy that focuses on
China’s ambition for national rejuvenation
and becoming a world power. Yang describes a
confident China that is ready to “shoulder its
responsibility as a major country” and build aglobal network of partnerships, but one that is
resolved and uncompromising as it upholds its
sovereignty and security interests.16

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

13cers responsible for personnel decisions, propaganda, and counterintelligence. These political officers also are responsible for ensuringthat party orders are carried out throughout
the PLA. CCP committees, led by the political
officers and military commanders, make majordecisions in units at all levels.19
The CMC, the PLA’s highest decisionmaking
body, is technically both a party organ subordinate to the CCP Central Committee and agovernmental office appointed by the National
People’s Congress, but it is staffed almost

exclusively by military officers. The CMC
chairman is a civilian who usually serves concurrently as the CCP general secretary andChina’s president. During the past decade, the
CMC’s membership has included two military
vice chairmen who serve concurrently on thepolitburo; the minister of national defense,
who serves as the face of the military for foreign engagement; the service commanders;
and the directors of the four general headquarters departments. This framework occasionally shifts; it was revised during the 19th
Party Congress in October 2017, at which

Xi Jinping, CCP General Secretary, President and Central Military Commission Chairman.
Image Source: Shutterstock

14

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

point the service chiefs were removed fromthe body, leaving the chairman, vice chairmen, minister of national defense, Joint Staff
Department chief, Political Work Department
director, and Discipline Inspection Commis-

sion secretary.20,21 These changes align the
military’s top body to its postreform structure
and underscore key themes of jointness, party
loyalty, and anticorruption.

I N T E L L I G E N C E
D E F E N S E

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

A G E N C Y

People’s Liberation Army’s Organizational Structure 22,23

15

Political Work in the PLA
The PLA has been a politicized “party army” since its inception and exists to guarantee the
CCP regime’s survival above all else, serving the state as a secondary role, in contrast to
most Western militaries, which are considered apolitical, professional forces that first andforemost serve the state.
Maintaining this party-military identity even as the PLA embarks on major structuralreforms is the top priority for China’s leadership. PLA reforms include establishment of the
Political Work Department, which appears to have assumed many responsibilities of theformer General Political Department. The PLA’s political work system is the primary means
through which the CCP “controls the gun” in accordance with Mao Zedong’s famous dictumthat “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Most PLA officers are party members,
and in recent decades, PLA officers typically have constituted about 20 percent of the CCP’s
Central Committee. Moreover, since 1997 the two uniformed vice chairmen of the CMC have
served concurrently on the CCP Politburo.
• The tiers of political work in the PLA are interlocking, reinforcing systems that allow the
CCP to penetrate the military from top to bottom. These tiers comprise the political commissar system, the party committee system, and the party discipline inspection system.
• Political commissars are responsible for personnel, education, security, discipline, andmorale. The Political Work Department, the director of which serves on the CMC, manages
the PLA’s political commissars and is the locus for day-to-day political work in the military.
• The party committee system is replicated in some fashion at each level of command.
Party committees fall under the supervision of the CMC Political Work Department andare intended to ensure loyalty at all levels. They propagate the party positions, policies,and directives throughout the force.
• Party discipline inspection bodies monitor the performance of party members in the military and ensure “upright” behavior. The PLA Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) was elevated to the CMC level during recent restructuring from its previous
position as a subordinate office within the former General Political Department.24 Thesechanges culminated with the CDIC head’s appointment as a member of the CMC during
the 19th Party Congress. The CDIC has played a key role within the military in recent
years, overseeing investigations to weed out graft and uproot politically powerful networks
in the ranks as part of China’s ongoing anticorruption campaign. In November 2015, Xi
also announced the creation of a new PLA Politics and Law Commission, mirroring a similar party organization that oversees legal and judicial issues in the state bureaucracy.25

16

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Stability Issues
We must do more to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development
interests, and staunchly oppose all attempts to split China or undermine its ethnic unity and social harmony and stability.
–Xi Jinping, speech at the 19th Party Congress
Xi Jinping, Beijing has responded to these challenges with a mixture of increased repression
and CCP-led efforts to address some of theseunderlying problems. Xi is using the CCP toassert control over all facets of the Chinese state,
restricting the space for independent activity
across social, political, and economic spheres.

D E F E N S E

I N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y

China’s leaders for decades have prioritizeddomestic stability and the continued rule of
the CCP. Since the 1990s, however, China has
confronted chronic social protest spurred by anoften unresponsive and corrupt political andlegal system, and a range of economic, social,and environmental problems. Under President

People’s Armed Police in formation during antiterrorism drill for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
Image Source: AFP

17

This push includes a sweeping anticorruption
campaign, a faithfully propagandistic media, atightly constrained civil society, and an all-encompassing concept of national security.26
In ethnic minority regions such as Tibet andXinjiang, the CCP has promulgated repressive regulations against alleged extremism bytightening limits on peaceful religious expression and ethnic identity. Beginning in April
2017, Xinjiang authorities detained hundredsof thousands, possibly millions, of Muslims
in the region ostensibly for antiextremism
reeducation. As part of the Xinjiang campaign,
security officials greatly expanded their use ofhigh-tech and big-data surveillance systems,
which they are expected to extend countrywide
in an effort to curb social unrest.27
China’s armed forces support the CCP’sdomestic ambitions without question. In 2015,
top military guidance reaffirmed this role as
one of the force’s main strategic tasks: “maintain China’s political security and social stability.”28 China’s military and paramilitaryleaders are actively developing doctrine andforces to backstop local police, respond to riots
and natural disasters, and stop terrorism.

18

The People’s Armed Police (PAP) is at the forefront of this mission. The PAP is a paramilitary force of more than 500,000 troops that for
decades has focused on domestic security andeconomic development tasks under the sharedcommand of the CMC and State Council. In
2018, Beijing moved the PAP entirely under
CMC control and out of civilian channels,
and announced additional reforms intended
to modernize its force structure, streamline
its command system, and increase its operational effectiveness.29 Changes to the PAP
also reflect a shift toward a more operational
mindset, trading legacy site-security missions
for rapid-deployment counterterrorism andmaritime patrols.30
In recent years, Beijing’s longstanding suspicion that so-called “hostile foreign influences”
constitute a significant threat to internal stability and CCP rule has led it to step up efforts
to pursue political security-related goals overseas. In 2015, China passed a counterterrorism law that included a provision authorizing
PLA, PAP, police, and intelligence operations
abroad—evidence that party leaders are considering this possibility.31

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

External Defense Relations
In the spirit of neighborhood diplomacy of friendship, sincerity, reciprocity, and inclusiveness, China’s armed forces will further develop relations with their counterparts in neighboring countries. Also, they will work to raise the level of military relations with European
counterparts [and] continue the traditional friendly military ties with their African, Latin
American, and Southern Pacific counterparts. China’s armed forces will work to further
defense and security cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and continue toparticipate in multilateral dialogues and cooperation mechanisms, such as the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus, ASEAN Regional
Forum, Shangri-La Dialogue, Jakarta International Defence Dialogue, and Western PacificNaval Symposium. The Chinese military will continue to host multilateral events like the
Xiangshan Forum, striving to establish a new framework for security and cooperation conducive to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

China advances its day-to-day overseas military diplomacy using PLA officers assigned as
military attachés in at least 110 countries.32

As China’s regional and international interests have grown, the PLA has substantiallyexpanded its international engagement,
especially in the areas of peacekeeping operations (PKOs), counterpiracy, humanitarianassistance and disaster relief (HADR), counterterrorism, and multinational combined
exercises. For example, many Latin American and Caribbean countries send officers to

I N T E L L I G E N C E

China’s military attachés serve as militaryadvisers to the ambassador, support Ministryof Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign policy objectives, and perform a variety of duties tied to
PLA military and security cooperation, including counterpart exchanges with host nation andthird-country personnel. Expanded PLA travel
abroad enables PLA officers to observe andstudy foreign military command structures,
unit formations, and operational training.33

D E F E N S E

The PLA engages with foreign militaries todemonstrate its growing capabilities; improve
its tactics, techniques, and procedures; enhance
China’s image and influence abroad, and further China’s diplomatic objectives. Bilateraland multilateral exercises provide politicalbenefits to China and opportunities for the PLA
to improve capabilities in areas such as counterterrorism, mobility operations, and logistics. Senior-level visits and exchanges provide
China with opportunities to increase military
officers’ international exposure, communicate
China’s positions to foreign audiences, understand alternative worldviews, and advance foreign relations through interpersonal contacts
and military assistance programs.

A G E N C Y—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 201519

PLA soldiers conduct individual movement training.
Image Source: DIMOC

the strategic-level College of Defense Studies
at China’s National Defense University; someof these countries also send officers to other
PLA schools. In addition to furthering PLA
modernization, these engagements probably
will remain focused on building China’s political ties, explaining China’s rise, and building
China’s international influence, particularly in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America.34

Defense Budget
China’s approach to funding security requirements has been deliberate and substantial.
China’s military spending increased by an average of 10 percent (inflation adjusted) per year
from 2000 to 2016 and has gradually slowed to

20

5- to 7-percent growth during the past 2 years.
The official defense budget has remained at 1.2
to 1.4 percent of gross domestic product for the
past decade, allowing for steady, sustainable
expenditure growth and qualitative improvements throughout the PLA.
Estimating actual military expenses is difficult
because of China’s poor accounting transparency and incomplete transition to a market
economy. The formal defense budget process
does not include funding for foreign weapons
procurement, some research and development(R&D), and certain personnel benefits. Other
government ministries distribute defense funds
in addition to extrabudgetary funds that supplement personnel living subsidies, equipment
maintenance, and other budgetary items.35,36

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

However, using 2018 prices and exchange
rates as an example, China’s total military-related spending for 2018 probably exceeded$200 billion, a threefold increase since 2002.
Such spending has been on the rise since the1990s, when China formally began to emphasize defense-related programs throughout thecourse of several “Five-Year Plans.”
Although the total dollar value of China’s
defense budget remains significantly belowthat of the United States, China has benefited
from “latecomer advantage.” In other words,
China has not had to invest in costly R&D of
new technologies to the same degree as theUnited States. Rather, China has routinely
adopted the best and most effective platforms
found in foreign militaries through direct purchase, retrofits, or theft of intellectual property. By doing so, China has been able to focus
on expediting its military modernization at asmall fraction of the original cost.

China's Official Defense Spending 2007-2018 (billions of 2018 dollars)

1.3

2007

2008

1.4

1.2

1.2

1.2

2011

2012

2013

1.3

2009

2010

Real defense expenditures(Billions 2018 USD, Adjusted for Inflation)

131.5

138.6

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

#

% of GDPA G E N C Y

85.2

1.3

109.5

101.6

170.4

I N T E L L I G E N C E

77.8

97.2

156.9

D E F E N S E

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

92.9

114.9

149.2

21

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

China’s military goal is to build a strong,
combat-effective force capable of winning regional conflicts and employing
integrated, real-time C2 networks.37 The doctrine that supports this strategy is evolving
with ongoing PLA reforms. For instance, in2017 the PLA began to implement revised military training regulations that focused on realistic training for modern warfare and preparations for joint combat operations.38

China characterizes its military strategy as
one of “active defense,” a concept it describes

as strategically defensive but operationally
offensive. The strategy is rooted in the concept that once Beijing has determined that anadversary has damaged or intends to damage
China’s interests at the strategic level, Beijing
will be justified in responding “defensively”
at the operational or tactical level, even if
the adversary has not yet conducted offensive
military operations. Beijing interprets active
defense to include mandates for deescalating a
conflict and seizing the initiative during a conflict, and has enshrined the concept in China’s
National Security Law (2015) and in the PLA’s

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Military Doctrine and Strategy

D E F E N S E

Jiangkai II class frigate Hengshui conducting gunnery exercise.

A G E N C YModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Image Source: DIMOCCH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

23

major strategy documents.39 President Xi’s
speech during the 90th anniversary parade of
the PLA further highlighted that China would
never conduct “invasion and expansion” butwould never permit “any piece of Chinese territory” to separate from China.40
China’s approach to its dispute with Japanover the Senkaku Islands partially illustrates
this concept: China has employed both military and law enforcement assets proactively
to challenge Japan’s administration of theislands since Beijing determined that Japan’spurchase of the islands from a private ownerin 2012 constituted a serious infringement on
China’s sovereignty claims. Although the PLA
has not yet carried out kinetic strikes on Japanese forces around the islands, China’s active
defense concept could potentially justify suchattacks if Beijing perceived Japan to have further escalated the dispute.

24

and using information to conduct joint military
operations across the domains of land, sea, air,space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum during a conflict. PLA writings highlightthe benefit of near-real-time shared awarenessof the battlefield in enabling quick, unified effort
to seize tactical opportunities.41

Perceptions ofModern Conflict

In 2015, China’s leaders adjusted guidance on
the type of war the PLA should be preparedto fight by directing the PLA to be capable offighting and winning “informatized local wars,”with an emphasis on “maritime military struggle.” Chinese military strategy documents alsoemphasize the growing importance of offensive
air operations, long-distance mobility operations, and space and cyber operations. In otherwords, China expects that its future wars mostly
will be fought outside its borders and will involve
conflict in the maritime domain. China promulgated this through its most recent update toits “military strategic guidelines,” the top-level
directives that China’s leaders use to define concepts, assess threats, and set priorities for planning, force posture, and modernization.42

The PLA often uses the term “informatization” todescribe the transformation process of becoming
a modern military that can operate in the digital age. The concept figures prominently in PLA
writings and is roughly analogous to the U.S. military’s concept of net-centric capability: a force’s
ability to use advanced information technology
and communications systems to gain operational
advantage over an adversary. The PLA uses
the term “informatized warfare” to describe theprocess of acquiring, transmitting, processing,

The PLA considers information the criticalenabler for these maritime-focused digital-age
operations, and as a result, China invests
heavily in the development and proliferation of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceequipment, force structure, and a universal
network that processes information acrossall of its operational domains. These domains
include C2, comprehensive support, multidimensional protection, joint firepower strike,and battlefield maneuver.

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Consequently, core elements of national- andregional-level military reforms since 2015 havefocused on refining the PLA’s C2 structure,
producing a joint operational command systemwith decisionmaking emanating from the CMC
to theater commands and down to operational
units.45,46 The reform plan aimed to establish twoclear lines of authority under the CMC, giving
the services authority over force management
issues while empowering theater headquarters
to command operations—a distinction that had
been ambiguous.47 One aspect of the new structure that is different from previous ChineseCore Elements of Command
and Control Reform
Theater Commands. The PLA transitioned
from seven military regions to five “theaters ofoperations,” or joint commands.48 This structure is aligned toward Beijing’s perceived“strategic directions,” geographic areas of strategic importance along China’s periphery inwhich the PLA must be prepared to operate.
Joint Operations Command Centers. The
cornerstone of the military’s new joint C2 system is the PLA’s national- and theater-leveljoint operations command centers (JOCCs),
staffed by personnel drawn from all services.
The national-level joint operations command
center, also known as the CMC JOCC, coordinates the efforts of the five theater commands
to achieve the PLA’s strategic objectives. The
theater-level JOCCs are responsible for alltasks in their area of responsibility, including
carrying out around-the-clock watch functions,maintaining situational awareness, managing
joint exercises, and providing a communications hub linking theater commanders withservice component commanders and forces.49

A G E N C Y

A key driver of ongoing military reforms is
Beijing’s desire to increase the PLA’s ability tocarry out joint operations on a modern, high-techbattlefield.43 Prior to reforms, no permanent joint
C2 mechanism existed. In fact, service headquarters had operational authority over theirown forces during peacetime, and the former
Army-centric military regions were responsible
for conducting joint operations during wartime,
although this was never attempted. This construct was impractical because it would haveforced the PLA to transition from a service-oriented peacetime construct to a war-ready joint
construct on a moment’s notice. Senior leadersrecognized this flaw, and President Xi remarked
in 2013 that “establishing a joint C2 systemshould be given primary importance, and establishing a CMC and theater command joint C2
system should not be delayed.”44

military C2 is the permanence of operational
C2, which eliminates the need to create ad hoc
wartime commands. This system theoreticallygives China the ability to quickly transition toa war footing. Speaking on behalf of the PLA,a Ministry of National Defense spokesman said
reforms sought to improve “leadership administration and command of joint operations” sothat the PLA would have a force structure able
to fight and win modern conflicts.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

National MilitaryCommand and Control

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

25

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

Theaters of Operation

According to China's Ministry of National Defense, the Theater of Operations construct will enhancecombat effectiveness.

Joint Staff Department. During PLA
reforms, the CMC dissolved the former General Staff Department, establishing a number of CMC-subordinate departments fromthe former organization. According to the
Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Staff

26

Department (JSD) is responsible for combat
planning, C2 support, and formulating strategy and requirements.50 The formation of the
CMC JSD is likely to result in more streamlined and efficient operational planningbecause other former General Staff Depart-Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

China continues to place a high priority on
modernizing the PLA’s command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system as a response to trends in modern warfare that emphasize the importance of rapid
decisionmaking and information sharing andprocessing. The PLA is seeking to improve its
technological capabilities and organizational
structure to command complex joint operations
in near and distant battlefields with increasingly sophisticated weapons.52
Supporting the reforms with technologicalimprovements to C4ISR systems is essential
to improving the speed and effectiveness ofdecisionmaking while providing secure, reliable communications to fixed and mobile command posts. The PLA is fielding advanced
automated command systems, such as its
Integrated Command Platform, with units atlower echelons across the force. The adoptionof the Integrated Command Platform enables
multiservice communications necessary forjoint operations.

—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy,
May 2015
New technologies which are being introduced
into the PLA enable sharing of information—
intelligence, battlefield information, logistic information, and weather reports—on
robust, redundant communication networks to
improve commanders’ situational awareness.
In particular, the transmission of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data innear-real time to commanders in the field could
facilitate the commanders’ decisionmaking processes and make operations more efficient.53
As these technical improvements are broughton line, they greatly enhance the PLA’s flexibility and responsiveness. Informatized operations no longer require in-person meetings forcommand decisionmaking or labor-intensive
processes for execution. Commanders can issue

A G E N C YModernizing Joint
Command and Control

In the implementation of the military strategic guideline in the new situation, China’s
armed forces must closely center aroundthe CPC’s [Communist Party's] goal ofbuilding a strong military, respond to thestate’s core security needs, aim at building an informatized military and winning
informatized wars, deepen the reform ofnational defense and the armed forces inan all-round way, build a modern system of
military forces with Chinese characteristics,
and constantly enhance their capabilities
for addressing various security threats andaccomplishing diversified military tasks.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

ment functions, such as mobilization, training, and administration, have been assumed
by separate departments. The JSD is purported to have greater representation fromacross the PLA’s services, potentially enhancing joint operational planning and execution.51

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27

orders to multiple units at the same time whileon the move, and units can rapidly adjust theiractions through the use of digital databases
and command automation tools.
The nature of these reform and modernization
efforts in part resembles a Western-style joint
C2 structure in which operational commanders develop force packages from units that aretrained and equipped by the services. The creation of a permanent joint C2 structure thatplaces more emphasis on naval and aerospaceforces, along with a dedicated Strategic Support Force responsible for electronic warfare
and operations in the space and cyberspacedomains, reflects an emerging PLA capacity tomore effectively execute joint operations.54

PLA Navy sailors manning an Integrated Command
Platform command post.
Image Source: DIMOC

28

Regional andGlobal Operations
Even as PLA capabilities have improved andunits have begun to operate farther from the
Chinese mainland, Beijing has continued toemphasize what it perceives as a “period of strategic opportunity” during which it can pursue
development without a major military conflict.
In line with this perception, Beijing has implemented an approach to external engagementthat seeks to enhance China’s reach and power
through activities calculated to fall below thethreshold of alarming the international community about China’s rise or provoking theUnited States, its allies and partners, or othersin the Asia-Pacific region into military conflictor an anti-China coalition. This is particularly
evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial andmaritime sovereignty claims in the South andEast China Seas. In the South China Sea, China
primarily uses maritime law enforcement ships,with its Navy ships in protective positions, topressure other claimants and limit access toChinese-occupied features. China’s expansionof disputed features and construction in the
Spratly Islands using large-scale land reclamation demonstrates China’s capacity—and a shift
in willingness to exercise that capacity short ofmilitary conflict—to strengthen China’s control
over disputed areas, enhance China’s presence,and challenge other claimants.55

Image Source: DIMOC

China’s maritime emphasis and concern
with protecting its overseas interests haveincreasingly drawn the PLA beyond China’s borders and immediate periphery. The
evolving focus of the PLA Navy (PLAN)—
from “offshore waters defense” to a mix ofoffshore waters defense and “open-seas protection”—reflects China’s desire for a wider
operational reach. Since 2009, the PLA has
incrementally expanded its global operations beyond the previously limited port
calls and UN PKO missions. The PLAN
has expanded the scope and frequency ofextended-range naval deployments, military
exercises, and engagements.
The establishment in Djibouti of the PLA’s firstoverseas military base with a deployed companyof Marines and equipment, and probable follow-on bases at other locations, signals a turning point in the expansion of PLA operationsin the Indian Ocean region and beyond.56,57,58,59
These bases, and other improvements to the
PLA’s ability to project power during the next
decade, will increase China’s ability to deter by
military force and sustain operations abroad.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Luhai class destroyer Shenzhen.

A G E N C YModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

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INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Core Chinese Military Capabilities

W

hereas the PLA of Mao’s era was
ground-force-centric and lacked
most modern capabilities such asmechanized troop transportation, investments
in modernization have expanded China’s military capabilities across all warfare domains.

Today’s PLA is still far from being able todeploy large numbers of conventional forces
globally, but China has developed nuclear,space, cyberspace, and other capabilities
that can reach potential adversaries acrossthe globe.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

PLAN helicopter operating near the Jiangkai II class Hengshui.

D E F E N S E

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Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

The First and Second Island Chains32Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Although Beijing states that its intent is toserve as a stabilizing force regionally, in practice the PLA’s actions frequently result inincreased tensions. Since 2012, Beijing has
routinely challenged Tokyo’s Senkaku Island
claims in the East China Sea. China’s Coast
Guard frequently conducts incursions into thecontiguous zone surrounding the islands tofurther China’s claims, while its Navy operates around the claims to enforce administra-

Examples of incremental improvements to
PLA power projection in the region are readilyfound in annual military exercises and operations.60 For instance, in 2015 the PLA Air Force(PLAAF) carried out four exercise training missions past the first island chain through theBashi Channel, the northernmost passage of
the Luzon Strait, and through the Miyako Strait
closer to Japan. The Miyako Strait flights were1,500 kilometers from Guam, within range of
the PLAAF’s CJ-20 air-launched land-attack
cruise missile (LACM).61 Also in 2015, the
PLAAF began flying the H-6K medium-range
bomber, the PLAAF’s first aircraft capable ofconducting strikes on Guam (with air-launched
LACMs like the CJ-20), past the first island
chain into the western Pacific.
China is also developing new capabilities thatwill enhance Beijing’s ability to project power.
In September 2016, then-PLAAF Commander
Gen Ma Xiaotian confirmed for the firsttime that the PLAAF was developing a newlong-range bomber that would undoubtedly
exceed the range and capabilities of the H-6K.
Although the H-6K recently began flying with
LACMs, this Chinese-built airframe is the10th design variant of the Soviet Tu-16, whichbegan flying in 1952.62 In 2016, China andUkraine agreed to restart production of theworld’s largest transport aircraft, the An-225,

A G E N C Y

Beijing’s longstanding interest to eventually compel Taiwan’s reunification with themainland and deter any attempt by Taiwan
to declare independence has served as theprimary driver for China’s military modernization. Beijing’s anticipation that foreign
forces would intervene in a Taiwan scenario
led the PLA to develop a range of systems todeter and deny foreign regional force projection. The implementation of Hu’s New Historic Missions in 2004 led to the incremental
expansion of the military’s modernization priorities to develop a PLA capable of operatingin new domains and at increasing distancesfrom the mainland. During this modernization
process, PLA ground, air, naval, and missile
forces have become increasingly able to project power during peacetime and in the eventof regional conflicts. Beijing almost certainly
will use this growing ability to project power tobolster international perceptions of its role asa regional power and global stakeholder.

tion. The PLA has expanded and militarized
China’s outposts in the South China Sea, andChina’s Coast Guard, backed by the PLAN,
commonly harasses Philippine and Vietnameseships in the region.

I N T E L L I G E N C EPower Projection and
Expeditionary Operations

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which is capable of carrying a world-record
payload of nearly 254 tons. China expects thefirst An-225 to be delivered and operational by
2019.63 If used by the military, this capability
would facilitate the PLA’s global reach.
In addition to land-based aircraft, China
is currently building its first domesticallydesigned and produced aircraft carrier.64 The
primary purpose of this first domestic aircraft
carrier will be to serve a regional defense mission. Beijing probably also will use the carrier
to project power throughout the South China
Sea and possibly into the Indian Ocean.65 The
carrier conducted initial sea trials in May 2018
and is expected to enter into service by 2019.66[For more information on China’s aircraft carrier program, please see Appendix B.]
Other areas that reflect China’s growing military presence abroad include China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations.67 Separately, China routinely employs its modern
hospital ship, Peace Ark, to support HADR
missions worldwide. In 2015, the PLA conducted its first permissive noncombatantevacuation operation, to extricate Chineseand other civilians from Yemen supported by
Yemeni security forces.
China’s efforts to enhance its presence abroad,such as establishing its first foreign militarybase in Djibouti and boosting economic connectivity by reinvigorating the New Silk Road
Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime
Road under the “Belt and Road Initiative”(BRI), could enable the PLA to project power34

at even greater distances from the Chinese
mainland.68,69,70 In 2017, China’s leaders said
that the BRI, which at first included economic
initiatives in Asia, South Asia, Africa, andEurope, now encompasses all regions of theworld, including the Arctic and Latin America,
demonstrating the scope of Beijing’s ambition.
Growing PLA mission areas and enhanced
presence abroad may lead to an increase indemand for the PLA to protect China’s overseas interests and provide support to Chinese
personnel. China’s increased presence also
introduces the possibility that the PLA could
play a more prominent role in delivering global
public goods in the future.

PLAN Anwei class hospital ship Heping Fangzhou(Peace Ark).
Image Source: DIMOCCH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

D E F E N S E

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

I N T E L L I G E N C E

A G E N C Y

China’s Southern Theater Forces

China’s Southern Theater forces are arrayed to support multiple contingencies.

35Separately, China’s modern naval platforms
include advanced missile and technological capabilities that will strengthen the force’s core warfighting competencies and enable credible combat operations beyond the reaches of land-based
defenses. The expansion of naval operations
beyond China’s immediate vicinity will provide
China with a diverse set of capabilities for striking targets across the Pacific and Indian Ocean
regions, in addition to improving defensive capabilities such as exercising control of SLOCs.
Improving bluewater capabilities will extend
China’s maritime security buffer to protect China’s near- and far-seas interests more effectively.
China’s current aircraft carrier and planned
follow-on carriers will extend air defense
umbrellas beyond the range of coastal systems and help enable task group operations
in far seas. Sea-based land attack probably isan emerging requirement for the PLAN. Chinese military experts argue that to pursue a
defensive strategy in far seas, the PLAN must
improve its ability to control land from the sea
through development of a long-range LACM.71
The PLA’s land-based missile and air forces
enable other military assets to focus on con-ducting offensive missions, such as blockades
and sovereignty enforcement, as well as defensive operations farther from China’s shores.
China also focuses on enhancing the PLA’s ISR
capabilities, which will enable improved targeting and timely responses to perceived threats.

Nuclear Forces and Weapons
China invests considerable resources to maintain a limited, survivable nuclear force thatcan guarantee a damaging retaliatory strike.72
73
As part of this, China has long maintained
a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating it would
use nuclear forces only in response to anuclear strike against China.74,75,76 There issome ambiguity, however, over the conditions
under which China’s NFU policy would apply.
Some PLA officers have written publicly of theneed to spell out conditions under which Chinamight need to use nuclear weapons first; forexample, if an enemy’s conventional attack
threatened the survival of China’s nuclear
force or of the regime itself.77 Nevertheless,there has been no indication that national
leaders are willing to attach such nuances andcaveats to China’s NFU doctrine.

The nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security. China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered
to a self-defensive nuclear strategy. China unconditionally will not use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapons-free zones andwill never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.

36

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

China will optimize its nuclear force structure; improve strategic early warning, commandand control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection; and deter
other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China.

China maintains a stockpile of nuclear warheads and continues research on and development and production of new nuclear weapons.88
The PLA probably has multiple nuclear warhead designs that are decades old and requireroutine observation, maintenance, or refurbishment to maintain effectiveness.89 China’s
nuclear weapon design and production organization—the China Academy of Engineering
Physics—is the key organization in developing
and maintaining China’s nuclear force.90 It
employs tens of thousands of personnel, and its
scientists are capable of conducting all aspectsof nuclear weapon design research, including
nuclear physics, materials science, electronics,
explosives, and computer modeling.91,92

I N T E L L I G E N C E

PLA writings express the value of a “launch
on warning” nuclear posture, an approach todeterrence that uses heightened readiness,
improved surveillance, and streamlined decisionmaking processes to enable a more rapid
response to enemy attack. These writings
highlight the posture’s consistency with China’s NFU policy. China is working to develop
a space-based early warning capability that
could support this posture in the future.84

The PLA is developing a range of technologies
to counter U.S. and other countries’ ballistic
missile defense systems, including maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs), MIRVs,
decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, andhypersonic glide vehicles.85,86,87 In addition,
the PLA is likely to continue deploying moresophisticated C2 systems and refining C2 processes as growing numbers of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and futurenuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine(SSBN) deterrence patrols require the PLA
to safeguard the integrity of nuclear releaseauthority for a larger, more dispersed force.

D E F E N S E

China is developing a new generation of mobile
missiles, with warheads consisting of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles(MIRVs) and penetration aids, intended toensure the viability of its strategic deterrent
in the face of continued advances in U.S. and,to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR, precision strike, and missile defense capabilities.78
China is enhancing peacetime readiness levels
for these nuclear forces to ensure responsiveness. China maintains nuclear-capable delivery systems in its Rocket Force and Navy. Asof 2017, the Air Force had been reassigned anuclear mission, probably with a developmental strategic bomber.79,80,81,82,83 The bomber’s
deployment would provide China with its firstcredible nuclear triad of delivery systems dispersed across land, sea, and air—a posture
considered since the Cold War to improve survivability and strategic deterrence.

A G E N C Y—Excerpts from China’s Military Strategy, May 201537

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

China Nuclear Weapon-Related Facilities

China's nuclear weapons program has been supported by a number of facilities that include production,
processing, research and development, and testing.

38Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

China has consistently claimed that it has
never researched, produced, or possessed biological weapons and would never do so.97 Beijing says China has researched only defensive
biological technology necessary for China’s
defense.98 China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984.99 It declared
the Academy of Military Science’s Institute ofMicrobiology and Epidemiology in Beijing as abiodefense research facility.100 China regularly
and voluntarily submits to confidence-building
measures under the BWC.101 Although China
is not a member of the Australia Group, China’s export control regulations have been inline with Australia Group guidelines and control lists since 2002.102, 103 China’s biotechnology
infrastructure is sufficient to produce some biological agents or toxins on a large scale.104,105,106—Excerpt from the Australia Group’s website

China has declared that it once operated asmall chemical weapons program for offensive
purposes; however, Beijing has consistently
maintained that the program was dismantled
and all agents and munitions were used before
China ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997.107 Beijing also has declared
two historical chemical warfare production
facilities that may have produced mustard gas,
phosgene, and lewisite.108,109 In 1998, Beijing
published chemical export control regulations
consistent with Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) standards.
It also has consistently updated its chemical
control list to reflect changes made to the Australia Group chemical control list. China continues to reaffirm its compliance with the CWC as
well as its support for the activities conductedby the OPCW.110,111,112 Since acceding to the
CWC, China has declared hundreds of dualuse facilities and has hosted hundreds of facility inspections and OPCW-led seminars.113,114

A G E N C Y

Biological andChemical Warfare

The Australia Group (AG) is an informal
forum of countries which, through theharmonisation of export controls, seeks toensure that exports do not contribute to
the development of chemical or biologicalweapons. Coordination of national export
control measures assists Australia Groupparticipants to fulfil their obligations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention
and the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention to the fullest extent possible.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

China has the required industrial capacity toenrich uranium and produce plutonium for military needs. The China National Nuclear Corporation operates several uranium enrichment
facilities organized under three plants.93 China
probably intends the bulk of its enrichment
capacity to support its burgeoning nuclear
power industry but could devote some enrichment capacity to support military needs.94 China’s plutonium production reactors probablyceased operation in the 1980s.95 However, China’s reprocessing facilities can extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel.96

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39

China’s chemical infrastructure is sufficient toresearch, develop, and produce some chemical
agents on a large scale.115

cal expertise, military units, and equipment
necessary to detect CBW agents and to defend
against a CBW attack.117

China probably has the technical expertise
to weaponize chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents, and China’s robust armaments industry and numerous conventional
weapon systems, including missiles, rockets,and artillery, probably could be adapted todeliver CBW agents.116 China has the techni-

Entities and individuals in China continue tosupply countries of concern with technologies,
components, and raw materials applicable toweapons of mass destruction and missile programs. Such material and technology transfers
could assist countries in developing their own
production capabilities.118

Space/Counterspace
Outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition. Countries concerned are developing their space forces and instruments, and the first signs of weaponization of outer space have appeared. China has all along advocated the peaceful use ofouter space, opposed the weaponization of and arms race in outer space, and taken an active
part in international space cooperation. China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outerspace, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets
to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security.
—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015
The PLA historically has managed China’s
space program and continues to invest in
improving China’s capabilities in space-based
ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.119 China
uses its on-orbit and ground-based assets to
support national civil, economic, political, andmilitary goals and objectives. Strategists in the
PLA regard the ability to use space-based systems and deny them to adversaries as central
to enabling modern informatized warfare. As aresult, the PLA continues to strengthen its mil-40

itary space capabilities despite its public stanceagainst the militarization of space. Space operations probably will form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and serve a keyrole in enabling actions to counter third-party
intervention during military conflicts.
China continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or preventan adversary’s use of space-based assets duringcrisis or conflict. In addition to the researchand possible development of satellite jammersand directed-energy weapons, China has prob-

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Space and counterspace capabilities—like missile forces, advanced air and seapower, and cybercapabilities—are critical for China to fight andwin modern military engagements. To support
various requirements, China has built a vast
ground and maritime infrastructure enabling
spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink.

Satellites
China employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for civil and military
remote sensing and mapping, terrestrial andChina pursues parallel programs for militaryand commercial communications satellites(COMSATs), and owns and operates about
30 COMSATs used for civil, commercial, andmilitary satellite communications. The PLA
operates a small number of dedicated military
COMSATs.123 China’s civil COMSATs incorporate turnkey off-the-shelf commercially manufactured components, and China produces its
military-dedicated satellites domestically.124
China continues to launch new COMSATs toreplace its aging satellites and increase its
overall satellite communications bandwidth,
capacity, availability, and reliability.
China uses its domestically produced Dongfanghong-4 (DFH-4) satellite bus—the structure that contains the components of the satellite—for its military COMSATs.125 Even
though early satellites suffered mission-endingor mission-degrading failures, the DFH-4 has
become a reliable satellite bus. The PLA andgovernment continue to vigorously support the
program and have signed numerous contracts
with domestic and international customers
for future DFH-4 COMSATs. The DFH-4 bus
has also allowed China to position itself as
a competitor in the international COMSAT
market, orchestrating many contracts withforeign countries to supply on-orbit satellites,
ground-control systems, and training.

A G E N C Y

The PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF),
established in December 2015, has an important role in the management of China’s aerospace warfare capabilities.121 Consolidating
the PLA’s space, cyber, and electronic warfare
capabilities into the SSF enables cross-domainsynergy in “strategic frontiers.” The SSF may
also be responsible for research, development,
testing, and fielding of certain “new concept”
weapons, such as directed energy and kinetic
energy weapons. The SSF’s space function is
primarily focused on satellite launch and operation to support PLA reconnaissance, navigation, and communication requirements.
[For more on the SSF, please see Appendix E.]

maritime surveillance, and military intelligencecollection, China’s ISR satellites are capable ofproviding electro-optical (EO) and synthetic
aperture radar imagery, as well as electronic
intelligence and signals intelligence data.122

I N T E L L I G E N C E

ably made progress on kinetic energy weapons, including the anti-satellite missile systemtested in July 2014.120 China is employing moresophisticated satellite operations and probably
is testing on-orbit dual-use technologies that
could be applied to counterspace missions.

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In 2008, China launched the first Tianlian
data-relay satellite of its China Tracking
and Data Relay Satellite constellation. As
of December 2017, China had four Tianlian
data-relay satellites on orbit, allowing China
to relay commands and data to and from its
satellites even when those satellites were notover Chinese territory.
In 2000, China launched its first Beidou satellites to test the development of a regional satellite navigation system. By 2012, China hadestablished a regional satellite navigation constellation consisting of 10 Beidou satellites andhad initiated testing of a global constellation
similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System(GPS).126 As Beidou satellites continue to beplaced in orbit, by 2020 China will complete its
global constellation of 27 Beidou satellites while
maintaining a separate regional constellation
providing redundant coverage over Asia.127
China owns and operates 10 domestically
produced Fengyun and Yunhai meteorological satellites.128 The China Meteorological
Administration supports civilian and military customers with the delivery of meteorological data and detailed weather forecasts.
The newer satellites house almost a dozen
all-weather sensors concerning atmosphericconditions as well as maritime terrain data
for military and civilian customers. China’s

Space operations control station.
Image Source: AFP

42

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

membership in the World MeteorologicalOrganization grants it free access to global
meteorological data from the internationalorganization’s 191 members.129

Counterspace

Image Source: AFP

Human Spaceflight andSpace-Exploration Probes
China became the third country to achieve
independent human spaceflight in 2003, when
it successfully orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5

spacecraft, followed by space laboratory Tiangong-1 and -2 launches in 2011 and 2016,
respectively. China intends to assemble andoperate a permanently inhabited, modular
space station capable of hosting foreign payloads and astronauts by 2022.133

I N T E L L I G E N C ELong March-3B SLV in midlaunch.

D E F E N S E

China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new programs since it confirmed
it used an antisatellite missile to destroy
a weather satellite in 2007. PLA writingsemphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance…and communications satellites,”suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could beamong the targets of attacks designed to “blindand deafen the enemy.”131,132

A G E N C Y

The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies
to improve China’s counterspace capabilities.
China is developing antisatellite capabilities,
including research and possible development
of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers, and probably has made progress on theantisatellite missile system that it tested inJuly 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is testing dual-use technologies that could be applied
to counterspace missions.130

43China is the third country to have soft-landed
a rover on the Moon, deploying the rover Yutu
as part of the Chang’e-3 mission in 2013.
China’s Lunar Exploration Program plans tolaunch the first mission to land a rover on the
lunar far side in 2018 (Chang’e-4), followedby its first lunar sample-return mission in2019 (Chang’e-5).134,135,136

Space Launch
China has a robust fleet of launch vehicles tosupport its requirements. The Chang Zheng, orLong March, and Kuaizhou SLVs can launchChinese spacecraft to any orbit.

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

Space Launch Sites

China operates four space launch sites: Jiuquan, Taiyuan, Xichang, and Wenchang.

44

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Propellant

Generation Outlook

LM-2, LM-3, LM-4 series

LiquidLegacyPhase out by 2025

LM-5 series

LiquidNext

Heavy-lift for the proposed spacestation and other payloads

LM-6

LiquidNext

Light-lift for low Earth andsun-synchronous orbit

LM-7

LiquidNext

Medium-lift for human spacefight andresupply to the future space station

LM-11 and Kuaizhou series

Solid

Next

Lift for emergency response

Cyberspace
Authoritative PLA writings identify controlling the “information domain”—sometimes
referred to as “information dominance”—as aprerequisite for achieving victory in a modern
war and as essential for countering outside
intervention in a conflict.140 The PLA’s broader
concept of the information domain and of information operations encompasses the network,
electromagnetic, psychological, and intelligence domains, with the “network domain”
and corresponding “network warfare” roughly
analogous to the current U.S. concept of thecyber domain and cyberwarfare.141
The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) may
be the first step in the development of a cyber-force by combining cyber reconnaissance,
cyberattack, and cyberdefense capabilities into
one organization to reduce bureaucratic hurdles and centralize command and control of
PLA cyber units. Official pronouncements offer
limited details on the organization’s makeup
or mission. President Xi simply said during the
SSF founding ceremony on 31 December 2015that the SSF is a “new-type combat force tomaintain national security and [is] an important growth point for the PLA’s combat capabilities.”142 The SSF probably was formed toconsolidate cyber elements of the former PLA
General Staff Third (Technical Reconnaissance) and Fourth (Electronic Countermeasures and Radar) Departments and Informatization Department.143,144 [For more informationon the SSF, please see Appendix E.]

I N T E L L I G E N C E

SystemA G E N C Y

137,138,139

D E F E N S ESpace Launch Fleet

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45

Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new
domain of national security. As international strategic competition in cyberspace
has been turning increasingly fiercer, quite
a few countries are developing their cybermilitary forces. Being one of the major
victims of hacker attacks, China is confronted with grave security threats to its
cyber infrastructure. As cyberspace weighs
more in military security, China will expedite the development of a cyberforce, andenhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness, cyber defense, support
for the country’s endeavors in cyberspaceand participation in international cybercooperation, so as to stem major cyber crises, ensure national network and information security, and maintain national security and social stability.
—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy,
May 2015

The PLA could use its cyberwarfare capabilities to support military operations in three key
areas. First, cyber reconnaissance allows the
PLA to collect technical and operational data for
intelligence and potential operational planningfor cyberattacks because the accesses and tactics, techniques, and procedures for cyber reconnaissance translate into those also necessary to
conduct cyberattacks. Second, the PLA could
employ its cyberattack capabilities to establish
information dominance in the early stages of aconflict to constrain an adversary’s actions or
slow mobilization and deployment by targeting46

network-based C2, C4ISR, logistics, and commercial activities. Third, cyberwarfare capabilities can serve as a force multiplier when coupledwith conventional capabilities during a conflict.
PLA military writings detail the effectivenessof information operations and cyberwarfare
in modern conflicts, and advocate targetingan adversary’s C2 and logistics networks toaffect the adversary’s ability to operate during
the early stages of conflict. One authoritative
source identifies an adversary’s C2 system as“the heart of information collection, control,
and application on the battlefield. It is also thenerve center of the entire battlefield.”145 China’s cyberwarfare could also focus on targeting
links and nodes in an adversary’s mobility system and identifying operational vulnerabilities
in the mobilization and deployment phase.
The PLA also plays a role in cyber theft. In May
2014, the U.S. Department of Justice indictedfive PLA officers on charges of hacking into the
networks of U.S. companies for commercial
gain. Beijing maintains that the Chinese government and military do not engage in cyberespionage and that the United States fabricatedthe charges.146,147

Denial and Deception
The PLA uses military deception to reduce theeffectiveness of adversaries’ reconnaissanceand to deceive adversaries about the PLA’s
warfighting intentions, actions, or major targets.148 PLA tradition emphasizes deceptionModernizing a Force to Fight and Win• Concealing and camouflaging.
• Blending false or misleading military
movements with actual deployments
and war preparations.
• Employing counterreconnaissance:
understanding and evading, jamming, or
destroying the whole spectrum of enemy
reconnaissance activities against PLA
units and facilities.
• Using deceptive maneuvers, psychological ploys, and unorthodox schemes todeceive, confuse, or otherwise manipulate
an adversary into a militarily disadvantageous position.150
Skillfully employed, deception can paralyze
an enemy force and achieve decisive results.
Options range from no-warning strikes, violent multiaxis strikes, and envelopment to aless ambitious attempt to confuse the adversary regarding the exact timing, nature, direction, or scope of a PLA operation.151,152[China’s armed forces will] develop new
support means, augment war reserves, integrate logistics information systems, improverules and standards, and meticulously organize supply and support, so as to build alogistics system that can provide support
for fighting and winning modern war, serve
the modernization of the armed forces, andtransform towards informatization.
—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy,
May 2015
The PLA’s increased focus on developing thecapabilities required to conduct joint operations under “informatized” conditions thatbegan in the 1990s has spurred efforts during
the past two decades to develop the PLA’s
capacity to supply and sustain its operations.
Along these lines, the PLA has taken steps
to modernize its defense-industrial base toensure that the PLA is developing capabilities to meet future mission requirements.
Key areas of focus have included civil-military
integration, support to joint combat operations, and high-tech weapons development.

Logistics
According to various military officials, the
PLA’s logistics system historically has been
plagued with inefficiencies that degrade combat readiness and restrict its ability to sup-A G E N C Y

Denial and deception activities include: 149

Logistics and DefenseIndustrial Modernization

I N T E L L I G E N C E

and psychological manipulation to create
asymmetric advantages and enable surprise.
The PLA has a longstanding doctrine for
deception, and claims that it regularly practices deception during training. PLA sources
describe military deception as a form of combat support, on par with ISR, meteorologicalsupport, missile calculation, engineering, andlogistic support.

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port and sustain modern joint combat operations.153,154,155 Since the late 1990s, the PLA has
invested in the modernization of its logistics
system, force structure, and supporting infrastructure to enable a transition from a rigid
command-directed and manpower-dependent
system, rife with corruption. The overarching
objective of these reforms is to build a precision logistic support system that is capable ofcomprehensive, timely, and accurate logistic
support to PLA joint operations.156,157
This transformation is dependent on building
high-efficiency transportation and warehouseinfrastructure, fielding new combat support
equipment, integrating comprehensive information systems, and developing a new breed of
officer capable of leveraging these capabilities
to support rapid mobilization and high-tempo
combat operations.158,159 For China, logistics
modernization also is heavily dependent on the
PLA’s ability to leverage the full potential of
China’s comprehensive national power to maximize combat capabilities, ensure peacetime
efficiencies, and guarantee a constant state ofcombat readiness.160
The PLA has made great progress in logistics
reform by improving logistics resources andprocedures during the past two decades, andenhancing the PLA’s ability to mobilize rapidly and project support along internal lines
of communication for large operations (mostly
disaster responses and exercises).161,162,163,164
Since 2016, the PLA has implemented structural reforms to improve command and control, procedural reforms to improve civil-mil-48

itary integration, and oversight mechanisms
to eliminate waste and inefficiencies that stemfrom longstanding corrupt practices within thelogistics sector. The successful implementationof these measures remains to be seen, given
the substantial cultural challenges of executing joint operations and reducing corruption.165
The extent to which the PLA will be able tosustain external military force projection operations effectively also remains in question
because the PLA’s experience is still nascent.
Efforts to support the PLA’s first overseas military base, in Djibouti, may provide insight into
these capabilities. [Please see Appendix G for
more information on PLA logistics.]

Defense-Industrial Base
China’s defense-industrial complex comprises
both a military and a state sector governedby the CMC and State Council, respectively,
under oversight of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.166 The CMC’s
Equipment Development Department oversees weapons planning, research, development, and acquisition (RDA) in conjunction
with the military service armament organizations for China’s Army, Navy, Air Force,
Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, Armed
Police, and Coast Guard.
The State Council’s State Administration for
Science, Technology, and Industry for National
Defense (SASTIND) is the key organ responsible for overseeing China’s state-owned
defense-industrial corporations and enterprises.167,168 Twelve SASTIND-subordinate

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win• Naval/maritime• Aviation• Ground systems/ordnance• Electronics• Nuclear
During a speech at an equipment-quality work
conference in 2015, CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang stressed the need to build astrong defense-industrial base to support military development. Xu emphasized themes ofquality, innovation, technology, and improving
combat readiness, but also said it would benecessary to strengthen laws, regulations, andaccountability within the defense industry toincrease quality standards.169
The PLA initiated defense-industrial reforms
in 2016 that aimed to reduce bureaucracy,develop a more structured RDA and production decisionmaking apparatus, streamline
developmental timelines, promote innovation,and institutionalize civil-military integration.
Within an industrial context, the latter entails
establishing a formal relationship between

A key emphasis of defense-industrial reforms
is developing an innovative military industrial complex capable of delivering cutting-edge
technologies to meet future PLA requirements.
China’s research and development apparatus
is designed to both identify and maximize theutility of emerging and potentially disruptive
science and technology for military use. Scientific and technological disciplines with military
applications targeted for development include
hypersonics; nanotechnology; high-performancecomputing; quantum communications; spacesystems; autonomous systems; artificial intelligence; robotics; high-performance turbofan
engine design; new, more efficient and powerful forms of propulsion; advanced manufacturing processes (including additive manufacturing/3-D printing); and advanced aerospacequality materials, just to name a few.173

A G E N C Y• Aerospace/missile

China’s defense and civilian industrial bases
to develop a technologically advanced, domestically reliant, and internationally relevant
defense-industrial complex.170 Key componentsof the initiative include the establishment ofwidely distributed “science cities,” industrial
parks, and high-tech zones—most near China’s
defense-industrial corporations and commercial industrial centers, large cities, and provincial capitals harboring significant RDA andmanufacturing capabilities to facilitate efficient logistics and supply.171,172 These reforms
are expected to be implemented by 2020.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

defense-industrial enterprises conduct RDA
and production in six distinct scientific, engineering, and technological domains:

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Underground Facilities
The use of underground facilities for warfighting
protection and concealment enhances China’s
military capacity, with particular emphasis onprotecting C4I functions and missile assets. The
PLA maintains a robust, technologically advanced
underground facility (UGF) program. Given its
NFU nuclear policy, China assumes it might haveto absorb an initial nuclear strike while ensuringthat leadership and strategic assets survive.
China determined in the mid-to-late 1980s thatit needed to update and expand its military UGF
program. This modernization effort took on arenewed urgency after China observed U.S. andcoalition air operations during the 1991 Persian
Gulf War and in the Balkans in 1999. The resultant emphasis on “winning high-tech battles”
precipitated research into advanced tunnelingand construction methods. These military campaigns convinced China it needed to build moresurvivable, deeply buried facilities, resulting in
the widespread UGF construction effort we havedetected throughout China for the past decade.

Missions Other Than War
The PLA views “nonwar” missions as a component of its readiness preparations, broader military modernization efforts, and military diplomacy. These operations also reflect the PLA’s
increasing role beyond China’s borders.174 In
practice, the military shares many of these missions with the People’s Armed Police, China’s
largely domestically oriented paramilitary force.

50

Medical team onboard Peace Ark.
Image Source: DIMOC

China has broadened its participation in UN
PKOs since 2008 to support foreign policy andmilitary objectives by improving China’s international image, providing the PLA with operational experience, and opening avenues forintelligence collection. China provides civilian
police, military observers, engineers, logistic
support specialists, and medical personnel tomissions. In 2016, China had more than 3,000
peacekeepers deployed in support of 10 UN
missions around the globe—the largest contingent of any permanent member nation of the
UN Security Council—and separately committed to establish an additional 8,000-member peacekeeping standby force. China has
trained about 500 foreign peacekeepers andhas pledged to increase this number to 2,500
in the near future. In August 2017, Beijing
announced that China’s first helicopter unit to
be deployed to a UN mission area had arrived
in Sudan to support the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur.175 As of 2018,
China has more than 2,500 troops, police, andmilitary observers committed to UN missions.

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Beijing’s increased participation in UN PKO
missions, particularly in terms of securing China’s international image, has not come without
costs. For instance, in 2016, after three Chinese
peacekeepers were killed in action and six were
wounded in two high-profile attacks in Mali
and South Sudan, some international media
reports accused Chinese peacekeepers of failingto interdict attacks on civilian foreign aid workers. These reports implicitly questioned China’s
ability to perform as a responsible global actor.
In 2017, China sustained its contributions tocounterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden
through the deployment of its 28th naval escort
task force to the region since 2008. During theImage Source: DIMOC

same period, the PLAN continued to use support for counterpiracy to justify Chinese submarine patrols to the Indian Ocean. In 2016, a
nuclear-powered attack submarine conducted aport call in Karachi, Pakistan, during an official
visit by the PLAN commander, marking China’s first port call in South Asia by a nuclear
submarine. In 2017, Chinese attack submarines
conducted port calls in Seppangar, Malaysia,
and Karachi, but Sri Lanka denied a port callrequest in Colombo.176 These submarine patrols
demonstrate the PLAN’s emerging capability toprotect China’s SLOCs and to increase China’s
power projection into the Indian Ocean.
China continues to use humanitarian and disaster relief and counterterrorism cooperation as
low-threat avenues to advance military engagement with many of its foreign partners. In March
2016, Beijing also proposed the creation of a maritime joint search and rescue hotline with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, probably
in part as a means of assuaging regional concerns
over Chinese activities in the South China Sea.

A G E N C Y—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy,
May 2015

PLA soldiers working on a school in Thailand.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Fulfilling international responsibilities andobligations. China’s armed forces will continue to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, strictly observe the mandates of the
UN Security Council, maintain its commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts,
promote development and reconstruction,and safeguard regional peace and security.
China’s armed forces will continue to take anactive part in international disaster rescue
and humanitarian assistance, dispatch professional rescue teams to disaster-stricken
areas for relief and disaster reduction, provide relief materials and medical aid, andstrengthen international exchanges in thefields of rescue and disaster reduction.
Through the aforementioned operations,the armed forces can also enhance their own
capabilities and expertise.

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Outlook: Developing a Robust ForceChina’s military modernization efforts
have followed the broader growthand development of China as awhole. The PLA has made efforts toward
reducing corruption, professionalizing training and education, developing a science andtechnology base for research and development, and organizing the force for effective
C2. With its economic and security interests
reaching around the globe, Beijing perceives
further modernization of the PLA as an imperative for continued stability and security of its
growing interests.
During the past decade alone, from counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden to an
expanded military presence in the East andSouth China Seas, China has demonstrated awillingness to use the PLA as an instrumentof national power in the execution of “historic
missions” in the new century. Improvements

52

in PLA equipment and capabilities that havefocused on generating combat power across the
PLA services present Beijing with additional
response options as China faces increasing
global security concerns. Expected advancesin areas such as nuclear deterrence, power
projection, cyberspace, space, and electromagnetic spectrum operations will continue to be
critical components of the PLA’s developing
capabilities. China also continues to develop
capabilities for “nonwar” missions, such as
HADR and counterpiracy.
In the coming years, the PLA is likely to groweven more technologically advanced, withequipment comparable to that of other modern militaries. The PLA will acquire advanced
fighter aircraft, naval vessels, missile systems,
and space and cyberspace assets as it organizes
and trains to address 21st century threats farther from China’s shores.

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

The world today is undergoing unprecedented changes, and China is at a critical stage ofreform and development. In their endeavor to realize the Chinese Dream of great national
rejuvenation, the Chinese people aspire to join hands with the rest of the world to maintainpeace, pursue development, and share prosperity.

Note: The “two centenaries” is a reference to the 2021 centenary of the
CCP as well as the 2049 centenary of the People’s Republic of China.

I N T E L L I G E N C E—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy, May 2015

D E F E N S E

Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces is a strategic task of China’s
modernization drive and a security guarantee for China’s peaceful development. Subordinate to and serving the national strategic goal, China’s military strategy is an overarchingguidance for blueprinting and directing the building and employment of the country’s armed
forces. At this new historical starting point, China’s armed forces will adapt themselves to
new changes in the national security environment, firmly follow the goal of the Communist
Party of China to build a strong military for the new situation, implement the military
strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, accelerate the modernization ofnational defense and armed forces, resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty, security anddevelopment interests, and provide a strong guarantee for achieving the national strategic
goal of the ‘two centenaries’ and for realizing the Chinese Dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

A G E N C Y

China’s destiny is vitally interrelated with that of the world as a whole. A prosperous andstable world would provide China with opportunities, while China’s peaceful development
also offers an opportunity for the whole world. China will unswervingly follow the path ofpeaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense
policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all forms, andwill never seek hegemony or expansion. China’s armed forces will remain a staunch force inmaintaining world peace.

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APPENDIX A: PLA Army
The PLA Army (PLAA) is the world’s largest
standing ground force, with approximately
915,000 active-duty personnel in combat
units.177 China’s military reforms since 2015
have included creating a separate PLAA headquarters for the first time in the PLA’s history. In April 2017, the PLA announced the
reduction of 5 of the PLAA’s 18 group armies(corps-sized units), and the restructuring to acorps-brigade-battalion force structure. This
new design implemented more mobile, modu-

lar units and integrated maneuver elements
into combined-arms brigades.178 The PLAA is
also modernizing C4I systems to enhance its
forces’ interoperability.

Roles and Missions
The PLAA’s role is to serve as the primaryground fighting force for the PLA. Accordingly,
the PLAA’s mission falls into five areas witheight supporting capabilities.

Respond to emergencies and military threats

2

Safeguard the sovereignty and security of China’s territory, China’s security interests in new
domains, and overseas interests

3

Participate in security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace

4

Maintain China’s political security and social stability

5

Perform emergency rescue and disaster relief

Required Tactical and Operational Capabilities
1

Remote maneuver actions

5

Occupation and control actions

2

Information countermeasures

6

Regional guard actions

3

Firepower strike options

7

Special operations actions

4

Mobile assault actions

8

All-dimension defensive actions

I N T E L L I G E N C E

1

D E F E N S E

PLAA Strategic Purpose

A G E N C Y

Roles and Missions

55

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

Major Ground Units56

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

The development of the PLAA’s “new-type”
operational forces reflects China’s desire to planand construct a force that is multifaceted, withcapabilities for operations ranging from high-intensity conflict to security-stability operations.
These forces stress the importance of ISR andleveraging information to enable future combat; they can conduct three-dimensional operations (Army aviation, air mobility, and airborne
forces) and can operate in a severely degraded
communications environment.
Operations emphasize engaging the enemy frommuch longer distances, place greater importanceon protection and survivability, and emphasize
the employment of cyberoperations. Future
PLAA units will be smaller, more modular, andless dependent on headquarters for resources.

Image Source: AFP

This new construct envisions generating combat power and effectiveness across warfighting
functions, from smaller, more flexible units.179
In line with the strategic requirement ofmobile operations and multidimensional
offense and defense, the PLAA will continue to reorient from theater defense totranstheater mobility. In the process ofbuilding small, multifunctional and modular units, the PLAA will adapt itself
to tasks in different regions, develop thecapacity of its combat forces for different
purposes, and construct a combat force
structure for joint operations. The PLAA
will elevate its capabilities for precise,multidimensional, transtheater, multifunctional, and sustainable operations.
—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy,
May 2015

A G E N C Y

UnitsThe PLAA is the world’s largest army.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

PLAA-produced publications consistently
discuss “new-type operations,” which areoperations that emphasize an effects-based
application of combat power to neutralize
key nodes, diminish the enemy’s capability toeffectively fight (systems confrontation), andachieve operational objectives quickly. At thetactical level, PLAA battalion training most
likely includes use of precise, long-range fireto maximize protection and surprise; dispersion of formations of weapon platforms while
relying on advanced communications technologies; and increasingly lethal munitions toenable PLAA commanders to produce masseffects on an enemy.

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R57

PLAA Units

one-third of the Army’s operational unit
strength.184 The current family of modernizedsystems emphasizes long-range deployment,
firepower operations, and mobile warfare—the key attributes that the PLAA requires in
its newest artillery systems.185

180,181

The table below highlights PLAA units bytype and size.

Type and Echelon
Army Groups

13

Combined-Arms Brigades

78

Artillery Brigades

15

Army Aviation/Air Assault Brigades

13

Mechanized Infantry Division

1

Armor and Infantry. The majority of the
PLAA’s armored and infantry units are organized as combined-arms brigades, but the PLAA
maintains a few maneuver units organized into
divisions. The combined-arms brigades vary insize and composition, containing up to 5,000
troops. Infantry units include motorized infantry (those equipped with trucks for transportation) as well as mechanized infantry units,
which can be equipped with either wheeledor tracked armored infantry fighting vehicles.
Equipment in PLAA infantry units varies andmay include a mix of obsolete platforms fromthe 1960s up to some of the region’s most modernized and capable platforms. PLAA armoredunits similarly comprise a wide range of legacy
tanks and modernized third-generation main
battle tanks.182
Artillery. Artillery is the key component of
the PLAA’s strike capability.183 Its primaryfunction is supporting ground assault missions, and artillery accounts for more than58

Air Defense. PLAA air defense units comprise
active-duty forces and reserve forces. Activeduty units provide air defense for the mobile
forces. These units are equipped with a mix oftactical antiaircraft missiles, antiaircraft artillery, antiaircraft gun and missile systems, andman-portable antiaircraft missile systems. An
extensive reserve antiaircraft artillery force,comprising divisions and separate brigades,
provides primarily area antiaircraft artillery
protection for China’s urban areas and critical
economic areas.186,187
Electronic Countermeasures. Electronic
countermeasure (ECM) units are equippedwith a range of modern ground-based electronic warfare systems capable of targetinglarge portions of the electromagnetic spectrum.
PLAA ECM units use HF/VHF/UHF, radar,and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-borne
jamming systems to support maneuver forces.
Special Operations Forces. Consistent
with the PLAA’s recent emphasis on information- and intelligence-driven operations,the PLAA’s Special Operations Forces (SOF)
have undergone substantial expansion. According to PLAA doctrine, SOF missions include“carrying out special reconnaissance, special
sabotage, [and] harassment attacks; seizing
and controlling key targets; guiding precisionModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Logistics and Support. PLAA logistics andequipment support elements exist in active andreserve units. They provide field forces with allclasses of supply and maintenance support aswell as medical and technical support. These
forces normally form support groups underlogistics and equipment command posts.191
The PLAA also relies heavily on civil-military
integration to supplement services provided
by military logistics units. Official publications
note the importance of integrating civilian andmilitary production during mobilizations, and
the PLAA regularly uses a combination of military and civilian materiel (rations and fuel),
equipment (civilian transport vehicles, vessels,

Equipment 192,193
Main Battle Tanks. The PLAA armored corps
comprises a mix of older, obsolete tanks and avariety of more modern tanks. The PLAA is modernizing its armored units by fielding third-generation tanks with updated armor packages,
larger-caliber cannons, improved fire-control
systems, and advanced electronics and communications. The most capable of these tanks are
the Type 96A and Type 99 main battle tank.194

A G E N C Y

Army Aviation. PLA Army Aviation comprises
13 brigades. These units are subordinate tocorps-level units in the five theater commands.
The PLA considers PLA Army Aviation a “newtype” operational force and a priority for modernization. Since 2010, PLA Army Aviation has
transformed from an auxiliary transport role tothat of a main combat force and has increased
its regiments to brigade echelon. Newly fieldedand forthcoming helicopters combined withstructural and operational changes under way
in the PLAA indicate a pattern of development
designed to mold a three-dimensional, newtype Army Aviation force with all-weather dayor-night capability.190

and aircraft), and facilities (ports, docks, andhospitals) during large-scale training exercises.

A ZTZ99 (Type 99) main battle tankconducting training.
Image Source: AFP

Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles(AIFVs) and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs).
The PLAA has a large variety of wheeled andtracked AIFVs and APCs. Highlighted below
are two of the PLAA’s most modern AIFVs.
• ZBD-04A. The ZBD-04A is one of China’s
newest tracked AIFVs. It is well armed
with a 100-mm gun, a coaxial 30-mm can-I N T E L L I G E N C E

attacks; conducting rescues behind enemy
lines; and dealing with border armed conflicts and unexpected events.”188 PLAA SOF
appears to focus primarily on special reconnaissance and direct-action missions.189

D E F E N S E

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non, and a 7.62-mm machinegun. It has a
traditional layout, with the engine in thefront right and the driver in the front left.
The turret is in the middle, with the troop
compartment in the rear. The ZBD-04A has
a licensed copy of the Russian BMP 3 turret.
It has a three-member crew and room forseven passengers. This IFV weighs about
21 tons and has improved armor.
• ZBL-09. The ZBL-09, often referred to asa “wheeled light tank,” is the PLA’s newest
wheeled armored vehicle. It has an 8x8 configuration, a 105-mm gun, a 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, a 12.7-mm machinegun on
the right side of the turret, and six 76-mm
grenade launchers on each side of the turret.
The driver is in the front, the turret is in the
middle, the power pack is in the rear, andpassive armor is fitted to the hull and turret.
Artillery and Rockets. China continues to
produce modern artillery systems aimed atadvancing the mechanization of PLAA artillery while integrating information systems toincrease lethality and precision. The primarysystems are the PHL03 300-mm self-propelled(SP) multiple rocket launcher, the PLZ05 155mm SP gun/howitzer, and two tracked and twowheeled 122-mm artillery systems. These new
systems are likely to replace almost all towed
artillery. The exception to this modernization
trend is PLAA coastal defense artillery, which
will continue using towed Type 59-1 130-mm
guns and Type 66 152-mm howitzers.
Air Defense. China has been fielding medium-range HQ-16 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
with select air defense units in the PLAA as

60

PHL03 Multiple Rocket Launchers on paradein Beijing
Image Source: AFP

part of a comprehensive upgrade of its air
defense capabilities. China manufactures its
own variant of Russia’s SA-15 and is fielding
the system with PLAA air defense units supporting tracked armored forces.
China also manufactures a domesticallydesigned variant of the French Crotale tactical SAM system. This wheeled SAM is being
fielded with PLAA air defense units supporting primarily wheeled fighting forces.
China’s tactical SAMs have been replacing
outdated large-caliber antiaircraft artillery in
air defense units defending operational andlarge tactical-level units.
China is fielding a modern domestically produced SP antiaircraft gun system with select
PLAA air defense units protecting larger
maneuver units. The PGZ-07 will provide highly
mobile coverage for headquarters areas, troop
concentrations, and key logistic support areas.

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

China’s domestically designed and produced
PGZ-04 integrated missile-gun antiaircraft
system is an upgraded version of the PGZ-95,
equipped with more effective short-range SAMs.
The system is fielded with many PLAA armoredand mechanized units for close-range air defense
protection of combat maneuver elements.

Training
In 2015, PLA leaders directed changes to groundforces training.195 These changes included a callfor increased emphasis on problem solving, innovation, and realistic combat training, replacing
previously scripted training methods. Leadersstressed the performance of key tasks—such as
conducting joint training, training in nighttime
combat, and training under adverse weather
and geographical conditions—as essential towinning wars. The PLAA makes use of a number of training locations available for its ground

Recruitment and Professional Military
Education. Military service probably willremain a less attractive career option if China’s economy stays healthy. Although Chineseyouth remain interested in the career field,
interest is not widespread.197 The PLAA relies
on a 2-year conscription period along witha mix of volunteers (the ratio of conscripts tovolunteers is unclear). Recruitment challenges
notwithstanding, the PLA continues to pursue
efforts to “cultivate new-type military personnel” to retain talent and develop personnel who

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Image Source: AFP

D E F E N S E

PGZ-O7 self-propelled antiaircraft system onparade in Beijing.

Professionalization. Since at least 2012,
PLAA units (“red forces”) rotating through combined-arms training centers have trained against
a permanently established “blue force,” also
known as an opposition force.196 The constructionof a blue force was undertaken to ensure that the
PLAA would become more sophisticated in conducting realistic training scenarios. Increasingly,
PLAA training emphasizes the need to empower
lower-level leaders to conduct target-based, opportunistic, initiative-driven combat. The PLAA has
decreased the emphasis on “saving face,” shifting
toward a culture of understanding that commanders and subordinates should be allowed—and
expected—to make mistakes in training.

A G E N C Y

forces and maintains at least one sizable training area in each of China’s military theaters.
These training areas offer a variety of terrain,from coastal and flat areas to moderately hilly,
to high plateau and mountainous terrains. The
major training bases provide units with venues
featuring large areas for field maneuvers, artillery fires, and force-on-force confrontations.

61

can meet the data demands of modern warfare.198 The Army also has changed military
recruitment schedules and age limits in aneffort to better attract educated and talented
people.199 Basic training, where students learn
fundamental military skills and receive political indoctrination, continues to serve as thefoundation for both conscripted and volunteer
personnel entering the service. After completing the initial curriculum, trainees are sent totheir respective units for additional on-the-job
training. Some new soldiers will go on to different locations for technical training outside
their assigned units.200

PLA cadets receive political instruction.
Image Source: DIMOC

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Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

APPENDIX B: PLA Navy

Although Liu characterized offshore areas aseast of Taiwan and the northern part of the
Pacific Ocean, stretching beyond the first island
chain, offshore defense was often associatedwith operations in the Yellow Sea, East China
Sea, and South China Sea—China’s “near seas.”
Development of offshore defense paralleled the
CMC’s adoption of a new military strategy
that focused on local wars on China’s periph-—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy,
May 2015
Former President Hu and President Xi haverepeatedly emphasized the importance of maritime power. In 2004, former President Hu’s outline of the PLA’s New Historic Missions encompassed new expectations for the PLAN. In his
report to the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Hu
declared, “We should enhance our capacity for
exploiting marine resources, resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests,
and build China into a maritime power.” Hu’s
public emphasis on maritime power and theneed to “resolutely safeguard” China’s maritime rights and interests reflect a growing
consensus in China that maritime power is

A G E N C Y

In line with the strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open-seas protection, the PLAN will gradually shift its focus
from “offshore waters defense” to the combination of “offshore waters defense” with
“open-seas protection,” and build a combined, multifunctional and efficient marine
combat force structure. The PLAN will
enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive
defense, and comprehensive support.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

In the 1980s, China’s threat perceptions andgrowing economic interests drove a major
shift in the strategic orientation and utilityof naval forces. In particular, Chinese naval
strategists sought to expand the bounds oftheir maritime capabilities beyond coastal
defense. By 1987, PLAN Commander Adm Liu
Huaqing had established a strategy referred
to as “offshore defense.”204

ery rather than a major confrontation with
the Soviet Union, and it focused on achieving
regional goals and deterring a modern adversary from intervening in a regional conflict.

D E F E N S E

The PLA Navy (PLAN) is Asia’s largest navy,
with an inventory of more than 300 surface
combatants, submarines, amphibious ships,
patrol craft, and specialized units.201 The
PLAN is rapidly replacing obsolescent, generally single-purpose ships in favor of larger,
multirole combatants with advanced antiship,
antiair, and antisubmarine weapons and sensors. This modernization aligns with China’s
growing emphasis on the maritime domain,with increasing demands on the PLAN to conduct operational tasks at increasing distancesfrom the Chinese mainland using multimission, long-range, sustainable naval platforms
with robust self-defense capabilities.202,203

63

essential to advancing China’s interests. This
trajectory was carried forward under Xi and is
explicit in China’s 2015 military strategy:

The traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, andgreat importance has to be attached to
managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. It
is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structurecommensurate with its national security
and development interests, safeguard its
national sovereignty and maritime rights
and interests, protect the security of strategic SLOCs (sea lines of communication)and overseas interests, and participate ininternational maritime cooperation so as
to provide strategic support for building
itself into a maritime power.
—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy,
May 2015
In 2015, Beijing formally introduced a newnaval strategy, known as Offshore Defense andOpen Seas Protection. The new strategy contains the primary elements of offshore defense
but extends China’s maritime sphere of operations beyond the first and second island chains
and into the high seas in support of China’s
growing international interests and maritime
missions. China relies heavily on maritime
trade, access to overseas energy resources, andoverseas employment of Chinese citizens topropel its domestic economy, spurring Beijing’s
concern for ensuring that the PLAN is capable

64

PLAN Jiangkai II class guided-missile frigate Linyi.
Image Source: DVIDS

of pursuing open-seas protection missions. The
PLAN’s acquisition patterns demonstrate a
growing emphasis on ships that are multimission capable and large enough to sustain thesetypes of operations.

Roles and Missions
Given China’s heavy reliance on maritime
commerce, Beijing now has a vested interestin ensuring the security of international trade.
Beijing also faces growing pressure to contribute to international security missions. As an
increasingly modern and flexible force, thePLAN is at the forefront of addressing a number of enduring Chinese security challenges,
from reunification with Taiwan to asserting
China’s maritime claims in the East and South
China Seas. Today the PLAN’s primary operational, training, and planning focus remains in
the near seas, where China faces sovereignty
disputes over various islands, maritime features, territorial waters, and associated mar-Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Protecting Maritime Sovereignty. A key role
for the PLAN is protecting China’s maritime sovereignty. In the East and South China Seas, Beijing faces longstanding disputes with its neighbors regarding maritime boundaries, economic
rights, and sovereignty over various geographic
features. During the past few years, maritime
disputes between China and rival claimants,
including Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, andMalaysia, have periodically intensified.

Image Source: AFP

Countering
Third-Party
Intervention.
Since the mid-1990s, Chinese planners andstrategists have understood that the PLAN’s
development of capabilities to deter, delay, andif necessary degrade third-party forces’ intervention in a time of conflict is essential. Nearly
two decades later, China has closed many of thegaps in key warfare areas, such as air defense
and long-range strike, that would support countering third-party forces in regional campaigns.
China has built or acquired a wide array ofadvanced platforms, including submarines,

China’s Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime
Militia are increasingly visible throughout theregion, and Beijing has employed increasingly
coercive tactics to advance its regional interests. As China’s naval capabilities have grown,
Beijing has taken steps to consolidate its maritime forces and improve its ability to respondflexibly to contingencies, while avoiding escalation to military conflict and maintaining aveneer of advancing peaceful global interests.
China’s land reclamation and outpost expansion in the Paracel and Spratly Islands include
port facilities from which it can surge PLAN,

A G E N C Y

The aircraft carrier Liaoning sailing in a formation of
PLAN ships.

major surface combatants, missile patrol craft,maritime strike aircraft, and land-based systems that employ new, sophisticated antiship
cruise missiles and SAMs. China also has developed the world’s first roadmobile, antiship ballistic missile, a system specifically designed toattack enemy aircraft carriers. China’s leaders
hope that possessing these military capabilities
will deter proindependence moves by Taiwanor, should deterrence fail, will permit a rangeof tailored military options against Taiwan andpotential third-party military intervention.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

itime rights. The growth of China’s diversified“nonwar” missions, including HADR, SLOC
protection, and PKOs, has been a major driverof—and justification for—China’s expanded
naval strategy and operations in the far seas.
The following subsections highlight a few ofthese missions.

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

65

China Coast Guard (CCG), and People’s Armed
Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) ships tobetter enforce maritime sovereignty claims,
as well as airbases to support reconnaissance,fighter, and strike aircraft.

PLAN sailor participating in visit, board, search, andseizure (VBSS) training.
Image Source: DIMOC

Under Chinese law, maritime sovereignty is adomestic law enforcement issue under the purview of the CCG. Beijing also prefers to use CCG
ships for assertive actions in disputed waters
to reduce the risk of escalation and to portray
itself more benignly to an international audience. For situations that Beijing perceives carrya heightened risk of escalation, it often deploys
PLAN combatants in close proximity for rapid
intervention if necessary. China also relies on
the PAFMM – a paramilitary force of fishingboats – for sovereignty enforcement actions.
Sea Lane Protection. China increasingly
sees a need for the PLAN to help protect its
economic investments and political interests

66

around the world. The security of oil importroutes from the Middle East and Africa thatpass through the Indian Ocean is particularly
vital to China. Large portions of China’s critical mineral imports and trade in manufactured products and components also use theseroutes. Since any disruption of China’s trade
could undermine China’s economy, the PLAN
is placing growing importance on developing
long-range SLOC protection and general naval
presence capabilities. For example, SLOC protection and naval presence missions are among
the main drivers in China’s establishment ofa naval logistics support base in Djibouti aswell as Beijing’s pursuit of additional logistics-port-access agreements. In addition, thePLAN’s participation in counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden demonstrates Beijing’s intention to protect important SLOCs.
Naval Diplomacy. Another growing PLAN
mission is naval diplomacy. Since PLAN task
groups began supporting counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, the returning
units have often followed the deployment withport visits across the Indian Ocean and otherregions. In 2017, the PLAN completed its longest goodwill deployment in October, visiting
20 countries in 7 months, including several port
calls in Europe. The PLAN also employs its hospital ship, Peace Ark, to support HADR missions
worldwide. These visits advance the Navy’s
international profile, provide opportunities forbilateral cooperation, and build the PLAN’s
experience in areas farther from China’s coast.

Image Source: DIMOC

Nontraditional Missions. In 2004, the PLAN
was tasked with safeguarding China’s national
development and playing an important role inensuring world peace. This represented a substantial adjustment to China’s national defense
strategy and broadened its definition of security
to include new geographic and functional areas
beyond the PLA’s traditional territorial security
missions. Missions such as naval escort in the
Gulf of Aden support China’s economic interests
while enhancing China’s international image.

Units
The PLAN controls all of China’s naval and naval
aviation forces as well as seven marine brigades
and has deployed naval forces in three of China’s five geographically oriented theaters that
conduct day-to-day operations. The deputy commander of each fleet commands its respective
aviation force. The 2015 PLA-wide structuralreforms formally separated operational controlof the Navy from force-building aspects administered by PLAN headquarters, and additionalchanges to the PLAN’s structure, particularly at
the fleet level and below, are expected in 2018.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

PLAN Luyang II class destroyer Xian.

A G E N C YModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

67

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

Major Naval Units

68

has remained relatively constant, the PLAN is
rapidly retiring older, single-mission warships
in favor of larger, multimission ships equippedwith advanced antiship, antiair, and antisubmarine weapons and sensors and C2 facilities.

East Sea Fleet. Headquartered in Ningbo,
the East Sea Fleet covers the majority of theEast China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. It falls
under the PLA Eastern Theater Command’sarea of operations.

In the initial stages of its modernization, thePLAN successfully concentrated resources on
improving its antisurface warfare (ASUW)
capabilities, both in surface ship and submarine development. Subsequent efforts havefocused on improving antiair warfare capabilities and providing modest improvements in
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

South Sea Fleet. Headquartered in Zhanjiang, the South Sea Fleet is responsible for theSouth China Sea. It falls under the PLA Southern Theater Command’s area of operations.

Equipment: Building a Modern Navy
During the past 15 years, China’s naval modernization has produced a technologicallyadvanced, flexible force structure. The PLAN
has more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, and missile-armed
patrol craft. Although the overall inventory

Artist rendition of a PLAN Renhai class cruiser.

Every major PLAN surface combatant underconstruction is capable of embarking a helicopter to support over-the-horizon targeting,
ASW, and search and rescue. Meanwhile, thePLAN’s submarine force remains largely concentrated on ASUW, with Jin class SSBNs
poised to contribute to China’s nuclear deterrent once they begin strategic patrols in thenear future. Naval aviation is expanding its
mission set by incorporating modern multirole
combat aircraft along with modern special mission aircraft, carrier aviation, and UAVs. As awhole, the PLAN is becoming a force able toexecute a wide variety of missions near homeand far away.
Surface Force. In the late 1990s to early
2000s, the PLAN transitioned from a “greenwater” (coastal) force to one capable of operating offshore with increasing regularity.
During this period, China imported several
major combatants, weapon systems, and sen-I N T E L L I G E N C E

North Sea Fleet. Headquartered in Qingdao,
the North Sea Fleet is responsible for the Bo
Hai, Yellow Sea, and northern portion of theEast China Sea. It falls under the PLA Northern Theater Command’s area of operations.

A G E N C YModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons69

sors from Russia while concurrently producing
and developing its own designs and modernizing older ships to employ advanced weapons.
By the second decade of the 2000s, the PLAN
was using Chinese designs for surface ships
primarily equipped with Chinese weaponsand sensors (although some engineering components and subsystems remained imported
or license-produced in country at the time).
Furthermore, the era of past designs has
given way to production of modern multimission destroyer, frigate, and corvette classes as
China’s technological advancement in naval
design has begun to approach a level commensurate with, and in some cases exceeding, thatof other modern navies. Once operational, the
new Renhai class (Type 055) guided-missile
cruiser, of which several are currently underconstruction, will be one of the most advanced
and powerful ships in the world, boasting alarge array of advanced-capability weaponsand sensors developed domestically.205
Shipboard air defense and antisurface warfare capabilities are arguably the most notableareas of improvement on PLAN surface ships.
China has retired several older destroyers andfrigates that had at most a point air defense
capability and a range of just several nautical miles. Newer ships entering the force are
equipped with medium- to long-range area air
defense missiles, including the Renhai, whichhas 112 vertical-launch cells for mixed munitions. The PLAN received a total of six Luyang
II (Type 052C) class guided-missile destroyers
with the HHQ-9 SAM (55-NM range) and YJ-62
antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (150-NM

70

range), and six Luyang III (Type 052D) classguided-missile destroyers are now operational,
with several more under construction. The
Luyang III carries an extended-range variantof the HHQ-9 SAM and YJ-18 ASCM (290-NM
range). In addition, more than 25 Jiangkai II(Type 054A) class guided-missile frigates are
now operational, with the vertically launched
HHQ-16 (20- to 40-NM range), and more areunder construction.206
These newer ships use modern combat management systems and air surveillance sensors, such as the Sea Eagle and Dragon Eyephased-array radars. These new units allow
the PLAN surface force to operate outside
shore-based air defense systems because one or
two ships are equipped to provide air defense
for the entire task group.
China’s amphibious ship force has slowly
grown since a modernization program began
in the early 2000s. Since 2005, China has built
six large Yuzhao (Type 071) class amphibioustransport docks, signaling China’s development of an expeditionary warfare and overthe-horizon amphibious assault capability
as well as inherent HADR and counterpiracy
capabilities. The Yuzhao can carry up to four of
the new Yuyi air-cushion utility landing craft(similar to the U.S. landing craft air cushion,
LCAC) as well as four or more helicopters,
armored vehicles, and troops on long-distancedeployments. Additional Yuzhao construction
is expected in the near term, as is a follow-on
amphibious assault ship (landing helicopter
assault, LHA, which Chinese sources term theCH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

The PLA Navy: Naval SAM Ranges
HHQ-9
Extended Range

HHQ-16
HHQ-7
0

30

60

90

120

150

An expanded set of missions farther into thewestern Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, suchas counterpiracy deployments, HADR missions, survey voyages, and goodwill port visits, has increased demands on and broadened
the experience of the PLAN’s fleet of oceangoing replenishment and service vessels. The
PLAN recently launched two new Fuyi classfast combat support ships, intended to support aircraft carrier battle groups, as wellas the smaller Fuchi class replenishment
oilers, which support surface action groups
and long-distance deployments. These ships

constantly rotate in support of China’s Gulfof Aden counterpiracy deployments and regularly accompany surface groups operating
beyond the first island chain. At present,
China has at least 10 fleet replenishment ships
operational, with more under construction.

PLAN ships conducting replenishment at sea.

I N T E L L I G E N C E“Type 075”) that not only is larger but incorporates a full flight deck for helicopters. Production on the LHA is expected to begin soon, if it
has not already begun.

A G E N C Y

Approximate Range (Kilometers)

D E F E N S E

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

HHQ-9

Image Source: DVIDS71

In addition, China has added a variety ofoceangoing auxiliary ships in recent years,
including submarine rescue ships, hospital
ships, salvage and rescue ships, survey ships,
intelligence collection ships, and various largetransport ships.

PLAN sailors conduct VBSS training.
Image Source: DVIDS

Submarine Force. China’s modernizing force
includes several types of submarines. For its
diesel-electric force alone, between 2000 and2005 China constructed Ming diesel attack submarines (SSs) and Song SSs and the first Yuan
air-independent attack submarine (SSP), andpurchased eight Kilo SSs from Russia. Although
all of these classes remain in service, only the
Yuan SSP is in production. Over time, reducing
the number of classes in service helps streamline maintenance, training, and interoperability. The submarine force comprises 6 nuclear
attack submarines, 4 nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines, and 50 diesel attack submarines. By 2020 the submarine force probably
will increase to about 70 submarines.

72

The Yuan SSP is China’s most modern conventionally powered submarine. Seventeen are
in service, with possibly three more slated for
production. The Yuan SSP’s combat capability is comparable to that of the Song; both canlaunch Chinese-built antiship cruise missiles,
but the Yuan has the added benefit of an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system and may
have incorporated quieting technology fromthe Russian-designed Kilo SS. The AIP systemprovides a submarine a source of power otherthan battery or diesel engines while still submerged, increasing its underwater endurance
and reducing its vulnerability to detection.
The remainder of the conventional submarine
force is a mix of Song, Ming, and Russian-built
Kilo SSs. Of these, only the Ming and fourof the older Kilos lack an ability to launch
ASCMs. Eight of China’s 12 Kilos are equippedwith the SS-N-27 ASCM, which provides along-range ASUW capability out to about 120
nautical miles. China’s newest domestic submarine-launched ASCM, the CH-SS-N-13,
extends a similar capability to the Song, Yuan,
and Shang classes.
China also continues to modernize its nuclear-powered attack submarine force, althoughthese make up a small percentage of the total
number of submarines. Two Shang nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) havebeen launched, one each in 2002 and 2003. Afternearly 10 years, China is continuing production with four additional hulls of an improved
Shang variant. These six submarines will
replace the aging Han SSN on a nearly one-for-CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

one basis during the next several years. Afterthe completion of the improved Shang SSN,
the PLAN is expected to begin production on
another modified variant of the Shang SSN
class, the Type 093B.207 Thereafter, the PLAN
probably will progress to the Type 095 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine (SSGN).
This class of submarine may provide a generational improvement in many areas, such as
quieting and weapons capacity.

ing (AEW), and logistics. China’s first aircraft
carrier signaled a new age for PLAN aviation,
which is now evolving from an almost exclusively land-based force to one with a seabased component.
Fixed-Wing Aircraft. During the past two
decades, the PLAN has replaced antiquated
fixed-wing aircraft, such as the Q-5 Fantan
and the H-5 Beagle, with an array of high-quality aircraft. The force is now equipped for awide range of missions, including offshore air
defense, maritime strike, maritime patrol/
ASW, and carrier-based operations. Just a
decade ago, this air modernization relied very
heavily on Russian imports. Following in the
PLAAF’s footsteps, the PLAN is now benefit-

A G E N C Y

Image Source: DIBMAC Report

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Aviation. The role of PLAN aviation has
evolved during the past decade. PLAN combatants can now reach farther from shore andare more capable of providing their own air
defense. This has allowed the PLAN to concentrate on an expanded array of aerial missions, particularly maritime strike, as well as
maritime patrol, ASW, airborne early warn-

The JL-2/CSS-NX-14 SLBM in midlaunch.

D E F E N S E

The PLA Navy’s Jin class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, armed with the JL-2
submarine launched ballistic missile, provide
China its first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent and credible second-strike nuclear capability. The JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) has nearly three times therange of the Xia SSBN’s JL-1 SLBM, which wasable to reach targets only in China’s immediate
vicinity. The JL-2 SLBM underwent successful
testing in 2012. The Jin/JL-2 weapon system
will provide China with a capability to striketargets in the continental United States fromsome patrol areas. To maintain a continuous
at-sea nuclear deterrent, the PLAN probably
would require a minimum of five Jin SSBNs;
four are in service.

73

ing from domestic combat aircraft production.
Today, the PLAN is taking deliveries of modern, domestically produced fourth-generation
fighter aircraft, such as the J-10A Vigorous
Dragon and the domestically produced J-11B
Flanker. Equipped with modern radars andglass cockpits and armed with PL-8 and PL-12
air-to-air missiles, PLAN J-10As and J-11Bs
are among the most modern aircraft in China’s
inventory and are capable of extended fighter
patrols beyond China’s coastal areas.
For maritime strike, the PLAN has relied on variants of the H-6 Badger bomber for decades. The
H-6 is a licensed copy of the ex-Soviet Tu-16 Badger medium jet bomber, and maritime versions
employ advanced ASCMs against surface targets.
Despite the age of their design, the H-6s continue
to receive electronics and payload upgrades,
keeping the aircraft viable as a long-range strike
platform. As many as 30 aircraft remain in service. Noted improvements for the upgraded Badger include the ability to carry a maximum of four
ASCMs (instead of the two previously seen on
earlier H-6D variants). The PLAN also has modified a few H-6s to serve as tankers, increasing therange of PLAN fighter aircraft.
With at least five regiments fielded across thethree fleets, the JH-7 Flounder augments the
H-6 as the workhorse of the PLAN’s airborne
maritime strike force. The JH-7 is a domestically produced tandem-seat fighter-bomber
developed as a replacement for obsolete Q-5
Fantan light attack aircraft and H-5 Beagle
bombers. Updated versions of the JH-7 featurea more capable radar and additional weapons

74

capacity, enhancing its maritime strike capabilities. The JH-7 can carry up to four ASCMs
and two PL-5 or PL-8 short-range air-to-air
missiles, providing considerable payload formaritime strike missions, or the JH-7 can sacrifice two ASCMs for underwing fuel tanks,
increasing the platform’s range.
In addition to combat aircraft, the PLAN is
expanding its inventory of fixed-wing maritime
patrol aircraft, AEW, and surveillance aircraft.
China has achieved significant new capabilities
by modifying several existing airframes. The
Y-8, a Chinese license-produced version of the
ex-Soviet An-12 Cub, forms the basic airframe
for several PLAN special-mission variants. Allof these aircraft play a key role in providing aclear picture of surface and air contacts in themaritime environment. As the PLAN pushes farther from the coast, long-range aircraft capableof extended onstation times to act as the fleet’s
eyes and ears become increasingly important.
The PLAN has also developed a Y-9 ASW
variant. The new aircraft is equipped witha magnetic anomaly detector boom, similar to that of the U.S. Navy’s P-3. This Y-9
ASW variant is equipped with surface-searchradar mounted under the nose as well as multiple-blade antennas on the fuselage, probably for electronic surveillance. A small EO/
infrared turret is located just behind the nose
wheel, and this variant is equipped with aninternal weapons bay in front of the main
landing gear. Recent pictures of the Y-9 ASW
variant suggest at least some aircraft haveentered operational service.

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

304.5 meters (999.0 ft)

Beam

70 meters (229.7 ft)

Draft

10.5 meters (34.4 ft)

Flight deck length304.5 meters (999.0 ft)

Flight deck width

70 meters (229.7 ft)

Flight deck angle

7 degrees

Aircraft launchmechanism

Ski jump

Ski jump angle

14 degrees

Top speed

30 kn (55.6 km/h)(34.5 mph)

Range

3,850 NM (7,130.2 km)(4,430.5 miles) at 29 kn(53.7 km/h) (33.4 mph)
8,500 NM (15,742.0 km)(9,781.6 miles) at 18 kn(33.3 km/h) (20.7 mph)

Crew

1,960

Machinery

8 boilers; 4 turbines;
200,000 shp; 4 shafts
Up to 24 J-15 fighters

Aircraft

6 Z-8 helicopters and 4
Ka-31 helicoptersA G E N C Y

LengthI N T E L L I G E N C E

Aircraft Carrier Program. In September
2012, China commissioned the Liaoning, joining the small group of countries that have anaircraft carrier. Beijing acquired the Soviet
ship, formerly the Varyag, from Ukraine in
2002.210,211 Since that time, the PLAN has followed the long and difficult path of learning tooperate fixed-wing aircraft from a carrier. The
first launches and recoveries of J-15 fighter
aircraft occurred in November 2012, withadditional testing and training in early July
2013. With the first landing complete, China
became only the fifth country in the world tohave conventional takeoff and landing fightersaboard an aircraft carrier. In 2017, the Liaoning concluded its second deployment to theSouth China Sea for training—its first withembarked J-15 fighters—and conducted its
first port visit to Hong Kong.212,213,214

The Aircraft Carrier Liaoning

D E F E N S E

In December 2017, the Aviation Industry Corporation of China conducted the maiden flightof the AG-600 Kunlong, the world’s largest
seaplane.208 The aircraft is still under development, but once operational, the AG-600 probably will be used for both civilian and militaryroles, such as search and rescue operations or
defense needs in the South China Sea. Chinese
advertising depicts the aircraft as having an
endurance of 12 hours and the capacity to rescue 50 people during a single flight.209

Image Source: AFP

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

75

The Liaoning’s ski-jump configuration restricts
aircraft takeoff weight, limiting maximum
ordnance loads and overall combat power. The
ski-jump design also means it cannot operatelarge, specialized support aircraft, such as an
AEW aircraft.
China’s first carrier air regiment will comprise the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark. The
J-15 is externally similar to the Russian Su-33
Flanker D but has many of the domestic avionics and armament capabilities of the Chinese
J-11B Flanker. The J-15 has folding wings,
strengthened landing gear, a tailhook under ashortened tail stinger, two-piece slotted flaps,
canards, and a retractable inflight-refuelingprobe on the left side of the nose.
China’s aircraft carrier program also includes
efforts to develop domestic carriers. In 2017,
China launched its first domestic aircraft carrier, which was a modified version of the Liaoning and is expected to enter into service by
2019.215,216 Like the Liaoning, the ship lacks catapult capabilities and has a smaller flight deck
than U.S. carriers.217 The PLAN is expected
to begin construction in 2018 on its first catapult-capable carrier, which will enable additional fighter aircraft, fixed-wing early warning
aircraft, and more rapid flight operations.218
Helicopters. The PLAN operates three main
helicopter variants: the domestically produced
Z-9 and Z-8/Z-18 and the Russian-built Helix.
The primary helicopter operated by the PLAN
is the Z-9C. In the early 1980s, China obtained
a license from France’s Aerospatiale (now Air-76

Chinese Marines attend an international fleet review.
Image Source: AFP

bus Helicopter) to produce the AS 365N Dauphin II helicopter and its engine. The AS 365s
produced in China were labeled as the Z-9,
with the naval variant designated Z-9C. The
Z-9C is capable of operating from any helicopter-capable PLAN combatant. The Z-9C can be
fitted with the KLC-1 search radar and dipping sonar and is usually observed with a single lightweight torpedo. A new roof-mounted
EO turret, unguided rockets, and 12.7-mm
machinegun pods have been seen on several
Z-9Cs during counterpiracy deployments. An
upgraded naval version, designated the Z-9D,
has been observed carrying small ASCMs.
The Z-8 is also a Chinese-produced helicopter
based on a French design. In the late 1970s,
the PLAN took delivery of the SA 321 Super
Frelon. A reverse-engineered version was designated the Z-8, which reached initial operational capability by 1989. Low-rate production
continued through the 1990s and into the early
2000s. The Z-8’s size provides a greater cargo

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

In 2010, China purchased nine Ka-31 AEW
helicopters and its E-801 radar system. The
Z-18J and Ka-31 provide the PLAN a serviceable sea-based AEW capability to help fill thatcritical gap until newer catapult-equipped aircraft carriers capable of operating fixed-wing
AEW aircraft enter service.

capacity compared with other PLAN helicopters but limits its ability to deploy from most
PLAN combatants.
A new PLAN helicopter labeled the Z-18 has
operated with the Liaoning. The Z-18 comesin three variants: transport, antisubmarine(Z-18F), and AEW (Z-18J). As with the Z-8, theZ-18’s size limits its deployment options.
Variants of the Helix are the only imported
helicopters operated by the PLAN. In 1999,
the PLAN took delivery of an initial batch ofeight Russian-built Helix helicopters. Five
were Ka-28 Helix As, and three were Helix Ds.
An additional 9 Helix As have been delivered,and all 18 Helix are operational. As with theRussian Ka-27s, the exported Ka-28s can perform several mission sets but are usually used
for ASW, and the Ka-27PSs are optimized for
SAR and logistic support missions. The Ka-28
is fitted with search radar and dipping sonarand can employ sonobuoys, torpedoes, depth
charges, or mines.

In 2015, China's Military Strategy called for
the PLA to enhance realistic military training, particularly in complex electromagnetic
environments, diverse terrains, and adverse
weather conditions.220 The same year, thePLAN Headquarters Military Training
Department directed the PLAN to enhance thecomplexity of training and exercises by:• Making training more realistic.
• Strengthening command authority andrelationships through realistic opposing
force training.
• Deepening tactical innovation.
• Improving training in the actual use of
weapons in an electromagnetic environment.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Image Source: DVIDS

During the past decade, the scope and frequencyof naval training have gradually expanded,reflecting the growing capabilities of China’s
navy. The PLAN conducts year-round multimission training, including robust antisurface andantiair warfare training.219 The PLAN now also
participates in training exercises farther from
China’s coasts, in areas such as the western
Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

D E F E N S E

PLAN Z-9 helicopter.

A G E N C Y

Training77• Continuing “far seas” training.
• Improving training methods by avoiding
formalism and scripting in exercises.
• Improving joint campaign-level training.221
PLAN participation in missions such as the
antipiracy task groups in the Gulf of Aden provide opportunities to train in real-world situations to refine operational capabilities. The
Navy also makes use of shore-based simulators and vessel training centers to help maintain year-round readiness levels.222

Paramilitary Forces
China Coast Guard. The CCG is responsible for a wide range of missions, including theenforcement of China’s sovereignty claims,
antismuggling, surveillance, protection of fisheries resources, and general law enforcement.
Maritime law enforcement responsibilities
before 2013 were scattered across a numberof organizations but have since been consolidated to establish more effective command andcontrol. CCG ships are subordinate to the People's Armed Police and take part in Bejing's
whole-of-govenrment approach to maritime
disputes. China primarily uses civilian maritime law enforcement agencies in maritime
disputes, employing the PLAN in a protective
capacity in case of escalation.223
The CCG has rapidly increased and modernized its forces, improving China’s ability to
enforce its maritime claims. Since 2010, the
CCG’s large patrol ship fleet (more than 1,00078tons) has more than doubled in size from about
60 to more than 130 ships, making it by far
the largest coast guard force in the world andincreasing its capacity to conduct extended offshore operations in a number of disputed areas
simultaneously. Furthermore, the newer ships
are substantially larger and more capable thanthe older ships, and the majority are equippedwith helicopter facilities, high-capacity watercannons, and guns ranging from 30-mm to76-mm. Among these ships, a number arecapable of long-distance, long-endurance outof-area operations. In addition, the CCG operates more than 70 fast patrol combatants(more than 500 tons), which can be used forlimited offshore operations, and more than
400 coastal patrol craft (as well as about 1,000
inshore and riverine patrol boats). By the endof the decade, the CCG is expected to add up to
30 patrol ships and patrol combatants before
the construction program levels off.224

Haixun class cutter conducting port visit to
Honolulu, Hawaii – September 2012.
Image Source: DVIDSModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Amphibious Capabilities
The PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) is the
PLAN’s land combat arm. Its primary mission
is to conduct offensive and defensive amphibious assault in the South China Sea, including
the Paracel Island and Spratly Island chains,and potentially the Senkaku Islands.227 The
PLANMC is tasked with seizing and consolidating beachheads, destroying an opposing
force at the beachhead and adjacent areas,organizing landing areas, and supporting
landings by the PLAA. Other missions include
conducting amphibious raids; seizing andoccupying enemy naval bases, seaports, andislands; building beachhead protective zones;
and covering the PLAA as it advances inlandfrom the coast.228

The seas and oceans bear on the enduring
peace, lasting stability, and sustainable
development of China…The traditional
mentality that land outweighs the sea
must be abandoned.
—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy,
May 2015

A G E N C Y

A large number of PAFMM vessels train withand support the PLA and CCG in tasks suchas safeguarding maritime claims, protecting
fisheries, and providing logistic support, searchand rescue (SAR), and surveillance and reconnaissance. The Chinese government subsidizes
local and provincial commercial organizations to operate militia ships to perform “official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside theirregular commercial roles. The PAFMM has
played a noteworthy role in a number of military campaigns and coercive incidents over theyears, including the harassment of Vietnamese survey ships in 2011, a standoff with thePhilippines at Scarborough Reef in 2012, anda standoff involving a Chinese oil rig in 2014.
In the past, the PAFMM rented fishing boats
from companies or individual fisherman, but it
appears that China is building a state-owned
fishing fleet for its maritime militia force in theSouth China Sea. Hainan Province, adjacent to
the South China Sea, ordered the constructionof 84 large militia fishing boats with reinforced
hulls and ammunition storage for Sansha City,and the militia took delivery by the end of
2016.226

I N T E L L I G E N C E

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia.
The PAFMM is a subset of China’s national
militia, an armed reserve force of civilians
available for mobilization to perform basic
support duties. Militia units organize aroundtowns, villages, urban subdistricts, and enterprises, and they vary widely from one location to another. The composition and missionof each unit reflects local conditions and personnel skills. In the South China Sea, thePAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without
fighting, part of broader Chinese military doctrine that states that confrontational operations short of war can be an effective means ofaccomplishing political objectives.225

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

79

Roles and Missions. The PLANMC’s mission
appears to be evolving beyond amphibious
operations and toward a more expeditionary
mission beyond China’s borders. This is in linewith the PLA’s evolving strategy as outlined in
China’s Military Strategy.229,230 For the PLAN,
the New Historic Missions mean an increased
focus on “diversified missions” or noncombat
missions. Many of the tasks assigned to thearmed forces in the white paper are ideallysuited to the PLANMC, including ensuring
Chinese sovereignty claims, safeguarding China’s security and interests “in new domains,”
safeguarding the security of China’s interests
overseas, and performing such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights andinterest protection, and guard duty.231 The
PLANMC already is designated a rapid-reaction force for the PLA and has deployed on
numerous occasions in response to natural
disasters in China, including floods and earthquakes.232 The PLANMC is the natural landbased force of choice for HADR efforts overseas. In 2017, the PLA also chose to deploy
PLANMC troops to the PLA’s first overseas
base, in Djibouti, reflecting the Marine Corps’
growing role in China’s military.
Elements of the PLANMC are consistently
deployed as part of the PLAN’s counterpiracy
task groups operating in the Gulf of Aden.233 The
size of the embarked force is no larger than aplatoon. These Marines may be regular infantry
troops but more likely come from an amphibious reconnaissance group subordinate to theamphibious reconnaissance battalion. They arehighly trained in the tactics, techniques, and80

PLA marines conduct helicopter entry/exit training.
Image Source: DIMOC

procedures required for a counterpiracy mission,
including VBSS, hostage rescue, and small-teamassault. VBSS tactics include fast-roping or rappelling from PLAN helicopters.234
Units. The PLANMC is subordinate to the
PLAN and consists of seven brigades.235 Marinebrigades are located in each of the North,East, and South Sea Fleets’ areas of responsibility.236,237 Recent PLA reforms included
the establishment of a PLANMC headquarters, probably to oversee the administrativeman, train, and equip functions of the growing
Marine Corps, and also included the appointment of the PLANMC’s first commander.238,239
Each brigade has a headquarters element, anarmored regiment, at least two infantry battalions, a howitzer battalion, a missile battalion, a communications and guard battalion,
an engineer and chemical defense battalion,a maintenance battalion, and an amphibious reconnaissance battalion (special operations).240 Estimates of the PLANMC’s troop
strength differ widely and have been reported
as high as 35,000, but the actual number isImage Source: AFP

PLANMC Capabilities and Equipment
ZBD-05 AIFVZLT-05 AAG

PLZ-07B SP Howitzer

Weight26.5 tons

28 tons24.5 tonsCrew

3 + 8 infantry

4

5

Speed (in water)~20 kn~20 kn

UNK

Speed (on land)+40 mph+40 mph+40 mph30-mm cannon(4-km max range)

105-mm gun

122-mm cannon(18-km max range)

Red Arrow antitank
guided missile (ATGM)(2x)

Red Arrow ATGM

Main armament

I N T E L L I G E N C E

PLANMC units conduct an amphibious assault during a training exercise.

A G E N C YModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

81

probably between 28,000 and 35,000, evenly
divided among the 7 brigades.241,242,243 The
PLAN provides the PLANMC with both maritime and air (helicopter) transport, a force
enabler for PLANMC amphibious warfare
operations.244 The PLANMC does not havean organic air assault element and probably
would rely on PLAN ground-attack fixed-wing
aircraft or PLAA helicopters in a close air support role. The PLANMC also has a limited
logistics capability.
Equipment. The PLANMC is a fully amphibious force capable of conducting amphibious
assault operations using combined-arms tactics and multiple avenues of approach. It is
the most capable amphibious force of any
South China Sea claimant. The PLANMC
can simultaneously seize multiple islands in
the Spratlys. It also is capable of rapidly reinforcing China’s outposts in the Paracels. The

82

PLANMC still faces challenges and limitationsin close air support/air assault and logistics
sustainment for large-scale amphibious operations. The PLANMC is incapable of defeatingnear-peer or peer countries such as the UnitedStates, Japan, South Korea, and Russia in
amphibious or ground warfare.
The PLANMC’s primary fighting vehicles are
based on a single chassis and include the ZBD05 AIFV and the ZLT-05 amphibious assault
gun.245,246 Noncombatant amphibious variantsof the ZBD chassis include an armored recovery vehicle and an armored ambulance.247 Additional combat equipment includes man-portable air defense systems, antipersonnel mortars,
antitank rocket launchers, and flamethrowers.
The PLANMC is also equipped with amphibious combat engineering equipment for obstacle
removal, beach improvement, and constructionof defenses once ashore.248

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

APPENDIX C: PLA Air Force

Roles and Missions
The PLAAF’s role is to serve as a comprehensive strategic air force capable of long-range
airpower projection:250

The above excerpt illustrates the expandingroles and missions of the PLAAF. Whereas in
the mid-1990s, the PLAAF’s primary responsibilities were to protect China’s airfields, urban
centers, transportation systems, and militaryfacilities, the PLAAF is enhancing its ability to
conduct both offensive and defensive air operations farther from China’s borders.251

A G E N C Y—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy,
May 2015

I N T E L L I G E N C E

In 2017, the PLAAF reorganized its force structure as part of broader PLA reforms. Changes
included establishing at least six new airbases
and restructuring the force’s previously subordinate regiments into brigades under these newly
established bases by disbanding fighter andfighter-bomber divisions. The PLAAF also relocated or resubordinated some units to different
theater commands and redesignated the 15th
Airborne Corps as the PLA Airborne Corps. 249

In line with the strategic requirement ofbuilding air-space capabilities and conducting offensive and defensive operations, the
PLA Air Force (PLAAF) will endeavor toshift its focus from territorial air defense toboth defense and offense and build an airspace defense force structure that can meetthe requirements of informatized operations. The PLAAF will boost its capabilities
for strategic early warning, air strike, airand missile defense, information countermeasures, airborne operations, strategic
projection, and comprehensive support.

D E F E N S E

The PLAAF is the largest air force in theregion and the third largest in the world, withmore than 2,500 total aircraft (not including
UAVs or trainers) and 1,700 combat aircraft(including fighters, strategic bombers, tacticalbombers, and multimission tactical and attack
aircraft). The PLAAF is closing the gap with
Western air forces across a broad spectrum ofcapabilities, such as aircraft performance, C2,
and electronic warfare.

83

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

Major Air Units

84

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

The PLAAF is developing new medium- andlong-range stealth bombers to strike regionaland global targets. Stealth technology continues to play a key role in the development ofthese new bombers, which probably will reach
initial operational capability no sooner than
2025. These new bombers will have additional
capabilities, with full-spectrum upgrades compared with current operational bomber fleets,
and will employ many fifth-generation fighter
technologies in their design.
Early Warning. Airborne early warning andcontrol (AEW&C) aircraft, such as China’s
KJ-2000 Mainring, KJ-200 Moth, and KJ-500,
are force multipliers, amplifying the capabilities to detect, track, and target threats.
These aircraft extend the range of a country’s integrated air defense system network.
In particular, these systems are better suited
to detecting low-altitude targets at greater
standoff distances.

PLAAF J-11BS multirole fighter aircraft.
Image Source: AFP

Fighters. Although the PLAAF still operates
a large number of older second- and third-generation fighters, it will probably become amajority fourth-generation force within thenext several years. The PLAAF has fielded
at least 600 fourth-generation fighters and isalready developing fifth-generation fighters.
[Note: what the U.S. and Western militaries
refer to as fourth-generation fighters, China
refers to as third-generation. This is because the
PLA never had first-generation fighters—its firstfighter aircraft were second-generation fighters
acquired from Russia.]A G E N C Y

Bombers. China’s bomber force comprises
variants of the H-6 Badger bomber, and the
PLAAF has worked to maintain and enhancethe operational effectiveness of these aircraft.
The H-6K variant, which China is fielding in
greater numbers, integrates standoff weapons
and features more efficient turbofan engines inredesigned wing roots.252 This extended-range
aircraft can carry six LACMs, providing the
PLA a long-range, standoff, precision-strikecapability that can reach Guam.

PLAAF AEW&C aircraft also incorporate stateof-the-art radar technology, such as active
electronically scanned array radars that offer
instantaneous target updates, electronic beamsteering, advanced/specialized radar modes,
very large search volumes, and the ability tostare at a target or track thousands of targets
simultaneously. These features combine toprovide faster target acquisition time, moreaccurate target position data, and increased
ability to detect low-observable targets.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Equipment

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

85

Fourth-generation fighter aircraft*—which include the Chinese J-10B/C, J-11B, andJ-16—are generally characterized by the following:• Electronically or mechanically scanned multimode radars, passive infrared search andtrack systems.
• “Glass” cockpits with multifunction displays (MFDs), improved heads-up display(HUD), and helmet-mounted sight (HMS).
• High-bandwidth communications and datalinks and identification, friend or foe (IFF).
• Advanced electronic warfare (EW) avionics, including digital jamming system, radar
warning receiver, chaff/flare dispensers, and adaptive countermeasures.
• Engines with increased thrust and service life; advanced weapons, including longrange air-to-air missiles (AAMs), off-boresight short-range AAMs, LACMs, ASCMs,
and precision-guided munitions (PGMs).
• Passive electronically scanned array or active electronically scanned array (AESA)
radars. These radars provide long-range radar detection and electronically scannedradar beams that enable automatic target acquisition, tracking of multiple targets, andhighly accurate targeting data for air-to-air and precision air-to-ground engagements.
• Digital radiofrequency memory (DRFM) jammers enabling instantaneous smart jamming responses by automatically selecting jamming waveforms to counter a specificradar threat—significantly improving fighter aircraft survivability.
Fifth-generation fighter aircraft*, including the developmental Chinese J-20 and
FC-31/J-31, are commonly defined by the following state-of-the-art technologies:• Stealthy aircraft designs with significantly reduced radar and infrared signatures.
• AESA radars.
• Long-range, multiband EO targeting systems.
• Sensor fusion.
• Advanced glass cockpits with large MFDs and HMSs.
• Advanced datalinks fusing data from air and ground networks.
• Internal carriage of off-boresight and long-range AAMs, LACMs, ASCMs, and PGMs.
• Sophisticated EW suites with advanced DRFM jammers and EO defensive systems.
• Super maneuverability and/or super cruise capability (ability to fly above Mach 1 without use of afterburner).
• Designed with network-centric warfare technology; will have potent air-to-air lethality
and standoff attack capabilities in sensor-to-shooter operations.
*U.S.- defined fourth and fifth generation fighter aircraft in China.

86

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. During thepast 2 years, the PLA has improved its UAV
capabilities, unveiled new aircraft that combine strike capability with aerial reconnaissance, and deployed select platforms to newareas, such as the South China Sea. Examples
include China’s first turbine-powered armed
reconnaissance UAV, the Yunying (Cloud
Shadow), and the armed ISR UAV Gongji 1.
China also has sold armed UAVs to customers
such as Iraq. Marketing material for China’s
armed UAVs cites speeds of 170 mph, endurance of 20 hours, and payloads of two or more
air-to-surface guided munitions.
Surface-to-Air Missiles. The PLAAF has
one of the largest forces of advanced longrange SAM systems in the world, made up
of a combination of Russian-sourced SA-20(S-300PMU1/2) battalions and domestically
produced CSA-9 (HQ-9) battalions. In early

Effective use of information is critical to strengthening the PLAAF, and development and acquisition of systems and platforms are trending inthis direction. Information demand will necessitate a tight synchronization of C4ISR with operations. By 2020, the PLAAF probably hopes todevelop an ISR capability to effectively support
traditional air missions, including ground support and air superiority, along with the PLA’s
emerging military capabilities in space. From
the PLAAF’s perspective, this essentially means
seamlessly melding all of its air and space capabilities, a significant challenge.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Image Source: AFP

D E F E N S E

PLAAF KJ-2000 airborne early warning and control
system aircraft.

Transport. China’s aviation industry continues to test its Y-20 large transport aircraft for
introduction into the PLA’s operational inventory to supplement and eventually replace
China’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets,
which includes a limited number of Russian-made Il-76 aircraft. The Y-20 conducted
its maiden flight in early 2013 and reportedly
uses the same Russian engines as the Il-76.
The large transports are intended to support
airborne C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial refueling, and strategic reconnaissance operations
as well as HADR.

A G E N C Y

2018, Russia began delivering to China the
S-400/Triumf SAM system, which Beijing will
use to improve its strategic air defense systems
as a follow-on to the SA-20.253 The PLAAF may
simultaneously develop its domestically produced CSA-X-19 (HQ-19) to provide the basis
for a ballistic missile defense capability.

87Aircraft Systems Characteristics
ChineseMannedAircraft

U.S.
Generation Mission/Role Status

Off-BoreAESA Long-Range sight A/ARadar A/A Missiles Missiles

PrecisionGuided
Munitions

J-7

2nd

Fighter

Operational

J-8

3rd

Fighter

Operational

X

Su-30

4th

Multirole Fighter

Operational

X

J-10A

4th

Multirole Fighter

Operational

J-11B

4th

Multirole Fighter

Operational

X

X

J-10B

4th+

Multirole Fighter

Operational

X

X

X

Mach 1.8 class

J-10C

4th+

Multirole Fighter

X

X

X

X

Mach 1.8 class

J-16

4th+

Multirole Fighter

X

X

X

X

Mach 2 class

Su-35S

4th+

Multirole Fighter

Buying from
RussiaX

X

X

Mach 2 class

J-20

5th

Multirole Fighter

Development

X

X

X

X

Mach 2 class

FC-31/J-31

5thMultirole Fighter

Development

X

X

X

X

Mach 1.8 class

JH-7

N/A

Fighter-Bomber

Operational

X

Mach 1.7 class

H-6

N/A

BomberOperationalX

Subsonic

Tactical Bomber Next Gen

Fighter-Bomber

Development

X

Strategic Bomber Next Gen

Long-Range Bomber Development

X

KJ-2000

N/A

AEW&C

OperationalX

Subsonic

KJ-200N/A

AEW&C

OperationalX

Subsonic

KJ-500N/A

AEW&C

OperationalX

Subsonic

Speed

Mach 2 class

X

Mach 2 class
X

X

Mach 2 class

X

Mach 1.8 class
Mach 2 class

X
X+ Indicates a generation of aircraft has been partially upgraded with next-generation capabilities.
PLAAF literature paints a detailed picture of tomorrow’s air wars battlespace. It will be
an uncertain, hotly contested environment where decisions will be made with extreme
alacrity, requiring highly specialized equipment. The entire battlespace will be information-driven, from command staff decisions and supporting C2 all the way to the very
weapons the PLAAF desires.

88

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Training and Exercises

During the past few years, the PLAAF hasrevamped its training program and now seeks
to replicate real-world combat environments
as closely as possible. Through its four “namebrand exercises”—RED SWORD, GOLDENHELMET, GOLDEN DART, and BLUESHIELD—the PLAAF is making incremental improvements to its training regimen. The
PLAAF continues to seek engagement withforeign air forces, such as by participating in
the Russian-sponsored Aviadarts air-to-groundcompetition and the FALCON STRIKE exercise
with the Royal Thai Air Force, to gain exposure
to foreign operational concepts and tactics.
The effect of these training initiatives on operational capabilities remains to be seen; however, the PLAAF is beginning to codify fundamental changes to the training philosophy thatare expected to improve the PLA’s air capa-

A G E N C Y

Airborne Corps. As part of ongoing militaryreforms, in 2017 the PLAAF reorganized its
airborne units into a new corps—the PLA
Airborne Corps—consisting of six airborne
brigades, a special operations brigade, an aviation brigade, and a support brigade. Previously, airborne forces fell under the PLAAF
15th Airborne Corps and were organized
into three airborne divisions, supported bya special operations group, with both fixedand rotary-wing assets.254 The PLA Airborne
Corps’ main purpose is to carry out operations
including parachute, aircraft landing, andmixed parachute and aircraft landing. According to PLAA doctrine, the main advantage ofairborne operations is to “cut across grounddefense lines and topographical obstacles to
unfold attacks directly inside the enemy disposition.”255 These operations are designed tosupport main-force operational efforts, seize
and hold key targets and areas in the enemy’s
depth (such as airfields and bridges), blockan enemy’s retreat, block reinforcement byenemy reserve forces, and conduct raids on
key targets in the enemy’s depth.256

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Image Source: AFP

D E F E N S E

Two J-10 fighters refueling with an H-6U tanker.

Numerous professional articles and speeches
by high-ranking Chinese officers indicate the
PLAAF does not believe that its past training
practices prepared its pilots and other personnel for actual combat. Unrealistic training
manifested itself in multiple ways that hindered the PLA’s air combat capabilities. The
PLA recognizes that a gap exists between theskills of its pilots and those in “the air forces ofpowerful nations.” To address training weaknesses, the former PLAAF commander said
that when the PLAAF trains, it must “train forbattle” instead of “doing things for show…[or]going through the motions.”

89

bilities during the coming years. A key factor
in this development is the PLAAF’s use ofadvanced air combat maneuvering instrumentation (ACMI) systems, which enable the force
to train with more realism and learn morefrom each event while meeting safety requirements. The ACMI system allows the PLAAF
to monitor air combat training in real time
and to adjudicate interactions such as aircraft
maneuvering, weapons employment, jamming,and use of chaff and flares. Coupled with foreign engagements, the use of ACMI in training
offers the PLAAF the opportunity to accelerate
its progress in training.

The PLAAF has also made advances in joint
training. Traditionally Army-only exercises
now incorporate PLAAF participation, andlarge-scale joint exercises have given the
PLA opportunities to test its forces’ progress
toward being able to operate in a true joint
environment. Although more recent exercises
suggest improvement and increased sophistication, systemic shortfalls identified in several
PLA training events—difficulty in coordination, obstacles to information sharing, limited
realism, and a continued reliance on scripting—persist as problems for PLA and PLAAF
leaders, hampering key functions, such as air
defense, targeting, battle damage assessment,
and air support to ground forces.

Two fighter jets during a military drill over the South China Sea.
Image Source: AFP

90

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

APPENDIX D: PLA Rocket ForcePrincipal Weapon Systems
The PLARF has about 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and China is increasing the lethality of its conventional missile
force by fielding the CSS-11/DF-16 ballistic
missile, with a range of 800 to 1,000 kilometers. The CSS-11/DF-16, coupled with thealready deployed conventional land-attack
and antiship variants of the CSS-5/DF-21

China unveiled the DF-26 intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM) during its September
2015 military parade in Beijing. The DF-26 iscapable of conducting precision strikes against
ground targets and contributes to China’s
counterintervention posture in the Asia-Pacific region. During the parade, official publicstatements also referenced a nuclear versionof the DF-26, which, if it has the same guidance capabilities, would give China its firstnuclear precision-strike capability against
theater targets.

A G E N C Y

The PLARF operates China’s strategic landbased nuclear and conventional missiles and isa critical component of China’s deterrence strategy and efforts to counter third-party intervention in regional conflicts. The PLARF also ischarged with developing and testing several
new classes and variants of long-range missiles,
forming additional missile units, upgradingolder missile systems, and developing methods
to counter ballistic missile defenses.

The Rocket Force is fielding conventional
MRBMs to increase the range at which it canconduct precision strikes against land targets
and naval ships (including aircraft carriers)
operating from China’s shores out to the firstisland chain—the islands running from theKurils, through Taiwan, to Borneo, roughly
encompassing the Yellow Sea, East China
Sea, and South China Sea. The CSS-5 Mod-5/
DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 kilometers and has a maneuverable warhead. During
the PLA’s 90th anniversary parade in 2017,
China displayed a new MRBM designatedthe DF-16G, which China claims featureshigh accuracy, short preparation time, and an
improved maneuverable terminal stage thatcan better infiltrate missile defense systems.258

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Roles and Missions

medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), will
improve China’s ability to strike not only Taiwan but other regional targets.

D E F E N S E

As part of military reforms initiated in late 2015,
the PLA Second Artillery Force was renamed
the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and for the firsttime the force was elevated to a full service on
equal footing with the PLA Army, Navy, and Air
Force. PLARF weapons systems include dozens
of ICBMs and hundreds of theater-range missiles for precision strike against major adversary military and civilian infrastructure.257

91

A CSS-5 Mod 5/DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) system on parade.
Image Source: AFP

The PLARF also continues to enhance its
nuclear deterrent, maintaining silo-based
nuclear ICBMs and adding more survivable,
mobile nuclear delivery systems. China currently has 75 to 100 ICBMs, including the silobased CSS-4 Mod 2/DF-5A and MIRV-equipped
CSS-4 Mod 3/DF-5B; the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1/DF-31 and CSS-10 Mod 2/
DF-31A; and the shorter range CSS-3/DF-4.
The CSS-10 Mod 2/DF-31A has a range of morethan 11,200 kilometers and can reach most
locations within the continental United States.
China also is developing a new MIRV-capableroad-mobile ICBM, the CSS-X-10/DF-41.

92

The CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missile(GLCM) has a range in excess of 1,500 kilometers and offers flight profiles different fromballistic missiles, enhancing targeting options.
Because of overlap in the kinds of targets
China is likely to engage with either ballistic
missiles or cruise missiles, GLCMs and airlaunched land-attack cruise missiles provide
key operational and planning flexibility. These
weapons are likely to reduce the burden on
ballistic missile forces as well as create somewhat safer strike opportunities for Chinese
aircrews, allowing them to engage from muchgreater distances and from more advantageous
locations. This will complicate an adversary’s
air and missile defense problem.

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

Warheads

Propellant

Deployment Max
Mode
Range km

CSS-3/DF-4

ICBM

NuclearLiquidROTL**

5,500+

CSS-4/DF-5

ICBM

NuclearLiquidSilo

12,000-13,000

CSS-7/DF-11

SRBM

Conventional

Solid

Mobile300-600

CSS-6/DF-15

SRBM

Conventional

Solid

Mobile600-850+

CSS-11/DF-16

SRBM

Conventional

Solid

Mobile800-1,000

CSS-5/DF-21

MRBM

Nuclear andConventional
Variants

Solid

Mobile1,500-1,750+

CSS-5 Mod-5/DF-21D

ASBM

Conventional

Solid

Mobile1,500+

DF-26

IRBM

Nuclear andConventional
Variants

Solid

Mobile

4,000

CSS-10/DF-31

ICBM

Nuclear

Solid

Mobile7,200-11,200

CJ-10

GLCM

Conventional

Solid

Mobile1500+*This chart does not include systems in development.
** Rollout to Launch

I N T E L L I G E N C E

TypeD E F E N S E

SystemA G E N C Y

PLA Rocket Force Systems*

93

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

China’s Conventional and Nuclear Strike Range

94Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

The PLARF is moving away from a dependence
on conscripted personnel and is developing atechnically qualified enlisted force. In addition,
the force is modifying its annual training cycle
to incorporate more complicated training earlier
in the year, enabling PLARF units to better prepare to participate in PLA joint training in thefall. The force also reportedly has implemented arating system for unit training as well as accreditation criteria for personnel at critical posts.

PLARF training includes annual live missile
launches that allow the missile brigades topractice all required procedures. Much like theincrease in complexity for other PLA training
events, recent Rocket Force guidance has called
for the participating missile units to increase
the difficulty and intensity of live launches.

A G E N C Y

PLARF participation in joint force training has
increased during the past few years, and all PLA
joint training events probably now include atleast some level of PLARF involvement, such as
PLARF field operations in support of the exercise. This development indicates an increased
emphasis on joint firepower operations.

The PLARF now regularly conducts training under extreme weather and geographicalconditions and in complex electromagnetic
and nuclear, biological, and chemical environments. The PLARF’s goal is to train under
actual combat conditions, which include contending with enemy special forces, satellite
reconnaissance, electromagnetic jamming,and air attacks. To that end, the PLARF has
worked to improve its training against a modern (informatized) “blue force” that portrays asuperior adversary.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Training

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

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APPENDIX E: PLA Strategic Support ForceIn December 2015, Beijing established theStrategic Support Force (SSF) to provide the
PLA with cyber, aerospace, and electronic warfare capabilities.259 The SSF forms the core of
China’s information warfare force, supports
the entire PLA, and reports directly to the
CMC. The force’s formation appears to be theoutcome of debate in the PLA since the 1980s
regarding PLA needs in a potential conflictwith peer nations. According to a Ministry of
National Defense spokesman, “The SSF will
integrate reconnaissance, early warning, communications, command, control, [and] navigation … and will provide strong support for joint
operations for each military service branch.”260
A key aspect of the SSF is that the new bodyunites previously dispersed elements, pro-

The PLA’s 90th anniversary parade in July
2017 included the participation of an SSF
electronic reconnaissance formation, which
reportedly provides highly mobile, integrated,
flexible, multidomain information warfare
capabilities. The unit’s mission reportedly is
seizing and maintaining battlefield information control. This focus on the SSF and oneof its premier units suggests that the PLA isincreasing the priority and prominence of the
SSF and its assigned missions to tackle themilitary’s deficiencies in controlling complex
electromagnetic environments.261

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Image Source: Wikicommons

D E F E N S E

Strategic Support Force Insignia

The SSF constitutes the first steps in the development of a cyberforce by combining cyberreconnaissance, cyberattack, and cyberdefense capabilities into one organization to
reduce bureaucratic hurdles and centralize
command and control. The SSF also appears
to be in line with PLA efforts to support andexecute modern informatized warfare.

A G E N C Y

viding more centralized command and control of China’s cyber, space, and electronic
warfare capabilities. Before the 2015 structural reforms, for example, responsibility forspace, cyber, and electronic warfare missions
rested with offices across the former General
Armaments Department and the General
Staff Department (GSD), including the GSD
Technical Department and GSD Electronic
Countermeasures and Radar Department.

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APPENDIX F: Chinese Intelligence Services

Domestic Security. The Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) is China’s principal domestic
security agency and is responsible for overseeing the country’s domestic policing andpublic security activities. Although the MPS
is not directly involved in domestic intelligence gathering, it has domestic intelligence
functions, including investigating corruption
cases, countering threats to political andsocial stability, countering terrorism, andpolicing the Internet.266,267

Signals Intelligence. The former PLA Third
Department (3PLA) was one of the GSD’s
subdepartments but postreform has probably been renamed and subordinated under
the SSF. This element controls a vast signals
intelligence (SIGINT) and computer network

A G E N C Y

Military Intelligence. The former PLA Second Department (2PLA) was a subdepartment of the GSD. Postreform, the 2PLA has
been identified as the Intelligence Bureau of
the Joint Staff Department under the Central Military Commission.271 This bureau
carries out the military’s overt reporting andclandestine human intelligence collection
operations, provides indications and warningand other analysis to the CMC leadership,runs the defense attaché network, and manages intelligence produced by dedicated PLA
reconnaissance assets.272,273,274

I N T E L L I G E N C E

Civilian Intelligence. The Ministry ofState Security (MSS) is China’s main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence service.264 MSS missions include protecting China’s national security, securing political andsocial stability, implementing the updated
State Security Law and related laws andregulations, protecting state secrets, andconducting counterintelligence.265

Political Work. The General Political Department Liaison Department, which probably was
renamed the Political Work Department Liaison Bureau (PWD/LB) during recent reforms, isthe PLA’s principal organization responsible forpolitical warfare and for collecting and analyzing
intelligence information regarding senior-level
officers from the United States, Taiwan, Japan,
and other defense establishments of interest.268
269
The PWD/LB functions as an interlocking
directorate that operates at the nexus of politics,
finance, military operations, and intelligence.
The PWD/LB has few analogous counterparts inmodern democratic societies. 270

D E F E N S E

In June 2017, China passed a National Intelligence Law specifying that “state intelligencework” would fall under the “central national
security leadership body,” and military intelligence work would fall under the Central
Military Commission.262 The central national
security leadership body may refer to an intelligence committee structure subordinate to
China’s Central National Security Commission.263 The PLA’s national-level intelligencesystem is still undergoing changes as part ofbroader military reform efforts.

99

operations infrastructure. The PLA’s SIGINT
and cyber assets target foreign satellite, line ofsight, and over-the-horizon communications,as well as computer networks.275,276
Electronic Intelligence. The former PLA
Fourth Department (4PLA) was a subdepartment of the GSD, but postreform has

100

probably been renamed and subordinated to
the SSF. This element is primarily responsible for offensive electronic warfare, but it
is generally believed to maintain electronic
intelligence capabilities.277,278

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

APPENDIX G: Military Resources, Infrastructure, and Logistics

As part of the 2015 reorganization, the CMC
eliminated the GLD, replacing the organization
with the Logistic Support Department (LSD).
The new LSD’s strategic and administrativeroles include establishing logistic policies andconducting inspections.282 The LSD also provides
oversight for the general purpose supply chain,military facility construction, and equipment
management. The head of the LSD does not havea seat on the CMC, unlike his predecessor in the
GLD, probably in part to reduce corruption andstreamline PLA command and control.
Separately, the PLA established the Joint
Logistic Support Force (JLSF) in September
2016, charged with planning and executing
integrated joint logistic support for strategic
campaign operations.283,284 The JLSF oversees
theaterwide supply operations, while service branches retain service-specific supply
responsibilities.285 The force is headquartered
at a joint logistic support base in Wuhan andA G E N C Y

Image Source: DVIDSI N T E L L I G E N C E

The PLA has gradually integrated its militaryand civilian sectors by drawing on private (orcivilian) companies to supplement its logistics
resources. Before reforms, the PLA’s supply
system was controlled at multiple levels. The
former General Logistics Department (GLD)
provided general purpose supplies, such as
food, shelter, and fuel. Specific branches ofeach service maintained special materiel
unique to the PLAN and PLAAF. Redundantservice and joint supply processes createdinefficiencies within the logistics system. Corruption, bribery, and misuse of funds further
reduced the effectiveness of strategic logistic
support. Reforms to the PLA logistics system
combined with vigorous anticorruption measures are intended to both improve the efficiency of logistic support and reduce waste
within the system.280,281

PLAN Fusu class replenishment ship Qinghaihu.

D E F E N S E

The PLA’s centralized control supply system uses a push-pull process for replenishment. This means that supplies are pushed
to the troops based on standard demand anduse; individual units pull supplies when theyrequire additional materiel. Shortfalls in logistic support to PLA operations, even going backto China’s military conflict with Vietnam in thelate 1970s, when troops were ill equipped andencountered replenishment problems, haveprompted the PLA to modernize its logistic
support to match the modern requirements of
its forces.279 This incremental transformation
began in 2002 but also has been a major focusof the PLA’s ongoing reform efforts.

101

commands five subordinate support centers.286 The reorganization centralizes logistics operations under one chain of command
to more efficiently support theater and strategic logistics operations.
Much like structural changes that separated
operational control of the PLA from force-building efforts among the PLA’s services, theestablishment of the LSD and JLSF separated
logistics management from logistic support tocombat operations and probably was intended
to shorten resource replenishment timelines
across the PLA. These logistic reforms require
testing to determine whether they will beeffective in helping China overcome some of its
combat inefficiencies and successfully support
regional and national military operations.
[The PLA will focus on] developing uniform military and civilian standards forinfrastructure, key technical areas, andmajor industries, exploring methods fortraining military personnel in industries,
and outsourcing logistics support to civilian support systems.
—Excerpt from China’s Military Strategy,
May 2015

The PLA also has continued its efforts toimprove civil-military integration as a corefunction of logistic support to military operations under the LSD and JLSF constructs.
This entails leveraging civilian sector capabilities and technologies to support military
logistics to improve efficiency and reduce costs.

102

The PLA continues to increase its use of civilian-controlled assets in military operations
and exercises, most notably civilian groundtransportation and ships supporting joint
exercises and civilian firms providing supplies
to mitigate logistic shortfalls.287,288,289

Military Transportation
China has a robust transportation infrastructure and is enlarging its transportation network
to keep up with the country’s economic growthand increasing military demand. Althoughmost of China’s rail lines, roads, and seaports
are sufficient to support military transportation and mobilization, the variability of infrastructure throughout the country is an ongoingchallenge. For example, western China’s transportation network is more limited than thatof eastern China.290,291,292 Beijing is addressing
this problem by initiating infrastructure projects and targeted funding allocations. Futuretransportation network improvements willbolster the PLA’s ability to mobilize by moving higher numbers of units more expediently
across greater spans of the country.
The PLA primarily relies on rail transport
to move large numbers of ground troops andlarge amounts of equipment.293 The Chinese
rail network comprises about 100,000 kilometers of rail, 10,000 kilometers of which is highspeed track supporting trains running at up to
250 kilometers per hour.294 The PLA also relieson the road network to transport troops andmilitary equipment. Traffic congestion, tolls,
and bottlenecks limit the capacity of easternModernizing a Force to Fight and Win

In mid-2016, China allocated $600 billion aspart of a 3-year plan (2016-2018) to continue
improving its transportation network and,later the same year, passed the Defense Transportation Law (DTL) authorizing the management, development, and production of dual-use
facilities and equipment to support nationaland regional PLA operations.301 The DTL also
regulates the planning, construction, management, and use of transportation resources fornational defense.302 Governments above thecounty level are required to include national
defense transportation development in their

China’s territorial claims in the South China
Sea are driving major logistic developmentsin the Spratly and Paracel Islands. China’s
reclaimed territory in the South China Sea
is equipped with harbors and berthing areasthat are capable of accommodating large naval
ships, increasing the PLAN’s ability to exercise
control of critical SLOCs.304
China is expanding its access to foreign ports,such as in Gwadar, Pakistan, to pre-position
the logistic framework necessary to support
the PLA’s growing presence abroad, including normalizing and sustaining deployments
into and beyond the Indian Ocean. China’s
announcement in 2015 of its intention to build
military facilities in Djibouti cited aims “to help
the Navy and Army further participate in UN
peacekeeping operations, carry out escort missions in the waters near Somalia and the Gulfof Aden, and provide humanitarian assistance.”

A G E N C Y

China also is improving its existing domestic
airfields to handle heavier payloads, constructing airfields on islands and outposts in theSouth China Sea, and restructuring airfields
to support military and civilian use.299 As ofJune 2016, about one-third of China’s airports
supported military and civilian use.300 The PLA
exercises control of China’s airspace, filling arole similar to that which the Federal Aviation
Administration plays in controlling airspacein the United States. Although the Civil Aviation Administration of China administers Chinese civil aviation, PLA authority takes precedence over the airspace. Consequently, the
PLA regularly adjusts civil aviation schedules
and flightpaths to avoid PLA activities, such as
exercises and other operations.

socioeconomic development plan and to give themilitary basic information about civil transportation tools.303 The DTL grants the PLA authority over civil transportation systems during
wartime. Structuring the transportation infrastructure and facilities as a dual-use system
avoids the additional costs of building separate
airports, railways, ports, and roads for the military. The PLA’s efforts to obtain access to commercial ports in Africa, the Middle East, andSouth Asia would align with its future overseas logistic needs and meet its evolving naval
requirements. The PLAN is likely to use commercial ports and civilian ships to support its
international and domestic logistic operations,resupply, replenishment, and maintenance.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

China’s expressways in major cities.295 Road
conditions vary from good to poorly maintained in rural areas, restricting capacity andincreasing travel times.296,297 China expects tobuild about 1.3 million kilometers of roads and26,000 kilometers of expressways by 2020.298

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

103

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

China’s Outposts in the Spratly Islands

China's claims in the Spratly Islands require constant resupply from the mainland.

Transportation is also at the heart of the Beltand Road Initiative (BRI), which consists ofestablishing roads, railways, and ports toconnect to countries from Asia to Africa andEurope. Although the BRI is marketed as primarily an effort to increase trade and develop-

104

ment, China’s improved domestic transportation infrastructure and access to transportation
infrastructure abroad also would benefit the
PLA by enhancing PLA access to transportation hubs and road systems.305,306,307

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win• In 2016, the CMC established the Scienceand Technology Commission, a high-level
defense research body, as an independent
organization under the high command. It
also emphasized the importance of “civil-military integration,” a phrase used inpart to refer to the leveraging of dual-use
technologies, policies, and organizations
for military benefit.
• In March 2016, President Xi underscoredthis message by emphasizing defense
innovation during a visit with the PLA’s
delegation to the National People’s Congress. He urged “great attention to thedevelopment of strategic, cutting-edge
technologies” for the military, among
other subjects.

The National Natural Science Foundation ofChina (NSFC), the China Academy of Sciences,and the Ministry of Science and Technology
fund and promote basic and applied research,scientific innovation, and high-technology integration throughout China’s scientific, engineering, and civil-military industrial complex. The
China Academy of Sciences, working closelywith the NSFC, is the highest academic institution for comprehensive R&D in the natural andapplied sciences in China and reports directly to
the State Council in an advisory capacity, withmuch of its work ultimately funding disciplines
and contributing to products for military use.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

China’s defense-industrial complex continues to adapt and reorganize in an effort toimprove weapon system research, development, and production to compensate foran estimated lag of one to two generations
behind its main competitors in the global
arms industry. Over the past 2 years, China
has undertaken organizational and policy
measures to reenergize the military’s workon defense research and innovation throughcooperation with the market sector.

China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020)
includes the establishment of focus areas
for research, development, and innovation.
Several of these have defense implications:aerospace engines—including turbofan technology—and gas turbines; quantum communications and computing; innovative electronics
and software; automation and robotics; special
materials and applications; nanotechnology;
neuroscience, neural research, and artificial
intelligence; and deep-space exploration andon-orbit servicing and maintenance systems.
Other areas where China is concentrating significant R&D resources include nuclear fusion,
hypersonic technology, and the deployment
and “hardening” of an expanding constellationof multipurpose satellites. China’s drive toexpand civil-military integration and international economic activity supports these goals.

D E F E N S E

Defense Industry ReformA G E N C Y

APPENDIX H: Defense Industry

105

Major Production-Sector Snapshots
Missile and Space. China’s missile programs,
including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, are comparable to those of other international top-tier producers. China’s productionof a wide range of ballistic, cruise, air-to-air,and surface-to-air missiles for the PLA and forexport has probably been enhanced by upgrades
to primary assembly and solid rocket motor
production facilities. China has also purchased
Russia’s S-400 air defense system and received
its first delivery in April 2018.308 China’s spacelaunch vehicle industry is expanding to support
commercial and rapid satellite launch services
and the manned space program.
Naval/Shipbuilding. China is the top
ship-producing nation in the world and has
increased its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all types of naval projects, including
submarines, surface combatants, naval aviation, sealift, and amphibious assets. China’s
two largest state-owned shipbuilders—the
China State Shipbuilding Corporation and
China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation—
collaborate in shared ship designs and construction information to increase shipbuilding
efficiency. China continues to invest in foreign
suppliers for some propulsion units but isbecoming increasingly self-sufficient.
Armaments. China’s production capacity
continues to advance in almost every areaof PLAA systems, including new versionsof main battle tanks and new light tanks,
armored personnel carriers, assault vehi-

106

cles, air defense artillery systems, and artillery pieces.309 China is capable of producing
ground weapon systems at or near worldclass standards; however, quality deficiencies
persist with some export equipment.
Aviation. China’s aviation industry has
advanced to produce a developmental largetransport aircraft, modern fourth- to fifth-generation fighters incorporating low-observable
technologies, modern reconnaissance andattack UAVs, and attack helicopters. China’scommercial aircraft industry has invested inhigh-precision and technologically advanced
machine tooling and production processes,
avionics, and other components applicable tothe production of military aircraft; however,China’s aircraft industry remains reliant on
foreign-sourced components for dependable,
proven, high-performance aircraft engines.
China’s infrastructure and experience related
to the production of commercial and military
aircraft are improving because of the country’s
ongoing C919 commercial airliner and Y-20
large transport programs.

China’s domestically produced WS-10 family of
military turbofan engines, which power the J11-B,
carrier-based J-15, and J-16 fighters.
Image Source: AFP

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

APPENDIX I: Arms SalesA G E N C Y

China is a niche supplier of armed UAVs andhas sold these systems to several countries in
the Middle East, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. China
faces little competition for sale of such systems
because most countries that produce them
are restricted from selling the technology as
signatories of the Missile Technology Control
Regime and or the Wassenaar Arrangement
on Export Controls for Conventional Arms andDual-Use Goods and Technologies.316

I N T E L L I G E N C E

From the perspective of China’s arms customers, most of which are developing countries, Chinese arms are less expensive than those offeredby other top international arms suppliers. They
also are generally considered to be of lower quality and reliability, but many still have advanced
capabilities. Chinese arms also come with fewer
political strings attached compared with alternative sources, which is attractive to customers
who may not have access to other sources ofarms for political or economic reasons.

The bulk of China’s sales from 2012 to 2016
were to countries in the Asia-Pacific region,
primarily Pakistan. China’s arms sales anddefense-industrial cooperation with Pakistan include selling LY-80 SAMs, naval
ships, main battle tanks, air-to-air missiles,
and fighter aircraft.311,312,313 In 2015, China
signed an agreement with Pakistan for thesale of eight submarines. Under the termsof this multibillion-dollar contract, the first
four will be built in China and the remaining
four in Pakistan.314,315

D E F E N S E

From 2012 to 2016, China’s arms sales totaled
about $20 billion, placing China among theworld’s top five global arms suppliers.310 China
primarily conducts arms sales in conjunction
with economic aid and development assistanceto support its broader foreign policy goals, suchas securing access to natural resources andexport markets, promoting its political influence among host country elites, and building
support in international forums. To a lesser
extent, arms sales also reflect the profit-seeking
activities of individual arms trading companies
in China and efforts to offset China’s defense-related research and development costs.

107

China’s Conventional Weapons and Missile-Related Customers, 2002–2017
317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328

Algeria
AngolaArgentina
Belarus
Benin
Bolivia
BurundiCambodia
Cameroon
Chad
Congo,
Democratic
Republic of108

Congo, Republic of
Cuba
Djibouti
EcuadorEquatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ghana
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
JordanKazakhstan
Kenya

KuwaitLaos
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
MoroccoMozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Niger
Nigeria

North Korea
Peru
Qatar
RwandaSaudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
SomaliaSouth Africa
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
Syria
Tanzania

Over 65 countries have been recipients of Chinese arms since 2002.

Timor-Leste
TurkeyTurkmenistan
UgandaUzbekistan
Vietnam
Yemen
ZambiaZimbabwe

Image Source: DIA, D3 Design

Other Customers

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

CWC

Chemical Weapons Convention

3PLA

PLA Third Department

C2

command and control

4PLA

PLA Fourth Department

ACMI

air combat maneuvering
instrumentation

C4ISR

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance

AEW

airborne early warning

DTL

Defense Transportation Law

AEW&C

airborne early warningand control

ECMelectronic countermeasures

EDD

Equipment Development
Department

AG

Australia GroupAIFVarmored infantry
fighting vehicle

EOelectro-optical

ESF

East Sea Fleet

AIP

air-independent propulsion

EWelectronic warfare

APC

armored personnel carrier

FFG

guided-missile frigate

ASBM

antiship ballistic missileGDPgross domestic product

ASCM

antiship cruise missile

GLCM

ground-launched cruise missile

ASEAN

Association of Southeast
Asian Nations

GLD

General Logistics Department

GPS

Global Positioning System

ASW

antisubmarine warfare

GSD

General Staff Department

ASUW

antisurface warfare

BCW

Biological Weapons Convention

HADR

humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief

BRI

Belt and Road Initiative

HF

high frequency

CBWchemical and biological warfare

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

CCG

China Coast Guard

IO

information operations

CCP

Chinese Communist Party

CDIC

Central Discipline
Inspection Commission

IRBM

intermediate-range
ballistic missile

ISR

intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance

JLSF

Joint Logistics Support Force

CMC

Central Military Commission

COMSAT communications satellite

I N T E L L I G E N C E

PLA Second Department

D E F E N S E

2PLA

A G E N C Y

APPENDIX J: Glossary of Acronyms

109

JOCC

Joint Operations
Command Center

RDA

research, development,
and acquisition

JSD

Joint Staff Department

RMA

revolution in military affairs

LACM

land-attack cruise missileSAM

surface-to-air missile

LHA

landing helicopter assault

SAR

search and rescue

LSD

Logistics Support Department

MARV

maneuverable reentry vehicle

MIRV

multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle

State Administration for Science,
SASTIND Technology, Development, andIndustry for National Defense

MOOTW

military operations
other than war

MND

Ministry of National Defense

MPS

Ministry of Public Security

MRBM

medium-range ballistic missile

MSS

Ministry of State Security

NFU

no first use

NSF

SIGINTsignals intelligence

SLBM

submarine-launchedballistic missile

SLOC

sea line of communication

SLV

space launch vehicle

SOF

special operations forcesSP

self-propelled

SRBM

short-range ballistic missile

North Sea Fleet

SSBN

OPCW

Organization for the Prohibitionof Chemical Weapons

nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine

SSGN

PAFMM

People’s Armed Forces
Maritime Militia

nuclear-powered
guided-missile submarine

SSF

Strategic Support Force

PKO

peacekeeping operations

SSN

PLA

People’s Liberation Army

nuclear-powered
attack submarine

PLAA

PLA Army

SSP

PLAAF

PLA Air Force

air-independent attack
submarine

PLAN

PLA Navy

UAV

unmanned aerial vehicle

UGF

underground facility

UHFultrahigh frequency

UN

United Nations

VBSS

visit, board, search, and seizure

VHF

very high frequency

PLANMC PLA Navy Marine Corps

110

PLARF

PLA Rocket ForcePWD/LB

Political Work Department
Liaison Bureau

R&D

research and development

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the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

18 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, Office of
the Secretary of Defense; 2018.

19 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; April 2016.

20 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

A G E N C Y

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; April 2016.

gress,” Xinhua, November 03, 2017, URL: www.xinhuanet.
com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.&#65279;htm.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

August 01, 2017, URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-08/01/c_136491455.&#65279;htm.

gress,” Xinhua, November 03, 2017, URL: www.xinhuanet.
com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.&#65279;htm.

D E F E N S E

gress,” Xinhua, November 03, 2017, URL: www.xinhuanet.
com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.&#65279;htm.

113

21 “Xi Jinping rolls out leaner top line-up for China’s militarymachine,” South China Morning Post, October 26, 2017,
URL: http://www.scmp.&#65279;com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2117004/xi-jinping-rolls-out-leaner-top-linechinas-military.

22 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Devel-

opements Involving the People's Republic of China 2017;
Office of the Secretary of Defense; May 201723 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Devel-

opements Involving the People's Republic of China 2018,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018

24 “Xi Jinping rolls out leaner top line-up for China’s military

33 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; April 2016.

34 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; April 2016.

35 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; April 2016.

machine,” South China Morning Post, October 26, 2017,
URL: http://www.scmp.&#65279;com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2117004/xi-jinping-rolls-out-leaner-top-linechinas-military.

36 “The Dragon’s New Teeth,” The Economist, Bejing,

25 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, 2018.

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, April 2016.

26 “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Con-

gress,” Xinhua, November 03, 2017, URL: www.xinhuanet.
com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.&#65279;htm.

27 Maya Wang, “China’s Dystopian Push to Revolutionize

April 7th, 2012, URL: https://www.economist.com/
node/21552193.&#65279.

37 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-

38 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, 2018.

39 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

Surveillance,” Washington Post, 18 August 2017, URL:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/
wp/2017/08/18/chinas-dystopian-push-to-revolutionize-surveillance/?utm_term=.&#65279;aa85891a8c59.

40 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-

28 China’s Military Strategy White Paper; The State Coun-

41 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-

cil Information Office of the People’s Republic of China;
May 2015, Beijing; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-05/26/c_134271001.htm.

29 Viola Zhou, “Why China’s Armed Police Will Now Only Take

Orders From Xi And His Generals,” South China Morning Post,
28 December 2017, URL: http://www.scmp.&#65279;com/
news/china/policies-politics/article/2126039/reason-why-chinas-armed-police-will-now-only-take.
Liu Zhen, “China’s military police given control of coastguard
as Beijing boosts maritime security,” South China Morning
Post, 21 March 2018, URL: http://www.scmp.&#65279;com/
news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2138257/chinas-military-police-given-control-coastguard-beijing.

30

31 Timothy R. Heath, “China’s Pursuit of Overseas Security,”

RAND, 2018; p 22; accessed at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/.../RAND_RR2271.pdf.

32 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-

114

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, 2017.

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, Office of
the Secretary of Defense; 2018.
ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

42 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.
Joint Force Quarterly “China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA’s Organizational Reforms” by Phillip Saunders andJoel Wuthnow; Jul 1, 2016.

43

44 People’s Daily “Xi Jinping: Build a Modern Military Power Sys-

tem with Chinese Characteristics”; Aug 31, 2014; http://news.
xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-08/31/c_1112295195_3.htm.

45 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

47 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; April 2016.

ing to Djibouti Support Base.” Beijing China Military Online(Chines language), July 11, 2017. URL: http://www.81.cn.

60 PLA Southern Theater Command Air Force Enhances Mari-time Combat Capabilities; 21 OCT 2016; http://eng.chinamil.
com.cn/view/2016-09/05/content_7242128.htm.

61 In Depth; Why the U.S. is Frequently Provocative in Southments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

China Sea – China’s Bombers Break the Islands Chains 8
Times with Countermeasures; 02 DEC 15; http://mil.news.
Sina.com.cn/2015-12-02/1111845474.htm.

49 Xinhua “Starting with a New Style Under Fluttering Red

62 China Military Online: Three Solutions for China’s New-Gener-

48 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

Combat Banners – Observing the New Theater Commands”; Feb 2, 2016; URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-02/02/c_1117973365.htm.

50 China Military Online “Ministry of National Defense holdPress Conference on CMC Organ” by Yao Jianing; Jan 12,
2016; http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm.

51 Joint Force Quarterly “China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assess-ing PLA’s Organizational Reforms” by Phillip Saunders andJoel Wuthnow; Jul 1, 2016.

52 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

53 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

Joint Force Quarterly “China’s Goldwater-Nichols? Assessing PLA’s Organizational Reforms” by Phillip Saunders andJoel Wuthnow; Jul 1, 2016.

54

55 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

ation Long-range Strategic Bomber; 05 SEP 2016; http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-10/21/content_27130415_7.htm.

63 “China and Ukraine agree deal to restart production of An-

225,” Jane’s; September 07, 2016, URL: http://www.janes.
com/article/63341/china-and-ukraine-agree-to-restart-an-225.

64 Indian TV Website Report Shows Images of China’s First

Home-Grown Aircraft Carrier and new J-15A Fighter Jet;
12 OCT 2016; http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/china-racing-ahead-of-india-in-aircraft-carrier-development-1472835.

65 Global Times: Flashpoints in Asian Waters; 27 OCT 2016;

Global Times hosted the Japan Times article at: http://www.
globaltimes.cn/content/1013393.shtml.

66 Andrew Tate, “China’s second aircraft carrier begins sea trials,”
HIS Jane’s Defence Weekly; May 14, 2018, URL: http://janes.com/
article/80064/china-s-second-aircraft-carrier-begins-sea-trials.
67 China’s Troop Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping; Oct

2016; https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/07/chinas-troop-contributions-un-peacekeeping.

68 People’s Daily Online: “Belt and Road” Initiative Points toBrighter Globalization; 26 OCT 2016; http://www.globaltimes.
cn/content/1013888.shtml.

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; April 2016.

Global Times Online: Ethiopia Djibouti Railway Signals New
Era Of Chinese Aid In Infrastructure Construction; 27 OCT
2016; http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2016-10/09/content_4743532.htm.

57 “Photos: Chinese Military Forces Hold Ceremony After Ar-

70 China Military Online: ‘Djibouti Base Not for Military Power:

58 “Photos: Chinese Navy Holds Ceremony Establishing Dji-

71 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

56 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

riving at Djibouti Support Base.” Tianjin Jinri Toutiao (Chinese
language), August 1, 2017, URL: www.toutiao.com.

bouti Support Base.” Tianjin Jinri Toutiao (Chinese language),
July 13, 2017, URL: www.toutiao.com.

69

PLA Daily’; 27 OCT 2016; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-10/25/c_135780276.htm.

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; April 2016.

72 Xiao Tianliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Strategy, Bei-

jing: NDU Press, April 2015, pp. 121.

A G E N C Y

cil Information Office of the People’s Republic of China;
May 2015, Beijing; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-05/26/c_134271001.htm.

59 “Photos: Chinese PLA Navy Ceremony for Troops Depart-

I N T E L L I G E N C E

46 China’s Military Strategy White Paper; The State Coun-D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

115

73 “Senior Leader Perspective: China’s Perspective on Nuclear

Deterrence,”Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2010, pp 27-30.

74 “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China for

National Defense University publication; Beijing: NDU Press,
April 2015, pp. 364, 369.

the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,”
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to theUnited Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna, September 09, 2017, URL: http://www.chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/zgbd/t1490124.&#65279;htm.

86 “China hails first test of hypersonic nuclear missile carrier,”

China’s Military Strategy White Paper; The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China;
May 2015, Beijing; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-05/26/c_134271001.htm.

Cankao Xiaoxi, February 23, 2014, URL: http://ihl.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2014/0207/343864.shtml.

75

76 “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China forthe 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly,”
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to theUnited Nations and Other International Organizations in Vienna, September 09, 2017, URL: http://www.chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/zgbd/t1490124.&#65279;htm.

77 Yu Jixun, ed., “The Science of Second Artillery Cam-paigns,” Beijing: PLA Press, 2004, p. 238.

78 Xiao Tianliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Strategy, Bei-

jing: NDU Press, April 2015, pp. 364, 369.

79 “From tanks to carrier killers: 10 weapons unveiled at

China’s military parade,” South China Morning Post, September 03, 2015, URL: http://www.scmp.&#65279;com/news/
china/diplomacy-defence/article/1854800/10-most-anticipated-weapons-military-parade.

80 “Chinese nuclear forces, 2013,” Bulletin of Atomic Scien-tists; 1 November 2013.

81 “China confirms new generation nuclear-capable ICBM that

can target US,” Sydney Morning Herald, August 01, 2014,
URL: https://www.smh.com.&#65279;au/world/china-confirms-new-generation-nuclearcapable-icbm-that-can-target-us-20140801-zzj93.&#65279;html.

82 Ralph Cossa, Brad Glosserman, and David Santoro, “Con-ference report of the 11th China-US Strategic Nuclear Dynamics Dialogue,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
September, 2017, URL: https://www.csis.&#65279;org/analysis/issues-insights-vol-18-cr1-realistic-way-forward-us-china-strategic-nuclear-relationship.

83 Xinhua; Dec 07, 2016; “Rear Admiral: China’s Developmentof H-20 Bomber Just in Time;” http://english.chinamil.com.cn/
view/2016-12/07/content_7396601.htm.

84 Science of Strategy, Academy of Military Sciences, Beijing:

Military Science Press, 2013, pp. 175.

116

85 Xiao Tianliang, Chief Editor; The Science of Strategy, PLA

South China Morning Post, January 15, 2014, URL: http://
www.scmp.&#65279;com/news/china/article/1405784/china-hails-first-test-hypersonic-nuclear-missile-carrier.

87 “Hypersonic missiles Can Defeat US Missile Defenses,”

88 China Academy of Engineering Physics; 10JUN2015;

2015 Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics Postdoctoral
Careers; www.caep.ac.cn/rlzy/bsh/21443.shtml.

89 SinoDefense; Dong Feng-4 (CSS-3); www.sinodefense.

com/rocketry/df4.

90 NTI; 29 September 2011; Ninth Academy; Science City;

Zitong Facility; Mianyang Facility; “The Los Alamos of China”;
http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/702/.

91 NTI; 29 September 2011; Ninth Academy; Science City;

Zitong Facility; Mianyang Facility; “The Los Alamos of China”;
http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/702/.

92 China Academy of Engineering Physics; 10JUN2015;

2015 Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics Postdoctoral
Careers; www.caep.ac.cn/rlzy/bsh/21443.shtml.

93 Science & Global Security; ISSN: 0892-9882; 23OCT15;

China’s Uranium Enrichment Complex.

94 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; 07DEC15; China’s rapidly

expanding centrifuge enrichment capacity;, http://thebulletin.
org/china%E2%80%99s-rapidly-expanding-centrifuge-enrichment-capacity8934.

95 Harvard University; China’s Stockpile of Military Plutonium:

A New Estimate; July 2011; http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/chinas-stockpile-military-plutonium-new-estimate.

96 Telegraph; 4 January 2011; China Masters Nuclear Fuel

Reprocessing Technology; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/china/8238032/china-masters-nuclear-fuel-reprocessing-technology.html.

97 NTI; Aug 2013; China Biological Chronology;

http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/biological.

98 NTI; Aug 2013; China Biological Profile;

http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china.

99 NTI; OCT 2014; China Overview; http://www.nti.org/china.

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

101 US Department of State; Adherence to and Compliancewith Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments; August 2005; https://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/52113.pdf.
102 NTI; OCT 2014; China Overview; http://www.nti.org/china.
103 Shirley A. Kan; 03 January 2014; China and Proliferationof Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues;
Congressional Research Service (CRS) - Report # RL31555.

118 Shirley A. Kan; Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report # RL31555; 03 January 2014; China and Proliferationof Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues.
119 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

120 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.
121 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Develop-

104 NTI; JUN 2013; China Country Profiles; China;

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.

105 NTI; OCT 2014; China Overview; http://www.nti.org/china.

122 Harvey, Brian, China in Space: The Great Leap Forward;
2013; Springer Science + Business Media; New York.

http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china.

106 NTI; Aug 2013; China Biological Chronology; http://www.
nti.org/country-profiles/china/biological.

108 NTI; OCT 2014; China Overview; http://www.nti.org/china.

123 Report; Stokes, Mark A. and Dean Cheng; Project 2049
Institute for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission; China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications
for U.S. Interests; 26 April 2012; http://project2049.net/documents/uscc_china-space-program-report_april-2012.pdf.

109 Janes; 30 Oct 2014; China Production Capability.

124 Report; Stokes, Mark A. and Dean Cheng; Project 2049

107 Janes; 30 Oct 2014; China Production Capability.

110 Shirley A. Kan; 03 January 2014; China and Proliferationof Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues;
Congressional Research Service (CRS) - Report # RL31555.

111 Information Office, State Council of the People's Republicof China, "China's National Defense in 2010," Editor Wang
Guanqun, March 2011, www.xinhuanet.com; China Arms
Control and Disarmament Association, "Chinese Nonproliferation Policy and Export Control Policy," Li Hong, Vice President
and Secretary General, 28 August 2013, http://csis.org; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "'Bridging the Gap: Analysis
of China's export controls against international standards,"
Chin-Hao Huang, 25 May 2012, www.gov.uk.

112 NTI; OCT 2014; China Overview; http://www.nti.org/china.
113 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,“Workshop on Assistance and Protection against Chemical
Weapons held in China,” accessed online on 13 Feb 18,
URL: https://www.opcw.org/news/browse/116/article/regional-workshop-on-assistance-and-protection-against-chemical-weapons-held-in-china/Regional.
114 NTI; OCT 2014; China Overview; http://www.nti.org/china.
115 NTI; OCT 2014; China Overview; http://www.nti.org/china.
116 NTI; OCT 2014; China Overview; http://www.nti.org/china.

Institute for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission; China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications
for U.S. Interests; 26 April 2012;; http://project2049.net/documents/uscc_china-space-program-report_april-2012.pdf.
125 White Paper; The State Council Information Office of
the People’s Republic of China; China’s BeiDou Navigation
Satellite System; June 2016; http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/
Document/1480433/1480433.htm.
126 White Paper; The State Council Information Office of
the People’s Republic of China; China’s BeiDou Navigation
Satellite System; June 2016; http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/
Document/1480433/1480433.htm.
127 Internet; Xinhua; China To Launch 30 Beidou Navigation
Satellites In Next 5 Years; 19 May 2016; http://english.cas.cn/
newsroom/china_research/201605/t20160523_163363.shtml.
128 Report; Stokes, Mark A. and Dean Cheng; Project 2049
Institute for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission; China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications
for U.S. Interests; 26 April 2012; http://project2049.net/documents/uscc_china-space-program-report_april-2012.pdf.
129 World Meteorological Organization; Satellite Status;

accessed 17 October 2016; www.wmo.ing/pages/prog/sat/satellitestatus.php.

A G E N C Y

with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments; August 2005; https://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/52113.pdf.

117 NTI; OCT 2014; China Overview; http://www.nti.org/china.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

100 US Department of State; Adherence to and Compliance

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

117

130 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

6; https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-evolving-perspectives-on-network-warfare-lessons-from-the-science-of-military-strategy/.

Peng Guangqian, Yao Youzhi, eds; 2001;
Science of Strategy.

142 Lincoln Davidson; ‘China’s Strategic Support Force:
The New Home of the PLA’s Cyber Operations?’; CFR.
org; Net Politics; January 20, 2016; http://blogs.cfr.org/
cyber/2016/01/20/chinas-strategic-support-force-the-newhome-of-the-plas-cyber-operations/.

ments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017; Office of
the Secretary of Defense; May 2017.
131

132 Li Bingyan, 27 Jan 2016; Beijing Guangming Ribao:
General Trend of the Worldwide Revolution in Military Affairs
and the Form of Future War.
133 China Manned Space Engineering Office Website;

Space Station Project Development Progress; 23 April
2016; http://www.cmse.gov.cn/uploadfile/news/uploadfile/201604/20160427104809225.pdf.
134 Internet; Xinhua; Chang-E 5 To Launch Sometime in 2017-- China’s Latest Secret Lunar Exploration Project Uncovered; 1 March 2014; http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/201403/01/c_119562037.htm.
135 Xinhua: China To Land On Dark Side Of Moon In

2018; 14 January 2016; http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/15/c_135010577.htm.
136 Internet, NASASpaceFlight, Chang’e-5 Lunar Sample Return, CZ-5 - Wenchang - NET 2017, http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=33431.0;attach=1440126, Accessed 28 July 2017.
137 Report; Stokes, Mark A. and Dean Cheng; Project 2049
Institute for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission; China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications
for U.S. Interests; 26 April 2012; http://project2049.net/documents/uscc_china-space-program-report_april-2012.pdf.
138 Briefing; Zhou, Yuanying; China Great Wall Industry
Corporation; China’s Space Industry: Achievement, Future
Planning and International Cooperation; presented by Zhou
Yuanying for China Great Wall Industry Corporation at the 4thInternational Space Conference, Vilnius, Lithuania 18 Sept.
2012; updated 27 Sept. 2013.
139 China Space Flight; Chinese Rocket service time; 12
March 2016; http://www.chinaspaceflight.com/rocket/China-launchers-timeline.html.
140 Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth Allen ed; 26 AUG 2015; DGI;The PLA as Organization: Reference Volume v2.0; pp 401.;
http://www.andrewerickson.com/2015/12/a-classic-reference-with-renewed-relevance-download-the-pla-as-organization-v2-0/.
141 Joe McReynolds; 17 APR 2016; Jamestown Foundation China Brief; China’s Evolving Perspectives on Network
Warfare: Lessons from the Science of Military Strategy; pp

118

143 John Costello; ‘The Strategic Support Force: China’s Information Warfare Service’; The Jamestown Foundation; China
Brief Vol. 16 Issue 3; February 8, 2016; https://jamestown.
org/program/the-strategic-support-force-chinas-information-warfare-service/.
144 John Costello; ‘China Finally Centralizes Its Space, Cyber,
Information Forces’; TheDiplomat.com; January 20, 2016.
145 Peng Guangqian, Yao Youzhi, eds; 2001; Science ofStrategy; pp 311.
146 Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations
and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage;” May
19, 2014; URL: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14ag-528.html .
147 Lesley Wroughton, Michael Martina, “Cyber spying,
maritime disputes loom large in U.S.-China talks,” Reuters,
July 8, 2014, URL: https://www.reuters.&#65279;com/article/
china-usa/cyber-spying-maritime-disputes-loom-large-in-u-schina-talks-idUSL4N0PJ0MT20140708.
148 Zhang Yuliang (ed.), Science of Campaigns (National Defense

University, Beijing, 2006; ISBN 7-5626-1407-0 ) p. 155-66.

149 Zhang Yuliang (ed.), Science of Campaigns (National Defense

University, Beijing, 2006; ISBN 7-5626-1407-0 ) p. 155-66.

150 Zhang Xingye and Zhang Zhanli ed., Campaign Stratagems, (PLA National Defense University, Beijing, 2002),
p. 1-2, 26-8.
151 Zhang Yuliang (ed.), Science of Campaigns (National Defense University, Beijing, 2006; ISBN 7-5626-1407-0 ) p. 96-7.
152 “Theories of the Initial Period of War” in Tiao Youzhi, ed.,Theories of War and Strategy, PLA Press, Beijing, 2005 p. 564.
153 Wang Haibo, Gao Zhiwen, and Hua Xiao, Jiefangjun Bao

Online,  “The Grand Program for Building Modern Logistics-- an Interview of Zhou Songhe, Chief of Staff of the General
Logistics Department’s Headquarters Department on Issues
Concerning the Logistic Work in the New Year,” accessedat http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2014-02/12/content_4489582.htm.

Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

155 Liao Xilong, “Personally Experiencing Jinan Theater’s Major Joint Logistics Reform,” PLA Daily, December 16, 2008, accessed at http://military.people.com.cn/
GB/1076/52984/8527794.html.
156 Duan Chengliang and Zhou Rui, “Division of the 13thGroup Army Improves Support Effectiveness Through Precision Delivery, Realizes Precision Support With the Flexible
Grouping of Modules,” Jiefangjun Bao, November 15, 2016.
157 Wang Jixin and Sun Xingwei, “Practicing Logistical Operations by Closely Adhering to Actual Combat Operations, Developing Crack Troops by Aiming at Battlefield: Zhengzhou Joint
Logistical Support Center Focuses on Improving Rapid, Precise
Logistical Support Capability,” Jiefangjun Bao, January 26, 2018.
158 Wang Haibo, Gao Zhiwen, and Hua Xiao, Jiefangjun Bao

Online,  “The Grand Program for Building Modern Logistics-- an Interview of Zhou Songhe, Chief of Staff of the General
Logistics Department’s Headquarters Department on Issues
Concerning the Logistic Work in the New Year,” accessedat http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2014-02/12/content_4489582.htm.
159 Yang Yang, “Logistics Commanding Officers of Tomor-

row’s Battlefields -- No Longer the ‘Provision Officers’ of That
Month and That Date,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 29, 2010.
http://www.chinamil.com.cn/.
160 Liao Xilong, “Comprehensively Develop Modern Lo-

gistics With Scientific Development Concept as Guide,”
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I N T E L L I G E N C E

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Published in 2013.

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251 Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth Allen ed; 26 AUG 2015; DGI;The PLA as Organization: Reference Volume v2.0; pp 401.;
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239 Annual Report to Congress; Military and Security Develop-

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240 Li Faxin, The PLA Marines, China International Press;
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273 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip Saunders; Chinese Military
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Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win

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A G E N C Y

One Road: China’s Vision of Connectivity; Sep 2016; www.
css.ethz.ch/en/center.

I N T E L L I G E N C E

306 Center for Security Studies in Security Policy, One Belt,

D E F E N S E

CH INA M ILITARY P OWE R

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