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Foreword
From the Chief of Staff of the Army
The Army Operating Concept (AOC) describes how future Army forces will prevent conflict,shape security environments, and win wars while operating as part of our Joint Force andworking with multiple partners. The AOC guides future force development by identifying firstorder capabilities that the Army needs to support U.S. policy objectives. It provides theintellectual foundation and framework for learning and for applying what we learn to futureforce development under Force 2025 and Beyond.
The title, Win in a Complex World, emphasizes ready land forces' importance for protecting
our nation and securing our vital interests against determined, elusive, and increasingly capable
enemies. While the concept underscores the foundational capabilities the Army needs to prevent
wars and shape security environments, it also recognizes that to deter enemies, reassure allies,
and influence neutrals the Army must conduct sophisticated expeditionary maneuver and joint
combined arms operations.
The AOC's vision of future armed conflict considers both continuities in war's nature andchanges in its character. Conflicts in the future, like those in the past, will ultimately be resolved
on land. Hence the concept recognizes that Army forces will be essential components of joint
operations to create sustainable political outcomes while defeating enemies and adversaries whowill challenge U.S. advantages in all domains: land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. Joint
operations are critical to cope with such complexity, and the Army's contribution must provide
unique capabilities and multiple options to the President, Secretary of Defense, and CombatantCommanders. These capabilities include tailorable and scalable combinations of special
operations and conventional forces, regionally aligned and globally responsive combined arms
teams, and foundational theater capabilities to enable joint operations. To do this, innovation is
critical, both for the operational and the institutional Army, and the AOC is a beginning point for
the innovation we need to ensure that our Soldiers, leaders, and teams are prepared to win in acomplex world.

General, United States Army
Chief of StaffiTRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Preface
From the Commanding General
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
One of our most important duties as Army professionals is to think clearly about the problem
of future armed conflict. That is because our vision of the future must drive change to ensurethat Army forces are prepared to prevent conflict, shape the security environment, and win wars.
The purpose of the Army Operating Concept is to ask big questions, not focus on small answers.
This concept focuses on three big questions; what level of war is the concept going to address,
what is the environment we think Army forces will operate in, and what is the problem we aretrying to solve.
This concept, for the first time, focuses on all three levels of war; tactical, operational, andstrategic. The environment the Army will operate in is unknown. The enemy is unknown, thelocation is unknown, and the coalitions involved are unknown. The problem we are focusing on
is how to “Win in a Complex World.”“Win” occurs at the strategic level and involves more than just firepower. It involves theapplication of all elements of National Power. Complex is defined as an environment that is not
only unknown, but unknowable and constantly changing. The Army cannot predict who it willfight, where it will fight, and with what coalition it will fight. To win in a complex world, Army
forces must provide the Joint Force with multiple options, integrate the efforts of multiple
partners, operate across multiple domains, and present our enemies and adversaries with multiple
dilemmas.
Multiple Dilemmas. The key to a Strategic Win is to present the enemy with multiple
dilemmas. To compel enemy actions requires putting something of value to them at risk. Army
forces allow joint force commanders to dictate the terms of operations and render enemies
incapable of responding effectively. To present enemies and adversaries with multiple
dilemmas, this concept introduces the idea of Joint Combined Arms Operations, an expansion of
the traditional concept of combined arms to include the integration of not only joint capabilities,
but also the broad range of efforts necessary to accomplish the mission. Joint combined arms
operations allows joint force commanders to operate consistent with the tenet of initiative,
dictating the terms of operations and rendering the enemy incapable of responding. Futureforces operating as part of joint teams will conduct expeditionary maneuver through rapid
deployment and transition to operations. Units possess the ability to operate dispersed over wide
areas because they are able to integrate intelligence and operations to develop situational
understanding through action while possessing the mobility to concentrate rapidly. Future forces
conduct operations consistent with the tenet of adaptability, anticipating dangers andopportunities and adjusting operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Additionally,
Army forces present the enemy with multiple dilemmas because they possess the simultaneity tooverwhelm the enemy physically and psychologically, the depth to prevent enemy forces fromrecovering, and the endurance to sustain operations. Army forces are able to conduct joint
combined arms operations because Soldiers, leaders, and teams thrive in environments ofuncertainty and danger.
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Multiple Options. This concept adds set the theater and shape security environments as corecompetencies to emphasize the Army’s role in providing options to joint force commanders
across the range of operations to include large scale combat operations, limited contingencies,
security force assistance, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. This concept also adds
special operations as an Army core competency to highlight the Army’s ability to provide
dynamic combinations of conventional and unconventional forces. The concept calls forregionally engaged Army forces to establish a global landpower network, shape security
environments, and prevent conflict. Although there are political costs and sensitivities associatedwith the employment of U.S. ground forces, the presence or arrival of credible Army forces
demonstrates U.S. resolve and commitment to partners and adversaries. Army forces provide
combatant commanders with the ability to compel outcomes without the cooperation of theenemy. It is for these reasons that this concept emphasizes the Army’s ability to impose ournation’s will on an enemy by force as essential to deterring war and preserving options short ofwar. This concept also emphasizes the Army’s critical role in establishing stable environments
to consolidate gains and achieve sustainable outcomes.
Multiple domains. Army operations are inherently cross-domain operations. U.S. forces
depend on and complement joint efforts in the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspacedomains to enable operations on land. Because joint force freedom of movement and action
across all domains are increasingly challenged by elusive land-based threats, this conceptemphasizes Army operations to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, to deny its use to theenemy. Future Army forces help ensure access through joint forcible entry operations withcombined arms units that possess the mobility, firepower, and protection to defeat the enemy andestablish control of land, resources, and populations. Future Army forces will support joint force
freedom of movement and action through the projection of power from land across the maritime,
air, space, and cyberspace domains. To assure allies, deter conflict, and compel determined andelusive enemies, the concept introduces a tenet of simultaneity, emphasizing the need for Army
forces to extend efforts beyond the physical battleground to other contested spaces such as public
perception, political subversion, and criminality.
Multiple partners. American military power is joint power. How combatant and joint force
commanders combine land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace capabilities gives U.S. forces acompetitive advantage over enemies and adversaries. Army forces contribute to joint force
mission accomplishment by providing foundational capabilities that permit effective integrationof military, interorganizational, and multinational efforts. It is the need to integrate these effortsof multiple partners on land, in contested and dangerous environments and in response to crisesin the homeland or overseas, which requires Army forces to integrate the efforts of others andproject national power.
Developing the Future Force. The Army Operating Concept is the start point for developing
the future force. As the historian Sir Michael Howard observed, “No matter how clearly one
thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is to not
be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed.” Thetenet of innovation challenges us to anticipate changing conditions to ensure that Army forces
are manned, trained, and equipped to overmatch enemies in order to seize, retain, and exploit theiv

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
initiative. We must not be consumed with focusing solely on avoiding risk, but build leaders andinstitutions that recognize and leverage opportunities. Leaders at all levels must encourage
prudent risk taking and not allow bureaucratic processes to stifle them. Finally, we must assess
our efforts continuously and be prepared to adapt to unexpected opportunities and unanticipateddangers. Our Army must continuously learn, adapt, and innovate. The tenets in this concept
must apply to the institutional Army as well as the operational Army.

General, U.S. Army
Commandingv

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

Figure 1. Win in a complex world logic chartvi

Department of the Army
Headquarters, United States Army
Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Eustis, VA 23604

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1*

7 October 2014
Military Operations

THE U.S. ARMY OPERATING CONCEPT: WIN IN A COMPLEX WORLDDAVID G. PERKINSGeneral, U.S. Army
Commanding

RICHARD D. MONTIETH
Colonel, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6
History. This is a major revision to U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept.
Summary. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 describes how future Army forces, as part of joint,interorganizational, and multinational efforts, operate to accomplish campaign objectives andprotect U.S. national interests. It describes the Army’s contribution to globally integrated
operations, and addresses the need for Army forces to provide foundational capabilities for the
Joint Force and to project power onto land and from land across the air, maritime, space, andcyberspace domains. The Army Operating Concept guides future force development through theidentification of first order capabilities that the Army must possess to accomplish missions in
support of policy goals and objectives.
Applicability. This concept applies to all Department of the Army (DA) activities that develop
doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities(DOTMLPF) capabilities. This concept guides future force development and informs subsequent
supporting concepts and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
process. It also supports Army capabilities development processes described in TRADOC
Regulation 71-20 and functions as a conceptual basis for developing subordinate concepts related
to the future force within DOTMLPF.
*This pamphlet supersedes TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, dated 19 August 2010.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Proponent and supplementation authority. The proponent for this pamphlet is the Director,
Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC). The proponent has the authority to approve
exceptions or waivers to this pamphlet that are consistent with controlling law and regulations.
Do not supplement this pamphlet without prior approval from Director, ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 950
Jefferson Avenue, Fort Eustis, VA 23604.
Suggested improvements. Users are invited to submit comments and suggested improvements
using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Director,
ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 950 Jefferson Avenue, Fort Eustis, VA 23604. Suggested improvements
may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program Proposal).
Availability. This TRADOC pamphlet is available only on the TRADOC homepage at
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/.

Summary of Change
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex WorldThis revision, dated 7 October 2014o Updates the title, problem statement, and central idea (title changed throughout and sections
3-1. [problem statement], 3-2. [central idea]).
o Emphasizes the human aspects of armed conflict (throughout).
o Describes how Army forces conduct joint combined arms operations as part of globally
integrated operations consistent with the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force2020 and United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-0, The U.S.
Army Capstone Concept (throughout).
o Provides an updated operational context for the Army’s roles and missions (chapter 2).
o Refines tenets and core competencies for the future Army (section 3-4.).
o Updates required capabilities and describes how the Army will develop the future force(appendix B).
o Identifies science and technology priorities and emphasizes integration of skilled Soldiers andteams with technology (appendix C).
o Identifies risks associated with adopting this concept and ways to mitigate risks (appendix D).

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Contents
Page

Foreword ....................................................................................................................................... i
Chapter 1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 5
1-1. Purpose ............................................................................................................................ 5
1-2. References ........................................................................................................................ 5
1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms .......................................................................... 5
1-4. Relationship between Army doctrine and concepts ......................................................... 5
1-5. Assumptions .................................................................................................................... 6
Chapter 2
Operational Context ................................................................................................................... 6
2-1. Introduction: Continuity and change in armed conflict ................................................... 6
2-2. The Army’s missions and contributions to joint operations ............................................ 7
2-3. Anticipated threats and the future operational environment ............................................ 8
2-4. Harbingers of future conflict.......................................................................................... 10
2-5. Technologies with military application ......................................................................... 13
2-6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 13
Chapter 3
How Future Army Forces Operate ......................................................................................... 14
3-1. Military problem ............................................................................................................ 14
3-2. Central idea .................................................................................................................... 15
3-3. How the Army operates ................................................................................................. 15
3-4. Tenets and core competencies ....................................................................................... 18
3-5. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 22
Chapter 4
Army Operating Concept (AOC) Conclusion ........................................................................ 22
Appendix A References ............................................................................................................. 23
Appendix B From Concepts to Capabilities: Building the Future Force ................................... 29
Appendix C Science and Technology ........................................................................................ 34
Appendix D Risk and Mitigation ............................................................................................... 39
Glossary ...................................................................................................................................... 41
Endnotes...................................................................................................................................... 47
Figure List
Figure 1. Win in a complex world logic chart ............................................................................ vi

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Chapter 1
Introduction
1-1. Purpose
United States (U.S.) Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1,
The U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC): Win in a Complex World, describes how future Army
forces, as part of joint, interorganizational,1 and multinational efforts, operate to accomplish
campaign objectives and protect U.S. national interests.2 It describes the Army’s contribution to
globally integrated operations, which is the central idea of the Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations: Joint Force 2020. The AOC recognizes the need for Army forces to provide
foundational capabilities required by the Joint Force and to project power onto land and fromland across the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.3 The AOC is grounded in a visionof future armed conflict that considers national defense strategy; missions; emerging operational
environments; advances in technology; and anticipated enemy, threat, and adversarycapabilities.4 Ultimately, the AOC guides future force development through the identification of
first order capabilities that the Army must possess to accomplish missions in support of policy
goals and objectives.5
1-2. References
Appendix A lists required and related publications.
1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms
The glossary explains abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet.
1-4. Relationship between Army doctrine and concepts
a. Doctrine explains how current Army forces operate and guides leaders and Soldiers in the
conduct of training and operations. However, doctrine is not prescriptive and is not a substitutefor creative thought or initiative.
b. Concepts describe how commanders might employ future capabilities against anticipatedthreats to accomplish missions. Concepts establish the intellectual foundation for Armymodernization and help Army leaders identify opportunities to improve future force capabilities.
The AOC guides the development of detailed concepts that address each of the Army’s
warfighting functions. The seven functional concepts are mission command, movement andmaneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, engagement, and maneuver support and protection.
The AOC is particularly important because it discusses how capabilities associated withwarfighting functions combine in the conduct of joint operations.
c. Joint operations. Army forces conduct expeditionary operations consistent with the Joint
Operational Access Concept and the Joint Concept for Entry Operations. Army combined arms
teams integrate with other services and mission partners to conduct joint combined arms
maneuver, the synchronized application of capabilities critical to accomplish the mission. Army
forces, positioned forward or deployed rapidly from the United States, respond to and resolve
crises, defeat enemies, establish security, and consolidate gains. Army forces are critical toprojecting national power onto land as well as projecting military power from land across the air,5

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.6 Army forces possess the endurance and staying
power to achieve sustainable outcomes.
1-5. Assumptions
a. The following assumptions about the future underpin the AOC:
(1) The U.S. Army will remain a professional, all-volunteer force, relying on allcomponents of the Army to meet future commitments.7(2) The Army will adjust to fiscal constraints and have resources sufficient to preserve thebalance of readiness, force structure, and modernization necessary to meet the demands of thenational defense strategy in the mid- to far-term (2020 to 2040).
(3) Army forces remain engaged overseas in areas vital to U.S. security interests, but alarger percentage of the force will be based in the continental United States.
(4) The land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains will become more contested as
U.S. military technological advantages decrease.
(5) Changes in technology and geopolitical dynamics as well as the enduring political andhuman nature of war will keep war in the realms of complexity and uncertainty.8(6) Except for an immediate response to a national emergency, the Army will conduct
operations as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational teams.
b. The Army will continue to assess these assumptions.

Chapter 2
Operational Context
2-1. Introduction: Continuity and change in armed conflicta. Anticipating the demands of future armed conflict requires an understanding of continuities
in the nature of war as well as an appreciation for changes in the character of armed conflict.
Technological advances and changes in strategic guidance, joint operating concepts, and security
challenges require the U.S. Army to innovate to ensure that forces are prepared to accomplish
future missions. Shifts in the geopolitical landscape caused by competition for power andresources influence the character of armed conflict. These shifts, and violence associated withthem, occur more rapidly than in the past due to advances in technology, the proliferation of
information, and the associated increased momentum of human interaction.9
b. Recent and ongoing conflicts reinforce the need to balance the technological focus ofArmy modernization with a recognition of the limits of technology and an emphasis on thehuman, cultural, and political continuities of armed conflict. Nations and organizations in the6

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
future will fight for the same reasons that the Greek historian Thucydides identified 2,500 years
ago: fear, honor, and interest.10 Every armed conflict exhibits some combination of violence,emotion, policy, chance, and risk. Fundamentally, war will remain a contest of wills.11
Although advances in technology will continue to influence the character of warfare, the effectof technologies on land are often not as great as in other domains due to geography, theinteraction with adaptive enemies, the presence of noncombatants, and other complexities
associated with war’s continuities.
c. Threats to U.S. vital interests across the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains
originate on land. Land-based threats emanate from the fielded forces of hostile nation states andfrom areas where state weakness allows nonstate enemy or adversary organizations to operate.
Conflict often arises from disorder (the breakdown of peaceful and lawful behavior). In conflicts
involving nation states, disorder often follows the defeat of enemy forces or the collapse of aregime. Land forces are required to overcome the effects of this disorder through military
operations that integrate joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities. Although theability to project power onto land from the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains willremain vital to joint operations, the employment of land forces will remain essential to achieve
political outcomes.
d. The character of future warfare evolves based upon assigned missions; the operational
environment; emerging technologies; and changes in enemy capabilities, objectives, and will.
The Army must anticipate change while considering how continuities, such as those reflected in
the principles of war, affect how the Army must operate to accomplish future missions.12
2-2. The Army’s missions and contributions to joint operations
a. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review identified eleven enduring Armed Forces missions
in which the Army plays a substantial role:13
 Provide for military defense of the homeland.
 Defeat an adversary.
 Provide a global stabilizing presence.
 Combat terrorism.
 Counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
 Deny an adversary's objectives.
 Respond to crisis and conduct limited contingency operations.
 Conduct military engagement and security cooperation.
 Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations.
 Provide support to civil authorities.
 Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
b. These missions are consistent with the Army’s long-standing role in national defense. The
Army must remain prepared to protect the homeland, foster security globally, project power, andwin. To protect the homeland, the Army deters and defeats attacks and mitigates the effects ofattacks and natural disasters. To foster security, the Army engages regionally and prepares to
respond globally to compel enemies and adversaries. To project power and win decisively, the7

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Army, as the Nation’s principal land force, organizes, trains, and equips forces for prompt andsustained combat on land.
c. Army forces in joint operations. American military power is joint power. The Army both
depends on and supports air and naval forces across the land, air, maritime, space, andcyberspace domains. The Army depends on the other services for strategic and operational
mobility, fires, close air support, and other capabilities. The Army supports other services,
combatant commands, multinational forces, and interorganizational partners with foundational
capabilities such as communications, intelligence, rotary wing aviation, missile defense,
logistics, and engineering.14 Army forces are uniquely suited to shape security environments
through forward presence and sustained engagements with allied and partner land forces. Army
forces defeat enemy land forces and seize, hold, and defend land areas. The Army also preparesfor security operations abroad including initial establishment of military government pendingtransfer of this responsibility to other authorities.15 Balanced Joint Force capabilities createsynergy and provide the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders withmultiple options to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars.
d. The AOC describes how Army forces operating as part of joint, interorganizational, andmultinational teams accomplish the mission and win in a complex world. Army forces areprepared to do more than fight and defeat enemies; they must possess the capability to translate
military objectives into enduring political outcomes. Army forces must have the capability(ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions) and capacity(capability with sufficient scale and endurance) to accomplish assigned missions while
confronting increasingly dangerous threats in complex operational environments.16
2-3. Anticipated threats and the future operational environmenta. Diverse enemies will employ traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies to threaten
U.S. security and vital interests. Threats may emanate from nation states or nonstate actors suchas transnational terrorists, insurgents, and criminal organizations. Enemies will continue toapply advanced as well as simple and dual-use technologies (such as improvised explosive
devices). Enemies avoid U.S. strengths (such as long-range surveillance and precision strike)through traditional countermeasures (such as dispersion, concealment, and intermingling withcivilian populations). As new military technologies are more easily transferred, potential threatsemulate U.S. military capabilities to counter U.S. power projection and limit U.S. freedom ofaction. These capabilities include precision-guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles thattarget traditional U.S. strengths in the air and maritime domains. Hostile nation states may
attempt to overwhelm defense systems and impose a high cost on the United States to intervene
in a contingency or crisis.17 State and nonstate actors apply technology to disrupt U.S.
advantages in communications, long-range precision fires, and surveillance. Enemy actions
reduce U.S. ability to achieve dominance in the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspacedomains. Additionally, to accomplish political objectives, enemy organizations expand
operations to the U.S. homeland. Enemies and adversaries will operate beyond physicalbattlegrounds and enemies will subvert efforts through infiltration of U.S. and partner forces(e.g., insider threat) while using propaganda and disinformation to effect public perception.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Paradoxically, the connectedness of networked devices within the U.S. presents adversaries with
exploitable vulnerabilities.
b. The following five characteristics of the future operational environment are likely to havesignificant impact on land force operations.
(1) Increased velocity and momentum of human interaction and events. The speed at which
information diffuses globally through multiple means increases the velocity, momentum, anddegree of interaction among people. The diffusion of information via the Internet and social
media amplifies and accelerates interaction between people, governments, militaries, and threats.
Access to information allows organizations to mobilize people and resources locally, regionally,
and globally. Disinformation and propaganda drive violence in support of political objectives.
The compression of events in time requires forces capable of responding rapidly in sufficientscale to seize the initiative, control the narrative, and consolidate order.
(2) Potential for overmatch. Overmatch is the application of capabilities or use of tactics ina way that renders an adversary unable to respond effectively. Potential enemies invest intechnologies to obtain a differential advantage and undermine U.S. ability to achieve
overmatch.18 These technologies include long-range precision fires, air defense systems, electric
fires, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Anti-access and area denial capabilities challenge
the Joint Force’s ability to achieve air dominance and sea control as well as its ability to project
power onto land from the air and maritime domains.19 Potential enemies develop cyberspacecapabilities such as disruptive and destructive malware and space capabilities such as antisatellite weapons to disrupt U.S. communications and freedom of maneuver. To prevent enemy
overmatch, the Army must develop new capabilities while anticipating enemy efforts to emulate
or disrupt those capabilities. To retain overmatch, the Joint Force will have to combine
technologies and integrate efforts across multiple domains to present enemies with multiple
dilemmas.
(3) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. WMD proliferation to diverse state andnonstate actors in the form of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive (CBRNE) weapons poses an increased threat to U.S. and international security.20
Adversaries share CBRNE knowledge, technology, and materiel. The risk of a nation losing
control over nuclear assets increases as extremist organizations incite civil wars and establish
control of territories, populations, and weapons. Moreover, directed energy and sophisticated
CBRNE weapons could give adversaries unprecedented capabilities to threaten U.S. forces andcivilian populations with mass casualties. Coping with CBRNE threats requires speciallytrained, equipped, and organized Army forces that have the ability to operate in inhospitableconditions, conduct reconnaissance to confirm or deny the presence of weapons, destroy enemy
forces that possess those weapons, and secure territory to contain those weapons until CBRNE
units reduce or neutralize them.
(4) Spread of advanced cyberspace and counter-space capabilities. The cyberspace andspace domains grow in importance as global and regional competitors as well as nonstate actors
invest in capabilities to protect their access and disrupt or deny access to others.21 A broad arrayof actors challenges the Joint Force’s freedom of action in space and cyberspace. Enemies and9TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
adversaries collaborate as contests in space and cyberspace extend to and affect tacticaloperations. For example, enemy global positioning satellite jamming capabilities could renderprecision fires inaccurate. Army commanders must protect their own systems and disrupt theenemy’s ability to operate. Army units will have to operate with degraded communications andreduced access to cyber and space capabilities. Army forces will have to support joint operations
through reconnaissance, offensive operations or raids to destroy land-based enemy space andcyberspace capabilities.
(5) Demographics and operations among populations, in cities, and in complex terrain.
The percentage of the world’s population in urban areas will rise to sixty percent by 2030. 22
Internal migration and higher birth rates contribute to increasing urbanization.23 Adversaries
operate among the people in these urban areas and other complex terrain to avoid U.S. militaryadvantages and they operate in cities because war, as a political phenomenon, is inherently about
people. As cities grow, many governments fail to provide adequate security, employment,
infrastructure, and services. Armed groups will exploit popular disaffection and weak
governance. Urban areas become safe havens and support bases for terrorists, insurgents, or
criminal organizations. Urban areas are potential scenes for mass atrocities. Enemies may use
cities as launching platforms for long-range missiles that threaten allied as well as U.S.
populations. Because urban environments degrade the ability to target threats with precision,
joint operations will require land forces capable of operating in congested and restricted urban
terrain (to include subsurface, surface, supersurface) to defeat those threats.24 Understanding thetechnological, geographic, political, and military challenges of the urban environment will
require innovative, adaptive leaders and cohesive teams who thrive in complex and uncertain
environments. Operating in urban environments will require decentralized combined arms andjoint capabilities.
2-4. Harbingers of future conflicta. While the United States must assess new and emerging threats, many current operational
challenges will exist into the future. Harbingers of future conflict include competing powers(e.g., China and Russia), regional powers (e.g., Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea (DPRK)), transnational terrorist networks (e.g., al Qaida, its affiliates, and transnational
criminals), and cyber threats.25 The following are examples only and illustrate a limited numberof threats for which future Army forces must prepare.
b. Competing powers.
(1) Though the People’s Republic of China remains committed to stable relationships withneighbors and the U.S. in the near-term, it continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive
military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight andwin short-duration, high-intensity regional contingencies.26 China’s goal over time is to expand
its influence to establish stability along its periphery.27 While China prefers to avoid directconfrontation with the U.S., it uses civilian assets to challenge actions such as U.S. surveillanceflights. Moreover, China’s behavior has created friction with regional neighbors including U.S.
allies and partners.28 Territorial disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands; borderdisputes with India; and increased maritime pressure on the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and10

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Vietnam are examples of China exerting power through force or threat of force.29 China works
to negate U.S. advantages in space and cyberspace. China is developing significant anti-satellite
capabilities, integrating cyber into all aspects of military operations, and developing
sophisticated missiles and air defenses as part of an effort to challenge United States’ ability to
project power. Chinese doctrine calls for combining conventional and unconventional actions.30
The People’s Liberation Army opened six combat training centers where it emphasizes combinedarms operations and joint training.31 Chinese actions and force modernization efforts highlightthe need for Army forces positioned forward or regionally engaged to prevent conflict, deter
adversaries, and strengthen partners. Emerging Chinese capabilities also highlight the need forArmy forces to project power from land into the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.
(2) Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and use of conventional andunconventional land forces in Ukraine suggest that Russia is determined to expand its territory
and assert its power on the Eurasian landmass. Russia deployed and integrated a range of
diplomatic, information, military, and economic means to conduct what some analysts havedescribed as “non-linear” operations.32 Russia conducted operations to pursue its war aims
below the threshold that would elicit a concerted North Atlantic Treaty Organization response.
In addition, Russia used cyberspace capabilities and social media to influence perceptions athome and abroad and provide cover for large-scale military operations. While the long-term
results of the incursion into Ukraine are not yet certain, Russia demonstrated the centrality ofland forces in its effort to assert power and advance its interests in former Soviet states. Without
a viable land force capable of opposing the Russian army and its irregular proxies, suchadventurism is likely to continue undeterred.33 Russia’s actions highlight the value of land
forces to deter conflict as well as special operations and conventional force capability to projectnational power and exert influence in political contests.
c. Regional powers.
(1) Iran's management of its nuclear aspirations will shape its role as a rising power in the
Middle East.34 Iran, empowered by expanding sectarian conflicts in the greater Middle East,
poses a hybrid threat to U.S. interests and allies in the region. As it continues to apply pressure
on the region to erode and supplant U.S. power, Iran uses combinations of economic anddiplomatic overtures with irregular forces to advance its interests. Iran develops partnerships
with disenfranchised populations, religious factions, and criminal elements to create disorder
focused on subverting the influence of the U.S. and partner nations. Iran also develops
relationships with weak governments and uses those governments to advance its interests. For
example, Iran’s support for President Bashar al Assad in Syria is critical to its ability to sustain
Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iran’s support for militias in Iraq undermines government legitimacy
and intensifies sectarian conflict.35 Iran avoids direct military confrontations while developing
advanced capabilities and pursuing comprehensive military modernization. Iran’s modernization
efforts include the use of automated systems on land, sea, and air; ballistic missiles; and thedevelopment of nuclear capability. Iran is actively supporting militia in Iraq while confronting
the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Iran has become a more capable cyber actor as
well. Taken collectively, Iranian activity has the potential to undermine U.S. regional goals as it
continues to confront the U.S. indirectly on a number of fronts. Iran’s hybrid armed forces

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highlight the need for Army forces to remain effective against the fielded forces of nation states
as well as networked guerilla and insurgent organizations.
(2) The DPRK, while in the same category as Iran, is at once a dangerous military threat
and a failing state dependent upon the patronage of others, especially China. The DPRK isexpanding its nuclear arsenal and improving its ballistic missile force to complement an aging
but still large and capable conventional force. The DPRK’s military possesses cyber andchemical-biological warfare capabilities. Key government facilities, military installations, andweapons are located in underground shelters. Because economic, social, and political pressureson the DPRK leadership could lead to war or a collapse of the regime, the U.S. prepares for the
deployment of substantial ground, air, and maritime forces to operate as part of a coalition
alongside Republic of Korea (South Korea) forces and in defense of South Korea. The threat on
the Korean peninsula highlights the need for Army forces to operate in a CBRNE environment.
d. Transnational terrorist organizations. The emergence of ISIL is an example of how
nonstate actors seize upon opportunities created by communal conflict and weak governance.
ISIL is a nonstate actor that aims to create an Islamist militant state across large portions of Iraq,
Syria, and surrounding areas. ISIL’s military organization; ideological base; willingness to use
murder and other forms of brutality against innocents; and ability to mobilize people, money, andweapons have enabled it to seize territory and establish control of populations and resources.
ISIL exploits political opposition to governments to form alliances of convenience while acting
to consolidate gains and marginalize competing insurgent groups through intimidation andcoercion. ISIL moves into weakly governed spaces such as the Iraq-Syrian border where
governments are unable to project power. These areas provide sanctuary and “strategic depth.”
ISIL uses social media and cyberspace to prosecute a propaganda campaign while using terrorist
tactics (such as covert action, assassinations, destruction of historically significant property,
extortion, and mass murder) to control populations and territory. The wider problem is ISIL’s
success combined with weaknesses of Middle Eastern governments has caused extremist Islamand terrorism to metastasize across much of the Middle East and North Africa. From Egypt toYemen and from the Syrian Civil War to the disaster of Libya, the region is rife with weak
governments and active terrorist groups. ISIL demonstrates the need for land forces to defeat
determined enemies that operate among and control civilian populations. ISIL also highlights
the need to extend efforts beyond physical battlegrounds to other contested spaces such as public
perception and political subversion.
e. Transnational criminal organizations. Recent waves of migration from Central America to
the U.S. – largely due to criminal violence – highlight second and third order threats to U.S.
interests caused by transnational organized crime and weak governance. Ineffective governanceprovides an inviting environment for criminal organizations. Murders, kidnappings, andmaimings in Central America equal or exceed violence associated with many politicalinsurgencies in the Middle East and elsewhere. The region’s militaries are engaged in support oflaw enforcement activities due to the severity of the problem and the inability of sometimescorrupt police forces to cope with the problem. Criminal violence erodes state institutions andundermines governance. The threat from transnational organized crime highlights the need forArmy special operations and regionally aligned forces to understand complex environments,
operate with multiple partners, and conduct security force assistance.
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2-5. Technologies with military applicationa. Emerging technologies hold promise for improving future force combat effectiveness.
Because of the ease with which many technological advantages are copied or countered, theArmy must emphasize how to combine multiple technological improvements and counter enemy
efforts to adopt or disrupt new technologies. (See appendix C for additional detail ontechnologies.) The U.S. Army’s differential advantage over enemies derives, in part, from theintegration of advanced technologies with skilled Soldiers and well-trained teams. These
technologies and their potential to improve Army effectiveness include:(1) Human and cognitive sciences may revolutionize the way the Army recruits, educates,
trains, and develops leaders and Soldiers.
(2) Communications and information processing technology may improve understanding
through common operational pictures and a reduction of technological complexity for users.
(3) New materials may deliver greater protection at lighter weights.
(4) Power saving and generation technologies may reduce sustainment demand andstrategic lift requirements.
(5) Improved range, lethality, and precision of surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-tosurface fires may help overcome anti-access and area denial challenges, extend mutual support
across long distances, and permit land forces to project power into the air and maritime domains.
(6) Autonomous and semi-autonomous operational capabilities may increase lethality,
improve protection, and extend Soldiers’ and units’ reach.
(7) Vertical take-off and landing aircraft combined with increased capabilities of UAS may
provide a maneuver advantage for Army forces to overcome challenges of restrictive terrain andoperations across long distances.
b. The technologies mentioned above are not all inclusive and may change as science andtechnological innovations grow and mature.
2-6. Conclusion
a. Future armed conflict will be complex, in part, because threats, enemies, and adversaries
are becoming increasingly capable and elusive. State and nonstate actors employ traditional,
unconventional, and hybrid strategies that threaten U.S. security and vital interests. The
complexity of future armed conflict is due to increasing momentum of human interaction, threatsemanating from dense and weakly governed urban areas, the availability of lethal weapon
systems, and the proliferation of CBRNE threats. Enemies and adversaries will challenge U.S.
competitive advantages in the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. Advanced
technologies will transfer readily to state and nonstate actors. Enemies possess the capability to13

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
threaten the U.S. homeland and project power from land into all other domains. Because thesethreats may originate in dense urban areas or remote safe havens, long-range strikes will proveinsufficient to defeat them. The complexity of future armed conflict, therefore, will require
Army forces capable of conducting missions in the homeland or in foreign lands including
defense support of civil authorities, international disaster relief and humanitarian assistance,
security cooperation activities, crisis response, or large-scale operations. What all Army
operations will have in common is a need for innovative and adaptive leaders and cohesive teams
that thrive in conditions of complexity and uncertainty.
b. The diversity of threats to U.S. security and vital interests will increase the need for Army
forces to prevent conflict and shape security environments. Army forces have long been
essential to preventing conflict through the forward positioning or rotation of forces overseas.
Regionally engaged Army forces are needed to build partner capability, assure allies, and deter
adversaries. While long-range strike and offshore capabilities will remain important to joint
force operations, deterring threats from extended distance through retaliation often proves
insufficient because determined adversaries attempt to achieve objectives rapidly at low costprior to a U.S. or allied response. Army forces communicate U.S. commitment. Army forces
and their partners bolster forward defense to dissuade adversaries who are unwilling to risk directconfrontation. Moreover, Army forces are critical to deterring conflict because they are capableof compelling outcomes without the cooperation of the enemy.
c. Compelling sustainable outcomes in war requires land forces to defeat enemy
organizations, establish security, and consolidate gains. The Joint Force requires the Army to
deploy credible and reliable combined arms capabilities across the range of military operations.
In the complex future operating environment and while operating against hybrid enemies, Army
forces will be essential for projecting national power through support for diplomatic, political,
law enforcement, development, and other efforts.
d. Since World War II the prosperity and security of the United States have depended, inlarge measure, on the synergistic effects of capable land, air, and maritime forces. They havereinforced one another in the conduct of joint operations and together provided options that any
one or two services could not provide alone. U.S. military power is joint power. Trends inthreats, the operating environment, and technology highlight the enduring need for ready Army
forces operating as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational teams to prevent conflict,shape security environments, and win in a complex world.

Chapter 3
How Future Army Forces Operate
3-1. Military problem
To meet the demands of the future strategic environment in 2025 and beyond, how does the
Army conduct joint operations promptly, in sufficient scale, and for ample duration to prevent
conflict, shape security environments, and win wars?

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3-2. Central idea
The Army, as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational teams, protects the homelandand engages regionally to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and create multiple
options for responding to and resolving crises. When called upon, globally responsive combinedarms teams maneuver from multiple locations and domains to present multiple dilemmas to theenemy, limit enemy options, avoid enemy strengths, and attack enemy weaknesses. Forces
tailored rapidly to the mission will exercise mission command and integrate joint,interorganizational, and multinational capabilities. Army forces adapt continuously to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative. Army forces defeat enemy organizations, control terrain, secure
populations, consolidate gains, and preserve joint force freedom of movement and action in theland, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.
3-3. How the Army operates
a. Engage regionally. Army forces engage regionally to ensure interoperability, build
relationships based on common interests, enhance situational awareness, assure partners, anddeter adversaries. Because threats starting at low levels often gain strength and become moredangerous over time,36 Army forces engaged regionally are essential to the defense policy goalsof shaping security environments and preventing conflict.37 To promote regional security, Armyspecial operations forces and regionally aligned conventional forces engage in a broad range oftheater security cooperation activities including security force assistance. These activities are
special operations forces-specific, special operations forces-centric, or conventional force-centric
depending on the nature of the mission. When needed, Army forces reinforce or bolster theefforts of partners. Army units tailored to the mission provide advice as well as access to
combined joint and Army capabilities. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units sustain
long-term relationships and apply their unique civil-military expertise across military,
government, economic, and social spheres. Conventional and special operations forces
contribute to a global land network of relationships resulting in early warning, indigenous
solutions, and informed campaigns. Regional engagement sets favorable conditions for acommitment of forces if diplomacy and deterrence fail.
b. Respond globally. Forward positioned and rotational forces demonstrate U.S. resolve andprovide foundational capabilities to the Joint Force such as communications, intelligence, rotary
wing aviation, missile defense, logistics, engineering, and expeditionary joint task force
headquarters. Those capabilities combined with strategic airlift and sealift and prepositioned
equipment on land or afloat ensure Army forces are prepared to deter adversaries; respondrapidly to crises; and conduct expeditionary maneuver against enemy forces that threaten U.S.
interests.38 Expeditionary maneuver, the rapid deployment of task organized combined arms
forces able to transition quickly and conduct operations of sufficient scale and ample duration toachieve strategic objectives, aims to turn the enemy out of prepared positions or envelop forcesfrom unexpected directions. Army forcible and early entry forces, protected by joint air andmissile defense, achieve surprise and bypass or overcome enemy anti-access and area denial
capabilities through intertheater and intratheater maneuver to multiple locations. Integrated
special operations forces and combined arms teams dynamically task-organized for the mission
conduct reconnaissance and security operations to create and preserve options for the joint force

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commander.39 Expeditionary maneuver may enable the arrival of follow-on forces and set
conditions for subsequent operations.
c. Develop situational understanding through action. Army commanders develop anunderstanding of complex situations in depth, breadth, and context through the integration of
intelligence and operations while operating with multiple partners. Future Army forces process,exploit, and analyze information from multiple disciplines and push intelligence to the point ofneed to maintain advantages over the enemy. Because of limitations associated with humancognition and because much of the information obtained in war is contradictory or false, more
information will not equate to better understanding. Future enemies will act to remain
indistinguishable from protected populations and infrastructure. Combined arms units possess
the mobility, protection, and precision firepower that allow them to fight for understanding andidentify opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Army forces possess crosscultural capabilities that permit them to operate effectively among populations. Army forces aspart of joint teams see, fight, learn, and adapt operations across wide areas while maintaining
contact with the enemy across land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.
d. Conduct joint combined arms operations. Operations against elusive and capable enemies
demand an extension of the concept of combined arms from two or more arms or elements of
one service to include the application of joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities.
Joint combined arms operations create multiple dilemmas for the enemy. Army forces achieve
surprise through maneuver across strategic distances and arrival at unexpected locations. Army
forces have the mobility, protection, and firepower necessary to strike the enemy from
unexpected directions. In high anti-access and area denial environments, dispersion allows
future Army forces to evade enemy attacks, deceive the enemy, and achieve surprise. Even
when operating dispersed, mobile combined arms teams are able to concentrate rapidly to isolate
the enemy, attack critical enemy assets, and seize upon fleeting opportunities. Forces conduct
continuous reconnaissance and security operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative overthe enemy while protecting the force against dangers. During joint combined arms operations
Army forces maneuver and project power across all domains to ensure joint force freedom ofaction and deny the enemy the ability to operate freely across those domains. Army leaders
synchronize the efforts of multiple partners across multiple domains to ensure unity of effort.
e. Sustain high tempo operations. The Army’s ability to sustain operations on land isessential to the Joint Force’s ability to implement foreign policy and achieve favorable outcomesconsistent with U.S. interests. Army sustainment units integrate efforts with the Joint Force toensure unimpeded sustainment flows across the land, air, and maritime domains. These units
provide supplies and services to the point of need to joint, Army, and multinational forces as wellas interorganizational partners to ensure freedom of movement and action. To sustain hightempo operations at the end of long and contested supply lines, units distribute supplies using
capabilities that reduce vulnerability to ground interdiction. Army forces operate with reduced
logistics demand due to fuel-efficient vehicles and systems, improved reliability, locallygenerated power and water, and other efforts. Information systems connect the strategic
sustainment base to tactical organizations to anticipate needs and provide a high degree of
responsiveness and reliability in the supply chain. Every echelon maintains scalable organic
sustainment capabilities to preserve freedom of action even if logistical support slows.
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f. Establish and maintain security. Army forces conduct security operations across wide
areas to ensure freedom of movement and action and deny the enemy the ability to disrupt
operations. Commanders combine reconnaissance; raids; and offensive, defensive, and stability
operations to protect populations, friendly forces, installations, borders, extended infrastructure,
and activities critical to mission accomplishment. Army forces integrate with partner military,
law enforcement, and civil capabilities to establish and maintain security. Army forces securewide areas to deny the enemy use of terrain, protect populations, and enable the Joint Force toproject power from land into the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. The Army’s
ability to establish control on land prevents the enemy from disrupting activities and efforts
critical to consolidating gains in the wake of successful military operations.
g. Consolidate gains. The consolidation of gains is an integral part of armed conflict and isessential to retaining the initiative over determined enemies and adversaries. Enemy
organizations operate on physical battlegrounds and in other contested spaces such as perception,
criminality, and political subversion. To consolidate gains, Army forces often play a supportingrole by reinforcing and integrating the efforts of multiple partners. For example, Army units
provide military support to governance, rule of law, and law enforcement. Expanded leader andSoldier competencies allow Army forces to consolidate gains in complex environments.
Examples include support to law enforcement and financial actions for intelligence analysts,
advanced situational awareness for combat arms, investigative skills for military police,reconstruction skills for engineers, rule of law advising for staff judge advocates, andinstitutional development for civil affairs officers and leaders within the institutional Army.
Conventional and special operations forces work together to understand, influence, or compel
human behaviors and perceptions. Army commanders understand cognitive, informational,social, cultural, political, and physical influences affecting human behavior and the mission.
Leaders exert influence on key individuals, organizations, and institutions through cooperativeand persuasive means. For example, when mission accomplishment requires strengthening
partner institutions, Army forces exert influence to convince those partners that undertaking
necessary reforms and strengthening critical institutions are in their interest. Emphasis on earlyand effective consolidation activities as a fundamental part of campaign design enables successand achieves lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time span.
h. Respond to and mitigate crises in the homeland. The Army remains ready to protect theAmerican people and respond to crises in the homeland. The homeland is a unique theater ofoperations for the Joint Force and the Army. Homeland defense and defense support of civil
authorities remain critical missions for the Army as demands on the Army to protect thehomeland continue to grow.40 The Army (active component, Army Reserve, and Army National
Guard) fills critical first responder capacity shortfalls to save lives, relieve suffering, protect
property, and repair critical infrastructure. Army forces provide command, control, and long
duration logistics in response to complex catastrophes or attacks. The Army provides specialized
capabilities such as CBRNE response units. During defense support of civil authorities
operations, Army leaders at corps and division levels organize teams to support
interorganizational partners. Army forces help ensure unity of effort through dual-statuscommanders who respond to state and national chains of command and lead Army forces
operating under the authorities of Titles 10 and 32 U.S. Code.41
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i. Ensure institutional and operational synergy.
(1) The operational Army (those units organized, trained, and equipped to deploy and fight)
and the institutional Army (those units responsible for manning, training, equipping, deploying,and ensuring the readiness of all Army forces) work together in support of combatantcommanders to build partner capacity and shape regional security consistent with U.S. interests.
The institutional Army contributes to operational missions to shape security environments andconsolidate gains.
(2) Because of the acceleration of technological change, the institutional Army uses
streamlined processes to improve readiness and speed acquisition. New technologies simplify
systems and ensure their resiliency in the face of enemy action. The Army works with industry
to reduce costs of acquiring and sustaining advanced weapon systems. The institutional Army
adapts quickly to changes in the character of warfare with revised institutional training andeducation for leaders across the Army. Advanced technologies deliver training and education to
the point of need using realistic and integrated live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training.
Teams build confidence and leaders develop naturalistic decisionmaking skills through realistic
virtual experiences and mission rehearsals.42 The Army improves readiness through streamlined
personnel, logistics, and maintenance systems.
(3) The institutional Army optimizes individual and team performance and ensures that theright Soldier is in the right assignment at the right time to contribute to the mission. The
institutional Army and operational Army develop competencies in leaders and Soldiers critical to
future responsibilities.
j. Develop innovative leaders and optimize human performance. Decentralized operations incomplex environments require competent leaders and cohesive teams that thrive in conditions of
uncertainty. Leaders foster discipline, confidence, and cohesion through innovative, realistic
training. Repetitive training combined with self-study, rigorous education in joint and Army
institutions, and leader development in units ensures that Army forces thrive in chaotic
environments. Army forces gain intellectual advantages over adversaries through cross-culturalcompetencies and advanced cognitive abilities. Leaders think ahead in time to anticipate
opportunities and dangers and take prudent risk to gain and maintain positions of relativeadvantage over the enemy. Leaders foster trust among other leaders and Soldiers. They develop
unit cultures that encourage the exercise of initiative consistent with the philosophy of missioncommand. Leaders and Soldiers are committed to each other and the Army professional ethic.
They remain resilient and preserve their moral character while operating in environments ofpersistent danger.43
3-4. Tenets and core competencies
a. Tenets guide the generation and application of combat power. Commanders use tenets tothink about how best to align efforts in time, space, and purpose to achieve campaign objectives.
Conducting operations consistent with tenets allows forces to achieve operational overmatch andseize, retain, and exploit the initiative.44 Future Army commanders consider the following tenets
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when visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations: initiative,
simultaneity, depth, adaptability, endurance, lethality, mobility, and innovation.
(1) Initiative. Initiative is assessing a tactical or operational situation and acting to dictate
the terms of operations. A force that possesses the initiative renders hostile forces and other key
actors incapable of responding effectively or organizing counter efforts. Retaining initiativerequires decentralization consistent with the philosophy of mission command, focusedcommander’s intent, and clear concepts of operation. Commanders decentralize combined arms
and other capabilities so subordinate units have the resources to act immediately. Commanders
accept prudent risk and take action. Commanders encourage subordinates to seize upon fleeting
windows of opportunity. Because military operations are a series of temporary conditions,commanders think ahead in time and space to retain and exploit the initiative. Commanders
create and, if necessary, reconstitute reserves and other capabilities to preserve the flexibility
they need to retain the initiative.
(2) Simultaneity. Simultaneity is the execution of related and mutually supporting tasks at
the same time across multiple locations and domains. Operating simultaneously across the land,
air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains allows Army forces to deliver multiple blows to
the enemy while reassuring allies and influencing neutrals. The simultaneous application of joint
and combined arms capabilities aims to overwhelm the enemy physically and psychologically.
Simultaneity extends efforts beyond physical battlefields into other contested spaces such as
public perception, political subversion, illicit financing, and criminality.
(3) Depth. Depth is the extension of operations in time and space to prevent enemy forcesfrom recovering from simultaneous efforts. To achieve depth, commanders think ahead in timeand determine how to connect tactical and operational objectives to strategic goals.
Commanders and staffs anticipate future opportunities and dangers and make decisions thatallow their forces to retain and exploit the initiative. For example, because adversaries will use
long-range fires, Army forces create and maintain operational depth to protect friendly ports,bases, assembly areas, and lines of communication. Extending operations in time and space
applies beyond the physical area of operations on land. For example, Army forces project powerfrom land across the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains to ensure joint force freedomof maneuver.
(4) Adaptability. Adaptability is responding to new needs or changes without a loss offunctionality. Adaptive leaders possess many different skills and qualities that allow the Army
to retain the initiative. Army leaders think critically, are comfortable with ambiguity, accept
prudent risk, assess the situation continuously, develop innovative solutions to problems, andremain mentally and physically agile to capitalize on opportunities.45(5) Endurance. Endurance is the ability to sustain efforts for sufficient duration with thecapacity necessary to accomplish the mission. Endurance requires the ability to generate,
protect, and sustain forces in high tempo operations in austere environments and across wide
areas for as long as the commander requires. Resilience, the ability to cope with adversity andlosses, is a component of endurance. Endurance often requires uncommitted forces that canoperate in depth and sustain operations physically, morally, and psychologically over time.
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Army forces also reinforce the capacity of joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners
and ensure their ability to sustain efforts for the duration necessary to accomplish the mission.
(6) Lethality. Lethality is the ability to kill or cause physical destruction and is essential tofighting and winning battles. Army forces defeat or destroy opponents quickly withcombinations of skilled Soldiers, well-trained teams, and superior weapons. Army leaders seek
overmatch in close combat while applying firepower with discipline and discrimination.
Precision firepower, effective training, and commitment to Army values allow Soldiers todestroy the enemy while minimizing risk to non-combatants.46(7) Mobility. Mobility is the capability that permits military forces to gain positions ofrelative advantage, conduct high tempo operations, and concentrate combat power against
decisive points while operating dispersed across wide areas. Army forces possess strategic,
operational, and tactical mobility. At the strategic and operational levels, joint mobility requires
airlift and sealift to move Army forces. When combined with firepower and protection, mobility
at the tactical level allows Army units to gain positions of relative advantage and overmatch theenemy in close combat.
(8) Innovation. Innovation is the result of critical and creative thinking and the conversionof new ideas into valued outcomes. Innovation drives the development of new tools or methods
that permit Army forces to anticipate future demands, stay ahead of determined enemies, andaccomplish the mission. Innovation is particularly important in organizations that develop
capabilities as well as those that train, equip, and sustain forces.
b. Core competencies. Core competencies are the Army’s strengths, strategic advantages, andessential contributions to the Joint Force. Core competencies provide focus for leader
development, force design, and unit training. Understanding and excelling at these corecompetencies allow Army leaders to contribute to mission success across the range of military
operations. The Army core competencies are summarized below.
(1) Shape the security environment. Army forces provide unique capabilities that allow
combatant commanders to reassure partners and deter aggression while establishing conditions
that support the potential employment of joint forces. These capabilities include special
operations forces, regionally aligned forces, and partnered U.S. Army Reserve and Army
National Guard forces. Special operations forces provide capabilities that assist partners withinternal defense as well as developing the capabilities needed to deter potential enemies.
Regionally aligned forces develop relationships with and strengthen partner land forces, share
intelligence, increase cultural awareness, and conduct bilateral and multilateral military
exercises. Reserve forces, through efforts such as the State Partnership Program, provide uniquedual-trained Soldiers who apply special skills from their civilian backgrounds to assist in medical
and engineering activities, disaster preparedness, and critical infrastructure and resource
protection.47 Together, these efforts allow the Army to maintain a global landpower network thatis critical to preventing conflict and, when necessary, winning wars. While the ability to shape
security environments through the threat of punitive action will remain important, Army forces
conduct positive actions essential to reassuring allies, influencing neutrals, and dissuading
adversaries.
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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(2) Set the theater. Setting the theater includes actions to establish and maintain theconditions necessary to retain joint force freedom of action. The Army combines forward
deployed forces and rotational forces to develop, maintain, and operate the theater structure.
Joint forces depend on the Army to provide essential capabilities including logistics,
communications, intelligence, long-range fires, and air and missile defense. Future forces will
possess offensive capabilities to project power from land into air, maritime, space, andcyberspace domains to establish and maintain vital infrastructure, lines of communication, andprotection for successful joint combined arms operations. The Army’s ability to set the theater isessential to preventing conflict and, if deterrence fails, allowing the Joint Force to seize theinitiative while protecting the force and restricting the enemy’s options.
(3) Project national power. Projecting national power is the ability to deploy and sustain
land power rapidly and effectively in and from multiple locations and domains. Because war is apolitical and human competition, the Army provides support to the broad range of political,
development, law enforcement, and rule of law efforts necessary to accomplish the mission.
Army forces are essential to projecting national power in dangerous environments to secureinterorganizational and multinational efforts. Army forces ensure combatant commanders
possess the ability to scale-up land forces rapidly through forward positioning, strategic andoperational airlift and sealift, and the use of propositioned equipment and supplies. The Army is
the only element of the Joint Force with the capacity to conduct sustained campaign-quality land
operations that compel adversaries through the physical occupation of vital terrain andinfrastructure and consolidate gains to achieve sustainable outcomes.
(4) Combined arms maneuver in the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.
Combined arms maneuver is the application of combat power in time and space to defeat enemy
ground forces, seize, occupy, and defend land areas and achieve physical, temporal, andpsychological advantages over the enemy. Combined arms maneuver aims to seize, retain, andexploit the initiative. Army forces apply combat power from unexpected directions, achieve
surprise, and render the enemy unable to respond effectively. Army leaders integrate andsynchronize warfighting functions and joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities
such that they achieve complementary effects. The skills needed to conduct combined arms
maneuver across all domains represent the peak of military proficiency.
(5) Wide area security. Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat
power to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities to deny the enemy positions ofadvantage and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative. Army forces conduct security
tasks to provide the joint force commander with reaction time and maneuver space. Wide area
security includes the essential stability tasks including: establish civil security; security force
assistance; establish civil control; restore essential services; support governance; and support
economic and infrastructure development. Army forces conduct continuous reconnaissance andmaintain contact with the enemy to defeat or preempt enemy actions and retain the initiative.
Wide area security includes Army employment of long-range precision-strike systems (missiles),high-quality air defenses, cyber capabilities, and long-range artillery and rocket systems toachieve focused control in support of strategic and operational joint force freedom of maneuver.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(6) Cyberspace operations and the land domain. Cyberspace operations are actions at allechelons that generate and exert combat power in and through cyberspace to enable freedom of
maneuver and action. The Army as part of the joint team conducts cyberspace operations
combined with other nonlethal operations (such as electronic warfare, electromagnetic spectrum
operations, and military information support) as well as lethal actions. With Army cyber mission
forces, commanders direct offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations,and Department of Defense (DOD) information network operations in time and space. The
Army integrates maneuver in cyberspace with the other forms of maneuver to deny the enemy’s
ability to conduct operations in cyberspace while preserving U.S. freedom of action.
(7) Special operations. Special operations are those operations requiring unique modes of
employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training. Army special operations provide
combatant commanders with precise lethal and nonlethal capabilities. The Army conducts
special operations, including special warfare and surgical strike operations, in hostile, denied, or
politically sensitive environments. These operations may be time sensitive, clandestine, lowvisibility, and/or high risk. Special operations forces possess uniquely assessed, organized,
trained, and equipped capabilities and authorities. Interdependence gained by the right mix ofcomplementary conventional and special operations forces enhances success throughout therange of military operations and all phases of joint operations.
3-5. Conclusion
The Army will remain prepared to protect the homeland, foster security globally, project power,
and win. To confront the challenges anticipated in the future operational environment, the Army
will maintain high levels of readiness and deliver the capabilities and capacity needed to achieve
national security objectives. The Army must invest in and deliver future force capabilities tomaintain a competitive advantage against increasingly capable and determined adversaries.
Army core competencies and tenets are descriptive in nature and provide guidelines for Armyleaders to succeed in dangerous environments while guiding leader development, force design,
and unit training. As the starting point for future force development, the AOC requires sustained
collaboration and learning across the Army to strike the right balance between current readinessand investment of future capabilities. Only through focused investment and continuous analysis
and assessment will the ideas proposed in the AOC manifest as doctrine, organizations, training,materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions that allow the
Army to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win in a complex world.

Chapter 4
Army Operating Concept (AOC) Conclusiona. Anticipating the demands of future armed conflict requires an understanding of continuities
in the nature of war as well as an appreciation for changes in the character of armed conflict.
Because technology, strategic guidance, joint concepts, and global and regional security
challenges will continue to change over time, this operating concept does not deliver a definitive
answer to the problem of future armed conflict. Rather it describes how the Army may provide
foundational capabilities to the Joint Force and civil authorities to enable joint operations. The
Army under Force 2025 Maneuvers will evaluate the ideas contained in this concept and the22

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assumptions on which they are based to ensure that the Army’s preparation for the demands offuture armed conflict rest on a solid conceptual foundation.
b. Based on strategic guidance and the potential operational environment, the AOC describes
how the Army, as part of joint, interorganizational, and multinational teams, employs forces andcapabilities in complex environments against increasingly capable opponents to accomplish
campaign objectives and protect U.S. national interests. It proposes joint combined arms
operations as the conceptual foundation for the Army’s future operational approach. Thisapproach envisions the simultaneous employment of forces and capabilities from and into
multiple locations, contested spaces, and domains, presenting multiple dilemmas to an enemy,
limiting options, and avoiding strengths. The AOC emphasizes the integration of special
operations and conventional forces with joint, interorganizational, multinational partners acrossthe land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. Joint combined arms operations allow
the Army to respond quickly and conduct operations of significant scale and duration toaccomplish the mission across the range of military operations.
c. Employment of Army forces shows the Nation’s commitment to deter conflict and compel
enemies in war. The Army’s capabilities and capacity provide combatant commanders withmultiple options including the ability to conduct prompt and sustained combat or operations on
land. As the Army continues to adapt and innovate, it will continue to provide the foundational
capabilities that enable the Joint Force to prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win
in a complex world.

Appendix A
References
Section I
Required References. Army regulations, Department of the Army (DA) pamphlets, fieldmanuals, Army doctrine publications (ADP), Army doctrine reference publications (ADRP), andDA forms are available at Army Publishing Directorate Home Page http://www.usapa.army.mil
TRADOC publications and forms are available at TRADOC Publications at
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs Joint pubs are available on the Joint Electronic Library at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm or https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020
TP 525-3-0
The U.S. Army Capstone Concept
Section II
Related References
2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance. (2014). Retrieved from http://www.defense
innovationmarketplace.mil/resources/army_strategic_planning_guidance2014.pdf
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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1

ADP 1
The Army
ADP 3-0
Unified Land Operations
ADRP 3-0
Unified Land Operations
Allison, G. T., Blackwill, R., et al. (2000, July). America’s National Interests. The Commission
on America’s National Interests. Retrieved from http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
amernatinter.pdf
Army Regulation 71-11
Total Army Analysis (TAA)
Center for Army Lessons Learned. (2010, January 10). Gap Analysis Report # 2-11. Conduct
area security over large operational areas to protect against hybrid threats operating among the
population in complex terrain. Available by request from the proponent.
Clapper, J. (2014, January 2). Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community[Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]. Retrieved fromhttp://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf
Combined Arms Center. (2008, June). Gap Analysis Report No. 08-37. Corps and division joint,interagency, and multinational operations tactics, techniques, and procedures. Available byrequest from the proponent.
Dempsey, M. (2014, May 14). Address to the Atlantic Council. Retrieved from http://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/transcript-gen-martin-dempsey-at-disrupting-defense
Department of the Army. Memo 10-1. (1997, January 15). Executive Agent responsibilities
assigned to the Secretary of the Army.
Developments Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). UK. Ministry of Defence: Strategic
Trends Programme Future Character of Conflict. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33685/FCOCReadactedFinalWeb.pdf
DOD. (2014). Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Development Involving thePeople’s Republic of China 2014. Retrieved fromhttp://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf
DOD. (2011, February 8). The National Military Strategy of the United States of America:
Redefining America’s Military Leadership. Retrieved from http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/
2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf
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DOD. (2013, February). Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/homelanddefensestrategy.pdf
DOD. (2012, January). Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.
Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.01
Functions of the Department of Defense and its major components. Retrieved fromhttp://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/dir.html
DODD 7045.20
Capability management portfolios. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/dir.html
DOD. (2014, March 4). Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. Washington DC. Retrieved fromhttp://www.defense.gov/qdr/
Essays, UK. (2013, November). Comparative Influence of UK Component Politics Essay #4.
Retrieved from http://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/comparative-influence-of-ukcomponent-politics-essay.php#ftn4?cref=1
Field Manual 3-06
Urban Operations
Flynn. M. (2014, February 11). Annual Threat Assessment [Statement before the Senate Armed
Services Committee] Retrieved from http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/
2014_DIA_SFR_SASC_ATA_FINAL.pdf
Fulton, W., Holliday, J., & Wyer, S. (May, 2013). Iranian Strategy in Syria. [A joint report byAmerican Enterprise Institute’s critical threats project & Institute for the Study of War.]
Retrieved from http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria1MAY.pdf
Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept. (2012, March). Retrieved
from http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/Army%20Marine%
20Corp%20Gaining%20and%20Maintaining%20Access.pdf
Grygiel, A., & Mitchell, W. (2014, August 28). Limited war is back. The National Interest.
September-October Issue. Retrieved from http://nationalinterest.org/feature/limited-war-back11128
Hagel, C. (2014, September 3). [Speech]. Remarks at the Southeastern New England Defense
Industry Alliance, Defense Innovation Days. Newport Rhode Island. Retrieved fromhttp://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1877

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Haight, D.B., Laughlin, P.J. & Bergner, K.F. (2012, November) Armored forces: Mobility,
protection and precision firepower essential for future. eARMOR. Retrieved fromhttp://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2012/NOV_DEC/
Haight_Laughlin_Bergner.html
Hix, W. (2014, February 12). Technology to Enable Strategic Landpower 2025 [Video podcast].
AUSA Winter Symposium-Panel 5 Discussion. Retrieved fromhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QVyukSSxwBc
Jajko, W. (2012, September 19). Strategic surprise. The Institute of World Politics. [News &Publications.] Retrieved from http://www.iwp.edu/news_publications/detail/strategic-surpriseJohnson, D. (2010, April). Military capabilities for hybrid war, insights from the Israel Defense
Forces in Lebanon and Gaza. [Occasional paper]. Santa Monica, CA. Retrieved fromwww.rand.org
Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Decade of War. Volume I. (2012, June 15). Enduring
lessons from the past decade of operations. Retrieved from https://www.intelink.gov/sites/jcoa
Joint Operational Access Concept
Joint Publication 1-02
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
Joint Publication 3-0
Joint Operations
Joint Publication 3-08
Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations
Joint Publication 5-0
Joint Operation Planning
Manea, O. (2014, March 29). Reflections on the continuities in war and warfare. Small Wars
Journal. Retrieved from http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reflections-on-the-continuities-inwar-and-warfare
Matlak, R. W. (2014, July). The nightmare years to come? [Institute for National Strategic
Studies, Strategic Monograph]. Washington DC, National Defense University Press. Retrieved
from http://inss.dodlive.mil/2014/08/15/the-nightmare-years-to-come/McHugh, J. (2014, June 9). [Memorandum for Under Secretary of the Army]. Implementation of
the Army Management Action Group. Washington D.C. Retrieved fromhttp://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/SecArmy_Collection_1.html

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McNalley, D. (2014, September 2). Investing in the Army’s future. Army Technology. Retrieved
from http://armytechnology.armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2014/09/02/investing-in-the-armysfuture/
Miles, D. (2011, May 5). Golden hour initiative pays off in Afghanistan. Armed Forces Press
Service. Retrieved from: http://www.army.mil/article/55985/
National Intelligence Council. (2012, December). Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds.
Retrieved from http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-councilglobal-trends
Obama, B. (2014, May 28) [Speech] Remarks by the President at the United States Military
Academy Commencement Ceremony. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony
Odierno, R. (2012). Marching Orders, 38th Chief of Staff, Army: America’s Force of Decisive
Action. Retrieved from http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/232478.pdf
Odierno, R. (2013). Marching Orders, 38th Chief of Staff, Army: Waypoint #1. Retrieved fromhttp://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/280914.pdf
Odierno, R. (2014). Marching Orders, 38th Chief of Staff, Army: Waypoint #2. Retrieved fromhttp://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/329319.pdf
Pomerantsev, P. (2014, May 5). How Putin is reinventing warfare. Foreign Policy. Retrieved
from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/05/how_putin_is_reinventing_warfare
Quigly, S. L. (2005, October 5). 'Overmatch' is Watchword for Future Joint Force, Admiral Says.
American Forces Press Service. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=17958
Reed, B. J. (2012, October). Leader development, learning agility and the Army Profession. The
Land Warfare Papers. The Institute of Land Warfare. (92). Retrieved fromhttp://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/landwarfarepapers/Documents/LWP_92_web.pdf
Sauer, J. and Kaiser, M. (2013, August 29). Changing the strategic dialogue: New definitions forlandpower and land control. Small Wars Journal. Retrieved from http://smallwarsjournal.com/
jrnl/art/changing-the-strategic-dialogue-new-definitions-for-landpower-and-land-control
Sauer, J., Stolz, C., and Kaiser, M. (2014, February). Core competencies for an Army ofpreparation. Army Magazine, 41-46. Retrieved from http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2014/Documents/02February/Sauer_February2014.pdf

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Schelling, T. C. (2008, November 5). Arms and influence. (Rev. ed.). [The diplomacy of
violence.] The Henry L. Stemson Lectures Series. Yale University Press, 2-6. Retrieved fromhttp://www.amazon.com/Arms-Influence-Preface-Afterword-Lectures/dp/0300143370/
ref=pd_sim_b_3?ie=UTF8&refRID=05R6V4RARQ30DNCZ8J09#reader_0300143370
Sergie, M. A., and Johnson, T. (2014, May 5). Backgrounders: Boko Haram. Council on Foreign
Relations. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739
The Landmark Thucydides: A comprehensive guide to the Peloponnesian War. (R. Crawley,Trans). R. B. Strassler (ed.). New York: Free Press, 2008.
TRADOC G-2
Operational Environments to 2028: The Strategic Environment for Unified Land Operations
TP 525-3-7
The United States Army Human Dimension Concept
TP 525-8-5
The United States Army Functional Concept for Engagement
TRADOC Regulation 71-20
Concept Development, Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration
TP 71-20-3
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Concept Development Guide
U.S. Army Center for the Army Profession and Ethic. (2014, July 11). The Army Ethic White
Paper. Kansas: Fort Leavenworth. Retrieved from http://cape.army.mil/repository/whitepapers/Army-Ethic-White-Paper.pdf
U.S. Army TRADOC Unified Quest Strategic Trends Seminar Event Summary. (2012,
December 15). Technology is the most likely game changer in 2030-2040. [Team discussion].
Available upon request from proponent.
U.S. Army TRADOC Unified Quest Strategic Trends Seminar Event Summary. (2012,
December 15). Striking the right balance between focused science and technology investment.
[Team discussion]. Available upon request from proponent.
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. (2013, June 12). Army leader development strategy Kansas:
Fort Leavenworth. Retrieved from http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CAL/repository/
ALDS5June%202013Record.pdf
von Clausewitz, C. (1976). On war. (Ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret). NJ:
Princeton University Press.

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Wilkins, B. P. (2014, May 2). Total Army Analysis. [ARCIC Exclusive Capabilities
Development Directorate Feature.] Retrieved from http://www.arcic.army.mil/Articles/cddTotal-Army-Analysis.aspx

Appendix B
From Concepts to Capabilities: Building the Future Force
B-1. Introduction
Ensuring that future Army forces are prepared to win in a complex world requires a focused,sustained, and collaborative effort across the institutional Army, the operating force, the joint
community, industry, academia, and other interorganizational and multinational partners. Futureforce development must also integrate efforts across doctrine development, organizational
design, training, materiel development, leader development and education, personnel
management, and investments in facilities. While concepts aligned with the Army’s warfighting
functions (mission command, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, engagement,
maneuver support and protection, and sustainment) help identify required capabilities for future
Army forces, what is most important is to understand how units and leaders combine capabilities
across warfighting functions to accomplish the mission.48 The Army Warfighting Challenges(AWFCs) provide an analytical framework to integrate efforts across warfighting functions while
collaborating with key stakeholders in learning activities, modernization, and future force
design.49 As historian Sir Michael Howard observed, “No matter how clearly one thinks, it is
impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is not to be so far off
the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed.”50 The AWFCs
help the Army ensure it does not find itself too far off the mark by asking first order questions,the answers to which will drive development of the future force.51
B-2. Linking warfighting challenges to required capabilities
a. The AOC required capabilities are derived from AWFCs. They are the first ordercapabilities the Army must possess to win in a complex world. Army forces must:(1) Develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating incomplex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.
(2) Shape and influence security environments, engage key actors, and consolidate gains toachieve sustainable security outcomes.
(3) Provide security force assistance to support policy goals and increase local, regional,
and host nation security force capability, capacity, and effectiveness.
(4) Maintain an agile institutional Army that ensures combat effectiveness, supports otherservices, fulfills DOD and other government agencies' requirements, ensures quality of life for
Soldiers and families, and possesses the capability to surge (mobilize) or expand (strategicreserve) the active Army.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(5) Prevent, reduce, eliminate, and mitigate the use and effects of weapons of mass
destruction and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives threats andhazards on friendly forces and civilian populations.
(6) Conduct homeland operations to defend the Nation against emerging threats.
(7) Assure uninterrupted access to critical communications and information links (satellite
communications; position, navigation, and timing; and intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance) when operating in a contested, congested, and competitive environment.
(8) Train Soldiers and leaders to ensure they are prepared to accomplish the mission acrossthe range of military operations while operating in complex environments against determined,
adaptive enemy organizations.
(9) Develop resilient Soldiers, adaptive leaders, and cohesive teams committed to the Armyprofessional ethic that are capable of accomplishing the mission in environments of uncertainty
and persistent danger.
(10) Develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty
and chaos, and are capable of visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations
in complex environments and against adaptive enemies.
(11) Conduct effective air-ground combined arms reconnaissance to develop the situationin close contact with the enemy and civilian populations.
(12) Project forces, conduct forcible and early entry, and transition rapidly to offensive
operations to ensure access and seize the initiative.
(13) Establish and maintain security across wide areas (wide area security) to protect
forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities necessary to shape security environments,
consolidate gains, and set conditions for achieving policy goals.
(14) Integrate joint, interorganizational, and multinational partner capabilities andcampaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military
operations.
(15) Conduct combined arms air-ground maneuver to defeat enemy organizations andaccomplish missions in complex operational environments.
(16) Set the theater, provide strategic agility to the Joint Force, and maintain freedom of
movement and action during sustained and high tempo operations at the end of extended lines ofcommunication in austere environments.
(17) Coordinate and integrate Army and joint, interorganizational, and multinational fires
and conduct targeting across all domains to defeat the enemy and preserve freedom of maneuver
and action across the range of military operations.
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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(18) Deliver fires to defeat the enemy and preserve freedom of maneuver and action acrossthe range of military operations.
(19) Understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations consistent with thephilosophy of mission command to seize the initiative over the enemy and accomplish themission across the range of military operations.
(20) Design Army formations capable of deploying rapidly and operating to achieve
missions across the range of military operations.
b. These first order required capabilities are intentionally broad in nature and not all inclusive.
Required capabilities within the Army functional concepts derive from and align with the AOC
required capabilities.
B-3. Thinking and learninga. Thinking. Army leaders develop and mature concepts for future armed conflict, assess
concepts in experimentation and other learning activities, and use what is learned to drive futureforce development. Thinking clearly about future armed conflict requires consideration of
threats, enemies, and adversaries, anticipated missions, emerging technologies, opportunities touse existing capabilities in new ways, and historical observations and lessons learned. Armyleaders develop concepts aligned with each warfighting function (mission command,
intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, engagement, maneuver support and protection, andsustainment) to identify, through experimentation and learning activities, what capabilities are
required for the future force to accomplish missions across the range of military operations.
What is most important, however, is a refinement of those required capabilities based on anunderstanding of how Army leaders and units will combine them to accomplish missions.
b. Learning. Force 2025 Maneuvers are the physical (experimentation, evaluations, exercises,modeling, simulations, and wargames) and intellectual (studies, analysis, concept, andcapabilities development) activities that help leaders integrate future capabilities and developinterim solutions to warfighting challenges. Using the AWFCs as the analytical framework, theArmy conducts Force 2025 Maneuvers to develop concepts, operational and organizational
plans, DOTMLPF solutions, leader and Soldier assessment tools, and policy solutions to achieve
the vision of the Army’s force in the near- (2014-2020), mid- (2020-2030), and far- (2030-2040)
terms. Force 2025 Maneuvers allows the Army to translate big ideas (such as, logistics demand
reduction; integration of robotics and autonomy-enabled systems; and leader, Soldier, and team
optimization) into concrete actions to improve the future force.
B-4. Analysis: Capabilities Needs Analysis (CNA) and Total Army Analysis (TAA)a. The CNA assesses the current and programmed forces’ ability to accomplish the mission.52
The CNA effort helps leaders identify solution approaches to warfighting challenges, seize
opportunities, or close capability gaps. What the current and programmed forces cannot
accomplish becomes capability gaps. Analysis helps leaders prioritize those gaps based on risk
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as well as the benefit that new capabilities provide. CNA assessments inform interim
DOTMLPF solutions in the near- (2014-2020), mid- (2020-2030), and far- (2030-2040) terms.
Solutions may include doctrine updates, changes in force structure, innovations in training andleader development, new weapons or equipment, and investments in science and technology.
b. The TAA informs how the Army of today becomes the Army of the future.53 TAA
provides the analytical foundation for decisions related to the composition (organizations) andmix (active, Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve) of the operational force. 54 TAA begins
with a strategy-based requirements analysis using two primary sources: strategic guidance(requirements) and combatant commander operational plans (demands). The TAA also
considers Army concepts, first principles for force development (see below), and lessons from
Force 2025 Maneuvers.55
B-5. Implementation: Adapt, evolve, and innovatea. The CNA informs AWFC interim solution strategies that connect near-term efforts to longterm goals. The Army maintains running estimates for each of the warfighting challenges andrevises force development plans based on changes in resources, threat, technology, missions,lessons learned, or opportunities to use existing capabilities in new ways. Army leaders
prioritize resources based on how capabilities integrate across warfighting functions andcontribute DOTMLPF solutions to warfighting challenges in the near- (2014-2020), mid- (20202030), and far- (2030-2040) terms.
(1) Adapt in the near-term (2014-2020). Adaptation is responding to new needs or changes
without a loss of functionality. Changing doctrine, policy, leader development, and training may
occur quickly and with limited monetary cost. For the Army, adaptation is the modification ofexisting capabilities or decisions that adjust the balance between force structure, readiness, andmodernization. Organizational modifications linked to TAA may also happen quickly to respondto resource constraints as well as shifts in missions and operational environment changes. The
Army must adapt faster than enemies and potential adversaries. Army forces will have todevelop materiel solutions much faster than in the past due to the ease and speed of technology
transfer and adaptation by enemies.
(2) Evolve in the mid-term (2020-2030). Evolution is the gradual development ofsomething into a more complex or better form.56 The Army evolves using DOD and Army
resourcing processes such as the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), long-range
investment requirements analysis (LIRA), and the Joint Capabilities Integration andDevelopment System (JCIDS). The Army ensures that materiel solutions are integrated fully
with existing capabilities across DOTLPF solutions.
(3) Innovate for the far-term (2030-2040). Innovation is the act or process of introducing
something new, or creating new uses for existing designs.57 Innovation includes appliedresearch. The Army balances near-term requirements with future development investments to
support innovation. Army leaders assess what is possible and prioritize promising technologies.
The research and development community of practice applies an analytical framework to select amanageable sample of candidate technologies that have potential to address warfighting
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challenges and capability gaps. The Army assesses candidate technologies in learning andexperimentation activities and pursues mature technologies through the acquisition process orcontracting solutions. Less mature, but promising candidates are recommended for additional
research or experimentation.
b. Army forums under Force 2025 and Beyond. Force 2025 and Beyond is the Army’s
comprehensive effort for changing the Army and improving land power capabilities for the Joint
Force. It synchronizes processes and products from concepts to capabilities to implementchange. Force 2025 and Beyond efforts produce recommendations that help Army leaders directmodernization and force development.
B-6. Keys to success: Future force development first principles
a. To ensure that the future force maintains core competencies and is capable of operating
consistent with the tenets in the AOC, the Army uses first principles to prioritize efforts andassist future force development decisions.
b. The following principles may change based on changes in national strategy, joint or Army
concepts, senior leader guidance, or the operational environments.
(1) Retain capacity and readiness to accomplish missions that support achieving national
objectives.58(2) Build or expand new capabilities to cope with emerging threats or achieve overmatch.59(3) Maintain U.S. Army asymmetrical advantages.
(4) Maintain essential theater foundational and enabling capabilities.
(5) Prioritize organizations and competencies that are most difficult to train and regenerate.
(6) Cut unnecessary overhead to retain fighting capacity and decentralize capabilities
whenever possible.
(7) Maintain and expand synergies between the operating force and the institutional Army.
(8) Optimize performance of the Army through a force mix that accentuates relative
strengths and mitigates weaknesses of each component.
B-7. Conclusion
Continuous feedback, collaboration, and teamwork are keys to the success of Force 2025 andBeyond. Capabilities development efforts drive solutions aligned to AWFCs. These solutions
inform Army prioritization and resourcing. Army leaders make force-management and forcedevelopment decisions based on analysis and learning activities under Force 2025 Maneuvers
and apply first principles to evaluate courses of action.

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Appendix C
Science and Technology
C-1. Introduction
a. Science and technology helps shape the character of warfare. The U.S. Army’s advantage
over enemies depends in large measure on advanced technology. The Army achieves overmatch
through powerful combinations of leadership, skilled Soldiers, and technology. While thedevelopment of advanced technologies is important, the integration of these technologies into
Army units and training maximizes the potential of any technology. Increased technologicalcomplexity demands that Army forces maintain a high degree of preparedness in peacetime,
because it is increasingly difficult to achieve proficiency quickly.
b. The Army recognizes that there are no "silver bullet" technological solutions. The Armyretains overmatch through combining technologies and integrating them into changes inorganizations, doctrine, leader development, training, and personnel policies. The Army’s ability
to achieve significant leaps in warfighting efficiency and effectiveness requires an understandingof the interaction of technology with changes in doctrine, organizations, training, and otherelements of combat effectiveness.
c. The Army must fit machines to Soldiers rather than the other way around. The Army will
pursue advances in human sciences for cognitive, social, and physical development andemphasize engineering psychology and human factors engineering in the design of weapons andequipment.
C-2. Technology focus areas and first principles
a. Because technologies change rapidly and transfer easily, the U.S. military will have toaccelerate new technologies into the force to maintain its ability to overmatch enemies.
Acceleration requires institutional reform and collaborative efforts among Army, DOD, national
research and development communities, industry, academia, and international partners. The
following are key technological focus areas.
(1) Mobile protected precision firepower. Science and technology efforts focus ondeveloping lighter weight and lower volume platforms with increased protection andsurvivability to improve tactical, operational, and strategic mobility and deployability. These
new materials, combined with design optimization and new technologies, will reduce overallvehicle weight; increase system mobility, reliability, availability, and maintainability; and reducesustainment demand of ground vehicles. Reduced support structures enable Army forces todeploy through austere airports and seaports and transition quickly to operations. New materials
with improved strength-to-weight ratios, toughness, and ballistic resistance deliver greater
protection against lethal and nonlethal threats at significantly lighter weights. Critical toreducing vehicle weight is the development of active protection systems and other technology toincrease protection and survivability and counter emerging threats. Mobile protected systems
that possess scalable precision firepower and operate with reduced logistical demand are critical
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to the future force’s ability to project power, conduct joint combined arms maneuver and securewide areas. The development of unmanned ground combat systems that integrate into manned
formations (manned-unmanned teaming) extends the operational reach and increases thecapability and agility of units. Science and technology must focus on developing sensors thatcan locate and identify threats, enable vehicle protection systems to counter those threats, andreduce the likelihood of detection and engagement by the enemy.
(2) Lethality and effects. Science and technology must focus on developing munitions,platforms, sensors, targeting, and mission command systems that provide the commander theability to overmatch the enemy while employing lethal and nonlethal force with precision anddiscrimination. The Army enhances formations using manned-unmanned teaming to increasecombat effectiveness, expand terrain coverage, and reduce risk to Soldiers while conducting
hazardous tasks. The Army develops responsive surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-tosurface fires with extended range and enhanced precision to enable the Joint Force to overcome
anti-access and area denial threats and project power from land into the air, maritime, and spacedomains. Next generation mission command systems are interoperable with allies and allow thesynchronization of joint, Army, interorganizational, and multinational efforts. Precision
guidance systems improve lethality against moving and stationary targets in the air and on the
ground. The development of directed energy capabilities on mobile and fixed platforms holds
promise for orders-of-magnitude increases in range, effectiveness, rate of fire, and unlimited
munitions stowage.
(3) Logistics optimization. To improve the Army’s ability to conduct expeditionary
maneuver and sustain high tempo operations at the end of extended supply lines, the Army
increases logistical efficiencies and unit self-sufficiency. New technologies enable increased
efficiency and reduced demand through lower fuel consumption, decreased waste generation,
efficient storage, power and energy generation, and timely and agile logistics and precisionresupply. The Army develops technologies to enable automated and autonomous ground and air
resupply. These technologies minimize the logistical footprint, reduce risk to Soldiers, andpreserve freedom of maneuver and action. Increased reliability, maintainability, and resiliency
of vehicles and other systems can reduce force structure requirements as well as logisticaldemand. Production at the point of need such as water generation on demand, 3D printing, andadditive manufacturing reduce the logistical footprint, shorten mean time to repair, increase
operational availability, and reduce the need for intermediate staging bases.60 Advanced andefficient power saving and generation technologies will reduce sustainment and lift requirements.
Improved power efficiency, storage, and generation from traditional and renewable sources will
provide power under austere conditions.
(4) Army aviation.
(a) Advances in vertical take-off and landing technology improve future vertical lift
capabilities and deliver improved range, speed, payload, and performance. Future vertical lift
permits Army forces to operate more effectively across wide areas while maintaining mutual
support. The capability to transport vehicles and equipment across operational distances willallow future forces to pose the enemy with multiple dilemmas as forces with mobility,
protection, and lethality arrive at unexpected locations, bypassing enemy anti-aircraft weapons
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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
and strong points. Improved turbine engine, drivetrain, and airfoil technologies keep legacy
aircraft effective until future vertical lift fielding. Achieving aircraft operational availability
without reliance on augmented maintenance support allows aviation resources to position
forward as part of air-powered, combined arms teams. Other technologies applied to Armyaircraft will improve the all-weather capabilities of the fleet.
(b) Future mission command systems, flight-planning systems, and cockpit information
management systems will enhance situational understanding in air-ground operations throughrapid, collaborative mission planning and ease of transfer of mission data and situational updates
between air and ground systems.
(c) Science and technology goals for aviation include new aviation assets with twice therange, speed, and endurance of current platforms with increased lethality and protection. The
development of heavy lift capabilities would enable strategic mobility and expeditionary
maneuver. Science and technology must continue to focus on automation and autonomy to
improve the capabilities of UAS and enable the development and fielding of optionally mannedsystems and manned-unmanned teaming capabilities. Optionally manned platforms must also be
more efficient and possess increased reliability to reduce the size of the logistical footprint andallow those platforms to operate out of austere locations alongside ground forces. Selfdeployable aircraft will enable increased air and sea transportability.
(d) Technology advances will provide more capable and survivable UAS that haveincreased commonality and incorporate cognitive aiding capabilities. Advances will provide
improved capability for all-weather and global positioning satellite-denied operations.
Technology must break the dependency on fixed runways for UAS. Aircraft survivability
sensors and equipment, defensive electronic attack, and low observable technologies will
improve UAS survivability. Universal control systems will improve flexibility. Advances intechnologies to exploit manned-unmanned teaming to combine the inherent strengths of manned
and unmanned platforms will produce synergy and overmatch not realized with individual
platforms. Aided target detection, tracking, and recognition capabilities will improve UAS
capability to achieve enhanced situation understanding, greater lethality, and improved
survivability.
(5) Information to decision.
(a) To enable situational understanding across the Joint Force, the Army will continue todevelop and field advanced processing and analytic fusion tools, mission command decision
aids, and simplified networks resistant to cyber attacks. Science and technology must focus ondelivering technologies that empower leaders at the lowest levels with relevant combat
information, situational understanding, and access to joint and Army capabilities. These systems
must be interoperable with joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners and be designed
to improve human cognition and decisionmaking.
(b) Science and technology efforts focus on developing mission command capabilities suchas cloud-enabled networks for mobile operations in austere environments and across wide areas.
Systems must be simple and resilient, anticipating enemy efforts to disrupt communications.
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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(c) Information and communications technology such as a common modular chassis andupgraded tactical networking waveforms, must help simplify and integrate operational systems,
data centers, computers, and information technology devices. Technologies that mitigate cyberthreats will be of increasing importance, as will offensive cyberspace capabilities at theoperational and tactical levels.
(6) Human performance optimization. Advances in cognitive, behavioral, and learningsciences will improve critical thinking, increase cognitive and physical performance, foster
intuition and social empathy, improve health and stamina, facilitate talent management, enhanceleader training, and strengthen unit cohesion. Human performance technologies will help the
Army develop adaptive leaders, resilient Soldiers, and cohesive teams that thrive in uncertain,
dangerous, and chaotic environments. New pre-accessions tools hold promise for matching a
recruit’s aptitude to specific military occupations and building effective teams with appropriate
combinations of abilities. Blended live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training environments
replicate complex operating environments and improve leader and team competence andconfidence. Cognitive and physical training techniques could reduce time required for masteryof Soldier and leader skills, abilities, and attributes. Advancements in decision sciences willallow faster, better-informed decisions in an increasingly complex environment.61 Theseadvances must focus to produce young leaders with the experience, maturity, and judgment
previously expected of a more senior and experienced leader.
(7) Medical sciences. Advancements in medical sciences benefit not just Soldiers and themilitary, but the world as well. For example, innovations in prosthetics technology increase thequality of life for Soldiers and civilians, often returning them to pre-injury activity levels.
Improved casualty evacuation and treatment at the point of injury increase the number of ‘golden
hour’ survivors to unprecedented levels.62 Research in preventative medicine moves the world
towards cures for viruses previously untreatable. Traumatic brain injury is at the forefront ofboth military and civilian medical efforts, with both entities sharing research and technologicaldiscoveries. Continued investment in the medical sciences allows improved Soldier resiliency,
quicker physical and mental healing, smoother integration back into society, and improved
quality of life for the Soldier.
(8) Autonomy-enabled systems. The application of emerging technology creates thepotential for affordable, interoperable, autonomous, and semi-autonomous systems that improvethe effectiveness of Soldiers and units. Autonomy-enabled systems will deploy as force
multipliers at all echelons from the squad to the brigade combat teams. Future robotic
technologies and unmanned ground systems (UGS) will augment Soldiers and increase unit
capabilities, situational awareness, mobility, and speed of action. Artificial intelligence will
enable the deployment of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems with the ability to learn.
Decision aids will reduce the cognitive burden and help leaders make rapid decisions. Artificial
intelligence may allow robots and automated systems to act with increased autonomy. Robotics
will enable the future force by making forces more effective across wider areas, contributing toforce protection, and providing increased capabilities to maintain overmatch.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(a) Protection. UGS provide small units with standoff from potentially lethal threats. The
proliferation of CBRNE threats will require increased use of robotic technologies to secure theforce and civilian populations. The development of autonomous capabilities enhances protection
by allowing unmanned systems to operate in areas difficult for humans to access, where threats
demand standoff for manned teams, or where the duration of the operation dictates employment
of UGS. In the far term, UGS will require development of suitable autonomous or semiautonomous behaviors, preventing the need for constant Soldier input required in current
systems. The ability to assign tasks to UGS and passively control or over-watch multiple assets
simultaneously is critical.
(b) Expeditionary. Use of unmanned platforms in mounted and dismounted maneuver
formations will lead to smaller, mobile, and transportable manned and unmanned vehicles,
enabling greater expeditionary capability. UGS will be deployed to the support battalions to
reduce manpower needs in expeditionary environments and conduct routine maintenance andautonomous re-supply operations. Decreasing the Soldier-to-robot controller ratio provides
significant gains in unit effectiveness and manpower savings. By designing easily deployable,
modular systems with low maintenance demands, robotics add capability options to commanders
and reduce support demands as well. Connected to the reporting system and equipped to executeassigned tasks to support the maneuver force, UGS will be integral parts of a support structurethat allows commanders to retain the initiative during high tempo decentralized operations.
Rapidly deployable UGS capable of establishing mission command systems enables missioncommand on the move and then transition to offensive operations after initial entry.
(c) Situational understanding. Future autonomous robotic systems help commanders
develop and maintain situational understanding by providing persistent surveillance andreconnaissance. Future UGS reconnaissance will employ advanced power supplies to reduce
maintenance and sustainment demands. Next generation optics, information, and targeting
capabilities will increase standoff. Unmanned systems will allow units to conduct security
operations across a wider area for longer durations and enable manned systems to focus on othermissions within the unit. Autonomous UGS increase situational understanding in urban
environments through reconnaissance and mapping of subterranean systems. Teams of UGS and
UAS will execute intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance based on tasks given by a single
operator. These teams will conduct adaptive, persistent intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance for extended durations in areas inaccessible by human operators.
b. The Army is working with joint partners, industry, and key stakeholders developing futureforce capabilities with the following technological first principles in mind.
(1) Emphasize integration of technology with Soldiers and teams.
(2) Simplify systems and integrate Soldier training into design.
(3) Maximize reliability and reduce life cycle costs.
(4) Design redundant systems that improve effectiveness under conditions of uncertainty.

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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1(5) Develop systems that degrade gracefully.
(6) Maintain foundational knowledge to reduce the opportunity for surprise.
(7) Reduce logistical demands.
(8) Anticipate enemy countermeasures.
(9) Ensure interoperability.
(10) Consider scale and organizational implications.

Appendix D
Risk and Mitigation
D-1. Introduction
Risks to joint and Army forces as the Army implements this concept and develops the futureforce under Force 2025 and Beyond reside in three areas: resources and readiness, technologicalor strategic surprise, and bureaucracy. The Army must work with the Joint Force and civilian
leaders to assess these risks continuously and act to mitigate them.
D-2. Areas of risk
a. Resources and readiness.
(1) Insufficient funding and inadequate capacity (capability with sufficient scale andendurance). Due to reduced budgets, joint and Army forces may not have ready forces insufficient scale to respond to and resolve crises. Because adversaries will continue to invest intechnology to counter or evade U.S. strengths, resource reductions and insufficient force
modernization place at risk the U.S. ability to overmatch its opponents. Smaller and less capable
adversaries could restrict U.S. military options and impose serious risks to mission andcommitted forces. The Army may be reduced to a level that puts U.S. war plans and crisis
response abilities at significant risk. Efforts to compensate for less forces with precision strikecapabilities, special operations forces, and use of allied or partner armies may prove insufficient.
To mitigate risks, the Army must maintain high levels of readiness while also investing in futureforce modernization. The Army must retain sufficient institutional Army capabilities to expand
the force. Improved interoperability with joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners
provides additional methods to mitigate this risk by improving synergy across all domains andfully realizing the potential of joint combined arms maneuver. The Army must do all it can topreserve fighting capacity in ready combined arms formations while improving the readiness of
its reserve components.
(2) Insufficient strategic lift. Diminished service budgets could lead to insufficientinvestments in the strategic lift necessary to project land forces and conduct effective joint
combined arms operations. To mitigate this risk, the Army must work with other services, the39

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Joint Staff, and combatant commands to identify capability gaps and prioritize efforts to close
those gaps. The Army must also prioritize efforts to improve the expeditionary quality of theforce through reduced logistics demand and the overall weight and size of the force. Investments
in joint vertical lift capabilities with sufficient range, speed, and payload have the potential toallow the Army to conduct mounted vertical maneuver. Low cost opportunities to mitigate risk,such as joint logistics over-the-shore, seabasing, prepositioned equipment and supplies, and othercapabilities offer potential solution approaches to ensure the Army remains globally responsive.
(3) Industrial base. The U.S. military relies heavily on private industry to develop, build,
and maintain its equipment, weapons systems, and platforms.63 Decreased demand for militaryequipment as force structure is reduced and equipment ages leads to a decline in skills andtooling within the industrial base. This loss of skill and tooling could lead to increased cost foradvanced capabilities and a decrease in Army buying power in constrained capability portfolios.
Because industry anticipates a continued reduction in DOD and Army funding for research,development, testing, and evaluation of potential materiel solutions, traditional industrial
partners may shift internal research budgets into other sectors. To mitigate these issues, theArmy must work with joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners to provide incentives
to industry to maintain production capabilities. Potential methods to maintain the industrial baseinclude ongoing analysis to identify key and fragile industrial base capabilities; sustaining low
rate production or making some direct and targeted investment where necessary; encouraging
foreign military sales; and ensuring a consistent and credible research, development, testing, andevaluation strategy. In addition, the Army will continue to collaborate with industry andacademia to promote science, technology, engineering, and math education as well as identify
commercial technologies with military applications.
b. Technological or strategic surprise.
(1) Disruptive technologies. Enemy organizations may attack systems critical for joint andArmy operations. The most damaging attacks would disrupt the force’s ability to integrate joint
combined arms capabilities. To mitigate this risk, the Army develops resilient and hardened
systems that degrade gracefully under attack rather than fail catastrophically. The Army and
Joint Force develop redundant means for communication and coordination and conduct realistic
joint training under degraded communications conditions. Joint and Army forces anticipate
countermeasures and pursue a mix of technological and non-technological solutions to build
sufficient redundancy and adequate reliability of systems and nodes.
(2) Strategic surprise. Strategic surprise is an “unpredicted development that has adecisive, transformative, and sometimes revolutionary outcome. The nature of strategic surpriseis such that it confounds and negates strategy and purpose, not just objectives, but ultimately
policy, thereby making irrelevant and futile any follow-on effort.”64 To mitigate strategic
surprise, the Army must continue to emphasize adaptability in leaders, units, and institutions thatcan learn and innovate while fighting. Innovative and adaptive leaders, educated and trained in
the Profession of Arms, employ regionally aligned forces to gain and maintain situational
understanding and increase their awareness of the changing character of warfare. The Army also
mitigates risk through intelligence collection and collaboration, forward positioning of forces inareas vital to U.S. security interests, and prepositioning of equipment and supplies on land and40

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
afloat. The Army’s forcible entry capability allows the joint force commander to seize theinitiative in response to an unforeseen crisis and counter anti-access and area denial challenges.
Ultimately, the Army must be prepared to respond rapidly to arrest the acceleration of events andreturn an effected area to a level of stability in line with national objectives.
c. Bureaucracy. The DOD is organized as a bureaucracy with rules and procedures,
separation of functions, and a hierarchical structure that implements control over programs andbudgets.
Current processes, including acquisition law, DOD regulations, and service
parochialism, hinder the responsive development and fielding of new capabilities and necessary
counters to enemy technological advances. Technology change is outpacing the ability of the
DOD acquisition system to develop and field capabilities. To mitigate this risk Force 2025
Maneuvers will work with joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners to evaluate
trends; identify DOTMLPF gaps, opportunities, and solutions; and deliver integrated solutions to
the force. The Army will also examine the institutionalization of rapid acquisition and fielding
in anticipation of new technological breakthroughs. Furthermore, Force 2025 Maneuvers must
highlight operational requirements and risk to forces as part of the capabilities development
process.
d. The best overall way to reduce risks is to improve the Army’s agility as an institution.
Army leaders look for opportunities to innovate, overcome obstacles to progress, and takeadvantage of opportunities to ensure Army forces are prepared to win in a complex world.

Glossary
Section I
Abbreviations
ADP
ADRP
AOC
ARCIC
AWFC
CBRNE
CNA
DA
DOD
DODD
DOTMLPF
DPRK
ISIL
JCIDS
LIRA
POM

Army doctrine publication
Army doctrine reference publication
Army Operating Concept
Army Capabilities Integration Center
Army warfighting challenges
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield
explosive
capabilities needs analysis
Department of the Army
Department of Defense
Department of Defense Directive
doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership andeducation, personnel, and facilities
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systemlong-range investment requirements analysis
program objective memorandum
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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
QDR
TAA
TP
TRADOC
UAS
UGS
U.S.
WMD

Quadrennial Defense Review
Total Army Analysis
TRADOC Pamphlet
U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
unmanned aerial systems
unmanned ground systems
United States
weapons of mass destruction

Section II
Terms
anti-accessThose actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force fromentering an operational area (Joint Operational Access Concept).
area denial
Those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit an opposing force’s
freedom of action within an operational area (Joint Operational Access Concept).
capability
Ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through a
combination of means and ways across DOTMLPF to perform a set of tasks to execute a
specified course of action (DODD 7045.20).
conventional forces
Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons and forces other thandesignated special operations forces (Joint Publication 3-05).
globally integrated operations
The concept for how the Joint Force prepares for the security environment it will face (Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations).
human dimension
The cognitive, physical, and social components of Soldier, Army Civilians, leader, andorganizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Armyin unified land operations (TP 525-3-7).
interoperability
The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks (Joint Publication 3-0); thecondition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communicationselectronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily
between them and/or their users (Joint Publication 6-0).

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interorganizational coordination
The interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD, engaged U.S. government agencies;
state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies;
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (Joint Publication 3-08).
mission command system
The arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, andfacilities and equipment that enable commander to conduct operations (ADP 6-0).
multinational
Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners (Joint
Publication 5-0).
power projection
The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power - political,
economic, informational, or military - to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in andfrom multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance
regional stability (Joint Publication 3-35).
space operations
U.S. military space operations are comprised of the following mission areas: space situationalawareness, space force enhancement, space support, space control, and space force application(Joint Publication 3-14).
special operations
Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training
often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one
or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or
through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk (Joint
Publication 3-05).
stability mechanism
The primary method through which friendly forces influence civilians to attain conditions that
support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADRP 3-0).
Section III
Special Terms65
capacity*
Capability with sufficient scale to accomplish the mission; actual or potential ability to perform.
combined arms*
Synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than, if each arm
was used separately or sequentially.

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combined arms air-ground teams*
Army forces that merge quickly with other Services and mission partners to form teams capableof integrating efforts across multiple domains, echelons, geographical boundaries, andorganizations.
core competency
Those indispensable contributions in terms of capabilities and capacities beyond what otherservices and defense agencies provide which are fundamental to the Army's ability to maneuverand secure land areas for the Nation.
decentralized
The delegation of authority to subordinates which enables aggressive, independent, anddisciplined initiative to develop the situation; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; and copewith uncertainty to accomplish the mission within the commander’s intent (TP 525-3-3).
dispersion
The deliberate or accidental reaction to adversary capabilities to spread out or break up forces,
reduce the targetable mass of friendly forces, more effectively cover terrain in an AO, and gain
operational and tactical flexibility.
domainAn area of activity within the operating environment (land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace)in which operations are organized and conducted by components.
element
The integrating functions and activities required from both operational and institutional forces todeliver capabilities.
expeditionary
The ability to deploy task-organized forces on short notice to austere locations, capable ofconducting operations immediately upon arrival.
expeditionary maneuver*
The rapid deployment of task-organized combined arms forces able to transition quickly andconduct operations of sufficient scale and ample duration to achieve strategic objectives.
interorganizational*
Elements of U.S. government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign
government agencies; intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and commercial organizations.
(Does not include forces.)
joint combined arms maneuver*
The synchronized application of two or more arms or elements of one service, along with theapplication of joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities to place the adversary inpositions of disadvantage.
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joint combined arms operations*
Synchronized, simultaneous, or sequential application of two or more arms or elements of one
service, along with joint, interorganizational, and multinational capabilities combined withleadership and education across services to ensure unity of effort and create multiple dilemmas
for the enemy to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
key capability
A critical DOTMLPF attribute needed to achieve specific success in the execution of a specified
course of action.
land domain
The Earth’s physical surface located above the high water mark and inclusive of the physical,
cultural, social, political, and psychological aspects of human populations that reside upon it.
maneuver support and protection warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that enhance movement and maneuver, and preserve the force andpartners.
network
A single, secure, standards-based, versatile infrastructure linked by networked, redundanttransport systems, sensors, warfighting and business applications, and services that provide
Soldiers and civilians timely and accurate information in any environment, to manage the Armyenterprise and enable unified land operations with joint, allied, and interorganizational partners.
operational adaptability
The ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and situations withappropriate, flexible, and timely actions.
overmatch
The application of capabilities or unique tactics either directly or indirectly, with the intent toprevent or mitigate opposing forces from using their current or projected equipment or tactics.
project national power*
Ability to deploy and sustain landpower rapidly and effectively in and from multiple locations
and domains.
regionally aligned forces
Those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, andthose capabilities service retained, combatant command aligned, and prepared by the Army for
combatant command missions.
set the theater*
Actions taken to establish and maintain the conditions necessary to seize the initiative and retain
freedom of action.

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shape the security environment*
Combinations of activities that reassure partners, curtail aggression, and influence local
perceptions, while establishing conditions that support the employment of Army forces.
special operations forces–conventional forces interdependence*
The deliberate and mutual reliance by one force on another’s inherent capabilities designed toprovide complementary and reinforcing effects. Integration and interoperability are subsets ofinterdependence.
strategic movement*
Act of changing physical location or position to achieve important objectives, goals, or interests.
tenet
A basic truth held by an organization that describes the characteristics of successful operations;
the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power.
unified land operations*
Military efforts across the range of military operations to gain and maintain a position of relativeadvantage to prevent or deter conflict, win in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict
resolution.

*Proposed definition.

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Endnotes

1

Interorganizational includes U.S. government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign government agencies;
intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and commercial organizations, as appropriate for the mission. This definition is derived from JP 3-08, June
2011.
2
The dictionary defines “win” as: to be successful or victorious in (a contest or conflict). Winning in this concept is meeting the policy objectivesof the Commander in Chief. It refers to more than simply defeating threat forces; it means meeting national goals and objectives that are uniquefor each operation. The joint commander must define success for each operation (or campaign) based upon the national goals and objectives,
which may change, based on conditions during the operation.
3
Army foundational capabilities include combat forces, setting the theater, logistics preparation of the battlefield, shaping the security
environment, Army support to other services, Executive Agency (EA) (see DA Memo 10-1 for list of EA responsibilities assigned to the Army),
lead service responsibilities, and training (running the national and joint readiness training centers). These capabilities are provided across thewarfighting functions and include command and control and other activities identified in DOD policy, Army policy, and combatant command
operational plans. The list here is not all-inclusive.
4
A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or thehomeland. ADRP 3-0, 1-2.
5First order is defined as relating to the simplest or most fundamental level of organization, experience, or analysis; primary or immediate.
6
For example, in a July 2014 Summer Study at the Naval War College, Army forces established and maintained control of critical land areas andused long-range sensors, weapons, and communications to deny enemy access to air, sea, and underwater areas, and preserve freedom of
maneuver and action for U.S .and allied forces. These efforts were foundational for Navy and Air Force operations and played an important rolein deterring enemy future conflict.
7
In all cases, unless indicated otherwise, use of the term Army includes the active component, the U.S. Army Reserves, and the Army National
Guard. Total Army is not used in the AOC to alleviate confusion. Total Army as defined by some senior leaders includes civilians (the Total
Force includes civilians, families, retirees), and the use of the term Army in the AOC is used when applying combat forces (not civilians) where
logically required. The Army Total Force Policy, signed by Secretary of the Army John McHugh in September 2012, lends greater official andinstitutional permanence to fighting as one operational force (reserve and active) providing predictable, recurring, and sustainable capabilities.
8
Time highlights the uncertainty in war. In the time between conflicts, an army never knows how much time it has to prepare for the next
conflict, until the next conflict occurs.
9
Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2012).
10
Thucydides. From the Landmark Thucydides: A comprehensive guide to the Peloponnesian War. (R. Crawley, Trans). R. B. Strassler (ed.).
11
von Clausewitz, C. On War.
12
Principles of war provide general guidance for conducting missions across the range of military operations and are foundational to Army
concepts and doctrine. The principles are mass, objective, offensive, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, andsimplicity. Joint Pub, 3-0, I-2. Since the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947, joint doctrine recognized the nine principles of war.
13
QDR 2014, 60.
14
DODD 5100.01.
15
DODD 5100.01.
16
See glossary for capability and capacity definitions.
17
QDR 2014, 60.
18
The idea of overmatch was initially described in 2005 as part of Joint Forces Command's lessons-learned efforts. “'Overmatch' is Watchword
for Future Joint Force, Admiral Says” retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17958. The discussion of the idea andimplications of overmatch continues today. The article “Investing in the Army’s future” highlights the need for continued investment inmaintaining overmatch (http://armytechnology.armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2014/09/02/investing-in-the-armys-future/).
19
In his September, 2014 remarks at the Southeastern New England Defense Industry Alliance, HON Chuck Hagel, U.S. Secretary of Defense,
stated, "[Enemies] are also developing anti-ship, anti-air, counter-space, cyber, electronic warfare, and special operations capabilities that appear
designed to counter traditional U.S. military advantages - in particular, the Army’s ability to project power.”
20
Clapper, J. Worldwide Threat Assessment, pg. 6, and Matlak, R.,“The Nightmare Years to Come?" Monograph, 3.
21Clapper, J., pg 6-7, and Flynn, Annual threat assessment, 14-15.
22
Global trends 2030, 72.
23
Global trends 2030, iv and 20.
24
Field Manual 3-06. Pg 2-5. Identifies multiple dimensions as subsurface, supersurface, and surface.
25
GEN Martin Dempsey address to Atlantic Council, 14 May 2014. Retrieved from http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/transcriptgen-martin-dempsey-at-disrupting-defense
26
DOD, Annual Report to Congress on China 2014, i.
27
DOD China report, 21.
28
DOD China report, i.
29
DOD China report, 21.
30
Unrestricted warfare is the methods that a country (in this case China) would use to defeat a nation that has superiority over them in arms
technology, using a variety of means, such as economic warfare, terrorism and network warfare (hacking and cloning). Unrestricted warfare is a
type of warfare that is not limited to war and can be conducted without declaring war, thus 'unrestricted.
31
DOD China report.
32
This is the Russian definition of non-linear warfare. Pomerantsev states non-linear warfare includes using indirect intervention through local
gangs, with an understanding of the interests of local power brokers; manipulating Western media and policy discourse, using contradictory
mixed messages to build alliances with different groups; and using disinformation.
33
Adventurism is defined as defiance or disregard of accepted standards of behavior.
34
Global Trends 2030, 72.

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35"Iranian Strategy in Syria," Executive Summary, Introduction, and 19-23. Retrieved from http://www.understandingwar.org/\sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf
36
Boko Haram serves as a harbinger of this type of threat. The Council on Foreign Relations recently described this trend using the transition of
Boko Haram from an isolated irreligious organization to a regional threat in West Central Africa. Available at http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/bokoharam/p25739
37
2014 QDR.
38
During discussion between DA G-3/5/7 senior leaders: Prepositioned stocks need to transition from the current paradigm of “break glass incase of war” to a resource that supports disaster response and steady state activities, and serves as an indicator of U.S. resolve, creating “activity
sets” that more closely supports all missions across the range of military operations.
39
Army forces will have the ability to change task organizations on the fly and transition fluidly at all levels, as required.
40
The AOC is consistent with the DOD mandate that defending the homeland is the first priority and one of three strategic pillars. “Protect thehomeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural
disasters.” QDR 2014, v and 12.
41
Title 10 of the United States Code outlines the role of armed forces in the United States Code. It provides the legal basis for the roles, missions
and organization of each of the services as well as the United States Department of Defense. Title 32 of the United States Code outlines the roleof the United States National Guard in the United States Code. Both are available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection
UScode.action?collectionCode=USCODE
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TRADOC PAM 525-3-7, 24.
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To win in a complex world the Army must ensure operations are designed and planned to achieve physical and mental victory over its
adversary, while conducting operations consistent with Army values and the Army ethic. The Army Ethic White Paper is available at
http://cape.army.mil/repository/white-papers/Army-Ethic-White-Paper.pdf.
44
In his September, 2014 remarks at the Southeastern New England Defense Industry Alliance, HON Chuck Hagel, U.S. Secretary of Defense,
discussed achieving operational overmatch.
45
Reed, B. Leader development, learning agility and the Army Profession. The Land Warfare Papers. The Institute of Land Warfare. (92).
Retrieved from http://www.ausa.org/
publications/ilw/ilw_pubs/landwarfarepapers/Documents/LWP_92_web.pdf
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Haight, Laughlin, & Bergner. Armored forces: Mobility, protection and precision firepower essential for future. eARMOR. Retrieved fromhttp://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2012/NOV_DEC/Haight_Laughlin_Bergner.html
47
The State Partnership Program links a state’s National Guard with the armed forces of a partner nation in a cooperative, mutually beneficial
relationship.
48
The Army Concept Framework contains both functional and leadership-directed concepts. TP 525-8-5, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for
Engagement advocates for engagement as a warfighting function.
49
AWFCs are enduring first order problems, the solutions improving combat effectiveness of current and future forces.
50
Developments Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). UK. Sir Michael Howard quotes in the Ministry of Defence: Strategic Trends
Programme Future Character of Conflict, 2. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/33685/FCOCReadactedFinalWeb.pdf
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First order questions are those questions from which all other questions derive.
52
Current force: The force approved in the Army’s annual Command Plan process and codified in the Army master force. The master force
includes operating and institutional forces, all Army components, and DA Civilians. Programmed Force: The POM force is the future force
available during the Future Years Defense Plan (5 years out). It includes those elements in the current force. The current and programmed forces
are described in the annual Army Structure Memorandum, which is the Army’s implementation of TAA.
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AR 71-11. The POM force is the force recommended and supported by resource requests in the Army POM.
54
Wilkins, B. The mix includes the active component, Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve), Department of the Army Civilians,
Contractors trainees, transients, and students. Retrieved from http://www.arcic.army.mil/Articles/cdd-Total-Army-Analysis.aspx
55
A first principle is a basic assumption not deduced from any other proposition or assumption. For the AOC, the first principles are the set ofideas or ideals from which to base all actions.
56
Merriam-Webster online dictionary.
57
Merriam-Webster online dictionary.
58
ARFORGEN is the Army’s readiness cycle and is defined as the structured progression of unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring
periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units.
59
Overmatch is defined in the AOC glossary as, the application of capabilities or unique tactics either directly or indirectly, with the intent toprevent or mitigate opposing forces from using their current or projected equipment or tactics.”
60
Additive manufacturing is defined as the process of joining materials to make objects from 3D model data, usually layer upon layer.
61
Improvements in decision science foster an understanding of the cognitive, emotional, social, and institutional factors that influence judgment
and choice, normative (economic) models of rational choice, and how judgment and decisionmaking can be predicted and/or improved.
62
Miles, D. “‘Golden hour' initiative pays off in Afghanistan.” American Forces Press Service.
63
HON Chuck Hagel, U.S. Secretary of Defense, emphasized the importance of the industrial base in his September 2014 speech at theSoutheastern New England Defense Industry Alliance.
64
Jajko, W. (2012, September 19). Strategic surprise. The Institute of World Politics. Retrieved from http://www.iwp.edu/news_publications/detail/strategic-surprise
65
Special terms are those unique to this publication.

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