2022 INDEX OF

edited by

Dakota L. Wood© 2022 by The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Ave., NE
Washington, DC 20002(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
ISBN: 978-0-89195-306-7

edited by

Dakota L. Wood

We are honored to dedicate the2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength
to the Honorable John F. Lehman.

Contents
Contributors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Kay C. James

Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Managing Risk in Force Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
David A. Deptula, Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.)

Understanding Risk in the Great Competition with China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Sarah Kirchberger, PhD

What We Risk If We Fail to Fully Modernize the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs

How Prioritizing Climate Change Could Weaken America’s Military. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Rebecca Grant, PhD

Global Operating‌Environment
Assessing the Global Operating Environment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Daniel Kochis
Middle East. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Nicole Robinson
Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Jeff Smith, Dean Cheng, Bruce Klingner, and Walter Lohman
Conclusion: Scoring the Global Operating Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Threats to U.S. Vital Interests
Assessing Threats to U.S. Vital Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
China.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Dean Cheng
Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Alexis Mrachek
Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
James Phillips
North Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Bruce Klingner
Non-State Actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
James Phillips and Jeff Smith
Conclusion: Global Threat Level.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

U.S. Military PowerAn Assessment of U.S. Military Power.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
U.S. Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Thomas W. Spoehr
U.S. Army Modernization Table.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
U.S. Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
Brent Sadler
U.S. Navy Modernization Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404

U.S. Air Force.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
John Venable
U.S. Air Force Modernization Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
U.S. Marine Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
Dakota L. Wood
U.S. Marine Corps Modernization Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
U.S. Space Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
John Venable
U.S. Space Force Modernization Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
Patty-Jane Geller
Missile Defense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535
Patty-Jane Geller
Cyber Warfare and U.S. Cyber Command. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555
James Di Pane
Conclusion: U.S. Military Power.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561

﻿Glossary of Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565
Methodology.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579
The Honorable John F. Lehman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587

Contributors
Heritage Experts
Dakota L. Wood is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Programs in the Center for National Defense, ofthe Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage
Foundation. He served for two decades as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, including service as a
strategic analyst for the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of Defense’s Director of
Net Assessment.
Thomas W. Spoehr, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Ret.), is Director of the Center for National Defense.
Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served America for more than 36 years in the U.S. Army.
Frederico Bartels is Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting in the Center for National Defense.
Before joining The Heritage Foundation, he served for three years as a Policy Analyst with Concerned
Veterans for America.
Dean Cheng is a Senior Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center of the Davis Institute. He specializes
in China’s military and foreign policy.
Maiya Clark is a Research Associate in the Center for National Defense. She focuses on the militaryindustrial base.
Luke Coffey is Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy of the Davis Institute.
He joined Heritage after service as Senior Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for Defence of theUnited Kingdom.

﻿James Di Pane is a Policy Analyst in the Center for National Defense. He focuses on military cyber andthe U.S. Coast Guard and manages production of the Index of U.S. Military Strength.
Patty-Jane Geller is a Policy Analyst in the Center for National Defense. Her work addresses nuclear
deterrence and missile defense.
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. He served fortwo decades at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Daniel Kochis is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Davis Institute’s Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom, where he specializes in trans-Atlantic security issues including NATO, U.S.–Russia
relations, and the Arctic.
Walter Lohman is Director of the Asian Studies Center. He has served on the staff of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, in the office of Senator John McCain, and as Executive Director of the
U.S.–ASEAN Business Council.
Alexis Mrachek is Research Associate for Russia and Eurasia in the Allison Center.
James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Allison Center. He has also
served at the Congressional Research Service and at the East–West Center.
Nicole Robinson is a Research Associate in the Allison Center specializing in Middle East matters.
Brent D. Sadler is Senior Research Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology in the Center
for National Defense. He retired from the U.S. Navy as a captain and served for 26 years as a submarine
officer aboard multiple nuclear submarines and in various senior posts including Naval Attaché, Malaysia,
and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/MilitaryixJeff Smith is a Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center. He specializes in South Asia, has authoredand contributed to several books on Asian security matters, and formerly served as Director of Asian
Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council.
John Venable is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Policy in the Center for National Defense. A 25-year
veteran of the U.S. Air Force and F-16 pilot, he served in three combat operations, was commander of theThunderbirds, and earned the rank of colonel before retiring.

External Reviewers and Expert Contributors
David A. Deptula, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), is Dean of the Mitchell Institute for
Aerospace Studies.
Rebecca Grant, PhD, is President of IRIS Independent Research.
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute.
Tom Karako, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

﻿Sarah Kirchberger, PhD, is Head of the Center for Asia–Pacific Strategy and Security at the Institute for
Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK).

Any views presented in or reflecting the results of any prepublication review of this document by an officer or employee of theUnited States are rendered in his or her individual capacity and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States or any
agency thereof.

x2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthAcknowledgmentsIand driven by social media, and the guidanceand coordination provided by Director of Research Editors Therese Pennefather ensured
the creation of a cohesive finished product.
We believe that this Index helps to provide
a better-informed understanding and wider
appreciation of America’s ability to “provide
for the common defence”—an ability that undergirds The Heritage Foundation’s visionof “an America where freedom, opportunity, prosperity, and civil society flourish.” The
Index continues to be cited and referenced
across government­—by Congress, the executive
branch, and officials within the Department of
Defense and supporting government agencies­—
as well as the media, academia, and policy institutes and among the public. We remain encouraged that so many Americans are similarly
concerned about the state of affairs in and themultitude of factors affecting our country.
The Heritage Foundation seeks a better
life for Americans, and this requires a strong
economy, a strong society, and a strong defense.
To help measure the state of the economy, ourInstitute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity publishes the annual Index of Economic Freedom; to help guide Congress in its constitutional exercise of the power of the purse,
Heritage scholars analyze federal spending
across all sectors of the economy and put forward recommendations throughout the year
that, if implemented, would make Members ofCongress better stewards of the taxes paid by
all Americans. To help Americans everywheremore fully understand the state of our defenses,
our Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Militaryxi﻿t is only through the contributions of a great
many people that a publication like the Index of U.S. Military Strength is possible. Amongthem, a few special contributors have that extra talent, work ethic, and willingness to go theextra mile that make the Index a remarkable
and uniquely special undertaking.
James Di Pane, Policy Analyst in the Center
for National Defense, ably shouldered the major task of shepherding production of the 2022
Index of U.S. Military Strength. He worked withthe authors, editors, and graphics and production professionals to make this Index a reality, both in print and on the web. Maiya Clark,
Research Associate in the Center for National
Defense, lent her detailed attention to the development and accuracy of the military service
modernization tables for each service, a uniquereference found only in this Index.
Once again, the indefatigable Senior Editor William T. Poole reprised his central
role in maintaining a consistent tone, impeccable accuracy, and a fresh approach toconveying essential information throughout
this multi-author document. Data Graphics
Services Manager John Fleming and Data
Graphics Designer Luke Karnick continued
their impressive work in giving visual life totext and statistics to convey a message withmaximum impact, working with the authors
to explore more creative ways to convey important information. Senior Designer and Web
Developer of Research Projects Jay Simon and
Digital Director Maria Sousa ensured that thepresentation of Index materials was tuned toaccount for changes in content delivery as ourworld becomes increasingly digital, portable,

Finally, as we do each year, The Heritage
Foundation expresses its enduring appreciation to the members of the U.S. armed
forces who continue to protect the liberty of
the American people in an ever more challenging world.

﻿is publishing this eighth annual edition of theIndex of U.S. Military Strength.
In addition to acknowledging all of those
who helped to prepare this edition, very special recognition is due to the Heritage members and donors whose continued support
has made this 2022 Index of U.S. Military
Strength possible.

xii

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthPrefaceR

diplomacy fails, the U.S. must have the ability
to protect itself, its people, and its interests
physically and to deter aggression by its adversaries. A strong military is also importantin assuring allies and friends that the U.S. remains a capable and reliable partner.
At The Heritage Foundation, we have longrecognized that one of the very few obligations
the U.S. Constitution places on the federal government is to provide for the common defense.
That is why Heritage publishes its annual Index
of U.S. Military Strength: to help decision-makers
in government see where our strengths, our challenges, and our opportunities for improvement
lie and to help them see how we stand relative to
our adversaries. The Index also serves to ensurethat the American public is aware of how well—or
how poorly—their government is handling thismost critical and sacred task.
Heritage takes this mission seriously sothat the government we elect and empower
through our collective treasure does what theAmerican people need it to do—and the things
that only a federal government can do—and
does not lose focus by straying into things thatwould ultimately detract from its core function.
We trust that our work assessing the challenges to America’s interests and our country’s
ability to meet those challenges will significantly inform the debate that is so essential toprotecting what has made the United States
the beacon of hope, opportunity, and liberty
for all the world.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

Kay C. James, President
The Heritage Foundation
October 2021

xiii

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ecent calls by some elected leaders to reduce defense spending might lead one toconclude that they must believe we live in aworld that is completely safe, secure, and freefrom the need for a robust defense. But the unfortunate reality is that our biggest adversaries
are working diligently to surpass our militarycapabilities at a time when much of our military equipment—including planes, tanks, andships—is decades-old and years past its usefulservice life.
Even a glance at the news headlines reveals
critical problems in many areas of the world.
We see every day that countries like China,
Russia, and Iran are willing to invade a neighbor, use their military and militias to bully other countries, and even sponsor terrorist groups
and cyber hackers to attack other countries,
including the U.S. and our allies.
Rogue states like North Korea and Syria andproblematic ones like Iran pose direct threats
to their neighbors, to their regions, and ultimately to the security of the U.S. and the restof the free world. China and Russia, especially,
seek to overturn the more freedom-seeking international order that has defined global affairs
since the end of World War II in order to movetoward more authoritarianism, government
control of commerce, and state surveillance of
citizens—not just in their own countries but
throughout much of the world.
What is there to stop them? Diplomacy has its place in advocating for freedom,
free-market capitalism, and healthy international relations, and diplomacy absolutely must be the first tool reached for and thetool most desired in foreign affairs. But when﻿IntroductionTcarry the same risk of damage and loss of life,
but when the United States is confronted byphysical threats to its national security interests, it is the hard power of its military thatcarries the day. In fact, the absence of military
power or the perception that one’s hard power is insufficient to protect one’s interests will
frequently—and predictably—invite challenges
that soft power is ill-equipped to address. Thus,
hard power and soft power are complementaryand mutually reinforcing.
The decline of America’s military hard
power, historically shown to be critical to defending against major military powers and tosustaining operations over time against lesser
powers or in multiple instances simultaneously, is thoroughly documented and quantified inthis Index. It is harder to quantify the growing
threats to the U.S. and its allies that are engendered by the perception of American weakness
abroad and doubts about America’s resolve toact when its interests are threatened.
The anecdotal evidence is consistent withdirect conversations between Heritage scholars and high-level diplomatic and military officials from countries around the world: The aging and shrinking of America’s military forces,
their reduced presence in key regions since theend of the Cold War, and various distractions
created by America’s domestic debates havecreated a perception of American weakness
that contributes to destabilization in many
parts of the world and prompts old friends toquestion their reliance on America’s assurances. For decades, the perception of American
strength and resolve has helped to deter adventurous bad actors and tyrannical dictators.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military1﻿he United States maintains a militaryforce primarily to protect the homelandfrom attack and to protect its interests abroad.
Other uses, of course—assisting civil authorities in times of emergency, for example, andmaintaining the perception of combat effectiveness to deter enemies—amplify other elements of national power such as diplomacy
or economic initiatives, but America’s armed
forces exist above all else so that the U.S. canphysically impose its will on an enemy andchange the conditions of a threatening situation by force or the threat of force.
The Heritage Foundation’s Index of U.S.
Military Strength gauges the ability of the U.S.
military to perform its missions in today’s
world and assesses how the condition of themilitary has changed during the preceding
year. The Index is not meant either to predict
what the U.S. military might be able to do in
the future or to accord it efficacy today basedon the promise of new technologies that are indevelopment rather than fielded and proven inuse. It is a report to American citizens on thestatus of the military that they join, that they
support, and on which they depend.
The United States prefers to lead through“soft” elements of national power—diplomacy,
economic incentives, and cultural exchanges—­but soft power cannot substitute for raw military power. When soft approaches like diplomacy work, their success often owes much to
the knowledge of all involved that U.S. “hardpower” stands ready, however silently, in the
diplomatic background.
Soft approaches cost less in manpower andtreasure than military action costs and do not﻿Regrettably, both that perception and, as a that among their handful of purposes in esconsequence, its deterrent effect are eroding. tablishing the Constitution was to “provide
Recognition of this problem is growing in for the common defence.” The Constitution’s
the U.S. and was forcefully addressed in the enumeration of limited powers for the federal
2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which government includes the powers of Congresscalled for a renewal of America’s military “To declare War,” “To raise and support Armies,”
power. However, spending on defense must “To provide and maintain a Navy,” “To provide
be commensurate with the interests that the for calling forth the Militia,” and “To provide
defense establishment is called upon to protect, for organizing, arming, and disciplining, theand there continues to be a significant—even Militia” and the power of the President as
growing—gap between the two. Meanwhile, “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
America’s allies continue to underinvest in the United States, and of the Militia of the sevtheir military forces, and the United States’ eral States, when called into the actual Service
chief competitors are hard at work improving of the United States.”
their own. The result is an increasingly dangerWith such constitutional priority given toous world threatening a weaker America.
defense of the nation and its vital interests,
This can seem odd to many observers be- one might expect the federal government tocause U.S. forces have dominated the bat- produce a standardized, consistent reference
tlefield in tactical engagements with enemy work on the state of the nation’s security. Yetforces over the past 30 years. Not surprising- no such single volume exists, especially in thely, the forces built to battle those of the Sovi- public domain, to allow comparisons from year
et Union have handily defeated the forces of to year. Recently, the Department of Defense
Third World dictators and terrorist organiza- has moved to restrict reporting of force readitions. These military successes, however, are ness even further. Thus, the American people
quite different from lasting political successes and even the government itself are prevented
and have masked the deteriorating condition from understanding whether investments inof America’s military, which has been able to defense are achieving their desired results.
undertake such operations only by “cashing in”
What is needed is a publicly accessible refon investments made in the 1980s and 1990s. erence document that uses a consistent, meUnseen by the American public, our military thodical, and repeatable approach to assessing
readiness has been consumed at a rate that defense requirements and capabilities. The
has not been matched by corresponding in- Heritage Foundation’s Index of U.S. Military
vestments in replacements for the equipment, Strength, an annual assessment of the state ofresources, and capacity used up since Septem- America’s hard power, fills this void, addressing
ber 11, 2001.
both the geographical and functional environIt is therefore critical that we understand ments that are relevant to the United States’
the condition of the United States military vital national interests and the threats that risewith respect to America’s vital national securi- to a level that puts or has the strong potential
ty interests, the threats to those interests, and to put those interests at risk.
the context within which the U.S. might have
Any assessment of the adequacy of military
to use hard power. It is likewise important to power requires two primary reference points:
know how these three areas—operating envi- a clear statement of U.S. vital security interronments, threats, and the posture of the U.S. ests and an objective requirement for the milmilitary—change over time, given that such itary’s capacity for operations that serves as achanges can have substantial implications for benchmark against which to measure current
defense policies and investments.
capacity. Top-level national security docuThe U.S. Constitution opens with a beau- ments issued by a long string of presidential
tiful passage in which “We the People” state Administrations have consistently made clear22022 Index of U.S. Military Strengththat three interests are central to any assess- Index measures the hard power needed to winment of national military power:
conventional wars rather than the generalutility of the military relative to the breadth
Defense of the homeland;of tasks it might be (and usually is) assigned
in order to advance U.S. interests short of war.
Successful conclusion of a major war that
The authors acknowledge that advances
has the potential to destabilize a region of
in technology bring new capabilities into thecritical interest to the U.S.; andmilitary. New tools, platforms, and weapons
tend to prompt some observers to assume that
Preservation of freedom of movement
older capabilities can easily be replaced withwithin the global commons: the sea, air,
new ones, often in reduced numbers, or thatouter-space, and cyberspace domains
the current force will be transformed in ways
through which the nations of the worldthat make it decisively better than an oppoconduct their business.
nent’s. Typically missing in the most optimistic
assessments of what the military might then be
Every President has recognized that pro- able to do is a corresponding recognition that
tecting America from attack is one of the U.S. competitors quickly adopt similar technologmilitary’s fundamental reasons for being. Go- ical advances in their own militaries or thating to war has always been controversial, but the new capability might not be as effective as
the decision to do so has been based consis- believed during its development.
tently on the conclusion that one or more vitalThe historical record of war shows repeatU.S. interests are at stake.
edly that new technologies convey temporary
This Index embraces the requirement for advantages: The force that wins is usually thethe U.S. military to be able to handle two ma- one that is best able to sustain operations over
jor wars or two major regional contingencies time, replace combat losses with fresh forc(MRCs) successfully at the same time or in es and equipment, and use its capabilities inclosely overlapping time frames as the most novel ways that account for the enemy, terrain,compelling rationale for sizing U.S. military time, and achievable objectives. This reality
forces. The basic argument is this: The nation has led the authors to return consistently toshould have the ability to engage and defeat an appreciation for force capacity, the moderone opponent and still have the ability to nity of its capabilities, and the readiness of its
guard against competitor opportunism: that forces for close combat with an equally capais, to prevent someone from exploiting the ble and competent enemy. Consequently, thisperceived opportunity to move against U.S. Index continues to emphasize the importanceinterests while America is engaged elsewhere. of the two-war force sizing benchmark and the
The Index is descriptive, not prescriptive: necessity of ensuring that the current force is
It reviews the current condition of its sub- ready for war and materially capable of winjects within the assessed year and describes ning in hard combat.
how conditions have changed during the previous year, informed by the baseline condition Assessing the World and theestablished by the inaugural 2015 Index. In Need for Hard Power
short, the Index answers the question, “Have
The assessment portion of the Index is comconditions improved or worsened during the posed of three major sections that address theassessed year?”
aforementioned areas of primary interest: theThis study also assesses the U.S. military operating environments within or throughagainst the two-war benchmark and various which America’s military must be employed,
metrics that are explained further in the mil- threats to U.S. vital national interests, and theitary capabilities section. Importantly, the U.S. military services themselves. For each of
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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military﻿these areas, the Index provides context, ex- informed debate about what the United States
plaining why a given topic is addressed and needs in terms of military capabilities to deal
how it relates to understanding the nature of with the world as it is. A detailed discussion ofAmerica’s hard-power requirements.
scoring is provided in each assessment section.
The authors of this study used a five-­category
In our assessment, we begin with the operscoring system that ranges from “very poor” to ating environment because it provides the geo“excellent” or “very weak” to “very strong” as strategic stage upon which the U.S. attends toappropriate to each topic. This approach was its interests: the various states that would play
selected as the best way to capture meaningful significant roles in any regional contingency;
gradations while avoiding the appearance that the terrain that enables or restricts militarya high level of precision was possible given the operations; the infrastructure—ports, airfields,
nature of the issues and the information that roads, and rail networks (or lack thereof )—on
was publicly available.
which U.S. forces would depend; and the types
Some factors are quantitative and lend of its linkages and relationships with a region
themselves to discrete measurement; others and major actors within it that cause the U.S. toare very qualitative in nature and can be as- have interests in the area or that facilitate efsessed only through an informed understand- fective operations. Major actors within each reing of the material that leads to an informed gion are identified, described, and assessed injudgment call.
terms of alliances, political stability, the presBy themselves, purely quantitative mea- ence of U.S. military forces and relationships,sures tell only part of the story when it comes and the maturity of critical infrastructure.
to the relevance, utility, and effectiveness of
Our assessment focuses on three key
hard power. Using only quantitative metrics regions—­Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—­
to assess military power or the nature of an op- because of their importance relative to U.S.
erating environment can lead to misinformed vital security, economic, and diplomatic inconclusions. For example, the mere existence terests. This does not mean that we view Latinof a large fleet of very modern tanks has little to America and Africa as unimportant. It means
do with the effectiveness of the armored force only that the security challenges within thesein actual battle if the employment concept is regions do not currently rise to the level of diirrelevant to modern armored warfare. (Imag- rect threats to America’s vital interests as we
ine, for example, a battle in rugged mountains.) have defined them. We addressed their condiAlso, experience and demonstrated proficiency tion in the 2015 Index and will provide updated
are often so decisive in war that numerically assessments when circumstances make suchsmaller or qualitatively inferior but well- reassessments necessary.
trained and experienced forces can defeat a
Next is a discussion of threats to U.S. vitallarger or qualitatively superior adversary that interests. Here we identify the countries andis inept or poorly led.
non-state actors that pose the greatest curThe world is still very much a qualitative rent or potential threats to U.S. vital interests
place, however digital and quantitative it has based on two overarching factors: behavior andbecome thanks to the explosion of advanced capability. We accept the classic definition oftechnologies, and judgment calls have to be “threat” as a combination of intent and capabilmade in the absence of certainty. We strive to ity, but while capability has attributes that canbe as objective and evenhanded as possible in be quantified, intent is difficult to measure. We
our approach and as transparent as possible in concluded that “observed behavior” serves as
our methodology and sources of information so a reasonable surrogate for intent because it isthat readers can understand why we reached the clearest manifestation of intent.
the conclusions we reached—and perhaps reachWe based our selection of threat countheir own as well. The result will be a more tries and non-state actors on their historical

42022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthbehavior and explicit policies or formal statements vis-à-vis U.S. interests, scoring them in
two areas: the degree of provocative behavior
that they exhibited during the year and theirability to pose a credible threat to U.S. interests regardless of intent. For example, a state
full of bluster but with only a moderate ability
to act accordingly poses a lesser threat, and astate that has great capabilities and a patternof bellicose behavior that is opposed to U.S. interests still warrants attention even if it is relatively quiet in a given year. The combinationof behavior and ability to pose a credible threat
eliminates most smaller terrorist, insurgent,and criminal groups and many problematicstates because they do not have the ability tochallenge America’s vital national interests.
Finally, we address the status of U.S. military power in three areas: capability (or modernity), capacity, and readiness.

space-specific resources and missions of theother services without any decrement in support to the force. We continue to defer assessing U.S. cyber capabilities. There are no viable
metrics at this point by which to measure thecapacity, capability, or readiness of U.S. Cyber
Command, its constituent service components,and elements of the government that contribute to activities in the cyber domain, and it is
not yet clear how one would assess its role incontributing to “hard combat power,” which isthe focus of this publication.

Topical Essays
Since January 2018, when then-Secretaryof Defense James N. Mattis released the 2018
NDS, the military establishment has focused
its efforts on the NDS’s major theme: a returnto great-power competition. Secretary Mattis
noted that a quarter of a century after the Soviet Union had collapsed and 17 years after the
Do U.S. forces possess operational capabil- terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, worldities that are relevant to modern warfare?
events had brought the United States backinto direct, long-term competition with major
Can they defeat the military forces of an
powers—­China and Russia in particular.
opposing country?
Unfortunately, spending on the military
has not kept pace with inflation, much less the
Do they have a sufficient amount of suchincreased rates above inflation that Secretarycapabilities?
Mattis, among others, have said are needed torebuild U.S. forces exhausted by (now) 20 years
Is the force sufficiently trained to winof continuous operations so that they might bein combat, and is its equipment mateready for the next major conflict. When querially ready?
ried about the potential effect of less-thandesired levels of funding, military officials
All of these are fundamental to success will often say that the military will have toeven if they are not de facto determinants of operate at increased risk, but few attempt tosuccess (something we explain further in the define exactly what risk means in the context
section). We also address the condition of the of great-power competition or America’s abilUnited States’ nuclear weapons capability, as- ity to defend its interests.
sessing it in areas that are unique to this miliThis question provides the theme for the estary component and critical to understanding says in this edition of the Index. Our essayists
its real-world viability and effectiveness as a address risk within the context of great-power
strategic deterrent, and provide a descriptive competition and its implications for the Unitoverview of current U.S. missile defense capa- ed States from various perspectives.
bilities and challenges.
The Index provides our first assessment of
The U.S. military must always balance
the U.S. Space Force, the newest of the militarydemands that compete for resources andservices, noting its success in consolidating theattention as it assesses how much it needs
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in forces, as well as what types of forces
it needs, to deal with current challenges while also looking ahead to futurechallenges. It must also account for how
the use of the forces it has today affects
what it will have tomorrow. Lieutenant
General David A. Deptula, USAF (Ret.),addresses how we should understandrisk in this context in “Managing Risk inForce Planning.”
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Dr. Sarah Kirchberger shoulders thetask of addressing risk as it relates tothe challenge of dealing with China, themost profound, multifaceted, and capablecompetitor the U.S. has faced since theSoviet Union. In “Understanding Risk in
the Great Competition with China,” sheilluminates how China’s behavior, capabilities, investments, and intentions framerisk as a factor in U.S. defense planning.
In “What We Risk If We Fail to Fully
Modernize the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent,”
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs explains how U.S.
investment—or lack of investment—in
the nuclear enterprise strengthens or
weakens America’s interests in nonproliferation and deterrence, as well asallies’ and competitors’ perceptions of U.S.
capabilities.
Finally, concerns about changes in the
Earth’s climate have been raised for
decades, but the topic and its implications for national security, especially as it
relates to the U.S. military, have received
increased attention over the past 20 years
or so. Dr. Rebecca Grant, in “How Prioritizing Climate Change Could Weaken
America’s Military,” looks into the natureof the debate and the effect it has on the
military through the lens of risk: what
risks the country may be running if it
expects the military to do specific things
related to a changing climate but does notaccount for this in funding and proper
equipping and fails to appreciate thedegree to which such a course of action
might affect the ability of the military to
prepare for war.

Scoring U.S. Military Strength
Relative to Vital National Interests
The purpose of this Index is to make the national debate about defense capabilities better
informed by assessing the U.S. military’s ability
to defend against current threats to U.S. vital
national interests within the context of theworld as it is. Each of the elements can change
from year to year: the stability of regions andaccess to them by America’s military forces;
the various threats as they improve or lose capabilities and change their behavior; and theUnited States’ armed forces themselves as they
adjust to evolving fiscal realities and attempt tobalance readiness, capacity (size and quantity),
and capability (how modern they are) in waysthat enable them to carry out their assigned
missions successfully.
Each region of the world has its own set ofcharacteristics that include terrain; man-madeinfrastructure (roads, rail lines, ports, airfields,
power grids, etc.); and states with which theUnited States has relationships. In each case,these factors combine to create an environment that is either favorable or problematicwhen it comes to the ability of U.S. forces tooperate against threats in the region.
Various states and non-state actors withinthese regions possess the ability to threaten—
and have consistently behaved in ways that do
threaten—America’s interests. Fortunately for
the U.S., these major threat actors are few innumber and continue to be confined to three
regions—Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—
thus enabling the U.S. (if it will do so) to focus
its resources and efforts accordingly.
As for the condition of America’s military services, they are still beset by aging
equipment, shrinking numbers, rising costs,
and problematic funding (which make theirimprovements in current readiness quite
remarkable achievements). These four elements interact in ways that are difficult tomeasure in concrete terms and impossible

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthpotential allies, while a militarily strong America deters opportunism and draws partners to
its side from across the globe.

Conclusion
During the decades since the end of theSecond World War, the United States has underwritten and taken the lead in maintaining a
global order that has benefited more people inmore ways than at any other period in history.
Now, however, that American-led order is under stress, and some have wondered whether itwill break apart entirely as fiscal and economic
burdens (exacerbated by the costs incurred indealing with the COVID-19 pandemic) continue to plague nations, violent extremist ideologies threaten the stability of entire regions,state and non-state opportunists seek to exploit upheavals, and major states compete toestablish dominant positions in their respective regions.
America’s leadership role remains in question, and its security interests are under significant pressure. Challenges continue to grow,long-standing allies are not what they once
were, and the U.S. is increasingly bedeviled bydebt and domestic discord that constrain its
ability to sustain its forces at a level commensurate with its interests.
Informed deliberations on the status ofAmerica’s military power are therefore desperately needed. It is our hope that this Index
of U.S. Military Strength will help to facilitate
those deliberations.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military7﻿

to forecast with any certainty. Nevertheless,the exercise of describing them and characterizing their general condition is worthwhile
because it informs debates about defense policies and the allocation of resources that arenecessary if the U.S. military is to carry out its
assigned duties. Further, as seen in this 2022
Index, noting how conditions have changed
during the preceding year helps to shed lighton the effects that policies, decisions, and actions have on security affairs that involve theinterests of the United States, its allies andfriends, and its enemies.
It should be borne in mind that each annual
Index assesses conditions as they are for theassessed year. This 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength describes changes that occurred
during the preceding year, with updates current as of early September 2021.
Assessments for global operating environment, threats to vital U.S. interests, and U.S.
military power are shown in the Executive
Summary. Factors that would push things toward “bad” (the left side of the scale) tend tomove more quickly than those that improve
one’s situation, especially when it comes to thematerial condition of the U.S. military.
Of the three areas measured—global operating environment, threats to vital U.S. interests,
and U.S. military power—the U.S. can directly
control only one: its own military. The condition of the U.S. military can influence the other two because a weakened America arguably
emboldens challenges to its interests and loses

﻿Executive Summary“As currently postured, the U.S. military continues to be only marginally able to meet thedemands of defending America’s vital national interests.”

T

What the Index Assesses
The Index of U.S. Military Strength assesses
the ease or difficulty of operating in key regions
based on existing alliances, regional politicalstability, the presence of U.S. military forces, andthe condition of key infrastructure. Threats areassessed based on the behavior and physical capabilities of actors that pose challenges to vital
U.S. national interests. The condition of America’s military power is measured in terms of its
capability or modernity, capacity for operations,and readiness to handle assigned missions. This
framework provides a single-source reference
for policymakers and other Americans who seek
to know whether our military is up to the task of
defending our national interests.
Any discussion of the aggregate capacityand breadth of the military power needed toprotect U.S. security interests requires a clear
understanding of precisely what interests must
be defended. Three vital interests have been
specified consistently (albeit in varying language) by a string of Administrations over the
past few decades:llDefense of the homeland;
Successful conclusion of a major war
that has the potential to destabilize a region of critical interest to the U.S.; andThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military9﻿he United States maintains a military force
primarily to protect the homeland from attack and to protect its interests abroad. There
are other uses, of course—for example, to assist
civil authorities in times of emergency or to deter enemies—but this force’s primary purpose
is to make it possible for the U.S. to physically
impose its will on an enemy when necessary.
It is therefore critical that the condition of
the United States military with respect to America’s vital national security interests, threats to
those interests, and the context within which
the U.S. might have to use “hard power” be understood. Because such changes can have substantial implications for defense policies andinvestment, knowing how these three areaschange over time is likewise important.
Each year, The Heritage Foundation’s Index
of U.S. Military Strength employs a standardized, consistent set of criteria, accessible bothto government officials and to the American
public, to gauge the U.S. military’s ability toperform its missions in today’s world. The inaugural 2015 edition established a baseline assessment on which each annual edition builds,
one that both assesses the state of affairs for its
respective year and measures how key factors
have changed during the preceding year.
The Index is not an assessment of what mightbe, although the trends that it captures may wellimply both concerns and opportunities that canguide decisions that are germane to America’s

security. Rather, the Index should be seen as areport card for how well or poorly conditions,countries, and the U.S. military have evolved
during the assessed year. The past cannot bechanged, but it can inform, just as the future
cannot be predicted but can be shaped.

﻿lPreservation of freedom of movement
within the global commons (the sea, air,outer-space, and cyberspace domains)through which the world conducts
its business.

To defend these interests effectively on a
global scale, the United States needs a military force of sufficient size, or what is known in
the Pentagon as capacity. The many factors involved make determining how big the military
should be a complex exercise, but successive
Administrations, Congresses, Department of
Defense staffs, and independent commissions
have managed to arrive at a surprisingly consistent force-sizing rationale: an ability to handle two major conflicts simultaneously or inclosely overlapping time frames.
At its root, the current National Defense
Strategy (NDS) implies the same force requirement.1 Its emphasis on a return to long-termcompetition with major powers, explicitly
naming China and Russia as primary competitors,2 reemphasizes the need for the UnitedStates to have:lllSufficient military capacity to deter or
win against large conventional powers in
geographically distant regions,
The ability to conduct sustained operations against lesser threats, andThe ability to work with allies and maintain a U.S. presence in regions of key importance that is sufficient to deter behavior that threatens U.S. interests.

No matter how much America desires thatthe world be a simpler, less threatening placethat is more inclined to beneficial economic
interactions than violence-laden friction, thepatterns of history show that competing powers consistently emerge and that the U.S. must
be able to defend its interests in more than
one region at a time. Consequently, this Indexembraces the two-war or two-contingency
requirement.

10

Since its founding, the U.S. has been involved in a major “hot” war every 15–20 years.
Since World War II, the U.S. has also maintained substantial combat forces in Europe
and other regions while simultaneously fighting major wars as circumstances demanded.
The size of the total force roughly approximated the two-contingency model, which has
the inherent ability to meet multiple security
obligations to which the U.S. has committed
itself while also modernizing, training, educating, and maintaining the force. Accordingly, our assessment of the adequacy of today’s
U.S. military is based on the ability of America’s
armed forces to engage and defeat two major
competitors at roughly the same time.
We acknowledge that absent a dramaticchange in circumstances such as the onsetof a major conflict, a multitude of competinginterests that evolve during extended periodsof peace and prosperity will cause Administrations and Congresses to favor spending on
domestic programs rather than investing in
defense. Consequently, winning the support
needed to increase defense spending to the level that a force with a two-war capacity requires
is admittedly difficult politically. But this does
not change the patterns of history, the behavior
of competitors, or the reality of what it takes
to defend America’s interests in an actual war.
This Index’s benchmark for a two-war force
is derived from a review of the forces used foreach major war that the U.S. has undertaken
since World War II and the major defense studies completed by the federal government overthe past 30 years. We concluded that a standing (Active component) two-war–capable force
would consist of:
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Army: 50 brigade combat teams (BCTs);
Navy: 400 battle force ships and 624
strike aircraft;
Air Force: 1,200 fighter/ground-attack aircraft;
Marine Corps: 30 battalions; and2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthlSpace Force: satellite platforms, groundstations, and personnel sufficient to support warfighting requirements.

This recommended force does not accountfor homeland defense missions that would
accompany a period of major conflict and are
generally handled by Reserve and National
Guard forces. Nor does it constitute the totality of the Joint Force, which includes the arrayof supporting and combat-enabling functions
that are essential to the conduct of any military
operation: logistics; transportation (land, sea,
and air); health services; communications anddata handling; and force generation (recruiting, training, and education) to name only afew. Rather, these are combat forces that are
the most recognizable elements of America’s
hard power but that also can be viewed as surrogate measures for the size and capability of
the larger Joint Force.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military11﻿The Global Operating Environment
Looking at the world as an environment
in which U.S. forces would operate to protect
America’s interests, the Index focused on three
regions—Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—
because of the intersection of our vital interests and actors able to challenge them.
Europe. Overall, the European region remains a stable, mature, and friendly operating
environment. Russia remains the preeminent
military threat to the region, both conventionally and unconventionally, but China has become a significant presence through its propaganda, influence operations, and investments
in key sectors. Both NATO and many non-NATO European countries have reason to be increasingly concerned about the behavior andambitions of both Russia and China, althoughagreement on a collective response to thesechallenges remains elusive.
The past year saw continued U.S. militaryand political reengagement with the continent
along with modest increases in European allies’ defense budgets and capability investments. The U.S. military position in Europe
is the strongest it has been for several years.

Joint exercises have continued, and a large
withdrawal from Germany was cancelled. The
economic, political, and societal impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic are only beginning to befelt and will undoubtedly have to be reckoned
with for years to come, especially with respect
to Europe’s relationship with China.
NATO has maintained its collective defense
posture throughout the pandemic. Its renewedemphasis on collective defense has resulted ina focus on logistics. The biggest challenges tothe alliance derive from gaps in capability andreadiness among many European nations, theimportance of continuing improvements andexercises in the realm of logistics, a tempestuous Turkey, disparate threat perceptions
within the alliance, and the need to establish
the ability to mount a robust response to bothlinear and nonlinear forms of aggression.
For Europe, scores this year remained
steady, as they did in 2020 (assessed in the2021 Index), with no substantial changes in
any individual categories or average scores.
The 2022 Index again assesses the European
operating environment as “favorable.”
The Middle East. The Middle East regionis highly unstable, in large measure becauseof the erosion of authoritarian regimes, andremains a breeding ground for terrorism. Although Iraq has restored its territorial integrity since the defeat of ISIS, the political situation and future relations between Baghdad andthe United States will continue to be difficult
as long as a government that is sympathetic to
Iran is in power. U.S. relations in the region willremain complex, but this has not stopped the
U.S. military from operating as needed.
The supremacy of the nation-state is being
challenged in many countries by non-state
actors that wield influence and power comparable to those of small states. The region’s
primary challenges—continued meddling by
Iran and surging transnational terrorism—­
are made more difficult by Sunni–Shia sectarian divides, the more aggressive natureof Iran’s Islamist revolutionary nationalism,
and the proliferation of Sunni Islamist revolutionary groups. COVID-19 exacerbated theseGlobal Operating Environment: Summary
VERY POORUNFAVORABLE

MODERATE

FAVORABLE

EXCELLENT

Operating Environment: Europe
VERY POORUNFAVORABLE

MODERATE

FAVORABLE

Alliances%

Political Stability%

U.S. Military Posture%

Infrastructure%

OVERALL%

EXCELLENT

Operating Environment: Middle East
VERY POORUNFAVORABLE

Alliances

FAVORABLE

EXCELLENTFAVORABLE

EXCELLENT%

Political Stability

﻿

MODERATE%

U.S. Military Posture%

Infrastructure%

OVERALL%

Operating Environment: Asia
VERY POORUNFAVORABLE

MODERATE

Alliances%

Political Stability%

U.S. Military Posture%

Infrastructure%

OVERALL%

Global Operating Environment
VERY POORUNFAVORABLE

MODERATE

EuropeMiddle East

FAVORABLE

%
%

Asia

%

OVERALL%

122022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

EXCELLENT

that must be covered. The militaries of Japanand the Republic of Korea are larger and morecapable than European militaries, and bothcountries are becoming more interested in developing missile defense capabilities that willbe essential in combatting the regional threat
posed by North Korea.
We continue to assess the Asia region as “favorable” to U.S. interests in terms of alliances,
overall political stability, militarily relevant
infrastructure, and the presence of U.S. military forces.
Summarizing the condition of each region
enables us to get a sense of how they compare
in terms of the difficulty that would be involvedin projecting U.S. military power and sustaining combat operations in each one. As a whole,
the global operating environment currently
maintains a score of “favorable,” which meansthat the United States should be able to project military power anywhere in the world todefend its interests without substantial opposition or high levels of risk.

Threats to U.S. Interests
America faces challenges to its security athome and interests abroad from countries andorganizations with:lllInterests that conflict with those of theUnited States;
Sometimes hostile intentions toward
the U.S.; andIn some cases, growing military capabilities that are leveraged to impose an adversary’s will by coercion or intimidation ofneighboring countries, thereby creating
regional instabilities.

The government of the United States constantly faces the challenge of employing—sometimes alone but more often in concert
with allies—the right mix of diplomatic, economic, public information, intelligence, andmilitary capabilities to protect and advance
U.S. interests. Because this Index focuses on

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military13﻿economic, political, and regional crises during2020 and continued to do so throughout 2021,
and the result could be further destabilizationof the post-pandemic operational environmentfor U.S. forces.
The U.S. benefits from operationally proven procedures that leverage bases and infrastructure in the region and from the logisticalprocesses that are needed to maintain a large
force forward deployed thousands of miles
away from the homeland. The personal links
between allied armed forces are also present,
and joint training exercises improve interoperability and give the U.S. an opportunity to
influence some of the region’s future leaders.
America’s relationships in the region are
pragmatic, based on shared security and economic concerns. As long as these issues remain
relevant to both sides, the U.S. is likely to havean open door to operate in the Middle East
when its national interests require that it do so.
Although circumstances in all measured
areas varied throughout the year, in generalterms, the 2022 Index assesses the Middle East
operating environment as “moderate,” but theregion’s political stability continues to be “unfavorable” and will remain a dark cloud overeverything else.
Asia. The Asian strategic environment includes half the globe and is characterized by avariety of political relationships among stateswith wildly varying capabilities. This makes
Asia far different from Europe, which in turnmakes America’s relations with the region different from its relations with Europe. American conceptions of Asia must recognize thephysical limitations imposed by the tyrannyof distance and the need to move forces as necessary to respond to challenges from China andNorth Korea.
The complicated nature of intra-Asian relations and the lack of an integrated, regional
security architecture along the lines of NATOmake defense of U.S. security interests morechallenging than many Americans appreciate.
However, the U.S. has strong relations withallies in the region, and their willingness tohost bases helps to offset the vast distances﻿

the military component of national power, its 2022 Index again assesses Russia’s behavior
assessment of threats is correspondingly an as “aggressive” and its growing capabilities asassessment of the military or physical threat “formidable” (the highest category on the scale).
posed by each entity addressed in this section.
China is the most comprehensive threat
Our selection of threat actors discounted the U.S. faces. It remains “aggressive” in thetroublesome states and non-state entities that scope of its provocative behavior and earns
lacked the physical ability to pose a meaningful the score of “formidable” for its capability bethreat to vital U.S. security interests. This re- cause of its continued investment in the modduced the population of all potential threats to ernization and expansion of its military anda handful that possessed the means to threaten the particular attention it has paid to its space,
U.S. vital interests and exhibited a pattern of cyber, and artificial intelligence capabilities.
provocative behavior that should draw the fo- It continued to exercise its first domesticallycus of U.S. defense planning. This Index charac- produced aircraft carrier, commissioned interizes their behavior and military capabilities December 2019, and construction of its second
on five-point, descending scales.
continues. The People’s Liberation Army conAll of the threat actors selected—Russia, tinues to extend its reach and military activity
China, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups beyond its immediate region and engages inin the Middle East and Afghanistan—remained larger and more comprehensive exercises, inactual or potential threats to U.S. interests over cluding live-fire exercises in the East China Sea
the past year. All amply demonstrated a com- near Taiwan and aggressive naval and air pamitment to expanding their capabilities to trols in the South China Sea. It has continued
pursue their respective interests that directly to probe the South Korean and Japanese air
challenged those of the U.S.
defense identification zones, drawing rebukes
Just as there are American interests that are from both Seoul and Tokyo, and has been espenot covered by this Index, there may be addi- cially aggressive in sailing and flying throughtional threats to American interests that are the seas and airspace around Taiwan.
not identified here. The Index focuses on the
Iran represents by far the most significant
more apparent sources of risk and those that security challenge to the United States, its alappear to pose the greatest threat.
lies, and its interests in the greater Middle East.
Russia remains the primary threat to This is underscored by its open hostility to theAmerican interests in Europe as well as the United States and Israel, sponsorship of terrormost pressing threat to the United States. Mos- ist groups like Hezbollah, history of threatening
cow remains committed to massive pro-Russia the commons, and increased activity associatpropaganda campaigns in Ukraine and other ed with its nuclear program. Iran relies heavEastern European countries, has continued its ily on irregular (including political) warfare
active support of separatist forces in Ukraine, against others in the region and fields moreregularly performs provocative military exer- ballistic missiles than are fielded by any of its
cises and training missions, and in 2021 pres- neighbors. Its development of ballistic missiles
sured Ukraine with a large buildup of forces and its potential nuclear capability also makealong its border, raising speculation about a it a long-term threat to the security of the U.S.
possible incursion. It also has sustained its homeland. In addition, Iran has continued its
increased investment in the modernization of aggressive efforts to shape the domestic politits military and has gained significant combat ical landscape in Iraq, adding to the region’s
experience while continuing to sabotage U.S. general instability. The 2022 Index extends
and Western policy in Syria and Ukraine. Its the 2021 Index’s assessment of Iran’s behavior
economy was affected in the early stages of as “aggressive” and its capability as “gathering.”
the COVID-19 pandemic but rebounded in
North Korea’s military poses a security
the later stages and has grown in 2021. The challenge for American allies South Korea

142022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthThreats to U.S. Vital Interests: Summary
SEVEREHIGH

ELEVATEDGUARDED

LOW

Behavior of Threats
HOSTILEAGGRESSIVE

China

%

Russia%Iran%North Korea

TESTINGASSERTIVE

BENIGNASPIRATIONALMARGINAL

GUARDED

LOW%

Non-State Actors%

OVERALL%

Capability of Threats
FORMIDABLE
China

%

Russia%GATHERING%

North Korea%

Non-State Actors

﻿

Iran

CAPABLE%OVERALL%

Threats to U.S. Vital Interests
SEVERE

HIGH

China

%

Russia%Iran%North Korea%

Non-State Actors%

OVERALL%

and Japan as well as for U.S. bases in thosecountries and on Guam. North Korean officials are belligerent toward the United States,
often issuing military and diplomatic threats.

ELEVATED

Though Pyongyang has refrained from nuclear tests during 2021, it has engaged in arange of provocative behavior that includes
missile tests.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military15﻿North Korea has used its missile and nuclear global threat environment as “aggressive” andtests to enhance its prestige and importance do- “gathering” in the areas of threat actor behavior
mestically, regionally, and globally and to extract and material ability to harm U.S. security invarious concessions from the United States in terests, respectively, leading to an aggregatednegotiations on its nuclear program and various threat score of “high.”
aid packages. Such developments also improveNorth Korea’s military posture. U.S. and allied The Status of U.S. Military Power
intelligence agencies assess that Pyongyang has
Finally, we assessed the military power ofalready achieved nuclear warhead miniaturiza- the United States in three areas: capability,tion, the ability to place nuclear weapons on its capacity, and readiness. We approached thismedium-range missiles, and an ability to reach assessment service by service as the clearest
the continental United States with a missile. way to link military force size; modernizaNorth Korea also uses cyber warfare as a means tion programs; unit readiness; and (in generalof guerilla warfare against its adversaries and terms) the functional combat power (land, sea,international financial institutions. This Index and air) represented by each service.
therefore assesses the overall threat from North
We treated the United States’ nuclear caKorea, considering the range of contingencies, pability as a separate entity because of its
as “testing” for level of provocation of behavior truly unique characteristics and constituent
and “gathering” for level of capability.
elements, from the weapons themselves to the
A broad array of terrorist groups re- supporting infrastructure that is fundamentalmain the most hostile of any of the threats to ly different from the infrastructure that supAmerica examined in the Index even though ports conventional capabilities. And while notthey fall short of the state-level capabilities fully assessing cyber as we do the Army, Navy,possessed by countries such as Iran. The pri- Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Forcemary terrorist groups of concern to the U.S. (newly scored in this edition), we acknowledge
homeland and to Americans abroad are the the importance of new tools and organizations
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and that have become essential to deterring hostile
al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda and its branches remain behavior and winning wars.
active and effective in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, andThese three areas of assessment (capabilthe Sahel of Northern Africa. Though no longer ity, capacity, and readiness) are central to thea territory-holding entity, ISIS also remains a overarching questions of whether the U.S. hasserious presence in the Middle East, in South a sufficient quantity of appropriately modern
and Southeast Asia, and throughout Africa, military power and whether military units are
threatening stability as it seeks to overthrow able to conduct military operations on demand
governments and impose an extreme form of and effectively.
Islamic law. Its ideology continues to inspire
As reported in all previous editions of theattacks against Americans and U.S. interests. Index, the common theme across the services
Fortunately, Middle East terrorist groups re- and the U.S. nuclear enterprise is one of force
main the least capable threats facing the U.S., degradation and the effort needed to rebuild
but they cannot be dismissed.
after such degradation, which has been caused
Just as there are American interests that are by many years of underinvestment, poor exnot covered by this Index, there may be addi- ecution of modernization programs, and thetional threats to American interests that are negative effects of budget sequestration (cutsnot identified here. This Index focuses on the in funding) on readiness and capacity in spite
more apparent sources of risk and those that of repeated efforts by Congress to provide reappear to pose the greatest threat.
lief from low budget ceilings imposed by theBased on the assessments of these threat Budget Control Act of 2011. Pursuant to guidsources, the 2022 Index again rates the overall ance provided by then-Secretary of Defense

162022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthassessments of the institutional, programmatic, and material health or viability of America’s
hard military power.
Our analysis concluded with theseassessments:llArmy as “Marginal.” The Army’s scoreremains “marginal” in the 2022 Index.
The Army has sustained its commitment
to modernizing its forces for great-power competition, but its modernization
programs are still in their development
phase, and it will be a few years before
they are ready for acquisition and fielding.
In other words, the Army is aging fasterthan it is modernizing. It remains “weak”
in capacity with only 62 percent of theforce it should have. However, 58 percent(18) of its 31 Regular Army BCTs are at thehighest state of readiness, thus earninga score of “very strong” and conveying
the sense that the service knows what itneeds to do to prepare for the next major
conflict. That said, its capability scoreremains “marginal” given the age of its
equipment and the size and maturity of its
modernization programs.
Navy as “Marginal,” Trending Toward“Weak.” The Navy’s current battle force
fleet of 296 ships and intensified operational tempo combine to reveal a service
that is much too small relative to its tasks,
resulting in a capacity score of “weak,”which is unchanged from the 2021 Index.
It desperately needs a larger fleet of 400
ships, but current and forecasted levels offunding will prevent this from occurring
for the foreseeable future. This has theunhappy effect of causing the service toage more rapidly than it can replace older
ships, thus making it easier for major
competitors to achieve technologicalparity. It also has made it difficult for the
Navy to conduct the training essential toachieving high levels of readiness. Consequently, the Navy is rated “marginal” on a
downward slope to “weak” in readiness.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military17﻿James Mattis in the 2018 NDS, the services
undertook efforts to reorient from irregularwarfare to large-scale combat against a peer
adversary, but such shifts take time and evenmore resources. Substantial progress wasmade in regaining readiness in 2020, but slippage because of continued underinvestment in
defense relative to need has been noted in 2021,
and the forecast for 2022 is gloomy given thelevel of funding requested in the President’s FY
2022 budget submission.
Even though the military has been heavily
engaged in operations for the past two decades,
primarily in the Middle East but elsewhere as
well, experience in warfare is ephemeral andcontext-sensitive. Valuable combat experience is lost as servicemembers who individually gained experience leave the force, and it
retains direct relevance only for future operations of a similar type: Counterinsurgency andadviser support operations in Iraq, for example,
are fundamentally different from major conventional operations against a state like Iran or
China. In general, the withdrawals of U.S. military forces from Iraq in 2011 (now a decade in
the past) and from Afghanistan this year haveamplified the loss of direct combat experience
across the Joint Force. Thus, although portionsof the current Joint Force are experienced insome types of operations, the force as a wholelacks experience with high-end, major combat operations of the sort toward which it has
only recently begun to redirect its training andplanning, and it is still aged and shrinking in its
capacity for operations even if limited quantities of new equipment like the F-35 Lightning
II fighter are being introduced.
We characterized the services and the nuclear enterprise on a five-category scale ranging from “very weak” to “very strong,” benchmarked against criteria elaborated in the fullreport. These characterizations should not be
construed as reflecting either the competenceof individual servicemembers or the professionalism of the services or Joint Force as awhole; nor do they speak to the U.S. military’s
strength relative to other militaries around theworld in direct comparison. Rather, they areU.S. Military Power: Army
VERY WEAK
Capacity

WEAK

MARGINAL

STRONGVERY STRONG%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

U.S. Military Power: NavyVERY WEAK
Capacity

WEAK

MARGINAL

STRONGVERY STRONGSTRONGVERY STRONGSTRONGVERY STRONG%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

U.S. Military Power: Air Force﻿VERY WEAK

WEAK

MARGINAL

Capacity%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

U.S. Military Power: Marine Corps
VERY WEAK

WEAK

Capacity

MARGINAL%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

U.S. Military Power: SpaceVERY WEAK

WEAK

Capacity%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

18

MARGINAL

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

STRONGVERY STRONGU.S. Military Power: Nuclear
VERY WEAK

WEAK

MARGINAL

STRONG

Nuclear Stockpile%

Delivery Platform
Reliability%

WarheadModernization%

Delivery Systems
Modernization%

Nuclear Weapons
Complex%

National Labs Talent%

Force Readiness%

Allied Assurance%

Nuclear Test Readiness%

OVERALLl

VERY STRONG%lMarine Corps as “Strong.” The score
for the Marine Corps was raised to“strong” from “marginal” for two reasons:(1) because the 2021 Index changed thethreshold for capacity, lowering it from36 infantry battalions to 30 battalions in
acknowledgment of the Corps’ argumentthat it is a one-war force that also stands
ready for a broad range of smaller crisis-­
response tasks, and (2) because of theCorps’ extraordinary efforts to modernize(which improves capability) and enhance
its readiness during the assessed year.
However, in the absence of additional
funding in FY 2022, the Corps intends toreduce the number of its battalions evenfurther from 24 to 21, and this reduction,
if implemented, would harm the Corps’
overall ability to perform the role it has
set for itself: enabling the projectionof naval power into heavily contested
combat environments. The service has
moved ahead aggressively with a redesignof its operating forces and the acquisitionof new warfighting tools, but it remains
hampered by old equipment and problematic funding.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military19﻿Air Force as “Weak.” This is a downgrade from an assessment of “marginal”
in the 2021 Index. Though the Air Forcepossesses 86 percent of the combat aircraft that this Index recommends, public
reporting of the mission readiness andphysical location of these planes would
make it difficult for the Air Force torespond rapidly to a crisis. Additionally,
the need to source these aircraft from all
locations for a single major fight would
likely preclude a response to any othermajor combat action. Modernization
programs are generally healthy, but theadvanced age of key aircraft in the Air
Force’s inventory is driving the service
to retire planes faster than they can be
replaced, leading to a capability score of“marginal.” The service also lost groundin readiness compared with the preceding year. A score of “weak” in this areais the result of a shortage of pilots andflying time that implies a lack of effort orfocused intent given the general reduction in operational deployments as U.S.
actions overseas have ebbed.

U.S. Military Power
VERY WEAK

WEAK

MARGINAL

Army

%

Navy

%

Air Force

STRONG%

Marine Corps%

Nuclear

%

Space

%

OVERALL

﻿

l

l

20

VERY STRONG%Space Force as “Weak.” The Space
Force was formally established on December 20, 2019, as a result of an earlier
proposal by President Trump and legislation passed by Congress. The 2021
Index provided an overview of the newservice, explaining its mission, capabilities, and challenges, but did not offer anassessment. With an additional year togain more insight, the 2022 Index scores
the USSF as “weak” in all measured areas.
The service has done quite well in transitioning missions from the other services
without interruption in support, but it
does not have enough assets to track andmanage the explosive growth in commercial and competitor-country systems
being placed into orbit. The majority of
its platforms have exceeded their planned
life span, and modernization efforts to replace them are slow and incremental. The
force also lacks defensive and offensive
counter-space capabilities.
Nuclear Capability as “Strong” but
Trending Toward “Marginal” oreven “Weak.” This is the opposite of
the conclusion reached in the 2021 Index,
which reported a trend from “marginal” to “strong.” The grade of “strong”

recognizes the Trump Administration’scommitment to reversing the decline in
the U.S. nuclear enterprise and the Biden
Administration’s decision to sustain thecommitment to modernization of theentire nuclear enterprise—warheads,
platforms, command and control, personnel, and infrastructure—­and allocate
needed resources accordingly. Without
this commitment, this overall score will
degrade rapidly to “weak.” Progress inmodernization efforts, combined withassurances from senior leaders that theforces remain reliable, warrants a more
optimistic assessment than we have beenable to provide in previous editions. Thatbeing said, this score of “strong” with aconditional trend toward “marginal” or“weak” reflects a greater risk of a degradation in nuclear deterrence than has been
seen in the recent past. Current forces
are assessed as reliable today, but nearly
all components of the nuclear enterpriseare at a tipping point with respect to replacement or modernization and have no
margin left for delays in schedule. Failureof on-time appropriations and lack of Administration support for nuclear modernization could lead to a rapid decline in thisportfolio to “weak” in future editions.

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthIn the aggregate, the United States’ military posture continues to be rated “marginal” andfeatures both positive and negative trends: progress in bringing some new equipment
into the force, filling gaps in manpower, and rebuilding stocks of munitions and repair parts
alongside worrisome trends in force readiness, declining strength in key areas like trained
pilots, and continued uncertainty across the defense budget that is now having a negative
effect both on major acquisition programs and on installation-level repair capabilities. The
2022 Index concludes that the current U.S. military force is likely capable of meetingthe demands of a single major regional conflict while also attending to various presence
and engagement activities but that it would be very hard-pressed to do more and certainly
would be ill-equipped to handle two nearly simultaneous MRCs—a situation that is mademore difficult by the generally weak condition of key military allies. The presidential decision
to withdraw forces from Afghanistan might provide some breathing room for force recovery
but only if other operational demands do not retask the military services.

﻿

In general, the military services continue to prioritize readiness and have seen some
improvement over the past few years, but modernization programs, especially inshipbuilding, continue to suffer as resources are committed to preparing for the future andrecovering from 20 years of operations. In the case of the Air Force, some of its limited
acquisition funds are being spent on aircraft of questionable utility in high-threat scenarios
while R&D receives a larger share of funding than efforts meant to replace quite aged aircraft
are receiving. As observed in the 2021 Index, the services have also normalized reductionsin the size and number of military units, and the forces remain well below the level needed
to meet the two-MRC benchmark. The Marine Corps’ plan to reduce its size even further sothat it can redirect savings in manpower toward the capability modernization that it views as
essential for success in future combat provides a stark example of the consequences of thegovernment’s underinvestment in defense.
Congress and the Administration took positive steps to stabilize funding in the latter yearsof the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). This mitigated the worst effects of BCA-restrictedfunding, but sustained investment in rebuilding the force to ensure that America’s armed
services are properly sized, equipped, trained, and ready to meet the missions they are called
upon to fulfill will be critical.
As currently postured, the U.S. military continues to be only marginally able to meet thedemands of defending America’s vital national interests.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military21

Endnotes
Though issued during President Donald J. Trump’s Administration, the 2018 NDS has not yet been superseded by a similar
document, focused on the military, from the Administration of President Joseph R. Biden. However, the Biden Administration
has released interim guidance in which it sets out the broad outlines and priorities of its national security agenda. In particular,
President Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance reiterates the same core national security interests and thesame set of major competitor countries posing challenges to U.S. interests that the preceding Administration identified andplaces them in a global context wherein the U.S. military must be ready to handle several problems in geographically separated
locations. See President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, The White House, March 2021, pp. 8–9,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf (accessed August 19, 2021).

2.

James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge, p. 2. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-DefenseStrategy-Summary.pdf (accessed August 19, 2021).

﻿

1.

22

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Managing Risk in Force PlanningDavid A. Deptula, Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.)T

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military23﻿he United States is a global power with This lack of clarity and understanding of risk
global commitments. As such, it cannot undermines effective decision-making for defocus on a single problem or threat to the ex- fense planning—something the United Statesclusion of others, nor can it seek to minimize cannot afford at a time of simultaneously growrisk across the board. To do so would be finan- ing threats to U.S. national security and fewer
cially infeasible. Instead, the United States resources with which to deal with them.
must seek to manage risk, setting priorities
and allocating scarce resources to the most Risk to What?
salient threats while accepting risk in other,
The first step in reaching a more precise unless critical areas. As the United States enters derstanding is to clarify what is at risk. From
another defense budget downturn, these choic- a force planning perspective, there are two
es become even more challenging as Congress relevant types of risk: operational and straand the Department of Defense (DOD) must tegic. When Pentagon officials testify before
grapple with what programs to cancel, curtail, Congress about the potential implications ofor at least defer to balance the books.
programmatic cuts, they are typically referring
Although the fiscal year (FY) 2022 defense to a form of operational risk, which broadly
budget request is essentially flat after account- refers to the probability that a military force
ing for inflation, rising internal costs, particu- will be unable to achieve an operational mislarly for operations and maintenance (O&M) sion objective set out for it within the current
and compensation for U.S. servicemembers, defense strategy.
mean that DOD must find savings elsewhere
The objectives of a national defense stratto offset this cost growth.1 Congress, already egy are operationalized in a “force planningaware of the many programs and expenses for construct” that defines the number, types, andwhich the Pentagon has requested funding, frequency of operations for which the U.S. miliwill deliberate on the implications of budgets tary should be sized and shaped to support. For
that fall short of needs. This typically leads to example, the unclassified summary of the 2018
hearings during which a Member asks some- National Defense Strategy (NDS) outlines that
one from the Pentagon about the potential the U.S. military should be sized and shaped
consequences of a loss of funding for some- to “deter aggression in three key regions—thething or another and the answer is usually, Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East; de“Well, we’d have to operate at increased risk.”grade terrorist and WMD threats; and defend
Although correct in the strict sense, when U.S. interests from challenges below the level
the term “risk” is used repeatedly in this vague of armed conflict” in peacetime.2 In wartime,manner to explain the implications of virtual- “the fully mobilized Joint Force will be capaly any defense cut, it quickly loses all meaning. ble of defeating aggression by a major power;

deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere; invasion of NATO’s eastern flank, mostly likely
and disrupting imminent terrorist and WMD in the Baltic Sea region. In recent years, when
threats.”3 The strategy also requires the U.S. DOD and others have used war games to asmilitary to remain prepared to “deter nuclear sess these scenarios, the United States miland non-nuclear strategic attacks and defend itary has consistently lost.7 Given these disthe homeland” in both peace and wartime.4
couraging results, the question that naturally
Broadly, the U.S. military’s ability to meet follows is: What can be done to reduce thisthese objectives can be compromised in one risk to mission?
of two ways:
It is widely acknowledged that DOD suffersfrom both capability and capacity shortfalls.
It lacks the capability and/or capacity to
However, a better understanding of what they
achieve current and future military objec- are and how to address them requires operattives (risk to mission), oring concepts that link DOD’s planning guidance to its resource requirements. In other
It is unable to provide and sustain thewords, how much of what type of military powforce over time at an acceptable lever is needed to do what the planning scenarios
el of readiness and across the range
or strategy demand?
of objectives it is expected to execute
Operating concepts seek to solve oper(risk to force).
ational challenges—in this case Russia’s or
China’s fait accompli strategies—by describRisk to Mission. Risk to mission reflects ing the military objectives that military forces
the force’s capability and capacity to conduct should achieve and how those forces should
current operations at an acceptable human, be organized and employed to achieve themmaterial, and financial cost as well as its ex- in the smartest possible fashion. Critically, by
pected performance against emerging or antic- describing solutions to concrete problems in
ipated threats as laid out in the defense strate- terms that are understandable to all relevant
gy. Whereas current operations have focused stakeholders, operating concepts foster beton the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghani- ter understanding of what capabilities andstan, as well as on deterring rogue regimes such force structure are needed, convey the poas North Korea, the 2018 NDS made clear that tential implications of not resourcing a given
the priority would now be confronting Russia program, and provide a foundation for an asand/or China. However, because these are sessment of where potential tradeoffs exist—­
not active conflicts, risk to mission relative to including across services—to accomplish athese objectives must be assessed against plan- mission in the most effective and efficientning scenarios.
manner possible.
The most important and stressing scenarios
The Army’s experience with its AirLand
for which the 2018 NDS called on the services Battle doctrine provides insight into how opto prepare involve defeating the invasion of a erating concepts can help to focus attention on
U.S. ally or friend by China or Russia before operational risks and close gaps between stratthe invader can achieve a fait accompli.5 In this egy and resources. In the wake of the Vietnam
context, a fait accompli involves a peer adver- War, the Army found itself with a force that hadsary seizing territory before the U.S. military hollowed out its high-end warfighting capabilcan respond effectively and then presenting ities for a potential conflict against the Soviet
an escalation dilemma that would coerce the Union to prioritize organizing, training, andUnited States and its allies into relenting and equipping forces to support irregular warfare
accepting the new status quo.6
and counterinsurgency operations in SouthDOD planning scenarios include a Chi- east Asia. To rebuild itself, the Army focused onnese invasion to occupy Taiwan and a Russian the most salient, threat-based problem of the
l

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthemblematic of this modernization death spiral.
After almost three decades of budget pressures,
the bomber force has dropped from a high of
422 bombers in FY 19889 to just 158 today.10 At
the same time, demand for bombers has risen
dramatically, with one Air Force commander noting that the mission-driven need forbombers has risen 1,100 percent over a fiveyear period.11
The lack of sufficient funding for new aircraft combined with higher-than-expectedusage of current aircraft has accelerated thewear and tear on the bomber force. This dynamic is why the Air Force felt compelled toretire 17 of its most worn B-1Bs to sustain theremaining bombers and to help fund its modernization programs.12 A similar pattern holds
across most of the Air Force fleet, 44 percentof which is now operating beyond its planned
service life.13
The flip side of this is that the demand forforces from combatant commanders may be
more than the military can support. Some analysts have recently pointed out the need toreview and potentially curb combatant commanders’ “unbounded demands for U.S. forces,
primarily for an ever-growing list of presence
missions” for which they “have no incentive
to be sparing.”14 This puts tremendous strain
on the service chiefs, who must balance meeting the demand for forces from combatantcommanders with other priorities such as
much-needed force modernization.
In recent years, all of the services havestruggled to keep up with demand fortheir forces.
ll

To help bridge the gap between retiring its
aging KC-10s and KC-135s and bringing
its new KC-46s online, the Air Force wasthinking of contracting privately operated
tankers to help meet more than 25,000
hours of non-supported flying hours.15
Navy aircraft carriers have repeatedly had
to conduct back-to-back deployments
without major maintenance periods.
Last year, the USS Stout, a guided missile

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military25

﻿day: a Soviet attack by a numerically superior
force against NATO in Central Europe.
AirLand Battle, a combined-air/land doctrinal concept, sought to address this problem
with land forces maneuvering in an aggressive
defense while air forces attacked rear-echelon
enemy forces feeding their front. By providing
an understandable framework for how theservices would execute the concept, AirLand
Battle helped to rationalize and build support
for the Army’s “Big Five” modernization priorities: the M-1 Abrams tank, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Apache attack helicopter,
Black Hawk utility helicopter, and Patriot air
defense system, all of which continue to bemainstays of the Army today. Critically, theconcept also acknowledged the limitations ofwhat the Army could accomplish on its own
and fostered greater interservice cooperation and synchronization, recognizing that
the Air Force was better suited to providing
deep attacks beyond the forward edge of thebattle area.
Risk to Force. Risk to force relates to theability of the services to generate and sustain
military forces over time. Risk to force canmanifest itself in several ways. For example,
the military could struggle to meet current
campaign and contingency mission requirements, which could be an issue of either supplyof or demand for forces. On the supply side, theforce could be too small to maintain sustainable force rotations at the desired operational
tempo and for all the tasks the defense strategy expects it to execute. Over time, this kindof force generation imbalance can break theforce: too few people and too little equipment
trying to handle too much work.
This has been a chronic problem for the
Air Force, which since the end of the Cold War
has received insufficient funding to modernize
and recapitalize its force.8 Unable to procure
enough aircraft to modernize its fleet, the Air
Force has had to rely on an aging and progressively smaller force, which in turn costs more
to maintain and therefore crowds out evenmore resources that could have been used toacquire newer aircraft. The bomber force isdestroyer, spent a record 215 straightdays at sea, reflecting a U.S. Navy without
enough ships to execute the tasks required of it.16

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The Army has struggled with deployment to dwell time ratios far above what
is sustainable in the long term for thecurrent force.17

Another way risk to force can manifest
itself is through attrition in the executionof missions that leaves forces vulnerable orunable to respond to other challenges. Overthe past several decades of operating against
less capable adversaries, the U.S. military has
grown accustomed to astonishingly low attrition rates. Quite simply, this would not be thecase in the event of a peer conflict. For context,
during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israeli
Air Force (IAF) lost 102 of its 390 aircraft in 19
days of operations against a peer adversary (acollection of Arab countries led by Egypt and
Syria) and suffered a total aircraft lost or damaged rate of 4.8 percent during the first weekof fighting.18
If the U.S. Air Force continues to skew its
forces toward older aircraft that lack the degree of survivability that will be needed to operate in future threat environments, it should
expect to experience similar loss rates or worse
in a conflict with China or Russia. A recent
analysis by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies shows that if a similar 5 percent
attrition rate were applied to U.S. fighters in asimulated conflict with China, a U.S. force of791 combat-coded fighters could be reduced
to 236 fighters remaining available after just
19 days of combat.19
Lacking any spare capacity, it would takeyears to recover from such losses, during whichtime the United States would be exceedingly
vulnerable to other threats. For example, a recent study determined that it would take theindustrial base an average of 8.4 years at surge
production rates to replace current inventories of combat aircraft, ships, and other major
weapons systems.20

26

Of course, this risk is not limited to platforms. The Air Force has an ongoing shortageof pilots that, despite reduced competition
from airlines due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
has not abated.21 The lack of sufficient pilots
even during a time of relative peace means that
virtually no elasticity exists to replace highly
trained combat pilots in the event of combat casualties. As with aircraft, it would takeyears and significant investments to replacethese lost pilots. According to a recent RAND
study, it costs between $5.6 million and $10.9
million to train a basic qualified fighter pilot.22
Replacing potentially hundreds of pilots lostin battle would be enormously expensive justin dollars, not to mention the time it takes totrain new pilots.
Shortfalls in munitions and other expendables are also a perpetual concern.23 In a peer
conflict, current inventories of preferred munitions such as Advanced Medium-Range Airto-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and Joint Air-toSurface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) would be
expended rapidly and could not be replenishedquickly. Once depleted, U.S. forces would haveto reduce their operational tempo or revert toless effective and shorter-range weapons that
expose the launching aircraft to greater risk
from enemy defenses.

Risk to National Interests
Strategic risk relates to threats posing dangers directly to the United States including its
population, territory, civil society, critical infrastructure, and/or interests. The 2018 NDS
encapsulates what this means in practice forthe Department of Defense as being “prepared
to defend the homeland, remain the preeminent military power in the world, ensure thebalances of power remain in our favor, andadvance an international order that is mostconducive to our security and prosperity.”24
Assessing strategic risk involves a complex
cumulative judgement based on the priorities
assigned to various objectives within a given
strategy as well as the aggregated operationalrisk. As noted, there is strategic risk inherentin every defense strategy: There simply are not2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthalso increases the strategic risk that a second adversary could launch a major military operationthat threatens America’s vital interests. For example, the United States risks failing to defend
NATO from opportunistic Russian aggression
if U.S. forces are already locked in an existential
fight with China in the Indo-Pacific theater.
The DOD leadership has a responsibility
to make clear to the current Administration,
the Congress, and the American people theshortfalls and risks to readiness of a defense
budget that is unable to meet the requirementsof the national defense strategy, and this requires a clear problem statement. For example, the Air Force’s 2018 statement of need for
386 operational squadrons—24 percent larger
than the 312 that exist today—made clear what
was necessary to meet the demands of the national defense strategy. That requirement has
not changed.
The services must submit budgets in accordance with directed guidance from the WhiteHouse, but they also have a responsibility to
advocate for what they need to execute the defense strategy. Conflating budget submissions
with the actual defense strategy requirement
can give the false impression that missions canbe met no matter how small the budget may be.
Historically, the military services recognized a planning force (what it needed) and a
programming force (what the budget allowed).
The space between the two was a measure of
risk. The planning force was eliminated in thelate 1990s, and there is now no easy means torecognize the gap between what the militaryneeds to execute the defense strategy and what
it can field with the budget that it is issued.
The Biden Administration should reinstate
the process of submitting both a planning
force and a programming force. The formal
re-establishment of the planning force on anannual basis would provide a visible measureof risk between what the military has andwhat it needs.
Given its more abstract nature, strategicrisk is rarely discussed in the context of programmatic or capability decisions. One notable exception to this rule is the United States’

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military27

﻿enough resources to minimize risk across theboard. Instead, a well-crafted defense strategy
manages risk by establishing priorities basedon its assessment of what the most salient
threats are and, by extension, accepting morerisk in areas deemed less critical. For example,
the 2018 NDS prioritizes confronting China
and Russia at the expense of dedicating a greater share of resources to combating terrorism.
Whereas the prioritization and reorientation of DOD’s planning and resourcing toward
great-power competition are reasonable andlong overdue, other strategic risks acceptedby the 2018 NDS warrant greater scrutiny.
One notable example is the fact that its force
planning construct requires the services to organize, train, and equip to fight either China
or Russia—not both. This single-war condition
represents a significant break from previous
post–Cold War defense strategies, all of which
considered it critical that the U.S. maintainthe capacity to fight two wars nearly simultaneously. The logic of the two-war strategy was
to have sufficient capacity and capability todeter a second opportunistic aggressor fromtaking advantage of a U.S. military that is already engaged against a different adversary inanother theater.
The timing of the shift to a single-war construct is perplexing, considering that the United States faces more threats today than at anyother time since the end of the Cold War. Rather than being strategy based, this situation was
driven by arbitrary budgets set by Congress
without any relationship to the content of thenational security and national defense strategies. The reality is that senior DOD leaders
have concluded that a two-war force cannot be
achieved with the budget constraints imposedby Congress.25 Unfortunately, the current DOD
budget does not even support the projected
cost of rebuilding the U.S. military to win asingle war against a great-power adversary ata moderate level of confidence.
Simply put, the U.S. military today lacks
the capacity and capability to defeat China ina military conflict.26 Although perhaps understandable from a budgetary perspective, thisnuclear forces. Since the 1960s, the nuclear
Capacity relates to the size of the force,
triad and its associated nuclear command,
typically measured in terms of end
control, and communications (NC3) systemstrength or operational units.
have served as the bedrock of U.S. national
security by providing a continuous deterrent
The task that confronts the service chiefs
to nuclear-­armed adversaries who pose an and defense planners is attempting to findexistential threat to the United States and its the proper balance among these three factors,
allies. Over the past 30 years, however, nucle- making decisions on when and where to takear modernization programs have repeatedly risk in the current force to prepare for the fubeen truncated, deferred, or cancelled in favor ture or else taking risk in future capabilities ifof other programs that were deemed higher they assess that the demand for current capapriority at the time.
bilities cannot be put in jeopardy.
The culmination of these decisions that
Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen
used nuclear modernization as a “bill payer” Hicks has referred to this balancing act as theis a triad that is on the brink, with nearly all of “iron triangle of painful trade-offs” because
its major systems operating well beyond their defense planners “can nuance the edges of theoriginal planned service lives. Although the dilemma, but for the most part, the [triangle]
same critics who argued against previous nu- forecloses radical changes in the defense stratclear modernization initiatives are once again egy.”28 She further adds that, in general, as longarguing against the need to modernize DOD’s as U.S. forces are engaged in active conflicts, innuclear enterprise,27 the reality is that failure vestments in future capabilities are the mostto modernize America’s nuclear forces in a easily deferred.
timely manner would diminish the nation’s
Two change-minded leaders, Air Forcestrategic nuclear deterrence posture even as Chief of Staff General Charles “CQ” Brown andthe international security environment grows Marine Corps Commandant General David H.
more dangerous, punctuated by Russia and Berger, recently co-wrote an op-ed that atChina continuing to invest significant resourc- tempts to tilt the readiness balance in favor of
es into their nuclear forces.
modernization by introducing the future into
the readiness part of the equation. In line with
Risk in Time?
the 2018 NDS’s decision to accept more risk in
There is also a temporal element to risk: For the near term to modernize for future conflicts,
a given decision, there can be tradeoffs in risk the service chiefs argue that “we, as members
across time. One of the fundamental tradeoffs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should embracethat defense planners must confront is that a framework for readiness that manages the
between investment in readiness, capability, relationship between today’s combatant comand capacity.
mand requirements with the modernization
imperatives required to enable tomorrow’s
Readiness is the condition of forces with
combatant commanders.”29
respect to their equipment, personnel,
In other words, they are attempting to reskills, proficiency, and sustainment neces- frame readiness in terms of readiness to exesary to fight and win the nation’s wars.
cute the mission from a capability perspective,
which in their assessment requires placing
Capability in this context refers not only
more emphasis on future combat readinessto old equipment that may still be effecand capabilities even at the expense of curtive, but also to investments in the future
rent readiness.
force and is generally reflected in the budOn the one hand, they have a valid point.
gets for modernization and research, deCritical elements of readiness include sufficientvelopment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). and capable forces that can meet the anticipated

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2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthIn the hope of staying ahead of the technology curve, the services are also forgoing
sufficient procurement of capabilities thatare available today. For example, instead ofincreasing procurement of F-35As to 80 per
year as it once intended, the Air Force has requested only 48 F-35As per year in its threemost recent budgets. At that rate, the Air
Force will not fully field its planned F-35A
force until the mid-2040s.32 Although preparing the force for the future as technology
advances is critical, this approach dramatically increases the risk that the United States
will lose a peer conflict if it occurs in the nearterm—something of which potential adversaries are undoubtedly aware and are monitoring closely.
Ideally, the services would be able to fundcurrent combat-credible readiness and makesignificant investments in future capabilities.
However, this would be executable only if themilitary received significant funding increases. Instead, the services are constrained by thecurrent budget environment, and this places
them in the uncomfortable position of trying
to choose the least bad option. Ultimately, it
is up to Congress and the American people todecide whether they are willing to provide themilitary with the additional resources it needs.
But regardless of the outcome, these decisions
should be made with a full appreciation of therisks involved in not doing so.

How Much Risk?
Obviously, not all risks are created equal.
The level of risk associated with a given threator hazard is a function of two variables: theprobability that a negative event will occur andthe expected severity of the resulting harm. A
greater level of risk is assumed either when it
becomes more likely that a negative event will
occur or when the likely harmful consequencesof such an event become more severe. The potential harm or consequences of such an event
are in turn estimated by considering the valueof the interest at stake, the extent of the damage that can be done, and the permanence ofthe potential damage inflicted.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military29

﻿threats. Decades of deferred, truncated, or cancelled modernization mean that in the event of amajor conflict, the United States would have torely predominantly on 1970s and 1980s technology. Today, for example, the average Air Forcetanker is more than 50 years old, and less than
20 percent and 13 percent of the fighter andbomber fleets, respectively, are stealthy.30
Simply put, in view of the way that thecharacter of the threat is advancing, the United States would not be able to sustain the fightagainst a peer adversary with such outdated
equipment even if it achieved 100 percent
readiness across its forces. In this sense, theeffort by Generals Brown and Berger to redefine readiness to place greater emphasis on
modernization has significant merit.
On the other hand, although this effort tochange the framework is clever rhetorically, it
does not provide a fundamental escape fromthe iron triangle of painful tradeoffs. The
services are making big bets on future technologies that hold potential, such as artificial
intelligence and hypersonic weapons, in thehope that they ultimately will help the United States to maintain its comparative militaryadvantage against such peer competitors as
China and Russia. Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin has remarked that the FY 2022 defense
budget includes “the largest-ever request for
RDT&E for development of technologies,” with
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Mark
Milley adding that the budget “biases the future, slightly” over the present.31
However, in the rush to modernize, thechallenge remains: How well will the militarytransform for an uncertain future as well ashedge for unexpected contingencies in thepresent? What remains unsaid is that these investments in the future are coming at the costof having to divest existing force structure andcurrent combat-credible readiness. Furthermore, budget constraints are compelling theservices to divest current forces on the bet that
their replacements will be fielded sometimein the next 10 years rather than waiting until
the new capabilities have entered the force anddemonstrated their combat relevance.

﻿

Based on the assessed probability and po- that both the possibility of war and the postential consequences of a negative event oc- sibility that the United States might lose are
curring, each potential threat is characterized very real and continue to grow more likely aswith an associated level of risk ranging from the United States’ military advantage in key
low to high. Although bounded to the extent regions continues to erode.
possible by empirical data, risk judgment is ulSecond, the public also tends to underestitimately a qualitative effort that depends upon, mate the potential consequences of the risk
among other things, the relative importance posed by China and Russia. Reminiscent ofthat a decision-maker assigns to more likely debates during the Cold War over whether
or more consequential threats.
the United States would be willing to trade
By its nature, risk assessment is an inexact New York for Paris in a potential nuclear exscience hampered by a combination of the change, there is significant handwringing tocomplexity of the subject matter, uncertainty day over public willingness to go to war with adriven by incomplete knowledge, and the am- major power over Taiwan or Estonia, neither
biguity that can result in competing yet equally of which is perceived as a vital U.S. national
reasonable interpretations of the same sourc- interest. However, the potential consequences of risk. However, current defense planners es are profound. As the 2018 NDS points out,
suffer from another, more avoidable challenge: “failure to meet our defense objectives will reThe gap in threat perception between them- sult in decreasing U.S. global influence, erodselves and the broader American public they ing cohesion among allies and partners, andserve has grown alarmingly wide.
reduced access to markets”34 that for decades
In this sense, the U.S. military has been a vic- have helped make Americans secure, prospertim of its own success. For 30 years, the United ous, and free.
States has had the uncontested ability to do virThe fear is that it is going to require a sigtually whatever it wanted militarily anywhere nificant defeat to wake up Congress and thein the world. Additionally, the size of the force American people to the danger. The Unitedneeded for post–Cold War operations in which States could very well lose the next battle—andthe United States has engaged was such that the perhaps the next war—if it does not change
U.S. military could sustain those deployments course. Perhaps only then will the Adminisindefinitely. The result of this recent dominance tration, Congress, and the American people
is that many can no longer conceive of a world realize that the only thing more expensive
in which U.S. military supremacy is not a given, than a first-rate military is a second-rate one.
and this has biased the perception of both in- Unfortunately, by then, it may be too late toputs to the calculation of risk.
reverse the damage.
First, having grown accustomed to U.S. military superiority over lesser adversaries and not Conclusion
having experienced a larger, conventional war
Making better-informed decisions about
in more than 30 years, the public’s perception the acceptability of risk and, by extension,of the likelihood of armed conflict between what should be done about it requires betterthe United States and a peer competitor such communication among all relevant stakeholdas China or Russia is that it is highly unlike- ers: the Administration, defense planners inly. Furthermore, the public believes that the the Office of the Secretary of Defense, theUnited States far outpaces any other power armed services, Congress, and the Americanin defense spending—though the margin has public. Effective communication should aim
in fact narrowed significantly33—and this re- to reduce potential misunderstandings andinforces the belief that even should a conflict potential surprises as they relate to risk.
occur, it would be virtually impossible for the
The single most important step that DOD
United States to lose. The reality, however, is could take to improve the understanding of

30

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthboth the nature and the extent of risk would
be to require the services to release both aplanning force that is sized to meet the demands of the national defense strategy and a
programming force that reflects what can beachieved within the constraints of congressional appropriations. In this construct, thedifference between the two equates to risk.
This would dramatically improve transparency and insight into the degree of risk the U.S.
military faces because of differences between
what America’s armed services need and what
they are allocated.

﻿

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military31﻿Endnotes
1.

For example, see Congressional Budget Office, Trends in Spending by the Department of Defense for Operation and Maintenance,
January 2017, p. 2, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52156-omchartbook.pdf (accessed
June 24, 2021).

2.

James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, p. 6, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed June 24, 2021).

3.

Ibid.

4.

Ibid.

5.

Statement of Elbridge A. Colby, Director, Defense Program, Center for a New American Security, and former Deputy Secretary of
Defense for Strategy and Force Development, in stenographic transcript of Hearing to Receive Testimony on China and Russia,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, January 29, 2019, p. 13, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/1902_1-29-19.pdf (accessed June 27, 2021).

6.

Dan Altman, “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries,” International Studies Quarterly,Vol. 61, No. 4 (December 2017), pp. 881–891, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/61/4/881/4781720 (accessed June 27, 2021).

7.

Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “US ‘Gets Its Ass Handed to It’ in Wargames: Here’s a $24 Billion Fix,” Breaking Defense, March 7, 2019,https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/us-gets-its-ass-handed-to-it-in-wargames-heres-a-24-billion-fix/ (accessed June 27, 2021).

8.

Col. Mark A. Gunzinger, USAF (Ret.), and Col. Carl Rehberg, USAF (Ret.), “Moving Toward the Air Force We Need? Assessing Air
Force Budget Trends,” Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Policy Papers, Vol. 21, December 2019, https://docs.wixstatic.com/
ugd/a2dd91_65de89ab71114804aeee653e7bf95715.pdf (accessed June 27, 2021).

9.

Appendix B, “USAF Total Active Inventory by Aircraft Category, 1950–2016,” in Col. James C. Ruehrmund Jr. USAF (Ret.) andChristopher J. Bowie, Arsenal of Airpower: USAF Aircraft Inventory 1950–2016 (Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies,2018), pp. 22 and 28, http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/a2dd91_5ddbf04fd26e4f72aef6cfd5ee87913f.pdf (accessed June 29, 2021).

10. Table 6, “U.S. Air Force Total Aircraft Inventory (Page 1 of 3), in John Venable, “U.S. Air Force,” in 2021 Index of U.S. Military
Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2021), p. 417, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2020/
Index%20of%20Military%20Strength/PDFs/FINAL/2021_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_WEB.pdf (accessed June 29, 2021).
11. Douglas A. Birkey and Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula USAF (Ret.), “Building the Air Force We Need,” Air Force Magazine, April 15, 2019,https://www.airforcemag.com/article/Building-the-Air-Force-We-Need/ (accessed June 29, 2021). See also John A. Tirpak, “USAF
to Retire B-1, B-2 in Early 2030s as B-21 Comes On-Line,” Air Force Magazine, February 9, 2018, https://www.airforcemag.com/
USAF-to-Retire-B-1-B-2-in-Early-2030s-as-B-21-Comes-On-Line/ (accessed June 27, 2021).
12. Valeria Insinna, “The ‘Bone’ Heads to the Boneyard,” Defense News, February 18, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/
air/2021/02/18/the-bone-heads-to-the-boneyard/ (accessed June 27, 2021).
13. John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Wants to Cut 421 Old Fighters, Buy 304 New Ones,” Air Force Magazine, May 14, 2021, https://www.
airforcemag.com/air-force-wants-to-cut-421-old-fighters-buy-304-new-ones/ (accessed June 27, 2021).
14. Mackenzie Eaglen, “Putting Combatant Commanders on a Demand Signal Diet,” War on the Rocks, November 9, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/putting-combatant-commanders-on-a-demand-signal-diet/ (accessed June 27, 2021).
15. Brian W. Everstine, “Private Tankers Could Help USAF Keep up with Demand,” Air Force Magazine, March 26, 2020, https://www.
airforcemag.com/private-tankers-could-help-usaf-keep-up-with-unrelenting-need-for-booms/ (accessed June 27, 2021).
16. Megan Eckstein, “No Margin Left: Overworked Carrier Force Struggles to Maintain Deployments After Decades of Overuse,”
U.S. Naval Institute NI News, November 12, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/11/12/no-margin-left-overworked-carrier-forcestruggles-to-maintain-deployments-after-decades-of-overuse (accessed June 27, 2021).
17. Meghann Myers, “With Retention up and Recruiting down, Here’s How the Army Plans to Add 7,500 More Soldiers to the Ranks,”
Army Times, May 7, 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/05/08/with-retention-up-and-recruiting-downheres-how-the-army-plans-to-add-7500-more-soldiers-to-the-ranks/ (accessed June 27, 2021).
18. The loss and damaged rate of 4.8 percent and total number of losses were derived from data in Table 2, “Israeli Aircraft Losses,
by Date, by Battlefront, and by Aircraft Type, 16–24 October 1973, and Loss Rates as a Percentage of Total Sorties,” and Table 4,“Israeli Aircraft Damaged, by Date, by Battlefront, and by Aircraft Type, 16–24 October 1973, and Damage Rates as a Percentage
of Total Sorties,” in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The 1973 Arab–Israeli War: Overview and Analysis of the Conflict, Intelligence
Report, September 1975, approved for release September 4, 2021, pp. 34 and 42, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/197509-01A.pdf (accessed June 28, 2021).

32

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength19. Figure 3, “Attrition in a Conflict with China Could Quickly Deplete the USAF’s Undersized Fighter Force,” in Col. Mark Gunzinger,
USAF (Ret.), and Lukas Autenried, Building a Force that Wins: Recommendations for the 2022 National Defense Strategy(Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, 2021), p. 14, https://mitchellaerospacepower.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/06/Building-a-Force-that-Wins-FINAL.pdf (accessed June 27, 2021).
20. Mark Cancian, Adam Saxton, Owen Helman, Lee Ann Bryan, and Nidal Morrison, Industrial Mobilization: Assessing Surge
Capabilities, Wartime Risk, and System Brittleness, Center for Strategic and International Studies, International Security Program
Report, December 2020, pp. ix, 40, and 41, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210108_
Cancian_Industrial_Mobilization.pdf (accessed June 27, 2021).
21. Tobias Switzer, “The Air Force Pilot Retention Crisis Is Not Over,” War on the Rocks, October 20, 2020, https://warontherocks.
com/2020/10/the-air-force-pilot-retention-crisis-is-not-over/ (accessed June 27, 2021).
22. Michael G Mattock, Beth J. Asch, James Hosek, and Michael Boito, The Relative Cost-Effectiveness of Retaining Versus Accessing
Air Force Pilots (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), pp. xii and 35, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2415.
html (accessed June 27, 2021).
23. Aaron Mehta, “The US Is Running out of Bombs—and It May Soon Struggle to Make More,” Defense News, May 22, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/05/22/the-us-is-running-out-of-bombs-and-it-may-soon-struggle-to-make-more/(accessed June 28, 2021).
24. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, p. 4.
25. For example, see Jim Mitre, “A Eulogy for the Two-War Construct,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Winter 2019), pp.
7–30.
26. James Kitfield, “‘We’re Going to Lose Fast’: U.S. Air Force Held a War Game that Started with a Chinese Biological Attack,” Yahoo
News, March 10, 2021, https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/were-going-to-lose-fast-us-air-force-held-a-war-game-thatstarted-with-a-chinese-biological-attack-170003936.html (accessed June 27, 2021).
27. David Deptula, “Five Persistent Misconceptions About Modernizing the U.S. ICBM Force,” Forbes, December 22, 2020,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davedeptula/2020/12/22/five-persistent-misconceptions-about-modernizing-the-us-icbmforce/?sh=4c1054a93ba7 (accessed June 27, 2021).

29. Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr., and Gen. David H. Berger, “Redefine Readiness or Lose,” War on the Rocks, March 15, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/redefine-readiness-or-lose/ (accessed June 28, 2021).
30. Table, “Aircraft Total Inventory (TAI) (As of Sept. 30, 2019),” in “Air Force & Space Force Almanac 2020,” Air Force Magazine, Vol.
103, No. 6 (June 2020), p. 63, https://www.airforcemag.com/app/uploads/2020/06/June2020_Fullissue5.pdf (accessed June
28, 2021). Of U.S. Air Force fighters and bombers, only the F-22A and F-35A in the fighter/attack inventory (386 aircraft out of
2,056), and 20 B-2A bombers out of an inventory of 157 aircraft that include the B-1B, the B-2A, and the venerable B-52H are
considered stealthy.
31. Paul McLeary, “SecDef: ‘Largest-Ever’ R&D Spending in ’22 Budget,” Breaking Defense, May 27, 2021, https://breakingdefense.
com/2021/05/secdef-rd-spending-to-skyrocket-in-22-budget/ (accessed June 27, 2021).
32. John A. Tirpak, “TacAir Study Will Determine If F-35 Production Surge Needed,” Air Force Magazine, February 25, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/tacair-study-will-determine-if-f-35-production-surge-needed/ (accessed June 27, 2021).
33. Carla Babb, “China, Russia Military Budgets Combined Exceed US Spending, Top General Says,” Voice of America, June 10, 2021,
https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-politics/china-russia-military-budgets-combined-exceed-us-spending-top-general-says(accessed June 27, 2021).
34. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, p. 1.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military33﻿

28. Kathleen H. Hicks, “Defense Strategy and the Iron Triangle of Painful Trade-offs,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,International Security Program, June 22, 2017, p. 2, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170622_
Hicks_DefenseStrategy_Web.pdf?gt9Hy9FEzDPK408FsFG4KFZJ_bPDqJLW (accessed June 28, 2021).

﻿Understanding Risk in the Great
Competition with China
Sarah Kirchberger, PhD

OThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military35﻿n Christmas Day 2018, during an awards
their strengths are. And if you puncture
ceremony for Chinese military industheir strengths, just like when puncturing
try leaders, retired People’s Liberation Armya paper window, the weaknesses will
(PLA) Major General Luo Yuan gave a speech
be revealed.
discussing China’s options for dealing with its
main strategic rival, the United States of AmerLuo further elaborated on the specifics
ica. That speech soon made headlines because of how a “puncturing of US strengths” could
Luo, a deputy secretary-general of the Chinese be conducted:
Academy of Military Sciences, seemed to be advocating a preemptive attack on U.S. aircraft
Historical experience tells us that thecarriers as a way to shock the U.S. into retreat.1
United States is most afraid of people
During earlier parts of his speech, Luo sugdying. We now have the DF-21D and thegested attacking the opponent’s weak spots
DF-26 missiles, these are aircraft carrier
with China’s own superior forces:
killers. If we sank one of their carriers, thiswould cause 5,000 casualties; if we sank[W]hen our soldiers are fighting, they
two: 10,000 casualties—don’t you thinkshould use our own strengths to attack
America would be afraid?2
the enemy’s weak spots. Whatever theenemy fears for, we should attack! WherLuo’s suggestion does not necessarily repreever the enemy is weak, we will expand
sent the mainstream thinking among China’s
there! So, what exactly is the US afraid
leadership. Nevertheless, such rhetoric comof?… I feel we have not done enoughing from a seasoned military official signals aserious thinking and research on thisnew low in the war of words that increasingly
question…. I am not an expert in this area,
characterizes China–U.S. relations. If nothing
nor can I answer this question accurately
else, Luo’s ideas are a vivid example of the risk
myself. I do remember a saying by Maoof escalation through miscalculation. Already
Zedong though: “Imperialism is a paperin 2014, the influential navalist Zhang Wenmu
tiger.” So what are the characteristics
of Beihang University had put forward the ideaof a paper tiger? Outwardly it looks
that China should adapt Vladimir Putin’s hystrong, but it’s weak on the inside; its
brid strategy for occupying Crimea as a promappearance is severe, but it is devoid of
ising way to take Taiwan. He argued that China
substance. We don’t know where theirwould certainly succeed because the collective
weaknesses are, but we do know whereWest would not care enough to intervene.3

﻿Though it remains difficult to assess how ever more transgressions, permanently shiftprevalent such ideas are, it would be dangerous ing the boundaries of the “normal.”to assume that they are shared only by a few
This is a method China shares with Rus4
rogue thinkers. During the preceding decade, sia and Iran, as Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess
popular Chinese writings had increasingly Mitchell observe in The Unquiet Frontier:featured aggressive statements toward the U.S. Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisisand questioned the international order shaped of American Power. They note that “probing”
by it. Such publications, among them “China behavior, defined by them as a “test aimed at
Can Say No,” “Unhappy China,” “China’s Mar- gauging the opposing state’s power and will toitime Rights,” “China Dream,” and “Wolf To- maintain security and influence over a region,”tem,” typically emphasized Chinese grievances. seems to have become a tool used increasingly
In 2011, in an insightful analysis of what he “by revisionist powers for pushing the existing
calls the “geopolitik turn” in Chinese politics, boundaries of their influence.”6
Christopher Hughes traced in all of these texts
China’s probing has consisted so far of air
a “morbid fascination with the relationship be- incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identificatween violence and power,” notions of a Chi- tion zone (ADIZ) paired with exercises in thenese “moral exceptionalism,” and the idea that maritime space around Taiwan and in the SCS
China asserting its sovereignty over territories and also includes increased Maritime Militia
such as Taiwan or the South China Sea (SCS) activity around contested features in the Southis “no more than a form of restorative justice.” and East China Seas. The successful seizure
Consequently, “China’s use of force and expan- of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines insion is…always judged to be defensive,” and if 2012 and the subsequent land reclamation andsuch notions were to become more influential, militarization of occupied Paracel and Spratthe result would be “an increasingly zero-sum ly features can also be classified as “probing.”
approach to international politics.”5
From China’s viewpoint, those attempts to create a new status were vastly successful.
Challenges from Probing Behavior
The PLA derives a number of benefits from
Developments since Xi Jinping’s rise to disruptive actions. Each air incursion into
power in 2012 have largely borne out this anal- Taiwan’s ADIZ not only exerts psychologicalysis. The disruptive communication style ad- pressure on Taiwan’s public, but also provides
opted by Beijing’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomats all valuable intelligence on terrain and on elecover the world also appeared during the 2021 tronic signatures of Taiwanese defensive weapU.S.–China summit in Alaska when China’s on and sensor systems. Further, by forcing themost senior foreign affairs official disregarded Republic of China (ROC) Air Force to intercept
previously agreed rules on speaking time limits intruding aircraft, they are prematurely wearand berated his American hosts.
ing down Taiwan’s aging fighter aircraft fleet.
Rhetoric aside, a multitude of actions tak- The strain may already have been responsible
en by China’s military and paramilitary forc- for several accidents that led to the loss of pies in the Western Pacific reveal a pattern of lots and aircraft.
gray-zone activity that seems designed to
Steadily enhanced pressure from China’s
disrupt the status quo. By conducting threat- Maritime Militia on the Senkaku Islands or on
ening actions below the threshold of military Philippine-occupied or Vietnamese-­occupied
aggression on a steadily increasing scale and reefs in the SCS has similar effects of comfrequency, China seems determined to test the bining intimidation tactics with intelligencewillingness and capacity of neighboring states collection and is similarly wearing down oppoand the U.S. to respond effectively. There is a nents’ capacities to respond. The downside forrisk that China could succeed in numbing for- the PLA is a heightened China-related threat
eign observers into indifference in the face of perception among affected countries that may

362022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthyet lead to enhanced military spending andbetter readiness on their part and incentivizes them to balance China by cooperating moreclosely with the U.S.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military37

﻿

their worldwide business outreach activities financially and politically, including through its
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).8 In port infrastructure investments such as the state-owned
shipping giant COSCO’s 67 percent stake in the
China’s Capacity to Shapeport of Piraeus in Greece, according to the Euthe Global Playing Field
ropean Chamber of Commerce, a strategy ofChina’s increasingly disruptive behavior “vertical integration” is typically followed:
has been accompanied by an exceptionally fast
growth in military capability. Investments that
Chinese shippers use ports built and run
have poured into China’s military buildup forby SOEs (State-Owned Enterprises) using
three decades have borne fruit and threaten tosteel and cement provided by SOEs; theytilt the conventional military power balanceuse vessels built by the newly createdin the Western Pacific in China’s favor much
shipbuilding behemoth […] using steel
faster than most analysts had previously anmade by SOEs, which is provided using
7
ticipated. Backed by an increasing capacity
iron and coal from SOEs; all of which is
to cause harm, China’s assertive actions signal
financed by SOE banks.9
its resolve to use that capacity when whatever
Beijing defines as its “core interests” at any givThe BRI fulfills multiple functions for Chien time are threatened.
na’s Grand Strategy of making the world seMeanwhile, China’s ability to pressure cure for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
the West has increased dramatically since It allows China to hedge against the threat of
the financial crisis of 2008. In a world that blockade, generates dependencies and politicalis characterized by interdependent markets support within key regions and within the U.N.,
and globalized supply chains, the Communist and helps to market the Chinese business andParty–­led brand of Chinese state capitalism has investment models as well as cyber and space
not just been able to survive; it has thrived. Due technologies abroad while its infrastructure
to party-­state control of the Chinese financial investment projects help to make inroads into
sector, bolstered by the PRC’s large foreign re- NATO’s own backyard.
serves, and by following a state-capitalist apAll of this has led to a situation in which key
proach, China was able to weather the financial U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific havecrisis better than most and could even serve as become intertwined economically with Chian anchor of stability for other countries that na as closely as or even more closely than they
were not so fortunate. This had a remarkable ef- are with the U.S. This has created openings forfect on the attitudes displayed by Chinese func- authoritarian influencing campaigns, coercive
tionaries and diplomats abroad, who began to diplomacy, and elite capture, while the relabehave more assertively toward Western coun- tive openness of Western high-tech researchterparts, and has bought China lasting leverage has given the PLA easy access to military andin Europe where its supportive role during the dual-­use technologies that would otherwise be
European debt crisis left a legacy, notably in unavailable.10 The one-sided dependence of enGermany and Greece. It also has enhanced the tire business sectors on access to the Chinese
attractiveness of the “Chinese Model of devel- market imposes prohibitive costs on compaopment” to some developing countries.
nies and political actors that are brave enough
Making use of party-state control of strate- to risk political friction in their dealings withgic economic sectors, China nurtured its lead- China. This increasingly calls into question theing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into indus- ability and willingness of some allies to choose
trial giants through a combination of subsidies sides in a scenario in which tensions between
and domestic protectionism while bolstering the U.S. and China escalate.

﻿When seeing the chance to drive a wedge
between the U.S. and its allies, China is keen to
ensure that the West cannot unify to “gang up
on China.” At the same time, China is actively
competing for influence with European and
U.S. initiatives in Africa and the Middle Eastand North Africa (MENA) region, but increasingly also in South America, and is offering its
surveillance technologies to non-democratic
governments in an effort to check the spreadof democratic values around the world—values
that the CCP sees as an existential threat.11
As a result of these developments, the Western relationship with China has entered anage of uncertainty. Western leaders are facing
a more complex and therefore arguably morechallenging threat situation than they faced
before 1989 in a world that was neatly bifurcated into opposing camps between which there
was little economic exchange.
During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union shared an understanding of the risk
from mutually assured destruction (MAD);
had a reasonably clear picture of each other’s military capabilities, strategic intent, andnon-negotiable red lines; and had establisheddirect communication links as a mechanism
to minimize the risk of accidental escalation.
Today, the overall picture is far less clear. China’s ability to present a different face to different allies makes it hard for Western leaders toform a unified situational awareness regarding
the challenges posed by China, and this alonepresents significant potential for miscalculation.12 In addition, while a Beijing–Washington
hotline similar to the U.S.–Russian communication link has existed since 2008, reports indicate that China has cut it off several times, andU.S. attempts to communicate through thatchannel have typically not been answered.13
In this context, a discussion of some military risk factors in the U.S.–China relationshipis necessary. An escalation could occur not only
through mishap or accidents, but also if China
and the U.S. were drawn into a downward spiral and began to see conflict between them asultimately inevitable. In such a situation, China could see resorting to a preemptive strike38

as a rational decision. More likely than that,
however, would be accidental escalation due
to miscalculation—for instance, if brinkmanship were to go wrong in one of the many hot
spots where China and the U.S. compete overcritical interests.
One key question is: Would nuclear deterrence put strong enough constraints in place
to make scenarios of war through accidental
escalation or through premeditated preemptive attack exceedingly unlikely? While it is
not possible to provide any definite answers,
thinking through the implications of various
risk scenarios, including those that are deemed
unlikely, is a necessity for the U.S., its allies,
and the Chinese themselves: It is, after all, in
the long-term interest of all sides including
China to avoid a catastrophic war.

Can There Really Be War Between
Two Nuclear-Armed Powers?
During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence
was a decisive factor that constrained bothsides’ moves. Today, new technological developments have brought about shifts in the strategic balance that need to be factored into theold assumptions.
One such factor is the pace and quality of
China’s military modernization, which the
Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, Air
Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, recently described as “shocking.”14 To some degree, thiseffort is intended to counter American arms
programs that have long worried Chinese military experts: ballistic missile defense (BMD)
and conventional prompt global strike (PGS).
As Lora Saalman notes:
Chinese analysts view PGS as part of alarger U.S. effort to achieve “absolute
security,” with BMD as the shield and
PGS as the sword, such that Washington
is able to act preemptively…. Chinese
analysts tend to view U.S. PGS as a threat
to Beijing’s conventional and nuclear
weapons systems, as well as its commandand control centers.15

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military39

﻿Notably, Chinese military commentators June 2, 2019.18 At the same time, two recent
tend to view any U.S. program—whether real studies based on satellite imagery analyses
or only contemplated, whether funded or not, noted significant new construction activity ofwhether terminated or ongoing—as being about 250 new ballistic missile silos in Gansu
factually in existence, and they react to it as and Xinjiang provinces. This amounts to a tena threat that requires adequate countermea- fold expansion of the previously operationalsures. An abundance of technical Chinese Chinese missile silo capacity. It also “exceeds
articles dissecting PGS, for instance, have ad- the number of silo-based ICBMs operated by
vocated that China give up on its “no first use” Russia, and constitutes more than half of thepolicy of never deploying nuclear weapons size of the entire US ICBM force,” making it
first; intensify the military use of space; en- “the most extensive silo construction since thehance the resilience of its space infrastructures US and Soviet missile silo construction during
and global intelligence, surveillance, and re- the Cold War.”19 This was not the end of the stoconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; and improve ry. In August 2021, U.S. intelligence agencies
its space launch vehicles and offensive cyber identified a third, similar-sized missile silo
capabilities.16
field under construction in Inner Mongolia
Being critical of American PGS does not and estimated that the three new silos would
preclude China from striving for similar ca- be able to field a total of 350 to 400 new ICBMs.
pabilities itself, as Saalman also points out. With 10 warheads per DF-41 missile, this
China’s diverse ballistic missile program has would amount to space for more than 4,000
been described as the most active in the world, nuclear warheads—if all silos were indeed usedgiving China the world’s largest inventory of to house missiles rather than some being left
short-range and medium-range ballistic mis- empty as part of a shell game. This would exsiles, many of which can be either convention- ceed America’s approximately 3,800 warheads,
ally or nuclear armed. These form the back- of which more than 2,400 are in storage. The
bone of China’s version of a layered defense actual number of warheads would be limited
strategy, commonly known as anti-access/area by China's available stockpile of fissile materidenial or A2/AD, to deter foreign interventions al. Experts estimate that at present, China hasin its near abroad. According to a recent study enough weapons-grade uranium and plutoniby the International Institute for Strategic um “for about 730 nuclear warheads without
Studies (IISS), about 95 percent of China’s bal- having to build new enrichment or reprocesslistic and cruise missiles (approximately 2,200 ing facilities.”20
rockets) fall within the 500 km–5,500 km
In addition, many Chinese military andrange prohibited by the Intermediate-Range dual-­use programs, including the global SATNuclear Forces (INF) treaty. This makes the NAV (satellite navigation) constellation Beiprospects of China’s joining a comparable arms Dou; other remote sensing and communication
control mechanism dim.17
satellites such as Gaofen, Yaogan, Jilin, TianMeanwhile, China is working on a full nu- lian, and Hainan; China’s own BMD program;clear triad by developing an intercontinental-­ and hypersonic glide vehicles (the DF-ZF HGVrange submarine-launched ballistic missile, was tested in 2014) would be able to contribute
the JL-3, which reportedly can carry up to to a PGS capability over time. The commercial
10 independent warheads and is intended for nanosatellite Jilin-1 constellation, for instance,
China’s next-generation nuclear-powered aims “to have 60 satellites operational by 2020,
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). With and 138 satellites in service by 2030, which will
an estimated range of 12,000 km, it would ultimately make it possible to offer a 10-mingive China the option of targeting at least part ute revisit capability anywhere in the world.”21of the continental U.S. from a bastion in the In the summer of 2020, Jilin-1’s maker, Chang
SCS. A first successful test firing took place on Guang Satellite Technology, posted several﻿high-resolution videos of U.S. airports on its
Weibo channel and demonstrated the system’s
real-time ability to identify and track individual aircraft.22
Another remote-sensing constellation under development, the Hainan-1, is intended for
all-weather non-stop ship identification in allareas between latitudes 30 degrees North and
30 degrees South, which includes the entire
South China Sea. A Chinese research paper indicated that simulations have already yielded
95 percent accuracy in identifying ships larger
than 30 meters in length, which is sufficient formost surface warships.23
When combined with the existing military
remote-sensing constellations Gaofen and
Yaogan and a global network of ground stations
that is also under development, such systems
would enable targeting updates for an intercontinental PGS system, and the small, cheap
nanosatellites especially would add a layer ofresilience through redundancy and the easy
replacement of lost units.24 “If the same ideas
on preemption are applied to China’s own PGS,”
notes Saalman, “then its nuclear posture may
change, whether declared or not.”25
To counter perceived threats to its landbased nuclear-tipped missiles, China has begun to work on a full nuclear triad and thesignificant expansion of its warhead inventory. Other key priorities are a drive to further
enhance A2/AD capabilities to discourageinterventions within China’s near abroad, developing the maritime domain, and building a
blue-water power projection capability. A further aim is to transform the PLA from a fullymechanized force into an “informationized”(networked) force and eventually a force thathas adapted to the “intelligentization of warfare” and can take full advantage of militarily
focused artificial intelligence (AI).26

regarding the safe use of AI in warfare do notseem to exist at all.28 China fully embraces thepotential of AI for improving the accuracy andlethality of its cruise missiles. According to an
account of an August 2016 interview with Wang
Changqing, Director of the General Design Department at the China Aerospace Science andIndustry Corporation’s Third Academy:“[O]ur future cruise missiles will have avery high level of artificial intelligence
and automation,” he said. “They willallow commanders to control them in areal-time manner, or to use a fire-and-forget mode, or even to add more tasks to
in-flight missiles.”Chinese engineers have researched theuse of artificial intelligence in missiles
for many years, and they are leading theworld in this field, he said.29

AI is also a key enabler of China’s “blueocean information network,” a vast surveillance infrastructure deployed in the South
China Sea that consists of fixed and mobile
sensor arrays, unmanned systems, and communication platforms interlinking with ships,
aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
that aims to render the underwater domaintransparent. If successful, it could compromise
the stealth of U.S. nuclear attack submarines
operating in that area.30
Another application of AI is intended to network hypersonic weapons into smart swarms
for coordinated attacks in order to overwhelm
missile defense through saturation attack. A
study from the Beijing Institute of Technology titled “Network for Hypersonic UCAV[Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle] Swarms”
seeks to multiply the power of hypersonic
weapons by having them work together. SuchThe Impact of Emerging Technologies
swarms would be far more dangerous than inChina sees the emphasis on 4IR (fourth in- dividual hypersonic missiles, multiplying the
dustrial revolution)27 technologies in the mili- power of high-speed weapons.31
tary, especially AI, as a potential game-changer
One reason for China’s willingness to emthat could allow the PLA to leapfrog over some brace AI for offensive purposes in warfare isof its current deficiencies; ethical concerns the problem of nuclear asymmetry. Beijing’s

402022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthcomparatively small nuclear arsenal makes
concepts that neutralize an opponent’s numerical advantage especially attractive.
Writes Saalman:
AI and autonomy…offer Beijing the longterm potential to disrupt Washington’s
traditional strengths. They open thedoor for swarm and other technologies
that could overwhelm conventional andnuclear platforms that are larger, morecumbersome, and less agile. While China
may be concerned about potential adversaries tracking its own nuclear platforms
and systems, Beijing is just as likely toavail itself of these relatively inexpensive
methods of disrupting US activities.32[T]he PLA’s very theory of victory inmodern warfare recognizes system
destruction warfare as the current

At the same time, psychological and information warfare aimed at undermining an opponent’s ability to interpret the facts correctly,
arrive at a reliable situational awareness, andmaintain societal resolve to resist an opponent
in the face of an unclear threat situation is explicitly part of such an approach. So is “legal
warfare” employed to delegitimize the opponent’s actions and win international support
for one’s own position.
Though by no means new, information andpsychological warfare has gained new tractionin the age of social media. The openness of
democratic societies offers multiple vectors for
attacking societal cohesion, disrupting election procedures, or hindering the formation ofpolitical will in other ways, while cyberattacks
on critical infrastructures have the potential todisrupt and wear down societies. Depending on
the concrete circumstances, asymmetric “system destruction warfare” might be employed
as a first salvo, in particular if it were possible
to disguise the initial attack or make attribution to a particular perpetrator difficult.

How High Is the Risk of aConventional First Strike?
Jon Solomon has emphasized that naval
forces have to confront the risk of possibly
falling victim to a devastating first salvo. Thismight be fired by an enemy if he is certain that
war is unavoidable. In such a case, the opponent would expect his own ISR assets to degrade sharply once the fighting starts, knowing that the “maritime picture will never be as

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military41﻿The heavy reliance of American net-centricwarfare on data links and space infrastructures
for geolocation, communications, and C4ISR(command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) has not only acted as a force multiplier;as a side-effect, it has created vulnerabilities
that can be exploited through asymmetric attacks. Having analyzed American vulnerabilities, the PLA is exploring asymmetric attack
vectors against the nodes that enable a networked system.
Here China is following a holistic approachof “unrestricted” (total) warfare encompassing
all domains.33 Bringing down a military network by jamming data links, blinding sensors,
spoofing or otherwise disabling SATNAV andSATCOM (satellite communication) satellites,or physically destroying key platforms that are
relied upon by other units (for instance, forarea defense)—in other words, disrupting thesystem through cyber, electronic warfare, andkinetic attacks—is an approach long favored
by PLA thinkers. In a study of PLA writings on“system destruction warfare,” Jeffrey Engstrom
summarizes the concept:

method of modern war fighting. Under
this theory, warfare is no longer centeredon the annihilation of enemy forces on
the battlefield. Rather, it is won by the
belligerent that can disrupt, paralyze, or
destroy the operational capability of theenemy’s operational system. This can beachieved through kinetic and nonkinetic strikes against key points and nodes
while simultaneously employing a morerobust, capable, and adaptable operational system of its own.34

﻿

accurate and comprehensive at any later point
in a conflict as it is during peacetime’s waning
moments.” The awareness of a fast-closing
window of opportunity for accurate targetingof capital ships might induce such an attacker
to try to “maximally neutralize a defender’shigher campaign-value fleet assets” as long as
he still sees the chance to do so.35
Another key question is: How could a war
that began with a conventional first strikeremain conventional without escalating to
nuclear war if it turns into a protracted fight?
Depending on just how disastrous the prospectof losing would seem to those in power, it is notfarfetched to consider that the danger of losing might tempt that side into using the threatof nuclear coercion to avoid such an outcome.
Even though China officially adheres to a “nofirst use” policy, that is just a declaration of
intent that could be changed at any time andshould not be taken as a guarantee.36
Some analysts do not consider a nuclear escalation scenario when discussing conventional war between China and the U.S., deeming it
far too unlikely, but that might be unwise.37 As
a RAND study cautioned in 2016, “confidence
that an adversary will comply with one’s script
and, more generally, that the results of a decision can be controlled are tantamount toassuming away risk.”38 Even if the U.S. werewilling to accept defeat on the battlefield at thehands of China without ever resorting to thethreat of using its far superior nuclear arsenal,
the assumption that playing the nuclear card
would not even be contemplated by China’s
leaders in a desperate situation is just such an
expectation of the CCP’s adhering to a script.
Mao’s contempt for nuclear weapons as “paper
tigers” is a case in point.
For the CCP, the risk of losing a conflictwith the U.S. that China started might createsuch a harsh domestic backlash that accepting military defeat might make the CCP’s position at home precarious. Given the CCP’s
record of defending its power position by allmeans possible, Beijing might very well resort
to nuclear brinkmanship. Both sides in such asituation might try to find ways to employ the42

threat potential of their nuclear weapons to
avoid defeat while still trying to contain therisk of full-blown nuclear war—but the roadto a potentially catastrophic escalation would
be open, and whether an attempt to contain it
would be successful is uncertain.
In one hypothetical scenario of a future
great-power conflict between the U.S. and a
China–Russia coalition that was developedby the authors of the 2015 sci-fi novel Ghost
Fleet,39 the risk of a nuclear escalation was artfully eliminated from the equation through a
Chinese–Russian first strike that neutralized
the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This plot ploy allows
for a plausible scenario in which two nuclear-­armed opponents engage in a full-blown, kinetic, protracted, and yet purely conventional
great-power conflict.
In the book, China and Russia have formed
a secret alliance and have prepared the groundfor a preemptive strike against the U.S. to take
Hawaii. To achieve this, the attackers use anovel, secretly developed detection technology
from space to target all U.S. nuclear-powered
capital warships, including all SSBNs, simultaneously while carefully placed cyber weapons
paralyze the land-based and air-based nuclear
forces. This leaves the U.S. unable to resort tonuclear retaliation despite having absorbed
devastating losses. In that Pearl Harbor 2.0–
type scenario, Hawaii is invaded and occupied.
The book’s plot sketches out how the conflict continues as a conventional war in which
the U.S. finds itself fighting as the underdog
and China and Russia, having achieved theirlimited war aims, refrain from further attacking the U.S. mainland. The rest of the noveldescribes the process of reconquering Hawaii
through guerilla warfare, tactical ingenuity,and acts of individual heroism while portraying the use of emerging technologies including
sophisticated cyber weapons and autonomous
systems deployed in swarm formations. The
story ends with an uneasy truce.
It is worthwhile to ask what the necessary
preconditions for such a Ghost Fleet–style
first strike scenario would be. The American
defenders in that case would need to have2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthWhat Might China Actually
Be Planning to Do?
One indicator that China is trying to hedge
against the risk of a crippling first strike isthe emphasis placed on building much larger
numbers of individual weapon systems thanever before. This could be to ensure the ability
not just to overwhelm an opponent, but also
to create sufficient redundancy in the face ofheavy losses. One particularly striking example of this is the enlargement of the PLA Navy
(PLAN) fleet.
The modernization of the PLA that started in the mid-1990s was long hampered by
the Western arms embargo, but it has gained
unprecedented momentum under Xi Jinping.
The scale and pace are highly unusual and haveenabled China to replace its motley array of old
and obsolete hulls with large series of far more
modern and capable warships that are also significantly larger and more seaworthy overall.

l

l

l

l

In the largest peacetime naval buildup
since at least the 1930s, China has been
producing warships as if it were alreadyat war, with shipyards reportedly working around the clock seven days per
week, sometimes completing hulls aheadof schedule.40
An entirely new class of 72 corvettes wascommissioned by the PLAN within justeight years alongside numerous new frigates, destroyers, submarines, amphibious
assault vessels, and missile catamarans.
Between 2014 and 2018, measured in tonsof steel, China has added the equivalent of
the entire Royal Navy (Europe’s largest)
to its already large navy. Similarly, theChinese Coast Guard has been massively
enlarged and is now the world’s largest
according to tonnage.41
The past decade has already seen the addition of two aircraft carriers to the fleet,and more are in the pipeline. It is unclear
just how many aircraft carrier groups
China is planning to operate, but a retired
military official has indicated that “at least
six aircraft carriers” would be needed to“break through the first island chain involving South Korea, Japan, Taiwan islandand the Philippines to achieve commandof the sea” and that the PLAN would need“about 10 more bases for the six aircraft
carriers…[h]opefully…in every continent.”42 The opposite trend is the norm inWestern countries, where naval programs
typically suffer from cost overruns, cuts,and significant delays.

China’s huge buildup has not been accompanied by any serious attempts to defuse regional
worries through strategic communication—­
for instance, through transparency and other trust-building measures. As with the land
reclamation and island militarization frenzyin the South China Sea that China long denied, Beijing’s intentions regarding its arms

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military43﻿overlooked—for several years—the forming ofa secret Russian–Chinese military alliance; thesuccessful development and deployment of anovel technology that enabled the detection
and targeting of nuclear reactors from space,even aboard submerged strategic submarines;
and the long-term infiltration of their own
critical cyber networks through the hardware
and software supply chain. A series of striking
intelligence failures and massive deficiencies
in early warning on the part of the U.S. would
have been necessary for such a bold, high-risk
preemptive strike to be secretly planned andsuccessfully executed. It can be inferred that in
the absence of such a string of failures, the odds
of success would have been low—probably too
low for a rational actor even to contemplate.
In other words, unerring vigilance, regular
war-gaming, awareness of one’s own vulnerabilities, recognition of unlikely worst-casescenarios, incessant monitoring of all militaryand paramilitary activities, analyses of scientific developments in military-technologicaland dual-use fields and of diplomatic developments worldwide would go a long way toward
averting any scenarios of this type.

programs are typically not declared openly
until irrefutable evidence exists, and details
remain hard to access.
The pace of China’s fleet enlargement has
already allowed the PLAN to surpass the number of hulls in active service with the U.S. Navy
while in the United States, the coming decade
has been labeled the “Terrible 20s” because it
will be characterized by an impending shortageof materiel as a result of failures in procurement planning:﻿Fleets of ships, aircraft, vehicles, andother equipment are reaching the endof their service lives, hitting the edge of
their upgrade limits, and losing combat
relevance. As great-power competition
accelerates, the United States is offeringa free and open window of opportunity
and advantage to its adversaries. Unlesspolicymakers take concrete steps now,
defense leaders will continue America’s
sleepwalk into strategic insolvency and its
consequences. The aptly named “Terrible
20s” have arrived.43

Tanner Greer has elaborated on this themeby emphasizing the danger of inviting attack:In the mid 2020s the United States will
be struggling to pay the Pentagon’s“modernization crunch.” The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force will be midway
through a transition to a new, counter-­
China force structure. The number ofattack submarines and stealth bombersthat the United States can put in the field
will be at an absolute low.
It is at this moment we project the PLA
will be capable of executing a crossstraits invasion.
This does not make conflict inevitable. But if the Chinese have concluded
that military means are the only way tobring about Taiwan’s integration into
the People’s Republic of China, Beijing’s

44

leaders will soon face powerful pressure
to escalate towards war. Waiting until
the 2030s or 2040s to sabre rattle is to
wait for the U.S. military’s counter-China
modernization and procurement programs to run their course. There will be aterrific temptation to “resolve” the problem before these programs have been
implemented.44

Moreover, projected U.S. capability gaps are
not the only reason why the 2020s have beenlabeled a “decade of concern.” A thought experiment conducted by the retired U.S. Navy
Captain James E. Fanell, a former Directorof Naval Intelligence, Pacific Fleet, supposesthat Xi Jinping aims for China to have accomplished the successful integration of Taiwan
at the latest by 2049 in time for the PRC’s centenary. By that time, if the great celebration is
to be a festive affair attended by international
dignitaries, any military and political fallout
from an attack on Taiwan would need to havesubsided. Having learned from the world’s reaction to the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, thehypothesis goes, Beijing likely concluded thatthe world needs about 20 years to forgive andforget—as the widespread international participation in the 2008 Beijing Olympics showed.
Meanwhile, suppressing potential insurgencies on Taiwan might also take several years.45
If such a timetable is indeed in existence,
the implication would be that this decade is aparticularly tempting time in which to attempta military change in the Taiwan Strait, and impending U.S. capability gaps during the 2020s
could enhance this appeal.
Such sobering thought experiments canhelp to develop an awareness of how Western shortcomings might be seen by Beijing asa window of opportunity that could make an
attempt on Taiwan seem tempting enough toface the risk of escalation rather than missing
the chance once and for all. This means thatthe current situation calls for extreme watchfulness, clear signaling, and the enhancementof deterrence by all necessary means to ensurethat it does not fail. Taiwan itself plays a key

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

How Can Risk Be Mitigated?
Navigating the challenges of the 2020s
and managing the military risk ensuing from
China’s rise and increasingly assertive stancewill require vigilance and wisdom. If history
can be seen as a path-dependent process thatis shaped by the interactions of all parties, it
is important for the West to get its part of theinteraction right.
As the experiences of Pentagon war games
show, there is a strong necessity to enhance

the state of readiness; improve early warningand intelligence (as well as intelligence sharing
among allies); create redundancies in key military systems and weapon platforms; develop
resilient postures relying on dispersed rather
than concentrated forces; strengthen industry
and logistic capabilities; enhance the resilienceof critical infrastructures; and—above all—bolster threatened allies’ abilities to defend themselves. The aim should be to eliminate as many
attack vectors as possible.
Such an approach would have the added
benefit of signaling resolve and demonstrating the ability to adapt. It would counter theother side’s misperceptions of an irreversible
Western decline.
The current dynamic calls for close cooperation among all powers that have a stake inmaintaining the rules-based international order and deterring China from risking militaryadventurism. To be effective, such a Western
approach needs a combination of credible
capacity-­building, clearly communicated strategic intentions and priorities, and measured
yet determined reactions to individual rogue
actions that are aimed at slowly hollowing out
the status quo.
Allies should use different countries’ experiences, best practices, capabilities, andstrengths to create a sum that is larger thanits parts. The goal should be to signal to China’s military planners and political leadershipthe costs and dangers of engaging in brinkmanship while at the same time pointing
out a possible way to peaceful coexistencewith the large community of democraticnations—­if and when China’s leaders drop
their threatening behavior and adopt a morereasonable path.
It is ultimately not in China’s interest to
challenge the U.S. militarily as long as China
cannot be assured of victory. Risking a humiliating defeat would endanger CCP rule within
China and would certainly disrupt China’s economic growth, which still depends on exchanges with the outside world. The West therefore
needs to make sure that China can never becertain of victory.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military45﻿role in this, as the most effective deterrence
would be Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.
Worryingly, RAND analyst David Ochmanek
recently reported that U.S. war-­gaming exercises simulating an attack on Taiwan over theyears have consistently indicated that the U.S.
would lose if it followed its standard approachand that American attempts to counter Chinese military advances were still falling shortof the required goal. Ochmanek attributes thisto “attention deficit disorder,” a result of concentrating on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency wars for the past two decades.46
However, a recent Pentagon war gamein which U.S. forces changed their approachand integrated emerging technologies intoa changed posture yielded decidedly more
promising results. This time, “a more defensive and dispersed posture less reliant on large,
vulnerable bases, ports and aircraft carriers”
was adopted. To make the posture more resilient, this strategy employed “large numbers oflong-range, mobile strike systems, to includeanti-ship cruise missile batteries, mobile rocket artillery systems, unmanned mini-submarines, mines and robust surface-to-air missile batteries for air defense,” while focusing
strongly on “surveillance and reconnaissancecapabilities for both early warning and accurate intelligence to enable quicker decisions
by U.S. policymakers, and a more capablecommand-and-control system to coordinate
the actions of more dispersed forces.” In thatparticular war game, the dispersed, resilient
U.S. posture reportedly dissuaded the opponent from risking an attack in the first place.47

﻿

Endnotes
1.

See Jamie Seidel, “‘Sink Two Aircraft Carriers’: Chinese Admiral’s Chilling Recipe to Dominate the South China Sea,” News.com.au,
January 2, 2019, https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/sink-two-aircraft-carriers-chinese-admirals-chillingrecipie-to-dominate-the-south-china-sea/news-story/aaa8c33d57da62e7d5e28e791aa26e0f (accessed July 4, 2021).

2.

“Major General Luo’s Speech at the 2018 Military Industry Awards Ceremony and Innovation Summit,” Shenzhen, December 20,
2018, https://www.kunlunce.com/ssjj/guojipinglun/2018-12-25/130147.html (accessed July 23, 2021). Trans. Sarah Kirchberger. See
also J. D. Simkins, “‘We’ll See How Frightened America Is’—Chinese Admiral Says Sinking US Carriers Key to Dominating South
China Sea,” Navy Times, January 4, 2019, https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/01/04/well-see-how-frightenedamerica-is-chinese-admiral-says-sinking-us-carriers-key-to-dominating-south-china-sea/ (accessed July 21, 2021).

3.

Lyle J. Goldstein, “Get Ready: China Could Pull a ‘Crimea’ in Asia,” The National Interest, April 11, 2015, https://nationalinterest.
org/feature/get-ready-will-china-pull-crimea-asia-12605 (accessed July 4, 2021). For the full text of Zhang’s essay, see Zhang
Wenmu, “The World Significance of the Events in Ukraine and Its Warning to China,” December 28, 2014, http://www.guancha.cn/
ZhangWenMu/2014_12_28_304621.shtml (accessed July 21, 2021).

4.

See the sobering examples in Orianna Skylar Mastro, “The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force,” Foreign Affairs,
July/August 2021, pp. 58–67, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation (accessed
September 11, 2021).

5.

Christopher Hughes, “Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism: The Geopolitik Turn,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 20, No. 71(2011), pp. 601–620.

6.

Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), pp. 43– 44.

7.

Sarah Kirchberger and Johannes Mohr, “China’s Defence Industry,” Chapter 3 in The Economics of the Global Defence Industry, ed.
Keith Hartley and Jean Belin (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), pp. 35–68.

8.

The World Bank, “Belt and Road Initiative,” Brief, March 29, 2018, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/
belt-and-road-initiative (accessed July 4, 2021).

9.

Erik Kravets, “Sea Change: Can the E.U. Reverse Its Declining Fortunes—and the Growing Influence of China and Russia?” The
Maritime Executive, June 7, 2021, https://maritime-executive.com/magazine/sea-change (accessed July 4, 2021).

10. Alex Joske, “Picking Flowers, Making Honey: The Chinese Military’s Collaboration with Foreign Universities,” Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, International Cyber Policy Center Policy Brief, Report No. 10/2018, October 2018, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.
amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2018-10/Picking%20flowers%2C%20making%20honey_0.pdf (accessed July 4, 2021).
11. “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation: How Much Is a Hardline Party Directive Shaping China’s Current Political Climate?”
ChinaFile, November 8, 2013, https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation (accessed July 4, 2021).
12. Hans Binnendijk, Sarah Kirchberger, James P. Danoy, Franklin D. Kramer, Connor McPartland, Christopher Skaluba, Clementine G.
Starling, and Didi Kirsten Tatlow, The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition, Atlantic Council, Scowcroft
Center, March 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/The-China-Plan-A-Transatlantic-Blueprint.pdf(accessed July 4, 2021).
13. David Brunnstrom and Michael Martina, “Strategic Clarity on Taiwan Policy Carries ‘Significant Downsides’—U.S.,” Reuters, May 4,
2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/significant-downsides-strategic-clarity-over-taiwan-us-2021-05-04/ (accessed
July 4, 2021).
14. Helen Warrell and Michael Peel, “Senior Nato Officer Warns of China’s ‘Shocking’ Military Advances,” Financial Times, June 25,
2021, https://www.ft.com/content/8a0b3975-1938-4815-af3b-22b5d3e6aca4 (accessed July 4, 2021).
15. Lora Saalman, “Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear,” U.S. Department of Defense, Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies, April 2014, p. 1, https://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/APCSS_Saalman_PGS_China_Apr2014.pdf(accessed July 5, 2021).
16. Cf., for example, Ningbo Yuwen and Liwen Tang, “Discussion and Inspirations About Prompt Global Strike of the US,” in Journal of
the Academy of Equipment Command & Technology, Vol. 22, No. 3 (June 2011), pp. 58–61.
17. Mike Yeo, “China Could Lose 95% of Ballistic, Cruise Missiles Under Strategic Arms Control Pact, Says New Analysis,” Defense
News, June 5, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/06/05/china-could-lose-95-of-ballistic-cruisemissiles-under-strategic-arms-control-pact-says-new-analysis (accessed July 4, 2021).
18. Dylan Malyasov, “New Chinese Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Spotted on Test in the Bohai Bay,” Defence Blog, June 2,
2019, https://defence-blog.com/new-chinese-submarine-launched-ballistic-missile-spotted-on-test-in-the-bohai-bay/ (accessed
July 3, 2021).

46

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength19. Hans M. Kristensen, “China’s Expanding Missile Training Area: More Silos, Tunnels, and Support Facilities,” Federation of American
Scientists, Strategic Security Blog, February 24, 2021, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/02/plarf-jilantai-expansion (accessed
July 3, 2021), and Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, “China Is Building a Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field,” Federation of American
Scientists, Strategic Security Blog, July 26, 2021, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/07/china-is-building-a-second-nuclearmissile-silo-field/ (accessed August 5, 2021).
20. Bill Gertz, “Exclusive: China Building Third Missile Field for Hundreds of New ICBMs,” The Washington Times, August 12, 2021,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/aug/12/china-engaged-breathtaking-nuclear-breakout-us-str/ (accessed
September 11, 2021), and Malcolm Davis, “China Military Watch,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist, August 20,
2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-military-watch-10/ (accessed September 11, 2021).
21. Ma Si and Liu Mingtai, “Jilin Group Sets Goal of Putting 60 Satellites in Orbit by 2020,” China Daily, updated March 28, 2017,https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/newsrepublic/2017-03/28/content_28714354.htm (accessed July 5, 2021).
22. Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Ltd., official Weibo channel, https://m.weibo.cn/u/5838191069 (accessed July 21, 2021).
23. L. Wang, G. Q. Li, X. M. Li, and T. L. Yang, “Design of Hainan Satellite Constellation and Applications for Ocean Observations,”in IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science, Vol. 502, Proceedings of the First China Digital Earth Conference,
November 18–20, 2019, Beijing, China, p. [5], https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/502/1/012002/pdf (accessed
July 5, 2021), and Guo Silu, “Hainan Satellite Constellation System Provides Shield for South China Sea,” China Military Online,
January 3, 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-01/03/content_7894167.htm (accessed July 5, 2021).
24. Rear Admiral Monty Khanna, “Get Ready for the Next RMA at Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 146/1/1,403 (January2020), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/get-ready-next-rma-sea (accessed July 5, 2021).
25. Saalman, “Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear.”
26. Tate Nurkin and Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, “Emerging Technologies and the Future of US–Japan Defense Collaboration,”
Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, April 2020, p. 7, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/04/Emerging-Technologies-and-the-Future-of-US-Japan-Defense-Collaboration.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021).
27. For an overview of 4IR, see World Economic Forum, “Fourth Industrial Revolution,” https://www.weforum.org/focus/fourthindustrial-revolution (accessed July 5, 2021).

﻿

28. Elsa Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power, Center for a New
American Security, November 2017, p. 6, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Battlefield-SingularityNovember-2017.pdf?mtime=20171129235805&focal=none (accessed July 5, 2021).
29. Zhao Lei, “Nation’s Next Generation of Missiles to Be Highly Flexible,” China Daily, updated August 19, 2016, https://usa.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2016-08/19/content_26538878.htm (accessed July 5, 2021).
30. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “Exploring China’s Unmanned Ocean
Network,” June 16, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/exploring-chinas-unmanned-ocean-network/ (accessed July 5, 2021); DM Chan,“China Launches Drones to Monitor South China Sea,” Asia Times, September 12, 2019, https://asiatimes.com/2019/09/chinalaunches-drones-to-monitor-south-china-sea/ (accessed July 5, 2021); Jun Wang et al., “Design and Realization of Underwater
Environment Real-time Monitoring System for Ocean Observatory Network,” Journal of Zhejiang University (Engineering Science),
Vol. 50, No. 2 (February 2016), pp. 193–200; and Su Zhen-Dong, Liu Fan, Yang Rui-Ping, and Wang Fei-Yue, “Architecture of
Marine Environmental Parallel Monitoring System Based on the Lanhai Information Network,” Acta Automatica Sinica, Vol. 46, No.
8 (August 2020), pp. 1582–1591.
31. Shixun Luo, Zhongshan Zhang, Shuai Wang, Shuo Zhang, Jibo Dai, Xiangyuan Bu, and Jiangping An, “Network for Hypersonic
UCAV Swarms,” Science China Information Sciences, Vol. 63, Issue 4 (April 2020), Article No. 140311, http://scis.scichina.com/
en/2020/140311.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021), and David Hambling, “China Developing Hypersonic Swarms to Overwhelm Missile
Defenses,” Forbes, March 18, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2021/03/18/china-developing-hypersonicswarms-to-overwhelm-missile-defenses/ (accessed July 5, 2021).
32. Lora Saalman, “Fear of False Negatives: AI and China’s Nuclear Posture,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 24, 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/04/fear-of-false-negatives-ai-and-chinas-nuclear-posture/ (accessed July 5, 2021).
33. Col. Qiao Liang and Col. Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: Translated from the Original People’s Liberation Army Documents(Brattleboro, VT: Echo Point Books & Media, 2015). See also Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unretsricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA
Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021).
34. Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks toWage Modern Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), p. iii, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1708.
html (accessed July 4, 2021). Emphasis in original.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military47

35. Jon Solomon, “Parrying the 21st Century First Salvo,” Center for International Maritime Security Capability Analysis, July 7, 2016,
https://cimsec.org/parrying-21st-century-first-salvo/ (accessed July 5, 2021).
36. Peter Pry, “China’s ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Fiction,” The Hill, June 24, 2020, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/502503chinas-no-first-use-nuclear-fiction (accessed July 4, 2021).
37. Cf. David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), p. ix, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html (accessed July 4, 2021).
38. David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, and Bonny Lin, Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), p. 192, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR768.html (accessed July 4, 2021).
39. P. W. Singer and August Cole, Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015).
40. David Lague and Benjamin Kang Lim, “The China Challenge: Ruling the Waves,” Reuters, April 30, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/china-army-navy/ (accessed July 21, 2021), and Vinayak Bhat, “High-Speed Production: Chinese Navy
Built 83 Ships in Just Eight Years,” The Print, September 20, 2017, https://theprint.in/defence/chinese-navy-built-83-ships-8years/10416/ (accessed July 4, 2021).
41. Nick Childs and Tom Waldwyn, “China’s Naval Shipbuilding: Delivering on Its Ambition in a Big Way,” International Institutefor Strategic Studies, Military Balance Blog, May 1, 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/05/china-navalshipbuilding (accessed July 4, 2021), and Lyle J. Morris, “Blunt Defenders of Sovereignty—The Rise of Coast Guards in East andSoutheast Asia,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring 2017), Article 5, pp. 79 and 84, https://digital-commons.usnwc.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=nwc-review (accessed July 4, 2021).
42. Liu Xin and Liu Caiyu, “China Eyes Building More Aircraft Carriers,” Global Times, April 20, 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/
content/1043455.shtml (accessed July 22, 2021).
43. Mackenzie Eaglen with Hallie Coyne, The 2020s Tri-Service Modernization Crunch (Washington: American Enterprise Institutefor Public Policy Research, March 2021), p. 1, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/The-2020s-Tri-ServiceModernization-Crunch-1.pdf?x91208 (accessed July 4, 2021).

﻿

44. Tanner Greer, “Welcome to the Decade of Concern,” The Scholar’s Stage Blog, April 1, 2021, https://scholars-stage.blogspot.
com/2021/04/welcome-to-decade-of-concern.html (accessed July 22, 2021). Emphasis in original.
45. James E. Fanell, “Now Hear This—The Clock Is Ticking in China: The Decade of Concern Has Begun,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 143/10/1,376 (October 2017), pp. 10–11.
46. James Kitfield, “‘We’re Going to Lose Fast’: U.S. Air Force Held a War Game that Started with a Chinese Biological Attack,” Yahoo
News, March 10, 2021, https://news.yahoo.com/were-going-to-lose-fast-us-air-force-held-a-war-game-that-started-with-achinese-biological-attack-170003936.html (accessed July 4, 2021).
47. Ibid.

48

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthWhat We Risk If We Fail to Fully
Modernize the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs

C

President Barack Obama, U.S. leaders downplayed major-power conflict as a thing of thepast.1 Regrettably, adversaries of the U.S. havenot agreed and have invested in the weapons
they deem most able to thwart U.S. aims andthreaten U.S. security. The global threat environment is more complex and more dynamic
than at any time since the end of the Cold War,and the peace that America has enjoyed for 70
years is tenuous.
There are many factors that have led us
here, but the crux of the problem is that as ourenemies become more able to challenge theUnited States, they simultaneously perceive an
inverse correlation in the strength of American
resolve to defend its stated vital national interests. Their doubt in U.S. resolve is abetting thedeterioration of the credibility of strategic deterrence that has underpinned the post–WorldWar Two order.
The United States, by failing to invest sufficiently in a modern nuclear enterprise and a
reliable triad of modern nuclear delivery systems, has given adversaries reason to doubt.
An American observer might enthusiasticallydisagree with the notion that American resolve has weakened, but what matters for deterrence is our adversaries’ perception of ourresolve, and the United States has given themreason to doubt.
When the stakes are as high as they are, especially in the context of competition against two
adversaries—China and Russia—contesting the

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military49﻿entral to the effectiveness of U.S. strategic
deterrence is convincing our enemies ofour resolve to defend American vital interestsfrom aggression with whatever combinationsof weapons are necessary. Weapons within thearch of strategic deterrence include conventional and missile defenses, but the nuclear
deterrent is the keystone.
The primary purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons, as expressed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), is to deter a nuclear attack,whether small or large in scale, against a U.S. allyor the United States itself. But that is not theirsole purpose. They are also intended to prevent
large-scale conventional warfare that threatens
U.S. vital interests, as well as a chemical and biological weapons attack, and provide assurances
to allies who have chosen not to acquire theirown nuclear capabilities, which is more conducive to preventing a nuclear exchange.
At the heart of effective nuclear deterrenceis the credible threat that the United States iswilling to employ nuclear weapons to defend
its vital interests when absolutely necessary.
By maintaining a force that could reliably
contribute to terminating a war with as little
damage as possible, should deterrence fail, on
terms most favorable to the United States, theUnited States strengthens deterrence.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has sought to move away from nuclear weapons in its national defense strategy, and as recently as the Administration of﻿

United States in multiple theaters, the risk of aregional conventional conflict escalating withdire implications increases. While the focus ofmuch public commentary is on how the United States ought to shift and add conventional
firepower and defensive systems, we cannot
miss the salience of the unique contributionsof our nuclear deterrent in today’s dynamic
threat context.
Our nuclear forces complement our conventional forces and provide a backstop to
their use. Our nuclear deterrent signals toadversaries that should they decide to attack
U.S. interests with conventional weapons andthen escalate to a larger-scale conventional
war with strategic effects, they will not be able
to do so with a reasonable hope that the UnitedStates will ultimately back down. Our nuclear
deterrent therefore strengthens the deterrent
effect of our conventional weapons and strategies. This means that U.S. military planners
and operators, whether they realize it or not,rely heavily on the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence when they project power in the faceof our adversaries’ provocations and threats.
Our nuclear deterrent is therefore in use every minute of every day, and the importance ofthe deterrent effect’s remaining sound cannot
be overstated.
To demonstrate a real, as opposed to merely rhetorical, commitment to America’s nuclear deterrent and do so clearly, the UnitedStates must fully modernize its nuclear capabilities, especially given the actions of ouradversaries. Failing to do this with a sense ofurgency and willingness to adapt risks threemajor outcomes:
l

l

50

Adversaries could employ nuclear weapons, whether in a regional context because
they believe that a nuclear employment,
however small in scale, will cause theUnited States to back down and sue forpeace or, in the case of rogue nations,against U.S. soil.
Adversaries could either initiate a conventional war against U.S. vital interests that

could escalate to nuclear employment or
employ chemical or biological weapons.
lAllies could doubt the U.S. commitment
to their security and acquire their own
nuclear weapons, tempting other nations
to do the same and creating a far more
precarious global security environment.

Adversaries Are Emphasizing
Nuclear Weapons
The security environment continues to increase in complexity and volatility. While thethought of a nuclear exchange today mightseem to some too horrible even to contemplate,
it is a possibility, and we must think seriously
about how we might prevent it. It is imperative that we take a clear-eyed assessment not
only of other nations’ nuclear capabilities, butalso of their national agendas as well as otherfactors such as the willingness of those who
threaten the United States to threaten our
way of life and the relative peace and security
that the United States has helped to maintainfor the past seven decades. It is only when
we do this that we can most effectively deter
major war and, should deterrence fail, win as
quickly as possible on terms favorable to theUnited States.
China. The Chinese Communist Party(CCP), led by President Xi Jinping, has become
more willing to threaten to use force to carryout its national agenda. That is because sincethe 1990s, when the United States sat at theapex of its global power both economically andmilitarily, the CCP has invested in the kinds ofweapons it needs to coerce and threaten the
United States. When Xi came to power, as explained by Oriana Mastro:[He ordered the most] ambitious restructuring of the PLA since its founding,
aimed specifically at enabling Chinese
forces to conduct joint operations inwhich the air force, the navy, the army,
and the strategic rocket force fight seamlessly together, whether during an amphibious landing, a blockade, or a missile

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

attack—exactly the kinds of operations
needed for armed unification.2

China’s economic and political pressure
and military intimidation of Taiwan has led toa growing consensus that Taiwan is the most
likely near-term flashpoint between the United States and China. China is using “gray zone
tactics”7 against Taiwan, meant to exhaust andintimidate the Taiwanese so that when the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) makes its big
move, Taiwan will lack the political will to fightback.8 The PRC hopes that if Taiwan does notfight as though its very existence depends on
it, and if the United States has not adapted its
weapons deployments in time to win against
the PRC at acceptable costs, the United States
will not come to Taiwan’s defense.
But the security and sovereignty of democratic Taiwan is vital to America’s interest andis a linchpin of the U.S.-led order. China scholar
Michael Mazza articulates the stakes in playshould the PRC conquer Taiwan:

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military51﻿Importantly, China is focusing on cyber
operations and space and counterspace operations as well.3 Chinese leaders have also
engaged in nuclear threats, have practiced
employing nuclear weapons against U.S. basesin China’s military exercises, and have significantly increased the tempo of China’s military
provocations against U.S. assets (forces andbases), partners, and allies.4
The CCP’s national ambition and willingness to threaten military force to challenge U.S.
vital interests underscore the significance ofChina’s nuclear program. Although China will
not reveal details of its nuclear program, senior
U.S. military officials have informed Congressthat China is investing significantly in its nuclear weapons at a serious pace. As stated in2019 by Lieutenant General Robert T. Ashley,then the Director of the Defense Intelligence
The PLA would for the first time have
Agency, “[T]heir trajectory is consistent with
unimpeded access to the Pacific Ocean,
President Xi’s vision for China’s military, whichallowing it more easily to threaten Guam,was laid out at the 19th Party Congress, andHawaii, and the continental United States.
stated that China’s military will be fully transPLA ballistic missile submarines might ply
formed into a first-tier force by 2050.”5
the waters of the Western Pacific, allowThe U.S. should be concerned not only about
ing China to pose a more potent nuclear
the quantity of nuclear warheads China is proweapons threat to the United States.9
ducing, but also about the increasing quality of
China’s military. As recently summarized by
The U.S. also has an interest in trading andAdmiral Charles Richard, Commander of U.S. traveling safely in a region that will generate
Strategic Command:
two-thirds of the global economy in the next 10
years10 and will want to do so without having to[China’s] strategic dyad of ICBMs andobtain permission from the Chinese.
SLBMs will soon become a triad, with the
China’s willingness to prevent Taiwan’s
completion of a nuclear-capable longindefinite security as a free and democratic
range bomber. China is building newstate has been demonstrated by the kinds ofland-based, road-mobile ICBMs, providweapons China has recently unveiled, suching its forces more flexibility and capaas its nuclear-capable DF-26 that can conbility. The PLA Navy Jin-class ballistic-­
duct medium-­range and long-range precision
missile submarines carry up to 12 SLBMs
strikes against targets at sea and on land.11 Chieach. China has built new warning andnese officials have periodically threatened ex[command and control] capabilities andplicitly to attack not just U.S. aircraft carriers,
improved its readiness. Further, China’s
but also allies who might side with and assist
nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to
the United States in a regional war with Chidouble (if not triple or quadruple) overna—and even U.S. cities—with nuclear weap6
the next decade.
ons.12 Such audacious threats apply even to﻿what could be a purely conventional conflictover the fate of democratic Taiwan’s security.
Recent reports reveal that China is building
more than 250 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, which brings greater
clarity from unclassified sources to Admiral
Richard’s warnings that China is undertaking a“breathtaking” expansion of delivery systems.13
In a not-so-­discreet warning, China also conducted war-gaming exercises as recently as2020 during which it flew nuclear-capable H-6
bombers in what appeared to be a simulated
bombing of Guam, a U.S. territory.14
It is because the stakes over the fate of Taiwan are so high for the United States and the
CCP that the possibility of a military conflictis not only real, but becoming more acute and,because of the strategic nature of an all-out
conventional conflict, runs the risk of escalating to the employment of nuclear weapons.
Last (but certainly not least), militarily
threatening the U.S. against intervening on
behalf of allies and partners in the region
would also seriously impede the ability of the
U.S. to provide credible security assurances toallies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Ending U.S. extended deterrence would
be in line with China’s stated national interests. Chinese writers have revealed that China
is hostile to U.S. extended deterrence in Asia.
There exists in China a belief that U.S. extended deterrence is an unnecessary holdoverfrom the Cold War that bespeaks a hostile
approach toward China and that, rather thandiminishing in strength as we move further
away from the Cold War, it is growing stronger. As evidence of this, for example, they
have pointed to the 2010 Japanese Defense
Program Guidelines, which stated that Japan“will continue to maintain and improve thecredibility of US extended deterrence, with
nuclear deterrent as a vital element, throughclose cooperation with the US.”15
Russia. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), though never without political challenges for the United States, remains
a salient alliance protecting and promoting
U.S. interests and security. Russia continues

52

to identify both the alliance and the UnitedStates as its primary foes. Russia, led by President Vladimir Putin, uses a variety of means
to create and stoke divisions in the alliance, toweaken it, and to undermine U.S.-led initiatives that seek to support NATO.
In 2012, the U.S. National Intelligence
Council reported that “[n]uclear ambitions in
the United States and Russia over the last 20
years have evolved in opposite directions” andthat “[r]educing the role of nuclear weapons
in US security strategy is a US objective, while
Russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons
in its security strategy.”16 Nearly a decade later,
this has been made all the clearer.
In the wake of the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, senior Russian officials repeatedly made statements referencing
Russia’s nuclear forces in an effort to intimidate U.S. allies, challenge the NATO alliance,
and weaken the U.S. commitment to security
on the European continent. Russian officials,
for example, have repeatedly threatened preemptive nuclear attack against purely defensive U.S. systems deployed with NATO forceson Polish territory.17 Russia also recently announced that it will deploy 20 additional military units in Western Russia using the pretensethat it is countering NATO.
Despite the relief of some on the U.S. political left and various liberal internationalist
analysts, the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (New START) has not moderated Russia’s aggressive, illegal, and abusive behavior
against other nations, nor has it stopped thegrowth of Russia’s nuclear weapons program.
Setting aside for a moment the accounting
problems in New START, Russia has simply
gone around New START parameters to builddelivery systems that are not limited by thetreaty. As the Trump Administration’s 2019
Missile Defense Review explains:
Moscow is fielding an increasingly advanced and diverse range of nuclear-­capable regional offensive missile systems,
including missiles with unprecedented

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthcharacteristics of altitude, speed, propulsion type, and range. These missile
systems are a critical enabler of Russia’s
coercive escalation strategy and nuclear
threats to U.S. allies and partners.18

Risk in the Reluctance to Modernize
The threat environment is far more complex than it was during the Cold War, and adversaries are thinking about the employmentof nuclear weapons in different and alarming
ways. This is true despite actions by the U.S.
to move away from nuclear weapons in its defense strategy. Some of those actions include
reducing, at times unilaterally, the number ofnuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal (the United

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military53﻿The kinds of nuclear weapons in which Russia has chosen to invest raise serious concernsthat they are regarded as warfighting weapons.
Russia has built a large and diverse arsenal oftheater and tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems. As assessed by the U.S. intelligence community, Russia also believes that theranges and types of those systems may give it
an escalation advantage.19 The nature of thiscategory of weapons intensifies the concern ofU.S. military strategists that Moscow has lowered the threshold for employment of a nuclear
weapon by embracing escalate-to-deescalate
doctrine.20 This concept holds that Russia may
employ a low-yield nuclear weapon in a purely
conventional conflict in the hope that the United States would simply back down and concede
Russia’s victory.
Importantly, despite regularly opposing
missile defense advancements by the U.S. andits allies, Russia and China are investing in significant missile defense systems of their own.
Both are developing anti-satellite systems(ASATs).21 In addition, Russia has modernized
its missile defense system deployed around
Moscow and throughout Russia, including 68
nuclear-armed interceptors and other mobile
missile defense systems. The Trump Administration wisely included these advances in
the 2019 Missile Defense Review against the
backdrop of Russian and Chinese opposition
to modest U.S. developments.22
North Korea. North Korea remains anauthoritarian state and commits some of theworld’s worst atrocities against its own people.
The rogue regime remains desirous of bringing democratic South Korea under dictator
Kim Jong-un’s rule. North Korea presents along-standing proliferation concern. It has developed a nuclear missile capability and tests
missiles to intimidate the United States and its
allies in the region.

At the start of the last U.S. Administration,
Kim Jong-un was repeatedly testing nuclear
weapons and missiles, flying them over Japanese territory, and threatening to shoot atGuam, home to American citizens and an island on which U.S. military operations in theregion rely. In 2017, North Korea successfully
tested the Hwasong-14 ICBM, demonstratingthat it could likely deliver a nuclear warhead
all the way to the American Midwest. Since thesummits with President Donald Trump, Kim
Jong-un has not resumed testing of ICBMs,
but he has tested other missiles in violation ofUnited Nations Security Council Resolutions
1718 and 1874.23
Iran. Iran is ruled by a terrorist regime andproliferates weapons to proxy states and terrorist entities. It continues to threaten the existence of Israel, a U.S. ally, has demonstrated acommitment to improving its nuclear program,and has a record of hiding work and lying about
the nature of its nuclear weapons program.24
The Iranian regime also has sought to extort
the United States for sanctions relief by threatening further work on nuclear weapons.
At the same time, Iran continues to improve
its massive missile arsenal. In 2020, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps conducted a successful satellite launch, and the regime’s spacelaunch program is developing capabilities thatare directly applicable to the advancement ofan ICBM program. Also, Iran has shown that
it is willing to proliferate SCUD missiles to its
proxies in Yemen, to be used against Saudi Arabia, and to launch other kinds of missile attacks
against U.S. partner and even ballistic missiles
against U.S. bases.

﻿States has reduced its stockpile by 25 percent
since 2010, a time of rapid nuclear advancement by adversaries); committing to a unilateral testing moratorium; and committing, as
the Obama Administration’s Nuclear Posture
Review did, to considering the employment of
nuclear weapons in more limited scenarios, accelerating the dismantling of retired warheads,
and not developing new nuclear weapons.25
Despite the Obama Administration’s ambition to lead the world down to fewer nuclear
weapons, it did commit to modernizing the
U.S. nuclear stockpile and its delivery systems.
Thus, there are ongoing efforts in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) tomodernize nearly every aspect of the U.S. nuclear arsenal over the next two decades. This
includes ensuring the safety and reliabilityof the stockpile, improving the NNSA’s infrastructure, overhauling the nuclear commandand control architecture, and recapitalizing all
three legs of the nuclear triad.
The price for maintaining and modernizing
the U.S. nuclear deterrent mission is about 7
percent of the national defense budget at its
highest peak.26 The Trump Administrationagreed to continue the modernization effort,
and the Biden Administration appears poised
to do the same, barring a change that could beoutlined in the forthcoming NPR.27 But there
is already pressure to delay aspects of themodernization project, either by insisting on
more studies before moving forward with various components, by delaying replacement ofaging systems in favor of another service life
extension, by going down to fewer numbersof deployed weapons, and by shelving various
commitments altogether.
President Joe Biden’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, while recognizing
deepening “rivalries” with China and Russia,
aims to reduce the role of nuclear weapons,elevate arms control initiatives, and avert an“arms race.”28 To be sure, it also commits to ensuring that the U.S. strategic deterrent remains
safe, secure, and effective, but the document’s
emphasis does not instill confidence that the54

Biden Administration appreciates the imperative need to shore up the credibility of thenuclear deterrent.
Slowing or stopping modernization canjeopardize the United States’ ability to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear enterprise. It
also incurs increased operational and technical risk and can undermine confidence inAmerica’s ability to deliver a particular nuclear payload to a desired target accurately at atime of its choosing. U.S. adversaries and allies
are watching.

Risks to the Nuclear Stockpile
and NNSA Infrastructure
A safe, responsive, and resilient nuclear
weapons infrastructure enables the UnitedStates to adapt to shifting requirements in the
dynamic threat context. Although the NNSA
has been able to certify the safety and reliability of the stockpile to the President, its infrastructure is decades-old, continues to age, andin some cases is deteriorating.
Unlike what the United States did during
the Cold War and what adversaries like Russia,
for instance, are doing now, the United States
does not maintain a fully functional nuclear weapons design, development, test, andmanufacturing enterprise capable of annually producing significant quantities of nuclear
warheads to meet its national security requirements.29 During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear
industrial infrastructure included active design and engineering laboratories and testing
facilities. Warheads were developed with anintended service life of 10–15 years.30
The United States has been under a unilateral underground explosive testing ban sincethe 1990s when President George H. W. Bushhalted it and 1993 when President William
Clinton announced an indefinite moratoriumthat remains in place today. It is also worth
noting that North Korea tests, and there isreason to believe that Russia and China havetested above a zero yield. As the U.S. nuclear
stockpile ages and the U.S. continues to refrainfrom testing, the pressure to be able to certifythat the stockpile is safe and reliable builds.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military55﻿

The NNSA continually assesses each nu- and flexibility and manufacture new or replaceclear weapon to determine its reliability and ment components in a timely manner. Failing todetect problems with components caused by allocate the necessary funds as scheduled would
aging. Part of routine maintenance includes strain the NNSA’s ability to certify to the Presthe disposal of components that must be re- ident through the Stockpile Stewardship Protired in a way that both protects the health of gram that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe,
NNSA personnel and avoids creating an en- secure, and reliable. Successive extensions ofvironmental hazard. Compounding the chal- the service life of the current inventory of warlenge of maintaining a reliable and safe stock- heads will inevitably decrease confidence in thepile is the fact that the U.S. is unable to produce quality of the nuclear stockpile as the warheads
the core component of warheads—plutonium deviate further from designs that scientists had
pits—in sufficient quantities.31 Russia, China, validated by using data collected from actual exand North Korea also produce plutonium pits. plosive nuclear tests.
Without a change in policy, degradationfrom plutonium will cause the stockpile to Risks to the Triad of Delivery Systems
atrophy. Being able to produce at least 80 pluNuclear delivery systems rely on decades-­tonium pits per year is the minimum require- old technology.34 The 2018 Trump Nuclear
ment articulated by the nation’s senior military Posture Review agreed with the Obama NPR
and civilian leaders across Administrations that a nuclear triad, complemented by NATO’sand is legally required. The NNSA’s highest in- dual-capable aircraft and a nuclear command,
frastructure priority should be to reconstitute control, and communications system, is theplutonium pit production so that the number most cost-effective means of meeting deterof pits produced is enough to meet security rence and assurance aims. As stated in therequirements.32 The new production capabil- 2018 NPR, “The triad provides the President
ities would also enhance safety protections to flexibility while guarding against technologicalkeep the radioactive material from harming surprise or sudden changes in the geopolitical
U.S. personnel.
environment.”35 But to remain credible, we
The risks involved in failing to reconstitute must implement the Obama and Trump Adthis capability at two sites range from jeopar- ministrations’ commitments to recapitalizadizing the health of U.S. citizens working in the tion of each leg and do so without unnecessarylabs, to not being able to certify to the Presi- delays prompted by yet another study.
dent that the stockpile is safe and reliable, to
The Land-Based Leg. The land-based leg
failing to produce and sustain the stockpile at of the triad is the most reliable and responsive
numbers necessary to carry out the nation’s de- of the three. Comprised of ICBMs, it serves aterrent objectives. In particular, a delay in the great deterrent purpose by significantly raising
pit production plan would render the NNSA the threshold for a would-be enemy’s nucleunable to meet the DOD nuclear deterrent ar first strike on the United States. Currently,
mission requirement to field the Minuteman there are 450 MM III silos—400 ICBMs that
III (MMIII) W78 warhead replacement for the are operational and 50 silos in what is called
Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) “warm” status (meaning that they do not consystem by the end of this decade. To put a fin- tain missiles)—and 45 launch sites, locateder point on it, the U.S. could lose the ability to in five states. The United States’ Minuteman
threaten adversaries with ICBMs credibly by III ICBMs entered service in 1970. The plan
the end of the decade and go unilaterally from at the time was to retire them after a decade.
a triad of delivery systems to a dyad simply The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent willby attrition.33
replace the Minuteman III by the end of thisA modern, reliable industrial infrastructure decade—40 years later than intended—and its
must be able to maintain existing capabilities service life is expected to stretch into 2075.

﻿

Numerous government and non-­government
agencies have concluded that extending the lifeof Minuteman III yet again would be unwise. For
example, General Timothy M. Ray, Commander
of Air Force Global Strike Command, has testified that “indefinite sustainment is impractical,
unaffordable, and ineffective due to age-related deterioration, the evolution of the industrial
base, and the expanding technical capabilitiesof our adversaries.”36 In other words, pursuing
GBSD is more affordable than extending the
MMIII again. Extending the MMIII again would
also deprive the United States of a more effective,
versatile, adaptable missile with a modularitythat enables it to respond more flexibly to a dynamic threat environment.
General Ray urged Congress to continue
funding on schedule and in the full amount to“mitigate risk for the transition from MMIII to
GBSD. Maintaining GBSD schedule momentum and reducing schedule risk is critical to
avoiding capability shortfalls to warfighter
requirements during transition.”37 Schedulerisk always entails unplanned cost increases as well as potential holes in capability at
any given time.
Although MMIII has gone through various
life extension programs and replacements ofcomponent parts, the Obama Administration
recognized that it was untenable. There are significant concerns regarding the degradation ofcertain parts of the system and the challenge ofrepairing or replacing them.38 By failing to keep
GBSD on schedule to replace aging MMIIIs,
the U.S. could well find itself with fewer than
400 ICBMs to deploy. As nuclear strategist Dr.
Matthew Kroenig has warned:
Reducing numbers [of ICBMs] would
make an enemy first strike more effective,
allow larger adversaries to consider anuclear first strike while holding a larger
nuclear force in reserve, and place a firststrike within reach for smaller powers,
such as North Korea. Most importantly, deep ICBM reductions conflict withanother important U.S. goal: achieving its
objectives if deterrence fails.39

56

It is also important to keep in mind that
although the current fleet of ICBMs cannot
be intercepted by the missile defense systems employed by adversaries of the U.S., thismight not always be the case. Moreover, cyber threats and other new technologies could
also pose a challenge for the MMIII. The 2018
NPR warned that “Minuteman III will haveincreasing difficulty penetrating future adversary defenses.”40
The Air Leg. As with the land-based legof the triad, the air leg must be recapitalized.
The air leg is comprised of bombers with airlaunched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and gravity
bombs. The Air Force is developing the B61-12
guided bomb, which will be used on the F-35A(Air Force variant) and stealthy bombers.
Nuclear-­capable bombers assist in a crisis byproviding the United States with a highly visible means of signaling resolve. This can both
deter adversaries and reassure allies. Because
bombers can be called back once deployed, theair leg of the triad can also have a strong de-­escalatory impact.
The current AGM-86B ALCM carried by
U.S. bombers is scheduled to retire in 2030, andthe Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) weapon (assuming that Administrations and Congresses
maintain support) will replace it. The ALCM
now in use is becoming obsolete against bothcurrent and evolving enemy air defenses. The
B-52 cannot (and the B-2 probably cannot)
continue dependably in the nuclear mission
beyond 2030 without the LRSO.41 It is too early
to know how survivable the B-21 will be against
enemy air defenses in 2030.
Thus, by permitting the LRSO to slip inschedule, the United States faces the real possibility of losing a reliable air leg of the nuclear
triad. This is a matter of particular concern inthe context of the great-power contest, whenthe LRSO could play a leading role in deterring
and—if deterrence fails—retaliating against
Russian use of low-yield weapons. This makes
the LRSO a leading guarantor of the credibilityof extended deterrence because it provides acredible, tailored retaliatory response option
in a regional context. But the LRSO is not the2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthonly weapon system that is meant to fill thisCould cause allies under the U.S. deterrole in the current dynamic threat context.
rence umbrella to doubt America’s resolve
The Trump Administration’s 2018 review ofand ability to end a disastrously escalating
the nuclear landscape and threats concluded
war as quickly as possible and with thethat “in the near-term, the United States will
least amount of damage, andmodify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the
Could tempt allies to eschew U.S. guarlonger term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed
antees and acquire their own nuclesea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).”42 Rathar deterrents.
er than relying solely on the low-yield options
provided by the Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA),The Sea-Based Leg. The sea-based leg of
which may not be in an acceptable state of read- the triad is the nation’s most survivable nucleiness, these modest changes would provide the ar platform. It consists of 14 Ohio-class ballistic
United States with appropriate options to dis- missile submarines (SSBNs) armed with theabuse the Russians of the idea that they could intercontinental-range Trident II D5 missile
launch a low-yield attack against a NATO ally and constitutes 70 percent of the nation’s opand that the United States would not have a erational nuclear weapons.45 SSBNs are also
prompt, reliable, and proportional response at key contributors to regional nuclear assurhand that could penetrate ever-changing and ances of allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrelimproving air defenses.
la. U.S. SSBNs patrol the world’s oceans and—In 2020, the United States made good on its for now—can do so undetected. For just one
intent to field the low-yield W76-2 warhead on nuclear-­capable submarine to be destroyed
the SLBM.43 Having these additional options or lose communication, however, could imply
either deployed or planned for deployment that this most secure of the legs has been funto locations near allied countries as a forward damentally compromised and that the nation
presence offers important additions in terms has lost its entire sea-based leg.
of assurance and deterrence. In 2019, then-­Like the ALCM and Minuteman III, thepresidential candidate Joe Biden said he op- Ohio-class SSBNs face real challenges beposed the low-yield adaptations.44
cause of component part obsolescence. They
The publicly released version of the NPR are scheduled to be retired and replaced by the
discussed these adaptations as appropriate Columbia-­class SSBNs at some point aroundand tailored responses to Russia’s changing 2031. The Columbia-class SSBNs are the U.S.
nuclear strategy and doctrine. They are cer- Navy’s number one priority and are expected totainly that, but they should also be understood operate well into the 2080s—a fantastic value.46
as necessary additions to the tailored response
It is impossible to anticipate the advanceoptions in the Asia context as well. By main- ments of our adversaries’ anti-submarine wartaining these two modest changes and includ- fare capabilities throughout the decade anding them in the Biden Administration’s NPR, into the 2030s, but it would be prudent to asthe United States has the ability to bolster the sume that they possess far more advanced decredibility of its response to a potential nuclear tection capabilities that threaten the stealth of
employment in the regional context, thereby our submarines and would weaken the survivraising the nuclear thresholds that adversar- ability of our current fleet. The disarmamenties are lowering. On the other hand, failing to advocacy group Global Zero acknowledged
maintain these options:this risk in its 2012 report, stating that within
the next several decades, detection technology
Risks tempting a peer adversary that iscould advance to the point where submarines
in danger of losing a conventional war tomight be discoverable.47 The Columbia SSBN
employ nuclear weapons,
is designed to take such advancements intoll

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57

﻿

l

﻿

account, but the entire Ohio-class fleet must
be retired by 2039 regardless of whether the
Columbia-class SSBNs are ready. One can deduce that if the Columbia-class’s funding slips
and its deployment is delayed, one leg of the
U.S. nuclear triad—at least for a time—could beunderprepared.
The United States is at a crossroads. If it
fails to keep the modernization plan on schedule and across multiple Administrations andCongresses, it could drop below necessary
deployed levels of delivery systems. As President Obama’s Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
said in 2016:

the U.S. homeland, U.S. active missile defense can and must outpace existing andpotential rogue state offensive missile
capabilities. To do so, the United States
will pursue advanced missile defense
concepts and technologies for homeland defense.49

It does not say the United States is unwilling to improve its systems so that they canprovide some defense against Russian andChinese ICBMs; it merely notes the reality thatthe current deployments and capabilities are
scaled to stay ahead of the rogue threat. But
the variety of threats and the dangerous trends
The fact is, most of our nuclear weapfor missile development and proliferation are
on delivery systems have already been
blurring and eventually could erase the line
extended decades beyond their originalthat separates what is considered a limited
expected service lives. So it’s not a choicethreat and a more expansive one.
between replacing these platforms or
Moreover, it would be wise not to put evenkeeping them; it’s really a choice between
unofficial constraints on U.S. missile defense
replacing them or losing them. That
deployments that could provide a defense
would mean losing confidence in ouragainst some plausible Chinese or Russian
ability to deter, which we can’t afford in
missile attacks against the U.S. homeland eventoday’s volatile security environment.48
if this seems unlikely. Lower-level conflicts at
the regional level could escalate to outright
Risks in Missile Defense
conventional war but—as noted in the beginMaintaining the credibility of our strategic ning of this essay—with strategic consequencdeterrent will necessarily require a refocused es, and the likelihood of an attack against theeffort to bring about qualitative improvements U.S. homeland increases in such a scenario. A
in missile defense. Missile defense enjoys more robust missile defense system that builds
greater support among policymakers now than on the current homeland defense system but
it did during the Cold War. Homeland missile takes advantage of the space domain, includdefense protects Americans at home from ing space-based interceptors, would likely
rogue nations’ ICBMs, and regional missile strengthen U.S. strategic deterrence.
defense systems protect U.S. bases and allies
Even if policymakers do not make the conabroad. However, Cold War ideas about how certed (and prudent) policy commitment tomissile defense might affect “strategic sta- provide a defense against a small attack frombility” with peer adversaries help to prevent China or Russia, the threats from North Kothe United States from pursuing homeland rea and even Iran make it necessary that U.S.
defenses against anything other than rogue- missile defense advance faster. The Missile
state ICBMs. The 2018 Trump Missile Defense Defense Agency is already asked repeatedly
Review clearly states that:to do more but with a painfully small budget that does not grow with the increased
While the United States relies on deterresponsibilities.
rence to protect against large and techniFor example, assuming that Administracally sophisticated Russian and Chinesetions and Congresses support and sustain
intercontinental ballistic missile threats toit, the Next Generation Interceptor will be

582022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthadded to missile fields in Alaska by the end of
the decade, and this will affect America’s entire Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
missile defense system. In a January 2020
House Armed Services Committee hearing,
Congressman Doug Lamborn (R–CO) asked
then-Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
John C. Rood:
According to NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern
Command], while we can be confident
in our current GMD posture to counter a
North Korean threat for the next 5 to 6
years, at the rate North Korea is developing their ICBM capabilities, we must
begin assuming increased risks around2025 and beyond. Do you agree with thatassessment?50

Conclusion
Bolstering the credibility of our strategic
deterrent will require bold, coordinated moves
across Administrations to signal adversaries
that the United States is willing and able to do
whatever is necessary to defend its citizens andvital interests and that, should deterrence fail,America will fight to make sure that the costs
an adversary sustains far outweigh any conceivable gains.
The various elements of the nuclear deterrent are interdependent; slowing downor (worse) eliminating one will weaken theentire force. Moreover, if the United States
loses entire legs of the nuclear triad throughThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military59﻿

Rood did agree: “I do share that assessment.”51 What that means in blunt terms isthat North Korea could overwhelm the homeland missile defense system by 2025 if theUnited States does not commit to improving the system.

obsolescence, adversaries will be tempted to exploit perceived U.S. weakness andvulnerability.
The United States must maintain consistent,
full, and timely funding across Administrations and Congresses to ensure a safe, reliable,
and flexible modern nuclear enterprise. Likewise, nuclear delivery systems must be modernized and, in some cases, replaced to ensurethat the United States can credibly threaten
to deliver nuclear payloads on desired targets
in a timely manner. This capability will disabuse adversaries of the notion that the UnitedStates has only limited and unreliable options
to retaliate in a proportional way if they attack
U.S. vital interests with a nuclear weapon.
Failing to do this not only risks adversaries
employing nuclear weapons, but also tempts
allies under the nuclear deterrent umbrellato acquire their own nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation, even by an ally, could tempt
other non-nuclear nations to acquire theirown nuclear weapons. The global increase of
nuclear-weapon states is not conducive to U.S.
interests or to global security.
Finally, the United States must build thenecessary defenses to contribute to deterrence by denial, which strengthens strategic
deterrence and reinforces the credibility of
the U.S. promise both to deter strategic attack
and to fight to win as quickly as possible withas little damage as possible. The United States
must move forward with confidence and end
this decades-­long chapter in American history
during which some of our leaders have deemphasized U.S. nuclear strength and the goalof U.S. nuclear pre-eminence. For the sake ofpeace and to protect the American people, ourway of life, and the U.S.-led order, a renewed
and energetic commitment to the keystone of
our national defense is imperative.

Endnotes
In his 2006 book The Audacity of Hope, then-Senator Barack Obama wrote: “When Truman, Acheson, Kennan, and Marshallsat down to design the architecture of the post–World War II order, their frame of reference was the competition between thegreat powers that had dominated the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries…. That world no longer exists.” Barack Obama,
The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (New York: Crown, 2006), pp. 304–305. In 2014, President
Barack Obama declared at the United Nations: “The shadow of World War that existed at the founding of this institution
has been lifted; the prospect of war between major powers reduced.” See “Remarks by President Obama in Address to theUnited Nations General Assembly,” The White House, September 24, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly (accessed July 16, 2021).

2.

Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Taiwan Temptation, Why Beijing Might Resort to Force,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 100, No. 4 (July/August2021), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation (accessed July 16, 2021).

3.

Mary Stokes, Gabriel Alvarado, Emily Weinstein, and Ian Easton, China’s Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Activities, U.S.–
China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/China_Space_
and_Counterspace_Activities.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).

4.

Mark Moore, “China Threatens Nuclear War, Expanding Arsenal in Case of ‘Intense Showdown’ with US,” New York Post, June2, 2021, https://nypost.com/2021/06/02/chinese-media-says-beijing-expanding-its-nuclear-arsenal/ (accessed July 16, 2021),
and Tom O’Connor, “China, Creator of ‘Guam Killer’ Missile, Practices Bombing U.S. Territory After North Korea Resumes Threat,”
Yahoo Finance, October 31, 2017, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-creator-apos-guam-killer-162708764.html (accessed July16, 2021).

5.

Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, “Transcript: The Arms Control Landscape ft. DIA Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley, Jr.,” Hudson Institute, May 31,
2019, https://www.hudson.org/research/15063-transcript-the-arms-control-landscape-ft-dia-lt-gen-robert-p-ashley-jr (accessed
July 16, 2021).

6.

Admiral Charles A. Richard, U.S. Navy, “Forging 21st-Century Strategic Deterrence,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol.
147/2/1,416 (February 2021), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/february/forging-21st-century-strategicdeterrence (accessed July 16, 2021).

7.

For an explanation of gray zone tactics, see Elizabeth K. Kiessling, “Gray Zone Tactics and the Principle of Non-Intervention: Can‘One of the Vaguest Branches of International Law’ Solve the Gray Zone Problem?” Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 12,
Issue 1 (February 1, 2021), pp. 116–163, https://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2021/02/HNSJ-Vol-12-Kiessling-GrayZone-Tactics-and-the-Principle-of-Non-Intervention.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021). The author defines gray zone tactics as “actsthat exceed the threshold of accepted peacetime competition but do not rise to a level likely to trigger a conventional militaryresponse.” Ibid., p. 122.

8.

For examples, see Reuters, “Taiwan Reports New Incursion by Chinese Jets into Defence Zone,” April 5, 2021, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-taiwan-china-defence-idUSKBN2BS0U8 (accessed July 16, 2021).

9.

Michael Mazza, “‘Rock Solid’: America’s Past and Present Commitment to Taiwan,” The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, IndoPacific Perspectives, March 2021, p. 6, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/31/2002611841/-1/-1/1/IPP%20-%20MARCH%202021.
PDF?source=GovD (accessed July 16, 2021).

﻿

1.

10. Admiral Philip S. Davidson, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, statement on “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
Posture” before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 9, 2021, p. 2, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/Davidson_03-09-21.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).
11. “Meet the DF-26 Missile: China’s Prized Anti-Carrier Weapon,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, October 3, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/meet-df-26-missile-chinas-prized-anti-carrier-weapon-85261 (accessed July 16, 2021).
12. Danny Gittings, “General Zhu Goes Ballistic,” The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2005, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB112165176626988025 (accessed July 16, 2021).
13. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “China’s Nuclear Missile Silo Expansion: From Minimum Deterrence to Medium Deterrence,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/chinas-nuclear-missile-silo-expansion-fromminimum-deterrence-to-medium-deterrence/ (accessed September 8, 2021).
14. “China Air Force Video Appears to Show Simulated Attack on US Base on Guam,” The Telegraph, September 21, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBOho1AOKYY (accessed July 16, 2021).
15. Lin Bin and He Yun, “Credible Limitations: U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in Northeast Asia,“ in Disarming Doubt:
The Future of Extended Deterrence in East Asia, ed. Rory Medcalf and Fiona Cunningham, Lowy Institute for International Policy,
2012, p. 47, https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/disarmingdoubt_web_0.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).

60

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength16. National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, December 2012, p. 69, https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).
17. Harry de Quetteville and Andrew Pierce, “Russia Threatens Nuclear Attack on Poland over US Missile Shield Deal,” The Telegraph,
August 15, 2008, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2566005/Russia-threatens-nuclear-attack-onPoland-over-US-missile-shield-deal.html (accessed July 16, 2021).
18. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. IV, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).
19. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, p .9, https://media.
defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed July 16, 2021).
20. Mark B. Schneider, “Escalate to De-escalate,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 143/2/1,368 (February 2017), https://www.usni.
org/magazines/proceedings/2017/february/escalate-de-escalate#footnotes (accessed July 16, 2021).
21. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space,” information cutoff date January
2019, pp. 21 (China) and 29 (Russia), https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).
22. Fact sheet, “Chinese and Russian Missile Defense: Strategies and Capabilities,” U.S. Department of Defense, https://media.defense.
gov/2020/Jul/28/2002466237/-1/-1/1/CHINESE_RUSSIAN_MISSILE_DEFENSE_FACT_SHEET.PDF (accessed July 16, 2021).
23. Rebeccah Heinrichs, ”What North Korea’s First Missile Test During the Biden Administration Means,” National Review, March 24,
2021, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/what-north-korea-s-first-missile-test-during-the-biden-administration-means/
ar-BB1eVvXl (accessed July 16, 2021).
24. Yonah Jeremy Bob, “IAEA Chief: Deeply Concerned Iran Hiding Nuclear Material,” The Jerusalem Post, June 7, 2021, https://www.
jpost.com/middle-east/iaea-chief-deeply-concerned-iran-hiding-nuclear-material-670325 (accessed July 16, 2021).

26. U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Modernization: Ensuring a Safe, Secure, Reliable, and Credible U.S. Nuclear Deterrent,”
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/01/2002108024/-1/-1/1/NUCLEAR-MODERNIZATION-FIVE-KEY-TAKEAWAYS.PDF (accessed
July 16, 2021). An increase over 2019 projections is reported in Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Costs of Nuclear Forces,2021 to 2030,” May 2021, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-05/57130-Nuclear-Forces.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021). For a
discussion about the changing estimates, see transcript, “Virtual Event | A Conversation on Strategic Forces with Rep. Mike
Turner,” Hudson Institute, July 7, 2021, p. 9, https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Transcript-%20A%20Conversation%20
on%20Strategic%20Forces%20with%20Rep%20Mike%20Turner.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).
27. Lara Seligman, Bryan Bender, and Connor O’Brien, “Biden Goes ‘Full Steam Ahead’ on Trump’s Nuclear Expansion DespiteCampaign Rhetoric,” Politico, June 2, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/02/biden-trump-nuclear-weapons-491631(accessed July 16, 2021).
28. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, The White House, March 2021, p. 13, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).
29. U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Department of Defense, National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,
September 2008, p. 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/nuclearweaponspolicy.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).
30. Ibid., p. 19.
31. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Plutonium Pit Production,” https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/
plutonium-pit-production (accessed July 1, 2021).
32. The Honorable Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, statement before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, March 4, 2020, p. 6, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/
AP10/20200304/110623/HHRG-116-AP10-Wstate-Gordon-HagertyL-20200304.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military61﻿

25. The Honorable Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, statement before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, April 2, 2019, p. 3, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/
AP10/20190402/109204/HHRG-116-AP10-Wstate-Gordon-HagertyL-20190402.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021), and U.S. Departmentof Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_
Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021). The 2010 NPR addresses the Obama Administration’s underlying
rationale for reducing the U.S. nuclear posture, as well as various related initiatives and objectives; summary statements arefound on pages iii and vi.

33. Statement of Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, former Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, in stenographic transcript,
Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, June 16, 2021, p. 26, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2153_06-16-2021.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).
34. Patty-Jane Geller and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, “Extending New START Makes U.S. Nuclear Modernization Imperative,” Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 3595, March 16, 2021, p. 7, https://www.heritage.org/arms-control/report/extending-new-startmakes-us-nuclear-modernization-imperative.
35. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 2.
36. General Timothy M. Ray, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, statement on “FY22 Posture for Department of Defense
Nuclear Forces” before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, May 12, 2021, p. 9,
https://w/ww.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/5-12-21%20Gen%20Ray%20Written%20Statement%20Final.pdf(accessed July 18, 2021).
37. Ibid., p. 15.
38. Mark Gunzinger, “Don’t Delay GBSD ICBMs; It’s Too Risky,” Breaking Defense, July 2, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/07/
dont-delay-gbsd-icbms-its-too-risky/ (accessed July 16, 2021).
39. Matthew Kroenig, “The Case for the US ICBM Force,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, Issue 3 (Fall 2018), p. 58, https://www.
airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-3/Kroenig.pdf (accessed July 16, 2021).
40. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 46.
41. Dennis Evans and Jonathan Schwalbe, “The Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) Cruise Missile and Its Role in Future Nuclear Forces,”
Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Laboratory, National Security Perspective, 2017, pp. 4–5, https://www.jhuapl.edu/
Content/documents/LRSO.pdf#:~:text=Summary%20of%20need%20for%20LRSO%20in%20the%20nuclear,the%20B-21%20
is%20fully%20operational%20in%20the%20nuclear%C2%A0mission (accessed July 16, 2021).
42. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, pp. XII and 54.

﻿

43. Rebecca Kheel, “US Deploys Submarine-Launched Low-Yield Nuke,” The Hill, February 4, 2020, https://thehill.com/policy/
defense/481345-us-deploys-submarine-launched-low-yield-nuke (accessed July 16, 2021).
44. Council for a Livable World, “Presidential Candidates: Joe Biden,” https://livableworld.org/presidential-candidates-joe-biden/(accessed July 16, 2021).
45. ”Columbia-Class Ballistic Missile Submarines,” Naval Technology, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/columbiaclass-ballistic-missile-submarines/#:~:text=The%20new%20submarines%20will%20support%20the%20US%20
strategic,nation%E2%80%99s%20operational%20nuclear%20weapons.%20Columbia-class%20submarine%20programme%20
details (accessed July 1, 2021).
46. Brent Sadler, “U.S. Navy,” in 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation,2021), p. 399, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/2021_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_ASSESSMENT_POWER_
NAVY.pdf.
47. Global Zero, Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report: Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture,
May 2012, p. 7, https://www.globalzero.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf(accessed July 16, 2021).
48. News release, “Secretary of Defense Speech: Remarks on ‘Sustaining Nuclear Deterrence,’” U.S. Department of Defense,
September 26, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/956630/remarks-on-sustaining-nucleardeterrence/ (accessed July 16, 2021).
49. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, 2019, p. III.
50. Hearing, Security Update on the Korean Peninsula, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 116th Cong.,
2nd Sess., January 28, 2020, p. 13, https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG-116hhrg40664/CHRG-116hhrg40664.pdf (accessed
July 16, 2021).
51. Ibid.

622022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

How Prioritizing Climate Change
Could Weaken America’s Military
Rebecca Grant, PhD

AThe Secretary of Defense and the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall consider
the security implications of climate change,
including any relevant information from the
Climate Risk Analysis described in subsection (c) of this section, in developing the
National Defense Strategy, Defense Planning Guidance, Chairman’s Risk Assessment,
and other relevant strategy, planning, andprogramming documents and processes.2

﻿t ‌approximately 12:30 pm on October 10,
2018, Hurricane Michael struck Northwest Florida as a Category 5 storm with sustained winds of 160 miles per hour. Hurricane
Michael had burgeoned into a massive storm
in just two days. Trapped in a hangar at Tyndall Air Force Base were 17 U.S. Air Force F-22
stealth fighters. While 38 of the advanced-performance stealth jets had been flown out tosafety at other bases, these 17 F-22 Raptors
were undergoing repairs and could not be
moved on short notice. Official reports foundthat Hurricane Michael was the third most intense storm to make landfall in the U.S. since1900. A wind gust of over 130 mph was recorded at Tyndall before the sensor failed.1
When Hurricane Michael passed, the pictures of smashed buildings and F-22s coveredin roof debris seemed to deliver a final warning:
Climate change could impact the Departmentof Defense (DOD). Rising global temperatures
could fuel storms and floods and perhaps evenspark international conflict. If so, shouldn’t the
U.S. military move climate change to the heartof its planning priorities?
Fast forward three years, and the Department of Defense has taken on the most ambitious climate change policy agenda in its history. On January 27, 2021, President Joe Bidendeclared by executive order “that climate
considerations shall be an essential elementof United States foreign policy and national
security” and directed that:“We know first-hand the risk that climatechange poses to national security because it affects the work we do every day,” said Secretaryof Defense Lloyd Austin in an official Pentagon
statement that same day.3 “Climate change is athreat,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Mark Milley similarly testified to Congress in June 2021. “Climate change has a significant impact on military operations, and wehave to take that into consideration.”4
For activists, skeptics, and everyone in
between, the climate change discussion had
arrived—­and with significant risks.
America’s military is facing China and Russia
across multiple domains. Yet while the Defense
Department strives to modernize nuclear deterrence forces, replace old aircraft and ships,
guard access to space, and fend off cyberattacks,
new directives mandate that the military mustalso focus on the effects of climate change. “Every dollar that we spend addressing the effects
of climate change is a dollar that we are not

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military63

﻿

putting toward other priorities, like meeting the Discussion and assessments of climate datechallenge posed by China and modernizing our back over 15 years. Most recent defense reforces,” as Deputy Secretary of Defense Kath- views from the Administrations of Presidents
leen Hicks pointed out in May 2021.5
Donald Trump and Barack Obama added a secAsking the military to split its attention tion on climate concerns.
between great-power competition and the
However, the Biden–Harris Administrawide-ranging impacts of climate change is a tion’s 2021 executive order went much further
tough assignment. The potential consequenc- than previous policy guidance. As noted, thees of the effects of climate change for the mil- DOD was directed to perform a Climate Risk
itary include everything from seawalls to B-2 Analysis and then to include climate risk findbomber flights over the Arctic. Imagine if the ings in “the National Defense Strategy, Defense
military were told to prepare for “risks from Planning Guidance, Chairman’s Risk AssessRussia” but did not differentiate between cy- ment, and other relevant strategy, planning,
berattacks and harassment of U.S. Navy de- and programming documents and processes.”stroyers in the Black Sea.
Every January, starting in 2022, the Secretary
On top of that, the risks are poorly under- of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
stood, and that is not standard practice at the of Staff must report to the National Security
Pentagon. If natural hazards do not emerge as Council on how they have included climate
predicted, the U.S. military may find that build- matters in key planning processes.6
ing forces, bases, and plans for climate changeThis was not just a heads up; it was a manwas a waste of effort. At a minimum, the dollars date to inject responses to climate change into
for climate crisis programs will have to com- the most crucial defense planning processes.
pete with dollars for the development and ac- “This means that climate considerations must
quisition of technologies needed for the U.S. to become an integral element in resource allodominate in all-domain operations.
cation and our operational decision-making
Nevertheless, there are surprises in this dis- process,” confirmed Deputy Secretary Hicks.7
cussion. For example, the Department of DeBringing a rigorous discussion of climate
fense is by no means neglecting climate change. change into defense planning will not be easy
To the contrary: It has decades of experience because the threat analysis that is so centralwith environmental impact studies, improving to military planning is at an elementary stage
base resilience, and investing in sustainability in this area. Typically, the military has years ofand green energy research. That said, howev- analysis of threats to back its decisions. Analer, prioritizing climate change risks weakening ysis centers on weapons systems capabilities
the Pentagon’s preparations to face near-term and adversary tactics. Convene a discussion
threats. Policymakers face a difficult task in of missile defense or China’s Taiwan stratetrying to develop policies that address climate gy and you will get tactical and technologicalchange concerns while also maintaining U.S. detail along with informed analysis and conmilitary dominance.
trasting opinion on the best options. The cliNo definitive answers will be provided here. mate change discussion has not yet met theRather, this essay sets out several areas to con- rigorous standards demanded for national
sider for a better grasp of how the quest for cli- security dialogue.
mate change policies may impact U.S. military
Contrast that with the state of play seen incapabilities.
the 2019 unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment released by the Director of National
Climate Change and DefenseIntelligence. It noted threats to low-lying miliPlanning Guidancetary installations and remarked on the general
The rise of climate as a new policy direction risks in language not so different from that offor the Pentagon did not happen overnight. past Administrations: “Climate hazards such642022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

as extreme weather, higher temperatures,
droughts, floods, wildfires, storms, sea levelrise, soil degradation, and acidifying oceans
are intensifying, threatening infrastructure,
health, and water and food security.”8Such an estimate, while startling, does notprovide clear direction for defense programs.
Nor does it help decision-makers balanceclimate initiatives with meeting challenges
from nation-state adversaries, terrorism, andso forth. In short, the DOD has a tremendous
analytic task ahead if leaders want to take on
climate change and make their budget andpolicy recommendations stick after scrutiny
by Congress.

Climate Change and Military
Disaster Relief Missions
One of the easiest areas to evaluate should
be requirements for disaster relief. U.S. military forces engage regularly in relief missions
both small and large. Current climate change
policy anticipates increased deployment of U.S.
forces for international disaster relief and forsupport to civil authorities at home. However,
it is not always the climate—atmospheric andtemperature conditions—that drives disaster
relief missions. Earthquakes are a big factor.
Consider recent experience. On January
12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti left 220,000 dead.9 The capital city of Port
Au Prince was devastated. U.S. special forces
set up air traffic control at the airport’s one
working runway. Roads from the neighboring Dominican Republic were few because ofproblematic political relationships. Aid fromthe international community poured in, but 10
years later, Haiti was still rebuilding.
A 9.0 magnitude earthquake hit Japan Connecting Climate Change
on March 11, 2011, causing a tsunami with a and Causes of Wars
wave height measured at 133 feet. The tsuAnother very difficult area to evaluate is thenami swamped the power supply to Japan’s connection between climate change and the
Fukushima nuclear reactor and killed 20,000 causes of wars. It has become almost an artiJapanese.10 “At the peak,” according to the Con- cle of faith that climate change stokes conflict,gressional Research Service, “approximately in the words of Deputy Secretary Hicks, by
24,000 personnel, 189 aircraft, and 24 Navy “actually increasing risks of conflict from tervessels were involved in the humanitarian rorism and civil wars.”12 “Already, significant
assistance and relief efforts. Major assets in conflicts are being fueled by high temperatures

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military65﻿

the region were redirected to the quake zone,
including the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier
Strike group.”11
The U.S. military brings specialized assets including command and control, airlift,
air traffic control, and others to international disaster relief. The services already haveboth doctrine on disaster relief and prudent
planning to keep joint task force resourcesat the ready.
Put in context, climate change projections
may not be the right framework for estimating
military contributions to disaster relief missions. Even a cursory look at historic disasters
from the Great Chinese Famine of 1958–1962
or the 1815 eruption of the volcano at Mount
Tambora, Indonesia, shows that factors otherthan climate can drive disaster relief. By projecting climate change, especially on a global
scale, the U.S. military could oversize its relief
forces at the expense of combat capability. Natural and man-made disasters will occur, andthe U.S. military may well respond, but theclimate change set of disasters is not a goodsizing tool.
Ultimately, the decision to deploy militaryforces for worldwide disaster relief comes
down to politics. Key ally Japan merited andwelcomed assistance after the 2011 tsunami.
The situation might be very different in floodprone China or if the victim country did notwant much help from U.S. forces. The bottom
line is that climate change alone is not thedriver of intervention; in the end, the choice
is a political one. Focusing on climate change
may not improve the forecasting and related
preparation for disaster relief missions.

﻿

contributing to water shortages and crop failures in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia,”
commented retired Admiral and former NATO
Supreme Allied Commander James Stavridis.
“Wars in Syria, Iraq, Mali and Afghanistan are
all examples of that.”13
Climate change as an accelerant of conflict is not a new idea. The 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review stated that “[w]hile climatechange alone does not cause conflict, it may
act as an accelerant of instability or conflict”
and increase the “burden…on civilian institutions and militaries around the world.”14 President Obama’s 2015 National Security Strategy
sharpened the point and called climate change“an urgent and growing threat to our national
security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic
resources like food and water.”15
But the evidence is much more complicated.
One clear connection is the Arctic. Thawing ice
has led to open sea-lanes and increased competition among Arctic powers. The B-2 flightsof 2020 were part of a coordinated show-ofpresence mission to deter Russian activity in
the Arctic.16
Some have attempted to link worsening
climate conditions with the outbreak of wars,
but scholarly debate is still raging. Take Syria’s
civil war, which began in 2011. In 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry told an audience in
Norfolk, Virginia, that “it’s not a coincidence
that immediately prior to the civil war in Syria,
the country experienced its worst drought onrecord.”17 President Obama also suggested that“the droughts that happened in Syria contributed to the Syrian civil war.”18
The claims did not hold up. Scholars differed with respect to the impact of the drought
and the complex causes of the civil war suchas the actions of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. A
paper published by the National Academy of
Sciences linked a rise in global sea temperaturein the Mediterranean to a period of droughtfrom 2007–2010.19
However, a contrasting study showed thatrainfall in Syria was at the drought level of
80 percent of average rainfall only for 2008.

66

Drought alone was not sustained and did notcause the civil war; bad agricultural policies,
which induced more migration to cities, were
found to be more likely contributors.20 Anotheracademic study was even more direct:
We find that there is no clear and reliable
evidence that anthropogenic climatechange was a factor in northeast Syria’s
2006/07–2008/09 drought; we find that,while the 2006/07–2008/09 drought innortheast Syria will have contributed tomigration, this migration was not on thescale claimed in the existing literature,
and was, in all probability, more causedby economic liberalisation than drought;
and we find that there is no clear andreliable evidence that drought-related
migration was a contributory factor in
civil war onset.21

While the DOD seeks to improve its modelling of climate threats, presuming that a
climate crisis will drive certain types of conflicts is a risky proposition. Part of the problem
comes from scaling up data on smaller, isolated
conflicts. For example, a 2016 U.S. intelligencecommunity report found specific cases of small
riots over water access in Mexico, Nigeria, andMauritania.22 This suggests that there may be
a direct relationship between climate change
and small-scale internal conflict, but there
are few, if any, data to suggest that the same
relationship exists in much larger country or
regional-level events. On the contrary, anotherstudy predicted increasing demands for water
to 2040 but noted that “historically, water tensions have led to more water-sharing agreements than violent conflicts.”23
It would therefore be prudent for future modelling to appreciate the limits ofdata relevance.

Policy Clashes with Military Allies
Putting so much emphasis on climatechange could also strain military alliances ifallies disagree on decarbonization goals. Take
the case of Australia. At the April 2021 Climate

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military67

﻿Summit,24 Australia opted to stick with its Vulnerable Bases
goals of reducing carbon emissions by about
One slam-dunk area for analysis should be
26 percent.25 Its goals are in line with the Par- U.S. base vulnerability. In 2021, the DOD adis Climate Accords, and Australia leads the opted an Army climate risk tool and put it toworld in solar panel capacity at 591 watts per work evaluating the more than 5,000 U.S. milperson—eight times the world average.26 This itary installations at home and abroad.
would seem to be a good thing worthy of praise.
The fiscal impacts of climate change can be
Australia was also the world’s second-­ seen clearly in the recent repair bills. Togethlargest exporter of coal at 395 metric tons in er, Hurricane Michael and Hurricane Florence,
2019 compared to Indonesia at 455 metric tons. which hit the Carolinas in September 2018,
Interestingly, China and India were the biggest created a bill of almost $9 billion, primarily forcoal buyers that year. Trade coal accounts for the Air Force (costs of approximately $5 bilonly about one-fifth of global coal consump- lion) and the Marine Corps ($3.3 billion fromtion, implying that coal-produced energy oc- damage to Camp Lejeune and other facilities).29
curs mostly with domestically produced coal While many military construction projects areand further implying that China and India chronically underfunded, the mechanism to
produce huge quantities of coal. Despite a ban identify and characterize them does provide
from China that was implemented in late 2020, transparent funding for base repair.
Australia’s coal exports recovered by feeding
The problem arises when one tries to projthe markets of India and other countries. Chi- ect how hurricanes may increase funding
na produces, purchases, and consumes more needs in the future. Hurricanes are very costly
coal than any other nation per year.27
but notoriously difficult to predict, especially
However, senior Biden Administration years into the future.
officials chose to criticize Australia, saying
For one thing, the historical baseline forthat it was “insufficient for Australia to fol- big storms is spotty. According to data from
low the existing trajectory and hope that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adthey will be on a course to deep decarbon- ministration (NOAA), just four Category 5
ization and getting to net zero emissions by hurricanes have made landfall in the United
mid-century.” The U.S. made no reference States since 1851: the 1935 Labor Day storm,
to China and its prodigious consumption Hurricane Camille in 1969, Hurricane Andrewof coal and production of greenhouse gases. in 1992, and Hurricane Michael in 2018. The
This prompted a rebuttal from Angus Taylor, number of hurricanes making landfall in theAustralia’s Energy and Emissions Reduction continental United States did not increase
Minister, who said that “emissions reductions in either frequency or intensity from 1900
across the globe are what’s necessary here to through 2017. What did increase were the popachieve outcomes.”28
ulations along U.S. coastlines and the overall
Consider, however, that Australia is one of damage costs.30
America’s most crucial military allies in the PaLooking at the data another way, one studycific and, indeed, the world. Australia hosts U.S. determined that warming temperatures afforces for training; maintains hypersonic mis- fected the global spatial distribution of hursile test ranges; joined U.S.-led operations in ricanes from 1988 to 2018 but did not affectAfghanistan, Iraq, and Syria; opposes China’s their frequency. Intriguingly, this same study
5G intrusions; and figures in every scenario projected that increasing greenhouse gas
for keeping peace in the Pacific. In short, the emissions would lead to fewer hurricanes in
U.S.–Australia relationship is of paramount im- coming years.31
portance. Clouding defense cooperation with
What defense official would want to excriticism because of climate change goals could plain a hurricane disaster budget line to Conput larger U.S. defense strategy goals at risk.
gress with data this disparate? Storm repair﻿even in a bad year remains a tiny percentageof the overall defense budget. The DOD has
a workable method for major disaster repair
appropriations and completes them in a single fiscal year.
Keep in mind that money to rebuild militarybases is just one part of the federal response to
weather disasters. In contrast, other government departments fall behind on their storm
mitigation. The National Flood Insurance
Program, for example, “was about $21 billion
in debt to the Department of the Treasury asof April 2019,” and “the Congressional Budget
Office estimated in May 2019 that federal crop
insurance would cost the federal government
an average of about $8 billion annually from2019 through 2029.”32 By wider federal standards, the DOD has a more efficient mechanism for coping with damage from climatechange. Why, then, this imperative for the
DOD to start accounting for the potential consequences of severe weather as if it has been
negligent or unaware?

Impact on Research and Development
Of course, the DOD does more than spendmoney on base repair. Laced throughout thedefense budget are many programs that takeon climate problems. For example, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
has a project called the Reefense program,“which aims to develop novel hybrid biologicaland engineered reef-mimicking structures tomitigate wave and storm damage and reduce
the ecological impact of current coastal protection measures.”33
Energy programs have often taken the lead.
In 2015, the U.S. Navy used 78 million gallons of
biofuel to help power the USS John C. Stennis
Carrier Strike Group.34 Ten years earlier, theU.S. Air Force flew a B-52H bomber using biofuels in all eight engines.35
The Department of Defense operates about
170,000 non-tactical vehicles, a number second only to the number operated by the U.S
Postal Service. As a result, Deputy Secretaryof Defense Kathleen Hicks has called for smart
investment in electrification for that fleet.36

68

Combat vehicles are another matter, but
research is underway. The Army has been investing in research into electric vehicles foryears. In early 2021, a defense contractor developed an electric vehicle prototype for Army
officials in just 12 weeks. The Army will spend$50 million in fiscal year 2022 on electric andmobility vehicle development, although withcaution. “If you took the amount of batteries
with current technology that you would needto move an Abrams tank purely electrically,”according to Brigadier General Glenn Dean,
Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat
Systems, “it’s bigger than the tank, so we have a
packaging and storage problem when it comesto pure electric.”37
There is no reason why the DOD should notleverage commercial development of electricvehicles as part of climate response, but taken as a whole, programs like these run therisk of depleting investment needed to facehigher priorities such as great-power competition. Surely, the men and women of America’s military should not be asked to fight withequipment for which green energy and sustainability were dominant design factors. Carbon
footprint reduction should not become a key
performance parameter for major militarysystems. Such a course would inevitably put
combat performance at risk.

Climate, War Games, andModelling Uncertainty
Injecting climate concerns into formal
modelling of conflict is a tall order. The DOD
counts on highly refined analysis to back up
its internal budget choices and justify themto Congress. For nearly a century, American
military planning has employed scenarios astools for the assessment of tactics and systems
for future combat. The 1930s “color plans” like
War Plan Orange set out detailed plot lines for
war with Japan and even Great Britain.38 The
Army and Navy used these scenarios to gameout moves in battle and learn from the results.
Scenario-based planning dominated during
the Cold War and has created the basis for analyzing China as a pacing threat.

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthInsurers have money on the line and invest
heavily in models to control risk, but the models they use are a case study of the numerous
difficulties involved in modeling for climatechange. One analysis found that climatechange could imply a 3 percent–5 percent
decrease in the total number of potentiallydamaging storms but a 10 percent–20 percent
increase in the number of larger storms in addition to a shift in storm tracks toward Franceand Germany.42 Insurers point out that eventhese sophisticated models cannot cover every
peril in every region.

Conclusion: The DOD’s Long History
with Climate Consequences
The new guidance for the Department of
Defense sets out extremely ambitious targets
for including climate change as a national security priority, but the evidence indicates clearly
that building up a proper analytic foundation
will not be easy. For too long, casual discussionof climate and conflict has led proponents toskim the surface but neglect the tough choices.
What is needed is spadework to bring theclimate “threat analysis” up to the high standards necessary for decisions on national
defense—­if possible. Likewise, the DOD mustacknowledge that every bit of attention given
to climate change comes with a risk of distracting it from the pressing problems of China andRussia (among many others).
Yet the Department of Defense also deserves credit for its solid, quiet work on environmental protection, energy efficiency,
and base resilience, all of which enhance its
overall mission.
Sometimes the DOD does not get enoughcredit for activities already underway such asproviding a “climate-ready force.”43 The DOD
defines this as a force that is ready to train andoperate in extreme temperatures. In this case,the department is well ahead of climate policy
prescriptions.
Not surprisingly, weather has figured inequipment development for a very long time.
For example, the Air Force operates the world’s
largest indoor weather facility at Eglin Air

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military69﻿The current state of climate analysis is
nowhere near the level needed, as the DOD
has recognized. “We will need to incorporate
climate change into our threat assessments,”
Deputy Secretary Hicks has noted. “We must
update our modeling and simulations to reflect
climate change. Warfighting concepts, regionaland country engagement plans, and logistics
planning also need to be updated.”39
What would a climate scenario for the military look like? Recently, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence produced a setof five scenarios set in 2040, including one titled “Tragedy and Mobilization” that captured
climate issues.40 In the scenario, a global foodcatastrophe caused by climate change led toformation of a global coalition led by Europe
and China working with non-governmentalorganizations. Stronger “green” parties won
elections and the scenario culminated with therise of a Human Security Council that distributed food and technology.
Granted, this future scenario was the
product of the intelligence community andis designed to stimulate thought. However, it
contains little insightful future forecasting formilitary operations. With climate change nota principal factor in great-power competition,
asking the military to put in time on scenarios
like this could soon add up to a net loss of analytic capability.
As the DOD proceeds, it is important tonote that climate modelling is known for wide
swings in uncertainty. A World Bank/United Nations report estimated that a rare, major hurricane might strike the U.S. every 38
to 480 years under 2010 weather conditions
but that the probability would shift to every
18 to 89 years with warmer average temperatures.41 Clearly, such a wild analytic range is not
helpful for the refined analysis that the DOD
needs to justify more than $700 billion in annual spending.
It is possible that models can be developed
to bring greater fidelity to climate analysis forthe DOD, but the process is tricky. Leading insurance firm Lloyds found windstorms easier
to model than hurricanes.

﻿Force Base.44 The McKinley Climatic Labo- Corps, of course, got its start building coastratory creates sandstorms, blizzards, and any al forts like the one underneath the Statue ofconditions needed to test aircraft and equip- Liberty and has measured sea-level rise as ament—and has been doing so since 1947. The matter of routine from the late 1790s.
analytic rigor needed for analyzing a climate-­
As for the 17 F-22s trapped in the hangar atready force should start with getting to know Tyndall, none were destroyed. All were back inwhat that force already has to offer.
the air within a month. Despite being caught
The United States military has been mea- by surprise, the Air Force had taken proper
suring sea levels, tracking erosion, improving precautions to protect the irreplaceable jets.
energy efficiency, rebuilding bases after hurri- The F-22s rode out the storm. Four had damcanes, and trying to anticipate conflict trends age to multiple areas including coatings, doors,from the Arctic to the sub-Saharan region for canopies, leading edge, and engine inlet, but
years. For example, the work of the Army Corps their stealth features were fully restored by theof Engineers stretches back decades and even summer of 2019.46
centuries. In 1892, officers of the Corps tookThat was a tribute to something far beyond
a grand jury on a boat tour of Pittsburgh har- climate discussion: the resilience and ingenubor and obtained indictments against 50 firms ity of the men and women who serve in Amerthat were dumping debris into the rivers.45 The ica’s military.

70

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes
1.

Data on Hurricane Michael from U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National
Hurricane Center and Central Pacific Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Michael: Bulletin: Hurricane Michael Intermediate Advisory Number
16A...Corrected, NWS National Hurricane Center Miami FL AL142018, 100 PM CDT Wed Oct 10 2018,” https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
archive/2018/al14/al142018.public_a.016.shtml (accessed July 31, 2021), and news release, “Hurricane Michael Upgraded to Category 5
at Time of U.S. Landfall,” U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, last updated April 19, 2019,https://www.noaa.gov/media-release/hurricane-michael-upgraded-to-category-5-at-time-of-us-landfall (accessed July 31, 2021).

2.

Executive Order 14008, “Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad,” January 27, 2021, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 19 (February
1, 2021), pp. 7619 and 7621, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-02-01/pdf/2021-02177.pdf (accessed August 1, 2021).

3.

News release, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad,” U.S.
Department of Defense, January 27, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2484504/statementby-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-tackling-the-climate-cr/ (accessed July 31, 2021).

4.

Joseph Guzman, “Changing America: Trump Lashes out After Biden Says Joint Chiefs Told Him Greatest Threat to US Is Global
Warming,” The Hill, June 10, 2021, https://thehill.com/changing-america/sustainability/climate-change/557867-trump-lashes-outafter-biden-says-joint-chiefs (accessed July 31, 2021).

5.

David Vergun, “Climate Change Resiliency a High DOD Priority, Deputy Defense Secretary Says,” U.S. Department of Defense,
May 24, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2630037/climate-change-resiliency-a-high-dod-prioritydeputy-defense-secretary-says/ (accessed July 31, 2021).
Executive Order 14008, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 19 (February 1, 2021), p. 7621.
Kathleen Hicks, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Keynote Remarks at Department of Energy ARPA-E Energy Innovation Summit,
May 24, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2630071/deputy-secretary-of-defense-drkathleen-hicks-delivers-keynote-remarks-at-the-d/ (accessed August 3, 2021).

8.

Daniel E. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
statement before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, January 29, 2019, p. 23, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/
documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf (accessed July 31, 2021).

9.

U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Centers for Environmental
Information, Significant Earthquake Database, “January 12, 2010 DART [Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami]
Data,” https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/dart/2010haiti_dart.html (accessed July 31, 2021).

﻿

6.
7.

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Information, “On This Day: 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami,” March 11, 2021, https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/day-2011japan-earthquake-and-tsunami (accessed July 30, 2021).
11. Andrew Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Japan 2011 Earthquake: Department of Defense (DOD) Response,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress No. R41690, June 2, 2011, p. 1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41690.pdf (accessed July 31, 2021).
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13. Adm. James Stavridis, “The Climate and U.S. National Security: A Conversation Series,” The Cipher Brief, January 21, 2021, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/the-climate-and-u-s-national-security-a-conversation-series (accessed July 31, 2021).
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June 18, 2020, https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Press-Releases/Article/2224362/b-2s-fly-north-of-arctic-circle-integrate-withnorwegian-f-35s/ (accessed July 31, 2021).
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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military7120. Lina Eklund and Darcy Thompson, “Is Syria Really a ‘Climate War’? We Examined the Links Between Drought, Migration andConflict,” The Conversation, July 21, 2017, https://theconversation.com/is-syria-really-a-climate-war-we-examined-the-linksbetween-drought-migration-and-conflict-80110 (accessed July 31, 2021).
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https://www.smh.com.au/world/north-america/insufficient-biden-administration-criticises-australia-on-climate-20210422p57lb9.html (accessed August 1, 2021).

﻿

29. The Air Force had another $350 million in expenses from flooding at Offut Air Force Base, located in Nebraska, that same year.
30. Phillip J. Klotzbach, Steven G. Bowen, Roger Pielke Jr., and Michael Bell, “Continental U.S. Hurricane Landfall Frequency and
Associated Damage: Observations and Future Risks, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Vol. 99, Issue 7 (July 2018),
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Change in Global Distribution of Tropical Cyclones,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 117, No. 20 (May 19,2020), pp. 10706–10714, https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/117/20/10706.full.pdf (accessed August 1, 2021).
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Exposure, GAO-20-338T, December 19, 2019, p. 8 https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-338t.pdf (accessed August 2, 2021).
33. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “DARPA Launches Program to Mitigate Coastal Flooding,
Erosion and Storm Damage,” December 17, 2020, https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2020-12-17# (accessed August 1, 2021).
34. Wyatt Olsen, “Navy Launching First Great Green Fleet, Stars and Stripes, January 15, 2016, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/navy-launching-first-great-green-fleet-next-week-1.388769 (accessed August 1, 2021).
35. U.S. Air Force, “B-52 Flight Uses Synthetic Fuel in All Eight Engines,” December 15, 2006, https://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/Article/128702/b-52-flight-uses-synthetic-fuel-in-all-eight-engines/ (accessed August 1, 2021).
36. Hicks, Keynote Remarks at Department of Energy ARPA-E Energy Innovation Summit.
37. Jen Judson, “Is the Army Warming up to Electric Vehicles in Its Fleet?” Defense News, July 12, 2021, https://www.defensenews.
com/land/2021/07/12/is-the-army-warming-up-to-electric-vehicles-in-its-fleet/ (accessed August 2, 2021).
38. Henry G. Cole, The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), pp.
xviii and 22–23.
39. Hicks, Keynote Remarks at Department of Energy ARPA-E Energy Innovation Summit.
40. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World, National Intelligence
Council Publication NIC 2021-02339, March 2021, pp. 118–119, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/
GlobalTrends_2040.pdf (accessed July 31, 2021).
41. World Bank and United Nations, Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective Prevention,
The World Bank, 2010, pp. 20–21, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/620631468181478543/
pdf/578600PUB0epi2101public10BOX353782B.pdf (accessed July 31, 2021).

72

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength42. Ralf Toumi and Lauren Rostell, “Catastrophe Modeling and Climate Change,” Lloyd’s, 2014, p. 14, https://www.lloyds.com/~/media/
lloyds/reports/emerging-risk-reports/cc-and-modelling-template-v6.pdf (accessed July 31, 2021).
43. David Vergun, “Climate Change Resiliency a High DOD Priority, Deputy Defense Secretary Says,” U.S. Department of Defense,
May 24, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2630037/climate-change-resiliency-a-high-dod-prioritydeputy-defense-secretary-says/ (accessed July 31, 2021).
44. Kirk Velasco, “McKinley Climatic Laboratory Home to World’s Largest Climatic Chamber,” Arnold Air Force Base, September 8,
2020, https://www.arnold.af.mil/News/Commentaries/Display/Article/2338681/mckinley-climatic-laboratory-home-to-worldslargest-climatic-chamber/ (accessed July 31, 2021).
45. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A Brief History, https://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/
Brief-History-of-the-Corps/ (accessed July 31, 2021).
46. Lockheed Martin, “F-22s After the Storm: Tyndall’s Raptors Ride Out Hurricane Michael,” 2019, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/
en-us/news/features/2019-features/f-22-after-the-storm--tyndalls-raptors-ride-out-hurricane-michae.html (accessed July 31,2021).

﻿The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military73﻿Global Operating‌
Environment

Assessing the Global
Operating Environment

M

Likewise, nations where the U.S. has stationed
assets or permanent bases and countries fromwhich the U.S. has launched military operations in the past may provide needed support for future U.S. military operations. The
relationships and knowledge gained throughany of these factors would undoubtedly ease
future U.S. military operations in a region
and contribute greatly to a positive operating
environment.
In addition to U.S. defense relations within a region, additional criteria—including thequality of the local infrastructure, the politicalstability of the area, whether or not a country
is embroiled in any conflicts, and the degree towhich a nation is economically free—should
also be considered.
Then there are low likelihood–high consequence events that occur infrequently but,when they do happen, can radically alter conditions in ways that affect U.S. interests. Massive
natural disasters like Typhoon Tip in 19791 or
the explosion of Mount Tambora in 18162 candisplace populations, upend regional power
arrangements, or destroy critical infrastructure. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo did justthat in 1991, causing so much damage to Clark
Airbase and Subic Bay Naval Station that thecost, combined with diplomatic frictions between the U.S. and the Philippines, led the U.S.
to abandon these strategic facilities.3 A massive solar flare could have a similar impact ona much larger scale because of the level of dependence on electrical power across our world.
Scientists, analysts, planners, and officials in

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military77

﻿easuring the “strength” of a militaryforce—the extent to which that force canaccomplish missions—requires examination of
the environments in which the force operates.
Aspects of one environment may facilitate military operations; aspects of another may work
against them. A favorable operating environment presents the U.S. military with obvious
advantages; an unfavorable operating environment may limit the effect of U.S. military
power. The capabilities and assets of U.S. allies,
the strength of foes, the region’s geopoliticalenvironment, and the availability of forwardfacilities and logistics infrastructure all factor
into whether an operating environment can
support U.S. military operations.
When assessing an operating environment,
one must pay particular attention to any U.S.
treaty obligations with countries in the region. A treaty defense obligation ensures thatthe legal framework is in place for the U.S. tomaintain and operate a military presence in aparticular country. In addition, a treaty partnership usually yields regular training exercises and interoperability as well as political andeconomic ties.
Additional factors—including the militarycapabilities of allies that might be useful to
U.S. military operations; the degree to which
the U.S. and allied militaries in the region areinteroperable and can use, for example, common means of command, communication, andother systems; and whether the U.S. maintains
key bilateral alliances with nations in theregion—­also affect the operating environment.

and related financial accounts that have comeunder tremendous pressure have caused problems for allied countries that would otherwise
work to ensure that their military forces areable to work together effectively. The impactof the pandemic on specific countries is addressed in the assessments of military readiness, political stability, and access to training,
exercise, and operational basing opportunities.
Each of these factors contributes to an informed judgment as to whether a particular
operating environment is favorable or unfavorable to future U.S. military operations. The
operating environment assessment is meant to
add critical context to complement the threat
environment and U.S. military assessmentsthat are detailed in subsequent sections of
the 2022 Index.
A final note: This Index refers to all disputed territories by the names employed by theUnited States Department of State and should
not be seen as reflecting a position on any ofthese disputes.

﻿public and commercial ventures study suchthings but seldom take concrete action to mitigate their potential impact.
For the past couple of years, the world has
been shaken by the COVID-19 pandemic thathas caused governments to spend extraordinary sums of money not only to manage thepublic health crisis, but also to mitigate theeconomic impact on their countries. The economic and societal stresses stemming fromthe pandemic have put terrific pressureson political establishments. They also havecaused funding for such essential government functions as defense to be reallocatedto meet the more immediate demands of thepandemic and—given the threat of contagion—­mitigation measures to be adopted at the expense of military exercises, training events,
and deployments.
It remains to be seen what the long-term
consequences will be, but for the assessed yearof 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic is still having an impact. Training activities that would
normally keep military forces in a ready status

78

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes
1.

Meghan Evans, “Earth’s Strongest, Most Massive Storm Ever,” Scientific American, October 12, 2012, https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/earths-strongest-most-massive-storm-ever/ (accessed July 6, 2021).

2.

Robert Evans, “Blast from the Past: The Eruption of Mount Tambora Killed Thousands, Plunged Much of the World into a Frightful
Chill and Offers Lessons for Today,” Smithsonian Magazine, July 2002, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/blast-from-thepast-65102374/ (accessed July 6, 2021).

3.

Philip Shenon, “U.S. Will Abandon Volcano-Ravaged Air Base, Manila Is Told,” The New York Times, July 16, 1991, https://www.
nytimes.com/1991/07/16/world/us-will-abandon-volcano-ravaged-air-base-manila-is-told.html (accessed July 6, 2021).

﻿

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military79﻿Europe
Daniel KochisTefforts to destabilize Western cohesion. In
addition, the threat posed by Chinese investments, technology, and propaganda efforts tothe transatlantic alliance have begun to movetoward center stage.
The 50 countries in the U.S. European
Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility include approximately one-fifth of theworld’s population, over 10 million square
miles of land, and 13 million square miles ofocean. Some of America’s oldest (France) andclosest (the United Kingdom) allies are foundin Europe. The U.S. and Europe share a strong
commitment to the rule of law, human rights,
free markets, and democracy. During the 20th
century, millions of Americans fought alongside European allies in defense of these sharedideals—the foundations on which America was built.
America’s economic ties to the region are
likewise important. A stable, secure, and economically viable Europe is in America’s economic interest. For more than 70 years, the U.S.
military presence has contributed to regional
security and stability, and both Europeans andAmericans have benefited economically. The
member states of the European Union (EU),along with the United States, account for approximately half of the global economy, andthe U.S. and EU member countries are generally each other’s principal trading partners.
Europe is also important to the U.S. becauseof its geographical proximity to some of theworld’s most dangerous and contested regions.
From the eastern Atlantic Ocean to the Middle

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he past year saw steady U.S. reengagement
on European defense. A proposed largescale withdrawal of troops from Germany wascancelled; an important agreement on enhanced defense cooperation was signed with
Poland; an increased focus on Arctic security
came more clearly into view; and investments
in exercises, infrastructure, and rotational deployments continued. A poorly planned andexecuted withdrawal from Afghanistan in August tarnished U.S. credibility. European allies
remain upset over a lack of U.S. consultationand communication as well as ongoing downstream impact.
NATO underwent a strategic reflection
process and continues to operationalize newdecisions, exercises, and structures to bolster
collective defense and address the emerging
challenges of an evolving security landscape.
The Wuhan coronavirus pandemic affected
defense exercises, making it necessary to repurpose military resources for pandemic response. It also showcased new propaganda
vectors to be used by adversaries but did notaffect NATO’s collective defense posture.
Admiral Robert Burke, Commander of U.S.
Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Africa,and Allied Joint Forces Command Naples has
described the European and African theaters
as “the forefront of great power competition.”1
External threats to European security include
the continued risk of Russian aggression toward the eastern states of NATO, Russian activity in the Arctic, a growing Russian presencein the Mediterranean theater, and Russian﻿East, up to the Caucasus through Russia, andinto the Arctic, Europe is enveloped by an arcof instability. The European region also hassome of the world’s most vital shipping lanes,
energy resources, and trade choke points.
European basing allows U.S. forces to respond robustly and quickly to challenges to
U.S. economic and security interests in andnear the region. Russian naval activity in the
North Atlantic and Arctic has necessitated arenewed focus on regional command and control and has led to increased operations by U.S.
and allied air and naval assets in the Arctic, andRussia’s strengthened position in Syria has led
to a resurgence of Russian activity in the Mediterranean that has contributed to “congested”
conditions.2
Speaking at an Atlantic Council meeting inMarch 2019, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman
General Joseph Dunford explained that the U.S.
has two key advantages over adversaries: “ournetwork of allies and partners, and the ability
to project power where and when necessary
to advance our national interest.”3 Nowhereis the value of allies and U.S. basing more apparent than it is in the European operating
environment.
U.S. Reinvestment in Europe. Russia’scontinued aggression has caused the U.S. to
reinvest in military capabilities on the continent. In April 2014, the U.S. launched Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR), a series of actions
meant to reassure U.S. allies in Europe, particularly those bordering Russia. Under OAR
and funded through the European Deterrence
Initiative (EDI), the U.S. has increased its forward presence in Europe (approximately 6,000
soldiers take part in OAR missions and training
at any one time across 19 nations);4 invested inEuropean basing infrastructure and in prepositioned stocks and equipment and supplies;
engaged in enhanced multinational training
exercises; and negotiated agreements for increased cooperation with NATO allies.
European Deterrence Initiative. Despite
the Trump Administration’s proposal to reduce U.S. force levels in Europe, its FY 2021
request for the EDI, although less than the $682billion requested in FY 2020 and the $6.5 billion requested in FY 2019, was still $4.5 billion.5
In FY 2020, EDI-funded requests included(among others):
l

l

l

l

“Continued presence of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) with enablers,a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), and a
Battalion to support NATO’s Enhanced
Forward Presence (eFP)”;“Upgrade[d] Theater Anti-Submarine
Warfare infrastructure”;“Retain[ed] F-15C fighter aircraft in Europe” along with continued prepositioning of equipment; and“Enhanced scale and scope of rotationaland deployed force element participationin exercise and training events in supportof USEUCOM priority lines of effort.”6

Testifying in April 2021, General Tod Wolters, Commander, U.S. European Command(EUCOM), and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), highlighted theimportance of EDI funding in returning theUnited States to a posture of deterrence:
EDI enhances our theater posture to
deter adversaries and compete in acontested logistics environment, while
assuring Allies and Partners. Increases inforward stationed and rotational forces
strengthen our contact, blunt, and surge
layer capabilities, providing us the ability
to compete and win in a multi-domain
crisis or conflict. EDI investments improve
our response using more robust theater
infrastructure and prepositioned stocks.
Funding for exercises, training, and building partner capacity bolster the readinessand interoperability of U.S. and Allianceforces. Together, these advances enable our deterrence and defense efforts
through rapid deployment and sustainment of forces.7

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

CHART 1

European Deterrence
Initiative in Decline
The European Deterrence
Initiative (EDI) bolsters
NATO collective defense
by funding U.S. rotational
troop deployments to
Europe and critical military
infrastructure, as well as
exercises and capacitybuilding with allies.

$8 BILLION

$6.5

$7

$5.9

$6

$4.8

$5
$4

$4.5
$3.7

$3.4

$3
$2
$1
$0

$1.0

$0.8

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

NOTE: Figures for 2021 and 2022 are budget requests.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal
Year (FY) 2022: European Deterrence Initiative, June 2021, p. 2, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/
FY2022/FY2022_EDI_JBook.pdf (accessed September 2, 2021), and Frederico Bartels and Daniel Kochis, “Congress Should Transformthe European Deterrence Initiative into an Enduring Commitment,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3319, May 29, 2018,https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/congress-should-transform-the-european-deterrence-initiative-enduring-commitment.
A heritage.org

﻿The EDI has supported infrastructure
improvements across the region. One major
EDI-funded project is a replacement hospital at
Landstuhl, Germany. When completed in 2022,
the new permanent facility “will provide state-of
the-art combat and contingency medical support
to service members from EUCOM, AFRICOM
and CENTCOM.”8 Landstuhl’s importance is illustrated by the fact that in early March 2020, it
was one of the first two overseas U.S. laboratories
to be capable of testing for coronavirus.9
In addition to the EDI, the Department ofState has awarded $277 million in grants since
2018 through its European Recapitalization
Incentive Program (ERIP) and repurposed
funds to help U.S. allies in Europe replace
Russian equipment with U.S.-made equipment.
This has led to $2.5 billion in equipment sales
including procurement of Black Hawk helicopters in Albania, Lithuania, and Slovakia;
Stryker vehicles in North Macedonia; BradleyFighting Vehicles in Croatia; Bell Huey II helicopters in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and F16
purchases in Bulgaria.10
Forward Presence. In July 2021, the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) of the
1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas,
replaced the outgoing BCT in the eighth armored rotation in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. The BCT included “approximately
3,800 Soldiers, 80 tanks, 130 Bradley Fighting
Vehicles, 15 Paladins, more than 500 tracked
vehicles and more than 1,500 wheeled vehicles
and equipment.”11
Former Army Chief of Staff General Mark
Milley has emphasized the value of groundforces in deterrence: “The air [and] maritime
capabilities are very important, but I would
submit that ground forces play an outsize rolein conventional deterrence and conventional
assurance of allies. Because your physical presence on the ground speaks volumes.”12

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military83﻿

In addition to back-to-back rotations of armor, the U.S. has maintained a rotational aviation brigade in Europe since February 2017.13
As of March 2021, 1st Combat Aviation Brigade,1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas,
was to be the seventh aviation rotation with
1,800 troops, 10 CH-47 Chinooks, 25 AH-64
Apaches, 50 UH-60 and HH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters, and “1,800 wheeled vehicles andpieces of equipment.”14 The majority of the brigade is “stationed in Germany, with a forward
presence in Latvia, Romania and Poland.”15
The Biden Administration cancelled plans
put in place in July 2020 to withdraw nearly
12,000 troops from Germany. Instead, in April
2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced an increase of 500 U.S. troops to bestationed permanently at Wiesbaden.16 The U.S.
also announced that it will retain three facilities that under the previous plan were to beturned back over to the German government.
In May 2018, the U.S. began to fly MQ-9
Reaper drones on unarmed reconnaissanceflights out of Miroslawiec Airbase in Poland.
The drones became fully operational in March
2019 when U.S. Air Force (USAF) officials
stated that Poland was chosen for the MQ-9s
because of its “strategic location.”17 In June
2020, runway work at Miroslawiec caused
drones to be moved temporarily to Ämari Air
Base in Estonia, marking the first-time thatunmanned U.S. aircraft have operated outof Estonia.18
In the past, runway work has led to MQ9s operating out of Campia Turzii Air Base in
Romania. In January 2021, the U.S. announced
that 90 USAF personnel and an unspecified
number of MQ-9s would be based at Campia
Turzii “to conduct intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance missions in support ofNATO operations.”19 According to General Jeffrey Harrigian, Commander of U.S. Air Forcesin Europe, U.S. Air Forces Africa, and Allied
Air Command, the base’s location 300 miles
from the coast “really facilitates our ability
to compete in the Black Sea.”20 The Air Forcehas declined to say whether the deployment ispermanent.21 In addition to Miroslawiec and84

Campia Turzii, the U.S. also operates MQ-9s
out of Lask Air Base in Poland.22
In August 2020, the U.S. and Poland signed
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which entered into force in November
2020. The agreement increases U.S. rotational
forces in Poland by 1,000 people (for a total of
5,500) and provides for more exercises and infrastructure development that will be able tosupport a deployment of 20,000 U.S. troops if
necessary in the future.23 In addition:[The agreement] covers matters such as
the establishment of a forward divisioncommand in Poznan, stationing of arotationally-present armoured brigade inŻagań-Świętoszów, deployment of Reaper UAVs squadron to Łask, the establishment of a Polish-US combat training
centre (CTC) in Drawsko Pomorskie, theestablishment of an airlift cargo hub
for USAF in Wrocław-Starachowice, theestablishment of the presence of an Army
Aviation Brigade on a rotational basis,
and a logistics battalion as well as special
ops facility in Powidz, and another special
ops facility in Lubliniec.24

The agreement also ironed out legal andcost-sharing arrangements for the increased
U.S. presence.25 On November 9, 2020, the U.S.
Army’s V Corps, which had been deactivated in2013, was reactivated, to be fully operational in
November 2021.26 Forward deployed at Poznan,
Poland, it will remain headquartered at Fort
Knox, Kentucky.27
The U.S. has strengthened its presence in
Norway as well. In April 2021, the two nations
signed the Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement, which allows the U.S. to build
additional infrastructure at Rygge and Sola Air
Stations in southern Norway, as well as Evenes
Air Station and Ramsund Naval Station above
the Arctic Circle.28 Construction at Evenes will
support Norwegian and allied maritime patrolaircraft monitoring of Russian submarine activity. According to Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Soereide, “The agreement

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military85﻿reaffirms Norway’s close relationship with theRussian undersea activity continues at an
U.S. and confirms Norway’s key position on the elevated level. The U.S. Navy reestablished thenorthern flank of NATO.”29
2nd Fleet, which is “responsible for the northIn August 2020, the Marine Corps an- ern Atlantic Ocean,” in May 2018 nearly sevennounced the end of heel-to-toe rotations of 700 years after 2011 when it had been disbanded.39
Marines to Norway, which began in 2017, opt- The 2nd Fleet reached full operational capaing for shorter, more sporadic deployments.30 bility at the end of 2019.40 The fleet was reesThe first new deployment in October 2020 tablished because of Russian militarization of
consisted of 400 Marines, and in the second, the Arctic.41 “This is where the fight is…where
1,000 Marines were deployed to Setermoen, the competition is,” according to Vice Admiral
Norway, from January–March 2021 for Arc- Andrew Lewis, Commander of the 2nd Fleet.
tic warfare training.31 Major General Patrick J. “Specifically in the Atlantic [and] the undersea
Hermesmann, former Commander of U.S. Ma- capability of the Russians.”42 In March 2021,
rine Corps Forces Europe & Africa, has noted in a statement exercise, three Russian ballisthe growing relationship between Norway and tic missile submarines punched through ice inthe U.S. through “shared hardship of tough, re- the Arctic near the North Pole.43
alistic training in this austere environment.”32
For Vice Admiral Lewis, “Anti-submarine
In addition to ground forces, in February warfare is a primary mission for everybody
and March 2021, four B-1 Lancers were based in the United States Navy, regardless of what
out of Ørland Air Station in southern Norway, you wear on your chest.”44 Admiral Burke has
marking the first time the aircraft have been stated that the 6th Fleet keeps units operatingbased in Norway.33 The Lancers conducted “nearly continuously” in the Arctic and thattraining exercises with allies Denmark, Ger- U.S. submarines “really dominate that area.”45
many, Italy, Norway, and Poland while also The U.S. also has capable partners in patrolling
practicing landing and refueling at Bodø Air Arctic waters:
Base above the Arctic Circle.34
In October 2020, at the behest of the Unit“UK [and] France to name two extremely
ed States, Norway announced the reopening
reliable [and] capable partners. Canada…
of Olavsvern bunker, a mountainside submaNorway…all contribute significantly to therine base near Tromsø with “9,800ft of deep
theater of undersea warfare fight. Denwater underground docks that can house andmark is expanding their capabilities. Now
35
refit nuclear submarines.” The base, whichalmost every one of those nations that I’ve
had been closed in 2002, is now open to U.S.
mentioned now have significant airborne
Seawolf-class nuclear submarines.36
maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft, if
The U.S. also continues to rotate a Sustainnot the P-8A version, closely resembling
ment Task Force “comprised of nearly 1,000
the P-8 capabilities. Many have bought verpersonnel and 200 pieces of equipment” fromsions similar to the P-8. Their surface com“11 active duty, U.S. Army Reserve and National
batants today are incredibly capable too.46
Guard units.” The units that make up the task
force are varied and “include ammunition, fuel,In recent years, the U.S. has also made amovement control, transportation, mainte- point of publicly acknowledging the surfacnance, ordnance, supply, and postal services.”37 ing of nuclear-powered submarines in Arctic
Operation Atlantic Resolve’s naval compo- waters as a message of deterrence. One suchnent has consisted partly of increased deploy- example occurred in May 2021, when thements of U.S. ships to the Baltic and Black Seas Virginia-­class submarine USS New Mexico
since 2014. However, in 2020, the U.S. spent 82 docked in Tromsø, Norway.47
days in the Black Sea, which is 27 less that theOutside the Arctic, as explained by Admi38
109 days it spent in 2019.
ral Burke, “advances in its submarine fleet and﻿expanding maritime strategic goals have reinvigorated Russia’s access to the broader Atlantic Ocean.”48 These changes have led officials
to state that the U.S. east coast is no longer “asafe haven.”49
Prepositioned Stocks. The U.S. continues
to preposition equipment in Europe acrossall services. Equipment and ammunition sufficient to support a division will continue toarrive in Europe through 2021.50 The U.S. Air
Force, Special Forces, and Marine Corps arestrengthening their prepositioned stocks, andthe Marine Corps Prepositioning Program in
Norway is emphasizing cold-weather equipment.51 The services’ Force Design 2030 couldchange what is stored in the depot with an emphasis on rocket artillery, air-defense systems,
and long-range unmanned aircraft while deemphasizing helicopters and tanks.52 DOD’s
FY 2021 budget proposal includes “funding
to continue the build of a division-sized setof prepositioned equipment with corps-level
enablers that is planned to contain two ABCTs(one of which is modernized), two Fires Brigades, air defense, engineer, movement control,
sustainment and medical units.”53
In February 2020, General Gustave F. Perna,Commanding General of the U.S. Army Materiel Command, revealed that the U.S. is building
an additional Army prepositioned stock set
for Europe.54 In April 2021, General Wolters
testified that:[W]e expect to establish a U.S.
division-sized capability through the
combination of forward-stationed forces,
rotational forces, and Army Prepositioned
Stocks (APS). APS equipment facilitates
increased agility and lethality by enabling
rapid integration of rotational combat
units into operations. During Exercise
DEFENDER-Europe 20, U.S. Army Europe
and NATO Allies successfully exercisedat the battalion and brigade levels, andwe plan to assemble a divisional formation on NATO’s Eastern flank in Exercise
DEFENDER-Europe 24, the first since theend of the Cold War.55

86

In May 2021, General Christopher Cavoli,
Commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa,
noted a difference in focus between Defender Europe 2020 (northeastern Europe) and
Defender Europe 2021 (southeastern Europe): “[With] Defender 2021 we have decided to exercise the ports, and the airports, andthe rail lines, and the roadways throughout
southeastern Europe.”56 Defender Europe 21
will involve 26 nations, including the U.S., andaround 28,000 multinational forces in addition
to several smaller exercises including:
Swift Response, which involves airborne
operations in Estonia, Bulgaria andRomania; Immediate Response, which
involves more than 5,000 troops fromeight nations conducting live-fire training
in 12 different countries; Saber Guardian,which includes more than 13,000 service
members doing live-fire training as wellas air and missile defense operations;and a command post exercise with 2,000
personnel exercising the ability of aheadquarters to command multinational
land forces.57

Impact of COVID -19. The impact of
COVID-19 was felt across the alliance, but it
did not alter the alliance’s ability to carry out
the vital work of collective defense. In November 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that:
NATO Allies and our militaries have been
supporting each other and our partners
throughout this pandemic—transporting
critical medical supplies, patients andexperts; setting up military field hospitals
and securing borders; supporting civilian
efforts and helping to save lives. At thesame time, we remain vigilant and ready,because NATO’s main responsibility is
to make sure this health crisis does not
become a security crisis.58

NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
Coordination Centre (EADRCC) helped to2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military87

﻿coordinate assistance based on requests andAnother important impact of the pandemthe availability of supplies. In April 2020, ic was cancellation, postponement, or modiNATO foreign ministers directed Supreme Al- fication of exercises. Defender 2020, which
lied Commander Wolters to help coordinate was to be “the U.S. Army’s largest exercise in
the matching of requests for aid with offers of Europe in 25 years, ranging across ten counassistance and to utilize excess airlift capac- tries and involving 37,000 troops from at least
ity to ease the transport of essential supplies 18 countries, of which 20,000 soldiers will be
across borders.59 NATO’s Strategic Airlift Ca- deployed from the United States to Europe,”66
pability (SAC), “a multinational programme and drawing heavily on prepositioned equipthat provides assured access to strategic ment, was significantly scaled back, and linked
military airlift capability for its 12 member exercises “Dynamic Front, Joint Warfighting
nations,”60 was leveraged for pandemic re- Assessment, Saber Strike and Swift Response”
sponse. The NATO secretary general’s 2020 were cancelled.67 Another linked exercise, Alannual report specifies that military forces of lied Spirit, was postponed from May 2020 toNATO allies had flown more than 350 flights June 2020 and scaled back. The U.S. and Poto transport medical personnel, transported land were the only participating countries,
more than 1,500 tons of equipment, and helped only 6,000 of a planned 10,000 soldiers took
to build almost 100 field hospitals.61 NATO also part, and “NATO’s strategic airlift capability
established a Pandemic Response Trust Fund, [was] no longer included.”68
located in Romania and managed out of TaranDespite these changes, the scaled back Deto, Italy, which stockpiles medical equipment fender 2020 was an important exercise thatand supplies for allies and partners.62“brought more than 6,000 soldiers and 3,000
In addition to NATO facilitation, allies have pieces of equipment from the US to Europe via
assisted one another during the pandemic in air and sea and saw 9,000 pieces of equipment
numerous ways.63 Because of U.S. overseas bas- drawn from Army prepositioned stocks on theing, despite a poor vaccine rollout in most of continent.”69
Europe, thousands of Europeans who are emBecause of coronavirus-related concerns,
ployed by the U.S. military or who are eligible BALTOPS 2020, which took place in June 2020,
dependents received vaccines at U.S. bases on for the first time did not include amphibious
the continent.64 Additionally:
landings. The lack of amphibious landings,
however, allowed for a focus on other areas inNATO assisted local authorities to fightcluding testing the ability of NATO’s maritime
COVID-19 where the Alliance is deheadquarters in Lisbon “to coordinate with 6th
ployed. For example, in Afghanistan, theFleet headquarters in Naples, Italy, NATO opNATO-led Resolute Support Mission
eration centers and forces in the Baltic Sea.”70
contributed to fighting the pandemic
U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe. In his
with the provision of critical supplies to2021 EUCOM posture statement, General
Afghan security forces in 14 provinces,
Wolters reaffirmed that “[a]s long as nuclear
with several Allies providing essential
weapons exist, NATO must remain a nuclear
equipment. In Iraq, essential medical
Alliance. NATO’s nuclear capability preserves
equipment was delivered in coordination
peace, prevents coercion, deters aggression,
with NATO Mission Iraq. In Kosovo, theand instills confidence in the transatlantic
NATO-led Kosovo Force donated personbond. The Alliance’s strategic forces guaral protective equipment to hospitals andantee security and backstop U.S. operationsdelivered more than 50 donations of foodin Europe.”71
and clothing to 14 Kosovo municipalities,
It is believed that until the end of thein coordination with local charities andCold War, the U.S. maintained approximately
the Red Cross of Kosovo.65
2,500 nuclear warheads in Europe. Unofficial﻿

estimates range between 150 and 200 warheads spread out across bases in Belgium, Italy,
Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey.72
In October 2019, reports surfaced that
the U.S. was considering moving the approximately 50 tactical nuclear weapons stored at
Incirlik Air Base in Turkey in light of ongoing tensions, but this does not appear to have
happened.73 All of these weapons are free-fallgravity bombs designed for use with U.S. andallied dual-­capable aircraft. Although tactical nuclear weapons are forward deployed to
Incirlik, “there are no aircraft capable of delivering the B-61 gravity bombs co-located at
Incirlik Airbase.”74 The U.S. has nuclear sharing
agreements with Belgium, Italy, Germany, andthe Netherlands that allow for U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to be delivered by allied aircraft,
but no such agreement is in force with Turkey:“The weapons at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey aresolely for use on U.S. aircraft.”75
The B61 nuclear gravity bomb that is “deployed from U.S. Air Force and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) bases” is undergoing a life extension program that is expectedto add at least 20 years to its service life and“improve the bomb’s safety, security, and effectiveness.”76 The B61-12 bomb, according to U.S.
officials, is “intended to be three times more accurate than its predecessors.”77 The first production unit is slated for FY 2022 with production
completed in 2025.78 In November 2020, the U.S.
tested the B61-12 successfully with an F-35A following tests with the F-15E and B-2 bomber.79
China. At NATO’s 2019 leaders meeting in
London, the alliance “recognize[d] that China’s
growing influence and international policies
present both opportunities and challenges that
we need to address together as an Alliance.”80
Issues of concern include budding Russian
and Chinese military cooperation as well as
Chinese technology, propaganda, offensive
cyber capabilities, and control of critical infrastructure in Europe, all of which affect NATO’smember states. In an interview, Admiral Burke
noted the potential risk to U.S. and alliance interests from Chinese infrastructure acquisitions in Europe:

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Today, the Chinese have a controlling interest in 12 European ports. So, are NATOcountries going to be able to count on
those ports for Free Trade, and if NATOhas to defend Europe, will they allow us
into those ports to refuel, resupply, dorepairs, rearm? We don’t know if we cancount on that. It’s a troubling patternand our European partners are increasingly aware and awakened to this potential threat.81

In the same interview, he observed that the
Chinese are “increasingly present” in the Mediterranean not just with investments, but alsowith warships.82

Important Alliances and Bilateral
Relations in Europe
The United States has a number of important multilateral and bilateral relationships inEurope. First and foremost is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the world’s mostimportant and arguably most successful defense alliance.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NATO is an intergovernmental, multilateral
security organization that was designed originally to defend Western Europe from the Soviet Union. It anchored the U.S. firmly in Europe,solidified Western resolve during the Cold
War, and rallied European support following
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. NATO has been the
bedrock of transatlantic security cooperation
ever since its creation in 1949 and is likely toremain so for the foreseeable future.
In April 2021, following a U.S. decision towithdraw forces from Afghanistan, NATO declared “that there is no military solution to
the challenges Afghanistan faces”83 and ended Operation Resolute Support, a non-combat
operation intended to provide “training, advice
and assistance to Afghan security forces andinstitutions.”84 The withdrawal of alliance forces began on May 1, 2021.85
Two ongoing NATO operations are Kosovo
Force (KFOR) and Operation Sea Guardianin the Mediterranean to maintain “maritime

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 1China’s Ownership Stake in European Ports, Airports, and Railways
North
Sea

U.K.

1
4 2 3
5

1

6

Atlantic
Ocean

POLANDGERMANY

1
2

UKRAINE

FRANCE

3 4

2
HUNGARY

ITALY
7

9

ROMANIA

8

BUL.

15
14
13

5

SPAIN

RUSSIA

BELARUS

16

GREECE

10Black Sea

TURKEY

12
11

ALGERIA﻿

MOROCCO

Mediterranean
Sea

PORTS
11

AIRPORTS
11

U.K.—Heathrow Airport

22 Belgium—Zeebrugge (Bruges)

2

Germany—Frankfurt-Hahn Airport

33 Belgium—Antwerp Gateway

3

Slovenia—Ljubljana Airport

44 France—Terminal des Flandres (Dunkirk)

4

Slovenia—Maribor Airport

55 France—Terminal de France (Le Havre)

5

Albania—Tirana Airport

Netherlands—Euromax Terminal (Rotterdam)

Unknown
Less than Half
Nearly Half
Majority
Owns

Unknown
Less than Half
Nearly Half
Majority
Owns

LIBYA

66 France—Terminal du Grand Ouest (Nantes)
77 France—Eurofos Terminal (Marseille)

RAILWAYS

88 Italy—Vado Reefer Terminal (Genoa)

11

Germany—Port of Duisburg

99 Spain—Noatum Container Terminal (Bilbao)

2

Hungary—BILK Kombiterminal

10 Spain—Noatum Container Terminal (Valencia)
101111 Malta—Malta Freeport Terminal (Birżebbuġa)12 Greece—Piraeus Container Terminal
121313 Bulgaria—Port of Burgas* Includes Terminaux Nord and Terminal de France
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

14 Bulgaria—Port of Varna
14
15 Romania—Port of Constanta
15
16 Turkey—Kumport Sea Terminal (Istanbul)
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situational awareness, counter-terrorism at
sea and support to capacity-building.”86 Additional operations include Airborne Surveillance and Interception Capabilities to meet
Iceland’s Peacetime Preparedness Needs;
NATO Air Policing over the Baltics, Albania,
Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania, and Slovenia;87 and support to the African Union Missionin Somalia through occasional air and sealifts
while helping to train and build capacity in the
African Standby Force.88
Finally, there is NATO Mission Iraq (NMI),a non-combat mission to train and build thecapacity of Iraqi Security Forces. In February
2021, following an Iraqi government request inlate 2020, NATO defense ministers agreed toincrease the size of NMI and expand the scopeof training activities beyond the Baghdad region.89 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that an incremental increase could
raise the number of NATO troops participatingin NMI from 500 to around 4,000.90
In recent years, NATO has focused strongly
on military mobility and logistics in line withits 2014 Readiness Action Plan (RAP). The RAP
was designed to reassure nervous member
states and put in motion “longer-term changes to NATO’s forces and command structureso that the Alliance will be better able to react
swiftly and decisively to sudden crises.”91
In June 2018, NATO defense ministers
agreed to the Four 30s plan to improve themovement of troops in Europe by 2020. “Four30s” derives from the plan’s objective that
NATO should be able to respond to any aggression with 30 battalions, 30 squadronsof aircraft, and 30 warships within 30 days.92
According to Secretary General Stoltenberg,“Allies contributed all of the combat forces
required for this initiative” in 2019 “and are
now working to build and maintain the levelof readiness of these forces and organize theminto larger formations.”93
At the 2019 London Summit, space wasrecognized as an operational domain.94 Subsequently, in October 2020, NATO agreed tolaunch a space center, to “be located within
existing facilities at Allied Air Command” at

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Ramstein Air Base and charged with “support[ing] NATO operations, missions and activities in order to increase NATO Space Domain Awareness through the co-ordination ofdata, products and services with Allies.”95
Enhanced Forward Presence. The centerpiece of NATO’s renewed focus on collective
defense is the four multinational battalions
stationed in Poland and the Baltic States aspart of the alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP). Different countries serve as lead(framework) nations, providing overall coordination and the centerpiece force that is
augmented by other contributing nations, fordifferent supported countries.
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The U.S. serves as the framework nationin Orzysz, Poland, near the Suwalki Gap.
The U.S.-led battlegroup consists of 691
American troops and an armored cavalrysquadron with combat service and support enablers augmented by 80 troops
from Croatia, 120 from Romania, and 140
from the United Kingdom.96
In Estonia, the United Kingdom serves
as the framework nation, headquarteredin Tapa with 828 troops in an armoredinfantry battalion with main battle tanks
and armored fighting vehicles along with“self-propelled artillery and air defence
assets, engineers, an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance group andlogistic support elements”; one Icelandic
strategic communications civilian; and337 French troops with main battle tanks
and armored fighting vehicles.97
In Adazi, Latvia, Canada is the framework
nation with 527 troops and armoredfighting vehicles augmented by 21 troops
from Albania, 56 from the Czech Republic,
one civilian from Iceland, 200 troops from
Italy with tanks and armored fighting
vehicles, 10 from Montenegro, 175 from
Poland with tanks, 97 from Slovakia, 40
from Slovenia, and 346 from Spain withtanks and armored fighting vehicles.98

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthl

In Rukla, Lithuania, Germany serves as
the framework nation with 583 troops
augmented by another 198 from Belgium,
36 from the Czech Republic, 270 from theNetherlands, 195 from Norway with main
battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles,
a contribution from Luxembourg,99 and
one Icelandic public affairs civilian.100

awareness, and peacetime demonstrationof NATO’s intent to operate without constraint. It will also provide a strong signalof support to regional security. Options
for a strengthened NATO air and maritime presence will be assessed.105

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military91﻿The land component of this presence isa multinational framework brigade based
EFP troops are under NATO command and in Craiova, Romania, under the control ofcontrol; a Multinational Division Headquar- HQ MND–SE in Bucharest.106 HQ MND–SE
ters Northeast located in Elblag, Poland, which achieved final operational capability in Marchreached full operational capability in Decem- 2018.107 NATO’s tailored forward presenceber 2018, coordinates the four battalions.101 is supported by units from Bulgaria, CanaIn February 2017, the Baltic States signed an da, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxagreement to facilitate the movement of NATO embourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain,
forces among the countries.102 Some EFP host and Turkey.108
nations have called for additional assets—­
The U.S. and Romania jointly organize theimportantly, enablers to be added to the battal- biannual Saber Guardian exercise, which isions. Latvia, for example, views it as “extremely “designed to improve the integration of mulimportant to strengthen allied presence with tinational combat forces.”109 In the 2021 itlong-range components, such as fire support, eration, scheduled to take place in Bulgaria,
air defence support and on-shore (port)/off- Hungary, and Romania,110 “more than 13,000
shore components.”103
service members from 19 countries will conNATO also has established eight Force In- duct live fire and air and missile defense opertegration Units located in Sofia, Bulgaria; Tal- ations, plus a large scale medical evacuation.”111
linn, Estonia; Riga, Latvia; Vilnius, Lithuania; Saber Guardian 21 is one of several exercises
Bydgoszcz, Poland; Bucharest, Romania; Sze- linked with DEFENDER-Europe 21, which has
kesfehervar, Hungary; and Bratislava, Slovakia. a regional focus. According to General Cavoli,
These new units “will help facilitate the rap- “DEFENDER-Europe 21 provides us the best
id deployment of Allied forces to the Eastern opportunity to hone our abilities alongside ourpart of the Alliance, support collective defence allies and partners in the strategically importplanning and assist in coordinating training ant Balkans and Black Sea region so that coland exercises.”104
lectively, we are ready to respond to any crisis
At its July 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO that may arise.”112
agreed to “develop tailored forward presence
NATO continues air policing missions overin the southeast part of the Alliance territory.” Bulgarian and Romanian airspace. In SeptemSpecifically:
ber and October of 2020, six U.S. F-16s took
part in a four-week air policing mission over
Appropriate measures, tailored to the
Bulgaria with Bulgarian air force units and CaBlack Sea region and including thenadian F-18s flying from Romania.113 In 2020,
Romanian initiative to establish a multinathe alliance saw a modest uptick in Russian
tional framework brigade to help improveaircraft approaching or violating NATO airintegrated training of Allied units underspace. Jets were scrambled 400 times across
Headquarters Multinational Division
domains, and 350 of these incidents involved
Southeast [HQ MND–SE], will contribute
Russian military aircraft.114
to the Alliance’s strengthened deterIn October 2019, addressing a NATO carence and defence posture, situational
pability gap in aerial refueling, the Czech﻿

Republic, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, and Norway jointly procured A330 air-to-air refueling aircraft, to be
deployed from 2020–2024; the fourth of nine
aircraft was delivered in April 2021.115 Five of
the aircraft are planned to operate out of Eindhoven airbase in the Netherlands, and threewill operate out of Germany’s Cologne–Wahn
airbase.116 The U.S. currently accounts for 90
percent of NATO air-to-air refuelings.117
Additionally, in November 2019, NATO announced a $1 billion package to upgrade its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
planes, coupled with “an announcement thatthe first of five Global Hawk drones making up
the Alliance Ground Surveillance program wasen route from the United States to its futurehome base at Sigonella, Sicily.”118
In 2018, NATO established two new commands: a joint force command for the Atlantic
based in Norfolk, Virginia, and a logistics andmilitary mobility command.119 These commands consist of a total of 1,500 personnel,
with the logistics command headquartered inUlm, Germany.120 Logistics have been a significant focus of the alliance in recent years. Aninternal alliance assessment in 2017 reportedly concluded that NATO’s “ability to logisticallysupport rapid reinforcement in the much-expanded territory covering SACEUR’s (Supreme
Allied Commander Europe) area of operation
has atrophied since the end of the Cold War.”121
Former U.S. Commander of European Command Lieutenant General Ben Hodges has
described the importance of military mobility for deterrence: “We need to think how fast
the Russians are moving. We must be able tomove as fast [as] or faster than them so thatthey do not make the mistake of thinking thatthey could launch an attack of some sort in anarea before we could respond.”122
Continued shortfalls in the alliance’s ability to move soldiers and equipment swiftly andefficiently include “limitations of road surface
weight capacity, bridges capacity and railway
traffic limits” as well as differences in rail gauges and continued legal, procedural, and regulatory slowdowns.123 NATO has focused heavily

92

on overcoming these barriers, working with
the European Union, which retains competencies that are critical to improving military
mobility, particularly with regard to overcoming legal and regulatory hurdles. In March 2018,
the EU published an Action Plan on Military
Mobility that “identifies a series of operational measures to tackle physical, procedural or
regulatory barriers which hamper military mobility.”124 Cooperation has brought about somebeneficial legal and regulatory changes,125 but
notable challenges persist.
Cyber Capabilities. “A secure cyberspaceis essential to everything the Alliance does,”according to NATO’s secretary general. “Thisis why cyber defence is part of NATO’s coretask of collective defence. NATO has madeclear that a severe cyber attack could lead it to
invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”126
Ultimately, the decision to invoke Article 5 will
be a political decision.
At the 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations,and on August 31, 2018, it established a Cyberspace Operations Center (CYOC) in Mons, Belgium, that will include 70 cyber experts when it
becomes fully operational in 2023127 and “willprovide situational awareness and coordination of NATO operational activity within cyberspace.”128 In 2020, NATO published its firstcyber doctrine.129
In 2017, NATO announced a planned $1.85
billion expansion of its satellite communications capabilities.130 Its decision was driven
in part by the acquisition of five Global Hawk
surveillance drones, which generate significant
data; after delays, the first drone was deliveredin 2019 to Sigonella Naval Air Station.131 Satellite communications are critical both for piloting the Global Hawks and for disseminating
the surveillance data they collect in real time.
The alliance’s Joint Air Power (JAP) Strategy, released in June 2018, highlights the importance of cyber and space capabilities:
Increasing reliance on cyber and spacebased capabilities by Alliance forces
presents vulnerabilities for adversaries to2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengththeir respective authority, are committed toensuring the security of our communications,
including 5G, recognizing the need to rely on
secure and resilient systems.”136
The landscape in Europe for key decisions regarding Chinese technology in next-­
generation wireless networks remains inlimbo; many nations have taken decisions inrecent years to restrict Chinese vendors from
5G networks, but these threat perceptions
Through the NATO Industry Cyber Part- are not uniform. The impact of the emerging
nership, NATO has also invested in a stronger patchwork approach toward Chinese 5G techrelationship with industry. As described by nology on the European operating environNATO’s secretary general:
ment will become clearer in the coming years.
Ballistic Missile Defense. NATO’s balThis initiative, established in 2014, facililistic missile defense (BMD) achieved initial
tates cooperation for the mutual benefit
operational capability in July 2016, offering aof both NATO and Allies’ industry andstronger capability to defend alliance populaacademia. In 2019, industry continued totions, territory, and forces across the southern
support NATO’s cyber defence by proportion of Europe from a potential ballistic
viding real-time actionable cyber threat
missile attack.
information, thereby enabling stakeholders to take rapid action to respond
An Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Ro133
to threats.
mania, became operational in May
2016, and upgrades were completed in
Areas of further cooperation within NATO
August 2019.137
include the NATO Intelligence on Cyberspace Community of Interest “to more reguAn AN/TPY-2 forward-based early-­
larly exchange information, assessments andwarning BMD radar established at Kürebest practices—improving NATO’s ability tocik, Turkey, has a range of up to 1,800
prevent and respond to cyber threats,” andmiles. The U.S. is also reportedly building
the NATO Communications and Informationa second undisclosed site near Malatya,
Agency, which “continued to facilitate inforexpanding capability at that location.138
mation exchanges between NATO Allies oncyber threats and incidents through its Cyber
BMD-capable U.S. Aegis-equipped ships
Collaboration Network. Twenty-one Allies
are forward deployed at Rota, Spain.139
134
have joined the network to date.”
Two additional destroyers will be based
With respect to the likely effects of Chiout of Rota by 2025 or 2026, bringing thenese 5G technology on intelligence sharing
total to six; Rota’s four current destroyers
in Europe, U.S. officials have said that utilizare the “workhorses of deterrence” acing Chinese state-controlled companies forcording to General Wolters.140
next-generation wireless networks would
be “nothing short of madness.”135 A Chinese
A second Aegis Ashore site in Redzikowo,presence in European telecommunications
Poland, that broke ground in May 2016
networks could decisively compromise thehas faced delays but was commissioned
communications integrity of the military andin September 2020 and will begin operaintelligence community. The London Declations in 2022.141
ration stated that “NATO and Allies, within
negate critical NATO capabilities throughdegradation, denial or destruction, whilst
providing opportunities for the Allianceto integrate such capabilities with JAP
for kinetic and non-kinetic effect. Boththe resilience and exploitation of suchcapabilities is [sic] therefore a criticalrequirement that future development
should address.132

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NOTES: Figures are estimatesfor 2021. Iceland is not listed
because it has no military.
SOURCE: Press release,“Defence Expenditure ofNATO Countries (2013–2020),”
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, March 16, 2021,
https://www.nato.int/nato_
static_fl2014/assets/pdf/
2021/3/pdf/210316-pr-202030-en.pdf (accessed July 23,2021).

In Europe, NATOmembers closer to
Russia and the
Middle East spend,in general, more on
defense than thosefurther away.

Threat Proximity
Largely Dictates
Military Spending

MAP 2

PORTUGALIRELAND

SPAIN

U.K.

GREECE
N. MACEDONIAALBANIA

MONTENEGROBULGARIACYPRUSMOLDOVA

TURKEY

SYRIA

IRAQ

ARMENIAGEORGIARUSSIA<1%

1%–1.49%

1.5%–1.99%

2%+

DEFENSESPENDING AS
PERCENTAGE
OF GDPBlack Sea

UKRAINE

BELARUSITALYHUNGARY

LITHUANIALATVIAESTONIA

ROMANIA

AUSTRIASLOVAKREP.

POLANDCZECH REP.

SWEDENFINLANDSLOVENIACROATIA

SWITZERLAND

Mediterranean Sea

FRANCEGERMANYLUX.

BELGIUM

NETHERLANDS

DENMARKNORWAY﻿“capable of BMD mission (surveillance andtracking of ballistic missiles) up to 2000 km
while simultaneous[ly] maintaining the air
The U.K. operates an early warning BMD
defence capability.”152 All four Dutch frigatesradar at RAF Fylingdales in England. The
will receive the radar upgrade and carry SM-3
U.K. continues to consider upgrades tosurface-to-air missiles.153 In December 2020,
its Type 45 Destroyers with BMD capathe Royal Netherlands and German navies
143
ble missiles.
signed an agreement to work jointly to develop a replacement for the Dutch De ZevenIn May and June 2021, 10 nations—­
Provinciën–­class frigate and Germany’s three
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
F124 Sachsen-class frigates.154
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, theBelgian Admiral Jan de Beurme stated in
United Kingdom, and the United States—
April 2021 that “we are studying the feasibility
took part in the biannual BMD exercise
of integrating ballistic missile defense shooter
Formidable Shield.144 Formidable Shieldcapabilities into the new frigates.”155 A contract
21 features 15 ships, 10 aircraft, and 3,300
to develop a weapons suite for a joint Belgian
participants145 and “is designed to imand Dutch procurement of two multipurpose
prove allied interoperability in a live-firefrigates apiece was awarded in February 2019,
joint IAMD [Integrated Air and Missile
and the vessels are expected to enter service
Defense] environment, using NATO combeginning in 2024.156
146
mand and control reporting structures.”
Spain currently operates four Aegis-­equipped F-100 Alvaro de Bazan–class frigIn January 2017, the Russian embassy in ates, but they are not yet BMD capable.157
Norway threatened that if Norway contrib- In April 2019, Spain signed an agreement toutes ships or radar to NATO BMD, Russia procure five F-110 multi-mission frigates;“will have to react to defend our security.”147 the first F-110 will likely be deployed in 2026.
Norway operates four Fridtjof Nansen–class The Aegis-equipped frigates “will host the
Aegis-equipped frigates that are not currently first naval solid-state S-band radar for the
BMD capable.148 A fifth Aegis-equipped frigate, Spanish Navy.”158
the Helge Ingstad, collided with an oil tanker
The Italian Navy is procuring seven multiand sustained so much damage that the gov- role offshore patrol vessels (PPAs) that are toernment has decided to scrap it.149
be delivered from 2021–2026.159 The first of
Denmark, which agreed in 2014 to equip two PPAs in full configuration that are BMD
at least one of its Iver Huitfeldt–class frigates capable will be delivered in 2024.160
with radar to contribute to NATO BMD, reaffirmed this commitment in the Defence Agree- Quality of Armed Forces in the Region
ment 2018–2023.150 Russia’s ambassador in
Article 3 of the 1949 North Atlantic TreaCopenhagen has openly threatened Denmark ty, NATO’s founding document, states that at
for agreeing to contribute: “I do not believe a minimum, members “will maintain and dethat Danish people fully understand the con- velop their individual and collective capacity
sequences of what may happen if Denmark to resist armed attack.”161 Regrettably, only ajoins the American-led missile defense system. handful of NATO members are living up to
If Denmark joins, Danish warships become tar- their Article 3 commitments.
gets for Russian nuclear missiles.”151
In 2020, 11 countries—Estonia (2.33 perIn March 2019, the first of four Dutch De cent); France (2.04 percent); Greece (2.68
Zeven Provinciën–class frigates received a percent); Latvia (2.27 percent); Lithuania (2.13
SMART-L Multi-Mission/Naval (MM/N) percent); Norway (2.00 percent); Poland (2.31
D -band long-range radar upgrade that is percent); Romania (2.07 percent); the SlovaklRamstein Air Base in Germany hosts a
command and control center.142

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Republic (2.00 percent); the United Kingdom(2.32 percent); and the United States (3.73
percent)—spent the required minimum of 2
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on
defense,162 and 18 NATO allies spent 20 percentof their defense budgets on “major new capabilities.”163 NATO defense spending continues
to trend upward: “2020 marked the sixth consecutive year of growth in defence spending by
European Allies and Canada, with an increase
in real terms of 3.9% from 2019 to 2020.”164
Germany. Germany remains an economic powerhouse that punches well below its
weight in terms of defense. In 2020, it spent
only 1.56 percent of GDP on defense and 16.9
percent of its defense budget on equipment.165
In November 2019, German defense Minister
Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer announced
that the nation may not attain the 2 percent
benchmark until 2031.166 German defense
spending is rising, however: The $63.8 billion
budget for 2021 is a 3.2 percent increase overthe budget for 2020.167
Despite the positive momentum, theGerman military remains underfunded andunderequipped. One former German diplomat has stated that without NATO, Germany“would have to double its defence budget to
3–3.5 per cent of GDP or risk being ‘completely
blind, deaf and defenceless.’”168
Germany continues to serve as the framework nation for NATO’s EFP battalion in
Lithuania, with 583 troops stationed there.169
Germany is also spending $110 million through2021 to upgrade facilities in Lithuania that include barracks used by the multinational battalion.170 The Luftwaffe has taken part in Baltic
Air Policing 13 times—more than any other nation’s armed forces—most recently out of Šiauliai air base in Lithuania in the summer of2020171 and out of Ämari Air Base in Estonia
from September 2020 to May 2021.172
Germany maintains 70 troops in Kosovo aspart of NATO’s Kosovo Force173 and had been
the second-largest contributor to NATO’s
Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistanwith 1,300 troops.174 In April 2021, the Bundestag extended the mandate for Germany’s

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participation in NATO’s Sea Guardian maritime security operation, as well as Germany’s participation in United Nations Missionin South Sudan, extending both mandates
through March 31, 2022.175 German forces
also participate in a number of additional U.N.
peacekeeping missions including missions in
Lebanon and Mali.176
In October 2020, Germany extended its
non-combat training mission in Iraq and its
air-to-air refueling and air surveillance radar missions in support of the counter-ISIS
coalition, but it ended its Tornado reconnaissance mission on March 31, 2020.177 Germany
maintains 90 soldiers in Iraq helping to train
Kurdish forces.178
In April 2017, the Bundeswehr established a
new cyber command, which will have a staff ofapproximately 14,500 by the time it becomesfully operational this year.179 Germany also
led NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task
Force (VJTF) in 2019 and will do so again in
2023, with “the earmarked units prioritised formodernisation and upgrades.”180
Although Germany’s forces have taken on
additional roles in recent years, its overall military continues to suffer serious equipment andreadiness issues. As of December 2020, theFederal Ministry of Defence estimated thatreadiness for all major weapons systems was
74 percent—only a slight improvement sinceJune 2020’s 71 percent.181
Deployments often strain the military
for years. In one example, following deployment of TIGER combat helicopters to Mali in
2017–2018, “the concentration of all available
resources in training, personnel, special tools
and spare parts on this 15-month deployment
halted the process chain in domestic operations to such an extent that this continued tohave a significant disruptive impact on materiel readiness in 2020.”182 Even Germany’s robust
contribution to Baltic Air Policing “takes everything it has, often at the expense of training
initiatives.”183
Significant problems identified in a February 2021 parliamentary report include just13 operational LEOPARD 2 battle tanks being

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CHART 2

Less than Half of NATO Members Follow Defense Spending Guidelines
NATO members are expected to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense,
and at least 20 percent of their defense spending is supposed to go to equipment.
Only the U.S. and nine other nations do both.
DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 2021
4%

GreeceNATO GUIDELINE: 20%

3%

U.S.

Estonia

Lithuania
U.K.

LatviaPoland France

NorwaySlovak Rep

Romania2%

1%

NATO GUIDELINE: 2%

Hungary﻿Bulgaria
Croatia
Montenegro
TurkeyPortugal
Denmark
Netherlands
Germany
CanadaN. Macedonia
Italy
Albania Czech
Spain
Rep.
Slovenia
Belgium

Luxembourg
0%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

EQUIPMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 2021

NOTE: Figures are estimates for 2021. Iceland is not listed because it has no military.
SOURCE: Press release, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013–2020),” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 16, 2021,
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/3/pdf/210316-pr-2020-30-en.pdf (accessed July 23, 2021).
A heritage.org

available for training in 2020 (well under thetarget of 35)184 and procurement knots suchas those that resulted in a lack of cold-weather suits and flight helmets for the Navy.185 In
September 2020, a tender to replace Germany’s CH-53G heavy transport helicopters wascancelled because of high cost, although areplacement is still being sought.186 However,there also was some small progress in readiness; for instance, six more Eurofighters wereavailable for flight operations every day in2020 than were available in 2019.187

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Equipment problems are creating downstream pilot issues. Nearly half of the Luftwaffe’s pilots are unable to meet NATO training
requirements because a shortage of available
planes has caused a lack of flight time.188 As aresult, more pilots are leaving the armed forces.189 Only 106 of the air force’s 220 jet pilot
positions are filled, and only 44 out of 84 helicopter pilot positions are filled.190
The situation is not much better for the navy.
Problems with naval submarines include “longyard periods, difficulties with main batteries
and the practice of ‘controlled removal’ fromsome submarines in order to keep others operational.”191 Reports surfaced in March 2021
that more than 100 German vessels including
submarines rely on a Russian navigation system that does not meet NATO standards andthat “[d]uring a worst-case cyberattack, navigation data could be hacked and the ship could
fully lose operability.”192
In December 2017, Germany’s F-125
Baden-Württemberg–class frigate failed sea
trials because of “software and hardware defects.”193 The frigate reportedly had “problems
with its radar, electronics and the flameproof
coating on its fuel tanks,” was “found to list to
the starboard,” and lacked sufficiently robust
armaments as well as the ability to add them.194
Concerns have been raised about whether thefrigate’s ability to defend against aerial attack
is so deficient that the ship is fit only for “stabilization operations.”195 In addition, the lackof sonar and torpedo tubes makes the ship vulnerable to attack by submarines.196
Germany returned the ship to the shipbuilder following delivery.197 The redesigned
Baden-Württemberg was belatedly commissioned in June 2019, and Germany took delivery of the third of four F-125s in March 2021.198
In January 2020, Germany announced a $6.7
billion contract with a Dutch and German shipbuilder to build the next-generation MKS 180
frigate, with the first of four (with the possibility of another two) to be delivered in 2027.199
The number of personnel on active dutyin Germany’s army rose from 176,000 in
2016 to 183,500 in 2020.200 According to98

the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS):
The government recognizes that theforce structure needs to expand in lightof Germany’s ambitious plans but isgrappling with recruitment and retention
issues. To address this, Berlin launched a
new strategy in October 2019, designed
to create a more flexible reserve cadrethat can rapidly respond to territorial andcollective-defence tasks.201

However, partially because of the pandemic,
Germany recruited 19 percent fewer people in2020 than it recruited in 2019; “around 20,200
military personnel positions above the junior
ranks were vacant” at the end of 2020; and theaverage age of career soldiers has risen three
years since 2012 to 33.4 years.202 In April 2021,
Germany started a yearlong “voluntary military service in homeland security” programthat mixes combat training with specialist
training to prepare 1,000 young Germans per
year to deal with pandemics or natural disasters and protect critical infrastructure.203
In March 2020, Germany announced that
it will purchase 90 Eurofighter Typhoons and
45 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to replace its fleetof Tornados.204 It will cost almost €9 billion tokeep Germany’s Tornados in the air until theirscheduled retirement in 2031.205 Their replacement will need to be able to carry both nuclear and conventional weapons, as the Tornados
are dual-capable aircraft equipped to carry B61
tactical nuclear weapons in addition to conventional payloads.206 The U.S. and Germany
have already tested the Tornado’s ability tocarry the new B61-12 tactical nuke.207
Although the Super Hornets are not yet
certified to carry the B61 tactical weapons,Germany is planning on the Super Hornets astheir dual-capable aircraft.208 Of the 45 Super
Hornets, 15 will be an EA-18 Growler electronic
warfare variant.209 However, the Defence Ministry’s announcement is a “recommendationand not a commitment. According to MoD
statements, the government currently plans

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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military99

﻿to introduce supporting documents to parliaIn 2020, France spent 2.04 percent of GDP
ment in 2022 or 2023.”210
on defense and 26.5 percent of defense spendThe next German government will decide ing on equipment, meeting both NATO benchon the fate of the nation’s sharing posture. marks.220 France has safeguarded planned deGermany, France, Italy, and Spain plan to ac- fense spending increases of $2 billion in 2021.
quire a collective fleet of Eurodrones.211 The According to Defense News:
Bundestag approved funding for the programin April 2021, but the nation cannot purchaseThe €49.7 billion French defense budget
ammunition for the drones, and operators canfor 2021 includes payment approprianot receive “tactical weapons training,” whichtions of €39.2 billion, which is an increase
leaves German drones, once procured, “weapfrom the previous year, as planned in theonless for now.”212
2019–2025 military program law. Of this,In March, the Ministry of Defence ana record €22.3 billion is earmarked fornounced plans to upgrade its Patriot missiles
modernizing equipment and buildings;
to keep them in service until 2030 and to in€12.3 billion will go toward wages; andvest in drone technology rather than a next-­€4.6 billion is appropriated for opergeneration air defense platform.213
ating costs.221
Germany operates the largest fleet of heavytransport aircraft in Europe214 and has taken
While France has been increasing defense
delivery of 35 of 53 A400M cargo aircraft or- spending, one-third of the planned increases
dered.215 Germany is upgrading its fleet with are not set to take effect until 2023 after thefunds made available in December 2020. Ac- next general election, and a budgetary review
cording to the Ministry of Defence, “Aircraft set for this year. One major project is an upthat were previously only usable for logistical grade to the French sea-based and air-based
missions are to be made capable of tactical nuclear deterrent. The nation test fired themissions through additional equipment and M51.2, the current three-stage, sea-land strapreparations.”216
tegic ballistic missile (without a warhead) in
In May 2018, the U.S. approved the sale of April 2021 as part of a development program
six C-130J Hercules aircraft and three KC- for the M51.3, which is expected in 2025.222
130J tankers to France and Germany, which
France’s sea-based deterrent is provided
are planning to create a joint capability.217 A by four Le Triomphant–class ballistic missile
new joint training center for both aircraft in submarines.223 The government launched theNormandy will break ground in 2021 and be- country’s third-generation ballistic missile
gin operations in 2024.218 In June 2020, Ger- submarine program in February 2021. Delivmany announced an end to its P-3C ORION ery of the first submarine is planned for 2035,
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) moderniza- with three additional subs to be delivered everytion program.
five years thereafter.224 Armed Forces MinisIn March 2021, the U.S. approved the sale ter Florence Parly has described the third-­of the P-8A Poseidon to Germany. As this book generation submarines in colorful terms as
was being prepared for publication, a decision able to “hear better and defend themselves bethad not been made, but German procurement ter whilst at the same time being more silent:of the P-8 seems likely.219
They will not make more noise than a school
France. France has one of the most capa- of shrimp.”225
ble militaries within the NATO alliance andOther major naval procurements include
retains an independent nuclear deterrent $1.09 billion through 2025 for the design phasecapability. France rejoined NATO’s Integrat- of a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier thated Command Structure in 2009 but remains will deploy 30 future combat aircraft systems
outside the alliance’s nuclear planning group. and is planned to enter service in 2038.226 The﻿

Suffren, the first of six new fifth-­generation to be delivered in 2025, “will include some F4
Barracuda-class nuclear-powered attack sub- functionalities.”240 An additional 30 Rafales
marines, was commissioned in November at full F4 configuration will be delivered by
2020.227 France is procuring five defense and 2030.241 It is expected that “[t]he F4 version
intervention frigates, with the first due in 2024 will significantly improve the 4.5-generationand the second and third in 2025.228 The Alsace, fighter’s stealth capabilities, which althougha FREMM multi-mission frigate delivered in present in earlier versions to some extent
April 2021, and the Lorraine, which is to be failed to compete with fifth-generation comdelivered in 2022, will have enhanced air de- bat aircraft.”242
fense capabilities in addition to the focus on
In February 2021, France signed a contract
anti-submarine warfare that characterizes to procure an additional 12 Rafales at the F3R
the six FREMMs that were delivered between standard by 2025 to replace fighters that had
2012 and 2019.229
recently been sold to Greece.243 In May 2021,
In November 2020, Armed Forces Minis- France, Germany, and Spain signed an agreeter Parly announced the overhaul of the entire ment on the Future Combat Air System, whichmine countermeasures systems by 2029.230 In is to begin entering service in 2040.244
the same month, France and the U.K. signed
France established a 220-person Spacea production contract for the joint Maritime Command under the Air Force in September
Mine Counter Measure (MMCM) autonomous 2019 and has committed to investing $4.78 bilminehunting system.231
lion in its space capabilities by 2025.245 In JanArmy procurements include Kochi HK416 uary 2021, NATO approved a Center of ExcelAssault Rifles, 232 300 ANAFI USA micro-­ lence for Military Space to be located alongsidedrones,233 and Serval Armored Vehicles, with French Space Command in Toulouse.246 The
108 of the 364 Servals that have been procured first researchers arrived in 2021, and the center
to be delivered by 2022.234
is to be fully staffed by 2025.247
Air Force procurements include an upgrade
France intends to have a “fully capable”
to the aerial refueling and airlift fleet. In Feb- system to defend its assets in space in place byruary 2020, France received the second of two 2030. “If our satellites are threatened,” Armed
KC-130J Super Hercules.235 It also has been in- Forces Minister Parly has said, “we intend to
troducing new A330 MRTT Multi-Role Tanker blind those of our adversaries. We reserve theTransport aircraft and as of April 30, 2021, had right and the means to be able to respond:
received three of a dozen ordered.236 France that could imply the use of powerful lasers dereceived its 18th A400M Atlas military trans- ployed from our satellites or from patrolling
port aircraft in April 2021 and plans to have nano-satellites.”248 In March 2021, with Ger25 in service by 2025.237 In October 2020, the man and U.S. space forces also participating,government announced that the final 10 NH90 France launched its first military exercise
Tactical Troop Helicopters on order for deliv- in space “to evaluate its ability to defend its
ery in 2025 and 2026 would be upgraded to satellites and other defense equipment frommeet special forces requirements.238
an attack.”249
In January 2019, France signed a $2.3 bilIn December 2016, France opened a cyber-­lion agreement with Dassault Aviation for de- operational command.250 The French Militaryvelopment of the F4 Standard upgrade to the Programming Law for 2019–2025, enacted in
Rafale fighter aircraft. The upgrade includes “a the summer of 2018, added “an additional 1.6
number of new features, the most important of billion euros for cyber operations along withwhich is an improvement in the aircraft’s con- 1,500 additional personnel for a total of 4,000
nectivity in both national and allied contexts, cyber combatants by 2025,” and in January
through software-defined radio, new links, and 2019, France issued its “first doctrine for ofsatellite communications.”239 The 28 Rafales, fensive cyber operations.”251100

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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military101﻿France, which has the third-largest number a nuclear-propelled attack submarine and warof active-duty personnel in NATO,252 withdrew ship on an eight-month mission to the Indian
the last of its troops from Afghanistan at the and Pacific Oceans.263
end of 2014, although all French combat troops
The French-led Awareness Strait of Horhad left in 2012. France continues to remain muz initiative to help patrol the waters nearengaged in the fight against the Islamic State, Iran, based out of Abu Dhabi, became operadeploying 600 troops in Operation Chammal.253 tional on February 25, 2020. The mandate for
In February 2021, the Charles de Gaulle Carrier the initiative’s military mission, Operation
Strike Group deployed on a four-month opera- Agenor, was extended through 2021.264
tional deployment that includes support to OpOperation Sentinelle, launched in January
eration Chammal.254 In April 2021, the Charles 2015 to protect the country from terrorist atde Gaulle Carrier Strike Group and Dwight D. tacks, is the largest operational commitment ofEisenhower Carrier Strike Group conducted French forces. Sentinelle and Operation Resildual operations in the Arabian Sea.255
ience, launched in March 2020 to help combat
France’s contributions to NATO deter- coronavirus,265 together represent a domestic
rence missions in Eastern Europe include commitment of 13,000 French forces.
deployment of 337 soldiers to Estonia as partIn response to a series of terrorist attacksof NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.256 in southern France in October 2020, PresiFrance also has taken part in Baltic Air Policing dent Macron increased the number of troops
eight times, most recently flying out of Esto- deployed for Operation Sentinelle from 3,000
nia beginning in April 2020,257 and is prepar- to 7,000.266 This decision could have a negaing for high-intensity warfare with a full-scale tive impact on overall readiness as one analdivisional exercise Orion for 2023 that could ysis notes. The IISS has noted that in “midinvolve up to 10,000 troops in addition to air 2020, the army issued a strategy document,
and naval units.258‘Operational Superiority 2030’, which called
The French military is also very active in for improved readiness in light of the risk ofAfrica with more than 5,100 troops involved high-intensity conflict” but that “these plansin anti-terrorism operations in Burkina Faso, could be affected by the decision, in October,
Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger as part of to deploy more troops on the domestic OperOperation Barkhane and more than 1,450 ation Sentinel mission.”267 Frequent deploytroops stationed in Djibouti, 950 in Côte d’Ivo- ments, especially in Operation Sentinelle, haveire, 350 in Gabon, and 350 in Senegal.259 In placed significant strains on French forces
addition, France has a close relationship with and equipment.268
the United Arab Emirates. It has 650 troops
The United Kingdom. America’s moststationed in the UAE,260 and a 15-year defense important bilateral relationship in Europe isagreement between the countries has been in its Special Relationship with the United Kingeffect since 2012.
dom. From the sharing of intelligence to theFrance is part of the EU-led Operation So- transfer of nuclear technology, a high degree
phia in the Mediterranean in response to hu- of military cooperation has helped to make theman smuggling and other migration-related Special Relationship between the U.S. and the
problems and is involved in other maritime U.K. unique.
missions across the globe.261 It organized the
In 2020, the U.K. spent 2.32 percent ofApril 2021 Le Pérouse naval exercise in the Bay GDP on defense and 23.0 percent of its deof Bengal, which also included ships from Aus- fense budget on equipment.269 In November
tralia, Japan, India, and the U.S.262 France also 2020, the government announced plans to
conducts occasional freedom-of-­navigation spend an additional “projected total of nearoperations in the Pacific. In February 2021, ly $22 billion” on defense across the next fourfor example, it announced that it was sending years. “[T]his additional funding is on top of a﻿previous commitment to add $2 billion more reduction “is less than might appear” because
to the country's defense budget, with the com- “the Army has been well below its planned perbined planned increase being approximately sonnel numbers for some years.”277 The loss of$24.1 billion through 2024.”270 The new fund- the C-130J will be felt as “[t]hese aircraft had
ing will be used in part for acquisitions, includ- been particularly favoured for Special Forces
ing frigates, Type 32 warships, and the U.K.’s roles, which will now fall to the considerably
Future Combat Air System. The U.K. is also larger A400M Atlas.”278
standing up a Space Command and an ArtifiAlthough the number of its active-duty sercial Intelligence Center.271
vicemembers is small in comparison to the
A 2020 report from the National Audit Of- militaries of France and Germany, the U.K.
fice, however, warned that the U.K.’s 10-year maintains European NATO’s most effective
defense modernization program could face a armed forces. Nevertheless, the Army admitbudget shortfall of as much as ₤13 billion ($15 ted in October 2020 that it would miss targets
billion).272 Defence Secretary Ben Wallace set down in the 2015 Strategic Defence andstated that the U.K. would need to make some Security Review (SDSR) to field a fully capa“tough choices”:
ble division with three brigades by 2025 (thiswill not take place now until the early 2030s).279
The decades of funding deferrals were
Because of procurement delays and funding isabout to hit the buffers. Bogus efficiensues, the Army will “only be able to deploy acies, savings targets, hollowing out, andcombat division consisting of just a single arthe lasting impacts of fighting the Iraq
moured infantry brigade and an interim maand Afghanistan conflicts are all things
noeuvre support brigade.”280 As explained bythat continue to drain away precious
Ben Barry of the IISS:
resources long after the political leadership that directed them have exitThe Army was mandated [in the 2015 reed the stage.273
view] to deliver two armored infantry brigades, whereas they are now saying theyIn March 2021, the U.K. released its Intecan only generate one. They have enoughgrated Review of Security, Defence, Developvehicles for three infantry armoredment and Foreign Policy as well as a Defencebrigades, but my very strong suspicion
Command Paper.274 The Defence Ministry’s
is they haven’t been spending money
Command Paper, which lays out a plan foron spares. If they haven’t got sufficient
military modernization, includes plans forspare parts they will only risk sending one
the creation of a new special operations Armybrigade on operations.281
Ranger Regiment that will “be able to operate discreetly in high-risk environments andIn early 2021, the Defence Ministry anbe rapidly deployable across the world” and a nounced that it had been granted observer
new naval surveillance ship “aimed at protect- status for the Franco-German Main Grounding Britain’s undersea cables and other critical Combat System program, which is slated
national infrastructure.”275
to replace French and German Main Battle
The paper also specifies significant cuts in Tanks “around 2035.”282 In April 2019, the U.K.
capability, including a likely reduction in the reported that it was planning to upgrade only
planned procurement of 138 F-35s and the ear- 148 of its 227 remaining Challenger 2 main
ly retirement of C-130J transport aircraft. In battle tanks, cutting its fleet by a third.283 The
addition, the U.K. army would be reduced from 79 other tanks would be scavenged for spareits current 82,000 troops to 72,500 troops by parts.284 Because Challenger tanks are not cur2025—the smallest it has been since 1714.276 rently manufactured, sourcing spare parts is
However, one analysis argues that the Army a continual problem.285 The British Army had

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The U.K. operates seven C-17 cargo planes
and has started to bring the European A400M
cargo aircraft into service after years of delays. By April 2021, Britain had taken delivery of 20 of 22 A400M heavy transport aircraft ordered.301
The Sentinel R1, an airborne battlefield andground surveillance aircraft, flew its last operational flight in February 2021.302 That samemonth, the U.K. took delivery of the fifth ofnine P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft(MPA) that are to be based at RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland. The order will be completed by the end of the year.303 In 2018, retired Air
Vice-Marshal Andrew Roberts testified to Parliament that “capable though the P-8 may be,
the number of aircraft planned is undoubtedly
inadequate to fulfil even the highest priority
tasks likely to be assigned to the force in tension and hostilities.”304
The U.K. reportedly also plans to procure
approximately 45 medium helicopters to remain in service until the mid-2040s. This
platform will replace four different helicopter
platforms currently in service.305
The Royal Navy has lost 40 percent of its
fleet since the end of the Cold War.306 Of the
55 ships lost since the early 1980s, half are
frigates, and the U.K. now operates only 13.307
In five years, the Royal Navy will have only 10
frigates.308 According to one analyst, such aforce “can’t possibly handle all of [the] tasks[required of it]. Especially considering that, at
any given time, just a third of the vessels will
be available for operations. The others will
be in maintenance or refit or working up for
deployments.”309 However, as construction ofdestroyers and frigates picks up steam, “theambition is to rebuild to more than 20 by theend of the decade.”310
The Royal Navy’s surface fleet is based on
the new Type-45 destroyer and the older Type23 frigate. The latter will be replaced by eight
Type-26 Global Combat Ships sometime in the
2020s.311 The Type-26 Global Combat Ships aremeant to handle a flexible range of tasks, but
it remains unclear whether all of their weapons capabilities will be funded.312 The U.K.

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﻿previously cut its tank forces by 40 percent
in 2010.286 The Defence Command Paper laidout plans to spend £1.3 billion on upgrades toelevate the Challenger 2 to the Challenger 3.287
One former U.K. tank officer recently wrotethat the small number of U.K. tanks available
means that “our armoured brigades can only
play a bit part in someone else’s military in alliance or coalition.”288
In March 2021, the U.K. announced that it
would no longer upgrade its Warrior armoredvehicles, but that they would remain in service
through the mid-2020s.289 In 2019, the U.K.
signed a £2.8 billion deal to procure around
500 Boxer armored vehicles.290 As a result of
the decision to stop upgrading the heavier
Warriors, the Army is “conducting an analysis
on potential lethality enhancements of Boxer vehicle.”291
As of March 2021, the U.K. had taken delivery of 21 F-35Bs of 48 ordered.292 The total
number of F-35s that will be procured may
not be known until 2025.293 RAF F-35s basedat Akrotiri, Cyprus, flew operational sorties
for the first time in June 2019.294 In 2019, theU.K. took delivery of the last of 160 Typhoon
aircraft, all of which were expected to stay inservice until 2040.295 However, in March, theU.K. announced that 24 Tranche 1 Typhoons
will be retired by 2025.296 Project Centurion, a$515.83 million Typhoon upgrade to integrate
additional Storm Shadow long-range cruise
missiles and Brimstone precision attack missiles, was completed in 2018 and enabled the
U.K. to retire its fleet of Tornado aircraft.297
The U.K. recently detailed a £2 billion investment over the next four years in developmentof the Tempest, a sixth-generation fighter tobe delivered in 2035.298
The RAF operates the largest fleet of air-toair refuelers in Europe, which is noteworthy
because of the severe shortage of this capability on the continent.299 Along with the U.K.,
the U.S. has produced and jointly operated an
intelligence-­gathering platform, the RC-135
Rivet Joint aircraft, which has already seen
service in Mali, Nigeria, and Iraq and is now
part of the RAF fleet.300

were scheduled for January 2021.318 The Princeof Wales returned to the sea in May 2021 after
five months of repairs.319 Each carrier is capable of supporting 36 F-35s, but the U.K. currently plans to procure only 48.320
The Royal Navy is also introducing seven
Astute-class attack submarines as it phases
out its older Trafalgar-class subs. The fifth
Astute-class submarine was launched in April
2021.321 Crucially, the U.K. maintains a fleetof 13 Mine Counter Measure Vessels (MCMVs) that deliver world-leading capability. As a
supplement, the U.K. began minehunting andsurvey operations using unmanned surface
vessels (USVs) in March 2020.322
Perhaps the Royal Navy’s most important contribution is its continuous-at-sea,
submarine-­based nuclear deterrent based on
the Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarine and the Trident missile. In July 2016, theF-35B fighters from the carrier are exHouse of Commons voted to renew Trident
pected to fly combat missions over Syria
and approved the manufacture of four replaceand Iraq from the eastern Mediterranean
ment submarines to carry the missile.
as part of Operation Shader, the UK’s
The U.K. plans to procure four new
contribution to the anti-Daesh campaign.
Dreadnought-­class ballistic missile submarines,
The CSG will then move further east towhich are expected to have a 30-year life span,
the Indian and Pacific Oceans, exercising
at a cost of £31 billion (plus an additional conwith the UAE along the way and visiting
tingency funding stream of £10 billion for any
India. Further visits are planned to Japan,
potential cost overruns), with a completion
South Korea, and Singapore, underlindate of the early 2030s for the first, HMS Valing the United Kingdom's new shift iniant.323 In May 2021, the Ministry of Defence
defense focus towards the Pacific. The
ordered a review of the program because ofgroup will participate in Exercise Bersama
delays that continue to push back the date ofLima with forces from Australia, Malaysia,
completion.324
New Zealand, and Singapore. The exerU.K. defense forces have been plagued incise coincides with the 50th anniversary
recent years by vacancies. “The personnelof the Five Powers Defence Agreement
strength of the British armed forces continues
between the five nations.316
to decrease,” according to the IISS, “with an
overall deficit of 7.6% in 2019, compared withThe U.K.’s Queen Elizabeth–class carriers 6.2% the previous year. Although recruitment
are the largest operated in Europe. A second initiatives continue, shortages remain in key
in this class, HMS Prince of Wales, will be the specialist areas, including 18% of required Roylarger of the two carriers and was commis- al Air Force (RAF) pilots.”325 However, initial
sioned in December 2019.317 However, the reports suggest that the pandemic may havePrince of Wales has been beset by a series of helped to fuel an increase in military recruitleaks that have cost £3.3 million and necessi- ment in 2020.326
tated the cancellation of planned fixed-wing
Despite these issues, the U.K. remains a
sea trials with F-35s off the U.S. east coast that leader inside NATO, serving as the framework﻿announced a procurement of five T31e frigates,
which are scheduled to enter service in 2023,313
the year the first of the Type-23 frigates is slated to be phased out of service.314
HMS Queen Elizabeth set sail on its first operational deployment in May 2021.315 The Carrier Strike Group deployment, which includes
a U.S. destroyer and a Dutch frigate, will “lastfor 28 weeks and cover 26,000nm” and “willinclude visits to the waters of more than 40
countries” and “a wide range of exercise andjoint operations.” Specifically, “Queen Elizabeth is scheduled to conduct dual-carrier operations in the Mediterranean with the French
carrier Charles de Gaulle, as well as exercise
with a number of navies, including that of Israel. Elements of the CSG will also conduct
maritime security operations in the Black Sea.”
In addition:

104

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﻿nation for NATO’s EFP in Estonia and a conIn December 2020, Italy signed the Future
tributing nation for the U.S.-led EFP in Poland. Combat Air System (FCAS) Cooperation agreeThe Royal Air Force has taken part in Baltic Air ment with Sweden and the U.K. The agreePolicing six times since 2004, most recently in ment covers “the cooperation for research,
May–August 2020.327 In April 2021, four RAF development, and ‘joint-concepting’” of the
Typhoons were deployed to Romania to take sixth-generation Tempest fighter.340 In April,part in NATO’s enhanced Air Policing (eAP), Italy’s Military Chief of Staff General Enzo
the third time the RAF has participated in eAP Vecciarelli suggested that the Tempest might
since 2017.328 From November–December 2019, possibly employ directed energy weapons tofour U.K. typhoons and 120 personnel took defeat hypersonic missiles.341
part in Icelandic Air Policing.329
Key naval procurements include plans for
Before its withdrawal early in 2021, the U.K. four U212A submarines, “a special operations
maintained a force of 750 troops in Afghani- & diving operations/Submarine Rescue Ship,”stan as part of NATO’s Resolute Support Mis- and a new anti-ship missile system.342 Italysion.330 It also contributes to NATO’s Kosovo launched the last of 10 new FREMM frigates
Force; 331 NATO’s Mine Countermeasures in January 2020.343 For the Italian Navy, “[t]heGroup One;332 and, as an active part of the anti-­ expected retirement of much of the naval fleet
ISIS coalition, Operation Shader.333 In Febru- has triggered a long-term replacement planary 2021, the U.K. announced that it planned which includes the potential acquisition of two
to increase the number of British troops (cur- next-generation destroyers to replace the agerently “about 100 soldiers”) engaged in train- ing Luigi Durand de la Penne-class vessels.”344
ing Iraqi security forces.334
The Ministry of Defence’s “Multi-year
Italy. Italy hosts some of the U.S.’s most im- Planning Document 2020–2022,” released in
portant bases in Europe, including the head- November 2020, launched “de-risking studies
quarters of the 6th Fleet. It also has NATO’s for two next generation destroyers under thefifth-largest military335 and one of its more DDX program to replace the Navy’s two Admicapable despite continued lackluster defense ral-class destroyers,” with the new destroyinvestment. In 2020, Italy spent only 1.39 per- ers to be delivered in 2028.345 Other defense
cent of GDP on defense, but it did spend 24.6 priorities include acquiring a “multi-mispercent of its defense budget on equipment, sion, multi-sensor” Gulfstream G-550 jet formeeting the second NATO spending bench- “command-­and-control, ‘electronic superiormark.336 Italy will increase its defense budget ity’ and ‘electronic protection of forces.’”; theby 9.6 percent in 2021, a $1.7 billion year-over- launch of new surveillance and communicayear increase. Procurement spending will in- tions satellites; and needed munitions.346
crease about 26 percent in 2021 over 2020 levItaly’s focus is the Mediterranean region
els, and “Maintenance and Operations rises 23 where it participates in a number of stabilipercent to €2.15 billion.”337
zation missions including NATO’s Sea GuardKey procurements include 150 Centauro II ian,347 the EU’s Operation Sophia,348 and the
8x8 tank destroyers, 650 Lince 2 light multi- Italian Navy’s own Operation Mare Sicurorole vehicles, 156 VBM Freccia 8x8 infantry (Safe Sea) off the Libyan coast.349 Additionally,
combat vehicles, T-345 and T-346 jet trainers, 400 Italian troops are part of the bilateral MisItaly's first HH-101 Combat Search and Rescue sion of Assistance of Support in both Misrata
helicopter, and 16 CH-47F helicopters.338 Ita- and Tripoli.350
ly also plans to purchase 60 F-35As for the air
Despite a southern focus, Italy contributes
force and 30 F-35Bs; the F-35Bs will be divid- to Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures
ed equally between the air force and navy.339 A Group Two351 as well as the EFP battalion ingovernment-owned plant for final assembly of Latvia (200 troops);352 previously NATO’s
the F-35 is located in Cameri, Italy.
Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan﻿(895 troops);353 and Operation Prima Parthica and an annual two-week camp.”364 Its planned(600 troops, partly to help train Iraqi Security 17 brigades will be distributed across the counForces).354 Italian Tornado jets operating out of try.365 The force, which will number 53,000 by
the Ahmed Al Jaber airbase in Kuwait are per- 2026,366 constitutes the fifth branch of theforming reconnaissance missions in support Polish military, subordinate to the Minister ofof the coalition to defeat the IS.355 With 542 Defense.367 National Defense Minister Maritroops, Italy is the second largest contributor usz Blaszczak has stated that the TDF’s perforto KFOR after the United States.356
mance combating COVID-19 has “impeccably
The Italian Air Force has taken part in Bal- proved their importance and effectiveness.”368
tic Air Policing five times, most recently with
Poland is also investing in cyber capabilities.
Italian Typhoons operating out of Lithuania “Plans for a 2,000-strong cyberdefence force
from September 2020–April 2021.357 In April were also unveiled in 2019,” according to the2021, Italy deployed four F-35As to Estonia, IISS Military Balance. “Centralised within themarking the first time the F-35 has taken part defence ministry, this force is due to be operin Baltic Air Policing.358 From May–August ational before 2025. A cyber component was
2019, Italy’s air force took part in NATO’s en- also set up in the TDF in 2019.”369 In Novemhanced Air Policing in Romania, having previ- ber 2020, the U.S. and Poland signed an enously participated in “a four-month enhanced hanced defense cooperation agreement that
Air Policing deployment to Bulgaria in 2017.”359 increased the number of U.S. forces stationed
The Italian Air Force has deployed to Iceland in Poland by 1,000.
to perform air patrols six times since 2013,
In 2019, Poland spent 2.31 percent of GDP
most recently in June–July 2020 when six on defense and 29.0 percent of its defense
F-35As were deployed to Iceland.360
budget on equipment, reaching both NATO
Poland. Situated in the center of Europe, benchmarks.370 Pursuant to increases in dePoland shares a border with four NATO allies, fense spending adopted in October 2017, Poa long border with Belarus and Ukraine, and land should be spending 2.5 percent of GDP on
a 144-mile border with Russia’s Kaliningrad defense in 2030.371 In January 2021, Minister
Oblast, a Russian enclave between Poland Blaszczak stated that Poland remained comand Lithuania on the Baltic Sea. Poland also mitted to 2 percent but that “[t]he COVID-19
has a 65-mile border with Lithuania, making pandemic will most likely have an impact
it the only NATO member state that borders on national security policies, including deany of the Baltic States, and NATO’s contin- fense budgets.”372
gency plans for liberating the Baltic States in
Poland is making major investments in milthe event of a Russian invasion reportedly rely itary modernization and is planning to spend
heavily on Polish troops and ports.361$133 billion on new capabilities by 2035, as enPoland has an active military force of visioned in the Defense Ministry’s Technical
114,050 including a 58,500-person army with Modernization Plan for 2021–2035, which was
808 main battle tanks.362 Poland also has a Ter- signed in October 2019.373 In addition, several
ritorial Defense Force (TDF) that is intended major acquisitions have been announced in“to increase the strength of the armed forces recent years. For example:
and the defense capabilities of the country,” according to former Minister of Defense Antoni
In January 2020, Poland signed a $4.6
Macierewicz, and “is also the best response tobillion deal to purchase 32 F-35As withthe dangers of a hybrid war like the one follow“deliveries from 2026.”374 A group of 24
363
ing Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.” The TDF
Polish pilots completed F-35 simulator
is mostly volunteer; “its personnel combine
training in Arizona early in 2021.375 Potheir civilian careers with limited military serland has announced that the F-35s will bevice of a minimum of two days twice a monthbased in Lask.376
l1062022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthand approximately half of the 6,000 troops
in the VJTF’s Spearhead Force were Polish.387
Poland also is part of NATO’s EFP in Latvia388
and has 229 troops in NATO’s KFOR mission in Kosovo.389
In addition, “up to 350 soldiers and employees” are deployed to Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, andIn February 2019, Poland signed a $414
Qatar as part of Operation Inherent Resolve.390
million deal to purchase 20 high-mobility
In April 2021, around 80 Polish soldiers deartillery rocket systems from the U.S. forployed to Turkey as part of a NATO assurance
delivery by 2023.379
mission to assist Turkey by providing additional maritime patrols over the Black Sea and theIn April 2019, it signed a $430 million
Mediterranean.391 Finally, Poland’s commitdeal to buy four AW101 helicopters thatment to NATO’s tailored forward presence
will provide anti-submarine warfare andin Bulgaria and Romania includes about 250
search-and-rescue capabilities and are to
soldiers and civilians.392
380
be delivered by the end of 2022.
Turkey. Turkey remains an important U.S.
ally and NATO member, but the increasingly
In February 2018, Poland joined an
autocratic presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoeight-nation “coalition of NATO countries gan and a thaw in relations between Turkey
seeking to jointly buy a fleet of maritime
and Russia have introduced troubling chalsurveillance aircraft.”381
lenges. Turkey has been an important U.S. ally
since the closing days of World War II. During
Poland has been in negotiations to purthe Korean War, it deployed 15,000 troops andchase 180 Javelin anti-tank weapons. In
suffered 721 killed in action and more thanMarch 2020, the State Department ap2,000 wounded. Turkey joined NATO in 1952,
proved the potential sale, which would be
one of only two NATO members (the other was
382
worth $100 million.
Norway) that had a land border with the Soviet Union. Today, it continues to play an active
In April 2021, the U.S. and Poland signedrole in the alliance, but not without difficulties.
an agreement for Poland to acquire five
Following an attempted coup in July 2016,
retrofitted C-130H Hercules transport
thousands of academics, teachers, journalists,
aircraft (decommissioned by the U.S. injudges, prosecutors, bureaucrats, and soldiers
2017) by 2024, with the first to arrive by
were fired or arrested. Specifically, according
the end of 2021.383
to a Reuters account, “some 80,000 people
were held pending trial and some 150,000 civil
In July 2021, Poland announced a deal toservants, military personnel and others were
procure 250 M1A2 Abrams SEPv3 tanks
sacked or suspended. More than 20,000 peowith deliveries to begin in 2022.384
ple have been expelled from the Turkish military.”393 In May 2019, according to Deutsche
Although Poland’s focus is territorial de- Welle, observers estimated that “3,000 inmatesfense, it had 290 troops deployed in Afghan- are being held in isolation.394
istan as part of NATO’s Resolute Support
The post-coup crackdown has had an espe385
Mission. Poland’s air force has taken part in cially negative effect on the military. As noted,
Baltic Air Policing nine times since 2006, most 20,000 members have been dismissed since
recently operating four F-16s out of Ämari Air 2016 with deleterious effects on those remainBase in Estonia from January–April 2020.386 ing.395 The IISS reported that “[t]he effect on
In 2020, Poland was the lead for NATO’s VJTF, officer morale of these continuing purges wasl

In March 2018, in the largest procurement contract in its history, Poland
signed a $4.75 billion deal for two Patriot
missile batteries.377 The Patriot batteries are scheduled for delivery between
2022 and 2025.378

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exacerbated by the widespread suspicion that In December, a U.S. official stated, “We object
promotions and appointments were increas- to Turkey’s purchase of the system and are
ingly politicised, with outspoken supporters deeply concerned with reports that Turkeyof Erdogan fast-tracked for promotion.”396 In is bringing it into operation.”407 That same
April 2021, Turkish authorities detained 10 month, in response to Turkey’s purchase offormer admirals that were part of a group of the S-400 systems, the U.S. announced sancmore than 100 retired naval officers who, in tions that would take effect in April 2021.408
an open letter, criticized a government plan Fearful of the likely effect of these sanctions,
to construct a canal in Istanbul.397
Turkey has been stockpiling spare F-16 parts
Turkey’s military is now suffering from a since 2019.409
loss of experienced generals and admirals as
Turkish defense firms make “more than 800
well as an acute shortage of pilots. The dismiss- components…for the F-35 as part of a nine-naal of more than 300 F-16 pilots, for instance, tion consortium,” and Turkey’s suspension
greatly exacerbated existing pilot shortag- from the program could cost the Turkish dees.398 A third of the dismissed pilots were in the fense industry as much as $10 billion.410 (Theleadership echelon, commanding squadrons, U.S. Government Accountability Office specfleets, or bases.399 A request to the U.S. to send ifies more precisely that 1,005 parts are protrainers was denied, as was a Turkish plan to duced by Turkish firms.411) Despite Turkey’s
utilize Pakistani trainers to fly the F-16.400 Fur- removal from the program, components of thethermore, as one analyst notes, “The shortage F-35 will continue to be built in Turkey untilof pilots was not the only problem. Many of the 2022.412 In his posture statement to Congress,
veteran staff members, especially at the oper- General Wolters downplayed the lasting potenations and logistics centers that help pilots fly tial of the Turkish–Russian rapprochement:
successful missions, were also removed, ham- “Turkey retains a pivotal role in countering
pering the close coordination between the air Russia. Ankara’s relationship with Moscow
and land elements of the air force. Hundreds of remains competitive and transactional, withengineers on the ground were also removed.”401 Turkish engagement often aimed at constrainThe dilapidated condition of its air force ing Russian behavior.”413
is partly why Turkey has decided to acquire
Partly because of its manned aircraft issues,
new ground-based air defense systems.402 In Turkey is investing heavily in armed drones.
December 2017, Turkey signed a $2.5 billion These drones, of which it has approximately
agreement with Russia to purchase S-400 air 130, have played a significant role in Turkish
defense systems, and delivery began in July operations in Syria.414 Here too, however, the2019.403 “The decision to purchase two S-400 country remains reliant on foreign companies.
air-defence systems from Russia,” reports “While Turkish companies have assembled
the IISS, “was made by the president without the drones,” according to the Congressional
detailed consultation with the armed forces Research Service, “they apparently rely on
about the possible technical and strategic re- Western countries for some key components,
percussions.”404 U.S. officials have expressed including engines, optical sensors, and camgrave concerns about this purchase and sus- era systems.”415
pended Turkey from the F-35 program in JulyIn October 2019, Turkey launched a major
2019, stating that “[t]he F-35 cannot coexist offensive in Syria against the Kurdish-led Syrwith a Russian intelligence collection platform ian Democratic Forces (SDF), partly to createthat will be used to learn about its advanced a buffer zone near the Turkish border. The
capabilities.”405
largest Kurdish armed faction within the SDF
Turkey tested the system against its F-16s in is the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an offNovember 2019 and further tested the system shoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a
at Sinop near the Black Sea in October 2020.406 U.S.-designated terrorist group that has waged

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengtha NATO partner with us.”423 Two positive signs
have been the use of Turkey’s Konya Air Baseto support NATO AWACS aircraft involved incounter-ISIS operations424 and Spain’s operation of a Patriot system in the Turkish city of
Adana under NATO auspices.425 Turkey also
hosts a crucial radar at Kurecik, which is part ofNATO’s BMD system, and the U.S. is reportedly
building a second undisclosed site (site K) near
Malatya, which is home to an AN/TPY-2 radarwith a range of up to 1,800 miles.426
In January 2021, Turkey took over command of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint
Task Force. According to NATO:
Built around Turkey’s 66th Mechanised
Infantry Brigade of around 4,200 troops,
a total of around 6,400 soldiers will serveon the VJTF. Units from Albania, Hungary,
Italy, Latvia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Spain, the UK, and the UnitedStates will also serve on the force, which ispart of the alliance’s larger NATO Response Force. Turkey has made substantial
investments into the unit—amongst themost mobile in NATO—particularly in its logistics and ammunition requirements planning. The latest models of Turkish armed
vehicles, anti-tank missiles and howitzers
have been allocated to the force.427

Before May of 2021, Turkey maintained
more than 600 troops in Afghanistan as partof NATO’s Resolute Support Mission.428 The
Turks also have contributed to a number ofpeacekeeping missions in the Balkans, still
maintain 317 troops in Kosovo,429 and haveparticipated in counterpiracy and counterterrorism missions off the Horn of Africa in addition to deploying planes, frigates, and submarines during the NATO-led operation in Libya.
Turkey currently contributes to the Standing
NATO Mine Countermeasures Group Two430
and Standing NATO Maritime Group Two.431
Turkey has a 355,200-strong active-duty military,432 which is NATO’s second largest after that of the United States. However,in June 2019:

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war against Turkey off and on since 1984. The
offensive led to the creation of a buffer zone
jointly patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces
following an agreement between Presidents
Erdogan and Putin in Sochi.
In February 2020, Russian-backed Syrian
regime forces launched an attack on Idlib, thelast remaining stronghold of forces opposed
to Assad. Turkish forces opposed the offensive
and lost 36 soldiers before Turkey and Russia
agreed to a cease-fire.416 The cease-fire was extended in February 2021.417
Turkish threats to renege on a 2016 agreement with the EU under which the EU paid
Turkey to stop the flow of migrants to Europe
are a consistent and enduring source of friction.418 In addition, Turkey and Greece remain
at odds over maritime boundaries and drillingrights between their two nations in the eastern Mediterranean as well as drilling rights off
the Cypriot coast. Tensions flared in 2020, andmaritime talks between Turkey and Greece are
ongoing. Turkey is reportedly scouting a location in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for a naval base419 and began flying UAVs
out of Geçitkale Airport in December 2019.420
U.S. security interests in the region lend
considerable importance to America’s relationship with Turkey. Turkey is home to Incirlik Air Base, a major U.S. and NATO air base,but it was reported early in 2018 that U.S. combat operations at Incirlik had been significantly reduced and that the U.S. was considering
permanent reductions. Restrictions on the useof Incirlik for operations in Syria have provenproblematic. “[The] American operation to kill
Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in
Syria,” for example, “saw U.S. forces use a basein Iraq instead of the much closer Incirlik, requiring a round trip of many hours.”421 The U.S.
reportedly began reviewing plans to remove
nuclear weapons from Incirlik in 2019, but nosuch decision has yet been made.422
U.S. officials, however, have sought to focus
on the positive aspects of U.S.–Turkish bilateral relations. In December 2019, General Wolters noted that he “saw no cracks in the armor
in Turkey’s willingness to work side by side as﻿President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ratified
a new law that reduced the length ofcompulsory military service from 12 tosix months. On payment of a fee, compulsory service can be reduced further
to one month of basic training. Thechanges were expected to reduce theoverall size of the armed forces by around35%, as part of Turkey’s long-term plan
to create compact and fully professionalarmed forces.433

Turkish defense procurement has become
more convoluted and more directly tied to
President Erdogan. A December 2017 decree
placed the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSB), which is responsible for procurement, under Erdogan’s direct control.434
Since then, Turkey’s defense procurement
has suffered from a “brain drain.” In January
2019, it was reported that 272 defense officials
and engineers had left for jobs overseas since
the change. Of the 81 who responded to an SSB
survey, “41 percent are in the 26–30 age group.
‘This highlights a trend among the relatively
young professionals to seek new opportunities
abroad,’ one SSB official noted.”435
Another challenge is continued reliance on
foreign components despite a focus on indigenous procurement. For example, Turkey’s procurement of 250 new Altay main battle tanks,
the first of which had been scheduled for May
2020, is indefinitely delayed. The tank relies
on a German-made engine and transmission,as well as French armor, but the technology
transfer was not approved. Turkey has sought
alternative suppliers such as South Korea andis looking to produce domestic components,
but procurement remains delayed.436
Similarly, Turkey’s procurement of 50
T-129 attack helicopters will likely be delayed
for more than four years to wait for productionof a domestic engine to replace one producedby American and British firms.437 Because of alack of engines, Turkey has been unable to deliver 30 T129s to Pakistan as part of a 2018 deal,
and Pakistan granted a further six-month extension in March 2021.438 Also in March 2021,

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Turkey announced plans to produce a larger
T929 helicopter gunship using a Ukrainian
engine, but the helicopter “is not expected tomake its first flight until 2024, and won’t enter
service until the end of the decade.”439
Additionally, the French government has
blocked development of anti-ballistic missiles
because of Turkey’s actions in Syria.440 President Erdogan has personally lobbied French
President Macron to allow Turkey to purchase
Eurosam’s SAMP/T missile-defense systems.441
After its removal from the F-35 program, Turkey is purportedly planning to produce a domestic fifth-generation jet, the TF-X National
Combat Aircraft, by 2023.442
Other major procurements include 350
T-155 Fırtına 155mm self-propelled howitzers443 and six Type-214 submarines, the firstof which will enter service in 2022 and the lastof which is to be delivered in 2027.444
In February 2019, Turkey announced upgrades of four Preveze-class submarines, to takeplace from 2023–2027.445 In the same month,Turkey launched an intelligence-­gathering
ship, the TCG Ufuk, described by President
Erdogan as the “eyes and ears of Turkey in theseas.”446 In December 2019, the SSB released
its “Strategic Plan 2019–2023,” which in partsets targets of 75 percent of Turkish militaryneeds being supplied domestically by 2023
and defense exports being increased to $10.2
billion by 2023. The latter target is almost certainly not likely to be met.447 In 2020, Turkish
exports declined by 17 percent to $2.279 billion,
down from $2.74 billion in 2019.448
The Baltic States. The U.S. has a long history of championing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Baltic States that dates backto the interwar period of the 1920s. Since regaining their independence from Russia in theearly 1990s, the Baltic States have been staunch
supporters of the transatlantic relationship. Although small in absolute terms, the three countries contribute significantly to NATO in relative terms. In 2021, the U.S. will provide $169
million in military aid to the Baltics.449
Estonia. Estonia has been a leader in theBaltics in terms of defense spending, with

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

delivery of 128 Javelins from the United Statesin February 2020.459
In October 2020, Estonia withdrew from ajoint armored vehicle development programwith Latvia and Finland for financial reasons,putting off new armored vehicle acquisition
until the end of the decade.460 In 2019, it received two C-145A tactical transport aircraft
donated by the U.S.461 In July 2019, Estonia
signed a $24 million deal to purchase 16,000
rifles from an American arms company, allowing the nation to phase out older Soviet and Israeli weapons.462 Estonia has earmarked €46
million for mines and short-range to medium-­
range coastal defenses and has indicated an interest in joint procurement with Latvia.463
According to Estonia’s National Defence
Development Plan for 2017–2026, “the sizeof the rapid reaction structure will increase
from the current 21,000 to over 24,400.”464 In
addition, Estonia’s cyber command became
operational in August 2018 and is expected toinclude 300 people when it reaches full operational capability in 2023.465 U.S. and Estoniancyber commands train together. In the fall of
2020, for example, they trained in Estonia
to help search for and block incoming cyberthreats from Russia.466
In 2017, Estonia and the U.S. strengthened
their bilateral relationship by signing a defense cooperation agreement that builds on
the NATO–Estonia Status of Forces Agreement, further clarifying the legal framework
for U.S. troops in Estonia.467 Estonian forces
have participated in a number of operations
including 45 soldiers in Resolute Support before its end,468 a vessel as part of the Standing
NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One,469
about 95 troops in the French-led Operation
Barkhane in Mali,470 and a Special Forces contribution to France’s Task Force Takuba in the
Sahel, which began in the latter half of 2020.471
Estonian troops also take part in the U.S.-led
Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq along with
NATO Mission Iraq.472
Latvia. Latvia’s recent military experience
also has been centered on operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan with NATO and U.S. forces.

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﻿defense spending equal to 2.33 percent of GDP
and 25.4 percent of defense spending on new
equipment in 2020,450 and will spend 2.29 percent of GDP on defense in 2021 after a defense
budget increase of nearly $36 million.451 Estonia’s Ministry of Defence Development Plan
2022–2025, released in March 2021, includes
planned investments of €135 million for ammunition along with improved personal protection for soldiers, continued development ofa modular field hospital, and continued procurement of self-propelled artillery, coastal
defenses, and anti-tank weapons.452
Munitions are a major component of Estonian procurement. Estonia’s Defense Investments Center, according to the head of its procurements department, will “concentrate on
procuring long-range anti-tank missiles Spike,
Mistral air defense missiles and small caliber
munitions in the near future.”453
Although the Estonian armed forces total only 7,100 active-duty service personnel(including the army, navy, and air force),454
they are held in high regard by their NATOpartners and punch well above their weightinside the alliance. Between 2003 and 2011,
455 Estonians served in Iraq. Perhaps Estonia’s most impressive deployment has been
to Afghanistan: More than 2,000 Estonian
troops were deployed between 2003 and2014, and they sustained the second-highest
number of deaths per capita among all 28
NATO members.
In 2015, Estonia reintroduced conscription
for men ages 18–27, who must serve eight or
11 months before being added to the reserverolls.455 The number of Estonian conscripts
will increase from 3,200 to 4,000 by 2026.456
Estonia has demonstrated that it takes defense and security policy seriously, focusing on
improving defensive capabilities at home while
maintaining the ability to be a strategic actor
abroad. Estonia is acquiring a total of 18 South
Korean–built K9 self-propelled howitzers at
a total cost of €66 million.457 It received thefirst units in October 2020, and the remaining
units are scheduled to arrive by 2023.458 Estonia has prioritized anti-tank weapons and took﻿

Latvia deployed more than 3,000 troops to 22,000 active-duty troops.485 It reintroduced
Afghanistan and between 2003 and 2008 conscription in 2015 and lowered the age for
deployed 1,165 troops to Iraq. In addition, it compulsory service in December 2019.486
has contributed to a number of other interLithuania has shown a steadfast commitnational peacekeeping and military missions. ment to international peacekeeping and miliA recent analysis notes that “Latvia has no tary operations. Between 2003 and 2011, it sent
requirement and therefore no capacity to in- 930 troops to Iraq. Since 2002, around 3,000
dependently deploy and sustain forces beyond Lithuanian troops served in Afghanistan. Lithits national boundaries, although the armed uania continues to contribute to NATO’s KFOR
forces have taken part in a range of NATO and and contributed to its Resolute Support MisEU missions.”473
sion until the alliance’s withdrawal of forces.
Today, despite a military that consists of
In 2020, Lithuania spent 2.13 percent of
only 6,250 full-time servicemembers,474 Lat- GDP on defense and 26.2 percent of its defense
via contributes to operations abroad. It de- budget on equipment.487 In April 2019, the U.S.
ployed troops to NATO’s Resolute Support and Lithuania signed a five-year “roadmap” deMission until the mission’s completion475 and fense agreement.488 According to the Pentagon,
participates in Operation Inherent Resolve in the agreement will help “to strengthen training,Iraq, where the mandate for Latvian soldiers exercises, and exchanges” and help Lithuania
taking part runs until February 2022,476 and “to defend against malicious cyber intrusions
NATO’s VJTF477 as well as a number of EU and attacks.” The two nations also pledged “toflagged missions.
support regional integration and procurement
Latvia’s National Defence Concept 2020– of warfighting systems,” including “integrated
2024 states that “the National Guard must air and missile defense systems and capabilireach at least 10,000-men mark by 2024.”478 ties to enhance maritime domain awareness.”489
Latvia “is investing $56 million annually A new “Mobilisation and Host Nation Support
through 2022 on military infrastructure, with law” took effect in January 2021.490
two-thirds of this amount being spent to upIn November 2020, Lithuania signed a $213
grade Ādaži military base, headquarters of the million deal to purchase four UH-60M Black
Canadian-led EFP battlegroup.”479
Hawk helicopters, beginning in late 2024.491
In 2020, Latvia spent 2.27 percent of GDP The U.S. is contributing approximately $30
on defense and 26.0 percent of its defense million to help in the acquisition.492 In Octoberbudget on equipment, exceeding both NATO 2020, Lithuania received a Norwegian-madebenchmarks.480 In February 2019, Latvia pur- NASAMS mid-range air defense system armed
chased four UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters with U.S.-made missiles.493 Lithuania plansfrom the United States.481
to spend an additional $104 million throughIn 2018, Latvia signed a $133 million agree- 2030 to purchase Javelin anti-tank weapons toment to purchase Spike precision-guided tac- supplement the 124 that it already has.494 Adtical missiles, the first of which were delivered ditional procurements include Boxer Infantry
in February 2020.482 A new team trainer for Fighting Vehicles and €145 million for 200 U.S.
the missiles was installed in October 2020.483 made Oshkosh Joint Light Tactical Vehicles.495
Latvia has also expressed interest in procuring a medium-range ground-based air-defense Current U.S. Military Presence in Europe
system (GBADS). Joint procurements include
At its peak in 1953, because of the Soviet
Carl Gustav M-4 anti-tank rifles with Estonia in threat to Western Europe, the U.S. had approx2020 and armored vehicles with Finland, which imately 450,000 troops in Europe operating
is slated to begin manufacturing in 2021.484
across 1,200 sites. During the early 1990s, both
Lithuania. Lithuania is the largest of the in response to a perceived reduction in thethree Baltic States, and its armed forces total threat from Russia and as part of the so-called1122022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 3

U.S. Troops
Deployed in Europe

Germany
42,086

The U.S. has 75,418
troops in Europe either
permanently deployed oron rotational missions,nearly all of whom arestationed in 16 countries.

EuropeanNations with theMost U.S. Troops

Norway1,170

56% Germany
SWEDEN

Finland200

17% Italy
12% U.K.
4% Spain
11% All other

Iceland
200
U.K
9,315

BalticSea

RUSSIA

Netherlands
433

BELARUS
Poland1,060

Atlantic
Ocean

Ukraine150

Italy
12,445FRANCE

﻿

Belgium
1,170

Romania
211
Kosovo673

Portugal
Spain
290
3,256

Black Sea

Greece405
Mediterranean
Sea
ALGERIAGEORGIA
Turkey1,808

IRAQ

NOTES:• Germany. Rotational troops as part of Operation Atlantic

Resolve are often deployed further forward to Bulgaria,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, andSlovakia.
• Norway. About 1,000 rotational troops were deployed fromJanuary to April 2021 for cold-weather training, on what is
becoming a consistent winter deployment.

• Kosovo. Nearly all U.S. forces are part of NATO’s Kosovo

Force.
• Romania. Rotational forces have deployed from permanentbases in Italy.
• Iceland. Nearly all of these forces are temporarily deployedfrom permanent bases in the United Kingdom and taking
part in Icelandic Air Policing.

SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

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A heritage.org

113

﻿

peace dividend following the end of the Cold
War, U.S. troop numbers in Europe wereslashed. Today, fewer than 66,000 active-duty
forces are permanently stationed in Europe.496
EUCOM’s stated mission is to conduct
military operations, international military
partnering, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend theUnited States as part of a forward defensive
posture. EUCOM is supported by four service component commands (U.S. Naval Forces Europe [NAVEUR]; U.S. Army Europe andAfrica [USAREUR-AF]; U.S. Air Forces in Europe [USAFE]; and U.S. Marine Forces Europe[MARFOREUR]) and one subordinate unified
command (U.S. Special Operations Command
Europe [SOCEUR]).
U.S. Naval Forces Europe. NAVEUR is
responsible for providing overall command,
operational control, and coordination for maritime assets in the EUCOM and Africa Command (AFRICOM) areas of responsibility. This
includes more than 20 million square nautical
miles of ocean and more than 67 percent of the
Earth’s coastline.
This command is currently provided by the
U.S. 6th Fleet, based in Naples, and brings critical U.S. maritime combat capability to an important region of the world. Some of the morenotable U.S. naval bases in Europe include theNaval Air Station in Sigonella, Italy; the Naval
Support Activity Base in Souda Bay, Greece;
and the Naval Station at Rota, Spain.
In 2018, the Norfolk, Virginia-based Harry S.
Truman Carrier Strike Group (CSG) executed
no-notice deployments to the Mediterraneanover the summer and the Norwegian Sea above
the Arctic Circle in October; the Arctic deployment was the first for a CSG in 30 years.497 In
February 2020, General Wolters highlighted
the importance of CSG deployments: “In themaritime domain, we see predictable Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious presence as
key elements of an agile theater posture. The
reactivation of U.S. Second Fleet provides necessary maritime command and control capability in the Atlantic, while reinforcing NATO’s
western flank.”498

114

U.S. Army Europe and Africa. In November 2020, U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army
Africa were consolidated into U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF), headquartered in Wiesbaden, Germany.499 According
to USAREUR-­AF, “The consolidation of thesetwo Army service component commands
under one four-star commander will play avital role in supporting missions across twointerconnected theaters of operation” andwill “enhance efficiency by streamlining theheadquarters’ ability to execute functions andimproving global and regional contingency response efforts.”500
The former USAREUR was established in
1952. Then, as today, the U.S. Army formed thebulk of U.S. forces in Europe. USAREUR-AF
includes “approximately 73,000 U.S. Army
personnel assigned and deployed throughout
Europe and Africa.”501 Permanently deployed
forces include the 2nd Cavalry Regiment,
based in Vilseck, Germany, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, with both units supported by the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade out ofAnsbach, Germany. In November 2018, the41st Field Artillery Brigade returned to Europe,with headquarters in Grafenwoehr, Germany.
In addition:
Operational and theater enablers such as
the 21st Theater Sustainment Command,
10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, 7th Army Training Command, 79th
Theater Sustainment Command, 66th and207th Military Intelligence Brigades, 2ndTheater Signal Brigade, U.S. Army NATO
Brigade, Installation Management Command-Europe and Regional Health Command-Europe provide essential skills andservices that support our entire force.502

Reactivated in September 2019, the 1st
Battalion, 6th Field Artillery, 41st Field Artillery Brigade is currently the only U.S. rocket
artillery brigade in Europe and represents
the first time in 13 years that USAREUR has
had the Multiple Launch Rocket System in its
command.503 A second field artillery battalion

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthaircrew members and demonstrate U.S. commitment to allies and partners.”513
U.S. Marine Forces Europe. MARFOREUR
was established in 1980. It was originally a “designate” component command, meaning that it
was only a shell during peacetime but could
bolster its forces during wartime. Its initial staff
was 40 personnel based in London. By 1989, it
included more than 180 Marines in 45 separate
locations in 19 countries throughout the European theater. Today, the command is based in
Boeblingen, Germany, and approximately 300of the more than 1,500 Marines based in Europe
are assigned to MARFOREUR.514 It was also dual-hatted as Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF), under U.S. Africa Command in 2008.
MARFOREUR supports the Norway Air
Landed Marine Air Ground Task Force, theMarine Corps’ only land-based prepositioned
stock. The Corps has enough prepositioned
stock in Norway “to equip a fighting force of
4,600 Marines, led by a colonel, with everything but aircraft and desktop computers,”515
and the Norwegian government covers halfof the costs of the prepositioned storage. The
prepositioned stock’s proximity to the Arctic
region is particularly important geostrategically. In October 2018, Marines used the
prepositioned equipment in NATO’s Trident
Juncture 18 exercise, the largest NATO exercise in 16 years, which included 50,000 troops
from 31 nations.516 The prepositioned stocks
were to factor heavily into the cancelled Cold
Response 2020 exercise.517
Crucially, MARFOREUR provides the U.S.
with rapid reaction capability to protect U.S.
embassies in North Africa. The Special-­Purpose
Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Crisis Response–Africa (SPMAGTF–CR–AF) is “basedin Moron, Spain, although it frequently operates
from NATO bases throughout the Mediterranean, to include most often Sigonella, Sicily,”518
and provides a response force of 850 Marines,
six MV-22 Ospreys, and three KC-130s.519 The
SPMAGTF helped with embassy evacuationsin Libya and South Sudan and conducts regulardrills with embassies in the region and exerciseswith a host of African nations’ militaries.520

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military115﻿

was reactivated in the fall of 2020.504 The 5thBattalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment,
was activated in November 2018 and is now
based in Ansbach.505 The regiment will be thefirst in the Army to be fully operational with
the Maneuver Short Range Air Defense system having already received four of the systems by the end of April 2021 and with moreon the way.506 The U.S. Army in recent years
has reinstituted a number of snap deployments
to Europe to hone readiness.507 Each year,
USAREUR-­AF takes part in more than 60 exercises with 80,000 multinational participantsfrom 75 countries.508
U.S. Air Forces in Europe. USAFE provides a forward-based air capability that can
support a wide range of contingency operations. It originated as the 8th Air Force in1942 and flew strategic bombing missions overthe European continent during World War II.
USAFE describes itself as “direct[ing] air operations in a theater spanning three continents,
covering more than 19 million square miles,
containing 104 independent states, and possessing more than a quarter of the world’s population and more than a quarter of the world’s
Gross Domestic Product.”509
Headquartered at Ramstein Air Base,
USAFE has seven main operating bases alongwith 114 geographically separated locations.
The main operating bases include the RAF
bases at Lakenheath and Mildenhall in the
U.K., Ramstein and Spangdahlem Air Basesin Germany, Lajes Field in the Azores, Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, and Aviano Air Base in
Italy.510 Terrorist attacks against these installations remain a threat. In March and April 2020,
five Tajik nationals who had come to Germany
seeking refugee status were arrested for plotting terrorist attacks against U.S. Air Force bases and personnel on behalf of ISIS.511
Strategic bomber deployments continue
periodically. In March 2021, U.S. B-1 and B-2
bombers flying from the U.S. deployed out ofOrland Air Base in Norway and Lajes Field in
Portugal, respectively.512 According to the U.S.
Air Force, “Strategic bomber deployments to
Europe provide theater familiarization for﻿U.S. Special Operations Command Eu- budget request included over $40 million inrope. SOCEUR is the only subordinate unified declared special operations funding for varicommand under EUCOM. Its origins are in the ous programs including intelligence enhanceSupport Operations Command Europe, and it ments, staging and prepositioning, and exerwas based initially in Paris. This headquarters cises with allies.524
provided peacetime planning and operational control of special operations forces during Key Infrastructure andunconventional warfare in EUCOM’s area of Warfighting Capabilities
responsibility.
One of the major advantages of having U.S.
SOCEUR has been headquartered in Panzer forces in Europe is access to logistical infraKaserne near Stuttgart, Germany, since 1967. It structure. For example, EUCOM supports thealso operates out of RAF Mildenhall. In June U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
2018, U.S. Special Operations Command General with its array of air bases and access to ports
Tony Thomas stated that the U.S. plans “to move throughout Europe. One of these bases, Mitactical United States special operations forces hail Kogalniceanu Air Base in Romania, is afrom the increasingly crowded and encroached major logistics and supply hub for U.S. equipStuttgart installation of Panzer Kaserne to the ment and personnel traveling to the Middle
more open training grounds of Baumholder” in East region.525
a move that is expected to take a few years.521
Europe is a mature and advanced operatDue to the sensitive nature of special op- ing environment. Because of its decades-longerations, publicly available information is presence in Europe, the U.S. benefits fromscarce. However, it has been documented that tried and tested systems that involve moving
SOCEUR elements participated in various large numbers of matériel and personnel into,
capacity-­building missions and civilian evac- within, and out of the continent. This offers anuation operations in Africa, took an active role operating environment that is second to nonein the Balkans in the mid-1990s and in combat in terms of logistical capability. There are more
operations in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, than 166,000 miles of rail line in Europe (notand most recently supported AFRICOM’s Op- including Russia), an estimated 90 percent oferation Odyssey Dawn in Libya.
roads in Europe are paved, and the U.S. enjoys
SOCEUR also plays an important role in access to a wide array of airfields and ports
joint training with European allies and since across the continent.
June 2014 has maintained an almost continuous presence in the Baltic States and Poland Conclusion
in order to train special operations forces in
Overall, the European region remains a
those countries. A new special operations base stable, mature, and friendly operating enin Latvia that opened in December 2020, for vironment. Russia remains the preeminent
example, “includes a vehicle servicing facili- military threat, both conventionally and unty, ammunition storage and two helipads for conventionally, but Chinese propaganda, inU.S. CV-22 aircraft from the United Kingdom-­ fluence operations, and investments in key
based 352nd Special Operations Wing,” all of sectors present a new threat that needs to bewhich “are designed to allow special opera- addressed. NATO and many European countions forces to move rapidly in and out of the tries apart from those in the alliance have takarea and conduct maintenance.”522
en increased interest in the behavior and amAccording to General Tod Wolters, SOF bitions of both countries, although an agreed”
provide invaluable contributions in sensing upon, collective way to address these challengthe operational environment, enhancing our es remains elusive.
ability to deter through enhanced indicaAmerica’s closest and oldest allies are lo523
tions and warnings.” The FY 2021 DOD EDI cated in Europe, and the region is incredibly

116

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthimportant to the U.S. for economic, military,and political reasons. Perhaps most important,
the U.S. has treaty obligations through NATOto defend the European members of that alliance. If the U.S. needs to act in the European
region or nearby, there is a history of interoperability with allies and access to key logistical infrastructure that makes the operating
environment in Europe more favorable thanthe environment in other regions in which U.S.
forces might have to operate.
The past year saw continued U.S. reengagement with the continent, both militarily andpolitically, along with continued increases in
European allies’ defense budgets and capability investments. The U.S. has increased its investment in Europe, and its military positionon the continent is stronger than it has beenfor some time.
The economic, political, and societal impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are only

beginning to be felt and will undoubtedly
have to be reckoned with for years to come,particularly with respect to Europe’s relationship with China. NATO utilized a hostof resources to assist with the response to
COVID-19 while continuing to ensure thatthe pandemic did not enervate the alliance’s
collective defense.
NATO’s renewed focus on collective defense has resulted in a focus on logistics,
newly established commands that reflect achanged geopolitical reality, and a robust
set of exercises. NATO’s biggest challenges
derive from capability and readiness gaps
for many European nations, continuing improvements and exercises in the realm of
logistics, a tempestuous Turkey, disparate
threat perceptions within the alliance, andthe need to establish the ability to mount arobust response to both linear and nonlinear
forms of aggression.

Scoring the European Operating Environment﻿
As noted at the beginning of this secinstability. The U.S. military is inadetion, various considerations must be taken
quately placed in the region.
into account in assessing the regions within
which the U.S. may have to conduct military 3. Moderate. A neutral to moderately favoroperations to defend its vital national interable operating environment is characterests. Our assessment of the operating enviized by adequate infrastructure, a modronment utilized a five-point scale, ranging
erate alliance structure, and acceptablefrom “very poor” to “excellent” conditions
levels of regional political stability. The
and covering four regional characteristics
U.S. military is adequately placed.
of greatest relevance to the conduct of military operations:
4. Favorable. A favorable operating environment includes good infrastructure,
1. Very Poor. Significant hurdles exist forstrong alliances, and a stable political enmilitary operations. Physical infrastrucvironment. The U.S. military is well placed
ture is insufficient or nonexistent, andin the region for future operations.
the region is politically unstable. The U.S.
military is poorly placed or absent, and
5. Excellent. An extremely favorable
alliances are nonexistent or diffuse.
operating environment includes well-­established and well-maintained infra2. Unfavorable. A challenging operating
structure; strong, capable allies; and aenvironment for military operations isstable political environment. The U.S.
marked by inadequate infrastructure,
military is exceptionally well placed to
weak alliances, and recurring politicaldefend U.S. interests.

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117

The key regional characteristics consist of:﻿a. Alliances. Alliances are important forinteroperability and collective defense, as
allies are more likely to lend support to
U.S. military operations. Various indicators provide insight into the strengthor health of an alliance. These include
whether the U.S. trains regularly withcountries in the region, has good interoperability with the forces of an ally,and shares intelligence with nationsin the region.
b. Political Stability. Political stability
brings predictability for military planners
when considering such things as transit, basing, and overflight rights for U.S.
military operations. The overall degreeof political stability indicates whether
U.S. military actions would be hindered or
enabled and considers such questions as
whether transfers of power are generally
peaceful and whether there have been any
recent instances of political instability
in the region.
c. U.S. Military Positioning. Having
military forces based or equipment andsupplies staged in a region greatly enhances the ability of the United States
to respond to crises and, presumably,
achieve successes in critical “first battles”
more quickly. Being routinely present ina region also helps the U.S. to maintainfamiliarity with its characteristics and thevarious actors that might try to assist or
thwart U.S. actions. With this in mind, we
assessed whether or not the U.S. military
was well positioned in the region. Again,
indicators included bases, troop presence,
prepositioned equipment, and recent
examples of military operations (including training and humanitarian) launchedfrom the region.
d. Infrastructure. Modern, reliable, andsuitable infrastructure is essential tomilitary operations. Airfields, ports, raillines, canals, and paved roads enable theU.S. to stage, launch operations from, andlogistically sustain combat operations. We
combined expert knowledge of regionswith publicly available information on
critical infrastructure to arrive at ouroverall assessment of this metric.
For Europe, scores this year remained
steady, with no substantial changes in any individual categories or average scores:lAlliances: 4—Favorablel

Political Stability: 4—Favorablel

U.S. Military Positioning: 4—FavorablelInfrastructure: 4—Favorable
Leading to a regional score of: Favorable

Operating Environment: Europe
VERY POORUNFAVORABLE

MODERATE

FAVORABLE

Alliances%

Political Stability%

U.S. Military Posture%

Infrastructure%

OVERALL%

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

EXCELLENT

Endnotes
1.

Peter Ong, “U.S. Navy Reports on Arctic and North Atlantic,” Naval News, February 20, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/navalnews/2021/02/u-s-navy-reports-on-arctic-and-north-atlantic/ (accessed June 5, 2021).

2.

Trisha Thomas, “NATO: Russia Uses Syrian War to Boost Mediterranean Presence,” Associated Press, May 7, 2018, https://apnews.
com/article/391be5ea4450452caa7d84458806b9e9 (accessed June 5, 2021).

3.

David A. Wemer, “US Joint Chiefs Chairman Makes the Case for Keeping US Troops in Europe,” Atlantic Council, March 21, 2019,https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-joint-chiefs-chairman-makes-the-case-for-keeping-us-troops-ineurope (accessed June 5, 2021).

4.

U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe and Africa Support to Atlantic Resolve,” as of February 16, 2021, https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/Portals/19/documents/Fact%20Sheets/Atlantic-Resolve-Fact-Sheet-02162021.pdf (accessed June 5, 2021).

5.

Latvian Information Agency/Baltic News Service/TBT Staff, “Trump Proposes 25% Drop in Fund Designed to Deter Russia,” The
Baltic Times, February 12, 2020, https://www.baltictimes.com/trump_proposes_25__drop_in_fund_designed_to_deter_russia/(accessed June 5, 2021).

6.

U.S. European Command, “FY 2020 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) Fact Sheet,” https://www.eucom.mil/document/39921/
fy-2020-european-deterrence-initiative-fact-s (accessed June 5, 2021).

7.

General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force, Commander, United States European Command, statement before theCommittee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 13, 2021, p. 11, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
CLEARED%20USEUCOM%20SASC%20Congressional%20Posture%20Statement.pdf (accessed June 5, 2021).

8.

General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Commander, United States European Command, statement before the Subcommittee on Military
Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, May 2, 2017, unclassified“Resource Requirements—Addendum,” p. [1], https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/050217-ScaparrottiTestimony.pdf (accessed June 5, 2021).

9.

Phil Stewart, “Military Deploys First Coronavirus Test Kits, Though Capacity Is Limited,” Task & Purpose, March 6, 2020, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/military-deploys-coronavirus-test-kits (accessed June 5, 2021).

11. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Press Release: Eighth Atlantic Resolve Armored Rotation Set to Begin Mission,” July 9, 2021,
https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/ArticleViewPressRelease/Article/2688252/press-release-eighth-atlantic-resolve-armoredrotation-set-to-begin-mission/ (accessed July 19, 2021).
12. Caroline Houck, “Army Chief: The US Needs More Troops in Europe,” Defense One, November 15, 2017, https://www.defenseone.
com/threats/2017/11/army-chief-us-needs-more-troops-europe/142580/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
13. This was announced early in 2016. See Reuters, “U.S. to Deploy Armored Brigade Combat Teams to Europe,” March 30, 2016,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-europe-idUSKCN0WW23P (accessed June 5, 2021). In early 2017, the Army
initiated a program to rotate units from CONUS to Europe and back, emphasizing the heel-to-toe aspect, meaning that the
replacing unit would arrive before departure of the current unit so as to achieve a constant presence in Europe. The program
began in January 2017 with the 10th CAB, followed by the 1st CAB in November 2017 and the 4th CAB in June 2018. See Spc.
Thomas Scaggs, “10th Combat Aviation Brigade Returns from Successful Rotation in Europe,” U.S. Army, November 15, 2017,https://www.army.mil/article/196979/10th_combat_aviation_brigade_returns_from_successful_rotation_in_europe (accessed
June 5, 2021), and Staff Sgt. Adrian Patoka, “Third Atlantic Resolve Aviation Brigade Arrives in Europe,” U.S. Department of
Defense, June 22, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1558059/third-atlantic-resolve-aviation-brigade-arrivesin-europe/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
14. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe and Africa Support to Atlantic Resolve,” as of February 16, 2021.
15. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Press Release: Seventh Atlantic Resolve Aviation Rotation to Begin,” February 16, 2021, https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/ArticleViewPressRelease/Article/2503723/press-release-seventh-atlantic-resolve-aviation-rotationto-begin/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
16. Robert Burns, “Austin: US Adds 500 Troops in Germany, Despite Trump Pledge,” Associated Press, April 13, 2021, https://apnews.
com/article/joe-biden-europe-lloyd-austin-berlin-germany-201df3ddf8a2b17336c4df2cbf88ef1d (accessed June 5, 2021).
17. Kyle Rempfer, “Air Force MQ-9 Reaper Drones Based in Poland Are Now Fully Operational,” Air Force Times, March 5, 2019,https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/03/05/air-force-mq-9-reaper-drones-based-in-poland-are-now-fullyoperational/ (accessed June 10, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military119﻿

10. Aaron Mehta, “Special US Fund to Replace Russian Equipment in Europe Is Shifting Its Strategy,” Defense News, March 18, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/03/18/special-us-fund-to-replace-russian-equipment-in-europe-is-shiftingits-strategy/ (accessed June 5, 2021).

18. John Vandiver, “US Air Force Deploys Reaper Drones to Estonia for First Time on Short-Term Mission,” Stars and Stripes, June15, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/us-air-force-deploys-reaper-drones-to-estonia-for-first-time-on-short-termmission-1.633809 (accessed June 10, 2021).
19. Press release, “U.S. Air Force Establishes Enduring Presence in Romania,” U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, January
4, 2021, https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Press-Releases/Article/2461113/us-air-force-establishes-enduring-presence-in-romania/(accessed June 10, 2021).
20. Oriana Pawlyk, “With Fewer US Troops in Europe, MQ-9 Reaper Drones Are Filling the Gap,” Military.com, February 26, 2021,
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/02/26/fewer-us-troops-europe-mq-9-reaper-drones-are-filling-gap.html (accessed
June 10, 2021).
21. Stephen Losey, “Air Force Bases MQ-9 Reapers in Romania,” Air Force Times, January 5, 2021, https://www.airforcetimes.
com/news/your-air-force/2021/01/05/air-force-bases-mq-9-reapers-in-romania/#:~:text=The%20Air%20Force%20said%20
Monday,Africa%20said%20in%20a%20release (accessed June 10, 2021).
22. Brian W. Everstine, “US, Poland Finish Negotiations on Troop Increase, Drones,” Air Force Magazine, August 3, 2020, https://www.
airforcemag.com/us-poland-end-negotiations-on-troop-increase-drones/ (accessed June 10, 2021).
23. BBC News, “Pompeo Signs Deal to Redeploy Troops from Germany to Poland,” August 15, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-53792019 (accessed June 10, 2021).
24. Jędrzej Graf and Jakub Palowski, “Defence24 Reveals Details of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement [EXCLUSIVE],”
Defense24, September 14, 2020, https://www.defence24.com/defence24-reveals-details-of-the-enhanced-defence-cooperationagreement-exclusive (accessed June 10, 2021).
25. Ibid.
26. John Vandiver, “V Corps Takes up Position at New Poland Headquarters,” Stars and Stripes, November 20, 2020, https://www.
stripes.com/news/europe/v-corps-takes-up-position-at-new-poland-headquarters-1.652807 (accessed June 10, 2021).

﻿

27. John Vandiver, “Army’s V Corps, with a Long History in Europe, Is Back in Action,” Stars and Stripes, October 16, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/army-s-v-corps-with-a-long-history-in-europe-is-back-in-action-1.648804 (accessed June 10, 2021).
28. Thomas Nilsen, “U.S. Navy to Build Airport Infrastructure in North Norway to Meet Upped Russian Submarine Presence,” Eye on
the Arctic, April 16, 2021, https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2021/04/16/u-s-navy-to-build-airport-infrastructure-in-northnorway-to-meet-upped-russian-submarine-presence/ (accessed June 10, 2021).
29. Reuters, Terje Solsvik, and Nerijus Adomaitis, “Norway to Allow U.S. Military to Build on Its Soil in New Accord,” Reuters, April 16,
2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/norway-may-allow-us-military-build-its-soil-revised-cooperation-deal-2021-04-16/(accessed June 5, 2021).
30. Philip Athey, “Marine Corps Announces End to Year-Round Deployment to Norway,” Marine Corps Times, August 13, 2020, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/08/13/marine-corps-announces-end-to-year-round-deploymentto-norway/ (accessed June 10, 2021).
31. “1,000 US Marines Arrive in Norway for Cold-Weather Training,” Stars and Stripes, January 8, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/
news/europe/1-000-us-marines-arrive-in-norway-for-cold-weather-training-1.657845 (accessed June 10, 2021).
32. John Vandiver, “700 Marines Arrive in Norway for Six-Month Mission,” Stars and Stripes, September 27, 2019, https://www.stripes.
com/news/700-marines-arrive-in-norway-for-six-month-mission-1.600760 (accessed June 10, 2021).
33. Brian E. Everstine, “First B-1 Deployment to Norway Shows Importance of Arctic, Cold-Weather Ops,” Air Force Magazine, March 5,2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/first-b-1-deployment-to-norway-shows-importance-of-arctic-cold-weather-ops/ (accessed
June 10, 2021).
34. Ibid. and Thomas Nilsen, “U.S. B-1 Bomber Makes First Landing Inside Norway’s Arctic Circle,” The Barents Observer, March 9, 2021,
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2021/03/us-b-1-bomber-makes-first-landing-inside-norways-arctic-circle (accessed
June 10, 2021).
35. Bruno Waterfield, “Norway Reopens Submarine Base to Help US,” The Times, October 12, 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/
article/norway-reopens-submarine-base-to-help-us-hlmr3wv8s (accessed June 10, 2021).
36. Ibid.
37. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe and Africa Support to Atlantic Resolve,” as of July 6, 2021, https://www.
europeafrica.army.mil/Portals/19/documents/Fact%20Sheets/AtlanticResolveFactSheet_07062021.pdf (accessed July 20, 2021).
38. “Foreign Warships on Bosphorus in 2021,” Bosphorus Naval News, last updated July 12, 2021, https://turkishnavy.net/foreignwarship-on-bosphorus/foreign-warship-on-bosphorus-in-2021/ (accessed July 20, 2021).

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40. 13News Now Staff, “US Second Fleet Declares Full Operational Capability,” WVEC, Norfolk, Virginia, updated January 1, 2020,
https://www.13newsnow.com/article/news/national/military-news/us-2nd-fleet-declares-full-operational-capability/2914dddcb02-5f8d-46c6-8c2c-62ba665b017b (accessed June 10, 2021).
41. U.S. 2nd Fleet, “U.S. 2nd Fleet to Lead BALTOPS 2019,” Military News, April 2, 2019, https://www.militarynews.com/news/u-s-2ndfleet-to-lead-baltops-2019/article_00db98bc-557a-11e9-a02b-c718d36bd746.html (accessed June 10, 2021).
42. Paul McLeary, “How the US Is Preparing to Hunt New Chinese, Russian Subs,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/how-the-us-is-preparing-to-hunt-new-chinese-russian-subs/ (accessed June 10, 2021).
43. Joseph Trevithick, “Three Russian Ballistic Missile Submarines Just Surfaced Through the Arctic Ice Together,” The War Zone,
March 26, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39953/three-russian-ballistic-missile-submarines-just-surfacedthrough-the-arctic-ice-together (accessed June 10, 2021).
44. McLeary, “How the US Is Preparing to Hunt New Chinese, Russian Subs.”
45. Ong, “U.S. Navy Reports on Arctic and North Atlantic.”
46. Ibid.
47. U.S. 6th Fleet Public Affairs, “USS New Mexico Arrives in Tromsø, Norway,” U.S. Naval Forces Europe–Africa / U.S. 6th Fleet, May
10, 2021, https://www.c6f.navy.mil/Press-Room/News/Article/2600979/uss-new-mexico-arrives-in-troms-norway/ (accessed
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48. Ong, “U.S. Navy Reports on Arctic and North Atlantic.”
49. Joseph Trevithick, “Admiral Warns America’s East Coast Is No Longer a ‘Safe Haven’ Thanks to Russian Subs,” The War Zone,
February 4, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32087/admiral-warns-americas-east-coast-is-no-longer-a-safehaven-thanks-to-russian-subs (accessed June 10, 2021).
50. U.S. Army Europe, “Army Prepositioned Stock–Europe,” STAND-TO! The Official Focus of the U.S. Army, August 3, 2017, https://www.army.mil/standto/2017-08-03 (accessed June 10, 2019).

﻿

51. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY)
2019: European Deterrence Initiative, February 2018, pp. 12, 13, and 23, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2019/fy2019_EDI_JBook.pdf (accessed June 10, 2021).
52. Christopher Woody, “The US Marine Corps’ Big Plans to Redesign Its Force Means Changes to What It Stores in Secret Caves in
Norway,” Business Insider, August 18, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/marine-corps-force-redesign-means-taking-tanksfrom-norway-caves-2020-8 (accessed June 30, 2021).
53. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget Fiscal
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54. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Adding New Arms Stockpile in Europe: Gen. Perna,” Breaking Defense, February 4, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-adding-new-arms-stockpile-in-europe-gen-perna/ (accessed June 30, 2021).
55. Wolters, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2021, p. 15.
56. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, “Marshall Center Voices: General Christopher Cavoli, Commander of U.S.
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58. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 34, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/3/pdf/sgar20-en.pdf (accessed June 4, 2021).
59. Transcript, “Press Conference X [sic] by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meeting of NATO Ministersof Foreign Affairs,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated April 3, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
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60. News release, “COVID-19 Emergency Response Mission in Support to Romania,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO
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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military121

61. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 35.
62. Ibid., p. 36.
63. Ibid., p. 37.
64. Kent Harris, “US Military Could Vaccinate Thousands of Europeans with Base Ties,” Stars and Stripes, April 27, 2021, https://www.
stripes.com/news/europe/us-military-could-vaccinate-thousands-of-europeans-with-base-ties-1.671308 (accessed June 30,2021).
65. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 37.
66. Andrew A. Michta, “Without the US, European Defense Will Fall to Pieces,” The American Interest, October 23, 2019, https://www.
the-american-interest.com/2019/10/23/without-the-us-european-defense-will-fall-to-pieces/ (accessed June 30, 2021).
67. Hope Hodge Seck, “Military Update: Coronavirus Cancellations and Closures,” Military.com, March 17, 2020, https://www.military.
com/daily-news/2020/03/17/military-update-coronavirus-cancellations-and-closures.html (accessed June 30, 2021).
68. Christopher Woody, “The US and NATO Started 2020 with Big Plans to Practice a Vital Military Skill—Then the Coronavirus Hit,”
Business Insider, June 15, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-may-undermine-nato-eu-military-mobility-plansin-europe-2020-6 (accessed June 30, 2021).
69. Ibid.
70. John Vandiver, “The Navy’s Big Baltic Exercise Is Underway, but COVID-19 Means No Marines Storming the Beach,” Stars andStripes, June 9, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/the-navy-s-big-baltic-exercise-is-underway-but-covid-19-meansno-marines-storming-the-beach-1.632971 (accessed June 17, 2021).
71. Wolters, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2021, p. 15.
72. Joseph Trevithick, “Air Force Shows Off Squadron Logo Highlighting Stockpile of Nuclear Bombs in Belgium,” The War Zone,
March 31, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40008/air-force-shows-off-squadron-logo-highlighting-stockpile-ofnuclear-bombs-in-belgium (accessed June 30, 2021).

﻿

73. John Vandiver, “US Reviewing Plans to Move Nuclear Weapons from Incirlik, Report Says,” Stars and Stripes, October 15, 2019,https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/us-reviewing-plans-to-move-nuclear-weapons-from-incirlik-report-says-1.603116(accessed June 17, 2021).
74. Abhijnan Rej, “US Sanctions Turkey over Russian Air Defense System, Raising Questions and Concerns,” The Diplomat, December
16, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/us-sanctions-turkey-over-russian-air-defense-system-raising-questions-andconcerns/ (accessed June 30, 2021).
75. Trevithick, “Air Force Shows Off Squadron Logo Highlighting Stockpile of Nuclear Bombs in Belgium.”
76. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) Fact Sheet,” June 1,
2020, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/b61-12-life-extension-program-lep-fact-sheet (accessed June 30, 2021).
77. Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Advances Testing of New Nuclear Gravity Bomb: General,” Military.com, May 1, 2018, https://www.
military.com/dodbuzz/2018/05/01/air-force-advances-testing-new-nuclear-gravity-bomb-general.html (accessed June 30, 2021).
78. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) Fact Sheet.”
79. Greg Waldron, “F-35A Drops Inert Nuclear Bomb for First Time,” Flight Global, November 26, 2020, https://www.flightglobal.com/
defence/f-35a-drops-inert-nuclear-bomb-for-first-time/141330.article (accessed June 30, 2021).
80. Press release, “London Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in London 3–4 December 2019,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 4, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm (accessed June 30, 2021).
81. Ong, “U.S. Navy Reports on Arctic and North Atlantic.”
82. Ibid.
83. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan,” last updated April 15, 2021, https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm (accessed June 30, 2021).
84. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Operations and Missions: Past and Present,” last updated April 22, 2021, https://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm (accessed June 30, 2021).
85. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.”
86. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Operations and Missions: Past and Present.”
87. Ibid.

122

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength88. Ibid.
89. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Relations with Iraq,” last updated June 1, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_88247.htm (accessed June 30, 2021).
90. France 24, “NATO to Expand Iraq Mission to Around 4,000 Personnel,” February 18, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/
europe/20210218-nato-to-expand-iraq-mission-to-around-4-000-personnel (accessed June 30, 2021).
91. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Readiness Action Plan,” last updated March 23, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/on/natohq/
topics_119353.htm (accessed June 30, 2021).
92. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “NATO Agrees to ‘Four 30s’ Plan to Counter Russia,” last updated June 7, 2018, https://www.
rferl.org/a/nato-ministers-expected-to-okay-four-thirties-initiative-stoltenberg/29275979.html (accessed June 30, 2021).
93. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2019, p. 16, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/3/pdf_publications/sgar19-en.pdf (accessed June 4, 2021).
94. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Deterrence and Defence,” last updated June 25, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_133127.htm (accessed June 30, 2021).
95. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, “Space Centre,” https://shape.nato.int/about/aco-capabilities2/nato-space-centre (accessed July 6, 2021). See also John Vandiver, “New Space Center at Ramstein Is Part ofNATO’s Push to Protect Military Infrastructure,” Stars and Stripes, October 22, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/new-spacecenter-at-ramstein-is-part-of-nato-s-push-to-protect-military-infrastructure-1.649529 (accessed June 17, 2021).
96. Fact sheet, “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 2021, https://www.nato.int/nato_
static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/3/pdf/2103-factsheet_efp_en.pdf (accessed June 30, 2021).
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.

102. Baltic News Service, “Baltic Countries Sign Agreement on Fast Movement of NATO Forces,” Latvian Information Agency,
February 15, 2017, http://www.leta.lv/eng/defence_matters_eng/defence_matters_eng/news/CEB6CED4-EA2D-404C-8814A8765D6BA915/ (accessed June 30, 2021).
103. Press release, “Saeima Approves the National Defence Concept,” Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia, September 28,
2020, https://www.mod.gov.lv/en/news/saeima-approves-national-defence-concept#:~:text=National%20Guard%20are%20
indispensable%20to,long%2Dterm%20protection%20of%20Latvia (accessed June 30, 2021).
104. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Force Command, “NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) Fact Sheet,” https://jfcbs.
nato.int/page5725819/nato-force-integration-units/nato-force-integration-units-fact-sheet (accessed June 30, 2021).
105. Press release, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of theNorth Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 9, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/official_texts_133169.htm (accessed June 30, 2021).
106. Boris Toucas, “NATO and Russia in the Black Sea: A New Confrontation?” Center for Strategic and International Studies
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107. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Council, Multinational Division Southeast, “About Us,” https://mndse.ro/about-us/(accessed June 30, 2021). See also fact sheet, “Multinational Division Southeast (MND-SE),” United States Army NATO, May 9, 2018,https://www.usanato.army.mil/About-Us/Articles/Article/1515759/multinational-division-southeast-mnd-se/ (accessed June 30, 2021).
108. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 16.
109. Capt. Brian Anderson, “Michigan Units Dash Hopes at Saber Guardian 19,” U.S. Army, June 20, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/223457/michigan_units_dash_hopes_at_saber_guardian_19 (accessed June 30, 2021).
110. Fact sheet, “Key NATO and Allied Exercises in 2021,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 2021, https://www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/3/pdf/2103-factsheet_exercises.pdf (accessed June 30, 2021).

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2018, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2018/12/10/polands-defense-minister-making-the-constant-effort-to-strengthendefense/ (accessed June 30, 2021), and news release, “Landcom Soldiers in Elbląg,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
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111. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Press Release—DEFENDER-Europe 21 Activities Begin This Month, Include Two Dozen Nations,”
March 15, 2021, https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/ArticleViewPressRelease/Article/2537359/press-release-defender-europe-21activities-begin-this-month-include-two-dozen/ (accessed June 30, 2021).
112. Ibid.
113. News release, “U.S. F-16 Begin NATO Air Policing Mission with Bulgarian Air Force,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September
28, 2020, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2020/US_eAP_BGR (accessed July 1, 2021).
114. News release, “NATO Intercepts Hundreds of Russian Military Jets in 2020,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 28,
2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180551.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed July 1, 2021).
115. News release, “NSPA Delivers the Fourth Aircraft of the Multinational MRTT Fleet,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 1,
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116. Gareth Jennings, “Czech Republic Joins EU/NATO MMF Tanker Group,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 24, 2019, https://www.
janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/czech-republic-joins-eunato-mmf-tanker-group (accessed July 1, 2021).
117. Ciaran McGrath, “It’s a Farce! £10.5Billion Fleet Cannot Refuel RAF Aircraft Mid-Air—So We Rely on the US,” Express, July 30,
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118. Sebastian Sprenger, “NATO to Upgrade Its AWACS Surveillance Aircraft for $1 Billion,” Defense News, November 20, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/11/20/nato-to-upgrade-its-awacs-surveillance-aircraft-for-1-billion/ (accessed July 1,2021).
119. Jim Garamone, “NATO Approves Norfolk Joint Force Command, Defense Readiness Initiative,” U.S. Army, June 8, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/206683/nato_approves_norfolk_joint_force_command_defense_readiness_initiative (accessed July 1,2021), and news release, “NATO Defence Ministers Take Decisions to Strengthen the Alliance,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
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﻿

120. Reuters, “Germany Chooses Ulm for New Proposed NATO Logistics Command,” March 20, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/
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121. Christopher Woody, “A Convoy of US Army Howitzers Got Stopped by German Police, and It Points to a Major Problem NATO Has
in Europe,” Business Insider, January 12, 2018, http://www.businessinsider.com/us-army-howitzers-stopped-in-germany-natologistics-problems-2018-1 (accessed July 1, 2021).
122. Octavian Manea, “A Tour of Horizon Interview with Lieutenant General Ben Hodges on NATO Adaption and the Russian Way ofWar,” Small Wars Journal, August 7, 2018, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/small-wars-journal-interview-lieutenant-generalben-hodges-nato-adaptation-and-russian-way (accessed July 1, 2021).
123. Maciej Szopa, “Military Mobility—A Key in Defending the NATO Eastern Flank,” Defence24.com, March 31, 2020, https://www.
defence24.com/military-mobility-a-key-in-defending-the-nato-eastern-flank (accessed July 1, 2021).
124. Press release, “Action Plan on Military Mobility: EU Takes Steps Towards a Defence Union,” European Commission, March 28, 2018,https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_2521 (accessed June 5, 2021).
125. Ben Hodges, Tony Lawrence, and Ray Wojcik, “Until Something Moves: Reinforcing the Baltic Region in Crisis and War,”International Centre for Defense and Security, April 2020, p. 5, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ICDS_Report_Until_
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126. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 23. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
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127. Press release, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” and Robin Emmott, “NATO Cyber Command to Be Fully Operational in 2023,”
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128. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Cyber Defence,” last updated April 12, p. 21, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
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129. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 23.
130. Julian E. Barnes, “NATO Invests in More Bandwidth for New Data-Hungry Drones,” The Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-invests-in-more-bandwidth-for-new-data-hungry-drones-1490601588 (accessed July 1, 2021).

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength131. Voice of America, “NATO to Receive First Northrop Surveillance Drone, Years Late,” March 18, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/a/
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132. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy,” June 26, 2018, p. 3, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_
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133. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2019, p. 27.
134. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 24.
135. Dan Sabbagh, “Using Huawei in UK 5G Networks Would Be ‘Madness,’ US Says,” The Guardian, January 13, 2020, https://www.
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137. Dorian Archus, “NATO Has Completed AEGIS Upgrade at Romania,” Naval Post, August 11, 2019, https://navalpost.com/nato-hascompleted-aegis-upgrade-at-romania/ (accessed July 1, 2021).
138. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Architecture as of 2019,” https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pictures/2016_07_160711a-infographics-bmd/20170907_170907-bmd03.jpg (accessed June 2, 2019), and Joseph Trevithick,“The U.S. Army Wants to Expand a Secretive Missile Defense Site in Turkey,” The War Zone, May 25, 2017, http://www.thedrive.com/
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140. John Vandiver, “Rota to Gain Two US Destroyers by Middle of the Decade, EUCOM Chief Says,” Stars and Stripes, April 15, 2021,
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142. Fact Sheet, “NATO Ballistic Missile Defence.”﻿

143. Ethan Anderson, “Ballistic Missile Defence and the Type 45 Destroyer,” UK Defence Journal, March 19, 2021, https://
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145. Ibid.
146. News release, “Allied Forces Prepare for the Start of Exercise At-Sea Demo/Formidable Shield 2021,” U.S. Sixth Fleet Public
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147. Atlantic Council, “Russia Threatens Norway to Stay out of NATO Missile Defense,” March 21, 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
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148. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional
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150. Danish Government (Liberal Party, Liberal Alliance, and Conservatives); Social Democrats; Danish People’s Party; and SocialLiberal Party, “Defence Agreement 2018–2013,” https://fmn.dk/globalassets/fmn/dokumenter/forlig/-danish-defence-agreement2018-2023-pdfa-2018.pdf (accessed July 20, 2021).
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152. Xavier Vavasseur, “Germany and the Netherlands Joining Forces for F-124 / LCF Frigate Replacement,” Naval News, December
18, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/12/germany-and-the-netherlands-joining-forces-for-f-124-lcf-frigatereplacement/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
153. “HNLMS De Zeven Provincien Successfully Fires Two RIM-162 ESSM,” Navy Recognition, May 21, 2021, https://www.
navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2021/may/10177-hnlms-de-zeven-provincien-successfully-firestwo-rim-162-essm.html (accessed July 2, 2021).

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154. Vavasseur, “Germany and the Netherlands Joining Forces for F-124 / LCF Frigate Replacement.”
155. Xavier Vavasseur, “Video: Admiral De Beurme on Belgian Navy MCM and Frigate Programs,” Naval News, April 5, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/04/video-admiral-de-beurme-on-belgian-navy-mcm-and-frigate-programs/ (accessed
June 5, 2021).
156. “Thales to Develop Air Warfare Mission Suite for New Dutch, Belgian Frigates,” Naval Today, February 29, 2019, https://navaltoday.
com/2019/02/28/thales-to-develop-air-warfare-mission-suite-for-new-dutch-belgian-frigates/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
157. Lockheed Martin, “Aegis: The Shield of the Fleet: Deployed Aegis Global; Fleet,” https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/
products/aegis-combat-system.html (accessed July 2, 2021), and O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress,” p. 2.
158. “Lockheed Martin to Equip Spanish F-110 Frigates with New Radar System,” Naval Technology, December 6, 2019, https://www.
naval-technology.com/news/lockheed-martin-spain-f-110/ (accessed July 10, 2021).
159. “PPA Class Multi-Purpose Offshore Patrol Vessels,” Naval Technology, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/ppa-classmulti-purpose-offshore-patrol-vessels/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
160. “PPA to Bring BMD Capability to Italian Navy in 2024,” Navy Recognition, March 5, 2018, https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.
php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2018/march-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/6008-ppa-to-bring-bmd-capability-to-italiannavy-in-2024.html (accessed July 2, 2021).
161. The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 3.
162. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 50.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid., p. 48.
165. Ibid., p. 50.

﻿166. Associated Press, “Germany’s Merkel: 2% of GDP on Defense by 2031 ‘Realistic,’” November 7, 2019, https://apnews.com/
article/58e8073f384847a9a7627f0621215c52 (accessed July 2, 2021).
167. Leah Carter, “Germany Reports Record €53 Billion in NATO Defense Spending,” Deutsche Welle, February 7, 2021, https://www.
dw.com/en/germany-reports-record-53-billion-in-nato-defense-spending/a-56491017?maca=en-Twitter-sharing (accessed June
5, 2021).
168. “Germany’s Low Defence Spending Weakens NATO,” Financial Times, April 21, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/303ec9e8-5c3d11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a (accessed July 2, 2021).
169. Fact sheet, “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.”
170. Reuters, “Germany Vows to Keep Troops in Lithuania, Invest More in Barracks,” February 4, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-lithuania-nato/germany-vows-to-keep-troops-in-lithuania-invest-more-in-barracks-idUSKCN1PT1QN (accessed June 5, 2021).
171. News release, “German Air Force Reinforces Patrolling of the Baltic Airspace,” Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of National Defence,
July 20, 2020, https://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/212571/german-air-force-reinforces-patrolling-of-thebaltic-airspace.html (accessed July 20, 2021).
172. NATO Allied Air Command Public Affairs Office, “Italy Starts First-Time F-35 Deployment,” May 3, 2021, https://www.
lockheedmartin.com/f35/news-and-features/italy-starts-first-time-f35-deployment.html (accessed July 2, 2021).
173. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Kosovo Force (KFOR), “Key Facts and Figures,” February 2021, https://www.nato.int/nato_
static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/2/pdf/2021-02-KFOR-Placemat.pdf (accessed July 2, 2021).
174. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Resolute Support Mission, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” February
2021, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/2/pdf/2021-02-RSM-Placemat.pdf (accessed July 2, 2021).
175. Update, “Bundestag Decides to Extend the Deployments [of] UNMISS and Sea Guardian,” Federal Republic of Germany, Federal
Ministry of Defence, March 4, 2021, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/bundestag-beschliesst-verlaengerung-unmiss-seaguardian-5037506 (accessed July 2, 2021).
176. Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Foreign Office, “UN Peace Missions and Germany’s Engagement,” February 5, 2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/internationale-organisationen/vereintenationen/germanys-engagement-un-peacemissions/229116 (accessed July 2, 2021).
177. Press release, “Foreign Minister Maas on the German Bundestag’s Extension of the Mandate to Counter IS,” Federal Republic of
Germany, Federal Foreign Office, October 29, 2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2410976 (accessed
July 2, 2021).

1262022 Index of U.S. Military Strength178. Associated Press, “German Military Resumes Training Troops in Northern Iraq,” January 26, 2020, https://apnews.com/
article/269a2791b9a8a6b1f35a4ecd767081af (accessed July 2, 2021).
179. Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defence, Bundeswehr, Cyber and Information Domain Service, “Cyber andInformation Space—A New Domain,” https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/the-cyber-and-information-domain-service(accessed July 2, 2021).
180. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2019: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2019), p. 106.
181. Information from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces: Annual Report 2020 (62nd Report), German Bundestag,
19th Electoral Term, Printed Paper No. 19/26600, February 23, 2021, p. 78, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/839232/
e1a864120697c27057534944ceb20111/annual_report_2020_62nd_report-data.pdf (accessed July 2, 2021).
182. Ibid., p. 79.
183. Ibid.
184. Ibid, p. 78.
185. Ibid., p. 84.
186. Dan Parsons, “Germany Cancels Heavy-Lift Helicopter Competition,” Vertical, September 29, 2020, https://verticalmag.com/
news/germany-cancels-heavy-lift-helicopter-competition/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
187. Information from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, p. 80.
188. Michael Peck, “Why Pilots Are Quitting the German Air Force,” The National Interest, The Reboot Blog, January 28, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/why-pilots-are-quitting-german-air-force-177240 (accessed July 2, 2021).
189. Ibid.
190. Information from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, p. 41.
191. Information from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, p. 81.
192. Deutsche Welle, “German Submarines Fitted with Russian Technology: Report,” March 28, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/germansubmarines-fitted-with-russian-technology-report/a-57030819 (accessed July 2, 2021).

194. William Wilkes, “German Engineering Yields New Warship That Isn’t Fit for Sea,” The Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/german-engineering-yields-new-warship-that-isnt-fit-for-sea-1515753000 (accessed July 2, 2021).
195. John Beckner and Helmoed Heitman, “Is Germany's Navy Dead?” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, July 23, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/germanys-navy-dead-26566 (accessed July 2, 2021).
196. Ross Clark, “Germany’s Military Has Become a Complete Joke,” The Spectator, August 31, 2019, https://www.spectator.co.uk/
article/germany-s-military-has-become-a-complete-joke (accessed July 2, 2021).
197. “Germany Returns Lead F125 Frigate to Builder, Report,” Naval Today, December 22, 2017, https://navaltoday.com/2017/12/22/
germany-returns-lead-f125-frigate-to-builder-report/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
198. “Germany’s Third F125 Baden-Württemberg-Class Frigate Delivered by TKMS,” Naval News, March 30, 2021, https://www.navalnews.
com/naval-news/2021/03/germanys-third-f125-baden-wurttemberg-class-frigate-delivered-by-tkms/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
199. “Damen Wins Giant Contract for Four German Navy Frigates,” The Maritime Executive, January 14, 2020, https://www.maritimeexecutive.com/article/damen-wins-giant-contract-for-four-german-navy-frigates (accessed July 2, 2021).
200. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021), p. 107.
201. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2020), p. 76.
202. Information from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, p. 9.
203. Alex Berry, “Germany Launches New Voluntary Military Service Program,” Deutsche Welle, April 6, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/
germany-launches-new-voluntary-military-service-program/a-57105974 (accessed June 5, 2021).
204. Charlie Gao, “Germany's Air Force Is Going All in on the F/A-18 Super Hornet,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, March 28,
2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/germanys-air-force-going-all-fa-18-super-hornet-138332 (accessed March 30, 2020).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military127﻿193. Tyler Rogoway, “The German Navy Decided to Return Their Bloated New Frigate to the Ship Store This Christmas,” The War Zone,
December 23, 2017, http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17185/the-german-navy-has-decided-to-return-their-new-frigateto-the-ship-store-this-christmas (accessed July 2, 2021).

205. Andrea Shalal, “Exclusive: Germany Sees 8.86 Billion Euro Cost to Operate Tornado Jets to 2030,” Reuters, April 10, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-fighter-tornado-exclusive/exclusive-germany-sees-8-86-billion-euro-cost-to-operatetornado-jets-to-2030-idUSKCN1RM219 (accessed June 5, 2021).
206. Douglas Barrie, “Dogfight over Berlin: Germany’s Tornado Replacement Aspirations,” International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Military Balance Blog, December 21, 2017, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2017/12/berlin (accessed July 2, 2021).
207. Joseph Trevithick, “Nukes Drive Germany’s Plan to Replace Tornados with Typhoons, Super Hornets, and Growlers,” The War
Zone, March 26, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32768/nukes-drive-germanys-plan-to-replace-tornados-withtyphoons-super-hornets-and-growlers (accessed July 2, 2021).
208. Ibid.
209. Gao, “Germany's Air Force Is Going All in on the F/A-18 Super Hornet.”
210. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 70.
211. Inder Singh Bisht, “German Coalition Partners Approve ‘Unarmed’ Eurodrone Project,” The Defense Post, February 4, 2021,
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/02/04/german-coalition-approves-eurodrone/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
212. Sebastian Sprenger, “German Defense Minister Vows to Keep Fighting for Armed Drones,” Defense News, April 16, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/04/16/german-defense-secretary-vows-to-keep-fighting-for-armed-drones/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
213. Sebastian Sprenger, “Germany Shelves New Anti-Missile Weapon and Turns to Drone Defense,” Defense News, March 23, 2021,
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/03/23/germany-shelves-new-anti-missile-weapon-and-turns-to-dronedefense/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
214. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 67.
215. Table, “Orders, Deliveries, in Operation Military Aircraft by Country—Worldwide,” summary to April 30, 2021, in Airbus, “Defence:
Orders & Deliveries,” https://www.airbus.com/defence.html (accessed July 20, 2021).

﻿

216. Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Ministry of Defence, “Year-End Spurt in Bundeswehr Procurement,” December 17, 2020,
https://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/214931/germany-to-retrofit-more-a400ms-and-nh90-helicopters.
html (accessed July 2, 2021).
217. Trevithick, “Germany, France Move Ahead with Joint C-130J Unit amid Budget Woes and A400M Delays,” The War Zone, May 8,
2018, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/20697/germany-france-move-ahead-with-joint-c-130j-unit-amid-budget-woesand-a400m-delays (accessed June 30, 2021).
218. Lockheed Martin, “Hercules Training Takes Off for France & Germany,” https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/
features/2020/hercules-training-takes-off-for-france-and-germany.html (accessed July 2, 2021).
219. Xavier Vavasseur, “Germany Seemingly Selects P-8A Poseidon over ATL2 as ‘Interim’ Replacement for P-3C MPA,” Naval News,May 3, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/05/germany-seemingly-selects-p-8a-poseidon-over-atl2-as-interimreplacement-for-p-3c-mpa/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
220. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2020, p. 50.
221. Christina Mackenzie, “Despite Pressure from Lawmakers and Pandemic, French Defense Budget to Remain Unchanged,” Defense
News, October 5, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/10/05/despite-pressure-from-lawmakers-andpandemic-french-defense-budget-to-remain-unchanged/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
222. Christina Mackenzie, “See France Test-Fire an M51 Strategic Missile into the Atlantic,” Defense News, April 28, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/04/28/france-test-fires-an-m51-strategic-missile-into-the-atlantic/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
223. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 102.
224. Christina Mackenzie, “France to Begin Building New Ballistic Missile Subs,” Defense News, February 22, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/naval/2021/02/22/france-to-begin-building-new-ballistic-missile-subs/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
225. Ibid.
226. Christina Mackenzie, “Macron Kicks off French Race to Build a New Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier,” Defense News, December
8, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/12/08/macron-kicks-off-french-race-to-build-a-new-nuclearpowered-aircraft-carrier/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
227. Emmanuel Huberdeau, “France Launches First Barracuda SSN,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 12, 2019, https://www.janes.com/
defence-news/news-detail/france-launches-first-barracuda-ssn (accessed July 2, 2021), and “New Suffren Barracuda-Class
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine Officially Commissioned by French Navy,” Navy Recognition, November 2020, https://www.
navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2020/november/9236-new-suffren-barracuda-class-nuclear-poweredattack-submarine-officially-commissioned-by-french-navy.html (accessed June 5, 2021).

128

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength228. “France Accelerates the FDI Frigates Program,” Navy Recognition, March 2021, https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/
news/defence-news/2021/march/9901-france-accelerates-the-fdi-frigates-program.html (accessed June 5, 2021).
229. Christina Mackenzie, “Naval Group Delivers French Frigate with Bolstered Capabilities,” Defense News, April 16, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/naval/2021/04/16/naval-group-delivers-french-frigate-with-bolstered-capabilities/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
230. Christina Mackenzie, “French Navy Begins Broad Revamp of Its Mine-Hunting Abilities,” Defense News, November 6, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/11/06/french-navy-begins-broad-revamp-of-its-mine-hunting-abilities/(accessed June 5, 2021).
231. Harry Lye, “UK, France to Sign Autonomous Minehunting Production Contract,” Naval Technology, November 3, 2020, https://www.naval-technology.com/news/contract-news/uk-france-to-sign-autonomous-minehunting-production-contract/ (accessed
July 2, 2021).
232. Christina Mackenzie, “French Army Orders 364 Serval Armored Vehicles,” Defense News, January 15, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/land/2021/01/15/french-army-orders-364-serval-armored-vehicles/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
233. Tong Ong, “Parrot to Supply French Army with Hundreds of Micro-Drones,” The Defense Post, January 12, 2021, https://www.
thedefensepost.com/2021/01/12/french-army-parrot-micro-drones/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
234. Mackenzie, “French Army Orders 364 Serval Armored Vehicles.”
235. Staff Writer with Agence France-Presse, “France Receives Second Lockheed KC-130J, Completing Delivery of 4 Super Hercules
Aircraft,” The Defense Post, February 10, 2020, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2020/02/10/france-lockheed-kc-130j-superhercules/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
236. Table, “Orders, Deliveries, in Operation Military Aircraft by Country—Worldwide.”237. Thierry Dubois, “French Air Force Receives Newest-Standard Airbus A400M,” Aviation Week Network, April 6, 2021, https://aviationweek.
com/defense-space/multi-mission-transport-aircraft/french-air-force-receives-newest-standard-airbus (accessed July 2, 2021).
238. Christina Mackenzie, “France Orders Beefed-Up NH90 Choppers for Special Operations,” Defense News, October 12, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/10/12/france-orders-beefed-up-nh90-choppers-for-special-operations/ (accessed
June 5, 2021).

﻿239. David Donald, “France Launches Rafale F4 Upgrade,” AINonline, January 24, 2019, https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/
defense/2019-01-24/france-launches-rafale-f4-upgrade (accessed July 2, 2021).
240. Christina Mackenzie, “France Orders $2.3 Billion Upgrade for Rafale Warplanes,” Defense News, January 14, 2019, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/01/14/france-orders-upgraded-rafale-warplanes-for-23-billion/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
241. Younis Dar, “New F4 Rafale Fighter Jets to Have Advanced Stealth & EWS; Is India a Potential Customer?” The EurAsian Times,
April 5, 2021, https://eurasiantimes.com/new-f4-rafale-fighter-jets-to-have-advanced-stealth-is-india-a-potential-customer/(accessed July 2, 2021).
242. Ibid.
243. “French Air and Space Force to Receive 12 New Rafales from Dassault,” Air Force Technology, February 1, 2021, https://www.
airforce-technology.com/news/french-air-and-space-force-to-receive-12-new-rafales-from-dassault/ (accessed July 2, 2021),
and Christina Mackenzie, “France Begins Backfilling Its Rafale Fleet After Selling Some to Greece,” Defense News, January 29,
2021, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/01/29/france-begins-backfilling-its-rafale-fleet-after-selling-some-togreece/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
244. Reuters, “Germany, France, Spain Aim for Fighter Jet Agreement Next Week,” May 1, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/
europe/germany-france-spain-aim-fighter-jet-agreement-next-week-2021-05-01/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
245. Christina Mackenzie, “France Plans to Boost Its Self-Defense Posture in Space,” Defense News, July 26, 2019, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/07/26/france-plans-to-boost-its-self-defense-posture-in-space/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
246. Christina Mackenzie, “NATO Names Location for New Military Space Center,” Defense News, February 5, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/space/2021/02/05/nato-names-location-for-new-military-space-center/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
247. Ibid.
248. Lauren Chadwick and Jeremy Wilks, “‘May the Force Be with Vous’: France Unveils Space Weapons Plan,” Euronews, updated July26, 2019, https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/26/may-the-force-be-with-vous-france-unveils-space-weapons-plan (accessed
July 9, 2021), and Rachel Cordery, “French Defence Minister Announces Anti-Satellite Laser Weapons,” Air Force Technology, July26, 2019, https:// www.airforce-technology.com/news/french-anti-satellite-laser-weapon/ (accessed July 9, 2021).
249. Deutsche Welle, “France Conducts First Military Exercises in Space,” March 10, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/france-conductsfirst-military-exercises-in-space/a-56821868 (accessed June 5, 2021).

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250. Marine Pennetier, “Under Threat, France Grooms Army Hackers for Cyber Warfare,” Reuters, April 5, 2017, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-france-cyber/under-threat-france-grooms-army-hackers-for-cyber-warfare-idUSKBN1771B2 (accessed July 2,2021).
251. Arthur P. B. Laudrain, “France’s New Offensive Cyber Doctrine,” Lawfare, February 26, 2019, https://www.lawfareblog.com/
frances-new-offensive-cyber-doctrine (accessed July 2, 2021).
252. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2019, p. 66.
253. Republic of France, Ministry of Armed Forces, “Opérations: Dispositif Opérationnel Français Déployé à Travers Le Monde”(Operations: French Operational Device Deployed Throughout the World), Republic of France, Ministry of Armed Forces, update
June 15, 2021, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/operations/rubriques_complementaires/dispositif-operationnel-francaisdeploye-a-travers-le-monde (accessed July 2, 2021).
254. Xavier Vavasseur, “French Carrier Strike Group Begins 2021 Deployment,” U.S. Naval Institute News, February 23, 2021, https://
news.usni.org/2021/02/23/french-carrier-strike-group-begins-2021-deployment (accessed July 2, 2021).
255. News release, “U.S., French Carrier Strike Groups Conduct Dual Carrier Operations in 5th Fleet,” U.S. Naval Forces Central
Command Public Affairs, April 15, 2021, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2573492/us-french-carrierstrike-groups-conduct-dual-carrier-operations-in-5th-fleet/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
256. Fact sheet, “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.”257. Baltic News Service, “France to Take over NATO Baltic Air Policing Duties at Ämari,” ERR–Estonian Public Broadcasting, April 25,
2021, https://news.err.ee/1082229/france-to-take-over-nato-baltic-air-policing-duties-at-amari (accessed July 2, 2021).
258. Archyde, “French Armed Forces Prepare for High Intensity War,” March 30, 2021, https://www.archyde.com/french-armed-forcesprepare-for-high-intensity-war/ (accessed July 2, 2021), and “The French Armed Forces Are Planning for High-Intensity War,”
March 31, 2021, The Economist, https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/03/31/the-french-armed-forces-are-planning-for-highintensity-war (accessed July 2, 2021).
259. Republic of France, Ministry of Armed Forces, “Opérations: Dispositif Opérationnel Français Déployé à Travers Le Monde.”260. Ibid.

﻿

261. Ibid.
262. Abhijnan Rej, “France-Led Multination Naval Exercise Commences in Eastern Indian Ocean,” The Diplomat, April 5, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/france-led-multination-naval-exercise-commences-in-eastern-indian-ocean/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
263. Reuters, “French Nuclear Submarine Patrolled in South China Sea—Navy,” February 9, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/
southchina-sea-france-submarine-idUSL1N2KF1J7 (accessed June 5, 2021).
264. Ibid.
265. France 24, “Macron Launches Army Operation Resilience to Support Fight Against Coronavirus,” March 25, 2020, https://www.
france24.com/en/20200325-macron-launches-army-operation-resilience-to-support-fight-against-coronavirus (accessed July 2,2021).
266. Middle East Eye, “France: Knife Attack in Nice Leaves Three Dead, Several Injured,” October 29, 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.
net/news/france-nice-attack-knife-dead-injured (accessed July 2, 2021).
267. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 101.
268. Ibid.
269. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2020, p. 50.
270. Joseph Trevithick, “Everything We Know About the United Kingdom's Big New Defense Spending Plan,” The War Zone,
November 19, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37722/everything-we-know-about-the-united-kingdoms-big-newdefense-spending-plan (accessed July 2, 2021).
271. Ibid.
272. Andrew Chuter, “UK Should Rethink Deadline for Defense, Foreign Policy Review, Says Former National Security Adviser,”
Defense News, March 19, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/03/19/uk-should-rethink-deadline-fordefense-foreign-policy-review-says-former-national-security-adviser/ (accessed July 20, 2021).
273. Andrew Chuter, “British Defense Secretary Says ‘Tough Choices’ Are Coming Due on Spending,” Defense News, December 11,
2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/12/11/british-defense-secretary-says-tough-choices-are-coming-dueon-spending/ (accessed July 2, 2021).

1302022 Index of U.S. Military Strength274. Guy Anderson, Jon Hawkes, Gareth Jennings, and Kate Tringham, “The UK’s Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper,”Janes, March 23, 2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/the-uk-s-integrated-review-and-defence-commandpaper (accessed July 2, 2021).
275. Staff Writer with Agence France-Presse, “UK to Unveil Global Focus in Defense Modernization Plans,” The Defense Post, March 22,
2021, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/03/22/uk-defense-modernization-plans/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
276. Daniel Kochis, “European Defense Spending Still Rising, but COVID-19 Poses Retrenching Risk,” Heritage Foundation Commentary,
April 6, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/european-defense-spending-still-rising-covid-19-poses-retrenchingrisk.
277. Douglas Barrie, Ben Barry, Henry Boyd, and Nick Childs, “The UK’s New Model Forces,” International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Analysis Blog, March 24, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/03/uk-defence-command-paper (accessed July 2, 2021).
278. Ibid.
279. Andrew Chuter, “British Army Admits More Delays in Fielding Enough Combat Forces,” Defense News, October 12, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/10/12/british-army-admits-more-delays-in-fielding-enough-combat-forces/(accessed June 4, 2021), and Ben Barry, “British Army Heavy Division Comes up Light,” International Institute for Strategic
Studies, Military Balance Blog, January 8, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/01/british-army-heavy-division(accessed June 4, 2021).
280. Chuter, “British Army Admits More Delays in Fielding Enough Combat Forces,”
281. Ibid.
282. Andrew Chuter and Sebastian Sprenger, “British Military Looks to the ‘Eurotank’ as It Weighs Its Hardware Options,” Defense
News, January 11, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/01/11/british-military-looks-to-the-eurotank-as-itweighs-its-hardware-options/ (accessed June 2, 2021).
283. Samuel Cranny-Evans, “UK to Reduce Operational Challenger 2 Tank Fleet,” Janes, April 23, 2019, https://www.janes.com/
defence-news/news-detail/uk-to-reduce-operational-challenger-2-tank-fleet (accessed July 2, 2021).

285. David Axe, “British Army, German Tanks. London Might Not Like It, But It Needs to Buy Leopard 2s,” Forbes, November 11, 2020,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/11/11/british-army-german-tanks-london-might-not-like-it-but-it-needs-to-buyleopard-2s/?sh=32f598922d7a (accessed June 5, 2021).
286. Cranny-Evans, “UK to Reduce Operational Challenger 2 Tank Fleet.”
287. British Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence byCommand of Her Majesty, March 2021, p. 54, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/974661/CP411_-Defence_Command_Plan.pdf (accessed July 2, 2021).
288. Stuart Crawford, “The Future UK Main Battle Tank Fleet,” UK Defence Journal, March 22, 2021, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/
the-future-uk-main-battle-tank-fleet/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
289. Andrew Chuter, “British Army Wants More Punch in Its Boxer Vehicle Fleet,” Defense News, April 6, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/04/06/british-army-wants-more-punch-in-its-boxer-vehicle-fleet/ (accessed July 2,2021).
290. British Ministry of Defence, “What We Do: Equipping and Supporting the British Army: Boxer,” February 19, 2021, https://des.mod.
uk/what-we-do/army-procurement-support/boxer-mechanised-infantry/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
291. Chuter, “British Army Wants More Punch in Its Boxer Vehicle Fleet.”292. Craig Hoyle, “Lockheed Sees No Change to UK F-35 Commitment, Despite Ambiguous Review,” Flight Global, March 24, 2021,
https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/lockheed-sees-no-change-to-uk-f-35-commitment-despite-ambiguous-review/143015.
article (accessed July 2, 2021).
293. Ibid.
294. Dominic Nicholls, “Britain's New F35 Stealth Jets Used on Operations for the First Time,” The Telegraph, June 25, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/24/britains-new-f35-stealth-jets-used-operations-first-time/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
295. Ed Adamczyk, “Britain’s Royal Air Force Receives Last Typhoon Fighter on Order from BAE,” United Press International,
September 27, 2019, https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2019/09/27/Britains-Royal-Air-Force-receives-last-Typhoon-fighteron-order-from-BAE/7821569598752/ (accessed July 2, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military131﻿284. David Axe, “British Army Is Planning to Upgrade Just 148 of Its 227 Challenger 2 Tanks,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog,
April 21, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/british-army-planning-upgrade-just-148-its-227-challenger-2-tanks-53587(accessed June 5, 2021).

296. George Allison, “24 Typhoon Aircraft to Be Retired by 2025,” UK Defence Journal, March 22, 2021, https://ukdefencejournal.org.
uk/24-typhoon-aircraft-to-be-retired-by-2025/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
297. Andrew Chuter, “The British Air Force Is Upgrading Its Typhoon Fighter Jets to Keep Them Fighting Until 2040,” Business Insider,
August 9, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/british-air-force-sensor-upgrades-typhoon-fighter-jets-2019-8 (accessed July 2,2021).
298. “UK Defence to Invest £2bn in Combat Air System Tempest,” Government Computing, March 25, 2021, https://www.
governmentcomputing.com/national-security/news/uk-defence-to-invest-2bn-in-combat-air-system-tempest/ (accessed July 2,2021).
299. Alan Warnes, “NATO Air-to-Air Refuelling,” European Security & Defense, December 13, 2019, https://euro-sd.com/2019/12/
articles/15526/nato-air-to-air-refuelling/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
300. British Royal Air Force, “Aircraft: RC-135W Rivet Joint: About the RC-135W Rivet Joint,” https://www.raf.mod.uk/aircraft/airseekerrc-135w-rivet-joint/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
301. Table, “Orders, Deliveries, in Operation Military Aircraft by Country—Worldwide.”302. News release, “RAF Sentinel R1 Aircraft Conducts Last Operational Flight,” British Royal Air Force, February 26, 2021, https://www.
raf.mod.uk/news/articles/raf-sentinel-r1-aircraft-conducts-last-operational-flight/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
303. Gareth Jennings, “Fifth RAF Poseidon Arrives in UK,” Janes, February 2, 2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/fifth-raf-poseidon-arrives-in-uk (accessed July 2, 2021).
304. David Axe, “The Royal Air Force Needs More Patrol Planes,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, January 1, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/royal-air-force-needs-more-patrol-planes-110231 (accessed June 5, 2021).
305. Harry Lye, “UK’s New Medium Helicopter to Fly into 2040s,” Army Technology, April 8, 2021, https://www.army-technology.com/
news/uk-medium-helicopter-requirement/ (accessed July 2, 2021).

﻿

306. David B. Larter, “In a Naval Confrontation with Iran, Great Britain Can Find Neither Ships nor Friends,” Defense News, July 25,
2019, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/07/25/in-a-naval-confrontation-with-iran-great-britain-can-find-neither-shipsnor-friends/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
307. Ibid. and David Axe, “The Royal Navy Keeps Shrinking—Frigates to Drop by Three over Five Years,” Forbes, February 12, 2021,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/02/12/the-royal-navy-keeps-shrinking-frigates-to-drop-by-three/ (accessed July 2,2021).
308. Axe, “The Royal Navy Keeps Shrinking—Frigates to Drop by Three over Five Years.”
309. Ibid.
310. Barrie et al., “The UK’s New Model Forces.”
311. Tony Driver and Dominic Nicholls, “Sailor Shortage Means Four of Navy’s 13 Frigates Have Not Spent a Single Day at Sea This Year,MoD Data Reveal,” The Telegraph, October 18, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/10/18/sailor-shortage-means-fournavys-13-frigates-have-not-spent/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
312. David Axe, “The Royal Navy’s New Type 26 Frigate Could Be One Killer Warship,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, August 11,
2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/royal-navy%E2%80%99s-new-type-26-frigate-could-be-one-killer-warship-72876(accessed June 5, 2021).
313. News release, “Ministry of Defence Announces Procurement Programme for Royal Navy’s T31e Frigates,” British Royal Navy,
September 7, 2017, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2017/september/07/170907-t31e-frigateannouncement (accessed July 3, 2021). See also George Allison, “MoD Announce Programme for Royal Navy Type 31e Frigate
and Detail Requirements,” UK Defence Journal, September 7, 2017, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/mod-announce-procurementprogramme-royal-navy-type-31e-frigate/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
314. Alan West, “The Royal Navy’s Five New Frigates Isn’t Enough to Keep Britain Safe,” The Spectator, September 21, 2019, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-royal-navy-s-five-new-frigates-isn-t-enough-to-keep-britain-safe (accessed July 3, 2021).
315. News release, “Carrier Strike Group Deployment to Visit 40 Countries,” British Royal Navy, April 26, 2021, https://www.royalnavy.
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316. David Donald, “UK Carrier Strike Group Begins Deployment,” AINonline, May 4, 2021, https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/
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317. James Hirst, “Prince Charles Attends Commissioning of HMS Prince of Wales,” Forces.net, December 10, 2019, https://www.forces.
net/news/prince-charles-attend-commissioning-hms-prince-wales (accessed July 3, 2021).

1322022 Index of U.S. Military Strength318. Berenice Baker and Harry Lye, “HMS Prince of Wales to Begin F-35 Trials in January 2021: Exclusive,” Naval Technology, March 2,
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5, 2021, https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/hms-prince-of-wales-returns-to-the-sea-after-two-leaks-in-five-months/arBB1gf5KJ?MSCC=1604183894 (accessed July 3, 2021).
319. Carr, “HMS Prince of Wales Returns to the Sea After Two Leaks in Five Months,”
320. David Axe, “Attention Navy Fans, Britain’s Type 26 Frigate Is Nearly Here,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, September 1,
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322. Harry Lye, “Royal Navy to Begin Unmanned Minehunting Operations,” Naval Technology, January 14, 2020, https://www.navaltechnology.com/news/royal-navy-to-begin-unmanned-minehunting-operations/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
323. British Ministry of Defence, Defence Nuclear Organisation, “Guidance: Dreadnought Submarine Programme: Factsheet,” updated
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324. Dan Taylor, “MoD ‘Orders Review into Concerns over Dreadnought Submarine Programme,’” The Mail, May 5, 2021, https://www.
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325. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020, p. 85.
326. Dan Sabbagh, “British Army Recruits Rise as Covid Seems to Act as ‘Rallying Cry,’” The Guardian, January 6, 2021, https://www.
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327. British Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP, “RAF Typhoons Begin NATO Air Policing Mission in Lithuania,” May 1,
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329. George Allison, “British Jets Complete Icelandic Air Policing Mission,” UK Defence Journal, December 11, 2019, https://
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330. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Resolute Support Mission, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures.”331. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Kosovo Force (KFOR), “Key Facts and Figures.”332. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One (SNMCMG1),” https://mc.nato.int/
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333. British Ministry of Defence, “Operation SHADER Explained: Daesh’s Demise,” Medium, December 18, 2020, https://medium.com/
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335. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2019, p. 66.
336. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2020, p. 51.
337. Tom Kington, “Italy Defense Budget Rebounds Despite Coronavirus,” Defense News, October 28, 2020, https://www.defensenews.
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338. David Cenciotti, “The Italian Air Force Has Received the First HH-1010A ‘Caesar’ in Overall Grey Color Scheme,” The Aviationist,
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339. David Cenciotti and Stefano D'Urso, “Third Italian F-35B Goes to the Italian Air Force. And the Italian Navy Is Not Happy at All,”The Aviationist, February 26, 2020, https://theaviationist.com/2020/02/26/third-italian-f-35b-goes-to-the-italian-air-force-andthe-italian-navy-is-not-happy-at-all/ (accessed July 3, 2021).

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350. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 120.
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375. David Donald, “Poland to Receive C-130Hs, Announces F-35 Base,” AINonline, April 15, 2021, https://www.ainonline.com/aviationnews/defense/2021-04-15/poland-receive-c-130hs-announces-f-35-base (accessed July 3, 2021).

385. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Resolute Support Mission, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures.”386. Baltic News Service, “Number of NATO Jets Policing Baltic Airspace Back Down to 8,” ERR–Estonian Public Broadcasting, January
2, 2020, https://news.err.ee/1019567/number-of-nato-jets-policing-baltic-airspace-back-down-to-8 (accessed July 3, 2021).
387. News release, “Poland Takes Charge of NATO High Readiness Force,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 30, 2019,https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_172334.htm (accessed July 3, 2021).
388. Map, “NATO Enhanced Forward Presence,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, valid as of April 7, 2021, https://www.nato.int/
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389. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Kosovo Force (KFOR), “Key Facts and Figures.”390. “President Extends Polish Military Missions,” The First News, December 29, 2020, https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/presidentextends-polish-military-missions-18734 (accessed July 3, 2021).
391. News release, “Poland Joins NATO Assurance Mission for Turkey,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 20, 2021, https://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_183229.htm (accessed July 3, 2021).
392. “President Extends Polish Military Missions.”
393. Reuters, “Turkey Arrests 150 in Military Probe over Gulen Links: Anadolu,” March 23, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/turkeysecurity-gulen-int/turkey-arrests-150-in-military-probe-over-gulen-links-anadolu-idUSKBN2BF0NF (accessed July 10, 2021).
394. Aram Ekin Duran, “Turkey Holds Thousands in Solitary in Erdogan’s Prisons,” Deutsche Welle, May 7, 2019, https://www.dw.com/
en/turkey-holds-thousands-in-solitary-in-erdogans-prisons/a-48640213 (accessed June 5, 2021).
395. Al Jazeera, “Turkey Orders 532 Arrests over Fethullah Gulen Links,” April 26, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/26/
turkey-orders-532-arrests-in-military-probe-over-gulen-links (accessed July 3, 2021).
396. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020, p. 82.
397. Al Jazeera, “Turkey Arrests 10 Retired Admirals over Government Criticism,” April 5, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2021/4/5/turkey-issues-arrest-warrants-over-retired-admirals-open-letter (accessed July 3, 2021).

﻿

398. Michael Peck, “Bad Idea: In 2016, Turkey Destroyed Its Own Air Force,” The National Interest, The Reboot Blog, March 18, 2021,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/bad-idea-2016-turkey-destroyed-its-own-air-force-180427#:~:text=Yet%20in%20the%20
name%20of,of%20President%20Recep%20Tayyip%20Erdogan (accessed July 3, 2021).
399. Abdullah Bozkurt, “Turkish Air Force Crippled After Mass Purge of Pilots by Erdoğan Government,” Nordic Monitor, January
13, 2020, https://www.nordicmonitor.com/2020/01/the-turkish-air-force-crippled-after-mass-purge-of-pilots-by-erdogangovernment/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
400. Michael Peck, “Turkey: How One Country Destroyed Their Own Air Force,” The National Interest, January 2, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/turkey-how-one-country-destroyed-their-own-air-force-110581 (accessed July 3, 2021).
401. Bozkurt, “Turkish Air Force Crippled After Mass Purge of Pilots by Erdoğan Government.”
402. Peck, “Bad Idea: In 2016, Turkey Destroyed Its Own Air Force.”403. Reuters, “Turkey Says Russian S-400 Missile Delivery Brought Forward to July 2019,” April 4, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-russia-turkey-missiles/turkey-says-russian-s-400-missile-delivery-brought-forward-to-july-2019-idUSKCN1HB0IU(accessed June 5, 2021), and Reuters, “Russia to Start Deliveries of S-400 to Turkey in July: Ifax,” April 24, 2019, https://www.
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404. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020, p. 82.
405. Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Suspends Turkey’s Role in F-35 over Russian Missile System,” Bloomberg, July 17, 2019, https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-17/white-house-says-turkey-s-role-in-f-35-program-now-impossible (accessed July 3, 2021).
406. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Transports S-400 Air Defense System for Black Sea Tests,” Defense News, October 9, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2020/10/09/turkey-transports-s-400-air-defense-system-for-black-sea-tests/ (accessed
July 3, 2021).
407. Amanda Macias, “U.S. Sanctions Turkey over Purchase of Russian S-400 Missile System,” CNBC, updated December 15, 2020,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/14/us-sanctions-turkey-over-russian-s400.html (accessed July 3, 2021).
408. Alec Mally, “US Sanctions for Turkey’s S-400 Procurement Come into Effect,” New Europe, April 8, 2021, https://www.neweurope.
eu/article/us-sanctions-for-turkeys-s-400-procurement-come-into-effect/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
409. Thomas Newdick, “Turkish F-16 Knocks Down Target Drone with New Indigenous Air-to-Air Missile,” The War Zone, April 15, 2021,
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40193/turkish-f-16-knocks-down-target-drone-with-new-indigenous-air-to-air-missile(accessed July 3, 2021).

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410. David Welna, “U.S.–Turkey Standoff over F-35 Escalates as Each Side Waits for the Other to Blink,” NPR, April 3, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/04/03/709222963/u-s-turkey-standoff-over-f-35-escalates-as-each-side-waits-for-the-other-to-blin(accessed July 3, 2021), and Burak Ege Bekdil, “How Turkey’s Industry Could Suffer from the S-400 Deal with Russia,” Defense
News, April 11, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2019/04/11/how-turkeys-industry-could-suffer-from-the-s-400deal-with-russia/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
411. According to the GAO, “the F-35 program office and the prime contractors have identified and are contracting with alternative
suppliers to produce the 1,005 parts that are currently made in Turkey.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, F-35 Joint StrikeFighter: DOD Needs to Update Modernization Schedule and Improve Data on Software Development, GAO-21-226, March 2021, p.
5, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-226.pdf (accessed July 3, 2021).
412. Valerie Insinna, “Turkey’s Removal from F-35 Program to Cause Hike in Engine Price,” Defense News, April 23, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/air/2021/04/23/turkeys-removal-from-f-35-program-to-cause-hike-in-engine-price/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
413. General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force, Commander, United States European Command, statement before theCommittee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 13, 2021, p. 6, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
CLEARED%20USEUCOM%20SASC%20Congressional%20Posture%20Statement.pdf (accessed June 5, 2021).
414. David Axe, “Turkey Is the Middle East’s Newest Drone Super Power, The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, April 9, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/turkey-middle-easts-newest-drone-super-power-142242 (accessed June 5, 2021).
415. Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members
and Committees of Congress No. R41368, updated November 9, 2020, p. 29, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R41368.pdf(accessed June 5, 2021).
416. BBC News, “Syria War: Russia and Turkey Agree Idlib Ceasefire,” March 5, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-51747592 (accessed July 3, 2021).
417. Middle East Monitor, “Turkey, Russia and Iran Agree to Extend Ceasefire in Idlib,” February 18, 2021, https://www.
middleeastmonitor.com/20210218-turkey-russia-and-iran-agree-to-extend-ceasefire-in-idlib/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
418. Patrick Chevallereau, “The Worm Is in the Fruit: A Rising Strategic Foe Inside NATO,” RUSI [Royal United Services Institute]
Europe Commentary, July 31, 2020, https://rusieurope.eu/commentary/worm-fruit-rising-strategic-foe-inside-nato (accessed
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﻿

419. “Turkey Plans to Establish Naval Base in Cyprus,” Daily Sabah, December 25, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/
politics/2019/12/25/turkey-plans-to-establish-naval-base-in-cyprus (accessed July 3, 2021).
420. Reuters, “Turkish Drones Escorting Drill Ships to Fly from Turkish Cypriot Airport: Report,” December 13, 2019, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-turkey-defence-cyprus/turkish-drones-escorting-drill-ships-to-fly-from-turkish-cypriot-airport-reportidUSKBN1YH2DZ (accessed June 5, 2021).
421. Dorian Jones, “US Military Base in Turkey Has Uncertain Future,” Voice of America, November 26, 2019, https://www.voanews.
com/europe/us-military-base-turkey-has-uncertain-future (accessed July 3, 2021).
422. Vandiver, “US Reviewing Plans to Move Nuclear Weapons from Incirlik, Report Says.”423. Jeff Seldin, “US General Sees Hope for Ties with Turkey,” Voice of America, December 10, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/usa/
us-general-sees-hope-ties-turkey (accessed July 3, 2021).
424. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Airborne Warning and Control Force, “Current Operations,” https://awacs.nato.int/operations/current-operations (accessed July 3, 2021).
425. Zanotti and Thomas, “Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations,” p. 28.
426. Infographic, “NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Architecture as of 2019,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pictures/2016_07_160711a-infographics-bmd/20170907_170907-bmd03.jpg (accessed July 3, 2021),
and Trevithick, “The U.S. Army Wants to Expand a Secretive Missile Defense Site in Turkey.”
427. News release, “Turkey Takes Charge of NATO High Readiness Force,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated December
30, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180627.htm (accessed July 3, 2021).
428. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Resolute Support Mission, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures.”429. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Kosovo Force (KFOR), “Key Facts and Figures.”430. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group Two (SNMCMG2).”
431. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2),” https://mc.nato.int/snmg2 (accessed July 11,2021).
432. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 152.

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433. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020, p. 81.
434. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s Erdogan Decrees Sweeping Defense Procurement Takeover,” Defense News, December 27, 2017,https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2017/12/27/turkeys-erdogan-decrees-sweeping-defense-procurement-takeover/(accessed July 3, 2021).
435. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkish ‘Brain Drain’: Why Are Defense Industry Officials Ditching Their Jobs in Turkey for Work Abroad?”
Defense News, January 8, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2019/01/08/turkish-brain-drain-why-are-defenseindustry-officials-ditching-their-jobs-in-turkey-for-work-abroad/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
436. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey in Talks with South Korea to Salvage Altay Tank Program,” Defense News, November 19, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/11/19/turkey-in-talks-with-south-korea-to-salvage-altay-tank-program/ (accessed
July 3, 2021); “Turkey to Test Indigenous Engine for Main Battle Tank Altay in April,” Daily Sabah, March 29, 2021, https://www.
dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkey-to-test-indigenous-engine-for-main-battle-tank-altay-in-april (accessed July 3, 2021),
and “Turkey’s Altay Tank, ATAK Helicopter Held up Due to Engine Non-Availability,” DefenseWorld.net, January 9, 2020, https://www.defenseworld.net/news/26142/Turkey___s_Altay_Tank__ATAK_Helicopter_Held_up_Due_to_Engine_Non_availability#.
XpStV_hKjIU (accessed July 3, 2021).
437. Ibid.
438. Burak Ege Bekdil, Usman Ansari, and Joe Gould, “Pakistan Extends Delayed T129 Helo Deal with Turkey—Again,” Defense News,
March 15, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2021/03/15/pakistan-extends-delayed-t129-helo-deal-withturkey-again/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
439. StrategyPage, “Procurement: Engine Problems,” April 15, 2021, https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htproc/20210415.aspx(accessed July 3, 2021).
440. Sevil Erkuş, “France ‘Hampers Eurosam Missile System Due to Political Reasons,’” Hurriyet Daily News, January 6, 2020, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/france-hampers-eurosam-missile-system-due-to-political-reasons-150657 (accessed July 20, 2021).
441. Selcan Hacaoglu, Firat Kozok, and Ania Nussbaum, “Turkey Pushes Macron to Allow Purchase of Missile System,” Bloomberg,
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﻿

442. Ibid.
443. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 147–148.
444. Tayfun Ozberk, “Turkey Floats Out Its First AIP Submarine ‘Piri Reis,’” Naval News, March 25, 2021, https://www.navalnews.com/
naval-news/2021/03/turkey-floats-out-its-first-aip-submarine-piri-reis/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
445. Xavier Vavasseur, “Turkish Industry to Conduct Mid-life Upgrade of Preveze-Class Submarines,” Naval News, February 10,
2019, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/02/turkish-industry-to-conduct-mid-life-upgrade-of-preveze-classsubmarines/?nowprocket=1 (accessed July 3, 2021).
446. “Turkey Launches Test and Evaluation Ship TCG Ufuk,” Naval Today, February 11, 2019, https://navaltoday.com/2019/02/11/turkeylaunches-test-and-evaluation-ship-tcg-ufuk/ (accessed June 5, 2021), and Can Kasapoglu, “‘The Blue Homeland’: Turkey’s Largest
Naval Drill,” Anadolu Agency, February 27, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/-the-blue-homeland-turkey-s-largest-navaldrill/1404267 (accessed June 5, 2021).
447. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Reveals Path to Boost Defense and Aerospace Exports by $10.2B in 2023,” Defense News, December
10, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2019/12/10/turkey-reveals-path-to-boost-defense-and-aerospace-exports-by102b-in-2023/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
448. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Reports 17% Drop in Defense Exports,” Defense News, January 19, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/
global/europe/2021/01/19/turkey-reports-nearly-15-drop-in-defense-exports/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
449. Jari Tanner, “US Grants $169M in Military Aid to Baltic Nations for 2021,” Associated Press, December 23, 2020, https://apnews.
com/article/estonia-appropriations-defense-appropriations-lithuania-latvia-c140bdd0cf580826363ec2d0427e0c02 (accessed
May 20, 2021).
450. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 50.
451. ERR–Estonian Public Broadcasting News, “Defense Spending to Rise to €645.4 Million in 2021,” September 30, 2020, https://
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452. “Foreword,” in Estonian Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Defence Development Plan 2020–2025, p. 1, https://kaitseministeerium.
ee/sites/default/files/Planeeringud/the_ministry_of_defence_development_plan_2022-2025_foreword.pdf (accessed July 3,2021).

138

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estonia-complements-ammunition-stores (accessed July 3, 2021).
454. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 98.
455. Simon Newton, “Why NATO’s Military Might Is Focused on Estonia,” Forces.net, May 11, 2015, https://www.forces.net/news/triservice/why-natos-military-might-focused-estonia (accessed July 3, 2021).
456. Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Defence, and Republic of Estonia, Defence Forces, National Defence Development Plan 2017–2026,
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457. ERR–Estonian Public Broadcasting News, “Paper: More Military Equipment to Be Bought from South Korea,” October 3, 2019,https://news.err.ee/987854/paper-more-military-equipment-to-be-bought-from-south-korea (accessed July 3, 2021).
458. “Estonia Receives First K9 Howitzers from South Korea,” Defense Brief, October 10, 2020, https://defbrief.com/2020/10/10/
estonia-receives-first-k9-howitzers-from-south-korea/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
459. Press release, “U.S. Delivers Javelin Missiles to Estonia,” U.S. Embassy in Estonia, April 2, 2020, https://ee.usembassy.gov/pressrelease-u-s-delivers-javelin-missiles-to-estonia/ (accessed July 4, 2021).
460. ERR–Estonian Public Broadcasting News, “Finland and Latvia to Build Armored Vehicles Together,” January 10, 2021, https://news.
err.ee/1234201/finland-and-latvia-to-build-armored-vehicles-together (accessed July 4, 2021).
461. Gareth Jennings, “Estonia Receives First of Two Donated C-145As,” Janes, March 19, 2019, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/
news-detail/estonia-receives-first-of-two-donated-c-145as (accessed July 4, 2021).
462. Paul McLeary, “Estonia Inks ‘Big’ New US Defense Deal, Eyes on Russia,” Breaking Defense, July 9, 2019, https://breakingdefense.
com/2019/07/estonia-inks-big-us-defense-deal-eyes-on-russia/ (accessed July 4, 2021).
463. ERR–Estonian Public Broadcasting News, “Estonia Hopes to Bring Latvia on Board with Coastal Defense Procurement,” March 24,
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464. Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Defence, and Republic of Estonia, Defence Forces, National Defence Development Plan 2017–2026.
465. Monica M. Ruiz, “To Bolster Cybersecurity, the US Should Look to Estonia,” Wired, February 14, 2020, https://www.wired.com/
story/opinion-to-bolster-cybersecurity-the-us-should-look-to-estonia/ (accessed July 3, 2021).

467. News release, “Signing of Defense Cooperation Agreement—Remarks by Ambassador James D. Melville,” U.S. Embassy in Estonia,
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468. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Resolute Support Mission, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures.”469. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One (SNMCMG1).”
470. Republic of Estonia, Defence Forces, “Operations Abroad,” last updated June 28, 2021, https://mil.ee/en/defence-forces/
operations-abroad/#t-barkhane (accessed July 3, 2021).
471. Baltic News Service, TBT Staff, “Estonian Defmin Meets with Malian leaders,” The Baltic Times, March 4, 2021, https://www.
baltictimes.com/estonian_defmin_meets_with_malian_leaders/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
472. Republic of Estonia, Defence Forces, “Operations Abroad.”
473. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 120.
474. Ibid., p. 150.
475. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Resolute Support Mission, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures.”476. LETA [Latvian Information Agency], “Government Supports Extension of Participation of Latvian Soldiers in Military Operation in
Iraq,” January 14, 2020, https://www.leta.lv/eng/home/important/A3C2ACBB-F186-4540-BC0E-45E6658DD9AA/ (accessed July
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477. News release, “Turkey Takes Charge of NATO High Readiness Force.”
478. Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, “Saeima Approves the National Defence Concept,” September 28, 2020, https://www.
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479. Viktors Domburs, “Latvia: Armed to the Teeth,” The Independent, December 8, 2019, https://www.theindependentbd.com/
arcprint/details/226969/2019-12-08 (accessed July 4, 2021), and Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, “Latvia Plans to Invest
the Average of €50 Million a Year in the Development of Military Infrastructure over the Next Four Years,” February 26, 2019,https://www.mod.gov.lv/en/news/latvia-plans-invest-average-eu50-million-year-development-military-infrastructure-over-next(accessed July 3, 2021).
480. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 50.
481. Table, “Foreign Military Sales,” in U.S. Department of Defense, unclassified Select Acquisition Report (SAR): UH-60M Black Hawk
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482. Military Leak, “Latvian National Armed Forces Takes Delivery of New Spike Precision-Guided Tactical Missiles,” February 24, 2020,
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483. “Latvia Installs Team Trainer for Spike Missiles,” Army Technology, October 9, 2020, https://www.army-technology.com/news/
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484. ERR–Estonian Public Broadcasting News, “Finland and Latvia to Build Armored Vehicles Together.”
485. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 122.
486. LRT [Lithuanian National Television and Radio], “Lithuania Lowers Conscription Age,” December 12, 2019, https://www.lrt.lt/en/
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up%20for%20military%20service (accessed July 3, 2021).
487. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report: 2020, p. 50.
488. Sebastian Sprenger, “Lithuania Is First Baltic Nation to Sign US Defense-Cooperation Pact,” Defense News, April 3, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/04/03/lithuania-is-first-baltic-nation-to-sign-us-defense-cooperation-pact/(accessed July 3, 2021).

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489. News release, “U.S., Lithuania Detail Roadmap for Cooperation Through 2024,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 2, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1803578/us-lithuania-detail-roadmap-for-cooperation-through-2024/ (accessed
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490. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 122.
491. Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Lithuania Signs Deal for Its First American Military Helicopters,” Defense News, November 13, 2020,
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492. Ibid.
493. Press release, “NASAMS Medium-Range Air Defence System Officially Handed Over to the Lithuanian Armed Forces,” Republic of
Lithuania, Ministry of National Defence, October 30, 2020, https://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/214069/
lithuania-takes-delivery-of-nasams-air-defense-system.html (accessed June 5, 2021), and “Lithuania to Buy Additional NASAMSAir Defence Missiles from Norway,” Air Force Technology, January 4, 2019, https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/lithuanianasams-defence-missiles-norway/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
494. Shephard News, “Lithuania Orders More Javelins,” January 5, 2021, https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/landwarfareintl/
lithuania-orders-more-javelins/ (accessed July 2, 2021).
495. “Lithuania Will Procure 200 US JLTV Joint Light Tactical Vehicles from Oshkosh Defense,” Army Recognition, November 24,
2019, https://www.armyrecognition.com/november_2019_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/lithuania_will_procure_200_us_jltv_joint_light_tactical_vehicles_from_oshkosh_defense.html (accessed July 3, 2021).
496. Table, “Number of Military and DoD Appropriated Fund (APF) Civilian Personnel Permanently Assigned by Duty Location andService/Component as of March 31, 2021,” in U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, “Military and Civilian
Personnel by Service/Agency by State/Country (Updated Quarterly),” March 2021, https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/app/dod-datareports/workforce-reports (accessed July 3, 2021).
497. General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, United States Army, Commander, United States European Command, statement on USEUCOM
posture before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 5, 2019, p. 15, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Scaparrotti_03-05-19.pdf (accessed July 3, 2021), and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command Public Affairs,“Truman Strike Group Returns Home from Eight-Month Deployment,” Military News, January 7, 2019, https://www.militarynews.
com/news/truman-strike-group-returns-home-from-eight-month-deployment/article_5d7f548c-129f-11e9-84ed-3fd3730fb53e.
html (accessed June 5, 2021).

140

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength498. General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force, Commander, United States European Command, statement before theCommittee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 25, 2020, p. 13, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Wolters_02-25-20.pdf (accessed June 5, 2021).
499. U.S. Army, “U.S. Army Europe and Africa Commands Consolidate,” November 20, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/241094/
u_s_army_europe_and_africa_commands_consolidate (accessed June 5, 2021), and Corey Dickstein, “Army Merges Europe,
Africa Commands Under a Single 4-Star Headquarters,” Stars and Stripes, November 20, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/
europe/army-merges-europe-africa-commands-under-a-single-4-star-headquarters-1.652902 (accessed June 5, 2021).
500. U.S. Army, “U.S. Army Europe and Africa Commands Consolidate.”
501. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe and Africa,” as of March 8, 2021, https://www.
europeafrica.army.mil/Portals/19/documents/Infographics/USAREURAF%20Fact%20Sheet%2003082021.
pdf?ver=2RoIT5wSRaHhBRpUz26yvw%3D%3D (accessed July 20, 2021).
502. Ibid.
503. Kinsey Lindstrom, “Rockets Return to Europe,” U.S. Army, January 10, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/231553/rockets_return_to_europe (accessed July 3, 2021).
504. Ibid.
505. William Morris, “Europe Missile Defense Command Upgraded as Army Announces Leadership Moves,” Stars and Stripes, April
17, 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/europe-missile-defense-command-upgraded-as-army-announces-leadershipmoves-1.577276 (accessed July 3, 2021).
506. John Vandiver, “Ansbach-Based Army Unit First to Get New Mobile Air Defense System,” Stars and Stripes, April 26, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/ansbach-based-army-unit-first-to-get-new-mobile-air-defense-system-1.671189 (accessed June17, 2021).
507. John Vandiver, “‘We Got Zero Notice’: Army Resumes Cold War-Era Snap Deployments to Europe,” Stars and Stripes, March 29,
2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/we-got-zero-notice-army-resumes-cold-war-era-snap-deployments-to-europe-1.574788(accessed June 17, 2021).
508. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Army Europe and Africa,” as of March 8, 2021.

510. Fact sheet, “U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa,” U.S. Air Forces in Europe & Air Forces Africa, July 16, 2015, https://www.
af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/609838/united-states-air-force-in-europe/ (accessed July 3, 2021).
511. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Germany Arrests Four Tajik Nationals Suspected of Plotting Terrorist Attack,” April 15, 2020,
https://www.rferl.org/a/germany-arrests-four-tajik-nationals-suspected-of-plotting-terrorist-attack/30555712.html (accessed
July 3, 2021).
512. Brian W. Everstine, “B-1s, B-2s Wrap up European Bomber Task Force Deployment,” Air Force Magazine, https://www.airforcemag.
com/b-1s-b-2s-wrap-up-european-bomber-task-force-deployment/ (accessed June 17, 2021).
513. U.S. Air Force, U.S. Air Forces Europe and Air Forces Africa, “U.S. Air Force B-2s Return to Europe,” Air Force Global Strike
Command, March 10, 2020, https://www.afgsc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2106854/us-air-force-b-2s-return-to-europe/(accessed June 5, 2021).
514. U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Africa, “About: History,” https://www.marforeur.marines.mil/About/History/(accessed June 5, 2021).
515. Hope Hodge Seck, “Marines May Move Even More Combat Gear into Norwegian Caves,” Military.com, DefenseTech Blog, June 28,
2017, https://www.defensetech.org/2017/06/16/marines-combat-gear-norwegian-caves/ (accessed July 11, 2021).
516. Gunnery Sgt. Jason Fudge, “Marines, Sailors Build Bridge in Norway During Exercise Trident Juncture 18,” U.S. Marine Corps,
November 3, 2018, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/1681732/marines-sailors-build-bridge-in-norwayduring-exercise-trident-juncture-18/ (accessed June 5, 2021).
517. Michael T. Klare, “US Troops Are Heading North to Train on What Could Be the Next World War Battlefield,” Business Insider,
February 24, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-troops-heading-north-for-cold-response-2020-arctic-exercise-2020-2(accessed June 5, 2021).
518. U.S. Marine Corps, “Mission: MARFOREUR/AF Mission,” https://www.marforeur.marines.mil/About/Command-Information/(accessed June 17, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military141﻿

509. U.S. Air Forces Europe & Air Forces Africa, “USAFE–AFAFRICA,” https://www.usafe.af.mil/About-Us/Mission-and-Organization/(accessed July 3, 2021).

519. Todd South, “Marines Run Long-Range Insertion, Urban Attack with Portuguese in ‘Wild Crocodile II,’” Marine Corps Times,
January 13, 2020, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/01/13/marines-wild-crocodile-ii-runs-longrange-insertion-urban-attack-with-portuguese/ (accessed June 17, 2021), and Matthew Cox, “6 Years After Benghazi, a Marine
Commander Says Conditions May Soon Allow a US Diplomatic Return to Libya,” Business Insider, December 17, 2018, https://www.
businessinsider.com/conditions-improving-for-us-diplomatic-return-to-libya-2018-12 (accessed June 17, 2021).
520. Martin Egnash, “Legacy of Benghazi: Marine Force Stays Ready for Quick Africa Deployment,” Stars and Stripes, January 14, 2019,https://www.stripes.com/news/legacy-of-benghazi-marine-force-stays-ready-for-quick-africa-deployment-1.564342 (accessed
June 17, 2021).
521. John Vandiver, “Special Forces, SEAL Units to Join Mix of Elite Troops at Rural Baumholder,” Stars and Stripes, June 13, 2018,https://www.stripes.com/news/special-forces-seal-units-to-join-mix-of-elite-troops-at-rural-baumholder-1.532491 (accessed
June 17, 2021).
522. John Vandiver, “New US Special Operations Site Activated in Heart of the Baltics,” Stars and Stripes, December 3, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/europe/new-us-special-operations-site-activated-in-heart-of-the-baltics-1.654032 (accessed June 17,2021).
523. Wolters, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 2021, p. 17.
524. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year
(FY) 2021: European Deterrence Initiative,” pp. 22–40.

﻿525. Dan Stoutamire, “Romanian Air Base Proving Crucial as US Hub Ahead of Major Exercises,” Stars and Stripes, April 18, 2017,https://www.stripes.com/news/romanian-air-base-proving-crucial-as-us-hub-ahead-of-major-exercises-1.464105#.WPZirOR1rcs(accessed June 17, 2021).

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2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthMiddle East
Nicole Robinson

Ssoon after World War I as they dismantled the
Ottoman Empire.1
In a way not understood by many in theWest, religion remains a prominent fact of daily life in the modern Middle East. At the heartof many of the region’s conflicts is the friction
within Islam between Sunnis and Shias. This
friction dates back to the death of the Prophet
Muhammad in 632 AD.2 Sunni Muslims, whoform the majority of the world’s Muslim population, hold power in most of the region’s
Arab countries.
Viewing the Middle East’s current instability through the lens of a Sunni–Shia conflict, however, does not show the full picture.
The cultural and historical division between
Arabs and Persians has reinforced the Sunni–
Shia split. The mutual distrust between many
Sunni Arab powers and Iran, the Persian Shia
power, compounded by clashing national andideological interests, has fueled instability insuch countries as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, andYemen. The COVID-19 coronavirus exposed
Sunni–Shia tensions when Sunni countries in
the region blamed “Shia backwardness,” likely
referencing the lack of religious shrines, as thereason for the rapid spread of the virus in Iran.3
Sunni extremist organizations like al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State (IS) have exploited sectarian and ethnic tensions to gain support byposing as champions of Sunni Arabs against
Syria’s Alawite-dominated regime and othernon-Sunni governments and movements.
Regional demographic trends also are destabilizing factors. The Middle East contains one

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military143﻿trategically situated at the intersection ofEurope, Asia, and Africa, the Middle East
has long been an important focus of UnitedStates foreign policy. U.S. security relationships in the region are built on pragmatism,shared security concerns, and economic interests, including large sales of U.S. arms tocountries in the region to help them defend
themselves. The U.S. also has a long-term interest in the Middle East that derives from theregion’s economic importance as the world’s
primary source of oil and gas.
The region is home to a wide array of cultures, religions, and ethnic groups, including
Arabs, Jews, Kurds, Persians, and Turks, among
others. It also is home to the three Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as well as many smaller religions like the
Bahá’í, Druze, Yazidi, and Zoroastrian faiths.
The region contains many predominantly
Muslim countries as well as the world’s only
Jewish state.
The Middle East is deeply sectarian, andthese long-standing divisions, exacerbated by
the constant vying for power among religious
extremists, are central to many of the region’s
current challenges. In some cases, these sectarian divides have persisted for centuries.
Contemporary conflicts, however, have lessto do with these histories than they do withmodern extremist ideologies and the fact thattoday’s borders often do not reflect cultural, ethnic, or religious realities. Instead, they
are often the results of decisions taken by the
British, French, and other powers during and﻿of the world’s youngest and fastest-­growing
populations. In most of the West, this would
be viewed as an advantage, but not in the Middle East. Known as “youth bulges,” these demographic tsunamis have overwhelmed many
countries’ inadequate political, economic, andeducational infrastructures, and the lack ofaccess to education, jobs, and meaningful political participation fuels discontent. Because
almost two-thirds of the region’s inhabitants
are less than 30 years old, this demographic
bulge will continue to have a substantial effecton political stability across the region.4
The Middle East contains more than half of
the world’s oil reserves and is the world’s chiefoil-exporting region.5 As the world’s largest
producer and consumer of oil,6 the U.S., eventhough it actually imports relatively little of its
oil from the Middle East, has a vested interestin maintaining the free flow of oil and gas fromthe region. Oil is a fungible commodity, and the
U.S. economy remains vulnerable to sudden
spikes in world oil prices.
During the COVID-19 crisis, oil prices
plunged to below zero in April 2020 after stayat-home orders caused a severe imbalance
between supply and demand. This unprecedented drop in demand sparked an oil pricewar between Saudi Arabia and Russia. U.S. oil
producers were forced to cut back production,and “[i]f prices don’t regain stability, analysts’
biggest fear is that the U.S. energy sector won’t
be able to bounce back.”7 Although oil exporters Russia and Saudi Arabia eventually agreed
to reduce production by 12 percent, the plummet in oil prices over 2020 caused significant
shocks for exporters and importers. Saudi
Arabia’s economy—the largest in the region—
shrank by 4.1 percent in 2020, with a 3.3 percent decline in oil output during the first quarter alone.8 This decline in oil production willcause long-term damage to importers who now
face reduced foreign investment, remittances,
tourism, and grants from exporters.9
Because many U.S. allies depend on Middle
East oil and gas, there is also a second-ordereffect for the U.S. if supply from the Middle
East is reduced or compromised. For example,

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Japan is both the world’s third-largest economy and largest importer of liquefied natural gas(LNG).10 The U.S. itself might not be dependenton Middle East oil or LNG, but the economic
consequences arising from a major disruptionof supplies would ripple across the globe.
Financial and logistics hubs are also growing along some of the world’s busiest transcontinental trade routes. One of the region’s
economic bright spots in terms of trade andcommerce is in the Persian Gulf. The emiratesof Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the United ArabEmirates (UAE), along with Qatar, are competing to become the region’s top financial center.
The economic situation in the Middle Eastis part of what drives the political environment.
The lack of economic freedom was an important factor leading to the Arab Spring uprisings,
which began in early 2011 and disrupted economic activity, depressed foreign and domestic
investment, and slowed economic growth.
The COVID-19 pandemic has had massive
repercussions for the entire region, affecting economies and shaking political systems
in the aftermath of the crisis. Over 2020, theregional economy experienced a 5 percent decline in GDP growth, with declines across theregion fluctuating between 2 percent (Qatar)and almost 20 percent (Lebanon).11 Recovery
will likely take years, exacerbating tensions already present in many Middle East countries.
For example, the pandemic has already added
to Lebanon’s political instability, fueling conflict between rival political factions competing
to secure scarce medical resources for theirsupporters and aggravating tensions between
Lebanese citizens and desperate refugees who
have flooded in from neighboring Syria.12
The political environment has a direct bearing on how easily the U.S. military can operate
in a region. In many Middle Eastern countries, the political situation remains fraught
with uncertainty. The Arab Spring uprisings(2010–2012) formed a sandstorm that eroded
the foundations of many authoritarian regimes,
erased borders, and destabilized many of theregion’s countries,13 but the popular uprisingsin Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, and2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthallies in the Middle East, including Israel andmost Gulf Arab states, supported the U.S. decision and welcomed a harder line against the
Iranian regime.21 With the arrival of the Biden
Administration in 2021, Iran has been mounting its own maximum-pressure campaign toforce President Joseph Biden to lift sanctions
and unconditionally return to the 2015 agreement. Indirect talks brokered by the European
Union have been ongoing between U.S. and Iranian diplomats in Vienna since April 2021, but
as of the time this study was being prepared, adeal had not been reached.22
Tehran attempts to run an unconventional empire by exerting great influence on substate entities like Hamas (the Palestinian
territories); Hezbollah (Lebanon); the Mahdi
movement (Iraq); and the Houthi insurgents(Yemen). The Iranian Quds Force, the special-­
operations wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have orchestrated the formation, arming, training, and operations of thesesub-state entities as well as other surrogate
militias. These Iran-backed militias have carried out terrorist campaigns against U.S. forces and allies in the region for many years. On
January 2, 2020, President Donald Trump ordered an air strike that killed General Qassem
Suleimani, leader of the Iranian Quds Force,and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, leader of the
Iraqi Shia paramilitary group, both of whom
had been responsible for carrying out attacks
against U.S. personnel in Iraq. Suleimani’s andMuhandis’s deaths were a huge loss for Iran’s
regime and its Iraqi proxies. They also were amajor operational and psychological victory
for the United States.23
In Afghanistan, Tehran’s influence on some
Shiite groups is such that thousands have volunteered to fight for Bashar al-Assad in Syria.24
Iran also provided arms to the Taliban after it
was ousted from power by a U.S.-led coalition25
and has long considered the Afghan city of Herat near the Afghan–Iranian border to be within
its sphere of influence.
Iran already looms large over its weak anddivided Arab rivals. Iraq and Syria have beendestabilized by insurgencies and civil war and

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Yemen did not usher in a new era of democracy and liberal rule as many in the West were
hoping. At best, they made slow progress toward democratic reform; at worst, they added
to political instability, exacerbated economic
problems, and contributed to the rise of Islamist extremists.
Today, the region’s economic and politicaloutlooks remain bleak. In some cases, self-interested elites have prioritized regime survival
over real investment in human capital, aggravating the material deprivation of youth as
unresolved issues of endemic corruption, highunemployment, and the rising cost of living
have worsened. In response to this lack of progress, large-scale protests reemerged in 2019 in
Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, and other countries.14 Despite COVID-19 lockdowns
and curfews, protests also resumed in Lebanon
and Iraq in 2021.15 The protests in Lebanon and
Iraq could even affect the operational environment for U.S. forces in the region.16
There is no shortage of security challenges
for the U.S. and its allies in this region. Using
the breathing space and funding afforded by
the July 14, 2015, Joint Comprehensive Planof Action (JCPOA),17 for example, Iran has
exploited Shia–Sunni tensions to increase
its influence on embattled regimes and has
undermined adversaries in Sunni-led states.
In May 2018, the Trump Administration left
the JCPOA after European allies failed toaddress many of its serious flaws including
its sunset clauses.18 A year later, in May 2019,
Iran announced that it was withdrawing fromcertain aspects of the JCPOA.19 U.S. economic
sanctions have been crippling Iran’s economy
as part of the former Trump Administration’s“Maximum Pressure Campaign.” The sanctions
are meant to force changes in Iran’s behavior,particularly with regard to its support for terrorist organizations and refusal to renounce a
nascent nuclear weapons program.20
While many of America’s European allies
publicly denounced the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA,
most officials agree privately that the agreement is flawed and needs to be fixed. America’s﻿

may never fully recover; Egypt is distracted byits own internal problems, economic imbalances, and the Islamist extremist insurgency
in the Sinai Peninsula; and Jordan has beeninundated by a flood of Syrian refugees and isthreatened by the spillover of Islamist extremist groups from Syria.26 Meanwhile, Tehran has
continued to build up its missile arsenal, now
the largest in the Middle East; has intervened
to prop up the Assad regime in Syria; and supports Shiite Islamist revolutionaries in Yemen
and Bahrain.27
In Syria, the Assad regime’s brutal repression of peaceful demonstrations early in 2011
ignited a fierce civil war that killed more thanhalf a million people and created a major humanitarian crisis: according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “13.4
million people in need of humanitarian andprotection assistance in Syria”; “6.6 million
Syrian refugees worldwide, of whom 5.6 million [are] hosted in countries near Syria” like
Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan; and “6.7 million
internally displaced persons” within Syria.28
The large refugee populations created by thiscivil war could become a source of recruits for
extremist groups. For example, both the Islamist Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly known as
the al-Qaeda–affiliated Jabhat Fateh al-Shamand before that as the al-Nusra Front, and theself-styled Islamic State (IS), formerly known
as ISIS or ISIL and before that as al-Qaeda in
Iraq, used the power vacuum created by the
war to carve out extensive sanctuaries where
they built proto-states and trained militantsfrom a wide variety of other Arab countries,
Central Asia, Russia, Europe, Australia, andthe United States.29
At the height of its power, with a sophisticated Internet and social media presence and bycapitalizing on the civil war in Syria and sectarian divisions in Iraq, the IS was able to recruit
over 25,000 fighters from outside the region
to join its ranks in Iraq and Syria. These foreign fighters included thousands from Westerncountries, including the United States. In 2014,
the U.S. announced the formation of a broadinternational coalition to defeat the Islamic

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State. Early in 2019, the territorial “caliphate”
had been destroyed by a U.S.-led coalition ofinternational partners.
Arab–Israeli tensions are another source ofinstability in the region. The repeated breakdown of Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations
has created an even more antagonistic situation. Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood that has controlled Gaza
since 2007, seeks to transform the conflictfrom a national struggle over sovereignty andterritory into a religious conflict in which compromise is denounced as blasphemy. Hamas
invokes jihad in its struggle against Israel andseeks to destroy the Jewish state and replace
it with an Islamic state.
At the end of 2020, the signing of the Abraham Accords caused a brief spark of hope.
These U.S.-brokered agreements normalizing relations between Israel and the UAE andbetween Israel and Bahrain are importantmilestones in the diplomatic march toward a
broader Arab–Israeli peace.30 However, in May
2021, a real estate dispute in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah escalated
into active conflict between Israel and Hamas.
Violent riots intensified in the city of Jerusalem, and Hamas threatened to attack if Israel
did not withdraw its police by the evening of
May 10. When Israel ignored this ultimatum,
Hamas unleashed a barrage of almost 4,300
rockets at Jerusalem and southern Israel according to the Israeli military. Israel’s Iron
Dome air defense system was able to stop mostof these rockets. Following 11 days of fighting,a cease-fire brokered by Egypt was reached
between Hamas and Israel. At least 243 people were killed in Gaza, and 12 people were
killed in Israel.31

Important Alliances and Bilateral
Relations in the Middle East
The U.S. has strong military, security, intelligence, and diplomatic ties with several Middle Eastern nations, including Israel, Egypt,
Jordan, and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthopaqueness of these relationships sometimes
creates problems for the U.S. when it tries tocoordinate defense and security cooperation
with European allies—mainly the United
Kingdom (U.K.) and France—that are activein the region.
Military training is an important part ofthese relationships. These exercises are intended principally to ensure close and effective coordination with key regional partners,
demonstrate an enduring U.S. security commitment to regional allies, and train Arabarmed forces so that they can assume a larger
share of responsibility for regional security.
Israel. America’s most important bilateral relationship in the Middle East is with
Israel. Both countries are democracies, value free-market economies, and believe inhuman rights at a time when many Middle
Eastern countries reject those values. With
support from the United States, Israel has developed one of the world’s most sophisticated
air and missile defense networks.36 No significant progress on peace negotiations with thePalestinians or on stabilizing Israel’s volatileneighborhood is possible without a strong andeffective Israeli–American partnership.
After years of strained relations during the
Obama Administration, ties between the U.S.
and Israel improved significantly during thefirst two years of the Trump Administration. In
May 2018, the U.S. moved its embassy from Tel
Aviv to a location in western Jerusalem.37 On
January 28, 2020, President Trump unveiled
his Israeli–Palestinian peace proposal.38 The
plan accorded Israeli security needs a highpriority, recognized Israel’s vital interest inretaining control of the border with Jordan,and cleared the way for U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over many settlements andJewish holy sites in the disputed territory of
the West Bank.39
So far, the Biden Administration has shown
little interest in taking an active role in Israeli–­
Palestinian peace negotiations. However, if
the conflict between the two sides continues
to escalate, President Biden may be pressured
to become more involved.

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Arab Emirates. Because the historical and political circumstances that led to the creation ofNATO have been largely absent in the Middle
East, the region lacks a similarly strong collective security organization.
When it came into office, the Trump Administration proposed the idea of a multilateral Middle East Strategic Alliance with
its Arab partners.32 The initial U.S. concept,
which included security, economic cooperation, and conflict resolution and deconfliction,
generated considerable enthusiasm, but the
project was sidelined by a diplomatic disputeinvolving Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.33
Middle Eastern countries traditionally havepreferred to maintain bilateral relationships
with the U.S. and generally have shunned multilateral arrangements because of the lack oftrust among Arab states.
This lack of trust manifested itself in June2017 when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and several other
Muslim-­majority countries cut or downgraded diplomatic ties with Qatar after Doha was
accused of supporting terrorism in the region.34 All commercial land, air, and sea travel
between Qatar and these nations was severed,and Qatari diplomats and citizens were evicted. In January 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Bahrain, and Egypt agreed to restore ties
with Qatar during the 41st Gulf Cooperation
Council Summit. Per the agreement, Saudi
Arabia and its GCC allies lifted the economic
and diplomatic blockade of Qatar, reopening
their airspace, land, and sea borders. This diplomatic victory from Washington paves theway toward full reconciliation in the GCC
and, at least potentially, a more united front
in the Gulf.35
Bilateral and multilateral relations in theregion, especially with the U.S. and other Western countries, are often made more difficult
by their secretive nature. It is not unusual forgovernments in this region to see value (andsometimes necessity) in pursuing a relationship with the U.S. while having to account fordomestic opposition to working with America: hence the perceived need for secrecy. The

﻿

Saudi Arabia. After Israel, the U.S. military
relationship is deepest with the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, which serves as de facto leader of the GCC. America’s relationshipwith Saudi Arabia is based on pragmatism
and is important for both security and economic reasons, but it has come under intensestrain since the murder of Saudi dissident
and Washington Post journalist Jamal Ahmad
Khashoggi, allegedly by Saudi security services,in Turkey in 2018.
The Saudis enjoy huge influence across theMuslim world, and approximately 2 million
Muslims participate in the annual Hajj pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca. Riyadh has
been a key partner in efforts to counter the influence of Iran. The U.S. is also the largest provider of arms to Saudi Arabia and regularly, if
not controversially, sells munitions needed toresupply stockpiles expended in the Saudi-led
campaign against the Houthis in Yemen.
Gulf Cooperation Council. The GCC’s
member countries are located close to the
Arab–Persian fault line and are therefore strategically important to the U.S.40 The root of
Arab–Iranian tensions in the Gulf is Tehran’sideological drive to export its Islamist revolution and overthrow the traditional rulersof the Arab kingdoms. This ideological clash
has further amplified long-standing sectarian
tensions between Shia Islam and Sunni Islam.
Tehran has sought to radicalize Shia Arab minority groups to undermine Sunni Arab regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. It
also sought to incite revolts by the Shia majorities in Iraq against Saddam Hussein’s regime
and in Bahrain against the Sunni al-Khalifa dynasty. Culturally, many Iranians look down on
the Gulf States, many of which they see as artificial entities carved out of the former Persian
Empire and propped up by Western powers.
GCC member countries often have difficulty agreeing on a common policy with respect
to matters of security. This reflects both theorganization’s intergovernmental nature andits members’ desire to place national interests
above those of the GCC. The recent dispute regarding Qatar illustrates this problem.

148

Another source of disagreement involves thequestion of how best to deal with Iran. On one
end of the spectrum, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, andthe UAE take a hawkish view of the threat from
Iran. Oman and Qatar, the former of which prides
itself on its regional neutrality and the latter ofwhich shares natural gas fields with Iran, view
Iran’s activities in the region as less of a threat
and maintain cordial relations with Tehran.
Kuwait tends to fall somewhere in the middle.
Intra-­GCC relations also can be problematic.
Egypt. Egypt is another important U.S.
military ally. As one of six Arab countries thatmaintain diplomatic relations with Israel (theothers are Jordan, Bahrain, the UAE, Sudan,and Morocco), Egypt is closely enmeshed in
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and remains aleading political, diplomatic, and military power in the region.
Relations between the U.S. and Egypt havebeen difficult since the 2011 downfall of President Hosni Mubarak after 30 years of rule. The
Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi waselected president in 2012 and used the Islamist-­
dominated parliament to pass a constitutionthat advanced an Islamist agenda. Morsi’s authoritarian rule, combined with rising populardissatisfaction with falling living standards,
rampant crime, and high unemployment, led
to a massive wave of protests in June 2013 that
prompted a military coup in July. The leaderof the coup, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi,
pledged to restore democracy and was electedpresident in 2014 and again in 2018 in elections
that many considered to be neither free nor fair.
Sisi’s government faces major political,
economic, and security challenges. Rare anti-­
government protests broke out for two weeks
in September 2018 despite a ban on demonstrations, and waves of arrests and detainments followed in a massive crackdown.41 The
demonstrations exposed Egypt’s tenuous stability, and support for President Sisi appears
to be waning.

Quality of Armed Forces in the Region
The quality and capabilities of the region’s
armed forces are mixed. Some countries spend

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthCombined, these factors give Israel a regional
advantage despite limitations of manpowerand size. In particular, the IDF has focused on
maintaining its superiority in missile defense,
intelligence collection, precision weapons,
and cyber technologies.48 The Israelis regard
their cyber capabilities as especially important and use cyber technologies for a numberof purposes, including defending Israeli cyberspace, gathering intelligence, and carryingout attacks.49
In 2010, Israel signed a $2.7 billion deal with
the U.S. to acquire about 20 F-35I “Adir” Lightning fighter jets, a heavily modified version of
the Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighter.50 In
the 2021 conflict with Hamas, these jets were
deployed in a major combat operation that targeted dozens of Hamas rocket launch tubes innorthern Gaza.51
Israel maintains its qualitative superiority
in medium-range and long-range missile capabilities and fields effective missile defense
systems, including Iron Dome and Arrow, bothof which the U.S. helped to finance. Israel also
has a nuclear weapons capability (which it does
not publicly acknowledge) that increases its
strength relative to other powers in the region
and has helped to deter adversaries as the gap
in conventional capabilities has been reduced.
After Israel, the most technologically advanced and best-equipped armed forces arefound in the GCC countries. Previously, theexport of oil and gas meant that there wasno shortage of resources to devote to defense spending, but the collapse of crude oil
prices has forced oil-exporting countries toadjust their defense spending patterns. At
present, however, GCC nations still have theregion’s best-funded (even if not necessarily
its most effective) Arab armed forces. All GCC
members boast advanced defense hardwarethat reflects a preference for U.S., U.K., andFrench equipment.
Saudi Arabia maintains the GCC’s most capable military force. It has an army of 75,000
soldiers and a National Guard of 100,000
personnel reporting directly to the king. The
army operates 900 main battle tanks including

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military149﻿billions of dollars each year on advanced Western military hardware; others spend very little.
Saudi Arabia is by far the region’s largest military spender in terms of budget size. As a percentage of GDP, Oman leads the way, spending
11 percent on defense, followed by Saudi Arabia
at 8.4 percent in 2020, the most recent year forwhich data are available.42
Historically, figures on defense spending
for the Middle East have been very unreliable,
and the lack of data has worsened. For 2020,
there were no available data for Qatar, Syria,
the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.43
Different security factors drive the degree
to which Middle Eastern countries fund, train,
and arm their militaries. For Israel, which
fought and defeated Arab coalitions in 1948,
1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982, the chief potential threat to its existence is now an Iranianregime that has called for Israel to be “wiped
off the map.”44 States and non-state actors in
the region have responded to Israel’s military
dominance by investing in asymmetric andunconventional capabilities to offset its military superiority.45 For the Gulf States, the main
driver of defense policy is the Iranian military
threat combined with internal security challenges; for Iraq, it is the internal threat posedby insurgents and terrorists.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are considered one of the most capable military forces in
the Middle East. Recently, Iran and other Arabcountries have spent billions of dollars in aneffort to catch up with Israel, and the resulting“arms race” could threaten Israel’s qualitative
military effectiveness (QME). Iran is steadily
improving its missile capabilities and, due to the
expiration of the U.N. conventional arms embargo in October 2020, now has access to the global
arms trade.46 In response, other Arab countries
are procuring and upgrading their weapons capability while establishing officer training programs to improve military effectiveness.47
Israel funds its military sector heavily andhas a strong national industrial capacity that is
supported by significant funding from the U.S.

﻿

450 U.S.-made M1A2s. Its air force is built
With 438,500 active personnel and 479,000
around American-built and British-built air- reserve personnel, Egypt has the largest Arab
craft and consists of more than 443 combat-­ military force in the Middle East.58 It possesses
capable aircraft that include F-15s, Tornados, a fully operational military with an army, airand Typhoons.52
force, air defense, navy, and special operations
In fact, air power is the strong suit of most forces. Until 1979, when the U.S. began to supGCC members. Oman, for example, operates ply Egypt with military equipment, Cairo reF-16s and Typhoons. In 2018, the U.S. govern- lied primarily on less capable Soviet military
ment awarded Lockheed Martin a $1.12 bil- technology.59 Since then, its army and air force
lion contract to produce 16 new F-16 Block 70 have been significantly upgraded with U.S. milaircraft (Lockheed Martin’s newest and most itary weapons, equipment, and warplanes.
advanced F-16 production configuration) for
Egypt has struggled with increased terrorthe Royal Bahraini Air Force.53 Qatar operates ist activity in the Sinai Peninsula, including
French-made Mirage fighters and is buying 24 attacks on Egyptian soldiers, attacks on forTyphoons from the U.K.54
eign tourists, and the October 2015 bombing
In November 2020, the U.S. State Depart- of a Russian airliner departing from the Sinai.
ment notified Congress that it had approved The Islamic State’s “Sinai Province” terrorthe sale of a $23.4 billion defense package of ist group has claimed responsibility for all of
F-35A Joint Strike Fighters, armed drones, these actions.60
munitions, and associated equipment to the
Jordan is a close U.S. ally and has small but
UAE. After a temporary freeze on arm sales effective military forces. The principal threatsby the Biden Administration, the sale moved to its security include terrorism, turbulence
forward in April 2021.55 The sale is somewhat spilling over from Syria and Iraq, and the recontroversial, however, because of Israeli sulting flow of refugees. Although Jordan faces
concerns about other regional powers also few conventional threats from its neighbors,possessing the most modern combat aircraft, its internal security is threatened by Islamist
potentially challenging an important Israe- extremists returning from fighting in the reli advantage.
gion who have been emboldened by the growMiddle Eastern countries have shown a ing influence of al-Qaeda and other Islamist
willingness to use their military capability militants. As a result, Jordan’s highly profesunder certain and limited circumstances. The sional armed forces have focused on bordernavies of GCC member countries rarely deploy and internal security in recent years.
beyond their Exclusive Economic Zones, but
Considering Jordan’s size, its conventional
Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and capability is significant. Jordan’s ground forces
Qatar have participated in and in some cases total 86,000 soldiers and include 182 British-­have commanded Combined Task Force 152, made Challenger 1 tanks and four Frenchformed in 2004 to maintain maritime security made Leclarc tanks. Forty-seven F-16 Fighting
in the Persian Gulf.56 Since 2001, Jordan, Egypt, Falcons form the backbone if its air force,61 andBahrain, and the UAE have supplied troops to its special operations forces are highly capathe U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan. The UAE ble, having benefitted from extensive U.S. andand Qatar deployed fighters to participate in U.K. training. Jordanian forces have served in
NATO-led operations over Libya in 2011, al- Afghanistan and in numerous U.N.-led peacethough they did not participate in strike oper- keeping operations.
ations. To varying degrees, all six GCC memIraq has fielded one of the region’s mostbers also joined the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition, dysfunctional military forces. After the 2011
with the UAE contributing the most in terms withdrawal of U.S. troops, Iraq’s governmentof air power.57 Air strikes in Syria by members selected and promoted military leaders acof the GCC ended in 2017.
cording to political criteria.62 Shiite army

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Current U.S. Military Presencein the Middle East
Before 1980, the limited U.S. military presence in the Middle East consisted chiefly of asmall naval force that had been based at Bahrain since 1958. The U.S. “twin pillar” strategy relied on prerevolutionary Iran and Saudi
Arabia to take the lead in defending the Persian Gulf from the Soviet Union and its client
regimes in Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen,67 but
the 1979 Iranian revolution demolished one
pillar, and the December 1979 Soviet invasionof Afghanistan increased the Soviet threat
to the Gulf.
In January 1980, President Jimmy Carterproclaimed in a commitment known as the
Carter Doctrine that the United States would
take military action to defend oil-rich Persian
Gulf States from external aggression. In 1980,

he ordered the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), the precursor to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM),
which was established in January 1983.68
Until the late 1980s, America’s “regional
strategy still largely focused on the potential
threat of a massive Soviet invasion of Iran.”69
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Saddam
Hussein’s Iraqi regime became the chief threat
to regional stability. Iraq invaded Kuwait inAugust 1990, and the United States responded in January 1991 by leading an international coalition of more than 30 nations to expel
Saddam’s forces from Kuwait. CENTCOM
commanded the U.S. contribution of more than532,000 military personnel to the coalition’s
armed forces, which totaled at least 737,000.70
This marked the peak U.S. force deployment in
the Middle East.
Confrontations with Iraq continued
throughout the 1990s as Iraq continued to violate the 1991 Gulf War cease-fire. Baghdad’s
failure to cooperate with U.N. arms inspectors
to verify the destruction of its weapons of mass
destruction and its links to terrorism led to the
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. During the initial
invasion, U.S. forces reached nearly 192,000,71
joined by military personnel from coalition
forces. Apart from the “surge” in 2007, when
President George W. Bush deployed an additional 30,000 personnel, the number of American combat forces in Iraq fluctuated between
100,000 and 150,000.72
In December 2011, the U.S. officially completed its withdrawal of troops, leaving only
150 personnel attached to the U.S. embassy in
Iraq.73 In the aftermath of IS territorial gains in
Iraq, however, the U.S. redeployed thousandsof troops to the country to assist Iraqi forces
against IS and help to build Iraqi capabilities.
Despite calls from the Iraqi parliament to expel U.S. troops after the January 2020 air strikethat killed General Qassem Suleimani, U.S.
forces remain in Iraq and have “consolidated
their basing” and “deployed new missile defenses.”74 According to U.S. Central Command,
U.S. force levels in Iraq declined from 5,200 to
3,000 in August 2020, and in November 2020,

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﻿

officers were favored over their Sunni, Christian, and Kurdish counterparts, and former
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki chose top
officers according to their political loyalties.
Politicization of the armed forces also exacerbated corruption within many units, with somecommanders siphoning off funds allocated for“ghost soldiers” who never existed or had been
separated from the army for various reasons.63
It is unclear whether Prime Minister Mustafa
al-Kadhimi will follow the same model, butboth Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and the United States have welcomed
the appointment.64
The promotion of incompetent militaryleaders, poor logistical support due to corruption and other problems, limited operational
mobility, and weaknesses in intelligence, reconnaissance, medical support, and air force
capabilities have combined to undermine theeffectiveness of Iraq’s armed forces. In June
2014, for example, the collapse of as many asfour divisions that were routed by vastly smaller numbers of Islamic State fighters led to thefall of Mosul.65 The U.S. and its allies respondedwith a massive training program for the Iraqi
military that led to the liberation of Mosul on
July 9, 2017.66

MAP 4

U.S. Access to Bases andFacilities in the Middle East

COUNTRY U.S. TROOPS

TURKEY

SYRIA
Med.
Sea

2

ISRAEL

13,500

KuwaitQatar
Bahrain
UAE
JordanIraq
Oman
Saudi Arabia

8,000
5,000
3,500
3,145
2,500
Few hundred
n/a

IRAQ

1

AFG.
IRAN

3

JORDANKUWAIT

4

5

PAK.
7
8

6

EGYPT

BAHRAIN
QATAR
Persian
9
Gulf

11
10

U.A.E.

SAUDI
ARABIA

12

Gulf of Aden
13 14

OMAN

﻿

16
Red
Sea

ERITREA

1JORDAN
Muwaffaq Salti Airbase

IRAQ
2 al-Asad Air Base

17
18

YEMEN

BAHRAIN

5 Camp Arifjan

OMAN
13 Musnanah Air Base

8 Shaykh Isa Air Base

14 Muscat International Airport
15 RAFO Masirah

QATAR

KUWAIT
4 Ahmad al-Jabir Air Base

15°N

7 Khalifa bin Salman Port

9 Al Udeid Air Base
3 Ali al-Salem Air Base

Arabian
Sea
60°E

SUDAN

15

16 Al Duqm Port
17 RAFO Thumrait
18 Salalah Port

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
10 Al-Dhafra Air Base
11 Jebel Ali Port
12 Fujairah Naval BaseSAUDI ARABIA
6 Eskan Village Air Base

SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

“President Trump directed a further drawdown
to 2,500 by January 2021.”75
The U.S. also continues to maintain a limited number of forces in other locations in the
Middle East, primarily in GCC countries. Rising naval tensions in the Persian Gulf prompted additional deployments of troops, Patriot
missile batteries, and combat aircraft to theGulf in late 2019 to deter Iran, although reductions in U.S. forces were subsequently announced in May 2020.76 The decision perhaps
indicated a shifting strategy to counter Iran or
an assessment by U.S. officials of a reduced risk
as Iran continued to mitigate the economic
and political effects of COVID-19.
As of early 2020, “approximately 14,000 U.S.
military personnel had been added to a baseline of more than 60,000 U.S. forces in andaround the Persian Gulf…and those in Iraq
and Afghanistan.”77 Although their exact disposition is hard to triangulate because of thefluctuating nature of U.S. military operationsin the region,78 information gleaned from open
sources reveals the following:l

Kuwait. More than 13,500 U.S. personnel
are based in Kuwait and are spread among
Camp Arifjan, Ahmad al-Jabir Air Base,and Ali al-Salem Air Base. A large depot of
prepositioned equipment and a squadronof fighters and Patriot missile systems arealso deployed to Kuwait.79
UAE. About 3,500 U.S. personnel are
deployed at Jebel Ali port, Al Dhafra Air
Base, and naval facilities at Fujairah. Jebel
Ali port is the U.S. Navy’s busiest port ofcall for aircraft carriers. U.S. Air Forcepersonnel who are stationed in the UAE
use Al Dhafra Air Base to operate fighters,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), refueler aircraft, and surveillance aircraft. In
addition, the United States has regularly
deployed F-22 Raptor combat aircraft to
Al Dhafra and recently deployed the F-35
combat aircraft because of escalating tensions with Iran. Patriot missile systems
are deployed for air and missile defense.80llOman. In 1980, Oman became the first
Gulf State to welcome a U.S. military base.
Today, it provides important access in theform of over 5,000 aircraft overflights, 600
aircraft landings, and 80 port calls annually. The number of U.S. military personnel in Oman has fallen to a few hundred,mostly from the U.S. Air Force. According
to the Congressional Research Service,“the United States reportedly has accessto Oman’s military airfields in Muscat(the capital), Thumrait, Masirah Island,and Musnanah” as well as (pursuant to a
March 2019 Strategic framework Agreement) the ports of Al Duqm and Salalah.81
Bahrain. Approximately 5,000 U.S. military
personnel are based in Bahrain. Because
Bahrain is home to Naval Support Activity
Bahrain and the U.S. Fifth Fleet, most U.S.
military personnel there belong to the U.S.
Navy. A significant number of U.S. Air Forcepersonnel operate out of Shaykh Isa Air
Base, where F-16s, F/A-18s, and P-8 surveillance aircraft are stationed. U.S. Patriot missile systems also are deployed to Bahrain.
The deep-water port of Khalifa bin Salmanis one of the few facilities in the Gulf that
can accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers.82
Saudi Arabia. The U.S. withdrew thebulk of its forces from Saudi Arabia in
2003. After the October 2019 attacks on
Saudi Arabia’s oil and natural gas facilities, the U.S. Department of Defense
deployed 3,000 additional troops and sent
radar and missile systems to improve air
defenses, an air expeditionary wing tosupport fighter aircraft, and two fighter
squadrons in an effort to deter futureattacks.83 This large-scale military buildup
to counter Iran was reduced in May 2020
after the U.S. removed two Patriot missile
batteries and dozens of troops that had
been deployed during the troop buildup.84
The six-­decade-­old United States Military
Training Mission to the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, the four-decade-old Office of the

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153

﻿

l

l

Program Manager of the Saudi ArabianNational Guard Modernization Program,and the Office of the Program Manager–Facilities Security Force are based in
Eskan Village Air Base approximately 13
miles south of the capital city of Riyadh.85

Middle East [USARCENT]; U.S. Air Forces
Middle East [USAFCENT]; and U.S. Marine
Forces Middle East [MARCENT]) and one subordinate unified command (U.S. Special Operations Command Middle East [SOCCENT]).
l

Qatar. More than 8,000 U.S. personnel, mainly from the U.S. Air Force, aredeployed in Qatar.86 The U.S. operates its
Combined Air Operations Center at Al
Udeid Air Base, which is one of the world’s
most important U.S. air bases. It is also
the base from which the anti-ISIS campaign was headquartered. Heavy bombers,
tankers, transports, and ISR (intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance) aircraft
operate from Al Udeid Air Base, which
also serves as the forward headquartersof CENTCOM. The base houses prepositioned U.S. military equipment and isdefended by U.S. Patriot missile systems.
So far, the recent diplomatic moves by
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states against
Doha have not affected the United States’
relationship with Qatar.

﻿

l

l

Jordan. According to CENTCOM, Jordan“is one of [America’s] strongest and most reliable partners in the Levant sub-region.”87
Although there are no U.S. military basesin Jordan, the U.S. has a long history of
conducting training exercises in the country. Due to recent events in neighboring
Syria, in addition to other military assets
like fighter jets and air defense systems,“approximately 3,145 U.S. military personnel are deployed to Jordan to support
Defeat-ISIS operations, enhance Jordan’ssecurity, and promote regional stability.”88

CENTCOM “directs and enables military
operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability
in support of enduring U.S. interests.”89 Execution of this mission is supported by four service component commands (U.S. Naval Forces
Middle East [USNAVCENT]; U.S. Army Forces

154

l

l

l

l

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command.
USNAVCENT is USCENTCOM’s maritime
component. With its forward headquarters in Bahrain, it is responsible for commanding the afloat units that rotationallydeploy or surge from the United States in
addition to other ships that are based in
the Gulf for longer periods. USNAVCENT
conducts persistent maritime operations
to advance U.S. interests, deter and counter disruptive countries, defeat violent extremism, and strengthen partner nations’maritime capabilities in order to promotea secure maritime environment in an areathat encompasses approximately 2.5 million square miles of water.
U.S. Army Forces Central Command.
USARCENT is USCENTCOM’s land component. Based in Kuwait, it is responsible
for land operations in an area that totals
4.6 million square miles (1.5 times larger
than the continental United States).
U.S. Air Forces Central Command.
USAFCENT is USCENTCOM’s air component. Based in Qatar, it is responsible for
air operations and for working with the airforces of partner countries in the region.
It also manages an extensive supply andequipment prepositioning program atseveral regional sites.
U.S. Marine Forces Central Command.
MARCENT is USCENTCOM’s designatedMarine Corps service component. Basedin Bahrain, it is responsible for all Marine
Corps forces in the region.
U.S. Special Operations CommandCentral. SOCCENT is a subordinate
unified command under USCENTCOM.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

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﻿

Based in Qatar, it is responsible for
The British presence in the region extends
planning special operations throughout
beyond soldiers, ships, and planes. A British-run
the USCENTCOM region, planning andstaff college operates in Qatar, and Kuwait chose
conducting peacetime joint/combined
the U.K. to help run its own equivalent of thespecial operations training exercises, andRoyal Military Academy at Sandhurst.94 The U.K.
orchestrating command and control ofalso plays a very active role in training the Saudi
peacetime and wartime special operations. Arabian and Jordanian militaries.
The French presence in the Gulf is smallIn addition to the American military pres- er than the U.K.’s but still significant. France
ence in the region, two U.S. allies—the United opened its first military base in the Gulf in
Kingdom and France—play an important role. 2009. Located in the emirate of Abu Dhabi, it
The U.K.’s presence in the Middle East is was the first foreign military installation built bya legacy of British imperial rule. The U.K. has the French in 50 years.95 The French have 700
maintained close ties with many countries that personnel based in the UAE, along with eight
it once ruled and has conducted military oper- Rafale jets, as well as military operations in Kuations in the region for decades. Approximate- wait and Qatar.96 French ships have access to thely 1,350 British service personnel are based Zayed Port in Abu Dhabi, which is big enough tothroughout the region. This number fluctuates handle every ship in the French Navy except thewith the arrival of visiting warships.90
aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle.
The British presence in the region is domMilitary support from the U.K. and France
inated by the Royal Navy. Permanently based has been particularly important in Operation
naval assets include four mine hunters and one Inherent Resolve, a U.S.-led joint task force
Royal Fleet Auxiliary supply ship. In addition, formed to combat the Islamic State in Iraq
there generally are frigates or destroyers in and Syria. In March 2020, France and thethe Gulf or Arabian Sea performing maritime U.K. announced that they would be reducing
security duties,91 and although such matters their footprint in Iraq because of the impact
are not the subject of public discussion, U.K. of COVID-19.97 However, as of February 2021,
attack submarines operate in the area. In April the French Armed Forces had resumed their2018, as a sign of its long-term maritime pres- operations. France has 650 troops stationed inence in the region, the U.K. opened a base in the UAE, 600 stationed in Syria and Iraq, andBahrain—its first overseas military base in the 700 stationed in Lebanon.98 The U.K. tempoMiddle East in more than four decades.92 The rarily redeployed troops back to the U.K. as a
U.K. has made a multimillion-dollar invest- result of COVID-19 but announced in February
ment in modernization of the Duqm Port com- 2021 that the 500 troops would be sent backplex in Oman to accommodate its new Queen alongside an additional 3,500 extra troops to
Elizabeth–­class aircraft carriers.93
boost its counterterrorism training mission in
The U.K. has a sizeable Royal Air Force Iraq.99 Additional troops will help to prevent(RAF) presence in the region as well, main- the IS from returning and manage threats fromly in the UAE and Oman. A short drive from Iran-backed militias more effectively.
Dubai, Al-Minhad Air Base is home to a small
Another important actor in Middle East
contingent of U.K. personnel, and small RAF security is the small East African country ofdetachments in Oman support U.K. and coa- Djibouti. Djibouti sits on the Bab el-Mandeb
lition operations in the region. Although con- Strait, through which an estimated 6.2 milsidered to be in Europe, the U.K.’s Sovereign lion barrels of oil a day transited in 2018 (theBase Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus most recent year for which U.S. Energy Adhave supported U.S. military and intelligence ministration data are available) and which is a
operations in the past, and it is expected that choke point on the route to the Suez Canal.100
they will continue to do so.
An increasing number of countries recognize﻿Djibouti’s value as a base from which to projectmaritime power and launch counterterrorism
operations. The country is home to Camp Lemonnier, which can hold as many as 4,000 personnel and is the only permanent U.S. militarybase in Africa.101
China is also involved in Djibouti and has its
first permanent overseas base there, which canhouse 10,000 troops and which Chinese marines have used to stage live-fire exercises featuring armored combat vehicles and artillery.
France, Italy, and Japan also have presences ofvarying strength in Djibouti.102

The U.S. has access to several airfields inthe region. The primary air hub for U.S. forces
is Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Other airfields
include Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait; Al Dhafra, UAE; Al Minhad, UAE; Isa, Bahrain; Eskan
Village Air Base, Saudi Arabia; Muscat, Oman;
Thumrait, Oman; and Masirah Island, Oman,in addition to the commercial airport at Seeb,
Oman. In the past, the U.S. has used major airfields in Iraq, including Baghdad International
Airport and Balad Air Base, as well as Prince
Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.
The fact that a particular air base is available to the U.S. today, however, does not necKey Infrastructure andessarily mean that it will be available for a parWarfighting Capabilities
ticular operation in the future. For example,
The Middle East is critically situated geo- because of their more cordial relations withgraphically. Two-thirds of the world’s popula- Iran, it is highly unlikely that Qatar and Omantion lives within an eight-hour flight from the would allow the U.S. to use air bases in their
Gulf region, making it accessible from most territory for strikes against Iran unless they
other regions of the globe. The Middle East were first attacked themselves.
also contains some of the world’s most critical
The U.S. has access to ports in the region,
maritime choke points, including the Suez Ca- perhaps most importantly in Bahrain, as
nal and the Strait of Hormuz.
well as a deep-water port, Khalifa bin SalAlthough infrastructure is not as developed man, in Bahrain and naval facilities at Fuin the Middle East as it is in North America or jairah, UAE.105 The UAE’s commercial port
Europe, during a decades-long presence, the of Jebel Ali is open for visits from U.S. warU.S. has developed systems that enable it to ships and the prepositioning of equipment
move large numbers of matériel and person- for operations in theater.106 In March 2019,nel into and out of the region. According to the “Oman and the United States signed a ‘StraDepartment of Defense, at the height of U.S. tegic Framework Agreement’ that expands
combat operations in Iraq during the Second the U.S.–Oman facilities access agreements
Gulf War, the U.S. presence included 165,000 by allowing U.S. forces to use the ports of Al
servicemembers and 505 bases. Moving per- Duqm and Salalah.”107 The location of thesesonnel and equipment out of the country was ports outside the Strait of Hormuz makes“the largest logistical drawdown since World them particularly useful. Approximately 90
War II” and included redeployment of “the percent of the world’s trade travels by sea, and60,000 troops who remained in Iraq at the time some of the busiest and most important shipand more than 1 million pieces of equipment ping lanes are located in the Middle East. Tens
ahead of their deadline.”103of thousands of cargo ships travel throughThe condition of the region’s roads varies the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandebfrom country to country. The most recent Strait each year.
available data reflect that 100 percent of theGiven the high volume of maritime trafficroads in Israel, Jordan, and the UAE are paved. in the region, no U.S. military operation can
Other nations—for example, Oman (49.3 per- be undertaken without consideration of howcent); Saudi Arabia (21.5 percent); and Yemen these shipping lanes offer opportunity and risk
(8.7 percent)—have poor paved road cover- to America and her allies. The major shippingage.104 Rail coverage is also poor.
routes include:156

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 5The Effect of the Suez Canal Blockage on the U.S. Navy
Suez Canal operations were suspended March 23–29 due to the grounding of acontainer ship, which created a 360-ship traffic jam. The Eisenhower Carrier StrikeGroup (CSG) transited the canal April 2 and arrived on station in the Arabian Sea 10days later. If the Eisenhower CSG had had to circumnavigate Africa, the trip would
have taken about three weeks.
Mediterranean Sea
Eisenhower Carrier Strike GroupMankin Island Amphibious Ready Group
3/29

3/22

Suez Canal

CHINA
3/22

AFRICA

4/5

4/12

Pacific
Ocean

3/29

Arabian
Sea

4/5

4/12

Indian Ocean

Atlantic
Ocean

﻿

SOURCE: U.S. Naval Institute News, “USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker,”https://news.usni.org/category/fleet-tracker (accessed August 19, 2021).

l

The Suez Canal. In 2020, more than
19,000 ships transited the Suez Canal,
averaging 51.5 ships each day.108 Considering that the canal itself is 120 miles longbut only 670 feet wide, this is an impressive amount of traffic. The Suez Canal isimportant to Europe because it provides
access to oil from the Middle East. It also
serves as an important strategic asset, as it
is used routinely by the U.S. Navy to move
surface combatants between the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. Thanks to abilateral arrangement between Egypt andthe United States, the U.S. Navy enjoys
priority access to the canal.109

A heritage.org

The journey through the narrow waterway
is no easy task for large surface combatants. The canal was not constructed withthe aim of accommodating 100,000-ton
aircraft carriers and therefore exposesa larger ship to attack. For this reason,
different types of security protocols arefollowed, including the provision of air
support by the Egyptian military.110 These
security protocols, however, are not foolproof. In April 2021, the Suez Canal was
closed for over 11 days after a container
ship blocked the waterway, creating a
360-ship traffic jam that disrupted almost
13 percent of global maritime traffic. This
crisis proves that ever-larger container

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ships transiting strategic choke points areprone to accidents that can lead to massive disruptions of both global maritime
trade and U.S. maritime security.111

﻿

l

l

Strait of Hormuz. According to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration, theStrait of Hormuz, which links the Persian
Gulf with the Arabian Sea and the Gulfof Oman, “is the world’s most importantoil chokepoint because of the large volumes of oil that flow through the strait. In
2018, its daily oil flow averaged 21 million
barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalentof about 21% of global petroleum liquids
consumption.” In addition, “China, India,
Japan, South Korea, and Singapore werethe largest destinations for crude oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz to Asia,
accounting for 65% of all Hormuz crude oiland condensate flows in 2018.”112 Given theextreme narrowness of the passage and its
proximity to Iran, shipping routes throughthe Strait of Hormuz are particularly
vulnerable to disruption. Iran attacked oiltankers repeatedly in May and June 2019and continues to harass U.S. naval ships.113
Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Bab el-­Mandeb Strait is a strategic waterway
located between the Horn of Africa andYemen that links the Red Sea to the Indian
Ocean. Exports from the Persian Gulf andAsia destined for Western markets must
pass through the strait en route to theSuez Canal. Because the Bab el-Mandeb
Strait is 18 miles wide at its narrowest
point, passage is limited to two channels
for inbound and outbound shipments.114

Maritime Prepositioning of Equipment
and Supplies. The U.S. military has deployednoncombatant maritime prepositioning ships(MPS) containing large amounts of militaryequipment and supplies in strategic locations
from which they can reach areas of conflict
relatively quickly as associated U.S. Army orMarine Corps units located elsewhere arrive158

in the area. The British Indian Ocean Territoryof Diego Garcia, an island atoll, hosts the U.S.
Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, which
supports prepositioning ships that can supply
Army or Marine Corps units deployed for contingency operations in the Middle East.

Conclusion
For the foreseeable future, the Middle East
region will remain a key focus for U.S. militaryplanners. Once considered relatively stable,
mainly because of the ironfisted rule of authoritarian regimes, the area is now highly unstable
and a breeding ground for terrorism.
Overall, regional security has deteriorated
in recent years. Even though the Islamic State(or at least its physical presence) appears tohave been defeated, the nature of its successor is unclear. Iraq has restored its territorial
integrity since the defeat of ISIS, but the political situation and future relations between
Baghdad and the U.S. will remain difficult aslong as a government that is sympathetic to
Iran is in power.115 Although the regional dispute with Qatar is now resolved, U.S. relationsin the region will remain complex and difficult
to manage, although this has not stopped the
U.S. military from operating.
Many of the borders created after WorldWar I are under significant stress. In countries like Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, thesupremacy of the nation-state is being challenged by non-state actors that wield influence, power, and resources comparable tothose of small states. The region’s principal
security and political challenges are linked tothe unrealized aspirations of the Arab Spring,surging transnational terrorism, and meddlingby Iran, which seeks to extend its influencein the Islamic world. These challenges are
made more difficult by the Arab–Israeli conflict, Sunni–Shia sectarian divides, the rise of
Iran’s Islamist revolutionary nationalism, andthe proliferation of Sunni Islamist revolutionary groups. COVID-19 has already exacerbatedthese economic, political, and regional crises,
which may destabilize the post-pandemic operational environment for U.S. forces.

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthThanks to its decades of military operations in the Middle East, the U.S. has the triedand-tested procedures needed to operate in
the region. Bases and infrastructure are wellestablished, and the logistical processes formaintaining a large force forward deployed
thousands of miles away from the homeland
are well in place. Moreover, unlike in Europe,
all of these processes have been tested recently in combat. The personal links between
allied armed forces are also present. Joint
training exercises improve interoperability,and U.S. military educational courses thatare regularly attended by officers (and often
royals) from the Middle East provide an opportunity for the U.S. to influence some of theregion’s future leaders.
America’s relationships in the region are
based pragmatically on shared security andeconomic concerns. As long as these issues
remain relevant to both sides, the U.S. is likely
to have an open door to operate in the Middle East when its national interests requirethat it do so.

Scoring the Middle East Operating Environment

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As noted at the beginning of this section, 4. Favorable. A favorable operating envivarious aspects of the region facilitate or inronment includes good infrastructure,
hibit the ability of the U.S. to conduct militarystrong alliances, and a stable political enoperations to defend its vital national interests
vironment. The U.S. military is well placed
against threats. Our assessment of the operfor future operations.
ating environment uses a five-point scale that
ranges from “very poor” to “excellent” condi- 5. Excellent. An extremely favorable
tions and covers four regional characteristics
operating environment includes well-­of greatest relevance to the conduct of miliestablished and well-maintained infratary operations:structure, strong and capable allies, anda stable political environment. The U.S.
1. Very Poor. Significant hurdles exist for
military is exceptionally well placed tomilitary operations. Physical infrastrucdefend U.S. interests.
ture is insufficient or nonexistent, and theregion is politically unstable. In addition,
The key regional characteristics consist of:
the U.S. military is poorly placed or absent,
and alliances are nonexistent or diffuse.
a. Alliances. Alliances are important forinteroperability and collective defense,
2. Unfavorable. A challenging operating
as allies are more likely to lend support
environment for military operations isto U.S. military operations. Indicators
marked by inadequate infrastructure,that provide insight into the strength or
weak alliances, and recurring political inhealth of an alliance include whether thestability. The U.S. military is inadequately
U.S. trains regularly with countries in theplaced in the region.
region, has good interoperability with theforces of an ally, and shares intelligence
3. Moderate. A neutral to moderately favorwith nations in the region.
able operating environment is characterized by adequate infrastructure, a modb. Political Stability. Political stability
erate alliance structure, and acceptablebrings predictability for military planners
levels of regional political stability. The
when considering such things as tranU.S. military is adequately placed.
sit, basing, and overflight rights for U.S.
military operations. The overall degree﻿of political stability indicates whether
U.S. military actions would be hinderedor enabled and reflects, for example,
whether transfers of power are generally
peaceful and whether there have been any
recent instances of political instability
in the region.
c. U.S. Military Positioning. Having military forces based or equipment and supplies staged in a region greatly facilitates
the ability of the United States to respondto crises and, presumably, achieve successin critical “first battles” more quickly. Being routinely present in a region also helps
the U.S. to remain familiar with its characteristics and the various actors that might
either support or try to thwart U.S. actions.
With this in mind, we assessed whether or
not the U.S. military was well positioned
in the region. Again, indicators included
bases, troop presence, prepositioned
equipment, and recent examples of military operations (including training andhumanitarian) launched from the region.
d. Infrastructure. Modern, reliable, andsuitable infrastructure is essential to military operations. Airfields, ports, rail lines,
canals, and paved roads enable the U.S.
to stage, launch, and logistically sustain
combat operations. We combined expert

knowledge of regions with publicly available information on critical infrastructure
to arrive at our overall assessment of
this metric.116
The U.S. has developed an extensive network of bases in the Middle East region andhas acquired substantial operational experience in combatting regional threats. At thesame time, however, many of America’s allies
are hobbled by political instability, economic
problems, internal security threats, and mushrooming transnational threats. Although theregion’s overall score remains “moderate,” as it
was last year, it is in danger of falling to “poor”
because of political instability and growing
bilateral tensions with allies over the security implications of the nuclear agreement with
Iran and how best to fight the Islamic State.
With this in mind, we arrived at these average scores for the Middle East (rounded to thenearest whole number):l

Alliances: 3—ModeratelPolitical Stability: 2—Unfavorablel

U.S. Military Positioning: 3—ModeratelInfrastructure: 3—Moderate
Leading to a regional score of: Moderate

Operating Environment: Middle East
VERY POORUNFAVORABLE

Alliances
Political Stability

MODERATE%%

U.S. Military Posture%

Infrastructure%

OVERALL%

160

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

FAVORABLE

EXCELLENT

Endnotes
For example, during a 1916 meeting in Downing Street, Sir Mark Sykes, Britain’s lead negotiator with the French on carving up the
Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, pointed to the map and told the Prime Minister that for Britain’s sphere of influence in the
Middle East, “I should like to draw a line from the e in Acre [modern-day Israel] to the last k in Kirkuk [modern-day Iraq].” SeeJames Barr, A Line in the Sand: Britain, France, and the Struggle That Shaped the Middle East (London: Simon & Schuster U.K.,
2011), pp. 7–20. See also Margaret McMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2003).

2.

S.B., “What Is the Difference Between Sunni and Shia Muslims?” The Economist, May 29, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/
economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-19/ (accessed May 26, 2021).

3.

Tzvi Joffre, “Iranian Shias Lick, Kiss Shrines in Defiance of Coronavirus Outbreak,” The Jerusalem Post, March 2, 2020, https://www.
jpost.com/middle-east/iranian-shias-lick-kiss-shrines-in-defiance-of-coronavirus-outbreak-619428 (accessed May 26, 2021), andNicole Robinson, “Middle East Coronavirus Data Sketchy, Leaving Populaces to Suffer,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 7,
2020, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/middle-east-coronavirus-data-sketchy-leaving-populaces-suffer.

4.

Sabahat Khan, “MENA’s Youth Bulge Is a Regional Security Challenge,” The Arab Weekly, April 2, 2018, https://thearabweekly.
com/menas-youth-bulge-regional-security-challenge (accessed May 26, 2021).

5.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, “Datagraphs: OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves, 2018,” https://www.
opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm (accessed May 26, 2021).

6.

Table, “The 10 Largest Oil Producers and Share of Total World Oil Production in 2020,” and table, “The 10 Largest Oil Consumers
and Share of Total World Oil Consumption in 2018,” in U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,“Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): What Countries Are the Top Producers and Consumers of Oil?” last updated April 1, 2021,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6 (accessed May 26, 2021).

7.

Martha C. White, “Will Oil’s Price Slump Be Worse for the Economy than the Effects of the Coronavirus?” NBC News,
updated April 22, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/energy/will-oil-s-price-slump-be-worse-economy-effectscoronavirus-n1189001 (accessed May 26, 2021).

8.

Reuters, “Saudi Arabia’s GDP Contracts 3.3% in Q1 on Oil Output, Non-Oil Economy Recovers,” May 10, 2021, https://www.reuters.
com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabias-gdp-contracts-33-q1-oil-output-non-oil-economy-recovers-2021-05-10/ (accessed May 26,2021).

9.

Rabah Arezki and Ha Nguyen, “Coping with a Dual Shock: COVID-19 and Oil Prices,” World Bank Brief, April 14, 2020, https://www.
worldbank.org/en/region/mena/brief/coping-with-a-dual-shock-coronavirus-covid-19-and-oil-prices (accessed May 26, 2021).

10. Oliver Reynolds, “The World’s Top 5 Largest Economies in 2024,” FocusEconomics, February 16, 2021, https://www.focuseconomics.com/blog/the-largest-economies-in-the-world (accessed May 26, 2021), and U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration, “Country Analysis Executive Summary: Japan,” last updated October 2020, https://www.eia.gov/
international/content/analysis/countries_long/Japan/japan.pdf (accessed May 26, 2021).
11. Table 2.4.1, “Middle East and North Africa Forecast Summary,” and Table 2.4.2, “Middle East and North Africa Economy Forecasts,”in World Bank Group, Global Economic Prospects, January 2021, p. 94, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/globaleconomic-prospects (accessed May 26, 2021).
12. James Phillips and Nicole Robinson, “How COVID-19 Exacerbates Lebanon’s Mounting Economic, Political Woes,” April 16, 2020,
https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/how-covid-19-exacerbates-lebanons-mounting-economic-political-woes.
13. See, for example, The Heritage Foundation, “The ‘Arab Spring’: Heritage Foundation Recommendations,” Heritage Foundation
WebMemo No. 3222, April 13, 2011, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/the-arab-spring-heritage-foundationrecommendations.
14. Marwan Muasher, “Is This the Arab Spring 2.0?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Commentary, October 30, 2019,https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/30/is-this-arab-spring-2.0-pub-80220 (accessed May 26, 2021).
15. Najia Houssari, “Disappointed Lebanese Protestors Return to Street Demanding End of Deadlock,” Arab News, April 10, 2021,
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1840806/middle-east (accessed May 26, 2021), and Middle East Eye, “US Warns Pandemic
Could Push Some Middle East Countries to Collapse,” April 15, 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/middle-eastdestabilising-conditions-push-countries-collapse-us-report (accessed May 26, 2021).
16. James Phillips and Nicole Robinson, “Protesters in Iraq Have Legitimate Grievances,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, October
9, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/protesters-iraq-have-legitimate-grievances, and James Phillips andNicole Robinson, “Why Protests Rocking Lebanon Forced out the Prime Minister,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, October 30,
2019, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/why-protests-rocking-lebanon-forced-out-the-prime-minister.

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161

﻿

1.

17. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) Archive and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
Archive,” https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iransanctions/joint-plan-of-action-jpoa-archive-and-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-jcpoa-archive (accessed May 26, 2021).
18. James Phillips, “U.S. Iran Policy After the Demise of the Nuclear Deal,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3335, August 6,
2018, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/us-iran-policy-after-the-demise-the-nuclear-deal, and John Irish and Robin
Emmot, “Europeans Push Last Bid to Salvage Iran Deal, but Work on Plan B,” Reuters, May 3, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-iran-nuclear-europe/europeans-push-last-bid-to-salvage-iran-deal-but-work-on-plan-b-idUSKBN1I42ES (May 26,2021).
19. James Griffiths, Joshua Berlinger, and Sheena McKenzie, “Iranian Leader Announces Partial Withdrawal from Nuclear Deal,” CNN,
updated May 8, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-intl/index.html (accessed May 26, 2021).
20. U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Sanctions Programs and Country Information: Iran Sanctions,” last updated March 5, 2021,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions(accessed May 26, 2021), and Peter Brookes, Brett D. Schaefer, and James Phillips, “Iran Nuclear Deal: Next Steps,” Heritage
Foundation Issue Brief No. 5030, January 29, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/iran-nuclear-deal-next-steps.
21. Robert Berger, “Israel Welcomes Trump’s ‘Bold’ Decision to Leave Iran Deal,” Voice of America, May 9, 2018, https://www.voanews.
com/middle-east/israel-welcomes-trumps-bold-decision-leave-iran-deal (accessed May 26, 2021), and “Saudi Arabia Welcomes
US Withdrawal from Iran Nuclear Deal,” Arab News, updated May 9, 2018, http://www.arabnews.com/node/1299156/saudi-arabia(accessed May 26, 2021).
22. James Phillips, “Biden Must Stand Up to Iran’s Proxy Extortion Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 8, 2021,
https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/biden-must-stand-irans-proxy-extortion-strategy, and James Phillips, “U.S.
Enters Multilateral Minefield in Indirect Nuclear Talks with Iran,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 6, 2021, https://www.
heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/us-enters-multilateral-minefield-indirect-nuclear-talks-iran.

﻿

23. James Phillips, “How U.S. Strike Against Iranian General Changes the Rules of the Game in Iraq, Region,” Heritage Foundation
Commentary, January 5, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/how-us-strike-against-iranian-generalchanges-the-rules-the-game-iraq-region.
24. Sune Engel Rasmussen and Zahra Nader, “Iran Covertly Recruits Afghan Shias to Fight in Syria,” The Guardian, June 30, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/30/iran-covertly-recruits-afghan-soldiers-to-fight-in-syria (accessed May 26,2021).
25. BBC News, “Hague Fury as ‘Iranian Arms’ Bound for Taliban Seized,” March 9, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12694266(accessed May 26, 2021).
26. Chris Massaro, “US Has the Military Might, but Iran Will Lean on Proxies and Militias If They Get Dragged into the Conflict,” Fox
News, May 20, 2019, https://www.foxnews.com/world/us-military-might-iran-proxies-militias-conflict (accessed May 26, 2021);
Bruce Clingan, “Commentary: The U.S. Is Right to Restore Aid to Egypt,” Reuters, July 30, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-clingan-egypt-commentary/commentary-the-u-s-is-right-to-restore-aid-to-egypt-idUSKBN1KK1YE (accessed May 19, 2020);
and Fact Sheet, “Jordan,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, October 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/
download/72076 (accessed May 26, 2021).
27. Peter Brookes and James Phillips, “The Growing Danger of Iran’s Missile Programs,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3605,
April 13, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/the-growing-danger-irans-missile-programs.
28. “Past Month ‘Deadliest on Record’ for Syrian Civilians Killed in US-Led Air Strikes,” The Independent, May 23, 2017, http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-war-us-air-strikes-civilian-death-toll-deadliest-on-record-isis-donaldtrump-a7751911.html (accessed May 26, 2021), and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Syria Emergency,” updated
March 15, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html (accessed May 26, 2021).
29. Les Picker, “Where Are ISIS’s Foreign Fighters Coming From?” National Bureau of Economic Research Digest, June 2016, p. 6,
https://www.nber.org/digest/jun16/jun16.pdf (accessed May 26, 2021).
30. James Phillips, “How the Israel–Bahrain Peace Deal Will Reshape the Middle East,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September
17, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/how-the-israel-bahrain-peace-deal-will-reshape-the-middle-east.
31. James Phillips, “Hamas Exploits Palestinian Unrest to Launch Rocket War Against Israel,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May
12, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/hamas-exploits-palestinian-unrest-launch-rocket-war-against-israel,and BBC News, “Israel–Gaza Ceasefire Holds Despite Jerusalem Clash,” May 21, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-57195537 (accessed May 26, 2021).
32. Luke Coffey and James Phillips, “The Middle East Strategic Alliance: An Uphill Struggle,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5056,
April 7, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/the-middle-east-strategic-alliance-uphill-struggle.

162

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength33. Joshua Meservey, “The Saudi–Qatari Dispute: Why the U.S. Must Prevent Spillover into East Africa,” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 3268, November 29, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/africa/report/the-saudi-qatari-dispute-why-the-us-mustprevent-spillover-east-africa.
34. Tamara Qiblawi, Mohammed Tawfeeq, Elizabeth Roberts, and Hamdi Alkhshali, “Qatar Rift: Saudi, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt Cut
Diplomatic Ties,” CNN, updated July 27, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/middleeast/saudi-bahrain-egypt-uae-qatarterror/index.html (accessed May 26, 2021).
35. Nicole Robinson, “Qatar’s Normalization with Gulf States Could Pave the Way Toward a Secure and Stable Persian Gulf,” Heritage
Foundation Commentary, January 8, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/qatars-normalization-gulf-statescould-pave-the-way-toward-secure-and-stable.
36. Pieter D. Wezeman, “Conventional Strategic Military Capabilities in the Middle East,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium
Background Paper, July 2011, p. 8, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2016-03/Conventional-strategic-military-capabilitiesin-the-Middle-East.pdf (accessed May 27, 2021). Prepared for “EU Seminar to promote confidence building and in support of aprocess aimed at establishing a zone free of WMD and means of delivery in the Middle East,” Brussels, July 6–7, 2011.
37. Isabel Kershner, “9 Things to Know About Jerusalem as U.S. Embassy Opens,” The New York Times, May 13, 2018, https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/05/13/world/middleeast/israel-jerusalem-us-embassy.html (accessed May 27, 2021).
38. Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People, The White House, January 2020, https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf (accessed May 27, 2021).
39. James Phillips, “Palestinians Miss Opportunity by Rejecting Trump Peace Plan,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 31,
2020, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/palestinians-miss-opportunity-rejecting-trump-peace-plan.
40. The GCC was founded in 1981 to offset the threat from Iran, which became hostile to Sunni-led Arab states after its 1979 revolution.
41. Declan Walsh, “Rare Protests Against Egypt’s Leader Erupt in Cairo and Elsewhere,” The New York Times, September 20, 2019,https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/world/middleeast/anti-government-protests-egypt.html (accessed May 27, 2021), andVivian Yee and Nada Rashwan, “Egypt’s Harsh Crackdown Quashes Protest Movement,” The New York Times, October 4, 2019,https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/world/middleeast/egypt-protest-sisi-arrests.html (accessed May 27, 2021).

43. Ibid., p. 9, which specifies that the “[c]ountries included in the estimate are Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.”
44. Nazila Fathi, “Wipe Israel ‘Off the Map’ Iranian Says,” The New York Times, October 27, 2005, http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht-iran.html?_r=0 (accessed May 27, 2021).
45. Ibid.
46. The embargo “limited all U.N. member states from selling weaponry—including battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large
caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems and spare parts—to the Islamic
Republic.” United States Institute of Peace, “U.S. on U.N. Arms Embargo,” The Iran Primer, updated October 21, 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/may/11/part-1-us-arms-embargo (accessed May 27, 2021), and Nasser Karimi, “UN Arms Embargoon Iran Expires,” Defense News, October 19, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2020/10/19/un-armsembargoes-on-iran-expires/ (accessed May 27, 2021).
47. Jewish Institute for National Security of America, Gemunder Center U.S.–Israel Security Policy Project, “Arming Israel to Defeat
Iranian Aggression: Frontloading Weapons Delivery,” November 2019, https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ArmingIsrael-to-Defeat-Iranian-Aggression-1.pdf (accessed May 27, 2021).
48. T. S. Allen, “Here Is How Israel’s Military Dominates the Battlefield,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, February 27, 2018, http://
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/here-how-israels-military-dominates-the-battlefield-24679 (accessed May 27, 2021).
49. See, for example, Gil Press, “6 Reasons Israel Became a Cybersecurity Powerhouse Leading the $82 Billion Industry,” Forbes,
July 18, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2017/07/18/6-reasons-israel-became-a-cybersecurity-powerhouse-leadingthe-82-billion-industry/#d458614420aa (accessed May 27, 2021), and “Israel Is a Small Country, but a Cyber Superpower, Says
Ex-CIA Director at CyberTech 2018,” NoCamels, January 20, 2018, http://nocamels.com/2018/01/israel-cyber-superpower-ciacybertech-2018/ (accessed May 27, 2021).
50. Lynn Adler and Jim Wolf, “Update 1—Israel, U.S. Sign $2.75 Billion F-35 Deal,” Reuters, October 7, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/
article/israel-usa-f-35-idUSN0717986420101008 (accessed May 27, 2021), and “Adir Who? Israel’s F-35i Stealth Fighters,” Defense
Industry Daily, May 5, 2021, https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/israel-plans-to-buy-over-100-f35s-02381/ (accessed May 28, 2021).

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42. Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, and Alexandra Marksteiner, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020,” Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute Fact Sheet, April 2021, p. 12, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/fs_2104_milex_0.pdf (accessed
May 27, 2021).

51. Judah Ari Gross, “IDF Says It Launched Major Offensive on Dozens of Rocket Launch Tubes in Gaza,” The Times of Israel, May 11,
2021, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-launched-major-offensive-on-dozens-of-rocket-launch-tubes-ingaza/ (accessed May 27, 2021).
52. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 363–364.
53. News release, “Lockheed Martin Awarded Contract to Build F-16 Block 70 Aircraft for Bahrain,” Lockheed Martin, June 25, 2018,https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2018-06-25-Lockheed-Martin-Awarded-Contract-to-Build-F-16-Block-70-Aircraft-for-Bahrain?_
ga=2.3223408.1543096780.1588692655-1467716092.1546629521 (accessed May 27, 2021).
54. Reuters, “Qatar Goes Ahead with $6.7 Billion Typhoon Combat Jets Deal with UK’s BAE Systems,” December 10, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-qatar-typhoons/qatar-goes-ahead-with-6-7-billion-typhoon-combat-jets-deal-with-uksbae-systems-idUSKBN1E40QM (accessed May 27, 2021).
55. James Phillips, Nicole Robinson, and John Venable, “F-35 Sale to UAE Advances U.S. Security Interests,” Heritage Foundation
Issue Brief No. 6032, December 10, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/f-35-sale-uae-advances-us-security-interests.
56. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Combined Maritime Forces—U.S. 5th Fleet, “Combined Maritime Forces,” https://www.cusnc.
navy.mil/Combined-Maritime-Forces/ (accessed May 27, 2021).
57. Helene Cooper and Anne Barnard, “Jordan and Emirates Carry out Airstrikes in Syria Against ISIS,” The New York Times, February
10, 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/world/middleeast/united-arab-emirates-resume-airstrikes-against-isis.html (accessed
May 27, 2021).
58. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 334.
59. GlobalSecurity.org, “Egypt Military Guide: Introduction,” last modified April 4, 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/
egypt/intro.htm (accessed May 27, 2021).

﻿

60. Reuters and Jack Khoury, “Isis Claims Responsibility for Attack That Killed 15 Egyptian Military Personnel,” Haaretz, February 16,
2019, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/egypt/15-egyptian-military-personnel-killed-or-wounded-in-sinai-attackarmy-says-1.6938947 (accessed May 27, 2021), and Jason Hanna, Michael Martinez, and Jennifer Deaton, “ISIS Publishes Photoof What It Says Is Bomb that Downed Russian Plane,” CNN, updated November 19, 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/18/
middleeast/metrojet-crash-dabiq-claim/index.html (accessed May 27, 2021).
61. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, pp. 347–348.
62. See, for example, Florence Gaub, “An Unhappy Marriage: Civil–Military Relations in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Carnegie Middle East Center, January 13, 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ACMR-Gaub-final.pdf(accessed May 27, 2021).
63. Reuters, “Iraq Says It Found 50,000 ‘Ghost Soldiers’ on Payroll,” December 1, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-iraq-soldiers-idUSKCN0JF2RZ20141201 (accessed May 27, 2021).
64. Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraq Chooses New Prime Minister, an Ex-Intelligence Chief Backed by U.S.,” The New York Times, May 6, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/world/middleeast/iraq-prime-minister-mustafa-khadimi.html (accessed May 27, 2021),
and Maya Gebeilly, “Ex-Spy Chief Becomes Iraq PM Amid Fiscal, Virus Crises,” Barron’s, May 6, 2020, https://www.barrons.com/
news/iraq-gets-new-government-amid-fiscal-coronavirus-crises-01588805403?tesla=y (accessed May 27, 2021).
65. Ned Parker, Isabel Coles, and Raheem Salman, “Special Report: How Mosul Fell—An Iraqi General Disputes Baghdad’s Story,”
Reuters, October 14, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-gharawi-special-report/special-report-how-mosulfell-an-iraqi-general-disputes-baghdads-story-idUSKCN0I30Z820141014 (accessed May 27, 2021).
66. Tim Arango and Michael R. Gordon, “Iraqi Prime Minister Arrives in Mosul to Declare Victory over ISIS,” The New York Times, July
9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/09/world/middleeast/mosul-isis-liberated.html (accessed May 27, 2021).
67. During 1967 and 1990, South Yemen, officially known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, was a socialist state in thesoutheastern provinces of the present-day Republic of Yemen.
68. U.S. Central Command, “About Us: U.S. Central Command History,” https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/ (accessed May 27, 2021).
69. Ibid.
70. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Englehardt, Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990–1991 Persian
Gulf Crisis, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute Special Report AD-A234 743, March 25, 1991, p. 5, https://apps.dtic.
mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a234743.pdf (accessed May 27, 2021).
71. Associated Press, “A Timeline of Iraq War, Troop Levels,” Internet Archive, updated May 25, 2011, https://web.archive.org/
web/20141023033147/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/04/07/a-timeline-of-iraq-war-tr_n_95534.html (accessed May 27, 2021).

164

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength72. BBC News, “Iraq War in Figures,” December 14, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11107739 (accessed May 27,2021).
73. Reuters, “Timeline: Invasion, Surge, Withdrawal; U.S. Forces in Iraq,” December 18, 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraqusa-pullout/timeline-invasion-surge-withdrawal-u-s-forces-in-iraq-idUSTRE7BH08E20111218 (accessed May 27, 2021).
74. Christopher M. Blanchard, “Iraq and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. 10404, updated April 9, 2020,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10404/26 (accessed May 28, 2021).
75. Christopher M. Blanchard, “Iraq and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. 10404, updated December 6, 2020,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10404 (accessed May 28, 2021).
76. Gordon Lubold and Michael C. Bender, “U.S. to Remove Patriot Missile Batteries from Saudi Arabia,” The Wall Street Journal,
updated May 7, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-remove-patriot-missile-batteries-from-saudi-arabia-11588867916(accessed May 27, 2021).
77. Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas, “U.S.–Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45795, updated May 8, 2020, p. 13, https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/mideast/R45795.pdf (accessed May 27, 2021).
78. Matthew Wallin, “U.S. Bases and Military Facilities in the Middle East,” American Security Project Fact Sheet, June 2018, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Ref-0213-US-Military-Bases-and-Facilities-Middle-East.pdf(accessed May 27, 2021).
79. Kenneth Katzman, “Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members andCommittees of Congress No. RS21513, updated December May 12, 2021, pp. 8–11, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21513.pdf(accessed May 27, 2021).
80. Kenneth Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members
and Committees of Congress No. RS21852, updated April 15, 2021, pp. 16–18, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/
RS21852 (accessed May 27, 2021).
81. Kenneth Katzman, “Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members andCommittees of Congress No. RS21534, updated May 19, 2021, p. 14, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21534(accessed May 27, 2021).

83. Press release, “DOD Statement on Deployment of Additional U.S. Forces and Equipment to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,”
U.S. Department of Defense, October 11, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1987575/dodstatement-on-deployment-of-additional-us-forces-and-equipment-to-the-kingdo/ (accessed May 13, 2021).
84. Lubold and Bender, “U.S. to Remove Patriot Missile Batteries from Saudi Arabia.”
85. Captain Marie Harnley, “Wing Leadership Visits Eskan Village,” U.S. Air Forces Central Command, July 5, 2013, http://www.afcent.
af.mil/Units/379thAirExpeditionaryWing/News/Display/tabid/5382/Article/350180/wing-leadership-visits-eskan-village.aspx(accessed May 13, 2021).
86. Kenneth Katzman, “Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members andCommittees of Congress, April 7, 2021, pp.13-14, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44533 (accessed May 13, 2021).
87. U.S. Army Central, “Eager Lion,” STAND-TO! The Official Focus of the U.S. Army, April 11, 2018, https://www.army.mil/standto/2018-04-11 (accessed May 27, 2021).
88. Jeremy M. Sharp, “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committeesof Congress No. RL33546, updated June 18, 2020, p. 10, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33546 (accessed May
27, 2021), quoting “President Trump’s June 2020 War Powers Resolution Report to Congress.”
89. U.S. Central Command, “About Us: CENTCOM Mission and Command Priorities,” https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/ (accessed
May 27, 2021).
90. Louisa Brook-Holland, “UK Forces in the Middle East Region,” House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No. 08794, January 14,
2020, p. 2, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8794/CBP-8794.pdf (accessed May 27, 2021).
91. Ibid., p. 3.
92. Malak Harb, “U.K. Opens Persian Gulf Military Base in Bahrain,” Associated Press, April 5, 2018, https://apnews.com/
article/403eea90b7054edaa978c0e51fd182c4 (accessed May 27, 2021).

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82. Kenneth Katzman, “Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members andCommittees of Congress No. RS95-1013, updated April 20, 2021, pp. 11–15, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/95-1013(accessed May 27, 2021).

93. U.K. Ministry of Defence and The Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Fallon, MP, “Multi-Million Pound Joint Venture Announced Between Britain
and Oman,” March 30, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/multi-million-pound-joint-venture-announced-betweenbritain-and-oman (accessed May 27, 2021).
94. Frank Gardner, “‘East of Suez’: Are UK Forces Returning?” BBC News, April 29, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-22333555(accessed May 27, 2021).
95. Harriet Alexander, “Where Are the World’s Major Military Bases?” The Telegraph, July 11, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/defence/10173740/Where-are-the-worlds-major-military-bases.html (accessed May 27, 2021).
96. Government of France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “Country Files: United Arab Emirates,” updated May 14, 2019,https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/united-arab-emirates/# (accessed May 27, 2021), and International Institute forStrategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 348.
97. Shawn Snow, “Training in Iraq Halted, Smaller Bases Consolidating[,] Some Coalition Troops Homeward Bound over COVID-19
Concerns,” Military Times, March 20, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/03/20/training-in-iraqhalted-smaller-bases-consolidating-some-coalition-troops-homeward-bound-over-covid-19-concerns/ (accessed May 27,2021), and Associated Press, “France Pulls out Military Forces in Iraq amid Virus Demands,” March 25, 2020, https://apnews.
com/77a45e7c9a6fb44d6e19c90f9a8ad2c6 (accessed May 27, 2021).
98. French Defense Attaché Office, Washington D.C., “French Armed Forces Update,” February 2021, https://franceintheus.org/IMG/
pdf/FAFU/FAFU_007b.pdf (accessed May 27, 2021).
99. James Hirst, “UK to Increase Military Training Presence in Iraq,” Forces.Net, February 18, 2021, https://www.forces.net/news/iraq/
uk-increase-military-training-presence-iraq (accessed May 27, 2021).
100. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Today in Energy: The Bab el-Mandeb Strait Is a Strategic Routefor Oil and Natural Gas Shipments,” August 27, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073 (accessed May 27,2021).
101. U.S. Navy, Commander, Navy Installations Command, “Welcome to Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Installation Information,” https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnreurafcent/installations/camp_lemonnier_djibouti.html (accessed May 27, 2021).

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102. Associated Press, “The New Military Powerhouse on the Red Sea: Tiny Djibouti,” Haaretz, April 10, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/
middle-east-news/the-new-military-powerhouse-on-the-red-sea-tiny-djibouti-1.5990505 (accessed May 27, 2021).
103. Donna Miles, “Centcom Undertakes Massive Logistical Drawdown in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Press Service, June 21, 2013, inDefense Acquisition University, Defense AT&L In the News, September–October 2013, pp. 6–9, https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/DATLFiles/Sep-Oct2013/In%20the%20News.pdf (accessed May 27, 2021).
104. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Country Comparisons—Roadways,” in The World Factbook 2018, https://www.cia.gov/theworld-factbook/field/roadways/country-comparison/ (accessed May 26, 2021).
105. Katzman, “Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy,” pp. 17–18, and Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S.
Policy,” p. 19.
106. Katzman, “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy,” p. 18.
107. Katzman, “Oman: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy,” p. 15.
108. Theo Leggett, “Analysis,” in BBC News, “Egypt’s Suez Canal Blocked by Huge Container Ship,” March 24, 2021, https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-56505413#:~:text=The%20ship%20has%20the%20capacity,of%2051.5%20ships%20per%20day(accessed May 26, 2021).
109. Michael Wahid Hanna, “Getting over Egypt: Time to Rethink Relations,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2015, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/getting-over-egypt (accessed May 26, 2021).
110. Associated Press, “US Carrier Crosses Suez Canal into Red Sea,” The Times of Israel, November 8, 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.
com/us-carrier-crosses-suez-canal-into-red-sea/ (accessed May 26, 2021).
111. Brent Sadler, “What the Closing of the Suez Canal Says About U.S. Maritime Security,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 12,
2021, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/what-the-closing-the-suez-canal-says-about-us-maritime-security.
112. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Today in Energy: The Strait of Hormuz Is the World’s Most
Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” June 20, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39932 (accessed June 1,2021).
113. Janae Diaz and James Di Pane, “Iran Is Targeting the Strait of Hormuz. The World Needs to Take Heed,” Heritage Foundation
Commentary, October 22, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/iran-targeting-the-strait-hormuz-theworld-needs-take-heed.

166

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength114. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Today in Energy: Three Important Oil Trade Chokepoints Are
Located Around the Arabian Peninsula,” August 4, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32352 (accessed May
26, 2021).
115. Seth J. Frantzman, “Is Iran’s Influence in Iraq Growing, or Has It Reached a Plateau?” The Jerusalem Post, January 2, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Is-Irans-influence-in-Iraq-growing-or-has-it-reached-a-plateau-576104 (accessed May 26, 2021).
116. See, for example, World Bank, “Logistics Performance Index: Quality of Trade and Transport-Related Infrastructure (1=Low to
5=High),” 2007–2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/lp.lpi.infr.xq (accessed May 26, 2021).

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Asia
Jeff Smith, Dean Cheng, Bruce Klingner, and Walter Lohman

ElChina (third);lJapan (fourth);lSouth Korea (sixth);lVietnam (eighth);lIndia (ninth);l

Taiwan (11th); andlMalaysia (14th).1

Disruption in Asia can affect the production of goods like cars, aircraft, and computers
around the world as well as the global financial
system. The COVID-19 pandemic that originated in China and swept through the worldin 2020, for example, has wreaked havoc on
the global economy, disrupting supply chainsand defense budgets across the region, and has
led to the cancellation of several series of military exercises.
Asia is of more than just economic concern,
however. Several of the world’s largest militaries are in Asia, including those of China, India,
North and South Korea, Pakistan, Russia, andVietnam. The United States also maintains
a network of treaty alliances and security
partnerships, as well as a significant militarypresence, in Asia, and five Asian states (China,
North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Russia) possess nuclear weapons.
The region is a focus of American security
concerns both because of the presence of substantial military forces and because of its legacy of conflict. Both of the two major “hot” wars
fought by the United States during the Cold
War (Korea and Vietnam) were fought in Asia.
Moreover, the Asian security environmentis unstable. For one thing, the Cold War has
not ended in Asia. Of the four states divided

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military169﻿ver since the founding of the American
Republic, Asia has been a key U.S. area ofinterest for both economic and security reasons. One of the first ships to sail under an
American flag was the aptly named Empress ofChina, which inaugurated America’s participation in the lucrative China trade in 1784. In
the more than 235 years since then, the United States has held to the strategic assumptionthat allowing any single nation to dominate
Asia would be inimical to American interests.
Asia is too important a market and too great asource of key resources for the United States
to be denied access. Thus, beginning with U.S.
Secretary of State John Hay’s “Open Door”
policy toward China in the 19th century, theUnited States has worked to prevent the riseof a regional hegemon in Asia, whether it was
imperial Japan or the Soviet Union.
In the 21st century, Asia’s importance tothe United States will continue to grow. Asia
is a key source of vital natural resources and a
crucial part of the global value chain in areas
like electronic components. As of March 2021,
seven of America’s top 15 trading partners
were found in Asia:between Communism and democracy by theCold War, three (China, Korea, and Vietnam)
are in Asia. Neither the Korean situation nor
the China–Taiwan situation was resolved despite the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapseof the Soviet Union.
The Cold War itself was an ideologicalconflict layered atop long-standing—andstill lingering—­historical animosities. Asia
is home to several major territorial disputes, among them:
l

l

l

l

﻿

l

l

l

Northern Territories/Southern Kurils(Japan and Russia);
Senkakus/Diaoyutai/Diaoyu Dao (Japan,
China, and Taiwan);
Dok-do/Takeshima (Korea and Japan);
Paracels/Xisha Islands (Vietnam, China,
and Taiwan);
Spratlys/Nansha Islands (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and thePhilippines);
Kashmir (India and Pakistan); andAksai Chin and parts of the Indian state ofArunachal Pradesh (India and China).

Even the various names applied to the disputed territories reflect fundamental differences in point of view, as each state uses different names when referring to the disputed
areas. Similarly, different names are applied
to the various major bodies of water: for example, “East Sea” or “Sea of Japan” and “Yellow Sea” or “West Sea.” China and India do
not even agree on the length of their disputed
border, with Chinese estimates as low as 2,000
kilometers and Indian estimates generally inthe mid-3,000s.
These disputes over names also reflect thebroader tensions rooted in historical animosities that still scar the region. Most notably, Japan’s actions leading up to and during World170

War II remain a major source of controversy,
particularly in China and South Korea wheredebates over issues such as what should beincorporated in textbooks and governmental
statements prevent old wounds from healing.
Similarly, a Chinese claim that much of the
Korean Peninsula was once Chinese territory
aroused reactions in both Koreas. The end of
the Cold War did little to resolve any of theseunderlying disagreements.
It is in this light and in light of the reluctanceof many states in the region to align with great
powers that one should consider the lack of apolitical–security architecture. There is no
Asian equivalent of NATO despite an ultimately
failed mid-20th century effort to forge a parallel
multilateral security architecture through theSoutheast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
Regional security entities like the Five Power
Defense Arrangement (involving the United
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia,
and Singapore in an “arrangement” rather thanan alliance) or discussion forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and groupings likethe ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus(ADMM-Plus) have been far weaker. There also
is no Asian equivalent of the Warsaw Pact.
Instead, Asian security has been marked
by a combination of bilateral alliances, mostly centered on the United States, and individual nations’ efforts to maintain their own
security. In recent years, these core aspectsof the regional security architecture havebeen supplemented by “minilateral” consultations like the U.S.–Japan–Australia andIndia–­Japan–­Australia trilaterals and the U.S.–
Japan–­Australia–India quadrilateral security
dialogue popularly known as “the Quad.”
Nor is Asia undergirded by any significant
economic architecture. Despite substantial
trade and expanding value chains among thevarious Asian states, as well as with the restof the world, formal economic integration islimited. There is no counterpart to the European Union or even to the European Economic Community, just as there is no parallel with
the European Coal and Steel Community, theprecursor to European economic integration.

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthImportant Alliances andBilateral Relations in Asia
The keys to America’s position in the Western Pacific are its alliances with Japan, theRepublic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines,
Thailand, and Australia, supplemented byvery close security relationships with New
Zealand and Singapore, an emerging strategic
partnership with India, and evolving relationships with regional partners in Southeast Asia
like Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The U.S.
also has a robust unofficial relationship with
Taiwan. In South Asia, American relationships
with Afghanistan and Pakistan are critical toregional peace and security.
The United States also benefits from the interoperability gained from sharing common
weapons and systems with many of its allies.
Many nations, for example, have equipped
their ground forces with M-16/M-4–based infantry weapons and share the same 5.56 mm

ammunition; they also field F-15 and F-16
combat aircraft and employ LINK-16 data
links among their naval forces. Australia, Japan, and South Korea are partners in production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; Australia
and Japan have already taken delivery of aircraft, and South Korea is due to take delivery
soon. Partners like India and Australia operate
American-­made P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft and C-17 transport aircraft.
Consequently, in the event of conflict, theregion’s various air, naval, and even land forces would be able to share information in such
key areas as air defense and maritime domainawareness. This advantage is further expandedby the constant ongoing range of both bilateral and multilateral exercises, which acclimate
various forces to operating together and familiarize both American and local commanders
with each other’s standard operating procedures (SOPs), as well as training, tactics, and(in some cases) war plans. In addition, “enabling” military agreements allow the UnitedStates and several of its regional partners toaccess each other’s military facilities, share
intelligence and encrypted communications
and equipment, and refuel each other’s warships at sea.
While it does not constitute a formal alliance, in November 2017, Australia, Japan, India, and the U.S. reconstituted the Quad. Officials from the four countries agreed to meetin the quadrilateral format twice a year to
discuss ways to strengthen strategic cooperation and combat common threats. In 2019, thegroup held its first meeting at the ministerial
level and added a counterterrorism tabletop
exercise to its agenda. In 2020, officials fromthe four countries participated in a series ofconference calls to discuss responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic that also included government representatives from New Zealand,South Korea, and Vietnam. In 2021, the leaders of the four nations held a virtual summit,
marking a new level of interaction.
Japan. The U.S.–Japan defense relationship is the linchpin of America’s network of relations in the Western Pacific. The U.S.–JapanThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military171

﻿

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) is a far looser agglomeration of disparate states, although they have succeeded in
expanding economic linkages among themselves over the past 50 years through a rangeof economic agreements like the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA). Less important to regional
stability has been the South Asia Associationof Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The
SAARC is largely ineffective, both because of
the lack of regional economic integration andbecause of the historical rivalry between India
and Pakistan.
With regard to Asia-wide free trade agreements, the 11 countries remaining in theTrans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) after U.S.
withdrawal subsequently modified and signed
it. The Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership—the ASEAN-centric agreementthat includes China, Japan, South Korea, India,
Australia, and New Zealand—has gone through25 rounds of negotiations. When fully implemented, these agreements will help to remedy
the lack of regional economic integration.

﻿

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,
signed in 1960, provides for a deep alliance between two of the world’s largest economies andmost sophisticated military establishments.
Changes in Japanese defense policies are now
enabling an even greater level of cooperation
on security issues, both between the two allies
and with other countries in the region.
Since the end of World War II, Japan’s defense policy has been distinguished by Article
9 of the Japanese constitution, which statesin part that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nationand the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”2 In effect, thisarticle prohibits the use of force by Japan’s
governments as an instrument of national
policy. It also has led to several other associated policies.
One such policy was a prohibition against“collective self-defense.” Japan recognized thatnations have a right to employ their armed
forces to help other states defend themselves(i.e., to engage in collective defensive operations) but rejected that policy for itself: Japan would employ its forces only in defenseof Japan. This changed in 2015. The U.S. andJapan revised their defense cooperation guidelines, and the Japanese passed legislation thatenables their military to exercise limited collective self-defense in certain cases involving
threats to both the U.S. and Japan, as well as inmultilateral peacekeeping operations.
In recent years, Japan has increased its
security cooperation with other Indo-Pacificdemocracies. This has included enhancing security agreements, participating in more multilateral military exercises, and providing ships
to Southeast Asian coast guard forces.
Tokyo relies heavily on the United States
for its security. In particular, it depends on
the United States to deter both conventionaland nuclear attacks on the home islands. The
combination of the pacifist constitution andJapan’s past (the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which ended World War
II in the Pacific) has forestalled much public
interest in obtaining an independent nuclear

172

deterrent. Similarly, throughout the Cold War,Japan relied on America’s conventional andnuclear commitment to deter Soviet and Chinese aggression.
As part of its relationship with Japan, theUnited States maintains some 54,000 military
personnel and another 8,000 Department of
Defense (DOD) civilian employees in Japan
under the rubric of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ).3
These forces include, among other things, aforward-­deployed carrier battle group centeredon the USS Ronald Reagan; an amphibious
ready group at Sasebo centered on the LHA-6
America, an aviation-optimized amphibious
assault ship; and the bulk of the Third Marine
Expeditionary Force (III MEF) on Okinawa.
U.S. forces exercise regularly with their Japanese counterparts, and this collaboration has
expanded in recent years from air and naval
exercises to include joint amphibious exercises.
The American presence is supported bya substantial American defense infrastructure throughout Japan, including Okinawa.
These major bases provide key logistical andcommunications support for U.S. operations
throughout the Western Pacific, cutting travel time substantially compared with deployments from Hawaii or the West Coast of theUnited States. They also provide key listening
posts with which to monitor Russian, Chinese,and North Korean military operations. This capability is supplemented by Japan’s growing
array of space systems, including new reconnaissance satellites.
The Japanese government “pays roughly $2
billion per year to defray the cost of stationing
U.S. military personnel in Japan.”4 These funds
cover approximately 75 percent of the cost of
deployed U.S. forces,5 including utility and labor costs at U.S. bases, improvements to U.S.
facilities in Japan, and the cost of relocating
training exercises away from populated areasin Japan. Japan paid nearly all of the cost of
new U.S. military facilities at Futenma andIwakuni, as well as a third of the cost of new
facilities in Guam. Japan purchases 90 percent
of its weapons and defense systems from theUnited States.6

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengththe North Korean nuclear and missile threat.
The Moon Jae-in administration relented andmaintained the agreement, but there was public criticism of U.S. pressure.
Republic of Korea. The United States andthe Republic of Korea signed their Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. That treaty codified therelationship that had grown from the Korean
War, when the United States dispatched troops
to help South Korea defend itself against invasion by Communist North Korea. Since
then, the two states have forged an enduring
alliance supplemented by a substantial tradeand economic relationship that includes a free
trade agreement.
The U.S. is committed to maintaining
28,500 troops on the Korean Peninsula. This
presence is centered mainly on the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, rotating brigade combat teams,
and a significant number of combat aircraft.
The U.S.–ROK defense relationship involves one of the more integrated and complex
command-and-control structures. A United
Nations Command (UNC) established in 1950
was the basis for the American intervention
and remained in place after the armistice wassigned in 1953. UNC has access to a number ofbases in Japan to support U.N. forces in Korea.
In concrete terms, however, it oversaw only
South Korean and American forces as othernations’ contributions were gradually withdrawn or reduced to token elements.
In 1978, operational control of frontline
South Korean and American military forces passed from UNC to Combined Forces
Command (CFC). Headed by the American
Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who is also
Commander, U.N. Command, CFC reflects
an unparalleled degree of U.S.–South Korean military integration. Similarly, the system
of Korean Augmentees to the United States
Army (KATUSA), which places South Korean
soldiers into American units assigned to Korea,
allows for an atypical degree of tactical-level
integration and cooperation.
Under current command arrangements for
the U.S. and ROK militaries, CFC would exercise operational control (OPCON) of all forces

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﻿

During bilateral Special Measures Agreement negotiations, the Trump Administration
sought a 400 percent increase in Japanese contributions for renumeration above the cost of
stationing U.S. troops in Japan. In April 2021,
the Biden Administration signed a one-year
extension of the existing agreement, freezing
Japanese contributions at the current level, toallow for continued negotiations.
The United States has long sought to expand Japanese participation in international security affairs. Japan’s political system,
grounded in the country’s constitution, legal
decisions, and popular attitudes, has generally resisted this effort. Similarly, attempts
to expand Japan’s range of defense activities,
especially away from the home islands, haveoften been vehemently opposed by Japan’s
neighbors, especially China and South Korea,
because of unresolved differences on issues
ranging from territorial claims and boundaries to historical grievances, including visits by
Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine, a controversial memorial to Japan’s war dead that
includes some who are deemed war criminals
for their conduct in World War II. Even with
the incremental changes allowing for broader
Japanese defense contributions, these issues
will doubtless continue to constrain Japan’scontributions to the alliance.
These historical issues have been serious
enough to torpedo efforts to improve defense
cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo. South
Korean–Japanese relations took a major downturn in 2018 when the South Korean Supreme
Court ruled that Japanese companies could
be forced to pay occupation reparations. In
December 2018, an incident between a South
Korean naval ship and Japanese air force plane
further exacerbated tensions. Japan responded in July 2019 by imposing restrictions onexports to South Korea of three chemicals
that are critical to the production of semiconductors and smartphones.7 Seoul then threatened to withdraw from the bilateral General
Security of Military Information Agreement(GSOMIA), which enables the sharing of classified intelligence and military information on﻿on the peninsula in time of war; peacetime control rests with respective national authorities,
although the U.S. exercises peacetime OPCON
over non-U.S., non-ROK forces located on
the peninsula.
In 2003, South Korean President Roh
Moo-hyun, as agreed with the U.S., began totransfer wartime operational control from
CFC to South Korean commanders, thereby
establishing the ROK military as fully independent of the United States. This decisionengendered significant opposition within
South Korea and raised serious military questions about the transfer’s impact on unity ofcommand. Faced with various North Korean provocations, including a spate of missile tests as well as attacks on South Korean
military forces and territory in 2010, Washington and Seoul agreed in late 2014 to postpone wartime OPCON transfer and adopt a
conditions-based rather than timeline-based
policy. President Moon Jae-in has advocatedfor an expedited OPCON transition before
the end of his administration in 2021, but
critical prerequisite conditions, including
improvement in South Korean forces and adecrease in North Korea’s nuclear program,
have yet to be met.8
The domestic political constraints underwhich South Korea’s military operates areless stringent than those that govern the operations of the Japanese military. South Korea has fought alongside the United States inevery conflict since the Korean War. Seoul
sent 300,000 troops to the Vietnam War, and
5,000 of its soldiers were killed. At one point,
it fielded the third-largest troop contingent in
Iraq after the United States and Britain. It also
has conducted anti-piracy operations off thecoast of Somalia and has participated in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, East Timor,and elsewhere.
South Korean defense planning remains focused on North Korea, especially as Pyongyang
has deployed its forces in ways that optimize asouthward advance and has carried out several
penetrations of ROK territory by ship, submarine, commandos, and drones. The sinking of174

the South Korean frigate Cheonan and shelling of Yongpyeong-do in 2010, which together
killed 48 military personnel, wounded 16, andkilled two civilians, have only heightened concerns about North Korea.
Over the past several decades, the Americanpresence on the peninsula has slowly declined.
In the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon
withdrew the 7th Infantry Division, leaving
only the 2nd Infantry Division on the peninsula. Those forces have been positioned farther
back so that there are now few Americans deployed on the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
Traditionally, U.S. military forces have engaged regularly in major exercises with their
ROK counterparts, including the Key Resolve
and Foal Eagle series, both of which involved
the deployment of substantial numbers of forces and were intended partly to deter Pyongyang as well as to give U.S. and ROK forces achance to practice operating together. However, after the 2018 U.S.–North Korean Summit,
President Donald Trump announced unilaterally that he was cancelling major bilateral military exercises because he thought they were
provocative and expensive.9 This decision wasmade without consulting the DOD, U.S. Forces
Korea, or allies South Korea and Japan. During
the next two years, the U.S. and South Korea
cancelled numerous exercises and imposedconstraints on additional exercises.
North Korea did not reciprocate with any
diplomatic gesture or military constraints
in response to the unilateral U.S. concession.
The outbreak of COVID-19 in South Korea in2020 led to additional curtailment of training
activity, risking further degradation of allied
deterrence and defense capabilities.
The ROK government provides substantial
resources to defray the costs of U.S. Forces Korea. The bilateral, cost-sharing Special Measures Agreement has offset the non-personnel
costs of stationing U.S. forces in South Korea
since 1991 and is renegotiated every five years.
In February 2019, South Korea agreed to increase its share of the cost to $924 million, an
increase of approximately 8 percent. Later in
2019, President Trump demanded a fivefold

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthdeployment periods throughout the East
Asian littoral.
These bases, being reminders of the colonialera, were often centers of controversy. In 1991,
a successor to the Military Bases Agreement
between the U.S. and the Philippines was submitted to the Philippine Senate for ratification.
After a lengthy debate, the Philippines rejected
the treaty, thereby compelling American withdrawal from Philippine bases. Given the effectsof the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo, which
devastated Clark Air Base and damaged many
Subic Bay facilities, and the end of the Cold
War, it was not felt that closure of the bases
would fundamentally damage America’s posture in the region.
Moreover, despite the closing of the American bases and consequent slashing of American military assistance, U.S.–Philippine military relations remained close, and assistancebegan to increase again after 9/11 as U.S. forces
supported Philippine efforts to counter Islamic terrorist groups, including the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG), in the South of the archipelago.
From 2002–2015, the U.S. rotated 500–600
special operations forces regularly throughthe Philippines to assist in counterterrorism
operations. That operation, Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF–P),
ended during the first part of 2015.
The U.S. presence in Mindanao continued
at a reduced level until the Trump Administration, alarmed by the terrorist threat there,
began Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines(OPE-P). The presence of 200–300 American
advisers proved very valuable to the Philippines in its 2017 battle against Islamist insurgents in Marawi,11 and these advisers remain
there as part of a continuing advise-and-assist
mission. The operation’s final quarterly report
describes its activities:
Through ISR support, U.S. forces aim tofacilitate AFP and Philippines National
Police (PNP) ground operations in areas
with high concentrations of terrorist
targets. This included helping the AFP
develop six target packages. Of these,

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﻿increase of $5 billion a year and threatened toreduce or remove U.S. forces from South Korea. In April 2021, the Biden Administration
signed an agreement accepting an incremental increase in Seoul’s contribution in line withprevious agreements, defusing tensions within
the alliance.
South Korea spends 2.6 percent of its grossdomestic product (GDP) on defense—more
than is spent by any European ally. Seoul absorbs costs not covered in the cost-sharing
agreement, including paying $10 billion, or
93 percent, of the cost of constructing Camp
Humphreys, the largest U.S. base on foreignsoil. During the past four years, South Korea
has purchased $13 billion in arms from theUnited States.10
The Philippines. America’s oldest defense
relationship in Asia is with the Philippines. The
United States seized the Philippines from the
Spanish more than a century ago as a result of
the Spanish–American War and a subsequent
conflict with Philippine indigenous forces. Unlike other colonial powers, however, the U.S.
put in place a mechanism for the Philippines togain its independence, transitioning through aperiod as a commonwealth until the archipelago received full independence in 1946. Just as
important, substantial numbers of Filipinos
fought alongside the United States against Japan in World War II, establishing a bond between the two peoples. Following World War
II and after assisting the newly independent
Filipino government against the Communist
Hukbalahap movement in the 1940s, the United States and the Philippines signed a mutual
defense treaty (MDT).
For much of the period between 1898 andthe end of the Cold War, the largest Americanbases in the Pacific were in the Philippines,
centered on the U.S. Navy base in Subic Bay
and the complex of airfields that developedaround Clark Field (later Clark Air Base).
While the Philippines have never had the ability to provide substantial financial support for
the American presence, the unparalleled baseinfrastructure provided replenishment andrepair facilities and substantially extended﻿

the AFP took action against four targets
on Mindanao and in the Sulu archipelago.
U.S. military personnel conducted two advise and assist missions to help clear violent extremists in western Mindanao thisquarter, conducted four subject matterexchanges, and assisted two local medical staffs with patient assessments andtransfers, according to U.S. Special Operations Command–Pacific (SOCPAC).12

This on-the-ground assistance and other U.S. military activity have continued eventhough the future legal basis for the U.S. presence is uncertain. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that serves to operationalize thealliance was extended indefinitely in July 2021
with the retraction of the termination noticethat President Duterte first issued in February 2000. It had been renewed on a six-monthrolling basis. The VFA is now on stronger footing. It remains controversial in the Philippines,
however, and could re-emerge as a politicalissue. The VFA is an instrument of the MDT.
It comprises the procedures governing the deployment of U.S. forces and equipment to thePhilippines. It also governs the applicationof domestic Philippine law to U.S. personnel,
which is the most substantive part of the VFA
and historically its most controversial.
The VFA undergirds approximately 280
U.S.–Philippine annual exercises. If it is terminated as scheduled, the arrangements foreach of these exercises or groups of exercises
will have to be negotiated individually. The U.S.
conducts exercises with militaries throughout
Southeast Asia on this basis, but not as manyas it does with the Philippines. The loss of the
VFA will slow their rate, condition their composition, and expose each element to politicalpressures in the Philippines. It will inhibit
plans to implement base improvement andsharing arrangements under the 2014 U.S.–
Philippine Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA), and it will complicate situations in which the U.S. must respond quickly
in collaboration with Philippine forces, as in
the case of Marawi in 2017.

176

Beyond the insurgency threat, the U.S. government has long made it clear that any attack
on Philippine government ships or aircraft oron the Philippine armed forces—for example,by China—would be covered under the MDT
treaty.13 This makes it incumbent on the U.S.,
consistent with its constitutional procedures,to come to the defense of the Philippines. U.S.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken has madethis commitment explicit in two separate
calls with the Philippine Secretary of Foreign
Affairs.14 Termination of the VFA will makethis more difficult at a time of increasing Chinese pressure on claims and territories under the jurisdiction of the Philippines in theSouth China Sea.
The history of U.S.–Philippines defense ties
illustrates both Philippine vulnerability andthe relationship’s resilience. In fact, the U.S.
and the Philippines continue to work productively through political difficulties in their relationship. Termination of the VFA would be asetback to that effort, but both the long historyof U.S.–Philippines collaboration and the vagaries of domestic politics offer hope for a solution that will continue to facilitate close military cooperation between the two countries.
Thailand. The U.S.–Thai security relationship is built on the 1954 Manila Pact, which
established the now-defunct SEATO, and the1962 Thanat–Rusk agreement.15 These were
supplemented by the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai–U.S. Defense Alliance.16 In
addition, Thailand gained improved access toAmerican arms sales in 2003 when it was designated a “major, non-NATO ally.”
Thailand’s central location has made it animportant component of the network of U.S. alliances in Asia. During the Vietnam War, American aircraft based in Thailand ranged fromfighter-bombers and B-52s to reconnaissanceaircraft. In the first Gulf War and again in the
Iraq War, some of those same air bases were
essential for the rapid deployment of American forces to the Persian Gulf. Access to thesebases remains critical to U.S. global operations.
U.S. and Thai forces exercise together regularly, most notably in the annual Cobra Gold2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengththe military alliance, the founding documentsof which can seem anachronistic when readalone. There are some indications that the
Biden Administration may not share this priority,22 particularly in light of a re-energizeddemocracy movement and the government’s
repression of it.
Geopolitically, amid uncertainty in the U.S.
disposition, Thailand has been drifting fromthe U.S. and toward China. This process, underway since the end of the Vietnam War, hasbeen accelerating partly because of expanding
economic relations between the two states. Relations, however, are also expanding becauseof the complications in U.S.–Thai relations
arising from the political situation in Thailand
and a general difference in threat perception
concerning China. The U.S. considers China its
greatest long-term security challenge. Thailand has no such concern.
Relations between the Thai and Chinese
militaries have improved steadily over theyears. Intelligence officers began formal
meetings in 1988. Thai and Chinese militaryforces have engaged in joint naval exercises
since 2005, joint counterterrorism exercises
since 2007, and joint marine exercises since2010 and conducted their first joint air force
exercises in 2015.23 The Thais conduct morebilateral exercises with the Chinese than any
other military in Southeast Asia.24
The Thais also have been buying Chinese
military equipment for many years. Purchases
in recent years have included significant buys
of battle tanks and armored personnel carriers.25 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from2006–2020, China has been a bigger supplierthan the U.S., behind only Sweden.26 Among
its latest purchases, the acquisition of threesubmarines is currently stalled at just one
by a combination of budget restraints, thepriority of COVID-19 response, and public
protest.27 Submarines could be particularly
critical to Sino–Thai relations because the attendant training and maintenance will requirea greater Chinese military presence at Thai
military facilities.

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﻿

exercises, initiated in 1982. This builds on apartnership that began with the dispatch ofThai forces to the Korean War, during whichmore than 1,200 Thai troops died out of some
6,000 deployed. The Cobra Gold exercise is theworld’s longest-running international military
exercise in the world,17 and one of its largest.
The 39th iteration, conducted in 2020, was thebiggest to date,18 and involved close to 10,000
troops from seven countries, including 5,400
U.S. troops, 64 U.S. aircraft, two U.S. ships, and(for the first time) the new F-35B.19
In contrast to the close relations between
their militaries, U.S.–Thailand political relations have been strained since 2006. A coupthat year and another in 2014 limited military-­
to-military relations for more than 10 years.
This was due partly to standing U.S. law prohibiting assistance to governments that result
from coups against democratically elected governments and partly to policy choices by the
U.S. government.
The U.S. and Thailand, however, havemanaged to salvage much of their militaryto-­military cooperation and now look to normalize relations. This has been made possible by two developments: first, elections in2019 that led to a new civilian government
and, second, Washington’s new strategic focus on great-power competition with China. As a result, during the Trump Administration, the U.S. accepted the flawed Thai
electoral model as an opportunity to boost
the relationship. After the new Thai government was installed in July 2019, the Trump
Administration moved forward with at least$575 million in new arms sales, including 60
Stryker armored vehicles (with more to come)and four Black Hawk helicopters,20 as well as
hellfire missiles and other munitions, launchers, and equipment.21
In November 2019, Secretary of Defense
Mark Esper and Thai Prime Minister/Defense Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha signed the
Joint Vision Statement 2020 for the U.S.–ThaiDefense Alliance. The new joint statementbuilds on the 2012 version. It is a messaging
document intended to stress the relevancy of﻿Australia. Australia is one of America’s
The two nations’ chief defense and foreign
most important allies in the Asia–Pacific. U.S.–­ policy officials meet annually (most recently inAustralia security ties date back to World War I August 2020) in the Australia–United States
when U.S. forces fought under Australian com- Ministerial (AUSMIN) process to address
mand on the Western Front in Europe, and they such issues of mutual concern as security dedeepened during World War II when, after Ja- velopments in the Asia–Pacific region, global
pan commenced hostilities in the Western Pa- security and development, and bilateral secucific (and despite British promises), Australian rity cooperation.33 Australia also has granted
forces committed to the North Africa campaign the United States access to a number of joint
were not returned to defend the continent. As facilities, including space surveillance faciliJapanese forces attacked the East Indies and se- ties at Pine Gap, which has been characterized
cured Singapore, Australia turned to the United as “arguably the most significant American
States to bolster its defenses, and American and intelligence-­gathering facility outside theAustralian forces cooperated closely in the Pa- United States,”34 and naval communicationscific War. Those ties and America’s role as the facilities on the North West Cape of Australia.35
main external supporter of Australian security
Australia and the United Kingdom are twowere codified in the Australia–New Zealand–​ of America’s closest partners in the defense
U.S. (ANZUS) pact of 1951.
industrial sector. In 2010, the United States
The U.S. is now into its 10th deployment of approved Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties
Marine Rotational Force-Darwin, a set of an- with Australia and the U.K. that allow for thenual exercises carried out in northern Austra- expedited and simplified export or transfer of
lia’s six-month dry season. Having reached its certain defense services and items between theintended size of 2,500 Marines, it was scaled U.S. and its two key partners without the needback in 2020 due to COVID-19 disruptions. for export licenses or other approvals under
In 2021, it was back to nearly full force. Ap- the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
proximately 2,200 Marines took part. Assets This also allows for much greater integration
involved included “a tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey among the American, Australian, and British
squadron, a detachment of UH-1Y Venom util- defense industrial establishments.36
ity and AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters, and a
Singapore. Singapore is America’s closest
detachment of RQ-21A Blackjack drones.”28 non-ally partner in the Western Pacific. The
In April 2021, the Australian government an- agreements that support the security relanounced plans to upgrade bases and training tionship are the 2015 U.S.–Singapore Defense
areas used by the U.S. rotational forces.29
Cooperation Agreement (DCA), which is an
The annual Marine rotation goes hand- update of a similar 2005 agreement, and thein-hand with another recent alliance initia- 1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regardtive, the Enhanced Air Cooperation, which ing United States Use of Facilities in Singapore,
involves the U.S. Air Force and also operates which was renewed in 2019 for another 15
out of northern Australia.30 Both take place years. Pursuant to these agreements and othin the context of a wide range of other com- er understandings, Singapore hosts U.S. naval
bined activity that helps to integrate U.S. and ships and aircraft as well as the principal loAustralian forces. These include the massive gistics support node for the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
biannual Talisman Sabre exercises, which inSingapore trains “approximately 1,000
volved 34,000 American and Australian troops military personnel in the United States eachin 2019,31 and the presence of “approximately year” on such American-produced equipment
580 Defence personnel in the United States, as F-15SG and F-16C/D fighter aircraft and CHspread across 31 states, and the District of Co- 47 Chinook and AH-64 Apache helicopters.37
lumbia,” the majority of whom “are embedded Along with American allies Australia, Japan,
into the US military.”32
and South Korea, Singapore also has ordered

1782022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military179﻿and been approved to buy the F-35.38 Like USS Fitzgerald and a Philippine container ship
others of its assets, the F-35s will be housed at that killed seven American sailors.
training facilities in the U.S.39 and perhaps on
New Zealand is a member of the elite “five40
Guam under an agreement reached in 2019.
eyes” intelligence alliance with the U.S., CanNew Zealand. For much of the Cold War, ada, Australia, and the U.K.
U.S. defense ties with New Zealand were simTaiwan. When the United States shifted its
ilar to those between America and Australia. recognition of the government of China fromIn 1986, however, as a result of controversies the Republic of China (on Taiwan) to the Peoover U.S. Navy employment of nuclear power ple’s Republic of China (PRC, the mainland), it
and the possible deployment of U.S. naval ves- also declared certain commitments concernsels with nuclear weapons, the U.S. suspended ing the security of Taiwan. These commitits obligations to New Zealand under the 1951 ments are embodied in the Taiwan Relations
ANZUS Treaty.
Act (TRA) and the subsequent “Six Assurances.”
Defense relations improved in the early 21st
The TRA is an American law, not a treaty.
century as New Zealand committed forces to Under the TRA, the United States maintains
Afghanistan and dispatched an engineering de- programs, transactions, and other relations
tachment to Iraq. The 2010 Wellington Dec- with Taiwan through the American Institute inlaration and 2012 Washington Declaration, Taiwan (AIT). Except for the Sino–U.S. Mutual
while not restoring full security ties, allowed Defense Treaty, which had governed U.S. secuthe two nations to resume high-level defense rity relations with Taiwan and was terminateddialogues.41 As part of this warming of rela- by President Jimmy Carter following the shift
tions, New Zealand rejoined the multination- in recognition to the PRC, all other treaties
al U.S.-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval and international agreements made between
exercise in 2012 and has participated in each the Republic of China and the United States
iteration since then.
remain in force.
In 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck
Under the TRA, it is the policy of the United
Hagel and New Zealand Defense Minister Jon- States “to provide Taiwan with arms of a deathan Coleman announced the resumption of fensive character.”44 The TRA also states thatmilitary-to-military cooperation, and in July the U.S. “will make available to Taiwan such de2016, the U.S. accepted an invitation from New fense articles and services in such quantity as
Zealand to make a single port call, reportedly may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintainwith no change in U.S. policy to confirm or deny a sufficient self-defense capability.”45 The U.S.
the presence of nuclear weapons on the ship.42 has implemented these provisions of the TRA
At the time of the visit in November 2016, both through sales of weapons to Taiwan.
sides claimed to have satisfied their respecThe TRA states that it is also U.S. policy “to43tive legal requirements. The prime minister consider any effort to determine the future of
expressed confidence that the vessel was not Taiwan by other than peaceful means, includnuclear-powered and did not possess nuclear ing by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to thearmaments, and the U.S. neither confirmed nor peace and security of the Western Pacific area
denied this.
and of grave concern to the United States” andThe November 2016 visit occurred in a “to maintain the capacity of the United Statesunique context, including an international na- to resist any resort to force or other forms ofval review and relief response to the Kaikoura coercion that would jeopardize the security, or
earthquake. Since then, there have been sever- the social or economic system, of the people on
al other ship visits by the U.S. Coast Guard, and Taiwan.”46 To this end:
in 2017, New Zealand lent the services of one
its naval frigates to the U.S. Seventh Fleet folThe President is directed to inform thelowing a deadly collision between the destroyer
Congress promptly of any threat to thesecurity or the social or economic systemof the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United Statesarising therefrom. The President and theCongress shall determine, in accordancewith constitutional processes, appropriate
action by the United States in response to
any such danger.47

Supplementing the TRA are the “Six Assurances” issued by President Ronald Reagan in a secret July 1982 memo, later publicly
released and the subject of a Senate hearing.
These assurances were intended to moderate the third Sino–American communiqué,
itself generally seen as one of the “Three
Communiqués” that form the foundation of
U.S.–PRC relations. These assurances of July
14, 1982, were that:In negotiating the third Joint Communiquéwith the PRC, the United States:﻿

1. has not agreed to set a date for ending arms
sales to Taiwan;
2. has not agreed to hold prior consultations
with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan;
3. will not play any mediation role between
Taipei and Beijing;
4. has not agreed to revise the Taiwan
Relations Act;5. has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan;
6. will not exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC.48
Although the United States sells Taiwan avariety of military equipment and sends observers to its major annual exercises, it does
not engage in joint exercises with the Taiwan
armed forces. Some Taiwan military officers,
however, attend professional military education institutions in the United States. Therealso are regular high-level meetings between

180

senior U.S. and Taiwan defense officials, both
uniformed and civilian.
The United States does not maintain any
bases in Taiwan. However, with the 2018 Taiwan Travel Act and successive NDAAs, Congress has sent strong signals of support for
greater military-to-military interaction. This
could lead to a significant increase in the number and/or grade of American military officers
visiting Taiwan in the coming years.
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. On aregion-wide basis, the U.S. has two major ongoing defense-related initiatives to expand its
relationships and diversify the geographicalspread of its forces. The Maritime Security
Initiative is intended to improve the security
capacity of U.S. partners, and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) bolsters America’s military presence and makes it more accountable.
Among the most important of the bilateral
partnerships in this effort, beyond those listed
above, are Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
None of these relationships is as extensive andformal as America’s relationship with Singapore, India, and U.S. treaty allies, but all are of
growing significance.
Since shortly after the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries
in 1995, the U.S. and Vietnam also have gradually normalized their defense relationship.
The relationship was codified in 2011 with aMemorandum of Understanding Advancing
Bilateral Defense Cooperation that covers
five areas of operations, including maritime
security. In 2015, the MOU was updated with
the Joint Vision Statement on Defense Cooperation, which includes a reference to “cooperation in the production of new technologies
and equipment” and was implemented under athree-year 2018–2020 Plan of Action for United States–Viet Nam Defense Cooperation that
was agreed upon in 2017.49
The most significant development with respect to security ties over the past several years
has been the relaxation of the ban on sales ofarms to Vietnam. The U.S. lifted the embargoon maritime security–related equipment in
the fall of 2014 and then ended the embargo

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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military181

﻿

on arms sales completely in 2016. The embar- defense partners, party-to-party ties between
go had long served as a psychological obstacle the Communist Parties of Vietnam and China,
to Vietnamese cooperation on security issues, and a Vietnamese foreign policy that seeks to
but lifting it does not necessarily change the balance relationships with all major powers.
nature of the articles that are likely to be sold. The U.S., like others among Vietnam’s securiTransfers to date have been to the Vietnam- ty partners, remains officially restricted to one
ese Coast Guard. These include provision under port call a year, with an additional one to two
the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program of calls on Vietnamese bases being negotiable.
two decommissioned Hamilton-class cutters
The U.S. and Malaysia, despite occasionaland 24 Metal Shark patrol boats as well as infra- political differences, “have maintained steadystructure support.50 By 2022, Vietnam is sched- defense cooperation since the 1990s.” Examuled to take delivery of six unmanned Boeing-­ ples of this cooperation include Malaysian asmade Scan Eagle aerial vehicles (UAVs) for its sistance in the reconstruction of Afghanistan
Coast Guard.51 The U.S. is also providing T-6 tur- and involvement in anti-piracy operations
boprop trainer aircraft.52 Agreement has yet to “near the Malacca Strait and…off the Horn ofbe reached with respect to sales of bigger-ticket Africa” as well as “jungle warfare training at a
items like refurbished P-3 maritime patrol air- Malaysian facility, bilateral exercises like Kris
craft, although they have been discussed.
Strike, and multilateral exercises like Cobra
The Cooperative Humanitarian and Medi- Gold, which is held in Thailand and involves
cal Storage Initiative (CHAMSI) is designed to thousands of personnel from several Asianenhance cooperation on humanitarian assis- countries plus the United States.”56 The U.S.
tance and disaster relief by, among other things, has occasionally flown P-3 and/or P-8 patrol
prepositioning related American equipment in aircraft out of Malaysian bases in Borneo.
Da Nang, Vietnam.53 This is a sensitive issue
The U.S. relationship with Malaysia wasfor Vietnam and is not often referenced pub- strengthened under President Barack Obama
licly, but it was emphasized during Vietnamese and continued on a positive trajectory unPrime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s visit to der the Trump Administration. In addition
Washington in 2017 and again during Secretary to counterterrorism cooperation, the U.S. isof Defense James Mattis’s visit to Vietnam in focused on helping Malaysia to ensure mari2018. In the same year, Vietnam participated time domain awareness. In 2020, then-Deputy
in RIMPAC for the first time. In 2020, it did Assistant Secretary of Defense for South andnot participate in a scaled-down COVID-year Southeast Asia Reed B. Werner summarizedversion of the exercise.54
recent U.S. assistance in this area:
There have been two high-profile port calls
to Vietnam since 2018. Early that year, the USS[M]aritime domain awareness is importCarl Vinson visited Da Nang with its escort
ant for Malaysia, given where it sits geoships in the first port call by a U.S. aircraft cargraphically. Since 2017, we have provided
rier since the Vietnam War, and another carrinearly US$200 million (RM853 million) in
er, USS Theodore Roosevelt, visited Da Nang in
grant assistance to the Malaysian Armed
March 2020. These are significant signals from
Forces to enhance maritime domain
Vietnam about its receptivity to partnershipawareness, and that includes ScanEagle
with the U.S. military—messages underscoredunmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), marvery subtly in Vietnam’s 2019 Viet Nam Nationitime surveillance upgrades, and long55
al Defence white paper.
range air defence radar.57
Nevertheless, significant limits on the
U.S.–Vietnam security relationship persist,
The upgrading of its F-18 fleet is the mostincluding a Vietnamese defense establish- significant U.S. defense program currently unment that is very cautious in its selection of derway with Malaysia.58

﻿

The U.S.–Indonesia defense relationshipwas revived in 2005 following a period of estrangement caused by American concerns
about human rights. It now includes regular
joint exercises, port calls, and sales of weaponry. Because of their impact on the operating environment in and around Indonesia, as well as
the setting of priorities in the U.S.–­Indonesia
relationship, the U.S. is also working closelywith Indonesia’s defense establishment toreform Indonesia’s strategic defense planning processes.
U.S.–Indonesia military cooperation is governed by two agreements, the 2010 Framework
Arrangement on Cooperative Activities in the
Field of Defense and the 2015 Joint Statement
on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation,59 as
well as the 2010 Comprehensive Partnership.
These agreements have encompassed “morethan 200 bilateral military engagements ayear” and cooperation in six areas: “maritime
security and domain awareness; defense procurement and joint research and development;
peacekeeping operations and training; professionalization; HA/DR [High Availability/­
Disaster Recovery]; and countering transnational threats such as terrorism and piracy.”60
The agreements also frame multiple arms
transfers. According to the U.S. Departmentof State, “[t]he United States has $1.88 billion
in active government-to-government sales
cases with Indonesia under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system.”61 Perhaps most significantly, in 2018, the United States carriedthrough on the transfer of 24 refurbished F-16s
to Indonesia under its EDA program and a saleof eight new Apache helicopters. The U.S. government also remains involved in talks withIndonesia to fill its need for new fighter jets.62
The U.S. and Indonesia also have signed twoof the four foundational information-sharing
agreements that the U.S. maintains with its
closest partners: the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) andCommunications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA).
Afghanistan. On October 7, 2001, U.S.
forces invaded Afghanistan in response to

182

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
the United States. This marked the beginningof Operation Enduring Freedom to combat
al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters. The U.S.,in alliance with the U.K. and the anti-Taliban
Afghan Northern Alliance forces, ousted the
Taliban from power in December 2001. Most
Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders fled across theborder into Pakistan’s Federally Administered
Tribal Areas where they regrouped and initiated an insurgency in Afghanistan in 2003.
In August 2003, NATO joined the war in
Afghanistan and assumed control of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
In 2011, at the height of the war, there were50 troop-contributing nations and nearly
150,000 NATO and U.S. forces on the groundin Afghanistan.
On December 28, 2014, NATO formallyended combat operations and relinquishedresponsibility to the Afghan security forces,
which numbered around 352,000 (including army and police).63 After Afghan President Ashraf Ghani signed a bilateral security
agreement with the U.S. and a Status of Forces
Agreement with NATO, the international coalition launched Operation Resolute Support totrain and support Afghan security forces.
In 2018, U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad initiated talks with the Taliban in Doha,
Qatar, in an attempt to find a political solution
to the conflict and encourage the group to negotiate with the Afghan government. In February 2020, Ambassador Khalilzad and Taliban
co-founder and chief negotiator Abdul Ghani
Baradar signed a tentative peace agreement inwhich the Taliban agreed that it will not allow
al-Qaeda or any other transnational terroristgroup to use Afghan soil. It also agreed not toattack U.S. forces as long as they provided andremained committed to a withdrawal timeline,
eventually set at May 2021. One of the main objectives of this interim agreement was to jumpstart intra-Afghan negotiations between the
Taliban and the Afghan government.
Intra-Afghan talks did take place but were
hampered by continued Taliban attacks on
Afghan forces, domestic political turmoil in

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

U.S.–Pakistan relations suffered an acrimonious rupture in 2011 when U.S. special forces
conducted a raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad not far from facilities run
by the Pakistani military. In 2017, President
Donald Trump suspended billions of dollarsof U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and declared that “[w]e can no longer be silent about
Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that posea threat to the region and beyond.”68
Between 2001 and 2016, Pakistan received
approximately $30 billion in aid and “reimbursements” from the U.S. in the form of
coalition support funds (CSF) for its military deployments and operations along theborder with Afghanistan. In 2016, reflecting
a trend of growing congressional resistanceto military assistance for Pakistan, Congress
blocked funds for the provision of eight F-16s.
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), U.S. aid appropriations and military reimbursements have fallen continuously
since 2013, from $2.60 billion in that year to$108 million in 2018. CSF reimbursements
fell to zero in 2017 and remained at that level
through 2021.69
Since 2015, U.S. Administrations have refused to certify that Pakistan has met requirements to crack down on the Haqqani Network,
an Afghan terrorist group that resides in northern Pakistan. As the CRS notes, “The NDAA for
FY2019 revamped the CSF program, authorizing $350 million to support security enhancement activities along Pakistan’s western border, subject to certification requirements thathave not been met to date.”70
In addition to suspending aid, the Trump
Administration supported both the additionof Pakistan to the Financial Action Task Force(FATF) “grey list” for failing to fulfill its obligations to prevent the financing of terrorism
and its designation as a “Countr[y] of Particular Concern under the International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or
tolerated ‘systematic, ongoing, [and] egregious
violations of religious freedom.”71 Pakistan has
lobbied to be taken off the FATF grey list, andThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military183

﻿Afghanistan following the 2019 presidential
elections, disagreements between the Afghan government and the Taliban regarding prisoner exchanges, and the COVID-19
global pandemic.
In April 2021, President Joseph Biden announced that the U.S. would be withdrawing
its remaining 2,500 soldiers from Afghanistan
by September 11, 2021, remarking that America’s “reasons for remaining in Afghanistan are
becoming increasingly unclear.”64 As the finalcontingent of U.S. forces was leaving Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban launcheda rapid offensive across the country, seizing
provincial capitals and eventually the national capital, Kabul, in a matter of weeks. Amid
the Taliban offensive, President Ghani fled thecountry for the UAE and the Afghan security
forces largely abandoned their posts.65
Having left the Air Force base at Bagramweeks earlier, the U.S. and other countries
were left trying to evacuate their citizens andallies from the Kabul International Airport
as the Taliban assumed control of the capital.
Amid the chaos, a suicide bombing attack on
the airport perimeter on August 26 killed 13
U.S. military personnel and nearly 200 Afghans.
The local branch of ISIS, IS-K, claimed responsibility for the attack, and the Biden Administration subsequently launched drone strikes
on two IS-K targets.66 The Taliban formed
a new government in early September comprised almost entirely of hardline elements of
the Talban and Haqqani Network.67
Pakistan. During the early stages of thewar in Afghanistan, the U.S. and NATO relied heavily on logistical supply lines running
through Pakistan to resupply anti-Taliban coalition forces. Supplies and fuel were carried ontransportation routes from the port at Karachi
to Afghan–Pakistani border crossing points at
Torkham in the Khyber Pass and Chaman in
Baluchistan province. For roughly the first decade of the war, approximately 80 percent of
U.S. and NATO supplies traveled through Pakistani territory. This amount has decreased
progressively as the U.S. and allied troop presence has shrunk.

﻿others have argued for moving it to the organization’s “black list.” In a February 2021
meeting, the FATF elected to keep Pakistanon the grey list, noting that although Pakistan
has made significant progress in taking action
against money laundering and the financing ofterrorism, “serious deficiencies” remained.72
Pakistan has made significant progress incombating anti-state extremist groups operating within its borders. Pakistan has long sheltered the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network,and other allied extremist groups, but in thelate 2000s and early 2010s, several anti-state
extremist groups, including the Pakistani Taliban or TTP, began to target Pakistani security
forces and civilians. As a result, according to
the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the numberof terrorism-related incidents within Pakistan
surged from 150 in 2000 to 2,204 in 2010.73 The
number of incidents peaked in 2013 at 3,923
before Pakistan began a series of military operations against these groups in 2014 and fell
nearly every year thereafter, reaching 319 in
2020.74 There were some signs in 2021, however, that the TTP is reconstituting itself.75
Fatalities from terrorism inside Pakistan
have fallen as well. After peaking in 2009 at
11,317, there were 506 fatalities from terrorism (including civilians, security forces, andterrorists) in 2020.76
Pakistan–U.S. relations improved modestly
from 2018–2021 as Pakistan involved itself asa key player in bringing the Afghan Taliban to
the negotiating table with the Afghan government. It remains to be seen how the Biden Administration will approach the often troubled
U.S. relationship with Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimatesthat Pakistan “has a nuclear weapons stockpileof 140 to 150 warheads” that could “realistically grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, if thecurrent trend continues.”77 The possibility thatterrorists could gain effective access to Pakistani nuclear weapons is contingent on a complex chain of circumstances. Concern about thesafety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons increases when India–Pakistan tensions

184

increase. If Pakistan were to move its nuclear
assets or, worse, take steps to mate weapons
with delivery systems, the likelihood of theft or
infiltration by terrorists would increase.
Increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) is of particular concern because
launch authorities for TNWs are typically delegated to lower-tier field commanders far fromthe central authority in Islamabad. Anotherconcern is the possibility that miscalculations
could lead to regional nuclear war if India’s
leaders were to lose confidence that nuclear
weapons in Pakistan are under government
control or, conversely, were to assume thatthey were under Pakistani government control
after they ceased to be.
There are additional concerns that Islamist
extremist groups with links to the Pakistan security establishment could exploit those links
to gain access to nuclear weapons technology,
facilities, and/or materials. The realizationthat Osama bin Laden stayed for six years within a half-mile of Pakistan’s premier defense
academy has fueled concern that al-Qaeda canoperate relatively freely in parts of Pakistan
and might eventually gain access to Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal. Pakistan’s weapons-­grade
materials were ranked the 20th least securein 2018, with only Iran’s and North Korea’s
ranking lower.78
There is the additional (though less likely)
scenario of extremists gaining access througha collapse of the state. While Pakistan remains
unstable because of its weak economy, regular terrorist attacks, sectarian violence, civil–­
military tensions, and the growing influence ofreligious extremist groups, the Pakistani state is
not likely to collapse altogether. The country’s
most powerful institution, the 550,000-strong
army that has ruled Pakistan for almost half of
its existence, would almost certainly intervene
and assume control once again if the politicalsituation began to unravel. The potential breakup of the Pakistani state would have to be preceded by the disintegration of the army, whichcurrently is not plausible.79
Pakistan–India Conflict. India and Pakistan have fought four wars since partition

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

attack on an Indian army camp in Kashmir,and a February 2019 attack on Indian security
forces in Kashmir—the deadliest single terrorist attack in the disputed region since theeruption of an insurgency in 1989.82
Hafez Muhammed Saeed, LeT’s founder
and the leader of its front organization Jamaat-­
ud-Dawa (JuD), has periodically been placed
under arrest, only later to be released. He
was arrested most recently in July 2019 andremains under house arrest, charged withfinancing terrorism, with his trial delayed dueto the COVID-19 pandemic.83 Previously, he
had operated freely in Pakistan, often holding
press conferences and inciting violence against
India during large public rallies.
With terrorist groups operating relatively
freely in Pakistan and maintaining links to
its military and intelligence services, there isa moderate risk that the two countries might
eventually engage in all-out conflict. Pakistan’s recent focus on incorporating tactical
nuclear weapons into its warfighting doctrine
has also raised concern that conflict now involves a higher risk of nuclear exchange. In
early 2019 Pakistan conducted several tests of
its nuclear-capable, short-range NASR ballistic missiles.84
Following a deadly attack on Indian security
forces in Pulwama, Kashmir, in February 2019,
India launched an even more daring cross-­border raid. For the first time since the Third
India–­Pakistan War of 1971, the Indian air
force crossed the Line of Control and dropped
ordnance inside Pakistan proper (as opposed
to disputed Kashmir), targeting several JeM
training camps in Khyuber Pakhtunkhwa province.85 Delhi stressed that the “non-military”
operation was designed to avoid civilian casualties and was preemptive in nature because
it had credible intelligence that JeM was attempting other suicide attacks in the country.
In response, Pakistan launched fighter jets
to conduct their own strike on targets locatedon India’s side of the Line of Control (LoC) in
Kashmir, prompting a dogfight that resulted
in the downing of an Indian MiG-21. Pakistan
released the captured MiG-21 pilot days later,

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﻿in 1947, including conflicts in 1947, 1965, 1971,
and 1999. Deadly border skirmishes across theLine of Control in Kashmir, a disputed territory claimed in full by both India and Pakistan,
are commonplace.
The military and strategic dynamic between
India and Pakistan has grown more volatile
since the May 2014 election of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader Narendra Modi as India’s
prime minister. Modi invited Pakistani Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in
ceremony but then later called off foreign
secretary–level talks that were scheduled forAugust 2014 to express anger over a Pakistani
official’s meeting with Kashmiri separatist
leaders. During the same month, the two sides
engaged in intense firing and shelling along
their international border (called the working
boundary) and across the Line of Control that
divides Kashmir. A similar escalation in border tensions occurred again in October 2014
when a series of firing incidents claimed morethan a dozen casualties with several dozen
more injured.80
On December 25, 2015, a meeting did occur when Modi made an impromptu visit toLahore—the first visit to Pakistan by an Indian leader in 12 years—to meet with Sharif.
The visit created enormous goodwill between
the two countries and raised hope that official
dialogue would soon resume. Again, however,violence marred the new opening. Six days after the meeting, militants attacked an Indian
airbase at Pathankot, killing seven Indian security personnel.81
As a result, official India–Pakistan dialogue
remains deadlocked even though the two sides
are reportedly communicating quietly throughtheir foreign secretaries and national security advisers. With Prime Minister Modi’s BJP
sweeping national elections in May 2019 andearning him a second term in office, few expect
any major breakthroughs in the near term. As
noted, Pakistan continues to harbor terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) andJaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). The latter was responsible for a January 2, 2016, attack on the
Indian airbase at Pathankot, a February 2018﻿

ending the brief but dangerous crisis. Nevertheless, both militaries continued to engage
in artillery attacks along the disputed borderthroughout 2019. Pakistan reported more than
45 casualties, including 14 soldiers, from Indian shelling between January 2019 and October 2019. India reported 21 casualties and over
2,000 cease-fire violations in the same period.86
Skirmishes at the LoC continued and evenaccelerated in 2020, with India’s Home Ministry registering “5,133 instances of ceasefire
violations along the Line of Control (LoC)with Pakistan last year, which resulted in 46
fatalities.”87 In early 2021, however, India
and Pakistan experienced at least a partial
diplomatic thaw as both countries combated
the COVID-19 global pandemic. In February,both countries agreed to observe a strict ceasefire along the LoC,88 and in March, Pakistan’s
Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Javed
Bajwa, called for both sides to “bury the pastand move forward.”89
India. During the Cold War, U.S.–Indian
military cooperation was minimal except fora brief period during the Sino–Indian border
war in 1962 when the U.S. supplied India witharms and ammunition. The rapprochement
was short-lived, and the U.S. suspended aid to
India following the Second Indo–Pakistan War
of 1965. The Indo–U.S. relationship was again
characterized by suspicion and mistrust, especially during the 1970s under the Nixon Administration. The principal source of tension
was India’s robust relationship with Moscow,with which it signed a major defense treaty in
1971, and the U.S. provision of military aid toPakistan. America’s ties with India hit a nadir
during the 1971 Indo–Pakistani war when the
U.S. deployed the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise toward the Bay of Bengal in a show of
support for Pakistani forces.
Military ties between the U.S. and India
have improved significantly over the past two
decades as the two sides have moved toward
establishment of a strategic partnership basedon mutual concerns about China’s increasingly belligerent behavior and converging interests in countering regional terrorism and186

promoting a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” The
U.S. has supplied roughly $20 billion worth of
U.S. military equipment to India since 2008,
including C-130J and C-17 transport aircraft,
P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft, Chinook
airlift helicopters, Apache attack helicopters,
artillery batteries, and Firefinder radar. The
two countries also have several information-­sharing and intelligence-sharing agreements
in place, including one that covers “white” orcommercial shipping in the Indian Ocean.
Defense ties have advanced at an accelerated rate since the election of Prime Minister
Narendra Modi in 2014. In 2015, the U.S. andIndia agreed to renew and upgrade their 10year Defense Framework Agreement. In 2016,
the two governments finalized the text of the
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which allows each country toaccess the other’s military supplies and refueling capabilities through ports and militarybases, and the U.S. designated India a “major
defense partner,” a designation unique to India that is intended to facilitate its access toAmerican defense technology. Since then, Indian and U.S. warships have begun to offer eachother refueling and resupply services at sea.90
In October 2020, U.S. P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft were refueled for the first timeat an Indian military base in the Andaman andNicobar Islands.
America’s strategic and defense ties with India advanced in several important ways during
the Trump Administration. In 2018, India was
granted STA-1 status, easing controls on exports of advanced defense technology. India isonly the third Asian country after Japan andSouth Korea to be granted STA-1 status. In
the same year, India established a permanent
naval attaché representative to U.S. Central
Command in Bahrain, fulfilling a long-­standing
request from New Delhi.
In 2018, the two countries also signed theCommunications Compatibility and Security
Agreement (COMCASA), which will allow the
U.S. to sell India encrypted communications
equipment and create secure channels forcommunication between the Indian and U.S.

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthNATO, the United States partners with most of
the nations in the Asian region on a bilateralbasis. This means that there is no single standard to which all of the local militaries aspire;
instead, the region is characterized by a wide
range of capabilities that are influenced by local threat perceptions, institutional interests,
physical conditions, historical factors, andbudgetary considerations.
Moreover, most Asian militaries have
limited combat experience, particularly inhigh-intensity air or naval combat. Some, like
Malaysia, have never fought an external war
since gaining independence in the mid-20th
century. The Indochina wars, the most recent
high-intensity conflicts, are now more than 50
years in the past. It is therefore unclear how
well Asia’s militaries have trained for future
warfare and whether their doctrine will meetthe exigencies of wartime realities.
Based on examinations of equipment, however, we assess that several Asian allies andfriends have substantial potential military capabilities that are supported by robust defense
industries and significant defense spending.
The defense budgets of Japan, South Korea,
and Australia are estimated to be among theworld’s 15 largest, and the three countries’ military forces field some of the world’s most advanced weapons, including F-15s in the JapanAir Self Defense Force and ROK Air Force; airborne early warning (AEW) platforms; Aegis-­
capable surface combatants and modern diesel-electric submarines; and third-generation
main battle tanks. As noted, all three nations
are also involved in the production and purchase of F-35 fighters.
At this point, both the Japanese and Korean
militaries arguably are more capable than most
European militaries, at least in terms of conventional forces. Japan’s Self Defense Forces,
for example, field more tanks, principal surface
combatants, and combat-capable aircraft (617,
51, and 546, respectively) than their British
Quality of Key Allied or Partnercounterparts field (227, 20, and 222, respecArmed Forces in Asia
tively).92 Similarly, South Korea fields a larger
Because of the lack of an integrated, re- military of tanks, principal surface combatants,
gional security architecture along the lines of and combat-capable aircraft (2,321, 26, andThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military187

﻿militaries. In 2020, the U.S. and India signed
the Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement(BECA), which creates a framework for sharing
geospatial intelligence.
Beyond these “foundational” or “enabling”
military agreements, in recent years, the twocountries have also signed an agreement on
Helicopter Operations from Ships Other Than
Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC) and an Industrial Security Annex (ISA) that allows the U.S. toshare classified information with private Indian defense firms. During the Trump Administration, the two countries also initiated a new
2+2 defense and foreign ministers dialogue
while reviving the Quad grouping (which joins
India and the U.S. with Australia and Japan) in2017.91 In 2020, the four countries held the first
Quad naval exercise since 2007. When a deadly crisis erupted at the China–India border in
2020, the Trump Administration provided India with two advanced surveillance drones andcold-weather gear for Indian soldiers.
In recent years, India has made additionalpurchases of U.S. military hardware, including C-17 transport aircraft, Apache attack helicopters, MH-60R Seahawk multi-­mission
helicopters, Sig Sauer assault rifles, and M777
ultralight howitzer artillery guns. It also isreportedly considering the purchase of 30
armed MQ-9 reaper drones (10 each for thethree branches of its military) for $3 billion
and a half-dozen highly capable P-8I maritime
aircraft (to supplement the dozen currently inoperation) for nearly $2 billion.
New Delhi and Washington regularly holdjoint annual military exercises across all services. They include the Yudh Abhyas army exercises, Red Flag air force exercises, and Malabar naval exercise, which added Japan andAustralia as permanent participants in 2012
and 2020, respectively. In late 2019, India andthe U.S. held their first-ever tri-service military
exercise, nicknamed “Tiger Triumph.”﻿563, respectively) than their German counterparts field (225, 15, and 228, respectively).93
Both the ROK and Japan are also increasingly interested in developing missile defense
capabilities, including joint development andcoproduction in the case of Japan. After muchnegotiation and indecision, South Korea deployed America’s Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) missile defense system on
the peninsula in 2017. It is also pursuing an indigenous missile defense capability.
As for Japan, its Aegis-class destroyers areequipped with SM-3 missiles, and it decided
in 2017 to install the Aegis Ashore missile defense system to supplement its Patriot missile
batteries.94 In June 2020, Tokyo unexpectedly
cancelled plans to build two Aegis Ashore missile defense sites, citing the potential for theinterceptor missile’s first-stage booster to fall
onto populated areas. Other likely factors in
the decision include the overall cost of the program, inept handling of the site-selection process, and government unwillingness to press
national objectives over local resistance.95
Australia also has very capable armed forces. They are smaller than NATO militaries but
have major operational experience, having
deployed both to Iraq and to Afghanistan aswell as to help the Philippines with its Southern insurgency. Australia’s military has several operations underway in the region from theSouthwest Pacific islands, which are so critically important to it, to its partnership with
Malaysia in the North Indian Ocean and South
China Sea to the Korean Peninsula.96
Singapore’s small population and physical borders limit the size of its military, but
in terms of equipment and training, it has
Southeast Asia’s largest defense budget97 andfields some of the region’s highest-quality
forces. Singapore’s ground forces can deploy
third-generation Leopard II main battle tanks,and its fleet includes four conventional submarines (to be replaced by four new, more capable
submarines from Germany)98 and six frigatesand eight missile-armed corvettes. Its air force
has not only F-15E Strike Eagles and F-16s,
but also one of Southeast Asia’s largest fleets188

of airborne early warning and control aircraft(G550-AEW aircraft) and a squadron of KC130 tankers that can help to extend range ortime on station.99 In January 2020, Singapore
was cleared by the U.S. Department of State topurchase 12 F-35 combat aircraft, with an initial order placed for four aircraft and an option
to purchase an additional eight.
At the other extreme, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines are among the region’s weakest
military forces. Having long focused on waging
counterinsurgency campaigns while relying on
the United States for its external security, thePhilippines spent only 1.0 percent of GDP on
its military in 2020.100 The most modern ships
in the Philippine navy are three former U.S.
Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutters. In 2017,
however, South Korea completed delivery of 12
light attack fighter aircraft to the Philippines;
the Philippine air force had possessed no jet
fighter aircraft since 2005 when the last of its
F-5s were decommissioned. The Philippines
is in discussions with South Korea to acquire
upgrades to its FA-50 light fighters, as well asother military equipment.101 It is also taking
delivery of South Korean–built ships.102
The armed forces of American allies fromoutside the region, particularly those of France
and the United Kingdom, should also be mentioned. France has overseas bases in New
Caledonia and the South Pacific, locally based
assets, and 2,900 personnel in the region.103
It also conducts multiple naval deployments
each year out of Metropolitan France. The U.K.
is likewise very active in the region and, given
its unparalleled integration with U.S. forces,
can employ its capability directly in pursuit ofshared objectives. It has a naval logistics facility in Singapore and Royal Gurkhas stationed
in Brunei and has been an integral part of aU.S.-led mission to monitor seaborne evasions.

Current U.S. Presence in Asia
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Establishedin 1947 as U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),
USINDOPACOM is the oldest and largest of
America’s unified commands. According to
its Web site:2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthAsia–Pacific region. It has three numbered
air forces under its command: 5th Air
Force in Japan; 7th Air Force in Korea;
and 11th Air Force, headquartered in Alaska. These air forces field two squadrons of
F-15s, two squadrons of F-22s, five squadrons of F-16s, and a single squadron of
A-10 ground attack aircraft as well as two
squadrons of E-3 early-warning aircraft,tankers, and transports. Other forces that
regularly come under PACAF commandinclude B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers. In
2020, PACAF activated two F-35A squadrons at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska.
Eventually, the base will host a total of 54“combat-coded” F-35A aircraft.

USINDOPACOM protects and defends,
in concert with other U.S. Government
agencies, the territory of the United States,
its people, and its interests. With allies andpartners, USINDOPACOM is committed
to enhancing stability in the Asia–Pacificregion by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development,
responding to contingencies, deterring
aggression, and, when necessary, fighting
to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness.104ll

U.S. Army Pacific. USARPAC is the
Army’s component command in the Pacific. Headquartered in Hawaii and withapproximately 80,000 soldiers, it supplies
Army forces as necessary for various global contingencies and “has sent peacekeeping forces to the Sinai Peninsula, Haîti,East Timor, and Bosnia.”106 Among its 12
subordinate commands are U.S. Army
Japan, the 500th Military Intelligence
Brigade, and U.S. Army Alaska.
U.S. Pacific Air Force. PACAF is responsible for planning and conducting defensive and offensive air operations in thel

U.S. Pacific Fleet. PACFLT normallycontrols all U.S. naval forces committed
to the Pacific, which usually represents
60 percent of the Navy’s fleet. It is organized into Seventh Fleet, headquarteredin Japan, and Third Fleet, headquarteredin California. Seventh Fleet comprises theforward-deployed element of PACFLT
and includes the only American carrier
strike group (CTF-70, ported at Yokosuka, Japan) and amphibious group (CTF76, ported at Sasebo, Japan) that are
home-ported abroad. The Third Fleet’s
AOR spans the West Coast of the UnitedStates to the International Date Line andincludes the Alaskan coastline and partsof the Arctic. In recent years, the involvement of the Third Fleet’s five carrier strikegroups in the Western Pacific has been
eased by the blurring of this boundary
between the two fleets’ areas of operation under a concept called “Third Fleet
Forward.” Beginning in 2015, the conduct
of Freedom of Navigation Operations(FONOPS) that challenge excessive maritime claims, a part of the Navy’s mission
since 1979, has assumed a higher profile asa result of several well-publicized operations in the South China Sea. Under the
Trump Administration, the frequency ofthese operations increased significantly.

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USINDOPACOM’s area of responsibility(AOR) includes not only the expanses of the
Pacific, but also Alaska and portions of the Arctic, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Its 36
nations represent more than 50 percent of theworld’s population and include two of the threelargest economies and nine of the 10 smallest;
the most populous nation (China); the largest
democracy (India); the largest Muslim-majority nation (Indonesia); and the world’s smallest
republic (Nauru). The region is a vital driver ofthe global economy and includes the world’s
busiest international sea-lanes and nine of its
10 largest ports. By any meaningful measure, theIndo-­Pacific is also the world’s most militarized
region, with seven of its 10 largest standing militaries and five of its declared nuclear nations.105
Under INDOPACOM are a number of component commands, including:U.S. Marine Forces Pacific. With its
headquarters in Hawaii, MARFORPAC
controls elements of the U.S. Marine
Corps operating in the Asia–Pacific region.
Because of its extensive responsibilities
and physical span, MARFORPAC controls two-thirds of Marine Corps forces:
the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF),
centered on the 1st Marine Division, 3rdMarine Air Wing, and 1st Marine Logistics
Group, and the III Marine Expeditionary Force, centered on the 3rd Marine
Division, 1st Marine Air Wing, and 3rd
Marine Logistics Group. The I MEF is
headquartered at Camp Pendleton, California, and the III MEF is headquarteredon Okinawa, although each has various
subordinate elements deployed at any
time throughout the Pacific on exercises,
to maintain presence, or engaged in otheractivities. MARFORPAC is responsible
for supporting three different commands:
It is the U.S. Marine Corps component of
USINDOPACOM, provides the Fleet Marine Forces to PACFLT, and provides Marine forces for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

﻿

l

l

l

U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific. SOCPAC has operational control ofvarious special operations forces, including Navy SEALs; Naval Special Warfare
units; Army Special Forces (Green Berets);and Special Operations Aviation units in
the Pacific region, including elements inJapan and South Korea. It supports the
Pacific Command’s Theater Security Cooperation Program as well as other plans
and contingency responses. SOCPAC
forces also support various operations in
the region other than warfighting, suchas counterdrug operations, counterterrorism training, humanitarian assistance,and demining activities.
U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Eighth
Army. Because of the unique situationon the Korean Peninsula, two subcomponents of USINDOPACOM—U.S. Forces

190

Korea (USFK) and U.S. Eighth Army—are
based in Korea. USFK, a joint headquarters led by a four-star U.S. general, is incharge of the various U.S. military elements on the peninsula. U.S. Eighth Army
operates in conjunction with USFK as
well as with the United Nations presencein the form of United Nations Command.
Other forces, including space capabilities,
cyber capabilities, air and sealift assets, and additional combat forces, may be made available
to USINDOPACOM depending on requirements and availability.
U.S. Central Command—Afghanistan.
Unlike the U.S. forces deployed in Japan andSouth Korea, there is no permanent force
structure committed to Afghanistan; instead,forces rotate through the theater under the direction of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),
USINDOPACOM’s counterpart in that region of the world. U.S. forces are in the process of being fully withdrawn from Afghanistan by a September 11, 2021, deadline set byPresident Biden.

Key Infrastructure That Enables
Expeditionary Warfighting Capabilities
Any planning for operations in the Pacificwill be dominated by the “tyranny of distance.”
Because of the extensive distances that mustbe traversed in order to deploy forces, even
Air Force units will take one or more days todeploy, and ships measure steaming time inweeks. For instance, a ship sailing at 20 knots
requires nearly five days to get from San Diego
to Hawaii. From there, it takes seven more days
to get to Guam; seven days to Yokosuka, Japan;
and eight days to Okinawa—if ships encounterno interference along the journey.107
China’s growing anti-access/area denial(A2/AD) capabilities, ranging from an expanding fleet of modern submarines to anti-shipballistic and cruise missiles, increase the operational risk for deployment of U.S. forces inthe event of conflict. China’s capabilities not
only jeopardize American combat forces thatwould flow into the theater for initial combat,

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military191

﻿

but also would continue to threaten the lo- of air and naval assets as well as logistical ingistical support needed to sustain American frastructure, however, makes the island an atcombat power during the subsequent days, tractive potential target in the event of conflict.
weeks, and months.
The increasing reach of Chinese and North
American basing structure in the Indo-­ Korean ballistic missiles reflects this growing
Pacific region, including access to key allied vulnerability.
facilities, is therefore both necessary and inGuam and Saipan. The U.S. military has
creasingly at risk.
noncombatant maritime prepositioning ships(MPS), which contain large amounts of miliAmerican Facilities
tary equipment and supplies, in strategic locaHawaii. Much as it was in the 20th century, tions from which they can reach areas of conHawaii remains the linchpin of America’s abili- flict relatively quickly as associated U.S. Armyty to support its position in the Western Pacific. or Marine Corps units located elsewhere arrive
If the United States cannot preserve its facili- in the areas. U.S. Navy units on Guam and inties in Hawaii, both combat power and sustain- Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Marability become moot. The United States main- ianas, support prepositioning ships that cantains air and naval bases, communications supply Army or Marine Corps units deployed
infrastructure, and logistical support on Oahu for contingency operations in Asia.
and elsewhere in the Hawaiian Islands. Hawaii
is also a key site for undersea cables that carry Allied and Other Friendly Facilities
much of the world’s communications and data,
For the United States, access to bases inas well as for satellite ground stations.
Asia has long been a vital part of its ability to
Guam. The American territory of Guam support military operations in the region. Even
is located 4,600 miles farther west. Obtained with the extensive aerial refueling and replenfrom Spain as a result of the Spanish–­American ishment skills of the U.S. Air Force and U.S.
War, Guam became a key coaling station for U.S. Navy, it is still essential for the United States
Navy ships. It was seized by Japan in World to retain access to resupply and replenishment
War II, was liberated by U.S. forces in 1944, facilities, at least in peacetime. The ability ofand after the war became an unincorporated, those facilities to survive and function will diorganized territory of the United States. Key rectly influence the course of any conflict in the
U.S. military facilities on Guam include U.S. Western Pacific region. Moreover, a variety ofNaval Base Guam, which houses several attack support functions, including communications,submarines and possibly a new aircraft carri- intelligence, and space support, cannot be acer berth, and Andersen Air Force Base, one complished without facilities in the region.
of a handful of facilities that can house B-2
Today, maintaining maritime domain
bombers. U.S. task forces can stage out of Apra awareness or space situational awarenessHarbor, drawing weapons from the Ordnance would be extraordinarily difficult without acAnnex in the island’s South Central Highlands. cess to facilities in the Asia–Pacific region. The
There is also a communications and data relay American alliance network is therefore a matfacility on the island.
ter both of political partnership and of access
Guam’s facilities have improved steadily to key facilities on allied soil.
over the past 20 years. B-2 bombers, for examJapan. In Japan, the United States has acple, began to operate from Andersen Air Force cess to over 100 different facilities, including
Base in March 2005.108 These improvements communications stations, military and dehave been accelerated and expanded even as pendent housing, fuel and ammunition depots,
China’s A2/AD capabilities have raised doubts and weapons and training ranges in addition
about the ability of the U.S. to sustain opera- to such major bases as the air bases at Misations in the Asian littoral. The concentration wa, Yokota, and Kadena and naval facilities at﻿

Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Sasebo. The naval facilities support the USS Ronald Reagan carrier
strike group (CSG), which is home-ported in
Yokosuka, and a Marine Expeditionary StrikeGroup (ESG) centered on the USS America,
home-ported at Sasebo. The skilled workforce
at places like Yokosuka is needed to maintain
American forces and repair equipment in timeof conflict. Replacing them would take years, if
not decades.
This combination of facilities and workforce, in addition to physical location and political support, makes Japan an essential part ofany American military response to contingencies in the Western Pacific. Japanese financial
support for the American presence also makesthese facilities some of the most cost-effectivein the world.
The status of one critical U.S. base has beena matter of public debate in Japan for many
years. The U.S. Marine Corps’ Third Marine
Expeditionary Force, based on Okinawa, isthe U.S. rapid reaction force in the Pacific. The
Marine Air-Ground Task Force, comprised ofair, ground, and logistics elements, enables
quick and effective response to crises or humanitarian disasters. To improve the politicalsustainability of U.S. forces by reducing theimpact on the local population in that densely populated area, the Marines are relocatingsome units to Guam and less-populated areasof Okinawa. The latter includes moving a helicopter unit from Futenma to a new facility in amore remote location in northeastern Okinawa. Because of local resistance, constructionof the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp
Schwab will not be complete until at least 2025,
but the U.S. and Japanese governments haveaffirmed their support for the project.
South Korea. The United States also maintains an array of facilities in South Korea. The
Army’s footprint in South Korea is larger thanits footprint in Japan because the UnitedStates and South Korea remain focused ondeterring North Korean aggression and preparing for any possible North Korean contingencies. The Army maintains four major facilities (which in turn control a number of smaller

192

sites) at Daegu, Yongsan in Seoul, and Camps
Red Cloud/Casey and Humphreys. These facilities support the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division,
which is based in South Korea. Other key facilities include air bases at Osan and Kunsan anda naval facility at Chinhae near Pusan.
The Philippines. In 1992, the UnitedStates ended a nearly century-long presence in
the Philippines when it withdrew from its basein Subic Bay as its lease ended. The eruption of
Mount Pinatubo had already forced the closureof Clark Air Base; the costs of repairing the facility were deemed too high to be worthwhile.
In 2014, however, spurred by China’s growing
assertiveness in the South China Sea, including
against Philippine claims such as Mischief Reef
(seized in 1995) and Scarborough Shoal (2012),
the U.S. and the Philippines negotiated theEnhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,
which allowed for the rotation of American
forces through Philippine military bases.
In 2016, the two sides agreed on an initiallist of five bases to be used in the Philippines.
Geographically distributed across the country, they are Antonio Bautista Air Base in Palawaan, closest to the Spratlys; Basa Air Baseon the main island of Luzon and closest to
the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal; Fort
Magsaysay, also on Luzon and the only facilityon the list that is not an air base; Lumbia Air
Base in Mindanao, where Manila remains inlow-­intensity combat with Islamist insurgents;and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base in the central Philippines.109 In 2018, construction wascompleted on a humanitarian assistance anddisaster relief warehouse located at Basa Air
Base in Pampanga, central Luzon, the main
Philippine island.110 American F-16s based inSouth Korea deployed there for a 12-day exercise with Philippine fighter jets in 2019111 andexercised there again in 2020.112
It remains unclear precisely which additional forces would be rotated through thePhilippines as a part of this agreement, which
in turn affects the kinds of facilities that would
be most needed. The base upgrades and deployments pursuant to the EDCA are part of abroader expansion of U.S.–Philippine defense

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthDiego Garcia. The American facilities on
the British territory of Diego Garcia are vital
to U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean and Afghanistan and provide essential support for
operations in the Middle East and East Asia.
The island is home to the Military Sealift Command’s Maritime Prepositioning Squadron-2(MPSRON-2), which works with Maritime
Prepositioning Squadron-3 (MPSRON-3) “todeliver a strategic power-projection capability for the Marine Corps, Army and Air Force,
known as the Maritime Prepositioning Force(MPF).” Specifically, “MPF ships deliver a
forward presence and rapid crisis response
capability by pre-positioning equipment andsupplies to various locations at sea.”116 Several
elements of the U.S. global space surveillanceand communications infrastructure, as well asbasing facilities for the B-2 bomber, are also
located on the island.

Conclusion
The Asian strategic environment is extremely expansive. It includes half the globe
and is characterized by a variety of political
relationships among states that possess wildly varying capabilities. The region includes
long-standing American allies with relationships dating back to the beginning of the Cold
War as well as recently established statesand some long-standing adversaries such as
North Korea.
American conceptions of the region must
therefore recognize the physical limitations
imposed by the tyranny of distance. Moving
forces within the region (never mind to it)will take time and require extensive strategic
lift assets as well as sufficient infrastructure,such as sea and aerial ports of debarkationthat can handle American strategic lift assets,
and political support. At the same time, thecomplicated nature of intra-Asian relations,especially unresolved historical and territorial issues, means that the United States, unlike
Europe, cannot necessarily count on support
from all of its regional allies in responding to
any given contingency.

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﻿ties begun under the Aquino governmentand continued under President Duterte withsome adjustments. At the time this book was
being prepared, the extent of U.S.–Philippines
military cooperation, including implementation of the EDCA, was in doubt as a result of
Duterte’s on-again, off-again interest in terminating the VFA.
Singapore. The United States does nothave bases in Singapore, but it is allowed accessto several key facilities that provide essential
support for American forward presence. Since
the closure of its facilities at Subic Bay, theUnited States has been allowed to operate theprincipal logistics command for the Seventh
Fleet out of the Port of Singapore Authority’s
Sembawang Terminal. The U.S. Navy also hasaccess to Changi Naval Base, one of the few
docks in the world that can handle a 100,000ton American aircraft carrier. A small U.S. Air
Force contingent operates out of Paya Lebar
Air Base to support U.S. Air Force combat units
visiting Singapore and Southeast Asia, and Singapore hosts Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) androtating P-8 aircraft.113
Australia. The most prominent elementof the U.S. presence in Australia is the deployment of U.S. Marines to Darwin in northern
Australia. In keeping with Australian sensitivities about permanent American bases onAustralian soil, the Marines do not constitutea permanent presence in Australia.114 Similarly,
the United States jointly staffs the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap and the Joint Geological and Geophysical Research Station at Alice
Springs and has access to the Harold E. Holt
Naval Communication Station, including its
space surveillance radar system, in the westernpart of the country.115
Finally, the United States is granted accessto a number of facilities in Asian states on acontingency or crisis basis. Thus, U.S. Air Forceunits transited Thailand’s U-Tapao Air Baseand Sattahip Naval Base during the first Gulf
War and during the Iraq War, but they do not
maintain a permanent presence there. Additionally, the U.S. Navy conducts hundreds ofport calls throughout the region.

﻿Scoring the Asia Operating Environment
As with the operating environments of
The key regional characteristics consisted of:Europe and the Middle East, we assessed thecharacteristics of Asia as they could be expect- a. Alliances. Alliances are important fored to facilitate or inhibit America’s ability tointeroperability and collective defense, asconduct military operations to defend its vitalallies would be more likely to lend support
national interests against threats. Our assessto U.S. military operations. Indicators
ment of the operating environment utilized athat provide insight into the strength or
five-point scale that ranges from “very poor” tohealth of an alliance include whether the“excellent” conditions and covers four regionU.S. trains regularly with countries in theal characteristics of greatest relevance to theregion, has good interoperability with theconduct of military operations:forces of an ally, and shares intelligencewith nations in the region.
1. Very Poor. Significant hurdles exist for
military operations. Physical infrastrucb. Political Stability. Political stability
ture is insufficient or nonexistent, andbrings predictability for military planners
the region is politically unstable. The U.S.
when considering such things as tranmilitary is poorly placed or absent, andsit, basing, and overflight rights for U.S.
alliances are nonexistent or diffuse.
military operations. The overall degreeof political stability indicates whether
2. Unfavorable. A challenging operating
U.S. military actions would be hindered orenvironment for military operations isenabled and reflects, for example, whether
marked by inadequate infrastructure,transfers of power in the region are generweak alliances, and recurring political inally peaceful and whether there have beenstability. The U.S. military is inadequately
any recent instances of political instability
placed in the region.
in the region.
3. Moderate. A neutral to moderately favorable operating environment is characterized by adequate infrastructure, a moderate alliance structure, and acceptablelevels of regional political stability. The
U.S. military is adequately placed.
4. Favorable. A favorable operating environment includes good infrastructure,strong alliances, and a stable political environment. The U.S. military is well placedfor future operations.
5. Excellent. An extremely favorable operating environment includes well-establishedand well-maintained infrastructure, strong
and capable allies, and a stable political environment. The U.S. military is exceptionally well placed to defend U.S. interests.

194

c. U.S. Military Positioning. Having
military forces based or equipment andsupplies staged in a region greatly facilitates the ability of the United States to respond to crises and, presumably, achieve
successes in critical “first battles” more
quickly. Being routinely present also helps
the United States to maintain familiarity
with a region’s characteristics and thevarious actors that might act to assist or
thwart U.S. actions. With this in mind, we
assessed whether or not the U.S. military
was well positioned in the region. Again,
indicators included bases, troop presence,
prepositioned equipment, and recent
examples of military operations (including training and humanitarian) launchedfrom the region.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

d. Infrastructure. Modern, reliable, andsuitable infrastructure is essential tomilitary operations. Airfields, ports, raillines, canals, and paved roads enable theU.S. to stage, launch operations from, andlogistically sustain combat operations. We
combined expert knowledge of regionswith publicly available information on
critical infrastructure to arrive at ouroverall assessment of this metric.117

For Asia, we arrived at these average scores(rounded to the nearest whole number):l

Alliances: 4—Favorablel

Political Stability: 3—ModeratelU.S. Military Positioning: 4—FavorablelInfrastructure: 4—Favorable
Aggregating to a regional score of: Favorable

Operating Environment: Asia
VERY POORUNFAVORABLE

MODERATE

FAVORABLE

Alliances
Political Stability

EXCELLENT%%U.S. Military Posture%

Infrastructure%

OVERALL%﻿The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

195

﻿

Endnotes
1.

Table, “March Total Trade,” in U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, “Foreign Trade: Top Trading Partners—March
2021,” https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top2103cm.html (accessed May 5, 2021).

2.

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of thepreceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerencyof the state will not be recognized.” Constitution of Japan, Article 9, promulgated November 3, 1946, came into effect May 3, 1947,
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed June 20, 2021).

3.

U.S. Forces, Japan, “About USFJ: Guidance from the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan,” https://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/ (accessed
June 20, 2021).

4.

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, Brock R. Williams, and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs “U.S.–Japan Relations,” Congressional
Research Service In Focus No. 10199, updated May 12, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10199.pdf (accessed June 20, 2021).

5.

Bruce Klingner, James Jay Carafano, and Walter Lohman, “Don’t Break Alliances over Money,” The National Interest, Korea Watch
Blog, November 22, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/don’t-break-alliances-over-money-98967 (accessed
June 20, 2021).

6.

Bruce Klingner, Jung Pak, and Sue Mi Terry, “Opinion: Trump Shakedowns Are Threatening Two Key U.S. Alliances in Asia,” Los
Angeles Times, December 16, 2019, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-12-16/how-trump-is-threatening-alliances-inasia (accessed June 20, 2021).

7.

Bruce Klingner and Riley Walters, “The U.S. Must Limit Damage from the Japan–South Korea Trade Dispute,” Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 3429, August 7, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-us-must-limit-damage-the-japansouth-korea-trade-dispute.

8.

Bruce Klingner, “Enhance South Korean Military Capabilities Before OPCON Transfer,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
3452, December 2, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/enhance-south-korean-military-capabilities-opcon-transfer.

9.

NPR, “President Trump’s Press Conference on North Korea Summit, Annotated,” June 12, 2018, https://www.npr.
org/2018/06/12/619192513/president-trumps-press-conference-on-north-korea-summit-annotated (accessed June 20, 2021).

10. Klingner, Carafano, and Lohman, “Don’t Break Alliances over Money.”
11. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General; U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General; and U.S. Agency
for International Development, Office of Inspector General, Overseas Contingency Operations: Operation Inherent Resolve,
Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2017–December
31, 2017, pp. 99–100, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jun/18/2001932643/-1/-1/1/FY2018_LIG_OCO_OIR_Q1_12222017_2.PDF(accessed June 20, 2020).
12. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General; U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General; and U.S. Agency
for National Development, Office of Inspector General, Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines, Lead Inspector General Report to
the United States Congress, July 1, 2020–September 30, 2020, p. 4, https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/
LEAD%20INSPECTOR%20GENERAL%20FOR%20OPERATION%20PACIFIC%20EAGLE-PHILIPPINES%20JULY%201%2C%20
2020%20-%20SEPTEMBER%2030%2C%202020.pdf (accessed June 20, 2021). “Under…the Inspector General Act, the Lead IG
agencies cease quarterly reporting when the appropriations for an overseas contingency operation drop below $100 million ina fiscal year. In 2019, the Secretary of Defense rescinded the overseas contingency operation designation for OPE-P…. FY 2020
appropriations for OPE-P were less than $100 million. As a result, our Lead IG reporting responsibilities reached sunset at the endof FY 2020, and this is our final report.” Sean W. O’Donnell, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense; Matthew S.
Klimow, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of State; and Ann Calvaresi Barr, Inspector General, Agency for International
Development, “Foreword” in ibid., n.p. “Although OPE-P no longer meets the statutory threshold for Lead IG reporting after FY
2020,” however, “U.S. counterterrorism operations will continue. SOCPAC stated that OPE-P will remain important to addressing‘internal security challenges within the Philippines for the foreseeable future.’” “Enduring Challenges for Counterterrorism
Operations in the Philippines,” in ibid., p. 12.
13. Walter Lohman, “Scarborough Shoal and Safeguarding American Interests,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 3603, May 14,
2012, p. 2, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/south-china-sea-dispute-between-china-and-the-philippinessafeguarding-americas-interests.
14. Press release, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin,” U.S. Department of State, April 8, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin-2/ (accessed June 20, 2021),
and press release, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin,” U.S. Department of State, January
27, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-philippine-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-locsin/ (accessed June 20,

1962022 Index of U.S. Military Strength2021). See also former Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s remarks in transcript, “Remarks with Philippine Foreign Secretary
Teodoro Locsin, Jr. at a Press Availability,” Manila, Philippines, March 1, 2019, https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-with-philippineforeign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html (accessed June 20, 2020).
15. Named for Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
16. “2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai–U.S. Defense Alliance,” Bangkok, Thailand, November 15, 2012, in Bangkok Post,
November 16, 2012, https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/321551/text-of-thailand-us-joint-vision-statement (accessed June 20,2021).
17. 1st Lt. Timothy Hayes, “Cobra Gold 20: Opening Ceremony,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, February 25, 2020, https://www.pacom.
mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2094057/cobra-gold-20-opening-ceremony/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
18. 1st Lt. Timothy Hayes, “Cobra Gold 20: The 39th Iteration of Cobra Gold Concludes with a Combined Arms-Live Fire Exercise andClosing Ceremony,” U.S. Army, March 6, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/233549/cobra_gold_20_the_39th_iteration_of_
cobra_gold_concludes_with_a_combined_arms_live_fire_exercise_and_closing_ceremony (accessed June 20, 2021).
19. Kyodo News, “Cobra Gold Joint Drills Kick Off amid Precautions for Coronavirus,” February 25, 2020, https://english.kyodonews.
net/news/2020/02/2ad959647415-cobra-gold-joint-drills-kick-off-amid-precautions-for-coronavirus.html (accessed June 20,2021).
20. Reuters, “US Approves Sale of Black Hawk Helicopters to Thailand—Army Chief,” June 29, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/
usa-thailand/us-approves-sale-of-black-hawk-helicopters-to-thailand-army-chief-idUSL3N1JQ38D (accessed June 20, 2021).
21. Mike Yeo, “Thailand Approved to Acquire Stryker Infantry Carriers,” Defense News, July 29, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/
global/asia-pacific/2019/07/29/thailand-approved-to-acquire-stryker-infantry-carriers/ (accessed June 21, 2020), and Aaron
Mehta, “US Clears Attack Helicopters for Thailand, Plane Defenses for Qatar,” Defense News, September 24, 2019, https://www.
defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/09/24/us-clears-attack-helicopters-for-thailand-plane-defenses-for-qatar/ (accessed
June 21, 2021).
22. Michael George DeSombre, “America’s Oldest Asian Ally, Overlooked,” The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2021, https://www.wsj.
com/articles/americas-oldest-asian-ally-overlooked-11618007869 (accessed June 21, 2021).

24. Zachary Abuza, “America Should Be Realistic About Its Alliance with Thailand,” War on the Rocks, January 2, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/america-should-be-realistic-about-its-alliance-with-thailand/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
25. Ibid. and Mike Yeo, “Thailand to Buy More Chinese Tanks, Reportedly for $58M,” Defense News, April 4, 2017, http://www.
defensenews.com/articles/thailand-to-buy-more-chinese-tanks-reportedly-for-58m (accessed June 21, 2021), and Reuters,“Thailand in $67-Million Deal to Buy Armored Personnel Carriers from China,” June 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/usthailand-china-defence-idUSKBN1950IH (accessed June 21, 2021).
26. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database: Trade Registers: Transfers of Major Weapons:
Deals with Deliveries or Orders Made for 2006 to 2020,” https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php (accessed June21, 2021). Data for Thailand are a product of user query whereby the country and years of interest are selected. Query results
generate a table that shows countries supplying arms to Thailand. The top five include Sweden, China, Ukraine, South Korea, andthe U.S. in descending order.
27. Masayuki Yuda, “Thailand Shelves Chinese Submarine Deal After Public Backlash,” Nikkei Asia, August 31, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.
com/Politics/Turbulent-Thailand/Thailand-shelves-Chinese-submarine-deal-after-public-backlash (accessed June 21, 2021).
28. William Cole, “Marine Corps Rotation to Australia Continues amid COVID Concerns,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser, April 26, 2021,
https://www.staradvertiser.com/2021/04/26/hawaii-news/marine-corps-rotation-to-australia-continues-amid-covid-concerns/(accessed June 21, 2021).
29. Gina Harkins, “Australia Will Invest Millions to Upgrade Military Sites Where US Marines Train,” Military.com, April 29, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/29/australia-will-invest-millions-upgrade-military-sites-where-us-marines-train.html(accessed June 21, 2021).

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23. Phuong Nguyen and Brittany Billingsley, “China’s Growing Military-to-Military Engagement with Thailand & Myanmar,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Asia Program, cogitASIA blog, September 12, 2013,
http://cogitasia.com/chinas-growing-military-to-military-engagement-with-thailand-and-myanmar/ (accessed June 21, 2021);
Patpicha Tanakasempipat and Jutarat Skulpichetrat, “China, Thailand Joint Air Force Exercise Highlights Warming Ties,” Reuters,
November 14, 2015, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-thailand-military-idUKKBN0TD0CB20151124 (accessed June 21, 2021);
and Ian Storey, “Thailand’s Military Relations with China; Moving from Strength to Strength,” Yusof Ishak Institute Perspective,
Issue: 2019, No. 43, May 27, 2019, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_43.pdf (accessed June 21,2021).

30. Australian Government, Department of Defence, “United States Force Posture Initiatives: Background,” https://www.defence.gov.
au/Initiatives/USFPI/Home/Background.asp (accessed June 21, 2021).
31. Seth Robson, “US, Australia Plan to Carry on with Massive Talisman Sabre Exercise Despite Pandemic,” Stars and Stripes, January
28, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/us-australia-plan-to-carry-on-with-massive-talisman-sabre-exercise-despitepandemic-1.660096 (accessed June 21, 2021).
32. Embassy of Australia, “Australia and the United States: Australia–US Defence Relationship,” https://usa.embassy.gov.au/defencecooperation (accessed June 21, 2021).
33. Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Countries, Economies and Regions: United States of America:
AUSMIN—Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations,” https://dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/
ausmin-australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations.aspx (accessed June 21, 2021).
34. Kim Beazley, “Pine Gap at 50: The Paradox of a Joint Facility,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist, August 30, 2017,https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/pine-gap-50-paradox-joint-facility/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
35. Stephen Smith, Minister of Defence and Deputy Leader of the House, Ministerial Statement on “Full Knowledge andConcurrence,” Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, June 26, 2013, pp. 7071–7075,
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansardr/4d60a662-a538-4e48-b2d8-9a97b8276c77/0016/hansard_frag.
pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed June 21, 2021).
36. U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia,”
September 30, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/148478.htm (accessed June 21, 2021), and U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Office of the Executive
Director for International Cooperation, “Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties,” https://www.acq.osd.mil/ic/DTCT.html (accessed
June 21, 2021).

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37. “Joint Statement by President Trump and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore,” October 24, 2017, https://sg.usembassy.
gov/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-lee-singapore-joint-statements-october-23-2017/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
38. Valerie Insinna, “Singapore Gets the Green Light to Buy F-35s,” Defense News, January 9, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/
air/2020/01/09/singapore-gets-the-green-light-to-buy-f-35s/ (accessed June 21, 2021), and Mike Yeo, “Singapore Moves to Buy
Four F-35s, Possibly Eight More Afterward,” Defense News, March 1, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/
avalon/2019/03/01/singapore-moves-to-buy-four-f-35s-possibly-eight-more-afterward/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
39. Mike Yeo and Valerie Insinna, “Singapore Requests Future F-35 Training Location also Host Its F-16 Jets,” Defense News, July 22,
2020, https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2020/07/22/singapore-requests-new-f-35-training-location-also-host-its-f16-jets/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
40. Mike Yeo, “Singapore to Launch Fighter Jet Training Detachment on Guam,” Defense News, December 9, 2019, https://www.
defensenews.com/smr/reagan-defense-forum/2019/12/09/singapore-to-launch-fighter-jet-training-detachment-on-guam/(accessed June 21, 2021).
41. See “Text of the Wellington Declaration,” November 5, 2010, http://usnzcouncil.org/us-nz-issues/wellington-declaration/(accessed June 21, 2021), and “Text of the Washington Declaration on Defense Cooperation Between the Department of Defenseof the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of New Zealand and the New Zealand Defense Force,” June 19, 2012,
http://usnzcouncil.org/us-nz-issues/washington-declaration/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
42. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “U.S., New Zealand Announce Expanded Defense
Cooperation,” October 28, 2013, https://www.dsca.mil/news-media/news-archive/us-new-zealand-announce-expanded-defensecooperation (accessed June 21, 2021), and David B. Larter, “In Port Visit, New Zealand and U.S. Seek to Bolster Military Ties,” Navy
Times, July 22, 2016,
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43. Associated Press, “US Warship to Visit New Zealand as USS Sampson’s Arrival Ends Stalemate on Nuclear Vessels,” ABC[Australian Broadcasting Corporation] News, October 18, 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-18/new-zealand-to-endstalemate-on-us-warships/7943252 (accessed June 21, 2021).
44. Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 96th Cong., approved April 10, 1979, Section 2, https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/ (accessed June 21, 2021). Section 18 specifies that
“This Act shall be effective as of January 1, 1979.”
45. Ibid., Section 3.
46. Ibid., Section 2.

198

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength47. Ibid., Section 3.
48. Shirley A. Kan, “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei,”
Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL30341, October 10, 2014, pp. 43–44,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf (accessed June 21, 2021). Emphasis in original.
49. Aaron Mehta, “New US–Vietnam Agreement Shows Growth, Challenges,” Defense News, June 1, 2015, http://www.defensenews.
com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2015/06/01/us-vietnam-joint-vision-statement-signed-in-hanoi/28291963/ (accessed
June 21, 2021), and “Joint Statement: Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” U.S. Embassy
and Consulate in Vietnam, November 13, 2017, https://vn.usembassy.gov/20171112-joint-statement-united-states-americasocialist-republic-viet-nam/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
50. Media Note, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Vietnam,” U.S. Department of State, August 16, 2018, https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-ssecurity-cooperation-with-vietnam/index.html (accessed June 21, 2021).
51. Mike Yeo, “Asia-Pacific Militaries Bet on Unmanned Systems to Meet Regional Challenges,” Defense News, November 30, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2020/11/30/asia-pacific-militaries-bet-on-unmanned-systems-to-meet-regionalchallenges/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
52. Valerie Mai, “US Air Force Called Bid to Provide 3 Training Aircrafts to Vietnam,” Vietnam Times, February 20, 2021, https://vietnamtimes.org.vn/us-air-force-called-bid-to-provide-3-training-aircrafts-to-vietnam-28357.html (accessed June 21, 2021).
53. “Joint Statement: Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” The White House, May 23, 2016,
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54. Wyatt Olson, “Winnowed in Scope by Coronavirus, a Smaller RIMPAC Maritime Exercise Begins Monday,” Stars and Stripes,
August 13, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/winnowed-in-scope-by-coronavirus-a-smaller-rimpac-maritime-exercisebegins-monday-1.641263 (accessed June 21, 2021).
55. Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, Ministry of National Defence, 2019 Viet Nam National Defence, October 2019, http://
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56. [Name redacted], “Malaysia: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members
and Committees of Congress No. R43505, May 18, 2017, pp. 9–10, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20170518_
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57. Bernama [Malaysian National News Agency], “US Committed to Stronger Defence Ties with Malaysia,” Malay Mail, July 10, 2020,
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58. U.S. Embassy in Malaysia, “Office of Defense Cooperation,” https://my.usembassy.gov/embassy/government-agencies/officeof-defense-cooperation/ (accessed June 21, 2021), and “Malaysian F/A-18D Hornet Fleet to Undergo Depot Maintenance andUpgrade in Australia,” Asia Pacific Defense Journal, February 19, 2020, https://www.asiapacificdefensejournal.com/2020/02/
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59. News release, “Joint Statement Between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia and the Department of Defenseof the United States of America,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 31, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/
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60. U.S. Department of Defense, The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships andPromoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019, p. 37, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OFDEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF (accessed June 21, 2021).
61. Fact Sheet, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Indonesia,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, March 23,
2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-indonesia/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
62. Sebastian Strangio, “Indonesia Primed for US Fighter Jet Sale: Report,” The Diplomat, December 10, 2020, https://thediplomat.
com/2020/12/indonesia-primed-for-us-fighter-jet-sale-report/ (accessed June 21, 2021), and John A. Tirpak, “Indonesia Could Be
First Non-USAF Customer for F-15EX,” Air Force Magazine, February 19, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/indonesia-could-befirst-non-usaf-customer-for-f-15ex/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
63. U.S. Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 33, https://dod.defense.gov/
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Afghanistan-1225-Report-December-2016.pdf (accessed June 21, 2021).

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64. “Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” The White House, April 14, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
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65. Natasha Turak and Amanda Macias, “Ousted Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Resurfaces in UAE After Fleeing Kabul, Emirati
Government Says,” CNBC, August 18, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/18/afghan-president-ashraf-ghani-is-in-uae-afterfleeing-afghanistan.html (accessed September 11, 2021).
66. Sandi Sidhu, Nick Paton Walsh, Tim Lister, Oren Liebermann, Laura Smith-Spark, and Saskya Vandoorne, “Ten Family Members,
Including Children, Dead After US Strike in Kabul,” CNN, updated August 30, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/29/asia/
afghanistan-kabul-evacuation-intl/index.html (accessed September 11, 2021).
67. Yaroslav Trofimov, “Taliban Unveil New Afghan Government,” The Wall Street Journal, updated September 7, 2021, https://www.
wsj.com/articles/taliban-crack-down-on-protest-led-by-women-in-kabul-11631014019 (accessed September 11, 2021).
68. Nahal Toosi, “Pakistan Terrorism Crackdown ‘Necessary’ to Trump’s Afghanistan Strategy,” Politico, August 22, 2017, https://www.
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69. Table, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002–FY2020,” Prepared by theCongressional Research Service for distribution to multiple congressional offices, March 12, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
pakaid.pdf (accessed June 21, 2021). DOD’s “FY 2021 budget request for support for coalition forces,” however, “includes $180
million for the Coalition Support Fund (CSF)…. The FY 2021 CSF request of $180 million reflects a $45 million (20 percent)decrease from the FY 2020 enacted level of $225 million due to the continuing suspension of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan
based on the President’s January 4, 2018, guidance.” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request: Defense Budget
Overview, revised May 13, 2020, p. 6-6, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/fy2021_
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70. Table, “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002–FY2020,” note g.

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71. Press statement by Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, “United States Takes Action Against Violators of Religious
Freedom,” U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, December 20, 2019, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/12/20/
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72. Reuters, “Global Money Laundering Watchdog Keeps Pakistan on Terrorism Financing 'Grey List',” February 25, 2021, https://www.
reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/global-money-laundering-watchdog-keeps-pakistan-terrorism-financing-grey-list-2021-02-25/(accessed June 21, 2021).
73. Institute for Conflict Management, South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Datasheet—Pakistan: Number of Terrorism Related Incidents
Year Wise,” 2000–2021, https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/incidents-data/pakistan (accessed June 21, 2021). Data
as of June 19, 2021.
74. Ibid.
75. Daud Khattak, “The Pakistani Taliban Is Back,” The Diplomat, March 9, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/the-pakistanitaliban-is-back/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
76. Institute for Conflict Management, South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Datasheet—Pakistan: Yearly Fatalities,” 2000–2021, https://www.
satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/pakistan (accessed June 21, 2021). Data from March 6, 2000–June 19, 2021.
77. Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Julia Diamond, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74,
Issue 5 (September 2018), pp. 346–358, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1507796 (accessed June21, 2021). See also Zeba Siddiqui, “Factbox: India and Pakistan—Nuclear Arsenals and Strategies,” Reuters, March 1, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-nuclear-factbo/factbox-india-and-pakistan-nuclear-arsenals-and-strategiesidUSKCN1QI4O5 (accessed June 21, 2021).
78. Table, “Theft Ranking: Countries with Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Nuclear Security Index,
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79. Stephen P. Cohen, “The Future of Pakistan,” The Brookings Institution, South Asia Initiative, January 2011, p. 51,
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80. Associated Press, “Worst Fighting in Years over Disputed Kashmir,” CBS News, October 9, 2014, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
india-pakistan-fighting-kashmir-thousands-civilians-flee-border-violence/ (accessed June 21, 2021).

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81. Ralph Ellis, Euan McKirdy, and Harmeet Shah Singh, “Indian Prime Minister Urges Pakistan to Investigate Attack on Military Base,”
CNN, updated January 5, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/04/asia/india-air-base-gunmen/index.html (accessed June 21,2021).
82. Ravi Krishnan Khajuria, “Jammu Army Camp Attack: Two Soldiers Killed as JeM Militants Storm into Sunjuwan Base,” Hindustan
Times, updated February 10, 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/terrorists-attack-army-camp-in-jammu-soldierand-daughter-injured/story-20lLSRP8tuSE6UM2nvxt1O.html (accessed June 21, 2021), and BBC News, “Pulwama Attack: Nine
Killed in Kashmir Gun Battle,” February 18, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47275072 (accessed June 21, 2021).
83. Press Trust of India, “Pakistan Court Adjourns Hearing Against Hafiz Saeed in Terror Financing Cases for Indefinite Period in
Wake of Coronavirus,” The Economic Times, last updated April 15, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
pakistan-court-adjourns-hearing-against-saeed-in-terror-financing-cases-for-indefinite-period-in-wake-of-coronavirus/
articleshow/75160581.cms (accessed June 21, 2021).
84. Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Equips Military with Tactical Nuke-Capable Missile,” Voice of America, January 24, 2019, https://www.voanews.
com/south-central-asia/pakistan-equips-military-tactical-nuke-capable-missile (accessed June 21, 2021).
85. Joanna Slater, “India Strikes Pakistan in Severe Escalation of Tensions Between Nuclear Rivals,” The Washington Post, February
26, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pakistan-says-indian-fighter-jets-crossed-into-its-territory-and-carried-outlimited-airstrike/2019/02/25/901f3000-3979-11e9-a06c-3ec8ed509d15_story.html (accessed June 21, 2021).
86. BBC News, “India and Pakistan Blame Each Other over Kashmir Shelling,” October 21, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-india-50120613 (accessed June 21, 2021).
87. Special Correspondent, “Parliament Proceedings: 5,133 Ceasefire Violations Along LoC Last Year: Government,” The Hindu,
updated February 9, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/parliament-proceedings-46-security-personnel-killed-inceasefire-violations-by-pakistan-in-2020-rajnath-singh/article33782464.ece (accessed June 21, 2021).
88. Government of India, Ministry of Defence, “Joint Statement,” February 25, 2021, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.
aspx?PRID=1700682 (accessed June 21, 2021).
89. “Read: Full Text of Gen Bajwa's Speech at the Islamabad Security Dialogue,” Dawn, March 18, 2021, https://www.dawn.com/
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90. Jeff M. Smith, “Modi 2.0: Navigating Differences and Consolidating Gains in India–U.S. Relations,” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 3425, August 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/modi-20-navigating-differences-andconsolidating-gains-india-us-relations.
91. Jeff Smith, “Austin Goes to India: An Agenda for India–U.S. Defense Consultations,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6067,
March 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/austin-goes-india-agenda-india-us-defense-consultations.
92. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2020), pp. 158–160 and 280–283.
93. Ibid., pp. 109–110 and 287–289.
94. Marie Yamaguchi, “Japan to Buy Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Systems,” Defense News, December 19, 2017,https://www.defensenews.com/land/2017/12/19/japan-to-buy-aegis-ashore-missile-defense-systems/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
95. Masaya Kato, “Japan Stuck with $1.6bn Bill After Scrapping Aegis Ashore System,” Nikkei Asia, June 18, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.
com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-stuck-with-1.6bn-bill-after-scrapping-Aegis-Ashore-system (accessed June 21, 2021),
and Kyodo News, “Japan Suspends Plan to Deploy Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System,” The Japan Times, June 15, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/06/15/national/japan-halt-deploy-aegis-ashore-missile-defense-system/ (accessed June 21,2021).
96. Australian Government, Department of Defence, “Operations: Current Operations,” https://www1.defence.gov.au/operations(accessed June 21, 2021).
97. Table, “Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2019) US$ m., 1988–2019,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
2020, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932019%20in%20
constant%20%282018%29%20USD.pdf (accessed June 21, 2021).
98. Jeremy Koh, “Made for Singapore: First of Four Custom-Built RSN Submarines Launched in Germany,” CNA, updated February 19,
2019, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/custom-submarine-for-singapore-navy-launched-germany-11254318 (accessed
June 21, 2021).
99. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 297–299.

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100. Table, “Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1988–2020,” Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 2021, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%20
1988%E2%80%932020%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP%20%28pdf%29.pdf (accessed June 21, 2021).
101. Frances Mangosing, “PH, South Korea Discuss Corvettes, Light Fighter Jet Upgrades,” Inquirer.net, December 16, 2020, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/192725/ph-south-korea-discuss-corvettes-light-fighter-jet-upgrades (accessed June 21, 2021).
102. Frances Mangosing, “Philippine Navy’s First Brand New Warship Comes Home,” Inquirer.net, updated May 25, 2020, https://
newsinfo.inquirer.net/1279940/philippine-navys-first-brand-new-warship-comes-home (accessed June 21, 2021).
103. Government of France, Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy, France and Security in the Indo-Pacific,
updated May 2019, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/532754/9176250/file/France%20and%20Security%20in%20
the%20Indo-Pacific%20-%202018.pdf (accessed June 21, 2021).
104. U.S. Indo–Pacific Command, “About USINDOPACOM,” http://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
105. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility,” https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOMArea-of-Responsibility/ (accessed June 25, 2021).
106. MyBaseGuide, “Hawaii—Army Community: Brief History: U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC),” April 14, 2020, https://mybaseguide.
com/installation/hawaii-army/community/brief-history-6/ (accessed June 24, 2021).
107. These steaming times were calculated using Marine Vessel Traffic, “Sea Distance Calculator,” http://www.marinevesseltraffic.
com/2013/07/distance-calculator.html (accessed June 21, 2021).
108. Air Force Technology, “B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber,” http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/b2/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
109. Media Note, “Sixth United States–Philippines Bilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement,” U.S. Department of State, March 18,
2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/03/254833.htm (accessed June 21, 2021).

﻿

110. News release, “U.S., Philippines Cut the Ribbon on Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement Project,” U.S. Embassy in thePhilippines, January 30, 2019, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1744271/us-philippines-cut-theribbon-on-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement-project/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
111. Staff Sgt. Anthony Small, “US, Philippine AF Concludes [sic] Bilateral Air Contingency Exchange,” U.S. Air Force, February 6,
2019, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1749908/us-philippine-af-concludes-bilateral-air-contingency-exchange/(accessed June 21, 2021).
112. Michael J. Green and Gregory B. Poling, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines,” Center for Strategic and International Studies
Commentary, December 3, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-alliance-philippines (accessed June 21, 2021).
113. Fact Sheet, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Singapore,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, April 20,
2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-singapore/ (accessed June 21, 2021).
114. See, for example, Wyatt Olson, “Deal Likely to Bring More US Assets to Australia,” Stars and Stripes, June 20, 2014, https://www.
stripes.com/news/deal-likely-to-bring-more-us-military-assets-to-australia-1.289846 (accessed June 21, 2021).
115. Smith, Ministerial Statement on “Full Knowledge and Concurrence.”
116. Grady Fontana, “Military Sealift Command’s USNS Pililaau Delivers Cobra Gold 18 Essentials,” U.S. Department of Defense,
Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, February 9, 2018, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/265236/military-sealiftcommands-usns-pililaau-delivers-cobra-gold-18-essentials (accessed June 22, 2021). See also Rear Adm. (Ret.) Michael McDevitt,“America’s Interest in Diego Garcia,” War on the Rocks, June 3, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/americas-interest-indiego-garcia/ (accessed June 22, 2021).
117. For an example of a very accessible database, see The World Bank, “Logistics Performance Index: Quality of Trade and TransportRelated Infrastructure (1=Low to 5=High),” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/LP.LPI.INFR.XQ (accessed June 19, 2021).

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Conclusion: Scoring the Global
Operating EnvironmentTin key sectors. Both NATO and many non-NATO European countries have reason to be increasingly concerned about the behavior andambitions of both Russia and China, althoughagreement on a collective response to thesechallenges remains elusive.
The past year saw continued U.S. militaryand political reengagement with the continent
along with modest increases in European allies’ defense budgets and capability investment.
The U.S. military position in Europe is thestrongest it has been for several years; efforts
in exercises and logistics have continued, and alarge withdrawal from Germany was cancelled.
The economic, political, and societal impactsof the COVID-19 pandemic are only beginningto be felt and will undoubtedly have to be reckoned with for years to come, especially withrespect to Europe’s relationship with China.
However, NATO has maintained its collective
defense posture throughout the pandemic.
NATO’s renewed emphasis on collective defense has resulted in a focus on logistics. The
biggest challenges to the alliance derive from

Global Operating Environment
VERY POORUNFAVORABLE

MODERATE

FAVORABLE

EuropeMiddle East

EXCELLENT

%
%

Asia

%

OVERALL%

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military203﻿he United States is a global power with
global security interests, and threats to
those interests can emerge from any region.
Consequently, the U.S. military must be readyto operate in any region when called upon to
do so and must account for the range of conditions that it might encounter when planningfor potential military operations. This informs
its decisions about the type and amount ofequipment it purchases (especially to transport and sustain the force); the location or locations from which it might operate; and how
easily it can or cannot project and sustain combat power when engaged with the enemy.
Aggregating the three regional scores provides a global operating environment score of
FAVORABLE in the 2022 Index.
Europe. Overall, the European region remains a stable, mature, and friendly operating
environment. Russia remains the preeminent
military threat to the region, both conventionally and unconventionally, but China has become a significant presence through its propaganda, influence operations, and investments﻿gaps in capability and readiness among many
European nations, the importance of continuing improvements and exercises in the realmof logistics, a tempestuous Turkey, disparate
threat perceptions within the alliance, and theneed to establish the ability to mount a robust
response to both linear and nonlinear formsof aggression.
For Europe, scores this year remained
steady, as they did in 2020 (assessed in the2021 Index), with no substantial changes in
any individual categories or average scores.
The 2022 Index again assesses the European
operating environment as “favorable.”
The Middle East. The Middle East region
is now highly unstable, in large measure because of the erosion of authoritarian regimes,
and a breeding ground for terrorism. Overall,regional security has continued to deteriorate. Although Iraq has restored its territorial
integrity since the defeat of ISIS, the politicalsituation and future relations between Baghdad and the United States will remain difficult
as long as a government that is sympathetic to
Iran is in power. U.S. relations in the region willremain complex, but this has not stopped the
U.S. military from operating as needed.
The supremacy of the nation-state is being
challenged in many countries by non-state
actors that wield influence and power comparable to those of small states. The region’s
primary challenges—continued meddling by
Iran and surging transnational terrorism—are
made more difficult by Sunni–Shia sectarian
divides, the more aggressive nature of Iran’s
Islamist revolutionary nationalism, and theproliferation of Sunni Islamist revolutionarygroups. COVID-19 exacerbated these economic, political, and regional crises during 2020and continued to do so throughout 2021, andthe result could be further destabilization of
the post-pandemic operational environmentfor U.S. forces.
In the Middle East, the U.S. benefits fromoperationally proven procedures that leverage bases, infrastructure, and the logisticalprocesses needed to maintain a large force forward deployed thousands of miles away from204

the homeland. The personal links between
allied armed forces are also present, and joint
training exercises improve interoperability
and provide an opportunity for the U.S. to influence some of the region’s future leaders.
America’s relationships in the region are
based pragmatically on shared security andeconomic concerns. As long as these issues
remain relevant to both sides, the U.S. is likely
to have an open door to operate in the Middle East when its national interests requirethat it do so.
Although circumstances in all measured areas vary throughout the year, in general terms,
the 2022 Index assesses the Middle East operating environment as “moderate,” but theregion’s political stability continues to be “unfavorable” and will remain a dark cloud overeverything else.
Asia. The Asian strategic environment includes half the globe and is characterized by avariety of political relationships among stateswith wildly varying capabilities. This makes
Asia far different from Europe, which in turnmakes America’s relations with the region different from its relations with Europe. American conceptions of Asia must recognize thephysical limitations imposed by the tyrannyof distance and the need to move forces as necessary to respond to challenges from China andNorth Korea.
The complicated nature of intra-Asian relations and the lack of an integrated, regional
security architecture along the lines of NATOmake defense of U.S. security interests morechallenging than many Americans appreciate.
However, the U.S. has strong relations withallies in the region, and their willingness tohost bases helps to offset the vast distancesthat must be covered. The militaries of Japanand the Republic of Korea are larger and morecapable than European militaries, and bothcountries are becoming more interested in developing missile defense capabilities that willbe essential in combatting the regional threat
posed by North Korea.
We continue to assess the Asia region as “favorable” to U.S. interests in terms of alliances,2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthGlobal Operating Environment: Summary
VERY POORUNFAVORABLE

MODERATE

overall political stability, militarily relevant
infrastructure, and the presence of U.S. military forces.
Summarizing the condition of each region
enables us to get a sense of how they compare
in terms of the difficulty that would be involved in projecting U.S. military power and

FAVORABLE

EXCELLENT

sustaining combat operations in each one. As
a whole, the global operating environment currently maintains a score of “favorable,” whichmeans that the United States should be able toproject military power anywhere in the world
to defend its interests without substantial opposition or high levels of risk.

﻿

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military205Threats to U.S.‌
Vital Interests﻿Assessing Threats to U.S. Vital InterestsB

ecause the United States is a global powerwith global interests, scaling its military
power to threats requires judgments with regard to the importance and priority of thoseinterests, whether the use of force is the mostappropriate and effective way to address thethreats to those interests, and how muchand what types of force are needed to defeatsuch threats.
This Index focuses on three fundamental,
vital national interests:llSuccessful conclusion of a major war thathas the potential to destabilize a region ofcritical interest to the U.S.; andPreservation of freedom of movement within the global commons: thesea, air, outer space, and cyber-spacedomains through which the world conducts business.

The geographical focus of the threats inthese areas is further divided into three broad
regions: Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.
Obviously, these are not America’s only interests. Among many others are the growth of
economic freedom in trade and investment,
the observance of internationally recognizedhuman rights, and the alleviation of humansuffering beyond our borders. None of theseother interests, however, can be addressed
principally and effectively by the use of military force, and threats to them would notnecessarily result in material damage to thel

The Military Balance is an excellent, widely consulted source, but it is primarily acount of military hardware, often without
context in terms of equipment capability, maintenance and readiness, training,
manpower, integration of services, doctrine, or the behavior of competitors—
those that threaten the national interestsof the U.S. as defined in this Index.

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﻿

l

Defense of the homeland;

foregoing vital national interests. Therefore,
however important these additional American interests may be, they are not used in thisassessment of the adequacy of current U.S.
military power.
There are many publicly available sourcesof information on the status, capabilities, andactivities of countries with respect to military
power. Perhaps the two most often cited as
references are The Military Balance, publishedannually by the London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies,1 and the “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community” (formerly “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”or WWTA).2 The former is an unmatched resource for researchers who want to know, forexample, the strength, composition, and disposition of a country’s air force or navy. The latter serves as a reference point produced by the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Comparison of our detailed, reviewed analysis of specific countries with both The Military Balance and the ODNI’s “Annual Assessment” reveals two stark limitations in theseexternal sources.

Threat Categories
Behavior

HOSTILEAGGRESSIVETESTINGASSERTIVE

BENIGNCapability

FORMIDABLEGATHERINGCAPABLEASPIRATIONALMARGINAL

is observed behavior, because this is where intent becomes manifest through action. Thus,a provocative, belligerent pattern of behavior
that seriously threatens U.S. vital interests
would be very worrisome. Similarly, a comprehensive ability to accomplish objectives evenin the face of U.S. military power would be ofserious concern to U.S. policymakers, and weakor very limited abilities would lessen U.S. conWe suspect that this is a consequence of cern even if an entity behaved provocatively
the U.S. intelligence community’s withholding vis-à-vis U.S. interests. It is the combinationfrom public view its very sensitive assessments, of the two—behavior and capability—that inwhich are derived from classified sources and/ forms our final score for each assessed actor.
or result from analysis of unclassified, publicly
Each categorization used in the Index conavailable documents, with the resulting syn- veys a word picture of how troubling a threat’s
thesized insights becoming classified by virtue behavior and set of capabilities have beenof what they reveal about U.S. determinations during the assessed year. The five ascending
and concerns. The need to avoid the com- categories for observed behavior are:promising of sources, methods of collection,and national security findings makes such a
Benign,policy understandable, but it also causes the
ODNI’s annual threat assessments to be ofAssertive,
limited value to policymakers, the public, andanalysts working outside of the government.
Testing,
Consequently, we do not use the ODNI’s assessment as a reference, given its quite limAggressive, andited usefulness, but trust that the reader will
double-­check our conclusions by consulting
Hostile.
the various sources cited in the following pages as well as other publicly available reporting
The five ascending categories for physicalthat is relevant to challenges to core U.S. secu- capability are:rity interests that are discussed in this section.
Measuring or categorizing a threat is probMarginal,
lematic because there is no absolute reference
that can be used in assigning a quantitative
Aspirational,
score. Two fundamental aspects of threats,
however, are germane to this Index: the threatCapable,
ening entity’s desire or intent to achieve its objective and its physical ability to do so. Physical
Gathering, andability is the easier of the two to assess; intent
is quite difficult. A useful surrogate for intent
Formidable.

﻿l

The ODNI’s “Annual Assessment” omits
many threats, and its analysis of thosethat it does address is limited. Moreover,it does not reference underlying strategic
dynamics that are key to the evaluation of
threats and that may be more predictive of
future threats than is a simple extrapolation of current events.

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

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2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthAs noted, these characterizations—behavior
and capability—form two halves of an overall
assessment of the threats to U.S. vital interests.
We always hold open the potential to add
or delete from our list of threat actors. The
inclusion of any state or non-state entity isbased solely on our assessment of its ability topresent a meaningful challenge to a critical U.S.
interest during the assessed year.

﻿Endnotes
1.

For the most recent of these authoritative studies, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020: The
Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2020).

2.

See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” April 9, 2021,
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf. For an assessment by the previous
Administration, see Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community,” statement before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, January 29, 2019, https://www.dni.gov/files/
ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf.

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﻿

ChinaDean ChengIn the 2017 National Security Strategy, theTrump Administration made clear that it
was shifting the focus of American security
planning away from counterterrorism andback toward great-power competition. In particular, it noted that:

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military213﻿well as weapons of mass destruction, an areathat includes a multipronged nuclear modernization effort.
At the same time, the PRC has been acting
more assertively—even aggressively—against
more of its neighbors. Unresolved land andmaritime disputes have led Beijing to adopt an
China and Russia challenge Americanincreasingly confrontational attitude toward
power, influence, and interests, attemptterritorial disputes in the South China Sea,
ing to erode American security andin the East China Sea, and along the China–­
prosperity. They are determined to makeIndia border, and cross-Strait tensions haveeconomies less free and less fair, to growreemerged as a result of Beijing’s reaction totheir militaries, and to control information
the Democratic Progressive Party’s victories
and data to repress their societies andin Taiwan’s 2016 and 2020 elections.
expand their influence….1
In May 2020, the U.S.–China Economic andSecurity Review Commission reported that,
Until the Biden Administration issues its “[w]ith the world distracted by COVID-19, China
own National Security Strategy, the United also intensified its multi-faceted pressure camStates can probably be expected to adhere to paign against Taiwan. Chinese military aircraft
the policies outlined in the 2017 strategy.
crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait
three times in the early months of 2020 after
Threats to the Homeland
only one such incursion in 2019.” The commisBoth China and Russia are seen as revi- sion further noted that China conducted several
sionist powers, but they pose very different provocative military exercises around the island
challenges to the United States. The People’s and “continued its efforts to poach Taiwan’s reRepublic of China (PRC) has a far larger econ- maining diplomatic allies as the virus spread.”2
omy, as well as the world’s second-largest gross Since then, China has been intruding regularly
domestic product (GDP), and is intertwined across the median line of the Taiwan Strait within the global supply chain for crucial technol- ever-larger groups of aircraft.
ogies, especially those relating to information
Meanwhile, China’s attempts to obscure theand communications technology. As a result, it origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and stifle
has the resources to support a comprehensive international investigations into the matter
military modernization program that has been undermined global health efforts. Beijing has
ongoing for more than two decades and spans also sought to exclude Taiwan from multilatthe conventional, space, and cyber realms as eral efforts to combat the pandemic.

﻿Growing Conventional Capabilities.
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
remains one of the world’s largest militaries,
but its days of largely obsolescent equipment
are in the past. Nearly two decades of officiallyacknowledged double-digit growth in the Chinese defense budget have resulted in a comprehensive modernization program that has
benefited every part of the PLA. This has been
complemented by improvements in Chinese
military training and, in 2015, the largest reorganization in the PLA’s history.3 The PLA has
lost 300,000 personnel since those reforms,
but its overall capabilities have increased asolder platforms have been replaced with newer,much more sophisticated systems.
A major part of the 2015 reorganization was
the establishment of a separate ground forces
headquarters and bureaucracy; previously, theground forces had been the default service providing staffs and commanders. Now the PLA
Army (PLAA), responsible for the PLA’s groundforces, is no longer automatically in charge ofwar zones or higher headquarters functions.
At the same time, the PLAA has steadily modernized its capabilities, incorporating both
new equipment and a new organization. It has
shifted from a division-based structure towarda brigade-based one and has been improving
its mobility, including heliborne infantry andfire support.4 These forces are increasingly
equipped with modern armored fighting vehicles, air defenses, both tube and rocket artillery,and electronic support equipment.
The PLA Navy (PLAN) is Asia’s largest
navy. It now also outnumbers the U.S. Navy,
with “360 battle force ships, compared with aprojected total of 297 for the U.S. Navy at theend of FY2020.”5 Although the total numberof ships has dropped, the PLAN has fielded
increasingly sophisticated and capable multirole ships. Multiple classes of surface combatants are now in series production, including
the Type 055 cruiser and the Type 052C andType 052D guided missile destroyers, each ofwhich fields long-range surface-to-air (SAM)
and anti-ship cruise missile systems, as wellas the Type 054 frigate and Type 056 corvette.

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The PLAN has similarly been modernizing
its submarine force. Since 2000, the PLAN has
consistently fielded between 50 and 60 diesel-electric submarines, but the age and capability of the force have been improving as older
boats, especially 1950s-vintage Romeo-classboats, are replaced with newer designs. These
include a dozen Kilo-class submarines purchased from Russia and domestically designed
and manufactured Song and Yuan classes. Allof these are believed to be capable of firing
both torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles.6
The Chinese have also developed variants of
the Yuan, with an air-independent propulsion(AIP) system that reduces the boats’ vulnerability by removing the need to use noisy diesel
engines to recharge batteries.7
The PLAN has been expanding its amphibious assault capabilities as well. The Chinese
have announced a plan to triple the size of the
PLA naval infantry force (their counterpart
to the U.S. Marine Corps) from two brigades
totaling 10,000 troops to seven brigades with
30,000 personnel.8 To move this force, theChinese have begun to build more amphibious
assault ships, including Type 071 amphibioustransport docks.9 Each can carry about 800
naval infantrymen and move them to shore
by means of four air-cushion landing craft andfour helicopters.
Supporting these expanded naval combat
forces is a growing fleet of support and logistics vessels. The 2010 PRC defense white paper
noted the accelerated construction of “large
support vessels.” It also specifically noted thatthe navy is exploring “new methods of logistics support for sustaining long-time maritime
missions.”10 These include tankers and fast
combat support ships that extend the rangeof Chinese surface groups and allow themto operate for more prolonged periods awayfrom main ports. Chinese naval task forces
dispatched to the Gulf of Aden have typically
included such vessels.
The PLAN has also been expanding its naval
aviation capabilities, the most publicized element of which has been the growing Chinese
carrier fleet. This currently includes not only

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

operations employing land-attack cruise missiles. Although the H-6, like the American B-52
and Russian Tu-95, is a 1950s-era design copied from the Soviet-era Tu-16 Badger bomber,the latest versions (H-6K) are equipped with
updated electronics and engines and are madeof carbon composites. The 2020 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress on
China’s military also notes that China is developing a flying wing–type stealth bomber that isprobably similar to the U.S. B-2.14
Equally important, the PLAAF has been introducing a variety of support aircraft, including airborne early warning (AEW), commandand control (C2), and electronic warfare (EW)
aircraft. These systems field state-of-the-art
radars and electronic surveillance systems
that allow Chinese air commanders to detect
potential targets, including low-flying aircraft
and cruise missiles, more quickly and gather
additional intelligence on adversary radars andelectronic emissions. China’s combat aircraft
are also increasingly capable of undertaking
mid-air refueling, which allows them to conduct extended, sustained operations, and theChinese aerial tanker fleet, which is based on
the H-6 aircraft, has been expanding.
At the biennial Zhuhai Air Show, Chinesecompanies have displayed a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles that reflect substantial
investments and research and development
efforts. The surveillance and armed UAV systems include the Xianglong (Soaring Dragon)
and Sky Saber systems. The 2019 DOD reporton Chinese capabilities stated that China had
tested a cargo drone, the AT-200, capable ofcarrying 1.5 tons of cargo.15 Chinese UAVs havebeen included in various military parades overthe past several years, suggesting that they arebeing incorporated into Chinese forces, andthe 2018 DOD report on Chinese capabilities
stated that “China’s development, production
and deployment of domestically-developed
reconnaissance and combat UAVs continues
to expand.”16
The PLAAF is also responsible for the Chinese homeland’s strategic air defenses. Its array of surface-to-air missile batteries is one

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the Liaoning, purchased from Ukraine over a
decade ago, but a domestically produced copythat recently completed its first exercise.11 Bothof these ships have ski jumps for their air wing,
but the Chinese are also building several conventional takeoff/barrier landing (CATOBAR)
carriers (like American or French aircraft carriers) that will employ catapults and therefore
allow their air complement to carry more ordnance and/or fuel.12
The PLAN’s land-based element is modernizing as well, with a variety of long-range
strike aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles, andunmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) entering
the inventory. In addition to more modern
versions of the H-6 twin-engine bombers (aversion of the Soviet/Russian Tu-16 Badger),
the PLAN’s Naval Aviation force has added a
range of other strike aircraft to its inventory.
These include the JH-7/FBC-1 Flying Leopard, which can carry between two and four
YJ-82 anti-ship cruise missiles, and the Su-30
strike fighter.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF), with morethan 1,700 combat aircraft, is Asia’s largest air
force. It has shifted steadily from a force focused on homeland air defense to one that is
capable of power projection, including longrange precision strikes against both land andmaritime targets.
The PLAAF currently has more than 700
fourth-generation fighters that are comparable to the U.S. F-15, F-16, and F-18. They include
the domestically designed and produced J-10
as well as the Su-27/Su-30/J-11 system, whichis comparable to the F-15 or F-18 and dominates both the fighter and strike missions.13
China is also believed to be preparing to field
two stealthy fifth-generation fighter designs.
The J-20 is the larger aircraft and resembles
the American F-22 fighter. The J-31 appears toresemble the F-35 but with two engines rather
than one. The production of advanced combat
aircraft engines remains one of the greatest
challenges to Chinese fighter design.
The PLAAF is also deploying increasing
numbers of H-6 bombers, which can undertake longer-range strike operations including﻿of the largest in the world and includes theRussian S-300 (SA-10B/SA-20) and its Chinese counterpart, the Hongqi-9 long-range
SAM. In 2018, the Russians began to deliver
the S-400 series of long-range SAMs to China. These mark a substantial improvement in
PLAAF air defense capabilities, as the S-400
has both anti-­aircraft and anti-missile capabilities.17 China has deployed these SAM systems
in a dense, overlapping belt along its coast, protecting the nation’s economic center of gravity.
Key industrial and military centers such as Beijing are also heavily defended by SAM systems.
China’s airborne forces are part of the
PLAAF. The 15th Airborne Corps has beenreorganized from three airborne divisions to
six airborne brigades in addition to a special
operations brigade, an aviation brigade, and a
support brigade. The force has been incorporating indigenously developed airborne mechanized combat vehicles for the past decade, giving them more mobility and a better ability toengage armored forces.
Nuclear Capability. Chinese nuclear forces are the responsibility of the PLA Rocket
Forces (PLARF), one of the three new services
created on December 31, 2015. China’s nuclear
ballistic missile forces include land-based missiles with a range of 13,000 kilometers that canreach the U.S. (CSS-4) and submarine-based
missiles that can reach the U.S. when the submarine is deployed within missile range.
The PRC became a nuclear power in 1964
when it exploded its first atomic bomb as partof its “two bombs, one satellite” effort. Chinathen exploded its first thermonuclear bombin 1967 and orbited its first satellite in 1970,
demonstrating the capability to build a delivery system that can reach the ends of the Earth.
China chose to rely primarily on a land-based
nuclear deterrent instead of developing twoor three different basing systems as the United States did.
Unlike the United States or the Soviet
Union, China chose to pursue only a minimal nuclear deterrent. The PRC fielded onlya small number of nuclear weapons: 100–150
weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles

216

and approximately 60 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).18 Its only ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) conducted relatively few
deterrence patrols (perhaps none),19 and its
first-generation submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM), the JL-1, if it ever attained fulloperational capability had limited reach. The
JL-1’s 1,700-kilometer range makes it comparable to the first-generation Polaris A1 missile
fielded by the U.S. in the 1960s.
While China’s nuclear force remained
stable for several decades, it has been part ofthe modernization effort of the past 20 years.
The result has been modernization and some
expansion of the Chinese nuclear deterrent.
The core of China’s ICBM force is the DF-31
series, a solid-fueled, road-mobile system,
along with a growing number of longer-range,road-­mobile DF-41 missiles that may alreadybe in the PLA operational inventory. The DF-41
may be deployed with multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).20 China’s
medium-range nuclear forces have similarly
shifted to mobile, solid-rocket systems so thatthey are both more survivable and more easily maintained.
This past year has seen a sudden inflationin the number of strategic nuclear warheads
available to the PLA Rocket Force. Imagery analysts at several think tanks discovered at least
three fields of silos under construction in western China.21 Each appears to contain around
100 silos, which means that China is potentially expanding its land-based nuclear deterrent
component by over an order of magnitude.
Notably, the Chinese are also expanding
their ballistic missile submarine fleet. Replacing the one Type 092 Xia-class SSBN are
perhaps six Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs, four ofwhich are already operational. They will likely
be equipped with the new, longer-range JL-2
SLBM.22 Such a system would give the PRC asecure second-strike capability, substantiallyenhancing its nuclear deterrent.
There is some possibility that the Chinese
nuclear arsenal now contains land-attack
cruise missiles. The CJ-20, a long-range, airlaunched cruise missile carried on China’s

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Cyber and Space Capabilities. The major 2015 reorganization of the PLA included
creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force(PLASSF), which brings the Chinese military’s electronic, network (including cyber),and space warfare forces under a single service umbrella. Previously, these capabilities
had been embedded in different departments
across the PLA’s General Staff Department andGeneral Armaments Department. By consolidating them into a single service, the PLA
has created a Chinese “information warfare”
force that is responsible for offensive and defensive operations in the electromagnetic andspace domains.
Chinese network warfare forces are known
to have conducted a variety of cyber and network reconnaissance operations as well as
cyber economic espionage. In 2014, the U.S.
Department of Justice charged PLA officers
from Unit 61398, then of the General Staff
Department’s 3rd Department, with theft ofintellectual property and implanting of malware in various commercial firms.25 Membersof that unit are thought also to be part of Advanced Persistent Threat-1, a group of computer hackers believed to be operating on behalfof a nation-state rather than a criminal group.
In 2020, the Department of Justice charged anumber of PLA officers with one of the largest breaches in history: stealing the credit
ratings and records of 147 million people
from Equifax.26
Chinese space capabilities gained publicprominence in 2007 when the PLA conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test in low-Earthorbit against a defunct Chinese weather satellite. The test became one of the worst debris-­
generating incidents of the space age, with several thousand pieces of debris generated, manyof which will remain in orbit for more than acentury. However, the PRC has been conducting space operations since 1970 when it firstorbited a satellite.
Equally important, Chinese counter-spaceefforts have been expanding steadily. The PLA
not only has tested ASATs against low-Earthorbit systems, but also is believed to have

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H-6 bomber, may be nuclear tipped, although
there is not much evidence that China has pursued such a capability. China is also believed
to be working on a cruise missile submarine
that, if equipped with nuclear cruise missiles,
would further expand the range of its nuclear
attack options.23
As a result of its modernization efforts, China’s nuclear forces appear to be shifting froma minimal deterrent posture, suited only toresponding to an attack and even then with
only limited numbers, to a more robust but
still limited deterrent posture. While the PRC
will still likely field fewer nuclear weapons
than either the United States or Russia, it will
field a more modern and diverse set of capabilities than India, Pakistan, or North Korea,
its nuclear-armed neighbors, are capable offielding. If there are corresponding changes in
doctrine, modernization will enable China toengage in limited nuclear options in the eventof a conflict.
This assessment changes, however, if themissiles going into the newly discovered silos are equipped with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles). If theChinese place five MIRVs atop each missile,then 300 new ICBMs would have some 1,500
warheads—equivalent to the U.S. and Russian
numbers allowed under New START. Even
if there are fewer than 300 ICBMs, the new
SLBMs and new bombers would still mean thatwithin a few years, China could field as large anuclear force as the United States or Russia iscapable of fielding.
In addition to strategic nuclear forces, the
PLARF has responsibility for medium-range
and intermediate-range ballistic missile(MRBM and IRBM) forces. These include theDF-21 and DF-26 missiles, which can reachas far as Guam and southern India.24 It is believed that Chinese missile brigades equippedwith these systems may have both nuclear andconventional responsibilities, making any deployment from garrison much more ambiguous from a stability perspective. The expansionof these forces also raises questions about the
total number of Chinese nuclear warheads.

﻿tested a system designed to attack targets at aggressiveness of the Chinese navy, maritime
geosynchronous orbit (GEO), approximately law enforcement forces, and air forces in and22,000 miles above the Earth. As many vital over the waters of the East China Sea andsatellites are at GEO, including communica- South China Sea, coupled with ambiguous, extions and missile early-warning systems, Chi- tralegal territorial claims and assertion of conna’s ability to target such systems constitutes trol there, poses an incipient threat to Amera major threat.
ican and overlapping allied interests. Chinese
The creation of the PLASSF, incorporating military writings emphasize the importancecounter-space forces, reflects the movement of establishing dominance of the air and marof counter-space systems, including direct-­ itime domains in any future conflict.
ascent ASATs, out of the testing phase to
Although the Chinese do not necessarily
fielding with units. A recent report from the have sufficient capacity to deny the U.S. theU.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Cen- ability to operate in local waters and airspace,ter (NASIC) notes that Chinese units are now the ability of the U.S. to take control at accepttraining with anti-satellite missiles.27
able costs in the early stages of a conflict has
become a matter of greater debate.28 As its caThreats to the Commons
pabilities have expanded, China has increasThe U.S. has critical sea, air, space, and cy- ingly challenged long-standing rivals Vietnam
ber interests at stake in the East Asia and South and the Philippines. It also has begun to push
Asia international common spaces. These in- toward Indonesia’s Natuna Islands and into
terests include an economic interest in the free waters claimed by Malaysia.
flow of commerce and the military use of the
It is unclear whether China is yet in a pocommons to safeguard America’s own securi- sition to enforce an air defense identificaty and contribute to the security of its allies tion zone (ADIZ) consistently, but the steadyand partners.
two-decade improvement of the PLAAF andWashington has long provided the security PLAN naval aviation will eventually provide
backbone in these areas, and this in turn has the necessary capabilities. Chinese observasupported the region’s remarkable economic tions of recent conflicts, including wars in thedevelopment. However, China is taking in- Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and Afghanistan,creasingly assertive steps to secure its own have emphasized the growing role of airpowinterests in these areas independent of U.S. er and missiles in conducting “non-contact,
efforts to maintain freedom of the commons non-linear, non-symmetrical” warfare.29 Thisfor all in the region. Given this behavior, which growing parity, if not superiority, constitutes a
includes the construction of islands atop pre- radical shift from the Cold War era, when theviously submerged features, two things seem U.S., with its allies, clearly would have domiobvious: China and the United States do not nated air and naval operations in the Pacific.
share a common conception of international
China has also begun to employ non-tradispace, and China is actively seeking to under- tional methods of challenging foreign militarymine American predominance in securing in- operations in what Beijing regards as its terternational common spaces.
ritorial waters and airspace. It has employed
In addition, as China expands its naval ca- lasers, for example, against foreign air and napabilities, it will be present farther and farther val platforms, endangering pilots and sailors
away from its home shores. China has now es- by threatening to blind them.30
tablished its first formal overseas military base,
Increased Military Space Activity. One
having initialed an agreement with the govern- of the key force multipliers for the United
ment of Djibouti in January 2017.51
States is its extensive array of space-based
Dangerous Behavior in the Mari- assets. Through its various satellite consteltime and Airspace Common Spaces. The lations, the U.S. military can track opponents,

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthneed to control space in future conflicts. “Securing space dominance has already become
the prerequisite for establishing information,
air, and maritime dominance,” says one Chinese teaching manual, “and will directly affectthe course and outcome of wars.”35
Soft-kill attacks need not come only fromdedicated weapons, however. The case of Galaxy-15, a communications satellite owned byIntelsat Corporation, showed how a satellite
could disrupt communications simply by always being in “switched on” mode.36 Before it
was finally brought under control, it had drifted through a portion of the geosynchronous
belt, forcing other satellite owners to movetheir assets and juggle frequencies. A deliberate such attempt by China (or any other country) could prove far harder to handle, especially if conducted in conjunction with attacks bykinetic systems or directed-energy weapons.
Most recently, China has landed an unmanned probe at the lunar south pole on thefar side of the Moon. This is a major accomplishment because the probe is the first spacecraft ever to land at either of the Moon’s poles.
To support this mission, the Chinese deployeda data relay satellite to Lagrange Point-2, oneof five points where the gravity wells of the
Earth and Sun “cancel out” each other, allowing a satellite to remain in a relatively fixed location with minimal fuel consumption. While
the satellite itself may or may not have military roles, the deployment highlights that China will now be using the enormous volume ofcis-lunar space (the region between the Earthand the Moon) for various deployments. This
will greatly complicate American space situational awareness efforts, as it forces the U.S. tomonitor a vastly greater area of space for possible Chinese spacecraft. The Chinese Chang’e-5
lunar sample retrieval mission in 2020 and therecent Chinese landing on Mars underscore
China’s effort to move beyond Earth orbit to
cis-lunar and interplanetary space.
Cyber Activities and the Electromagnetic Domain. As far back as 2013, the Verizon Risk Center identified China as the “top external actor from which [computer] breaches

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﻿coordinate friendly forces, engage in precision
strikes against enemy forces, and conduct
battle-­damage assessments so that its munitions are expended efficiently.
Because the American military is expeditionary (i.e., its wars are fought far from thehomeland), its reliance on space-based systems is greater than that of many other militaries. Consequently, it requires global rather
than regional reconnaissance, communications and data transmission, and meteorological information and support. At this point,
only space-based systems can provide this sortof information on a real-time basis. No othercountry is capable of leveraging space as the
U.S. does, and that is a major advantage. However, this heavy reliance on space systems is
also a key American vulnerability.
China fields an array of space capabilities,
including its own BeiDou/Compass systemof navigation and timing satellites, and has
claimed a capacity to refuel satellites.31 It has
four satellite launch centers. China’s interestin space dominance includes not only accessing space, but also denying opponents the ability to do the same. As one Chinese assessment
notes, space capabilities provided 70 percent
of battlefield communications, over 80 percent
of battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance,and 100 percent of meteorological information
for American operations in Kosovo. Moreover,
98 percent of precision munitions relied on
space for guidance information. In fact, “[i]tmay be said that America’s victory in the Kosovo War could not [have been] achieved without
fully exploiting space.”32
To this end, the PLA has been developinga range of anti-satellite capabilities that include both hard-kill and soft-kill systems. The
former include direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles (DA-KKV) such as the system famously tested in 2007, but they also include moreadvanced systems that are believed to be capable of reaching targets in mid-Earth orbit
and even geosynchronous orbit.33 The latterinclude anti-­satellite lasers for either dazzlingor blinding purposes.34 This is consistent with
PLA doctrinal writings, which emphasize the﻿emanated, representing 30 percent of cases
Consequently, according to PLA analysis,
where country-of-origin could be deter- future wars will most likely be “local wars unmined.”37 Given the difficulties of attribution, der informationized conditions.” That is, theycountry of origin should not necessarily be will be wars in which information and inforconflated with perpetrator, but forensic efforts mation technology will be both widely applied
have associated at least one Chinese military and a key basis of victory. The ability to gather,
unit with cyber intrusions, albeit many years transmit, analyze, manage, and exploit inforago.38 The Verizon report similarly conclud- mation will be central to winning such wars:
ed that China was the source of 95 percent of The side that is able to do these things morestate-sponsored cyber espionage attacks. Since accurately and more quickly will be the side
the 2015 summit meeting between Chinese that wins. This means that future conflicts will
President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack no longer be determined by platform-versus-­
Obama, during which the two sides reached an platform performance and not even by system
understanding to reduce cyber economic es- against system: Conflicts are now clashes bepionage, Chinese cyber actions have shifted. tween rival systems of systems.39
Although the overall level of activity appears
Chinese military writings suggest that a
to be unabated, the Chinese seem to have great deal of attention has been focused on
moved toward more focused attacks mounted developing an integrated computer networkfrom new sites.
and electronic warfare (INEW) capability. This
China’s cyber espionage efforts are often would allow the PLA to reconnoiter a potenaimed at economic targets, reflecting China’s tial adversary’s computer systems in peacemuch more holistic view of both security and time, influence opponent decision-makers
information. Rather than creating an artificial by threatening those same systems in times
dividing line between military security and of crisis, and disrupt or destroy information
civilian security, much less information, the networks and systems by cyber and electronic
PLA plays a role in supporting both aspects and warfare means in the event of conflict. INEW
seeks to obtain economic intellectual property capabilities would complement psychologicalas well as military electronic information.
warfare and physical attack efforts to secureThis is not to suggest that the PLA has not “information dominance,” which Chinese milemphasized the military importance of cy- itary writings emphasize as essential for fightber warfare. Chinese military writings since ing and winning future wars.
the 1990s have emphasized a fundamental
It is essential to recognize, however, thattransformation in global military affairs. the PLA views computer network operations
Future wars will be conducted through joint as part of information operations, or inforoperations involving multiple services, not mation combat. Information operations arethrough combined operations focused on specific operational activities that are assomultiple branches within a single service, ciated with striving to establish information
and will span not only the traditional land, dominance. They are conducted in both peacesea, and air domains, but also outer space time and wartime with the peacetime focus onand cyberspace. The latter two arenas will be collecting information, improving its flow andof special importance because warfare has application, influencing opposing decision-­shifted from an effort to establish material making, and effecting information deterrence.
dominance (characteristic of industrial age
Information operations involve four
warfare) to establishing information dom- mission areas:
inance. This is due to the rise of the information age and the resulting introduction
Command and Control Missions. Anof information technology into all areas ofessential part of information operations is
military operations.
the ability of commanders to control jointl2202022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

operations by disparate forces. Thus, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance structures constitute a key partof information operations, providing themeans for collecting, transmitting, andmanaging information.

support and command and control. The creation of the PLASSF is intended to integratethese forces and make them more complementary and effective in future “local wars underinformationized conditions.”

Threat of Regional War
Three issues, all involving China, threaten
Offensive Information Missions. These American interests and embody the “general
are intended to disrupt the enemy’s batthreat of regional war” noted at the outset of
tlefield command and control systems and this section: the status of Taiwan, the escalacommunications networks, as well as totion of maritime and territorial disputes, andstrike the enemy’s psychological defenses. border conflict with India.
Taiwan. China’s long-standing threat toDefensive Information Missions. Suchend the de facto independence of Taiwan andmissions are aimed at ensuring the surviv- ultimately to bring it under the authority ofal and continued operation of information Beijing—by force if necessary—is both a threat
systems. They include deterring an oppoto a major American security partner and anent from attacking one’s own informathreat to the American interest in peace andtion systems, concealing information, and stability in the Western Pacific.
combating attacks when they do occur.
After easing for eight years, tensions acrossthe Taiwan Strait have resumed as a result ofInformation Support andBeijing’s reaction to the outcome of Taiwan’s
Information-­Safeguarding Missions.
2016 presidential election. Beijing has suspendThe ability to provide the myriad types ofed most direct government-to-­government disinformation necessary to support extencussions with Taipei and is using a variety of aid
sive joint operations and to do so on a con- and investment efforts to deprive Taiwan of its
tinuous basis is essential to their success.40 remaining diplomatic partners.
Beijing has also undertaken significantly esComputer network operations are inte- calated military activities directed at Taiwan.
gral to all four of these overall mission areas. For example:
They can include both strategic and battlefield
network operations and can incorporate both
In 2021, 20 Chinese aircraft, including
offensive and defensive measures. They also
fighters, bombers, and support aircraft,include protection not only of data, but also of
conducted the largest single incursion
information hardware and operating software.
into Taiwanese airspace.42
Computer network operations will notstand alone, however; they will be integrated
Chinese fighters, along with airborne earlywith electronic warfare operations as reflectwarning aircraft, have increased their exed in the phrase “network and electronics
ercises southwest of Taiwan, demonstratunified.” Electronic warfare operations are
ing a growing ability to conduct flexible
aimed at weakening or destroying enemy elecair operations and reduced reliance ontronic facilities and systems while defending
ground-based control.43
one’s own.41 The combination of electronic
and computer network attacks will produce
Through mid-April of 2021, China hadsynergies that affect everything from finding
already flown 260 unnotified sorties over
and assessing the adversary, to locating one’s
Taiwan’s ADIZ, compared to the record
own forces, to weapons guidance, to logisticalnumber of 380 it flew in 2020.44
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The PLA has also undertaken sustained
joint exercises to simulate extended air
operations, employing both air and naval
forces, including its aircraft carriers.45

These activities continued unabated andin some ways even intensified in the wake of
China’s struggle with COVID-19.46
Regardless of the state of the relationshipat any given time, Chinese leaders from Deng
Xiaoping and Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping haveconsistently emphasized the importance ofultimately reclaiming Taiwan. The island—along with Tibet—is the clearest example
of a geographical “core interest” in Chinese
policy. China has never renounced the useof force, and it continues to employ political
warfare against Taiwan’s political and military leadership.
For the Chinese leadership, the failure to effect unification, whether peacefully or throughthe use of force, would reflect fundamental
political weakness in the PRC. For this reason,
China’s leaders cannot back away from thestance of having to unify the island with themainland, and the island remains an essential
part of the PLA’s “new historic missions,” shaping its acquisitions and military planning.
It is widely posited that China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy—the deploymentof an array of overlapping capabilities, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
submarines, and long-range cruise missiles,
satellites, and cyber weapons—is aimed largely at forestalling American intervention in
support of friends and allies in the Western
Pacific, including Taiwan. By holding at risk
key American platforms and systems (e.g.,
aircraft carriers), the Chinese seek to delay oreven deter American intervention in supportof key friends and allies, thereby allowing the
PRC to achieve a fait accompli. The growth of
China’s military capabilities is specifically oriented toward countering America’s ability toassist in the defense of Taiwan.
Moreover, China’s efforts to reclaim Taiwan
are not limited to overt military means. The“three warfares” highlight Chinese political222

warfare methods, including legal warfare/lawfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological
warfare. The PRC employs such approaches to undermine both Taiwan’s will to resist
and America’s willingness to support Taiwan.
The Chinese goal would be to “win without
fighting”—­to take Taiwan without firing a shotor with only minimal resistance before the United States could organize an effective response.
Escalation of Maritime and Territorial
Disputes. Because the PRC and other countries in the region see active disputes over the
East and South China Seas not as differences
regarding the administration of internationalcommon spaces, but rather as matters of territorial sovereignty, there exists the threat ofarmed conflict between China and American
allies who are also claimants, particularly Japan and the Philippines.
Because its economic center of gravity is
now in the coastal region, China has had toemphasize maritime power to defend key assets and areas. This is exacerbated by China’s
status as the world’s foremost trading state.
China increasingly depends on the seas for its
economic well-being. Its factories are powered
increasingly by imported oil, and its diet contains a growing percentage of imported food.
China relies on the seas to move its products tomarkets. Consequently, it not only has steadily expanded its maritime power, including its
merchant marine and maritime law enforcement capabilities, but also has acted to secure
the “near seas” as a Chinese preserve.
Beijing prefers to accomplish its objectives
quietly and through nonmilitary means. In
both the East China Sea and the South China
Sea, China has sought to exploit “gray zones,”
gaining control incrementally and deterringothers without resorting to the lethal use offorce. It uses military and economic threats,
bombastic language, and enforcement throughlegal warfare (including the employment ofChinese maritime law enforcement vessels) as
well as military bullying. Chinese paramilitary-­
implemented, military-backed encroachment
in support of expansive extralegal claims could
lead to an unplanned armed clash.

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﻿The growing tensions between China and and Taiwanese claims raise the prospect ofJapan and among a number of claimants in the confrontation. This volatile situation has led
South China Sea are especially risky. In the to a variety of confrontations between China
former case, the most proximate cause is the and other claimants, as well as with Indonesia,
dispute over the Senkakus.
which is not claiming territory or rights disputChina has intensified its efforts to assert ed by anyone except (occasionally) China.
claims of sovereignty over the Senkaku IsChina–Vietnam tensions in the region, forlands of Japan in the East China Sea. Beijing example, were once again on display in 2020
asserts both exclusive economic rights within when CCG vessels twice rammed and sankthe disputed waters and recognition of “his- Vietnamese fishing boats near the disputed
toric” rights to dominate and control those Paracel islands.52 Vietnam has also protested
areas as part of its territory.47 Chinese fishing China’s decision to create additional adminboats (often believed to be elements of the istrative regions for the South China Sea, one
Chinese maritime militia) and Chinese Coast centered on the Paracels and the other cenGuard (CCG) vessels have been encroaching tered on the Spratlys.53 This is part of Beijing’s
steadily on the territorial waters within 12 nau- “legal warfare” efforts, which employ legal andtical miles of the uninhabited islands. In 2020, administrative measures to underscore ChiCCG or other government vessels repeatedly na’s claimed control of the South China Sea
entered the waters around the Senkakus.48 In region. For this reason, conflict often occurs
the summer of 2016, China deployed a naval around Chinese enforcement of unilaterally
unit (as opposed to the CCG) into the area.49
determined and announced fishing bans.54
Beijing’s 2013 ADIZ declaration was justBecause of the relationship between thepart of a broader Chinese pattern of using in- Philippines and the United States, tensions
timidation and coercion to assert expansive between Beijing and Manila are the most likely
extralegal claims of sovereignty and/or control to lead to American involvement in these disincrementally. For example:
putes. There have been a number of incidents
going back to the 1990s. The most contentious
In June 2016, a Chinese fighter madeoccurred in 2012 when a Philippine naval ship
an “unsafe” pass near a U.S. RC-135
operating on behalf of the country’s coast
reconnaissance aircraft in the East
guard challenged private Chinese poachers in
China Sea area.
waters around Scarborough Shoal. The resulting escalation left Chinese government ships
In March 2017, Chinese authorities
in control of the shoal, after which the Philipwarned the crew of an American B-1B
pines successfully challenged Beijing in thebomber operating in the area of the ADIZ
Permanent Court of Arbitration regarding itsthat they were flying illegally in PRC
rights under the U.N. Convention on the Law
airspace. In response to the incident, theof the Sea (UNCLOS). There is no indication
Chinese Foreign Ministry called for thethat the Chinese have reclaimed land around
U.S. to respect the ADIZ.50
the shoal as they did in the Spratlys, but they
continue to control access to the reef, and the
In May 2018, the Chinese interceptpresence of the Chinese Coast Guard remains
ed an American WC-135, also over thea source of confrontation.55
East China Sea.51
In March and April of 2021, a similar dispute seemed to be simmering around Whitsun
There have been no publicly reported, Reef in the Spratlys. The presence there of
ADIZ-related confrontations since then.
more than two hundred Chinese fishing boats,
In the South China Sea, overlapping Chinese, among them known assets of China’s maritime
Bruneian, Philippine, Malaysian, Vietnamese, militia,56 sparked protests from Manila. After aMAP 6The Scope of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)■ Exclusive
Economic
Zone

RUSSIAU.S.

Pacific
Ocean

AFRICA﻿SOUTH
AMERICAAs shown in the map
above, EEZs and otherwaters under national
jurisdiction account for 40
percent of the world’s
oceans. U.S. freedom ofnavigation worldwide
would be compromised if
national governments were
granted expansive
authority to restrict foreign
militaries from operating intheir EEZs. The South China
Sea, virtually all of which iscovered by various EEZclaims (see map at right),
has become a particular
flashpoint as China hassought to restrict freedomof navigation for U.S.
military vessels there.

Pacific
Ocean

CHINA

Atlantic
Ocean

Indian
Ocean

CHINA

AUSTRALIA

TAIWANBURMA
LAOSPHILLIPINESTHAILANDCAMBODIAVIETNAMSouth China
Sea

MALAYSIA
MALAYSIAINDONESIASOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

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MAP 7

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Claims in the South China Sea
Vietnam

Taipei

CHINA

Philippines

TAIWAN

LAOS

Indonesia
20°N

Paracel Islands

CAMBODIA
Phnom Penh

VIETNAM

Itu AbaIslandGaven Reefs

Singapore

130°E

110°E

NatunaIslands

Swallow
Reef

BRUNEI
MALAYSIAINDONESIA﻿

Kuala
Lumpur10°N

PHILIPPINES

Hughes Reef

Fiery Cross Reef
Cuarteron Reef

Ho Chi
Minh
City

Philippine Sea

Mischief Reef

Spratly Islands

100°E

ManilaSouth
Thitu Island
ChinaSouthwest
Subi Reef
Sea Cay

Bangkok

China’s“Nine-Dash
Line”

ScarboroughShoal

Woody Island

Duncan Island

THAILANDMALAYSIA

Brunei

20°N

120°E

BURMA

Malaysia

Hong Kong

Hanoi

Reclamation work done by:
China Taiwan Philippines
Vietnam Malaysia
Airstrip 0°

SOURCE: “China Has Militarised the South China Sea and Got Away with It,” The Economist, June 23, 2018, https://www.economist.com/
asia/2018/06/21/china-has-militarised-the-south-china-sea-and-got-away-with-it (accessed July 23, 2021).

JakartaSurabaja

A heritage.org

10°S

stay of a few weeks—which Beijing claimed wasnecessary because of the poor weather—mostof the ships departed. The unprecedented
gathering of fishing boats and maritime militia
could be an attempt to establish a basis within
the Philippines exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
for a subsequent return backed by the Chinese
Coast Guard.
In all of these cases, the situation is exacerbated by rising Chinese nationalism.57 In theface of persistent economic challenges, nationalist themes are becoming an increasingly
strong undercurrent and affecting policymaking. Although the nationalist phenomenon is
not new, it is gaining force and complicating
efforts to maintain regional stability.
Governments may choose to exploit nationalism for domestic political
purposes, but
20°S
they also run the risk of being unable to control
the genie that they have released. Nationalist

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rhetoric is mutually reinforcing, which makes
countries less likely to back down than in thepast. The increasing power that the Internet and social media provide to the populace,largely outside of government control, adds
elements of unpredictability to future clashes. China’s refusal to accept the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration findings, which were
overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines, despite both Chinese and Philippine accession to
UNCLOS is a partial reflection of such trends.
In case of armed conflict between China
and the Philippines or between China andJapan, either by intention or as a result of an
accidental incident at sea, the U.S. could be
required to exercise its treaty commitments.58
Escalation of a direct U.S.–China incident isalso not unthinkable. Keeping an inadvertent
incident from escalating into a broader military confrontation would be difficult. This isparticularly true in the East and South China
Seas, where naval as well as civilian law enforcement vessels from both China and the
U.S. operate in what the U.S. considers to beinternational waters.
The most significant development in theSouth China Sea during the past three years
has been Chinese reclamation and militarization of seven artificial islands or outposts. In
2015, President Xi promised President Obamathat China had no intention of militarizing theislands. That pledge has never been honored.
In fact, as described by Admiral Harry Harris, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, in his
April 2017 posture statement to the Senate
Committee on Armed Services:
China’s military-specific construction in
the Spratly islands includes the construction of 72 fighter aircraft hangars—which
could support three fighter regiments—
and about ten larger hangars that could
support larger airframes, such as bombers or special mission aircraft. All of thesehangars should be completed this year.
During the initial phases of construction
China emplaced tank farms, presumably
for fuel and water, at Fiery Cross, Mischief

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and Subi reefs. These could support substantial numbers of personnel as well as
deployed aircraft and/or ships. All sevenoutposts are armed with a large numberof artillery and gun systems, ostensibly for defensive missions. The recent
identification of buildings that appear
to have been built specifically to house
long-range surface-to-air missiles is thelatest indication China intends to deploy
military systems to the Spratlys.59

There have been additional developments since the admiral’s statement,60 but
the DOD’s 2019 annual report on the Chinese
military found no new militarization,61 which
would seem to suggest that the process has
been completed.
There is the possibility that China will ultimately declare an ADIZ above the South
China Sea in an effort to assert its authority
over the entire area.62 There also are concernsthat under the right circumstances, China
will take action against vulnerable targets like
Philippines-occupied Second Thomas Shoal
or Reed Bank, where a Chinese fishing boat
in 2019 rammed and sank a Philippine boat,
causing a controversy in Manila. There is also
consistent speculation in the Philippines about
when the Chinese will start reclamation workat Scarborough. This development in particular would facilitate the physical assertion of
Beijing’s claims and enforcement of an ADIZ,
regardless of the UNCLOS award.
Border Conflict with India. The possibility of armed conflict between India and China, while currently remote, poses an indirect
threat to U.S. interests because it could disrupt
the territorial status quo and raise nuclear tensions in the region. A border conflict between
India and China could also prompt Pakistan totry to take advantage of the situation, further
contributing to regional instability.
Long-standing border disputes that led toa Sino–Indian war in 1962 have again become
a flashpoint in recent years. In April 2013, themost serious border incident between India
and China in more than two decades occurred

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 8Chinese Fault LinesKAZ.

MONGOLIARUSSIA

SOUTH
KOREA
JAPAN

CHINA

China-India
BorderParacelIslands

PAK.

BURMA

INDIA

ArabianSea

Bay ofBengal

East
China
Sea

East China Sea

TaiwanSenkaku/Diaoyu Islands

30°N

South China Sea
Spratly
Islands
PHILIPPINES

South
China
Sea

Philippine
Sea
0°

China-India Border. The Line of
Actual Control represents oneof the world’s longest
disputed borders and has
been the site of several
standoffs between the
Chinese and Indian militaries
in recent years, including aborder crisis in 2020 that
resulted in the first casualties
from hostilities at the borderin more than 40 years.
East China Sea. China claims
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands, which are currently
administered by Japan. In
recent years, Chinese aircraft

120°E

90°E

﻿

Indian Ocean

and naval vessels haveentered the airspace andterritorial sea around theislands with growing
frequency.
30°S
Taiwan. The Republic of China
on Taiwan claims sovereignty.
The People’s Republic ofChina disputes this andregularly conducts
provocative militarymaneuvers near Taiwan.

Southeast Asian neighbors.
China's unlawful claims in thesea and attempts to restrict
freedom of navigation there
have also produced tensions
with the U.S., which has sent
aircraft and naval vessels
through the South China Sea
to signal its objections to thenature of China's claims. This
has resulted in a number ofconfrontations between
Chinese and U.S. vessels.

South China Sea. The South
China Sea hosts several
territorial disputes between
China and Taiwan and its

SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

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A heritage.org

227

MAP 9Disputed Borders Between India and China
TAJIKISTAN
XinjiangLine ofControl

Aksai
Chin

Islamabad
Jammu andKashmir
PAKISTAN

Ladakh

CHINA
Qinghai

Western Sector
Eastern Sector

Himachal
PradeshMiddle Sector

Uttarakhand

TIBET
AUTONOMOUSREGIONLhasa

New Delhi
Uttar
PradeshSichuan

esh
rad
hal P
c
a
n
Aru

NEPAL
BHUTAN
SikkimINDIA

YunnanBANGLADESH

Dhaka

BURMA

Disputed borders
Disputed territories﻿

Bay of Bengal

Western Sector. Aksai Chin, abarren plateau that was partof the former princely state of
Jammu and Kashmir, has been
administered by the Chinesesince they seized control of
the territory in the 1962
Sino–Indian border conflict.
One of the main causes ofthat war was India’s discovery
of a road China had built
through the region, which
India considered its territory.

Middle Sector. The Middle
Sector, where the Indian statesof Uttarakhand and Himachal
Pradesh meet the Tibet
Autonomous Region, is theleast contentious of the threemain disputed “sectors,” withthe least amount of territory
contested. It is also the only
sector for which the Chineseand Indian governments haveformally exchanged maps
delineating their claims.

SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

A heritage.org

when Chinese troops settled for three weeks
several miles inside northern Indian territory on the Depsang Plains in Ladakh. A visit toIndia by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2014 was overshadowed by anotherflare-up in border tensions when hundreds of228

Eastern Sector. China claims
nearly the entire Indian stateof Arunachal Pradesh, which
Beijing calls South Tibet. The
McMahon Line, which hasserved as the de facto Line of
Actual Control since 1962, wasestablished in 1914 by the
British and Tibetan
representatives and is notrecognized by China. The U.S.
recognizes Arunachal Pradesh
as sovereign Indian territory.

Chinese PLA forces reportedly set up camps in
the mountainous regions of Ladakh, prompting Indian forces to deploy to forward positions in the region. This border standoff lasted three weeks until both sides agreed to pulltheir troops back to previous positions.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthdevelopment along the disputed border, although China currently holds a decisive
military edge.

Conclusion
China presents the United States with the region’s most comprehensive security challenge.
It poses various threat contingencies across all
three areas of vital American national interests:
homeland; regional war, including potential attacks on overseas U.S. bases as well as against
allies and friends; and international common
spaces. China’s provocative behavior is well
documented. It is challenging the U.S. and its
allies such as Japan at sea, in the air, and in cyberspace; it has raised concerns on its borderwith India; and it is a standing threat to Taiwan.
Despite a lack of official transparency, publicly available sources shed considerable light on
China’s rapidly growing military capabilities.
The Chinese commissioned their firsthomegrown aircraft carrier two years ago andare fielding large numbers of new platforms
for their land, sea, air, and outer space forces
as well as in the electromagnetic domain. The
PLA has been staging larger and more comprehensive exercises, including major exercises inthe East China Sea near Taiwan, that are improving the ability of the Chinese to operate
their abundance of new systems. It has also
continued to conduct probes of both the South
Korean and Japanese ADIZs, drawing rebukesfrom both Seoul and Tokyo.
This Index assesses the overall threat from
China, considering the range of contingencies,
as “aggressive” for level of provocation of behavior and “formidable” for level of capability.

Threats: China
HOSTILE
Behavior

TESTINGASSERTIVE

BENIGNCAPABLEASPIRATIONALMARGINAL%
FORMIDABLE

Capability

AGGRESSIVEGATHERING%

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military229

﻿In 2017, Chinese military engineers werebuilding a road to the Doklam plateau, an areaclaimed by both Bhutan and China, and this led
to a confrontation between Chinese and Indianforces, the latter requested by Bhutanese authorities to provide assistance. The crisis lasted
73 days; both sides pledged to pull back, but Chinese construction efforts in the area have continued.63 Improved Chinese infrastructure not
only would give Beijing the diplomatic advantage over Bhutan, but also could make the Siliguri corridor that links the eastern Indian stateswith the rest of the country more vulnerable.
In June 2020, the situation escalated evenfurther. Clashes between Indian and Chinese
troops using rocks, clubs, and fists led to atleast 20 Indian dead and (as the Chinese authorities recently admitted) at least four Chinese killed. This was in the Galwan Valley areaof Ladakh.64 In September, there were reportsof shots exchanged near the Pangong Lake region, signaling further potential escalation.65
India claims that China occupies more than
14,000 square miles of Indian territory in the
Aksai Chin along its northern border in Kashmir, and China lays claim to more than 34,000
square miles of India’s northeastern state ofArunachal Pradesh. The issue is also closely
related to China’s concern for its control ofTibet and the presence in India of the Tibetan
government in exile and Tibet’s spiritual leader,
the Dalai Lama.
China is building up military infrastructureand expanding a network of road, rail, and air
links in its southwestern border areas. To meetthese challenges, the Indian government has
also committed to expanding infrastructureEndnotes
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, p. 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed June 2, 2021).

2.

Anastasia Lloyd-Damnjanovic, “Beijing’s Deadly Game: Consequences of Excluding Taiwan from the World Health Organization
During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission Issue Brief, May 12, 2020, p. 2, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/Beijings_Deadly_Game_Excluding_Taiwan_from_WHO_during_COVID-19_
Pandemic.pdf (accessed June 2, 2021).

3.

Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications,
National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, China
Strategic Perspectives No. 10, March 2017, passim, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/
ChinaPerspectives-10.pdf (accessed June 2, 2021).

4.

U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019,
pp. 58–60, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_
FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf (accessed June 2, 2021).

5.

Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL33153, updated March 9, 2021, p. 2,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf (accessed June 2, 2021). See also Table 2, “Numbers of Chinese and U.S. Navy Battle
Force Ships, 2000–2030,” in ibid., p. 32.

6.

Dennis Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, “A Potent Vector: Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments,”
Joint Force Quarterly No. 75 (4th Quarter 2014), pp. 98–105, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-75/jfq75_98-105_Gormley-et-al.pdf (accessed June 2, 2021).

7.

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, p. 24, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF (accessed June 2, 2021).

8.

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, p. 35, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf (accessed June 2, 2021).

9.

U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, p. 70.

﻿1.

10. Section II, “National Defense Policy,” in People’s Republic of China, Ministry of National Defense, White Paper 2010, http://eng.
mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-04/11/content_4778206_2.htm (accessed June 3, 2021).
11. Kristin Huang, “Shandong Aircraft Carrier Group Concludes South China Sea Exercise,” South China Morning Post, May 2, 2021,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3131977/shandong-aircraft-carrier-group-concludes-south-china-sea(accessed June 3, 2021).
12. Franz-Stefan Gady, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier to Use Advanced Jet Launch System,” The Diplomat, November 6, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-to-use-advanced-jet-launch-system/ (accessed June 3, 2021).
13. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021), p. 255.
14. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, p. 144, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DODCHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF (accessed June 3, 2021).
15. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, p. 58.
16. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, p. 34, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINAMILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF (accessed June 3, 2021).
17. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Delivers 1st S-400 Missile Defense Regiment to China,” The Diplomat, April 3, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/russia-delivers-1st-s-400-missile-defense-regiment-to-china/ (accessed June 3, 2021).
18. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, p. 66.

230

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength19. Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s SSBN Forces: Transitioning to the Next Generation,” Jamestown Foundation
China Brief, Vol. 9, Issue 12 (June 12, 2009), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35120#.
U5G0OSjb5NQ (accessed June 3, 2021).
20. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, p. 45.
21. Brad Lendon, “China Is Building a Sprawling Network of Missile Silos, Imagery Appears to Show,” CNN, July 2, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/02/asia/china-missile-silos-intl-hnk-ml/index.html (accessed September 11, 2021); Matt Korda andHans Kristensen, “China Is Building a Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field,” Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security
Blog, July 26, 2021, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/07/china-is-building-a-second-nuclear-missile-silo-field/ (accessed
September 11, 2021); and Shannon Bugos and Julia Masterson, “New Chinese Missile Silo Fields Discovered,” Arms Control Today,
Vol. 51 (September 2021), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-09/news/new-chinese-missile-silo-fields-discovered (accessed
September 11, 2021).
22. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, p. 66.
23. For more information on China’s cruise missile program, see Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A
Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2014),
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/force-multiplier.pdf (accessed June 3, 2021). Published by the NDU
Press for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, “established as an integral part of the National Defense University’s
Institute for National Strategic Studies on March 1, 2000.”
24. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, p. 45.
25. Press release, “U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor
Organization for Commercial Advantage,” U.S. Department of Justice, May 19, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-chargesfive-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor (accessed June 3, 2021).
26. BBC News, “Equifax: US Charges Four Chinese Military Officers over Huge Hack,” February 11, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-us-canada-51449778 (accessed June 3, 2021).

﻿

27. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, “Competing in Space,” December 2018, p. 21, https://media.defense.gov/2019/
Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.PDF (accessed June 3, 2021).
28. Gregory B. Poling, “The Conventional Wisdom on China’s Island Bases Is Dangerously Wrong,” War on the Rocks, January 10,
2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-conventional-wisdom-on-chinas-island-bases-is-dangerously-wrong/ (accessed
June 3, 2021), and J. Michael Dahm, “Beyond ‘Conventional Wisdom’: Evaluating the PLA’s South China Sea Bases in Operational
Context,” War on the Rocks, March 17, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/beyond-conventional-wisdom-evaluating-theplas-south-china-sea-bases-in-operational-context/ (accessed June 3, 2021).
29. “Building an Active, Layered Defense: Chinese Naval and Air Force Advancement,” interview with Andrew S. Erickson, U.S. Naval
War College, by Greg Chaffin, National Bureau of Asian Research, September 10, 2012, https://www.nbr.org/publication/buildingan-active-layered-defense-chinese-naval-and-air-force-advancement/ (accessed June 3, 2021).
30. Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan D. Neuhard, “Countering China’s Laser Offensive,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2020, https://thediplomat.
com/2020/04/countering-chinas-laser-offensive/ (accessed June 3, 2021).
31. Xinhua, “China Announces Success in Technology to Refuel Satellites in Orbit,” June 30, 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/china/
Off_the_Wire/2016-06/30/content_38784419.htm (accessed June 3, 2021).
32. Mei Lianju, Space Operations Teaching Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Publishing House, 2013), p. 65.
33. See, for example, Brian Weeden, Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian Anti-Satellite Testing in Space, Secure
World Foundation, March 17, 2014, https://swfound.org/media/167224/through_a_glass_darkly_march2014.pdf (accessed June 3,2021).
34. Ian Easton, “The Great Game in Space: China’s Evolving ASAT Weapons Programs and Their Implications for Future U.S. Strategy,”
Project 2049 Institute, 2009, pp. 4–5, https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf (accessed June 3, 2021).
35. Mei Lianju, Space Operations Teaching Materials, p. 69.
36. Peter B. de Selding, “Runaway Zombie Satellite Galaxy 15 Continues to Pose Interference Threat,” SpaceNews, October 15, 2010,
http://www.space.com/9340-runaway-zombie-satellite-galaxy-15-continues-pose-interference-threat.html (accessed June 3, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military231

37. Verizon, 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report, pp. 21–22, https://cybersecurity.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/
sites/87/2019/04/data-breach-investigations-report-2013.pdf (accessed June 3, 2021). See also Elise Ackerman, “New Verizon
Security Report Finds a Growing Number of Attacks by China’s Hacker Army,” Forbes, April 23, 2013, https://www.forbes.
com/sites/eliseackerman/2013/04/23/new-verizon-security-report-finds-a-growing-number-of-attacks-by-chinas-hackerarmy/#11429f622c49 (accessed June 3, 2021), and Lucian Constantin, “Verizon: One in Five Data Breaches Are the Result ofCyberespionage,” PC World, April 23, 2013, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2036177/one-in-five-data-breaches-are-the-resultof-cyberespionage-verizon-says.html (accessed June 3, 2021).
38. Mike Lennon, “Unit in China’s PLA Behind Massive Cyber Espionage Units,” SecurityWeek, February 18, 2013, https://www.
securityweek.com/cyber-unit-chinas-pla-behind-massive-cyber-espionage-operation-report (accessed June 3, 2021). For the fullreport, see Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf (accessed June 3, 2021).
39. Bai Bangxi and Jiang Lijun, “‘Systems Combat’ Is Not the Same as ‘System Combat,’” China National Defense Newspaper, January
10, 2008, cited in Dean Cheng, “U.S.–China Competition in Space,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Space, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, September 27, 2016, p. 2, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/SY/
SY16/20160927/105387/HHRG-114-SY16-Wstate-ChengD-20160927.pdf (accessed June 3, 2021).
40. Guo Ruobing, Theory of Military Information Security (Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Publishing House, 2013), pp.
12–21.
41. Tan Rukan, Building Operational Strength Course Materials (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Publishing House, 2012), p.
204.
42. Reuters, “Taiwan Reports Largest Ever Incursion by Chinese Air Force,” March 26, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/ustaiwna-china-security/taiwan-reports-largest-ever-incursion-by-chinese-air-force-idUSKBN2BI24D (accessed June 3, 2021).

﻿

43. Reuters, “Taiwan Air Force Scrambles Again to Warn off Chinese Jets,” Al Jazeera, March 16, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2020/03/taiwan-airforce-scrambles-warn-chinese-jets-200317003712908.html (accessed June 3, 2021).
44. Alastair Gale, “U.S. Concerns About China Put Focus on Taiwan’s Defensive Weakness,” The Wall Street Journal, April
22, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-concerns-about-taiwan-put-focus-on-islands-defensive-weakness11619113253?mod=searchresults_pos2&page=1 (accessed June 3, 2021), and Matthew Strong, “Chinese Reconnaissance Plane
Enters Taiwan’s ADIZ,” Taiwan News, January 2, 2021, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4092562 (accessed June 3,2021).
45. Kristin Huang, “Chinese Air Force’s Drill ‘Aimed at Signalling Deterrent Around Taiwan,’” South China Morning Post, April 2,
2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3077997/chinese-air-forces-drill-aimed-signalling-deterrent-around(accessed June 3, 2021).
46. Erin Hale, “In Shadow of Coronavirus, China Steps up Manoeuvres Near Taiwan,” Al Jazeera, April 23, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2020/04/shadow-coronavirus-china-steps-manoeuvres-taiwan-200422011542456.html (accessed June 3, 2021), and
Yew Lun Tian and Ben Blanchard, “China Rattles Sabres as World Battles Coronavirus Pandemic,” Reuters, April 21, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security/china-rattles-sabres-as-world-battles-coronavirus-pandemic-idUSKBN2230GC(accessed June 3, 2021).
47. See Chapter 10, “The South China Sea Tribunal,” in Tufts University, The Fletcher School, Law of the Sea: A Policy Primer, https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-ten/ (accessed June 3, 2021).
48. “Japan Lodges Protests Against Chinese Maritime Intrusions Near Senkakus,” The Japan Times, April 22, 2020, https://www.
japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/04/22/national/japan-protest-chinese-intrusions-senkakus/ (accessed June 3, 2021).
49. Ankit Panda, “Japan Identifies Chinese Submarine in East China Sea: A Type 093 SSN,” The Diplomat, January 16, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/japan-identifies-chinese-submarine-in-east-china-sea-a-type-093-ssn/ (accessed June 3, 2021);
Howard Wang, “China vs. Japan: Is the East China Sea Showdown Back on?” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, June 7, 2019,https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-vs-japan-east-china-sea-showdown-back-61492 (accessed June 3, 2021); and Ankit
Panda, “China Patrol Ships Sustain Presence Near Senkaku Islands: Report,” The Diplomat, June 10, 2019, https://thediplomat.
com/2019/06/china-patrol-ships-sustain-presence-near-senkaku-islands-report/ (accessed June 3, 2021).
50. Jason Le Miere, “China Claims U.S. Military Plane ‘Illegally’ Entered Chinese Air Defense Zone,” Newsweek, March 24, 2017, http://
www.newsweek.com/china-claims-us-military-plane-illegally-entered-chinese-air-defense-zone-573711 (accessed June 3, 2021).
51. Hans Nichols and Courtney Kube, “Two Chinese Fighter Jets Intercept U.S. Plane over East China Sea, Officials Say,” NBC
News, updated May 18, 2017, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/two-chinese-fighter-jets-intercept-u-s-plane-officialssay-n761931 (accessed June 3, 2021).

232

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength52. Khanh Vu, “Vietnam Protests Beijing’s Sinking of South China Sea Boat,” Reuters, April 4, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-vietnam-china-southchinasea/vietnam-protests-beijings-sinking-of-south-china-sea-boat-idUSKBN21M072 (accessed June 3,2021), and “Chinese Vessel Rams Vietnamese Fishing Boat in S. China Sea,” The Maritime Executive, June 14, 2020, https://www.
maritime-executive.com/article/report-chinese-vessel-rams-vietnamese-fishing-boat-in-s-china-sea (accessed June 3, 2021).
53. Reuters, “Vietnam Protests Beijing’s Expansion in Disputed South China Sea,” April 19, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-vietnam-china-southchinasea/vietnam-protests-beijings-expansion-in-disputed-south-china-sea-idUSKBN2210M7 (accessed
June 3, 2021).
54. Tam Anh, “Vietnam Rejects China’s Illegal Fishing Ban,” Vn Express International, April 29, 2021, https://e.vnexpress.net/news/
news/vietnam-rejects-china-s-illegal-fishing-ban-4270611.html (accessed June 3, 2021).
55. Andreo Calonzo, “Philippines Slams China’s ‘Dangerous’ Move in Disputed Sea,” Bloomberg, updated May 3, 2021, https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-03/philippines-dials-up-protest-on-china-s-dangerous-sea-maneuver?sref=InMWfBxD(accessed June 3, 2021).
56. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Transparency Initiative, “Caught on Camera: Two Dozen Militia Boats at
Whitsun Reef Identified,” April 21, 2021, https://amti.csis.org/caught-on-camera-two-dozen-militia-boats-at-whitsun-reefidentified/ (accessed June 3, 2021).
57. “Philippines Has Ulterior Motives to Suddenly Hype up the Matter over Niu’e Jiao,” Global Times, April 5, 2021, https://www.
globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1220284.shtml (accessed June 3, 2021).
58. Although it has long been a matter of U.S. policy that Philippine territorial claims in the South China Sea lie outside the scopeof American treaty commitments, the treaty does apply in the event of an attack on Philippine “armed forces, public vessels or
aircraft in the Pacific.” Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, August 30, 1951,
Article V, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp (accessed June 3, 2021). In any event, Article IV of the treaty
obligates the U.S. in case of such an attack to “meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.”
Regardless of formal treaty obligations, however, enduring U.S. interests in the region and perceptions of U.S. effectiveness andreliability as a check on growing Chinese ambitions would likely spur the U.S. to become involved.

60. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “An Accounting of China’s Deployments to
the Spratly Islands,” May 9, 2018, https://amti.csis.org/accounting-chinas-deployments-spratly-islands/ (accessed June 3, 2021).
61. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina 2019, p. 75.
62. Kelvin Chen, “China to Set up ADIZ in South China Sea,” Taiwan News, May 5, 2020, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/
news/3928503 (accessed June 3, 2021).
63. Joel Wuthnow, Satu Limaye, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Doklam, One Year Later: China’s Long Game in the Himalayas,” Waron the Rocks, June 7, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/doklam-one-year-later-chinas-long-game-in-the-himalayas/(accessed June 3, 2021).
64. BBC News, “Ladakh: China Reveals Soldier Deaths in India Border Clash,” February 19, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-56121781 (accessed June 3, 2021).
65. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Shots Fired Along India–China Border for First Time in Years,” The New York Times, updated September 29,
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/08/world/asia/india-china-border.html (accessed June 3, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military233﻿

59. Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, statement “On U.S. Pacific Command Posture” before
the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 27, 2017, p. 8, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Harris_04-27-17.pdf (accessed June 26, 2019).

﻿Russia
Alexis MrachekR

ussia remains a formidable ‌threat to the
The navy has one aircraft carrier; 49 submaUnited States and its interests in Europe.
rines (including 11 ballistic missile submaFrom the Arctic to the Baltics, Ukraine, and therines); four cruisers; 11 destroyers; 15 frigSouth Caucasus, and increasingly in the Medates; and 125 patrol and coastal combatants.
iterranean, Russia continues to foment instability in Europe. Despite economic problems,
The air force has 1,160 combat-­
Russia continues to prioritize the rebuilding
capable aircraft.
of its military and funding for its military operations abroad. Russia remains antagonistic to
The army has 280,000 soldiers.
the United States both militarily and politically,
and its efforts to undermine U.S. institutions
There is a total reserve force of 2,000,000
and the NATO alliance continue without letfor all armed forces.1
up. In Europe, Russia uses its energy position,
along with espionage, cyberattacks, and inforIn addition, Russian deep-sea research vesmation warfare, to exploit vulnerabilities with sels include converted ballistic missile submathe goal of dividing the transatlantic alliance rines, which hold smaller auxiliary submarines
and undermining faith in government and so- that can operate on the ocean floor.2
cietal institutions.
To avoid political blowback from military
Overall, Russia possesses significant con- deaths abroad, Russia has increasingly deventional and nuclear capabilities and remains ployed paid private volunteer troops trained at
the principal threat to European security. Its Special Forces bases and often under the comaggressive stance in a number of theaters, mand of Russian Special Forces. It has used
including the Balkans, Georgia, Syria, and such volunteers in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine
Ukraine, continues both to encourage desta- because they help the Kremlin “keep costs
bilization and to threaten U.S. interests.
low and maintain a degree of deniability,” andMilitary Capabilities. According to “[a]ny personnel losses could be shrouded fromthe International Institute for Strategic unauthorized disclosure.”3
Studies (IISS):In February 2018, for example, at Deir alZour in eastern Syria, 500 pro-Assad forces
Among the key weapons in Russia’s inand Russian mercenaries armed with Russian
ventory are 336 intercontinental ballistictanks, artillery, and mortars attacked U.S.-­
missiles, 2,840 main battle tanks, 5,220
supported Kurdish forces.4 Approximately 30
armored infantry fighting vehicles, more
U.S. Rangers and Delta Force special operators
than 6,100 armored personnel carriers,
were also at the base.5 U.S. air strikes helped toand more than 4,684 pieces of artillery.
repulse the attack, and “three sources familiar
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﻿

with the matter” estimated that approximately the Russian economy rebounded during the
300 Russian mercenaries were either killed or latter part of the pandemic and is expected towounded.6 Moscow claims, however, that since record growth in 2021.18 Because of the ecothe launch of its Syria operation, only 112 Rus- nomic boost following the coronavirus locksian troops have suffered casualties.7
downs, Russia will likely find it easier to fund
In January 2019, reports surfaced that 400 its military operations.
Russian mercenaries from the Wagner GroupIn 2020, Russia spent $61.7 billion on its
were in Venezuela to bolster the regime of military—5.23 percent less than it spent in
Nicolás Maduro.8 Russian propaganda in Ven- 2019—but still remained one of the world’s
ezuela has supported the regime and stoked top five nations in terms of defense spending.19
fears of American imperialism. In February
Much of Russia’s military expenditure is
2020, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov directed toward modernization of its armed
visited Venezuela to “counteract U.S. sanctions” forces. According to a July 2020 Congressioand show support for Maduro.9
nal Research Service report, “Russia has unDuring the past few years, as the crisis has dertaken extensive efforts to modernize andmetastasized and protests against the Madu- upgrade its armed forces” since its invasion
ro regime have grown, Russia has begun to de- of Georgia in 2008.20 From 2010 to 2019 (theploy troops and supplies to bolster Maduro’s most recent year for which data are publicly
security forces.10 In December 2018, for exam- available), close to 40 percent of Russia’s total
ple, Russia temporarily deployed two Tu-160 military spending was on arms procurement.21
nuclear-­capable bombers to Caracas.11 Russia Taking into account total military expenditure,also exports billions in arms to Venezuela (and Russia spent more than 4 percent of GDP on
has loaned the regime money to purchase Rus- defense in 2020.22
sian arms) along with $70 million–$80 million
In early 2018, Russia introduced its newyearly in nonmilitary goods.12
State Armament Program 2018–2027, a $306
In July 2016, Russian President Vladimir billion investment in new equipment andPutin signed a law creating a National Guard force modernization. However, according towith a total strength (both civilian and mili- the Royal Institute of International Affairs,tary) of 340,000, controlled directly by him.13 “as inflation has eroded the value of the rouble
He created his National Guard, which is re- since 2011, the new programme is less ambisponsible for “enforcing emergency-situation tious than its predecessor in real terms.”23
regimes, combating terrorism, defending RusRussia has prioritized modernization ofsian territory, and protecting state facilities its nuclear capabilities and “claims to be 81
and assets,” by amalgamating “interior troops percent of the way through a modernizationand various law-­enforcement agencies.”14 Pu- program to replace all Soviet-era missiles with
tin is more likely to use this force domestically newer types by the early 2020s on a less-thanto stifle dissent than he is to deploy it abroad.15 one-for-one basis.”24 Russia plans to deploy the
However, in November 2020, the Russian Na- RS-28 (Satan 2) ICBM by 2022 as a replacetional Guard (Rosgvardia) and the Belarusian ment for the RS-36, which is being phased
Ministry of the Interior signed an official co- out in the 2020s.25 The missile, which canoperation deal specifying that either side “may carry up to 15 warheads,26 was to undergo test
carry out law-­enforcement-type operations on launches in 2019, but the tests were delayed.
the other’s territory.”16 This deal likely direct- To complete the tests, “Russia will first needly resulted from the Belarusian protests that to upgrade the testing site,” which Russianbroke out in August 2020 following the fraud- Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu admitted
ulent presidential election.
in December 2020 had yet to be built.27
At first, the COVID-19 pandemic severely
The armed forces also continue to undergo17affected Russia’s economic growth. However, process modernization, which was begun by

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

ceremonies took place for the fifth and sixth
Admiral Gorshkov–class frigates, which reportedly will join Russia’s Black Sea fleet.40
Russia plans to procure eight Lider-classguided missile destroyers for its Northern andPacific Fleets, but procurement has faced consistent delay.41 As of April 2020, Russia’s Severnoye Design Bureau halted development of thefrigates because of financial setbacks.42
In November 2018, Russia sold three Admiral
Grigorovich–class frigates to India. It is set to deliver at least two of the frigates to India by 2024.43
The ships had been intended for the Black Sea
Fleet, but Russia found itself unable to produce
a replacement engine following Ukraine sanctions. Of the planned 14 frigates, Russia had engines for only two,44 but in January 2021, India
procured gas turbine engines from Ukraine togive to Russia to install on the frigates.45
Russia’s naval modernization continues toprioritize submarines. In June 2020, the first
Project 955A Borei-A ballistic-missile submarine, the Knyaz Vladimir, was delivered
to the Russian Northern Fleet, an addition to
the three original Project 955 Boreis.46 Russia reportedly will construct at least 10 more
Borei-A–class submarines.47 According to Admiral Phil Davidson, head of U.S. Indo-PacificCommand, it was expected that “the Russian
Pacific Fleet [would] add its first Kalibr cruise
missile-capable ships and submarines to its inventory in 2021.”48 In August 2021, the missile
corvette Sovetsk, part of Russia’s Baltic Fleet,test-launched a Kalibr cruise missile fromthe White Sea.49
The Khaski-class submarines are planned
fifth-generation stealth nuclear-powered submarines. They are slated to begin construction
in 2023 and to be armed with Zircon hypersonic missiles, which have a reported speed offrom Mach 5 to Mach 6.50 According to a Russian vice admiral, these submarines will be twotimes quieter than current subs.51
Russia also continues to upgrade its diesel
electric Kilo-class subs.52 Reportedly, it inducted the first improved Project 636 Kilo-class submarine into its Pacific Fleet in November 2019and is now focused on delivering six Project

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military237﻿Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in 2008.28
Partially because of this modernization, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Strategy and Force Development Elbridge
Colby stated in January 2018 that the U.S. military advantage over Russia is eroding.29
In April 2020, the Kremlin stated that it had
begun state trials for its T-14 Armata main battle tank in Syria.30 In March 2021, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu revealed that theRussian military would receive a pilot batch of
the T-14 Armata tanks in 2022.31 Aside from the
T-14 Armata, 10 new-build T-90M main battle
tanks, contracted in 2017, were delivered to
the 2nd Motor-Rifle Division in the Moscow
region in 2020.32
Russia’s fifth-generation Su-27 fighter fell
short of expectations, particularly with regard
to stealth capabilities. In May 2018, the government cancelled mass production of the Su-27
because of its high costs and limited capability
advantages over upgraded fourth-generation
fighters.33 Russia lost one of its Su-27 jets near
the Crimean coast during a planned missionin March 2020.34
In October 2018, Russia’s sole aircraft carrier,
the Admiral Kuznetsov, was severely damaged
when a dry dock sank and a crane fell, puncturing the deck and hull.35 In December 2019,the carrier caught on fire during repair work.36
Despite these setbacks, the Kuznetsov is scheduled to begin sea trials in 2022.37 In May 2019,
reports surfaced that Russia is seeking to begin
construction of a new nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier in 2023 for delivery in the late 2030s, but
the procurement’s financial and technologicalfeasibility remains questionable.38
Following years of delays, the Admiral Gorshkov stealth guided missile frigate was commissioned in July 2018. The second Admiral
Gorshkov–class frigate, the Admiral Kasatonov,began sea trials in April 2019, but according tosome analysts, tight budgets and the inability to procure parts from Ukrainian industry(importantly, gas turbine engines) make it
difficult for Russia to build the two additional
Admiral Gorshkov–class frigates as planned.39
Nevertheless, on April 23, 2019, keel-laying﻿

636 improved Kilo-class subs to the Pacific
EW [electronic warfare] to deny, degrade,
Fleet.53 According to one assessment, the suband disrupt communications and navigamarines’ improvement in noise reduction hastion and DEW [directed energy weapons]caused them to be nicknamed “Black Holes,”to deny the use of space-based imagery.
but “the submarine class lacks a functioning air-­
Russia is probably also building a groundindependent propulsion system, which reduced
based missile capable of destroying
the boats’ overall stealth capabilities.”54
satellites in orbit.58
Transport remains a nagging problem, andRussia’s defense minister has stressed theIn December 2020, Russia tested a ballispaucity of transport vessels. According to a tic, anti-satellite missile built to target imagRAND report:
ery and communications satellites in low Earthorbit.59 According to Colonel Andrei ReveIn 1992, just after the collapse of the Sovinok, Chief of the Space Troops’ Main Center
et Union, the Russian Federation militaryfor Missile Attack Warning within Russia’s
had more than 500 transport aircraft ofAerospace Force, in February 2021, the latest
all types, which were capable of lifting
Voronezh radars will replace all of the existing
29,630 metric tons. By 2017, there were
airspace control systems.60
just over 100 available transport aircraft
Military Exercises. Russian military exerin the inventory, capable of lifting 6,240
cises, especially snap exercises, are a source of
metric tons, or approximately one-fifth ofserious concern because they have masked realthe 1992 capacity.55
military operations in the past. Their purposeis twofold: to project strength and to improve
In 2017, Russia reportedly needed to pur- command and control. According to Air Forcechase civilian cargo vessels and use icebreakers General Tod D. Wolters, Commander, U.S. Euto transport troops and equipment to Syria at ropean Command (EUCOM):the beginning of major operations in supportof the Assad regime.56
Russia employs a below-the-threshold of
Although budget shortfalls have hampered
armed conflict strategy via proxies andmodernization efforts overall, Russia continintermediary forces in an attempt toues to focus on development of such high-end
weaken, divide, and intimidate our Allies
systems as the S-500 surface-to-air missile
and partners using a range of covert,
system. As of March 2021, the Russian Minisdifficult-to-attribute, and malign actions.
try of Defense was considering the most fitting
These actions include information andways to introduce its new S-500 Prometheus
cyber operations, election meddling, posurface-to-air missile system, which is able tolitical subversion, economic intimidation,
detect targets at up to 1,200 miles, with its mismilitary sales, exercises, and the calculatsile range maxing at approximately 250 miles,
ed use of force.61“as part of its wider air-defense modernization.”
According to one report, the S-500 system will
Exercises in the Baltic Sea in April 2018, a
57
enter full service by 2025.
day after the leaders of the three Baltic nations
Russia’s counterspace and countersatellite met with President Donald Trump in Washcapabilities are formidable. A Defense Intelli- ington, were meant as a message. Russia statedgence Agency report released in February 2019 twice in April that it planned to conduct threesummarized Russian capabilities:
days of live-fire exercises in Latvia’s Exclusive
Economic Zone, forcing a rerouting of com[O]ver the last two decades, Moscow
mercial aviation as Latvia closed some of its
has been developing a suite of counterairspace.62 Sweden issued warnings to comspace weapons capabilities, including
mercial aviation and sea traffic.63 It turned

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military239

﻿out that Russia did not actually fire any live[T]he breadth of the exercise was impresmissiles, and the Latvian Ministry of Defense
sive. It uniquely involved several major
described the event as “a show of force, nothmilitary districts, as troops from the64
ing else.” The exercises took place near theCentral Military District and the NorthernKarlskrona Naval Base, the Swedish navy’s
Fleet confronted the Eastern Military Dislargest base.65
trict and the Pacific Fleet. After establishRussia’s snap exercises are conducted withing communication links and organizing
little or no warning and often involve thouforces, live firing between September
sands of troops and pieces of equipment.66
13–17 [sic] included air strikes, air defence
In April 2021, for example, between 150,000
operations, ground manoeuvres and raids,
and 300,000 Russian troops massed at thesea assault and landings, coastal defence,
Ukrainian border and in Crimea to conduct
and electronic warfare.73
snap exercises that also involved approximately 35,000 combat vehicles, 900 aircraft,
Chinese and Mongolian forces also tookand 190 navy ships.67 The reintroduction of part, with China sending 3,200 soldiers fromsnap exercises has “significantly improved the the People’s Liberation Army along with nuRussian Armed Forces’ warfighting and power-­ merous pieces of equipment.74 Chinese parprojection capabilities,” according to one ac- ticipation was a significant change from past
count. “These, in turn, support and enable Rus- iterations of VOSTOK, although Chinese forcsia’s strategic destabilisation campaign against es were likely restricted largely to the Tsugol
the West, with military force always casting a training ground, and an uninvited Chinese inshadow of intimidation over Russia’s sub-ki- telligence ship shadowed the Russian Navy’s
netic aggression.”68
sea exercises.75
Snap exercises have been used for military
campaigns as well. According to General Curtis Threats to the Homeland
M. Scaparrotti, former EUCOM Commander
Russia is the only state adversary in theand NATO Supreme Allied Commander Eu- Europe region that possesses the capability torope, for example, “the annexation of Crimea threaten the U.S. homeland with both conventook place in connection with a snap exer- tional and nonconventional means. Althoughcise by Russia.”69 Such exercises also provide there is no indication that Russia plans to use
Russian leadership with a hedge against un- its capabilities against the United States absent
preparedness or corruption. “In addition to a broader conflict involving America’s NATOaffording combat-training benefits,” the IISS allies, the plausible potential for such a scenarreports, “snap inspections appear to be of in- io serves to sustain the strategic importance of
creasing importance as a measure against cor- those capabilities.
ruption or deception.”70
Russia’s 2021 National Security Strategy
Russia conducted its VOSTOK (“East”) describes NATO as a threat to the national sestrategic exercises, held primarily in the curity of the Russian Federation:
Eastern Military District, mainly in Augustand September of 2018 and purportedly withMilitary dangers and military threats to
300,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft, and 900 tanks
the Russian Federation are intensified bytaking part.71 Russia’s defense minister claimed
attempts to exert military pressure onthat the exercises were the largest to have takRussia, its allies and partners, the buildup
en place in Russia since 1981; however, someof the military infrastructure of the North
analysis suggests that the actual number ofAtlantic Treaty Organization near Russianparticipating combat troops was in the range
borders, the intensification of reconof 75,000–100,000.72 One analyst described thenaissance activities, the development ofextent of the exercise:the use of large military formations andabroad,” primarily in Ukraine but also concerning the Baltic States.81 This arsenal serves
both as a deterrent to large-scale attack and
The same document also clearly states that as a protective umbrella under which Russia
Russia will use every means at its disposal to can modernize its conventional forces at a deachieve its strategic goals:
liberate pace, but Russia also needs a modern
and flexible military to fight local wars such as[P]articular attention is paid to…improvthose against Georgia in 2008 and the ongoinging the system of military planning in the
war against Ukraine that began in 2014.
Russian Federation, developing and imUnder Russian military doctrine, the use
plementing interrelated political, military,of nuclear weapons in conventional local andmilitary-technical, diplomatic, economic,
regional wars is seen as de-escalatory because
information and other measures aimed
it would cause an enemy to concede defeat. In
at preventing the use of military force
May 2017, for example, a Russian parliamenagainst Russia and protecting its sovertarian threatened that nuclear weapons might77
eignty and territorial integrity.
be used if the U.S. or NATO were to move toretake Crimea or defend eastern Ukraine.82
Strategic Nuclear Threat. Russia possessGeneral Wolters discussed the risks prees the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons (in- sented by Russia’s possible use of tacticalcluding short-range nuclear weapons) among nuclear weapons in his 2020 EUCOM posthe nuclear powers. It is one of the few nations ture statement:with the capability to destroy many targets in
the U.S. homeland and in U.S.-allied nations as
Russia’s vast non-strategic nuclear weapwell as the capability to threaten and preventons stockpile and apparent mispercepfree access to the commons by other nations.
tion they could gain advantage in crisis
Russia has both intercontinental-range andor conflict through its use is concerning.
short-range ballistic missiles and a varied arRussia continues to engage in disruptive
senal of nuclear weapons that can be delivered
behavior despite widespread internationby sea, land, and air. It also is investing signifial disapproval and continued economic
cant resources in modernizing its arsenal andsanctions, and continues to challenge
maintaining the skills of its workforce, andthe rules-based international order andmodernization of the nuclear triad will remain
violate its obligations under internationala top priority under the new state armament
agreements. The Kremlin employs coerprogram.78 An aging nuclear workforce could
cion and aggressive actions amid growing
impede this modernization. “[A]lthough Russigns of domestic unrest. These actions
sia’s strategic-defence enterprises appear tosuggest Russian leadership may feel
have preserved some of their expertise,” accompelled to take greater risks to maincording to the IISS, “problems remain, for extain power, counter Western influence,
ample, in transferring the necessary skill sets
and seize opportunities to demonstrate aand experience to the younger generation ofperception of great power status.83
79
engineers.” Nevertheless, Putin revealed in
December 2020 “that modern weapons andRussia has two strategies for nuclear deterequipment now make up 86 percent of Russia’s rence. The first is based on a threat of massive
nuclear triad.”80
launch-on-warning and retaliatory strikes to
Russia currently relies on its nuclear arse- deter a nuclear attack; the second is based on
nal to ensure its invincibility against any en- a threat of limited demonstration and “de-­emy, intimidate European powers, and deter escalation” nuclear strikes to deter or termicounters to its predatory behavior in its “near nate a large-scale conventional war.84 Russia’s

﻿nuclear weapons against the RussianFederation.76

2402022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 10

U.S. Troops Vastly
Outnumbered by
Russian Troops Outside
Russia’s Borders
U.S. troops in Norway and
Poland number less than
7,000—far fewer than the
48,300 Russian troops thatare, for all intents andpurposes, permanently
stationed outside its borders
on NATO’s perimeter.

Arctic
Ocean

Atlanic
Ocean

Norway1,007 U.S.
troops

SWEDENFINLAND

Belarus1,500 Russian troops
Kaliningrad(Russia)

Moldova
1,500
Ukraine Ukraine(Crimea) (Donbas)
28,0003,000■ NATO nations● U.S. troops in NATO nations
adjacent to Russia

GERMANY● Russian troops● Russian troops in occupied
territories

RUSSIA

Poland5,500

UKRAINE

FRA.
ITALY

Black Sea
TURKEY

Mediterranean Sea

Armenia
3,300
Syria 4,000

A heritage.org

reliance on nuclear weapons is based partly
on their small cost relative to the cost of conventional weapons, especially in terms of theireffect, and on Russia’s inability to attract sufficient numbers of high-quality servicemembers.
In other words, Russia sees its nuclear weapons as a way to offset the lower quantity andquality of its conventional forces.
Moscow has repeatedly threatened U.S.
allies in Europe with nuclear deployments
and even preemptive nuclear strikes.85 The
Russians justify their aggressive behavior by﻿

SOURCES: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual
Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge,2021); U.S. Department of Defense, Defense
Manpower Data Center; and Heritage
Foundation research.

Georgia
7,000

ROMANIA

pointing to deployments of U.S. missile defense systems in Europe. In the past, thesesystems were not scaled or postured to mitigate Russia’s advantage in ballistic missiles
and nuclear weapons to any significant degree, but Pentagon officials have revealed thatlaser-armed Strykers, new Eastern European
batteries, and sea-based interceptors are set toarrive by 2023.86
Russia continues to violate the Intermediate-­
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, whichbans the testing, production, and possession of

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﻿

intermediate-range missiles.87 Russia first violated the treaty in 2008 and then systematically
escalated its violations, moving from testing to
producing to deploying the prohibited missile
into the field. Russia fully deployed the SSC-X-8
cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty early in 2017 and has deployed battalions with themissile at a missile test site, Kapustin Yar, insouthern Russia; at Kamyshlov, near the border with Kazakhstan; in Shuya, east of Moscow;
and in Mozdok, in occupied North Ossetia.88 U.S.
officials consider the banned cruise missiles tobe fully operational.89
In December 2018, in response to Russian
violations, the U.S. declared Russia to be inmaterial breach of the INF Treaty, a position
with which NATO allies were in agreement.90
The U.S. provided its six-month notice of
withdrawal from the INF treaty on February
2, 2019, and officially withdrew from the treaty
on August 2.91
The sizable Russian nuclear arsenal remains the only threat to the existence of the
U.S. homeland emanating from Europe andEurasia. While the potential for use of thisarsenal remains low, the fact that Russia continues to threaten Europe with nuclear attack
demonstrates that it will continue to play acentral strategic role in shaping both Moscow’s military and political thinking and thelevel of Russia’s aggressive behavior beyond
its borders.

ll

In May 2016, a Russian spy was sentenced
to prison for gathering intelligence for
Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service(SVR) while working as a banker in New
York. The spy specifically transmitted
intelligence on “potential U.S. sanctions
against Russian banks and the UnitedStates’ efforts to develop alternative energy resources.”92
In October 2019, the U.S. released and deported to Russia Maria Butina, a convicted
Russian operative who had infiltrated
American conservative political groups
to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.93

The European External Action Service, diplomatic service of the European Union (EU),estimates that 200 Russian spies are operating in Brussels, which also is the headquartersof NATO.94 According to one report, Russian
spies are becoming harder to track because
they infiltrate companies, schools, and eventhe government.95
On March 4, 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former
Russian GRU colonel who was convicted in2006 of selling secrets to the United Kingdom and freed in a spy swap between the U.S.
and Russia in 2010, and his daughter Yulia
were poisoned with Novichok nerve agent by
Russian security services in Salisbury, U.K.
Hundreds of residents could have been conThreat of Regional War
taminated, including a police officer who was
Many U.S. allies regard Russia as a genuine exposed to the nerve agent after responding.96
threat. At times, this threat is of a military na- It took a year and the work of 190 U.K. Armyture. At other times, it involves less conven- and Air Force personnel plus contractors totional tactics such as cyberattacks, utilization complete the physical cleanup of Salisbury.97
of energy resources, and propaganda. Today, as
On March 15, 2018, France, Germany, thein Imperial times, Russia uses both the pen and U.K., and the U.S. issued a joint statement conthe sword to exert its influence. Organizations demning Russia’s use of the nerve agent: “Thislike the Collective Security Treaty Organiza- use of a military-grade nerve agent, of a typetion (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union developed by Russia, constitutes the first of(EEU), for example, embody Russia’s attempt fensive use of a nerve agent in Europe since theto bind regional capitals to Moscow through a Second World War.”98 U.S. intelligence officials
series of agreements and treaties.
have reportedly linked Russia to the deaths ofRussia also uses espionage in ways that are 14 people in the U.K. alone, many of them Rusdamaging to U.S. interests. For example:
sians who ran afoul of the Kremlin.99

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 11

Russian Interference Zones
UKRAINE

DonbasKAZAKHSTANTransnistria
MOLDOVARUSSIA

CrimeaROMANIA

Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia
Black Sea
CaspianSea

BULGARIAGEORGIAARMENIA AZERBAIJAN

NagornoKarabakh

GREECE
TURKEY
IRAN

Transnistria 1992
Nagorno-Karabakh

﻿

1994

Abkhazia and South Ossetia

2008

Crimea2014

Donbas2014
1990

Transnistria. Russia has stationed
troops in Transnistria since 1992
when a cease-fire ended the
Moldovan civil war.
Nagorno-Karabakh. In
September 2020, major
fighting broke out in the
Nagorno–Karabakh frozen
conflict. Since 1994, Armenia
had been occupying
Azerbaijan’s Nagorno–
Karabakh region and parts ofseven other surrounding
districts. The fighting ended in
November 2020 when Armenia
and Azerbaijan signed a
Russian-brokered cease-fire

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

deal. Although Azerbaijan
regained much of its territory,
approximately 2,000 Russian
peacekeeping troops remain inparts of Nagorno–Karabakh fornow.

there ever since then. In
March–April 2021, Russian
troops massed within Crimea inconnection with an escalationof fighting in the Donbas
region.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Since Russia’s 2008 invasion ofGeorgia and the subsequent
five-day war, Russian troops
have been stationed in both
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Donbas. Russia’s annexation of
Crimea led to an armed conflict
between Russian troops,
Russian-backed separatist
forces, and Ukrainian soldiers in
Ukraine’s eastern Donbas
region. In March–April 2021, thefighting escalated sharply, andRussia massed troops along
the Ukrainian border in
response to that escalation.

Crimea. In March 2014, Russia
illegally annexed the entire
Crimean peninsula, and Russian
troops have been stationed

SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

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Russian intelligence operatives are reportedly mapping U.S. telecommunications infrastructure around the United States, focusing
especially on fiber-optic cables.100
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In March 2017, the U.S. charged four
people, including two Russian intelligence
officials, with directing hacks of user data
involving Yahoo and Google accounts.101
In December 2016, the U.S. expelled 35
Russian intelligence operatives, closed
two compounds in Maryland and New
York that were used for espionage, andlevied additional economic sanctions
against individuals who took part in interfering in the 2016 U.S. election.102
Undersea cables in the United States arealso at risk of being tapped for valuable intelligence. Fourteen Russian sailors whodied aboard a submarine that caught firein July 2019 were suspected of attempting
to tap information flowing from American
undersea cables.103

Russia has also used its relations withfriendly nations—especially Nicaragua—for espionage purposes. In April 2017, Nicaragua began using a Russian-provided satellite station
at Managua that, even though the Nicaraguan
government denies it is intended for spying, isof concern to the U.S.104 In November 2017, theRussian-built “counter-drug” center at Las Colinas opened, its future purpose being to support “Russian security engagement with theentire region.”105 According to a Foreign Policy
Research Institute report, “Aside from the center, Russian forces have participated in joint
raids and operations against drug trafficking[in Nicaragua], capturing as many as 41 presumed traffickers in one particular operation”
since 2017.106 Russia also has an agreementwith Nicaragua, signed in 2015, that allows access to Nicaraguan ports for its naval vessels.107
Pressure on Central and Eastern Europe. Moscow poses a security challenge
to members of NATO that border Russia.

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Although a conventional Russian attack against
a NATO member is unlikely, primarily because
it would trigger a NATO response, it cannot be
entirely discounted. Russia continues to use
cyberattacks, espionage, its significant share of
the European energy market, and propaganda
to sow discord among NATO member states
and undermine the alliance. The Estonian
Foreign Intelligence Service’s International
Security and Estonia 2019 report states clearly
that “[t]he only serious threat to regional security, including the existence and sovereignty of
Estonia and other Baltic Sea states, emanatesfrom Russia. It involves not only asymmetrical,
covert or political subversion, but also a potential military threat.”108
After decades of Russian domination, thecountries of Central and Eastern Europe factor
Russia into their military planning and foreign
policy formulation in a way that is simply unimaginable in many Western European countries and North America. Estonia and Latvia
have sizable ethnic Russian populations, andthere is concern that Russia might exploit thisas a pretext for aggression—a view that is notwithout merit in view of Moscow’s irredentist
rhetoric and Russia’s use of this technique toannex Crimea.
According to Lithuania’s National Threat
Assessment 2021, “It is almost certain that Russia’s policy of denying the sovereign choices of
its neighbours will remain one of the most significant security threats in the Baltic Region in
the future.”109 Its National Threat Assessment
2019 states that Russia “exploits democratic
freedoms and rights for its subversive activity”
and “actually promotes its aggressive foreign
policy” while “pretending to develop cultural
relations” in Lithuania.110
Latvian authorities describe the means
used by Russia to claim that it is defending
the rights of citizens or Russian compatriots
in similar terms: TV propaganda to push discrediting messages about Latvia and stories
in which the rights of Russian citizens are allegedly violated; “spreading interpretationsof history favourable to Russia within Russia and abroad, as well as actively engaging

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthwas published online was meant to undermine NATO’s reputation among the public.118
One report summarized that “Russia’s state
propaganda channels RT and Sputnik remainvery keen to exploit to the maximum any incidents involving eFP personnel, and to repeat
the Kremlin’s anti-NATO and anti-eFP narrative.”119 In particular, more recent Russian
propaganda has focused on portraying eFP as
an “occupying force.”120
Russia has also demonstrated a willingness
to use military force to change the bordersof modern Europe. When Kremlin-backed
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych failed
to sign an Association Agreement with the EU
in 2013, months of street demonstrations led
to his ouster early in 2014. Russia responded
by sending troops, aided by pro-Russian local militia, to occupy the Crimean Peninsula under the pretext of “protecting Russian
people.” This led to Russia’s eventual annexation of Crimea, the first such forcible annexation of territory in Europe since the Second World War.121
Russia’s annexation of Crimea has effectively cut Ukraine’s coastline in half, and Russia
has claimed rights to underwater resources
off the Crimean Peninsula.122 In May 2018,
Russia inaugurated the first portion of a $7.5
billion, 11.8-mile bridge connecting Russia
with Kerch in occupied Crimea. The projectwill be fully completed in 2023.123 The effecton Ukraine’s regional economic interests canbe seen in the fact that 30 percent of the cargoships that served Mariupol could not clear the
span.124 In December 2019, Russia completed a
new rail bridge over the Kerch Strait that the
EU condemned as “yet another step toward
a forced integration of the illegally annexedpeninsula.”125
Russia has deployed 28,000 troops toCrimea and has embarked on a major program
to build housing, restore airfields, and install
new radars there.126 The Monolit-B radar system, for instance, has a passive range of 450
kilometers, and its deployment “provides theRussian military with an excellent real-time
picture of the positions of foreign surface

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military245

﻿in military-memorial work”; and the use of“compatriot support funds and other compatriot policy bodies” targeted at Latvian youth.111
Russia has also sought to undermine thestatehood and legitimacy of the Baltic States.
In January 2018, for example, Putin signed
a decree renaming an air force regiment the“Tallinn Regiment” to “preserve holy historical military traditions” and “raise [the] spiritof military obligation.”112 General Scaparrotti
testified in March 2017 that Russian propaganda and disinformation should be viewed as
an extension of Russia’s military capabilities:“The Russians see this as part of that spectrumof warfare, it’s their asymmetric approach.”113
In 2020, Russia used the COVID-19 pandemic to spread disinformation. In March, forexample, various Russian state news sources
reported that the U.S. initiated the coronavirus pandemic, that the U.S. deployed the virus
as a “biological weapon,” or that the virus was
a complete hoax created by the United States.
Nor did Russia create this disinformation on
its own; it relied on various theories createdby China and Iran.114
In addition, Russia has sought to use disinformation to undermine NATO’s Enhanced
Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltics. In April
2017, for example, Russian hackers planted afalse story about U.S. troops being poisonedby mustard gas in Latvia on the Baltic News
Service website.115 Since 2017, a disinformation
campaign nicknamed “ghostwriter” has beenongoing. In some cases, Russian hackers published false news stories “on real news websites
without permission.” In one case, a Lithuanian news site published a fake article in 2019“claiming that German soldiers had desecrateda Jewish cemetery,” and in another, a fake message was published on the Polish War Studies
Academy website, purportedly from the organization’s commander, calling for troops “tofight against ‘the American occupation.’”116
U.S. troops stationed in Poland for NATO’seFP have been the target of similar Russian
disinformation campaigns.117 A fabricated interview with U.S. Army Europe commander
Lieutenant General Christopher Cavoli that﻿

vessels operating in the Black Sea.”127 In addition, “Russian equipment there includes 40
main battle tanks, 680 armored personnel carriers and 174 artillery systems of various kinds”
along with 113 combat aircraft.128
These numbers may be larger now, given
Russia’s military buildup in Ukraine in April
2021.129 In March 2019, Russia announced thedeployment of nuclear-capable Tupolev Tu22M3 strategic bombers to Gvardeyskoye airbase in occupied Crimea.130
Control of Crimea has allowed Russia to
use the Black Sea as a platform to launch andsupport naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.131 The Black Sea fleet has received
six Kilo diesel submarines and three Admiral
Grigorovich–class frigates equipped with Kalibr-NK long-range cruise missiles.132 Russia
is also planning to add Gorshkov-class frigatesto its Black Sea fleet.133 Kalibrs have a range ofat least 2,500 kilometers, placing cities from
Rome to Vilnius within range of Black Sea–
based cruise missiles.134
Russia has deployed five S-400 air defense
systems with a potential range of around 250
miles to Crimea.135 Russia’s new S-350 air defense systems also have the potential to be deployed to Crimea.136 In addition, “local capabilities have been strengthened by the Pantsir-S1(SA-22 Greyhound) short-to-medium-range
surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-aircraft
artillery weapons system, which particularlycomplements the S-400.”137 Russia also deploys the Bastion P coastal defenses armed
with the P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missile,which “has a range of up to 300 kilometers andtravels at nearly Mach 2.5, making it extraordinarily difficult to defeat with kinetic means.”138
In eastern Ukraine, Russia has helped to
foment and sustain a separatist movement.
Backed, armed, and trained by Russia, separatist leaders in eastern Ukraine have declared the so-called Lugansk People’s Republicand Donetsk People’s Republic. Moscow hasbacked separatist factions in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine with advanced weapons, technical and financial assistance, andRussian conventional and special operations

246

forces. Approximately 3,000 Russian soldiers are operating in the Donbas region of
Ukraine.139 Russian-­backed separatists daily
violate the September 2014 Minsk I and February 2015 Minsk II cease-fire agreements.140
These agreements have led to the de facto
partition of Ukraine and have created a frozen
conflict that remains both deadly and advantageous for Russia. As of April 2021, the war in
Ukraine had cost an estimated 14,000 lives.141
On November 25, 2018, Russian forces
blocked the passage of three Ukrainian naval
vessels through the Kerch Strait and opened
fire on the ships before boarding and seizingthem along with 24 Ukrainian sailors.142 In
September 2019, Russia released the sailors
in a prisoner swap with Ukraine.143 Russian
harassment of ships sailing through the Kerch
Strait and impeding of free movement had taken place consistently before the November
2018 aggression and continued afterwards.144
Russian inspections of ships, blockages of thestrait, and delays have coalesced to constrict
the port of Mariupol, where shipping traffic has
been greatly reduced since 2014.145
In Moldova, Russia supports the breakaway
enclave of Transnistria, where yet another frozen conflict festers to Moscow’s liking. According to a Congressional Research Service report:
Russia stations approximately 1,500
soldiers in Transnistria, a few hundred ofwhich Moldova accepts as peacekeepers.
In 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled that
Russia’s troop presence in Moldova wasunconstitutional, and parliament adopted
a declaration calling on Russia to withdraw.
In 2018, the U.N. General Assembly passed
a resolution calling on Russia to withdraw
its troops from Moldova “unconditionallyand without further delay.”
A political settlement to the Transnistrian
conflict appears distant. The Moldovan
government supports a special local
governance status for Transnistria, but
Russia and authorities in Transnistria haveresisted agreement.

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthIskanders have been deployed to the Southern
Military District at Mozdok near Georgia andKrasnodar near Ukraine as well, and Russian
military officials have reportedly asked manufacturers to increase the Iskander missiles’
range and improve their accuracy.154
Nor is Russia deploying missiles only inEurope. In February 2018, Russia approved
the deployment of warplanes to an airport on
Iturup, one of the largest Kuril Islands.155 In
September 2019, Russia announced its plans
to deploy additional missile systems on Paramushir and Matua, two islands in the northern
portion of the Kuril Island chain.156 In December 2020, Russia announced the deployment
Russia continues to occupy 12 percent of of S-300V4 air defense missile systems on
Moldova’s territory. In August 2018, Russian Iturup.157 Russia has stationed 3,500 troops
and separatist forces equipped with armored on the Kuril Islands. In December 2018, Japan
personnel carriers and armored reconnais- lodged a formal complaint over the building ofsance vehicles exercised crossing the Dniester four new barracks.158
River in the demilitarized security zone. MolRussia has deployed additional troops anddovan authorities called the exercises “provoc- capabilities near its western borders. In May
ative,” and the Organization for Security and 2021, Russia announced plans to increase its
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to troop presence along its western border “inMoldova “expresse[d] its concern.”147 On Janu- response to what it views as an increasingary 22, 2019, in an effort to enhance its control threat from the United States and the NATOof the breakaway region, Russia opened an of- alliance.”159 In June 2020, one report revealed
fice in Moscow for the Official Representation that the brigade in the Western Military Disof the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic in trict is relatively well-equipped with “modern
the Russian Federation.148
weapons and specialist equipment, including
Russia’s permanent stationing of Iskander ‘T-90A tanks, BTR-82A armored personnel carmissiles in Kaliningrad in 2018 occurred a year riers, BMP-3 combat vehicles, as well as 9A34
to the day after NATO’s eFP deployed to Lith- Strela-10 and 2S6M Tunguska air defense sysuania.149 Russia reportedly has deployed tac- tems.’”160 According to a report published bytical nuclear weapons, the S-400 air defense the Royal Institute of International Affairs:
system, and P-800 anti-ship cruise missiles to
Kaliningrad.150 Additionally, it plans to reesFive dedicated storage and maintenancetablish a tank brigade and a “fighter aviation
bases have been established in theregiment and naval assault aviation (bomber)Western Military District, and anotherregiment” in Kaliningrad and to reequip the arone in the Southern Military District (andtillery brigade with new systems.151 According
a further 15 in the Central and Eastern
to the IISS, the majority of Russian air force
districts). These, similar to the US Arpilot graduates this past year were sent to Kamy’s POMCUS (Prepositioning Of Maliningrad “to improve staffing” in the air force
teriel Configured in Unit Sets), contain
units located there.152
pre-positioned, properly maintained
Russia also has outfitted a missile brigade
brigade-level assets, and 2.5 units of firein Luga, Russia, a mere 74 miles from the Esfor all equipments.161
tonian city of Narva, with Iskander missiles.153
The conflict-resolution process operates
in a “5+2” format under the chairmanship of the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the
OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine as mediatorsand the EU and the United States as
observers. The EU also supports conflict
management through a Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine(EUBAM). EUBAM seeks to help the twocountries combat transborder crime, facilitate trade, and resolve the conflict overTransnistria, which shares a long borderwith Ukraine.146

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﻿The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military﻿

Russia represents a real and potentiallyexistential threat to NATO member countries
in Eastern and Central Europe. Considering
Russia’s aggression in Georgia and Ukraine, aconventional attack against a NATO member,while unlikely, cannot be ruled out entirely. In all likelihood, Russia will continue to
use nonlinear means in an effort to pressure
and undermine both these nations and theNATO alliance.
Militarization of the High North. Russia
has a long history in the Arctic and, as an Arctic
nation, has interests there. However, Russia’s
ongoing militarization of the region, coupledwith its bellicose behavior toward its neighbors,
makes the Arctic a security concern.
Because nationalism is on the rise in Russia, Vladimir Putin’s Arctic strategy is popularamong the population. For Putin, the Arctic
is an area that allows Russia to flex its muscles without incurring any significant geopolitical risk.
Russia is also eager to promote its economic interests in the region. Half of the world’s
Arctic territory and half of the Arctic region’s
population are located in Russia. It is wellknown that the Arctic is home to large stockpiles of proven and yet unexploited oil and gas
reserves. The majority of these reserves arethought to be located in Russia. In particular,
Russia hopes that the Northern Sea Route(NSR) will become one of the world’s mostimportant shipping lanes.
Russia has invested heavily in the Arctic
region, opening a series of Arctic bases andinvesting in cold-weather equipment, coastal
defense systems, underground storage facilities, and specialized training. Additionally,“Russian hardware in the High North area includes bombers and MiG31BM jets, and new
radar systems close to the coast of Alaska.”162
Russia has also staged a series of statement activities in the Arctic. In 2007, Artur
Chilingarov, then a member of the RussianDuma, led a submarine expedition to the North
Pole and planted a Russian flag on the seabed.
Later, he declared: “The Arctic is Russian.”163 In
July 2017, Russia released a new naval doctrine

248

citing the alleged “ambition of a range of states,
and foremost the United States of America andits allies, to dominate the high seas, includingin the Arctic, and to press for overwhelming
superiority of their naval forces.”164
In May 2017, Russia announced that its
build-up of the Northern Fleet’s nuclear capacity is intended “to phase ‘NATO out of[the] Arctic.’”165 A recent statement exercise
occurred in March 2021, when three Russianballistic missile submarines punched throughthe Arctic ice near the North Pole.166
In addition to an ongoing strong naval presence in the Arctic, Russia often undertakes
aggressive Arctic flights. In one instance inMarch 2017, nine Russian bombers simulated
an attack on the U.S.-funded, Norwegian-run
radar installation at Vardø, Norway, above theArctic Circle.167 In May 2017, 12 Russian aircraft simulated an attack against NATO naval
forces taking part in the Eastern Atlantic Area
(EASTLANT) 17 exercise near Tromsø, Norway,
and later that month, Russian aircraft targetedaircraft from 12 nations that were taking partin the Arctic Challenge 2017 exercise nearBodø.168 In April 2018, Maritime Patrol aircraftfrom Russia’s Pacific Fleet for the first time exercised locating and bombing enemy submarines in the Arctic while fighter jets exercised
repelling an air invasion in the Arctic region.169
Although the Arctic region has been an areaof low conflict among the Arctic powers, NATOshould consider the implications of Russia’s
recent aggressive military behavior. NATO isa collective security organization designed todefend the territorial integrity of its members.
Five NATO members (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States) are Arctic countries, and each has territory above theArctic Circle. Two closely allied nations (Finland and Sweden) also have Arctic territory.
The U.S. in recent years has begun to pay
increased attention to the Arctic theater inEurope. One way has been by maintaining
an enhanced presence in Norway. In April
2021, the two nations signed the Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement, whichin part allows the U.S. to build additional

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthinfrastructure at Rygge and Sola air stations insouthern Norway as well as Evenes air station
and Ramsund naval station above the Arctic
Circle.170 Construction at Evenes will support
Norwegian and allied maritime patrol aircraftin monitoring Russian submarine activity.
Because Russia is an Arctic power, its military presence in the region is to be expected,
but it should be viewed with some caution because of Russia’s pattern of aggression. In the
Arctic, sovereignty equals security. Respecting national sovereignty in the Arctic would
ensure that the chances of armed conflict in
the region remain low. Since NATO is an intergovernmental alliance of sovereign nation-states built on the consensus of all of its
members, it has a role to play in Arctic security.
In the words of NATO Secretary-General Jens
Stoltenberg:

In March 2017, a decree signed by Putin gave the Federal Security Service (FSB),
which controls law enforcement along theNorthern Sea Route, an Arctic shipping routelinking Asia and Europe, additional powers to
confiscate land “in areas with special objects
for land use, and in the border areas.”172 Russia’s Arctic territory is included within this
FSB-­controlled border zone. The FSB and its
subordinate coast guard have added patrol
vessels and have built up Arctic bases, including a coast guard base in Murmansk that was
opened in December 2018.173
The Russian National Guard, which reports to President Putin,174 is likewise taking
on an increased role in the Arctic and is now
charged with protecting infrastructure sitesthat are deemed to be of strategic importance,
including a new liquefied natural gas (LNG)

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military249﻿Increased Russian presence, more Russian bases in the High North, has also triggered the need for more NATO presence,
and we have increased our presence
there with more naval capabilities, presence in the air, and not least, the importance of protecting transatlantic undersea cables transmitting a lot of data.171

export terminal at Sabetta that was opened
in December 2017.175 In April 2021, shareholders of Novatek, Russia’s second-largest
natural gas producer, “approved externalfinancing of $11 billion for the Arctic LNG 2
project, which is expected to start productionof [LNG] in 2023.”176
In May 2018, Putin issued a presidential degree setting a target of 80 million tons shipped
across the NSR by 2024.177 In December 2020,
Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear power company, announced that it had shipped a record
32 million tons on the NSR in 2020. This surpassed the original target of 29 million tons.178
In March 2019, Russian media reported thatthe government was drafting stringent navigation rules for the entire length of the NSR
outside Russian territorial waters. Under theserules, for example, foreign navies would be
required to “post a request with Russian authorities to pass through the Sevmorput [NSR]
45 days in advance, providing detailed technical information about the ship, its crew anddestination.”179
Russia also has been investing in militarybases in the Arctic. Its base on Alexandra
Land, commissioned in 2017, can house 150
soldiers autonomously for up to 18 months.180
In addition, old Soviet-era facilities havebeen reopened.
In September 2018, the Northern Fleet announced construction plans for a new militarycomplex to house a 100-soldier garrison andanti-aircraft units at Tiksi; in January 2019,
Russian authorities claimed that the base was
95 percent completed.181 Also in 2018, Russia
opened an Arctic airfield at Nagurskoye that is
equipped with a 2,500-meter landing strip anda fleet of MiG-31 or Su-34 Russian fighters.182
Air power in the Arctic is increasingly important to Russia, which has 14 operational
airfields in the region along with 16 deep-­water ports.183 According to a March 18, 2021,
Forbes report, “the Russian navy has taskeda regiment of upgraded MiG-31BM [interceptor aircraft] to skip and hop across Arctic
airfields in order to range across the cold-butrapidly-­thawing North Pole.”184 In March 2019,

﻿

Mayor General Igor Kozhin, head of the Rus- an area through which NATO ships were sailsian Naval Air Force, claimed that Russia had ing during the Trident Juncture exercise.195 In
successfully tested a new airstrip cover that is March 2021, Russia’s Admiral Gorshkov frigate
effective in “temperatures down to minus 30 successfully “launched an Oniks cruise miscentigrades.”185
sile and hit a coastal target on Novaya Zemlya,
Russia resumed regular fighter jet combat about 300 kilometers from launch position.”196
patrols in the Arctic in 2019.186 The Ministry
Russia’s ultimate goal is encapsulated in aof Defense, for example, announced that in June 2019 study published by the Royal InstiJanuary 2019, two Tu-160 bombers flew for 15 tute of International Affairs:
hours in international airspace over the Arctic.187 Over the course of one week in April 2019,
Since the mid-2010s, the Kremlin has
Russian fighter and bomber jets flew near the
deployed substantive force and capabilicoast of Norway twice. In one instance, twoties along the coast of its northern border
Tu-60 bombers and a MiG-31 flew 13 hours
in the AZRF [Arctic Zone of the Russian
over the Barents, Norwegian, and North Seas.
Federation]. Parts of the armed forces
British and Danish jets scrambled to meet theare now Arctic-capable, and have develRussian aircraft.188
oped concepts of operations tailored to
Russian Arctic flights are often aggressive.
that environment. With the creation of
In May 2017, 12 Russian aircraft simulated an
OSK Sever [Joint Strategic Command
attack against NATO naval forces taking part
North] in 2013, the Russian armed forcesin the EASTLANT 17 exercise near Tromsø,
have been slowly reshaping their Arctic
Norway, and later that month, Russian aircraft
command structure. The Arctic forces aretargeted aircraft from 12 nations, including the
primarily focused on air and naval operaU.S., that took part in the Arctic Challenge 2017
tions, with the aim of creating an integratexercise near Bodø.189 As noted previously, in
ed combined-arms force for the region.197
April 2018, Maritime Patrol aircraft from Russia’s Pacific Fleet for the first time exercised loFor a few years, Russia was developing threecating and bombing enemy submarines in the new nuclear icebreakers, and in May 2019, it
Arctic while fighter jets exercised repelling an launched its third and final Arktika.198 The
air invasion in the Arctic region.190 In March Arktika, currently the world’s largest and most
2020, two Russian strategic heavy bombers powerful nuclear icebreaker,199 sailed straightflew over U.S. submarines surfaced in the Arc- to the North Pole in October 2020.200
tic Ocean, and in April, two maritime Tu-142
Russia’s most recently released naval docreconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare trine, from July 2017, cites the alleged “amplanes flew over the Barents, Norwegian, and bition of a range of states, and foremost theNorth Seas.191
United States of America and its allies, toIn 2017, Russia activated a new radar dominate the high seas, including in the Arctic,
complex on Wrangel Island.192 In 2019, it an- and to press for overwhelming superiority ofnounced plans to lay a nearly 8,000-mile fiber-­ their naval forces.”201 In May 2017, Russia had
optic cable across its Arctic coast, linking mili- announced that its buildup of the Northern
tary installations along the way from the Kola Fleet’s nuclear capacity is intended “to phase
Peninsula through Vladivostok.193 Construc- ‘NATO out of [the] Arctic.’”202tion of the cable began in spring 2021.194
Russia’s Northern Fleet is also building
In November 2019, Russia announced newly refitted submarines, including a newly
rocket firings in the Norwegian Sea 20 to 40 converted Belgorod nuclear-powered submanautical miles from the Norwegian coast. The rine that was launched in April 2019.203 The
test firings, with little advance notice, were de- Belgorod is expected to carry six Poseidon
signed to send a message as they took place in drones, also known as nuclear torpedoes, and

250

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthwill carry out “a series of special missions.”204
The submarine will have a smaller minisubthat will potentially be capable of tamperingwith or destroying undersea telecommunications cables.205 According to Russian media reports, the Belgorod “will be engaged instudying the bottom of the Russian Arctic shelf,
searching for minerals at great depths, and also
laying underwater communications.”206 A similar submarine, the Khabarovsk, is under construction and scheduled to be launched in thefall of 2021.207
Russia continues to develop and increase its
military capabilities in the Arctic region. The
likelihood of armed conflict remains low, butphysical changes in the region mean that theposture of players will continue to evolve. It isclear that Russia intends to exert a dominant
influence. According to a U.S. Department ofState official, as quoted in a Congressional Research Service report:

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military251﻿countries in the region (Armenia, Georgia, andAzerbaijan) are not part of NATO and therefore do not receive a security guarantee fromthe United States, they have participated tovarying degrees in NATO and U.S.-led operations. This is especially true of Georgia, whichaspires to join NATO.
Russia views the South Caucasus as part ofits natural sphere of influence and stands readyto exert its influence by force if necessary. In
August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia, coming
as close as 15 miles to the capital city of Tbilisi. A decade later, several thousand Russian
troops occupied the two Georgian regions ofSouth Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russia has sought to deepen its relationship with the two occupied regions. In 2015,
it signed so-called integration treaties with
South Ossetia and Abkhazia that, among other things, call for a coordinated foreign policy,
creation of a common security and defense
space, and implementation of a streamlined[The U.S. has] concerns about Russia’s
process for Abkhazians and South Ossetians
military buildup in the Arctic. Its presence
to receive Russian citizenship.209 The Georgian
has grown dramatically in recent years
Foreign Ministry criticized the treaties as awith the establishments of new Arctic
step toward “annexation of Georgia’s occupied
commands, new Arctic brigades, refurterritories,”210 both of which are still internabished airfields and other infrastructure,tionally recognized as part of Georgia.
deep water ports, new military bases
In January 2018, Russia ratified an agreealong its Arctic coastline, an effort to esment with the de facto leaders of South Ossetia
tablish air defense and coastal missile systo create a joint military force—an agreement
tems, early warning radars, and a variety
that the U.S. condemned.211 In November 2017,of other things along the Arctic coastline.
the U.S. State Department approved an estiWe’ve seen an enhanced ops [operamated $75 million sale of Javelin missiles totions] tempo of the Russian military inGeorgia, and in June 2018, the State Departthe Arctic, including last October one ofment approved a sale of Stinger missiles.212
the largest Russian military exercises in
Russia’s “creeping annexation” of Georgia has
the Arctic since the end of the Cold War.
left towns split in two and families separated by
So there is some genuine and legitimate
military occupation and the imposition of anconcern there on the part of the Unitedinternal border (known as “borderization”).213
States and our allies and partners about
In May 2020, the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi rethat behavior in the Arctic.208
ported that Russian-led security forces were
continuing to erect unauthorized fences andDestabilization in the South Cauca- reinforcing existing illegal “borderization” efsus. The South Caucasus sits at a crucial geo- forts near a number of Georgian villages.214
graphical and cultural crossroads and has
Today, Moscow continues to exploit ethnic
been strategically important, both militarily divisions and tensions in the South Caucasus
and economically, for centuries. Although the to advance pro-Russian policies that are often﻿

at odds with America’s or NATO’s goals in theregion, but Russia’s influence is not restricted
to soft power. In the South Caucasus, the coinof the realm is military might. It is a dangerous
neighborhood surrounded by instability andinsecurity reflected in terrorism, religious fanaticism, centuries-old sectarian divides, andcompetition for natural resources.
Russia maintains a sizable military presence in Armenia based on an agreement thatgives Moscow access to bases in that country until at least 2044.215 The bulk of Russia’s
forces, consisting of 3,300 soldiers, dozens offighter planes and attack helicopters, 74 T-72
tanks, almost 200 APCs, and an S-300 air
defense system, are based around the 102nd
Military Base.216 Russia and Armenia havealso signed a Combined Regional Air Defense
System agreement. Even after the election ofPrime Minister Nikol Pashinyan following theso-called Velvet Revolution, Armenia’s cozy relationship with Moscow remains unchanged.217
Armenian troops have even deployed alongside
Russian troops in Syria to the dismay of U.S.
policymakers.218
Another source of regional instability is the
Nagorno–Karabakh conflict, which began in
1988 when Armenia made territorial claims
to Azerbaijan’s Nagorno–Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.219 By 1992, Armenian forces andArmenian-­backed militias had occupied 20
percent of Azerbaijan, including the Nagorno–
Karabakh region and seven surrounding districts. A cease-fire agreement was signed in 1994,
and the conflict has been described as frozen
since then. In 2020, major fighting broke out
along the front lines. After six weeks of fighting,Azerbaijan liberated its internationally recognized territory, “which had been under Armenian occupation since the early 1990s.”220
The conflict ended on November 9, 2020,
when Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a
Russian-­brokered cease-fire agreement.221 As
part of the nine-point cease-fire plan, nearly
2,000 Russian peacekeeping soldiers were deployed to certain parts of Nagorno-Karabakhlargely populated by ethnic Armenians. In May
2021, tensions rose again in the region but for252

a different reason—the demarcation of the
Armenian–­Azerbaijani border.222
The Nagorno–Karabakh conflict offers
another opportunity for Russia to exert malign influence and consolidate power in theregion. While its sympathies lie with Armenia, Russia is the largest supplier of weapons
to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.223 As notedby Eurasia expert Eduard Abrahamyan, “foryears, Moscow has periodically sought to use
the local authorities in Karabakh as a proxy
tool of coercive diplomacy against both Baku
and Yerevan.”224
The South Caucasus might seem distant tomany American policymakers, but the spillover effect of ongoing conflict in the region canhave a direct impact both on U.S. interests andon the security of America’s partners, as well as
on Turkey and other countries that depend on
oil and gas transiting the region. Russia views
the South Caucasus as a vital theater and uses
a multitude of tools that include military aggression, economic pressure, and the stoking of
ethnic tensions to exert influence and control,
usually to promote outcomes that are at odds
with U.S. interests.
Increased Activity in the Mediterranean.
Russia has had a military presence in Syria for
decades, but in September 2015, it became thedecisive actor in Syria’s ongoing civil war, having
saved Bashar al-Assad from being overthrownand having strengthened his hand militarily,
thus enabling government forces to retake territory lost during the war. Although conflicting
strategic interests cause the relationship between Assad and Putin to be strained at times,
Assad still needs Russian military support totake back Idlib province, a goal that he likely
shares with Putin.225 Russia’s Hmeymim Air
Base is closely located to Idlib, a source of attacks from rebel fighters and terrorist groups,
and Moscow instinctively desires to protect
its assets. Assad’s only goal is to restore sovereignty over all of Syria; Russia generally is more
focused on eliminating terrorism in the region
and must manage its relationship with Turkey.
In January 2017, Russia signed an agreement with the Assad regime to “expand the2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 12

Before and After the Second Karabakh War
The Nagorno–Karabakh region has been defined by nearly three decades ofconflict. After a second war in the fall of 2020, Armenia and Azerbaijan finallyreached a settlement. Azerbaijan regained much of its territory, and Russian
peacekeeping forces now oversee the remaining parts.
TbilisiRUSSIAGEORGIA

Ganja

ARMENIASEPTEMBER 27,
2020

AZERBAIJAN
Stepanakert/Khankendi

Yerevan

Baku

ShushaNagorno–Karabakh

TURKEY

CaspianSea
Nakhchivan

﻿Armenianoccupied
territories

IRAN

TbilisiRUSSIA

CURRENTGEORGIA

Ganja

ARMENIAAZERBAIJAN
Stepanakert/Khankendi

YerevanNagorno–Karabakh

TURKEY

Russianpeacekeeping
force

Baku

ShushaCaspianSea
Nakhchivan

IRAN

SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

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A heritage.org

253

﻿

Tartus naval facility, Russia’s only naval footintroduced to the conflict. These included
hold in the Mediterranean, and grant Russian
the Pantsir S1 anti-aircraft and Iskander-M
warships access to Syrian waters and ports….
ballistic missile systems on the ground,
The agreement will last for 49 years and could
Tupolev Tu-160 supersonic strategic
be prolonged further.”226 According to a May
bombers, Tu-22M3 supersonic bombers
2020 report, Russia is reinforcing its naval
and Tu-95 propeller-driven bombers, asgroup in the Mediterranean Sea with warships
well as Mikoyan MiG-29K fighters and Kaand submarines armed with Kalibr cruise mis52K Katran helicopters in the air.236
227
siles. In May 2021, the Voice of America reported that Russia is expanding its navy baseOverall, Russian arms sales abroad reportat Tartus and “planning to construct a floating edly exceeded $13 billion in 2019, surpassing
dock to boost the port’s ship repair facilities.”228 sales in 2018 by more than $2 billion.237
The agreement with Syria also includes
Russian pilots have occasionally acted danupgrades to the Hmeymim air base at Latakia, gerously in the skies over Syria. In May 2017,
including repairs to a second runway.229 Russia for example, a Russian fighter jet intercepted
deployed the S-400 anti-aircraft missile sys- a U.S. KC-10 tanker, performing a barrel rolltem to Hmeymim in late 2015.230 It also has de- over the top of the KC-10.238 That same month,ployed the Pantsir S1 system. “The two systems Russia stated that U.S. and allied aircraft would
working in tandem provide a ‘layered defense,’” be banned from flying over large areas of Syria
according to one account, “with the S-400 pro- because of a deal agreed to by Russia, Iran, andviding long-ranged protection against bomb- Turkey. The U.S. responded that the deal does
ers, fighter jets, and ballistic missiles, and the not “preclude anyone from going after terrorPantsir providing medium-ranged protection ists wherever they may be in Syria.”239
against cruise missiles, low-flying strike airThe U.S. and Russia have a deconfliction hocraft, and drones.”231 Russia currently operates tline to avoid midair collisions and incidents,
out of Hmeymim air base on a 40-year agree- but incidents have occurred on the ground as
ment and continues to entrench its position well as in the air. In November 2018, Ambassathere, as demonstrated by its recent building dor James Jeffrey, U.S. Special Representativeof reinforced concrete aircraft shelters.232 In for Syria Engagement, told news media that
August 2020, Syria agreed to give Russia ad- “American and Russian forces have clashedditional land and coastal waters to expand its a dozen times in Syria—sometimes with exHmeymim air base.233
changes of fire.”240
Russia is using Syria as a testing ground for
In October 2018, Egyptian President Abdel
new weapons systems while obtaining valuable Fattah al-Sisi signed a strategic cooperation
combat experience for its troops. According to treaty with Russia.241 In November 2018, RusLieutenant General Ben Hodges, former Com- sia sought to solidify its relations with Egypt,mander, U.S. Army Europe, Russia has used its approving a five-year agreement for the twointervention in Syria as a “live-fire training op- countries to use each other’s air bases.242 Rusportunity.”234 The IISS similarly reports that sia is a major exporter of arms to Egypt, which
Russia has used Syria as “a test bed for the de- agreed to purchase 20 Su-35 fighter jets in 2018velopment of joint operations and new weap- for $2 billion.243 Production of the Su-35 jets
ons and tactics.”235 In fact, Russia has tested began in May 2020.244
hundreds of pieces of new equipment in Syria.
In Libya, Russia continues to support Field
In December 2018:
Marshal Khalifa Haftar with weapons and military advisers. According to the Department
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borof Defense, Russia’s Wagner Group continues
isov detailed to local media…the various
to be involved militarily in Libya.245 Despite
new weapons systems [that] have been
its ties to Haftar, Russia has also focused on

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Russia seeks to sever the transatlantic
bond forged with the Western Balkans…
by sowing instability. Chiefly Russia hassought to inflame preexisting ethnic,
historic, and religious tensions. Russian
propaganda magnifies this toxic ethnic
and religious messaging, fans publicdisillusionment with the West, as wellas institutions inside the Balkan nations,and misinforms the public about Russia’s
intentions and interests in the region.251

Senior members of the Russian government have alleged that NATO enlargementin the Balkans is one of the biggest threats to
Russia.252 In June 2017, Montenegro became
NATO’s 29th member state, and in March 2020,
North Macedonia became NATO’s 30th member state, both joining Albania and Croatia as
NATO members in the Balkans.
Russia stands accused of being behind afailed plot to break into Montenegro’s parliament on election day in 2016, assassinate
its former prime minister, and install a pro-­
Russian government. In May 2019, two Russian
nationals, believed to be the masterminds behind the plot, were convicted in absentia alongwith 12 other individuals for organizing andcarrying out the failed coup. The trial judge
stated that the convicted Russians who organized the plot “knowingly tried to terrorize
Montenegrins, attack others, threaten and hurt
basic constitutional and social structures.”253
After Russia annexed Crimea, the Montenegrin government backed European sanctions
against Moscow and even implemented its own
sanctions. Nevertheless, Russia has significant
economic influence in Montenegro and in 2015sought unsuccessfully to gain access to Montenegrin ports for the Russian navy to refuel andperform maintenance. Russia was the largest
investor in Montenegro until October 2020,
when it was surpassed by China.254
North Macedonia’s accession to NATOwas similarly targeted by Russia, which had
warned the nation against joining the allianceand sought to derail the Prespa agreementthat paved the way for membership by settling

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﻿growing business ties with the Libyan government in Tripoli.246
Russia has stepped up its military operations in the Mediterranean significantly, often
harassing U.S. and allied vessels involved in operations against the Islamic State. In April 2020,
for example, a U.S. Navy aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea was intercepted by a Russian
Su-35 jet—the second time in four days that
“Russian pilots made unsafe maneuvers whileintercepting US aircraft.”247 The Russian jet had
taken off from Hmeymim air base in Syria. This
happened again in May when two Russian Su35 jets unsafely intercepted a U.S. Navy P-8A
maritime patrol aircraft over international waters in the Eastern Mediterranean.248
From April–August 2017, the U.S. along with
British, Dutch, and Spanish allies tracked theKrasnodar, a Kilo-class submarine, as it sailed
from the Baltic Sea to a Russian base in occupied Crimea. The submarine stopped twice inthe eastern Mediterranean to launch cruise
missiles into Syria and conducted drills in theBaltic Sea and off the coast of Libya. This was
one of the first times since the Cold War that
the U.S. and NATO allies had tracked a Russian
submarine during combat operations.249 In
February 2020, General Wolters revealed that
Russian submarines are becoming more active
and harder for the United States to track.250
Russia’s position in Syria, including its expanded area-access/area-denial capabilities
and increased warship and submarine presence, underscores the growing importanceof the Mediterranean theater in ensuring Europe’s security.
The Balkans. Security has improved
dramatically in the Balkans since the 1990s,
but violence based on religious and ethnic
differences remains an ongoing possibility.
These tensions are exacerbated by sluggish
economies, high unemployment, and political corruption.
Russia’s interests in the Western Balkans
are at odds with the ongoing desire of the U.S.
and its European allies to encourage closer
ties between the region and the transatlantic community:﻿

long-standing Greek objections to Macedonia’sname.255 In 2018, after North Macedonia wasinvited to join NATO, Russia’s ambassador
to the EU stated that “there are errors thathave consequences.”256 In July 2018, Greece
expelled two Russian diplomats and banned
entry by two Russian nationals because of
their efforts to undermine the name agreement; Russian actions in Macedonia included
disinformation surrounding the vote, websites
and social media posts opposing the Prespa
agreement, and payments to protestors aswell as politicians and organizations opposing
the agreement.257
Serbia in particular has long served as Russia’s foothold in the Balkans:churches. It also has helped to establish morethan 100 pro-Russian non-governmental organizations and media outlets in Macedonia.261
Serbia and Russia have signed a strategic
partnership agreement that is focused on
economic issues. Russia’s inward investment
is focused on the transport and energy sectors. Except for those in the Commonwealthof Independent States, Serbia is the only country in Europe that has a free trade deal with
Russia. In January 2019, Serbia and Russia
signed 26 agreements relating to energy, railway construction, and strategic educationcooperation.262
In a January 2019 state visit to Serbia,
Vladimir Putin stated a desire for a free trade
agreement between Serbia and the Russian-led
Russia’s influence in the Balkans centers
Eurasian Economic Union, to be signed by
on Serbia, a fellow religiously orthodox
the end of the year. An agreement between
nation with whom it enjoys a close ecothe two countries was signed in October 2019
nomic, political, and military relationship.
“following veiled warnings from the European
Serbia and Russia have an agreement
Union.”263 In addition, Russia has held out thein place allowing Russian soldiers to bepossibility of $1.4 billion in infrastructure aid
based at Niš airport in Serbia. The twoto Serbia aimed at building the Turk Stream
countries signed a 15-year military cooppipeline and increasing Russia’s energy levereration agreement in 2013 that includes
age in the region. Russia also has continued tosharing of intelligence, officer exchanges,
oppose Kosovo’s recognition as an indepenand joint military exercises. In Octoberdent sovereign country and has condemned[2017], Russia gave Serbia six MiG-29
Kosovo’s creation of its own army.264
fighters (which while free, will require SerHowever, Serbia still participates in military
bia to spend $235 million to have them
exercises far more often without Russia thanoverhauled). Additionally, Russia plans towith Russia. “In 2017,” for example, “Serbian
supply Serbia with helicopters, T-72 tanks,
forces participated in 2 joint exercises witharmored vehicles, and potentially even
Russia and Belarus but held 13 exercises withsurface-to-air missile systems.258
NATO members and 7 with U.S. units.”265 Like
Russia, Serbia is a member of NATO’s PartThe so-called Russian–Serbian Humani- nership for Peace program. Additionally, Sertarian Center at Niš is “widely believed to be a bia has been part of the U.S. National Guard’s
Russian spy base” and is located “only 58 miles State Partnership Program, partnering withfrom NATO’s Kosovo Force mission based the State of Ohio since 2006.
in Pristina.”259
Russia is also active in Bosnia andIn February 2020, Serbia purchased the Herzegovina—­specifically, the ethnically Serb
Pantsir S1 air-defense system from Russia Republika Srpska, one of two substate entities
despite objections and potential sanctions inside Bosnia and Herzegovina that emerged
from the United States.260 Russia has used its from that country’s civil war in the 1990s. Moscultural ties to increase its role in Serbia, posi- cow knows that exploiting internal ethnic andtioning itself as the defender of orthodoxy and religious divisions among the country’s Bosinvesting funds in the refurbishing of orthodox niak, Croat, and Serb populations is the easiest

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﻿

way to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from Kremlin’s proxy separatists in Ukraine.”273 Vetentering the transatlantic community.
erans organizations in Russia and Republika
Republika Srpska’s current unofficial leader, Srpska have developed close ties.274
Milorad Dodik, has long advocated indepenRussia has cultivated strong ties with thedence for the region and has enjoyed a very security forces of Republika Srpska. Russian
close relationship with the Kremlin. President police take part in exchanges with the secuŽeljka Cvijanović also claims that Republika rity forces, and Russian intelligence officers
Srpska will continue to maintain its partner- reportedly teach at the police academy and loship with Russia.266 Recent events in Ukraine, cal university. On April 4, 2018, the Republika
especially the annexation of Crimea, have in- Srpska authorities opened a new $4 million
spired more separatist rhetoric in Republika training center “at the site of a former army
Srpska. In September 2018, two weeks before barracks in Zaluzani, outside Banja Luka.” Theelections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russian site serves as the headquarters for “anti-terForeign Minister Lavrov visited Sarajevo, but rorist units, logistics units, and a department
he also visited Banja Luka in Republika Srpska, to combat organized crime.”275
where he visited the site of “a future Serbian–Russia does not want Kosovo to be seen as
Russian Orthodox cultural center.”267
a successful nation pointed toward the West.
In many ways, Russia’s relationship with Re- Rather, it seeks to derail Kosovo’s efforts to inpublika Srpska is akin to its relationship with tegrate into the West, often by exploiting the
Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia occupied Serbian minority’s grievances. In the most jarregions: more like a relationship with another ring example, in January 2017, a train travelsovereign state than a relationship with a semi- ing from Belgrade to Mitrovica, a heavily Serb
autonomous region inside Bosnia and Herze- town in Kosovo, was stopped at the Kosovar
govina. When Putin visited Serbia in October border. The Russian-made train was “painted
2014, Dodik was treated like a head of state and in the colors of the Serbian flag and featured
invited to Belgrade to meet with him. In Septem- pictures of churches, monasteries, and meber 2016, Dodik was treated like a head of state dieval towns, as well as the words ‘Kosovo is
on a visit to Moscow just days before a referen- Serbian’ in 21 languages.”276
dum that chose January 9 as Republika Srpska’s
The U.S. has invested heavily in the Balkans“statehood day,” a date filled with religious and since the end of the Cold War. Tens of thouethnic symbolism for the Serbs.268 In October sands of U.S. servicemembers have served in2018, just days before elections, Dodik again the Balkans, and the U.S. has spent billions ofvisited Russia where he watched the Russian dollars in aid there, all in the hope of creating
Grand Prix in a VIP box with Putin.269 Republika a secure and prosperous region that will someSrpska continues to host its “statehood day” in day be part of the transatlantic community.
defiance of a ruling by Bosnia’s federal constiThe foremost external threat to the Balkans
tutional court that both the celebration and the is Russia. Russia’s interests in the Balkans arereferendum establishing it were illegal.270
at odds with the U.S. goal of encouraging the
On January 9, 2020, Bosnian Serbs again region to progress toward the transatlantic
held “statehood day.”271 At the 2018 “state- community. Russia seeks to sever the transathood day,” then-president Dodik and the self-­ lantic bond forged with the Western Balkans byproclaimed leaders of South Ossetia had “signed sowing instability and increasing its economic,
a memorandum on cooperation between the political, and military footprint in the region.
‘states.’”272 Russia has reportedly trained a Republika Srpska paramilitary force in Russia at Threats to the Commonsthe nearby Niš air base to defend the Serbian
Other than cyberspace and (to some exentity. It has been reported that “[s]ome of its tent) airspace, the commons are relatively semembers fought as mercenaries alongside the cure in the European region. Despite Russia’s﻿periodic aggressive maneuvers near U.S. and airspace over the past year. In April 2021, LieuNATO vessels—and with the significant excep- tenant General David Krumm from Joint Basetion of the Kerch Strait—this remains largely Elmendorf–Richardson, Alaska, revealed thattrue with respect to the security of and free during the past year, there was a large increasepassage through shipping lanes. The maritime in Russian activity and the U.S. intercepted
domain is heavily patrolled by the navies and more than 60 Russian aircraft.282 That was thecoast guards of NATO and NATO partner coun- “most action the Alaska Air Defense Identifitries, and except in remote areas in the Arctic cation Zone—a region spanning 200 nauticalSea, search and rescue capabilities are readily miles that reaches past U.S. territory and into
available. Moreover, maritime-launched ter- international airspace—ha[d] seen since therorism is not a significant problem, and piracy Soviet Union fell in 1991.”283 In October 2020,
is virtually nonexistent.
F-22 Raptor stealth fighter jets scrambled “toSea. In May 2018, 17 Russian fighter jets intercept Russian long-range bombers andbuzzed the HMS Duncan, which was serving fighters flying off Alaska’s coast” in “the 14th
as the flagship of Standing NATO Maritime such incident off Alaska’s coast in 2020.”284Group Two (SNMG2), operating in the BlackIn March and April 2019, the Royal Air
Sea. Commodore Mike Utley, who was leading Force scrambled fighters twice in five days to
SNMG2, stated that the ship was “probably intercept Russian bombers flying near U.K.
the only maritime asset that has seen a raid of airspace off Scotland while the U.S., Austrathat magnitude in the last 25 years,” and then-­ lia, and 11 NATO allies were taking part in the
British Defense Minister Gavin Williamson Joint Warrior exercise in Scotland.285 Also indescribed the behavior as “brazen Russian March 2019, Italian jets operating from Kehostility.”277 In April 2018, a fully armed Rus- flavík in Iceland intercepted two Russian Tusian jet buzzed a French frigate operating in 142 Bear bombers flying in Iceland’s air surthe eastern Mediterranean.278
veillance area.286
Russian threats to the maritime theater
Aggressive Russian flying has occurred nearalso include activity near undersea fiber-­optic North American airspace as well. In January
cables. In July 2019, a Russian submarine re- 2019, two U.S. F-22s and two Canadian CF-18
portedly was trying to tap information flowing fighters scrambled when two Russian Tu-160
through undersea cables near Russia’s north- Blackjack bombers flew into Arctic airspace
ern shore in the Barents Sea. The cables “car- patrolled by the Royal Canadian Air Force.287
ry 95 percent of daily worldwide communicaRussian flights have also targeted U.S. allytions” in addition to “financial transactions Japan. Twice in one day in June 2019, two Rusworth over $10 trillion a day.”279 Thus, any dis- sian Tupolev Tu-95 bombers entered Japaneseruption would cause a catastrophic reduction airspace—over Minamidaito Island east of Okiin the flow of capital.
nawa and over Hachijo Island southeast of ToThe Yantar, a mother ship to two Russian kyo. Japan sent out fighter jets to warn them.288
minisubmersibles, is often seen near undersea In incidents in January, March, and May 2019,
cables, which it is capable of tapping or cutting, Japan scrambled fighter jets to intercept a Rusand has been observed collecting intelligence sian Il-38N maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) flynear U.S. naval facilities, including the subma- ing over the Sea of Japan.289 Nor is it only MPAs
rine base at Kings Bay, Georgia.280 The Russian that fly near Japan; for instance, Russian Su-24
spy ship Viktor Leonov was spotted collecting attack aircraft were intercepted in December
intelligence within 20 miles of Kings Bay in 2018 and January 2019 incidents.290 Between
March 2017 and within 30 miles of Groton, April 1, 2018, and March 31, 2019, Japan had toConnecticut, in February 2018.281
scramble jets 343 times to intercept Russian
Airspace. Russia has continued its provoc- aircraft, although that was 47 times less than
ative military flights near U.S. and European was necessary in the preceding year.291

258

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthforces or Russian-sponsored groups poses athreat to civilian aircraft in Europe was amply
demonstrated by the July 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, killing all 283 passengers and 15 crewmembers, over the skies ofsoutheastern Ukraine.
Cyber. Russian cyber capabilities are sophisticated and active, regularly threatening
economic, social, and political targets aroundthe world. Even more, Moscow appears to be
increasingly aggressive in its use of digitaltechniques, often employing only the slightest
veneer of deniability in an effort to intimidate
targets and openly defy international norms
and organizations.
Russia clearly believes that these online
operations will be essential to its domestic
and foreign policy for the foreseeable future.
As former Chief of the Russian General Staff
General Yuri Baluyevsky has observed, “a victory in information warfare ‘can be much more
important than victory in a classical military
conflict, because it is bloodless, yet the impact
is overwhelming and can paralyse all of the enemy state’s power structures.’”298
Russia continues to probe U.S. critical infrastructure. In January 2019, testifying before
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel
R. Coats assessed that:
Russia has the ability to execute cyberattacks in the United States that generate
localized, temporary disruptive effects
on critical infrastructure—such as disrupting an electrical distribution network
for at least a few hours—similar to thosedemonstrated in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016.
Moscow is mapping our critical infrastructure with the long-term goal of being
able to cause substantial damage.299

Russia continued to conduct cyberattacks
on government and private entities in 2020
and 2021. In December 2020, Russian hackers “broke into a range of key government
networks, including in the Treasury and Commerce Departments, and had free access to

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﻿The principal threat from Russian airspace
incursions, however, remains near NATO territory in Eastern Europe, specifically in theBlack Sea and Baltic regions. In the Black Sea
region, in December 2020, Russia scrambled
one of its Su-30 fighter jets to prevent U.S. and
French reconnaissance planes from crossing
the Russian border, even though they were
flying over international waters.292 In March
2021, NATO fighter jets scrambled 10 times in
one day “to shadow Russian bombers and fighters during an unusual peak of flights over the
North Atlantic, North Sea, Black Sea and Baltic Sea.”293 In the Baltics, in April 2021, “NATOscrambled fighter jets from bases in Estonia,
Lithuania and Poland to track and intercept
Russian fighters, bombers and surveillance
aircraft over the Baltic Sea.”294
There have been several incidents involving Russian military aircraft flying in Europe
without using their transponders. In April
2020, two maritime Tu-142 reconnaissanceand anti-submarine warfare planes flew overthe Barents, Norwegian, and North Seas but
had switched off their transponders. As a result, two Norwegian F-16s were scrambled to
identify the planes.295 In September 2019, aRussian Air Force Sukhoi Su-34 fighter flew
over Estonian airspace without filing a flightplan or maintaining radio contact with Estonian air navigation officials because the plane’stransponder had been switched off. This was
the second violation of Estonia’s airspace by a
Russian aircraft in 2019.296 In August 2019, two
Russian Su-27 escort jets flew over the Baltic
Sea without a flight plan and without turningon their transponders.297
Russia’s violation of the sovereign airspaceof NATO member states is a probing and antagonistic policy that is designed both to test
the defense of the alliance and as practice forpotential future conflicts. Similarly, Russia’santagonistic behavior in international waters
is a threat to freedom of the seas.
Russia’s reckless aerial activity in the region
also remains a threat to civilian aircraft flyingin European airspace. That the provocativeand hazardous behavior of the Russian armed﻿

their email systems.”300 According to The New and the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Center
York Times, “[a]bout 18,000 private and gov- warned that Russian hackers were targeting
ernment users downloaded a Russian tainted Britain’s critical infrastructure supply chains.
software update—a Trojan horse of sorts—that Cyber activity continues to be a significant
gave its hackers a foothold into victims’ sys- part of Russia’s efforts to manipulate andtems, according to SolarWinds, the company undermine democratic elections in Europe
whose software was compromised.”301 Multiple and elsewhere.
U.S. government agencies, the Pentagon, nuIn addition to official intelligence and miliclear labs, and several Fortune 500 companies tary cyber assets, Russia employs allied crimihad been using the SolarWinds software on nal organizations (so-called patriotic hackers)
their computers.302
to help it engage in cyber aggression. Using
In April 2021, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned these hackers gives Russia greater resources
Russia for the SolarWinds hack. It also sanc- and can help to shield its true capabilities. Pationed 32 Russian “entities and individuals” triotic hackers also give the Russian governwho had carried out “Russian government-­ ment deniability when it is desired. In June
directed attempts to influence the 2020 U.S. 2017, for example, Putin stated that “[i]f theypresidential election, and other acts of disin- (hackers) are patriotically-minded, they start
formation and interference.”303
to make their own contribution to what theyIn May 2021, a Russia-based hacking group believe is the good fight against those who
known as DarkSide launched a cyberattack speak badly about Russia. Is that possible?
against Colonial Pipeline, “the operator of one Theoretically it is possible.”311
of the nation’s largest fuel pipelines.”304 The
Russia’s cyber capabilities are advanced
5,500-mile pipeline, “responsible for carrying and of key importance in realizing the state’sfuel from refineries along the Gulf Coast to strategic aims. Russia has used cyberattacks
New Jersey,” was down for six days.305 Colonial to further the reach and effectiveness of its
Pipeline paid DarkSide $90 million in bitcoin propaganda and disinformation campaigns,
as a ransom payment,306 but the Department and its ongoing cyberattacks against electionof Justice was able to recover approximately processes in the U.S. and European countries$2.3 million of that amount a few weeks later.307 are designed to undermine citizens’ belief in
In June 2021, REvil, a Russian cybercriminal the veracity of electoral outcomes and erodegroup, launched a ransomware attack on JBS, support for democratic institutions in the lon“the world’s largest meat processing compa- ger term. Russia also has used cyberattacks tony.”308 As a result of the cyberattack, JBS was target physical infrastructure, including elecforced to shut down all nine of its U.S. plants trical grids, air traffic control, and gas distrifor a brief period.309
bution systems.
However, the United States is not Russia’s
Russia’s increasingly bold use of cyber capaonly target. In February 2020, the U.S. and its bilities, coupled with their sophistication and
key allies accused Russia’s main military intel- Moscow’s willingness to use them aggressiveligence agency, the GRU, of a broad cyberattack ly, presents a serious challenge both to the U.S.
against the Republic of Georgia. According to and to its interests abroad.
The New York Times, the attack “took out websites and interrupted television broadcasts.”310 Conclusion
The attack was limited, but through its accuOverall, the threat to the U.S. homelandsation, the U.S. sought to deter Moscow from originating from Europe remains low, but theintervening in the 2020 presidential election. threat to America’s interests and allies in the
In April 2018 alone, Germany’s head of region remains significant. Behind this threat
domestic intelligence accused Moscow of at- lies Russia. Although Russia has the militacking his government’s computer networks, tary capability to harm and (in the case of its

260

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthinterests in Europe to ensure their continued relevance.
Russian provocations that are much lessserious than any scenario involving a nuclear
exchange pose the most serious challenge to
American interests, particularly in Central andEastern Europe, the Arctic, the Balkans, andthe South Caucasus. As the 2021 Worldwide
Threat Assessment states:
Moscow will continue to employ a varietyof tactics this year meant to undermine US
influence, develop new international norms
and partnerships, divide Western countries
and weaken Western alliances, and demonstrate Russia’s ability to shape global
events as a major player in a new multipolar international order. Russia will continue
to develop its military, nuclear, space, cyber,and intelligence capabilities, while actively
engaging abroad and leveraging its energy
resources, to advance its agenda andundermine the United States.312

For these reasons, the Index of U.S. Military
Strength continues to assess the threat from
Russia as “aggressive” and “formidable.”Threats: Russia
HOSTILE
Behavior

TESTINGASSERTIVE

BENIGNCAPABLEASPIRATIONALMARGINAL%
FORMIDABLE

Capability

AGGRESSIVEGATHERING%

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﻿nuclear arsenal) to pose an existential threat to
the U.S., it has not conclusively demonstrated
the intent to do so.
The situation with respect to America’s allies in the region is different. Through NATO,the U.S. is obliged by treaty to come to the aidof the alliance’s European members. Russia
continues its efforts to undermine the NATO
alliance and presents an existential threat to
U.S. allies in Eastern Europe. NATO has been
the cornerstone of European security and stability ever since its creation in 1949, and it is in
America’s interest to ensure that it maintains
both the military capability and the political
will to fulfill its treaty obligations.
While Russia is not the threat to U.S. global
interests that the Soviet Union was during theCold War, it does pose challenges to a rangeof America’s interests and those of its allies
and friends closest to Russia’s borders. Russia possesses a full range of capabilities fromground forces to air, naval, space, and cyber.
It still maintains the world’s largest nuclear
arsenal, and although a strike on the U.S. ishighly unlikely, the latent potential for such a
strike still gives these weapons enough strategic value vis-à-vis America’s NATO allies and﻿Endnotes
1.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 164–217.

2.

Michael Birnbaum, “Russian Submarines Are Prowling Around Vital Undersea Cables. It’s Making NATO Nervous,” The Washington
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3.

Paul Stronski, “Implausible Deniability: Russia’s Private Military Companies,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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4.

Kimberly Marten, “The Puzzle of Russian Behavior in Deir al-Zour,” War on the Rocks, July 5, 2018, https://warontherocks.
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5.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria,” The New
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6.

Maria Tsvetkova, “Russian Toll in Syria Battle Was 300 Killed and Wounded: Sources,” Reuters, February 15, 2018, https://www.
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7.

Luke Harding, “Lawsuit Targets Russian Mercenary Company over Role in Syria,” The Guardian, March 15, 2021, https://www.
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8.

Maria Tsvetkova and Anton Zverev, “Exclusive: Kremlin-Linked Contractors Help Guard Venezuela's Maduro—Sources,” Reuters,
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9.

Tom Balmforth, “Russia Sends Lavrov to Venezuela to ‘Counteract’ U.S. Sanctions,” Reuters, February 4, 2020, https://www.
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13. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 186.
14. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Putin Creates National Guard Force,” July 4, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-nationalguard-dissent-riots/27836301.html (accessed June 19, 2021), and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
2017, p. 169.
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﻿

30. Kyle Mizokami, “Russia Is Field Testing Its New Armata Tank in Syria,” Popular Mechanics, April 22, 2020, https://www.
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33. Alex Lockie, “Russia Admits Defeat on Its ‘Stealth’ F-35 Killer by Canceling Mass Production of the Su-57 Fighter Jet,” Business
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40. Ibid. and Xavier Vavasseur, “Project 22350 Gorshkov-Class Frigates to Join Russia’s Black Sea Fleet,” Naval News, April 2, 2020,
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﻿

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60. TASS, “Latest Voronezh Radars to Replace All Russian Existing Airspace Control Systems,” February 15, 2021, https://tass.com/
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61. General Tod D. Wolters, United States Air Force, Commander, United States European Command, statement on EUCOM posture
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media/doc/Wolters_02-25-20.pdf (accessed June 19, 2021). Emphasis in original.
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64. Nikers, “Russia’s Offshore ‘Missile Tests’: Psychologically Undermining the Economic Security of the Baltics,” and Birnbaum,“Russia Tests Missiles in the Baltic Sea, a Day After Baltic Leaders Met with Trump.”
65. Osborne, “Russian Live Missile Tests Force Latvia to Close Airspace over Baltic Sea: ‘It’s Hard to Comprehend.’”
66. Col. Tomasz K. Kowalik and Dominik P. Jankowski, “The Dangerous Tool of Russian Military Exercises,” Foreign Policy Association,
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voanews.com/europe/blinken-heads-ukraine-after-russia-sends-150k-troops-border (accessed June 19, 2021), and VladimirIsachenkov, “Russian Military Says Its Troops Back to Bases After Buildup,” Associated Press, April 29, 2021, https://apnews.com/
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69. U.S. Strategic Command, “Remarks by Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti at the 2016 Deterrence Symposium,” La Vista, Nebraska, July 27,
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70. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 187.
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2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/world/europe/russia-military-drills.html (accessed June 19, 2021).
72. Ibid. and Johnson, “VOSTOK 2018: Ten Years of Russian Strategic Exercises and Warfare Preparation.”
73. Mathieu Boulègue, “Russia’s Vostok Exercises Were Both Serious Planning and a Show,” Chatham House: The Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, September 17, 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/russia-s-vostok-exercises-were-bothserious-planning-and-show (accessed June 19, 2021). Also posted on IntelliBriefs, September 18, 2018, http://intellibriefs.blogspot.
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74. Ibid. and Johnson, “VOSTOK 2018: Ten Years of Russian Strategic Exercises and Warfare Preparation.”
75. Higgins, “300,000 Troops and 900 Tanks: Russia’s Biggest Military Drills Since Cold War,” and Sam LaGrone, “China Sent
Uninvited Spy Ship to Russian Vostok 2018 Exercise Alongside Troops, Tanks,” U.S. Naval Institute News, September 17, 2018,https://news.usni.org/2018/09/17/china-sent-uninvited-spy-ship-russian-vostok-2018-exercise-alongside-troops-tanks (accessed
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76. Vladimir Putin, “On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,” Decree of the President of the Russian Federation
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77. Ibid., p. 12.
78. Connolly and Boulègue, “Russia’s New State Armament Programme: Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military
Capabilities to 2027,” p. 16.
79. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 15.
80. Kristensen and Korda, “Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2021,” p. 90.

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83. Wolters, statement on EUCOM posture, p. 3.
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90. Jim Garamone, “NATO Agrees: Russia in Material Breach of INF Treaty,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 5, 2018, https://
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95. Warren Strobel and John Walcott, “Fewer Russian Spies in U.S. but Getting Harder to Track,” Reuters, March 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-spies/fewer-russian-spies-in-u-s-but-getting-harder-to-track-idUSKBN1H40JW(accessed June 19, 2021).
96. BBC News, “Sergei Skripal: Who Is the Former Russian Intelligence Officer?” March 29, 2018, http://www.bbc.com/news/
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Outraged as 500 Told They May Be at Risk a Week After Spy Attack,” The Telegraph, March 12, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
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Officer Discharged from Hospital After Salisbury Spy Poisoning Speaks Out: ‘Life Will Probably Never Be the Same,’” Evening
Standard, March 22, 2018, https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/police-officer-discharged-from-hospital-after-salisbury-spypoisoning-speaks-out-for-first-time-life-a3797041.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
97. Lauren Said-Moorhouse and Samuel Quashie-Idun, “Salisbury Declared Novichok-Free Nearly a Year After Nerve Agent Attack,”
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98. News release, “Statement from the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on the Attack in Salisbury,” The
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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength99. Heidi Blake, Tom Warren, Richard Holmes, Jason Leopold, Jane Bradley, and Alex Campbell, “From Russia with Blood: The
Kremlin’s Ruthless Assassination Program and Vladimir Putin’s Secret War on the West,” BuzzFeed News, June 15, 2017 (including
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100. Ali Watkins, “Russia Escalates Spy Games After Years of U.S. Neglect,” Politico, June 1, 2017, http://www.politico.com/
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101. BBC News, “US Charges Russian Spies over Yahoo Breach,” March 15, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39281063(accessed June 20, 2021).
102. Katie Bo Williams, “US Sanctions Russia over Hacking, Expels 35 Officials,” The Hill, December 29, 2016, http://thehill.com/policy/
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103. Nadia Schadlow and Brayden Helwig, “Protecting Undersea Cables Must be Made a National Security Priority,” Defense News,
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104. Cristina Silva, “New Cold War: Is Russia Spying on the U.S. from a Nicaragua Military Compound?” Newsweek, May 22, 2017,
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105. Evan Ellis, “Russian Engagement in Latin America: An Update,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Commentary,
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106. Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, “Russia’s Central American Engagements,” Foreign Policy Research Institute Russia Foreign Policy Paper,
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107. Brett Forrest, “In Cold War Echo, Russia Returns to U.S.’s Backyard,” The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2018, https://www.wsj.
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108. Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, International Security and Estonia 2019, p. 4, https://www.valisluureamet.ee/pdf/raport2019-ENG-web.pdf (accessed June 20, 2021).

﻿109. State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Defence Intelligence and Security Service Under the Ministry of
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110. State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and Second Investigation Department Under the Ministry of National
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111. Latvian State Security Service, Annual Report for 2018, April 2019, pp. 18–24, https://vdd.gov.lv/en/useful/publications/annualreport-on-the-activities-of-latvian-state-security-service-in-2018.art139 (accessed June 20, 2021).
112. Per Olaf Salming, “Kremlin Intimidation: Putin Renames Air Force Regiment ‘Tallinn Regiment,’” UpNorth, January 30, 2018,https://upnorth.eu/kremlin-intimidation-putin-renames-air-force-regiment-tallinn-regiment/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
113. Bill Gertz, “Russia Waging Information Warfare, General Says,” The Washington Free Beacon, March 24, 2017, http://freebeacon.
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114. Alexis Mrachek, “Don’t Believe Russia’s Disinformation About Coronavirus,” The Daily Signal, April 7, 2020, https://www.
dailysignal.com/2020/04/07/dont-believe-russias-disinformation-about-coronavirus/.
115. Baltic News Service/TBT Staff, “Fake News About US Troops Posted on BNS Website and Cyber Attack Suspected,” The Baltic
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116. BBC News, “Hackers Post Fake Stories on Real News Sites ‘to Discredit NATO,’” July 30, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/
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117. Bill Gertz, “Russia Steps up Anti-U.S. Military Propaganda,” The Washington Free Beacon, April 27, 2017, http://freebeacon.com/
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118. John Vandiver, “Poland Hit by Wave of Fake News Before Start of Major Military Exercise with US,” Stars and Stripes, May 29,
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119. Kalev Stoicescu and Pauli Järvenpää, Contemporary Deterrence: Insights and Lessons from Enhanced Forward Presence,
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120. Atlantic Council, Digital Forensic Research Lab, “#BalticBrief: The Kremlin’s Loudspeaker in Latvia,” November 18, 2018, https://
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121. Kathrin Hille, Neil Buckley, Courtney Weaver, and Guy Chazan, “Vladimir Putin Signs Treaty to Annex Crimea,” Financial Times,
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122. Janusz Bugajski and Peter B. Doran, “Black Sea Rising: Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Europe,” Center for
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123. Neil MacFarquhar, “Putin Opens Bridge to Crimea, Cementing Russia’s Hold on Neighbor,” The New York Times, May 15, 2018,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/world/europe/putin-russia-crimea-bridge.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
124. UNIAN Information Agency, “Shipping Volumes at Mariupol Port Fall 10% Against 2017—Media,” January 9, 2019, https://www.
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125. Ann M. Simmons, “New Rail Bridge to Crimea Strengthens Russia’s Hand Against Ukraine,” The Wall Street Journal,
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126. “Deployment: Ukraine,” in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021, p. 205. Ukraine has put the
number of Russian troops in occupied Crimea at more than 31,000; however, with Russia’s military buildup in April 2021, thenumber could now be closer to 40,000. Ukrinform, “Already 31,500 Russian Troops Deployed in Occupied Crimea,” November
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﻿127. Michael Petersen, “The Naval Power Shift in the Black Sea,” War on the Rocks, January 9, 2019, https://warontherocks.
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128. Dmitry Gorenburg, “Is a New Russian Black Sea Fleet Coming? Or Is It Here?” War on the Rocks, July 31, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/is-a-new-russian-black-sea-fleet-coming-or-is-it-here/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
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131. Bugajski and Doran, “Black Sea Rising: Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Europe,” p. 3.
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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength140. Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “Situation in Eastern Ukraine Remains ‘Tense and Volatile’ Despite Post-Ceasefire
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141. Reuters, “Two Ukrainian Soldiers Killed in Eastern Ukraine: Military,” April 6, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukrainecrisis-casualties/two-ukrainian-soldiers-killed-in-eastern-ukraine-military-idUSKBN2BT0KV (accessed June 20, 2021).
142. Crimea.Realities, “Russian Court Leaves Jailed Ukrainian Sailors in Pretrial Detention,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January
15, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-court-leaves-jailed-ukrainian-sailors-in-pretrial-detention/29711363.html (accessed June20, 2021).
143. Ivan Nechepurenko and Andrew Higgins, “Russia and Ukraine Swap Dozens of Prisoners, in a ‘First Step to Stop the War,’” The
New York Times, updated April 9, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/07/world/europe/russia-ukraine-prisoner-swap.html(accessed June 20, 2021).
144. Heather Knauert, Spokesperson, statement on “Russia’s Harassment of International Shipping Transiting the Kerch Strait and Sea
of Azov,” U.S. Department of State, August 30, 2018, https://ru.usembassy.gov/russias-harassment-of-international-shippingtransiting-the-kerch-strait-and-sea-of-azov/ (accessed June 26, 2021).
145. Current Time, Crimea.Realities, and Stuart Greer, “Ukraine’s Mariupol Port Struggles to Stay Afloat amid Russian ‘Hybrid War,’”Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 21, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-s-mariupol-port-struggles-to-stay-afloatamid-russian-hybrid-war-/30285170.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
146. Cory Welt, “Moldova: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. 10894, updated March 9, 2020, https://
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147. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “OSCE Expresses Concern over Russian Forces Actions in Transdniester,” August 16, 2018,https://www.rferl.org/a/osce-expresses-concerns-russian-forces-transdniester/29437831.html (accessed June 20, 2021), andpress release, “OSCE Mission to Moldova Concerned About Unsanctioned Military Exercises in the Security Zone,” Organizationfor Security and Co-operation in Europe, August 15, 2018, https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/390644 (accessed June 20,2021).

149. Sergey Sukhankin, “Kaliningrad: From Boomtown to Battle-Station,” European Council on Foreign Relations Commentary, March
27, 2017, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kaliningrad_from_boomtown_to_battle_station_7256 (accessed June 20,2021).
150. Michael Krepon and Joe Kendall, “Beef up Conventional Forces; Don’t Worry About a Tactical Nuke Gap,” Breaking Defense,
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152. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2020), p. 171.
153. Kalev Stoicescu and Henrik Praks, “Strengthening the Strategic Balance in the Baltic Sea Area,” International Centre for
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154. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017, p. 216, and Damien Sharkov, “Russian Military Asks
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155. Andrew Osborn, “Russia Approves Warplane Deployment on Disputed Island Near Japan,” Reuters, February 2, 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-japan-russia-islands-military/russia-approves-warplane-deployment-on-disputed-island-near-japanidUKKBN1FM179 (accessed June 20, 2021).
156. Kyodo News, “Russia Plans to Beef up Missile Defense on Northern Kurils, Close to Islands Claimed by Japan,” The Japan Times,
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157. Associated Press, “Russia Deploys Missiles to Pacific Islands Claimed by Japan,” December 1, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/
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﻿148. Dumitru Minzarari, “Russia Perfecting Its Elections Interference Toolkit in Moldova,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor,Vol. 16, Issue 12 (January 31, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/russia-perfecting-its-elections-interference-toolkit-inmoldova/ (accessed June 20, 2021).

158. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Is Building Military Barracks on Disputed Kuril Islands,” The Diplomat, December 19, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/russia-is-building-military-barracks-on-disputed-kuril-islands/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
159. Jason Lemon, “Russia Plans to Build up Troops near Western Border to Combat Increasing Threat from NATO,” Newsweek, May
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160. Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Armed Forces Strengthen Western Military District,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor,Vol. 17, Issue 91 (June 24, 2020), https://jamestown.org/program/russias-armed-forces-strengthen-western-military-district/(accessed June 20, 2021).
161. Charles Dick, “Russia Ground Forces Posture Towards the West,” Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs,
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162. Nick Paton Walsh, “Satellite Images Show Huge Russian Military Buildup in the Arctic,” CNN, updated April 5, 2021, https://www.
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163. Tom Parfitt, “Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed,” The Guardian, August 2, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/
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164. Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s New and Unrealistic Naval Doctrine,” War on the Rocks, July 26, 2017, https://warontherocks.
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165. Daniel Brown, “Russia’s Northern Fleet Beefs up Its Nuclear Capabilities to Phase ‘NATO Out of Arctic,’” Business Insider, June
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166. Joseph Trevithick, “Three Russian Ballistic Missile Submarines Just Surfaced Through the Arctic Ice Together,“ The War Zone,
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167. Thomas Nilsen, “Russian Bombers Simulated an Attack Against This Radar on Norway’s Barents Sea Coast,” The Barents Observer,
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168. Thomas Nilsen, “Arctic Challenge 2017 Set for Take Off,” The Barents Observer, May 16, 2017, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/
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169. “Russian Pacific Fleet Il-38N MPA Practice ASW in Arctic,” Navy Recognition, April 2, 2018, https://www.navyrecognition.com/
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170. Thomas Nilsen, “U.S. Navy Will Build Airport Infrastructure in Northern Norway to Meet Upped Russian Submarine Presence,”
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171. Kostya Manenkov and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia’s Northernmost Base Projects Its Power Across Arctic,” Associated Press, May
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172. Thomas Nilsen, “FSB Gets Right to Confiscate Land from People,” The Barents Observer, May 16, 2017, https://thebarentsobserver.
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173. Atle Staalesen, “New FSB Base Opens Way for More Operations in Arctic,” The Barents Observer, January 3, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/01/new-fsb-base-opens-way-more-operations-arctic (accessed June 20, 2021).
174. BBC News, “Putin Creates New National Guard in Russia ‘to Fight Terrorism,’” April 6, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-35975840 (accessed June 20, 2021).
175. Atle Staalesen, “National Guard Becomes Arctic Protector,” The Barents Observer, January 28, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.
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176. Reuters, “Russia's Novatek Approves Arctic LNG 2 Financing of $11 bln by End-Q2,” April 23, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/
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177. Atle Staalesen, “It’s an Order from the Kremlin: Shipping on Northern Sea Route to Reach 80 Million Tons by 2024,” The Barents
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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength178. Atle Staalesen, “Shipping on Northern Sea Route Breaks Record,” The Barents Observer, December 22, 2020, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2020/12/shipping-northern-sea-route-breaks-record (accessed June 20, 2021).
179. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Claims Total Military Superiority in the Arctic,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 16,
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180. Elizabeth McLaughlin, “The Race for the Arctic: As New Frontier Opens, Russia Leaves US in Its Wake,” ABC News, May 10, 2017,
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181. Atle Staalesen, “New Arctic Naval Base Built in 6 Months,” The Barents Observer, January 30, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.
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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military275﻿265. Vincent L. Morelli and Sarah E. Garding, “Serbia: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for
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274. Vera Mironova and Bogdan Zawadewicz, “Putin Is Building a Bosnian Paramilitary Force,” Foreign Policy, August 8, 2018, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/08/putin-is-building-a-bosnian-paramilitary-force/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
275. Ibid.
276. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Balkan Service, “Serbia Stops ‘Promo Train’ to Kosovo’s North,” January 14, 2017, https://www.
rferl.org/a/28233304.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
277. Christopher Woody, “‘Good Luck, Guys’: 17 Russian Jets Buzzed a British Destroyer and Left a Threatening Message Earlier This
Year,” Business Insider, November 27, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/17-russian-jets-buzzed-a-british-destroyer-in-theblack-sea-2018-11 (accessed June 20, 2021).
278. Reuters, “As Syria Tensions Surge, Russian Fighter Jet Buzzes French Warship in Breach of International Law,” The Japan Times,
April 11, 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/04/11/world/syria-tensions-surge-russian-fighter-jet-buzzes-frenchwarship-breah-international-law/#.Wx_gGIpKjcs (accessed June 20, 2021).
279. Marcia Wendorf, “Both the U.S. and Russia Are Stalking the World’s Undersea Cables,” Interesting Engineering, August 16, 2019,https://interestingengineering.com/both-the-us-and-russia-are-stalking-the-worlds-undersea-cables (accessed June 20, 2021).
280. Kyle Mizokami, “What Is a Russian Spy Ship Doing in the Eastern Mediterranean?” Popular Mechanics, September 19, 2017, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a28276/yantar-spy-ship-eastern-mediterranean/ (accessed June 20, 2021),
and Deb Reichmann, “Russia May Be Targeting Undersea Internet Cables. Here’s Why That’s Bad,” Yahoo News, March 30, 2018,https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-may-targeting-undersea-internet-213130980.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
281. Ryan Browne and Zachary Cohen, “Russian Spy Ship Spotted 100 Miles off North Carolina Coast,” CNN, updated January 22,
2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/22/politics/russia-spy-ship-us-coast/index.html?sr=twCNNp012218russia-spy-ship-uscoast0253PMStory&CNNPolitics=Tw (accessed June 20, 2021).
282. Rachel S. Cohen, “Spike in Russian Aircraft Intercepts Straining Air Force Crews in Alaska, Three-Star Says,” Air Force Times, April
28, 2021, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2021/04/28/spike-in-russian-aircraft-intercepts-straining-air-forcecrews-in-alaska-three-star-says/ (accessed June 20, 2021).

﻿

283. Ibid.
284. Corey Dickstein, “US Jets Intercept Russian Bombers off Alaskan Coast for 14th Time this Year,” Stars and Stripes, October
20, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/news/air-force/us-jets-intercept-russian-bombers-off-alaskan-coast-for-14th-time-thisyear-1.649318 (accessed June 20, 2021).
285. BBC News, “RAF Lossiemouth Jets Scrambled to Russian Planes Twice in Five Days,” April 3, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/
uk-scotland-highlands-islands-47799660 (accessed June 20, 2021).
286. Jelena Ćirić, “Russian Bombers Enter NATO Airspace Near Iceland,” Iceland Review, March 19, 2019, https://www.icelandreview.
com/news/russian-bombers-enter-nato-airspace-near-iceland/ (accessed June 20, 2021), and Larissa Kyzer, “Russian Bombers
Re-Enter NATO Airspace Near Iceland,” Iceland Review, March 29, 2019, https://www.icelandreview.com/news/russian-bombersreenter-nato-airspace-near-iceland/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
287. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “U.S., Canadian Jets Scrambled to Escort Russian Bombers Away from North American
Coastline,” January 27, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/us-canadian-jets-scramble-escort-russian-blackjack-bombersaway/29733515.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
288. Carlos M. Vazquez II and Aya Ichihashi, “Russian Bombers Violated Japan’s Airspace Twice in One Day, Defense Ministry Says,”
Stars and Stripes, June 21, 2019, https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/russian-bombers-violated-japan-s-airspace-twice-in-oneday-defense-ministry-says-1.586945 (accessed June 20, 2021).
289. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Scrambles Fighter Jets to Intercept Russian Military Reconnaissance Plane,” The Diplomat, March
29, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/japan-scrambles-fighter-jets-to-intercept-russian-military-reconnaissance-plane/(accessed June 20, 2021), and Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Scrambles Fighter Jets to Intercept 2 Russian Military Aircraft,” The
Diplomat, May 6, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/japan-scrambles-fighter-jets-to-intercept-2-russian-military-aircraft/(accessed June 20, 2021).
290. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Intercepts 2 Russian Nuclear-Capable Fighter-Bombers,” The Diplomat, January 17, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/japan-intercepts-2-russian-nuclear-capable-fighter-bombers/ (accessed June 20, 2021).
291. Gady, “Japan Scrambles Fighter Jets to Intercept 2 Russian Military Aircraft.”292. Reuters, “Russia Scrambles Fighter Jet to Escort NATO Planes over Black Sea,” The Jerusalem Post, December 7, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/russia-scrambles-fighter-jet-to-escort-nato-planes-over-black-sea-651422 (accessed June 20,2021).

276

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength293. News release, “NATO Jets Intercept Russian Warplanes During Unusual Level of Air Activity,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
last updated March 30, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_182897.htm (accessed June 20, 2021).
294. News release, “NATO Fighter Jets Intercept Russian Military Aircraft over the Baltic Sea,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Allied Air Command, April 21, 2021, https://ac.nato.int/archive/2021/20210420_Baltic_Intercepts (accessed June 20, 2021).
295. Nilsen, “Russian Sub Hunters Worry Air Traffic Controllers. Norway Scrambled F-16s and F-35s.”
296. Associated Press, “Russian Aircraft Violates Airspace of NATO Member Estonia,” ABC News, September 24, 2019, https://abcnews.
go.com/International/wireStory/russian-aircraft-violates-airspace-nato-member-estonia-65818448 (accessed June 20, 2021).
297. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “NATO Says Russian Su-27 Escort Jets Had No Flight Plans, Turned off Transponders,” August
14, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-says-russian-su-27-escort-jets-had-no-flight-plans-turned-off-transponders/30109797.
html (accessed June 20, 2021).
298. BBC News, “Russian Military Admits Significant Cyber-War Efforts,” February 23, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-39062663 (accessed June 20, 2021).
299. Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
statement before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, January 29, 2019, p. 6, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/
documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf (accessed June 20, 2021).
300. David Sanger, “Russian Hackers Broke into Federal Agencies, U.S. Officials Suspect,” The New York Times, May
10, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/13/us/politics/russian-hackers-us-government-treasury-commerce.
html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock (accessed June 24, 2021).
301. Ibid.
302. David E. Sanger, Nicole Perlroth, and Eric Schmitt, “Scope of Russian Hacking Becomes Clear: Multiple U.S. Agencies Were
Hit,” The New York Times, updated May 10, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/politics/russia-hack-nsa-homelandsecurity-pentagon.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
303. “FACT SHEET: Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government,” The White House, April 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activitiesby-the-russian-government/ (accessed June 20, 2021).

305. Matt Egan and Clare Duffy, “Colonial Pipeline Launches Restart After Six-Day Shutdown,” CNBC, updated May 12, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/12/business/colonial-pipeline-restart/index.html (accessed June 20, 2021).
306. Ryan Browne, “Hackers Behind Colonial Pipeline Attack Reportedly Received $90 Million in Bitcoin Before Shutting Down,“
CNBC, May 18, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/18/colonial-pipeline-hackers-darkside-received-90-million-in-bitcoin.html(accessed June 20, 2021).
307. News release, “Department of Justice Seizes $2.3 Million in Cryptocurrency Paid to the Ransomware Extortionists Darkside,” U.S.
Department of Justice, June 7, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-seizes-23-million-cryptocurrency-paidransomware-extortionists-darkside (accessed June 19, 2021).
308. BBC News, “JBS: FBI Says Russia-Linked Group Hacked Meat Supplier,” June 3, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-57338896 (accessed June 19, 2021).
309. Brett Molina and Mike Snider, “JBS USA, World's Largest Meat Supplier, Shuts Down 9 Beef Plants After Cyberattack; ‘Vast
Majority’ of Plants to Open Wednesday,” USA Today, June 1, 2021, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/shopping/2021/06/01/
jbs-cyberattack-worlds-largest-meat-supplier-closes-5-beef-plants/7493850002/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
310. David E. Sanger and Marc Santora, “U.S. and Allies Blame Russia for Cyberattack on Republic of Georgia,” The New York Times,
updated February 21, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/world/europe/georgia-cyberattack-russia.html (accessed
June 19, 2021).
311. Denis Pinchuk, “Patriotic Russians May Have Staged Cyber Attacks on Own Initiative: Putin,” Reuters, June 1, 2017, http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-russia-economic-forum-putin-cyber-idUSKBN18S56Y (accessed June 19, 2021).
312. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” April 9, 2021, p. 9,
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf (accessed June 19, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military277﻿304. Jenna McLaughlin, “Justice Department Recovers Majority of Colonial Pipeline Ransom: 'We turned the tables on DarkSide,’”Yahoo News, June 7, 2021, https://news.yahoo.com/justice-department-recovers-majority-of-colonial-pipeline-ransom-weturned-the-tables-on-dark-side-210611828.html (accessed June 20, 2021), and Michael Schwirtz and Nicole Perlroth, “DarkSide,
Blamed for Gas Pipeline Attack, Says It Is Shutting Down,” The New York Times, updated June 8, 2021, https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/05/14/business/darkside-pipeline-hack.html (accessed June 20, 2021).

﻿

Iran
James Phillips

Ra “global jihad.” It helped to introduce andpopularize the tactic of suicide bombingsin Lebanon in the 1980s, developed a strong
guerrilla force and a political apparatus in
the 1990s, provoked a war with Israel in 2006,
intervened in the Syrian civil war after 2011at Iran’s direction, and has become a major
destabilizing influence in the ongoing Arab–
Israeli conflict.
Before September 11, 2001, of all of theworld’s terrorist groups, Hezbollah had murdered the most Americans. Despite al-Qaeda’s
increased visibility since then, Hezbollah remains a bigger, better equipped, better organized, and potentially more dangerous terrorist organization, partly because it enjoys the
support of the world’s two chief state sponThreats to the Homelandsors of terrorism: Iran and Syria. Hezbollah’sHezbollah Terrorism. Hezbollah, the demonstrated capabilities led former Deputy
radical Lebanon-based Shia revolutionary Secretary of State Richard Armitage to dub it
movement, poses a clear terrorist threat to “the A-Team of Terrorists.”1
international security. Hezbollah terrorists
Hezbollah has expanded its operations fromhave murdered Americans, Israelis, Lebanese, Lebanon to regional targets in the Middle East
Europeans, and citizens of many other nations. and far beyond the region. Today, it is a global
Originally founded with support from Iran in terrorist threat that draws financial and logis1982, this Lebanese group has evolved from a tical support from its Iranian patrons as well
local menace into a global terrorist network as from the Lebanese Shiite diaspora in thethat is strongly backed by regimes in Iran and Middle East, Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia,
Syria. Its political wing has dominated Leba- North America, and South America. Hezbollah
nese politics and is funded by Iran and a web fundraising and equipment procurement cellsof charitable organizations, criminal activities, have been detected and broken up in the Unitand front companies.
ed States and Canada, and Europe is believed
Hezbollah regards terrorism not only as to contain many more of these cells.
a useful tool for advancing its revolutionary
Hezbollah has been involved in numerous
agenda, but also as a religious duty as part of terrorist attacks against Americans, including:

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﻿adical Islamist terrorism in its many
forms remains the most immediate global threat to the safety and security of U.S. citizens at home and abroad, and Iran-supported
terrorists and proxy militias pose some of thegreatest potential threats. The Lebanon-based
Hezbollah (Party of God) has a long history of
executing terrorist attacks against American
targets in the Middle East at Iran’s direction,and it could be activated to launch attacks
inside the United States in the event of a conflict with Iran. Such state-sponsored terrorist
attacks pose the greatest potential Iranianthreats to the U.S. homeland, at least until Irandevelops a long-range ballistic missile capableof targeting and reaching the United States.

l

l

l

l

The April 18, 1983, bombing of the U.S.
embassy in Beirut, which killed 63 people
including 17 Americans;
The October 23, 1983, suicide truck
bombing of the Marine barracks at
Beirut Airport, which killed 241 Marines and other personnel deployed aspart of the multinational peacekeeping
force in Lebanon;
The September 20, 1984, suicide truck
bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in
Lebanon, which killed 23 people including
two Americans; andThe June 25, 1996, Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19 American servicemen
stationed in Saudi Arabia.
In addition:

﻿

l

l

l

l

Hezbollah operatives were later found tohave been responsible for the 1984 murder of American University of Beirut President Malcolm Kerr and the June 14, 1985,
murder of U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem,
who was a passenger on TWA Flight 847,
which was hijacked and diverted to Beirut
International Airport.
In March 1984, Hezbollah kidnapped
William Buckley, the CIA station chief in
Beirut, who died in captivity in 1985 after
being tortured for more than a year.2
Hezbollah was involved in the kidnappingof several dozen Westerners, including
14 Americans, who were held as hostagesin Lebanon in the 1980s. The American
hostages eventually became pawns that
Iran used as leverage in the secret negotiations that led to the Iran–Contra affair inthe mid-1980s.
Hezbollah kidnapped Colonel William
Higgins, a Marine officer serving with
the United Nations Truce Supervision

280

Organization in Lebanon, in February
1988 and killed him in 1989.
Hezbollah has launched numerous attacks
outside of the Middle East. It perpetrated thetwo deadliest terrorist attacks in the historyof South America: the March 1992 bombingof the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which killed 29 people, and the July
1994 bombing of a Jewish community centerin Buenos Aires that killed 96 people. The trial of those who were implicated in the 1994
bombing revealed an extensive Hezbollah
presence in Argentina and other countries inSouth America.
Hezbollah has escalated its terrorist attacks
against Israeli targets in recent years as part of
Iran’s shadow war against Israel. In 2012, Hezbollah killed five Israeli tourists and a Bulgarian bus driver in a suicide bombing near Burgas, Bulgaria. Hezbollah terrorist plots against
Israelis were foiled in Thailand and Cyprus
during that same year.
Hezbollah deployed personnel to Iraq after the 2003 U.S. intervention to assist pro-­
Iranian Iraqi Shia militias that were battling
the U.S.-led coalition. In addition, Hezbollah
has deployed personnel in Yemen to train
and assist the Iran-backed Houthi rebels. In
2013, Hezbollah admitted that it had deployed
several thousand militia members to fight in
Syria on behalf of the Assad regime. By 2015,
Hezbollah forces had become crucial to thesurvival of the Assad regime after the Syrian
army was hamstrung by casualties, defections,and low morale.
Although Hezbollah operates mostly in the
Middle East, it has a global reach and has established a presence inside the United States.
Cells in the United States generally are focusedon fundraising, including criminal activities
such as those perpetrated by over 70 usedcar dealerships identified as part of a scheme
to launder hundreds of millions of dollars of
cocaine-generated revenue that flowed backto Hezbollah.3
Covert Hezbollah cells could morph into
other forms and launch terrorist operations

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthFour days later, the U.S. intelligence community warned that if Iran decided to carry out aretaliatory attack in the United States, it “could
act directly or enlist the cooperation of proxies and partners, such as Lebanese Hezbollah.”8Then, on January 12, 2020, Hezbollah leader
Hassan Nasrallah publicly threatened U.S.
forces in the Middle East: “The U.S. administration and the assassins will pay a heavy price,and they will discover their miscalculation.”9Hezbollah also has a long history of cooperation with criminal networks. On May 27, 2020,
U.S. prosecutors announced the indictment of
a former Venezuelan politician who sought torecruit terrorists from Hezbollah and Hamas
to orchestrate attacks against U.S. interests.
Adel El Zabayar, a Venezuelan citizen of Syrian descent who is a close associate of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, traveled to
the Middle East in 2014 to obtain weapons andrecruit members of Hezbollah and Hamas totrain at hidden camps in Venezuela. The goalof this “unholy alliance,” according to the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of
New York, was to “create a large terrorist cell
capable of attacking United States interests onbehalf of the Cartel de Los Soles,” a criminalorganization that “conspired to export literally
tons of cocaine into the U.S.”10
Iran’s Ballistic Missile Threat. Iran has
an extensive missile development programthat has received key assistance from North
Korea, as well as more limited support from
Russia and China until the imposition of sanctions by the U.N. Security Council. Although
the U.S. intelligence community assesses that
Iran does not have an ICBM capability (an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of
5,500 kilometers or about 2,900 miles), Tehran could develop one in the future. Iran is not
likely to develop missiles capable of reaching
the United States until 2025 at the earliest.11
Iran has launched several satellites with spacelaunch vehicles that use similar technology,
which could also be adapted to develop an
ICBM capability.12
On April 22, 2020, Iran launched a military satellite with a new launch vehicle that

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﻿inside the United States. Given Hezbollah’sclose ties to Iran and past record of executing terrorist attacks on Tehran’s behalf, there
is a real danger that Hezbollah terrorist cells
could be activated inside the United States inthe event of a conflict between Iran and the U.S.
or between Iran and Israel.
On June 1, 2017, two naturalized U.S. citizens were arrested and charged with providing
material support to Hezbollah and conducting preoperational surveillance of military andlaw enforcement sites in New York City andat Kennedy Airport, the Panama Canal, and
the American and Israeli embassies in Panama.4 Nicholas Rasmussen, then Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center, noted that
the June arrests were a “stark reminder” of
Hezbollah’s global reach and warned that Hezbollah “is determined to give itself a potential
homeland option as a critical component of its
terrorism playbook,” which “is something thatthose of us in the counterterrorism community
take very, very seriously.”5
On July 9, 2019, a New Jersey man who
served as a U.S.-based operative for Hezbollah’s terrorism-planning wing for years, wasarrested and charged with providing material
support to the terrorist group. Alexei Saab, a42-year-old Lebanese immigrant and naturalized U.S. citizen, scouted such New York City
landmarks as the Statue of Liberty and the Empire State Building for possible attacks. Whenhe was indicted in September 2019, he was atleast the third American to have been charged
since 2017 with being an agent for Hezbollah.6
In January 2020, after a spate of attacks on
U.S. military personnel and the U.S. embassy
in Iraq provoked a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike that killed Iranian General
Qassem Soleimani, leader of the Quds Forceof Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps(IRGC), U.S. intelligence officials warned
about the potential Hezbollah threat to the
U.S. homeland. The Department of Homeland
Security warned in a January 4, 2020, bulletinthat “Iran and its partners, such as Hizballah,
have demonstrated the intent and capability
to conduct operations in the United States.”7

﻿

includes such new features as a light carbon
fiber casing and a moving nozzle for flight control that is also used in long-range ballistic missiles—clear evidence that Iran continues to improve its capabilities.13 Tehran’s missile arsenal
primarily threatens U.S. bases and allies in the
Middle East, but Iran eventually could expand
the range of its missiles to include the continental United States. Iran is the only country
in history that has developed missiles with arange of 2,000 kilometers without first having
nuclear weapons.

Threat of Regional War
The Middle East region is one of the mostcomplex and volatile threat environments
faced by the United States and its allies. Iran,Hezbollah, and Iran-supported proxy groupspose actual or potential threats both to America’s interests and to those of its allies.
Iranian Threats in the Middle East. Iranis led by an anti-Western revolutionary regime
that seeks to tilt the regional balance of power
in its favor by driving out the U.S. military presence, undermining and overthrowing opposing
governments, and establishing its hegemony
over the oil-rich Persian Gulf region. It alsoseeks to radicalize Shiite communities andadvance their interests against Sunni rivals.
Iran has a long record of sponsoring terrorist
attacks against American targets and U.S. allies
in the region.
Iran’s conventional military forces, although relatively weak by Western standards,
loom large compared to those of Iran’s smallerneighbors. Iran’s armed forces remain dependent on major weapons systems and equipment that date back to before the country’s
1979 revolution. The regime’s ability to maintain or replace these aging weapons systems,
many of which were depleted in the 1980–1988
Iran–Iraq war, has been limited by Westernsanctions. Iran has not been able to importlarge numbers of modern armor, combat aircraft, longer-range surface-to-surface missiles,
or major naval warships.
Tehran, however, has managed to import modern Russian and Chinese air-to-air,282

air-to-ground, air defense, anti-armor, andanti-ship missiles to upgrade its conventional
military and asymmetric forces.14 It also has
developed its capacity to reverse engineer
and build its own versions of ballistic missiles,
rockets, UAVs, minisubmarines, and otherweapon systems. To compensate for its limited capability to project conventional military
power, Tehran has focused on building up its
asymmetric warfare capabilities, proxy forces,and ballistic missile and cruise missile capabilities. For example, partly because of the limited capabilities of its air force, Iran developed
UAVs during the Iran–Iraq war, including atleast one armed model that carried up to six
RPG-7 rounds in what was perhaps the world’s
first use of UAVs in combat.15
The July 2015 Iran nuclear agreement,
which lifted nuclear-related sanctions on Iranin January 2016, gave Tehran access to about$100 billion in restricted assets and allowed
Iran to expand its oil and gas exports, thechief source of its state revenues. Relief fromthe burden of sanctions helped Iran’s economy and enabled Iran to enhance its strategic
position, military capabilities, and support forsurrogate networks and terrorist groups.
In May 2016, Tehran announced that it wasincreasing its military budget for 2016–2017 to$19 billion—90 percent more than the previous
year’s budget.16 Estimating total defense spending is difficult because of Tehran’s opaque budget process and the fact that spending on somecategories, including Iran’s ballistic missile
program and military intervention in Syria,
is hidden, but the International Institute forStrategic Studies estimates that Iran’s defense
spending fell from $21.9 billion in 2018 to $17.4
billion in 2019.17 In 2020, defense spending declined again to an estimated $14.1 billion.18
The lifting of sanctions also enabled Tehran to emerge from diplomatic isolation andstrengthen strategic ties with Russia. Russian
President Vladimir Putin traveled to Iran inNovember 2015 to meet with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other officials.
Both regimes called for enhanced military cooperation. During Iranian President Hassan

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

After the 2015 nuclear agreement, Iran andRussia escalated their strategic cooperation inpropping up Syria’s embattled Assad regime.
Iran’s growing military intervention in Syria
was partly eclipsed by Russia’s military intervention and launching of an air campaign
against Assad’s enemies in September 2015,
but Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corpsand surrogate militia groups have played theleading role in spearheading the ground offensives that have retaken territory from Syrian
rebel groups and tilted the military balance infavor of Assad’s regime. By October 2015, Iran
had deployed an estimated 7,000 IRGC troops
and paramilitary forces in Syria, along with anestimated 20,000 Iran-backed Shiite militia
fighters from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, andPakistan.24 Tehran escalated to deploy a force
of almost 80,000 Shia militia fighters commanded by nearly 2,000 IRGC officers.25
Working closely with Russia, Iran then expanded its military efforts and helped to consolidate a costly victory for the Assad regime.
At the height of the fighting in August 2016,
Russia temporarily deployed Tu-22M3 bombers and Su-34 strike fighters to an air base atHamedan in western Iran in order to strike
rebel targets in Syria.26 After the fall of Aleppo
in December 2016, which inflicted a crushingdefeat on the armed opposition, Tehran sought
to entrench a permanent Iranian militarypresence in Syria, establishing an elaborate
infrastructure of military bases, intelligencecenters, UAV airfields, missile sites, and logistical facilities. The IRGC also sought to securea logistical corridor to enable the movement ofheavy equipment, arms, and matériel throughIraq and Syria to bolster Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Iran’s military presence in Syria and continued efforts to provide advanced weapons to
Hezbollah through Syria have fueled tensions
with Israel. Israel has launched more than
2,000 air strikes against Hezbollah and Iranianforces to prevent the transfer of sophisticatedarms and prevent Iran-backed militias from
deploying near Israel’s border. On February
10, 2018, Iranian forces in Syria launched anarmed drone that penetrated Israeli airspace

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﻿Rouhani’s visit to Russia in March 2017, Putin
proclaimed his intention to raise bilateral relations to the level of a “strategic partnership.”19
On June 9, 2018, during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, Putin notedthat Iran and Russia were “working well together to settle the Syrian crisis” and promised Rouhani that he would support Iran’s entry into the SCO.20 On September 16, 2019, in
Ankara, Turkey, ahead of a trilateral meetingwith Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to discuss the situation in Syria, the twopresidents met again, and Putin praised Iran’s
support for the Assad regime.
This growing strategic relationship has
strengthened Iran’s military capabilities. Tehran announced in April 2016 that Russia had
begun deliveries of up to five S-300 Favorit
long-range surface-to-air missile systems,
which can track up to 100 aircraft and engage
six of them simultaneously at a range of 200
kilometers.21 The missile system, which wasconsidered a defensive weapon not included in
the U.N. arms embargo on Iran, was deployed
and became operational in 2017, giving Irana “generational improvement in capabilities”
according to Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lieutenant General Robert Ashley.22
In 2016, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein
Dehghan traveled to Moscow “to negotiate aseries of important weapons deals with Russia”
that included the purchase of advanced Sukhoi
Su-30 Flanker fighter jets. These warplanes
would significantly improve Iran’s air defense
and long-range strike capabilities, although
under the terms of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, they could not be delivered until after the
U.N. arms embargo expired in October 2020. It
was also reported that Tehran was “close to finalizing a deal for purchase and licensed productionof Russia’s modern T-90S main battle tank.”23
Russia and Iran have not announced anyarms deals since the expiration of the U.N.
arms embargo. Moscow may be waiting to see
whether the Iran nuclear agreement can berenegotiated, thereby enabling it to receive
payments from Iran after U.S. financial sanctions are lifted.

﻿

before being shot down. Israel responded with
air strikes on IRGC facilities in Syria. Iranianforces in Syria later launched a salvo of 20
rockets against Israeli military positions in theGolan Heights on May 9, 2018, provoking Israel
to launch ground-to-ground missiles, artillery
salvos, and air strikes against all known Iranianbases in Syria.27
Although Russia reportedly helped to arrange the withdrawal of Iranian heavy weapons to positions 85 kilometers from Israeli military positions in the Golan Heights, Moscow
has “turned a blind eye” to Iranian redeployments and the threat that long-range Iranian
weapon systems deployed in Syria pose to Israel.28 On January 13, 2019, Israel launched an
air strike against an Iranian arms depot at Damascus International Airport, and the Israeli
government revealed that it had launched over
2,000 missiles at various targets in Syria in
2018.29 Israel remains determined to prevent
Iran from establishing forward bases near its
borders, and another clash could rapidly escalate into a regional conflict.
By early 2020, Iran reportedly had reduced
its military forces in Syria after successfully
defeating the rebel military challenge to the
Assad regime.30 Iran continues to bolster thestrength of its proxies and allies in Syria, however, particularly Hezbollah, which has embedded itself in the Syrian army’s 1st Corps andis recruiting Syrian fighters near the Golan
Heights for future attacks on Israel.31 Israel
launched a series of air strikes against Iranianforces and proxy militias in eastern Syria in
January 2021, reportedly to prevent Iranianballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs
that have been deployed in western Iraq frombeing deployed inside Syria.32 Israel also hastargeted Iranian forces and ballistic missiles
inside Iraq.33
Iran’s Proxy Warfare. Iran has adopted
a political warfare strategy that emphasizes
irregular warfare, asymmetric tactics, andthe extensive use of proxy forces. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has trained,
armed, supported, and collaborated with awide variety of radical Shia and Sunni militant284

groups, as well as Arab, Palestinian, Kurdish,and Afghan groups that do not share its radical Islamist ideology. The IRGC’s elite Quds
(Jerusalem) Force has cultivated, trained,
armed, and supported numerous proxies, particularly the Lebanon-based Hezbollah; Iraqi
Shia militant groups; Palestinian groups suchas Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad; andinsurgent groups that have fought against the
governments of Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt,Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates(UAE), and Yemen.
Iran is the world’s foremost state sponsor
of terrorism and has made extensive efforts toexport its radical Shia brand of Islamist revolution. It has established a network of powerful Shia revolutionary groups in Lebanon and
Iraq; has cultivated links with Afghan Shia andTaliban militants; and has stirred Shia unrestin Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, andYemen. In recent years, Iranian arms shipments have been intercepted regularly by naval forces off the coasts of Bahrain and Yemen,
and Israel has repeatedly intercepted Iranianarms shipments, including long-range rockets,
bound for Palestinian militants in Gaza.
U.S. troops in the Middle East have beentargeted by Iranian proxies in Lebanon in the
1980s, Saudi Arabia in 1996, and Iraq in the
2000s. In April 2019, the Pentagon released
an updated estimate of the number of U.S. personnel killed by Iran-backed militias in Iraq,
revising the number upward to at least 603
dead between 2003 and 2011. These casualties, about 17 percent of the American death
toll in Iraq, “were the result of explosively
formed penetrators (EFP), other improvised
explosive devices (IED), improvised rocket-­assisted munitions (IRAM), rockets, mortars,
rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), small-arms,
sniper, and other attacks in Iraq,” according toa Pentagon spokesman.34
In 2019, Tehran ratcheted up surrogate attacks in Iraq against U.S. troops as part of its
aggressive campaign to push back against the
U.S. “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign
and block the negotiation of a revised nuclear

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthper year according to Israeli officials.39 Tehran
has been lavish in stocking Hezbollah’s expensive and extensive arsenal of rockets, sophisticated land mines, small arms, ammunition,
explosives, anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft
missiles, and even UAVs that Hezbollah can use
for aerial surveillance or remotely piloted terrorist attacks. Iranian Revolutionary Guards
have trained Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon’s
Bekaa Valley and in Iran.
Iran has used Hezbollah as a club to hit not
only Israel and Tehran’s Western enemies, butmany Arab countries as well. Tehran’s revolutionary ideology has fueled Iran’s hostility toother Middle Eastern governments, many ofwhich it seeks to overthrow and replace withradical allies. During the Iran–Iraq war, Iranused Hezbollah to launch terrorist attacks
against Iraqi targets and against Arab states thatsided with Iraq. Hezbollah launched numerous
terrorist attacks against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which extended strong financial support toIraq’s war effort, and participated in several other terrorist operations in Bahrain and the UAE.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards conspiredwith the Saudi Arabian branch of Hezbollah to
conduct the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing thatkilled 19 American military personnel. Hezbollah collaborated with the IRGC’s Quds Forceto destabilize Iraq after the 2003 U.S. occupation and helped to train and advise the Mahdi
Army, the radical anti-Western Shiite militia
led by militant Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
Hezbollah detachments also have cooperated
with IRGC forces in Yemen to train and assist
the Houthi rebel movement.
Hezbollah threatens the security and stability of the Middle East and Western interests in
the Middle East on a number of fronts. In addition to its murderous actions against Israel,
Hezbollah has used violence to impose its radical Islamist agenda and subvert democracy in
Lebanon. Some experts believed that Hezbollah’s participation in the 1992 Lebanese elections and subsequent inclusion in Lebanon’s
parliament and coalition governments would
moderate its behavior, but political inclusion
did not lead it to renounce terrorism.

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﻿

agreement with tighter restrictions. Afterscores of rocket attacks on Iraqi military bases that hosted U.S. personnel, Iran-controlled
Shia militias succeeded in killing an American
contractor on December 27, 2019. The ensuing
crisis quickly escalated. The U.S. launched air
strikes against the Kataib Hezbollah militia
that launched the attack; pro-Iranian militia
members retaliated by trying to burn down
the U.S. embassy in Baghdad; and Washington
responded on January 2, 2020, with a drone
strike that killed General Qassem Soleimani,
leader of the IRGC Quds Force, which was orchestrating the attacks. Iran responded withadditional proxy attacks and a ballistic missile
attack that failed to kill any U.S. troops stationed at Iraqi military bases.35
After a February 15, 2021, rocket attack on
an airport in Erbil, Iraq, killed a U.S. contractor,
the U.S. retaliated with air strikes against seventargets inside Syria that were controlled by two
Iran-backed Iraqi militias, Kataib Hezbollah
and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, that were foundto have been responsible for the Erbil attack.36
Attacks by Iran-backed militias have continued
in Iraq, including UAV strikes that pose a growing threat to the 2,500 U.S. troops that train
and support Iraqi security forces.37
Terrorist Threats from Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a close ally of, frequent surrogate for,and terrorist subcontractor for Iran’s revolutionary Islamist regime. Iran played a crucialrole in creating Hezbollah in 1982 as a vehicle
for exporting its revolution, mobilizing Lebanese Shia, and developing a terrorist surrogate
for attacks on its enemies.
Tehran provides the lion’s share of Hezbollah’s foreign support: arms, training, logisticalsupport, and money. The Pentagon has estimated that Iran provides up to $200 million in
annual financial support for Hezbollah; otherestimates made before the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly
known as the Iran nuclear deal, ran as highas $350 million annually.38 After the nuclear
deal, which offered Tehran substantial relief
from sanctions, Tehran increased its aid to
Hezbollah, providing as much as $800 million

MAP 13

Iranian Missile Systems: Maximum Ranges

GER.

FRA.

RUSSIAPOL.
Moscow

UKRAINE

ITALY

Caspian
Sea

Istanbul Black
Sea
Med.
Sea

KAZAKHSTAN

30°
E

TURKEY

CHINA
Baghdad

Cairo

IRAQ

EGYPT
RiyadhTehran

IRAN

AFG.

PAK.

Persian
Gulf

Delhi

UAE

﻿

Red
Sea

SUDAN

SAUDI
ARABIA

INDIA
Mumbai

ArabianSea

Gulf of Aden
60°E

ETHIOPIA

Bay ofBengalSOMALIA2,000 kmShahab 3/Emad-1/Sejjil MRBMs

700 kmZolfaghar SRBM

750 kmQiam-1 SRBM

500 kmShahab 2 SRBM and Fateh-110

300 kmShahab 1

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing
Military Dominance, 2019, p. 43, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/
Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf (accessed July 23, 2021).
A heritage.org

286

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthHezbollah also poses a potential threat toAmerica’s NATO allies in Europe. It established a presence inside European countries
in the 1980s amid the influx of Lebanese citizens who were seeking to escape Lebanon’s
civil war and took root among Lebanese Shiite
immigrant communities throughout Europe.
German intelligence officials have estimated that about 1,250 Hezbollah members andsupporters were living in Germany in 2020.40
Hezbollah also has developed an extensive
web of fundraising and logistical support cells
throughout Europe.41
France and Britain have been the principal
European targets of Hezbollah terrorism, partly because both countries opposed Hezbollah’s
agenda in Lebanon and were perceived as enemies of Iran, Hezbollah’s chief patron. Hezbollah has been involved in many terrorist attacks
against Europeans, including:surrogate to punish states that Tehran perceived as supporting Iraq. Significantly, if
Hezbollah decided to revive its aggressive
operations in southern Lebanon, European
participation in Lebanese peacekeeping operations, which became a lightning rod for
Hezbollah terrorist attacks in the 1980s, could
again become an issue. Troops from European Union (EU) member states could someday
find themselves attacked by Hezbollah withweapons financed by Hezbollah supporters
in their home countries.
Hezbollah operatives have been deployedin countries throughout Europe, including
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Germany,and Greece.42 On April 30, 2020, Germany designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization
after Israel provided intelligence on a Hezbollah stockpile of ammonium nitrate intended
to make explosives that were stored in a German warehouse.
The October 1983 bombing of the French
Mounting Missile Threat. Iran possesscontingent of the multinational peacees the largest number of deployed missiles in
keeping force in Lebanon, which killed 58
the Middle East.43 Testifying before the House
French soldiers on the same day that theArmed Services Committee in March 2020, theU.S. Marine barracks was bombed;
commander of CENTCOM, Marine Corps General Kenneth McKenzie, estimated that Iran
The December 1983 bombing of thehas “about 2500 to 3000 ballistic missiles.”44 In
French embassy in Kuwait;
June 2017, Iran launched mid-range missiles
from its territory against opposition targets
The April 1985 bombing of a restaurant
in Syria. This was Iran’s first such operational
near a U.S. base in Madrid, Spain, which
use of mid-range missiles in almost 30 years,
killed 18 Spanish citizens;but it was not as successful as Tehran might
have hoped. It was reported that three of the
A campaign of 13 bombings in France infive missiles launched missed Syria altogether
1986 that targeted shopping centers andand landed in Iraq and that the remaining two
railroad facilities, killing 13 people andlanded in Syria but missed their intended tarwounding more than 250; andgets by miles.45
Iran launched a much more successful atA March 1989 attempt to assassinate
tack on September 14, 2019, using at least 18
British novelist Salman Rushdie that
UAVs and three low-flying cruise missiles tofailed when a bomb exploded prematurely, destroy parts of the Saudi oil processing facility
killing a terrorist in London.
at Abqaiq and the oil fields at Khurais. The precisely targeted attack shut down half of Saudi
Hezbollah’s attacks in Europe trailed off Arabia’s oil production, which is approximately
in the 1990s after the group’s Iranian spon- equivalent to 5 percent of global oil production.
sors accepted a truce in their bloody 1980– Although Iran denied responsibility, U.S. intel1988 war with Iraq and no longer needed a ligence sources identified the launch site as the
l

l

l

l

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287

﻿

l

﻿

Ahvaz air base in southwest Iran about 650 kiIran’s Shahab-3 and Ghadr-1, which is alometers north of Abqaiq.46
modified version of the Shahab-3 with a smallIran also used ballistic missiles to attack er warhead but greater range (about 1,600 kitwo Iraqi bases hosting U.S. military personnel lometers or 1,000 miles), are considered more
on January 8, 2020, in retaliation for an earlier reliable and advanced than the North Korean
U.S. strike that killed IRGC Quds Force com- No-dong missile from which they are derived.
mander General Qassem Soleimani. Of the 16 Although early variants of the Shahab-3 missile
short-range ballistic missiles launched from were relatively inaccurate, Tehran was able tothree bases inside Iran, 12 reached their tar- adapt and employ Chinese guidance technolgets: 11 struck al-Asad air base in western Iraq, ogy to improve strike accuracy significantly.50
and one struck a base near the northern Iraqi In 2014, then-Defense Intelligence Agency
city of Irbil.47 No U.S. personnel were killed, Director Lieutenant General Michael T. Flybut more than 100 were later treated for trau- nn warned that:matic brain injuries.
The backbone of the Iranian ballistic misIran can strike targets throughout the resile force is the Shahab series of road-mobile
gion and into Eastern Europe. In addition
surface-to-surface missiles. Based on Soviet-­
to its growing missile and rocket invendesigned Scud missiles, the Shahabs are potories, Iran is seeking to enhance [the]tentially capable of carrying nuclear, chemical,
lethality and effectiveness of existingor biological warheads in addition to convensystems with improvements in accuracy
tional high-explosive warheads. Their relative
and warhead designs. Iran is developinaccuracy (compared to NATO ballistic mising the Khalij Fars, an anti-ship ballistic
siles) limits their effectiveness unless they are
missile which could threaten maritime
employed against large soft targets like cities.
activity throughout the Persian Gulf andTehran’s heavy investment in such weapons
Strait of Hormuz.51
has fueled speculation that the Iranians intend
eventually to replace the conventional warIran’s ballistic missiles threaten U.S. bases
heads on their longer-range missiles with nu- and allies from Turkey, Israel, and Egypt to theclear warheads. As the Nuclear Threat Initiative west to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States
has observed, “Iran’s rapidly improving missile to the south and Afghanistan and Pakistan
capabilities have prompted concern from inter- to the east. Iran also has become a center fornational actors such as the United Nations, the missile proliferation by exporting a wide vaUnited States and Iran’s regional neighbors.”48 riety of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, andIran is not a member of the Missile Tech- rockets to the Assad regime in Syria and such
nology Control Regime. Instead, it has sought proxy groups as Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian
aggressively to acquire, develop, and deploy Islamic Jihad, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, anda wide spectrum of ballistic missile, cruise Iraqi militias. The Houthi Ansar Allah group
missile, and space launch capabilities. During has launched Iranian-supplied ballistic misthe 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war, Iran acquired siles and armed drones against targets in Saudi
Soviet-made Scud-B missiles from Libya and Arabia and the UAE, which launched a military
later acquired North Korean–designed Scud-C campaign against them in 2015 in support ofand No-dong missiles, which it renamed the Yemen’s government.
Shahab-2 (with an estimated range of 500
However, it is Israel, which has fought akilometers or 310 miles) and Shahab-3 (with shadow war with Iran and its terrorist proxies,
an estimated range of 900 kilometers or 560 that is most at risk from an Iranian missile atmiles). It now can produce its own variants of tack. In case the Israeli government had any
these missiles as well as longer-range Ghadr-1 doubt about Iran’s implacable hostility, theand Qiam missiles.49
Revolutionary Guards, which control most of288

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthuranium to fuel a single nuclear warhead inless than 2 months.”55 Clearly, the development of a nuclear bomb would greatly amplify
the threat posed by Iran. Even if Iran did notuse a nuclear weapon or pass it on to one of its
terrorist surrogates to use, the regime could
become emboldened to expand its support for
terrorism, subversion, and intimidation, assuming that its nuclear arsenal would protect
it from retaliation as has been the case with
North Korea.
On July 14, 2015, President Barack Obamaannounced that the United States and Iran,along with China, France, Germany, Russia, theUnited Kingdom, and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
had reached “a comprehensive, long-term deal
with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a
nuclear weapon.”56 The short-lived agreement,
however, did a much better job of dismantling
sanctions against Iran than it did of dismantling Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, much ofwhich was allowed to remain functional subject to weak restrictions, some of them only
temporary. This flaw led President Donald
Trump to withdraw the U.S. from the agreement on May 8, 2018, and reimpose sanctions.57
In fact, the agreement did not specify thatany of Iran’s covertly built facilities would haveto be dismantled. The Natanz and Fordow
uranium enrichment facilities were allowed
to remain in operation, although the latter facility was to be repurposed at least temporarily as a research site. The heavy-water reactor
at Arak was also retained with modifications
that would reduce its yield of plutonium. Allof these facilities, built covertly and housing
operations prohibited by multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, were legitimized by
the agreement.
The Iran nuclear agreement marked a risky
departure from more than five decades of U.S.
nonproliferation efforts under which Washington opposed the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, such as uranium enrichment,even for allies. Iran got a better deal on uranium enrichment under the agreement thansuch U.S. allies as the United Arab Emirates,

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﻿Iran’s strategic missile systems, displayed amessage written in Hebrew on the side of oneof the Iranian missiles tested in March 2016:“Israel must be wiped off the earth.”52 The
development of nuclear warheads for Iran’sballistic missiles would significantly degrade
Israel’s ability to deter major Iranian attacks,an ability that the existing (but not officiallyacknowledged) Israeli monopoly on nuclear
weapons in the Middle East currently provides.
For Iran’s radical regime, hostility to Israel, which Iran sometimes calls the “Little Satan,” is second only to hostility to the UnitedStates, which the leader of Iran’s 1979 revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, dubbed the “Great
Satan.” However, Iran poses a greater immediate threat to Israel than it does to the UnitedStates: Israel is a smaller country with fewer
military capabilities, is located much closer
to Iran, and already is within range of Iran’s
Shahab-3 missiles. Moreover, all of Israel canbe hit with the thousands of shorter-range
rockets that Iran has provided to Hezbollah
in Lebanon and to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza. In April 2021, Hamas andPalestinian Islamic Jihad launched more than
4,000 rockets and missiles in an 11-day miniwar with Israel.53
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Tehran
has invested tens of billions of dollars sincethe 1980s in a nuclear weapons program thatit sought to conceal within its civilian nuclear
power program. It built clandestine but subsequently discovered underground uranium
enrichment facilities near Natanz and Fordow and a heavy-water reactor near Arak thatwould generate plutonium to give it a second
potential route to nuclear weapons.54
Before the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran had accumulated enough low-enriched uranium tobuild eight nuclear bombs (assuming that theuranium was enriched to weapon-grade levels).
In November 2015, the Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control reported that “[b]y using the approximately 9,000 first generation
centrifuges operating at its Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant as of October 2015, Iran could
theoretically produce enough weapon-grade﻿South Korea, and Taiwan have received from
Washington in the past. In fact, the Obama Administration gave Iran better terms on uranium enrichment than President Gerald Ford’s
Administration gave the Shah of Iran, a close
U.S. ally before the 1979 revolution, who wasdenied independent reprocessing capabilities.
President Trump’s decision to withdraw
from the nuclear agreement marked a return
to long-standing U.S. nonproliferation policy.
Iran, Britain, France, Germany, the EU, China, and Russia sought to salvage the agreement but were unable to offset the strengthof U.S. nuclear sanctions that were fully reimposed by November 4, 2018, after a 180-day
wind-down period.
Iran initially adopted a policy of “strategic
patience,” seeking to preserve as much of theagreement’s relief from sanctions as it could
while hoping to outlast the Trump Administration and deal with a presumably more
pliable successor Administration after the2020 elections. The Trump Administration,
however, ratcheted up sanctions to unprecedented levels under its “maximum pressure”
campaign. On April 8, 2019, it designated Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards as a foreign terrorist organization. Because the Revolutionary Guards
are extensively involved in Iran’s oil, construction, and defense industries, this allowed U.S.
sanctions to hit harder at strategic sectors of
Iran’s economy.58 On April 22, 2019, Secretaryof State Mike Pompeo announced that theAdministration would eliminate waivers for
Iran’s remaining oil exports on May 2 and seek
to zero them out entirely.59
Although President Trump made it clearthat he sought a new agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran refused to return to thenegotiating table. Instead, it sought to pressure
European states into protecting it from the effects of U.S. sanctions.
On May 8, 2019, Iranian President Rouhani
announced that Iran would no longer comply
with the 2015 nuclear agreement’s restrictions
on the size of Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium and heavy water.60 Tehran gave the Europeans 60 days to deliver greater sanctions

290

relief, specifically with respect to oil sales andbanking transactions, and warned that if theterms of its ultimatum were not met by July
7, 2019, it would incrementally violate the restrictions set by the JCPOA. Since then, Iran
has escalated its noncompliance with theagreement in a series of major violations that
include breaching the caps on uranium enrichment, research and development of advanced
centrifuges, numbers of operating centrifuges, and resuming enrichment at the fortified
Fordow facility. When announcing the fifth
breach in January 2020, Iran stated that its
uranium enrichment program no longer faced
any restrictions.61
By late February 2020, Iran had accumulated about 1,510 kilograms of low-enricheduranium—enough to give it a breakout estimate (the time needed to produce enoughweapon-grade uranium for one nuclear
weapon) of “3.8 months, with a range of 3.1
to 4.6 months.”62 By February 16, 2021, Iran
had accumulated about 4,390 kilograms oflow-­enriched uranium and had reduced its
estimated breakout time to as little as 2.7
months, with enough enriched uranium to
arm three nuclear weapons within six months
if it continued to enrich to higher levels.63
This worst-case estimate of how long it would
take Tehran to acquire the enriched uranium
necessary for a nuclear weapon at its known
nuclear facilities is likely to shrink further
as Iran adds new centrifuges and expands its
stockpile of enriched uranium.
On April 11, 2021, Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts were disrupted by an explosionthat cut power and damaged centrifuges at theunderground Natanz enrichment facility, Tehran blamed the explosion and damage on Israeli sabotage.64 Iran announced it would raiseenrichment levels to 60 percent, much closer
to the 90 percent enrichment level required fora nuclear weapon, in retaliation for the loss ofcentrifuge capacity.
The future of Iran’s nuclear program is being negotiated at indirect talks between Iranand the United States hosted by the European
Union in Vienna, Austria.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthdamaged the economies on both sides of theborder. Hezbollah has since rebuilt its depleted arsenal with help from Iran and Syria. Hezbollah has amassed at least 130,000 rockets
and missiles—more than all of the European
members of NATO combined.67 Some of themost dangerous are long-range Iranian-mademissiles capable of striking cities throughout
Israel.68 In recent years, under cover of the war
in Syria, Iran has provided Hezbollah with increasingly sophisticated, accurate, and longer-range weapons as well as guidance kits that
upgrade the accuracy of older rockets.69 Iranand Hezbollah also have established anotherpotential front against Israel in Syria.
Since Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip in 2005, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist groups have fired morethan 11,000 rockets into Israel during briefwars in 2008–2009, 2012, and 2014.70 Over
5 million Israelis out of a total population of
8.1 million live within range of rocket attacks
from Gaza, although the successful operationof the Iron Dome anti-missile system has
greatly mitigated this threat in recent years.
In the 2014 Gaza war, Hamas also unveiled asophisticated tunnel network that it used toinfiltrate Israel so that it could launch attacks
on Israeli civilians and military personnel.
In early May 2019, Palestinian Islamic Jihad
ignited another round of fighting in Gaza inwhich about 700 rockets were fired at Israel.71
In May 2021, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad launched another 11-day war against Israel during which they launched about 4,300
rockets at Israel, killing 12 Israelis while suffering over 240 Palestinian deaths, including
roughly 200 militants, according to Israel.72
Gaza remains a flash point that could trigger
another conflict with little warning.
Threats to Saudi Arabia and Other
Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Saudi Arabia and the five other Arab Gulf
States—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and theUnited Arab Emirates—formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 to deter and defend against Iranian aggression. Iran remains
the primary external threat to their security.

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﻿Iran also is a declared chemical weapons
power that claims to have destroyed all of its
stockpiles of chemical weapons, but it has never fully complied with the Chemical Weapons
Convention or declared its holdings.65 U.S. intelligence agencies have assessed that Iranmaintains “the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents and ‘probably’ has thecapability to produce some biological warfare
agents for offensive purposes, if it made thedecision to do so.”66
Iranian Threats to Israel. In addition toballistic missile threats from Iran, Israel faces
the constant threat of attack from Palestinian,Lebanese, Egyptian, Syrian, and other Arabterrorist groups, including many that are supported by Iran. The threat posed by Arab states,
which lost four wars against Israel in 1948,
1956, 1967, and 1973 (Syria and the PLO losta fifth war in 1982 in Lebanon), has gradually
declined. Egypt and Jordan have signed peace
treaties with Israel, and Iraq, Libya, Syria, andYemen have been distracted by civil wars. At
the same time, however, unconventional military and terrorist threats, especially from an
expanding number of sub-state actors, haverisen substantially.
Iran has systematically bolstered many ofthese groups, including some whose ideology
it does not necessarily share. Today, for example, Iran’s surrogates Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, along with more distantally Hamas, pose the chief immediate security threats to Israel. After Israel’s May 2000
withdrawal from southern Lebanon and theSeptember 2000 outbreak of fighting between
Israelis and Palestinians, Hezbollah stepped
up its support for such Palestinian extremistgroups as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It also
expanded its own operations in the West Bankand Gaza and provided funding for specific attacks launched by other groups.
In July 2006, Hezbollah forces crossed the
Lebanese border in an effort to kidnap Israeli
soldiers inside Israel, igniting a military clash
that claimed hundreds of lives and severely﻿

Tehran has supported groups that launchedterrorist attacks against Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. It sponsored the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, asurrogate group that plotted a failed 1981 coupagainst Bahrain’s ruling Al Khalifa family, theSunni rulers of the predominantly Shia country. Iran also has long backed Bahraini branches of Hezbollah and the Dawa Party.
When Bahrain was engulfed in a wave ofArab Spring protests in 2011, its government
charged that Iran again exploited the protests
to back the efforts of Shia radicals to overthrow
the royal family. Saudi Arabia, fearing that a
Shia revolution in Bahrain would incite its own
restive Shia minority, led a March 2011 GCC intervention that backed Bahrain’s government
with about 1,000 Saudi troops and 500 police
from the UAE.
Bahrain has repeatedly intercepted shipments of Iranian arms, including sophisticatedbombs employing explosively formed penetrators. The government withdrew its ambassador
to Tehran when two Bahrainis with ties to the
IRGC were arrested after their arms shipment
was intercepted off Bahrain’s coast in July 2015.
Iranian hard-liners have steadily escalatedpressure on Bahrain. In March 2016, a former IRGC general who is a close adviser to
Ayatollah Khamenei stated that “Bahrain isa province of Iran that should be annexed to
the Islamic Republic of Iran.”73 After Bahrain
stripped a senior Shiite cleric, Sheikh Isa Qassim, of his citizenship, General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force,threatened to make Bahrain’s royal family “paythe price and disappear.”74
Saudi Arabia has criticized Iran for supporting radical Saudi Shiites, intervening in Syria,
and supporting Shiite Islamists in Lebanon,
Iraq, and Yemen. In January 2016, Saudi Arabia
executed a Shiite cleric charged with sparking
anti-government protests and cut diplomatic
ties with Iran after Iranian mobs responded
to the execution by attacking and setting fireto the Saudi embassy in Tehran.75
In addition to military threats from Iran,
Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states face292

terrorist threats and possible rebellions by
Shia or other disaffected internal groups supported by Tehran. Iran has backed Shiite terrorist groups against Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
Iraq, and Kuwait and has supported the Shiite
Houthi rebels in Yemen. In March 2015, Saudi
Arabia led a 10-country coalition that launcheda military campaign against Houthi forces andprovided support for ousted Yemeni President
Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, who took refuge in
Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Navy also establisheda blockade of Yemeni ports to prevent Iranfrom aiding the rebels.
The Houthis have retaliated by launching Iranian-supplied missiles at military andcivilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
including ballistic missile attacks on airports,
Riyadh, and other cities as well as cruise missile strikes. In December 2017, the Houthis
launched a cruise missile attack on an unfinished nuclear reactor in Abu Dhabi.
The Houthis also have made extensive useof UAVs and UCAVs (unmanned combat aerial
vehicles, or armed drones). A Houthi UCAV attacked a military parade in Yemen in January
2019, killing at least six people including Yemen’s commander of military intelligence, andlonger-range UCAVs were used in a coordinated attack on Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline
on May 14, 2019.76 The Houthis have employed
Iranian Sammad-2 and Sammad-3 UCAVs instrikes against Riyadh, Abu Dhabi International Airport in the UAE, and other targets.77

Threats to the CommonsThe United States has critical interests atstake in the Middle Eastern commons: sea, air,space, and cyber. The U.S. has long provided
the security backbone in these areas, and thissecurity has supported the region’s economic
development and political stability.
Maritime. Maintaining the security of thesea lines of communication in the Persian Gulf,
Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and Mediterranean Sea
is a high priority for strategic, economic, andenergy security purposes. In 2019, the Persian
Gulf region produced about 31 percent of theworld’s crude oil and held about 48 percent of2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 14UZBEKISTANKAZAKHSTAN

Iranian Naval Headquarters
RUSSIA

Islamic Republic of Iran Navy Headquarters

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy Headquarters

GEORGIA

Trabzon Rize

Coruh

Gumushane
Erzurum
Erzincan

ARMENIAKars
Agri

AZERBAIJANTURKMENISTAN

Baku

TURKEYMus
VanTabrizElazigBitlisalatyaRasht
Siirt
Diyarbakir
HakkariOrumiyeh
yaman
ZanjanMardinBandar-e Anzali
Sanhurfa
Dahuk
Ar Raqqah
Dayr az Zawr

IRAQ

SYRIA

SanandajIlam

Al-KutBandar-e Mahshahr
Al 'Amarah
An Najaf
Ahvaz

RDAN

IRGCN
3rd ND
As-Samawah

QuettaBandar-e Lengeh
IRGCN 5th ND

Arak

Khorramabad

Karbala'

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN

TehranIRIN HQ

HamadanKermanshah

SamarraBaghdadBa qubahON

Sari

IRIN 4th ND

KirkukP

Caspian
Sea

Naxcivian

Al-Hasakah Al MawsilArbil

TAJIKISTAN

ZahedanBandar Abbas
IRGCN HQ & 1st ND
IRIN SNFHQ & 1st ND

Bandar-e Bushehr
IRGCN 2nd ND
IRIN 2 HQPAKISTANH

Karac

Al Basrah

Ar'ar

Strait of
HormuzKUWAIT

SakakahBuraydah

SAUDI ARABIABAHRAIN

QATAR

Dubai
Abu
Dhabi

UAE

Gulf of Oman

Jask
IRIN 2nd ND

﻿

Ha'il

Persian
Gulf

Bandar-e Asaluyeh
IRGCN 4th ND

Chah Bahar
IRIN 3rd ND

OMAN

MedinaND — Naval district

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing
Military Dominance, 2019, p. 48, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/
Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf (accessed July 23, 2021).
A heritage.org

global proved crude oil reserves.78 The Persian
Gulf is a crucial source of oil and gas for energy-­
importing states, particularly China, India, Japan, South Korea, and many European countries. Interstate conflict or terrorist attacks
could easily interrupt the flow of that oil.
Bottlenecks such as the Strait of Hormuz,
Suez Canal, and Bab el-Mandeb Strait are potential choke points for restricting the flow ofoil, international trade, and the deploymentof U.S. and allied naval forces. Although theUnited States has greatly reduced its dependence on oil exports from the Gulf, it still
would sustain economic damage in the eventof a spike in world oil prices, and many of its
European and Asian allies and trading partners
import a substantial portion of their oil needsfrom the region.
The world’s most important maritime
choke point and the jugular vein throughThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

293

﻿

which most Gulf oil exports flow to Asia andEurope is the Strait of Hormuz. In 2018, the“daily oil flow [through the Strait of Hormuz]
averaged 21 million barrels per day (b/d), or
the equivalent of about 21% of global petroleum liquids consumption.”79 The chief potential threat to the free passage of ships throughthe strait is Iran, whose Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, proclaimed in 2006 that“[i]f the Americans make a wrong move toward
Iran, the shipment of energy will definitely face
danger, and the Americans would not be able toprotect energy supply in the region.”80
Iranian officials often reiterate thesethreats during periods of heightened tension.
For example, the chief of staff of Iran’s army,
Major General Mohammad Baqeri, warned on
April 28, 2019, that “if our oil does not pass, theoil of others shall not pass the Strait of Hormuz either.”81
Less than one month later, Iran began to intensify its intimidation tactics against international shipping near the strait. On May 12, 2019,four oil tankers were damaged by mysterious
explosions off the coast of the UAE in the Gulfof Oman. Then-U.S. National Security Adviser
John Bolton stated that “naval mines almost
certainly from Iran” were the cause of thedamage.82 On June 13, two more tankers wereattacked in the Gulf of Oman. Even though Iranian Revolutionary Guards were filmed removing an unexploded limpet mine from one of thedamaged ships, Tehran continued to deny its
involvement in all of the attacks.83 On June 19,
an IRGC surface-to-air missile shot down a U.S.
surveillance drone in international air space.
The U.S. initially planned to launch retaliatory strikes, but President Trump called off theoperation.84 Iran continued its aggressive behavior, launching a sophisticated UCAV andcruise missile attack on Saudi oil facilities in
September 2019.
In late 2019, Iranian-controlled Iraqi militias launched a series of rocket attacks on Iraqi
bases containing U.S. troops, provoking U.S. retaliatory air strikes against those militias andthe January 2020 UCAV strike that killed General Qassem Soleimani. Rocket attacks by Iraqi

294

militias have continued, and tensions remainhigh in Gulf waters.
On May 10, 2020, a missile launched froman Iranian Navy frigate struck another Iraniannaval vessel during a military exercise in the
Gulf of Oman, killing at least 19 sailors andwounding 15.85 The incident raised questions
about the competence and training of Iran’snaval forces. The June 2, 2021, sinking of the
Kharg, Iran’s largest warship, raised similar
questions. The Kharg, a naval replenishment
ship, caught fire and sank in the Gulf of Oman
during a training exercise.
However, while Iran’s military forces havesuffered numerous accidents because of lax
maintenance and safety practices, there also
was speculation that the Kharg might havebeen sabotaged in a covert Israeli attack. Israel reportedly has attacked at least 12 Iranian
vessels transporting oil, arms, and other cargo
to Syria to prop up the Assad regime and bolster Hezbollah.86 It also has been suspectedof triggering the April 6, 2021, explosion thatdamaged the Saviz, a converted cargo ship
permanently moored in the Red Sea near thecoast of Yemen to collect intelligence and support Iran’s Houthi allies.87 For its part, Iran is
the leading suspect in two attacks on Israeli-­owned cargo ships: one on February 25, 2021,
in the Gulf of Oman and another on March 25,
2021, in the Arabian Sea.88 Although its contours remain murky, it is clear that the Iran–
Israel shadow war has expanded to include
maritime attacks.
Iran has a long history of attacking oil
shipments in the Gulf. During the Iran–Iraq
war, each side targeted the other’s oil facilities, ports, and oil exports. Iran escalated attacks to include neutral Kuwaiti oil tankers
and terminals and clandestinely laid mines in
Persian Gulf shipping lanes while its ally Libya
clandestinely laid mines in the Red Sea. The
United States defeated Iran’s tactics by reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers, clearing the mines,
and escorting ships through the Persian Gulf,
but a large number of commercial vessels
were damaged during the “Tanker War” from1984 to 1987.

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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military295

﻿Iran’s demonstrated willingness to disrupt to the simple World War I–style contact mines
oil traffic through the Persian Gulf to pressure that it used in the 1980s. In addition to expandIraq economically is a red flag to U.S. military ing the quantity of its mines from an estimatedplanners. During the 1980s Tanker War, Iran’s 1,500 during the Iran–Iraq war to more thanability to strike at Gulf shipping was limited by 5,000 in 2019, Tehran has increased their qualiits aging and outdated weapons systems and the ty.90 It has acquired significant stocks of “smart
arms embargo imposed by the U.S. after the 1979 mines” including versions of the Russian
revolution. Since the 1990s, however, Iran has MDM-6, Chinese MC-52, and Chinese EM-11,
been upgrading its military with new weapons EM-31, and EM-55 mines.91 One of Iran’s mostfrom North Korea, China, and Russia, as well as lethal mines is the Chinese-designed EM-52
with weapons manufactured domestically.
“rocket” mine, which remains stationary on the
Since the Iran–Iraq war, Tehran has in- sea floor and fires a homing rocket when a shipvested heavily in developing its naval forces, passes overhead.
particularly the IRGC Navy, along unconvenIran can deploy mines or torpedoes from its
tional lines. Today, Iran boasts an arsenal of three Kilo-class submarines, purchased from
Iranian-built missiles based on Russian and Russia and based at Bandar Abbas, Iran’s largChinese designs that represent significant est seaport and naval base. These submarines
threats to oil tankers as well as warships. Iran could be difficult to detect for brief periods
has deployed mobile anti-ship missile batteries when running silent and remaining stationary
along its 1,500-mile Gulf coast and on many of on a shallow bottom just outside the Strait of
the 17 Iranian-controlled islands in the Gulf in Hormuz.92 Iran also could use minisubmarines,
addition to modern anti-ship missiles mount- helicopters, or small boats disguised as fishinged on fast attack boats, submarines, oil plat- vessels to deploy its mines. Iran’s robust mine
forms, and vessels disguised as civilian fishing warfare capability and the U.S. and allied navies’
boats. Six of Iran’s 17 islands in the Gulf—Forur, limited capacity for countermine operations are
Bani Forur, Sirri, and three islands seized from major challenges to Gulf maritime security.93
the UAE: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser
Iran has developed two separate naval
Tunb—are particularly important because they forces. The regular navy takes the lead in theare located close to the shipping channels that Caspian Sea and outside the Strait of Hormuz
all ships must use near the Strait of Hormuz.
in the Gulf of Oman, and the Islamic RevoluIran has imported Russian submarines, tionary Guard Corps Navy is Iran’s dominant
North Korean minisubmarines, and a wide force inside the Persian Gulf. The IRGC Navyvariety of advanced Chinese anti-ship mis- has developed an effective asymmetric naval
siles. It also has a significant stock of Chinese-­ warfare strategy that could enable it to counter
designed anti-ship cruise missiles, including the superior firepower and technology of thethe older HY-2 Seersucker and the more mod- U.S. Navy and its GCC allies, at least for a short
ern CSS-N-4 Sardine and CSS-N-8 Saccade period. It has adopted swarming tactics using
models, and has reverse engineered Chinese well-armed fast attack boats to launch surprise
missiles to produce its own Ra’ad and Noor an- attacks against larger and more heavily armed
ti-ship cruise missiles. More recently, Tehran naval adversaries.
has produced and deployed more advanced
The commander of the IRGC Navy bragged
anti-ship cruise missiles, the Nasir and Qa- in 2008 that it had brought guerilla warfare
dir.89 Shore-based missiles deployed along tactics to naval warfare: “We are everywhere
Iran’s coast would be augmented by aircraft-­ and at the same time nowhere.”94 The IRGC
delivered laser-guided bombs and missiles as has honed such unconventional tactics as dewell as by television-guided bombs.
ploying remote-controlled radar decoy boats
Iran has a large supply of anti-ship mines, and boats packed with explosives to confuse
including modern mines that are far superior defenses and attack adversaries. It also could﻿

deploy naval commandos trained to attack
using small boats, minisubmarines, and even
Jet Skis as well as underwater demolition
teams that could attack offshore oil platforms,
moored ships, ports, and other facilities.
On April 28, 2015, the Revolutionary Guard
naval force seized the Maersk Tigris, a container ship registered in the Marshall Islands near
the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran claimed that it
seized the ship because of a previous court ruling ordering the Maersk Line, which charters
the ship, to make a payment to settle a disputewith a private Iranian company. The ship waslater released after being held for more thana week.95 Then, on May 14, 2015, the Alpine
Eternity, a Singapore-flagged oil tanker, wassurrounded and attacked by Revolutionary
Guard gunboats in the Strait of Hormuz when
it refused to be boarded. Iranian authorities alleged that it had damaged an Iranianoil platform in March, but the ship’s owners
maintained that it had hit an uncharted submerged structure.96
The Revolutionary Guard’s aggressive
tactics in using commercial disputes as pretexts for illegal seizures of transiting vessels
prompted the U.S. Navy to escort American
and British-flagged ships through the Straitof Hormuz for several weeks in May before
tensions eased.
The July 2015 nuclear agreement did not alter the Revolutionary Guard’s confrontational
tactics in the Gulf.97 IRGC naval forces challenged U.S. naval forces in a series of incidents.
IRGC missile boats launched rockets within
1,500 yards of the carrier Harry S. Trumannear the Strait of Hormuz in late December
2015, flew drones over U.S. warships, and detained and humiliated 10 American sailors in a
provocative January 12, 2016, incident.98 Even
though the two U.S. Navy boats carrying thesailors had drifted inadvertently into Iranian
territorial waters, the vessels had the right ofinnocent passage, and their crews should nothave been disarmed, forced onto their knees,
filmed, and exploited in propaganda videos.
In 2017, for unknown reasons, Iran temporarily halted the harassment of U.S. Navy296

ships. According to U.S. Navy reports, Iraninstigated 23 “unsafe and/or unprofessional”
interactions with U.S. Navy ships in 2015, 35
in 2016, and 14 in the first eight months of 2017,with the last incident occurring on August 14,
2017.99 The provocations resumed in April
2020 when 11 IRGC Navy gunboats harassed
six U.S. Navy vessels conducting exercises in
the international waters of the North Arabian Gulf.100 One week later, President Trump
warned that U.S. Navy forces were authorized
to destroy any Iranian vessels that harassed
them. Iran’s naval harassment subsided, but
resumed in April 2021, when the IRGC Navystaged two incidents, forcing U.S. naval vessels
to take evasive action in one and fire warning
shots in the second.101
Iran has been accused of spoofing satellite
navigation systems to lure foreign ships into
its territorial waters so that it can seize them.
This may have occurred in 2016 when 10 U.S.
sailors were captured near an Iranian islandand in 2019 when the Stena Impero tanker wasseized in the Strait of Hormuz.102 Iran also may
have used a similar technique to divert a U.S.
UAV from Afghan airspace to Iran, where it wascaptured and put on display in 2011.
If Tehran were to attack ships transiting theStrait of Hormuz, the United States and its allies have the capacity to counter Iran’s maritime threats and restore the flow of oil exports,
but “the effort would likely take some time—days, weeks, or perhaps months—­particularly
if a large number of Iranian mines need to
be cleared from the Gulf.”103 Naval warfare
experts estimated in May 2019 that by using
its combined coastal missile batteries, mines,
submarines, and naval forces, Iran could close
the strait for up to four weeks.104 Such an aggressive move would be very costly and risky
for Tehran. Closing the strait would also block
Iran’s oil exports and many of its imports, including imports of food and medicine. Moreover, most of Iran’s naval forces, naval bases,
and other military assets could be destroyedin the resulting conflict.
In addition to using its own forces, Tehran
could use its extensive network of clients in

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﻿

the region to sabotage oil pipelines and other quantities of arms, including man-portable air
infrastructure or to strike oil tankers in port defense systems, were looted from arms depots
or at sea. Iranian Revolutionary Guards de- in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen during theirployed in Yemen reportedly played a role in the civil wars and could find their way into theunsuccessful October 9 and 12, 2016, missile hands of Iranian-supported groups. Iran has
attacks launched by Houthi rebels against the provided anti-aircraft missiles to Hezbollah,
USS Mason, a U.S. Navy warship, near the Bab Iraqi militias, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
el-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea.105 The Houth- The Houthis also have attacked Saudi airports
is denied that they launched the missiles, but with ballistic missiles and armed drones, althey did claim responsibility for an October though they may have been targeting nearby
1, 2016, attack on a UAE naval vessel and the military facilities.110
suicide boat bombing of a Saudi warship in
Perhaps the greatest Iranian threat to civil
February 2017.
aviation would come in the event of a military
Houthi irregular forces have deployed clash in the crowded skies over the Persian
mines along Yemen’s coast, used a remote-­ Gulf. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administracontrolled boat packed with explosives in an tion issued a warning to commercial airlines
unsuccessful attack on the Yemeni port of on May 16, 2019, during a period of heightMokha in July 2017, and have launched sev- ened tensions with Iran, explaining that cieral unsuccessful naval attacks against ships vilian planes risked being targeted by the Irain the Red Sea. Houthi gunboats also attacked nian military as a result of “miscalculation or
and damaged a Saudi oil tanker near the port misidentification.”111
of Hodeidah on April 3, 2018.
Tragically, this warning foreshadowed the
U.N. investigators have concluded that the January 8, 2020, shooting down of Ukraine
Houthis also operate UAVs with a range of up International Airlines Flight 752 that killed
to 1,500 kilometers (930 miles), several of 176 passengers and crew, most of them Iraniwhich were used to attack Saudi Arabia’s East– ans. Several hours earlier, Iran had launched aWest pipeline on May 14, 2019.106 This attack, ballistic missile attack on Iraqi bases hostingalong with attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf U.S. troops, and Iranian officials later admittedof Oman two days earlier, likely was a signal that they had kept Tehran’s airport open in thefrom Tehran that it can also disrupt oil ship- hope that the presence of passenger jets could
ments outside the Persian Gulf in a crisis. The act as a deterrent against an American attack
Houthis have staged numerous UCAV attacks on the airport or a nearby military base.112
on Saudi targets along with a cruise missile
Space. Iran has launched satellites into
attack on June 12, 2019, and an attack by 10 orbit, but there is no evidence that it has an
ballistic missiles on August 25.107 The Houthis offensive space capability. Tehran successfulalso claimed responsibility for the September ly launched three satellites in February 2009,14, 2019, attacks on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq, June 2011, and February 2012 using the Safir
but U.S. officials asserted that intelligence re- space launch vehicle, which uses a modified
ports identified Iran as the staging ground for Ghadr-1 missile for its first stage and has a
the attacks.108 On March 7, 2021, the Houthis second stage that is based on an obsolete Solaunched long-range UAVs and ballistic mis- viet submarine-launched ballistic missile, thesiles provided by Iran at Saudi Arabia’s Ras R-27.113 The technology probably was transTanura oil shipment facility, the largest in the ferred by North Korea, which built its BM-25
world, driving oil prices up to over $70 per bar- missiles using the R-27 as a model.114 Safir techrel for the first time since the COVID-19 pan- nology could be used to develop long-range
demic depressed the global economy.109
ballistic missiles.
Airspace. The Middle East is particularly
Iran claimed that it launched a monkey into
vulnerable to attacks on civilian aircraft. Large space and returned it safely to Earth twice in﻿2013.115 Tehran also announced in June 2013 ‘hacktivists,’ who engage in cyber activities
that it had established its first space tracking broadly consistent with the Islamic Republic’s
center to monitor objects in “very remote interests and views.”122
space” and help manage the “activities of satelThe creation of the Iranian Cyber Army inlites.”116 On July 27, 2017, Iran tested a Simorgh 2009 marked the beginning of a cyber offensive(Phoenix) space launch vehicle that it claimed against those whom the Iranian regime regards
could place a satellite weighing up to 250 kilo- as enemies. The Ajax Security Team, a hacking
grams (550 pounds) in an orbit of 500 kilome- group believed to be operating out of Iran, has
ters (311 miles).117 The satellite launch failed, as used malware-based attacks to target U.S. dedid another Simorgh-boosted satellite launch fense organizations and has breached the Navyin January 2019.118
Marine Corps Intranet.123 The group also has
In April 2020, Tehran finally discarded the targeted dissidents within Iran, seeding verpretense that its space program was dedicated sions of anti-censorship tools with malware
exclusively to peaceful purposes. On April 22, and gathering information about users of those
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards launched a Noor programs.124 Iran has invested heavily in cyber(Light) satellite into a low Earth orbit from a activity, reportedly spending “over $1 billion
secret missile base to celebrate the 41st anni- on its cyber capabilities in 2012 alone.”125
versary of the IRGC’s founding. The new spy
An April 2015 study released by the Amerisatellite’s path takes it over North Africa and can Enterprise Institute reported that hostile
the central Mediterranean, putting Israel with- Iranian cyber activity had increased signifiin its potential field of vision approximately ev- cantly since the beginning of 2014 and could
ery 90 minutes.119 General Jay Raymond, com- threaten U.S. critical infrastructure. The Ismander of U.S. Space Command, dismissed the lamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Sharif
satellite as a “tumbling webcam in space,” but University of Technology are two Iranian instiIran’s real achievement focused more on the tutions that investigators have linked to efforts
previously unheard-of satellite carrier, the to infiltrate U.S. computer networks.126
Qased (Messenger), a three-stage system that
Iran allegedly has used cyber weapons to120
used both solid and liquid fuel. The technical engage in economic warfare, most notably
advances required to launch a satellite are sim- the sophisticated and debilitating “[distributilar to those required to launch an ICBM, and ed] denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against a
the use of solid fuel could allow Iran to launch number of U.S. financial institutions, includa missile more quickly—something that is cru- ing the Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, andcial in an offensive weapon.
Citigroup.”127 In February 2014, Iran launched
On February 2, 2021, Iran’s Defense Min- a crippling cyberattack against the Sands Caistry announced the successful development sino in Las Vegas, owned by Sheldon Adelson,of a new satellite launch vehicle, the Zuljanah. a leading supporter of Israel and critic of the
The first two stages of the three-stage rocket Iranian regime.128 In 2012, Tehran was sususe solid fuel, and the rocket can be launched pected of launching both the Shamoon virus
from a mobile launch pad—two characteristics attack on Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest oil-­more suitable for a weapons system than for a producing company—an attack that destroyed
satellite launch system.121
approximately 30,000 computers—and an atCyber Threats. Iranian cyber capabilities tack on Qatari natural gas company Rasgas’s
present a significant threat to the U.S. and its computer networks.129
allies. Iran has developed offensive cyber capaIsrael has been a major target of Iranian cybilities as a tool of espionage and sabotage and berattacks. In 2014, Iranian hackers launchedclaims “to possess the ‘fourth largest’ cyber denial-of-service attacks against the infraforce in the world—a broad network of quasi-­ structure of the Israel Defense Forces. On April
official elements, as well as regime-aligned 24, 2020, an Iranian cyberattack targeted the298

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The FBI assesses [that] foreign cyber actors operating in the Islamic Republic of
Iran could potentially use a range of computer network operations—from scanning

networks for potential vulnerabilities todata deletion attacks—against U.S.-based
networks in response to the U.S. government’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).137

On November 4, 2020, the U.S. Departmentof Justice announced that it had seized 27 domain names used by Iran’s IRGC in a global
covert influence campaign.138 The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence released a report on March 16, 2021, assessing that during
the 2020 U.S. presidential election:
Iran carried out a multi-pronged covert
influence campaign intended to undercut former President Trump’s reelection
prospects—though without directly
promoting his rivals—undermine publicconfidence in the electoral process and
US institutions, and sow division andexacerbate societal tensions in the US.139

Conclusion
Iran represents by far the most significant
security challenge to the United States, its allies, and its interests in the greater Middle East.
Its open hostility to the United States and Israel, sponsorship of terrorist groups like Hezbollah, and history of threatening the commons
underscore the problem. Today, Iran’s provocations are mostly a concern for the region
and America’s allies, friends, and assets there.
Iran relies heavily on irregular (to include
political) warfare against others in the region
and fields more ballistic missiles than any of
its neighbors field. The development of its ballistic missiles and potential nuclear capability
also mean that it poses a significant long-term
threat to the security of the U.S. homeland.
This Index therefore assesses the overall
threat from Iran, considering the range ofcontingencies, as “aggressive.” Iran’s capability
score holds at “gathering.”140

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﻿command and control center of Israel’s Water Authority, disrupting operations of Israeli
water and sewage facilities. According to an
Israeli cyber expert, the operation was “a firstof-its-kind attack and they were not far frominflicting human casualties.”130 Israel retaliatedwith a May 9, 2020, cyberattack that disrupted operations at one of Iran’s most important
port facilities, the Shahid Rajaee terminal in
Bandar Abbas.131 In September 2020, a hacker
group linked to Iran targeted “many prominent Israeli organizations” according to theIsraeli cybsersecurity company Clearsky. The
group, named MuddyWater, used malware disguised as ransomware that would encrypt files
and demand payment but not allow the files tobe accessed.132
In the fall of 2015, U.S. officials warned of asurge of sophisticated computer espionage by
Iran that would include a series of cyberattacks
against State Department officials.133 In March
2016, the Justice Department indicted seven
Iranian hackers for penetrating the computer
system that controlled a dam in the State of
New York.134 In April 2020, Iran-linked hackers targeted staff at the World Health Organization and the U.S. pharmaceutical company
Gilead Sciences Inc., a leader in developing atreatment for the COVID-19 virus.135
The growing sophistication of these andother Iranian cyberattacks, together with
Iran’s willingness to use these weapons, has
led various experts to characterize Iran as oneof America’s most cyber-capable opponents.
Iranian cyber forces have gone so far as to create fake online personas in order to extract
information from U.S. officials through suchaccounts as LinkedIn, YouTube, Facebook,and Twitter.136 Significantly, the FBI sent thefollowing cyber alert to American businesses
on May 22, 2018:

Threats: IranHOSTILE
Behavior

TESTINGASSERTIVE

BENIGNCAPABLEASPIRATIONALMARGINAL%
FORMIDABLEGATHERING%﻿Capability

AGGRESSIVE

300

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Endnotes
1.

Rebecca Leung, “Hezbollah: ‘A-Team of Terrorists,’” CBS News, 60 Minutes, April 18, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
hezbollah-a-team-of-terrorists/ (accessed June 10, 2021).

2.

Dana Priest and Nora Boustany, “Buckley’s Remains Identified,” The Washington Post, December 28, 1991, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/12/28/buckleys-remains-identified/5b3bf0cc-41c2-4a1c-aa0b-27be8c3795d2/(accessed June 10, 2021).

3.

Suzanne Kelly, “Experts: Hezbollah Positioned for Attack in U.S.,” CNN, March 21, 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/21/
house-panel-hears-testimony-on-hezbollah-in-u-s/ (accessed June 10, 2021).

4.

Ellie Kaufman, “2 Americans Led Double Lives as Hezbollah Agents, Officials Say,” CNN, updated June 9, 2017, http://www.cnn.
com/2017/06/08/us/americans-accused-hezbollah-agents/ (accessed June 10, 2021).

5.

Nathan A. Sales, Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and Nicholas J. Rasmussen, National
Counterterrorism Center Director, “Briefing on U.S. Efforts to Counter Hizballah,” U.S. Department of State, October 10, 2017,https://2017-2021.state.gov/briefing-on-u-s-efforts-to-counter-hizballah/index.html (accessed June 10, 2021).

6.

Jason Hanna, Elizabeth Joseph, and Brynn Gingras, “A New Jersey Man Scouted US Landmarks for Potential Hezbollah Attacks,
Charges Allege,” CNN, September 20, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/20/us/hezbollah-us-terror-charges/index.html(accessed June 10, 2021).

7.

“Summary of Terrorism Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Terrorism Advisory
System Bulletin, January 4, 2020, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ntas/alerts/20_0104_ntas_bulletin.pdf (accessed June
10, 2021).

8.

“(U/FOUO) Escalating Tensions Between the United States and Iran Pose Potential Threats to the Homeland,” Joint Intelligence
Bulletin, January 8, 2020, p. 1, https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-FBI-NCTC-IranThreats-2020.pdf (accessed June 10, 2021).

9.

Sara Taha Moughnieh, “Sayyed Nasrallah: Suleimani Revenge Is Long Track, Trump Biggest Liar in History of US Presidency,” AlManar, January 12, 2020, https://english.almanar.com.lb/913904 (accessed June 10, 2021).

11. Michael Elleman, “Iran’s Missiles: Evolution and Arsenal,” United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer, January 15, 2021,
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/jan/15/biden-iran-missile-program (accessed June 10, 2021).
12. Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committeesof Congress No. R44017, updated January 11, 2021, pp. 10 and 12, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf (accessed June 10,2021).
13. Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Iran Satellite Launch Reveals Gains in Missile Program,” The Wall Street Journal, updated May 1, 2020,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-satellite-launch-reveals-gains-in-missile-program-11588330800 (accessed June 11, 2021).
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Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2014, pp. 14–16, https://csiswebsite-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140131_Cordeman_GulfMilitaryBalance_VolumeI_Web.pdf (accessed June 10, 2021).
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107. United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer, “Timeline of Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia,” September 16, 2019, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/sep/16/timeline-houthi-attacks-saudi-arabia (accessed June 11, 2021).
108. Dion Nissenbaum, Summer Said, and Jared Malsin, “U.S. Tells Saudi Arabia Oil Attacks Were Launched from Iran,” The Wall Street
Journal, updated September 17, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-tells-saudi-arabia-oil-attacks-were-launched-from-iran11568644126?mod=hp_lead_pos1 (accessed June 11, 2021).
109. Michael Knights, “Continued Houthi Strikes Threaten Saudi Oil and the Global Economic Recovery,” Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, PolicyWatch No. 3449, March 12, 2021, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/continued-houthi-strikesthreaten-saudi-oil-and-global-economic-recovery (accessed June 11, 2021).
110. Jon Gambrell, “Bomb-Laden Drone from Yemen Rebels Targets Saudi Airport,” Associated Press, May 21, 2019, https://apnews.
com/d7a332d8303349b6bc2f63b8eb8675e8 (accessed June 11, 2021).
111. Jon Gambrell, “US: Iran Military Could Misidentify Airliners amid Tension,” Associated Press, May 18, 2019, https://www.apnews.
com/b4f5c00455fb4ffb878ed29df58abc03 (accessed June 11, 2021).
112. Farnaz Fassihi, “Anatomy of a Lie: How Iran Covered up the Downing of an Airliner,” The New York Times, January 26, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/26/world/middleeast/iran-plane-crash-coverup.html (accessed June 11, 2021).
113. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Iran: Missile.”
114. Duncan Gardham, “WikiLeaks: Iran ‘Obtains North Korea Missiles Which Can Strike Europe,’” The Telegraph, November 29, 2010,https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/8166848/WikiLeaks-Iran-obtains-North-Korea-missiles-which-can-strike-Europe.
html (accessed June 11, 2021).
115. Lateef Mungin, “Iran Claims 2nd Launch of Monkey into Space and Back,” CNN, updated December 14, 2013, http://www.cnn.
com/2013/12/14/world/meast/iran-monkey-space/ (accessed June 11, 2021).
116. Nasser Karimi, “Iran Says It Sets up Space Monitoring Center,” The San Diego Union-Tribune, June 9, 2013, https://www.
sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-iran-says-it-sets-up-space-monitoring-center-2013jun09-story.html (accessed June 11, 2021).
117. Reuters, “U.S. Says Iran Rocket Test Breaches U.N. Resolution,” July 27, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-satellite/u-ssays-iran-rocket-test-breaches-u-n-resolution-idUSKBN1AC1YY (accessed June 11, 2021).
118. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Military
Dominance, p. 37.
119. Amir Vahdat and Jon Gambrell, “Iran Guard Reveals Secret Space Program in Satellite Launch,” Associated Press, April 22, 2020,
https://apnews.com/0b45baa8a846f55e058e98905e290ce5 (accessed June 11, 2021).

306

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength120. J.D. Simkins, “Space Force General Trolls Iranian Military Satellite Launch—‘Space Is Hard,’” Military Times, April 28, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/off-duty/military-culture/2020/04/28/space-force-general-trolls-iranian-military-satellite-launch-spaceis-hard/ (accessed June 11, 2021).
121. Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Satellite Program Is All About Missiles,” 1945, February 8, 2021, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021/02/iranssatellite-program-is-all-about-missiles/ (accessed June 11, 2021).
122. Ilan Berman, Vice President, American Foreign Policy Council, “The Iranian Cyber Threat, Revisited,” statement before theSubcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S.
House of Representatives, March 20, 2013, p. 3, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM08/20130320/100523/HHRG-113-HM08Wstate-BermanI-20130320.pdf (accessed June 11, 2021).
123. “Report: Iran Hackers Infiltrated Airlines, Energy, Defense Firms,” Defense News, December 2, 2014, https://www.defensenews.
com/global/mideast-africa/2014/12/02/report-iran-hackers-infiltrated-airlines-energy-defense-firms/ (accessed June 11, 2021).
124. Nart Villeneuve, Ned Moran, Thoufique Haq, and Mike Scott, “Operation Saffron Rose 2013,” FireEye Special Report, 2014, https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-operation-saffron-rose.pdf (accessed June 11,2021).
125. Ian Bremmer, “These 5 Facts Explain the State of Iran,” Time, March 27, 2015, http://time.com/3761786/5-facts-explain-irannuclear-talks-sanctions/ (accessed June 11, 2021). Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies similarly reported in October
2012 that “[i]n order to realize the goals of its strategy, Iran has allocated about $1 billion to develop and acquire technology
and recruit and train experts.” Gabi Siboni and Sami Kronenfeld, “Iran’s Cyber Warfare,” Tel Aviv University, Institute for National
Security Studies, INSS Insight No. 375, October 15, 2012, p. 2, https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/systemfiles/375.pdf(accessed June 11, 2021).
126. Frederick W. Kagan and Tommy Stiansen, The Growing Cyberthreat from Iran: The Initial Report of Project Pistachio Harvest,
American Enterprise Institute Critical Threats Project and Norse Corporation, April 2015, passim, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/04/Growing-Cyberthreat-From-Iran-final.pdf (accessed June 11, 2021).
127. Berman, “The Iranian Cyber Threat, Revisited,” p. 3.

129. Christopher Bronk and Eneken Tikk-Ringas, “The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 55,
No. 2 (April/May 2013), pp. 81–96.
130. Ben Caspit, “Israel Response to Cyber Attack Sends Clear Warning to Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 22, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2020/05/israel-us-iran-mike-pompeo-aviv-kochavi-cyberattack-port.html (accessed June 11, 2021).
131. Joby Warrick and Ellen Nakashima, “Officials: Israel Linked to a Disruptive Cyberattack on Iranian Port Facility,” The Washington
Post, May 18, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/officials-israel-linked-to-a-disruptive-cyberattack-oniranian-port-facility/2020/05/18/9d1da866-9942-11ea-89fd-28fb313d1886_story.html (accessed June 11, 2021).
132. Clearsky Cyber Security, “Operation Quicksand: MuddyWater’s Offensive Attack Against Israeli Organizations,” October 2020,
https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Operation-Quicksand.pdf (accessed June 11, 2021).
133. David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “Iranian Hackers Attack State Dept. via Social Media Accounts,” The New York Times,
November 24, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/world/middleeast/iran-hackers-cyberespionage-state-departmentsocial-media.html?_r=0 (accessed June 11, 2021).
134. Ellen Nakashima and Matt Zapotosky, “U.S. Charges Iran-Linked Hackers with Targeting Banks, N.Y. Dam,” The Washington Post,
March 24, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-to-unseal-indictment-againsthackers-linked-to-iranian-goverment/2016/03/24/9b3797d2-f17b-11e5-a61f-e9c95c06edca_story.html (accessed June 11, 2021).
135. Jack Stubbs and Christopher Bing, “Exclusive: Iran-Linked Hackers Recently Targeted Coronavirus Drugmaker Gilead—Sources,”
Reuters, May 8, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcare-coronavirus-gilead-iran-ex/exclusive-iran-linked-hackersrecently-targeted-coronavirus-drugmaker-gilead-sources-idUSKBN22K2EV (accessed June 11, 2021).
136. David E. Sanger, “Iran Hackers Dangle a Familiar Name to Fish for Data,” The New York Times, May 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/05/31/world/middleeast/iran-hackers-dangle-a-familiar-name-to-fish-for-data.html?_r=2 (accessed June 11, 2021).
137. Bill Gertz, “FBI: Iran to Launch New Cyber Attacks,” The Washington Free Beacon, May 24, 2018, http://freebeacon.com/nationalsecurity/fbi-iran-launch-new-cyber-attacks/ (accessed June 11, 2021).
138. Andrew Hanna, “The Invisible U.S.–Iran Cyber War,” United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer, updated March 31, 2021,
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/oct/25/invisible-us-iran-cyber-war (accessed June 11, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military307﻿128. Tony Capaccio, David Lerman, and Chris Strohm, “Iran Behind Cyber-Attack on Adelson’s Sands Corp., Clapper Says,” Bloomberg,
February 26, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-26/iran-behind-cyber-attack-on-adelson-s-sands-corpclapper-says (accessed June 11, 2021).

139. National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections,” Intelligence Community Assessment ICA 202000078D, March 10, 2021, p. i, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf (June 11, 2021).

﻿

140. This Index scores threat capability as it relates to the vital national interests of the United States and the role and utility of U.S.
military forces. Terrorist groups clearly have the ability to conduct attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), firearms,
and even hijacked airplanes. The bombing of the Boston Marathon in April 2013, an attempted car bomb attack in New York
City’s Times Square in May 2010, and al-Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, 2001, are stark examples. Often, the U.S. has handled
terrorism as a law enforcement and intelligence collection matter, especially within the United States and when it presents a
threat to particular U.S. interests in other countries. Compared to the types of threats posed by states such as China or Russia,
terrorism is a lesser sort of threat to the security and viability of the U.S. as a global power. This Index does not dismiss thedeaths, injuries, and damage that terrorists can inflict on Americans at home and abroad; it places the threat posed by terrorism
in context with substantial threats to the U.S. homeland, the potential for major regional conflict, and the potential to deny U.S.
access to the global commons. With this in mind, terrorist groups seldom have the physical ability either to accomplish theirextreme stated objectives or to present a physical threat that rises to a level that threatens U.S. vital security interests. Of course,
terrorist organizations can commit acts of war on a continuing basis, as reflected in their conduct in the war against al-Qaeda
and its associates in which the United States has been engaged for more than a decade.

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North Korea
Bruce Klingner

N

Threats to the Homeland
In 2017, North Korea conducted three successful tests of two variants of its road-­mobileintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),
which “is capable of reaching anywhere in
the U.S. mainland, according to United States
Forces Korea’s (USFK) first official assessment of the long-range missile.”1 In its October 2020 parade, North Korea revealed a
new massive ICBM that may have the ability

to carry multiple warheads. In January 2021,
Kim Jong-un declared that North Korea
was in the final stages of perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead missiles.2
Such missiles, combined with Pyongyang’s
recently confirmed ability to produce ICBM
transporter-­erector-launchers indigenously,
risks overwhelming the limited missile defenses protecting the American homeland.
North Korea has conducted six nuclear
tests, including a 2017 test of a much more
powerful hydrogen bomb with an explosive
yield approximately 10 times those of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs of WorldWar II. In 2017, the U.S. Intelligence Community assessed that Pyongyang may have produced 30–60 warheads3 and can create enoughfissile material for at least seven and as manyas 12 warheads per year.4 By 2027, North Korea
could have 200 nuclear weapons and several
dozen ICBMs.5
Pyongyang has created a new generation ofadvanced mobile missiles that are more accurate, survivable, and capable of evading allied
missile defenses. Pyongyang’s evolving nuclear
and missile forces increasingly give the regime
the ability to conduct a surprise preemptive
first-strike, retaliatory second-strike, and battlefield counterforce attacks.
In 2016 and 2017, North Korea successfully
test-launched the Hwasong 12 intermediate-­
range ballistic missile, which can target
critical U.S. bases in Guam, and both the
Pukguksong-2 road-mobile medium-range
ballistic missile and the Pukguksong-1

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military309

﻿orth Korea is a perennial problem in
Asia because of the regime’s consistently
provocative behavior and sustained investment in missile, nuclear, and cyber technologies that it sees as essential to maintaining
power domestically and asserting its will internationally. Though not on the same scaleas the threat posed by China or Russia, thethreat that North Korea poses to the stability
and security of the region and, given its developments in nuclear weapon delivery systems
and cyberwarfare capabilities, to the UnitedStates and U.S. interests is significant.
Pyongyang now has a spectrum of missile
systems that threaten the continental UnitedStates as well as U.S. forces and allies in Asiawith nuclear weapons. On assuming power in
2011, Kim Jong-un accelerated nuclear andmissile testing and oversaw an expansive diversification of North Korea’s arsenal. New
weapons overcame the shortcomings of theirpredecessors and now pose a far greater threat
to allied forces in spite of advancements in
missile defense systems.

﻿submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLB- South Korean destroyers provides protectionM).6 In 2019, North Korea conducted 26 mis- only against anti-ship missiles.
sile launches, its highest-ever number of anIn June 2018, President Donald Trump met
nual violations of U.N. resolutions. In March with Kim Jong-un in Singapore and subse2020, Pyongyang conducted another nine quently declared that “there is no longer a nushort-range missile launches, all of which clear threat from North Korea” and that “total
were violations of U.N. resolutions.
denuclearization…has already started taking
In 2019, the regime unveiled five new short- place.”9 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo rerange missile systems threatening South Korea, peatedly claimed that North Korean leader Kim
including a 400mm multiple rocket launch- Jong-un had accepted U.N.-mandated complete,er (MRL); the KN-23 maneuverable missile, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of hiswhich is similar to the Russian Iskander; the nuclear, missile, and biological and chemical
KN-24 missile, which is similar to the U.S. Ar- weapons (BCW) programs. However, during themy’s ATACMS; the KN-25 600mm MRL; and February 2019 Trump–Kim summit, it became
the Pukguksong-3 SLBM. The enhanced ac- clear that Kim had not agreed to do so and thatcuracy of these systems enables North Korea the two sides still did not even have a common
to accomplish counterforce operations with definition of “denuclearization” or what constifewer missiles.
tutes the Korean Peninsula. After October 2019,
The KN-18 and KN-21 Scud variants have working-level diplomatic meetings collapsed,
maneuverable reentry vehicles, and the KN-23’s and North Korea rejected any further dialogue.
flight profile showed evasive characteristics inDespite three U.S.–North Korea summit
stead of a typical ballistic parabola. The KN-23 meetings, there was no progress on denuclearwas flown at depressed trajectories, potential- ization during the Trump Administration andly between the upper reach of Patriot missiles no decrease in North Korea’s weapons of massand below the minimum intercept altitude for destruction (WMD) arsenal or production capaTerminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), bilities. Pyongyang continued to increase its prowith a final pull-up maneuver that provides a duction of fissile material for nuclear weapons,
steep terminal descent,7 revealing that North and satellite imagery showed upgrades to misKorea has studied U.S. and South Korean defen- sile, reentry vehicle, missile launcher, and nusive systems in order to gain a military advan- clear weapon production facilities.10 The Inteltage with weapons that exploit gaps in coverage. ligence Community assessed that North Korea
The KN-23 could also be used in a first strike “is unlikely to give up all of its WMD stockpiles,
against leadership, hardened command and delivery systems, and production capabilities.”11
control, or high-value military targets.
North Korea has successfully tested the Threat of Regional War
Pukguksong-1 (KN-11) and Pukguksong-3 (KNIn addition to its nuclear and missile forces,
26) SLBMs, which could target South Korea North Korea has approximately 1 million people
and Japan, potentially with a nuclear warhead. in its military and reserves numbering several
In its October 2020 and January 2021 parades, million more. Pyongyang has forward-deployed
North Korea revealed the Pukguksong-4 and 70 percent of its ground forces, 60 percent of naPukguksong-5 SLBM missiles.
val forces, and 40 percent of naval forces south
South Korea does not currently have de- of the Pyongyang–Wonsan line. South Korea
fenses against SLBMs. Because the THAAD assesses that North Korean forces “maintain aballistic missile defense (BMD) system radar readiness posture capable of carrying out a suris limited to a 120-degree view that is directed prise attack on the South at any time.”12
toward North Korea, it cannot protect against
The April 2018 inter-Korean summit led to
SLBMs arriving from either the East or West bilateral pledges of nonaggression and mutuSeas.8 The SM-2 missile currently deployed on al force reduction. Similar pledges were also

3102022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 15

North Korean Missiles Can Target South Korea, Japan,
U.S. Bases in Guam, and the United States
Arctic Ocean

INTERMEDIATERANGE

Hwasong–12
4,500 km*Musudan
4,000 km

MEDIUM-RANGERUSSIA

U.K.

Scud-ER and
No Dong andPukguksong-1 Pukguksong-2/3
1,000 km1,300 km

AlaskaCANADAEUROPE
N. KOREA

CHINA
AFRICAJAPAN
S. KOREA
Guam

Indian
Ocean
AUSTRALIA

Pacific
Ocean

U.S.

Hwasong–14
10,000 km**

Atlantic
Ocean

SOUTH
AMERICAICBM* First tested May 2017. ** First tested July 2017.
SOURCES: Heritage Foundation research and media reports.

contained in the 1972, 1992, 2000, and 2007
joint statements, all of which Pyongyang subsequently violated or abrogated. None of thosepledges prevented North Korea from conducting provocations, attempted assassinations ofSouth Korea’s president, terrorist acts, militaryand cyberattacks, and acts of war.
In September 2018, the two Koreas signed
a Comprehensive Military Agreement to easemilitary tension and build confidence. The
agreement sought to reduce the danger that
inadvertent tactical military clashes along
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) might escalate
to larger strategic conflicts. However, static﻿

Hwasong–15
13,000 km

A heritage.org

defensive positions like fixed concrete bunkers and minefields are not threatening andhave never been the source of military clashes
on the peninsula. Rather, the greatest danger
arises from the forward, offensively oriented
disposition of North Korea’s forces and the regime’s history of making threats and initiating
hostilities. The confidence-building measures
implemented to date have not reduced North
Korea’s tactical or strategic conventional military threat to South Korea, nor do they represent progress in denuclearization.
Due to a predicted shortfall in 18-yearold conscripts, South Korea initiated a

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311

﻿

comprehensive defense reform strategy to Threats to the Commonstransform its military into a smaller but more
Pyongyang has developed an advanced cycapable force to deal with the North Korean berwarfare prowess that is surpassed by thatthreat. Overall, South Korean military man- of few other nations. From initial rudimentary
power will be reduced approximately 25 per- distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
cent, from 681,000 to a planned goal of 500,000. against South Korea, the regime has improved
As of 2020, the South Korean military had a its cyber programs to create a robust and global
total strength of 550,000: 420,000 in the army, array of disruptive military, financial, and es70,000 in the navy, and 65,000 in the air force.13 pionage capabilities.
Seoul planned to compensate for decreased
North Korea leader Kim Jong-un declared
troop levels by procuring advanced fighter that cyber warfare is a “magic weapon”17 and an
and surveillance aircraft, naval platforms, and “all-purpose sword that guarantees the Northground combat vehicles.14
Korean People’s Armed Forces ruthless strikThat North Korea’s conventional forces are ing capability, along with nuclear weapons anda very real threat to South Korea was vividly missiles.”18 In the run-up to a crisis or as an aldemonstrated by two deadly attacks on South ternative to kinetic strikes, the regime could
Korea in 2010. In March, a North Korean sub- conduct cyberattacks on government and cimarine sank the South Korean naval corvette vilian computer networks controlling commuCheonan in South Korean waters, killing 46 nications, finances, and infrastructure such as
sailors. In November, North Korean artil- power plants and electrical grids.
lery shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing four
As its cyber proficiencies have evolved,
South Koreans.
Pyongyang has implemented ever more soSince the North Korean military is equipped phisticated techniques and prioritized finanpredominantly with older ground force equip- cial targets to evade international sanctions
ment, Pyongyang has prioritized deployment and increase its ability to finance its nuclearof strong asymmetric capabilities that include and missile programs. Pyongyang has conspecial operations forces, long-range artillery, ducted cyber guerrilla warfare to steal classiand missiles. North Korea has deployed hun- fied military secrets in addition to absconding
dreds of short-range ballistic missiles that can with billions of dollars in money and cybertarget all of South Korea with explosive, chem- currency, holding computer systems hostage,ical, and biological warheads. The land and sea and inflicting extensive damage on comborders between North and South Korea re- puter networks.
main unsettled, heavily armed, and subject toTo the extent that the cyber domain is
occasional, limited armed conflict.
a “global commons” used by all people andNorth Korean forces arrayed against Amer- countries, North Korea’s investment in andican allies South Korea and Japan are substan- exploitation of cyberwarfare capabilities prestial, and North Korea’s history of provocation ents a very real threat in this domain.
is a consistent indicator of its intent to achieve
its political objectives by at least the threat of Conclusion
force. After assuming power, Kim Jong-un diThe North Korean military poses a securirected the North Korean military to develop a ty challenge for American allies South Korea
new war plan to invade and occupy South Ko- and Japan, as well as for U.S. bases in those
rea within a week using asymmetric capabili- countries and Guam. North Korean officials
ties including nuclear weapons.15 North Korea are belligerent toward the United States, often
has conducted several missile exercises and issuing military and diplomatic threats. Pyonghas subsequently announced that they were yang has also engaged in a range of provocative
practice drills for preemptive nuclear attacks behavior, including nuclear and missile tests
on South Korea and Japan.16
and tactical-level attacks on South Korea.

312

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

North Korea has used its missile and nuclear tests to enhance its prestige and importancedomestically, regionally, and globally and to
extract various concessions from the UnitedStates in negotiations over its nuclear programand various aid packages. Such developments
also improve North Korea’s military posture.
U.S. and allied intelligence agencies assessthat Pyongyang has already achieved warhead

miniaturization, the ability to place nuclear
weapons on its medium-range missiles, andthe capability to reach the continental UnitedStates with a missile.
This Index assesses the overall threat from
North Korea, considering the range of contingencies, as “testing” for level of provocative
behavior and “gathering” for level of capability.

Threats: North Korea
HOSTILEAGGRESSIVE

Behavior

ASSERTIVE

BENIGNASPIRATIONALMARGINAL%
FORMIDABLE

Capability

TESTINGGATHERINGCAPABLE%﻿The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

313

﻿

Endnotes
1.

Yonhap News Agency, “Most of America in Reach of North’s Missile,” Korea JoongAng Daily, July 11, 2019, http://
koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3065390 (accessed May 25, 2021).

2.

North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-Style Socialist Construction toFresh Victory: On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK,” KCNA, January 9, 2021, https://
kcnawatch.org/newstream/1610272851-580631610/great-programme-for-struggle-leading-korean-style-socialist-construction-tofresh-victoryon-report-made-by-supreme-leader-kim-jong-un-at-eighth-congress-of-wpk/?t=1610568921077 (accessed May 25,2021).

3.

Joby Warrick, Ellen Nakashima, and Anna Fifield, “North Korea Now Making Missile-Ready Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Analysts Say,”
The Washington Post, August 8, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-makingmissile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html (accessed
May 25, 2021); Deb Riechmann and Matthew Pennington, “Estimates of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Hard to Nail Down,”
Associated Press, August 18, 2017, https://apnews.com/53076b0dc7644f94b2751134a1d9d76b/Estimates-of-North-Korea'snuclear-weapons-hard-to-nail-down (accessed May 25, 2021); and Jeong Yong-soo, Lee Chul-jae, and Sarah Kim, “North Could
Have 60 Nuclear Warheads,” Korea JoongAng Daily, February 9, 2017, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.
aspx?aid=3029689 (accessed May 25, 2021).

4.

Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. 10472,
updated April 14, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10472 (accessed May 25, 2021), and Ankit Panda, “USIntelligence: North Korea May Already Be Annually Accruing Enough Fissile Material for 12 Nuclear Weapons,” The Diplomat,
August 9, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/us-intelligence-north-korea-may-already-be-annually-accruing-enough-fissilematerial-for-12-nuclear-weapons/ (accessed May 25, 2021).

5.

Bruce W. Bennett, Kang Choi, Myong-hyun Go, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., Jiyoung Park, Bruce Klingner, and Du-Hyeogn Cha,
Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear Weapons, RAND Corporation Perspective, April 12, 2021, https://www.rand.org/
pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html (accessed May 25, 2021).

6.

Joshua Berlinger, “North Korea’s Missile Tests: What You Need to Know,” CNN, updated December 3, 2017, https://www.cnn.
com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html (accessed May 25, 2021).

7.

Jeff Jeong, “North Korea’s New Weapons Take Aim at the South’s F-35 Stealth Fighters,” Defense News, August 1, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/smd/2019/08/01/north-koreas-new-weapons-take-aim-at-souths-f-35-stealthfighters/ (accessed May 25, 2021).

8.

Bruce Klingner, “South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3024, June 12, 2015, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense.

9.

Reuters, “Trump Says North Korea ‘No Longer a Nuclear Threat,’” June 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkoreausa-trump/trump-says-north-korea-no-longer-a-nuclear-threat-idUSKBN1J915T (accessed May 26, 2021), and David Brunnstrom
and James Oliphant, “Trump: North Korea ‘Total Denuclearization’ Started; Officials See No New Moves,” Reuters, June 21, 2018,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-sites/trump-north-korea-total-denuclearization-started-officials-see-nonew-moves-idUSKBN1JH2QX (accessed May 25, 2021).

10. Jonathan Cheng, “North Korea Expands Key Missile-Manufacturing Plant, The Wall Street Journal, updated July 1, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-expands-key-missile-manufacturing-plant-1530486907 (accessed May 25, 2021); Courtney
Kube, Ken Dilanian, and Carol E. Lee, “North Korea Has Increased Nuclear Production at Secret Sites, Say U.S. Officials,” NBC
News, updated June 30, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/north-korea-has-increased-nuclear-productionsecret-sites-say-u-n887926 (accessed May 25, 2021); Frank V. Pabian, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Jack Liu, “Infrastructure
Improvements at North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Research Facility,” 38 North, June 26, 2018, https://www.38north.org/2018/06/
yongbyon062618/ (accessed May 25, 2021); and Ankit Panda, “Exclusive: North Korea Has Continued Ballistic Missile Launcher
Production in 2018, Per US Intelligence,” The Diplomat, June 30, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/exclusive-north-koreahas-continued-ballistic-missile-launcher-production-per-us-intelligence/ (accessed May 25, 2021).
11. Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
statement before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, January 29, 2019, p. 8, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/
documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf (accessed May 25, 2021).
12. South Korean Ministry of National Defense, 2020 Defense White Paper, p. 24 (Korean-language version), https://www.mnd.go.kr/
user/mnd/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_202102021153057640.pdf (accessed August 16, 2021). See also South Korean Ministryof National Defense, 2018 Defense White Paper, p. 29 (English-language version), https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201908070153390840.pdf (accessed August 16, 2021).

314

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength13. South Korean Ministry of National Defense, 2020 Defense White Paper, pp. 51–52 (Korean-language version). In 2018, total
strength was 599,000: 464,000 for the Army, 70,000 for the Navy, and 65,000 for the Air Force. South Korean Ministry of
National Defense, 2018 Defense White Paper, pp. 55–58, 119, and 332 (English-language version).
14. Bruce Klingner, “Enhance South Korean Military Capabilities Before OPCON Transfer,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
3452, December 2, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/enhance-south-korean-military-capabilities-opcon-transfer.
15. Jeong Yong-soo and Ser Myo-ja, “Kim Jong-un Ordered a Plan for a 7-day Asymmetric War: Officials,” Korea JoongAng Daily,
January 7, 2015, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2999392 (accessed May 25, 2021).
16. North Korea Leadership Watch, “Kim Jong Un Observes and Guides Ballistic Missile Drill,” July 19, 2016, https://nkleadershipwatch.
wordpress.com/2016/07/19/kim-jong-un-observes-and-guides-ballistic-missile-drill/ (accessed May 26, 2021); Shin Hyon-hee,“NK Says Missile Test Aimed at Ports, Airfields in South Korea,” The Korea Herald, July 20, 2016, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.
php?ud=20160720000876 (accessed May 26, 2021), and North Korea Leadership Watch, “Kim Jong Un Supervises Missile Drill,”
March 6, 2017, http://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/2017/03/06/kim-jong-un-supervises-missile-drill/ (accessed May 26, 2021).
17. “N. Korea Boosting Cyber Warfare Capabilities,” The Chosun Ilbo, November 5, 2013, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2013/11/05/2013110501790.html (accessed May 26, 2021).
18. Kong Ji Young, Lim Jong In, and Kim Kyoung Gon, “The All-Purpose Sword: North Korea’s Cyber Operations and Strategies,”in 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle, ed. T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga,
G. Visky, NATO CCD COE (Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence) Publications, 2019, p. 143, https://ccdcoe.org/
uploads/2019/06/CyCon_2019_BOOK.pdf (accessed May 26, 2021). The conference was held in Tallinn, Estonia, on May 28–31,
2019.

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Non-State Actors
James Phillips and Jeff SmithTnonexistent governance that allows them toplan, train, equip, and launch attacks.
Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates. Al-Qaeda wasfounded in 1988 by Arab foreign fighters who
flocked to Afghanistan to join the war against
Soviet occupation of the country in the 1980s.
With Osama bin Laden appointed emir, al-­Qaeda was envisaged as a revolutionary vanguard that would radicalize and recruit Sunni
Muslims across the world and lead a global
Islamist revolution.2
After 9/11, al-Qaeda’s leadership fled Afghanistan. Much of the original cadre has now
been killed or captured, including Osama bin
Laden, and other key al-Qaeda leaders havebeen killed by targeted strikes in Afghanistan,Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia.
However, al-Qaeda’s central leadership remains a potential threat to the U.S. homeland.
Key elements of al-Qaeda’s leadership havesurvived or been replaced. Bin Laden’s successor as emir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was forced
Terrorist Threats to the Homeland fromdeeper into seclusion and reportedly is sickthe Middle East and North Africa
or already dead from natural causes.3 Some
Radical Islamist terrorism in its various al-Qaeda lieutenants are believed still to be informs remains a global threat to the safety the Afghanistan–Pakistan region; others haveof America’s citizens. Many terrorist groups taken refuge in Iran.4 Zawahiri’s likely succesoperate in the Middle East, but those that are sor, Mohammed Salahuddin Zeidan, reportinspired by Islamist ideology also operate in edly also is based in Iran, where he operates
Europe, Asia, and Africa.
under the nom de guerre Saif al-Adel (“Sword
The primary terrorist groups of concern to of Justice”).5
the U.S. homeland and to Americans abroad
Like scores of other al-Qaeda members inare the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham Iran, Zeidan experienced imprisonment, some
(ISIS) and al-Qaeda. Their threat is ampli- form of house arrest, and periods of relative
fied when they can exploit areas with weak or freedom to operate inside Iran, depending

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military317

﻿errorist groups come in many forms but
have one thing in common: the use ofviolence to achieve their political objectives,
whether those objectives are religious, ethnic,
or ideological. In general, terrorist groups operate in a very local context, usually within a
specific country or sub-region. Sometimes aterrorist group’s objectives extend beyond theinternationally recognized borders of a statebecause their identity as a group transcends
such legal or geographic boundaries.
Terrorist groups rarely pose a threat to theUnited States that rises to the threshold usedby this Index: a substantial threat to the U.S.
homeland; the ability to precipitate a war ina region of critical interest to the U.S.; and/or
the ability to threaten the free movement ofpeople, goods, or services through the global
commons. Those that do meet these criteria
are assessed in this section, with the exceptionof Hezbollah and other Iran-backed groups.1

﻿

on the state of relations between Iran and al-­ affiliates that shared the long-term goals of
Qaeda. Although both share common enemies al-Qaeda’s general command and largely rein the United States, Israel, and Sunni Arab re- mained loyal to it. These affiliates have enjoyedgimes, they represent clashing Shia and Sunni some success in exploiting local conflicts. In
Islamist ideologies and pursue conflicting long- particular, the Arab Spring uprisings that beterm goals in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. gan in 2011 enabled al-Qaeda to advance its
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps revolutionary agenda, taking advantage of(IRGC) played an important role in estab- failed or failing states in Iraq, Libya, Mali, Syria,
lishing links with al-Qaeda in the early 1990s, and Yemen. It is through these affiliates thatwhen Bin Laden was based in Sudan. Accord- al-Qaeda is able to project regional strength
ing to the report of the 9/11 Commission, the most effectively.
IRGC trained al-Qaeda members in camps in
Yemen. Yemen has long been a bastion of
Lebanon and in Iran, where they learned to support for militant Islamism. Yemenis madebuild much bigger bombs. The commission up a disproportionate number of the estimatassessed that al-Qaeda may have assisted ed 25,000 foreign Muslims that fought in the
Iran-backed Saudi Hezbollah terrorists who Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union in theexecuted the June 1996 bombing that killed 19 1980s. After that conflict ended, Yemen also
U.S. Air Force personnel at the Khobar Tow- attracted Westerners into the country to carers residential complex in Saudi Arabia and ry out terrorist operations there. In 1998, sevrecommended that further investigation was eral British citizens were jailed for planningneeded to examine Iran’s ties to al-Qaeda.6
to bomb Western targets, including hotels
This long-neglected issue resurfaced in and a church.102020 after The New York Times reported that
Al-Qaeda’s first terrorist attack against
al-Qaeda’s second-highest leader was killed Americans occurred in Yemen in Decemberin the heart of Iran’s capital city on August 1992 when a bomb was detonated in a hotel used
7, 2020, by Israeli agents at the behest of the by U.S. military personnel. In October 2000, in
United States.7 The al-Qaeda leader, Abdul- a much deadlier operation, it used a boat filled
lah Ahmed Abdullah, who went by the nom de with explosives to attack the USS Cole in theguerre Abu Muhammad al-Masri, had been liv- port of Aden, killing 17 American sailors.11 The
ing in Iran at least since 2003 when he had fled first U.S. drone strike outside Afghanistan after
from Afghanistan. Abdullah was a longtime fix- 9/11 also took place in Yemen, targeting thoseture on the FBI’s “most wanted” list for his role connected to the attack on the Cole.12
in planning the August 7, 1998, bombings of theAfter 9/11 and following crackdowns in other
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which countries, Yemen became increasingly importkilled 224 people including 12 Americans. He ant as a base of operations for al-Qaeda. In Sepwas gunned down on a street in Tehran by two tember 2008, al-Qaeda launched an attack on
assassins on a motorcycle on the anniversary the U.S. embassy in Yemen that killed 19 peoof that attack, which was al-Qaeda’s most le- ple, including an American woman. Yemen’s
thal operation before 9/11.8
importance to al-Qaeda increased further in
On January 12, 2021, then-Secretary of January 2009 when al-Qaeda members whoState Mike Pompeo confirmed the New York had been pushed out of Saudi Arabia merged
Times report about Abdullah’s death and with the Yemeni branch to form Al-Qaeda inwarned that Iran had become the “new Af- the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This affiliate
ghanistan.”9 He also announced sanctions on quickly emerged as one of the leading terrortwo al-Qaeda leaders that continue to operate ist threats to the U.S. By 2010, CIA analysts asinside Iran.
sessed that AQAP posed a more urgent threat
Al-Qaeda also dispersed its fighters further to U.S. security than the al-Qaeda general comafield, allowing for the development of regional mand based in Afghanistan/Pakistan.13

318

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthradicalized by 2015 and was influenced by Awlaki’s propaganda.23
Much of AQAP’s activity has focused on
exploiting the chaos of the Arab Spring in Yemen. AQAP acquired a significant amount ofterritory in 2011 and established governance inthe country’s South, finally relinquishing thisterritory only after a Yemeni military offensivein the summer of 2012.24
AQAP further intensified its domestic activities after the overthrow of Yemen’s government by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in 2015,
seizing the city of al-Mukalla and expanding
its control of rural areas in southern Yemen.
AQAP withdrew from al-Mukalla and otherparts of the South in the spring of 2016, reportedly after the U.S.-backed Saudi–United ArabEmirates coalition had cut deals with AQAP,
paying it to leave certain territory and evenintegrating some of its fighters into its own
forces that were targeting the Houthis.25
More substantive progress has beenachieved in the targeting of AQAP’s leadership. Said al-Shehri, a top AQAP operative,
was killed in a drone strike in 2013. The group’s
leader at the time, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, waskilled in a drone strike in June 2015. Perhaps
most significantly, Ibrahim al-Asiri, AQAP’s
most notorious bomb maker, was killed in a
U.S. strike in 2017. Since then, the tempo of
U.S. drone strikes against AQAP has slowed.26
In 2018, U.N. experts estimated that AQAP
commanded between 6,000 and 7,000 fightersin 2018.27 AQAP has declined since its 2015–2016 peak, losing key leaders to drone strikes
and other attacks and suffering manpower
losses in factional clashes and defections.28
Nevertheless, it remains a resilient force that
could capitalize on the anarchy of Yemen’s
multi-sided civil war to seize new territory andplan more attacks on the West.
Syria. Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, initiallynamed the al-Nusra Front (ANF), was established as an offshoot of the Islamic State of
Iraq (ISI), al-Qaeda’s Iraq affiliate, in late 2011by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, a lieutenant of
ISI leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.29 ANF had
an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 members and

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military319﻿Much of this threat centered initiallyon AQAP’s Anwar al-Awlaki, a charismatic
American-­born Yemeni cleric who directed
several terrorist attacks on U.S. targets before
being killed in a drone air strike in September
2011. He had an operational role in the plot
executed by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, thefailed suicide bomber who sought to destroy
an airliner bound for Detroit on Christmas Day
2009.14 Awlaki was also tied to plots to poison
food and water supplies, as well as to launchricin and cyanide attacks,15 and is suspected ofplaying a role in the November 2010 plot to dispatch parcel bombs to the U.S. in cargo planes.
Additionally, Awlaki was in contact with Major
Nidal Hassan, who perpetrated the 2009 Fort
Hood shootings that killed 13 soldiers.16
Since Awlaki’s death, the number of
AQAP-sanctioned external operations in theWest has diminished.17 However, his videos on
the Internet have continued to radicalize andrecruit young Muslims, including the perpetrators of the April 2013 bombing of the Boston
Marathon that killed three people.18
AQAP’s threat to Western security, while
seemingly slightly reduced by Awlaki’s death,is still pronounced. Another attempt to carryout a bombing of Western aviation using explosives concealed in an operative’s underwear
was thwarted by a U.S.–Saudi intelligence operation in May 2012.19 In August 2013, U.S. interception of al-Qaeda communications led tothe closure of 19 U.S. embassies and consulates
across the Middle East and Africa because of
indications that AQAP was planning a massive
attack.20 In January 2015, two AQAP-trained
terrorists murdered staff members and nearby
police at Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris.21 In
2017, aviation was targeted once again by a plan
to conceal bombs in laptop batteries.22
AQAP launched another successful attack
inside the United States on December 6, 2019,
when a radicalized Saudi Royal Air Force
officer being trained at Naval Air Station
Pensacola killed three U.S. Navy sailors andwounded eight other Americans in a shooting
attack. The FBI later assessed that the shooter, Mohammed Saeed Al-Shamrani, had been﻿

emerged as one of the top rebel groups fight- in pursuit of its objectives.” The report further
ing the Assad dictatorship in Syria.30 Most ANF estimated that ANF’s strength had fallen tocadres are concentrated in rebel strongholds “between 5,000 to 10,000 fighters.”36
in northwestern Syria, but the group also has
Further complicating matters surroundsmall cells operating elsewhere in the country. ing al-Qaeda’s presence, another group in
ANF had some success in attracting Amer- Syria connected to al-Qaeda, Hurras al-Din
icans to its cause. An American Muslim re- (Guardians of the Religion), was formed incruited by ANF, Moner Mohammad Abusalha, March 2018.37 Among its ranks were those who
conducted a suicide truck bombing in north- defected from HTS, and its suspected emir is
ern Syria on May 25, 2014, in the first reported an Ayman al-Zawahiri acolyte.38
suicide attack by an American in that country.31
HTS is more pragmatic than its ultra-­At least five men have been arrested inside the extremist parent organization and has coU.S. for providing material assistance to ANF, operated with moderate Syrian rebel groups
including Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud, a nat- against the Assad regime, as well as against
uralized U.S. citizen who was arrested in April ISIS. However, the leadership of Abu Muham2015 after returning from training in Syria and mad al-Julani and his tactical approach to thewas planning to launch a terrorist attack on U.S. conflict, as well as the clear divisions withsoldiers based in Texas.32
in the Syrian jihad, have led to rebukes fromIn recent years, the al-Qaeda network in Ayman al-Zawahiri and those who are loyal to
Syria has undergone several name chang- him.39 Zawahiri has stressed the need for unies, allying itself with various Islamist rebel ty while lambasting the jihadist movement ingroups. This has made it more difficult to as- Syria and its emphasis on holding territory insess the degree of direct threat that it poses northwest Syria at the expense of intensifying
outside of Syria.
the struggle against Assad.40
In a May 2015 interview, al-Julani stated
One entity that did pose a direct threat tothat al-Nusra’s intentions were purely local the West was the Khorasan group, which wasand that, “so as not to muddy the current war” thought to comprise dozens of veterans ofin Syria, ANF was not planning to target the al-Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan and PakiWest.33 In July 2016, al-Nusra rebranded itself stan.41 Al-Zawahiri had dispatched this cadre ofas Jabhat Fatah Al Sham (JFS), and al-Julani operatives to Syria, where they were embedded
stated that it would have “no affiliation to any with ANF and—despite al-Julani’s statement
external entity,” a move that some experts that ANF was not targeting the West—charged
regarded as a break from al-Qaeda and oth- with organizing terrorist attacks against Westers regarded as a move to obscure its ties to ern targets. A series of U.S. air strikes in 2014–
al-Qaeda and reduce U.S. military pressure 2015 degraded Khorasan’s capacity to organizeon the group.34
terrorist attacks.
In January 2017, ANF merged with other IsAl-Qaeda’s presence and activities in Syria,
lamist extremist movements to create a new as well as the intent of those who once wereanti-Assad coalition: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham aligned with it, are sometimes opaque, most
(HTS, Organization for the Liberation of the likely on purpose. Even if offshoots of al-­Qaeda
Levant). It was estimated that HTS had 12,000 are not currently emphasizing their hostilto 14,000 fighters in March 2017.35 HTS suf- ity to the U.S., however, that will probably
fered many casualties as Syria’s Assad regime, change if they succeed in further consolidating
backed by Iran and Russia, tightened the noose power in Syria.
around its strongholds in northwest Syria.
The Sahel. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb“Since 2017,” according to the U.S. Department (AQIM) “has an estimated 1,000 fighters operof State’s 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism, ating in the Sahel, including Algeria, northern“ANF has continued to operate through HTS Mali, southwest Libya, and Niger.”42 AQIM’s

3202022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthMarch 2017, the Sahara branch of AQIM
merged with three other al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda–
linked organizations based in the Sahel to form
the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims(JNIM), an organization that has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri.44
AQIM is not known to have targeted the U.S.
homeland explicitly in recent years, but it does
threaten regional stability and U.S. allies inNorth Africa and Europe, where it has gained
supporters and operates extensive networks
for the smuggling of arms, drugs, and people.
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shamand Its Affiliates. The Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS) is an al-Qaeda splintergroup that has outstripped its parent organization in terms of its immediate threats to U.S.
national interests.
The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the precursor to ISIS and an al-Qaeda offshoot, wasperceived by some Western policymakers as
having been strategically defeated following
the U.S. “surge” of 2006–2007 in Iraq. However, the group benefited from America’s political and military withdrawal from Iraq in the
2010–2011 period, as well as from the chaos in
Syria where the Arab Spring protests were met
with bloody persecution from Bashar al-Assad.
In both Iraq and Syria, ISI had space inwhich to operate and a large disaffected poolof individuals from which to recruit. In April
2013, ISI emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declaredthat the al-Nusra Front, the al-Qaeda affiliate
operating in Syria, was merely a front for his
operation and that a new organization was
being formed: the Islamic State of Iraq and al-­Sham. ISIS sought to establish an Islamic state
governed by its harsh interpretation of sharia
law, posing an existential threat to Christians,
Shiite Muslims, Yazidis, and other religious
minorities. Its long-term goals include leading a jihad to drive Western influence out of
the Middle East; diminishing and discrediting Shia Islam, which it considers apostasy;
and becoming the nucleus of a global Sunni
Islamic empire.
With both al- Qaeda leader Ayman al-­
Zawahiri and ANF emir Abu Mohammed

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military321﻿roots lie in the Algerian civil war of the 1990s,
when the Algerian government cancelled thesecond round of elections following the victoryof the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the firstround. The armed wing of the FIS, the Armed
Islamic Group (GIA), responded by launchinga series of attacks, executing those who wereeven suspected of working with the state. The
group also attempted to implement sharia
law in Algeria.
The GIA rapidly alienated Algerian civilians, and by the late 1990s, an offshoot, theSalafist Group for Preaching and Combat(GSPC), emerged. Its violence, somewhat lessindiscriminate than the GIA’s, was focused on
security and military targets. Having failed tooverthrow the Algerian state, the GSPC began to align itself with al-Qaeda, and Ayman
al-Zawahiri announced its integration into theal-Qaeda network in a September 2006 video.
The GSPC subsequently took the AQIM name.
AQIM has carried out a series of regional
attacks and has focused on kidnapping Westerners. Some of these hostages have been
killed, but more have been used to extort
ransoms from Western governments.43 Likeother al-Qaeda affiliates, AQIM also took advantage of the power vacuums that emerged
from the Arab Spring, particularly in Libya
where Islamist militias flourished. The weakcentral government was unable to tame fractious militias, curb tribal and political clashes,or dampen rising tensions between Arabs andBerbers in the West and Arabs and the Toubou
tribe in the South.
The September 11, 2012, attack on the U.S.
diplomatic mission in Benghazi underscoredthe extent to which Islamist extremism hadflourished in the region. The radical Islamistgroup that launched the attack, Ansar al-­Sharia,
had links to AQIM and shared its violent ideology. AQIM and like-minded Islamist allies
also grabbed significant amounts of territory
in northern Mali late in 2012, implementing a
brutal version of sharia law, until a French military intervention helped to push them back.
AQIM continues to support and work alongside various jihadist groups in the region. In﻿

al-Julani unable to rein in al-Baghdadi, ISIS
was expelled from the al- Qaeda network
in February 2014. Despite this, ISIS swept
through parts of northern and western Iraq
and in June 2014 declared the return of the caliphate, with its capital in the northern Syrian
city of Raqqa. It subsequently kidnapped andthen murdered Westerners working in Syria,
including American citizens.
A U.S.-led international coalition was assembled to chip away at ISIS’s control of territory. The Iraqi Army and Iranian-backed
militias, supported by U.S. and coalition air
strikes and special operations forces, liberated
Mosul in July 2017. In Syria, U.S.-backed Syrian
Democratic Forces militia liberated Raqqa in
October 2017, and ISIS’s last town (Baghouz)
fell in March 2019.
ISIS fighters have dispersed, have adopted
insurgent tactics, and will continue to pose a
regional terrorist threat with direct implications for the U.S. In January 2019, for example,
four American military and civilian personnel
were killed in a suicide bombing at a market in
Manbij in northern Syria.45
On October 26, 2019, U.S. special operations
forces killed ISIS leader al-Baghdadi in a raid
in northwestern Syria’s Idlib governate near
the Turkish border.46 ISIS soon named a successor, Abdullah Qardash, the nom de guerre of
Mohammad Abdul Rahman al-Mawli al-Salbi.
An Iraqi Turkman from Tal Afar near Mosul,
Salbi is said to have met Baghdadi in Camp
Bucca, a U.S. military detention center.47
The number of ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria fell from 776 during the first four months of2019 to 330 during the same period in 2020.48
Nevertheless, ISIS remains a significant regional threat. U.S. officials estimate that ISIS
retains 14,000 to 18,000 militants in Syria andIraq, where it is rebuilding its strength in remote desert and mountain regions.49
Although ISIS’s territorial control has
been broken in Iraq and Syria, its presence
has spread far beyond that territory. Terrorist groups around the world have pledged
allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his
successor, and ISIS now has affiliates in the322

Middle East, in South and Southeast Asia, andthroughout Africa. ISIS poses a threat to stability in all of these regions, seeking to seize
territory, overthrow governments, and impose
its harsh brand of Islamic law.
Although the regional ISIS groups may notpose as great a threat to the U.S. homeland as
the original group in Iraq and Syria posed, they
represent significant threats to U.S. allies andU.S. forces deployed overseas. An Islamic Statein the Greater Sahara ambush in Niger in October 2017, for example, resulted in the death offour U.S. special operations troops.50 In addition,
ISIS has made threats against embassies, including those of the U.S., in its areas of influence.51
ISIS poses an ongoing threat to life in
the West. On May 3, 2015, for example, two
American extremists in contact with an ISIS
operative in Syria were fatally shot by police
before they could commit mass murder in Garland, Texas.52
More commonly, however, the ISIS ideology
has inspired individuals and small groups toplan attacks in the U.S. According to the GW
Extremism Tracker, “228 individuals havebeen charged in the U.S. on offenses related to
the Islamic State…since March 2014, when thefirst arrests occurred.”53
Tashfeen Malik, one of the perpetrators of
the December 2, 2015, shootings that killed 14
people in San Bernardino, California, pledged
allegiance to al-Baghdadi.54 ISIS also claimed
responsibility for the June 12, 2016, shootings
at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida, that killed
49 people. Omar Mateen, the perpetrator, had
pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi, although
there is no evidence to show that the attacks
were directed by ISIS.55 The group also claimed
responsibility for the October 31, 2017, vehicular attack by Sayfullo Saipov in New York thatkilled eight.56 Saipov, too, had pledged allegiance to ISIS’s emir but did not appear to be
operationally guided by ISIS.57 Such terrorist
attacks, incited but not directed by ISIS, arelikely to continue for the foreseeable future.
Although its appeal appears to have diminished since the fall of its caliphate in Iraq and
Syria, ISIS continues to attract support from2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

ISIS ideology has also inspired a wave of
vehicle and knife attacks in Europe, including
one carried out by a Tunisian who used a truck
to kill 86 people and injure 434 more at a Bastille Day celebration in Nice, France, in July
2016.66 In another such attack, in June 2017,
three men killed eight people and injured 47 onor near London Bridge in London, England, by
running over them or stabbing them.67 London
Bridge also was the site of a November 29, 2019,knife attack by an ISIS supporter who killed
two people and wounded three more before
being killed by police.68
ISIS has demonstrated an interest in carrying out biological attacks. Sief Allah H., a Tunisian asylum seeker who was in contact with
ISIS, and his German wife Yasmin H. were arrested in Cologne in June 2018 after they had
produced ricin as part of a suspected attack.69
This was the first time that ricin had been successfully produced in the West as part of analleged Islamist plot.
Overall, as of May 2019, ISIS had had someinvolvement—ranging from merely inspirational to hands-on and operational—in over 150
plots and attacks in Europe since January 2014
that had led to 371 deaths and more than 1,700
injuries.70 This includes the loss of American
lives abroad. An American college student was
killed in Paris in November 2015, four Americans were killed in the Brussels attack of March
2016, and another three were killed in the Niceattack of July 2016.71 Moreover, the threat is by
no means confined to Europe: Americans werealso killed in ISIS-claimed attacks in Tajikistan
in July 2018 and Sri Lanka in April 2019.72

Terrorist Groups Operating in
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af-Pak)
According to General John W. Nicholson, former Commander of U.S. Forces–­
Afghanistan, “Of the 98 U.S.-designated terrorist organizations globally, 20 are located in the
Afghanistan–­Pakistan region. This constitutes
the highest concentration of terrorist groups
anywhere in the world…”73
A wide variety of Islamist terrorist groups
operate from Pakistani territory, many withThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military323

﻿

self-radicalized Americans. For example, in
April 2021, two men were arrested for attempting to provide material support to ISIS. One
received a prison term for providing material
support, and one received a prison term forthe December 2017 bombing of a New York
City subway.58
ISIS has also attempted complex attacks
on aviation. It claimed responsibility for the
October 31, 2015, downing of a Russian passenger jet over Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula that killed
224 people and also tried to bring down a flightheading from Sydney, Australia, to Abu Dhabi by concealing an explosive device inside ameat grinder.59
ISIS had well-publicized success in attracting the support of foreign fighters. Approximately 250 from the U.S. traveled or attempted
to travel to Syria.60 These individuals, who arelikely to have received military training, could
well pose an ongoing threat upon their returnto the U.S. by involving themselves in attack
planning or by helping to recruit future generations of jihadists.
ISIS had greater success attracting recruits
from Europe, with approximately 6,000 departing from European countries.61 The return of foreign fighters to Europe has led toseveral attacks. Mehdi Nemmouche, a French
citizen of Algerian origin who shot and killed
four civilians at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014, for example, was an ISISaligned terrorist who had fought in Syria.62 In
August 2015, Ayoub el-Khazzani, a Moroccan,
attempted to gun down passengers in a train
travelling between Amsterdam and Paris.
Passengers, including two members of the U.S.
Army, foiled the attack and restrained him.63
Similarly, a group of ISIS foreign fighters
teamed with local Islamist terrorists in France
to launch a series of suicide and gun attacks ona music venue, restaurants, cafes, and a football stadium, killing 130 and injuring 368 people in Paris in November 2015.64 Recruits fromwithin the same network then killed 32 people
and injured around 300 more in shootings andsuicide bombings across Brussels, Belgium, inMarch 2016.65

﻿

the support or sanction of the Pakistani state.
Pakistan’s military and intelligence leaders
maintain a short-term tactical approach offighting some terrorist groups that are deemeda threat to the state while supporting others
that are aligned with Pakistan’s goal of extending its influence and curbing India’s.
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI) views terrorist proxies as an extensionof Pakistan’s foreign policy, and many of thesegroups advance Pakistan’s interests by launching attacks in Afghanistan, Kashmir, or otherparts of India.
Some Islamist terrorist groups operatingin Pakistan target non-Muslims and Muslim
minorities deemed un-Islamic. A smaller number of anti-state terrorist outfits, like the “Pakistani Taliban” or TTP, have targeted Pakistanisecurity forces, though their capabilities havebeen degraded in recent years by Pakistani military operations.74
In 2015, after a series of terrorist attacks
against Pakistan’s state and security services,
the government introduced a National Action Plan (NAP) to reinvigorate the country’s
fight against terrorism. Pakistani military
operations against TTP hideouts in North
Waziristan helped to reduce Pakistan’s internal terrorist threat to some degree. According to the India-based South Asia Terrorism
Portal, total fatalities in Pakistan (including
terrorists/­insurgents) have mostly been declining steadily since 2009.75
However, there are few signs that Pakistan’s
crackdown on terrorism extends to groups thattarget India such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
which was responsible for the 2008 Mumbai
attacks, and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), which
carried out an attack on the Indian parliamentin 2001, another on the airbase at Pathankot in
2016, and the deadliest attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir in February 2019.76 Pakistani military and intelligence officials also
maintain close links to the Taliban and the
Haqqani Network.
The Haqqani Network, which operates outof Pakistan’s tribal areas, has enjoyed close
links to Pakistan’s ISI since the 1970s. After324

the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, theHaqqani Network launched some of the deadliest and most devastating attacks on U.S.
forces in Afghanistan. These attacks include
a December 2009 bombing of a CIA outpost
in Khost, the deadliest attack on the CIA in
the agency’s history, and two brazen assaults
in 2011, including an attack on a U.S. militarybase in Wardak that injured 77 soldiers and an
attack on the U.S. embassy that resulted in a
20-hour gun battle. Former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen has
described the Haqqani Network as a “veritablearm” of Pakistan’s ISI.77 The Haqqani Network
maintains close links to al-Qaeda, and its operational leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, was named
Interior Minister in the Taliban’s new government in Afghanistan in August 2021.78
The threat posed by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan diminished somewhat after
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 andthe killing of Osama bin Laden at his hideout in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011. It was further degraded by an intensive drone campaign
in Pakistan’s tribal areas in the 2010s. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda still maintains a presence inthe region and could experience a resurgencewith the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, given the group’s close links to both the Haqqani
Network and the Taliban. A 2020 report by the
U.S. Treasury Department concluded that “asof 2020, al-Qaeda is gaining strength in Afghanistan while continuing to operate with the
Taliban under the Taliban’s protection. Senior
Haqqani Network figures have discussed forming a new joint unit of armed fighters in cooperation with and funded by al-Qaeda.”79
A local affiliate of ISIS, the so-called IslamicState-Khorasan (IS-K), emerged in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2014–2015, drawing fromdisaffected members of the Afghan Taliban
and TTP. Though its actual numbers remainmodest, its high-profile, high-casualty terrorist
attacks have helped it to attract followers. In
March 2019, General Joseph Votel, the head of
CENTCOM, said that he believed “ISIS Khorasan does have ideations focused on external
operations toward our homeland.”802022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Conclusion
ISIS has lost its so-called caliphate, but it
remains a highly dangerous adversary capableof planning and executing attacks regionally
and—at the very least—inspiring them in theWest. It has transitioned from a quasi-state to
an insurgency, relying on its affiliates to project
strength far beyond its former Syrian and Iraqi
strongholds.
Meanwhile, despite sustained losses inleadership, al-Qaeda remains resilient. It has
curried favor with other Sunnis in particularareas of strategic importance to it, has focusedits resources on local conflicts, has occasionally controlled territory, and has deemphasized(but not eschewed) focus on the global jihad.
This approach has been particularly noticeable
since the Arab Spring.
Regardless of any short-term tactical considerations, both groups ultimately aspire
to attack the U.S. at home and U.S. interestsabroad. While the U.S. has hardened its domestic defenses, both ISIS and al-Qaeda canrely on radicalized individuals living within
the U.S. to take up the slack. Furthermore, as
has been demonstrated time and again, there
are ample opportunities to target Americans
overseas in countries that are more vulnerable
to terrorist attack. If it wishes to contain andultimately end Islamist violence, the U.S. must
continue to bring effective pressure to bear onthese groups and those that support them.
The terrorist threat to the U.S. homelandfrom Afghanistan and Pakistan remains realand uncertain in a rapidly shifting landscapethat is home to a wide variety of extremist andterrorist groups. On one hand, the capabilitiesof al-Qaeda, the terrorist group that is most directly focused on attacking the U.S. homeland,
have been degraded since the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001. On the other hand, the U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s
rapid takeover of the country, as well as its ongoing links to the Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda,
and other terrorist groups, are serious causes
for concern.
In its interim peace agreement with the U.S.,
the Taliban ostensibly committed to preventing Afghan soil from being used to launch attacks against the U.S. homeland. However, experts remain skeptical of these commitments.

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﻿

Experts believe that there is little coordination between the IS branch operating in Afghanistan and the central command structure
located in the Middle East. Instead, the branchdraws recruits from disaffected members of
the Pakistani Taliban and other radicalized
Afghans and has frequently found itself at odds
with the Afghan Taliban, which views IS-K as
a direct competitor for financial resources, recruits, and ideological influence. U.S. officials
acknowledge that even though they were notcoordinating directly, U.S. air strikes and Taliban ground attacks substantially degraded
IS-K capabilities in the late 2010s.81
The lack of publicly available informationand the willingness of local fighters in the region to change allegiances make it difficult toknow the exact number of IS-K fighters in Afghanistan at any given time. In September 2019,
U.S. officials estimated that there were between
2,000 and 5,000 ISIS fighters in Afghanistan.82
A series of major defeats in 2019 led to IS-K’s“collapse” in eastern Afghanistan, according to
U.S. officials.83 Since then, it appears to havechanged strategies—for example, by pursuing
a rapprochement with the ISI and Haqqani
Network—even as it continues to battle theAfghan Taliban.84
Finally, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Afghan Taliban’s
rapid takeover of the country have raised concerns that Afghanistan will once again becomea safe haven for international terrorist groups,
including al-Qaeda. Of particular concern isthe fact that on August 19, a senior memberof the Haqqani Network was put in charge of
security in Kabul.85 One week later, a suicide
bomber launched an attack on the Kabul airport that killed 13 U.S. military personnel andover 150 Afghans.86 The Biden Administration blamed IS-K, which took responsibility
for the attack, and launched two drone strikes
on IS-K targets in the week following the airport attack.87

The Pakistani state, meanwhile, continues toThis Index assesses the threat from ISIS,
harbor and support a vibrant ecosystem of al-Qaeda, and their affiliated organizations as
terrorist groups within its borders, creating a “aggressive” for level of provocation of behavior
volatile situation even as it seeks to dissuade and “capable” for level of capability.
loyal militant organizations from attacking the
U.S. for fear of blowback.

Threats: Non-State Actors
HOSTILE
Behavior

TESTINGASSERTIVE

BENIGNCAPABLEASPIRATIONALMARGINAL%
FORMIDABLEGATHERING%﻿Capability

AGGRESSIVE

326

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes
See “Iran,” infra.

2.

Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 82–83.

3.

Daniel L. Byman, “The Death of Ayman al-Zawahri and the Future of al-Qaida,” The Brookings Institution, Order from Chaos blog,
November 17, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/17/the-death-of-ayman-al-zawahri-and-thefuture-of-al-qaida/ (accessed June 28, 2021).

4.

See, for example, United Nations Security Council, Twenty-Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring
Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2368 (2017) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities,
S/2018/705, July 27, 2018, pp. 15 and 18, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2018/705&referer=/english/&Lang=E (accessed June 28, 2021).

5.

Ali Soufan, “Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-to-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, CTC
Sentinel, Vol. 14, Issue 2 (February 2021), pp. 1–21, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/CTC-SENTINEL-022021.pdf(accessed June 28, 2021).

6.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, released July 22, 2004, pp.
60 and 61, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf (accessed June 28, 2021). For the undated report’s official
release date, see media advisory, “9-11 Commission Releases Unanimous Final Report,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, July 22, 2004, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/press/pr_2004-07-22.pdf (accessed June 29, 2021).
For transcripts of the commission’s 12 public hearings, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,“Hearings: Public Hearings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” https://govinfo.library.unt.
edu/911/hearings/index.htm (accessed June 29, 2021).

7.

Adam Goldman, Eric Schmitt, Farnaz Fassihi, and Ronen Bergman, “Al Qaeda’s No. 2, Accused in U.S. Embassy Attacks, Was
Killed in Iran,” The New York Times, updated November 27, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/almasri-abdullah-qaeda-dead.html (accessed June 28, 2021).

8.

James Phillips, “Why Was Iran Hiding Al Qaeda’s No. 2 in Tehran?” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog, November 20, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-was-iran-hiding-al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-no-2-tehran-173064 (accessed June 28, 2021).

9.

Michael Gordon, “Pompeo Accuses Iran of Allowing al Qaeda to Set up Headquarters,” The Wall Street Journal, updated January
12, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/pompeo-accuses-iran-of-allowing-al-qaeda-to-set-up-headquarters-11610469984(accessed June 28, 2021).

10. BBC News, “Britons Convicted of Yemen Bomb Plot,” August 9, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/415096.stm(accessed June 28, 2021).
11. James Phillips, “The Yemen Bombing: Another Wake-up Call in the Terrorist Shadow War,” Heritage Foundation Executive
Memorandum No. 703, October 25, 2000, http://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/the-yemen-bombing-another-wake-callthe-terrorist-shadow-war.
12. CNN, “Sources: U.S. Kills Cole Suspect,” November 5, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/11/04/yemen.blast/index.
html (accessed June 28, 2021).
13. Greg Miller, “CIA Sees Increased Threat in Yemen,” The Washington Post, August 25, 2010, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082406763.html (accessed June 28, 2021).
14. Jeremy Pelofsky, “Prosecutors Say al Qaeda Leader Awlaki Directed Underwear Bomber,” Reuters, February 10, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-abdulmutallab/prosecutors-say-al-qaeda-leader-awlaki-directed-underwear-bomberidUSTRE8191VL20120210 (accessed June 29, 2021).
15. Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the Obama Presidency (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt,2012), p. 216.
16. Mark Schone and Rehab el-Buri, “Fort Hood: Hasan Asked Awlaki If It Was Okay to Kill American Soldiers,” ABC News, December
23, 2009, https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/FtHoodInvestigation/fort-hood-hasan-asked-awlaki-kill-american-soldiers/
story?id=9410718 (accessed June 29, 2021).
17. For more on the potential decline of AQAP’s external operations program, see Gregory D. Johnsen, “The Two Faces of Al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/the-two-faces-of-al-qaeda-inthe-arabian-peninsula/ (accessed June 29, 2021).
18. Scott Shane, “The Enduring Influence of Anwar al-Awlaki in the Age of the Islamic State,” Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 9, Issue 7 (July 2016), pp. 15–19, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2016/08/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss710.
pdf (accessed June 29, 2021).

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327

﻿

1.

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Policy, PolicyWatch No. 3263, February 14, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/death-aqap-leader-showsgroups-fragmentation-and-durability (accessed June 30, 2021).

﻿

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328

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength39. Thomas Joscelyn, “Analysis: Ayman al Zawahiri Calls for ‘Unity’ in Syria amid Leadership Crisis,” Foundation for Defense of
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de/20150413/up-to-6000-europeans-fighting-for-islamic-groups-isis-syria-iraq (accessed June 30, 2021).
62. BBC News, “Brussels Jewish Museum Murders: Mehdi Nemmouche Jailed for Life,” March 12, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-europe-47533533 (accessed June 30, 2021).
63. Paul Cruickshank, “Train Attack Suspect Confesses After Revelations in Academic Journal,” CNN, updated December 19, 2016,
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/19/europe/isis-train-attack-suspect-confession/index.html (accessed June 30, 2021).
64. BBC News, “Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night,” December 9, 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-34818994 (accessed June 30, 2021).
65. Jennifer Rankin and Jon Henley, “Islamic State Claims Attacks at Brussels Airport and Metro Station,” The Guardian, March 22,
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/22/brussels-airport-explosions-heard (accessed June 30, 2021).

﻿

66. BBC News, “Nice Attack: What We Know About the Bastille Day Killings,” August 19, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-36801671 (accessed June 30, 2021).
67. BBC News, “London Bridge Attack: What Happened,” May 3, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-40147164(accessed June 30, 2021).
68. Calla Wahlquist, Kevin Rawlinson, and Matthew Weaver, “London Bridge Attacker Named as Usman Khan, 28—as It Happened,”
The Guardian, updated November 30, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/live/2019/nov/29/london-bridge-incidentpolice-city (accessed June 30, 2021).
69. Florian Flade, “The June 2018 Cologne Ricin Plot: A New Threshold in Jihadi Bio Terror,” Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 11, Issue 7 (August 2018), pp. 1–4, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CTC-SENTINEL082018-final.pdf (accessed June 30, 2021).
70. Unpublished data building on Robin Simcox, “European Islamist Plots and Attacks Since 2014—and How the U.S. Can Help
Prevent Them,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3236, August 1, 2017, http://www.heritage.org/europe/report/europeanislamist-plots-and-attacks-2014-and-how-the-us-can-help-prevent-them.
71. CBS News, “American Killed in Paris Terror Attacks,” updated November 14, 2015, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/paris-attacksamericans-us-state-department/ (accessed June 30, 2021); Camila Domonoske, “Americans Were Among Those Killed in
Brussels Attacks, Says Kerry,” NPR, March 25, 2016, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/25/471829453/kerryamericans-were-among-those-killed-in-brussels-attacks (accessed June 30, 2021); and BBC News, “Nice Attack: Who Were theVictims?” August 19, 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36805164 (accessed June 30, 2021).
72. BBC News, “Tajikistan ‘Attack’ Leaves Four Foreign Cyclists Dead,” July 30, 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldasia-45004059 (accessed June 30, 2021), and Morgan Winsor and Dragana Jovanovic, “ISIS Claims Responsibility for Sri Lanka
Easter Bombings that Killed over 350,” ABC News, April 23, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/International/isis-claims-responsibilitysri-lanka-easter-bombings-killed/story?id=62570339 (accessed June 30, 2021).
73. General John W. Nicholson, Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, statement on “The Situation in Afghanistan” before theCommittee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 9, 2017, p. 1, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Nicholson_02-09-17.pdf (accessed June 30, 2021). See also transcript, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by General
Nicholson in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 2, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/
Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1019029/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-general-nicholson-in-the-pentagon-brief/(accessed June 30, 2021).

330

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength74. Madiha Afzal, “Terrorism in Pakistan Has Declined, but the Underlying Roots of Extremism Remain,” The Brookings Institution,
Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors, January 15, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/15/terrorismin-pakistan-has-declined-but-the-underlying-roots-of-extremism-remain/ (accessed September 11, 2021).
75. Institute for Conflict Management, South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000–2019,” https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm (accessed June 25, 2019). Data as of June 28, 2019.
76. Ankit Panda, “Jaish-e-Mohammed Leader’s ‘Global Terrorist’ Designation Is Overdue,” The Diplomat, March 4, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/jaish-e-mohammed-leaders-global-terrorist-designation-is-overdue/ (accessed June 29, 2021).
77. BBC News, “US Admiral: 'Haqqani Is Veritable Arm of Pakistan's ISI,'” September 22, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/worldus-canada-15026909 (accessed September 11, 2021).
78. Reuters, “Taliban Name New Afghan Government, Interior Minister on U.S. Sanctions List,” September 7, 2021, https://www.
reuters.com/world/india/taliban-fire-air-scatter-kabul-protesters-no-reports-injuries-2021-09-07/ (accessed September 11, 2021).
79. Gregory Sullivan, Audit Director, Memorandum for Department of Defense Lead Inspector General, “Subject: Operation Inherent
Resolve—Summary of Work Performed by the Department of the Treasury Related to Terrorist Financing, ISIS, and Anti-Money
Laundering for First Quarter Fiscal Year 2021,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Inspector General, January 4, 2021, p. 4,
https://oig.treasury.gov/sites/oig/files/2021-01/OIG-CA-21-012.pdf (accessed September 11, 2021).
80. Eric Schmitt, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Helene Cooper, and Alissa J. Rubin, “Its Territory May Be Gone, but the U.S. Fight Against
ISIS Is Far from Over,” The New York Times, March 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/24/us/politics/us-isis-fight.html(accessed June 30, 2021).
81. Shawn Snow, “ISIS Loses More than Half Its Fighters from US Airstrikes and Taliban Ground Operations,” Military Times, February
27, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/02/27/isis-loses-more-than-half-its-fighters-from-us-airstrikes-andtaliban-ground-operations/ (accessed June 30, 2021).
82. Snow, “ISIS Loses More than Half Its Fighters from US Airstrikes and Taliban Ground Operations.”
83. Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Mugib Mashal, “ISIS Is Losing Afghan Territory. That Means Little for Its Victims,” The New York Times,
December 2, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/02/world/asia/ISIS-afghanistan-baghdadi.html (accessed June 30, 2021).

85. Jamie Dettmer, “Hardline Haqqani Network Put in Charge of Kabul Security,” Voice of America, August 19, 2021, https://www.
voanews.com/south-central-asia/hardline-haqqani-network-put-charge-kabul-security (accessed September 11, 2021).
86. Lara Seligman, “Pentagon Prepared for ‘Mass Casualty’ Attack at Kabul Airport Hours Before Explosion,” Politico, August 30, 2021,
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/08/30/pentagon-mass-casualty-attack-kabul-507481 (accessed September 11, 2021).
87. Sandi Sidhu, Nick Paton Walsh, Tim Lister, Oren Liebermann, Laura Smith-Spark, and Saskya Vandoorne, “Ten Family Members,
Including Children, Dead After US Strike in Kabul,” CNN, updated August 30, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/29/asia/
afghanistan-kabul-evacuation-intl/index.html (accessed September 11, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military331﻿

84. Abhinav Pandya, “The Pakistan Connection: How ISKP Became Islamabad’s Latest Proxy,” The National Interest, September 7,
2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/pakistan-connection-how-iskp-became-islamabad%E2%80%99s-latest-proxy-193221(accessed September 11, 2021).

﻿Conclusion: Global Threat Level

America‌faces challenges to its security athome and interests abroad from countries
and organizations with:along its border, raising speculation about apossible incursion. It also has sustained its
increased investment in the modernization ofits military and has gained significant combat
Interests that conflict with those of theexperience while continuing to sabotage U.S.
United States;
and Western policy in Syria and Ukraine. Its
economy was affected in the early stages ofSometimes hostile intentions toward
the COVID-19 pandemic but rebounded in
the U.S.; andthe later stages and has grown in 2021. The
2022 Index again assesses Russia’s behavior
In some cases, growing military capabilias “aggressive” and its growing capabilities asties that are leveraged to impose an adver- “formidable” (the highest category on the scale).
sary’s will by coercion or intimidation ofChina is the most comprehensive threat theneighboring countries, thereby creating
U.S. faces. It remains “aggressive” in the scope
regional instabilities.
of its provocative behavior and earns the scoreof “formidable” for its capability because of its
The government of the United States con- continued investment in the modernization
stantly faces the challenge of employing— and expansion of its military and the particusometimes alone but more often in concert lar attention it has paid to its space, cyber, andwith allies—the right mix of diplomatic, eco- artificial intelligence capabilities. It launchednomic, public information, intelligence, and its first domestically produced aircraft carrier
military capabilities to protect and advance this year and continues construction of its secU.S. interests. Because this Index focuses on ond. The People’s Liberation Army continues
the military component of national power, its to extend its reach and military activity beyond
assessment of threats is correspondingly an its immediate region and engages in larger andassessment of the military or physical threat more comprehensive exercises, including liveposed by each entity addressed in this section. fire exercises in the East China Sea near TaiRussia remains the primary threat to Amer- wan and aggressive naval and air patrols in theican interests in Europe as well as the most South China Sea. It has continued to conductpressing threat to the United States. Moscow probes of the South Korean and Japanese air
remains committed to massive pro-Russia defense identification zones, drawing rebukes
propaganda campaigns in Ukraine and other from both Seoul and Tokyo, and has been espeEastern European countries, has continued its cially aggressive in sailing and flying throughactive support of separatist forces in Ukraine, the seas and airspace around Taiwan.
regularly performs provocative military exerIran represents by far the most significant
cises and training missions, and in 2021 pres- security challenge to the United States, its
sured Ukraine with a large buildup of forces allies, and its interests in the greater Middle
l

l

l

333

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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/MilitaryBehavior of Threats
HOSTILEAGGRESSIVE

China

%

Russia%Iran%North Korea

TESTINGASSERTIVE

BENIGNASPIRATIONALMARGINAL

GUARDED

LOW%

Non-State Actors%

OVERALL%

Capability of Threats
FORMIDABLE
China

%

Russia%GATHERING

Iran%

North Korea%

Non-State Actors%

OVERALL﻿CAPABLE%Threats to U.S. Vital Interests
SEVERE

HIGH

China

%

Russia%Iran%North Korea%

Non-State Actors%

OVERALL%

East. This is underscored by its open hostility
to the United States and Israel, sponsorshipof terrorist groups like Hezbollah, history of
threatening the commons, and increased activity associated with its nuclear program. Iranrelies heavily on irregular (including political)
warfare against others in the region and fields
more ballistic missiles than are fielded by anyof its neighbors. Its development of ballistic
missiles and its potential nuclear capability

334

ELEVATED

also make it a long-term threat to the security of the U.S. homeland. In addition, Iran has
continued its aggressive efforts to shape thedomestic political landscape in Iraq, adding to
the general instability of the region. The 2022
Index extends the 2021 Index’s assessment of
Iran’s behavior as “aggressive” and its capability as “gathering.”
North Korea’s military poses a security
challenge for American allies South Korea

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthThreats to U.S. Vital Interests: Summary
SEVEREHIGH

ELEVATEDGUARDED

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LOW

335

﻿

and Japan as well as for U.S. bases in those by countries such as Iran. The primary tercountries and on Guam. North Korean offi- rorist groups of concern to the U.S. homecials are belligerent toward the United States, land and to Americans abroad are the Islamic
often issuing military and diplomatic threats. State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and al-­Qaeda.
Though Pyongyang has refrained from nu- Al-Qaeda and its branches remain active andclear tests during 2021, it has engaged in a effective in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and the Sahelrange of provocative behavior that includes of Northern Africa. Though no longer a termissile tests.
ritory-holding entity, ISIS also remains a seNorth Korea has used its missile and nucle- rious presence in the Middle East, in Southar tests to enhance its prestige and importance and Southeast Asia, and throughout Africa,
domestically, regionally, and globally and to threatening stability as it seeks to overthrow
extract various concessions from the United governments and impose an extreme form ofStates in negotiations on its nuclear program Islamic law. Its ideology continues to inspireand various aid packages. Such developments attacks against Americans and U.S. interests.
also improve North Korea’s military posture. Fortunately, Middle East terrorist groups reU.S. and allied intelligence agencies assess main the least capable threats facing the U.S.,
that Pyongyang has already achieved nuclear but they cannot be dismissed.
warhead miniaturization, the ability to place
Just as there are American interests that are
nuclear weapons on its medium-range missiles, not covered by this Index, there may be addiand an ability to reach the continental United tional threats to American interests that are
States with a missile. North Korea also uses not identified here. This Index focuses on the
cyber warfare as a means of guerilla warfare more apparent sources of risk and those thatagainst its adversaries and international finan- appear to pose the greatest threat.
cial institutions. This Index therefore assesses
Compiling the assessments of these threat
the overall threat from North Korea, consider- sources, the 2022 Index again rates the overall
ing the range of contingencies, as “testing” for global threat environment as “aggressive” andlevel of provocation of behavior and “gather- “gathering” in the areas of threat actor behavior
ing” for level of capability.
and material ability to harm U.S. security inA broad array of terrorist groups remain the terests, respectively, leading to an aggregatedmost hostile of any of the threats to America threat score of “high.”
examined in the Index even though they fall
Our combined score for threats to U.S. vital
short of the state-level capabilities possessed interests can be summarized as:

U.S. Military Power﻿An Assessment of U.S. Military PowerBl

Training was curtailed in order to minimize the transmission of the virus within
the force by keeping servicemembers as
separated as possible;ll

Exercises with allies and other security partners were canceled or reducedin scope; andMilitary resources, especially in the
medical community, were redirected tosupport civilian efforts to deal with the
spreading pandemic through the construction and staffing of field hospitals
and the distribution and administeringof vaccines.

This situation took a toll on some aspectsof conventional readiness across the force,but it also provided an opportunity—albeit
unwanted—for the military to practice existing protocols for dealing with infectious disease and develop new methods for training
and education, conducting exercises underrestricted conditions, and maintaining operational efforts abroad in spite of the pandemic.
Similar pandemic-related problems confronted all elements of the defense industrial baseand the full range of supply, maintenance, andtransportation activities across the militaryand civilian, government, and private sectorsthat are essential to maintaining a viable military enterprise.
Viewed through the lenses of readiness, thepotential requirement to surge operations inwar, or the need to adjust practices to counteran enemy attack, responding to the COVID-19
challenge served as an important learning opportunity. Whether the military services, theDepartment of Defense (DOD), the Administration and Congress, and civilian firms supporting defense programs internalize such

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﻿ecause America is a global power with
global interests, its military is tasked
first and foremost with defending the country
from attack. Beyond that, it must be capableof protecting Americans abroad, America’s
allies, and the freedom to use internationalsea, air, space, and cyberspace while retaining the ability to engage in more than one
major contingency at a time. America must
be able not only to defend itself and its interests, but also to deter enemies and opportunists from taking action that would challenge
U.S. interests—­a capability that includes bothpreventing the destabilization of a region andguarding against threats to the peace and security of America’s friends.
As noted in all preceding editions of theIndex, however, the U.S. does not have thenecessary force to meet a two–major regional contingency (two-MRC) requirement andis not ready to carry out its duties effectively.
Consequently, as we have seen during the past
few years, the U.S. finds itself increasingly challenged by major competitors such as China andRussia and the destabilizing effects of terrorist
and insurgent elements operating in regionsthat are of substantial interest to the U.S.
During 2020, SARS-CoV-2, the virus thatcauses the COVID-19 disease, affected the military services in ways that were similar to how
it affected the population generally.

﻿

lessons remains to be seen. For 2021, it is reaFurther, two different combatants can use
sonable to assume that the U.S. military gained the same set of tools in radically different ways
as much as, if not more than, it lost with regard to quite different effects. The concept of emto wartime readiness.
ployment matters. Concepts are developed
to account for numbers, capabilities, mateHow to Think About Sizing Military Power rial readiness, and all sorts of other factors
Military power consists of many things and that enable or constrain one’s actions, suchis the result of how all of its constituent pieces as whether one fights alone or alongside allies,
are brought together to create an effective war- on familiar or strange terrain, or with a large,
fighting force, but it begins with the people and well-equipped force or a small, poorly equipped
equipment used to conduct war: the weapons, force. A thinking adversary will analyze his optanks, ships, airplanes, and supporting tools ponent for weaknesses or patterns of behavior
such as communications systems that make it and seek to develop techniques, approaches,
possible for one group either to impose its will and tools that exploit such shortfalls or preon another or to prevent such an outcome from dictable patterns—the asymmetries of war. One
happening, which is the point of deterrence.
need not try to match an enemy tank for tank:
However, simply counting the number of In many cases, not trying is more effective.
people, tanks, or combat aircraft that the U.S.
All of these factors and a multitude of othpossesses would be insufficient because it ers affect the outcome of any military contest.
would lack context. For example, the U.S. Army Military planners attempt to account for themmight have 100 tanks, but to accomplish a spe- when devising requirements, developing traincific military task, 1,000 or more might be need- ing and exercise plans, formulating war plans,ed or none at all. It might be that the terrain on and advising the President in his role as Comwhich a battle is fought is especially ill-suited mander in Chief of U.S. military forces.
to tanks or that the tanks one has are inferior to
Measuring hard combat power in terms of
the enemy’s. The enemy could be quite adept at its capability, capacity, and readiness to defend
using tanks, or his tank operations might be in- U.S. vital interests is difficult, especially in suchtegrated into a larger employment concept that a limited space as this Index, but it is not imleverages the supporting fires of infantry and possible. However difficult determining the
airpower, whereas one’s own tanks are poorly adequacy of one’s military forces may be, themaintained, the crews are not well prepared, or Secretary of Defense and the military services
one’s doctrine is irrelevant.
have to make such decisions every year when
Success in war is partly a function of match- the annual defense budget request is submiting the tools of warfare to a specific task and ted to Congress.
employing those tools effectively in battle. Get
The adequacy of hard power is affected mostthese wrong—tools, objective, competence, or directly by the resources the nation is willing
context—and you lose.
to apply. Although that decision is informed
Another key element is the military’s ca- to a significant degree by an appreciation ofpacity to conduct operations: how many of the threats to U.S. interests and the ability of a givright tools—people, tanks, planes, or ships—it en defense portfolio to protect U.S. interests
has. One might have the right tools and know against such threats, it is not informed solely
how to use them effectively but not have by such considerations; hence the importanceenough to win. Because one cannot know with of clarity and honesty in determining exactly
certainty beforehand just when, where, against what is needed in terms of hard power and thewhom, and for what reason a battle might be status of such power from year to year.
fought, determining how much capability is
Administrations take various approaches inneeded is an exercise that requires informed determining the type and amount of military
but not certain judgment.
power needed and, by extension, the amount of

340

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

l

l

l

Does the country need enough for two
major combat operations (MCOs) atroughly the same time or just enough for asingle major operation and some numberof lesser cases?
To what extent should “presence” tasks—
the use of forces for routine engagementwith partner countries or simply to be on
hand in a region for crisis response—bein addition to or a subset of a militaryforce sized to handle two major regional conflicts?
How much value should be assigned toadvanced technologies as they are incorporated into the force?

lWhat is the likelihood of conventional war
and, if one thinks it unlikely, what level ofrisk is one willing to accept that sufficientwarning will allow for rearming?

Where to Start
There are two major references that one
can use to help sort through the variables andarrive at a starting point for assessing the adequacy of today’s military posture: government studies and historical experience. The
government occasionally conducts formal
reviews that are meant to inform decisions
on capabilities and capacities across the Joint
Force relative to the threat environment(current and projected) and evolutions in operating conditions, the advancement of technologies, and aspects of U.S. interests that
may call for one type of military responseover another.
The 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) conducted by then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin is one example frequently cited by analysts.
Secretary Aspin recognized that “the dramaticchanges that [had] occurred in the world as aresult of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union” had “fundamentally altered America’s security needs” and were
driving an imperative “to reassess all of ourdefense concepts, plans, and programs fromthe ground up.”1
The BUR formally established the requirement that U.S. forces should be able “toachieve decisive victory in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and to conduct
combat operations characterized by rapid response and a high probability of success, while
minimizing the risk of significant American
casualties.”2 Thus was formalized the twoMRC standard.
Since that study, the government has undertaken others as Administrations, national
conditions, and world events have changed
the context of national security. Quadrennial
Defense Reviews (QDRs) were conducted in
1997, 2010, and 2014, accompanied by independent National Defense Panel (NDP) reportsthat reviewed and commented on them. BothThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military341

﻿money and other resources that will be necessary to support that power. After defining thenational interests to be protected, the DOD
can use worst-case scenarios to determine themaximum challenges the U.S. military might
have to overcome. Another way is to redefine
what constitutes a threat. By taking a different
view of whether major actors pose a meaningful threat and of the extent to which friends
and allies have the ability to assist the U.S. inmeeting security objectives, one can arrive at
different conclusions about the necessary levelof military strength.
For example, one Administration might view
China as a rising belligerent power bent on dominating the Asia–Pacific region. Another Administration might view China as an inherently
peaceful rising economic power and the expansion of its military capabilities as a natural occurrence commensurate with its strengthening
status. There can be dramatically different perspectives with respect to how China might use
its military power and what would constitute aneffective U.S. response. The difference between
these views can have a dramatic impact on how
one thinks about U.S. defense requirements. So,
too, can policymakers amplify or downplay risk
to justify defense budget decisions.
There also can be strongly differing views
on requirements for operational capacity.

﻿

sets of documents purported to serve as key
assessments, but analysts came to minimize
their value, regarding them as justifications for
executive branch policy preferences (the QDRreports) or overly broad generalized commentaries (the NDP reports) that lack substantive
discussion about threats to U.S. interests, acredible strategy for dealing with them, andthe actual ability of the U.S. military to meetnational security requirements.
The QDR was replaced by the National Defense Strategy (NDS), released in 2018, and the
independent perspectives of the formal DOD
review by the National Defense Strategy Commission, which released its view of the NDS in
November 2018. Departing from their predecessors, neither document proposed specificforce structures or end strength goals for theservices,3 but both were very clear in arguingthe need to be able to address more than one
major security challenge at a time. The commission’s report went so far as to criticize the
NDS for not making a stronger case for a larger
military that would be capable of meeting thechallenges posed by four named competitors—
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—while
also possessing the capacity to address lesser, though still important, military tasks that
included presence, crisis response, and assistance missions.
Though the Biden Administration has not
yet produced a national defense strategy toreplace the one issued by the Trump Administration in 2018, its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INNSG) echoes thegeneral goal for the U.S. military to “deter andprevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States and our allies, inhibiting
access to the global commons, or dominating
key regions,”4 themes that have remained remarkably consistent from one Administration
to the next for several decades. Taken at facevalue and considering the challenges posed simultaneously by a multitude of competitors inseveral regions, the INSSG seems to imply thatthe military should have the capability and capacity to meet this objective.

342

Correlation of Forces as a
Factor in Force Sizing
During the Cold War, the U.S. used the Soviet threat as its primary reference in determining its hard-power needs. At that time, thecorrelation of forces—a comparison of one
force against another to determine strengths
and weaknesses—was highly symmetrical. U.S.
planners compared tanks, aircraft, and ships
against their direct counterparts in the opposing force. These comparative assessments
drove the sizing, characteristics, and capabilities of fleets, armies, and air forces.
The evolution of guided, precision munitions and the rapid technological advancements in surveillance and targeting systems
since the late 1980s have made comparing
combat power more difficult. What was largelya platform-versus-platform model has shiftedsomewhat to a munitions-versus-target model.
The proliferation of precise weaponrymeans increasingly that each round, bomb,rocket, missile, and even (in some instances) individual bullet can hit its intended target, thus
decreasing the number of munitions needed toprosecute an operation. It also means that thelethality of an operating environment increases significantly for the people and platforms
involved. We have reached the point at which,instead of focusing primarily on how manyships or airplanes the enemy can bring to bearagainst one’s own force, one must consider how
many “smart munitions” the enemy has when
thinking about how many platforms and people
are needed to win a combat engagement.5 The
increasing presence of unmanned systems thatcan deliver precision-guided munitions against
targets adds complexity and danger to the modern battlefield.
In one sense, increased precision and thetechnological advances now being incorporated into U.S. weapons, platforms, and operating
concepts make it possible to do far more thanever before with fewer assets.
l

Platform signature reduction (stealth)makes it harder for the enemy to find andtarget them, and the increased precision

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

of weapons makes it possible for fewer
platforms to hit many more targets.
l

The ability of the U.S. military to harness
computers, modern telecommunications, space-based platforms—such as
for surveillance, communications, andpositioning-navigation-timing (PNT)
support from GPS satellites—and networked operations potentially means thatin certain situations, smaller forces canhave far greater effect in battle than at
any other time in history (although thesesame advances also enable enemy forces).

adequacy of America’s military power. Yet without such an assessment, all that remains are thedefense strategy reviews, which are subject tofiltering and manipulation to suit policy interests; annual budget submissions, which typically favor desired military programs at presumed
levels of affordability and are therefore necessarily budget-constrained; and leadership posture statements, which often simply align withexecutive branch policy priorities.

The U.S. Joint Force and the Art of War
This section of the Index assesses the adequacy of America’s defense posture as it pertains to a conventional understanding of hardSome military functions—such as seizing,
power, defined as the ability of American milholding, and occupying territory—mayitary forces to engage and defeat an enemy’s
require a certain number of soldiers noforces in battle at a scale commensurate withmatter how state-of-the-art their equipthe vital national interests of the U.S. While
ment may be. For example, the number ofsome hard truths in military affairs are approinfantry squads needed to secure an urban priately addressed by mathematics and science,area where line of sight is constrained and others are not. Speed, range, probability of deprecision weapons have limited utility
tection, and radar cross-section are examples
is the same as the number needed inof quantifiable characteristics that can be meaWorld War II.
sured. Specific future instances in which U.S.
military power will be needed, the competence
Regardless of the improved capability of of the enemy, the political will to sustain opersmaller forces, there is a downside to fewer ations in the face of mounting deaths and denumbers. With smaller forces, each element struction, and the absolute amount of strengthof the force represents a greater percentage needed to win are matters of judgment andof its combat power. Each casualty or equip- experience, but they nevertheless affect howment loss therefore takes a larger toll on the large and capable a force one might need.
ability of the force to sustain high-tempo, high-­
In conducting the assessment, we acintensity combat operations over time, espe- counted for both quantitative and qualitativecially if the force is dispersed across a wide aspects of military forces, informed by antheater or multiple theaters of operation.
experience-based understanding of military
As advanced technology has become more operations and the expertise of external reaffordable, it has become more accessible for viewers. The authors of these military sections
nearly any actor, whether state or non-state.6 bring a combined total of more than a hundred
Consequently, it may well be that the outcomes years of uniformed military experience toof future wars will depend far more on the skill their analysis.
of the forces and their capacity to sustain operMilitary effectiveness is as much an art as it
ations over time than they will on some great is a science. Specific military capabilities repdisparity in technology. If so, readiness and resented in weapons, platforms, and militarycapacity will become more important than units can be used individually to some effect.
absolute advances in capability.
Practitioners of war, however, have learned
All of this illustrates the difficulties of and that combining the tools of war in various ways
need for exercising judgment in assessing the and orchestrating their tactical employment
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in series or simultaneously can dramatically
amplify the effectiveness of the force that iscommitted to battle.
Employment concepts are exceedingly hardto measure in any quantitative way, but theirvalue as critical contributors in the conduct of
war is undeniable. How they are used is verymuch an art-of-war matter that is learned
through experience over time.

the tip to locate, close with, and destroy its
target, and there is a rough proportionality
between shaft and tip. Thus, in assessing thebasic units of measure for combat power, one
can get a sense of what is probably needed in
the combat support, combat service support,
and supporting establishment echelons.
The scope of this Index does not extend toanalysis of everything that makes hard power
possible; it focuses on the status of the hard
What Is Not Being Assessed
power itself. It also does not assess the services’
In assessing the current status of the mili- Reserve and National Guard components, altary forces, this Index uses the primary mea- though they account for roughly one-third ofsures used by the military services themselves the U.S. military force and have been essential
when they discuss their ability to employ hard to the conduct of operations since September
combat power.
2001.7 Consistent assessment of their capability, readiness, and operational role is chalThe Army’s unit of measure is the brigade
lenging because each service determines the
combat team (BCT);
balance among its Active, Reserve, and National Guard elements differently: Only the
The Marine Corps structures itself
Army and Air Force have Guard elements; theby battalions;
Navy and Marine Corps do not. This balance
can change from year to year and is based on
For the Navy, it is the number of ships infactors that include cost of the respective elits combat fleet; andements, availability for operational employment, time needed to respond to an emergent
The most consistent measure for the Air
crisis, allocation of roles among the elements,
Force is total number of aircraft, someand political considerations.8
times broken down into the two primary
As with other elements essential to thesubtypes of fighters and bombers.
effective employment of combat power—­
logistics, medical support, strategic lift, trainObviously, this is not the totality of service ing, etc.—the U.S. military could not handle acapabilities, and it certainly is not everything major conflict without the Reserve and Guard
needed for war, but these measures can be forces. Nevertheless, to make the challenge ofviewed as surrogates that subsume or repre- annually assessing the status of U.S. military
sent the vast number of other things that make strength using consistent metrics over timethese units of measure possible and effective more manageable, this Index looks at somein battle. For example, combat forces depend thing that is usually associated with the Acon a vast logistics system that supplies every- tive component of each service: the baseline
thing from food and water to fuel, ammunition, requirement for a given amount of combat
and repair parts. Military operations require power that is readily available for use in a maengineer support, and the force needs medical, jor combat operation. There are exceptions,dental, and administrative capabilities. The however. For example, in the 2020 Index, four
military also fields units that transport combat Army National Guard BCTs were counted as
power and its sustainment to wherever they “available” for use because of the significant
may be needed around the world.
amounts of additional resources that had been
The point is that the military spear has a dedicated specifically to these formations togreat deal of shaft that makes it possible for raise their readiness levels.9
l

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthwell-equipped, and well-resourced countries
requires a U.S. force that is modern, ready, andeffective in all domains of warfare.
The decision to fund national defense at alevel that is commensurate with interests andprevailing threats reflects our national priorities and risk tolerance. This Index assesses theability of the nation’s military forces to protect
vital national security interests within theworld as it is so that the debate about the levelof funding for hard power is better informed.
The fiscal year (FY) 2021 base discretionary budget for the Department of Defense was$703.7 billion.12 This represents the resources allocated to pay for the forces (manpower,
equipment, and training); enabling capabilities(things like transportation, satellites, defense
intelligence, and research and development);
and institutional support (bases and stations,facilities, recruiting, and the like). The basebudget has not paid for the cost of major ongoing overseas operations, which are captured
in supplemental funding known as OCO (overseas contingency operations).
FY 2021 was the last year that was heavily
shaped by two budgetary instruments: OCO
and the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011.13
The OCO account was created in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to provide the resources needed
to prosecute the war on terrorism.14 Since then,the account has ebbed and flowed depending
on political and fiscal concerns in Congressand operational realities on the battlefields.
The account is set to be merged into the basebudget by the Biden Administration startingin FY 2022.15
Passage of the BCA established legal limits
on the funds dedicated to the budget, including defense. That prompted Congress to use
OCO as an escape valve for artificially low
defense budgets.16 In this regard, for the past
decade, the level of funding for defense has
been determined by the politics surrounding
the BCA. Despite repeated emphasis on theimportance of investing more to fix obvious
readiness, capacity, and modernization problems, the debate has been determined by larger

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﻿The Defense Budget andStrategic Guidance
When it comes to the defense budget, howmuch we spend does not automatically determine the U.S. military’s posture or capacity. Asa matter of fact, simply looking at how muchis allocated to defense does not tell us muchabout the capacity, modernity, or readiness ofthe forces. Proper funding is a necessary condition for a capable, modern, and ready force,but it is not sufficient by itself. A larger defense
budget, for example, could be associated withless military capability if the money were allocated inappropriately or spent wastefully.
Nevertheless, the budget does reflect the importance assigned to defending the nation andits interests in prioritizing federal spending.
Absent a significant threat to the country’s
survival, the U.S. government will always balance spending on defense against spending inall of the other areas of government activity
that are deemed necessary or desirable. Ideally, defense requirements are determined by
identifying national interests that might need
to be protected with military power; assessing
the nature of threats to those interests, what
would be needed to defeat those threats, andthe costs associated with that capability; andthen determining what the country can afford
or is willing to spend. Any difference between
assessed requirements and affordable levels ofspending on defense would constitute a risk to
U.S. security interests.
This Index enthusiastically adopts this approach: interests, threats, requirements, resulting force, and associated budget. Spending less than the amount needed to maintain a
two-MRC force results in policy debates about
where to accept risk: force modernization, thecapacity to conduct large-scale or multiple simultaneous operations, or force readiness. The
composition of the force and the understanding of military risk have become more salientissues with the shift toward competition with
China and Russia. Both the 2017 National
Security Strategy10 and the 2021 Interim National Security Guidance11 recognize that meeting the challenges posed by these two large,

CHART 3

Changes in Defense Spending Since 2011
IN BILLIONS OF CONSTANT DOLLARSYEAR-TO-YEAR PERCENTAGE CHANGE$1,000

12%
8%

$800

4%

$600

0%
$400

–4%

$200

–8%

$0

–12%
2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

2021

2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

2021

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimatesfor FY 2021, April 2020, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/FY21_Green_Book.pdf(accessed July 23, 2021).

﻿

A heritage.org

political dynamics that pit those who want tosee an overall reduction in federal spending
against those who advocate higher levels ofdefense spending and those who want to see
any increase in defense spending matched bycommensurate increases in domestic spending.
This dynamic shaped the defense spending
debate until FY 2021, the last year within the
BCA framework. As Congress and the DOD
move into a new budgetary reality, there will
be an opportunity to explain the challenges
that lie ahead both for the U.S. military and forAmerica’s national interests.
Senior DOD leaders have expressed theneed for more funding to meet the challenge of a more capable and aggressive China
and Russia since well before the release of
the 2018 NDS. Testifying before the House
Armed Services Committee in 2017, boththen-Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis
and then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of346

Staff General Joseph Dunford emphasized
the need for sustained budget growth so that
U.S. forces can maintain a competitive advantage over likely adversaries. Secretary Mattis
said that “he expect[ed] to ask for base budget
growth ‘along the lines of close to 5 percent
growth, 3 to 5 percent growth for 2019 to ’23,”
and General Dunford stated that “[w]e know
now that continued growth in the base budgetof at least 3 percent above inflation is the floor
necessary to preserve just the competitive advantage we have today, and we can’t assume
our adversaries will remain still.”17
The bipartisan commission that assessed
the National Defense Strategy also assessed
the need for budgetary growth of between 3
percent and 5 percent above inflation,18 andthis recommendation was sustained by former
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper.19
Unfortunately, over the past five fiscal years,
the DOD has seen a swing when it comes to real

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthPurpose as a Driver in Force Sizing
The Joint Force is used for a wide range of
purposes, only one of which is major combat
operations. Fortunately, such events have been
relatively rare, although they have occurred
every 15 years on average.23 In between (andeven during) such occurrences, the military
is used to support regional engagement, crisis
response, strategic deterrence, and humanitarian assistance as well as to support civil authorities and U.S. diplomacy.
All of the U.S. Unified Geographic Combatant Commands, or COCOMS24—­Northern Command (NORTHCOM); European Command(EUCOM); Central Command (CENTCOM);
Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM); Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); and Africa Command (AFRICOM)—have annual and long-termplans through which they engage with countries
in their assigned regions. Engagements range
from very small unit training events with theforces of a single partner country to larger bilateral and sometimes multilateral military
exercises. Such events help to foster working
relationships with other countries, acquire amore detailed understanding of regional political–military dynamics and on-the-groundconditions in areas of interest, and signal U.S.
security interests to friends and competitors.
To support such COCOM efforts, the services provide forces that are based permanently in their respective regions or that operate
in them temporarily on a rotational basis. To
make these regional rotations possible, theservices must maintain base forces that arelarge enough to train, deploy, support, receive back, and again make ready a stream ofunits that ideally is enough to meet validated
COCOM demand.
The ratio between time spent at home andtime spent away on deployment for any given
unit is known as OPTEMPO (operational tempo), and each service attempts to maintain aratio that both gives units enough time to educate, train, and prepare their forces and allows the individuals in a unit to maintain somesemblance of a healthy home and family life.
This ensures that units are fully prepared forthe next deployment cycle and that servicemembers do not become “burned out” or suffer
adverse consequences in their personal lives
because of excessive deployment time.
Experience has shown that a ratio of at least
3:1 (three periods of time at home for every period deployed) is sustainable. If a unit is to be
out for six months, for example, it will be homefor 18 months before deploying again. Obviously, a service needs enough people, units, ships,
and planes to support such a ratio. If peacetime
engagement were the primary focus for the
Joint Force, the services could size their forces
to support these forward-based and forward-­
deployed demands.
Thus, the size of the total force must necessarily be much larger than any sampling of its
use at any point in time.

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﻿

growth in its budget authority (i.e., budgets
that account for the effect of inflation). From2017 to 2019, there was significant real growthof 3 percent followed by 8.4 percent and 0.3
percent. However, that was followed by two
years of real decline of 1 percent in 2020 andthen 2.8 percent in 2021. Further, the latest
projection of defense budgets anticipates negative growth of 0.1 percent in the coming years.20
That is a far cry from the steady above-inflation
increase that was seen as necessary by bipartisan leaders.
Adding to future challenges, the federal
government’s response to the coronavirus
pandemic could influence how the defense
budget is discussed and appropriated in future fiscal years. The Congressional Budget
Office highlighted a $3 trillion deficit for FY
2020 and a second $3 trillion deficit for FY
2021 in its most recent outlook on the budget and the economy.21 This extremely highlevel of budgetary deficit will undoubtedly
shape how the country assesses the federal
government’s budgetary priorities, especiallywhen added to the already massive national
debt that approached $27 trillion by the endof 2020,22 and demand adjustments in thefederal government’s allocations of taxpayers’ dollars.

In contrast, sizing a force for major combat
operations is an exercise informed by history—
how much force was needed in previous wars—
and then shaped and refined by analysis of current threats, a range of plausible scenarios, andexpectations about what the U.S. can do given
training, equipment, employment concept, andother factors. The defense establishment mustthen balance “force sizing” between COCOM requirements for presence and engagement and theamount of military power (typically measured interms of combat units and major combat platforms, which inform total end strength) that isthought necessary to win in likely war scenarios.
Inevitably, compromises are made that
account for how much military the country is
willing to buy. Generally speaking:This Index focuses on the forces required to win two major wars as the baseline force-sizing metric for the Army, Navy,and Air Force and the one-war-plus-crisis-­
response paradigm for the Marine Corps.
The three large services are sized for global
action in more than one theater at a time; theMarines, by virtue of overall size and most recently by direction of the Commandant, focus
on one major conflict while ensuring that all
Fleet Marine Forces are globally deployablefor short-notice, smaller-scale actions.25 The
military’s effectiveness, both as a deterrent
against opportunistic competitor states andas a valued training partner in the eyes ofother countries, derives from its effectiveness(proven or presumed) in winning wars.

The Army sizes to major warfighting
requirements;

Our ApproachWith this in mind, we assessed the state ofAmerica’s military forces as it pertains to theirability to deliver hard power against an enemy
in three areas:

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The Marine Corps focuses on crisis
response demands and the ability to contribute to one major war;
The Air Force attempts to strike a balance that accounts for historically based
demand across the spectrum because air
assets are shifted fairly easily from one
theater of operations to another (“easily”
being a relative term when compared tothe challenge of shifting large land forces),and any peacetime engagement typicallyrequires some level of air support; andThe Navy is driven by global presence
requirements. To meet COCOM requirements for a continuous fleet presence at sea,
the Navy must have three to four ships inorder to have one on station. A commander
who wants one U.S. warship stationed off
the coast of a hostile country, for example,
needs the use of four ships from the fleet:one on station, one that left station and istraveling home, one that just left home andis traveling to station, and one that is otherwise unavailable because of major maintenance or modernization work.

348lCapability,lCapacity, andl

Readiness.

Capability. Examining the capability of amilitary force requires consideration of:lll

The proper tools (material and conceptual) with the design, performance characteristics, technological advancement, andsuitability that the force needs to perform
its function against an enemy successfully;
The sufficiency of armored vehicles, ships,
airplanes, and other equipment and weapons to win against the enemy;
The appropriate variety of options topreclude strategic vulnerabilities in theforce and give flexibilities to battlefieldcommanders; and2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthl

The degree to which elements of the force
reinforce each other in covering potential
vulnerabilities, maximizing strengths,
and gaining greater effectiveness throughsynergies that are not possible in narrowly
stovepiped, linear approaches to war.

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The military articulates a requirementthat the manufacturing sector attempts to satisfy.
“Unexpected” technological hurdles arisethat take longer and much more money tosolve than anyone envisioned.
Programs are lengthened, and cost
overruns are addressed, usuallywith more money.

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﻿The capability of the U.S. Joint Force was on
ample display in its decisive conventional war
victory over Iraq in liberating Kuwait in 1991
and later in the conventional military operation in Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein in 2003.
Aspects of its capability have also been seen innumerous other operations undertaken since
the end of the Cold War. While the conventional combat aspect of power projection has been
more moderate in places like Yugoslavia, Somalia, Bosnia and Serbia, and Kosovo, and evenagainst the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, thefact that the U.S. military was able to conduct
highly complex operations thousands of miles
away in austere, hostile environments andsustain those operations as long as required
is testament to the ability of U.S. forces to do
things that the armed forces of few if any othercountries can do.
A modern “major combat operation”26
along the lines of those upon which Pentagon planners base their requirements wouldfeature a major opponent possessing modern
integrated air defenses; naval power (surface
and undersea); advanced combat aircraft (toinclude bombers); a substantial inventory ofshort-range, medium-range, and long-range
missiles; current-generation ground forces(tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, rockets, andanti-armor weaponry); cruise missiles; and (insome cases) nuclear weapons. Such a situation
involving an actor capable of threatening vital
national interests would present a challengethat is comprehensively different from thechallenges that the U.S. Joint Force has facedin past decades.
Since 2018, given its focus on counterinsurgency, stability, and advise-and-assist operations since 2004 and the 2018 NDS directive
to prepare for conflict in an era of great-power competition, the military community has

focused on its suitability and readiness for
major conventional warfare.27 The Army inparticular has noted the need to reengage intraining and exercises that feature larger-scale
combined arms maneuver operations, especially to ensure that its higher headquarters
elements are up to the task.
This Index ascertains the relevance andhealth of military service capabilities by looking at such factors as average age of equipment,
generation of equipment relative to the current state of competitor efforts as reportedby the services, and the status of replacement
programs that are meant to introduce more
updated systems as older equipment reaches
the end of its programmed service life. Whilesome of the information is quite quantitative,
other factors could be considered judgment
calls made by acknowledged experts in the relevant areas of interest or addressed by seniorservice officials when providing testimony toCongress or examining specific areas in otherofficial statements.
It must be determined whether the services
possess capabilities that are relevant to themodern combat environment.
Capacity. The U.S. military must have asufficient quantity of the right capability orcapabilities. When speaking of platforms suchas planes and ships, a troubling and fairly consistent trend within U.S. military acquisition
characterizes the path from requirement tofielded capability. Along the way to acquiring
the capability, several linked things happen
that result in far less of a presumed “criticalcapability” than was supposedly required.

TABLE 1

Historical U.S. Force Allocation
Troop ﬁgures are in thousands.

﻿

ARMY
Total Troop Deployment
During Engagement
Divisions*
Reserve Component
Divisions Total for
Strategic Documents
Total Army End Strength
During Engagement,
During Year of Strategy
Document Active
Total Active End Strength
Recommendations
NAVY
Total Fleet During
Engagement
Aircraft Carriers
Carrier Air Wings
Large Surface Combatants
Small Surface Combatants
Attack Submarines
Amphibious Vessels
Combat Logistics andSupport Ships
Fighter/Attack Squadrons
MARINE CORPS
Total Troop Deployment
During Engagement
Active Divisions*
Reserve Divisions
Marine Expeditionary Force
Air Wings Active/Reserve
Total Marine Corps End
Strength During
Engagement by Year ofStrategy Document
Total Recommended
End Strength
AIR FORCE
Bombers or Bomber
Squadrons**
Fighter Squadrons
Active Fighter Wings
Reserve Fighter Wings
Airlift/Tankers

Korean War

Vietnam War

Persian Gulf War

Operation Iraqi
Freedom

206.3

219.3

267.0

99.7

6

7

4

1

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

1,313.8

1,113.3

738.0

499.0

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

904

770

529

297

6
6
37
16
4
34

5
5
14
47
0
26

6
6
30
16
12
21

5
5
23
9
12
7

28

29

45

42

21

43

22

24

33.5

44.7

90.0

66.2

1
n/a
1
1

2
n/a
1
1

2
n/a
1
1

1
n/a
2
1

187.0

289.0

196.3

178.0

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

21

23

26

3

4

30

30

7

8

10

10

239

167

388

293

* Figures for engagements are numbers deployed; figures for documents are totals.
** Figures for Air Force bombers for Korean War, Vietnam War, Persian Gulf War, and Iraq are bomber squadrons.
All other figures are bombers.
*** 2014 QDR prescribed nine heavy bomber squadrons, equaling 96 aircraft.

350

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

ARMY
Total Troop Deployment
During Engagement
Divisions*
Reserve Component
Divisions Total for
Strategic Documents
Total Army End Strength
During Engagement,
During Year of Strategy
Document Active
Total Active End Strength
Recommendations

MARINE CORPS
Total Troop Deployment
During Engagement
Active Divisions*
Reserve Divisions
Marine Expeditionary Force
Air Wings Active/Reserve
Total Marine Corps End
Strength During
Engagement by Year ofStrategy Document
Total Recommended
End Strength
AIR FORCE
Bombers or Bomber
Squadrons**
Fighter Squadrons
Active Fighter Wings
Reserve Fighter Wings
Airlift/Tankers

1997
QDR

2001
QDR

2006
QDR

2010
QDR

2010
Indep.
Panel

2-MRC
Paper

2014
QDR

2014
NDP

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

10

10

10

11

11

10

10

n/a

7

8

8

n/a

18

n/a

5

8

8

572.0

492.0

481.0

505.0

566.0

566.0

550.0

490.0

490.0

n/a

n/a

n/a

482.4

n/a

1,106.0

600.0

450.0

490.0

346

310

n/a

n/a

n/a

346

350

n/a

346

12
12

12
11

12
11

124

116

116

55
41

50
36

55
36

11
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

11
10
84–88
14–28
53–55
29–31

11
10
n/a
n/a
55
n/a

11
10
120
n/a
50
38

11
10
92
43
51
33

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

65

n/a

n/a

n/a

58

n/a

75

n/a

n/a

33

30

30

n/a

30

30

30

30

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

4
1
3
n/a

3
1
3
4

3
1
3
4

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

3
1
3
4

n/a
n/a
3
n/a

n/a
n/a
3
n/a

3
1
2
4

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

174.0

174.0

173.0

180.0

202.0

202.0

196.0

182.0

182.0

n/a

n/a

n/a

175.0

n/a

243.0

202.0

182.0

182.0

200

187

112

n/a

96

180

200

96***

n/a

54
13
7
n/a

54
12+
8
n/a

46
15
12
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

42
n/a
n/a
1023

66
20
n/a
1023

54

48
9
7
954

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

20
1,000

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351

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NAVY
Total Fleet During
Engagement
Aircraft Carriers
Carrier Air Wings
Large Surface Combatants
Small Surface Combatants
Attack Submarines
Amphibious Vessels
Combat Logistics andSupport Ships
Fighter/Attack Squadrons

1993
BUR

U.S. Military Power: Five-Grade Scale
VERY WEAKMARGINAL

STRONG

Then the realization sets in that the country either cannot afford or is unwilling to
pay the cost of acquiring the total numberof platforms originally advocated. The
acquisition goal is adjusted downward, if
not canceled altogether, and the military
finally fields fewer platforms at a higher
cost per unit than it originally said it needed to be successful in combat.

VERY STRONG

Older equipment can be updated with newcomponents to keep it relevant, and commanders can employ fewer units more expertly for
longer periods of time in an operational theater to accomplish an objective. At some point,
however, sheer numbers of updated, modern
equipment and trained, fully manned units aregoing to be needed to win in battle against acredible opponent when the crisis is profoundenough to threaten a vital national interest.
As deliberations proceed toward a decision
Capacity (numbers) can be viewed in at
on whether to reduce planned procurement, least three ways: compared to a stated objecthey rarely focus on and quantify the increase tive for each category by each service, comin risk that accompanies the decrease in pared to amounts required to complete varprocurement.
ious types of operations across a wide range
Something similar happens with force of potential missions as measured against a
structure size: the number of units and total potential adversary, and as measured against
number of personnel the services say they a set benchmark for total national capability.
need to meet the objectives established by the This Index employs the two-MRC metric as a
Commander in Chief and the Secretary of De- benchmark for most of the force.
fense in their strategic guidance.
The two-MRC benchmark for force sizingis the minimum standard for U.S. hard-power
The Marine Corps has stated that it needs
capacity because one will never be able to em27 infantry battalions to fully satisfy theploy 100 percent of the force at any given time.
validated requirements of the regional
Some percentage of the force will always be unCombatant Commanders, yet it currently
available because of long-term maintenancefields only 24 and has stated that it plansoverhaul, especially for Navy ships; unit trainto drop to 21 in order to make resourcing cycles; employment in myriad engagement
es available for experimentation andand small-crisis response tasks that continue
modernization.28
even during major conflicts; a standing commitment with allies to maintain U.S. forces
In 2012, the Army was building towardin a given country or region; and the need to48 brigade combat teams, but incremenkeep some portion of the force uncommitted
tal budget cuts reduced that number
to serve as a strategic reserve.
over time to 31—less than two-thirds the
The historical record shows that, on average,
number that the Army originally thought
the U.S. Army commits 21 BCTs to a major conwas necessary.
flict; thus, a two-MRC standard would requirethat 42 BCTs be available for actual use. But an
The Navy has produced various assessArmy built to field only 42 BCTs would also bements of fleet size since the end of the
an Army that could find itself entirely commitCold War, from 313 ships to 372 ships,
ted to war, leaving nothing back as a strategic
with some working estimates as high as
reserve to replace combat losses or to handle
500 manned ships.
other U.S. security interests. Although new
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WEAK

l

l

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2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthlArmy: 50 BCTs.

l

Navy: at least 400 ships and 624
strike aircraft.

l

Air Force: 1,200 fighter/attack aircraft.

lMarine Corps: 30 battalions.

America’s security interests require that theservices have the capacity to handle two major
regional conflicts successfully.
Readiness. The consequences of the sharp
reductions in funding mandated by sequestration over the past decade have caused military
service officials, senior DOD officials, and even
Members of Congress to warn of the dangers
of re-creating the “hollow force” of the 1970s
when units existed on paper but were staffedat reduced levels, minimally trained, and woefully ill-equipped.30 To avoid this, the services
have traded quantity/capacity and modernization to ensure that what they do have is “ready”
for employment.
Supplemental funding in FY 2017, a higher
topline in FY 2018, and sustained increases infunding in FY 2019 and through FY 2020 havehelped to stop the bleeding and have enabled
the services to plan and implement readinessrecovery efforts. Massive federal spending in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic in calendar year 2020 led to fiscal pressure on defense
accounts in future years, but gains in readinesswere preserved during FY 2020. Ensuring adequate readiness in FY 2021 has been difficult
given the challenges created by COVID-19
during the preceding year.
It is one thing to have the right capabilities
to defeat the enemy in battle. It is anotherthing to have enough of those capabilities tosustain operations and many battles against
an enemy over time, especially when attrition
or dispersed operations are significant factors.
But sufficient numbers of the right capabilities
are rather meaningless if the force is not readyto engage in the task.
Scoring. In our final assessments, we
tried very hard not to convey a higher level ofprecision than we think is achievable using
unclassified, open-source, publicly available

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﻿

technologies and additional capabilities havemade current BCTs more capable than thosethey replaced, one thing remains the same: Today’s BCT, like its predecessors, can be committed to only one place at a time and must beable to account for combat losses, especially
if it engages a similarly modernized enemy
force. Thus, numbers still matter regardlessof modernity.
Again, this Index assesses only the Active
component of the service, albeit with fullawareness that the Army also has Reserve
and National Guard components that together account for half of the total Army. The additional capacity needed to meet these “above
two-MRC requirements” could be handled bythese other components or mobilized to supplement Active-component commitments. In
fact, this is how the Army thinks about meeting operational demands and is at the heart ofthe long-running debate within the total Army
about the roles and contributions of the various Army components. A similar situation exists with the Air Force and Marine Corps.
The balance among Active, Reserve, andGuard elements is beyond the scope of thisstudy. Our focus is on establishing a minimum
benchmark for the capacity needed to handle
a two-MRC requirement.
We conducted a review of the major defense studies (1993 BUR, QDR reports, andindependent panel critiques) that are publicly available,29 as well as modern historicalinstances of major wars (Korea, Vietnam, Gulf
War, Operation Iraqi Freedom), to see whether there was any consistent trend in U.S. force
allocation. The results of our review are presented in Table 5. To this we added 20 percent,both to account for forces and platforms thatare likely to be unavailable and to provide
a strategic reserve to guard against unforeseen demands.
Summarizing the totals, this Index concluded that a Joint Force capable of dealing with
two MRCs simultaneously or nearly simultaneously would consist of:documents; not to reach conclusions thatHow does one neatly quantify the elecould be viewed as based solely on assertions
ment of combat experience, the erosion
or opinion; and not to rely solely on data andof experience as combat operation events
information that can be highly quantified. Simrecede in time and those who participatedple numbers, while important, do not tell thein them leave the force, the health of awhole story.
supporting workforce, the value of “presWe believe that the logic underlying ourence and engagement operations,” and themethodology is sound. This Index drew from
related force structures and patterns ofa wealth of public testimony from senior govdeployment and employment that preernment officials, from the work of recognizedsumably deter war or mitigate its effects if
experts in the defense and national security
it does occur?
analytic community, and from historical instances of conflict that seemed most appropriNew capabilities such as unmanned sysate to this project. It then considered several tems, cyber tools, hypervelocity platforms andquestions, including:weapons, and the use of artificial intelligenceto achieve a better understanding of operaHow does one place a value on the combat tions and orchestrate them more effectively
effectiveness of such concepts as Air-Sea
have the potential to change military force
Battle, Multi-Domain Operations, Littoposture calculations in the future. At the presral Operations in a Contested Environent time, however, they are not realized in any
ment, Distributed Maritime Operations,practical sense.
Network-­centric Operations, or Joint
This Index focused on the primary purOperational Access?
pose of military power—to defeat an enemy incombat—and the historical record of major U.S.
Is it entirely possible to assess accurately
engagements for evidence of what the U.S. de(1) how well a small number of newest-­
fense establishment has thought was necessary
generation ships or aircraft will fareto execute a major conventional war successagainst a much larger number of currently fully. To this we added the two-MRC benchmodern counterparts when (2) U.S. forces mark; on-the-record assessments of what theare operating thousands of miles fromservices themselves are saying about their stahome, (3) orchestrated with a particular
tus relative to validated requirements; and theoperational concept, and (4) the enemy isanalysis and opinions of various experts, bothleveraging a “home field advantage” thatin and out of government, who have covered
includes strategic depth and much shortthese issues for many years.
er and perhaps better protected lines of
Taking it all together, we rejected scales that
communication and (5) might be pursuing would imply extraordinary precision and setmuch dearer national objectives thantled on a scale that conveys broader characterthe U.S. is pursuing so that the politicalizations of status that range from very weak towill to conduct sustained operations invery strong. Ultimately, any such assessment
the face of mounting losses might differ
is a judgment call informed by quantifiable
dramatically?
data, qualitative assessments, thoughtful
deliberation, and experience. We trust that
our approach makes sense, is defensible, andis repeatable.
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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes
1.

Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, U.S. Department of Defense, October 1993, p. iii, https://www.
hsdl.org/?view&did=448259 (accessed July 8, 2021).
Ibid., p. 8.
Commission on the National Defense Strategy, Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of
the National Defense Strategy Commission, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.
pdf (accessed July 8, 2021), and press release, “National Defense Strategy Commission Releases Its Review of 2018 National
Defense Strategy,” United States Institute of Peace, November 13, 2018, https://www.usip.org/press/2018/11/national-defensestrategy-commission-releases-its-review-2018-national-defense (accessed July 8, 2021).

4.

President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, The White House, March 2021, p. 9, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf (accessed July 8, 2021).

5.

The United States has not had to contend in combat with any credible air force since the Vietnam War, but U.S. Air Force planners
are increasingly concerned about an enemy’s ground-based, anti-air missile capability. Naval planners are much more concerned
about ship-based, air-based, and shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles than they are about the number of conventional surface
combatants armed with large-caliber guns that an enemy navy has. Likewise, ground force planners have to consider thenumbers and types of guided anti-armor weapons that an enemy possesses and whether an opposing force has guided artillery,mortar, or rocket capabilities. Guided/precision weapons are typically less expensive (by orders of magnitude) than the platforms
they target, which means that countries can produce far more guided munitions than primary weapons platforms. Adding
this to the rise of unmanned platforms capable of carrying anti-platform weapons makes the threat environment even more
complicated. Some examples: Harpoon ASCM ($2 million)/DDG-51 Arleigh Burke–Class destroyer ($2 billion); AT4 anti-armor
weapon ($1,500)/M1A1 Abrams main battle tank ($9 million); 120mm guided mortar round ($10,000) or 155mm guided artillery
round ($100,000)/M198 155mm howitzer ($500,000); S-300 anti-air missile ($1 million)/F/A-18 Hornet ($70 million) or F-35A
Lightning II ($78 million).

6.

The use of low-cost drones to attack tanks and other armored vehicles during the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan
proved devastatingly effective. See Benjamin Brimelow, “A Brief, Bloody War in a Corner of Asia Is a Warning About Why
the Tank’s Days of Dominance May Be Over,” Business Insider, November 24, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/dronesin-armenia-azerbaijan-war-raises-doubt-about-tanks-future-2020-11 (accessed July 8, 2021). In late June 2021, U.S. forces
conducted air strikes against Iranian-backed militia groups in Syria that had been using drones to attack U.S. forces in the region—
further evidence of the proliferation of these unmanned systems that enable non-state groups to attack state forces with somelevel of effectiveness. See Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Carries out Air Strikes in Iraq and Syria,” The New York Times, June 27, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/27/us/politics/us-airstrikes-iraq-syria.html (accessed July 8, 2021).

7.

For a detailed discussion of this force, see Richard J. Dunn III, “America’s Reserve and National Guard Components: Key
Contributors to U.S. Military Strength,” in 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage
Foundation, 2015), pp. 61–73, https://s3.amazonaws.com/ims-2016/PDF/2016_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FULL.pdf. For
the percentage of U.S. military capability that resides in the Guard/Reserve, see ibid., p. 63.

8.

One example of force balancing was the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative, in which the active-duty force sought toredistribute certain rotorcraft platforms among units of the active-duty Army and the National Guard. The Guard has contended
that this plan would reduce the capabilities it has gained during recent combat engagements, such as its pilots’ proficiency inflying Apache helicopters. For more on this issue, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Force Structure: Army’s Analysesof Aviation Alternatives, GAO–15–430R, April 27, 2015, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669857.pdf (accessed July 8, 2021), andEnclosure 1, “Force Structure: Army’s Analysis of Aviation Alternatives, Briefing for Congressional Defense Committees,” updated
April 27, 2015, in ibid., pp. 8–44.

9.

Thomas W. Spoehr, “U.S. Army,” in 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage
Foundation, 2021), pp. 362 and 368, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/2021_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_
ASSESSMENT_POWER_ARMY.pdf.

10. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, p. 21, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed July 9, 2021).
11. Biden, “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.”
12. Figure 1.1, “Department of Defense Budget,” in U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request: Defense Budget
Overview, May 2021, p. 1-5, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_
Request_Overview_Book.pdf (accessed July 9, 2021).

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2.
3.

13. S. 365, Budget Control Act of 2011, Public Law 112-25, 112th Cong., August 2, 2011, https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ25/
PLAW-112publ25.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
14. Brendan W. McGarry and Emily M. Morgenstern, “Overseas Contingency Operations Funding: Background and Status,”
Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R44519, updated September 6, 2019, p. 1,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44519.pdf (accessed July 9, 2021).
15. John M. Donnelly, “Analysis: Biden Ends Abuse-Prone Overseas Military Budgets,” Roll Call, April 9, 2021, https://www.rollcall.
com/2021/04/09/analysis-biden-ends-abuse-prone-overseas-military-budgets/ (accessed July 9, 2021). See also news release,“The Department of Defense Releases the President’s Fiscal Year 2022 Defense Budget,” U.S. Department of Defense, May
28, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2638711/the-department-of-defense-releases-thepresidents-fiscal-year-2022-defense-budg/ (accessed July 9, 2021).
16. Emil Maine and Diem Salmon, “The Future of Overseas Contingency Operations: Due Diligence Required,” Heritage Foundation
Issue Brief No. 4294, November 4, 2014, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-future-overseas-contingency-operationsdue-diligence-required.
17. Aaron Mehta, “DoD Needs 3–5 Percent Annual Growth Through 2023, Top Officials Say,” Defense News, June 13, 2017, http://www.
defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/06/13/dod-needs-3-5-percent-annual-growth-through-2023-top-officials-say/ (accessed July
9, 2021). Emphasis added. See also James Mattis, U.S. Secretary of Defense, statement on President’s budget request for FY 2018
before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, June 12, 2017, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/
AS00/20170612/106090/HHRG-115-AS00-Bio-MattisJ-20170612.pdf (accessed July 9, 2021).
18. Commission on the National Defense Strategy, Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of
the National Defense Strategy Commission, p. 22.
19. Paul McLeary, “Flatline: SecDef Esper Says DoD Budgets Must Grow 3–5%,” Breaking Defense, February 6, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/flatline-secdef-esper-says-dod-budgets-must-grow-3-5/ (accessed July 9, 2021).

﻿

20. Table 6-26, “Department of Defense Discretionary Budget Authority (Continued): Total Funding by Military Department,” in U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2021,
April 2020, p. 271, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/FY21_Green_Book.pdf (accessed
July 9, 2021).
21. Table 1, “CBO’s Baseline Budget Projections, by Category,” in Congressional Budget Office, “An Update to the Budget andEconomic Outlook: 2021 to 2031,” July 2021, p. 2, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57339 (accessed July 9, 2021).
22. Data Lab, “By the End of 2020, the Federal Government Had $26.95 Trillion in Federal Debt,” USASpending.gov, https://datalab.
usaspending.gov/americas-finance-guide/debt/ (accessed July 9, 2021).
23. Since World War II, the U.S. has fought four major wars: the Korean War (1950–1953); the Vietnam War (1965–1973); the Gulf
War/Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990–1991); and the Iraq War/Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–2011).
24. U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) is also considered a geographic command, but within the context of this discussion,
SPACECOM’s interactions with other countries and the extent to which it must deal with units and peoples operating on its
terrain is much different from those of terrestrial commands.
25. In previous editions of the Index, the capacity of the Marine Corps was assessed against a two-war requirement of 36 battalions:a historical average of 15 battalions for a major conflict (twice that for two) and a 20 percent buffer, bringing the total to 36.
The Corps has consistently maintained that it is a one-war force and has no intention of growing to the size needed to fight
two wars. Its annual budget requests and top-level planning documents reflect this position. Having assessed that the IndoPacific region will continue to be of central importance to the U.S., noting that China is a more worrisome “pacing threat” thanany other competitor, and that the Joint Force lacks the ability to operate within the range of intensely weaponized, layered
defenses featuring large numbers of precision-guided munitions, the Corps is reshaping itself to optimize its capabilities andorganizational structures for this challenge. This Index concurs with this effort but assesses that the Corps will still need greater
capacity to succeed in war in the very circumstances for which the Marines believe they must prepare. For a detailed examinationof the current state of the Corps, see Dakota Wood, “The U.S. Marine Corps: A Service in Transition,” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 3501, June 16, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/BG3501_0.pdf.
26. Defense references to war have varied over the past few decades from “major combat operation” (MCO) and “major theaterwar” (MTW) to the current “major regional contingency” (MRC). Arguably, there is a supporting rationale for such shifts asplanners attempt to find the best words to describe the scope and scale of significant military efforts, but the terms arebasically interchangeable.

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength27. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, p. 4.
28. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, pp. 7–8, https://www.
hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.
pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed July 9, 2021).
29. The Department of Defense, through the Joint Staff and Geographic Combatant Commanders, manages a relatively small set ofreal-world operational plans (OPLANS) that are focused on specific situations in which the U.S. feels it is most likely to go to war.
These plans are reviewed and updated regularly to account for changes in the Joint Force or with the presumed enemy. They arehighly detailed and account not only for the amount of force the U.S. expects that it will need to defeat the enemy, but also forwhich specific units would deploy; how the force would actually flow into the theater (the sequencing of units); what ports andairfields it would use; how much ammunition, fuel, and other supplies it would need at the start; how much transportation or“lift” would be needed to get the force there (by air, sea, trucks, or rail); and the basic plan of attack. The Pentagon also routinely
develops, explores, and refines various notional planning scenarios so that it can better understand the implications of different
sorts of contingencies, which approaches might be more effective, how much of what type of force might be needed, and theregional issue or issues for which there would have to be an accounting. These types of planning events inform service efforts todevelop, equip, train, and field military forces that are up to the task of defending national security interests. All of these efforts
and their products are classified national security information and therefore not available to the public.
30. For more on the potential for a hollow force, see Association of the United States Army, “Preventing a Hollow Force Is Army’s
Top Priority,” May 25, 2017, https://www.ausa.org/news/preventing-hollow-force-army%E2%80%99s-top-priority (accessed July
9, 2021, and J. V. Venable, “America’s Air Force Is in Bad Shape,” National Review, June 13, 2017, http://www.nationalreview.com/
article/448556/us-air-force-weakened-funding-cuts-shrinking-workforce-aging-fleet-hurt-preparedness (accessed July 9, 2021).

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U.S. Army
Thomas W. Spoehr

T

Army sensor-to-shooter chains. Autonomy
is changing the character of warfare, and the
Army has bold ideas about how to take advantage of this technology.
However, whether the necessary resources will be available to enable such change isopen to question. Since fiscal year (FY) 2019,
the Army’s budget has decreased, and the Administration’s FY 2022 budget request for the
Army takes a sharp downward drop from $177
billion in FY 2021 to $173 billion requested for
FY 2022. If this requested amount is approved,
the Army may not be able to achieve its visionof modernizing and regaining its technological advantage while preserving readiness andOver 69,000 Soldiers are in the Indo-­
sufficient end strength. The FY 2022 proposed
Pacific, including over 25,000 forward
Army budget sharply reduces training prodeployed on the Korean peninsula. Over
grams and exercises and drastically curtails
30,000 Soldiers are in Europe supportmany equipment programs.3
ing NATO and the European Deterrence
Enduring Relevance of Land Power. ArInitiative, including the forward command
guments that America no longer needs a strong
post of our newly reactivated V Corps.
modern Army because, for example, China is
We remain dedicated to our counterterlargely a maritime threat ignore history androrism and train, advise, assist missions,
ignore what it means to be engaged in global
providing over 21,000 Soldiers in support
competition with a near peer. America has aof the U.S. Central Command theater.2
horrible record of predicting where it will fightits next war. As former Secretary of Defense
The Army, like the other military services, Robert Gates famously said:
finds itself at a strategic inflection point. Thatit needs to evolve and transform is unquesWhen it comes to predicting the naturetioned. Advances in firepower like ballistic
and location of our next military engagemissiles and kamikaze drones fielded by adments, since Vietnam, our record has
versaries like China have outpaced the U.S.
been perfect. We have never once gotten
Army’s capabilities. Information-age warfare
it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenarequires new levels of speed and precision inda, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti,

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he U.S. Army is America’s primary agent
for the conduct of land warfare. Although
it is capable of all types of operations acrossthe range of military operations and support
to civil authorities, its chief value to the nation
is its ability to defeat and destroy enemy land
forces in battle.
The Army is engaged throughout the worldin protecting and advancing U.S. interests.
Operationally, as of May 20, 2021, the Army
had 167,370 soldiers forward located in 142
countries.1 On May 5, 2021, the Acting Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff
testified that:﻿

Kuwait, Iraq, and more—we had no idea ayear before any of these missions that wewould be so engaged.4

Many also seem to overlook the fact that
great-power competition with China andRussia is a global contest, which means that
we face the enduring need to counter aggression wherever it may occur, not just within the
territory or waters of China or Russia. All of
this reinforces the reality that America has along-term need for modernized, sufficiently
sized land power.
A Difficult Year. The Army has largely surmounted the challenges posed by the
COVID-19 pandemic. The virus affected Armyrecruiting efforts in 2020, but in the end, theArmy achieved its desired overall end strength,
albeit by relying more on reenlistments.5 The
magnitude of Army support for the fightagainst the pandemic stands in sharp contrast
to the views of those who opine that our national security infrastructure is not designed
to counter threats like novel coronaviruses.6
The Army’s contributions to this fight wereboth multiple and noteworthy. Operation
Warp Speed, the prior Administration’s herculean effort to jump-start the production of
COVID-19 vaccines, was a Department of Defense (DOD)–Department of Health and Human Services operation that included multiple
senior Army officers and was co-led by Army
General Gus Perna.7 During the height of thepandemic, the Army Corps of Engineers built
dozens of treatment centers, and Army soldiers were deployed throughout the country
to help administer vaccines. More than 47,000
National Guard personnel were deployed tohelp states combat the pandemic.8
Although the Army was forced to scale backits Defender-Europe 20 exercise, which wasplanned to be the Army’s largest exercise inEurope in 25 years, DEFENDER 21 was executed in 2021 from March to June and was more
extensive than the prior year’s planned event.9
A Strong Force Showing Its Age. The U.S.
Army is currently the world’s most powerfularmy, but it is also too small to meet even the360

modest requirements of the 2018 National
Defense Strategy (NDS), much less the standard of being able to handle two major regional contingencies simultaneously, which mostexperts believe is necessary. It also is not sufficiently modern.
Even though the conflict in Iraq has largely
ended and the military is withdrawing fromAfghanistan, the 15 years from 2001 to 2016,
when the Army was focused single-­mindedly
on counterinsurgency and winning those conflicts, completely distracted the service fromfocusing on modernizing the key combat capabilities that it will need for near-peer competition. As a consequence, the Army’s last major
modernization occurred in the 1980s. As Army
Chief of Staff General James McConville stated in March 2021, “[W]e must modernize theArmy. Every 40 years the Army needs to transform. It did in 1940, it did in 1980 and we’re in2020 right now.”10
The Army’s ability to recover was further
constrained by a period of fiscal austerity thatbegan with the Budget Control Act (BCA) of
2011.11 The inability to fund everything thatwas needed led to difficult across-the-board
tradeoffs in equipment, manpower, and operations accounts. Budget pressure drove DOD in
January 2014 to shrink the Army’s Active component end strength from more than 500,000
to 420,000—the smallest Army in modern
U.S. history.12 Multiple equipment programs
were cancelled.
The change in Administrations in 2017 forestalled those cuts in end strength. However, theaddition of billions of dollars by Congress andthe Trump Administration, although it served
to arrest the decline of the Army and significantly improved unit readiness, was not sufficient to modernize or significantly increase
the size of the force.13
A Change in Strategic Direction? It is
unclear what direction the Biden Administration’s National Security or National Defense
strategies will take. The Administration’s Interim National Security Guidance provides
little insight into its thinking with respect tonational defense and does not even mention

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

CHART 4

Army Budget Hit by Inflation and Cuts
The Army’s total obligation authority (TOA) is declining in actual dollars, but
because of inflation, those declines also result in an additional loss in buying power.
From 2018 to 2022, those losses have totaled $39 billion.
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
$200

TOA
Adjustedfor inflation

$195

$195
$191

$190

$185

$14

$22

Actual
TOA$180

Loss inbuying
power

$177

$175

$173

﻿

$170
2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

SOURCE: Major General Paul A. Chamberlain, Director, Army Budget, “Army Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Overview,” May 28, 2021, p. 4,
https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/pbr/FY22_PB_brief_28MAY21.pdf (accessed July 23, 2021).
A heritage.org

the Army or any other service.14 The Trump
Administration’s NDS made “long-term strategic competitions” with China and Russia
the “principal priorities” but also stated that
DOD would “sustain its efforts” to counter thechallenges posed by Iran, North Korea, andterrorism—­threats where land power has greator even predominant utility.15
The 2018 NDS included the relatively modest goal of “defeating aggression by a major
power; deterring opportunistic aggression
elsewhere; and disrupting imminent terrorist
and WMD threats.”16 Some, however, question

whether even that goal is achievable. According to Representative Adam Smith (D–WA),
the influential chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, for example, “We should
get off of this idea that we have to win a war
in Asia, with China, what we have to do from anational security perspective, from a military
perspective, is we have to be strong enough todeter the worst of China’s behavior.”17 Exactly
what the “worst” of China’s behavior would
be and what it would take to deter it remained
undefined, but a change in U.S. strategy isclearly possible.

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Consequences of the Loss in Buying
BCTs range between 4,400 and 4,700 solPower. Despite relatively broad agreement diers in size.23 There are three types of BCTs:
that the DOD budget needed real growth of 3 Infantry, Armored, and Stryker. Each of thesepercent through 5 percent to avoid a strategy– formations at its core has three maneuver batbudget mismatch,18 the defense budget topline talions enabled by multiple other units such as
did not meet that target in FY 2019 and still artillery, engineers, reconnaissance, logistics,
has not done so.
and signal units.24
Of all the services, the Army has fared the
The best way to understand the status ofworst in terms of resources. Its funding levels hard Army combat power is to know the readplateaued with the FY 2018 budget and since iness, quantity, and modernization level ofthen have declined. The Army received $179 BCTs. This section deals with the number ofbillion in FY 2018, $181 billion in FY 2019, BCTs in the force.
$186 billion in FY 2020, and $177 billion in FY
In January 2012, “DOD announced [that]2021 and requested $173 billion for FY 2022. the Army would reduce the size of the Active
Because of the inexorable annual bite of infla- Army starting in 2012 from a post-9/11 peaktion and the decline in budget authority, the in 2010 of about 570,000 soldiers to 490,000
Army budget for FY 2022 represents a net loss soldiers by the end of 2017.” Later guidanceof about 9 percent in buying power, or $16 bil- revised that figure downward “to a range oflion, since FY 2018.19
440–450,000 soldiers.”25 In 2013, the Army
Summarizing the Army budget at a recent announced that because of those end strength
hearing, Acting Secretary of the Army John reductions and the priorities of the prior AdWhitley stated, “I think there is a lot of risk ministration, the number of Regular Armyin the budget, congressman…. The Army’s BCTs would be reduced from 45 to 33.26 Subbudget has actually been flat for the last two sequent reductions reduced the number ofto three years.”20 General McConville’s as- Regular Army BCTs from 33 to 31, where they
sessment is somewhat more colorful: In the remain today.
past two years, the Army has “picked the fruit”
When President Trump and Congress refrom the tree trying to find ways to make versed the drawdown in end strength and autough budget choices. Now, as the service ap- thorized growth starting in 2017, instead ofproaches FY 2022, “[t]here’s no more fruit in “re-growing” the numbers of BCTs, the Armythat tree.”21
chose to “thicken” the force and raise themanning levels within the individual BCTs to
Capacity
increase unit readiness. The Army’s goal is to
Capacity refers to the sufficiency of forces fill operational units to 105 percent of their auand equipment needed to execute the Nation- thorized manning.27
al Defense Strategy. One of the ways the Army
Combat Aviation Brigades. The Regularquantifies its warfighting capacity is numbers Army also has a separate air component orgaof Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).
nized into Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs),
Brigade Combat Teams. BCTs are the which can operate independently. CABs are
Army’s primary combined arms, close combat made up of Army rotorcraft, such as the AH-64
force. They often operate as part of a division Apache, and perform various roles including
or joint task force, both of which are the basic attack, reconnaissance, and lift. The number
building blocks for employment of Army com- of Army aviation units has also been reduced.
bat forces. BCTs are usually employed within In May 2015, the Army deactivated one of its
a larger framework of U.S. land operations but 12 CABs, leaving only 11 in the Regular Army.28
are equipped and organized so that they canGenerating Force. CABs and Stryker, Inconduct limited independent operations as fantry, and Armored BCTs make up the Arcircumstances demand.22
my’s main combat forces, but they obviously

362

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

TABLE 2

Major Army Combat Formations
Regular Army

Army National
Guard

Total

Infantry Brigade Combat Teams

13

20

33

Stryker Brigade Combat Teams

7

2

9

Armored Brigade Combat Teams

11

5

16

Total

31

27

58

Regular Army

Army National
Guard

Total

Combat Aviation Brigades

11

–

11

Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigades

–

8

8

Theater Aviation Brigades

–

2

2

Total

11

10

21

Brigade Combat Teams

Aviation Brigades

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do not make up the entirety of the Army. A
so-called Generating Force of 87,015 Regular
Army troops provides such types of support as
preparing and training troops for deployments,
carrying out key logistics tasks, staffing headquarters, and overseeing military schools andArmy educational institutions.29 The troops
in this Generating Force are the seed corn of
the Army, which therefore endeavors to insulate them from drawdown and restructuring
proposals in order to “retain a slightly moresenior force in the Active Army to allow growth
if needed.”30
Functional or Multifunctional Support Brigades. In addition to the institutional Army, a great number of functional or

multifunctional support brigades, amounting
to approximately 46 percent of the force,31
provide air defense; engineering; explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD); chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection; military police; military intelligence; and medical
support among other types of battlefield support. Special operations forces such as the 75th
Ranger Regiment, six Special Forces Groups,
and the 160th Special Operations Aviation
Regiment are also included in this category.
New Concepts and Supporting Force
Structure. The Army is trying to adapt its
force structure to meet the anticipated new
demands of near-peer competition. The foundations for these changes are contained in

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﻿

SOURCES:• U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Volume 1, Operation and Maintenance,
Army, Justification of Estimates, May 2021, pp. 65 and 128, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/
Base%20Budget/Operation%20and%20Maintenance/OMA_VOL_1_FY_2022_PB.pdf (accessed July 23, 2021).
• U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Volume 1, Operation and
Maintenance, Army National Guard, Justification Book, May 2021, pp. 44 and 101, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2022/ Base%20Budget/Operation%20and%20Maintenance/OMNG_VOL_1_FY_2022_PB.pdf (accessed July 23, 2021).

﻿

the Army’s multi-domain operations (MDO)
concept, which outlines how the Army views
the future.32
In April 2020, the Army announced that itplanned to modify its force structure for MDO
under the designation AimPoint Force Structure Initiative. Its objective is to produce an“MDO-capable force” by 2028 and an “MDOready force” by 2035.33 As part of this initiative,
the Army reactivated V Corps Headquarters on
October 16, 2020, to provide operational planning, mission command, and oversight of rotational forces in Europe.34 The Army has alsoannounced plans to create five Multi-Domain
Task Forces (MDTFs). One MDTF is currently stationed at Joint Base Lewis–McChord in
Washington State. Another will be located inGermany. Of the remaining three MDTFs, onewill be in the Indo-Pacific, one will be in the
Arctic, and the fifth will likely be maintainedin the U.S. to be available for global response.
These task forces contain rockets, missiles,
military intelligence, and other capabilities
that will allow Army forces to operate seamlessly with joint partners and conduct multidomain operations.35
To relieve the stress on the use of BCTs foradvisory missions, the Army has activated six
Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs).
These units, composed of about 800 soldiers
each, are designed specifically to train, advise, and mentor other partner-nation military units. The Army had been using BCTs
for this mission, but because train-and-assist
missions typically require senior officers andnoncommissioned officers, a BCT comprised
predominantly of junior soldiers was a poor fit.
The SFABs will be regionally aligned to combatant commands. Of the six SFABs, one is in
the National Guard, and the other five are in
the Regular Army.36
Force Too Small to Execute the NDS.
Army leaders have consistently stated that
the Army is too small to execute the National Defense Strategy at less than significant
risk. As of September 30, 2021, the Army
had an authorized total end strength of
1,012,200 soldiers:364

l485,900 in the Regular Army,l

189,800 in the Army Reserve, andl336,500 in the Army National
Guard (ARNG).37

In May 2021, Army Chief of Staff McConville testified that “[w]hen we take a look at
end-strength, I would like to grow the Army.
We’ve done analysis like the previous chief[General Mark Milley] talked about. 540 to 550[thousand] is about the right size of the Army.”38
In an earlier discussion with reporters, McConville stated, “I would have a bigger…sized
Army if I thought we could afford it, I think weneed it, I really do…. I think the regular Armyshould be somewhere around 540–550 [thousand]…. So, we’re sitting right now at 485,000.”39
The Army’s plan to increase the size of theRegular Army force has recently been put on
hold because of budget cuts. The Army hadplanned to raise the Regular Army incrementally to above 500,000 by adding approximately
2,000 soldiers per year.40 At that rate, it would
have reached 500,000 by around 2028. Now
even that modest plan is off the table. As a result of bleak defense budget forecasts, McConville has reported that the Army will have tohold its end strength constant to save money.41
Overall end strength dictates how many
BCTs the Army can form, and by holding end
strength constant, it is very unlikely that theservice will be able to add any new maneuver
formations to the mix. This will drive a higher operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for Armyunits and increase risk both for the force
and for the ability of the Army to carry out
its mission.
Many outside experts agree that the U.S.
Army is too small. In 2017, Congress established the National Defense Strategy Commission to provide an “independent, non-partisan
review of the 2018 National Defense Strategy.” Two of the commissioners, Dr. Kathleen
Hicks and Michael McCord, are now senior
DOD officials. Among its findings, the commission unanimously reported that the NDS

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

TABLE 3

Army Formations: Time Deployed vs. Time at Home Station
Even with a reduced presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, certain Army formations
continue to deploy globally at a high tempo. The table below shows the ratio oftime deployed to time at home station for three select Army formations. Typically,
if the ratio drops below 1-to-2, a formation is spending more time deployed than isrecommended, and this pace will cause long-term challenges.
Ratio of Time Deployed
to Time at Home Station

Unit Type
Patriot Battalions

1 to 1.23

IBCTs (Regular Army)

1 to 1.86

Division Headquarters (Regular Army)

1 to 2.25

NOTE: Data are current as of May 20, 2021.
SOURCE: Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.

during the Cold War, to a force that is mostly based in the continental United States. In
1985, 31 percent of the active-duty Army wasstationed overseas; by 2015, that figure had
declined to 9 percent.44 The desire to finda peace dividend following the dissolutionof the Soviet Union, combined with a reluctance to close bases in the United States, led
to large-scale base closures and force reductions overseas. Even though the 2018 NDS
placed a high premium on how the joint force
is postured, achieving that goal will be very difficult with the vast bulk of the Army now in the
United States.
Among Army units that deploy periodicallyare Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs)
that rotate to and from Europe and Korea.
Rather than relying on forward-stationed
BCTs, the Army rotates ABCTs to Europe andKorea on a “heel-to-toe” basis so that there isnever a gap. There is disagreement as to which
represents the better option: rotated forces orforward-­stationed forces. Proponents of rotational BCTs argue that they arrive fully trained
and remain at a high state of readiness throughout their typically nine-month overseas

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now charges the military with facing “five credible challengers, including two major-powercompetitors, and three distinctly different geographic and operational environments.” Thecommission assessed that “[t]his being thecase, a two-war force sizing construct makes
more strategic sense today than at any previous point in the post-Cold War era.” In otherwords, “[s]imply put, the United States needs alarger force than it has today if it is to meet theobjectives of the strategy.”42
In addition to the increased strategic riskof not being able to execute the NDS within
the desired time frame, the combination of an
insufficient number of BCTs and a lower-than-­required Army end strength has resulted in ahigher-than-desired level of OPTEMPO. As of
May 2021, despite a reduction in unit deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, Army units
continued to experience sustained demand.
Some of the units with the highest OPTEMPOs(measured in boots on the ground/dwell ratios)
are shown in Table 3.43
Army Force Posture. The Army also hastransitioned from a force with a third of its
strength typically stationed overseas, as it was

A heritage.org﻿rotation. Those who favor forward-stationed
forces point to a lower cost, forces that typicallyare more familiar with the operating environment, and a more reassuring presence for ourallies.45 In reality, both types of force postures
are needed, not only for the reasons mentioned,
but also because the mechanisms by which aunit is deployed, received into theater, and integrated with the force stationed abroad must
be practiced on a regular basis.
To mitigate risk and add to the number ofready BCTs, the Army has initiated a program,
ARNG 4.0, to resource select Army National Guard BCTs with additional training days,
moving from the standard number of 39 to
as many as 63 per year to increase readinesslevels. To apply these resources, the National
Guard has implemented a multi-year training
cycle to build readiness over time. As part ofthis concept, the Army increased the number of National Guard BCTs participating ina Combat Training Center (CTC) rotationfrom two to four starting in FY 2019. Becauseof budget cuts, however, the FY 2022 budget
reduces National Guard CTC rotations backdown to two.46
Despite the increase in the number of training days, the training goal for National Guard
BCTs is to achieve a company level rather thana brigade level of proficiency, which means that
additional training time would be required before the unit could be deployed.

Capability
Capability in this context refers to the quality, performance, suitability, and age of the
Army’s various types of combat equipment. In
general, the Army is using equipment developed in the 1970s, fielded in the 1980s, and incrementally upgraded since then. This “modernization gap” was caused by several factors:
the predominant focus on the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan since 9/11; pressures causedby budget cuts, especially those associatedwith the BCA; and failures in major modernization programs like the Future Combat System, Ground Combat Vehicle, and Crusader
artillery system.

366

Army leaders today clearly view this situation as a serious challenge. General McConville believes that modernization cannot bedeferred any longer:[E]veryone believes, and I believe
strongly—­that we must transform andmodernize the Army now. So we’ve
got to do that. We’re three years into it,[and] I think we’ve got some really good
programs going. We probably need about
two or three more years of good solid
budgets. And I think that’s something wehave to do.47

Emphasizing the point, McConville also
said recently that “we must transform theArmy, now. Every 40 years, I would argue
or suggest the Army transforms. It did it in
1940, it did it when I came in, in the Army in1980. Now, we’re in 2020, and we must transform the Army.”48
Equipment Losing Its Competitive Advantage. As an example of how Army equipment is falling behind that of our competitors,
the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS),
first introduced in 1991, is the Army’s only
ground-launched precision missile. Due to therestrictions of the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty and other factors, it had a maximum range of 300 kilometers. Meanwhile, both
China and Russia have much more substantial
inventories of conventional, precision, groundlaunched missiles and rockets. China has ninemajor ground-launched missile systems andmore than 425 launchers. These capable systems can range from 600 km (DF-11A and DF-15)
to 4,000 km (DF-26).49 Russia, on the other hand,
has the widest inventory of missiles in the world:at least four conventional ground-launched missile systems that can range from 120 km (SS-21)
to 2,500 km (SSC-8).50 The U.S. hopes to field anew precision strike missile by 2023, but for now,that system remains a plan, not a capability.
Another example is the main battle tank.
When the M-1 Abrams was introduced in 1980,
it was indisputably the world’s best tank. Now,
in 2021, Russia is reportedly beginning to2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

CHART 5

U.S. Lags Behind China, Russia in Land-Based Missiles
GROUND-LAUNCHED CONVENTIONAL-CAPABLE PRECISION MISSILE SYSTEMSUNITED
STATESATACMS

CHINA

DF-11A
DF-15
DF-16
CJ-10A
DF-21D
DF-21C
CJ-100DF-17
DF-26

RUSSIA

300

600
900
1,000
1,500
1,500
1,500
2,000
2,000
4,000

SS-21
SS-26
SSC-8
SS-N-21
Avangard

120
500
2,500
3,000
6,000
0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

﻿

RANGE (KILOMETERS)SOURCES:• Center for Strategic and International Studies, China Power Project, “How Are China’s Land-based Conventional Missile Forces
Evolving?” updated May 12, 2021, https://chinapower.csis.org/conventional-missiles/ (accessed July 23, 2021).
• Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Russia,” Missile Threat, last modified February 11,
2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/russia/ (accessed July 23, 2021).
• U.S. Army, Acquisition Support Center, “Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS),” https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/atacms/(accessed July 23, 2021).
A heritage.org

export versions of its T-14 Armata tank, which
has an unmanned turret, reinforced frontal
armor, an information management systemthat controls all elements of the tank, a circular Doppler radar, an option for a 155 mm gun,and 360-degree ultraviolet high-­definition
cameras. The M-1 is a great tank, but the decisive advantage that the U.S. once enjoyed intank warfare is disappearing.51
Similarly the U.S. Army’s Patriot Missile
System is an excellent system, but countries

such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and India have either purchased or recently expressed interestin buying the Russian competitor system, theS-400.52 The question has to be asked: Why?
Within the Army’s inventory of equipment
are thousands of combat systems, including
small arms, trucks, aircraft, soldier-carried
weapons, radios, tracked vehicles, artillery
systems, missiles, and drones. The following
updates with respect to some of the major systems as they pertain to Armored, Stryker, andThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

367

﻿

Infantry BCTs and Combat Aviation Brigades
are by no means exhaustive.
Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT).
The Armored BCT’s role is to “close with theenemy by means of fire and movement todestroy or capture enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close combat, andcounterattack to control land areas, including
populations and resources.”53 The Abrams
Main Battle Tank (most recent version in production: M1A2 SEPv3, first unit equipped in FY2020)54 and Bradley Fighting Vehicle (most recent version: M2A4, first unit equipped in FY2020) are the primary combat platforms inArmored BCTs. There are two modernizationlevels of these two armored combat vehicles
within the Army. (See Chart 6).
The M-1 tank and Bradley first entered service in 1980 and 1981, respectively. There are
87 M-1 Abrams tanks and 152 Bradley Fighting Vehicle variants in an ABCT.55 Despite upgrades, the M-1 tank and the Bradley are now
at least 40 years old, and their replacements
will likely not arrive until the platforms are atleast 50 years old.
Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle(OMFV). The Army’s replacement program
for the Bradley, the Optionally MannedFighting Vehicle, was on an aggressive timeline, but the Army cancelled the request for
proposals in January 2020 and re-released a
new RFP for what it calls a “concept design”
in December 2020. As many as five proposals
were scheduled to be awarded in June 2021
to companies to refine their designs,56 and“[t]he Army now plans for the first unit to beequipped [with the OMFV] in the fourth quarter of FY2028.”57
New Tank? A potential replacement for
the M-1 tank is even further down the road.
The Army does not intend to decide “whatdirection we want to go for decisive lethality
and survivability on the battlefield” until atleast 2023.58
Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle(AMPV). Also part of an ABCT, the venerable M113 multi-purpose personnel carrier
fills multiple roles like mortar carrier and368

ambulance. It entered service in 1960 and wasscheduled to be replaced by the new ArmoredMulti-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), which after
delays has begun product qualification testing. As of May 20, 2021, BAE had delivered 31
AMPVs to the Army.59 First fieldings for thissystem are now expected during the second
quarter of FY 2023.60 Apparently because ofbudget cuts, no procurement of the AMPV is
proposed in the Army’s FY 2022 budget request. It is unclear what the Army plans forthis platform or whether its stated objectiveof 2,897 AMPVs will ever be reached.61
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).
The Stryker BCT “is an expeditionary combined arms force organized around mounted
infantry” and is able to “operate effectively inmost terrain and weather conditions” becauseof their rapid strategic deployment and mobility.62 Stryker BCTs are equipped with approximately 321 eight-wheeled Stryker vehicles.63
Relatively speaking, these vehicles are among
the Army’s newest combat platforms, having
entered service in 2001. In response to an Operational Needs Statement, the Stryker BCT
in Europe received Strykers fitted with a 30
mm cannon to provide an improved anti-armor capability.64 Based on the success of thateffort, the Army decided to outfit at least threeof its SBCTs equipped with the Double V-hull,
which affords better underbody protection
against such threats as improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), with the 30 mm autocannon.65
The Army is also integrating Javelin anti-tank
missiles on the Stryker platform.66
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).
The Infantry BCT “is an expeditionary, combined arms formation optimized for dismounted operations in complex terrain—ageographical area consisting of an urban
center larger than a village and/or of two
or more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same
space.”67 Infantry BCTs have fewer vehicles
and rely on lighter platforms such as trucks,
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), and Joint Light Tactical
Vehicles (JLTVs) for mobility.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

CHART 6

Army Armored Combat Vehicle Modernization
ABRAMS TANKBRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE

M1A2 SEP(most modern)

M2A3(most modern)

76.6%

65.3%

M1A1 SATOTAL VEHICLES:
2,101

23.4%

TOTAL VEHICLES:
3,359

SOURCE: Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army,
G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.

34.7%

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enemy armored vehicles and fortifications.
In 2020, the Army received 24 prototypes (12each from General Dynamics Land Systems
and BAE) for testing and evaluation, which willcontinue through June 2021. The first units are
expected to receive MPF in FY 2025.71
Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV). Airborne BCTs are the first IBCTs to receive a newplatform to increase their speed and mobility. The Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) provides enhanced tactical mobility for an IBCT
nine-soldier infantry squad with their associated equipment. GM Defense was selected
for the production contract in June 2020. The
Army has approved a procurement objective of
11 IBCT sets at 59 vehicles per IBCT (649 vehicles in total), to be completed by FY 2028. Ultimately, the Army will buy as many as 2,065 ofthese vehicles.72 As of May 20, 2021, 168 GMVs
had been fielded to Army units.73
Combat Aviation Brigade. Combat Aviation Brigades are composed of AH-64 Apacheattack, UH-60 Black Hawk medium-lift, andCH-47 heavy-lift Chinook helicopters. The
Army has been methodically upgrading thesefleets for decades, but the FY 2022 budget request dramatically curtails the number of aircraft to be procured. This cutback in helicopter
modernization, if enacted, would extend the

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﻿

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) combines
the protection offered by Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) with themobility of the original unarmored HMMWV.
The vehicle features design improvementsthat increase its survivability against anti-armor weapons and IEDs. The Army plans to
procure 49,099 JLTVs over the life of the program, replacing about 50 percent of the current HMMWV fleet. As of May 20, 2021, theArmy had fielded 4,543 JLTVs.68
Requested FY 2022 funding of $574.5 million would support procurement of 1,203 JLTVs and 1,541 trailers. This reflects a continued
reduction in funding for this program ($884
million was enacted for FY 2021) and illustrates the extreme budget pressures the Armyis facing. Considering the 8,621 JLTVs the
Army has already procured69 and procurement
at a rate of 1,203 vehicles per year starting in
FY 2022, the Army will not reach its acquisition objective for the JLTV until 2055, forcing
continued reliance on aging HMMWVs, whichbegan fielding in 1983.70
Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF). The
Army is developing an armored gun systemcalled Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) to
provide IBCTs with the firepower to engage

Othervariants﻿amount of time necessary to put aircraft crews
in the latest version of these critical platforms.
This is a continued reflection of downward
budget pressure and incurs additional risk
for the Army.
UH/HH-60. The acquisition objective
for the H-60 medium-lift helicopter is 1,375
H-60Ms and 760 recapitalized 60-A/L/Vs fora total of 2,135 aircraft. The FY 2022 procurement request for the UH-60M is $630.2 million,
which would support the procurement of 24 aircraft (18 less than the 42 requested in FY 2021).74
The most modernized variant, the UH/HH60M, accounts for approximately 50 percentof the Army’s H-60 medium helicopter fleet.75
CH-47. The CH-47F Chinook, a rebuilt
variant of the Army’s CH-47D heavy-lift helicopter, has an acquisition objective of 550 aircraft and, with no replacement on the horizon,
is expected to remain the Army’s heavy-lift helicopter for the next several decades. The FY
2022 budget request of $145.2 million would
support the procurement of six aircraft, all ofwhich would be the MH-47G special operations model.76 The most recent model, the CH47F, accounts for 89 percent of the 518 CH-47
helicopters currently in service.77
AH-64. The AH-64E heavy attack helicopter has an acquisition objective of 791 aircraft,which is being met by the building of new aircraft and remanufacturing of older AH-64
models. The FY 2022 procurement request of$504.1 million would support the purchase of
30 AH-64E aircraft,78 22 less than the 52 produced in FY 2021. This would likely terminate
the AH-64E new-build line. Of the 740 AH-64
helicopters in service, 53 percent are the mostrecent variant, the AH-64E.79
Overall, the Army’s equipment inventory,
while increasingly dated, is maintained well.
Despite high usage in Afghanistan and Iraq,
most Army vehicles are relatively “young” because the Army deliberately undertook andCongress funded a “reset” plan that includes“[r]epairing and reconditioning systems tobring them back to a satisfactory operating
condition.” Under its current modernizationplans, for example, “the Army envisions [the370M-1 Abrams Tank, the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), and the M-1126 Stryker
Combat Vehicle] in service with Active andNational Guard forces beyond FY 2028.”80
In addition to seeing to the viability of today’s equipment, the military must look to
the health of future equipment programs. Although future modernization programs are
not current hard-power capabilities that canbe applied against an enemy force today, they
are a leading indicator of a service’s overall fitness for future sustained combat operations.
In future years, the service could be forced toengage an enemy with aging equipment andno program in place to maintain viability or
endurance in sustained operations.
The U.S. military services are continuallyassessing how best to stay a step ahead of competitors: whether to modernize the force todaywith currently available technology or wait to
see what investments in research and development produce years down the road. Technologies mature and proliferate, becoming moreaccessible to a wider array of actors over time.
After years of a singular focus on counterinsurgency followed by concentration on thecurrent readiness of the force, the Army is now
playing catch-up in equipment modernization.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Mark Milley, for example, has said that China
is “on a path…to be on par with the U.S. at somepoint in the future….”81 While his statement isintentionally ambiguous, General Milley was
clearly conveying his concern about the paceof China’s modernization and the very real
danger that the U.S. military could lose its current advantages.
New Organizations and Emphasis on
Modernization. The Army established a new
four-star headquarters, Army Futures Command, to manage modernization and eightcross-functional teams (CFTs) to improve themanagement of its top modernization priorities.82 Army leadership—in particular the Under
Secretary of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staffof the Army—devote an extraordinary amountof time to equipment modernization issues, but
only time will tell whether the new structures,

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military371

﻿commands, and emphasis result in long-term increasing the readiness of its forces. Its goal isimprovement in modernization posture. The to have 66 percent of the Regular Army and 33
Army aspires to develop and procure an entire percent of National Guard BCTs at the highest
new generation of equipment based on its six levels of readiness. In FY 2021, however, BCT
modernization priorities: “Long Range Preci- readiness declined, and if enacted, the FY 2022
sion Fires, Next Generation Combat Vehicle, budget’s dramatic cuts in funding for Army
Future Vertical Lift, the Army Network, Air and training could lead to even bigger declines
Missile Defense, and Soldier Lethality.”83
in the future.
Although the Army has put in place new
As of May 20, 2021, the Army reported thatorganizations, plans, and strategies to man- “58 percent of Active Component Brigade Comage modernization, the future is uncertain, bat Teams are at the highest levels of tacticaland Army programs are in a fragile state, with readiness,” eight percentage points below their
only a few in an active procurement status. The goal and 16 percentage points below last year’s
Army has shown great willingness to make reported level. This means that 18 of the Artough choices and reallocate funding toward my’s 31 active BCTs were at either C1 or C2,
its modernization programs, but usually at the two highest levels of tactical readiness, andthe expense of end strength or reduction in ready to perform all or most of their wartime
the total quantity of new items purchased. missions immediately.87 Last year’s Index re“There has been real progress in [moderniza- ported that 21 Regular Army BCTs were at thetion] over the last three or four years, but that highest levels of readiness.
progress is fragile,” Lieutenant General James
There has also been an apparent drop in
Pasquarette, a senior Army budget official, has readiness among National Guard BCTs fromwarned. “We continue to fund [the top] prior- FY 2020 to FY 2021. Last year’s Index estiity programs at the cost of the other programs mated that four to five National Guard BCTs
in the equipping portfolio.”84
were at the highest levels of readiness. Now the
As DOD budget challenges for nuclear de- Army reports that no National Guard BCTs are
terrence programs, rising personnel costs, at the highest levels of readiness.88
health care, and the need to invest in proOf the Army’s 11 Combat Aviation Brigades,
grams to respond to China’s increasingly ag- eight (73 percent) are at the highest levels ofgressive activities present themselves, the readiness. This is relatively healthy.89
Army desperately needs time and funding toTraining Resources Slashed. In the FY
modernize its inventory of equipment. Re- 2022 budget request, funding for training accent modernization programs seem to be on tivities has been reduced significantly. When
track except for the OMFV program, which measuring training resourcing, the Army uses
needed a reboot. Limited numbers of Stryker full-spectrum training miles (FSTMs) for Brivehicle-mounted Maneuver Short Range Air gade Combat Teams, representing the numDefense (M-SHORAD) systems have been ber of miles that formations are resourced todelivered to Europe.85 Army officials are cur- drive their primary vehicles on an annual basis.
rently optimistic about future fielding dates for For Combat Aviation Brigades, the Army uses
equipment like the Extended Range Cannon hours per crew per month ((H/C/M), reflecting
Artillery, a hypersonic weapon firing battery, the number of hours that aviation crews can fly
and the Precision Strike Missile, all of which their helicopters per month.
are scheduled for delivery in FY 2023, but their
According to the Army’s budget justification86
success will depend on sustained funding.
exhibits, “[t]he FY 2022 budget funds 1,109 Operating Tempo Full Spectrum Training Miles
Readinessand 10.2 flying hours per crew, per month” to
BCT Readiness Reduced. Over the past meet “required training readiness levels.”90
four years, the Army has made progress in The FY 2022 proposed FSTM is significantly

FIGURE 1

Army Readiness: Brigade Combat Teams
Based on historical force requirements, The Heritage Foundation assesses that the
Army needs a total of 50 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). Although the Armycurrently has 58 BCTs, only the 31 Regular Army BCTs have the necessary readinessto meet near-term and mid-term operation plan requirements.
The U.S. Army currently has 31 BCTs* available to meet needs.
Of those,
18 BCTs are
considered“ready.”﻿An additional
19 BCTsare needed
to reach 50.

* Includes four Army National Guard BCTs.
SOURCE: Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.

lower (30 percent) than resourced levels of
1,598 miles and lower (5 percent) than the 10.8
flying hours enacted in the FY 2021 budget.
Training Level Goals Reduced. The Armyis trying to cope with these reduced training
resources by shifting training to lower echelons, which is less expensive. Its new strategy “focuses resources on squad, platoon andcompany level training to achieve highly
trained companies.”91 The FY 2022 budget
justification books omit the Unit Proficiency
Level Goal, which for years has been BCT; it is372

A heritage.org

likely now battalion or company. In addition,
the Army’s major exercise, the DEFENDER
series, is being cut back dramatically by $339
million in FY 2022, shifting to an exercise inEurope in even years and an exercise in the
Pacific in odd years.92
CTC Rotations Chopped. The Army uses
Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to train its
forces to desired levels of proficiency. Specifically, this important program “provide[s]realistic joint and combined arms training…
approximating actual combat” and increases

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength“unit readiness for deployment and warfighting.”93 The FY 2022 budget request reduces
CTC rotations by 34 percent: For FY 2022,
the Army requested resources for 17 CTC rotations (15 Regular Army and two National
Guard); in FY 2021, the Army was resourced
for 26 rotations (21 Regular Army and five National Guard).94
New Readiness Model. The Army is transitioning from one readiness model to another.
Its Sustainable Readiness Model, implementation of which began in 2017, was intended
to give units more predictability. Its new Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM) is designed to “betterbalance operational tempo (OPTEMPO) withdedicated periods for conducting missions,training, and modernization.”95 ReARMM reportedly will feature six-month cycles to field
new equipment and allocate units to specifictheaters. The Army intends to shift to this newmodel on October 1, 2021.96
In general, the Army continues to be challenged by structural readiness problems as
evidenced by too small a force attempting tosatisfy too many global presence requirements
and Operations Plan (OPLAN) warfighting requirements. If demand is not reduced, funding
cuts in the FY 2022 budget can be expected toresult in a continued decline in readiness.

Scoring the U.S. Armycount of available BCTs. Because the Army reports that no Army National Guard BCTs areat the highest state of readiness, they are nolonger counted in this edition of the Index. The
Army has 31 Regular Army BCTs compared toa two-MRC construct requirement of 50. The
Army’s overall capacity score therefore remains unchanged from 2020.
ll

Two-MRC Benchmark: 50 Brigade
Combat Teams.
Actual FY2021 Level: 31 Regular Army
Brigade Combat Teams.

The Army’s current BCT capacity equals 62
percent of the two-MRC benchmark and thus
is scored as “weak.”Capability Score: Marginal
The Army’s aggregate capability score remains “marginal.” This aggregate score is a
result of “marginal” scores for “Age of Equipment,” “Size of Modernization Programs,”
and “Health of Modernization Programs.”
More detail on these programs can be foundin the equipment appendix following this section. The Army scored “weak” for “Capabilityof Equipment.”

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military373

﻿Capacity Score: WeakHistorical evidence shows that, on average,
the Army needs 21 Brigade Combat Teams tofight one major regional conflict (MRC). Basedon a conversion of roughly 3.5 BCTs per division, the Army deployed 21 BCTs in Korea, 25
in Vietnam, 14 in the Persian Gulf War, and approximately four in Operation Iraqi Freedom—
an average of 16 BCTs (or 21 if the much smaller Operation Iraqi Freedom initial invasion
operation is excluded). In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Obama Administration
recommended a force capable of deploying 45
Active BCTs. Previous government force-­sizing
documents discuss Army force structure interms of divisions and consistently advocate
for 10–11 divisions, which equates to roughly
37 Active BCTs.
Considering the varying recommendationsof 35–45 BCTs and the actual experience ofnearly 21 BCTs deployed per major engagement, our assessment is that 42 BCTs would
be needed to fight two MRCs.97 Taking into
account the need for a strategic reserve, theArmy force should also include an additional
20 percent of the 42 BCTs, resulting in an overall requirement of 50 BCTs.
Previous editions of the Index had counted
four Army National Guard BCTs in the overallDespite modest progress with the JLTV and
AMPV, and in spite of such promising developments as creation of Army Futures Command,
CFTs, and the initiation of new Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDTE)
funded programs, new Army equipment programs remain in the development phase andin most cases are two to three years from entering procurement phases. FY 2022 requested funding levels would lead to reductions innumerous equipping programs: helicopter
modernization, AMPV, JLTV, HEMMT, andothers. The result would be an Army that isaging faster than it is modernizing.

those levels of readiness. The Army’s internalrequirement for Regular Army BCT readinessis 66 percent, or 20.5 BCTs.99 Using the assessment methods of this Index, this results in apercentage of service requirement of 87 percent, or “very strong.”

Overall U.S. Army Score: Marginal
The Army’s overall score is calculated basedon an unweighted average of its capacity, capability, and readiness scores. The unweighted
average is 3.33; thus, the overall Army scoreis “marginal.” This was derived from the aggregate score for capacity (“weak”); capability(“marginal”); and readiness (“very strong”).
Readiness Score: Very Strong
This score is the same as the assessment of
The Army reports that 58 percent (18) of its the 2021 Index, which also rated the Army as
31 Regular Army BCTs are at the highest state “marginal” overall.
of readiness.98 No National Guard BCTs are at

U.S. Military Power: Army﻿

VERY WEAK
Capacity
Capability

WEAK

MARGINAL

374

VERY STRONG%%

Readiness
OVERALL

STRONG%%

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

1

ARMY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

Main Battle Tank
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Size
Score

HealthScore

Decisive Lethality Platform (DLP)

M1A1/2 Abrams
Inventory: 678/1619
Fleet age: 30.5/13.5 Date: 1980/1993

The DPL program is intended to replace the Abrams
tank. This program is part of the Next Generation Combat
Vehicle (NGCV) program, which is number two among the
Army’s “Big Six” modernization priorities. The soonest a
replacement for the Abrams tank could be introduced is
2030.

The Abrams is the main battle tankused by the Army in its armoredbrigade combat teams (BCTs). Its main
beneﬁts are lethality, protection, andmobility. The Abrams went through aremanufacture program to extend its
life to 2045.

Infantry Fighting Vehicle
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Size
Score

HealthScore

Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle(OMFV)

M2 Bradley
Inventory: 4,006
Fleet age: 20 Date: 1981
The Bradley is a tracked vehicle meant
to transport infantry and provide
covering ﬁre. The Bradley complements
the Abrams tank in armored BCTs. The
Bradley underwent a remanufacture
program to extend its life to 2045.

Armored Fighting Vehicle
Age
Score

PLATFORM
Stryker

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Size
Score

HealthScore

None

Inventory: 4,859
Fleet age: 10 Date: 2001
The Stryker is a wheeled vehicle that is
the main platform in Stryker BCTs. The
program was considered an interim
vehicle to serve until the arrival of the
Future Combat System (FCS), butthat program was cancelled becauseof technology and cost hurdles. The
original Stryker is being replaced witha double-v hull (DVH) conﬁguration toincrease survivability and a 30mm gun
to increase lethality. Its components
allow for rapid acquisition and ﬁelding.
The Stryker is expected to remain inservice for 30 years.

NOTE: See page 379 for details on fleet ages, dates, and procurement spending.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military375

﻿In March 2019, the Army issued a request for proposals tobuild prototypes of the OMFV, but it then did an about-faceand cancelled the solicitation in January 2020. The Army is
now redeﬁning the requirements and intends to seek digital
designs from companies in mid to late 2020. The program
has likely slipped to ﬁrst ﬁeldings in 2028. This programis part of the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV)
program, which is number two among the Army’s “Big Six”
modernization priorities

1

ARMY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
PendingArmored Personnel Carrier
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

M113 Armored Personnel Carrier

Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV)Inventory: 4,339
Fleet age: 36 Date: 1960

Timeline: 2018–TBD

HealthScore

The AMPV has been adapted from the Bradley Fighting
Vehicle which largely allowed the program to bypass thetechnology development phase. The ﬂeet will consist of ﬁvevariants. The ﬁrst unit is set to be equipped at the end of 2021.

The tracked M113 serves in a supportingrole for armored BCTs and in units
above brigade level. The APC is being
replaced by the Armored Multi Purpose
Vehicle (AMPV). Plans are to use theplatform until 2045.

PROCUREMENT
474

2,391

SPENDING ($ millions)$2,666$11,126

Light Wheeled Vehicle

﻿

PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Health
Score

HMMWV

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)

Inventory: 99,800
Fleet age: 18 Date: 1985

Timeline: 2015–2036

The HMMWV is used to transport troops
and for a variety of other purposes (forexample, as ambulances). Its expected
life span is 15 years. A portion of the
HMMWV ﬂeet will be replaced by the
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).

The JLTV vehicle program replaces some of the Army’s
HMMWVs and provides improved protection, reliability, andsurvivability of vehicles. This is a joint program with the
USMC. In June 2019, the Army approved the JLTV for full-rate
production. Production is underway. Current budget shortfalls
have forced the Army to reduce procurement quantities.
PROCUREMENT
13,43835,661

NOTE: See page 379 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

376

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

SPENDING ($ millions)$6,492$19,219

1

ARMY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Attack Helicopter
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

HealthScore

AH-64 D Apache

AH-64E Reman

Inventory: 381
Fleet age: 14.5 Date: 1997

Timeline: 2010–TBD

The Apache is found in Combat
Aviation Brigades and is the Army’s
attack helicopter. It can destroy armor,
personnel, and material targets. Its
expected life cycle is approximately 20
years.

The AH-64E Reman (short for remanufactured) is a
program to remanufacture older Apache helicopters into
the more advanced AH-64E version. The AH-64E will havemore modern and interoperable systems and will be able
to carry modern munitions, including the JAGM missile.
PROCUREMENT*431

SPENDING* ($ millions)189$10,639$3,986

AH-64E

AH-64E New Build

Inventory: 351
Fleet age: 4 Date: 2012

Timeline: 2010-2027

The AH-64E variant is a remanufactured
version with substantial upgrades in
power plant, avionics, communications,and weapons capabilities. Its expected
life cycle is approximately 20 years.

The AH-64E New Build program produces new-build,
not rebuilt, Apaches. The program is meant to modernize
and sustain the current Apache inventory. The AH-64E
has more modern and interoperable systems and is able
to carry modern munitions, including the JAGM missile.
PROCUREMENT*
2

﻿

79

SPENDING* ($ millions)$2,404* Additional procurement expected.
NOTE: See page 379 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

377

1

ARMY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
PendingMedium Lift
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

UH-60A Black Hawk

UH-60M Black Hawk

Inventory: 157
Fleet age: 36.5 Date: 1978

Timeline: 2004–TBD

The UH-60A is a utility helicopter thatprovides air assault and aeromedical
evacuation and supports special
operations. Its expected life span isapproximately 25 years. This variant of
the Black Hawk is now being replacedby the newer UH-60M variant.

PROCUREMENT*

UH-60L Black Hawk

UH-60V Black Hawk

Inventory: 958
Fleet age: 14.5 Date: 1989

Timeline: 2021–TBD

SPENDING* ($ millions)145$21,175$6,650The Army plans to upgrade the older model UH-60L to the
UH-60V conﬁguration, which incorporates a digital cockpit
like the one on the UH-60M. This is an Army cost-saving
measure because it is cheaper to make a UH-60V from a UH60L than it is to buy a new UH-60M.
PROCUREMENT*﻿

3

UH-60M Black Hawk
Inventory: 1,070
Fleet age: 7.5 Date: 2005
The UH-60M is the follow-on to the UH60A helicopter. As the UH-60A is retired,
the M-variant will be the main mediumlift rotorcraft used by the Army. They are
expected to remain in service at least
until 2030.

NOTE: See page 379 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

378

HealthScore

The UH-60M, currently in production, is intended tomodernize and replace current Black Hawk inventories. The
newer M-variant will improve the Black Hawk’s range andlift by upgrading its rotor blades, engine, and computers.

1,123

The UH-60L is the follow-on to the
UH-60A helicopter. As the UH-60A is
retired, the M-variant will be the main
medium-lift rotorcraft used by the
Army. They are expected to remain inservice at least until 2030.

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

SPENDING* ($ millions)
N/A1

ARMY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Heavy Lift
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

HealthScore

CH-47F Chinook

CH-47F

Inventory: 439
Fleet age: 9 Date: 2002

Timeline: 2001–TBD

The F-variant includes a new digital
cockpit and monolithic airframe to
reduce vibrations. It transports forcesand equipment while providing otherfunctions such as parachute drops andaircraft recovery. Its expected life span
is 35 years. The Army plans to use theCH-47F until the late 2030s.

Currently in production, the CH-47F program is intended
to keep the ﬂeet of heavy-lift rotorcraft healthy as older
variants of the CH-47, notably the CH-47D, are retired.
The program includes both remanufactured and newbuilds of CH-47s. The F-variant has engine and airframe
upgrades to lower its maintenance requirements.
Total procurement numbers include the MH-47G
conﬁguration for U.S. Special Operations Command.
PROCUREMENT*

MH-47G

1,183

Inventory: 67
Fleet age: 9 Date: 2014

SPENDING* ($ millions)172$1,369$25,517

﻿

The MH-47G is a special operations
variant of the CH-47 Chinook multi-role
helicopter used in heavy-lift missions
such as the transportation of troops,
ammunition, vehicles, equipment,
fuel, and supplies, as well as civil andhumanitarian relief missions. The
helicopter can conduct long-range
missions at low levels and in adverse
weather conditions, both during the day
and at night.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

MQ-1C Gray Eagle

MQ-1C Gray Eagle

Inventory: 158
Fleet age: 4.5 Date: 2011

Timeline: 2010–2022

The Gray Eagle is a medium-altitude
long-endurance (MALE) unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) used to conduct
ISR missions. The use of MALE UAVs is
a new capability for the Army. The Gray
Eagle is currently in production.

Size
Score

HealthScore

The MQ-1C UAV provides Army reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities. The Armyis continuing to procure MQ-1Cs to replace combat losses.
PROCUREMENT
277

SPENDING ($ millions)$6,140$1* Additional procurement expected.
NOTES: See Methodology for descriptions of scores. Fleet age is the average between the first and last years of delivery. The
date is the year of first delivery. The timeline is from the first year of procurement to the last year of delivery/procurement.
Spending does not include advanced procurement or research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military379

U.S. Army Modernization Table Citations
GENERAL SOURCES• U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Comprehensive Selected Acquisition Reports for the Annual 2019 Reporting
Requirement as Updated by the President’s Fiscal Year 2021 Budget,” https://media.defense.gov/2020/Nov/19/2002538295/-1/1/0/SAR-SUMMARY-TABLES-DEC-2019-UPDATED.PDF (accessed August 20, 2021).
• U.S. Department of the Army, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army, Justification Book of Aircraft
Procurement, Army, May 2021, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/
Procurement/ACFT_FY_2022_PB_Aircraft_Procurement_Army.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
• U.S. Department of the Army, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army, Justification Book Volume 1of 3, Other Procurement, Army: Other Procurement, Army, Tactical and Support Vehicles, Budget Activity 1, May 2021, https://www.
asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/Procurement/OPA_BA_1_FY_2022_PB_Other_
Procurement_BA1_Tactical_and_Support_Vehicles.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
• U.S. Department of the Army, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army, Justification Book ofProcurement of W&TCV, Army, May 2021, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20
Budget/Procurement/WTCV_FY_2022_PB_Procurement_of_Weapons_and_Tracked_Combat_Vehicles.pdf (accessed August20, 2021).
• U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request: Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, May 2021, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Weapons.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).

﻿

PROGRAM SOURCES
Abrams:• Congressional Budget Office, “Projected Acquisition Costs for the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicles,” April 2021, https://www.cbo.
gov/system/files/2021-03/57085-ground-combat-vehicles.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
Bradley:• Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45519, updated June 8, 2021, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45519/18 (accessed August 20, 2021).
JLTV:• Andrew Feickert, “Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Reportfor Members and Committees of Congress No. RS22942, updated July 13, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22942.pdf(accessed August 20, 2021).
AMPV:• Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV),” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. IF11741,
updated June 3, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/IF11741.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
UH-60L Black Hawk:• “UH-60A/L Black Hawk Helicopter,” Military.com, https://www.military.com/equipment/uh-60a-l-black-hawk (accessed August 20,2021).

380

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes
Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.

2.

The Honorable John E. Whitley, Secretary of the Army, Acting, and General James P. McConville, Chief of Staff, UnitedStates Army, statement “On the Posture of the United States Army” before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, May 5, 2021, p. [7], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP02/20210505/112531/
HHRG-117-AP02-Wstate-McConvilleJ-20210505.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).

3.

Major General Paul A. Chamberlain, Director, Army Budget, “Army Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Overview,” U.S. Army, May 28, 2021,
passim, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/pbr/PB22%20Rollout%20Brief%20Final%20_
as%20of%2025%20May%202021_V15.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).

4.

Brad Knickerbocker, “Gates’s Warning: Avoid Land War in Asia, Middle East, and Africa,” The Christian Science Monitor, February
26, 2011, https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0226/Gates-s-warning-Avoid-land-war-in-Asia-Middle-East-and-Africa(accessed June 7, 2021).

5.

Association of the United States Army, “Army Exceeds Fiscal Year 2020 End Strength Goal,” October 9, 2020, https://www.ausa.
org/news/army-exceeds-fiscal-year-2020-end-strength-goal (accessed June 7, 2021).

6.

Morgan Bazilian and Cullen Hendrix, “An Age of Actorless Threats: Rethinking National Security in Light of COVID and Climate,”
Just Security, October 23, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/72939/an-age-of-actorless-threats-re-thinking-national-security-inlight-of-covid-and-climate/ (accessed June 7, 2021).

7.

Nicholas Florko, “New Document Reveals Scope and Structure of Operation Warp Speed and Underscores Vast Military
Involvement,” Stat, September 28, 2020, https://www.statnews.com/2020/09/28/operation-warp-speed-vast-militaryinvolvement/ (accessed June 7, 2021).

8.

Reuters, “Pentagon to Deploy 1,100 Troops to Help COVID-19 Vaccination Efforts,” February 5, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-healthcare-coronavirus-whitehouse-pen/pentagon-to-deploy-1100-troops-to-help-covid-19-vaccination-effortsidUSKBN2A529G (accessed June 7, 2021).

9.

U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “DEFENDER-Europe 21 Activities Begin This Month, Include Two Dozen Nations,” March 15, 2021,
https://www.army.mil/article/244260/defender_europe_21_activities_begin_this_month_include_two_dozen_nations(accessed June 7, 2021).

﻿1.

10. Jen Judson, “US Army Chief Says End Strength Will Stay Flat in Upcoming Budgets,” Defense News, March 16, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/global-force-symposium/2021/03/17/army-chief-says-end-strength-numbers-to-stayflat-in-upcoming-budgets/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
11. S. 365, Budget Control Act of 2011, Public Law 112-25, 112th Cong., August 2, 2011, https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ25/
PLAW-112publ25.pdf (accessed June 8, 2021).
12. “DOD Makes It Official: Budget Cuts Will Shrink Army to 420,000 Soldiers,” Inside Defense, January 10, 2014, https://
insidedefense.com/daily-news/dod-makes-it-official-budget-cuts-will-shrink-army-420000-soldiers (accessed June 7, 2021).
13. Elizabeth Howe, “Trump-Era Efforts to Boost Military Readiness Produced Mixed Results, GAO Finds,” Defense One, April 16,
2021, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/04/trump-era-efforts-boost-military-readiness-produced-mixed-results-gaofinds/173411/ (accessed June 7, 2021), and U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Readiness: Department of Defense
Domain Readiness Varied from Fiscal Year 2017 Through Fiscal Year 2019, GAO-21-279, April 2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/
gao-21-279.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
14. Thomas Spoehr, “Hits & Misses in Biden’s Interim National Security Guidance,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 8, 2021,
https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/hits-misses-bidens-interim-national-security-guidance. See also President
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, The White House, March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf (accessed June 8, 2021).
15. James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge, p. 4, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-DefenseStrategy-Summary.pdf (accessed June 8, 2021). See also National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The WhiteHouse, December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf(accessed June 8, 2021).
16. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, p. 6.
17. Council on Foreign Relations, “A Conversation with House Armed Services Chairman Adam Smith,” November 19, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-house-armed-services-chairman-adam-smith (accessed June 7, 2021).

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18. Aaron Mehta, “DoD Needs 3–5 Percent Annual Growth Through 2023, Top Officials Say,” Defense News, June 13, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/06/13/dod-needs-3-5-percent-annual-growth-through-2023-top-officials-say/(accessed June 7, 2021), and Paul Mcleary, “Flatline: SecDef Esper Says DoD Budgets Must Grow 3–5%,” Breaking Defense,
February 6, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/flatline-secdef-esper-says-dod-budgets-must-grow-3-5/ (accessed
June 7, 2021). “Real” growth means that the growth is in addition to inflation. As an example, if inflation equals 2 percent eachyear, real growth of 3 percent would equal 5 percent net growth.
19. Chamberlain, “Army Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Overview,” p. 4.
20. Testimony of John E. Whitley, Acting Secretary of the Army, in Congressional Quarterly, “House Appropriations Subcommittee
on Defense Holds Hearing on Fiscal 2022 Budget Request for the Army,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 5, 2021, https://plus.
cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6214685?5 (accessed June 7, 2021).
21. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “‘No More Fruit’ in Army’s Budget Tree: McConville,” Breaking Defense, May 14, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/no-more-fruit-in-armys-budget-tree-mcconville/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
22. Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, January 19, 2021, p. xi, https://armypubs.
army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31505-FM_3-96-000-WEB-1.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
23. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, Audit of Brigade Combat Team Readiness, Report No. DODIG-2020-028,
November 18, 2019, pp. 1–2, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Nov/20/2002214021/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2020-028.PDF (accessed June 5,2021).
24. Barbara Salazar Torreon and Andrew Feickert, “Defense Primer: Organization of U.S. Ground Forces,” Congressional ResearchService In Focus No. IF10571, updated December 11, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10571 (accessed June
5, 2021).
25. Andrew Feickert, “Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report
for Congress No. R42493, February 28, 2014, pp. 4, 14, and 18, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42493.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).

﻿

26. Association of the United States Army, “Army Brigade Combat Teams Are Reduced from 45 to 33,” August 1, 2013, https://www.
ausa.org/articles/army-brigade-combat-teams-are-reduced-45-33 (accessed June 7, 2021).
27. John H. Pendleton, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Army Readiness:
Progress and Challenges in Rebuilding Personnel, Equipping and Training,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Readinessand Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-19-367T,
February 6, 2019, p. 7, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-367t.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
28. Exhibit OP-5, “Budget Activity 01: Operating Forces; Activity Group 11: Land Forces; Detail by Subactivity Group 116: Aviation
Assets,” in U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Army, Volume I,
Operations and Maintenance, Army: Justification of Estimates, February 2020, p. 137, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/
Documents/BudgetMaterial/2021/Base%20Budget/Operation%20and%20Maintenance/OMA_VOL_1_FY_2021_PB_Army_
Volume_1.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
29. Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.
30. Feickert, “Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress,” pp. 3 and 18.
31. Based on data in Table 2.2, “Average Distribution of the Department of the Army’s Military Personnel, 2021 to 2025,” inCongressional Budget Office, The U.S. Military’s Force Structure: A Primer, 2021 Update, May 2021, p. 20, https://www.cbo.gov/
system/files/2021-05/57088-Force-Structure-Primer.pdf (accessed June 8, 2021).
32. U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet No. 525-3-1,
December 6, 2018, https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/02/26/b45372c1/20181206-tp525-3-1-the-us-army-in-mdo2028-final.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021). For more on the Multi-Domain Operations concept, see Thomas W. Spoehr, “Rebuilding
America’s Military Project: The United States Army,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 215, August 22, 2019, https://www.
heritage.org/defense/report/rebuilding-americas-military-project-the-united-states-army.
33. Devon L. Suits, “What Soldiers Need to Know About Multi-Domain Ops, Modernization,” U.S. Army, April 23, 2019, https://www.
army.mil/article/220663/what_soldiers_need_to_know_about_multi_domain_ops_modernization (accessed June 7, 2021).
34. Eric Pilgrim, “Historic V Corps Activates at Fort Knox on ‘Picture Perfect’ Day,” U.S. Army, October 16, 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/240038/historic_v_corps_activates_at_fort_knox_on_picture_perfect_day (accessed June 7, 2021).
35. Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF),” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. 11797, updated
April 13, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11797 (accessed June 7, 2021).
36. Andrew Feickert, “Army Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs),” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. 10675,
updated March 25, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10675 (accessed June 7, 2021).

382

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength37. Report No. 116-617, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Conference Report to
Accompany H.R. 6395, U.S. House of Representatives, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess., December 3, 2020, pp. 171 and 172, https://www.
congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt617/CRPT-116hrpt617.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
38. Testimony of General James G. McConville, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, in Congressional Quarterly, “House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense Holds Hearing on Fiscal 2022 Budget Request for the Army,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, May 5,
2021, https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6214685?5 (accessed June 7, 2021).
39. Jaspreet Gill, “McConville: Army Active-Duty End Strength Should Be ‘Somewhere Around’ 540K,” Inside Defense, March 25, 2021,
https://insidedefense.com/insider/mcconville-army-active-duty-end-strength-should-be-somewhere-around-540k (accessed
June 7, 2021). Punctuation as in original.
40. Meghann Myers, “Big Bonus Changes, Filling Units, New Slogan: Inside the Army’s Push to Recruit and Man a Bigger Force,” Army
Times, March 28, 2019, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/03/28/big-bonus-changes-filling-units-marketinginside-the-armys-push-to-recruit-and-man-a-bigger-force/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
41. Judson, “US Army Chief Says End Strength Will Stay Flat in Upcoming Budgets.”
42. Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States, Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment andRecommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission, pp. 35–36, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/
providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021). Emphasis in original. The commission’s report is undated but
was released in November 2018. Press release, “National Defense Strategy Commission Releases Its Review of 2018 National
Defense Strategy,” United States Institute of Peace, November 13, 2018, https://www.usip.org/press/2018/11/national-defensestrategy-commission-releases-its-review-2018-national-defense (accessed June 7, 2021).
43. Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, Secretary of the Army’s Office to the author, May 25, 2021.
44. Boost Labs, “The U.S. Army: Then & Now,” https://www.boostlabs.com/portfolio/u-s-army-now/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
45. See Andrew Gregory, “Maintaining a Deep Bench: Why Armored BCT Rotations in Europe and Korea Are Best for America’s
Global Security Requirements,” Modern War Institute at West Point, July 31, 2017, https://mwi.usma.edu/maintaining-deepbench-armored-bct-rotations-europe-korea-best-americas-global-security-requirements/ (accessed May 25, 2021), and Daniel
Kochis and Thomas Spoehr, “It’s Time to Move US Forces Back to Europe,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 15, 2017,https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/its-time-move-us-forces-back-europe.

﻿

46. Chamberlain, “Army Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Overview,” p. 9.
47. Transcript, “How the Army Is Adapting to Great Power Competition,” Brookings Institution Webinar, March 25, 2021, p. 13, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/fp_20210325_army_mcconville_transcript.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
48. Congressional Quarterly, “Heritage Foundation Holds Webinar on the Army and Great Power Competition,” CQ NewsmakerTranscripts, February 17, 2021, https://plus.cq.com/doc/newsmakertranscripts-6130618?4&searchId=69Nsjt4V (accessed June 7,2021).
49. Center for Strategic and International Studies, China Power Project, “How Are China’s Land-based Conventional Missile Forces
Evolving?” updated May 12, 2021, https://chinapower.csis.org/conventional-missiles/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
50. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of Russia,” Missile Threat, last modified February
11, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/russia/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
51. Peter Suciu, “Russia Begins Production of T-14 Armata Tanks, Including Those for Export,” The National Interest, The Buzz
Blog, August 4, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-begins-production-t-14-armata-tanks-including-thoseexport-166219 (accessed June 7, 2021).
52. Amanda Macias, “At Least 13 Countries Are Interested in Buying a Russian Missile System Instead of Platforms Made by US
Companies, Despite the Threat of Sanctions,” CNBC, updated November 15, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/14/countriesinterested-in-buying-russian-missile-system-despite-us-sanction-threats.html (accessed June 7, 2021).
53. Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, p. 1-15.
54. U.S. Army, Acquisition Support Center, “Abrams Tank Upgrade,” https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/gcs-m1-abrams-mainbattle-tank/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
55. Table 5, “ABCT Allocations,” in Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background andIssues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R44229, April 5, 2016,p. 13, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44229.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
56. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “OMFV: Army Tries to Make Life Easier for Industry,” Breaking Defense, December 11, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/12/omfv-army-tries-to-make-life-easier-for-industry/ (accessed June 7, 2021).

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57. Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45519, updated April 19, 2021, pp. 13,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R45519.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
58. Matthew Cox, “Army Studying Whether M1 Tank Replacement Should Be Driver-Optional,” Military.com, September 4, 2019,https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/09/04/army-studying-whether-m1-tank-replacement-should-be-driver-optional.
html (accessed June 7, 2021).
59. Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.
60. Jen Judson, “US Army’s Newest Tracked Vehicle Will Undergo Initial Operational Test in Early 2022,” Defense News, March 1, 2021,
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/03/01/us-armys-newest-tracked-vehicle-will-undergo-initial-operational-test-inearly-2022/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
61. Exhibit P-40, “Budget Line Item Justification: PB 2022 Army,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 2944G80819 / Armored Multi
Purpose Vehicle (AMPV), in U.S. Department of the Army, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates,
Army, Justification Book of Procurement of W&TCV, Army, May 2021, p. 3, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/Procurement/WTCV_FY_2022_PB_Procurement_of_Weapons_and_Tracked_Combat_
Vehicles.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
62. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, p. 1-11.
63. Table 6, “SBCT Allocations,” in Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background andIssues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R44229, April 5, 2016,p. 13, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44229.pdf (accessed June 7, 2021).
64. Kyle Rempfer, “New Upgunned Stryker Arrives in Europe,” Army Times, December 19, 2017, https://www.armytimes.com/
news/2017/12/19/new-upgunned-stryker-arrives-in-europe/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
65. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Reassures Anxious Industry over Stryker Cannon Competition,” Breaking Defense, June 17, 2020,
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/army-rebuffs-anxiety-over-stryker-cannon-competition/ (accessed June 7, 2021).

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66. Scott R. Gourley, “Army Begins Fielding Upgraded Third-Generation Strykers,” National Defense, September 18, 2020, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/9/18/army-begins-fielding-upgraded-third-generation-strykers (accessed
June 8, 2021).
67. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, p. 1-1. Emphasis in original.
68. Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.
69. Exhibit P-40, “Budget Line Item Justification: PB 22 Army,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 5600D15603 / Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle, in U.S. Department of the Army, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army, Justification
Book Volume 1 of 3: Other Procurement, Army, Tactical and Support Vehicles, Budget Activity 1, May 2021, p. 47, https://www.
asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/Procurement/OPA_BA_1_FY_2022_PB_Other_
Procurement_BA1_Tactical_and_Support_Vehicles.pdf (accessed June 8, 2021).
70. Exhibit P-40, “Budget Line Item Justification: PB 22 Army,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 5731D15610 / Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
Family of Vehicles, in ibid., pp. 48–50.
71. Jen Judson, “Light Tank Prototypes Arrive at Fort Bragg for Soldier Evaluation,” Defense News, December 11, 2020, https://www.
defensenews.com/land/2020/12/11/light-tank-prototypes-arrive-at-fort-bragg-for-soldier-evaluation/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
72. Aaron Mehta, “GM Defense Wins Infantry Squad Vehicle Production Contract,” Defense News, June 29, 2020, https://www.
defensenews.com/land/2020/06/29/gm-defense-wins-infantry-squad-vehicle-production-contract/ (accessed June 8, 2021).
73. Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.
74. Exhibit P-40, “Budget Line Item Justification: PB 22 Army,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 6771AA0005 / UH-60 Blackhawk
M Model (MYP), in U.S. Department of the Army, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army,
Justification Book of Aircraft Procurement, Army, May 2021, p. 38, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/Procurement/ACFT_FY_2022_PB_Aircraft_Procurement_Army.pdf (accessed June 8,2021).
75. Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.
76. Exhibit P-40, “Budget Line Item Justification: PB 22 Army,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 6775A05101 / CH-47 Helicopter, in U.S.
Department of the Army, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army, Justification Book of Aircraft
Procurement, Army, pp. 58–60.
77. Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.

384

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength78. Exhibit P-40, “Budget Line Item Justification: PB 22 Army,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 5757A05111 / AH-64 Apache Block
IIIA Reman, and P-1 Line Item Number 5840A05133 / AH-64 Apache Block IIIB New Build, in U.S. Department of the Army,
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army, Justification Book of Aircraft Procurement, Army, pp.
17–34.
79. Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.
80. Feickert, “The Army’s M-1 Abrams, M-2/M-3 Bradley, and M-1126 Stryker: Background and Issues for Congress,” pp. 1 and 14–15.
81. “Gen. Mark Milley: The Biggest Security Challenges for the U.S.,” interview with General Mark A. Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs ofStaff, The Wall Street Journal, updated December 13, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/gen-mark-milley-the-biggest-securitychallenges-for-the-u-s-11607824353 (accessed June 8, 2021).
82. U.S. Army, “2019 U.S. Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future,” released October 2019, pp. 1, 6, and 7, https://www.
army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2019_army_modernization_strategy_final.pdf (accessed June 8, 2021).
83. Whitley and McConville, statement “On the Posture of the United States Army,” May 5, 2021, p. [10].
84. Freedberg, “‘No More Fruit’ in Army’s Budget Tree: McConville.”
85. Jen Judson, “First Short-Range Air Defense Systems Deploy to Europe,” Defense News, April 23, 2021, https://www.defensenews.
com/land/2021/04/23/first-short-range-air-defense-systems-deploy-to-europe/ (accessed June 7, 2021).
86. Whitley and McConville, statement “On the Posture of the United States Army,” May 5, 2021, p. [11].
87. Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Volume 1, Operationand Maintenance, Army, Justification of Estimates, May 2021, p. 2, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/Operation%20and%20Maintenance/OMA_VOL_1_FY_2022_PB.pdf (accessed June 8,2021).
91. Ibid., p. 2.

﻿

92. Ibid., p. 63.
93. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350–50, “Combat Training Center Program,” May 2, 2018, p. 2, https://
armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN8650_AR350_50_Final.pdf (accessed June 8, 2021).
94. “Budget Activity 01: Operating Forces; Activity Group 11: Land Forces; Detail by Subactivity Group 111: Maneuver Units,” in
U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Volume 1, Operation and
Maintenance, Army National Guard, Justification Book, May 2021, p. 44, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/
BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/Operation%20and%20Maintenance/OMNG_VOL_1_FY_2022_PB.pdf (accessed June
8, 2021), and “Budget Activity 01: Operating Forces; Activity Group 11: Land Forces; Detail by Subactivity Group 115: Land Forces
Operations Support,” in U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Volume 1,
Operation and Maintenance, Army, Justification of Estimates, p. 115.
95. Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s New Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model,” Congressional Research Service In
Focus No. 11670, updated March 9, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11670 (accessed June 7, 2021).
96. Devon Suits, “Army Implementing ReARMM Unit Life Cycle Model,” Army News Service, March 2, 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/243828/army_implementing_rearmm_unit_life_cycle_model (accessed June 7, 2021).
97. Note that the first figures derive from an average BCT size of 4,500 and average division size of 15,000. The second set of
numbers derives from the current average of around 3.5 BCTs per division and analysis of the structure of each Army division.
98. Email from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Office to the author, May 25, 2021.
99. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, Audit of Brigade Combat Team Readiness, p. 3.

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U.S. Navy
Brent Sadler

T

l

l

COVID-19 vaccines have been approved,
enabling officers and sailors to be vaccinated at higher rates relative to thenational average.
In late April 2021, the Navy conducted its
first multi-platform manned-unmanned
fleet experiment, Integrated Battle Problem 21 (UxS IBP21).

llHighlighting the importance of maritime choke points to national security,
on March 23, 2021, container ship Ever
Given ran aground in the Suez Canaland stopped the flow of maritime traffic
through the canal for 11 days, delaying transit of the Eisenhower Carrier
Strike Group.4
Because of a catastrophic fire in mid-July
2020, USS Bonhomme Richard (LHA-6)
was decommissioned just halfway throughits planned service life.

Strategic Framework. The Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard (known collectively
as the sea services) have enabled the U.S. toproject power across the oceans, controlling
activities on the seas when and where needed. To address today’s maritime competition
more effectively, the sea services have released
a new naval strategy, Advantage at Sea. If the
new strategy is executed, the Navy will be
conducting more assertive forward presence
operations to challenge Chinese and Russian
maritime coercion.5
As the U.S. military’s primary maritime
arm, the Navy will provide the enduring forward global presence required of this strategy
while retaining war-winning forces. The Navy
therefore continues to focus its investments
in several functional areas: power projection,
control of the seas, maritime security, strategic
deterrence, and domain access. This approachis informed by several key documents:

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military387﻿he Navy’s enacted budget for fiscal year
(FY) 2021 was $162.9 billion. The goal
was to balance readiness, lethality, and capacity so that the Navy could be “agile and readyto fight today while also committing to thetraining, maintenance, and modernization toensure [that it] can fight and win tomorrow.”1
The proposed FY 2022 Navy budget is $163.9
billion for an overall increase of 1 percent.2
The budget themes for the Department of
the Navy (which includes both the U.S. Navyand the U.S. Marine Corps) under the Biden
Administration are “Defend the Nation” (toinclude “rapid innovation”); “Take Care of
Our People” (to include “building resilienceand readiness”); and “Succeed through Teamwork.”3 Unfortunately, the Navy is under immense strain to maintain readiness for combat
while also conducting the daily operations necessary in peacetime to compete with the activities of China and Russia.
In the year since publication of the 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength, there have been
several significant developments that are important to the Navy.

l

l

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l

The 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance;6
The December 2020 Advantage at Sea
naval strategy;7The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS);8 and
The Global Force Management Allocation
Plan (GFMAP).9

U.S. official strategic guidance increasingly
requires the Navy to act beyond the demands ofconventional warfighting. China and Russia use
their fleets to establish a physical presence in regions that are important to their economic andsecurity interests in order to influence the policies of other countries. To counter their influence, the U.S. Navy similarly sails ships in thesewaters to reassure allies of U.S. commitments
and to signal to competitors that they do nothave a free hand to impose their will. This meansthat the Navy must balance two key missions: ensuring that it has a fleet ready for war while alsousing that fleet for peacetime “presence” operations. Both missions require crews and ships thatare materially ready for action and a fleet that islarge enough to maintain presence and marshal
enough combat power to win in battle.
This Index focuses on the following elements as the primary criteria by which to measure U.S. naval strength:lll

Sufficient capacity to defeat enemies inmajor combat operations and provide a
credible peacetime forward presence tomaintain freedom of shipping lanes anddeter aggression;Sufficient technical capability to ensurethat the Navy is able to defeat potential
adversaries; andSufficient readiness to ensure that the
fleet can “fight tonight” given propermaterial maintenance, personnel training,and physical well-being.

388

Capacity
Force Structure. The Navy is unique relative to the other services in that its capacity requirements must meet two separate objectives:
1. During peacetime, the Navy must maintain a global presence in distant regions
both to deter potential aggressors and toassure allies and security partners.
2. The Navy must be able to win wars. To thisend, the Navy measures capacity by thesize of its battle force, which is composedof ships it considers directly connected tocombat missions.10
This Index continues the benchmark set in
the 2019 Index: 400 ships to ensure the capability to fight two major regional contingencies(MRCs) simultaneously or nearly simultaneously, plus a 20 percent strategic reserve, andhistorical levels of 100 ships forward deployedin peacetime.11 This 400-ship fleet is centeredon providing:lll

13 Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs);
13 carrier air wings with a minimum of
624 strike fighter aircraft;12 and
15 Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs).13

Unmanned platforms are not included
because they have not matured as a practicalasset. They hold great potential and will likely
be a significant capability, but until they aredeveloped and fielded in larger numbers, theirimpact on the Navy’s warfighting potential remains speculative. The same holds true acrossthe fleet when it comes to new classes of ships.
The Navy is investing in research, modeling,
war gaming, and intellectual exercises to improve its understanding of the potential utility of new ship and fleet designs. Consequently,
this Index measures what is known and can be
known in naval affairs, assessing the current
Navy’s size, modernity, and readiness to perform its most important missions today.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 16

Key U.S. Naval Installations
9
2
4

3

U.S.

7

1

RUSSIA

2F

8

10

6
5

11

6F

CHINA
12
13

Fleet
3F

16 17
18
19
20

5F
14

15

7F

6F

21

AUSTRALIA

4F

ANTARCTICA

Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickham, HI
U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters

12

Naval Support Activity, Bahrain
U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters

22

Naval Base Kitsap, WA

13

Lemonnier, Djibouti—Camp Lemonnier

33

Naval Station Everett, WA

14

4

Naval Base San Diego and Naval BaseCoronado, CA
U.S. Third Fleet headquarters

Diego Garcia—Navy Support Facility Diego
Garcia15

Singapore—Commander Logistics Group
Western Pacific

55

Naval Station Mayport, FL
U.S. Fourth Fleet headquarters

16

Buson, South Korea—Fleet Activities
Chinhae Navy Base

66

Naval Submarine Base King’s Bay, GA

1777

Naval Base Norfolk and Joint Expeditionary
Base Little Creek, VA
U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Second
Fleet headquarters

U.S. Fleet Activity Yokosuka, Japan
U.S. Seventh Fleet headquarters

18

U.S. Fleet Activity Sasebo, Japan

19

Okinawa, Japan—Naval Base White Beach

88

Naval Submarine Base New London, CT

99

Keflavik, Iceland—Expeditionary Maritime
Operations Center

1010Naval Station Rota, Spain

11

Naval Support Activity Gaeta, Italy
U.S. Sixth Fleet headquarters

20 Naval Base Guam—Navy Expeditionary
20
Force Command Pacific headquarters

21

Darwin, Australia—Marine Rotational Force
DarwinNOTE: Fleet boundaries are approximate.
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

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389

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11

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

South
China Sea

CHINA
YS
6 DA

Pacific
Ocean

PanamaCanal
DivertSan Diego

S
AY
8D

Atlantic
Ocean

Norfolk

9 DAYSSOUTH
AMERICA

Baltimorel)
6 DAYS (rai

U.S.

22 DA
YS*

Long Beach

AlaskaPearl Harbor

12 DAYS

9 DAYS

27 DAYS

Guam

AUSTRALIA

5

S
DAY

Yokosuka* Assumes no delay in passage through the Panama Canal.
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

IndianOcean

Strait of
HormuzRUSSIA

ArcticOcean

Steam times are approximate based on an average speed of 15 knots.

Steaming Times to Areas of Vital U.S. National Interest

MAP 17

﻿

29
DA
YS

390
Gibraltar

GI UK Gap

26 DAYSAFRICA

Suez Canal

5 DAY
S

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Suez
Canal
DivertS
AY
6D

Strait of
HormuzRUSSIAl

Homeporting. The ships, crew, and theirfamilies are stationed at the port or basedabroad (e.g., a CSG in Yokosuka, Japan).

lForward Stationing. Only the ships are
based abroad while crews are rotated out
to the ship.18 This deployment model iscurrently used for Littoral Combat Ships(LCS) and Ohio-class guided missile submarines (SSGNs) manned with rotating
blue and gold crews, effectively doubling
the normal forward deployment time (e.g.,
LCS in Singapore).

These options allow one forward-based
ship to provide a greater level of presence
than four ships based in the continental UnitedStates (CONUS) can provide by offsetting thetime needed to transit ships to and familiarize their crews with distant theaters.19 This iscaptured in the Navy’s GFM planning assumptions: a forward-deployed presence rate of 19
percent for a CONUS-based ship compared
to a 67 percent presence rate for an overseas-­
homeported ship.20 To date, the Navy’s use of
homeporting and forward stationing has not
mitigated the reduction in overall fleet size on
forward presence.
Shipbuilding Capacity. To meet statedfleet-size goals, the Navy must build and maintain ships. Significant shortfalls in shipyards,
both government and commercial, make bothof these tasks hard to accomplish, and underfunded defense budgets make accomplishingthem even more difficult. Given the limited
ability to build ships, the Navy will struggle
to meet the congressionally mandated 355ship goal,21 much less the 400 ships called forin this Index.
A bright spot in FY 2020 was the Navy’s
procurement of 12 ships, which marked a highpoint in shipbuilding over the past 20 years.22
However, subsequent procurement has not
kept pace. The Navy purchased 10 new warships in FY 2021 and will purchase anothereight in FY 2022,23 but it will not meet congressional mandates for a fleet of 12 aircraft carriers.24 Instead, the aircraft carrier fleet could
shrink to nine (possibly augmented by a light
carrier yet to be defined).25
Meanwhile, diminished demand for ships
has led shipbuilders to divest workforce and

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﻿

Relative to the above metric, the Navy’s
current fleet of 297 warships is inadequate andplaces greater strain on the ability of ships andcrews to meet existing operational requirements. To alleviate the operational stress onan undersized fleet, the Navy has attempted
since 2016 to build a larger fleet. However, for
myriad reasons, it has been unable to achievesustained growth. In the past, the Navy has had
some success in meeting operational requirements with fewer ships by posturing ships forward as it has done in Rota, Spain, and Guam.
Posture/Presence. Although the Navy remains committed to sustaining forward presence, it has struggled to meet the requests ofregional Combatant Commanders. The result
has been longer and more frequent deployments to meet a historical steady-state forward presence of 100 warships.14 At the heightof the Cold War in 1985, the percentage of the
571-ship fleet deployed was less than 15 percent, and throughout the 1990s, deployments
seldom exceeded the six-month norm: Only
4 percent to 7 percent of the fleet exceeded
six-month deployments on an annual basis.15
Using the Navy’s aircraft carrier fleet—the
most taxed platform—as a sample set, for 20
years, approximately 25 percent of the aircraft
carrier fleet has been deployed. Following the2017 deadly collisions involving USS McCain
and USS Fitzgerald, this dropped temporarily
to less than 20 percent, but it surged again toalmost 30 percent in 2020.16
The numbers as of July 12, 2021, are fairly
typical for a total battle force of 297 deployable ships with 83 warships at sea: 58 deployed
and underway and 25 underway on local operations for an operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of
28 percent, nearly double the OPTEMPO thatcharacterized the Cold War.17 Given Combatant Commanders’ requirements for naval presence, there is impetus to have as many ships
forward deployed as possible by:﻿

delay capital investments. From 2005 to 2020, sailors.33 As of June 10, 2021, the Navy consistthe Navy’s procurement of new warships in- ed of 342,911 officers and sailors, 17,484 shortcreased the size of the fleet from 291 to 296 of the number needed by 2034.34 To improvewarships; at the same time, China’s navy grew personnel readiness and meet the demands offrom 216 to 360 warships.26 If the Navy is to a growing fleet, the Navy added 5,100 sailors
build a larger fleet, more shipbuilders will have in FY 2020.35 The FY 2021 budget continued
to be hired and trained—a lengthy process that these increases in active-duty manning end
precedes any expansion of the fleet. Sadly, la- strength by an additional 7,300 sailors.36 The
bor statistics from 2017 to 2020 show trends Navy recently exceeded retention and recruitin the opposite direction with total shipbuild- ment goals for FY 2020 and appears to be on
ing labor involved in production, like welders track to meet its FY 2021 recruitment goals. It
and pipefitters, shrinking 3 percent for a loss remains to be seen, however, whether high reof 1,950 workers and wages falling relative to tention and recruitment rates can be sustained
inflation.27 The consequence is a reduction to meet long-range manning needs.
in the shipbuilding sector’s capacity to meet
Despite the acknowledged need to increase
emergent demands from the Navy.
the Navy’s cadre of officers and enlisted sailOf particular concern is the increased pro- ors, the President’s FY 2022 budget goes in theduction of nuclear-powered warships, most no- opposite direction for the first time in years.
tably nuclear-powered submarines that would This proposed budget reduces the Navy’s end
be vital in any conflict with China. Limited nu- strength by 1,600 officers and sailors in the Acclear shipbuilding capacity28 may constrain the tive component and 200 in the reserves while
Navy’s plans to increase the build rate from two increasing the civilian workforce by 1,141 fullattack submarines to three while concurrently time employees.37 Moreover, under the theme
building one ballistic missile submarine.29 To of “Take Care of Our People,” it shrinks higher
support a larger nuclear-powered fleet, the education funding by $117 million and otherrelevant public shipyards have increased their “key educational programs” such as the Reserve
workforce by 16 percent since 2013.30 Howev- Officer Training Corps (ROTC) by another $4
er, as demand increases for nuclear-powered million.38 Such reductions are surprising inwarships to pace the threat from China and view of the Government Accountability Office’s
Russia into the foreseeable future, it remains recent findings that persistent crew manningto be seen whether the public shipyards will be shortfalls on ships are as high as 15 percent andable to sustain the recruitment of skilled labor compound crew fatigue, which was a contribin the numbers needed.
uting factor in several fatal collisions in 2017.39
As it stands today, the most senior naval ofFinally, the effort to attract people to join
ficer, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), has the Navy is made more difficult by wages that
admitted that current funding will not build are not keeping up with civilian wages. It isor maintain the larger fleet that both the Navy therefore not helpful that a 2.7 percent pay
and this Index say is needed and Congress has raise is planned in FY 2022 at a time when
mandated. At best, the Navy has assessed that inflation continues to increase: On August 11,
it will only be able to maintain a fleet of “about 2021, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics re300 to 305 ships.”31
ported that “[t]he all items index rose 5.4 perManpower. In 2018, the Navy assessed that cent for the 12 months ending July, the sameits manpower would need to grow by approx- increase as the period ending July.”40
imately 35,000 to achieve an end strength of360,395 sailors to support a 355-ship Navy;32 Capability
for comparison, the last time the Navy had
A complete measure of naval capabilities rea similar number of ships was in 1997, when quires an assessment of U.S. platforms against
it had 359 ships and 398,847 officers and enemy weapons in plausible scenarios. The

392

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

TABLE 4

Navy Fleet Design
Starting
Point

Navy Plan(Dec. 2020)

Jan. 2021

2023

2028

2035

2023

2035

Range perFuture Naval
Force Study

Unmanned (LUSV, MUSV, XLUUV)

0

9

48

136

2

110

143 to 242

Aircraft Carriers (CVN, CVNE, CVS)

11

11

12

15

11

11

8 to 17

Recommendation

Large Surface Combatant

91

103

111

94

92

86

73 to 88

Small Surface Combatant

30

32

38

56

37

58

60 to 67

Logistics and Support Vessels

63

71

98

135

70

96

96 to 117

Submarines (SSBN, SSGN, SSN)

68

78

77

82

72

74

84 to 90

Amphibious Warships

33

34

42

57

28

52

61 to 67

Total Without Unmanned

296

329

378

439

310

377

382 to 446

Total

296

338

426

575

312

487

525 to 688

SOURCES: U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Warfighting Requirements andCapabilities–OPNAV N9), Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels, December 9, 2020,
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/10/2002549918/-1/-1/1/SHIPBUILDING%20PLAN%20DEC%20 20_NAVY_OSD_OMB_FINAL.PDF(accessed August 19, 2021), and Heritage Foundation research.

Navy routinely conducts war games, exercises, and simulations to assess this, but insight
into its assessments is limited by their classified nature. This Index therefore assesses capability based on remaining hull life, mission
effectiveness, payloads, and the feasibility ofmaintaining the platform’s technological edge.
Most of the Navy’s fleet consists of older
platforms; of the Navy’s 20 classes of ships,
only eight are in production. However, acrossthe Department of the Navy’s $211.7 billion
FY 2022 budget,41 investment in future capability will see the largest real dollar increase($2.5 billion) and relative increase (12.4 percent) over the previous year.42 The following
are highlights by platform.
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN).
The Columbia-class will relieve the aging
Ohio-class SSBN fleet. Because of the implications of this for the nation’s strategic nuclear

deterrence, the Columbia-class SSBN remains
the Navy’s top acquisition priority. To ensure
the continuity of this leg of the U.S. nuclear
triad, the first Columbia-class SSBN must be
delivered on time for its first deterrent patrolin 2031.43 To achieve this goal, the Navy signed
a $9.47 billion contract in November 2020 with
General Dynamics Electric Boat for the first inclass boat and advanced procurement for longlead-time components of the second hull.44
Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN). SSNs
are multi-mission platforms whose stealthenables clandestine intelligence collection;
surveillance; anti-submarine warfare (ASW);
anti-surface warfare (ASuW); special operations forces insertion and extraction; land attack strikes; and offensive mine warfare. The
newest class of SSN, the Block V Virginia with
the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) enhancement, is important to the Navy’s overall strike

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CHART 7

U.S. vs. China and Russia Navies: Fleet Expansion Trends
NUMBER OF HULLS

Russia800

China Maritime Militia
600

China Coast Guard

400

U.S. NAVY

200

﻿

0

China Battle Force

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

NOTE: U.S. figures are actual through 2020. Figures for 2025 and 2030 are from the Navy’s December 2020 30-year shipbuilding plan.
See U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Warfighting Requirements andCapabilities–OPNAV N9), Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels, December 9, 2020,
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/10/2002549918/-1/-1/1/SHIPBUILDING%20PLAN%20DEC%2020_NAVY_OSD_OMB_FINAL.PDF(accessed September 3, 2021).
SOURCES:• Figure 1, “Growth of China’s Maritime Forces Since 2000,” in U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard,
Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, December 2020, p. 4, https://media.defense.gov/2020/
Dec/16/2002553074/-1/-1/0/TRISERVICESTRATEGY.PDF (accessed September 2, 2021).
• Table 2, “Numbers of Chinese and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships, 2000–2030,” in Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members
and Committees of Congress No. RL33153, updated January 27, 2021, p. 32, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/
RL/RL33153/248 (accessed September 2, 2021).
• U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition, December 2015, https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/
historic.pdf (accessed September 2, 2021).
• Michael A. McDevitt, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), prepared statement in hearing, Department of Defense’s Role in Competingwith China, Committee of Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 116th Cong. 2nd Sess., January 15, 2020, pp. 76–88,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-116hhrg40508/pdf/CHRG-116hhrg40508.pdf (accessed September 2, 2021).
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capacity, enabling the employment of an additional 28 Tomahawk cruise missiles over earlier SSN variants.45
The FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act included additional funds for advanced procurement that preserves a future394

option to buy as many as 10 Virginia-classsubmarines through FY 2023. As indicatedpreviously, increasing Virginia-class production has raised concerns regarding strain on
the industrial base. Complicating matters is
the recently revealed premature replacement

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

CHART 8

U.S. vs. China and Russia Navies: Hull Classes
NUMBER OF HULLS■ U.S. ■ China ■ Russia

100
80
60
40
20
0

Aircraft
Carriers

Large Surface
Warships(CG, DDG)

Small Surface
Warships(FFG, DDC,
PPG)

Submarines(SS, SSN, SSGN,
SSBN)*

CombatLogistics

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of parts that were intended to last for the life of 79), christened on December 7, 2019, is more
the boat. That such life-of-ship parts had to be than 76 percent complete. Given recent shifts
replaced further taxes the ability of suppliers in shipyard workloads due to later than anticito meet the demand for new SSNs.46
pated Kennedy construction and planned NimAircraft Carriers (CVN). The Navy has 11 itz overhaul, the Navy recently renegotiatednuclear-powered aircraft carriers: 10 Nimitz-­ the Kennedy to single-phase contracting, whichclass and one Ford-class. The Navy has been is intended to ensure that the ship is ready tomaking progress in overcoming nagging is- support F-35C fighters before its anticipatedsues with several advanced systems, notably delivery to the fleet on June 30, 2024.48
the advanced weapons elevators, but has not
Large Surface Combatants. The Naannounced any delay in USS Ford’s first oper- vy’s large surface combatants consist of theational deployment in FY 2022.47 The second Ticonderoga-­class cruiser, the Zumwalt-class deship in the class, USS John F. Kennedy (CVN stroyer, and the Arleigh Burke–class destroyer. If

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﻿* USN ballistic missile submarines are not included because their mission is strategic deterrence, which makes it unlikely that they will
be employed in a combat zone.
SOURCES:• Michael A. McDevitt, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), prepared statement in hearing, Department of Defense’s Role in Competingwith China, Committee of Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 116th Cong. 2nd Sess., January 15, 2020, pp. 76–88,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-116hhrg40508/pdf/CHRG-116hhrg40508.pdf (accessed September 2, 2021).
• Graphic, “Major Naval Units,” in U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military
and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2020, p. 49, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/
2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF (accessed September 3, 2021).
• International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 196–199, 235–237, and 261–263, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance (accessed September 3, 2021).

CHART 9

U.S. vs. China and Russia Navies: Missile Density
Missile density is calculated as thenumber of total launchers divided
by the number of total platforms.

80

72.3

70
60
50
40
30

﻿

Strike and
Air Defense
Weapon Density

20

9.7

11.5

Russia

China

U.S.

Total Launchers

746

2,932

10,696

Total Platforms

77

254

148

10
0

NOTES: Numbers of launchers do not include reloads. Launchers include torpedo tubes, vertical launch tubes (submarine and surface
ships), and mounted canister launchers.
SOURCES: U.S. Navy, Office of Information, “Fact Files,” https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/ (accessed September 3, 2021),
and Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Vessel Register, “Ship Battle Forces,” https://www.nvr.navy.mil/NVRSHIPS/SHIPBATTLEFORCE.HTML (accessed September 3, 2021).
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the Navy executes the President’s FY 2022 budget, it will decommission “15 Battle Force Ships”
including seven cruisers.49 The effect is a measurable reduction of the fleet’s aggregate firepowerof 854 vertical launch tubes for launching strikeand defensive weapons—a 9 percent reductionof overall surface fleet firepower. Attempts toextend the life of the aging Ticonderoga-classcruisers have yielded mixed results as deferred
upgrades and past incomplete maintenance are
now driving up operating costs.50
In FY 2022, the Navy intends to procure
one Arleigh Burke–class DDG 51 destroyer;
there is no intention of resuming constructionof Zumwalt destroyers beyond the three previously purchased and being built out. The first
Zumwalt destroyer (DDG-1000) was delivered

396

on April 24, 2020; the second, USS Michael
Monsoor (DDG-1001), was commissioned on
January 26, 2019; and the third, USS Lyndon
B. Johnson (DDG-1002), should complete construction in November 2021.51 The Zumwalt
was to achieve initial operational capability(IOC) by September, but it is more likely that
IOC will be achieved in December 2021.52
To reach 355 ships by 2034, the Navy plansseveral class-wide service life extensions, notably the extension of DDG-51-class service life
from 35 to 40 years and modernization of older
hulls. The FY 2020 budget included $4 billion
for modernization of 19 destroyers from FY
2021 through FY 2024.53 The previously noteddecommissioning of seven cruisers in FY 2022
makes this more critical.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthfrigates to four a year by FY 2025 with theaddition of a second “follow yard” by FY 2023.
Austal USA has broken new ground on a steel
production facility in an effort to become thissecond yard.62
Amphibious Ships. Commandant of the
Marine Corps General David Berger issued the38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance in July
2019 and Force Design 2030 in March 2020.
Both documents signaled a break with past Marine Corps requests for amphibious lift, specifically moving away from the requirement for
38 amphibious ships to support an amphibious
force of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades(MEB).63 The Commandant envisions a larger
yet affordable fleet of smaller, low-­signatureamphibious ships—the so-called Light Amphibious Warship (LAW)—that enable littoral
maneuver and associated logistics support ina contested theater.64 Today, the amphibious
fleet remains centered on fewer large ships, but
the Navy’s Future Naval Force Study (FNFS)65
and December 2020 30-year shipbuilding plan
acknowledged the growing importance of the
LAW, which will have to be produced rapidly
and in sufficient numbers in order to actualize
the naval forces’ distributed concepts of operations (e.g., Marine Littoral Regiments andMaritime Distributed Operations).
As of July 14, 2021, the Navy had nine amphibious assault ships in the fleet (seven Waspclass LHD and two America-class LHA); 11 amphibious transport docks (LPD); and 11 docklanding ships (LSD).66 USS Tripoli (LHA-7) was
delivered on February 28, 2020, and fabrication has begun on LHA-8, supporting delivery
in FY 2024.67
The FY 2021 budget included $250 million
in additional funds to accelerate constructionof LHA-9.68 The July 2020 catastrophic fireon Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) makes it important that LHA-9 be delivered early so that
the Navy can sustain its amphibious capacity.
The decision to decommission the damaged
ship further exposed limitations in shipyard
capacity, as repairs would have had a negative effect on other planned shipbuilding andmaintenance.69

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Small Surface Combatants. The Navy’s
small surface combatants consist principallyof the Avenger-class mine countermeasures(MCM) ship; the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS);
and the Constellation-class frigate (FFG),
which has just begun production in 2021. In
January 2021, the Navy halted production of
the mono-hull Freedom-variant of LCS until
issues involving the design of its propulsion
system are resolved. In the meantime, thetop speed of affected ships (currently 40-plus
knots) is reportedly limited to 34 knots.54 Today’s fleet of 23 LCS (10 Freedom-variant and
13 Independence-variant) is expected to grow to
34 hulls, to be joined by 18 frigates by FY 2034.55
On August 20, 2020, the Navy decommissioned three of its aging Avenger-class MCM
ships, leaving eight in service overseas in
Sasebo, Japan, and Manama, Bahrain. These
represent the only dedicated ships countering
the mine threat.56 The FY 2020 budget accelerated retirement of all Avenger-class MCMs by
FY 2023.57 In what could be a reversal of thatdecision, the current long-range shipbuilding
plan will retain the last four ships of the classin Sasebo, Japan, through 2024.58
As these ships reach the end of their service
life, the Navy is relying on the developmentof mine countermeasure mission packages(MPs) for the LCS to provide this capability,
which will not reach IOC until FY 2022 at theearliest. In an unanticipated move, the Navyannounced plans, supported in the FY 2022
budget, to begin arming LCS ships with thenaval strike missile, giving these ships a longrange anti-ship capability that they had lacked
despite notable operations by the class in theSouth China Sea.59
Instead of requesting additional LCS, theNavy has focused on a new frigate. On April
30, 2020, the Navy awarded Fincantieri $795
million to build the lead ship at its Marinette
Marine shipyard in Wisconsin based on a proven design currently in service with the French
and Italian navies.60 The FY 2021 budget supported purchase of the second ship with annual procurement beginning in FY 2023.61 The
Navy intends to expand production of these﻿

The Navy’s LSDs, the Whidbey Island–classand Harpers Ferry–class amphibious vessels,
are currently scheduled to reach the end of
their 40-year service lives in 2025. LPD-30
began construction in April 2020 and when delivered will be the first of 13 San Antonio–class
Flight II ships to replace the legacy LSD ships.
The 12th first flight San Antonio–class ship
(LPD 28) will be delivered in September 2021,70
and the FY 2021 budget included $500 million“to maximize the benefit of the amphibious shipprocurement authorities provided elsewherein this Act through the procurement of longlead material for LPD–32 and LPD–33.”71
Unmanned Systems. The Navy does notinclude unmanned ships in counting its battle force size, but the current long-range shipbuilding plan envisions purchasing 12 Large
Unmanned Surface Vessels (LUSV); one Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV); andeight Extra Large Undersea Unmanned Vessels(XLUUV) by FY 2026.72 This plan builds on theprevious FY 2021–FY 2025 budget, which included $12 billion for all naval unmanned air
and sea platforms, an increase of 129 percent
over FY 2020.73 The June 2021 iteration of the
Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan does notaddress the procurement of unmanned ships.74
In April 2020, the Navy took delivery of its
second MUSV Sea Hunter prototype. It will bejoined in FY 2022 by two LUSV under Surface
Development Squadron One (SURFDEVRONONE), charged with developing associated operating requirements.75 On May 18, 2021, one ofthese experimental LUSV vessels, the Nomad,
was seen transiting the Panama Canal on its
way to SURFDESRON ONE.76
In a show of concern about the maturity oftechnologies associated with unmanned systems, both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees stipulated in the FY 2021
NDAA that the Navy qualify the reliability ofengines and power generators before procuring unmanned surface vessels.77 Those concerns remain outstanding.
Until the March 2021 release of the Department of the Navy’s Unmanned Campaign
Framework, there had been no overarching398

vision to guide the naval services’ unmanned
investments and operational strategies.78 For
example, in 2019, the Marine Corps’ Long
Range Unmanned Surface Vessel conductedautonomous navigation from Norfolk, Virginia, to Cherry Point, North Carolina. The Corps
plans to procure three more of these longrange unmanned vessels for further testing.79
As the Marine Corps’ unmanned program
has progressed, the Navy has also made independent progress, notably its April 2021
U.S. Pacific Fleet–led Unmanned Integrated
Battle Problem 21 (IBP21) exercise. This fleet
experiment brought together the Navy’s Zumwalt destroyer and unmanned MUSVs with arange of sensitive air and undersea unmanned
platforms to mature the technologies and techniques required for effective naval manned–
unmanned operations.80
Navy and Marine Corps unmanned programs also appear to be converging in thedevelopment of an expeditionary control station for the Fire Scout (MQ-8C) unmanned
helicopter.81 If deployed, this control station
would allow for flexible employment of theFire Scout both from austere sites ashore andfrom a range of ships for anti-submarine aswell as surface warfare missions. However, as
the Navy and Marine Corps accelerate their investments in unmanned systems, future fleet
experimentation will have to incorporate both
services’ platforms to ensure interoperability.
Logistics, Auxiliary, and Expeditionary
Ships. Expeditionary support vessels are highly flexible platforms consisting of two types:
Today there are two Expeditionary Transfer
Dock (ESD) and three Expeditionary Sea Base
(ESB) vessels, which are used for prepositioning and sustaining forward operations, and 12
shallow-draft Expeditionary Fast Transport(EPF) vessels for high-speed lift in uncontested environments. Delivery of ESB 6 is planned
for FY-2022, and delivery of ESB 7 is planned
for FY 2023.82 Newport (EPF-12) was delivered to the Navy on September 2, 2021, andconstruction of Apalachicola (EPF-13) is progressing.83 In March 2021, the Navy revised its
contract with Austal USA for $235 million to2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthmiles) conventional ground-launched strike
options became politically viable. This is especially important in Asia where such capable missiles deployed to the first island chain
would have great relevance in any conflictwith China.90
The FY 2020 budget included $76 million
to develop ground-launched cruise missiles.91
The FY 2021 budget included $59.6 million in
additional funds to procure 36 ground-based
anti-ship missiles.92 A photo of the launch of aU.S. Marine Corps truck-mounted naval strike
missile—ostensibly, part of the Navy–­Marine
Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System(NMESIS)—was released in April 2021.93
Electronic Warfare (EW). The purpose ofelectronic warfare is to control the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) by exploiting, deceiving,or denying its use by an enemy while ensuring its use by friendly forces. It is therefore a
critical element of successful modern warfare.
The final dedicated EW aircraft, the EA-18G
Growler, was delivered in July 2019, meeting
the Navy’s requirement to provide this capability to nine carrier air wings (CVW), five expeditionary squadrons, and one reserve squadron.94
Anticipating the EA-18G’s retirement in the2030s, the Navy has been exploring follow-on
manned and unmanned systems.
Air Early Warning. The E-2D forms the
hub of the Naval Integrated Control-Counter
Air system and provides critical Theater Air
and Missile Defense capabilities. The Navy’s
FY 2021 budget supported the procurementof four aircraft with an additional 10 to be
procured over the next two years.95 The proposed FY 2022 budget conforms to this planby including procurement of five new E-2D aircraft, thus sustaining effective air early warning and increasingly important air control ofunmanned platforms.
High Energy Laser (HEL). HEL systems
provide the potential to engage targets or shootdown missiles without being limited to howmuch ammunition can be carried onboard
ship. A significant milestone was achieved
when USS Portland (LPD-27) used its HEL
Weapon System Demonstrator to shoot down

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﻿modify EPF-14 and future EPF-15 to be highspeed hospital ships with the capability of embarking a V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft.84
The Navy’s Combat Logistics Force (CLF),
consisting of dry-cargo and ammunition ships(T-AKE), fast combat support ships (T-AOE),
and oilers (AO), provides critical support, toinclude at-sea replenishment, that enables the
Navy to sustain the fleet at sea for prolonged
periods. The Navy’s future oiler John Lewis(T-AO 205) was launched on January 12, 2021,
with delivery expected in June 2021 and an additional five to follow.85 To sustain the fleet’s
number of oilers, the Navy will have to receive
T-AO 205 and T-AO 206, both currently underconstruction, by FY 2023.86
Strike Platforms and Key Munitions.
The FY 2021 and proposed FY 2022 budgets
continued the Navy’s focus on long-range, offensive strikes launched from ships, submarines, and aircraft. Notable investments include Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS); theMaritime Strike Tomahawk (MST); the Joint
Standoff Weapon Extended Range (JSOW-ER);
the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM);
and the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6).
The FY 2021 budget sustained the rapid
prototyping of upgraded SM-2 Block IIIC andSM-6 Block IB; procurement of Block V Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) cruise missiles andNavigation/Communication upgrade kits toimprove performance in layered defense environments; and procurement of 48 LRASM.87
To counter the threat posed by the Chinese
PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile, which has
an operational range of 186 miles, the Navy is
working with the Air Force to develop the AIM120 Advanced Medium-Range missile, the operational range of which has not been madepublic.88 In March 2021, the Air Force reported a record long-range kill of a drone target
by this developmental missile from one of its
F-15C fighters.89 If this report is accurate, it indicates that development is proceeding apace.
Shore-Based Anti-Ship Capabilities. Following the August 2019 U.S. withdrawal fromthe Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty, new intermediate-range (500–1,000﻿an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over the
Pacific on May 16, 2020.96 This was followedby the Navy’s decision to begin installation ofa HEL system—the HELIOS (60kw) laser—on
destroyers in 2021 beginning with USS Preble.97
HELIOS is a scalable laser system integrated into the ship’s weapons control and radarsystems that can dazzle and confuse threats,
disable small boats, or shoot down smaller air
threats. However, until field testing against
meaningful threat platforms is conductedacross a range of weather conditions, the effectiveness of such systems remains unproven.
Command and Control. Networked communications are essential to successful military operations, and the information passed
over these networks includes sensitive datafrom targeting to logistics. Cyber security,communications, and the information systems
that generate and relay this information are
therefore critical elements of the DOD information enterprise.
To enhance continuity, the Navy has consolidated information management in the
Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO).
The Navy plans to spend $4.17 billion from FY
2021–FY 2026 to bolster cyber defense andresiliency to attack.98 On February 23, 2021,
the Navy consolidated network and IT-related technical authorities in a newly formed
office, Taskforce Overmatch.99 At a May 10,2021, event, the CNO described Taskforce
Overmatch as a unified data construct at theoperational and tactical level and part of the
DOD Joint All Domain Command and Control
architecture.100 Such investments are meant
to prevent competitors’ efforts to nullify the
Navy’s technological advantage or interfere inits logistic infrastructure (much of it on unclassified networks).

workload, training schedules become shorter while deployments become longer. The
commanding officer’s discretionary time fortraining and crew familiarization is a precious
commodity that is made ever scarcer by the increasing operational demands on fewer ships.
FY 2019 marked the first time in more thana decade that the DOD and the Navy did nothave to operate under a continuing resolution
for at least part of the fiscal year. Having a full
fiscal year to plan and execute maintenanceand operations helped the Navy to continue on
its path to restoring fleet readiness. However,as CNO Admiral John Richardson explained to
the Senate Armed Services Committee in April
2018, it will take until late 2021 or 2022 to restore fleet readiness to an “acceptable” levelprovided adequate funding is maintained, andwithout “stable and adequate funding,” it willtake longer.101
Unfortunately, the Navy began FY 2020
under a continuing resolution that delayedplanned maintenance for USS Bainbridge(DDG 96) and USS Gonzalez (DDG 66).102 This
indicates that progress on fleet material readiness remains tenuous despite the fact that current and previous CNOs have made readinesstheir number one priority. Admiral Michael
Gilday reiterated this most recently at a May
2021 Navy Memorial SITREP speaker event.103
Impact of COVID-19. The eruption of the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 caused many
problems for the U.S. Navy. USS Theodore
Roosevelt (CVN 71), for example, was forced
to quarantine for 55 days in Guam; the major biannual international Rim of the Pacific
Exercise (RIMPAC) was scaled down; 1,629
reservists were called to active duty to backfill
high-risk shipyard workers conducting critical maintenance; and the Navy was restricted
to using “safe haven” COVID-free ports, limReadinessiting where warships could call. In May 2021,
In the 1980s, the Navy had nearly 600 ships the CNO assessed that the Navy managed thein the fleet and kept roughly 100 (17 percent) pandemic with minimal operational impact
deployed at any one time. As of July 12, 2021, but with added time at sea and delays for famthe fleet numbered 297 ships, of which 83 (28 ily reunions pending quarantines.104
percent) were at sea or deployed. With fewIn fact, the Navy’s response to the pandemic
er ships carrying an unchanging operational has been a success overall. As of June 2, 2021,

400

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

CHART 10

Navy Combat Ships Nearing End of Service Life
Combat Class

Ships

Avenger MCM
Los Angeles SSN
Ticonderoga CG
Ohio SSGN and SSBN
Seawolf SSN
Whidbey Island LSD
Harpers Ferry LSD
Wasp LHD
Independence/Freedom LCS
Nimitz and Ford CVN
Virginia SSN
Arleigh Burke DDG
Zumwalt DDG
San Antonio LPD
America LHA

Average Years Until Class End of Service Life

8
28
22
18
3
7
4
7
23
11
19
67
2
11
2

1.1
3.2
9.0
9.6
11.9
12.7
14.8
15.6
20.9
22.0
24.9
26.2
26.3
30.0
36.1
0

10

20

30

40

﻿

NOTE: Figures are based on calculations for August 2021.
SOURCE: Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Vessel Register, “Fleet Size,” http://www.nvr.navy.mil/NVRSHIPS/FLEETSIZE.HTML(accessed August 2, 2021).
A heritage.org

total cumulative COVID cases among the Navy’s active-duty uniformed personnel numbered 38,849, with six deaths since February
2020.105 Of the Navy’s active-duty personnel on
July 16, 2021, 78 percent were fully vaccinated,and 84.4 percent of sailors had received at least
one shot, with both figures above the national
average at the time.106
Maintenance and Repairs. Naval Sea Systems Command completed its Shipyard Optimization and Recapitalization Plan in September 2018.107 Three years later, the improvementof public shipyard capacities is just beginning.
The initial step of building digital models to
inform future upgrades to the Navy’s four
public shipyards is expected to be completeby the end of 2021, but attempts by Congressto accelerate the breaking of new ground remain stalled.108
At a May 10, 2021 event, the Chief of Naval
Operations highlighted reducing the numberof days of delayed maintenance at the four public yards by 80 percent and at private yards by
60 percent, improving maintenance planningat private shipyards, and giving yards moretime to plan from contract approval to starting work as positive trends.109 Nevertheless, theoverall capacity for maintaining today’s Navy,much less a fleet that is larger than 300 ships,
remains inadequate.
Moreover, a recently declassified DOD Inspector General report that assessed readiness

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401

﻿

issues with respect to the Navy’s newest maritime patrol aircraft, the P-8A Poseidon, concluded that the platform’s low capability rates
were due to an inadequate sustainability strategy for the aircraft.110 A similar issue regarding spare parts for the Virginia-class nuclear
submarine fleet came to light at a fall 2020
Navy League conference and in a subsequentCongressional Budget Office report.111 Over a
two-year period beginning in 2018, the cannibalization of otherwise life-of-ship parts had amarked early failure rate, reportedly becauseof galvanic corrosion, which occurs at thecontact space of two dissimilar metals. This
problem reflects either poor design decisions
preceding construction of the submarine classor modification of materials used by suppliers
without the Navy’s knowledge. Either way, thismaterial issue illustrates an ongoing need forbetter management of the transition from design to sustainment as well as better management of the Navy’s supplier base.
Training, Ranges, and Live-Fire Exercises. Ship and aircraft operations and training
are critical to fleet readiness. The Navy seeks tomeet fleet readiness requirements by funding
58 underway days for each deployed warshipand 24 underway days for each non-deployedwarship per quarter. Less clear is how much ofthis time is spent on crew training and whether
the Navy assesses this as effective in meetingneeded operational proficiencies.
That said, to achieve desired days at sea, theNavy sought an increase of 6.4 percent in its FY
2022 operations budget,112 slightly less than FY
2021’s 6.5 percent increase to cover “ship operations funding.”113 Importantly, the FY 2022
budget increases the Flying Hour program by
11.0 percent, continuing the previous year’s 5.8
percent increase, to ensure that squadrons arecombat-ready when deployed.114
To improve warfighting proficiency, theNavy is seeking to expand and update instrumentation of the training range at Naval Air
Station Fallon, Nevada, to enable practicewith the most advanced weapon systems.115

402

This training range fits into the larger fiveyear $27.3 billion Pacific Deterrence Initiative(PDI), led by Indo Pacific Command, intended partly to transform the way the Navy trains
for high-end conflict and improve training
with U.S. allies in the Pacific.116 Of particularimportance to the Navy are PDI investments
to modernize the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF); the Joint Pacific Alaska Range
Complex (JPARC); and the Combined/Joint
Military Training (CJMT) CommonwealthNorthern Mariana Islands in order to improvetraining for operations across all domains: air,land, sea, space, and cyber.117
Not forgotten are the 2017 collisions of USS
John S. McCain (DDG 56) and USS Fitzgerald(DDG 62) in which 17 sailors were lost. Findings of the subsequent investigations, whichhighlighted the importance of operational risk
management and unit readiness, remain relevant.118 To ensure that these tragic events are
not repeated, the following broad institutional recommendations in the Secretary of the
Navy’s Strategic Readiness Review should be
implemented:
l

l

l

l

“The creation of combat ready forcesmust take equal footing with meeting
the immediate demands of CombatantCommanders.”“The Navy must establish realistic limits
regarding the number of ready ships andsailors and, short of combat, not acquiesce
to emergent requirements with assetsthat are not fully ready.”“The Navy must realign and streamline
its command and control structures totightly align responsibility, authority, andaccountability.”“Navy leadership at all levels must foster aculture of learning and create the structures and processes that fully embrace
this commitment.”1192022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Scoring the U.S. Navy
Capacity Score: Weak
This Index assesses that a battle force consisting of 400 manned ships is required for the
U.S. Navy to do what is expected of it today. The
Navy’s current battle force fleet of 297 ships
and intensified operational tempo combine toreveal a Navy that is much too small relative to
its tasks. The result is a score of “weak,” whichis unchanged from the 2021 Index. Dependingon the Navy’s ability to fund more aggressive
growth options and service life extensions, its
capacity score could be lower in the next edition of the Index.

rapid growth of competitor navies with modern technologies does not bode well for U.S.
naval power.

Readiness Score: Marginal
Trending Toward Weak
The Navy’s readiness is rated “marginal”
trending toward “weak” as the Navy struggles
to sustain overdue readiness corrective actions,complicated by an inadequate fleet size andoverwhelmed maintenance infrastructure.

U.S. Military Power: NavyVERY WEAK
Capacity

WEAK

MARGINAL

STRONGVERY STRONG%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

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﻿Overall U.S. Navy Score: Marginal
Trending Toward Weak
Capability Score: Marginal
The Navy’s overall score for the 2022 Index
Trending Toward Weakis “marginal” trending toward “weak.” To corThe overall capability score for the Navy rect this trend, the Navy will have to eliminate
remains “marginal” with downward pressure several readiness and capacity bottlenecks
as the Navy’s technological edge narrows while seeing to it that America has an operaagainst peer competitors China and Russia. tional fleet with the numbers and capabilities
The combination of a fleet that is aging fast- postured to counter Russian and Chinese naer than old ships are being replaced and the val advances.

1

NAVY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Aircraft Carrier
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carrier (CVN-68)

Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier (CVN-78)

Inventory: 10
Fleet age: 30.4 Date: 1975

Timeline: 2017–2032

The Nimitz-class is a nuclear powered
multipurpose carrier. The aircraft carrier
and its embarked carrier air wing canperform a variety of missions including
maritime security operations and power
projection. Its planned service life is 50
years. The class will start retiring in the
FY 2025 and will be replaced by theFord-class carriers.
Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier (CVN-78)
Inventory: 1
Fleet age: 4 Date: 2017

Currently in production, the Ford-class will replace the
Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. The Ford-class design uses
the basic Nimitz-class hull form but incorporates several
improvements to achieve a 33 percent higher sortie rate, asmaller crew with approximately 600 fewer sailors, two anda half times greater electrical power, and more than $4 billion
in life-cycle cost savings over the Nimitz-class. The shipcompleted its ﬁrst Full Ship Shock Trial (FSST) on June 18
and will complete the rest by the end of summer.
Then it will enter a Planned Incremental Availability forsix months before operational employment so that it canundergo modernization, maintenance, and repairs. The ship’s
intended life expectancy is 50 years.
PROCUREMENT
3﻿

The Ford-Class incorporates newtechnologies that will increase aircraft
sortie rates, reduce manning, provide
greater electrical power for future
weapons systems, and decrease
operating costs. Its planned service life
is 50 years.

NOTE: See page 412 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

404

HealthScore

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

SPENDING ($ millions)$37,803$15,558

1

NAVY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Large Surface Combatant
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

HealthScore

Ticonderoga-Class Cruiser (CG-47)

Zumwalt-Class Destroyer (DDG-1000)

Inventory: 22
Fleet age: 31 Date: 1981

Timeline: 2016–2022

The Ticonderoga-class is a multimission battle force ship equipped with
the Aegis Weapons System. While itcan perform strike, anti-surface warfare
and anti-submarine warfare, its primary
focus is air and missile defense. The
ship has a life expectancy of 40 years,
the Navy plans to retire eight of the 22
CGs between FY 2021 and FY 2024.

The DDG-1000 was designed to be a new-generation
destroyer capable of handling more advanced weapon
systems for long-range strike with a hull design capable ofreducing aimed to reduce radar detectability for its original
primary mission of naval surface ﬁre support (NSFS).
The DDG-1000 program was intended to produce a totalof 32 ships, but this number has been reduced to three.
The ﬁrst DDG-1000 was commissioned in October 2016.

Zumwalt-Class Destroyer (DDG-100)

PROCUREMENTSPENDING ($ millions)$23,427

3

Inventory: 1
Fleet age: 3.6 Date: 2016

$753

Arleigh Burke-Class Destroyer(DDG-51)

﻿The Zumwalt-Class is a multi-mission
destroyer that incorporates several
technological improvements, such asa stealthy hull design and integrated
electric-drive propulsion system.
Although it has passed sea trials, it
continues to experience problems with
its combat systems. The third and ﬁnal
Zumwalt-class ship was commissioned
in FY 2020.
Arleigh Burke-Class Destroyer (DDG-51)

Inventory: 69
Fleet age: 18.7 Date: 1991

Timeline: 1991–2029

The Arleigh Burke–class is a multimission guided missile destroyer
featuring the Aegis Weapons Systemwith a primary mission of air defense.
The Navy was supposed to buy two
in FY 2022, but President Biden’s
proposed budget would provide
only one. This would break multiyear
contracts and has received pushbackfrom Congress, so the decision is still
being debated. The Navy plans toextend the service life of the entire
class to 45 years from its original life
expectancy of 35–40 years.

DDG-51 production was restarted in FY 2013 to make up
for the reduction in DDG-1000 acquisitions. Beginning in
FY 2017, all DDG-51s procured will be the Flight III design,
which includes the more capable Advanced Missile Defense
Radar (AMDR). The Navy was supposed to buy two in
FY 2022, but President Biden’s proposed budget would
provide only one. This would break multiyear contracts
and has received pushback from Congress, so the decision
is still being debated. The destroyers are believed to havean extended life span of 45 years of operational service.
PROCUREMENT
87

SPENDING ($ millions)
1$106,120$18,379

NOTE: See page 412 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

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405

1

NAVY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Small Surface Combatant
PLATFORM

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

HealthScore

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)

Inventory: 24
Fleet age: 4.1 Date: 2008

Timeline: 1991–2030

The Littoral Combat Ship includes twoclasses: the Independence-class and theFreedom-class. The modular LCS design
depends on mission packages (MPs) toprovide warﬁghting capabilities in the
SUW, ASW and MCM mission areas. The
ship has an expected service life of 25
years.

The LCS is intended to fulﬁll the mine countermeasure,
antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare roles for the
Navy. It is designed to operate in near-shore environments
but is also capable of open-ocean operation. It works betterwith smaller ships than the DDG-51 does. It will be the only
small surface combatant in the ﬂeet once the Navy’s MCM
ships are retired and until the new FFG(X) enters service.
The Navy will have six deployed by the end of the year.

Avenger-Class Mine Counter Measure(MCM-1)Inventory: 8
Fleet age: 28.8 Date: 1983

﻿

Age
Score

Avenger-class ships are designed asmine sweepers/hunter-killers capableof ﬁnding, classifying, and destroying
moored and bottom mines. The class
has an expected 30-year service life.
The remaining MCMs are expected
to be decommissioned throughout
the 2020s. While there is no direct
replacement single-mission MCM shipin production, the Navy plans to ﬁll its
mine countermeasure role with the LCS
and its MCM MP.

PROCUREMENTSPENDING ($ millions)$21,80933

FFG Frigate
Timeline: 1991–2030
A new program called the FFG(X) will augment the LCS
program to ﬁll out the remaining 20-ship small surface
combatant requirement for a total of 52 Small Surface
Combatants. The ships will be 496 feet with a top speed of 29
miles per hour and a range of 6,000 nautical miles. Its purpose
is to escort carrier battle groups and high-value convoys. It willaccommodate 32 VLS cells to handle high-powered missiles
and machine guns. The ﬁrst ship should be delivered by 2026
and be operational by 2030. The current contract would
provide 10 hulls by 2035.
PROCUREMENT
2

NOTE: See page 412 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

406

$602

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

SPENDING ($ millions)1$2,334$1,088

1

NAVY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

SSGN Cruise Missile Submarine
Age
Score

PLATFORM
Ohio-Class (SSGN-726)

Capability
Score

MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Size
Score

HealthScore

None

Inventory: 4
Fleet age: 38.5 Date: 1981
The SSGNs provide the Navy with alarge stealthy strike and special
operations mission capabilities. From
2002–2007, the four oldest Ohioclass ballistic missile submarines wereconverted to guided missile submarines.
Each SSGN is capable of carrying up to
154 Tomahawk land-attack cruise
missiles and up to 66 special operations
forces for clandestine insertion andretrieval. All four SSGNs will be retired
between FY 2026 and FY 2028. The
Navy has tentative plans to replace
the SSGNs with a new Large Payload
Submarine beginning in FY 2036. The
SSGN had a planned service life of 42
years, but this may be extended.

﻿

NOTE: See page 412 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

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1

NAVY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Attack Submarines
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

Seawolf-Class (SSN-21)

Virginia-Class (SSN–774)

Inventory: 3
Fleet age: 21 Date: 1997

Timeline: 2004–2019

The Seawolf-class is exceptionally quiet,
fast, well-armed, and equipped withadvanced sensors. Though lacking a
vertical launch system, the Seawolfclass has eight torpedo tubes and canhold up to 50 weapons in its torpedo
room. Although the Navy planned tobuild 29 submarines, the program was
cut to three. The Seawolf-class has a
33-year expected service life. They havebeen succeeded by the Virginia-classattack submarine.
Los Angeles-Class (SSN-688)

﻿HealthScore

The Virginia-class is in production and will replace the Los
Angeles–class and Seawolf-class attack submarines as they
are decommissioned. The Virginia Payload Module (VPM)
will be incorporated into eight of the 11 planned Block
V submarines beginning in FY 2019. VPM includes fourlarge-diameter, vertical launch tubes that can carry up to 28
additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads. The planned
service life of the Virginia-class is 33 years. Thirty-four havebeen procured so far at a rate of two per year.
PROCUREMENT
34

Inventory: 28
Fleet age: 30 Date: 1976
The Los Angeles-class comprises thelargest portion of the Navy’s attack
submarine ﬂeet. They are multi-mission
submarines that can perform covert
intelligence collection, surveillance,
ASW, ASuW, and land attack strike.
The Los Angeles-class has a 33-year
expected service life. The last Los
Angeles-class submarine is expected tobe retired in the late 2020s and is being
replaced by the Virginia-class.
Virginia-Class (SSN-774)
Inventory: 19
Fleet age: 8 Date: 2004
The Virginia-class is the U.S. Navy’s
next-generation attack submarine. It
includes several improvements overprevious attack submarine classes thatprovide increased acoustic stealth,improved SOF support, greater
strike payload capacity and reduced
operating costs. The planned service
life of the Virginia-class is 33 years.
The Virginia-class is in production andwill replace the Los Angeles-class andSeawolf-class attack submarines as
they are decommissioned. Thiry-four
have been procured so far, at a rate of
two per year.

NOTE: See page 412 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

408

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

SPENDING ($ millions)
2$105,314$60,202

1

NAVY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Ohio-Class (SSBN)

Columbia-Class (SSBN–826)

Inventory: 14
Fleet age: 31 Date: 1981

Timeline: TBD

HealthScore

The 12-ship Columbia-class will replace the existing
Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine force, which
provides a credible and survivable sea-based strategic
deterrent. The Navy’s FY 2021 budget estimates that the
total procurement cost for 12 ships will be $109.8 billion.
The ﬁrst patrol of the lead ship, SSBN 826, is scheduledfor FY 2031. However, the pandemic, technical challenges,
and potential funding issues could cause the designing andbuilding of the lead boat to be delayed. The Columbia-classships will have a 42-year life expectancy.

The Ohio-class SSBN is the mostsurvivable leg of the U.S. military’s
strategic nuclear triad. Its sole mission
is strategic nuclear deterrence, forwhich it carries long-range submarinelaunched ballistic missiles. The
Ohio-class’s expected service life is
42 years. Retirement of the class will
begin in 2027 at an estimated rate ofone submarine per year until 2039.
The Ohio-class is being replaced by the
Columbia-class SSBN.

PROCUREMENT
1

SPENDING ($ millions)$21,428$106,176

Amphibious Warfare Ship
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Inventory: 7
Fleet age: 24.3 Date: 1989

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

HealthScore

America-Class (LHA–6)

﻿

Wasp-Class Amphibious Assault Ship
(LHD-1)Capability
Score

Timeline: 2004–TBD

The Wasp-class can support
amphibious landing operations with
Marine Corps landing craft through its
well deck. It can also support Marine
Air Combat Element operations withhelicopters, tilt-rotor aircraft, andVertical/Short Take-Oﬀ and Landing (V/STOL). This ship has a planned 40-year
service life.
America-Class Amphibious Assault
Ship (LHA-6)

LHA Flight 0 (LHA-6 and 7) were built without a welldeck to provide more space for Marine Corps aviation
maintenance and storage as well as increased JP-5 fuelcapacity. LHA Flight 1 (LHA-8 and beyond) will reincorporate
a well deck for increased mission ﬂexibility. The Americaclass is in production with three LHA 6s already procured.
Advance procurement for LHA 9 will begin in FY 2023.
PROCUREMENT
3

SPENDING ($ millions)$11,897$3,055Inventory: 2
Fleet age: 3.9 Date: 2014
This new class of large-deckamphibious assault ships is meant toreplace the retiring Wasp-class LHD.
LHAs are the largest of all amphibious
warfare ships and resemble small
aircraft carriers. The America-class isdesigned to accommodate the Marine
Corps’ F-35Bs.

NOTE: See page 412 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

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1

NAVY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Amphibious Warfare Ship (Cont.)
PLATFORM

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

San Antonio-Class Amphibious
Transport Dock (LPD-17)

San Antonio-Class Amphibious
Transport Dock (LPD-17)

Inventory: 11
Fleet age: 9.9 Date: 2006

Timeline: 2006-2017

HealthScore

The LPDs have well decks that allow
the USMC to conduct amphibious
operations with its landing craft. The
LPD can also carry four CH-46s or two
MV- 22s. Eleven of the planned 13 Flight
I LPD- 17–class ships are operational,
and the remaining two are underconstruction. The class has a 40-yearplanned service life.

The 13 LPD-17s are replacements for the San Antonio–
class LPDs. Both Flight I and Flight II LPDs are multimission ships designed to embark, transport, and landelements of a Marine landing force by helicopters, tilt
rotor aircraft, landing craft, and amphibious vehicles.

Whidbey Island-Class Dock Landing
Ship (LSD-41)

LPD-17 Flight II

Inventory: 7
Fleet age: 32.2 Date: 1985

﻿

Age
Score

LSD-41 Whidbey Island–class ships
were designed speciﬁcally to transportand launch four Marine Corps Landing
Craft Air Cushion vehicles. They havean expected service life of 40 years. Alleight ships will be retired between FY
2026 and FY 2033. LSD-41–class ships
will be replaced by the LPD–17 Flight IIprogram, which began procurement in
FY 2018.

PROCUREMENT
13$26,447$25,063

Timeline: 2025–TBD
Previously known as LX(R), the LPD-17 Flight II program
will procure 13 ships to replace the Navy’s LSD-type ships.
The Navy originally planned to procure the ﬁrst Flight II shipin FY 2020, but accelerated procurement funding enabledprocurement of the ﬁrst LPD-17 Flight II in FY 2018. The Navydelayed the second ship, planned for FY 2020, until FY 2021.
PROCUREMENT
2

Harpers Ferry-Class Dock Landing
Ships (LSD-49)
Inventory: 4
Fleet age: 25.1 Date: 1995
The Harpers Ferry–class reduced LCAC
capacity to two while increasing cargocapacity. They have an expected service
life of 40 years, and all ships will beretired by FY 2038. The LSD-49 will be
replaced by the LPD–17 Flight II, whichbegan procurement in FY 2018.

NOTE: See page 412 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

410

SPENDING ($ millions)2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

SPENDING ($ millions)$2,926

1

NAVY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

Airborne Early Warning
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

E-2C Hawkeye

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye

Inventory: 49
Fleet age: 38 Date: 1973

Timeline: 2014–2022

HealthScore

The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye replaces the legacy E-2C
and is in production. The Navy received approval for a
ﬁve-year multi-year procurement plan beginning in FY
2019 for 24 aircraft to complete the program of record. The$17.5 billion program has a goal to build 75 new aircraft.

The E-2C Hawkeye is a battle
management and airborne early
warning aircraft. The E-2C ﬂeet received
a series of upgrades to mechanical andcomputer systems around the year
2000. While still operational, the E-2C isnearing the end of its service life and isbeing replaced by the E-2D Advanced
Hawkeye.

PROCUREMENT
107

SPENDING ($ millions)5$19,160$6,001E-2D Advanced Hawkeye
Inventory: 45
Fleet age: 3.5 Date: 2014
The E-2D program is the nextgeneration, carrier-based early
warning, command, and control
aircraft that provides improved battle
space detection, supports theater air
missile defense, and oﬀers improved
operational availability.

﻿Electronic Attack Aircraft
Age
Score

PLATFORM
EA-18G Growler

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Size
Score

HealthScore

None

Inventory: 158
Fleet age: 8 Date: 2009
The EA-18G Growler is the U.S. Navy’s
electronic attack aircraft and provides
tactical jamming and suppression ofenemy air defenses. The ﬁnal EA-18G
aircraft was delivered in FY 2018,bringing the total to 160 aircraft andfulﬁlling the Navy’s requirement. It
replaced the legacy EA-6B Prowlers.

NOTE: See page 412 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

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1

NAVY SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Fighter/Attack Aircraft
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet

F-35C Joint Strike Fighter

Inventory: 586
Fleet age: 17 Date: 2001

Timeline: 2019–TBD

The F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet has longer
range, greater weapons payload, andincreased survivability than the F/A18A-D Legacy Hornet. The Navy plansto achieve a 50/50 mix of two F-35C
squadrons and two F/A-18E/F Block III
squadrons per carrier air wing by themid-2030s. The ongoing service life
extension program will extend the life of
all Super Hornets to 9,000 ﬂight hours.

HealthScore

The F-35C is the Navy’s variant of the Joint Strike Fighter.
The Joint Strike Fighter faced many issues during its
developmental stages, including engine problems,
software development delays, cost overruns incurringa Nunn–McCurdy breach, and structural problems. The
Navy declared initial operational capability (IOC) of
the F-35C in February 2019. The planned procurementof 273 F-35Cs will replace over 500 Super Hornets.
PROCUREMENT
144

﻿

Size
Score

SPENDING ($ millions)20$22,727$2,109F-35C Joint Strike Fighter

F/A-18 Super Hornet

Inventory: 30
Fleet age: 1 Date: 2019

The Navy plans to buy 108 Block III Super Hornets by 2024
and modernize most of its existing Super Hornets to Block
II standards. All of the Block III Super Hornets will have a life
span of 10,000 ﬂight hours, which is 50 percent greater thanthat of earlier F/A-18E/F aircraft. The Biden Administration’s
proposed budget would decrease the Navy’s aviationbudget, which would eliminate the planned purchase ofSuper Hornets.

The C-variant is the Navy’s ﬁfthgeneration aircraft, bringing radarevading technology to the carrier deckfor the ﬁrst time. The F-35C performs avariety of missions to include air-to-air
combat, air-to-ground strikes, and ISR
missions.

NOTES: See Methodology for descriptions of scores. Fleet age is the average of platform since commissioning. The date for ships
is the year of commissioning. Inventory for aircraft is estimated based on the number of squadrons. The date for aircraft is the yearof initial operational capability. The timeline for ships is from the year of first commissioning to the year of last delivery. The timeline
for aircraft is from the year of first year of delivery to the last year of delivery. Spending does not include advanced procurement or
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). The total program dollar value reflects the full F–35 joint program, including
engine procurement. The Navy is also procuring 67 F-35Cs for the Marine Corps. Age of fleet is calculated from date of commissioning
to January 2016.

412

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

U.S. Navy Modernization Table Citations
GENERAL SOURCES• U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, “Naval Vessel Register,” https://www.nvr.navy.mil/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
• “North America,” in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military
Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021).
• U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Comprehensive Selected Acquisition Reports for the Annual 2019 Reporting
Requirement as Updated by the President’s Fiscal Year 2021 Budget,” https://media.defense.gov/2020/Nov/19/2002538295/-1/1/0/SAR-SUMMARY-TABLES-DEC-2019-UPDATED.PDF (accessed August 20, 2021).
• U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 1of 3: Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Budget Activities 01–04, May 2021, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/
APN_BA1-4_Book.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
• U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume
1 of 1: Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, May 2021, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/SCN_Book.pdf(accessed August 20, 2021).
PROGRAM SOURCES
Ford-Class Aircraft Carrier• Press release, “USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) Completes First Full Ship Shock Trial Event,” U.S. Navy, June 18, 2021, https://www.
navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/2663444/uss-gerald-r-ford-cvn-78-completes-first-full-shipshock-trial-event/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Newport News Shipbuilding, “Ford Class Aircraft Carriers: CVN 78,” https://www.thefordclass.com/cvn-78/ (accessed August 20,2021).

Arleigh Burke–Class Destroyer• Joe Gould, “Democratic Appropriators Want to Spend More on Weapons Procurement than Biden,” Defense News, June 29,
2021, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2021/06/29/house-pentagon-spending-bill-bumps-up-weapons-procurement/(accessed August 20, 2021).
• Richard Abott, “Navy Says It Will Extend Life of All DDG-51s, Reaching 355 Ships in 2030s,” Defense Daily, April 13, 2018, https://www.defensedaily.com/navy-says-will-extend-life-ddg-51s-reaching-355-ships-2030s/navy-usmc/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
Littoral Combat Ship
• Sam LaGrone, “Six Littoral Combat Ships to Deploy by Year’s End as Navy Continues to Refine Operations,” U.S. Naval InstituteNews, June 28, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/06/28/six-littoral-combat-ships-to-deploy-by-years-end-as-navy-continues-torefine-operations (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Andrew Dyer, “After 15 Years, the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships Are Still in Search of a Mission,” The San Diego Union-Tribune, May
15, 2021, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/military/story/2021-05-15/littoral-combat-ship-mission (accessed August20, 2021).
FFG(X)• John Keller, “The Navy’s New FFG(X) Frigate Warship Will Be Right-Sized and -Armed for the Crucial Open-Ocean Escort Role,”
Military & Aerospace Electronics, June 2, 2020, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/blogs/article/14176965/frigate-armamentelectronics (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Joe Saballa, “Lockheed Martin Designing Combat System for New US Navy Frigates,” The Defense Post, July 1, 2021, https://www.
thedefensepost.com/2021/07/01/lockheed-designing-combat-system-frigates/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Megan Eckstein, “Fincantieri Wins $795M Contract for Navy Frigate Program,” U.S. Naval Institute News, April 30, 2020, https://
news.usni.org/2020/04/30/fincantieri-wins-795m-contract-for-navy-frigate-program (accessed August 20, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military413﻿Columbia-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine• Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R41129, updated June 24, 2021, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41129/206 (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Franz-Stefan Gady, “US Navy’s Deadly New Nuclear Sub Finally Has a Name,” The Diplomat, December 16, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/us-navys-deadly-new-nuclear-sub-finally-has-a-name/ (accessed August 20, 2021).

Virginia-Class• Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32418, July 29, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/weapons/RL32418.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye• “E-2D Hawkeye: The Navy’s New AWACS,” Defense Industry Daily, August 16, 2021, https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/e-2dhawkeye-the-navys-new-awacs-03443/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
F/A-18 Super Hornet• Vicky Hartzler, “Hartzler: President Biden’s Budget Fails St. Louis and Our F-18 Fleet. Here’s How,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 29,
2021, https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/hartzler-president-biden-s-budget-fails-st-louis-and-our-f-18-fleet-here-s/
article_d93a2acf-912f-59d9-bc3c-b473d887b885.html (accessed August 20, 2021).
F-35C Joint Strike Fighter• Mark Episkopos, “This F-35C Stealth Fighter Will Be the Star of the Navy’s Sea Strategy,” The National Interest, The Buzz Blog,
June 29, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/f-35c-stealth-fighter-will-be-star-navy%E2%80%99s-sea-strategy-188828(accessed August 20, 2021).

﻿

Ohio-Class• Megan Eckstein, “Navy May Extend Life of Ohio SSBNs to Provide Cushion for Introduction of Columbia-Class,” U.S. Naval InstituteNews, updated December 24, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/11/16/navy-may-extend-life-of-ohio-ssbns-to-provide-cushionfor-introduction-of-columbia-class (accessed August 20, 2021).

414

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes
1.

The Honorable Thomas B. Modly, Acting Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Michael M. Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations; and General
David H. Berger, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, statement “On Fiscal Year 2021 Department of the Navy Budget” before
the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 5, 2020, p. 21, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Modly--Gilday--Berger_03-05-20.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021). Emphasis in original. See also stenographic transcript, Hearing
to Receive Testimony on Posture of the Navy in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2021 and the Future
Years Defense Program, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 4, 2020, p. 9, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/20-14_03-05-2020.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).

2.

Figure 1-7, “FY 2022 DON Total Budget Request by Appropriation $211.7B,” in U.S. Navy, Office of Budget, Highlights of the
Department of the Navy FY 2022 Budget, 2021, p. 1-23, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/Highlights_
Book.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021). Total cited in title of table includes $47.9 billion for the U.S. Marine Corps.
Ibid., pp. 1-3 and 1-4.
Emily Jacobs, “Pentagon Says Suez Canal Traffic Impacted US Military Vessel Movement,” New York Post, March 29, 2021, https://nypost.com/2021/03/29/pentagon-says-suez-canal-traffic-will-impact-us-military/ (accessed July 12, 2021).

5.

See The Heritage Foundation, “The New 2020 Tri-Service Maritime Strategy—‘Advantage at Sea,’” Factsheet No. 195, January 19,
2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/FS_195_0.pdf.

6.

President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, The White House, March 2021, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf (accessed July 11, 2021).

7.

U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain
Naval Power, December 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/16/2002553074/-1/-1/0/TRISERVICESTRATEGY.PDF(accessed July 11, 2021).

8.

James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed July 11, 2021).

9.

The Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) is a classified document that specifies forces to be provided by theservices for use by operational commanders. It is an extension of a reference manual maintained by the Joint Staff, Global ForceManagement Allocation Policies and Procedures (CJCSM 3130.06B), which is also a classified publication. See U.S. Department of
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework,” unclassified Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide 3130, March 5, 2019, p. B-2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Handbooks/CJCS%20
GUIDE%203130.pdf?ver=2019-03-18-122038-003 (accessed July 11, 2021).

10. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary, “General Guidance for the Classification of Naval
Vessels and Battle Force Ship Counting Procedures,” SECNAV Instruction 5030.8C, June 14, 2016, pp. 1–2, http://www.nvr.navy.
mil/5030.8C.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
11. Thomas Callender, “The Nation Needs a 400-Ship Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 205, October 26, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-nation-needs-400-ship-navy. For an analysis regarding future force design out to2035, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242,
February 18, 2021, pp. 3–5, 7, 71, 75, and 83, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/rebuilding-americas-military-the-unitedstates-navy.
12. The full array of aircraft comprising a carrier air wing also includes one EA-18G Growler electronic attack squadron, one E-2D
Hawkeye airborne early warning squadron, two SH-60 Seahawk helicopter squadrons, and one C-2 Greyhound logistics
support squadron.
13. U.S. Navy, “Executive Summary: 2016 Navy Force Structure Assessment (FSA),” December 15, 2016, p. 2, http://static.politico.
com/b9/99/0ad9f79847bf8e8f6549c445f980/2016-navy-force-structure-assessment-fsa-executive-summary.pdf (accessed
July 12, 2021). The full FSA was not released to the public. Importantly, in July 2019, the Marine Corps cancelled the requirementfor 38 amphibious ships as a formal force-sizing demand for the Navy. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, stated his belief that future naval warfare and the Marine Corps’ role in it against a peer competitor will require new
types of smaller vessels that will be harder for an enemy to find and target, as well as able to support an evolving concept of
distributed naval warfare more effectively, and that can be purchased in greater quantity at a lower price per vessel. Nevertheless,the long-standing 38-ship requirement has informed Navy shipbuilding plans and remains a central factor in current shipacquisition contracts. See General David H. Berger, “Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 38th Commandant of the Marine
Corps,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, p. 4, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/%2038th%20
Commandant%27s%20Planning%20Guidance_2019.pdf?ver=2019-07-16-200152-700 (accessed July 12, 2021).

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415

﻿

3.
4.

14. Bryan Clark and Jesse Sloman, “Deploying Beyond Their Means: America’s Navy and Marine Corps at a Tipping Point,” Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, November 18, 2015, pp. 5–8, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6174_(Deploying_Beyond_Their_Means)Final2-web.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
15. Daniel Whiteneck, Michael Price, Neil Jenkins, and Peter Swartz, “The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?”
Center for Naval Analyses, March 2010, p. 7, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022262.A3.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
16. Megan Eckstein, “No Margin Left: Overworked Carrier Force Struggles to Maintain Deployments After Decades of Overuse,” U.S.
Naval Institute News, November 12, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/11/12/no-margin-left-overworked-carrier-force-strugglesto-maintain-deployments-after-decades-of-overuse (accessed July 12, 2021).
17. U.S. Navy, Office of Information, “Status of Ships Underway July 12, 2021,” https://www.navy.mil/About/Mission/ (accessed July 12, 2021).
18. U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard, Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy, p. 26,
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/noc2010.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
19. On average, rotational deployments require four ships for one ship to be forward deployed. This is necessary because one ship is
sailing out to a designated location, one is at location, one is sailing back to the CONUS, and one is in the CONUS for maintenance.
20. Figure 4, “Comparison of Forward-Presence Rates Provided on an Annual Basis for Ships Homeported in the United States andOverseas,” in U.S. Government Accountability Office, Navy Force Structure: Sustainable Plan and Comprehensive Assessment
Needed to Mitigate Long-Term Risks to Ships Assigned to Overseas Homeports, GAO-15-329, May 2015, p. 13, https://www.gao.
gov/assets/680/670534.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).

﻿

21. See Section 1025, “Policy of the United States on Minimum Number of Battle Force Ships,” in H.R. 2810, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Public Law 115-91, 115th Cong., December 12, 2017, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/
publ91/PLAW-115publ91.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
22. The Honorable James F. Geurts, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A); Vice
Admiral William R. Merz, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (OPNAV N9); and Lieutenant General David
H. Berger, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration, and Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, statement on “The Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request for Seapower andProjection Forces” before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Houseof Representatives, March 26, 2019, p. 3, https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/9/1/919f5faa-95da-41d8-88b9395b063c36ee/C72CB2C30F9989D64E8C8BF8F1A18801.hhrg-116-as28-wstate-geurtsj-20190326.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
23. Figure 2.2, “Shipbuilding Procurement Quantities and Total Funding,” in U.S. Navy, Office of Budget, Highlights of the Departmentof the Navy FY 2022 Budget, p. 2-3.
24. Section 123, “Sense of Congress on Accelerated Production of Aircraft Carriers,” in H.R. 5515, John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232, 115th Cong., August 13, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/
publ232/PLAW-115publ232.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
25. Paul McLeary, “Navy Scraps Big Carrier Study, Clears Desk for OSD Effort,” Breaking Defense, May 12, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/navy-scraps-big-carrier-study-clears-deck-for-osd-effort/ (accessed July 12, 2021).
26. Table 1, “Numbers of Certain Types of Chinese and U.S. Ships Since 2005,” in Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for
Members and Committees of Congress No. RL33153, updated March 9, 2021, pp. 30–31, https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/20509332/china-naval-modernization-implications-for-us-navy-capabilities-background-and-issues-for-congressmarch-9-2021.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
27. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics: May 2020 National
Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, NAICS 336600—Ship and Boat Building,” occupation code
51-4121, last modified March 31, 2021, https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_336600.htm (accessed August 16, 2021), and U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics: May 2017 National IndustrySpecific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, NAICS 336600—Ship and Boat Building,” occupation code 51-4121, lastmodified March 30, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/naics4_336600.htm (accessed August 16, 2021).
28. The Navy’s FY 2020 30-year shipbuilding plan identified opportunities to build three additional Virginia-class submarines overthe next six years and an additional nine next-generation SSNs between FY 2037 and FY 2049. The Navy’s FY 2020 budget
requested three Virginia-class SSNs. This is the first time in over 20 years that the Navy has procured three SSNs in one fiscal
year. Since the advance procurement for the third Virginia SSN was not included in the Navy’s FY 2019 budget, construction ofthis third submarine most likely will not commence until FY 2023. Critical parts and equipment for this additional submarine
above the planned 10-submarine block buy have not been purchased yet, and the shipyards (Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls
Industries Newport News Shipbuilding) have not planned for this submarine as part of their Virginia-class construction.

416

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength29. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32418, June 24, 2021, pp. 12–13, https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32418.pdf (accessed July 13, 2021).
30. Modly, Gilday, and Berger, statement “On Fiscal Year 2021 Department of the Navy Budget,” pp. 23–24.
31. Testimony of Admiral Mike Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations, in transcript of “Hearing on Fiscal 2022 Budget Request for the
Navy and Marine Corps,” Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, April 29, 2021,
in U.S. Navy, Office of Information, “CNO Gilday at HAC-D Navy Posture Hearing,” https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Testimony/
display-testimony/Article/2590426/cno-gilday-at-hac-d-navy-posture-hearing/ (accessed July 14, 2021).
32. Vice Admiral Robert P. Burke, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Personnel and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel,
Training & Education), statement on “Personnel Posture of the Armed Services” before the Subcommittee on Personnel,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 14, 2018, p. 11, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
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90. The term “first island chain” refers to a string of archipelagoes in the Western Pacific ringing the Asia landmass in the East,
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Posture” before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 9, 2021, pp. 25–26, https://www.armed-services.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_03-09-21.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
118. U.S. Navy, Fleet Forces Command, Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents, October 26, 2017, passim, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4172114-Comprehensive-Review-of-Recent-Surface-Force (accessed July 14, 2021).
119. U.S. Department of the Navy, Strategic Readiness Review 2017, p. 5, http://s3.amazonaws.com/CHINFO/SRR+Final+12112017.pdf(accessed July 12, 2021).

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421

﻿

U.S. Air ForceJohn Venable

T

Today’s Air Force has five principal missions:ll

Air superiority (space superiority is now
the responsibility of the Space Force);
Intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance;l

Mobility and lift;lGlobal strike; andlCommand and control.

﻿

he U.S. Air Force (USAF), originally partof the Army Signal Corps, became a separate service in 1947, and its mission has expanded significantly over the years. Initially,
operations were divided among four major
components—Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, Air Defense Command,and Military Air Transport Service—that collectively reflected the Air Force’s “fly, fight,
and win” nature. Space’s rise to prominencein the early 1950s brought a host of faculties
that would expand the service’s portfolio andincrease its capabilities in the mission areas ofintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance(ISR) and command and control (C2). Together, the addition of the Space Force as the fifth
uniformed service within the Departmentof Defense (DOD) and the onset of the global SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic have
had a notable impact on the Air Force in theyear since the 2021 Index of Military Strength
was published.
With the birth of the Space Force in December 2019,1 the Air Force began to move its
space portfolio of assets and personnel to the
new service. This change will affect at least
three mission areas: air and space superiority,
ISR, and C2. Each of these mission areas wasborn from air-breathing assets, and while theloss of the space portfolio will reduce the service’s inherent capabilities, they will remain
within the Department of the Air Force (DAF)
and allow the Air Force to focus the weight of
its efforts on the core missions in the air andcyber domains.

The summer of 2021 finds the Air Force, likethe rest of DOD, recovering from the effects of
COVID-19. Recruiting and other training pipelines like pilot training have slowed considerably,
and this has affected accessions. The service’s
ability to generate sorties and flying hours fortraining has reached near-historic lows withequally grim readiness levels. All of this comes on
the heels of reductions in force size and a drought
in readiness from which the Air Force has been
trying to recover for the past several years.
The pandemic’s impact on the economy
has reduced external hiring opportunities,
particularly with the airlines, and this hashelped to mitigate the separation from the
Air Force of the most experienced airmen in
critically manned areas.2 However, because
the COVID-19 vaccine’s distribution is now
widespread and the economic recovery is underway, it could well become harder to retain
trained personnel.

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423

﻿

Unlike some of the other services, the Air
Force did not grow larger during the post-9/11
buildup. Instead, it grew smaller as acquisitionsof new aircraft failed to offset programmed
retirements of older aircraft. Following thesequestration debacle in 2012, the Air Forcebegan to trade size for quality.3 Presidential defense budgets from 2012 through 2017 during
the Obama Administration proved merely
aspirational, and as the service sustained thewar on terrorism, it struggled also to sustain
the type of readiness required to employ in a
major regional contingency (MRC) against anear-peer threat.
The Air Force was forced to make strategic
trades in capability, capacity, and readiness tomeet the operational demands of the war on
terrorism and develop the force it needed forthe future. The collective effects left the Air
Force of 2016 with just 55 total force fighter
squadrons, and the readiness levels withinthose organizations were very low. Just fourof the Air Force’s 32 active-duty fighter squadrons were ready for conflict with a near-peer
competitor, and just 14 others were considered
ready even for low-threat combat operations.4
Recognizing the threat from a rising China
and resurgent Russia, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) directed the services
to prepare for a large-scale, high-intensity
conventional conflict with a peer adversary.5
Later that same year, the Air Force released“The Air Force We Need” (TAFWN), a studyof the capacity it would need to fight and help
the U.S. win such a war. Based on thousandsof war-game simulations, the study foundthat the service needed to grow by 25 percent, from 312 to 386 squadrons, to executethat strategy. That growth included one additional airlift squadron and seven additional fighter, five additional bomber, and 14 additional tanker squadrons.6 That equates toan additional 182 fighter, 50 bomber, 210 air
refueling, and 15 airlift platforms.7 During thesame period, the service’s most senior leadersconveyed the need for more time in the air for
its aircrews,8 and these collective demands required a bigger budget.

424

In a series of speeches in 2018, Air Force
Secretary Heather Wilson and Air Force Chiefof Staff General David Goldfein highlighted
the shortfall and the need for more funding
to increase the service’s capacity with next-­
generation platforms: in other words, to buy
all-new-design aircraft rather than continuing to purchase aircraft that have been in production since the 1980s and 1990s).9 To meetthat requirement, the Trump Administration
increased DAF funding by 31 percent from2017 to 2021.10
Considering this shortfall, one might assume that the Air Force increased its procurement budget and accelerated acquisitionof fifth-generation offensive platforms andnext-generation tanker aircraft during that period by a substantial margin. However, funding
for aircraft procurement remained relatively
flat, growing from $22.4 billion in fiscal year
(FY) 2017 to just $25.6 billion in FY 2022—arate of growth that did not keep up with inflation. The budget for procurement fell from$28.4 billion in FY 2021 to $25.6 billion in FY
2022, a straight decrease of 11 percent but, accounting for inflation, a loss of buying powerthat approaches 14 percent.
The budget for research, development, test
and evaluation (RDT&E), on the other hand,
has more than doubled since FY 2017, growing
from $20.5 billion in FY 2017 to $40.1 billion
in FY 2022, and now exceeds procurement by
more than 50 percent.11 Much of that funding
was used to develop and field the digital backbone for the Airborne Battle Management
System (ABMS) to help move information to
the warfighter, process targets, and optimize
their engagement.

CapacityAt the height of the Cold War buildup in
1987, the active-duty Air Force had an inventory of 3,082 fighter, 331 bomber, 576 air refueling, and 331 strategic airlift platforms. Whenthe strategic reserve assets within the Air National Guard (Guard) and Air Force Reserve(Reserve) are added, the 1987 totals were 4,468
fighter, 331 bomber, 704 air refueling, and 362

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

CHART 11

Air Force Budgets, 2017–2022
IN BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS$200$165.2$168.3$172.6■ Overseas Contingency
Operations■ Procurement$155.3$146.3$150■ Military Construction$132.2■ Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation$100■ Military Personnel$50■ Operation &Maintenance$0

FY 2017

FY 2018

FY 2019

FY 2020

FY 2021

FY 2022

A heritage.org

strategic airlift platforms. After the fall of theIron Curtain, the United States shifted from aforce-sizing construct centered on great-power competition to one capable of winning two
simultaneous or nearly simultaneous MRCs.
Those numbers for capacity have been reduced
significantly over the years.
It is projected that at the end of FY 2021, theAir Force will have a total aircraft inventory(TAI) of 2,183 fighters, 140 bombers, 512 tankers, and 274 strategic airlift platforms. After
just three years of adding to that inventory, theservice returned to the idea of trading capacity
for some future gain through RDT&E.12 In 2021,
Chief of Staff General C.Q. Brown announcedplans to cut another 137 fighters and 32 tankers from the USAF’s inventory by the end of FY
2022. While the service has not stated where
those reductions will be made, it will reduce
the TAI to 2,096 fighters, 140 bombers, 483
tankers, and 274 by the end of FY 2022.13 The
Air Force will have a total force that equates to47 percent of the fighter and bomber assets and69 percent of the tanker and airlift assets that

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military425

﻿NOTE: FY 2022 figures are proposed.
SOURCES: Extracted from U.S. Air Force budget summaries for the years 2017 through 2021. For example: Table 1, “Air Force Budget
Highlights Summary,” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Overview, May 2017, p. 15,
http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=m3vZOmfR368%3d&portalid=84 (accessed August 17, 2021), and Table 1,“Department of the Air Force Budget Summary,” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force FY 2021 Budget
Overview, p. 2, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY21/SUPPORT_/FY21%20Budget%20Overview_1.pdf?
ver=2020-02-10-152806-743 (accessed August 17, 2021).

﻿

it possessed the last time the United States was requirements and the fact that most squadrons
prepared to fight a peer competitor.
have several jets that are in disrepair at any
The idea that aircraft production lines will given time, it takes the resources of approxisomehow surge to come to the rescue in a mately three active-duty squadrons to deploy
peer-level crisis may seem plausible to some,14 two combat-capable fighter units forward.17
but even if Congress were to throw an unlimit- That effectively reduces the total number ofed amount of funding at production lines, there active-duty, combat-coded fighters to 649 jets.
would not likely be enough time to bring new
The strategic reserve has 518 fighters, offighters into the force to meet the 2018 NDS’s which 419 are combat coded. Because of the
scenario and timing requirements.15
additional manning requirements and the fact
The Index of U.S. Military Strength uses that Guard and Reserve units generally have“combat-coded” fighter aircraft within the ac- just one squadron at each location, it takes
tive component of the U.S. Air Force to assess two squadrons to deploy one combat-capable
capacity. Combat-coded aircraft and related unit forward.18 In terms of capacity, this means
squadrons are aircraft and units with an as- that 649 active-duty and 210 strategic reserve
signed wartime mission, which means that fighters, for a total of 859 combat-coded fightthose numbers exclude units and aircraft as- ers, could be deployed into combat, leaving
signed to training, operational test and evalu- virtually nothing in reserve.
ation (OT&E), and other missions.
Capacity also relies on the stockpile of availThe software and munitions carriage and able munitions and the production capacity ofdelivery capability of aircraft in non-combat-­ the munitions industry. The actual number ofcoded units renders them incompatible with munitions within the U.S. stockpile is classified,
and/or less survivable than combat-coded but there are indicators that make it possible
versions of the same aircraft. For example, all to assess the overall health of this vital area.
F-35As may appear to be ready for combat, but The inventory for precision-guided munitions
training wings and test and evaluation jets (PGM) was severely stressed by nearly 18 years
have hardware and software limitations that of sustained combat operations and budget acwould severely curtail their utility and effec- tions that limited the service’s ability to protiveness in combat. While those jets could be cure replacements and increase stockpiles.
slated for upgrades, hardware updates sideline From 2017 through 2021, funding for munijets for several months, and training wings and tions was significant, and the service, believing
certain test organizations are generally the last the inventory is now sufficiently restocked, has
to receive those upgrades.
reduced the number of PGMs it will acquire to
Of the 5,504 manned and unmanned air- a total of 8,365 munitions in FY 2022.
craft projected to be in the USAF’s inventory
However, even though the munitions stockat the end of FY 2021, 1,482 are active-duty pile may have returned to a level capable offighters, and 983 of those are combat-coded supporting a surge in expenditures associataircraft.16 It is important to separate the ac- ed with a conflict similar to the one in which
tive-duty fighters and units from the strategic the U.S. has been engaged for the past 19-plus
reserve because it would take several months years, it would not likely support a peer-levelto get elements of the latter up to manning and fight that lasts more than a few weeks. Typicalreadiness levels that allowed their first ele- ly, there is a delay of 24–36 months between
ments to deploy. Unfortunately, there are other funding and delivery of additional munitions,factors that also affect the number of fighters and while the potential exists for a rapid exthe service could actually employ in combat.
pansion of production, it is hard to envision
Most squadrons will have to pack up and de- how such an expansion could be rapid enoughploy several thousand miles to be able to fight. to exceed demand before the stockpile is deBecause of the additional wartime manning pleted. (See Table 5).

4262022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

TABLE 5

Precision-Guided Munitions Expenditures and Programmed Acquisitions
TOTAL MUNITIONS EXPENDED

FY 2017

FY 2018

FY 2019

FY 2020

FY2021*JDAM

30,664

5,462

7,354

4,004

4,500

HELLFIRE

1,536

2,110

2,449

1,019

1,250

SDB-I/II

4,507

749

1,289

397

300

APKWS

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

JASSM-ER

360

19

16

10

16

LGB

276

373

106

6,078

6,000

ARRW**

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

38,092

9,462

11,963

11,50812,066

FY 2018

FY 2019

FY 2020

FY 2021

FY 2022*

JDAM

35,10636,00025,00016,800

1,919

HELLFIRE

3,629

3,734

3,859

4,517

1,176

SDB-I/II

7,312

6,254

8,253

3,205

1,983

APKWS

10,6216879

15,642

3,946

2,750

JASSM-ER

360

360

390

400

525

0

0

0

0

0

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

12

57,77753,97653,89329,617

8,365

Total
TOTAL MUNITIONS ACQUIREDARRW**
Total* Estimate based on data from President’s Budget.
** Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) is a hypersonic, long-range, conventional air-to-surface missile with precisionguided, prompt-strike capability from stand-off ranges.
SOURCES: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to Heritage Foundation request for
information on Air Force munition levels, May 7, 2021; Table 2, “Department of the Air Force Budget Summary,” in U.S. Departmentof the Air Force, Department of the Air Force FY 2022 Budget Overview, p. 12, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/
FY22/SUPPORT_/FY22%20Budget%20Overview%20Book.pdf?ver=SMbMqD0tqIJNwq2Z0Q4yzA%3d%3d (accessed August 17, 2021);
and U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force, Justification Book
Volume 1 of 1, Procurement of Ammunition, Air Force, May 2021, pp. Volume 1-7–Volume 1-76, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/
documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203011%20-%20Ammunition%20Proc.pdf?ver=PaFt7rWf7aiKYJhIcpv9w%3d%3d (accessed August 17, 2021).
A heritage.org

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427

﻿

LGB

﻿

Capability
to invest in modernization, which is critical to
The risk assumed with capacity has placed ensuring future capability. Even with a SLEP,
an ever-growing burden on the capability of there is a direct correlation between aircraft
Air Force assets. The ensuing capability-over-­ age and the maintainability of those platforms.
capacity strategy centers on the idea of devel- (See Table 6).
oping and maintaining a more-capable force
The Air Force’s ISR and lift capabilities facethat can win against the advanced fighters and similar problems in specific areas that affectsurface-to-air missile systems now being de- both capability and capacity. The majority ofveloped by top-tier potential adversaries like the Air Force’s ISR aircraft are now unmanned
China and Russia, which are also increasing aerial vehicles (UAVs). The Air Force will actheir capacity.
cept delivery of 19 MQ-9s to its inventory in
Any assessment of capability includes not FY 2022 for a total of 351 Reapers.24 The seronly the incorporation of advanced technolo- vice lost an RQ-4 to an Iranian missile in 2019
gies, but also the overall health of the inventory. and intends to reduce its inventory by another
Most aircraft have programmed life spans of 21 platforms by the end of FY 2022, leaving it
20 to 30 years based on a programmed level with just 10 of these strategic reconnaissanceof annual flying hours. The bending and flex- platforms. These unmanned surveillance airing of airframes over time in the air generates craft have largely replaced older manned platpredictable levels of stress and fatigue on ev- forms, but not entirely. With an average age oferything from metal airframe structures to 39 years,25 the U-2, a manned high-altitude
electrical wiring harnesses.
reconnaissance aircraft, is still very much in
The average age of Air Force aircraft is 31 demand and currently has no scheduled reyears, and some fleets, such as the B-52 bomb- tirement date.26
er, average 60 years. In addition, KC-135s comThe E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack
prise 78 percent of the Air Force’s 483 tankers Radar System (J-STARS) and RC-135 Rivand are more than 59 years old on average. By et Joint are critical ISR platforms. Each was
the end of FY 2022, 71 brand-new KC-46s will built on the Boeing 707 platform, and the last
make up 15 percent of the tanker inventory, but one came off the production line 42 years ago.
they will not be capable of refueling aircraft The FY 2020 National Defense Authorizaduring combat operations—the jet’s primary tion Act directed the Air Force not to retire
mission—until sometime in FY 2024.19
the E-8 until a replacement system is availThe average age of the F-15C fleet is more able. However, the President’s FY 2022 budthan 37 years,20 significantly exceeding the pro- get request includes the retirement of four ofgrammed service life of a fleet that comprises those platforms.27
more than half of USAF air superiority platThe Air Force is working on an incremen21
forms. The planes in the F-16C/D fleet are al- tal approach for a J-STARS replacement thatmost 31 years old on average,22 and the service focuses on advanced and disaggregated senhas used up nearly 87 percent of their expected sors (a system of systems) that would require
life span. In 2018, the Air Force announced its enhanced and hardened communications
intent to extend the service lives of 300 F-16s links. Known as the Advanced Battle Managethrough a major service life extension program ment System (ABMS),28 it is envisioned as an(SLEP) that will allow those jets to continue to all-encompassing approach to both airborne
fly through 2050.23 SLEPs lengthen the useful and ground Battle Management Command
life of airframes, and these F-16 modifications and Control (BMC2) that would allow the Air
also include funding for the modernization of Force to fight and support joint and coalition
avionics within those airframes. These modi- partners in high-end engagements.29
fications are costly, and the added expense reWith respect to air combat, the Active Air
duces the amount of funding the service has Force has just 98 F-15Cs left in its fleet,30 and

428

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

429

20

58

2

109

52

146

52

16

1

20

0

9

0

86

B-2A

B-52H

C-130H

C-130J

C-5M

C-17A

CV022B

E003B

E003C

E003G

E008C

EC130HEC130J

F015C

6AC130U

61

26

AC130J

B-1B

143

Active
Duty

A010C

Type

123

7

0

16

0

0

0

0

50

16

127

0

0

0

0

0

85

Air
National
Guard

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

26

10

42

18

0

0

0

0

55

Air Force
Reserve

FY 2021

209

7

9

16

20

1

16

52

222

52

146

141

76

20

44

6

26

281

Total

36

20

47

20

40

37

42

8

17

11

30

59

26

33

30

4

39

AverageAge inYears

Air Force Total Aircraft Inventory (Page 1 of 3)

TABLE 6

70%

57%

73%

67%

74%

73%

74%

53%

82%

77%

66%

66%

60%

46%

86%

86%

71%

MC RateFY 2019

﻿

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military
72%

53%

67%

67%

71%

77%

66%

54%

82%

61%

79%

70%

61%

62%

53%

88%

82%

72%

MC RateFY 2020

1.85%–4.88%–6.29%–0.86%–3.66%

3.61%–8.61%

0.75%

0.07%

1.98%

4.49%

–4.73%

1.53%

6.58%

2.38%

–4.12%

0.80%

ChangeMISSION CAPABLE (MC)

150

4

6

11

14

1

11

28

183

31

115

99

46

12

23

5

21

202

Average
Daily MC
Aircraft,
FY 2021

–36

–2

–4

–4

–13

0

–6

–42

Programmed
Retirements

5

4Programmed
Acquisitions

FY 2022

173

7

7

12

20

1

12

52

222

52

151

128

76

20

44

0

30

239

Total

430

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

218

F015E

439

111

166

306

21

0

74

50

52

122

30

0

16

44

306

F016C

F016D

F022A

F035A

HC130J

HC130N

HH060G

KC010A

KC046AKC135R

KC135T

LC130H

MC130H

MC130J

MQ009A

2

10

F015D

F015EX

Active
Duty

Type

24

0

0

10

24

148

12

0

18

3

12

20

20

44

288

0

14

Air
National
Guard

0

0

0

0

0

70

4

0

15

0

2

0

0

4

49

0

0

Air Force
Reserve

FY 2021

330

44

16

10

54

340

68

50

107

3

35

326

186

159

776

2

218

24

Total

7

6

32

35

60

59

2

36

30

26

6

5

13

30

30

0

28

36

AverageAge inYears

Air Force Total Aircraft Inventory (Page 2 of 3)

TABLE 6

89%

78%

69%

40%

71%

73%

63%

79%

66%

68%

80%

62%

51%

70%

73%

71%

72%

MC RateFY 2019

﻿

91%

76%

74%

44%

73%

73%

67%

81%

69%

74%

80%

76%

52%

72%

74%

69%

71%

MC RateFY 20201.45%–1.64%

4.95%

3.42%

1.99%

0.40%

0.00%

1.50%

2.79%

6.07%

–0.07%

14.50%

1.41%

1.73%

0.93%

–2.09%–1.95%

ChangeMISSION CAPABLE (MC)

300

33

12

4

39

248

45

40

74

2

28

248

97

115

573

151

17

Average
Daily MC
Aircraft,
FY 2021

–18

–14

–25

–6

–40

–12

Programmed
Retirements

21

11

3

4

50

Programmed
Acquisitions

FY 2022

351

55

16

10

54

322

71

36

82

3

39

376

186

153

736

2

218

12

Total

2

8

9

30

178

59

445

RC135U

RC135V

RC135W

RQ004B

T001A

T038A

T038C

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Air Force
Reserve

31

445

59

178

30

9

8

2

3

2

Total

29

53

54

26

9

57

56

55

58

58

AverageAge in
Years

78%

63%

74%

61%

76%

69%

74%

91%

90%

82%

MC RateFY 2019

73%

65%

71%

68%

74%

81%

78%

87%

88%

87%

MC RateFY 2020

–5%

2.35%

–3.18%

7.89%–2.15%

11.51%

3.90%–4.57%–2.79%

4.14%

ChangeMISSION CAPABLE (MC)

23

291

42

122

22

7

6

2

3

2

Average
Daily MC
Aircraft,
FY 2021–20–2

Programmed
Retirements

Programmed
Acquisitions

FY 2022

31

445

59

178

10

9

8

2

3

0

Total

A heritage.org

SOURCES: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to Heritage Foundation request for information on Air Force mission-capable rates, May 17, 2021;
Appendix, “Department of the Air Force Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI),” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force FY 2022 Budget Overview, p. 50, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/
Portals/84/documents/FY22/SUPPORT_/FY22%20Budget%20Overview%20Book.pdf?ver=SMbMqD0tqIJNwq2Z0Q4yzA%3d%3d (accessed August 17, 2021); and International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 56–59.

31

3

RC135S

U2

2

ActiveDuty

OC135B

Type

Air
National
Guard

FY 2021

Air Force Total Aircraft Inventory (Page 3 of 3)

TABLE 6

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431

﻿

concerns about what platform will fill this role
when the F-15C is retired are fully justified.
The Department of Defense planned to purchase 750 F-22A stealth air superiority fighters
to replace the F-15C, but draconian cuts in the
program of record reduced the acquisition toa total of just 186 F-22As: 166 Active Duty and
20 Air National Guard.31
The ability to fulfill the operational needfor air superiority fighters will be further
strained in the near term because of the F-22’s
low availability rates and a structural repair
program that causes some portion of thosejets to be unavailable for operational use. The
program had six F-22s off the flight line at any
given time32 to make alterations required to extend the airframe’s service life to 8,000 hours.
That program was completed in late 2020 andwill now transition to a 10-year program torefurbish the low-observable coatings on theengine inlets and inspect and overhaul theaircraft’s flight control system that will run
through 2031.33
The Air Force’s number-one acquisition priority remains the F-35A, the next-­generation
fighter scheduled to replace all legacy multirole and close air support aircraft. The jet’s fulloperating capability (FOC) was delivered inearly 2018.34 The rationale for the Air Force’s
planned acquisition of 1,763 aircraft is to replace every F-117, F-16, and A-10 aircraft on a
one-for-one basis.35 The F-35A’s multirole design favors the air-to-ground mission, but its
fifth-generation faculties will also be dominant
in an air-to-air role, allowing it to augment the
F-22A in many scenarios.36
A second top acquisition priority is the
KC-46A air refueling tanker. The KC-46 has
experienced a series of problems and delays,
the most recent of which involves the air refueling system that currently cannot refuelfighters in an operational environment. The
Air Force will have 68 KC-46s (44 Active, 12
Guard, and 12 Reserve) by the end of FY 2021
and will receive three more for a total of 71 in
FY 2022.37 The program plans to acquire another 108 tankers for a total of 179 by the endof FY 2028. The KC-46 will replace less than432

half of the current tanker fleet and will leave
the Air Force with over 200 aging KC-135s (already averaging 59 years old) that still need tobe recapitalized.38
The third major USAF acquisition priority
is the B-21 Raider, formerly called the LongRange Strike Bomber (LRSB). The USAF
awarded Northrop Grumman the B-21 contract to build the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase, which includes
associated training and support systems andinitial production lots. The program has completed an Integrated Baseline Review for theoverall B-21 development effort as well as thejet’s Preliminary Design Review. The Air Forceis committed to a minimum of 100 B-21s at an
average cost of $564 million per plane.39
With the budget deal that was reached for
FY 2018 and FY 2019, the Secretary of the Air
Force announced the service’s intent to retire
all B-1s and B-2s and sustain a fleet comprisedof 100 B-21s and 71 B-52s.40 The B-21 is programmed to begin replacing portions of theB-52 and B-1B fleets by the mid-2020s.41 In
the interim, the Air Force continues to execute a SLEP on the remaining fleet of B-1s in
the inventory to restore the bomber’s engines
to their original specifications. Through 2020,
the Air Force sustained a fleet of 61 B-1s, but
the state of repair of 17 of those jets has deteriorated to the point where the Air Force will
retire them by the end of FY 2021.42
The Air Force had planned to modernize theB-2’s Defense Management System but cancelled the plan in 2021 because of a software
coding mismatch with its legacy computer system.43 Stores Management Operational Flight
Program and Common Very-Low-Frequency/
Low Frequency Receiver Program elements
will be fielded to ensure that this penetrating
bomber remains viable in highly contested environments, keeping it fully mission capable
until it is replaced by the B-21.44
Modernization efforts for the B-52 arealso underway. The jet was designed in the
1950s, and the current fleet entered service
in the 1960s. The FY 2018 budget funded there-engineering of this fleet with upgrades

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military433

﻿that will include a new Long-Range Standoff
Early in 2019, General Goldfein stated that(LRSO) cruise missile, improved radar, new the service would likely not meet the 80 percomputers, new communication links, and a cent mission-capable (MC) threshold directive
new suite of electronic warfare countermea- until 2020, and in the spring of 2020, he madesures. The aircraft will remain in the inventory it clear that the threshold was no longer a fothrough 2050.45
cus for the Air Force. MC rates are a measure
When the Secretary of the Air Force and of how much of a certain fleet is “ready to go”
the Chief of Staff rolled out “The Air Force at a given time, and the general stated in clear
We Need” in 2018 to expand the number of terms that he regarded them as an inaccuratesquadrons from 312 to 386, one of the stated portrayal of the service’s overall health.
elements of that campaign was to fill the ranks
Instead of using that historic marker forof those new squadrons with only the newest readiness, the service moved to highlight how
generation of aircraft—F-35s, B-21s, and KC- deployable the fleet is within a short period of
46s—because of the capabilities that those time49 and shifted its focus to the number ofplatforms bring to bear.46 Curiously, the Air “force elements” (fighters, bombers, and tankForce is now acquiring the fourth-generation ers) that it has across the Air Force and how
F-15EX, based primarily on the ill-perceived quickly those forces need to be ready. One ofnotion that it will be cheaper to acquire and the examples that Goldfein used was the rapid
operate than the F-35A.47 The FY 2022 bud- deployment of a “task force” of four B-52s to
get funds 12 F-15EXs, and the Air Force has an the Middle East in May 2019.50 The bombers,
unfunded request for 12 more. Although the from Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, hadservice will certainly increase its numbers two days to deploy and immediately began towith that approach, the F-15EX will not be fly combat missions even though the B-52 fleet
survivable in the high-threat environment in had a mission-capable rate of 65.73 percent at
which deployed assets will be required to fight the time. While the ability to prepare and thenby the time fielding has been completed. The deploy four of 58 operational bombers rapidly is
Air Force is using precious acquisition dollars a capability, it is more in line with responding toto buy an aircraft that, by all indicators, will a regional contingency than it is with the capachave very limited utility in a conflict with a ity requirements spelled out in the 2018 NDS.
peer competitor.
In the USAF’s FY 2020 posture statement,
Secretary Wilson and Chief of Staff Goldfein
Readiness
said that more than 90 percent of the “leadThe 2018 National Defense Strategy’s focus force packages” within the service’s 204 “pacon peer-level war was designed to facilitate a ing squadrons” are “ready to ‘fight tonight.’”
clear and rapid paradigm shift away from the They went on to say that “pacing squadrons
tiered levels of readiness the Air Force had are on track to reach 80% readiness before theadopted because of years of relentless deploy- end of Fiscal Year 2020.”51 In the FY 2021 posments and funding shortfalls. In a move that ture statement, however, Goldfein and new Air
would refine the service’s focus on great-pow- Force Secretary Barbara Barrett were unable
er competition as spelled out by the new NDS, to declare that pacing squadrons had actually
Secretary of Defense James Mattis directed achieved that level of readiness, saying only
the Air Force to increase the mission-capable that pacing squadron mission-capable rates
rates of the F-16, F-22, and F-35 aircraft to 80 had increased and that the Air Force was conpercent by the end of September 2019.48 The tinuing its efforts to improve MC rates “acrossmove was designed to make more of an all-too- all fleets.”52
small fleet of combat aircraft available to deThe definitions for “pacing unit” and “pacploy in the numbers required to deter or defeat ing squadrons” are somewhat elusive. Assuma peer adversary.
ing that a pacing squadron is an operational

TABLE 7

Mission-Capable Combat-Coded Fighters in the Active-Duty Air Force
Combat-Coded
Fighters

Average Age
in Years

MissionCapable Rate

Mission-Capable
Combat-Coded
Fighters

A-10C

117

39

72%

84

F-15C

98

36

72%

71

F-15E

164

28

69%

113

F-16C

336

30

74%

249

F-22A

133

13

52%

69

F-35A

136

4

76%

103

Total

983

689

NOTE: Thirteen months were added because of the difference between the aircraft data capture dates for the 2021 USAF Almanac andpublication of this edition of the Index.
SOURCES:• “Air Force & Space Force Almanac 2021,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 104, No. 6 and 7 (June/July 2021), https://www.airforcemag.com/
article/2021-usaf-ussf-almanac-equipment/ (accessed Augsut 17, 2021).
• Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to Heritage Foundation request for informationon Air Force mission-capable rates, May 17, 2021.

﻿

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unit that is fully qualified and ready to execute
its primary wartime mission (C1), one is stillleft wondering what the “lead force packages”
within those 204 pacing/mission-ready units
are and what the limits on the remaining portions of those units might be. Taken together,
these statements imply that only portions of
the Air Force’s combat-coded squadrons are
currently qualified to execute the unit’s primary wartime mission.
The FY 2022 Air Force posture statement
offers no more clarity or assurances of readiness, but it has moved (again) to change theterminology. The simplified, three-phaseforce-generation model is designed “to more
effectively articulate” otherwise undefined“readiness impacts and capacity limits.”53
In 2017, the Secretary of the Air Force andthe Chief of Staff informed Congress that “[w]eare at our lowest state of full spectrum readiness in our history.”54 In the four years since434

their testimony, DOD has stifled open conversation or testimony about readiness, limiting
the Air Force’s ability to be forthcoming with
open-source readiness indicators. While thismakes any assessment of readiness difficult,there are three areas that can support an assessment: MC rates, aircrew training, anddeployability.
MC rates are defined as the percentage of aunit’s aircraft that are capable of executing its
mission set. Several factors drive MC rates, but
two are common to mature systems: manningand operations and maintenance (O&M) funding. Taken together, they dictate the number ofsorties and flight hours that units have available for aircrew training. Multiplying the MC
rates by the actual number of aircraft withina particular fleet yields the actual operational
capacity of that capability.
There are 186 F-22As in the total aircraft
inventory, but 28 are dedicated trainers, and2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

TABLE 8

Air Force Maintenance Manning
Skill Level
3–level (Apprentice)

Authorized

Assigned

Manning Percentage

15,07815,994106%

5–level (Journeyman)

36,70436,15198%

7–level (Craftsman)

18,443

18,390100%

SOURCE: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to
Heritage Foundation request for information on Air Force mission-capable rates, May 17, 2021.

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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military435﻿

16 are primary development aircraft invento- shortage shows no signs of abating. In Marchry (used for testing new equipment). In 2020, 2017, Lieutenant General Gina M. Grosso, Air
the F-22A had an MC rate of 52 percent, which Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Permeans that there were just 74 F-22As that sonnel, and Services, testified that at the end of
could be committed to combat at any given FY 2016, the Air Force had a shortfall of 1,555
time.55 The last time the United States was pre- pilots across all mission areas: 608 Active, 653
pared to fight a peer competitor, the Air Force Air National Guard, and 294 Reserve. Of that
had more than 700 F-15C air superiority fight- total, the Air Force was short 1,211 fighter piers with an MC rate of more than 80 percent lots: 873 Active, 272 Air National Guard, andfor that fleet. If just 500 of them were combat 66 Reserve.57
coded, more than 400 mission-­capable jets
The numbers continued to fall, and in thewere ready to fight the Soviet Union. Although middle of FY 2020, the Air Force was short
the F-22A is an incredibly capable fighter and 2,100 pilots. Today, the total Air Force has a
74 F-22s would be a formidable capability shortfall of 1,925 pilots, and while this is anagainst a regional threat, numbers are critical improvement of 175 pilots over 2020, almost
to winning a peer fight, particularly for offen- all of that improvement was due to the cessasive platforms, and 74 would not be sufficient. tion of airline hiring caused by COVID-19.58
For a summary of the mission-capable rates for The ability of the Air Force to recover fromcombat-coded (operational) aircraft of the five that shortfall will depend on how well the serfighter weapons systems, see Table 7.
vice addresses several major issues, especially
There are 33 operational B-1s in the Lancer the available number of pilot training slots, anfleet,56 and with an MC rate of 52.78 percent, area in which it appears that some progress
17 are available for combat at any given time is being made.
during the year. The small size of the B-2 fleet,
In FY 2018, the Air Force graduated 1,200
coupled with its 62.41 percent MC rate, means pilots; it added 1,279 in FY 2019 and projectthat, on average, just 12 are combat capable. ed that 1,480 would graduate in 2020, but theIf the B-52 operational fleet and its mission-­ impact of COVID-19 was such that only 1,263
capable rate of 60.51 percent are added, just received their wings. The vast majority of can64 bombers in the Air Force inventory were didates who did not graduate washed back andcapable of executing combat missions on any will graduate some time in FY 2021.
given day in 2020.
Those projected numbers rely on a very
Maintenance manning is now healthy high annual graduation rate of approximately
across the board (see Table 8), but the pilot 94 percent of the candidates that enter flight﻿

school. According to the data the Air Force pro- decreased the flying hour budget for FY 2022
vided for the 2021 Index of Military Strength, by some 80,000 hours (7 percent).64 This calls
the graduation rates for 2016, 2017, and 2018 into question how well maintenance is orgawere 93 percent, 98 percent, and 97 percent, nized to generate those sorties.
respectively.59 Those numbers, however, were
The sortie production recovery that took
incorrect, and the actual graduation rates were place at the end of the hollow-force days of the
96 percent for 2016, 92 percent for 2017, and 93 Carter Administration happened while levels
percent for 2018.60
of maintenance experience and inventories ofThroughout the pilot shortage, the Air spare parts were still low and well before theForce has done an excellent job of emphasizing Reagan Administration’s increase in defense
operational manning instead of placing expe- spending.65 The maintenance organization
rienced fighter pilots at staffs and schools, but that created that turnaround was changed in
the currency and qualifications of the pilots in 1989 to “save money by reducing maintenance
operational units are at least as important as staffing, equipment, and base level support,”66
manning levels. Although the quality of sorties which may help to explain the lackluster peris admittedly subjective, a healthy rate of three formance. No matter what the rationale may
sorties a week and flying hours averaging more be, even with robust manpower and funding,than 200 hours a year have been established as flying hours and sortie rates are still short of“sufficient” over more than six decades of fight- the levels required for a rapid increase in reader pilot training.61 In the words of General Bill iness levels across the fighter force.
Creech, “Higher sortie rates mean increased
Five years of increases in the O&M budproficiency for our combat aircrews,”62 and get have not translated into a proportionate
given the right number of sorties and quality growth in flight hours or greater readinessflight time, it takes seven years beyond mission levels. Fighter pilots received an average of
qualification in a fighter for an individual to 13.0 hours per month in 2017, and an incremaximize his potential as a fighter pilot.63
mental O&M budget increase of 16.4 percent
COVID-19’s impact on flying hours hit the over the next three years delivered 12.9 hours
Air Force as it was beginning to recover from an per month in 2018 and 14.1 hours per month
18-year drought in training for combat with a in 2019—only 8 percent higher than in 2017.67
near-peer competitor. Flying hours and sortie (For data related to flight hours and sorties, seerates across all fighter platforms fell to historic Tables 9 through 14.)lows as the average line combat mission-ready
Combat mission-ready pilots generally
fighter pilot received less than 1.5 sorties a week fly more than average, and those assigned toand 131 hours of flying time that year. That is a combat-coded (operational) unit received
significantly below the healthy fighter force just 14.6 hours and 7.5 sorties a month in 2019,68
thresholds of three sorties a week and 200 hours which is an average below two sorties a week
a year per pilot. Moreover, to the extent that the when they need three per week to sustain their
Air Force lacks available aircraft, it will remain skills.69 The Air Force did its best to fly throughunable to train pilots to those thresholds.
the effects of COVID-19, but the pandemic had
As noted, the primary drivers for mission-­ a devastating effect on hours and sortie rates.
capable rates are maintenance manning and The average fighter pilot flew just over one sorO&M funding. Maintenance manning has been tie a week for the duration of 2020, which inhealthy for more than four years, and FY 2022 a high-performance jet reduces competency
O&M funding is 42 percent higher than the levels to the point where excellent pilots begin
funding O&M received for FY 2017. However, to question the execution of very basic tasks.70
flying hours across the fleet of fighters have
It will take several more years of robust
increased by just 9 percent over that same training for fighter pilots within fighter squadperiod, and senior Air Force leaders actually rons to regain what they lost in 2020 alone.

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

TABLE 9

Average Hours All Fighter Pilots Received per Month
2017

2018

2019

2020

Percentage Change,
2019 to 2020

F-22

10.8

10.8

10.5

6.9

–34%

F-35A

10.4

10.4

14.4

10.2

–29%

F-15C

10.5

10.5

11.8

4.8

–59%

F-16C

12.2

12.2

12.1

6.7

–45%

F-15E

18.3

18.3

20.3

13.0

–36%

A-10

15.1

15.1

16.5

12.2

–26%

All Jets

13.0

12.9

14.1

8.7

–38%

Average Hours per Year

155.4

154.6

168.7

104.3

–38%

SOURCE: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to
Heritage Foundation request for information on Air Force mission-capable rates, May 17, 2021.

availability of support equipment and aircraft, it takes three active-duty squadrons to
deploy two squadrons forward. For that reason, up until the end of the Cold War, the Air
Force organizational structure was based on athree-squadron wing. On any given day, units

TABLE 10

Average Sorties All Fighter Pilots Received per Month
2017

2018

2019

2020

Percentage Change,
2019 to 2020

F-22

6.4

6.4

7.1

5.3

-25%

F-35A

6.6

6.6

6.5

5.9

-9%

F-15C

7.0

7.0

6.6

4.5

-32%

F-16C

7.4

7.4

7.3

4.6

-37%

F-15E

7.9

7.9

7.6

6.4

-16%

A-10

7.1

7.1

7.5

5.9

-21%

All Jets

7.2

7.2

7.2

5.3

-26%

Average Sorties per Year

86.5

86.2

86.0

64.0

-26%

SOURCE: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to
Heritage Foundation request for information on Air Force mission-capable rates, May 17, 2021.

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437﻿

Unfortunately, the Air Force is not movingon that path and will cut 87,479 flying hours
from its budget in FY 2022—a reductionof 7 percent.71
Deployability. Because long-term inspections and depot-level work affect the

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TABLE 11﻿

Average Hours Line Fighter Pilots Received per Monthin Combat-Coded Squadrons
2019

2020

Percentage Change

F-22

11.0

7.6

–31%

F-35A

15.4

14.7

–5%

F-15C

11.9

8.9

–25%

F-16C

12.7

8.5

–33%

F-15E

21.7

16.6

–24%

A-10

16.9

14.1

–17%

All Jets

14.6

10.9

–25%

Average Hours per Year

174.7

131.0

–25%

SOURCE: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, response to request for information, May 14, 2021.

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have several aircraft that are not flyable because of long-term inspections, deep maintenance, or the need for spare parts. By using aircraft from one of the three squadrons to “plusup” the others, the wing could immediately deploy two full-strength units into combat. The
handful of fully flyable jets and pilots left at thehome station were then used to train new andinbound pilots up to mission-ready status sothat, among other things, they could replacepilots that were lost during combat.72
Normal, active duty fighter squadron manning levels are based on a ratio of 1.25 aircrew
members for every aircraft,73 which means thata unit with 24 assigned aircraft should have 30
line pilots and five supervisor pilots who are

TABLE 12

Average Sorties Line Fighter Pilots Received per Monthin Combat-Coded Squadrons
2019

2020

Percentage Change

F-22

7.4

5.5

–26%

F-35A

6.7

6.8

1%

F-15C

6.8

5.0

–26%

F-16C

7.6

5.3

–30%

F-15E

8.0

7.2

–10%

A-10

7.7

6.5

–16%

All Jets

7.5

5.9

–21%

Average Sorties per Year

89.9

71.0

–21%

SOURCE: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, response to request for information, May 14, 2021.

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438

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

TABLE 13

Average Hours All Line Fighter Pilots Received per Month
2017

2018

2019

2020

Percentage Change,
2019 to 2020

F-22

11.7

12.8

10.9

7.1

–35%

F-35A

10.6

12.4

15.0

10.5

–30%

F-15C

10.5

13.1

11.8

4.6

–61%

F-16C

11.9

15.5

12.5

6.9

–45%

F-15E

19.1

20.3

21.3

6.6

–69%

A-10

16.7

23.0

16.9

12.6

–25%

All Jets

13.2

16.1

14.6

8.9

–39%

Average Hours per Year

159.0

193.0

175.0

107.0

–39%
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SOURCE: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, response to request for information, May 14, 2021.

its roster.75 Pilots from “donor” squadrons canfill those slots for the deploying units.
With the downsizing that has taken placesince the end of the Cold War and the reduction in the number of fighter squadrons, theActive Air Force has reduced the number offighter squadrons to two or even one in many
wings. All operational Guard and Reserve

TABLE 14

Average Sorties All Line Fighter Pilots Received per Month
2017

2018

2019

2020

Percentage Change,
2019 to 2020

F-22

6.3

4.5

7.3

5.5

–25%

F-35A

6.5

7.5

6.6

6.0

–9%

F-15C

7.2

8.4

6.7

4.6

–31%

F-16C

7.3

9.3

7.5

4.7

–37%

F-15E

8.0

8.5

7.9

6.6

–16%

A-10

7.2

9.7

7.7

6.1

–21%

All Jets

7.2

8.3

7.4

5.4

–27%

Average Sorties per Year

86.0

100.0

89.0

65.0

–27%

SOURCE: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to
Heritage Foundation request for information on Air Force mission-capable rates, May 17, 2021.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

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439

﻿combat mission ready.74 Flight times, sortie
rates, mission planning teams, and flight supervision requirements are significantly higher in combat, and to cover those requirements,
the manning ratio normally increases to 1.50
pilots per aircraft, or 36 line pilots per squadron. In other words, every squadron deployed
to fight requires six more pilots than it has on

FIGURE 2

Air Force Active-Duty Combat-Coded Fighter Squadrons (32 Total)

﻿F-16
11 squadrons

F-15E
6 squadrons

F-15C
3 squadrons

F-22
4 squadrons

F-35
4 squadrons

SOURCE: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to
Heritage Foundation request for information on Air Force mission-capable rates, May 17, 2021.

wings are comprised of a single squadron,
which complicates the math behind the total
number of deployable fighter squadrons.
Of the 55 operational fighter squadrons on
the Air Force roster, 32 are Active and 23 are
Guard or Reserve Units. (See Figures 2 and
3.) Using the notion that it takes three squadrons to get two active-duty ones forward, theairframe disposition of each active-duty wing
would allow just 21 active-duty fighter squadron equivalents (24 fighter aircraft each) to deploy to a fight. That equates to 480 active-duty
fighters that could deploy to meet a crisis situation, which is well short of the 600 it takes to
win a single MRC and means that a war with apeer competitor will draw heavily on our strategic reserve.
Guard and Reserve units face the samemanning and deployment challenges that the

440

A-10
4 squadrons

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active-duty service faces, except that the vast
majority of those units have just one fighter
squadron per wing, further straining theirability to muster the airframes and manning
to meet an emergency deployment.76 Planningfor low-threat, low-intensity deployments to
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom took this into consideration
by mapping deployments out months (often
years) in advance of the required movement,
allowing pilots to deconflict their civilian work
schedules not just for the deployment, butalso to get the training and time in the air thatthey needed to employ successfully in those
low-threat combat operations.77 Nevertheless,it was common for Guard units to pull pilots
from other units to fulfill manning requirements for “rainbow” fighter squadrons,78 andin a conflict where there is little time from2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

FIGURE 3

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Combat-Coded
Fighter Squadrons (23 Total)
F-16
12 squadrons

F-15C
5 squadrons

F-22
1 squadron

A-10
5 squadrons

warning order to deployment, it would likely
take two Guard and Reserve squadrons to enable one to deploy forward.79
The average Guard and Reserve fighter
squadron has one-third fewer jets than similar active-duty units have. By rainbowing units
with similar aircraft, they could muster 12squadrons as a strategic reserve of 288 fightersthat could deploy sometime after the active-duty units deploy. In other words, the service could
muster just 768 fighters (480 Active and 288
Guard and Reserve) for a peer-level fight. Unfortunately, the gravity of that mix is not fully understood. The Guard and Reserve numbers are
based on airframes alone, but other factors suchas manning levels would also limit the numberof sorties and the amount of combat power thatthose fighters could generate continually in ahigh-end confrontation with a peer competitor.

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The declaration in Air Force posture statements for FY 2020 and FY 2021 that leadforce packages within the service’s 204 pacing squadrons are ready to fight also conveys
the fact that only portions of its most capablesquadrons have enough mission-capable aircraft and mission-ready aircrews to respondreadily to a crisis. Because of the pilot shortage,
actual unit manning levels in fighter squadrons are below peacetime requirements (ifonly slightly), which obviously is not enoughto meet the significantly increased demands
and the tempo required for combat operations.
The service has already moved the majorityof pilots who were in staff or other non-flying
billets back to the cockpit in an effort to relieve
the manning shortfall. Thus, the only way units
can meet wartime manning requirements is bypulling pilots from other “donor” squadrons.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military441

﻿

SOURCE: Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to
Heritage Foundation request for information on Air Force mission-capable rates, May 17, 2021.

The complications that this involves are significant and call into question the idea thatthe portions of the 55 fighter squadrons thatare unable to deploy immediately in a crisis
could be combined to create more combat

power. The vast majority of aircraft and aircrew that are left would be used for homeland
defense and to train replacement pilots or
as replacement aircraft that are lost throughcombat attrition.

Scoring the U.S. Air Force
Capacity Score: MarginalTAFWN Tanker Squadron—­Threshold:One of the key elements of combat power in
54 tanker squadrons / 540 combat-­the U.S. Air Force is its fleet of fighter aircraft.
coded tankers.
In responding to major combat engagements
since World War II, the Air Force has deployed
TAFWN Tanker Squadron—Actual
an average of 28 fighter squadrons. Based on
2021 Level: 39 combat-coded tanker
an average of 18 aircraft per squadron, thatsquadrons (72 percent) / 414 combat-­equates to a requirement of 500 active compocoded tankers (76 percent).
nent fighter aircraft to execute one MRC. Adding a planning factor of 20 percent for spares
TAFWN Airlift Squadron—Threshand attrition reserves brings the number toold: 54 airlift squadrons / 540 combat-­
600 aircraft.
coded airlifters.
As part of its overall assessment of capacity, the 2022 Index looks for 1,200 active-duty,
TAFWN Airlift Squadron—Actual
combat-coded fighter aircraft to meet the base2021 Level: 50 combat-coded airlift
line requirement for two MRCs.80 That numsquadrons (93 percent) / 538 combat-­ber of fighters lines up well with the fighter recoded airlifters (99 percent).
quirement from the 2018 TAFWN. The bomber,tanker, and strategic air requirement from that
Based on a pure count of combat-coded
study are also used in this assessment.
squadrons and platforms that have achieved
initial operating capability (IOC), the USAF
Two-MRC Fighter—Threshold: 1,200
currently is at 86 percent of the capacity recombat-coded active-duty fighters /quired to meet a two-MRC/TAFWN bench62 squadrons.
mark. However, the disposition of those assets
limits the ability of the service to deploy them
Two-MRC Fighter—Actual 2021 Level: rapidly to a crisis region. While the active fight983 active-duty combat-coded fighterser and bomber assets that are available would(82 percent) / 55 total force squadrons
likely prove adequate to fight and win a single(88 percent).
regional conflict, when coupled with the low
mission capability rates of those aircraft (seeTAFWN Bomber Squadron—­
Table 7), the global sourcing needed to field
Threshold: 14 combat-coded bomber
the required combat fighter force assets would
squadrons / 140 bombers.
leave the rest of the world uncovered.
Nevertheless, the capacity level is well withTAFWN Bomber Squadron—Actualin the methodology’s range of “marginal.” With
2021 Level: nine combat-coded bomber
programmed retirements that will exceed acsquadrons (64 percent) / 114 combat-­quisitions, capacity is now trending downward.
coded bombers (81 percent).
l

l

l

﻿

l

l

l

l

l

442

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthCapability Score: Marginal
The Air Force’s capability score is “marginal,” based on scores of “strong” for “Sizeof Modernization Program,” “marginal” for“Age of Equipment” and “Health of Modernization Programs,” but “weak” for “Capability ofEquipment.” These assessments are the sameas those in the 2021 Index. New F-35 and KC46 aircraft continue to roll off their respective
production lines, but these additions are morethan offset by aircraft retirements. As a consequence, this score will probably not improveover the next three to five years.

Overall U.S. Air Force Score: Weak
This is an unweighted average of the
USAF’s capacity score of “marginal,” capability score of “marginal,” and readiness scoreof “weak.” The shortage of pilots and flying
time for those pilots degrades the ability of
the Air Force to generate the quality of combat air power that would be needed to meetwartime requirements. Fighter pilots should
receive an average of three or more sorties aweek and 200 hours per year to develop theskill sets needed to survive in combat, andwhile the service cannot be blamed for theeffects of COVID-19 on readiness, it elected
not to surge to acquire more aircraft or significantly increase training/sortie production in
the window of robust funding.
Although it would likely win a single MRC in
any theater, there is little doubt the Air Forcewould struggle in war with a peer competitor.
Both the time required to win such a conflict
and the attendant rates of attrition would bemuch higher than they would be if the service
had moved aggressively to increase high-end
training and acquire the fifth-generation weapon systems required to dominate such a fight.

U.S. Military Power: Air ForceVERY WEAK

WEAK

MARGINAL

Capacity%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

STRONGVERY STRONG

443

﻿

Readiness Score: Weak
The Air Force scores “weak” for readinessin the 2022 Index, one grade lower than it received in the 2021 Index. The USAF’s sustained
pilot deficit and the impact of COVID-19 on
already low sortie rates and flying hours certainly contribute to this assessment. The
Air Force’s mission-capable rates improved
slightly in 2020, but the lack of a systemic effort to increase operational training reflects a
service that is content with being ready to respond to a regional contingency rather thanbuilding the readiness levels required to meetthe 2018 NDS.81
The Air Force should be prepared to respond quickly to an emergent crisis not with a“task force” of four bombers, but with the speed
and capacity required to stop a peer competitor

in its tracks. With the significant curtailment
of deployments in support of the global war on
terrorism, the Air Force should be much farther along in its full-spectrum readiness than
we have witnessed to date.

1

AIR FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

Strategic Bomber
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

B-52 StratofortressB-21 Raider

Inventory: 76
Fleet age: 60 Date: 1961

Timeline: TBD

The B-52, oldest of the bombers,
provides global strike capabilities withconventional or nuclear payloads.
Programmed upgrades for the B-52
include new communications, avionics,
and Multi-Functional Color Displays.
The Air Force plans to use this aircraft
through the 2050s.

Inventory: 44
Fleet age: 34 Date: 1986

﻿

HealthScore

The B-21 is an advanced stealth bomber that is currently
programmed to replace all B-1s and B-2s in the Air Forcebomber ﬂeet by 2032. Flight testing is scheduled for late2021, and procurement is expected to begin in FY 2022. The
Raider is projected to enter service in the mid-2020s anddeliver a ﬂeet of at least 100 aircraft.

B-1B Lancer

Nicknamed “The Bone,” the B-1B
Lancer is a long-range, multi-mission,
supersonic conventional bomber, thathas served the United States Air Forcesince 1985. Originally designed fornuclear capabilities, the B-1 switched toan exclusively conventional combatrole in the mid-1990s. In September
2020, the entire B-1B Lancer ﬂeet
completed the Integrated Battle
Station upgrade to modernize the jet’s
datalinks, cockpit displays, and test
system. The B-1B is scheduled to bephased out in 2032.
B-2 Spirit
Inventory: 20
Fleet age: 27 Date: 1997
The B-2 bomber provides the USAF
with global strike capabilities for both
nuclear and conventional payloads. The
stealth bomber’s communication suite
is currently being upgraded. At present,
the plan is to begin phasing out the B-2
in 2032.

NOTE: See page 450 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

444

Size
Score

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

1

AIR FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

Ground Attack/Multi-Role Aircraft
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

A-10 Thunderbolt II

F-35A

Inventory: 281
Fleet age: 41 Date: 1977

Timeline: 2016–2035

The A-10 is the only USAF platformthat is designed speciﬁcally for close
air support missions using both selfdesignated precision-guided munitions
and an internal 30mm cannon.
Retirement of the A-10 has been
discussed for years, but it appears that
it will continue ﬂying through 2040.
F-16C Falcon

Size
Score

HealthScore

The F-35A “Lightning” is a multirole stealth ﬁghter that
became IOC on August 2, 2016. In FY21, Congress funded
the procurement of 60 F-35As (including 12 congressionaladds) and in FY22, the number fell back to 49 jet (including
a single congressional add). The Block 4 version of theaircraft will upgrade capabilities of early production.
PROCUREMENT
460

SPENDING ($ millions)48$51,381$4,168Inventory: 935
Fleet age: 31 Date: 1980
The F-16 is a multi-role aircraft capableof tactical nuclear delivery, all-weather
strike, and Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses (SEAD). An ongoing Service
Life Extension Program (SLEP) will keep
this jet in the inventory through the late
2040s.
F-35A Lightning﻿Inventory: 326
Fleet age: 5 Date: 2016
The F-35 is a multi-role stealth ﬁghterthat became operational in 2016. The
Air Force has received more than 326 ofa planned purchase of 1,763 aircraft.
F-15E Strike Eagle
Inventory: 218
Fleet age: 29 Date: 1989
The F-15E is a multi-role aircraft capableof all-weather, deep interdiction/attack,and tactical nuclear weapons delivery.
Upgrades include an AESA radar, an
EPAWSS self-defense suite, a newcentral computer, and cockpit displays.

NOTE: See page 450 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

445

1

AIR FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Fighter Aircraft
PLATFORM

Capability
Score

F-15 EX

Inventory: 233
Fleet age: 37 Date: 1975

Timeline: 2020–2029

F-22A Raptor
Inventory: 186
Fleet age: 15 Date: 2005

HealthScore

The F-15EX, the most advanced Eagle variant, is basedon the F-15QA as a replacement for the legacy F-15C/D.
The USAF awarded Boeing a $1.2 billion contract for theﬁrst eight of up to 144 new-build F-15EX jets on July 13,
2020. FY 2021 funds procure an additional 12 aircraft and12 more in FY 2022. The Air Force accepted the ﬁrst two
F-15EXs in FY 2021 and expects the next six ﬁghters in 2023.
PROCUREMENT
12SPENDING ($ millions)
12

The F-22 is the preeminent air
superiority stealth ﬁghter aircraft,
modiﬁed to enable delivery of
precision- guided weapons. The jet iscurrently undergoing a modiﬁcation
called RAAMP that will improvereliability, maintainability, andperformance. In FY 2022, the jet
will begin ﬁelding the Link-16, which
will allow it to transmit data withlegacy aircraft via the Multifunctional
Information Distribution System/Joint
Tactical Radio System (MIDS/JTRS).

NOTE: See page 450 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

446

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

F-15C/D Eagle

The F-15C/D is an air superiority ﬁghterthat has been in service since the late1970s. The jet is receiving upgradesthat include a new AESA radar andself- defenses needed to survive andﬁght in contested airspace. Discussions
are underway to retire the F-15C in late
2020s.

﻿

Age
Score

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength$1,234$1,187

1

AIR FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

TankerAge
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

HealthScore

KC-10 Extender

KC-46

Inventory: 50
Fleet age: 36 Date: 1981

Timeline: 2019–2027

The KC-10 is multi-role tanker and airlift
platform that can refuel both boomcompatible and drogue-compatible
ﬁghters on the same mission. Recent
modiﬁcations have enabled a service
life extension through 2045. The USAF
targeted ﬂeet reduction to 40 aircraftin FY 2021, but Congress directed theservice to maintain at least 50 aircraftto provide suﬃcient tanker support
because of shortfalls with the KC-46.

The KC-46 Pegasus entered low-rate production in
August 2016, and the Air Force accepted the ﬁrst
Pegasus on January 10, 2019. The tanker has had
several problems, the most signiﬁcant of which is with
its remote visual refueling system, which is required
to refuel aircraft. In spite of that challenge, the Air
Force has cleared the KC-46 for limited, non-combat
operations while Boeing ﬁxes that system. The Air Forceis still accepting approximately 15 aircraft a year while
simultaneously retiring other refueling platforms despite
the inability of the Pegasus to perform its primary mission.

KC-135 Stratotanker

PROCUREMENT

Inventory: 340
Fleet age: 61 Date: 1957

94

SPENDING ($ millions)14$15,695$2,380﻿

The KC-135 a multi-role tanker/airlift
platform. The aircraft has undergone
several modiﬁcations, mainly engine
upgrades to improve performance andreliability. The USAF plans to modify
395 aircraft with Block 45 upgrades(an additional glass cockpit display
for engine instrumentation, a radar
altimeter, an advanced autopilot, and amodern ﬂight director) at a rate of 38
aircraft per year through 2026. Part of
the ﬂeet will be replaced with the KC46, with the remainder scheduled to be
in service through 2050.
KC-46 Pegasus
Inventory: 68
Fleet age: 1 Date: 2020
This Pegasus is a multi-role tanker/airlift
platform that can refuel both boomcompatible and drogue-compatible
ﬁghters on the same mission. The
Air Force accepted the ﬁrst of 179
programmed aircraft in 2019. The
program has signiﬁcant problems that
preclude use of the plane as a refuelingplatform in combat, but 15 of the aircraft
will be delivered in 2021, bringing thetotal number of KC-46s in the inventory
to 68.

NOTE: See page 450 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

447

1

AIR FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Heavy Lift
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

C–5M Galaxy

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Size
Score

Health
Score

Size
Score

HealthScore

None

Inventory: 52
Fleet age: 34 Date: 1970
The C-5 is the USAF’s largest mobility
aircraft. It can transport 270,000
pounds of cargo over intercontinental
ranges and can be refueled in the air.
The “M” models are heavily modiﬁed
C-5A/Bs that have new engines,
avionics, and structural/reliability ﬁxes.
Ongoing modiﬁcations include a new
weather radar, a new mission computer,and improved Large Aircraft Infrared
Countermeasures (LAIRCM).
C-17 Globemaster III

﻿Inventory: 222
Fleet age: 19 Date: 1995
The C-17 is a heavy-lift strategictransport capable of direct tacticaldelivery of all classes of military cargo.
It is the U.S. military’s core airlift asset; it
can be refueled in the air and is capableof operating on small airﬁelds (3,500
feet by 90 feet). Ongoing modiﬁcations
include next-generation Large Aircraft
Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM),
structural, safety, and sustainment
modiﬁcations.

Medium Lift
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

C-130J Super Hercules

C-130J

Inventory: 146
Fleet age: 12 Date: 2006

Timeline: 2006–2022

The C-130J is an improved tacticalairlift platform that can operate fromsmall, austere airﬁelds, and provide
inter-theater airlift and airdrop andhumanitarian support. The Air Force
active component completed its
transition to the C-130J in October 2017.

The C130J Super Hercules is an upgraded tactical airlift
platform with a medium-lift capability with multiple
variants including the C-130J-30, AC-130J gunship, andHC-130 rescue/air refueling platform. The C-130J-30 cancarry 92 airborne troops and lift over 40,000 pounds ofcargo. The Air Force currently has two multi-year contracts
underway with Lockheed Martin to procure 16 C-130Js
per year through FY2023, and second to procure an
additional 24 H/MC-130 aircraft from FY 2021–FY 2025.
PROCUREMENT
182

NOTE: See page 450 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

448

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

SPENDING ($ millions)1$16,417$ 129

1

AIR FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Age
Score

PLATFORM
RQ-4 Global Hawk

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Size
Score

HealthScore

None

Inventory: 30
Fleet age: 11 Date: 2011
The Global Hawk is a strategic, highaltitude, long-endurance (HALE), “deeplook” ISR platform that complements
satellite and manned ISR. Unlike theMQ-9, which is a medium-altitude, longendurance unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV), the RQ-4 has a higher altitude
and longer range.
MQ-9 A/B Reaper

MQ-9

Inventory: 330
Fleet age: 7 Date: 2007

Timeline: 2007–2024

The MQ-9B is a medium-altitude tohigh-altitude, long-endurance hunterkiller RPA (remotely piloted aircraft)tasked primarily with eliminatingtime-critical and high-value targets
in permissive environments. The
USAF is attempting to end the MQ-9
procurement and seeks to replace theReaper with a more survivable, ﬂexible,
and advanced platform as early as 2031.

The MQ-9 Reaper is a hunter-killer unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV). The Air Force planned to end procurementof the Reaper in FY 2021, but Congress decided to
procure an additional 16 Reaper aircraft. The Air Force isplanning to replace the Reaper with a more survivable,
ﬂexible, and advanced platform as early as 2031.

RC-135 Rivet Joint

None

PROCUREMENT

$652

$3

﻿

40

SPENDING ($ millions)

Inventory: 22
Fleet age: 58 Date: 1972
The RC-135V/W is tasked with real-timeelectronic and signals intelligencegathering, analysis, and disseminationin support of theater and strategiclevel commanders. The RC-135, an
extensively modiﬁed reconnaissanceversion of the C-135, detects, identiﬁes,
and geolocates signals throughout theelectromagnetic spectrum.

NOTE: See page 450 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

449

1

AIR FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) (Cont.)
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

U-2 Dragon Lady

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Size
Score

Health
Score

Size
Score

HealthScore

None

Inventory: 31
Fleet age: 40 Date: 1956
The U-2S is the Air Force’s only manned,
strategic, high-altitude, long-endurance
ISR platform and is capable of SIGINT,IMINT, and MASINT collection. The
aircraft’s modular payload systems allow
it to carry a wide variety of advanced
optical, multispectral, EO/IR, SAR, SIGINT,
and other payloads simultaneously. Its
open system architecture also permits
rapid ﬁelding of new sensors to counteremerging threats and requirements.

Command and Control
PLATFORM
E-3 Sentry

Age
Score

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM
None﻿Inventory: 35
Fleet age: 41 Date: 1977
The E-3 Airborne Warning andControl System (AWACS) is tasked
with all-weather air and maritime
surveillance, command and control, battle
management, target, threat, and emitter
detection, classiﬁcation, and tracking.
Ongoing upgrades include an urgent
operational requirement to shorten
kill-chains on time-sensitive targets,modernization of airborne moving target
indication, and addition of high-speed
jam-resistant Link 16. The E-3 is scheduled
to stay in service through the 2040s.
E-8 JSTARS
Inventory: 16
Fleet age: 41 Date: 2010
E-8C is a ground moving target indication(GMTI), airborne battleﬁeld management/command and control platform. Its
primary mission is providing theatercommanders with ground surveillancedata to support tactical operations. The
Air Force planned to retire this platformin the mid-2020s, but Congress blocked
this. The USAF aims to re-engine the ﬂeet
with refurbished JT8D-219 turbofans as a
cost-eﬀective interim solution to improve
performance and reliability.
NOTES: See Methodology for descriptions of scores. The date is the year the platform achieved initial operational capability. The
timeline is from the year the platform achieved initial operational capability to its final procurement. Spending does not include
advanced procurement or research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E).

4502022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

U.S. Air Force Modernization Table Citations
GENERAL SOURCES• U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force, Justification
Book Volume 1 of 2: Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Vol-1, May 2021, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/
documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203010%20-%20Aircraft%20Proc%20Vol%20I.
pdf?ver=D30H6xM2u1TyofiA4HpW3g%3d%3d (accessed August 19, 2021).
• U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Comprehensive Selected Acquisition Reports for the Annual 2019 Reporting
Requirement as Updated by the President’s Fiscal Year 2021 Budget,” https://media.defense.gov/2020/Nov/19/2002538295/-1/1/0/SAR-SUMMARY-TABLES-DEC-2019-UPDATED.PDF (accessed August 20, 2021).
• “Air Force and Space Force Almanac 2021,” in Air Force Magazine, Vol. 104, No. 6 and 7 (June/July 2021), pp. 44–168, https://www.
airforcemag.com/app/uploads/2021/06/Almanac2021_Fullissue-1.pdf (accessed August 19, 2021).
PROGRAM SOURCES
B-2 Spirit:• Fact Sheet, “B-2 Spirit,” U.S. Air Force, December 16, 2015, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104482/b-2spirit/ (accessed August 19, 2021).
B-1B Lancer:• Airman 1st Class Charles V. Rivezzo, “Airmen Gear up for Largest B-1 Modification,” U.S. Air Force, January 31, 2013, https://www.
af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/109777/airmen-gear-up-for-largest-b-1-modification/ (accessed August 19, 2021).
• Brian W. Everstine, “B-1B Fleet Finishes Integrated Battle Station Upgrade,” Air Force Magazine, September 24, 2020, https://www.
airforcemag.com/b-1b-fleet-finishes-integrated-battle-station-upgrade/ (accessed August 19, 2021).
• Boeing, “B-1B Lancer,” https://www.boeing.com/defense/b-1b-bomber/ (accessed August 19, 2021).

KC-10:• Larry Merritt, “Extended Term of Service,” Boeing Frontiers, September 2006, pp. 8–9, https://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/
archive/2006/september/i_history.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
F-16 Falcon:• News release, “U.S. Air Force Authorizes Extended Service Life for F-16,” Lockheed Martin, April 12, 2017, https://news.
lockheedmartin.com/2017-04-12-U-S-Air-Force-Authorizes-Extended-Service-Life-for-F-16 (accessed August 20, 2021).
B-21:• John Venable, “Acquiring the Air Force We Need,” The Mitchell Forum, No. 31 (June 2020), https://a2dd917a-65ab-41f1-ab115f1897e16299.usrfiles.com/ugd/a2dd91_681c25bfb72c46769d2004894ed1ea3a.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Jeremiah Gertler, “Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members andCommittees of Congress No. R44463, updated July 7, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44463.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
F-15EX Strike Eagle:• Senate Armed Services Committee, “Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act,” https://www.armed-services.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/FY%2021%20NDAA%20Summary.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
KC-46 Pegasus:• Marcus Weisgerber, “KC-46 Tankers Expand Mission Workload, Start Refueling F-35s,” Defense One, July 7, 2021, https://www.
defenseone.com/business/2021/07/kc-46-tankers-expand-mission-workload-start-refueling-f-35s/183155/ (accessed August 20,2021).
• Valerie Insinna, “Top US Air Force General Hopes for Major KC-46 Fix by March,” Defense News, February 20, 2020, https://www.
defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/air-warfare-symposium/2020/02/20/top-us-air-force-general-hopes-for-major-kc-46-fixby-march/ (accessed August 20, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military451

﻿A-10 Thunderbolt II:• Kyle Mizokami, “The Air Force Really Wants to Kill the A-10 Warthog,” Popular Mechanics, December 8, 2020, https://www.
popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a34907462/air-force-wants-to-retire-a-10-thunderbolt-warthog-congress-opposition/(accessed August 19, 2021).

C-130J:• William McCormick, “Lockheed Martin Receives 3rd Installment of $3B Multiyear Award from U.S. Government to To [sic] Deliver
50 C-130Js; Rod McLean Quoted,” ExecutiveGov, January 13, 2020, https://www.executivegov.com/2020/01/lockheed-martinreceives-3rd-installment-of-3b-multiyear-award-from-us-government-to-to-deliver-50-c-130js-rod-mclean-quoted/ (accessed
August 20, 2021).

﻿

MQ-9 Reaper:• Tyler Rogoway, “Abrupt End of Air Force MQ-9 Reaper Buys Points to New Focus on Survivable Drones,” The War Zone, February
27, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32379/abrupt-end-of-air-force-mq-9-reaper-buys-points-to-new-focus-onsurvivable-drones (accessed August 19, 2021).
• Theresa Hitchens, “ABMS in Trouble: Rep. Smith Wants $85M Cut,” Breaking Defense, June 25, 2020, https://breakingdefense.
com/2020/06/abms-in-trouble-rep-smith-wants-85m-cut/ (accessed August 19, 2021).
• Valerie Insinna, “Congress Resurrects MQ-9 Reaper Program, Adding 16 Drones for the Air Force,” Defense News, December 22,
2020, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/12/22/congress-resurrected-the-mq-9-reaper-program-adding-16-drones-for-theair-force/ (accessed August 19, 2021).

452

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes
S. 1790, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Public Law 116-92, 116th Cong., December 20, 2019, Title IX,
Subtitle D, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1790 (accessed July 5, 2021).

2.

Oriana Pawlyk, “Coronavirus Pandemic Could Mitigate the Air Force’s Pilot Shortage, General Says,” Military.com, April 13, 2020,
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/04/13/coronavirus-pandemic-could-mitigate-air-forces-pilot-shortage-general-says.
html (accessed July 5, 2021).

3.

The Honorable Michael B. Donley, Secretary of the Air Force, and General Mark A. Welsh III, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force,“Fiscal Year 2014 Air Force Posture Statement” before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, April 12,
2013, p. 2, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/budget/2014-budget-posture-statement.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021).

4.

John Venable, “Independent Capability Assessment of U.S. Air Force Reveals Readiness Level Below Carter Administration Hollow
Force,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3208, April 17, 2017, p. 2, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/
BG3208.pdf.

5.

James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).

6.

U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed July 5, 2021).

7.

“The Air Force We Need” calls for one additional airlift squadron and five additional bomber, seven additional fighter, and 14
additional tanker squadrons. While the number of aircraft in any one of those categories varies from unit to unit, there areapproximately 30 fighters, 10 bombers, 15 tankers, and 15 strategic airlift aircraft in each squadron. Mathematically, “The Air ForceWe Need” calls for 182 more fighters, 50 more bombers, 210 more refuelers, and 15 more airlift aircraft than the Air Force currently
has in its inventory. Airframe purchases alone would cost approximately $80 billion. That rough estimate is based on the needfor 182 more F-35s (seven squadrons, 26 fighters per squadron, $80 million each); 50 more B-21 bombers (five squadrons, 10
bombers per squadron, $564 million each); 210 more KC-46s (14 squadrons, 15 tankers per squadron, $169 million each); and 15
additional C-17s (one squadron, 15 aircraft per squadron, no longer in production but an average of $262 million each in FY 2020
dollars). See, respectively, U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons”; Marcus Weisgerber, “Price Drop:
Lockheed Pitches $80M F-35A to Pentagon,” Defense One, May 7, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/business/2019/05/pricedrop-lockheed-pitches-80m-f-35a-pentagon/156825/ (accessed July 5, 2021); Jeremiah Gertler, “Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range
Strike Bomber,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R44463, updated November
13, 2019, p. 4, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44463.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021); U.S. Department of the Air Force, Departmentof Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Air Force, Justification Book Volume 1 of 2: Aircraft Procurement, Air Force
Vol-1, March 2019, p. 25, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY20/PROCUREMENT/FY20_PB_3010_Aircraft_Vol-1.
pdf?ver=2019-03-18-152821-713 (accessed July 5, 2021); and Fact Sheet, “C-17 Globemaster III,” U.S. Air Force, May 14, 2018, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/1529726/c-17-globemaster-iii/ (accessed July 5, 2021).

8.

Stephen Losey, “Pilots Are Flying 17 Hours per Month, but It’s Still Not Enough, Air Force Secretary Says,” Air Force Times, March 1,
2018, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/03/01/secaf-air-force-pilots-are-flying-17-hours-per-month-butits-still-not-enough/ (accessed July 5, 2021).

9.

Author’s conversation with General Goldfein and Secretary Heather Wilson at Air Force Association Air, Space and Cyber
Conference, National Harbor, Maryland, September 17, 2018.

10. Extracted from U.S. Air Force budget summaries for the years 2017 through 2021. For example: Table 1, “Air Force Budget
Highlights Summary,” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Overview, May 2017,p. 15, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=m3vZOmfR368%3d&portalid=84 (accessed July 5, 2021), and Table
1, “Department of the Air Force Budget Summary,” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force FY 2021
Budget Overview, p. 2, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY21/SUPPORT_/FY21%20Budget%20Overview_1.
pdf?ver=2020-02-10-152806-743 (accessed July 5, 2021).
11. These numbers are estimates based on the requirements presented by the Air Force within the President’s budget for FY 2022.
For consistency, the calculations include procurement and RDT&E figures for the Space Force, as they were not separated in all
previous fiscal years’ budgets.
12. Technological advances in aircraft materials and structure greatly extended the service life of USAF equipment. As a result, the service
could maintain force structure while buying fewer aircraft.” See Colonel James C. Ruehrmund Jr. and Christopher J. Bowie, Arsenal of
Airpower: USAF Aircraft Inventory 1950–2016, Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, February 2018, p. 6, https://03236830-405f-41419f5c-3491199c4d86.filesusr.com/ugd/a2dd91_5ddbf04fd26e4f72aef6cfd5ee87913f.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).

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1.

13. Appendix, “Department of the Air Force Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI),” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the
Air Force FY 2022 Budget Overview, p. 50, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/SUPPORT_/FY22%20
Budget%20Overview%20Book.pdf?ver=SMbMqD0tqIJNwq2Z0Q4yzA%3d%3d (accessed July 7, 2021).
14. In the words of Lieutenant General Mark Kelly, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force: “At the end of
the day, if a peer fight kicks up, we’re going to have no time and all the money.” Abraham Mahshie, “‘Every Day Is a Shell Game’:
Air Force Budget Prioritizes Technology over Warfighting, General Says,” Washington Examiner, February 13, 2020, https://www.
washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/every-day-is-a-shell-game-air-force-budget-prioritizes-technologyover-warfighting-general-says (accessed July 7, 2021).
15. Author’s conversation with Lockheed Martin Representative who estimated that it would take two years of herculean efforts andfunding to reduce the F-35A production timeline (funding to employable fighter) from two-to-three years to one-to-two years.
This is driven primarily by “sole source” parts that are produced in other countries where unions and labor laws severely constrain
increases in production. “Sole-source” parts are parts made in only one location. That means the fighters that are on the flightline
when the next war kicks off are the ones the U.S. will have for the first year of the war in addition to a very limited number of
attrition replacements that come off what is already in the production line.
16. The numbers of total aircraft inventory (TAI) and combat-coded aircraft for the active-duty Air Force were derived throughreview of U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force FY 2022 Budget Overview, and International Institutefor Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics(London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 56–59. Where the two publications were in conflict for TAI, the SAF/FMB numbers were generally
adopted. Neither document specifies the number of active-duty combat-coded aircraft. That number was derived by tallying thetotal number of fighters by type and dividing that number by the total number of active-duty squadrons flying those types ofaircraft. The numbers and types of aircraft associated with Weapons Instructor Course Squadrons, Adversary Tactics, Test, OT&E,
and other units are not standard/determinable and could not be assessed. The associated error is minimized by totaling all likefighter aircraft (F-16, F-15C, etc.); dividing them by the total number of squadrons flying those aircraft; and spreading the error
equally across all combat-coded fighter and training units. The total number of fighters associated with non–Fighter Training Unit
(FTU) squadrons was counted as combat-coded.

﻿

17. John Venable, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Air Force,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 225, March 26,
2020, pp. 42–43, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/rebuilding-americas-military-the-united-states-air-force.
18. Ibid.
19. Theresa Hitchens, “AMC Approves ‘Limited’ KC-46 Tanker Refueling,” Breaking Defense, February 24, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/amc-approves-limited-kc-46-tanker-refueling/ (accessed July 7, 2021).
20. Table, “Aircraft Total Active Inventory (TAI) (As of Sept. 30, 2020),” in “Air Force & Space Force Almanac 2021,” Air Force
Magazine, Vol. 104, No. 6 (July 2021), p. 73, https://www.airforcemag.com/app/uploads/2021/06/Almanac2021_Fullissue-1.pdf(accessed July 19, 2021)). Thirteen months were added because of the difference between the aircraft data capture dates for the2021 USAF Almanac and publication of this edition of the Index.
21. Ibid. Thirteen months were added because of the difference between the aircraft data capture dates for the 2020 USAF Almanacand publication of this edition of the Index.
22. Ibid. Thirteen months were added because of the difference between the aircraft data capture dates for the 2020 USAF Almanacand publication of this edition of the Index.
23. Micah Garbarino, “F-16 Service Life Extension Program a ‘Great Deal’ for Department of Defense, Taxpayers,” Air Force MaterielCommand, May 3, 2018, http://www.afmc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1512449/f-16-service-life-extension-program-agreat-deal-for-department-of-defense-taxp/ (accessed July 7, 2021).
24. Appendix, “Department of the Air Force Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI),” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air
Force FY 2022 Budget Overview, p. 50.
25. Table, “Aircraft Total Active Inventory (TAI) (As of Sept. 30, 2020),” in “Air Force & Space Force Almanac 2021,” p. 73. Thirteenmonths were added because of the difference between the aircraft data capture dates for the 2021 USAF Almanac andpublication of this edition of the Index.
26. Rachel S. Cohen, “Budget Elicits Confusion over Fate of U-2,” Air Force Magazine, February 11, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.
com/budget-elicits-confusion-over-fate-of-u2/ (accessed July 7, 2021).
27. John A. Tirpak, “Air Force Asks to Retire 201 Aircraft in 2022 and Will Buy 91 New Ones,” Air Force Magazine, May 28, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-fiscal-2022-retire-buy/ (accessed July 7, 2021).
28. Originally known as the Airborne Battle Management System.

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength29. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, A8XC/A5RW, written response to Heritage Foundation request for information on Air Force PGM
expenditures and programmed replenishments, June 10, 2018.
30. Appendix, “Department of the Air Force Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI),” U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air
Force FY 2022 Budget Overview, p. 50.
31. Jeremiah Gertler, “Air Force F-22 Fighter Program,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress No. RL31673, July 11, 2013,
p. 7, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31673.pdf (accessed August 5, 2020), and Rebecca Grant and Loren Thompson,“Losing Air Dominance? The Air Force and Its Future Roles,” presentation at Air Force Association Air & Space Conference,
Washington, D.C., September 16, 2008, p. 3, https://secure.afa.org/Mitchell/presentations/091608LosingAirDominance_tnx.pdf(accessed July 7, 2021).
32. James Drew, “F-22 Raptor Retrofit to Take Longer, but Availability Hits 63%,” FlightGlobal, July 6, 2015,
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/f-22-raptor-retrofit-to-take-longer-but-availability-hits-414341/ (accessed July 7,2021).
33. Alex R. Lloyd, “F-22 Raptor Gets Major Upgrades,” Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, corrected January 28, 2021, https://www.
wpafb.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2484112/f-22-raptor-gets-major-upgrades/ (accessed July 7, 2021).
34. Kris Osborn, “Air Force: F-35 3F Software Drop Challenges Resolved,” Defense Systems, May 17, 2017, https://defensesystems.com/
articles/2017/05/17/f35.aspx (accessed July 7, 2021).
35. See Col. Michael W. Pietrucha, “The Comanche and the Albatross: About Our Neck Was Hung,” Air & Space Power Journal, Vol. 28,
No. 3 (May–June 2014), pp. 133–156, https://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-28_Issue-3/F-Pietrucha.
pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).
36. Venable, “Independent Capability Assessment of U.S. Air Force Reveals Readiness Level Below Carter Administration Hollow
Force,” p. 2, and Dave Majumdar, “Can the F-35 Win a Dogfight?” War Is Boring, December 17, 2013, https://warisboring.com/canthe-f-35-win-a-dogfight/ (accessed July 7, 2021).
37. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, A8XC/A5RW, written response to Heritage Foundation request for information on Air Force PGM
expenditures and programmed replenishments, July 10, 2019.

39. Ibid., p. 4, and Lieutenant General James M. “Mike” Holmes, Deputy Chief of Staff (Strategic Plans and Requirements), andLieutenant General Arnold W. Bunch, Jr., Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition),statement on “Air Force Bomber/Tanker/Airlift Acquisition Programs” before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 1, 2016, p. 4, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/
AS28/20160301/104353/HHRG-114-AS28-Wstate-BunchA-20160301.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).
40. Small group discussion with the Honorable Heather Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force, February 9, 2018.
41. Holmes and Bunch, statement on “Air Force Bomber/Tanker/Airlift Acquisition Programs,” March 1, 2016, pp. 2–3.
42. The B-1 fleet will be reduced from 61 to 44 through programmed retirements in the FY 2021 budget. See Appendix, “Departmentof the Air Force Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI),” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force FY 2021 Budget
Overview, p. 42.
43. Cal Biesecker, “Canceled Defensive System for B-2 Suffered from Coding Challenges, Roper Says,” Defense Daily, February 28,
2020, https://www.defensedaily.com/canceled-defensive-system-b-2-suffered-coding-challenges-roper-says/budget/ (accessed
July 7, 2021).
44. Valarie Insinna, “The Air Force Is Massively Scaling Back a Major Upgrade for the B-2 Stealth Bomber,” Defense News, February
12, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/12/the-air-force-is-massively-scaling-back-a-majorupgrade-for-the-b-2-stealth-bomber/ (accessed July 7, 2021).
45. Edwin Castro, “USAF B-52 Gets a Series of Huge Upgrades, New Weapon, Radar and More,” Blasting News, updated September
16, 2019, https://us.blastingnews.com/world/2019/09/usaf-b-52-gets-a-series-of-huge-upgrades-new-weapon-radar-andmore-002982887.html (accessed July 7, 2021).
46. Dave Majumdar, “Why the Air Force Won’t Buy the F-15X or ‘New’ F-22 Raptor,” RealClearDefense, September 18, 2018, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/09/18/why_the_air_force_wont_buy_the_f-15x_or_new_f-22_raptor_113808.html(accessed July 7, 2021).

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﻿38. Lieutenant General Arnold W. Bunch, Jr., Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); Lieutenant
General Jerry D. Harris, Deputy Chief of Staff (Strategic Plans and Requirements); and Major General Scott A. Vander Hamm,
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), statement on “Air Force Bomber/Tanker/Airlift Acquisition Programs” before theSubcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, May 25, 2017, p. 10,
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS28/20170525/106013/HHRG-115-AS28-Wstate-BunchA-20170525.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).

47. The baseline F-15EX will cost $87.7 million to acquire, and that cost does not include the operational equipment it needs
to employ in a low-threat to medium-threat environment. That excluded equipment includes the $12.5 million electronic
countermeasures package (Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability system or EPAWSS) and the $900,000 targeting pod.
Every F-15EX will cost a total of $100.2 million to acquire, while the FY 2022 cost of the F-35A is $77.9 million. Sustainment
costs are measured in cost per flying hour (CPFH). The estimated CPFH for the F-15EX is $27,000 and is based on more than 30
years of flying the F-15E, but that cost does not include EPAWS or targeting pod maintenance. The F-35A’s CPFH was $30,137
in 2018 and includes all operational systems (internal targeting pod and ECM); that price is still falling and is projected to be
below $27,000 by 2025. See notes for Exhibit P-40, “Budget Line Item Justification: PB 2021 Air Force,” in U.S. Department of
the Air Force, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Air Force, Justification Book Volume 1 of 2, Aircraft
Procurement, Air Force, Vol-1, February 2020, p. 1-2, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY21/PROCUREMENT_/
FY21%20Air%20Force%20Aircraft%20Procurement%20Vol%20I_1.pdf?ver=2020-02-10-145310-973 (accessed July 7, 2021);
Courtney Albon, “EPAWSS Cost Estimate Grows by $2 Billion as USAF Moves to Buy 144 Systems for F-15EX,” Inside Defense,
July 2, 2020, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/epawss-cost-estimate-grows-2-billion-usaf-moves-buy-144-systems-f-15ex(accessed July 7, 2021); and Joe Gould, “US Air Force Defends F-15X Buy to Skeptical Inhofe, Reed,” Defense News, April 4, 2019,https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/04/04/usaf-defends-f-15x-buy-to-skeptical-inhofe-reed/ (accessed July 7, 2021).
Lockheed also won an $8.9 million contract to provide 10 Sniper targeting pods to the Royal Jordanian Air Force by the end of
2016. GlobalSecurity.org, “AN/AAQ-33 Sniper XR / ATP–Advanced Targeting Pod, Advanced Targeting Pod-Sensor Enhancement
ATP-SE,” https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/atp.htm (accessed July 7, 2021).
48. Aaron Mehta, “Mattis Orders Fighter Jet Readiness to Jump to 80 Percent—in One Year,” Defense News, October 9, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/10/09/mattis-orders-fighter-jet-readiness-to-jump-to-80-percent-in-one-year/ (accessed July
7, 2021).
49. Brian W. Everstine, “Breaking down USAF’s 70-Percent Overall Mission Capable Rate,” Air Force Magazine, May 19, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/breaking-down-usafs-70-percent-overall-mission-capable-rate/ (accessed July 7, 2021).

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50. Kyle Mizokami, “Why the U.S. Just Deployed B-52s to the Middle East,” Popular Mechanics, May 8, 2019, https://www.
popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a27409504/b-52-middle-east/ (accessed July 7, 2021).
51. The Honorable Dr. Heather Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force, and General David L. Goldfein, Chief of Staff, United States
Air Force, “USAF Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 2020,” Department of the Air Force Presentation to the Committees andSubcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 1st Session, 116th Congress, p. 4, https://www.
af.mil/Portals/1/images/posturestatement/FY20_POSTURE_STATEMENT_OMB_Cleared_12MAR_1310L.pdf (accessed July 7,2021).
52. The Honorable Barbara Barrett, Secretary of the Air Force, and General David L. Goldfein, Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force, “United States Air Force Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 2021,” United States Air Force Presentation to the Armed Services
Committee of the United States Senate, 2nd Session, 116th Congress, p. 7, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Barrett--Goldfein_03-03-20.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).
53. The Honorable John P. Roth, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., Chief of Staff, United States Air
Force; and General John W. Raymond, Chief of Space Operations, United States Space Force, “Department of the Air Force
Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 2022,” Department of the Air Force Presentation to the Committees and Subcommittees of
the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 1st Sess., 117th Congress, p. 12, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/
documents/2021SAF/05_May/FY22_DAF_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed July 7 2021).
54. The Honorable Heather A. Wilson, Secretary of the Air Force, and General David L. Goldfein, Chief of Staff of the Air Force,statement on “Air Force Budget Posture” before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, June 6, 2017, p. 3, https://www.
armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wilson-Goldfein_06-06-17.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).
55. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to Heritage Foundation request for
information on Air Force manning levels, May 14, 2021.
56. See Dyess Air Force Base, “7th Operations Group,” https://www.dyess.af.mil/Units/7th-Bomb-Wing/7th-Operations-Group/(assessed July 7, 2021).
57. Lieutenant General Gina M. Grosso, Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower, Personnel and Services, United States Air Force,statement on “Military Pilot Shortage” before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House ofRepresentatives, March 29, 2017, p. 2, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS02/20170329/105795/HHRG-115-AS02-WstateGrossoG-20170329.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).
58. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to Heritage Foundation request for
information on Air Force manning levels, May 14, 2021.

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength59. Data provided by Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to Heritage Foundation
request for undergraduate pilot “graduation rates” for each of the respective years, July 24, 2020. The numbers reported wereactually the percent of production goals the Air Force had established for each of those respective years. As an example, in 2016,
the Air Force produced 96 percent of its pilot production goal for that year.
60. Colonel Randy Oakland, Air Education and Training Command, 19th Air Force/A3, written response to Heritage Foundation
request for information on Air Force pilot graduation rates, July 27, 2021.
61. Venable, “Independent Capability Assessment of U.S. Air Force Reveals Readiness Level Below Carter Administration Hollow
Force,” p. 4.
62. James C. Slife, Creech Blue: Gen Bill Creech and the Reformation of the Tactical Air Forces, 1978–1984 (Maxwell Air Force Base:
Air University Press, October 2004), p. 92, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0095_SLIFE_CREECH_
BLUE.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).
63. John Venable, “A Plan for Keeping the U.S. Air Force’s Best Pilots in Service,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, November 14,
2017, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/plan-keeping-the-us-air-forces-best-pilots-service.
64. Telephone conversation with senior Air Force leader, April 24, 2020.
65. Slife, Creech Blue, pp. 92–95.
66. U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Force Maintenance: Two Level Maintenance Program Assessment, GAO/NSAID-96-86, March
1996, p. 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/222350.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).
67. Averages for sorties and hours are based on weighted fighter manning levels for each of the five major weapons systems
provided in Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to Heritage Foundation request
for information on Air Force manning levels, July 24, 2020. The numbers were weighted based on aircraft numbers as explainedin note 16, supra, as well as standard aircrew ratios established in Figure A8.1, “Air Force Single Flying Hour Model F-16C Example,”in U.S. Air Force, “Flying Operations: Flying Hour Program Management,” Air Force Instruction 11-102, August 30, 2011, p. 17.
68. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, written response to Heritage Foundation request for
information on Air Force sortie rates, July 25, 2020.

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69. Venable, “Independent Capability Assessment of U.S. Air Force Reveals Readiness Level Below Carter Administration Hollow
Force,” p. 4.
70. Ibid.
71. Table 2, “Department of the Air Force Budget Summary,” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force FY
2022 Budget Overview, p. 12.
72. Author’s experience through 26 years of Air Force operations, coupled with senior leader engagements from 2018–2019.
73. Albert A. Robbert, Anthony D. Rosello, Clarence R. Anderegg, John A. Ausink, James H. Bigelow, William W. Taylor, and James
Pita, Reducing Air Force Fighter Pilot Shortages (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), p. 33, https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1113/RAND_RR1113.pdf (accessed July 7, 2021).
74. Even though active-duty fighter squadrons have an average of 30 aircraft per squadron, that number includes maintenance,
spare, and attrition reserve platforms. Manning is based on Primary Assigned Aircraft (PAA), which is 24 aircraft for active-duty
fighter squadrons.
75. Based on a squadron with 24 Primary Assigned Aircraft. For units with 18 PAA, four additional pilots are required.
76. The very premise of these units is that they are manned with citizen soldiers whose main source of income is full-time civilianjobs and who are committed to travel and temporary duty locations that make them unavailable for days or weeks at a time.
Those units would likely require several days to assemble the manpower required to deploy, and once an assessment of their real
mission currency was made, they would need some period of intense training before a responsible senior leader could employ
them in a fight with a peer competitor.
77. “Deployments most suited to the ARC are those in which there is long lead time (six months or more), and in which theoperation is of short duration (six days or less), requiring a small force package (12 aircraft or less), and in which the scheduling is
flexible.” John T. Correll, “Future Total Force,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 82, No. 7 (July 1999), p. 32, https://www.airforcemag.com/
PDF/MagazineArchive/Documents/1999/July%201999/0799total.pdf (accessed July 5, 2021).
78. The author commanded the 349th Expeditionary Combat Group at Al Udeid, Qatar, from 2004–2005. During that time, he flew
with seven different Air National Guard F-16 squadrons. Every one of those units had some level of rainbow manning, and eachperformed admirably.
79. Interview with senior Air National Guard leader, November 20, 2019.

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80. The number of fighters needed for a two-MRC strategy is based on a Heritage Foundation study of airpower requirements andactual fighter deployments for all major combat operations and conflicts from 1950 through 2021.

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81. See Venable, “Independent Capability Assessment of U.S. Air Force Reveals Readiness Level Below Carter Administration Hollow
Force.”

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U.S. Marine Corps
Dakota L. WoodT

comprehensive assessment of the operational
challenges that the service’s operating forces
are most likely to face 10 to 15 years in the future, General David H. Berger, Commandantof the Marine Corps, issued Force Design
2030 (FD 2030), his directive to the service toreorganize, re-equip, and retrain Marines inways that will make them relevant and effective in the presumed operating environmentof the 2030s.2
As necessary an effort as FD 2030 appears
to be, however, the force envisioned by the
project has yet to be built (though progress
is being made) and certainly has not yet been
proven in battle. Consequently, this Index can
only assess the Corps that exists today, and ourassessments of capacity, capability (modernity), and readiness therefore pertain to the Marine Corps’ current status, not to what it might
be in the future.
As reported in 2021, the Corps had 33,500
Marines deployed, roughly one-third of its operational force.3 During the year preceding its
fiscal year (FY) 2022 budget request, “[T]heMarine Corps executed 156 total operations,nine amphibious operations, [and] 36 theater
security cooperation events, and participatedin 36 exercises” involving numerous countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia
including Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Germany, Norway, Scotland,
and Romania.4
The Marine Corps has always prized its
crisis-response contributions to national
security—­a point consistently emphasized by

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he U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is the nation’s expeditionary armed force, positioned and ready to respond to crises aroundthe world. Marine units assigned aboard ships(“soldiers of the sea”) or at bases abroad standready to project U.S. power into crisis areas.
Marines also serve in a range of unique missions, from combat defense of U.S. embassies
under attack abroad to operating the President’s helicopter fleet.
Although Marines have a wide variety of
individual assignments, the focus of every
Marine is on combat: Every Marine is first arifleman. Over the past several decades, theMarine Corps has positioned itself for crisis
response, but while the Corps has maintained
its historical, institutional, and much of its
doctrinal focus on operations in maritime
environments, the majority of its operational experience over the past 20 years has beenin sustained land operations. This has led toa dramatic decline in the familiarity of mostMarines with conventional amphibious operations and other types of employment within
a distinctly maritime setting.1
Recognizing this shortfall, the Corps’ leadership has initiated efforts to reorient theservice toward enabling and supporting the
projection of naval power in heavily contested
littoral environments with a particular focus
on the Indo-Pacific region and China as the“pacing threat” against which Marine Corps capabilities are being assessed and modified. This
reorientation is much more than a simple refocusing on amphibious operations. Following a﻿senior service leaders over the years. Maintaining this emphasis, General Berger has made it
central to the Corps’ efforts to remain combat
credible as adversary capabilities evolve, evenat the expense of force capacity (the size of theservice) and existing capabilities that, whilestill of value, are perceived as less relevant to
the maritime environment of the Indo-­Pacific.
Service leadership is assuming that defense
budgets will not see any appreciable growthin the next several years, so the Commandant
has ordered the Corps to retire or reduce assets and capabilities such as tanks, conventional tube artillery, heavy bridging, and someaircraft and continue to reduce manpowerend strength in order to make related funding
available for other purposes.
In general for the Joint Force, this Index
focuses on the forces required to win two major wars as the baseline force-sizing metric for
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but it adopts
a different paradigm—one war plus crisis
response—­for the Marine Corps. The threelarge services are sized for global action in
more than one theater at a time; the Marines,by virtue of overall size and most recently bydirection of the Commandant, focus on one
major conflict while ensuring that all Fleet
Marine Forces are globally deployable forshort-notice, smaller-scale actions. Marine
Corps officials have emphasized that the results of the FD 2030 redesign will ensure that
USMC forces are more capable and relevant inany fight, in any region, but the pacing challenge for Corps planners is China.
In previous editions of the Index, the capacity of the Marine Corps was assessed against a
two-war requirement of 36 battalions: a historical average of 15 battalions for a major conflict(30 for two major conflicts) and a 20 percent
buffer, bringing the total to 36. The Corps has
consistently maintained that it is a one-war
force and has no intention of growing to thesize needed to fight two wars, and both its annual budget requests and its top-level planningdocuments reflect this position.
However, with China as the primary threat
driving Marine Corps force planning and given

460

China’s extraordinary investment in modernizing its forces across all capabilities, to include
the expansion of various sensors, weapons, andplatforms that are essential to the creation of
an intensely weaponized, layered defense architecture, this Index cannot help but note that
the Corps will need greater capacity if it is to
succeed in war in the very circumstances forwhich the Marines believe they must prepare
and with which this Index concurs.

Capacity
The measures of Marine Corps capacity inthis Index are similar to those used to assess
the Army’s: end strength and units (battalions
for the Marines and brigades for the Army).
The Marine Corps’ basic combat unit is theinfantry battalion, which is composed of approximately 900 Marines and includes threerifle companies, a weapons company, and aheadquarters and service company.5
Infantry. In 2011, the Marine Corps maintained 27 infantry battalions in its active
component at an authorized end strength of
202,100.6 As budgets declined, the Corps prioritized readiness through managed reductions
in capacity, including a drawdown of forces,and delays or reductions in planned procurement levels. After the Marine Corps fell to a
low of 23 active component infantry battalions
in FY 2015,7 Congress began to fund gradualincreases in end strength, returning the Corps
to 24 infantry battalions.
New requirements have also sapped theCorps’ conventional deployable strength. In
2005, the Marines were directed to establish
a special operations component to which theyultimately committed 2,700 Marines.8 In 2010,
the Corps established a cyberspace element,9
redirecting more manpower to new capabilities. The point here is that new requirements
arise over time. Unless the Marine Corps’ end
strength is increased accordingly, establishing
new units and capabilities means losing capacity in other areas.
The Corps operated with 181,200 Marines
in FY 2021, with plans to shrink further to178,500 in FY 2022 to free funding so that it

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The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military461

﻿can be reapplied to experimentation, retool- fleet to 10,000 flight hours, making it possible
ing, and reorganization as described in Force to keep them in service until FY 2030. A simiDesign 2030.10 The current size allows for 24 lar effort will keep the venerable AV-8B Harrier
infantry battalions, but future plans will likely in use until FY 2027.18 At present, the Marines
see the number shrink to 21 battalions.11
have acquired 101 F-35B—the Short Take-Off
Infantry battalions serve as a surrogate and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of themeasure for the Corps’ total force. As the first Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)—and nine F-35C
to respond to many contingencies, the Marine (aircraft carrier capable) aircraft19 of a planned
Corps requires a large degree of flexibility and 353 F-35B and 67 F-35C models.20 This has enself-sufficiency, and this drives its approach to abled the service to stand up 10 JSF squadrons:
organization and deployment of operational six operational, two fleet replacement (used toformations that, although typically centered train new pilots), and one test for F-35Bs andon infantry units, are composed of ground, air, one operational squadron of F-35C aircraft.21
and logistics elements. Each of these assets
The activation of and achievement of fulland capabilities is critical to effective deploy- operational capable status for the F-35C
ment of the force, and any one of them can squadron are especially important given the
be a limiting factor in the conduct of training end of operational service of the last squadronand operations.
flying its predecessor aircraft, the F/A-18C. MaAviation. Despite being stressed consis- rine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (VMFA 323)
tently by insufficient funding, the Marine returned from its final deployment aboard theCorps has made significant progress in re- USS Nimitz (CVN-68) with Carrier Air Wing
gaining capability and readiness in its avia- 17 at the end of February 2021.22 The Corps’
tion component, achieving its objective of 80 F-35Cs will eventually replace the now operpercent aviation readiness in FY 202012 and ationally retired F/A-18C for duty aboard theachieving 86 percent to 96 percent pilot man- Navy’s aircraft carriers.
ning in its rotary wing community, a status
In its heavy-lift rotary-wing fleet, the Corps
the Corps considers healthy.13 The Corps has began a reset of the CH-53E in 2016 to bridge
not published an update to its Aviation Plan the procurement gap between the CH-53E
since 2019. At that time, the service stated that and the CH-53K King Stallion and aimed toit possessed 16 tactical fighter squadrons,14 “reset…the entire 143-aircraft fleet by FY20,”23
compared to 19 in 201715 and approximately but reporting in 2020 indicated that the Corps
28 during Desert Storm.16 Service officials have was moving rather slowly in this effort, andstated repeatedly that the number of manned it was only one-third of the way through theaircraft, and therefore squadrons, will likely process toward the close of the fiscal year.24
continue to decline as the Corps divests itself Even when the reset is complete, the serviceof older aircraft without replacing them on will still be 57 aircraft short of the stateda one-for-one basis, shifts investment to un- heavy-lift requirement of 200 airframes andmanned platforms, and retools the force for will not have enough helicopters to meet its
distributed operations undertaken by smaller heavy-lift requirement without the transition
units per Force Design 2030.
to the CH-53K.25
While the Corps is introducing the F-35
As for the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter, theplatform into the fleet, F/A-18 Hornets remain service has reported good news about the per“the primary bridging platform to F-35B/C” and unit cost, once an exorbitant $125 million per
will remain in the force until 2030.17 This pri- aircraft. In testimony to the House Armed Sermary tactical air (TACAIR) capability has to be vices Committee’s Subcommittee on Tacticalmanaged carefully as it is no longer in produc- Air and Land Forces, Lieutenant General Marktion. Through various programs, the Marines Wise said that the cost per aircraft had dropped
have extended the service life of their F/A-18 to $97 million and could drop further to $94

﻿

million per plane.26 The Marines have acquired
four of these new helicopters for testing andhope to have the King Stallion available for
deployment by 2024.27
The Corps continues to search for improvements to its MV-22B Osprey, most recently by
testing a version of an electronic warfare radar
jamming pod that it uses on other aircraft.28 In
the absence of conventional pylons on which
weapons and sensors can be mounted, new capabilities have to be reconfigured to fit inside
the aircraft or mounted on the aircraft fuselage.
Notably, the Corps has moved aggressively
to implement aviation-related actions specified or implied by FD 2030. In May, it disestablished HMLA-367, a light-attack helicopter
squadron in Hawaii, sending its still relatively
new attack and utility helicopters to Davis–
Monthan Airbase in Arizona where they will beplaced in the “bone yard” for possible use in the
future. The 27 AH-1Z Viper attack helicoptersand 26 UH-1Y Venom utility helicopters thatwere decommissioned represented approximately one-fifth of the Marine Corps’ inventory of such aircraft.29 The Marines have also
started divestiture of three MV-22 squadrons,
an additional light-attack helicopter squadron,and nearly three heavy-lift squadrons.30
Amphibious Ships. Amphibious ships,
although driven by the Corps’ articulation ofwhat it needs to execute its operational concepts, remain a Navy responsibility. A trio of
documents describe the rationale for and nature of the Marine Corps’ thinking about how
it plans to contribute to the projection of naval
power in highly contested environments suchas that found in the Indo-Pacific region should
the U.S. find itself at war with China.
ll

In 2017, the Corps and the U.S. Navy
jointly released Littoral Operations in aContested Environment (LOCE), in which
the services presented general ideas about
how to conduct naval operations against avery capable enemy.31
Several months after taking office, General Berger published FD 2030, which set

462

objectives for redesigning the force so thatit could do the things implied by LOCE.32
l

In February 2021, the Corps released
an unclassified version of the Tentative
Manual for Expeditionary Advanced BaseOperations, in which the service provided
substantial details about its evolved thinking about the tactical and organizational
challenges posed by high-threat maritime
environments.33

These documents informed and reinforced
Marine Corps and Navy plans to develop andacquire upwards of 35 light amphibious warships (LAWs), new amphibious vessels thatwould be smaller than those constituting thecurrent fleet and optimized to support naval
operations in the contested environments
envisioned by LOCE and Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO).34 The Marine
Corps held 38 amphibious ships as the minimum requirement for many years but steppedaway from that as a prelude to redefining its
amphibious operations capabilities.35 With theevolution of FD 2030 and refinement of related supporting concepts and material requirements, the Corps is now making the case for 28
to 31 traditional amphibious ships augmented
by LAWs.36 Though five companies have been
awarded contracts for further concept development of LAWs,37 procurement is not expected to begin until FY 2023 and will extend
through FY 2026.38 Meanwhile, the number of
traditional amphibious ships had dropped to 31
as of August 2021.39
The USMC continues to invest in the recapitalization of legacy platforms in order to extend platform service life and keep aircraft andamphibious vehicles in the fleet, but as theseplatforms age, they also become less relevantto the evolving modern operating environment.
Thus, although they do help to maintain capacity, programs to extend service life do not provide the capability enhancements that modernization programs provide. The result is anolder, less capable fleet of equipment that costs
more to maintain.

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthCapability
Programs such as the Amphibious Combat
The nature of the Marine Corps’ crisis-­ Vehicle (ACV), F-35, CH-53K, Naval Strike
response role requires capabilities that span Missile,41 and Light Amphibious Warship are at
all domains. The USMC ship requirement is the top of the list of major items of equipment
managed by the Navy, as indicated in the pre- and weapons, but the Corps is also pursuing aceding section on capacity, and is covered in variety of unmanned systems (air, ground, andthe Navy’s section of the Index. The Marine sea) and has placed great emphasis on smaller
Corps is focused on a force-wide redesign per pieces of gear and individual-level weapons
FD 2030 with modernization and divestiture that will enable tactical units to be more effecprograms shaped accordingly. General Berger tive.42 These latter items are typically small inhas emphasized that his force redesign initia- cost when compared with aircraft and armoredtives are being self-funded, meaning that the vehicles, but they can have a decisive effect inservice will get rid of some capabilities that small-unit actions in the field.
are less relevant to expected operational deVehicles. Of the Marine Corps’ current
mands and will reduce manpower to redirect fleet of vehicles, its amphibious vehicles—­that funding to other priorities of greater rel- specifically, the Assault Amphibious Vehicle
evance. Nevertheless, defense funding has not (AAV-7A1) and Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)—
kept pace with inflation, and there are some are the oldest, with the AAV-7A1 averaging
things for which the Corps needs additional more than 49 years old and the LAV averaging
money. According to one account:
39 years old.43 The Corps had moved to extend
the service life of the AAV but abandoned that
Making his case [on June 15, 2021] before
program as progress with the ACV acceleratthe House Armed Services Committee…
ed.44 The Corps has stated that:“We have wrung just about everything
we can out of the Marine Corps internally,” Berger said. “We’re at the limits ofwhat I can do.”
The Marine Corps’ budget request represents a 6.2% increase from fiscal 2021,
even as the service plans to reduce thesize of the active-duty force by 2,700, to
178,500 Marines. The service ultimately
wants to reach 174,000 by 2030—roughly
the size it was in fiscal 2002.
Berger is using the money he has saved
by reorganizing the Marine Corps andshedding capabilities such as tanks andartillery to invest in new technologies
and platforms.40[W]e continue to make strategic choicesin the divestiture of certain programs toreallocate funds toward building a morelethal, modern, multi-domain, expeditionary force. This has included accepting near-term capacity risk by reducing
depot level maintenance for the legacy
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) as
we transition to the Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV).45

﻿for the Marine Corps’ $47.86 billion budget request, Berger said he has reduced
headquarters staffing by 15%, cut legacy
systems and end strength, and has nothing left to draw from to fund programs
and projects.

The Marine Corps has also been exploring
the possible replacement of its aged Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) with a collection of vehicles under the Advanced Reconnaissance
Vehicle (ARV) program and has requested$48.6 million in its FY 2022 budget submission
for research and design work. General Berger, however, has said that he is “unconvincedthat additional wheeled, manned armoredground reconnaissance units” are needed
and that the Corps’ light armored reconnaissance units “must be re-evaluated in light ofthe emerging concept of multi-domain mobile

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463

﻿

reconnaissance,” indicating that the requirement for the ARV is being reconsidered.46
The AAV program hit rough waters on July30, 2020, with the sinking of an AAV off the
California coast near San Clemente Island. In
addition to halting all AAV operations until
various investigations were completed, theCorps installed supplementary emergency
breathing devices in the vehicle and took othersteps to improve its safety and survivability.47
AAV operations were resumed in April 2021
following inspection and modification of vehicles and related training and certification of
AAV crews on the improvements.48
The Corps has accelerated procurementof the ACV in recognition of the problems of
its AAV fleet and the urgent need to update
force capabilities per FD 2030. It procured 56
ACVs in FY 2020 and 72 in FY 2021 and has
requested funding sufficient to acquire 92 in
FY 2022.49 Combined with the 56 vehicles
acquired in previous years, the additions in2020 and 2021 bring the number of ACVs in
the Corps’ inventory to 184 out of a total program objective of 632.50
A note about the Corps’ heavy armor: The
operational challenges, organizational design, and tactical capabilities addressed in
FD 2030 called for the Marines to retire theirinventory of M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks
and associated support capabilities like heavy
bridging and recovery vehicles. The Marine
Corps retired its last active-duty tank unit in
May 2021,51 bringing to a close nearly a century of experience with tanks. The Corps retains
some tanks in various storage configurations(for example, aboard Maritime Prepositioning Squadron ships and in equipment storage
caves in Norway) but will transfer them to the
Army by FY 2023.52
Acquisition of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) continues to move apace. Since 2017,
when fielding of the HMMWV replacement
began, the Marines have acquired 4,531 vehicles (out of a requirement for 9,09153) and haveplaced another 613 on order with its FY 2022
budget request.54 Budget documents do notindicate plans for purchase beyond FY 2022,55

464

most likely because decisions extending fromFD 2030 initiatives have yet to be made.
Aircraft. Fixed-wing fighter-attack aircraftcontinue to age while the Corps pursues delivery of replacement aircraft: the F-35B STOVL
variant to replace the AV-8B, in service since
1985, and the F-35C to replace its carrier-­
capable F/A-18s. To account for a lengthytransition period, the Corps has undertaken
various efforts to extend the service life of its
Hornets and Harriers to keep them in service
until the end of the decade.56
The Corps has acquired approximately onethird of the F-35B aircraft that it plans to purchase but has only started to outfit its aviation
element with the F-35C, the version designed
for use aboard aircraft carriers. Though the
F-35 program has been the subject of vigorous
criticism ever since it began, much of this criticism is misplaced today given the superior capabilities the aircraft brings to air operationsin heavily contested environments featuringpeer-level enemies and the steady decrease in
per-unit cost.57 The Corps’ current concerns
about the aircraft have less to do with its capabilities than they do with the overall cost ofmodern aircraft in general in the constrained
budget environment within which the service
is working to redesign its force.
Today, the USMC MV-22 Osprey programis operating with few problems and nearing
completion of the full acquisition objectiveof 360 aircraft.58 The Marine Corps now has
16 fully operational MV-22 squadrons in theactive component.59 The MV-22’s capabilities
are in high demand from the Combatant Commanders (COCOMS), and the Corps is adding
such capabilities as fuel delivery and use of
precision-guided munitions to the MV-22 toenhance its value to the COCOMs.
The Corps has struggled with sustainment
challenges in the Osprey fleet. In the years
since procurement of the first MV-22 in 1999,
the fleet has developed more than 70 different
configurations.60 This has resulted in increased
logistical requirements as maintainers have
had to be trained to each configuration and not
all spare parts are shared. The Marine Corps

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has developed its Common Configuration–­
readiness—The ability to provide caReliability and Modernization program topabilities required by the combatantconsolidate the inventory to a common concommanders to execute their assigned
figuration at a rate of “2–3 aircraft installs per
missions. This is derived from the ability
year.” The program was initiated in FY 2018.61
of each unit to deliver the outputs for
The USMC’s heavy-lift replacement prowhich it was designed. b. joint readiness—gram, the CH-53K, conducted its first flight on
The combatant commander’s ability to
October 27, 2015.62 The CH-53K will replace
integrate and synchronize ready combat
the Corps’ CH-53E, which is now 30 years
and support forces to execute his or her
old. Although “unexpected redesigns to critassigned missions.67
ical components” delayed a low-rate initial
production decision,63 the program achieved
To this the Commandant has added an exMilestone C in April 2017. The Corps received panded perspective that includes force mod$1 billion in 2019 to purchase seven aircraft,64 ernization as an essential element to ensure
continued this effort by purchasing six in FY that combat forces remain relevant and there2020 for $848 million, and bought an addi- fore ready. As General Berger and Air Forcetional nine in FY 2021 for $1.1 billion.65 This Chief of Staff General Charles Q. Brown, Jr.,aircraft is of increasing importance because have argued, only by divesting old capabilities
the Marine Corps maintains only 138 CH-53Es that would not be useful in changed circumand will not have enough helicopters to meet stances and investing in new capabilities thatits heavy-lift requirement of 200 aircraft with- account for more capable enemies and theout the transition to the CH-53K.
characteristics of key operational theaters can
U.S. forces be ready. “To do this,” however, “weReadinesscannot let our focus on near-term availability
Riding alongside the Corps’ principal Ti- consume the resources necessary to generatetle 10 responsibility to provide “fleet marine truly relevant future readiness through adapforces [for service] in the seizure or defense of tive modernization.”68
advanced naval bases and for the conduct ofDivestiture carries with it some risk unlesssuch land operations as may be essential to the replacement capabilities are brought into theprosecution of a naval campaign”66 is its contri- force as old or legacy capabilities are retired.
bution as the crisis-response force for the mili- For example, the Marine Corps’ decision totary. This aspect of USMC contributions to na- get rid of tanks and a large percentage of its
tional defense has been reinforced by service tube artillery means that the service will notleaders who take pains to allay concerns that have these capabilities should it be called into
their focus on China and the Indo-Pacific will battle before new items can be fielded. Early
distract them from this important role. The reports of promising replacement capabiliCorps’ readiness must therefore account for ties to compensate for the loss of the Abrams
both high-end conflict against a major oppo- main battle tank, for example, are encouragnent in the most complex operational settings ing, but the Corps now no longer has tanks
and pop-up crises against lesser opponents while the improved replacement remains tothat cannot be predicted, all of which implies be fielded.69 This has a bearing on readiness toa force that is ready to go at a moment’s notice. the extent that the force has a current ability
Marine Corps guidance identifies multiple to win in combat. The force might be ready,levels of readiness that can affect the ability to but in a different posture. For a few years,
conduct operations:
the Marines could be more light-infantry
than the middle-weight “two-fisted fighter”
Readiness is the synthesis of two disproudly described by a former Commandanttinct but interrelated levels. a. unit
a decade ago.70﻿

Unfortunately for this Index, the Corps
reports its current readiness in vague, generalized terms instead of providing data bywhich external audiences can independently
assess the status of the service, although thisapproach is generally used by all of the services.
Detailed readiness reports are classified to prevent potential enemies from obtaining sensitive information.
In the past, the services’ leaders would report to Congress in formal testimony the various percentages of key equipment that were orwere not available, share the status of primary
units or types of force capabilities, and perhaps
provide insight into maintenance or supply
backlogs. The absence of such details from
Marine Corps statements during the past year
reveals that the Corps prefers not to share suchinformation, at least currently. Consequently,
our assessment of the Corps’ readiness must
rely on the tone of statements and discussions,
inferences derived from the totality of efforts
and programs, and the sense one gets from anecdotal evidence of the seriousness with which
the service is taking preparations for current
and future employment.
As mentioned, the Marine Corps has undertaken a great reorientation to ready itself
for war against China in a heavily contested
maritime environment. The service believes
that the changes it is pursuing to this end will
be relevant and necessary for other combat
environments because many countries are
acquiring capabilities that are now possible
and affordable with modern technologies.
With this as the driver, combined with the reiteration of the Corps’ role as a force in readiness, the service’s words, actions, and policies
strongly imply a focused commitment to combat readiness.71
To improve force capabilities from the levelof the individual to the most senior operationalcommands, the service is pushing several initiatives. Among them:l

The Marine Corps School of Infantry
has revamped its training for entry-level
infantry Marines, lengthening its course466

by half and including new courseworkand field training intended to sharpen
the thinking skills of Marines who will
likely find themselves operating more
independently than has been the casein the past.72ll“In May [2021], the Marine Corps brokeground on a new, state-of-the-art
wargaming facility intended to housevarious capabilities to enhance warfighter
preparedness.”73 The Corps intends thatthe center, planned for use as early as
2024, will “help Marines better visualize
the threat environment” and participate
in war games of various sizes with a focus
on realism and that it will also “provide
data to inform decisions affecting force
development [and] support existing anddeveloping weapons platforms and capabilities in all regions of the globe.”74
Taking this emphasis on thinking, training,
and war-gaming scenarios to the field, theCorps and the Navy teamed to executea two-week Large Scale Exercise 2021,
billed as the largest the services haveconducted in many years, that involved
25,000 personnel, 36 live units, 50 virtual
units, and a half-dozen major commands
spread across 17 time zones.75

Such efforts, from improvements to infantry training to war gaming to large exercises,
are steps that will have effects in the future
rather than the present. However, they do reveal attitudes, priorities, and perspectives thatreflect a level of seriousness about warfighting.
Within the Marine Corps, perhaps because
it is a smaller service, changes in direction andattitude are more easily conveyed by seniorleaders to the force and adopted force-wide
than is the case in the larger services. While
this does not directly replace hard data on
mission-­capable rates for equipment used by
the Marines or cleanly substitute for unclassified reports about the readiness of units composing the Fleet Marine Force, it can be seen

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

as a surrogate for the attention being paid by reorients toward the requirements of FD 2030,
the Corps to its level of readiness. In addition, LOCE, and EABO.
now that the extended operational demands
Lacking any other direct reporting, thisof Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded, the Index’s assessment of the Corps’ readiness forforce can reconstitute its readiness as it current operations is an optimistic one.

Scoring the U.S. Marine Corps
Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan).
Most recently, General Berger has stated flatlythat the Corps will trade manpower for modernization and that he intends to shrink theCorps from its current 24 infantry battalions
to 21 battalions in order both to free resources so that they can be applied to new formations and to maintain capability investments
in other areas such as Marine Special Operations Command.78
Manpower is by far the biggest expense for
the Marines. As allocated for the Corps’ FY
2021 budget, the military personnel account
was approximately $14.68 billion (an increaseof $730 million over FY 2020),79 dwarfing
both the approximately $8.4 billion allocated for operations and maintenance80 and the$2.7 billion allocated for the procurement of
new equipment, with both accounts seeing adecline in spending compared with the previous year.81 Nevertheless, the historical recordof the use of Marine Corps forces in a major
contingency argues for the larger number.
More than 33,000 Marines, for example, were
deployed in Korea, and more than 44,000 were
deployed in Vietnam. In the Persian Gulf, oneof the largest Marine Corps missions in U.S.
history, some 90,000 Marines were deployed,
and approximately 66,000 were deployed forOperation Iraqi Freedom.
One could reasonably presume that in a war
with China, the demand for forces would be
similar to the demand during these historicalinstances of Marine Corps employment. The
pacing threat for the Corps is China, which
is developing new tools and operational concepts that will likely require the distribution ofMarine Corps forces across a large, contested
littoral battlespace. But because the Corps has

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﻿Capacity Score: Marginal
Based on the deployment of Marines acrossmajor engagements since the Korean War, theCorps requires roughly 15 battalions for one
major regional contingency (MRC).76 Thisrequirement is based on the presumption of
a rather conventional force using known (current) equipment and capabilities against a similar opponent.
This Index acknowledges the service’s work
to develop new capabilities and approaches tofighting and is certainly aware of the trends
in new technologies and associated thinking
about how warfare might change in the future,
but until this happens, one can assess only
what can be known at present. Consequently, the Corps’ historical need for 15 battalions(and associated enabling elements) for one
major conflict translates to a force of approximately 30 battalions to fight two MRCs simultaneously if we were to retain the metricused in previous Indexes. The government
force-sizing documents that discuss Marine
Corps composition support the larger measure.
Though the documents that make such a recommendation count the Marines by divisions,
not battalions, they are consistent in arguingfor three Active Marine Corps divisions, which
in turn requires roughly 30 battalions.
With a 20 percent strategic reserve, the ideal USMC capacity for a two-MRC force-sizing
construct is 36 battalions. However, the Corps
has repeatedly made the case that it is a onewar force that must also have the ability toserve as the nation’s crisis-response force.77
It has just as consistently resisted growing
in end strength even during the years of highoperational demand associated with peak activities in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) and﻿

not yet refined what its envisioned formations
will require, much less proven them in operational employment, we can only assess the service’s current status against historical demand.
Consequently, even a one-major-war Marine
Corps should possess a larger end strength andmore tactical units (infantry battalions as thesurrogate measure for the total Corps) than it
currently has.
As a one-war force that also needs the ability to provide crisis-response forces, sustain
operations in the face of combat losses, andsustain its support for efforts that are not
USMC-specific such as its service component
contribution to U.S. Special Operations Command, the Corps should have a minimum of
30 battalions.
l

One-MRC-Plus Level: 30 battalions.

lActual 2021 Level: 24 battalions.

The Corps is operating with 80 percent of
the number of battalions it should have relative to the revised benchmark set by this Index and has stated its intent to shrink from its
current 24 battalions to 21 battalions. Marine
Corps capacity is therefore scored as “marginal,” the same as it was scored in the 2021 Index
but only because the bar has been lowered.
Reducing operational strength by three battalions, or 12.5 percent, would drive the Corps’
capacity score down to “weak.”score was helped by the retirement of the old
M1A2 Abrams tank. At the small-unit level, theforce will still depend on old AAVs, HMMWVs,
LAVs, cargo trucks, and various items of support equipment procured in the 1990s and early 2000s, but the increasing quantity of JLTVs
and the aggressive acquisition of ACVs will offset the problem of old equipment as the Corps
enters FY 2022.

Readiness Score: Strong
The Corps has exhibited an especially focused and aggressive commitment to ensuringthat Marine Corps forces are ready for action.
This is the point of FD 2030. That said, however, the history of military services is litteredwith the debris of grand vision statements andfuturistic concepts unrealized in practicalimplementation.
The Marine Corps’ effort appears to bequite different, as evidenced by nearly irrevocable decisions to cashier old equipment andimplement significant changes in educationand training programs, dramatic investments
in experimentation and war gaming, acquisition of new capabilities, and profound redesign of operational units. The Corps seems tomean what it has been saying by making realchanges in its programs and organizations thatreflect its published rhetoric. This 2022 Index
believes it a low-risk proposition to apply theevidence of preparing for the future to current
forces in terms of their focus on readiness forcombat. The force remains encumbered by old
primary equipment, but the service’s effort tospend the money needed to keep it serviceable
mitigates this problem to a reasonable extent.
The Corps is still too small, but the force
it has is fully focused on warfighting. Consequently, the 2022 Index assesses Marine Corps
readiness as “strong,” a marked improvement
over the 2021 Index score of “marginal” andquite a jump in a short three-year period overthe 2019 Index measure of “weak.”Capability Score: Strong
The Corps receives scores of “marginal”
for “Capability of Equipment,” “marginal” for“Age of Equipment,” “very strong” for “Healthof Modernization Programs,” and “strong” for“Size of Modernization Program.” Therefore,
the aggregate score for Marine Corps capability is “strong,” an increase from the 2021 Indexscore of “marginal.”
The Corps is aggressively pursuing a host of
new capabilities that will modernize the force
over the next decade, and those capabilities—­ Overall U.S. Marine Corps Score: Strong
specifically, the JLTV, ACV, and F-35B—are
The Marine Corps has made substantial
slowly entering the force. Admittedly, the strides in the past few years in regaining its

468

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthmaterial readiness and stabilizing key modernization programs and, over the past two years,
in profoundly changing its battle orientation,
conceptual underpinnings, organizational design, and acquisition of the tools that it believes
it will need to win in combat. This admittedly
has been accomplished at the expense of capacity, but better to have a combat-relevant
force, even if small, than a large force that is
ill-suited for war.
The 2022 Index score of “strong” is buoyedby the status of the Corps’ modernization andreadiness efforts. The Marine Corps does run
the risk of becoming too small relative to thetask of enabling the projection of naval power
into the most challenging combat environments, and this will be determined by the levelof funding it receives in the coming years. The
same holds true for its modernization efforts
if the Administration and Congress elect tounderfund defense.
But these are future problems. For FY 2021,
the Corps achieved fine form, and its efforts augur well for FY 2022.

U.S. Military Power: Marine Corps
VERY WEAK
Capacity

WEAK

MARGINAL

STRONGVERY STRONG%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%﻿The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military469

MARINE CORPS SCORES

1

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

Main Battle Tank
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

M1A1 Abrams

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Size
Score

Health
Score

Size
Score

HealthScore

None

Inventory: DEACTIVATED
Fleet age: 18 Date: 1990
The M1A1 Abrams was the main battle
tank of the USMC and provided theMarines with heavy-armor direct ﬁrecapabilities. Following the release ofForce Design 2030, the Marine Corps
decided to discontinue the use of theirtanks in order to adapt their ﬁghting
capabilities to potential conﬂicts in the
Paciﬁc.

Light Wheeled Vehicle

﻿

PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

HMMWVJoint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)

Inventory: 10,859
Fleet age: 23 Date: 1983

Timeline: 2017–2022

The HMMWV, better known as the“Humvee,” is a light wheeled vehicle
that is used to transport troops withsome measure of protection against
small arms, blast, and fragmentation.
Initially introduced in the 1980s,
HMMWVs will be replaced by the Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).

The JLTV program is a joint program with the Army for the
eventual replacement of all HMMWVs. Full-rate production isscheduled for early 2019. JLTVs should be at full operational
capability in FY 2022. The ﬁrst set of JLTVs were ﬁelded in
March 2019; IOC was achieved in mid-summer 2019 withﬁelding at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
PROCUREMENT
4,531

SPENDING ($ millions)613$1,918$322

JLTV
Inventory: 4,531
Fleet age: 1 Date: 2019
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
is replacing the HMMWV as a lightwheeled vehicle for troop transport. The
vehicle provides a long-term solution to
IEDs and other unorthodox tactics withwhich the Humvee struggled during theconﬂicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
JLTV improves reliability, survivability,
and strategic and operationaltransportability. It achieved initial
operational capability in 2019.

NOTE: See page 475 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending. JLTV spending figures reflect the full joint
program spending

470

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MARINE CORPS SCORES

1

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Amphibious Assault Vehicle
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

AAV

Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)Inventory: 692
Fleet age: 49 Date: 1972

Timeline: 2018–2021

The Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV)
is an amphibious landing vehicle thattransports Marines from large naval
vessels to land. Similar to a tank inbeing fully tracked and armored, theAAV is designed for assault on shores inhostile territory. The AAV will eventually
be replaced by the ACV.

HealthScore

The ACV is tasked with replacing the aging AAV.
The vehicle achieved IOC in November 2020, andfull-rate production was ordered to begin in 2021.
PROCUREMENT
98

SPENDING ($ millions)92$1,310$4,200

LAV-25Inventory: 494
Fleet age: 39 Date: 1983
The Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) is aneight-wheeled, armored reconnaissancevehicle. It is designed for oﬀ-road andmoderate amphibious capabilities. This
allows for highly mobile ﬁre support,
operational in most terrains. The LAV
will be in service until 2035.
ACV﻿Inventory: 98
Fleet age: 0.5 Date: 2020
The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
is an amphibious landing vehicle that is
intended to supplement and eventuallyreplace the AAV. It is designed forincreased survivability, the most notablediﬀerence being increased groundclearance to reduce the harm from IEDs
and mines. A new remote weaponssystem improves the ACV’s situationalawareness and ability to track and ﬁreon targets. The ACV is also equippedwith tires instead of tracks and has aredesigned interior.

NOTE: See page 475 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military471

MARINE CORPS SCORES

1

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Attack Helicopters
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

AH-1W Super Cobra

AH-1Z

Inventory: 20
Fleet age: 25 Date: 1986

Timeline: 2014–2022

HealthScore

The new AH-1Z Viper program is part of a larger program for
modiﬁcation of the H-1 platform. Replacing the AH-1W, theZ-Variant will serve as the next generation of attack aircraft.
The AH-1Z features upgrades across multiple dimensions.
It is scheduled to achieve full operational capability in 2021.

The Super Cobra was the attack
helicopter that provided Marines
with close air support and armed
reconnaissance. After more than 30
years of eﬀective and dependable
service, the AH-1W was retired in
October 2020. It is being replaced by
the more advanced AH-1Z Viper

PROCUREMENTSPENDING ($ millions)

189$6,012$7

AH-1Z Viper﻿Inventory: 125
Fleet age: 7 Date: 2010
The AH-1Z Viper is replacing the AH-1W
Super Cobra as the USMC’s premierattack helicopter. The Viper has greater
speed, payload, and range as wellas upgraded landing gear, advanced
weapons systems, and a fully integrated
glass cockpit. The Viper provides
Marines with close air support, armed
escort/reconnaissance, and anti-armor
capabilities. The Viper’s expected
operational life span is 30 years.

Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft/Ground Attack Aircraft
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

AV-8B

F-35B/C

Inventory: 109
Fleet age: 29 Date: 1985

Timeline: 2007–2031

The Harrier is the Marine Corps’ groundattack aircraft. It is a subsonic jet and,like a helicopter, is capable of hovering.
The Harrier has a Vertical/Short TakeOﬀ and Landing (V/STOL) system and isdesigned to ﬂy from amphibious assault
ships and unconventional runways.
These unique capabilities allow it tooperate in a variety of environmentsthat are inaccessible to other jets. The
aircraft is being replaced by the F-35B
and will be fully retired in or near 2024.

HealthScore

The Marine Corps is purchasing 353 F-35Bs and 67
F-35Cs. The F-35B is the USMC version of the Joint StrikeFighter program. It is meant to replace the AV-8B Harrier,completing transition by 2030. The B-variant achieved initial
operational capability in July 2015. Full operational capability
for both variants is expected in the late 2020s. The F-35C
is the version built for employment on aircraft carriers. It is
primarily for the U.S. Navy, but the Marines augment carrier
operations and will use the F-35C for this purpose.
PROCUREMENT
124

SPENDING ($ millions)245

NOTE: See page 475 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

472

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength$16,821$27,853MARINE CORPS SCORES

1

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft/Ground Attack Aircraft (Cont.)
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

F/A-18 A-D
Inventory: 224
Fleet age: 30 Date: 1978
The F/A-18 Hornet is a ﬁghter and attack
jet that the Marine Corps uses primarily
for traditional strike missions, ﬂeet
air defense, and air support. It will be
replaced by the F-35C model; however,the F/A-18 ﬂeet’s life has been extended
to 2030 in order to bridge the gap
between the two platforms.
F-35B Lightning II (STOVL)
Inventory: 130
Fleet age: 5 Date: 2015

﻿The F-35B is the Marine Corps variant of
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program.
It is a ﬁfth-generation, stealth multi-role
ﬁghter. Its next-generation technology
allows it to dominate combat missions
without being detected by the enemy.
Unique to the other variants, theB-model is designed with a Short TakeOﬀ-oﬀ and Vertical Landing (STOVL)
system that allows it to operatefrom amphibious assault ships andunconventional runways. This combines
the unique operational capabilities of
the AV-8B Harrier with a supersonic,ﬁfth-generation stealth ﬁghter.
F-35C Lightning II (CV)Inventory: 11
Fleet age: 0.5 Date: 2020
The F-35C is the aircraft carrier
variant of the Joint Strike Fighter(JSF) program used by both the
Navy and the Marine Corps. It is aﬁfth-generation, stealth multi-role
ﬁghter. Its next-generation technology
allows it to dominate combat missions
without being detected by the enemy.
The C-model, also known as thecarrier variant (CV), is equipped for
traditional carrier catapult launches
and tailhook landings. It also featuresa slightly larger combat radius thanthe B-model. Although the C-model isused primarily by the Navy, the Marine
Corps implemented its ﬁrst squadronin December 2020 to complement its
F-35B ﬂeet.

NOTE: See page 475 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military473

MARINE CORPS SCORES

1

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
PendingMedium Lift
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

MV-22B Osprey

MV-22B

Inventory: 309
Fleet age: 14 Date: 2007

Timeline: 2007–2019

HealthScore

Fielding of the Osprey was completed in 2019 with theMV-22 replacing the CH-46E helicopter, and the platform
is meeting performance requirements. The modernization
program does not face any serious issues.

The Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft thatcombines the vertical capabilities of ahelicopter (V/STOL) with the speed andrange of a ﬁxed-wing aircraft. Similar
to the AV-8B, this allows the aircraft
to take oﬀ and land in unconventional
environments. The Osprey provides
transport for ground personnel, cargo
lift, and support for raid operations. IOC
was achieved in 2007, and the programis still in production. The MV-22B’s life
expectancy is 23 years.

PROCUREMENT
349

SPENDING ($ millions)11$30,782$3,087

Heavy Lift
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM
CH-53K

Inventory: 138
Fleet age: 29 Date: 1981

Timeline: 2017–2029

﻿

CH-53E Super Stallion

HealthScore

The CH-53E is a heavy-lift rotary-wing
aircraft. The Super Stallion transports
heavy equipment and supplies foramphibious assault. The aircraft will
operate through 2027 and will thenbe replaced by the more advanced
CH-53K. The CH-53E’s program life is
41 years.

The program is in development. It is meant to replace the CH53E and provide increased range, survivability, and payload.
The program still has not fully developed the necessary
critical technology. The helicopter is scheduled to complete
initial testing in 2021 and to be ﬁelded as early as 2023.
PROCUREMENTSPENDING ($ millions)20$3,030176

NOTE: See page 475 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

474

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength$18,026

MARINE CORPS SCORES

1

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

TankerAge
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

KC-130J

KC-130J

Inventory: 45
Fleet age: 9 Date: 2005

Timeline: 2005–2031

The KC-130J is a large multi-role aircraft,used primarily as a tanker and cargotransport aircraft. It is equipped for avariety of missions, including troop
and equipment transport, air-to-air
refueling, and medevac operations. The
airframe is expected to last 38 years.

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

HealthScore

The KC-130J is both a tanker and transport
aircraft. The procurement program for the
KC-130J is not facing acquisition problems.
PROCUREMENT
68

SPENDING ($ millions)43$4,676$5,111﻿NOTES: See Methodology for descriptions of scores. Fleet age is the average between the last year of procurement and the first yearof initial operational capability. The date is when the platform achieved initial operational capability. The timeline is from the start ofthe platform’s program to its budgetary conclusion. Spending does not include advanced procurement or research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E). Total program dollar value reflects the full F–35 joint program, including engine procurement. As part of the
F–35 program, the Navy is purchasing 67 F-35Cs for the U.S. Marine Corps that are included here. The MV-22B program also includes
some costs from U.S. Air Force procurement. AH-1Z costs include costs of UH-1 procurement.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military475

U.S. Marine Corps Modernization Table Citations
GENERAL SOURCES• U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 1of 1: Procurement, Marine Corps, May 2021, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/PMC_Book.pdf (accessed
August 20, 2021).
• U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 1of 3: Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Budget Activities 01–04, May 2021, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/
APN_BA1-4_Book.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
• U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Comprehensive Selected Acquisition Reports for the Annual 2019 Reporting
Requirement as Updated by the President’s Fiscal Year 2021 Budget,” https://media.defense.gov/2020/Nov/19/2002538295/-1/1/0/SAR-SUMMARY-TABLES-DEC-2019-UPDATED.PDF (accessed August 20, 2021).
• “North America,” in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military
Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021).
PROGRAM SOURCES
M1A1 Abrams:• Todd South, “New in 2021: The Final Year for Marine Tankers,” Marine Corps Times, December 28, 2020, https://www.
marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/12/28/new-in-2021-the-final-year-for-marine-corps-tanks/ (accessed
August 20, 2021).

﻿

HMMWV:• Matthew Cox, “JLTV Is Tougher and Faster, but Troops Will Still Ride into Battle on Humvees,” Military.com, February 10, 2019,https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/02/10/jltv-tougher-and-faster-troops-will-still-ride-battle-humvees.html (accessed
August 20, 2021).
Amphibious Assault Vehicle:• Andrew Feickert, “Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV): Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional ResearchService Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R42723, updated July 23, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/
R42723.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
LAV-25:• “LAV-25 Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle,” Military-Today.com, http://www.military-today.com/apc/lav_25.htm (accessed August20, 2021).
• Staff Writer, “LAV-25 (Light Armored Vehicle 25) 8x8 Wheeled Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle (1983),” MilitaryFactory.com, lastedited February 13, 2019, https://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.php?armor_id=57 (accessed August 20, 2021).
ACV:• Mallory Shelbourne, “Marines Defend ACV Development as Program Matures,” U.S. Naval Institute News, updated February 19,
2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/02/18/marines-defend-acv-development-as-program-matures (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Peter Ong, “USMC Receives First ACVs for Service as BAE Systems Designs More Variants,” Naval News, December 1, 2020,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/12/usmc-receives-first-acvs-for-service-as-bae-systems-designs-more-variants/(accessed August 20, 2021).
• News release, “U.S. Marine Corps Awards $184 Million Contract for Full-Rate Production of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle
Following IOC Declaration,” BAE Systems, December 10, 2020, https://www.baesystems.com/en/article/u-s-marine-corps-awards-184-million-contract-for-full-rate-production-of-the-amphibious-combat-vehicle-following-ioc-declaration (accessed August 20,2021).
AH-1W Cobra:• “AH-1W/AH-1Z Super Cobra Attack Helicopter,” Naval Technology, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/ah1w-supercobrahelicopter/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
• U.S. Marine Corps, “AH-1W Cobra,” https://web.archive.org/web/20070816230216/http:/hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/AVN/
documents/aircraft/rotarywing/ah1.htm (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Press release, “United States Marines Retire Bell AH-1W After 34 Years of Service,” Bell Textron, October 19, 2020, https://news.
bellflight.com/en-US/192399-united-states-marines-retire-bell-ah-1w-after-34-years-of-service (accessed August 20, 2021).

476

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthAH-1Z Viper:• Zaal Tchkuaseli, “AH-1Z Viper Attack Helicopter,” Military-Today.com, http://www.military-today.com/helicopters/ah1z_viper.htm(accessed August 20, 2021).
• John Keller, “Navy Asks Bell to Build 25 AH-1Z Viper Attack Helicopters and Avionics for Marine Corps,” Military & Aerospace
Electronics, January 21, 2019, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/16722056/navy-asks-bell-to-build-25-ah1z-viperattack-helicopters-and-avionics-for-marine-corps (accessed August 20, 2021).
• U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, “AH-1Z Viper,” updated June 2020, https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/AH-1Z-Viper(accessed August 20, 2021).
AV-8B:• Boeing, “AV-8B Harrier II (V/STOL) Aircraft,” https://www.boeing.com/history/products/av-8-harrier-ii.page (accessed October 16,2020).
• Dan Alex, “Boeing (BAe Systems / McDonnell Douglas) AV-8B Harrier II Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STVOL) Strike
Aircraft (1985),” MilitaryFactory.com, last edited March 30, 2021, https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=47(accessed August 20, 2021).
F-35:• Lockheed Martin, “F-35 Lightning II: About the F-35: F-35B Lightning II,” https://www.f35.com/f35/about.html (accessed August 20,2021).
• Harm Venhuizen, “Marine Corps’ First F-35C Squadron Ready to Deploy on Carriers,” Marine Corps Times, December 6, 2020,
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/12/06/the-marine-corps-first-f-35c-squadron-is-ready-todeploy-on-carriers/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
F/A-18 A-D• Boeing, “Defense, Space & Security: F/A-18 Hornet,” last updated July 29, 2005, https://web.archive.org/web/20120521030622/
http:/www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/fa18/fa18_milestones.htm (accessed August 20, 2021).

CH-53E Sea Stallion:• “CH-53E Super Stallion,” Military.com, https://www.military.com/equipment/ch-53e-super-stallion (accessed August 20, 2021).
• “CH-53E Super Stallion Heavy-Lift Helicopter,” Air Force Technology, https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/sikorsky-ch53esuper-stallion/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
• “Marine Corps CH-53K Passes Air Refueling Tests,” Seapower, April 10, 2020, https://seapowermagazine.org/marine-corps-ch-53kpasses-air-refueling-tests/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
KC-130J:• “KC-130J Hercules,” Military.com, https://www.military.com/equipment/kc-130j-hercules (accessed August 20, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

477

﻿

MV-22
• U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, “MV-22B Osprey,” updated September 2020, https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/MV22B-Osprey (accessed August 20, 2021).

Endnotes
Philip Athey, “The Marine Corps Needs to Restore Its Amphibious Competency, Commandant Says,” Marine Corps Times, June2, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/06/02/marine-corps-needs-to-restore-amphibiouscapabilities-commandant-says/ (accessed August 18, 2021).

2.

For the primary document driving the Corps’ effort, see General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force
Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/
CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed
August 18, 2021). In an unpublished (but in the public domain) February 23, 2021, memorandum to the Secretary of Defense,
General Berger stated a number of propositions underpinning FD 2030: China will remain the pacing threat for the next decade;the Corps will continue to operate as a Force-in-Readiness; INDOPACOM is the primary theater of operations for the Marines; andUSMC forces will be the United States’ “‘stand-in force’ operating persistently inside China’s Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ),”
implying the need for Marines to be highly mobile, possessing advanced reconnaissance capabilities, and able to operate withminimal footprint and signature (physical size, electronic emissions, reduced need for logistical resupply, etc.). For an extended
discussion of the Marine Corps’ efforts to reorient to the operational challenge presented by China in the Indo-Pacific region,
see Dakota Wood, “The U.S. Marine Corps: A Service in Transition,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3501, June 16, 2020,
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/BG3501_0.pdf.

3.

U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Budget, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2022 Budget, 2021, p. 1-12, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/Highlights_Book.pdf (accessed August 18, 2020).

4.

Ibid., p. 7-7.

5.

To be clear, the Corps has thought of itself in terms of Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), a collection of ground, aviation,and logistics capabilities under a common commander, for nearly six decades, but because its size and composition vary by task,
the MAGTF is not helpful as a consistent reference for capacity; thus, we use battalions as a measure that is generally understoodby most students of military affairs. For an expanded discussion, see Dakota L. Wood, Rebuilding America’s Military: The UnitedStates Marine Corps, Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 211, March 21, 2019, pp. 15–16, https://www.heritage.org/defense/
report/rebuilding-americas-military-the-united-states-marine-corps. With specific reference to the Corps’ infantry battalions,the service is engaged in a fundamental redesign as a subcomponent of FD 2030. But until the reorganization effort is complete,
the force the Corps would use in an emerging crisis for the foreseeable future will consist of the standard infantry battalions andsupporting arms and units that it possesses today. For additional information, see U.S. Marine Corps, “2030 Infantry Battalions,”
August 2, 2021, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708161/2030-infantry-battalions/ (accessed August 18,2021).

6.

U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget Estimates, Justification of Estimates: Military
Personnel, Marine Corps, February 2010, p. 4, http://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/11pres/MPMC_Book.pdf(accessed August 18, 2020).

7.

Table A-1, “Combat Force Structure Overview,” in U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request: Overview, February
2015, p. A-1, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request_Overview_
Book.pdf (accessed July 29, 2020).

8.

Wood, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Marine Corps,” p. 41.

9.

Alan J. McCombs, “Marines Launch into Cyberspace Mission with New Command,” U.S. Army, January 29, 2010, https://www.
army.mil/article/33744/Marines_launch_into_cyberspace_mission_with_new_command/ (accessed August 18, 2021).

﻿1.

10. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Budget, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2022 Budget, pp. 1-18 and 1-19,
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/Highlights_Book.pdf (accessed August 18, 2021).
11. Andrew Feickert, “New U.S. Marine Corps Force Design Initiatives,” Congressional Research Service Insight No. IN11281, updated
March 2, 2021, p. 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11281 (accessed August 18, 2021).
12. Testimony of General David H. Berger, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, in Congressional Quarterly, “House Armed Services
Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal 2021 Budget Request for the Navy,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, February 27, 2020, https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-5845986?0 (accessed August 18, 2021).
13. Testimony of Lieutenant General Mark Wise, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps, in hearing, Fiscal Year2022 Rotary Wing Aviation Budget Request, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. House of Representatives, June 30, 2021, comments made from 53:10 to 53:30, https://armedservices.house.gov/
hearings?ID=015887BD-CD41-4336-A74C-25F88C6AAE14 (accessed August 18, 2021). Cited hereafter as Wise testimony, June 30,
2021.

478

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength14. U.S. Marine Corps, 2019 Marine Corps Aviation Plan, p. [39], https://www.aviation.marines.mil/portals/11/2019%20avplan.pdf(accessed August 18, 2021). As this book was being prepared, the Marine Corps had not publicly released an updated plan for2020 or 2021.
15. U.S. Marine Corps, 2017 Marine Aviation Plan, p. 54, www.aviation.marines.mil/Portals/11/2017%20MARINE%20AVIATIOIN%20
PLAN.pdf (accessed August 18, 2021).
16. Testimony of Lieutenant General Jon M. Davis, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps, in hearing, Aviation
Readiness, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
July 6, 2016, p. 25, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg20796/pdf/CHRG-114hhrg20796.pdf (accessed August 18,2021).
17. U.S. Marine Corps, 2019 Marine Corps Aviation Plan, p. [43].
18. Lieutenant General Mark Wise, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps, in hearing, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Requestof the Department of Defense for Fixed-Wing Tactical and Training Aircraft Programs, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, July 13, 2021, comments made from 27:15 to 28:10, https://
armedservices.house.gov/hearings?ID=D50BE244-286E-41DD-88CF-C1523BEC70E4 (accessed August 18, 2021). Cited hereafter
as Wise testimony, July 13, 2021.
19. Testimony of Lieutenant General Eric Fick, Program Executive Officer, F-35 Joint Program Office, Office of the Undersecretaryof Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in joint hearing, Update on F-35 Program Accomplishments, Issues, andRisks, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces and Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. House of Representatives, April 22, 2021, comments made from 2:55:50 to 2:56:15, https://armedservices.house.gov/
hearings?ID=EBD9430F-7760-4485-8398-7B34D4A31D54 (accessed August 18, 2021).
20. Wise testimony, July 13, 2021, comments made from 28:30 to 29:40.
21. Zarrin Ahmed, “First Marine Corps F-35C Squadron Reaches Full Operational Capability,” United Press International, July 1, 2021,
https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2021/07/01/f35c-aircraft-foc/9521625164804/ (accessed August 18, 2021).
22. Richard R. Burgess, “Admiral Praises Marine Corps’ Last Hornet Carrier Deployment,” Seapower, March 1, 2021, https://
seapowermagazine.org/admiral-praises-marine-corps-last-hornet-carrier-deployment/ (accessed August 18, 2021).

24. “US Marines’ Four CH-53E Aircraft Complete Maintenance Overhaul,” Naval Technology, June 11, 2020, https://www.navaltechnology.com/news/us-navy-marines-conclude-maintenance-process-of-four-ch-53e/ (accessed August 18, 2021).
25. Lieutenant General Steven R. Rudder, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps, statement on “Aviation Readiness”
before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, November 9, 2017, p. 7,
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS03/20171109/106611/HHRG-115-AS03-Bio-RudderS-20171109.pdf (accessed August 18,2021).
26. Wise testimony, June 30, 2021, comments made from 1:33:00 to 1:34:30.
27. Megan Eckstein, “Marine Corps Conducting Fleet Flight Tests of CH-53K Ahead of IOT&E This Summer,” U.S. Naval Institute News,
February 24, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/02/24/marine-corps-conducting-fleet-flight-tests-of-ch-53k-ahead-of-iote-thissummer (accessed August 18, 2021).
28. Joseph Trevithick, “Marine Osprey Flies with New Radar-Scrambling Intrepid Tiger System for the First Time,” The War Zone, June25, 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41282/marine-osprey-flies-with-new-radar-scrambling-intrepid-tiger-systemfor-the-first-time (accessed August 18, 2021).
29. Kevin Knodell, “Marines Scrap Hawaii-Based Attack Helicopters After Just Three Years,” Honolulu Civil Beat, May 21, 2021, https://www.civilbeat.org/2021/05/marines-scrap-hawaii-based-attack-helicopters-after-just-three-years (accessed August 18, 2021).
30. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030: Annual Update,” U.S. Department of the Navy,
U.S. Marine Corps, April 2021, p. 5, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20689736/force-design-2030.pdf (accessed August
18, 2021).
31. U.S. Department of the Navy and U.S. Marine Corps, Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, Unclassified Edition, 2017,https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=804776 (accessed August 18, 2021).
32. Berger, “Force Design 2030,” passim.
33. U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations,”
February 2021, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20616385/tm-eabo-first-edition-rev-20210211.pdf (accessed August 18,2021).

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23. U.S. Marine Corps, 2018 Marine Aviation Plan, p. 10, https://www.aviation.marines.mil/Portals/11/2018%20AvPlan%20FINAL.pdf(accessed August 18, 2021).

34. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R46374, updated August 10, 2021, pp. 1, 7, and 8, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46374 (accessed August 18, 2021).
35. On July 11, 2019, General David Berger assumed command of the U.S. Marine Corps as 38th Commandant. A short five days
later, he issued his “Commandant’s Planning Guidance” to announce his priorities for the service. Parting with years of practice,
General Berger stated that the Corps would “no longer use a ‘2.0 MEB requirement’ as the foundation for our arguments
regarding amphibious ship building” and would “no longer reference the 38-ship requirement memo from 2009, or the2016 Force Structure Assessment, as the basis for” USMC force structure naval amphibious support requirements. General
David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine
Corps,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, p. 4, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/%2038th%20
Commandant%27s%20Planning%20Guidance_2019.pdf?ver=2019-07-16-200152-700 (accessed August 18, 2021).
36. O’Rourke, “Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” p. 7.
37. Ibid., p. 15.
38. Ibid., pp. 10–11.
39. Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Vessel Register, “Fleet Size,” last updated August 18, 2021, https://www.nvr.navy.mil/
NVRSHIPS/FLEETSIZE.HTML (accessed August 18, 2021).
40. Patricia Kime, “‘At the Limits of What I Can Do:’ Marine Corps Commandant Makes Pleas for Funding,” Military.com, June 16, 2021,
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/06/16/limits-of-what-i-can-do-marine-corps-commandant-makes-plea-funding.html(accessed August 18, 2021).
41. Sam LaGrone, “Anti-Ship Missiles Top Marines $2.95B Fiscal Year 2022 Wishlist,” U.S. Naval Institute News, June 2, 2021, https://
news.usni.org/2021/06/02/anti-ship-missiles-top-marines-2-95b-fiscal-year-2022-wishlist (accessed August 18, 2021).
42. See, for example, Connie Lee, “Marines Going After Slew of New Infantry Weapons,” National Defense, August 24, 2020, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/8/24/marines-going-after-slew-of-new-infantry-weapons (accessed August
18, 2021).

﻿

43. Private correspondence with the author, August 6, 2021.
44. Megan Eckstein, “Marine Corps Cancels AAV Survivability Upgrade,” U.S. Naval Institute News, September 25, 2018, https://news.
usni.org/2018/09/25/marine-corps-cancels-aav-survivability-upgrade (accessed August 18, 2021).
45. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Budget, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2021 Budget, 2020, p. 3-14, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf (accessed August 18, 2021).
46. Andrew Feickert, “Marine Corps Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV),” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. IF11831,
updated July 19, 2021, p. [2], https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/IF11831.pdf (accessed August 18, 2021). See also Berger, “Force
Design 2032,” p. 5.
47. A concise explanation of the incident and follow-on actions by the Marine Corps is provided in the official press releaseannouncing the findings of the command investigation. See press release, “Marine Corps Releases Command Investigation into
the Assault Amphibious Vehicle Mishap off the Coast of Southern California on July 30, 2020,” U.S. Marine Corps, March 25,
2021, https://www.marines.mil/News/Press-Releases/Press-Release-Display/Article/2551200/marine-corps-releases-commandinvestigation-into-the-assault-amphibious-vehicle/ (accessed August 18, 2021). The Corps allocated $39.5 million in FY 2020 and$87.5 million in FY 2021 to AAV improvements in part to address shortfalls identified as a result of the accident. See Exhibit P-40,“Budget Line Item Justification: PB 2022 Navy,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 2021 / AAV7A1 PIP, in U.S. Department of the Navy,
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 1 of 1: Procurement, Marine
Corps, May 2021, pp. Volume 1-1 and Volume 1-2, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/PMC_Book.pdf(accessed August 18, 2021), and Exhibit P-5, “Cost Analysis: PB 2022 Navy,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 2021 / AAV7A1 PIP, Item
Number / Title [DODIC]: 1 / AAV7A1 PIP, in ibid., pp. Volume 1-3 and Volume 1-4.
48. Gidget Fuentes, “Marines: Limited AAV Operations on Water Resume as Vehicle Inspections, Unit Certifications Required in Fatal
Sinking Aftermath,” U.S. Naval Institute News, April 21, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/04/21/marines-limited-aav-operationson-water-resume-as-vehicle-inspections-unit-certifications-required-in-fatal-sinking-aftermath (accessed August 18, 2021).
49. Exhibit P-40, “Budget Line Item Justification: PB 2022 Navy,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 2025 / Amphibious Combat Vehicle
Family of Vehicles, in U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy,
Justification Book Volume 1 of 1: Procurement, Marine Corps, p. Volume 1-5.
50. Andrew Feickert, “The Marine Corps’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV),” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. IF11755,
updated June 7, 2021, p. [1], https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11755 (accessed August 18, 2021).

480

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength51. Philip Athey, “Marine Corps Deactivates Its Final Active-Duty Tank Battalion,” Marine Corps Times, May 25, 2021, https://www.
marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/05/25/marine-corps-deactivates-its-final-active-duty-tank-battalion/(accessed August 18, 2021).
52. Todd South, “Goodbye, Tanks: How the Marine Corps Will Change, and What It Will Lose, by Ditching Its Armor,” Marine Corps
Times, March 22, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/03/22/goodbye-tanks-how-themarine-corps-will-change-and-what-it-will-lose-by-ditching-its-armor/ (accessed August 18, 2021).
53. Andrew Feickert, “Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service
Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RS22942, updated July 13, 2020, p. 6, https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/RS/RS22942 (accessed August 18, 2021).
54. Exhibit P-40, “Budget Line Item Justification: PB 2022 Navy,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 5095 / Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, in
U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 1of 1: Procurement, Marine Corps, p. Volume 1-313.
55. See Exhibit P-40, “Budget Line Item Justification: PB 2022 Navy,” P-1 Line Item Number / Title: 2025 / Amphibious Combat
Vehicle Family of Vehicles, in ibid., p. Volume 1-5.
56. Wise testimony, July 13, 2021, comments made from 27:15 to 28:10.
57. For an explanation of current F-35 cost and performance matters, see John Venable, “Swiss Government Purchase of F-35A
Fighter Jet Reveals Critical Flaws in U.S. Air Force Decision to Buy F-15EX,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5202, July 12, 2021,
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/IB5202.pdf.
58. U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR): V-22 Osprey Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft(V22) as of FY 2020 President’s Budget, RCS: DD-A&T(Q&A)823-212, December 2018, pp. 39 and 68, https://www.esd.whs.mil/
Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Selected_Acquisition_Reports/FY_2018_SARS/19-F-1098_DOC_84_V-22_
SAR_Dec_2018.pdf (accessed August 18, 2021).
59. U.S. Marine Corps, 2019 Marine Corps Aviation Plan, p. [72].
60. U.S. Marine Corps, 2018 Marine Aviation Plan, pp. 76 and 84.
61. U.S. Marine Corps, 2019 Marine Corps Aviation Plan, pp. [71] and [84].

63. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs, GAO-16-329SP, March
2016, p. 93, http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676281.pdf (accessed August 18, 2021).
64. Exhibit P-1, “FY 2021 President’s Budget, Total Obligational Authority,” in U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 2021, Procurement Programs (P-1), February
2020, p. N-4, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/fy2021_p1.pdf (accessed August 18,2021).
65. Exhibit P-1, “FY 2022 President’s Budget, Total Obligational Authority,” in U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget, Fiscal Year 2022, Procurement Programs (P-1), May 2021, p.
N-4, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_p1.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
66. 10 U.S. Code § 8063, “United States Marine Corps: Composition; Functions,” https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/8063(accessed August 18, 2021).
67. U.S. Marine Corps, Commander’s Readiness Handbook, May 2014, p. iv, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/138/HiRes%20
Commanders%20Readiness%20Handbook.pdf (accessed August 18, 2021).
68. General Charles Q. Brown, Jr., and General David H. Berger, “Redefine Readiness or Lose,” War on the Rocks, March 15, 2021,
https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/redefine-readiness-or-lose/ (accessed August 18, 2021).
69. “[Lieutenant General Eric] Smith used the anti-armor mission as an example of how the service [is] evolving. Before, the Marines
would use their own tanks to target enemy tanks. Now, the service is divesting its entire fleet of tanks to free up money to invest
in higher priorities. Instead, it can use long-range precision munitions launched from the back of a JLTV to destroy enemy tanks
from a more mobile posture and from longer ranges. ¶ ‘The experimentation that we’ve done now to date successfully using
lightweight mounted fires—think the back of a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle—is killing armor at ranges, rough calculation, about 15,
20 times the range that a main battle tank can kill another main battle tank,’ Smith said. He added the Marine Corps didn’t get rid

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﻿62. Vice Admiral Paul Grosklags, Representing Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition); Lieutenant
General Jon Davis, Deputy Commandant for Aviation; and Rear Admiral Michael C. Manazir, Director Air Warfare, statement
on “Department of the Navy’s Aviation Programs” before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, April 20, 2016, p. 21, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Grosklags-Davis-Manazir_04-20-16.pdf(accessed August 18, 2021).

of its tanks because they weren’t good at taking out adversary tanks, but rather ‘we can kill armor formations at longer ranges
using additional and other resources without incurring a 74-ton challenge trying to get that to a shore, or to get it from theUnited States into the fight. You simply can’t be there in time.’” Megan Eckstein, “Early Experiments Are Proving out Tank-Free
Marine Corps Concept,” U.S. Naval Institute News, February 10, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/02/10/early-experiments-areproving-out-tank-free-marine-corps-concept (accessed August 18, 2021).
70. J. R. Wilson, “State of the Corps: The Final Interview with Gen. James T. Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps,” Defense
Media Network, October 24, 2010, https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/state-of-the-corps/ (accessed August 18,2021).
71. See note 2, supra.
72. See Sarah Cammarata, “Infantry Training More Intense as Marine Corps Makes Major Changes, Commandant Tells Senators,”
Stars and Stripes, June 25, 2021, https://www.stripes.com/branches/marine_corps/2021-06-24/Infantry-training-more-intenseas-Marines-Corps-makes-major-changes-commandant-tells-senators-1793441.html (accessed August 20, 2021); Chad Garland,“Marine Corps Seeks to Make ‘Smarter’ Infantry Force with New Course,” Stars and Stripes, February 22, 2021, https://www.stripes.
com/theaters/us/marine-corps-seeks-to-make-smarter-infantry-force-with-new-course-1.663144 (accessed August 20, 2021);
and Gidget Fuentes, “Marines Retooling Infantry Training for Complex Warfare in Pacific,” U.S. Naval Institute News, May 6, 2021,
https://news.usni.org/2021/05/06/marines-retooling-infantry-training-for-complex-warfare-in-pacific (accessed August 20,2021).
73. Matt Gonzales, “Breaking New Ground: Corps’ Wargaming Center Ready for Construction,” U.S. Marines, June 24, 2021, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2670179/breaking-new-ground-corps-wargaming-center-ready-for-construction/(accessed August 18, 2021).
74. Ibid.

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75. Diana Stancy Correll, “Navy, Marine Corps Aim to Refine, Test Modern Warfighting Concepts in Large Scale Exercise 2021,” Navy
Times, August 9, 2021, https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2021/08/09/navy-marine-corps-aim-to-refine-testmodern-warfighting-concepts-in-large-scale-exercise-2021/ (accessed August 18, 2021), and Sam LaGrone, “Large Scale Exercise
2021 Tests How Navy, Marines Could Fight a Future Global Battle,” U.S. Naval Institute News, August 9, 2021, https://news.usni.
org/2021/08/09/large-scale-exercise-2021-tests-how-navy-marines-could-fight-a-future-global-battle (accessed August 18,2021).
76. This count is based on an average number of 1.5 divisions deployed to major wars (see Table 1, “Historical U.S. Force Allocation,” p.
350) and an average of 10–11 battalions per division.
77. General David H. Berger and Ryan Evans, “A Chat with the Commandant: Gen. David H. Berger on the Marine Corps’ New
Direction,” War on the Rocks, April 6, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/a-chat-with-the-commandant-gen-davidh-berger-on-the-marine-corps-new-direction/ (accessed August 20, 2021), and General David H. Berger, Commandant of the
Marine Corps, “The 38th Commandant’s Intent,” U.S. Marine Corps, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/THE%2038TH%20
COMMANDANT%27S%20INTENT-CSG.pdf?ver=2019-07-16-164244-723 (accessed August 20, 2021).
78. Berger, “Force Design 2030,” pp. 2, 7, 8, and 11.
79. Exhibit M-1, “FY 2022 President’s Budget, Total Obligational Authority,” in U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy
Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Justification of Estimates: Military Personnel, Marine Corps (MPMC), May 2021, p. 2,
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/MPMC_Book.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
80. Exhibit O-1, “FY 2022 President’s Budget, Total Obligational Authority,” in U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy
Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Justification of Estimates: Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps, May 2021, p. 9,
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/OMMC_Book.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
81. Exhibit P-1, “FY 2022 President’s Budget, Total Obligational Authority,” in U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of Defense
Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 1 of 1: Procurement, Marine Corps, May 2021, p. Volume
1-vii.

482

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

U.S. Space ForceJohn Venable

Tand we now rely on it for nearly every aspectof our lives. Banking, commerce, travel, entertainment, the functions of government, andour military all depend on our assets in space.4
Though recognized by every President since
Dwight Eisenhower in the mid-1950s, various
issues kept the United States from developing
a single service charged with managing spaceassets and capabilities. In 1961, the Air Force
was named executive agent for space researchand development, but at that point, the Armyand Navy already had well-established programs.5 This splintered approach was sustained by every Administration for the next six
decades. Nevertheless, U.S. space capabilities
advanced at a stunning pace.
The effectiveness of the DOD’s space support missions was put on full display during
Operation Desert Storm,6 and adversary nations did much more than take note. They
recognized the growing U.S. dependence on
space and began to position themselves tomove against it.
As early as 2001, a congressionally mandated report warned of our growing dependence
on space and the vulnerability of U.S. assets
in that domain and ultimately recommended
establishing a Space Corps within the DAF.7
Those recommendations were set aside following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, and by the mid-2010s, the command andcontrol of space had fragmented across at least
Background60 different DOD offices.8 All the while, U.S. reMore than any other nation, America has liance on the Global Positioning System (GPS)enjoyed the technological advantages of space, for air, land, and sea maneuver, targeting, andThe Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military483

﻿

he U.S. Space Force (USSF) was createdwith enactment of the fiscal year (FY) 2020
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on
December 20, 2019.1 Established as the fifth uniformed service within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the second service within the
Department of the Air Force (DAF), the USSF
functions under the direction and leadership of
the Secretary of the Air Force. The 2019 NDAA
specifies that a four-star general will serve as
Chief of Space Operations (CSO) and as a full
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The mission of this newest service is to organize, train, and equip forces “to protect U.S. andallied interests in space and to provide spacecapabilities to the joint force.” Its responsibilities include “developing Guardians [military
space professionals], acquiring military spacesystems, maturing the military doctrine forspace power, and organizing space forces topresent to our Combatant Commands.”2
A 2001 RAND study estimated that 95 percent of all civilian and commercial space technologies have direct applicability to militarysystems or are of dual use. That fact and thecapabilities that those two sectors bring to theSpace Force are critical to an assessment of thisnew service.3 The domination of great-powercompetition in space relies on the interwoven efforts of all three U.S. sectors—military, civil, andcommercial space—and that reliance is growing.

﻿

engagement has grown to the point of beingnearly universal, exposing a critical vulnerability that our adversaries have moved to exploit.
Both China and Russia have developed
doctrine, organizations, and capabilities tochallenge U.S. access to and operations in thespace domain. Concurrently, their use of spaceis expanding significantly. These nations havedemonstrated the capability to put American
space assets at risk, and until very recently,
the United States had not taken overt steps toprotect those systems, much less to develop its
own warfighting capability in that domain.
The 2017 NDAA mandated that DOD conduct a review of the organization and command and control of space assets within thedepartment. Shortly after the NDAA was enacted, President Donald Trump directed thata Space Force be established within the DAF.9
Congress concurred and created the USSF
with the 2020 NDAA.
An important addition to the U.S. warfighting command structure was the reestablishment of U.S. Space Command as the 11th
combatant command within the Departmentof Defense with the mission of conducting “operations in, from, and to space to deter conflict
and, if necessary, defeat aggression, deliver
space combat power for the Joint/Combinedforce, and defend U.S. vital interests with allies
and partners.”10

l

l

l

The 45th Space Wing at Patrick Air Force
Base, Florida;
The 50th Space Wing at Schriever Air
Force Base, Colorado; andThe 460th Space Wing at Buckley Air
Force Base, Colorado.12

Those personnel, organizations, and structures have been or will be restructured androlled into three major field commands thatfall directly under the CSO:lSpace Operations Command,lSpace Systems Command, andlSpace Training and Readiness Command.

These three commands are leading or willlead the next tier of organizations, called Deltas and Garrisons. Deltas are equivalent to
Air Force Groups, are led by a colonel, and aretasked with and responsible for specific missions and operations. Garrisons are also theequivalent of Air Force Groups and support
Deltas with functions similar to those of Air
Force “Base”-level command. Squadrons are
the final level of command and will fall under
Deltas and Garrisons.
Space Operations Command. SpOC was
U.S. Space Force Organization
established on October 22, 2020, as the first
The USSF Headquarters and Office of the major USSF field command. Currently locatedChief of Space Operations are located in the at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, SpOC isPentagon. When Congress authorized the led by a three-star general and is responsible
Space Force, it limited its scope to Air Force for organizing, training, and equipping spacepersonnel and assets, equating to a total work- forces assigned to combatant commands. The
force of approximately 27,30011 comprised of already standing SpOC at Vandenberg Air
personnel and organizations within five Air Force Base, California, will be redesignated asForce Wings located at five major installations: SpOC West and will continue to conduct operations in support of combatant commanders.
The 21st Space Wing at Peterson Air ForceSpace Systems Command. This commandBase, Colorado;
was scheduled to stand up in the summer of
202113 to oversee the development, acquisition,
The 30th Space Wing at Vandenberg Air
and maintenance of satellites and ground sysForce Base, California;
tems, the procurement of SATCOM and launchservices, and investments in next-generation
l

l

484

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthMore than 6,400 people have been hand selected to make the transition, and as of the end of
April 2021, more than 4,840 had transferredto the new service.21 Methodically expanding
the Space Force to include all DAF military andcivilian personnel that the service intends totransfer will probably not be completed until
the end of FY 2021.22
However, even when combined with the
new geographic combatant command for space,a service formed just from Air Force assets will
not remedy the dysfunctional oversight orcommand and control issues that the Space
Force initiative was intended to resolve.23 For
that to happen, a significant portion of theapproximately 21,200 space professionals
that remain in the Army and Navy24 will need
to be incorporated into the Space Force—­
something that is not likely to happen until
FY 2024 or later.

Funding
The President’s budget request for FY 2022
lays out a relatively robust level of funding forevery aspect of the new service’s mission set.
The budget for Operations and Maintenance(O&M) is $3.4 billion; the budget for RDT&E
is $11.3 billion; and procurement adds another$2.8 billion for a total of $17.4 billion, a 13 percent increase over FY 2021.
Assuming that the President’s budget isfully funded, Space Force end strength will beauthorized up to 12,764 military and civilian
personnel, an increase of 2,785 over FY 2021.25
The combination of robust funding and manpower levels will allow the CSO to continue
to focus on building a strong organizationalfoundation and filling critical billets with theright people.
Capacity
The classified nature of deployed spaceassets makes listing specific capacity levels
within the Space Force portfolio, much lessattempting to assess the service’s capability to
execute its mission, a challenging exercise. The
USSF’s position, navigation, and timing (PNT);
command and control (C2); communications

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technologies. Space Systems Command will beheaded by a three-star general who will oversee the Space Force’s approximately $11.3 billion annual budget for research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and the acquisition of new systems.14
At present, DOD’s primary space procurement agency is the Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC), located at Los Angeles Air
Force Base, California. When Space Systems
Command stands up, it will absorb SMC alongwith two other procurement agencies: theCommercial Satellite Communications Officebased in Washington, D.C.,15 and the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL) Space Vehicles
Directorate based at Kirkland Air Force Base,
New Mexico.16
Space Training and Readiness (STAR)
Command. STARCOM will be the third USSF
field organization and will be based at Peterson
Air Force Base in Colorado. It will be led by a
two-star general and will be responsible for theeducation and training of space professionals.
Until the two-star command stands up, a provisional command and foundational element of
STARCOM, STAR Delta (P), which was established in July 2020, will serve as the parent organization for several education, training, test,
and evaluation units.17
Personnel. The 2020 NDAA specified that
only the Air Force was required to provide
personnel for the Space Force, and with theredesignation of Air Force Space Command(AFSPC) as Space Operations Command, approximately 16,000 Air Force active-duty andcivilian personnel were assigned to support
the USSF.18 However, most are still wearing
the same uniforms they wore before being reassigned, as well as working in the same offices.
“Assigned” personnel remain in the Air Force oranother service and perform work in supportof the USSF. An officer that transfers will be(re)commissioned in the USSF, and enlisted
personnel that transfer will execute an enlistment contract with the new service.19
The 2021 NDAA authorized 6,434 military
personnel, 3,545 civilian personnel, and a total
end strength of 9,979 on September 30, 2021.20

TABLE 15

U.S. Space Force Budget
In billions of dollars

Military
Personnel*

Research,
Development,
Test, andEvaluation

$2.6

0

$3.4

0

Operation
andMaintenance
FY 2021
FY 2022

Procurement

Overseas
Contingency
Operations

Military
Construction

Total

$10.5

$2.3

0.1

0

$15.4

$11.3

$2.8

0

0

$17.4

* U.S. Space Force personnel costs were funded by U.S. Air Force Military Personnel, FY 2021 ($800.3 million) and FY 2022 ($929.8 million).
NOTE: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.
SOURCES: Extracted from U.S. Air Force budget summaries for fiscal years 2021 and 2022. For example: Table 3, “U.S. Space Force
Budget Summary,” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Overview, p. 8, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY21/SUPPORT_/FY21%20Budget%20Overview_1.pdf?ver=2020-02-10-152806-743(accessed September 3, 2021).

﻿

A heritage.org(Comm); and weather satellites (referred to communications, command and control, miscollectively as Backbone satellites) and its in- sile warning, nuclear detonation detection,
telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance weather, and GPS for the world.26 An estimated(ISR) satellites are unrivaled and provide ex- 90 satellites in that portfolio now reside withintraordinary capabilities. Its space situational the Space Force. (See Table 17).
awareness (SSA) satellites and terrestrial-­
Global Positioning System (38 Satellites).
based capabilities, while also unrivaled, are Perhaps the best-known constellation of satellimited and require additional resourcing. lites under Space Force control is the Global
Each satellite, satellite constellation, and Positioning System (GPS), which provides PNTterrestrial space surveillance site has unique for millions of simultaneous users around thecharacteristics and an expected life span.
world. It takes 24 of these satellites to provide
The Space Force has a total of 70 Backbone seamless global coverage, and 31 are currently
satellites that enable every facet of modern operational.27 Approximately seven additional
American warfare, to include the collection satellites that have been decommissioned andof real-time intelligence and the ability to serve as on-orbit spares bring the total to 38.
communicate, adaptively maneuver, and
GPS III is the latest upgrade to the platform
deliver precision effects almost anywhere and incorporates a more robust anti-jamon the planet.
ming capability. The fifth GPS III28 satellite
was launched into orbit on June 17, and theSatellite Constellations
scheduled launch of the sixth in September
The Space Force mission is conducted 2021 will increase the number in orbit to 39.29
through a network of satellites, ground-based Interoperability with other Global Navigation
radar, ground stations, and situational aware- Satellite Systems (GNSS) such as the European
ness nodes. In 2018, the Secretary of the Air Galileo network and the Japanese Quazi-ZeForce stated that the service operates 77 sat- nith Satellite System adds an impressive level
ellites vital to national security that provide of resiliency.30

4862022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

FIGURE 4

Types of Earth Orbits
Geosynchronous Orbit
22,000+ miles above EarthAt this altitude, an object’s speed
matches the Earth’s rotation, causing
satellites effectively to stay over the sameline of longitude on the Earth’s surface.

Highly Elliptical Orbit
500–24,000 miles
The advantage of a Highly Elliptical
Orbit is the ability to remain
above certain altitudes forlong periods of time6
due to their long7
approaches and5
descents.

8

Middle Earth Orbit
1,200–22,000 miles
Relatively few satellites
operate in this band because
it contains the Van Allenradiation belts, which cansignificantly affect satellite
operations.

4

9

3
10
22,000 milesm
1,200 iles

2

Low Earth Orbit
100–1,200 miles
Various types of satellites populate
this band. Because it is closer toEarth, a satellite here can see
smaller objects than acomparably equipped
satellite at a higher
altitude can see.

﻿

11
1 (time in hours)

12
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SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

Weather (Four Satellites). Defense
weather satellites have been collecting weather
data and providing forecasts for U.S. military
operations since 1962 through the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).31
Currently, four operational DMSP satellites
are in polar low-Earth orbits (LEOs).32

The main sensors for these weather satellites are optical, and each provides continuous
visual and infrared imagery of cloud cover overan area approximately 1,600 nautical miles
wide and provide complete global coverage of
weather features every 14 hours.33 Launchedbetween 1999 and 2009 with a life expectancy

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487

﻿

of just five years, they have continued to deliver exceptional data well beyond their expected lifetimes.34
Communications (28 Satellites). Milstar is a satellite communications (SATCOM)
system designed in the 1980s to provide the
National Command Authorities assured, survivable global communications with a low
probability of intercept or detection. The technology built into this five-satellite constellation was crafted to overcome enemy jammingand nuclear effects and was considered the
DOD’s most robust and reliable SATCOM system when it was fielded.
The follow-on to Milstar is the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency System (AEHF).
This system is a network of satellites operated
by the Space Force for the Joint Force that allows the DOD to sustain secure, jam-resistantcommunications and C2 for high-priority military ground, sea, and air assets located anywhere in the world. The AEHF Constellation
includes six satellites35 in GEO.36
The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) has seven operational satellites
that provide nuclear-hardened, global communications to the Defense Department, the Department of State, and the National Command
Authorities. The system is capable of high data
rates and provides anti-jamming capabilities.
Wideband Global SATCOM (10 Satellites). Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) is a
joint-service program funded by the U.S. Air
Force and U.S. Army, along with international
partners Australia and Canada, and is used by
all DOD services as well as National Command
Authorities. Once known as the Wideband
Gapfiller Satellite,37 WGS provides Super HighFrequency (SHF) wideband communications,using direct broadcast satellite technology toprovide C2 for U.S. and allied forces. With solid
capabilities that include phased array antennas and digital signal processing technology,
this system delivers a flexible architecture witha satellite life span of up to 14 years.
Space-Based Infra-Red System (SixSatellites).38 The Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS) is an integrated constellation488

of satellites designed to deliver early missile
warning and provide intercept cues for missile defenses. This surveillance network was
designed to incorporate three satellites in highelliptical orbit (HEO) and eight others in geosynchronous orbit (GEO), each working in concert with ground-based data processing andcommand and control centers. Because SBIRSHEO is a retaskable orbit, these satellites canbe moved to more optimum orbits/viewpoints
as mission requirements dictate. Five SBIRSGEO satellites have been placed in orbit, and
it is expected that the final vehicle, GEO-6, will
launch sometime in 2022.39
The funding that was removed from SBIRS
shifted to a new program, Next-Generation
Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next- Gen
OPIR), which will include a new ground-­control system. The program is intended todeliver resilient detection and tracking capability through a contested environment that
includes emerging advances in adversary rocket propulsion technology. It is expected thatfielding of a strategically survivable constellation of satellites to provide missile warning will
begin sometime in FY 2023.40
Defense Support Program (Five Satellites). Defense Support Program (DSP)
satellites were designed to detect launches
of ICBMs or Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles(SLBMs) against the U.S. and its allies. Its secondary missions include detection of spacelaunch missions or nuclear weapons testingand detonations. The DSP constellation is
in GEO and uses infrared sensors to pick up
the heat from and booster plumes against the
Earth’s background. Phase 1 placed four satellites in orbit from 1970 through 197341 andwas followed by Phase 2, which placed six satellites in orbit from 1979–1987.42 Phase 3 consisted of 10 DSP satellites that were launchedfrom 1989–2007.43
Although Phase 3 DSP satellites have longexceeded their design lifetimes, reliability has
exceeded expectations, and at least five44 and as
many as eight are still providing reliable data
and are now integrated with and controlled by
the SBIRS program ground station.45

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military489

﻿Space Situational Awareness Systems
GSSAP satellites are maneuverable and thereKnowledge of hostile systems—their loca- fore able to perform rendezvous and proximtions, their positional history, and how those ity operations (RPO) on objects of interest in
satellites are maneuvering in real time—­ space.50 Launched in pairs, the first two GSSconveys intent and collectively shapes the pro- AP satellites were put in orbit on July 28, 2014,
tocols and counterspace decisions that follow. followed by the second two on August 19, 2016,
Space situational awareness is therefore crit- and each has a life span of up to seven years.51
ical to every aspect of defensive and offensive
The first of the two remaining satellites,counterspace operations and forms the foun- Space-Based Surveillance System-1 (SBSS-1),
dation for DOD counterspace activities.46
was launched to LEO in 2010 with a seven-year
In addition to adversary systems, other life expectancy.52 The second, Space Tracking
significant threats are in orbit. The National and Surveillance System Advanced TechnoloAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) gy Risk Reduction (STSS-ATR), is an RDT&E
estimates that as many as a half-million ob- satellite placed in a polar LEO on May 5, 2009,
jects with diameters between 0.4 inches and with an unknown life expectancy. It was placed
four inches are circling the Earth,47 and the in orbit by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
Australian Space Academy says that objects in but is now part of the USSF portfolio.53
LEO are traveling between 15,600 and 17,900
Space Surveillance Network (Six Dedmiles an hour.48
icated Ground-Based Sensors). The U.S.
Maintaining a high level of situational Space Surveillance Network (SSN) is comawareness of satellites and debris orbiting prised of 23 ground-based radar and opticalacross the depth and vast dimensions of poten- tracking sites that have the ability to detect,tial Earth orbits requires a robust and seamless track, identify, and catalog all man-made obnetwork of space-based and terrestrial-based jects orbiting the Earth. Of the 23 sites, six are
sensors. Understanding the capabilities and dedicated sensors with a primary mission oflimitations of that network naturally begins space surveillance.
with understanding the numbers and types ofSeven collateral sensors are part of the netspace-based and ground-based systems.
work, but their primary mission is to detect
Six acknowledged satellites and six dedicat- and track ICBMs and SLBMs and to test anded and 17 collateral or contributing terrestrial-­ evaluate other systems. Another 10 contribbased sensors help to maintain situational uting SSN sensors controlled by other organiawareness of satellites and other objects in zations or agencies provide space surveillance
space. The satellites, collectively known as the support upon request from the National SpaceSpace-Based Surveillance System (SBSS), op- Defense Center (NSDC).
erate in concert with ground-based sensors but
Reconnaissance and Imaging Satelwithout their weather-related and sunlight-­ lites (Unknown). Although the history of therelated limitations.
Air Force is steeped in these reconnaissanceSome satellites track objects and debris systems, the operational details of each confields from LEO. Others operate from a much stellation are classified. In the late 1990s andhigher orbital position (GEO) and are capable of early 2000s, the Air Force moved to develop
maneuvering to perform detailed inspections of and field a constellation of space-based radar
orbiting items of especially high interest.
satellites. That program (known as Lacrosse/
Space-Based Surveillance System (Six Onyx) launched five satellites, each carrying
Satellites). The Geosynchronous Space Sit- a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) as its prime
uational Awareness Program (GSSAP) is a imaging sensor. Because SAR systems can seeclassified surveillance constellation of four through clouds with high resolution, they ofsatellites that can accurately track and char- fer the potential to provide a capability fromacterize objects in orbit.49 Operating near GEO, which it is hard to hide.54

TABLE 16

Space Launches by Country Since 2010
U.S.

China

Russia

India

2010

17

16

16

3

2011

19

19

20

3

2012

12

19

12

2

2013

19

15

18

3

2014

21

15

22

4

2015

19

19

14

3

2016

24

22

13

7

2017

29

18

13

4

2018

29

39

13

7

2019

20

34

14

6

2020

53

19

21

14

2021

66

22

26

7

Total

328

257

202

63

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﻿

SOURCE: Space Launch Schedule, https://www.spacelaunchschedule.com/(accessed September 8, 2021).

Space Launch Capacity
The Space Force manages the National
Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, aMajor Defense Acquisition Program that acquires launch services from private companies
to deliver national security satellites into orbit. Currently, the NSSL uses the Atlas V and
Delta IV Heavy launch vehicles from United
Launch Alliance (ULA) and the Falcon 9 andFalcon Heavy from SpaceX to launch national
security payloads.
In 2018, the Air Force awarded three launchservices agreements to space launch companies to develop their launch vehicles for asecond phase of the NSSL. In 2020, the Space
Force awarded two launch services procurement contracts to ULA and SpaceX, and those
two vendors will provide space launch services
for the Space Force through 2027.55
In 2010, four organizations, including
NASA, were involved in launching manned

490

and unmanned systems into space. Today, nineprivate corporations—twice the number that
had launched systems into orbit in 2019—areengaged in placing satellites into orbit.56 In
2021, U.S. companies are scheduled to launch
66 missions into space, and China and Russia
are scheduled to conduct 22 and 26 launches,
respectively.57 America has turned the corneron this vital capability, and the access to spacethat these private companies provide will be amajor factor in determining whether the United States is able to prevail in the great-powercompetition that lies ahead.

Capability
With an estimated 90 satellites in its portfolio, the USSF can meet much of the communications, collection, and imagery demand placedon it by the National Command Authorities
and the strategic-level intelligence requirements of the Defense Department. However,2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

TABLE 17

U.S. Satellites in Orbit
SystemFunction

Satellites

GPS

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing

38

SBIRS

Missile Warning

9

DSP

Missile Warning

5

SBSS

Space Surveillance

1

STSS-ATR

Missile Defense

1

GSSAP

Space Tracking

4

DMSP

Weather4

MilstarCommunications

5

AEHF

Communications

6

DSCS

Communications

7

WGS

Communications

10

Total

90

• Gunter’s Space Page, “SBIRS-GEO 1, 2, 3, 4,” last update

November 4, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/sbirsgeo-1.htm (accessed September 3, 2021).
• Fact Sheet, “Space Based Space Surveillance,” U.S. Air
Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), current as ofJuly 2019, https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/
Article/249017/space- based-space-surveillance-sbss/(accessed September 3, 2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “STSS-ATRR,” last update July 21, 2019,https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/stss-atrr.htm (accessed
September 3, 2021).
• News release, “Missile Defense Agency Space Tracking and
Surveillance System Advanced Technology Risk Reduction
Satellite Transfers to Air Force Space Command,” U.S.
Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, February 26,
2011, https://www.mda.mil/news/11news0004.html (accessed
September 3, 2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “GSSAP 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (Hornet 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,6),” last update November 4, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/
doc_sdat/ gssap-1.htm (accessed September 3, 2021).

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﻿

NOTE: Data are current as of May 20, 2021.
SOURCES:• Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Satellite Database,”
updated May 1, 2021, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources
satellite-database (accessed September 3, 2021).
• U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration, National Environmental Satellite
Data and Information Service, “Currently Flying,” https://www.
nesdis.noaa.gov/content/currently-flying (accessed September
3, 2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “DSP 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23(Phase 3),” last update March 19, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.
de/ doc_sdat/dsp-3.htm (accessed September 3, 2021).
• Table, “Spacecraft in Service over Time (As of Sept. 30,2019),” in “Air Force & Space Force Almanac 2020,” Air
Force Magazine, Vol. 103, No. 6, June 2020, p. 67, https://www.airforcemag.com/ app/uploads/2020/06/June2020_
Fullissue5.pdf (accessed September 3, 2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “Trumpet 4, 5 / SBIRS HEO-1, 2,” last
update November 4, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_
sdat/trumpet-fo.htm (accessed September 3, 2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “Trumpet 6, 7 / SBIRS HEO-3, 4,” last
update April 29, 2021, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/
trumpet-fo-2. htm (accessed September 3, 2021).

TABLE 18

U.S. Space Launches by Organization﻿

Organization

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Total

Space X

2

0

2

3

5

7

10

18

20

13

31

36

147

United Launch
Alliance

10

12

9

11

14

12

12

8

7

4

13

12

124

Northrup
Grumman

2

4

1

5

2

0

2

3

2

3

5

2

31

Rocket Lab, Ltd

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

6

8

NASA

3

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

8

Virgin Orbit

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3

3

FireﬂyAerospace

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

2

Blue Origin

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

Astra Space
Launch Co.

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

Relativity Space

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

USAF

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

Total

17

19

12

19

21

19

24

29

29

20

53

66

328

SOURCE: Space Launch Schedule, “USA Launch Schedule,” https://www.spacelaunchschedule.com/
category/usa/ (accessed September 8, 2021).

A heritage.org

getting real-time satellite intelligence to war- great that the Departments of the Air Forcefighters at the operational and tactical levels is and Army, the National Reconnaissance Ofstill problematic. The loss of even a small num- fice, and other agencies have invested in andber of those 90 satellites could significantly im- are employing the services of commercial
pact operational capabilities across the DOD. organizations to provide collection and imagBackbone Satellites. In spite of an ever-­ ery on demand.58
growing demand, the USSF can meet a signifIn the summer of 2020, the U. S. Army conicant amount of the strategic demand for col- ducted an exercise called Project Convergencelection, imagery, and communications placed 2020 (PC20), which was designed to test theon it by the National Command Authorities and capability of commercial spaceborne systems
the Defense Department. The PNT services of- to provide the intelligence, imagery, and comfered by GPS are unrivaled in both capacity and munications linkages for warfighters in thecapability. With 31 operational GPS satellites in service’s “close fight.” Brigade Combat Teams
orbit and seven spaceborne (dormant) spares, (BCTs), Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs), andthe system has enough redundancy and resil- Expeditionary Signal Battalion-Enhanced
iency to handle losses associated with normal (ESB-E) were given access to 600 commercial(not-combat-related) space operations.
SpaceX Starlink satellites in LEO to facilitate
The current and growing DOD demands faster decisions.59
for imagery and collection are another thing
When combined with other small satellites
entirely. The shortfall is projected to be so (SmallSats), the sensors on Starlink’s rapidly

492

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

TABLE 19

Satellites by WeightGroup Name

WeightSize

Large Satellite

1,000+ kilograms

Large

Medium Satellite

500–1,000 kilograms

MediumMini Satellite

100–500 kilograms

Small

Micro Satellite

10–100 kilograms

Small

Nano Satellite (CubeSats)

1–10 kilograms

Small

Pico Satellite

0.1–1 kilograms

Small

Femto Satellite<100 grams

Small

SOURCE: Table 1, “Satellites by Mass,” in Chalie L. Galliand, “Study of the Small: Potential for Operational Military Use of CubeSats,” 24th
Annual AIAA/USU [American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics/Utah State University] Conference on Small Satellites, August 10,
2010, p. 1, https:// digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1199&context=smallsat (accessed September 3, 2021).
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fall well short of the needs of the services.
The Department of the Air Force is therefore
investing in and employing the services ofcommercial organizations to meet the “ondemand” collection and imagery needs of
USSF customers.64
Space Situational Awareness. The Space
Force’s six acknowledged SSA satellites and thesix dedicated and 17 collateral contributing
ground-based sensors within the space-based
surveillance system help to maintain situational awareness of satellites and other objects inspace. However, the limited number and inherent limitations of the sensors within the SBSS
leave significant gaps in coverage. Those gaps
are addressed by prediction, and every timea satellite maneuvers, “the process of initial
discovery by a sensor, creation of an initial element set, and refinement of that element set
needs to be repeated.”65
The Backbone and ISR assets within the
USSF are critically important; however, thefocus of the Index of U.S. Military Strengthis primarily on assessing the classic “hardcombat power” found in defensive and offensive systems.

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﻿

expanding constellation, which numbered
1,440 satellites as of May 2021,60 will enable
the Army’s concept for a Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)–Capable Force by 2028 and an
MDO-Ready Force by 2035.61 The capabilities
demonstrated in PC20 are similar in nature
to those sought in the Air Force’s Advanced
Battle Management System (ABMS) and the
Navy’s Overmatch C2 development programs.62
Starlink reportedly also has the ability toprovide a very accurate PNT backup for GPS,
which will become increasingly important for
all of the services as the competition in spaceintensifies.63
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. The USSF has 14 satellites dedicated to missile launch warning. While the
SBIRS constellation is two GEO satellites shortof design, its nine satellites, coupled with thefive DSP satellites, provide global coverage andgenerally excellent response times.
As noted above, the current portfolio ofreconnaissance satellites, while highly classified, meets many of the essential strategic
requirements of the NCA and the Defense Department. However, Space Force capabilities

Defensive Capabilities
of International Affairs report states that the
Defensive systems and operations are U.S. is well behind its peer competitors in thisdesigned to protect friendly space capabil- area and should assume that its satellite conities against kinetic anti-satellite weapons, stellations have already been penetrated andhigh-powered lasers, laser dazzling or blinding, compromised.69
and high-powered microwave systems.66
In spite of its current limitations, protective
The first challenge in defense is detecting measures that the service can take now to safean attack, and a host of sensors exist that can guard its spaceborne systems can be separated
detect the launch of terrestrial-based anti-­ into two categories of systems and actions: acsatellite (ASAT) weapons. With 14 satellites tive and passive.
dedicated to detecting missile launches, it ispossible for the USSF to determine an ASAT’s
An active defense is really offensive in natrajectory, identify the targeted satellite, andture and includes engagements to destroy,
alert operators in time for them to take evanullify, or reduce enemy systems thatsive action with those systems. Unfortunateput U.S. and allied systems and capabilily, the gaps in the SSA network highlighted
ties at risk.
earlier make the timely assessment of andresponse to such an attack on a specific U.S.
Passive defense measures increase sursatellite difficult.
vivability through asset diversification,
Detecting other (non-missile) attacks presincluding the deployment of more spaceents another problem, and the Space Force hassystems in different orbits, as well as
fielded a system that can deal with one partreal-time satellite maneuverability andof that challenge. Operated by ground-based
self-protection.70
units, Bounty Hunter can detect an adversary’s
attempts to deceive, disrupt, deny, or degrade
Shortly before the USSF became an indesatellite communications by monitoring elec- pendent service, the Air Force made clear that
tromagnetic interference across multiple fre- it wanted to build a constellation of thousands
quency bands. Operators can locate sources of SmallSats in low-Earth orbit to provide a reof intentional and unintentional interference dundant, diversified portfolio of capabilities.
and minimize them.67 Bounty Hunter achieved Over time, it is has become apparent that thoseinitial operational capability (IOC) in the sum- expanding constellations will be comprised of
mer of 2020. While this system is a significant both military and civilian satellites.71
improvement, it has no known capability to
In 2018, the Air Force signed a $28 million
detect or counter laser.
contract with SpaceX to evaluate its LEOUSSF satellites need a sensor package that based Starlink constellation of satellites thatallows them to self-detect hostile system en- provide broadband services. In 2019, the sergagement and report it to operators who are vice tested Starlink’s ability to provide compositioned to take defensive actions. That ca- munications linkages with airborne service
pability is currently not known to exist.
aircraft and other spaceborne systems during
Cyberattacks present a different challenge its Global Lightning program.72
to space-based systems. Like other kinetic andStarlink had 1,440 satellites in orbit as of
non-kinetic attacks, cyber intrusions can cause May 2021, but while significant in number,service disruptions, sensor interference, or the that constellation would be unable to provide
permanent loss of satellite capabilities. Addi- seamless global coverage. Ultimately, howevtionally, an effective cyberattack could corrupt er, Starlink is on track to field some 4,500 satthe satellite’s data stream to reliant elements ellites by the end of 2023, which will lift thator systems—or even allow an adversary to seize limitation.73 Continuing this relationship with
control of a satellite.68 A recent Royal Institute Starlink will bode well for the USSF and its
l

﻿

l

494

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Scoring the U.S. Space Force
Capacity Score: Weak
With the influx of small satellites (see Table
The number and types of Backbone and 19), the potential for the number of U.S. military
ISR assets are sufficient to support global PNT satellites in orbit to grow from a few hundred
requirements and the majority of strategic-­ to several thousand over the next three years
level communications, imagery, and collec- is very real. Add new commercial, allied, andtion requirements of the National Command adversary SmallSats to the mix and it is highly
Authorities and the Department of Defense. likely that the number of operational satellites
However, the Space Force is not capable of in orbit will double over that same period. Almeeting current—much less future—on-de- though increasing numbers alone will challengemand, operational, and tactical-level warfight- the current Space Surveillance Network, theer requirements.
number of unannounced orbital changes among
As noted in the readiness section, the gaps those satellites will make it markedly more difin the SBSS are covered by prediction, and op- ficult to keep track of bad actors.
erators of adversarial satellites can time their
The U.S. had announced plans to build a secmaneuvers to take advantage of those gaps.
ond, strategically located Space Fence like the

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military495

﻿ability to support U.S. forces with satellite acThe operations assumed by the USSF tocess, resilience, and the overall survivability of support strategic and high-end operational-­
the network of satellites available to the DOD. level support have proceeded uninterrupted,
and to that end, readiness has remained high,Offensive Systems
but those operations were primarily supportThe Air Force’s FY 2017 budget included ive in nature and did not include robust, near$158 million to develop offensive space capa- ly real-time support to tactical units. Whilebilities over a period of five years.74 The only of- the service is undoubtedly moving forward
fensive space system of record within the USSF on credible defensive and offensive readiness,that can be found in open-source literature is there is little evidence that it is ready for thea system called Meadowlands.
threat envisioned by Congress when it formed
Meadowlands is a mobile, terrestrial-based, the Space Force.
counter-communications system (CCS) that
Available government and commercial sysdelivers effects to thwart adversary SATCOM tems have the capability and capacity to meetin a given area of responsibility (AOR). The the imagery, collection, and communication
effects of Meadowlands are reversible: When linkage demands and throughput requirethe system is turned off, the communications ments of warfighters at the operational andlinkages it was targeting return to their origi- tactical levels. However, the entities driving
nal functionality.75
to fill the gaps in capability, capacity, and thereadiness levels required to infuse that intelReadinessligence to the operational and tactical levels is
The Space Force was born of a congressio- coming from the other services.
nally mandated study that included a plan for
The Space Force needs to take the reins of
the incremental transition of operational Air this challenge in every dimension (capacity, caForce space assets and personnel to the new pability, and readiness) to further the efforts ofservice. Throughout the plan’s execution, the warfighters at all levels in the other domains, andUSSF has been deliberate in its hiring and is on it should move aggressively to fill the gaps thata path to developing a solid cadre of personnel exist in the readiness that is required to defend
and a strong organizational culture.
our assets and threaten those of our adversaries.

﻿

one on Kwajalein Atoll in Western Australia in “weak,” the result of being scored “weak” in
2021, but that site has yet to be funded. Even “Size of Modernization Program,” “weak” forif a second Space Fence does eventually ma- “Age of Equipment” and “Health of Modernterialize, the Space Force will still need more ization Programs,” and “weak” for “Capability
satellites that are dedicated to this mission.76
of Equipment.”
The service’s two counterspace weaponssystems (Meadowlands and Bounty Hunter, Readiness Score: Weak
respectively) cover only a fraction of the ofThe mission sets, space assets, and personfensive and defensive capabilities required to nel that transitioned to the Space Force andwin a conflict in space. Other counterspace sys- those that have been assigned to support thetems are likely being developed or, like cyber, USSF from the other services have not missed
are already in play. Nevertheless, the current an operational beat since the Space Forcevisible capacity of the Space Force is not suffi- stood up in 2019. Throughout that period, thecient to support, fight, or weather a war with a readiness levels have seamlessly sustained
peer competitor.
backbone and ISR support to the NCA, DOD,
combatant commanders, and warfighters
Capability Score: Weakaround the world.
The current space asset modernization plan
However, there is little evidence that thethat is visible to the public follows the same USSF has improved its readiness to provide
incremental replacement and fielding design nearly real-time support to the operationalthat has been in practice for decades. The vast and tactical levels (“marginal”) or that it ismajority of Backbone and ISR assets have ex- ready in any way to execute defensive and ofceeded their designed life spans and the DAF’s fensive counterspace operations to the degree
willingness to delay and/or defer the acquisi- envisioned by Congress when it formed thetion of replacement systems remains a legacy Space Force (“very weak”).
of that department.
The capability of Backbone and ISR sat- Overall U.S. Space Force Score: Weakellites is marginal, but it is more than offset
This is an unweighted average of the USSF’s
by the gaps in SSA and the apparent lack of capacity score of “weak,” capability score ofdefensive and offensive capabilities (“very “weak,” and readiness score of “marginal.”
weak”). The capability score is therefore

U.S. Military Power: SpaceVERY WEAK

WEAK

Capacity%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

496

MARGINAL

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

STRONGVERY STRONG1

SPACE FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5

Procurement
and Spending

Strongest

Through FY 2021
Pending

Navigation
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

Size
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Global Positioning System (GPS)GPS III

Inventory: 38
Fleet age: 14.5 Date: 1997

Timeline: 2019–TBD

HealthScore

GPS III is the latest upgrade to the GPS platform andincorporates more robust anti-jamming capabilities. It isinteroperable with other countries’ Global Navigation
Satellite systems, and this interoperability adds resilience to
the GPS system.

GPS satellites provide timing, velocity,and precise navigation for millions ofsimultaneous users around the world.
It takes 24 GPS satellites to provide
seamless global coverage; currently, 32
are operational with an additional four
decommissioned satellites serving as
on-orbit spares.

PROCUREMENT
2

SPENDING ($ millions)
2

$598

$601

Missile Warning
Age
Score

PLATFORM
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
Inventory: 9
Fleet age: 7.5 Date: 2006

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Size
Score

HealthScore

Next Generation Persistent Infrared(Next-Gen OPIR)
Timeline: TBD

﻿An integrated constellation of satellites,
SBIRS is designed to deliver early
missile warning and provide intercept
cues for missile defenses. The satellites
are retaskable, which means they
can be moved to more optimum or
viewpoints as mission requirements
dictate. The program was ended
early because of cost, schedule, andperformance issues.
Defense Support Program (DSP)
Inventory: 5
Fleet age: 32.5 Date: 1970
These satellites were designed to detect
intercontinental ballistic missile andsea-launched ballistic missile launches
against the U.S. and its allies. They
can also detect space launch missions
and nuclear weapons testing anddetonations. Phase 3 satellites werelaunched from 1989 to 2007 and havelong exceeded their designed lifetimes,
but they are still providing reliabledata and are integrated with the SBIRS
program.

NOTE: See page 500 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

497

1

SPACE FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
PendingSpace Surveillance
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

Space Based Surveillance System(SBSS)REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Size
Score

Health
Score

Size
Score

Health
Score

Size
Score

HealthScore

None

Inventory: 1
Fleet age: 11 Date: 2010
This system uses multiple types of
sensors to track man-made objects anddebris ﬁelds in orbit.

Missile Defense
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

Space Tracking and Surveillance
System Advanced Technology Risk
Reduction (STSS-ATR)

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM
None

Inventory: 1
Fleet age: 12 Date: 2009﻿This research, development, testing,and evaluation (RDT&E) satellite wasoriginally launched by the Missile
Defense Agency to explore diﬀerent
capabilities and technology but wastransferred to the Air Force in 2011.

Space Object Tracking
PLATFORM
Geosynchronous Space Situational
Awareness Program (GSSAP)

Age
Score

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM
None

Inventory: 4
Fleet age: 6 Date: 2014
This classiﬁed surveillance satellite
constellation can accurately track andcharacterize objects in orbit using
electro-optical and emissions sensors.
Their maneuverability allows thesesatellites to conduct rendezvous andproximity operations (RPO) on space
objects, enabling them to conduct
oﬀensive operations against othernations’ assets.

NOTE: See page 500 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

498

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

1

SPACE FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

Weather
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program (DMSP)

Weather System Follow-on Microwave
Satellite (WSF-M)

Inventory: 4
Fleet age: 17 Date: 1999

Timeline: TBD

Size
Score

Health
Score

Size
Score

Health
Score

TBD

TBD

Since 1962, defense weather satellites
in the DMSP have been collecting
weather data and providing forecasts
for U.S. military operations. The current
four satellites were launched between
1999 and 2009 with only a ﬁve-year life
expectancy, but they have continued toprovide accurate meteorological datawell beyond that timeframe and are stillin use today.

Communications
Age
Score

PLATFORM

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM
Advanced Extremely High Frequency
System (AEHF)

MilstarInventory: 5
Fleet age: 22.5 Date: 1994

Timeline: 2010–2021

﻿

Milstar is a satellite communications
system designed in the 1980s to provide
the National Command
Authorities with global communications
that were assured and survivable andcarried low probability of interception
or detection. Designed to overcome
nuclear eﬀects and enemy jamming, it
was considered the most robust andreliable DOD SATCOM system at thetime of ﬁelding.

PROCUREMENTSPENDING ($ millions)$8$0Advanced Extremely High Frequency
System (AEHF)
Inventory: 6
Fleet age: 6 Date: 2010
The AEHF system is a network of six
satellites that provides DOD withsecure, jam-resistant communications
and command and control for military
ground, sea, and air assets locatedanywhere in the world.

NOTE: See page 500 for details on fleet ages, dates, timelines, and procurement spending.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

499

1

SPACE FORCE SCORES

2

Weakest3 4 5Strongest

Procurement
and Spending

Through FY 2021
Pending

Communications (Cont.)
PLATFORM

Age
Score

Capability
Score

REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

Defense Satellite Communications
System (DSCS)

Advanced Extremely High Frequency
System (AEHF)

Inventory: 7
Fleet age: 28.5 Date: 1982

Timeline: 2010–2021

This system of seven satellites
provides nuclear-hardened, global
communications with anti-jamming
capabilities to the Defense Department,
State Department, and National
Command Authorities.

PROCUREMENT

Size
Score

Health
Score

TBD

TBD

SPENDING ($ millions)$8$0

Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS)
Inventory: 10
Fleet age: 8 Date: 2007

﻿

WGS, formerly known as the Wideband
Gapﬁller Satellite, is a joint-service
program funded by the U.S. Air Forceand U.S. Army along with international
partners Australia and Canada. It uses
direct broadcast satellite technology
to provide command and control for
U.S. and allied forces. Satellites have alife span of as many as 14 years.

NOTES: See Methodology for descriptions of scores. Fleet age is the average between the last year of procurement and the first yearof initial operational capability. The date is when the platform achieved initial operational capability. The timeline is from the start ofthe platform’s program to its budgetary conclusion. Spending does not include advanced procurement or research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E).

500

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

U.S. Space Force Modernization Table Citations
GENERAL SOURCES• U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force, Justification Book
Volume 1 of 1: Procurement, Space Force, May 2021, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT_/
FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203022%20-%20SF%20Proc.pdf?ver=NEFQ6zdjfeGcJFeAdv_97g%3d%3d (accessed August 20,2021).
PROGRAM SOURCES
GPS• GPS.gov, “Space Segment: Current and Future Satellite Generations,” last modified July 12, 20021, https://www.gps.gov/systems/
gps/space/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Fact Sheet, “GPS III,” U.S. Air Force, Los Angeles Air Force Base, current as of April 2018, https://www.losangeles.af.mil/About-Us/
Fact-Sheets/Article/343728/gps-iii/ (accessed August 20, 2021). Fact Sheet, “Global Positioning System,” United States Space
Force, current as of October 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/2197765/global-positioning-system/(accessed August 20, 2021).
SBIRS• Gunter’s Space Page, “Trumpet 4, 5 / SBIRS HEO-1, 2,” last update November 4, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/
trumpet-fo.htm (accessed August 20, 2021).
• GlobalSecurity.org, “SBIRS HEO–High Earth Orbit,” last modified August 26, 2018, https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/
sbirs-heo.htm (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “Trumpet 6, 7 / SBIRS HEO-3, 4,” last update April 29, 2021, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/trumpetfo-2.htm (accessed August 20, 2021).
• William Harwood, “Space Force Launches Billion-Dollar Satellite to Warn of Missile Launches,” CBS News, May 18, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/space-force-launches-missile-early-warning-satellite/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Sandra Erwin, “The End of SBIRS: Air Force Says It’s Time to Move on,” SpaceNews, February 19, 2018, https://spacenews.com/
the-end-of-sbirs-air-force-says-its-time-to-move-on/ (accessed August 20, 2021).

﻿
DSP• Gunter’s Space Page, “DSP 1,2,3,4 (Phase 1),” last update March 19, 2020,• https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/dsp-1.htm (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “DSP 5, 6, 7 (Phase 2),” last update March 19, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/dsp-2.htm(accessed August 20, 2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “DSP 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 (Phase 3),” last update March 19, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/
doc_sdat/dsp-3.htm (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Table, “Spacecraft in Service over Time,” in “Air Force & Space Force Almanac,” Air Force Magazine, Vol. 103, No. 6 (June 2020), p.
67, https://www.airforcemag.com/app/uploads/2020/06/June2020_Fullissue5.pdf (accessed August 20, 2021).
SBSS• Fact Sheet, “Space Based Space Surveillance,” U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), current as of July 2019, https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/249017/space-based-space-surveillance-sbss/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “MSX,” last update December 11, 2017, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/msx.htm (accessed August 20,2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “SBSS-1,” last update December 11, 2017, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/sbss-1.htm (accessed August20, 2021).
STSS-ATR• Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, “Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS),” Missile
Threat, last updated July 19, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/stss/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Gunter’s Space Page, “STSS-ATRR,” last update July 21, 2019, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/stss-atrr.htm (accessed August20, 2021).
• News release, “Missile Defense Agency Space Tracking and Surveillance System Advanced Technology Risk Reduction Satellite
Transfers to Air Force Space Command,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, February 26, 2011, https://www.mda.
mil/news/11news0004.html (accessed August 20, 2021).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military

501

GSSAP• Gunter’s Space Page, “GSSAP 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (Hornet 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6),” last update November 4, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/
doc_sdat/gssap-1.htm (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Spaceflight101, “GSSAP Satellite Overview,” https://spaceflight101.com/spacecraft/gssap/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
• Fact Sheet, “Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program,” U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), current
as of September 2019, https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/730802/geosynchronous-space-situationalawareness-program-gssap/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
DMSP• Fact Sheet, “Defense Meteorological Satellite Program,” U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), current as of July
2019, https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/249019/defense-meteorological-satellite-program/ (accessed August20, 2021).
• William McCormick, “DOD Plans to Replace DMSP Weather Satellites Within Five Years; Gen. David Thompson Quoted,”
ExecutiveGov, May 24, 2021, https://www.executivegov.com/2021/05/dod-plans-to-replace-dmsp-weather-satellites-within-fiveyears-gen-david-thompson-quoted/ (accessed August 20, 2021).
WSF-M• Gunter’s Space Page, “WSF-M 1, 2,” last update May 25, 2021, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/wsf-m.htm (accessed August20, 2021).
• Debra Werner, “Are Small Satellites the Solution for Space Weather Monitoring?” SpaceNews, March 6, 2019, https://spacenews.
com/are-small-satellites-the-solution-for-space-weather-monitoring/ (accessed August 20, 2021).

﻿

Milstar• U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), “Milstar Satellite Communications System,” current as of July 2019, https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/1012622/milstar-satellite-communications-system/ (accessed August 20,2021).
AEHF• Airman 1st Class Jonathan Whitely, “AEHF-6 Satellite Completes Protected Satellite Constellation,” United States Space Force,
March 27, 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2129221/aehf-6-satellite-completes-protected-satellite-constellation/(accessed August 20, 2021).
• U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), “Advanced Extremely High Frequency System,” current as of July 2019,https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/249024/advanced-extremely-high-frequency-system/ (accessed
August 20, 2021).
DSCS• Fact Sheet, “Defense Satellite Communications System,” U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), current as ofJuly 2019, https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/1012656/defense-satellite-communications-system/(accessed August 20, 2021).
WGS• Gunter’s Space Page, “WGS 1, 2, 3 (WGS Block 1),” last update November 4, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/wgs-1.htm(accessed August 20, 2021).

502

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes
1.

S. 1790, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Public Law 116-92, 116th Cong., December 20, 2019, Title IX,
Subtitle D, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1790 (accessed June 13, 2021).

2.

United States Space Force, “About the United States Space Force: USSF Mission,” https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/AboutSpace-Force (accessed June 13, 2021).

3.

Roger Cliff, The Military Potential of China’s Commercial Technology, RAND Corporation, Project Air Force, 2001, p. 27, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1292.html (accessed June 13, 2021).

4.

For a more in-depth understanding of this domain and how much the United States depends on it, see Dean Cheng, “Space
201: Thinking About the Space Domain,” in 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage
Foundation, 2018), pp. 73–82, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/2018_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength-2.pdf.

5.

R. Cargill Hall and Jacob Neufeld, Preface, in The U.S. Air Force in Space: 1945 to the Twenty-first Century, ed. R. Cargill Hall andJacob Neufeld, Proceedings, Air Force Historical Foundation Symposium, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, September 21–22,
1995, p. iii, https://media.defense.gov/2010/Oct/01/2001329745/-1/-1/0/AFD-101001-060.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).

6.

For examples of retrospectives of this pivotal moment in war, see Larry Greenemeier, “GPS and the World’s First ‘Space War,’”Scientific American, February 8, 2016, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gps-and-the-world-s-first-space-war/(accessed June 13, 2021), and Sharon Watkins Lang, “SMDC History: 25 Years Since First ‘Space War,’” U.S. Army, January 20, 2016,
https://www.army.mil/article/161173/smdc_history_25_years_since_first_space_war (accessed June 13, 2021).

7.

Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Report of the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, 2001, pp. 52 and 80–81, https://aerospace.csis.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/RumsfeldCommission.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).

8.

John Venable, “Done Right, Trump’s Space Force Would Put the U.S. on Top,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 21, 2018,https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/done-right-trumps-space-force-would-put-the-us-top.

9.

Donald J. Trump, Space Policy Directive–4, “Establishment of the United States Space Force,” February 19, 2019, Federal Register,Vol. 84, No. 37 (February 25, 2019), pp. 6049–6052, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-02-25/pdf/2019-03345.pdf(accessed June 13, 2021).

11. This number is an estimate based on the fact that “approximately 12,100 active duty, 1,600 guard and reserve, and 11,900
civilian personnel” are part of 14th Air Force. Todd Harrison, “How Much Will the Space Force Cost?” Center for Strategic andInternational Studies Brief, November 2018, p. 2, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181119_
Harrison_SpaceForce_layout_FINAL.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
12. Fact Sheet, “Fourteenth Air Force,” U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), current as of October 2019, https://www.
afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/1604750/fourteenth-air-force/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
13. Satnews, “Space & Missile Systems Center to Be Re-Designated as the USAF’s New Space Systems Command,” April 11, 2021,
https://news.satnews.com/2021/04/11/space-missile-systems-center-to-be-re-designated-as-the-usafs-new-space-systemscommand/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
14. Table 3, “U.S. Space Force Budget Summary,” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force FY 2022 Budget
Overview, generated May 28, 2021, p. 14, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/SUPPORT_/FY22%20
Budget%20Overview%20Book.pdf?ver=Reck2JzBUzoZmGByl9Zm-Q%3d%3d (accessed June 15, 2021).
15. The Commercial Satellite Communications Office manages the procurement of commercial SATCOM for DOD. The Space Vehicles
Directorate develops and transitions space technologies to provide space-based ISR, space domain awareness, communications,
global position, navigation and timing, and defensive space control (space defense) capabilities. U.S. Air Force, Air Force
Research Laboratory, “Technology Directorates: Space Vehicles (RV),” https:// www.afrl.af.mil/RV/ (accessed June 14, 2021).

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﻿

10. U.S. Department of Defense, United States Space Command, “Mission,” https://www.spacecom.mil/Mission/#:~:text=United%20
States%20Space%20Command%20(USSPACECOM,interests%20with%20allies%20and%20partners (accessed June 17, 2021). Thisis the second time USSPACECOM has been on the roster of combatant commands within the Unified Command Plan (UCP). It
was established in 1986 as a functional combatant command designed to unify command and control of the space forces within
the Army, Navy, and Air Force and support the development of a shield against Soviet ballistic missiles that was known as theStrategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In 2002, the UCP was amended to place the USSPACECOM mission for space operations, aswell as warning and assessment of space attack, under U.S. Strategic Command as a subordinate unified command. Edward J.
Drea, Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb, History of the Unified Command
Plan 1946–2012, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, 2013, pp. 55 and 86, https://www.jcs.mil/
Portals/36/Documents/History/Institutional/Command_Plan.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).

16. Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Space Force Creates Acquisition Command to Build Culture of Innovation,” SpaceNews, July 18, 2020, https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-force-creates-acquisition-command-to-build-culture-of-innovation/ (accessed June 14, 2021).
17. Capt. Christopher Merian, “U.S. Space Force Stands up STAR Delta Provisional,” United States Space Force, Space Force News,
July 24, 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2287104/us-space-force-stands-up-star-delta-provisional/ (accessed
June 22, 2021).
18. Transcript, “Space Force Briefing,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 20, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/
Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2045979/space-force-briefing/ (accessed June 14, 2021). The briefing was provided by Barbara
Barrett, Secretary of the U.S. Air Force; General John “Jay” Raymond, Commander, U.S. Space Command, and Commander, Air
Force Space Command, and Commander, Joint Force Space Component; Stephen Kitay, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Space Policy.
19. Lynn Kirby, “2.4k Airmen to Transfer into Space Force Beginning Sept. 1,” United States Space Force, Space Force News,
September 1, 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2332258/24k-airmen-to-transfer-into-space-force-beginningsept-1/ (accessed June 14, 2021).
20. Table 3, “U.S. Space Force Budget Summary,” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force FY 2021
Budget Overview, p. 8, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY21/SUPPORT_/FY21%20Budget%20Overview_1.
pdf?ver=2020-02-10-152806-743 (accessed June 14, 2021).
21. Theodore Bunker, “Space Force Reports Thousands of Applications Received from Other Military Branches,” Newsmax, April 20,
2021, https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/spaceforce-military-transfer-applications/2021/04/20/id/1018377/ (accessed June 14,2021).
22. United States Space Force, “Transfer FAQs,” https://www.spaceforce.mil/Transfer/ (accessed June 14, 2021).
23. Venable, “Done Right, Trump’s Space Force Would Put the U.S. on Top.”
24. Harrison, “How Much Will the Space Force Cost?”
25. Table 3, “U.S. Space Force Budget Summary,” in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force FY 2022 Budget
Overview, p. 14.

﻿

26. Air Force News Service, “AF Plans to Accelerate Defendable Space with Next-Gen OPIR,” U.S. Air Force, May 4, 2018, https://www.
af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1512949/af-plans-to-accelerate-defendable-space-with-next-gen-opir/ (accessed June 14, 2021).
27. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center, “GPS Constellation Status for 06/014/2021,” last
updated June 14, 2021, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?Do=constellationStatus (accessed June 14, 2021).
28. Nathan Strout, “Space Force Launches Fifth GPS III Satellite for More Secure Positioning,” C4ISRNET, June 18, 2021, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2021/06/18/space-force-launches-fifth-gps-iii-satellite/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%206.21&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief (accessed June 23, 2021).
29. Ben Evans, “Next GPS Block III Satellite Arrives in Florida, Targets Mid-June Launch,” AmericaSpace, April 22, 2021, https://www.
americaspace.com/2021/04/22/next-gps-block-iii-satellite-arrives-in-florida-targets-mid-june-launch/ (accessed June 14, 2021),
and RocketLaunch.Live, “Launch Schedule,” https://www.rocketlaunch.live (accessed June 14, 2021).
30. GPS.gov, “New Civil Signals: Fourth Civil Signal: L1C,” last modified August 10, 2020, https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/
modernization/civilsignals/#L1C (accessed June 23, 2021).
31. Fact Sheet, “Defense Meteorological Satellite Program,” U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), current as of July
2019, https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/249019/defense-meteorological-satellite-program/ (accessed June
14, 2021).
32. William McCormick, “DOD Plans to Replace DMSP Weather Satellites Within Five Years; Gen. David Thompson Quoted,”
ExecutiveGov, May 24, 2021, https://www.executivegov.com/2021/05/dod-plans-to-replace-dmsp-weather-satellites-within-fiveyears-gen-david-thompson-quoted/ (accessed June 14, 2021).
33. Fact Sheet, “Defense Meteorological Satellite Program.”
34. McCormick, “DOD Plans to Replace DMSP Weather Satellites Within Five Years; Gen. David Thompson Quoted.”
35. Airman 1st Class Jonathan Whitely, “AEHF-6 Satellite Completes Protected Satellite Constellation,” United States Space Force,Space Force News, March 27, 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2129221/aehf-6-satellite-completes-protectedsatellite-constellation/ (accessed June 14, 2021).
36. Fact Sheet, “Advanced Extremely High Frequency System,” U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), current as ofJuly 2019, https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/249024/advanced-extremely-high-frequency-system/(accessed June 14, 2021).

504

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength37. Gunter’s Space Page, “WGS 1, 2, 3 (WGS Block 1),” last update November 4, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/wgs-1.htm(accessed June 14, 2021).
38. The 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength stated erroneously that there were seven SBIRS satellites in orbit. This was an error incomputation. There actually were eight in orbit, and a ninth satellite joined the constellation (GEO) in May 2021.
39. SIBRS GEO5 was placed in orbit on May 18, 2021. William Harwood, “Space Force Launches Billion-Dollar Satellite to Warn ofMissile Launches,” CBS News, May 18, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/space-force-launches-missile-early-warningsatellite/ (accessed June 14, 2021), and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, “Space Tracking
and Surveillance System (STSS),” Missile Threat, last updated June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/stss/ (accessed
June 14, 2021).
40. Sandra Erwin, “The End of SBIRS: Air Force Says It’s Time to Move on,” SpaceNews, February 19, 2018, https://spacenews.com/
the-end-of-sbirs-air-force-says-its-time-to-move-on/ (accessed June 14, 2021).
41. Gunter’s Space Page, “DSP 1,2,3,4 (Phase 1),” last update March 19, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/dsp-1.htm(accessed June 14, 2021).
42. Gunter’s Space Page, “DSP 5, 6, 7 (Phase 2),” last update March 19, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/dsp-2.htm(accessed June 14, 2021).
43. Gunter’s Space Page, “DSP 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 (Phase 3),” last update March 19, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/
doc_sdat/dsp-3.htm (accessed June 14, 2021).
44. Table, “Spacecraft in Service over Time (As of Sept. 30, 2019),” in “Air Force & Space Force Almanac 2020,” Air Force Magazine,
Vol. 103, No. 6 (June 2020), p. 67, https://www.airforcemag.com/app/uploads/2020/06/June2020_Fullissue5.pdf (accessed June23, 2021).
45. Gunter’s Space Page, “DSP 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 (Phase 3).”46. Chalie L. Galliand, “Study of the Small: Potential for Operational Military Use of CubeSats,” 24th Annual AIAA/USU [American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics/Utah State University] Conference on Small Satellites, August 10, 2010, p. 8, https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1199&context=smallsat (accessed June 17, 2021).

48. Australian Space Academy, “An Overview of Space Situational Awareness,” https://www.spaceacademy.net.au/intell/ssa.htm(accessed June 17, 2021). Speed converted from kilometers per second to miles per hour (mph).
49. Gunter’s Space Page, “GSSAP 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (Hornet 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6),” last update November 4, 2020, https://space.skyrocket.de/
doc_sdat/gssap-1.htm (accessed June 14, 2021).
50. Fact Sheet, “Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program,” U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived),current as of September 2019, https:// www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/730802/geosynchronous-spacesituational-awareness-program-gssap/ (accessed June 14, 2021).
51. Gunter’s Space Page, “GSSAP 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (Hornet 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6),” and Craig Covault, “AFSPC-6 Launch Helps Form Extraordinary
New US Space Defense Foundation,” AmericaSpace, August 19, 2016, https://www.americaspace.com/2016/08/19/afspc-6launch-helps-form-extraordinary-new-u-s-space-defense-foundation/ (accessed June 17, 2021).
52. Gunter’s Space Page, “SBSS 1,” last update December 11, 2017, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/sbss-1.htm (accessed June 14,2021), and Fact Sheet, “Space Based Space Surveillance,” U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command (Archived), current as of July
2019, https://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/249017/space-based-space-surveillance-sbss/ (accessed June 14,2021).
53. Gunter’s Space Page, “STSS-ATRR,” last update July 21, 2019, https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/stss-atrr.htm (accessed June 14,2021), and news release, “Missile Defense Agency Space Tracking and Surveillance System Advanced Technology Risk Reduction
Satellite Transfers to Air Force Space Command,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, February 26, 2011, https://www.mda.mil/news/11news0004.html (accessed June 14, 2021).
54. Dwayne A. Day, “Radar Love: The Tortured History of American Space Radar Programs,” The Space Review, January 22, 2007,https://thespacereview.com/article/790/1 (accessed June 14, 2021).
55. Air Force News Service, “Space Force Awards National Security Space Launch Phase 2 Launch Service Contracts to United Launch
Alliance, LLC (ULA) and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX),” United States Space Force, Space Force News,
August 7, 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2305278/space-force-awards-national-security-space-launch-phase-2launch-service-contra/ (accessed June 14, 2021).

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47. Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Space Force Is Ready to Turn on Its All-Seeing ‘Space Fence,’” Popular Science, February 7, 2020, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a30798053/us-space-force-space-fence/ (accessed June 17, 2021).

56. SpaceX, Northrup Grumman, and the United Launch Alliance have been launching systems into space throughout the past
decade. In July 2020, Rocket Lab Ltd., Astra Space, and Firefly Aerospace were scheduled to launch their first systems into
space. The compiling of corporate and national space launch numbers was accomplished by reviewing the global space launchschedules by year at “Space Launch Schedule,” https://www.spacelaunchschedule.com (accessed June 21, 2021).
57. Space Launch Schedule, “2021 Launch Schedule,” https://Spacelaunchschedule.com/2021-launch-schedule/ (accessed June 21,2020).
58. John Venable, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Space Force,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 245, April
27, 2021, p. 44, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/rebuilding-americas-military-the-united-states-space-force, and Kris
Osborn, “Army Seeks Thousands of High-Speed, Low Earth Orbit Satellites for Ground Attack,” Warrior Maven, September 29,
2020, https://defensemaven.io/warriormaven/land/army-seeks-thousands-of-high-speed-low-earth-orbit-satellites-for-groundattack-N0ghFfguE0uakOTOcufTJQ (accessed June 13, 2021).
59. Osborn, “Army Seeks Thousands of High-Speed, Low Earth Orbit Satellites for Ground Attack.”
60. Amy Thompson, “SpaceX Launches 60 Starlink Satellites in Record 10th Liftoff (and Landing) of Reused Rocket, Space.com, May
9, 2021, https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-27-10th-falcon-9-rocket-launch-landing-success (accessed June 14, 2021).
61. Matthew A. Anderson, Christopher M. Duron, Timothy A. Farmer, Matthew A. Hitt, Melanie G. Klinner, Gerald E. Lanz, John R.
London III, Mark E. Ray, Molly E. Riebling, Sierra L. Smith, Davis J. Weeks, and Ryan T. Wolff, “Army Decade in Space,” 34th Annual
AIAA/USU [American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics/Utah State University] Conference on Small Satellites, August 16,
2020, p. 12, https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4712&context=smallsat (accessed June 17, 2021).
62. Theresa Hitchens, “Exclusive: J6 Says JADC2 Is a Strategy; Service Posture Reviews Coming,” Breaking Defense, January 4, 2021,
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/01/exclusive-j6-says-jadc2-is-a-strategy-service-posture-reviews-coming/ (accessed June 14,2021).
63. Brian Wang, “SpaceX Starlink Can Provide Super GPS with a Software Modification,” Nextbigfuture Blog, September 28, 2020,
https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2020/09/spacex-starlink-can-be-tweaked-to-provide-super-gps.html (accessed June 14, 2021).

﻿

64. The Air Force’s AFWERX program invests in U.S. and global technology companies and organizations and uses military problems
to accelerate commercial technologies. As an early-stage investor, it can then use private capital to develop and field commercial
systems to solve military problems. AFWERX, “What Is AFWERX?” https://www.afwerx.af.mil/faq.html (accessed June 14, 2021).
65. Brian Weeden, “The Numbers Game: What’s in Earth Orbit and How Do We Know?” The Space Review, July 13, 2009, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/1417/1 (accessed June 17, 2021).
66. Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, Thomas G. Roberts, Tyler Way, and Makena Young, Space Threat Assessment 2020, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Aerospace Security Project, March 2020, p. 6, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/
s3fs-public/publication/200330_SpaceThreatAssessment20_WEB_FINAL1.pdf (accessed June 14, 2021).
67. Frank Wolfe, “Space Force Developing Non-Kinetic Counterspace Systems,” Defense Daily, November 9, 2020, https://www.
defensedaily.com/space-force-developing-non-kinetic-counterspace-systems/space/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
68. Lawrence Sellin, “The US Is Unprepared for Space Cyberwarfare,” Military Times, September 4, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.
com/opinion/commentary/2019/09/04/the-us-is-unprepared-for-space-cyberwarfare/ (accessed June 23, 2021).
69. Ibid. and Beyza Unal, “Cybersecurity of NATO’s Space-Based Strategic Assets,” Chatham House: The Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs Research Paper, July 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-27-SpaceCybersecurity-2.pdf (accessed June 23, 2021).
70. These measures also include “communication, transmission, and emissions security; camouflage, concealment, and deception;and system hardening” across the entire portfolio of space assets. U.S. Space Force, Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces,
Space Capstone Publication, June 2020, p. 36, https://www.spaceforce.mil/Portals/1/Space%20Capstone%20Publication_10%20
Aug%202020.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
71. Adam Mann, “Starlink: SpaceX’s Satellite Internet Project,” Space.com, updated May 28, 2021, https://www.space.com/spacexstarlink-satellites.html (accessed June 14, 2021).
72. Joey Roulette, “Musk’s Satellite Project Testing Encrypted Internet with Military Planes,” Reuters, October 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-spacex-starlink-airforce/musks-satellite-project-testing-encrypted-internet-with-military-planesidUSKBN1X12KM (accessed June 13, 2021).
73. Osborn, “Army Seeks Thousands of High-Speed, Low Earth Orbit Satellites for Ground Attack.”
74. Mike Gruss, “DoD Will Spend $2 Billion on Space Control This Year,” SpaceNews, March 23, 2016, https://spacenews.com/dod-willspend-2-billion-on-space-control-this-year/ (accessed June 14, 2021).

506

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength75. Wolfe, “Space Force Developing Non-Kinetic Counterspace Systems.”
76. Debra Werner, “Indian Anti-Satellite Test Proves Early Test for Space Fence,” SpaceNews, April 11, 2019, https://spacenews.com/
indian-anti-satellite-test-proves-early-test-for-space-fence/ (accessed June 14, 2021).

﻿

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﻿

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Capability
Patty-Jane GellerUl

An aging workforce.

The United States must fully recapitalize
all three legs (land, air, and sea) of the nuclear
triad including the systems for nuclear command and control while also conducting timely
and cost-efficient warhead life-­extension programs—all while operating under the current
nuclear testing moratorium. Despite thesechallenges, the United States must ensurethat its nuclear capabilities are sufficient toaddress the rising nuclear threat for the decades to come.
For the first time in history, the UnitedStates must deter two nuclear peers—Russia
An Increasingly Threatening
and China—while contending with a larger
Global Environment
number of nuclear weapons states. Russia is
The nuclear threat environment has engaged in an aggressive nuclear buildup, havchanged drastically from a stability paradigm ing added several new nuclear systems to its
based on mutually assured destruction involv- arsenal since 2010. The United States is only
ing the United States and the Soviet Union beginning to modernize its existing nuclear
during the Cold War to a multipolar nuclear systems, but Russia’s modernization effort
threat environment that presents complex is about 86 percent complete.3 Russia is also
challenges. As the threat increases, several developing “novel technologies,” such as anegative trends, if not addressed, could under- nuclear-­powered cruise missile and nuclemine the overall effectiveness of U.S. nuclear ar-capable unmanned underwater vehicle, anddeterrence. Today, U.S. nuclear forces face arming delivery platforms with nuclear-tipped
three great challenges:
hypersonic glide vehicles.4
In addition, Russia maintains a stockpile ofAging nuclear warheads, their associatedat least 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons,delivery systems, and systems for theirunconstrained by any arms control agreement.5
command and control;
Lieutenant General Robert Ashley, Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, has said thatAn aging and crumbling nuclear weapons
Russia is expected to increase this category
infrastructure; andof nuclear weapons—a category in which itll

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military509

﻿.S. nuclear weapons have played a critical role in preventing conflict between
major powers since the end of World War II.
Given their ability to deter large-scale attacks
that threaten the U.S. homeland, allies, andforward-deployed troops and to assure allies
and partners, nuclear deterrence has remained
the number one U.S. national security mission.1
Operationally, all U.S. military operations relyon the backstop of U.S. nuclear deterrence.2
It is therefore critical that the United States
maintain a modern and flexible nuclear arsenalthat can deter a diverse range of threats from adiverse set of potential adversaries.

﻿“potentially outnumber[s]” the United Statesby 10 to 1.6 This disparity is of special concern
because Russia’s recent nuclear doctrine indicates a lower threshold for use of these tactical
nuclear weapons. According to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Moscow “mistakenly
assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or
actual first use of nuclear weapons would serveto ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms favorable
to Russia.”7
China is engaging in what Admiral Charles
A. Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), has described as a “breathtaking” expansion of its nuclear capabilities
as it attempts to project power into the South
China Sea and throughout the world. China iswell on its way to more than doubling its nuclear
stockpile by the end of the decade. It is deploying advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs), completing its nuclear triad with theaddition of a strategic nuclear-capable bomber,and deploying numerous theater-range ballistic
missiles in the Indo-Pacific that can strike U.S.
bases and allied territory with precision. Satellite imagery has also detected three ICBM siloconstruction sites in China that could hold atleast 100 ICBM silos each.8 STRATCOM has described this expansion as a “strategic breakout”
and has stated that China’s nuclear capabilities
will eventually exceed those of Russia.9 Current
U.S. nuclear posture is not designed to deter two
peer nuclear threats.
Evidence also suggests that China is shifting
a portion of its nuclear forces to Launch-onWarning posture as it improves its early warning systems.10 Combined with a refusal to discuss its forces or intent with the United States,
this shift in posture increases the likelihood of
mistakes and miscalculations.11
North Korea is also advancing its nuclear
weapons and missile capabilities. It continues
to produce fissile material to build new nuclear weapons, recently paraded a new “monster”
ICBM supposedly able to carry multiple warheads, and has recently tested ground-based
and sea-based ballistic missiles.12
Iran, in addition to being the world’s principal state sponsor of terrorism, continues to510

enrich uranium at dangerous levels and may beable to develop a nuclear weapon within just a
few months. According to a recent report:
A worst-case breakout estimate, which isdefined as the time to produce enough
WGU for one nuclear weapon, is as short
as 2.3 months. Iran could produce a second significant quantity of WGU early inthe fifth month after breakout commences,
and a third quantity could be produced
early in the seventh month. For comparison, if no explosion had occurred at the
FEP [Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant], theminimum breakout timeline would havebeen 1.75 months, reflecting a longer
breakout by one month. However, it should
be noted that the post-explosion breakout
estimate has additional uncertainties thatsuggest that it may be lengthier.13

As current U.S. nuclear capabilities continue to age, the advancing nuclear threat increases the importance of nuclear weapons to U.S.
national security. Noting this rapid deterioration of the threat environment since 2010, the2018 NPR outlined four enduring roles for U.S.
nuclear capabilities:
l

l

l

l

Deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack;Assurance of allies and partners;
Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails; andCapacity to hedge against an uncertain future.14

To achieve these objectives, the U.S. nuclear
portfolio must balance the appropriate levelsof capacity, capability, variety, flexibility, andreadiness. Deterrence in a multipolar world ismore complicated than in a bipolar world, as
it requires a U.S. nuclear force capable of deterring multiple separate adversaries at thesame time. What matters most in deterrence is2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

CHART 12

A Smaller and Less Diverse Nuclear Arsenal
TYPES OF WARHEADS IN THE
U.S. NUCLEAR STOCKPILE
50

TOTAL WARHEADS IN THE
U.S. NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

1963: 51

25,00040
30

1967: 31,255

30,0001988: 23,205

20,0001989: 28

15,00020

2021: 1210

10,0005,000

02017: 3,822

01950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 20201950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 ’17

A heritage.org

not necessarily what the United States thinks
will be effective. What matters most are thepsychological perceptions—among both allies and adversaries—of America’s willingness
to use nuclear forces to defend its interests. If
an adversary believes that he can fight a limited nuclear war, for instance, U.S. leaders

must convince that adversary otherwise. In
addition, military roles and requirements fornuclear weapons will differ from adversary
to adversary based on each country’s values,
strategy, and goals.
The United States also extends its nuclear
umbrella to more than 30 allies and partners

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﻿

NOTE: The 2017 figure of 3,822 warheads reflects the last year the U.S. government declassified stockpile quantities. These quantities
include deployed warheads and warheads in reserve, but the U.S. is limited by New START to only 1,550 deployed warheads.
SOURCES:• Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Warheads, 1945–2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 4(2009), pp. 72–81, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.2968/065004008 (accessed August 19, 2021).
• U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Declassification, Restricted Data Declassification Decisions, 1946 to the Present, January 1, 1999,
https://fas.org/sgp/library/rdd-5.html (accessed August 19, 2021).
• U.S. Department of Defense, “Stockpile Numbers: End of Fiscal Years 1962–2017,” http://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/
frddwg/2017_Tables_UNCLASS.pdf (accessed August 19, 2021).
• Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 76, No. 1 ( 2020), pp.
42–60, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701286 (accessed August 19, 2021).
• Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, current update April 2020,
https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ (accessed August 19, 2020).
• Chapter 4, “Nuclear Weapons,” in U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, pp. 43–69, https://fas.org/man/eprint/nmhb2020.pdf (accessed August 19, 2021).
• U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Fiscal Year 2021 Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan—Biennial Plan Summary, December 2020, pp. 1–3, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2020/12/f82/FY2021_SSMP.pdf(accessed August 19, 2021).

﻿that rely on the U.S. to defend them from existential threats. This additional responsibility
imposes requirements for U.S. nuclear force
posture beyond defense of the U.S. homeland.
U.S. nuclear forces underpin the broad nonproliferation regime by assuring allies—including
NATO, Japan, South Korea, and Australia—that
they can forgo their own development of nuclear
capabilities. Erosion of the credibility of American nuclear forces could lead a country like Japan or South Korea to pursue an independent
nuclear option, and this could have a profoundly
negative impact on stability across the region.
In addition to deterrence and assurance,
the United States historically has committed
to achieving its political and military objectives if nuclear deterrence fails. As a result, U.S.
forces must be postured to engage their targets
successfully if such a failure makes it necessary
to use nuclear weapons.
Finally, U.S. nuclear capabilities must havethe capacity to hedge against an uncertain future. Nuclear weapon capabilities take years or
decades to develop, as does the infrastructure
supporting them—an infrastructure that theUnited States has neglected for decades until
quite recently. Decisions regarding nuclear
forces made today will impact the United States
decades into the future. Since the United Statescannot predict what the level of the threat will
be decades in the future, it is critical that the U.S.
maintain a nuclear enterprise that can respondto changes in the global security environment.
A robust, well-resourced, focused, and reliable nuclear enterprise that is able to respondto unforeseen contingencies is itself an important piece of deterrence and will enable anuclear force that is resilient and adaptable.
The U.S. nuclear enterprise today, however, islargely static, leaving the United States at what
could well be a technological disadvantage.
Such a posture puts the security of the UnitedStates, the security of its allies, and the entire
free world at risk.

Challenges to Maintaining Nuclear Forces
To provide assurance against failures in
the U.S. stockpile or changes in a geopolitical

512

situation, the United States must maintain theability to adjust its nuclear force posture. To
this end, the United States maintains an inactive stockpile that includes near-term hedge
warheads that “can serve as active ready warheads within prescribed activation timelines”
and reserve warheads that can provide “a longterm response to risk mitigation for technicalfailures in the stockpile.”15
The United States preserves upload capability on its strategic delivery vehicles, whichmeans that the nation could increase thenumber of nuclear warheads on each typeof its delivery vehicles. For example, the U.S.
Minuteman III ICBM can carry up to three
Mk12A/W78 nuclear warheads, although it iscurrently deployed with only one.16 Certain
modernization decisions (e.g., 12 versus 14
Columbia-­class ballistic missile submarines
with 16 rather than 24 missile tubes per submarine) will somewhat limit upload capacity
on the strategic submarine force. U.S. heavy
bombers will continue to retain a robust upload capability that can be used if a geopolitical or technical emergency requires more
deployed nuclear warheads.
The United States has not designed or built
a nuclear warhead since the end of the Cold
War. Instead, the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) uses life-extension
programs (LEPs) to extend the service lives ofexisting weapons in the stockpile, some dating back to the 1960s. Not all of the existing
inactive stockpile, however, will go througha life-extension program. Consequently, ourability to respond to contingencies by uploading weapons kept in an inactive status will inevitably decline with the passage of time.
In addition, while LEPs replace or upgrade most components in a nuclear warhead,
all warheads will eventually need to be replaced because their nuclear components—­
specifically, plutonium pits that comprise thecores of warheads—are also subject to aging.17
It is therefore unwise for the United States torely solely on LEPs to sustain needed levels of
reliability. Moreover, the United States is the
only nuclear state that lacks the capability to

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthdiminished ability to conduct key activities at
the nuclear laboratories. According to former
Acting Administrator Dr. Charles Verdon:
The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is currently safe, secure, and militarily effective.
However, the legacy stockpile systems
are aging, and NNSA’s production infrastructure has atrophied considerably.
America must invest in the weapons andinfrastructure modernization programs toprovide the capabilities needed to ensure
the deterrent’s viability into the future.
Future American political leaders will
not have the weapons and infrastructure
in place to support the nuclear arsenal
unless we reestablish that capability now.
The need to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile and recapitalize the supporting infrastructure needed to produce
and maintain that stockpile has reached atipping point. Approximately 60 percent of NNSA’s facilities are more than
40 years old and more than 50 percent
are in poor condition. Assessments offacilities throughout the enterprise haveidentified numerous single-point failures.
Production capabilities allowed to lapse
are needed once again and reestablishingthese capabilities is both a priority and achallenge. If not appropriately addressed,
the age and condition of NNSA’s infrastructure will put at risk NNSA’s missions,and the safety of its workforce, the public,
and the environment.21

﻿

produce plutonium pits in quantity. An effort
is underway to restart plutonium pit production, but various challenges have been encountered that could upset U.S. plans to sustain its
nuclear weapons.
Part of the U.S. hedge against uncertainty
in deterrence is the ability to conduct a nuclear test if testing is ever required to ensure
the safety and reliability of U.S. warheads.
Presidential Decision Directive-15 (PDD-15)
requires the United States to maintain theability “to conduct a nuclear test within 2–3
years” of direction by the President.18 However,“the steady degradation” of test readiness after
three decades of no testing calls into question
the U.S.’s ability to meet this goal.19 The lack ofcongressional interest in funding any significant improvements in test readiness further
undermines efforts by the NNSA to comply
with the directive.
The nuclear weapons labs also face demographic challenges. Most scientists and engineers with practical hands-on experiencein nuclear weapons design and testing are
retired. This means that the certification of
weapons that were designed and tested as far
back as the 1960s depends on the scientificjudgment of designers and engineers who
have never been involved in either the testing or the design and development of nuclear
weapons. According to former NNSA Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, more than 40
percent of the NNSA workforce will be eligible for retirement over the next five years,
further adding to the loss of legacy nuclear
weapons knowledge.20
The Stockpile Responsiveness Program(SRP), mandated by Congress and being implemented by NNSA, has been effective in exercising critical nuclear weapons design anddevelopment skills not fully exercised since
the end of the Cold War. It is essential thatthose skills are available when needed to support modern warhead development programsfor U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles(SLBMs) and ICBMs.
The shift in emphasis away from the nuclear
mission after the end of the Cold War led to a

As a result of this neglect, at the same time
the nation faces a great challenge in modernizing its aging nuclear warheads, “NNSA isundertaking a risk-informed, complex, andtime-constrained modernization and recapitalization effort.”22
In recent years, bipartisan congressional
support for the nuclear mission has beenstrong, and nuclear modernization has received additional funding.23 Preservation ofthat bipartisan consensus will be critical as

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these programs mature and begin to introduce
modern nuclear systems to the force.
In its budget requests, the Trump Administration advanced the comprehensive modernization program for nuclear forces thatwas initiated by President Barack Obama. Despite some opposition, Congress funded thetwo previous Presidents’ budget requests forthese programs. Because such modernization
activities require consistent, stable, long-term
funding commitments, this continued bipartisan support has been critical.
The NNSA received $19.7 billion in fiscal
year (FY) 2021, $3 billion more than it received in FY 2020, which included full funding
for major efforts like modernization of plutonium pit production and five warhead modernization programs.24 The FY 2022 budget

would continue these efforts but with a flat
NNSA topline of $19.7 billion.25 Modernization programs to replace the triad—including
the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD);
Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO);
Columbia-­class nuclear submarine; and B-21
Raider bomber—also continue to progressin 2021 with the FY 2022 budget supportingthese programs. The 2018 NPR proposed two
supplements to nuclear capabilities in light of
the worsened security environment with Russia and China: a low-yield warhead for SLBMs
in the near term, which was deployed in 2020,
and a low-yield, nuclear-armed, sea-launchedcruise missile, for which funding was first included in the FY 2022 budget request after
the completion of a preliminary analysis ofalternatives.26

﻿Assessing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
Assessing the state of U.S. nuclear weapons‌capabilities presents at least three serious
difficulties.
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The United States has not taken full advantage of technologically available developments to field modern warheads (often
incorrectly termed “new” warheads) that
could be designed to be safer, more secure,and more effective and could give the United States better options for strengthening
a credible deterrent. Instead, the UnitedStates has largely elected to extend the lifeof aging nuclear warheads based on designs
from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s that werein the stockpile when the Cold War ended.
The lack of detailed publicly available
data about the readiness of nuclear forces,
their capabilities, and the reliability of
their weapons makes analysis difficult.
The U.S. nuclear enterprise has many
components, some of which are also
involved in supporting other military (e.g.,conventional) and extended deterrence

missions. For example, U.S. strategic
bombers perform a significant conventional mission and do not fly airborne
alert with nuclear weapons today, as they
did routinely during the 1960s, nor standat quick-reaction strip alert as they did up
until the early 1990’s.
Additionally, the three key national security laboratories no longer focus solely on
the nuclear weapons mission; they also focus
extensively on nuclear nonproliferation andcounterproliferation, intelligence, biological/
medical research, threat reduction, and countering nuclear terrorism, which includes avariety of nuclear-related detection activities.
Moreover, the Nuclear Command, Control, andCommunications System entails many assets
such as early warning and communications
satellites that serve non-nuclear missions,such as routine military communications anddetecting and tracking conventional missiles.
Thus, it is hard to assess whether any one
piece of the nuclear enterprise is sufficiently
funded, focused, and/or effective with regard
to the nuclear mission.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

of error if all of one type are affected by a technical problem that might cause a weapon typeor its delivery system to be decommissioned.
Loss of diversity in the stockpile also increases
the risk of “common-mode” failure that could
affect multiple systems simultaneously, making the push for commonality with potential
single points of failure in U.S. warheads worrisome. America and its allies must have highconfidence that U.S. nuclear warheads will perform as expected.
As warheads age, uncertainty about theirability to perform their mission as expected
could increase and significantly complicate
military planning. Despite creating impressive amounts of knowledge about nuclear
weapons physics and materials chemistry,
the United States could find itself surprisedby unanticipated long-term effects on aging
components that comprise a nuclear weapon. “The scientific foundation of assessmentsof the nuclear performance of US weapons iseroding as a result of the moratorium on nuclear testing,” argue John Hopkins, nuclear
physicist and a former leader of the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s nuclear weapons
program, and David Sharp, former Laboratory
Reliability of Current U.S. Nuclear
Fellow and a guest scientist at Los Alamos NaStockpile Score: Strong
tional Laboratory.28
U.S. warheads must be safe, secure, effective,
The United States currently has the world’s
and reliable. The Department of Defense de- safest and most secure stockpile, but concerns
fines reliability as “the probability that a weap- about overseas storage sites, potential probon will perform in accordance with its design lems introduced by improper handling, or unintent or military requirements.”27 Since the anticipated effects of aging could compromise
cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, reliabili- the integrity or reliability of U.S. warheads. The
ty has been assessed and maintained through nuclear warheads themselves contain security
the NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program, measures that are designed to make it difficult,which consists of an intensive warhead sur- if not impossible, to detonate a weapon withveillance program; non-nuclear experiments out proper authorization. Some U.S. warheads(i.e., experiments that do not produce a nuclear have modern safety features that provide adyield); sophisticated calculations using high-­ ditional protection against accidental detonaperformance computing; and related annual tion; others do not.
assessments and evaluations.
Grade: Absent nuclear weapons testing, theThe reliability of nuclear warheads and de- national laboratories’ assessment of weapons
livery systems becomes even more important reliability, based on the full range of surveilas the number and diversity of nuclear weap- lance, scientific, and technical activities carons in the stockpile decrease. Fewer types of ried out in NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Pronuclear weapons results in a smaller margin gram, depends on the expert judgment of the

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military515

﻿

The U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise iscomposed of several key elements that include
warheads; delivery systems; and the physicalinfrastructure that designs, manufactures, andmaintains U.S. nuclear weapons. The nuclear
enterprise also includes and must sustain thetalent of people: the nuclear designers, engineers, manufacturing personnel, planners,
maintainers, and operators who help to ensure
a nuclear deterrent that is second to none. The
nuclear weapons enterprise entails additional
elements like nuclear command and control;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
and aerial refueling, all of which also play a major role in conventional operations.
The factors selected below are the most important elements of the nuclear weapons complex. They are judged on a five-grade scale that
ranges from “very strong,” defined as meeting
U.S. national security requirements or having
a sustainable, viable, and funded plan in place
to do so, to “very weak,” defined as not meeting current security requirements and with noprogram in place to redress the shortfall. The
other three possible scores are “strong,” “marginal,” and “weak.”MAP 18

U.S. Nuclear
Weapons
Complex
1&2

3
7
4

1

Sandia National
Laboratories
Livermore, CA
Nuclear weapons R&D andsystems engineering

4

5

﻿

2

Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory
Livermore, CA
Nuclear weapons R&D

3

Nevada National
Security Site
Nye County, NV
Subcritical experiments andtest readiness

6

5

6

9

Sandia National
Laboratories
Albuquerque, NM
Nuclear weapons R&D andsystems engineering

7 Kansas City Plant

Los Alamos National
Laboratory
Los Alamos, NM
Nuclear weapons R&D andplutonium pit production

8 Y-12 National Security

Pantex Plant
Panhandle, TX
Assembly of nuclear
warheads

SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.

Kansas City, MO
Production of non-nuclear
components for nuclear
warheads
Complex
Oak Ridge, TN
Manufacture ofhighly-enriched uranium
parts for nuclear warheads

9 Savannah River Site

Aiken, SC
Pit production and tritium
production

A heritage.org

laboratories’ directors and the weapons scientists and engineers on their staffs. This judgment, albeit based on experience, non-nuclear
experimentation, and extensive modeling andsimulation, does not benefit from the objective
data that could be obtained through direct nuclear testing. Nuclear testing was used in thepast to diagnose potential problems with warheads and to certify the effectiveness of fixes
to those problems. It also was used to certify
current nuclear warheads, as well as to detect516

8potential problems and confirm the effectiveness of fixes to those problems.
The sustained political decision to maintainthe nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing—­­a decision made across multiple presidential
Administrations—creates some inherent uncertainty concerning the adequacy of fixes
to the stockpile when problems are found.
These growing numbers of additional uncertainties include updates to correct problems
that were found in the weapons or changes

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military517

﻿in the weapons resulting from life-extension is critical to keeping our stockpile safe, seprograms. It is simply impossible to duplicate cure, and reliable without testing.”32 She also
exactly weapons that were designed and built highlighted the importance of producing new
many decades ago. According to former San- plutonium pits to help avoid the need to test if
dia National Laboratories Director Dr. Ste- confidence in aging warheads decreases.
phen Younger, we have had to fix “a number
To assess the reliability of the nuclearof problems that were never anticipated” by stockpile annually, each of the three nuclear
using “similar but not quite identical parts.”29 weapons labs (Los Alamos National LaboratoHowever, while the United States does not test ry, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
as part of its stockpile stewardship efforts, it and Sandia National Laboratory) reports its
has been U.S. policy to lift its test moratorium findings with respect to the safety, security,and conduct the required testing if the Presi- and reliability of the nation’s nuclear warheads
dent deems it necessary to do so based on in- to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense, whoformation from the lab directors, the Secretary then brief the President. Detailed classified
of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy.
reports are provided to Congress as well. The
In light of concerns that are inherent in a Commander of U.S. Strategic Command alsolack of nuclear testing, the United States main- assesses overall nuclear weapons system retains the most advanced Stockpile Stewardship liability, including the reliability of both warProgram in the world and continues to make head and delivery platforms.
scientific and technical advances to help certify
In spite of concerns over aging warheads,
the stockpile. For example, NNSA is working “[i]n FY 2021, the science-based Stockpile
on upgrades to the Enhanced Capabilities for Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries
Subcritical Experiments facility in Nevada of Energy and Defense to certify to the Presi(such as adding the capability to produce high- dent for the 25th consecutive year the nuclear
speed, high-fidelity X-ray images of subcritical weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, andexperiments) to improve our understanding of militarily effective.”33 Admiral Richard statedplutonium.30 In addition:in 2021 “that there are no identified conditions
at this point that would require nuclear weapThe Exascale Computing Initiative (ECI)
ons testing to restore that confidence.”34
will provide NNSA with next-generation
In light of our overall assessment, andsimulation capabilities to support weapbased on the results of the existing method
ons design, warhead assessment andused to certify the stockpile’s effectiveness,certification, and continued development
we grade the U.S. stockpile conditionally asof the underpinning science needed to“strong.” This grade, however, will depend on
support the nuclear stockpile long-term.
whether support for an adequate stockpile,
NNSA remains on track to accept andboth in Congress and in the Administration,
operate NNSA’s first Exascale high perremains strong.
formance computing system for program
use in 2023.31
Reliability of Current U.S. Delivery
Platforms Score: Strong, Trending
Such advanced capabilities can help the Toward Marginal or Weak
NNSA to certify the stockpile more accurateReliability encompasses not only the warly and without testing. As Deborah Rosen- head, but strategic delivery vehicles as well.
blum, President Biden’s nominee to serve as For ICBMs, SLBMs, and air-launched cruise
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, missiles (ALCMs), in addition to a successful
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, missile launch, this includes the separation
explained in her confirmation hearing, “The of missile boost stages, performance of themodernization of the NNSA infrastructure missile guidance system, separation of theFIGURE 5

U.S. Nuclear Delivery Systems Outdated
Current U.S. nuclear delivery systems are between 28 and 59 years old,and some are expected to be retired within a decade.
First enteredservice

Original planned
retirement

Current projected
retirement

B–52H Bomber
Minuteman III ICBM
Ohio-class SSBN
AGM–86B air-launched cruise missile
Trident D5 sub-launched ballistic missile
B–2 Bomber﻿1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060

NOTES: The original retirement date for the B-2 was set at 2058, but in the FY 2019 budget, the Air Force moved up the retirement
date by 22 years to 2036. That move could have been caused by projected threats, the cost of sustainment, or both. The original
programmed retirement date for the B-52H is not known, but the Air Force recently stated that it plans to continue flying this jet into
the 2050s. The average B-52H bomber has logged approximately 20,300 hours, and based on airframe component lifetime estimatesand 350 hours of flying time each year, it could continue flying until 2067.
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research.
A heritage.org

reentry vehicles from the missile post-boost demonstrated high level of combat readiness.
vehicle, accuracy of the final reentry vehicle The Air Force tested the AGM-86B ALCM,
in reaching its target, and the ability of weap- launched from the B-52H bomber, most reons systems (cruise missiles, aircraft carrying cently in 2017.36 The DOD must perform upbombs, and reentry vehicles) to penetrate to grades to existing platforms and develop their
their targets.35
replacement programs simultaneously, andThe United States conducts flight tests of already diminished capabilities make this task
ICBMs and SLBMs every year to ensure the more difficult.
reliability of its delivery systems with high-­
Grade: In July 2018, the Air Force sufferedfidelity “mock” warheads. Anything from its first unsuccessful ICBM test since 2011,37
faulty electrical wiring to booster separations but it has conducted six successful tests since
could degrade the reliability and safety of the then. These successes include a test in FebruU.S. strategic deterrent. U.S. strategic long- ary 2020—the first one to be hosted by Vanrange bombers also regularly conduct con- denberg Air Force Base since it became parttinental United States and intercontinental of the U.S. Space Force38—and a test in August
exercises and receive upgrades to sustain a 2020 that launched a missile armed with three518

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

nuclear warheads to counter Soviet advances and modernization efforts and to leverageadvances in our understanding of the physics,
chemistry, and design of nuclear weapons.
Today, the United States focuses on extending the life of its aging stockpile rather thanon fielding modern warheads while trying toretain the skills and capabilities needed todesign, develop, and produce such warheads.
Relying only on sustaining the aging stockpile
could increase the risk of failure caused bothby aging components and by not exercising
critical skills. It could signal to adversaries that
the United States is less committed to nuclear deterrence.
Meanwhile, potential U.S. adversaries andcurrent and future proliferants are not limited to updating Cold War designs and can seek
designs outside of U.S. experiences. Other nations can maintain their levels of proficiency
by having their scientists work on new nuclear warheads.45 As recently reported by the Department of State, “Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that have creatednuclear yield and are not consistent with the
U.S. ‘zero-yield’ standard,” and evidence points
to China’s potential lack of adherence to thisstandard as well.46
Fortunately, the NNSA has made noticeable
improvements in this category in recent years.
In FY 2016, Congress established the Stockpile
Responsiveness Program to “exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study, design,develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy
nuclear weapons.”47 Congress doubled funding
for the SRP from $34 million in FY 2019 to $70
million in FY 2020 and appropriated $70 million again in FY 2021.48 The budget request for
FY2022 also includes $70 million for the SRP.49
Although it has been operating for only a
few years, the SRP has demonstrated some important accomplishments in ensuring criticalskills retention. The design and development
work planned for the Navy’s W93/Mark 7 warNuclear Warhead Modernization
head for the Trident II D5 SLBMs and the W87Score: Marginal
1 warhead for GBSD will build on the success
During the Cold War, the United States fo- of the SRP in exercising these skills on modern
cused on designing and developing modern warhead programs.

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﻿reentry vehicles.39 However, the May 2020 test
experienced a ground abort prior to the launch,which has provoked speculation about thereliability of the Minuteman III missile as it
approaches its retirement starting at the endof the decade.40 The SLBM tests were successful in 2019 and 2020 and have been thus
far in 2021.41
To the extent that data from these tests are
publicly available, they provide objective evidence of the delivery systems’ reliability andsend a message to U.S. allies and adversaries
alike that U.S. systems work and the U.S. nuclear deterrent is ready if needed. The aged
systems, however, occasionally have reliability problems, as evidenced by the failed July
2018 and May 2020 Minuteman III launches.
Although delivery systems are likely reliable
enough today, the evidence indicates that
this reliability could dwindle with aging. For
instance, because of its obsolescence against
Russian air defense systems, the B-52H bomber already no longer carries gravity bombs.42
Despite the fact that the AGM-86B passed its
most recent public test in 2017, General John
Hyten has stated that because of its age, “it’s amiracle that [the missile] can even fly” and thatthe current ALCMs “do meet the mission, but
it is a challenge each and every day.”43 Admiral
Richard has also stated that “Minuteman-III
is increasingly challenged in its ability” to “flyand make it to the target.”44
Aging will continue to affect delivery platform reliability until platforms are replaced,
but no publicly released data or statementsfrom senior leaders have thus far indicatedthat U.S. delivery systems cannot currently
meet mission requirements. Until that changes, this factor receives the grade of “strong.”
However, this grade will trend to “marginal” if
not “weak” in just a few years if modernization
programs are not fully pursued and these aging
systems are not replaced on time.

﻿

Fielding modern weapons like the W93 enough progress in the W93/Mk 7, W87-1, andwould allow American engineers and scientists plutonium pit production projects to demonto improve previous designs and devise more strate that those projects will be completed on
effective means to address evolving military schedule and that the delay in pit production
requirements (e.g., adaptability to emerging at the Savannah River Site will not significantthreats and the ability to hold at risk hard and ly affect the ability to meet warhead requiredeeply buried targets). Future warheads could ments. An improved score will also depend
improve reliability (i.e., remedy some ongoing on other advancements in nuclear warhead
aging concerns) while also enhancing the safe- modernization.
ty and security of American weapons. The abilSpecifically, in addition to the W93/Mark 7
ity to work on modern warhead design options program to replace existing SLBM warheads,
would help to ensure that today’s experts and the NNSA will need to begin a program for athose of the next generation remain engaged future strategic land-based warhead to sucand knowledgeable, help to attract the best ceed the W87-1, a program that remains notalent to the nuclear enterprise, and help the tional.54 Future assessments will also need tonation to gain additional insights into adver- examine whether the NNSA’s current warheadsaries’ nuclear weapon programs.
modernization effort is sufficient to address
The nuclear enterprise displayed improved the increasing threat. For instance, an earth-­
flexibility when it produced the W76-2 war- penetrating warhead is not part of the NNSA’shead, a low-yield version of the W76 warhead warhead modernization plan, despite Rusdesigned to counter Russia’s perception of an sian progress in hardening and deeply buryexploitable gap in the U.S. nuclear force pos- ing facilities to withstand strikes by current
ture, within a year. Such efforts warranted U.S. weapons.55
an improvement in this score from “weak” toFor now, the score for this category re“marginal” in 2019. Additionally, in FY 2021, mains at “marginal,” but it could trend toward
Congress appropriated initial funding for the “strong” in future years.
W93/Mark 7 warhead program, which will
eventually replace the W76-1 and W88 war- Nuclear Delivery Systems
heads carried by the Trident II D5 SLBMs.50 Modernization Score: Strong
The FY 2022 budget continues funding for the
All U.S. delivery systems were built during
W93 program with $72 million requested for the Cold War and are overdue for replacement.
NNSA in line with the FY 2022 projection in The Obama Administration, in consultation
the FY 2021 budget.51
with Congress, initiated a plan to replace curThe effort to restore the ability to produce rent triad delivery systems within the conplutonium pits for future warheads has like- straints of the New Strategic Arms Reduction
wise progressed after Congress provided the Treaty (New START) with Russia. President
NNSA with its full funding request for FY 2021. Trump advanced this modernization proThe NNSA reached the first critical milestone gram in his budget requests with bipartisan
for pit production at Los Alamos National Lab- support from Congress. Under this modernoratory in April 2021 and at the Savannah Riv- ization program:er Site in June 2021.52 While production at Los
Alamos remains on schedule, the plan to proThe Navy is fully funding the Columbia-­
duce 50 plutonium pits per year at the Savanclass submarine to replace the Ohionah River Site by 2030 has shifted, and the goalclass submarine;
is now somewhere between 2032 and 2035.53
Grade: Before the score for this categoThe Air Force is funding the B-21 Raider
ry can move up to “strong,” the NNSA, with
Long-Range bomber, which will replace
the support of Congress, will need to achieve
conventionally armed bombers before
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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengththey become certified to replace nuclear-capable bombers, and the Long-Range
Standoff weapon, which will replace theaging air-launched cruise missile;llExisting Minuteman III ICBMs are
expected to remain in service beyond theend of the decade, 50 years after theirintended lifetime, and in 2029 will start tobe replaced by the GBSD; andExisting Trident II D5 SLBMs have been
life-extended to remain in service until
2042 through the end of the last Ohioclass submarine’s lifetime.56

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military521﻿All of these programs have remained on
track for the past few years, but they face highrisks of delay. For instance, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found risks
in the GBSD schedule related to technology
maturation, the complexity of concurrently operating Minuteman III missiles and
GBSD missiles during the transition, limitedschedule margin for testing, and an aggressive plan for construction activities.57 Additionally, issues involving cost estimates andpotential industrial base impacts caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic could make it harder to achieve the goal of deploying the first
Columbia-class submarine in 2031.58 After acontract for development of the LRSO wasawarded early, Congress reduced funding in
FY 2021 by $89 million.59 Fortunately, thebudget for FY 2022 would boost funding for
the LRSO beyond what was previously projected for that year.
These risks in schedule are especially dangerous because modernization programs havezero margin for delay after the United States
has deferred recapitalization for years. In September 2020, then-Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord
testified that even a minor cut in funding for
the GBSD would affect its schedule.60 Since
these modernization programs are just-intime, they would be significantly affected byany continuing resolution.

The impacts of schedule delays are significant. As systems like the Minuteman III,AGM 86-B, and Ohio-class submarines continue to age, they take on greater risks. Agedegrades reliability by increasing the potential
for systems to break down or fail to respondcorrectly. Corrupted systems, defective electronics, or performance degradation caused
by long-term storage defects can have serious
implications for U.S. deterrence and assurance.
Should GBSD fail to reach initial operating
capability by 2029, the United States will beleft with a less-capable—and therefore lesscredible—ICBM fleet, which will also begin to
dip below 400 missiles as the Air Force continues to use missiles for annual testing. With
respect to the Navy, the GAO has reported thatthe consequence of failing to deliver the first
Columbia-class submarine on time would bea failure for the Navy to meet STRATCOM’s
force-­generation operational requirement,
which means a weaker sea-based deterrent.61
Grade: U.S. nuclear platforms are in direneed of recapitalization. Plans for modernization of the nuclear triad are in place, and Congress and the services have largely sustained
funding for these programs. Moreover, some
aspects of these programs have progressed in
2021. For instance, the Air Force awarded acontract for GBSD to Northrop Grumman in
2020.62 Congress did not cut any major funding for nuclear recapitalization systems in FY
2021, and the budget for FY 2022 would provide the funding necessary to continue these
programs on schedule.
Despite these successes, potential modernization delays and congressional funding
cuts still hold nuclear delivery system modernization at risk, especially as some Membersof Congress push for major funding cuts andunilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear forces.63
Moreover, this plan simply replaces the force
structure designed by the Obama Administration in 2010 before China commenced its strategic breakout and the strategic environment
was assumed to be much more benign than it
is today. Future U.S. nuclear posture will needto adjust to the drastic change in the threat

environment since 2010 and account for two
These complexes design, develop, test, andnuclear peers. The FY 2022 budget includes produce the weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsefunding for the initial stages of a program to nal, and their maintenance is of critical impordevelop a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise tance. As the 2018 NPR stated:
missile that, if fielded, would introduce additional regional nuclear capabilities beyond
An effective, responsive, and resilient
current non-strategic gravity bombs to address
nuclear weapons infrastructure is essenthe rising threat.
tial to the U.S. capacity to adapt flexibly
Based on the commitment to nuclear weapto shifting requirements. Such an infraons modernization demonstrated by Congressstructure offers tangible evidence to bothand the Administration this year, this category
allies and potential adversaries of U.S.
(for now) again earns a grade of “strong.”
nuclear weapons capabilities and thus
contributes to deterrence, assurance, andNuclear Weapons Complex
hedging against adverse developments.
Score: MarginalIt also discourages adversary interest in
Maintaining a reliable and effective nuclear
arms competition.64
stockpile depends in large part on the facilities where U.S. devices and components are
Maintaining a safe, secure, effective, anddeveloped, tested, and produced. These facili- reliable nuclear stockpile requires modern
ties constitute the foundation of our strategic facilities, technical expertise, and tools botharsenal and include the:to repair any malfunctions quickly, safely, andsecurely and to produce new nuclear weapons
Los Alamos National Laboratories (nucle- if required. According to the 2010 NPR, “As thear weapons research and development, or
United States reduces the numbers of nuclear
R&D, and plutonium pit production);
weapons, the reliability of the remaining weapons in the stockpile—and the quality of theLawrence Livermore National Laboratofacilities needed to sustain it—become moreries (nuclear weapons R&D);
important.”65
The existing nuclear weapons complex,
Sandia National Laboratory (nuclear
however, is not fully functional. The United
weapons R&D and systems engineering);
States cannot produce some of the nuclear
components needed to maintain and modNevada National Security Site (subcritical ernize the stockpile.66 For instance, the Unitexperiments, test readiness);
ed States has not had a substantial plutonium
pit production capability since 1993. A plutoPantex Plant (assembly of nuclenium pit is the core of a nuclear weapon thatar warheads);
contains the nuclear material. The NNSA currently plans “to produce no fewer than 80 pits
Kansas City Plant (production of non-nuper year during 2030, consistent with federal
clear components for nuclear warheads);
law, national policy, and DoD requirements,”
which is a challenging timeline by the agency’s
Savannah River Site (second site for pit
own admission.67
production, tritium production); andIf the NNSA’s facilities are not properly
funded, the U.S. will gradually lose the abiliY-12 National Security Complex (manuty to conduct the high-quality experiments
facture of highly enriched uranium partsneeded to ensure the reliability of the stockfor nuclear warheads).
pile without nuclear testing. In addition todemoralizing the workforce and hampering

﻿

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

l

522

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthreported this year that it will not be able tomeet the required timeline for the SavannahRiver Site. Achieving this timeline is difficult
because the NNSA is concurrently embarking
on the most ambitious warhead sustainment
program since the end of the Cold War, overhauling some five warhead types and stressing
the capacity of both workforce and facilities.
Meanwhile, certain warhead types will require
modern pits.
Aside from plutonium, the NNSA must also
maintain production of several other key materials and components that are used to build
and maintain nuclear weapons. For instance,
NNSA plans to increase the supply of tritium
as demand increases. Other projects currently
underway include a new lithium processing facility and the new Uranium Processing Facility
at Y-12. So far, this facility is moving forward onschedule and cost.
Grade: Modernizing U.S. nuclear facilities
is critical because the NNSA’s warhead modernization plans depend on the ability to produce certain components like plutonium pits.
The W87-1, for example, will be composed of all
newly manufactured components.72
On one hand, the United States maintains
some of the world’s most advanced nuclear facilities. On the other, some parts of the complex have not been modernized since the 1950s.
Plans for long-term infrastructure recapitalization remain essential even as the NNSA
is embarking on an aggressive warhead life-­
extension effort. Sustaining or increasing critically essential but always decaying tritium gas
is likewise essential; delays only increase production needs for its timely replenishment.73
Significant progress has been made over the
past decade in getting funded plans in place torecapitalize plutonium pit production capacity and uranium component manufacturing
in particular. This effort, however, faces great
technical challenges in addition to the challenge of ensuring stable funding to support it.
The recent shift in deadline for plutonium pit
production at the Savannah River Site from2030 to the 2032–2035 range is one example.
After years of deferred modernization, any

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military523

﻿recruitment, old or obsolete facilities and poor
working environments make maintenance ofa safe, secure, reliable, and militarily effective
nuclear stockpile difficult. The NNSA’s facilities are old: About 40 percent date back to
World War II, about 60 percent are over 40
years old, and more than half are in poor condition.68 As a consequence, the NNSA had accumulated about $5.8 billion in deferred maintenance as of FY 2020.69 Aging facilities have also
become a safety hazard: In some buildings, forexample, chunks of concrete have fallen fromthe ceiling.70
The U.S. currently retains more than 5,000
old plutonium pits in strategic reserve in addition to pits for use in future LEPs. Uncertainties regarding the effect of aging on plutonium
pits and how long the United States will be able
to depend on them before replacement remainunresolved. In 2006, a JASON Group study of
NNSA assessments of plutonium aging estimated that, depending on pit type, the minimum pit life was in the range of 100 years.71 A
work program was recommended to address
additional uncertainties in pit aging, but that
did not reach fruition. Moreover, numerous
pits have been in the stockpile for decades—
some for more than 50 years—and will need
to be replaced. Depending on the rate at which
NNSA can produce new pits, replacement willneed to start sooner rather than later.
Today, the production rate is insufficient toreplace aging pits. The United States has only
demonstrated an ability to produce about 10
plutonium pits a year at the Los Alamos PF-4
facility. If executed as planned, infrastructure modernization of PF-4, as mandated
by the 2018 NPR, will boost that number
to 30 by 2026.
A second plutonium pit production facility
is being planned to exploit the Mixed Oxide
Fuel (MOX) facility that was being constructed at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The MOX building is being repurposedfor plutonium pit production with a required
production of no fewer than 50 pits per yearby 2030 for an overall requirement of no fewer than 80 per year. Unfortunately, the NNSA﻿

unexpected failure or disruption at a criticalfacility could significantly affect schedules fornuclear warhead modernization.74
According to former Acting NNSA Administrator Charles Verdon, “Continued recapitalization is imperative, otherwise there will bea point at which no amount of money will beable to mitigate the operational risks and losses to infrastructure capabilities that accrued
over time.”75 Until demonstrable progress has
been made toward completion of infrastructure modernization, the grade for this category
will therefore remain at “marginal.”

Nuclear Test Readiness Score: Weak
In the past, nuclear testing was one of the
key elements of a safe, secure, effective, andreliable nuclear deterrent. The U.S. is currently under a self-imposed nuclear testing
moratorium, but it is still required to maintain a low level of nuclear test readiness at the
Nevada National Security Site (formerly Nevada Test Site).
“Test readiness” refers to a single test or avery short series of tests, not a sustained nuclear testing program, reestablishment of which
would require significant additional resources.
Specifically, under the 1993 PDD-15 (which isstill U.S. policy), “a capability to conduct a nuclear test within 6 months up to FY 1996, andto conduct a nuclear test within 2–3 years afterthat time will be assumed by the Departmentof Energy [now NNSA].”76 Because of a shortage of resources, the NNSA has been unable
to achieve this goal. Test readiness has notbeen funded as a separate program since FY2010 and is instead supported by the Stockpile
Stewardship Program that exercises testing elements at the Nevada National Security Siteand conducts subcritical nuclear laboratory
experiments.77
However, whether this approach can assurethat the United States has the timely ability to
conduct yield-producing experiments to correct a flaw in one or more types of its nuclear
weapons is open to question. The United Statesmight need to test to assure certain weaponcharacteristics that only nuclear testing can

524

validate or potentially to verify render-safe
procedures. The ability to conduct timely
yield-producing experiments is likewise important, especially if the United States needs
for political reasons to respond to another nation’s nuclear weapons tests or communicate
its unquestioned resolve.
The NNSA is mandated to maintain a capability to conduct a nuclear test within 24
to 36 months of a presidential decision to doso. However, the FY 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) statesthat “[a]ssuring full compliance with domestic
regulations, agreements, and laws relating toworker and public safety and the environment,
and international treaties, would significantly
extend the time required for execution of a nuclear test.”78 According to the FY 2018 SSMP,
it would take 60 months to conduct “a test to
develop a new capability.”79 Because the UnitedStates is rapidly losing its remaining practical
nuclear testing experience, including instrumentation of very sensitive equipment, theprocess would likely have to be reinvented
from scratch.80
Grade: As noted, the United States canmeet the legally required readiness requirement only if certain domestic regulations,agreements, and laws are waived. In addition,
the United States is not prepared to sustain
testing activities beyond a few limited experiments because it no longer retains the deep
drilling technology in Nevada and has only a
few “holes” that are able to contain a nuclear
test. In recognition of these concerns, Admiral
Richard testified in 2021 “that I am concerned
about the Nation’s test-readiness and that I endorsed the [NNSA] lab director's calls… for anational review of our test-readiness to understand where we sit.”81
The Senate-passed version of the FY 2021
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
included an additional $10 million within existing budgets to practice test readiness capabilities, which would have made only a minor
improvement in test readiness.82 A July 2020
amendment to the House bill would have prohibited the use of funds to conduct nuclear

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthtests.83 The conference report on the NDAA
did not include either provision.84
Opposition to a mere $10 million for test
readiness and willingness to prohibit testing
altogether are matters of great concern. The effort to improve the NNSA’s technical and scientific capabilities to certify the stockpile without
testing for the foreseeable future is worthwhile,
but the United States must maintain at least
the mandated level of test readiness so that it
can deal with an emergency that requires testing if one should arise.
Thus, testing readiness earns a grade of“weak.”

Personnel Challenges Within the
National Nuclear Laboratories Score:
Marginal but Trending Toward Strong
Combined with nuclear facilities, U.S. nuclear weapons scientists and engineers are
critical to the health of the complex and thestockpile. The 2018 NPR emphasizes that:

The ability to maintain and attract ahigh-quality workforce is critical to ensuring
the future of the American nuclear deterrent,
especially when a strong employment atmosphere adds to the challenge of hiring the best
and brightest. Today’s weapons designers andengineers are first-rate, but they also are aging and retiring, and their knowledge must be

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military525﻿The nuclear weapons infrastructure
depends on a highly skilled, world-classworkforce from a broad array of disciplines, including engineering, physicalsciences, mathematics, and computerscience. Maintaining the necessary criticalskills and retaining personnel with theneeded expertise requires sufficient opportunities to exercise those skills. Shoulda technical or geopolitical development
demand a new nuclear weapon, it is crucial that the nuclear weapons workforce
possess the skills and the knowledge
needed to design, develop, and manufacture warheads of different design in atimely manner.85

passed on to the next generation of experts.
This means that young designers need meaningful and challenging warhead design and development programs to hone their skills. The
SRP offers one visible means to address suchconcerns. The NNSA and its weapons labs understand this problem and, with the supportof Congress, are beginning to take the necessary steps through SRP and foreign weapon
assessment to mentor the next generation. To
continue this progress, SRP funding should bemaintained if not increased.
The United States currently relies on
non-yield-producing subcritical experiments
and other laboratory experiments, flight tests,
and the judgment of experienced nuclear scientists and engineers, using robust modelingand simulation, to ensure continued confidence in the safety, security, effectiveness, andreliability of its nuclear deterrent. Without
their experience, the nuclear weapons complex
could not function. Few of today’s remaining
scientists or engineers at the NNSA weaponslabs have had the experience of taking a warhead from initial concept to “clean sheet” design, engineering development, production,and fielding. The SRP is remedying some ofthese shortfalls by having its workforce exercise many of the nuclear weapon design andengineering skills that are needed.
The average age of the NNSA’s enterprise-­wide workforce had decreased slightly to 46.9
years as of September 2018, the most recent
year for which data are available.86 Still worrisome, however, is that NNSA sites are reporting rates of retirement eligibility “from 15 percent to 44 percent, which will likely increaseover the next 5 years.”87 Given the distributionof workforce by age, these retirements, if notaddressed in plans for the hiring and mentoring of new hires, will create a significant knowledge and experience gap.
Grade: In addition to employing worldclass experts, the NNSA labs have had goodsuccess in attracting and retaining talent (e.g.,through improved college graduate recruitment efforts). As many scientists and engineers with practical nuclear weapon design﻿and testing experience are retired, continued to ensuring the strong recruitment and trainannual assessments and certifications of nu- ing of personnel.
clear warheads will rely increasingly on theGrade: Despite uncertainties regarding
judgments of people who have never tested or the future impacts of budgetary shortfalls, thedesigned a nuclear weapon. Moreover, demand young men and women who secure, maintain,
for skilled personnel will increase as NNSA plan for, and operate U.S. nuclear forces are oframps up production capabilities and moves an extremely high caliber. General Timothysome operations to around-the-clock, seven-­ Ray, Commander of Air Force Global Strikedays-a-week scheduling.88 Admiral Richard has Command, has testified that “our combat
emphasized the importance of investing in the mission readiness rates among our bomber
workforce now: If “[w]e lose those talent bas- aircrews is at its highest in the history of thees, you can’t buy it back, it will take five to ten command.”91 Nuclear force commanders haveyears to…retrain and redevelop the people.”89 provided assurance that the COVID-19 panIn light of these issues, the NNSA work- demic has had no impact on force readinessforce earns a score of “marginal,” but will and the ability to launch nuclear weapons.92
trend toward “strong” with these continued
Force readiness thus receives a grade
improvements.
of “strong.”

Readiness of Forces Score: Strong
The readiness of forces that operate U.S. delivery platforms is a vital component of America’s strategic forces. The military personnel
operating the three legs of the nuclear triad
must be properly trained and equipped. It isalso essential that the crews responsible forthe nuclear mission are maintained in an appropriate state of readiness.
During FY 2021, the services have continued to align resources to preserve strategic
capabilities in the short term. Nevertheless,long-term stable funding will be essential forthe timely execution of programs and associated readiness activities.
U.S. general-purpose forces are critical toensuring the overall effectiveness of our nuclear forces (e.g., by providing a pool of qualified
candidates to operate nuclear weapon delivery systems). Changes prompted in part by
the 2014 Navy and Air Force cheating scandals
have addressed most morale issues and haverecast the role of forces supporting the nuclear
deterrent by, for example, providing additional funding for equipment purchases, creating
more mid-career billets to help career-fieldcontinuity, focusing leadership attention, andchanging training to focus on mission in thefield rather than on a theoretical ideal.90 Sustained attention to this issue remains critical

526

Allied Assurance Score: Strong
The credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrenceis one of the most important components ofallied assurances. The United States extends
nuclear assurances to more than 30 allies who
in turn have maintained the commitment toforgo nuclear programs of their own. If allies
were to resort to building their own nuclear
weapons because their confidence in U.S. extended deterrence had been degraded, the consequences for nonproliferation and stability
could become dire.
In Europe, the United States can coordinate
with France and the United Kingdom, which
already have nuclear weapons. The U.S. also deploys B-61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe as
a visible manifestation of its commitment to
its NATO allies and retains dual-capable aircraft that can deliver those gravity bombs. The
United States provides nuclear assurances toJapan, South Korea, and Australia, all of whichface increasingly aggressive nuclear-armed regional adversaries: China, Russia, and North
Korea. Continued U.S. nuclear deterrence assurances are critical and must be perceived as
credible. Both Japan and South Korea have thecapability and basic know-how to build theirown nuclear weapons quickly. A decision to doso would be a major setback for U.S. nonproliferation policies.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

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﻿The 2018 NPR took a positive step when Rejecting calls for a “no first use” or “sole purit placed “Assurance of allies and partners” pose” declaratory policy will also be critical, as
second on its list of four “critical roles” that such policies are not popular with most of ournuclear forces play in America’s national se- allies because, among other things, they could
curity strategy. The 2018 NPR proposed two call into question America’s commitment to
supplements to existing capabilities—a low- extending its nuclear deterrent for non-nuyield SLBM warhead and a new nuclear sea- clear, but still existential, attacks on its allies.97
launched cruise missile—as important initiaThe score for allied assurance therefore retives to strengthen assurance along with the mains “strong.”
Obama and Trump Administrations’ initiatives
to bolster conventional forces in NATO.93 The Overall U.S. Nuclear Weapons
recent successful deployment of the W76-2 Capability Score: Strong but Trending
low-yield warhead is an important component Toward Marginal or Weakof America’s ability to deter regional aggresIt is necessary to emphasize that the gradesion against its Asian and NATO allies.
of “strong” assumes that the United States
Grade: At this time, U.S. allies are not se- maintains its commitment to modernization ofriously considering developing their own nu- the entire nuclear enterprise—warheads, platclear weapons. European members of NATO forms, command and control, personnel, andcontinue to express their commitment to and infrastructure—and allocates needed resourcappreciation of NATO as a nuclear alliance es accordingly. Without this commitment, thiseven as they worry about the impact of Russia’s overall score will degrade rapidly to “weak.”growing non-strategic nuclear capabilities not Since every other military operation—andlimited by New START. The NATO Secretary therefore overall national defense—relies on
General’s annual report and the recent NATO a strong nuclear deterrent, the United Statessummit in the United Kingdom reiterated cannot afford to fall short in fulfilling this imNATO’s commitment to remaining a nuclear perative mission.
alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist.94
There have been major issues with nucleWhile significant percentages of South Kore- ar capabilities since the end of the Cold War,ans continue to express support for an indig- ranging from degraded infrastructure to theenous nuclear weapons capability or nuclear-­ inability to produce plutonium pits to delivsharing agreement with the United States,95 ery platforms at risk from aging. Yet progressneither South Korea nor Japan has expressed in modernization efforts, combined with asserious concern about the U.S. commitment to surances from senior leaders that the forces
extended deterrence.
remain reliable, warrants an improvement toAllied assurance will likely remain strong as the grade of “strong” this year.
long as the United States remains committed
Although modernization programs have yet
to modernizing its own nuclear deterrent and to produce many tangible results (e.g., delivrejects calls to reduce its nuclear forces unilat- ery systems have not yet entered production),erally. The Biden Administration has empha- a sustained bipartisan commitment to nuclear
sized a renewed focus on allies and partners modernization extending through the previin American foreign policy; achieving this goal ous two Administrations reflects a positive
will require the prioritizing of extended deter- trend. Both the 2010 and 2018 NPRs strongly
rence. Continued commitment from the Ad- articulate a core nuclear weapons policy that
ministration and Congress to development of is solidly grounded in the realities of today’s
the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, which threats and growing international concerns, as
can be deployed as a regional nuclear capabili- well as a continued commitment to extended
ty in both the European and Indo-Pacific the- deterrence. Moreover, presidential budgets
aters, is one important way to meet this goal.96 and congressional appropriations in recent

years have continued to provide the necessary funding for modernization programs. As
a result, this is a more optimistic assessmentof the nuclear portfolio than we have been able
to provide in previous editions.
That being said, this score of “strong” with aconditional trend toward “marginal” or “weak”
reflects a greater risk than in previous years ofa degradation in nuclear deterrence. Current

forces are assessed as reliable today, but nearly
all components of the nuclear enterprise areat a tipping point with respect to replacement
or modernization and have no margin left fordelays in schedule. Failure of on-time appropriations and lack of Administration support
for nuclear modernization could lead to a
rapid decline in this portfolio to “weak” in future editions.

U.S. Military Power: Nuclear
VERY WEAK

WEAK

MARGINAL

Nuclear Stockpile%

Delivery Platform
Reliability%

WarheadModernization%

Delivery Systems
Modernization

﻿

STRONG%

Nuclear Weapons
Complex%

National Labs Talent%

Force Readiness%

Allied Assurance%

Nuclear Test Readiness%

OVERALL

528%

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

VERY STRONG

Endnotes
All of the past six confirmed Secretaries of Defense—including current Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin—have affirmed U.S.
nuclear deterrence as the department’s number one mission.

2.

Admiral Charles A. Richard, Commander, United States Strategic Command, statement before the Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, April 20, 2021, p. 3, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Richard04.20.2021.pdf (accessed June23, 2021).

3.

President of Russia, “Events: Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board,” December 21, 2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/64684 (accessed June 23, 2021).

4.

Peter Brookes, “Responding to Troubling Trends in Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
3601, March 26, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/responding-troubling-trends-russias-nuclear-weapons-program.

5.

New START limits warheads deployed on strategic ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers but excludes an entire category of non-strategic
warheads. While there is no legal definition of a non-strategic warhead, such a warhead can be described as tactical and moresuited to use in a regional conflict or as any warhead not defined as strategic by New START. Russia’s arsenal of non-strategic
warheads includes systems ranging from artillery, land mines, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles to short-range and intermediaterange missiles. For further information, see Amy F. Woolf, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” Congressional Research Service
Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32572, updated March 16, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.
pdf (accessed June 23, 2021).

6.

“Transcript: The Arms Control Landscape ft. DIA Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley, Jr.,” Hudson Institute, May 29, 2019, p. 24, https://s3.amazonaws.
com/media.hudson.org/Hudson%20Transcript%20-%20The%20Arms%20Control%20Landscape.pdf (accessed June 23, 2021).

7.

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, February 2018, p. 8, https://media.
defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed June 23, 2021).

8.

Joby Warrick, “China Is Building More than 100 New Missile Silos in Its Western Desert, Analysts Say,” The Washington Post, June30, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-nuclear-missile-silos/2021/06/30/0fa8debc-d9c2-11eb-bb9e70fda8c37057_story.html (accessed September 11, 2021); William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “A 2nd New Nuclear Missile
Base for China, and Many Questions About Strategy,” The New York Times, July 26, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/26/
us/politics/china-nuclear-weapons.html (accessed September 11, 2021); and Rod Lee, “PLA Likely Begins Construction of anIntercontinental Ballistic Missile Silo Site Near Hanggin Banner,” U.S. Air Force, Air University, August 12, 2021, https://www.
airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2729781/pla-likely-begins-construction-of-an-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-silo-si/(accessed September 11, 2021).

9.

See Aaron Mehta “STRATCOM Chief Warns of Chinese ‘Strategic Breakout,’” Breaking Defense, August 12, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/08/stratcom-chief-warns-of-chinese-strategic-breakout/ (accessed September 11, 2021), and Michael
Martina, “China Will Soon Surpass Russia as a Nuclear Threat—Senior U.S. Military Official,” Reuters, August 27, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-will-soon-surpass-russia-nuclear-threat-senior-us-military-official-2021-08-27/ (accessed
September 11, 2021).

10. Launch-on-Warning posture allows launch of nuclear weapons against an opponent as soon as early warning sensors detect anincoming attack.
11. Richard, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, pp. 6–8.
12. Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. 10472,
updated April 14, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IF10472.pdf (accessed June 23, 2021).
13. David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker, “Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report—May 2021,”
Institute for Science and International Security Report, June 7, 2021, p. 2, https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/
Analysis_of_IAEA_Iran_Verification_and_Monitoring_Report_-_May_2021_June_8_Final.pdf (accessed June 23, 2021).
14. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, p. 20.
15. Chapter 4, “Nuclear Weapons,” in U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, pp. 43–69, esp. p. 50, https://fas.org/man/eprint/nmhb2020.pdf (accessed June 23,2021).
16. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, “Minuteman III,” Missile Threat, last updated June 15, 2018,https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/minuteman-iii/ (accessed June 25, 2021).
17. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook
2020, p. 44.

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1.

18. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-15, “U.S. Policy on Stockpile Stewardship Under an Extended Moratorium and Comprehensive
Test Ban,” November 3, 1993, p. 5, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-15.pdf (accessed June 23, 2021).
19. See John C. Hopkins, “Nuclear Test Readiness: What Is Needed? Why?” Los Alamos National Laboratory, National Security
Science, December 2016, p. 9, https://www.lanl.gov/discover/publications/national-security-science/2016-december/_assets/
docs/NSS-DECEMBER2016.pdf (accessed June 23, 2021).
20. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “NNSA Administrator and Rep. [Marcy] Kaptur Attend
Nuclear Security Enterprise Day at the University of Toledo,” October 7, 2019, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsaadministrator-and-rep-kaptur-attend-nuclear-security-enterprise-day-university (accessed June 23, 2021).
21. The Honorable Dr. Charles P. Verdon, Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, statement before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. Senate, May 19, 2021, p. 2, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/5-19-21%20Verdon%20
Testimony%20SASC%20FINAL.pdf (accessed June 23, 2021).
22. Ibid.
23. However, this support for nuclear modernization in Congress has not included support for test readiness. Instead, Congress has
prioritized improvements in the NNSA’s ability to certify the stockpile without testing.
24. Explanatory Statement, “Division D—Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2021,” inConsolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Committee Print of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on
H.R. 133/Public Law 116-260 [Legislative Text and Explanatory Statement], Book 1 of 2, Divisions A–F, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., March
2021, p. 923, https://www.congress.gov/117/cprt/HPRT43749/CPRT-117HPRT43749.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
25. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “FY 2022 Presidential Budget for NNSA Released,” May 28,
2021, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/fy-2022-presidential-budget-nnsa-released (accessed June 2, 2021).
26. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, p. 55.

﻿

27. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook
2020, p. 126.
28. John C. Hopkins and David H. Sharp, “The Scientific Foundation for Assessing the Nuclear Performance of Weapons in the US
Stockpile Is Eroding,” Issues in Science and Technology, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (Winter 2019), p. 23, https://issues.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/01/Hopkins-Sharp-The-Scientific-Foundation-23-25-Winter-2019.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
29. Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), p. 192.
30. Stenographic transcript of hearing To Receive Testimony on the Department of Energy’s Atomic Defense Activities and Programsin Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and Future Years Defense Program, Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, May 19, 2021, p. 35, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/21-40_05-19-2021.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
31. Verdon, statement before Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, p. 5.
32. Stenographic transcript of Hearing to Consider the Nominations of Ms. Jill M. Hruby to Be Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear
Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; Mr. Frank A. Rose to Be Principal Deputy Administrator
National Nuclear Security Administration; Ms. Deborah G. Rosenblum to Be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological Defense Programs and Mr. Christopher P. Maier to Be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations And
Low-Intensity Conflict, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, May 27, 2021, p. 50, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/21-45_05-27-2021.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
33. Verdon, statement before Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, p. 3.
34. Stenographic transcript of hearing To Receive Testimony on United States Strategic Command and United States SpaceCommand in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program,Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 20, 2021, p. 79, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2122_04-20-2021.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
35. Robert W. Nelson, “What Does Reliability Mean?” in “If It Ain’t Broke: The Already Reliable U.S. Nuclear Arsenal,” Arms Control Today,
Vol. 36, No. 3 (April 2006), p. 19, https://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/2006_April_ACT_reduced.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
36. Leah Bryant, “Air-Launched Cruise Missile Passes Tests,” U.S. Air Force, January 21, 2017, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/
Article/1055470/air-launched-cruise-missile-passes-tests/ (accessed June 25, 2021).
37. Elaine M. Grossman, “New Details Emerge About U.S. Nuclear Missile Test Failure,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 22, 2011,https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/new-details-emerge-about-us-nuclear-missile-test-failure/ (accessed June 25, 2021).

530

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength38. Air Force Global Strike Command Public Affairs, “AFGSC Tests Minuteman III Missile Launch from Vandenberg AFB,” U.S. Air Force,
February 5, 2020, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2075531/afgsc-tests-minuteman-iii-missile-launch-fromvandenberg-afb/ (accessed June 25, 2021).
39. Air Force Global Strike Command Public Affairs, “Unarmed Minuteman III Test Launched: Missile Launched from Airborne Navy
Aircraft,” U.S. Strategic Command, August 4, 2020, https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2299173/
unarmed-minuteman-iii-test-launched-missile-launched-from-airborne-navy-aircraft/ (accessed June 25, 2021).
40. Air Force Global Strike Command Public Affairs, “Minuteman III Test Launch Aborts Prior to Launch,” Air Force Global Strike
Command AFSTRAT-AIR, May 5, 2021, https://www.afgsc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2595189/minuteman-iii-test-launchaborts-prior-to-launch/ (accessed June 25, 2021).
41. Shaan Shaikh, “US Navy Test Fires Trident II SLBM,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project,
Missile Threat, last modified February 18, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/us-navy-test-fires-trident-ii-slbm-4/ (accessed
June 25, 2021), and Masao Dahlgren, “US Navy Test Fires Trident II SLBM,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile
Defense Project, Missile Threat, last modified February 11, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/us-navy-test-fires-trident-ii-slbm-5/(accessed June 25, 2021).
42. Oriana Pawlyk, “The B-52 Will No Longer Carry Certain Nuclear Weapons. Here’s Why,” Military.com, January 18, 2020, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/01/18/b-52-will-no-longer-carry-certain-nuclear-weapons-heres-why.html (accessed June25, 2021).
43. “Hyten Says Nuclear Modernization Cannot Be Delayed,” Air Force Magazine, June 20, 2017, https://www.airforcemag.com/hytensays-nuclear-modernization-cannot-be-delayed/ (accessed June 25, 2021).
44. Stenographic transcript of hearing To Receive Testimony on United States Strategic Command and United States SpaceCommand in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program, p. 86.
45. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture. The Final Report of theCongressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press,2009), p. 14, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).

47. 50 U.S. Code § 2538b, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/2538b (accessed June 25, 2021).
48. Tables, “Engineering: Funding (Non-Comparable, New Structure),” and “Engineering: Funding (Comparable, Old Structure),”in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2021 Congressional Budget Request,
Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration: Federal Salaries and Expenses, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, February 2020, p. 207, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2020/03/f72/doe-fy2021budget-volume-1_2.pdf (accessed June 20, 2020), and Explanatory Statement, “Division D—Energy and Water Development
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2021,” in Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Committee Print of the Committee
on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on H.R. 133/Public Law 116-260 [Legislative Text and Explanatory Statement],
Book 1 of 2, Divisions A–F, p. 959.
49. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2022 Congressional Budget Request,
Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration: Federal Salaries and Expenses, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, May 2021, p. [276], https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-05/doe-fy2022-budgetvolume-1.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
50. These funds include $53 million to NNSA for initial concept studies and approximately $32.5 million for DOD to begin work on
the Mark 7 reentry vehicle. See Explanatory Statement, “Division D—Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2021,” in Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Committee Print of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S.
House of Representatives, on H.R. 133/Public Law 116-260 [Legislative Text and Explanatory Statement], Book 1 of 2, Divisions A–F,
p. 953, and Exhibit R-2A, “RDT&E Project Justification: PB 2021 Navy,” in U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of Defense Fiscal
Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy, Justification Book Volume 5 of 5: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy, February
2020, p. 114, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/RDTEN_BA7-8_Book.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
51. Table, “Weapons Activities: Funding by Program,” in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Departmentof Energy FY 2022 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration: Federal Salaries andExpenses, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, p. [125], and U.S. Department of Energy, Officeof Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2021 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 1, National Nuclear Security
Administration: Federal Salaries and Expenses, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, p. 105.

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46. U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements
and Commitments, April 2021, pp. 38 and 40–41, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2021-Adherence-to-andCompliance-With-Arms-Control-Nonproliferation-and-Disarmament-Agreements-and-Commitments.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).

52. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “NNSA Approves Critical Decision 1 for Los Alamos
Plutonium Pit Production Project,” April 28, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-approves-critical-decision-1-losalamos-plutonium-pit-production-project (accessed June 25, 2021), and U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration, “NNSA Approves Critical Decision 1 for Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility,” June 28, 2021, https://www.
energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-approves-critical-decision-1-savannah-river-plutonium-processing-facility (accessed September 11,
2021)
53. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2021 Congressional Budget Request,
Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration: Federal Salaries and Expenses, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, p. 211.
54. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Fiscal Year 2021 Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan—Biennial Plan Summary: Report to Congress, December 2020, p. 2-10, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2020/12/
f82/FY2021_SSMP.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
55. While the B61-11, the United States’ only current earth-penetrating bomb, will remain in the stockpile, the B61-12 LEP will
not provide an earth-penetrating capability. Mark B. Schneider, “Putin’s New Assured Survival Nuclear Bunker,” Real Clear
Defense, December 1, 2021, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/12/01/putins_new_assured_survival_nuclear_
bunker_651424.html (accessed May 19, 2021). Congress canceled the Bush Administration’s effort to develop a Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator in 2005.
56. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, pp. 45 and 46.
57. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Triad: DOD and DOE Face Challenges Mitigating Risks to U.S. Deterrence Efforts,
GAO 21-210, May 2021, pp. 26–29, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-210.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).

﻿

58. ExchangeMonitor, “Officers Send Conflicting Signals on Columbia Sub Margin,” Morning Briefing, February 27, 2019, https://www.
exchangemonitor.com/officers-send-conflicting-signals-columbia-margin/ (accessed June 25, 2021), and Ronald O’Rourke, “NavyColumbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional ResearchService Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R41129, updated March 22, 2020, pp. 11–12, https://crsreports.
congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41129/178 (accessed June 25, 2021).
59. Explanatory Statement, “Division C—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021,” in Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,
Committee Print of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on H.R. 133/Public Law 116-260 [Legislative
Text and Explanatory Statement], Book 1 of 2, Divisions A–F, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., March 2021, p. 652, https://www.congress.
gov/117/cprt/HPRT43749/CPRT-117HPRT43749.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
60. Stenographic transcript of Hearing to Receive Testimony on Matters Relating to the Budget of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, September 17, 2020, p. 56,https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/20-37_09-17-2020.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
61. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Triad: DOD and DOE Face Challenges Mitigating Risks to U.S. Deterrence
Efforts, p. 35.
62. Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Department of the Air Force Awards Contract for New ICBM System that Enhances,Strengthens US Triad,” U.S. Air Force, September 8, 2020, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2340139/departmentof-the-air-force-awards-contract-for-new-icbm-system-that-enhances-s/ (accessed June 25, 2021).
63. For instance, see press release, “Senator Markey and Rep. [Earl] Blumenauer Announce Legislation to Cut $73 Billion from
Bloated Nuclear Weapons Budget,” Office of Senator Ed Markey, May 24, 2021, https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/pressreleases/senator-markey-and-rep-blumenauer-announce-legislation-to-cut-73-billion-from-bloated-nuclear-weapons-budget(accessed June 25, 2021).
64. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, pp. XIV. See also ibid., p. 60.
65. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. xv, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/
defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf (accessed June 23, 2021).
66. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook
2020, p. 45.
67. The Honorable Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, statement before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, March 4, 2020, p. 6, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/
AP10/20200304/110623/HHRG-116-AP10-Wstate-Gordon-HagertyL-20200304.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
68. Verdon, statement before Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, p. 2.

532

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength69. Table 1, “NNSA Deferred Maintenance (DM) as a Percentage of Replacement Plant Value (RPV),” in U.S. Department of Energy,
Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2022 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 1, National Nuclear
Security Administration: Federal Salaries and Expenses, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors,
p. [336].
70. Transcript, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department of Energy’s Atomic Energy Defense Programs in Review of the
National Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program, Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate, March 28, 2019, pp. 4 and 49, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19-30_03-28-19.pdf(accessed June 25, 2021).
71. MITRE Corp., JASON Group, “Pit Lifetime,” JSR-06-335, November 20, 2006, p. 1, http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/JASON_
ReportPuAging.pdf (accessed June 16, 2021).
72. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Triad: DOD and DOE Face Challenges Mitigating Risks to U.S. Deterrence Efforts, p. 34.
73. Tritium is a critical component of nuclear warheads, used for such functions as increasing warhead yield and margins. It has a
half-life of 12 years so must be replenished in U.S. warheads over time.
74. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Triad: DOD and DOE Face Challenges Mitigating Risks to U.S. Deterrence Efforts, p. 34.
75. Verdon, statement before Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, p. 5.
76. William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-15, “U.S. Policy on Stockpile Stewardship Under an Extended Moratorium
and a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB),” November 3, 1993, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-15.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
77. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan: Report to Congress, July 2019, p. 3-26, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1615600 (accessed June 25, 2021).
78. Ibid. The SSMP for FY 2018 specified somewhat more precisely that “[f]ull compliance with domestic regulations, agreements,and laws relating to worker and public safety and the environment, as well as international treaties, could significantly extend
the time required for execution of a nuclear test beyond 36 months.” U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Fiscal Year 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan: Report to Congress, November 2017, p. 3-26,
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/11/f46/fy18ssmp_final_november_2017%5B1%5D_0.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).

80. Hopkins, “Nuclear Test Readiness. What Is Needed? Why?” pp. 9–15.
81. Stenographic transcript of hearing To Receive Testimony on United States Strategic Command and United States SpaceCommand in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program, p. 79.
82. S. 4049, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, 116th Cong., introduced June 23, 2020, § 3166, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/4049/text (accessed June 25, 2021).
83. Joe Gould, “House Democrats Vote to Block Funding for Nuclear Weapons Tests,” Defense News, July 20, 2020, https://www.
defensenews.com/congress/2020/07/20/house-democrats-block-funding-for-nuclear-weapons-tests/ (accessed June 25, 2021).
84. Press release, “Lawmakers Decide Against Nuclear Weapons Test Funding in Annual Defense Bill,” Union of Concerned Scientists,
December 3, 2020, https://www.ucsusa.org/about/news/no-nuclear-weapons-testing-funding-annual-defense-bill (accessed
June 25, 2021), and Report No. 116-617, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021,
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 6395, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess. December 3, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/
hrpt617/CRPT-116hrpt617.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
85. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018, p. 63.
86. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan, p. 7-1.
87. Ibid., p. 7-5.
88. Verdon, statement before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, p. 6.
89. Stenographic transcript of hearing To Receive Testimony on United States Strategic Command and United States Space Command in
Review of the National Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program,” p. 74.
90. In January 2014, the Air Force discovered widespread cheating on nuclear proficiency exams and charged more than 100 officers
with misconduct, leading DOD to conduct a review that identified issues that included a lack of leadership attention and alack of resources with which to modernize the atrophied infrastructure. Since then, DOD and the Air Force in particular have
implemented a number of changes to improve the morale of nuclear forces.

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79. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Fiscal Year 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan: Report to Congress, p. 3-26.

91. General Timothy M. Ray, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, statement on “FY22 Posture for Department of Defense
Nuclear Forces” before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, May 12, 2021, p.
2, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/5-12-21%20Gen%20Ray%20Written%20Statement%20Final.pdf(accessed June 25, 2021).
92. Kris Osborn, “Air Force Says Nuclear Weapons and Stealth Bombers Remain Ready for War, Despite COVID-19,” Fox News, April
29, 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/tech/air-force-nuclear-weapons-stealth-bombers-remain-ready-despite-coronavirus(accessed June 25, 2021), and Lucas Y. Tomlinson, “Coronavirus Has ‘No Impact’ on Ability to Launch Nuclear Weapons: Top US
Nuke Commander,” Fox News, March 17, 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/us/coronavirus-does-not-affect-nuclear-weaponslaunch (accessed June 25, 2021).
93. U.S. Department of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, pp. XII, 54, and 55.
94. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2020, p. 31, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/3/pdf/sgar20-en.pdf (accessed June 25, 2021).
95. Toby Dalton and Ain Han, “Elections, Nukes, and the Future of the South Korea–U.S. Alliance,” Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, October 26, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/26/elections-nukes-and-future-of-south-koreau.s.-alliance-pub-83044 (accessed June 25, 2021).
96. See Vic Mercado, “A Nuclear Sea-launched Cruise Missile Will Help Deter Nuclear Aggression,” Defense News, August 5, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/08/05/a-nuclear-sea-launched-cruise-missile-will-help-deternuclear-aggression/ (accessed June 25, 2021).

﻿

97. Patty-Jane Geller, “Dangerous Nuclear Policy Idea No. 2: A U.S. Policy of No First Use or Sole Purpose,” Heritage Foundation Issue
Brief No. 6047, February 16, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/dangerous-nuclear-policy-idea-no-2-us-policy-nofirst-use-or-sole-purpose.

534

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Missile Defense
Patty-Jane GellerMissile defense is a critical component of
the U.S. national security architecturethat enables U.S. military efforts and can protect national critical infrastructure, from population and industrial centers to politically andhistorically important sites. It can strengthen
U.S. diplomatic and deterrence efforts and provide both time and options to senior decision-­makers amid crises involving, for example,
cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons thatfly on ballistic and non-ballistic trajectories.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military535

﻿launch sophisticated missiles, which implies
that it has or is developing the ability to advance to the ICBM level of capability.3
China and Russia, in addition to their vast
ballistic missile inventories, are investing in
new ground-launched, air-launched, and sealaunched cruise missiles that uniquely challenge the United States in different domains
and are deploying new hypersonic glide vehicles.4 China is rapidly building up its missile inventory, to include hundreds of new
silo-based ICBMs and road-mobile ICBMs
The Growing Missile Threatthat reportedly can carry 10 warheads, as well
Missiles remain a weapon of choice for as theater-range missiles that can strike U.S.
many U.S. adversaries who view them as assets with precision.5 Russia is developing
cost-effective and symbols of power compared entirely new capabilities, such as a nuclear-­to other types of conventional weapons.1 The powered cruise missile, that are intended tonumber of states that possess missiles will avoid U.S. sensors and missile defenses, andcontinue to increase, as will the sophistication its conventionally armed sea-launched andof these weapons as modern technologies be- air-launched cruise missiles can strike stratecome cheaper and more widely available.
gic nodes within the U.S. homeland, even from
Despite U.S. diplomatic efforts, North Ko- Russian territory.6
rea continues its aggressive pursuit of a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) The Strategic Role of Missile Defense
program—­including a new “monster” ICBM
Because they are designed to detect and desupposedly able to carry multiple warheads feat incoming missile attacks, missile defense
and decoys—that will allow it to strike the Unit- systems can save lives and protect civilian ined States. It also recently tested ground-based frastructure from damage or destruction. Moreand sea-based ballistic missiles and appears to important, missile defense plays a critical role
direct its missile advancements toward over- in strategic deterrence.
coming U.S. missile defenses.2
The ability to deter an enemy from attackIran continues to modernize and proliferate ing depends on convincing him that his attack
its regional missile systems. Its recent success- will fail, that the cost of carrying out a sucful solid-fuel rocket launch demonstrates that cessful attack is prohibitively high, or that the
Iran has the ability to build and successfully consequences of an attack will outweigh theperceived benefit of attacking. A U.S. missile interests. This can make them profoundly
defense system strengthens deterrence by stabilizing.
offering a degree of protection to the American people and the economic base on which The U.S. Missile Defense System
their well-being depends, as well as forward-­
The U.S. missile defense system has three
deployed troops and allies, making it harder for critical physical components:
an adversary to threaten them with missiles.
By raising the threshold for missile attack, misSensors,
sile defense limits the option for a “cheap shot”
against the United States.
Interceptors, andA missile defense system also gives adecision-­maker a significant political advanCommand and control infrastructure
tage. By protecting key U.S. assets, it mitigatesthat provides data from sensors toan adversary’s ability to intimidate the Unitedinterceptors.
States into conceding important security, diplomatic, or economic interests.
Of these, interceptors receive much of theMissile defense systems enable U.S. and al- public’s attention because of their visible andlied conventional operations. Adversaries want kinetic nature. Components of missile defense
to deny the United States the ability to conduct systems can be classified based on the phase of
offensive operations during a regional conflict, flight during which intercept occurs, althoughwhich they can do by targeting U.S. and allied some—for example, the command and control
forward-deployed personnel or military as- infrastructure or radars—can support intersets. In addition, they might try to decouple cepts in various phases of flight. Interceptors
the United States from defense of its allies can shoot down an adversarial ballistic missile
by threatening to strike U.S. forces and assets in the boost, ascent, midcourse, or terminal
if the United States intervenes in a regional phase of its flight. As cruise missiles and hyconflict. Missile defenses in place, by making personic glide vehicles continue to proliferate,
it easier for the U.S. military to introduce rein- the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and theforcements that can move more freely through services must therefore consider intercept ina region, can strengthen the credibility of U.S. the boost, glide, or terminal phase of flight.
extended deterrence.
Another way to classify missile defense
Finally, a missile defense system gives systems is by the range of an incoming missile
decision-­makers more time to choose the (short-range, medium-range, intermediate-­
most de-escalatory course of action. Without range, or intercontinental-range) that an
the ability to defend against an attack, U.S. au- interceptor is designed to shoot down. An
thorities would be limited to an unappealing interceptor’s flight time determines both theset of responses ranging from preemptively at- time available to conduct an intercept and thetacking an adversary to attacking his missiles optimal interceptor placement to improve inon launch pads or even acceding to an enemy’s tercept probability. With ICBMs, the United
demands or actions. By assuring some level of States has “30 minutes or less”7 to detect theprotection from a missile attack, robust missile missile, track it, provide the information to
defense systems would affect the dynamics of the missile defense system, find the optimal
decision-making by removing the need to take firing solution, launch an interceptor, andimmediate action.
shoot down the incoming missile, ideally with
In other words, missile defense creates enough time to fire another interceptor if theadditional options and provides more time to first attempt fails. The time frame for intersort through them and their implications to cepting short-range, medium-range, and inarrive at the one that best serves U.S. security termediate-range ballistic missiles is shorter.
l

l

﻿

l

536

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

MAP 19

U.S. Missile Defense Assets
10
3

4

CANADA

1
5

7

6

U.S.

11

8
9

Pacific
Ocean

13
15
14

12

Atlantic
Ocean

2

18

RUSSIA

CHINA

16
17

AFRICA

SOUTH
AMERICA

Indian
Ocean

AUSTRALIA

GBI—Ground-based interceptors
GFC—Fire control center
GMD—Ground-based midcourse defense
Shemya, AK• Cobra Dane radar
• IDT

12

Pearl Harbor, HI (base)• Sea-based X-Band radar

23

Clear, AK• UEWR

34 Ft. Greely, AK• 40 GBIs
• GMD
• GFC
• IDT
45

56

Vandenberg AFB, CA• 4 GBIs• 2 IDTs
Beale AFB, CA• UEWR

TPY-2—Transportable Radar Surveillance
and Control Model 2
UEWR—Upgraded early warning radar

67 Schriever AFB, CO
• GFC

14
13 Israel

78 Ft. Drum, NY
• IDT

15
14 CENTCOM-Middle East

89 Cape Cod, MA• UEWR

16
15 Shariki, Japan

10
9 Thule, Greenland

17
16 Kyogamisaki, Japan

11 Fylingdales, UK
10• UEWR

17 Outer space
18• UEWR• TPY-2 radar• TPY-2 radar﻿1

IDT—In-Flight Interceptor
Communications System (IFICS)
Data Terminal• TPY-2 radar• TPY-2 radar

12 Rota, Spain (base)11• Sea-based Aegis BMD
SPY-1 radar
13 Kurecik AFB, Turkey
12• TPY-2 radar• Defense support program
satellites• Space-based infraredsystem satellites• Space tracking andsurveillancesystem-demonstrator

NOTE: Locations are approximate.
SOURCES:• Fact Sheet, “Upgraded Early Warning Radars, AN/FPS-132,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, approved for
public release July 28, 2016, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/uewr1.pdf (accessed August 19, 2021).
• William Cole, “‘Golf Ball’ Radar Leaves Pearl Harbor After $24M Upgrade,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser, October 8, 2019, https://www.staradvertiser.com/2019/10/08/hawaii-news/golf-ball-radar-leaves-pearl-harbor-after-24m-upgrade/ (accessed August 19, 2021).
• Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD),” January 31, 2019,https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/ground-based-midcourse-defense/ (accessed August 19, 2021).
• Thomas Karako, Ian Williams, and Wes Rumbaugh, Missile Defense 2020: Next Steps for Defending the Homeland, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, April 2017, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/
s3fs-public/publication/170406_Karako_MissileDefense2020_Web.pdf (accessed August 19, 2021).
A heritage.org

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FIGURE 6

U.S. Missile Defense: Interceptors

MISSILETHREAT TYPE
Intercontinental

MIDCOURSE

5,500 kmIntermediateRange

MIDCOURSE

3,000 km

MIDCOURSE
AND TERMINAL

MediumRange

TERMINAL

1,000 km
TERMINALTERMINAL

Ground-basedInterceptor

Aegis Standard
Missile-3

Terminal High
Altitude Area
DefensePatriot
Advanced
Capability-3

44 interceptors

40 Aegis BMDequipped ships

7 batteries

15 battalions

Short-Range﻿

MIDCOURSE
AND TERMINALSOURCE: Lieutenant General Daniel L. Karbler, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, andCommander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, statement on “Fiscal Year 2022 Authorization
Request for Missile Defense” before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, June 9, 2021,
pp. 18 and 19, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Karbler%20Written%20Statement%20to%20SASC%
206-091.pdf (accessed August 17, 2021).
A heritage.org

Finally, missile defense can be framed by
the origin of interceptor launch. At present,
U.S. interceptors are launched from the groundor from the sea. In the past, the United States
explored possible ways to launch interceptors from the air or from space, but efforts538

on that front have been limited since the U.S.
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty in 2002.8
The current U.S. missile defense system is a
result of investments made by successive U.S.
Administrations. President Ronald Reagan

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthmissile defense programs. The 2019 MDR addresses the dangerous threat environment thathas evolved since the previous MDR in 2010
and advocates a comprehensive approach to all
missile threats—no longer only ballistic—that
integrates offensive capabilities, active defenses, and passive defenses. It acknowledges that
the United States is no longer vulnerable only
to ballistic missiles and recognizes that future
missile defense systems must defend against
cruise and hypersonic missiles as well.14
For fiscal year (FY) 2022, the Biden Administration requested $8.9 billion for the MDA,15
a decrease from the FY 2021 budget request’s
projection of $9.1 billion16 and a decrease of$1.6 billion from the FY 2021 enacted budgetof $10.5 billion.17

Interceptors
Interceptors are one major component of
the U.S. missile defense system. Different typesof interceptors that respond to different missile threats have been emphasized over theyears, and the composition of today’s U.S. missile defense reflects these choices.
While the United States is working to improve its ability to strike down cruise missiles
and hypersonic glide vehicles, the primary
mission of its fully operational missile defense
systems today is to intercept ballistic missiles.
In particular, missile defense interceptors aredesigned to intercept ballistic missiles in threedifferent phases of flight.
lll

The boost phase extends from the time a
missile is launched from its platform until
its engines stop thrusting.
The midcourse phase is the longest andthus offers a unique opportunity to intercept an incoming threat and, depending
on other circumstances like the trajectoryof the incoming threat and quality of U.S.
tracking data, a second shot if the firstintercept attempt fails.
The terminal phase is less than one
minute long, occurring as the missile

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﻿envisioned the program—the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—as a layered ballistic
missile defense (BMD) system, including
BMD interceptors in space, that would render
nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.”9These layers would have boost, ascent, midcourse, and terminal interceptors, including
directed-­energy interceptors, providing theUnited States with more than one opportunity
to shoot down an incoming missile.
The United States stopped far short of thisgoal, even though the SDI program generated
tremendous technological advances and benefits.10 Instead of a comprehensive layered
system, the U.S. has no boost-phase ballistic
missile defense systems and no defense against
the advanced ballistic missile threats from China or Russia. The volatility and inconsistencyof priority and funding for missile defense by
successive Administrations and Congresses—
Administrations and Congresses controlled
by both major political parties—have yieldeda system that is numerically and technologically limited and incapable of defending against
more sophisticated or more numerous longrange missile attacks.
Beginning with the National Missile Defense
Act of 1999, it was U.S. policy to protect thehomeland only from a “limited ballistic missile
attack.”11 The National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 dropped theword “limited” even as it continued to focus onballistic missiles.12 Then the 2020 NDAA made ita matter of policy to rely on nuclear deterrence
to defend against “near-peer intercontinental
threats” and focus on improving missile defense
against “rogue states.”13 In the future, as technological trends progress and modern technologies become cheaper and more widely available,
North Korean or Iranian ballistic missiles may
rival, in sophistication if not in numbers, thoseof Russia or China. Consequently, the U.S. mustremain aware of how such threats are evolving
and alter its missile defense posture accordingly.
In January 2019, the Trump Administration published its congressionally mandated
Missile Defense Review (MDR), a statement ofpolicy intended to guide the Administration’s﻿

plummets through the atmospheretoward the target, and offers a very limited opportunity to intercept a ballistic
missile threat.
Boost-Phase Interceptors. The UnitedStates currently has no capability to shootdown missiles in their boost phase. Technologically, boost-phase intercept is the most challenging option because of the very short timeframe in which a missile is boosting, the missile’s extraordinary rate of acceleration during
this brief window of time, and the need to havethe interceptor close to the launch site.18 This
phase, however, is also the most beneficial time
to strike. A boosting ballistic missile is at its
slowest speed compared to other phases; it istherefore not yet able to maneuver evasively
and has not yet deployed decoys that complicate the targeting and intercept problem.
In the past, the United States pursued several boost-phase programs, including the Airborne Laser, the Network Centric Air Defense
Element, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, and
the Air Launched Hit-to-Kill missile. Each ofthese programs was eventually cancelled because of technical, operational, or cost challenges. The current MDR discusses the optionof incorporating the F-35 initially as a sensor
platform and later as an interceptor platform
for boost-phase intercepts. However, this effort has not progressed.
Midcourse-Phase Interceptors. Intercepting missiles in their midcourse phaseoffers more time for intercept and presents
fewer technological challenges than intercept
in the boost phase presents, but it also allows
the missile time to deploy decoys and countermeasures that are designed to complicate interception by confusing sensors and radars.
The United States deploys two systems thatcan shoot down incoming missiles in the midcourse phase of flight:ll

The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense(GMD) system and
The Aegis defense system.

540

The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
system is the only operational system capableof shooting down a long-range ballistic missile headed for the U.S. homeland. It consistsof 40 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) at
Fort Greeley, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg
Air Force Base, California. A GBI consists of amulti-staged rocket booster and an Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which intercepts
the incoming missile with hit-to-kill technology. In March 2019, the MDA conducted agroundbreaking and successful “salvo” GMD
test against an ICBM target during which one
GBI intercepted the target and a second intercepted the biggest piece of debris from the
exploded target.19
To increase the probability of an intercept,
the United States has to shoot multiple interceptors at each incoming ballistic missile. At
present, because its inventory of interceptors
is limited, the United States can shoot down
only a handful of ballistic missiles that haverelatively unsophisticated countermeasures.
In 2017, Congress approved a White House
request to increase the number of GBIs from44 to 64 to keep up with the advancing ballistic missile threat, particularly from North
Korea. Construction of 20 new silos has been
underway, but they remain empty.20 The MDA
intended to produce a Redesigned Kill Vehicle(RKV) to top 20 additional GBIs to fill thesesilos, but this program was canceled in 2019because of technological difficulties. The MDA
instead initiated the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) program to build an entirely new
interceptor that would add both capacity andcapability to the GMD system. NGIs will begin
to fill the 20 empty silos in 2028 and eventually will replace at least some of the existing 44
GBIs, the result of which will likely be a mixed
fleet of interceptors. Unlike the GBIs, the NGI
will feature multiple kill vehicles, enabling asingle NGI to shoot at multiple objects ejectedfrom one incoming missile.21
Contracts to develop the NGI were awarded
to Lockheed Martin and a Northrop Grumman–­Raytheon team in March 2021.22 The FY 2022
budget request includes $926 million for2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthto defend Guam as well as $40 million to begin procuring components for a missile defense system.29
In November 2020, the U.S. Navy and the
MDA shot down an intercontinental-range
ballistic missile using the SM-3 interceptor
class Block IIA against an ICBM target.30 The
test, FTM-44, was the first step in a plan to use
SM-3 Block IIAs as an “underlay” to the GMD
system to defend the homeland, with GBIs
taking the first shot at an incoming target andSM-3 interceptors taking a second shot if the
GBIs miss.31 Deploying such an underlay would
require a concept of operations that includes
optimal locations for the deployment of SM-3
interceptors on Aegis ships or at Aegis Ashoresites across the United States.
The November 2020 test was against a simple ICBM target; the next step will be to test
against a more complicated and realistic ICBM
target that could be armed with decoys or other missile-defense countermeasures. The FY
2022 budget request supports the continued
pursuit of a layered homeland defense (LHD)approach with funding for continued assessment of the SM-3 Block IIA against ICBMs.32
Terminal-Phase Interceptors. The United States currently deploys three terminal-­
phase missile defense systems:lTerminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD);l

The Patriot missile defense system; andlAegis BMD.

A THAAD battery is capable of shooting
down short-range and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles inside and just outside of theatmosphere.33 It consists of a launcher, interceptors, the Army Navy/Transportable Radar
Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2)
radar, and fire control.34 The system is transportable and rapidly deployable.
THAAD batteries have been deployed tosuch countries as Japan, South Korea, Israel,
and the United Arab Emirates. The United

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﻿

NGI to support these two competing designs
through Preliminary Design Review.23
The Aegis defense system is a sea-based
component of the U.S. missile defense system.
It is designed to address the threat of shortrange, medium-range (1,000–3,000 kilometers), and intermediate-range (3,000–5,500
kilometers) ballistic missiles. It utilizes different versions of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
depending on the threat and other considerations like ship location and quality of tracking data. The Aegis system also has capability
against aerial threats and cruise missiles.24“Under the FY2021 budget submission,”
according to the Congressional Research Service, “the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis
ships is projected to increase from 48 at theend of FY2021 to 65 at the end of FY2025.”25
The increase reflects an increase in demand
for these assets.
The Aegis Ashore system in Romania andanother being deployed to Poland will relieve
some of the stress on the fleet because missile
defense–capable cruisers and destroyers are
multi-mission and are used for other purposes,
such as wartime fleet operations and even anti-­piracy operations. These Aegis Ashore sites
will help to protect U.S. allies and forces in Europe from the Iranian ballistic missile threat.
Two Aegis Ashore batteries were being
built in Japan to help protect U.S. allies andforces in the Indo-Pacific from the North Korean and Chinese threats, but the Japanesecanceled the project in June 2020 because ofcosts and technical issues.26 Instead, Japan willbuild two additional destroyers to deploy SM-3
interceptors.27
Moreover, the former Commander of U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Admiral Philip Davidson, has testified that “themost important action we can take to increase
the joint force’s lethality [in the region] is tointroduce a 360-degree, persistent, air andmissile defense capability on Guam (GuamDefense System (GDS)),” a capability that only
the Aegis Ashore system can provide.28 The FY
2022 budget request includes $78.3 million to
support the continued assessment of systems

States temporarily deployed a THAAD battery
to Romania in support of NATO ballistic missile defense in the summer of 2019 as Romania’s Aegis Ashore system was being updated35
and signed a deal in 2020 to deliver THAAD to
Saudi Arabia.36 In FY 2022:

﻿[The MDA will also] continue to evaluate a new Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) interceptor prototype
to support Contiguous United States
Defense as part of the LHD effort. Thiseffort will result in a series of technology
demonstrations allowing for expansion ofengagement options and coverage areas
for the THAAD weapon system culminating in a flight test in FY 2023.37

Patriot is an air-defense and short-range
ballistic missile defense system. A battery iscomprised of a launcher, interceptors, AN/
MPQ-53/65 radar, an engagement control
station, and diesel-powered generator units.
The Patriot family of missile defense interceptors has been upgraded over time, from theinitial Patriot Advanced Capability-1 (PAC-1)
deployed in Europe in 1988 to the PAC-3 configuration deployed around the world today.
The most recent Patriot upgrade, the PAC-3
Missile Segment Enhancement, expands thelethal battlespace with an advanced solid
rocket motor.38 The system is transportable,
and the United States currently deploys it inseveral theaters around the world.39
Assessment. Interceptor strength is difficult to assess because, while deploying moreinterceptors to increase capacity or defend
more targets would always be better, deploying more short-range to medium-range interceptors to unprotected locations or increasing interceptor capacity ad infinitum is simply
not feasible. Congress provided funding in FY
2021 to procure additional PAC-3, SM-3, and
THAAD interceptors, and the FY 2022 budget
continues this effort for PAC-3 and SM-3 interceptors. However, the FY 2022 budget sharply reduces support for THAAD interceptor
procurement.40

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To increase the defended battlespace, the
MDA is also pursuing the Patriot Launch-onRemote (THAAD) capability, which integrates
the PAC-3 and THAAD systems by enabling a
PAC-3 launch using a THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar.
Launch-on-Remote is an important capability
that can help to increase the defended area by
spreading out missiles.41 The MDA conducted
two flight tests for this capability in 2020, andboth failed.42 However, the test failures do notnecessarily indicate lack of progress; the MDA
can now use the test data to proceed with development of this capability. The Army plans
to field this capability “across all Patriot battalions beginning in Fiscal Year 2023.”43
In addition, Congress provided funding foran eighth battery that appeared on the Army’s
unfunded priorities list. Nine THAAD batteries have long been required, but sufficient
funds have not been available to support morethan seven.44
One way to improve interceptor capability
would be to fully fund an Aegis Ashore system
on Guam using SM-3 interceptors in FY 2022.
Such a system for Guam has appeared on the
INDOPACOM unfunded priorities list for the
past three years, but efforts to build the systemhave yet to begin. This year’s budget includes
funding to study a missile defense architecture
on Guam and begin procuring componentsthat would be common to any missile defense
system. However, the budget does not commit to any specific system that will be built on
Guam. Congress could move this critical capability forward by providing the additional$231.7 million requested for the Guam Defense
System on INDOPACOM’s FY 2022 unfundedpriorities list.45
In terms of capacity and capability to defend the homeland, the Commander of U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM), General Glen VanHerck, recently stated that heis “comfortable with my ability to defend thehomeland, including Hawaii, against a limited
state actor such as DPRK, which the system isdesigned for, for the foreseeable future” butthat we need “to maintain the timeline of nolater than 2028 for NGI, to ensure that we

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthDespite the MDA’s original plan to field
an underlay quickly as U.S. forces await NGI,
the Department of Defense (DOD) has yet tospecify a concept of operations for employing
the SM-3 Block IIA and THAAD for homeland defense, as requested by Congress. The
FY 2022 budget request states that homeland
underlay systems “could begin fielding as early as 2025” but does not address where in the
United States those systems could be deployedor how many would be required.51 The utilityof exploring the use of SM-3 and THAAD interceptors for ICBMs can also extend beyond
an underlay for the continental United States,as they can also work for other missions or defended assets like Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam.
Therefore, using SM-3 and THAAD interceptors to defend against ICBMs is a worthwhile
effort, but the DOD will eventually need a more
specific deployment plan.
The cruise missile threat to the homeland,
for which the United States does not have a
dedicated missile defense system, is also advancing. That Russia can strike key strategic
nodes in the U.S. homeland from its own territory is of particular concern. To address thecruise missile threat, General VanHerck hasemphasized improving domain awareness,because early identification of a threat allows
for options like left-of-launch operations or diplomacy to avoid having to shoot down cruise
missiles in the U.S. homeland.52 Ensuring that
the NORTHCOM Commander has the capabilities needed to address this advancing threat
will therefore be important.
The Army’s Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment 2 program has been
moving very slowly but has seen recent improvement. The IFPC 2 would defend against
short-range rockets, artillery, and mortars,
as well as cruise missiles, against which theUnited States, as noted, lacks a sufficient defensive capability.53 As a system, IFPC would
fill the gap between short-range tactical air
defense and ballistic missile defense like
PAC-3 and THAAD.
In response to a congressional requirement to field an interim cruise missile defense

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﻿maintain capacity and capability to defend
against a ballistic missile threat.”46 Among
General VanHerck’s specific concerns are theincreasing capacity of North Korean ballistic
missiles to strike the U.S. homeland and North
Korea’s ability to deploy decoys.47
The recent NGI contract award follows adelay in schedule of more than a year. Fortunately, both competitors have been challenged
to meet or exceed the schedule of 2028 for an
operational capability.48 This program also
seems to enjoy bipartisan support in Congress.
In addition to accelerating the NGI program, Congress provided additional funds inboth FY 2020 and FY 2021 for a GMD service
life extension program (SLEP). The GMD system was largely built in the early 2000s, andmany parts—like the GBI kill vehicles andboosters—are subject to degradation fromaging. Regardless of how quickly NGI can bedelivered, GBIs will likely remain a part of the
fleet of interceptors beyond this decade.
Moreover, it is important to distinguish between GBIs, which are the interceptors themselves, and GMD, which is the entire homeland defense system that encompasses othercomponents like silos, fire control, and eventraining methods for personnel. The MDA has
begun to replace aging boosters on the GBIs,
for instance, but as MDA Director Admiral Jon
Hill has stated, “It’s not just about the GBIs but
it’s also about the weapon system and its support.”49 Since the NGI will be integrated into
the GMD system for the long term, upgrading
the entire GMD system to last beyond the fielding of NGI will remain critical.
In FY 2020, to compensate for the delay inadding 20 additional interceptors to the fleet,the Trump Administration proposed that anunderlay using SM-3 Block IIA and THAAD
interceptors be developed. General VanHerckagreed to the value of an underlay, statingthat “an underlayer would give us additional
capacity and capability” to address threats tothe homeland, but he also specified that an underlay should focus on more than just ballistic
missiles, to include other threats like cruise
missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles.50

﻿

capability in response to the increasing cruise
missile threat, the Army purchased two Iron
Dome batteries manufactured by the Israeli company Rafael.54 Despite prior concerns
about integrating Iron Dome as part of an enduring IFPC solution, the Army is preparing
the Iron Dome systems for operational deployment and integration into its future missile defense command and control system.55 In April
2021, the Army issued the solicitation for its
own enduring IFPC 2 system, to reach combat
capability by 2023.56
Overall, the United States has multiple capable interceptors, but there is much room for
improvement. The most important step for thenear future will be on-time or early delivery of
the NGI to ensure protection of the homelandfrom North Korea.

Sensors
The sensor component of the U.S. missile defense system is distributed across theland, sea, and space domains and provides
the United States and its allies with the earliest possible warning of a launch of enemy
missiles in addition to missile tracking anddiscrimination. These sensors can detect a
missile launch, acquire and track a missile inflight, and even classify the type of projectile,
its speed, and the target against which the missile has been directed. They relay this information to the command and control stations
that operate interceptor systems like Aegis(primarily a sea-based system) or THAAD (aland-based system).
Land-Based. On land, the major sensor
installations are the upgraded early warningradars (UEWRs), which are concentrated
along the North Atlantic and Pacific corridorsthat present the most direct flight path for a
missile aimed at the United States. They include the phased array early warning radars
based in California, the United Kingdom, andGreenland that scan objects up to 3,000 miles
away.57 Two additional sites—one in Cape
Cod, Massachusetts, and the other in Clear,
Alaska—­are being modernized for use in thelayered ballistic missile defense system, but544

their certifications have been delayed.58 Thesesensors focus on threats that can be detectedin the missile’s boost or launch phase when
the release of exhaust gases creates a heat
trail that is “relatively easy for sensors to detect and track.”59 A shorter-range (2,000-mile)radar called the Cobra Dane is based in Shemya, Alaska.60
The United States also deploys mobile landbased sensors, called AN/TYP-2s. These sensors can be forward deployed for early threat
detection or kept in terminal mode to provide tracking and fire control support for the
THAAD interceptors.61 Of the United States’ 12
AN/TPY-2 systems, five are forward deployedwith U.S. allies.62
In cooperation with the Republic of Korea, the United States deploys a THAAD missile system accompanied by an AN/TPY-2
on the Korean Peninsula. Despite China’s
long-­standing opposition to a U.S. radar deployed so close to its homeland, the THAAD
system is critical to countering the North Korean threat.63
To fill a gap in missile discrimination capability for tracking North Korean missiles overthe Pacific, the MDA is developing the Long
Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) in Northern Alaska to improve coverage in the northern
Pacific. There had been plans to develop theHomeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) as
well to fill a tracking and discrimination gap
over Hawaii. In its FY 2021 budget request,
the Trump Administration omitted fundingfor HDR-H because of budget constraints, but
Congress provided the full funding needed toproceed with the radar. The FY 2022 budget
does not include funding for HDR-H, so thisradar’s future again lies with Congress.
Sea-Based. There are two types of seabased sensors. The first is the Sea-Based
X-band (SBX) radar, which is mounted on an
oil-drilling platform and can be relocated todifferent parts of the globe as threats evolve.64
SBX is employed primarily in the Pacific. The
second radar is the SPY-1 radar system, which
is mounted on all U.S. Navy vessels equippedwith the Aegis Combat System and therefore

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

phase.72 STSS-D satellites provide operational
surveillance and tracking capabilities and havethe advantage of a variable waveband infraredsystem to maximize their detection capabilities. Data obtained by STSS-D have been usedin ballistic missile defense tests and are now
providing risk reduction to support a future
space tracker. After more than a decade ofserving risk reduction efforts, the MDA recently announced its plans to deorbit the STSS-D
satellites within “the next couple [of ] years.”73
In addition, the United States is developing a system of satellites capable of providing
global detection, tracking, and discriminationof any missile launch. Dating back as far as
President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative,
successive Administrations have called for a
proliferated layer of sensing satellites in space
to track the flight of any type of missile—not
just ballistic—from birth to death.
A layer of space-based sensors can be particularly useful in tracking hypersonic vehicles, which fly at lower altitudes than ballistic
missiles and can maneuver during their trajectories. Comparatively, the DSP and SBIRS
systems were designed for ballistic missiles
and can lose track of missiles flying at lower
altitudes. Since many new threats are not flying on ballistic trajectories, the Trump Administration paid close attention to developing thisspace sensor layer as endorsed by the MDR.
As a result, the SDA, in conjunction with
the MDA, is developing a space Tracking Layer of satellites proliferated in Low-Earth Orbit(LEO) as part of the SDA’s National Defense
Space Architecture. According to the SDA:
Once fully operational, the SDA Tracking
Layer will consist of a proliferated heterogeneous constellation of Wide Field ofView (WFOV) space vehicles (SVs) thatprovide persistent global coverage andcustody capability combined with theMissile Defense Agency (MDA) Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor(HBTSS) Medium Field of View (MFOV)
SVs that provide precision global accesscapability.74

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﻿is able to provide data that can be utilized forballistic missile missions. Of these ships, 40
are BMD-capable vessels that carry missile
defense interceptors.65
Space-Based. Finally, U.S. missile defense
sensors operate in space. From the ultimate
high ground, space-based sensors can detectand track missile launches from almost any
location from boost to terminal phase, compared to ground-based radars that are limited in their tracking range.66 The MDA, theU.S. Space Force, and the Space Development
Agency (SDA) all control aspects of the space
missile defense sensor system.
Of the systems that contribute to the missile defense mission, the oldest is the Defense
Support Program (DSP), a constellation ofsatellites that use infrared sensors to identify
heat from booster and missile plumes. The DSP
satellite system has gradually been replacedby the Space-Based Infrared Radar System(SBIRS) to improve the delivery of missile
defense and battlefield intelligence.67 For instance, SBIRS can scan a wide swath of territory while simultaneously tracking a specifictarget, making it a useful means for observing
tactical, or short-range, ballistic missiles.68
The Air Force and Space Force havelaunched five SBIRS satellites out of a planned
total of six.69 The Air Force originally planned
to launch eight SBIRS satellites, but due tocongressional funding delays, it decided to
end production of SBIRS early and moveon to development of its replacement, theNext-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next-Gen OPIR) satellite, in 2017.70 The
seventh and eighth SBIRS satellites will beswitched to Next-Gen OPIR satellites, thefirst of which is to be delivered “no later than
FY 2025.”71 The Next-Gen OPIR satellites aredesigned to be more survivable against cyberand electronic attacks.
The MDA also operates the Space Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstrators(STSS-D) satellite system. Two STSS-D satellites were launched into orbit in 2009 to
track ballistic missiles that exit and reenter
the Earth’s atmosphere during the midcourse﻿Once deployed, the Tracking Layer will beable to detect, track, and discriminate among
any types of missile launches throughout theentirety of the missiles’ flights. The SDA is also
exploring the ability of space sensors to provide fire control information directly to weapon platforms like the NGI (as opposed to thedata’s going through a ground station).
Last year, Congress provided $130 million—
about $30 million above the President’s budget
request—for the HBTSS and affirmed that the
MDA, not the SDA, would develop the system.75
It also fulfilled the President’s request for $48
million for the SDA.76 This year’s budget request includes $256 million for the HBTSS
to enable an on-orbit demonstration for twocontractors in FY 2023.77
Assessment. Senior defense leaders havestated repeatedly that the most important
way to advance sensor capability is to deploy
sensor satellites to space in order to track missiles from the high ground throughout their
entire flight. According to Admiral Charles
Richard, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM):

improved missile tracking as well as the technological challenges associated with developing a sensor that can perform in LEO.80
Development of land-based sensors to fill
the missile discrimination capability gap overthe Pacific has progressed slowly. Development of the LRDR has been delayed by at leasta year.81 The HDR-H project resumed in FY
2021, but local opposition to its development
threatens to create delays.82 Because the DOD
originally proposed the HDR-H to fill the critical discrimination gap identified over Hawaii,
the lack of funding for HDR-H again in the FY
2022 budget also demonstrates a disconnect
with DOD priorities. Additionally, the Pentagon initially planned to build a radar elsewherein the Pacific (HDR-Pacific), but the FY 2021
budget request excluded this program, andCongress did not restore its funding. If NGI
is the solution to a strong homeland missile
defense, the NORTHCOM Commander musthave the sensor coverage necessary to executethe mission.
With respect to Next-Gen OPIR, Congress
fulfilled the FY 2021 budget request, whichshould keep the program on schedule, andFuture space-based sensors may bethis year’s budget request continues to fundable to provide birth-to-death detection,
the program.83 The Army is also progressing
tracking, and discrimination of hyperquickly on development of the Lower-Tier Air
sonic glide vehicle, cruise missile, andand Missile Defense System radars that willballistic missile threats globally. These
provide 360-degree threat coverage for PACabilities cannot be fully achieved with the
3 and other regional missile defense batteries;
current or future terrestrial-based radar
the current Patriot radar can scan only onearchitecture due to the constraints ofthird of the sky at a time.84
geography and characteristics of future
Fortunately, the space-sensor project is78
missile threats.
now on track compared to previous years. It
is important that land-based radar coverage
Fortunately, the U.S. government has pro- move forward in order to stabilize the future
gressed in the space-based sensor effort de- sensor architecture.
spite a slow start. In FY 2019, FY 2020, and FY
2021, the program was plagued by insufficient Command and Control
funding requests and bureaucratic infighting
Command and control of the U.S. ballistic
over whether the SDA or MDA would develop missile defense system requires bringing tothe HBTSS.79 These issues seem to have been gether data from U.S. sensors and radars andresolved as clear roles for the SDA and MDA relaying those data to interceptor operators sohave been defined. The space-based sensor that they can destroy incoming missile threatseffort must continue to be fully funded, espe- against the U.S. and its allies. The operational
cially in view of commanders’ urgent need for hub of missile defense command and control

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military547

﻿is the Joint Functional Component Command as the primary decision aid for GMD execution,
for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), a and the C2BMC system provides integrated
component of STRATCOM housed at Schriev- battlefield awareness information before and
er Air Force Base, Colorado. JFCC IMD brings during GMD operations.90 It also provides intogether Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Space, and formation to other missile defense systems like
Air Force personnel and is co-located with the THAAD and Patriot. Dozens of C2BMC workMDA’s Missile Defense Integration and Oper- stations are distributed throughout the worldation Center (MDIOC). This concentration of at U.S. military bases.
leadership from across the various agencies
C2BMC has undergone multiple technicalhelps to streamline decision-making for those upgrades, called “spirals,” since 2004 to bringwho command and operate the U.S. missile de- more missile defense elements into the netfense system.85
work. In 2019, the MDA completed an upgrade
Command and control of the GMD system that will help to expand Aegis missile defense
to defend the homeland utilizes the Ground- coverage by enabling Aegis Weapons Systems
based Midcourse Defense Fire Control (GFC) to engage on remote.
system, which consists of a suite of hardware,
Regional missile defense systems like
software, and personnel located in Fort Gree- THAAD, PAC-3, and Aegis are equipped withley, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, their own individual fire control systems to
California.86 The system involves collecting command and control the launch of their indata on missile movement from sensors and terceptors. The C2BMC system can also proradars to inform the launch of GBIs.
vide tracking information to individual missile
Once a missile is launched, data from the defense batteries from other regional sensors.
U.S. global network of sensors and radars travel Aegis BMD systems have onboard commandthrough secure satellite communications and and control governed by the Aegis Combat Sysground-based redundant communications tem, and they can provide their sensor data tolines to the Command Launch Equipment the GMD system through C2BMC.91(CLE) software that can task GBIs to fire at the
C2BMC connects sensors and shootersincoming missile. Then, once the NORTHCOM around the world to a global network, but
Commander—who becomes the supported there is no comparable system to link sensors
commander during GMD execution—in con- and shooters in a single region. The Army issultation with the President has determined developing the Integrated Air and Missile Dethe most effective response to a missile threat, fense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS)
the CLE fire response option is relayed to the to provide this capability. Once fielded, IBCS
appropriate GBIs in the field.87 When the se- would connect all sensors and shooters in alected missiles have been fired, they maintain region to a single fire control network.92 Like
contact with In-Flight Interceptor Commu- IFPC, IBCS would also link defenses against
nications System (IFICS) Data Terminals smaller threats with ballistic missile defense.
(IDTs) to receive updated flight information
Assessment. A strong global commandthat helps to guide them to their target.88
and control system is critical to missile deTo prepare for and execute GMD operations, fense because linking information from senthe NORTHCOM Commander can also utilize sors can increase domain awareness and decisituational awareness data from the Command sion time, thereby improving the probability
and Control, Battle Management and Com- of intercept. According to General VanHerck,munication (C2BMC) system. Through its “Decision space starts with that domain awaresoftware and network systems, C2BMC helps ness.” With more information about the threat,to process and integrate sensor information decision-makers can move “further left” toto provide a more complete picture of the bat- engage a target sooner.93 For instance, it was
tlespace.89 The GMD Fire Control system acts recently reported that the MDA provided U.S.

﻿

Indo-Pacific Command with a hypersonic which each unit operates its co-located sensor
missile defense capability, largely as a result and launcher independently. By permitting airof C2BMC improvements that allow sensors and missile defenses to function as a joint kill
to see the threat sooner.94 Future spirals that web rather than as a linear kill chain, IBCS will
are planned will continue to increase the in- be able to determine the best shooter to taketegration of ballistic missile defense elements down an incoming missile, in turn increasing
across the world.
the defended battlespace.
The MDA planned to complete another
IBCS was originally scheduled to reach
upgrade to incorporate the LRDR into C2B- initial operating capability in FY 2019, but it
MC in FY 2021, but this upgrade has been de- was delayed to FY 2022 because of technicallayed, primarily by the COVID-19 pandemic.95 issues.98 The program remains on this new
Domain awareness can also allow decision-­ schedule today and successfully engaged two
makers to use other tools to deescalate con- targets during a limited user test conducted
flict before missiles are launched. This option last year.99 Advancements underway in missile
is especially important in dealing with cruise defense command and control will become inmissile threats to the homeland, for which the creasingly necessary to enable defense against
U.S. does not have a comprehensive intercep- the growing missile threat.
tor capability.
The United States will need a more ad- Conclusionvanced command and control capability as
By successive choices of post–Cold War
global missile threats shift to include cruise Administrations and Congresses, the Unitedand hypersonic missiles in addition to ballis- States does not have in place a comprehentic missiles. The DOD is currently developing sive set of missile defense systems that woulda Joint All Domain C2 (JADC2) system to be capable of defending the homeland andintegrate non-compatible sensors across all allies from robust ballistic missile threats.
domains into a single network so that it can U.S. efforts have focused on a limited archirespond to the complex threat more efficient- tecture that protects the homeland and on
ly. Missile defense command and control will deploying and advancing regional missile destrengthen as the services begin to field JADC2 fense systems.
capabilities.
Although the United States has in place
North American Aerospace Defense Com- multiple types of capable interceptors, a vast
mand is also pursuing a program called Path- sensor network, and a command and control
finder that “ingests data from multiple sources, system, many elements of the missile defense
infuses that data and uses machine learning system need to be improved to defend against
and intelligence capabilities to process and today’s threat more efficiently. At the same
share in real time.”96 Sensor information can time, the development of missile threats, bothtend to exist in stovepipes, and if it is not in- qualitative and quantitative, is outpacing thetegrated, the result can be failure to detect a speed of missile defense research, developthreat.97 Pathfinder’s use of artificial intelli- ment, and deployment to address those threats.
gence can help to ensure that the commander Senior leaders continue to stress the imporreceives a full data picture.
tance of U.S. missile defense, but if the nation
IBCS will also provide an important im- is to realize the strategic benefits that missile
provement in regional missile defenses. The defense provides, Congress must make suresystem will link all missile defense sensors and that the funding of critical programs like NGI,
interceptors to one fire control center, as op- space sensors, and JADC2 is commensurate
posed to today’s more stovepiped approach in with that importance.

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes
1.

U.S. Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), and Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee,
2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, July 2021, p. 2, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/11/2002563190/-1/-1/1/2020%20
BALLISTIC%20AND%20CRUISE%20MISSILE%20THREAT_FINAL_2OCT_REDUCEDFILE.PDF (accessed June 11, 2021).

2.

Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. 10472,
updated April 14, 2021, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IF10472.pdf (accessed June 11, 2021).

3.

Sune Engel Rasmussen, “Iran Launches New Rocket, Showing Advances in Potential Missile Technology,” The Wall Street Journal,
updated February 1, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-launches-new-rocket-showing-advances-in-potential-missiletechnology-11612214948 (accessed June 11, 2021).

4.

General Glen VanHerck, United States Air Force, Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace
Defense Command, statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 16, 2021, pp. 3–4 and 6, https://www.
armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/VanHerck_03-16-21.pdf (accessed June 11, 2021).

5.

Through satellite imagery, analysts have discovered three ICBM silo construction sites that could hold over 100 ICBMs each. See
Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “China’s Nuclear Missile Silo Expansion: From Minimum Deterrence to Medium Deterrence,”
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September 1, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/chinas-nuclear-missile-silo-expansion-fromminimum-deterrence-to-medium-deterrence/ (accessed September 1, 2021). China’s state-run Global Times reports that the
new mobile DF-41 ICBM can carry 10 warheads. See Yang Sheng and Liu Xuanzun, “China Debuts Most Advanced ICBM DF-41 at
Parade,” Global Times, October 1, 2019, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1165931.shtml (accessed June 11, 2021).
VanHerck, statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 4.
Matthew Kroenig, “The Case for the US ICBM Force,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Fall 2018), p. 59, https://www.
airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12_Issue-3/Kroenig.pdf (accessed June 11, 2021).

8.

The platform carrying air-launched ballistic missile interceptors has to be close to the launch area, aloft, properly oriented,
and generally within the range of enemies’ anti-access/area-denial systems because of payload limits on airborne platforms
themselves. These requirements make airborne intercepts particularly challenging.

9.

Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on National Security,” March 23, 1983, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/
presidential-speeches/march-23-1983-address-nation-national-security (accessed June 12, 2021).

﻿

6.
7.

10. For example, SDI Organization investment helped to make certain electronic and optical components cheaper and more effective.
It helped to reduce the cost per pixel on a display screen by a factor of 20. Additional advances were made in areas of sensor
technology, communications, and computers. For more information, see James A. Abrahamson and Henry F. Cooper, What
Did We Get for Our $30-Billion Investment in SDI/BMD? National Institute for Public Policy, September 1993, pp. 9–11, http://
highfrontier.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/What-for-30B_.pdf (accessed June 12, 2021).
11. H.R. 4, National Missile Defense Act of 1999, Public Law 106-38, 106th Cong., July 22, 1999, https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/
publ38/PLAW-106publ38.pdf (accessed June 16, 2021).
12. S. 2943, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 114–328, 114th Cong., December 23, 2016, https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ328/PLAW-114publ328.pdf (accessed June 12, 2021). The understanding of the word “limited”
changed over time, from scaling a missile defense system to shoot down about 200 reentry vehicles right after the end of theCold War (because that is how many a rogue Soviet commander was believed to be able to launch from a submarine) to only ahandful of relatively less sophisticated North Korean or Iranian ballistic missiles. For more information, see Independent Working
Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, 2009 Report, Institute for Foreign Policy
Research and Analysis, 2009, p. 17, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf (accessed June 12, 2021).
13. S. 1790, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Public Law 116-92, 116th Cong., December 20, 2018, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1790?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22s+1790%22%5D%7D&s=1&r=1 (accessed
June 12, 2021).
14. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, passim, https://media.defense.
gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF (accessed June 12, 2021).
15. Transcript, “Department of Defense Press Briefing on the President's Fiscal Year 2022 Defense Budget for the Missile Defense
Agency,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 28, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2639375/
department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-the-presidents-fiscal-year-2022-defense/source/GovDelivery/ (accessed June 12,2021). The briefing was provided by Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, Director, Missile Defense Agency, and Michelle C. Atkinson, Director
for Operations, MDA.

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16. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, DefenseWide Justification Book Volume 2a of 5: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, February 2020, pp. xxxvi,
and l, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/
RDTE_Vol2_MDA_RDTE_PB21_Justification_Book.pdf (accessed June 12, 2021).
17. Explanatory Statement, “Division C—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021,” in Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,
Committee Print of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on H.R. 133/Public Law 116-260 [Legislative
Text and Explanatory Statement], Book 1 of 2, Divisions A–F, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., March 2021, p. 395, https://www.congress.
gov/117/cprt/HPRT43749/CPRT-117HPRT43749.pdf (accessed June 12, 2021).
18. National Research Council, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, Committee on an Assessment of Concepts andSystems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An
Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (Washington:
National Academies Press, 2012), pp. 8–9, https://www.nap.edu/read/13189/chapter/1 (accessed June 12, 2021).
19. Staff Sgt. Zachary Sheely “National Guard Soldiers at Forefront of Most Significant Test in Missile Defense History,” U.S. Army,
April 5, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/219788/national_guard_soldiers_at_forefront_of_most_significant_test_in_missile_
defense_history (accessed June 12, 2021).
20. Jen Judson, “Countering North Korea: Congress Authorizes Major Buildup in Homeland Missile Defense,” Defense News,
November 17, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2017/11/17/countering-north-korea-hill-authorizes-major-buildup-inhomeland-missile-defense/ (accessed June 12, 2021).
21. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https://www.defensenews.
com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense-right/ (accessed June 12, 2021).
22. Press release, “Contracts Awarded for Next Generation Interceptor Program,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2547665/contracts-awarded-for-next-generation-interceptor-program/(accessed June 12, 2021).

﻿

23. Jason Sherman, “MDA Seeks New Cruise Missile Defense Layer, New Guam Defense System in $8.9 Billion FY-22 Proposal,” Inside
Defense, May 28, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/mda-seeks-new-cruise-missile-defense-layer-new-guam-defensesystem-89-billion-fy-22 (accessed June 12, 2021).
24. Fact Sheet, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, approved for public release July28, 2016, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/aegis.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
25. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional
Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL33745, updated February 25, 2021, p. 5, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33745 (accessed June 12, 2021).
26. Mike Yeo, “Japan Suspends Aegis Ashore Deployment, Pointing to Cost and Technical Issues,” Defense News, June 15, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/06/15/japan-suspends-aegis-ashore-deployment-pointing-to-costand-technical-issues/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
27. “Japan to Build 2 New Aegis Ships in Place of Land-Based System,” Nikkei Asia, December 9, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/
Politics/Japan-to-build-2-new-Aegis-ships-in-place-of-land-based-system#:~:text=TOKYO%20(Kyodo)%20%2D%2D%20
Japan%20will,Minister%20Nobuo%20Kishi%20said%20Wednesday (accessed June 13, 2021).
28. Admiral Philip S. Davidson, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, statement “On U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture” before
the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 9, 2021, p. 5, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Davidson_03-09-21.pdf (accessed June 12, 2021).
29. U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates Overview, approved for public
release May 20, 2021, pp. 10 and 11, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/Budget%20Overview%20FY22%20Booklet%20-%20FINAL.pdf (accessed June 12, 2021).
30. News release, “U.S. Successfully Conducts SM-3 Block IIA Intercept Test Against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Target,” U.S.
Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, November 16, 2020, https://www.mda.mil/news/20news0003.html (accessed
June 12, 2021).
31. A homeland defense “underlay” would enable a “Shoot-Look-Shoot” or “Shoot-Assess-Shoot” doctrine, which entails shooting
a first layer of interceptors at a target, performing a kill assessment, and then shooting the next layer of interceptors at thetarget, continuing through all available layers. This doctrine decreases the number of interceptors required to fire at a target that
overcompensate for lack of a backup. See U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget
Estimates Overview, p. 9, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy21.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).

550

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength32. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request: Defense Budget Overview, May 2021, p. 2-15, https://comptroller.
defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (accessed June 13,2021).
33. Fact Sheet, “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, approved for public
release September 30, 2020, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/thaad.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
34. One THAAD battery “nominally consists of 6 truck-mounted launchers, 48 interceptors (8 per launcher), 1 AN/TPY-2 radar, anda Tactical Fire Control/Communications component.” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request, Program Acquisition
Cost by Weapon System, February 2020, p. 4-3, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/
fy2021_Weapons.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
35. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defence System in Romania Completes Scheduled Update,” last
updated August 9, 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_168377.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed June 13, 2021).
36. Jason Sherman, “MDA Awards Lockheed Nearly $1B THAAD Contract for Army, Saudi Arabia,” Inside Defense, March 26, 2020,
https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/mda-awards-lockheed-nearly-1b-thaad-contract-army-saudi-arabia (accessed June 13,2021).
37. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request: Defense Budget Overview, pp. 2-14 and 2-15.
38. Lockheed Martin, “PAC-3,” https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/pac3-mse.html (accessed June 13, 2021).
39. Fact Sheet, “Patriot Advanced Capability-3,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, approved for public release
September 30, 2020, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/pac3.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
40. The FY 2022 request includes $251.5 million for the procurement of 18 THAAD interceptors. U.S. Department of Defense, Missile
Defense Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates Overview, p. 12. The FY 2021 request included $495.4 million in funding
for the procurement of 41 THAAD interceptors. U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget
Estimates Overview, p. 11.

﻿

41. Jen Judson, “In First, MDA Remotely Launches a Missile,” Defense News, August 20, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/
land/2019/08/30/first-remotely-launched-terminal-missile-defense-test-deemed-a-success/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
42. Table 4, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Flight Tests,” in U.S. Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense: Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery
and Testing Progressed, but Annual Goals Unmet, GAO-21-314, April 2021, p. 12, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-314.pdf(accessed June 13, 2021).
43. Lieutenant General Daniel L. Karbler, U.S. Army, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command,and Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, statement on “Fiscal Year 2022
Authorization Request for Missile Defense” before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, June 9, 2021, p. 19, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Karbler%20Written%20Statement%20to%20
SASC%206-091.pdf (accessed June 22, 2021).
44. Explanatory Statement, “Division C—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021,” in Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,
Committee Print of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on H.R. 133/Public Law 116-260 [Legislative
Text and Explanatory Statement], Book 1 of 2, Divisions A–F, p. 597.
45. Jen Judson, “DoD Wish List Seeks More Funds to Boost Pacific Missile Defense, Weapons Cybersecurity,” Defense News, June 10,2021, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2021/06/10/dod-desires-more-funding-to-boost-missile-defense-in-the-pacificin-wish-list-to-congress/ (accessed June 22, 2021).
46. Stenographic transcript of hearing “To Receive Testimony on United States Southern Command and United States Northern
Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program,”Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 16, 2021, p. 39, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2112_03-16-2021.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
47. Ibid., pp. 38 and 40.
48. For instance, the MDA is offering the NGI contractors cash fees for delivering the program before 2028. See Jason Sherman,“MDA Dangles Cash Incentives to Accelerate NGI Fielding,” Inside Defense, April 29, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/
mda-dangles-cash-incentives-accelerate-ngi-fielding (accessed June 13, 2021).
49. Jason Sherman, “MDA: GMD SLEP Will Improve Interceptor Fleet While Waiting for NGI,” Inside Defense, May 18, 2021, https://
insidedefense.com/daily-news/mda-gmd-slep-will-improve-interceptor-fleet-while-waiting-ngi (accessed June 13, 2021).

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50. Testimony of General Glen D. VanHerck, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense
Command, in video, “Full Committee Hearing: ‘National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and SouthAmerica,’” Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, April 14, 2021, https://armedservices.house.gov/
hearings?ID=53EFF923-DE06-4584-AD0E-B449740774A8 (accessed June 22, 2021).
51. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request: Defense Budget Overview, p. 2-15.
52. VanHerck testimony in video, “Full Committee Hearing: ‘National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North andSouth America.’”
53. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Reboots Cruise Missile Defense: IFPC & Iron Dome,” Breaking Defense, March 11, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-reboots-cruise-missile-defense-ifpc-iron-dome/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
54. Jen Judson, “Iron Dome Plans Being Finalized as US Army Begins Training on Systems,” Defense News, February 15, 2021, https://www.
defensenews.com/land/2021/02/15/iron-dome-plans-being-finalized-as-us-army-begins-training-on-systems/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
55. Jason Sherman, “Iron Dome Shortcomings Prompt Army to Overhaul IFPC 2 Inc. 2 with New ‘Shoot off’ Competition,” Inside
Defense, March 5, 2020, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/iron-dome-shortcomings-prompt-army-overhaul-ifpc-2-inc-2new-shoot-competition (accessed June 13, 2021).
56. Brenda Marie Rivers, “Army Issues Prototype Solicitation for Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2 Program,” GovCon
Wire, April 8, 2021, https://www.govconwire.com/2021/04/army-issues-prototype-solicitation-for-indirect-fire-protectioncapability-increment-2-program/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
57. Fact Sheet, “Upgraded Early Warning Radars, AN/FPS-132,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, approved for
public release July 28, 2016, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/uewr1.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
58. Appendix IV, “Program Overview: Sensors,” in U.S. Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense: Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery
and Testing Progressed, but Annual Goals Unmet, p. 29.

﻿

59. Henry F. Cooper, Malcolm R. O’Neill, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Rowland H. Worrell, “Missile Defense: Challenges andOpportunities for the Trump Administration,” Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis White Paper, 2016, p. 23, note 47, http://www.
ifpa.org/pdf/IWGWhitePaper16.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
60. Fact Sheet, “Cobra Dane,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, approved for public release September 30, 2020,
https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/cobradane.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
61. Fact Sheet, “Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2),” approved for public release July 28, 2016, https://www.
mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/an_tpy2.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
62. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, “TPY-2 X-Band Radar,” Missile Threat, last modified June 15,
2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/tpy-2/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
63. Bruce Klingner, “South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3024, June 12, 2015, http://
www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense.
64. Fact Sheet, “Sea-Based X-Band Radar,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, approved for public release
September 30, 2020, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/sbx.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
65. Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, “AN/SPY-1 Radar,” December 2018, https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/
anspy-1-radar/ (accessed June 13, 2021), and Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency, statement before theSubcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 12, 2020, p. 13, https://
docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20200312/110671/HHRG-116-AS29-Wstate-HillJ-20200312.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
66. See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. 36, and Thomas Karako,“Opinion: Trump’s Blind spot,” Politico, September 6, 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/06/opinion-missile-defenseblind-1480426 (accessed June 13, 2021).
67. Fact Sheet, “Space Based Infrared System,” U.S. Air Force, Air Force Space Command, March 22, 2017, http://www.afspc.af.mil/
About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/1012596/space-based-infrared-system/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
68. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, “Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS),” last updated June15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/sbirs/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
69. Sandra Erwin, “ULA Launches U.S. Space Force Missile-Warning Satellite, Two Rideshare Cubesats,” SpaceNews, May 18, 2021, https://spacenews.com/ula-launches-u-s-space-force-missile-warning-satellite-two-rideshare-cubesats/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
70. Sandra Erwin, “Production of New Missile Warning Satellites Likely Delayed by Budget Impasse,” SpaceNews, October 20, 2017,
http://spacenews.com/production-of-new-missile-warning-satellites-likely-delayed-by-budget-impasse/ (accessed June 13, 2021).

552

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength71. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force, Justification
Book Volume 1 of 1, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Space Force, May 2021, p. 220, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/
Portals/84/documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203620%20-%20SF%20RDT%20and%20E.
pdf?ver=IjGtfzXsB_JjzQshbt68Fw%3d%3d (accessed June 13, 2021).
72. Fact Sheet, “Space Tracking and Surveillance System,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, approved for public
release September 30, 2020, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/stss.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
73. Nathan Strout, “After More than a Decade, Agency to Retire Experimental Missile Warning Satellites,” C4ISRNet, May 13, 2021,
https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2021/05/13/after-more-than-a-decade-agency-to-retire-experimental-missilewarning-satellites/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
74. Space Development Agency, “SDA Awards Contracts for the First Generation of the Tracking Layer,” https://www.sda.mil/sdaawards-contracts-for-the-first-generation-of-the-tracking-layer/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
75. Explanatory Statement, “Division C—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021,” in Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,
Committee Print of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on H.R. 133/Public Law 116-260 [Legislative
Text and Explanatory Statement], Book 1 of 2, Divisions A–F, p. 396.
76. Ibid., p. 467.
77. Video, “MDA Holds Briefing on FY22 Defense Budget,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 28, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/
Watch/Video/videoid/799271/dvpcc/false/#DVIDSVideoPlayer581 (accessed June 13, 2021).
78. Charles A. Richard, Commander, United States Strategic Command, statement before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, February 27, 2020, p. 19, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/
AS29/20200227/110583/HHRG-116-AS29-Wstate-RichardC-20200227.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
79. Wes Rumbaugh, “Bad Idea: Ignoring Congressional Oversight on Space Sensor Development,” Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, Defense 360, Bad Ideas ion National Security Series, December 4, 2020, https://defense360.csis.org/badidea-ignoring-congressional-oversight-on-space-sensor-development/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
80. To detect hypersonic missiles maneuvering in the upper atmosphere close to LEO (a goal of HBTSS), space sensors may need toview them at a bit of an angle rather than by looking straight down. This side view makes hypersonic missiles appear dimmer,
requiring more sensitive sensors.

82. Kevin Knodell, “Rep. Kai Kahele Wants New Missile Defense Radar System on Kauai—Not Oahu,” Honolulu Civil Beat, March
21, 2021, https://www.civilbeat.org/2021/03/rep-kai-kahele-wants-new-missile-defense-radar-system-on-kauai-not-oahu/(accessed June 13, 2021).
83. Theresa Hitchens, “2021 Budget Will Fully Fund Next-Gen OPIR, Says Roper,” Breaking Defense, February 24, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/2021-budget-will-finally-fully-fund-next-gen-opir-says-roper/ (accessed June 13, 2021);
Explanatory Statement, “Division C—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021,” in Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,
Committee Print of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on H.R. 133/Public Law 116-260 [Legislative
Text and Explanatory Statement], Book 1 of 2, Divisions A–F, p. 671; and Secretary of the Air Force, “DAF Releases FY22 Budget
Proposal, Journeys to the Air and Space Forces of 2030,” U.S. Air Force, May 28, 2021, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/
Article/2639087/daf-releases-fy22-budget-proposal-journeys-to-the-air-and-space-forces-of-2030/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
84. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “LTAMDS: Raytheon to Build Linchpin of Army Air & Missile Defense,” Breaking Defense, October 17,
2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/10/ltamds-raytheon-to-build-linchpin-of-army-air-missile-defense/ (accessed June
13, 2021), and Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Raytheon Readies LTAMDS Radar for Tests,” Breaking Defense, March 16, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/03/raytheon-readies-ltamds-radar-for-tests/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
85. U.S. Strategic Command, “Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD),” current as ofDecember 2020, https://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Documents/JFCC%20IMD%20Fact%20Sheet_Dec%202020.pdf (accessed
May 3, 2021).
86. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication No. 3-27.3, Ground-based Midcourse Defense Operations,
October 2019, p. 2-1, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/atp3-27-3.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021), and U.S. Department of Defense,
Missile Defense Agency, “Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD),” last updated April 8, 2021, https://www.mda.mil/system/
gmd.html (accessed June 13, 2021).
87. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication No. 3-27.3, Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Operations,pp. 1-5 and 1-6, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/atp3-27-3.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).

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81. Jen Judson, “Yearlong Delay Hits Operational Test of Alaska-Based Missile Defense Radar,” Defense News, April 30, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/04/30/alaska-based-missile-defense-radar-operational-test-delayed-a-year/ (accessed June 13,2021).

88. Thomas Karako, Ian Williams, and Wes Rumbaugh, Missile Defense 2020: Next Steps for Defending the Homeland, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, April 2017, pp. 101–103, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/
s3fs-public/publication/170406_Karako_MissileDefense2020_Web.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021).
89. Fact Sheet, “Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense
Agency, approved for public release September 30, 2020, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/c2bmc.pdf (accessed
June 13, 2021).
90. Army Techniques Publication No. 3-27.3, “Ground-based Midcourse Defense Operations,” pp. 3-2 and 5-3.
91. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense,” Missile Threat, lastmodified June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/aegis/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
92. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, “Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command
System (IBCS),” last modified June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/ibcs/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
93. Stenographic transcript of hearing “To Receive Testimony on United States Southern Command and United States Northern
Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program,” p. 41.
94. Jason Sherman, “MDA Outfits INDOPACOM with Defense Against Hypersonic Weapons in Pacific,” Inside Defense, May 4, 2021,
https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/mda-outfits-indopacom-defense-against-hypersonic-weapons-pacific (accessed June 13,2021).
95. Appendix II, “Program Overview: “Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC),” in U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Missile Defense: Fiscal Year 2020 Delivery and Testing Progressed, but Annual Goals Unmet, p. 25.
96. VanHerck testimony in video, “Full Committee Hearing: ‘National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North andSouth America.’”﻿

97. In 2015, for example, individual sensors failed to detect a gyrocopter that landed in the National Capital Region, but when
NORAD went back and used the Pathfinder to analyze the information, it found the gyrocopter. See stenographic transcript ofhearing “To Receive Testimony on United States Southern Command and United States Northern Command in Review of the
Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program,” p. 42.
98. Jen Judson, “After Complex Test, Is the US Army’s Major Missile Defense Command System Ready for Prime Time?” Defense
News, December 12, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/12/12/after-complex-test-is-the-armys-major-missiledefense-command-system-ready-for-primetime/ (accessed June 13, 2021).
99. The Honorable John E. Whitley, Secretary of the Army, Acting, and General James P. McConville, Chief of Staff, UnitedStates Army, statement “On the Posture of the United States Army” before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, May 5, 2021, p. 14, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP02/20210505/112531/
HHRG-117-AP02-Wstate-McConvilleJ-20210505.pdf (accessed June 13, 2021), and Northrop Grumman, “Command and Control
System Continues Strong Performance Against Highly Challenging Targets During Live-Fire Test,” August 20, 2020, https://news.
northropgrumman.com/news/releases/ibcs-successfully-engages-advanced-tactical-ballistic-missile-and-cruise-missile-duringrigorous-test (accessed June 13, 2021).

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Cyber Warfare and U.S. Cyber Command
James Di PaneTwords of Kenneth P. Rapuano, former Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Global Security:
Their vulnerability means that adversaries
could disrupt military operations without actually targeting military networks
and systems themselves…. To addressthese challenges, we are strengthening
alliances and attracting new partners
to take a whole-of-society approach toenabling better security and resilience of
key assets.3

﻿

he world of cyber operations is notoriously
secretive. Nevertheless, even a rudimentary understanding of the domain, the threats
and opportunities associated with it, and theability of the Department of Defense (DOD)
to protect the U.S. from cyberattack and enable military operations against enemies is of
the greatest importance. To supplement theconcise overview of military cyber capabilities
provided in this chapter, more detailed discussions of the characteristics of cyber warfare
can be found in “National Defense and the
Cyber Domain”1 and “The Reality of Cyber
Conflict: Warfare in the Modern Age.”2 Theseessays, published in previous editions of the Index of U.S. Military Strength, provide a wealthof information about the cyber domain andhow it fits into the world of national defense.
Cybersecurity has been very much in theforefront of public attention this year, withseveral large cyber incidents from foreign actors drawing considerable public attention. The
Solar Winds hack and the Colonial Pipeline andother notable ransomware attacks demonstrate
the potential threat to the homeland from malicious cyber actors and provide a window into thetypes of threats the U.S. could face on a broader
scale during wartime. They also demonstrate
the link between private networks and public
networks, as well as the broad approach that isnecessary to ensure cybersecurity.
The vulnerability of allies and the private
sector has an indirect effect on military affairs
because the compromise of just one can lead tocomplications for the military services. In the

Because of this, cybersecurity for the military is very expansive and goes beyond theDepartment of Defense alone.
The use of cyber as a military tool to target
enemy forces and capabilities falls into categories similar to those of other military operations.
Cyber tools can be used in the form of conventional operations, like the operations against
the Islamic State that were used to disrupt
command and control nodes and the group’s
ability to distribute propaganda.4 In this typeof campaign, cyber accompanies the other military capabilities as a way to target enemy forces.
Or they can take the form of special
operations–­type activity like the Stuxnet cyber
operation against Iran, which could be compared to the U.S. Navy SEAL raid to kill Osama
Bin Laden.5 In these operations, cyber is used
to achieve targeted goals, sometimes in a covert way that, like special operations, falls below the threshold of traditional armed conflict.

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In conventional operations, cyber is used tosupport forces and commanders by ensuringthat they can operate uninhibited in cyberspace or by disrupting the enemy’s ability tooperate in order to achieve necessary objectives more effectively. In this way, cyber is used
to gain an advantage over an adversary similar
to the way advantage is sought in the other domains.6 This is similar to the use of naval forces
to restrict the enemy’s ability to use the seas toachieve strategic ends.
Like naval power, cyber is an importantmeans with which to maximize one’s own access and effectiveness while restricting the
opponent’s access and effectiveness. However,it differs from other domains in the sense thattime and space are incredibly compressed. A
cyber force can launch an attack from anywhere in the world and strike very quickly,
unlike more traditional forces that take time
to move and launch attacks.

U.S. Cyber Command
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) isa capability-based Unified Combatant Command similar to U.S. Special Operations Command and is the military’s primary organization for both offensive and defensive cyber
activity. It is currently commanded by General Paul Nakasone, who serves simultaneously
as Director of the National Security Agency(NSA). The two organizations have a close
cooperative relationship: The NSA and Cyber
Command operate, respectively, under Title
50 and Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the sections
that govern intelligence and military affairs.7
U.S. Cyber Command was founded in 2010as a sub-unified command under U.S. Strategic Command. In 2018, the Trump Administration elevated it to full Unified CombatantCommand status, and it reached full operational capability in that same year.8 Over the
past approximately 11 years, Cyber Commandhas grown from a very small organization thatwas largely dependent on the NSA for personnel and resources into the much morerobust and independent organization thatexists today.

556

Missions
U.S. Cyber Command has a wide range of
missions, from offensive and defensive cyber
operations to monitoring DOD networks andassisting with the defense of critical infrastructure. Its primary role is to ensure the DOD’s
ability to operate in a world that is increasingly
dependent on cyber. To this end, according toGeneral Nakasone:
Our three enduring lines of operation
are as follows:lllProvide mission assurance for the Department of Defense (DoD) by directing
the operation and defense of the Department of Defense Information Networks(i.e. the DoDIN) and its key terrain andcapabilities;
Defeat strategic threats to the UnitedStates and its national interests; andAssist Combatant Commanders to achieve
their missions in and through cyberspace.9

These “lines of operation” are critical to ensuring the success of the military enterpriseand national defense, as any compromise in theability to communicate or operate could jeopardize the full range of U.S. military activities.
The types of operations that Cyber Command is tasked with performing encompass
defensive cyber activity coupled with offensive
options to impose costs on an adversary. For
example, USCYBERCOM is helping to lead thegovernment’s response to the SolarWinds hack.
Discovered in December 2020, the SolarWinds hack was one of the most significant
breaches of computer networks in history,
and its effects are still being felt because of
the number of organizations affected and thesophistication of the hackers. A Russia-aligned
hacking organization known as Cozy Bear was
most likely behind the breach. Thousands ofprivate-sector organizations, as well as government agencies like the Departments of theTreasury, Commerce, and Homeland Security,
were compromised following the corruption

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthBudgetAnalyzing the budget for cybersecurity isdifficult because of the large degree of classification involved, but there are some data thatcan be tracked with respect to USCYBERCOM
and the broader Department of Defense. President Joseph Biden’s FY 2022 DOD budget request includes $10.4 billion for cyberspace.12
This is slightly higher than the $9.8 billion requested for FY 2021.13
General Nakasone has testified that U.S.
Cyber Command alone executed a budget of$605 million in FY 2021.14 This was $9 million
over the reported executed budget for FY 2020,
which was $596 million.15
Capacity
The Cyber Mission Force is the operationalarm of U.S. Cyber Command, and CMF teams
are distributed across various mission sets. In
2013, a force of 133 teams with 6,200 personnel was envisioned based on the mission requirements at that time. All 133 CMF teams
reached full operational capability in 2018.16
These teams are distributed across functional
areas. Specifically, there are:
l

l

l

l

13 National Mission Teams that defend
the U.S. against high-impact cyberattacks
and provide for election security;
68 Cyber Protection Teams that arefocused on defending DOD networks andsystems and ensuring that the department
is not compromised by a hack;27 Combat Mission Teams that support
the combatant commands with integrated
cyber effects in various theaters across theglobe, either in tandem with or independent of other military forces, and ensurethat the Combatant Commanders havecyber tools at their disposal; and25 Support Teams that support thenational mission and combat teams withanalysis and planning.17

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of the widely used Orion software. Cyber
Command has worked to search for compromise within networks and expel the adversary
when found, and it will provide options to policymakers for imposing costs on the attacker.
With respect to election security, U.S. Cyber Command conducted a number of operations aimed at preventing meddling in the2020 presidential election. Another example
was the 2018 targeting of the Russian Internet
Research Agency (IRA), “a troll farm that led
the effort to spread disinformation around the2016 presidential election and 2018 midterm
elections.”10 USCYBERCOM proactively shut
down the organization’s Internet access to prevent it from engaging in influence operations
against the United States.
In 2021, Cyber Command has also continued
to support the ongoing counterterrorism fight,
including force protection and target prosecution in Afghanistan in support of U.S. Central Command. These efforts are continuousand extend to other regions as well, including
support for U.S. Special Operations Command.
Cyber is used to disrupt terrorist organizations’financing and ability to communicate in addition to intelligence collection and targeting.
A key part of these missions is the concept of“defending forward.” As described in the 2018
DOD Cyber Strategy, “[t]his includes working
with the private sector and our foreign allies
and partners to contest cyber activity that could
threaten Joint Force missions and to counterthe exfiltration of sensitive DoD information.”11
Defending forward means operating as
close to the origins of the cyber threat as possible before it reaches critical networks in the
U.S. with the goal of collecting threat intelligence or disrupting attacks. This is contrasted
with passive defense, which involves monitoring within U.S. networks for intrusions. Cybercompresses time and space in the battlespaceby its very nature, and attacks can emanatefrom anywhere in the world with similar speed.
U.S. forces must therefore engage adversaries
in their networks and work to disrupt attacks
in their early stages because it is often too lateonce the networks have been compromised.

The teams are supported by four service components: Army Cyber Command(ARCYBER); Air Force Cyber Command(AFCYBER); Navy Fleet Cyber Command(FLTCYBER); and Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command (MARFORCYBER). Thesefour commands, created at the same time that
U.S. Cyber Command was created, provide theoperational forces that make up the teams.
l

ARCYBER supplies 41 teams to the CMF;18l

AFCYBER supplies 39 teams;19l

FLTCYBER supplies 40 teams, whichreached full operational capability a year
ahead of schedule in 2017;20 andthe talent it cultivates. The high demand forcyber personnel in the private sector makes
this a difficult challenge.

Capability
Due to the nature of cyber and the classification of methods, analyzing USCYBERCOM’s
capability as reflected in open-source (i.e., unclassified) literature is nearly impossible. However, the United States is considered to be oneof the world’s most capable cyber actors, anassessment that is based on its wide range ofinfrastructure and strategies and the advanced
technologies that the U.S. is known to employ.25

Readiness
Because of the lack of open-source reporting, it is also nearly impossible to assess the
MARFORCYBER provides 13 teams.21
readiness of America’s cyber forces. The U.S.
Government Accountability Office has identiAs of January 2021, according to Gener- fied some issues of training consistency in the
al Nakasone, Cyber Command had “roughly past.26 Standardizing and improving training is
6,000 service members and civilians out of one of the main priorities for U.S. Cyber Coman authorized total of 6,187 positions.”22 The mand, along with retaining its talent, and both
Biden Administration is proposing a 10 percent are critical to maintaining readiness.
increase to expand the CMF by approximately 600 personnel to meet its growing demands Conclusion
for FY 2022.23
Cyber is a key domain for the U.S. military.
In addition, there are about 12,000 person- It also is increasingly important and expannel outside of U.S. Cyber Command who main- sive in the modern world generally. As seen intain DOD networks and fall under the com- the various breaches and ransomware attacks
mand of the various services. Asked by House that have come to light, cybersecurity for deArmed Services Committee Chairman James fense extends well beyond the Department ofLangevin (D–RI) to specify “how many people Defense. For the Joint Force, cyber supports
will be part of the new Cyber Operations Force,” military capabilities both by ensuring that U.S.
General Paul Nakasone, Commander of U.S. forces can operate in cyberspace without disCyber Command and Director of the National ruption and as a tool on its own to achieve goals.
Security Agency, testified that “I would say the
U.S. Cyber Command is the primary orga6,187 that are part of our Cyber Mission Force. nization for the full spectrum of military cyber
And then I would say probably double that with operations, and it has grown as an organization,
regards to our cybersecurity service providers reaching full operating capability in 2018. Now
across all four services.”24that USCYBERCOM has reached its authorized
The recruiting and retaining of cyber tal- manning levels, the emphasis has shifted to
ent is one of the key challenges for U.S. Cyber training the force to ensure that in the coming
Command, which has invested in retention years, it will be as capable as possible in helping
and incentive programs in an effort to keep to advance and protect the nation’s interests.

﻿

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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes
1.

G. Alexander Crowther, “National Defense and the Cyber Domain,” in 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L.
Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2018), pp. 83–97, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/2018_
IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength-2.pdf.

2.

Paul Rosenzweig, “The Reality of Cyber Conflict: Warfare in the Modern Age,” in 2017 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota
L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2016), pp. 31–40, https://ims-2017.s3.amazonaws.com/2017_Index_of_Military_
Strength_WEB.pdf.

3.

Terri Moon Cronk, “DOD's Cyber Strategy of Past Year Outlined Before Congress,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 6, 2020,
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2103843/dods-cyber-strategy-of-past-year-outlined-before-congress/(accessed June 17, 2021).

4.

Dina Temple-Raston, “How the U.S. Hacked ISIS,” NPR, September 26, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/howthe-u-s-hacked-isis (accessed June 17, 2021).

5.

Crowther, “National Defense and the Cyber Domain,” 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength, p. 88.

6.

U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, June 8, 2018, p. I-8, https://www.
marforcyber.marines.mil/Portals/215/Docs/JP%203-12.pdf?ver=2019-03-20-110123-190 (accessed June 17, 2021).

7.

See U.S. Code Title 50, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50 (accessed June 19, 2021), and U.S. Code Title 10, https://www.
law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10 (accessed June 19, 2021).

8.

U.S. Cyber Command, “About: Our History,” https://www.cybercom.mil/About/History/ (accessed June 17, 2021).

9.

General Paul M. Nakasone, Commander, United States Cyber Command, posture statement before the Committee on Armed
Services, U.S. Senate, March 25, 2021, p. 1, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Nakasone_03-25-21.pdf(accessed June 17, 2021).

10. Maggie Miller, “Trump Confirms 2018 US Cyberattack on Russian Troll Farm,” The Hill, July 10, 2020, https://thehill.com/policy/
cybersecurity/506865-trump-confirms-2018-us-cyberattack-on-russian-troll-farm (accessed June 17, 2021).
11. U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, 2018,” p. 4, https://media.defense.gov/2018/
Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF (accessed June 17, 2021).

﻿

12. News release, “The Department of Defense Releases the President’s Fiscal Year 2022 Defense Budget,” U.S. Department of
Defense, May 28, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2638711/the-department-of-defensereleases-the-presidents-fiscal-year-2022-defense-budg/ (accessed June 17, 2021).
13. News release, “DOD Releases Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Proposal,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 10, 2020, https://www.
defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2079489/dod-releases-fiscal-year-2021-budget-proposal/ (accessed June 17,2021).
14. Nakasone, posture statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 4.
15. General Paul M. Nakasone, Commander, United States Cyberspace Command, statement before the Subcommittee onIntelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 4, 2020,
p. 2, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20200304/110592/HHRG-116-AS26-Wstate-NakasoneP-20200304.pdf (accessed
June 17, 2021).
16. News release, “Cyber Mission Force Achieves Full Operational Capability,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 17, 2018, https://www.
defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1524747/cyber-mission-force-achieves-full-operational-capability/ (accessed June 17,2021).
17. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, United States
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request: Defense Budget Overview, February 2018, p. 3-11, https://dod.defense.
gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/FY2019-Budget-Request-Overview-Book.pdf (accessed June 17, 2021).
18. U.S. Army Cyber Command, “DOD Fact Sheet: Cyber Mission Force,” February 10, 2020, https://www.arcyber.army.mil/Info/FactSheets/Fact-Sheet-View-Page/Article/2079594/dod-fact-sheet-cyber-mission-force/ (accessed June 17, 2021).
19. Tech. Sgt. R. J. Biermann, “Air Force Cyber Mission Force Teams Reach ‘Full Operational Capability,’” Joint Base San Antonio,
May 16, 2018, https://www.jbsa.mil/News/News/Article/1524859/air-force-cyber-mission-force-teams-reach-full-operationalcapability/ (accessed June 19, 2021).
20. Petty Officer 1st Class Samuel Souvannason, “Navy Cyber Mission Force Teams Achieve Full Operational Capability,” U.S.
Department of Defense, November 2, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1361059/navy-cyber-missionforce-teams-achieve-full-operational-capability/ (accessed June 19, 2021).

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21. Biermann, “Air Force Cyber Mission Force Teams Reach ‘Full Operational Capability.’”
22. Nakasone, posture statement before Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 1.
23. Martin Matishak and Lara Seligman, “Biden Budget to Seek Boost to the Military's Cyber Force,” Politico, May 26, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/26/biden-budget-military-cyber-force-490965 (accessed June 17, 2021).
24. Testimony of General Paul M. Nakasone, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, and Director, National Security Agency, in hearing,
The Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request for U.S. Cyber Command and Operations in Cyberspace, Subcommittee on Intelligence andEmerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 4,2020, p. 8, https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG-116hhrg40605/CHRG-116hhrg40605.pdf (accessed July 19, 2021).
25. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities andDefence Economics (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 503–506.

﻿

26. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Training: U.S. Cyber Command and Services Should Take Actions to Maintain aTrained Cyber Mission Force, GAO-19-362, March 6, 2019, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-362.pdf (accessed June 17, 2021).

560

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Conclusion: U.S. Military PowerT

he Active Component of the U.S. militaryis two-thirds the size it should be, operates
equipment that is older than it should be, andis burdened by readiness levels that are more
problematic than they should be. Some progress has been made, but it has been made at theexpense of both capacity and modernization.
Accordingly, this Index assesses the:readiness in 2021, but it has a very largehole to fill, its fleet is too small relative toworkload, and supporting shipyards are
overwhelmed by the amount of repair
work that is needed to make more ships
available. Funding to improve any of these
serious deficiencies remains problematic.
llNavy as “Marginal,” Trending Toward“Weak.” The Navy’s overall score remains “marginal” in the 2022 Index but istrending toward “weak” in capability andreadiness and remains “weak” in capacity.
The technology gap between the Navy andits peer competitors is narrowing in favorof competitors, and the Navy’s ships are
aging faster than they are being replaced.
The Navy sustained its focus on improvingl

Air Force as “Weak.” The USAF scores“marginal” in capacity and capability
but has dropped to “weak” in readiness.
Retirement of aircraft is outpacing the
introduction of new aircraft, worsening the service’s capacity problem. The
shortage of pilots and flying time for thosepilots degrades the ability of the Air Forceto generate the amount and quality of
combat air power that would be needed
to meet wartime requirements. Although
it could eventually win a single major regional contingency (MRC), the time needed to win that battle and the attendantrates of attrition would be much higher
than they would be if the service had
moved aggressively to increase high-end
training and acquire the fifth-generation
weapon systems required to dominate
such a fight.
Marine Corps as “Strong.” The score
for the Marine Corps was raised to“strong” from “marginal” for two reasons:(1) because the 2021 Index changed thethreshold for capacity, lowering it from36 infantry battalions to 30 battalions in
acknowledgment of the Corps’ argumentthat it is a one-war force that also stands

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561

﻿

l

Army as “Marginal.” The Army’s scoreremains “marginal” in the 2022 Index.
The Army has fully committed to modernizing its forces for great-power competition, but its programs are still in theirdevelopment phase, and it will be a few
years before they are ready for acquisition
and fielding. In other words, the Army isaging faster than it is modernizing. It remains “weak” in capacity with 62 percentof the force it should have but has significantly increased the readiness of the force,scoring the highest level of “very strong.”
The Army has a better sense of what itneeds for war against a peer, but funding
uncertainties could threaten its ability torealize its goals.

U.S. Military Power: Army
VERY WEAK
Capacity

WEAK

MARGINAL

STRONGVERY STRONG%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

U.S. Military Power: NavyVERY WEAK
Capacity

WEAK

MARGINAL

STRONGVERY STRONGSTRONGVERY STRONGSTRONGVERY STRONG%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

U.S. Military Power: Air Force﻿VERY WEAK

WEAK

MARGINAL

Capacity%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

U.S. Military Power: Marine Corps
VERY WEAK

WEAK

Capacity

MARGINAL%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

U.S. Military Power: SpaceVERY WEAK

WEAK

Capacity%

Capability%

Readiness%

OVERALL%

562

MARGINAL

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

STRONGVERY STRONGU.S. Military Power: Nuclear
VERY WEAK

WEAK

MARGINAL

STRONG

Nuclear Stockpile%

Delivery Platform
Reliability%

WarheadModernization%

Delivery Systems
Modernization%

Nuclear Weapons
Complex%

National Labs Talent%

Force Readiness%

Allied Assurance
Nuclear Test Readiness%%

OVERALL%

Space Force as “Weak.” The Space
Force was formally established on December 20, 2019, as a result of an earlier
proposal by President Trump and legislation passed by Congress. The 2021 Index
provided an overview of the new service,
explaining its mission, capabilities, andchallenges, but did not offer an assessment. With an additional year to gain
more insight, the 2022 Index scores the
USSF as “weak” in all measured areas.
The service has done quite well in transitioning missions from the other services
without interruption in support, but it
does not have enough assets to track andmanage the explosive growth in commercial and competitor-country systems
being placed into orbit. The majority of
its platforms have exceeded their planned
life span, and modernization efforts to replace them are slow and incremental. The
force also lacks defensive and offensive
counter-space capabilities.
l

Nuclear Capability as “Strong” but
Trending Toward “Marginal” or even
“Weak.” The U.S. nuclear enterprise rates
a score of “strong” primarily becauseof the serious attention it has received
during the past couple of years. There
has been strong, largely bipartisan political support for modernizing warheads,
delivery platforms, command and control
systems, and supporting infrastructure

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﻿

ready for a broad range of smaller crisis-­
response tasks, and (2) because of theCorps’ extraordinary efforts to modernize(which improves capability) and enhance
its readiness during the assessed year.
However, in the absence of additional
funding in FY 2022, the Corps intends toreduce the number of its battalions evenfurther from 24 to 21, and this reduction,
if implemented, would harm the Corps’
overall ability to perform the role it has
set for itself: enabling the projectionof naval power into heavily contested
combat environments. The service has
moved ahead aggressively with a redesignof its operating forces and the acquisitionof new warfighting tools, but it remains
hampered by old equipment and problematic funding.
l

VERY STRONGU.S. Military Power
VERY WEAK

WEAK

MARGINAL

Army

%

Navy

%

Air Force

VERY STRONG%

Marine Corps%

Nuclear

%

Space

%

OVERALL%

and for the development of essential personnel. However, it should be emphasizedthat the U.S. must maintain its commitment and allocate resources accordingly.
Without this sustained commitment, theoverall score for America’s nuclear capability will degrade rapidly to “weak.”﻿

STRONGIn general, the military services have continued to prioritize readiness and have seen
improvement over the past couple of years, butmodernization programs continue to suffer as
the failure of resources to keep pace with inflation leads to cancelations, truncation, or delay.
The services have normalized the reduction
in size and number of military units, and theIn the aggregate, the United States’ mili- forces remain well below the level they needtary posture is rated “marginal.” The 2022 to meet the two-MRC benchmark.
Index concludes that the current U.S. milMounting U.S. federal debt and creeping
itary force is likely capable of meeting the inflation will pressure defense accounts furdemands of a single major regional conflict ther at a time when competitor countries likewhile also attending to various presence and China and Russia are redoubling their efforts
engagement activities but that it would be very to expand and improve their military forces.
hard-pressed to do more and certainly would If it continues on this trajectory, the U.S. risks
be ill-equipped to handle two nearly simulta- falling very short in its ability to secure its core
neous major regional contingencies.
national interests.

564

2022 Index of U.S. Military StrengthGlossary of Abbreviations
A
anti-access/area-denial

AAMDS

Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System

AAV

Amphibious Assault Vehicle

ABCT

Armored Brigade Combat Team

ABM

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis

ABMS

Airborne Battle Management System

ACF

Army contingency force

ACV

Amphibious Combat Vehicle

ADIZ

Air Defense Identification Zone

ADMM-Plus

ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus

AEHF

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (satellite system)

AEW

airborne early warning

AFAFRICA

U.S. Air Forces Africa

AFCYBER

U.S. Air Force Cyber Command

AFP

Armed Forces of the Philippines

AFRICOM

U.S. Africa Command

AFSOC

U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command

AFTA

ASEAN Free Trade Area

AIPAir Independent Propulsion

AIT

American Institute in Taiwan

AMDR

Air and Missile Defense Radar

AMPVArmored Multipurpose Vehicle

ANSF

Afghan National Security Forces

AN/TPY-2

Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance

ANZUS

Australia–New Zealand–U.S. Security Treaty

AOR

area of responsibility

APC

armored personnel carrier

APS

Army Prepositioned Stocks

AQAP

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

AQI

Al-Qaeda in Iraq

AQIM

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ARCYBER

U.S. Army Cyber Command

ARF

ASEAN Regional Forum

ARG

amphibious ready group

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﻿

A2/AD

565

ARNG

Army National Guard

ASAT

anti-satellite

ASBM

Anti-ship ballistic missile

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASG

Abu Sayyaf GroupASUW

anti-surface warfare

ASW

anti-submarine warfare

AUSMIN

Australia–United States MinisterialAW

air warfare

AWACS

Airborne Warning and Control System

﻿

B
BBA

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015

BCA

Budget Control Act of 2011

BCT

brigade combat team

BCW

biological and chemical weapons

BDCA

border defense cooperation agreement

BECA

Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement

BJP

Bharatiya Janata Party

BMD

ballistic missile defense

BUR

Bottom-Up Review

BVR

beyond visual recognitionC
C2

command and control

C4ISR

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceCA

civil affairs

CAB

combat aviation brigade

CAPE

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

CATOBARconventional takeoff/barrier landing

CBO

Congressional Budget Office

CCG

Chinese Coast Guard

CCT

Combat Controller Team

CELAC

Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

CENTCOM

U.S. Central Command

CFC

Combined Forces Command (South Korea–U.S.)

CFSCC

Combined Force Space Component Command

566

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Cross-Functional TeamCHAMSI

Cooperative Humanitarian and Medical Storage InitiativeCI

counterintelligence

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CISMOA

Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement

CJTF-HOA

Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa

CLF

Combat Logistics Force

CMF

Cyber Mission Force

CMRR

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement

CMT

combat mission team

COCOM

Combatant Command

CONUS

continental United States

COVID-19

Coronavirus Disease 2019

CPMIEC

China Precision Machinery Import–Export Corporation

CPT

Cyber Protection TeamCRS

Congressional Research Service

CSF

coalition support funds

CSG

carrier strike group

CSO

Critical Skills Operator

CTcounterterrorism

CTC

Combat Training Center

CTF

Combined Task Force

CTIC

Counter Terrorism Information Center

CVN

aircraft carrier, nuclear powered

CVW

carrier air wing

CW

chemical warfare

CYBERCOM

U.S. Cyber Command

CYOC

Cyberspace Operations Centre

﻿

CFT

D
D2D

deployment-to-dwell

DA-KKV

direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicle

DCA

defense cooperation agreement

DDOS

distributed denial of service

DDPR

Deterrence and Defense Posture Review

DIME

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic

DMZ

demilitarized zone

DNI

Director of National Intelligence

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567

DOAF

Department of the Air Force

DOD

U.S. Department of Defense

DOE

U.S. Department of EnergyDOSdenial of service

DPRK

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

DTTI

Defense Trade and Technology Initiative

DSG

Defense Strategic Guidance

DSR

Defense Strategic Review

﻿

E
EAC

enhanced air cooperation

EADRCCEuro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre

EAS

European Activity Set

EBO

effects-based operations

ECP

engineering change proposal

EDA

excess defense articles

EDCA

Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement

EDI

European Defense Initiative

EEZ

exclusive economic zone

EFP

enhanced forward presence

EFV

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle

EMD

engineering and manufacturing development

EMP

electromagnetic pulse

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal

ERIP

European Recapitalization Incentive Program

ESG

Expeditionary Strike GroupEU

European Union

EUCOM

U.S. European Command

EW

electronic warfareF
FATA

Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FATF

Financial Action Task Force

FCS

Future Combat System

FLTCYBER

U.S. Navy Fleet Cyber Command

FOC

full operational capability

FONOP

freedom of navigation operation

568

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

FRAGO

fragmentary order

FSTM

full spectrum training miles

FTA

free trade agreement

FY

fiscal year

FYDP

Future Years Defense Program

G
GAO

Government Accountability Office (formerly General Accounting Office)

GATOR

Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar

GCC

geographic combatant commander

GCC

Gulf Cooperation Council

GCV

Ground Combat VehicleGDPgross domestic productGEO

geosynchronous orbit

GFMAP

Global Force Management Allocation Plan

GMV

Ground Mobility Vehicle

GPF

general purpose forces

GPS

Global Positioning System

﻿

H
HA/DR

humanitarian assistance/disaster relief

HEOhighly elliptical orbit

HMMWVHigh Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HUMVEE)

HVE

homegrown violent extremist

I
IAMD

Integrated Air and Missile Defense

IBCT

Infantry Brigade Combat Team

ICBM

intercontinental ballistic missile

ICS

industrial control systems

ICT

Information and communications technology

IDF

Israel Defense Forces

IED

improvised explosive device

IFPC

indirect fire protection capability

IFV

infantry fighting vehicle

IMF

International Monetary Fund

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INDOPACOM

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

INEW

Integrated Network Electronic Warfare

INF

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (treaty)

INFSA

Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment

IOC

initial operating capability

IRGC

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

ISAF

International Security Assistance Force

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISR

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

﻿

J
JCPOA

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

JeM

Jaish-e-Mohammed

JLTV

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

JOAC

Joint Operational Access ConceptJP

joint publication

JSF

Joint Strike Fighter (F-35 Lightning II)

JSOC

Joint Special Operations Command

JSOTF-P

Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines

JSTARS

Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

JTF North

Joint Task Force North

JTF–SD

Joint Task Force–Space Defense

JuD

Jamaat-ud-Dawa

K
KATUSA

Korean Augmentees to the United States Army

KFOR

Kosovo Force

L
LAC

Line of Actual Control

LAF

Lebanese Armed Forces

LAV

Light Armored Vehicle

LCAC

Landing Craft Air Cushion Vehicle

LCS

Littoral Combat Ship

LEMOA

Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement570

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

LeT

Lashkar-e-Taiba

LHA

landing helicopter assault (amphibious ship)

LHD

landing helicopter dock (amphibious ship)

LNG

liquefied natural gas

LoCLine of Control

LPD

landing platform/dock or amphibious transport dock (amphibious ship)

LRA

Lord’s Resistance Army

LRASM

long range anti-ship missile

LRDR

long range discrimination radar

LRIP

Low-Rate Initial Production

LRS-B

Long-Range Strike Bomber

LSD

landing ship, dock (amphibious ship)

M
Marine Air-Ground Task ForceMANPADS

man-portable air-defense systems

MARCENTU.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

MARFORAF

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa

MARFORCYBER

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace Command

MARFOREUR

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe

MARFORPAC

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific

MARSOC

U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command

MCM

mine countermeasure (ship)

MCMV

mine countermeasure vessel (ship)

MCO

major combat operation (see MRC, MTW)

MDAP

Major Defense Acquisition Program

MDO

multi-domain operations

MDT

mutual defense treaty

MDTF

Multi-Domain Task Force

MEB

Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF

Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU

Marine Expeditionary Unit

MIRV

multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle

MISO

Military Information Support Operations

MNLA

National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

MNLF

Moro National Liberation Front

MNNA

major non-NATO ally

MOJWA

Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa

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﻿

MAGTF

571

MPC

Marine Personnel Carrier

MPS

Maritime Prepositioning Ships

MRAP

Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (vehicle)

MRBM

medium-range ballistic missile

MRC

major regional conflict (see MTW, MCO)MRF

Marine Rotational Force

MSI

Maritime Security Initiative

MTW

major theater war (see MCO, MRC)

﻿

N
NAP

National Action Plan

NASIC

U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVAF

U.S. Naval Forces Africa

NAVEUR

U.S. Naval Forces Europe

NDAA

National Defense Authorization Act

NDN

Northern Distribution Network

NDP

National Defense Panel

NDS

National Defense Strategy

New STARTNew Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

NGI

next generation interceptor

NMI

NATO Mission Iraq

NNSA

National Nuclear Security Administration

NPR

Nuclear Posture Review

NPRIS

Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study

NSA

National Security Agency

NSC

National Security Council

NSR

Northern Sea Route

NSWC

Naval Special Warfare CommandO
OAR

Operation Atlantic Resolve

OAS

Organization of American States

OCO

overseas contingency operations

OEF

Operation Enduring Freedom

O-FRP

Optimized Fleet Response PlanOIF

Operation Iraqi Freedom

572

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

OMFV

optionally manned fighting vehicle

ONA

Office of Net Assessment

ONE

Operation Noble Eagle

OPCON

operational control

OPE-P

Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines

OPIR

Overhead Persistent Infrared

OPLAN

operational plan

OPTEMPO

operational tempo

OSCE

Organization for Security and Co-operation In Europe

OT&E

operational test and evaluation

OTFSTM

Operating Tempo Full Spectrum Training Miles

P
U.S. Pacific Air Forces

PACFLT

U.S. Pacific Fleet

PACOM

U.S. Pacific Command

PAF

Philippine Air Force

PDD-15Presidential Decision Directive-15

PFLP

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PFLP-GC

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command

PGM

precision-guided munition

PIM

Paladin Integrated Management

PKK

Kurdistan Workers' Party

PKO

peacekeeping operation

PLA

People's Liberation Army

PLAAF

People's Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN

People's Liberation Army Navy

PLARF

People's Liberation Army Rocket ForcePLASSF

People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force

PLO

Palestine Liberation Organization

PNI

Presidential Nuclear Initiative

PNT

positioning, navigation, and timing

PRC

People’s Republic of China

PRT

Provisional Reconstruction Team

PSA

Port of Singapore Authority

PSF

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﻿

PACAF

573

Q
QDR

Quadrennial Defense Review

QNSTR

Quadrennial National Security Threats and Trends

﻿

R
RAF

Royal Air Force

RAP

readiness action plan

RBA

Ready Basic Aircraft

RCOH

refueling and complex overhaul (nuclear-powered ship)

RDJTF

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

RDT&E

research, development, test and evaluation

RFP

request for proposals

RIMPACRim of the Pacific

RKV

redesigned kill vehicle

RMA

revolution in military affairs

ROK

Republic of Korea (South Korea)

RP

Republic of the PhilippinesRPGrocket-propelled grenade

S
SAARC

South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation

SAC

strategic airlift capability

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SAR

search and rescue

SBCT

Stryker Brigade Combat TeamSBIRSSpace-Based Infrared System (satellite system)

SCN

Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (budget category)SEAL

Sea Air Land operator (Navy)SEATO

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SFA

Strategic Framework Agreement

SFAB

Security Force Assistance Brigades

SIGINTsignals intelligence

SIPRI

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SLBM

submarine-launched ballistic missile

SMU

special mission unit

574

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

SOCAFRICA

U.S. Special Operations Command Africa

SOCCENTU.S. Special Operations Command Central

SOCEUR

U.S. Special Operations Command Europe

SOCPAC

U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific

SOF

U.S. Special Operations Forces

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure

SORT

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

SOTFE

Support Operations Task Force Europe

SPE

Sony Pictures Entertainment

SPMAGTF

Special-Purpose Marine Air–Ground Task Force

SRBM

short-range ballistic missile

SRM

Sustainable Readiness Model

SSBN

ballistic missile submarine, nuclear-powered

SSGN

guided missile submarine, nuclear-powered

SSN

attack submarine, nuclear-powered

SSP

Stockpile Stewardship Program

STA-1

Strategic Trade Authorization-1

STRATCOM

U.S. Strategic Command

SUW

surface warfare﻿

T
TACAIR

tactical air

TAFWN

The Air Force We Need

TAI

total active inventory

TANAP

Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline

TAP

Trans-Adriatic Pipeline

TCO

transnational criminal organization

TDY

Stateside Temporary Duty

THAAD

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

TLAM/NTomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear

TMP

technical modernization program

TNW

tactical nuclear weapon

TPP

Trans-Pacific Partnership

TRA

Taiwan Relations Act

TRANSCOM

U.S. Transportation Command

TSOC

Theater Special Operations Command

TTP

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

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﻿

U
UAE

United Arab Emirates

UAV

unmanned aerial vehicle

UCLASS

Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike

UCP

Unified Command Plan

UNASUR

Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations)

UNC

United Nations Council

UNCLOS

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea

USAF

U.S. Air Force

USAFCENT

U.S. Air Forces Central

USAFE

U.S. Air Forces Europe

USARAF

U.S. Army Africa

USARCENT

U.S. Army Central

USAREUR

U.S. Army Europe

USARPACU.S. Army Pacific

USASOC

U.S. Army Special Operations Command

USCYBERCOM

U.S. Cyber Command

USFJ

U.S. Forces JapanUSFK

U.S. Forces Korea

USMC

U.S. Marine Corps

USNAVCENTU.S. Naval Forces Central

USNORTHCOM

U.S. Northern Command

USSF

U.S. Space ForceUSSOCOM

U.S. Special Operations Command

USSOUTHCOM

U.S. Southern Command

USSPACECOM

U.S. Space Command

USV

unmanned surface vessel

USW

undersea warfare

V
VEO

violent extremist organizations

VFA

U.S.–Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement

VLS

vertical launching system

576

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

W
WGS

Wideband Global SATCOM (satellite system)

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

WRM

wartime readiness materials

WWTA

Worldwide Threat Assessment

﻿

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577

﻿

Methodology

Tmilitary power or the nature of an operating
environment can lead to misinformed conclusions. Raw numbers are a very important component, but they tell only a part of the story ofwar. Similarly, experience and demonstrated
proficiency are often decisive factors in war,
but they are also nearly impossible to measure.
The assessment of the global operating
environment in this Index focuses on three
key regions—Europe, the Middle East, andAsia—because of their importance relative to
U.S. vital economic, diplomatic, and security interests.
For threats to U.S. vital interests, theIndex identifies the countries that pose thegreatest current or potential threats to U.S. vital interests based on two overarching factors:
behavior and capability. The classic definitionof “threat” considers the combination of intent
and capability, but intent cannot be clearlymeasured, so observed behavior (including
historical behavior and explicit policies orformal statements vis-à-vis U.S. interests) isused as a reasonable surrogate because it is theclearest manifestation of intent. The countries
selected according to these criteria are scoredin two areas:ll

The degree of provocative behavior thatthey exhibited during the year.
Their ability to pose a credible threat to
U.S. interests irrespective of intent.

Finally, the status of U.S. military poweris addressed in three areas: capability (or modernity), capacity, and readiness. All three are

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he assessment portion of the Index of U.S.
Military Strength is composed of threemajor sections that address America’s military
power, the operating environments within or
through which that power must be employed,
and threats to U.S. vital national interests.
The authors of this study used a five-­category
scoring system that ranged from “very poor”
to “excellent” or “very weak” to “very strong”
as appropriate to each topic. This particularapproach was selected to capture meaningful
gradations while avoiding the appearance thata high level of precision was possible given thenature of the issues and the information thatwas publicly available.
Some factors are quantitative and lendthemselves to discrete measurement; others
are very qualitative in nature and can be assessed only through an informed understanding of the material that leads to a judgment call.
Further, because conditions in each of the areas assessed are changing throughout the year,
any measurement must necessarily be basedon the information at hand and viewed as asnapshot in time. We understand that thisis not entirely satisfactory when it comes toreaching conclusions on the status of a given
matter (especially the adequacy of military
power) and will be quite unsatisfactory forsome readers, but we also understand that senior officials in decision-making positions will
never have a comprehensive set of inarguable
hard data on which to base a decision.
Purely quantitative measures alone tell only
part of the story when it comes to the relevance,
utility, and effectiveness of hard power. In
fact, using only quantitative metrics to assess﻿fundamental to success even if they are not de 4. Favorable. A favorable operating envifacto determinants of success (something weronment includes good infrastructure,explain further in the section). Also addressedstrong alliances, and a stable political enis the condition of the United States’ nuclear
vironment. The U.S. military is well placed
weapons capability, which is assessed in areas
for future operations.
that are unique to this military component andcritical to understanding its real-world viabil- 5. Excellent. An extremely favorable
ity and effectiveness as a strategic deterrent.
operating environment includes well-­Though they are not scored according to theestablished and well-maintained infrastated metrics, the chapter on military power
structure; strong, capable allies; and a
includes explanatory overviews of U.S. ballistic
stable political environment. The U.S.
missile defense, cyber, and space capabilities.
military is exceptionally well placed todefend U.S. interests.
Assessing the Global
Operating Environment
The key regional characteristics consisted of:
Not all of the factors that characterize an
operating environment are equal, but each a. Alliances. Alliances are important forcontributes to the degree to which a particinteroperability and collective defense
ular operating environment is favorable or
because allies are more likely to lend supunfavorable to future U.S. military operations.
port to U.S. military operations. Indicators
Our assessment of the operating environmentthat provide insight into the strength or
utilized a five-point scale that ranges fromhealth of an alliance include whether the“very poor” to “excellent” conditions and covU.S. trains regularly with countries in theers the four regional characteristics that are
region, has good interoperability with theof greatest relevance to the conduct of miliforces of an ally, and shares intelligencetary operations:with nations in the region.
1. Very Poor. Significant hurdles exist for
military operations. Physical infrastructure is insufficient or nonexistent, andthe region is politically unstable. The U.S.
military is poorly placed or absent, andalliances are nonexistent or diffuse.
2. Unfavorable. A challenging operating
environment for military operations ismarked by inadequate infrastructure,
weak alliances, and recurring political instability. The U.S. military is inadequately
placed in the region.
3. Moderate. A neutral to moderately favorable operating environment is characterized by adequate infrastructure, a moderate alliance structure, and acceptablelevels of regional political stability. The
U.S. military is adequately placed.

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b. Political Stability. Political stability
brings predictability for military planners
when considering such things as transit, basing, and overflight rights for U.S.
military operations. The overall degreeof political stability indicates whether
U.S. military actions would be hinderedor enabled and reflects, for example,
whether transfers of power are generally
peaceful and whether there have been any
recent instances of political instability
in the region.
c. U.S. Military Positioning. Having
military forces based or equipment andsupplies staged in a region greatly facilitates the ability of the United States
to respond to crises and, presumably,
achieve successes in critical “first battles”
more quickly. Being routinely present ina region also helps the U.S. to maintain2022 Index of U.S. Military Strengthfamiliarity with its characteristics and thevarious actors that might try to assist or
thwart U.S. actions. With this in mind, we
assessed whether or not the U.S. military
was well-positioned in the region. Again,
indicators included bases, troop presence,
prepositioned equipment, and recent
examples of military operations (including training and humanitarian) launchedfrom the region.

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Assessing U.S. Military Power
Also assessed is the adequacy of the United States’ defense posture as it pertains to aconventional understanding of hard power,
defined as the ability of American militaryforces to engage and defeat an enemy’s forces in battle at a scale commensurate with thevital national interests of the United States.
The assessment draws on both quantitativeand qualitative aspects of military forces,
informed by an experience-based underd. Infrastructure. Modern, reliable, andstanding of military operations and the exsuitable infrastructure is essential topertise of the authors and internal and extermilitary operations. Airfields, ports, rail
nal reviewers.
lines, canals, and paved roads enable the
It is important to note that military effecU.S. to stage, launch operations from, andtiveness is as much an art as it is a science.
logistically sustain combat operations. We Specific military capabilities represented in
combined expert knowledge of regions
weapons, platforms, and military units can bewith publicly available information on
used individually to some effect. Practitioners
critical infrastructure to arrive at ourof war, however, have learned that combining
overall assessment of this metric.
the tools of war in various ways and orchestrating their tactical employment in series orAssessing Threats to U.S. Vital Interests
simultaneously can dramatically amplify the
To make the threats identified in this Index effectiveness of the force committed to battle.
measurable and relatable to the challenges of
The point is that the ability of a military
operating environments and the adequacy force to locate, close with, and destroy an enof American military power, Index staff and emy depends on many factors, but relatively
outside reviewers, working independently, few of them are easily measured. The scope
evaluated the threats according to their level of this specific project does not extend toof provocation (i.e., observed behavior) and analysis of everything that makes hard power
their actual capability to pose a credible threat possible; it focuses on the status of the hardto U.S. interests on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 rep- power itself.
resenting a very high threat capability or level
This Index assesses the state of military afof belligerency. This scale corresponds to the fairs for U.S. forces in three areas: capability,
tone of the five-point scales used to score the capacity, and readiness.
operating environment and military capabilCapability. Scoring of capability is basedities in that 1 is bad for U.S. interests and 5 is on the current state of combat equipment. This
very favorable.
involves four factors:
Based on these evaluations, provocative behavior was characterized according to five deThe age of key platforms relative to theirscending categories: benign (5); assertive (4);expected life span.
testing (3); aggressive (2); and hostile (1). Staff
also characterized the capabilities of a threat
Whether the required capability is being
actor according to five categories: marginal
met by legacy or modern equipment.
(5); aspirational (4); capable (3); gathering (2);and formidable (1). Those characterizations—­
The scope of improvement or replacebehavior and capability—form two halves ofment programs relative to the operational
the overall threat level.
requirement.

l

The overall health and stability (financial and technological) of modernization programs.

l

Weak: Equipment age is 61 percent–80
percent of expected life span.

Marginal: Equipment age is 41
This Index focused on primary combat
percent–­60 percent of expected life span.
units and combat platforms (e.g., tanks, ships,
and airplanes) and elected not to include theStrong: Equipment age is 21 percent–40
array of system and component upgrades thatpercent of expected life span.
keep an older platform viable over time, suchas a new radar, missile, or communications
Very Strong: Equipment age is 20
suite. New technologies grafted onto aging
percent or less of expected life span.
platforms ensure that U.S. military forces keep
pace with technological innovations relevant to Capability of Equipment
the modern battlefield, but at some point, theVery Weak: Over 80 percent of capability
platforms themselves are no longer viable andrelies on legacy platforms.
must be replaced. Modernized sub-systems andcomponents do not entirely substitute for agWeak: 60 percent–79 percent of capabiliing platforms, and it is the platform itself thatty relies on legacy platforms.
is usually the more challenging item to field. In
this sense, primary combat platforms serve as
Marginal: 40 percent–59 percent of caparepresentative measures of force modernity justbility is made up of legacy platforms.
as combat forces are a useful surrogate measurefor the overall military that includes a range ofStrong: 20 percent–39 percent of capabilsupport units, systems, and infrastructure.
ity is made up of legacy platforms.
In addition, it is assumed that modernization programs should replace current capacity
Very Strong: Less than 20 percent of
at a one-to-one ratio; less than a one-to-one
capability is made up of legacy platforms.
replacement assumes risk, because even if
the newer system is presumably better than Size of Modernization Program
the older, until it is proven in actual combat,
Very Weak: Modernization program ishaving fewer systems lessens the capacity ofsignificantly too small or inappropriate
the force, which is an important factor if comto sustain current capability or probat against a peer competitor carries with itgram in place.
the likelihood of attrition. For modernization
programs, only Major Defense Acquisition
Weak: Modernization program is smaller
Programs (MDAPs) are scored.
than current capability size.
The capability score uses a five-grade scale.
Each service receives one capability score that
Marginal: Modernization programis a non-weighted aggregate of scores for fouris appropriate to sustain current cacategories: (1) Age of Equipment, (2) Moderpability size.
nity of Capability, (3) Size of Modernization
Program, and (4) Health of Modernization
Strong: Modernization program will
Program. General criteria for the capability
increase current capability size.
categories are:Very Strong: Modernization programAge of Equipment
will vastly expand capability size.
Very Weak: Equipment age is past 80
percent of expected life span.
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2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Health of Modernization Program
Very Weak: Modernization program
faces significant problems; too far behindschedule (five-plus years); cannot replacecurrent capability before retirement;
lacks sufficient investment to advance;
cost overruns include Nunn–McCurdy
breach, which occurs when the cost of a
new item exceeds the most recently approved amount by 25 percent or more or if
it exceeds the originally approved amountby 50 percent or more.1lll

Marginal: Modernization program faces
few problems; behind schedule by one–
two years but can replace equipment withsome delay or experience some funding
cuts; some cost growth but not within objectives.
Strong: Modernization program faces no procurement problems; can replace equipment with no delays; withincost estimates.

Capacity Score Definitions
Very Weak: 0 percent–37 percent of thetwo-MRC benchmark.
lll

Weak: 38 percent–74 percent of the twoMRC benchmark.
Marginal: 75 percent–82 percent of thetwo-MRC benchmark.

﻿l

Weak: Modernization program faces
procurement problems; behind schedule (three–five years); difficult to replacecurrent equipment on time or insufficient funding; cost overruns enough totrigger an Acquisition Program Baseline(APB) breach.

Corps’ specific assessment.2 A strategic reserveis necessary because deployment of 100 percentof the force at any one time is highly unlikely.
Not only do ongoing requirements like trainingor sustainment and maintenance of equipment
make it infeasible for the entirety of the force
to be available for deployment, but committing
100 percent of the force would leave no resources available to handle unexpected situations.
Thus, a “marginal” capacity score would exactly meet a two-MRC force size, a “strong” capacity score would equate to a plus–10 percent
margin for strategic reserve, and a “very strong”
score would equate to a 20 percent margin.

llStrong: 83 percent–91 percent of the twoMRC benchmark.
Very Strong: 92 percent–100 percent of
the two-MRC benchmark.

Readiness. The readiness scores are derived from the military services’ own assessVery Strong: Modernization program isments of readiness based on their requireperforming better than DOD plans, inments. For many reasons, not least of which iscluding with lower actual costs.
concern about informing a potential enemy’s
calculations on sensitive, detailed aspects of
Capacity. To score capacity, the Army, Navy, a force’s readiness for combat, the services
and Air Force (be it end strength or number of typically classify their internal readiness replatforms) are compared to the force size re- porting. However, they do make some publicquired to meet a simultaneous or nearly simul- reports, usually when providing open testimotaneous two-war or two–major regional con- ny to Congress. Thus, the Index does not delve
tingency (MRC) benchmark. This benchmark into comprehensive reviews of all readinessconsists of the force needed to fight and win two input factors; it relies instead on the public
MRCs and a 20 percent margin that serves as a statements of the military services regarding
strategic reserve. The Marine Corps is handled the state of their readiness.
a bit differently; see the explanatory note below
It should be noted that even a “strong” or
and a more expanded discussion within the “very strong” score does not indicate that 100l

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percent of the force is ready; it simply indicatesthat the service is meeting 100 percent of its
own readiness requirements. Often, these requirements assume that a percentage of themilitary at any one time will not be fit for deployment. Because of this, even if readinessis graded as “strong” or “marginal,” there is
still a gap in readiness that will have significant implications for immediate combat effectiveness and the ability to deploy quickly.
Thus, anything short of meeting 100 percent
of readiness requirements assumes risk andis therefore problematic.
Further, a service’s assessment of its readiness occurs within its size or capacity at thattime and as dictated by the Defense Strategic
Guidance, National Military Strategy, and related top-level documents generated by the
Administration and senior Defense officials.
It does not account for the size-related “readiness” of the force to meet national security requirements assessed as needed by this Index.
Consequently, for a service to be assessed as“very strong” would mean that 80 percent–100
percent of the existing force in a service meets

584

that service’s requirements for being “ready”
even if the size of the service is less than that
required to meet the two-MRC benchmark. It
is important that the reader keep this in mind
when considering the actual readiness of theforce to protect U.S. national security interests
against the challenges presented by threatsaround the world.

Readiness Score Definitions
Very Weak: 0 percent–19 percent of service’s requirements.
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Weak: 20 percent–39 percent of service’s
requirements.
Marginal: 40 percent–59 percent of service’s requirements.
Strong: 60 percent–79 percent of service’s requirements.
Very Strong: 80 percent–100 percent ofservice’s requirements.

2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Endnotes1.

See 10 U.S. Code § 2433, Unit Cost Reports, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/2433 (accessed July 20, 2021).

2.

As noted in the introduction to the chapter assessing military power, the three large services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) aresized for global action in more than one theater at a time. The Marines, by virtue of overall size and most recently by directionof the Commandant, focus on one major conflict while ensuring that all Fleet Marine Forces are globally deployable for shortnotice, smaller-scale actions. Having assessed that the Indo-Pacific region will continue to be of central importance to the U.S.
and noting that China is a more worrisome “pacing threat” than any other competitor and that the Joint Force lacks the ability
to operate within the range of intensely weaponized, layered defenses featuring large numbers of precision-guided munitions,the Corps is reshaping itself to optimize its capabilities and organizational structures for this challenge. This Index concurs withthis effort but assesses that the Corps will still need greater capacity to succeed in war in the very circumstances for which theMarines believe they must prepare. Consequently, we assess the Marine Corps’ capacity against a one-war metric.

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﻿

The Honorable John F. Lehman

W

the White House. For more than two decades,
Dr. Lehman flew various tactical aircraft for
the Naval Reserve.
Previously, he has served on the boards ofBall Corporation, TI Group plc, Westland Helicopter plc, Sedgwick plc and many of JFLCO’s investments. He is also Chairman of the
Princess Grace Foundation and an Overseer of
the School of Engineering at the University ofPennsylvania. Previously, he was also a member of the 9/11 Commission and the National
Defense Commission.
A native of Pennsylvania, Dr. Lehman
earned a BS from St. Joseph’s University, a BA
and MA from Cambridge University, and a PhD
from the University of Pennsylvania.

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﻿e are honored to dedicate the 2022 Index
of U.S. Military Strength to the Honorable John F. Lehman.
From 1981 to 1987, Dr. Lehman served as
Secretary of the U.S. Navy. As the chief executive of the Navy, he was responsible for the
management of 1.2 million people, an annual
budget of $95 billion and total assets equivalent to those of the seven largest Fortune
500 corporations combined. Prior to being
appointed Secretary of the Navy, Dr. Lehman
served as president of the aerospace consulting firm Abington Corporation, a delegate
to the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions
negotiations, Deputy Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, and a senior staff member to Dr. Henry Kissinger atFounded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational
institution—a think tank—whose mission is to formulate and promoteconservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise,
limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values,
and a strong national defense.
We believe the principles and ideas of the American Founding are worth
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ISBN 978-0-89195-306-7

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