Strategic Trends Programme
Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2045

Fifth Edition

Strategic Trends Programme
Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2045

Fifth Edition

Conditions of release

Global Strategic Trends describes a strategic
context for Defence and security looking
out to the middle of the century. It takes
a comprehensive view of the future
derived through research headed by theDevelopment, Concepts and Doctrine Centre(DCDC).
This publication is the fifth edition of Global
Strategic Trends. It is benchmarked at 30 April
2014. Developments taking place after thisdate have not been considered.
The findings and deductions contained inthis publication do not represent the official
policy of Her Majesty’s Government or that ofUnited Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD).
It does, however, represent the view of theDevelopment, Concepts and Doctrine Centre,
a department within the MOD.
This information is Crown copyright © Ministryof Defence (MOD) 2014 and the intellectual
property rights for this publication belong
exclusively to the MOD. No material orinformation contained in this publication
should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form outside
MOD establishments, except as authorisedby both the sponsor and the MOD, whereappropriate. This information may be subject
to privately owned rights.

ii

Global Strategic Trends

Foreword

The Development, Concepts and Doctrine
Centre’s Strategic Trends Programme is acontinuous programme of research thatseeks to provide policy-makers with acontext for long-term decision-making.
This, the fifth edition of Global Strategic
Trends, builds on previous editions and arespected body of work that benefits fromcontinual engagement with a wide rangeof contributors from academia, businessand government both domestically andinternationally. The extent of across UK
Government engagement – together withincreased levels of international consultationand peer review – are particular strengths ofthis edition.
The challenge of looking 30 years aheadcannot be overstated. Importantly, Global
Strategic Trends does not seek to predict the
future, instead it describes plausible outcomeson the basis of rigorous trends analysis. It
is a truism that in an increasingly complex,
competitive and connected world, thechallenge is not responding to what we know
today, but rather preparing for what tomorrowmight bring.
Looking out toward the middle of thiscentury, the opportunities and challenges
abound. Demographic change will see
developed nations adapting to aging
populations, while developing nations face
the challenge of rapid population growth that
won’t necessarily be matched by economic
development. The pace and breadth oftechnological advancements will change
our perception of our role in the workplace,
reveal new opportunities for health advancesand facilitate the deepening of global
communications. But as access to technology

Global Strategic Trends

increases, we will face
new risks to our security
both at home and abroad.
The industrialisation of
the developing world
will present resource andenvironmental challenges
while generating wealthand prosperity for someof the most impoverishednations. In the West in particular, a rise ofindividualism and, amongst many, a growing
sense of disconnection from long-establishedgoverning structures will challenge traditional
systems. The growth of cities will provide
opportunities to make better use of theworld’s resources but will expose many of themillions living in coastal cities to the risks offlooding as rising sea levels and more frequentand destructive weather events begin totest resilience. And climate change and theconsequences of warming will affect food andwater availability for many.
Ultimately, Global Strategic Trends is designed
to inform policy-makers as they grapple withthe opportunities and threats that the future
could bring. And the choices that they makecould have as great an impact on the future as
the trends themselves.

Rear Admiral John Kingwell
Director, Concepts and Doctrineiii

Contents

Foreword............................................................................................................................................................................... iii
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................................vii
How to use..........................................................................................................................................................................ix
Synopsis...............................................................................................................................................................................xiii
Executive summary.......................................................................................................................................................xv
Methodology................................................................................................................................................................xxiv

Part 1 Thematic1
Demography......................................................................................................................................................................3
Gender................................................................................................................................................................................. 11
Urbanisation.................................................................................................................................................................... 17
Resources.......................................................................................................................................................................... 21
The Environment......................................................................................................................................................... 31
Health................................................................................................................................................................................... 41
Transport...........................................................................................................................................................................49
Information......................................................................................................................................................................55
Education.......................................................................................................................................................................... 61
Automation and work..............................................................................................................................................67
Corruption and money............................................................................................................................................75
Identity and the role of the state.....................................................................................................................83
Defence spending and capabilities................................................................................................................93

Part 2 Geographic

99

Northern America.................................................................................................................................................... 101
Latin America and the Caribbean................................................................................................................. 109
Europe...............................................................................................................................................................................117
Middle East and North Africa........................................................................................................................... 125
Sub-Saharan Africa.................................................................................................................................................. 133
Central Asia....................................................................................................................................................................141
South & East Asia and Oceania........................................................................................................................147
Polar regions.................................................................................................................................................................155
Space................................................................................................................................................................................. 165
Acknowledgements..................................................................................................................................................170
Contact details..............................................................................................................................................................172
Feedback form..............................................................................................................................................................173

Global Strategic Trendsvvi

Global Strategic Trends

Introduction

Global Strategic Trends (GST) describes a
strategic context for those in the Ministryof Defence (MOD) and wider Government
who are involved in developing long-termplans, policies and capabilities. Without astrategic context there is a risk that planners,
policy-makers and capability developers may
assume a future that adheres to preconceived
thoughts and assumptions. As well as
providing a strategic context, this fifth editionof GST (GST 5) identifies long-term threats
and opportunities, out to 2045. GST does
not attempt to predict the future – it cannot.
Rather, it describes those phenomena that
could have a significant impact on the future
and combines these differing perspectives
to produce a multifaceted picture ofpossible outcomes.
The need for the MOD to set out the future
strategic context was articulated in the 1998
Strategic Defence Review. To meet that
requirement, the Strategic Trends Programme
was started in 2001 and the first edition of GST
was published in 2003. Subsequently, GST,
along with the Future Character of Conflict(which will be renamed the Future Operating
Environment when it is released in 2014) havebeen key elements of the MOD’s contribution
to both the National Security Strategy and theStrategic Defence and Security Review – and we
expect them to play similar roles in the future.
GST is the first step in a series of MOD longterm planning activities. By providing a global
context, further work will then be able toexamine its implications and develop policy
and capability options to meet the resulting
challenges. While GST is produced principallyfor MOD it has utility for others involved inlong-term planning. We have benefited from

Global Strategic Trends

considerable engagementwith those outside MOD –from academia, business andgovernment both domesticallyand internationally. In sodoing, we have deliberately attempted to
avoid a single, subjective perspective.
The starting point for GST is identifying trends(discernable patterns of change) – an example
is the growth in world population. The next
step is projecting those trends forward 30
years, analysing their potential consequences
and using this to build a series of picturesof what the future could look like in 2045.
Finally, these components are combined
to produce a strategic context, including
defence and security implications, against
which policies, capabilities and plans can betested and refined. Key scenarios illustrate
how these trends could interact and shocks
provide the reader with examples of how thestrategic context could be radically altered by
unexpected events. In addition, alternative
outcomes emphasise that there are several
possible ways trends could impact on the
future.
Following a complex mapping process(explained further in the methodology
section) we have identified 13 clusters oftrends and drivers with particularly strong
linkages. This provides the overall structure
for the document, rather than the STEEP
method1 used in GST 4. Some trends (mostnotably those relating to economics, religion,
technology and globalisation – themes that

1 ‘STEEP’ analysis provides broad headings forgrouping information: social, technological,
economic, environmental and political.

vii

Introduction

would have been called ‘ringroad issues’ inprevious issues of GST) run through all of thefollowing groups, and are discussed as theyarise rather than in their own sections. We
hope this brings them to life more clearly.
The 13 overarching themes are:■■ Demography■■ Gender■■ Urbanisation■■ Resources■■ The Environment■■ Health■■ Transport■■ Information■■ Education■■ Automation and work■■ Corruption and money■■ Identity and the role of the state■■ Defence spending and capabilities.

“

We hope you
will refer to GST 5
regularly anddraw your own
conclusions fromthe information
we havepresented.

”

viii

Contained within these sections are anumber of scenarios which explore someof the most important connections andinter-dependencies between trends, givinga brief indication of a few of the challenges
and opportunities that these linkages could
produce. While we have set out what we
believe are the most plausible trends, ourwork on strategic shocks has shown how
significant outlying disruptive events canbe. The most significant of these shocks are
discussed with the relevant trends. Although
GST 5 may initially seem to have a rather
gloomy, Malthusian2 outlook, we believe thatpolicy-makers can have a significant impact on
the future, and hence there are considerable
grounds for optimism.

For those readers who have a particularinterest in the way that trends are likely toaffect specific parts of the world, the second
part of GST 5 focusses on what 2045 may look
like in eight regional groups as well as Space:■■ Northern America■■ Latin America■■ Europe■■ Middle East and North Africa■■ Sub-Saharan Africa■■ Central Asia■■ South & East Asia and Oceania■■ Polar regions■■ Space.
There is, unavoidably, a huge degree of
uncertainty in what we describe. We will
have got some things wrong, there will be
unidentified shocks and surprises, as well
as phenomena that we had not envisaged.
Parts of the document may, at first glance,
seem contradictory. There will inevitably be
inconsistencies because we are aiming todescribe a variety of possible futures rather
than predicting a single, certain outcome.
Although we try to give a picture of the worldin 2045, you may see references to different
dates in the document where we have drawn
on sources not perfectly aligned with ourtimeframe. Because we are looking so far
into the future, much of what we describe
is, inevitably, based on extrapolation and (adegree of) imagination. Extrapolation may
not, of course, be linear. Unlike the method
used in GST 4, we have not attempted toassign probabilities, given the inherent
uncertainty – that could be misleading
and simplistic. Instead, we hope you willrefer to GST 5 regularly and draw your own
conclusions from the information we havepresented. This, we believe, will be the mosteffective way of helping you think about the
future and how to embrace it.

2 The view that “the population tends to increase at agreater rate than its means of subsistence, resulting
in the population checks of war, famine andepidemic”. Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th
edition.

Global Strategic Trends

How to use

Synopsis, Executive summary and key
implications for defence and security
This section provides a brief overview,summarises the major trends, drivers andtheir implications, as well as highlighting key
implications for defence and security.
Part 1 – ThematicThis part brings together important trends
and drivers under related themes. The
relationships between themes, trends anddrivers are described and the implications
for defence and security are highlighted.
Where a geographical relationship has been
identified, the theme is cross-referenced to theappropriate geographical analysis (Part 2).
Part 2 – Geographic
Drawing on region-specific research, andexpanding on the observations made inPart 1, this part considers regional and(where appropriate) country-specific effectsof themes, trends and drivers.

Global Strategic Trends

ShocksThroughout GST 5, text boxes containing shocks
will alert the reader to the inherent uncertainty
when looking 30 years into the future. Events
could occur that would disrupt trends, leading
to a future that looks very different. These
events – or ‘shocks’ – only have a low probabilityof occurring, but because of their potentiallyhigh impact, it is important to consider somein more detail, allowing for possible mitigating
action to be taken. The terrorist attacks of
September the 11th or the 2008 global financial
collapse are historical examples of lowprobability events happening with significant
long-term consequences.
Scenarios
Scenarios illustrate ways in which trends anddrivers from multiple themes could interact.
Alternative outcomes
When discussing trends and drivers, wehighlight the outcome judged to be the most
likely. However, there are several credible waysthat particular trends could interact and affectthe future. The alternative outcome boxes
highlight other plausible ways that trends
could develop.

ixHow to use

Thematic
The key trends, drivers andthe potential implications foreach theme are summarised.
Supporting details can befound in the main text.

Alternative outcomes
highlight otherplausible ways thattrends could develop.

Each theme has an icon andits own colour which is used
to index and cross reference
information.

Scenarios illustrate ways in which
trends and drivers from multiple
themes could interact.

x

The implications for defence andsecurity are summarised at theend of each theme.

Global Strategic Trends

How to use

Geographic

Each regionalgrouping is shown
together with a listof the countries thatcomprise the group.

A representation of theregion provides a quickreference and helps tosituate the area underdiscussion.

The key trends, drivers and the potential
implications for each region are summarised.
Supporting details can be found in the main text.

Global Strategic Trends

Shocks - events that could occurthat disrupt the trends described are highlighted.

xi

xii

Global Strategic Trends

Synopsis

Our lives and the world we live in will almost
certainly change over the next 30 years, with
the impacts felt by all. We will probably live
longer and know more. By 2045, the global
population is likely to grow by two billion, with
far-reaching consequences for how, and where,
we live. Changing demographics could create
new threats and opportunities, with aging
populations in many developed countries andyouth bulges in some developing countries.
This is likely to be coupled with a growing
number of migrants across the globe as we
become more connected. Gender inequality
is likely to remain in 2045, driving poverty
and insecurity in large parts of the world.
Governments may come under immensepressure to address the coming challenges,
and if social expectations fail to be met, social
unrest or even violence could ensue. Over
70% of a growing global population looks
set to live in urban areas by 2045. Where
urbanisation is managed successfully, it could
spur economic growth and create a better
quality of life. Handled poorly, people may live
in slums, without adequate infrastructure andservices – driving an increase in communicablediseases and poverty, possibly leading to violent
insurgencies.
With more people living longer, demand forresources will almost certainly grow. We arelikely to need more food, water and better
sanitation. However, without successfully
managing water stress, including more effective
international cooperation, it is likely that 3.9billion people will suffer water shortages.
Demand for energy could more than double by2045, although non-polluting power sources
and better energy storage may offset some ofour reliance on coal and hydrocarbons.

Global Strategic Trends

As we increase the stress we place on thenatural environment, our need to understand,protect and preserve it will almost certainly
grow. Climate change, a rise in sea levels,
desertification and reducing biodiversity are
all issues that could affect us even more overthe next 30 years. They are likely to impact on
agricultural production and fishing, and could
exacerbate humanitarian crises. It is possible,
however, that new technologies may holdsolutions to some of these problems.
Physical inactivity, unhealthy diets andincreased life expectancy could lead to an
obesity ‘epidemic’ as well as rises in noncommunicable diseases such as dementia.
But significant improvements in health andmedicine could let us live longer and be moreproductive. We are likely to be able to makemedical diagnoses faster, more cheaply andwith greater accuracy. Innovative methods
could be introduced for drug and treatment
delivery. Medicines may even be tailored to aperson’s genetic make-up, providing safer andmore effective treatment.

“

Our lives andthe world we livein will almost
certainly changeover the next thirty
years, with theimpacts felt by all.

”Technological progress is occurring in almost
all aspects of human life and is likely to causesignificant change by 2045. Everyone andeverything seem certain to become moreconnected, with revolutionary advances in how
we acquire, store and analyse information. If
current trends continue, there are likely to bedramatic increases in computing power that
could enable us to predict and monitor many
aspects of our lives and surroundings. Thismay mean that complex global issues canbe modelled and predicted, such as climatechange, population movements, disease
patterns and economic trends. But people
are likely to find it increasingly difficult to go

xiii

Synopsis‘offline’ and maintaining privacy could become
more challenging. There could also be anincreasing threat of cyber attack from criminals
and terrorists as information, communications
and critical national infrastructure become
more integrated.
Our changing technological world is likely
to have a tremendous impact on the way
we are educated in the future. Improved
computing power and ‘Big Data’ meansthat teachers are likely to have access to vastquantities of information. Learning is likely to
be stimulated through exercises, games andsimulations – enabled at the touch of a button.
Although face-to-face education is unlikely
to disappear, teachers will probably become
more like ‘learning advisers’, guiding students
through digitally-delivered, personally-tailorededucation. Social networking is likely to play
an important role in collaborative learning,
through real-time discussion and virtual
classrooms. Learning is unlikely to end at
school and university – rather, lifelong learning
will probably become the norm. There is likely
to be a growing emphasis on the transferability
and constant upgrading of qualifications.
Global inequality in education is likely to remain,
particularly as a ‘digital’ education is unlikely
to be available to all. There will probably still
be a gender gap, despite near-parity for girls
and boys at the primary level. However, thedisparity between developed and developing
countries is likely to reduce. It is even possiblethat by 2045 the majority of the world’s children
will have enjoyed a university or higher-level
education.
Technology is highly likely to change ourworking environment. By 2045, robots or‘unmanned systems’ (able to carry out complex
tasks without a human operator’s direct
involvement) are likely to be as ubiquitous ascomputers are today. Machines are likely to
become more sophisticated and lifelike. We
could also see robots used in many more areasof work and society, including caring roles,
customer-service, surgery and in combat. This
will probably mean a period of adaption andchange, as robots take on some traditionally‘human’ roles. There will almost certainly bechallenges to overcome, such as establishingwhether we can learn to ‘trust’ robots. But

xiv

it is not just the increasing use of machinesthat has the potential to change the way wework. As the population alters, the workforce
may change as well – people are likely towork longer. We are likely to place a greater
emphasis on flexible working, short-term
contracts and working away from the office.
So much change will almost certainly affect ourperception of identity. And again, technologicaldevelopments are likely to drive change.
Advances in human augmentation may
mean we can enhance our sensory capability,
become more physically able and improve our
cognitive functions. However, it is unlikely thistechnology will be available to all, potentiallycontributing to the increasing inequality theworld faces.
How the state functions in this changing world
will almost certainly alter. Individuals may feelless connected to their country of origin as theymigrate more frequently and identify morestrongly with online communities of interest.
Private companies and non-governmentalorganisations could grow in power, providing
services that used to be the responsibility of thestate. Internationally, countries may be moreclosely connected, with stronger trading andpolitical blocs.
Widespread and challenging implications
for defence and security will almost certainly
be generated by this increasingly connectedworld, with its rapidly advancing technology
and evolving societies. The face of somearmed forces may change, with an increasinguse of unmanned systems and women incombat roles. Militaries and security forces
may be asked to meet the challenges of morehumanitarian disasters, and attacks by nonstate actors and cyber-criminals may increase.
As more people live in cities, it is likely thatsome future adversaries will be found in larger,
more complex urban environments, possessing
a greater level of information and better accessto technology than they do today.

Global Strategic Trends

Executive summary

This fifth edition of Global Strategic Trends(GST 5) aims to describe possible futures toprovide a strategic context for policy- anddecision-makers across Government. Thirteen
broad thematic areas have been identified,with eight geographic regions and a section
on space. Some trends (most notably thoserelating to economics, religion, technology
and globalisation) are so important that they
run through all of the subject areas, and are
discussed as they arise rather than in their own
sections, to bring them to life more clearly. In
the process of identifying threats, challenges
and defence and security implications forpolicy- and decision-makers, there may be atendency for the document to seem rather
negative in its outlook. This is an inevitableconsequence of its purpose. There is ofcourse scope for human ingenuity to have asignificant impact on the future, and hence
there are considerable grounds for optimism.

Demography
The global population is likely to grow to
between 8.3 and 10.4 billion by 2045, largely
because of increasing life-expectancy,
declining levels of child mortality andcontinuing high birth rates in many
developing countries.1 Growth is not likely
to be evenly distributed and will probably
be slower in developed countries. Some,
including Japan and parts of Europe, arelikely to experience a decline in population.
In developing countries, rapid population
increase and urbanisation will probably
challenge stability. Age and genderimbalances may exacerbate existing politicaland social tensions while a growing youth
1 UN categories are used for ‘developed’ and‘developing’ countries.

Global Strategic Trends

population, especially in the Middle East,
Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, could
provide a reservoir of disaffected young
people. Conversely, if harnessed, they could
provide a boost to their economies. Migration
is likely to increase, with people moving
within, and outside, their country of origin toseek work or to escape the effects of climatechange.

GenderGlobal gender equality and opportunity gaps
will almost certainly continue in economic,
social and political spheres out to 2045.
Although women’s autonomy is likely togradually increase in most regions, entrenchedgender disparities will probably remain as
major drivers of poverty and insecurity. As
is the case today, women are likely to havegreater opportunities and autonomy indeveloped countries than elsewhere in theworld, but are unlikely to achieve total parity
with their male counterparts, particularly whensocial expectations inhibit the role of womenin society. In some regions of the world,
women’s rights and feminist movements arelikely to continue to face a ‘backlash’ fromthose with vested interests in maintaining thestatus quo.
Urbanisation
With 70% of the global population likely tolive in cities by 2045, urbanisation will be aparticularly important theme in developing
countries. Urbanisation is likely to enhance
economic and social development, but –without mitigation measures – may also
lead to pressure on infrastructure (and theenvironment) which could contribute tosocial tensions within the urban population.

xv

Executive summary

New technologies are likely to enable step changes in speed and efficiency of mass transport“

Demand forresources of all
kinds is likely
to increaseout to 2045,
as the world’s
population grows.

”

xvi

Urbanisation and the effects of climatechange are likely to result in an increase in themagnitude of humanitarian crises, particularly
since the majority of urban areas will almost
certainly be either on, or near, the coast,
making these cities vulnerable to flooding.

Resources
Demand for resources of all kinds is likely toincrease out to 2045, as the world’s population
rises to around nine billion. While the demand
for food is expected to grow, some countries
are likely to experience significant declines
in agricultural productivity. Water shortages
are likely to be particularly acute in many
areas, exacerbated by increasing demandand climate change. In the 2045 timeframe,
coal and hydrocarbons are likely to remain
the most important sources of energy, withrenewable and nuclear energy likely to makean increasing contribution.
The Environment
A growing population will demand more
food and water, increasing the strain on
the environment out to 2045. As centres of
population cluster in vulnerable areas such as

coastal regions, the consequences of adverse
weather are highly likely to be felt more keenly.
By 2045, climate change is likely to have more
noticeable effects. Without mitigation, rising
sea levels will increase the risk of coastal
flooding, particularly in regions affected bytropical cyclones. Droughts and heatwaves
are also likely to increase in intensity, durationand frequency. Some of these events
could precipitate natural disasters which,because of the interdependencies enabledby globalisation, may have consequences far
beyond the site where the disaster occurs.

HealthDevelopments in technology are likely to leadto significant improvements in medicine andhealth, such as the potential for developingcures for some cancers by 2045. Advancesin diagnostic techniques, the developmentof artificial organs and mind-controlled
prosthetic limbs mean that we are highly likely
to live for longer and have more productive
lives. But new challenges to good healthwill almost certainly emerge. Rising physicalinactivity and unhealthy diets are likely tocontribute to an obesity epidemic and a rise in

Global Strategic Trends

Executive summary

non-communicable diseases. Antimicrobialresistant pathogens could be widespreadby 2045, making post-operative infections
potentially lethal.

Transport
New materials, manufacturing techniques
and power systems, as well as advances in
information technology, are likely to open up
new opportunities for automated transportand generate step-changes in speed andefficiency. Driverless transport is likely to
be widespread by 2045, providing greater
independence for the elderly and impaired.
Unmanned systems could play a key rolein the mass delivery of people and goods.
New developments in super-sonic flight
could make sub-orbital space transport acommercial reality in the next 30 years.
Information
Revolutionary advances in how we acquire,
store and analyse information, together
with dramatic increases in computer
processing power, are likely to give us theability to predict accurately a wide range ofphenomena, from crime hot-spots to theeffects of climate change. As everyday objects
are increasingly connected to the Internet,
this vast network of sensors is likely to gather
data on more aspects of our lives and theenvironment, making it hard for anyone to go‘off the grid’.
Education
Increasing computing power, growing accessto the Internet and ‘Big Data’ are likely to havea transformative effect on education, withan increasing blurring between online andoffline learning. Education levels will almost
certainly continue to rise across the globe andfor both sexes. At the same time, educational
institutions could face a series of major
challenges, including facilitating smoothertransitions from education to work andencouraging lifelong learning to ensure theworkforce can adapt to a changing job market.
These pressures may force educational
institutions to provide more informal, distanceand personalised learning. There is likely to bea growing emphasis on the transferability andconstant upgrading of qualifications, as well

Global Strategic Trends

as a shift towards more personalised forms ofassessment that use a range of technologies
to trace the paths of individual learners.

Automation and work
Robots or ‘unmanned systems’ – machines
capable of carrying out complex tasks
without directly involving a human operator– are likely to be as ubiquitous in 2045 ascomputers are today. Unmanned systems
are increasingly likely to replace people in theworkplace, carrying out tasks with increased
effectiveness and efficiency, while reducing
risk to humans. This could ultimately leadto mass unemployment and social unrest.
As robots become more lifelike, perhaps
capable of appearing to express emotion,interactions with people are likely to become
more complicated. The increased capability ofrobots is likely to change the face of warfare,with the possibility that some countries may
replace potentially large numbers of soldiers,
sailors and airmen with robots by 2045.
However, military decision-making is likely
to remain the remit of humans for ethicalreasons, at least in western countries. Others
may not be so willing to make the same tradeoffs between speed and accountability.

“

Unmanned
systems are
increasingly likely
to replace people
in the workplace.

”

The proportion of older workers in the global
labour force is likely to increase out to 2045,
with a possible corresponding decrease inopportunities for younger people. Flexible
working practices are likely to become
more widespread, with people employedon shorter-term contracts and a growth inworking remotely. Workers will probably
have less predictable income and increasing
economic insecurity. By 2045, there is likely to
be greater equality between men and womenin the jobs market, particularly in developed
countries. In part, this may be driven by aglobal shift away from manual labour, towards
a more knowledge-based economy.

Corruption and money
If unchallenged, corruption is likely tocontinue to exacerbate global inequality
and conflict. By 2045, consistent attempts
to curtail corrupt practices are likely to bemade by national governments, international
governing institutions, the private sector andxvii

Executive summary“

Personal privacy
will very probably
be increasingly
difficult to achievein the years
leading up to2045, as identity
is increasingly
defined by online
activities.

”

non-state actors. Technology is highly likely
to play a significant role in both enabling andcombating corruption.
State-backed currencies will almost certainly
still be the dominant form of money in 2045,
although alternative currencies are likely to
expand, constituting the main shift in thefinancial landscape. Criminal transactions
may increasingly be made using alternative
currencies, with a possible growth in the
anonymous raising and transferring of funds
by terrorist groups. Governments could haveless influence over alternative currencies
and, as a result, may be less able to shape
the global financial system or raise revenues
through taxation. A single international
currency within the timeframe is improbable,with the US dollar likely to remain the mostimportant global currency by 2045. China islikely to allow greater financial liberalisation,
contributing to its possible overtaking of the
US in terms of GDP within the next 30 years.
This is likely to contribute to some erosionof the pre-eminence of the dollar as thedominant global reserve currency. Increased
globalisation could also make transmission offinancial shocks more widespread.

Identity and the role of the state
The state will almost inevitably be thedominant actor in international affairs in 2045.
Private or semi-state owned companies andnon-governmental organisations are likely
to exert increasing influence, but are lesslikely to exercise state-like legal and decisionmaking powers. Individuals may define
themselves less by their nationality, withgrowing migration and stronger links to virtual
communities. Rising costs, demands, technicalcomplexity and need for specialisation could
see private and other non-state entities
increasingly functioning as the primary
providers of those services that states havetraditionally delivered, such as security. Somestates may lose their monopoly on force, asprivate security contractors are increasingly
employed and as some private companies takemore responsibility for their own security. The
extent to which these changes happen under
the control of state-based decision-makers is
likely to vary between countries according totheir stability and forms of governance.

xviii

Personal privacy will very probably be
increasingly difficult to achieve in the years
leading up to 2045, as identity is ever-moredefined by online activities. People are likely
to demand higher levels of privacy protection
from governments and businesses. Religion
will probably remain a significant componentof identity, with the spread of representative
governments providing the space forsome religions to become increasingly
politically assertive. A range of technologicalenhancements have the potential to transformhuman identity by improving sensory
perception, physical performance and perhaps
even giving us the ability to control fear andother emotional states.

Defence spending and capabilities
Chinese defence expenditure is likely to rivalthat of the US over the next 30 years, reflecting
China’s growing economic strength. These
two global powers are likely to spend far
more on defence than any other country,
accounting for almost half of the world’s total
defence spending by 2045. India’s defence
budget could see it occupying a ‘second tier’by 2045. Russia is likely to increase defence
spending, although not quickly enough tomatch that of China, the US or India. European
countries are likely to continue to spend
substantial amounts on their armed forces,
although their spending is unlikely to increasesignificantly unless a major threat emerges.
Advances in technology are likely to lead toincreasingly effective non-lethal capabilities
and increase the precision of weapons. This is
likely to alter the nature of conflict.
Northern America
By 2045, Northern America’s population is
likely to grow to between around 394-478
million and become more ethnically diverse.
Climate change is likely to open up shipping
routes during the summer months, as well
as new areas for extracting minerals andhydrocarbons in the Arctic. However, it isalso likely to cause significant harm throughheatwaves, droughts, and flooding across theregion. Northern America’s economic outlook
is positive, boosted by newly accessibleenergy reserves, and it is expected to integrate
ever-more closely with the global economy.
While security challenges (including the threat

Global Strategic Trends

Executive summaryof terrorism) will probably endure, the region is
likely to remain stable and politically influential.
The India-US relationship has the potential to
become significant in the timeframe, but thepre-eminent relationship for the region is likely
to be between China and the US, particularly
as trading partners. However, there will almost
certainly remain a number of issues that
could give rise to tensions between the twocountries.

Latin America and the Caribbean
Latin America and the Caribbean are likely
to remain politically and economicallyfragmented, with individual countries pursuingbilateral relationships rather than forming astrong unified bloc. Brazil and Mexico arelikely to show the strongest growth in theregion, with both countries likely to be major
global economies (in terms of GDP) by 2045.
Rising sea levels and extreme rainfall are likely
to expose a number of large and populous
cities in coastal regions around South America
to additional flooding risk. Socially, weak
governance is likely to continue to inhibit
progress in a number of countries, with thegrowing consumer class being increasingly
vocal in its challenge to regimes. Some Latin
American countries are highly likely to havemature military-industrial complexes andarmed forces capable of performing on the
global stage by 2045. Regional stability ishighly likely to endure, although producing
and globally distributing narcotics will almost
certainly continue, with an increasing ‘homemarket’. However, the emergence of a fullyfledged narco-state is unlikely.
EuropeEurope is likely to remain a substantial part of
the global economy, with the euro and thesingle market still likely to exist by 2045. EU
membership is likely to expand, although it isunlikely that all countries who wish to join will
be included. The effects of climate change
are likely to be less severe in Europe than inmost other regions, although increased water
scarcity in the south may limit agricultural
productivity there. Energy consumption
is likely to decrease out to 2045, althoughhydrocarbons will probably continue to be
the continent’s main source of fuel. Europe

Global Strategic Trends

Europe is likely to remain a substantial part of global economy

is likely to face a range of security challenges,
but disagree internally over how to address
them. As the US focusses increasingly on
Asia, Europe will almost certainly be expected
to make a greater contribution to its own
security. Russia is likely to continue to bea major power, maintaining a substantial
capability for regional intervention by 2045.
China and Europe are unlikely to view eachother as threats and may become partners inmanaging future crises.

Middle East and North Africa
Over the next 30 years, the Middle East andNorth Africa (MENA) are likely to remain
volatile areas, with high potential for tension
and some violent conflict. The aftermath of
the Arab uprisings of 2011 may still resonate
in some countries, with civil unrest likely.
Identity politics and sectarianism will almost
certainly be key characteristics of the politicallandscape, constituting a serious challenge
to good governance. Countries in MENA
are unlikely to be able to break the cycle ofpower politics, patronage, religious tension
and authoritarianism. Social, environmental
and economic issues will probably continue
to threaten the region’s stability out to2045, including an under-employed young
population, a decline in natural energy
resources and the effects of climate change.

“

Some Latin
Americancountries arehighly likely tohave mature
military-industrial
complexes andarmed forces
capable ofperforming on the
global stage by
2045.

”

xix

Executive summary“

As Arctic andAntarctic sea
ice retreats,
many areas thatare currently
inaccessible could
become open
to commercial
exploitation,
particularly of oil
and gas.

”xx

Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa will almost certainly remaina region of significant political and economic
differences by 2045 but overall the region’s
economy should grow – possibly rapidly.
However, economic performance is likely tovary sharply from country to country, with alack of infrastructure and political instability
likely to continue to provide some of thebiggest challenges to sustained growth.
The region is likely to see the fastest rise inpopulation growth of anywhere in the world,with some countries’ populations morethan doubling by 2045. Governance in theregion is likely to improve and the current
trend towards representative government islikely to continue, although this will probably
be resisted by some authoritarian regimes,
possibly leading to violence. The risk ofstate-on-state conflict is likely to reduce but
will almost certainly remain a concern. By
contrast, the threat from intra-state conflict
and from terrorism is likely to endure - andcould worsen. The African Union’s ability todeal with crises is likely to improve, but it willprobably still require international assistancefor more demanding situations. Technology
is likely to facilitate links between different
parts of the region and with the wider world,
thereby increasing economic productivity
and improving governance. If current trends
continue, most people in the region are likely
to have access to the Internet by 2045. Climatechange is likely to have a severe impact
on some parts of sub-Saharan Africa, with
agriculture particularly badly affected. The
region is likely to continue to face significant
rates of infection from communicablediseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. But it isconditions such as diabetes and cancer that arelikely to pose the greater health threat by 2045.
Central Asia
Despite the divergent paths taken by thefive Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan andUzbekistan) since their independence from theSoviet Union, each remains vulnerable to socialand economic risks. These potential problems
stem from internal threats caused by weak
infrastructure and institutions, as well as theirrelations with external actors. As a result, theregion is susceptible to ethnic conflict, suddenpolitical transitions, economic shocks, foodinsecurity and natural disasters – all potentiallyposing strategic threats beyond Central Asia to
the rest of the world.

South & East Asia and Oceania
China and India will almost certainly continue
to be the dominant powers in the region
by 2045, with their economies ensuringthat South & East Asia makes the biggest
contribution to the world’s GDP. Japan is likely
to continue to have the region’s third-largest
economy. In Oceania, Australia will almost
inevitably remain the dominant power andhave the largest economy. South & East Asiaand Oceania are likely to continue to containover 50% of the world’s population by 2045,
presenting both benefits and challenges.
China and India are likely to continue todevote considerable resources to ensuring
economic growth and both countries arelikely to continue to seek a strong economic
relationship with the US. The ways that
China and India manage their societies’
demands and their internal methods ofgovernance will be important to the region’s
development. Both countries are likely to
become increasingly dependent on the
global economy for their long-term stability,
prosperity and security.
Polar regions
Climate change is the principal driver ofchange in the Arctic and Antarctic, withincreasing temperatures and precipitation.
As Arctic and Antarctic sea ice retreats, many
areas that are currently inaccessible could
become open to commercial exploitation,
particularly of oil and gas. The opening-upof the Arctic is likely to focus attention on
the region’s governance arrangements, but,
despite challenges, current arrangements
are likely to endure out to 2045. Large-scale
military confrontation in either region isunlikely, but it is possible that some countries– depending on their internal politics – mayseek to project power in the Arctic if they
consider their interests in the region to beunder threat. In Antarctica, the current
governance arrangements are likely to endureout to 2045, but the Antarctic Treaty System

Global Strategic Trends

Executive summary

could come under pressure to accommodate
increased commercial exploitation within
carefully managed bounds.

Space
Our reliance on space technology in a numberof commercial and military areas will almost
certainly increase out to 2045. Technologicaladvances are likely to further reduce thecost of manufacturing and launching spacevehicles, making space increasingly accessible
to (and profitable for) countries, companies,
organised crime and private individuals. As
reliance on space grows, so could the impactof damage caused by deliberate attack, space
weather and orbital collisions.

Key defence and security implications
Each section in GST 5 ends with a number of defence-related deductions. The following
are the most important of those defence and security implications. Rather than attach any
additional prioritisation to them, they are listed simply in the order in which they appear in
the document.
■■ Technological developments will probably allow diasporas to remain
more closely connected to their native countries. Consequently, issues
from homelands are likely to be brought into host countries, and viceversa. Diasporas may also provide an impetus for governments tointervene - or refrain from interfering - in their citizens’ countries oforigin. Lack of integration of migrant groups could exacerbate social
tensions.
■■ Increasing numbers of women are likely to have front-line combat roles
in armed forces worldwide, mirrored by growing female participation inarmed resistance movements and terrorist groups.
■■ Sexual violence will almost certainly continue to be a feature of conflictand state violence and, used as a weapon of war, has the potential to be asignificant factor in instability. However, countries and their armed forces
are likely to face greater international scrutiny and legislation against suchactivities.
■■ Failed and failing cities, in both developed and developing countries,
could pose major security challenges (such as social unrest and eveninsurgencies) with the potential for country-wide repercussions. If more
people live in urban areas, security and armed forces will almost certainly
need to operate in this environment to a greater extent. Adversaries could
range from government-controlled militaries to armed non-state groups
with criminal or malign intent.
■■ Urbanisation concentrates populations, potentially making them more
vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters, disease and deliberate actsof violence. With most urban areas in coastal regions, cities are likely to beparticularly vulnerable to the effects of rising sea levels.
■■ Growing use of nuclear energy raises the possibility of fissile material
being obtained by non-state actors as well as countries operating outside
international laws, potentially causing security threats.
■■ Extreme weather events, such as flooding and droughts, are likely toincrease in both frequency and intensity in a number of regions. Extreme
events will almost certainly continue to cause widespread damage andloss of life, although our warning mechanisms, defences and ability torespond may also improve in the same timeframe.

Global Strategic Trends

3

11

11

17

17

21

31

xxi

Executive summaryxxii■■ Armed and security forces, both at home and abroad, are likely to be more
frequently tasked with providing humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, perhaps supporting indigenous responders.

31■■ Greater reliance on automated technologies could provide scope forterrorists and criminals to disrupt the transport system through cyberattacks.

49■■ As more of our work and social activities depend on interconnected
information and communications networks – which may, in places, be
extremely vulnerable to attack – there could be more opportunities forcriminals and terrorists to have a greater impact on our day-to-day lives.

55■■ An increasing number of devices capable of collecting sensor data could
intensify levels of surveillance. Stealth vehicles may find it more difficult toremain hidden and the ability to prosecute covert operations, especiallyin urban environments, is likely to become more technically challenging.
This is particularly significant given the probable increase in the size ofurban areas, along with the growing use of surveillance to prevent crime.

55■■ Unmanned systems are likely to have an increasing role in combat,
potentially transforming the way that wars are fought. Military decisionmaking is likely to remain a human preserve, at least in western countries,
but it is possible that the actual fighting will no longer be a solely humanendeavour.

67■■ The cost of unmanned systems is likely to fall, while the ease of
manufacturing complex items rises, making unmanned systems much
more widespread and harder to regulate. Criminal and terrorist groups arelikely to find it easier to gain, hold and use unmanned capabilities.

67■■ The expansion of alternative currencies may make it easier to transfer andretain funds anonymously and hence harder for governments to freeze
criminals’ assets or sanction rogue regimes. Criminal and terrorist groups
may also find it easier to transfer funds between jurisdictions.

75■■ The pressures of globalisation are likely to mean that individual countries
will find it increasingly difficult to act unilaterally – most countries arelikely to be less powerful. This could lead to a reduction in conflict. The
state is still likely to have the most important voice in international affairs,
but out to 2045 the private sector and non-state organisations are likely
to become more influential. There is likely to be an increase in the useof private security companies by governments – interdependencies may
strengthen, despite their largely separate motivations.

83■■ Some augmentation of humans with embedded sensors and computing
devices is likely to occur within the 2045 timeframe. This may provide
advantages such as improved situational awareness, health monitoring,and the ability to modify physiological and psychological states toincrease performance and enhance resilience. Mind-controlled machinery
is likely to become much more sophisticated, with human brain-to-brain
communication possible by 2045.

83

Global Strategic Trends

Executive summary■■ The US and China are likely to have similarly sized defence budgets,potentially out-spending the rest of the world by 2045. India could have adefence budget equivalent to the EU’s total spending on defence.

93■■ Increasing real-terms equipment costs may mean that platforms become
more expensive. Consequently, higher levels of defence spending may
not lead to armed forces larger than today’s.

93■■ Although China is likely to surpass the US in terms of GDP, the US is still
likely to remain, militarily, the most powerful country in the world.

101■■ NATO is likely to remain the key security alliance for Northern Americancountries, although US (and possibly Canadian) commitments elsewherein the world may mean that European countries will have to take on moreof the burden of maintaining security in their region.

101■■ There are a number of issues and treaties which may involve the US andChina in armed conflict – with potentially dire consequences regionallyand globally.

101■■ NATO is likely to remain the key organisation for military crisis
management, although its cohesion may be challenged by diverse threat
perceptions, a US focus on Asia and internal disagreement on its global
role. The Alliance could be reinvigorated by the need to band together toaddress a deteriorating security situation in Europe’s near abroad.

117■■ Internal terrorist threats are likely to continue in the Middle East andNorth Africa, as are attacks on other nations from groups based in theregion. Although Al-Qaida has been damaged in recent years, Islamic
fundamentalism will almost certainly continue to fuel terrorist networks
out to 2045.

125■■ In sub-Saharan Africa, the combined challenge of an increased population,
demands on resources and the effects of climate change (particularly
drought) on food and water supplies are likely to lead to tension, which
could result in conflict.

133■■ China’s military is becoming more capable and has increasing global
reach. By 2045, China’s military capability may be close to matching thatof the US, perhaps exceeding it in some areas. India’s military capability isalso likely to increase – but probably not to the point where it rivals that ofChina or the US by 2045.

147■■ The East and South China Seas may be flashpoints for confrontation
between China and the US and allied countries. Similarly Kashmir, theKorean Peninsula and the border between China and India are likely to beareas of tension. The risk of a major state-on-state conflict in the region
cannot be ruled out.

147■■ Commercial activity expansion in the Arctic Ocean may require extensive
monitoring to safeguard Arctic countries’ sovereignty.

155■■ Increasing reliance on space-based technologies, particularly in developed
countries, means that any large-scale disruption to satellites (such as
solar superstorms) could have significant consequences for electricity
distribution, communications, navigation, logistics and weather forecasts.

165

Global Strategic Trends

xxiiiMethodology

Review of previous data
The Strategic Trends Programme has beenrunning as a continuous research programme
since 2001 and as a consequence there isa considerable body of material on trends
and drivers. We began writing this fifth
edition of Global Strategic Trends (GST 5) byreviewing our existing data to identify any
inconsistencies and enduring trends. Themes,
trends and drivers from editions one to four
were mapped and compared. This produced
an enduring trends map that showedsimilarities and some areas of contradiction.
Identifying gaps
In a parallel exercise, we engaged with a rangeof external contributors to explore the gaps
in our existing research. We considered anumber of new areas as a result.
Research topics
From the enduring trends map, output fromour external engagement and a continuing
process of in-house gap analysis, we identified
nearly 30 research topics. These were a mix of
new areas and existing themes that needed
substantial updating. Researchers, fromthe Development, Concepts and Doctrine
Centre’s (DCDC) Futures Team, wider Defenceor academia, wrote extensive essays on each
topic, consulting widely and paying particularattention to defence and security implications.
Breakdown, analysis and mapping
These essays were then analysed and mappedby DCDC’s Defence Analysis and Research(DAR) Team to identify drivers, factors andtrends. Ultimately, this produced a very
detailed cluster map, drawing together both
our previous work and new research. The map

xxiv

ordered themes and drivers into their top-level
thematic areas, highlighting interactions anddependencies. How these relationships relate
to one another helped us to understand therelevance and importance of our findings. The
process also highlighted ideas that are basedon assumptions or assertions that needed tobe substantiated with additional evidence.

Draft sections for consultation
Short draft sections – based on either atheme or particular region – were sent forlimited consultation across Government,
industry, think-tanks and academia. Extensive
engagement took place both in the UK andabroad, with visits to Brazil, China, France,
India, NATO Allied Command Transformation,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa,
Sweden, the United Arab Emirates and theUnited States of America. Other international
exchanges were conducted electronically,
with Norway and Slovakia. We are gratefulfor the generous amounts of time and effort
expended on reviewing these drafts which
GST 5 has benefited from enormously. It
was always our intention for GST 5 to be
an inclusive and transparent, proactively
engaging part of the Strategic Trends
Programme, for wider benefit to policy- anddecision-makers.
Consolidation, writing and editing
The final phase consisted of consolidating ourwork and incorporating feedback from theconsultations, writing up our findings, adding
scenarios to highlight key potential outcomes,
including certain strategic shocks, andsubjecting our work to a final round of peer
review and editing.

Global Strategic Trends

Methodology

Uncertainty

Farsight(10 to 30 years)

Foresight(5 to 10 years)

Trends(3 to 5 years)

Insight(1 to 2 years)

Predictability
Now

FutureA timeframe looking out 30 years means there is a huge degree of uncertainty in the world that
we describe, which by its nature, is based on extrapolation and a degree of imagination.

Global Strategic Trends

xxv

Part 1

Thematic

This section brings together related trends anddrivers under important themes. We describe
the relationships between themes, trends
and drivers and highlight the implications for
defence and security.
Where a geographical relationship has been
identified, the theme is cross-referenced to theappropriate regional section in Part 2.
Demography.....................................................................3
Gender................................................................................ 11
Urbanisation.................................................................. 17
Resources......................................................................... 21
The Environment....................................................... 31
Health.................................................................................. 41
Transport..........................................................................49
Information....................................................................55
Education......................................................................... 61
Automation and work...........................................67
Corruption and money........................................... 75
Identity and the role of the state................83
Defence spending and capabilities...........931

Part 1

Demography

The global population is likely to grow to between 8.3 and 10.4 billion by 2045, largely
because of increasing life-expectancy, declining levels of child mortality and continuing
high birth rates in many developing countries. Growth is not likely to be evenly
distributed and will probably be slower in developed countries. Some, including Japanand a number of European countries, are likely to experience a decline in population.
In developing countries, rapid population increase and urbanisation will probably
challenge stability. Age and gender imbalances may exacerbate existing political andsocial tensions while a growing youth population, especially in the Middle East, Central
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, could provide a reservoir of disaffected young people.
Conversely, if harnessed, they could provide a boost to their economies. Migration is
likely to increase, with people moving within, and outside, their country of origin to seek
work or to escape the effects of climate change.

Global population growth
The current world population of around
7.2 billion is expected to increase by almost
one billion in the next 12 years and reach
between 8.3 and 10.4 billion by 2045.1 Driving
factors for such an increase are a decline in
infectious diseases, high birth rates in thedeveloping world, improving maternal andneonatal health, improved sanitation anddeclining under-five mortality. Most of the
population growth will probably occur, as it
does today, in developing countries (mainly in
sub-Saharan Africa), while the population indeveloped countries is likely to remain largely
unchanged at around 1.3 billion. Developing
regions are likely to account for approximately
97% of global population growth by 2050,
with 38% taking place in the least developed
countries. Africa is likely to account for 49% of
1 Global population is expected to reach 8.323 (ifthere is a low birth rate), 9.308 (if there is a medium
birth rate) or 10.352 billion (if there is a high birthrate) by 2045. This forecast is drawn from UN (2012)‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’,
United Nations Department for Economic and Social
Affairs hereafter referred to as UN WPP, available at
http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm

Global Strategic Trends

global population growth by 2050. Population
increases in poor areas may magnify existing
poverty, generating an unsustainable demandfor public services (for example, education,
health and sanitation), unless there is a parallel
increase in economic development. Conflicts
over scarce resources are possible and could
be an obstacle to development where it ismost needed.
In most developed countries, birth rates havedeclined due to changes in attitude andway of life – the most important of which isan increase in the status of women.2 Somecountries have seen a recent increase in birthrates, although this is likely to be a temporary
phenomenon. Overall, global birth rates
halved between 1950 and 2010, droppingfrom 5 to 2.5 per woman,3 and are likely tocontinue to decline. Newly-industrialising“

Most of the
population
growth willprobably occur,
as it does today,
in developing
countries.

”

2 Population Bulletin of the UN (2002), ‘Completing
the Fertility Transition’
3 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs(2010), ‘The World’s Women 2010: Trends andStatistics’, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW_
full%20report_color.pdf

3Part 1

Demography

A growing population and a declining growth rate
10.4

10

9.3

2012

Population (billions)

8

1.79

8.3

6

4
2.5

Fertility estimate
High

2

0

MediumLow

0.59

Growth rate % (medium fertility estimate)

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2045

Source: UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’“

Imbalances acrossregions andcountries are likely
to exacerbate
existing politicaland social
tensions.

”

countries in east and south eastern Asia haveexperienced reducing numbers of children per
woman and a resulting decrease in the ratio
of productive workers to dependents. These
factors have contributed to their vigorous
economic growth, and are likely to be a modelthat others seek to emulate.
Methods to slow population growth vary, as
do their success. Mandated measures such as
China’s ‘one child’ policy have created longterm problems, such as a significant genderimbalance. Other approaches, however, showthat it is possible to slow population growthwith popular consent.4 For example, sex
education, access to contraception, reducing
child mortality (negating the need for large
families to ensure survival of family lines),and encouraged emigration policies have
all helped to reduce growth rates. In manysocieties, bearing children grants a woman
status in her community, but increasing
female literacy and employment, as well as
4 Bangladesh is a good example of a society thathas managed to reduce its high birth rates on a
voluntarily basis.

4

improvements in contraceptive technology
and availability, are changing such cultural
attitudes.5 Women are becoming more
empowered without needing to have several
children.

Age and gender imbalances
Imbalances across regions and countries arelikely to exacerbate existing political and social
tensions. The global median age is increasing(although the rate of increase is slower indeveloping countries) with those aged 60
or over comprising the fastest growing
population age-group. Indeed, by 2045, 750
million people are likely to be over 65 years
old.6 For those countries with increasingly
elderly populations, requirements such as
public pensions, health services and longterm care are likely to be ever-more pressing– priorities which could reduce defence

5 Montgomery, K. (2009), ‘The Demographic
Transition’
6 Christine Lagarde (2014), ‘A New Multilateralism forthe 21st Century: The Richard Dimbleby Lecture’

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Demography

Global population by ten-year age group and sex
Age group
100+

Male

Female

90-99

2015
2045

2015
2045

80-89
70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
0
100
Millions of people

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Source: UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’

spending in most affected countries.7 Somedeveloping countries do not provide welfare
and will not be directly affected by this trend.
A declining working population coupledwith increasing welfare costs are likely tolead to the retirement age increasing (as has
happened in some developed countries). For
some governments, a rising welfare burden
is likely to lead to them re-evaluating how
they provide social welfare. In societies withan ageing working population, older people
are likely to hold an increased proportion of
7 ISS (2013), ‘Enabling the Future – European Military
Capabilities’, available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/
uploads/media/Report_16.pdf

Alternative outcome:Care costs

Ageing populations and increased
dependency ratios may create funding
pressures, particularly in developed
countries. However, advances inhealthcare and changes in education
methods may see the cost of providing
these services fall, as people become
healthier, work longer and education
becomes de-centralised.

Global Strategic Trends

positions with authority and influence which, if
not managed effectively, could disenfranchise
the younger generation. Compounding
this, young people may feel frustrated at
the increasing cost of supporting a growing
elderly population, particularly if they believe
they have been disadvantaged by their elders.
Women are likely to still represent 55% of
the world’s population in 2045 and current
gender imbalances in some areas are notanticipated to change significantly in this time.
Some Asian countries are likely to continue
to experience an uneven male to female
population balance out to 2045, due to sexselective abortions, child abandonment anddiseases which disproportionately affect girls.
For example, due to its demographic legacy,
China may have 48 million more men than
women by 2045,8 potentially exacerbating
gender imbalances in receiving countries
if Chinese emigration increases. Increasing
numbers of young men may be frustrated
at being unable to find a wife and could lackthe stability that a family life provides. Maledominated societies also tend to be moreauthoritarian and violent. Studies monitoring
the level of violence exhibited by states during
8 UN WPP, op. cit. Figures based on medium birth rate
for China at 2045.

5

Part 1

Demography

The proportion of young adults is likely to grow most rapidly in sub-Saharan Africainternational crises show that the severityof violence decreases as domestic genderequality increases.9“

If managed
effectively, ahigh proportionof working age
adults could
provide countries
with an economic
boost.

”

Globally, there are already three billion people
under the age of 25, and this group is likely toincrease.10 The proportion of young adults
is likely to grow most rapidly in sub-SaharanAfrica, but there are also likely to be significant
rises in Central and Southern Asia. In Middle
Eastern countries, the proportion of young
adults will probably reach its peak during thecoming decade and by 2045 the majority ofthe population is likely to be between theages of 15 and 59.11 If managed effectively,a high proportion of working age adults
could provide countries with an economic
boost, but if the rising expectations of young
adults are not met, social unrest could follow.
Avoiding unrest is likely to depend on effective
9 Caprioli, M. and Trumbore, P. F. (2003), ‘Identifying‘Rogue’ States and Testing their Interstate Conflict
Behavior’, available at http://lib.znate.ru/docs/
index-124184.html
10 Lagarde, op. cit.
11 UN WPP, op. cit.

6

governance together with positive andinclusive economic development. However,these conditions will probably only be met ina limited number of affected countries.

Migration
Migration is likely to increase or, at least,
remain constant.12 In 2005, 191 million people
lived outside their country of origin. Today
there are 232 million (this figure alreadyexceeds our earlier assessment in the 4thedition of Global Strategic Trends).13 Those
countries attempting to limit immigration
are likely to be only partially successful. In
preceding decades, migration has beencharacterised by people moving from Asia andAfrica to Northern America and Europe.

12 Statistics on migration from UN WPP, op. cit. andOECD (2009), ‘The Future of International Migration
to OECD Countries’
13 Figures from UN WPP, op. cit. show that the numberof international migrants has already risen above
232 million (compared to GST 4’s estimation that 230
million people would live outside their countries oforigin by 2040).

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Demography

Economic growth
Gross Domestic Product (adjusted for purchasing power parity)*, expressed in US$ trillion at 2012 values.

Key
4.7

Germany

UK

4.3

3.2

2045

3.8

France2.3

Russia

6.6

2.2

2.5

Now
Canada3.3

1.5

30.7 15.7

US

3.1

Algeria 1.0
5.3

3.3

Iran

Saudi

2.3

0.9

1.6
3.1

Nigeria

0.9

0.5

6.6

Brazil2.3

World
in 2045
243.1

4.7

1.0

Egypt
0.5

0.3

26.1

12.4
4.4

4.7

1.6

62.9

Ethiopia
0.1

5.4

Indonesia
1.2

2.0

2.5

0.6

0.3

Republic of Korea

India

World
83.2
South Africa

Chile 1.0

4.6

China

Turkey
1.1

Japan

6.7

0.2

4.5

MexicoKazakstan

1.2

EU

28.3 16.1

Australia
1.0* Purchasing power parity is used to show a country’s comparative economic strength by
expressing domestic values in the equivalent US$ that would be required to purchase thesame amount of goods and services in the US domestic market.
Source: Based on analysis by the MOD economics unit 2014

However, out to 2045, a growing number of
migrants will probably move between andwithin Asia and Africa, with Asia becoming
an increasingly important destination.
Developed countries will almost certainly
continue to attract significant numbers of
migrants. As is the case now, most migrants
are likely to be seeking work, althoughtechnological advances could lead to
reducing demand for less skilled migrant
workers and increasing demand for highlyand multi-skilled people. Temporary large
displacements due to crises will probably
continue to occur with high local impact –and the magnitude of such events is likely
to be amplified by increased population
density.

Global economic centre of gravity shifting
The steady rise of emerging economies in Asia will cause the world’s
economic centre of gravity – the average location of economic activity by
GDP – to continue its move eastwards.

1980

2014

2045

Source: Quah, D. (2011), ‘The Global Economy’s Shifting Centre of Gravity’ (adapted by DCDC)

Global Strategic Trends

7Part 1

Demography

Asia’s share of the growing consumer class could more than double Climate change is likely to drive some people
from areas that are particularly badly affected,
although not everyone who wishes to leaveis likely to be able to do so. Millions of people
may be ‘trapped’ in vulnerable areas becauseof the high costs of migration, unable to raise
the capital needed for moving away.14
During 2010-2050, the number of internationalmigrants to developed countries is likely
to be about 96 million, whereas the excess
of deaths over births is projected to be 33
million, implying total net growth. The main
estimated net receivers of migrants are likely tobe the US, Canada, UK and Australia, while themain estimated senders are Bangladesh, China,
India and Mexico.15 Without immigration,
the population in most developed countries
is highly likely to reduce. Those developed
countries that do see population growth,
therefore, will almost certainly see an increasein the size and importance of their ethnic
14 Government Office for Science (2011), ‘Migration
and Global Environmental Change’, available at
http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/
published-projects/global-migration/reportspublications
15 UN WPP, op. cit.

8

Chennai, India

minority communities. While some ethnic
groups are likely to integrate effectively andbe economically successful, some are likely
to be poorly integrated and economicallydisadvantaged – this may lead to tension andinstability.16 Some countries, for example
Japan, are likely to face particular challenges.
In light of Japan’s long-standing sensitivity
to the ’otherness’ of gaijin (non-Japanese),
immigration to Japan has been strikingly
limited and assimilation of newcomers more
so. Immigration, along with globalisedcommunications, is likely to contribute to a
growing cultural mix and complexity withincountries. While the norms of receiving
countries are likely to impact on migrants,
the reverse may also be true. Technologicaldevelopments are likely to allow diasporas
to remain more closely connected to theirnative countries and hence they are likely tobring issues from their homeland into thehost country, and vice versa. Diasporas may
also provide an impetus for governments tointervene in their citizens’ countries of origin –or to refrain from intervening.

16 See, for example, the European Commission series ofcohesion reports.

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Demography

A growing consumer class
A rapidly growing consumer class (those who
spend more than ten US dollars a day) willalmost certainly be a key driver of the global
economy. By 2030, this group is likely to growto more than five billion from two billion
today,17 while the proportion of consumers
who are European and North American is likely
to shrink from 50% today to just 22%. Rapid
growth in many Asian countries, particularly
China and India, is shifting the economic
centre of gravity south and east. This looks
likely to more than double Asia’s share of
the consumer class from its current level of

30% to around 64% by 2030.18 As well as its
economic importance, this group is likely todemand, and receive, more political influence.
Typically, they are likely to be more mobile,place greater value on education, and be lessaccepting of the status quo. The likely growthof the consumer class may, however, mask arise in global income inequality. Currently, 70%of the world’s population lives in countries
where disparities between the wealthiest andpoorest have grown over the last 30 years.19

17 Lagarde, op. cit.

19 Lagarde, op. cit.

18 Rohde, D. (2012), ‘The Swelling Middle’, available at
http://www.reuters.com/middle-class-infographic

Defence and security implications■■ Areas with larger youth populations and poor governance are likely to suffer frominstability, which could lead to unrest or conflict within the 2045 timeframe.
■■ Lack of integration of migrant groups could exacerbate social tensions.
■■ Technological developments will probably allow diasporas to remain more closely
connected to their native countries. Consequently, issues from homelands are likely
to be brought into host countries, and vice versa. Diasporas may also provide an
impetus for governments to intervene – or refrain from interfering – in their citizens’
countries of origin.

Global Strategic Trends“

Rapid growth
in many Asian
countries,
particularly
China and India,
is shifting the
economic centreof gravity southand east.

”

9Part 1

GenderGlobal gender equality and opportunity gaps will almost certainly continue ineconomic, social and political spheres out to 2045. Although women’s autonomy islikely to gradually increase in most regions, entrenched gender disparities will probably
remain as major drivers of poverty and insecurity. As is the case today, women are likely
to have greater opportunities and autonomy in developed countries than elsewherein the world, but are unlikely to achieve total parity with their male counterparts,
particularly when social expectations inhibit the role of women in society. In someregions of the world, women’s rights and feminist movements are likely to continue toface a ‘backlash’ from those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.

Political decision-makers
The World Economic Forum reported that,of 110 countries it surveyed in 2006, 86% had
improved their gender equality performance,
while 14% had regressed.1 Women’s
participation in politics has accelerated during
the last decade with the proportion of womenin national assemblies increasing from 11.6%
in 1995 to 18.4% in 2008. Since 2004, theproportion of seats held by women in national
parliaments has increased by 2% in developing
as well as developed countries. If this trend
continues, there would be an additional 10%of such seats by 2045. Trends indicate that, incountries with a quota system, such as thosein Africa, formal parity is likely to be achieved
more readily, although other measures also
have a role to play in determining women’slevels of political influence. Globally,
women often lack the resources to accessparliamentary level politics. They find barriers
at selection and campaigning stages as wellas prejudicial attitudes during elections. As aresult, women at this highest level of politics
are likely to continue to be predominantly
1 World Economic Forum (2013), ‘The Global Gender
Gap Report’, available at http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

drawn from elite societal groups. Barriers toentering ‘formal’ politics make it likely thatwomen will continue to be comparatively
better-represented in non-governmentalorganisations and civil society, playing animportant role in peace- and state-building.
This could take on particular significance if,
as seems likely, such organisations take on
an increasing role in meeting global aid anddevelopment needs.

Self-determination
Trends suggest that, particularly in thedeveloping world, improvements in women’s
degree of autonomy over personal decisions– such as those relating to their employment,
marriage and health – are likely to be slow.
Such change may require alterations in social
attitudes and ‘ways of life’ as well as legislation;
and all segments of society may need to
be involved. It can be difficult to quantify
or measure gender inequality, but women’s
access to services such as contraception andhealth care can often be used as a proxy
indicator for their degree of autonomy. For
example, women with little say over their own
reproductive autonomy are unlikely to be able
to access family planning services. The rateof increase in women using reliable family“

Women’s
participationin politics has
accelerated
during the last
decade withthe proportionof womenin national
assemblies
increasing.

”11

Part 1

GenderIn low-income countries, the majority of women are involved in unpaid service

planning has stalled. Currently, more than
220 million women in developing countries
who want to delay or avoid pregnancy lackaccess to effective methods of contraception
and voluntary family planning services. Fewerthan 20% of women in sub-Saharan Africa andbarely one-third of women in South Asia use
modern contraceptives. In the US, birth rates
are increasing, which is ascribed to a decline
in access to contraceptives, terminations andeducation in family planning. The unmet
need for reliable birth-control methods islikely to continue out to 2045, with significant
regional variations owing to a variety of socialand cultural factors.

Employment
In most countries, women are less likely thanmen to be employed or looking actively
for a job. Participation rates are highest in
low-income countries—where a majority ofwomen are active because they are involved
in unpaid subsistence agriculture, although
they are less involved in paid activities outside
the household—and where few youth andadults are enrolled in education. Only 1% of
the world’s titled land is owned by women – afigure that has not changed for over ten years

12

and is likely to remain roughly the same by2045. It is estimated that women account for
two thirds of the 1.4 billion people currently
living in extreme poverty and make up 60%of the 572 million ‘working poor’ in the world.
This general trend in economic activity is likely
to remain in 2045.
In the past two decades, the overall numbersof females participating in the labour force
have remained stable. Changes in gendernorms and the roles of men and women
have also begun to shift. However, women indeveloping countries still retain the ‘double
burden’ of being responsible for (unpaid)
domestic and care work, as well as taking
on increasing roles in paid work outside
the home. Gender inequalities in future
employment are likely to centre on women
not having equal access to higher-quality jobs,
with commensurate pay and treatment. As aresult of their lower educational attainment,
domestic responsibilities and socially ascribed
gender roles, women are more likely to workin informal employment. These characteristics
are highly likely to persist by 2045.

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Gender

Women in front-line military roles will become increasingly commonplace 

Women tend to be more active in the labour
market in developed countries, especiallythose with extensive social protection
coverage and in societies where part-timework is possible and accepted. Female wealthcreation is likely to continue to increase withindeveloped economies. In 2009, womencontrolled 27% of global wealth (roughly
US$ 20.2 trillion)2 but only 24% of senior
management roles are filled by women. The
Alternative outcome:

Rapid gender equality
By 2045, women’s rights and status insociety could improve at an even greaterrate than current trends suggest, further
reducing the gender gap. Increases
in gender equality have historically
had a substantial impact on poverty
and the global economy, simply by
improving women’s access to birthcontrol, education and increasing theiropportunities.
2 The Boston Consulting Group (2010), ‘Levelling thePlaying Field’, available at https://www.bcg.com/
documents/file56704.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

UK’s Equalities and Human Rights Commission
estimates it will take 70 years at the current
rate of progress to see an equal numberof female and male directors of FTSE 100
companies.3 In the UK, the gender pay gap
stands at 15%, with women on average
earning £5,000 less a year than their malecounterparts. This disparity is even greater inpart-time jobs, going up to 35%. Following
the trend over the last 30 years, it is likely that(within the industrialised world) the gender gap
in terms of pay is likely to reduce out to 2045.
Many of the world’s defence and security
organisations are likely to incorporate specificgender equality targets, and it is likelythat by 2045 all formal barriers to womenbeing involved in ‘front-line’ combat will beeliminated in most developed countries’
armed forces. Mimicking changes in militaries,
it is also probable that in 2045, armed resistancemovements and terrorist groups will include
greater numbers of women than at present.

Female Israeli Defence Force soldier“

Female wealthcreation is likely
to continue toincrease withindeveloped
economies but
only 24% of senior
management
roles are filled by
women.

”

3 Morse, F. (2014), ‘International Women’s Day 2014’,
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/international-womens-day-2014-theshocking-statistics-that-show-why-it-is-still-soimportant-9177211.html

13

Part 1

Gender

The gender gap for primary school enrolments is closing 

Education
Educational achievement is seen as a goodpredictor for future economic activity. Overall,
the gender gap in primary education has
shrunk, and global primary enrolments are
now 48% for girls and 52% for boys. Thesestatistics on enrolment may mask the numbersof children, often girls, who fail to complete
their primary education because they are
removed from school to marry early or tocontribute to household income. While trends
for girls and young women are improving,
adult women still account for two-thirds of themore than 770 million illiterate adults in theworld.4 This has not changed significantly in
relative terms over the past two decades and it
is unclear whether it will improve significantly
by 2045.5

as many as 38% of murders of women arecommitted by a husband or partner. Factors
associated with perpetration of sexual violence
include beliefs in family honour and sexual
purity, ideologies of male sexual entitlement
and weak legal sanctions for sexual violence.
Violence is also likely to continue to be used
as a weapon of war. Conservative estimatessuggest that 20,000 to 50,000 women wereraped during the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia andHerzegovina,6 while approximately 250,000
to 500,000 women and girls were targetedin the 1994 Rwandan genocide.7 Violenceagainst women has tremendous costs, fromgreater health care expenses to losses in
productivity, impacting national budgets andViolence against women
Globally, around 35% of women haveexperienced physical or sexual assault, and6 Based on reports by the Government of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the European Commission.
Ward, J. (2002), ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina, If Not
Now, When?: Addressing Gender-based Violencein Refugee, Internally Displaced, and Post-Conflict
Settings’, cited in UNIFEM (2014), ‘Facts and Figures
on Peace and Security’

4 OECD (2011), ‘Shifting Wealth, Shifting Gender
Relations?’, available at http://www.oecd.org/dev/
pgd/48619715.pdf
5 Ibid.

14

School girls in Cambodia

7 UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of humanrights in Rwanda (1996), ‘Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Rwanda’

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Genderoverall development.8 In 2045, this global
figure is likely to have only marginally declined
compared to today. Sexual violence willalmost certainly still impact negatively on asignificant minority of women.
Human trafficking ensnares millions of womenand girls in modern-day slavery. Womenand girls represent 55% of the estimated 20.9
million victims of forced labour worldwide,and 98% of the estimated 4.5 million forced

into sexual exploitation.9 With further
globalisation, there could be an increase intrafficking and slavery by 2045, although
the trend may be mitigated by improved
surveillance technology and international
cooperation between police and security
forces. If not addressed, an increase intrafficking and slavery could impact onregional and local stability, as it could enhance
the criminal economy, thereby undermining
the capability and authority of the state.

8 UN Women (2013), ‘Facts and Figures: Ending
Violence Against Women’, available at http://www.
unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violenceagainst-women/facts-and-figures ; World HealthOrganisation (2013), ‘Violence Against Women’,available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
factsheets/fs239/en/

9 International Labour Organization (2012), ‘ILO
Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results andMethodology’

Defence and security implications■■ Many of the world’s defence and security organisations are likely to incorporate
specific gender equality targets.

“

There could be
an increase intrafficking andslavery by 2045,
although the trend
may be mitigatedby improved
surveillancetechnology andinternational
cooperation.

”■■ Increasing numbers of women are likely to have front-line combat roles in armed
forces worldwide, mirrored by growing number of females participating in armed
resistance movements and terrorist groups.
■■ Sexual violence will almost certainly continue to be a feature of conflict and state
violence. Used as a weapon of war, sexual violence can be a significant factor in
instability. However, countries and their armed forces are likely to face greaterinternational scrutiny and legislation against such activities.

Global Strategic Trends

15

Part 1

Urbanisation

With 70% of the global population likely to live in cities by 2045, urbanisation will be aparticularly important theme in developing countries. Urbanisation is likely to enhance
economic and social development, but – without mitigation measures – may also leadto pressure on infrastructure (and the environment) which could contribute to social
tensions within the urban population. Urbanisation and the effects of climate change
are likely to result in an increase in the magnitude of humanitarian crises, particularly
since the majority of urban areas will almost certainly be either on, or near the coast,
making these cities vulnerable to flooding.

From rural to urban
By 2045, the proportion of people living inurban areas is likely to have increased from alittle over 50% to around 70% of the world’s
population.1 Urbanisation will probably
increase most rapidly in the developing world.
Of the 23 cities expected to have ten million ormore inhabitants by 2015, 19 are likely to be indeveloping countries. The greatest increases
in urbanisation are likely to be in Asia, with
between 250 and 300 million people likely tomove from rural to urban areas over the next
15 years in China alone.2 Although those
who remain in rural areas may experience
increased isolation as rural populations
decline, technological advancements arelikely to enable better communication andremote working. Managed successfully,
urbanisation could stimulate economic
growth.3 In part, due to the exposure of
new ideas and the accessibility of goods
and services, it may also act as a spur for civil
activism and improve the quality of life formany. While older cities are likely to have
1 OECD (2012), ‘Environmental Outlook to 2050’
2 Calculations by the Chinese Government as part ofguidelines for infrastructural demands in the coming
five year plan, specifically underlined by Premier Li
Keqiang in his inauguration speech.
3 McKinsey Global Institute (2012), ‘Urban World: Cities
and the Rise of the Consuming Class’Global Strategic Trends

established links to resources, new cities may
enjoy an infrastructural advantage – they will
be able to build transport and communication
networks suitable for modern vehicles andways of working, without the constraints ofhistoric buildings, narrow streets and obsolete
infrastructure.
By 2045, there are likely to be around 280
megacities (cities with more than 20 million
inhabitants4). Many of these could be
agglomerations spanning administrative, andin some cases national, boundaries thereby
driving integration and changing governancestructures. Europe, for example, may havemore than 20 major agglomerations by
2045 – the German Ruhr region, much of theNetherlands and Belgium could become asingle gigantic urban area. The taxation rights
of some major cities could make them major
regional or international actors.

Urban challenges
Much of the rapid urban growth in developing
countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa,
is unlikely to be matched by investment inessential services and infrastructure. One
billion people throughout the world alreadylive in slums, lacking basic amenities – and“Urbanisation
could stimulate
economic growthand may also
act as a spurfor civil activism
and improve thequality of life for
many.

”

4 UN Habitat (2011), ‘State of the World’s Cities Report
2010/2011’17

Part 1

Urbanisation

A growing population living in the urban environment
2015

Rural

2025

Urban

2035
2045
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Global population in billions
Source: UN ‘World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision’

there could be almost three billion people
living in these conditions by 2045 if mitigating
action is not taken.5 Unless there is sufficient
opportunity for bettering their lives, theurban poor are likely to become frustrated– and with increasing access to information,
there is likely to be a growing awareness of
inequality. If not dealt with effectively, this
could lead to violent protest and possibly
full-blown urban insurgencies. Similarly, cities
in areas with population decline, or those with
dysfunctional governance, will probably find it
difficult to attract people and resources. Theseissues are likely to be exacerbated by demands
for resources. In particular, urbanisation often
results in increasing requirements for energy(particularly electricity), which could be asource of considerable tension unless it isprovided in a sustainable way. Once people
have access to energy, they are likely to always
expect it. Some cities, in both developed anddeveloping countries could fail (for example,
becoming bankrupt or seeing a breakdown in
law and order) – potentially becoming security
issues. Correctly managed, though, urban
growth could generate greater prosperity andhigher tax revenues, potentially offsettingsome of these more negative aspects.
Because of their concentrated populations,when disasters (whether natural or man-made)strike cities, large numbers of people areaffected. Many of the biggest cities, a numberof which are vital to the global economy,
are situated in coastal regions which could
face more extreme weather events and bevulnerable to rising sea-levels. Furthermore,because of inadequate sanitation, slums could
be susceptible to communicable diseases –which could then spread globally because ofincreased connectivity between cities.

5 UN (2013), ‘World Economic and Social Survey 2013’,
available at http://www.un.org/en/development/
desa/policy/wess/wess_current/wess2013/
WESS2013.pdf

18

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Urbanisation

Major centres of population

MoscowChongqing
Chicago

Cairo

Tokyo
Osaka-Kobe

Delhi Hyderabad

Istanbul

New York-Newark

LahoreKarachi

Dongguan, Guangdong
Shenzhen
Guangzhou, Guangdong

Wuhan

Mexico City

FoshanAhmadabad
Lagos

2015

ShanghaiChengduLondonParis

Los Angeles

Beijing Tianjin

Mumbai

2045

Kinshasa
LuandaSão Paulo
Shows the top 30 cities bypopulation size in 2015 and2045 together with those withpopulations greater than 10
million that are forecasted
to increase by more than
40% between 2015 and2045. London is included forcomparison.

ManilaDhaka

Bangalore

Calcutta
Chennai

Ho Chi Minh City
Jakarta

Rio de Janeiro
Buenos Aires

City size guide (millions)

Source: UN World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision

10

20

40

Defence and security implications■■ Rapid urbanisation and inadequate socio-economic infrastructure are likely toincrease the number and scale of densely populated slums. Such areas are likely to
be more prone to social unrest.
■■ Failed and failing cities, in both developed and developing countries, could pose
major security challenges (such as social unrest and even insurgencies) with thepotential for country-wide repercussions. If more people live in urban areas, security
and armed forces will almost certainly need to operate in this environment to agreater extent. Adversaries could range from government-controlled militaries toarmed non-state groups with criminal or malign ideological intent.
■■ Urbanisation concentrates populations, potentially making them more vulnerable
to the effects of natural disasters, disease and deliberate acts of violence. With mosturban areas in coastal regions, cities are likely to be particularly vulnerable to theeffects of rising sea levels.
■■ People living in slums could be more susceptible to communicable diseases, which
could then spread globally as a result of increased connectivity between cities.

Global Strategic Trends

19Part 1

Resources

Demand for resources of all kinds is likely to increase out to 2045, as the world’s
population rises to around nine billion. While the demand for food will grow, somecountries are likely to experience significant declines in agricultural productivity. Water
shortages are likely to be particularly acute in many areas, exacerbated by increasing
demand and climate change. In the 2045 timeframe, coal and hydrocarbons are likely toremain the most important sources of energy, with renewable and nuclear energy likely
to make an increasing contribution.

Water
Even at current population levels, supply offresh water is, arguably, insufficient.1 Factors
such as population growth, increasing
demand from industry and agriculture, andreliance on unsustainable water sources(such as aquifers) are likely to mean thatmany people may not have reliable accessto adequate supplies of water.2 By 2045,
global agricultural water consumption could
increase by 19%, with global fresh water
demands likely to grow by 55% in the same
period.3 Estimates of those suffering fromwater shortages today vary between 450
million4 and more than 1.3 billion people.5
Without mitigation, by 2045 or sooner, around
3.9 billion people – over 40% of the world’s
population – are likely to be experiencing
1 Oxford Research Group (2011), ‘Competition overResources: Drivers of Insecurity and the Global
South’
2 Wiltshire, A. et al. (2013), ‘The Importance ofPopulation, Climate Change and CO2 Plant
Physiological Forcing in Determining Future Global
Water Stress’
3 OECD (2012), ‘Environmental Outlook to 2050’
4 UN Environment Programme estimate.
5 Falkenmark, M. (1986), ‘Fresh Water - Time for a
Modified Approach’; Rockström, J., et al. (2009);‘Future Water Availability for Global Food
Production: The Potential of Green Water for
Increasing Resilience to Global Change’

Global Strategic Trends

water stress. This represents a significant
increase on the estimated 2.6 billion people
suffering water shortages in 2000.6
The poorest people often have extremely
limited access to fresh water. Someone living
in a slum may only be able to access about
five to ten litres daily, while a middle- or highincome individual living in the same city may
use about 50-150 litres per day. An estimated
2.2 million people die every year from diseases
that cause diarrhoea because of inadequate
water and sanitation.7 This is still likely to be
problematic by 2050, when 1.4 billion people(mainly living in developing countries) are
unlikely to have basic sanitation.8 Efforts toimprove safe water supply and health-careaccess have succeeded in reducing deaths
from diarrhoea, but these gains may bethwarted as the number of people living
in slums increases, while environmental
change places further stress on fresh water
availability. However, there continues to beadvances in water desalinisation technology,
as well as activity to reduce water waste and“By 2045 orsooner over 40%of the world’s
population
are likely to beexperiencing
water stress.

”

6 Wiltshire, A. et al., op. cit.; Arnell, N. (2004), ‘Climate
Change and Global Water Resources: SRES Emissions
and Socio-Economic Scenarios’
7 WHO (2009), ‘Water-related Diseases’, available
at http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/diseases/diarrhoea/en/
8 OECD, op. cit.

21Part 1

Resources

Meat consumption in Asia is increasing

improve water utility. Improvements in waste
treatment and purification technologies offer
hope that in the future more water could bereused or recycled.

“

There are anumber ofreasons why
violent conflictover water may
occur.

”

22

A shortage of water could lead to countries(and communities within them) divertingwater for their benefit to the detriment ofothers. Many water resources are shared bymore than one country – 263 river basins
and 269 aquifers are shared by two or morecountries,9 and 21 rivers and four aquifers
cross the boundaries of more than fivecountries.10 As demand for water intensifies,
it could lead to conflict. Some experts argue
that water scarcity drives closer cooperation11
and, despite tensions, no modern state hasever declared war on another solely overwater.12 But there are a number of reasons
why violent conflict over water may occur
9 Cooley, H. et al. (2009), ‘Understanding and Reducing
the Risks of Climate Change for Transboundary
Water’, available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/
transboundary_waters/transboundary_water_and_climate_report.pdf

by 2045 or sooner. For example, global
demand is likely to increase while supplies offresh water dwindle, yet water management
issues are likely to become increasingly
complex. The effects of environmental andclimate changes will also probably become
more severe in many locations, potentiallyoutweighing any beneficial consequences.

Food
By 2045, food production is predicted tohave increased by nearly 70%, to feed a larger
and more demanding population13 – and
it is possible that demand could outstrip
supply. Some types of consumption are likely
to grow particularly strongly. As affluence
grows in the developing world, the demand
for more protein-rich diets is also likely toincrease. China, for example, has seen meat
consumption increase by 63% between
1985 and 2009, and this trend seems likely tocontinue.14 Pollution and soil erosion are likely
to adversely affect agricultural land – someestimates assess that, globally, as much as

10 Ibid.
11 Allouche, J. (2010), ‘The Sustainability and Resilienceof Global Water and Food Systems: Political Analysisof the Interplay Between Security, Resource Scarcity,
Political Systems and Global Trade’

13 UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (2009), ‘How
to Feed the World in 2050’, available at http://www.
fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/expert_
paper/How_to_Feed_the_World_in_2050.pdf

12 Pandya, M. (2009), ‘Troubled Waters: Climate Change,
Hydropolitics and Transboundary Resources’

14 Australian Department of Agriculture (2012), ‘Food
Consumption Trends in China’

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Resources

25% of agricultural land is already degraded.15
Climate change will almost certainly haveadverse effects on some agriculture, but
may open up new areas for cultivation,with positive impacts on particular crops incertain regions. On balance, even though thequality of some areas is likely to have been
degraded by 2045, the global arable landarea is projected to remain relatively constant(estimates range from a 10% decrease to a
25% increase),16 with some potential increases
in crop productivity in the high latitudes,
and decreases across the tropical regions.17
Furthermore, warming, acidification and overfishing also threaten to reduce the amount offood that can be harvested from the oceans.
Estimates of future food prices are highly
varied and may be more volatile, althoughmost projections indicate a general increase.18
Analysis by the International Food Policy
Research Institute suggests that average prices
of many staple grains could rise by 30% evenin the most optimistic scenario.19 Disruption,and possibly congestion, of global trade routes
may lead to sharp increases in food prices –particularly in those countries dependent onfood imports. When the effects of climatechange are taken into account, the priceincrease above present levels could be as

15 Re|Source Conference (2012), ‘The Challengeof Feeding 9–10 Billion People Equitably
and Sustainably’, available at http://www.
reversethefuture.org/media/medialibrary/2012/07/
Professor_Charles_Godfray_-_ReSource_2012_
Food_Briefing.pdf

much as 100%.20 Inflation of food prices could
also be driven by a shortage of arable land,particularly in Africa and developing parts ofSouth and East Asia. A number of factors arelikely to put pressure on the availability of landfor cultivation, such as: the rapid developmentof bio-fuels; the effects of climate change;
dwindling water supplies; increasing
demand to use land for industrial and urban
growth. Set against this, transferring current
technologies and closing existing productivity
gaps by developing new measures tomaximise yields could be important inensuring productivity growth keeps pace withdemand. Developments such as geneticallymodified crops, laboratory-cultured meat,
improved agricultural techniques and recent
developments in nitrogen fixing from the air,21
may also increase productivity while lowering
the environmental impact of agriculture.
These advances may mean that forecasted
food prices could be lower than expected, oreven cheaper than today. Historical evidenceshows that higher food prices cause a jump inhunger levels. For example, during the 2008
food crisis, the number of hungry people in
the world increased by 40 million, primarily
due to increased food prices. It is likely that by
2045 food shortages will increase the numberof children under the age of five who areundernourished by around 20-25 million,22
while the global malnourished population
could increase by around 49 million.23“

Average prices
of many staple
grains could
rise by 30%
even in themost optimistic
scenario.

”

16 Lobell, D. B., Baldos, U. L. C., and Hertel, T. W. (2013),‘Climate Adaptation as Mitigation: the Case of
Agricultural Investments’; Zhang, X. and Cai, X. (2011),‘Climate Change Impacts on Global Land Availability’
17 Fischlin, A. et al. (2007), ‘Ecosystems, Their Properties,
Goods, and Services’; Müller, C. et al. (2010), ‘Climate
Change Impacts on Agricultural Yields‘, Knox, J. et al.
(2012), ‘Climate change impacts on crop productivity
in Africa and South Asia’
18 Lobell, D. B. et al., op. cit.; Nelson, G. C. et al. (2009),‘Climate Change: Impacts on Agriculture and Costsof Adaptation’; Nelson, G. C., et al. (2013), ‘Agriculture
and Climate Change in Global Scenarios: Why Don’t
the Models Agree?’
19 Nelson, G. C. et al. (2010), ‘Food Security, Farming,
and Climate Change to 2050: Scenarios, Results,
Policy Options’, available at http://www.ifpri.org/
sites/default/files/publications/rr172.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

20 Ibid.
21 Phys.org (2013), ‘World Changing Technology
Enables Crops to Take Nitrogen from the Air’,available at http://phys.org/news/2013-07-worldtechnology-enables-crops-nitrogen.html#ajTabs
22 Nelson, G. C.,et al. (2009), op. cit.
23 Baldos, U. L. C. and Hertel, T. W. (2013), ‘Global
Food Security in 2050: The Role of Agricultural
Productivity and Climate Change’

23Part 1“

Much of the
future demandfor electricity
will probably
originate indeveloping
countries,
although it may
be extremely
difficult to meetthis growth indemand.

”Resources

EnergyA growing global population will almost
certainly increase its demand for energy.
Most analysts expect that demand could
more than double by 2045.24 The amount of
power derived from nuclear25 and renewableenergy is likely to increase out to 2045, but
may remain less significant than coal andhydrocarbons. Growing use of nuclear
energy raises the possibility of fissile material
being obtained by non-state actors as well asstates operating outside international laws,
potentially causing security threats. While
there could be significant breakthroughs indeveloping novel energy sources or making
existing technologies suitable for the mass
market (thorium reactors or fuel cells, forexample) there is little evidence to suggestthat this will occur by 2045. Furthermore,while fossil fuels remain relatively cheap, there
is little incentive to fund the development of
new energy sources.

24 International Energy Agency (2012), ‘World Energy
Outlook’; Energy Information Administration (2012),‘International Energy Outlook’; Exxon Mobil (2012),‘Outlook to 2040’
25 There are currently 435 operable civil nuclear
power reactors around the world, with a further 67
under construction. See World Nuclear Association(undated), ‘Number of Nuclear Reactors’, available
at http://www.world-nuclear.org/Nuclear-Basics/
Global-number-of-nuclear-reactors/

Demand for electricity is also likely toincrease.26 Regardless of the source,
producing electricity consumes a significant
amount of primary energy (though this canbe limited to the manufacturing stage – forexample, producing solar panels) and energy
is also lost in transmission, and sometimes
through theft. However, technologicaldevelopments are likely to increase theefficiency of electricity generation by 2045.
Much of the future demand for electricity willprobably originate in developing countries,
although it may be extremely difficult to meetthis growth in demand without investing
significantly in power generation capacity andthe necessary distribution infrastructure. It
is unclear whether such investments will bemade. In developing countries, particularly
those in Africa, creating economically viable
distribution networks will probably require
cooperation between countries. Theinterconnectedness of energy markets andtransportation networks may also meanthat current choke-points become morecongested. The consequences of blockages
in areas such as the Panama Canal, Straits of
Hormuz and the Malacca Straits could be felt
far beyond their point of origin.

26 Exxon Mobil (2013), ‘The Outlook for Energy: A
View to 2040’, available at http://cdn.exxonmobil.
com/~/media/Reports/Outlook%20For%20
Energy/2014/2014-Outlook-for-Energy.pdf

Scenario:

Breakthrough in alternative energy
It is possible that, by 2045, work on new methods of generating energy will bear fruit,
such as harnessing the Sun’s energy by splitting seawater into hydrogen and oxygen.
If such processes could be industrialised, without producing significant amounts ofpollution, near-limitless amounts of extremely cheap energy could be generated.
Without the constraints of cost or pollution, heat and light could be freely available toall of the world’s people, with a number of beneficial consequences.
For example, if energy cost was no longer an object, desalinated water could betransported via pipelines to irrigate much of the Sahara, massively increasing thecontinent’s arable land and potentially ending hunger. Similarly, desalinisation plants
could resolve the probable crisis in water supply.

24

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Resources

Global energy demand by source
1000

Oil

Quadrillion British Thermal Units

Gas
Coal

750

NuclearBiomass500

Hydro
Renewables

250

0
2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

Source : US EIA ‘International Energy Outlook 2013’

Energy storage
Power sources such as wind, tidal and solar
are intermittent, providing energy whenconditions are right rather than whenneeded. This mismatch between availability
and demand is one of the main obstacles
limiting the proportion of energy generated
from renewable sources27 and perpetuating
reliance on conventional methods of power
generation. Improving the ability to store
energy would make using renewable energy
sources much more practical. While a numberof means of storing energy are available, they
suffer limitations that prevent their use on a
global scale. For example, storing water toproduce hydropower has limited capacity for
expansion, and conventional batteries are too
expensive for storing vast amounts of energy.28
New approaches such as adopting organic
materials like wood and newly discovered
liquids to produce large-scale batteries could
provide affordable and environmentally

sustainable storage.29 Such systems are highly
likely to be available and in common use
by 2045, making it possible to rely more on
renewable energy and reduce the numberof conventional power stations needed
to meet the growing demand for energy.
International interest in energy storage has
led governments in Europe, the US, Japanand elsewhere to provide funding or makeregulatory changes to encourage innovation.

Growing US energy independence 30
A key change to the global energy market
by 2045 is likely to be growing US energy
independence, driven by recently adopted
novel oil and shale gas production techniquessuch as ‘fracking’. If the current increases
in production continue, the US looks set tobecome the world’s number one oil producer
by around 2020 and a net exporter by 2030,

27 Energy Research Partnership, collated by Workman,
M. (2013), ‘DCDC Technology Review for Shale Gas,
CCS and Energy Storage’

29 The Economist (2013), ‘Battery technology: A Pileof Wood’; Huskinson, B. et al. (2014), ‘A Metal-Free
Organic–Inorganic Aqueous Flow Battery’, available
at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v505/
n7482/full/nature12909.html

28 Pumped-storage hydropower typically takes
advantage of natural topography and accounts formore than 99% of bulk storage capacity. See The
Economist (2012), ‘Energy Storage: Packing Some
Power’, available at http://www.economist.com/
node/2154

30 ‘Energy independence’ refers to a country meetingits total energy requirement from all sources at its
disposal, including imports and trades. This is not
the same as ‘energy self-sufficiency’, a term often
taken to mean that no imports or trade are required
to meet a country’s energy needs.

Global Strategic Trends“

Adopting
organic materials
and newly
discovered liquids
could provide
affordable andenvironmentally
sustainable[energy] storage.

”

25

Part 1“

The cost of energy
to US-based
manufacturers
could return topre-1970s prices,
providing themwith significant
savings.

”

Resources

dramatically altering the energy productionindustry.31 Exploiting and exporting
unconventional oil and gas, however, is notwithout its challenges. The main sources of
US shale gas and oil are far away from existing
pipeline infrastructure, and refineries aredesigned to process the heavier crude oilfrom the Middle East. Furthermore, if returns
on investment for oil and gas producers are
insufficient, the rate of development may
slow.32 However, if US electricity providers
are able to accelerate their shift from coalor oil to natural gas, the cost of energy to
US-based manufacturers could return to pre1970s prices, providing them with significant
savings.33 Consumers should also benefit
through lower energy bills, leaving them moremoney for discretionary purchases. Because
natural gas burns more cleanly than coal, there
may also be environmental benefits. Low
energy costs and a healthy consumer market
could make the US an attractive location for
manufacturers and other energy-intensive
industries, providing a significant boost to
the US economy. The share of electricity
generated by burning coal in the US has
fallen to its smallest in nearly 40 years amid
historically low natural gas prices.34 This US
shift away from coal is likely to continue toaffect global coal prices with implications forcoal-exporting countries.
A reduced requirement for Middle Easternoil (coupled with a shift in the Middle

31 International Energy Agency (2012), ‘World Energy
Outlook 2012’, available at http://www.iea.org/
publications/freepublications/publication/English.
pdf
32 Joint Research Centre (2012), ‘A Report to the Energy
Security Unit of the Joint Research Centre of theEuropean Commission’
33 Christopher J. Wolfe, Chief Investment Officer of thePrivate Banking and Investment Group at Merrill
Lynch, “We could end up with the cost of energy
to US manufacturers returning to what it was in
the 1970s or even the ’60s, adjusted for inflation.”
Quoted in Merrill Lynch (2013) ‘A Transforming
World’, available at http://wealthmanagement.
ml.com/publish/content/application/pdf/GWMOL/
AR9D50CF-MLWM.pdf
34 Teranzono, E. (2012) ‘US Power Groups Switch toGas Hits Coal’, available at http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/4924ea34-afef-11e1-b737-00144feabdc0.
html?siteedition=uk#axzz2ravy9egj

26

Eastern markets toward Asia) could call the
US commitment to the Middle East into
question. However, US involvement in the
Middle East is unlikely to alter significantly as
the region will almost certainly continue tohave a significant bearing on global stability
and security. US interests in maintaining lines
of communication are likely to continue out
to 2045. Other powers (particularly China,
Europe and India) are also likely to be vying
for influence and the US has long standing
commitments to countries in the region – notleast Gulf Cooperation Council allies and Israel.
Quite apart from political concerns, the oilmarket is genuinely global. The price of oilin the Middle East will almost certainly affectthe price of oil produced in the US and viceversa; meaning that any serious disruption to
the Middle East (or other major oil producing
regions) could also impact upon the US
economically.

Critical and novel materials
The availability of natural resources such as
rare earth elements (a group of 17 metals
often vital for many technologically advanced
products)35 and other critical materials arelikely to remain key to enabling technologicalprogress. However, they are often only
available from a limited number of sources.
Although physical depletion is not generally
considered a threat to supply, other factors
such as access, environmental impact andethical issues (such as exploitative mining
practices) are concerns.36
The discovery of alternative materials offering
improved efficiency, reliability and longevity islikely to reduce demand for some traditional
materials (although it may lead to increases
in others). Some examples of these newmaterials and their potential applications aredescribed on the next page.

35 British Geological Survey (2013), ‘World Mineral
Statistics Database’36 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs(2012), ‘Resource Security Action Plan: Making theMost of Valuable Materials’, available at https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/resource-securityaction-plan-making-the-most-of-valuable-materials

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Resources

Material

Potential applications

Miniaturisation
DNA nanotechnology to fabricate nano-scale devices.
The self-assembly mechanism of DNA could be harnessed
to fabricate mechanical, electrical and optical devices
and circuits that may be ten times smaller than current
technology allows.

Significant expansion of the capabilities of computers, suchas improved processing power; better ability to synthesisematerials by design; the development of advanced
therapeutic and drug delivery systems; and ultimately, thedevelopment of nanobots.

New developments in piezoelectric materials (materials
that turn kinetic energy into electrical energy) could allow
devices without batteries to run on power harvested fromvibrations and operate at more extreme temperatures.

Constructing devices able to operate in normallyunreachable or unsafe locations, such as the monitoring
environmental conditions in places too dangerous forhumans.

Replacements for traditional materials
Micro-alloys such as palladium-based metallic glass witha strength and toughness greater than any known material.

May be used in small-scale components, leading to betterconstructed aircraft and spacecraft.

Graphene paper. Flexible and inexpensive to produce,
and around ten times stronger than steel.

Replacements for a range of conventional and existing
composite structural materials, far stronger than thoseavailable today. Could also support miniaturisation andsensors with greater sensitivity and accuracy.

Responsive materials
Magnetic shape-memory alloys. Materials that change
shape and mechanical properties when a magnetic field
is applied.

Ultra-efficient engine valves that open and close
automatically; positioning tools for microsurgicalprocedures; sensors for detecting environmental
contaminants; and less toxic batteries. Applications likely
to be limited to a small scale, due to the challenge of
integrating the required high magnetic field actuation
system.

Self-repairing metal. Metal that responds to damage by‘healing’ itself, such as nickel super-alloys with designedin defects that allow cracks to repair themselves undernormal loading conditions.

Better structural materials that could be used in turbine
blades, giving better resistance to fatigue.

Information-providing protective coatings. Chemical
reactions that are triggered by various failure mechanisms,
resulting in a change of visual appearance to indicate
when maintenance or repair is required.

Active corrosion protection systems; coatings whichindicate exposure to chemical or biological agents;
coatings which indicate aging.

Metamaterials
Artificial materials engineered to exhibit properties that only rarely occur naturally
Nanospheres. A transparent material made of selfassembling nanospheres that is the stiffest organic material
ever created, surpassing the properties of stainless steel
and even Kevlar.

Revolutionary improvements in body armour, with thepotential for new ways to customise products, such as
printed body armour. A component for strengthening
existing metals and composites; creating medical implants.

Ultra-lightweight and ultra-absorbent materials suchas highly-porous carbon constructs one-sixth the densityof air and highly absorbent.

Current materials used for cleaning up oil spills absorb
around ten times their weight in oil, but new materials
show potential to handle 900 times their weight in oilwith very high rates of absorption. Capture and transport
aerosols such as pollutants and water vapour.

Jelly-forming polymers so effective that a kilogrammeof the compound could turn the water within an
Olympic-sized swimming pool into jelly.

Treating wounds; altering or denying access to waterways.

Programmable matter. Materials that can be
programmed to alter themselves at the molecular level
into various shapes and then disassemble to form entirely
new ones.

Compounds that can reform the shape of components
in real-time, similar to holograms, could allow the remote
projection of a replica of a person or object, or enablerobots to change size (and perhaps even state of matter) tonavigate narrow passages or around obstacles.

Global Strategic Trends

27

Part 1“

Rising demand
for rare earth
elements
could continue
to motivate
countries in trying
to develop or
secure their own
sources of supply.

”

Resources

Resource protectionism
Increased demand for critical materials –which could include oil and water – has seen
governments adopt protectionist measures
to boost revenues and secure access toresources. These practices are likely to endureout to 2045. Anti-competitive behaviours
such as expropriation of foreign companies,
export restrictions, cartel-pricing behaviour,‘land acquisition’ or high taxation are formsof resource nationalism designed to restrict
international supply. For example, potash(used in agriculture) is increasingly subject togovernment-to-government trade deals rather
than being traded on the open market. Risingdemand for, and concerns over, access to rareearth elements could continue to motivate
countries in trying to develop or secure theirown sources of supply, bypassing international
markets. While running out of these materials
is unlikely within the 2045 timeframe, reliabilityof supply could be an issue because they
are only mined in a very small number ofcountries (for example, China produces 86%
of all rare earth elements). If one of thosecountries restricted supply, it would be likely
to have a significant impact on availability andprice.37 However, such action is not without its
costs. Unpredictable and retro-active policychanges to protect resources can, for example,
lead to a drying up of foreign investment or
customers.
Resource inequality
Inequitable distribution of resources including
food, water, energy and materials will almost
certainly endure out to 2045, both between
countries and within them. Plentiful supplies
of food and water are usually beneficial.
However, plentiful supplies of hydrocarbons
and minerals can be destabilising – especially
37 Ernst and Young identified resource nationalism as
the top risk in their assessment of ‘Business Risks
Facing Mining and Metals 2011–2012’, available
at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/
Business_risks_facing_mining_and_metals_2011012/$File/Metal_Mining_paper_02Aug11_lowres.
pdf. This represented a move from fourth highest
risk, behind skills and cost, to the number one riskin 2012 – an assessment which has held in their
updated report. See also Lee, B. (2012), ‘Resources
Futures’, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/
publications/papers/view/187947

28

in countries with authoritarian or fragile
governance. In such countries, profits frommineral and hydrocarbon extraction are often(through corruption) concentrated in thehands of elites. This can result in grievances,leading to instability and potentially violent
conflict. Inequitable availability of food andwater, particularly in those countries sufferingfrom shortages, is also likely to lead to
instability and violence.

Rare earth elements
Reserves, production
and consumption

Production

China produces almost 85%
of rare earth elements andconsumes around 60% of
the global supply. Suppliers
outside of China aredeveloping capacity.

Estimated
reserves

55,000,000 tons

13,000,000

China

United States
7,000
95,000 tons

74,000 tons

Nechalacho-Thor Lake
Avalon Rare Metals Inc.
Estimated start date late 2016

Hoidas Lake
(Great Western Minerals Group)
Mountain Pass
(Molycorp Inc.)
Was the world’s biggest supplier from about
1965–1984 but environmental problems andcompetition from China put it out of business.
It re-opened in 2012.

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Resources

Defence and security implications■■ Competition over some resources is likely to intensify and exacerbate existing politicaland security tensions, potentially acting as a catalyst for intra- and inter-state conflict.
■■ Demand for food may outstrip supply, leading to a rise in costs. Food shortages
could lead to sharp price spikes, which could result in instability in those areas
unable to absorb the increase.
■■ Climate change could contribute to increasing incidences of crop failure, potentiallycausing disruption to global food supplies.
■■ Growing use of nuclear energy raises the possibility of fissile material being obtainedby non-state actors as well as countries operating outside international laws,
potentially causing security threats.
■■ A reduced requirement for Middle Eastern oil by the US, coupled with a shift in the
Middle Eastern markets toward Asia, could bring the US commitment to defence ofMiddle East export routes into question. However, US involvement in the Arabian Gulf
is unlikely to alter significantly. But the US may look to other countries, including China
and the EU, to play a greater role in security provision in the Middle East.

Consumption

1,600,000

3,100,000

10,000,000

36,00030,000Australia

India

Commonwealth of Ind. States*

BrazilMalaysia

300

350

4,000

2,800

2,500

31,000,000

Other
6,000

United States

Japan & South Asia

18,50023,500

Bayan Obo(Chinese Government)
The world’s biggest rareearth mine since at least
1990.

Lovozero, Russia
Sichuan Province(multiple producers)

Dong Pao(Vietnamese Government/
Toyota Tsusho/Sojitz)
Jiangxi Province(multiple producers) The
Chinese Government
took control of mining
operations from local
authorities in 2011,
allowing for greater control
and to tackle corruption.

Kinta Valley(multiple producers)

Dubbo Zirconia
Project(Alcane Resources Ltd.)
Mount Weld
(Lynes Corp.)

Global Strategic Trends

Nolans Bore(Arafura Resources Ltd.)

Map key
Identified rare earth deposit
Site that produces or has
produced at least somerare earths
Current major producer
Could be a major producer
within five years
Source: Analysis by DCDC based on
information from the US Geological
Survey and other open source
reporting. Original design concept
New York Times.
* Member states: Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan andUzbekistan; and participating states
Turkmenistan and Ukraine.

29

Part 1

The Environment

A growing population will demand more food and water, increasing the strain on theenvironment out to 2045. As centres of population cluster in vulnerable areas such as
coastal regions, the consequences of adverse weather are highly likely to be felt more
keenly. By 2045, climate change is likely to have more noticeable effects. Without
mitigation, rising sea levels will increase the risk of coastal flooding, particularly inregions affected by tropical cyclones. Droughts and heatwaves are also likely to increase
in intensity, duration and frequency. Some of these events could precipitate natural
disasters which, because of the interdependencies enabled by globalisation, may haveconsequences far beyond the site where the disaster occurs.

People and the environment
Human activities are likely to continue to havean impact on the environment. The processesof urbanisation, deforestation, industrialisation,
agriculture and fishing have damaged thenatural environment. By some estimates,
pollution and soil erosion have led to as muchas 25% of available land being degraded.1
Similarly, over-fishing and pollution have
reduced the amount of food that can be
harvested from the oceans. However, moresustainable farming and fishing methods andbetter industrial and urban practices could
mitigate these adverse effects.
Climate change
Inertia in the climate system means that
historic greenhouse gas emissions will almost
certainly affect the climate for the next few
decades, regardless of any mitigating action
taken. By 2045, average global temperatures
are likely to have increased by approximately
1.4°C above levels recorded at the end of the

1 Re|Source Conference (2012), ‘The Challengeof Feeding 9–10 billion People Equitably
and Sustainably’, available at http://www.
reversethefuture.org/media/medialibrary/2012/07/
Professor_Charles_Godfray_-_ReSource_2012_
Food_Briefing.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

20th century.2 Without concerted action,3 it
is unlikely that it will be possible to prevent
global average temperatures rising more than
2°C above pre-industrial levels.4 Although
there may appear to have been no significant
increase in temperatures over the last 10-15
years, periods of slow-down and speed-up
in global temperature trends have occurred
before, and are likely to occur again. Energy
which would usually manifest as a rise insurface temperature is also being absorbed
elsewhere in the Earth system, primarily inthe oceans. Observations of ocean heat
content and of sea-level rise re-enforce thisconclusion.5
2 Kent, C. and Lewis, K., Met Office Hadley Centre(2014), ‘Climate Change for Global Strategic
Trends out to 2045’. It is worth noting that futuretemperature predictions are projections based oncomputer modelling, and hence are subject to theinherent uncertainties involved in such modelling, as
well as to the uncertainties associated with any kindof prediction.
3 Rogelj, J. et al. (2012), ‘Global Warming Under Old
and New Scenarios Using IPCC Climate Sensitivity
Range Estimates’
4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014),‘Fifth Assessment Report’. Hereafter referred to as‘IPCC AR5 (2014)’. AR5 data is used throughout GST 5
where available; AR4 data is used when AR5 data has
not yet been published or interpreted.
5 Kent, C. and Lewis, K, op. cit.

31Part 1The Environment

Amount of CO2 emitted per capita
16

tCO2 / per capita

12

2010
13.4

13.6

14.3

15.0

2025
2035
2045

9.7

8

8.4
7.2
5.4

4
0

3.8

OECD

BRICS

4.3

4.8

5.3

Rest of World

6.2

7.0

7.8

8.5

Global average

Source: Based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Environmental Outlook to 2050: Output from IMAGE/ENV-Linkages“

Without
mitigating
action, on a percapita basis,
most developed
countries’
emissions arelikely to remain
higher thanthose of mostdeveloping
countries.

”

Without meaningful effort to secure global
consensus on the scale of the problem andhow it should be tackled, it will almost certainly
be challenging to limit global temperature
increases. By the end of the century, the Earth’s
climate is likely to be substantially warmer anddifferent from today’s. A large body of scientificevidence indicates that climate change
is mostly being driven by human-caused
greenhouse gas emissions,6,7 particularly carbon
dioxide (CO2) from generating power. While
the proportion of CO2 emitted by developing
countries (particularly India and China) is likely
to increase significantly out to 2045 without
mitigating action, on a per capita basis, mostdeveloped countries’ emissions are likely toremain higher than those of most developing
countries.

the ocean floor are possible. All could cause
major global disruption, although it is notpossible to quantify the likelihood of these
events occurring by 2045. Heatwaves andextremely hot days are likely to become
more frequent and intense, as are droughts,
while instances of extreme cold are likely to
reduce. It is also probable that instances ofintense rainfall will increase and that extratropical storms move pole-ward.8 Historically,

Abrupt events (or tipping points) such as thefailure of the Indian monsoon, changes inlarge-scale ocean circulation (for example aweakening of the Gulf-stream), substantial
melting of the Greenland ice sheet and therelease of large quantities of methane fromIf advances in energy technology are
insufficient to ensure the required
amounts of electricity for economic
growth, countries could burnhydrocarbons at ever-higher rates. This
may increase greenhouse gas levels,
causing global temperature rise. In turn,this could lead to long heat waves innormally temperate latitudes. Sustained
drought could contribute to repeatedharvest failures, as arable crops would
be unable to cope with the hightemperatures. Severe food shortages
could lead to sudden mass migrationof populations across national borders,triggering widespread social unrest.

6 ‘Greenhouse Gas’ refers to CO2 (approximately 0.04%
of the atmosphere), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide(N2O) and various fluorinated gases as well as water
vapour (gaseous H2O).
7 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) foundgood agreement between climate models for the
global temperature to increase throughout the 21st
century, primarily driven by changes in Greenhouse
Gas (GHG) concentrations. This assessment holds for
current report. See IPCC AR5 (2014).

32

8 Knutson, T. R. et al. (2010), ‘Tropical Cyclones andClimate Change’

Shock:

Catastrophic
climate change

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1The Environment

the flooding in Pakistan in 2010 displaced an
estimated 20 million people, and damaged 1.6
million homes. Similarly, some experts believethat a 2.5cm rise in sea levels would displace
50 million people in the coastal regions ofIndia.9 The economic impact of extreme
events is uncertain, but losses per event from1980-2010 ranged from a few billion US dollars(USD) to over US$ 250 billion in 2005 following
Hurricane Katrina.10 It seems likely thatdeveloping countries will feel the economic
impact of climate change particularly sharply,as they are unlikely to have the resources tomitigate its effects as successfully as moredeveloped countries.
The Arctic is likely to see significant changewith the melting of sea-ice opening up newroutes across the Arctic Ocean during thesummer months. Reduced summer sea-ice
may present opportunities as new traderoutes and areas rich in natural resources open
up for exploitation. Thawing permafrost could
make transportation to and from Arctic oil andgas facilities problematic as ice roads turn tomarsh, particularly in Siberia. The softening of
the ground is likely to make new areas suitable
for agriculture.

Rising sea levels
Global sea-levels are likely to rise by between
0.32–0.38 metres by 2050, although larger
increases cannot be ruled out.11 The effects
of sea level rise will not be uniform across theglobe and there will be regional variations
which affect the vulnerability of certain
coastal regions. Currently, between 270 and
310 million people are believed to be at risk

9 DCDC conversations with the Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India, February 2014.
10 Estimated property damage totalled US$ 108 billion,
with economic impact assessments estimating
losses of US$ 150 billion. See Blake, E. S. et al. (2011),‘The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense US
Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2010 (And Other
Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts)’; Burton,
M. L. and Hicks, M. J. (2005), ‘Hurricane Katrina:
Preliminary Estimates of Commercial and Public
Sector Damages’
11 Jevrejeva, S. et al. (2012), ‘Sea Level Projections toAD2500 with a New Generation of Climate Change
Scenarios’

Global Strategic Trends

Scenario:City concentrationand sea level rise
If our use of coal-fuelled power
stations increases out to 2045 (perhaps
as developing countries build theireconomies), alongside a possible
demand from the growing consumerclass for larger, higher-status petroldriven cars, it is conceivable that global
warming could significantly increase,perhaps by as much as 3oC. With
such a rise in temperature, significant
melting of Arctic ice-sheets could occur,
releasing vast amounts of methane andraising temperatures (and hence sealevels) even higher.
Current trends indicate that a numberof mega-cities will be in littoral areas.
If this coincides with climate-changeinduced sea level rise and extreme
weather events, the consequences
could be disastrous – particularlyin those rapidly expanding cities
in developing countries where
governance is weak.
of coastal flooding.12 By 2045, a growing
number of low-lying islands could be at riskof near total submersion – displacing entire
communities. Without measures to mitigate
and adapt to the effects of sea-level rises, by
2045 there could be between 80 and 130
million more people at risk from flooding,
three-quarters of them in Asia.13

Desertification
Arid and semi-arid areas cover about 40% ofEarth’s land surface and are home to morethan two billion people.14 These areas are“

Between 270 and
310 million people
are believed to be
at risk of coastal
flooding.

”

12 Hinkel, J. et al. (2014), ‘Coastal Flood Damage andAdaptation Costs Under 21st Century Sea-Level Rise’
13 Jongman, B. et al. (2012), ‘Global Exposure to Riverand Coastal Flooding: Long Term Trends andChanges’; Met Office (2013), ‘Sea-Level Rise’ available
at http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate-change/
guide/impacts/high-end/sea-level
14 UN FAO (2008), ‘Water and Cereals in Drylands’;
Warner, T. (2004), ‘Desert Meteorology’33

Part 1“

Around 20-30% of
plant and animal
species could be
at high risk ofextinction due toclimate change.

”

The Environment

expanding, with one study suggesting an
estimated 135 million people will be at risk ofbeing displaced by desertification over the
coming decades, due to water shortages andreduced agricultural output.15 In sub-SaharanAfrica alone, some 60 million people are
expected to move from ‘desertified’ areas tonorthern Africa and Europe by 2020, and thisfigure is highly likely to increase out to 2045.

Water
Future water stress is likely to be mainly driven
by socio-economic factors.16 The frequency,
intensity and duration of droughts in many
parts of the world are likely to increase.
Climate change is likely to contribute tolonger-term changes in water availability,
particularly in areas dependant on glaciermelt-water. The continued melting of glaciers
could increase freshwater availability out to2045, but may bring with it an increased riskof localised flooding. In the longer term, as
glaciers melt, the inter-annual reliability of the
supply of water in glacial rivers will be affected.
Changing rainfall patterns may mean declining
water availability for some, and an excess forothers.
15 Global Humanitarian Forum (2009), ‘Human Impact
Report - Climate Change’, available at http://www.
ghf-ge.org/human-impact-report.pdf
16 Kent, C. and Lewis, K., op. cit.

Concentrated reliance on 30 crop species
Historically cultivated for
consumption*
Widely cultivated†
Critical in providing 95% of dietaryrequirement*
7,000
120
30

*Source: FAO http://www.fao.org/
biodiversity/components/plants/en/
Source: Shiva, V., Buiatti, M.,
Ceccarelli, S., Dolder, F., Esquinas, J. T.,
Mammuccini, M. G., Magarinos-Rey, B.
& Pucci, G. (2013) ‘The Law of the Seed’,
Navdanya International, p.9. (http://
www.navdanya.org/attachments/
lawofseed.pdf)†

Marine life
Marine ecosystems are expected to undergo
substantial change by 2045.17 For example,
numerous studies suggest that the increasing
acidity of the ocean (due to greater absorptionof carbon dioxide) will have harmful
consequences for calcifying organisms suchas coral reefs and many species of shellfish.18
Around inland and coastal areas, changing
patterns of freshwater runoff, droughts,
floods, increasing temperatures and rising
sea levels could all have a significant negative
effect on fisheries and aquaculture.19 Inland
fisheries are particularly vulnerable to low
water levels, changes in spawning grounds,
water extraction and modifications to rivercourses (such as the construction of dams).
Freshwater runoff could reduce the salinity ofseawater, adversely affecting fishing grounds
and coral reefs. Aquaculture depends heavily
on adequate water exchange and is vulnerable
to temperature extremes and storm damage,
particularly in coastal areas.
Biodiversity
The impact of pollution, habitat destruction
and climate change will almost certainly
have a profound effect on wildlife. Some
species are likely to adapt to the changes
in their environment but many may not beable to. More species will almost inevitably
become extinct, with the OECD’s projections
indicating that terrestrial biodiversity could
decrease by up to 10% by 2050.20 The UN
assesses that biodiversity loss has been more
rapid in the last 50 years than in any otherperiod in human history,21 a trend that somecommentators suggest shows no sign ofslowing.22 Around 20-30% of plant and animal
17 Fischlin, A. et al. op. cit.
18 IPCC AR4, op. cit.; Bellard, C. et al., op. cit.; Wittmann,
A. C. and Pörtner, H. O. (2013), ‘Sensitivities of Extant
Animal Taxa to Ocean Acidification’
19 FAO (2009), ‘Report of the Expert Workshop on
Climate Change Implications for Fisheries andAquaculture’, available at http://www.fao.org/
docrep/011/i0203e/i0203e00.htm
20 OECD (2012), ‘Environmental Outlook to 2050’
21 UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board (2005),‘Ecosystems and Human Well-Being’, available
at http://www.unep.org/maweb/documents/
document.354.aspx.pdf
22 Karkkainen, B. (1997), ‘Biodiversity and Land’

34

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1The Environment

Pressures driving global biodiversity loss
Projected Mean Species Abundance* loss as the result of different human induced pressures,with a large role for agricultural land use, encroachment and climate change.
0%

2010

2030

2045

Crops
Energy crops-10%

Pasture-20%

Infrastructure, enchroachment
and fragmentation

Forestry

Former land-use
Nitrogen-30%

Climate change-40%
Source: OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050
* This is a way of measuring the impact of human behaviour on ecosystems. It compares the current number and variety of species in a particular areawith historic data, to assess the major causes of biodiversity loss.

species could be at high risk of extinction due
to climate change.23 Reduction in biodiversity
decreases the natural environment’s resilience
when adapting to change, since genetic
diversity is the raw material for evolution.
A reduction in biodiversity could also leadto the loss of organisms that keep pest anddisease species in check. There may also
be significant economic consequences tobiodiversity loss, with some suggestions thatthe annual cost to the global economy is
between US$ 2bn and US$ 5bn.24 Reduction
in biodiversity may also place food supplies atrisk. At present, four crops (rice, wheat, maizeand potato) provide more than 60% of global
food energy.25 Relying so heavily on such asmall number of crops means that, if growing
conditions change (due to drought, increased
temperatures or flooding, for example), we
may not have sufficient genetic variety to
be able to breed crops to cope with theseenvironmental stresses.
23 Fischlin, A. et al. (2007),‘Ecosystems, Their Properties,
Goods, and Services’; Bellard, C. et al. (2012), ‘Impactsof Climate Change on the Future of Biodiversity’
24 OECD, op. cit.
25 UN FAO (2014), ‘Biodiversity: Plants’

Global Strategic Trends

Agriculture
The impact of climate change on agriculture
is complex and region-dependent. Adverse
impacts (for example, heatwaves, droughts,
storms and flooding) are expected acrosstropical regions26 and much of theMediterranean basin.27 Higher latitudes
are likely to experience a range of both
positive and negative impacts (such aschanges in water availability, heat stress ,increased growing seasons and decreases
in the occurrence of frost damage).28 Until
about 2050, modest warming is expected
to improve growing conditions for a rangeof crops in the mid- and high-latitudes.29
Increased atmospheric carbon dioxide could
also increase the growth rates of many plant

26 IPCC AR4, op. cit.
27 Ferrise R. et al. (2013), ‘Climate Change Impacts on
Typical Mediterranean Crops and Evaluation of
Adaptation Strategies to Cope With’
28 Gornall, J. et al. (2010), ‘Implications of Climate
Change for Agricultural Productivity in the Early
Twenty-First Century’
29 Fischlin, A. et al. op. cit.

35

Part 1The Environment

species.30 However, the indirect impacts ofclimate change – wildfires, land degradation,
pests and diseases, extreme rainfall and sealevel rise – could have significant effects. For
example, it is currently estimated that eachyear 10-16% of the total global harvest is lostto plant diseases,31 and climate change could
increase this figure by 2045. Nevertheless, agreat deal of the world’s agricultural potential
is unused or under-used. If this ‘yield gap’
could be closed, perhaps by technologicalimprovements, GM crops and improved
methods of agriculture and farming, the trend
towards a decrease in food production could

30 Notaro, M. et al. (2007), ‘Global Vegetation andClimate Change due to Future Increases in CO2 as
Projected by a Fully Coupled Model with Dynamic
Vegetation’
31 Chakraborty, S. and Newton, A. C. (2011), ‘Climate
Change, Plant Diseases and Food Security: An
Overview’be slowed or reversed. Even using current
technology, the potential exists to increase
production by up to 40%.32
About 60% of the workforce in developing
countries (around 1.5 billion people) is
employed in agriculture, livestock, fisheries
and tourism. While the proportion of people
working in these areas is expected to reduce(not least due to increased urbanisation), manyare still likely to depend on the health of thenatural environment for their livelihoods andmay therefore be particularly vulnerable to theeffects of climate change and environmental
degradation. Degraded and threatened
environments are likely to lead to affected
communities migrating – with potentiallydestabilising consequences.
32 Department for International Development (2014),
unpublished comments at the Horizon Scanning
Office for Government (GOSH).

Food Insecurity
vulnerability to climate(Projected change between
2010 and 2045)■ Low–Low■ Low–Medium■ Medium–Medium■ Medium–High■ High–High■ Low–High■ OECD and EU**OECD and EU countries are not considered at risk due to their economic means and access to global food markets

36

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1The Environment

Water security(Projection for 2045)■ Highly unstressed■ Unstressed■ Approaching water stress■ Moderately water stressed■ Highly water stressed

Population density
Persons per km2 (Projection for 2045)■ Very low
<75
■ Low
75–249■ Medium
250–499■ High500–799■ Very High 800–1,200■ Extreme>1,200Sources:
Climate Security Team, Met Office Hadley Centre (2014), ‘Climate Change and Food
Security: Measuring Climate Impact Through the Hunger and Climate Vulnerability Index’
Wiltshire, A. J., Kay, G., Gornall, J. L., and Betts, R. A. (2013), ‘The Impact of Climate, CO2
and Population on Regional Food and Water Resources in the 2050s’

Global Strategic Trends

Wiltshire, A., Gornall, J., Booth, B., Dennis, E., et al. (2013), ‘The Importance ofPopulation, Climate Change and CO2 Plant Physiological Forcing in Determining
Future Global Water Stress.’
UN World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision37

Part 1The Environment

Sudanese mothers and their malnourished babies gather at a field hospital

Humanitarian relief
The financial requirements for humanitarianassistance are projected to increase by up to1,600% over the next 20 years, in large partdue to the effects of climate change.33 By
2045, this figure is likely to be substantiallyhigher. Funds available for disaster
preparedness and relief are widely assessed to
be inadequate. As the incidence and impactof natural disasters increase, this situation is
likely to worsen. Governments, particularly
those in the regions most affected, are likely to
become increasingly focussed on: preventing,preparing for (and dealing with) the impact ofenvironmental and climate related disasters
at home; and with providing humanitarianassistance and disaster relief abroad. Somegovernments are likely to require their armed
forces to take on an increased role in disaster
relief.
Intervention and prevention
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is likely
to be the most important means by whichclimate change is managed – although out
to 2045 it appears likely that the drivers of
33 Webster, M. et al. (2008), ‘The Humanitarian Costs of
Climate Change’

38

greenhouse gases will continue to increase.
Inertia in the climate system means thatwarming would continue even if emissions
were cut to zero tomorrow. Catchinggreenhouse gases before they are released
into the atmosphere through techniquessuch as carbon capture and storage could
play a vital role in reducing climate change –particularly while fossil fuels remain a majorenergy source.34 Although at an early stage ofdevelopment, and with questions remaining
about whether they could operate on alarge scale, more advanced carbon capture
technologies have the potential to convert
carbon into useful products such as plastics.35
At a local level, constructing flood defences,altering agricultural practices in light ofchanging weather patterns and implementing
water conservation measures are likely to be
the primary means of adapting to the effects
of climate change.

34 Bosetti, V. et al. (2009), ‘Optimal Energy Investment
and R&D Strategies to Stabilize AtmosphericGreenhouse Gas Concentrations’
35 IEA (2009), ‘Technology Road Map, Carbon
Capture and Storage’, available at http://www.iea.
org/publications/freepublications/publication/
TechnologyRoadmapCarbonCaptureandStorage.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1The Environment

Theoretically plausible geoengineering
methods (intentional, large-scale activities
intended to counteract aspects of climatechange) have been proposed for anumber of years.36 Detailed studies on
the environmental implications of different
geoengineering activities have recently
begun to appear, but large-scale testingand implementation of such methods
has not occurred – in some cases due topublic opposition.37 One theoretical ‘solar
36 The Royal Society (2009), ‘Geoengineering the
Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty’;
Political and governance issues discussed by
Bodansky, D. (2012), ‘The Who, What, and Whereforeof Geoengineering Governance’
37 Lenton, T. M. and Vaughan, N. E. (2009), ‘The
Radiative Forcing Potential of Different Climate
Geoengineering Options’; Kravitz, B. et al. (2011),‘The Geoengineering Model Intercomparison
Project (GeoMIP)’; Kravitz, B. et al. (2013), ‘Climate
Model Response from the Geoengineering Model
Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP)’

radiation management’ technique would
aim to disperse sulphates into the upper
atmosphere, reflecting the sun’s rays backout to space, producing a cooling effect.
However, as with most geoengineering
techniques, there are questions about how
to maintain the intervention, and minimise
the potentially harmful side-effects. For
example, it is not known what the longterm effects of dispersing large quantities
of sulphates into the atmosphere would be.
Over-reliance on particular geoengineering
technology to mitigate the effects of climatechange could also render users vulnerable
to catastrophic effects if equipment failed or
was sabotaged. It is not clear therefore what,
if any, role geoengineering will play by 2045
in countering the effects of climate change,
and the extent to which it could heighten
international tensions.

“

Advancedcarbon capture
technologies havethe potential toconvert carbon
into usefulproducts such as
plastics.

”

Defence and security implications■■ Extreme weather events, such as flooding and droughts, are likely to increase inboth frequency and intensity in a number of regions. Extreme events will almost
certainly continue to cause widespread damage and loss of life, although ourwarning mechanisms, defences and ability to respond may also improve in the same
timeframe.
■■ Reductions in the extent of summer Arctic sea-ice could open up new shipping
routes during the summer months and boost economic growth in the region –increasing its strategic significance for many countries.
■■ Degraded and threatened environments are likely to lead to affected communities
migrating – with potentially destabilising consequences.
■■ Armed and security forces, both at home and abroad, are likely to be more
frequently tasked with providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
perhaps supporting indigenous responders.
■■ Without mitigation measures such as carbon capture and storage, continued
reliance on coal and hydrocarbons for the majority of energy demand may
exacerbate climate change and its knock-on effects.

Global Strategic Trends

39Part 1

HealthDevelopments in technology are likely to lead to significant improvements in medicine
and health, such as the potential for developing cures for some cancers by 2045.
Advances in diagnostic techniques, the development of artificial organs and mindcontrolled prosthetic limbs mean that we are highly likely to live for longer and havemore productive lives. But new challenges to good health will almost certainly emerge.
Rising physical inactivity and unhealthy diets are likely to contribute to an obesity
epidemic and a rise in non-communicable diseases. Antibiotic-resistant pathogens
could be widespread by 2045, making post-operative infections potentially lethal.

1 WHO (2011), ‘Global Status Report on
Noncommunicable Diseases 2010’, available at
http://www.who.int/entity/nmh/publications/
ncd_report_summary_en.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

Falling under five mortality
Number of deaths
per 1,000 of population
Sub-Saharan Africa

125

100

05

Global average

20
15

Middle East & N Africa

20

Central Asia

75

20
25

S & E Asia and Oceania

Europe20
35

Latin America

50

45North America

20

Impediments to health
Globally, significant progress has been madein reducing levels of child mortality. Between
1990 and 2012, the number of under-fives
dying each year fell from 12 million to 6.3
million, and further decreases look likely.
However, more than one third of the global
population (approximately 2.5 billion people)
currently lack access to adequate sanitation,and despite efforts to reduce it, due to theprobable increase in the number of people
living in slums, this figure is likely to growout to 2045. Perhaps the most serious
development in global health is the increasein the prevalence of non-communicablediseases (such as cardiovascular diseases,
diabetes, cancers) which – following the
success of treatments for communicablediseases – have become the leading global
causes of death, particularly in developing
countries.1 Of the 57 million deaths in
2008, 63% were due to non-communicablediseases. They are the most frequent causesof death in most countries, except thosein Africa. Even here, the incidence of non-25
10

Source: UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’41Part 1“

Outdoor urban air
pollution currently
causes about 1.2
million deaths
every year, andthis number islikely to increaseout to 2045.

”

Healthcommunicable diseases is rising rapidly.2 This
global rise is mainly attributable to population
growth; ageing; and economic transition
and the resulting changes in behavioural,
occupational and environmental risk factors.
Most non-communicable diseases are strongly
associated, and causally linked, with four
particular behaviours: tobacco use; physicalinactivity; unhealthy diet; and the harmful useof alcohol.3
Antimicrobial resistance among bacteria,
viruses and fungi is increasing. If current
trends continue, antimicrobial resistantpathogens could be prevalent by 2045 orsooner. This could make surgery and medical
procedures such as chemotherapy (which
suppresses the body’s immune systems) much
more hazardous. Already, 25,000 people a year
die in Europe due to antimicrobial resistance.
The consequences of infected wounds on
military operations would also become more
serious if we returned to a ‘pre-antibiotic’ era.
Moreover, research and development for new
antimicrobials is very limited – no new classof antibiotics has been developed since 1987.
However, alternatives to antibiotics are being
examined, including using vaccines, metals4
and viral agents.5

Emerging infections and the risk ofpandemics
Up to 70% of recent emerging infections haveoriginated in animals and this will almost
certainly continue to be the case out to 2045.
The time and location of new infections (orre-emergence of already known infections)cannot be accurately predicted, but places
where animals and humans interact are likely
to be particularly problematic. The likelihood
2 Ibid.
3 WHO (2011), op. cit.
4 Lemire, J. A. et al. (2013), ‘Antimicrobial Activityof Metals: Mechanisms, Molecular Targets andApplications’, available at http://www.nature.com/
nrmicro/journal/v11/n6/abs/nrmicro3028.html
5 Mathur, M. D. et al. (2003), ‘Bacteriophage Therapy:
an Alternative to Conventional Antibiotics’, available
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15266928;
Borrell, B. (2012), ‘Could Bacteria-Fighting Viruses
Replace Overused Antibiotics?’, available at http://
www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=couldbacteria-fighting-viruses-replace-antibiotics

42

of disease outbreak could, however, be
mitigated by alertness to changing trends
in infectious diseases (in both humans andanimals), joined-up surveillance strategies andsharing of information across disciplines andborders.

Climate change
Climate change is already affecting health,contributing to a decline in clean air, safe
drinking water, sufficient food and secure
shelter across the globe. Increased frequency
and intensity of extreme weather eventsare likely to affect physical health (such asheat-related illness) as well as mental healthproblems,6 such as increased stress due tothe impact of flooding.7 Higher temperatures
are also likely to raise the levels of ozone andother pollutants in the air that exacerbate
cardiovascular and respiratory disease.
Outdoor urban air pollution currently causes
about 1.2 million deaths every year,8 andthis number is likely to increase out to 2045.
Climatic conditions strongly affect waterborne diseases and diseases transmitted
through insects,9 snails or other cold-blooded
animals. Lengthening transmission seasonsof important vector-borne diseases, such as
dengue fever, could also alter their geographic
range.10 The loss or contamination of fresh
water is almost certain to lead to disease andcrop destruction – resulting in food shortages,
poor nutrition and malnutrition. Longer-termchanges in weather patterns may lead tosignificant decreases in fertility of farmland
and water availability in some areas.11

6 WHO (2013), ‘Climate Change and Health: Factsheet
No. 266’, available at http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/en/
7 Health Protection Agency (2011), ‘The Effectsof Flooding on Mental Health’, available at
http://www.hpa.org.uk/webc/HPAwebFile/
HPAweb_C/1317131767423
8 WHO (2013), op. cit.
9 WHO (2014), ‘Climate Change and Vectorborne
Diseases’, available at http://www.wpro.who.int/
mvp/climate_change/en/
10 Costello et al. (2009), ‘Lancet and University College
London Institute for Global Health Commission’
11 Met Office (2012), ‘Climate Impacts on Food Security
and Nutrition’, available at http://www.metoffice.
gov.uk/climate-guide/climate-change/impacts/foodGlobal Strategic Trends

Part 1

Health170 million children globally are overweight or obese

Obesity
Were obesity to be considered a disease, there
would arguably already be a global obesity
pandemic.12 By 2008, an estimated 1.5 billion
adults globally were overweight and 500
million adults were obese. An estimated 170
million children globally were also classified as
overweight or obese. This includes more than
25% of all children in some countries – morethan double the proportions from the start of
the global rise in obesity in the 1970s. Unlike
other major causes of preventable death anddisability, such as tobacco use, injuries andinfectious diseases, there are no examplesof populations in which rising obesity has
been reversed by public health measures.
The increases in obesity in adults are widely
projected to continue to rise in the next 10 to
20 years. However, some reports are emerging
from countries such as Sweden, Switzerland,
France and Australia which indicate that
overweight and obesity prevalence in some
12 Swinburn, B. A. et al. (2011), ‘The Global Obesity
Pandemic: Shaped by Global Drivers and Local
Environments’Global Strategic Trends

childhood age-groups may be flattening oreven decreasing, although overall occurrenceis still high. Very few countries have adequate
monitoring systems in place to track different
populations.

Ageing
In 1950, there were 200 million people aged
over 60 across the world – by 2050, thenumber is likely to be around two billion,13
nearly a quarter of the global population.
Over the past century, advances in medicine
have contributed to people living longer
and healthier lives. However, as we live
longer, different types of diseases, suchas dementia, are likely to become moreprevalent. Current estimates indicate 35.6
million people worldwide are living withdementia. This is likely to double by 2030
and more than triple by 2050 if no treatment
is found. Dementia is a costly condition:
13 Aging Societies Working Group 2012 (2012), ‘Creating
Sustainable Health and Care Systems in Aging
Societies’, available at http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/
images/uploads/publication-pdfs/GHPS_Ageing_
Societies_Report.pdf

43Part 1

Healthsocially, economically, and on the quality oflife of those afflicted by it. Nearly 60% of theburden of dementia is concentrated in lowand middle-income countries and this is likely
to increase in coming years. More modern
medical advances have also turned many lifethreatening conditions such as some cancers
and heart disease into long-term conditions, as
more people survive acute episodes of illness
and live for many years with their conditions.
This helps to explain why the extra years oflife that people have gained are not always
healthy or disability free.

“

Mental healthconditions are theleading cause ofhealthy life years
lost worldwide.

”

Mental health
The global cost of mental health conditionsin 2010 was estimated at US$ 2.5 trillion. Thisis likely to more than double to US$ 6.0 trillion
by 2030.14 Of these costs, 65% are incurred bydeveloped countries and this is not expected
to change over the next 20 years. By disease,mental illness accounted for the largest shareof the global economic burden in 2010 andis likely to in 2030, just slightly more thancardiovascular diseases (followed by cancer,
chronic respiratory disease and diabetes).
Mental health conditions are the leading
cause of healthy life years lost worldwide andaccount for 37% of the healthy life years lostfrom non-communicable diseases.15
Prevention, monitoring and diagnosis
Improved computing power, data collection
and processing are likely to make medical
diagnosis quicker, cheaper and more accurate.
Through implementing global standards,
medical information such as patient records
could be shared by clinicians in different
countries. With a globalised medical
information network interlinked with millionsof sensors, advanced analytical systems
could identify, track and predict the spreadof disease, providing information so thatpreventative measures can be quickly put
in place. Similarly, portable medical devices
that can be linked to medical networks may
14 World Economic Forum (2011), ‘The Global Burdenof NCDs’, available at http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/WEF_Harvard_HE_GlobalEconomicBurden
NonCommunicableDiseases_2011.pdf
15 Ibid.

44

Alternative outcome:Drop in noncommunicable diseases
Current trends suggest that there is
likely to be a rise in deaths from noncommunicable diseases out to 2045.
However, this could be reduced orreversed if: large-scale lifestyle andbehavioural changes are made; accessto primary healthcare is improved; andresearch into preventative medicine orcures proves fruitful.
mean that remotely operated (or automated)
medical systems will allow larger numbers ofpatients to be treated and cared for in theirown homes.

Drug and treatment delivery
In 2001, the first camera pill was approvedby the US Federal Drug Administration for
diagnostic applications. Seven years later, a pillcapable of being electronically programmed
to control medicine delivery according to a
pre-defined drug release profile was readyfor serial manufacturing, and being used asa research and development tool.16 Current
advances have produced a pill which canmonitor the patient, communicate withexternal diagnostic systems and respondto instruction for the targeted delivery ofdrugs within the digestive tract. The next
evolution will probably see further integrationof monitoring and drug delivery, with
automated diagnostic and response systems.
As technology advances, the size of devices islikely to be reduced while retaining the same
capability. It seems probable, therefore, that
there will be future medical devices smallenough to travel in the bloodstream.
Personalised medicine
The field of pharmaco-genomics (the studyof how an individual’s genetic inheritanceaffects the body’s response to medicines)
16 Phys.org (2008), ‘Philips’ Intelligent Pill Targets
Drug Development and Treatment for Digestive
Tract Diseases’, available at http://phys.org/
news145640874.html

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Healthis in its infancy, but holds the promise that
medicines might be tailor-made to a person’s
genetic makeup – making medicines more
effective and safe.17 New approaches arebeing developed, which should make precise
medicine formulations, treatment duration anddosing for individuals possible.18 The ability
to determine the genetic basis for certain
toxic side effects would allow medicines to beprescribed to those who are not geneticallyat risk of such side effects, thereby paving
the way for potentially lifesaving medicinesthat may otherwise be taken off the market.19
Whole genome sequencing is also likely toincrease the diagnosis rate for rare diseases
and stimulate new treatment development.

Regenerative medicine
Active bio-materials have the potential
to provide an alternative to surgery andtransplants by allowing in-situ repair andregeneration of damaged tissue.20 Thesematerials could deliver drugs to particularsites or activate specific genes that stimulate
live tissue to regenerate.21 Using stem cells(either separately or combined with active
biomaterials or DNA engineering to correct
genetic defects)22 may lead to a new kind ofcell-based medicine that could be applied
to every system in the human body, offering
an alternative approach to treatment by
medicines. Possibilities include: growing entire
organs to replace damaged ones; providing
17 National Institute of General Medical Sciences(2014), ‘Frequently Asked Questions about
Pharmacogenomics’, available at http://www.nigms.
nih.gov/Research/SpecificAreas/PGRN/Background/
Pages/pgrn_faq.aspx
18 Government Office for Science (2011), ‘Customisationof Drugs through Biotechnology’, available at http://
www.sigmascan.org/Live/Issue/ViewIssue/474/5/
customisation-of-drugs-through-biotechnology/
19 National Institute of General Medical Sciences, op.
cit.
20 Government Office for Science (2012), ‘Active
Biomaterials for Regenerative Medicine’,available at http://www.sigmascan.org/Live/
Issue/ViewIssue/478/5/active-biomaterials-forregenerative-medicine

an endless supply of red blood cells fortransfusion; and treating severe burns with
bio-materials.23 Neural stem cells may also be
used to treat spinal cord injury and replacedamaged neurons in the brain.24 Novel
medical and surgical interventions such asthese will almost certainly improve casualties’survival and recovery rates.

Prosthetics
Artificial limbs that connect to the wearer’s
nervous system are already being developed.
Neural receptors that are able to control
mechanical limbs are in use today, significantly
improving the quality of life of those who
possess them.25 Developments in this area arelikely to see refinement of control to provide
Shock:

Rapid medical
advancements
A game-changing medical
breakthrough, similar in impact tothe discovery and mass-productionof antibiotics, could significantly
extend the human lifespan anddramatically reduce the incidence of
non-communicable diseases such as
cancers. Initially, this breakthroughwould probably only be available
to the very rich, exacerbating social
tensions. As the treatment became
accessible to everyone, there would be asignificant impact on populations, as life
span dramatically increased. Without
mitigating action, there could be asubsequent unsustainable increase indemand for food, water and housing.

23 Government Office for Science (2009), ‘Stem Cell
Research and Hope for Cell-based Medicine’,available at http://www.sigmascan.org/Test/Issue/
ViewIssue/473/4/stem-cell-research-and-hopes-forcell-based-medicine/

21 Ibid.

24 Panchision, D. (2012), ‘Repairing the Nervous Systemwith Stem Cells’, available at http://stemcells.nih.gov/
info/Regenerative_Medicine/pages/2006chapter3.
aspx

22 Young, S. (2014), ‘Genome Surgery’ in MIT Technology
Review, available at http://www.technologyreview.
com/review/524451/genome-surgery/

25 See, for example, the artificial hand developedby Touch Bionics http://www.touchbionics.com/
products/active-prostheses/i-limb-ultra/

Global Strategic Trends

45Part 1

HealthSome may elect to use genetic modification as a route to securing advantage

unconscious response, greater dexterity andsensory feedback, as well as providing new
ways to connect the able-bodied to machinesand computers.26 By 2045, there is a realprospect that artificial devices will provide
a superior level of performance than can beachieved naturally – for example, hearing-aids
that can detect sounds beyond the range ofthe human ear.

Fertility and reproduction
The recent development of a device in which
a mouse embryo was successfully implanted
and able to grow for a short period of timein an artificially created environment, opens
the possibility of allowing a human embryo
to develop outside the body.27 Advances in
26 Singh, A.K. (2012), ‘Robotics as a Future andEmerging Technology’
27 University of Nottingham (2012), ‘Artificial ‘Womb’
Unlocks Secrets of Early Embryo Development’,available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/news/
pressreleases/2012/march/artificial-womb-unlockssecrets-of-early-embryo-development.aspx

46

similar technology could provide a meansfor childless couples to have children andgive greater flexibility when choosing whento have children. The ability to transfer adeveloping foetus to an artificial environment
could enable surgical procedures to be
performed that would otherwise have tofollow childbirth.
The extent to which human attributes could(or should) be selected through manipulating
their embryonic genetic make-up is a highly
controversial area. The first child to be bornafter his parents had the entire genomes ofa batch of their IVF embryos screened forabnormalities was reported in July 2013 in
the UK.28 This was done with the intentionof selecting the healthiest for implantation
but there is evidence that pre-implantation
gender selection is already widespread in
28 Geddes, L. (2013), ‘First Baby Born After Full Genetic
Screening of Embryos’, available at http://www.
newscientist.com/article/dn23827-first-baby-bornafter-full-genetic-screening-of-embryos.html

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Healthsome societies. 42% of US clinics which
offered pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
were found in 2008 to allow gender selection
for non-medical reasons.29 There is clearly
also scope for selecting, or engineering, othergenetically-determined characteristics. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and screeningor genetic modification is regulated in the
UK but is currently commercially available in
the US for around 100 medical conditions
including some cancers. Some countries(and individuals) are likely to want to use
techniques like genetic modification to
gain a competitive advantage, while others
will probably constrain their development
for ethical reasons. The extent to which it
will be possible to select, or influence thedevelopment of complex characteristics,
such as athletic ability or intelligence, isunclear. However, it seems probable that, in
time, technology will be available that will
make it possible for parents to select a rangeof attributes for their child – though notnecessarily by 2045.

generalists.30 The slow growth or reducing
number of generalists raises concerns about
future access to primary care. There are also
concerns in many countries about shortagesof nurses. The demand for nurses continues toincrease, with the ageing of the ‘baby-boom’
generation leading to greater numbers of
retired people requiring nursing. There arealso growing concerns about a severe global
shortage in the supply of homeworkers.
Trends indicate that, without successful plansfor expanding this workforce, the crisis could
increase in the future. Immigrants are seen
as a plausible answer to this problem, at leastfor developed countries. There are significant
flows of care workers from low- and middleincome countries to high-income countries
within Europe.

Health workers
Since 2000, the number of doctors hasgrown in most OECD countries, both inabsolute number and on a per capita basis,
with only a few exceptions (Estonia, France
and Israel). However, in most countries
there are twice as many specialist doctors as
29 Baruch, S. et al. (2012), ‘Genetic Testing of Embryos:
Practices and Perspectives of US In Vitro Fertilization
Clinics’, available at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/17628552“

The extent towhich it will bepossible to select,
or influence thedevelopmentof complex
characteristics
such as athletic
ability or
intelligence isunclear.
30 OECD (2013), ‘Health at a Glance 2013: OECD
Indicators’, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
health_glance-2013-en”

Defence and security implications■■ Antimicrobial-resistant infection could significantly increase medical risk on military
operations.
■■ Novel medical and surgical interventions will almost certainly improve casualties’survival, and recovery rates.
■■ Advances that allow patients to interact with their prosthetics and other aids arelikely to lead to new ways to connect the able-bodied to machines and computers.
■■ Some countries (and individuals) are likely to use advanced medical techniques,
such as genetic modification, to gain a competitive advantage. Others will probably
constrain their development for ethical reasons.

Global Strategic Trends

47Part 1

Transport

New materials, manufacturing techniques and power systems, as well as advances
in information technology, are likely to open up new opportunities for automatedtransport and generate step-changes in speed and efficiency. Driverless transport is
likely to be widespread by 2045, providing greater independence for the elderly andimpaired. Unmanned systems could play a key role in the mass delivery of goods. New
developments in super-sonic flight could make sub-orbital space transport a commercial
reality in the next 30 years.

Drivers for change
Transport has not changed fundamentally
since high-speed rail travel, jet-powered flightand oceangoing container transporters wereintroduced half a century ago. The dominanceof oil as a source of energy is argued by someto have been the primary constraining factor
limiting developing alternative modes oftransportation.1 However, new materials,
manufacturing techniques and power systems
may provide the catalyst for more significant
change.
Personal transport
More efficient engines and the possible
adoption of fuel cells could make transportsystems more efficient and probably cheaper.2
Increasing automation could enable a far
greater density of traffic to move at higher
speeds and provide automatic routing to
avoid congestion and hazards. Driverlesstransport is likely to be prevalent by 2045,
providing bespoke transport solutions formany who currently find it difficult to access acar, such as the elderly, children, and the visually,
1 Rodrigue, Jean-Paul (2013), ‘The Geography ofTransport Systems’
2 Scott, C. (2014), ‘Hydrogen Vehicles, Long
Promised, Finally Hit the Road’, available at http://
singularityhub.com/2014/01/08/hydrogen-vehicleslong-promised-finally-hit-the-road/

Global Strategic Trends

physically, and mentally impaired. Driverlesstransport is likely to be safer and more reliable– driverless vehicles would not be affected byhuman failings such as road rage, drink-driving
or falling asleep at the wheel.

Mass transport
Future mass transport solutions are likely toprovide faster and more closely-integrated
transport using a variety of road, rail, sea andair systems. Future improvements are framedaround the concept of ‘seamless transport’,
the idea that journeys could be taken without
interruption. This would reduce waiting or
travel time and there could be an ability to
do other tasks while travelling.3 To achievethis, there is likely to be closer integrationand coordination across infrastructure andtransport providers, as well as adopting
automated systems. Unmanned systems
could play a much greater role in the massdelivery of goods. For example, an urgent,high-value product (such as blood of a raretype), could be quickly delivered. While
Amazon’s recently proposed remotely
piloted aerial delivery system may seem like“

Driverlesstransport is likely
to be prevalent by
2045, providing
bespoke transport
solutions for many.

”

3 OECD (2012), ‘International Transport Forum:
Summary of Findings – Consultation with
International Organisations On Seamless
Transport’, available at http://www.
internationaltransportforum.org/2013/pdf/
Findings_Consultation2012.pdf

49

Part 1

Transport

Aircraft will be able to travel at many times the speed of soundscience-fiction, the European Commission
and US Federal Aviation Authority haveboth published remotely piloted air systems
airspace integration roadmaps. We may see
many more such aircraft, both large and small,in future skies, meaning that aircraft providing
passenger travel may have to compete forspace, particularly over urban areas. However,greater reliance on automated technologies
could provide scope for terrorists and criminals
to disrupt the transport system through cyberattacks.

Super-sonic flightWith the final flight of the Concorde in 2003,
an era of super-sonic passenger flight ended,
but developments in design and engine
technology have continued. New concepts
such as variable-cycle engines (an engine thatis designed to operate efficiently under mixed
flight conditions, such as subsonic, transonicand supersonic) and recent successes withother reaction engines, offer the potential
for very high speed travel at many times
the speed of sound. Striving for increased
range and fuel efficiency, combination
power sources are likely to see a blend of
conventional hydrocarbon-fuelled andelectrically-powered flight – advances which
are also likely to improve stealth capabilities
suited to military applications. The major
global manufacturers have announced their50

intent to develop aircraft which deliver theseobjectives by around 2030. In the 15 years
following, developments to further improve
efficiency, capacity and speed are near certain
to continue, with commercial sub-orbital flightbetween two destinations likely by 2045 orsooner.

Transportation of material
On current trends, by 2045 the tonnage ofmaterial moved by sea is likely to have doubled,
as are the number of international flights.
This could lead to increasingly congested
shipping lanes and air corridors, although
greater connectivity and computing-power
may enable more efficient traffic management.
However, international governance will almost
certainly be required if this is to happen
successfully. Increased computing power andconnectivity could also increase efficiency –for example, routes could be automatically
optimised to take into account traffic andweather forecasts. This could reduce therisk of loss and damage when transporting
commodities such as perishable foods.
Technology is also likely to improve inventory
management, by automatically monitoring
consumption levels. This could allow spares tobe safely dispatched in sufficient time – large
amounts of expensive stock would no longer
have to be held in readiness for prolonged
periods.

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Transport

If fewer inventory items were being routinely
transported, the resources needed fortransportation could also decrease.
Technologies such as additive manufacturing(‘3-D printing’) could allow spares and otheritems to be manufactured where needed,further reducing the need for stock holdings.
Additive manufacturing could reduce theamount of certain manufactured goods thatare transported globally. However, the overall
volume of material moved internationallyis likely to increase due to the growing
consumer class. New materials are also likely
to increase the performance of vehicles,

reducing the energy required for a given
journey. Lighter-than-air-vehicles, for example,
could significantly reduce the cost and timeof transporting material over difficult terrain,such as regions with a limited road network.
However, the effects of climate change arelikely to have an adverse affect on most formsof transport. Warming in the Arctic is likely tolead to the melting of permafrost. In turn, thiswill probably adversely affect land transport,
as ice roads turn to marsh. However, newArctic shipping routes are likely to open up
during the summer months.

Global passenger and freight travel growth2010

55 trillion passenger and tonnes per km

2045

106 trillion passenger and tonnes per km

8.1
7.7
19.3

39.8
21.0

13.3

32.8

Globaltravel growth
Vehicle type
%

15.5

5.4

2010
2045

19.8
4.4
12.9

Source: Dulac, J. (2013), ‘Global Land Transport Infrastructure Requirements’Global Strategic Trends

51

Part 1

Transport

The tonnage of material moved by sea is likely to double by 2045 

Shanghai container terminal

Scenario:

Maritime choke point
By 2045, sea lanes are likely to continue toplay a major role in the global economy,
despite probable advances in additive
manufacturing and improvements
to air and land based transport. On
current forecasts, the tonnage of goods
transported by sea is likely to double
within the next 30 years. Anticipatedgrowth in computing power, situationalawareness and automation could meanthat the shipping of goods will be quicker,
cheaper and more reliable. Shipping is
also likely to be safer than ever before,
driven by more accurate long-range
weather forecasts and improved ship
construction and operating procedures.
As such, a significant amount of theworld’s economy would depend uponmaritime trade - some countries could
face major financial crises if sea transport52

became significantly disrupted.
If tensions rose between countries near toa vital maritime choke point, particularly
if threats to block the sea lane were made,the international community would
almost certainly act. Countries that arelikely to be highly internationally active
by 2045 (such as Brazil, China and the US)
could be expected to work together to try
and find a resolution. Should diplomaticefforts fail to reduce tensions, theinternational community could approvethe deployment of an international naval
task force to ensure that key sea lanes
were kept open. Land-based international
observers could be deployed to thosecountries bordering the choke point andair, cyber and space surveillance of theregion is likely to be intensified.

Global Strategic Trends

Transport

Part 1

Defence and security implications■■ The development of driverless vehicles could provide benefits such as safer andmore reliable transport, reducing the need to put drivers and pilots, particularly oftransport vehicles, into harm’s way.
■■ Greater reliance on automated technologies could provide scope for terrorists andcriminals to disrupt the transport system through cyber attacks.
■■ Advances in propulsion and design are likely to provide faster and more efficienttransport.
■■ Developments such as additive manufacturing, automated inventory management
and remotely piloted and unmanned transport systems are likely to bring significant
efficiencies to logistics but also increase its technical complexity.

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53Part 1

Information

Revolutionary advances in how we acquire, store and analyse information, together
with dramatic increases in computer processing power, are likely to give us the ability
to predict accurately a wide range of phenomena, from crime hot-spots to the effects
of climate change. As everyday objects are increasingly connected to the Internet, thisvast network of sensors is likely to gather data on more aspects of our lives and theenvironment, making it hard for anyone to go ‘off the grid’.

Computational power
In 2000, the highest performing processors
achieved levels of computation equivalent tothat of a spider – today they are close to being as
powerful as the brain of a mouse. If processing
power continues to grow at its current rate
(doubling every three years), by 2023 somecomputers could have the processing powerof the human brain and by 2045 they could
be 100,000 times more powerful.1 If quantum
computing becomes a reality, even these
extraordinary figures could be exceeded.
The idea of quantum computing starts fromthe premise that quantum physics generates
fundamentally novel ways of processing
information, although due to the extraordinarily
complex nature of this immature technology,
there is little consensus on what actuallyconstitutes a quantum computer. Initial
versions of such machines are limited toperforming highly specialised processes andlack the utility and flexibility of conventional
computers. It is unclear when quantum
machines with the usefulness of existing
computers will be produced, although it is likelythat this will be achieved close to or by 2045.2

1 Time Magazine (2011), ‘The Year Man Becomes
Immortal’, available at http://content.time.com/time/interactive/0,31813,2048601,00.html
2 DCDC research interview with Dr Simon Benjamin,
Oxford University, 14 October 2013.

Global Strategic Trends

If quantum computing becomes a reality, a
key benefit could be a revolution in cybersecurity through harnessing quantum
cryptography, to guarantee the security ofa message while detecting eavesdropping.
Traditional methods of securing data rely on
encryption and decryption keys. Once a key
is compromised, the encrypted informationis accessible to all who have the key.
Drawing on the fundamental properties ofquantum mechanics, the secure distributionof encryption keys can be assured, as can
the ability to safeguard the contents ofencrypted messages. In both cases, theact of illicit ‘listening-in’ to the transmission
changes its quantum properties rendering it
unreadable. The message is protected while
its interception is flagged. However, because
it is in such an early stage of development, it
is difficult to make any firm predictions about
when the advantages of quantum computing
are likely to be realised. Indeed, someexperts believe that quantum computing
may make all codes ‘crackable’ and genuine
encryption impossible, as theoretically aquantum computer could try every possiblecombination of codes simultaneously tounlock a system. If this is the case, armed andsecurity forces may have to physically separate
their computer systems from the Internet,
posing huge problems for networking andefficiency. In turn, this may result in a greaternumber of self-contained networks, making a“

Some experts
believe thatquantum
computingmay make allcodes ‘crackable’and genuine
encryption
impossible.

”

55

Part 1

Information

Growth in volume of digitally stored information

6,172,127

213,381

8,251

132
2005

2015

178,531,657

Exabytes of data (Exabyte is a billion gigabytes)

2025

2035

2045

Source: Analysis by DCDC based on work by Gantz, J. and Reinsel, D. (2011) ‘Extracting Value from Chaos’ and EMC (2014) ‘The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and theIncreasing Value of the Internet of Things’
2

small contribution to slowing the current trendof greater Internet use.
Instantaneous communication opens thepossibility of creating a network of quantum
computers, which – regardless of their location– would be able to operate as a single system.
This could generate significant advances inforecasting and modelling ability, enablingnear real-time representation of complex
systems, such as population dynamics,
economic models and weather patterns.

‘Big Data’
In 2000, 25% of the world’s information wasstored digitally: today it is more than 98%. On
this trajectory, by 2045 there will be 20,000
times more digital information than there istoday. The ability to collect and analyse thisgrowing volume of information has beentermed ‘Big Data’. Such a large amount ofdata generates yet more information whenappropriately analysed, allowing us to identify
patterns which may help to counter the
spread of disease, combat crime and evenpredict social and behavioural patterns.
Access to information has until now only let
us understand the past, leaving it to people

56

to extrapolate and imagine what this may
mean for the future. Big Data is increasingly
allowing us to predict future behaviours
accurately. Complex data sets which containcrime records, meteorological data, andbehavioural heuristics are starting to be used
to map probable crime locations3 – and in
the future they are likely to deliver far moresophisticated forecasting tools. The advancesin computation power mentioned previously
are likely to enable further analytical processes
development. This could provide the ability tomodel very large and complex systems moreaccurately to make predictions in areas such as
climate change and population movements.
While Big Data could become important in
helping solve some complex global issues,
businesses may also become increasingly
dependent on it – we are already seeing
Big Data being used to predict consumer
behaviours. Accountability and situationalawareness are likely to increase too, as more
aspects of life are quantified and analysed.
3 Friend, Z. (2013), ‘Predictive Policing: Using
Technology to Reduce Crime’, available at http://
www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/lawenforcement-bulletin/2013/April/predictivepolicing-using-technology-to-reduce-crime

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Part 1

Information

Alongside privacy issues, it is also likely to
become harder to go ‘off-line’. Those who do
may even find that they have made themselvesmore conspicuous by their absence.

The number of connected devices has increased by 4,000%
between 2003 and today. The new IPv6 internet protocol allows for
340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 connections
which is believed to be sufficient for the foreseeable future.

Connected
devicesPer
person

0.5

0.08

12.5

1.81

20

2.79

25

3.41

40

5.18

95+

10.22

(Billions)

20
03

201

0

201

3

201

5

The ‘Internet of Things’
The number of devices linked to the Internet
is increasing rapidly, with everything frommobile phones to cars and even fridges
having an Internet connection. This ‘Internetof Things’ is already a reality, with around 20
billion devices already connected,4 rising to an
estimated 40 billion by 2020. If that trajectorywere to continue, there would be around 100
billion devices connected to the internet by2045. However, increasing availability (notleast because they are becoming cheaperand smaller) is likely to lead to a sharp increasein the number of connected devices, so thatby 2045 there could be around 50 trillion
devices connected to the internet.5 These
devices are likely to be producing and sharing
vast amounts of data and information whileconnected to each other and to additional
systems. Such a large number of devices
connected across the world will almost
certainly require a significant increase incommunications infrastructure. The costs andtechnical challenges involved are likely to meanthat there are some global disparities in access,at least in the short to medium term.

Number of connected devices

202
0

The number of Internet users is almost
certain to rise, with Internet penetration and
4 EMC2 (2014), ‘The Digital Universe of Opportunities:
Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the Internetof Things’, available at http://www.emc.com/
leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/internet-ofthings.htm
5 Based on exponential growth forecast.

204
0

Source: Analysis by DCDC based on
work by Evans, D. (2011) ‘The Internetof Things’, EMC2 Digital Universe with
Research & Analysis by IDC and ABI
Research (2013) ‘More Than 30 Billion
Devices’.

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57Part 1

Information

voice. This could further the rights of underrepresented minorities but may also lead topolarization as extreme views are exchanged
and reinforced in forums where dissenting
voices are absent.

More sensors will intensify levels of surveillance“

The information
advantagecurrently enjoyedby countries’
defence andsecurity forces
could be eroded
or even reversed.

”

58

connection speeds continuing to improvein developed economies, facilitating remote
working and further entrenching globalisation.
Internet access in the Middle East and North
Africa region grew by more than 2,500%
between 2000 and 2012, with 40% of theworld's population now online. As mobile
technologies become cheaper, it is likely that
sub-Saharan Africa and developing parts of Asia
will see similar adoption rates. A vast increase inInternet access in the developing world could
provide significant competitive advantages,
as access to markets is improved and theinformation advantage of the developed
world is equalised or even exceeded.
As more of our work and social activities
depend on a richly interconnected
information and communications network(which may, in places, be extremely vulnerable
to attack) there could be more opportunities
for criminals and terrorists to have a greater
impact on our day-to-day lives. Cyber bullying
could also have a greater impact on ourlives, as the online environment becomesincreasingly socially important. Electronic
communications can facilitate harassment,with online users writing comments that theywould be unlikely to say in person. Anonymity
could also lead to a greater propensity formalicious gossip, witch-hunts and hatecampaigns, potentially leading to rapid
escalation of issues. Similarly, electronic media
allows small, technologically-savvy interest
groups to have a disproportionately loudPeople in many parts of the world are used tohaving mobile phones and computers with
Internet connections, but by 2045, it is likelythat numerous objects will contain some kindof sensor. There will probably be ubiquitous,
tiny and cheap monitors reporting on thequality of drinking water, detecting structural
damage in buildings and vehicles, and sensing
and measuring pollution in the environment.
Machinery and consumer products arelikely to be monitored for the state of theircomponents and materials, enabling themto report when repair or replacement isnecessary. With progress in nanotechnology,
vast networks of security sensors could
provide continuous monitoring of criticalinfrastructure (such as buildings, bridges andpipelines),6 detecting chemical and biologicalattacks.7 The fusion of data from a range ofsensors, combined with inputs from public
sources such as social networking sites, willprobably improve profiling and tracking
capabilities. Stealth vehicles are likely to find it
more difficult to remain hidden and the ability
to prosecute covert operations, particularly
in urban environments, is likely to become
more technically challenging. As the numberof connected public sensors increases, theinformation advantage currently enjoyed bycountries’ defence and security forces could
be eroded or even reversed as adversaries,
including non-state actors, attain similar levelsof situational awareness.
The uptake of social networking sites andeven the use of supermarket loyalty cards
shows that – for comparatively small rewards– people are readily persuaded to record
their movements, financial transactions andbuying habits. This behaviour is highly likely
to continue out to 2045. National authorities
6 Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre Sigma Scan
2.0 (2009), ‘Nanosensors for Innovative Sensing
Applications’, available at http://www.sigmascan.
org/Live/Issue/ViewIssue/527/5/nanosensors-forinnovative-sensing-applications/
7 Ibid.

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Information

are almost certain to seek to use this potential
mine of information – a development thatis likely to raise major privacy concerns.8
Marketing campaigns are likely to portray thebenefits of smart technology and machineto-machine interaction, but the increased
surveillance capability may make others fear
an increase of state control. In turn, this is
likely to drive the growth of the ‘hactivist’community characterised by groups suchas Anonymous.9 However, it is likely to be
increasingly difficult to avoid the sensor
8 Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (2012),‘Mass Surveillance’
9 Kelly, B. (2012), ‘Investing in a Centralized
Cybersecurity Infrastructure’

network of a future ‘Internet of Things’, sinceeven remote environments are likely to containsome connected devices. A desire not tobe part of the ‘Internet of Things’ may create
new markets, for example a holiday resort
advertising its facilities as literally ‘getting awayfrom it all’ with a promise that you will becompletely ‘off-grid’. This could also lead to adrive to try to create spaces, both physical andvirtual, which are unseen or ungoverned bystate authorities around the world.10

10 As predicted by Social Identity Theory. See Tajfel, H.
and Turner, J. C. (1986), ‘The Social Identity Theory ofIntergroup Behaviour’

Defence and security implications■■ Quantum computing could make all codes ‘crackable’ and genuine encryption
impossible, as a quantum computer could theoretically try every possiblecombination of codes simultaneously to unlock a system. If this is the case, armed
and security forces may have to physically separate their computer systems fromthe Internet, posing huge problems for networking and efficiency. Alternatively
quantum cryptography could guarantee security of a message.
■■ Better gathering and analysis of data could vastly improve our understanding ofphysical and virtual environments. Predicting crime hotspots could enable moretargeted deployment of police officers. Greater awareness of deficits and surpluses
may make logistics more efficient. Similarly, detailed and rapid analysis of social
networks could provide a deeper understanding of the local population, its culture
and the environment.
■■ As more of our work and social activities depend on interconnected informationand communications networks – which may, in places, be extremely vulnerable toattack – there could be more opportunities for criminals and terrorists to have agreater impact on our day-to-day lives. Similarly the ability to keep secrets is likely
to become increasingly difficult.
■■ Connectivity of assets with strategic importance (such as those relating to national
infrastructure) is likely to increase. Although this is likely to lead to gains inefficiency, it may also make such assets more vulnerable.
■■ An increasing number of devices capable of collecting sensor data could intensify
levels of surveillance. Stealth vehicles may find it more difficult to remain hidden
and the ability to prosecute covert operations, especially in urban environments, islikely to become more technically challenging. This is particularly significant given
the probable increase in the size of urban areas, along with the growing use of
surveillance to prevent crime.
■■ As the number of connected ‘public’ sensors increases, the information advantage
currently enjoyed by countries’ defence and security forces could be eroded or evenreversed as adversaries, including non-state actors, attain similar levels of situationalawareness.

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59Part 1

Education

Increasing computing power, growing access to the Internet and ‘Big Data’ are likely tohave a transformative effect on education, with an increasing blurring between online
and offline learning. Education levels will almost certainly continue to rise across theglobe and for both sexes. At the same time, educational institutions could face a seriesof major challenges, including facilitating smoother transitions from education to workand encouraging lifelong learning to ensure the workforce can adapt to a changing job
market. These pressures may force educational institutions to provide more informal,
distance and personalised learning. There is likely to be a growing emphasis on thetransferability and constant upgrading of qualifications, as well as a shift towards more
personalised forms of assessment that use a range of technologies to trace the paths ofindividual learners.

Technology’s impact on educationand skills
Significantly increased computing power
seems likely to be available on demand at
greatly reduced cost over the next three
decades. Teachers are likely to have accessto vast quantities of data, and could have thefacility to command the flow of informationand learning in their classrooms by controllingthe exercises, simulations and games, inwhich their students participate, at the touchof a button. Books will almost certainly bemore widely available online – as e-booktechnologies evolve, they seem likely to offer
new ways of interacting with shared, adaptive,
dynamic and multimedia publications. As ‘Big
Data’ changes our understanding of the world,developing data analysis and computing skills
are likely to become increasingly central. For
example, social science students are likely toincreasingly examine social phenomena using
computer models and data rather than justfieldwork. As school teaching becomes more
online and software-based in nature, existingeducational inequalities could be exacerbated,
as not everyone is likely to have the same

Global Strategic Trends

level of digital access.1 However, it is likelythat online learning will continue to makeeducation more accessible, particularly forpeople who are geographically isolated.
Education courses, particularly at university
level, are likely to depend increasingly on theInternet, with some delivered exclusively, or
almost exclusively, online. Digitally-delivered
education could also provide increasing
personalisation, with students able tocustomise when, where and how they learn.
While face-to-face teaching in the classroom
is unlikely to disappear, it is likely to become
increasingly focussed on simulation, interactive
games and debate rather than traditionalclassroom-based learning. Teachers’ primaryroles are likely to become that of learning
adviser, helping students navigate theirown education rather than providing it allthemselves.

1 Facer, K. (2011), ‘Learning Futures: Education,
Technology and Social Change’; Sharples, M. et al.
(2012), ‘Innovating Pedagogy 2012’; Stoyanov, S. etal. (2010), ‘Mapping Major Changes to Education andTraining in 2025’

61

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Education

skills.2 Already sites like ‘RateMyTeachers’
are beginning to challenge old power
relationships and underpin new ones, andthey are likely to become even more widelyused in new and sophisticated ways.3

Restructuring traditional education
systems
As research reveals more about thepsychology of education, so learning is likely
to increasingly be packaged in a way thatblends the formal with the informal. Linemanagers in the workplace may take on
increasing responsibilities as ‘learning advisers’
for their staff and, as workplace learningand development becomes more ongoing,social and informal, organisations are likely to
run extensive programmes of coaching andmentoring as a core element of their learningand development programme. As informal
and social learning grow in importance,
individuals may increasingly look for ways forthis learning to be recognised or accredited todemonstrate their value in the marketplace.4
Blending formal with informal teaching

The capacity to manage and mobilise
social networks will almost certainly be anincreasingly important skill-set to possess,with growing demands on educators andemployers to build this capacity. Researchshows that people learn best with, andfrom, others. Therefore, as social networking
evolves, there may be more collaborative
learning, with online networks offering realtime discussion and virtual classrooms.
The ‘Internet of Things’ is likely to allow datafrom the classroom to be used for continuous
performance management. Networked
devices are likely to combine with cheap
data storage to open up new accountability,
scrutiny and reporting practices. New tools
could permit students to share comments
about their education in public forums,
opening up new ways of holding teachers
to account. Students and teachers may feelincreasingly scrutinised, with some positive
benefits – such as detailed, sophisticated andreal-time feedback on performance – andmany negative, such as a decline in social

62

Educational institutions may be increasingly
organised (and classes brought together) on
the basis of common knowledge, skills andpreferred learning and teaching styles rather
than (just) age. Educational programmes
are also likely to include elements dedicatedto developing students’ skills in learning.
Research highlighting the importance of
creativity in underpinning academic andbusiness success may stimulate a new focus
on developing students’ creative skills at
school and university. Cognitive testing may
have developed to such an extent that its
results replace qualifications and experienceassessment as the major element in the
recruitment process. It is possible that, by
2045, hiring decisions will become (almost)entirely based on cognitive tests rather thanqualification levels. 5
2 Facer, op. cit.; Cliff, D. et al. (2008), ‘Future Issues in
Socio-Technical Change for UK Education’
3 Facer, op. cit; Castells, M. (2009), ‘Communication
Power’; Taylor, E. and Sheehan, T. (2010),‘Perspectives on the Future of Learning’
4 Ibid.
5 Facer, op. cit.; Fairhurst, P. (2010), ‘Learning andDevelopment: Perspectives on the Future’

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Education

As the future workforce, at least in developed
countries, is recruited increasingly from anolder population, so the need for an improved
lifelong training and education system could
increase. Educational providers may aim
short and online courses at lifelong learners,
and sabbaticals could become increasingly
popular as a means of refreshing one’s
learning in a fast-paced world. Educational
entrepreneurs are likely to recognise that
there is a huge market among middle-aged
people wanting to upgrade their knowledge
and older people wanting to pursue second
careers. Simultaneously, as the world’s
population ages, and as education becomes
more informal and less institutionally based,so the family home could become a morecritical educational space. As opportunities
for education increasingly occur at home,away from the classroom, so grandparents
and great-grandparents could be more crucial
to its delivery. As older people mix work andcare later in life, they may become partners
in learning alongside their own children
and grandchildren. It is already common
to find grandchildren acting as teachers for
grandparents to introduce them to digitaltechnology, and other precedents can befound in the roles played by younger children
in citizenship education and adjusting older
family members following migration. As
the twenty-first century nears its mid-point,
educational institutions may become crossgenerational hubs of learning, with older
family members actively involved in passing
on their learning to the younger generations
and, in turn, picking up new ideas and skills
from them.6

The global education marketplace
Institutions in Europe, Northern America andAustralia may increasingly run their highest
quality programmes from campuses indeveloping countries, as well as introducing
more distance-learning courses. As more
people learn outside their country of origin,and migrate to pursue careers, it is likelythat there will be a drive to standardise
qualifications at the global level. Even if acommon global curriculum is not universally
6 Facer, op. cit.; Fairhurst, op. cit.

Global Strategic Trends

pursued at secondary school level – as anextension and expansion of the International
Baccalaureate, for example – it is probablethat qualifications will be defined as partof a common global system.7 Across thedeveloped world, many schools are likely to
be increasingly run (or at least sponsored)by powerful corporate organisations or byparent groups. There may be much-reduced
government oversight and involvement.

Educational inequalities
Global gender gaps at the primary schoollevel are likely to have largely disappearedby 2045,8 although girls are likely to remain
under-educated in many of the world’s mostintractably poor countries. This trend is likely
to be strongly evident in those countries
where cultural and religious factors (suchas some interpretations of Islam) constrain
women from taking part in education andthe economy. Access to education could also
become more polarised, depending on wealthor ability to pay. Students may be separated
into vocational and academic streams froma young age. As corporate involvement ineducation grows it may encourage children’s
entry to one or other stream at even earlier
ages, as corporations and organisations(including the armed forces) seek to identify– and train accordingly – the strongest future
performers.9“

As education
becomes more
informal and lessinstitutionallybased, so thefamily home
could becomea more criticaleducational space.

”

The average level of educational attainment ishighly likely to rise, shrinking the gap between
developing and more developed countries.
Countries like Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and
Nigeria are projected to raise the average yearsof schooling of their workforce by about three
years over the next three decades. However,
the average number of years spent in full-timeeducation is likely to remain at current levels inwell-educated workforces. In more advanced
developing countries, women’s participation
in formal education is likely to increase
7 Stoyanov, S. et al. (2010), ‘Ten-Year Forecast’
8 Beck, B. (2012), ‘Women’s World’; Dickson, J. R. etal. (2010), ‘Patterns of Potential Human Progress’;
Dorling, D. (2013), ‘Population 10 Billion’
9 Facer op. cit.; Watson, R. (2010), ‘Future Files: a Brief
History of the Next 50 Years’; Benn, M. (2011), ‘School
Wars: the Battle for Britain’s Education’63Part 1

Education

considerably. By 2045, it is possible that amajority of the world’s children will have had auniversity or higher-level education.

Machines, jobs and education
Machines are likely to take over certain
jobs from people, with developments in
artificial intelligence ultimately meaning that
education could focus on those (few) areas ofhuman thought and activity that machines
are unable to deliver efficiently. This meansthat education may play an important role inenhancing people’s ability to develop new
ideas, to interact empathetically with otherpeople and to take responsibility – all things
that it is difficult to envisage machines doingby 2045.10

Gender gaps within schools are likely to have largely disappeared by 2045

10 Facer, op. cit.; Cliff et al., op. cit.; Watson, op. cit.

Defence and security implications■■ Global education levels are likely to increase, but educational inequalities willprobably persist, entrenching social discontentment and allowing youth disaffection
to continue.
■■ In the new education and training mix facilitated by employers, online and virtual
blended learning are likely to predominate, though formal face-to-face learning is
unlikely to die out completely.
■■ Some countries may begin to educate and train children assessed as having thepotential to succeed in specific careers (including in the armed forces) from a very
young age.

64

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65Part 1

Automation and work

Robots or ‘unmanned systems’ – machines capable of carrying out complex tasks
without directly involving a human operator – are likely to be as ubiquitous in 2045 ascomputers are today. Unmanned systems are increasingly likely to replace people in theworkplace, carrying out tasks with increased effectiveness and efficiency, while reducing
risk to humans. This could ultimately lead to mass unemployment and social unrest.
As robots become more lifelike, perhaps capable of appearing to express emotion,interactions with people are likely to become more sophisticated. The increased
capability of robots is likely to change the face of warfare, with the possibility thatsome countries may replace potentially large numbers of soldiers, sailors and airmen
with robots by 2045. However, military decision-making is likely to remain the remit ofhumans for ethical reasons, at least in western countries. Others may not be so willingto make the same trade-offs between speed and accountability.
The proportion of older workers in the global labour force is likely to increase out to2045, with a possible corresponding decrease in opportunities for younger people.
Flexible working practices are likely to become more widespread, with people employedon shorter-term contracts and a growth in working remotely. Workers will probably
have less predictable income and increasing economic insecurity. By 2045, there is likely
to be greater equality between men and women in the jobs market, particularly in thedeveloped countries. In part, this may be driven by a global shift away from manual
labour, towards a more knowledge-based economy.

Robots in the workplace
Robots are increasingly likely to replace
people at work, which could ultimately leadto social unrest. Robots are likely to continue
to carry out tasks deemed too dirty, dull or
dangerous for people, and will probably be
used more extensively in such roles, as well
as for more highly-skilled jobs. As robots
become increasingly sophisticated, they arelikely to perform tasks which would otherwise
put people at risk, such as minefield clearance.
By 2045, it is even possible that robots willtake on combat roles. Non-military jobs suchas fire-fighting or construction are also likely
to be carried out by machines in the future.
In the same way that the widespread use ofcomputers has made some professions (suchas typists) almost redundant, we can expect

Global Strategic Trends

robot development to remove a number oftypes of job that are common today.1 Whileadvancements in robotics may create newjobs that we have not yet envisaged (justas web designers were not imagined in the
1980s), adapting workers to a new set of roles
may take considerable time, causing problems
in the interim. While it is possible thatgovernments will legislate to try to preventthe employment of robots in some areas,
to safeguard human jobs, it is not clear how
effective this would be in the face of market
forces. It is also unclear whether new jobs willbe created at a rate sufficient to replace thosethat are lost. As some automated processes
become cheaper than even the lowest-paid“

By 2045, it is evenpossible thatrobots will take on
combat roles.

”

1 Lin, P., Abney, K. and Bekey, G. (2011), ‘Robot Ethics:
Mapping the Issues for a Mechanized World’67

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Automation and work

human workers, it is possible that there will
be a rebalancing of global manufacturing
economies.

“

Developments
in robotics
may meanthat robots arealmost physicallyindistinguishable
from humanbeings.

”Additive manufacturing
Global manufacturing is currently evolvingfrom a highly labour-intensive process
towards more information technologybased processes.2 This is, in places, drivinga trend towards manufacturing processes
relocating closer to their consumers, to avoid
long supply chains. This could affect thebalance of manufacturing in the developed
and developing world, with less need forconventional manufacturing jobs in many
regions.3 Automation already facilitates
this trend, and we expect to see additive
manufacturing (more commonly knownas ‘3-D printing’) also making a significant
contribution. Additive manufacturing has
the potential to transform the manufacturingindustry, with performance and costeffectiveness rapidly improving to the point
where large-scale adoption for manufacturers
is plausible well within the 2045 timeframe.
3-D printing enables on-demand production,
allowing items to be created quickly when anorder is placed, rather than large amounts ofcostly stock having to be held in readiness forprolonged periods. With more decentralised
production, products could be designed andprinted for local consumption, potentiallyreducing reliance on expensive imports
and requiring less industrial infrastructure
than conventional manufacturing. It is also
likely that personal use of 3-D printers will
increase rapidly, allowing for unprecedented
levels of mass customisation and eventhe ‘democratisation’ of manufacturing,as consumers and entrepreneurs begin toprint their own products.4 By 2045, additive
manufacturing systems could be a common
feature in the home and be capable ofproducing a wide range of outputs – food,clothing, and even complex devices withmechanical and electronic components.

2 RAHS Vanguard (2013), ‘Rising Robotics and the Third
Industrial Revolution’
3 National Intelligence Council (2012), ‘Global Trends
2030: Alternative Worlds’
4 Ibid.

68

Additive manufacturing is almost certain
to enable the production of a wide rangeof illicit objects, although it seems unlikely
that, by 2045, additive manufacturingsystems will be able to replicate complex
chemical components, such as propellants forammunition.

More life-like machines
A growing number of customer-service
roles are likely to become automated or
be performed by robots. Over the lastcentury, industrial processes have shown
how automation can dramatically increase
productivity, while lowering cost. This trend
will probably continue, with increasing
automation of service roles, such as telephoneor Internet-based customer support. By
2045, advances in artificial intelligence arelikely to mean that such services could beenhanced to the point that a virtual telephone
operator would be indistinguishable froma human one. There is also likely to be anincreasing shift towards mechanising caringroles, particularly in areas where there arefew human candidates. Japan is developing
pioneering robots that can provide carefor the elderly, driven partly by its ageing
population and shrinking workforce.5 Using
robots as companions is also likely to increasein the timeframe. For example, Japan isexperimenting with using robot companions
for its astronauts in space,6 and robotic petsand computer programmes with simulated
personalities are growing in popularity.
Eventually, developments in robotics may
mean that robots are almost physicallyindistinguishable from human beings, but it
is hard to believe that by 2045 they will haveachieved the degree of social acceptanceor skills necessary for them to operate in allroles. For example, jobs that require a humanface will probably remain a human preserve,
as will roles that require the display (or atleast appearance) of emotion. Althoughdemonstrating the appearance of realistic
5 Lin, et al., op cit.
6 Sky News (2013), ‘Robot Astronaut Kirobo Calls
Home From Space’, available at http://news.sky.com/
story/1137583/robot-astronaut-kirobo-calls-homefrom-space

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Part 1

Automation and workemotion is likely to endear robots more tohumans, this could create its own problems,with people potentially becoming emotionallyattached to machines. Such a phenomenon
has arguably already been experienced bya small sub-set of computer-users’ feelings
towards virtual characters,7 and may beparticularly problematic in the case of children
forming emotional attachments to robot
carers. The implications of human-machine
relations are not yet known, and even by 2045,
the long-term effects may not be clear.
Technological advancements are almost
certain to provide increasing levels of robotic
automation, improving efficiency, speedof response and ease of use. By 2045, it islikely that there will be many more robots
that are able to perceive their environments,
make limited decisions and take action forthemselves. The level of responsibility given
to such robots is likely to be determined by
the importance of the roles they are intended
to be used for and, more significantly, howwilling we are to trust them.8 This trust is likely
to largely depend on how well robots performthe tasks they are instructed to do, and how
well they are able to learn.

Research, regulation and healthResearch into, and development of, unmannedsystems will probably be increasingly
commercially led. How unmanned systems
develop is likely to depend, to a considerable
degree, on how they are funded. Building
large or highly complex robots – such as
those used for surgery – can be extremely
costly, while the decreasing cost of manytechnological components makes developing
smaller or simpler robots more affordable. This
may impact on which countries or companies
carry out cutting-edge research. The US
Government may lead on robotics for military
usage, while Japanese companies are currently
at the forefront of developing robots withcommercial applications.9
7 Rani, A. (2013), ‘The Japanese Men Who Prefer Virtual
Girlfriends to Sex’, available at http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/magazine-24614830
8 Singer, P. W. (2009), ‘Robots at War: The New
Battlefield’
9 Lin, et al., op. cit.

Global Strategic Trends

An increasing shift towards mechanising of caring roles

As robots become more sophisticated, taking
on a wider range of responsibilities, novel legal
questions will almost certainly emerge. For
example, when robots malfunction, is it theowner, manufacturer or programmer who
is responsible? Does a robot with biologicalcomponents have rights? Changes tolegislation will almost certainly be required,but past experience suggests it is highly likelythat legislation will fail to keep up with the
speed of technological developments.
Surgery and surgical implants of the future arelikely to be less invasive and more effective.
By 2045, robots will almost certainly be able
to respond to fast-moving or microscopic
environments far better than humans, due
to their faster information-processing times,10
enhanced precision and lack of susceptibility
10 Parasuraman, R. et al. (2007), ‘Adaptive Automationfor Human-Robot Teaming in Future Command andControl Systems’69Part 1“

Some experts
believe thatrobots will begin
to replace infantry
soldiers for somedeveloped-world
militaries within
the next ten years.

”

Automation and workto human weaknesses, such as fatigue or
hand-tremors. This is highly likely to leadto new possibilities for medicine, such as
eventually removing human surgeons fromoperating theatres, diagnoses performed byrobots travelling along the bloodstream andoperations performed at a cellular level. Someexperts suggest that robots will eventually
be small enough to fit inside a single living
cell, capable of repairing damaged DNA or
acting as antibodies against viruses/infections,although it is unclear whether or not suchtechnology will be available by 2045.

with much less human involvement, it
may become more publicly and politically
acceptable, and potentially more likely.

Automation and conflict
The increased capability of robots is likely tochange the face of warfare. Improvements inrobotics have obvious applications for military
usage. Unmanned naval vessels – possibly
reconnaissance submarines to probe a hostile
shore – are likely to become as much a partof the military system as unmanned andremotely piloted platforms have in the air.
Machines are likely to carry out tasks, such as
minefield clearance and delivering supplies
across hazardous areas, although the highly
complex nature of these tasks may mean thatdriverless military vehicles lag behind theircivilian counterparts. There may also be adrive towards replacing infantry soldiers withrobots, as society becomes less willing toaccept death or injury in warfare. In 2045, it islikely to continue to be much more palatableto put a machine in harm’s way, rather thana human soldier. Some experts believethat robots will begin to replace infantry
soldiers for some developed-world militaries
within the next ten years.11 The extent towhich military personnel will be replaced byautomated systems within the 2045 timeframe
is unclear. However, robots are likely to work incollaborative human/machine teams, similar to
the way that dogs and their handlers currently
operate.12 Western countries are likely tocontinue to keep humans in the decisionmaking loop for ethical reasons, althoughothers may not be so willing to make the same
trade-offs between speed and accountability.
If combat is primarily conducted by machines,

Age inequality in the workforce
The proportion of older workers in the global
labour force is likely to increase, with a possible
corresponding decrease in opportunities foryounger people in some areas. The retirement
age in many western countries is rising andlooks set to continue doing so, driven by anincrease in life expectancy, improvements
in health and the rising cost of supporting
older people who are not working. Several
estimations indicate that the number ofpeople aged 60 and over in the EU workingage population will increase by about 0.5% a
year over the next 30 years.13 Some membersof this older workforce may not possess thedigital and high-tech skills that many jobs arelikely to require. Nevertheless, they are likely
to have the expertise in management andcustomer relations that may enable them toremain in comparatively well-paid employment,
which may block younger workers fromsatisfactory career progression. This could
create an uncertain and frustrating working life
for some younger people, who may be cut off
from financial stability while simultaneously
being provided with increasing amounts of
information (via growing access to the Internet)
about the financial security enjoyed by others.
The economic disenfranchisement of young
people is likely to be particularly problematic in
those regions and countries (most notably subSaharan Africa, the Middle East and India) which
are likely to have sizeable youth populations.
However, this may be counterbalanced to someextent by the higher numbers of young people
who become entrepreneurs or are employed in

In the future, a sophisticated robotic ‘army’
could theoretically be operated by a single
individual, giving that person enormous power.
Authoritarian regimes may therefore find it
easier to stay in power, at least in the face ofinternal uprisings. Similarly, using robots could
significantly amplify the capabilities of small
groups of insurgents or terrorists, thereby
increasing the threat that they present.

11 Singer, op. cit.
12 Ibid.

70

13 Bell, D. N. F. (2013), ‘Older Workers and Working Time’

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Automation and work

Scenario:

Large-scale automation of work
Robots and automated systems havethe potential to be near-ubiquitousin 2045, capable of carrying out
extremely complex tasks with no human
involvement. Potentially, machines
could: carry out all manufacturing andagricultural tasks; repair themselves; aswell as clean, cook and tidy. Advancesin artificial intelligences could makemachines so life-like that they are able toanswer phones in call-centres, take careof children and even teach. Computers
could potentially diagnose and treat
almost every medical condition. If
progress on this scale is made in the
future, it is possible that there would bevery few jobs still carried out by humanbeings, who could, in practice, be almost
totally excluded from the workforce.
In richer countries, this large-scale
automation of work would be likely
to have a mostly positive effect, as
governments would probably be able toprovide their citizens with all the material
comforts they need. However, many
people may initially struggle to achieve asense of purpose and social status withoutwork, with possible rises in cases ofdepression. Education systems may need
to be totally redesigned to enable people
to self-motivate and to gain satisfaction
from activities other than work. Overthe new technology enabled jobs that are likely
to appear – rather like the jobs in web designand social media marketing that have appearedin the past couple of decades.

Flexible working
Flexible working practices are likely to
become more widespread, potentially
increasing economic insecurity. It is highly
likely that developments in information andcommunications technology will make remote
working more feasible. Consequently, there
are likely to be smaller and fewer permanent
workspaces, with increasing use of working hubs,

Global Strategic Trends

time, when populations had become
more used to a life without work, they
may fill their time playing sport, painting,reading and composing music.
In poorer countries, however, large-scale
automation of work could stall economic
development, perhaps even reversing
it. For example, foreign companies
would be far less likely to employ cheap
labour, as machines would be so much
more cost-effective and efficient. Some
employment could initially remain, as
poorer countries would be less likely
to afford to use machines to carry out
roles in their internal labour markets.
Eventually, though, automated equipment
would probably become cheap enoughfor even these countries to afford.
Poorer governments may not be able
to provide more than an extremely
basic level of subsistence, meaning thatpeople would have no way to improvetheir living conditions. This could leadthem to become deeply frustrated andangry. Nevertheless, citizens would still
receive some benefits from large-scale
automation, such as charity-fundedmachines capable of providing very
cheap diagnosis and treating disease.
Mass protests and civil unrest could stilldevelop, with ‘anti-robot’ movements
becoming increasingly powerful.
hot desks and teleconferencing. Organisations
are also likely to have an ever-smaller pool of corefull-time employees for fixed functions, with the
majority of workers employed on short-term
contracts, allowing employers to adapt more
readily to ebbing and flowing demand. Theseflexible working practices may let employers
operate more efficiently in an increasingly
uncertain, unpredictable and competitive
business environment. While some workers
are likely to welcome the increased freedomthat more variable employment brings, others
are likely to resent the insecurity caused by an
unpredictable income.

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Automation and work

Gender and work
There is a global move away from jobs
requiring heavy manual labour, with acorresponding shift towards a knowledgebased economy, in which women and men
are likely to be able to perform on more equalterms. Women are also less likely than men
to emigrate for work. However, they are more
likely to be mobile within their own country,
providing economic benefit to their countryof origin rather than exporting that expertise.14
Improved information and communications
technology could render geographicallocation less important, making women moreable to access the workplace while caring for
dependents.
The stigma attached to fulfilling opposite
gender roles may decrease. Men are likely
14 Docquier, F. (2008), ‘Are Skilled Women More
Migratory than Skilled Men?’

to readjust their aspirations to suit a moregender-equal workplace, as it becomes morenormal for women to have long-term careers.
However, some men may find it difficult toadjust their career aspirations and adapt to adomestic role, with women still being more
likely to care for dependents in 2045. It is
likely that there will continue to be professions
preferred by one gender over another, and50/50 representation in all careers is unlikely.
In most western cultures, the ‘glass ceiling’ islikely to increasingly be replaced by a ‘glass
funnel’. Gender may still play a role in filtering
people for the most high profile jobs, butthere will probably be increasing paths tothe top for women in most professions. It is
likely that the aperture of the ‘glass funnel’
will widen in the 2045 timeframe, and thatwomen’s representation at higher levels ofsociety, politics, industry and in the military
will increase.

Automation will drive a move away from jobs requiring heavy manual labour

72

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Part 1

Defence and security implications■■ Automated manufacturing techniques and practices may lead to economic
destabilisation, as there is less need to use cheap labour. This may
disproportionately affect emerging economies that would otherwise have benefited
from out-sourced production arising from inexpensive labour.
■■ There may be public mistrust of, and resistance to, using unmanned systems (androbots in particular).
■■ Unmanned systems are likely to have an increasing role in combat, potentiallytransforming the way that wars are fought. Military decision-making is likely toremain a human preserve, at least in western countries, but it is possible that theactual fighting will no longer be a solely human endeavour.
■■ There is unlikely to be global legal and ethical agreement on the way in which
military unmanned systems should be employed.
■■ If combat is primarily conducted by machines, with much less human involvement, it
may become more publicly and politically acceptable, and possibly more likely.
■■ The cost of unmanned systems is likely to fall, while the ease of manufacturing
complex items rises, making unmanned systems much more widespread and harder
to regulate. Criminal and terrorist groups are likely to find it easier to gain, hold anduse unmanned capabilities.

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73Part 1

Corruption and money

If unchallenged, corruption is likely to continue to exacerbate global inequality andconflict. By 2045, consistent attempts to curtail corrupt practices are likely to be madeby national governments, international governing institutions, the private sector andnon-state actors. Technology is highly likely to play a significant role in both enablingand combating corruption.
State-backed currencies will almost certainly still be the dominant form of money in 2045,
although alternative currencies are likely to expand, constituting the main shift in thefinancial landscape. Criminal transactions may increasingly be made using alternative
currencies, with a possible growth in the anonymous raising and transferring of funds byterrorist groups. Governments could have less influence over alternative currencies and,as a result, may be less able to shape the global financial system or raise revenues throughtaxation. A single international currency within the timeframe is improbable, with the US
dollar likely to remain the most important global currency by 2045. China is likely to allow
greater financial liberalisation, contributing to its possible overtaking of the US in termsof GDP within the next 30 years. This is likely to be a factor in some erosion of the preeminence of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency. Increased globalisation
could also make transmission of financial shocks more widespread.

Defining corruption
Tackling corruption is particularly difficult
because there is little global agreement on
what it is. While most people have a sense ofwhat ‘corruption’ means to them, this often
varies between countries. What constitutes
corruption in one country may be entirely
culturally acceptable in another – politicallobbying is seen as corrupt in Brazil but normal
in the US, while the UK Parliament is debating
whether to regulate it further. Social norms andperceptions of what constitutes corruption arelikely to continue to change, although once asociety labels a practice ‘corrupt’ it rarely goesback to being deemed acceptable. The poor
are likely to continue to be disproportionately
affected by corruption, contributing to risinginequality and potential civil unrest. For
example, although they are most in need ofgovernment services, they are often unable to
pay the bribes required to access them.

Global Strategic Trends

The potential for corporate corruption may
increase as multinational corporations growin prominence and economic reach. Politicalparty funding and lobbying by industries
and interest groups are also likely to be key
aspects of the debate around corruption
over the next 30 years. Some countries may
seek to promote more transparency andregulations in lobbying to prevent informal
or illegal practices. Police and judiciaries
in many countries are likely to continue tobecome more transparent, reducing overalllevels of corruption. Where these authorities
have entrenched corrupt practices, efforts tocomplete institutional and cultural reforms willprobably be impeded.

Responses to corruption
There is already an acceptance today that
corruption needs to be addressed, but it islikely that by 2045 this will have become even“

The potential
for corporate
corruption may
increase as
multinational
corporations growin prominence
and economic
reach.

”

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Part 1

Corruption and money

Anti-corruption legislation
OECD Development
Assistance Committee
donor principles agreed

Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) created
FATF set firstglobal anti- money
laundering standards

World Bank ‘cancer of corruption’speech marking first anticorruption strategy

OECD Bribery
Convention in force

World Bank andInternational
Monetary Fund
agree to address
money-laundering

Stolen Assets Recovery
initiative establishedInternational
Centre for
Asset Recovery
established

UN Convention Against
Corruption
AgreedIn Force

UN Convention
Against Corruption
review processagreed1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Extension of UK
bribery law
UK Bribery Acts,
1889, 1906 & 1916“

The shift towards
online banking
and finance may
simply alter thevehicle of bribery,with unregulated,
non-state-backed
currencies being
used to avoid
scrutiny.

”

UK moneylaundering
regulations inline with FATF

Centralised reportingof bribery allegations
UK proceeds of Crime
Act (asset recovery)

more widespread. Global efforts to counter
corruption are likely to continue to develop,
probably in an increasingly international andcollaborative way, underpinned by treaties andformal agreements. While some corporate
governance practices already address
corruption, it is likely that by 2045 there will
be more nuanced approaches taken to ensure
greater transparency in the activities of thestate. Reform is likely to be slow, as strong
governance institutions and cultural reforms
take time to establish. For example, while
democracy is correlated with significantly
lower levels of corruption, this only applies
after democracy has been in place for anumber of decades. With corruption still likely
to be endemic in some countries by 2045,
there may be an increased focus on foreign
direct investment as an alternative to aid
provided through governments.

Technology and corruption
Technology is likely to have both a positive
and negative impact on corruption. The
growing number of Internet users – anestimated three billion today1 – together
with the accessibility of ‘Big Data’ and everexpanding digital and social media to share
information and organise campaigns, is likely
1 Lagarde, C. (2014), ‘A New Multilateralism for the 21stCentury: The Richard Dimbleby Lecture’76

Cabinet OfficeInternational
Corruption
Group Action
Plan

Ministerial‘Champion’appointed

Met Police
Proceeds ofCorruption UnitestablishedRoyal
Assent toBribery
Act 2010

City of London Police, Overseas
Corruption Unit establishedto drive dialogue between the citizen andstate and promote state accountability. For
example, the UK has already been required
to demonstrate public transparency overthe beneficial ownership of companies.
There might be greater transparency overcorporate ownership and the risks of money
laundering even before 2045. Whistle-blowers
are likely to increasingly use cyberspace asa publishing platform and may demand
more protection when they reveal corrupt
practices. However, it may be easier to hide
payment of large bribes in the vast datasetsthat increased global connectivity produces.
The shift towards online banking and financemay simply alter the vehicle of bribery, withunregulated, non-state-backed currencies
being used to avoid scrutiny.
Criminal transactions are likely to be
increasingly made using alternative (nonstate-backed) currencies, potentially making
it easier for illegal groups to transfer funds
between jurisdictions. The potential for
individuals to make anonymous payments(bypassing laws and avoiding tax), alongwith a lack of central control and regulation
makes alternative currencies such as Bitcoin,
Litecoin or Ripple attractive for criminal use.
When the founder of a website associatedwith the sale of narcotics and firearms (‘theSilk Road’) was detained by US authorities

Global Strategic Trends

Part 1

Corruption and moneyin October 2013, the value of Bitcoin fell
sharply. Some commentators have suggested
that this incident illustrates the impactthat criminal users have on the value ofthe currency.2 This view is reinforced by arecent study which showed that daily sales
on the Silk Road website corresponded toapproximately 20% of the activity on the main
Bitcoin exchange.3 It is likely that non-statebacked currencies will continue to be used
as a means of payment for online criminal
activity. It is also possible that terrorist groups
could adopt such currencies as a means offundraising or transferring funds anonymously– governments are, of course, likely to try tomonitor the use of these currencies.

2 Hern, Alex (2013), ‘Bitcoin Price Plummets After Silk
Road Closure’, available at http://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2013/oct/03/bitcoin-price-silkroad-ulbricht-value
3 Christin, N (2013), ‘Travelling the Silk Road: A
Measurement Analysis of a Large Anonymous Online
Marketplace’State-backed and alternative currencies
State-backed currencies will almost certainly
still be the dominant form of money in2045, although a global currency by then is
improbable. A genuinely global currency
would require a high level of international
cooperation, likely to be brought about only inthe case of an extraordinarily severe shock to
the international financial system. Countries (orblocs of countries) are highly likely to remain
the dominant seats of global authority by
2045. Consequently, such countries are likely tocontinue to be seen as the most reliable backers
of monetary systems, above multinational
corporations or private organisations. Further
currency unions, such as the euro, are possible
in the timeframe. State-backed currencies havean established position and usefulness that willalmost certainly guarantee their persistence as
the principal means of exchange. Advances intechnology are likely to make online monetarysystems increasingly important, but these willprobably remain complementary to statebacked currencies, rather than replacing them.

“Non-state-backed
currencies willcontinue to be
used as a meansof payment for
online criminal
activity.

”

Crypto currency values and market share
The crypto currency market is valued at over US$6.8 billion, with Bitcoin accounting for over 80% of the market.

Bitcoin $5.5bn 81%

value
l
a
b
o
l
g
l
a
t
o
T

US$ 6.8bn

Ripple $758m 11%
Litecoin $298m 5%
Others* $222m 4%*130 other currencies exist ranging from 0.0002–0.5% global share

Source: CoinMarket

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There are, however, a number of situations
in which alternative currencies could seem
more attractive. For example, state-backed
currencies could be undermined if government
indebtedness rises sharply, perhaps due to anincrease in interest rates. Similarly, if banking
regulations become too onerous, alternative
currencies may be more appealing tobusinesses and customers alike.

“States’ monopoly
on money is likely
to be increasingly
eroded byalternative
currencies out to
2045.

”

Even if these scenarios do not emerge,alternative currencies are likely to grow in size
and importance out to 2045, constituting
the main shift in the financial landscape.
We are already seeing this trend. Although
predominantly used for online transactions,
Bitcoin has already been used to make offlinepurchases such as food and drink in pubs andrestaurants.4 If alternative currencies holdtheir value in the future better than thosebacked by the state, people may convert theirsavings into alternative currencies to insulatethemselves from wider economic uncertainty.
Currently, their volatility means that cryptocurrencies are not considered a ‘safe bet’for storing value. There may be an increase
in international businesses carrying out
transactions using online currencies to avoid
exchange-rate volatility. Small businesses may
increasingly turn to alternative currencies toavoid credit card fees and tax.5
States’ monopoly on money is likely to be
increasingly eroded by alternative currencies
out to 2045. Alternative currencies may beable to bypass emergency capital controls
or other measures taken by governments inthe wake of financial crises. While this is only
likely to have a limited effect on developed
economies, there could be a greater impact
on more economically closed countries(those nations which have a limited amountof external trade), which rely on capital
controls to protect their national currencies.
Governments’ ability to raise revenue isalso likely to be curtailed by the growthin alternative currencies. As ever-moretransactions are carried out using alternative
4 Shubber, K. (2013), ‘London’s Bitcoin Pub’, available at
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-06/17/
london-bitcoin-pub
5 Needleman, S. (2013), ‘More Small Businesses
Embrace Bitcoin’

78

Alternative outcome:Globalisation backlash
Globalisation could conceivably facea backlash, perhaps driven by antiimmigrant sentiment or resentment at
perceived over-reaching of authority
by international organisations.
Although unlikely, there could be acorresponding rise in nationalism andeconomic protectionism, along with areduction in international cooperation.
In turn, this could lead to more conflict,particularly over water resources, energy
and food. If institutions such as theEuropean Union failed, there could be
dramatic shifts in the global economy.
Countries may be unable to effectively‘police’ regions of the world on theirown, leading to more failed states.
Resurgence of national identity could
encourage societies to become lessproactive in tackling global issues suchas climate change and poverty.
currencies, their anonymous nature is likely toprovide a significant challenge to identifying
and taxing economic activity.
However, alternative currencies are likely
to remain vulnerable to attack. As withtraditional forms of money, alternative
currencies are only as secure as theorganisation that controls them. Governments
and commercial banks have technologicaladvantages over ordinary users of theircurrency. They spend considerable resources
securing their systems and responding toforgeries. By contrast, alternative currencies
may come under attack from those who
possess similar levels of skill and resources
to the currencies’ developers. For example,
Bitcoin’s infrastructure has been subject toseveral malicious attacks, with an attack in2013 leading to its value dropping by 20%.6
While there is no reason in principle whyalternative currencies should not implement
an improved security infrastructure, this would
6 Clinch, M. (2013), ‘Bitcoin Hacked: Price Stumbles
After Buying Frenzy’, available at http://www.cnbc.
com/id/100615508

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The requirement to hold US currency reserves may reduce

probably take time to develop and incur
significant costs, which may be beyond theresources of most private organisations.

Reserve currencies
The US dollar is likely to remain the mostimportant currency by 2045, but its status
as the pre-eminent reserve currency willprobably be eroded. Perhaps the mostsignificant factor contributing to this eroding
effect is the probable broad shift in economic
power from West to East, meaning that the
US is likely to account for a comparatively
smaller part of the global economy. This
trend is already evident, with the WorldBank suggesting that the US accounted for
39% of global economic output in 1960, but
only 22% in 2012. If this trend continues,
the dollar is likely to become less central to
global trade. As foreign reserves are used tomake purchases and settle debt obligations,
governments tend to hold the currenciesof their major trading partners. Less tradewith the US (as a proportion of global
trade) may mean that there is less need forcountries to hold US dollars as a reserve. The

Global Strategic Trends

consequences for the US of a less dominant
dollar could be significant. The US benefits
from the dollar’s reserve status to maintainits debt and to fund its expenditure. If thedollar becomes a less dominant reserve
currency, it is likely that that the US will
have to curb its expenditure. It is difficult toassess the implications of reduced spending
but, as defence constituted 19% of federal
expenditure in 2013,7 it is likely that thedefence budget will decrease. This may inturn limit the US’s international military roleand possibly influence.
China is likely to be the US’s main rival as
the global reserve currency provider within
the 2045 timeframe. The recent growthof China’s economy has not yet been
mirrored by a growth in the prominenceof its currency, the Renminbi. China’s strict
capital controls – designed to keep thevalue of the Renminbi low – have so far
7 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2014),‘Policy Basics: Where do Our Federal Tax Dollars
Go?’, available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.
cfm?fa=view&id=1258“”

The dollar is likely
to become lesscentral to global
trade.

79

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prohibited developing international tradein the currency.8 However, out to 2045,
China is likely to want to grow its economy(and influence) still further by implementing
significant financial liberalisation. As China
develops and domestic demand grows, it islikely to make sense to allow the Renminbi toappreciate, allowing cheaper imports to satisfy
a growing consumer class. Increasingly liberalfinancial measures could also allow the global
market to deliver the kind of credit needed
for a complex modern economy. China has
already made some moves in this direction.
It has encouraged an offshore Renminbi
market in Hong Kong and allowed offshorebanks to trade Renminbi among themselves,paving the way for Renminbi-denominatedfinancial products. Perhaps most significantly,
in September 2013, China’s Central Bank
announced that it wanted to accelerateloosening capital controls.9“

The Renminbi isunlikely to replace
the US dollar as
the pre-eminent
reserve currency
but it may
become a rival
to it.

”The Renminbi is unlikely to replace the US
dollar as the pre-eminent reserve currency
in the 2045 timeframe, but it may becomea rival to it. Currently, only a tiny minority
of international foreign reserves are in theRenminbi. Although it is held by close trading
partners such as Taiwan, most governments
do not yet include it as part of their reserves.10
However, it is likely that the Renminbi’s riseas an international reserve currency will be
preceded by its adoption as a major regional
currency, and there is evidence that this isalready happening.11 For Chinese businesses,
Renminbi internationalisation may offer arelative benefit in dealings with foreign firms,
as trade can be carried out in their domestic
currency. It also transfers exchange rate risk
from Chinese companies to their foreign
8 Chey, H. (2013), ‘Can the Renminbi Rise as a Global
Currency? The Political Economy of Currency
Internationalization’9 Orlik, T. (2013), ‘China Signals Speedier Moves to
Loosen Capital Controls’, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732362330457905
6741795219748.html
10 IMF (2012), ‘Will the Renminbi Rule?’, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
fandd/2012/03/prasad.htm

counterparts. These are factors which havelong benefited US businesses, and may
serve to increase China’s overall competitive
advantage.
Shock:

Global financial collapse
Following the drop in price of its
principal exports, a massive uprisingfollowed by a coup could fragment alarge, pivotal economic power. Before
its disintegration, such a country would
almost certainly have held trillions of
US dollars of foreign debt and would
have been home to many of the world’s
most influential banks and investmentcompanies. The collapse of this typeof country could mean that global
capital flows would be brought to anear-halt and the world’s financial
system would, in such a situation,cease to function effectively. Multiple
defaults on payments could lead tothe further collapse of numerous
countries and potentially a collapse of
the international trading system. If thisoccurred, hyper-inflation could takehold, making global trade drop to its
lowest recorded level, with catastrophic
consequences for the global economy.

Globalisation and financial shocks
Increased globalisation is highly likely tomake transmission of financial shocks morewidespread. The world will almost certainly
become even more financially interconnected,
with most western governments andmultilateral financial institutions increasingly
promoting the removal of restrictions on theflow of capital. While the 2008 financial crisis
led to reduced international capital flows,money still moves relatively freely. One of
the key benefits of the flow of money is that
capital is allocated more smoothly throughout
the world – investors are not limited to putting
money into projects in their own countries.

11 Peterson Institute for International Economics (2013),‘The Renminbi Bloc Is Here: Asia Down, Rest of theWorld to Go?’80

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In turn, this helps smooth out economic
imbalances and fosters higher growth.12
However, more interconnectedness may alsomean that financial shocks in one area of theworld economy can be quickly transmitted toother areas. Arguably, volatile global capital
flows have contributed to financial crises,
such as the bursting of the East Asian credit
12 Peterson, op. cit.

bubble in the late 1990s and the 2008 global
financial crisis. In line with the trend over thelast 30 years, global capital flows are likely toincrease out to 2045. The effects of this trend
are difficult to predict, but it is reasonable toassume that the risk will be similar to thoseexperienced so far. Although leading toan overall increase in wealth, it is likely that
increased capital flows will lead to volatility insome parts of the global economy.

Defence and security implications■■ In the majority of cases, corruption will almost certainly continue to be adestabilising factor. This will disproportionately affect the poor.
■■ As corruption continues to prevent some aid money from reaching its intended
recipients, donor countries may increasingly use direct investment as an alternative.
■■ The expansion of alternative currencies may make it easier to transfer and retain
funds anonymously and hence harder for governments to freeze criminals’ assets
or sanction rogue regimes. Criminal and terrorist groups may also find it easier totransfer funds between jurisdictions.
■■ Out to 2045, alternative (non-state backed) currencies are likely to grow, havingsome effect on governments’ ability to raise revenues.
■■ The US dollar’s status as the pre-eminent reserve currency may be eroded making
it more difficult for the US to fund its debt. This may lead to cuts in the US’s defence
spending and limit its international role.

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81Part 1

Identity and the roleof the state
The state will almost inevitably be the dominant actor in international affairs in 2045.
Private or semi-state owned companies and non-governmental organisations are likely
to exert increasing influence, but are less likely to exercise state-like legal and decisionmaking powers. Individuals may define themselves less by their nationality, withgrowing migration and stronger links to virtual communities. Rising costs, demands,
technical complexity and need for specialisation could see private and other non-state
entities increasingly functioning as the primary providers of those services that states
have traditionally delivered, such as security. Some states may lose their monopoly on
force, as private security contractors are increasingly employed and as some privatecompanies take more responsibility for their own security. The extent to which thesechanges happen under the control of state-based decision-makers is likely to vary
between countries according to their stability and forms of governance.
Personal privacy will very probably be increasingly difficult to achieve in the years
leading up to 2045, as identity is ever-more defined by online activities. People
are likely to demand higher levels of privacy protection from governments andbusinesses. Religion will probably remain a significant component of identity, withthe spread of representative governments providing the space for some religions tobecome increasingly politically assertive. A range of technological enhancements
have the potential to transform human identity by improving sensory perception,
physical performance and perhaps even giving us the ability to control fear and otheremotional states.

Governance
Since 1941 (when only 11 countries were
democratic),1 democracy, as a system ofgovernment, has spread. By 2012, the numberof electoral democracies had reached 1182
– just over 60% of all countries. Despite
this, the spread of democracy has arguably
slowed since 2000. In most establisheddemocracies, voter turn-out is reducing and

1 The Economist (2014), ‘What’s Gone Wrong with
Democracy?’, available at http://www.economist.
com/news/essays/21596796-democracy-was-mostsuccessful-political-idea-20th-century-why-has-itrun-trouble-and-what-can-be-do
2 Freedom House (2013), ‘Freedom in the World 2013’,
available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/freedom-world-2013

Global Strategic Trends

could conceivably reach the point where
the legitimacy of democratic institutions
is challenged. Membership of politicalparties has also been reducing, as has trustin government. The ‘Beijing Consensus’(a limited free market, with strong central
control) is sometimes cited as an alternative
to the Western democratic model. China’s
success at rapidly improving the standardof living of its population could be seen as
proof that its system of governance is more
effective (although democratic Brazil has
achieved, proportionally, a similarly impressivefeat). However, China’s per-capita income isstill substantially lower than that of establisheddemocracies, and looks likely to remain soby 2045.

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Although difficult to measure, the spread of
information and ideas appears, on balance, tobe increasing the pressure for governments
to be accountable and representative.
The increasing spread of information andcommunication technology (includingInternet uptake) looks likely to accelerate thistrend – and will probably lead to democracy
continuing to spread out to 2045.

Interdependence and internationalorganisations
Globalisation is likely to lead to increasing
constraints on countries’ freedom of action,with countries likely to become more
economically and politically interdependent.
As economic power shifts from west toeast over the next 30 years, international
relationships and institutions are likely
to undergo a similar change in power
distribution. As well as becoming increasingly
reliant on other countries for critical supplies
of food, water, energy and materials, smaller
countries, in particular, may find that theway to be most effective on the global stage
is to work within blocs. Such blocs may
be structured around regional alliances orshared values, to meet common interests
in a more crowded environment. Current
trends suggest we are likely to see more
blocs with increased powers, although it isunlikely many will have the same level ofauthority as the current EU. Groups are also
likely to be established to seek solutions for
wider challenges, such as enabling trade orcountering the effects of climate change andresource allocation. Future organisations may
look similar to the G-20. Formed in 2008 as an
emergency response to the global financial
crisis, the G-20 has come to be recognised as
the principal forum for leading states to agree
global financial governance. Another example
is the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
whose member states are geographicallydispersed, formed around the shared interestof highlighting and seeking solutions to rising
sea levels. Through new groups like these,countries could challenge or seek to reform
existing international organisations to provide
legitimacy for their actions and increase theirrepresentation.

84

Such organisations may strengthen theconditions for countries to fragment. If subnational regions believe that their interests will
be represented by international organisations,they may have less reason to stay within their
original country. This is not a new trend –regions within countries have split throughout
history, and this trend is likely to continue
out to 2045. As parts of supra-nationalorganisations, countries are more likely to be
subject to international rules, standards andinstitutions, further constraining their freedomof action. Increasing use of: international
tribunals (such as the WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism); transnational private arbitration
arrangements; regional mechanisms (such as
the European, African and American Courtsof Human Rights); the EU arrest warrant; andthe International Criminal Court, could bringformal justice systems closer together. Someof these organisations, though, have faced
criticism which may hamper their future
effectiveness – the International Criminal
Court is sometimes accused of being overly
focussed on Africa, with all six of its current
cases from that continent. By 2045, there arestill likely to be clear regional differences inlegal and judicial practice even between close
allies, such as the US and European countries.
Over the next 30 years, there is likely to besignificant pressure on perhaps the mostsignificant international organisation – the UN
Security Council (UNSC) – to reform. Driven
by the growing self-confidence of member
states and the increasing economic strength of
emerging countries such as India, Brazil, Nigeria
and South Africa, there may be continued
pressure to expand Council membership,
which still does not include any permanentregional representation from Latin America,
Africa or Oceania, and to reform its working
practices to incorporate greater transparency.
Such reforms may also be associated with anincrease in the number of non-permanent
members. Non-UNSC states’ current lack ofconsensus as to what UNSC reform should look
like, and unwillingness to expend effort pushingfor change may, by 2045, be overcome by anincreasingly evident disconnect between theinternational distribution of economic andmilitary power and the distribution of politicalpower in the UNSC.

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Non-governmental organisations in consultative status with the
UN Economic and Social Council
As of 2013 there were 3,900 organisations with consultative status: 147 in general
consultative status; 2,774 in special consultative status; and 979 on the Roster.
The status of 157 organisations is currently suspended.*

4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

13
20

00
20

90
19

80
19

70
19

60
19

50
19

19

46

0
*There are 408 organisations with consultative status with other United Nations bodies or the specialized agencies for which
entry dates are not recorded that are included under 2013.
Source: UN Economic and Social Council (2013)

Non-state actors
The concept of the state will almost certainly
continue to exist by 2045 and states are still
likely to have the most important voices ininternational affairs. Large private, or semiprivate, companies and non-governmentalorganisations will very probably grow innumber and power, seeking to influencenational and international decisions.3 Some
multinational corporations are alreadyworth as much financially as some national
economies, with 12 multinational corporations
among the top 100 economies.4 For example,
Apple is bigger, economically, than Ecuador,
while Ford is bigger than Morocco.5 Shell has a
private security force of 1,200 people in Nigeria
alone. Non-governmental organisations,such as major charities, also have significant
voices and exert influence, entering into
formal and informal negotiations with states.
3 Ritzer, G. (2010), ‘Globalization: A Basic Text’
4 Lagarde, C. (2014), ‘A New Multilateralism for the 21stCentury: The Richard Dimbleby Lecture’
5 Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Programme
Office, Singapore (2013), ‘Future Stake’

Global Strategic Trends

At some major international conferences, thenumber of non-governmental organisations
exceeds the number of states.6 More than
3,500 non-governmental organisations have‘consultative status’ with the UN Economic
and Social Council,7 up from 700 nongovernmental organisations 20 years ago.8
As a result of this growing influence, thenext 30 years may see increasing calls for thelargest multinational corporations and nongovernmental organisations to have voices
in, and be accountable to, supra-nationalorganisations (such as the G77). Without
such an accommodation, existing companies
and non-governmental organisations may

6 For example, at the annual UN Framework
Conference on Climate Change. The best-known ofthese conferences was held at Kyoto in 1997, when
the Kyoto Protocol seeking to limit carbon emissions
was signed.
7 Willets, P. (2013), ‘The Growth in the Number of NGOs
in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations’, available at http://
www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/NGOS/NGO-GRPH.
HTM
8 Lagarde, op. cit.

“

Nongovernmentalorganisations,such as majorcharities, also
have significant
voices and exert
influence.

”85Part 1

Identity and the role of the state

proliferate and become an increasing focus
of policy-making, coordination and public
lobbying and scrutiny to the detriment ofstate-based international organisations.
Private companies are also likely to provide
many of the security functions currently
provided by the state, with states increasingly
contracting out their monopoly on force.
Private companies already provide security
in prisons and contribute to military
operations – a recent Congressional report
put the proportion of American contractors
in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans at
more than 50% of the total number of US
personnel present.9 If this trend continues,
by 2045, armed forces may have evolved into
a confederation of public and private sector
capabilities. Questions about regulation willalmost certainly be raised if binding national
and international legislation continues to apply
to armed forces personnel, but not to private
military contractors.

“

The state willprobably be of lessrelevance to theindividual, due tothe movementof people,
informationand ideas
across nationalboundaries.

”

86

These patterns of non-state encroachment
into areas where the state currently dominates
are likely to take different forms in different
countries. In robust, stable democracies andauthoritarian states, state-based governing
elites are likely to retain strategic direction andcontrol, with the non-state sector delivering
services and fulfilling functions rather than
exercising power. Increasing interchanges
between governing and commercial elites(for example, as traditional career structures
break down) may blur the boundaries of stateand non-state influence and policy-making,particularly in states with weaker systemsof transparency and control. Some fragile,
unstable, resource-dependent states may wellfind themselves subject to greater pressures,
particularly from transnational enterprises
wholly or partly owned by other states.

National identity
By 2045, more individuals are likely to define
themselves less by their country of origin or
residence than they do today. In developing

countries, some people may continue tofeel more closely bound by tribal allegiancesor other loyalties than connected to thestate. Globally, the state will probably be ofless relevance to the individual, due to the
movement of people, information and ideas
across national boundaries. As individuals
feel less connected to the state, they are also
likely to become less interested in supportingit.10 (This is far less likely to be the case inautocratic regimes, where nationalism may
increase.) Participation in politics in mature
democracies looks likely to continue to fall,
which could result in citizens challenging thelegitimacy of their governments. Finally, as
global connectedness (particularly economic
interdependence) grows, people may moveabroad more frequently. We are alreadyseeing this trend with UN figures showing thatin 2013, the number of international migrants
worldwide reached 232 million, up from 175
million in 2000 and 154 million in 1990.11

State provision of services
A growing population may underminesome countries’ ability to provide services,causing unrest. As expanding and aging
populations grow more demanding of evermore personalised, technologically advanced
medical, financial and other services, and as
supply chains grow more complex requiring
more specialisation and more sophisticatedproject management techniques, states mayneed to turn increasingly to the private andnon-governmental sector to deliver essential
services. While developed countries are likely
to be able to have the resources to meet thesedemands – or at least are likely to be able toimport or contract out the means to respondto them – this is less likely to be the case forsome developing countries. If countries areunable to provide vital services required bytheir growing populations, their citizens arelikely to become increasingly discontent,
which may manifest itself in protest or unrest.
Protest is likely to be facilitated by advances incommunications technology, allowing those
10 Cooper, R. (2004), ‘The Breaking of Nations’

9 Congressional Research Service (2013), ‘Departmentof Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military
Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues forCongress’

11 UN (2013), ‘232 Million International Migrants Living
Abroad Worldwide – New UN Global Migration
Statistics Reveal’, available at http://esa.un.org/
unmigration/wallchart2013.htm

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Identity and the role of the state

who are discontent with their government tochallenge it collaboratively, as seen in the ‘Arab
Spring’.12 This could lead to increased civil
unrest and in extreme cases a disintegration oforder in affected countries.
A key service that the state is less likely to beable to provide in future is security, particularly
information security. As people live moreof their lives online, safeguarding personal
data is likely to be increasingly important.
Private companies already provide muchof our communications infrastructure, fromdelivering post to providing phone and email
services, and it seems likely that – in response
to customer demands – they will take greater
responsibility for making sure those services
are secure. Similarly, despite reducing ratesof crime, individuals may be more likely toseek alternatives to the state to provide their
physical security.

Privacy
The longevity of data storage means that
there is an ever-growing record of people’s
activity, and attempts to avoid leaving a digital
footprint may become increasingly difficult.
At the same time, the growth in the numberof surveillance devices is increasing at a rapid
rate and, unless individuals go to great lengths
to avoid detection, it is likely that by 2045, a
near-complete record of their movements
could be built up by an interested party. Muchof the data created and rendered accessibleby the information age has the potential tobenefit society. For example, criminality may
prove increasingly difficult to conceal, allowing
governments, businesses and individuals tobe held to account. But governments may
also increasingly exploit extensive databases
and surveillance devices to monitor and curtail
individuals’ activities.13 It is, however, likelythat individuals and societies will demandhigher levels of privacy protection from theirgovernments and from businesses that they
12 RAND Europe (2013), ‘Thinkpiece for a ‘Future
Role of the State’ Workshop in Support of the GST
Programme’; High Level Panel on Fragile States(2014), ‘Ending Conflict and Building Peace in Africa:
A Call to Action’
13 Schmidt, E. and Cohen, J. (2013), ‘The New Digital
Age’

Global Strategic Trends

Digital anonymity will be increasingly
difficult to maintaininteract with. Public demand for encryption
software could increase as individuals seek
to live their digital lives without leaving apermanent trace. However, it is likely thatgovernments will resist such demands as
their ability to detect and prosecute criminal
activity could be impeded.

Religion and ideology
Religion is likely to remain a significant
component of people’s identity, withevangelical Christianity growing in popularity
in Latin America, Asia and Africa, as well as
Islam becoming more prevalent in the Middle
East and North Africa.14 Some religions
are likely to become increasingly politicallyassertive.15 This influence will almost certainly
continue to be assisted by globalisation
and by developments in communications
technology, permitting the messages ofreligious groups to unite diaspora populations
and appeal to a far wider audience thanpreviously possible. Technology is also likely
to contribute to diaspora communities being
increasingly affected by intra-faith discordin countries of origin. Some governments
14 Micklethwait, J. and Wooldridge, A. (2009), ‘God isBack’
15 Ibid.

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may have to address new challenges fromreligious groups. For example, by 2045, China
may be home to some of the world’s largest
Muslim and Christian populations and its
internal politics and global posture are likely
to be influenced significantly by the mannerin which these two faith groups pursue theirgoals and seek religious freedom.16 As religion
is so fundamental to many people’s identity,
where tensions between different groups
exist, they are likely to be exacerbated byreligious differences.
While there is little evidence to suggestthat ideologies as influential as communismand fascism were in the 1930s and 1940s
are emerging, ideology is likely to remain
an important component of many people’s
identity. The desire by some to make all
information freely available is, possibly, an
example of an emerging ideology.

Shock:

Sectarian conflict
Areas of considerable sectarian tension
exist across the world – if there wasa prolonged period of escalation,
campaigns of terrorist attacks could
be carried out on a previously unseen
scale. It is possible that attacks on sucha level could cause a major power todescend into civil war. Pre-existing
religious divides could rapidly escalate
into a transnational conflict between
two aspects of the global society. It
is possible that some countries would
be drawn into a wider war, as pressure
from their populations, existing treaty
obligations and allegiances force themto take sides. If the UN was deadlocked,
unable to manage this degree ofpolarisation, widespread killings could
occur across the globe.

16 Micklethwait and Wooldridge, op. cit.

China will be home to one of the world’s largest Christian and Muslim populations

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Human augmentation
Future technologies may make it possible
for people to radically alter their identities
by using a range of physical and cognitiveenhancements. The power and range of thefive major senses is likely to be significantly
enhanced, often as a result of extending andapplying developments made for medical
reasons. Some developments are likely torequire surgical implants, implying a degreeof permanence – others will probably betemporary. However, it is difficult to speculate
on the extent to which enhancing sensory
perception will lead to improved interpretationof our surroundings. Some augmentations
could provide signals from beyond ournormal sensory range. Despite its inherent
adaptability, it is not clear how well the humanbrain will be able to process such data to
produce useful information and analysis.
New technologies may be able to extend
our visual sense beyond the range of visible
light into other parts of the spectrum.
Implants designed to help restore sightprovide an early indication of what could beachieved in allowing us to ‘see’ otherwise
non-visible radiation.17 Our hearing could
be significantly enhanced. Hearing aids are
currently being developed that can choose
and boost frequencies of interest which would
enhance the ability to detect and understandspeech in noisy environments.18 Similarly,
improved understanding of how the brain
can discriminate between individual smells
in a mix of odours found in a typical room19
could provide the basis for developing futuretechnology that may enhance our sense of
smell. Even the tongue could be used as anovel pathway to conduct a range of sensory
17 For example, see Planker, D. (undated), ‘Restorationof Sight to the Blind: Optoelectronic Retinal
Prosthesis’, available at http://www.stanford.
edu/~palanker/lab/retinalpros.html

information to the brain, from external sensors
such as cameras or sonar.20
Advances in a range of disciplines, such as
brain science and pharmacology, are likely
to increase our ability to influence emotional
responses such as motivation, anxiety and fear
– all of these affect individual performance inareas of considerable significance. Cognitive
function may be enhanced either by machineinterfaces or by using chemicals. Treatments,
often developed to address mental healthissues, may be widely used by healthypeople to augment or optimise cognitive
performance, offering potential enhancementof many aspects of cognition, from learningand memory to wakefulness, attention andmotivation.21
External and internal electro-mechanicaldevices are likely to enhance human physicalperformance. For example, powered
exoskeletons already in development allow
users to lift loads of up to 90kg without
their performance being impaired, as well
as reducing fatigue experienced when
exercising.22 Prostheses are being developedthat exceed the functionality of the limbs
they replace and whose electronic control
systems outperform the original. Brainmachine interfaces may allow direct control of
prostheses, exoskeletons and systems remotefrom the body. Control of simple devices by
thought is already a reality.23”

Some social and religious groups may not wish
to adopt these new augmentations for ethical
20 For example, see University of Nebraska (undated),‘Train the Brain’, available at http://www.unmc.edu/
mmi/docs/TrainTheBrain.pdf
21 Office of Science and Technology (2005), ‘Drugs
Futures 2025’, available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/299221/05-1182-drugs-futures-overview.
pdf

18 For example, see ABC Science (2008), ‘Chinese Frog
has Tuneable Ears’, available at http://www.abc.net.
au/science/articles/2008/07/29/2317848.htm

22 Berkeley Robotics & Human Engineering Laboratory(undated), ‘Research Projects – HULC’, available at
http://bleex.me.berkeley.edu/research/exoskeleton/
hulc/

19 For example, see Phys.org (2007), ‘Neuronal Circuits
Able to Rewire on the Fly to Sharpen Senses’,available at http://phys.org/news117036872.html

23 Goudarzi, S. (2006), ‘Human Thoughts Control
New Robot’, available at http://www.livescience.
com/9446-human-thoughts-control-robot.html

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External andinternal electromechanicaldevices are likely
to enhance
human physicalperformance.

89Part 1“

It is possiblethat direct
brain-to-brain
communication
may be achievedby 2045,transforming ways
of working.

”90

Identity and the role of the statereasons, in much the same way that the Amishcommunities of Northern America currently
reject most modern technology. Equally, not
all who wish to adopt these new technologies
may be able to do so – the rich will almost
inevitably have better access than the poor.
Many of the technologies described above
will almost certainly be expensive (at least
initially), leading to the prospect of poorer
people being excluded from the benefits thattechnological enhancements may provide.
Such inequality could lead to disaffection
and instability when such groups perceive
themselves as being marginalised. Conversely,
it is plausible that in the longer term, improved
and mass-produced technologies may provide
for greater equality in delivering healthcare.

Direct interfacing
It is possible that direct brain-to-brain
communication may be achieved by 2045,
transforming ways of working. The realtime transfer of behaviourally meaningful
information between the brains of two rats
has already been demonstrated, with rats
successfully performing tasks that they had
not previously attempted.24 Building on the
progress that has been made with animals, theability to move another’s hand through noninvasive brain-to-brain interfaces has already24 Pais-Vieira, M. et al. (2013), ‘A Brain-to-Brain
Interface for Real-Time Sharing of Sensorimotor
Information’, available at http://www.nature.com/
srep/2013/130228/srep01319/full/srep01319.html

been demonstrated.25 If extended to complex
cognitive tasks, the approach of directly
linking brains could be the basis for wholly
new methods of decision-making, problem
solving and planning. These methods could
involve collaboration and using directly-sharedknowledge and experience between humans(and potentially between humans and otherspecies).
As well as potentially transforming both sensing
and decision-making, direct brain linkage
could have profound implications for social
interaction and for the notion of what it means
to be an individual human being. As seen withcurrent interaction with virtual environments,
where high-use levels sometimes leadto addiction,26 there could be powerful
behavioural effects. Notions of individuality
could be challenged, possibly leading toquestioning of loyalties and allegiances toorganisations, as individual and group identities
merge. By 2045, it is even possible (althoughunlikely) that the sharp distinctions between
people and machine will disappear.

25 Armstrong, D. and Ma, M. (2013), ‘Researcher
Controls Colleague’s Motions in 1st Human Brain-toBrain Interface’, available at http://www.washington.
edu/news/2013/08/27/researcher-controlscolleagues-motions-in-1st-human-brain-to-braininterface/
26 American Psychiatric Association (2013), ‘Internet
Gaming Disorder Fact Sheet’, available at http://
www.dsm5.org/Documents/Internet%20
Gaming%20Disorder%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf

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Identity and the role of the statePart 1

Defence and security implications■■ The pressures of globalisation are likely to mean that individual countries will find it
increasingly difficult to act unilaterally – most countries are likely to be less powerful.
This could reduce conflict.
■■ The state is still likely to have the most important voice in international affairs, but
out to 2045 the private sector and non-state organisations are likely to grow more
influential. There is likely to be an increase in the use of private security companies
by governments – interdependencies may strengthen, despite their largely separate
motivations.
■■ Non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, are likely to grow in influenceand some may develop highly capable security forces. The private sector and nongovernmental organisations are likely to increase their influence over government
policy-making as developed states rely on them for providing services and as theygain greater control over markets, resources and infrastructure in fragile states.
■■ Advances in communications technology may increasingly enable those who are
discontent with local forms of governance to challenge it, in pursuit of perceived
betterment.
■■ Some augmentation of humans with embedded sensors and computing devices
is likely to occur within the 2045 timeframe. This may provide advantages suchas improved situational awareness, health monitoring and the ability to modify
physiological and psychological states to increase performance and enhance
resilience.
■■ Mind-controlled machinery is likely to become much more sophisticated, withhuman brain-to-brain communication possible by 2045.

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91Part 1

Defence spending
and capabilities
Chinese defence expenditure is likely to rival that of the US over the next 30 years,
reflecting China’s growing economic strength. These two global powers are likely tospend far more on defence than any other country, accounting for almost half of theworld’s total defence spending by 2045. India’s defence budget could see it occupyinga ‘second tier’ by 2045. Russia is likely to increase defence spending, although not
quickly enough to match that of China, the US or India. European countries are likely tocontinue to spend substantial amounts on their armed forces, although their spending is
unlikely to increase significantly unless a major threat emerges. Advances in technology
are likely to lead to increasingly effective non-lethal capabilities and increase theprecision of weapons. This is likely to alter the nature of conflict.

Economic growth
Defence expenditure, at least in peacetime,
has historically depended on a country’s
economic strength. By 2045, the world’s
largest economies (by GDP) are likely to be
China and the US, with India likely to be theonly country in a ‘second tier’. Some expertssuggest that the US and China may accountfor 45% of global defence spending in 30
years’ time.1 Although the EU as a whole islikely to have a GDP comparable to the US(although smaller than China) and spend
a similar amount to India on defence, nosingle European country is likely to have adefence budget comparable to these three
powers.2 Additionally, China, India and the US
are likely to lead in defence-related researchand development – further enhancing theirmilitary capabilities. Russia is likely to increase
defence spending, although its economy
is unlikely to grow quickly enough to allow
it to match the future defence spending ofChina, the US or India, even if its expenditure
as a percentage of GDP were to rise. Those
countries currently occupying the ‘second tier’of defence spending (such as France, Germany
1 Internal MOD economic analysis (2014)
2 Ibid.

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and the UK) are likely to continue to spend
substantial amounts on their armed forces,
broadly maintaining their positions relative toeach other, but are unlikely to increase theirdefence spending significantly unless a major
threat emerges.

Political impacts of changing
defence spending
At the moment, those countries with thelargest defence budgets are also permanent
members of the UN Security Council. As levelsof defence spending change, it is possiblethat pressure will increase for membershipreform. If some permanent members spend
less on defence, they are likely to be less able
to contribute to military operations, relying
more heavily on support from others. Inturn, this could affect their political power
and influence. As the cost of staying ahead
in a global technology race seems likely
to increase, maintaining a technologicaladvantage could increasingly be achievedby cooperation and burden-sharing. Of
course, higher defence expenditure does notnecessarily lead to greater military influence.
For example, although India is likely to spend
more on defence than the UK, it will almost
certainly have to overcome domestic political

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issues and improve the way it invests toattain the capabilities needed to project
conventional military power globally. While
spending on defence is usually highest duringconflict, deterrence can also be associatedwith high levels of spending – for example
during the Cold War.

Defence expenditure
Expenditure (adjusted for purchasing power
parity)*, expressed in US$ billion at 2012 values.
2012

2025

2035

2045

US

682

1335

China

251

1270

India
RussiaUK
FranceJapan
Germany
Brazil

117
654
113
295
58

108

51

97

46

87

46

67

35

63

Based on analysis by MOD economics unit 2014.
*Purchasing power parity expresses a country’s expenditure in
the equivalent US$ that would be required to purchase the sameamount of goods and services in the US domestic market.

Equipment and personnel cost inflation
Unlike civilian technology, there is no trendthat suggests military equipment will become
cheaper as technology advances. The latest
platforms are more expensive in real terms
than previous generations. If this trend
continues, armed forces are likely to havesmaller quantities of extremely expensive
equipment, suggesting that by 2045 only
the two highest-spending nations – the US
and China – would be able to afford a large
and cutting-edge air force and navy. Whilst
countries account for their Service personnel
costs in differing ways – making comparison
difficult – it seems likely that the Service
personnel costs per capita of many countries(including China) are increasing at a fasterrate than inflation – this may act as a spur for
automation.
Future weapons
Increased levels of defence spending andcontinuing advances in technology are likely
to lead to a variety of new weapons being
available by 2045. For example, laser systems
are maturing, with vehicle and sea-based
platforms already at advanced stages of trial.3
Directed energy weapons, such as lasers, could
be capable of discrete target discrimination,
producing a focussed beam (or wider field) ofelectromagnetic energy or atomic radiation
to cause disruptive or damaging effects toequipment and infrastructure. Such weapons
may also be capable of delivering non-lethal
effect on human targets at considerable
distances. Increases in the number andsophistication of sensors (civil and military) arelikely to increase the accuracy of targeting, as
well as making it increasingly difficult to hidepeople, machines or equipment. As people
use electronic devices more frequently, theability to target an individual by their ‘digital
3 BBC (2013), ‘Rheinmetall Demos Laser that can Shoot
Down Drones’, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/technology-20944726; Greenemeier, L. (2010),‘U.S. Navy Laser Weapon Shoots Down Drones in
Test’, available at http://www.scientificamerican.
com/article.cfm?id=laser-downs-uavs. For
announced deployment see USNI News (2013), ‘Navy
to Deploy Anti-UAV, Small Boat Laser Next Year toGulf’, available at http://news.usni.org/2013/04/08/
navy-to-deploy-anti-uav-small-boat-laser-next-yearto-gulf

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The US/Israeli THEL system has spurred development of more capable laser weapons

Shock:

Weaponised virus
Technological advances could
allow a rogue regime, terrorists or
criminal groups to synthesize highly
contagious, fatal viruses with longincubation periods that would makeearly detection and quarantine very
difficult. The promise of an anti-virus
could be used to extort money, goods
or used for political leverage. It is evenpossible that viruses could, in future, be
engineered to target specific individuals
or groups, making them a more viableweapon.

Global Strategic Trends

signature’ is likely to become easier. Similarly,
as the cost of sequencing an individual’s DNA
continues to fall, targeting an individual using
their DNA may be possible by 2045. We could
also see sophisticated environmental warfare,capable of spreading plant and humandiseases by insects or insect-machine hybrids.
Crops and cattle could be destroyed, as well as
people being incapacitated or killed.
Globalisation, in particular the spread oftechnology, information and ideas, is likely
to give an increasing number of people(both state and non-state actors) access tosophisticated and technologically advanced
capabilities. This is likely to increase theopportunity for unconventional attacks
on technologically sophisticated nations,
including by terrorists. However, futuretechnology may also be developed to predict,detect and counter such attacks.

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Levels of conflict
Although many people see the 20th and early
21st centuries as being the most violent andbloody in human history, evidence suggeststhat the frequency and intensity of wars, aswell as the number of violent deaths, has been
declining sharply and is likely to continue
to fall.4 For example, no western European
countries have gone to war against each othersince the end of World War II, but by contrast,in the 600 years before 1945, they started anaverage of two new wars each year. Although
the number of civil wars increased after 1945,
these have also been on the decline since1991. Countries are also much more willing,
globally, to get involved in peacekeeping,with peace-support operations dramaticallyincreasing since the end of World War II(although they have slightly decreased in
number since 2000).5 Of course, the risk ofa major conflict will almost certainly remain.
Historically, the rise of two or more great
powers in close physical proximity is usuallycorrelated with war or conflict – and there are
a number of such potential flashpoints aroundthe world, looking out to 2045.
Nature of conflict
The nature of conflict will almost certainly
continue to change, particularly as a result
4 Pinker, S. (2011), ‘A History of Violence: Edge
Masterclass’, available at http://edge.org/
conversation/mc2011-history-violence-pinker

of technology. Increasing use of unmannedsystems may mean that, in the future, physicalconflict could occur between unmannedsystems (for example, using remotely piloted
aircraft to attack an unmanned oil installation).
The opportunities for bloodless attacks could
lower the threshold for conflict. Similarly,
as people become more connected anddependent on technology, the potential for
inflicting significant harm on an adversary
without the need for violence, is likely toincrease. Power distribution networks orbanking systems could be closed down, rather
than more physically destructive action being
taken. Furthermore, globalisation is likely toprovide opportunities for actors to createsocial and political instability. For example,
the reach and penetration of the internet
could be used to spread disinformation; social
media could be used to incite specific interest
groups and organisations; and the actor’s
diaspora communities could also be exploited,particularly where they have local grievances.
When violence does occur, technology is likely
to make applying it more precise, and possibly,
more effective. For example, targetedassassinations of the family members of aruling elite (or the threat of them) may havemore of a deterrent effect than the threat ofwar. Nevertheless, war is ultimately a humanendeavour. It will be humans who choose
to go to war, it will be humans who can stop
wars and it will be humans who suffer theconsequences of war.

5 Ibid.

Defence and security implications■■ The US and China are likely to have similarly sized defence budgets by 2045,
potentially out-spending the rest of the world.
■■ India could have a defence budget equivalent to the EU’s total spending on defence.
This would put India in a ‘second tier’ of global defence expenditure, with a ‘thirdtier’ (comprising countries such as France, Germany, Russia and the UK).
■■ The link between expenditure and capability is not straightforward. Domestic
political problems may undermine the effectiveness of some countries’ armed
forces. Other countries may choose not to develop global military reach.
■■ Increasing real-terms equipment costs indicate that platforms will become evermore expensive. Higher levels of defence spending may not lead to armed forces
larger than today’s.

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97Part 2

Geographic

Northern America

Expanding on the observations made inPart 1, we consider regional and (whereappropriate) country-specific effects ofthemes, trends and drivers.
Northern America.................................................. 101
Latin America and the Caribbean............109
Europe...............................................................................117
Middle East and North Africa.......................125
Sub-Saharan Africa............................................... 133
Central Asia................................................................. 141
South & East Asia and Oceania................... 147
Polar regions..............................................................155
Space.................................................................................165

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99

3
5

2

5

4

1

1
2
3
4
5

BermudaCanadaGreenlandSaint Pierre and Miquelon
United States of America

Part 2

Northern America

By 2045, Northern America’s population is likely to grow to between around 394478 million and become more ethnically diverse. Climate change is likely to open up
shipping routes during the summer months, as well as new areas for extracting minerals
and hydrocarbons in the Arctic. However, it is also likely to cause significant harmthrough heatwaves, droughts, and flooding across the region. Northern America’s
economic outlook is positive, boosted by newly accessible energy reserves, and it
is expected to integrate ever more closely with the global economy. While security
challenges (including the threat of terrorism) will probably endure, the region is likely toremain stable and politically influential. The India-US relationship has the potential to
become significant in the timeframe, but the pre-eminent relationship for the region is
likely to be between China and the US, particularly as trading partners. However, there
will almost certainly remain a number of issues that could give rise to tensions between
the two countries.

Demography
Driven principally by a mixture of immigration
and a high birth rate in the US, the overall
population of Northern America is likely toincrease from 352 million today to between
394 to 478 million by 2045.1 Canada’s
population is expected to grow to between
40 to 48 million, although this is likely to be
due to immigration rather than the birthrate, as the latter is expected to reduce.
Canada’s population is likely to be increasingly
ethnically diverse, but less so than that of the
US. While Canada’s population is likely toage, immigration and a changing economic
emphasis towards production should help
meet the demographic challenge. The US
population is expected to have grown by
about 80 million by 2045,2 and will be more
ethnically diverse. By 2045, the US is likely
to have a strong working age population
comfortably able to provide for its elderly.

This is likely to differentiate the US from mostother developed economies, playing a keyrole in ensuring that the country’s economy
continues to prosper. The social impact ofthese changing demographics is expected
to be comparatively small due to the strong
and inclusive nature of American culture andits continuing progress in managing diversity.
Radical changes to US policy (especiallyforeign policy) as a result of its changing
ethnic mix are, therefore, unlikely.

1 UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012
Revision’, available at http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/
panel_population.htm

3 Kotkin, J. (2010), ‘America 2050: Where and How We’ll
Live’, available at http://www.newgeography.com/
content/001469-america-2050-where-and-howwell-live

2 Ibid.

Global Strategic Trends

Urbanisation
The populations of the major cities are likely
to grow significantly,3 in line with global
trends towards increased urbanisation. If
regeneration programmes are prioritised,scores of new communities could be createdfollowing the redevelopment of rundown
inner cities – although some urban areas
may fail, contributing to security issues. New“

The US is likely
to have a strong
working age
population
comfortably able
to provide for its
elderly.

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Part 2

Northern America

A growing population living in the urban environment
55% shareof global
population
2015
2045

2015

Rural

2025

Urban

2035
2045
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

towns are also likely to spring up aroundnewly developed oil and gas fields. Citydwelling is likely to remain popular with theyoung and ambitious, but suburbia – thepredominant form of America life – willprobably evolve beyond the conventional
1950s-style ‘production suburbs’ of vast
housing tracts constructed around existing
commercial and industrial centres. Instead,they are likely to become more compact
and self-sufficient, providing office space
as well as accommodating an increasingly
home-based workforce. One in four or five
Northern Americans are likely to work fromhome by 2045 – and as remote working relies
on frequent communication with others,potentially across the globe, this may break the

US population by group
The charts show the change in population
composition between today and 2045.
2045
2012

400

450

500

traditional isolation of rural communities in theheartland of Northern America.4

Education
The best-performing Northern American
universities, particularly those in the US, arelikely to remain globally competitive. Thisshould benefit the region’s economy andallow it to maintain technical dominance ina number of fields, although it is of note thatmany of the students enrolled on graduate
and science and technology courses areborn outside Northern America. Northern
American universities are also at the forefrontof digital learning, and may well retain
leadership in this field – further benefiting theregion’s economy and academic standing. In
the US the standard of primary and secondary
education for some of the less affluent iscomparatively low for a developed country,
and on current trends is likely to remain so.
This may mean that some elements of thelabour force may not be able to achieve theeducational standards that are likely to beneeded in the information-driven economy of2045. This could lead to high unemployment
rates, further exacerbating inequality, which
may lead to significant social tension. If, as
seems likely, educational standards in othercountries continue to rise, the US economy
may start losing its competitiveness if nomitigating action is taken.5

African-American

American Indians

4 Kotkin, J., op. cit.

Asian-American

Hispanic

5 Nye Jr., J. S. (2010), ‘The Future of American Power’,available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/66796/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-future-ofamerican-powerWhite

Source: US Census Bureau and UN Population Division

102

350

Population in millions

Source: UN ‘World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision’

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2

Northern America

Climate change
Climate change is likely to have a mixed
impact on Northern America, although theoverall effect will probably be negative.
Melting ice in the Arctic is likely to open up
areas of land for extracting minerals andhydrocarbons, and access to new summer
shipping routes, could have a beneficial
impact on Northern America’s economy.
Melting permafrost in northern Canada andAlaska could, however, have large and costly
implications for infrastructure that is built
on top of it, such as pipelines or ice roads.
Climate change will probably have a negative
impact on the forest industry, extending theforest fire season and facilitating the spread ofpests, such as the pine beetle.
The impact on agriculture from climatechange is also likely to be mixed. Averageannual rainfall is likely to increase in all regions
except for the Canadian Prairies, the west
coast, and south-west US. The Colorado River(a major freshwater source used for agriculture,
water storage and energy generation), could
see run-off reduced by around 10-30% by
2045, potentially leading to water shortages.
The cost of water stress on agriculture
throughout Northern America is expected to
be in the billions of dollars by 2045. Severe
heatwaves could hit Northern America, withsome east coast cities (including Washington,
New York and Toronto) likely to see an increasein their maximum summer temperatures. This
could cause power failures, crop damage andhigh death-rates among vulnerable people
such as the young and elderly. At the sametime, moderate climate change could increase
yields from rain-fed and irrigated agriculture
in some parts of the US and Canada. The US
produces more than 30% of the world’s wheat,soybean, corn and rice. Some crop yields
could increase with moderate changes in the
climate (particularly in northern regions) but
continuing warming may cause significant
decreases. One study suggests that maize
yield could decrease by as much as 18% by
the 2040s.6 Rising sea levels and intense
6 Urban, D. et al. (2012), ‘Projected Temperature
Changes Indicate Significant Increase inInterannual Variability of U.S. Maize Yields’,
available at http://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007%2Fs10584-012-0428-2

Global Strategic Trends

rainfall could leave coastal cities and regions
more exposed to flooding, particularly in theMississippi delta and cities along the east coast
such as New Orleans, Miami and New York.

Energy independence
If the recent adoption of new oil and shalegas production techniques such as ‘fracking’continue to increase production at expected
rates, the US could become the world’s
number one oil producer by 2017 and a net
exporter by 2030. Exploiting and exporting
unconventional oil and gas, however, is notwithout its challenges. If such problems can beovercome (as seems likely), the cost of energy
could return to pre-1970s prices.7 This would
provide a significant advantage to the Canadianand US economies, which contain particularly
energy-intensive industries. Consumers should
also benefit through lower energy bills, leaving
them more money for discretionary purchases;
and because natural gas burns more cleanly
than coal, there could be environmental
benefits. Northern America is also likely
to generate an increasing proportion of its
energy from renewable resources, further
strengthening its energy security. Energy
independence is unlikely to mean that
Northern America will become detached fromglobal markets. On the contrary, the region is
likely to export hydrocarbons internationallyand – with Asia’s demand for hydrocarbons
expected to grow – the potential for mutually
beneficial trade should increase. However,relationships with countries that used to exporthydrocarbons to Northern America may cool as
mutual dependence lessens.

“

The US could
become theworld’s number
one oil producer
by 2017 and a net
exporter by 2030.

”

Economy
Despite the expected shift in the economic
centre of gravity to the south and east,
Northern America is expected to remain amajor player in the world economy out to2045. Its share of global GDP is likely to remain
7 Christopher J. Wolfe, Chief Investment Officer of thePrivate Banking and Investment Group at Merrill
Lynch, “We could end up with the cost of energy
to U.S. manufacturers returning to what it was in
the 1970s or even the ’60s, adjusted for inflation.”
Quoted in Merrill Lynch (2013), ‘A Transforming
World’, available at http://wealthmanagement.
ml.com/publish/content/application/pdf/GWMOL/
AR9D50CF-MLWM.pdf

103

Part 2

Northern America

An ageing population
Population by ten-year age group and sex
Age group
100+

Male

Female

90-99

2015
2045

2015
2045

80-89
70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Millions of people
Source: UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’“Northern America
is expected toremain a major
player in theworld economy
out to 2045.

”

about 20%, and the US will almost certainly
remain the dominant player in the region with
its 85% share of the regional economy unlikely
to change significantly. While China’s GDP ishighly likely to have surpassed that of the US by2045, on a per-capita basis the US will probably
be five times richer. Furthermore, although the
US is likely to face a variety of internal issues,these are likely to be less severe than domestic
problems affecting China, if only because of
the difference in the sheer numbers of people
involved. This is likely to mean that the US
will have greater uncommitted resources
available than China (or any other country)– a position that is only likely to strengthen
due to its newly-available energy reserves.
However, despite this positive outlook, there
are a number of risks to the US, such as therising costs of healthcare and other welfare
entitlements which could burden its economy
by 2045. In particular, if its debt grows, thecost of servicing it could become increasingly
onerous – and an increasing threat to the longterm health of the US economy.

The international system
Regional economic interdependence is
expected to strengthen, and although thedevelopment of the North American Free
Trade Agreement has been somewhat bumpy,
the shared interests of its member countries

104(Canada, Mexico and the US) could make it
one of the strongest regional economic blocs
in the world.8 Northern American countries
are also likely to continue to deepen theirintegration with the international system.
Both Canada and the US are likely to remaincommitted to the Trans-Pacific Partnershipand they, along with Bermuda, Greenland andSt Pierre and Miquelon are likely to be includedin the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade and Investment
Partnership. The region is likely to remain
highly influential within the international
system and the US is likely to remain at theforefront of world politics. By 2045, the US is
still likely to have the most powerful military
in the world and retain considerable politicalinfluence.
NATO is likely to remain the key security
alliance for Northern American countries,
although US (and possibly Canadian)commitments elsewhere in the world arelikely to mean that European countries will
have to assume more of the security burdenin their region – and possibly in Africa andthe Middle East as well. Nevertheless, the US
will probably continue to invest in NATO and8 Lanthemann, M. (2014), ‘NAFTA and the Future of
Canada, Mexico and the United States’, available at
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/nafta-and-futurecanada-mexico-and-united-states

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2

Northern America

in the former could have a knock-on effect on
the global economy.

The region is likely to remain highly
influential within the international system

is likely to remain the guarantor of European
stability. The US and Canada are also bothlikely to continue to be significant contributors
to the UN and the US membership of the UN
Permanent Security Council is highly likely
to continue out to 2045. If the US became
disengaged from the UN, it would be likelythat the organisation’s credibility and capacity
would be severely damaged.

US commitment to the Middle East
A reduced need for Middle Eastern oil(coupled with a shift in the Middle Easternmarkets toward Asia) could bring the UScommitment to the Middle East into question.
However, US involvement in the Middle East isunlikely to alter significantly, as the region willalmost certainly continue to have a significant
bearing on global stability and security. The
US also has long standing commitments tocountries in the region – not least Israel. Quite
apart from political concerns, the oil market
is genuinely global. The price of oil in the
Middle East affects the price of oil producedin the US, meaning that any serious disruption

Global Strategic Trends

US rebalancing towards the
Asia-Pacific region
With the growth in Asia’s economic power,
Canada and the US are likely to increase theirfocus on the region, as demonstrated when
the US announced a rebalancing towards the
Asia-Pacific area. Although both Canada andthe US have strong ties to several countries
in the region, the pre-eminent relationshipis likely to be between China and the
US – one which is likely to continue to be
extremely complex. While the US has viewed
the increase in Chinese military capability,
particularly its lack of transparency, withconcern, America’s economy is tightly tied toChina. China owns US$ 1.4 trillion of American
debt (approximately eight percent)9 and themutual trade in goods is valued at US$ 502
billion annually.10 Both figures could growout to 2045. Such economic interdependence
is likely to act as a stabilising influence andshould reduce the likelihood of military
conflict.
There are, however, a number of issues
which may result in conflict between thetwo powers. US arms sales to Taiwan, US
exercises with South Korea and China’s
relationships with Iran and North Korea could
all exacerbate tensions. US security treaties
with Japan, the Republic of Korea and thePhilippines also mean that if these countries
miscalculate their responses to China, the US
could be brought into the ensuing conflict.
Managing the Chinese-American bilateralrelationship is likely to be extremely time- andresource-consuming, with the potential riseof India from 2030 onwards constituting asignificant complication. Canada has fewer
binding obligations with Asian countries
and, as a result, is likely to continue to be lessconstrained by its treaties than the US.

“

US involvementin the Middle Eastis unlikely to altersignificantly, as
the region willalmost certainly
continue to havea significant
bearing on global
stability andsecurity.

”

9 Rogers, S. (2012), ‘US Debt: How Big Is It and Who
Owns It?’, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
news/datablog/2011/jul/15/us-debt-how-big-whoowns
10 Figures for 2011 from US Census Bureau, available
at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/
c5700.html

105Part 2

Northern America

Canada may continue to reject claims over rights of navigational passage

Regional integrity
The Northern American region will almost
certainly remain one of the most stable in
the world and the threat of major instability
or conflict in the region is very low – but thethreat from terrorism will probably endure.
Though diverse, the US has a strong culture
and sense of national identity and it is highly
unlikely that any state will secede from the
US – although a number of organisations
seeking independence for their states doexist. Similarly, it is likely that Canada willretain its territorial integrity, although thepossibility of a province or territory gaining
independence cannot be wholly discounted.
The populations of Bermuda and St Pierre
and Miquelon are likely to choose to remain
dependent territories of the UK and France
respectively so long as their prosperity andway of life is maintained. Greenland, however,is likely to have chosen independence, orsome lesser form of home rule, by 2045. Thereis likely to be competition for influence inGreenland, perhaps particularly from China,
especially if – as is expected – melting ice
opens up Greenland’s exclusive economic

106

zone. It is also possible that Greenland will seek
to join one or more of the North American Free
Trade Alliance, the EU and NATO.

The Northern American Arctic
The Arctic is likely to be an increasingly
important region for the US and Canada out
to 2045, particularly as melting ice opens
areas for mining and hydrocarbon extraction,
as well as shipping. Canada will probably
continue to emphasise the importance of
the Arctic to its national interests and may
continue to reject US and Danish claims
over rights of navigational passage within
its exclusive economic zone. Despite thesedisagreements, it is likely to maintain good
relations with both countries. Canada and the
US are likely to reach agreement on a rangeof Arctic issues, particularly over gas and oil
distribution pipelines from the Arctic to themarkets of Northern America. The US may
be reluctant to assert its sovereignty overdisputed areas of the Chukchi Sea with Russia
and may find controlling fishing within the
Bering Sea challenged by several countries if
the region continues to be a significant source

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2

Northern Americaof fish. Although Russia sees the Arctic as anarea of key national interest, open conflict
between Russia and Northern Americancountries is highly unlikely. While Greenland’s
economy and political influence is likely tobe relatively small, its strategic location andmineral resources (particularly uranium and rareearth elements) mean that it is likely to be an
important partner for both Canada and the US.

Defence and security implications■■ While Northern America’s economic outlook is positive, US debt could grow, withsignificant ramifications for its future.
■■ Although China is likely to surpass the US in terms of GDP, the US is still likely toremain, militarily, the most powerful country in the world.
■■ A reduced need for Middle Eastern oil is unlikely to alter significantly the UScommitment to the region, which will almost certainly continue to have a significant
bearing on global stability and security.
■■ NATO is likely to remain the key security alliance for Northern American countries,
although US (and possibly Canadian) commitments elsewhere in the world
may mean that European countries will have to take on more of the burden ofmaintaining security in their region.
■■ There are a number of issues and treaties which may involve the US and China inarmed conflict – with potentially dire consequences regionally and globally.
■■ The Arctic is likely to be an increasingly important region for Northern America. The
US and Canada (and possibly Greenland) are likely to grow military capabilities thatcan operate there.

Global Strategic Trends

107

16

32

21

39

2

45

25

30

28

29

46
4 17

34

18

38 10

19

12

7
26

42

1

5

31

33

40

11

6
41

44
15

35

24

48
27
14

43

23

20

9

37

1 Anguilla
2 Antigua and Barbuda
3 Argentina
4 Aruba
5 Bahamas
6 Barbados
7 Belize
8 Bolivia
9 Brazil
10 British Virgin Islands
11 Caribbean Netherlands
12 Cayman Islands
13 Chile
14 Colombia
15 Costa Rica
16 Cuba
17 Curaçao
18 Dominica
19 Dominican Republic
20 Ecuador
21 El Salvador
22 Falkland Islands
23 French Guiana
24 Grenada

25 Guadeloupe
26 Guatemala
27 Guyana
28 Haiti
29 Honduras
30 Jamaica
31 Martinique
32 Mexico
33 Montserrat
34 Nicaragua
35 Panama
36 Paraguay
37 Peru
38 Puerto Rico
39 Saint Kitts and Nevis
40 Saint Lucia
41 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
42 Saint Maarten
43 Suriname
44 Trinidad and Tobago
45 Turks and Caicos Islands
46 United States Virgin Islands
47 Uruguay
48 Venezuela

8

36
13

3

47

22

Part 2Latin America andthe Caribbean
Latin America and the Caribbean are likely to remain politically and economicallyfragmented, with individual countries pursuing bilateral relationships rather thanforming a strong unified bloc. Brazil and Mexico are likely to show the strongest growthin the region, with both countries likely to be major global economies (in terms of GDP)by 2045. Rising sea levels and extreme rainfall are likely to expose a number of large
and populous cities in coastal regions around South America to additional flooding
risk. Socially, weak governance is likely to continue to inhibit progress in a number ofcountries, with the growing consumer class being increasingly vocal in its challenge
to regimes. Some Latin American countries are highly likely to have mature militaryindustrial complexes and armed forces capable of performing on the global stage by2045. Regional stability is highly likely to endure, although producing and globally
distributing narcotics will almost certainly continue, with an increasing ‘home market’.
However, the emergence of a fully-fledged narco-state is unlikely.

Political and economic fragmentation
With a population as large as that of the EU,
the Latin American and Caribbean region ischaracterised by a diverse economic scale,political orientation, language, history andculture. While there is a desire for a strong
pan-regional organisation, efforts to create
one have not been realised. It is likely thatthe region will remain a loose communityof countries rather than becoming an
institutionalised federal entity. While subregional organisations such as CELAC,
CARICOM and Mercosur1 are likely to continue,
they are unlikely to develop into powerful,unified institutions. This makes it probablethat relationships with external actors will be
conducted on a bilateral basis.

1 CELAC: Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States. CARICOM: Caribbean Community. Mercosur:
an economic and political agreement between
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela,
promoting free trade.

Global Strategic Trends

Global economic powerhouses
The region’s most powerful economies,
Brazil and Mexico, are likely to be among theworld’s ten largest economies by 2045. Bothcountries possess natural resources, includinghydrocarbons, which have the potential
to be very lucrative. However, exploitingthese resources has, to date, proved quite
challenging. For example, Mexico is estimatedto have the same amount of oil as Kuwait.
However, its state-owned oil company has
lacked the expertise to develop Mexico’s
oil fields, and the country’s constitution has
prevented private and public companies
from entering into joint ventures.2 Mexico
therefore has to import more than 40% of its
petrol from abroad,3 – although this could bechanging. Similarly, due to a lack of refining
2 Thomson, A. (2013), ‘Rusty Wheels of Pemex Require
Much Oiling’, available at http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/0d5a467c-9bb0-11e2-8485-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz2VBhfGoiL
3 Nedelec-Lucas, C. (2012), ‘Unrefined Company:
PEMEX and Gasoline Imports’, available at http://gbroundup.com/2012/08/07/unrefined-companypemex-and-gasoline-imports

109

Part 2Latin America and the Caribbean

A growing population living in the urban environment
8
9% shareof global
population
2015
2045

2015

Rural

2025

Urban

2035
2045
0

Source: UN ‘World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision’“

Trade routes andchoke points willprobably become
increasingly
important toLatin Americancountries.

”

100

200

300

400

500

capacity, Brazil’s state oil company, Petrobras,
had to increase its petrol imports by 90% in2012 to meet consumer demand. Due to theGovernment setting the price of oil, Petrobras
had to sell on the fuel to the public at a huge
loss.4 Unless such issues are resolved, Brazil
and Mexico could find themselves in theposition of merely being resource providers
for other economies, stopping their progress
towards becoming economic and politicalpowers.

Foreign investment
The US is likely to remain the pre-eminent
external economic power in the region, withmany countries deepening their economic
ties with it. Compared to the US, China is
a comparatively minor regional provider offoreign direct investment. 5 To date, China hasconcentrated its regional investment on Peru,
Colombia and Ecuador, buying vast amountsof commodities and providing state loans.
These purchases and loans often require theborrower to open up their internal markets tocheap Chinese goods, reducing the demandfor domestic products. Out to 2045, China’s
4 This measure resulted in the refining sector of
Petrobras posting a 2012 loss of some 22.9 billion
Reais (US$ 11 billion). MercoPress (2013), ‘Petrobras
Still Going Strong but 2012 Low Profits and HighDebt Pound on Prospects’, available at http://
en.mercopress.com/2013/02/05/petrobras-stillgoing-strong-but-2012-low-profits-and-high-debtpound-on-prospects
5 OCO (2012), ‘Latin America’s Decade? FDI Trends andPerspectives’, available at http://www.ocoglobal.
com/uploads/default/files/Latin_Americas_
Decade_-_FDI_trends_and_perspecives.pdf

110

600

700

800

900

Population in millions

relationship with the region is likely to remain
an often uneasy marriage of convenience,with some Latin American countries resenting
the conditions attached to China’s financial
involvement. China’s interest will almost
certainly remain economic and any move toinfluence Latin American politics, social norms
or wider development will almost certainly bein the context of ensuring continued accessto markets and commodities. Trade with Asia
more generally is likely to increase, particularly
for the ‘Pacific Alliance’ countries in the westof Latin America (Chile, Colombia, Mexico andPeru). Trade routes and choke points, suchas the Malacca Straits, will probably become
increasingly important to Latin Americancountries – some form of military presencein the area may be necessary to assist with
policing. EU countries are likely to continue
to invest in the region primarily on a bilateral,
rather than collective, basis (although some EU
negotiations are likely to continue), increasing
their trade links out to 2045.

Migration
Latin American economies currently struggle
to produce a sufficient number of skilled andeducated workers. This is likely to continue
out to 2045, attracting economic migrants
from Europe and elsewhere into the region.6
If Europe’s economic problems continue,
6 The number of European immigrants to Brazilrose sharply by 50% to almost 1.5 million in thefirst half of 2011. Emerging Market Musings (2011),‘Brazil’s Brain Gain Not Enough’, available at http://
emergingmarketmusings.com/2011/12/11/brazilsbrain-gain-not-enough/Global Strategic Trends

Part 2Latin America and the Caribbean

this flow is likely to increase, leading to somesignificantly-sized European communities
in the region, primarily working in well-paidmanagement or technical jobs. In stablecountries, this is likely to bring new business
opportunities, but in those less stable, it may
also mean that countries such as Portugal andSpain could have significant ‘populations at
risk’. In extreme (but unlikely) cases, foreign
nationals living and working in Latin America
may need protecting or evacuating if severe
natural disasters or rising political tensions
occur.

the Internet, a more confident and affluent
consumer class is likely to be increasingly
vocal in its scrutiny of governing regimes. The
growing consumer class, particularly in larger
and more affluent countries like Brazil andArgentina, is also likely to find itself increasingly
beset by health problems commonly found inwestern countries, such as obesity and related
illnesses like type-two diabetes – 18% of theArgentine population is currently obese. 8
Consequently, workforce productivity could
be lowered and a rise in healthcare costs could
burden these countries’ economies.

The consumer class
Latin America and the Caribbean are likely
to see an expanding consumer class out to2045. The consumer class has grown by 50%
in the last ten years, and now comprises 30%of the region’s population, with growth likely
to continue.7 From a regional perspective,
this growth in relative wealth is likely to havea positive, stabilising effect, as more people
feel that they are prospering within the current
system. However, with greater access to

ClimateAverage temperatures are projected toincrease by several degrees across the region,
particularly in the south, but less so in thetropics. Heatwaves are expected to increasein frequency and intensity over much of theregion. Annual precipitation projections
indicate a drying over the eastern Amazon
basin, Brazil and southern Chile, with increases
over north western South America. Sea-level

7 World Bank (2012), ‘Latin America: Middle Class Hits
Historic High’, available at http://www.worldbank.
org/en/news/feature/2012/11/13/crecimiento-clasemedia-america-latina

8 Hill, A. (2011), ‘Expanding Waistlines - Obesityin Argentina’, available at http://www.
argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/
newsfromargentina/expanding-waistlines-obesityin-argentina/“

Growth in relative
wealth is likely tohave a positive,
stabilising effect,as more people
feel that they
are prospering
within the current
system.

”Santiago, Chile. An example of growing urban prosperity in the region

Global Strategic Trends

111Part 2Latin America and the Caribbean

An ageing population
Population by ten-year age group and sex
Age group
100+

Male

Female

90-99

2015
2045

2015
2045

80-89
70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Millions of people
Source: UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’rise, combined with potential increases inextreme precipitation events, could increase
the exposure of a number of large andpopulous cities in coastal regions around
South America.

Water
The rainfall changes across the region, anda projected continuing retreat of glaciersdue to increasing temperatures, is likely toaffect the availability of freshwater acrossSouth America. This could have significant
impacts on agricultural productivity, water
for hydro-energy (which meets around 60%of domestic energy demand) and ecosystem
health and diversity. Continued retreat ofglaciers is likely to increase glacial runoff inthe short-medium term, but as the glacial
mass reduces, reductions in glacial-water
availability could occur. Drought events in theregion are projected to occur more frequently,
particularly in the Amazon.
Agriculture
In the south eastern part of South America,
crop yields (such as soy, maize and wheat) areprojected to either remain stable or slightly
increase out to 2045, due to more favourable
temperature conditions. However, water
limitations and an increase in extreme weather

112

events may reduce crop yields. In tropicalregions, the changing climate is likely to
reduce crop production, particularly affecting
crops such as beans, corn, cassava and coffee.

Marine ecosystem productivity
The future impact of climate change on the
Humboldt Current (one of the world’s mostproductive marine systems) is uncertain, but
fisheries could be damaged. Coral reefs,
and the marine ecosystems and fisheries
they support, have been identified as ‘at risk’
due to increasing temperatures and ocean
acidification. This may reduce the productivityof reefs to the north of the region, affecting
those who depend on them for work andfood.
Governance
For its economies to grow, the region willprobably have to strengthen its politicalinstitutions, many of which currently faceconsiderable challenges in delivering effective
governance, tackling underdeveloped
commercial legislation, employment law andfiscal credibility.

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2Latin America and the Caribbean

Without action, these issues are likely tocontinue to have a damaging effect on levelsof foreign direct investment, limiting theregion’s economic potential.9 There are someindicators that the region’s governance isimproving. For example, in 2001, Argentina’s
civil government dealt with the largest
sovereign debt default in history. Despite
subsequent civil unrest, Argentina did notrevert to military rule, evidence that civilian
institutions and government have taken hold.
Nevertheless, corruption in Latin America andthe Caribbean is likely to remain a significant
issue, with Transparency International
assessing a number of the region’s countries as
having a serious corruption problem.10

9 The World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business Rankings’
places the region’s two largest economies (Brazil
and Argentina) at 116th and 126th respectively, outof 189 nations evaluated. Doing Business (2013),‘Economy Rankings’, available at http://www.
doingbusiness.org/rankings
10 Paraguay ranks 150, Venezuela 160, Guyana 136,
Nicaragua 127, Mexico 106. Chile, by contrast, israted 22nd out of 177 countries. Transparency
International (2013), ‘Corruption Perceptions Index
2013’, available at http://www.transparency.org/
cpi2013/results

Military development
Although defence expenditure in Latin
American countries overall remains low
in global terms,11 by 2045 Brazil is likely tohave the ability to project power globally.
Brazil is buying more military capability andmodernising its military-industrial complex.
It has recently stated its intention to build
nuclear- as well as conventionally-powered
submarines. While the degree to which Brazil
would wish to use these new assets for power
projection remains unclear, it is apparent
that the capabilities needed for Brazil to playa large part in global security will almost
certainly exist within (approximately) the next
15 years. Like Brazil, Argentina also aspires todevelop nuclear propulsion technology to
power “vessels or submersibles” and has madea commitment that “the current 0.5% of GDP[spent on defence] will be increased in coming
years to reach 1.5%.”12
11 SIPRI (2012), ‘Trends in World Defence Expenditure
2012’, available at http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/
SIPRIFS1304.pdf
12 MercoPress (2010), ‘Argentine [sic] to Increase
Budget Defence [sic] 50%, Recovering Losses of
Falklands War’, available at http://en.mercopress.
com/2010/09/01/argentine-to-increase-budgetdefence-50-recovering-losses-of-falklands-war

Brazil is increasing investment in defence capability

Global Strategic Trends

113Part 2Latin America and the Caribbean

Although Argentina’s military is currently
geared towards local defence and security,
an increase in defence spending could see
more capable armed forces develop over time.
Given the country’s sensitivities regarding therecent history of its military, however, lavish
defence expenditure and large armed forces
are likely to remain unpopular propositions
for most Argentines. Other Latin Americancountries may also develop aspirations for
global power projection and political influenceout to 2045.

Similarly, Chile has recently offered to become
more involved in peace support operations(including with the EU) and Columbia has
expressed a desire to form a link with NATO.
As Latin American countries become moreengaged, they are likely to seek greater
influence in international institutions –including the UN Security Council.

Although tension between some countries
is likely to endure out to 2045, Latin America
is unlikely to see an ‘arms race’. While
increasingly capable militaries and a maturing
military-industrial complex will almost
certainly be features of the larger countries,
particularly within South America, a regional
state-on-state conflict is unlikely. Althoughsuch wars have taken place comparatively
recently, the increasingly interdependent
nature of regional trade, as well as diplomatic
activities, provides strong incentives forpeace.13
No country in the region has made a publicdeclaration of its intent to acquire nuclear
weapons. Indeed, some have enshrined nonnuclear armed clauses in their constitutions
or signed up to binding treaties. However,both Brazil and Argentina have pursued suchcapabilities in the past, albeit when they
were under military dictatorships. By 2045 a
number of countries in the region will almost
certainly have both the resources and thelatent expertise to pursue a nuclear weapons
programme should a political imperative
emerge.
Out to 2045, many Latin American countries
are likely to become more globally engaged.
Several countries could actively use theirmilitaries more internationally, probably
in peace support and security assistanceroles. Brazil, for example, has a programmeof military cooperation and development
assistance along the African Atlantic coast.

13 For example, the Cenepa War of 1995 between Peru
and Ecuador, which resulted in approximately 500
casualties.

114

The region produces nearly all of
the world’s coca leaf

Narcotics
A recent UN report stated that Colombia,
Peru and Bolivia are responsible for producing
almost 100% of the world’s coca leaf.14
Narcotics intended for Northern American andEuropean markets will probably continue tobe smuggled through Central America andthe Caribbean. Drug cartels are highly likely
to remain a significant threat to social andpolitical stability throughout Latin America
and the Caribbean. As the region’s own
14 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2011), ‘World Drug
Report 2011’, available at http://www.unodc.org/
documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World_
Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2Latin America and the Caribbean

consumer class becomes more affluent, there
is likely to be an increase in the ‘home’ drugs
market. Some studies have suggested that
“Brazil is now the world’s number one market
for crack cocaine - with at least 1 million hardcore users.”15 It is unlikely that a full-blown

15 Ghosh, P. (2013), ‘Brazil Ensnared In Crack Cocaine
Epidemic: Sao Paulo takes Desperate Measures’,available at http://www.ibtimes.com/brazilensnared-crack-cocaine-epidemic-sao-paulo-takesdesperate-measures-1014090

narco-state – a region controlled by drugcartels, with non-existent law-enforcement –will develop in the region, given the improved
nature of domestic drugs policy and US
interests. However, smaller countries such as
Belize, El Salvador and Panama are likely toremain highly vulnerable to the influence ofdrug cartels, as well as the related crime andcorruption that such influence brings.

Defence and security implications■■ A mature military-industrial complex will probably be a feature of the wealthier Latin
American countries by 2045.
■■ While a Latin American arms race is unlikely, some countries are likely to have much
more capable armed forces by 2045 than at present, with world-class capabilities insome areas.
■■ A regional state-on-state conflict is unlikely to occur.
■■ The emergence of a nuclear-armed country in Latin America by 2045 cannot be
ruled out, despite existing treaties to the contrary. The resources and knowledge tocreate nuclear weapons will almost certainly be present in a number of countries in
the region.
■■ More Latin American countries and their militaries are likely to become increasingly
active internationally.
■■ It is not likely that a narco-state will emerge in Latin America or the Caribbean by
2045, but drug cartels are likely to continue to have significant influence in a numberof countries for the foreseeable future.

Global Strategic Trends

115

23
46
14

15

35

40

13
27
12
25

24

29
4

50
34

36
18

5

11

30

8

49
43

16

47

32
2

3

28

44
41

39

9
6

26

42
33

21

7
1

45

37

38

22

17

48
20

19

1 Albania
2 Andorra
3 Austria
4 Belarus
5 Belgium
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina
7 Bulgaria
8 Channel Islands
9 Croatia
10 Cyprus
11 Czech Republic
12 Denmark
13 Estonia
14 Faeroe Islands
15 Finland
16 France
17 Georgia

31

18 Germany
19 Gibraltar
20 Greece
21 Holy See
22 Hungary
23 Iceland
24 Ireland
25 Isle of Man
26 Italy
27 Latvia
28 Liechtenstein
29 Lithuania
30 Luxembourg
31 Malta
32 Monaco
33 Montenegro
34 Netherlands

10

35 Norway
36 Poland
37 Portugal
38 Republic of Moldova
39 Romania
40 Russian Federation
41 San Marino
42 Serbia
43 Slovakia
44 Slovenia
45 Spain46 Sweden
47 Switzerland
48 TFYR Macedonia
49 Ukraine
50 United Kingdom

Part 2EuropeEurope is likely to remain a substantial part of the global economy, with the euro
and the single market still likely to exist by 2045. EU membership is likely to expand,although it is unlikely that all countries who wish to join will be included. The effects
of climate change are likely to be less severe in Europe than in most other regions,although increased water scarcity in the south may limit agricultural productivity
there. Energy consumption is likely to decrease out to 2045, although hydrocarbons
will probably continue to be the continent’s main source of fuel. Europe is likely to facea range of security challenges, but disagree internally over how to address them. As
the US focusses increasingly on Asia, Europe will almost certainly be expected to makea greater contribution to its own security. Russia is likely to continue to be a major
power, maintaining a substantial capability for regional intervention by 2045. China andEurope are unlikely to view each other as threats and may become partners in managing
future crises.

The European economy
Europe is likely to remain a substantial part of
the global economy, although the European
economic area is likely to face internal
structural problems. As Europe already has
a mature economy, opportunities for further
development are comparatively few (relative
to the developing countries), which may
mean that growth prospects remain low. The
Organisation for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD) estimates that there
will be annual growth of 1.5-2% by 2045.1
Nevertheless, Europe is still likely to have among
the highest levels of consumption and wealthin the world – the EU single market is likely
to remain a globally important and attractive
trade area. Despite competitive pressures,
there is likely to continue to be a strong politicaland economic relationship between the EU
and US. This is likely to be driven by common
values, extensive financial interdependence andshared interests between EU- and US-based
multinational corporations.
1 OECD (2011), ‘An Economic Projection to 2050: The
OECD ENV-Linkages’

Global Strategic Trends

The euro and the European single market
will probably continue out to 2045, but arelikely to face continuing economic challenges.
Some countries may withdraw (or be forced towithdraw) from the single currency by 2045.
It is possible that the euro will expand to takein new members, perhaps from EU accession
countries. Further integration is likely to occur
to bolster economic recovery and prepare for
future crises. However, political and economic
tensions leading to the collapse of the euro
cannot be ruled out. This would be a severe
setback for European integration and have asignificant impact on the global economy.

EU membership
By 2045, it is likely that the EU will include mostof the countries in the western Balkans. Turkey
is likely to become increasingly important toEuropean security, as the size, capability andincreasing modernisation of its armed forcesmeans that it may have one of the morecapable militaries in Europe, as well as theMiddle East.2 Despite Turkey’s importance,
2 IISS (2013), ‘The Military Balance 2013’117

Part 2EuropeA declining population with fewer living in the rural environment
910% shareof global
population
2015
2045

2015

Rural

2025

Urban

2035
2045
0

Source: UN ‘World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision’“

Diaspora Muslim
communities in
Europe are likely
to be increasingly
affected by intrafaith discord in the
Middle East.

”

100

200

300

400

500

it may not receive full membership of the EU
by 2045, as existing members are likely to fear
high costs of integration and disruptions tolocal labour markets. These reasons may alsorule out other countries wishing to join the EU.
The EU is likely, however, to seek far-reachingtrade and cooperation agreements with thesecountries to promote stability.

Urbanisation, diversity and religion
Urbanisation is likely to continue, with supercities straddling national boundaries. Morethan two thirds of the European population
currently live in cities and urbanisation is likely
to increase out to 2045, with large transnational urban regions developing. The UN
estimates that Europe will have more than
20 such areas by 2045, with a substantial
element of south-west Germany, most of theNetherlands and much of Belgium forming
a single agglomeration.3 Urban areas acrossEurope are likely to contain pockets ofsocial deprivation, often containing a highproportion of migrants.
Extensive immigration and mobility of people
within Europe is likely to lead to increasingly
multicultural societies, with a trend towards
secularism. However, local communities
with strong religious beliefs are also likely tocontinue to exist. The majority of Europeans
will probably tolerate integration andimmigration, rather than embrace it, reverting
to a national or regional (rather than European)
identity in times of stress. The Islamic
3 UN Population Division (2011), ‘World Urbanisation
Prospects, 2011 Revision’, available at http://esa.
un.org/unup/

118

600

700

800

Population in millions

population of Europe is expected to continue
to grow, exceeding 58 million by 2030 (8%of the total population),4 but with Christiantraditions likely to remain dominant. Diaspora
Muslim communities in Europe are likely to
be increasingly affected by intra-faith discordin the Middle East. In particular, tension
between Sunni and Shia Islam could spread.
In 2012, Belgium’s largest Shiite mosque wasfire-bombed by hard-line Sunnis.5 While there
may be an increase in incidents, particularly inresponse to events in Asia and the Middle East,
it is unlikely that large-scale violence between
the different sects will occur in Europe itself,
not least because of the small number ofShias.6

Family sizes
European family sizes are likely to remain small,with birth rates expected to remain under
the replacement level of 2.1 children for eachwoman. Population growth is therefore only
likely to occur due to immigration. The UK andFrance are likely to have the highest increases

4 Pew Research Centre (2011), ‘The Future of
the Global Muslim Population’, available at
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/01/
FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF-Feb10.pdf
5 The Economist (2012), ‘The Sword and the Word:
In the Struggle Between the Two Strands of Islam,the Sunnis are on the Rise’, available at http://www.
economist.com/node/21554513
6 In the UK, Shiite leaders claim their number isapproximately 15-20% of local Muslims, whereas
government figures put the proportion at 5%. See
Puelings, J. (2010), ‘Fearing a ‘Shiite Octopus’: Sunni –Shi’a Relations and the Implications for Belgium andEurope’, available at http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep35.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2EuropeAn ageing population
Population by ten-year age group and sex
Age group
100+

Male

Female

90-99

2015
2045

2015
2045

80-89
70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Millions of people
Source: UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’in population in the timeframe, leading toincreased infrastructural and environmentalpressures in their urban regions.7 Conversely,
significant parts of central, eastern andsouthern Europe are highly likely to facedemographic decline and stagnation.8

ClimateTemperatures will almost certainly increase
across the region, with a rise in extreme
weather events such as the 2003 heatwave(which caused over 35,000 deaths). Rainfall
patterns will probably change, withnorthern Europe becoming wetter in winterand Mediterranean regions becoming
significantly drier, particularly in summer
months. Droughts are likely to increasein number, particularly in the central andsouthern regions. Rising sea levels could havesignificant impacts for several major low-lying
cities particularly in the Netherlands.
Agriculture and fisheries
The climatic effect on agriculture willprobably have a significant impact on futureyields. Significant decreases in yields in the

7 UN Population Division (2013), ‘World Population
Prospects, 2012 Revision’, available at http://esa.
un.org/wpp/Documentation/publications.htm

southern regions are expected due to water
shortages and increasing temperatures, withsmall decreases in the central regions, andincreases in the north. Europe is likely toremain self-sufficient for arable and livestock
production, although many European people
may be concerned about food security.
Technological advancements, such as more
efficient desalinisation plants, are likely to
mitigate water shortages in the Mediterranean
Shock:

Rise of a European power
If a European country financiallyout-performed the rest of the EU to asignificant extent, domestic politicalconcerns could prompt the country’s
leaders to use its leverage to dominate
Europe not only economically but also
politically, severely challenging the EU’s
cohesion. In such a situation, Europe
could split between those countries
who are dependent on the large power
and those who resent its influence.
There is a risk that NATO could becomeless effective, as European countries
may place loyalty or opposition to
the economic power above any otheralliances.

8 Ibid.

Global Strategic Trends

119Part 2EuropeThere is likely to be an increase in renewable energy capabilitiesarea, and genetically modified crops are likely
to become increasingly widespread (despite
opposition from environmentalists), allowing
continued production as temperatures rise
and rainfall patterns change. Warming of theoceans, due to climate change, may affect fish
migration and could lead to the collapse ofsome fisheries in European waters. There may
also be tension over fishing rights, particularlyin the north Atlantic, as non-European fishingfleets seek to operate in the area.

EnergyEuropean energy consumption is likely togradually decrease out to 2045 as a resultof wide-scale efficiency initiatives, although
there will probably be an increase in energy
used for heavy transportation.9 Hydrocarbons
are likely to continue to be the continent’s
main source of energy. Although there is
likely to be an increase in renewable energy
capabilities, nuclear power is likely to continue
to be the primary source of power-generation
in some European countries and its use may
become more widespread if safety concerns
9 International Energy Authority (2013), ‘World
Energy Outlook 2013’, available at http://www.
worldenergyoutlook.org/

120

can be addressed. Europe is likely to remain
dependent on imports to meet a substantial
proportion of its energy requirements,
potentially still relying on imports from Russia
and the Middle East by 2045. The US, however,is also likely to become an important European
supplier of hydrocarbons within the next two
decades. Nevertheless, reliance on energy
imports is likely to mean that Europe will remain
vulnerable to disruptions to its energy supply.

European security
Europe is likely to face a range of security
challenges, but disagree internally over
how to address them. However, on a subregional level, defence cooperation is likely
to increase to maximise scarce resources.
Operational responsibilities (such as airand sea surveillance) will almost certainly
continue to be shared, and resources pooled.
Military capabilities are also likely to be jointly
developed and procured. In an increasingly
globalised world, no European country is
likely to be able to handle major security
issues in isolation. Such challenges may, forexample, come from: more sophisticatedtrans-national criminals and terrorists using
new technologies; resource-security; andGlobal Strategic Trends

Part 2Europevulnerabilities in the cyber environment.
Europe-wide decisions on foreign and security
policy are likely to remain a source of tension,
with decision-making unlikely to proceed
rapidly, even in times of crisis. Although the
EU will probably continue to be one of theworld’s three largest economies by 2045, itslack of a central military capability means that
it is likely to be comparatively weak as a global
actor. European countries are, however, likely
to continue to agree on the necessity forsupporting and using institutions, such as the
UN and the G20, to maintain global stability
and security.
As the US focusses increasingly on Asia,
European countries will almost certainly be
expected to make a greater contribution
to their collective security. NATO is likely toendure and remain globally significant, but
its character will probably change. Most
European NATO members are likely to find it
difficult to deploy and sustain military poweroutside Europe without extensive US support.
Smaller European countries are only likely tobe able to use their armed forces in a coalition.
Exceptions to this trend will probably be the
UK and France, who are both likely to continue
to be nuclear-armed powers by 2045, andcapable of independent operations. European
countries’ defence spending is unlikely toincrease significantly unless a major threat
develops, with an emphasis on technology
and professionalism rather than weight ofnumbers. This lack of volume may lead toan increased number of security contractors
augmenting European countries’ forces inoverseas operations. NATO is likely to remain
the bedrock of European countries’ security.
However, as US force levels decline and the
US is forced to prioritise, its role in NATOmay reduce. This could lead to the Alliancetaking on the character of a European-based
defence organisation. In particular, European
NATO-members and the EU may have to take amore active role in managing Russian influenceat a time when Russia’s military is re-emerging
as an instrument of power. Similarly, European
countries are likely to be the principal provider ofstability in the Balkans.

Global Strategic Trends

RussiaRussia is likely to continue to be a major
regional power, maintaining a substantial
capability for regional intervention by 2045.
Russia’s permanent membership of the UN
Security Council, geographical size, large
energy reserves and substantial armed
forces are likely to ensure its continued
status as a regionally (and, to some extent,
globally) influential power by 2045. The
Russian political system will probably remain
authoritarian, even after President Putin’s
tenure ends. Restoring Russia’s status as a‘great power’ is likely to remain a key politicalobjective for the country. Russia will almost
certainly seek to influence its near abroad witha mixture of hard and soft power. Geopoliticalconsiderations, domestic concerns andeconomic pragmatism are likely to continue tocharacterise Russia’s foreign policy out to 2045.
The Russian economy may have a better rateof growth than some European countries
in the short-term, but this is unlikely tocontinue out to 2045. Russia’s economy isalmost certain to remain smaller than the
EU’s as a whole. Although energy exports
to Asian markets are likely to have increasing
importance, Europe will probably remain
Russia’s primary economic focus. The

Shock:

Collapse of a major power“

The EU may
have to take amore active rolein managing
Russian influenceat a time when
Russia’s military
is re-emerging as
an instrument of
power.

”

An authoritarian country, held together
by an oppressive, unrepresentative
regime could conceivably collapse
following a period of prolonged
under-investment in civil institutions,infrastructure and healthcare,combined with an economic decline
exacerbated by international isolationand sanctions. If such a country alreadycontained a number of different
sub-national groups, civil war could
occur, followed by fragmentation into
several new countries with severe
consequences for the global economy
and regional security and stability.

121

Part 2“

With sharedinterests China
and the EU may
become partners
in future crisis
management.

”

Europecountry is almost certain to face a numberof challenges, such as an ageing society,environmental degradation, corruption,
under-investment and narrow democratic
institutions. Russia may also be hindered infulfilling its economic potential by inefficient
allocation of resources and chronic underinvestment. In the long term, this may make itharder to maintain social stability.
Russia’s growing Islamic population could
challenge the traditional Slavic identity andcontinuing unrest driven by separatists in
its outlying regions could exacerbate thegovernment’s security concerns. At the sametime, the generation of Russians born after theCold War may demand greater representation
and reduced corruption. However, major
reforms of the political system and theinstitutional economic framework are not
likely unless there is a change in Russia’s styleof government. Without reform, however,Russia is likely to experience a gradualeconomic decline and there is the potential for
extensive political and social unrest. A Russiancollapse or fragmentation would have serious

consequences for the global economy andwould be likely to have severe implications
for the stability of neighbouring countries,
including those in eastern Europe.

China
With shared interests such as stability in the
Middle East and security of trade routes,
China and the EU may become partners infuture crisis management. Europe and China
will probably have a primarily economic
relationship, centred on the EU and the single
market. The Chinese market will almost
certainly be an important one for Europe,just as access to European consumers andcapital is likely to be important for Chinese
growth. Chinese tourism to Europe is also
likely to significantly increase, constituting
an important part of the European tourist
industry by 2045. Militarily, China and Europe
are unlikely to see each other as direct
threats, although European countries may
continue to view China with caution becauseof differences on human rights, systems ofgovernance and encroachment on intellectual
property rights.

Defence and security implications■■ Countries in Europe are likely to agree on the broad nature of security challenges
facing the continent, but will probably disagree over how to address them.
However, on a sub-regional level, defence cooperation is likely to increase to
maximise scarce resources. Operational responsibilities (such as air and sea
surveillance) will almost certainly continue to be shared, and resources pooled.
Military capabilities are likely to be jointly developed and procured.
■■ European countries’ defence spending is unlikely to increase significantly without amajor threat.
■■ NATO is likely to remain the key organisation for military crisis management,
although its cohesion may be challenged by diverse threat perceptions, a US
focus on Asia and internal disagreement on its global role. The Alliance could be
reinvigorated by the need to band together to address a deteriorating security
situation in Europe’s near abroad.
■■ Russia is likely to remain an influential regional power. Its assertiveness and powerpolitics may cause future European security challenges.

122

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Part 2Global Strategic Trends

123

2

3

20

19

13

18

11
17
8

7

6

9
10

1

5

4

12

15
16

22

21
14

1 Algeria
2 Armenia
3 Azerbaijan
4 Bahrain
5 Egypt
6 Iran7 Iraq
8 Israel
9 Jordan
10 Kuwait
11 Lebanon
12 Libya
13 Morocco
14 Oman
15 Qatar
16 Saudi Arabia
17 State of Palestine
18 Syrian Arab Republic
19 Tunisia
20 Turkey
21 United Arab Emirates
22 Western Sahara
23 Yemen

23

Part 2

Middle East andNorth Africa
Over the next 30 years, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are likely to remain
volatile areas, with high potential for tension and some violent conflict. The aftermathof the Arab Uprisings of 2011 may still resonate in some countries, with civil unrest
likely. Identity politics and sectarianism will almost certainly be key characteristics ofthe political landscape, constituting a serious challenge to good governance. Countries
in MENA are unlikely to be able to break the cycle of power politics, patronage, religious
tension and authoritarianism. Social, environmental and economic issues will probably
continue to threaten the region’s stability out to 2045, including an under-employedyoung population, a decline in natural energy resources and the effects of climate change.

Political reform
The popular uprisings and protests thatbegan in 2011 – known as the ‘Arab Spring’– expressed a demand for more freedom
and reform of the political systems acrossthe region. Activists were able to exploitsocial media, something that existing, rigid
state structures initially found hard to copewith. However, while this demand is likely
to increase over the next 30 years, it will notnecessarily lead to major political reform acrossthe region. Activists often struggle to translate
short-term revolutionary action into lasting,concentrated authority. Creating flourishingdemocracies in a number of Middle Easternand North African countries faces a range ofproblems,1 but there is agreement that a lackof an established civil society is preventing
sustainable change. There is also a broadconsensus that a willingness by authoritarianregimes to crack down on popular uprisings
using force is preventing real change fromoccurring. Social and economic pressures
are likely to increase the demand for change

1 Burnell, Peter J. (2013), ‘Democratisation in the
Middle East and North Africa: Perspectives from
Democracy Support’, available at http://wrap.
warwick.ac.uk/55386/1/WRAP_Burnell_7270220pais-280613-twq2%20%284%29.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

in the region, driving violent unrest out to2045. Identity politics have made a resurgenceacross the region which is likely to continue,
with many people defining themselves andtheir relationship with the state by their ethnicor religious identities. As witnessed in Iraq
and Syria, sectarian differences are being
exploited as a justification for violence – atrend that is likely to continue out to 2045.2
Governments in MENA are using sectarian
identities as a basis for defining their powerand distributing resources, meaning conflicts
are often superficially sectarian in nature even
if they are actually driven by power politics
and resources.

Balance of power
It is highly likely that over the next 30 years
there will be shifts in the balance of power
across the region. For example, it is possiblethat the recent development in Iran’s
relationship with the US will have a major
knock-on effect within the Middle East. The
easing of sanctions and acceptance of Iran’sdevelopment of nuclear energy could see

2 European Council on Foreign Relations (2013), ‘The
Gulf and Sectarianism’, available at http://www.
ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_gulf_and_sectarianism217

125

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Middle East and North Africa

A growing population living in the urban environment
7
6% shareof global
population
2015
2045

2015

Rural

2025

Urban

2035
2045
0

Source: UN ‘World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision’“

MENA’spopulation is
expected toincrease byaround 230
million by 2045 toapproximately 670
million.

”

100

200

300

400

500

Iran strengthening its position as one of theregion’s leading powers, and increasing its
international cooperation. However, theregion will almost certainly remain volatileand the thawing of relations between Iranand the US may be reversed. Out to 2045,
it is likely that new drivers will emerge thatalter the shape of the region’s geo-politics,
such as a potential decline in the market
for hydrocarbons due to advancements inalternative energy sources.

Regional demographics
Increasing numbers of working-age people
are likely to be dissatisfied with employment
opportunities, fuelling civil unrest. MENA’s
population is expected to increase byaround 230 million by 2045 to approximately
670 million, with the populations of somecountries, such as Yemen, almost doubling
during this period.3 North Africa accounts forabout six percent of the world’s population,with an average annual growth rate of 1.7%.
People of working age are likely to be thelargest section of the population, meaningthat governments will probably be underpressure to ensure that there are enough jobs
to meet people’s needs. However, as the
economies of many countries in the region are
driven by energy production or consumption,
they generally lack the necessary economic
diversity for sustained growth. Many of
the governments in the region are alreadyexperiencing significant problems with their
youth, who now have better education and
3 UN Population Division (2013), ‘World Population
Prospects: The 2012 Revision’ available at http://esa.
un.org/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm

126

600

700

800

Population in millions

more access to information via the Internet,
causing them to become increasingly
frustrated with their limited opportunities towork and improve their standard of living. This
problem is likely to worsen. By 2045, accessto information will almost certainly improve,
making the population increasingly awareof inequality and their lack of opportunity.
Providing work and meeting a growing
sense of personal ambition among people ofworking age are highly likely to be significant
challenges for governments across the region.
In 2012, for example, North African youths
were 3.4 times more likely to be unemployedthan adults.4 These factors are likely to add to
growing civil discontent in MENA out to 2045,
constituting some of the most likely causes ofcivil unrest.
Israel’s future demographics are unclear, withsome predictions suggesting that by 2030 thenumber of Israeli Jews in the area between
the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River could
be in a 44% minority if the current rate of
population growth continues (1.8% among
Israeli Jews and 2.5% among Palestinians).5
Many argue that Israel must adopt the twostate solution if it is to preserve itself as a
Jewish and democratic country. However,others argue the statistics are flawed and the‘demographic time bomb’ that faces Israel
is a political tool to achieve a settlement.
Evidence is inconclusive as to whether Israel’s
4 High Level Panel on Fragile States (2014), ‘Ending
Conflict and Building Peace in Africa: A Call to Action’
5 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2012), ‘Statistical
Abstract of Israel 2012’, available at http://cbs.gov.
il/reader/shnaton/templ_shnaton_e.html?num_
tab=st02_03&CYear=2012

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2

Middle East and North Africa

An ageing population
Population by ten-year age group and sex
Age group
100+

Male

Female

90-99

2015
2045

2015
2045

80-89
70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Millions of people
Source: UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’changing demographics will necessarily
force a Middle East settlement or alter thebalance of power between Israeli Arabs andJews, although it is likely that the Israeli Arab
population will increase significantly over the
next 30 years.

Resources
Most of the region’s economies are likely
to continue to be centred on exportinghydrocarbons and there is scope for further
exploitation. For example, estimates suggestthat Libya holds 46 billion barrels of known
oil reserves6 and Israel has recently started
exploiting extensive new fields of natural gas.7
Conversely, Egypt is already a net importer ofoil, a situation that is unlikely to change in theforeseeable future.

6 Oil and Gas Journal (2011), ‘Libya: NATO Dismisses
Government Allegations of Air Attacks on Oil Fields’,
available at http://www.ogj.com/articles/2011/04/
libya--nato-dismisses.html
7 Reuters (2014), ‘Israel Takes Step Towards Becoming
a Gas Exporter’, available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/2014/02/07/woodside-leviathanidUSL3N0LB5KU20140207

Global Strategic Trends

EnergyIt is likely that the majority of MENA’s energy
will flow towards Asia and Europe, rather thanNorthern America, out to 2045. China andIndia, in particular, are likely to increase theirdependency on the region’s oil to drive theireconomic development, to the extent thatit could be the key factor in their economic
progress. MENA already provides more than
70% of China’s oil, with Saudi Arabia being
its largest supplier – China is second only to
the US as a buyer of Saudi Arabian oil.8 India
has long-established relations across MENA,
including close ties with both Israel and Iran,and is the fourth biggest consumer of oil inthe world, importing around three million
barrels of oil per day. Forecasts of India’s
oil consumption suggest that there could
be a particularly steep increase as the gap
between India’s production and consumption
continues to grow. Threats to MENA’s stability
and its hydrocarbon production could havedevastating consequences for Asia’s economic
growth over the next few decades – policies
8 For a local review of growing and ‘fruitful’ ChinaSaudi relations see Arab News (2012), ‘Working
Together for Brighter Future of Saudi -Chinese
relations’, available at http://www.arabnews.com/
working-together-brighter-future-saudi-chinarelations“

Threats to MENA’s
stability and its
hydrocarbon
production could
have devastatingconsequences for
Asia’s economic
growth over the
next few decades.

”

127

Part 2“

[The] lack of
networked
economicinterdependence
remains a
structural
weakness for theregion.

”128

Middle East and North Africa

of non-intervention are likely to be difficult tomaintain. As a result, China and India could
become more involved in maintaining MENA’s
regional security.9 It is possible that the US
will reduce its involvement in the region, as
it becomes more energy self-sufficient, but it
is more likely to maintain a commitment to
MENA due to its commitment to countries in
the region (including Israel) and because of its
strategic military basing in the area. The US’s
desire to keep the price of oil stable, to avoid
shocks to the global economy, is also likely tosecure its commitment to the region for sometime to come. The EU is likely to continue
to be a major importer of Middle Eastern oil.
Consequently, EU member states may findthemselves increasingly partnering Asian
countries in addressing security issues within
MENA.
Economic diversification is likely to benecessary in a post-hydrocarbon era.
For many MENA countries, economic
development over the last 80 years has
been dominated by the hydrocarbon exportindustry, with only limited inter-regional
trade. This lack of networked economic
interdependence remains a structural
weakness for the region, and could constitutea major challenge as hydrocarbon sources
become less productive. Some countries
are, however, already investing in a posthydrocarbon economic model. The UAE,
for example, currently generates 63% of
its income from commerce and tourism.10
Alternative energy resources may reduce theregion’s reliance on hydrocarbons. Out to2045, solar power may offer some opportunity
to secure sustainable energy for the region.
Morocco is investing significantly in solar
power and Saudi Arabia has announced
ambitious plans to invest some US$ 100
billion in a project designed to produce one

third of its energy via solar power by 2032.11
However, building productive solar power
infrastructure across the region is challenging.
Desert conditions which create an abundanceof dust and a lack of water are two major
obstacles that increase costs and may makesolar energy prohibitively expensive for mostof the less wealthy MENA countries. Lack ofwater is particularly problematic, as MENA isthe driest and most water-scarce region in theworld – the vast majority of people in North
Africa survive on less than 100 mm of averageannual rainfall. However, breakthroughs insolar power technology, such as photo-voltaic
cells, do not use water to convert the sun’s rays
to electricity. If large-scale prototypes provesuccessful, the potential rewards are massive.
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are all
investing heavily in nuclear technology and it
is likely to be an attractive alternative for many.
The nuclear industry estimates that new-build
contracts in the region will have passed US$
200 billion by 2020, suggesting that by 2045
the region will have significantly increased
amounts of fissile material and nuclear
expertise.12
Fuel, food and electricity subsidies may
continue to impede economic development,with the International Monetary Fundestimating that governments in the Middle
East spent US$ 212 billion on fuel andfood subsidies in 2011.13 North African
governments also often use state subsidies
to reduce food and energy prices as a wayof artificially controlling potential instability.
High spending of this kind arguably threatens
economic development. In the oil-producing
countries in particular, subsidies have insulated
producers from the need to cultivate larger
markets, stifling growth. The situation is made11 Marc, R. and Mahdi, W. (2012), ‘Saudi Arabia Plans$109 Billion Boost for Solar Power’, available at http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-10/saudiarabia-plans-109-billion-boost-for-solar-power.html

9 Parthasarathy, G. (2011), ‘India-Middle East Relations’available at http://asianaffairs.in/february2011/indiamiddle-east-relations.html

12 NuclearEnergyInsider.com (2013), ‘Nuclear
Construction Conference, MENA’, available at http://
www.nuclearenergyinsider.com/mena

10 Government Office for Science (2013), ‘After the Oil:
The Future of the Middle East’, available at http://
www.sigmascan.org/Live/Issue/ViewIssue/491/4/
after-the-oil-the-future-of-the-middle-east/

13 International Monetary Fund (2012), ‘Costly Middle
East Subsidies Need Better Targeting’, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/
so/2012/car051412b.htm

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2

Middle East and North Africa

worse because most beneficiaries are thewealthy – subsidies therefore increase the gap
between rich and poor. Changing the status
quo may prove difficult, due to resistancefrom interested parties who see subsidies
as a right. In already fragile countries withpoor governance, it could be very difficult for
subsidies to be reduced over the next 30 years.

Climate, water and agriculture
The region will almost certainly becharacterised by rising temperatures andhot extremes, with average annual surface
temperatures projected to increase acrossNorth Africa and the northern areas of the
Middle East by approximately 1.2 times morethan the global average. Global drying could
lead to a general increase in the size of deserts,
such as the Sahara. Annual average rainfall willprobably reduce, with a shift to more intense
drought events which could negatively
impact freshwater availability. These climate
and weather factors, coupled with potentiallychanging pest and disease distribution, could
negatively impact crop yields, particularly in
the North African region. Rising sea levels
will almost certainly increase the exposure ofmany coastal communities to flooding, withalmost the entire coast of North Africa being

vulnerable, due to levels of development andrapid population growth. With large populous
cities, Egypt has been identified as having
important centres at risk of future coastal
flooding.

Education
Many MENA countries have invested heavily
in education over the last half of the century.
Gains have been made across the region in
the education sector, with more equitable
access to education being established.
Gender disparity in education has reduced(but certainly not disappeared) and this has
contributed towards a significant decline
in birth rates and infant mortality, as wellas increased life expectancy. Most children
across the region now attend primaryschool, and rates of secondary and university
education match those of countries in otherregions at comparable levels of development.
However, funding for education has notdelivered significant results for MENA in termsof improving skills.14 Patronage, using often
14 Badr, M. et al. (2012), ‘Determinants of Educational
Attainment in MENA’, available at http://www.
nottingham.ac.uk/credit/documents/papers/12-03.
pdf

Agricultural productivity will be challenging, particularly in Northern Africa

Global Strategic Trends

129Part 2

Middle East and North Africa

out-dated or heavily religious syllabuses, anda reliance on rote-learning, have all had anegative affect on the region’s ability to turnbright students into productive and skilledworkers. Many of the region’s education
systems are unable to provide pupils with thenecessary tools to transition successfully fromschool to work. This often drives parental
decisions to remove children from education
at an early stage in favour of seeking work forthe child. Although there is some recognitionof the need to reform education, it is likely
that, until broader political and social reforms
take hold in MENA, education will continue tosuffer over the next 30 years.

Religion
Out to 2045, Sunni and Shia relations willalmost certainly continue to cause significant
friction in the Middle East. Tensions between
Shiite Iran and the Sunni Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) are likely to remain high.
However, not all Shia movements will
necessarily be pro-Iranian and not every Salafi(hard-line Sunni) movement will be strongly

influenced by Saudi Arabia.15 Indeed, there are
significant Shiite minorities in GCC countries,
as well as a growing Salafi movement in
Iran. Sectarian tensions also reflect socioeconomic disparities and are likely toescalate if governments do not address thesefundamental issues. For example, Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia, where economic inequality
between Sunni and Shia is greatest, aremore likely to see tensions rise than othercountries in the region. Satellite television
channels and social media are also likely toplay an increasing role in spreading sectarian
mistrust.16 Over the next 30 years, growing
tensions are also likely within Sunni and Shiite
communities. Sunni Islam is particularly likely
to become increasingly factionalised. As
Salafist groups grow in prominence aroundthe world, a backlash may emerge frommoderate Sunnis. Correspondingly, Shiite
Islam contains a number of internal divisions.
15 Chatham House (2012), ‘Identities and Islamisms
in the GCC: Future Trends in the GCC Workshop
Summary’, available at http://www.chathamhouse.
org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20
East/0512gcc_summary.pdf
16 Ibid.

Jerusalem, Western Wall and The Dome of The Rock. A manifestation of the proximity of religion

130

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Part 2

Middle East and North Africa

Terrorism
Social, economic, religious and politicaljustifications for terrorism are likely to continue
to be used by many groups within the region.
Most terrorist groups in MENA are likely tocontinue to target Israel, western interestsin the region and secular governments,
with many acting in the name of Islam andfollowing Islamic fundamentalist principles.
Most terrorists are highly likely to remain
focussed on attacks within the region,
although Al-Qaida and affiliated groups arelikely to continue to target western interests
out to 2045. China is already experiencing
some threat to its overseas interests within
MENA, and may increase its activity in theregion - which could lead to a corresponding
rise in the terrorist threat to China.17

17 Zhu, W. (2011), ‘Middle East Terrorism, Global
Governance and China’s Anti-terror Policy’,available at http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/picture/article/33/81/10/ca7475ef4594a8e57aaaaf20a6e7/
ffa30577-f3be-4895-aac3-f29fa2ac421b.pdf

Defence and security implications■■ MENA is highly likely to remain a volatile region over the next 30 years and thepossibility of major regional conflict cannot be ruled out. The possible thawing ofrelations between Iran and the US could have significant implications for regional
security.
■■ Socio-economic factors, including disparity in wealth, gender inequality andpoor education, are likely to be the underlying causes of much of the unrest andsometimes violent conflict within MENA.
■■ Identity politics in the region, particularly sectarianism, are likely to continue to be
used as a mobilising factor in conflict.
■■ Internal terrorist threats are likely to continue, as are attacks on other nations fromgroups based in the region. Although Al-Qaida has been damaged in recent years,
Islamic fundamentalism will almost certainly continue to fuel terrorist networks out
to 2045.

Global Strategic Trends“

Most terroristgroups in MENA
are likely tocontinue to[operate], withmany acting in
the name of Islam.

”131

1 Angola
2 Benin
3 Botswana
4 Burkina Faso
5 Burundi
6 Cameroon
7 Cape Verde
8 Central African Republic
9 Chad10 Comoros
11 Congo
12 Côte d’Ivoire
13 Democratic Republic of the Congo
14 Djibouti
15 Equatorial Guinea
16 Eritrea
17 Ethiopia
18 Gabon

19 Gambia
20 Ghana
21 Guinea
22 Guinea-Bissau
23 Kenya
24 Lesotho
25 Liberia
26 Madagascar
27 Malawi
28 Mali
29 Mauritania
30 Mauritius
31 Mayotte
32 Mozambique
33 Namibia
34 Niger
35 Nigeria
36 Réunion

37 Rwanda
38 Saint Helena
39 Sao Tome and Principe
40 Senegal
41 Seychelles
42 Sierra Leone
43 Somalia
44 South Africa
45 South Sudan
46 Sudan
47 Swaziland
48 Togo49 Uganda
50 United Republic of Tanzania
51 Zambia
52 Zimbabwe

29
28
7

40
19
22

34
16

46

9
4
21

14

2

42

12

25

20

35

17

48

45

8
11

43

15
39

18

49
6

23

37

13

5

41

50

38

10

1
27

51

52
3

33

32
26

30
36

47

44

31

24

Part 2Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa will almost certainly remain a region of significant political andeconomic differences by 2045 but overall the region’s economy should grow – possibly
rapidly. However, economic performance is likely to vary sharply from country tocountry, with a lack of infrastructure and political instability likely to continue toprovide some of the biggest challenges to sustained growth. The region is likely to see
the fastest rise in population growth of anywhere in the world, with some countries’
populations more than doubling by 2045. Governance in the region is likely to improveand the current trend towards representative government is likely to continue, although
this will probably be resisted by some authoritarian regimes, possibly leading toviolence. The risk of state-on-state conflict is likely to reduce but will almost certainly
remain a concern. By contrast, the threat from intra-state conflict and from terrorism islikely to endure and could worsen. The African Union’s ability to deal with crises is likely
to improve, but it will probably still require international assistance for more demanding
situations. Technology is likely to facilitate links between different parts of the region
and with the wider world, thereby increasing economic productivity and improving
governance. If current trends continue, most people in the region are likely to haveaccess to the Internet by 2045. Climate change is likely to have a severe impact on someparts of sub-Saharan Africa, with agriculture particularly badly affected. The region is
likely to continue to face significant rates of infection from communicable diseases suchas HIV/AIDS and malaria. But it is conditions such as diabetes and cancer that are likely
to pose the greater health threat by 2045.

Demographics
Today, 877 million people live in sub-SaharanAfrica. This is likely to double by 2045,
meaning that around 20% of the world’s total
population could live in the region. SubSaharan Africa’s working-age population is
expected to exceed that of China by 2030 andIndia by 2035.1 Correctly harnessed, this could
provide a significant demographic dividend.
However, this rapid population growth islikely to jeopardise social and economic
development, particularly in the mostvulnerable countries. With the proportionof those in the 15-25 age-group higher in
sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the
1 McKinsey Global Institute (2012), ‘Africa at Work: Job
Creation and Inclusive Growth’

Global Strategic Trends

world, young people are likely to be under- or
unemployed and hence disaffected, driving
instability. For example, Nigeria currently sees
four million young people join the workforce
each year, but only a small proportion of themfind paid work.2 In sub-Saharan Africa as awhole, official figures from 2012 put youth
unemployment at 11.8% – double the rate
for adults. Much of this population growthis likely to occur in urban areas, with the
populations of African cities growing by an
estimated 15-18 million people each year.3
Over the next 20 years, city populations in
the region are likely to grow 45% faster than

2 High Level Panel on Fragile States (2014), ‘Ending
Conflict and Building Peace in Africa: A Call to Action’3 Ibid.

“Sub-SaharanAfrica’s workingage population
is expected to
exceed that ofChina by 2030 andIndia by 2035.

”

133

Part 2Sub-Saharan Africa

A growing population in both rural and urban environments
13

19% shareof global
population
2015
2045

2015

Rural

2025

Urban

2035
2045
0

Source: UN ‘World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision’“There has been asteady decline inrates of state-onstate conflict in theregion as a whole
and this trend islikely to continue.

”
134

250

500

750

1,000

1,250

1,500

1,750

2,000

Population in millions

in rural areas, with 60% of people in Africa
likely to live in cities by 2050.4 Most subSaharan cities, though, are likely to struggle toprovide basic services, with an estimated 100
million Africans – around 10% of the region’s
projected total population – living in slums by
2020.5sub-Saharan countries, they will probably varyin quality. Flawed democracies are still likely
to be prevalent in 2045, with some countries
subject to authoritarian governments.
Demands for democratic elections could
become violent, particularly in areas where
democracy is not entrenched.

Governance
The political picture within sub-Saharan Africa
will almost certainly continue to vary fromcountry to country by 2045, but if current
trends continue, there is likely to be a decreasein the overall number of coups. Between
1960 and 2000, there were approximately
20 successful coups each decade in theregion, but this fell to just six in 2000-2010.
(Successful coups took place in the Central
African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania(twice), Guinea and Madagascar.) A numberof countries in sub-Saharan Africa now havedemocratically elected governments. This
shift towards representative government
is likely to continue, driven by improved
education, higher income and better access,via technology, to information and different
points of view.6 Demand and support for
greater representation is likely to become
widespread among the general public,
mobilising an increasingly politically active
and outspoken population. However, thepath towards democracy is unlikely to besmooth. Although multi-party elections willalmost certainly become the norm in mostCorruption is likely to decline in some partsof the region while enduring in others.
Currently, three of the world’s ten mostcorrupt countries are found in sub-SaharanAfrica (Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan),while only three are among the 50 least
corrupt countries (Botswana, Cape Verde andRwanda).7 Poverty, weak political institutions
and poorly developed institutional checks
and balances will probably continue to drive
and allow corruption in some parts of theregion. However, this is likely to be mitigatedto some extent by: deeper involvement ofcivil groups; strengthening the judiciary;
more transparency (facilitated in large part byincreasing information and communication
technology); and increasing education andcorruption-awareness programmes. This
could lead to a decline in overall levels ofcorruption (as perceived today) by 2045.

Terrorism and conflict
There has been a steady decline in rates
of state-on-state conflict in the region as awhole and this trend is likely to continue out
to 2045 – although some areas will remaincontested. Intra-state conflict will almost

4 High Level Panel on Fragile States, op. cit.
5 Ibid.
6 Cillers, J., Hughes, B. and Moyer, J. (2011), ‘African
Futures 2050’

7 Transparency International (2013), ‘Corruption
Perception Index 2013’, available at http://www.
transparency.org/cpi2013/results

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2Sub-Saharan Africa

certainly endure, and fragmentation of somecountries remains possible, perhaps likely. The
risks of instability and violence are unlikely
to disappear (and may even increase insome areas) due to factors such as dramatic
population growth, unfulfilled expectations,
unemployment, radicalising ideologies,
widening inequalities and differences inaccess to resources. These factors may also
increase the risk of terrorism out to 2045. A
number of more positive trends, however,may provide a measure of mitigation, suchas stronger civil societies, economic growth,
greater access to education and the growing
empowerment of women.8 Indeed, thenumber of women entering politics has
increased – for example, the number ofwomen members of the South African
Parliament has more than doubled since 1994.
Also, the capacity of African governments andregional organisations, particularly the African
Union, to deal with security challenges is likely
to increase – although the more demanding
security challenges are still likely to requireinternational assistance.
8 Cillers, J. and Schünemann, J. (2013), ‘The Future of
Intrastate Conflict in Africa: More Violence or Greater
Peace?’

Resources
Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to continue to beresource-rich, with new oil and gas discoveries
likely to be made, potentially helping to satisfy
the world’s rising demand for hydrocarbons.
While this revenue is likely to boost theregion’s economies, it may exacerbate existing
inequalities by concentrating wealth in thehands of a small number of people. Oil andgas production is likely to grow faster in subSaharan Africa than in other regions, attracting
significant foreign investment.9 China ishighly likely to continue to be involved in theregion, but could become less welcome if it isviewed as being exploitative rather than as aninvestor. With this increasing potential wealth,however, comes a corresponding increasein the potential for violence. Between 2010
and 2011, friction over resources accounted
for approximately 35% of all conflicts in
sub-Saharan Africa – and this trend is likely
to continue.10 By 2045, dramatic population
growth and the increasing threat from climatechange are likely to increase competition for
9 Verma, Raj (2012), ‘Is Africa the New Persian Gulf?
Not Yet’
10 Heidelberg Institute for International ConflictResearch (2012), ‘Conflict Barometer 2012’

A resource rich region will attract foreign investment

Global Strategic Trends

135Part 2Sub-Saharan Africa

Falling crop yields may be alleviated by improvements in science and technology“

Rising sea levels
will almost
certainly increase
the risk of flooding
for ecosystems
and coastal
communities.

”

food, water and energy – these factors may
also act as catalysts for further violence andinstability, particularly in the most fragile
countries.11 Water scarcity could be a key
driver of conflict – water basins which crossnational boundaries account for 90% of Africa’s
surface water, with the Congo Basin alone
spanning ten countries.12

becoming more frequent. The south of theregion is likely to be particularly at risk ofsevere droughts. Rising sea levels will almost
certainly increase the risk of flooding forecosystems (such as mangroves) and coastal
communities (including a number of cities)
with Mozambique and small island states
particularly at risk.

ClimateThe sub-Saharan economy will almost
certainly continue to rely on climate-sensitive
activities out to 2045. Average annual
temperatures are projected to increase, as
are instances of heatwaves. Annual average
rainfall is also likely to increase over thetropical regions (particularly in east Africa)
but decrease over the sub-tropical regions.
The variability of rainfall is likely to change,
with both intense rainfall and drought events

Agriculture and fisheries
Many crops in the region are already grownclose to their limits of heat tolerance and
95% of sub-Saharan Africa’s agriculture israin-fed. Overall crop yields are expected to
decline, and while improvements in scienceand technology have the potential to alleviatethese challenges, the region could facedecreasing productivity and increasing foodprices. Declines are projected for key crops
including wheat, maize, sorghum, millet andgroundnut. This is likely to impact productivity
in a number of countries, particularly South
Africa, Zimbabwe and those in the east.

11 Cillers and Schünemann, op. cit.
12 High Level Panel on Fragile States, op. cit.

136

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2Sub-Saharan Africa

An ageing population
Population by ten-year age group and sex
Age group
100+

Male

Female

90-99

2015
2045

2015
2045

80-89
70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

250

200

150

100

50

0

0

50

100

150

200

250

Millions of people
Source: UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’

Ocean acidification and temperature changes
are also likely to adversely affect marine
ecosystems and fishing industries.

Technology
The growth of information andcommunication technology within subSaharan Africa, although uneven, is likely
to drive change and improve the region’s
integration with the rest of the world,
including via diaspora communities. Internet
connectivity is likely to continue to improveand, if current trends continue, the majority ofpeople should have access to the Internet andmobile communications technology by 2045.
As communication gets easier, people arelikely to be able to monitor their governments
more readily and press for improvements.13
Governments will probably find it harder tocontrol or restrict the flow of information andto hide abuses of power from the public.
HealthMortality levels in most sub-Saharan countries
have decreased and are likely to continue
to do so out to 2045. Of particular note are
infant and child mortality levels, which havedeclined by approximately 50% between
13 Center for Strategic and International Studies (2011),‘Assessing Risks to Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa’Global Strategic Trends

the 1980s and the present day.14 These
decreases are primarily due to sanitation
programmes, vaccination campaigns andproviding nutritional supplements. Although
the number of AIDS-related deaths has
noticeably decreased throughout the region,
with significant progress in reducing motherto-child transmission of HIV,15 rates of infection
are still extremely high – over 4% of adults
currently live with the disease.16 Unless anaffordable cure is found, the disease is still
likely to be prevalent in 2045. The same istrue for malaria, which caused an estimated627,000 deaths worldwide in 2012, mostly
among African children.17 Changes intemperature and rainfall could impact thegeographic distribution of malaria, causing
areas of contraction as well as expansion.
However, socio-economic factors are likely tocontinue to play a significant role in incidence
rates. Sub-Saharan Africa is also likely to see
a rise in non-communicable diseases such
14 JICA Research Institute (2013), ‘Development
Challenges in Africa Towards 2050’“

As communication
gets easier, people
are likely to beable to monitor
their governments
more readily
and press for
improvements.

”

15 UNAIDS (2012), ‘Regional Fact Sheet’
16 World Health Organisation (2011), ‘Global Health
Observatory: HIV/AIDS’, available at http://www.who.
int/gho/hiv/en/
17 World Health Organisation (2013), ‘Malaria Fact
Sheet No. 94’, available at http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs094/en/index.html

137Part 2“

Some projections
see [the region]achieving thehighest rate ofglobal economic
growth between
2030 and 2050.

”

Sub-Saharan Africa

as hypertension, heart disease and cancer.18
There is an increasing trend in hospitalisationand mortality due to such diseases, which
are likely to account for more than 20% of thedisease burden by 2030. By 2045, the numberof deaths due to non-communicable diseases
in Africa is likely to exceed the combined
deaths from communicable disease, nutritional
deficits and maternal and prenatal deaths.19
Health services in sub-Saharan Africa are
currently under-resourced and struggle tomeet the demand for services. The region has
14% of the world’s population and 24% of theworld’s diseases, yet it only has 1.3% of global
health workers.20

18 World Bank (2008), ‘The Business of Health in Africa’,
available at http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_
media/Services/PSD/BEP/IFC_HealthinAfrica_Final.
pdf
19 World Health Organisation (2013), ‘Fact Sheet: NonCommunicable Diseases’, available at http://www.
who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs355/en/
20 IRIN News (2008), ‘Africa: Climate Change Linked to
Spread of Disease’

Economic growth
Economic inequalities between countries
are likely to continue and potentially increaseout to 2045.21 Some sub-Saharan countries
have developed diverse economies which are
likely to reduce their vulnerability to external
shocks and enable them to achieve long-term
growth. Other countries lack strong, stable
governments and institutions – this is likely tohinder their ability to build a better businessenvironment in the future. Although there iscautious optimism about the region’s potential
to compete in global manufacturing,22 unlessskills shortages and infrastructure challenges
are addressed, only a few sub-Saharancountries are likely to be able to competewith countries such as Vietnam or Indonesia
by 2045. Although Africa is expected tocontinue to be the world’s poorest region,some projections see it achieving the highest
rate of global economic growth between 2030
and 2050.23
21 McKinsey Global Institute (2010), ‘Lions on the Move:the Progress and Potential of African Economies’
22 Dinh, H. T. (2012), ‘Opinion: Could Africa Be World’s
Next Manufacturing Hub?’, available at http://
edition.cnn.com/2012/06/15/opinion/africamanufacturing-hub/
23 OECD (2012), ‘Environmental Outlook to 2050’

Defence and security implications■■ The risk of state-on-state conflict is likely to reduce overall, although instability andviolence will almost certainly continue out to 2045, possibly increasing in someareas.
■■ Terrorist organisations are likely to continue to pose a threat to peace and security,
driven by youth unemployment, dissatisfaction with governing regimes and themis-management of natural resources.
■■ The African Union’s ability to handle crises is likely to improve, although it willprobably still require support from the international community to deal with moredemanding situations.
■■ The combined challenge of an increased population, demands on resources and theeffects of climate change (particularly drought) on food and water supplies are likely
to lead to tension, which could result in conflict.
■■ The urban population is likely to increase significantly and many more cities arelikely to be located on or near the coast. Rising sea-levels are likely to lead tohumanitarian disasters that will probably need an international response.

138

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Part 2Global Strategic Trends

139

1
2
3
4
5

Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan

1

5
4

2
3

Part 2Central Asia

Despite the divergent paths taken by the five Central Asian republics since their
independence from the Soviet Union, each remains vulnerable to social andeconomic risks. These potential problems stem from internal threats caused by weak
infrastructure and institutions, as well as their relations with external actors. As aresult, the region is susceptible to ethnic conflict, sudden political transitions, economic
shocks, food insecurity and natural disasters – all potentially posing strategic threatsbeyond Central Asia to the rest of the world.

External influences
Compared to the other Central Asian countries,
Kazakhstan has greater capability and scope topursue an independent foreign and economic
agenda. The other four republics are likely tobe the subjects of competing interest frompowers outside the region.1 As its own large
reserves in the Arctic become more accessible,
Russia may no longer see an overriding needto maintain specific influence linked to Central
Asia’s oil and gas supplies. Nevertheless, Russia
is likely to continue to seek to be the dominant
external actor in the region, aiming to prevent
other foreign powers from attaining a highdegree of political or military influence.2 China
is likely to continue to invest in Central Asian
agriculture, energy reserves and associatedinfrastructure, looking for extra ways to link thecountries in the region to each other and toitself. This is likely to be welcomed overall, butsome in Central Asia may be concerned about
economic competition caused by the influxof Chinese goods into local markets. Amongthe South Asian countries, India and Pakistan
1 Oxford Analytica (2013), ‘South and Central Asia
Workshop: Strategic Trends out to 2045. Summary
report produced for DCDC’
2 Chatham House (2012), ‘The Long Goodbye: Waning
Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central
Asia’, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20
and%20Eurasia/0612bp_nixey.pdf

Global Strategic Trends(as well as Afghanistan) have most to gainfrom energy and trade relations with Central
Asia, but – with the exception of PakistaniTurkmen gas cooperation – are unlikely to
be as influential as China in the region. The
region’s largest trading partner, the EU, islikely to remain influential in 2045, as is the
US. Although all the major regional actors
have an interest in Central Asia, none appears
to have a strategy of territorial expansion into
the region or of becoming directly involved insecurity issues.

Internal threats
All the Central Asian republics are vulnerable
to significant political and social threats that,in turn, pose risks to the region’s security.3
Of the five, Kazakhstan is the most stable.
However, the eventual departure of its
long-standing President will almost certainly
give rise to some jockeying for position.
Kazakhstan’s institutions are likely to be
sufficiently developed to prevent subsequent
outbreaks of widespread violence orseparatism. Kazakhstan also has the greatest
political and economic independence from
Russia, arguably making it the most importantCentral Asian country.4

3 Oxford Analytica, op. cit.
4 Chatham House, op. cit.

“

Kazakhstan has
the greatest
political andeconomic
independence
from Russia,
making it themost importantCentral Asian
country.

”141

Part 2Central Asia

A growing population living in the urban environment
1
1% shareof global
population
2015
2045

2015

Rural

2025

Urban

2035
2045
0

10

20

Source: UN ‘World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision’“All five Central
Asian countries
face parallel risks
to their water
security as aconsequenceof cross-borderdisputes.

”

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Population in millions

By contrast, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan havecomparatively weak government institutions
and relatively unitary political hierarchies (withthe partial exception of Kyrgyzstan, which
is demonstrating trends towards greater
pluralism). Like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan may
also face challenges with political stability
due to an aging President and no clear
successors. Out to 2045, Southern Kyrgyzstan
is likely to remain a hotbed of inter-ethnic
violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek
communities, arising out of each community’s
perceptions of unequal opportunities, historic
grievances and the central government’s lackof control over local security forces. A porous
border with Afghanistan is likely to continue
to make Tajikistan vulnerable to developmentsin the north of that country, particularly ifhistoric conflicts resurface between Tajikistan’s
government forces and Islamist insurgents.
In Uzbekistan, persistent poverty andinappropriate distribution of basic resources(such as land and water) will probably be longterm drivers of instability.

Religion
Islamist movements stand almost no
chance of overpowering state institutions orgathering substantial support in urban areas.5
Nevertheless, the overall manner in which
the governments of the region have sought
to combat extremism has exacerbated the
problem. It is also likely to remain a long-term(if low-level) threat to stability. Out to 2045,
continued socio-economic adversity andgrowing animosity towards an overbearing,monopolistic state are likely to increase thenumber of instances of instability acrossCentral Asia. Social discontent may result insupport for underground religious movements
rather than opposition parties, which are
expected to remain weak.

Resources
Fluctuations in food prices and low levels of
self-sufficiency will almost certainly continue
to test the ability of Central Asian countries
to manage their food supply. Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan currently import significant
proportions (over 30%) of their food supplies
and remain the most vulnerable to pricefluctuations and supply disruptions. In
Uzbekistan and parts of Tajikistan, statepolicies of cotton cultivation have dramaticallyreduced the amount of land available forarable farming. Such policies are likely toremain in place for the foreseeable future
given how important cotton is to bothcountries’ economies. All five Central Asian
countries also face parallel risks to their water
security as a consequence of cross-borderdisputes over the Amu Darya and Syr Darya
rivers and the Caspian Sea.
ClimateThe region is characterised by a generallyhigh altitude, arid and semi-arid conditions
with warm summers and cold winters, withseasonal rainfall affecting water availability
and flooding. Average annual temperatures
are likely to increase by around 1.5°C by the
middle of the century. Existing low water
availability in the west of the region is likely toworsen. Heatwaves will probably increase infrequency and magnitude, while extreme cold
events are likely to decrease across the region.

5 Oxford Analytica, op. cit.

142

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Part 2Central Asia

Natural disasters
All five Central Asian countries are, and willalmost certainly remain, prone to severe
earthquakes and other natural disasters.6 The
most seismically active areas are often themost densely populated, among them theOsh region in Kyrgyzstan and the Ferghana
Valley, which includes parts of Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and is home to morethan 11 million people (nearly 20% of theregion’s population).7 Institutional weakness
and budgetary constraints leave populations
in Central Asia particularly vulnerable tonatural disasters. The only exception is
Kazakhstan, which has initiated long-term
reform efforts and dedicated financial
resources to develop risk management
capabilities. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan has
repeatedly failed to take into account thewarnings of seismologists, and more than 60%of the population live in housing that is not
6 Oxford Analytica, op. cit.
7 Asian Development Bank (2010), ‘Central Asia Atlasof Natural Resources’

able to withstand the strong earthquakes thatthe region is likely to continue to experience.8

Economic vulnerability
Unemployment and poor resource availability
mean that many people in the region are likely
to continue to migrate to find work. There
have been large population movements
across Central Asia since independence, bothwithin and between countries, and theseincreasingly reflect economic considerations.
Together with Russia, Kazakhstan has become
the preferred destination for immigrants fromthe poorer countries of Central Asia, while
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan havebecome increasingly dependent on money
sent home by emigrants (which currently
accounts for 50% of GDP in Tajikistan, 40%

8 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation(2008), ‘Kyrgyzstan Earthquake Safety Initiative
Project’, available at http://www.swiss-cooperation.
admin.ch/centralasia/en/Home/Activities_in_
Kyrgyzstan/COMPLETED_PROJECTS/Kyrgyzstan_
Earthquake_Safety_Initiative

A mosque in Khiva, Uzbekistan

Global Strategic Trends

143Part 2Central Asia

An ageing population
Population by ten-year age group and sex
Age group
100+

Male

Female

90-99

2015
2045

2015
2045

80-89
70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Millions of people
Source: UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’in Kyrgyzstan, and 10% in Uzbekistan).9 The
viability of this development model depends
on external circumstances, and particularly on
the continued demand for imported labourin Russia and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan.
The labour-exporting countries are, therefore,
extremely vulnerable to an economic
downturn in the host economies or to theimposition of migration restrictions. Suchlimits are likely to be put in place by 2045 due

to Russia’s economic difficulties and associatedanti-immigrant violence. At the same time,
Uzbek and Turkmen dependence on oil andgas exports is likely to continue to make bothcountries vulnerable to downturns in demandoutside the region and to reducing levels of
supply. Out to 2045, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are therefore
likely to be at risk of instability from economic
hardship.

9 Oxford Analytica, op. cit.

Defence and security implications■■ Although all the major regional actors have an interest in Central Asia, none appears
to have a strategy of territorial expansion into the region or of becoming directly
involved in security issues.
■■ The primary triggers of instability in Central Asia remain rooted in the internal
politics of each country. Countries in the region are likely to remain vulnerable tosignificant political and social threats that, in turn, pose risks to the region’s security.

144

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Part 2Global Strategic Trends

145

25

12
37

18

8
1
33

28

5
4

16

42
26

10

20

9

32

43
7

36

49

15
34

41

24

23

6

21

27

39
22
17

35
40

44

1 Afghanistan
2 American Samoa
3 Australia
4 Bangladesh
5 Bhutan
6 Brunei Darussalam
7 Cambodia
8 China
9 China, Hong Kong SAR
10 China, Macao SAR
11 Cook Islands
12 Dem. People’s Republic of Korea
13 Fiji
14 French Polynesia
15 Guam
16 India
17 Indonesia
18 Japan
19 Kiribati
20 Lao People’s Democratic Republic
21 Malaysia
22 Maldives23 Marshall Islands
24 Micronesia (Fed. States of)
25 Mongolia
26 Myanmar
27 Nauru
28 Nepal29 New Caledonia
30 New Zealand
31 Niue

32 Northern Mariana Islands
33 Pakistan
34 Palau
35 Papua New Guinea
36 Philippines
37 Republic of Korea
38 Samoa
39 Singapore
40 Solomon Islands
41 Sri Lanka
42 Taiwan
43 Thailand
44 Timor-Leste
45 Tokelau
46 Tonga
47 Tuvalu
48 Vanuatu
49 Viet Nam
50 Wallis and Futuna Islands

48

29
3

See inset

30

19

Inset for South Pacific Islands
47

45

38

50

2

14

13
31
46

11

Part 2South & East Asiaand Oceania
China and India will almost certainly continue to be the dominant powers in the region
by 2045, with their economies ensuring that South & East Asia makes the biggest
contribution to the world’s GDP. Japan is likely to continue to have the region’s thirdlargest economy. In Oceania, Australia will almost inevitably remain the dominant
power and have the largest economy. South & East Asia and Oceania are likely tocontinue to contain over 50% of the world’s population by 2045, presenting bothbenefits and challenges. China and India are likely to continue to devote considerable
resources into ensuring economic growth and both countries are likely to continue toseek a strong economic relationship with the US. The way that China and India manage
their societies’ demands and their internal methods of governance will be importantto the region’s development. Both China and the US are likely to become increasingly
dependent on the global economy for their long-term stability, prosperity and security.

Demography
The average age of China’s population is
likely to increase from 34 in 2011, to 46 in
2045, with some projections seeing China’s
workforce shrinking by 2045 as a result of
population aging.1 This could lead to China
becoming one of the first countries to age
before it gets wealthy.2 The populations ofSouth Korea, Japan and parts of Oceania
will almost certainly become significantly
older. Countries with younger age profiles
and larger populations, such as Bangladesh,
India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines
are likely to enjoy the economic benefits ofproductive, and relatively cheap, manpower.
However, all countries will probably need todevelop adequate social policies, to ensurethat large-scale inequality and poor education
do not generate social problems that lead to
instability. Furthermore, many South & East
Asian countries have significantly more men
than women. For example, China is likely
1 OECD (2012), ‘Environmental Outlook to 2050’
2 Goldman Sachs (2011), ‘Population Growth andAgeing in the BRICs’, available at http://www.
goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archivepdfs/population-growth-ageing-brics.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

to have around 48 million more men than
women by 2045. This could lead to social
challenges, particularly as male-dominatedsocieties tend to be more authoritarian andmore prone to violence.3 Urbanisation willalmost certainly continue at a rapid rate, withmany cities located in coastal areas vulnerable
to flooding.

Economic and strategic importance
As well as containing over 50% of the world’s
population,4 South & East Asia are also likely
to be the greatest contributor to global GDP
from 2030 onwards.5 Its huge population
could provide a vast consumer market, while
3 Caprioli, M. and Trumbore, P. F. (2003), ‘Identifying‘Rogue’ States and Testing their Interstate Conflict
Behavior’, available at http://lib.znate.ru/docs/
index-124184.html“

Urbanisation willalmost certainly
continue at a
rapid rate, withmany cities
located in coastal
areas vulnerable
to flooding.

”

4 UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012
Revision’, available at http://esa.un.org/wpp/unpp/
panel_population.htm
5 Standard Chartered (2010), ‘The Super-Cycle Report’,available at https://www.sc.com/id/_documents/press-releases/en/The%20Super-cycle%20Report12112010-final.pdf. Projections that suggest that
China, India, Japan and the rest of Asia combined willcontribute 47% to global GDP by 2030, as opposed
to 26% from the EU and US.

147

Part 2South & East Asia and Oceania

A growing population living in the urban environment2015% shareof global
population

Rural

2025
56

2015

52

Urban

2035
2045

2045

0

500

Source: UN ‘World Urbanization Prospects: 2011 Revision’“

China and India
are likely to attain
global leadershipin select technicaldisciplines,
achieving parity
with the West in a
number of nicheareas as soon as
2015.

”

148

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000

Population in millions

continued industrialisation, investment
in research and improved transportation
infrastructure are likely to drive economic
growth and build independent capabilities
across South & East Asia and beyond. For
example, the further development of the
Pan-Asia railway network includes a proposed
rail link between China and Central Asianstates as well as between China and Russia.
The economic growth of China, possibly
succeeded by India, will probably commandparticular attention over the next 30 years.
Forecasts suggest that by 2045 China, the EU,
India and the US will form the world’s largest
economies, with Japan also likely to remain an
important economic power, both regionallyand globally. These countries or (in the EU’scase) blocs are likely to engage increasinglywith each other on a host of issues ranging
from defence, through to climate change and,perhaps most significantly, continued national
economic and industrial development. Most
countries in South & East Asia are likely tocontinue to enjoy strong economic growth –with Indonesia likely to be one of the world’s
ten largest economies by 2045. Australia
will almost certainly remain the dominanteconomy in Oceania.
Maintaining economic growth will probably
be the pressing national priority for all South& East Asian nations, but for India and China
it is likely to take precedence over all matters
except national sovereignty and security. An
enduring aim of both countries is likely tobe sustaining a stable external environment,
allowing India and China to pursue domestic
reforms and expand trade and investment
opportunities with as many countries as

possible. However, both India and China arelikely to face problems such as the effects
of climate change, growing populations ofvarying composition and challenges to theirsystems of government. How India andChina meet these challenges is almost certain
to have profound implications nationally,
regionally and globally. Other South & East
Asian nations, such as Indonesia, are also likely
to see strong economic growth and facesimilar challenges, but none of them are likely
to rival India or China. The Chinese Renminbi
and possibly the Indian Rupee are likely to be
traded internationally as reserve currencies
by 2045 – assuming that both countries canundertake the necessary economic reforms to
make this possible. Given the strength of theChinese economy it is possible (though notnecessarily likely) that the Renminbi could rival
the US dollar as the world’s principal reserve
currency by 2045.6

Technology
China and India are likely to attain global
leadership in select technical disciplines,
achieving parity with the West in a number ofniche areas as soon as 2015 and more widelyby 2045. Chinese companies are already filingmore international patent applications thanbusinesses in the US or Japan.7 As South& East Asian nations become increasingly
6 Bloomberg (2011), ‘China’s Yuan Convertible by 2016
in Global Poll Marking Big Investor Shift’, available
at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-12/
china-s-yuan-convertible-by-2016-in-poll.html
7 Reuters (2011), ‘China tops U.S, Japan to Become
Top Patent Filer’, available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/12/21/us-china-patentsidUSTRE7BK0LQ20111221

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2South & East Asia and Oceania

An ageing population
Population by ten-year age group and sex
Age group
100+

Male

Female

90-99

2015
2045

2015
2045

80-89
70-79
60-69
50-59
40-49
30-39
20-29
10-19
0-9

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Millions of people
Source: UN (2012), ‘World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision’

significant developers of technology,
protecting their intellectual property fromtheft and infringement will probably become
more important. The region’s strength
in technology is likely to be enhanced bycontinuing high levels of investment ineducation. South & East Asian countries have,and are projected to continue to have, higher
rates of enrolment in science and technology
courses than western countries – Japan,
Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea
are already highly advanced.

EnergyAs their populations and economies grow,South & East Asian countries are likely to needaccess to more energy – and consequently,
will probably seek to secure bilateral deals withother resource-rich nations around the globe.
China and India are likely to lead the fieldin securing such agreements. For example,
China is making significant investment ininfrastructure, including pipelines, to bringoil and gas from Burma. China is currently
the world’s largest producer of greenhousegases (although it emits less on a per-capita
basis than most developed nations) but India
could be a bigger emitter by 2045. However,growing demand for coal and hydrocarbons
across the region is likely to increase prices
which may make alternative energy sources(such as renewable and nuclear energy)

Global Strategic Trends

more viable. Japan is a major investor inrenewable energy and India, in particular, haslarge reserves of material that can be used to
produce nuclear energy, such as thorium – anaturally occurring element.

Religion
Religious tensions throughout the region arelikely to endure. Relations between religious
groups will probably vary between countries,
largely depending on the strength of politicalinstitutions and how well ideas of national
identity and cultural pluralism are propagated.
In India, sectarian violence (for example,
between Hindus and Muslims) is likely tocontinue, although elections could ameliorate
tensions – at least in some regions. In Pakistan
there is a risk that permissive conditions forpersecuting the Shiite minority will endure.8
Burma has seen large-scale violence between
Buddhists and Muslims which shows little
sign of abating, with tens of thousands ofpeople displaced from their homes, andhundreds of fatalities.9 Malaysia has banned
the preaching of Shiite Islam since 1996,
8 Ganguly, S. (2007), ‘ The Roots of Religious Violencein India, Pakistan and Bangladesh’
9 Pew Research Centre (2014), ‘Religious Hostilities
Reach Six-Year High’, available at http://www.
pewforum.org/files/2014/01/RestrictionsV-fullreport.pdf

149

Part 2“Christians makeup around
5% of China’s
population; thecountry could
have the world’s
largest Christiancommunity by
2030.

”

South & East Asia and Oceania

and anti-Shia sentiment has arguably beenbuilding throughout the 21st century, fuelledby the growth of Wahabism (a conservative
Sunni faction) in Malaysia.10 China has also
seen religious tensions turn into violence,for example with an attack on Muslims by
Buddhist monks in 2012, at the site of a new
mosque.11 In Indonesia, the persecution of
Shiite minorities (including the burning of
Shiite villages in 2012 in East Java, which led
to the displacement of hundreds of people)
has drawn international attention.12 However,a peace treaty initiated by Sunni and Shiite
communities in Sampang, which saw thesafe return of exiled Shias, the creation of
new housing and schools, and promises ofreconciliation, may offer hope for future ShiaSunni relations in Indonesia.13
Christianity could have a growing role in a
number of countries in South & East Asia overthe next 30 years. An estimated 29% of South
Koreans are adherents, making Christians
the largest religious group in the country.14
China has seen a rapid rise in the numbers ofChristians since the middle of the 20th century,with numbers of Protestants growing fromone million in 1949 to more than 58 million
by 2010.15 Christians make up around 5% of
10 Mahavera, S. (2013), ‘Ignorance, Extremist Sunnis
Fuelling Anti-Shia Sentiments in Malaysia,
Says Academic’, available at http://www.
themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/
ignorance-extremist-sunnis-fuelling-anti-shiasentiments-in-malaysia-says-a
11 Pew Research Centre (2014), op. cit.
12 Human Rights Watch (2013), ‘Indonesia: Ensure Safe
Return Home of Evicted Shia Villagers’, available at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/30/indonesiaensure-safe-return-home-evicted-shia-villagers
13 The Shia Post (2013), ‘Indonesia: Sampang Sunni,
Shia Muslims Sign Peace Treaty’, available at http://en.shiapost.com/2013/09/25/indonesia-sampangsunni-shia-muslims-signpeace-treaty/; The Jakarta
Globe (2013), ‘Government to Place Sampang Shiites’
Future in Sunni Leaders’ Hands’, available at http://
www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/govt-to-placesampang-shiites-future-in-sunni-leaders-hands/
14 Pew Research Centre (2012), ‘The Global Religious
Landscape’
15 Phillips, T. (2014), ‘China on course to become‘world’s most Christian nation’ within 15 years’,available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/china/10776023/China-on-courseto-become-worlds-most-Christian-nation-within-15years.html; Pew Research Centre (2012), op. cit.

150

China’s population,16 and some commentators
have suggested that the country could have theworld’s largest Christian community by 2030.17

ClimateTemperatures are likely to rise across theregion over the next 30 years. Averageannual rainfall will almost certainly increasein most areas, with a rise in monsoon rainfall
potentially leading to more flooding andreduced crop yields. Nevertheless, droughts
may increase in frequency and intensity
across the region, particularly in central
and western Australia, southern Asia andsouthern China. Extreme cold events arelikely to decrease across the region. Hightemperature extremes will probably increasein frequency and magnitude. The danger
from wild fires across Australia is projected
to increase, with a reduced interval between
fires, as well as increased fire intensity. Fires
are likely to spread faster and be harder to put
out. Southern areas are identified as being atparticularly high risk.
The majority of countries in the region
are likely to adopt at least some measures
to counter the effects of climate change.
Measures adopted by China are likely to beparticularly important, as it is the world’s
biggest emitter of greenhouse gases(although not on a per-person basis). China’s
system of government allows the country to
implement environmental policies rapidly – forexample, its recent Renewable Energy Law
was drafted in less than nine months andpassed with no amendments the following
year. However, China’s directive approach
can have unintended effects – in 2009 and2010, local governments imposed rolling
power cuts to meet emission targets, evenas temperatures dropped to -10°C.18 The
consequences of such measures have andcould continue to result in a backlash; hence
environmental policies failing in the long-term.

16 Pew Research Centre (2012), op. cit.
17 Phillips, op. cit.
18 Gilley, B. (2012), ‘Authoritarian Environmentalism
and China’s Response to Climate Change’, available
at http://www.web.pdx.edu/~gilleyb/Gilley_
AuthoritarianEnvironmentalism.pdf

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2South & East Asia and Oceania

Water
Increasing annual rainfall across parts ofeastern Asia is likely to lead to increased riverrunoff, but demand for water will probably
also increase. Changes to the Asian summer
monsoon may result in increased flooding,but overall rainfall in South Asia could reduce.
Many people across Asia rely on glacial melt
water which, due to continued melting, islikely to increase out to 2045 (but decreasebeyond then). Growing populations withhigher expectations, inefficient water usage,
rising levels of pollution and more diversions
are likely to increase the regional demand
for water, which could heighten tensions
over, and competition for, shared resources.
South Australia is likely to become drier andthe volume of water flowing in the MurrayDarling Basin (the largest river basin in the
country, accounting for approximately 70% of
irrigated crops and pastures) could reduce by
between 10-25% by 2045. While north-easternregions of Australia may experience moderateincreases in yield, average crop yields areprojected to decrease across the country.

Agriculture
The effect of climate on agriculture is almost
certain to vary. Rice yields in East Asia,
particularly in the Yangtze region could
decrease. However, potato, rice, and winterwheat yields in other areas of China may
increase. Cereal production across South &East Asia is projected to decrease, particularlyin the Indo-Gangetic Plains. Severe crop
failure is likely to force people to move,
mostly within their country of origin, but
a small proportion of the affected people(current estimates suggest around 1-2% of the
population) is likely to undertake internationalmigration.

Marine and coastal areas
A large proportion of the world’s coral
reefs are located in Asia and Oceania,
many of which are likely to be affected byclimate change, reducing biodiversity andproductivity. A significant proportion of theGreat Barrier Reef is projected to experience
coral bleaching – adversely affecting fisheries.

Rice terraces in Longsheng, China

Global Strategic Trends

151Part 2South & East Asia and Oceania

A changing climate threatens marine habitats such as Australia’s Great Barrier Reef“

Both India
and China willprobably seek todevelop sizeable
and technicallyadvanced armed
forces, including
ocean-goingnavies.

”152

Rising sea levels are also likely to increase stresson coastal habitats and cause an increase incoastal flooding. Many Asian cities are highly
likely to be at risk of such flooding, including:Calcutta, Mumbai, Shanghai, Ho Chi Minh City
and Bangkok. Although no major cities inAustralia or New Zealand have been identified
as being at high risk of flooding due to rising
sea levels, a significant proportion of bothcountries’ populations live near the coast. The
impact of sea-level rise on low-lying island
countries such as the Maldives and Vanuatu
may lead to wholesale international migrationby these small nations. Singapore will almost
certainly be threatened by climate change but
is likely to have sufficient resources to protect
itself from catastrophic effects.

Conflict
Although China’s military-industrial complex
is unlikely to surpass the technologicalsophistication of the US by 2045, it may rival itin terms of size, as could India’s. Both India andChina will probably seek to develop sizeable
and technically advanced armed forces,
including ocean-going navies, capable ofdelivering an enduring and capable maritime
presence both regionally and further afield.
The military capabilities of other countries in
the region are also likely to increase but only

China, India, Australia, Japan (which is actively
increasing its military capability) and South
Korea are likely to have the ability to project
conventional military power globally.
The emergence of India and China as great
powers is likely to lead to tensions, both
between these two countries and theirneighbours that – if not carefully managed– could spill over into conflict. For example,
the East and South China Seas are home toa number of disputed territories, and thelikelihood of conflict could be increased if
dwindling hydrocarbon reserves make thearea a more important site for extractions.
Similarly, China and India dispute areas of theirborder; India and Pakistan contest sovereignty
over Kashmir; and the Korean peninsula also
remains an area of heightened tension. In
short, the risk of a major state-on-state conflictin the region cannot be ruled out.
Terrorism will almost certainly remain an
enduring factor in the region, particularly
in South & East Asia. A variety of terrorist
organisations are likely to continue to operate
in the region. For example, the Taliban in
Pakistan; Kashmiri inspired terrorist groups; anincreasingly active Maoist ‘Naxalite’ insurgency
in India (there were nearly 1,900 terrorist

Global Strategic Trends

South & East Asia and Oceania

Part 2

related deaths in India in 2010);19 and Uighur
separatists in China. Although the ability ofmany of the region’s countries to combat
terrorism is likely to improve, its developing
countries may find it harder to manage suchdiverse ethno-religious groups.

19 US Department of State (2011), ‘Country Reports on
Terrorism 2010’, available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/170479.pdf

Defence and security implications■■ In large part because of its economy (likely to be the largest in the world by 2045),
South & East Asia will probably be of increasing strategic significance.
■■ A growing population, increasing demand and the effects of climate change arelikely to lead to food and water shortages. While cooperation over water has often
overcome national differences, the potential for confrontation over shared water
resources may increase.
■■ Rising sea levels are likely to lead to humanitarian disasters which may requireinternational assistance.
■■ China’s military is becoming more capable and has increasing global reach. By
2045, China’s military capability may be close to matching that of the US, perhaps
exceeding it in some areas. India’s military capability is also likely to increase – but
probably not to the point where it rivals China or the US by 2045.
■■ The East and South China Seas may be flashpoints for confrontation between China
and the US and allied countries. Similarly Kashmir, the Korean Peninsula and theborder between China and India are likely to be areas of tension. The risk of a majorstate-on-state conflict in the region cannot be ruled out.
■■ Terrorism will almost certainly continue to pose a threat in South & East Asia, lessso in Oceania. High levels of inequality based upon class, ethnicity and religion
are likely to endure as sources of tension across the region and may impact on theoverall governance and stability of some countries.

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1

1
2
3
4

United States
CanadaGreenland (Den.)
Russia4

2

Arctic31
2
3
4

Argentina
Chile
Falkland Islands
Australia

3
12

Antarctic

4

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Polar regions

Climate change is the principal driver of change in the Arctic and Antarctic, withincreasing temperatures and precipitation. As Arctic and Antarctic sea ice retreats, many
areas that are currently inaccessible could become open to commercial exploitation,
particularly of oil and gas. The opening-up of the Arctic is likely to focus attention on
the region’s governance arrangements, but, despite challenges, current arrangements
are likely to endure out to 2045. Large-scale military confrontation in either region isunlikely, but it is possible that some countries – depending on their internal politics– may seek to project power in the Arctic if they consider their interests in the region
to be under threat. In Antarctica, the current governance arrangements are likely toendure out to 2045, but the Antarctic Treaty System could come under pressure toaccommodate increased commercial exploitation within carefully managed bounds.

Arcticpossibly to catastrophic levels. The incidenceof severe storms is also likely to increase.

Climate change
Alterations in the climate are the drivers
behind many of the changes expected to takeplace in the polar regions over the coming
decades. The impacts of climate change are
already being felt, from the reducing areaof sea ice during the summer to shifting
patterns of rain and snowfall. In the Arctic,
significant warming will almost certainly occur
throughout the region, and is likely to begreater than the anywhere else in the world.1
Sea levels will probably continue to rise andprecipitation is likely to increase, particularly
in winter. Sea ice is likely to reduce, facilitating
increased access for shipping. Due to risingtemperatures, the permafrost is likely to melt.
This could cause subsidence, infrastructuredamage and release methane – all adding
to global greenhouse gas emissions andexacerbating global warming and its effects,

Transit routes
Over the next few decades there is likely to
be a sustained reduction in both the extent
and thickness of summer sea ice, and regular
ice-free summers may occur by 2045. The
Arctic navigation season could be extended
and new shipping routes have the potential
to be opened up. This could save significant
time when transporting goods from theFar East to Europe and Northern America.
Constraints on the utility of the new Arctic
shipping routes for major global trade willprobably remain – none are likely to be majortrans-global routes by 2045. If countries areto fully exploit hydrocarbon reserves andshipping routes in the Arctic, they will needto invest substantially in icebreaking capacity.
As the volume of maritime traffic increases,
there is likely to be an associated growth in theenvironmental risks faced by the Arctic region– and regulating the passage of vessels is likely
to pose a significant challenge. The number
and magnitude of human disasters requiring
search and rescue services is also likely torise. Measures to improve international

1 Chatham House-Lloyd’s (2012), ‘Arctic Opening:
Opportunity and Risk in the High North’, available
at http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182839

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Polar regions

to oil spills – as a consequence of both theslow recovery of cold ecosystems and the
difficulties facing clean-up processes inremote and cold areas where ice is present.
It is possible that a major environmental
disaster may halt economic exploitation of theregion until expensive safeguards have been
implemented. A collapse in hydrocarbon
prices, though unlikely, could also remove themajor economic imperative for development
within the Arctic and may lead to major
negative impacts on many local and national
economies within the region.

Reduction in summer sea ice will extend Arctic navigation routes

coordination and allocate regional
responsibilities for providing such services
are likely to be developed, but may become
entangled in wider disputes over sovereignty.2

Resources
Global demand for energy is expected tomore than double by 2045, with coal andhydrocarbons likely to continue to play amajor role in the global energy mix. The
Arctic currently produces around 10% of
the world’s oil and 25% of its gas, withapproximately 80% of these resources
coming from Russian territory. It has been
estimated that the Arctic contains up to 13%of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of
its gas reserves, which are likely to become
increasingly attractive as existing reserves are
depleted.3 Oil and gas exploration is likely
to be concentrated in Russia and northern
Norway, with other new reserves possible
off the seaboards of Greenland, Alaska andthe Canadian north. Developing both
existing and new oil and gas fields will almost
certainly be complex, requiring advances intechnology and demanding high standardsof engineering and quality control. The Arctic
will probably remain particularly vulnerable

Mining of minerals in the Arctic is likely tocontinue to be a major source of economic
development and may expand significantly
as sea routes to deep water ports are
opened up for bulk carrier access. Depositsof coal, diamonds, nickel, copper, gold,
silver, manganese, chromium and titanium
are particularly likely to be exploited at anincreased level, bringing both money andpeople into several parts of the region.
Although Russia and Canada are likely
to possess the largest reserves of theseresources, mineral wealth is widely distributed
through the Arctic, and there are many areas,
including Greenland, with great potential
for new discoveries and further exploitation.
Commodity prices are likely to rise further,which could provide an extra incentive
for more marginal areas to be opened forextraction. However, although explorationand extraction conditions are likely to improvein some areas as the ice retreats, thesechanging conditions are likely to add newchallenges. Melting permafrost, in particular,
could impede developing sustainableinfrastructure on land. New technology
is likely to be needed to exploit mineral
extraction potential in many areas affectedby melting permafrost, particularly in Russia.
Mineral extraction is likely to be harmful to the
Arctic environment and adverse ecologicalimpacts could occur.

2 Smith, L. C. and Stephenson, S. R. (2013), ‘New TransArctic Shipping Routes Navigable by Midcentury’
3 Chatham House-Lloyd’s, op. cit.

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Polar regions

Agri- and aqua-culture, forestry
and tourism
Fishing is already an important source of
employment in the region, with several
countries, notably Iceland, Russia and
Norway, investing in large fishing fleets.
Major commercial fish stocks such as cod,herring and pollock are likely to be exploitedincreasingly easily as sea ice cover reduces,
and the areas populated by these fish stocks
are likely to increase further in size as theseas warm. For other species of fish, such as
salmon and trout, the outlook is less positive,
and climate change may significantly reducethese fish stocks. The opening up of the Arctic
Ocean, and the possible northwards migrationof fish stocks, may – when combined withgrowing demand for protein in world foodmarkets – encourage large numbers of EU
and Asian fishing fleets to move into theregion, especially in areas not within countries’
exclusive economic zones. By 2045, it is likelythat fish stocks in the Arctic will be under
severe pressure, potentially causing tensions
between Arctic Rim countries, the EU andother fishing countries.
Climate change is already stimulating
significant changes to Arctic ecosystems and,as a result, to Arctic agriculture and forestry.
The warmer climate is highly likely to extend
the growing season and may encourage crop
diversification at higher latitudes. Increased
crop disease, also as a result of climate change,
is unlikely to counteract increased crop yields.
Timber productivity is likely to improve, withplanted forests in the Arctic likely to expand
to the north, despite a likely increase in forest
fires and tree-killing pests. Numbers ofcaribou and reindeer in the region could also
rise, although they may be more affected by
insect infestations. Diminishing cattle andsheep habitats in southern Europe may create
markets for reindeer and caribou products,
improving the economic situation of Nordic
farmers. Much of the Arctic is also alreadyseeing significant increases in tourist numbers
and, by 2045, changes in climatic patterns arelikely to have opened up several new Arctic
regions as viable tourist destinations.4
4 Chatham House-Lloyd’s, op. cit.

Global Strategic Trends

Governance
The Arctic region, comprising four million
people, eight countries and over 30
indigenous groups, is largely under-populated
and is characterised by sparse communicationand infrastructure links. Out to 2045, there
are likely to be significant increases in using,and extracting, the region’s resourcesand developing its transport links. This isalready beginning to render its governancearrangements of deep significance and could
lead to increased tensions within the countries
and peoples of the region. International
governance, regional groupings and non-state
actors are all likely to play important roles
within the Arctic.5
By 2045, it is unlikely that there will be any
appetite for a formal UN agreement settinga legally binding governance framework for
the Arctic region (as exists in Antarctica). The
delineation of countries’ exclusive economic
zones and continental shelf boundaries under
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) process will probably establish
the ownership of economic rights in thevast majority of the Arctic Ocean, and it isunlikely that Arctic countries would attempt tooverturn these decisions by force. Althoughtension between countries over interpreting
the UNCLOS criteria for claiming jurisdiction
may increase during the period leading up to2045, it is likely that competing claims will be
arbitrated such that each country will be able
to exploit large areas of the Arctic sea bed
beyond its exclusive economic zones. The UN
Security Council will almost certainly continue
to provide a forum for countries locatedoutside the Arctic (but with national interests
within it) to discuss economic and politicalissues as they arise.

“

It is unlikely that
there will be
any appetite
for a formal UN
agreement settinga legally binding
governanceframework for theArctic region.

”

New regional governance arrangements arealso unlikely to materialise, primarily because
it is not likely to be in the national interests of
5 Ibid.; Holte, N. J. (2009), ‘The Arctic Region is at a
Time of Geopolitical Transition. Will this Transpire
Through Aggressive Competition or as Peaceful
Change?’, available at http://www.da.mod.uk/
colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-housepapers/2009-seaford-house-papers/shp09holte.pdf;
Rogers, J. (2012), ‘Geopolitics and the ‘Wider North’:
the United Kingdom as a ‘Strategic Pivot’

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Isolated and sparsely populated areas are likely to see development of infrastructure and transport links“

The EU is likely
to becomemore involvedin the Arctic as
non-Arctic EU
members, such as
Germany and theUK, become more
dependent on theregion’s energy
resources and fishstocks.

”158

Arctic countries for them to do so. Although
the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (a semiannual gathering of senior military officers)
is currently informal, it has the potential todevelop into a more structured forum forinternational coordination by 2045. The Arctic
Council is likely to continue to provide a focus
for all Arctic countries and peoples. It may
consider some form of low-level economic
collaboration, but is unlikely to expand into thegovernance or security sphere. The influenceof the indigenous peoples is also likely tobe limited and dispersed, and focussed
on exerting pressure on multinational
corporations and authorities within theircountries to secure better economic
conditions. Indigenous people are also likely
to continue to exert influence through theirposition at the decision-making table of the
Arctic Council. The EU is, however, likely to
become more involved in the Arctic as it islikely to expand to incorporate Arctic countries
and as larger non-Arctic EU members, suchas Germany and the UK, become more

dependent on the region’s energy resources
and fish stocks.

CanadaThe Arctic is likely to be an increasingly
important region for Canada out to 2045.
Melting ice is likely to open new areas formining, hydrocarbon extraction, fishing andshipping during the summer months. Canada
will probably continue to emphasise theArctic’s importance to its national interests.
It may also continue to reject US and Danish
claims to rights of navigational passage within
its exclusive economic zone. Despite thesedisagreements, Canada is likely to maintain
good relations with both nations. Canada andthe US are likely to reach an agreement on a
range of Arctic issues, particularly over gas andoil distribution pipelines from the Arctic to themarkets of Northern America.
China
By 2045 China could have substantial maritime
power and may look to an accessible Arctic as

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Polar regionsa channel for trade and fishing in the region.
To maintain these trading routes, China may
deploy its naval forces, which may heighten
tensions with Russia. China may also seek toextend itself economically into the Arctic, again
risking conflict, although violence is unlikely.6

RussiaRussia will almost certainly be the dominant– but unpredictable – state actor in the Arctic
by virtue of its economic, political and militarystrength in the region, as well as its locationand size. Russia is likely to have sovereignty
over the region’s major fossil fuel reserves,
fish stocks and mineral deposits, and climatechange could afford it the possibility of
expanding its agricultural sector in the region.
Russia is also likely to have significant influence
over the Northern Sea Route as it becomes
more viable to commercial traffic as summer
ice retreats. Russia’s Arctic region is currently
the source of 20% of its GDP, 60% of its oil and
90% of its gas, and the country’s leadershipwill probably continue to view it as a strategicinterest. Russia is likely to continue to maintainsignificant military capabilities in the Arctic
to protect its nuclear forces and secure its
economic assets, as well as providing a basis
for its search and rescue responsibilities. Theremay be more frequent demonstrations ofmilitary strength in the air and at sea, possibly
to distract from domestic sociopolitical issues.
The United States of America
The US, while seeking to ensure that its
economic and security interests are protected,
is unlikely to see the Arctic as a primary theatreof American activity. However, there may betension with Russia over disputed areas of the
Chukchi Sea, and US control of fishing within
the Bering Sea may be challenged by Russian,Chinese, Korean and Japanese interests if theregion continues to be a significant source offish and sea mammals.
Other Arctic countries and populations
Norway will almost certainly continue torely on NATO as the guarantor of its security,
6 Blank, S. (2013), ‘China’s Arctic Strategy’, available at
http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/20/chinas-arcticstrategy/

Global Strategic Trends

though it is likely to seek further bilateralagreements with EU countries to reinforce
its position. More advanced than the othercountries in setting out a vision for theregion, it is likely to retain the lead in Arctic
regional development. A newly independent
Greenland may seek to join the EU and NATO,and could become the subject of intenseinterest from countries such as China. Out to2045, Iceland may also seek EU membershipas well as more substantive engagement withother NATO members.
The indigenous populations of the Arctic
are likely to see their lifestyles threatened,
their numbers declining, and their influencewaning. Their unique lifestyle and patternsof subsistence are likely to have disappearedby 2045, and the need to assimilate andto gain new skills to compete with skilledmigrants from the south is likely to be bothan opportunity and a risk. The indigenous
population within the Arctic is likely to decline
slowly, and may undergo some degree ofurbanisation as its members move in searchof healthcare and employment opportunities
for their young people. It is unlikely that theregional peoples will be able to counteract thepower and influence of their largely sub-Arctic
based governments and their influence willprobably remain largely peripheral (except
Greenland’s large Inuit population). Tension
and low level violence between migrants andindigenous people is possible.

“

Russia’s Arctic
region is currently
the source of 20%
of its GDP, 60% of
its oil and 90% of
its gas.

”Multinational corporations
Many of the inhabited areas of the Arctic willprobably continue, in practice, to be managed
by multinational corporations and populated
solely or predominantly by their workers.
Russian-based conglomerates are likely toremain semi-state controlled. They are unlikely
to operate to levels of corporate governanceexpected in the West and are likely to beless inclined to comply with international
regulations. Environmental pressure groups
and non-governmental organisations, suchas the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace,
could play an increasing role in influencing theactivity of western countries and corporationsin the Arctic region.

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Antarctic
Climate change
Across Antarctica as a whole, land
temperatures could rise by more than 2°C by
2045, and sea temperatures in the region are
also likely to continue to rise, albeit at levels
below the global average. An increase inaverage annual maximum precipitation of 7%
is likely by 2045 (compared with 1999 levels),
and parts of Antarctica and its surrounding
seas will almost certainly continue to lose
ice at a rapid rate up to, and beyond, 2045.
The effects of climate change on Antarctic
ecosystems are likely to be significant.
Melting Antarctic ice may contribute to sealevel rises, with a subsequent effect on therest of the planet.

“

Although the
Antarctic Treaty
explicitly prohibits
extracting
minerals andhydrocarbons,the [economic]
potential islikely to becomea significant
influence on
the region’s
geopolitics.

”
160

Resources
Global demand for minerals, fossil fuels
and low-emission energy sources arelikely to continue to rise until at least
2045, providing an incentive to operate inpreviously unexploited areas. Although
the Antarctic Treaty explicitly prohibits
extracting minerals and hydrocarbons (otherthan for scientific research purposes), thepotential for their extraction in Antarctica
is likely to become a significant influenceon the region’s geopolitics in the coming
decades. It is already likely that substantial
hydrocarbon deposits exist, including in
the area triple-claimed by the UK, Argentina
and Chile. Drilling, however, is likely toremain uneconomical unless oil prices
rise well above their current level or until
technological advances lower the cost of
exploitation significantly. Nevertheless, given
probable global demand levels, proposals for
exploitation are likely by 2045 if hydrocarbon
deposits have been found on the continentand in its surrounding waters. Any proposals
for exploitation could heighten politicaltensions in the region, and may not evenbe accepted given the likelihood of strong
opposition from certain countries and fromenvironmental pressure groups. Exploitinghydrocarbon deposits in Antarctica is likely
to damage the local environment andcould bring about grave consequences

for the continent’s ecosystems. Although
the geography of Antarctica lends itself to
producing renewable energy, it is unlikely tobe economically viable to do so by 2045.
Although there is much uncertainty about
the extent and nature of mineral deposits,
early studies indicate that Antarctica is likely
to contain mineral deposits similar to those inAustralia, Africa, India and South America, towhich it was once joined. The Dufek Massif– which lies within the area triple-claimed by
the UK, Argentina and Chile – is the location
with the most significant potential mineralendowments within the Antarctic continent.
All nations currently carrying out scientificresearch on Antarctica are likely to maintaina keen interest in its mineral potential, with
China foremost among them. Nevertheless,there are several physical, environmental andtechnological factors that effectively prevent
mining in Antarctica, some of which may not– as a result of melting ice and technologicaladvances – be present by 2045. Significant
opposition to exploiting Antarctica’s mineral
wealth is, however, likely to remain, based on
environmental protection grounds. Althoughsome Antarctic Treaty System members, as well
as non-member nations, may lobby for mining
to be allowed to ease economic pressures,
there is likely to be strong pressure from othernations and non-state actors to maintain thestatus quo, preserving continental Antarctica
from commercial activity.

Water
By 2045, one third of the world’s population
is likely to live in areas of water stress. In thedeveloped world, water scarcity is likely to
be overcome mainly through conservationand the increased use of desalinisation(which is extremely energy-intensive). Someestimates suggest that 90% of the world’s
fresh water is in Antarctica,7 mostly in theice sheets that flow to the continent’s coastand in the many ice shelves floating on thesea. These vast quantities of ice may holdpart of the solution to world water shortages,
7 British Antarctic Survey (undated), ‘Ice Sheets in
Antarctica’, available at http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/
about_antarctica/geography/ice/sheets.php

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Polar regions

particularly if better and cheaper technology
enables the establishment of a commercial
iceberg harvesting industry. Although this
could generate worldwide benefits, suchcommercial exploitation could bring negativeenvironmental consequences to Antarctica,
including damage to ecosystems.

Fishing
Commercial exploitation of Antarctica’s marine
resources has taken place for over a century,and has evolved markedly since the 1950s
in response to a range of drivers, particularly
resource demand. Control mechanisms havebeen developed that have adequately dealt
with fisheries management and lowered
political tensions. Under these mechanisms
fish and krill are the only Antarctic living
resources whose exploitation has been
sanctioned. However, an increase in demandduring the period leading up to 2045 is
likely to put these control mechanisms andassociated political relationships under strain,
and the Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources is likely tohave to be amended to reflect higher levels of
demand – or face being flouted.

Abandoned whaling ship in Antarctica – a legacy of resource exploitation

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Polar regions

Antarctic territorial claims and permanent research stations

NorwayUnited Kingdom
Argentina
Sanae IV
Neumayer (South Africa)(Germany)
Maitri(India)See inset

Novolazarevskaya(Russia)
Syowa(Japan)Molodezhnaya(Russia)

Halley(UK)

Mawson(Australia)

Belgrano II(Argentina)
Zhong Shan (China)
Progress (Russia)

Chile

Bharati (India)
Davis(Australia)

Amundsen-Scott(US)

Unclaimed
St. Kliment Ohridski Base
(Bulgaria)
Comandante Ferraz(Brazil)Marambio(Argentina)

Concordia(France & Italy)

Scott
(NZ)
McMurdo(US)

Esperanza(Argentina)

Bernardo
O'Higgins
Arturo Prat (Chile)(Chile)Palmer(US)

Vostok(Russia)

Mirnyy(Russia)

Australia

Casey(Australia)

Jang Bogo Station(South Korea)
Dumont d’Urville(France)

FranceVernadsky(Ukraine)

San Martin(Argentina)

New Zealand

Rothera(UK)

Governance
The Antarctic Treaty System is likely to endure,
but may be subject to disputes as countries
deal with climate change, population
increase, resource scarcity and global
inequality. These stresses are highly likely
to cause tensions between Antarctic Treaty
System members, and between them andother countries. Any discovery of significant
resources – especially hydrocarbons or
strategic minerals – on the continent is likely
to further increase the pressure. Although a
resource-driven scramble for the Antarctic isunlikely, incremental increases in exploiting162

the area under the Antarctic Treaty System are
expected. The global scientific community
is likely to act in concert to halt the open
exploitation of Antarctica for economic ends,
but is unlikely to be able to stop incremental
increases in exploitation. While it is also
unlikely that the prohibition of military activity
in the region will be breached (military
support to civil activity is likely to continue tobe permitted), there may be a considerable
increase in military activity in the surrounding
seas and airspace, influenced by increased
competition for Antarctic resources.

Global Strategic Trends

Polar regions

Part 2

Defence and security implications■■ Commercial activity expansion in the Arctic Ocean may require extensive
monitoring to safeguard Arctic countries’ sovereignty.
■■ Arctic Council members, in general, are likely to continue to operate in accordancewith its rules – the Arctic is likely to remain a largely well-governed space.
■■ Inter-country disputes within the Arctic, driven by access to, and control over,resources, are possible but are unlikely to result in military conflict.
■■ Russia will almost certainly remain the dominant power in the Arctic but, although
unpredictable, is unlikely to take unilateral, aggressive steps to provoke conflict in
the region.
■■ Resource demands are likely to increase pressure on the Antarctic Treaty System, butlarge-scale military conflict is unlikely.

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Part 2Space

Our reliance on space technology in a number of commercial and military areas willalmost certainly increase out to 2045. Technological advances are likely to further
reduce the cost of manufacturing and launching space vehicles, making space
increasingly accessible to (and profitable for) countries, companies, organised crime andprivate individuals. As reliance on space grows, so could the impact of damage caused
by deliberate attack, space weather and orbital collisions.

Relying on space-based technology
Developed countries already depend heavily
on space-based technologies and thisreliance is likely to increase out to 2045, withmany developing countries also likely toseek similar capabilities. Almost 60 countries
currently have satellites or space projects
with significant levels of investment – there
are an estimated 3,400 satellites in orbit, ofwhich around 1,000 are operational.1 Someestimates put replacement costs for these
active satellites at nearly US$ 140 billion,
with the impact of their loss on the global
economy several times higher.2 Activity inspace is increasing, and may well accelerate.
In total, governments (including Kazakhstan,
the Congo and Laos) spent more than US$
40 billion on civil space programmes in 2013
alone.3 These high levels of investment are
driven by the critical role that space-based
technologies now play in routine activity.
For example, global navigation satellite
systems (GNSS) are used to provide essential
position, navigation and timing information
1 European Space Agency (2013), ‘Space Debris:
Frequently Asked Questions’, available at http://
www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_
Debris/FAQ_Frequently_asked_questions

for industries as diverse as agriculture, finance,
surveying, emergency services, energy
distribution, wireless technology and railtransport. GNSS are also crucial for commercial
aviators and sailors, and many departmentsof defence use space systems for global
communication and to collect remote sensing
imagery of points of interest on the Earth. The
accuracy of modern weather forecasts alsorelies on satellite imaging and sensing.

Decreasing costs and improving access
The traditional view of a satellite as a large,
expensive object is being increasingly
challenged by the use of ever-smaller devices(some nicknamed ‘cubesats‘), often nolarger than 10 cm3 and weighing as little asa kilogram. Small satellites usually operate
in low-Earth orbits and take advantage ofcommercial off-the-shelf components to
reduce production costs and development
times. Some commercial organisations are
already using constellations of cubesats
to generate Earth imagery,4 and their use
is only likely to grow as their effectivenessand reliability are proven. Industry sources
anticipate that up to 543 cubesats andmicrosatellities (up to 50kg in weight)
could be launched in 2020, compared to

2 Ibid.
3 The Economist (2014), ‘Ye Olde Space Race’,available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/
graphicdetail/2014/02/daily-chart-11

Global Strategic Trends

4 Such as Planet Labs, http://www.planet.com/

165

Part 2“The European
Commission has
estimated that
6-7% of westerncountries’ GDP
is currently
dependent onsatellite timing
and navigation:
this equates to€800 billion for
the EU alone.

”

Space

92 in 2013.5 With greater access, though,comes greater competition, particularly forallocating satellite orbital slots and radio
frequencies. A more optimistic view is that,with more space objects and potentially more
collisions, there is a greater need to develop
and abide by international standards and tocreate as complete a picture as possible of
all activity in space. Notwithstanding thetrend towards greater collaboration between
groups of countries, attempts to introduce acomprehensive, effective and binding legal
framework have so far been unsuccessful.

the UN recently commented that “The outerspace environment [is] becoming increasingly‘congested, contested and competitive’
as States [vie] to benefit from space based
technologies.”8 Orbiting laboratories could
become viable, with some companies
aiming for orbital platforms with significantly
greater capacity than the International Space
Station.9 In turn, this has the potential to leadto breakthroughs in the development of new
medicines and materials that require a micro
gravity environment.

New economic opportunities
As space becomes more accessible throughsignificant advances in the development of
spaceplanes (vehicles that can operate in the
Earth’s atmosphere as well as in space) andreusable rockets, new economic opportunities
are likely to emerge. Several companies
are already proposing to extract water andminerals from asteroids that travel near Earth.
One of these companies, Planetary Resources,
is hoping to launch its first spacecraft in 2014,
with prospecting platforms operating in thenext decade. By 2045, companies pursuingoff-Earth resources are likely to have extensive
operations, particularly if the potential
revenues are as significant as suggested bysome analysts.6 For example, a single asteroid(1999 JV6) which passed the Earth in January
2014 could generate mining profits of up to
US$ 218 billion.7 Space tourism – both suborbital and orbital – is also a real possibility
by 2045, with a number of projects currently
in development. These potential economic
benefits, along with continuing reductionsin operating costs, make it likely that there
could be greater space congestion as morecountries, commercial operators and evenindividuals deploy orbital systems. Indeed,

Vulnerabilities

5 Spaceworks (2014), ‘Nano/Microsatellite Market
Assessment’, available at http://www.sei.aero/
eng/papers/uploads/archive/SpaceWorks_Nano_
Microsatellite_Market_Assessment_January_2014.
pdf
6 Knight, O. (2014), ‘To Infinity and Beyond for
Property’, available at http://www.knightfrankblog.
com/wealthreport/news-headlines/to-infinity-andbeyond-for-property/
7 Ibid.

166

Our reliance on space technologies generates
widespread vulnerabilities which are likely toincrease in the future. The UK Government’s
National Risk Assessment ranked severe
disruption to satellite services, possibly as theresult of a deliberate attack by another state, inthe second highest category of security risks
faced by Britain.10 Similarly, a US Government
report observed that lives and billions ofdollars could be lost if significant disruption to
global positioning systems (GPS) occurred.11
The European Commission has estimated that
6-7% of western countries’ GDP is currently
dependent on satellite timing and navigation:
this equates to €800 billion for the EU alone.12
As well as deliberate threats, satellites are
at risk from man-made space debris, space
weather and from accidental collision witheach other. Such collisions have alreadyoccurred, and this risk is likely to grow as moreman-made objects are launched into space.
8 UN (2013), ‘68th General Assembly GA/DIS/3487
Press Release’, available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2013/gadis3487.doc.htm
9 Bigelow Aerospace (undated), ‘Mission Statement’,available at http://www.bigelowaerospace.com/
10 HM Government (2010), ‘A Strong Britain in an Ageof Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy’,available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf
11 US Government Accountability Office (2013), ‘GPS
Disruptions’, available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/660/658792.pdf
12 European Commission (2012), ‘Galileo Will Boost
Economy and Make Life of Citizens Easier’, available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11717_en.htm?locale=en

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2Space

Criminal use of space
Criminals and other actors with malignintent may increasingly exploit space-based
capabilities, particularly as access becomescheaper. Already, those who wish to discover
weaknesses in the security arrangementsof sensitive infrastructure can buy highresolution imagery from companies that
operate Earth observation spacecraft. By 2045
or earlier, criminal organisations could secure
payload space on rockets operated by privatecompanies – this would allow them to launch
their own surveillance satellites, potentiallythreatening individual and corporate privacy.
Jamming
Ground-based receivers of satellite signals
have already been jammed for short periods
in localised areas. In 2009, navigation aids
at Newark airport suffered daily breaks inreception, caused by a driver with a GPS
jammer who regularly drove past. Drivers arelikely to continue to use jammers to prevent
their location being monitored by theiremployers and criminals may increasingly use
them to avoid paying GNSS-based road tolls.
Perhaps more significantly, North Korea has

used large, lorry-based jammers to interferewith GPS signals in South Korea – the crewsof more than 1,000 aircraft and 250 ships
reported disruptions over a 16-day period in
2012.

Chain reactions and deliberate attacks
The large amount of space debris currently
in orbit – an estimated 670,000 objects larger
than one centimetre and 29,000 larger thanten centimetres13 – increases the risk of achain reaction of collisions which could render
low-earth orbits unusable, disabling mostsurveillance satellites and threatening accessto higher orbits. Some debris mitigation
measures are already in place, such asproviding extra fuel for manoeuvring neardefunct satellites into the atmosphere so thatthey burn up. However, the European Space
Agency suggests that, even if satellite launches
were stopped today, a chain reaction ofcollisions is likely within 20 years, unless someof the debris currently in orbit is removed.14
Prototype machines for removing
13 European Space Agency, op. cit.
14 Klinkrad, H. (2013), ‘The Space Debris Environment’, apresentation to the Royal Aeronautical Society

Reliance on space technologies generates widespread vulnerabilities

Global Strategic Trends

167

Part 2

Space

Scenario:

A city without space15
By 2045, a solar superstorm of a similar size to the Carrington Event of the mid1800s could occur and be so disruptive that there would be widespread loss ofcommunications and navigation systems for several days, with possible permanent
loss of some satellites. Transport and logistic systems dependent on GNSS would be
disrupted - flights would be cancelled and planes already in flight may be unable
to navigate to safe landing areas, potentially causing loss of life. Roads and railway
networks are likely to become congested as drivers find themselves lost. Vehicles
carrying high risk or hazardous loads are often tracked by satellite - they would
disappear from the screens of monitoring centres, potentially resulting in accidents.
Assisting casualties could be delayed as, without GNSS, the emergency services would
take longer to arrive at the scene. If traditional means of navigation had not beenretained, emergency vehicles may not be able to reach their destination at all. Logistics
networks are likely to be disrupted and - depending on duration - this could lead tobare shelves in shops, as most supermarkets hold very limited amounts of stock, relying
on daily deliveries. Criminals may take advantage of a lack of coordination and delayed
response times to loot and riot.
15 Based on Hammond, J. (2012), ‘Increased Problem of GPS Jamming’, lecture delivered at the RUSI Space and
UK National Security Conference“

The risk ofcreating spacedebris may
make countries
or groups think
more carefully
before carryingout a deliberate
physical attack onsatellites.

”

malfunctioning satellites and debris arebeing developed, but international law only
allows the country that owns (or the agency
that launched) a spacecraft to touch it – astechnology able to remove an obsolete
satellite could equally be used to interfere with
an operable one. The risk of creating spacedebris may make countries or groups think
more carefully before carrying out a deliberate
physical attack on satellites. Although somecountries already have the capability to carryout this kind of attack, the fragments created ifa satellite was destroyed in a usable orbit could
also deny access to space to the perpetrator.
However, this could make space assets an
attractive target for those countries or groups
that either do not rely on space-based systems
or that have developed resilient systems orprocesses. Cyber attacks on control networks
may be more likely, and there is some evidence
that such attacks are already occurring. In
2008, a NASA Earth observation satellite

was effectively taken over, although those
responsible did not actually issue commands.16

Space weather
Although most satellites are designed todeal with the effects of minor space weather(such as disturbed orbits and radiation), they
are not usually able to withstand the effects
of solar superstorms. These extreme events
can cause severe disruption. In 1989, forexample, the biggest storm to reach Earth for
50 years led to space agencies losing trackof 1,600 spacecraft and the power grid ofQuebec collapsing in two minutes, leaving six
million people without power for nine hours.
Similarly, in 2003, a superstorm interrupted
the Federal Aviation Authority’s augmented
GPS signal (used for aircraft vertical guidance)for 30 hours. Far more disruptive storms may,
however, affect the Earth in future.17 In 1859
16 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission(2011), ‘2011 Report to Congress’, available at http://
origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_
reports/annual_report_full_11.pdf
17 Hapgood, M. (2012), ‘Prepare for the Coming Space
Weather Storm’

168

Global Strategic Trends

Part 2Space

the Carrington Event (a storm four times
stronger than any of the examples above)18
struck the Earth. Some experts suggest thata storm of Carrington’s magnitude is likely toreach Earth once every 100 years.
The effects of a superstorm like the Carrington
Event may lead to satellites being offline for
periods ranging from hours to days. Somemay even be lost entirely due to sudden
damage, such as that caused by electrostatic
charging. All satellites would have theireffective lives reduced through exposure
to an increased radiation dose. Solar radio
bursts would be likely to interfere with GNSS
transmission frequencies, with possible errorsof hundreds of metres. During the main
phase of a superstorm, navigational systems
may be completely lost, with some expertssuggesting that GNSS could be partially orcompletely inoperable for up to three days.
Communication satellites’ radio transmissions
and long-range terrestrial radio could also beaffected, making long distance communication
during a superstorm particularly challenging.

Military operations
Military activity, at least in developed
countries, has come to rely on space-derived
services, a trend that is likely to increase out to
18 Royal Academy of Engineering (2013), ‘Extreme
Space Weather’, available at http://www.raeng.org.
uk/news/publications/list/reports/space_weather_full_report_final.pdf

2045.19 If space capabilities were lost, modern
armed forces could be without many of theadvantages that they currently enjoy. A lackof strategic communications would makedirect command and control links impossible,
hampering coordination with military partners
and making most remotely-piloted air systems
inoperable. Early warning systems would becompromised, removing the ability to provide
warnings of ballistic missile launches or to
track and monitor missiles in flight. Navigation
would be more difficult, relying on maps
and compasses – and it is even possible thatcompasses would not function properly if
the Earth’s magnetic field was sufficiently
disrupted. Collateral damage may increase,as precision-strike capabilities disappear.
Limited surveillance and radar capabilities
would make it more difficult to select thehighest-value targets or conduct timely
battle damage assessment. Without accurate
weather forecasting, effective planning
would be difficult and operations would beriskier without warning of extreme events
or conditions. Logistics would be disrupted
as tracking and monitoring supplies could
become more difficult.

19 Ministry of Defence (2013), ‘JDP 0-30 UK
Air and Space Doctrine’, available at http://
defenceintranet.diif.r.mil.uk/libraries/library1/MOD/
July2013/20130716-JDP_0_30_UK_Air_and_Space_
Doctrine.pdf

Defence and security implications■■ Increasing reliance on space-based technologies, particularly in developed
countries, means that any large-scale disruption to satellites (such as solar
superstorms) could have significant consequences for electricity distribution,communications, navigation, logistics and weather forecasts.
■■ There could be increasing competition between countries for access to valuable
resources, such as water and minerals, located in space.
■■ Criminal organisations and other actors with malign intent may take advantage ofreduced costs to acquire their own satellites, increasing their awareness of security
vulnerabilities and causing privacy and security concerns.
■■ The military operations of developed countries are heavily dependent on spacebased technologies, the loss of which may be significantly disruptive.

Global Strategic Trends

169

Acknowledgements

We have benefited enormously from the time and effort generously given by the organisations
and institutions listed below. To all of those individuals who contributed their valuable knowledge
and expertise – we regret that space does not permit us to thank you by name, but are extremely
grateful to you for your participation. We look forward to working with you in the future.
Aberystwyth University
Bespoke Industry Workshop
Brazilian Ministry of Defence
Brenthurst Foundation
Bristol University
British Geological Survey
British Peace Support Team, South Africa
BT Innovate
Cabinet Office: Cabinet Secretary’s AdvisoryGroup
Cabinet Office: Government Office forStrategic Horizon ScanningCentre for Strategic Futures, Singapore
Centre Interarmées de Concepts, de Doctrineset D’expérimentations
Cranfield University
Department for Business Innovation and Skills:
Government Office of Science
Department for Business Innovation and Skills:
Met Office Hadley Centre
Department for Energy and Climate Change
Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs
Department for International Development
Department of Health
Department of Transport
DRPM Group
Economic and Social Research Council
Energy Research Partnership
ESKTN

170

Explore Strategic Business Insights Inc
Firm Futures
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: National
Security Strategy Network
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Park
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HM Treasury
Home Office
Igarapé Institute, Brazil
Imperial College London
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,
India
Institute of Applied Economic Research, Brazil
International Energy Agency
International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Singapore
International Institute of Strategic Studies
IR Consilium Ltd
JLT Speciality Ltd
Joaan bin Jasim Joint Command and Staff
College, Qatar
Joint Committee for National Security
Strategy
Kings College London (Defence Studies
Department)
Lee Kuan Centre for Innovative Cities
London School of Economics

Global Strategic Trends

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Microsoft
Ministry of Defence: Defence Academy of theUnited Kingdom
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Ministry of Defence: Royal College of Defence
Studies
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Allied
Command Transformation
Norwegian Ministry of Defence
Now and Next
Observer Research Foundation, India
Overseas development Institute
Oxfam
Oxford Analytica
Pandia Calogeras Institute, Brazil
Potomac Institute for Policy
PWC
Rajaratnam School of International Studies
RAND Europe
Respublica
Rio de Janeiro State University
Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Office,Singapore
Royal Holloway, University of London
Royal Institute of International Affairs(Chatham House)
Royal United Services InstituteSaudi Arabia Armed Forces War College
Saudi Arabia based Defence Attachés from
Australia, USA, Japan, Romania and Poland
Saudi Arabia National Guard Command andGeneral Staff College
School of International Futures
Scottish Government
Shell
Singaporean Ministry of Defence
Slovak Republic (Institute for Security and
Defence Studies Ministry of Defence)
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Swedish Defence Research Agency
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Swedish National Defence College
The Diplomatic Institute, Qatar

Global Strategic Trends

United Arab Emirates based Defence Attachésfrom France, Italy, Australia, Canada andNetherlands
United Arab Emirates Center for Strategic
Studies and Research
United Kingdom Embassy and Defence
Attaché Staff• Brazil• India• Republic of Korea• Qatar• Saudi Arabia• Sweden• United Arab Emirates• United States
United Services Institute, India
United States of America Department of
Defence Pentagon Joint Staff J7
United States of America National
Intelligence Council
University of Cambridge
University of Exeter
University of Kent
University of Oxford
University of Reading
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
Vivekananda International Foundation, India
World Energy Council
WWF

171

Contact details
Strategic Trends Programme
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
Shrivenham
SwindonSN6 8RFE-mail dcdc-strategictrends@mod.uk
This publication is available through the
gov.uk website in interactive form.

172

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