MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the
Post-Bubble Adjustments
in Japan: A Tentative Review
Naruki Mori, Shigenori Shiratsuka, and Hiroo Taguchi
This paper provides a very tentative review of the monetary and prudential policy responses to thepost-bubble adjustments in Japan. The adjustments after the collapse of the bubble have been prolonged due to (1) the rapid downward revision of the expected economic growth rate; (2) balancesheet adjustments on the part of firms; and (3) the malfunctioning of the financial intermediarysystem stemming from its nonperforming-asset problem. We use four yardsticks, Marshallian k,
Taylor rule, the equity yield spread, and the short-term real interest rate for assessing the monetaryeasing. The results suggest that the timing of policy reversal was swift and the magnitude of easingin the early phase could be viewed as broadly adequate for dealing with a normal business cycle.
It is possible to argue that the effects of the bursting of the bubble might have not been sufficiently
taken into account. It should be noted the outcome would not have differed greatly even if thedrastic monetary easing that eventually took place had been decided at an earlier point in time
without a fundamental cure of the nonperforming-asset problem. A considerable achievement ofprudential policy in the period under review is that systemic risk was avoided with the cost being
delayed in establishing a legal framework for handling troubled financial institutions and inorganizing a comprehensive safety net. As a result of this delay, it took a long time to deal with thenonperforming-asset problem. This, in turn, posed a serious drag on the economy. Our preliminary
conclusion about the lesson we should draw from this experience is the importance for the Bank ofJapan of identifying the precise impacts of shocks on the economy as well as their transmission
mechanism promptly and thereby minimizing adjustment costs. It should also be conducive for the
Bank to address actively structural issues that may influence the effectiveness of its policy measures.
Key words: Monetary policy; Prudential policy; Bursting of bubble; Nonperforming assets;
Credit channel; Management of failure in financial institutions; Structural problems

Naruki Mori: Bank of Japan (E-mail: naruki.mori@boj.or.jp)
Shigenori Shiratsuka: Bank of Japan (E-mail: shigenori.shiratsuka@boj.or.jp)
Hiroo Taguchi: Bank of Japan (E-mail: hiroo.taguchi@boj.or.jp)
This paper has been prepared for the Ninth International Conference on July 3–4, 2000, sponsored by the Institutefor Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, entitled “The Role of Monetary Policy Under Low Inflation.” Itis also a substantially revised draft of a preliminary paper in Japanese co-authored by Mahito Uchida, Shigenori
Shiratsuka, and Naruki Mori, and submitted to the workshop on January 25, 2000, hosted by the Institute for
Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan. The authors acknowledge comments received at the workshop andconference from discussants Professors Hiroshi Yoshikawa and Kazuo Ogawa, Messrs. Charles Collyns and Georg
Rich, and other participants. Messrs. Michio Kitahara and Toyoichiro Shirota provided valuable assistance. The
views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of either the Bank ofJapan or the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies.

53

I. Introduction
Some call the 1990s in Japan a “lost decade.” Whether it was lost or not, Japan experienced severe recession as evidenced by average real annual GDP growth declining
from 3.8 percent in the 1980s to 1.6 percent in the 1990s, and only 1 percent in theeight years 1992-99. Average growth of 1 percent is substantially lower than that of
3 percent for the same period in the United States (Figure 1). In fact, among G-7
countries, Japan’s real GDP growth in the 1990s was next to lowest; compared withthe 1980s, it marked the largest decline (Table 1).
As of end-1999, while the economy had shown signs of improvement, clear signsof the self-sustained recovery of private demand had yet to be seen. It was the firstexperience in the post-World War II period that slackness has lasted for some 10 years.
Figure 1 Comparison of Real GDP Growth between the United States and Japan

8

Percent
Japan

6
4
2

United States

0–2–41977 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts ;Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Main
Economic Indicators, Economic Outlook.

Table 1 Average Annual Growth Rates of Real GDP by Decade
Percent
Japan
United States
Germany
FranceUnited Kingdom
Italy
Canada

1970s
5.2
3.2
3.2
3.7
2.4
3.7
4.4

1980s
3.8
2.7
1.8
2.3
2.4
2.4
2.9

1990s
1.6
2.6
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.3
2.0

Notes: 1. When calculating the average annual growth rates of the 1990s, data for 1999 are estimatedby the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, except for Japan, where
the data are based on the quick estimates published by the Economic Planning Agency.
2. Real GDP of Germany is that of West Germany until 1991 and that of unified Germany from1992 onward, i.e., comparison is made with aggregate East and West German GDP in 1991.
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts; Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Main Economic Indicators, Economic Outlook.

54 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

During the 1990s, various monetary and fiscal policy measures were effected to
avoid deflation: the Bank of Japan (BOJ) successively cut short-term interest rates tovirtually zero percent (Figure 2); and, as a result of the successive implementation of
fiscal stimulus measures, the fiscal deficit became the largest among major industrial
countries (Figure 3). The mere fact that Japan’s economy has been stagnant for 10
years despite these sizable monetary and fiscal stimuli seems to indicate that theslackness cannot be explained solely by the normal business cycle, but that someother deflationary factors also existed.
Figure 2 Interest Rates

Percent
98Call rates (overnight, uncollateralized)

7
6

Government bond yield (10-year)

5
4
3
Euro-yenfutures (3-month)2
1

Official discount rate

0
1991

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Sources: Bank of Japan; Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange;
Japan Bond Trading Co., Ltd.

Figure 3 Fiscal Deficits (Ratio to Nominal GDP) of the Major Industrial Countries
Percent
Japan
United States
United Kingdom

20Germany
France
Italy

–2
–4
–6
–8
–10
–12
1990

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic
Outlook, June 1999.

55

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the factors that contributed to thisprolonged stagnation, and to attempt a very tentative evaluation of monetary andprudential policy responses in the post-bubble period.1 The period subject to ouranalysis is mainly from February 1991, the peak of the Heisei boom, to end-1999.2
It is legitimate, at least to some extent, to say that prolonged stagnancy was
mainly due to the failure of not only firms and households but also the government
and the entire social and economic framework adapting adequately to the large wave
of changes, such as innovation in information and telecommunication technology
and changes in global competition.3 With respect to the troubles facing financial
institutions, many have pointed out, rightly, that they were the result of banks’ overreliance on traditional banking business, the materialization of which had merely
been temporarily postponed because of the emergence and expansion of the bubble
economy. However, for arguing what were the most dominant factors behind the
problems, we have to wait at least for some more years before the Japanese economy
completes the post-bubble adjustments. It is certainly still premature to come to any
definitive conclusion.
Notwithstanding what the essential factors were, it is hard to deny that the
emergence and burst of the bubble played an important role in the economic
fluctuation of this decade. Therefore, in this paper we focus on the policy responses
to the shocks incurred by the burst of the bubble on real economic activity.
In doing so, however, we emphasize the following two points: (1) that policy decisions were inevitably based on a information set available at that time; and (2) thatany policy assessment has to examine achievements as well as accompanying costs.

II. Japan’s Economic Development in the 1990s
This section provides a brief review of the prolonged economic stagnation which
took place in Japan in the 1990s. The main features of the decade were (1) a substantial decline in asset prices; (2) prolonged low growth in real GDP; (3) low growth
in monetary aggregates—the first negative year-on-year growth since the statistics
began to be compiled—and (4) a deterioration in the quality of firms’ assets and theaccumulation of nonperforming loans in the banking sector.

1. With respect to the bank regulatory responses to the bursting of the asset price bubble since 1991, Cargill, Hutchison,and Ito (1997) wrote that “the Ministry of Finance first adopted a ‘forbearance policy,’ allowing banks to hold nonperforming loans without special write-offs in the hope that the economy and the real-estate market would recoverquickly.” In fact, many regard prudential policy of this period as forbearance. Although we cannot deny that, shortly
after the bursting of the bubble, the authorities might have tried to buy time predicated on a rapid recovery of theeconomy, it would not be appropriate to assess policy responses to financial system problems during the whole 1990s
solely as forbearance. In the absence of an adequate safety net, it might have been necessary for the authorities to buy
some time (e.g., the disposal of nonperforming assets within a financial institution’s income stream for a certain
period) in trying to improve the safety net and dispose of nonperforming assets simultaneously.
2. According to the Economic Planning Agency, the economic expansion that started from November 1986 peaked in
February 1991, was followed by a deceleration for 32 months until October 1993, and then expanded up to March 1997.
3. Noguchi (1999) referred to (1) the development in Asian economies, (2) the progress of network technology, and(3) the aging population as structural problems which Japan faces, and noted that “problems that Japan’s current
economy faces are structural rather than cyclical.”56 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

In the following, we divide the decade into three sub-periods: (1) 1991–93, when
Japan’s economy slowed down, due mainly to a decline in business investment;(2) 1994–96, when the economy gained some breathing room with the aid of record
fiscal stimulus measures and monetary easing, notwithstanding the effects of balancesheet adjustment and increased global competition; and (3) 1997–99, when theeconomy tumbled into recession again as a result of fiscal consolidation and the adverse
effects of East Asian economic crises, accompanied by financial system instability
stemming from the worsening nonperforming-asset problem in financial institutions.
A. The Economic Slowdown of 1991–93
Following the Heisei boom, recession continued for 32 months, the second longest
such period since World War II. Stock adjustment of durable goods, housing, andcapital stock all occurred simultaneously, with the resulting decline in final demandleading the economy into an inventory adjustment phase. These stock and inventory
adjustments, together with the effects of the bursting of the asset price bubbles,
induced a rapid decline in the growth of monetary aggregates.
1. Stock adjustment in the aftermath of the bursting of the asset price bubbles
It is hard to deny that it was the rise in interest rates—the official discount rate wasset at its peak of 6 percent in August 1990—and the consequent bursting of the
bubble which triggered the economic slowdown. Residential investment and businessfixed investment by small and medium-sized enterprises, which were the final
demand components most sensitive to changes in interest rates, started to slow downin spring 1991. In addition, a substantial inventory adjustment started around 1992
(Figure 4). During this phase, the adjustment process for durable goods, residential
stock, and capital stock occurred almost simultaneously (Figure 5).

Inventories, year-on-year percentage change

Figure 4 Inventory Cycle (Industrial Production Total)
15
92/I

10

95/III

98/I

5

91/I

0

94/II
98/III

96/IV

–5
93/II

99/III

–10
–15
–10

–5

0

5

10

Shipments, year-on-year percent change
Source: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, “Indices of Industrial Production.”57

Another marked feature of this period was the fall in asset prices and the rapid
decline in the growth of monetary aggregates. Stock prices, in terms of the Nikkei
225 (Figure 6), fell to ¥14,309 in August 1992, more than 60 percent below thepeak of ¥38,915 recorded at end-December 1989. The Urban Land Price Index(commercial land in six major cities, Figure 7) continued to decline after hitting
a peak in September 1990. Monetary aggregates (M2+CDs, Figure 8) recorded
Figure 5 Business Fixed Investment, Residential Investment, and Expenditure on
Consumer Durables

Fixed investment of manufacturing industry
Fixed investment of non-manufacturing industry
Residential investment
Registration of new cars

110
100
90
80
70
60
50
1989

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Note: Data are indexed by setting the peak of 1989/I to 1999/III to 100.
Sources: Ministry of Finance, “Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations byIndustry, Quarterly”; Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National
Accounts ; Japan Automobile Dealers Association, “Registration of New
Passenger Cars, Trucks, and Buses.”

Figure 6 Development of the Nikkei 225 Stock Average (End of Month)Yen
45,00040,00035,00030,00025,00020,00015,00010,0005,000
01982 83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

Source: The Nihon Keizai Shimbun.

58 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

94

95

96

97

98

99

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

Figure 7 Development of Land Prices (Commercial Land)
1989/Second half = 100
120
Tokyo metropolitan area
All Japan

100
80
60
Six large cities
40
2001985 86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Note: Data for the first half are those at the end of March, while those for the second
half are at the end of September.
Source: Japan Real Estate Institute, Urban Land Price Index .

Figure 8 Money Stock (M1, M2+CDs, Broadly-Defined Liquidity)

20

Year-on-year percentage change

M2+CDs

M1

15
Broadly-defined liquidity

10

5

0

–5
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.

negative year-on-year growth in mid-1992 for the first time since the start of thisstatistical series in 1968, reflecting stagnant asset transactions under conditions of
declining asset prices, and a reduction in the demand for funds owing to capital stock
adjustment on the part of firms. The growth of monetary aggregates recovered
slightly thereafter to about 1 percent toward the end of 1993, as bank lending to the
public sector increased, reflecting various fiscal stimulus measures.

59

2. Monetary easing and the increase in fiscal expenditure
The BOJ reacted to the slowdown of the economy by reducing the official discountrate six times from July 1991 to February 1993, by a total of 3.5 percentage points (6.0
percent → 2.5 percent: Figure 2). On the fiscal policy front, three economic stimulus“packages,” totaling ¥29.9 trillion, were implemented during 1992–93.
In response to these policy measures, residential investment started to recoverfrom the beginning of 1993. However, business fixed investment remained flat
(Figure 5), as the depth of the needed capital stock adjustment was amplified byeuphoria about the expected upward shift in growth, which ended in a rather abrupt
collapse. The effects of balance-sheet adjustment were most pronounced among small
and medium-sized manufacturers, which used to be highly sensitive to interest rate
declines and whose business fixed investment had tended to recover prior to that ofother sectors in previous monetary easing phases. In fact, the decline in real GDP
growth during this sub-period can be almost totally explained by the decline inbusiness fixed investment (Table 2).
Table 2 Contribution to Year-on-Year Changes in Real GDP by Component

Contribution by component(percent)

CY 1990GDP
5.1(year-on-year change, percent)Private consumption
2.6
Residential investment
0.3
Business fixed investment
2.0
Private inventory–0.2
Government consumption
0.2
Public investment
0.3
Net exports
0.0
Exports
0.7
Imports (–)
–0.8

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

3.8

1.0

0.3

0.6

1.5

5.0

1.6

–2.5

0.3

1.5
–0.5
1.2
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.9
0.6
0.3

1.2
–0.3
–1.1
–0.5
0.2
1.0
0.6
0.5
0.1

0.7
0.1
–1.9
–0.1
0.2
1.2
0.2
0.2
0.0

1.1
0.4
–0.9
–0.3
0.3
0.2
–0.3
0.5
–0.8

1.2
–0.3
0.8
0.2
0.3
0.1
–0.8
0.6
–1.4

1.7
0.7
1.8
0.4
0.2
0.8
–0.5
0.8
–1.3

0.3
–0.9
1.5
0.1
0.1
–0.9
1.4
1.4
–0.1

–0.3
–0.6
–1.4
–0.6
0.1
–0.2
0.5
–0.3
0.9

0.7
0.1
–1.0
0.1
0.1
0.6
–0.3
0.3
–0.6

Source: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.

B. Temporary Economic Recovery in 1994–96
The Japanese economy experienced a temporary recovery in 1994–96, as businesscapital stock and inventory adjustments were almost complete. However, with land
prices still declining, business firms maintained their balance-sheet adjustments, and,on the part of financial institutions, nonperforming-asset problems came increasingly
to the fore, eroding their capital base. It was also during this phase that housing loan
companies (jusen) and some bank-affiliated non-banks, which had lent aggressively
in the bubble years to small and medium-sized firms that heavily invested in realestate, financing themselves by borrowings from banks and cooperative-type financial
institutions, collapsed.
1. Recovery endangered by appreciation of the yen and increased global
competition
In 1994, owing greatly to the effects of successive fiscal and monetary stimulus
measures, the economy showed signs of a moderate recovery (according to the
Economic Planning Agency [EPA], the economy marked bottom in October 1993).

60 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

Residential investment continued to increase and inventory adjustments were
almost completed (Figures 4 and 5). However, several factors prevented the upward
movement from gaining momentum: land prices continued to slide; balance-sheet
adjustment at firms accelerated; and the higher yen forced manufacturing industry toreview the location of their production bases from a global viewpoint.
As the economy entered the year 1995, a chain of events eroded publicconfidence: the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, a large fall in stock prices, and therapid appreciation of the yen, which reached a high on April 19 of ¥79.75 per U.S.
dollar (Figure 9). In particular, the yen’s appreciation, which came amid a weak
recovery in domestic final demand, severely damaged business sentiment, both
directly and indirectly through the downward pressure on stock market.
In the meantime, concern over intensified deflationary pressure began to accumulate against the backdrop of weak prices (Figure 10). Wholesale prices declined due
Figure 9 Exchange Rate (Yen/US$)
Yen/US$
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1990

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Note: End of month. Data are the exchange rates of yen per U.S. dollar at 5 p.m. in Tokyo.
Source: Bank of Japan.

Figure 10 Prices (Changes from a Year Earlier)
Percent
4
Corporate service price index

3

Consumer price index(nationwide, excluding perishables)

2
1
0
–1
–2
–3
CY

Domestic wholesale price index
1991

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99 00

Note: Excluding the effects of the consumption tax hike in April 1997 on the assumptionthat prices of all taxable goods fully reflect the rise of the tax rate.
Sources: Management and Coordination Agency, “Consumer Price Index”; Bank ofJapan, “Wholesale Price Indexes,” “Corporate Service Price Index.”61to a fall in import prices caused by the appreciation of the yen; even consumer priceinflation (year-on-year basis) temporarily turned negative, reflecting an increase in
low-priced imported manufactured goods from Asian countries.
2. Policy responses to the rapid appreciation of the yen
In such circumstances, the BOJ successively eased monetary conditions in 1995. The
BOJ urged interbank interest rates to decline at end-March 1995 and reduced theofficial discount rate by 0.75 percentage points (from 1.75 percent to 1 percent)in April. The BOJ guided market interest rates further down in July and reduced
the official discount rate again, this time by 0.5 percentage points (from 1 percent
to 0.5 percent).
The government, on its part, put forward consecutively in April and June two
economic policy packages, both entitled “Emergency Measures for Yen Appreciationand the Economy” and chiefly containing measures to promote deregulation andimports. In addition, concerted foreign exchange market intervention was conductedin April in response to the G-7 communiqué. Then, in September, the government
launched another fiscal stimulus package of ¥14.2 trillion.
3. Permeation of policy effects and temporary rebound of the economy
These additional policy measures by the government and the BOJ succeeded ingetting the economy moving from the latter half of 1995 onward.
Notably, fixed investments of major manufacturing companies relating to personal
computers and telecommunications items such as cellular phones and personal handphones marked sizeable growth following deregulation (Figure 11). Owing largely tothis development, overall business fixed investment turned positive in 1995 for the firsttime since 1991 on a year-on-year basis.
Figure 11 Contribution of Electronic and Telecommunications Industries to
Machinery Orders
Year-on-year percentage change, contribution to changes from a year earlier
20
Electronic andtelecommunications industries

15
10
5
0
–5

Orders in other industries
–10
–15

Total

–20
–25
1990

91

92

93

94

95

Source: Economic Planning Agency, “Machinery Orders Statistics.”

62 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

96

97

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

Stock prices (Nikkei 225) rebounded strongly from mid-July onward and hit¥20,000 by the end of the year. In 1996, public investment by the government aswell as private demand, such as business fixed investment, private consumption,
inventory accumulation and housing investment bolstered the economy, which
posted high 5 percent real annual growth overall (Table 2).
A major reason for this recovery was the progress in adjustment of equipment
stock and reductions in excess liabilities (mainly bank borrowings) at major firmsthat had taken place during 1991–93. Deregulation concerning telecommunications
and large-scale retail operations that spurred investment in those industries also
contributed to this recovery.4 The effects of low interest rates and the increase inpublic investment became clearly felt in these improved business conditions.
Growth in monetary aggregates (M2+CDs), measured on a year-on-year basis,rose to 2–3 percent (Figure 8). Fund-raising in capital markets (Figure 12) and banklending (Figure 13) increased against the backdrop of the temporary recovery ofbusiness fixed investment from the latter half of 1995 to 1996, although major firms
continued their efforts at financial restructuring (reducing interest-bearing liabilities).
As business sentiment improved toward mid-1994, by when inventory and stock
adjustments had been completed, the long-term interest rate (on the benchmark
10-year government bond) reached 4 percent; it declined thereafter to 2 percent in
1996, reflecting a decline in short-term interest rates (Figure 2).
Figure 12 Amount Outstanding of Corporate Bonds (Year-on-Year Changes)

7

End of period, year-on-year percentage change

End of period, year-on-year percentage change

7

6

6

5

5

4

4

3

3

2

2

1

1

0

0

–1

–1

–2
CY

1995

96

97

98

99

–2
00

Notes: 1. Includes straight bonds, convertible bonds, and bonds with warrants.
2. Estimated by the Bank of Japan.
Source: IN Information Center, Funding Eye.

4. In the mobile communications area, introduction of the outright sales of terminals in April 1994 resulted in a
dramatic increase in subscribers. The Large-Scale Retail Store Law was amended in May 1994 allowing retailers tofreely open outlets with a sales floor space of less than 1,000 square meters.

63

Figure 13 Lending by Domestic Commercial Banks
Year-on-year percentage change

3Year-on-year percentage change

3

2

2

1

1

0

0

–1

–1

–2

–2

–3

–3
Lending by domestic commercial banks2
Lending by domestic commercial banks2 (adjusted3)

–4

–4

–5

–5

–6

–6

–7
CY

–7
1993

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

Notes: 1. Percent changes in average amounts outstanding from a year earlier.
2. “Domestic commercial banks” refers to member banks of the Japanese
Bankers Association, which consists of city banks, long-term credit banks,
trust banks (excluding foreign-owned trust banks and trust banks thatstarted business after October 1993), the member banks of the Regional
Banks Association of Japan (regional banks) and the member banks of theSecond Association of Regional Banks (regional banks II).
3. Adjusted to exclude(1) fluctuations resulting from the liquidation of loans,(2) fluctuations in the yen value of foreign currency-denominated loans due
to changes in exchange rates,(3) fluctuations resulting from loan write-offs,(4) the transfer of loans to the former Japan National Railways Settlement
Corporation to the General Account, and(5) the transfer of loans to the former Housing Loan Administration
Corporation to the Resolution and Collection Corporation.
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.

4. The disposal of nonperforming assets including loans to the jusen and theerosion of the capital base of financial institutions
As we turn our eyes to the financial system, the nonperforming assets of financial
institutions continued to increase as a whole during this period of temporary economic recovery (Figure 14). The asset value of small and medium-sized enterprises,
which had financed their excessive investment in the bubble period by bank borrowings, fell further as the economic recovery was limited and land prices continued to
decline; nonperforming assets increased.
A typical example of excessive investment was seen at bank-affiliated non-banks
and the jusen that had aggressively financed high-risk real estate investments during
the bubble years. The decision on how to dispose of the nonperforming loans to the64 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

Figure 14 Risk Management Loans of Major Japanese Banks

50
45
40

¥ trillions
Accumulated direct write-offs
Risk management loans
Outstanding amount of specificallowance for loan loss

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Mar. 1993

10

Mar. 94

Mar. 95

Mar. 96Mar. 97

Mar. 98

Mar. 99

Sep. 99

Ratio to nominal GDP, percent

987
Accumulated direct
write-offs

6
5
4
3

Risk management
loans

2
1
0
Mar. 1993 Mar. 94

Mar. 95

Mar. 96Mar. 97

Mar. 98

Mar. 99

Sep. 99

Notes: 1. The above data are the total of those for city banks, long-term credit banks,
and trust banks.
2. Figures of the risk management loans at March 1993 and March 1994 are thetotal of loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and past due loans, and thoseat March 1995 and March 1996 include these two and restructured loans.
Source: Financial Services Agency (http://www.fsa.go.jp).

jusen was delayed because it was a highly political matter as to what extent financial
institutions affiliated with agricultural cooperatives (prefectural credit federations)should bear the cost of disposal. However, in December 1995 the Cabinet finallyapproved the injection of some ¥685 billion of public funds (the Jusen Law wasapproved by the Diet in June 1996).

65

Non-banks affiliated with Hyogo Bank, a long-troubled regional bank, wereliquidated, and many non-banks affiliated with other banks were restructured withsupport from their parent banks. A significant number of banks decided to book aloss, many for the first time, to settle accounts and drew on retained earnings or on
their own capital at the end of fiscal 1995 (end-March 1996, Figure 15).
Figure 15 Japanese Banks’ Capital Impairment[1] Changes in Capital Accounts from the Previous Year (All Banks)¥ trillions
8
Earned surplus
6
Capital

4
2
0
–2
–4
–6
FY 1983

85

87

89

91

93

95

[2] Banks’ Capital Impairment and Its Recovery (All Banks)¥ trillions
3
2
1

Earned surplus reserve

Net income of banks with surplus

Capital

0
–1
–2
–3

Net changes in capital accounts

–4
–5
–6

Net losses of banks with deficit
1994
95
96
FY
Notes: 1. All data in the lower chart are cumulative figures from fiscal 1994.
2. “Capital” is the sum of capital, funds paid in for new shares, and the legal
reserve.
3. “Net income of banks with surplus” is equal to net income minus dividend
payments and managing directors’ bonus payments. The term “net lossesof banks with deficit” is equal to net losses plus dividend payments andmanaging directors’ bonus payments. These adjustments are necessary to
calculate the changes in capital accounts.
4. “Net changes in capital accounts” indicates recovery of net losses on a stockbasis in the net capital accounts.
Source: Bank of Japan (1997a).

66 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

As these events were highlighted by the media, the serious state of thenonperforming-asset problem of Japanese financial institutions became widely
recognized among the public. Distrust of bank disclosure grew rapidly, especially as
the huge losses incurred by illegal trading and covered up by a rogue trader at Daiwa
Bank’s New York branch came to light. Distrust regarding the stability of Japan’s
financial system was even greater overseas, and the so-called Japan premium recorded
a peak of 50 basis points in October 1995 (Figure 16).
It was at this juncture that the government introduced a package of measures forsecuring financial system stability. The Diet passed six bills relating to the financial
stability in June 1996, including bills to liquidate the failed jusen and establish the
Resolution and Collection Bank (a restructured institution of Tokyo Kyodo Bank,
which was originally established to deal with two credit cooperatives, Tokyo Kyowa
and Anzen) and the Housing Loan Administration Corporation.5
Figure 16 Japan Premium in the Eurodollar Market
Basis points
100
80
60
40
20
0
–20
1995

96

97

98

99

Note: The Japan premium is an extra expense a Japanese bank must pay for raisingfunds in overseas financial markets. The Japan premium in this chart iscalculated as follows: Japan premium = interest rate quoted by Bank of TokyoMitsubishi – interest rate quoted by Barclays Bank in the Eurodollar market(London).
Source: British Bankers’ Association.

5. In June 1996, in addition to the so-called “three financial laws,” the Jusen Law (the Law Concerning Special
Packages for Promoting the Disposal of Claims and Debts of Specified Housing Loan Companies), the Law
Concerning Special Packages for Suspending Prescription of Claims Owned by the Specified Jusen, and the Law to
Amend the Agricultural and Fishery Cooperative Savings Insurance Law were all approved and enacted by theDiet. The “three financial laws” refer to (1) the Law to Implement Measures for Ensuring the Sound Managementof Financial Institutions, which aims at ensuring the management soundness of financial institutions through suchmeasures as intensive auditing in credit cooperative associations and introduction of prompt corrective action;(2) the Special Law Concerning Reorganization of Financial Institutions, which empowered the Financial
Supervisory Agency to initiate bankruptcy procedures against troubled institutions, and also introduced a rehabilitation process for credit cooperative associations (in addition to conventional disposal processes such as the transfer
of operations based on consensus among related parties [management, stockholders, and subscribers]); and (3) the
Law to Amend the Deposit Insurance Law, which improved payoff and established a credit purchasing system aswell as introduced special fund assistance within a limited duration (five years) which enabled the Deposit
Insurance Cooperation (DIC) to protect all liabilities in excess of payoff costs.

67

C. Developments from 1997 to End-1999
In 1997, the government changed its fiscal policy stance and moved toward fiscal
consolidation, including an increase in consumption tax. Shortly after this move,
Japan’s economy was unfortunately affected by the East Asian economic crisis anddeflationary pressure stemming from financial system instability, and fell into a
serious recession, with real GDP posting negative growth for five consecutive
quarters from the fourth quarter of 1997 onward. In particular, against the backdrop
of increased concern over financial system stability, consumer sentiment became
cautious and the financial intermediary function further deteriorated, resulting in an
additional adverse impact on business fixed investment.
Faced with this situation, the government shifted again to an expansionary fiscal
policy from the beginning of 1998 onward and implemented comprehensive
economic measures, including special tax reduction and an increase in public-sector
investment. It also strengthened the capital base of banks by injecting public funds torestore financial system stability. With regard to monetary policy, the BOJ adopted
a “zero interest rate policy” in February 1999. As the effects of these measuresmaterialized, the economy finally ceased to decline around spring 1999 and started toshow some signs of improvement toward the end of the year.
1. Serious recession, financial system instability, and fiscal consolidation
The economy encountered various shocks in 1997.
First, with regard to fiscal policy, various measures for fiscal consolidation were
implemented, based on the Cabinet decision of December 1996. For example, theinitial fiscal 1997 budget included tax increases such as a rise in consumption tax(from 3 percent to 5 percent), withdrawal of the special tax reduction, and reform of
the medical insurance system (whereby the burden on the insured was increased from
10 percent to 20 percent). Second, in July 1997, the East Asian economic crisis
began, triggered by the large devaluation of the Thai baht. Finally, several major
Japanese financial institutions virtually collapsed in autumn, and the stability of thefinancial system was brought into jeopardy.
Obviously, it had been foreseen that fiscal tightening would have negative effects
such as the reaction of rush purchases prior to the increase in consumption tax, but
the consensus forecast among both policy makers and businesses was that thesenegative impacts should fade out by summer. In reality, however, the financial systeminstability triggered by the collapse of some financial institutions dampened
households’ confidence and the average propensity to consume declined, resulting ina substantial fall in consumption expenditure (Figure 17). In addition, Japan’s exports
declined, reflecting the East Asian crisis (Figure 18).
In 1998, the downward pressure acquired further momentum. Fixed investmentof small and medium-sized non-manufacturers was substantially reduced (Figure 19),reflecting in the main the stagnant economy and the East Asian crisis; however,it cannot be denied that fall in the investment activities was aggravated by thenonperforming-asset problems of financial institutions, which caused a further
deterioration in the functioning of the financial intermediation system.
This decline in final demand intensified inventory adjustment pressure, andproduction activity shrank significantly. The economy was thus caught in a vicious

68 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

cycle (decline in demand → decline in production activity → decline in corporate
profits and labor income → further decline in business fixed investment and private
consumption), with real GDP recording negative growth for five consecutive quartersfrom the fourth quarter of 1997 onward (for the first time since the start of GDP
statistics in 1955).
Figure 17 Consumer Confidence and the Propensity to Consume

Seasonally adjusted, 1990 = 100

Seasonally adjusted, 1990 = 100
Consumer Sentiment Indexes (left scale)

100
95
90
85

Worsened

80
75
70
65

Consumer Forecasting
Indicator (left scale)60
CY 1991

92

93

NRI Consumer’s SentimentIndex (right scale)
94

95

96

97

98

95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
145

Worsened

Improved

105

Improved[1] Surveys on Consumer Confidence

99

Notes: 1. Seasonally adjusted by X-11. “Consumer Sentiment Indexes” is seasonallyadjusted by the Economic Planning Agency.
2. Consumer Sentiment Indexes, Consumer Forecasting Indicator, and NRIConsumer’s Sentiment Index are based on surveys on consumer
confidence.
3. Data are plotted at the months of each survey.
4. Consumer Sentiment Index is surveyed by the Economic Planning Agency,“Consumer Forecasting Indicator” by Nikkei RIM, and NRI Consumer’s
Sentiment Index” by NRI.
[2] Propensity to Consume (Family Income and Expenditure Survey)
Seasonally adjusted, percent
78
77
76
75
74
73
72
71
70
69
68
67
92
93
CY 1991

3-month moving average

94

95

96

97

98

99

Note: Seasonally adjusted by Management and Coordination Agency.
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, “Consumer Behavior Survey”; Nikkei ResearchInstitute of Industry and Markets (Nikkei RIM), “Consumption Forecasting
Indicator”; Management and Coordination Agency, “Monthly Report on the
Family Income and Expenditure Survey”; Nippon Research Institute (NRI),“Consumer’s Sentiment Survey.”69

Figure 18 Real Exports (Breakdown by Region)

8

Seasonally adjusted quarter-to-quarter change, percent

6

Real exports total

United States + European Union

4
2
0
–2

OthersASEAN 4 + Korea

–4
–6
CY

1994

95

96

97

98

99

Notes: 1. Seasonally adjusted by X-11.
2. ASEAN 4 consists of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
Source: Ministry of Finance, “The Summary Report on Trade of Japan.”Figure 19 Business Fixed Investment by Industry and Scale[2] Manufacturing Medium and Small Firms[1] Manufacturing Large Firms
4.5¥ trillions; seasonally adjusted

2.4¥ trillions; seasonally adjusted

2.2
4.0
2.0
3.5

1.8
1.6

3.0

1.4
2.5
1.2
2.0
CY 1991 92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

[3] Non-Manufacturing Large Firms
6.0

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

[4] Non-Manufacturing Medium and Small Firms¥ trillions; seasonally adjusted

4.5

Total
Excluding gas and electric powercompanies

5.5

1.0
CY1991 92¥ trillions; seasonally adjusted

4.3
4.1
3.9

5.0

3.7
3.5

4.5

3.3
4.0

3.1
2.9

3.5

2.7
3.0
CY 1991

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

2.5
CY 1991

92

93

94

95

96

97 98

Source: Ministry of Finance, “Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Quarterly.”

70 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

99

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

2. Policy responses to the recession
In 1998, however, the government decided to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy inresponse to the deteriorating economy.
Specifically, the government took successive measures deviating from its fiscal
consolidation line, including (1) a ¥2 trillion special tax reduction in February,(2) the announcement of a ¥16 trillion total economic stimulus package in April, and(3) a revision of the Fiscal Structure Reform Law in June (enacted in November1997), postponing the target year for a reduction in the fiscal deficit to fiscal 2005
(and temporarily freezing the law in December). In addition, the government introduced measures to encourage banks to lend to small and medium-sized companies
such as the expansion of the special public loan-guarantee scheme in August. As the
economic downturn did not come to a halt by autumn in spite of these measures,
and as employment and income condition deteriorated further, the government drewup an additional ¥24 trillion emergency economic package.
The economy finally showed some gradual signs of ceasing to deteriorate toward
the end of 1998, and real GDP growth (compared with previous quarter, seasonallyadjusted) turned to post substantial positive growth of 1.5 percent in the first quarterof 1999. Then, in the spring of 1999, the financial system saw its stability restored tosome extent, owing greatly to the injection of public funds into major financial
institutions (in March 1999, the total that had been injected amounted to about¥7.5 trillion for 15 major banks). In addition, residential investment rebounded in
response to special tax cuts for mortgage holders.
The BOJ, for its part, reduced short-term interest rates in September 1998
(guiding the uncollateralized overnight call-loan rate down to 0.25 percent). Then, in
February 1999, it encouraged a further reduction in short-term interest rates—the zerointerest rate policy (Figure 2). Such policy action was adopted in order to prevent an
accumulation of deflationary pressures and a further deterioration in the economy.6
To this end, the BOJ announced that it would “flexibly provide ample funds andencourage the uncollateralized overnight call rate to move as low as possible.”7
Furthermore, in April, the BOJ announced that it would commit itself to the zerointerest rate policy “until deflationary concerns are dispelled,” intending to stabilize
market expectations regarding short-term interest rates from the overnight call rate tolonger terms at low levels, thereby maximizing the effects of monetary easing.8

6. In the announcement of February 12, 1999, the Bank referred to background economic and financial developments that prompted the policy change as “corporate and household sentiments remain cautious and private sector
activities stagnant . . . . Long-term interest rates have risen considerably, and the yen has been appreciating against
the dollar.”
7. At the press conference on April 17,1999, BOJ Governor Hayami stated, “I understand that the Bank of Japan
will continue with the current policy, which encourages the unsecured overnight call rate to move around virtuallyzero percent by providing ample funds, with paying due consideration to maintaining the proper functioning of
the market until deflationary concerns subside.”
8. In the announcement of the Monetary Policy Meeting decisions up to September 21, 1999, the Bank’s concern at
the initial stage of the zero interest rate policy was stated in expressions such as “to avoid excessive volatility in the
short-term financial markets” and “by paying due consideration to maintaining market function.” At the meetingon October 13, however, such expressions were excluded since it became inappropriate in accordance with thechanges in financial market conditions. In addition, the guideline as a whole was changed to state more explicitly
the meaning of and the intention behind the zero interest rate policy, as quoted in the text.

71

As the effects of these fiscal and monetary policy measures were diffused,the economy gradually improved toward the end of the year. However, this improvement was mainly due to public-sector demand and external demand reflecting therecovery of Asian economies; we are yet to see clear signs of a sustained growth inprivate demand.
3. Financial system instability: the collapse of major financial institutions andpolicy responses
This period (1997–99) was characterized by the growing concern over financial
system stability. In November 1997, as Sanyo Securities collapsed and this collapse
was followed by the collapse of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities,
the market was suddenly looking for the next candidate to fail, and concern over theloss of financial system stability and the possibility of systemic risk spread rapidly. A
number of financial institutions came under severe attack: the rumor that they had
incurred huge nonperforming assets drove down their stock prices and triggered
sizeable outflow of deposits. Moreover, the Japan premium rose close to 100 basis
points, reflecting the difficulty of fund-raising in overseas interbank markets, whilesome banks hastened to raise money to cover year-end funding (Figure 16).
In order to cope with this situation and contain the turmoil, the BOJ extended
special loans to Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities and provided,from late November onward, ample reserves in excess of the volume necessary for thebanks to meet their legal reserve requirements (Figure 20).
Figure 20 Reserve Requirement and Excess Reserve

5.0¥ trillions

Outstanding of overdraft accounts otherthan required reserve at the Bank of Japan
Outstanding of excess reserve

4.5

Outstanding of reserve requirement

4.0

3.5

3.0
CY

1997

98

99

Note: Data are average amounts per day from the 16th of the month to the 15th of
the next month.
Source: Bank of Japan.

72 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

Notwithstanding these efforts, financial institutions adopted a stringent attitude
toward lending to firms in general, and toward lending to small and medium-sizedenterprises in particular. Facing funding difficulties, the business condition of thelatter naturally worsened rapidly (Figure 21). Corporate bankruptcies increased andfixed investments by small and medium-sized enterprises decreased. It became
increasingly recognized that a decline in the financial intermediation function was
hampering economic recovery.
Figure 21 Corporate Finance-Related Indicators in the Tankan (December 1999)[1] Lending Attitude of Financial Institutions
60

DI (“accommodative” – “severe”), percentage points

50
Forecast

40
30“Accommodative”

20
10
0
–10
–20

“Severe”

Large enterprises
Small enterprises–30–40
CY 1983 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00[2] Financial Position40

DI (“easy” – “tight”), percentage points

30

Forecast

20“Easy”
100–10“Tight”–20

Large enterprises
Small enterprises–30
CY1983 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Source: Bank of Japan, “Tankan —Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan.”73

This recognition brought again to the fore the importance of injecting publicfunds into financial institutions so as to correct their undercapitalized status, thus
revitalizing their financial intermediation function. In March 1998 some ¥1.8 trillion
in public funds was injected into 21 major banks. In October, public funds appropriated for financial system stabilization, based on the Financial Reconstruction Law
and the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law, were increased to ¥60 trillion
and an additional ¥7.5 trillion was injected into 15 major banks, followed by a ¥2.6
billion injection into four regional banks. In the meantime, the Long-Term Credit
Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank, both suffering from huge nonperforming
assets, were placed under special public administration in accordance with the
Financial Reconstruction Law in October and December 1998, respectively.

III. Mechanism behind the Prolonged Economic Stagnation
after the Bursting of the Asset Price Bubble
The prolonged economic stagnation that occurred in the 1990s was the outcome of
the interaction of various factors. Hayakawa (1999), for example, stresses the following four: (1) the existence of “nonperforming assets” as an aftermath of the burstingof the asset price bubble; (2) a high household savings rate reflecting the rapid agingof the population and a decline in the fertility rate; (3) a decline in capital efficiency;and (4) low productivity in non-manufacturing industry.9 The authors of this paper
agree that the background to the prolonged economic stagnation in the 1990s was
multifaceted, and that the negative impact of the asset bubble constituted only a partof this complex structure. In any event, it is obvious that it is premature at thismoment to conclude what the fundamental factors behind the prolonged economic
stagnation were. We have to wait at least for some more years before the Japanese
economy completes the post-bubble adjustments.
Nevertheless, even though it is too early to reach a firm conclusion regarding theidentity of a fundamental factor behind the prolonged economic stagnation, there
should be little doubt that the emergence, expansion, and subsequent bursting of
the asset price bubble played a major role in determining business conditions in the
1990s. We therefore focus in this section on the role that “nonperforming assets”
played in prolonging the economic stagnation of the post-bubble years.
The working hypothesis regarding the adjustment mechanism of the bursting of
the bubble to be examined here is as follows: (1) the impacts of the bursting of the
bubble were amplified by the decline in expected growth rate, and malfunctioning of
the financial system stemming from balance-sheet adjustment in the nonfinancial
sector and nonperforming assets in the banking sector; (2) such amplified impacts
prolonged the adjustment period, thus, aggravating the negative impacts on real
economic activities.

9. For the details of each point, see Nakagawa (1999), Maeda and Yoshida (1999), and Bank of Japan (1999).

74 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

A. Effects of Delayed Stock Adjustment
With regard to the recession after the bursting of the bubble, a commonly expressedargument is that excess accumulation of capital stock during the bubble period
amplified the resultant adjustment pressure.
1. Decline in expected growth rate and required stock adjustment
Although the Heisei boom peaked in February 1991 according to the EPA’s reference
dates of the business cycle, real business fixed investment of manufacturing continued
to grow in the second quarter of 1991; moreover, it was only in the third quarter of1992 that investment in non-manufacturing industry reached its peak (Figure 5).
At around the peak of the business cycle in 1990–91, capital stock was growing at
8 percent per annum, and the ratio of business fixed investment to nominal GDP
moved up to around 20 percent (Figure 22), both the highest figures since the first oilcrisis. It is a widely shared view that this surge in investment was based on high growth
expectations, especially that at the micro level, that is, entrepreneurs tended to believethat demand growth for their industry, at least, would remain high (Figure 23).
Figure 22 Ratio of Business Fixed Investment to Nominal GDP

25

Ratio to nominal GDP, percent

20
15
10

Iwado
boom

Izanagiboom

Heiseiboom

501957 60

63

66

69

72

75

78

81

84

87

90

93

96

Note: Shaded periods are those of economic expansion.
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.

Figure 23 Firms’ Expected Growth Rates
Year-on-year percentage change
6

Expected growth of the demand forindustries for the coming three years

5
4
3
2

Expected economic growth
for the coming three years

10
FY 1981

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

Source: Economic Planning Agency, “Report on Survey Research of Firms’ Behavior.”

75

However, as these growth expectations were revised downwards (from close to
4 percent to barely above 2 percent), growth in capital stock, and the ratio of businessfixed investment to nominal GDP declined remarkably. The fact that the capitalutilization rate remained low throughout the stock adjustment period (Figure 24)
suggests that the period during which adjustment pressure was apparent was prolonged
by the excessive investment that occurred during the last stage of the bubble period.
Figure 24 Capital Utilization Index and Business Fixed Investment
Year-on-year percentage change

1990 = 100, seasonally adjusted

40

105
Capacity utilization index (right scale)

30

100

20
95
10
90
0
85

–0
–20

Business fixed investment(real term, left scale)

–30

80

75
1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, “Gross Capital Stock of Private Enterprises”;
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, “Monthly Statistics of Machinery.”

2. Adjustment in stock of structures
One of the significant characteristics of the bubble period is that the expansion ofcapital stock appeared particularly in investment in structures (Bank of Japan[1997b]). A typical example is the large increase of floor space in the Tokyo metropolitan area, triggered by the increase in demand for high-quality office buildingsthat took place in the late 1980s. Construction of a number of large office buildings
with long building periods was begun in 1990–91, the very last years of the Heiseiboom, prolonging the capital stock adjustment process that followed.10
B. Balance-Sheet Adjustment and Deterioration of Financial Intermediation
The bursting of the bubble initiated not only capital stock adjustment but alsobalance-sheet adjustments, as companies’ assets lost their value and/or became
nonperforming. The other side of the same coin was the growth in the number of
10. Relating to this point, Yoshikawa and Ohara (1997) reported that construction in process in fixed assets, as aproxy for a large-scale fixed investment such as factory construction and other large building projects, increased
remarkably in 1990–91. Based on such findings, they argued that complete adjustment of capital stock took along time, since the lives of factories and buildings are longer than those of equipment.

76 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

debtors who became unable to honor their debts. Thus nonperforming assets becamea serious problem for financial institutions and eroded their capital base. This meansthat the risk-taking capacity of the financial institutions deteriorated; in other words,
the banks’ financial intermediary function deteriorated. Difficulty in bank borrowing
for small and medium-sized firms that have only limited access, if any, to capital
markets became a significant hurdle for recovery in investment activity.
1. The magnitude of the nonperforming-asset problem
It is often emphasized that what made Japan’s nonperforming-asset problem worse
was the aggressive lending behavior of banks in real estate-related industries: realestate development, the construction industry and non-banks. Such aggressive
lending was triggered by the rapid increase in the land prices, as well as by the slow
and incomplete deregulation of the financial system in the 1980s.11 True, rapid asset
price inflation during and after the progress of financial liberalization have been
observed elsewhere: cases in point are U.S. savings and loan and bank crises in theNordic countries.12 However, the magnitude of nonperforming-asset problems inJapan exceeded such experiences.
The upper panel of Figure 11 shows the movement of nonperforming assets at
major Japanese banks.13 “Risk management loans” at end-March 1999 stood at ¥20.3
trillion (4.0 percent of nominal GDP), compared with ¥12.8 trillion (2.7 percent) in
March 1993, notwithstanding the fact a large quantity of bad loans were written
off.14 Taking into account the latter, total amount of nonperforming loans, i.e., risk
management loans plus accumulated direct write-offs since fiscal 1992, reached¥44.6 trillion (9.0 percent of nominal GDP) at end-March 1999, slightly above thelevel it had recorded at end-September 1999, or ¥44.3 trillion (8.9 percent).
Although its growth has become marginal recently, the peak has yet to be confirmed.
Since the 1980s, the banking industry in many countries has experienced
nonperforming-asset problems. For example, nonperforming loans in the UnitedStates (commercial banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)
increased in 1990-91, recording US$117 billion (2.0 percent of nominal GDP) atthe end of the second quarter of 1991 (Figure 25), and adding to that amount thesum of direct write-offs since the last quarter of 1986, the accumulated amount of
nonperforming loans reached US$251.2 billion (4.1 percent).
Comparing the magnitude of nonperforming-asset problems across countries
is difficult. However, is seems safe to conclude that Japan’s nonperforming-loan
problem was more serious than that experienced in the United States.
11. For example, Hoshi (2001) empirically examines the relevance of gradual and incomplete financial liberalization
as one of the factors that caused the nonperforming-asset problem in Japan. In his study, it is shown that (1) thesize of nonperforming assets is largely attributable to the growth of real estate lending in the 1980s, and that(2) the growth of real estate lending was in turn caused by the experience of losing customers to capital markets.
12. Okumura (1999), for instance, referred to a conference paper authored by IMF economists, which pointed
out the following three common factors behind the banking crises that coexisted in those countries underfinancial liberalization: (1) insufficient internal governance, such as weak discipline by the management within
financial institutions; (2) weak market discipline, such as insufficient monitoring of financial institution
management through market forces; and (3) inadequacy of the financial regulation, supervision, and examinationby the authorities.
13. Major banks include city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks.
14. “Risk management loans” include (1) loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, (2) past due loans in arrears by
three months or more, and (3) restructured loans.

77Figure 25 Nonperforming Loans of the U.S. Commercial Banks

300

US$ billions
Accumulated net charge-offs
Nonperforming assets
Reserve for losses

250
200
150
100
50
0
1986
4.5

87

88

89

90

91

92

Ratio to nominal GDP, percent

4.0
3.5
3.0

Accumulated net
charge-offs

2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0

Nonperforming loans

0.5
0
1986

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

Note: Data for FDIC-insured commercial banks. Nonperforming loans include thosepast their due date by 90 or more days, those in non-accrual status, and OREO.
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Quarterly Banking Profile.

2. The malfunctioning of financial intermediation and its macroeconomic
impact
The increase in nonperforming assets in the banking sector exerted a considerable
negative impact on macroeconomic activity through the deterioration of financial
intermediation.
Recent literature on banking under conditions of asymmetric information
provides a useful viewpoint from which to examine issues regarding the malfunctioning of financial intermediation.15 The informational asymmetry between borrowers
15. For the standard analytical framework for discussing the macroeconomic effects of financial intermediation, see,for example, Chapter 6 of Freixas and Rochet (1997).

78 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

and lenders creates market imperfection by generating agency costs, which Bernanke
and Gertler (1995) called the external finance premium. The size of this premium
depends on the borrowers’ financial position. The amount of bank lending, and thus
the investment decisions of firms in general, and of bank-dependent small andmedium-sized firms in particular, are very sensitive to their financial positions.16
Based on this theoretical argument, we summarize Japan’s experience in the 1990s
as follows. First, in the companies sector, the decline in asset prices lowered the net
worth of firms and raised agency costs with regard to their external financing.
Second, in the banking sector, the continuous land price slide and prolonged
economic stagnation amplified their nonperforming-asset problem and weakened
their financial intermediary function, with the resultant credit crunch imposing an
additional hindrance to business investment.
The results of the existing studies tend to support the view that: First, thedecline in asset prices restricted firms’ investment behavior throughout the 1990s, bycausing a deterioration in their balance sheet and net worth, magnifying agency costs,
and thus aggravating their credit constraint (Gibson [1997], Suzuki and Ogawa[1997], and Ogawa and Kitasaka [1998]);17 Second, major banks began to attach
greater importance in the post-bubble period to the profitability of loans to
non-manufacturing and small and medium-sized manufacturers, reflecting theincrease in agency cost as a result of the decline in asset prices (Ogawa and Kitasaka[2000]); Third, especially since the fall of 1997 when concern over the stability of thefinancial system mounted, nonperforming assets eroded banks’ capital bases andaggravated the malfunctioning of financial intermediation, which appeared as a credit
crunch (Horiye [1999], and Motonishi and Yoshikawa [1999]).18
To sum up, the decreased functioning of financial intermediation restrained
business fixed investment throughout the 1990s, to some extent. Such effects havemanifested themselves in a particularly noticeable way since 1997.

IV. Monetary Policy Responses
We now turn to the very tentative evaluation of monetary policy responses to developments in the 1990s. In evaluating the validity of policy responses, we think it is ofutmost importance to weigh what was (or was not) achieved against the explicit andpotential costs, as well as to examine the political and social environment policy
16. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) refer to the amplification mechanism of initial shocks through changes incredit market conditions stemming from cyclical movements in firms’ net worth and cash flow as the “financial
accelerator.” Changes in firms’ net worth as a collateral for borrowing from banks arise from movements of asset
prices, affecting agency costs and thus credit conditions, and then affecting firms’ investment behavior.
17. In particular, the effects of the malfunctioning of financial intermediation appear asymmetrically between
large firms and small and medium-sized firms, reflecting the difference in degree of bank-dependence. Empiricalstudies that focus on the asymmetric effects resulting from differences in firm size indicate that credit constraints
became more serious in the small and medium-sized firms, which find it more difficult to gain access to capital
markets and are thus highly dependent on bank lending.
18. Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) estimate the effect of financial factors, using the BOJ’s Tankan diffusionindex of bank lending attitudes as a proxy for business fixed investment by non-manufacturing and small andmedium-sized firms, and argue that business fixed investment and real GDP are lowered by 10 percentage points
and 1.6 percentage points, respectively.

79makers had to face. This is even more the case because the period under review was amost unusual one in that it occurred in the midst of a collapse of the bubble economy.
We first examine the timing of policy change, then the tempo and scale ofmonetary easing.
A. What Monetary Policy Achieved
An obvious achievement of monetary policy during the years under consideration isthat while Japan was faced with a tremendous decline in asset prices, which cameclose to that experienced in the United States during the Great Depression, the CPI
has so far remained stable. In other words, a rapid and self-sustaining price decline
known as deflation, as was experienced in the United States during the Great
Depression (Figure 26), has been successfully avoided.
In fact, as a result of the BOJ’s historically unprecedented accommodative
monetary policy, interest rates in Japan have recently declined more rapidly and to alower level than in the United States during the Great Depression (Figure 27). Thereis no doubt that this policy contributed considerably to the prevention of monetarycontraction and deflation as was experienced in the United States during the Great
Depression (Figure 26). However, it is also obvious that Japanese economy hasremained stagnant for a long time. Was monetary policy responsible for thislong-lasting economic slump, and if so, to what extent?
Growth of monetary aggregates (M2+CDs) cannot answer this question. True, it
has remained low, and it has recently been hovering at around 2.5 percent per annum.19
However, as a result of the BOJ’s accommodative monetary easing, it has risen, slowly
but steadily, while real annual GDP growth remained virtually flat at around 1 percent.
We have to examine in somewhat more detail the adequacy of the timing ofpolicy reversal, and the speed and size of monetary easing.
B. Was Monetary Reversal to Easing Delayed?
The first move toward monetary relaxation after the bursting of the asset pricebubble was the official discount rate cut in July 1991 (6.0 → 5.5 percent). Critics
of the BOJ argue, with the benefit of hindsight, that this move was “too late andtoo timid” and failed to prevent an “overkill” of the economy. In the following, we
examine whether the timing of that monetary policy change, i.e. the switch from atight to an easy monetary policy, was appropriate. Then we examine the tempo andmagnitude of policy responses.
19. The characteristics of economic stagnation during this period have been clearly observed in the contributing
factors for monetary aggregates. In this regard, Shirakawa (2000) stated as follows:
Looking at the change in the assets of financial institutions corresponding to the above increase in money
supply, their loans to the private sector have grown only 6 percent, significantly lower than the 62 percent
increase in their credit (bond purchases, etc.) to the government. Needless to say, reductions in interest rates
by the Bank of Japan will not automatically lead to an increase in money supply unless financial institutions
respond to such rate cuts. Money supply will only grow if financial institutions engage in credit creation
activities in response to declines in interest rates, i.e., making loans to firms after appropriate assessment of
their borrowing plans, and also investing in securities. A small increase in loans to the private sector, which isin sharp contrast to credit extended to the government, vividly illustrates that financial institutions have had
few profitable lending opportunities given their risk taking capacity.

80 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

Figure 26 Comparison of Stock Price, Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and Money
Stock (Between the 1990s in Japan and the Great Depression in
the United States)
120

Stock Prices

130

Real GDP
Japan (1989/IV = 100)

120

100

110
80
Japan: Nikkei 225(1989/IV = 100)

100

United States (1929/I–1937/IV,
1929/IV = 100)

60
90
40
80
20

70
US: Dow Jones Industrial Average(1929/I–1937/IV, 1929/IV = 100)01989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
120

Consumer Prices
Japan: CPI (nationwide, excluding
perishables, 1989/IV = 100)

60
1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
140
130

Money StockJapan: M2+CD(1989/IV = 100)

110
120
110

100
United States: CPI (1929/I–
1937/IV, 1929/IV = 100)
90

100

United States: M2 (1929/I–
1937/IV, 1929/IV = 100)

90
80

80
70
70
1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

60
1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

Notes: 1. Japanese CPI data are adjusted by excluding the effects of the consumption
tax increase in April 1997 on the assumption that prices of all taxable goods
fully reflect the tax rate rise.
2. Data for stock prices, consumer prices, and money stocks are quarterly
average.
Sources: Bank of Japan; Management and Coordination Agency, “Consumer Price
Index”; Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts ;The Nihon Keizai Shimbun ; Bloomberg; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureauof Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index”; Balke, N. S., and R. J. Gordon,“Historical Data,” in R. J. Gordon, ed. The American Business Cycle,
University of Chicago Press, 1986.

81

Figure 27 Comparison of Interest Rates (Between the 1990s in Japan and the Great
Depression in the United States)

12

Quarterly

Percent

Yield on U.S. corporate bonds (Moody’s Baa)
(1929/I–1937/IV)

10
8Yield on corporate bonds(Moody’s Baa)

6

Yield on government bonds (10-year)

4
2

Yield on U.S. Treasury bonds (10-year)(1929/I–1937/IV)

0
CY 1991

9

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Quarterly

Percent

8
Call rate (overnight, uncollateralized)
7
6
5

U.S. CP rate (4–6 months)(1929/I–1937/IV)

4
3

CP rate (3-month)2
1
0
CY 1991

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Notes: 1. Japanese interest rates: 1991/I–1999/II. U.S. interest rates: 1929/I–1937/IV.
2. The horizontal scale is graduated for the Japanese case, while 1991/I in thescale corresponds to 1929/I for the U.S. data.
Sources: Bank of Japan; Federal Reserve Board, Financial and Business Statistics ;Balke, N. S., and R. J. Gordon, “Historical Data,” in R. J. Gordon, ed. The
American Business Cycle, University of Chicago Press, 1986.

1. Timing
The BOJ’s first step toward monetary easing was the cut in the official discount ratefrom 6 to 5.5 percent in July 1991, which was followed by four successive cuts thatbrought the rate down to 3.25 percent by 1992. The official discount rate was thus
reduced by a total of 2.75 percentage points in a period of one year.
How should we evaluate the adequacy of the timing of policy reversal? The
Japanese economy had marked a peak in February 1991, according to the reference

82 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

dates of business cycles that the EPA set retroactively.20 CPI inflation had peaked in
the first quarter of 1991 (when consumer prices increased by 3.2 percent from a year
earlier), and kept rising by more than 3 percent per year until the third quarter of1991. We have also to take into account that the Gulf War had just ended in
February 1991, and its lagged impact on prices was not yet certain.
Against this background, it should be fair to conclude that it is difficult to make astrong case against the timing of the policy reversal, especially taking into account thetime lag with which macroeconomic indicators became available to policy makers.
2. The speed and magnitude of monetary easing
How, then, about the tempo and magnitude of monetary relaxation? In thefollowing, we will try to tackle this harder question basing ourselves on four criteria:
monetary aggregates, the so-called “Taylor rule,” the equity yield spread, and the real
short-term interest rates.
a. Monetary aggregates
As Okina (1993) pointed out, judgment on the growth rates of monetary aggregatesshould differ depending on whether the preceding phase was a normal situation, or aperiod of excess supply. In this context, we have to bear in mind that M2+CDs had
shown double-digit growth rates in the late 1980s.
We therefore focus on the Marshallian k (the inverse of the velocity of monetary
aggregates)—i.e., the ratio of monetary aggregates to nominal GDP—in terms ofboth M2+CDs and the monetary base, and compare its movement with the historical
trend computed for the period of 1970–86 (Figure 28).21
Marshallian k in terms of M2+CDs started to exceed its historical trend (excess inmonetary aggregates) from 1987, when the growth rate of M2+CDs reached double
digits. The upward deviation peaked in 1990. While k started to decline rapidly soonafter the collapse of the asset price bubble, deviation from the trend has remained
constant since end-1992. Thus the Marshallian k in terms of M2+CDs had been
consistently exceeding the historical trend.
Marshallian k in terms of monetary base, similar to that of M2+CDs, showedsignificant upward deviation from its historical trend during the bubble era, andpeaked in 1990. Then, following a temporary contraction of upward deviations up
to 1992, the deviation began to widen further due to the growth in demand forbanknotes, which is a major component of the monetary base, reflecting the decline
in opportunity cost of holding cash balances.
It is difficult to argue by using these charts that the volume of monetary
aggregates was insufficient;22 on the contrary, ample liquidity was provided.23
20. The committee on defining the reference date of business cycles tentatively set a peak at April 1991 in November
1993, then finalized a peak at February 1991 in July 1996.
21. Series of monetary base are adjusted for the impact of changes in reserve requirement rates.
22. However, as we point out in Footnote 19, the change in the assets of financial institutions corresponding to
the increase in monetary aggregates came mainly from increased holding of the Japanese government bonds,
while their loans to the private sector were stagnant. In this sense, the effects of balance-sheet adjustments weresignificant, and the impact of the increase in monetary aggregates was dampened.
23. Looking at the diffusion index of the lending attitudes of financial institutions, which is a rather subjective
judgmental indicator, it turned to an accommodative direction soon after the transition to a policy of monetaryeasing. Financial conditions for firms were not so tight, except for the period from the fall of 1997 to 1998, when
the impact of the credit crunch was accentuated.

83

Figure 28 Ratio of Money Stock to Nominal GDP[1] M2+CDs
Times

1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9

Trend line of 1970–86

0.8
0.7
0.6

1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99[2] Monetary Base
0.13

Times

0.12
0.11
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.07
Trend line of 1970–86
0.06
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly ; Economic
Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.

The fact that the upward deviation from its trend of the Marshallian k in terms ofmonetary base has expanded steadily since 1992, while that in terms of M2+CDs
remained unchanged from 1992 to 1996 and temporarily declined to trend level in1997 seems to indicate that the increase in monetary base failed to exert a positiveeffect due to the malfunctioning of the financial intermediation system.24
b. Taylor rule
We now examine the speed and size of the reduction in short-term interest rates withreference to the second criterion, the policy reaction function based on the Taylor
rule (Taylor [1993]).25
24. It should be noted that the decline in the money multiplier in 1999 mainly reflects the excess monetary baseunder the zero interest rate policy that reduced the opportunity cost of holding excess reserves. In fact, although
the financial crisis was accentuated in 1997–98, such concerns subsided in 1999 as a result of the fact that theJapanese government adopted a reactive policy, including an increased infusion of public funds.
25. Meyer (2000) emphasized that the Taylor rule is an attractive and simple guidepost for the conduct of adiscretionary monetary policy, because it “responds directly to deviations from the Federal Reserve’s objectives—
price stability and an equilibrium utilization rate” as well as because “it incorporates a preemptive response toinflation” and “is closely aligned both with the objectives of monetary policy and with the model that governs
inflation dynamics.” However, it should be noted that one important assumption for the Taylor rule is that thepotential growth rate remains unchanged, and this assumption might not always hold. In fact, Orphanides et al.

84 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

We compare the movements of the call rate with that of the target rate, which
is derived using Taylor-rule policy reaction function, starting from the second
quarter of 1991, when the call rate peaked (Figure 29).26 We assumed two types ofparameters in applying the Taylor rule: one lays similar weights on both the inflation
Figure 29 Monetary Easing in Japan in the 1990s (Actual vs. Taylor’s Rule-Type
Policy Reaction Function)[1] Case 1 ( α = 1.5, β = 1.0)
Percentage points
0
Uncollateralized overnight call rate
Target rate (partial adjustment)
Target rate (perfect adjustment)

–2
–4
–6
–8
–10
–12
–14
1991

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

[2] Case 2 ( α = 2.0, β = 0.3)
0Percentage points
Uncollateralized overnight call rate
Target rate (partial adjustment)
Target rate (perfect adjustment)

–2
–4
–6
–8
–10
–12
–14
1991

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

Notes: 1. Baseline formula of Taylor’s rule:
Rt = (1 – λ ) × [ α × (πt +4 – π *) + β × (Yt – Y*)] + λ × Rt –1.
Rt = uncollateralized overnight call rates at t -period; πt +4 – π * = the difference
in inflation rate (consumer prices) between the actual and the target; Yt – Y* =real GDP gap at t -period (actual real GDP minus potential real GDP); λ = 0
in perfect adjustment rule; λ = 0.85 in partial adjustment rule.
2. The data above are the changes in interest rates (actual call rates ortarget rates calculated by the baseline formula of Taylor’s rule) from therates in the 1991/II (when the first move to monetary easing in the 1990s
was made).
Sources: Bank of Japan; Management and Coordination Agency, “Consumer Price
Index”; Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.

(1999) pointed out that measurement errors in the GDP gap, stemming from ex post revision of the statistics, areso large that policy judgment could be different if real-time data were used instead of the ex post revised data.
Although, the impacts of measurement errors in the GDP gaps are not examined in Japan, the ex post policy
evaluation based on Taylor rule is not free from this kind of criticism based on hindsight.
26. Since we compare the cumulative reduction in interest rates from the second quarter of 1991, our simulation
results are unaffected by the parameter assumptions in the Taylor rule, such as those of equilibrium real
short-term interest rate and target inflation rate.

85

rate and GDP gap (the parameters for the inflation rate and GDP gap are 1.5 and
1.0, respectively), the other much greater weight to the inflation rate than on the
GDP gap (2.0 and 0.3).27 We also assume the two formulas of the Taylor rule, i.e.
both with and without interest rate smoothing (partial and total adjustment
mechanisms), where the adjustment parameter of the former is assumed to be 0.85.
The call rate declined approximately six percentage points from the second
quarter of 1991 to the first quarter of 1994. During the same period, target rates
derived from the Taylor rule declined six to eight percentage points, according to
the model. The pace of decline in the target rate was faster in the case in whichsimilar weights were applied to the inflation rate and the GDP gap. In general, thedeviations between call rate and estimated target rate remained relatively limited.
The results suggest that we may rate monetary policy as having responded
properly to external shocks on inflation and GDP as captured by the Taylor rule.
c. Equity yield spread
The third criterion is the movement of equity yield spread relative to that of theinterest rates.
An important mechanism that brought the asset price bubble to an end is that theprocess by which a decline in expected growth adjusted for risk premium, caused byeither a lower expected growth rate or a higher risk premium, or both, has effects
similar to those of a rise in interest rates: both lower expected growth rate and higher
risk premium raise the effective cost of funds even though nominal interest rates
remain unchanged.
Against the backdrop of extremely bullish sentiment during the bubble expansion
period, a marginal increase in interest rates did not much alter private expectations
regarding the future course of the economy. In order to have some meaningful
impact in such a situation, any rise in interest rates had to be large enough to
influence private expectations. On the contrary, even if the initial impact of a risein interest rates was insignificant, it would start “biting” seriously once private
expectations were reversed, since the original impact of higher interest rates would
become amplified by the effect of revised growth expectations.
The equity yield spread provides a useful proxy for private expectations regarding
economic growth (Figure 30).28 It widened even after the monetary policy stance wastightened in 1989; it was only in the fall of 1990 that the yield spread showed thefirst signs of contraction. The spread shrank rather rapidly thereafter: it had declinedby two percentage points by the end of 1990, and by a further two percentage points
after monetary policy moved toward easing in July 1991.
It is thus possible to argue that the speed and magnitude of monetary easing up
to 1992 was broadly in line with this movement of the equity yield spread. That is,
the official discount rate was lowered five times to 3.25 percent from 6 percent by
2.75 percent points during the period from July 1991 to July 1992.
27. Parameters for the Taylor rule are taken from Kimura and Tanemura (2000) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
However, it should be noted the later estimation is conducted with monthly data, thus it employs the deviationof the index of industrial production from its trend instead of the GDP gap.
28. As Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) point out regarding the period of expansion of the asset pricebubble, it is not important to decompose the effects of the lower expected growth rate and of the increased risk
premium, since both affect asset prices in the same direction so that asset prices will decline.

86 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

Figure 30 Equity Yield Spread

10

Percent
Government bond yields (A)(10-year)

8

6

4

2

0

Earnings on stocks (B)(listed on the TSE First Section)

Equity yield spread([A] – [B])–2
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Notes: 1. Data are at the end of month. Government bond yields are 10-year bondyields with the longest remaining maturity.
2. Equity yield spread = government bond yields – expected earnings on stocks,
where expected earnings on stocks are the inverse of the price earnings ratio.
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.

However, one may also point out that the equity yield spread had declined by two
percentage points prior to the shift in expansionary policy. In light of the aforementioned view, it is possible to argue that the effect of higher interest rates becomes
amplified when public expectations are revised downwards. Thus, it might be thecase that a sharper rate cut was required after July 1991, when the monetary policy
stance was reversed toward easing.
d. Real short-term interest rate
As a fourth yardstick, we compare, as suggested by Blinder (1998), real short-term
interest rates with a benchmark, or “neutral,” real interest rate which we obtained
from long-run historical data.
As the neutral real short-term interest rate, we chose the average ex post realinterest rate, that is the official discount rate minus realized year-on-year consumer
price inflation during the period 1883–1986.29 We obtained a neutral real short-term
interest rate of 2.85 percent by excluding as extraordinary the period around WorldWar II, and 1.72 percent if we exclude the observations when of real interest
rate exceeding 10 percent in absolute terms (i.e., over 10 percent or under minus
10 percent). In the following evaluation, we assume that the “true” neutral real
short-term rate should lie somewhere between these two estimates.
29. Before the 1980s, deposit and loan rates were linked to the official discount rate under the system of regulated
interest rates. Therefore, the historical series of the official discount rate could be reasonably used as a benchmark
for evaluating the call rate that was the central policy instrument in the 1990s under conditions of liberalized
financial markets.

87Real short-term rates remained relatively high at around 5 percent after the
bursting of the bubble (Figure 31), but they gradually began to fall after July 1991,
when the BOJ’s monetary policy stance was reversed, and declined to around
4 percent by end-1991. It then accelerated on its downward trend and by mid-1992
was fluctuating at around 2 percent, or approximately the lower bound of the“neutral rate zone.” Real short-term interest rates continued to fall; from late-1993 to
mid-1994 they remained well below the neutral rate zone. Real rates briefly roseto the lower bound of neutral rate zone in early 1995, but again fell sharply to
0.5 percent, reflecting the monetary easing adopted to cope with the rapid yen
appreciation that occurred during the first half of 1995.
In retrospect, this movement of real short-term interest rates could be interpreted
as follows. The real interest rate had to be kept two percentage points above theneutral rate for more than one and half years in order to offset the inflationarypressure of the Heisei boom. Such a high real rate was, then, adjusted smoothly tothe neutral level along with the transition to easy monetary policy in mid-1991.
However, the downward movement of the real interest rate slowed down thereafter.
Moreover, during mid-1994 and early 1995, real short-term interest rates instead
moved upwards to the neutral level, since the inflation rate went down while nominalinterest rate was flat.
As nonperforming-loan problems in U.S. financial institutions came to the fore
and the credit crunch became serious, the Fed left the real short-term rate below theneutral rate from end-1991 to mid-1994; especially in the first half of 1993 it was
about zero or even negative (Figure 32). Such U.S. experience, if compared with that
Figure 31 Short-Term Real Interest Rates in Japan
Percent

98Nominal call rate (overnight)

7
Real call rate(nominal call rate – CPI percentage change from a year earlier)

65

The average of real short-term ratefrom 1883 to 1996 (except for wartime
during the period 1937 to 1949)

4
3
2
1

The average of real short-term rate from 1883 to 1986 (excluding theyears with CPI year-on-year percentage change from a year earlier
over +10 percent or below –10 percent)

0
1989

90

91

92

93

94

95

Sources: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Monthly, Nihon Ginko Hyakunenshi
Shiryouhen (The Centennial History of the Bank of Japan: Data andMaterials).

88 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

96

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

Figure 32 U.S. Short-Term Real Interest Rates
Percent
1086Nominal FF rate

Real FF rate (nominal FF rate –CPI year-on-year percentagechange from a year earlier)

42
Neutral real FF rate
(range)

0
–2

1989

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

Note: The range of neutral real interest rates above is based on Blinder (1998).
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve
Bulletin ; Blinder (1998).

of Japan, might suggest that in order to cope with deflationary pressure amplified by
the collapse of asset price bubbles some additional monetary stimulus would havebeen useful.
e. Evaluation of policy reactions: a tentative summary
Let us sum up the discussion on the evaluation of policy reaction based on our four
criteria. The results are rather mixed.
First, the movements of monetary aggregates hardly suggest that the volume
of monetary aggregates was insufficient if compared with the level of nominal GDP
at that time. We may also argue quite safely on the results of Taylor-type reaction
function that the speed and size of monetary easing were broadly adequate in thelight of the then prevailing business conditions and inflation indicators. It seems
appropriate to say that the reaction of monetary policy was rather swift to the extent
it was taken against the background of a normal business contraction with stock
adjustments, in spite of economic and social environment at that time that made itdifficult to reverse the policy direction toward monetary easing. However, looking at
the equity yield spread, it is not impossible to argue that the degree of monetaryeasing was insufficient for offsetting the initial shock of the burst of the bubble
before the reversal of monetary policy. In addition, an examination of the real
short-term interest rate might suggest its decline was not sufficient for coping withthe balance-sheet adjustment pressures that became evident later on.
C. Summary of the Tentative Evaluation
Based on the above analysis, we will summarize our very tentative evaluation ofmonetary policy responses after the bursting of the bubble.

89

1. Evaluation of the monetary policy responseFirst, in summary, what our analysis above suggests is that: (1) the timing of policy
reversal was swift; (2) with the benefit of hindsight, however, it is possible to argue
that the degree of monetary easing corresponded to an economic setback in an
ordinary stock adjustment phase, but not necessarily in an extraordinary recession; inother words, the negative effects of the collapse that later became evident may havebeen underestimated at that time.
Some caveats are in order here. Our appraisal depends on some mechanicalapplication of simple yardsticks; thus there are limitations in evaluating theadequacy of policy decisions based solely on real-time information. Any bubble canonly be identified for certain as a bubble after it has definitely burst. It is close toimpossible to foresee with any precision in the early stages of the crash the magnitudeof adjustment pressure it will bring forth.
In addition, we have to take into account that public sentiment against theasset price bubble, and the desire for “bubble-busting” that then existed, formeda social background against which it was difficult to pursue an even more drastic
monetary easing.30 The BOJ is not, and should not be a dictator. It is a central
bank in a democracy, which is not able to pursue a policy without some degree ofunderstanding and support from the general public.
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the monetary easing that was implemented in
the aftermath of the bursting of the asset price bubble should, especially if the thensocial sentiment prevailing is carefully taken into account, be assessed as broadly
adequate as a response to the economic setback in a normal stock adjustment cycle.
However, in order to draw lessons for future central banking, we felt it useful to
extract factors that might have been underestimated in the real-time decision-making
process, but, with the aid of hindsight, were of importance in foreseeing the precise
magnitude of the adjustment pressure. We focus in what follows on the negative
effects of balance-sheet adjustment, the magnitude of which seems not to have beenrecognized in its entirety in the early phase of the recession.
2. Delayed recognition of balance-sheet adjustment
In retrospect, it is possible to point out several misperceptions about the mechanismof balance-sheet adjustment at the time.
First, it was not correctly recognized that “while debts always remain, assets may
become lost.” This was partly because the vast majority of people, including policy
makers, believed, up to a certain point in time, that “asset prices, even if they decline
now, will recover in due course.”31 Second, it was not correctly understood what kindof mechanism might be triggered when asset prices decline while the nominal value
30. For example, the former BOJ Governor Mieno, who took office in December 1989 and proceeded with
monetary tightening from the start, was named “Heisei’s Oni-Hei” by a well-known critic. Oni-Hei was thenickname for Heizoh Hasegawa, who was chief of the security police during the 1780s–90s in the Edo Period.
A gang of thieves in those days was afraid of him, since he enforced crackdowns against them as a devil, or
oni. This episode clearly indicates that the public felt that “bubble-busting” was a right-minded act even from an
ethical viewpoint.
31. For example, Nishimura (1999) recollects: “Even the unprecedented land price decline in 1974 subsequent to thePlan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago continued for just a year and was limited to 5 percent. When we
observed a sign of land price decline in September 1991, most people believed that land prices would soon

90 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

of debt is held constant.32
A possible explanation of this lack of understanding may have been something that
could be called tacit dominance of the “zero-sum fallacy,” i.e., that capital gain and loss
should offset each other, and thus be neutral with regard to economic
activity as a whole. A capital gain, even if it is unrealized, corresponds to an increase in
net worth. However, once such capital gain has stimulated expenditure—via thewealth effect on consumption—or has been used for aggressive capital investment withdebt-financing, and these expenditures turn out to be “excessive” ex post, or in plain
words, wasted, the subsequent decline in asset prices will end up as “negative-sum,” not“zero-sum.” This comes close to what happened in Japan in the last two decades.
It may also not have been well recognized that the adjustment cost of the burstingof the asset price bubble may increase as the adjustment process is prolonged. Since
the bursting of a bubble occurs as a consequence of the emergence and expansionof that bubble beforehand, some kinds of adjustment are inevitable. However, thepolicy implications might differ depending on whether one believes that “adjustment
costs are constant” regardless of policy responses, or, instead, supposes that adjustment costs may increase as policy responses are delayed, because nonperforming
assets will pile up due to the deterioration in business conditions. In the latter case,speed of decision and implementation of policy reactions also matters, even if thesame policy packages are established.
3. What monetary policy alone cannot do
However, it is difficult to imagine that the outcome would have differed greatly even if
the drastic monetary easing that eventually took place had been decided at an earlier
point in time. Monetary easing alone would not have been able to make things muchbetter without having devised a fundamental cure for the nonperforming-asset problem, which was hindering the smooth functioning of financial intermediation, as thedeviation between monetary base and M2+CDs indicates. As described earlier in thispaper, the magnitude of the nonperforming-asset problem in the aftermath of the
bursting of the bubble was unprecedented. If one takes into account the significant role
this problem played in prolonging the stagnation, it seems obvious that there was a limit
to the extent to which monetary policy would have been capable of stimulating the
economy on its own. What the U.S. experience in the early 1990s tells us is that thedisposal of nonperforming assets played a role as important in supporting the economy
as the monetary easing that pushed the real short-term interest rate down to zero.
As we examine in detail in the next chapter, it was considered in Japan that thecost of pursuing a fundamental cure for the nonperforming-asset problem in a phaseof recession would have been enormous, and, as a result, both the government andthe BOJ decided to implement a series of fiscal and monetary stimulus measures,
which they considered easier to enforce in the short run. In retrospect, one canrecover, recollecting their experience of the Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago.”
32. In the early 1990s when the credit crunch was a big issue of debate in the United States, it seemed that even the
FRB lagged behind in recognizing the mechanism of balance-sheet adjustment. In fact, although the FRB cut theinterest rate by a quarter percentage point in January 1991, subsequent to the previous cut at end-1990 by a quarter percentage point, the growth rate of bank assets remained at just 1 percent. However, FRB Chairman
Greenspan began to emphasize the impacts of the balance-sheet mechanism in the fall of 1991, by using a metaphorof “50 mile per hour headwinds.” For the details of the situation at that time, see, for example, Beckner (1996).

91

say that Japan has opted to absorb the impacts of the shock, with the aid of
macroeconomic policy and prudential policy, over a lengthy period. Any assessmentof this choice, however, has to take carefully into account, first, whether or not it
would have been possible to accelerate the adjustment process, and second, what
were the costs and benefits of prolonging the adjustment phase.33

V. Prudential Policy Responses
As we indicated at the end of Chapter IV, to understand the background of Japan’s
stagnant economy in the 1990s, it is not enough to consider the monetary policy
responses, but prudential policy also has to be examined. In Japan, prudential policy
has been conducted by the cooperation between the financial supervisory authority
and the BOJ. In this paper, the “financial supervisory authority” mainly refers to the
Ministry of Finance. From June 1998 onward, it refers to the Financial Supervisory
Agency and the Ministry of Finance.34
A. What Prudential Policy Achieved
The BOJ’s prudential policy has been criticized from various viewpoints. The mostimportant of such criticisms is that the BOJ is responsible for the huge costs entailed
in resolving the nonperforming-asset problem of financial institutions, because it
chose a buy-time policy, in cooperation with the financial supervisory authority, inorder not to let the problem materialize at an earlier stage.
It should be noted, however, that the BOJ’s ultimate goal in its prudential policy
is to maintain the stability of the financial system. Considering the importanceof preventing systemic risk in fulfilling this mission, it should be counted as asignificant achievement that the materialization of systemic risk in the form of acontagious bank run (or collapse of the financial system) has been avoided, in spiteof the lack of a comprehensive safety net and established bankruptcy proceduresto handle with institutions in trouble. This helped, in conjunction with monetaryeasing, to prevent the Japanese economy from being trapped in a serious deflationary
spiral. In assessing prudential policy we should always bear in mind what otheralternative measure were available, and at what potential cost.
B. Nonperforming Loans and Prudential Policy
An important issue in discussing the costs incurred by the nonperforming-asset
problem in Japan is the length of time it took to resolve it.
The fundamental reason why it took a long time to deal with the problem was
the delay in introducing bankruptcy procedures to be applied to institutions that
got into trouble, and in constructing a comprehensive safety net that enables problems to be tackled according to their severity. In fact, for a long time burden-sharing
33. It should be noted that macroeconomic policy possessed some aspect of “buying time” to hide the gravity of thenonperforming-asset problem, making it possible for regulatory authorities to gain time.
34. Some financial institutions other than banks, such as credit cooperatives and federational credit associations, aresupervised by the local government or the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.

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Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

within a financial sector grouping had been virtually the only measure available
to the authorities for resolving the problems of failed financial institutions (Fordetails of the incidents that occurred and the measures taken with regard to financial
system stability, please refer to Table 3).35 A host of factors are offered as having
formed the background to the delay in constructing the bankruptcy procedures andcomprehensive safety net.36 As we will illustrate in the following sections, various
factors were intertwined and made the problem complex and difficult to deal with.
1. Why the settlement of the problems of failed financial institutions wasprolonged
No matter whether losses incurred by a failed institution are imposed on large
depositors and investors, or the money of the depositors and investors is totallyprotected by some comprehensive safety net, it is close to impossible to obtain
public support for closing banks without the disclosure of the whole picture of thetrue state of the nonperforming-asset problem and banks’ business conditions.
On the other hand, given that a huge amount of nonperforming assets alreadyexisted and bankruptcy procedures against troubled institutions and comprehensive
safety net were not established, disclosing information on the problem might havearoused serious concern over the financial system, and may thus have triggered asystemic crisis. Suppose that a bank becomes unable to keep itself alive on its own. In
such a situation, the financial supervisory authority, if it wishes to avoid a systemiccrisis, is left with the sole option of providing the troubled institution with enoughliquidity to buy time. The bought time is used for the bank to make provision
against nonperforming assets with its operational profits and the gains realized fromits securities holdings, or to find someone willing to take over the bank that is introuble, with or without public financial support. This comes close to what
happened in Japan.
During this process, information on the magnitude of the nonperforming-asset
problem and the soundness of individual banks and the banking sector as a whole
was kept within limited circles, including the financial supervisory authority and the
Bank of Japan; disclosure to the public occurred only gradually. Naturally, market
35. A standard criticism against the way problem banks were dealt with after the bursting of the bubble is typicallyindicated in Shimizu and Horiuchi (1997): financial liberalization reduced the “franchise value” of banks (banks’
unreproducible illiquid assets, such as the long-term relationship between banks and their depositors andborrowers whose value can be maintained only if they are a going concern) so that the banks could not find an
economically rational incentive to rescue or merge troubled financial institutions but the financial supervisory
authority did not stop relying on burden-sharing among financial institutions. While this view has somerelevancy, the authors of this paper believe that the underlying reason was the delay in introducing bankruptcy
procedures for troubled institutions and in constructing a comprehensive safety net.
36. For example, Yoshitomi (1998, pp. 136–137) pointed out that there was a kind of implicit consensus amongbank management, the financial supervisory authority and politicians, all of whom had an incentive to shirk their
responsibility, on the postponement of settlement of the nonperforming-loan problem. In other words, bankmanagement, the financial supervisory authority, and politicians all had an incentive to postpone an injection of
taxpayers’ money into the banking sector, which was a necessary measure for depositor protection as well as foran early settlement of banking system instability, for fear of being blamed for it: (1) banks’ management would
be blamed for their mismanagement and be requested to restructure; (2) the financial supervisory authority
would be blamed for insufficient monitoring; (3) politicians would be criticized for having used taxpayers’ money
to rescue the banks. There are other points to be criticized, including a conflict of interest within the Ministryof Finance between the financial regulatory function and the government budgeting and taxing authoritythat are both the responsibility of that one ministry, and the government’s underestimation of the increase in
nonperforming loans that had occurred due to the non-repayment of interest on existing loans.

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Table 3 Chronology of Events That Affected the Stability of the Financial System
Year

Month

1971 July

Main events
The Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) was established under the provisions of the
Deposit Insurance Law (DIL, brought into effect in April 1971).

1986 JulyThe DIL was amended to include “financial assistance.”

1992 April

The DIC extended financial assistance (loans) for the first time to Iyo Bank in order tofacilitate its merger with the failed Toho Sogo Bank.

October

Financial assistance (in the form of grants) was provided for the first time to Sanwa Bankin order to facilitate its acquisition of the failed Toyo Shinkin Bank.

1994 December

The Tokyo Metropolitan Government announced the resolution plan of Tokyo Kyowa andAnzen Credit Cooperatives.

1995 January

Tokyo Kyodo Bank was established to take over the assets and liabilities of the Tokyo
Kyowa and Anzen Credit Cooperatives.

June

The Ministry of Finance issued a report entitled “Reorganizing the Japanese Financial
System.” (The report disclosed that the estimated outstanding of nonperforming loans[the total of loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, past due loans, and restructured loans]of the deposit-taking financial institutions at the end of March 1995 was about ¥40 trillion.)
The three ruling coalition parties (Liberal Democratic, Social Democratic, and Sakigake) set
up a joint task force that aimed at resolving the nonperforming loan problem of the jusen(housing loan companies).

July

The Tokyo Metropolitan Government ordered Cosmo Credit Cooperative to suspend its
business, except for the repayment of deposits.

AugustThe Osaka Prefectural Government ordered Kizu Credit Cooperative to suspend its business,
except for repayment of deposits.
Hyogo Bank was liquidated: its assets (except for nonperforming loans) and liabilities weretransferred to Midori Bank, which was newly founded by shareholder banks and local firms
and received grants from the DIC.

September

Daiwa Bank was discovered to have covered up the loss of nearly US$1.1 billion incurredby a rogue trader at the New York branch.

NovemberDaiwa Bank accepted the New York state government’s order to close down its operationsin the United States. (Most of its operations were assumed by Sumitomo Bank.)

December

The Cabinet decided on concrete measures to address the jusen problem.
The Financial System Research Council released its recommendations on “Measures for
Stabilization of the Financial System.”

1996 June

The Diet passed six laws promoting stability of the financial system: the Jusen Law (theLaw Concerning Special Packages for Promoting Disposal of Claims and Debts of Specified
Housing Loan Companies); the Law Concerning Special Packages for Suspending the
Prescription of Claims Owned by the Specified Jusen; the Law to Amend the Deposit
Insurance Law; the Special Law Concerning the Reorganization of Financial Institutions; theLaw to Implement Measures for Ensuring the Sound Management of Financial Institutions;and the Law to Amend the Agricultural and Fishery Cooperative Savings Insurance Law.
Special financial assistance was introduced as a temporary measure to protect all thedepositors of the failed banks until the end of March 2001.
The regulations concerning the Resolutions and Collection Bank were provided.
The Ministry of Finance decided to introduce the Prompt Corrective Action in April 1998.
The general premium rate of the deposit insurance was raised from 0.012 percent to0.048 percent (of the total balance of all deposits), and the special insurance premium(0.036 percent) was temporarily introduced.

July

The Housing Loan Administration Corporation was established.

SeptemberTokyo Kyodo Bank was restructured into the Resolution and Collection Bank.
An incorporated association, the New Financial Stabilization Fund, was established.

November

The Ministry of Finance ordered Hanwa Bank to suspend its business, except for the
repayment of deposits.
Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a deregulation package for reforming the Japanesefinancial system, the so-called Japanese “Big Bang.”

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Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

Year

Month

1997 April

Main events
A restructuring plan for Nippon Credit Bank was announced: it included (1) the purchaseof newly issued shares by its shareholder banks, (2) a swap of its subordinated debentures
held by insurance companies for shares, and (3) underwriting of preferred stocks by the
New Financial Stabilization Fund.

July

The government published a detailed plan of the Japanese “Big Bang.”

November

Sanyo Securities filed for corporate reorganization under the Corporate Reorganization
Law; a default of call loans occurred for the first time since World War II.
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failed; Yamaichi Securities announced that it was to close down
voluntarily; Tokuyo City Bank failed.

December

The DIL was revised to allow the DIC to provide financial assistance to (1) a merger that
does not involve failed financial institutions and (2) a consolidation between two or more
failed financial institutions.

1998 February

A Law to Amend the DIL was enacted to provide public funds totaling ¥17 trillion to the
DIC for the resolution of the problems of financial institutions in difficulties. The Law
Concerning Emergency Measures for Financial Stabilization was enacted; the Financial
Crisis Management Examination Board was established within the DIC. Public funds worth¥30 trillion in total were appropriated for financial system stabilization.

March

The Financial Crisis Management Examination Board approved the injection of a total of¥1.8 trillion of public funds to recapitalize 21 banks by purchasing preferred stocks andsubordinated debentures.
The Land Revaluation Law was enacted. (This temporary legislation was valid only forfiscal 1998 and 1999.)

April

The Prompt Corrective Action was implemented.
The new Bank of Japan Law and the revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law came into force.

June

Four laws implementing the Japanese “Big Bang” were approved by the Diet.
The Financial Supervisory Agency was established.

July

The Government and ruling coalition parties published “The Total Plan of Financial
Reconstruction.”

October

Enactment of the financial reconstruction legislation: the Law on Emergency Measures for
Stabilizing the Financial Function; the Financial Functioning Early Strengthening Law; theLaw to Amend the DIL; the Servicer Law; Two laws simplifying public auction procedures;the Law concerning temporary measures to facilitate the transfer of assets backed byrevolving collateral.
A special public administration scheme was introduced; the outstanding total of public funds
appropriated for the purpose of financial system stabilization was increased to ¥60 trillion.
The Financial Crisis Management Examination Board was abolished.
Long-Term Credit Bank was placed under special public administration under the terms of
the Financial Reconstruction Law.

December

Nippon Credit Bank was placed under special public administration under the terms of the
Financial Reconstruction Law.
The Financial Reconstruction Commission was established.

1999 January

The guidelines for the work of the Financial Reconstruction Commission were approved.

March

The Financial Reconstruction Commission approved the injection of public funds (about¥7.5 trillion in total) into 15 major banks to reinforce their capital positions.

September

The Financial Reconstruction Commission approved the injection of public funds(¥2.6 billion in total) into four regional banks to reinforce their capital positions.

December

The three ruling coalition parties agreed to postpone the termination of special financial
assistance until the end of March 2002. (It was originally due to cease at the end of
March 2001.)
Finance Minister Miyazawa publicly stated that the total amount of public funds
appropriated for financial system stabilization would be raised to ¥70 trillion.

Sources: Nishimura (1999); Japanese Bankers Association, Kin’yu (Finance); Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Annual Report ; Bank of Japan, Annual Report.

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discipline could not work effectively in that situation. Even a bank on the verge ofbankruptcy would not come under the pressure of market forces, such as a drastic
decline in its stock price or a downgrading of its credit worthiness, or difficulty inmeeting its funding needs. Since financial institutions were able to maintain theiroperations as far as they were managing to meet their funding needs, what was thenpredominant was something like a state of fallacious stability. Without sufficient
information, there existed no strong criticism of this situation.
This fallacious state of stability made it possible to prevent systemic crisis. At
the same time, however, it considerably weakened the momentum needed forestablishing bankruptcy procedures for institutions in trouble and for constructing
a comprehensive safety net. It was the very success of buying time that forced
the authorities to buy more time, and thus the whole process of handling thenonperforming-asset problem was prolonged.37
2. The buy time policy and the dominating view regarding economic recovery
and the development of asset prices
A natural and legitimate criticism that arises here is that the financial supervisory
authority should have organized the framework required for coping with the problem
much earlier. The reality was that up to a certain point both the financial supervisory
authority and management of financial institutions seemed to have expected theeconomy and land prices to recover before long. If that were the case, the nonperforming-asset problem would have been fixed without any special treatment. In
particular, land price was the key element that decided the volume of nonperforming
assets, since small and medium-sized enterprises and non-bank financial institutions
had heavily invested in real estate with the money borrowed from banks during the
speculative bubble years.
To be fair, it should be pointed out here that the authorities and the bankers were
not alone in expecting an early recovery in economic activity and asset prices. In fact,
their expectation was broadly shared in the early phase of asset deflation.38 The “mythof ever-rising land prices,” which had dominated the bubble economy, survived in
the sense that for a fairly long time after the bursting of the bubble it was still widelybelieved that land prices would recover once the necessary adjustment phase was over.
37. Of course, the financial assistance function of the DIC, which was introduced when the Deposit Insurance Law(DIL) was revised in July 1986, could have been implemented, and it was actually applied when the troubled
Toho Sogo Bank was merged with Iyo Bank in 1992. However, financial assistance was conditional on themerger and on the passing of a special resolution at the shareholders’ meetings of both the closing bank and theassuming bank, so a lack of flexibility restricted implementation of this function. Because of this limitation, it
could only be used as a component of the total package that was agreed by the banks that assist or rescue thefailing bank, or involved loss-sharing within the industry. In particular, the DIC’s financial assistance function
was restricted to situations in which the bridge bank was available and its assistance was limited to the payoff
cost, both of which seemed to be definitive limitations restricting the implementation of this function. The DIL
was amended in June 1996 to enable the DIC to extend financial assistance to cases that involved sums thatexceeded payoff costs; in order to finance the additional cost, the deposit insurance premium was increased. At
the same time, the framework of depositors’ protection afforded by public funds was also introduced, but only
for cases of failure of credit cooperatives. However, the depositor protection framework that dealt with failed
banks still faced limitations such as the DIC’s weak financial condition and the continuing lack of bankruptcy
procedures for banks.
38. In the preface to the White Paper on the development of the Japanese economy in the fiscal year 1991 (publishedin July 1992), it was said that the impact of bursting of the bubble economy was not so great, so the economy
would recover in the latter half of 1992 because of the restructuring of the enterprises and accommodative
economic policies.

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Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

3. Costs and benefits of the buy-time policy
When it became quite clear that the expectation of recovery in land prices was a
fallacy, the main purpose of the buy-time policy changed. Its aim was now to secure
enough time for bringing realistic bankruptcy procedures to be applied to troubled
financial institutions into law and establishing a reasonably comprehensive safety net.
In retrospect, these goals were not realized until after the collapse of some major
financial institutions had brought us to the brink of a systemic crisis.39
How should we interpret this sober fact? It is possible to argue that some broad
public consensus needed for establishing a comprehensive safety including theinjection of public funds into financial institutions would never have been attained
without a quasi-crisis such as the one that actually occurred after the collapse ofmajor financial institutions. If one inclines to this view, the conclusion is that thebenefit of buying time was rather limited.
However, it is also possible to present an alternative interpretation. The financial
supervisory authority and the BOJ, while adopting a buy-time policy, had liquidated
a number of failed financial institutions, albeit mostly relatively small ones, withoutcausing a systemic crisis. The experience they accumulated in this process helped
them considerably in containing the financial turmoil that erupted in the aftermathof the failure of major institutions to the limited proportions of a quasi-crisis, andprevented its deterioration into a real crisis.
It is obviously premature at this point to side definitely with either of these twoviews, and aver whether there was any benefit in buying time or not.
What about the cost of buying time? In a narrow sense, this can be measured as
the increase in the costs entailed in dealing with the nonperforming-asset problem. In
order to tackle this aspect, we have to explore how, for example, land prices would
have moved if the nonperforming-asset problem had been settled and the financial
intermediation function revitalized earlier.40 Such an exploration is beyond the scopeof this paper.
The cost, in a broader sense, is the negative impact of the nonperforming-asset
problem on the economy. It could hardly be possible to deny that this cost had any
significant effect, since it is quite obvious that the delay in revitalizing the financial
intermediary function hampered recovery of the economy.
However, here we are faced again with a legitimate counter-argument. How
would that cost compare with the damage a systemic crisis, the realization of which
was circumvented in the end, might have caused? We have to confess that weighing
the balance between the cost of delay in economic recovery and the cost of meltdownof the financial system is far beyond the ability of the authors of this paper, at least
for the time being.
39. Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (1997) claimed that the first turning point away from the buy-time policy was theresolution of the problems of Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen Credit Cooperatives in December 1994, which involved
the establishment of Tokyo Kyodo Bank. Supposing that this is the case, it means that it still required three more
years to realize a fundamental change in prudential policy, namely the injection of the taxpayers’ money into thebanking industry, and it was decided after collapse of the major financial institutions.
40. If an early settlement could have prevented the increase in nonperforming assets caused by worsening financial
and business conditions of the debtors, and thus have limited the continuous decline in land prices, then thatwould imply that the costs in a narrow sense incurred by the buy-time policy were quite high.

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4. The Bank of Japan and the buy-time policy
As regards the buy-time policy, the BOJ has been faced with the strong criticism thatthe bank had more information on the business conditions of financial institutions
than the financial supervisory authority and should therefore have sent cautionary
messages regarding the severity of the banks’ nonperforming-loan problem at an earlystage, even though the financial supervisory authority hesitated to do so.41
If the central bank had made public its own judgment prior to the supervisory
authority, it would have caused some temporary friction but may have contributed toan earlier establishment of the necessary framework. In fact, Governor Hayami’s
warning in October 1998 that the capital ratios of 19 major Japanese banks were as
low as the danger level actually contributed to the decision to inject public money
into the banks under the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law.42
However, this is a rather delicate matter. It is also possible that this kind of warningfrom a central bank might have aroused excessive fear in the financial markets, andcaused a panic reaction similar to that which was observed on Black Monday in October
1987, or even worse, have triggered a series of bank runs. In the aforementioned episode,Governor Hayami was taking a risk, quite legitimately, in order to urge an early capital
injection to ensure the revitalization of the financial intermediation system; but he washeavily criticized that time. Panic in the financial system has a self-fulfilling nature. Even
though warnings by the central bank are meant to accelerate the restoration of soundness of the financial system, there is always a considerable risk that it might make it
difficult to avoid systemic risk, once the message is taken inappropriately. Should
this fear materialize, the stakes are enormously high, especially if the safety net is notcomprehensive enough to deal with imminent problems.
The inaction the BOJ chose could be interpreted to mean that it did not seek fora “best outcome if successful, however with high risk,” but opted for a solution which
could achieve only a “sub-optimal outcome but with relatively low risk.”43 In otherwords, the BOJ had judged that the potential systemic-risk damage would outweighthe costs entailed by delayed economic recovery under the buy-time policy.
41. For example, see Yamawaki (1998).
42. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (morning newspaper on October 6, 1998) article quoted an article in the New YorkTimes (daily newspaper on October 5, 1998), in which it was said that Governor Hayami of the BOJ
participated in an unofficial meeting between Finance Minister Miyazawa and Treasury Secretary Rubin (Fed
Chairman Greenspan also took part in the meeting) prior to the G-7 official meeting held in Washington, D.C.,
in early October 1998, and that Governor Hayami explained that “the capital ratios of 19 major Japanese banks
were as low as the danger level.” Since this article led to a widening of the Japan premium in the Eurodollar
market and temporarily made the Japanese banks’ foreign currency funding difficult, Governor Hayami was
criticized: for instance, the chairman of the Japanese Bankers Association said, “The Governor made a imprudent
comment, even though it is true.” In response to this criticism, Governor Hayami answered in the Diet session of
October 7 that it was a misleading quotation based on a misunderstanding. He also explained that his commenton the banks’ capital accounts was misunderstood as a comment on their capital ratios. Later, in the Governor’s
regular press conference of October 15, he reflected on the bill of Financial Function Early Strengthening
Law drafted by the Liberal Democratic Party, which provided capital injection scheme of public funds, andsaid, “None of the banks is sufficiently capitalized. Hence, I wish the banks altogether would give a positive
response to the scheme and apply for the scheme given by the Government that appropriates public funds forstrengthening the banks’ capital accounts.”
43. In the meantime, the BOJ took extraordinary measures for a central bank, including the provision ofmoney involving credit risk similar to the capital supplied for the resolution of the problems of financial
institutions. These measures later resulted in the imposition of losses on the BOJ, which is a point which should
be considered in assessing the BOJ’s policy response. One possible assessment is that this was inevitable for the

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Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review

VI. Lessons
This section is a very preliminary attempt to evaluate the BOJ’s monetary andprudential policies in the aftermath of the collapse of the bubble economy, and draw
some lessons for future monetary and prudential policies.
The timing of policy reversal toward monetary easing was relatively swift,
although the magnitude of initial easing was enough to offset a standard recession,
not an extraordinary post-bubble recession. The following accommodative monetary
policy was historically unprecedented, and succeeded in avoiding the kind of
deflationary spiral that occurred in the United States in the 1930s.44 However,when we review the post-bubble period as a whole, it is also true that the processof recovery in business conditions was still far from being satisfactory. It has taken
a long time to dispose of the overhang of debt in the nonfinancial sector, which is
the other side of the same coin of the accumulation of nonperforming assets in thefinancial sector.
So what lessons can be learned? The first is that a central bank should, with great
caution, recognize the importance of various pressures which tend to amplify
ordinary business-cycle movements. And when it does recognize some significant
extraordinary pressures it should flexibly consider the need for additional action to
mitigate them. Taking account of the fact that the nonperforming-asset problem
hindered the smooth functioning of the financial intermediation system and thus
prolonged economic stagnation, an even more accommodative stance might havebeen put into effect if we had been more confident earlier about the macroeconomic
implication of this problem.
Monetary easing of this nature can be characterized as a policy designed to “buytime,” that is, to buy time until the structural policy bears fruit. In fact, when it
lowered the official discount rate to 0.5 percent in September 1995, the Policy Board
issued a statement stressing that such monetary easing would only be effective if
it were accompanied by structural policies such as deregulation. It can not beemphasized too much that monetary policy may succeed in buying time for thenecessary adjustments, but it cannot substitute for structural reform itself.
By easing monetary conditions aggressively and playing the role as lender of lastresort to support the financial system in a decisive manner, the BOJ no doubt averted
both deflation and financial panic, but at the cost of dampening the restructuring
efforts of Japanese corporations and financial institutions. The fact that it did nottake leading actions to disclose to the public the problems of the financial sector inits entirety contributed to insufficient support for legislative initiatives and budget
outlays in response to bank failures. Moreover, mitigating immediate risks reduced
incentives on the part of regulatory authority to adopt ultimate solutions. The BOJ
was faced with an enormous dilemma.
BOJ in fulfilling its mission of avoiding materialization of systemic risk, given that bankruptcy procedures to deal
with troubled institutions and a comprehensive safety net did not exist. Another claim is that the BOJ shouldhave tried to make such a warning as mentioned above before it had been forced to respond by providing its
money. This ends up with the question of how far the BOJ could commit itself to take risks when facing thepossibility of materialization of the system risk.
44. Okina (1999) and McKinnon (1999) are based on this viewpoint.

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In this regard, the second possible lesson concerns the importance of how the central bank should address such structural problems. In fact, most of the structural problems are “predetermined” for the central bank in the short run, as are nonperforming
loan and government debt problems. However, from a somewhat longer perspective, it
may be possible for a central bank to take some meaningful initiatives and to work on
the parties concerned. It seems to be conducive for the central bank to participate more
actively in the process of designing economic systems and working on the allocation ofpolicy instruments to improve the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy as a whole.45
Take prudential policy, for example. Kane (1993) points out that the basic principles to minimize the cost of buying time for regulatory authority are as follows. First,
to improve incentives for the regulatory authority, the consequences of regulatory
choice must be made transparent enough for outsiders to monitor. Second, to thisend, it is necessary to limit the responsibilities of the regulatory authority to monitoring and minimizing the systemic risk spread over the financial system as a whole.46
Two issues emerge immediately from these arguments. First, an attempt should bemade to make more efficient use of the disciplinary effect that market pressure
provides in containing the excessive risk-taking behavior of financial institutions, andto design an incentive-compatible system to complement this market discipline.47
Second, once the present exceptional state is overcome—i.e., when exceptional
measures including the full guarantee of all the depositors at the expense of
public funds become unnecessary—the public safety net should seek to minimize
the coverage as long as systemic risk can be avoided.48
An immediate issue is how to evaluate the government decision to postpone thestart of “payoff ” for one year, i.e., from April 2001 to 2002. Is that really necessary
now that a quite comprehensive safety net has been provided, and there is growing
understanding among the general public about the gravity of and nature of thenonperforming-asset problem? Since it will take some more time before the nonperforming-asset problem is fully solved, we should intensify positive discussion on
how to restore the health of financial system as early as possible.
Japan’s experience in the 1990s underlines the importance for the BOJ of participating actively in addressing structural problems, and of seeking better and more
prompt understanding of the effects of shocks, including structural ones, on the economy.
The authors hope that this paper has made some contribution in fostering such efforts.
45. For the discussion on monetary policy and structural problems, see Yamaguchi (1999) and Shirakawa (2000).
46. In Japan, as Fukao (1998) pointed out, procedures in financial accounting employ the acquisition cost method,
lagging to introduce market value information into financial reporting and leading to an insufficient disclosureof management information. In addition, cross-shareholding between corporations and banks limit the cost ofcapital, dampening incentives for managers to improve efficiency in corporate management. This led to a lack of
corporate governance mechanism through capital markets, forming one of the factors that provoked instability inthe financial system.
47. For example, if we narrow the extent of coverage of the safety net, creditors other than small-scale depositors
covered by the deposit insurance would have to share risks of bank failure, promoting incentives to monitor bankmanagement. In this context, it is very important to consider the expansion of disclosure by banks themselves
and the proper conduct of prompt corrective action.
48. Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor (1998), which comprehensively surveys the recent development of theoretical andempirical literature, points out the pros and cons of a public safety net as follows. On the one hand, the fragility
inherent in the banking system as a liquidity provider requires a public safety net such as government deposit
insurance and a central bank’s lender of last resort function. On the other hand, however, such a public safety net
has numerous costs in terms of the distortion of the asset portfolio choices of banks, lowering their efficiency.

100 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review
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Blinder, A., Central Banking in Theory and Practice, Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1998.
Cargill, T. F., M. M. Hutchison, and T. Ito, The Political Economy of Japanese Monetary Policy,
Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1997.
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Fukao, Mitsuhiro, “Japanese Financial Instability and Weakness in the Corporate Governance
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Kimura, Takeshi, and Tomoki Tanemura, “Kin’yu Seisaku Ruuru to Makurokeizai no Anteisei(Monetary Policy Rule and Macroeconomic Stability),” Kin’yu Kenkyu (Monetary andEconomic Studies), Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 19 (2), June
2000, pp. 101–159 (in Japanese).
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101Motonishi, T., and Hiroshi Yoshikawa, “Causes of the Long Stagnation of Japan during the 1990s:
Financial or Real?” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, December 13, 1999,
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102 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Comment

Comment
GEORG RICH
Swiss National Bank
Naruki Mori, Shigenori Shiratsuka, and Hiroo Taguchi submit a comprehensive andilluminating paper on the difficult and painful post-bubble adjustments in theJapanese economy. They examine the role of monetary policy and prudential
supervision after the bursting of the bubble in order to assess the performance of
the authorities in dealing with the economic problems of the 1990s. They reach two
sets of conclusions:(1) Some critics argue that the Bank of Japan was too slow in relaxing monetary
policy and therefore contributed to prolonging the economic crisis. According
to the authors of the paper, with hindsight, the critics may have a point. In the
mid-1990s, the Bank faced a complicated situation. The slump in economic
activity starting in 1991 at first looked like a normal cyclical contraction. The
policy course pursued by the Bank would have been adequate if the contraction
had indeed been normal. However, only as time wore on did it become obviousthat the recession was abnormal and thus required a more expansionary course
than the Bank would have followed in ordinary circumstances.
(2) Prudential supervisors too are criticized for their slow reaction. The authors
argue that the authorities had been aware for a long time of the precarious
state of the Japanese banking system. Even so, they were reluctant to take swift
action because the Japanese financial system lacked a safety net and adequate
bankruptcy procedures. In these circumstances, swift action might have provoked a systemic crisis. Therefore, the authorities tried to gain sufficient time
to implement the institutional changes required to deal effectively with thebanks’ problem of nonperforming loans. In this way, the authorities could
avert a systemic crisis, but at the cost of worsening the nonperforming-loan
problem. The authors are very careful in passing judgment on the supervisors’
performance. They seem to hint that their performance was not optimal.
Since I cannot claim to be an expert on Japanese monetary and supervisory
policies, I do not wish to comment on the specifics of the authors’ paper. On thewhole, I find their analysis persuasive although I would have liked to see more
explicit conclusions regarding the performance of supervisors. I only quibble about
two issues raised in the paper.
First, the authors employ a variety of indicators in order to judge whether monetary
policy was adequate in the face of the Japanese recession. What is the significance of
these indicators? Does the Bank actually monitor them? Did these indicators in the
mid-1990s convince the Bank that it faced an extraordinary situation, or were otherconsiderations relevant? It would be interesting to learn more about how the Bank
actually made policy decisions in a very difficult economic environment. Moreover,the question arises whether the indicators used by the authors could also serve as
reliable guides to monetary policy in the future.
Second, there is a troubling aspect about the authors’ analysis of prudential103policies. As I already pointed out, the authors argue that the authorities knew about
the nonperforming-loan problem at an early stage, but concealed from the public thedismal state of Japanese banks in order to buy time. But could the authorities really
withhold such information for a lengthy period of time? Our own experience wasentirely different. When a Swiss bank was in trouble, market participants usuallyfound out quickly. In these circumstances, concealing information was pointless.
Swiss authorities could not help acting quickly in order to avert disaster.
Let me conclude my comment with a point not directly related to the paper.
During the 1990s, Switzerland went through an experience very similar to that ofJapan. A significant slump in real growth in the early 1990s was followed by a long
period of stagnation, opening up the specter of deflation (Figures 1 and 2). Moreover,in both countries, a banking crisis occurred, due to a bubble in real estate prices
Figure 1 Real GDP Growth8

Percent
Japan
Switzerland

6
4
2
0
–2
–4
1985 86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

Figure 2 Consumer Price Inflation

8

Percent
Japan
Switzerland

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
–1
–2
1985 86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

104 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

97

98

99

00

Comment

that had burst at the beginning of the 1990s. In Switzerland the economy started totake off again in the winter of 1996–97, with the recovery interrupted by the Asiancrisis. While the Japanese economy also tended to stagnate, Figure 1 shows that real
growth was more volatile than in Switzerland. Japan faced a succession of positive
and negative economic shocks, emanating, respectively, from the various Japanese
fiscal packages and the Asian crisis. But contrary to the situation in Switzerland,
there is still no clear evidence of the Japanese economy having returned to asustained expansion path. How can the differences between the Japanese and Swisseconomic experiences after 1996–97 be explained? Let us take a look at monetaryand prudential policies in the two countries.
In my view, monetary policy does not account for the sluggish recovery in Japanas compared to that in Switzerland. Figure 3 points to striking similarities in the
behavior of the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank. After both central
banks had relaxed monetary policy early in the 1990s, their enthusiasm for further
loosening waned temporarily in 1994, despite a threat of deflation caused by a sharp
real appreciation of the domestic currency in both countries (Figure 4). As may beseen from Figure 3, both the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank loweredinterest rates as the economies slumped, but that decline came to a temporary
halt in 1994. With hindsight, the monetary policy pursued by the Swiss National
Bank in 1994 was clearly inappropriate. The decision against relaxing monetary
policy probably accentuated the real appreciation of the Swiss franc and delayed
to some extent the recovery of the Swiss economy.49 Nevertheless, after a further
reduction in short-term interest rates in 1995 and 1996, Swiss economic activity
picked up again in due course. In Japan, by contrast, the stagnation of the economy
Figure 3 Three-Month Rate of Interest

10

Percent
Japan (gensaki )Switzerland(interbank rate)

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1985 86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

49. The growth in the monetary base, then the Swiss National Bank’s intermediate target variable, strongly indicatedthat monetary policy was too restrictive in 1994. However, key bank officials misinterpreted the temporary surge
in real growth in 1994 (Figure 1) as a sustained recovery. Moreover, they were concerned about the effects of theintroduction of a value-added tax at the beginning of 1995, which caused inflation to increase temporarily in thatyear (Figure 2).

105

Figure 4 Real Effective Exchange Rate
Index average of 1990 = 100
160
Japan
Switzerland

150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
1985 86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

continued even though the central bank operated in a similar fashion as the Swiss
National Bank.
Prudential policies are more likely to explain the differences in Japanese and Swissexperiences than monetary policies. The nonperforming-loan problem that emerged
in Switzerland in 1991 assumed similar proportions as in Japan. According to theFederal Banking Commission, the agency in charge of Swiss bank supervision, thecumulative value of loans written off by Swiss banks after 1992, including provisions
against nonperforming loans still on their books, amounts to roughly 15 percent of
GDP. Despite an enormous nonperforming-loan problem, Switzerland did not face abanking crisis. Nor can it be argued that the nonperforming-loan problem acted
as a serious drag on the domestic economy, although many small and medium-sizedcompanies complained about banks introducing more stringent standards for assessing
credit risk. Figure 5 compares the development of bank loans in Japan and Switzerland.
As in the case of interest rates, Japanese and Swiss bank loans have moved in anamazingly parallel manner. In both countries, bank lending has not grown much since1993. Yet, despite the sluggish behavior of bank lending, the Swiss economy turned
around strongly, while the prospect of a recovery in the Japanese economy is still
somewhat uncertain. Thus, I doubt that bank lending acts as a serious impediment toan economic recovery in the two countries.
Despite the similarities in lending behavior, there were fundamental differences in
the way the authorities in the two countries reacted to the banking problems of the
1990s. Four differences are particularly worthy of note:(1) Swiss authorities deregulated the financial sector in the 1980s, long before thebanking crisis broke out. Therefore, banks had ample time to adapt to a newenvironment characterized by more vigorous competition among financial
institutions. In Japan, by contrast, the authorities faced the difficult task of
having to deregulate the financial sector at a time when many banks werealready in trouble.

106 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Comment

Figure 5 Bank Loans to Customers (Public and Private)

16

Percent
Japan
Switzerland

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
–2
1985 86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

(2) Swiss supervisors acted swiftly when serious problems with nonperforming
loans started to crop up in the course of 1991. They insisted that banks failingto meet capital requirements should be closed unless they were able to makeup for the deficiency quickly. In contrast to their Japanese counterparts, they
never considered the possibility of implementing a “buy time” policy.
(3) In their efforts to follow a tough approach to dealing with nonperforming
loans, Swiss supervisors were helped by the fact that—on the whole—domestic
banks, notably most of the big institutions, possessed ample capital andreserves. Although supervisors closed many small, and even some medium-sized
and big institutions, only few outright bank failures occurred. Most of the
problem banks were taken over by, or merged with, institutions that were stillequipped with sufficient capital. Even though Switzerland does not feature
an effective deposit-insurance system, losses by depositors were small. But
the losses that did occur received a great deal of publicity. As in Japan, the lackof an adequate safety net complicated the supervisors’ task of dealing with
nonperforming loans.
(4) Swiss supervisors also benefited from a revolution in corporate governancethat swept Switzerland in the 1990s and forced financial and nonfinancial
companies to improve their efficiency. In general, shareholders, like supervisors,favored a rapid resolution of the nonperforming-loan problem.
While I find it difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions from Japanese and Swissexperiences with nonperforming loans, it is probably safe to argue that policies ofbuying time do not help in resolving banking crises. Swift action by supervisors ispreferable as it helps to contain banking crises and, thus, to minimize the detrimental
effects on the real sectors of the economy.

107

Comment
CHARLES COLLYNSInternational Monetary FundThe paper provides an insightful and thought-provoking review of the policy
responses to the collapse of the asset price bubble.
The paper’s assessment of economic developments in Japan during the 1990s isvery much in line with our own work in the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
In particular, our empirical work supports the diagnosis that the prolonged weaknessof Japan’s economy during the 1990s reflected in substantial part the fallout from thebursting of the asset price bubble. (See, for example, Morsink and Bayoumi [2000].)
Corporations left with excessive debt and capital stock have had to go through alengthy period of adjustment that is still not complete. Moreover, a weak financial
system has not been in condition to fulfill its normal intermediation function or,
perhaps even more important, to apply appropriate market discipline on borrowers.
I would also agree with the suggestion that, in retrospect, the structure of Japan’s
economy—which looked so strong at the end of the 1980s—has not adaptedsufficiently quickly to the technological and demographic challenges emerging in
the 1990s.
With this background, the authors are right to suggest that there were limits to
how far expansionary macroeconomic policies could operate to support economic
activity. Nevertheless, there are valid questions as to whether in fact monetary policy
did do all that it could during this period, and the authors provide some interesting
evidence. I agree with the paper’s tentative conclusion that, with the advantage ofhindsight, the degree of monetary easing may have been adequate for an ordinary
cycle, but was not necessarily either quick or deep enough for the extraordinary andextended recession which took place after the collapse of the bubble.
(1) Although interest rates were cut sharply in the early 1990s, real short-term callrates were not in fact reduced significantly below historical averages until thelatter part of 1995. Moreover, real short-term rates were still positive evenduring 1997–98, when Japan suffered the deepest recession experienced byany major industrial country in the postwar period.
(2) I would draw a similar conclusion from the illustrative Taylor rule calculations
shown in Figure 29 of the paper. The Taylor rule reaction function giving
significant weight to the output gap (the upper panel of Figure 29) suggests thatshort-term rates should in fact have been cut further and faster over 1994–95,
and by an additional six percentage points from 1997 to the end of 1999.
(3) A third piece of evidence not considered in the paper comes from themonetary conditions index (MCI), which is constructed to reflect the impactof the combination of interest rates and the exchange rate on aggregate
demand. The IMF’s calculations suggest that the MCI rose rather sharply in
1994–95 as the exchange rate appreciated (Figure 1). Moreover, movements of
the MCI imply a considerable tightening of monetary conditions since theintroduction of the zero interest rate policy in February 1999.

108 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

Comment

Figure 1 Japan: Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)
Index: 1990–95 average = 100
140
130

140
130

Tighter

120

120

110

110

100

100

90

90

80

80

70

70

Easier

60

60

50

50

40

40
1990

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

Note: An increase indicates a tightening of monetary conditions. The MCI is aweighted average of changes in the real interest rate and the real effective
exchange rate.
Source: International Monetary Fund.

The difficulty of course is that from late 1995 the Bank of Japan (BOJ) only
had room to cut overnight rates by about 50 basis points before hitting the zerointerest rate floor, scope that was eventually utilized in February 1999. This raises
two issues:(1) First, did the BOJ in fact have additional instruments to provide stimulus to
the economy? This question is difficult and will be considered in more detailin other sessions later in the conference. The IMF’s view is that the BOJ does
have a variety of tools at its disposal—including extending operations up theyield curve in the government securities market, and unsterilized intervention
in the foreign exchange market. To be sure, the impact of such policies may
be quantitatively uncertain, and each has its drawbacks, but at some pointa central bank has to be ready to use all means at its disposal to avoid adeflationary situation.
(2) Second, there is also a relevant question of what should be the BOJ’s inflation
objective. The paper notes that while virtually all price indices have shown
mild declines the BOJ did in fact succeed in avoiding a deflationary spiral.
However, I would suggest that Japan’s recent experience provides strong
support for the proposition that central banks should aim at an inflation ratethat is low but definitely positive. Irrespective of the issue of whether priceindices provide an unbiased indicator of inflation, a positive inflation rate
provides room for short-term interest rates to be negative in real terms in arecession. From this perspective, while the BOJ was successful in averting a109steep deflationary spiral, I would argue that in fact macroeconomic outcomes
would have been better if monetary policy had aimed at low but positive
rates of inflation, as do other countries that have explicitly adopted inflation
targeting frameworks. This is an important lesson that could usefully beapplied now as the BOJ considers its policies looking ahead.
Finally, before turning to prudential policy, let me mention an issue raised in thepapers’ concluding remarks. The authors observe that an easy monetary policy had acost of dampening restructuring efforts of corporations and financial institutions.
Should this be an argument in setting the stance of monetary policy? In myview, monetary policy should in fact remain focused on macroeconomic outcomes,
while regulatory and structural policies should bear responsibility for ensuring anappropriate pace of restructuring.
This brings us to the second interesting and difficult issue tackled by this paper,
which relates to whether prudential policy was sufficiently forceful in requiring
financial institutions to face their weaknesses after the asset price bubble collapse.
Here, the paper identifies a trade-off between the immediate objective of avoidinga systemic crisis that could have erupted if the full extent of the banking problem
had emerged before the necessary instruments to handle resolution of problem
banks were in place and the longer-term objective of restoring a healthy banking
system. The authors make the interesting point that the authorities’ very successin preventing the full scale of the problem from coming to light at an early stage
probably delayed the political process of putting in place the needed framework forbank resolution.
The IMF’s view is that while some regulatory forbearance was probably justified
by the uncertain situation in the early 1990s, the authorities waited for too long to
act forcefully to resolve the very serious weaknesses in the banking system. The costsof prolonged forbearance should not be underestimated:(1) First, and most important, a weak banking system applied a serious dragon economic performance. As mentioned earlier, this relates to both theconstraints on financial intermediation and the fact that banks were not in aposition to play their role in corporate governance.
(2) Second, the ultimate fiscal cost of resolution has probably been raised byallowing banks to continue to increase their exposure to problem debtors. It isstriking that the sectors of the economy which continued to receive credit
during the so-called credit crunch in 1997–98 were the troubled property andconstruction sectors.
(3) Third, the prolonged period in which regulatory authorities downplayedbanking problems despite very real market concerns has undercut the credibility of bank regulators. Certainly as early as 1993, strong concerns had
already emerged among market participants about the health of the Japanesebanking system, which were echoed in the IMF’s capital markets reports at thetime (Goldstein and Folkerts-Landau [1993]). There has undoubtedly been amajor shift to tighten bank regulations and supervision since the creation ofwhat is now the Financial Services Agency, but I think it is fair to say thatcredibility has not been fully restored.

110 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001

General Discussion

Against this, the paper points out that the “buy time” policy avoided an earlysystemic meltdown and gave regulators experience in dealing with small failures,
before large failures occurred in 1997. However, I do not share the view that the
choice was truly between forbearance and a systemic crisis. Japan’s experience can becompared to that of the Nordic countries, which also went through an asset pricebubble and collapse in the late 1980s, creating a banking crisis. These countries
embraced transparency and resolved their banking problems much more quickly inthe 1990s. As a result, these countries’ economies were able to turn around much
more quickly than Japan.

References

Goldstein, Morris, and David Folkerts-Landau, International Capital Markets Part II, Systemic Issues
in International Finance, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund, August 1993.
Morsink, James, and Tamim Bayoumi, “Monetary Policy Transmission in Japan,” in Tamim Bayoumi
and Charles Collyns, eds. Post-Bubble Blues: How Japan Responded to Asset Price Collapse,
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1999.

General Discussion
Responding to the comments by Charles Collyns and Georg Rich, Shigenori
Shiratsuka argued that it is not clear how effective a quicker and larger monetaryeasing would have been in dealing with the nonperforming-loan problem in thebanking sector that remained unresolved throughout the 1990s. It is also inconceivable to him that inflation targeting could have improved Japan’s economic
performance during that decade.
However, in assessing Japanese monetary easing after the bursting of the bubble,
Guy M. Meredith maintained that, rather than phased expansion, monetaryconditions should have been eased more quickly and more aggressively. Lars E. O.
Svensson pointed out that the BOJ’s inflation forecasts should be disclosed tofacilitate evaluation of the adequacy of policy responses. Vítor Gaspar commented
that the experiences of Japan illustrated the extreme difficulties involved in measuring
the real equilibrium interest rate and potential GDP growth in real time.
William R. White found that the insufficient monetary expansion in the 1990s
resulted in an increase in the real exchange rate, which, in turn, became a source of
persistent deflationary pressure. Allan H. Meltzer stressed that it was a mistake of
the Japanese policy makers to manipulate the nominal exchange rate with the aimof curtailing current account imbalances, which stemmed from the structural
imbalance between domestic savings and investment. He voiced worries that thismistake was seen not only in the 1985–87 period, but also during the East Asiancrisis of 1997–98.
Yutaka Yamaguchi responded that although the BOJ does not directly target
foreign exchange rates, it takes measures to offset the impact of foreign exchange

111

rate fluctuations when they cause significant effects on domestic economic activities.
In this sense, the BOJ has certainly not ignored exchange rate fluctuations. Keimei
Kaizuka noted that the MOF wanted to keep the yen-U.S. dollar rate high throughthe late 1980s to the early 1990s in order to alleviate trade frictions between the
United States and Japan, and suggested that the BOJ’s monetary policy may havebeen constrained by this.
With regard to prudential policy, Thomas F. Cargill pointed out that an important factor that complicated the handling of the nonperforming-asset problem
was the belief among the general public that the government would rescue everyone
even if problems materialized. As to the role of central banks in handling structural
policy, Collyns and Cargill emphasized that there were limits to what the central
bank could accomplish and stressed that they should concentrate exclusively onmacroeconomic problems.
Commenting on Meltzer’s keynote speech, which focused attention on low
investment as the main reason for slower growth in the 1990s, Yamaguchi pointed
out that, assuming that the high levels of investment seen in Japan in the late 1980s
were not sustainable, the stock adjustments experienced in the 1990s were, from a
medium- or long-term perspective, an inevitable consequence. On Meltzer’s notionthat managers of troubled banks tend to incline toward excessive risk-taking, hemaintained that in the 1990s Japanese bank managers have been generally extremely
cautious in their risk-taking. Meltzer agreed that low investment had its origins in
the excessive investment of the 1980s, but indicated that the persistent contrast of
imbalance between domestic saving and investment in Japan and the United States
formed a background against which a yen-appreciation policy was chosen, intentionally or by chance. He argued that a depreciation of the yen would create additional
demand for exports from Japan, which would in turn expand its imports from Asian
countries and also serve for an orderly solution of the U.S. current-account deficit in
the somewhat longer run.

112 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/FEBRUARY 2001