Central Banking in a Changing World
Summary of the 2018 BOJ-IMES Conference
Organized by the Institute for Monetaryand Economic Studies of the Bank of Japanby Shigenori Shiratsuka

I. Introduction
The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES) of the Bank of Japan (BOJ)
held the 2018 BOJ-IMES Conference, entitled “Central Banking in a Changing World,”
on May 30–31, 2018, at the BOJ head oﬃce in Tokyo.1 The conference attracted about
one hundred participants from academia, central banks, and international organizations. The participants discussed central bank policies and operations in the light ofglobal structural changes in recent years.
The conference began with the opening remarks delivered by Haruhiko Kuroda,
Governor of the BOJ. Raghuram G. Rajan (University of Chicago), the former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, presented the Mayekawa Lecture. Athanasios
Orphanides (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), honorary adviser to the IMES,
gave the keynote speech. In the paper presentation sessions, four papers were
presented by Hélène Rey (London Business School), Andrew T. Levin (DartmouthCollege), Klaus Adam (University of Mannheim), and Ichiro Muto (BOJ), anddiscussed by the participants. The policy panel discussion moderated by Kazuo Ueda
(Kyoritsu Women’s University and University of Tokyo), the IMES chief councilor,
was comprised of two panelists: James Bullard (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
and David Ramsden (Bank of England).

Director-General, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan (E-mail: shigenori.shiratsuka@
boj.or.jp)..........................................................................................................................................
The conference organizers would like to express their sincere gratitude to the IMES honorary adviser, Athanasios
Orphanides, the IMES chief councilor Kazuo Ueda, and all other conference participants for thought-provoking
presentations and discussions. The views expressed throughout this summary are those of the attendants and do
not necessarily reflect those of their respective institutions. All remaining errors are the author’s responsibility.
1. See Appendix 1 for the program. See Appendix 2 for a list of participants; their aﬃliations are as of May
30–31, 2018.

MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2018
DO NOT REPRINT OR REPRODUCE WITHOUT PERMISSION

1

II. Opening Remarks
Kuroda highlighted that global structural changes in recent years influenced not only
central bank policies, but also central bank operations, and raised three important issues
for central banks.2First, Kuroda focused on the challenges in conducting monetary policy. He pointed
out that prices and wages remained sluggish despite recent substantial improvements in
the real economy. He then noted the importance of exploring the mechanism behind thephenomenon recently labeled as “missing inflation” and “missing wage inflation.” Second, he mentioned challenges to financial stability. He stated that developments in theso-called shadow banking sector, which is not suﬃciently covered by conventional supervision and regulations, and the low profitability of financial institutions, especiallyin advanced economies, posed new challenges to global financial stability. Third, hementioned the eﬀects of innovations in information and communication technology on
central bank operations. He pointed out that “FinTech” brought about drastic changes
in the payment practices in many countries, inducing some central banks to explore thepossibility of issuing digital currency. He argued that an era of major transformation
might lie ahead in central banks’ role as “bank of banks” and “issuer of banknotes.”
Kuroda then expressed his hope that this year’s conference would facilitate active
discussions from a variety of perspectives and also deepen our understanding of theissues faced by central banks.

III. The Mayekawa Lecture: Whither Bank Regulation; Current Debates and Challenges
Rajan reviewed recent development in banking sector regulation and discussed desirable features of future regulations for the financial system.3
Rajan began by explaining the rationale for regulating banks and elaborating on
theoretical background issues such as the structure of banks’ balance sheets, the negative externalities of bank failures, banking-specific aberrations, and regulatory interventions. He then reviewed micro-prudential measures implemented after the global
financial crisis (GFC) such as the heightened capital requirements, the introduction ofliquidity requirements, and the widespread use of stress tests. He also explained regulators’ incentives for pro-cyclical regulations and highlighted the diﬃculty in resisting
the temptation to deregulate banks during financial booms. As areas of ongoing controversy, he examined three specific topics: (i) the role of monetary policy in financial
stability; (ii) macro-prudential regulations; and (iii) regulatory harmonization acrossborders. He closed his lecture by emphasizing the importance of systemic regulationand the need for broad, robust, and timely regulations across the financial system.
From the floor, a number of comments on macro-prudential policy were raised.
Oldřich Dědek (Czech National Bank) commented on the diﬃculty in pursuing pricestability and financial stability simultaneously. For instance, policy rate hikes to com................................
2. For details, see Kuroda (2018).
3. For details, see Rajan (2018).

2 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2018

Central Banking in a Changing Worldbat asset price bubbles might damage the real economy. Rajan agreed that this poseda dilemma for central banks, and noted that changing the pattern of liquidity would be
more important than the size of interest rate hikes. Masahiro Kawai (University ofTokyo) added that policy coordination among a broad set of relevant authorities would
be desirable to deal with bubbles. Kosuke Aoki (University of Tokyo) asked whether
the optimal policy mix of monetary policy and macro-prudential policy depended on
the degree of financial openness. Rajan argued that certain policy actions are needed
to preserve monetary policy eﬀectiveness, considering the large impacts of external
factors, especially in a relatively small open economy with shallow financial markets.
Regarding issues other than macro-prudential policy, Nestor A. Espenilla, Jr.
(Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) asked how central banks should address the trade-oﬀ
between competition among banks and financial stability. Rajan mentioned India’s
experience of excessive bank loans to low income households as a result of banking
deregulation and argued that increased competitions should be accompanied by improved risk management as well as supervision. Kenichi Ueda (University of Tokyo)
asked if central banks should help with the cleanup of private sector debt after crises
or in the middle of crises by causing high inflation so as to reduce debt burdens inreal terms. Referring to the Great Depression in the 1930s, Rajan argued that such a
strategy would be permissible only in exceptional cases where there was a tremendous
debt overhang. Tsutomu Watanabe (University of Tokyo) expressed his concern regarding the uncertainty around the appropriate timing for regulating FinTech. Rajan
stressed the importance of having discussions before intervening so as not to hinder
technological progress.

IV. Keynote Speech: The Boundaries of Central Bank Independence; Lessons from Unconventional Times
Orphanides reviewed the recent history of the BOJ’s monetary policy since the mid1990s and discussed the practical implications for central bank independence.4
Orphanides argued that the zero lower bound (ZLB) complicates policy design
because unconventional monetary policy has more pronounced fiscal implications anddistributional eﬀects than merely adjusting interest rates. He then mentioned that at
the ZLB, eﬀective monetary policy making by an independent central bank needs (i) aclear definition of price stability, and (ii) the legitimacy for the bank to assume significant risks on its balance sheet, which may be required with large scale asset purchases.
He indicated that the BOJ’s monetary policy was restrictive in the 2000s and attributed
such policy stance to the lack of clarity on the two points [(i) and (ii)], which was
not addressed in the revised BOJ Act published in 1997. In a sense, he argued thatthe timing of the Act was unfortunate as the BOJ had to establish its reputation as anindependent central bank right at the time when the ZLB was encountered and unconventional policies became necessary. He then argued that by providing a precise
definition of price stability—a symmetric 2％ inflation goal—the “Joint Statement of
the Government and the Bank of Japan” in January 2013 facilitated “Quantitative and................................
4. For details, see Orphanides (2018).

3

Qualitative Monetary Easing.” Finally, he highlighted the potential benefits from thecoordination of monetary and fiscal policy when the central bank is independent.
From the floor, several comments on the BOJ’s experience in the 2000s were madeby former BOJ Policy Board members. Kazuo Ueda and Kiyohiko G. Nishimura(National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies) recalled their experience during theirtime at the BOJ regarding the diﬃculty of forming a consensus on the definition of pricestability. Orphanides stressed that numerical definition of price stability contributes
to anchoring inflation expectations and facilitates the transmission of monetary policy
actions. As for the BOJ’s unconventional measures, Kazuo Ueda remembered that,during his term in oﬃce, Policy Board members were reluctant to purchase long-term
government bonds, since they thought that an independent central bank should notunderwrite the fiscal deficit. Orphanides replied that the lack of institutional arrangements regarding the recapitalization of the BOJ if it were to suﬀer huge losses due
to unconventional policy measures was a valid concern for BOJ Policy Board members. He also argued that without clarity on such recapitalization, such losses might
compromise the reputation and future policy decisions of the BOJ.
Regarding issues other than Japan’s monetary policy in the past, Doddy Zulverdi(Bank Indonesia) asked whether asset purchases by central banks had potentially negative eﬀects on income inequality. Orphanides argued that, even though monetary
policy was associated with distributional issues, the central bank should focus on pricestability. Lukasz Rawdanowicz (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and Nishimura expressed concern over fiscal discipline under a low interest
rate environment and sovereign bond purchases by central banks. Orphanides replied
that, an independent central bank first needed to deliver price stability and fiscal discipline is not the central bank’s mandate. He also noted that to the extent delivering
price stability required policies that kept interest rates on government debt low, thiswould also contribute to simultaneously reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio due to longterm bond yields being lower than nominal GDP growth rates.

V. Paper Presentation Sessions
A. Global Real Rates: A Secular Approach
Rey presented empirical research on the determinants of real short-term interest rates
using long-run historical data for the U.S., U.K., Germany, and France.5 She showedthat the consumption-to-wealth ratio could be decomposed into three factors: risk freerates, risk premiums, and consumption growth. She empirically showed that mostof the movements in the consumption-to-wealth ratio were explained by the movements in future risk-free rates. She then argued that this suggested in historical data,
consumption-to-wealth ratios were associated with the global financial cycle and that
low real short-term interest rates were associated with the aftermath of important boom
bust cycles such as the Great Depression and the GFC. She concluded that global real
short-term interest rates have remained low or negative for an extended period of timesince the GFC reflecting increased savings and demand for safe assets.
................................
5. For details, see Gourinchas and Rey (2018).

4 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2018

Central Banking in a Changing WorldAs the discussant, Marianne Nessén (Sveriges Riksbank) began by praising thepaper for the analysis of the economic background of low real short-term interest rates,
which attracted great interest among central bankers. She argued that regarding thefinancial cycle as the primary contributor to the observed dynamics may be problematicdue to unexpected correlations among components. She then suggested carrying out
sensitivity analyses by varying the parameter values and observation periods. She also
remarked that the predicted prolonged low risk-free rates implied that unconventionalmonetary policy measures would likely be kept in the central bank toolkit.
From the floor, in line with Nessén’s comments, Orphanides expressed his concern that the asset purchase programs of central banks may have a large eﬀect on risk
premiums and may have influenced the results. Rey answered that such programs
were unlikely to aﬀect the time series evidence she was considering (since the beginning of the 20th century). Kazuhiko Ohashi (Hitotsubashi University) pointed outthat the relationship among the components might be time-varying. Rey agreed thatthe importance of some of the economic mechanisms may have changed over time
but also argued that her analysis built on an accounting identity that is always verified
and let the data speak as much as possible. She also noted that the data have seemed
pretty clear on the importance of the link between consumption-to-wealth ratio and real
short-term interest rates. Adam and Óscar Arce (Banco de España) suggested taking
out private and public debt instruments from the net wealth measure. Rey agreed that
decomposition of the wealth information could be interesting and noted that her ongoing research dealt with housing wealth. Kenichi Ueda commented that human wealthwould be estimated in a more precise manner by considering levels of education andlife expectancy.
B. Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy
Levin investigated the advantages of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) and provided an overview of what kind of future currency system would be desirable.6 He began by arguing that an account-based CBDC enabled households and firms to directly
access accounts at a central bank, thereby serving as a practically costless medium of
exchange. He then pointed out that an interest-bearing CBDC could provide a secure
store of value with a rate of return in line with other risk-free assets. He also argued
that eliminating the eﬀective lower bound (ELB) of nominal interest rates enabled central banks to pursue and achieve true price stability, i.e., zero inflation. Finally, heencouraged central banks to actively engage in discussions about CBDCs.
As the discussant, Hiroshi Fujiki (Chuo University), praised the theoretical analysis in the paper, and then, from a practical point of view, raised two issues that could
make the introduction of CBDCs in Japan diﬃcult. He argued that, for the sake ofanonymity, the Japanese holds huge amounts of cash “under their mattress” rather thandepositing it at a bank. He also stressed that if the BOJ pursued another round ofnegative interest rate policy after the introduction of CBDCs, it would face diﬃcultyin gaining public support for the policy. Levin agreed with the importance of such
communication and added that, in introduction of CBDCs, central banks needed to................................
6. For details, see Bordo and Levin (2017).

5

carefully consider the impact of changes in the currency system on vulnerable people,
referring to the case of Sweden.
From the floor, in line with Fujiki’s comments, John McDermott (Reserve Bankof New Zealand) and Ramsden expressed their view that people regarded paper currencies as a robust and trusted technology and that paper currencies might not become
obsolete as a result of the introduction of CBDCs. Bullard explained the Federal
Reserve’s ongoing initiative on future payment systems and mentioned the Federal Reserve’s white papers on the implications of CBDC for monetary policy. Nessén andOhashi observed that central banks might lose control over money due to international
currency substitution, especially if central banks imposed a negative interest rate on
their CBDCs. Yin Sze Liew (Monetary Authority of Singapore) pointed out the possibility that people might prefer to use privately issued digital currencies rather than
CBDCs. Focusing on the aspect of financial stability, Andréa M. Maechler (Swiss
National Bank) remarked that the implementation of an account-based CBDC might
drastically change the business model of commercial banks.
C. Optimal Trend Inflation
Adam presented his theoretical and empirical analysis on the optimal trend inflation
rate by incorporating firm heterogeneity and systematic firm-level productivity trends
in a sticky price model.7 He showed that, when these two features were incorporated,the optimal trend inflation rate became diﬀerent from zero. Based on these findings,
he argued that the predictions of standard sticky price models with homogeneous firms
were not robust. Next, applying the heterogeneous firm model to U.S. Census Bureau
establishment-level data on the number of employees as (the extensive margin of) labor
input, he showed that estimated optimal trend inflation path for the U.S. economy stoodat 1.5 percent in 1977 but subsequently declined to around 1.0 percent in 2015. Finally,
he stressed the robustness of the analysis by showing the estimates of the optimal trend
inflation path under alternative settings.
As the discussant, Jan Marc Berk (De Nederlandsche Bank) first praised the paperfor bridging the gap between the previous literature suggesting zero or negative optimal
trend inflation rates and current central bank practice pursuing significantly positive inflation targets. He then made three comments on the calibration of the model to data.
First, he suggested extending the model by including the extensive margin of labor input in order to make the model fully consistent with the data employed. Second, heencouraged the authors to confirm that the estimation results were not sensitive to theunit of analysis, i.e., changing data from establish-level to firm-level. Third, he recommended employing data on the price-change distribution of products as an alternative.
Adam replied that even if the model were extended in the suggested manner, the main
results of the paper would remain intact.
Several questions regarding various topics were raised from the floor. Rey mentioned that the data employed in the analysis might reflect heterogeneities not only in
productivity but also in monopoly power. Adam replied that monopoly power did notaﬀect the results on the optimal trend inflation rate when an optimal output subsidy................................
7. For details, see Adam and Weber (2018).

6 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2018

Central Banking in a Changing World

was considered, although it might distort the measurement of firm-level productivity trends. Marc P. Giannoni (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas) and Etsuro Shioji(Hitotsubashi University) asked how relaxing the assumption on equal birth and death
rates would aﬀect the main results of the paper by pointing out the observations thatthe birth and death rates of firms were not equal and the diﬀerence between them fluctuated cyclically. Adam replied that relaxing the assumption would be non-trivial andsacrifice the tractability of the model. Tsutomu Watanabe commented that this model
could be applied to product-turnover, making more consistent with price-index theory
relevant to the inflation rate. Adam agreed with the comment and mentioned the preliminary results of his ongoing research about the optimal trend inflation rate for the
U.K. employing item-level consumer price data.
D. Missing Wage Inflation? Estimating the Natural Rate of Unemployment in a
Nonlinear DSGE Model
Muto discussed whether downward wage rigidity (DWR) was the source of the recent
missing wage inflation in major advanced economies, focusing on Japan, the euro area,
the U.K., and the U.S.8 He stressed that the novelty of the study was joint estimation of
the natural rate of unemployment and the degree of DWR within a nonlinear dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model. He then showed theoretically that the presenceof DWR produced a nonlinear wage Phillips curve, thus making wage inflation lessresponsive to the unemployment gap at lower rates of wage inflation. He also presented
empirical results based on Markov chain Monte Carlo methods with a particle filter,showing that the degree of DWR was large in Japan, the euro area, and the U.K., but
not in the U.S. He concluded that DWR played an important role in the behind of thewidely observed missing wage inflation after GFC at least in Japan, the euro area, andthe U.K.
As the discussant, Arce first pointed out that the precautionary motive, which gave
rise to upward wage rigidity, might not be fully captured in the analysis. He also suggested taking into account labor market duality, i.e., the fact that workers are divided
into regular and non-regular workers. He finally pointed out that estimated unemployment gaps might be sensitive to steady-state wage inflation. As his rejoinder, Muto
admitted that their second order approximation approach did not fully quantify the precautionary motive, although it is incorporated in their theoretical model. He noted that
DWR might be much stronger than estimated in the paper, if the analysis focused solely
on regular workers. He highlighted that since changes in a steady-state level of wage
inflation would not necessarily shift the wage adjustment cost function in a parallelmanner, the estimated unemployment gaps would not be greatly aﬀected.
From the floor, Levin noted that he agreed with the view that labor supply shocks
played an important role in the U.S. and suggested the authors endogenizing labor force
participation as in Erceg and Levin (2014). In addition, he argued that Japan may haveexperienced a structural change in the labor market in the late 1990s, citing Kuroda
and Yamamoto (2014). Fujiki pointed out that the results may be driven by the data
for the 1970s. Mototsugu Shintani (University of Tokyo), one of the coauthors of................................
8. For details, see Iwasaki, Muto, and Shintani (2018).

7

the paper, replied that it was necessary to include that period in order to properly estimate DWR. Giannoni expressed his concern about the apparent non-stationarity in thedata of unemployment gap for Japan and suggested extending the model to introduce
time-varying trend wage inflation. Yuzo Honda (Osaka Gakuin University) and Kenji
Wada (Keio University) suggested to explicitly incorporate unconventional monetary
policy in the model.

VI. The Policy Panel Discussion
In the policy panel discussion moderated by Kazuo Ueda, Bullard and Ramsden expressed their views on two issues: the causes and consequences of “missing inflation”
and central banking under the FinTech revolution.
A. The Causes and Consequences of “Missing Inflation”
Bullard first theoretically showed that eﬀective monetary policy making under the inflation targeting era from the early 1990s had led to a flattening of the empirical Phillips
curves in advanced economies. He added that the recent experience of unconventional
policies in advanced economies showed that policymakers had put more weight on inflation deviations in the conduct of monetary policy than before. He concluded his
remarks by pointing out that the estimated slope for empirical Phillips curve would
unlikely provide policy makers in advanced economies with a reliable indicator formonetary policy.
Ramsden discussed the causes and consequences of missing wage inflation in the
U.K. He pointed out four possible explanations: (i) weak productivity growth, (ii) the
decline in the structural unemployment rate, (iii) lags between unemployment falling
and wage growth picking up, and (iv) weakened workers’ bargaining power due totechnological developments. He then highlighted that a policymaker should consider
the consequences of missing wage inflation for future developments in the inflation
rate. He also added that the stance of monetary policy would be judged based on notjust labor market indicators, such as wage growth and unit labor costs, but a wider
range of indicators on demand and supply conditions.
Kazuo Ueda began general discussion by asking the two panelists regarding theimplications of their analyses on Japanese long lasting deflation. Bullard replied thatthe model presented in his remarks had two steady-state equilibria: one with a highinflation rate and the other with a low inflation rate. He then argued that the Japanese
economy might be stuck in a self-fulfilling low inflation equilibrium. Ramsden highlighted that it was important for policymakers to look at a range of structural and empirical models for the key relationships in the economy, given that those models inevitably had strengths and shortcomings. He thus argued that policymakers’ judgment
also played an important role in making policy decisions.
After the replies from the panelists, the discussion was opened to conference participants. Regarding Bullard’s presentation, Masazumi Wakatabe (Bank of Japan) asked
what kind of information policymakers should rely on other than the empirical Phillips
curve. Bullard replied that market-based inflation expectation measures would be a

8 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2018

Central Banking in a Changing World

good candidate, since they reflected market participants’ judgments on a daily basis.
He added that policymakers could use inflation expectation measures as a way to obtain
feedback for monetary policy.
Regarding Ramsden’s presentation, Rey posed two questions: (i) impact of recent volatile movements in the exchange rate on the U.K. inflation, and (ii) eﬀect oflarge fluctuations in immigrants to the U.K. on slack in the labor market. With regard
to the exchange rate, Ramsden replied that even when the fall of the pound exerted
upward pressure on the headline inflation rate, measures of domestically-generated inflation and inflation expectations remained well-anchored. On the immigration issue,
Ramsden argued that the net inflow of immigrants from the EU to the U.K. after Brexit
would depend on the end-state agreement. He also commented that the complexities
related to Brexit made it diﬃcult for policymakers to chart the course of monetary
policy.
Honda and Pym Manopimoke (Bank of Thailand) asked about the eﬀects of globalization, in particular the emergence of Asian economies, on inflation and the conductof monetary policy. Bullard replied that even if the model were extended to a multicountry setting, the presented result would remain unchanged regarding monetary policy as a dominant factor in determining the slope of empirical Phillips curve. Ramsden
commented that globalization in terms of immigration had little impact on wage bargaining in the U.K. labor market except that for unskilled workers.
B. Central Banking under the FinTech Revolution
Ramsden explained the Bank of England’s approach to the FinTech revolution by using one word, “open,” as in “open to changes,” “open minded,” and “open door policies.” He then introduced ongoing research on CBDCs as an example reflecting theapproach. Moreover, he highlighted that the FinTech revolution had impacted on thefinancial landscape in the U.K. in many ways and at diﬀerent speeds, and hence financial authorities should not respond to the FinTech revolution in a uniform manner. He
added the need to think about broader consumer and societal preferences, i.e., trends
toward greater individual autonomy, which might raise questions about the role of thecentral bank.
Bullard argued that the recent cryptocurrency wave entailed the risk of changing a
locally uniform currency system in individual countries toward something that is more
like a non-uniform international currency system with various drawbacks, including excessive volatility. He also reviewed the history of “private money” and pointed out that
it is not surprising that many private currencies are issued. He concluded that the valueof cryptocurrencies would inevitably be volatile without credible promises regarding
limits to future issuance, resulting in the declined eﬃciency in market transactions.
Following the presentations from the panelists, the discussion was opened to conference participants. Regarding Bullard’s presentation, Levin commented that CBDCs
with instantaneous real-time settlement could greatly facilitate global trade and capital movements, thus encouraging central bankers to cooperate and collaborate on theissue. Bullard agreed with Levin on the point that CBDCs might make a positive contribution to the global economy through enhancing payment and settlement eﬃciency.
Maechler posed a question for the two panelists, asking how people could trust in

9

cryptocurrencies. Bullard highlighted the importance of credible limits on the futureissuance of cryptocurrencies for people to trust them. He added that people’s trust in
currencies historically depended on the credibility of central banks backing the currencies. Ramsden replied that robust technology would be key for the development oftrust in cryptocurrencies, in a similar manner as in the case of paper currencies.

10 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2018

Central Banking in a Changing World

References
Adam, Klaus, and Henning Weber, “Optimal Trend Inflation,” IMES Discussion Paper No. 2018-E-7,
Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2018.
Bordo, Michael D., and Andrew T. Levin, “Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary
Policy,” NBER Working Paper No. 23711, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
Erceg, Christopher J., and Andrew T. Levin, “Labor Force Participation and Monetary Policy in the
Wake of the Great Recession,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 46(S2), 2014, pp. 3–49.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Hélène Rey, “Global Real Rates: A Secular Approach,” paper presented at the 2018 BOJ-IMES Conference on “Central Banking in a Changing World” heldby the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2018.
Iwasaki, Yuto, Ichiro Muto, and Mototsugu Shintani, “Missing Wage Inflation? Estimating the Natural Rate of Unemployment in a Nonlinear DSGE Model,” IMES Discussion Paper No. 2018E-8, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2018.
Kuroda, Haruhiko, “Opening Remarks,” Monetary and Economic Studies, 36, Institute for Monetaryand Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2018, pp. 17–20 (this issue).
Kuroda, Sachiko, and Isamu Yamamoto, “Is Downward Wage Flexibility the Primary Factor ofJapan’s Prolonged Deflation?” Asian Economic Policy Review, 9(1), 2014, pp. 143–158.
Orphanides, Athanasios, “The Boundaries of Central Bank Independence: Lessons from Unconventional Times,” Monetary and Economic Studies, 36, Institute for Monetary and Economic
Studies, Bank of Japan, 2018, pp. 35–56 (this issue).
Rajan, Raghuram G., “The Mayekawa Lecture: Whither Bank Regulation; Current Debates and Challenges,” Monetary and Economic Studies, 36, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies,Bank of Japan, 2018, pp. 21–34 (this issue).

11

APPENDIX 1: PROGRAM
Wednesday, May 30, 2018
Morning
Opening Session
Speaker:
Mayekawa Lecture
Chairperson:
Lecturer:Haruhiko Kuroda, Bank of Japan

Masazumi Wakatabe, Bank of Japan
Raghuram G. Rajan, University of Chicago

Session 1: Global Real Rates: A Secular Approach
Chairperson:
Nestor A. Espenilla, Jr., Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Paper Presenter:
Hélène Rey, London Business School
Discussant:Marianne Nessén, Sveriges Riksbank
Afternoon
Keynote Speech
Chairperson:
Speaker:

Shigenori Shiratsuka, Bank of Japan
Athanasios Orphanides, Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology

Session 2: Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy
Chairperson:
John McDermott, Reserve Bank of New ZealandPaper Presenter:
Andrew T. Levin, Dartmouth College
Discussant:Hiroshi Fujiki, Chuo University
Session 3: Optimal Trend Inflation
Chairperson:
Andréa M. Maechler, Swiss National Bank
Paper Presenter:
Klaus Adam, University of Mannheim
Discussant:Jan Marc Berk, De Nederlandsche Bank

12 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2018

Central Banking in a Changing World

Thursday, May 31, 2018
Morning
Session 4: Missing Wage Inflation? Estimating the Natural Rate ofUnemployment in a Nonlinear DSGE Model
Chairperson:
Oldřich Dědek, Czech National Bank
Paper Presenter:
Ichiro Muto, Bank of Japan
Discussant:Óscar Arce, Banco de España
Policy Panel Discussion
Moderator:
Kazuo Ueda, Kyoritsu Women’s University and Universityof Tokyo
Panelists:
James Bullard, Federal Reserve Bank of St. LouisDavid Ramsden, Bank of England

13

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Klaus Adam
Moayad H. Al Rasasi
Masayoshi Amamiya
Kosuke AokiÓscar Arce
Ivailo I. Arsov
Veronica B. Bayangos
Jan Marc Berk
Odd Per Brekk
James Bullard
Oldřich Dědek
Nestor A. Espenilla, Jr.
Hiroshi Fujiki
Shin-ichi Fukuda
Yukitoshi Funo
Marc P. Giannoni
Yutaka Harada
Hisashi Harui
Hideo Hayakawa
Yuzo Honda
Nobuo Inaba
Yuto Iwasaki
Goushi Kataoka
Takeshi Kato
Masahiro Kawai
Yukinobu Kitamura
Keiichiro Kobayashi
Hirohide Koguchi
Haruhiko Kuroda
Shigehiro Kuwabara
Hwanseok Lee
Andrew T. Levin
Yin Sze Liew
Per Espen Lilleås
Andrey S. Lipin
Andréa M. Maechler
Eiji Maeda
Elizabeth Mahoney
Pym Manopimoke

University of Mannheim
Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority
Bank of Japan
University of Tokyo
Banco de España
Reserve Bank of Australia
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
De Nederlandsche BankInternational Monetary FundFederal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Czech National Bank
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Chuo University
University of Tokyo
Bank of Japan
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Bank of Japan
Japan Society of Monetary Economics
Fujitsu Research Institute
Osaka Gakuin University
Ricoh Company, Ltd.
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
University of Tokyo
Hitotsubashi University
Keio University
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of JapanThe Bank of Korea
Dartmouth College
Monetary Authority of Singapore
Norges Bank
Bank of Russia
Swiss National Bank
Bank of Japan
Federal Reserve Bank of New YorkBank of Thailand

14 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2018

Central Banking in a Changing World

Takako Masai
John McDermott
Katsuyuki Meguro
Ryuzo Miyao
Kazuo Momma
Ichiro Muto
Shinobu Nakagawa
Hiroshi Nakaso
Yoshinori Nakata
Ko Nakayama
Marianne Nessén
Viet-Linh Nguyen
Kiyohiko G. Nishimura
Kazuhiko Ohashi
Yoji Onozawa
Athanasios Orphanides
Raghuram G. Rajan
David Ramsden
Lukasz Rawdanowicz
Hélène Rey
Jessica Roldán Peña
Tetsuya Sakamoto
Makoto Sakurai
Toshitaka Sekine
Seiichi Shimizu
Mototsugu Shintani
Etsuro Shioji
Shigenori Shiratsuka
Wee Haw Sim
Tiziana Sodano
Hitoshi Suzuki
Wataru Takahashi
Yosuke Takeda
Taro Teruuchi
Tomohiro Tsuruga
Shinichi Uchida
Kazuo Ueda

Bank of Japan
Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance
University of Tokyo
Mizuho Research Institute Ltd．
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Sveriges Riksbank
Banque de France
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
and University of Tokyo
Hitotsubashi University
Bank of Japan
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
University of Chicago
Bank of England
Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment
London Business School
Banco de México
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
University of Tokyo
Hitotsubashi University
Bank of Japan
Bank Negara Malaysia
Banca d’Italia
Bank of Japan
Osaka University of Economics
Sophia University
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Kyoritsu Women’s University and Universityof Tokyo15

Kenichi Ueda
Yoichi Ueno
Jun UnoKenji Wada
Masazumi Wakatabe
Kenichiro Watanabe
Toshiaki Watanabe
Tsutomu Watanabe
Luke Woodward
Hirohide Yamaguchi
Hiromi Yamaoka
Noriyuki Yanagawa
Haichun Ye
Nobuyasu Yoshioka
Doddy Zulverdi

University of Tokyo
Bank of Japan
Waseda University
Keio University
Bank of Japan
Nihon University
Hitotsubashi University
University of Tokyo
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Nikko Research Center, Inc.
Bank of Japan
University of Tokyo
Hong Kong Monetary Authority
Bank of Japan
Bank Indonesia

16 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2018