Strategic Annual Report
2020
The Indo-Pacific of Today and Tomorrow:
Transformation of the Strategic Landscapeand International ResponseStrategic Annual Report 2020
First published February 2021 by JIIA
Printed in Japan©2021 Japan Institute of International Affairs

Japan Institute of International Affairs
Tel:+81-3-3503-7261 Fax:+81-3-3503-7292
3rd Floor, Toranomon Mitsui Building
3-8-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, TokyoJapan 100-0013
https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/Message from the President���������������������� 01
1. Overview
The Indo-Pacific of Today and Tomorrow:
Transformation of the Strategic Landscape and International Response��� 02
2. Intensifying US-China Confrontation and Destabilizationof the International Order���������������������� 10
3. Intensifying US-China Military Confrontation and
Its Impact on International Arms Control���������������� 21
4. The Novel Coronavirus and the New Normal of Battles over Techno-hegemony 32
5. Fallout of the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic and the Crisis of Multilateralism� 41
6. Europe’s Shift Towards Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Future Course������� 49
7. Russia in 2020 amid the Coronavirus Pandemic������������� 57
8. The Middle East: Coronavirus Pandemic, US Withdrawal,
Normalization of Diplomatic Relations, and Rivalry for Regional Supremacy� 64
9. Impact of the US-China confrontation on Japan and Northeast Asia����� 70
10. Simultaneous Development of Confrontation andCooperation in the Indo-Pacific ������������������� 76
11. JIIA Executive Officers, Experts, Directors and Councilors �������� 84
12. Leaders of the Ongoing Research Projects /Summaries of Research Projects and Outcomes ������������� 88
13. Research Reports�������������������������� 90
14. JIIA Strategic Commnets ���������������������� 91

Message from the President

In 2019, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of its
foundation, the Japan Institute of International Affairs

Kenichiro Sasae
President, JIIA

(JIIA) published its first Strategic Annual Report and held
the 1st Tokyo Global Dialogue. These activities formed part of our concerted effort
to effectively communicate the results of research activities conducted at JIIA in both
Japanese and English, the importance of which I have emphasized since becoming
president, and they have received high praise from various quarters.
As a result, JIIA has decided to regularly issue the Strategic Annual Report and holdthe Tokyo Global Dialogue, under a strategic theme worthy of particular attention
each year, thereby widely disseminating its analyses of regional situations andperspectives on the future reflecting the results of its research activities in various study
groups. This Strategic Annual Report 2020, under the theme “The Indo-Pacific ofToday and Tomorrow: Transformation of the Strategic Landscape and International
Response,” analyzes the international situation in 2020 by thematic area and region.
The analysis focuses on the US-China confrontation and strategic competition that has
intensified amid the global coronavirus pandemic, and on the Indo-Pacific region thatis tranforming into divided and contested oceans due to this confrontation. The reportthen briefly describes future prospects as well as the actions and roles expected of Japanin this context.
Recently, JIIA has been enhancing timely dissemination of its research results in both
Japanese and English by issuing “Strategic Comments” and “Research Reports”
in addition to its series of study group reports. Interested readers may refer to the
documents listed at the end of this report with their URLs.
I hope you will find this report useful for enhancing your understanding of theinternational issues.
01Strategic Annual Report 2020
Overview The Indo-Pacific of Today and Tomorrow: Transformation of the Strategic Landscape and International Response

Overview
The Indo-Pacific of Today and Tomorrow: Transformation of
the Strategic Landscape and International Response
The year 2020 was characterized by the intensification of US-China confrontationand strategic competition, which had been pointed out in the Strategic Annual Report
2019, in all areas from military and security affairs as well as dominance in advanced
technologies and supply chains to narratives on coronavirus responses. Amid thisconfrontation, the rules-based international order faced even more severe challenges;
the multilateral framework established after World War II with the United Nations at
its core lost its US leadership and fell into serious dysfunction.
While the international community is struggling to cope with the rapidly expanding
outbreak of the novel coronavirus, China has been moving to expand its influence
through increasingly authoritarian and assertive domestic and international policies
on the rule of law and territorial issues, as well as through economic initiatives suchas the existing “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) and its responses to the pandemic.
The confrontation with the United States is becoming more and more pronounced,
and the Indo-Pacific region is turning itself into divided and contested oceans. In thistransforming strategic environment, expressions of support for the vision of a rulesbased “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) that Japan has been promoting for the past
several years, or announcements of similar visions have followed one after the other.
The year 2020 also saw significant strengthening of the cooperative framework amongfour countries – Japan, the United States, Australia, and India (QUAD) – together withthe enhancement of bilateral cooperation between countries in this group. At the sametime, progress was also made in a regional cooperation framework that includes China
with the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (RCEP).
The Strategic Annual Report 2020 looks back at major international developments
since last year’s Report through the end of 2020, focusing on the transformation of thestrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region and the response of the international
community.

02

Intensified US-China Confrontation and Strategic Competition and Their Impact
The international security system, which was built upon the US’s overwhelming
military power following World War II and which became a uni-polar sytem centeredaround the United States after the end of the Cold War, has been facing an immensetransformation of the strategic environment in the past several years, particularlyin the Indo-Pacific region. This is due to China’s rapid economic, military andtechnological development, accompanied by China’s domestic and foreign policies
that have become increasingly authoritarian and assertive, as well as its economic
assistance through such means as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) and the AsianInfrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The trade dispute between the United States
and China, which had attracted world attention in 2018 and 2019, calmed down
somewhat by the beginning of 2020. However, at around the same time, a newcononavirus that first emerged in China rapidly spread all over the world, causing
a major outbreak that hit the United States hard. Against this backdrop, and withthe presidential election in the US, the US-China confrontation intensified in 2020,
covering a whole range of areas from responses to the coronavirus pandemic andrelated policies on international organizations, military and security affairs, advanced
technology, human rights issues such as Hong Kong and the Uyghurs, to Taiwan and
the South China Sea. In its criticism of China, the United States focused particularlyon the communist regime.
China’s military power has been growing exponentially in parallel with its economic
growth, while lacking transparency. In recent years, China has been particularly
strengthening its A2/AD capabilities through enhanced missile, maritime and air force
capabilities, and developing its capabilities in new areas such as space and cyberspace.
China’s moves to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea and the South
China Sea are also becoming more and more apparent. Faced with this, the UnitedStates articulated a policy of attaching greater importance to this region, including theestablishment of the “US Indo-Pacific Command” in 2018. In 2020, amid concernsthat the US Navy’s deployment capability in the Indo-Pacific might be temporarily
weakened due to the coronavirus pandemic, China continued to expand its military
power in the Western Pacific and conduct active military operations, including putting
increased pressure on Taiwan. In response, the United States made clear its policy ofconfronting China by conducting “freedom of navigation” operations in the South03

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Overview The Indo-Pacific of Today and Tomorrow: Transformation of the Strategic Landscape and International Response

China Sea and other areas, undertaking military activities in and around Taiwan,
including the passage of Aegis destroyers through the Taiwan Strait, and strengthening
high-level relations with Taiwan. Even among moderate intellectuals in the UnitedStates, there were calls to revise the existing “strategic ambiguity” and clarify the
US position through a revision of the Taiwan Relations Act. In the areas of nuclear
disarmament and arms control, the transformation of the strategic landscape in the
Indo-Pacific region and the intensification of the US-China great power competition,
which extends to military matters as well, has led the United States to demand China’s
participation in the US-Russia framework, while such bilateral arms control talks havestalled. In these circumstances, and with the expected entry into force of the Treaty
on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in early 2021, the situation surrounding
nuclear disarmament is becoming increasingly difficult.
The coronavirus pandemic accelerated moves to review international interdependence
from the perspective of power politics. Not only was the vulnerability of electronics
that form the core of the digital economy and defense infrastructure recognized, butthere was also a growing sense of alarm about the use of international supply chainsrelying on asymmetric interdependence for diplomatic or political purposes. Concerns
about the use of surveillance technology by the Chinese government also increased.
Against this backdrop, moves by the US to exclude China from supply chains andR&D in various fields of advanced technologies such as digital and communications
as well as China’s countermeasures thereto both intensified throughout 2020.
In 2020, Japan and China initially sought to improve their relations, but thiseffort stalled. Japan worked to review its security strategy, but the discussions on
strengthening its self-defense capabilities including “missile elimination” capabilities
did not make much progress. Japan also worked to respond to the US policy on
China regarding advanced technologies and to reduce its supply chains’ excessive
dependence on China. With regard to the Korean Peninsula, US-DPRK negotiations
stagnated after the summit meeting in Hanoi in February 2019, and there was no
positive progress in US-DPRK, North-South and Japan-ROK relations in 2020.

04

Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic and Changes in the International
Community’s Perception of China
The coronavirus pandemic has had profound and widespread socioeconomic impacts
worldwide. As a result of restrictive measures to contain the spread of infection, theworld economy was simultaneously frozen in terms of both supply and demand in
2020, leading to an unprecedented economic crisis. The scale of the economic crisis
surpassed that of the global financial crisis following the Lehman shock of 2008
and is comparable to the Great Depression in the 1930s. Amid this crisis, China,
which had been slow in its initial responses to the coronavirus outbreak, succeeded incontaining the spread of infection much more rapidly than Western countries throughdraconian measures to restrict the movement of people. China will be the only majorcountry to record positive economic growth in 2020. It is conceivable that China, by
quickly controling the disease and restoring its positive economic growth, will leadthe recovery of the world economy following the pandemic, making the world evenmore dependent on the Chinese economy. On the other hand, contradictions in its
political and social systems may pose risks to economic growth in China.
Confident of the success of its governance model, China has sought to exert influenceon other countries through “mask diplomacy”—assistance through the provision ofmasks and medical equipment—and “vaccine diplomacy”—provision of domesticallydeveloped vaccines. At the same time, it has been also employing “wolf warrior
diplomacy”, severely criticizing countries like Australia for their critical attitude toward
China and taking tough measures against them. Such belligerent policies on China’s
part intensified friction with the United States and Europe, and their views on China
rapidly deteriorated, a decline further hastened by the implementation of the National
Security Law in Hong Kong and other developments. However, in the deliberations
at the UN Commission on Human Rights in June, 27 countries—mainly developed
countries such as Japan and those in Europe—opposed the Hong Kong National
Security Law, while 53 countries—largely developing countries—voted to support it.
This revealed that China’s influence has spread widely among developing countries
through its economic assistance via “mask and vaccine diplomacy” regarding thecoronavirus and the existing “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). Thus, the developmentof the international situation in 2020, including coronavirus responses, intensified the“battle of narratives” over values between China and democratic countries.
05

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Overview The Indo-Pacific of Today and Tomorrow: Transformation of the Strategic Landscape and International Response

Crisis of Multilateralism
Following the establishment of the Trump administration in 2017, the United Statesproceeded to withdraw from multilateral agreements and international organizations,
stepping up its anti-multilateralist moves after 2019. The WTO’s dispute settlement
mechanism has been dysfunctional since the end of 2019 due to US opposition, andthe organization has been without a Director-General since the summer of 2020. The
US suspended its funding to the WHO in April 2020, complaining about its responseto the spread of coronavirus infections, and announced its withdrawal in July. The US
and Russia were also absent from the COVAX Facility, an international frameworkfor vaccine supply led by the WHO, instead acting on their own and cooperating
bilaterally. In the United Nations, the United States and China clashed over whether
or not the Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in conflict zones should
mention the WHO, delaying its adoption until July. Furthermore, the US withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement, of which formal notification had been given in Novemberof the previous year, took effect in November 2020. These developments revealed theabsence of US leadership on the international stage and the serious dysfuctioning ofinternational organizations due to the US-China confrontation in the year marking
the 75th anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations and amid the coronavirus
pandemic, a grave situation that requires a global response.

The Indo-Pacific of Today
In recent years, China has been pursuing an assertive policy of claiming territorial
rights in the South China Sea, increasing military activities and constructing artificial
islands, thereby provoking opposition from neighbors and other countries concerned.
In 2020, China repeatedly conducted military exercises in the South China Sea,
indicating it had no intention of refraining from active military movements, while
neighboring countries struggled in their responses to the coronavirus. In June 2020,
Chinese and Indian troops clashed in the Himalayan highlands, resulting in the first
confirmed deaths in a border dispute between the two countries since 1975. Against
the backdrop of these developments, the momentum for promoting the “Free andOpen Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision, which Japan has been advocating since 2016,
has increased since 2018, bolstered by wider support for the vision and its concrete
operationalization.

06

In response to the expansion of China’s military power, the United States has placedemphasis on security in the Indo-Pacific region and heightened its military presence.
It has also made increasingly clear its support of the FOIP vision. In 2019, countries
in the region pronounced their Indo-Pacific policies, as seen in the publicationof the “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” by the US Department of Defense and theannouncement of the “Indo-Pacific Outlook” by the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN). This was followed in 2020 by policy statements from countries
beyond the region. In Europe, where France had already announced its own IndoPacific defense strategy in 2018, Germany and the Netherlands announced theirrespective Indo-Pacific policies in 2020. The EU defined China as a “systemic rival”
for the first time in 2019, and France, Germany and the Netherlands are now leading
efforts to accelerate the formulation of an EU-level strategy on the Indo-Pacific region.
In December 2020, NATO released the “NATO 2030” report outlining strategic
challenges for the next ten years, in which it defined China as a “full-spectrum systemic
rival that poses acute challenges to open and democratic societies” and discussed theneed to set up an advisory body to deliberate security issues regarding China and to
take countermeasures against cyber attacks and disinformation.
The cooperation through the framework of four countries—Japan, the United States,
Australia, and India (QUAD)—that started in 2007 and resumed in 2017 after aninterruption led to the first Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held on the sidelines of the UN
General Assembly in September 2019, followed by the 2nd Foreign Ministers’ Meetingin Japan in October 2020, held independently from international conferences for the
first time. In this meeting, it was decided to hold future Foreign Ministers’ Meetings ona regular basis. In November 2020, the four countries took part in Exercise Malabar,with Australia participating for the first time since 2007. As demonstrated by further
promotion of security cooperation between India and the other three countries aswell as between Japan and Australia, the cooperation among the four countries saw
intensification and deepening.
In the Indo-Pacific region in 2020, a cooperation framework including China also
showed new progress. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),
an agreement covering a gigantic economic zone that accounts for 30% of the world’s
population, GDP, and trade value, the negotiations for which had been launched in
07Strategic Annual Report 2020
Overview The Indo-Pacific of Today and Tomorrow: Transformation of the Strategic Landscape and International Response

2012 by the ASEAN+6 (Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, andIndia), was signed in November by 15 countries (excluding India) and is scheduled
to enter into force in 2021.
In the Middle East at the western rim of the Indo-Pacific, the struggle for supremacy
among regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran continued in Syria,
Yemen, Libya and other countries where continuing civil wars were compoundedby the suffering caused by the spread of the coronavirus infection. Through a seriesof US-brokered normalization agreements between Israel and Arab countries, therelationships among states in the Middle East have started to shift from a façade of“Israel versus the Arab”, which had in essence already collapsed, to straightforward
relationships that emphasize the economy and security. The intensifying confrontation
between Iran and the United States has accelerated Iran’s deviation from the nuclear
agreement (JCPOA), leading to the escalation of tensions in the Gulf region.

Perspective
The change of administration in the US will be a driving force for climate change
and other multilateral negotiations, international organizations, and a rules-based
international order. The US’s relations with NATO and other allies are expected to bestrengthened, but Japan and other US allies will be asked to increase their share of theburden at the same time. The United States and China are expected to cooperate inthose areas where they share common interests, such as climate change and nuclear
nonproliferation. However, as long as China continues its military expansion and its
challenges to the existing international order, which are the root causes of the USChina conflict, the strategic confrontation between the United States and China willcontinue, and the possibility of further escalation cannot be ruled out. In the IndoPacific region, which will be the focus of this conflict, the division and confrontation
between the United States and China in the military and security arenas are expected to
become even more pronounced. Moreover, the US-China confrontation will certainly
exacerbate the competitions for supremacy in advanced technology, cyberspace andspace, as well as in supply chains and digital networks.
The Japan-US alliance is the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy and security. It isessential that Japan further strengthen its alliance with the United States, with which
08

Japan shares the universal values of freedom and democracy. At the same time, it is also

important for Japan to review its defense capabilities and increase its efforts to stabilize
East Asia. To this end, Japan and the United States should expedite their efforts toestablish a mechanism for regular, systematized and comprehensive dialogue, such as a
strategic dialogue with multiple perspectives. In parallel, for the prosperity and stabilityof the region, diplomatic efforts are also required to maintain stable and cooperative
relations with neighboring China. For example, cooperation between Japan and China
within international frameworks such as the RCEP can be considered.
The new US administration is expected to continue to support the vision of developing
the Indo-Pacific as a region that respects the rule of law and the fundamental valuesof freedom and democracy. However, it is not yet clear how the new administration
will promote, further deepen and expand the cooperative framework limited to Japan,
Australia, and India, and how it will promote concrete cooperation with a wider range
of democratic countries as previewed in the “Summit for Democracy” initiative. It
is important for Japan to continue to promote the rule of law and the progress of
freedom and democracy in the Indo-Pacific region, in coordination with the UnitedStates and friendly nations that share these fundamental values, and by building up
multilayered cooperation with countries that support or resonate with the FOIP
vision. In doing so, Japan should make effective use of cooperation with ASEAN
countries and other countries within and outside the region, such as Australia, India
and European countries that share the same vision, and the QUAD framework in
particular.
Japan will further advance cooperation with its friends across and beyond the IndoPacific region who share universal values, as well as work on coronavirus and climatechange issues. Japan is also expected to play a role in promoting the free trade systemand strengthening the functions of global cooperative frameworks such as the G20
and G7, and to build multilayered safety valves to manage China-US relations and at
least avoid a decisive conflict by addressing common issues and interests. ■09

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Confrontation and Destabilization of the International OrderIntensifying US-China Confrontation and Destabilization of
the International Order
Deteriorating US-China relations
have become a premise fordiscussing global affairs today.
A harsh view on China is
now shared among bipartisan
policy makers in the US, andthere is no sign of easing of theconfrontation between the twocountries in the short term under

President Trump speaks during a campaign rally in New Hampshire and Democratic
Presidential candidate Biden delivers remarks at a voter mobilization event in Ohio,
October 2020. (Photo by AFP/Aflo)

the Biden administration following
its inauguration in January 2021. Today’s escalation of the bilateral rivalry is neither
an accidental nor temporary phenomenon. In recent years, China’s rapid developmentof economic, military, and technological capabilities, coupled with its increasingly
authoritarian and assertive domestic and foreign policies, have prompted the UnitedStates to reinforce its countermeasures. This, together with the structural constraintsof the two countries’ politics, has led to geopolitical and structural rivalry. Other
countries, including Japan, are forced to elaborate their own foreign policies under
this harsh international environment where the international order is shaken by theconfrontation between the two major powers.

Current Situation of US-China Confrontation
The most prominent structural factor for the US-China confrontation is the riseof China and the resulting relative decline of the United States’ influence in theinternational community. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) surpassed Japan in2010 and is now the world’s second largest economy. It has been also pushing ahead
with military buildup. Since the normalization of diplomatic relations with China, theUnited States has effectively supported China’s development through its engagement
policy, with the expectation that China would be democratized if it achieved economic
development. However, today’s China shows that expectations have not come true.
Far from democratizing itself, China has continued to increasingly strengthen its
10authoritarian attitudes and become a strong competitor to the United States, while
the US has been losing its relative influence in the international community. Basedon this structural background, the US-China rivalry has expanded in a multi-facetedmanner, making it difficult to resolve.
The year 2020 was symblized by the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the discovery of thevirus in Wuhan, China, it has spread exponentially to the rest of the world, causing
serious human and economic damage to both the United States and China. The
United States, suffering from the highest number of infection cases and fatalities in
the world, has been criticizing China for not disclosing enough information about thedisease to the international community. In September 2020, President Trump criticized
China for spreading the virus throughout the world in his speech at the UN General
Assembly. Conspiracy theories such as “the virus leaked from a virus laboratory in
Wuhan,” or “the virus itself was artificially made” were also floating, and President
Trump sympathized with those theories. On the other hand, although China was slow
to respond in the initial stage of the outbreak, it decided to impose strict restrictions
on people’s movement, which had huge impact temporarily on the economy and daily
lives. With those policies, China succeeded in containing the spread of the infection
at the relatively early stage in contrast with the Western countries that still suffer fromthe pandemic. Confident with the success of this Chinese governance model, China
is showing more assertive attitudes. Through its “mask diplomacy” in which masks
and medical equipment are provided worldwide, China tries to influence the recipient
countries’ policies and public opinions. At the same time, China has been implementing
its “wolf warrior diplomacy,” in which it severely criticizes countries showing critical
attitudes and taking severe countermeasures agaist them, as in the case of Australia.
It is speculated that China may develop a “vaccine diplomacy” through prioritizedprovision of its vaccine to the friendly countries once it succeeds in developing one.
Such belligerent diplomacy has intensified friction with the United States and Europe,and had a major impact on their views on China. There is currently no prospect forcooperation between the United Stated and China, the two major powers, to cope withthe unprecedented global pandemic.
The US-China trade friction over import tariffs which had been continuing since 2018with imposition of countermeasures by both sides, was more or less settled at the11Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Confrontation and Destabilization of the International Order

beginning of 2020. However, China’s economic structural problems, such as protectionof intellectual property rights, measures to distort trade including industrial subsidies,and national industrial policy, remain unresolved. The confrontation between thetwo countries has further spread beyond the purely trade area as exemplified by theconfrontation over advanced technologies. For example, Huawei Technologies Inc.
(Huawei), a Chinese company, one of the leading manufacturers in the developmentof 5G communications technology, is at the center of America’s criticism. The UnitedStates restricts its semiconductor exports to Huawei and imposes restrictions on its
businesses in the US due to concerns with regard to the intellectual property andsecurity. The US-China confrontation in the field of advanced technologies extends
beyond communications technology and infrastructure to artificial intelligence (AI)and space. At its core is the competition between the United States and China forhegemonic supremacy in advanced technologies worldwide, which is not limited
to the private sector but also covers the national security because of China’s civilmilitary integration policy.
In the area of traditional security, the United States has long been concerned about
China’s rapid military expansion. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which wasonce large in size but poorly equipped and not well trained, has carried out reforms
and modernization. In particular, the development of the navy has been remarkable,
and it has shown a desire of maritime expansion. The Xi Jinping administration
has stepped up military activities in the South China Sea and constructed artificial
islands, prompting repulsion from neighboring countries. In 2020, China repeatedly
conducted military exercises in the South China Sea, indicating that it had nointention of refraining from such active military operations. Also in the East China
Sea, China has been making more frequent and long-lasting incursions into themaritime areas surrounding Senkaku Islands, which are Japan’s territory, and this has
become a major factor in increasing Japan’s distrust of China. The deterioration of
the security environment in East Asia is of great concern to the United States, which
has enormous interests in the region. In the South China Sea, the United States has
shown signs of containing China’s expansion policies, including through “Freedomof Navigation Operations.” However, China has not shown signs of reviewing or
refraining from such policies, thus amplifying the cyclical structure of mutual distrustand confrontation between the two countries.
12In 2020, China further strengthened its repressive policies toward Hong Kong andthe Uyghurs, which drew criticism from the United States, Europe, Japan and otherdemocratic countries. Conflicts over the values of human rights and democracy havebeen an old and new issue in US-China relations since the Tiananmen Incident in
1989. In recent years, however, China has shown increasingly authoritarian policies in
its domestic affairs, which exacerbated the acuteness of the bilateral confrontation. In
Hong Kong in particular, the National Security Law was enacted in June 2020, andhas been strictly enforced from the early days of implemenataion. The Hong Kong
government has arrested prominent democracy activists and journalists one after
another, highlighting a serious threat to freedom of speech and political activity in HongKong. The Chinese government has also stepped up its intervention in Hong Kong,and the One Country Two Systems policy that has sutained Hong Kong’s prosperity
has lost its substance. However, in the deliberations of the UN Commission on Human
Rights in June 2020, 53 countries, mainly developing countries, voted in favor of the
National Security Law while 27 countries, mainly developed countries including Japanand Europe, opposed the law. This shows that China’s influence has spread widely todeveloping countries through the “mask diplomacy” on the coronavirus infection andits existing “Belt and Road Initiative.” In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, alarge number of Muslim Uyghur ethnic minorities are being detained in concentration
camps, infringing on their human rights. In November 2019, the United States passed
the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, under which the US examines
whether China is observing the One Country Two Systems policy which guarantees
a high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong. In June 2020, the US passed the Uyghur
Human Rights Policy Act, which authorizes sanctions against Chinese authorities
for the detention of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and has
repeatedly criticized China’s response to human rights issues.
Taiwan is a symbol of the “core interests” of China which upholds the “One China”
principle. Against the backdrop of Chinese military exercises carried out in the
Taiwan Strait, the US-Taiwan relations strengthened, which in turn led to China’s
stronger repulsion. In March 2018, the Taiwan Travel Act was enacted to promotemutual visits by senior officials of the United States and Taiwan. In August 2020,
Secretary of Health and Human Services Azar visited Taiwan, which was the first
visit by a US Cabinet member. In September 2020, Under Secretary of State Krack
13

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Confrontation and Destabilization of the International Ordervisited Taiwan and met with President Tsai Ing-wen. US arms exports to Taiwan
under the Taiwan Relations Act are also on the rise. China strongly opposes to this,saying it is an intervention in the internal affairs by the United States.
As seen above, the confrontation between the United States and China is now becoming
a structural one, including the change in the power balance in the international
community originating from the rise of China. In addition, disagreements between
the two countries over the causes of the transformation of international order haveintensified the conflict. From the US point of view, China’s recent activities are“actions to change the status quo,”—revisionism toward the international order led
by the United States since the end of World War II. On the other hand, seen from the
Chinese side, the United States which is dimishing its influence as a hegemonic state
looks like it is trying to contain China’s legitimate development by “undue pressure.”
Such differences in mutual recognition and resulting mutual distrust make it difficult
to ease the confrontation between the two nations.

Solidification of the US-China Confrontation Structure
What is noteworthy about the reaction to this confrontation between the United States
and China is the change in perceptions of China among US policy makers. The Trumpadministration issued its National Security Strategy at the end of 2017 and its National
Defense Strategy in early 2018, which stated its comprehensive view of China. The US
National Security Strategy defined China as a force that changes the status quo, andlisted China as a major US competitor for the first time alongside Russia in an official
US government document. Thus, the US has changed its perception of China and its
engagement policy that had been in place since the 1970s.
Against the backdrop of this change in the Trump administration’s perception ofChina and mindful of the presidential election, a series of criticisms of China and its
Communist Party rule in partiuclar were made by senior US government officials one
after another in 2020. On June 26, 2020, in a speech in Arizona entitled “The Chinese
Communist Party’s Ideology and Global Ambitions,” National Security Adviser
O’Brien stated that the Chinese Communist Party, which had inherited MarxismLeninism, had not switched to liberalism even after achieving economic growth, andthat the days of American passivity and naivety regarding the People’s Republic of
14

China were over. On July 7, US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Ray
gave a speech in Washington entitled “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government
and the Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of theUnited States” in which he criticized that China and the Chinese Communist Party
were endangering not only US economic security but also US security in general bystealing intellectual property and increasing espionage activities. On July 16, Attorney
General Barr stated in his address at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum in
Michigan on US policy toward China that he hoped the American people would be
inspired to reevaluate their relationship with China as long as the rule of the Chinese
Communist Party continued. On July 23, Secretary of State Pompeo delivered aspeech entitled “Communist China and the Free World’s Future” at the Richard
Nixon Presidential Library in California, in which he criticized China’s human rights
violations led by the Chinese Communist Party, the theft of intellectual property,
territorial expansion and the renunciation of international promises, stating thatliberalism must triumph over communism in the international community.
Since its inauguration, China’s
Xi Jinping administration has
attached

importance

to

its

relationship with the United Statesand has been striving to build asstable a relationship as possible.
On the other hand, “The Chinese
Dream” and “Great Rejuvenationof the Chinese Nation” became

The Third Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress, China, May 2020.
(Photo by AP/Aflo)the government’s slogans, and rapid military buildup continues in parallel with theeconomic development. China has been also making its active advances overseas, as
represented by the “Belt and Road Initiative.” As a result, China’s interests overseas havegrown, raising concerns among the US, Europe and Asia-Pacific countries including
Japan, Australia and India about the expansion of China’s influence over key ports
in the Indo-Pacific region and the infrastructure, communications and surveillancetechnologies in other countries. Self-consciousness that China is a great power continued
to grow, and the “mask diplomacy” and “wolf warrior diplomacy” amid the coronavirus
pandemic were criticized by many countries. China’s behavior in the international
15

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Confrontation and Destabilization of the International Ordercommunity has become more oppressive than before, and the deterioration of China’s
relations with the United States seems inevitable. While the Trump administration
rapidly shifted its position to a hard-line attitude toward China, it appears that China,
in anticipation of the US presidential election in November 2020, focused on preparing
for a new administration rather than irritating the bilateral relations. China expects thatthe Biden administration, following its inauguration in 2021, will adopt a milder, morepredictable, and coherent policy toward China. Nevertheless, it is difficult for China
to make concessions to the United States, and there is little room for adjustment in
China’s foreign policy, especially concerning its “core interests” defined unilaterally.
It is also unlikely that China’s foreign policy, particularly toward the US, will change
dramatically. China may view the passage of time as advantageous to China in light ofthe medium- to long-term trends. In the meantime, China may be thinking it can get bywith tactical convergence or alignment of interests.
The influence of populism should also be addressed. Looking at the societies of
the United States and China, the rise of nationalism is pointed out as an important
determning factor. Coupled with the development of social networking services, bothgovernments have used nationalism with similar logic—the Trump administration
since 2017 has called for “Make America Great Again” while the Xi Jinping
administration since 2012 has called for “The Chinese Dream.” These moves havereally gained the support of society in each country and have underpinned theirhard-line attitudes toward each other. Diplomacy is often said to be an extension ofdomestic politics, and the current situation in the two countries exemplifies it. In bothcountries, the governments have placed priority on appealing to the domestic politicalsituation and public opinion, and interpreted foreign policy from the viewpoint ofdomestic politics. As a result, the US-China trade friction intensified.
Amid these developments, there is a growing perception in the United States that
China is attempting to create a favorable situation for itself by lobbying and puttingpressure on American civil society, media, industry and political circles throughthe Confucius Institute, which China has established at US universities and otherinstitutions to promote and develop Chinese culture, including Chinese language
education, as well as through Chinese students studying in the US and collaboratorswith the Chinese Communist Party. Since the spread of COVID-19, US public
16

opinion has become increasingly critical of China. According to a survey conductedby the Pew Research Center between June 16 and July 14, 2020, as many as 73% ofAmericans showed unfavorable view of China, the highest since the survey began in
2005. This percentage was 60% in 2018, 66% in 2019, and 73% in 2020 respectively,
recording the worst for the three consecutive years and indicating steady worseningof American perception of China in recent years. Looked at by party lines, thepercentage among Republican supporters in 2020 was 83%, up 11 percentage points
from 2019, and the percentage among Democrat supporters was up 6 percentage
points at 68%. Thus, the unfavorable views are increasingly spread in a bipartisan
manner, leaving little room for the US government to make adjustments in its China
policy. Even after the inauguration of the Biden administration in 2021, the UnitedStates is expected to continue its hard-line approach toward China, even though its
approach including the manner of dialogue and crisis management may change.
With regard to populism, attention needs to be paid to the potential impact of its
spread within the United States to the support of democracy worldwide. Regarding
the 2020 presidential election, President Trump’s campaign staff and close aides filed
a series of lawsuits in several states demanding the nullification of the postal ballot
widely used amid the coronavirus pandemic and ballot counting. On December 12,
the Supreme Court rejected a Texas appeal to nullify the results of the four contested
states. On December 14, the electoral college votes took place in which it was
confirmed that Mr. Biden won 306 votes and President Trump 232. President Trump,however, did not make a consession speech, which had been the tradition of peaceful
power transition. Also, some GOP members and media have repeatedly challenged
the legitimacy of the election. This situation, in which the United States underminedthe credibility of its own election system while it demanded that other countries holdfair elections as the keystone for democracy, could adversely affect the defense ofinternational democracy and the American leadership for it.

Perspective
As mentioned above, the current US-China confrontation has expanded into multiple
areas and become structurally fixed with the geopolitical changes. Thus, it is difficult
to resolve it in the short term, with enoumous political and economic impact on theinternational community. Then, how will this bilateral confrontation unfold in the
future, and what position should Japan take?

17Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Confrontation and Destabilization of the International OrderFirst, the impact of the change in the US leadership needs to be considered. In
the US, a change of government takes place in January 2021 from the Trumpadministration of the Republican Party to the Biden administration of the
Democratic Party following the presidential election in November 2020. The
Trump administration was characterized by its attitude of not attaching importanceto policy consistency in both domestic and foreign affairs. In contrast, the Biden
administration is expected to carefully coordinate the consistency and legitimacy ofthe policies and return to the traditional US behavior of emphasizing cooperation
with its allies. However, the American hard-line stance toward China has become abipartisan consensus among policy makers, driven by the factors such as changes in
the power balance and China’s military expansion, and is expected to continue fromthe Trump administration to the Biden administration. Compared with the Trumpadministration, the Biden administration will refrain from imposing economic
pressures, sanctions, and provocative actions, but the administration’s emphasis on
human rights and democratic values may intensify the US-China confrontation in
those areas.
In China, no promotion of the next generation of leaders was announced at the
5th Plenary Session of the 19th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee heldin the autumn of 2020, increasing the likelihood that Xi Jinping will remain in his
position in the 2022 Party Congress. Therefore, the Xi Jinping administration’s
foreign policy is expected to continue. However, the political situation is expected
to become fluid as various preparations for the 2022 congress begin. This increases
the risk of unforeseen events. In addition, as 2021 will be an important year as itmarks the centennial anniversary of the founding of the CCP, China will promote
the achievements of the Party and behave even more like a major power. For thesereasons, it is unlikely that China will soften its foreign policy stance significantly.
In light of these situations in the US and China, the medium- and long-term outlook
for US-China relations will be generally bleak. However, the Biden administration
is expected to seek strategic dialogue with China in areas where the interests of thetwo nations coincide, such as climate change and nuclear nonproliferation. Efforts tomaintain interdependence in investment and trade, that do not have a major impact on
high-tech hegemony, will also continue. It may also try to cooperate with China on the18issues regarding the Korean Peninsula, particularly North Korea’s nuclear and missile
issues. Thus, some room for improvement remains in the bilateral relationship.
Then, what position should Japan take? First, it goes without saying that the UnitedStates is Japan’s only ally and the Japan-US alliance is the cornerstone of Japanesediplomacy and security. Hence, Japan should further strengthen its alliance with theUnited States, which shares the universal values of freedom and democracy. At thesame time, Japan should review its defense capabilities and strive to stabilize the East
Asia region. In order to respond to the geopolitical changes in this region describedabove, the region with Japan and US at its center, together with countries and regions
including Taiwan that share common values, should strive for coordination aimed at
the co-existence with China and stabilization of the region, instead of destabilization
as a result of the rise of China. Such coordination toward regional stability will requirea multifaceted perspective, including efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula,combat infectious diseases like COVID-19, efforts on climate change and establishingdigital economic standards in multilateral free trade agreements like CPTPP. For
these purposes, Japan and the United States should expedite the establishment of aregular, systematized, and comprehensive dialogue mechanism, such as the strategic
dialogue between Japan and the United States, so that the two countries can play acentral role in such multi-layered discussions and coordination.
Second, it is necessary for Japan to maintain stable and cooperative relations with
China as its neighbor at the same time for the prosperity and stability of the region.
Japan and China have very strong economic and cultural ties. Since the normalizationof diplomatic relations, Japan has consistently supported and greatly contributed to
the reconstruction and development of China. Japan has attached importance to its
relations with China and called on China to participate in the international communityand contribute as a more cooperative entity. Japan should continue to promote stable
relations with China based on such standpoint. For example, the RCEP agreed in2020 is an important framework for economic cooperation in Asia. Japan and China
can cooperate within such an international framework. On the other hand, although
Chinese President Xi Jinping has expressed his interest to participate in the CPTPP, it
is important to require the same standards as other participants in high-level economic
agreements like CPTPP, and to require China to conform to the international standards.
19

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Confrontation and Destabilization of the International Order

Third, based on the basic recognition that the firmly established rule of law anda free and open international order is essential for the prosperity and stability ofneighboring regions and the world, Japan should continue to strive for peace andstability of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” in coordination with the United States
and those nations that share the fundamental values. In doing so, it is important topromote cooperation with ASEAN countries, which play an important role in theregion, as well as with countries within and outside the region, such as Australia,
India, and European countries, which share this vision. In particular, the QUAD
framework of the four democracies of Japan, the US, Australia and India should
be utilized effectively. The four countries of QUAD should work closely together insecurity and economy, provide leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, and contributeto regional stability and development. Cooperation with countries outside this region,such as Europe, which has close ties with the region, will also be important. At thesame time, instead of excluding or opposing China, which is an important player inthe region, Japan should call on China to behave responsibly according to its national
power and influence, and encourage China to contribute to stability and developmentof the Indo-Pacific region, while keeping peace with the four countries and making
effective use of existing regional multilateral cooperation frameworks such as APEC,
the ARF, and the East Asia Summit.
Finally, Japan should promote cooperation with friendly countries that share
universal values beyond the Indo-Pacific region, and actively work for common
challenges in the international community that require multilateral cooperation,such as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. Japan should also play a rolein strengthening the functions of such free trade frameworks as the WTO, CPTPP
and RCEP, as well as global cooperative frameworks like G20 and G7. Despite theongoing confrontation between the United States and China, by working together
to address common issues within these frameworks of international and regional
cooperation, it is expected that a multilayered safety valve will be built to manage therelationship between the two countries, at least to avoid a decisive confrontation. ■20

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Military Confrontation and Its Impact on International Arms Control

Intensifying US-China Military Confrontation and
Its Impact on International Arms Control
As

mentioned

above,

therelationship between the UnitedStates and China in 2020 became
harshly adversarial, which somedescribe as the “New Cold War.”As the military confrontation
between the United States andChina over Taiwan deepened,
there were growing concerns

DF-17s taking part in a military parade celebrating the 70th founding anniversary of thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC), October 1, 2019. (Photo by Xinhua/Aflo)about the outbreak of a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis. While the global pandemic of
the COVID-19 initially created difficulties for the US military to operate, the PLA
continued its military operations in the Western Pacific even during the pandemic. The
intensification of the US-China confrontation in the Indo-Pacific region, including
in military dimensions, has also had significant implications for the debates overdeterrence and nuclear arms control.

Intensifying US-China confrontation over Taiwan
With the re-election of President Tsai Ing-wen in the Taiwanese presidential election in
January 2020, China increased military pressure and showed a strong determination to
unify Taiwan against the United States and Taiwan. At the end of 2019, China sent its
first indeginous aircraft carrier Shandong across the Taiwan Strait to threaten Taiwan’s
presidential election. When Taiwan’s incoming vice president, Lai Ching-te, visited theUnited States in February, Chinese fighters, early warning aircraft, and bombers flew
around Taiwan, crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entering Taiwan’s
airspace. Furthermore, on the occasion of the inauguration ceremony of President Tsaiin May, China deployed the aircraft carrier Liaoning off the east coast of Taiwan,
creating a situation in which the Taiwanese military was forced to be on alert. In June,
Chinese military aircraft entered Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) ninetimes, probably to express dissatisfaction with Taiwan’s position on the Hong Kongissue. During visits to Taiwan by Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar
21

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Military Confrontation and Its Impact on International Arms Control

in August and US Under secretary of State Keith Krach in September, Chinese fighterscrossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, and the Chinese Ministry of National
Defense denied the recognition of the median line. In November, Chinese aircraft flew
in the ADIZ between Taiwan and the Dongsha Islands 26 days out of 30. With the only
exception in 2019, Chinese military aircraft have explicitly avoided entering Taiwan’s
ADIZ crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait for nearly 20 years. However, with
China’s frequent actions that are not bound by such tacit agreements, the possibilityof unexpected accidents has increased. In March, a high-speed vessel believed to bea Chinese maritime militia collided with a Taiwan Coast Guard patrol vessel off thecoast of Kinmen Islands, creating a new gray zone situation.
China conducted military exercises with unprecedented frequency and scale that
seemed to threaten Taiwan. In February, the PLA conducted a large-scale amphibious
exercise in the Eastern Theater. A spokesman for the theater said that the exercise
was not “something that is regular” but was “a deterrent to Taiwan’s independent
force.” In March, Chinese military aircraft conducted its first night-time exercise inwaters southwest of Taiwan, demonstrating its ability to carry out operations in a harshenvironment. Concurrent with the inauguration ceremony of President Tsai in May,
78 days of joint exercises were conducted in the Bohai Sea for the purpose of assault
landings, island capturing, bridgehead construction, and air defense. These exercises
were apparently conducted reflecting the geographical similarity between the Bohai
Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In July, the Eastern and Southern Theaters simultaneously
conducted exercises off the east and west coasts of Taiwan, and in August, the Eastern
Theater conducted exercises in the north and south of the Taiwan Strait. In September,the PLA conducted joint naval and air exercises near the Dongsha Islands, which arewithin Taiwan’s ADIZ. At the time of Taiwan’s National Day on October 10, the PLA
conducted a mobilization exercise in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, in which drones,
special forces, and airborne troops participated. Thus, the PLA’s activities aroundTaiwan have increased significantly compared to the past several years. Coupled with
the qualitative changes that include formation flights using a wide variety of aircraft,night-time drills, and flights to the Taiwanese ADIZ by aircraft out of inland China,
these acticities heightened the threat to Taiwan. Furthermore, the increased activitiesof the PLA in the area east of Taiwan undermines the premise that Taiwan has to beprepared for solely an invasion over the Taiwan Strait.
22

The military balance between China and Taiwan is greatly favorable to China in termsof land forces, fighter aircraft, and submarines, with particularly significant differencesin the submarines. The US Department of Defense considers that the PLA still lacks
amphibious lift in order to carry out a large-scale landing invasion against Taiwan.
However, the PLA has introduced new equipment to make up for this shortfall,such as the installation of a large missile destroyer and a second amphibious assault
ship. It is also believed that hundreds of additional ground-based cruise missiles andshort-range ballistic missiles have been acquired, and these additional capabilities are
expected to be effective in the initial phase of the landing operation. Furthermore, the
PLA continued to improve its landing capability by utilizing commercial ships andintroducing rotorcrafts.
Faced with China’s growing military threat, Taiwan has been improving its defense
capabilities mainly by introducing asymmetric weapons such as anti-ship and air
defense missiles, drones, and submarines. Throughout 2020, in accordance with the
Taiwan Relations Act, the United States continued to support Taiwan’s defense efforts
by proactively selling unmanned aerial vehicles, large guided torpedoes, anti-ship
missiles, self-propelled howitzers, anti-tank missiles, and other items for extending theoperational life of the PAC-3 interceptor missiles. Taiwan began building domestic
submarines in November, and such reinforcements of the Taiwanese submarine force
would have the effect of offsetting China’s improved landing capabilities.
The United States also strengthened its security cooperation with Taiwan in areas otherthan the provision of weapons. In 2019, the United States and Taiwan announced
that they would establish a joint committee for the defense of Taiwan, and experts are
believed to have exchanged views on such areas as special operations, army air forces,
unmanned vehicles and mines. The US military also invited Taiwan to a multilateral
videoconference on countermeasures against novel coronavirus infections and helda bilateral forum on cybersecurity to discuss the security risks of 5G technology. In
November, a rear admiral, who serves as the Director for Intelligence in the US IndoPacific Command, visited Taiwan and held talks with the Taiwanese side. This was avisit by the highest ranking US military officer to Taiwan in 40 years.

23

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Military Confrontation and Its Impact on International Arms Control

The United States has frequently conducted military operations in areas around Taiwan,
demonstrating its support for Taiwan, which is under military pressure from China. The
US Navy’s Aegis destroyers transited the Taiwan Strait more than nine times between
January and September. In many cases, the timing of the passages coincided with the
PLA’s exercises around Taiwan. In April, the US Navy took an unusual step of crossing
the median line by sailing westward to warn against China. In February, a B-52 bomber
flew along the eastern coast of Taiwan, and in October, a US special operations transport
aircraft flew along the median line of the Taiwan Strait. China strongly criticized this,calling it “a violation of international law.” In addition, US reconnaissance planes
frequently flew through the Bashi Channel and maintained alert condition.
Amid growing tensions between the United States and China over Taiwan, attention
was focused on the Dongsha Islands, located in the southwest of Taiwan, as a flash
point of a Taiwan Strait crisis. Taiwan has built a runway in the Dongsha Islands,
but has no military presence and no civilian population. For this reason, China may
assume that it would be relatively easy to conquer the Dongsha Islands militarily while
avoiding US military intervention and criticism from the international community. The
Dongsha Islands, located at the northern entrance of the South China Sea, could be an
important strategic base for China in the area. Above all, the Chinese leadership under
President Xi can demonstrate its determination to unify Taiwan both at home andabroad by invading the Dongsha Islands. Therefore, the PLA’s increased activities inthe sea area between Taiwan and the Dongsha Islands since the summer of 2020 wasviewed as possibly preparing for an invasion of the Dongsha Islands.
Thus in 2020, the situation continued in which China referred to the unificationof Taiwan and increased military pressure, while the United States responded byincreasing its support for Taiwan’s defense efforts. If China makes a military invasionof Taiwan, it is highly likely that the United States will intervene, leading to great losses
on both sides. Therefore, China is believed to give priority to avoiding a war with theUnited States at this point. However, as the PLA began to ignore those factors that had
previously contributed to the stability of the Taiwan Strait, such as crossing the medianline of the Taiwan Strait, the possibility of an incident increased. The Dongsha Islands
would remain a potential flash point of a Taiwan Strait crisis. In addition, China’s
implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong despite the international24

criticism indicates that China is ready to take hard-line measures for political stability.
This led to heightened concerns in the United States about possible contingencies in
Taiwan and a renewed recognition of Taiwan’s strategic importance. In this context,
there have been calls for clarification of the US position, including a revision of the
Taiwan Relations Act, as conventional strategic ambiguity cannot deter China.

Intensifying US-China Military Confrontation in the Western Pacific
In 2020, the military confrontation between the United States and China intensified
in the South China Sea and throughout the Western Pacific. Despite the spread of
the novel coronavirus disease in China, Beijing continued to take a hard-line stance,
particularly in the South China Sea, and continued activities in line with its territorial
claims. In February, a Chinese warship pointed its fire-control radar at a Philippine
warship. In March, China set up a scientific research facility in the Spratly Islands,
while a Chinese government vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing boat in the Paracel
Islands. In April, the Chinese government established a new administrative area in
the South China Sea.
In March, the coronavirus disease spread on the aircraft carrier USS Theodore
Roosevelt, forcing the US Navy to suspend its operation. On the other hand, China
deployed its aircraft carrier Liaoning in the Western Pacific in April and demonstrated
its presence. While its aircraft carriers were unable to move in the Western Pacific,
the US military dispatched expeditionary strike groups consisting of amphibious
assault ships to the South China Sea, and frequently conducted freedom of navigation
operations by destroyers and littoral combat ships in an attempt to prevent a power
vacuum. In addition, the US military carried out Dynamic Force Employment(DFE) at full scale, and in June three carrier strike groups conducted operations in
the South China Sea. In July, the US military conducted exercises with two carrier
strike groups in the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea, and the PLA conductedlarge-scale exercises in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.
Accordingly, an unusual situation emerged in which the Unites States and China
conducted large-scale exercises at the same time in the South China Sea. In March,
the US Air Force stopped the 16-year routine deployment of bombers to Guam andswitched to DEF-based flight operations from the US mainland, resulting in more
frequent flights to the Western Pacific.
25

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Military Confrontation and Its Impact on International Arms Control

In mid-July 2020, four years since
the Philippines v. China arbitralaward,

theUSgovernment

expressed its view for the firsttime that China’s assertion on
the South China Sea was illegal.
At the same time, the US Navy
carried out freedom of navigation
operations in the South China Sea

The US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan participating in a US-Japan joint
exercise, October 2020. (Photo by Mainichi Shimbun/Aflo)and conducted large-scale exercises involving two carrier strike groups as describedabove. Japan, the United States, and Australia held naval exercises in the South China
Sea shortly thereafter. In response, the PLA conducted live-fire exercises in the South
China Sea for several weeks, including 24 hour, non-stop training by bombers and thelaunching of anti-ship ballistic missiles into the training area between Hainan Islandand the Paracel Islands. Subsequently, the US Indo-Pacific Command confirmed thatthese missiles had hit on a moving target in the sea, confirming China’s ability toprevent intervention.
In October, it was reported that the PLA deployed its hypersonic glide weapon, DF17, in the coastal area. If this was true, China might have deployed a weapon that isdifficult to intercept with the US missile defense system. Further expansion of China’s
intermediate-range missile capability will enhance Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD)
capabilities, of which the intermediate-range missile is an important component. In
addition, the National Defense Law, which the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress revised at the end of December, now stipulates that the protectionof the country’s “development interests” including overseas interests as reasons formilitary mobilization in additon to the protection of territries and sovereignty. It also
defined outerspace, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum as “important security
domains,” which indicates further enhancement of military capabilities in thosedomains. China’s militarization, if continued, would pose a significant constraint
on the military operations of the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific, thus
significantly undemining the deterrence.

26

In a phone conversation in August amid rising tensions between the two countries,
US and Chinese defense chiefs accused each other of escalating the situation, butalso referred to the need to avoid military clashes. In December, the United States
and China sought to hold a crisis management conference based on the Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), but the United States criticized China
for not participating in the online conference. In response, the Chinese side argued
that the United States, by unilaterally setting the agenda and arbitrarily distorting
the nature of the talks, bore the entire responsibility. US Defense Secretary Esper’s
planned visit to China by the end of the year failed to materialize, leaving issues on
military crisis management unresolved.
Amid the growing threat from China in the Western Pacific, the US military hurried
to enhance its ability to cope with China’s counter-intervention capabilities. In
particular, the Department of Defense acknowledged that China had 350 vessels,
the largest number in the world, and in response, Secretary Esper announced aplan to increase the number of US Navy vessels from the current 293 to over 355
by 2035. It was also announced that in the future, unmanned naval vessels will be
introduced, and that the number of manned and unmanned naval vessels, including
light aircraft carriers, will increase to 500 by 2045. In addition, each service of the
US armd forces are pursuing the concept of cross-domain operations that would
improve communications in all areas, mainly using AI. The Congress passed the
FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act in the end of December including
the establishment of a new fund called the Indo-Paciic Deterrence Initiative, which
allocated $2.2 billion for the procurement by the Indo-Pacific Command in order toenhance US posture vis-à-vis China in the region amid the great power competition.

Implications for Deterrence and Arms Control Issues
Transformation of the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region andintensifying competition between the United States and China, including in military
dimensions have also had significant implications for the debate over deterrence andnuclear arms control issues.
What attracted attention in 2020 was the US “offensive” regarding the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The New START is a bilateral treaty which
27

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Military Confrontation and Its Impact on International Arms Control

limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), andstrategic bombers) deployed by the US and Russia respectively to 700 and deployedstrategic nuclear warheads to 1550. While how to determine the future of the treaty
became a pressing issue with the approaching expiration date of February 2021, theUnited States argued that not only Russia but also China should participate, andthat a new agreement should be explored to regulate not only strategic nuclear forces
but also other nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. The United States also
requested China’s participation in the arms control talks on the extension of the New
START held in June 2020, and arranged a seat with the Chinese flag. However, China
refused to attend the meeting. Although Washington reiterated its call for China’s
participation in nuclear arms control talks, Beijing continued its refusal; Moscow
reiterated its standing position that it would welcome China’s participation but
respect its position, and that Russia would not actively pursuade China. In the end,
the United States and Russia agreed to hold bilateral talks, in which they shared theview that the New START should be extended for one year. However, whereas theUnited States demanded that a cap should cover not only strategic nuclear weapons
but also all Russian nuclear weapons with verification measures, Russia argued thatwhile it would freeze the number of nuclear warheads along with the United States,
it would refuse verification measures. Thus, an agreement on the extension could not
be reached by the end of 2020.
According to an estimate by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI), China possessed 320 nuclear warheads, while the United States had 5800 and
Russia 6375 as of the beginning of 2020. There is still a large numerical asymmetry. In
light of this difference in nuclear forces, China has justified its position by arguing that
it is not yet an appropriate time for China to participate in nuclear disarmament talks,that the largest nuclear powers have special and primary responsibilities in nuclear
disarmament, and that their nuclear arsenals should be further reduced drasticallyto create a condition for other nuclear-weapon states to join in multilateral nuclear
disarmament talks. On the other hand, amid the intensifying great power competition
between the United States and China, including on the military dimention, the UnitedStates is deeply concerned about China’s aggressive nuclear and missile modernization,
which is the only country among the five nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear28

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that has not implemented any substantive nuclear
arms control measures, together with the lack of transparency of China’s nuclear
arsenal, referred to as the “Great Wall of Secrecy” by US Special Presidential Envoy
Marshall Billingslea. In its annual China military power report released in September
2020, the US Department of Defense estimated that China posessed 100 ICBMs(90 in the previous year), 200 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) (80 in theprevious year), and more than 200 missiles (80-160 in the previous year). This led tothe evaluation that “Over the next decade, China will expand and diversify its nuclear
forces, likely at least doubling its nuclear warhead stockpile.” With regard to strategic
nuclear forces, the deployment and expansion of ICBMs equipped with multiple
independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), which are capable of carrying
approximately 10 nuclear warheads, and the development and future deployment
of SLBMs are drawing special attention. In addition, China is estimated to possess
approximately 2000 dual-capable ground-launched medium and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles, including the medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) capable ofreaching Japan, overwhelming the United States (as well as Russia), which was aparty to the INF Treaty until August 2019. Should Chinese-US mutual vulnerability
be undeniably established as a result of China’s nuclear and missile modernization,
their deterrence relationship at the strategic level may be stabilized. However, there isconsiderable concern that this may bring into being the so-called stability-instability
paradox; that is, stability at the strategic level may encourage China to act freely andto further challenge and provoke the existing order at the theater level, leading todestabilization at this level.
Intensifying great-power and geopolitical competitions also had a significant impact
on the global framework of nuclear disarmament. There was a strong concern that the
NPT regime would be severely damaged if the upcoming NPT Review Conference,
which had been scheduled from April to May 2020 but postponed to August 2021 dueto the global pandemic of COVID-19, failed again following the previous conferencein 2015 due to the severe confrontation over nuclear arms control issues between
the United States on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other. In fact, it
was reported that the only thing the five nuclear-weapon states could agree upon attheir annual meeting held in February 2020 was their opposition to the Treaty on theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).
29

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Intensifying US-China Military Confrontation and Its Impact on International Arms Control

The TPNW was adopted in 2017 as the first treaty legally banning nuclear weapons,through the initiative of non-nuclear-weapon states in cooperation with NGOs, both ofwhich are strongly dissatisfied with the standstill and deterioration of nuclear disarmamentand consider that the NPT regime alone would not be enough to pressure nuclear-weapon
states to undertake nuclear disarmament. In October 2020, the number of states ratifying
the treaty exceeded 50, meaning that the treaty would enter into force on January 22,2021. At present, it is not clear what implications the TPNW will have for nuclear arms
control and disarmament. Proponents of the TPNW argue that its entry into force andthe increase in the number of States Parties to the Treaty would strengthen the global
norm on the prohibition of nuclear weapons; increase the pressure on nuclear-armed
states and their allied non-nuclear weapon states under extended nuclear deterrence,or nuclear umbrella (“nuclear-umbrella states”) to reduce their dependence on nuclear
deterrence; and promote nuclear arms control and disarmament. Among them, one of
the important targets for the proponents in the short term is participation of Japan andother “nuclear-umbrella states” as observers at the Conference of the States Parties to the
TPNW, which is to be held within one year from its entry into force, and the signing of
the treaty. However, nuclear-armed states or their allies, which consider that thay cannot
renounce nuclear deterrence at least at this time, are highly unlikely to accede to thistreaty; nor is it likely that the entry into force of the TPNW will result in substantial
nuclear arms control and disarmament, inter alia, the reduction of nuclear weapons, or US
allies’ renouncement of extended nuclear deterrence. The global nuclear situation could
rather be destabilized if the TPNW further widens the divide over nuclear disarmament
between proponents and opponents of the treaty, or if it weakens the unifying force of
the NPT, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the only
treaty in which the five nuclear-weapon states accept the legal commitment to nuclear
disarmament. A possibility cannot be denied that some countries may act in violation of
their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, by taking advantage of thereluctance of nuclear powers such as the United States and China to engage in nuclear
arms control and disarmament.

Perspective
The military balance between the United States and China in the Western Pacific is
becoming favorable to China, and the situation surrounding Taiwan is expected to continue
to deteriorate. On the other hand, the left wing of the Democratic Party of the United
30

States is calling for a reduction in the defense budget and reduced involvement in overseas
conflicts. The extent to which the new Biden administration will pay attention and makeeffort to military competition with China in the Indo-Pacific will determine regional
security. Depending on these developments, the military balance between the UnitedStates and China under the new US administration may become even more favorable
to China. Amid the deepening confrontation between the United States and China, it
is necessary for the two countries to reestablish their crisis management mechanisms toease military tensions and build confidence. At the same time, given that China’s military
power has already become a real threat to Asian countries, it is extremely important for
the new US administration to promote the maintenance and enhancement of its military
power in the Indo-Pacific region in line with the “Pacific Deterrence Initiative” stipulated
in the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act, which calls for the enhancement of
the capabilities of US and allies forces, in order to buttress the credibility of the UnitedStates among Asian countries. In particular, if China shows signs of using military force
to seize the Dongsha Islands, how it will respond will become a touchstone of the Biden
administration’s Asian policy.
Regarding nuclear arms control, the Biden administration is expected to be morepositive about nuclear arms control than the Trump administration. However, as was
the case under the Obama administration which advocated “a world without nuclear
weapons,” whether it can actually promote nuclear arms control depends largely on
the security environment surrounding nuclear weapons. The security environment has
become much more severe than at that time, and the imperative of deterrence, including
nuclear deterrence, has been reaffirmed. As the basis of the deterrence relationshiphas shifted from a US-Russian bipolar to a multipolar one centering on the UnitedStates, China and Russia, coordination toward an agreement will become much more
complicated than before while realistic nuclear arms control is necessary in order toreduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons. It is important for the United States andRussia to extend the New START, and further reduce their nuclear arsenal as a postNew START. Furthermore, China should show its part of the responsibility as an
emerging great power through the implementation of substantive nuclear arms control
measures, such as improving transparency (consistency of its intention and capability)
and reducing its nuclear and missile arsenals. ■31

Strategic Annual Report 2020
The Novel Coronavirus and the New Normal of Battles over Techno-hegemony

The Novel Coronavirus and the New Normal ofBattles over Techno-hegemony
The novel coronavirus pandemic
has accelerated moves to review
international

interdependence

from the perspective of power
politics. Shocks in the low tier ofsupply chains caused delays andinterruptions in the supply ofparts and materials, hampering
the stable supply of finishedA CCTV security surveillance camera monitoring people’s movement during COVID-19
outbreak in Beijing, May 2020. (Photo by REUTERS/Aflo)products. As a result, the vulnerability of the defense industry bases and electronics
which are the core of the digital economy was once again recognized. The use of
the supply chain for foreign and/or domestic policy purposes caused concerns. In
addition, surveillance cameras and biometric technologies, which attracted attention
during the novel coronavirus pandemic, highlighted the differences in values andnorms between countries. Based on machine learning technologies, these technologies
attracted attention as tools to promote a contactless and low-contact society, but at thesame time, raised concerns that they were being used to suppress dissidents and ethnic
minorities, and to maintain or strengthen authoritarian regimes at home and abroad.
The novel coronavirus pandemic has not only built the logic of foreign policy andsecurity into international economic interdependence, but also shook international
relations in terms of values and norms.

Competition for Technological Superiority
Even during the novel coronavirus pandemic, the US and China are still locked ina battle for technological supremacy. This is based on a view that the superiority
or inferiority of technology is directly related to the relative power relationshipbetween nations. In October, the US government released the ‘National Strategy for
Critical and Emerging Technologies’ in which it announced its intention to focus ontechnology protection and innovation in 20 technology areas including advanced
computing, artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, biotechnology, quantum32information science as well as semiconductors and microelectronics.
On the other hand, China is also striving for technological superiority. Although the
Chinese government has refrained from exaggeratedly referring to military-civilian
integration or ‘Made in China 2025’, it has not relaxed its pursuit of technologicalinnovation. In October, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized the acquisitionof international superiority in quantum technology. China’s high-tech innovationrelated market is increasing its presence: in July, the Semiconductor Manufacturing
International Corporation (SMIC), the largest semiconductor foundry in China,
achieved a listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange ‘Science and Technology Innovation
Board (STAR Market)’ which was opened in 2019. The era in which the US has had
an overwhelming technological superiority and China has been pursuit is coming toan end, and it is argued that China is already ahead of the US in some technologicalfields. Looking at the number of patent applications by country, China is said to bealready at the top, having overtaken the US and Japan in the fields of advanced andemerging technologies such as AI, blockchain technology, virtual reality (VR), drones
and lithium-ion batteries. As the value of big data, the core of digital technology,
rises dramatically, some may argue that China’s political system is advantageous fortechnological innovation.

Networks
The battles over techno-hegemony are not limited to competition for the superiorityof technology. As competing countries are interdependent, networks connecting
their industrial and technological bases are sometimes used for foreign and/or
domestic policy purposes. It is the weaponization of networks. The novel coronavirus
pandemic has highlighted the vulnerability of cross-border supply chain networks,
forcing governments to review and reorganize their supply chains. In particular, theUS government’s efforts to reorganize the supply chains were strongly focused on
exclusion of China. In September, the US government tightened export controlson Huawei Technology and halted the supply of products manufactured using US
products. Next, SMIC was added to the list of companies subject to regulation, hitting
semiconductor manufacturing in China. The US government appears to be trying todrive a wedge into China’s semiconductor supply chain networks.

33

Strategic Annual Report 2020
The Novel Coronavirus and the New Normal of Battles over Techno-hegemony

The US government, which is strong in the fields of research and development (R&D)
and semiconductor design, has also strengthened its efforts targeting the low tier ofthe supply chains. Amid growing criticism that Chinese researchers and students
are stealing technology, information, and intellectual property in the US, the US
government announced a series of measures, including banning Chinese students
from entering the US, revoking their visas, and prosecuting university teachers who
cooperated in the ‘Thousand Talents Plan.’ The US is also trying to limit the flow offunds. In November, President Trump banned US citizens from investing in Chinesecompanies considered to have close ties with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), andin December, the US Department of Defense designated SMIC and other companies
as having a connection with the PLA. These measures will prohibit US investors frominvesting in the designated Chinese companies, and US financial institutions will nolonger be able to offer financial products that include shares of these companies. The
Senate and House, with bipartisan support, also passed a bill that would allow Chinesecompanies to be ruled out of the US stock market. These measures seek to impose
restrictions on the R&D stage, which is the low tier of the supply chains.
Furthermore, new supply chain networks reflecting security considerations are beingsought. The US government, along with its allies and friends, has accelerated efforts
to rebuild supply chain networks of advanced technologies and industries with builtin security considerations. A typical example is the strengthening of the supply chain
between the US and Taiwan. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Ltd.
(TSMC), which holds half of the global market share in semiconductor foundry andis known for its technological quality, announced in May that it would build a newchip plant in the US in response to the request of the Trump administration. In
addition, the US and Taiwan held an economic dialogue in November, which called
for the strengthening of their supply chains and 5G networks.
The Chinese government took counter-measures. In April, President Xi Jinping madea speech requesting to increase the dependence of the world’s supply chain on China.
At the 5th General Assembly of the 19th Central Committee (5th Plenary Session) in
October, the ‘Dual Circulation’ to increase the international economic cycle (external
circulation) and the domestic economic cycle (internal circulation) was emphasized.
This indicates the Chinese government seeks to get out of the US-centered supply34

chain network and build an independent supply chain centered on China. This is thereason why the Chinese government is concentrating on domestic production efforts
through the establishment of industrial parks, use of subsidies and other industrial
policy measures as well as government procurement. The announcment by SMIC
of its plan to establish a new company with a Chinese government-affiliated fundin December to build a large-scale semiconductor production base in China can beunderstood in this context. The Chinese government is trying to ease the shock ofUS-led supply chain disruptions through domestic production and diversification of
supply chains. In addition, China stepped up its offensive. In China, a new export
control law took effect in December, and it was announced on the day after that
semiconductors and quantum cryptography were listed on the export control list.
At the same time, the Chinese government has made it clear that it will not hesitate
to retaliate against the arbitrary policies of other countries, leading to uncertainties
regarding how the export control measures will be implemented. Concerns have beenraised that the Chinese government may use its export control measures to influence
the supply chain for foreign and/or domestic policy purposes.
Digital networks are also a major battleground in the US-China confrontation. The
current state of international interdependence, networked with digital technology,
increases vulnerability against counterpart countries in cyberspace. Therefore, in
the age of the Internet of Things (IoT), countries try to prevent competitors fromaccessing their advanced technologies and reduce their digital dependence on othercountries. In addition, concerns that machine learning technology could turn big
data, a collection of personal data, into tools for influence and other operations, raise
security concerns about data collection. Data flow, data privacy and data security are
emerging as new security challenges while the boundaries between data privacy andnational security become ambiguous.
The US government has made it clear that it will exclude China from digital networks
linking its allies and friends. In August, US Secretary of State Pompeo launched a ‘Clean
Network’ program that excluded Chinese telecoms, app stores, apps, the cloud, and cablesfrom US digital networks, and called allies and friends to participate in ‘clean’ digital
networks. More than 30 parties are said to have already participated in the initiative.
The US government, concerned about Chinese sharp power, was particularly sensitive35

Strategic Annual Report 2020
The Novel Coronavirus and the New Normal of Battles over Techno-hegemony

about collection of personal data
through Chinese apps, and began
to remove them. In August, the US
government banned trading with
TikTok, a popular video-sharing
app. This was because TikTok’s
automatic collection of users’
personal information gives the
Chinese Communist Party access

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced the Clean Network Initiative, August 5,
2020. (Photo by REUTERS/Aflo)to information on US citizens.
However, in September, the month after the ‘Clean Network’ program wasannounced, the Chinese government launched a ‘Global Data Security Initiative’
to restrain the US initiative. The Chinese government called on states to foster an
open, fair and non-discriminatory business environment for mutual benefit, win-win
outcomes and common development; it also requested to handle data security in
a comprehensive, objective and evidence-based manner, and to maintain an open,
secure and stable supply chain of global information and communication technology(ICT) products and services. The Chinese government resisted the US government’s
ban on digital networks and proposed alternative digital network governance. The
Chinese government has lobbied a number of countries to gain support for the
initiative, and Pakistan, Syria, Belarus, and Laos expressed their support. It evenappears that the Chinese government has embarked on the international rulemaking
of data governance.
At the same time, the Chinese government appears to be taking steps to counterthe US exclusion of Chinese apps. In December, the Chinese government issued adraft guideline on collecting personal information through mobile phone apps, andimmediately banned 105 apps for violating three cyber-related laws. However, thelack of details about the violations and the inclusion of US apps among those bannedby the Chinese government have led some to view the move as a countermeasure
to the US government’s exclusion of Chinese apps. The US is no longer the only
country to unilaterally control digital networks.

36

International Standards
One of the most notable aspects of international rulemaking is international
standardization activities. International standards that promote cross-border R&D,
technology transfer and trade facilitation have lock-in effects, such as path dependency,that shape future technology trajectories and market dominance, and determine thefate of nations, businesses and society. Therefore, international standardization
activities reflect technical requirements, economic rationality, social norms andinternational power politics.
One focus is technical standards. Until now, Japan, the US and Europe haveplayed leading roles in setting international technical standards, but today China isalso showing strong interest. It appears that the Chinese government has alreadystepped up its international standardization activities, including the formulation of a
‘China Standards 2035’ to follow on the ‘Made in China 2025.’ In the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International ElectrotechnicalCommission (IEO), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), China
has been actively leading the proceedings, proposing technical standards documents,and obtaining important posts. In addition, by taking advantage of the simplicityof standards, low product prices and entry into their own domestic market, China
is trying to promote cooperation in standardization with countries along the ‘Belt
and Road Initiative’ in order to make the Chinese standard an international de facto
standard. China attempts to influence the establishment of international technicalstandards through activities in international organizations and bilateral relations. The
focus is on the areas where technological standards have not yet been established,such as IoT. As China’s presence in the field of advanced industries and technologies
grows, it is increasingly likely that China will control international standards inthese areas. Furthermore, China’s standardization efforts are having influence overinternational political dynamics by prompting changes in US export control policies.
Since the US government placed Huawei on its export control list in May 2019, it has
tightened regulations on the company. However, in June 2020, the US government
decided to allow the supply of some technologies only for the purpose of contributing
to the revision and development of international standards. It is believed that there
were concerns that restrictions on exports to Huawei would lead to the delay of US
companies in standardization activities such as 5G and result in China’s advance.
37

Strategic Annual Report 2020
The Novel Coronavirus and the New Normal of Battles over Techno-hegemony

The rise of China as an important player in setting technical standards may be an
aspect of international power transition.
Another focus is governance standards. Much attention is being paid to areas related
to the management of data generated by digital technologies that the global economy
is based on. The Court of Justice of the European Union (EUJ) ruled in July that the‘Privacy Shield’ framework, which allows American companies to transfer personal
information obtained in the EU to the US, was invalid. The reason for the EUJ’s
decision was that the protection of personal data under the US law was not at thelevel equivalent to that under the EU law. Difference between the US and Europe on
the values and norms of personal data protection have caused these problems. As
big data circulates among countries that have different values and social norms for
personal information, institutions and mechanisms are being sought to establish andimplement governance standards for the transfer, use and protection of such data.

Bringing Governments Back In
In the world of advanced technology, private companies and research institutions
cannot be ignored. However, today the government’s involvement in private activities
appears to be increasing as the logic of foreign policy and security comes to theforefront in supply chain reconsideration.
Big Tech companies, such as GAFA or BAT, have been seen as the drivers of innovation,
but concerns that their dominance distorts market competition have motivatedgovernment intervention. In the US, lawsuits were filed against Google in Octoberand Facebook in December for violation of the Antitrust Law. Even divestitures of
Big Tech companies are sometimes discussed. In Europe, where Big Tech companies
and the government have confronted each other over taxation and data collection,
involvement of governments is increasing as seen in the UK, where the government
established a special organization in November to monitor and regulate fair market
competition among Big Tech companies. In addition, the Chinese government hasannounced new guidelines on the regulation of monopolistic activities by Big Techcompanies and the collection of personal information through apps; the government’s
control over tech companies such as Baidu, Alibaba Group and Tencent, which had
been growing with the support of the government, is getting stronger. This is in line38with the view that the reduction in subsidies by the Chinese government led to thedefault of state-owned semiconductor giant Tsinghua Unigroup, and that pressure
from the Chinese government led to Alibaba’s Ant abandoning its listing on the
Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges.
Sometimes, various governments work together to confront Big Tech companies. In
October, seven governments, five countries of Five Eyes plus Japan and India, issued
a joint statement calling on tech companies to, among others, allow law enforcement
authorities to access the contents of their communications. The end-to-end
encryption technology that this statement took issue with means that only the parties
to the communication create the encryption key. While the advantages of protecting
personal information are great, it has been regarded as a problem that it is technically
impossible for telecommunications carriers and government authorities to accessthe contents of communications. The US government has sought legal access to thecontents of communications by enforcement authorities for public interest purposessuch as child abuse prevention and terrorism investigations. The joint declaration
reiterates the need to address illegal communications and urges tech companies toincorporate cryptographic mechanisms that allow government authorities to access
communications. There is a value struggle between the protection of personal
information and the public interest.

Perspective
Amid the novel coronavirus pandemic, US-China competition for technologicalsupremacy continues, and the logic of foreign policy and security is built into theinternational economic interdependence. The retreat of US dominance and therise of China extended from the relative relationships among nations to the levelof networks and international rulemaking. As governments’ presence in society
increases, differences in values, norms and political systems among countries affectoverall technology and foreign policies.
These international ‘New Normals’ are not unrelated to Japan. The July ‘Integrated
Innovation Strategy’ defines AI technology and quantum technology as disruptive
innovation to be strategically tackled, and promotes the world’s most advanced R&D,
base formation, and human resource development in these fields. Improved scrutiny
39

Strategic Annual Report 2020
The Novel Coronavirus and the New Normal of Battles over Techno-hegemonyof visa issuance to foreign students and researchers, and the introduction of a secretpatent system are being considered. In Japan, the development and protection of
the advanced and emerging technologies are urgent issues that need to be tackled
together. The Japanese government also seeks to restructure its supply chain throughdiversification initiatives, including the reshoring of suppliers to Japan. Further
promotion of ‘China plus One’ and the establishment of a new supply chain network
among Japan, Australia and India are emphasized. Some argue that advanced
technology ecosystems should be built among democratic countries. Furthermore,
Japan, which lagged behind regarding 5G, seeks to find a way in relation to theinternational standards for 6G, which is expected to become available in 2030. The
Japanese government will focus on standardizing Japanese companies. In addition,
the Japanese government has been strengthening its presence by clarifying its stanceon the abuse of dominant bargaining positions by Big Tech companies.
However, these efforts by the Japanese government have not been sufficiently effective.
Japan has fallen behind the US and China in R&D expenditures for advanced andemerging technologies, and its presence has declined. It has been reported that several
Japanese universities have concluded academic exchange agreements with Chinese
universities associated with the military and some point out that private companies are
not so enthusiastic about the government’s call for diversification of the supply chain.
With the relative decline in technological capabilities and the limited number of key
positions in international organizations, it is unclear whether Japan’s standardization
activities will bear fruit.
In 2020, the Japanese government took a proactive stance on economic security. In
April, an economic team was established within the National Security Secretariat,
and in July, the Foreign Ministry carried out organizational reform with regard to
economic security. According to media reports, the Ministry of Defense and theMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are also consideringorganizational reforms related to economic security. Lack of personnel and experience,
however, have hampered effective policy development. Attention needs to be paid tothe effects of these efforts in the future. ■40

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Fallout of the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic and the Crisis of Multilateralism

Fallout of the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic and
the Crisis of Multilateralism
The transnational outbreak of
a novel coronavirus infection(COVID-19) brought about thegreatest impact on the world
affaires in 2020. The COVID-19
pandemic is a global issue that
affects multiple sectors of theeconomy and society of eachcountry and region, and has

The outbreak of COVID-19 put French medical staff under severe strain, March 2020.
(Photo by AFP/Aflo)

had a major impact on the
global economy. Furthermore, the multilateral cooperation through internationalorganizations, which had already been in a state of dysfunction in the absence of US
leadership, has fallen into a serious crisis in the year of the 75th anniversary of thecreation of the United Nations.

The COVID-19 Pandemic
In December 2019, the first case of COVID-19 infection was confirmed in Wuhan
City, Hubei Province, China. In January 2020, the number of new infections in China
increased rapidly. By April, the infection had spread to almost all countries aroundthe world, including countries in East Asia and Europe, the United States, Russia,
India, and Brazil. The WHO issued a pandemic declaration on March 11. Enormous
burden was placed on medical systems as there were no vaccine or specifically effective
medicine, resulting in a large number of fatalities in April, mainly in Europe and theUnited States. In many countries and regions, strict measures such as lockdowns andborder restrictions were implemented, and measures were taken to prevent the spreadof infection by curbing economic activities. While the spread of infection slowed
down in summer partly due to the effectiveness of infection prevention measures,the infection started to spread anew in the Northern Hemisphere in autumn andwinter when the weather became cold and dry, leading to an increased number of
new infections and deaths. As of the end of December 2020, the cumulative number
41

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Fallout of the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic and the Crisis of Multilateralismof confirmed cases stood at 81.55 million and the number of deaths exceeded 1.8
million in the world. In December, the United States and Europe approved their first
vaccines. Although the situation varies depending on the countries and regions, theworld as a whole cannot be expected to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic for thetime being.
From mid-March through summer 2020, when the first wave peaked, many countries
and regions took strict control measures to prevent the infection. These measures
included canceling large-scale events, closing or limiting business hours of stores andfacilities, closing schools, refraining from traveling, and keeping distance from othersin public spaces. Teleworking was recommended to companies, and telecommuting
using ICT tools became widespread. Restrictions on entry and exit as well asactivities after entry into countries were implemented as border measures, and the
movement of people was significantly restricted. Almost all countries and regions
faced the dilemma that the more restrictive measures to prevent the infection were
implemented, the more serious the negative impact on economic activities. Since
the summer, restrictions have been gradually relaxed in order to resume economic
activities as the spread of infection has calmed down. However, as the spread of
infection has turned to an increasing trend, restrictions have been tightened again.

Serious Impacts on the Global Economy
Restrictive measures to contain the spread of the virus worldwide have created an
unprecedented economic crisis in which the global economy is frozen from bothsupply and demand sides. The scale of the economic crisis surpasses that of the
global financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and iscomparable to the Great Depression in the 1930s. The impact on employment isextremely serious due to the impact on the manufacturing industry brought about by
supply chain disruptions and a decrease in overseas demand, as well as the damage tothe service industries such as food and drink and tourism caused by disruptions in the
cross-border movement of people, resulting in the increase of the unemployment rate
in many countries. In response to this serious economic crisis, governments aroundthe world have come up with large-scale emergency economic packages and various
assistance measures. Compared with the Great Depression and the global financial
crisis, the economic crisis caused by the pandemic has shown signs of recovery in42

a short period of time because economic activities could resume while controllingthe spread of infection. However, restrictions have to be repeatedly implemented
in developed countries, and wide distribution of vaccines is nowhere in sight indeveloping countries. Thus, there is a risk that the impact on the economy may
linger. In such situation, vulnerable groups of people and developing countries are
the ones most affected by the economic crisis, as the effects of the crisis will increase
unemployment, economic disparities, and educational disparities, which will persist
for a long time. Recognizing this, it is necessary to strengthen the safety net functions
in domestic economic measures as well as to enhance international cooperation.
According to the IMF, China’s growth rate in 2020 is projected to be 1.9%, the only
positive growth among the major economies. The forecast by the Japan Center for
Economic Research, released in December, predicted that China would overtake theUnited States in terms of nominal GDP in 2028. This projection means that the timingof China becoming the world’s largest economy would be moved forward, as China
quickly gets a grip on the spread of the infections and recovers relatively quickly. A
scenario is conceivable in which China will lead the recovery of the global economy ina post-COVID-19 world, thereby increasing its dependence on the Chinese economy.
On the other hand, it is necessary to carefully analyze whether China, which has
long relied heavily on overseas demand from developed countries, can be the solewinner amid the global economic downturn with negative growth everywhere. Overthe medium to long term, China faces a number of structural problems, including thedebt problem, sustainability of its economic growth relying on public finance, and thedimishing labor force due to the declining birthrate and aging population. Therefore,
projecting the growth of the Chinese economy premised on the extension of current
trends entails certain risks. It also needs to be mentioned that there is always a riskthat the contradictions in its political and social systems may pose to the economic
growth in China.

43

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Fallout of the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic and the Crisis of Multilateralism

Figure 1. Projected Real Growth Rate (%)
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15

United Japan Germany FranceStates
2020

China

India

RussiaBrazil2021

Source: IMF

The coronavirus pandemic has prompted a review of the supply chain. While there
have been cases of disruptions in the supply chain due to natural disasters in the past,risks and vulnerabilities of the supply chain were recognized anew in the face of the
difficulty in obtaining medical and other essential supplies such as masks amid the
pandemic, and the disruptions of the manufactured part supplies from China in theearly phase. There are three aspects in reviewing the supply chain. First, Article 11of the GATT allows temporary restrictions on exports of food and medical essential
supplies. It is necessary for the governments to support domestic production andsecuring of important materials. The second issue is whether a supply chain thatis excessively dependent on overseas production and dispersed is optimal, and theoptions of shortening the supply chain and returning to domestic production are being
considered. The third is the acceleration of the movement of the so-called China Plus
One: relocation of production bases from China to ASEAN countries due to risinglabor costs in China, which had been in motion since before the COVID-19 pandemic.
Vietnam and Indonesia are promising investment destinations. Developed countries’
policy moves are also noteworthy. The US President-elect Joe Biden said that $700
billion would be invested over four years to support the manufacturing industry as ameasure to create jobs in the US. In Japan, as part of emergency economic packages,
a subsidy program for promoting domestic investment to strengthen supply chain
and overseas supply chain diversification for small and medium enterprises were
implemented, to which applications far exceeded the budget limit, suggesting that
potential demand is high.

44

The acceleration of digitization is one of the positive sides of the effect of thepandemic. With infection-control measures that restrict mobility and humancontact, ICT has become an essential tool for maintaining socioeconomic activities,
and digitization has rapidly advanced. In counties such as China and Singapore,
thorough infection control is implemented through the use of smartphone tracking
applications. For administrative support such as benefits, Germany and othercountries used the Identification Number System, which enabled smooth online
application and payment. Telecommuting and online meetings in the workplace,
online teaching in education, online medical consultation, e-shops for drug purchase,
as well as robotics and automation in production sites have been introduced or are
becoming widespread rapidly in various countries. Society 5.0, which aims to achieveboth economic development and solutions to issues such as the declining birthrate
and aging population as well as climate change through the use of digital technology,
is a key to achieving the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
In the governance of international data flows, which are increasing along with thedigitalization of the economy, rulemaking through regional free trade agreements
such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) andthe WTO has become an important issue.

Crisis of Multilateralism
The worldwide spread of the novel coronavirus created a situation that cannot be
solved by any country alone, therefore requires international cooperation. On thecontrary, however, the year commemorating the 75th anniversary of the creationof the United Nations witnessed the absence of global leadership and the crisis ofmultilateralism that had been worsening in recent years. Since the inauguration of
the Trump administration, the United States had accelerated its anti-multilateralist
move by implementing policies of secession from multilateral agreements andinternational organizations. In 2019, the US formally notified its withdrawal fromthe Paris Agreement on the greenhouse gas reduction. In the WTO, the disputesettlement process fell into dysfunction at the end of 2019 due to the US opposition
to the appointment of a member of the Appellate Body. Furthermore, in the election
process of the Director-General following the resignation of Director-General Roberto
Azevedo in August 2020, the United States opposed the approval of Nigeria’s Ngozi
Okonjo-Iweala recommended by the selection committee. As a result, a new Director45

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Fallout of the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic and the Crisis of Multilateralism

General has not been elected as of the end of 2020. Regarding the pandemic, President
Trump has criticized China over its handling, drawing counterargument from China
and leading to a blame game between the two countries. The United States strongly
criticized the WHO that it was accomodating to China, suspended the payment of its
contributions in April and announced its withdrawal in July. At the United Nations,
Secretary General António Guterres called for an immediate ceasefire in conflictareas in March, but adoption of the Security Council resolution to the same effectwas delayed until July due to a disagreement between the United States and China
over whether it should include reference to the WHO. These developments at various
internationalorganizations

revealed in broad daylight theabsence of US leadership andthe dysfuntion of internationalorganizations

stemmingfromthe confrontation between the
United States and China amid
the pandemic.

Director-General of the WHO Tedros attends a conference on the outbreak of COVID-19,
March 2020. (Photo by AP/Aflo)

Vaccines for COVID-19 have been developed at a rapid pace. Pharmaceuticalcompanies such as Pfizer and Moderna of the United States, and AstraZeneca of
the United Kingdom have led the way to development and distribution of vaccines.
Vaccination was approved and started in the United Kingdom and the United Statesin December. The COVAX facility, a framework for global COVID-19 vaccine
supply, was launched under the leadership of the GAVI Alliance (Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunization), CEPI (Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
Innovations), and the WHO. COVAX has two mechanisms: a framework in whichhigh and middle income countries contribute funds to purchase vaccines for theirown use; and a framework in which vaccines are supplied to developing countries
through contributions from donors. Countries that participate in and contribute to
COVAX will have access to the vaccines to cover up to 20% of their population.
Contributions will also be used for development and manufacturing facilities. In
September, the Japanese government announced its participation, and in October,
Foreign Minister Motegi announced that Japan would contribute more than $130
million to help developing countries secure vaccines. As for China, President Xi
46

Jinping announced in May that China would contribute $2 billion over the next two
years to respond to the pandemic, and China decided to join COVAX in October. On
the other hand, the United States and Russia have not joined COVAX, symbolizing
the lack of international cooperation in dealing with the coronavirus pandemic.

Perspective
COVID-19 triggered an economic crisis comparable to the Great Depression in 1930
and had serious effects on the economy and society of each country as well as theinternational community. In the short term, the international community should
work together to contain the pandemic, recognizing that “it is impossible to solve thisproblem alone.” In the medium to long term, it is important to turn the crisis into an
opportunity by striving to build a sustainable economy and society, and to stregntheninternational cooperation. There is expectation for the new US administration’s
intention to play a leading role again in multilateralism, including in the area ofclimate change, which it attaches importance to, and to show its willingness tocooperate with its partners.
The spread of the new virus is a problem closely related to environmental problems,
as it has been pointed out that one of the causes is changes in ecosystems triggered byenvironmental destruction which brought humans closer to viruses. In addition, thesuppression of economic activities through measures to prevent infectious diseases
has reduced air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, which led to renewed
awareness of the environmental impact of regular economic activities. In theeconomic measures of major countries and regions in response to this crisis, measuresaiming at structural transformation of the economy and society and the realization ofsustainable economic growth with the post-COVID-19 society have been announced,
and slogans such as “green recovery” are attracting attention. There is a growing
desire to build a resilient economy and society against pandemics and to contributeto solving common global challenges. Under these circumstances, there is a growing
movement to become carbon neutral by 2050. The EU and China are working hardto promote renewable energy, and under the slogan of “European Green Deal,” theEU declared that it would achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, and China by 2060.
Japan and South Korea have since pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. In
the United States, the new Biden administration is expected to return to the Paris
47

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Fallout of the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic and the Crisis of Multilateralism

Agreement and come up with a commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050 according
to the election pledge, which will give impetus to the promotion of international
cooperation and implemenation of concrete measures to tackle the climate change
challenges. ■48

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Europe’s Shift Towards Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Future Course

Europe’s Shift Towards Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Future CourseThe

intensifying

hegemonic
the

US-China

competition

worsening

perception

andofChina due to the COVID-19
pandemic have brought abouta strategic change in Europe toturn its attention towards the
Indo-Pacific. Several European
countries have successively put in

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wears a mask after givinga statement on the outcome of the Brexit negotiations, December 2020. (Photo by
REUTERS/Aflo)place their Indo-Pacific strategies,
and the EU is working to swiftly develop its own strategy towards this region. NATOhas characterized China as a “full-spectrum systemic rival.” Against these backdrops,
relations between Japan and Europe, as natural partners, have been strengthened in
the areas of economic liberalization through the Economic Partnership Agreements(EPAs) with the EU and the UK, cooperation on connectivity and infrastructuredevelopments, and security cooperation in tandem with NATO.

European Rebalance to the Indo-Pacific
An important strategic change in Europe identifiable from 2020 has been its increasing
interest in the Indo-Pacific region. For a long time, Europe did not show strong interestin this region. The presence of the UK, through its Commonwealth countries, and theinterests of France, with more than 90% of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) inthe region, have been standing out, making the Indo-Pacific issue above all an AngloFrench issue. When Japan and the US launched their Indo-Pacific visions, the European
countries remained indifferent, and the concept was rarely used at the political level.
However, such perception has clearly changed, driven by the intensification of the
US-China hegemonic competition and the worsening perception of China due tothe COVID-19 pandemic. As early as March 2019, the EU displayed its warinessregarding China by adopting ‘EU-China: A Strategic Outlook’ in which it labelled
China as a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” The EU
49

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Europe’s Shift Towards Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Future Course

also expressed its concerns about expansion of China’s influence through the ‘Belt
and Road Initiative’ (BRI), human rights abuse against ethnic minorities, and its
crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy. China’s ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ and ‘mask
diplomacy’ during the pandemic further exacerbated Europe’s perception of China.
According to a public opinion survey on changes in perceptions of China during the
pandemic, 48% of respondents in Europe replied that their perceptions had worsened,
while only 12% said they had improved. Europe’s threat perceptions surrounding
China have thus been reinforced during the pandemic.
Current strong interest of European countries in the Indo-Pacific is based on
the recognition that the direction of this region will not only have a significant
consequence on their individual interests but also on the future international order.
Certainly, the economic importance of the Indo-Pacific region for Europe cannot be
understated given the amounts of Europe’s imports and exports passing through thisregion. Conflicts and disputes, including piracy on the sea lanes, are also a European
security issue. However, European countries are now viewing the Indo-Pacific lessfrom the perspective of individual interests, but as a keystone for the future of the
postwar rules-based international order and multilateralism.
This change in perception has led successive European countries to release IndoPacific strategies. France was the first European country to adopt a strategy for theregion in 2018 by revealing ‘France’s Defense Strategy in the Indo-Pacific.’ At thattime, the reaction of European countries to this move was limited. The perceptionof Chinese threats was not widely shared across Europe. However, as perceptions ofChina worsened during the pandemic, Germany adopted ‘Policy Guidelines for the
Indo-Pacific Region’ in September 2020. Accounting for 48.5% of total EU exports to
China in 2019, Germany has so far been cautious to criticize China, in marked contrast
to France. The fact that Germany adopted guidelines for the ‘Indo-Pacific,’ a concept
it avoided using up to that point, can be taken as a wake-up call for other European
countries. Following Germany, in November 2020, the Netherlands released its IndoPacific strategy. Now Germany, France, and the Netherlands are at the center of the
EU’s efforts to develop a new European strategy towards the Indo-Pacific.

50However, the Indo-Pacific strategy at European level is not yet clear, and there areslight differences in the strategies adopted by individual European countries. France
is primarily interested in protecting its security and national interests including
protection of its EEZ, and aims to strengthen its presence in the Indo-Pacific. The
German guideline positions the Indo-Pacific region as “the key to shaping theinternational order in the 21st century.” Referring to China that “calls the rules of
the international order into question,” it emphasizes the need of “closing ranks withdemocracies and partners with shared values in the region.” Compared to France’s
security leaning, the German guideline suggests a broader spectrum of multilateralengagement, such as strengthening regional partnerships with ASEAN, promoting
open markets and trade, investing in digitalization and infrastructure sustainability,and fostering inclusive cooperation. These policy divergences cannot be ignored asthey suggest potential discrepancies, and an early establishment of EU-wide strategy
towards the Indo-Pacific is all the more needed.
Although overall perceptions of China have worsened, the European countries
have not become monolithic in their attitudes toward China. In Hungary and theCzech Republic, the increasingly authoritarian governments have not abandoned
their pro-China stance. Of even greater importance is the dependence of Western
European countries on China for their economy and supply chains. At the endof 2020, under the leadership of German Chancellor Merkel, the EU-China
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment was hastily concluded after seven years
of protracted negotiations. In the absence of indications of a resolution to theHong Kong and Xinjiang Uyghur issues, the conclusion of the agreement has been
criticized as prioritizing economic gains over human rights and values. Although
the EU has attempted to draw concessions from China by requiring it to ratify
the ILO conventions on forced labor, there is little cause for optimism. Under thesystemic US-China rivalry, not only Japan but also Europe is faced with the dual
challenge of maintaining good economic relations with China while countering
those of its actions that are contrary to their interests and values.

Progress in Japan-Europe Cooperation
As Europe deems the Indo-Pacific to be a strategic cornerstone, Japan is expected
to play a role as a partner. Japan and Europe have made progress in recent years
51Strategic Annual Report 2020
Europe’s Shift Towards Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Future Course

in multiple areas of cooperation, including economic liberalization through EPAs,
connectivity and infrastructure development, and security and defense cooperation
with NATO.
Strengthening cooperation with Europe was one of the key priorities of Japan’s
diplomacy during Prime Minister Abe’s tenure of seven years and eight months,
and his commitment yielded steady results. In February 2019, the Japan-EU EPA
and Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) came into force. In September 2019,
the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure was also
signed between Japan and the EU. As early as 2018 through the ‘Strategy for EUAsia Connectivity,’ the EU displayed its commitment to promoting sustainable andrules-based connectivity, which resonates with Japan’s idea of ‘quality infrastructure
investment.’ Such convergence of the principles and values between Japan andEurope was heightened to the level of partnership through this agreement. The
new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, who took office in September 2020, seeks topromote the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) vision and strengthen Japan-EU
cooperation. Suga repeatedly referred to FOIP in his telephone conversations withGerman Chancellor Merkel, President of the European Council Michel, and UK
Prime Minister Johnson. In October 2020, Foreign Minister Motegi visited France andPortugal, and in November, he reaffirmed the importance of Japan-EU cooperation
to the realization of FOIP during a Japan-EU Foreign Ministers’ telephone call withHigh Representative Borrell.
Japan-NATO cooperation has also been strengthened. Japan-NATO cooperation
has been centered on cooperation with France and the UK, the two countries withmaritime capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. However, since the adoption of a Joint
Political Declaration between Japan and NATO in 2013 and the approval of the
Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) in the following year, theirpractical and operational cooperation has steadily progressed. In June 2020, Japan
and NATO made its latest revision of IPCP, which included: the addition of ‘humansecurity’ to the priority areas for cooperation; reference to the Indo-Pacific; and the
deepening of consultation on the East Asian security situation. Behind the progressof Japan-NATO cooperation is a considerable change in NATO’s perception towards
China. In the London Declaration adopted in December 2019, NATO announced the52need to address China’s rise along with Russia’s threat, stating that “[w]e recognise
China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities
and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.” Furthermore, in
December 2020, NATO launched ‘NATO 2030: United for a New Era,’ a reportoutlining the strategic challenges for the Alliance over the next 10 years. In thisreport, China is characterized as a “full-spectrum systemic rival” that poses “acutechallenges to open and democratic societies.” The recommendations of this report
include the establishment of a consultative body to discuss NATO’s security interestsvis-à-vis China and the development of countermeasures against cyber-attacks anddisinformation.
The relations with the UK in the post-Brexit era are also important in considering thefuture relations between Japan and Europe. The UK formally left the EU in January
2020, and it then spent about a year in a transition period. However, the negotiations
on the terms of its exit from the bloc were difficult and protracted, with especiallyheavily divisions on governance, state aid and competition, and fisheries. The text ofa deal was only agreed on December 24, 2020, and thus the situation in which the
UK would crash out of the bloc without arrangements was avoided. However, due tothe lateness of the deal and the resulting lack of wide dissemination of the text andterms, major disruption in areas such as customs clearance and quarantine measures isforeseeable. As the four-and-a-half-year drama of the ‘Brexit’ comes to a close, Prime
Minister Johnson has emphasized its achievement by trumpeting UK’s “recaptured
sovereignty.” Yet, when looking at Northern Ireland, which is dissatisfied with its
effective decoupling from the British mainland, and Scotland, which has a strong
pro-EU stance and a mounting sense of independence, the prospects of the ‘United’
Kingdom cannot be said to be especially bright. It is thus important to follow how
the UK, now a third-country as regards the EU, develops its engagement with the EU
and the world.
While the UK-EU relationship has been in turmoil, the UK-Japan relationship has been
deepened. In October 2020, Japan and the UK signed a Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement (CEPA). While CEPA is, for the most part, a replacement toJapan-EU EPA, it also contains enhanced provisions on tariffs, financial services ande-commerce regulations. This agreement is also considered to be a stepping-stone to53Strategic Annual Report 2020
Europe’s Shift Towards Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Future Course

the UK acceding to The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-PacificPartnership (CPTPP). On the security front, too, Japan and the UK have strengthened
their cooperation through joint military exercises. As part of its Global Britain strategy,
the UK plans to dispatch its aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacificand remain in the West Pacific including the area close to Japan in 2021.

Future Course of Japan-Europe Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
In a globally connected strategic environment, Japan and Europe, as ‘natural partners’
who share the same principles, should take a more proactive role in shaping the global
order. Japan-Europe cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is linked not only to a regional
challenge of maintaining order in East-Asia but also to the global challenge of defending
the rules-based international order and free trade. Future cooperation between Japanand Europe will need to give further substance to the conceptual agreements andframeworks that have been built up so far and provide a free and open rules-based order
as a global public good.
Connectivity

andsustainable

development are the first areas
where Japan and Europe canfurther cooperate in the IndoPacific. The concept of ‘quality
infrastructure investment,’ ledby Japan, has won widespread
support at G7 and G20 summits
andisencapsulated

in

the

European Council President Charles Michel speaks during a news conference following
an EU-Japan videoconference summit, May 2020. (Photo by REUTERS/Aflo)connectivity partnership between Japan and the EU. This concept is expected toplay an important role in rebuilding the supply chains disrupted by the COVID-19
crisis. The EU has expressed concerns about China’s aggressive implementation ofits BRI and resulting debt trap, as well as its growing influence over Central andEastern European countries, as these may promote authoritarianism and potentially
undermine European unity. Japan and Europe should put forward the idea of quality
infrastructure and sustainable connectivity as an alternative to the BRI and promotea wide range of projects throughout the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, Central
Asia, Indo-Pacific, and Africa.
54

Sustainable development is one of today’s global agenda. President of the European
Commission von der Leyen has made the European Green Deal her top policy priority.
The ‘Next Generation EU,’ a massive recovery fund agreed on in July 2020 after amarathon meeting, also emphasizes the importance of green investment together withcyber and digital transformation. Now, Prime Minister Suga pledged to achieve carbon
neutrality by 2050, and the US is transitioning to the Biden administration that has
also set the goal of zero-emissions by 2050. In this context it is of great importance topromote high-quality infrastructure investments and raise the regulatory standards.
Such development cooperation should be implemented jointly in pursuit of multilateralism.
Japan should seek positive synergies among existing multilateral frameworks such as the
CPTPP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (RCEP), andEPAs with the EU and the UK. France and Germany’s Indo-Pacific strategies underscorethe importance of cooperation with ASEAN and The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue(QUAD). High Representative Borrell commented positively on RCEP, saying that “itis a sign of the members’ commitment to rules-based trade and investment in the eraof unilateral reward and retaliation.” He also commented that “Europeans should be
proactive in the Indo-Pacific and have a position towards China that is firm but also
open,” citing Japan as an exemplar of such a position.
In addition to such economic and social cooperation, it is also important to develop
security cooperation in tandem with NATO. While continuing joint training andpersonnel dispatches with the UK, France, and other partner countries is important,more concrete Japan-NATO cooperation in the Indo-Pacific needs to take place.
NATO and Japan are expected to play a proactive role not only in defending freedomof navigation and maritime security, but also in expanding intelligence collection
and joint research on cyber-attacks and disinformation. In December 2020, German
Defense Minister Kramp-Karrenbauer announced a plan to dispatch the country’s
naval frigate to the Indo-Pacific for joint exercises with the Self-Defense Forces and thearmed forces of countries in the region. Along with voicing Germany’s wariness ofChina, she stressed a potential role for NATO in the Indo-Pacific and an expectation
for cooperation with the Biden administration. Whether this can be regarded as a
strategic change by Germany or not, opportunities for multilateral cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific are certainly expanding.
55

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Europe’s Shift Towards Indo-Pacific and Japan’s Future Course

Japan and Europe should take a joint leadership in promoting their shared agendas
in coordination with the US and other partner countries that hold common principles
and values. Japan and Europe should become rule-makers rather than rule-takers,
and they can only exert real influence if they work together, not alone. Seeking liberal
cooperation through rules, Japan and the EU should work together as strategic partners
to create the necessary order to further shared economic and security interests, andencourage cooperation to solve global issues. The time has come for Japan and the EU
to take full advantage of each other’s strategic values. ■56

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Russia in 2020 amid the Coronavirus Pandemic

Russia in 2020 amid the Coronavirus Pandemic
2020

was

the

year

of

the

coronavirus pandemic for Russia.
As of the end of December 2020,
the number of novel coronavirus
infection cases in Russia stood
at 3,159,297, the fourth highest
number in the world, with 57,019
deaths. The number of new cases
per day exceeded 20,000 since

President Vladimir Putin gives a televised speech on the coronavirus outbreak, April
2020. (Photo by Alexander NEMENOV/AFP)

mid-November, with the death toll hovering around 500 to 600. The second wave
since October is raging in Russia. The pandemic had a major impact on Russia’s
economy, politics and diplomacy in 2020.

Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic on the Russian Economy
It was at the end of January 2020 that an infection case of the novel coronavirus was
confirmed for the first time in Russia. As the first infected person was a student from
China, the Russian government immediately restricted travel to and from China, andin early February brought Russian citizens who were staying in Wuhan back home.
These measures have largely prevented the spread in Russia of the novel coronavirus
originating in China, the first epicenter of the disease. Until mid-March, only a small
number of people were infected in Russia. However, the spread of the coronavirus
in Russia appears to have occurred via Europe. People who had returned from Italy,
France and Austria, where a high number of coronavirus infection cases had alreadybeen confirmed in early March, were found to have been infected. Since mid-March,
Russia restricted access to/from Europe and the United States, but in late March, theinfection began to spread in Russia, mainly in Moscow.
In response, Moscow became the first city in the country to impose stringent
measures such as restrictions on outings and businesses. President Putin decided todesignate the period from March 30 to May 11 as “non-working days.” In addition,
Prime Minister Mishustin urged local governments to adopt similar restrictions as in
57

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Russia in 2020 amid the Coronavirus Pandemic

Moscow, which resulted in the shutting down of all facilities other than the public
institutions, hospitals and pharmacies, as well as shops for essential commodities
across the country. In parallel with these strict measures called “self-isolation,” thegovernment provided relief measures such as income compensation and various
allowances, interest rate subsidies for small and medium-sized enterprises, and tax
and debt moratorium (although their scale was smaller than those in the developed
Western countries).
Regarding the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the Russian economy, it isdifficult to grasp the overall picture as the second wave started in the autumn of 2020.
However, it can be said that the impact of the first wave was less severe than thatin the West. According to the IMF’s “World Economic Outlook (October 2020),”
Russia’s real GDP growth rate in 2020 was projected to be minus 4.1%, which would
represent less damage than minus 4.3% for the US and minus 8.3% in the Eurozone.
Although there were external shocks such as a temporary plunge of crude oil prices
amid the worsening coronavirus situation in various parts of the world, the effectsof the relief measures described above as well as the gradual release of the lockdown
since May that led to the resumption of economic activities may have mitigatedthe economic damage, at least in the first half of 2020. In addition, the economic
structure of Russia, where contribution of the service industry and related sectors to
the GDP is lower compared to other developed countries, also mitigated the negative
impact of the lockdown on the overall economy. However, since the second quarter,
the unemployment rate has rapidly worsened and the real disposable income has
decreased. Thus, the negative impact of the coronavirus pandemic at the micro levelis considered to be significant.
In the fiscal aspect of the government, the damage caused by the pandemic has
been within the controllable range. The fiscal balance is expected to fall into the red
because oil and gas revenues, which account for nearly half of the total revenues, havedeclined due to falling crude oil prices, while expenditures for the coronavirus-related
measures have increased. However, the level of outstanding government debt is low
due to the steady fiscal management to date, and the government has ample funds inthe “National Wealth Fund,” which is a fiscal buffer. Therefore, the government isunlikely to go bankrupt immediately. Since October, crude oil prices have been stable58

at about 39 to 40 dollars per barrel, contributing to the fiscal stability.

Generally speaking, the Russian economy was severely damaged by the coronavirus
pandemic, but its impact was not uniform. Industries directly affected by the
lockdown, such as the commercial and service industries, experienced significant
negative growth, while other industries experienced positive growth — the situation
varies greatly depending on the industry sector. The rapid growth of new businesses
using the Internet, which does not involve the movement or contact of people, also
indicates the unexpected strength of the Russian economy.

Influence of the Coronavirus Pandemic on Russian Politics and Diplomacy
The spread of the novel coronavirus has also greatly affected the politics of Russia.
In his Annual Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly in January, President
Putin proposed constitutional amendments, but the referendum for this purpose
was postponed from the originally planned date of April 22 to July 1. In addition,
the Putin administration postponed the World War II Victory Parade, upon which
special importance was placed to confirm the historical memory for the unificationof the people, from May 9 to June 24. The parade in 2020, the year marking the 75th
anniversary of the victory of the war, was conducted with the participation of troops
from 17 countries, including China and India as well as former Soviet republics, thatmarched through the Red Square. Originally, leaders from Japan and other countries
had been expected to be invited, but due to the pandemic, participation at the head ofstate level was limited to seven countries including Serbia and former Soviet republics
such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Moldova.
While those important domestic political events were held with postponement,international conferences and events in which foreign participants were expected were
promptly cancelled. In recent years, Russia has hosted several international forums,
including the Russian Investment Forum in Sochi (mid-February), the Krasnoyarsk
Economic Forum (late March), the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum(early June), and the Eastern Economic Forum (early September), but they were allcancelled in 2020. In particular, the Eastern Economic Forum had been attended
by the heads of government from many Asian countries and is thus regarded as animportant opportunity to demonstrate Russia’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
The cancellation of this forum due to the pandemic has stalled Russia’s Asia-Pacificstrategy, albeit by force majeure.
59

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Russia in 2020 amid the Coronavirus Pandemic

The outbreak of the novel coronavirus infection in Russia appears to have contributed
to the overall stagnation of its diplomatic activities. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which rekindled at the end of September thisyear, took place while Russia was occupied coping with the coronavirus problem. An
attack against Armenia, a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization(CSTO) led by Russia, would oblige Russia to participate in the war, but Moscow
took a neutral position early on, stating it would not support Armenia unless there
was a fight on the Armenian mainland. Armenia, which could not receive substantial
support from Russia, was completely defeated by Azerbaijan, which had high morale
over recovering its lost territory and enjoyed full support from Turkey. This conflict
resulted in a ceasefire agreement under the leadership of Russia, which enabled thedispatch of Russian troops as peacekeepers to Azerbaijan, a territory where Russian
troops had not been stationed. In this sense, it may have been beneficial to Russian
diplomacy. On the other hand, the first two ceasefire agreements were immediately
breached, which gave the impression that Russia’s influence had declined. In addition,
there seems be no conspicuous involvement of Russia in the political turmoil inneighboring Belarus, as it is merely standing by, possibly because Russia is not willingto make enemies of Belarus citizens who are fundamentally friendly to Russia.
Even in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic that restricts the international
movement of people, Russia is trying to strengthen its influence in its own way. For
example, Russia offered medical assistance to European countries and the UnitedStates in February and March this year, when the infection situation in Russia was not
yet severe. In addition, by providing the Russian coronavirus vaccine “Sputnik V,” thefirst vaccine approved in the world in August, and the second vaccine “EpiVacCorona”
approved in October, Russia is conducting its “vaccine diplomacy.” Phase III clinical
trials of “Sputnik V” will also be conducted in friendly nations such as Belarus, India,
Venezuela, Egypt, Brazil, and the UAE; its local production is planned in China,
India, South Korea, and Brazil. Moreover, inquiries about “Sputnik V” have been
made by more than 30 countries, including Mexico, Indonesia, the Philippines, India,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. President Putin himself has been conducting promotionof Russian vaccines at the top level, stating at the G20 meeting held in November that
“Russia is prepared to provide vaccines to countries in need.”60However,

there

is

certaincriticism about Russia’s attitude.
One is the hasty developmentof vaccines. Doubts about thesafety of vaccines linger as theirapproval

preceded

the

final

results of clinical trials. Anotheraspect is that Russia does notparticipate in the COVAX facility,

Sputnik V is the world’s first vaccine against COVID-19 registered by the Russian
Government, August 2020. (Photo by Dmitry KURAKIN/Russia’s Health Ministry/AFP)

an international framework led by WHO to provide vaccines to developing countries.
While expressing certain appreciation to the role of COVAX, Russia refused toparticipate, saying that Russia, which had its own vaccine, did not need or intend tobuy foreign vaccines.

Perspective
In the US presidential election in November 2020, Democratic presidential candidate
Biden defeated the incumbent President Trump, but Russia does not seem to welcome
the inauguration of a new president. According to a Russian expert, Russia isconsidered to be number one enemy among US political elites, both Republican and
Democrat (Biden himself referred to Russia as the “biggest threat” when he was Vice
President). Therefore, while the change of US administration is expected to lead toprogress in nuclear disarmament talks, confrontation between the United States andRussia is rather expected to intensify over issues such as the Middle East including
Syria, Ukraine, and human rights in Russia — the relationship between the UnitedStates and Russia is not expected to improve dramatically. During the four years of
Trump’s presidency, Russia also learned that American diplomacy was not heavily
influenced by the personality of the president. President Trump may have been proRussian, but his administration tightened economic sanctions against Russia, and theUnited States broke away from the INF and Open Skies treaties.
Thus, even with the inauguration of the Biden administration, the strained relations
between the United States and Russia are expected to continue for the time being,
and this could cast a dark shadow on the future of Japan-Russia relations. Since thestart of the second administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2012, Japan61

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Russia in 2020 amid the Coronavirus Pandemic

Russia relations have generally been moving toward closer relations, despite a cooling
period following the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. The “Eight-Point Cooperation Plan”
of the Abe administration was in response to Russia’s “Pivot to the East” policy,
which is aimed at strengthening its relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region;
great improvement in Japan-Russia relations was therefore expected. In addition
to fulfilling Japan’s long-cherished ambition of resolving the Northern Territories
issue and concluding a peace treaty with Russia, which has remained unresolved formore than 70 years since the end of World War II, Japan attached importance on
the strengthening of its cooperative relationship with Russia from the perspective ofrestraining China, which has gained political and economic power in the international
arena in recent years. Even after the annexation of Crimea, there was speculation that
Russia, which had no choice but to lean toward China amid Western sanctions, mightplace importance on Japan as a balancer against China. However, such “expectation”
of the Japanese side shrank rapidly because of the “zero answer” on the Northern
Territories issue by the Russian side. The constitutional revision in July 2020 thatmade it illegal for Russia to engage in speech and action related to the cession of
its territory, and Russia’s moves to strengthen the deployment of missiles on the
Northern Territories, have dampened the prospect of a resolution of the territorial
issue between Japan and Russia.
Changes in the strategic environment surrounding Japan and Russia are also forcing
a review of the relationship between the two countries. As the confrontation between
the United States and Russia intensifies, Russia is increasingly approaching China
to counter the United States. In November 2019, President Putin called China an“ally” at an international conference held in Sochi, and announced that he had been
supporting China’s development of an early warning system for ballistic missiles. It is
probably true that Russia placed certain expectations on Japan, which could act as abalancer toward China, depending on how China acted. However, now that the USChina confrontation has become unavoidable and there is no prospect of fundamental
improvement in the US-Russia relations, Russia seems to have given priority to its
relations with China in order to keep the United States in check; thus, the pursuit of abalancer against China seems to have receded. As the strategic environment changes
drastically, Japan-Russia relations may appear secondary for Russia. Russia’s hardline stance toward the Northern Territories issue can be seen as an indication of62

such views. Public opinion in Japan has also turned a stern eye on Russia’s moves,and is increasing its distrust of Russia. Amid the changing strategic environment
surrounding the Asia-Pacific region and the growing public distrust of Russia, theJapanese government will be pressed to make difficult responses. ■63Strategic Annual Report 2020
The Middle East: Coronavirus Pandemic, US Withdrawal, Normalization of Diplomatic Relations, and Rivalry for Regional Supremacy

The Middle East: Coronavirus Pandemic, US Withdrawal, Normalizationof Diplomatic Relations, and Rivalry for Regional Supremacy
In 2020, the Middle East was hit
by an outbreak of the coronavirus
disease

like

other

countries,

duringwhich

theinstability

and vulnerability of the region
became apparent. Against the
backdropofamultilayered“power vacuum” in the region,
the struggle for supremacy by

A delegation from the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain visited the Judaism’s holiest prayersite in Jerusalem’s old city, December 14, 2020. (Photo by REUTERS/Ammar Awad)

regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran has continued in countries
like Syria, Yemen and Libya that have entered a state of civil war since the “ArabSpring.” Relations between Israel and Arab countries were normalized one after
another since the summer through the intermediary of the Trump administrationin the United States; the state-to-state relations in the Middle East started to change
drastically from the façade of “Israel versus the Arab,” which had already collapsed
in reality, to the straightforward one that emphasizes the economy and security. Afterthe assassination of General Soleimani of the Revolutionary Guard Corps in January
and the assassination of Dr. Fakhrizadeh, a key figure in the nuclear development
program in November, Iran has accelerated its confrontation with the United Statesand its deviation from the nuclear agreement (JCPOA). Meanwhile, the United States
responded by stepping up sanctions against Iran and dispatching an aircraft carrier tothe Strait of Hormuz, leading to further escalation of tensions in the region.

Consequences of the Coronavirus Pandemic
The spread of the coronavirus in 2020 exacerbated the region’s serious refugee problem
and economic recession. Following the first report of infection in Iran in late February,
the damage has spread throughout the region. Although the spread was temporarily
contained, the second wave began in June after the end of Ramadan and the third
wave continued unabated since September. According to Johns Hopkins University
in the United States, Iran (approximately 1.22 million cumulative infection cases and64

55 thousand deaths) was the most seriously affected country in the region at theend of December, followed by Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. In Israel, thenumber of infection cases exceeded 8,000 per day at one time, but in November thenumber of both infection cases and deaths went down to zero. The infection situationin the Palestinian Gaza Strip, Syria, and Yemen, which have faced humanitariancrises since before the pandemic, is not known accurately. In late July, the Islamic
pilgrimage (Hajji) was scheduled to begin. But in order to prevent the spread of thecoronavirus, restrictions on entry into Saudi Arabia were imposed for the first timesince its foundation in 1932. The number of pilgrims, more than 2 million from allover the world every year, was limited to 1,000 from within the country.
The coronavirus pandemic, which caused contraction in global economic activity
and decline in demand, dealt a severe blow to the economy of the Gulf states andthe region as a whole through the plunge in oil prices. At the beginning of March,when the spread of the coronavirus began to escalate, the talks between the OPEC
and non-OPEC oil-producing countries in Vienna over the coordinated reduction ofoil production broke down, leading to a fierce price war between Saudi Arabia andRussia. On April 20, the crude oil futures price at the New York Mercantile Exchange
fell to below minus $40 a barrel, which meant that sellers of crude oil had to pay theirbuyers for the first time in the history. The oil-producing countries in the Gulf wereforced to drastically reduce their production, thus facing a fiscal crisis. The plight offoreign workers that support the Gulf economy, whose number is said to be about 35
million, including human rights issues such as sudden dismissal and abandonment
in front of embassies, in addition to the risk of infection, was widely reported. Whiledependent on foreign workers, the unemployment rate among young people in theoil-producing countries in the Gulf has been chronically high, with job insecurity due
to the stagnation in tourism, aviation and the related industries. Further instability
is expected in the region following the anti-government protests in various parts of
the region since the “Second Arab Spring” in 2019. A large-scale blast in the Portof Beirut in Lebanon in August revealed the poor governance of its government. It
was reported that 192 persons died and homes of up to 300 thousand people weredestroyed because of a large amount of ammonium nitrate stored and left in the port
for six years. The government resigned en masse to take responsibility in the face ofthe escalation of public protests, but concerns remained about a food crisis due to the65Strategic Annual Report 2020
The Middle East: Coronavirus Pandemic, US Withdrawal, Normalization of Diplomatic Relations, and Rivalry for Regional Supremacy

large-scale destruction of infrastructure, disruption of distribution networks, and thedestruction of the largest wheat silo in the Port of Beirut.

Changing Power Balance in the Region
In 2020, the Middle East saw shifts in the power balance amid the multilayered“power vacuum” reflecting the change of US policy toward the region along with the
US-China confrontation.
First is the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the 9.11 attacks in 2001,
US forces have been stationed in Afghanistan for a period of 19 years. In February 2020,
however, the US and the Taliban agreed on the withdrawal of US forces and releaseof Taliban prisoners. In May, about 2,000 prisoners were released, and the UnitedStates announced that it would halve its 5,000 soldiers stationed in Afghanistan by
mid-January 2021. With regard to Iraq, the United States dispatched its troops withmultinational forces since the invasion in 2003. In early January, the United Statesassassinated General Soleimani, Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps, in Iraq by air strikes “to prevent an imminent attack against the United States.”
Following this assasination, the Iraqi parliament passed a law on the withdrawal of
US forces from Iraq, heightening tensions. The US government announced that it
would reduce the number of its troops from 5,200 to 3,000 by September and halve
the number by mid-January 2021.
The Trump administration has made clear its pro-Israel stance, including the relocationof its embassy to Jerusalem announced in May 2018, and has been working to improve
relations between Arab countries and Israel by offering up-front economic incentives.
In 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain normalized relations on
September 15, and Sudan on October 23, and Morocco on December 4, respectively,
with Israel. In addition to strengthening economic relations, deals existed in each case:strengthening of its position in the region for Israel, high level surveillance technologyof Israel and purchace of F-35 fighters from the US for the UAE; lifting of the US
economic sanctions for Sudan; and US approval of its sovereignty over Western Sahara
for Morocco. Although Saudi Arabia, a major regional power, maintained its support tothe policy for “the establishment of the state of Palestine,” it has allowed Israeli aircraft
to fly over its territory. It was also reported in late November that Israeli Prime Minister66

Netanyahu visited the country. Thus, it is believed that Saudi Arabia is working on
improving its relations with Israel. The UAE claimed that its agreement with Israel
had halted Israel’s annexation of the West Bank, but Israel continued the occupationand expanded its settlements despite international condemnation, further complicating
the stalled Middle East peace negotiations. Following Mr. Biden’s victory in the US
presidential election in November, activities to demonstrate the achievements before
the change of US administration continued, including the expansion of settlements by
Israel and the visit by the US Secretary of State to the Golan Heights.
On

the

other

confrontation

hand,

the

betweenthe

United States and Iran continued
toescalate.

administration

The

Trump

declaredUS

withdrawal from the JCPOA
in May 2018 and graduallystrengthened its own sanctions
againstIran.

Followingthe

A protest in Tehran on Saturday, November 28, 2020, against the assassination of Mohsen
Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s top nuclear scientist. (Photo by Arash Khamooshi/The New York Times)

assassination of General Soleimani by US forces in January, the Trump administration
declared re-imposition of UN sanctions against Iran in September, before the deadline
for the end of the arms embargo on Iran based on the JCPOA, and strengthened its
own sanctions at the end of October before the presidential election and thereafter.
Iran, on the other hand, has taken steps that gradually exceeded the limits on its nuclear
activities stipulated in the JCPOA. In November, Dr. Fakhrizadeh, a key figure in
Iran’s nuclear program, was assassinated in broad daylight in Iran. Iran accused Israelof the assassination, and in response to the killing, the Iranian Parliament passed a newlaw requiring the intensification of uranium enrichment activities, including enrichment
up to 20%, and suspension of the provisional application of the Additional Protocol
to the Safeguards Agreement, which would be a further departure from the JCPOA.
Thus, Iran significantly raised the hurdle for negotiations with the United States aheadof the inauguration of Biden administration in the US in January 2021.
The moves of Russia and China in the Middle East are also noteworthy. Against the
backdrop of the strengthening of US containment policy against Iran, such as the67Strategic Annual Report 2020
The Middle East: Coronavirus Pandemic, US Withdrawal, Normalization of Diplomatic Relations, and Rivalry for Regional Supremacy

withdrawal from the JCPOA and economic sanctions under the Trump administration,
China is now Iran’s largest trading partner, and there have been reports of Westernconcerns that Iran might purchase a large amount of weapons from China following thelifting of the arms embargo. In December, Russia and Sudan agreed to establish a Russian
naval base on the Red Sea coast, a move that would mark Russia’s return to Africa since
the end of the Cold War. In addition, the US government decided to impose sanctions
against the defense industry of Turkey, a NATO member, regarding Turkey’s project tointroduce the Russian-made surface-to-air missile (SAM) S400 despite the opposition of
the United States. This also draws attention to Russia’s increasing influence.
While almost 10 years have passed since the first “Arab Spring,” civil wars in Syria,
Yemen and Libya have turned into proxy wars involving major regional powers (Iran,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, etc.), Europe, the United States and Russia, creating protracted
chaos and leading to many internally displaced persons and refugees. Following the
spread of the “Second Arab Spring” in 2019, the Bouteflika’s administration in Algeria,
which had lasted for 20 years, and the Bashir’s administration in Sudan, which had
lasted for 30 years, collapsed in April of the same year, followed by confusion in bothcountries. The situation continues to be unstable in the “Horn of Africa” region, suchas northern Ethiopia, where the airstrike was carried out under the direction of theNobel Peace Prize laureate, Prime Minister Abiy. Since the United States, France, andChina have bases in Djibouti along the Red Sea coast, instability in the region could
affect maritime security. Japan also maintained its Self-Defense Forces presence in the
Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia in eastern Africa for the anti-piracy missions.
Tension has been mounting in the Strait of Hormuz, a key point in maritime trafficroutes (sea lanes), reflecting the confrontation between Iran on one hand and theUnited States and oil-producing nations in the Gulf on the other. In May 2020, Irandemonstrated the strengthening of its military capability by introducing more than
100 vessels equipped with missiles and destroying an imitation US aircraft carrier. In
November, the United States sent the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Nimitz to theStrait of Hormuz, although it denied any direct connection with the assassination of
Dr. Fakhrizadeh. Following the attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz in May andJune 2019, Japan has been dispatching Maritime Self-Defense Force escort vessels
and “P3C” patrol aircraft to the neighboring sea zones since October of the same year68for the purpose of information gathering. In December 2020, the period of dispatch
was extended by one year. At the same time, in consideration of its relationship with
Iran, Japan has not joined the US-led coallition of the willing to protect ships. Japan
has been striving to serve as a mediator between the United States and Iran, and it
will be important to continue this effort in the future.

Perspective
It is vital for Japan to contribute to the stability of the Middle East region by continuingand developing its initiatives based on the trust built up in the region through its
interactions, such as trade, investment, development assistance, and people-to-people
exchanges. For example, in the midst of the increasingly difficult Palestinian issue inthe wake of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and some Arabcountries, Japan, based on its history of contributing to Palestine in various fields
including humanitarian assistance, human resource development and agriculturaldevelopment, and the confidence thus gained from both Palestine and Israel, could
play a role in encouraging the Israeli government to return to peace negotiations
together with other members of the international community. Japan has also
maintained friendly relations with major powers in the region such as Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkey respectively, and can play an active diplomatic role in alleviating
conflicts among these countries.
Finally, Afghanistan, which had been in turmoil since the invasion by the Soviet
Union during the Cold War and by the United States after the 9.11 attacks, entereda new phase in 2020 with the withdrawal of US forces. Since the Tokyo Conferenceon assistance to Afghanistan in 2002, Japan has been playing a substantial role as
one of the major donor countries together with the EU, the UK, and the UnitedStates and providing a wide range of assistance to Afghanistan including on politicalprocesses, infrastructure development, agriculture and culture. The 2020 Afghanistan
Conference was held in November with the participation of 66 countries and 32
international organizations. Japan pledged its commitment to disburse 720 million
yen (approximately $6.9 million) for the period 2021 to 2024. Other donor countries
attached conditions to their assistance or reduced the amount of disbursment toprevent corruption. With consideration of those concerns, it will be necessary forJapan to continue its support to realize the stabilization of Afghanistan. ■69

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Impact of the US-China confrontation on Japan and Northeast Asia

Impact of the US-China confrontation on Japan and Northeast Asia
In 2020, Japan and China initiallysought to improve their relations,but this movement stalled. Japan
also worked with the UnitedStates to improve the situation inwhich its supply chain is overly
dependent on China, but thereview of its national security
strategy did not make enoughThe commissioning ceremony of China’s first Type 055 guided-missile destroyer, January
12, 2020. (Photo by Li Tang/Xinhua)

progress. Meanwhile on the Korean Peninsula, confrontations at the local level
developed in anticipation of the US presidential election.

China’s maritime expansion and its impact on Japan-China relations
In 2020, China stepped up its provocative actions around the Senkaku Islands.
Between April and August 2020, Chinese government vessels sailed in the contiguouszone for 111 consecutive days, reflecting the increasing size of Chinese government
vessels and the improved maneuvering skills of the crew. In addition, although thefrequency of intrusions into Japanese territorial waters remained largely stable, there
were moves to pursue Japanese fishing boats within the territorial waters in May, Julyand October. Amid the rising tensions in the East China Sea, Gen. Kevin Schneider,commander of US Forces, Japan, affirmed the US support for Japan, and in his
telephone conversation with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga in November, Presidentelect Joe Biden confirmed that the Senkaku Islands are subject to Article 5 of theJapan-US Security Treaty. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Japan inNovember, he justified the pursuit of Japanese fishing boats, saying that “unidentified
Japanese fishing boats” frequently entered sensitive waters around the Senkaku
Islands. As Beijing is expected to enact a China Coast Guard Law in 2021, which
would set the rules of engagement, the chances for unintended accidents between
Chinese government vessels and Japanese fishing boats and between the China Coast
Guard and the Japan Coast Guard would increase.

70

The PLA activities continued to require vigilance in not only the East China Sea,
but also the waters surrounding Japan, including the Philippine Sea and the Sea ofJapan, as evidenced by the aircraft carrier Liaoning heading from the East China
Sea to the South China Sea in April and a submarine believed to be Chinese in thecontiguous zone of Amami-Oshima in June. In addition, although the activities ofChinese military aircraft decreased slightly from the previous year, the number offlights by intelligence-gathering aircraft, including the new Y-9, increased more thanthat of fighter aircraft, and it is possible that China analyzed the impact of the spreadof the novel coronavirus on Japan’s defense posture.
In 2020, as tensions between Japan and China over territory continued and the USChina confrontation intensified, there were initial moves between Japan and China
to improve relations, but these moves stalled. Japan-China relations were supposed tohave entered a “Sino-Japanese new era” when Chinese President Xi Jinping was slated
to visit Japan as a state guest in the spring of 2020. However, faced with the spread of
the novel coronavirus, Japan and China agreed in March to reschedule President Xi’sstate visit to Japan, which had been planned for around April, in order to prioritize theprevention of the spread of the disease. Behind this was growing opposition within
the Liberal Democratic Party to provide a state guest status to President Xi unlessthe situations improved regarding the intrusions by Chinese government vessels into
Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands and the human rights violationsin China. After China enacted the “Hong Kong National Security Law” in June, calls
within the Liberal Democratic Party for an “abort” of Xi’s visit as state guest increased
again. In the first telephone talks between Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and Chinese
President Xi in September, there was no mention of a state visit to Japan, amid growing
calls to postpone the visit on the Japanese side.
As the COVID-19 pandemic showed the vulnerability of supply chains depending on
China, the Japanese government decided to provide subsidies to companies that movetheir production bases to Japan or third party countries such as those in Southeast
Asia. As both the United States and China are tightening their export controls, thiseffectively encourages the withdrawal of Japanese companies, which are at high riskor paying a high price for their dependence on China. The Japanese government
also announced that it would keep in step with the Trump administration’s “clean
71

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Impact of the US-China confrontation on Japan and Northeast Asia

network” plan to exclude Chinese companies deemed unreliable in five key areas,such as telecommunications network, apps and cloud services, though it wouldn’t
specifically exclude Chinese companies. In addition, the Japanese government decided
to replace its current drones with new, more secure models, effectively excluding
Chinese drones. In addition, amid growing international criticism of China’s humanrights violations, cross-party parliamentarians moved to enact legislation similar to
the US “Magnitsky law” that would allow sanctions to be applied to individuals andorganizations involved in human rights violations.

Tension on the Korean Peninsula Grows under a “Localised” Standoff
On July 10, 2020, North Korea announced in a statement by Kim Yo-jong, First Deputy
Director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, that it would shift theframework of US-DPRK negotiations from “Denuclearization and lifting of sanctions”
to “Withdrawal of US hostile policies and resumption of negotiations” to “Overwrite”
the economic hardship that was revealed at the US-DPRK summit meeting in Hanoi in
February 2019, thus making a further retreat in its stance on the US-DPRK negotiations.
This move was supposedly aimed at strengthening the DPRK’s bargaining powerin anticipation of the next US administration, while using the preventive measuresagainst COVID-19 epidemics including the border closure and the disaster recovery
effort as an opportunity to tighten the internal controls. At the same time, moves tostrengthen its nuclear capability have become more prominent, and on the anniversaryof the party’s founding in October, a large missile believed to be an untested new ICBM
was unveiled for the first time. North Korea concentrated its harsh criticism on South
Korea’s stance as a mediator between the US and North Korea, and they moved toblow up the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office in Kaesong in June. North Korea seems
to be trying to create a favorable
environment for its negotiations
with the United States while
keeping the confrontation at a
local level through the sharing ofroles between the “pacificatory”
Kim Jong-un, chairman of theruling WPK and the “belligerent”
Kim Yo-jong, his younger sister.
72

DPRK’s new ICBM (untested) unveiled during the military parade marking the 75th
anniversary of WPK, October 10, 2020. (Photo by KCNA/UPI/Aflo)

The short-range ballistic missile tests conducted in 2020 on four occasions can also beinterpreted as an attempt to improve the offensive capability against the South Koreanand US forces in Korea, while disguising a “self-restraint” stance on the surface. Against
this backdrop, no positive progress was realized in US-DPRK, North-South and JapanNorth Korea relations throughout 2020.
In terms of Japan-ROK relations, the differences between Japan, which regards
the issues of forced labor and comfort women as a breach of the 1965 regime thatdefined the bilateral relationship after the restoration of diplomatic relations, andSouth Korea, which interprets these issues from the perspective of “victim-centrism”
and “universal human rights” were not bridged throughout 2020. In particular, South
Korea’s domestic procedures in progress to convert the Japanese corporate assets
distrained for compensation for victims into cash are remaining matters of concern
in that the issue could spread again into other areas including security. In addition,
there is a sense of fatigue in Japan over the situation in South Korea, where relations
with Japan are discussed in the context of its domestic politics, and no momentum tosupport positive improvement in the bilateral relations occurred.

Meandering Review of Japan’s Security Strategy
Amid the growing threat from missiles to Japan, it was suddenly announced inJune that the introduction of the Aegis Ashore ground-based interceptor system
to Yamaguchi and Aomori prefectures, which the Japanese government had beenpromoting, would be suspended because it would be difficult to control the boostersof the interceptors and drop them inside the Self-Defense Force’s facilities. Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe expressed his intention to review the national security strategy
by the end of the year and present an alternative plan in the review. The review
was expected to focus on strengthening missile defense, introducing offensive strikecapabilities, and ensuring economic security in the post-COVID-19 era. However, with
Prime Minister Abe’s announcement of his resignation, the trend toward the reviewof the national security strategy declined rapidly, and the discussion was divided into
the following specific issues: consideration of alternatives to Aegis Ashore; the pros
and cons of the introduction of “missile elimination” capabilities; and strengthening
the resilience of the supply chains.

73

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Impact of the US-China confrontation on Japan and Northeast Asia

As there is no ground-based alternative to the Aegis Ashore, an alternative of the
deployment at sea was considered. After reviewing the plans to mount the Aegis
system on oil rigs or commercial ships, the government decided to introduce two
additional Aegis-equipped ships, but the cost of introducing the Aegis ships is
expected to be about 100 billion yen higher than the cost of installing the Aegis
Ashore. Originally, the introduction of the Aegis Ashore was expected to realize 24/7
response to North Korean ballistic missiles, which would enable Aegis destroyers,which had been responding to ballistic missiles, to respond to China’s maritime
expansion. Therefore, the alternative of increasing the number of Aegis ships is notconsidered an appropriate solution in terms of cost or operation. With regard to thecapability of “missile elimination,” while the introduction of this capability faced theissue of difficulty in detecting North Korea’s mobile launchers in advance and thequestion of whether the limited concept of a counterforce was appropriate in the firstplace, the decision was shelved without clearly and openly laying out the issue as partof the efforts to gain sufficient public support. As postwar Japan has never possessed
a “missile elimination” or its own counterstrike capability, it would not be realistic torush to the conclusion in half a year. It is necessary to hold in-depth discussions in
the context of Japan’s security strategy, including the Japan-US alliance, to gain theunderstanding of the Japanese people.

Perspective
The new US administration of Joe Biden has stressed the importance of alliancesand called for coordination among democracies to force China to change its behavior.
While he has referred to his commitment to the defense of Japan, Biden will likely
call on Japan to strengthen its self-defense capabilities and to act with restraint toensure that unforeseen events in the Senkaku Islands do not escalate into armed
conflict. In addition, the emphasis on the alliance also means that the United States
would demand a greater share of the burden. Therefore, Japan should respond to thisrequest by reviewing its security strategy and strengthening its self-defense capability.
The Biden camp sees competition between the United States and China in termsof economics and technology, and will continue to ask its allies for cooperation inefforts to reduce dependence on China in the supply chain.

74

As for the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Biden administration may try to
mediate between Japan and South Korea in order to restore security cooperation
among Japan, the United States, and South Korea. However, depending on themanner of mediation, tensions may arise in the US relations with both Japan andSouth Korea. As for the denuclearization of North Korea, the Biden administration isreluctant to engage in direct summit-level negotiations like the Trump administration,and there is a possibility that North Korea will simultaneously pursue seemingly
contradictory policies of provocation and peace offensive again. In pursuing a “gradualdenuclearization,” the US administration will need to avoid a situation in which it
would proceed unintentionally to arms control negotiations that would lead to thede facto preservation of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles.
Such a situation would oblige a serious reexamination concerning the modality of
US extended deterrence and Japan’s own defense capability. ■75

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Simultaneous Development of Confrontation and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Simultaneous Development of Confrontation and Cooperation in
the Indo-Pacific
In 2020, as the countries of theregion struggled to deal with thecoronavirus

pandemic,

China

pursued more authoritarian andassertive domestic and foreign
policies on the rule of law andterritorial issues, and the US
opposition to such moves became
more pronounced. Under these

Foreign ministers from Japan, the US, Australia and India attend the meeting at the prime
minister’s office in Tokyo, Japan, October 2020. (Photo by REUTERS/Aflo)circumstances, as explained above, the vision of rules-based “Free and Open IndoPacific” (FOIP), which Japan has been advocating for several years, is spreading bothwithin and outside the region. In the same year, the border dispute between China
and India escalated into conflict between the two militaries. Against this background,the activities of the cooperative framework among the four countries of Japan,
the United States, Australia, and India (QUAD) became markedly intensive, andindividual cooperation among the four countries participating in this framework wasalso strengthened. Concurrently, progress was also made in the regional cooperation
framework involving China, with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)At TICAD VI held in Kenya in 2016, then Prime Minister Abe launched the “Freeand Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). Since then, the United States, based on the sharedrecognition with Japan that the prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region to date is built
upon “freedom” and “openness,” has expressed its policy to promote multilateraldiplomacy as well as diplomacy with its allies and partners under its own IndoPacific Strategy, which aimed at further promoting such prosperity. Australia andIndia have also adopted similar concepts to “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in theirsecurity policies in recent years. From 2019 to 2020, support for this vision further
expanded, and the moves to operationalize the vision also accelerated.
76

At the ASEAN Summit held in June 2019, the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific(AOIP)” which focused on ASEAN Centrality was adopted as a policy document.
ASEAN Centrality aims to promote regional cooperation and economic integration
while protecting the interests of ASEAN, by leading regional integration andcooperation efforts with ASEAN at its core in the regional frameworks in Asia.
As noted above, European countries are also increasingly interested in the Indo-Pacificstrategy, with Germany and the Netherlands announcing their respective policies
in 2020 following the policy from France in 2018. In Japan, Prime Minister Suga,
who took office in September, continued the FOIP policy and confirmed cooperation
towards the realization of FOIP in Vietnam and Indonesia, the countries he visitedin his first overseas trip as Prime Minister.

Development of Cooperation among the Four Countries of Japan, theUnited States, Australia, and India (QUAD)
An important basis for realizing the FOIP is cooperation among the four countries ofJapan, the United States, Australia, and India (QUAD). The four-nation frameworkfor security cooperation, which emphasizes the values of freedom and democracy aswell as the rules-based international order, was proposed by the first Abe administrationin 2007 but its activities were subsequently suspended. It was resumed in 2017 under
the second Abe administration. Following the cooperation through director-generallevel meetings, a meeting at foreign ministerial-level was held for the first time in
September 2019 when the foreign ministers of the four countries gathered at theUnited Nations General Assembly. In October 2020, the second foreign ministers’
meeting was hosted by Japan, with the visit of ministers from the US, Australia andIndia amid the pandemic; the first such meeting held apart from the framework ofinternational conferences. The US Secretary of State Pompeo visited Japan to attend
the QUAD foreign ministers’ meeting despite canceling other parts of his planned trip
to East Asia in the wake of President Trump’s coronavirus infection, indicating theimportance the United States placed upon this framework. In addition to discussions
on measures to deal with the issues with the new coronavirus in the Indo-Pacificregion and the formulation of international rules, an agreement was reached to holdforeign ministers’ meetings on an annual basis. This regularization of the ministerial
meetings represents a major step forward in strengthening the QUAD framework.
77Strategic Annual Report 2020
Simultaneous Development of Confrontation and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

The 2020 Malabar exercise, which was held with the participation of the four
countries, also showed the strengthening of security cooperation among them. For
the past five years, Australia continued to request its participation in the Malabar
exercises conducted by Japan, the United States, and India. But India, due to its
consideration of China and to maintain a balance between the United States andChina, coupled with the frictions in Australia-India relations, had been refusing
Australian participation. In 2020, however, as the relations between China and India
deteriorated over the border disputes, Australia was allowed to participate in theexercise in November for the first time since 2007, during which antisubmarine andantiaircraft warfare exercises were conducted.

China-India Border Conflict and the Strengthening of Security and
Defense Cooperation by India
In June 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in the Himalayan Galwan Valley.
The Indian death toll was reported to be 20, and it was said that China also sufferedfatalities, though their number was not disclosed. This was the first time since 1975
that the border conflict between India and China led to confirmed deaths. While thetwo governments took some time to grasp the situation, the Chinese side initiallymade rather restrained reporting of the clash in China. This indicates that China
did not wish to escalate the situation with India, a member of both the QUAD
and the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On the other hand, public
opinion in India grew critical of China, and in response, China gradually took a
hard-line stance against India both at home and abroad. The two countries madeefforts to ease tensions by holding foreign and defense ministers’ meetings on theoccasion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other fora, but there islittle prospect of concrete steps toward reducing tensions or resolving the conflict,except for an agreement to discuss the withdrawal by both sides and to maintaincommunication. The two countries have deployed tens of thousands of troops in thedisputed areas and the possibility of further incidents cannot be excluded. In addition
to the coronavirus pandemic, this conflict led to a hardening of India’s public opinion
towards China. Thus, it is believed that this incident prompted India to commit itself
more actively to the QUAD framework and defense cooperation as seen above, andto quickly accelerate its bilateral defense cooperation with Japan, the United States,
and Australia respectively, as described below.
78

Japan, the United States, Australia and India have concluded various agreements
to strengthen their security cooperation. India had been skeptical about building
relations with Japan, the US and Australia in diplomacy and defense, as it was keen
to maintain a balance between Western countries and developing countries basedon its long-held tradition since the Non-Aligned Movement. But it became more
active in security and defense cooperation in 2020 due to the circumstances describedabove, and the defense cooperation between India and the other three countries madesignificant progress. On June 4, 2020, India held a 2 + 2 meeting with Australia in
New Delhi and concluded a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) and a“comprehensive strategic partnership.” In recent years, India had continuously andsignificantly enhanced its “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” with Japan
under the Abe administration, and on September 9, 2020, India concluded theAcquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Japan. These agreements
improve interoperability by enabling the mutual provision of food, fuel, ammunition,transport, and medical care needed for humanitarian and international disaster
relief operations including the United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO). On
October 27, the US-India 2 + 2 meeting was held in New Delhi, in which the “Basic
Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA)” wasconcluded, which enables the provision of satellite images and other information.
As a result, it is expected that the provision of satellite information from the UnitedStates will enable India to obtain a more accurate picture of the state of conflict
between China and India in eastern Ladakh. They also agreed that the United States
would export fighters, antisubmarine helicopters, antiaircraft missiles for cruise
missile interception, unmanned maritime patrol aircraft and Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) to India.

China’s Hard-line Stance, Deepening of Japan-Australia Relations and
ASEAN’s Response
In 2020, China reacted angrily to Australia’s request for an investigation on thesource of the novel coronavirus and its severe criticism on the implementation of
the Hong Kong “National Security Law.” As a retaliatory measure, China raised
tariffs on Australian products such as wine and substantially restricted imports ofcoal and other commodities, significantly worsening the relations between Australia
and China. Against this backdrop, Australian Prime Minister Morrison visited Japan79

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Simultaneous Development of Confrontation and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacificin November despite the need for voluntary self-isolation after returning to Australia
due to the pandemic. Prime Minister Suga told him that “Japan and Australia are
special strategic partners, and the importance of the partnership keeps increasing.” At
the summit, the two leaders confirmed that Japan and Australia, as “special strategic
partners” sharing fundamental values and strategic interests, would cooperate
toward the realization of the FOIP. In order to take Japan-Australia security anddefense cooperation to the next level, the two countries also announced a broad
framework agreement on a “Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA)”
to facilitate joint operations and exercises between the Self-Defense Forces and theAustralian military. Moreover, the joint statement issued by Defence Minister Kishi
and Australian Defence Minister Reynolds included the enhancement of bilateral
exercises and joint operations including aerial refueling, and deepening of theirjoint research and technical cooperation in the fields of underwater acoustics andunmanned aircraft. Furthermore, arrangements are being worked out to apply the“Asset Protection,” which is currently applied to the United States on the basis of
Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, to the Australian Defence Force, thereby
enhancing interoperability.
In recent years, China has been building military bases in the South China Sea: antiship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles have been deployed on seven artificial
islands which are now inhabited by military personnel, construction personnel andfacility operators. In 2020, as countries in the region struggled to cope with the
pandemic, China continued its activities to push its claims in the South China Sea
more aggressively. In January, Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered Indonesia’s
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with fishing boats. In response, Indonesia deployed
its fleets and other defenses, and in July, conducted large-scale military exercises inthe surrounding waters, leading to heightened tensions. In February, Chinese naval
vessels pointed lasers at Philippine naval vessels in the Spratly Islands and in August
they took a provocative act of a radar lock-on. In April, a Chinese surveillance ship
collided with a Vietnamese fishing boat. In March, China also built new researchfacilities on Fiery Cross and Subi Reefs, and announced the establishment of new
administrative districts and organizations on the artificial islands in pursuit ofcreating fait accompli from legal aspect. In response, ASEAN declared that they had“serious concerns” about China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea in its
80Statement by the Chairman of the Summit in June. Moreover, in the joint declarationof the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting held in December, ASEAN included
language emphasizing the respect for international law and freedom of navigationand overflight in the South China Sea for the first time in the last seven years. Thus,
ASEAN, which had not previously expressed clear concerns to China’s actions,increased their anxieties over China’s hard-line stance and moved to publicly express
such anxieties.

RCEP Agreement and China’s Expression of Interest in TPP
In 2020, new progress was also made with the cooperation framework including
China in the Indo-Pacific. In November, the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) was signed by 15 countries excluding India, and its entry into
force is expected in 2021. RCEP is a regional Free Trade Agreement (FTA), thenegotiations for which began in November 2012 between ASEAN + 6 (Japan, China,
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India). After eight years of negotiations,
RCEP was signed by all countries except India. Upon its entry into force, RCEP will
cover a huge economic zone that accounts for 30% of the world’s population, GDP
and total trade. RCEP has great significance to FOIP which aims to contribute toregional peace, stability and prosperity and to promote cooperation in both economic
and security aspects by ensuring a rules-based international order in the fastgrowing Asian and African regions with great potential. In addition, RCEP creates
new FTAs between Japan, China and South Korea, which had no existing FTAs.
However, RCEP also left a major challenge in that India, a strategically importantpartner for Japan, did not join the agreement. India’s return to RCEP is importantto further promote economic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, and RCEP has
made special institutional arrangements for this. The India-China relationship andthe domestic political and economic reforms in India have had a major impact on
India’s position, but it is necessary to urge India to participate through continuous
consultations.
Chinese President Xi Jinping said in his speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit in November that China would “actively consider”
joining TPP. In fact, however, the standards required by TPP regarding the level ofliberalization, state-owned enterprises, labor, and other provisions prohibiting unfair
81Strategic
StrategicAnnual
AnnualReport
Report2020
2020
Strategic
Simultaneous
AnnualDevelopment
Report 2020of Confrontation and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacifictrade practices are very high
for

China

to

meet.

UnlessChina renounces its rights as adeveloping country and boldly
promotesdomestic

structuralreforms, it will be extremely
difficult for China to immediately
participate in TPP. Although the

15 Asian nations signed the RCEP Agreement, November 2020. (Photo by AP/Aflo)intent of this statement is notclear, there are various possibilities behind his expression of interest in TPP where
the United States is absent.

Perspective
The QUAD framework and the cooperation among four participating countries maderapid progress in 2020. Following the regularization of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,the challenge will be to further expand and deepen the cooperation among the four
countries, including through holding a summit meeting and operationalization ofcooperation in the security field. On the other hand, with the inauguration of the new
Biden administration, it remains unclear how the US will promote the cooperation
framework limited to the three countries of Japan, Australia and India, and how itwill promote cooperation with a larger number of democratic countries, such as theidea of holding a “Democracy Summit.” At the same time, it will certainly continue
to provide unwavering general support to the vision of developing the Indo-Pacificas a region that respects law and order and the fundamental values of freedom anddemocracy. Against this backdrop, Japan should continue to promote the rule of law
and the development of freedom and democracy in the Indo-Pacific region, not only
by advancing a specific framework such as the QUAD as a core component of theFOIP vision, but also by building up multilayered cooperation with countries within
and outside the Indo-Pacific region that have expressed their support for or evenmild resonance with this vision. Continued support for maritime capacity building
and high-quality infrastructure exports to ASEAN and African countries will also
contribute to the stability and development of the Indo-Pacific region. ■

82

83

Strategic Annual Report 2020
JIIA Executive Officers, Experts, Directors and Councilors

JIIA

Research Staff

President

Kenichiro SASAE

Director General

Tomiko ICHIKAWA

Senior Consultant

Tetsuo TAKAGISecretary General

Akemi SUTO

Senior Research Advisor

Seiichiro TAKAGI

Director of Research Coordination

Kensuke NAGASE

Policy Director of the Center for
Disarmament, Science and Technology

Akemi SUTO

Senior Fellows

Tetsuo KOTANI
Toyomi SAKAMOTO
Hirofumi TOSAKI
Chushiro YONEZAWA

Fellows

Shohei AKAGAWA
Koji ENOMOTO
Naoko FUNATSU
Hironori FUSHITA
LI HaoYuko IDO
Tomoki IIMURA
Daisuke KAWAI
Reika KAWAI
Kyoko KUWAHARA
Takeshi MIYAI
Shigeru OSUGI
Chihiro SHIKATA
Yoshiaki TAKAYAMA
Kazushi TANI
Kensuke YANAGIDA
Kiyotaka YASUI

Senior Adjunct
Fellows

Yuichi HOSOYA Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University
Tsutomu KIKUCHI Professor, International Political Economy,
Aoyama Gakuin University

Fumiaki KUBO Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics,
University of Tokyo

Toshihiro NAKAYAMA Professor, Faculty of Policy Management,
Keio University

Naoya OKUWAKI Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo
Akio TAKAHARA Professor, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics,
University of Tokyo

Akihiko TANAKA President, National Graduate Institutefor Policy Studies (GRIPS)

84

Research Staff

Adjunct Fellows

Nobumasa AKIYAMA Professor, School of International and Public Policy,
Hitotsubashi University

Kiyoshi ARAKI Former Ambassador of Japan to the Republic of Turkey
Masahiko ASADA Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University
Hideaki ASAHI Former Ambassador of Japan to East TimorKen ENDO Dean, Graduate School of Public Policy, Hokkaido University
Yoshihisa ENDO Former Ambassador of Japan to Panama
Takahiro IKAWA Head of Global Relations Department, Fujitsu Ltd.
Kazuhide ISHIKAWA Former Ambassador of Japan to the Republicof the Philippines

Matake KAMIYA Professor, Department of International Relations,
National Defense Academy

Nobukatsu KANEHARA Professor, Doshisha Univercity,
Former Deputy Secretary-General of National Security Secretariat,
Former Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary

Kenichi KAWASAKI Professor, National Graduate Institutefor Policy Studies

Hideya KURATA Professor, Department of International Relations,
National Defense Academy

Mitsuru KUROSAWA Professor Emeritus, Osaka University
Sumio KUSAKA Former Ambassador of Japan to Australia
Toru NAKAKITA Professor, Faculty of Economics, Toyo University
Mutsuyoshi NISHIMURA Former Special Advisor to the Cabinet
Shotaro OSHIMA Former Permanent Representative of Japanto the International Organizations in Geneva

Yoichi OTABE Former Permanent Representative of Japanto the International Organizations in Geneva

Yoichi SUZUKI Former Ambassador of Japan to the French Republic
Tomohisa TAKEI Former Chief of Staff, Maritime Self-Defense Force
Shigenobu TAMURA Former Policy Research Council, LDP
Toshiya TSUGAMI President, Tsugami Workshop
Kyoichi WAKAYAMA Director, Japanese Secretariat
of Japan-China Joint Study

Masaru WATANABE Professor, National Defense Academy,
Former Ambassador of Japan to Cuba

Katsuyuki YAKUSHIJI Professor, Faculty of Sociology, Toyo University

85Strategic Annual Report 2020
JIIA Executive Officers, Experts, Directors and Councilors

Councilors

Joji HARANO President, Japan Echo Inc.
Ryokichi HIRONO Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
Yoshinori IMAI Professor, Ritsumeikan University
Seiji INAGAKI President and Representative Director,
The Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company, Limited

Eiko OHYA-Edahiro President, Oya Soichi Library, Inc.
Tamotsu OKAMOTO Chairperson of the Board of Directors, Council of Local Authorities
for International Relations (CLAIR)

Teiichi SATO Eminent Scholar Professor, J. F. Oberlin University
Yukio SATOH Former President of JIIA
Hiroshi SHIGETA President, The Okazaki InstituteYoshiaki SHIN Senior Advisor, Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.
Takashi TSUKIOKA Representative Director Chairman, Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd.
Akio WATANABE Vice Chairman, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Yoshinobu YAMAMOTO Emeritus Professor, the University of Tokyo, Adjunct Professor,
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Aiko Jane YAMANO Principal, Yamano Beauty College, Yamano Gakuen

Directors andAuditors

Chairman

Motoyuki OKA Honorary Adviser, Sumitomo Corporation

Vice Chair

Yoshiji NOGAMI Former President of JIIA
Takashi OYAMADA Senior Advisor, MUFG Bank, Ltd.
Teisuke KITAYAMA Advisor, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation

President

Kenichiro SASAE

Directors

Naoki ATSUMI Representative Director, Executive Vice President, Kajima Corporation
Michiaki HIROSE Chairman of the Board, Tokyo Gas Co., Ltd.
Ryuichi KITAYAMA Representative Executive Officer, Executive Vice President
and Executive Officer Hitachi Ltd.

Yoshinobu NAKAMURA President, Seiko Holdings Corporation
Katsunori NAKANISHI Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
The Shizuoka Bank, Ltd.

Masashi NISHIHARA President, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Shoichi OIKAWA Chairman of the Board, Senior Deputy Editor-in-Chief,
International Operations of The Yomiuri Shimbun (Editor-in-Chief, The Japan News)

Shotaro OSHIMA Former Chairman of the Institute for International Economic Studies
Ichio OTSUKA President, Toyo Seikan Group Holdings, Ltd.
Masayuki SATO Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, JGC Holdings Corporation
Osamu SHINOBE Vice Chairman, ANA Holdings Inc.
Yoshihisa Q SUZUKI President and COO, ITOCHU Corporation
Yukio TADA Senior Advisor, Sojitz Research Institute, Ltd
Masayasu TOYOHARA Representative Executive Officer,
Corporate Executive Vice President, Toshiba Corp.

Kanji WAKUNAGA President, Wakunaga Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.

86

Directors andAuditors

Auditors

Yasuhisa FUJIKI Managing Director, Member of the Board of Directors,
Mizuho Leasing Co., Ltd.

Yasuhiro YOSHIDA Corporate Officer, General Manager,
General Accounting Dept., Sumitomo Corporation

Adviser

Hisashi OWADA, Former President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs

GeneralCounsels

Yohsaku FUJI Advisor, The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Sumitaka FUJITA Advisor, ITOCHU Corporation
Nobuo INABA Director and Chairman of the Board, Ricoh, Co., Ltd.
Rei MASUNAGA Former Director, Institute of World Economy
Kazuo TSUKUDA Senior Executive Advisor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
Hiroshi WATANABE President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs
Shunji YANAI Judge, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea(Titles as of the end of December 2020)87Strategic Annual Report 2020
Leaders of the Ongoing Research Projects (FY2020-2022) / Summaries of Research Projects (FY2019) and Outcomes (in Japanese)

Leaders of the Ongoing Research Projects (FY2020-2022)
A. Japan’s rule-making strategy in a transition period of international order: China’s rise and renewed cooperation
among Japan, the US, and Europe.
I. China in a “new era” and transformation of the international order
Akio TAKAHARA, Professor, University of Tokyo
II. Vacillating international order and future of American global leadership
Toshihiro NAKAYAMA, Professor, Keio University
III. Japan-Europe cooperation in the context of US-China hegemonic competition
Ken ENDO, Professor, Hokkaido University
B. Japan’s security in an era of great power competition
I. The Japan-US alliance in an era of great power competition
Satoru MORI, Professor, Hosei University
II. The Korean peninsula and the future of the peninsular order in an“era of great power competition”
Masao OKONOGI, Professor Emeritus, Keio Univeristy
III. Russia in an era of great power competition
Nobuo SHIMOTOMAI, Distinguished Professor, Kanagawa University,
Professor Emeritus, Hosei University
C. Competition and cooperation in a transforming international order: Recommendations for Japanese foreign policy
to rebuild global governance
I. Economic-Security Linkages
Keisuke IIDA, Professor, University of Tokyo
Security and Emerging Technologies
Kazuto SUZUKI, Professor, University of Tokyo
II. Global Issues
Kiyotaka AKASAKA, Former Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information,
United Nations
III. The Middle East and Africa
Ryoji TATEYAMA, Professor Emeritus, National Defense Academy
D. Beyond US-China relations: and Indo-Pacific strategy for Japan as a “cornerstone state” in building a free and open
regional order
Tsutomu KIKUCHI, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University

88Summaries of Research Projects (FY2019)
and Outcomes (in Japanese)
A. The Resilience of the “Open Liberal International Order”: The Situations of the US, China and Europe, and their
Impacts
A-1: The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy and Japan-US Relations•h ttp://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/study_groups/2017-2019/A-Sub-Project_I_The_Trump_Administration_s_
Foreign_Policy_and_Japan-US_Relations.pdf• https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/R01_US/
A-2: China’s Foreign Policy and Other Countries’ China Policies•h ttp://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/study_groups/2017-2019/A-Sub-Project_II_China_s_Foreign_Policy_and_Other_Countries_Policies_Toward_China.pdf• https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/R01_China/
A-3: Europe in Turbulence•h ttp://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/study_groups/2017-2019/A-Sub-Project_III_Europe_in_Turbulence_and_
the_International_Order.pdf• https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/R01_Europe/
B. Bottom-up Review of Security Policy
B-1: Bottom-up Review (Security Research)• http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research_pj/h29-31/h29-31_project_B-subproj_I_summary.pdf
B-2: Korean Peninsula in an ‘Age of Uncertainty’ and Japan’s Foreign / Security Policy•h ttp://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/study_groups/2017-2019/B-Sub-Project_II_Korean_Peninsula_in_an_Age_of_Uncertainty_and_Japan_s_Foreign-Security_Policy.pdf• https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/R01_Korean_Peninsula/B-3: Post-Putin Russia• http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/study_groups/2017-2019/B-Sub-Project_III_Post_Putin_Russia.pdf• https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/R01_Russia/
C-1: World Economy• https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/R01_World_Economy/
C-2: Global Risk
Subgroup (1) Analysis of Current Situation in the Middle East and Energy Issues
Subgroup (2) Analysis of Populism and Demographic Shift (Immigrant and Refugee) Issues• https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/R01_Global_Risk/
D-1: Rule of Law in the Indo-Pacific: Japan’s foreign policy for enhancing global public goods• http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/indo_pacific_focus/

89

Strategic Annual Report 2020
Research Reports

Research Reports
AuthorTitle/Affiliation

Date

Title

URL

Yoshinobu Yamamoto

Emeritus Professor, theUniversity of Tokyo,
Adjunct Professor,
National Graduate
Institute for Policy Studies

2020/9/17

Economy and Security inthe Era of Sino-American
Rivalry

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/09/
research-reports-economy-securitylinkages01.html

Naoko Iwasaki

Professor, Institute ofe-Government, Waseda
University

2020/9/29

Digital Government
in Japan's Super-aging
Society and International
Contributions

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/09/
research-reports-global-issues01.html

Kayo Takuma

Professor, Tokyo
Metropolitan University

2020/10/8

Global Health Governance
Issues Exposed by theCoronavirus Crisis

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/10/
research-reports-global-issues02.html

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/10/
research-reports-middle-east-and-africa01.
html

Ryoji Tateyama

Emeritus Professor,
National Defense
Academy of Japan

2020/10/16

From the Arab World's"Three No's" toNormalized Ties—The
Establishment of UAEBahrain-Israel Diplomatic
Relations and thePalestinian Question

Motohiro Tsuchiya

Professor, Keio University

2020/10/20

Submarine Cables andInternational Relations

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/10/
research-reports-economy-securitylinkages02.html

Masaki Kakizaki

Associate Professor,
Temple University, Japan
Campus2020/10/21

Turkey's Diplomacy
toward Africa at a Turning
Point—With Special
References to Somalia,
Sudan, and Libya—

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/10/
research-reports-middle-east-and-africa02.
html

Mikio Ishiwatari

Visiting Professor,
Graduate School The
University of Tokyo

2020/12/2

Multi-hazard Approachto Compound/Cascading
Disasters: Putting
Experience in Developing
Disaster Risk Reduction to
Use in Pandemics

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/12/
research-reports-global-issues03.html

Akiko Yoshioka

Senior Analyst, The
Institute of Energy
Economics, Japan

2020/12/16

Iraq's Challenges and the
New Prime Minister's
Initiatives

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/12/
research-reports-middle-east-and-africa05.
html.html

Daisaku Higashi

Professor, Sophia
University

2020/12/17

Human Security in
Tackling the Coronavirus
Pandemic: Japan's Role ina Global Solution

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/12/
research-reports-global-issues04.html

Keisuke Iida

Professor, Graduate
School of Public Policy,
The University of Tokyo

2020/12/18

On Economy-Security
Linkages

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/12/
research-reports-economy-securitylinkages03.html

2020/12/20

New Dynamics overthe Grand Ethiopia
Renaissance Dam (GERD)
and Changing Political
Systems in the Horn ofAfrica Region

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/12/
research-reports-middle-east-and-africa03.
html

2020/12/23

The Environment
Surrounding Saudi
Arabia's Economy, With a
Focus on Petroleum Policy,
Economic Reform, andForeign Relations

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/12/
research-reports-middle-east-and-africa06.
html

2020/12/24

Libyan Conflict and
Its Interaction with
Geopolitical Dynamics inthe Eastern Mediterranean
Sea and the Red Sea

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/column/2020/12/
research-reports-middle-east-and-africa04.
html

Mitsugi Endo

90

Professor, The Universityof TokyoToshihiro Nakanishi

Professor, Teikyo
University

Amane Kobayashi

Senior Researcher, The
Institute of Energy
Economics, Japan

Strategic Annual Report 2020
JIIA Strategic Commnets

JIIA Strategic Commnets
AuthorTitle/Affiliation

NO.

Date

Title

URL

Ryoji Tateyama

Professor Emeritus,
National Defense
Academy, Japan

2020 1

2020/3/23

The Demise of the
Two-State Solution: The
Realities Trump's Peace
Plan Will Create

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/03/the-demise-ofthe-two-state-solution-the-realitiestrumps-peace-plan-will-create.html

LI HaoResearch Fellow, The
Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020 2

2020/3/13

The Novel Coronavirus
Outbreak and Its
Political/Economic
Impact on China

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/
strategic_comment/2020/03/
jiia-strategic-comments-2020-2-thenovel-coronavirus-outbreak.html

Kyoko Kuwahara

Research Fellow, The
Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020 42020/4/23

The Coronavirus Blame
Game Intensifies the USChina Information War
for International Public
Opinionhttps://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/04/jiia-strategiccomments-2020-4.html

Kensuke Yanagida

Research Fellow, The
Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020 52020/4/25

The Impacts of the New
Coronavirus Pandemic on
the Global Economy: A
Nontechnical Summary

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/04/jiia-strategiccomments-2020-5.html

Hironori Fushita

Research Fellow, The
Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

20220/4/28

The Spread of theNovel Coronavirus
Infection in Russia
and the Government's
Countermeasures

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/04/jiia-strategiccomments-2020-6.html

Tetsuo Kotani

Professor, Meikai
University, Senior Fellow,
The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020/5/15

U.S. Dynamic Force
Employment and thePandemic: Implications
for the U.S.-Japan
Alliancehttps://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/05/jiia-strategiccomments-2020-8.html

LI HaoResearch Fellow, The
Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020 92020/5/15

The Novel Coronavirus
Outbreak and Its
Political/Economic
Impact on China(Continued)

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/05/jiia-strategiccomments-2020-9.html

Yoshiaki Takayama

Research Fellow, The
Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020 102020/5/11

Coronavirus Crisis
Accelerating
Reconsideration of
Supply Chainshttps://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/05/2020-10.html

Kyoko Kuwahara

Research Fellow, The
Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020 112020/5/16

China's "Wolf Warrior
Diplomacy": The
Limitations andChallenges Exposed by
the Corona Crisis

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/05/jiia-strategiccomments-2020-11.html

Naoko Funatsu

Research Fellow, The
Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020 122020/7/7

The Two Disruptions
Rocking the US

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/07/2020-12.html

LI HaoResearch Fellow, The
Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020 132020/7/1

China's Situation after
the National People's
Congress

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/07/2020-13.html

Yuko Ido

Research Fellow, The
Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020 142020/12/14

Abraham Accords
and Camp David
Accords: Rethinking the
Trajectories of the 'Arab
Cause'

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/12/2020-14.html

Hirofumi Tosaki

Senior Research Fellow,
The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

2020 15

2020/11/2

Entry into Force of the
TPNW: Challenges for
Revitalizing Nuclear
Disarmament

https://www.jiia.or.jp/en/strategic_
comment/2020/11/2020-15.html

2020 62020 891