AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
NPIRIPS

Nakasone Yasuhiro
Peace Institute

The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs(Secretariat)

Research Institute for
Peace and Security

No. 301
30 March 2023

THE XI JINPING ADMINISTRATION IN ITS
THIRD TERM: WHAT KIND OF DIPLOMACYSHOULD JAPAN PURSUE TOWARD CHINA?
Kazuko Kojima
・ Behind Xi Jinping’s third term as a strong
leader is the Communist Party leaders’ strong
sense of crisis about internal and external
circumstances and the urgency of building agoverning system based on law anddiscipline.
・ If Japan closes its diplomatic window bydismissing China as a “dictatorship” and joinsin the dichotomization of the world, Japan’s
security and national interests will beundermined.
・ Japan needs to make diplomatic efforts tobuild multidimensional and multilayered
international relations, including military
security, economic security, and even “life”
security, transcending differences in politicalregimes and values, and to involve China insuch relations.
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should not beattributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies.

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

The Xi Jinping Administration in Its Third Term
With the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter,“20th Party Congress”) held in October 2022, the Xi Jinping administration entered its
third term, breaking with the recent practice of general secretaries serving two terms up
to 10 years. This fact shows that Xi, who was not necessarily a renowned leader 10years ago, has become a "strong leader”.
Reasons for the Emergence of a “Strong Leader”
Why and how was the "strong leader" Xi Jinping created? In the author's view,
behind the emergence of a strong leader was a common sense of crisis among Partyleaders with regard to internal and external conditions. When Xi took office in 2012,
Party leaders shared the understanding that the United States, which had incited thecolor revolutions, the Arab Spring, and the Occupy Central movement in Hong Kong,
was now targeting mainland China and was planning to overthrow its one-party regime
through intellectual networks, NGOs, and Christian churches. Domestically, they werealso very concerned that the corruption that had pervaded the Party, government, andmilitary from the local level to the center not only hindered market reforms but also had
led to the threat of a Party split, as shown by the scandals of Bo Xilai and Zhou
Yongkang. If this situation continues, China may be plunged into an economic crisis andeven into political turmoil. To overcome this critical situation and build a robust
government and markets based on law and discipline, a leader with strong power andauthority is required, and time is also needed to carry out this difficult task in vast andpopulous China. The common understanding among Party leaders was probably
something along these lines.
Building a "Robust" Governing System with a “Strong Leader”
During the past decade, attempts to build a "robust" governing system havebeen put into practice by the Xi administration. First, the administration tightened thecontrol of thought and speech, and placed the activities of liberal intellectuals and NGOs
as well as information on the Internet under strict surveillance. It also launched anationwide movement praising Xi Jinping, gave Xi the core position on the Party CentralCommittee and in the Party as a whole, and included the phrase "Xi Jinping Thought on
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" in the Party constitution and thenational constitution. In addition, it has created a system in which Xi supervises policies
in all areas by enhancing the Party's central organs, such as the committees and the

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary2

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

leading groups that substantively decide important national policies, and by placing Xi atthe head of these organizations.
With power and authority in his hands, Xi has used the Party's Discipline
Inspection Commission to conduct an exhaustive anti-corruption campaign targeting
Party, government, and military organizations from the central to the local level, as well
as state-owned enterprises, media, and universities. Furthermore, under the banner of“rule by law,” Xi has employed the Party's Political and Legal Affairs Commission toestablish a governing structure for “rule by law” from the center to localities and evendown to the residential district level. Xi's goal seems to be to enhance a top-down
vertical chain of command by building disciplined Party organizations loyal to the Party
Central Committee in every corner of society.
Given the above series of initiatives over the past 10 years, how should wecharacterize the Xi administration, which has now entered its third term? On the one
hand, it is easy to portray Xi Jinping as a dictator who privatizes power. This trend isparticularly apparent in his arbitrary way of conducting personnel affairs. Following the20th Party Congress and the First Session of the 14th National People’s Congress, key
positions in the Party and state apparatus have mostly been monopolized by Xi'slongtime aides, and the leaders who did not belong to Xi’s personal circle were blatantly
eliminated. On the other hand, it is possible to portray Xi Jinping as a virtuous man who
has been forced to seize power and authority for the common good of protecting China
from internal and external "enemies," eradicating corruption, and creating a government
and markets based on law and discipline. We cannot judge which of theseinterpretations is correct at this point. For the Xi administration, the only way to provethat the latter is correct is to achieve economic stability and development and improve
people's welfare through its future endeavors.

Japan should build a pluralistic and multilayered international environment withChina, overcoming differences in regimes and values
In Japan, there is a widespread tendency to dismiss China as a dictatorshipwithout paying attention to its internal logic. Especially since the US-China confrontation
and Russia's invasion of Ukraine began, there has been a noticeable trend among
Japanese lawmakers and media to use assertive words to fully engage in the war ofdiscourse created by the US targeting Russia and China. Autonomous diplomacy
featuring “panoramic views” disappeared with the resignation and death of former Prime
Minister Abe.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary3

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Of course, utilizing the position of being a US ally for Japan's security anddevelopment has been important in the past and present, and efforts should be made tocontinue this approach. However, if war should break out between China and the US,
Japan, a neighbor of China’s, would become the front line of the war. Japan should be
mindful of this risk and work hard to halt the move toward global dichotomization, which
would narrow Japan’s diplomatic options and jeopardize its national security. Efforts tobuild a pluralistic and multilayered international environment with China are possible on
many fronts. For example, one idea would be to build a "life security" partnership
between Japan and China that relates to the health and livelihood of the people of bothcountries by promoting personnel exchange and cooperation in areas such as medicaland nursing care. It is important to build a multidimensional security framework thatincludes not only military and economic security, but also "life" security, and to make it
function as a device to deter war.
Originally, the strength of Japan's diplomacy lay in its flexibility to achievecoexistence and harmony with various political regimes based on a diversity of values.
Japan should demonstrate this strength in its diplomacy toward China.

Kazuko Kojima is a professor in the Faculty of Law at Keio University.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary4