To move or not to move:
Some consequences of a logical analysis of the English auxiliary system
Yusuke Kubota
NINJAL

Just as the transformational analysis of auxiliary inversion and affix hopping (Chomsky 1957)
was once thought to be one of the most convincing arguments for the notion of syntactic transformation, a movement-free analysis of auxiliaries whose essence is embodied in the early GPSG
analysis by Gazdar et al. (1982) has been taken in the literature of nontransformational syntactic
theories to be one of the most successful demonstrations for the viability of movement-free syntax.
The consensus in the field (in both the transformationalist and nontransformationalist camps) seems
to be that the mainstream syntax which has employed some version of ‘syntactic transformation’in all of its avatars and the so-called nontransformational variants of syntax (such as HPSG, LFG,Sign-Based Construction Grammar and categorial grammar) which all disavow syntactic transformation are mutually incompatible alternatives. To what extent is this common wisdom true? If thetwo are mutually incompatible, which one is closer to the truth?
This talk addresses this question from a somewhat unusual (and potentially controversial) angle.
A version of categorial grammar called Hybrid Type-Logical Grammar (Hybrid TLG; Kubota &Levine 2020) turns out to have properties similar to both transformational and nontransformationalvariants of syntax. An analysis of English auxiliaries in Hybrid TLG turns out to have properties
similar to both the transformational and nontransformational analyses. Moreover, it can be formally
proven (in the technical sense of ‘prove’) that the traditional ‘VP/VP analysis’ of auxiliaries innontransformational syntax is a theorem of a more abstract analysis which embodies the core
insight of the transformational analysis. A number of interesting consequences follow, including a
conceptually simple analysis of ‘do insertion’ that is different from both the transformational andnontransformational analyses. The overall considerations seem to lead us to the conclusion thatboth transformational syntax and nontransformational syntax were right and both were wrong, and,more importantly, that we need logic to really make sense of the deeper properties underlying thestructure-building component of language which linguists usually call ‘syntax’.

Remarks on the Partial Pronominal Use of Proverbs in English andthe “Simulation Effects” of Generic Pronouns and Clausal Generic Expressions
Koichi Nishida (Yamaguchi Prefectural University)
As is commonly observed (cf. Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998), Huang (2000)), in
logophoric complements like (1), pronouns, but not definite noun phrases like epithetsor descriptions, can corefer with the matrix subject (where i stands for corefence):(1) Johni thinks that {hei/*the idioti/*the senior office workeri} will win.
However, like pronouns, proverbs with noun phrase subjects may occur in suchcomplements and their subjects are taken to corefer with the matrix subject, as in (2):(2) For more than 20 years, John has woken up at 4:30 every morning and has
started working in his office from 7:00. Hei believes that the early birdi catches
the worm.
Proverbs of this type are similar to generic indefinite pronouns like one. Moltmann(2006) observes that in (3), the complement with one is fine as a general statement if
John alone can, but doesn’t have to, see the picture from the entrance, but the one
with people requires that people other than John also can see it from the entrance:(3) John found out that {one/people} can see the picture from the entrance.
Moltmann (2006: 265) argues that generic one accompanies “inference from the firstperson,” which “is licensed in a (simple) sentence establishing a generalization basedon a first-person application of the predicate.” Sentence (3) is fine even if John himself
is unable to see the picture, because he can simulate anyone with normal vision.
The first-person simulation also comes into play with generic indefinite singularslike those in (4), where a Christian is better than Christians, and the Christian is
unacceptable in the reading in which the complement is a matter of Jack himself:(4) Living in a small house himself, Jack Sanders believes that {a Christian/Christians/*the Christian} should live a humble life.
Nunberg and Pan (1975) argue that indefinite singulars can be used as genericexpressions only in the sentences whose predicates express the properties that thesubject individual has through its class-membership; by contrast, bare plurals anddefinites can make generic sentences that express properties of the class as a whole.

Thus, in (4), the individual in matrix subject, i.e. J. Sanders, can easily simulate theindividual in the complement and take it as a matter of himself when the latter isexpressed as an individual having the same class-membership properties as him.
Proverbs are closer to generic one and indefinite singulars than generic definites
in accepting the first-person simulation, but their required indefiniteness does notcome from their forms. Rather, it comes from the fact that they lack what Goffman(1981) calls “Author” in their production format; since they are free from authorship,
any speaker can apply them to anyone in any similar situation, as specified in (5):(5) Without authorship, any speaker has to copy proverbs to talk about anyone
alike, as in anyone seen as “the early bird” catches the worm or its equivalent(s).
In (5), anyone invites the generic reading, which then invites the first-person simulation.
The indefinite production format qualifies proverbs as clausal generic expressions.
Because the first-person simulation of proverbs belongs to pragmatic inference
rather than to grammar, it also works for proverbs preceded by other determiners, asin “I don’t fight that because Ii believe that every dogi has its day” (Howard (2007)
Women as Hamlet). The pronominal use of proverbs builds on the simulation ofindividuals in matrix subject; it disappears if they do not simulate anyone, as in (6):(6) For more than 20 years, John’s father woke up at 4:30 every morning andstarted working in his office from 7:00. However, he went into bankruptcy at theage of 55. So, today John doesn’t believe that the early bird catches the worm.
In (6), the embedded proverb under the negated matrix clause remains a matter ofanyone. The simulation effects on the production format in (5) link proverbs with salient
discourse referents that are unrelated to their literal meanings (cf. Barajas (2010)).
References
Barajas, E. Domínguez (2010) The Function of Proverbs in Discourse: The Case of a
Mexican Transnational Social Network, De Gruyter Mouton, New York.
Dubinsky, Stanley and Robert Hamilton (1998) “Epithets as Antilogophoric Pronouns,”
Linguistic Inquiry 29, 685-693.
Goffman, Erving (1981) Forms of Talk, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
Huang, Yan (2000) Anaphora: A Cross-Linguistic Approach, Oxford University Press,Oxford.
Moltmann, Friederike (2006) “Generic One, Arbitrary Pro, and the First Person,”Natural Language Semantics 13, 257-281.
Nunberg, Geoffrey and Chiahua Pan (1975) “Inferring Quantification in GenericSentences,” CLS 11, 412-422.

Metonymy in Grammar Revisited
Yoshiki Nishimura
University of Tokyo
In a series of publications and presentations (e.g. Nishimura 2002, 2003, 2008), I haveproposed a characterization of metonymy that, to my mind, is sufficiently unified andcomprehensive to allow us to (1) deal with the widest range of metonymic phenomena,(2) explain why metonymy should be as pervasive in language as most cognitive linguists
would like to think it is, and (3) show that a broad array of grammatical phenomena, manyof which have traditionally been treated separately, can appropriately be seen as groundedin metonymy. For the benefit of those of you who are not familiar with my work on
metonymy, here is how I have characterized it: Metonymy can be defined as occurring
when different uses of a given expression, while activating a single shared frame,
highlight different facets of that frame.
I will begin this presentation with a quick review of points (1) and (2) above. WhileI am at it, I will also try to set the record straight about the fate of metonymy in thenetwork model for polysemy (in fact, for much else in language as well) put forward by
Langacker many years ago. As far as this country is concerned, many, perhaps the great
majority of cognitive linguists seem to believe that this model, at least as it was originallyconceived, is inherently not equipped to accommodate metonymy. I will show, bydocumentation, that nothing could be further from the truth. I will then go on to walk you
through my analyses of a couple of grammatical phenomena, most of which are revised
versions of the ones presented in my previous work. Among the phenomena to be
discussed are the tough construction (e.g. Mary is hard to convince), the English
resultative (e.g. Bill ate himself sick), and the Japanese indirect passive (e.g. Taro-wa
Hanako-ni nakareta ‘Taro was adversely affected by Hanako’s crying’ [Lit. Taro wascried by Hanako]). Taken together, these analyses will hopefully help to convince you of
the coherence and potential significance of Cognitive Grammar, which maintains thatgrammar is inherently meaningful, adopts a usage-based approach to linguisticknowledge, views lexicon and grammar as forming a continuum, and takes linguistic
semantics to be encyclopedic in scope.