Georgia Institute of Technology
From the SelectedWorks of Diana Hicks

May, 2008

The U.S. Research Enterprise in a Changing
Global Science System
Diana M Hicks, Georgia Institute of Technology - Main Campus

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/diana_hicks/1/

The U.S. Research Enterprise in a Changing Global Science System

Diana Hicks
School of Public Policy
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta GA, 30332

Wednesday, August 13, 2008

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Abstract
Scientific communities outside Europe and the U.S. have become more competitive overrecent decades due to greater investment, restructuring and increased evaluation. Most scientists
probably have a vague sense of this, aware that there are many more competent scientists andinteresting results coming from abroad than in the past. This paper argues that as a result, it ispossible for the U.S. scientific community to perform as well as it has ever done, yet for it toappear to be in decline. This paper will explore the trajectory of the U.S. research enterprise in
an international context to highlight some of the surprising consequences that strengthening of
foreign R&D systems can have for trends in U.S. research output.
Introduction
The global scientific landscape has changed. Over the past decade many governments
became convinced that their economic futures lay with knowledge-based economies in which
research is central. Governments sought to strengthen national research, swiftly building
capability and fostering a sharper competitive culture. As a result, foreign scientificcommunities have become more competitive. These changes are easy to underestimate because
the size of the US scientific enterprise still dwarfs that of any other country (though the scientificoutput of the EU is now larger). Nevertheless, in aggregate these shifts are beginning to have an
impact on the perceived strength of US research.
Around the world governments’ science policy trajectories and goals are clear and so we
can imagine the changed world we might inhabit in say, 2015. It will be a place in which scienceand technology advance even faster than they do at present. More diverse approaches will be
brought to bear on tough problems and will accelerate their solution. At the personal level, theimplications are less positive. US scientists will compete for the best students and for corporate
research support not just with other US universities but with Asian and European universities.
And US scientists will have to compete for limited space in top journals not just with other US
scientists, but with more and better scientists from around the world. Races to patent discoveries
will involve more players. Inevitably, this will reduce the perceived achievements of younger
generations of US scientists, who though they will work far harder than any previous generationof scholars will somehow not command the same dominating position in world science as did
their predecessors. It is quite possible that in 2015 measured scientific output from the UnitedStates will be less than that from the EU-15 countries or Asian countries as a group. This paper
explores how a situation might develop in which US scientific output is smaller than that ofcountries we now consider to be less proficient in research than ourselves.
Measured rates of growth in scientific output
To examine growth rates in scientific publishing, we use data from NSF’s Science andEngineering Indicators 2006 (S&EI). S&EI appendix table 5-41 reports the number of scientificpapers published by various countries including the U.S., EU-15 and Asian countries. In thesecounts countries are given fractional credit for papers based on how many addresses on each
paper list the country. The papers are counted in the full Science and Social Science Citation
Indices (S/SCI) database so changes in journal coverage will affect the trends. Table 1 reports2the growth in output between 1988 and 2002 for South Korea, the EU-15, the database as awhole and the United States.
Table 1 – Growth in publications between 1988 and 2002
EntityGrowthSouth Korea
Asian countries 1
EU-15
Database
United States

15.2
2.5
1.5
1.4
1.1

% share of
database
2
18
32
100
31

In comparison to the US, whose paper output as indexed in this database was flat during
this period, we see between four and fifteen fold growth in the output of up and coming Asian
science systems such as China, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea. In aggregate the Asian
countries including Japan and India more than doubled their output. Of course, the strongest
growth was from a low base, and the US still publishes far more papers in the journals indexed in
the S/SCI, accounting for 31% of the database. Indeed, the database has always been criticized
for being biased towards Anglo-Saxon researchers. However, the relatively static position of the
U.S. in these numbers is a worry because it contrasts with the healthy growth of prior decades
and thus may signal a transition to an actual decline in measured scientific output.
Open publication in peer-reviewed research journals traditionally characterizes scientificcommunication, and counting a country's journal articles is a basic indicator of a nation's
scientific output. Increases in published output are routine, expected and taken as indicators of ahealthy scientific research system. A declining publication count would be worrying, perhaps
signaling weakness or decay in the research system, which in turn might threaten future
economic growth in our science-driven, high tech economy. Could a country where almost
everything measurable increases, most especially things associated with high technology, accept
a decline in scientific output with equanimity? Perhaps not. 2 Certainly, the issue deserves
scrutiny.
Does the database grow?
It is of course possible that U.S. scientists are indeed publishing more and more articles
in scientific journals as they always have, but S&EI counts are somehow missing that and getting
it wrong. After all, these publication counts are indicators, and indicators can go astray.
Bibliographic databases index part of the scientific literature. No representation of thescientific literature is more complete than these databases, yet there are published scientificpapers that are not indexed. Thus, publication indicators can go astray if the database is not afaithful representation of the scientific literature. Of particular relevance here, if the databasegrows more slowly than the literature, U.S. scientific output could appear to decline whenmeasured in the database yet could still be expanding.
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It is quite likely that the scientific literature grows differently from the literature
databases because different mechanisms underlie the expansion of the literature and the
expansion of databases. The literature expands as journals grow and split and new journals arefounded to serve new specialist interests. This reflects the continuous expansion of research as
scientists become more specialized and new specialties emerge. Growth in literature may beslowed if subscriptions are harder to come by, for example if library budgets are static or journal
subscription costs rise. Databases must expand or risk looking old fashioned and losing
subscribers, yet expansion per se probably does not increase subscriptions, though it increases
costs. Also, databases are affected by changes in company policy, for example a decision to
include more foreign literature, or to add all health sciences journals (as happened in the SSCI in1996). Perhaps most crucially, the literature grows as the result of decisions of innumerable
highly motivated individuals and publishers looking for expansion. Database growth iscontrolled by a management skilled in assessing the costs and benefits of expansion in businessterms. Thus, the literature is biased towards exuberant and uncontrolled growth, while databases
are biased towards staying the same size, or if they must, growing slowly, steadily andpredictably.
This disparity is not as worrying as it might seem at first because of what might betermed "the quality factor" in science. Simply put, not all literature that claims to be scientific is,and not all scientific literature is equal. In the first category would be, for example, journals on
astrology or homeopathy. In the second would be house journals, locally oriented journals, andoften new journals, because researchers may be wary of submitting good work to new journals
with an uncertain future and limited circulation. Clearly, the boundary between the best
scientific literature and the rest is subjective and shifts over time as approaches once consideredobsessions of the fringe gain acceptance. However, from the policy perspective, quality counts.
If U.S. output in Science and Nature declined, it would not be comforting to know that increased
publishing in the "Vegetable Journal" and "Astrology Today" more than made up for it.
To generalize this principle, in bibliometrics we rely on databases to draw a line
somewhere and to incorporate the best scientific literature. We hope, and in general this is thecase, that the database indexes the best literature, and that at the bottom end of its quality
spectrum questions may arise and coverage may change, but that overall what is missed is muchless important than what is indexed. This works because the impact of scientific research is notarrayed in a normal distribution (like height or intelligence). Measured by citations, impact
follows a power law distribution, meaning that a very few papers earn very high citation counts
and a large number earn no citations at all. Normal distributions are well described by a meanand standard deviation; power law distributions are not. Thus, database providers work not tocover a spread about a quality mean, but rather to identify the top of the distribution which isvery visible, given the nature of the distribution. And the nature of the distribution means that
however far down the distribution databases draw their line, the literature excluded will be muchless significant than the literature included.
The implications for assessing growth of U.S. scientific output are these. We would liketo count papers in peer reviewed, internationally oriented journals because this is the yardstickby which a nation's science should be measured against other nations. However we count – in a
few top journals, in a fixed set of journals that avoids database coverage changes (as was done
for S&EI counts until the 2006 edition), or in the full database (S&EI 2006) – what we count is4relatively fixed in size when compared to the full scientific literature. Nevertheless, growth innumber of U.S. papers is possible using each of these three counting methods because the total
number of papers in each set grows. Between the five year periods ending 1994 and 1999, thenumber of papers in the journal Science increased by 9%; the number of papers in a fixed set ofjournals grew by 5%; 3 and the number of papers in the Science and Social Science Citation
Index grew by 13%. Growth rates measured in these sets of journals are probably lower thanthose that would be obtained from a count of the full scientific literature. But this does not meanthat our indicators have gone astray. If U.S. output in the world's peer reviewed, internationallyoriented journals begins to decline, that in itself may signify a problem. Our indicators may be
more complex than we initially thought, but they raise policy relevant questions.
Prediction
Might we be able to predict the trend in U.S. authored publications whole counted in thefull S/SCI? Perhaps this is possible if we can identify fundamental factors that underpin trends inthe number of U.S. publications. There would seem to be two such factors. The first is growthin the S/SCI, which sets an upper bound on growth in number of U.S. authored publicationsindexed in the S/SCI. Between 1988 and 2002 the number of articles and reviews indexed in the
S/SCI increased from about 466,000 to 640,000, growing in a linear fashion by about 12,500
papers per year on average or about 2.3% per year.
The second factor shaping the trend in number of U.S. papers in the S/SCI is the U.S.
share of articles. The U.S. share of articles is the ultimate outcome of innumerable peer-review
and editorial decisions allocating space in S/SCI indexed journals. For our purposes we canimagine a contest between U.S. and foreign authors for limited space in high quality,internationally oriented, scientific journals. 4 To perpetually increase measured output, U.S.
authors must succeed in the peer review contest at the same rate they always have.
Unfortunately, the American share of world scientific output, measured in the S/SCI, decreases
every year. The decreasing share has not been a concern, because after World War II, the U.S.
so dominated world scientific output that it was only natural that other nations would recover,new entrants would build scientific capability, and the U.S. share would decline.
In isolation, neither the rate of S/SCI expansion nor the declining U.S. share of S/SCI
papers is cause for concern. However, when number of S/SCI papers is multiplied by U.S. share,
we obtain number of U.S. papers. Since both S/SCI expansion and decline in U.S. share arelinear, we can use the trends in both to predict the future growth in U.S. output. The results doprovide cause for concern. Here are the equations:
S/SCI= Total S/SCI papers
US% = U.S. share of S/SCI papers
US = U.S. papers = S/SCIxUS%
With linear growth in the S/SCI and linear decline in U.S. share, we have:(1) S/SCI = nxyear + a5

(2) US% = mxyear + b
Thus:(3) US = S/SCIxUS% = (nxyear + a)(mxyear + b) = mxnxyear2 + year (nxb + mxa) + axb
With the S/SCI expanding and U.S. share of papers declining, a parabola describes thetrend in number of U.S. papers. Even with share falling, we can expect number of U.S. papers torise for a number of years, though in ever decreasing increments until the top of the curve isreached at which point number of papers will begin to decline. From the policy viewpoint, theimportant question is: when will we reach this inflection point? If it comes in 300 years, it isunimportant now; but if arrives soon there is a policy problem.
To find the inflection point we take the first derivative of the equation and solve fordUS/dt = 0:
(4) dUS/dyear = 2xmxnxyear + nxb + mxa = 0(5) year = -(nxb + mxa)/ 2xmxn = -½(b/m + a/n)
Linear regression on the trend in S/SCI papers and U.S. share gives:(6) S/SCI = 12,756xyear - 24,876,247(7) US% = -0.006xyear + 12.6
Using these parameters in equation 5, we calculate the year at which decline in U.S.
output began to be 2001. However, the trend in U.S. share appears to change in the early 1990s
and enter a much steeper decline. The linear regression line does not really fit the data very well,its slope being too steep at the beginning and not steep enough at the end. If things had remained
as they were in the late 1980s, U.S. share would decline so slowly that number of U.S. papers
would not decline until 2106–making it a non-issue. However, if there has been a change, andthe regression based on years 1992-2002 is more appropriate, decline began even earlier, in1999. Examining year-to-year changes in number of U.S. papers as reported in S&EI reveals
that between 1999 and 2002 the number of U.S. papers increased by 2% between 2000 and 2001,
and the other years were static or declining. 5Some conjectures and stylized facts
Suppose the article database were fixed in size, and furthermore suppose the U.S. R&D
enterprise was the best in the world, working at maximum efficiency. And suppose that the
database had a U.S. bias such that more minor U.S. journals were indexed than minor journals
from other countries (we might call this the “Idaho Potato Journal” effect). In contrast, the R&D
systems of other countries contain slack resources and slack R&D capacity. When the othercountries decide to emphasize R&D more they quickly (because of slack capacity) improve their
R&D enterprise and produce more and higher quality work. What is the effect on the US in the
fixed database? Things get more competitive, the bar is raised a bit, some lower quality U.S.
work can’t find a place anymore and so the US share declines.
6In reality the database isn’t fixed in size; it is almost fixed. The database grew by about
13,000 articles per year, or on average by 2.0% between 1990 and 2002. But there is a limit to
growth, Thomson Scientific’s costs scale with articles indexed. To keep costs constant, theywould have needed to improve productivity by 2.0% per year.
The U.S. R&D system is not perfect, but as a stylized fact it is very plausible that U.S.
scientists have worked harder than anyone else for longer than anyone else and that the
incentives, particularly in academia, over the long term have extracted maximum efficiency andthat this contrasts with the situation in other countries which did have slack R&D capacity. For
example, the UK RAE evaluation of universities was implemented and output rose. The 1990s
saw aggressive expansion of government R&D support in Asia – esp. South Korea and China –as well as Latin America and Pacific countries. Substantial government expenditure on training
and infrastructure is not captured in R&D statistics. Doctoral programs have expanded acrossAsia and in Latin America as a point of government policy. Many US-trained PhDs now return
to home countries that can offer them good professional opportunities. Even in Europe andAustralia, which like the US suffered a relative decline in government R&D funding, newsystems of evaluation have played a significant role. Governments imposed aggressive
accountability and evaluation for research into systems in which stringent evaluation was not
used at any level.
A recent NSF study of publication counts concludes that the key factors driving academic
publication rates are money, (research funding, especially federal); researchers (number offaculty) and students (number of PhD students). The hypothesis that an international perspective
is needed to understand the decline in U.S. output is supported by quantitative data on theseresearch resources: total U.S. R&D expenditure, numbers of scientists and engineers andnumbers of graduate students and doctoral degrees awarded increased in the 1990s. This is thedomestic perspective. In the international perspective, U.S. resources are expressed as a share ofa group of countries.
In the domestic perspective, there is a general pattern of growth with perhaps someleveling and a bit of decline, but nothing especially worrying. Long periods of growth areinterrupted in the early 1990s (except in doctoral degrees awarded which continued to grow).
There was a slight decline in R&D expenditures, a leveling of growth in scientists and engineers
and a drop off in graduate enrollment. 6 The most worrying decline is the drop in number ofgraduate students beginning in 1993 which followed four decades of increase. 7 In the domestic
perspective there are hints of problems, but things really do not look too bad.
The international perspective is truly worrying. The U.S. share of G7 R&D expenditure
declined sharply from 1987 to 1990; share of G7 scientists and engineers declined sharply from1991 to 1993; and share of U.S.-Asian doctoral degrees began declining sharply in 1993. Theinternational perspective reveals patterns very similar to the drop in U.S. share of publications—a long-term gentle decline in share is rudely interrupted by a slide down a much steeper slope.
The declines in resources begin a couple of years before the declines in U.S. output, whichmakes perfect sense. Share of R&D expenditure and scientists and engineers has since turned
up, offering hope that we are simply seeing a transition to a new regime which will soonstabilize.

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SummaryIn the Economist on September 16, 2006 it was noted that:
Last year the combined output of emerging economies reached an important milestone: it
accounted for more than half of total world GDP (measured at purchasing-power parity). Thismeans that the rich countries no longer dominate the global economy. The developing countries
also have a far greater influence on the performance of the rich economies than is generally
realized. Emerging economies are driving global growth and having a big impact on developed
countries' inflation, interest rates, wages and profits.
This paper argues that other countries are having a big impact on the rate at which ourscientific output grows as well. We seem to be entering a new era in science policy. The U.S.
has long accepted that its share of world scientific output will decline as scientific communities
in other countries strengthen. This process seems to have accelerated sharply, as othergovernments have become convinced that their economic futures lie with knowledge-based
economies in which research plays a central role. Foreign scientific communities have becomemuch more competitive.
The institutions of modern science have in many ways been a gift from the United Statesto the rest of the world. The U.S. has demonstrated that the best quality scientific research isfostered when funding is awarded competitively, plentiful rigorously trained PhD students andpostdocs are available cheaply, substantial amounts of money are spent, modern equipment isused, and transfer of research to technological application is encouraged. In many ways, othercountries have sought over the past decade to incorporate more of these elements into theirsystems. Furthermore, the U.S. has probably trained or at some point employed many of thescientists now doing so well back home. As a result, American universities no longer standalone at the scientific frontier.
This paper has explored the trajectory of the U.S. research enterprise in an international
context to highlight some of the surprising consequences that strengthening of foreign R&D
systems can have for trends in U.S. research output.

1

China, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan

2

The worrying trend has not gone unnoticed - "Less Ink for U.S. Economists, Journals print more foreignwork", Business Week, July 30, 2001, p. 26.
3

The fixed set comprising in this case all journals indexed in the S/SCI in 1985, taking into account journal
administrative changes.
4

Presumably in the top journals, article space is the scarce quantity and at the bottom of the journal quality
spectrum, good papers are scarcer than publication places.
5

The year 2003 is excluded from this analysis because in that one year the database grew by more than it
had in the previous six years combined, and by more than in any other single year in the 15 years recorded in S&EI
2006. Between 2002 and 2003 the database increased in size by an unprecedented 9%, and so measured U.S. output
increased by 8%. Perhaps the worries about declining U.S. output convinced Thomson-Scientific to solve the8problem. Unfortunately, analysis of the 2003 changes in database coverage is not possible using the information
released in S&EI 2006.
6

Note that development expenditures and personnel are included, and as military expenditure declined
during this period substantially, an unknown proportion of the drop must be due to military development which
would not affect the trend in paper output much.
7

Historically, growth in graduate enrolment has generally echoed shifting patterns of Federal R&D support,with an influx of foreign students complicating matters. Some of this decline may trace to the favourable U.S. job
market after 1992. The decline in graduate students may well be connected to the decline in university output,
though the decline in graduate enrolment seems to affect the biological sciences as well as the physical sciences,which does not echo the pattern in paper output.

References
National Science Board. 2006. Science and Engineering Indicators 2006. Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National
Science Foundation (volume 1, NSB 06-01; volume 2, NSB 06-01A).

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