AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
NPIRIPS

Nakasone Yasuhiro
Peace Institute

The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs(Secretariat)

Research Institute for
Peace and Security

No. 296
31 August 2022

THE LESSONS OF THE UKRAINE WAR FOR
THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION: A PREVIEW OF,RATHER THAN A CHANGE IN, WHAT WEWILL FACE IN 10-15 YEARSMasafumi Ishii
・ The Ukraine war has not changed the fundamental
geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. We
need to realize that in 10 to 15 years, 1) interactions
among the G3, the US, China and India will decidethe basic direction of international politics and 2) the
positioning of India and Indonesia will decide theglobal majority.
・ The war in Ukraine, however, has had the effect ofreminding us of the urgent need to tackle thechallenges we have been facing and, above all, theimportance of strengthening deterrence.
・ With that in mind, Japan should strengthen its own
defense capabilities through cooperation with allies,
friends and like-minded countries in the region, andstart doing everything possible to avoid Ukraine’s
failure and make deterrence work in the Indo-Pacificregion.
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should not be
attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies.

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

In recent months, there has been a plethora of articles arguing that the Ukraine
war has brought about significant changes to the security landscape in the Indo-Pacificregion. My argument here is quite the contrary. In short, the Ukraine war has notchanged the fundamental geopolitical dynamics in the region. Rather, the Ukraine war isa kind of preview or test run of what we are going to face within 10 to 15 years in theIndo-Pacific. The good news is, thanks to the Ukraine war, the need to adopt theprevailing geopolitical dynamics is more clearly understood now and support for that
position is higher than ever, accelerating the push to adapt.
Now, what are the geopolitical dynamics we need to realize?
First, the G3 will emerge in 10 to 15 years. Though the US is still the only
superpower for now, its relative supremacy has been steadily in decline and, within 10
to 15 years, both the GDP and the defense spending of the US and China will reach thesame level. Though this sounds like a G2, India will also be joining the Superpower Clubsoon. The UN recently predicted that India’s population will exceed China’s next year
and, more importantly, it will keep on rising even as China’s population declines, and theaging situation there in 10 to 15 years could be as serious as that of Japan now. By thattime, India’s GDP will be the world’s third largest. Hence, the positioning of andinteraction among these G3 countries will decide the basic direction of internationalrelations.
Second, where India and Indonesia stand will be decisive for creating a global
majority. If you were trying to create a new G7 in 2040, who would you pick? The G3 ofthe US, China and India would be in, as would Japan and Indonesia, by then the world’s
fourth- and fifth-largest economies regardless of which is which, then the EU if it stays
united and, whether for better or worse, Russia. We need to realize Russia will not
disappear even after the Ukraine war. Though the decline in its economic power willfurther accelerate, it will hold on tightly to its nuclear arsenal and never give up its vetopower in the UN Security Council. Russia may become more difficult to deal with but it
cannot be ignored.
It is likely the US, Japan and the EU will stick together, as will China and Russia,
analogous to the present situation. Who will be left in between? India and Indonesia.
Where they stand will be decisive, as it is now to a certain extent.
What should Japan start doing now to adopt these dynamics with the lessons
we are learning from the Ukraine war in mind? In short, we should do everything
possible to make sure that deterrence will not fail in the Indo-Pacific region, as it did inUkraine.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary2

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

First, Japan should strengthen its own defense capability. The US could not
deter Russia, which made us more aware that the decline of the US’ relative supremacy
has become reality. Under these circumstances, one should not be surprised if the USprioritizes engagement with those who try to help themselves. Japan will be coming up
with new strategic documents by the end of this year and, like in Germany, a substantial
increase in the defense budget is under discussion, with even a NATO standard of 2%of GDP in sight. Public support is stronger than ever partly because of the Ukraine war.
Second, Japan should use its influence to get the US to stay engaged in theIndo-Pacific. The Ukraine war should mean that a physical US pivot to the Indo-Pacificis postponed for now. However, there are things we can do to create reasons forstronger engagement by the US.
For that purpose, treaty allies of the US like Japan should enhance theirplanning efforts. If the division of labor and roles and missions in crises become moreclearly defined and suitable preparations are made, the US will feel more responsibility
to do its own part. One of the big questions after the Ukraine war is whether the US
would become militarily engaged in a Taiwan crisis, having refrained from doing so inUkraine. I believe the US would engage simply because what the US does will decide
the basic direction of its strategic competition with China and the US cannot afford tostay away. Still, Japan should try to make sure that a war would be deterred rather thanfought.
From a different perspective, the best way to secure US engagement is for
East Asia to stay economically vibrant so that the US cannot stay away from this sourceof prosperity. The IPEF is a good start but we should keep pressing the US toreestablish market access arrangements with the Indo-Pacific region.
Third, we should create closer cooperation among like-minded countries to fill
the gap created by the US’ relative decline. The first two actions mentioned above may
not be enough, so this is more important and urgent than ever.
As Prime Minister Kishida made clear in his Shangri La speech, Japan will
support the capacity building of maritime security organizations in those countries in theregion that share the strategic objective of maintaining safe and free navigation. There
will be more cooperation in cybersecurity with those who are ready to take part. Japan
can even conclude agreements to provide defense systems to countries that alreadyhave the necessary framework with Japan, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, thePhilippines, Thailand, Vietnam and soon Singapore.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary3

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Europe has both the interest and the capability to make substantial
contributions to these endeavors. The new NATO Strategic Concept identified China asa “systemic challenge” for NATO while pointing out that “(T)he Indo-Pacific is important
for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic
security.” As Russia remains understandably the absolute top priority for NATO, theUkraine war has also made NATO realize that, in order to deal with Russia, it needs todeal with China as well.
It also makes more sense to improve our relations, especially in the area ofsecurity, with the Republic of Korea. The recent trilateral summit meeting in Singapore
gave us something to work on in a bilateral context.
Fourth, we should engage India more closely because the impact of its
positioning will become more and more crucial as the years go by. Therefore, it isessential to understand why India is taking its present position on the Ukraine war. We
should have quiet but extensive discussions with India to find out how we can do abetter job next time.
Indonesia is another country that requires closer focus. I would just like to pointout here that, in recent years, Indonesia has been getting closer to India because it has
become more apparent that they face a common challenge, namely China. We are
happy to work closely together with them.
Last but not least, with all the aforementioned in mind, we should enhancestrategic communication to compete and coexist with our biggest neighbor China. Thisis the time to make diplomacy play its role.
We have every intention of enjoying prosperity with China. As neighbors formore than 2000 years, Japan knows ways to compete and coexist with China. At thesame time, we do not want to see coercion or the use of force undermining therule-based international order. It is always good to have direct and frank lines ofcommunication so that the chance of misunderstanding and miscalculation isminimized.
We know China can never give up its hope for unification with Taiwan because
this is crucial for creating legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party but, for the samereason, China cannot afford to fail. This means that there is a better chance fordeterrence efforts to work than in the case of Russia, and strategic communication is
key to that purpose.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary4

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Our challenge is not to lose sight and, without taking anything for granted,
never stop our efforts to make deterrence work. The lessons of the Ukraine war,
however devastating it turns out, should not be allowed to go to waste.

Masafumi Ishii is a special adjunct professor in the Faculty of Law at Gakushuin University
and former Ambassador of Japan to Indonesia.

http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/commentary5