Journal of International Fisheries▶ Note ◀

vol.22，2023

Inland Fisheries Management in Argentina: Comparative Analysis of Regional
Artisanal Fishing
Hazuki MATSUDAThe University of Tokyo
E-mail: dhmatsuda@g.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp【abstract】
Recent statistics indicate that globally, marine capture fisheries and inland water
captures have declined or remained stagnant owing to overfishing and depletion of
aquatic resources. The resultant impact on fish fauna and the aquatic environment has
prompted policy makers to formulate adequate fisheries management mechanisms toconserve resources in a sustainable way. The purpose of this study is to examine themanagement of small-scale inland fisheries in Argentina, and evaluate the patterns offisheries management from an institutional perspective, in order to address issues
concerning the governance of aquatic commons. This study utilizes one of the models
proposed by economist Elinor Ostrom to analyze commercial inland artisanal fishing in
the Pampean and Patagonian regions in the context of fisheries governance at the local
level. Ostrom argues that groups of individuals who share common values andobjectives tend to cooperate in the creation of a set of informal rules to organize and use
the resource system in the long term. However, the effects tend to be adverse whenrules are imposed by the central government without considering local circumstances.
The present study concludes that granting some autonomy to fishing communities toorganize and use the commons could probably lead to the sustainable use of aquatic
fauna. Meanwhile, communication, cooperation, and interaction between local
stakeholders are crucial elements to sustain the resource system.
【keywords】
artisanal fishing, inland fisheries, Pampas region, Patagonia region

1. Introduction
Globally, there has been a decline or stagnation in marine capture fisheries andinland water captures in light of overfishing and dwindling aquatic resources. Thissituation that severely affects the fish fauna and the water environment itself, leads
decision makers to formulate adequate fisheries management mechanisms to conserve-1-

Hazuki MATSUDA

resources in a sustainable way. The purpose of this paper is to examine the managementof inland fisheries in Argentina. It intends to evaluate the patterns of fisheries
management from an institutional perspective, in order to address issues concerning
the governance of aquatic commons. The study focuses on two cases of regional artisanalcommercial fishing patterns. The first corresponds to the modality used to capture
native pejerrey Odontesthes bonariensis species in the Pampas region, which includes
the Buenos Aires Province (Las Tunas Shallow Lake); and the other, on the captures ofnative pejerrey patagónico Odontesthes hatcheri and perca Percichthys colhuapiensis
species in the southern part or the Patagonian region, which includes the Río Negro
Province (Pellegrini Lake). The first part of this study provides an overview of fisheries
management in Argentina, and outlines the centralized regime in fisheries in bothprovinces. The second and the third section examine how users of the commons utilize
aquatic resources for their livelihood, based on the fisheries management regime
adopted in both the Pampas and Patagonia regions. The subsequent section analyses
the degree of adaptation to the Ostrom model in terms of the recognition of local users’rights to organize to use the commons, comparing the two cases. It concludes that
granting certain autonomy to fishing communities to organize and use the commons
could probably lead to the sustainable use of aquatic fauna. However, communication,
cooperation, and interaction between local stakeholders are crucial elements to sustain
the resource system.

2. Theoretical Framework
Elinor Ostrom suggests that a “bottom-up” approach to prevent the overuse ofresources could serve as an alternative to solve the commons problems. She contends
that groups of individuals can self-organize and create rules to improve outcomes.
Ostrom adds that this is possible because individuals sharing similar values cancommunicate and interact with one another, coordinate their activities, and cooperate
to create agreed upon rules covering the use of resources to prevent overexploitationand degradation (Ostrom (1990)). The government can act as a facilitator in providing
information about the use of commons resources and serve as an arbitrator inconflicting situations (Ostrom et al. (1999)). In this study, commons resources refer toresource systems that are used by local fishermen in inland waters.
Ostrom developed eight design principles (1-Clearly defined boundaries; 2Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions; 3-2-

Inland Fisheries Management in Argentina: Comparative Analysis of Regional Artisanal
Fishing

Collective choice arrangements; 4-Monitoring; 5-Graduated sanctions; 6-Conflictresolution mechanisms; 7-Minimal recognition of rights to organize; 8-Nested
enterprises) derived from similarities found in long-enduring common-pool resource(CPR) management (Ostrom (1990), p.90). Ostrom recognizes the lack of specificity inthese principles, but justifies her intent in that she was examining the robustness of
systems that had persisted over time, identifying the conditions under which CPRs had
survived for so long (Ostrom (1994), p.36, Ostrom (2012), pp.77-79).
As this paper studies the fisheries institutional regimes arranged by central
government authorities in relation to Ostrom’s approach, it adopts the seventh principle
to determine whether the recognition of certain rights, such as informal rules devised
by local users can also sustain the resources over time. It also examines how inlandfishing communities self-organize to use aquatic resources, and the role of thegovernment in regulating their activities to conserve natural resources. Ostrom statesthat granting certain rights to direct users to organize and use the resources can leadto sustain the resources over time (Ostrom (1990)).
Agrawal contends that the seventh principle, which indicates that local users canmanage the resources sustainably when their rights are recognized by external
authorities, should be taken as a general, rather weak conditions for long-enduring CPR
management. He agrees that local users have the right to devise their own rules, but
he points out, drawing from the argument of Haripriya Rangan, that “unspecified rights
and the settlement of major disputes often cannot be addressed without stateintervention.” (Agrawal (2002), pp.49-58). Rangan, who studied the case of state
forestry in Indian Himalaya, also argues that some forms of state control of access toresources and state management can sustain the use of resources (Rangan (1997)). As
previously mentioned in Ostrom et al. argument, while some state intervention can help
sustain the use of resources, giving some autonomy to their operations can also lead tothe management of the commons in the long term. With regard to the rest of Ostrom’s
principles, it requires further research to evaluate the conditions under which a
resource system as a whole can endure overtime, through local communities’ selforganization mechanisms.
In terms of the research methodology on site, the study involved face-to-faceinterviews with local fishermen and local governmental officials, as part of the fieldwork conducted by the author, in July 2015, in the district of Trenque Lauquen, Buenos
Aires Province, and in the district of General Roca in Río Negro Province, Argentina, inJune 2016. In addition, data were collected from governmental fisheries departments-3-

Hazuki MATSUDA

and research archives.

3. Overview of Fisheries in Argentina
Fisheries management in Argentina is centralized and owing to the federal system ofgovernance, each province is responsible for stipulating its own fishing regulation. Even
though the country is endowed with large and diversified water bodies, with a coastline
extending up to 4,725 km, fisheries and aquaculture are considered non-traditional
economic activities in Argentina. Inland artisanal commercial fishing is operated
extensively mainly for local consumption. The Ministry of Agroindustry reports that inArgentina, the La Plata basin, with more than 4,000 km-long channels, constitutes animportant water system for artisanal fishermen. Local artisanal fishermen are subject
to provincial legislation and operate close to their residence individually or in small
groups or cooperatives for subsistence, directly selling to the public, as well as
supermarkets or restaurants. The total capture volumes are difficult to estimate due tothe lack of formal statistics on fish sales in local markets (Ministerio de Agroindustria(2017a), p.2-6). Conversely, inland recreational fishing is a common practice in both thePampas and Patagonia regions and generates important local income.
Given that the main economic activity in Argentina is agriculture and livestock
production, the contribution of fisheries to national production has been limited(0.2%)(1)(2). In fisheries, the main contributions to the national account are export
revenue and employment generated in the coastal areas, with Mar del Plata being oneof the main fish landing platforms. Available data indicates that the total value ofexports of fishery products increased marginally between 2009 (US$1,147.9 million)and 2013 (US$1,501.9 million)(3)(4) , although exports of inland fishery products, basedon harvest activities in the La Plata basin, declined compared to 2011 (Table 1). The
main exports from inland waters are the sabalo and to a lesser extent pejerrey species(5).
Therefore, inland fishing primarily caters to local consumption needs which has been
Table 1

Trade of Fisheries Products
US$ FOB Million

Total Export
Inland Export

2009
1,147.9
13.8

2010
1,321.6
15.4

Source: FAO, 2014-2016; MAGyP, 2020.
Note: Numbers are rounded.

-4-

2011
1,490.0
21.5

2012
1,333.2
17.7

2013
1,501.9
18.3

Inland Fisheries Management in Argentina: Comparative Analysis of Regional Artisanal
Fishingpracticed by small rural fishing communities for their livelihood.

4. Institutional Framework of Fisheries in Buenos Aires Province
4-1. An Outline of Fisheries Regulations
Inland commercial fisheries within the province of Buenos Aires have been regulated
under the Provincial Fishing Law 11.477, which establishes a legal framework for the
extraction, culture or farming of maritime, fluvial, and lacustrine fish resources, as wellas the investigation, commercialization, industrialization, and transportation of
aquatic animals predominant in the province. The Undersecretary of Fisheries of
Buenos Aires oversees the enforcement of the measure, as part of efforts to protect
water resources(6). Grosman argues that despite the Provincial Fishing Law, theabsence of an explicit regulation is evident in terms of recreational fishing activities.
Moreover, confusing and ambiguous conceptions exist regarding the use of water
resources, property rights, forms of appropriation, ownership, and access regimes(Grosman (2001), p.186). For example, while the angler has the right to access public
fishing grounds, if the natural water body is located on private property, the owner can
decide who has the right to fish.
Baigún and Delfino also perceive that the management of fisheries in the Pampas
region has been entirely traditional, based on conventional fishing regulations andrestocking programs (Baigún and Delfino (2001), pp.132-134). Noting that fishingregulations are not reinforced by technical and scientific studies, they argue that thecurrent capture limits for pejerrey (15 pieces per angler per day) in water bodies smaller
than 1,000 hectares in the lower Salado River area could lead to overfishing. Since thelower basin is located close to urban areas, there is an influx of anglers during highseasons, while the impact on the fish population might be lower in the remote westernarea of the river (Baigún and Delfino (2001), pp.135-136).
In the 1990s, licenses were provided to individuals or cooperatives (Alvarez andZingoni (2001), pp.146-148) to exploit some “lagunas” or shallow lakes for pejerrey
fishing, including Las Tunas (Trenque Lauquen district), del Monte (Guaminí), andCuero (Pehuajó) shallow lakes (López et al. (2001), pp.24-25). However, apparently inthe 2000s, fishing was banned in the province, except for recreational fishing purposes(Government official Buenos Aires A, interview (September 4, 2012); Government
official Buenos Aires B, interview (July 23, 2015)). In 2016, under a new governmental
directive, artisanal commercial fishing resumed, and permits were granted to use the-5-Hazuki MATSUDA

Las Tunas shallow lake complex(7) after a long period of closure.
4-2. Trenque Lauquen: Artisanal Commercial Fisheries in Las Tunas Shallow Lake
Trenque Lauquen is located in the western part of Buenos Aires Province. It issituated on the Pampas plains and covers an area of 5,500 km2, with approximately
43,000 inhabitants(8). The main towns are 30 de Agosto, Beruti, Garré, and Girodías,
while there also exist smaller rural villages. Trenque Lauquen is endowed with a large
shallow lake complex, the Hinojo-Las Tunas. Particularly, the Las Tunas shallow lake
complex covers an area of 25,000 hectares and has a maximum depth of 4.5 meters(Dirección de Desarrollo Pesquero (1998), p.8). A report of the Fisheries Department of
Buenos Aires Province indicates that this complex has many rounded lakes that do nothave floating or submerged aquatic plants. The shores are sandy with a slight slope(Dirección de Desarrollo Pesquero (1998), p.8).
In Trenque Lauquen, according to Clarín, the Las Tunas shallow lake complex
emerged as a result of heavy rainfall that overflowed a canal connecting River Quinto
in 1987. The subsequent precipitation impacted vast agricultural areas, converting it
into the Hinojo-Las Tunas shallow Lake complex. Effectively, the land of some farmers
sank after being inundated by a vast body of water, forcing them to become fishermen.
They had to learn fishing techniques and processing methods as well as the use offishing gear and boats to sustain their livelihood (9). Beruti is located a few kilometers
away from the Hinojo-Las Tunas shallow lake complex. The neighborhood community
has been relying on fishing since the water engulfed their agricultural land
(Government official Buenos Aires C, interview (July 22, 2015)). The peculiarity of theland in this area is its permeability and salinity (Ameghino (1886); Dangavs (2005),
p.222; Ringuelet et al. (1967), p.201) that explain why agricultural land has been
converted into a shallow lake.
The government of Buenos Aires had prohibited commercial fishing in all water
bodies within the province, although apparently prior to 2000s, permission was granted
to certain fishing cooperatives (Alvarez and Zingoni (2001), p.148; Government official
Buenos Aires A, interview (September 4, 2012); Government Official Buenos Aires B,
interview, July 23, 2015)). The closure may be attributed to the technical limnologicaland ichthyological studies conducted in Las Tunas, which showed that the quality andsize of pejerrey species were not conductive to be intensively exploited (Dirección
Provincial de Pesca (1999), pp.19-20). Moreover, according to technical studies
conducted in 2013, the population of pejerrey remained low and small (less than the-6-Inland Fisheries Management in Argentina: Comparative Analysis of Regional Artisanal
Fishing

permitted capture size of 25 cm) (Dirección Provincial de Pesca (2013), p.12). Therefore,
probably commercial fishing was not promoted from the technical perspective, either.
During the fieldwork conducted by the author in 2015, approximately 40 families
living in the Beruti community relied on fishing and became self-organized to capture
pejerrey, creating their own operational rules and transporting and selling their catchto consumers or trading agencies in Buenos Aires, according to an interviewed official(Government official Buenos Aires C, interview (July 22, 2015)). For instance, it seems
that a group of fishermen set up fishing areas and boats for harvesting in the fishingground (Fisher A, interview (July 22, 2015)). These motorized boats came in various
sizes, in which one or two fishermen could embark, and they usually commenced theirharvest early in the morning and returned to the embarkation station at midday.
Apparently, the captured pejerrey was transported to each fisherman’s house, where it
was processed. A portion of the processed pejerrey was stored in 1 kg bags and frozen
for distribution as estimated by a government official (Government official Buenos
Aires C, interview (July 22, 2015)).
In the interview, an official stated that the price of pejerrey was estimated at ARS300
per 30 kg, excluding the removal of thorns and other processing services. The flesh
without thorns costed ARS40 per kg (Government official Buenos Aires C, interview(July 22, 2015)). According to López et al., in 1998, the legal concession of Las Tunas
fisheries was granted to three cooperatives, each of which was authorized to use 100
nets per eight fishermen (12.5 nets per person). They stated that the fishing quotas percooperative permitted the extraction of 2,000 lots per year, each lot weighing 30 kg(López et al. (2001), p.39).
Beruti’s fishermen, mostly aged between 20 and 30, have apparently been relying on
fishing for decades, having learned fishing and processing techniques from theirparents as stated by Fisher A (Fisher A, interview (July 22, 2015)). It appears that Las
Tunas has been occupied by this fishing community, which has restricted the access toexternal users or outsiders (Government official Buenos Aires C, interview (July 22,2015)). Group members have organized to monitor and control both the access and useof the fishing ground. There was a small station in the fishing ground where a member
used to stay at night on a rotational basis to monitor the entry of outsiders into theresource system, as stated by an official (Government official Buenos Aires C, interview(July 22, 2015)).
It was perceived that fishermen respected their internal rules, including closed
seasons, because they understood that the conservation of resources is important for-7-

Hazuki MATSUDA

their livelihood. One of the interviewed fishermen stated that during closed seasons, hesought temporary jobs, such as carpentry and masonry, and resumed fishing operationsin December (Fisher B, interview (July 22, 2015)). This case meets the conditions
suggested by Ostrom for the good governance of commons resources of a community, as
these individuals used to communicate and interact with one another and coordinate
their activities (Ostrom (1990)).
In July 2016, the central government of Buenos Aires revived the exploitation of Las
Tunas complex after a long period of closure. It opened a fishing filleting plant toreactivate local fish production. The main objective of this move was to support Beruti’s
households by creating jobs at the local level. Even though technical studies revealed
that the shallow lake was in a good condition for harvesting at that time, thegovernment stated that resource conservation was crucial. Therefore, officials
announced that the inspection system would be reinforced through the allocation offishing rangers, surveillance boats, and other equipment. The training provided tofishing control agents would include ways to create infraction statements, verificationof current infractions and so on. In order to regulate the captures in Las Tunas, a station
has been planned so that a municipal inspector can register access, capture sizes, andthe number of delivered containers. Local officers also stated that they are considering
working with rural patrols teams to prevent conflicts and sustain the control policy.
However, officials underscored the need for fishermen’s collaboration in conserving
pejerrey resources to achieve sustainable use of resources (7).

5. Institutional Framework of Fisheries in Río Negro Province
5-1. An Outline of Fisheries Regulations
Inland commercial fishing in Río Negro Province has been regulated under theProvincial Law Q 1254, which establishes the requirements and prohibitions to perform
this activity in the province(10). As for regulations concerning access to public riverbanks
and water bodies, the Provincial Law Q 3365 establishes free access as long as the useof resources is for recreational purposes (10). Therefore, fisheries operations are subject
to governmental or formal written laws. The peculiarity in this province is that inlandcommercial fishing is authorized in Pellegrini Lake, providing licenses to fishermen andestablishing fishing regulations.
The fisheries management in Río Negro was traditionally concerned with marine
commercial fishing. Inland fisheries began to play an important role when the-8-Inland Fisheries Management in Argentina: Comparative Analysis of Regional Artisanal
Fishing

government decided to reinforce local tourism with the promotion of recreational fishing.
Wegrzyn and Santos state that the province has been always encouraged to undertake
collaborative management, especially in the area of fisheries. Accordingly, several
meetings and conventions have been held regularly with the participation of local
stakeholders to discuss issues concerning the management of salmonids andrecreational fishing, facilitating the involvement of local anglers in recreational fishingmanagement issues (Wegrzyn and Santos (2005), pp.40-41). Therefore, in this region,
inland recreational fishing prevails rather than inland commercial fishing.
5-2. General Roca: Artisanal Commercial Fishing in Pellegrini Lake
The General Roca is located in the northwestern part of the Río Negro Province. The
land covers an area of 14,655 km2 with 320,000 inhabitants (11). The Pellegrini Lake islocated in the so-called Alto Valle region. This artificial lake was formed as a naturaldepression containing a rich concentration of salt and nutrients suitable for fisheries
production. It was created to regulate the water flow of Neuquén River through the
Arroyón canal. It is a closed lake with no effluents. The area is 11,000 hectares with anaverage depth of 9.4 meters (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca de Río Negro(2016); Amalfi and Vernere (2009), pp.2-3).
Pelllegrini Lake has been the only inland water body used to extract and land native
pejerrey patagónico and perca species for commercial purposes in Río Negro. The
central provincial government of Río Negro manages and controls the aquatic resources.
The beneficiaries were local fishermen authorized to land and process captures(Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca de Río Negro (2016). It appears thatbased on an agreement between the provincial government and the fish-filleting plantowner, the control of fish landings and processing operations was conducted in thisfacility. Local fishermen had to land and process (fillet) their catches in the fish-filleting
facility so that fishery officers, from the provincial government, could verify thesanitation and capture requirements (Government official Río Negro, interview (June15, 2016)).
Interviews with fishermen and an official stated the owner of the facility
commercialized the processed fish (for human consumption or bait) for local markets(Government official Río Negro, interview (June 15, 2016); Fisher C, interview (June15, 2016)). According to Fisher C, in this transaction, the plant owner paid ARS60 per
kg to the fisherman and then sold the filleted product on the market for ARS100 per kg,
retaining the difference as his own profit. The owner also charged the fishermen to use-9-Hazuki MATSUDA

his facility. Apparently, this transaction generated conflicts between the plant ownerand certain fishermen. Fisher C argued that the payment was too low to sustain a living(Fisher C, interview (June 15, 2016)). He stated that, the fish-filleting plant was
originally built with materials and effort from local fishermen so that it could be freely
used for processing their fish landings. However, circumstances changed, and the plantowner stipulated the transaction conditions, causing discontent among fishermen(Fisher C, interview (June 15, 2016)). This case shows that when transactions do notsatisfy the needs of local fishermen, conflicts may arise between users.
The provincial government has managed and controlled the Pellegrini Lake fishery.
In the area of inspection operation, it was supported by the national security force called
Prefectura Naval Argentina(12).The management of fish resources includes determining
fishing efforts based on access restrictions (number of fishermen), the maximum
number of fishing gear, the minimum size of gillnets, and closed seasons. Restocking
programs for native species have been conducted using seeds produced at Pellegrini
Lake Hydrobiological Station. Authorized local fishermen captured mature pejerrey
and perca species during the closed season and delivered the samples to government
technical officials for farming (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca de Río
Negro (2016); Government official Río Negro, interview (June 15, 2016)). Despite theabsence of modern cultivation materials and obsolete infrastructure, restocking
programs were performed periodically, especially in 2008, probably because of thegovernment’s decision to promote local artisanal commercial fisheries. However,
captures have been decreasing from 2008 to 2010 (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganaderíay Pesca de Río Negro (2016); MAGyP (2011)).
Only six fishermen (as of June 2016) have been authorized to catch endemic species
from the lake. Although they were related to each other, competition might havesegregated the group, producing some conflicts over the use of resources. Fisher C, alocal authorized fisherman I interviewed, said that reconciliation was not possible
because each had his own interests and was reluctant to cooperate (Fisher C, interview(June 15, 2016)). Since unequal profit shares were allocated, it seems that somefishermen sold processed fish to their own clients. Fisher C has relied on this activity
for over 43 years. He used to arrange the nets at night, leaving early in the morning toharvest the fish from the lake. His son also relied on fishing and worked with his father,but Fisher C said he would not recommend fishing to his grandson because of theunstable economic conditions (Fisher C, interview (June 15, 2016)).
The pejerrey species are captured in winter and perca in both winter (on a small- 10 -

Inland Fisheries Management in Argentina: Comparative Analysis of Regional Artisanal
Fishing

Table 2Degree of adaptation to Ostrom theory

Province

StatusVariable

Ostrom theory

Buenos Aires

SustainableSelf-organized group

AdaptedRío Negro

Unsustainable

Centralized

Non-Adapted

scale) and summer. The provincial government establishes the closed season(Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca de Río Negro (2016); nevertheless,detecting and punishing non-licensed fishing is costly. Fishermen were concerned about
the existence of non-licensed fishing and were willing to express their concerns to local
officers. However, it seems that there was no mechanism to gather fishermen’s concerns
at the local level (Fisher C, interview (June 15, 2016)), that is, local agencies that could
gather all the problems faced by fishermen and place them in the central provincial
government.

6. Analysis of the two cases
In Buenos Aires, groups of fishermen have developed their own rules throughcommunity-based organizations. Even though the fisheries system is centralized, it
seems that the apparently weak control over the use of the fishing ground has
facilitated members of the community, to coordinate and cooperate to use the resource
system. However, it appears that in Río Negro, the fishing management has led tononcooperation among some fishermen owing to the perception of unequal distributionof revenues, and there is a need to decentralize the system to address fishermen’s
concerns at the local level (see Table 2).
Ostrom’s seventh principle “Minimal recognition of rights to organize,” suggests thatrecognizing certain rights (such as access to fishing ground and type of equipment to beused) to organize the resource system could prompt users to enforce their devised rules
and conserve resources. However, as Ostrom stated, “if external governmental officials
presume that only they have the authority to set the rules, then it will be very difficult
for local appropriators to sustain a rule-governed CPR over the long run” (Ostrom(1990), p.101). Therefore, as the central government imposes rules that are notcongruent to local needs and circumstances, it can undermine the resource system itself.

7. Discussion and Conclusions- 11 -

Hazuki MATSUDAThe Ostrom model in governing the commons demonstrates that providing someautonomy to local people in organizing and using commons resources, such as devising
their own operational rules, could lead to sustainable fishing practices. However, when
the central government imposes rules that are not congruent with local needs, locals
can be resistant to these regulations, generating conflicts between the involved actors.
The fishing community in Buenos Aires Province has created its own internal rules andbecame self-organized, devising fishing operations (including distribution of time, space,technology, and monitoring) and rules over the past decades. Although the central
authorities administer the water resources in the region, this case makes us assume
that even without strong intervention by the government, informal groups can at times
manage CPRs well through coordination and cooperation among members. However,artisanal commercial fishing practiced in Río Negro Province presented a contrasting
situation. Cooperation and coordination between direct users to organize their fishingactivities were weak, and there was a prevailing absence of a local agency to addressuser’s concerns regarding fishing operations.
In view of the cases studied, decentralization and the recognition of certain rights tolocal direct users could help reorganize and sustain inland fishing systems. In the caseof Buenos Aires, as fishing communities have self-organized to use commons resources,
the central government can act as facilitators to solve certain internal issues, such asproviding support in terms of monitoring and surveillance activities, to improve theiractivities. As for Río Negro, the central government can delegate decisions concerning
the management of resources to local governments so that users can interact with
policymakers in the area and facilitate the resolution of local problems.
The findings of this research provide an open inquiry into how local governments cancoordinate with direct users and the central government to sustain inland fisheries inboth regions. Further research based on fisheries’ management regimes in othercountries, such as Japan, could help introduce some fisheries’ management patterns inArgentina, considering the co-management system as a mechanism to organize theutilization of commons resources. More precisely, giving some autonomy to direct users
to organize and devise their own rules to utilize the resource system. Follow-up researchis needed, as fishing operations, regulatory measures, and local situations may havechanged in recent years.
Notes(1) Centro de Economía Internacional (2004-2013): http://www.cei.gov.ar/es/argentina-- 12 -

Inland Fisheries Management in Argentina: Comparative Analysis of Regional Artisanal
Fishingcomposici%C3%B3n-sectorial-del-pib-1, “Accessed 5 August, 2017”.
(2) Centro de Economía Internacional (2004-2014): http://www.cei.gov.ar/es/argentinacomposici%C3%B3n-sectorial-del-pib-1, “Accessed 5 August 2017”.
(3) FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) (2014-2016) Perfiles
sobre la Pesca y la Acuicultura por países -Argentina:

ttp://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/

ARG/es, “Accessed 30 January 2016”.
(4) MAGyP (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca Argentina) (2020): https://www.
magyp.gob.ar/sitio/areas/pesca_continental/estadisticas/, “Accessed 27 October 2020”.
(5) Ministerio de Agroindustria (2017) Pesca Continental, Estadísticas: http://www.agroind
ustria.gob.ar/sitio/areas/pesca_continental/estadisticas/, “Accessed 2 April 2017”.
(6) Leyes Provinciales (2017) Ley 11.477 Ley de Pesca, Legislación, Provincia de Buenos
Aires: http://www.maa.gba.gov.ar/pesca/images/leg_archivos/ley_11477.pdf, “Accessed
2 January 2017”.
(7) Municipalidad de Trenque Lauquen (2016) El Municipio anunció la habilitiación depesca en la laguna Las Tunas: http://www.trenquelauquen.gov.ar/noticias/el municipioanuncio-la-habilitacion-de-pesca-en-laguna-las-tunas/, “Accessed 1 November 2016”.
(8) INDEC, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (2010), Población (Partido deTrenque Lauquen: http://www.indec.gov.ar/censos_provinciales, “Accessed 3 January
2017”.
(9) Clarín (2001) Los Gauchos que Cambiaron Vacas por Pejerreyes: http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2001/12/30/s-04215.htm, “Accessed 27 February 2016”.
(10) Legislatura de Río Negro (2017) Rama Q – Recursos Naturales: http://www.legisrn.gov.
ar/DIGESCON/despliramawp.php?rama=QR, “Accessed 9 January 2017”.
(11) INDEC, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (2010a) Población (Departamento
de General Roca): http://www.indec.gov.ar/censos_provinciales, “Accessed 4 January
2017”.
(12) Secretaría de Comunicación Río Negro (2013) Pesca Furtiva: Operativo de fiscalización
en el Lago Pellegrini: https://www.rionegro.gov.ar/index.php?contID=10731, “Accessed
13 March 2021”.
This research note is part of the author’s doctoral thesis and an updated study.

References[1] Agrawal A. (2002) “Common Resources and Institutional sustainability,” in: Ostrom E.,
Dietz T., Dolsak N., Stern P.C., Stonich S. and Weber E.U. (eds.), The Drama of theCommons, Washington, National Academy Press.

- 13 -

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