Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

Technical Strategic Plan 2017
for Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station ofTokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.
August, 2017
Nuclear Damage Compensation andDecommissioning Facilitation Corporation
NDF
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Contents

１．Introduction
２．Strategic Plan
３．Strategy for Reducing Risks Posed
by Radioactive Materials
４．Fuel Debris Retrieval
５．Waste Management
６．R&D Initiatives
７．Enhancement of International
Cooperation
８．Future Actions
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1. Roles & Responsibilities of Organizations Relevant toFukushima Daiichi NPS Decommissioning3

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１．Introduction
２．Strategic Plan
３．Strategy for Reducing Risks Posed
by Radioactive Materials
４．Fuel Debris Retrieval
５．Waste Management
６．R&D Initiatives
７．Enhancement of International
Cooperation
８．Future Actions
無断複製・転載禁止 原子力損害賠償・廃炉等支援機構©Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

２－１．Purpose and Positioning of the Strategic PlanFY 2015

FY 2016

FY 2017

The purpose of the Strategic Plan is to provide a firm technicalbasis for contributing to the steady implementation of theGovernment-developed Mid-and Long-Term Roadmap.
Published on July 13 th, 2016

Published on Apr 30 th, 2015

Strategic Plan 2016

Providing strategic proposals for “determination offuel debris retrieval policies for each unit” and“compilation of the basic concept of solid waste
management”

Strategic Plan 2017
 Strategic Plan 2017 provides
strategic proposals for the milestonesof Mid-and Long-Term Roadmap
based on discussions so far.

Strategic Plan 2015
Concepts and Direction of Initiatives

Basic Attitude The decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPS is a project in which considerable uncertainty inheres.
 To realize prompt decommissioning, it is necessary to assume the attitude of taking flexible and prompt
approach, based on the directions determined with previously obtained experience and knowledge, placing
safety at the top priority, even though a certain extent of uncertainty remains.
→ The attitude of optimizing the entire project from the long-term and comprehensive viewpoint, and the attitudeof making preparations for unexpected cases, are also important.
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２－２．Basic Concept of the Strategic Plan
Fundamental Policy
To continuously and promptly reduce the risks associated with theradioactive materials generated by the accidents
Five Guiding Principles
 Principle 1：Safe→ Reduction of risks * posed by radioactive materials and ensuring worksafety （*）Environmental impacts and exposure to the workers
 Principle２：Proven→ Highly reliable and flexible technologies
 Principle３：Efficient→ Effective utilization of resources(e.g. human, physical, financial and space) Principle４：Timely→ Awareness of time axis
 Principle５：Field Oriented→ Thorough application of Three Actuals(actual field, actual things and actual situation)
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１．Introduction
２．Strategic Plan
３．Strategy for Reducing Risks Posed
by Radioactive Materials
４．Fuel Debris Retrieval
５．Waste Management
６．R&D Initiatives
７．Enforcement of International
Cooperation
８．Future Actions
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３－１．Progress in Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPS Over the last year, progress has been made in the following areas.
Contaminated Water Management【Removal】 Removal of contamination resources is underway using advanced multi-nuclide removal system.
【Keeping Away】 Freezing operation of the land-side impermeable walls has bee extended; The operation on the mountain side is yet to be completed only at one location.
After the operation on the sea side was completed in October 2016, the amount of groundwater pumped up from the area of 4.0m above sea level was reduced to
one-third (an average of about 118 m3/day in March 2017). As a result of implementing preventive/multi-layered measures such as subdrain, the amount ofgroundwater flowing into the buildings decreased to an average of about 120 m3/day in March 2017.
【Preventing Leakage】 The concentration of radioactive materials in the surrounding sea area is constantly low.
【R/B Stagnant Water Management】 The stagnant water level in the Unit 1 Turbine Building was reduced to the lowest floor levelin March 2017.

Removal of Spent Fuel from Spent Fuel Pool
•Unit 1: The removal of the cover wall panels for the Reactor Building was completed. Information gathering for developing a rubble removal plan is in progress.
•Unit 2: A yard around the Reactor Building was prepared and a working platform for access to the operating floor was constructed.
•Unit 3: Measures to reduce the dose rates on the operating floor were completed. Installation of a cover for fuel removal is underway.

Fuel Debris Retrieval•Unit 1: An investigation using a robot in the basement outside the pedestal and in the vicinity of the access in PCV was conducted.
•Unit 2: A survey inside the pedestal in PCV using a robot and other devices was conducted.
•Unit 3: An investigation using muon detection system and an investigation in PCV using a robot were performed.

Waste Management•The waste reduction measures are continued to be in place. An operation to reduce waste protective clothingwith an incinerator was started.
•The Solid Waste Storage Management Plan was updated.
•Sampling and analysis is underway in order to characterize the solid waste.

Other Specific Measures•Since the rubble removal and facing in the area 4m above sea intended for improving site environment have resulted in the reduced risks of contamination, theclassification for the protective equipment has been changed to “ordinary clothing area”.

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３－２．Basic Thought in Reducing Risk of Radioactive Materials
Principle for Risk Reduction
 Combining the activities/means for reducing “the level of impact” and “the likelihood of impact” in order to promptly reduce therisk levels and ensure/retain the risk levels be adequately low Level of Impact: significance of negative impacts on human health and environment caused by the risk sources Likelihood of Impact: possibility of being affected by the negative impacts
 Risk Level: magnitude of the risk caused by the risk sources

It is important to develop optimal risk reduction measures based on the “Five Guiding Principles”.

Major Risk Sources The major risk sources to be studied at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS are as follows: Fuel debris in Units 1-3, fuel assemblies stored in Units 1-3 SFP, fuel assemblies in the common pool and fuel assemblies in the drycasks Stagnant water in buildings, concentrated liquid waste and etc.
 Solid waste: secondary waste generated from the water treatment system (waste adsorption columns, waste sludge and HIC slurry),
rubble and etc.
 Contaminated structures in building: structures, pipes, equipment and other components in the R/B, PCV and the RPV that were
contaminated, and activated structures.

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３－３．Risk Estimation and Evaluation
 Risk level defined by the combination of the level of the impact in case of
the release of radioactive materials and the likelihood of impact
 Risk estimation and evaluation is performed based on the SED score*developed by the U.K. Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA)*Safety and Environmental Detriment Score(1) Hazard Potential (Index of the level of impact)
Sample of risk analysis of the Fukushima Daiichi
 Use SED score as it is.
 Consider the amount of all radioactive materials, theform of risk sources (e.g. gas, liquid and solid) and theavailable time for recovery in the event of a loss ofsafety function.

(2) Safety Management (Index of the likelihood of
impact) Partially revised to flexibly cope with the situation of the
Fukushima Daiichi NPS referencing the SED score.
 Graded and quantified the risk sources by the factors ofintegrity of the facility, containment function and apossibility of change in the state of the risk sources.

It will be appropriate to develop risk reduction measures
based on the classification such as Category Ⅰ ~ Ⅲ.
【the interim goal】 To bring their risk levels to the “region of
sufficiently stable management ”

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３－４．Current Status and Challenges of Risk Reduction Measures
Current Status of Risk Reduction Measures
Category I : Risk source to be addressed as soon as practicable

Fuels in Spent Fuel Pool and stagnant water in buildings⇒ The government and TEPCO have been working on
Category II : Risk source to be addressed safely, effectively and carefully with thorough preparation andtechnologies to realize a more stable condition


Fuel debris⇒ Technological studies/developments are underway
Category III : Risk source that requires actions to be taken for a more stable conditionConcentrated liquid waste, waste sludge, HIC slurry, solid wastes (outdoor ) and contaminated structures in buildings⇒ To make continuous effort toward reduction of risk levels and implement appropriate measures in planned manner

Challenges during Risk Reduction
 It is necessary to consider a temporary change in the risk level and the exposure ofworkers when implementing risk reduction measures.
 Even if the risk source is currently in a certain stable condition, it will not be tolerated
for a long period of time.
⇒ The level of the risk may rise due to degradation of facilities and changes in theconditions of risk source, unless any measures are taken.
 To avoid this, risk reduction measures should be implemented by an appropriate time.
Strategy for Reducing Risks are shown at Chapter4 for CategoryⅡ, Chapter5 for CategoryⅢ

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１．Introduction
２．Strategic Plan
３．Strategy for Reducing Risks Posed
by Radioactive Materials
４．Fuel Debris Retrieval
５．Waste Management
６．R&D Initiatives
７．Enhancement of International
Cooperation
８．Future Actions
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４－１. Study Plan for Fuel Debris Retrieval
 The current stable state is just supported by the temporary measures.
 However, having risk management issues such as “uncertainty”, “instability” and“inadequate management”.
 The purpose of fuel debris retrieval is to fundamentally improve this situation and to bring
the reactor and the fuel debris into safer and more stable condition.
 And it requires two different strategies: reducing “medium-term” risks and “long-term” ones.

Medium-Term Risks
 ‘A certain level of stability’ of fueldebris may be lost.

Vital to maintainstability inside
the reactor overthe mid-termLong-Term Risks
 Environmental contamination due tothe leakage of highly toxic nuclear
fuel materials may occur as a resultof aging degradation of the buildings.

Leaks due tolong-term aging
degradationmust be avoided

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４－２．Basic Concept for Ensuring Safety in the Fuel Debris Retrieval Operation“Concept of safety function” and “principles for realizing safety functions” have been developed
Taking into account factors, such as the international safety fundamentals, the safety-related characteristics of the
Fukushima Daiichi NPS and the risk associated with the fuel debris retrieval operation

Concept of safety function
Features to ensure the containment function (release prevention and management) and measures to prevent
loss of the features are necessary.



Decay heat removal and criticality control, as well as prevention of pulverization and spread of fuel debris to the extent
possible should be considered.

Preparedness for normal operations as well as for anticipated external events, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, andinternal events, such as failures and operator errors, is required.



It is necessary to observe the dose limits for workers under normal operating conditions to reduce the exposure ofworkers to the extent possible, and to observe the emergency dose limits for workers engaged in emergency response
activities.

Principles for realizing safety functions
Considering that the reactors after the accident are decommissioned, it is important to effectively use existing
equipment, to provide the necessary equipment and to consider the combination of equipment and work
management.

In order to reduce the exposure of workers engaged in preparatory work and maintenance work, it is important toensure the containment function by maintaining the PCV at a negative pressure and to consider agile action using both
permanent and mobile equipment.



In applying defense-in-depth, it is necessary to carefully consider the hierarchy of defense levels and the need for the
independence of each level.



It is important to recognize the presence of uncertainty in the conditions in the PCV and to be able to change plans in a
flexible manner.



In safety assessment, it is important to set a realistic management goal and assessment conditions. For example,
actual lifestyles should be considered.

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４－３．Current Status of Each Unit

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４－４．Feasibility of the Fuel Debris Retrieval Method
 In order to evaluate the feasibility of the fuel debris retrieval method, which
are based on combination of water level and access routes, three priority
methods have been selected.

a. SubmersionTop Access methodb. Partial Submersion Top Access method

c. Partial Submersion Side Access method

Fuel debris is accessed from the top.
PCV will be completely filled withwater or filled with water to a levelat which the fuel debris is present.

Fuel debris is accessed from thetop. Part of fuel debris will be
dealt with in the air withoutwater covering.

Fuel debris is accessed from theside of the PCV. Part of fuel debris
will be dealt with in the air
without water covering.

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４－５． Evaluation of Feasibility of the Methods 1
 Evaluate the feasibility based on the status of R&D, occupational radiation
exposure and so on.
Submersion-Top AccessPartial Submersion - Top AccessPartial Submersion - Side AccessLiquid Phase
Gas Phase

Ensuring
Containment
Capability

・Hard to ensure water seal capability of・Technical difficulty is slightly lower as・Technical difficulty is slightly lower as
resisting hydrostatic pressure when beinghydrostatic pressure is lower than that ofhydrostatic pressure is lower than that ofsubmerged
submersion case.
submersion case.
・Hard to ensure capability to remotely fix
・Penetration holes on upper PCV to be fixed ・Penetration holes on upper PCV to be fixedpenetration holes for upper PCV with lots
are limited.
are limited.
of holes・It is possible to prevent water leakage even ・It is possible to prevent water leakage even・Emergency water leak prevention measureon emergencies depending on water levelon emergencies depending on water levelis required as a large amount of water issettings.
settings.
supposed to be kept.

・Although air conditioning system
・Air conditioning system with capability ・Air conditioning system with capabilityof maintaining negative pressure forwith capability of maintainingof maintaining negative pressure forcontaining alpha-emitting nuclides isnegative pressure is required, small containing alpha-emitting nuclides isscale equipment may be goodnecessary. The scale of the equipment necessary. The scale of the equipment
will be large, but it can be feasible.
will be large, but it can be feasible.
enough.

・Preventing criticality when reactor ・There is a low probability of re・There is a low probability of reCriticality
core is covered with water is an
criticality as reactor core will not be criticality as reactor core will not beManagement issue.
covered with water.
covered with water.
・Although the total weight of coolant in ・Although the total weight of fuel
Structural
PCV and fuel debris retrieval
debris retrieval equipment to be
Soundness /installed at upper R/B increases,
Seismic Resistant equipment to be installed at upper
R/B increases, seismic margin will be seismic margin will be ensured for
Features of PCV
ensured for major components.
major components.
and R/B

・Better seismic margin will be ensured
as fuel debris retrieval equipment will
be installed on the first floor.

・Occupational radiation exposure
・Occupational radiation exposure
would be of several times of the past would be less than the past annual
annual total exposure when sealing
total exposure when sealing lower
upper PCV as there are lots of
PCV.
penetration holes on the upper PCV.

・Occupational radiation exposure would
be less than the past annual total
exposure when sealing lower PCV.

Reducing
Occupational
Radiation
Exposure

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４－６． Evaluation of Feasibility of the Methods 2
Submersion-Top AccessPartial Submersion - Top AccessPartial Submersion - Side Access

Inner
RPV
PCV
BottomEstablishing
Access Route・Scale of work concerning retrieval ・Scale of work concerning retrieval ・Building an access route to fuelof fuel debris located in RPV could of fuel debris located in RPV could debris located in RPV is difficult at
be significant as inner structures
be significant as inner structures of present.
of reactor must be removed.
reactor must be removed.
・Scale of work concerning retrieval ・Scale of work concerning retrieval ・Scale of work concerning retrieval ofof fuel debris located at theof fuel debris located at the bottom fuel debris located at the bottom ofbottom of PCV could be moreof PCV could be more significant
PCV could be less significant thansignificant than that of sidethan that of side-access method as that of top-access method.
access method as it is required to it is required to bore the bottom ofbore the bottom of RPV.
RPV.

Evaluation of feasibility
Submersion-Top AccessPartial Submersion - Top AccessPartial Submersion - Side Access・Development of technologies
for remotely fixing
penetration holes for watersealing is difficult.
・Total occupational exposure
concerning repair work could
be enormous.

・It is necessary to continue
development of technology
for maintaining negative
pressure in order to containalpha-emitting nuclides.
・Both top-access and sideaccess would be required.

・It is necessary to continue
development of technology
for maintaining negative
pressure in order to containalpha-emitting nuclides.
・Both side-access and topaccess would be required.

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４－７．Comprehensive Evaluation
Evaluation of the water level during the fuel debris retrieval operationIn the partially submersion method, though it is necessary to develop a gas-control system and contain radioactive
materials in the gas-phase portion, we should further accelerate the R&D process and evaluate the applicability of themethod to work in the field toward materialization of the partially submersion method in all Units 1 to 3.

With discussing the feasibility of the submersion method in the future scope, we should also store the knowledge obtainedin the R&D process and remaining issues in an appropriate manner to prepare for the possible use of them.

Access routes
At the moment, it is considered difficult to access the fuel debris inside the RPV from the side for retrieval. It is necessary
to access it from the operating floor (from the top).



It is more realistic to access the fuel debris at the bottom of the PCV and retrieve it from the side of the PCV (on the firstfloor level of reactor building). In terms of reducing the exposure of workers and performing maintenance work, it isreasonable to access it from the side of the PCV.

Locations in the reactor from which fuel debris should be retrieved first

It is realistic to retrieve the fuel debris from the bottom of the PCV first by accessing from the side.
The reasons are:1.

The bottom of the PCV in Units 1 to 3 has been investigated and, as a result, a certain amount of knowledge
on the routes for accessing the bottom from the side has been accumulated, which can be used for realistic
engineering.

2. The actual time to reach the fuel debris will be longer when accessing the inside of the RPV from the top thanwhen accessing the bottom of the PCV from the side.
3. In order to streamline the decommissioning process as a whole, preparations for side access to the bottom of
the PCV can be made concurrently with the removal of the fuel from the pool.

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４－８．Proposal for Deciding Fuel Debris Retrieval Policies andApproach after Decision (Strategic Proposal) 1
Proposal for Drafting Fuel Debris Retrieval Policies(1)Develop a comprehensive fuel debris retrieval plan aimed to optimize the entire retrieval process,from preparation work and transfer from the site to treatment, storage and cleanup, including
coordination with other works in the field.
(2)Move forward in a flexible manner according to the information gained little by little via a step bystep approach after deciding the retrieval method to be focused on.
(3)Assume that combination of a variety of methods will be required to complete the fuel debris
retrieval.
(4)Promote preliminary engineering and R&D focusing on the partial submersion methods.
(5)Firstly, focus on retrieving the fuel debris located at the bottom of the PCV and keep reviewing themethods based on the newly gained expertise/experience through the retrieval.
(6)At first, focus on the route from the side of the PCV (the side-access method) for the first access tothe fuel debris located at the bottom of the PCV. The following are the points to be stressed about themethod.
At “Uncertainty”, it is important to analyze small but importantsuccessful experiences, expand the scope and accumulate useful
information gradually（Step by Step Approach）

Judging thefeasibility

The basic concept
which seems mostreliableEngineering

1. Implementation

Result of internal survey

To be United

Modify2. Reflecting result

Fuel debris
retrieval

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４－9. Proposal for Deciding Fuel Debris Retrieval Policies andApproach after Decision (Strategic Proposal) 2
 Once the fuel debris retrieval policies have been defined, the following priority issues
should be dealt with towards “determination of fuel debris retrieval method for the
first implementing unit” and accelerating the development of the actual construction
plan.
Preliminary engineeringThe applicability of the results of research and development and system concept to the actual field will be evaluated and theprocesses involved in the retrieval will be specified.

As needed, the fuel debris retrieval methods may be revised based on the results of the preliminary engineering.

Acceleration of technology development based on the selection and prioritizationof research and development projects and practical application of technology
Extra investigations into internal PCVInvestigations into internal RPVJudging feasibility of alpha emitting radionuclides management system required for partial submersion methods

Promoting the necessary research and development projects to materialize the side-access method into practicaluse and discussing the significance of mockup facility

Conducting research and development on a system for containing, transferring and storing fuel debris, on the
preparation of a storage facility, and on the waste to be generated by fuel debris retrieval

Path to Commencement of Fuel Debris Retrieval
 It is important to remember the following when promoting the fuel debris project.
"Considerations to the continuity of the project", "Optimization of the entire retrieval process" and"Close communication with the local government and community"

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１．Introduction
２．Strategic Plan
３．Strategy for Reducing Risks Posed
by Radioactive Materials
４．Fuel Debris Retrieval
５．Waste Management
６．R&D Initiatives
７．Enhancement of International
Cooperation
８．Future Actions
無断複製・転載禁止 原子力損害賠償・廃炉等支援機構©Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

５－１． Study Policy on the Strategic Plan for Waste Management

It is considered that the solid waste generated due to the accident has different characteristics. Hence,characterization of solid waste has been conducted, on the basis of which the study towards processing
and disposal has progressed. The management such as storage of solid waste also has been
implemented in accordance with risk reduction approach.
The international safety principles on radioactive waste management are compiled and the policies onsolid waste management to be applied are shown, in light of the current state that solid waste
characteristics data has been accumulated.

International Safety Principles on Radioactive Waste Management
 Described below are some principles in the safety principles on radioactive waste
management compiled by ICRP and IAEA for all radioactive waste.
 To contain all radioactive waste and isolate it from the accessible biosphere To be processed to have stable solid form, and reduced volume to the extent possible
and immobilized during the management activity of radioactive waste
 At various steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste, theradioactive waste shall be characterized and classified.
 During the predisposal management, storage is important as a measure to givethe management with flexibility.
 To be stored in such a manner that it can be inspected, monitored, retrieved andpreserved in a condition suitable for its subsequent management.
 The anticipated needs for any future steps in radioactive waste management have to betaken into account as far as possible in making decisions on the processing of the waste.
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５－２．Current State of Solid Waste Management
Effort１．Storage

Current State Solid waste is safely stored continuously according to its type and surface dose rate.
Volume reduction of solid waste such as used protective clothing is being carriedout by operation of miscellaneous solid waste incineration facility.
 In the Solid Waste Storage Management Plan, the amount of solid waste generated
in the next ten years is estimated, and a plan is shown to reduce volume of waste
stored outdoors as much as possible and transfer to indoor storage in order toachieve further reduction of the risk on storing solid waste.

Miscellaneous solid waste incineration facility

Outline of solid waste contamination source and nuclide migration pathway

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５－２．Current State of Solid Waste Management
EffortCurrent State

２．WasteCharacterization



３．
Processing
and disposal








Sampling and analysis were carried out mainly on “rubble, etc.” and secondary waste from water
treatment generated after the accident. Analysis results of about 300 samples have been accumulated
over the past 6 years.
Although some contamination characteristics of solid waste are being estimated based on
accumulation of analysis results, further analysis is still required. In addition, in order to promotecharacterization, a method of understanding the characteristics by using analysis data and nuclide
migration model evaluation data is being developed.
For secondary waste from water treatment system, the technologies for stabilization andimmobilization have been developed with priority. In order to narrow down the applicable candidatesof conditioning technology, fundamental tests for solidification have been conducted with simulated
non-radioactive waste using proven technologies. Through these tests, data was obtained on thepossibility of solidification and the soundness of the solidified products.
As for disposal, waste classification methodology has been studied on a trial basis for existing disposal
concepts as an example.
The case-based study of overseas disposal facilities has been conducted in order to contribute to thestudy on disposal concepts which is based on the characteristics of solid waste.

Sampling（JAEA）

Examples of sampling location25

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５－３．Proposal for Compilation of the Basic Concept of Solid Waste
Management (Strategic Proposal) 1
Characteristics of Solid Waste

Described below are the characteristics of solid waste that have been presumed.


The amount of solid waste is greater than that of radioactive solid waste generated by normal operation of
nuclear power stations, and a lot of solid waste have relatively high dose rate.

As the major source of contamination is fuel debris, radioactive concentration of nuclides in solid waste does notexceed that of spent fuel.

Composition and radioactive concentration of nuclides in solid waste have a lot more varieties compared withthose of radioactive solid waste generated by normal operation of nuclear power stations.



Secondary waste generated from water treatment has high fluidity, high dose rate that can causes thegeneration of hydrogen, and the materials/substances which have never been dealt with in Japan.

Solid waste generated immediately after the accident include materials/substances whose chemical
characteristics might impact on the safety of the predisposal and disposal and/or whose chemical hazard might
affect the environment.



Information about the total amount of solid waste and their characteristics, which are essential for discussions
on disposal, will be revealed sequentially as decommissioning activities proceeds.

Solid Waste Management Policies
Characterization, storage and preceding processes in predisposal management are mainly focused on until a prospect of disposa l is obtained.

◇Thorough containment and isolation ◇Reduction of the amount of solid waste◇Promotion of characterization⇒ Increasing analytical capability systematically by constructing required facilities/equipment, keeping on
analytical talented staff and bringing up analytical staff, and improving characterization by R&D from theperspective of efficiency.
◇Thorough storage ◇Establishment of a selection system of preceding processing methods in consideration of
disposal⇒ Establishment of a selection system of preceding processing methods for stabilization and immobilization ofsolid waste before technical requirements are set.

26

無断複製・転載禁止 原子力損害賠償・廃炉等支援機構©Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

５－３．Proposal for Compilation of the Basic Concept of Solid Waste
Management (Strategic Proposal) 2
 Present Efforts/R&D Based on Solid Waste Management Policies
Thorough containment and isolation


The measure such as store in containers or immobilization is performed as needed. Solid waste is isolated bystoring in the storage place which is set up appropriately.

Reduction of the amount of solid wasteContinue such efforts as carry-in control, re-use/recycling and volume reduction.

Promotion of characterization【Increasing analytical capability】 Construct new facilities/equipment and use existing ones systematically from a mid-tolong term perspective, and establish a system for human resource development (HRD) and technology transfer.
【R&D for improving characterization from the perspective of efficiency】 Develop a characterization method withcomplimentarily combining analytical data and evaluation data based on nuclide migration models, and facilitate R&D
for optimizing the number of analytical samples and for simplifying analytical methods to speed up analysis.

Thorough storageReduce the amount of solid waste that have been stored temporarily outside of storage facilities by moving
them to storage facilities after volume reduction as much as possible.
Discuss the methods of evaluating the amount of hydrogen gas generated from the secondary waste fromwater treatment during the period of storage, estimate the timing of implementing additional safety measuresand consider what kind of the measures will be required.
Study storage method for solid waste to be generated by fuel debris retrieval.

Establishment of a selection system of preceding processing methods in consideration of disposal
 Establish a selection system of preceding processing methods. In this system, safety assessment ofspecifications of a provisional waste package is performed relatively in each developed disposal concept. The
selection of preceding processing method depends on the result of safety assessment.
Efficient implementation of R&D projects from the perspective of overall solid waste management

Development of a system for continuous operations
Measures to reduce the exposure of workers to radiation27

無断複製・転載禁止 原子力損害賠償・廃炉等支援機構©Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

１．Introduction
２．Strategic Plan
３．Strategy for Reducing Risks Posed
by Radioactive Materials
４．Fuel Debris Retrieval
５．Waste Management
６．R&D Initiatives
７．Enhancement of International
Cooperation
８．Future Actions
無断複製・転載禁止 原子力損害賠償・廃炉等支援機構©Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

６．R&D Initiatives
Basic PolicyAs fuel debris retrieval policies for each unit will be fixed, such R&D methodology shall enter a new phase.

It is necessary to arrange the division of roles and responsibilities between the government and the operator in an appropriatemanner in order to steadily implement R&D results on the decommissioning site.
•

TEPCO is expected to continue actively implementing highly feasible R&D projects necessary for decommissioning, and to promoteengineering projects for applying component technologies developed in the Project of Decommissioning and Contaminated Water
Management as well.

•In the Project of Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Management, it is important to flexibly reorganize this kind of R&D
projects. Once the fuel debris retrieval policies for each unit are determined, engineering activities, such as application designing
for actual units, shall commence. As these processes progress, it is needed to continuously revise R&D projects in order to make itwork more closely with engineering processes.



It is considered to be further expected that the government and the relevant research institutes should establish a center ofbasic research/research infrastructure based on a mid-to long-term perspective.

Research institutes are expected to enhance the technologies required for decommissioning through considerations on the statusof the project and the fundamental R&D activities according to scientific and technological issues (needs) regarding thedecommissioning.


NDF has been hosting the Decommissioning R&D partnershipCouncil meetings and undertaking optimization of R&D activities
carried out by each institution for a better effectiveness andefficiency as a whole.



NDF has built a task force on research collaboration and specified
the Essential R&D Themes that should be preferentially andstrategically targeted. Now, sectional meetings have been
established in the Platform of Basic Research for
Decommissioning and discussions to compile R&D strategies forthe themes are underway

It is essential to work on developing R&D infrastructure andaccumulating technological knowledge, such as developing
generic technologies and collecting basic data, building up
research centers, facilities and equipment, and human resource
development. Measures to further utilize JAEA/CLADS should be
implemented.

A conceptual picture of the division of roles among
main R&D Institutions for 1F Decommissioning29

無断複製・転載禁止 原子力損害賠償・廃炉等支援機構©Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

１．Introduction
２．Strategic Plan
３．Strategy for Reducing Risks Posed
by Radioactive Materials
４．Fuel Debris Retrieval
５．Waste Management
６．R&D Initiatives
７．Enhancement of International
Cooperation
８．Future Actions
無断複製・転載禁止 原子力損害賠償・廃炉等支援機構©Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

７．Enhancement of International Cooperation


There are a lot of experiences and expertise in the world on decommissioning of nuclear facilities and sites that
suffered accidents or contamination. To actively learn and make use of these learnings will help to facilitate safer
and faster decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPS, and it is important for the relevant organizations in Japanto proactively enhance international cooperation.

Integrating and Utilizing WisdomParticipation in the activities of the international organizations such as IAEA and OECD/NEA

Signing the co-operation agreement with NDA, U.K. and memorandum of understanding with Alternative Energies andAtomic Energy Commission (CEA), for information exchangeParticipation in the discussions under the governmental framework among U.K., U.S., France, Russia and Japan

Inviting distinguished experts from the U.K., France, Spain, and the U.S. as International Special Advisers to receive
advice from them

Holding the Decommissioning R&D Partnership Council, in order to promote effectively and efficiently the research anddevelopment projects of individual organizations⇒

As the technically challenging works progress, it is vital to carry out decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi NPS byintegrating wisdom from Japan and overseas such as continuing to collect and utilize knowledge and experiences on
decommissioning activities of other countries and to be evaluated against the international standards.

Active Information Dissemination to International Communities


NDF has been participating in a variety of events in close collaboration with the government such as holding The
International Forum on the Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, and a side event at IAEA General Conference
and presenting at Waste Management Symposia. Also, NDF has been participating in the activities of OECD/NEA for
providing the information on Fukushima Daiichi NPS.
⇒ it is essential to disseminate information about the issues, progress and achievements to international communities toreceive their advice and assessments as decommissioning proceeds. Efforts need to be made so that the international
community have correct understanding, it is necessary to further reinforce dissemination of information that is easy tounderstand.

31

無断複製・転載禁止 原子力損害賠償・廃炉等支援機構©Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

１．Introduction
２．Strategic Plan
３．Strategy for Reducing Risks Posed
by Radioactive Materials
４．Fuel Debris Retrieval
５．Waste Management
６．R&D Initiatives
７．Enhancement of International
Cooperation
８．Future Actions
無断複製・転載禁止 原子力損害賠償・廃炉等支援機構©Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

８．Future Actions
 The importance of project management will increase as the decommissioning activities at the
Fukushima Daiichi NPS progress to an advanced phase and technically difficult activities, such asfuel debris retrieval, are fully performed.

Enhancing Project Management Capabilities

The fuel debris retrieval operation, which is technically difficult and needs to be performed,
taking into account the relationship with and the continuity of the activities that have been
performed, will be fully performed.
Project risk management that identifies the risks which may impact on the implementation of
the project, analyzes the significance of the risks and take required actions is essential.
TEPCO, as the organization responsible for the implementation of decommission, and NDF, as
the organization responsible for the management and supervision of decommission, need toclearly define their roles and accountability, and strengthen project governance in order tofacilitate sound progress of the project, respectively.

Engagement with Stakeholders
 Based on providing plain and accurate information, it is necessary to have good conversation,
make continuous effort mutually in order to reduce the gap between the providers and receivers,
and repeat these processes.
 Just anxiety about potential risks may cause serious harm to the reputation. To avoid further
reputational damages, it is more significant, than anything else, to manage radioactive materials
in an appropriate manner in order not to let them leak and reduce the existing risks promptly.

Consideration for the Project Sustainability
 It is necessary to ensure the mechanism that enables continuous project management, etc. andto secure a large variety of human resources taking the roles in these works.

33

無断複製・転載禁止 原子力損害賠償・廃炉等支援機構©Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation