MEGATRENDS

THE TRANSFORMATIONOF LABOR MARKETS
Winners and losers in a new era

FALL/WINTER 2023-2024
For professional investors only.
All investments involve risk,
including possible loss of capital.
PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 1

About PGIM
PGIM is the global asset management business of Prudential Financial, Inc. (PFI). PFI has a history that dates
back over 145 years and through more than 30 market cycles.i With 46 offices in 18 different countries, ourmore than 1,400 investment professionals are located in key financial centers around the world.
As a leading global asset manager,ii with $1.27 trillion in assets under management (as of 06/2023), PGIM
is built on a foundation of strength, stability and disciplined risk management. Our firm is comprisedof autonomous asset management businesses, each specializing in a particular asset class with a focusedinvestment approach. This gives our clients diversified solutions with global depth and scale across public
and private asset classes, including fixed income, equities, real estate, private credit and other alternatives.
For more information, visit www.pgim.com.

i 30 market cycles represent PFI’s asset management expertise through PGIM and its affiliates and its predecessors. For additional information related to market cycles visit:www.nber.org/research/business-cycle-datingii P GIM is the investment management business of Prudential Financial, Inc. (PFI). PFI is the 11th largest investment manager (out of 434 firms surveyed) in terms of worldwide
institutional assets under management based on Pensions & Investments’ Top Money Managers list published June 2023. This ranking represents institutional client assets undermanagement by PFI as of December 31, 2022. Participation in the P&I ranking is voluntary and open to managers that have any kind of U.S. institutional tax-exempt AUM. Managers
self-report their data via a survey. P&I sends the survey to previously identified managers and to any new managers asking to participate in the survey/ranking. No compensation isrequired to participate in the ranking.

2 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIMINTRODUCTION
Among its many tragic human and economic consequences, the COVID-19 pandemic left labor markets inturmoil. In a matter of weeks, hundreds of millions of workers around the world saw their income reduced or
disappear entirely. For example, more than 40 million Indian migrant workers returned home, 32 million workers
across Europe were furloughed and 22 million Americans lost their job.1, 2, 3
Even those that kept their job saw their working hours
plunge – dropping by almost half in some countries.4
Globally the sharp drop-off in working hours was
equivalent to 400 million full-time jobs – roughly
six times the total decline experienced from peak totrough during the Global Financial Crisis.5
Debates continue to rage about the long-term
consequences of COVID-19 on labor markets. These
include the impact of massive fiscal support on labor
availability, the lingering effects of long COVID onlabor force participation, media accounts of a Great
Resignation and so-called “quiet quitting,” as well as adesire for greater work flexibility, reflecting a rethinking
by many of how work fits into their lives.6, 7, 8, 9
While these issues get much media attention – andsome may prove to have an enduring impact – theyoften obscure the profound structural changes to labormarkets that were already underway prior to COVID
and that will ultimately have a much greater impact on
reshaping the global workforce.
Specifically, as the pandemic’s impact on workers
begins to fade, four structural forces are gathering
momentum:1. The economic drag from aging across mostcountries will not be fully offset by growing
working-age populations in sub-Saharan Africa
and South Asia due to the significant hurdles
they face – including institutional fragility, poor
business environments, low human capital andclimate disasters.
2. Structural mismatches between labor demandand supply are already evident but accelerating

given the pace of technological change, anaging workforce and the reshoring of global
supply chains.
3. The rise of new technologies, especially AI,
will lead to a new anxious phase in the complex,
double-edged relationship between technology
and labor.
4. Slowing globalization, which is disrupting thepattern of global labor demand and potentiallysetting the stage for a resurgence of organizedlabor and growing worker bargaining power after
an era of increasing returns to capital, especially in
the US.
For investors, the forces reshaping global labor markets
will impact wages, productivity, unemployment,
economic growth, inflation and fiscal deficits –creating a new roster of winning and losing industries
and countries.
To understand the macroeconomic and investment
implications, we have drawn on the insights of over 25
investment professionals across PGIM’s equity, fixedincome, real estate and private alternatives managers– as well as leading policymakers, labor economists
and other academics. Chapter 1 identifies the driving
forces reshaping labor markets today and in the future.
Chapter 2 looks at the macroeconomic implicationsof these new workforce dynamics. Finally, Chapter 3
identifies the potential winners and losers – by both
sector and region. We also leverage new proprietary
research conducted in partnership with the Brookings
Institution to delve into US labor market mismatches
at a granular state and city level.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE FORCES TRANSFORMINGGLOBAL LABOR MARKETSRESHAPING THE
MACRO LANDSCAPE

WINNERS AND LOSERS IN
THE NEW ERA OF LABOR

Page 3

Page 15

Page 2101
2 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

0203

CHAPTER 1

THE FORCES TRANSFORMINGGLOBAL LABOR MARKETS“Global labor markets are at a critical
turning point and will be reshaped bydemographic changes, labor mismatches,
technology and slowing globalization.”

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 3

CHAPTER 1

THE FORCES TRANSFORMING GLOBAL LABOR MARKETSThe entry of China into the World Trade Organization in 2001 ushered in a “golden era” of globalization repletewith outsourced manufacturing, soaring international trade and complex multinational supply chains. In many
ways, the integration of China and other large emerging countries into the global economy can be considered apositive labor supply shock, initiating an era of “abundant labor.”
A little more than two decades later, this era issunsetting. Global labor markets are at a critical turning
point and will be reshaped by demographic change,potentially deepening structural mismatches, rapid
technological change and a slowdown of globalization.

Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, but any potential
demographic dividend is threatened by weak
institutions, fragile economies, low human capital
investments and significant climate challenges.

1. A new demographic map for labor markets

North America and Europe: The Dual Aging ofWorkers and Companies

Global labor supply and demand will be transformedby powerful demographic trends in the decades ahead.
But these demographic forces will impact regions
very differently: (1) the “dual aging” of both workers
and firms in North America and Europe is leading
to declining entrepreneurship and labor mobility;(2) the transition from a demographic dividend to ademographic drag in East Asia and South America;and (3) the rise of a massive new workforce in SouthThe rapid aging of the workforce is one of the mostprofound issues facing advanced economies and is now
at a tipping point in the OECD (Exhibit 1).10 Europe
alone will see over 40 million workers exit the labor
force between now and 2050 – roughly equivalent to
the entire current workforce of France or Germany.
In the US, the share of older workers – aged 45 andabove – has risen from 27% in the 1980s to around
45% today.11

Exhibit 1: A shrinking workforce across OECD countries
Working age population

2023

900

Million people

800

700

600

500
1960

1970

1980

Source: World Bank. Data as of August 2023.

4 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

While aging of the labor force in advanced economies
is well-understood, the “dual aging” of companies inthese economies is less appreciated. In fact, the US
economy has experienced a striking shift towards older
workers and older firms since the mid-1990s (Exhibit2). Mature firms (11 years and older) used to employ
about two-thirds of workers in 1987; by 2017, this had
grown to over 80%.12
The dual aging of workers and companies has
major implications for labor force participation,
entrepreneurship, job destruction and unemployment.
Older, more settled workers are less willing toswitch jobs, and older companies are less likely todestroy jobs, leading to a lower unemployment, lessturbulence, less new business formation as well asa growing concentration of older and bigger firms.
To pick one example, there is a striking correlation
between the rate of entrepreneurship and the average
growth rate of the working-age population acrossdifferent US states (Exhibit 3). Since the 1980s, thishas led to a persistent decline in the share of startup
firms in the US economy from around 14% to below
9% in 2020.13

East Asia and South America: From demographic
dividend to demographic dragratios – played a meaningful part in the economic
success stories of Asia and Latin America.14
In countries like South Korea and Singapore,demographics are estimated to have boosted GDP
by as much as three-quarters of a percent annually
between 1960 and 2000.15

The dual aging of workers andcompanies has major implications
for labor force participation,
entrepreneurship, job destruction
and unemployment.
Going forward, these supportive demographic
tailwinds will become a drag on growth as dependency
ratios reach an inflection point and the share of theworking-age population begins to shrink. Some,like South Korea, Russia and China, have seen theirdependency ratios already increase, while others,
like Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia, are about to turnupwards (Exhibit 4).

Over the last few decades, favorable demographics –with lower fertility rates and declining dependency

The sharpest reversal is in China where the one-childpolicy has accelerated the demographic transition
dramatically. China now stands at a demographic cliff,with 40 million workers retiring by 2025, leading to a

Exhibit 2: The dual aging of the workforce and firms
in the US

Exhibit 3: An aging population diminishes entrepreneurship
Startup rate and WAP growth across US states

85%

80%

18%

22%

16%

20%
18%
16%

70%

14%

Employment share ofolder workers (right)

65%

12%

60%

10%
1988

1995

2002

2009

2016

Mean startup rate

75%

Employment share by
mature firms (left)

24%

14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

Mean WAP growth rate
Source: Crump, Eusepi, Giannoni and Sahin (2019, 2022). Data as of August 2023.
Note: Employment share of 55-and-above workers and employment share of firms
11 years and older.

Source: Karahan, Pugsley and Sahin (2022). Data as of August 2023.
Note: WAP refers to working age population.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 5

reduction of 35 million in the working-age population
over the same period. Indeed, absent a dramatic
shift in migration policy, China is projected to facea contraction in its working-age population between
now and 2050 of well over 200 million – a decline
the size of the entire current workforce in the
United States!
Aside from the direct impact on workforce size and
GDP growth potential, the rapidly rising dependency
ratios in East Asia and South America will also leadto growing fiscal strains via social expenditures onpension and health care systems – and to shifting

Exhibit 4: Dependency ratios are turning
Dependents as a share of working-age population
Brazil70%

MexicoIndonesia

60%

50%

40%
1995

2005

China

a

2015

2025

South Korea

2035

Russia

60%

50%

40%

2035

30%
1995

2005

2015

2025

2035

consumer demand patterns (e.g., more health care,nursing and medicines, less schooling, restaurants andmotor vehicles).16

South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa: The false
promise of a demographic dividend?
By 2030, working-age populations will be declining
in all but four of the 30 largest economies (measured
by GDP in US dollars) around the world. In contrast,
the two regions that will see a significant growth inworking-age populations and lower dependency ratios,are South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.iii Over the next
three decades, South Asia will see a 300 million net
increase in working-age population and sub-SaharanAfrica will see an increase more than twice as large.
Collectively,
this growth implies
that – even Russia
with the
China
South Korea
demographic
headwinds in the rest of the world – the60%
global labor force will have an additional 860 million
workers in 2050 relative to today.
However, demographics alone do not determine
50%
economic
destiny. A growing workforce driving
economic prosperity requires high levels of humancapital, an environment conducive to robust foreignand domestic investment, well-functioning and40%
trustedinstitutions as well as stable political andregulatory regimes. Unlike East Asia and much of
Latin America, which reaped a prior demographic
dividend, these foundational characteristics are
30% or absent in many of the countries with the
weak
1995
2005
2015
2025
2035
biggest net increase in workers. With some notable
exceptions, such as India – projected to be one of
the fastest growing economies over the next decade –many of the countries that could be the beneficiariesof the next demographic dividend are plagued bycorrupt and fragile institutions, political instability,
a business environment that limits the attractivenessof foreign direct investment or domestic capitalformation and low levels of literacy and education.
Many of these countries are also heavily reliant on
agriculture – which employs around 40% of theworkforce in both South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa– but face real productivity and health challenges
given significant climate risk from extreme heat,droughts and other disasters.

Source: World Bank. Data as of August 2023.
iii South Asia refers to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

6 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

2. The growing risk of structural labormarket mismatches

Education mismatches

Examples of labor market mismatches abound. In
Germany, 1 in every 6 professions is struggling with alack of skilled workers.17 Similarly, while many focus
on China’s aging population and bemoan a looming
labor shortage, today the youngest Chinese workers
are suffering from an unemployment rate above 20% –nearly four times the overall rate.18 This elevated youth
unemployment is due in part to cyclical factors, but
structural factors – namely a misalignment between thejobs recent graduates want and are qualified for and thejobs that are available – are most prominent.19, 20

A third of university graduates
end up in jobs that do not require
their full level of education.
Looking ahead, labor market mismatches are poised
to increase. Demographic changes in the global
workforce, the emergence of new tech paradigms andthe resurgence of nearshoring and reshoring are creating
an environment where labor mismatches will bepotentially increasing.

The International Labor Organization estimates that
almost one billion workers worldwide have jobs that
don’t match their education levels: 675 million are
undereducated (mainly in low- and middle-income
countries) and 258 million are overeducated (mainly inhigh-income countries).21
Many lower- and middle-income countries are
struggling with undereducation and a workforce thatlacks the full qualifications for their current job. In
contrast, overeducation is prevalent in both Europe
and the US, where roughly a third of university
graduates end up in jobs that do not require their fulllevel of education (Exhibit 5).22, 23 This comes witha high cost for individuals – in the form of lower
wages – but also impacts overall economic output andproductivity, particularly because overeducation tends
to be persistent once a worker takes a job with lower
requirements.24 This has also led to sizable mismatches
in vocational jobs – such as electricians and plumbers
as well as specialized manufacturing and technicians –that are deemed “undesirable” by many young workers.

Cross-country geographic mismatches
There are also significant geographic mismatches
between available jobs and qualified labor across theworld. There are over 300,000 unfilled nursing jobs

Exhibit 5: Overeducation and undereducation coexist
Percentage of overeducated vs. undereducated workers
Overeducation

80%

Undereducation

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
GermanyUS

VietnamSouth Africa

Pakistan

Ethiopia

Source: International Labor Organization. Data as of August 2023.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 7

Taxonomy of labor market mismatches
Cyclical mismatches arise when (a) in a recession, the number of unemployed exceeds the numberof job vacancies and, as a result, labor demand cannot match labor supply, (b) conversely, in an
overheated economy, job vacancies exceed labor supply either across the economy or in specific sectors
such as the crypto bubble of the early 2020s or delivery and warehouse workers during the pandemic.
Structural mismatches, our focus in this report, occur when aggregate imbalances arise frompersistent shifts in the supply and demand for workers. For example, a structural mismatch could
result if the unemployed mostly search for work in shrinking industries – because of their skills,
qualifications or location – while vacancies in growing sectors remained unfilled. Examples ofstructural mismatches would include coal mining in the U.K. (shrinking demand), chip manufacturing in the US (rising demand), nurses in Germany (shrinking supply), or agricultural workers in
China (overqualified labor pool).
We use education mismatch to refer to both skill and qualification mismatches. These mismatches
can exist in both directions. For example, some workers possess skills which are underutilized in theircurrent job, while others struggle because, through lack of training and experience, they don’t possess
the necessary skills.
Geographic mismatches happen when both demand and supply for labor are available but in distantlocations. That is, a match would be possible if either labor or jobs would move. When it comes tolabor moving, there are two aspects – migration, which is people moving from one country to anotherfor work, and mobility, which is moving within a country from one location to another for a job.

in Germany, for example, while 1 out of 10 nurses
in Brazil is unemployed.25 Targeted immigration ofworkers that fill a particular skill gap is an obvious
solution to matching the need for workers in one
place with the available and unemployed labor pool inanother region.
While fact and fiction around immigration are
persistently confused, the long-term trend is clear.
Over the past two decades the share of the workforce
in developed countries that is foreign-born has
increased consistently (Exhibit 6).26, 27, 28 In Canada,
for example, immigrant workers accounted for 84% of
the total labor force growth in the 2010s.29 Immigrants
are also employed at a higher rate than native-bornworkers and take on low- and high-skilled jobs in theservice industry and other sectors.30 In the US, thesurge of nearly 5 million foreign-born workers entering
the labor force over the past two years has equaled thetotal net increase from the entire pre-COVID decade.

8 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

Exhibit 6: International talent has become crucial
Share of foreign-born workforce
U.K.

US

Germany

18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
2007

2012

2017

Source: U.K. Office of National Statistics , US Bureau of Labor Statistics andGermany’s Federal Statistical Office. Data as of August 2023.

2021

It is striking to note that of the 550 U.S. unicorns –startups valued at over $1 billion – 79% were foundedby an immigrant or a first-generation American or are
currently operated by an immigrant.
Policies for targeted work visas to mitigate specificmismatches range from short-term, seasonal work
permission to longer-term visas for workers withespecially desired skills. In Europe where the workforce
is likely to contract most rapidly, Germany has a
special partnership with Brazil as part of an effort
to attract skilled workers – like nurses.31 Even Italy’s
far-right government – which campaigned on anativist platform that labeled asylum seekers as a threat
to Italian people and their culture – plans to issue425,000 work visas to non-EU nationals by 2025 after
ongoing complaints from various industries including
tourism, health care and construction about difficultyfinding workers.32

Labor mobility within a country
Geographic mismatches within a country should beeasier to resolve than those across countries. However,
over the past few decades many countries have seena decline in labor mobility. China had an elevatedmobility rate of almost 40% through the 1970s and1980s due to government policies that encouraged
movement – in the 2000s the mobility rate there has
dropped below 30%.33 The labor mobility story in the

US is similar albeit at a lower level. Almost one-thirdof US workers relocated for a job in the 1980s; that
number has fallen to around 5% (Exhibit 7). And a
recent study indicated that 80% of young American
adults live less than 100 miles from where they grewup, limiting the radius of economic opportunity thatis accessible.34 Looking ahead, higher mortgage rates
and lower home affordability will only contribute to afurther decline in labor mobility.

3. Technology: The weightless economy shifts
demand for workers
Technology has a long and complex relationship withlabor – at times displacing it (e.g., horse carriage drivers
and typists), at times enhancing worker productivity(e.g., tractors and canning machines), at times creating
new jobs (e.g., data scientists and software engineers)
and at times reducing wages (e.g., London cabbies afterUber). For investors, it is critical to look past herovillain narratives and focus on three key aspects of theinterplay between technology and jobs.

Modern weightless firms recast labor demand
Physical capital and massive payrolls are less criticalto modern firms. Instead, investment in intellectual
property and other intangible capital has become acritical driver of growth in the knowledge economy.

Exhibit 7: US labor mobility has been declining since the 1980s
Share of working population relocating for a job
30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
1986-1997

1998-2007

2008-20172018-2023*

Source: Challenger and Gray. Data as of August 2023.
Note: *Available data through first quarter 2023.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 9

Indeed, over 70% of the value of the S&P Euro 350
and 90% of the value of the S&P 500 now comprises
intangible assets.35
The rise of “weightless” firms has also led to apolarization of jobs – and wages.36 That is, highpaying jobs in sophisticated fields like technology,
finance and science are being created along withlow-skilled, low-paying jobs in food processing,logistics and personal care.37 This has contributed toa hollowing out of jobs in the middle of the skill andincome distribution.38 For those benefiting, mainly
workers with sophisticated cognitive skills, improving
technology has been complementary to their efforts,
expanding the impact or technical precision of theirwork. For those who have been harmed, technology
has provided lower-cost substitutes for the output they
were producing and because of global integration, they
have faced increased wage competition from abroad.
Consequently, many of these workers have moved torelatively low-paying jobs.39

Investment in intellectual property
and other intangible capital has
become a critical driver of growthin the knowledge economy.
Despite the anxiety, technology tends tocomplement rather than replace labor
While media headlines about the alarming job
displacement power of new technologies abound, thehistorical evidence suggests the risks are somewhat
overblown. For instance, in 1900, 41% of the US
workforce was employed in agriculture. A century laterthat share had fallen to just 2%, largely due to a rangeof automated machinery. Yet despite automation andtechnology decimating employment, there was no
decades-long surge in unemployment. Why is that?
First, technology – from the cotton gin and thesteam engine to the internet – has replaced tasks for
centuries, changing labor more than displacing it.40
Technology tends to automate the repetitive andmanual tasks of work – from plowing fields to typing
10 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

memos. Importantly, this replacement of simple
tasks provides a tangible productivity boost for laborover the long term.41 However, in the short-term,
technology adoption can also displace workers in aconcentrated and disruptive manner.
Second, technology alters the set of skills indemand and creates new industries, roles, tasks andopportunities that did not exist before.42, 43 Morethan 60% of the jobs done in 2018, for example,
had not yet been invented in 1940.44 And even whentechnology does replace jobs, it does not happen
overnight. For example, the ATM debuted in the US
in 1969, but the number of bank tellers continued torise and peaked in the early 1980s. And three decades
after the ATM’s launch there were just as many banktellers as before (Exhibit 8).
Third, while there are many realms where technology
can enhance productivity and replace tasks, there are
equally many non-standardized activities that cannot
be replaced easily by automation and technology –from unclogging a drain to changing a fuse to caring
for the elderly or very young.

Technology enters a new phase
Critically, the latest wave of technological change ismoving from automating mechanical and physicaltasks to cognitive and service tasks. Technology is

Exhibit 8: It took decades for ATMs to displace bank tellers
Number of bank tellers in the US (thousands)
600

500

400

300

200

100

0
1970

1980

2000

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data as of August 2023.

2022

going well beyond the physical realm of manufacturing
and now disrupting service industries like legal, healthcare and education.45
So, what is different about today’s technology? First,
the scope of what can be automated is expanding into
new industries and jobs. Prior waves of technology
primarily replaced repetitive and predictablephysical tasks in areas like farming, construction andmanufacturing. Today’s technology has the potential toautomate creative and professional tasks in industries
like health care, software development, education andfinancial services – in many cases for the first time.
Second, today’s tools can be commanded using spoken
language rather than computer code. Consequently,
these tools are much more accessible and allow for abroader range of use cases in new areas.

4. Downshifting globalization and new labordemand patterns
It is well understood that heightened Great Power
rivalries (US-China, India-China, US-Russia),
growing nativist and protectionist moves (Brexit, theUS exit from the Trans-Pacific Partnership), and thenearshoring and onshoring of post-COVID supply
chains have slowed down globalization. As a result,
growth in global trade has cooled off since the Global
Financial Crisis (Exhibit 9).46 What are the emerging
implications of this downshift in globalization
for workers and labor markets? We believe threelabor market trends are not widely appreciated andparticularly important for investors to track.

Slowing globalization has impacted trade but not
migration – despite all the political rhetoric
While the growth of global trade has stagnated, thecross-country movement of workers has been far less
impacted (Exhibit 10).
Even more recently, while the pandemic lockdowns
disrupted the migration of workers, faster growthin the U.K., Australia, Canada and the US is being
driven by an unexpectedly large post-COVID influxof immigrants. Their decisions to enter the labor
force will determine their impact on labor supply,
though in the US it appears they already are. In any
case, the presence of immigrants will undoubtedly

boost consumption as well as the demand for shelter.
The numbers are substantial. For example, temporary
work permits for agricultural workers have increased
more than sixfold over the past 10 years and the total

Exhibit 9: Growth in global trade has stagnatedWorld trade as a share of global GDP
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2001

2006

2011

2016

2021

Source: World Bank. Data as of August 2023.
Note: Five-year moving average.

Exhibit 10: Global migration remains elevatedNet migration of top five countries (millions)
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1961-1980

1981-2000

2001-2020

Source: World Bank. Data as of August 2023.
Note: Aggregate of the five countries (US, Russia, Canada, Germany and Australia)
with highest average net migration 1960 to 2020.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 11

number of skilled worker visas reached a new high lastyear (Exhibit 11).iv
The same trend is playing out in other developed
markets as well. Australia’s 2023 net overseas
immigration level of 400,000 is running nearly twotimes pre-COVID levels. Canada’s influx of over one
million workers in 2022 was the highest on record.
And the U.K., even post-Brexit, had more than
600,000 immigrants in 2022, representing a highwatermark and a 24% increase over the prior year.47

Post-COVID supply chains will lead to new labordemand patterns, potentially exacerbating labormarket mismatches
As we predicted in After the Great Lockdown, the
COVID-19 pandemic has led to a barbelling of global
supply chains into (a) more resilient, diversified,multiregional supply chains, and (b) “reshored” supply
chains returning to their home markets, either becauseof economic logic or government intervention. Each ofthese trends has significant labor market implications.
Before COVID, nearly all manufacturing supply
chains passed through China, though rising laborcosts and pressures from the US-China trade war

were already beginning to reverse this trend. Manyinternational firms have now ring-fenced their China
operations and are moving to geographically dispersed,
more flexible and sometimes intentionally redundantsources of supply to increase resilience. Countries
like Vietnam – which has seen Apple, Nike, Adidas
and Samsung move production there – have alreadybenefited from supply chains diversifying away from
China – and will continue to do so. Indian firms arealso trying to fill the void in high-end manufacturing.
For example Apple has moved some of its iPhone
production to the Indian states of Tamil Nadu andKarnataka.48 Similarly, Malaysia and Thailand are also
aiming to move up the value chain as a production
hub for car parts, vehicles, solar panels and electronics
with multinationals such as Sony, Sharp and Micron.49
On the other end of the barbell, governments andfirms are reshoring goods and services that are
deemed of strategic or national security importance.
Industrial policies to spur domestic production in
sectors with national security implications – likepharmaceuticals, leading-edge semiconductors, clean
energy and EV batteries – have become the norm
across many countries.50 These efforts may run into
labor supply constraints and exacerbate labor market

Exhibit 11: Targeted migration has been key in closing labor market mismatches
Number of issued temporary work visas in the US (thousands)
Agricultural Workers

500

Other Service Workers

Specialized Workers

400

300

200

100

0
1999

2007

2015

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data as of August 2023.
Note: Agricultural Workers, Other Service Workers and Specialized Workers refer to H2A, H2B and H1B visas, respectively.
iv Despite the growth in visas, the persistent growth demand for agriculture workers is still outstripping supply in the US, costing the industry billions in lost revenue.

12 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

2022

mismatches. Though over time there will likely be anincreased reliance on automation and robotics to allow
companies to offset higher costs in their home market
by replacing labor costs with up-front capital costs.

uncertainty bands, is that – at least initially – generative
AI may have a positive productivity impact for whitecollar workers, potentially enhancing their real wages.
Second, the reshoring or “friendshoring” ofmanufacturing capacity, R&D and technologicallysophisticated sectors comes with labor requirements
in several G7 countries. US legislation, for example,
includes specific requirements to hire unionized laboror at least draw from the local labor force. Whilesome may consider this unionization trend to be
short-lived and tied to electoral cycles, the politicalstrategy behind this industrial policy in the US has
been to spread the benefits of the associated subsidies
and funding broadly across red and blue states – forexample, battery plants are being built in Tennessee
and Georgia – increasing the probability that it
survives across different political regimes. Furthermore,some major central banks have made changes totheir operating frameworks to introduce more

A potential resurgence of labor bargaining power,
after an era of increasing returns to capital
The labor share of income has been falling in somecountries, most notably the US. This is driven by a
combination of factors including new technologies,
increased employer monopoly power in a “winnertake all” market structure as well as the offshoring oflabor-intensive activities (Exhibit 12). The result is a
growing share of productivity gains has been going tocapital – and since capital is far more concentrated thanlabor, this has also led to rising US income inequality.
While still somewhat speculative, there is a case to bemade that the interplay of the structural forces we havedescribed may underpin a resurgence of labor.
First, reduced working-age populations in many
economies will likely lift the bargaining powerof labor broadly. Of course, the next wave oftechnological change, especially generative AI, may
mitigate the impact of fewer workers. But if history
is any indication, our hunch, admittedly with wide

The latest wave of technologicalchange is moving from automating
mechanical and physical tasks tocognitive and service tasks.

Exhibit 12: Labor’s share of total income in the US has declined
Labor share of total output, nonfarm business sector
70%

68%

66%

64%

62%

60%
1956

1967

1978

1989

2000

2011

2022

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and PGIM Thematic Research. Data as of August 2023.
Note: Five-year moving average used for the labor share of income.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 13

flexibility on achieving the inflation mandate while
placing sufficient emphasis on “broad and inclusive”
employment, affording more flexibility to allow labormarkets to run hot in future cycles.

Exhibit 13: Petitions for unions in the US have bounced backNumber of petitions for union representation election
2,200

1,800

1,400

1,000

2018

2019

2020

2021

Source: US National Labor Relations Board. Data as of August 2023.

14 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

2022

Indeed, there are a few nascent examples from the US
that suggest it may be worth keeping a close eye onunion and labor bargaining power. For instance, thenumber of work stoppages or strikes in the US rose by
more than 50% in 2022 in a potential sign of labor’s
increasing bargaining power. Similarly, looking ahead,
there are compelling signs unionization activity willcontinue to accelerate: The number of petitions toform a union surged by 63% in 2022 compared to theprior year (Exhibit 13).51

A new demographic map of the global
workforce, an increasing probability of labormarket mismatches, the pace and directionof technological change, and shifting labordemand patterns in the post-COVID
global order clearly have the potential toreshape growth, inflation, and fiscal andmonetary policy around the world. It is to thesemacroeconomic implications of this new era inlabor markets that we turn to in Chapter 2.

CHAPTER 2

RESHAPING THE MACROLANDSCAPE“

The new dynamics of labormarkets will transform themacroeconomic underpinningsof the global economy.”

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 15

CHAPTER 2

RESHAPING THE MACRO LANDSCAPE
The new dynamics of labor markets will not just change workforce participation, unemployment and the futureof work – but also the macroeconomic underpinnings of the global economy. What kind of impact should
investors expect on future inflation, economic growth and fiscal spending patterns?

The new dynamics of labormarkets will likely be
inflationary

The new dynamics of labormarkets will dampen growthand growth potential

Rising dependency ratios will
strain fiscal budgets,
especially in emerging markets

The new dynamics of labor markets
will likely be inflationary

period – lead to a shrinking population. Declining
populations generate less aggregate demand andprovide a strong disinflationary pull.54

The relationship between demographics and priceinflation is multifaceted, complex and sometimes evencontradictory. In our view, the inflationary impulses
will dominate and most economies will experience
inflation as a result of their aging demographics. A
shrinking domestic labor pool in graying economies
should push wages up and create inflationary pressure.
Another inflationary impulse can arise from a higher
dependency ratio as a larger proportion of the
population – i.e., retirees – are consuming without
producing. Research by the IMF and others finds
a strong link between trend inflation and the age
structure of populations. Specifically, the larger theshare of the very young and old in a population, thehigher the inflation trend.52, 53 In addition, the burdenof social expenditures on pensions and health care forthe elderly can increase aggregate cost pressures.

While there are arguments for both scenarios, we
believe inflationary pressures will prevail in mostcases. The combined forces of upward pressure on
wages from a shrinking labor pool and increased
fiscal expenditures will offset any declining aggregate
demand in most countries.

Of course, aging demographics can provide
some disinflationary impulses as well. Namely,
the combination of low fertility rates and aging
populations can – if left unaddressed for a prolonged
16 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

A shrinking domestic laborpool in graying economies
should push wages up andcreate inflationary pressure.
The Japan experience since the 1980s is taken as theproof of a causal link between aging demographics anddisinflation. In our view, this experience is unique andshould not be thought of as a blueprint of what is tocome, for a variety of reasons.

Japan’s disinflationary experience may not be
representative or easily repeatable
On the surface, Japan’s persistent disinflation during
a time of aging demographics and low fertility rates
seems like a perfect example of what may await otheraging economies. However, the Japanese example may
prove to be a global outlier.

reduced the demand for domestic labor while tapping
new pools of labor in China, Southeast Asia andother parts of the world. The timing of Japan’s sharp
demographic aging also happened to coincide withthe golden era of globalization: Japanese outboundforeign direct investment (FDI) began to accelerate in
the early 2000s and remained strong into the 2020s(Exhibit 15).56

First, the choices made by Japan’s government andsociety maximized the disinflationary impulse from adeclining population. Decades of below-replacement
fertility rates led to a sustained decline in native-born
Japanese nationals, which has fallen for 14 consecutive
years.55 The choice to forego migration and allow the
population to contract is a critical one (Exhibit 14).
Second, Japan was able to limit the inflationary
impulse from the anticipated wage increases in ashrinking labor pool by finding new sources of labor –both at home and abroad. While Japan was reluctant
to bring in workers from abroad, Japanese firms wereactive in moving their production overseas. This

Japan was able to limit the
inflationary impulse from ashrinking labor pool by finding
new sources of labor.
In addition, the Japanese economy found new sourcesof labor domestically – namely, Japanese women. From2003 to 2022 the participation rate of Japanese womensoared from less than 60% to 74% (Exhibit 16).

Exhibit 14: Population growth in Japan has been declining for decades
Average net migration as a percentageof working-age population (2000-2020)

Overall population growth rate
(2-year moving average)
1.4%

1.5%

1.0%

1.2%

0.6%

0.9%

0.2%

0.6%

-0.2%

0.3%

0.0%

-0.6%
1975

1981

1987

1993

1999

2005

2011

2017

2023

Japan

Germany

U.K.

NorwayCanadaAustralia

Source: PGIM Thematic Research, ILO and World Bank. Data as of August 2023.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 17

Exhibit 15: Japan increased global production to mitigate a shrinking population
Japan’s outbound FDI (left) and manufacturing employment (right)
FDI

Manufacturing

4%

30%

Percent of GDP

24%
2%
21%
1%

Share of total employment

27%

3%

18%

0%
1980

15%
1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and Japanese Statistics Bureau. Data as of August 2023.
Note: Three-year moving average used for both FDI and share of manufacturing.

The Japanese experience of
persistent disinflation may bedifficult to repeat going forward.
Exhibit 16: Japan’s female participation grew markedly
within a decade
Labor force participation rate of Japanese women
74%

69%

63%

2012

2017

Source: Japanese Statistics Bureau. Data as of August 2023.

18 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

2022

In short, the Japanese experience of persistentdisinflation as their population aged may be difficultfor others to repeat going forward. For example,
some countries may not opt for an extreme closedmigration policy and tolerate the disinflationary
forces as populations decline. Furthermore, countries
with shrinking labor forces today will be less able
to offset inflationary wage pressures by outsourcing
production the way Japan did given the current
slowdown in globalization. In fact, rather than opting
for outsourcing production to distant nations, morecountries and companies today are committing toreshoring critical industries and taking control of
supply chains where possible.
Ultimately, this results in our stance on the new eraof global labor being inflationary for most. Japan,
for better or worse, was the first advanced country toobserve a shrinking workforce, allowing it to respondin ways that are not feasible today. Countries that are
just entering a demographic drag will therefore haveto find new ways and responses to shifting global anddomestic labor markets.

"

The new dynamics of labormarkets will dampen growthand growth potential
The relationship between the dynamics of the
global labor pool and economic growth is clear andintuitive. If left unaddressed, countries sufferingfrom shrinking working-age populations will see a
decline in both their potential and actual growth rates
for three reasons.57 First, total factor productivity
tends to decline with aging populations. An aging
workforce negatively impacts areas that influence
growth potential such as investment, innovation andtechnological progress. For example, it may lead to a
decline in per capita patent applications of up to 30%
in some countries.58 Second, the total hours worked
will likely decline and – unless productivity rises tocompensate – this would adversely impact overall
growth.59 Third, and more indirectly, fewer workers
and higher dependency ratios slow aggregate demandand dampen growth.
These labor force dynamics are already impacting
economic growth forecasts. Since 2015, growth inChina’s population has dwindled from 10 million
people annually to roughly flat.60 Indeed, the IMF
recently dropped its five-year forecast for Chinese

growth from 4.6% to 3.8%, citing a shrinking
population and declining productivity growth asprominent factors.61 Similarly, the US Congressional
Budget Office projects an annual growth rate of 1.6%in the 30-year period beginning 2020 vs. a growth rateof 2.5% in the prior 30-year period.62 Over this period,
the slowdown in growth of the US labor force is cited
as a material factor in the slowing of overall economic
growth through 2040.63

Countries with shrinking labor
forces today will be less able
to offset inflationary wage
pressures the way Japan did.

Rising dependency ratios will
strain fiscal budgets, especiallyin emerging markets
Many emerging markets are set to experience rapid
aging and from lower levels of wealth and fiscal
strength than many developed countries that went
through a similar demographic transition. Those

Exhibit 17: Countries challenged by high fiscal debt and a rapidly aging population
EMBIGD Countries

Dependency Ratio 2050-2023, (higher = graying faster)

35

Median Dep Ratio

Median Debt to GDP

Already high debt & more dependency ahead
China

25
Hungary

Brazil

15
Tunisia

Malaysia

5

-5

-15

-25
35

45

55

65

75

85

2023 Debt as percentage of GDP

Source: Adapted from Perasso and Doppelt, “Greying and Greening Across Emerging Markets,” PGIM. Data as of August 2023.
Note: EMBIGD refers to J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index Global Diversified.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 19emerging markets that face the sharpest rise independency ratios and currently have challenging
fiscal situations will face the most acute strain. Theirsovereign finances are most at risk going forward.
Our analysis suggests that countries most at risk
include Brazil, Hungary, China, Tunisia and Malaysia(Exhibit 17).64

It is critical to recognize thatthe responses and actions ofgovernments and firms will
ultimately determine the dividing
line between winners and losers.
This demographic dynamic has important fiscal
consequences. A smaller population in their prime
working age and more dependents to support
implies lower tax revenues from workers as well as
greater spending on health care, pensions and otherretirement services – ultimately straining state andnational budgets.

20 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

Aging populations will strain fiscal resources in otherways as well. For example, child care subsidies toattract more women into the workforce will be a larger
component of the social safety net going forward. And
attracting foreign labor means providing social services
and benefits to them and their families – sometimes
before they can participate in the workforce.

It has become cliché to say “demographics are
destiny.” If this is indeed true, it follows thatan aging and shrinking workforce combinedwith significant labor market mismatches will
inevitably lead to slower economic growthand higher inflation for most countries as wellas rising labor costs and shrinking margins
for companies. For investors, it is criticalto recognize that the responses and actionsof governments and firms will ultimately
determine the dividing line between winners
and losers. Chapter 3 examines what measuresthey can take and which industries andcountries will emerge as leaders.

CHAPTER 3

WINNERS AND LOSERS IN
THE NEW ERA OF LABOR“

Winners and losers in the new eraof labor are not predetermined –actions of governments and firms
will matter greatly.”

03

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 21

CHAPTER 3

WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE NEW ERA OF LABOR
The structural forces reshaping labor markets will determine the next generation of leaders and laggards acrossindustries, regions and countries. These winners and losers are not predetermined – and will depend heavily on
the quality of responses and actions by governments and firms.
We take both a sector lens – which industries are mostvulnerable, and which are most likely to thrive – aswell as a geographic lens – which countries, states orcities will be best and worst positioned – to understandthe ultimate impact of the structural labor market
changes discussed in Chapter 1 and the resulting
macroeconomic implications raised in Chapter 2.v

Winners and losers by sectors
We believe two factors are particularly helpful inunderstanding the impact of labor market changes
on different sectors. First, those sectors with a highshare of labor costs, will be hit hardest. Second,
forward-leaning industries – like renewable energy andcybersecurity – will have a very different experience
than lagging industries.

Wage pressures will hit some industries harderthan others
Many industries are likely to face upward wage
pressure from the decline in working-age populations
across most advanced economies. Those industries
where labor is 65% or more of input costs – forexample, education, building construction andmaintenance, as well as some parts of the health caresector – will face the greatest pressure on margins(Exhibit 18).
For investors looking to discern between winning andlosing firms in these industries, technology will be a
key factor. Specifically, those firms able to leveragetechnology to enhance productivity will be leaders. By
contrast, the laggards will have to address higher wage
costs by either shrinking margins or raising prices.

Exhibit 18: Some industries’ margins are highly dependent on labor cost
Labor cost as a percentage of input costs, United States
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%

US industry average (33%)

30%
20%
10%
0%
Agriculture

Manufacturing

Health Care

Construction & MaintenanceSource: PGIM Thematic Research and Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data as of August 2023.
Note: The five industries refer to a representative set of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS); for each of the five sectors.
v For more details on the methodology see Appendix on page 33.

22 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

Education

The advent of generative AI may be especiallypromising for industries where technology adoption
has been challenging. For example, in the education
sector, while robots will not be replacing human
instruction in classrooms anytime soon, AI may assist
in grading abstract assignments like essays, provide
feedback on students’ work, or provide differentiatedand individualized learning for students who require
special attention outside of a classroom environment.

can increasingly be used for large-scale complex
architectural projects. Similarly in health care, AIenabled tools can accelerate drug development andincrease precision in the operating room (e.g., biopsies
and tissue removal).

New technology and demographics will drive
employment in four leading sectors
We believe four industries will exhibit strong growthand have the highest demand for labor going forward(Exhibit 19). The high demand for labor in these

Construction, too, has stubbornly remained in theanalog realm, but high-precision 3-D renderings

Exhibit 19: Employment outlook of future leading and lagging industries in the US and Europe
Employment growth rates above/below national average (2022-2031)-10%

US Average

-5%

5%

10%

Renewable Energy
Senior Care
Chips & Computer Systems
Cybersecurity

Agriculture
Basic Manufacturing"Old" Media & Communications
Administrative Services

-25%

-15%

-5%

EU Average

5%

15%

25%

Renewable Energy

50+%

Chips & Computer Systems
Senior Care

Basic Manufacturing
Administrative Services
Agriculture

Source: PGIM Thematic Research, Brookings Institution, European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, European Commission and US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Data as of August 2023.
Note: Numbers are based on occupation forecasts by the BLS, the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training and direct forecast of renewable job growth fromthe European Commission; see Appendix for further details.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 23

industries will be reflected in the number of new
openings and the growth rates of employment inthese industries. Employment in these sectors will
add 13 million jobs by 2031 across Europe and the
US alone.65 However, the strong demand in thesefields – many in new locations – will amplify existing
dislocations between supply and demand for workers
with specialized skills.

Programs to promote key industries
like semiconductors and EV
batteries are a major thrust ofindustrial policy in India, South
Korea, Canada, Israel and Japan.
In senior health care, for example, the demand fornurse practitioners in the US alone is expected toincrease by nearly 50% between 2022 and 2031.
Similarly, the energy transition – and industrial policy
designed to support renewables – will continue todrive demand for solar panel and hydrogen fuel cell
technicians in nearly every region of the world. In
Europe, for example, the biggest challenge will comefrom the REPowerEU initiative that is set to reduce
the union’s dependence on fossil fuels.66 On top oflarge infrastructure investments, the most challenging
part may be to fill 3.5 million new job openings in the
renewable sector by 2030 – a projected 270% growthfrom current levels.67
Industrial policy will not only impact job creationin the renewable sector but will also play a large rolein generating opportunities in chips, semiconductor
manufacturing and advanced computer systems. The
EU’s Chips Act and the CHIPS and Science Act in
the US are two recent examples that each provide
tens of billions of dollars to companies to build
plants and train workers for the specific technicalskills needed. Programs to promote key industries
like semiconductors and EV batteries are also a major
thrust of industrial policy in India, South Korea,
Canada, Israel and Japan (Exhibit 20).68
The competition among governments to attract
leading companies can be especially fierce. Throughthe first half of 2023 alone, government subsidies

Exhibit 20: The paradigm shift to onshoring creates skill shortages across the globe
Worker shortages in the semiconductor sector, select regions and countries

North America
65K

Europe40K

SouthChina Korea

Israel
5K

India

55K

30K
50K

5K

Taiwan

Malaysia 6K
8K

Singapore

Source: Kearney. Data as of August 2023.

24 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

15K

Japan

around the world are estimated to total over$100 billion to attract chip manufacturers. For
example, Germany agreed to a subsidy package withsemiconductor manufacturer Intel worth roughly€10 billion to build a cutting-edge wafer fabricationsite. The project is estimated to generate 7,000
construction jobs as well as 3,000 permanent hightech jobs and will mark the single largest foreign direct
investment in German history.69

Industrial policy will not only
impact job creation in renewables
but will also generate opportunities
in semiconductor manufacturing
and advanced computer systems.
Future labor shortages will not be among
workers with the most advanced skills
The industrial policies around renewables, chip
manufacturing and advanced computer systems are
creating demand for millions of workers with specifictechnical skills in new locations. These policies may
also have the unintended consequence of aggravating
existing mismatches. In the European semiconductor
industry, for example, reshoring efforts will add
to the over 60,000 unfilled positions in Germany
today.70 Meanwhile in the US, chip manufacturers
are struggling to fill openings in a timely manner,and unfilled jobs are estimated to reach over 58%
by 2030.71, 72
The areas likely to face the greatest misalignment
between labor supply and demand are not at the highend of the skills range. Rather, the biggest shortfall
is likely to be in roles where specific technical skills
and training are needed – rather than advanced
degrees – namely, technicians to manufacture, installand maintain wind turbines, hydrogen fuel cells andenergy storage devices. A similar picture emerges insemiconductor manufacturing as well. The largest
gaps between supply and demand for labor are not at
the advanced chip design or architecture phase but
rather in the technical roles around manufacturingchips, which do not require physics degrees but rather
specialized training and experience.73
The trend towards advanced university education will
also amplify mismatches in middle-skilled, technicalroles. In the future we can expect more shortages
not just in home health aides, dental hygienists andphysical therapists, but also in wind turbine andsemiconductor technicians – all roles which require
specific job-related skills rather than advanced degrees.
These are the kinds of roles leading industries will
struggle to fill over the next 10 years.

Tech is most likely to displace labor in four
lagging sectors
The combination of generative AI and robotics
will open up new realms of cognitive and complex
tasks that had been resistant to earlier waves of tech
disruption. Specifically, four areas – (i) agriculture,(ii) “old” media and communications, (iii) basic
manufacturing, and (iv) administrative services – standout as being most vulnerable to the new wave oftechnology disruption. In the US and Europe alone,over 30 million workers are expected to be displacedby 2031 as technological advancement will increase
productivity and also reduce the need for labor.74
In agriculture, for example, GPS-enabled tractors canroam large-scale industrial farms autonomously, and– equipped with sensors to detect levels of moistureand nutrients in the ground – perform multiple tasks.
Cameras and sprayers mounted on the tractor also
leverage AI to discern between weeds and crops anddeliver herbicide only where it is needed.75, 76
Generative AI is also impacting more cognitive tasks
that had not been disrupted by previous waves oftechnology. Old media and administrative services
are good examples of this. Content creation andscriptwriting for TV shows and movies are an exampleof new realms for technology to disrupt. Indeed, theuse of AI to supplant writers was a central issue in a
recent labor strike by US screenwriters.77
Additionally, more customer engagement, sales and callcenter functions can be handled by AI.78 Large natural
language models will not only be able to screen calls
and respond to customers, but they will increasingly beable to take action on issues and resolve them. Office

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 25

managers and executive assistants are another area
where smart applications of AI can displace workers.
For example, Microsoft is leveraging AI to create
features in popular software like Word and Excel thatwill automate simple business tasks like taking notes
at meetings, editing and drafting documents andresponding to emails.79, 80

One reason for a falling malelabor force participation
rate is the lack of reskilling
opportunities.
Enabling smoother transitions ofdisplaced workers
The reskilling and retraining of workers who will be
displaced by technology in these industries is criticalfor cities and regions where these industries areprominent. Research suggests that one reason for a
falling male labor force participation rate is difficultyin finding ways to reskill.81 If displaced workers
cannot transition to new work smoothly, theireconomic vitality and productivity may be lost for an
extended period.
When it comes to displaced workers who findthemselves undereducated for job openings, reskilling
programs that take an integrated approach toworkforce development, like Year Up in the US, have
met with some success.82

Winners and losers by region
Labor is a key input to every country’s economic
growth and competitiveness. It is therefore crucial
for investors to understand which countries are
well-positioned and which are challenged by thetransformation of labor markets. To this end, we haveexamined all countries that are part of the typicalinstitutional investment universe, i.e., either part of

26 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

the MSCI All World or J.P. Morgan Emerging Market
Bond Index. We propose a set of indicators that whencombined can serve as a framework to help investorsgauge winners and losers across regions.

A framework for assessing labor dynamics
by country
To understand how countries are positioned to manage
the deep structural changes in labor markets, we haveundertaken a multidimensional assessment of eachcountry, focused on:(1) Labor supply: the stock and flow of theworking-age population, including the net
impact of current migration policies,(2) Labor quality: the set of skills and education ofa country’s workforce and ability to tap global
talent, and(3) Policy environment: the extent to which
policies encourage well-functioning labor andcapital markets.

1. Labor supply
We look at several metrics including the current
stock of the working-age population; the net decrease(or increase) in future workers between 2023 and 2050
as a percentage of total population; and the actual
10-year trend in migration (as a share of the workingage population).
The forward-looking indicators reflect how critical
it is for investors to understand not only the current
starting point of each country, but also how steep the
decline in workforce may be for them given current
demographic trends (Exhibit 21). Net migration isanother lever to enhance domestic labor supply. It is
not surprising that countries with small populations
tend to lean into immigration as a means of boostinglabor supply (Exhibit 22).
Countries with a steep decline in working-age
population and low migration rates can also increase
labor supply by adopting policies to boost female
participation rates. This may be an especially large

Exhibit 21: Divergence in workforce supply going forward
Forecast of working-age population (2020-2040)
Index, 2020=100140Israel130
120

Saudi Arabia
Australia

110
100
90

China
Spain

80

South Korea

70
2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

Source: World Bank. Data as of August 2023.

Exhibit 22: Countries with small populations tend to lean into migration
Average net migration (2012-2019)
1.60%

1.20%

0.80%

0.40%

0.00%
Japan

Italy

TurkeySpain

South Korea

US

U.K.

Germany

Switzerland

CanadaAustralia

New Zealand

Source: PGIM Thematic Research and International Labour Organization. Data as of August 2023.
Note: Average net migration as a share of working-age population.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 27

opportunity for countries like Italy, Argentina andSouth Korea – where female participation rates lag
their male counterparts significantly. China, on theother hand, already has a high female participation rate
and may not get much of a boost from such policies(Exhibit 23).

and INSEAD’s Talent Competitiveness Index –which measures the set of policies and actions thatenable a country to develop, attract and empower
their workforce.

Importantly, this is an area where government canmake a material impact and targeted public policies
have been highly effective in increasing women’s
participation rate in the workforce. For example, Japan
undertook a series of policies called “Womenomics”
designed to bring more women back into theworkforce.83 These policies have been instrumental inraising female participation by about 10% between
2010 and 2020, and Japan is now one of the leadersamong OECD countries.84

Labor quantity and quality will only attract investors
and opportunity if it is supported by the right kind ofpolicies, institutions and existing productive capacity.
An environment that attracts domestic and foreign
capital provides the necessary infrastructure and has
a stable and transparent regulatory regime backed byrobust institutions can unleash the productivity of aqualified workforce. To assess the policy environment
in each country, we have used two indicators. First,
the Harvard University Growth Lab’s Complexity ofExport Index, which measures the sophisticationand productive capacity of countries. Second, theWorld Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, provides
a useful directional indicator of key elements of thepolicy and investment environment acrossthe globe.85

2. Labor quality
Given the pace of technological disruption, labor
quality is at least as relevant as labor quantity. The
global competition for skilled workers will place apremium on a country’s ability to develop, attract andretain talent with the technical skill sets required tocompete in the next era for labor. To evaluate labor
quality, we draw upon the World Bank’s Human
Capital Index – which measures the educational andhealth outlook for a child born today through age 18 –3. Policy environment

We use these three sets of indicators and apply aregional lens to understand which countries are
well-positioned and which might face a challenging
environment given the ongoing transformation of
global labor dynamics.

Exhibit 23: Female labor participation offers opportunities for select countries
Female labor force participation rate (2022)
75%

70%

OECD average (64.6%)

65%

60%

55%

50%

Italy

Source: World Bank. Data as of August 2023.

28 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

Argentina

South Korea

China

Asia

Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA)

The list of leading countries veers towards advanced
countries with smaller populations (Exhibit 24).
Malaysia emerges as well-positioned not by a hugeadvantage in many indicators but by having a wellbalanced if roughly average set of strengths across all
our indicators. Interestingly, neither India nor China
were among the leaders (or the most challenged) in
our framework and were “stuck in the middle.” China’s
combination of steep demographic drop-off and net
negative migration left it scoring very poorly on labor
supply. In India, while its demographics will be better,it fell short on broad measures of human capital andretaining talent.

The list of European leaders skews towards smaller
countries as well (Exhibit 25). Some of Europe’s
largest economies were not among the leaders forseveral reasons. The region’s largest countries by
GDP and population, such as Germany, Italy or
Spain, for example, face steep demographic drop-offs
that are not likely to be resolved by current trendsof immigration. In Africa and the Middle East
while regional leaders like South Africa, Egypt
or Nigeria face favorable demographics relative
to other nations, they scored poorly on labor
quality, productive capacity as well as their overall
attractiveness for foreign investors.

Exhibit 24: Select leading and lagging Asian countries
Country

Labor Supply
WAP

WAP Change

Labor Quality
Migration

Human Capital Index

Talent Competitiveness

Policy Environment
Productive Capacity

Doing BusinessSingapore
South Korea
Well
Positioned

New ZealandAustralia
Malaysia
Indonesia

Potentially
Challenged

Philippines
Pakistan

Source: PGIM Thematic Research, World Bank, INSEAD and Harvard Growth Lab. Data as of August 2023.
Note: WAP refers to current working age population; for all other definitions see Appendix.

Exhibit 25: Select leading and lagging EMEA countries
Country

Labor Supply
WAP

WAP Change

Labor Quality
Migration

Human Capital Index

Talent Competitiveness

Policy Environment
Productive Capacity

Doing BusinessSwedenSwitzerland
Well
Positioned

United Kingdom
IsraelUnited ArabEmirates
Saudi Arabia

Potentially
Challenged

Italy
GreeceNigeria

Source: PGIM Thematic Research, World Bank, INSEAD and Harvard Growth Lab. Data as of August 2023.
Note: WAP refers to current working age population; for all other definitions see Appendix.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 29

Exhibit 26: Select leading and lagging countries in the Americas
Country

Labor Supply
WAP

WAP Change

Labor Quality
Migration

Human Capital Index

Talent Competitiveness

Policy Environment
Productive Capacity

Doing Business

CanadaUnited States
Well
Positioned

Chile
Costa Rica
Colombia
BrazilPotentially
Challenged

Peru
Argentina
Paraguay

Source: PGIM Thematic Research, World Bank, INSEAD and Harvard Growth Lab. Data as of August 2023.
Note: WAP refers to current working age population; for all other definitions see Appendix.

AmericasInterestingly, regional leaders like Mexico and Brazil
were not among the leaders in the Americas (Exhibit26). While both have favorable demographic starting
points, they both face steep demographic challenges
that are unlikely to be mitigated by current trends inmigration or female labor force participation.
Investors in emerging and frontier markets shouldbe especially cautious around a handful of countries
that appear to be quite significantly challenged froma structural labor market lens. This includes countries
such as Nigeria, Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan, thePhilippines, Ethiopia and Morocco. While many ofthese countries have the potential for a demographic
dividend in coming years, they currently lackeducational infrastructure and human capital, have a
hard time drawing foreign capital and can be difficult
places to do business in.

Looking beyond countries: A state- andcity-level perspective
For some investors, a national perspective may not
be sufficient. For example, investors in infrastructure
and real estate would benefit from a more granular
view – especially in the case of large countries withdiversified economies where winners and losers mightvary significantly by region. Similarly, investors
30 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

looking to understand the competitive dynamics
of companies with a significant labor force in aparticular region or city may want to understand the
local market dynamics, which can at times deviate
from national trends.

Many countries have thepotential for a demographic
dividend but lackeducational infrastructureand human capital.
To shed further light on the trajectory and evolutionof labor mismatches over the coming decade,we collaborated with the Brookings Institution’s
Workforce of the Future Initiative. We carried out
a case study of leading and lagging industries at
the US state and city level to identify the skills andtechnologies that will reshape the economy over the
coming decade. Our research took a comprehensive
look across 384 metropolitan areas in the US andanalyzed their current industries as well as the
proficiency of their workforce across an array of
individual skills. Our study then identified which skills
would be most critical for future leading industries,

Exhibit 27: The rise of new industries offers varying opportunities across US states

Opportunity
Low

High

Source: PGIM Thematic Research and Brookings Institution. Data as of August 2023.

such as chip manufacturing or computer system design,
and identified which cities had a workforce with thegreatest share of those skills but currently applied in
an adjacent industry. By matching states and areas
with future critical skills already in place, our research
was able to identify which metropolitan areas are bestaligned with leading industries of the future. That is,which states and cities had workforces with skills thatbest matched renewable energy and chip manufacturing
and could most easily step into these industries.

US states and cities best-positioned to capitalize
on leading industries
Silicon Valley in California or Cambridge in
Massachusetts are well-known hubs of cutting-edge
technology. They have workforces in place withadvanced skills and talent as well as highly developed
startup ecosystems. But which other cities and statesoffer a workforces and tech ecosystems that are suitably
adjacent to future industries – namely, renewableenergy and chip manufacturing.
At the state level, our research identified states – suchas South Dakota, Oregon and Wisconsin – that havethe highest potential to boost local productivity
and growth in this new era. Unlike states such as

California, whose future growth will come fromtheir existing dominant industries, these states canbenefit from increasing their economic complexity byembracing industries of the future.

Matching areas with future
critical skills already inplace, our research identifies
metropolitan areas that are
best aligned with futureleading industries.
These states already have a workforce that has manyof the needed skills for industries such as renewablesor the IT sector but also statewide industrial networks
that would amplify the incremental value these newindustries would add.86 As labor markets shift andindustrial policy regains momentum through onshoringand nearshoring, our analysis provides a prediction on
the rise and decline of industries across states and theirlocal impact (Exhibit 27).

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 31

Exhibit 28: The rise of new industries offers opportunities for cities across the US
4
3.5

San Francisco, CA

3

Economic Complexity

2.5

Boston, MA

Established
Leaders2

Biggest Opportunity
Bend, OR

1.5

Eugene-Springfield, OR

1

Spokane, WA
Bellingham, WA

Mobile, AL

0.5
0
-0.5
-1
-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0
Strategic Benefit

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Source: PGIM Thematic Research and Brookings Institution. Data as of August 2023.
Note: See Methodology regarding details and calculations.

At a more granular city level, our research goes one
step further by identifying metropolitan areas that
could most easily step into these leading industries.
One set of cities was in the Pacific Northwest,
specifically Oregon (cities like Eugene and Bend) andWashington (Bellingham and Spokane), which arestates with high potential (Exhibit 28). But even cities
located in states that are more challenged can offer
opportunity, such as Mobile, Alabama.

Global labor markets are now
facing powerful, dynamic forcesthat will transform them in theyears and decades to come.
Notably, most of these cities have major universities
which can supply a steady stream of scientific andresearch talent. Eugene, Oregon already has some
simple chip manufacturing facilities that can be easily
scaled up. Bellingham, Washington has industries
adjacent to renewables like power systems as well as

32 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

chemical and petroleum refining. Mobile, Alabama,
is a hub for skill-adjacent industries like aviation andaerospace, as well as chemical and heavy machinery.
Ultimately, we believe a multidimensional analysis
of how countries, states and cities are navigating achanging labor market will be critical to understanding
the full range of investment opportunities.

Global labor markets are now facing powerful,
dynamic forces that will transform themin the years and decades to come. The
macroeconomic and geopolitical consequencesof these changes will be profound. There
will be significant sectoral and geographic
shifts between those well-positioned andthose deeply challenged by this new era forthe global workforce. At PGIM, we believe
long-term investors will want to ensure
their portfolios are positioned based on a
deep understanding of the structural forces
unleashed in this new era of labor.

APPENDIXWINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE NEW ERA OF LABOR,METHODOLOGY
Leading and lagging industries
The growth rates for leading and lagging industries of the future are based on forecasts of employment using
detailed occupation data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the European Union Labour Force Survey.vi, vii To
create the sector categories from the list of occupations, we have picked a subset of occupations for each of our fivecategories that best fits their workforce needs. This allows us to aggregate the current level of employment in eachof our sectors and create growth rates using the ten-year forecast from the two institutions. The lone exception tothis approach is the renewable sector in the European Union, which is based on assumptions from the European
Commission’s “Pact for Skills.”viii

Winners and losers by region
For the analysis around countries in the MSCI All World or J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index we havepicked the following indicators to address each country’s outlook regarding labor supply, labor quality andpolicy environment. All countries are ranked for each variable into quartiles, which are reflected by the colored
dots (going from green to orange) in Exhibit 24 to 26.
VARIABLEDESCRIPTIONSOURCE

Working age population, percentage

Working age population as a share of total population

World Bank

Working age population change, 2023-2050

Change in the share of working age population between 2023 and 2050

World Bank

Migration

Average net migration as a share of working age population from 2010 to 2019.

World Bank

Human Capital Index

Amount of human capital that a child born today can expect to attain by age 18.

World Bank

Talent Competitivness Index

The talent competitiveness refers to the set of policies and practices that enablea country to develop, attract, and empower the human capital that contributes to
productivity and prosperity

INSEAD

Productive Capacity

Assessment of the current state of a country’s productive knowledge

Harvard Growth Lab

Doing Business Index

The Doing Business project provided a set of measures of country’s businessregulations and their enforcement.

World Bank

vi Employment by detailed occupation : U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
vii European Union Labour Force Survey, detailed employment by occupation.
viii Pact for Skills: Launch of large-scale renewable energy skills partnership – Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion – European Commission.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 33

Winners and losers by US cities
The analysis of the opportunity of cities and states’ capabilities to grow industries of the future given their current
workforce and industrial network, is based on updated work of “Growing Cities that Work for All.”87 In this work
each metropolitan area’s industry space is assessed for its overall complexity as well as a strategic index and gain. The
economic complexity is an assessment of cities’ capabilities to develop a more diversified set of high-value products
and services, whereas the strategix index measures cities’ overall potential to add attractive industries and therefore
growth – for further detail, see the “Economic complexity” chapter in “Growing Cities that Work for All.”
While Exhibit 28 directly uses economic complexity and the strategic index to map cities across the US, the statemap (Exhibit 27) is based on an aggregation of each city’s strategic index within a given state weighted by theshare of overall jobs the city represents of the state total.

34 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIMACKNOWLEDGMENTS
PGIM gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the following individuals:
Aaron Brenner, Senior Capital Markets Analyst, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union
Dr. Michael Herrmann, Adviser, Economics and Demography, United Nations Population Fund
Prof. Jennifer Hunt, Rutgers University
Manoj Pradhan, Founder, Talking Heads Macroeconomics
Prof. Ayşegül Şahin, Richard J. Gonzalez Regents Chair in Economics, University of Austin Texas
Dr. Nathan Sheets, Chief Economist, Citigroup
Dr. Greg Wright, Fellow, Brookings Institution
Ian Seyal, Senior Project Manager and Senior Research Analyst, Brookings Institution

PGIM Contributors• Mark Baribeau, Jennison Associates• Anna McDonald, PGIM

• Dr. Gerwin Bell, PGIM Fixed Income• Lee Menifee, PGIM Real Estate• Ed Campbell, PGIM Quantitative Solutions• Dr. Katharine Neiss, PGIM Fixed Income• Peter Clark, PGIM Real Estate• Giancarlo Perasso, PGIM Fixed Income• Elizabeth Doppelt, PGIM Fixed Income• David Power, PGIM Real Estate• Dr. Guillermo Felices, PGIM Fixed Income• Nicolas Rubinstein, Jennison Associates• Dr. Peter Hayes, PGIM Fixed Income• Raj Shant, Jennison Associates• Cathy Hepworth, PGIM Fixed Income• Daleep Singh, PGIM Fixed Income• Owen Hyde, Jennison Associates• Robert Tipp, PGIM Fixed Income• Erika Klauer, Jennison Associates• Henri Vuong, PGIM Real Estate• David Klausner, PGIM Fixed Income• Dr. Sushil Wadhwani, PGIM Wadhwani• Warren Koontz, Jennison Associates• Dr. Noah Weisberger, PGIM IAS• Tyler Linsky, PGIM Fixed Income• Andrea Wong, PGIM Fixed Income

Principal Authors
Shehriyar Antia, PGIM Thematic Research
Dr. Taimur Hyat, PGIM
Jakob Wilhelmus, PGIM Thematic Research
PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 35

ENDNOTES
1

Look, Carolyn et al., “Europe’s Giant Job-Saving Experiment Pays Off in Pandemic,” Sept. 28, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/
graphics/2021-furlough-jobs-unemployment-europe-united-states2

Nizam, Arif et al., “Interstate Migration in India During the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Analysis Based on Mobile Visitor Location
Register and Roaming Data,” Vol. 17, Issue 3, Sept. 23, 2022. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09731741221122000

3

DePillis, Lydia, “With Surge in July, US Recovers the Jobs Lost in the Pandemic,” Aug. 5, 2022. https://www.nytimes.
com/2022/08/05/business/economy/july-jobs-report-gains.html

4

ILO, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Jobs and Incomes in G20 Economies,” 2020. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---dgreports/---cabinet/documents/publication/wcms_756331.pdf

5

Ibid.

6

Bach, Katie, “New Data Shows Long COVID Is Keeping as Many as 4 Million People Out of Work,” Aug. 24, 2022. https://www.
brookings.edu/articles/new-data-shows-long-covid-is-keeping-as-many-as-4-million-people-out-of-workarticles

7

Konish, Lorie, “How Effective Were Those Stimulus Checks? Some Argue the Money May Have Fueled Inflation,” June 11, 2022.
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/11/the-pandemic-stimulus-checks-were-a-big-experiment-did-it-work.html

8Constantz, Jo, “Is ‘Quiet Quitting’ a Sign of Workers Slacking Off or Pushing Back?,” Nov. 3, 2022. https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2022-11-03

9Foster, Malcolm, “Working From Home, Japan’s Corporate Warriors Rethink Their Priorities,” April 19, 2022. https://www.nytimes.
com/2022/04/19/business/japan-covid-work.html

10

Engbom, Niklas, “Misallocative Growth,” New York University, April, 2023. https://www.niklasengbom.com/wp-content/uploads/
MG2022.pdf

11Juselius, Mikael and Takáts, Elöd, “Age and Inflation”, March 2016, Vol. 53, No. 1. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
fandd/2016/03/juselius.htm

12

Crump, Richard et al., “A Unified Approach to Measuring u*,” Brookings Institute, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/CrumpEtAl_web.pdf

13

Karahan, Fatih, Pugsley, Benjamin and Şahin, Ayşegül, “Demographic Origins of the Startup Deficit,” Staff Reports, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, No. 888, May 2019. https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr888.pdf

14Lee, Ronald and Mason, Andrew, “What Is the Demographic Dividend?,” September 2006, Vol. 43, No. 3. https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/09/basics.htm

15

Mason, Andrew and Kinugasa, Tomoko, “East Asian Economic Development: Two Demographic Dividends,” June 1, 2005. https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/east-asian-economic-development-two-demographic-dividends

16

PGIM Megatrends, “A Silver Lining: The Investment Implications of an Aging World,” November 7, 2016.

17

AP News.com, “Germany Reports Labor Shortage in One-Sixth of Professions,” June 2, 2023. https://apnews.com/article/
germany-labor-shortages-brazil-8be4a0cd14b9dcd55a2f9ebf4d1d0cae

18

Fue, Claire, “1 in 5 Young Chinese Is Jobless, and Millions More Are About to Graduate,” May 19, 2023. https://www.nytimes.
com/2023/05/19/business/china-youth-unemployment.html

19

The Economist, “China’s Young Want to Work. For the Government,” May 31, 2023. https://www.economist.com/china/2023/05/31

20

Wigglesworth, Robin, “The Chinese Youth Unemployment Phenomenon,” May 24, 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/420b28b66db9-475d-b3c3-b5685516a06f

21

International Labour Organization, “258 million workers in the world are over-educated for their jobs,” February 26, 2020.
https://ilostat.ilo.org/258-million-workers-in-the-world-are-over-educated-for-their-jobs

22

Abel, Jaison and Deitz, Richard “Are the Job Prospects of Recent College Graduates Improving?,” Sept. 4, 2014. https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2014/09

23

Allen, Jim and van der Velden, Rolf “Educational Mismatches Versus Skill Mismatches: Effects on Wages, Job Satisfaction, andOn-the-Job Search,” Oxford Economic Papers, pp. 434-452, No. 3, 2001. https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/606099/
guid-d259b85a-2cc2-49ae-b321-38b3b43fe817-ASSET1.0.pdf

24

Meroni, Elena and Vera-Toscano, Esperanza, “The persistence of overeducation among recent graduates,” Labour Economics, Vol 48,
Pages 120-143, October 2017. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537116303992

36 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

25

LearnGermanOnline.org, “Nursing and Caregiving Jobs in Germany,” April 11, 2023. https://www.learngermanonline.org/nursingjobs-in-germany

26

The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, “Young People and Migration in the UK: An Overview,” Dec. 19, 2016.
https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/young-people-migration-uk-overview

27

Angenendt, Steffen, Knapp, Nadine and Kipp, David, „Germany is Looking for Foreign Labour,” SWP Research Paper, German
Institute for International and Security Affairs, March 2023. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_
papers/2023RP03_LookingforForeignLabour.pdf

28

United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics – 2022,” May 18, 2023. https://www.
bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf

29

Statistics Canada, “Immigration as a Source of Labour Supply,” June 6, 2022. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/220622/dq220622c-eng.htm

30

Ibid.

31

SchengenVisaInfo.com, “Germany & Brazil Sign Declaration to Boost Skilled Worker Immigration,” June 7, 2023. https://www.
schengenvisainfo.com/news

32

Kazmin, Amy, “Italy’s Giorgia Meloni Opens Door to More Workers from Outside the EU,” July 27, 2023. https://www.ft.com/
content/865c052c-70e5-41a4-9b15-6288f86fbe88

33

Hao, Lingxin and Liang, Yucheng, “The Spatial and Career Mobility of China’s Urban and Rural Labor Force,” April 11, 2016.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5679455

34

Sprung-Keyser, Ben, Hendren, Nathaniel and Porter, Sonya “The Radius of Economic Opportunity: Evidence from Migration andLocal Labor Markets,” US Census Bureau, July 2022. https://www.census.gov/library/working-papers/2022/adrm/CES-WP-22-27.
html

35

PGIM Megatrends, “The Future Means Business,” October 2019. https://www.pgim.com/pgim-japan/insights/pgim-megatrend

36

Autor, David H., “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the US Labor Market,” Vol. 103, No. 5, August
2013. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.103.5.1553

37

Jiranek, George, “The Great ‘Hollowing Out’ of the US Job Market,” June 3, 2019.

38

Ibid.

39

Ibid.

40

Nunes, Ashley, “Automation Doesn’t Just Create or Destroy Jobs – It Transforms Them,” Nov. 2, 2021. https://hbr.org/2021/11/
automation-doesnt-just-create-or-destroy-jobs-it-transforms-them41

Acemoglu, Daron and Restrepo, Pascual, “Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor,” Vol. 33,
No. 2, Spring 2019. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.33.2.3

42World Economic Forum, “The Future of Jobs Report 2023,” April 30, 2023. https://www.weforum.org/reports

43

Acemoglu, Daron and Restrepo, Pascual, “Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor,” Vol. 33,
No. 2, Spring 2019. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.33.2.3

44

Autor, David et al., “The Work of the Future: Building Better Jobs in an Age of Intelligent Machines,” 2020. https://workofthefuture.
mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2020-Final-Report4.pdf

45Autor (2003), Goos (2014), Spit-Oener (2006)

46

PGIM Megatrends, “After the Great Lockdown,” May 2020. https://www.pgim.com/pgim-japan/insights/pgim-mega-trend

47

Tipp, Robert, “From Low Ranger to High Plains Drifter,” PGIM Fixed Income, Aug. 22, 2023. https://www.pgim.com/pgimjapan/insights/from-low-ranger-to-high-plains-drifter

48

Tan, Huileng, “China Is Losing Its Place as the Center of the World’s Supply Chains,” December 26, 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/china-trade-war-covid-companies-moving-supply-chains-2022-12

49

Ibid.

50

Yang, Zeyi, “What’s Next for the Chip Industry: Aggressive New US Policies Will Be Put to the Test in 2023. They Could Ultimately
Fragment the Global Semiconductor Industry,” Jan. 3, 2023. https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/01/03/1065959/whats-nextchip-industry-2023

51

Shierholz, Heidi et al., “Unionization Increased by 200,000 in 2022: Tens of Millions More Wanted to Join a Union, but Couldn’t,”
Jan. 19, 2023. https://www.epi.org/publication/unionization-2022

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 37

52

Juselius, Mikael and Takáts, Elöd “BIS Working Papers No 722 The enduring link between demography and inflation”, May 2018.
https://www.bis.org/publ/work722.pdf

53

Tomoki, Isa, “Demographic Effects on Prices: Is Aging Deflationary?,” July 2021. https://www.mof.go.jp/pri/research/discussion_
paper/ron342.pdf

54

NHK News, “Japan Childbirths Continue to Decline, to About 371,000 in Jan.-June,” Aug. 29, 2023.

55

AP News, “Japan records steepest population decline while number of foreign residents hits new high,” July 26, 2023. https://apnews.
com/article/japan-population-decline-foreign-low-births-d047ea6136a5c66ffc45508cb824d5f1/

56

Bayoumi, Tamim and Lipworth, Tamim, “Japanese Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Trade,” September 1997. https://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/09/pdf/bayoumi.pdf

57

Lee, Hyun-Hoon and Shin, Kwanho, “Decomposing Effects of Population Aging on Economic Growth in OECD Countries,” Nov.
1, 2021. https://direct.mit.edu/asep/article/20/3/138/107271

58

Aksoy, Yunus et al., “Demographic Structure and Macroeconomic Trends,” Vol. 11, No. 1, January 2019. https://www.aeaweb.org/
articles?id=10.1257/mac.20170114

59

Ibid.

60

Rosen, Daniel H. “The Age of Slow Growth in China and What It Means for America and the Global Economy,” April 5,
2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-04-15/age-slow-growth-china

61

Lingling, Wei, “IMF Tempers Its Medium-Term Economic Growth Forecast for China: Five-year outlook reflects a shrinking
population and declining productivity gains,” Feb. 3, 2023. https://www.wsj.com/articles/imf-tempers-its-medium-term-economicgrowth-forecast-for-china-11675437545

62

CBO.gov, “Appendix A: CBO’s Projections of Demographic and Economic Trends,” accessed Aug. 31, 2023. https://www.cbo.gov/
system/files?file=2020-09/56516-LTBO-AppendixA.pdf

63

Ibid.

64

Perasso, Giancarlo and Doppelt, Elizabeth, “Greying and Greening Across Emerging Markets,” June 30, 2023. https://www.pgim.com/pgim-japan/insights/greying-and-greening-across-em

65

PGIM analysis of forecasts of Bureau of Labor Statistics for the U.S. and Eurostat for the European Union.

66

European Commission, “REPowerEU: A Plan to Rapidly Reduce Dependence on Russian Fossil Fuels and Fast Forward the Green
Transition,” Press release, May 18, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_313167European Commission, “Pact for Skills: Launch of Large-Scale Renewable Energy Skills Partnership,” March 21, 2023.
https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&furtherNews=yes&newsId=10530

68

Shih, Willy, “The New Era of Industrial Policy Is Here,” September/October 2023. https://hbr.org/2023/09

69

Intel, Press release, June 19, 2023. https://www.intc.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/1628/intel-german-government-agree-onincreased-scope-for-wafer

70

Chazan, Guy, “Worker Shortages and Far Right Threaten East Germany’s Chip Ambitions,” Aug. 7, 2023. https://www.ft.com/
content/8cb93bc0-d560-45e8-8fd3-ffd9b95cbba071

SIA, “Chipping Away: Assessing and Addressing the Labor Market Gap Facing the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,” accessed Sept, 7,2023. https://www.semiconductors.org/chipping-away-assessing-and-addressing-the-labor-market-gap-facing-the-u-s-semiconductorindustry

72

Hawkins, McKenzie, “US Chip Plans Hit Speed Bump with Key Jobs Taking Months to Fill,” Aug. 8, 2023. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-08/us-chip-plans-hit-speed-bump-with-key-jobs-taking-months-to-fill#xj4y7vzkg

73

National Skills Coalition, “The Skills Mismatch.” https://nationalskillscoalition.org/skills-mismatch/

74

Manyika, James, et al, “Jobs lost, jobs gained,” McKinsey, November 2017. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-ofwork/jobs-lost-jobs-gained-what-the-future-of-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skills-and-wages#/75

PGIM Megatrends, “Food for Thought: Investment Opportunities Across a Changing Food System,” Spring/Summer
2023. https://www.pgim.com/pgim-japan/insights/pgim-megatrends-food-for-thought

76

Hall, Algy, “Deere Bets the Farm on $150bn ‘Precision Agriculture’ Opportunity,” Jan. 26, 2023. https://citywire.com/pro-buyer/
news /a2408316

77

Werner, Erica, “Hollywood Writers Are Still On Strike. Here’s Where WGA, Studios Stand,” Aug. 27, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2023/08/27/hollywood-writers-strike-issues-studios/

78

Ellingrud, Kweilin et al., “Generative AI and the Future of Work in America,” July 26, 2023. https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research

38 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

79

Murphy Kelly, Samantha, “Microsoft Is Bringing ChatGPT Technology to Word, Excel and Outlook,” March 16, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/16/tech/openai-gpt-microsoft-365/index.html

80

Dastin, Jeffrey, “Microsoft Unveils AI Office Copilot in Fast-Moving Race with Google,” March 16, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/
technology/microsoft-unveils-ai-its-office-suite-increased-competition-with-google-2023-03-16/

81

Nunn, Ryan et al., “Labor Force Nonparticipation: Trends, Causes, and Policy Solutions,” October 2019. https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ES_THP_labor-force-nonparticipation_final.pdf

82

Yearup.org, “Learn New Skills to Launch Your Career,” accessed Aug. 31, 2023. https://www.yearup.org

83

We Are Tomodachi, “Womenomics Is Pushing Abenomics Forward: Woman Play an Increasingly Active Role in Japan,” Summer
2014. https://www.japan.go.jp/tomodachi/2014/summer2014/womenomics_is_pushing_abenomics_forward.html.

84

Matsui, Kathy et al., “Womenomics 5.0: Progress, Areas for Improvement, Potential 15% GDP Boost,” April 18, 2019. https://www.
goldmansachs.com/intelligence/pages/womenomics-5.0/multimedia/womenomics-5.0-report.pdf

85

Given some of the controversies around political influence around the Doing Business index, the World Bank has published themethodology and will be launching a revised ranking of countries’ business climate and investment environment. We believe however,that even with some of it flaws that the current Index provides investors a useful directional indicator of important elements of thepolicy environment. < https://www.worldbank.org/en/businessready >.

86

Escobari, Marcela et al., “Growing Cities that Work for All,” Brookings Institution, May 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GrowingCitiesthatWorkforAll-FINALforWeb.pdf

87

Ibid.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 39

IMPORTANT INFORMATION
Professional Investor Use Only. All investments involve risks, including possible loss of principal. Past performance is
not indicative of future results.
The information contained herein is provided by PGIM, Inc., the principal asset management business of Prudential
Financial, Inc. (PFI), and a trading name of PGIM, Inc. and its global subsidiaries. PGIM, Inc. is an investment adviser
registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Registration with the SEC does not imply a certain
level of skill or training.
In the United Kingdom, information is issued by PGIM Limited with registered office: Grand Buildings, 1-3 Strand,
Trafalgar Square, London, WC2N 5HR. PGIM Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority(“FCA”) of the United Kingdom (Firm Reference Number 193418). In the European Economic Area (“EEA”), information
is issued by PGIM Netherlands B.V. with registered office: Gustav Mahlerlaan 1212, 1081 LA Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
PGIM Netherlands B.V. is, authorised by the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (“AFM”) in the Netherlands (Registration
number 15003620) and operating on the basis of a European passport. In certain EEA countries, information is, wherepermitted, presented by PGIM Limited in reliance of provisions, exemptions or licenses available to PGIM Limited under
temporary permission arrangements following the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union. These materials areissued by PGIM Limited and/or PGIM Netherlands B.V. to persons who are professional clients as defined under the rules of
the FCA and/or to persons who are professional clients as defined in the relevant local implementation of Directive 2014/65/
EU (MiFID II). In Italy, information is provided by PGIM Limited authorized to operate in Italy by Commissione Nazionale
per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB). In Japan, information is provided by PGIM Japan Co., Ltd. (“PGIM Japan”) and/or PGIM Real Estate (Japan) Ltd. (“PGIMREJ”). PGIM Japan, a registered Financial Instruments Business Operator with
the Financial Services Agency of Japan offers various investment management services in Japan. PGIMREJ is a Japanese realestate asset manager that is registered with the Kanto Local Finance Bureau of Japan. In Hong Kong, information is provided
by PGIM (Hong Kong) Limited, a regulated entity with the Securities & Futures Commission in Hong Kong to professional
investors as defined in Section 1 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571). In Singapore,
information is issued by PGIM (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. (“PGIM Singapore”), a regulated entity with the Monetary Authorityof Singapore under a Capital Markets Services License to conduct fund management and an exempt financial adviser. This
material is issued by PGIM Singapore for the general information of “institutional investors” pursuant to Section 304 of the
Securities and Futures Act 2001 of Singapore (the “SFA”) and “accredited investors” and other relevant persons in accordancewith the conditions specified in Section 305 of the SFA. In South Korea, information is issued by PGIM, Inc., which islicensed to provide discretionary investment management services directly to South Korean qualified institutional investors ona cross-border basis.
These materials are for informational or educational purposes only. The information is not intended as investment advice andis not a recommendation about managing or investing assets or an offer or solicitation in respect of any products or services
to any persons who are prohibited from receiving such information under the laws applicable to their place of citizenship,
domicile or residence. In providing these materials, PGIM is not acting as your fiduciary. These materials represent theviews, opinions and recommendations of the author(s) regarding the economic conditions, asset classes, securities, issuersor financial instruments referenced herein. Distribution of this information to any person other than the person to whom it
was originally delivered and to such person’s advisers is unauthorized, and any reproduction of these materials, in whole orin part, or the divulgence of any of the contents hereof, without prior consent of PGIM is prohibited. Certain information
contained herein has been obtained from sources that PGIM believes to be reliable as of the date presented; however, PGIM
cannot guarantee the accuracy of such information, assure its completeness, or warrant such information will not be changed.
The information contained herein is current as of the date of issuance (or such earlier date as referenced herein) and is subject
to change without notice. PGIM has no obligation to update any or all of such information; nor do we make any express or
40 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

implied warranties or representations as to the completeness or accuracy or accept responsibility for errors. These materials
are not intended as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial instrument or
any investment management services and should not be used as the basis for any investment decision. No risk management
technique can guarantee the mitigation or elimination of risk in any market environment. Past performance is not a guarantee
or a reliable indicator of future results and an investment could lose value. No liability whatsoever is accepted for any loss
(whether direct, indirect, or consequential) that may arise from any use of the information contained in or derived fromthis report. PGIM and its affiliates may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations or views
expressed herein, including for proprietary accounts of PGIM or its affiliates. Any projections or forecasts presented herein
are as of the date of this presentation and are subject to change without notice. Actual data will vary and may not be reflected
here. Projections and forecasts are subject to high levels of uncertainty. Accordingly, any projections or forecasts should
be viewed as merely representative of a broad range of possible outcomes. Projections or forecasts are estimated, based onassumptions, and are subject to significant revision and may change materially as economic and market conditions change.
PGIM has no obligation to provide updates or changes to any projections or forecasts.
PGIM and its affiliates may develop and publish research that is independent of, and different than, the recommendations
contained herein. PGIM’s personnel other than the author(s), such as sales, marketing and trading personnel, may provide
oral or written market commentary or ideas to PGIM’s clients or prospects or proprietary investment ideas that differ fromthe views expressed herein.
Prudential Financial, Inc. of the United States is not affiliated in any manner with Prudential plc, incorporated in the United
Kingdom or with Prudential Assurance Company, a subsidiary of M&G plc, incorporated in the United Kingdom.
© 2023 PFI and its related entities, registered in many jurisdictions worldwide.
3138044PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 41

PGIM’S MEGATREND SERIESHow today’s shifting global landscape will affect the investments of tomorrow

Food For Thought
Whether seeking opportunities or mitigating hidden risks, understanding the rapidlytransforming food system is crucial for institutional investors.
Learn more at pgim.com/food

The New Dynamics of Private Markets
Private markets have provided entrepreneurs, corporate tycoons and property developers
with access to capital for centuries. But the current scale, growth and complexity of private
capital is truly unprecedented – and is radically altering the investment opportunities andchallenges facing institutional investors.
Learn more at pgim.com/private-markets

Cryptocurrency Investing
Exploring why direct investments in bitcoin and its peers are currently unattractive for an
institutional portfolio – underscored by recent gyrations in the crypto market. Still, thetechnologies that cryptocurrencies helped spawn present new opportunities for savvy
long-term investors.
Learn more at pgim.com/crypto

Reshaping Services
Technological disruption has finally reached the shores of the service economy. It’s adevelopment that will represent a major shift for investors and the global economy asservices represent more than two-thirds of global GDP, three-quarters of the workforce indeveloped markets, and nearly half of the workforce in advanced emerging markets.
Learn more at pgim.com/reshaping

42 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

Weathering Climate Change
Climate change is no longer a hypothetical risk. It is already transforming the global
economy, reshaping markets and altering the investment landscape. In this paper, we
propose an actionable climate change agenda that addresses both hidden portfolio
vulnerabilities and potential opportunities in the transition to a lower-carbon world.
Learn more at pgim.com/climate

After the Great Lockdown
The pandemic has forced businesses to adapt in ways that will lead to lasting changes
in consumer behavior and corporate business models. Now is the time to focus on themassive disruption that lies ahead so we’re best positioned for when the Great Lockdown
has passed.
Learn more at pgim.com/lockdown

The Future Means Business
Disruptive forces have led to the emergence of three new business models that areradically changing the investment calculus for institutional investors. Here we explore theinvestment implications of these transformative new corporate models.
Learn more at pgim.com/futurefirm

The Technology Frontier
We are living in an era of unprecedented technological change. At PGIM, we believe
the implications for investors will be profound, radically transforming investment
opportunities across asset classes and geographies.
Learn more at pgim.com/tech

The End of Sovereignty?
Never before in history have people, information and capital moved across borders at the
speed, frequency and volume we see today. In this white paper, we take a closer look at theescalating tussle between globalization and nationalism, the implications this could havefor global financial markets, and how long-term investors may best position themselves tonavigate these uncertain times.

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 43

Emerging Markets at the Crossroads
A radical shift in the forces shaping emerging market growth will require investors
to take a different investment approach from what may have worked in the past.
Increasingly, discovering investment opportunities will be rooted in the ability tocapture alpha from the new growth drivers, rather than in chasing the beta of thebroad universe.

A Silver Lining
The unprecedented aging of the global population creates increased opportunities insenior housing, multifamily condos, biotech, and the emerging silvertech industry.
Institutional investors should consider how this megatrend could affect their portfolios,
given the trend’s evolving impact on consumer spending and far-reaching effects on
emerging nations, home to two-thirds of the world’s elderly.

Longevity and Liabilities
The rise in global life expectancy has implications for pension plan liabilities that are
not fully appreciated. As new mortality tables demonstrate, longevity risk to pension
liabilities could increase dramatically over the next two to three decades. This reportexamines the challenge and the available risk mitigation strategies.

The Wealth of Cities
Never in history has the pace of urbanization been so rapid: 60 to 70 million people
moving to cities every year for the next few decades. To help institutional investors
benefit from this “prime time” of urbanization, we identified a range of specificinvestment ideas across the major investable themes of this opportune megatrend.

44 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIM

PGIM | THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS 45

THE PURSUIT OF OUTPERFORMANCETM

46 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR MARKETS | PGIMཻқࣆߴͤ ຌࣁྋͺธࠅ 6(& ͹ౌ࿧౦ࣁ‫ޒ‬໲ճऀͲ͍Ζ 3*,0 ΢ϱέ͗ࡠ੔ͪ͢΍͹Ͳͤɽͤ ຌࣁྋͺ৚ๅ఑‫ڛ‬Ν໪దͳͪ͢΍͹Ͳ͍Εɼಝఈ͹ۜ༧ঐ඾͹‫ש‬༢຤ͺ൤ജΝ໪దͳͪ͢΍͹Ͳͺ͍ΕΉͦΞɽΉͪɼຌࣁྋͶ‫͠ࡎى‬Η಼ͪ༲౵Ͷͯ͏ͱͺࠕ‫ޛ‬รߍ͠ΗΖ͞ͳ΍͍ΕΉͤɽͤ ‫͠ࡎى‬Ηͱ͏Ζࢤ৖ಊ޴౵ͺ‫Ͳ఼࣎ݳ‬͹‫ݡ‬մͲ͍Εɼ͞ΗΔͺࠕ‫ޛ‬รߍͤΖ͞ͳ΍͍ΕΉͤɽΉͪɼͨ͹݃Վ͹ࣰ֮੓Νන໎ͤΖ΍͹Ͳͺ͵͚ɼগཔ͹ࢤ৖‫ڧ؂‬͹รಊ౵ΝฯৄͤΖ΍͹Ͳ΍͍ΕΉͦΞɽͤ ຌࣁྋͶ‫͠ࡎى‬Ηͱ͏Ζࢤ৖‫ؖ‬࿊υʖν‫;ٶ‬৚ๅ౵ͺ৶བͲ͘Ζͳ൓இ֦ͪ͢झ৚ๅ‫͖ݱ‬Δ೘घͪ͢΍͹Ͳͤ͗ɼͨ͹৚ๅ͹ਜ਼֮੓ɼࣰ֮੓Ͷͯ͏ͱ౲ऀ͗ฯৄͤΖ΍͹Ͳͺ͍ΕΉͦΞɽͤ գ‫ڊ‬͹ӣ༽ࣰ੹ͺචͥ͢΍গཔ͹ӣ༽੔Վ౵ΝฯৄͤΖ΍͹Ͳͺ͍ΕΉͦΞɽͤ ຌࣁྋͺ๑ແɼճ‫ܯ‬ɼ੭ແ৏͹Πχώ΢η͍Ζ͏ͺ౦ࣁਬও౵Νߨ͑ͪΌͶࡠ੔͠Ηͪ΍͹Ͳͺ͍ΕΉͦΞɽͤ ౲ऀͶΓΖࣆ઴টଡ଼͵͢Ͷɼຌࣁྋ͹Ҳ෨Ήͪͺસ෨Ν෵੣ͤΖ͞ͳͺ‫͕͚ݐ‬இΕ஗͢Ήͤɽ※ 本資料内で取り上げられた資産クラス、個別セクター等はあくまで例示目的であり、推奨ならびにこれらにかかる将来性を明示・暗示的に示唆するものではありません。
ͤ n3UXGHQWLDO|ɼn3*,0|ɼͨΗͩΗ͹ϫβ͕Γ;ϫρέʀεϱϚϩͺɼϕϩυϱεϡϩʀϓΟ΢ψϱε
ϡϩʀ΢ϱέ͕Γ;ͨ͹‫ؖ‬࿊ճऀ͹γʖϑηϜʖέͲ͍Εɼଡ਼͹ࠅʀஏҮͲౌ࿧͠Ηͱ͏Ήͤɽ
ͤ 3*,0 ζϡϏϱ‫ࣞה‬ճऀͺɼ੊ֆ࠹୉‫څ‬͹ۜ༧γʖϑη‫ؖؽ‬ϕϩυϱεϡϩʀϓΟ΢ψϱεϡϩ͹ҲҽͲ͍Εɼӵࠅϕϩʖυϱεϡϩऀͳͺ͵ΞΔ‫͍͗ܐؖ‬ΕΉͦΞɽ

3*,0ζϡϏϱ‫ࣞה‬ճऀۜ༧ঐ඾खӀ‫ؖ ंۂ‬౨ࡔແ‫ۃ‬ௗʤۜঐʥ୊ߺՅ೘‫ڢ‬ճ：Ҳൢऀ஄๑ਕ౦ࣁ৶୙‫ڢ‬ճɼҲൢऀ஄๑ਕೖຌ౦ࣁ‫ޒ‬໲‫ڢۂ‬ճ、一般社団法人第二種金融商品取引業協会
3*,0-103312