NUREG-1650
Revision 4

The United States ofAmerica National Reportfor the 2012 Convention
on Nuclear Safety
Extraordinary Meeting

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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NUREG-1650
Revision 4

The United States ofAmerica National Reportfor the 2012 Convention
on Nuclear Safety
Extraordinary Meeting
Manuscript Completed: May 2012
Date Published: July 2012
Prepared by
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)Offf

ABSTRACT
The United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in coordination with the U.S.
Department of State, U.S. Department of Energy, and the Institute of Nuclear PowerOperations, prepared this report, “The United States of America National Report for the 2012
Convention on Nuclear Safety Extraordinary Meeting,” and will submit it for peer review at the2012 Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) Extraordinary Meeting to be held at the International
Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, in August 2012. This report addresses the actions
taken by the U.S. to improve nuclear safety in response to the March 11, 2011, accident at the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. It demonstrates how the U.S. contributes toachieving and maintaining a high level of nuclear safety worldwide by enhancing national
measures and international cooperation and by meeting the obligations of all the articles
established by CNS. It describes how the U.S. addressed six topics in relation to the
Fukushima accident: (1) external events, (2) design issues, (3) severe accident management
and recovery, (4) national organizations, (5) emergency preparedness and response and postaccident management, and (6) international cooperation. Similar to the U.S. National Report for
the fifth CNS issued in 2010, this report includes a section developed by the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations describing work done by the U.S. nuclear industry in response to the
Fukushima accident.

iii

CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................................................................................. ix
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........................................................................................ xi
DEFINITIONS .......................................................................................................................... xiii
PART 1 ...................................................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 3
TOPIC 1. EXTERNAL EVENTS ................................................................................................ 5
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Seismic, Flooding, and Other Hazards Protection ............................................................ 7
1.3 State-of-the-Art Analysis .................................................................................................11
1.4 Events Beyond the Current Design Basis ........................................................................12
TOPIC 2. DESIGN ISSUES .....................................................................................................13
2.1 Introduction .....................................................................................................................13
2.2 Preventing Loss of Onsite and Offsite Alternating Current Power Sources(Station Blackout) ...........................................................................................................14
2.3 Containment Overpressure Protection.............................................................................16
2.4 Reliable Cooling of Spent Fuel Pools ..............................................................................17
2.5 Preventing Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink ............................................................................18
TOPIC 3. SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY (ONSITE).......................21
3.1 Introduction .....................................................................................................................21
3.2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Personnel Resources and Training ......................22
3.3 Adequacy of Procedures .................................................................................................23
3.4 Multi-Unit Events .............................................................................................................25
3.5 Equipment Availability .....................................................................................................26
TOPIC 4. NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS .................................................................................29
4.1 Introduction .....................................................................................................................29
4.2 Regulator ........................................................................................................................29
4.3 Interactions with Congress and Other Government Agencies ..........................................36
4.4 Interactions with the Nuclear Industry, Members of the Public, and Stakeholders ...........37
TOPIC 5. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AND POST-ACCIDENTMANAGEMENT........................................................................................................41
5.1 Introduction .....................................................................................................................41
5.2 Multi-Unit Events and Station Blackouts - Staffing and Communication...........................42
5.3 Maintain Emergency Response Data System Capability .................................................44
5.4 Radiation Protection ........................................................................................................45
5.5 Pre-Staging of Potassium Iodide Beyond the 10-Mile Radius ..........................................46
5.6 Communication, Transparency, and Openness ...............................................................46
5.7 Additional Long-Term EP-Related Topics........................................................................48
TOPIC 6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION..........................................................................51
6.1 Introduction .....................................................................................................................51
6.2 International Treaties.......................................................................................................51
6.3 Communications .............................................................................................................53
6.4 Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation and Assistance Program ......................................54v

6.5 Sharing Operating Experience ........................................................................................56
PART 2 .....................................................................................................................................59
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................63
TOPIC 1. EXTERNAL EVENTS ...............................................................................................67
1.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned ............................................................................67
1.2 Schedule of Planned Actions...........................................................................................68
1.3 Results of Completed Actions .........................................................................................69
TOPIC 2. DESIGN ISSUES .....................................................................................................71
2.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned ............................................................................71
2.2 Schedule of Planned Actions...........................................................................................73
2.3 Results of Completed Actions .........................................................................................73
TOPIC 3. SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY (ONSITE).......................75
3.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned ............................................................................75
3.2 Schedule of Planned Actions...........................................................................................76
3.3 Results of Completed Actions .........................................................................................76
TOPIC 4. NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS .................................................................................77
4.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned ............................................................................77
4.2 Schedule of Planned Actions...........................................................................................78
4.3 Results of Completed Actions .........................................................................................78
TOPIC 5. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AND POST-ACCIDENTMANAGEMENT (OFFSITE) .....................................................................................79
5.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned ............................................................................79
5.2 Schedule of Planned Actions...........................................................................................80
5.3 Results of Completed Actions .........................................................................................80
TOPIC 6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION..........................................................................81
6.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned ............................................................................81
6.2 Schedule of Planned Actions...........................................................................................82
6.3 Results of Completed Actions .........................................................................................82
REFERENCES .........................................................................................................................83
APPENDIX A – SUMMARY TABLES ........................................................................................89vi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYOn March 11, 2011, the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki earthquake and subsequent tsunami hit Japan,
devastating the area and affecting numerous nuclear power plants, including Fukushima Daiichi.
At the fifth review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), held April 4 – 15, 2011,
in Vienna, Austria, the contracting parties agreed to analyze the relevant issues of the
Fukushima accident during an extraordinary meeting. This meeting is scheduled to take place
August 27 – 31, 2012, in Vienna, Austria. The objectives of this CNS extraordinary meeting are
to enhance safety through reviewing and sharing lessons learned and actions taken bycontracting parties in response to the events of Fukushima and to review the effectiveness andcontinued stability of the provisions of the CNS.
Consistent with this commitment, the United States (U.S.) developed this national reportdetailing the response of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. nuclear
industry to the safety issues raised by the Fukushima accident. The following topics are
addressed:(1) external events(2) design issues(3) severe accident management and recovery(4) national organizations(5) emergency preparedness and response and post-accident management(6) international cooperation
Part 1 of the report describes how the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is addressing thesesix topic areas. Because the prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests
with the license holder, Part 2 of the report explains how the nuclear industry is addressing thesix topics described above. Part 2 was developed by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
in cooperation with other entities including the Nuclear Energy Institute. Each topic addresses
actions taken, actions planned, schedules, and results. The report also contains a tablesummarizing all the actions and activities discussed herein. This matrix is located inAppendix A.

vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Contributors to this report include the following technical and regulatory experts from the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Astwood, Heather
Brown, David
Couret, Ivonne
Decker, David
Dudek, Michael
Foster, Jack
Garmon, David
Harrington, Holly
Henderson, Karen
Hopkins, Jon
Kauffman, John
Kratchman, Jessica
Laura, Richard
Miller, Barry
Mitchell, Matthew
Norton, Charles
Pascarelli, Robert
Quiñones-Navarro, Lauren
Rodriguez, Veronica
Schwartzman, Jennifer
Shane, Raeann
Skeen, David
Taylor, Robert
Thorp, John
Witt, Kevin
Wittick, Susan
Contributors to this report include the following experts from the Institute of Nuclear PowerOperations:
Nielsen, Frederick
Shorey, Larry
Webster, Williamix

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AC
ACIRS
ADAMS
ANPR
AOP

alternating current
Advisory Committee for the International Reporting System for Operating
Experience
Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systemadvance notice of proposed rulemaking
abnormal operating procedure

BWRboiling water reactor

CEUS
CFR
CNRA
CNS
CNSC
CNSNS
COL

Central and Eastern United States
Code of Federal Regulations
Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities
Convention on Nuclear Safety
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Comisión Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias of Mexico
combined license

DC
DHS
DOD
DOE

direct current
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Energy

EDG
EDMG
EDO
EOP
EP
EPRI
ERDS
EPA
ESP

emergency diesel generator
extensive damage mitigation guidelines
Executive Director for Operations
emergency operating procedure
emergency preparedness
Electric Power Research Institute
Emergency Response Data System
Environmental Protection Agency
early site permit

FEMA
FLEX

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability

GDC
GIP
GL

general design criterion
Generic Issues Program
generic letter

HOC

Headquarters operations center

IAEA
IN
INES
INPO
IPEEE
IRS

International Atomic Energy Agency
information noticeInternational Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale
Institute of Nuclear Power Operationsindividual plant examinations for external events
International Reporting System for Operating Experience

xi

JNES
JLD

Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
Japan Lessons-Learned Project DirectorateKI

potassium iodide

LOOP

loss of offsite power

MDEP

Multinational Design Evaluation Program

NEA
NEI
NOAA
NPP
NRC
NRR
NTTF

Nuclear Energy Agency
Nuclear Energy InstituteNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
nuclear power plant
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations
Near-Term Task Force

OECD
OCA
OPA

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Office of Congressional Affairs
Office of Public Affairs

PRA

probabilistic risk assessment

RFI
RG

request for information
regulatory guide

SAMG
SBO
SECY
SFP
SRM
SSC

severe accident management guidelines
station blackout
Office of the Secretary of the Commission
spent fuel poolstaff requirements memorandum
structure, system, and component

TEPCO
TI
TMI

Tokyo Electric Power Company
temporary instruction
Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station

UHS

ultimate heat sink

WANO
WGOE

World Association of Nuclear Operators
Working Group for Operating Experiencexii

DEFINITIONSAdvanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) – An ANPR is a vehicle for soliciting
external stakeholder feedback concerning a potential regulatory action. Its use can varydepending on the circumstances associated with the regulatory issue under consideration,
including soliciting feedback to determine whether an issue warrants regulatory action,collecting information that can be used to complete a regulatory basis for a potential regulatory
action, or obtaining comments on proposed regulatory approaches. Issuance of ANPR does
not, however, commit the NRC to a rulemaking.
Beyond-design-basis events – events that are possible but were not fully considered in thedesign process because they were judged to be too unlikely.
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) – the codification of the general and permanent rules
published in the Federal Register by the executive departments and agencies of the U.S.
Government.
Combined license (COL) – an NRC-issued license that authorizes a licensee to construct and(with certain specified conditions) operate a nuclear power plant (NPP) at a specific site, in
accordance with established laws and regulations. A COL is valid for 40 years (with thepossibility of a 20-year renewal).
Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability (FLEX) – a U.S. industry strategy being developed
to address the impact of external events. The strategy includes the use of portable contingency
equipment positioned at diverse on-site locations capable of being connected to maintain or
restore core cooling, containment and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities
Early Site Permit (ESP) – an ESP is an NRC approval for a site (or sites) for one or more
nuclear power facilities. This includes a partial constructions permit. The approval of an ESP
provides an applicant with an opportunity to hold a site for up to 20 years, reduces licensing
uncertainty, and resolves siting issues before construction begins.
Federal Register notice – publication of a document in the Federal Register, the official daily
publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of U.S. Federal agencies and organizations,as well as executive orders and other presidential documents.
Generic letter (GL) – a letter that addresses either (1) a technical issue, emergent or routine,that has arisen between the NRC staff and the nuclear industry, or (2) a compliance matter that
the NRC staff has concluded carries significant risk and should therefore be brought
immediately to the attention of the nuclear industry. A GL may request information from, orrequest action, by the addressees on matters of safety, safeguards, or environmental
significance. A GL may request new or revised commitments based on analyses performed andproposed corrective actions but may not require commitments.
Hostile-Action-Based Drill – an exercise that simulates an act toward an NPP or its personnel
that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, or intimidate thelicensee to achieve an end.
Information Notice (IN) – a communication used by the NRC to inform the U.S. nuclear
industry of recently identified, significant operating experience. The nuclear industry is expectedxiiito review the information for applicability to its facilities or operations and consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. An IN neither conveys nor implies new requirements
and interpretations, nor does it request information or action.
National Response Framework – the guiding principles that enable all response partners to
prepare and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies - from thesmallest incident to the largest catastrophe. The framework establishes a comprehensive,
national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response.
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NRIA) to the National Response Framework – theset of policies, situations, concepts of operations, and responsibilities of Federal departments
and agencies that governs the immediate response and short-term recovery activities forincidents involving the release of radioactive materials.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) – a systematic analysis tool that consists of specifictechnical elements that provide both qualitative insights and a quantitative assessment of risk byaddressing the following questions known as the “risk triplet”: (1) What can go wrong?, (2) How
likely is it?, and (3) What are the consequences? Modern PRAs also have incorporated
uncertainty analyses to address a fourth question: How confident are we in our answers tothese three questions? In this way, PRAs improve NPP safety by identifying, prioritizing, andmitigating significant contributors to risk. Three levels of PRA address different aspects ofaccidents:•

Level 1 PRA uses event and fault trees to model the responses of NPPs and theiroperators to initiating events that challenge plant operation. These models identify
accident sequences that result in damage to the reactor core. The estimatedfrequencies for all accident sequences that cause core damage are summed to calculate
the NPP’s total core damage frequency.

•

Level 2 PRA models and analyzes the progression of “severe accidents” - Level 1 PRA
accident sequences that result in reactor core damage - by considering how the reactor
coolant and other relevant systems and the containment respond to the accident. This
analysis is based on both the initial status of structures and systems and their ability towithstand the harsh accident environment. Once the system and containment response
is characterized, the PRA can determine the frequency, type, amount, timing, andenergy content of the radioactivity released to the environment, also known as “source
term characteristics”.

•

Level 3 PRA models the release and transport of radioactive material in a severe
accident and estimates the health and economic impact in terms of the following
measures of offsite consequences: (1) early fatalities and injuries and latent cancer
fatalities resulting from the radiation doses to the surrounding population and (2)economic costs associated with evacuation, relocation, property loss, anddecontamination. Offsite consequences are estimated using the Level 2 PRA source
term characteristics and several other factors that affect the transport and impact of theradioactive material. These factors include meteorology, demographics, emergency
response, and land use. By combining the results of the Level 1 and Level 2 PRAs withthe results of this consequence analysis, the Level 3 PRA estimates the NPP’s
integrated risk (likelihood × consequences) to the public.

xivOrder – A written NRC directive used to modify, suspend, or revoke a license or to require
specific actions by licensee or other persons. Orders can also be used to impose civil penalties.
Regulatory guide (RG) – a document that offers guidance to licensees and applicants on
implementing specific parts of the NRC's regulations, techniques used by the NRC staff toevaluate specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed the staff needs for its
review of applications for permits or licenses.
Request for information (RFI) – a written request from the NRC to a licensee that seeks
information about a potential safety issue. The RFI typically is used to determine whether tomodify, suspend or revoked a license. The NRC must justify each request to ensure it
addresses a potentially significant safety issue. These requests are issued as letters under theauthority of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 50.54(f).
Rulemaking – the process by which the NRC develops regulations.
SECY paper – documents on policy, rulemaking, and adjudicatory matters, as well as general
information that the NRC staff provides to the Commission for consideration.
Safe-shutdown Earthquake – earthquake ground shaking for which certain structures,
systems, and components are designed to remain functional.
Seiches – an occasional and sudden oscillation of a body of water (e.g., lake, bay, or estuary),caused by events such as wind, earthquakes, or changes in barometric pressure, that produces
fluctuations in the water level.
Staff requirements memorandum (SRM) – a concise statement of the Commission’s decision
about a SECY paper’s recommendation that notes any approved modifications to therecommendation and clearly states any additional requirements the staff must perform, alongwith due dates.
Stakeholder – a person or group that has an investment, share, or interest in the NPP industry,including private citizens, licensees, and governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
Station blackout (SBO) – the total loss of alternating current (AC) power at an NPP as a resultof complete failure of both offsite and onsite AC power sources
Steering Committee – committee responsible for implementing the Near-Term Task Forcerecommendations. The committee is chaired by the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor
Preparedness and includes Office Directors from many of the NRC’s program offices andregions. The group is supported by the Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate.
Tier 1 actions – actions that are to begin without unnecessary delay. These actions are
considered to have the greatest potential for safety improvement in the near-term.
Tier 2 actions – actions that cannot be initiated because of the need for further technicalassessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or current lack of critical skill sets.
Tier 3 actions – actions that (1) require further study to support regulatory action, (2) dependon the completion of an associated short-term action to inform the longer-term action, (3)depend on the availability of critical skill sets, or (4) depend on the development of a logical,xv

systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriatelybalances defense-in-depth and risk considerations.
Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) – consists of an assured supply of water that is credited fordissipating reactor decay heat and essential station heat loads after a normal reactor shutdown
or a shutdown following an accident or transient, including a loss-of-coolant accident. The UHS
includes the cooling media itself, the equipment needed to pump the cooling media, the heatexchangers and all possible combinations of these systems. Many commercial NPPs also rely
upon the atmosphere for performing the UHS function to some extent in conjunction with theassured supply of cooling water, such as in the case of spray ponds and cooling towers; andpassive reactor plant designs may rely more exclusively on the atmosphere for dissipating
reactor decay heat immediately following plant transient and accident conditions.

xvi

PART 11

INTRODUCTIONThe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continuously oversees nuclear power plants toverify that they are being operated in accordance with the agency’s rules and regulations.
Immediately after the March 2011 earthquake in Japan, the NRC staffed its Headquarters
operations center (HOC) and began communicating available information to stakeholders,
including members of the public, the U.S. Congress, representatives from State Governments,
other Federal agencies, and the nuclear industry, regarding the developments at the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant. Staff from U.S. Government agencies, including the NRC,
Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of Defense (DOD), was dispatched as an
assistance team to support the U.S. Ambassador in Japan and the Japanese Government.
The NRC has the authority to take any action it deems necessary to protect public health andsafety, and may demand immediate licensee response, including plant shutdowns. The NRC
took immediate action following the Fukushima accident, in the form of temporary instructions(TIs), information notices (INs), bulletins, and inspections, to ensure that there were no
immediate safety concerns at American facilities. Next, the NRC created the Near-Term Task
Force (NTTF), composed of senior NRC staff and management, to systematically andmethodically review the NRC’s processes and regulations. The NRC tasked the NTTF withdetermining whether the NRC should make additional improvements to its regulatory system,and to make policy recommendations to the Commission. The NTTF issued its report, titled“Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century: The Near-Term Task
Force Review of the Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident,” on July 12, 2011. The
NTTF concluded that continued operation of U.S. nuclear plants and ongoing NRC licensing
activities posed no imminent risk. The NTTF also concluded that enhancements to safety andemergency preparedness (EP) are warranted, and it made 12 overarching recommendations forCommission consideration.
Since then, the NRC has created a Steering Committee, which is chaired by the Deputy
Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs and is composed of Office Directors
from many of the NRC program offices and regions. The NRC also created a new organization,
the Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate (JLD). The objective of the Steering Committee
and the JLD is to perform a long-term review of the March 11, 2011, Japanese earthquake andtsunami, and to oversee implementation of Fukushima lessons learned for U.S. nuclear plants.
All of the NRC’s actions in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident are being coordinated bythese two groups. For example, the Steering Committee prioritized the NTTF’s
recommendations and other recommendations derived from interactions with internationalorganizations; other Federal, State, and local agencies; NRC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards; the public; and other stakeholders. In some cases, recommendations from theSteering Committee modified or enhanced the NTTF’s recommendations.
The NRC’s prioritization scheme, SECY-11-0137, “Prioritization of Recommended Actions To
Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,” dated October 3, 2011, describes
three tiers of actions.
Tier 1 actions are to begin without unnecessary delay. To determine and recommend near-term
regulatory actions that should be initiated without delay, the staff considered whether any of therecommendations identified an imminent hazard to public health and safety. The staff
concluded that none of the recommendations rise to this level. The staff then identified, under3

the Tier 1 activities, a subset of actions that has the greatest potential for safety improvement in
the near-term.
Tier 2 actions are those that cannot yet be initiated because of a need for further technicalassessment and alignment, dependence on Tier 1 issues, or lack of availability of critical skill
sets. Tier 3 actions are those that require further staff study to support regulatory action; need
the result of an associated short-term action to inform the long-term action; depend on theavailability of critical skill sets; or depend on the development of a logical, systematic, andcoherent regulatory framework that balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations.
Part 1 of this report describes actions the NRC and the U.S. Government have taken, or plan totake to address lessons learned from the Fukushima accident as they pertain to U.S. nuclear
power plants and international cooperation on nuclear safety. The topics addressed are(1) external events, (2) design issues, (3) severe accident management and recovery, (4)national organizations, (5) EP and response and post-accident management, and (6)international cooperation. Each topic covered in the report includes a discussion of the actions
taken or planned, schedules for completion of ongoing and planned activities, and results ofcompleted actions.

4

TOPIC 1. EXTERNAL EVENTS
1.1 Introduction
The NRC has long recognized that protection from natural phenomena is an important means toprevent core damage and ensure the integrity of containment and the spent fuel pool (SFP).
The NRC established several requirements addressing natural phenomena in 1971 with
General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, “Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena,”of Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to Title 10 of the Code ofFederal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization
Facilities.”
GDC 2 requires, in part, that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety
be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as floods, tsunami, andseiches without losing the capability to perform their safety functions. GDC 2 also requires thatdesign bases for these SSCs reflect (1) appropriate consideration of the most severe of thenatural phenomena that historically have been reported for the site and surrounding region, with
sufficient margin for the limited accuracy and quantity of the historical data and the period oftime in which the data have been accumulated; (2) appropriate combinations of the effects ofnormal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena; and (3) the
importance of the safety functions to be performed.
Since the establishment of GDC 2, the NRC’s requirements and guidance for protection fromseismic events, floods, and other natural phenomena have continued to evolve. The NRC hasdeveloped new regulations, new and updated regulatory guidance, and several regulatory
programs to enhance previously licensed reactors, including the following:•

Appendix A, “Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 10 CFRPart 100, “Reactor Site Criteria”•

NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for
Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [light water reactor] Edition”), and interim staff guidance inthree areas related to protection from natural phenomena•

The systematic evaluation program established in 1977 to review the designs of older
operating nuclear reactor plants to reconfirm and document their safety•

Issuing Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, “Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical andElectrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue A-46,” dated
February 19, 1987, to address concerns related to seismic qualification of mechanicaland electrical equipment in operating nuclear power plants (NPPs)•

Supplement 4 to GL 88-20, “Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe
Accident Vulnerabilities, 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Subsection (f) of 10 CFR 50.54, “Conditions ofLicenses”),” dated June 28, 1991, requesting licensees to perform an individual plantexamination of external events (IPEEE) to identify vulnerabilities•

Subpart B, “Evaluation Factors for Stationary Power Reactor Site Applications on or
After January 10, 1997,” to 10 CFR Part 100

5•Appendix S, “Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 10 CFRPart 50

The staff also has published several regulatory guides (RGs) that address specific technicalissues related to protection from natural phenomena, including the following:•

RG 1.29, “Seismic Design Classification,” dated March 2007•

RG 1.59, “Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants,” dated August 1977•

RG 1.60, “Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants,” dated
December 1973•

RG 1.102, “Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants,” dated September 1976•

RG 1.125, “Physical Models for Design and Operation of Hydraulic Structures andSystems for Nuclear Power Plants,” dated March 2009•

RG 1.208, “A Performance-Based Approach to Define the Site-Specific Earthquake
Ground Motion,” dated March 2007•

RG 1.221, “Design-Basis Hurricane and Hurricane Missiles for Nuclear Power Plants,”
dated October 2011

The NRC staff continually evaluates new information on natural phenomena, including lessons
learned from operational experience and their potential impact on risk and overall plant safety.
These evaluations have led to new requirements or guidance as discussed above, updated
regulatory guidance, generic communications, and plant-specific actions to address identified
issues.
At the time of the Fukushima accident, the NRC staff was proceeding with regulatory actions torequest licensees to evaluate updated seismic hazard information. In support of early site
permits (ESP) and combined license (COL) applications for new reactors, the NRC staff
reviewed updates to the seismic source and ground motion models the applicants provided.
These reviews of the applications performed by the staff identified higher seismic hazard
estimates than previously assumed, increasing the likelihood of exceeding the safe-shutdown
earthquake at operating facilities in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). In 2005, thestaff recommended an examination of increased seismic hazard estimates in the CEUS under
the NRC Generic Issues Program (GIP). The NRC established Generic Issue (GI)-199,“Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern UnitedStates on Existing Plants,” on June 9, 2005.
In 2010, the NRC concluded that GI-199 should transition to the regulatory assessment stage ofthe GIP. Information Notice (IN) 2010-018, “Generic Issue 199, Implications of Updated
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States on Existing
Plants,” dated September 2, 2010, summarizes the results of the GI-199 safety and risk
assessment. After it issued the IN, the NRC asked licensees to evaluate the updated seismic
hazard analysis. The staff recommended, and the Commission approved, the incorporation of
GI-199 into the regulatory actions being taken within the context of the JLD.

6

As a result of the NTTF review of the Fukushima events, the NRC concluded that seismic andflooding hazards warranted further consideration because of significant advancements in thestate of knowledge and state of analysis in these areas in the time period since the operating
plants were sited and licensed. One example of advancement in the state of knowledge is
NUREG-2115, “Central and Eastern United States Seismic Source Characterization for Nuclear
Facilities,” dated January 2012, which presents updated composite seismic hazard curves for
the CEUS that resulted from a joint NRC, Department of Energy (DOE) and Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) effort. The Japan earthquake and subsequent tsunami also
highlighted the need to evaluate concurrent related events, such as seismically-induced fires
and floods. The NTTF identified a number of regulatory actions in the area of external events.
These actions, as expanded or modified by the Steering Committee, are discussed below.
1.2 Seismic, Flooding, and Other Hazards Protection
1.2.1 Seismic and Flooding Hazards
1.2.1.1 Discussion
The NRC is undertaking near-term regulatory activities to reevaluate and upgrade, as
necessary, the protection of SSCs against design-basis seismic and flooding events for all
operating reactors in the United States (U.S.). These activities are based on NTTF
Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3, as modified by subsequent NRC management direction. These
activities include the following:
1. Request that licensees reevaluate the seismic and flooding hazards at their sites against
current NRC requirements and guidance and, if necessary, identify actions to be taken
to update the design basis and SSCs important to safety. (NTTF Recommendation 2.1)
2. Request that licensees perform seismic and flooding protection walkdowns to identify
and address plant-specific vulnerabilities and verify the adequacy of monitoring andmaintenance for protection features in the interim period until longer-term actions arecompleted to update the design basis for external events. (NTTF Recommendation 2.3)
1.2.1.2 Actions Taken
1. On March 23, 2011, the NRC issued TI 2515/183, “Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event,” to its inspectors. The report focused on theadequacy of facility equipment, capabilities, and strategies for responding to large area
fires, explosions, SBO events, and flooding. As such, the results of the inspections
conducted by the NRC provided information regarding the readiness of licensees to
respond to seismic and flooding events.
2. On May 11, 2011, the NRC issued Bulletin 2011-01, “Mitigating Strategies,” to requirethat licensees provide a comprehensive verification of their compliance with theregulatory requirements for strategies required to maintain or restore core cooling,
containment and spent fuel cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated withloss of large areas of the plant caused by explosions or fires. These strategies could be
important in responding to a severe seismic or flooding event.
3. The NRC staff engaged stakeholders to discuss the technical basis and acceptancecriteria for conducting a reevaluation of site-specific seismic hazards. In those7

discussions, the staff considered the implementation of the hazard and risk
methodologies described in draft GL 2011-XX, “Seismic Risk Evaluations for Operating
Reactors,” which was published in the Federal Register (FR Doc. 2011-22422,
76 FR 54507) on September 1, 2011.
After meetings with stakeholders, the NRC decided not to issue the GL in final form.
Instead the staff decided that a more appropriate regulatory mechanism was to issue arequest for information (RFI) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f). The issuance of this RFI is
discussed in Section 1.2.1.3.
4. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137, “Prioritization of Recommended Actions To Be Taken In Response to
Fukushima Lessons Learned”). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved thestaff’s proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations and stated its support for
staff action on the near-term recommendations (staff requirements memorandum (SRM)
on SECY-11-0137).
5. The NRC staff engaged stakeholders to inform NRC’s process for defining guidelines for
applying present-day regulatory guidance and methodologies being used for ESP and
COL reviews to the reevaluation of seismic and flooding hazards at operating reactors.
The NRC held the first public meeting on December 14, 2011, and the second one in
January 18, 2012. The participants discussed RFIs associated with NTTF
Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3, Flooding and Seismic Protections, including walkdown
methodologies and acceptance criteria.
6. On January 13, 2012, the NRC Steering Committee again met with representatives fromthe Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the nuclear industry to discuss how to implement
near-term recommendations.
7. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued RFIs asking licensees to (1) reevaluate site-specificseismic and flooding hazards using the updated methodology, and (2) identify actions
they have taken -- or planned to take -- to address plant-specific issues associated withthe updated seismic and flooding hazards (including potential changes to the licensing ordesign basis of a plant). (NTTF Recommendation 2.1) The specifics associated with the
RFIs are discussed in SECY-12-0025, “Proposed Orders and Requests for Information
in Response to Lessons Learned From Japan’s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku
Earthquake and Tsunami,” dated February 17, 2012.
8. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued RFIs asking licensees to (1) identify and address
plant-specific issues (through their corrective action program) and verify the adequacy ofmonitoring and maintenance for protection features by performing seismic and flooding
walkdowns and (2) inform the NRC of the results of the walkdowns and corrective
actions taken or planned. (NTTF Recommendation 2.3) This is discussed in
SECY-12-0025.
9. In March 2012, the NRC staff completed its review of licensee responses to NRC
Bulletin 2011-01.

8

1.2.1.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC staff is in the process of determining whether regulatory actions are needed inlight of the licensees’ responses to NRC Bulletin 2011-01.
2. The NRC staff will prepare implementation guidance for seismic and flooding hazard
walkdowns and guidance for seismic and flooding hazard reevaluations.
3. The NRS staff will evaluate each licensee’s response to the RFIs and take appropriate
regulatory action to resolve issues associated with updated site-specific seismic andflooding hazards.
4. The NRC will issue orders to licensees to require regulatory action, if necessary.
5. The NRC staff will conduct inspection activities and issue letters to close out the actions
on a plant-by-plant basis.
1.2.1.4 Schedule
The staff’s analysis of the responses to NRC Bulletin 2011-01 was completed in March 2012.
Based on the analysis, the NRC will determine if further regulatory actions are needed by thesummer 2012. The NRC staff will prepare implementation guidance for seismic and flooding
hazard walkdowns by the end of May 2012. Guidance for seismic and flooding hazard
reevaluations will be prepared by November 2012. The staff has not yet determined a schedule
to evaluate the licensee responses to the RFIs on seismic and flooding reanalysis andwalkdowns.
1.2.1.5 Results
None of the observations that resulted from the inspections conducted under TI 2515/183
indicated a significant safety issue; however, in general, they indicated a potential industry trendof failure to maintain the equipment and strategies needed to mitigate some beyond-design anddesign-basis events. A summary of the observations and the results overview are available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/follow-up-rpts.html.
By June 11, 2011, all licensees had confirmed compliance with the regulatory requirements in
Bulletin 2011-01. All licensees provided the requested information on maintenance, testing,offsite support and other features of their mitigating strategies programs. The staff has
analyzed the licensees’ responses and is in the process of determining whether additional
regulatory actions are needed. Each licensee’s response to this bulletin is available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/mitigating-strategies.html.
The remainder activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
1.2.2 Other External Hazards
1.2.2.1 Discussion
While undertaking actions to address the seismic and flooding hazards discussed above, the
NRC staff recognized that it should reevaluate other external hazards against existing
requirements and regulatory guidance. Other external hazards include phenomena such as
9tornados, hurricanes, severe winds, extreme temperatures, extreme precipitation, dust storms,
forest fires, and volcanic activity. Thus, NTTF Recommendation 2.1 will be expanded to include
consideration of other external hazards. The other external hazards evaluation will requiresignificant resources for both licensees and NRC, as well as specialized expertise to review
licensee re-evaluations and to document results of NRC evaluations. Since sufficient resource
flexibility, including availability of critical skill sets, does not exist, the staff prioritized the otherexternal hazards evaluation of NTTF Recommendation 2.1 as a Tier 2 activity.
1.2.2.2 Actions Taken
1. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
2. The NRC staff engaged stakeholders to inform the NRC’s process for defining guidelines
for applying present-day regulatory guidance and methodologies being used for ESP
and COL reviews to the reevaluation of seismic and flooding hazards at operating
reactors. The NRC held the first public meeting on December 14, 2011, and the second
one on January 18, 2012.
3. On January 13, 2012, the NRC Steering Committee again met with representatives fromNEI and the nuclear industry to discuss how to implement near-term recommendations,
including reevaluation of other external hazards.
1.2.2.3 Actions Planned
Once sufficient expertise and resources are available, the staff will undertake regulatory
activities to:
1. Continue stakeholder interactions to discuss the technical basis and acceptance criteria
for conducting a re-evaluation of site-specific external natural hazards. These
interactions will also help to define guidelines for the application of present-day
regulatory guidance and methodologies being used for ESP and COL reviews to there-evaluation of hazards at operating reactors.
2. Develop and issue a RFI to (1) re-evaluate other site-specific natural hazards using themethodology discussed in item 1 above, and (2) identify actions that have been taken, or
are planned, to address plant-specific issues associated with the updated natural
hazards (including potential changes to the licensing or design basis of a plant).
3. Evaluate licensee responses and take appropriate regulatory action to resolve issues
associated with updated site-specific natural hazards.
1.2.2.4 Schedule
The NRC staff plans to develop and issue the RFIs on the reanalysis for other external hazards
six months after sufficient expertise and resources are available. The staff has not yet
determined a schedule to evaluate the licensee responses to the RFIs. Based on the results ofthese evaluations, the NRC will decide whether orders should be issued. If applicable, the NRC

10

will conduct its inspection activities subsequent to the issuance and implementation of theseorders.
1.2.2.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
1.3 State-of-the-Art Analysis
1.3.1 Discussion
Driven by technical advances since the last NRC-sponsored Level 3 probabilistic risk
assessments (PRAs) were performed, the NRC staff is developing plans for a new Level 3 PRA.
The last Level 3 PRA, NUREG-1150, “Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S.
Nuclear Power Plants,” was issued more than 20 years ago, in December 1990. Technicaladvances since that time include (1) plant modifications to enhance NPP operational
performance, safety, and security; (2) improved understanding and modeling of severe accident
phenomena; and (3) advances in PRA technology, such as common-cause modeling.
The staff also has identified additional scope considerations that could be addressed in a newand more comprehensive Level 3 PRA. These factors include (1) multi-unit site effects; (2) othersite radiological sources (e.g., SFPs or dry storage casks); and (3) site-specific external hazards
such as fires, flooding, and seismic events.
A new full-scope comprehensive site Level 3 PRA that incorporates these technical advances
and additional scope considerations could improve the NRC’s understanding of probable risk,enhancing regulatory decisionmaking, and helping the agency focus its limited resources on
issues most pertinent to its mission to protect public health and safety. Two documents give afull description of Level 3 PRA activities: SECY-11-0089, “Options for Proceeding with Future
Level 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Activities,” dated July 7, 2011, and the associated SRM,
dated September 21, 2011. In SECY-11-0089, the staff presented three options to theCommission for performing a Level 3 PRA: (1) maintain status quo and continue evolutionary
development of PRA technology, (2) conduct focused research to address identified gaps inexisting PRA technology before performing a full-scope comprehensive site Level 3 PRA, and(3) conduct a full-scope comprehensive site Level 3 PRA. In the SRM response, theCommission approved a modified version of Option 3 to conduct a full-scope comprehensive
site Level 3 PRA for an operating plant. The modification to Option 3 extended the schedule to
4 years to alleviate some of the near-term resource challenges and allow adequate time for acareful site selection process. The new Level 3 PRA will offer insight into many of the NTTF
recommendations.
1.3.2 Actions Taken
1. NRC is currently developing plans to perform a new multi-year Level 3 PRA to gain
insights into multi-unit risk and total site risk. This assessment will be conducted for one
multi-unit site.
1.3.3 Actions Planned
1. NRC will implement the plan and perform the Level 3 PRA.

11

1.3.4 Schedule
NRC will implement the plan and perform the Level 3 PRA within the 4-year time frame given by
the Commission.
1.3.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
1.4 Events Beyond the Current Design Basis
1.4.1 Discussion
The staff’s review of the NTTF recommendations identified areas for further evaluation toenhance the regulations and cope with events beyond the current design basis. Essentially allof the actions the NRC is pursuing relate to events beyond the current design basis. (Pleasesee other sections of this report for discussions of station blackout (SBO), mitigating beyonddesign-basis and multi-unit events, emergency preparedness (EP), containment venting, and
SFP instrumentation.)
1.4.2 Actions Taken
1. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
2. The NRC currently is evaluating additional topics related to external events beyond thedesign basis. These topics include the following:•

Rulemaking to require licensees to confirm seismic and flooding hazards every
10 years and address any new and significant information. (NTTF
Recommendation 2.2)•

Potential enhancements to licensees’ capability to prevent or mitigate
seismically-induced fires and floods. (NTTF Recommendation 3)

1.4.3 Actions Planned
1. The staff will write a SECY paper describing the plans and schedules for performing
work on these additional topics.
1.4.4 Schedule
The staff is scheduled to deliver a SECY paper describing the plans and schedules for
performing work on these additional topics to the Commission in July 2012.
1.4.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.

12

TOPIC 2. DESIGN ISSUES
2.1 Introduction
After the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, the NRC decided to take specificregulatory actions in areas of NPP design to improve the availability and reliability of plant safetysystems. These actions include additional protection against losses of one or more of thefollowing:•

all onsite and offsite alternating current (AC) power sources•

containment heat removal and overpressure protection•

SFP cooling•ultimate heat sink (UHS)

These actions will build upon existing NRC regulations and will help ensure the continued
availability and reliability of NPP systems. Topic 2 of this report describes specific actions the
NRC will take.
The availability of AC power is essential for the safe operation and accident recovery in all
NPPs currently in use in the U.S. All NPPs are connected to the electrical grid which supplies
its offsite AC power source. If a plant experiences a loss of offsite power (LOOP), emergency
diesel generators (EDGs) provide onsite AC power. If the EDGs also fail, resulting in a total
loss of AC power, the plant will experience an SBO. Certain passive, new reactor designs, suchas the Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000) and Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor(ESBWR), can cope for a significant period of time (72 hours) without AC power.
The unavailability of AC power can have a significant adverse impact on an NPP’s ability toachieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. Risk analyses performed for U.S. NPPs
indicate that the loss of all AC power can be a significant contributor to the risk associated withplant operation, contributing more than 70 percent of the overall risk at some plants. Therefore,a LOOP and its subsequent restoration are important inputs to plant risk models. Other
important contributors to the plant’s risk during LOOP-initiated scenarios involve situations inwhich plants must achieve safe shutdown by relying on components that do not require AC
power, such as turbine- or diesel-driven pumps. Thus, the reliability of such components, thecapacity of direct current (DC) batteries, and the timeliness of offsite power restoration areimportant contributors to SBO risk.
In 1980, the NRC established a plan to address concerns about SBO risk and the associatedreliability of EDGs. In August 1988, the NRC issued the SBO rule (10 CFR 50.63, “Loss of All
Alternating Current Power”) and the associated RG 1.155, “Station Blackout.” The SBO rule
requires that NPPs have the capability to withstand a SBO and maintain core cooling for a
specified duration. The method described in RG 1.155 results in a minimum acceptable SBO
duration coping capability ranging from 2 to 16 hours. The result for all U.S. operating plants
was a coping duration of either 4 or 8 hours. NPPs also were required to enhance procedures
and training for restoring both offsite and onsite AC power sources. To meet the requirements

13

of the SBO rule, some licensees chose to make NPP modifications, such as adding more
sources of emergency AC power.
To address protection from loss of containment cooling and containment overpressure, the NRC
issued a generic communication to boiling water reactor (BWR) licensees on the safety benefitsof installing hardened wetwell vents (GL 89-16, “Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent,” dated
September 1, 1989). All BWR licensees with Mark I containments voluntarily installed a
hardened vent. Also, to date, three of eight BWR Mark II units have installed hardened vents.
No regulatory requirement was imposed at that time, and designs of these systems varied –some relied on AC-operated, DC-operated, or air-operated valves; some incorporated passive
rupture disks along with isolation valves.
The NRC has taken additional steps over the years to require reliable equipment and strategies
to provide adequate cooling to reactors and SFPs. The NRC initiated these requirements after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These requirements are now codified in 10 CFR
50.54(hh)(2), and both the NRC and the U.S. nuclear industry have developed guidance toimplement this rule. To comply with the requirements, each NPP licensee expanded its
command and control capabilities and developed strategies and capabilities to cool fuel in thereactor and SFP and to mitigate releases without having to rely on the site’s AC electrical power
distribution system.
As a result of the Japanese tsunami, the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi lost the capacity torelease the heat being produced by the cores of units 1, 2 and 3 to the UHS (the ocean). The
event reinforces the need to evaluate the capacity to restore an UHS promptly under accident
conditions, and to include in accident planning consideration an alternative means formaintaining the reactor stable in hot standby for an extended period of time when normal modesof heat transport to the UHS are unavailable. The NRC has taken regulatory actions as a resultof the lessons learned from Fukushima that addresses several aspects of the loss of UHS.
The NRC’s review of the Fukushima Daiichi accident identified a number of NPP design issues.
The activities discussed below focus on regulatory actions that the NRC has taken (or plans totake) to enhance a plant’s capability to prevent significant core damage if it experiences abeyond-design-basis external hazard.
2.2 Preventing Loss of Onsite and Offsite Alternating Current Power Sources (Station
Blackout)
2.2.1 Discussion
The NRC issued orders to licensees to develop, implement, and maintain guidance andstrategies to mitigate the effects of challenges to the key safety functions of core cooling,
containment, and SFP cooling capabilities for beyond-design-basis events and multi-unit events.
(NTTF Recommendation 4.2 as expanded by the Steering Committee). In addition, the NRC isplanning regulatory activities that will address design enhancements to further reduce theprobability of SBO, including a rulemaking to improve the SBO rule (10 CFR 50.63) (NTTF
Recommendation 4.1).
2.2.2 Actions Taken
1. On March 23, 2011, the NRC issued TI 2515/183 to provide guidance to its inspectors toassess the adequacy of actions taken by U.S. licensees in response to the Fukushima
14

accident. The intent was to provide the NRC a high-level look at the U.S. industry’s
preparedness for events that may exceed the design basis for a plant.
2. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
3. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued orders to provide for reasonable protection of theequipment needed to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP coolingcapabilities in the event that explosions or fires cause the loss of large areas of the plant.
These orders are discussed in SECY-12-0025.
4. On March 20, 2012, the NRC issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR)
to engage stakeholders in rulemaking activities associated with the potential SBO
rulemaking (NTTF Recommendation 4.1). The ANPR will allow the NRC to obtainstakeholder input early in the rulemaking process.
2.2.3 Actions Planned
1. Undertake a rulemaking to improve the SBO rule. In the rulemaking process, the NRC
will develop a regulatory basis, issue a proposed rule and supporting guidance, resolve
public comments, and issue the final rule and guidance documents. A period forlicensees to implement the rule and submit license amendments will follow. The NRC
will inspect sites to ensure that licensees meet the new regulations. (NTTF
Recommendation 4.1)
2. The NRC staff is planning to engage stakeholders to (1) inform the development of
acceptance criteria for reasonable protection of equipment needed to respond tobeyond-design-basis external hazards and multi-unit events, (2) assess the need tosupplement equipment to support beyond-design-basis and multi-unit event mitigation,and (3) discuss the need to develop and provide training on supporting strategies.
3. The NRC staff intends to develop plant-specific safety evaluation reports and perform
inspections to verify compliance with the orders.
2.2.4 Schedule
The SBO rulemaking is expected to be completed within 2.5 years (approximately December2014). The full implementation of orders -- to provide for reasonable protection of theequipment needed to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP coolingcapabilities under the circumstances associated with beyond-design-basis events and multi-unit
events -- is expected to be complete no later than two refueling cycles after February 28, 2013
(the date by which licensees must submit their plans to address the orders), or by
December 31, 2016, whichever comes first. The NRC staff has not yet developed schedules for
its inspection activities.
2.2.5 Results
None of the observations that resulted from the inspections conducted under TI 2515/183
indicated a significant safety issue; however, in general, they indicated a potential industry trend15

of failure to maintain the equipment and strategies needed to mitigate some beyond-design anddesign-basis events. A summary of the observations and the results overview are available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/follow-up-rpts.html.
2.3 Containment Overpressure Protection
2.3.1 Discussion
The NRC issued orders to all licensees of NPPs with Mark I or Mark II containment designs toprovide reliable hardened wetwell vents. In addition, the NRC is planning three long-term
regulatory activities to ensure protection of NPP containment functions. These activities include
the following:
1. Consider regulatory action for hardened vents for other containment designs (NTTF
Recommendation 5.2).
2. Evaluate enhanced measures for hydrogen control and mitigation (NTTF
Recommendation 6).
3. Consider adding filtered vents for Mark I and Mark II containments (NTTF
Recommendation 5.1), such that further analysis and interaction with stakeholders will
inform whether filtered vents should be required. The staff has determined thatconsideration of severe accident conditions in the design and operation of the vents andthe possible addition of filters to the vents are significant policy issues that will require
further consideration and stakeholder interaction for the Commission to make an
informed decision.
2.3.2 Actions Taken
1. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
2. The NRC engaged stakeholders to help the NRC determine the technical bases andacceptance criteria for suitable design expectations of hardened wetwell vents.
3. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued orders to all licensees of NPPs with Mark I or
Mark II containment designs to provide reliable hardened wetwell vents. These orders
are discussed in SECY-12-0025. (NTTF Recommendation 5.1).
2.3.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC staff will perform inspections to verify compliance with the orders.
2. NRC is planning to engage with stakeholders to discuss reliable hardened vents anddetermine the necessity for taking regulatory actions to require filtration of containment
vents and provide the Commission with a staff recommendation.

16

3. The NRC is planning to conduct a longer-term evaluation of the need for reliablehardened vents in containment designs that are not Mark I and Mark II. (NTTF
Recommendation 5.2)
4. The NRC is planning to conduct a longer-term evaluation of the need for enhancedhydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or other buildings. (NTTF
Recommendation 6)
2.3.4 Schedule
The orders regarding the implementation of reliable hardened wetwell vents for Mark I andMark II containments should be fully implemented no later than two refueling cycles after
February 28, 2013 (the date by which licensees must submit their plans to address the orders),
or by December 31, 2016, whichever comes first. The NRC staff has not yet developedschedules for its inspection activities.
The NRC staff expects to issue a SECY paper with its recommendation on whether filtration ofcontainment vents should be required by July 2012.
The NRC staff has not yet developed schedules for longer-term activities to consider hardened
vents for other containment designs (NTTF Recommendation 5.2) or to evaluate enhanced
measures to control and mitigate hydrogen (NTTF Recommendation 6).
2.3.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
2.4 Reliable Cooling of Spent Fuel Pools
2.4.1 Discussion
The NRC issued an order to all operating NPP licensees to provide reliable instrumentation tomeasure SFP water levels. In addition, the NRC is planning a long-term regulatory action toensure continued cooling of spent fuel in the SFPs. This activity includes the issuance of arulemaking to provide reliable instrumentation and makeup capabilities (NTTF
Recommendations 7.2 through 7.5).
2.4.2 Actions Taken
1. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
2. The NRC engaged stakeholders to help the NRC staff determine (1) what constitutes
reliable (potentially safety-related) SFP instrumentation, (2) what conditions the
instrumentation must withstand to fulfill its intended function, and (3) where indications
are needed (e.g., control room and/or remote location).

173. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued orders to all operating NPP licensees to provide
reliable indicators of water level in the SFP. These orders are discussed in
SECY-12-0025.
2.4.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC staff will develop plant specific safety evaluation reports and perform
inspections to verify compliance with the orders.
2. Undertake a rulemaking to provide for enhanced SFP makeup capabilities (NTTF
Recommendations 7.2 through 7.5), and reliable SFP water level instrumentation(derived NTTF Recommendation 7.1).
2.4.4 Schedule
The NRC expects that full implementation of the orders to provide reliable SFP instrumentation
should be completed no later than two refueling cycles after February 28, 2013 (the date bywhich licensees must submit their plans to address the orders), or by December 31, 2016,
whichever comes first. Subsequent to the implementation of the orders, the NRC will conduct
its inspection activities. The NRC staff has not yet developed the inspection schedule. The
NRC expects to complete the rulemaking related to SFP makeup capabilities and reliable waterlevel instrumentation within 5 years.
2.4.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
2.5 Preventing Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink
2.5.1 Discussion
The NRC is planning two short-term regulatory activities to further reduce the risk of plants
losing access to their normal UHS. Preventing the loss of UHS was not included in therecommendations from the NTTF report, but the NRC later identified this issue as one needed
to be considered and included it for consideration in SECY-11-0137.
2.5.2 Actions Taken
1. On March 23, 2011, the NRC issued TI 2515/183, “Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event,” to its inspectors. The report focused on theadequacy of facility equipment, capabilities, and strategies for responding to large area
fires, explosions, SBO events, and flooding.
2. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
3. The NRC held a public meeting on December 1, 2011, with members of the public, NEI,
and industry, to discuss the implementation of the NTTF recommendations. During this18

meeting, the NRC communicated that design basis natural event could result ininterruption of access to the normal UHS and that this issue would be considered during
the resolution of near-term regulatory actions.
4. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued orders to all licensees to provide mitigating
measures for beyond-design-basis external events that result in a loss of UHS in
conjunction with the resolution of NTTF Recommendation 4.2. This NRC order isdiscussed in SECY-12-0025.
2.5.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC plans to include UHS as an important system to consider during the resolutionof the near-term regulatory actions as described below:
a. The NRC plans to request licensees to include UHS in the reevaluation andwalkdowns of site-specific seismic and flooding hazards, and identify actions takenor planned to address plant-specific issues associated with the updated seismic
hazards in conjunction with the resolution of NTTF Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3.
These RFIs are discussed in SECY-12-0025.
b. The NRC plans to incorporate the loss of UHS as a design assumption during the
SBO rulemaking activities in conjunction with the resolution of NTTF
Recommendation 4.1.
c. The NRC plans to address loss of UHS in the context of the reevaluation of otherexternal hazards as described in Section 1.2.2.3.
2.5.4 Schedule
The NRC staff has not yet developed the schedule for evaluating the RFI responses. Based on
the results of these evaluations, the NRC will decide whether orders should be issued.
The SBO rulemaking, which will incorporate loss of UHS, is expected to be completed within
2.5 years.
The implementation of orders -- to provide equipment needed to maintain or restore corecooling, containment, and SFP cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated withbeyond-design-basis events and multi-unit events -- is expected to be complete no later than
two refueling cycles after February 28, 2013 (the date by which licensees must submit theirplans to address the orders), or by December 31, 2016, whichever comes first. The NRC staff
has not yet developed the schedule for its inspection activities.
2.5.5 Results
None of the observations that resulted from the inspections conducted under TI 2515/183
indicated a significant safety issue; however, in general, they indicated a potential industry trendof failure to maintain the equipment and strategies needed to mitigate some beyond-design anddesign-basis events. A summary of the observations and the results overview are available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/follow-up-rpts.html.
The remainder activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
19TOPIC 3. SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY(ONSITE)
3.1 Introduction
After the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, the NRC decided to take specificregulatory actions in areas of severe accident management and onsite recovery. At U.S.
NPPs, combinations of onsite programs contribute to severe accident management and overall
emergency response capability. These programs include abnormal operating procedures(AOPs), alarm response procedures, emergency operating procedures (EOPs), severe accident
management guidelines (SAMGs), and extensive damage mitigation guidelines (EDMGs). The
technical basis and rationale for these procedures represent lessons learned from international
experiences; U.S. reactor accidents; and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Whatfollows is a brief history of the NRC’s current regulatory approach to severe accident
management and the NRC’s plans to develop additional requirements to address lessons
learned from the Fukushima accident.
In October 1980, following the March 1979 accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2, the NRC
staff developed guidance for NPP licensees to develop comprehensive and integrated plans toimprove safety at power reactors (NUREG-0660, “NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of
the TMI-2 Accident”, dated May 1980). The Commission approved specific items from thisguidance for implementation at nuclear power reactors (NUREG-0737, “Clarification of TMI
Action Plan Requirements,” dated November 1980). In January 1983, the NRC publishedadditional supplemental guidance, which included its expectations for licensees to upgrade their
EOPs (NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, “Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements:
Requirements for Emergency Response Capability,” dated January 1983). EOPs are used byreactor operators to mitigate the consequences of transients and accidents that cause plantparameters to exceed setpoints for the reactor protection system or the actuation of engineered
safety features. In response to the 1983 guidance, the NRC required licensees to reanalyzetransients and accidents and prepare technical guidelines. These analyses identify operator
tasks as well as information and control needs. The analyses also serve as the basis for
integrating upgraded EOPs and the control room design review and for verifying the design ofsafety parameter display systems.
The nuclear industry also voluntarily developed SAMGs in response to the TMI accident; details
can be found in GL 88-20, Supplement 2, “Accident Management Strategies for Considerationin the Individual Plant Examination Process,” dated April 4, 1990. However, the NRC did not
require licensees to develop and implement SAMGs. The SAMGs are used by plant technicalsupport staff in the plant’s technical support center, when an accident at the plant progresses
beyond the point at which EOPs and other plant procedures are applicable. The SAMGs arevoluntary, and training and licensing of plant operators may not address them.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly issued advisories thatlicensees should demonstrate their ability to deal with losses of large areas of their plants
caused by fires and explosions. These early security advisories and orders are now containedin a new regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(hh). This rule includes requirements for EDMGs. Like
SAMGs, the EDMGs would be used in the unlikely event that the normal command and control
structure is disabled and the continued use of EOPs is no longer feasible.

21Following the March 2011 accident at Fukushima Daiichi, the NRC recognized that each of theonsite emergency action programs described above contributes to the overall capability of plant
operators to mitigate accidents in response to an emergency. The SAMGs and EDMGs
complement the EOPs in an important way and have established the command and control
responsibilities for each of these programs, although not necessarily in a consistent manner. As
described above, each of these programs was developed at a different time to serve a different
purpose, and each of these programs is treated differently in the NRC’s regulations, inspection
program, and licensing process, as well as in licensee programs and organizations.
The NRC has identified a number of regulatory actions in the area of severe accident
management and recovery (onsite) as a result of its review of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
The specific actions are discussed below.
3.2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Personnel Resources and Training
3.2.1 Discussion
The NRC estimates that issuing new regulations over the next 5 years will require a diverse andhighly specialized professional staff at the NRC with experience in such matters as reactor
licensing, seismology, structural engineering, PRA, geotechnical engineering, inspection
program management, inspection, surface water hydrology, mechanical engineering,
instrumentation and control, electrical engineering, fire protection, nuclear engineering, incident
response and EP, and rulemaking.
The NRC’s significant challenge will be to ensure that regulatory improvements in response to
Fukushima do not displace ongoing work that has greater safety benefit. The NRC also
acknowledges that there are resource and implementation challenges that licensees will
experience with regard to skill sets in high demand (e.g., PRA, seismic, and flooding expertise).
3.2.2 Actions Taken
1. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
3.2.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC has identified a longer-term activity to train NRC staff on severe accidents andtrain resident inspectors on SAMGs (NTTF Recommendation 12.2). Other specificregulatory actions are described below under Sections 3.3 and 3.5.
3.2.4 Schedule
The NRC plans to develop a schedule for NRC staff training on SAMGs.
3.2.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.

223.3 Adequacy of Procedures
3.3.1 Discussion
The March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi site demonstrated the need for better
integration of EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs. (NTTF Recommendation 8). In particular, these
improved procedures should address the possibility of severe external hazards creating a
prolonged SBO condition, which affects multiple reactor units and SFPs (NTTF
Recommendation 9).
The NRC concluded that further integration could substantially enhance the overall
effectiveness of those programs. The integration should clarify transition points, command andcontrol, and decisionmaking, and rigorously train staff using conditions that are as close to real
accident conditions as feasible (NTTF Recommendation 8.1). The NRC also concluded that
action is warranted to confirm, augment, consolidate, simplify, and strengthen current regulatory
and industry programs in a manner that produces a single, comprehensive framework for
accident mitigation. Once the regulatory framework has been expanded, the NRC plans tomodify its Reactor Oversight Process for inspection and performance monitoring of licensees toincorporate the expanded framework (NTTF Recommendation 12.1).
The framework may specify the authority to implement SAMGs and EDMGs without the need fora licensee to seek the NRC’s permission or to invoke the regulations in 10 CFR 50.54(x) and(y), which allow operators to take action in an emergency that departs from a license conditionor technical specification because it is necessary to protect public safety. This change would
further clarify authority, streamline decisionmaking, and prevent potential delays in taking
important emergency actions (included within NTTF Recommendation 8).
The NRC plans to issue an ANPR to engage stakeholders in rulemaking activities associatedwith the methods to integrate onsite emergency response processes, procedures, training andexercises. The ANPR will address a methodology and acceptance criteria to do the following(all related to NTTF Recommendations 8.1 through 8.4):
1. Modify the EOP technical guidelines (required by NUREG-0737, Supplement 1,“Requirements for Emergency Response Capability”).
2. Include EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs in an integrated manner.
3. Specify clear command and control strategies for their implementation.
4. Stipulate appropriate qualification and training for those who make decisions during
emergencies.
5. Modify the standard technical specifications for each operating reactor design toreference the approved EOP technical guidelines for that plant.
6. Require licensees to modify each plant’s technical specifications to conform to thesechanges.
7. Require more realistic, hands-on training and exercises on SAMGs and EDMGs for all
staff expected to implement the strategies and make decisions.

23

3.3.2 Actions Taken
1. On March 18, 2011, the NRC issued an IN to licensees and new reactor applicants. IN
2011-05, “Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake Effects On Japanese Nuclear Power
Plants,” notified addressees of the effects of the Japanese Earthquake on NPPs andasked licensees to consider actions at their plants that would avoid similar problems.
the NRC sent a similar notice to fuel cycle facilities on March 31, 2011 (IN 2011-08,“Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake Effects on Japanese Nuclear Power Plants – For
Fuel Cycle Facilities”).
2. On April 29, 2011, the NRC issued TI 2515/184, “Availability and Readiness of SAMGs”
to provide guidance to its inspectors on assessing the availability and readiness of
SAMGs.
3. On May 11, 2011, the NRC issued Bulletin 2011-01, “Mitigating Strategies,” to requirethat licensees provide a comprehensive verification of their compliance with theregulatory requirements for strategies required to maintain or restore core cooling,
containment and spent fuel cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated withloss of large areas of the plant caused by explosions or fires.
4. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
5. In March 2012, the NRC staff completed the analysis of the licensee’s responses to
NRC Bulletin 2011-01.
6. On April 18, 2012, the NRC issued an ANPR to engage stakeholders in rulemaking
activities associated with the methodology for integration of onsite emergency response
process, procedures, training, and exercises (NTTF Recommendation 8, see
Section 3.3.1). The ANPR will allow the NRC to obtain stakeholder input early in therulemaking process.
3.3.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC staff will use the analysis of the licensees’ responses to NRC Bulletin 2011-01
to inform the development of guidance for the recently issued “Order Modifying Licenses
with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events.”
2. In addition, the rulemaking process will develop a regulatory basis, issue a proposed ruleand supporting guidance, resolve public comments, and issue the final rule andguidance documents. A period for licensees to implement the rule and submit licenseamendments will follow. The NRC will inspect sites to ensure licensees meet the new
regulations.
3.3.4 Schedule
The staff’s analysis of the responses to NRC Bulletin 2011-01 was completed in March 2012.
Based on the analysis, the staff is informing the development of the guidance for the recently24issued order and is in the process of determine whether further regulatory actions are needed.
The staff’s conclusion is expected by the summer 2012 and the guidance document by
August 2012. The final rule is scheduled to be issued in approximately 5 years. The SECY
paper describing options for expanding the regulatory framework to include
beyond-design-basis requirements (NTTF Recommendation 1) is scheduled to be issued by
February 2013. The NRC has yet to determine the schedule for making changes to the Reactor
Oversight Process (NTTF Recommendation 12.1).
3.3.5 Results
None of the observations that resulted from the inspections conducted under TI 2515/184
indicated a significant safety issue; however, in general, they indicated an inconsistent
implementation of some aspects of the voluntary SAMG program. A summary of theobservations and the results overview are available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/SAMGs.html.
By June 11, 2011, all licensees had confirmed compliance with the regulatory requirements in
Bulletin 2011-01. All licensees had provided the requested information on maintenance, testing,offsite support, and other features of their mitigating strategies programs. The staff has
analyzed the licensees’ responses and is in the process of determining whether further
regulatory actions are needed. Each licensee’s response to this bulletin is available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/mitigating-strategies.html.
3.4 Multi-Unit Events
3.4.1 Discussion
As described in Section 3.3, a methodology to better integrate the various types of procedures(i.e., EOPs, SAMGs, EDMGs) will be developed as part of the rulemaking and will apply to both
single-unit and multi-unit sites. However, actions have been taken to require licensees todevelop, implement, and maintain guidance and strategies to mitigate the effects of challenges
to the key safety functions of core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling capabilities forbeyond-design-basis events and multi-unit events. (NTTF Recommendation 4.2 as expanded by
the Steering Committee). The NRC is also planning to develop a rulemaking to integrate EOPs,
SAMGs, and EDMGs. (NTTF Recommendation 8). Further, the NRC is currently developing
plans to perform a new multi-year Level 3 PRA to gain insights into multi-unit risk and total siterisk.
3.4.2 Actions Taken
1. On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved a prioritization of recommended
actions to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima (SRM on SECY11-0137).
2. The NRC staff engaged stakeholders to (1) inform the development of acceptancecriteria for reasonable protection of equipment needed to respond tobeyond-design-basis external hazards and multi-unit events, (2) assess the need tosupplement equipment to support beyond-design-basis and multi-unit event mitigation,and (3) discuss the need to develop and train licensee personnel on supporting
strategies.

25

3. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued orders to all operating NPP licensees requiringthem to take steps to provide reasonable protection of equipment needed for strategies
to mitigate beyond-design-basis events and multi-unit events. These orders are
discussed in SECY-12-0025. (NTTF Recommendation 4.2).
3.4.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC staff will develop plant specific safety evaluation reports and perform
inspections to verify compliance with the orders.
3.4.4 Schedule
The full implementation of these orders is expected no later than two refueling cycles after
February 28, 2013 (the date by which licensees must submit their plans to address the orders),
or by December 31, 2016, whichever comes first. As stated in Section 3.3, the final rule
pertaining to integration of onsite emergency response processes, procedures, training, andexercises is scheduled to be issued in approximately 5 years.
3.4.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
3.5 Equipment Availability
3.5.1 Discussion
Some of the near-term activities that the NRC is specifically undertaking to enhance onsite
severe accident prevention are focused on improving equipment availability. Theseenhancements may also provide benefits with respect to severe accident mitigation andrecovery actions at U.S. NPPs. These near-term activities are listed, along with other planned
activities, in Section 3.5.3.
3.5.2 Actions Taken
1. On March 23, 2011, the NRC issued TI 2515/183, “Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event,” to its inspectors. The report focused on theadequacy of facility equipment, capabilities, and strategies for responding to large area
fires, explosions, SBO events, and flooding. Although the focus of these inspections
was on equipment intended to prevent a severe accident, the equipment inspected
would also provide benefits with respect to severe accident mitigation and recovery
actions.
2. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
3. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued orders to provide equipment required to maintain or
restore core cooling, containment and spent fuel cooling capabilities under thecircumstances associated with beyond-design-basis events and multi-unit events (NTTF

26

Recommendation 4.2). These orders are discussed in SECY-12-0025.
4. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued an order to licensees that operate BWRs withMark I and Mark II containment designs, to ensure reliable operation of hardened
wetwell vents (NTTF Recommendation 5.1). This near-term order is discussed in
SECY-12-0025.
5. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued an order to licensees to provide reliable SFP
instrumentation and procedures for operation, maintenance, and testing of theequipment (NTTF Recommendations 7.1). The near-term order is discussed in
SECY-12-0025.
3.5.3 Actions Planned
1. A near-term rulemaking to enhance the capability of stations to maintain safety through a
prolonged SBO (NTTF Recommendation 4.1).
2. A longer term activity to consider regulatory action for hardened vents for othercontainment designs (NTTF Recommendation 5.2).
3. A longer term activity to evaluate the need for enhanced measures for hydrogen control
and mitigation (NTTF Recommendation 6).
3.5.4 Schedule
The full implementation of these near-term orders is expected no later than two refueling cycles
after February 28, 2013 (the date by which licensees must submit their plans to address theorders), or by December 31, 2016, whichever comes first. All final rules are scheduled to becompleted within 5 years. No schedules have been developed for the longer-term activities.
3.5.5 Results
None of the observations that resulted from the inspections conducted under TI 2515/183
indicated a significant safety issue; however, in general, they indicated a potential industry trendof failure to maintain the equipment and strategies needed to mitigate some beyond-design anddesign-basis events. A summary of the observations and the results overview are available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/follow-up-rpts.html.
The remainder activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.

27

TOPIC 4. NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
4.1 Introduction
The U.S. Congress created the NRC as an independent regulatory agency in January 1975,
with the passage of the Energy Reorganization Act. By giving the NRC an exclusively
regulatory mandate, the statute reflected (in part) a congressional judgment that the expanding
commercial nuclear power industry (which was expected to continue to grow) warranted the fulltime attention of an exclusively regulatory agency. In creating the NRC, Congress also
addressed a developing public concern that regulatory responsibilities were overshadowed by
the promotion of nuclear power at the Atomic Energy Commission.
The NRC is headed by a five-member Commission. The President designates one member toserve as Chairman and official spokesperson. The Commission as a whole formulates policies
and regulations governing nuclear reactor and materials safety, issues orders to licensees, andadjudicates legal matters brought before it. The Executive Director for Operations (EDO)
carries out the policies and decisions of the Commission and directs the activities of the
program offices. As a result of the Fukushima event, a new organization, the JLD, was formed
to perform a longer-term review of the March 11, 2011, Japanese earthquake and tsunami.
This directorate is part of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), which reports to the
EDO. The JLD coordinates all of the NRC actions in response to Fukushima.
The NRC has frequent contact and interaction with the executive branch, including the WhiteHouse, the Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Department of State (DOS), DOE, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Defense,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and U.S. Department of Justice. After the Fukushima event, the NRC
continued, and in some cases increased, communications with these organizations.
4.2 Regulator
The NRC’s mission is to ensure the safe use of radioactive materials for beneficial civilian
purposes while protecting people and the environment. The NRC was established by the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, under which the agency took over regulatory responsibility
for civilian nuclear facilities, formerly carried out by the Atomic Energy Commission (asestablished in the Atomic Energy Action of 1954). The NRC’s regulations are contained in the
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, “Energy.” The NRC Commissioners are appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate for 5-year terms. As a collegial body, theCommission formulates policies, develops regulations governing the safety of nuclear reactors
and nuclear material, issues orders to licensees, and adjudicates legal matters. The staff of the
NRC provides technical assessments and recommendations to aid the Commission’s
decisionmaking.
In response to the events at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP on March 11, 2011, the NRC
established the NTTF. This group, consisting of senior managers and NRC officials, conducteda systematic and methodical review of NRC regulations to determine whether the agency
should make additional improvements to its regulatory system in light of the events that
unfolded. The NTTF identified 12 recommendations that are intended to clarify and strengthen
the regulatory framework for protection against natural disasters. In some cases, subsequent29

recommendations from the Steering Committee have modified or enhanced the NTTF
recommendations. The NRC then tasked its staff with prioritizing and implementing the NTTF
recommendations. Each NTTF recommendation was prioritized by the Steering Committee into
one of three groups depending on such factors as significance of risk and benefit to safety. The
NRC also took certain immediate actions, in the form of an IN, TIs, a bulletin, and inspections, toensure that no immediate safety concerns existed at American facilities. The JLD is responsible
for overseeing the implementation of NTTF recommendations, identifying and evaluating
additional recommendations, and overseeing the development of plans to address the items
identified as requiring long-term review.
4.2.1 Information Notices and Temporary Instructions Issued in Response to the Effects of the
Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan
4.2.1.1 Discussion
One week after the event, the NRC issued an IN to alert licensees of the effects of the TohokuTaiheiyou-Oki earthquake and resultant tsunami on NPPs in Japan. The NRC expectedlicensees to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as
appropriate.
In addition, the NRC gave its inspectors guidance on how to assess the following:•

Actions taken by the NPP licensee in response to the Fukushima event – Within monthsof the Fukushima event, NRC inspectors received guidance on how to independently
assess the adequacy of actions taken by U.S. licensees in response to the Fukushima
Daiichi accident. The intent of this guidance was an initial high-level look at theindustry’s preparedness for events that may exceed those for which the plants were
designed. The inspection results were used to help evaluate the industry’s readiness fora similar event and to aid in determining whether additional regulatory actions by the
NRC were warranted. The inspections and associated reports identified no significant
findings.

•

Implementation of SAMGs by the NPP licensees – The NRC inspectors received
guidance to determine the nature and extent of licensee implementation of SAMG
training and exercises. The inspections and associated reports identified no significant
findings.

•

Compliance with mitigation strategies by the NPP licensees – The NRC inspectors
received guidance to obtain verification from U.S. NPPs of their compliance with
mitigation strategies associated with the loss of large areas of the plant caused by fires
or explosions. To achieve these objectives the NRC issued a bulletin (Bulletin 2011-01)
that required a written response from all those addressed.

The NRC staff has developed guidance for NRC inspectors to verify that U.S. fuel cycle facilities
are adequately prepared to prevent and mitigate the consequences of selectedbeyond-design-basis events. Beyond-design-basis events are events that are possible but were
not fully considered in the design process because they were judged to be too unlikely. The
NRC will use the inspection results from this TI to evaluate readiness for such an event and to
determine whether additional regulatory actions by the NRC are warranted. The inspection
activities associated with this TI are scheduled to be completed by September 30, 2012.

30

4.2.1.2 Actions Taken
1. On March 18, 2011, the NRC issued IN 2011-05, “Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake
Effects on Japanese Nuclear Power Plants.”
2. On March 23, 2011, the NRC issued TI 2515/183, “Followup to Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event.”
3. NRC inspectors conducted plant inspections, to assess the adequacy of actions taken
by U.S. licensees in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The inspections werecompleted on April 29, 2011, and the results were documented in NRC inspection
reports. The inspection reports were issued on May 13, 2011.
4. On April 29, 2011, the NRC issued TI 2515/184, “Availability and Readiness Inspectionof Severe Accident Management Guidelines.”
5. NRC inspectors conducted plant inspections, to determine the nature and extent oflicensees’ implementation of SAMG training and exercises. They completed theinspections by May 27, 2011, and documented the results in NRC inspection reports
issued by June 2, 2011.
6. On May 5, 2011, the NRC issued NRC Bulletin 2011-01, “Mitigating Strategies.”
7. Licensees confirmed compliance with the bulletin within 30 days of its issuance, andprovided information on their mitigation strategies programs within 60 days of the date of
the bulletin.
8. On September 30, 2011, the NRC issued TI 2600/0015, “Evaluation of Licensee
Strategies for the Prevention and/or Mitigation of Emergencies at Fuel Facilities.”
9. In March 2012, the NRC staff completed the analysis of the licensee’s responses to
NRC Bulletin 2011-01.
4.2.1.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC staff will use the analysis of the licensees’ responses to NRC Bulletin 2011-01
to inform the development of guidance for the recently issued “Order Modifying Licenses
with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events.”2. The NRC staff will continue the inspection activities associated with TI 2600/0015.
4.2.1.4 Schedule
The staff’s analysis of the licensees’ responses to NRC Bulletin 2011-01 was completed in
March 2012. Based on the analysis, the staff is informing the development of the guidance forthe recently issued order and is in the process of determining whether further regulatory actions
are needed. The staff’s conclusion is expected by the summer 2012 and the guidance
document by August 2012. The staff’s inspection activities associated with TI 2600/0015 arescheduled to be completed by September 30, 2012. Based on the inspection findings the NRC
will determine if further regulatory actions are needed.

31

4.2.1.5 Results
NRC inspectors independently assessed the adequacy of actions taken by U.S. licensees in
response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. They also evaluated the nature and the extent oflicensee implementation of SAMGs. No significant findings were identified. A summary ofobservations and a results overview are available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/follow-up-rpts.html andhttp://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/SAMGs.html.
The staff has analyzed the licensees’ responses to NRC Bulletin 2011-01 and is in the processof determining whether further regulatory actions are needed. The results are not available atthis point; however, the licensees’ responses to the bulletin are available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/mitigating-strategies.html.
4.2.2 Assessment Performed by the Near-Term Task Force
4.2.2.1 Discussion
In light of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, on March 23, 2011, the NRC Chairman tasked thestaff to establish a senior-level task force to conduct a systematic and methodical review of
NRC processes and regulations. The NTTF was to determine whether the NRC needed tomake additional improvements to its regulatory system and to provide recommendations to theCommission for its policy direction within 90 days.
The NTTF concluded that even though there was no imminent risk from continued NPP
operation and licensing actives, enhancements to safety and EP were warranted. The NTTF
provided 12 overarching recommendations in five general areas: (1) clarifying the regulatory
framework, (2) ensuring protection, (3) enhancing mitigation, (4) strengthening EP, and (5)improving the efficiency of NRC programs.
The NTTF also determined that continued operation and continued licensing activities did notpose an imminent risk to the public health and safety of the U.S. population and environment.
4.2.2.2 Actions Taken
1. On March 23, 2011, the Chairman issued a tasking memorandum, COMGBJ-11-002,“NRC Actions Following the Events in Japan,” requesting the staff to establish the NTTF.
2. On July 12, 2011, the NTTF issued its recommended safety enhancements in SECY-110093, “Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century.”
3. On July 19, 2011, the NRC held a Commission briefing on the NTTF review of NRC
processes and regulations following the events in Japan.
4. On July 28, 2011, the NRC held a public meeting on the NTTF’s review of NRC
processes and regulations following the events in Japan.
5. On August 31, 2011, the NRC held a public meeting to obtain feedback on the NTTF’s
recommendations.

32

4.2.2.3 Actions Planned
1. The NTTF has completed its actions and has published its report, as mentioned in
Section 4.2.2.2. The NRC staff is now working on implementing the NTTF
recommendations and the additional identified actions that should be taken in responseto the Fukushima event.
4.2.2.4 Schedule
The NTTF has completed all of its actions. No further activities are scheduled for the NTTF.
The JLD is overseeing the implementation of the NTTF recommendations and additional
identified actions.
4.2.2.5 Results
The NTTF issued its recommended safety enhancements in SECY-11-0093,“Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century.”
4.2.3 The NRC Staff’s Review and Implementation of the NTTF Recommendations
4.2.3.1 Discussion
The Commission directed the staff to promptly engage with stakeholders to review and assess
the recommendations of the NTTF in a comprehensive and holistic manner. The purpose of thisassessment was to provide the Commission with fully informed options and recommendations.
The Commission instructed the staff to remain open to strategies and proposals presented bystakeholders, expert staff members, and others as it provided its recommendations to theCommission. The staff was directed to develop a paper, within 21 days of the issuance of the
NTTF report, reviewing the actions the NTTF recommended be taken without unnecessary
delay (see SECY-11-0124). The Commission also directed the staff to submit a second paper
within 45 days of the issuance of the NTTF report, prioritizing all recommended actions to betaken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima (see SECY-11-0137). Prioritization of
the recommendations was subject to the review and approval of the Steering Committee.
The near-term actions that the staff identified in SECY-11-0124 which should be taken without
unnecessary delay focused on:•

seismic and flood hazard reevaluations•

seismic and flooding walkdowns•

SBO regulatory actions•

equipment needed to recover from the loss of large areas due to explosions or fire•reliable hardened vents for Mark I containments•

strengthening and integrating EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs•

EP regulatory actions

33

The NRC staff developed a SECY paper that used the following method for prioritizing all NTTF
recommendations:•

Reflect regulatory actions to be taken by the staff in response to the Fukushima lessons
learned.

•

Identify implementation challenges.

•

Include the technical and regulatory bases for the prioritization.

•

Identify additional recommendations, if any.

•

Include a schedule and milestones with recommendations for appropriate stakeholder
engagement.

In some cases, subsequent recommendations from the Steering Committee have modified orenhanced the NTTF recommendations.
As a result of the staff’s assessment and prioritization by the Steering Committee, the NTTF
recommendations were categorized in SECY-11-0137 into three tiers:•

Tier 1 - consists of those recommendations that should be started without delay.

•

Tier 2 - consists of those recommendations that could not be initiated in the near-term
because they need further technical assessment, depend on Tier 1 issues, or require theavailability of critical skill sets.

•

Tier 3 - consists of those recommendations that require further staff study to support a
regulatory action.

4.2.3.2 Actions Taken
1. On August 19, 2011, the Commission issued the SRM on SECY-11-0093, “Near-Term
Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan.”
2. On September 9, 2011, the NRC staff issued SECY-11-0124, “Recommended Actions to
Be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report.”
3. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff issued SECY 11-0137, “Prioritization of
Recommended Actions to be taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned.”
4. On October 18, 2011, the Commission issued the SRM on SECY-11-0124,“Recommended Actions to be taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force
Report.”5. On December 15, 2011, the Commission issued the SRM on SECY-11-0137,“Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons
Learned.”6. On February 17, 2012, the NRC issued SECY-12-0025 to provide (1) the proposedorders; (2) the proposed RFIs; (3) the resolution of the six additional issues from34

SECY-11-0137; and (4) the resolution of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety
recommendations.
7. On March 9, 2012, the Commission approved actions in SECY-12-0025.
8. On March 12, 2012, the NRC staff issued the orders and RFIs.
4.2.3.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC staff will evaluate additional recommendations which may be related tolessons-learned from the Fukushima accident as they are identified. As appropriate,
these recommendations will be prioritized and addressed.
4.2.3.4 Schedule
The NRC staff will evaluate additional recommendations as they are identified.
4.2.3.5 Results
The NRC has determined that continued operation and continued licensing activities associatedwith U.S. NPPs do not pose an imminent risk to the health and safety of the U.S. population andenvironment. The NTTF concluded, however, that even though there was no imminent risk fromcontinued NPP operation and licensing actives, enhancements to safety and EP were
warranted. In light of these needed enhancements, the NRC staff continues to evaluate all of
the Fukushima-related recommendations to assess them in a comprehensive and holisticmanner.
4.2.4 Establishment of the Japan Lessons-Learned Project Directorate
4.2.4.1 Discussion
As a result of Commission direction related to SECY-11-0117, which established a proposed
charter for future Japan-related work, the JLD was established to oversee implementation of the
NTTF’s recommendations, identify and evaluate additional recommendations, and oversee thedevelopment of plans to address the items identified as requiring long-term review. The JLD
works in conjunction with the other NRC offices to achieve these goals.
The JLD is guided by a steering committee composed of senior NRC managers who report
directly to the EDO. The Steering Committee is responsible for providing high-level direction
and management vision in light of the events that took place in Japan.
4.2.4.2 Actions Taken
1. On August 26, 2011, the NRC staff issued SECY 11-0117, “Proposed Charter for theLonger-Term Review of Lessons Learned from the March 11, 2011, Japanese
Earthquake and Tsunami.”
2. On October 19, 2011, the Commission issued the SRM on SECY-11-0117, “Proposed
Charter for the Longer-Term Review of Lessons Learned from the March 11, 2011,
Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami.”
3. On November 7, 2011, the JLD was established as part of NRR.
35

4.2.4.3 Actions Planned
1. The JLD, as well as the technical staff, will coordinate the implementation of all theactions in response to the Fukushima event.
4.2.4.4 Schedule
The schedule for the implementation of the actions in response to the Fukushima event is
discussed throughout this report.
4.2.4.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
4.3 Interactions with Congress and Other Government Agencies
4.3.1 Discussion
After receiving news of the Japan earthquake, on March 11, 2011, the NRC’s Office ofCongressional Affairs (OCA) started staffing the Headquarters operations center (HOC) 24
hours a day and provided information to congressional staffers (including press releases, andresponses to telephone and e-mail requests for information). OCA also participated innumerous briefings with other Federal agencies.
The NRC’s OCA staff supported requests for information about the Japan event, including
coordinating twice daily telephone briefings to interested congressional staffers looking for upto-date information on the situation in Japan. To supplement the staffing levels needed toperform these actions, OCA hired a retired civil servant with years of OCA experience.
The OCA Director accompanied the NRC Chairman to Congress to discuss various aspects ofthe situation in Japan and the NRC’s response.
Briefings and meetings with congressional stakeholders are key parts of OCA’s mission. By
engaging with congressional stakeholders, the NRC maintains an open and cooperativeenvironment that enhances Congress’ ability to enact appropriate measures. In support of thisgoal, many congressional briefings (in person and by telephone with members of Congress andcongressional staffers) have been conducted to respond to requests for information.
4.3.2 Actions Taken
1. Provided staff to perform liaison duties in the NRC Operations Center. OCA has eightstaffers who are trained to respond to such an event, and have participated in many
drills over the years to ensure they are able to respond appropriately.
2. Developed (and continues to maintain) a distribution list of more than 600 congressional
points of contact to five updated information about the NRC’s response to the events inJapan, the NTTF’s recommendations and Commission decisions.
3. Provided all relevant information concerning the situation in Japan to the NRC’s
oversight committees, congressional delegations, and any other members whorequested information.

36

4. Participated in several joint congressional briefings with the NRC’s Federal partners,
including DOE, DOS, DHS, NOAA, EPA, and DOD.
5. Since the Fukushima events unfolded, the NRC has testified at over 20 hearings, mostof which covered the situation in Japan and the actions the NRC has taken in response.
6. Participated in twice-daily U.S. Agency for International Development telephone briefings
to congressional staff members to provide up-to-date information on the situation in
Japan, and held NRC-specific briefings for congressional staffers.
7. Responded to numerous e-mails and telephone calls from congressional staffers about
issues associated with the situation in Japan and its potential impact to the U.S.
8. Provided a “year-end” briefing to interested congressional staffers to describe what the
NRC has done in 2011, including an update on actions associated with the NRC’s
response to Fukushima.
4.3.3 Actions Planned
1. Continue to give relevant information to Congress as it becomes available to ensure
Congress is currently and fully informed.
2. Maintain an e-mail distribution list for updates related to the NTTF’s recommendations.
4.3.4 Schedule
NRC will update Congress, as appropriate.
4.3.5 Results
The NRC has regularly engaged with congressional stakeholders to maintain an open andcooperative environment that enhances Congress’ ability to enact appropriate measures. The
activities related to Fukushima are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
4.4 Interactions with the Nuclear Industry, Members of the Public, and Stakeholders
4.4.1 Discussion
As a result of the Japan event, the NRC has interacted with the U.S. nuclear industry, membersof the public, and other stakeholders on how to best implement the actions contained in the
NTTF report and additional Commission direction. A kickoff meeting on the implementation ofnear-term recommendations was held on December 1, 2011, between the NRC staff,
representatives from NEI and nuclear industry, and members of the public. During this meeting,
the NRC staff and the participating stakeholders discussed how to most efficiently move forward
in implementing the NTTF near-term recommendations. Subsequently, the NRC planned andheld public meetings for each of the near-term recommendations that required the issuance ofan order or RFI. These meetings were instrumental in obtaining early input which was factored
into the specific implementation plans for all the issues. These meetings were highly effective inengaging external stakeholders in an open and transparent manner.

37

4.4.2 Actions Taken
1. The NRC held a public meeting on October 7, 2011, and February 9, 2012, with theAdvisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
2. The Commission held a meeting on November 29, 2011, with the Advisory Committee
on Reactor Safeguards.
3. The NRC held a public meeting on December 1, 2011, with members of the public, NEI,
and industry, to discuss strategies to implement the NTTF near-term recommendations.
4. The NRC held public meetings on December 8, 2011, January 18, March 28, andApril 24, 2012, with members of the public, NEI, and industry, to discuss actions related
to NTTF Recommendation 4.2, Mitigating Strategies.
5. The NRC held public meetings on December 12, 2011, January 9, January 19, 2012,
February 7, and March 5, 2012, with members of the public, NEI, and industry, todiscuss actions related to NTTF Recommendation 9.3, EP Staffing Analysis andCommunications.
6. The NRC held public meetings on December 14, 2011, January 18, February 22,
March 1-2, March 15, March 27, April 2-3, April 11-12, April 13, April 17, April 25-26, andApril 27, 2012, with members of the public, NEI, and industry, to discuss actions related
to NTTF Recommendations 2.1 and/or 2.3, Flooding and Seismic Protections.
7. The NRC held public meetings on December 15, 2011, January 17, and May 2, 2012,
with members of the public, NEI, and industry, to discuss actions related to NTTF
Recommendation 5.1, Reliable Hardened Vents.
8. The NRC held public meetings on December 15, 2011, January 19, and March 29,
April 18, and May 1, 2012, with members of the public, NEI, and industry, to discuss
actions related to NTTF Recommendation 7.1, SFP Instrumentation.
9. On January 13, 2012, the NRC Steering Committee met with representatives from NEI
and the nuclear industry Committee to discuss the path forward on the implementation
near-term recommendations.
10. On March 12, 2012, the NRC staff issued orders and RFIs to all licensees. Theseorders and RFIs are discussed in SECY-12-0025.
4.4.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC staff will continue to engage with stakeholders to support associated guidancedevelopment, as necessary.
4.4.4 Schedule
The schedule for the implementation of the actions in response to the Fukushima event is
discussed throughout this report. The NRC staff will, however, continue to engage withstakeholders to support associated guidance development, as necessary.

38

4.4.5 Results
The NRC has determined that continued operation and continued licensing activities associatedwith U.S. NPPs do not pose an imminent risk to the public health and safety of the U.S.
population and environment. The NTTF concluded, however, that even though there was no
imminent risk from continued NPP operation and licensing actives, enhancements to safety andEP were warranted. In light of these needed enhancements, the NRC staff continues toevaluate all of the Fukushima-related recommendations to assess and disposition them in acomprehensive and holistic manner.

39

TOPIC 5. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AND
POST-ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT
5.1 Introduction
The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP demonstrated the need for effective post-accident
management, including radiological evaluation, efficient mechanisms for decisionmaking,control and management of contaminated goods, resettlement, communication and information,
remediation activities, and indemnifications.
The NRC determined that the accident at Fukushima highlights a need to evaluate EP activities
when addressing beyond-design-basis accidents. This section of the report will discuss NRC
post-Fukushima actions in the context of multi-unit events and prolonged SBO, incident
response and EP, communications, and radiation protection. The EP framework was recently
changed to reflect technological advances and address a number of security enhancements that
resulted from the events of September 11, 2001. The revised EP rule, which was in effect on
December 23, 2011, directly correlates to certain post-Fukushima EP safety enhancements.
The rule can be found on www.regulations.gov, Docket ID: NRC-2008-0122, or at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=FR, (FR DOC# 2011-29735
or 76 FR 72560). Below are highlights of pertinent U.S. EP regulations.
•Staffing - The revised EP rule amends 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV(A)(9), toaddress staffing concerns regarding the assignment of responsibilities of the on-shift
personnel, such that during a response to an emergency event the on-shift personnel
are not overburdened. Before this revision, the regulations required “adequate” on-shiftstaffing levels, and guidance documents (such as Interim Staff Guidance
NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, “Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,” dated November2011), more clearly defined the meaning of “adequate.” The revised EP rule requires
licensees to conduct a detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned
to implement emergency plans are not given responsibilities that would prevent the
timely performance of their assigned functions as specified in the emergency plan.

•

Dose Assessment - Under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), the NRC requires licensees to have ameans for assessing the potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency.
Appendix E, “Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization
Facilities,” to 10 CFR Part 50, describes requirements for emergency planning andpreparedness for production and utilization facilities in the U.S, including therequirements of each facility’s emergency plans. Accordingly, a requirement of theemergency plan includes assessing the impact of a radiological release and providing aprotective action recommendation.

•

Communication - After an emergency is declared, a licensee must first notify the Stateand local response organizations, and then the NRC. The NRC requires that licensees
provide these emergency notifications with accurate and timely data on: (1) core andcoolant system conditions, (2) conditions inside the containment building, (3)radioactivity release rates, and (4) data from the plant’s meteorological tower.
Regulations at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 provide for thesenotifications and clearly specify the times in which licensees must make the declarations,41

as well as the methods by which they must be made. The NRC also uses theEmergency Response Data System (ERDS), which allows for the direct electronictransmission of selected NPP parameters. Regulations at 10 CFR 50.72, “Immediate
Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Plants,” and Appendix E to 10
CFR Part 50, require power reactor licensees to transmit ERDS data to the NRC whenan emergency has been declared. Memoranda of understanding exist between
neighboring countries so that their governments can be well informed if there is an eventat a U.S. facility.
To meet the U.S. commitment under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the NRC will promptly notify
IAEA if a serious accident occurs at a commercial NPP. In addition to providing updated
technical reports, NRC will work with DOS and other U.S. agencies to provide additional
information to the IAEA.
•

Drills and Exercises - Under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), the NRC requires licensees toperiodically conduct drills and exercises to develop key skills and evaluate major
portions of their emergency response capabilities. Regulations at 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15)
provides requirements for radiological emergency response training, and NUREG-0654,“Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans andPreparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,” dated November 1980, includes
further details on implementing these regulations. The revised EP rule added
requirements for more challenging drills and exercises, as well as hostile-action-based
exercises.

5.2 Multi-Unit Events and Station Blackouts - Staffing and Communication
5.2.1 Identify Staff Needed for Responding to a Multi-Unit Event
5.2.1.1 Discussion
In the U.S., NRC licensees’ EP plans must ensure adequate staffing of emergency response
personnel (onsite and offsite) to effectively respond to an emergency. As a result of the events
at Fukushima Daiichi, the NRC is evaluating whether more regulatory actions regarding alicensee’s ability to responds to multi-unit events may be warranted. The NRC issued an RFI tolicensees to determine whether additional changes to NRC regulations or guidance documents
are necessary to ensure appropriate staffing to respond to a multi-unit event. The NRC staff will
evaluate the responses to determine appropriate regulatory actions, if any (NTTF
Recommendation 9.3). Specific actions to address this are included below.
5.2.1.2 Actions Taken
1. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
2. The NRC staff has engaged stakeholders to inform the development of a methodology toperform a staffing study to determine the required staff to fill all necessary positions to
respond to a multi-unit event.

42

3. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued an RFI to licensees to (1) perform a staffing study
to determine the required staff to fill all necessary positions to respond to a multi-unit
event, and (2) inform the NRC of the results of the staffing study and any actions takenor planned, along with their implementation schedules. (NTTF Recommendation 9.3).
This RFI is discussed in SECY-12-0025.
5.2.1.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC will evaluate licensee responses and take regulatory action to require
implementation, as appropriate.
5.2.1.4 Schedule
The staff will evaluate licensee responses to RFIs and take regulatory action, as appropriate.
5.2.1.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
5.2.2 Periodic Training and Exercises for Multi-Unit and Prolonged SBO Scenarios
5.2.2.1 Discussion
In the U.S., EP must ensure adequate training of emergency response personnel (onsite andoffsite) so licensees can effectively respond to emergency events. As a result of the events at
Fukushima Daiichi, additional regulatory actions may be needed to determine whether thecurrent requirements for training are adequate (NTTF Recommendation 9.1 and 9.2). Specificactions to address this are included below.
5.2.2.2 Actions Taken
1. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
5.2.2.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC will evaluate and determine whether a rulemaking is warranted to address theneed for licensees to conduct periodic training and exercise for multi-unit and prolonged
SBO scenarios. (NTTF Recommendations 9.1 and 9.2)
5.2.2.4 ScheduleThis is a long-term action and a detailed schedule has not been developed.
5.2.2.5 Results
This is a long-term effort and results are not yet available.

435.2.3 Onsite and Offsite Communications
5.2.3.1 Discussion
The Fukushima incident highlighted the need to provide a way to power communications
equipment needed to communicate onsite (e.g., radios for response teams and communication
between facilities) and offsite (e.g., cellular telephones, satellite telephones) during a prolonged
SBO (NTTF Recommendation 9.3). Specific actions to address this are included below.
5.2.3.2 Actions Taken
1. On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).
2. The NRC staff has engaged with stakeholders to discuss potential enhancements tocommunications systems and power supplies to ensure a means to power
communications equipment necessary for licensee onsite and offsite communications ismaintained during a prolonged SBO event.
3. On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued an RFI to licensees to (1) conduct an assessmentof the communications systems and power supplies to determine what enhancements
would be needed to power communications systems and equipment necessary forlicensee onsite and offsite communications during a prolonged SBO event, and (2)inform the NRC of the results of the study of communications systems and power
supplies and any actions taken or planned, to enhance the communication systems,
along with their implementation schedules. (NTTF Recommendation 9.3) This RFI is
discussed in SECY-12-0025.
5.2.3.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC staff will evaluate licensee responses to the RFI and take appropriate
regulatory action to require implementation.
5.2.3.4 Schedule
The NRC staff will evaluate licensee responses to the RFI and take regulatory action, as
appropriate.
5.2.3.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
5.3 Maintain Emergency Response Data System Capability
5.3.1 Discussion
The Fukushima incident highlighted the need for accurate, real-time data from the site. As partof the current effort to modernize the ERDS infrastructure, the NRC has developed areplacement to the existing modems. The current regulatory requirements do not require that
44

ERDS data be available when power supplies are lost and transmission capability may beaffected. Another challenge evident from Fukushima is the need for archived data to aid in thereconstruction of events after an accident (NTTF Recommendations 9.3 and 9.4).
5.3.2 Actions Taken
1. The NRC is currently completing the ERDS virtual private network transition that has
upgraded NRC servers, upgraded user interfaces, allowed Web access, and replaced
obsolete analog modem technology.
5.3.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC will complete the transition to the ERDS virtual private network.
2. The NRC staff will evaluate additional regulatory options to address redundanttransmission capability, completeness of data, and continuous monitoring capability for
ERDS information. (NTTF Recommendations 9.3 and 9.4)
5.3.4 Schedule
The transition to the virtual private network is ongoing and expected to be complete inJune 2012. Additional regulatory actions will require that the NRC conduct a long-term study
and coordinate with the ongoing effort to modernize ERDS. A schedule for this long-term study
is not currently available.
5.3.5 Results
The activities are currently ongoing and results are not yet available.
5.4 Radiation Protection
5.4.1 Discussion
The accident at Fukushima presents challenges with respect to dose assessment capability
because of the multi-unit nature of the release. The presence of extended releases frommultiple units and SFPs at Fukushima has highlighted the need to have the ability to model
multi-unit accidents (NTTF Recommendation 9.3).
5.4.2 Actions Taken
1.

On October 3, 2011, the NRC staff proposed that the NRC prioritize the NTTF
recommendations to be taken in response to the lessons learned from Fukushima(SECY-11-0137). On December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the staff’s
proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations (SRM on SECY-11-0137).

5.4.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC staff will evaluate additional regulatory options that may be needed to address
how licensees should add guidance to their emergency plans that documents how to
perform a multi-unit dose assessment (including releases from SFPs) using a licensee
site-specific dose assessment software and approach.
45

5.4.4 ScheduleThis is considered a long-term action and a schedule will be developed in the summer 2012.
5.4.5 Results
This is a long-term action and results are not yet available.
5.5 Pre-Staging of Potassium Iodide Beyond the 10-Mile Radius
5.5.1 Discussion
The NRC staff has determined that the current 10-mile potassium iodine (KI) distribution zone
remains adequate. However, the NRC staff will continue to monitor and evaluate population
health studies to confirm this determination.
5.5.2 Actions Taken
1. The NRC has determined that the current 10-mile KI distribution zone remains adequate.
5.5.3 Actions Planned
1. The staff intends to continue to study the health effects on populations around NPPs.
The staff will also continue to monitor and evaluate the population health studies thathave been proposed by the Japanese Government.
5.5.4 ScheduleThis is considered a long-term effort and a schedule will be developed in the summer 2012.
5.5.5 Results
This is a long-term action and results are not yet available.
5.6 Communication, Transparency, and Openness
5.6.1 Discussion
After receiving news of the Japan earthquake, on March 11, 2011, the NRC staffed its HOC anddisseminated the first of many press releases and NRC blog posts.
The NRC’s Office of Public Affairs (OPA) staff provided extended coverage for several months,
to support requests for information about the Japan event. All media inquiries of the NRC HOC
were sent to a media desk, where they were recorded, prioritized, and sent to public affairs
officers at Headquarters for response. OPA staff members from the regional offices handled
local media inquiries. OPA also brought in more than a dozen employees from around the NRC
to augment the six professionals who comprise the Headquarters public affairs staff and allow
OPA to respond to hundreds of requests for information from domestic and international media
outlets and the public. Two public affairs staffers from FEMA also came to support the NRC’s
response efforts for several days.
46

To respond to an unprecedented level of public telephone calls and e-mails, OPA created the
NRC’s first-ever public inquiry desk. This desk answered telephone and e-mail inquiries forextended daily hours and on weekends for several months. A special page was created on the
NRC Web site to make it easier for the public to obtain Japan-specific information, includingpress releases, questions and answers documents, background information and fact sheets,and links to the NRC blog posts.
The OPA Director accompanied the NRC Chairman to the White House and Congress.
Coverage of the NRC’s role in the overall U.S. Government’s response to the events in Japanand how the Japanese incident related to the safety of U.S. NPPs was intense and continuous.
A media monitoring contractor provided extensive reports on press coverage.
Meeting with stakeholders is a key portion of each step in the process for all EP
recommendations related to the Fukushima lessons learned project. By engaging withstakeholders, the NRC will maintain a collaborative environment that will enhance the project’s
results and keep the public informed. All EP actions related to the lessons learned from the
Fukushima Daiichi event and the resulting impact on U.S. nuclear facilities are posted on the
NRC’s public Web site and, as appropriate, included in periodic press releases.
The NRC held a series of public meetings on the EP recommendations to directly engage
stakeholders and industry. The dates of these meetings were December 12, 2011,
January 9, January 19, February 7, and March 5, 2012; more will follow, if needed.
5.6.2 Actions Taken
1. The NRC updated its crisis communication plan with lessons learned and added staff to
the OPA’s technical briefer list to support public and media outreach efforts in future
events.
2. The NRC developed a standard operating protocol using lessons learned from theimplementation of the public inquiry desk; the agency is developing a permanent roster.
3. The NRC held public meetings to discuss NTTF recommendations and to obtain input
from the public and interested stakeholders on how to address the recommendations of
the NTTF that relate to EP lessons learned from the Fukushima response.
4. The NRC conducted a post-event response After Action Review (AAR) that addressedneeded enhancements to our real-time communications with stakeholders, such as theStates, during events.
5.6.3 Actions Planned
1. Develop a roster to staff the public inquiry desk during future events.
2. The NRC is participating in a Federal Government working group to update theEmergency Support Function 15 – External Communication chapter and annexes to the
U.S. “National Response Framework,” dated January 2008, which will include a new
section addressing communications response to international incidents as well as
updating expected coordinated responses to domestic incidents.

47

3. Resolve the items identified in the AAR report.
5.6.4 Schedule
The schedule for developing the roster to staff the inquiry desk has not been determined. The
updated National Response Framework Emergency Support Function 15 annexes arescheduled to be delivered to the U.S. President before the end of 2012. The AAR action items
are currently being prioritized in near- and long-term activities. A detailed schedule forcompleting the AAR action items is not currently available.
5.6.5 Results
This is a long-term action and results are not yet available.
5.7 Additional Long-Term EP-Related Topics
5.7.1 Discussion
The NTTF report identified additional long-term EP-related areas that need further evaluationand enhancement. Specifically, the NTTF recommended that the NRC staff review three
additional EP-related topics associated with multi-unit events and prolonged SBOs; as well as
additional topics related to decisionmaking, radiation monitoring, and public education. (NTTF
Recommendations 10 and 11)
5.7.2 Actions Taken
1. No specific actions have been taken on these topics.
5.7.3 Actions Planned
1. The NRC is currently evaluating the following topics related to EP:•

Analyze current protective equipment requirements for emergency responders andguidance based upon insights from the accident at Fukushima. (NTTF
Recommendation 10.1)•

Evaluate the command and control structure and the qualifications of decisionmakers
to ensure that the proper level of authority and oversight exists in the correct facility
for a long-term SBO or multi-unit event accident or both. (NTTF Recommendation
10.2)

•

Evaluate ERDS to determine an alternate method for transmittal, and whether thecurrent data set is sufficient. (NTTF Recommendation 10.3)•

Study whether enhanced onsite emergency response resources are necessary tosupport the effective implementation of the licensees’ emergency plans, including theability to deliver the equipment to the site under conditions involving significant
natural events where degradation of offsite infrastructure or competing priorities forresponse resources could delay or prevent the arrival of offsite aid. (NTTF
Recommendation 11.1)

48

•Work with FEMA, State officials, and other external stakeholders to evaluate insightsfrom the implementation of EP at Fukushima to identify potential enhancements to
the U.S. decisionmaking framework, including the concepts of site recovery andre-entry. (NTTF Recommendation 11.2)•

Study the efficacy of real-time radiation monitoring onsite and within the emergency
planning zones (including consideration of AC independent and real-time availabilityon the internet). (NTTF Recommendation 11.3)•

Conduct training, in coordination with the appropriate Federal partners, on radiation,
radiation safety, and the appropriate use of KI in the local community around each
NPP. (NTTF Recommendation 11.4)

2. The NRC staff will write a paper to the NRC Commission describing the plans andschedules for performing work on these additional topics.
5.7.4 Schedule
A Commission paper describing the plans and schedules for performing work on these
additional topics is scheduled to be provided to the Commission in July 2012.
5.7.5 Results
This is a long-term action and results are not yet available.

49

TOPIC 6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
6.1 Introduction
The accident at Fukushima highlights the importance of continuous international cooperation.
Since the accident occurred, the U.S. Government has augmented its coordinated program ofinternational nuclear safety activities. Some existing activities have been expanded to address
lessons learned from the accident, while certain initiatives have been created specifically toaddress the accident and its implications. In both cases, the objectives of U.S. representatives
in international meetings have been to expand their understanding of the accident and others’
approaches to learning its lessons; to share relevant experience and lessons learned; and tominimize duplication of effort and leverage financial and human resources. In addition tocontributing to the U.S. Government’s direct cooperation with and support of the Government ofJapan, the NRC has actively supported numerous post-Fukushima international activities, bothon a bilateral and a multilateral basis. Through regular communication with its foreign
government counterparts, particularly in the regulatory area, and participation in international
meetings, the U.S. has gleaned valuable information to enhance its domestic nuclear safety
program and has contributed to the development of a stronger global nuclear safety regime.
Within its areas of responsibility, the NRC supports the U.S. foreign policy goal of ensuring thesafe and secure use of nuclear and radioactive materials and guarding against the spread of
nuclear weapons. As explained in greater detail in the “United States of America Fifth National
Report for the Convention on Nuclear Safety,” dated September 2010, the NRC actively
participates in developing and implementing a variety of legally binding treaties and conventions
that create an international framework for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NRC
provides technical and legal advice and assistance to international organizations and foreigncountries as they work to develop effective regulatory organizations and rigorous safety
standards. Some activities are carried out within the programs of the IAEA, the Nuclear Energy
Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), or
other international organizations. The NRC conducts other activities directly with counterpart
agencies in other countries under bilateral cooperation agreements.
6.2 International Treaties
6.2.1 Discussion
Among the treaties that legally bind the U.S. Government’s peaceful uses of nuclear energy andnuclear applications are the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1980 Convention on
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), the1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the 1986 Convention on
Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the 1997 Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management.
6.2.2 Actions Taken
1. The NRC maintained leadership roles (Vice President and Country Group Vice Chair) in
the CNS review process.

51

2. The NRC participated in U.S. Government discussions with international counterparts on
proposals to either amend relevant conventions or enhance their effectiveness throughprocedural means.
3. The NRC participated in the international negotiation of the IAEA “Action Plan on
Nuclear Safety,” which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and endorsed by
the IAEA General Conference in September 2011.
4. The NRC informed the IAEA that in April 2011, it had appointed a National Competent
Authority contact at the NRC for the Early Convention and Assistant Convention.
5. The NRC submitted 2 proposals to enhance the CNS effectiveness on April 19, 2012.
6. The NRC is supporting the U.S. delegation to the first Preparatory Committee meeting ofParties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
7. The NRC is supporting the U.S. Government in its development of implementing
legislation to complete its ratification of the amendment to the Convention on PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Material.
6.2.3 Actions Planned
1. Participate in the Joint Convention review meeting. The NRC will co-deliver the U.S.
National Report, will chair a Country Group and will assist the U.S. delegation during thetwo-week review meeting.
2. Participate in the CNS extraordinary meeting. The NRC will maintain its leadership roles(i.e., Vice President and Country Group Vice Chair) and will assist the U.S. delegation
during the one-week meeting.
3. Participate in the sixth CNS review meeting.
4. Support the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review
Conference.
6.2.4 Schedule
U.S. representatives will participate in the Joint Convention review meeting, which will takeplace in May 2012, in Vienna, Austria. The U.S. will also attend the CNS extraordinary meetingin August 2012, and the sixth CNS review meeting in April 2014, both in Vienna, Austria. U.S.
representatives will also attend the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meetings in2013 and 2014, and the Review Conference in 2015.
6.2.5 Results
Participation in these ongoing activities has provided the U.S. with multiple opportunities tobenefit from the peer review process set forth by the various international instruments. It has
also enabled the U.S. to share experience and insights with the international community as
nuclear safety-related documents and proposals have been crafted.

52

6.3 Communications
6.3.1 Discussion
The NRC supports U.S. Government activities to improve communications before, during, andafter a nuclear or radiological event. Through its treaty and convention obligations, the U.S.
Government participates in international emergency response activities such as the emergency
response trials, drills, and IAEA Incident and Emergency Center convention exercises(ConvEx); provides funding and staff support for international EP, including the IAEA’s
International Emergency Center and the NEA’s Working Party on EP; and routinely coordinateswith neighboring States on natural disaster and other emergency communication events.
To meet the U.S. commitment under the IAEA Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident, the NRC will promptly notify IAEA if a serious accident occurs at a commercial NPP.
In addition to providing updated technical reports, the NRC will work with DOS and other U.S.
Government agencies to provide additional information to the IAEA.
Since 1992, the U.S. has participated in the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale(INES) system that the IAEA and NEA have established as a means for promptly
communicating, to the public and media, the safety significance of events that may occur atnuclear or radiological facilities. In 2002, NRC expanded its participation in INES to submit
ratings for those events rated at Level 2 or higher on INES. The U.S. has also played asignificant role on IAEA’s INES Advisory Committee, including support of the international
negotiations that resulted in the INES and events related to its expanded use for rating radiationand transport events.
The NRC has agreements with its neighboring states, Canada and Mexico, to promptly notify
and exchange information in the event of an emergency that has the potential for transboundary
effects. The agreement with Canada, “Agreement Between the Government of the UnitedStates of America and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in Comprehensive Civil
Emergency Planning and Management,” is implemented by the procedure specified in“Administrative Arrangement Between the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada for Cooperation and the Exchange of Information in
Nuclear Regulatory Matters,” both dated June 21, 1989. The agreement between the NRC andthe Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) was most recently renewed in 2007. The
agreement with Mexico, “Agreement for the Exchange of Information and Cooperation in
Nuclear Safety Matters,” is implemented by the “Implementing Procedure for the Exchange ofTechnical Information and Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Matters Between the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission of the United States of America and the Comisión Nacional de
Seguridad Nuclear y Salvaguardias of Mexico (CNSNS),” both dated October 6, 1989. Thisagreement was most recently renewed in 2007.
After the events at Fukushima, recognizing the proximity of several U.S. NPPs to the borders
with Canada and Mexico, the NRC engaged in close communications with the neighboring
countries.
6.3.2 Actions Taken
1. The NRC and CNSC continued to exchange information regularly as details about the
Fukushima accident unfolded, in part because of shared public concerns about radiation53

affecting the western coasts of Canada and the U.S. While such discussions with
Mexico were not as immediately necessary, the U.S. Government continued to
exchange information with its Mexican counterparts in the areas of EP and nuclear
reactor safety.
2. The NRC and CNSC held a technical bilateral meeting to exchange information on avariety of subjects, including enhancing bilateral EP cooperation and sharing experienceand lessons learned to strengthen both domestic programs in February 2012.
3. The NRC held a planning meeting with CNSNS in March 2012 to discuss futurecooperation meetings and technical bilateral exchanges in 2012.
6.3.3 Actions Planned
1. The U.S. will continue to maintain close cooperative relationships with its North
American neighbors. This will include sharing information about the nuclear safetyassessment activities currently underway at U.S. facilities and discussing ways toenhance coordination in the EP area.
2. The NRC will schedule additional technical bilateral meetings with CNSC and CNSNS in2012.
6.3.4 Schedule
Bilateral activities will be scheduled on an as-needed basis. The U.S. Government will also
continue to interact with both Canada and Mexico on a regular basis in multilateral fora and inpeer review forums such as the CNS review meetings and the extraordinary meeting.
6.3.5 Results
Interactions with Canadian officials in the short-term and long-term aftermath of the Fukushima
accident have been beneficial in sharing data and approaches. Participation in international EP
exercises such as the ConVex exercise hosted by Mexico has helped ensure that proper
procedures are in place for robust cooperation in the event of an accident affecting North
American borders. A Commissioner-level visit to Mexico in February 2012 provided an
opportunity to discuss Fukushima lessons learned and likely changes in each country’s
regulatory program.
6.4 Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation and Assistance Program
6.4.1 Discussion
The NRC has arrangements to exchange technical information with nuclear safety agencies inmore than 41 countries and Taiwan. In addition, the NRC works with many countries that areconsidering the option of nuclear power through the International Regulatory Development
Partnership, although there may not yet be a formal bilateral arrangement in place. The NRC
and its foreign counterparts routinely exchange operational safety data and other regulatory
information. The NRC provides safety, security, EP, and safeguards advice, training, and otherassistance to countries that seek U.S. help to improve their regulatory programs.

54

The NRC’s information exchange arrangements serve as communication channels with foreign
regulatory authorities, establishing a framework for the NRC to gain access to non-U.S. safety
information that can (1) alert the U.S. Government and industry to potential safety problems, (2)help find possible accident precursors, and (3) provide accident and incident analyses, including
lessons learned, that could be directly applicable to the safety of U.S. NPPs and other facilities.
The arrangements also serve as a vehicle for the assistance the NRC provides to countries toestablish and improve their regulatory capabilities and infrastructure. Thus, the arrangements
facilitate the NRC’s strategic goal to support U.S. interests in the safe and secure use of nuclear
and radioactive materials and in nuclear nonproliferation.
Since the Fukushima accident, the NRC and its regulatory counterparts have shared a variety of
information under the framework of these agreements, including preliminary results from the
NRC’s lessons learned activities. As the NRC’s work in this area progresses and conclusions
continue to develop, the NRC will continue to provide information about its activities andwelcomes open, frequent exchanges of information to learn from its counterparts’ efforts.
In the multilateral area, the U.S. has participated actively in nuclear safety activities at the IAEA
and the NEA. This has included representation on nuclear safety committees and associatedworking groups, consultative work to develop international safety standards and guidance, andparticipation in international peer review missions. Following Fukushima, the U.S. has
supported these agencies as they identify specific initiatives to address lessons learned andenhance multilateral communication, including identifying new or redistributing existing
resources. In these areas, the U.S. has emphasized the importance of close cooperation
among parties to maximize the effectiveness of the initiatives and avoid duplication of efforts.
6.4.2 Actions Taken
1. Following the event, the U.S. Government sent technical and diplomatic representatives
to the U.S. Embassy in Japan to assist the U.S. Ambassador and his team. As
requested, the U.S. representatives also assisted the Japanese Government withtechnical support.

2. The U.S. Government participated in major international meetings on Fukushima in 2011
including meetings hosted by the French Government as 2011 President of the Group of
Eight Industrialized Nations (G8), and parallel meetings of the Group of Twenty (G20) in
Paris, the NEA Forum in Paris, the IAEA ministerial-level conference in Vienna, and theEuropean Nuclear Safety Regulators Group meeting in Brussels.
3. The U.S. Government participated in the development of the IAEA “Action Plan on
Nuclear Safety,” which was approved by the Board of Governors and adopted by theGeneral Conference in September 2011.
4. The NRC is participating in an ongoing IAEA review of safety standards and guidance toaddress lessons learned from Fukushima.
5. The NRC participated in several IAEA international peer review missions to Japan,
including the initial fact-finding mission that took place in May 2011.
6. The NRC, through its INES Advisory Committee member, is developing additional
guidance on the application of INES in severe accidents as directed in the IAEA Action
Plan on Nuclear Security.
55

7. The NRC is participating in meetings of the NEA Senior Task Group on the Impacts ofFukushima and in ongoing work within the NEA committee structure to determine NEA’srole in post-Fukushima lessons-learned efforts.
8. The NRC hosted the October 2011 international workshop on lessons learned from
Integrated Regulatory Review Service missions, which discussed the potential impactsof the Fukushima accident on the program, in keeping with the direction of the IAEA
Action Plan on Nuclear Safety to enhance the international peer-review process.
9. The NRC held bilateral meetings with several regulatory counterparts to discuss lessons
learned from Fukushima.
10. The NRC participated in the IAEA international experts meetings on reactor and spent
fuel safety in light of the Fukushima accident in March 2012.
6.4.3 Actions Planned
1. Continue to participate in bilateral and multinational activities to exchange lessons
learned from the Fukushima accident.
2. The U.S. will maintain regular contact with the Japanese regulator, the U.S. Embassy,
and other stakeholders, as appropriate.
6.4.4 Schedule
Bilateral and multilateral activities for the exchange of lessons learned from Fukushima are
ongoing. No schedule is necessary at this time beyond the current schedule of conferences,
working group meetings, and consultancy meetings.
6.4.5 Results
U.S. participation in bilateral and multilateral activities such as those in the illustrative, but notcomprehensive, list discussed above have provided fruitful opportunities for U.S technical andpolicy experts to exchange information and lessons learned with international counterparts whoare employing a variety of approaches to address the enhancement of nuclear safety worldwide.
As the global nuclear safety community continues to identify lessons from the Fukushima
accident, these forums will continue to serve this beneficial purpose. These discussions havealso enabled nuclear regulators, policymakers and other stakeholders to address the issue of
how best to leverage resources to ensure that they are used efficiently while minimizing
duplication and overlap.
6.5 Sharing Operating Experience
6.5.1 Discussion
As part of its safety goal, under the current NRC Strategic Plan, published in February 2012, the
NRC is committed to the systematic evaluation of domestic and international operating
experience and using information from those evaluations to improve NRC programs and for the
benefit of U.S. commercial nuclear safety. As a result, the NRC’s emphasis on the effective use
and communication of international operating experience remains strong. It follows that, as part56

of its commitments to international stakeholders, and for the purposes of supportinginternational nuclear safety and security, the NRC shares U.S. nuclear industry operating
experience with the international community through various means. The NRC participates in
the INES and the International Reporting System for Operating Experience (IRS); both of these
programs resulted from cooperation between the IAEA and the NEA of the OECD and make
operating experience information accessible to the international nuclear community. NRC
operating experience personnel also participate in a range of international meetings,
conferences, and working groups, including the NEA/OECD/CNRA Working Group forOperating Experience (WGOE), the Advisory Committee for the IRS (the ACIRS), andworkshops supporting IAEA and the European Commission’s Operating Experience
Clearinghouse.
NRC operating experience personnel rate all reactor related events using the criteria from the2008 INES User’s Manual. Furthermore, all nuclear or radiological events that are rated at an
INES Level 2 or higher are transmitted to the IAEA for publication through its information
channel on nuclear and radiological events, NEWS (http://www-news.iaea.org/). Additionally,
the NRC posts all of the reactor-related INs to the IRS database in accordance with the mostcurrent manual for IRS coding. NRC INs are the vehicles the agency uses to communicate
operating experience to U.S. commercial nuclear plant operators. Meetings, conferences andworking groups also provide a multitude of opportunities for sharing information about specific
U.S. events or trends that the NRC is following or to which the agency is responding. These
interactions foster personal relationships between operating experience personnel from different
countries and enable the sharing of operating experience through direct communications, suchas e-mails and telephone conversations. Thus, the NRC operating experience staff routinely
interacts with and responds to queries from international nuclear regulatory staff and associatedbodies requiring assistance on operating experience topics. As an example, operating
experience staff recently completed a comprehensive survey on operating experienceorganization, process, and products in response to an NEA-sponsored request from theregulatory authority in the United Arab Emirates.
After the reactor accidents at Fukushima Daiichi, the NRC shared relevant operating experiencethrough various international forums. The NRC staff presented U.S. actions in response to
Fukushima at various OECD/NEA/CNRA working group meetings, such as the WGOE and at
meetings of the IRS. The NRC issued IN 2011-05, which describes the events at the
Fukushima Daiichi plant with details that were known at the time. The IN also communicatesseveral NRC rules that may be applicable from the perspective of the U.S. nuclear industry.
The NRC shared this IN with the international community through the IRS. The NRC staff also
developed a preliminary sequence of events that it shared within the NRC and with other U.S.
Government agencies and entities that needed this information as the NRC sought to respondto and evaluate the event.
6.5.2 Actions Taken
1. IN 2011-05, “Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake Effects on Japanese Nuclear Power
Plants," dated March 18, 2011 was posted to the IRS database. IN 2011-05 describes
the events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station with details known at thetime; the IN also communicates several NRC rules that maybe applicable from a U.S.
nuclear industry perspective.
2. NRC operating experience personnel provided a presentation during the fall 2011
WGOE meeting that described the NRC’s response to the events in Japan, the57

radiological protective action recommendations made by the NRC to the U.S.
Ambassador to Japan, the domestic considerations that were made in light of the eventsin Japan, and the NRC’s NTTF findings.
3. In keeping with the NRC’s value of openness, the agency has developed a Web site
focused on communicating information related to the actions taken in response to theevents in Japan. This site is easily accessible from the NRC’s home page,www.nrc.gov.
6.5.3 Actions Planned
1. Continue supporting international nuclear safety and security through the open sharingof relevant and significant operating experience with international and domestic
stakeholders.
6.5.4 Schedule
No schedule is necessary at this time, beyond the current schedule of conferences, working
group meetings, and consultancy meetings. The NRC shares operating experience with theinternational community on a routine basis.
6.5.5 Results
While specific results concerning the sharing of operating experience are not readily measured
or catalogued, it is accepted that the open and collaborative sharing of operating experience isalways to the benefit of nuclear safety and security. From a domestic perspective, operating
experience has served as a key component of the foundation upon which lessons learned fromthe nuclear events related to the Great East Japan Earthquake are developed. For example,
insights from the extraordinary flooding conditions that occurred in the Midwestern U.S. in thespring of 2011 will be considered within the highest priority items of the NRC's response to theevents in Japan. Similarly, insights gained from the sharing of operating experience amonginternational partners has enabled fruitful exchanges and led to additional actions (e.g.,consideration of the potential for the loss of UHS) not initially considered when prioritizing the
NRC’s actions in response to the events in Japan.

58

PART 259

Convention on Nuclear Safety 2012
Extraordinary Meeting:
U.S. Industry Response to the Fukushima
Accident

May 2012
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

61

INTRODUCTIONThe U.S. industry response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP)
builds upon an existing regime of procedural guidance, equipment capability, and personnel
training developed over many years. This regime helps maintain the integrity and performanceof critical safety functions for bounding design-basis events and other beyond-design-basis
events that may occur during the life of a plant. The following highlight several actions the U.S.
industry has implemented over the last three decades to establish a robust capability to respondto these events:
1. The U.S. industry has adopted procedural guidance to address the preservation ofcritical safety features threatened by external events. This guidance includes thesymptom-based emergency operating procedures (EOPs), developed in the 1980s
following the Three Mile Island accident; severe accident management guidelines(SAMGs), developed in the 1990s following the Chernobyl accident; and the extensive
damage management guidelines (EDMGs), developed in the 2000s following theterrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This procedure regime provides
defense-in-depth for design bases events and flexibility to respond to postulated
conditions beyond the design basis of a plant.
2. The U.S. industry has addressed several specific issues related to external event
response. These include procuring necessary equipment, developing procedural
guidance, conducting training for plant operators to cope with a station blackout (SBO),
managing and mitigating the effects of a terrorist attack (NRC Security Order B.5.b), andimplementing emergency plans for responding to external events.
3. In accordance with NRC regulations, the U.S. industry implemented plant designmodifications to increase AC power redundancy in the event of an SBO in the 1990s,
and to establish robust containment hydrogen and pressure control capabilities.
Additionally, the industry conducted individual plant examinations for external events(IPEEEs) using probabilistic risk assessment methods to identify external event
vulnerabilities. It then put into place plant response strategies to mitigate thosevulnerabilities.
With consideration to the above foundation, the response of the U.S. industry to the Fukushima
nuclear accident involves both a response to orders and requests for information (RFIs) fromthe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the near-term, intermediate, and long-term
actions industry initiatives as outlined below:
1. Prior to the NRC issuing orders and RFIs as a result of the lessons learned from
Fukushima, a series of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) event reports(IERs) defined the self-initiated near-term U.S. industry response. These include thefollowing IERs, which are for internal use and available to INPO members only:•

IER L1-11-1, “Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused by
Earthquake and Tsunami,” dated March 15, 201163•

IER L1-11-1, Supplement 1, “Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage
Caused by Earthquake and Tsunami,” dated October 3, 2011•

IER L1-11-2 , “Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Spent Fuel Pool Loss of Coolingand Makeup,” dated April 25, 2011•

IER L1-11-3, “Weaknesses in Operator Fundamentals,” dated June 15, 2011•

IER L1-11-4, “Near-Term Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended Loss of All
AC Power in Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Event,” dated August 1, 2011

2. A U.S. industry document, dated June 8, 2011, established the intermediate andlong-term self-initiated industry response. Entitled “The Way Forward: U.S. Industry
Leadership in Response to the Events at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant,”
the document defines eight strategic goals for the U.S. industry in response to the
Fukushima accident. This document is available to the public at
http://nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/whitepaper/the-way-f
orward---june-2011.
The strategic goals are as follows:
1. The nuclear workforce remains focused on safety and operational excellence at allplants, particularly in light of the increased work that the response to the Fukushima
event will represent.
2. Timelines for emergency response capability to ensure continued core cooling,
containment integrity and spent fuel storage pool cooling to prevent fuel damage
following SBO or challenges to the ultimate heat sink (UHS).
3. The U.S. nuclear industry is capable of responding effectively to any significant eventin the U.S. with the response being scalable to support an international event, as
appropriate.
4. SAMGs, security response strategies (B.5.b), and external event response plans are
effectively integrated to ensure nuclear energy facilities are capable of asymptom-based response to events that could impact multiple reactors at a single
site.
5. Margins for protection from external events are sufficient based on the latest hazards
analyses and historical data.
6. Spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling and makeup functions are fully protective during
periods of high heat load in the SFP and during extended SBO conditions.
7. Primary containment protective strategies can effectively manage and mitigate postaccident conditions, including elevated pressure and hydrogen concentrations.
8. Accident response procedures provide steps for controlling, monitoring andassessing potential radiation and ingestion pathways during and following an
accident, including timely communication of accurate information.

64

In support of the strategic goals, “The Way Forward” defines six guiding principles andestablishes an industry structure, including an executive steering committee, to implement theactions necessary to accomplish the strategic goals. The normal governance structure of theElectric Power Research Institute (EPRI), INPO, and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) willoversee “The Way Forward” plan. The executive steering committee will use the strategic plan
to assign actions and provide the appropriate accountability for action completion. The U.S.
industry expects “The Way Forward” to be consistent with actions required as specified by the
NRC’s regulatory response.

65TOPIC 1. EXTERNAL EVENTS
1.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned
In the area of external events, the U.S. industry undertook the following near-term actions in
response to the Fukushima accident:
1. Based on the best information available at the time, on March 15, 2011, the U.S.
industry issued IER L1-11-1, which contains the following recommendations:•

Verify the capability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond-design-basis
events, typically bounded by security threats, committed to as part of the NRC
Security Order B.5.b issued on February 25, 2002 and in SAMGs.

•

Verify that the capability to mitigate SBO conditions required by station design isfunctional and valid.

•

Verify the capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events required bystation design.

•

Perform walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate
fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipment’s function could
be lost during seismic events. Develop mitigating strategies for identified
vulnerabilities.

Actions for the above recommendations are to be in place within 30 days of the issuanceof the IER.
2. Based on an industry review of discrepancies found during the completion of thewalkdowns and inspections conducted for IER L1-11-1, the industry, on October 3, 2011,
issued IER L1-11-1, Supplement 1. The supplement recommended actions to verify that
equipment and mitigating strategies are included in station programs for configuration
management, preventive maintenance, training, qualification, and routine audits andinspections. Actions to address identified issues will be provided to INPO in March
2012.
These near-term actions provided a high level of assurance that the U.S. industry was inconformance with plant design and appropriate industry initiatives and was prepared to respondto external events.
The U.S. industry has established the intermediate and long-term direction for external eventswith Strategic Goal 5 of “The Way Forward” plan. Strategic Goal 5 states: “Margins forprotection from external events are sufficient based on the latest hazards analyses andhistorical data.” The U.S. industry provides assurance that power and water requirements canbe sustained to protect critical safety functions independent of a specific beyond-design-basis
initiating event. The following ongoing actions support this strategic goal:67

1. The chief nuclear officers in the U.S. industry have committed to validating external
flooding and seismic design basis against the latest known data for external eventsusing current methodology. This action is consistent with recommendations from the
NRC Near-Term Task Force related to the accident at Fukushima. The validation
includes the following:•

Conduct evaluations and walkdowns to determine the capability to mitigate
external flooding events, using approved procedures and acceptance criteria.

•

Conduct seismic evaluations and walkdowns on safety-related systems,
structures, and components (SSCs), using approved procedures and acceptancecriteria. Walkdowns will build on the walkdowns conducted for IER L1-11-1. The
specific criteria and timing will be consistent with the anticipated regulatory
requirements.

2. The consequences of postulated beyond-design-basis external events that are mostimpactful to reactor safety are loss of power and loss of the UHS. The U.S. industry isdeveloping a strategy called “Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability” (FLEX) toaddress these events by providing multiple means of power and water supplies tosupport key safety functions. The FLEX strategy consists of portable equipment thatprovides the means of obtaining power and water to maintain or restore key safetyfunctions for all reactors at a site and reasonable staging and protection of portableequipment from natural phenomena. FLEX uses equipment stored at the plant site and,if necessary, materials and equipment from either other plant sites or support centers forlonger-term responses.
3. Based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, EPRI is assessing
the risks and responses to a broad range of external hazards. This initiative includes areview of recent domestic events, such as flooding and earthquakes. Whereas thereport’s primary scope is on flooding and seismic events, it also considers the impact ofhigh winds, transportation accidents, low temperatures, and loss of UHS.
1.2 Schedule of Planned Actions
1.2.1 Near-Term Actions
1. The U.S. industry completed actions specified in IER L1-11-1 in April 2011. NPPs
documented any deficiencies or exceptions to the required actions in the site corrective
action programs, to be resolved consistent with their safety priority. As of December 31,
2011, 95 percent of all deficiencies or exceptions had been corrected. The remaining
items require specific plant conditions for resolution and will be addressed later in 2012
consistent with plant outage schedules.
1.2.2 Intermediate and Long-Term Actions
1. Consistent with the requirements of the NRC, the industry will conduct walkdowns andevaluate the adequacy of design features for mitigating external flooding.
2. Consistent with the requirements of the NRC, the industry will evaluate the adequacy
and conduct walkdowns for seismic concerns.

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3. Consistent with the requirements of the NRC, the industry will evaluate the adequacy
and conduct walkdowns of safety-related SSCs for other external events, such as highwinds, transportation accidents, low temperatures, and loss of UHS.
4. Under EPRI’s leadership, the scope of work required for reviews of external hazards has
been set, and working groups will start the actual reviews by September 2012.
1.3 Results of Completed Actions
1. By completing IER L1-11-1, the industry verified that equipment, procedures and staffing
intended to implement beyond-design conditions are in place and functional for a singleunit external threat. The review of existing capabilities for design-basis andbeyond-design-basis external events determined that surrounding area development,
security modifications, and other site changes sometimes adversely affected external
flood capability. Also, configuration management systems for procedures and drawings
have not consistently captured beyond-design-basis commitments. The industry hascorrected most specific deficiencies identified by IER L1-11-1, although a few arescheduled to be resolved later in 2012, consistent with plant outage schedules. Over150 man-years of effort was expended during 2011 in conducting this work. The
industry will address organizational lessons from the findings in an additional set ofactions specified in IER L1-11-1, Supplement 1.
2. Industry responses to IER L1-11-1 Supplement 1 were provided to INPO in March 2012.
These responses are not publicly available.
3. The industry has verified that individual station capabilities to mitigate an SBO event are
in place and functional.
4. The industry has verified that individual station capabilities to mitigate design-basis
internal and external flooding events are in place.
5. The industry has conducted walkdowns and inspections of equipment needed to mitigate
floods and fires. NPPs have established mitigating strategies in the event of a flood orfire following a seismic event.
6. The industry self-identified, through inspections and reviews, portable equipment that
improves capabilities to mitigate beyond-design-basis events. Equipment has either
been acquired or was ordered by March 2012.
7. The industry has implemented enhanced operational capability for protecting spent fuelstorage pools against extreme external events.
8. Consistent with the requirements of the NRC in Bulletin 2011-01, the industry provided
information on maintaining, testing, and offsite support of mitigating strategies programs.
The information confirmed compliance with requirements of the bulletin. Each plant’s
response to this bulletin is publicly available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/mitigating-strategies.html.

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TOPIC 2. DESIGN ISSUES
2.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned
The U.S. industry has initiated the following near-term actions to identify vulnerabilities withdesign and operating strategies involving the Fukushima Daiichi accident:
1. The U.S. industry issued IER L1-11-4, which recommends actions be taken to extend
the time that existing equipment can be used to maintain critical safety functions forextended losses of AC power to allow more time for additional equipment to be provided
to support long-term safe shutdown. Specific actions include the following:a. Develop methods to maintain or restore core cooling, containment integrity, and
SFP inventory using existing installed and portable equipment during an
extended loss of electrical AC power.
b. Identify unit-specific information concerning coping response capability anddesign limitations for extended loss-of-power events; this information will be usedin support of a broader U.S. response to the event.
c. Identify essential instrumentation needed for monitoring core, containment
integrity, and spent fuel safety; develop methods to ensure these functions aremaintained during an extended loss of AC power.
d. Develop methods to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP
inventory using installed and portable equipment under extended loss of AC
power conditions of at least 24 hours. The actual length of time critical safetyfunctions can be maintained using existing installed and portable equipment will
be analyzed and proposed upgrades and expected margin improvements will bereported. Key support functions -- such as instrumentation, fuel provisions, andmaintenance -- are included in required actions.
2. Because there are many design variations among U.S. plants, the industry has
established additional operational controls to enhance the design capability of SFPs.
The reliability and availability of the SFP makeup systems have been analyzed
specifically as part of IER L1-11-2. Short-term actions include increasing sensitivity tospent fuel storage event response and ensuring that NPPs maintain a high state ofreadiness to respond to events that challenge spent fuel storage integrity. Key actions
taken include the following:a. Whenever the SFP time to reach 200 degrees Fahrenheit upon loss of normal
cooling is less than 72 hours, identify and protect systems and equipment
required to maintain decay heat removal and inventory control.
b. Determine the time to reach 200 degrees Fahrenheit for all plant conditions in theevent that normal cooling is lost, and maintain this information readily available tothe control room and emergency response facilities.

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c. Verify the adequacy of abnormal operating procedures (AOPs) to guide response
to losses of all AC power and that the guidance can be implemented during
severe weather, seismic events, loss of control room, and flood conditions.
d. Revise EOPs to provide precautions that SFP level and temperature should bemonitored.
The U.S. industry has established the intermediate and long-term direction as follows:
Strategic Goals 2, 6, and 7 of “The Way Forward” establish the nuclear industry’s response to
design issues. These goals include associated principles and building blocks.
•

Strategic Goal 2 states, “Timelines for emergency response capability to ensure
continued core cooling, containment integrity and spent fuel storage pool cooling aresynchronized to preclude fuel damage following station blackout.”•

Strategic Goal 6 states, “Spent fuel pool cooling and makeup functions are fully
protected during periods of high heat load in the spent fuel pool and during extended
station blackout conditions.”•

Strategic Goal 7 states, “Primary containment protective strategies can effectively
manage and mitigate post-accident conditions, including elevated pressure andhydrogen concentrations.”

The FLEX strategy adds another layer of safety to mitigate beyond-design-basis events. The
objective of the strategy is to establish an essentially indefinite coping capability to prevent
damage to the fuel in the reactor and SFP, and maintain the containment function by utilizing
installed equipment, on-site portable equipment, and pre-staged off-site resources. This
capability will address both extended losses of AC power and UHS events which could arise
from beyond-design-basis external events. The diverse and flexible strategies focus on
maintaining or restoring key safety functions and are not tied to any specific damage state ormechanistic assessment of external events.
The industry is reviewing procedures for existing boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I
containment vent valves, and it is evaluating the accessibility for operation of these valves.
BWR Mark II plants will install hardened vent valves for containment. The industry will use thereviews to identify any needed improvements, which it will implement, consistent with NRCorders, plant operational schedules and its strategic plan. These actions will ensure thatprimary containment protective strategies can effectively manage and mitigate post-accident
conditions, including elevated pressure and hydrogen concentrations. EPRI is supporting
efforts related to understanding containment over-pressurization and combustible gas control.
In addition to the actions associated with IER L1-11-2, the industry is taking further actions toevaluate and identify the instrumentation and equipment needed to monitor spent fuel safety
throughout an extended loss of AC power that includes depletion of DC power. NPPs will takeappropriate site-specific actions to ensure continuity of cooling and makeup capability andremote temperature, level, and radiation monitoring of the SFP.

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2.2 Schedule of Planned Actions
1. The U.S. industry developed plant-specific information concerning coping times anddesign limitations for extended loss-of-power events in January 2012. Consistent withthe requirements of the NRC, it will develop procedural guidance for mitigating strategies
for extended loss of AC and continuity of essential instrumentation and communicationequipment.
2. Consistent with the requirements of the NRC, the U.S. nuclear industry will verify
reliability of containment vents on a schedule that considers plant operating schedules.
All actions are expected to be completed by December 31, 2016.
3. Consistent with the requirements of the NRC, the U.S. nuclear industry will evaluate andidentify additional instrumentation and controls for SFPs. Any necessary plantmodifications are expected to be completed by December 31, 2016.
4. Consistent with the requirements of the NRC, hardened vents will be in place for Mark I
and Mark II containments by December 31, 2016.
2.3 Results of Completed Actions
1. The industry conducted plant-specific sensitivity studies for extended loss-of-power
events as part of the IER 11-4 response, and provided results to INPO in January 2012.
2. The industry completed actions to increase sensitivity to spent fuel storage event
response and ensure that NPPs maintain a high state of readiness to respond to events
that challenge spent fuel storage integrity. These actions included the following:a. NPPs established controls to identify and protect systems and equipment required tomaintain the functions of SFP decay heat removal and inventory control, such as
clearly identifying protected equipment in the field and providing physical barriers
whenever possible. This also included establishing controls and compensatory
measures to prevent the SFP from reaching saturated conditions on loss of coolingwhen it is necessary to perform work on protected equipment.
b. The industry established the time for the SFP to reach 200 degrees Fahrenheit (bulktemperature) in the event that normal cooling is lost and maintains this information in
a format that is readily available in the control room and emergency response
facilities.
c. NPPs verified the adequacy of station AOPs for responding to the loss of SFP
cooling and/or inventory and ensured these procedures include actions andcontingencies to monitor SFP level and temperature and the capability to make up
inventory to the SFPs during a loss of all AC power. This also includes verifying that
NPPs can implement the guidance in the AOP during severe weather, seismic
events, loss of control room, and flood conditions.
d. NPPs revised station EOPs to include a precautionary statement that they should
monitor SFP level and temperature.

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TOPIC 3. SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY(ONSITE)
3.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned
Strategic Goals 2 and 4 of “The Way Forward” establish the nuclear industry’s response to
severe accident management and recovery. These goals are as follows:•

Strategic Goal 2 states, “Timelines for emergency response capability to ensure
continued core cooling, containment integrity, and spent fuel storage pool cooling aresynchronized to preclude fuel damage following station blackout or challenges to theultimate heat sink.”•

Strategic Goal 4 states, “Severe accident management guidelines, security response
strategies (B.5.b), and external event response plans are integrated effectively to ensure
nuclear energy facilities are capable of a symptom-based response to events that could
impact multiple reactors at a single site.”

To address these strategic goals, the following actions have been taken or are under way:
1. Procedures - The industry has validated the ability of NPPs to implement EOPs,
SAMGs, and B.5.b strategies. These actions included reviewing, identifying, andimplementing enhancements to training programs to ensure that plant operators are able
to implement the guidance. EPRI is leading an effort to update the technical bases of
the SAMGs based on lessons learned from the Fukushima accident. The effort will
determine whether the underlying assumptions and technical bases for the existing
guidelines are adequate. The regime of EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs will be integrated
as appropriate.
2. SFPs - As discussed in Section 2.1, actions associated with IER L1-11-2 increase
sensitivity to spent fuel storage event response and ensure that NPPs maintain a highstate of readiness to respond to events that challenge spent fuel storage integrity.
Specific actions required are as follows:a. Verify the adequacy of AOPs to guide the response to the loss of all AC power
and that the guidance can be implemented during severe weather, seismic
events, loss of control room, and flood conditions.
b. Revise EOPs to provide precautions that SFP level and temperature should bemonitored.
3. AC Power - As described in Part II, Section 2 of this report, actions associated with IER
L1-11-4 will extend the time that existing equipment can be used to maintain criticalsafety functions for extended losses of AC power until additional equipment can beprovided to support long-term safe shutdown. Specific actions include the following:a. Sensitivity studies under the conditions specified in IER L1-11-4 will form thebases for plant-specific actions required to extend mitigating times with onsite

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equipment, as well as whether additional offsite equipment or material support
are needed to extend mitigation times identified.
b. The industry will conduct further reviews for other outcomes (beyond extended
loss of AC), such as concurrent loss of DC power or loss of UHS, to determine if
the established mitigation strategy should be modified.
3.2 Schedule of Planned Actions
1. Consistent with the requirements of the NRC, the industry will update the technicalbases of SAMGs. Based on the updated technical bases, the EOPs, EDMGs, andSAMGs will be integrated by 2016.
2. Consistent with the requirements of the NRC, site-specific actions in response tosensitivity studies will be taken to mitigate the effects of a complete loss of AC power.
These actions are expected to be completed by December 31, 2016.
3. The industry will issue a supplement to IER L1-11-4, or other industry-approved
guidance, once the industry results of the IER are analyzed and the necessity of further
measures are identified. Further industry guidance will consider the FLEX strategy andalign with NRC requirements. The need for and time of issuing this supplement is to be
determined.
3.3 Results of Completed Actions
1. Actions associated with SFPs per IER L1-11-2 are complete. These include verifying
the adequacy of AOPs to guide the response to a loss of all AC power and that theguidance can be implemented during severe weather, seismic events, loss of control
room, and flood conditions. Also, the industry revised EOPs to provide precautions tomonitor SFP level and temperature.
2. The U.S. industry has analyzed actions and set procedures for an extended loss of AC
power, as defined by IER L1-11-4. Additionally, it has taken actions to ensure continuityof essential instrumentation and communication equipment under extended loss of AC
power conditions.
3. The industry procured or ordered equipment needed for improving station response to or
mitigation of beyond-design-basis events as of March 2012. The equipment ordered
was identified as part of various reviews, including actions associated with IER L1-11-4.
Equipment ordered includes portable pumps, generators, air compressors, switchgear
and transformers, and other portable emergency equipment. Lists of equipment were
provided to INPO in February 2012 (this information is not publicly available).
4. Consistent with the requirements of the NRC in Bulletin 2011-01, the industry verified
plant capability for maintaining or restoring core cooling, containment, and spent fuelcooling under circumstances involving losses of large areas of the plants from
explosions or fire. The information confirmed compliance with requirements of thebulletin. Each plant’s response to this bulletin is publicly available at
http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/mitigating-strategies.html.

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TOPIC 4. NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
4.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned
The roles and responsibilities for response to nuclear emergencies are described in “The UnitedStates Commercial Nuclear Industry Emergency Response Framework,” which will be issued in
March 2012. The Framework incorporates lessons learned from a self-assessment of thenuclear industry’s response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Although the plan was written to
respond to a domestic event, the U.S. nuclear industry used it in support of TEPCO during the
Fukushima Daiichi accident. The Framework focuses on commercial and private organizations,but it also identifies Government agencies and their responsibilities as outlined in the
Framework. Thirty recommendations were identified and broken down into immediate,near-term, and long-term actions. The organizational roles and responsibilities of the industry
are listed below:
1. Nuclear Facility Operator
The owner/operator of a nuclear/radiological facility or materials has primary
responsibility for mitigating the consequences of an incident; providing notification andappropriate protective action recommendations to State, local, and/or Tribal government
officials; and minimizing the radiological hazard to the public.
For incidents involving fixed facilities, the owner/operator has primary responsibility foractions within the facility boundary and may also have responsibilities for response andrecovery activities outside the facility boundary under applicable legal obligations.
2. Electric Power Research Institute
EPRI will maintain and provide independent technical expertise and event analysis
capabilities. EPRI will maintain emergency response capabilities and be available for
consultation and for conducting an in-depth analysis of the emergency.
3. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
INPO will serve as the industry notification point for industry events and will facilitate the
US industry response to support the affected utility in mitigating the accident. INPO will
maintain a dedicated emergency notification system for this purpose, as well as an
emergency response center capable of supporting the functions of this plan. INPO will
help identify and mobilize the resources of the nuclear industry in the event of an
emergency, including obtaining and facilitating the flow of technical information from theaffected utility to the nuclear industry and support organizations. INPO will provide
operating experience to support the affected plant or the industry and liaisons to aid
communication between the affected utility and stakeholder organizations.
4. Nuclear Energy Institute
NEI will provide a broad industry perspective of the event to the Government, including
Congress, the White House, and Federal agencies. NEI will supply professional
communications and governmental relations support and resources to the affected site
77and support the management of media requests. NEI will maintain regular contact with
Federal regulatory agencies and identify potential generic regulatory issues that may
result from a significant plant event. NEI will coordinate responses to congressional or
White House requests for information with the industry. NEI will cover the nature of andprognosis for the radiological situation causing the emergency and the actual or potential
offsite radiological impact. Subsequent information should cover the status of mitigation,corrective actions, protective measures, and overall industry response to the emergency.
4.2 Schedule of Planned Actions
1.

The “United States Commercial Nuclear Industry Emergency Response Framework” will
be issued in March 2012 to address immediate lessons learned from the industry’s
response. Further revisions of this document will be issued to incorporate the near- andlong-term lessons learned. A schedule for incorporating these lessons learned has yet
to be determined.

4.3 Results of Completed Actions
1.

A self-assessment of the industry response to the Fukushima accident was completed
in December 2011. The self-assessment identified 14 principal lessons learned and 30
recommendations categorized as immediate, near-term, and long-term priorities. The
results of the assessment are not publicly available.

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TOPIC 5. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AND
POST-ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT (OFFSITE)
5.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned
Strategic Goals 3 and 8 of “The Way Forward” establish the nuclear industry’s response to
emergency preparedness (EP) and post-accident management. These goals include
associated principles and building blocks.
•

Strategic Goal 3 states, “The U.S. nuclear industry is capable of responding effectively to
any significant event in the U.S. with the response being scalable to support aninternational event, as appropriate.”•

Strategic Goal 8 states, “Accident response procedures provide steps for controlling,
monitoring, and assessing potential radiation and ingestion pathways during andfollowing an accident, including timely communication of accurate information.”

To address these items, the following actions have been taken or are under way:
1. An industry initiative associated with “The Way Forward” improves the industry’s ability
to respond effectively to a significant event in the U.S., with a scalable response able tosupport an international event. There are two aspects to this initiative:a. The “United States Commercial Nuclear Industry Emergency Response
Framework” was issued in March 2012 for industry senior executives to use
when providing assistance and coordinating resources in the event of a severe
nuclear emergency. The framework provides guidance and coordination and isfully integrated with the capabilities and responsibilities of the U.S. National
Response Framework’s Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex. Utilities activate
the plan in response to domestic or international nuclear incidents involving
individual or multiple facilities, hostile actions toward a facility, or other incidents
in which the full capabilities and assistance of the industry are needed to support
the overall response. The guidance can be partially or fully implemented in thecontext of the event, in anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an
event. Selective implementation allows for a graded response, delivery of theresources needed, and an appropriate level of coordination. This plan is
described in greater detail as part of Topic 4.
b. As part of the FLEX strategy, an initiative is under way to identify and store
materials, supplies, and equipment needed to respond to a multi-unit site
accident, placed in locations readily accessible to plants located in the U.S. Thisinitiative is based on mitigating a long-term severe accident lasting beyond aplant’s installed equipment’s capabilities. The initiative includes information on
sharing existing equipment and establishing the types of additional equipment(size and quantity) to be stored offsite. Onsite equipment is considerednecessary for a plant to be self-sufficient in meeting its current design
capabilities. Key aspects of the industry response capability are listed below:•

staging equipment in central areas for regional response

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•
•
•

fitting equipment with standard mechanical and electrical connections
sharing agreements between utilities
providing adequate procedures and training

5.2 Schedule of Planned Actions
1. The initiative to identify and store materials, supplies, and equipment needed to respondto a multi-unit site accident, placed in regional centers that are readily accessible toplants located in the U.S., is under way. Contracts and protocols for regional centers forprestaged equipment are being developed consistent with the implementation of the
FLEX strategy.
2. The industry plans to adopt the FLEX three-phased approach that addresses responding
to extended loss of AC power and loss of UHS, using installed, onsite portable andoffsite portable equipment. This strategy will be fully implemented by December 31,
2016.
5.3 Results of Completed Actions
1. The regional inventory for emergency equipment was established in February 2012.
Standardized fittings for mechanical and electrical connections for use at any facility willbe established in 2012. Portable equipment that improves capability to respond tobeyond-design-basis events was identified as part of various reviews, including actions
associated with IER L1-11-4. Lists of equipment were provided to INPO in
February 2012, and includes portable pumps, generators, air compressors, switchgear
and transformers, and other portable emergency equipment (this information is not
publicly available). Many utilities have already acquired the identified equipment. The
industry has ordered equipment not already procured for improving station response toor mitigation of beyond design basis events as of March 2012.
2. The “United States Commercial Nuclear Industry Emergency Response Framework”
was issued in March 2012 to address lessons learned from the industry’s response to
the Fukushima event.

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TOPIC 6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
6.1 Overview of Actions Taken or Planned
The U.S. nuclear industry is fully committed to a high level of international engagement in its
response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. International engagement is inherent in
the actions for all strategic goals in “The Way Forward” plan.
The following specific actions have been taken or are planned:
1. Share international approaches taken in response to the Fukushima Daiichi event.
INPO and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) Atlanta Centerco-hosted The Fukushima Forum on November 14-16, 2011. Twenty-three countries
participated and presented a worldwide view of industry activities under way or planned.
TEPCO representatives presented their findings of the accident at the opening of theforum. Participants also described specific aspects of their utility’s responses to theaccident, addressing actions associated with natural phenomena, SAMGs, losses ofpower, command and control, communications, emergency response, losses of UHS,
SFPs, and hydrogen generation and containment. These findings informed participantsof the activities under way at utilities around the world. Other similar forums will be held
periodically.
2. The strong relationship between the Japanese and the U.S. nuclear industries at thetime of the Fukushima accident was key to the high level of access to and support ofTEPCO that the U.S. industry supplied from the early stages of the accident. The
effectiveness of this level of support has been confirmed in many forums. The current
levels of cooperation are based on the following programs:a. WANO, which consists of all NPP operators, provides a structure and forum foraccess to operating experience and direct interaction. The WANO Tokyo Center
was key to the early and continuing information exchange between TEPCO andthe rest of the world’s nuclear operators and helped establish the interfaces
necessary to bring U.S. industry support to Japan.
b. INPO’s International Participant Program includes a number of international
nuclear power operating organizations that exchange information andexperience, thereby promoting safe and reliable nuclear operations worldwide.
This exchange was a substantial asset in supporting and learning from TEPCO
because of the protocols in place at the time of the accident.
3. The U.S. industry, working closely with TEPCO, issued a sequence-of-events timeline
describing the accident at Fukushima. The report, INPO 11-005, “Special Report on the
Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” is dated
November 11, 2011. This timeline informs the U.S. and international response and isavailable to the public at
http://nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/safetyandsecurity/reports/specialreport-on-the-nuclear-accident-at-the-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-station.

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4. The U.S. industry will continue to review the corrective actions of the international
nuclear community to gain future insights from which the U.S. industry could benefit.
6.2 Schedule of Planned Actions
1. A second Fukushima Forum is scheduled for October 2012. Routine, weekly
communications with foreign entities and counterparts will continue.
6.3 Results of Completed Actions
1. The Fukushima timeline, INPO 11-005, was issued in November 2011. The reportprovides a narrative overview and timeline for the earthquake, tsunami, and subsequent
nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi on March 11, 2011. INPO 11-005 supplies anaccurate, consolidated source of information on the sequence of events that occurred in
the first days of the accident. The report reflects the best available information, most ofwhich was obtained through direct and ongoing interaction with TEPCO. TEPCO, theJapanese Government, IAEA, and several other Japanese organizations provided theinformation used in the report. Data sources included logs, chart recorder indications,and personal accounts.
2. Results of the November 2011 Fukushima Forum, INPO 11-009, “Report of the
INPO/WANO Fukushima Forum Proceedings,” were published in December 2011. The
document, which is for internal use and available to INPO members only, compiles
industry issues and preventive and corrective actions associated with lessons learned
from the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Topics include accident mitigation strategies,
design issues, and emergency responses. Combined with meeting presentationmaterials, the report offers NPP operators an opportunity to benchmark their experienceagainst industry peers and facilitate utility self-assessments.

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— — — Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 2, “Accident Management Strategies for
Consideration in the Individual Plant Examination Process,” April 4, 1990.
— — — Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, “Individual Plant Examination of External
Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities,” June 28, 1991.
— — — Generic Letter 89-16, “Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent,” September 1,
1989.
— — — Information Notice 2010-018, “Generic Issue 199, ‘Implications of Updated
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States on Existing
Plants,’” September 2, 2010.
— — — Information Notice 2011-05, “Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake Effects On
Japanese Nuclear Power Plants,” March 18, 2011.
— — — Information Notice 2011-08, “Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake Effects On
Japanese Nuclear Power Plants – For Fuel Cycle Facilities,” March 31, 2011.
— — — Interim Staff Guidance: “Compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) and 10 CFR
52.80(d) Loss of Large Areas of the Plant due to Explosions or Fires from a Beyond-Design
Basis Event: DC/COL-ISG-016,” June 9, 2010 (Official Use Only).
— — — Interim Staff Guidance: “Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,”
November 2011.
— — — NUREG-0654, “Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency
Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,” Rev. 1,
November 1980.
— — — NUREG-0660, “NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident,”
May 1980.
— — — NUREG-0737, “Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,” November 1980.
85

— — — NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, “Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements:
Requirements for Emergency Response Capability,” January 1983.
— — — NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for
Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition, Rev. 6,” March 2007.
— — — NUREG-1032, “Evaluation of Station Blackout Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants:
Technical Findings Related to Unresolved Safety Issue A-44, Final Report,” June 1988.
— — — NUREG-1614, Vol. 4, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2008-2013,” February 2008.
— — — NUREG-1650, “The United States of America Fifth National Report for theConvention on Nuclear Safety, Rev. 3,” September 2010.
— — — NUREG/CR-6890, “Reevaluation of Station Blackout Risk at Nuclear Power Plants:
Vol. 1, Analysis of Loss of Offsite Power Events: 1986-2004,” December 2005.
— — — Regulatory Guide 1.29, “Seismic Design Classification,” March 2007.
— — — Regulatory Guide 1.59, “Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants,”
August 1977.
— — — Regulatory Guide 1.60, “Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear
Power Plants,” December 1973.
— — — Regulatory Guide 1.102, “Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants,”
September 1976.
— — — Regulatory Guide 1.125, “Physical Models for Design and Operation of Hydraulic
Structures and Systems for Nuclear Power Plants,” March 2009.
— — — Regulatory Guide 1.155, “Station Blackout,” August 1988.
— — — Regulatory Guide 1.208, “A Performance-Based Approach To Define theSite-Specific Earthquake Ground Motion,” March 2007.
— — — Regulatory Guide 1.217, “Guidance for the Assessment of Beyond-Design-Basis
Aircraft Impacts,” August 2011.
— — — Security Order, “Issuance of Order for Interim Safeguards and Security
Compensatory Measures for [Plant Name],” February 25, 2002.
— — — SECY-11-0053, “Final Rule: Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness
Regulations (10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52),” April 8, 2011.
— — — SECY-11-0089, “Options for Proceeding with Future Level 3 Probabilistic Risk
Assessment Activities,” July 7, 2011.
— — — SECY-11-0093, “Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions
Following the Events in Japan” July 12, 201186

— — — SECY 11-0117, “Proposed Charter for the Longer-Term Review of Lessons
Learned from the March 11, 2011, Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami,” August 26, 2011.
— — — SECY-11-0124, “Recommended Actions to be taken Without Delay from the
Near-Term Task Force Report,” September 9, 2011
— — — SECY-11-0137, “Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response
to Fukushima Lessons Learned,” October 3, 2011.
— — — SECY-12-0025, “Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to
Lessons Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami,”
February 17, 2012.
— — — Tasking Memorandum COMGBJ-11-002, “NRC Actions Following the Events inJapan,” March 23, 2011.
— — — Temporary Instruction 2515/183, “Follow up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Station Fuel Damage Event,” March 23, 2011.
— — — Temporary Instruction 2515/184, “Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe
Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs),” April 29, 2011.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), andElectric Power Research Institute (EPRI)— — — NUREG-2115, “Central and Eastern United States Seismic Source Characterization
for Nuclear Facilities,” January 2012.
Federal Register
74 FR 28112, “Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactors; Final
Rule,” Federal Register, Vol. 74, Issue 112, pp. 28112-28147, Washington, DC, June 12,2009.
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 06-12, “B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 Submittal Guideline,” Rev. 2,
December 2006.
— — — NEI 07-13, “Methodology for Performing Aircraft Impact Assessments for New Plant
Designs,” Rev. 7, May 2009.

87

APPENDIX ASUMMARY TABLES
The tables included in the following pages provide a high-level summary of all activities taken orplanned described in this report. The tables are divided by topic and are intended to assist in
the development of the Coordinator’s report.

89

90

Engaged stakeholders to discuss seismic andflooding hazards

Prioritized NTTF recommendations

Taken

Issued Bulletin 2011-01 (mitigating strategies)
Responses
provided by
July 2011

Taken.
Industry selfinitiatedreviews ofcapabilities aspart of IER 111

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

Issued temporary instructions TI 2515/183(responding to large area fires, explosions, SBO
events, and flooding) and TI 2515/184 (SAMGs)

Activity(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

N/A

N/A

Yes.
Responses toself-initiatedreviews andinspections per
TI2515/183
showed nosignificant
findings.
Yes.
Licensees’
responses
provided.
Information
confirmed
compliancewith bulletin.
(publicly
available)

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 1 – EXTERNAL EVENTS

Taken

Ongoing.
Conclusion
underdevelopment
Taken

Taken.
Bulletin –issued May
2011.
Responses
evaluated in
March 2012

Taken
TI – issued
March 2011

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)(Item 3.c)

N/A

N/A

Conclusion
expected bysummer 2012

N/A

N/A

No,
conclusion
underdevelopment
Yes, Action
Tiers
established
N/A

No

Yes,
inspections
completed.
No significant
findings

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

91

Engage stakeholders to discuss other external
hazards
Requests for information regarding otherexternal hazards

Requests for information regarding seismic andflooding hazards

Activity

PlannedPlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

Responses to
RFIs beprovidedconsistent with
NRC
requirements
and schedules

Responses to
RFIs to beprovidedconsistent with
NRC
requirements
and schedules

No

As a related
activity,
industry hasverified that
individual
stationcapabilities tomitigate designbasis flooding
events are inplace.

No.

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 1 – EXTERNAL EVENTS

PlannedPlannedPlannedTaken –
RFIs Issued
March 12

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)(Item 3.c)

Issuing RFIs –TBD, 6mos after
resources
becomeavailable.
Issuing orders
and conducting
inspections –
TBD.

No

N/A

N/A

N/A

Guidance forhazards
reevaluation –Nov 2012
Subsequent
orders andinspections may
be required.
TBD

N/A

No

Implementation
guidance forwalkdowns –May 2012

N/A

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

92

Working groups led by EPRI will conduct
reviews of external hazards.

Planned

Taken

Actions
Completed
April 2011

Taken

September
2012

N/A

Yes,
deficiencies
documented inplant corrective
action program(not publicly
available)
Responses
provided to
INPO in March2012 (notpublicly
available)
No

PlannedEnhancements related to seismically-induced
fires and floods

Take actions specified in IER L1-11-1, including
verifying capability to mitigate conditions
resulting from beyond design basis events,
capability to mitigate SBO conditions, capability
to mitigate internal and external flooding events,
and walkdowns of equipment needed to mitigate
fire and flooding events.
Take actions specified in IER 1-1 Supplement 1:
Verify equipment and mitigating strategies areincluded in station programs for configuration
management, preventive maintenance, training,
qualification, and routine audits and inspections.

PlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)Rulemaking on seismic and flooding hazards

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.c)Ongoing

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)(Item 3.c)Plan underdevelopment.
Implementation
will take 4 years
TBD, schedule
will bedeveloped inJuly 2012
TBD, schedule
will bedeveloped inJuly 2012

No

No

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Perform multi-year Level 3 PRA

Activity(Item 2.a)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 1 – EXTERNAL EVENTS

93

Acquire equipment for improving station
response to or mitigation of beyond designbasis events, as identified through IER 11-4
responses and other reviews.

Activity

Taken.

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)Lists of needed
equipment
were collated
and provided to
INPO in Feb
2011(not publicly
available)
Identified
equipment haseither beenacquired orordered as ofMarch 2012

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 1 – EXTERNAL EVENTS

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)(Item 3.c)

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

94

Rulemaking on SBO

Prioritized NTTF recommendations

Issued temporary instruction TI 2515/183(responding to large area fires, explosions, SBO
events, and flooding)

Activity

Ongoing

PlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

Taken

Taken.
TI – issued
March 2011

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)(Item 3.c)Rule to becompleted in
2.5 yrs –Dec 2014

N/A

N/A

N/A

No

Yes,
inspections
completed.
No significant
findings
Yes, action
Tiers
established
No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

N/A.
Taken The industry
Advanceconducted
notice ofplant-specificproposedsensitivity
rule issued instudies for
March 2012extended loss
Meanwhile,of power
Plannedindustry is
events as partdevelopingof the IER 11-4
mitigating
response, andstrategies forprovidedextended loss of results to INPO
AC andin Jan 2012.
continuity of(not publicly
essential
available)
instrumentation
andcommunicationequipment. The
issuanceschedule is TBD

Implementationof the rule will
be scheduledconsistent with
NRC
requirements.

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 2 – DESIGN ISSUES

95

PlannedPlannedEngage stakeholders and issue orders
regarding hardened vents (Mark I and II)

Engage stakeholders to discuss regulatory
actions on filtration of containment vents

Evaluate need for reliable vents in othercontainments (Not Mark I and II)

PlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

Engage stakeholders and issue orders
regarding SFP cooling

Activity(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

Responses tobe provided
consistent with
NRC
requirements
and schedules

Hardened ventsfor Mark I andMark II
containments to
be installed by
Dec 2016

Comply withorders by
Dec 2016

No

No

No

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 2 – DESIGN ISSUES

Orders full
implementation- Dec 2016.
Inspections –
TBD.
N/A

PlannedPlannedPlannedPlanned

TBD

Orders full
implementation- Dec 2016.
Inspections –TBD.
SECY paper will
be issued inJuly 2012

N/A

Taken –
ordersissued on
March 12(Item 3.c)

No

No

No

No

No

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)Taken –
ordersissued on
March 12

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)

Activities by the Regulator

96

Rulemaking on SFP makeup capability andwater level instrumentation
Engage stakeholders to discuss UHS
assumptions
Issue requests for information on seismic andflooding hazards, including UHS systems

Evaluate need for enhanced hydrogen control
and mitigation
Engage stakeholders and issue orders
regarding reliable SFP instrumentation

Activity

PlannedPlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

Responses tobe provided
consistent with
NRC
requirements
and schedules

Additional SFP
instrumentation
to be installed
as needed by
Dec 2016 inaccordance with
NRC orders

No

No

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 2 – DESIGN ISSUES

Orders full
implementation- Dec 2016.
Inspections –
TBD.
5 yrs
N/A

Planned

Taken

TBD
N/A

N/A

Subsequent
orders andinspections may
be required.

Taken –
RFIs issued
March 12PlannedPlanned(Item 3.c)

N/A

No

N/A

No

No

No

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)Taken –
ordersissued on
March 12PlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)

Activities by the Regulator

97

PlannedTaken.
Completed in
Jan 2012
Taken.
Completed in
Nov 2011

Conduct sensitivity studies to determine
capabilities for responding to extended loss of
power events.
Increase sensitivity to spent fuel storage event
response and ensure that a high state ofreadiness is maintained to events.

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

Orders regarding beyond-design-basis events,
including loss of UHS

Activity(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

N/A

N/A

Comply withorders by
Dec 2016

Yes. (notpublicly
available)
Controls
established to
identify/ protect
systems/equip
ment required
to maintain thefunctions of
SFP decayheat removal
and inventory
control.
Procedures
revised where
needed.

No

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 2 – DESIGN ISSUES(Item 3.c)

N/A

Orders full
implementation- Dec 2016.
Inspections –TBD.

PlannedNo

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)Taken –
ordersissued on
March 12

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)

Activities by the Regulator

98

Issued temporary instruction TI 2515/184(SAMGs)Taken.
TI – issues
April 2011

Taken.
IN – issued
March 2011

PlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)Training to NRC staff and Resident Inspectors on
SAMGs
Issued information notice on earthquake andtsunamiSchedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.c)

Taken

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)(Item 3.c)

N/A

Schedule will be
issued in 1 yr
N/A

N/A

Yes,
inspections
completed.
No significant
findings

N/A

Yes, action
Tiers
established
No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Prioritized NTTF recommendations

Activity(Item 2.a)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 3 – SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY (ON-SITE)

99

Issued Bulletin 2011-01 (mitigating strategies)

Activity

Responses
provided by
July 2011

Taken

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

N/A

Yes.
Licensees’
responses
provided.
Information
confirmed
compliancewith bulletin.
(publicly
available)

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator(Item 3.c)Conclusion
expected bysummer 2012
Aug 2012

Planned.
Use insights
to develop
guidance fororders on
mitigating
strategies

N/A

No,
guidanceunderdevelopmentNo,
conclusion
underdevelopment

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)Ongoing.
Conclusion
underdevelopment

Taken.
Bulletin –issued May
2011.
Responses
evaluated in
March 2012

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)

Activities by the Regulator

TOPIC 3 – SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY (ON-SITE)

100

2016

Industry tovoluntarily
integrate
EOPs,
EDMGs, andSAMGs

PlannedPlannedEngage stakeholders and issue Orders related to:- beyond design basis events and multi-unit
events- hardened vents for Mark I and II- SFP instrumentation

No

No

No

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)PlannedCompliance withorders by
Dec 2016

Implementationof the rule will
be scheduledconsistent with
NRC
requirements.

Planned(Item 2.c)Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

PlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)(Item 3.c)

SECY Paper Feb 2013. ROPchanges – TBD.
Orders full
implementation- Dec 2016.
Inspections –
TBD.

5 yrs

No

No

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Expand regulatory framework to include beyonddesign-basis events and make changes to ROP

Rulemaking on licensee emergency response tocoordinate EOPs, SAMGs, EDMGs

Activity(Item 2.a)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 3 – SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY (ON-SITE)

101

Evaluate the need for supplement to IER L1-11-4
Near-Term Actions to Address the Effects of an
Extended Loss of All AC Power in Response to
the Fukushima Daiichi Event,

Evaluate regulatory action for- hardened vents for other containments (notMark I and II)- hydrogen control and mitigation
The technical bases of severe accident
management guidelines will be updated.

Rulemaking on prolonged SBOs

Activity

Utility
responses to
IER L1-11-4
will be used
to determine
if asupplement
is necessary.

PlannedPlanned(Item 2.c)

TBD

To be
scheduledconsistent with
NRC
requirements

No

No

No

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Implementationof rule to be
Improvescheduledplant
consistent withcapability to
NRC
mitigaterequirements
effects of a and schedules
completeloss of AC
power

PlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.a)

Activities by the Operator

PlannedPlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)(Item 3.c)

Schedule TBD
in summer 2012

5 yrs

No

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

TOPIC 3 – SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY (ON-SITE)

102
OngoingIndustry
responses
werereceived in
Jan 2012.

Taken
Completedby Nov 2011

Complete the actions of IER L1-11-2, Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Station Spent Fuel Pool Loss of
Cooling and Makeup

Complete the actions of IER L1-11-4, Near-Term
Actions to Address the Effects of an Extended
Loss of All AC Power in Response to the
Fukushima Daiichi Event,

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

Activity(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)Actions will be
determinedbased onanalysis of
responses.

N/A

No

Yes. Results ofactions taken
were provided
to INPO. Sites
revisedprocedures tostrengthen
defences ofSFP
temperaturesand levels,
addressed
training of
personnel, andhave taken
steps tomonitor level
andtemperatureduringextended SBO.

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)(Item 3.c)

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

TOPIC 3 – SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY (ON-SITE)

103

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?
Ongoing

Activity

Acquire equipment for improving station response
to or mitigation of beyond design basis events, as
identified through IER 11-4 responses and otherreviews.

(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

Not alreadyYes. Lists ofprocuredneededequipment was
equipment
ordered bywere collated
March 2012 and provided to
INPO inFeb 2012 (notpublicly
available)
Over 450 major
pieces of
portableequipment has
been procured
or ordered,includingdiesel-driven
pumps, dieseldriven
generators,
trucks ortrailers,
switchgear, aircompressors,and other gear.

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)(Item 3.c)

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

TOPIC 3 – SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT AND RECOVERY (ON-SITE)

104
Responses
provided by
July 2011

Yes.
Licensees’
responses
provided.
Information
confirmed
compliancewith bulletin.
(publicly
available)(Item 3.c)Conclusion
expected bysummer 2012
Aug 2012

Planned.
Use insights
to develop
guidance fororders on
mitigating
strategies

N/A

N/A

N/A

No,
guidanceunderdevelopmentNo,
conclusion
underdevelopment

Yes,
inspections
completed.
No significant
findings
No

N/A

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)Ongoing.
Conclusion
underdevelopment

Taken.
Bulletin –issued May
2011.
Responses
evaluated in
March 2012

N/A

Issued Bulletin 2011-01 (mitigating strategies)

Taken

Taken
TIs issued
March andApril 2011

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)Issued temporary instruction 2515/183(responding to large area fires, explosions, SBO
events, and flooding) and TI 2515/184 (SAMGs)

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.c)Taken
IN – issued
March 2011

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Issued Information Notice on earthquake andtsunamiActivity(Item 2.a)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 4 – NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

105

N/A

Inspections to
be completed
by Sept 2012
N/A

Planned

Taken
Ongoing

N/A

Taken –
orders and
RFIs issued
March 12
Taken

N/A, support
provided asneededAdditional
meetings will bescheduled asneeded

N/A

N/A

Taken

Taken

(Item 3.c)

N/A

N/A

N/A

Yes, NTTF
reportavailable
Yes, Action
Tiers
established
No

No

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)Taken –
TI issued
Sept 2011

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)Held over 10 public meetings to discuss NRC
actions and Task Force recommendations

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.c)Taken
Ongoing

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Established the Japan Lessons Learned
Directorate
Support Members of the Congress and testify inhearings

Engaged stakeholders to discuss the Task Forcerecommendations and prioritizedrecommendations
Engage stakeholders, and issue orders andrequests for information for near-term activities

Established the NRC Task Force and developed
recommendations

Issue temporary instruction 2600/0015 (fuelfacilities)

Activity(Item 2.a)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 4 – NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

106

Conduct self-assessment of the industry responseto the Fukushima accident

Issue The United States Commercial Nuclear
Industry Emergency Response Framework toaddress immediate lessons learned from theindustry’s response.

ActivityComplete

Taken –March 2012

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

N/A

N/A

Yes. Actions
categorized as
immediate,near-term, andlong-term. (notpublicly
available)

N/A

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 4 – NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONSThe
governmentis also
updating its
response
framework
document“National
Response
Framework”(Discussed
in Part 1,
Topic 5)

PlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)(Item 3.c)

2012

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

107

Evaluate regulatory options to address monitoring
capability for ERDS information

Evaluate rulemaking related to training and exercises
for multi-units and prolonged SBOs
Complete ERDS Virtual Private Network transition

Engaged stakeholders and issue requests for
information related to:- staffing requirements during an emergency- communications equipment

Prioritized NTTF recommendations

Activity

Taken

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

(Item 3.a)N/A

PlannedPlanned

TBD

June 2012

Identified
Taken –
N/A
equipment RFIs IssuedforMarch 12
improvingstationPlannedSubsequent
response toorders andor mitigation
inspections mayof beyondbe required.
designbasis
events, as
identified
through IER
11-4
responses
and otherreviews was
acquired orordered byMarch 2012
Planned
TBD

Taken(Item 3.c)

No

No

No

N/A

No

Yes, action
Tiers
established

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Schedule
Results
Activity
Or Milestones Available - Taken?
for Planned - Yes?
- Ongoing?
Activities- No?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 5 – EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

108PlannedPlannedAction items
being
prioritized.
Implementation
schedule TBD
TBD

Taken – AAR
conducted

No

N/A

Taken

Updated crisis communication plan and developed astandard operating protocol
Conduct post-event After Action Review (AAR)

March 2012

Schedule will be
developed by
Summer 2012
N/A

Schedule will be
developed by
Summer 2012

PlannedDevelop Public Inquiry Desk roster(Item 3.c)

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)Continue studies on health effects on populations
around NPPs

Ongoing(Item 3.a)Schedule
Results
Activity
Or Milestones Available - Taken?
for Planned - Yes?
- Ongoing?
Activities- No?
- Planned?

(Item 2.c)

PlannedActivity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Evaluate regulatory options to address multi-unit
dose assessment

Activity(Item 2.a)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 5 – EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS109

Evaluating regulatory options related to:- protective equipment for emergency responders- command and control structure- evaluate ERDS and determine alternate methods
for transmittal- enhancements to site-recovery and site-entry plans- study of efficacy of real-time- conduct training on radiation safety and use of KI
around the NPPs

Update the U.S. Homeland Security’s National
Response Framework

Activity

The industry
updated its
response
framework
document“The UnitedStatesCommercial
NuclearIndustry
Emergency
Response
Framework”(Discussed inPart 2,
Topic 4)

Taken –March 2012

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

(Item 3.a)N/A

PlannedPlanned(Item 3.c)

TBD, schedule
will be issued inJuly 2012

2012

No

No

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Schedule
Results
Activity
Or Milestones Available - Taken?
for Planned - Yes?
- Ongoing?
Activities- No?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 5 – EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

110
Taken

Ongoing

Ongoing

Identify and store materials, supplies, and equipment
needed to respond to a multi-unit site accident inlocations that are readily accessible to plants locatedin the U.S is underway.

Adopt the three-phased approach of the diverse
flexible plan that addresses improving responses
during an extended loss of AC power and loss of
UHS, using installed, on-site portable, and off-site
portable equipment.
Establish standardized fittings for mechanical andelectrical connections to allow use at any facility.

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

Activity(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)

(Item 3.a)Contracts andNo.
protocols forMaterials
regional centers and costs
for prestaged have beenequipment are identified.
being developed Regionalin conjunction inventory forwith FLEX
emergency
strategy.
equipment
establishedin Feb
2012.
To be
No
scheduledconsistent with
the NRCrequirements
N/A
N/A(Item 3.c)

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Schedule
Results
Activity
Or Milestones Available - Taken?
for Planned - Yes?
- Ongoing?
Activities- No?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 5 – EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

111Participate in- Joint Convention- CNS Extraordinary Meetingth- CNS 6 Review Meeting- Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee
Meeting and Review Conference

Appoint National Competent Authority contact for
the Early Convention and Assistant Convention
Support Preparatory Committee meeting of Parties
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Support ratification of the amendment to theConvention on Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material
Submit CNS proposals

Maintain CNS leadership roles (Vice President,
Vice Chair Group 1) for Extraordinary Meeting
Participate in discussions related to changes toconventions
Participate in IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety

Activity

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.a)(Item 2.c)Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 6 – INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION(Item 3.c)

N/AApril 2012

Ongoing
Taken

JC –May 2012
EM –Aug 2012th
6 CNS- 2014
NPT – 20132015

N/A

Ongoing

Planned

N/A

N/A

Taken
Taken

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)Taken
Ongoing
Ongoing

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)

Activities by the Regulator

112

TBD

Ongoing

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Bilateral with
Canada and
Mexico –2012
Support to beprovided, as
needed.

N/A

N/A

Taken –
Multipledates
Ongoing(Item 3.c)

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)Participated in- G8/G20 ministerial meeting- NEA forum- IAEA ministerial conference- ENSREG meeting- IAEA review of safety standards- IAEA Japan fact-finding mission- IAEA International Experts meetings
Develop guidance on application of INES

Ongoing

PlannedTakenExchanged
information.
Bilateral with
Canada and
Mexicocompleted.

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)Support to beprovided, as
needed.
Support to beprovided, as
needed. NRC
will continue toattend CNRA
STG meetings

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.c)Taken
Ongoing

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Support to U.S. Embassy in Japan

Exchange information with Canada and Mexico

Activity(Item 2.a)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 6 – INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

113

Issue Fukushima accident timeline.

Taken

N/A

Yes. Reportpublicly
available –Nov 2011

Participated in WGOE meeting - presented the
NRC response to Fukushima
Developed NRC public website on actions taken in
response to Fukushimand
Hold forums for international participants to share Taken - First 2 forum – Oct Yes. Specificlessons and actions taken in response toforum Nov
2012
utility2011
responses
Fukushima accident.
discussed.
PlannedKey aspects
shared in a
privatedocument –Dec 2012.

Issued IN 2011-05 (earthquake and tsunami)

Ongoing
Taken.
IN – issued
March 2011
Taken - Fall
2011
Taken

Taken –
Multiple
dates

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 3.a)Support bilateral meetings on lessons learned from
Fukushima

Schedule
Results
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 2.c)Taken October
2011

Activity- Taken?
- Ongoing?
- Planned?

(Item 2.b)(Item 3.c)

N/A
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Will continue toprovide support,
as needed

N/A

Schedule
Conclusion
Or Milestones
Available
for Planned - Yes?
Activities- No?

(Item 3.b)

Activities by the Regulator

Hosted IRRS lessons learned workshop anddiscussed impacts of Fukushima

Activity(Item 2.a)

Activities by the Operator

TOPIC 6 – INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONWASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001-------------------OFFICIAL BUSINESSNUREG-1650
Revision 4

The United States of America National Report for the 2012 Convention on
Nuclear Safety Extraordinary Meeting

July 2012