2009
Blue Planet Prize
Professor Hirofumi Uzawa(Japan)Lord (Nicholas) Stern of Brentford(UK)

Member of The Japan Academy
Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo

Professor, The London School of Economics

GIFT:
This Blue Planet we live on
Is blessed to hold life
In the universe full of stars brilliantly
shining
We humankind
Are we spending the days by embracingfrom deep in our heart?
The happiness of being born on this blue
planet of life
As a tiny life born on this planet
Caring other lives, cherishing eachother
Are we pursuing in full, the meaning of
our lives?
By truly giving our appreciation
To the blessings of the “planet of life”
Earth
It is our great pleasure
If the film this time
Served you to think
About the happiness of living on thisblue planet
By extending your thoughts
To the gifts from the “planet of life”
Earth

Selected from the Slide Show Presented at the Openingof the Awards Ceremony151

His Imperial Highness Prince Akishino congratulates
the laureates

Their Imperial Highnesses Prince and Princess Akishino
congratulate the laureates at the Congratulatory Party

The prizewinners receive their trophies from Chairman Seya

Professor Hirofumi Uzawa

Lord (Nicholas) Stern of Brentford
Dr. Hiroyuki Yoshikawa,
Chairman of the Selection
Committee explains therationale for the determination of the year's winners

Hiromichi Seya, Chairman of the Foundationdelivers the opening address

152

Professor Ichiro Kanazawa, President, Science Council ofJapan (left) and Mr. David Warren, United Kingdom
Ambassador to Japan, congratulate the laureates

Profile

Professor Hirofumi Uzawa
Member of The Japan Academy
Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo
Education and Academic and Professional Activities
1928
Born in Yonago, Tottori Prefecture
1951
Graduated from the Department of Mathematics, Tokyo University; Special
research student from 1951 to 1953
1956
Research Assistant, Stanford University; Assistant Professor in 1959
1960
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics at the University of California,
Berkeley
1961
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University
1962
PhD in Economics (Tohoku University), Thesis: “Studies of the General
Economic Equilibrium Theory of Léon Walras”
1964
Professor, Department of Economics, University of Chicago
1966
Fellow, Churchill College, Cambridge University
1968
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Tokyo University; Professor in
1969; Dean in 1980
1983
Person of Cultural Merit1989
Appointed Professor at the Department of Economics, Niigata University after
retiring from Tokyo University; Professor Emeritus at Tokyo University
1994
Professor, Department of Economics, Chuo University (retired in 1999)
1997
Order of Cultural Merit1999
Full-time researcher, The Institute of Economic Research, Chuo University;
Adjunct Professor, Institute of Advanced Studies, United Nations University
2000
Professor, Research and Development Initiative, Chuo University
2003
Director, Research Center of Social Common Capital, Doshisha University
2009
Senior Fellow, Keiyu International Institute of Medicine(As of June, 2009)

In addition to the accomplishment of internationally cutting-edge research in the field ofmathematical economics, Professor Uzawa has made a great impact from early on with his
economics-based analyses and proposals for the issues on pollution and the environment. He
has tackled the social cost of automobiles, urban problems, and global warming, and as atheoretical framework in confronting such issues he has advocated the concept of Social
Common Capital, a pioneering and highly original achievement.
In addition, he has contributed to the peaceful resolution of the Minamata disease issue
153

and the Narita Airport construction issue, and has been consistent in his work as an economist
who confronts the real world with a sincere outlook. Professor Uzawa continues to sound thealarm with respect to contemporary economics and civilization and remains a major influence
on both the international stage and in Japan.
From Mathematics to Economics
Professor Uzawa graduated from the Department of Mathematics at the University of Tokyoin 1951 where he continued to work as a special research student until 1953. At that time, hediscovered the true nature of economics in the words of John Ruskin, “There is no wealth, butlife.” which was featured in the foreword to Tale of Poverty by Hajime Kawakami, and set out
to educate himself about economics.
In 1956, a paper on decentralized economic planning written by Professor Uzawa
caught the eye of Professor Kenneth Arrow at the Department of Economics, Stanford
University, who invited him to be a research assistant. After becoming Assistant Professor at
Stanford in 1959 and in 1960 at the Department of Economics of University of California,
Berkeley, he was appointed Associate Professor of the Department of Economics at Stanford
in 1961, and in 1964 became Professor at the Department of Economics of University of
Chicago. During this period, he researched the issue of optimum economic growth resulting
in his remarkable paper On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth, which covered the
production sectors of consumer goods and investment goods in manufacturing equipments.
During his time at the University of Chicago, Joseph E. Stieglitz and George A. Akerlof, later
Nobel laureates in economics, were among the students attending his seminars in mathematical
economics.
Departing from Mathematical Economics to A Theory of Social Common Capital
In 1968, Professor Uzawa accepted a position as Assistant Professor of the Department of
Economics at the University of Tokyo and returned to Japan as protests against the Vietnam
War in the United States turned violent. Then, the words of John Ruskin came back to him andhe started to think about the concept of Social Common Capital or “how to incorporate thenatural environment and the social environment in economic theory,” renewing his resolution
to study the “economics that value the human spirit,” which later became his consistent set ofbeliefs. Even though he realized that “it would be a full-frontal critique of the work I had done
so far,” he nevertheless criticized the status quo of mathematical economics (neo-classicaleconomics) and sought to build a framework for economics with a solid foundation in thesocial environment, nature, education and healthcare.
In this period, he also turned his attention to the issues of pollution worldwide following
in the wake of industrialization and urbanization, taking a strong interest in the Minamata
disease and immersing himself deeply in pollution and environmental issues.
In 1972, he published for the first time the concept of Social Common Capital, which
later became extremely important in thinking about global warming countermeasures. Social
Common Capital refers to a natural environment and social infrastructure that enables thepeople living in a country or a specific region to enjoy a prosperous economy, develop a superb

154

culture, and maintain in a sustained and stable fashion a society that is attractive on a humanlevel. It has a strong connection to human life and existence, one might even say that it is a wayof thinking that attempts to socially manage common assets including resources, goods,
services and systems that are important for a society to function smoothly. As a result, Professor
Uzawa constructed the theoretical foundation that lies behind the concept of the commons.
The following three elements constitute Social Common Capital:
1. The Natural Environment: the atmosphere, water, forests, rivers, lakes, oceans,coastal wetlands, soil etc.
2. Social Infrastructure: roads, transportation facilities, water and sewerage, electricity
and gas etc.
3. Institutional Capital: education, healthcare, finance, the judiciary, public administrationand other systems
Each category must be managed and operated by professionals in accordance withprofessional standards and based on specialist knowledge.
Building on ideas based on the concept of the Social Common Capital, Professor
Uzawa became involved in the pollution problems, authoring The Social Cost of the Automobile
in 1974, which turned the focus on the extent of pollution and damage caused to the naturalenvironment and the social infrastructure of the Social Common Capital by the use of
automobiles. Next, he attempted to calculate the social cost of automobiles. He measured thecost of creating ideal roads that do not infringe on the basic rights of the community byrebuilding roads which had numerous defects such as the lack of separation between pedestrians
and cars. Setting this value as the index, he calculated the necessary cost of converting roadstructures and found that the social cost per automobile per year was at minimum two million
yen.
The Economics of Global Warming
Professor Uzawa also put his attention to the issue of global warming from an early stage. As
well as participating in the first conference of economists on the topic of global warming inRome in 1990, he authored The Economics of Global Warming in 1991 where he focused on
the implications of global warming on 20th century civilization and proposed preventative
measures. His understanding on global warming was that it was caused by the massconsumption of fossil fuel and logging in the tropical rainforests. And the global environment
came under great stress as a result of the insatiable pursuit of “affluence” and material comfort
of advanced industrial nations that have turned waste habit into a virtue. In contrast, indeveloping countries where poverty dominates and economic development is nowhere insight, people are forced into a predicament where they cannot but destroy nature and pollutethe environment in order to survive. Consequently, Professor Uzawa pointed out that rich andpoor countries equally destroyed the global environment, inflicting damage that cannot be
undone by future generations. On the other hand, Professor Uzawa also turned his attention tocarbon tax, in a broad sense an environmental tax, which was an initiative developed among
economists as an effective policy for preserving the stability of the natural environment far
into the future and for preventing global warming. Professor Uzawa stated that from the155viewpoint of fairness there were major problems with the intergovernmental terms for reducing
total emissions of greenhouse gases by country, including the plan to reduce carbon dioxide
emissions by 20% proposed at the international conference on atmospheric change held at thesame time as the 1988 Toronto Summit in Canada. He has pointed out that, generally speaking,international agreements for stabilizing the atmosphere were extremely lucrative for developed
countries and, moreover, that their character was antisocial to the extent that countries that
consume fossil fuels profit from them. He is an advocate of the carbon tax system as a measurefor stabilizing the atmosphere that could actually be put into practice. On the other hand, an
uniform carbon tax system was not only problematic from the viewpoint of international
fairness, but as there was a risk of nipping economic development in the bud in the majority
of developing countries, he proposed a “proportional carbon tax” according to per capita
income in each country.
In addition, there was an inherent risk that the carbon tax itself would deter economic
progress in developing countries and, even if the system of a proportional carbon tax is adopted,
Professor Uzawa thought that it was not an effective strategy in resolving the North-South
problem. Accordingly, he devised the concept of an international fund for stabilizing theatmosphere that would eliminate the economic disparities between industrialized anddeveloping countries and act as an effective deterrent to global warming while stabilizing theatmosphere.
The principle behind the concept is that every government donates a fixed percentageof the silviculture subsidy deducted from the proportionate carbon tax revenues to theinternational fund for stabilizing the atmosphere. The fund distributes the contributions fromeach country to developing countries where the allocation is used for measures to protect the
global environment such as protecting tropical rain forests, sustaining agricultural communities
or developing alternative energies.
Professor Uzawa’s concept of a proportionate carbon tax and an international fund forstabilizing the atmosphere that would protect tropical rain forests and facilitate the preventionof global warming has won the backing of many economists as an international concept thatconsiders intergenerational and regional disparities, but it has not been accepted as policy yet.
A Message to the Contemporary Society
In recent years, Professor Uzawa has turned his attention to movements that aim to “rehabilitate
human beings,” referring to the “urban and natural renaissance” that is taking place in Europe,and he is engaged in the research to spark this trend in Japan as well. He favors removing theconcrete that covers riversides and returning to the meandering rivers of the past, planting theperiphery with local trees and shrubs, and preventing floods not by building dams, but by
creating rich woodlands in the upper reaches of the rivers, which social wisdom have long
employed to control the waters by means of “green dams” that use the storage capacity ofnature.
Professor Uzawa discloses his perception of the relationship between human beingsand nature as a form of culture whereby society should communicate by going beyond thegenerations, saying “The culture of original human society prevented the depletion of natural156

resources by means of a dialog with nature and accumulated knowledge about the naturalenvironment within social norms designed for the survival of the society, and the culture(social system) also included transmission to the next generation.”
Professor Uzawa points out that in modern times harmony between people and nature
has collapsed and environmental destruction has advanced on a global scale because “modern
science has played a major role in facilitating a lack of constraints on the exploitation of natureand ideas that place human beings in a position that is superior to nature.” Global warming is
a straightforward example. He stressed that we should recognize it is an extremely dangerous
environmental change progressing on an unprecedented scale and that every effort must be
made to tackle it now.
When considering institutional capital as social common capital, education and medicalcare assume the most important position. Education has the mission to promote both naturalborn and acquired talent of each child as far as possible. On the other hand, medical care shallbe performed based upon the professional medical knowledge to treat people who lose theirregular functions through diseases or accidents. Those two functions are absolutely imperative
to sustain the society that keeps each citizen to maintain dignity and to enjoy civil liberty. To
live one’s life in humane manner, I like to emphasize, those social common capitals play
important part and shall never be controlled by mere market standards or bureaucrats.
A Paradigm Shift
In the latter half of the 1960s, Professor Uzawa felt “the emptiness and limitation of economics
that advances enquiries based on abstract concepts such as capitalism or socialism” andstemming from this, he searched for a new framework, arriving at the idea of the Social
Common Capital. The concept of the Social Common Capital offers an important foundation
for institutional and political analysis in order to draft and select policies. It is viewed as anengine (mechanism) that creates measures that point to new directions for resolving a range ofissues.
Social Common Capital provides a more honest answer than the economic point ofview to the enquiry that is the ultimate goal of economics, “what should be done to bring abouta sustainable and stable society?” When its social and institutional implications are considered,Social Common Capital furnishes a paradigm that opens the way to a new age.
Today, when it is said anew that social stability is important, the concept of Social
Common Capital is an important starting point for economics even as we consider whatstability is and what should be done. The concept is a form of social management based onsocial standards and a way of thinking that emphasizes management systems on a foundationof professional ethics. It is a great achievement on the part of Professor Uzawa to haveconsistently advocated this concept, and based on the unshakeable conviction that social
problems including environmental issues are “the issues that economics should be tackling,”
to have shown such vigor in protecting the fundamental rights of the citizenry, issuing warnings
on global warming and proposing measures and policies. In the future, Professor Uzawa will
surely continue to have a great impact both in Japan and on the international stage.
157

LectureSocial Common Capital
Professor Hirofumi Uzawa
Rerum Novarum Inverted: The Abuses of Socialism and The Illusions of Capitalism
In his historic 1891 Encyclical Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII identified the most pressing
problems of the times as “the abuses of capitalism and the illusions of socialism”. He called
the attention of the world on “the misery and wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majorityof the working class” and condemned the abuses of liberal capitalism, particularly the greedof the capitalist class. At the same time, he vigorously criticized the illusions of socialism,
primarily on the ground that private property is a natural right indispensable for the pursuit ofindividual freedom. Exactly 100 years after Rerum Novarum, the New Rerum Novarum wasissued by Pope John Paul II on May 1, 1991, identifying the problems that plague the world
today as “the abuses of socialism and the illusions of capitalism” (John Paul II, 1991, andUzawa, 1991a, 1992c).
Contrary to the classic Marxist scenario of the transition of capitalism to socialism, theworld is now faced with an entirely different problem of how to transform a socialist economy
to a capitalist economy smoothly. For such a transformation to result in a stable, well-balanced
society, however, we must be explicitly aware of the shortcomings of the decentralized market
system as well as the deficiencies of the centralized planned economy.
The centralized planned economy has been plagued by the enormous power that has
been exclusively possessed by the state and has been arbitrarily exercised. The degree of
freedom bestowed upon the average citizen has been held at the minimum, whereas humandignity and professional ethics have not been properly respected. The experiences of socialist
countries during the last several decades have clearly shown that the economic plans, both
centralized and decentralized, that have been conceived of by the government bureaucracy,
have been inevitably found untenable either because of technological deficiencies or in termsof incentive incompatibility. The living standard of the average person has fallen far short ofthe expectations, and the dreams and aspirations of the majority of the people have been left
unfulfilled.
On the other hand, the decentralized market economy has suffered from the perpetualtendency toward an unequal income distribution, unless significant remedial measures aretaken, and from the volatile fluctuations in price and demand conditions, under which
productive ethics has been found extremely difficult to sustain. Profit motives often outrun
moral, social, and natural constraints, whereas speculative motives tend to dominate productive
ethics, even when proper regulatory measures are administered.
We must now search for an economic system in which stable, harmonious processes of
economic development may be realized with the maximum degree of individual freedom andwith due respect to human dignity and professional ethics, as eloquently prophesied by John
158

Stuart Mill in his classic Principles of Political Economy in a chapter entitled “Of the Stationary
State” (Mill, 1848). The stationary state, as envisioned by Mill, is interpreted as the state of theeconomy in which all macroeconomic variables, such as gross domestic product, national
income, consumption, investments, prices of all goods and services, wages, and real rates ofinterest, all remain stationary, whereas, within the society, individuals are actively engaged ineconomic, social, and cultural activities, new scientific discoveries are incessantly made, andnew products are continuously introduced still with the natural environment being preservedat the sustainable state. [Regarding Mill's stationarity state, one may be referred to an excellent
discussion by Daly (1977, 1999).]
We may term such an economic system as institutionalism, if we adopt the concept
originally introduced by Thorstein Veblen in his classic The Theory of Leisure Class, (Veblen,
1899) or The Theory of Business Enterprise (Veblen 1904). It has been recently reactivated asa theory of institutions by Williamson (1985) and others, where institutions are defined by therules of games that specify the incentives and mechanisms faced by the members of the society
engaged in social activities. We would like to emphasize that it is not defined in terms of acertain unified principle, but rather the structural characteristics of an institutionalist economy,
as symbolized by the network of various components of social common capital, are determinedby the interplay of moral, social, cultural, and natural conditions inherent in the society, andthey change as the processes of economic development evolve and social consciousness
transforms itself correspondingly. Institutionalism explicitly denies the Marxist doctrine thatthe social relations of production and labor determine the basic tenure of moral, social, andcultural conditions of the society in concern. Adam Smith emphasized several times in his
Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776) that the design of an economic system conceived of purely interms of logical consistency inevitably contradicts the diverse, basic nature of human being,
and instead he chose to advocate the merits of a liberal economic system evolved through the
democratic processes of social and political development. It is in this Smithian sense that wewould like to address the problems of the economic, social implications of social common
capital and the analysis of institutional arrangements and policy measures that ensue theprocesses of consumption and accumulation of both social common capital and private capitalthat are optimum in terms of a certain well-defined, socially acceptable sense.
Social Common CapitalSocial common capital provides members of a society with those services and institutionalarrangements that are crucial in maintaining human and cultural life. It is generally classified
into three categories: natural capital, social infrastructure, and institutional capital. These
categories are neither exhaustive nor exclusive, but they merely illustrate the nature of functions
performed by social common capital and the social perspectives associated with them.
Natural capital consists of the natural environment and natural resources such as forests,
rivers, lakes, wetlands, coastal seas, oceans, water, soil, and above all the earth's atmosphere.
Social infrastructure is another important component of social common capital. It consists ofroads, bridges, public transportation systems, water, electricity, and other public utilities,
communication and postal services, among others. Social common capital may also include

159

institutional capital such as hospitals and medical institutions, educational institutions,financial and monetary institutions, cultural capital, judicial and police systems, public
administrative services, and others. They all provide members of a society with those services
that are crucial in maintaining human and cultural life, without being unduly influenced by thevicissitudes of life.
Social common capital in principle is not appropriated to individual members of thesociety, but rather is held as common property resources to be managed by the commons inquestion, without, however, precluding the private ownership arrangements. Nor is it to becontrolled bureaucratically by the state. Thus, a problem of crucial importance in the theory ofsocial common capital is to devise the institutional arrangements that result in the managementof social common capital that is optimum from the social point of view. The theory of social
common capital provides us an analytical framework in which economic implications of social
common capital are fully examined and explored the conditions under which the intertemporal
allocation of scarce resources, including both social common capital and private capital, is
optimum from the social point of view.
Natural Capital
Natural capital consists of the natural environment and natural resources such as forests,
rivers, lakes, wetlands, coastal seas, oceans, water, soil, and the earth’s atmosphere. They all
share the common feature of being regenerative, subject to intricate and subtle forces of theecological and biological mechanisms. They provide all living organisms, particularly humanbeings, with the environment to sustain their lives and to regenerate themselves. However, therapid processes of economic development and population growth in the last several decades,with the accompanying vast changes in social and natural conditions, have altered the delicate
ecological balance of natural capital to such a significant extent that their effectiveness has
been lost in many parts of the world.
The sustainable management of natural capital may be made possible when theinstitutional arrangements of the commons are introduced, as indicated by the historical andtraditional experiences of the commons, with a particular reference to the fisheries and forestry
commons, as in detail discussed by McCay and Acheson (1987) and Berkes (1989).
However, processes of industrialization themselves, together with the ensuing changes
in cultural, social, and political conditions, have made the survival of the commons extremely
difficult. Only a handful of the commons now remain as viable social institutions in which
economic activities are effectively conducted with natural capital prudently sustained.
Social Infrastructure, Institutional Capital, and Cultural CapitalSocial infrastructure is another important component of social common capital. It
consists of roads, bridges, public mass transportation systems, water, electricity, and otherpublic utilities, communication and postal services, and sewage, among others. Social common
capital may also include institutional capital such as hospitals and medical institutions,educational institutions, judicial and police systems, public administrative services, financial
and monetary institutions, and so on.

160

Cultural capital may also be regarded as an important component of social common
capital, as extensively examined in particular by Throsby (2001). Cultural capital comprises
those capital assets in society that yield goods and services of cultural value, including
artworks, historic buildings, and so on, together with intangible assets such as language,
traditions, and others.
Social Capital
A word of caution may be necessary regarding the concept of social capital, originallyintroduced by James Coleman, Robert Putnam, and others. The standard reference is Putnam(2000) and an extensive discussion is reported in Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000). Social
capital refers to intangible social networks and relationships of trust that exists in communities.
It means the connectivity of the social network each individual is embedded in, and facilitates
the exchange of information and encourages reciprocal altruism. It is an interesting andfascinating concept, molded in the traditional framework of sociology and political science,
though in good contrast with that of social common capital as envisioned in this book. [Seealso Arrow (2000) and Solow (2000).]
Sustainability
Social common capital is held by the society as common property resources to be managed bysocial institutions of various kinds that are entrusted on a fiduciary basis to maintain social
common capital in good order and to distribute the services derived from it equitably. Social
common capital is in principle not appropriated to individual members of the society, without,
however, precluding the private ownership arrangements. Nor is it to be controlledbureaucratically by the state. Thus, a problem of crucial importance in the theory of social
common capital is how to devise the institutional arrangements that result in the managementof social common capital that is optimum from the social point of view.
The concept of sustainability is formally defined as the efficient pattern of intertemporal
allocation of private capital and social common capital for which the imputed price of social
common capital is assumed to remain at the stationary level at each time. As the imputed priceof social common capital expresses the subjective value of social common capital eachgeneration inherits from the past, the concept of sustainabililty thus defined may be regarded
as expressing in formal terms the concept of the stationary state as envisioned by John Stuart
Mill. It is closely linked to that introduced by Pezzey (1992), in which the utility remains
constant over time. On the other hand, it is not apparent to see the link with Page’s concept ofsustainability which emphasizes maintaining life opportunity from generation to generation(Page, 1997).
Externalities
One of the intricate problems inherent in social common capital concerns the phenomenon of
externalities. Since the classic treatment of Pigou (1925) and Samuelson (1954), the economists
were always puzzled by the phenomenon of externalities, but it was put aside as peripheral andnot worthy of serious consideration. Concern with environmental issues, however, has changed161this habit of economic thinking, and a large number of contributions have appeared where theissue of externalities occupies a central place, both from theoretical and empirical points ofview. The analytical treatment of externalities in the theory of social common capital is adopted
from that introduced in Uzawa (1974a, 1974b, 1974c, 1975, 1982, 1992a), in which two kindsof externalities, static on the one hand, and dynamic on the other, are recognized with respect
to the services derived from social common capital. Static externalities occur when the levelsof marginal products or utilities of individual economic units are affected by the aggregate
amount of services of social common capital used by all members of the society, assumingthat the stock of social common capital is kept at a constant level. Dynamic externalities, on
the other hand, are observed when the conditions of production and consumption for eachindividual economic unit change over time due to changes in the stock of social common
capital, either accumulation or depreciation, that occurs today.
The Commons
The natural environment, or rather natural capital, has been subject to an extensive examinationin the literature, particularly with respect to the fisheries and forestry commons. The analysisof the fisheries commons was initiated by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955), and was later
extended to the general treatment within the framework of modern capital theory by Schaefer(1957), Crutchfield and Zellner (1962), Clark and Munro (1975), and Tahvonen (1991),
among others. The simple dynamic model of the natural environment introduced in Uzawa(2003) that has the case of the fisheries commons primarily in mind belongs to the lineage of
their approach. It is an extension of the analysis developed by Uzawa (1992b), where it is used
to examine critically the theory of the tragedy of the commons, as advanced by Hardin (1968).
The model of the natural environment developed in Uzawa (1992b) may be applicableto the dynamics of the forestry commons as well. As with the fisheries commons, the dynamics
of the forestry commons has been extensively analyzed in the literature. Indeed, it was made acentral issue in economic theory by Wicksell (1901), who developed the core of modern
capital theory with the analysis of forests as the prototype. The most recent contribution toforestry economics was made by Johansson and Lögren (1985).
The theory of social common capital provides us with the theoretical framework within
which the role of institutional arrangements concerning social, cultural, and naturalenvironments in the processes of resource allocation and income distribution may be effectively
analyzed. Social common capital is generally composed of those scarce resources that are inprinciple neither privately appropriated nor subject to market transactions. Social common
capital or the services derived from it play a crucial and indispensable role for each memberof the society in concern to conduct at least the minimum level of human and dignified life.
The management of social common capital thus is entrusted on a fiduciary basis to autonomous
social institutions, to provide the environmental framework within which all human activities
are conducted and allocative mechanism through market institutions work. The analysis ofsocial common capital, as introduced by Uzawa (1974a, 1989, 1991a, 1991b) and recently
developed in Uzawa (1998, 2003, 2005), may be applied to discuss some of the difficulties
arising out of the tragedy of the commons phenomenon. Particularly, the institutional

162

arrangements whereby the sustainable use of resources in the commons may ensue are
examined in terms of the concept of imputed price of social common capital.
The society generally allocates a significant portion of scarce resources for theconstruction and maintenance of social common capital, particularly social infrastructure, andone of the central issues in the dynamic theory of social common capital is to find the criteria
by which scarce resources are allocated between investment in social common capital on the
one hand and production of goods and services which are transacted on the market on theother.
In the theory of social common capital, we formulate an analytical framework in which
economic implications of social common capital of various kinds are examined and explore
the conditions under which the intertemporal allocation of social common capital and privately
owned scarce resources is optimum from the social point of view. It may be regarded as thegeneral equilibrium versions of those formulated in Uzawa (1992b), where, however, thephenomenon of externalities is not explicitly discussed. In the dynamic models of social
common capital introduced in Uzawa (2005), the phenomenon of externalities, both static anddynamic, is incorporated in the construct of the model and their implications for the processesof resource allocation, including both social common capital and privately managed scarce
resources, are fully explored. The sustainable allocation of scarce resources occurs when the
imputed prices associated with the accumulation and use of social common capital are used as
signals in the allocative processes. Privately owned scarce resources and goods and services
produced by private economic units are allocated through the mechanism of market institutions.
In the dynamic models concerning the accumulation of social common capital referred
to above, the technological conditions are assumed to remain largely constant, independent of
the accumulation of the stock of social infrastructure. Technological progress induced by theavailability of social infrastructure and the accompanying increase in investment activities inthe stock of privately owned scarce resources may be regarded as the central issue in the theoryof social infrastructure, particularly within the context of developing nations, also examined
in detail by Hirschman (1958) in terms of the concept of social overhead capital. Social
overhead capital as defined by Hirschman comprises those basic services without whichprimary, secondary, and tertiary productive activities cannot function. In its wider sense, social
overhead capital includes all public services from law and order through education, publichealth to transportation, communications, power and water supply, as well as agricultural
overhead capital such as irrigation and drainage systems. Thus the theory of social common
capital introduced in Uzawa (2005) may be regarded as an extension of Hirschman’s conceptof social overhead capital, in which natural resources are included in addition to social
infrastructure and institutional and cultural capital.
The theory of social common capital may also be regarded as an extension of the twosector models of capital accumulation originally introduced by Uzawa (1962, 1963, 1964).
Similarly, the problems of designing institutional framework in which the optimum allocationof both social common capital and privately owned scarce resources may be realized are
crucial in any attempt toward practical implementations of the theory of social common
capital.

163

When we include all components of social common capital in a particular nation, thesocial institutions entrusted on a fiduciary basis with their management constitute the public
sector in the broadest sense of the word. The aggregate expenditures incurred by all thesesocial institutions are nothing but the governmental expenditures, either on the current accountor on the capital account. Thus, the problem we address may be interpreted as that of devising
an institutional framework in which the ensuring governmental activities are optimum fromthe social point of view.
Environmental Problems
In the last several decades, we have observed a significant change in the nature of environmental
problems and the economic, social, and cultural implications that the degradation of thenatural environment has brought about. During the 1960s and in the early 1970s, our primaryenvironmental concern was with the disruption of the environment and the ensuing hazard tohuman health that were caused by the rapid processes of industrialization and urbanization,
both of which were taking place at an unprecedented high pace in many parts of the world. The
environmental damages were mainly caused by the emission of chemical substances such as
sulfur and nitrogen oxides that themselves are toxic and hazardous to human health. In recent
years, however, we have become increasingly aware of the extensive degradation of the global
environment, as exemplified by such phenomena as global warming, the extensive depletionof tropical rain forests, with the accompanying loss of biodiversity, and pollution of the oceans.
The global environmental problems are primarily caused either by the imprudent use andexcess depletion of the natural resources or by the emission of those chemical agents such ascarbon dioxide in the case of global warming which by themselves are neither harmful tohuman health nor hazardous to the natural environment, but, on the global scale, they contributeto the atmospheric instability and global disturbances.
As for the industrial pollution and similar environmental problems that were rampant
and wide spread in the 1960s, the causal relationships were fairly easy to recognize, both fromthe social and scientific points of view, and the remedial measures were not too difficult totake, both from economic and political points of view, although one has to be aware of asignificant number of major environmental problems in the 1960s such as the case of the
Minamata disease that left a state of extreme social injustice for the victims.
On the other hand, the global environmental problems concern the degradation anddestabilization of the natural environment covering an extensive area, with a large number ofpeople involved. They not only affect the current generation, living in developing as well as indeveloped countries, but also all future generations are irreversibly involved as exemplified by
the phenomena of global warming, the loss of biodiversity, and pollution of the oceans.
The global environmental problems are also noted for the intricate and subtle
interrelationships that exist between human activities, both economic and cultural, and theecological and biological processes in the natural environment. Traditional economic theory
has not paid sufficient attention to the damages and threats to the natural environment,
particularly with respect the stability and resilience of regenerative processes, that are exerted
by industrial, urban, and other human activities. Instead, it has treated the natural environment

164

simply as the stock of natural capital, from which various natural resources are extracted to be
used as factors of production for the productive processes in the economy.
However, in the economic analysis of fisheries, forestry, and other agricultural activities,
a large number of studies have been made, where the implications of economic activities forthe stability and resilience of the natural environment, either in the fisheries ground or inforestry commons, are explicitly recognized, and the patterns of resource allocation that are
dynamically optimum in terms of the intertemporal preference ordering prevailing within thesociety are analytically examined, as in detail described, for example, by Johansson and Lögren
(1985), and Clark (1990).
When we examine the interaction of economic activities with the natural environment,
one of the more crucial issues concerns the organizational characteristics of the social
institutions that manage the natural environment, in conjunction with their behavioral andfinancial criteria, which realize those patterns of the repletion and depletion of the naturalenvironment and the levels of economic activities that are dynamically optimum from thesocial point of view. The dynamically optimum time-paths generally converge to the long-run
stationary state at which the processes of economic activities are sustained at those levels
that are at the optimum balance vis- vis the natural environment, and the problem we face
now concerns the organizational and institutional arrangements for sustainable economic
development.
Such an organizational framework may be provided by the institutional arrangementsof the commons, as have been shown in terms of a large number of historical, traditional, andcontemporary commons documented, for example, in McCay and Acheson (1987) and Berkes(1989). The commons discussed by McCay and Acheson (1987) and Berkes (1989) refer to avariety of natural resources extending from fisheries, forestry, grazing grounds, to irrigationand subterranean water systems. The processes of industrialization, however, together with theaccompanying changes in economic, social, and cultural conditions prevailing in modern
society, have made these commons untenable both from economic and social points of view,and the survival of the majority of the traditional commons have become extremely difficult.
Agriculture and Social Common Capital
Agriculture concerns not only economic, industrial aspects, but also virtually every aspect ofhuman life: cultural, social, and natural. It provides us with food and the raw materials such aswood, cotton, silk, and others that are indispensable to sustain our existence. It also hassustained, with few exceptions, the natural environment such as forests, lakes, wetlands, soil,
subterranean water, and the atmosphere.
Agriculture made possible a harmonious and sustainable interaction between natureand mankind through the social institution of the rural community in many East Asian
countries, particularly in Japan. This does not, however, necessarily imply that the traditional,
conventional social institutions prevailing in most of the agricultural communities are
justifiable or desirable.
The land ownership probably is the single most serious and complex problem in Japan.
Japan is noted for a high population density and for a long history of agricultural development.

165

Land had been cultivated literally to the top of the mountains and forestry had been subject tomyriads of property right arrangements. The modern Civil Law, enacted in 1898, adopted an
extremely narrow definition of land ownership, voiding traditional forms of property ownershipfor villages as the commons to manage and control the natural resources to be directly or
indirectly obtained from land, forests, and other natural environments. The conflict between
the modern Civil Law and traditional institutions of the commons had occupied the majorityof the legal suits brought before the Grand Court before the Second World War. The land
reform measures implemented during the period occupied by the Allied Powers did not help
resolve the dilemma either. The postwar Japan has seen a large number of conflicts, occasionallyserious, between the State and citizens, mostly farmers, in the processes of land expropriation
for the construction of infrastructure facilities.
The Narita Airport Problem is probably one of the thorniest problems Japan has facedsince the end of the Second World War involving infrastructure construction, and brought withit a far more extensive damage to the society than the scope and magnitude of the infrastructure
facilities originally planned would deserve. It began on July 4, 1966, when the Cabinet meeting
decided to construct the New Tokyo International Airport at Sanrizuka in Narita, without priorconsultation with the inhabitants in the community or the local authorities, and the thirty yearsof the conflict claimed close to ten thousand casualties on both sides, leading to a large numberof human tragedies, unprecedented in peacetime Japan. The conflict was peacefully brought
to an end on May 24, 1993, when the Minister of Transportation and the representatives of the
Airport Opposition Alliance jointly declared that neither side would resort to any forcefulmeasures and instead would cooperate in devising a comprehensive regional development
plan, including the completion of the Airport, that would be acceptable to all those involved.
As part of the peaceful resolution of the Narita Conflict, a commission was appointed to draw
a blueprint for the Sanrizuka Agricultural Commons that would serve not only as the coreorganization for the comprehensive regional development plan, but also as the prototype of theorganizational renovation to vitalize the Japanese agriculture.
Medical Care as Social Common Capital
When medical care is regarded as social common capital, every member of the society isentitled, as basic human rights, to receive the best available medical care that the society canprovide, regardless of the economic, social, and regional circumstances, even though this does
not necessarily imply that medical care is provided free of charge. The government then isrequired to compose the overall plan for the regional distribution of various types of medical
institutions and the schooling system to train physicians, nurses, technical experts, and otherco-medical staff to meet the demand for medical care that would result in the management of
the medical care component of social common capital that is socially optimum. It is thenrequired to devise institutional and financial arrangements under which the construction andmaintenance of the necessary medical institutions are realized and the required number of
medical professionals are trained without social or bureaucratic coercion. It should beemphasized that all medical institutions and schools basically are private and the management
is supervised by qualified medical professionals.

166

The fees for medical care then are determined based on the principle of marginal social
costs pricing, not through merely market mechanism. It may be noted that, the smaller thecapacity of the medical component of social common capital, the higher are the fees charged
to various types of medical care services. Hence, in composing the overall plan for the medicalcare component of social common capital, we must explicitly take into account the relationships
between the capacity of the medical care component of social common capital and the imputed
prices of medical care services. The socially optimum plan for the medical care component ofsocial common capital then is one where the resulting system of imputed prices of various
types of medical care services leads to the allocation of scarce resources, privately appropriatedor otherwise, and the accompanying distribution of real income that are socially optimum, inthe sense as will be in detail discussed in this chapter.
When, however, physicians provide medical care services to those whose health isimpaired due to diseases or injuries, the very nature of medical care necessarily implies thatthe processes of diagnosis and curative treatment may occasionally involve the impairment,
physical or mental, of patients, whereas the curative effects are not necessarily absolutely
guaranteed. If an ordinary person were to perform such conduct, he or she would certainly becriminally prosecuted. Only qualified physicians and co-medical staff are immune from suchprosecution, because not only are they licensed to practice medical care, but also they aresupposed, as being trusted on a fiduciary basis the management of the medical care componentof social common capital, to obey professional codes of conduct truthfully and to take care ofpatients with the best scientific knowledge and the highest available technical proficiency ofthe medical sciences today. For such presuppositions to be fulfilled, it is not only necessarythat arrangements are institutionalized whereby the provision of medical care and the conductof each physician are properly monitored, in terms of peers’ review or some other means, butalso it is required that an overall system of incentive mechanisms, in terms of social esteem
and compensatory scheme, must be established whereby it becomes physicians’ own selfinterest to obey professional codes of conduct truthfully and to seek for the best scientificknowledge and the highest available technical proficiency of the medical profession.
Under such utopian presuppositions, total expenditures for the construction andmaintenance of the socially optimum medical care component of social common capital thenexceed, generally by a large amount, the total fees paid by the patients under the principle ofmarginal social cost pricing. The resulting pattern of resource allocation and real income
distribution, however, is optimum from the social point of view. The magnitude of the deficits
with respect to the management of the socially optimum medical care component of social
common capital then may appropriately be regarded as an index to measure the relative
importance of medical care from the social point of view.
Education as Social Common Capital
Education, together with medical care, constitutes the most important components of social
common capital and, as such, may require the institutional arrangements substantially different
from those for the standard economic activities that are generally pursued from the view pointof profit maximization and subject to transactions on the market. Whereas medical care is167

provided for those who are not able to perform ordinary human functions due to impaired
health or injuries, education is provided to help young people develop their human abilities,
both innate and acquired, as fully as possible. Both activities play a crucial role in enabling
every member of the society in concern to maintain his or her human dignity and to enjoy
basic human rights as fully as possible. If either medical care or education is subject to market
transactions based merely on profit motives or under the bureaucratic control by stateauthorities, their effectiveness may be seriously impaired and the resulting distribution of real
income may tend to become extremely unfair and unequal. Thus the economics of educationand medical care may better be carefully analyzed within the theoretical framework of social
common capital. The role of education as social common capital within the analyticalframework of the theory of social common capital may be effectively analyzed.
In describing the behavior of educational institutions, we occasionally talk about the
maximization of net value, it is used in the sense that the optimum level of education and themost efficient pattern of resource allocation in the provision of education are sought, strictlyin accordance with professional disciplines and ethics.
We consider a society which consists of a finite number of individuals and two types of
the institutions; private firms that are specialized in producing goods that are transacted on themarket, on the one hand, and social institutions that are concerned with the provision of
education as services of social common capital, on the other.
All social institutions are characterized by the properties that all factors of productionthat are needed for the professional provision of education are either privately owned, or if not,they are managed as if privately owned. However, the social institutions in charge of education
are managed strictly in accordance with professional discipline and expertise knowledge.
Subsidy payments are made for the provision of education, with the rate to beadministratively determined by the government and announced prior to the opening of themarket. The fees paid to social institutions for the provision of education exceed, by the subsidy
rate, those charged for the attainment of education. Given the subsidy rate for the provision of
education, the two levels of fees are so determined that the general level of education provided
by all educational institutions in the society is precisely equal to the total level of education
attained by all individuals of the society. One of the crucial roles of the government is todetermine the subsidy rate for education in such a manner that the ensuing pattern of resource
allocation and income distribution is optimum in a certain well-defined, socially acceptablesense.
Global Warming and Sustainable Development
The atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, particularly of carbon dioxide, has been
increasing since the times of the Industrial Revolution, with an accelerated rate in the last three
decades. According to the IPCC reports, it is estimated that, if the emission of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases and the disruption of tropical rain forests were to continue at thepresent pace, global average air surface temperature toward the end of the twenty-first century
would be 3 - 6 C higher than the level prevailing before the Industrial Revolution, resulting indrastic changes in climatic conditions and accompanying disruption of the biological and168

ecological environments.
The problems of global warming are genuinely dynamic. From past human activities
we inherit an excess concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide, and the choices we maketoday concerning the use of fossil fuels and related activities significantly affect all future
generations through the phenomenon of global warming that is brought about by theatmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide due to the combustion of fossil fuels today.
Thus, we have to take into account explicitly the changes in the welfare levels of all future
generations caused by the increases in the atmospheric accumulations of carbon dioxide.
In Uzawa (2005), we are primarily concerned with the economic analysis of global
warming within the theoretical framework of dynamic analysis of global warming, as
introduced in Uzawa (1991b, 2003). We are particularly concerned with the policy arrangementsof the proportional carbon tax scheme under which the tax rate is made proportional either tothe level of the per capita national income of the countries where greenhouse gases are emitted
or to the sum of the national incomes of all countries in the world. We first consider the casewhere the oceans are the only reservoir of CO2 on the earth, and then we explicitly take into
consideration the role of the terrestrial forests in moderating processes of global warming byabsorbing the atmospheric accumulation of CO2, on the one hand, and in affecting the level of
the welfare of people in the society by providing a decent and cultural environment, on theother.
The rate of anthropogenic change in the atmospheric level of CO2 is determined by the
combustion of fossil fuels and is closely related to the levels of production and consumption
activities conducted during the year observed.
The impact index function (V) of the following form is postulated:^^(V) = (V - V ) ß, 0 < V < V,^
Where V is the critical level of the atmospheric accumulation of CO2 and ß is the sensitivity^
parameter (0 < ß < 1). The critical level V of the atmospheric accumulation of CO2 is usually^assumed to be twice the level prevailing before the Industrial Revolution; that is, V = 600 GtC.
The impact coefficient (V) is given byß.
(V) = ^
V -V
Proposition. Sustainable time-paths (Vt) of the atmospheric accumulations of CO2 are obtained
as the competitive market equilibrium under the following system of proportional carbon
taxes for the emission of CO2 and tax-subsidy measures for the reforestation and depletion of
resources of forests:(i) In each country v, the carbon taxes are levied with the rate
per capita national income yv:
v

=

(V)
+µ

v

that is proportional to they v,

where (V) is the impact coefficient of global warming, is the social rate of discount, and µ169

is the rate at which atmospheric CO2 is annually absorbed by the oceans.
(ii) In each country v, tax-subsidy arrangements are made for the depletion of resources andreforestation of forests with the rate v that is proportional to the national income yv, to begiven byv=

1

[ v(Rv) + v

(V) v
]y,
+µ

where v(Rv) , v are, respectively, the impact coefficient and carbon sequester rate for forests
in country v.
International Fund for Atmospheric Stabilization
The divergence in economic performance between developed countries and developing
countries has steadily widened in the last several decades, and various institutional and policy
measures that have been devised internationally or bilaterally have not had much impact innarrowing the gap between these two groups of countries. The introduction of the proportional
carbon tax system as envisioned here, in spite of the implicit recognition of the equity aspect
in its design, may tend to worsen the relative position of developing countries, at least in the
short-run. It would be desirable, therefore, to supplement the carbon tax system with theinternational redistributive scheme that would have significant impact in narrowing the gap
between the stages of economic development of various countries involved.
The International Fund for Atmospheric Stabilization is an institutional framework inwhich it is possible to combine an international arrangement to stabilize atmosphericequilibrium with a redistributive scheme to help developing countries to accelerate processesof economic development.
The International Fund for Atmospheric Stabilization presupposes that each country
adopts the proportional carbon tax system under which emissions of carbon dioxide and othergreenhouse gases are charged a levy evaluated at the imputed prices proportional to the percapita level of national income and a charge (or a subsidiary payment) is made for the depletion(or the afforestation) of terrestrial forests, again based upon the evaluation at the imputed
prices of terrestrial forests that are proportional to the per capita level of national income, as
in detail discussed in Uzawa (2003, 2005).
The tax revenues from the proportional carbon tax system are principally put into thegeneral revenue account of each government, preferably to be partly earmarked for the
purposes of restoring the natural and ecological environments, and for encouraging private
economic agents to develop those technological and institutional knowledge that are crucial inrestoring equilibrium conditions in the global environment.
Each country then transfers a fixed portion, say 5%, of the net revenue from the carbon
tax system to the International Fund for Atmospheric Stabilization. The total amounttransferred to the International Fund for Atmospheric Stabilization from individual countries
then would be allocated to developing countries according to a certain predetermined schedule,
properly taking into account the per capita levels of national income and the size of population.

170

Developing countries may use the amounts transferred from the International Fund for
Atmospheric Stabilization for the purposes which they think appropriate, preferably forcompensating those who would suffer from the phenomena of global environmental
disequilibrium and incur the hardships by the implementation of the carbon tax system, for
restructuring industrial organizations and social infrastructure, and for introducing
substitutional energy sources and energy-saving technologies.
It is difficult to imagine that the International Fund for Atmospheric Stabilization orsimilar international arrangements on the global scale may be instituted in any immediate
future. Whether such international arrangements may be effectively implemented or not
depends to a significant extent upon the degree of awareness on the part of the general publicconcerning the enormous burden and costs future generations will have to suffer from thephenomena of global warming and other global environmental disequilibrium.
The strenuous effort by a large number of geo-scientists, ecologists, and other scientists
to clarify the mechanism of global warming and to identify the specific implications of global
warming and other environmental issues for ecological, biological, social, and cultural life on
Earth has had a significant impact to the awareness and consciousness of the general public
and the national governments. The numerous conferences and symposia organized by various
international organizations, such as the 1991 Rio Conference and the Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change, particularly the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, have substantially altered theperception of the international community as regards the plausibility and danger of global
warming and other atmospheric disequilibria.
All these help the national governments involved to search for those policy andinstitutional arrangements that will make the practical implementation of the International
Fund for Atmospheric Stabilization or similar international agreements feasible from
economic, social, and political points of view. It would not be too optimistic to expect to havethe International Fund for Atmospheric Stabilization or a similar framework to be instituted
within a foreseeable period, though not in the immediate future.

171

A Hypothetical CaseA hypothetical case of the incidences of the proportional carbon taxes under the system of
proportional carbon taxes for the emission of CO2 and tax-subsidy measures for the reforestationand depletion of resources of forests are presented, all in terms of the statistical data of 2005
(in US$).
Table 1
Incidences of Proportional Carbon Taxes (2005) with
the Coefficient of Proportion 0.01 Including All Radiative Forcing Agents (RFA)Countries

National Income
per capita [Dollars]

RFA Increase
per capita (Ct)USA
Canada42,00034,000

5.90
6.20

420
340

2,500
2,100

UK
FranceGermany
Italy
The Netherland
SwedenNorweyFinlandDenmark

32,00031,00031,00028,00035,00032,00048,00031,00034,000

3.00
2.20
3.20
2.20
3.60
1.90
1.60
2.00
3.20

320
310
310
280
350
320
480
310
340

950
680
980
600
1,200
610
760
610
1,100

Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Philippine
Singapore
Thailand
India
China

3,100
31,00021,00011,0003,200
40,000
6,900
2,200
4,100

1.70
2.70
2.60
1.90
0.30
3.20
1.20
0.30
1.10

30
310
210
110
30
400
70
20
40

50
840
560
210
8
1,300
80
7
40

Australia
New Zealand

33,00023,000

7.10
3.50

330
230

2,300
790

Sources: UNFCCC, World Development Indicators, etc.

172

Imputed Price Carbon Taxes[Dollars / ct] per capita [Dollars]

Table 2
Incidences of Tax-Subsidy Measures for the Reforestation and
Depletion of Resources of Forests (2005)
Country

Forest and Woodlands Net Annual Reforestation Imputed Price[Million ha][1000 ha][Per ha]Assessment
Per Capita
Total[Million Dollars] [Dollars]

USA
Canada

303
310

159
0

42,00034,000

6,627
0

22
0

UK
FranceGermany
Italy
The Netherland
SwedenNorwayFinlandDenmark

3
16
11
10
0
28
9
23
1

10
41
0
106
1
11
17
5
3

32,00031,00031,00028,00035,00032,00048,00031,00034,000

321
1,264
0
2,929
35
351
808
153
102

5
21
0
50
2
39
175
29
19

Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Philippine
Singapore
Thailand
India
China

88
25
6
21
7
0
15
68
197

−1,871
−2
−7
−140
−157
0
−59
29
4,058

9,300
31,00021,00033,0009,600
40,00020,7002,200
4,100−17,120−62−149−4,679−1,5070−1,22064
16,678

−77
0
−3
−179
−18
0
−19
0
13

Australia
New Zealand

164
8

−193
17

33,00023,000−6,319
388

−310
94

Tropical rain forest states: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine, and Thai
Source: World Resources Institute, etc.
References
Arrow, K. J. (2000). “Observation on Social Capital” in Dasgupta, P., and Serageldin, I. (eds.), Social Capital: A
Multi-faceted Perspective, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000.
Berkes, F. (1989). Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-based Sustainable Development (ed.),London: Balhaven Press.
Clark, C. W. (1990). Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources, Second
Edition, New York: John Wiley.
Clark, C. W., and G. R. Munro. (1975). “The Economics of Fishing and Modern Capital Theory,” Journal ofEnvironmental Economics and Management, 2, 92-106.
Crutchfield, J. A., and A. Zellner (1962). Economic Aspect of the Pacific Halibut Fishery, US Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C.
Daly, H. E. (1977). Steday State Economics,: Economics of Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral Growth, San
Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

173

Daly, H. E. (1999). Steday State Economics,: Economics of Second Edition with New Essays, Washington D. C.:
Island Press.
Dasgupta, P., and Serageldin, I. (eds.). (2000). Social Capital: A Multi-faceted Perspective, Washington, D.C.:
World Bank.
Gordon, H. S. (1954). “The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resources: The Fishery,” Journal of Political
Economy, 62, 124-142.
Hardin, G. (1968). “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 162, 1243-1248.
Hirschman, A. O. (1958). The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven: Yale University Press.
John Paul II. (1991). Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus, Vatican City: Libreria Editorice Vaticana.
Johansson, P.-O., and Lögren, K.-G. (1985). The Economics of Forestry and Natural Resources, Oxford: BasilBlackwell.
Leo XIII. (1891). Encyclical Letter Rerum Novarum, Leonis XIII P. M. Acta, XI, Romae 1892.
McCay, B. J., and J. M. Acheson (1987). The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Economy of Communal
Resources (ed.), Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.
Mill, J. S. (1848). Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, New York,D. Appleton [5th edition, 1899].
Page, T. (1997). “Sustainability and the Problem of Valuation”, in R. Costanza (ed.), Ecological Economics: The
Science and Management of Sustainability, New York: Columbia University Press, 58-74.
Pezzey, J. (1992). “Sustainability: An Interdisciplinary Guide,” Environmental Values, 1, 321-362.
Pigou, A. C. (1925). The Economics of Welfare, London: Macmillan.
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New York: Simon andSchuster.
Samuelson, P. A. (1954). “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 36, 387389.
Schaefer, M. B. (1957). “Some Considerations of Population Dynamics and Economics in Relation to the Managementof Commercial Marine Fisheries,” Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada, 14, 669-681.
Scott, A. D. (1955). “The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership,” Journal of Political Economy, 63, 116-124.
Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [The Modern Library Edition,
New York: Random House, 1937].
Solow, R. M. (2000). “Note on Social Capital and Economic Performance,” in Dasgupta, P., and Serageldin, I.
(eds.), Social Capital: A Multi-faceted Perspective, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000.
Tahvonen, O. (1991). “On the Dynamics of Renewable Resource Harvesting and Population Control,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 1, 97-117.
Throsby, D. (2001). Economics and Culture, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Uzawa, H. (1962). “On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth,” Review of Economic Studies, 14, 40-7.
Uzawa, H. (1963). “On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth, II,” Review of Economic Studies, 19, 105-18.
Uzawa, H. (1964). “Optimal Growth in a Two-Sector Model of Capital Accumulation,” Review of Economic
Studies, 31, 1-24.
Uzawa, H. (1974a). “Sur la thérie éonomique de capital collectif social,” Cahier du Séinaire d’ Éonometrie, 103-22.
Translated in Preference, Production, and Capital: Selected Papers of Hirofumi Uzawa, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988, 340-362.
Uzawa, H. (1974b). “The Optimum Management of Social Common Capital,” in J. Rothenberg and I. G. Heggie(eds.), The Management of Water Quality and the Environment, London: Macmillan, 3-17.
Uzawa, H. (1974c). Social Costs of the Automobile (in Japanese), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten.
Uzawa, H. (1975). “Optimum Investment in Social Common Capital,” in E. S. Mills (ed.), Economic Analysis ofEnvironmental Problem, New York: Columbia University Press, 9-26.
Uzawa, H. (1982). “Social Stability and Collective Public Consumption,” in R. C. O. Matthews and G. B. Stafford(eds.), The Grants Economy and Public Consumption, London: Macmillan , 23-37.
Uzawa, H. (1989). A History of Economic Thought (in Japanese), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1989.
Uzawa, H. (199la). “Rerum Novarum Inverted: Abuses of Capitalism and Illusions of Socialism”, Rivista di
Politica Economica, 81(4), 19-31.
Uzawa, H. (1991b). “Global Warming Initiatives: The Pacific Rim,” in R. Dornbusch and J. M. Poterba (eds.),
Global Warming: Economic Policy Responses, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 275-324.
Uzawa, H. (1992a). “Imputed Prices of Greenhouse Gases and Land Forests,” Renewable Energy 3, 499-511.

174

Uzawa, H. (1992b). “The Tragedy of Commons and the Theory of Social Common Capital,” The Beijer Discussion
Paper Series.
Uzawa, H. (1992c). “Institutions, Development, and Environment,” in Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace(ed.), Social and Ethical Aspects of Economics: A Colloquium in the Vatican, Vatican City, 129-43.
Uzawa, H. (1998). “Toward a General Theory of Social Common Capital,” in G. Chichilnsky (ed.), Markets,
Information, and Uncertainty, New York: Cambridge University Press, 253-304.
Uzawa, H. (1999). “Global Warming as a Cooperative Game,” Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2,
1-37.
Uzawa, H. (2003). Economic Theory and Global Warming, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Uzawa, H. (2005). Economic Analysis of Social Common Capital, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Veblen, T. B. (1899). The Theory of Leisure Class, New York: Macmillan.
Veblen, T. B. (1904). The Theory of Business Enterprise, New York: Charles Scribners’ Sons.
Williamson, O. E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, and Relational Contacting,
New York: Free Press.

175