Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation

Technical Strategic Plan 2016 forDecommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station of TEPCO, Inc.
“Summary”

July, 2016
Nuclear Damage Compensation andDecommissioning Facilitation Corporation

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Overall Structure of the Strategic Plan 2016

1. Introduction
２. The Strategic Plan
３. Risk reduction strategy
４. Strategic plan for fuel debris retrieval
５. Strategic plan for radioactive waste management
６. Approach to the R&D projects
７. Future Actions

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1. Establishment of NDF
The structure for TEPCO to reliably address the decommissioning wasestablished after Dec. 2011 based on the major policies described in"the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap" determined by the Japanese Government.

Government

TEPCO

Determine Mid and Long-Term Roadmap

Implement decommissioning(Developed in Dec. 2011, revised in Jun. 2013 and Jun. 2015)
Dec 2011
Establishment of
the Roadmap

Dec 2013
2 years laterDec 2021
10 years later

30 to 40years later▼
Stabilization

Phase 1

Phase 2Phase 3

Period until thecommencementof fuel removalfrom SFP

Period untilcommencementof fuel debris
retrieval

Period until the endof decommissioningof Units 1 to 4

Source: TEPCO’s website

Strengthening the framework so that the Japanese Government at the forefront
to make steady progress in the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS.

Nuclear Damage Compensation & Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation
established on August 18, 2014.
(Reorganization of Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation)3

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1. Role Sharing of Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Management
Japanese government

TEPCO (D&D Engineering Company)

Make Policy and Manage Progress Status• Determine the approaches to the decommissioning andcontaminated water management Approve the Roadmap• Manage progress status of current issues e. g.
contaminated water management

Mid- and Long-term Roadmap
Indicate
key issues

Progressmanagement

ReportCarry out Stable Decommissioning• Remove fuels from spent fuel pools• Manage contaminated water (installation of additionaltanks, water purification, rainwater management)
Action plan
• Store/manage rubbles, wastes, etc.
• Ensure safety/quality, improve work environment, etc.
ReportReportAdvice/Guidance

NDF
Issue
project grant

Formulate strategy and provide technical support

Report results

1. Develop a mid- and long-term strategy
2. Provide technical support for progress mgt of key issues
3. Carry out R&D planning and progress management
4. Reinforce international cooperation The Strategic Plan

Report/Submit action plan

Monitoring/assessment

Share progress and issues

R&D institutions

Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)

Conduct R&D

Carry out Safety Regulation-International Research Institutefor Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)･PCV internal survey and characterization
technologies through investigation inside thereactor, accident progressions analysis andactual unit data etc.
･Fuel debris retrieval, decontamination/dose
reduction technologies, PCV repair and water
seal technology･R&D regarding radioactive waste processing
and disposal etc.

-Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)･Installation and operation of R&D center(Naraha Remote Technology Development
Center, Okuma Analysis and Research Center,
Collaborative Laboratories for Advanced
Decommissioning Science (CLADS) etc. )･Basic and fundamental technology research• Approval for implementation plan, pre-use inspection,
welding inspection etc.

Results of R&D* TEPCO, decommissioning operator is participating as a member of IRID and sharing R&D needs and results of activities.

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1. Purpose of the Strategic Plan and Relationship with the Roadmap
Goals and policies presented by the Government
Key elements of strategies, policies and plans
determined by the Government“Roadmap”
determined by theGovernment

1. Strategy- The approach toward the objectives, concept of thedecision-making and order of priorities
2. Specific policies to implement the strategy- Concrete policies and requirements to conduct
activities and make decisions

Strategic Plan

developed by NDF
Official name: Technical Strategic
Plan 2016 for Decommissioning of
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station of Tokyo ElectricPower Company Holdings, Inc.

3. An integrated plan to implement the strategy- A comprehensive plan to conduct field work and R&D

Detailed decommissioning plan by TEPCO and research
institutions (field work, engineering and R&D)

・Decommissioning
performed by TEPCO
・R&D by research
institutions

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1. Positioning and Purpose of the Strategic Plan 2016
FY 2015

FY 2016

FY 2017
Determination of fuel debris
retrieval policies for each unit

Milestones of Mid-andLong-Term Roadmap.

FY 2018
Establishment of basic
concept of processing/disposal

Determination of fuel debris retrieval
methods for the first implementing unit

Purpose: To contribute to steady implementation andrevision of the Roadmap in order to facilitate
appropriate and steady decommissioning of the
Fukushima Daiichi NPS and to provide a firm
technical base to the Roadmap.

Strategic Plan 2018
 Fuel debris retrieval methods forthe first implementing unit

Publication Jul. 13, 2016

Published Apr. 30, 2015

Strategic Plan 2016

Strategic Plan 2017
 Fuel debris retrieval policies for each unit
 Outline of basic concept of processing/disposal
for solid radioactive wastes

Strategic Plan 2015
 Concept andapproaches

The strategic Plan 2016 develops the detailed method and studies according to
the concept and approaches of the Strategic Plan 2015 towards 2017 and 2018.

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2. Progress over the Last One Year Management of contaminated water• [Remove] Water purification using Advanced Liquid Processing System andwater leakage prevention from the sea water piping trenches are underway.
• [Isolating] Groundwater bypassing, reduction of the amount of water flowing into the R/B bysubdrain systems, and the freezing operation of the land-side impermeable walls started.

Before• [Preventing leakage] Pumping out the groundwater through the subdrain systemwith the sea-side impermeable walls closed.
 Spent fuel removal from SFP

After• Unit 1 : Dismantling the building cover and removing rubble.
• Unit 2 : All the upper part of the R/B will be disassembled.
• Unit 3 : Completed removal of large sized rubbles in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP).
 PCV internal survey• Unit 1 : Performing investigation using muon detection system and PCV internal survey using the robots.

Cleanup for the peripheryof Unit 2 building• Unit 2 : Preparing measurement using muon detection system and PCV internal survey using the robots.

• Unit 3 : Obtained information using inspection device.
Muon detection equipment (Small device) Radioactive waste• Increased in the stored inventory because of the secondary waste generated due to the progress of contaminatedwater treatment and solid radioactive waste caused by removal of rubble.
• Reinforced the system of the waste management department and reduced the generated amount of radioactive waste.
• Released waste storage plan for the next decade.
 Work environment• Reduced on-site radiation dose (additional effective dose of less than 1mSv/year at the site boundary).
• Performing decontamination but it takes time to reduce dose rate in the high radiation area of the building.
 R&D activities• Established the Decommissioning R&D Partnership Council in the NDF, enhancing R&D through the promotion of collaboration with therelevant institutions.
• Established Collaborative Laboratories for Advanced Decommissioning Science (CLADS) by JAEA as an international R&D organisation.
• Started the operation of "Naraha Remote Technology Development Center" where development/demonstration tests are performed forremotely controlled device (robotics etc.)7

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2. Guiding Principles for the Strategic Plan Fundamental policy for the “decommissioning” of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS
 The decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS is to continuously and promptly reduce
the risks associated with the radioactive materials generated by the accidents.
 The Strategic Plan is "a design of risk reduction strategy" on a mid- and long- term basis.

 Five Guiding Principles for Risk Reduction
 Principle 1: Safe

Reduction of risks posed by radioactive materials*
and ensuring work safety(*Environmental impact and worker’s exposure) Principle 2: Proven

Highly reliable and flexible technologies

 Principle 3: Efficient

Effective utilization of resources(e.g. human, physical, financial and space) Principle 4: Timely

Awareness of time axis

 Principle 5: Field-oriented Thorough application of Three Actuals(actual field, actual things and actual situation)

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3. Risk Reduction Strategy (1) Basic concept Decide the measures for risk reduction by identifying various radioactive materials,
performing analysis and evaluation based on their characteristics, and then deciding
priorities.
 Identify and appropriately manage “the project risks” that can significantly affect the
progress of the decommissioning project.
 It is important to proceed with decommissioning in cooperation with the community, throughgaining the understanding by the stakeholders, including the local residents.

 Major risk source The major risk sources at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS include as follows.

 Fuel debris Pooled fuels, common pooled fuels and fuels in dry cask
 Contaminated water in the buildings and concentrated liquid waste
 Secondary waste generated from the water treatment(waste adsorption column, waste sludge and HIC slurry) Radioactive solid waste Contaminated PCV internal structures and R/B internal, activated reactor internals(e.g. "PCV internal structures")9

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3. Risk Reduction Strategy (2)Sample of risk analysis of the
Fukushima Daiichi(1) Risk of radioactive materials (Risk level) Determined by (2) “Consequence,” which is the impact
caused when radioactive materials are released and(3)”Likelihood of occurrence”.

*Impact of uncertainties is expressed by "extent. "*Safety and Environmental Detriment Score(2) Hazard Potential (Index of “Consequence”)
 Use SED score as it is.
 Consider the amount of all radioactive materials, properties(e.g. gaseous, liquid and solid) and the time allowable
until recovery in the event of a loss of safety function.

(3) Safety Management(Likelihood of loss of containment function)
 Partially revised to flexibly cope with the situation of
the Fukushima Daiichi NPS referencing the SED score.
 Graded and quantified the risk sources by the factors of
likelihood relating to the integrity of the facilities andmonitoring state.

Hazard Potential (logarithmic scale) Analyze risks referencing the SED score* developed by
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority in the U. K. (NDA)

Fuels incommonpool

Category II
Category I

HIC
slurryFuel indry casks

PCV
Waste
internal
adsorption structures
columns

Fueldebris Fuels in
SFPs

Waste
sludgeContaminatedwater in bldgs

Concentrated
liquid waste
Solid waste
in storehouse

Under sufficient
safety management

Category III
Tentatively
stored solid
waste

Safety Management (logarithmic scale)10

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3. Risk Reduction Strategy (3) Risk source category and action policy
Category I : Risk sources to be addressed as soon as practicable(Pooled fuels and contaminated water in the buildings)

・Transfer the pooled fuels to the common pool which has a sufficiently small Safety Management.
・Process the contaminated water in the buildings and store radioactive materials in a safe manner as a secondary
waste generated from the water treatment.
Category II : Risk source to be addressed safely, effectively and carefully with thorough preparations
and technologies to realize a more stable condition (Fuel debris)
・Collect retrieved fuel debris in the storage canister designed from the safety perspective and store them inmore stable condition.
Category III : Risk source that requires actions to be taken for a more stable condition(e.g. Concentrated liquid waste, waste sludge, HIC slurry, part of tentatively stored
solid waste and PCV internal structures)
・Risk level is small but measures needs to be taken so as to ensure a stable storage over a long period of time.
Others :The common pooled fuels, fuels in dry casks, solid waste in the storage and waste adsorption column
are in a sufficient safe and stable state, maintaining a sufficiently low level of risk by ensuring continuous
management.
 Considering the time axis:
Even if the risk source is currently in a certain stable condition, the level of the risk may arise due todegradation of facilities. Measures need to be taken in advance.
 Risk during the work:
The level of the risk may arise temporarily due to the changes in the conditions of facilities and process itself
during the risk reduction work. Comparison with current risk reduction effect obtained by the work should beconsidered.
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3. Changes in the Risk Over Time Even if a level of risk is present in the ALARP region, it cannot remain there permanently(the yellow zone). In addition, as time passes, the level of risk could increase due todeterioration of the facilities and the risk source (Solid line).
 On the other hand, Although the level of risk may increase temporarily, the risk sources
should be prevented from entering the unacceptable region (Red zone). Thus, it should
be targeted to reduce the level of risk without entering the unacceptable or intolerable
regions. (solid line).
 Unacceptable region
 Risks are significant, and cannot be justified except in
extraordinary circumstances.
 ALARP region (or tolerable region)
 Risks are tolerable only when risk reduction is
impracticable, or the cost incurred with risk reduction isdisproportionate to the effect acquired by risk reduction.
 As the lower a risk becomes, the higher the cost that iscommensurate with the effect of risk reduction becomes,
the risk should be reduced to a level as low as reasonably
practicable.
 Broadly acceptable region
 The risk is sufficiently low; it should be continuously
ensured that the risk stays at this level.
Reference：V. Roberts, G. Jonsson and P. Hallington, “Collaborative Working Is Driving Progress in Hazard and Risk Reduction Delivery at Sellafield” 16387, WM2016
Conference, March 6-10, 2016.
M. Weightman, “The Regulation of Decommissioning and Associated Waste Management” Management ”The 1st International Forum on the Decommissioning of
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (April 2016 )12

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3. Risk Reduction Strategy (4) Steady progress in decommissioning project To make steady progress in the designed risk reduction strategy and to accomplish
the fundamental policy, risks affecting the progress of decommissioning should be
identified and measures against significant risks should be prepared.

 It is essential to make a clear explanation to society about the prospect ofdecommissioning work and to share various risks with the local residents.
(1) Project risk management
 In addition to the deployment of the concrete approach to the risk through the Strategic Plan,systematic risk management methodology is to be applied.

(2) Basic concept for ensuring safety
 To prevent the rework, the basic concept for ensuring safety is to be shared by the relevant
parties in advance.

(3) Relationship with the society It is important to make a decision through the communication with local residents by disseminationand sharing information in timely manner.
 It is important to develop common understanding with local residents regarding that the risks
required to be removed as soon as practicable from those requiring careful actions.
 To prevent further occurrence of such reputational damage, it is important to control and reducerisks and continuously provide accurate information.
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4. Strategic Plan for Fuel Debris Retrieval (1) Study plan for fuel debris retrieval (risk reduction)
 In order to continuously and promptly reduce the risks associated with fuel debris,which is the fundamental policy, the strategy to reduce risks from two points of view
from mid-and long-term will be required.
 The mid-term risk reduction is required to be focused in the initial operation of fueldebris retrieval.
 If mid-term risk is reduced and safety of the R/B is maintained by a passive method,"a low risk level widely accepted by the society" can be considered to have beenachieved.

Mid-term risk
 A risk of a deviation from "a certain stable state" which is currently maintained forthe fuel debris

Long-term risk
 A risk of environmental contamination caused by the leakage of highly toxic nuclear
fuel materials due to the deterioration of the buildings

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４. Strategy of fuel debris retrieval (2) Logic tree on risk reduction for fuel debrisStrategy to reduce mid-term risk
Studies to solve the difficulties in uncertainties,
instability and insufficient management based on themaintenance of current stable condition.
(1) Condition/characterization of fuel debris(decrease in uncertainties)(2) Improvement of reactor condition by the fueldebris retrieval (resolution of instability)(3) Maintain fuel debris in a stable storing state(improvement of management level)

Base

Criticality
control(1)

Prompt retrieval of fuel debris withthorough preparations and technologies
and storage in a stable condition

Maintenance/managementof stable condition offuel debris retrieval

Cooling

Containment

Understanding of location,amount and properties offuel debris and FP distribution

Estimationby actual unit
investigation

Risk reduction offuel debris

Estimation by
analysis

Estimation based on
knowledge/experiments

Safe retrieval of fuel debris

Maintenance/reliability
improvement ofsafety system

Future(3)
CanisterdesignStable storage of retrieved
fuel debris after collection
and transport

Establishment oftransport system

Processing and disposal of
retrieved fuel debris

Establishment ofstorage system

Establishment ofsafeguards approach(2)
Fuel debris
retrieval method

Safety during fueldebris retrieval work

Structural integrityof PCV and R/B

Criticality
control

Maintenanceof cooling
function

Establishmentof containment
function

Dose reduction
during operation

WorksafetyDevelopment ofequipment/device
for fuel debris retrieval

Establishment ofaccess route tofuel debris

Establishment ofsystem equipment
and areas15

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４. Strategy of fuel debris retrieval (3)It is extremely important to carry out the studies on the fuel debris retrieval method
to understand the internal PCV conditions including plant conditions and fuel debris.

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４. Strategy of fuel debris retrieval (4) Plant conditions of Units 1-3 (including the estimation of fuel debris distribution)

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4. Strategic plan for fuel debris retrieval (5) Results and findings of PCV internal survey
 Most of the fuel debris had fallen to the bottom of the reactor and D/W. The amount at thebottom of the D/W is larger than that of reactor. Very little fuel remaining in the core region;
therefore risk caused by criticality due to stub-shaped fuels is small.
 In the evaluation of Unit 2, it is desired to obtain the confirmation through the visualinspection with remote devices, since the changes in the amount of the fuel debris remain at
the bottom of the RPV is large due to the amount of injected water at the time of accident.
 Also, due to high degree of uncertainties, further analysis and evaluation will be required forthe erosion of the concrete at the bottom of the D/W caused by MCCI and the properties ofthe products, ratio of the fuel debris in and outside the RPV pedestal including visualinspection with remote devices.

 When studying the fuel debris retrieval method, it is necessary to take into account that theinternal structures may be deformed as the results of experience of the high-temperaturestate during the accident.
 Further study will be necessary for FP distribution since there is a large difference between
the analysis codes.
 According to the PCV internal survey for Units 1 and 3, there were some deposits on the
structures in the accumulated water in the PCV, and those should be considered in the futureinternal survey and the studies of fuel debris retrieval methods.

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４. Strategy of fuel debris retrieval (6)Narrow down of the methods based on the PCV water level and access direction
Submersion

Partial submersion

Dry

A method in which water fills to
the top of the reactor well.

A method in which the water fills
to a level above the highest pointof the fuel debris distribution

A method in which the water is filled to a level below the highest part of
the fuel debris distribution.
(with poring water to the fuel debris)

All the areas where fuel debris isscattered are exposed to the air,and neither water cooling nor water
pouring is involved

Water

Full submersion

level
Top Side Bottom

Access direction

a.

b.

c.

: Possibility of water flowing out from the openings

Methods to be focused: Difficulty of constructing new access routea. Submersion method (including full submersion)1: Difficulty of evaluating cooling performanceb. Partial submersion – Top access method
c. Partial submersion – Side access method2
1：Including the Full submersion

2：The water level is lower than the access hole.

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４. Strategy of fuel debris retrieval (7) Three Methods of Fuel Debris Retrieval to be focused
Individual method from the following three methods or combined method
will be applied according to the distribution of the fuel debris.

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4. Strategic plan for fuel debris retrieval (8) Ensuring safety during the fuel debris retrieval work
The purpose of ensuring safety is to protect (1) Residents and environment, and (2) Workers from the impact causedby radioactive materials. The objective is to reduce risks by fuel debris retrieval from the current level of conditions,where the severe accident occurred.

Important technical issues

Action status

1. Securing the structural integrity of
the PCV and R/B

2. Criticality control







The evaluation of design basis seismic ground motion Ss is currently being conducted
for S/C support which are considered to have comparatively small margin.
The impact caused by erosion to the RPV pedestal is being evaluated, as needed, forthe fuels which are estimated to have fallen at the bottom of the D/W following theanalysis of the spread of fuel debris distribution.
The method to maintain sub-criticality state of fuel debris has been studied for each
operation step for fuel debris retrieval and water level rising.
Specification of sub-critical control method will be studied from the view point of actual
applicability based on the results of evaluation of critical accident.

3. Maintaining the cooling function(PCV repair (water sealing) )

4. Ensuring containment function(Radioactive prevention of radioactive
dust scattering )Dust scattering during fuel debris cutting operation is to be prevented by installing theisolation walls consists of operation cells, PCV and R/B wall, and by maintaining
negative pressure inside.

5. Reducing workers’ exposure during
operation

Decontamination work around the X-6 penetration as a preparation of internal survey
for Unit 2 PCV takes significantly longer time than expected.
The decontamination/radiation dose reduction work to be performed in the area closer
to the PCV requires more thorough preparation and approaches.

6. Ensuring work safety







The development has been performed to date focusing on the feasibility of the watersealing technology and method for the vent pipe and downcomer at the PCV bottom.
In addition to the solutions of the issues which became apparent, long-term water seal
required to confirm the applicability to the actual unit will be studied.

The conditions of work place are required to be improved with the strong awareness ofthe safety shared among the concerned people and the assessment of the safety
performed in advance.

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4. Strategic plan for fuel debris retrieval (9) The studies on the important technical issues in the realization of thefuel debris retrieval method
1. Establishment of access route to the fuel debris
 It is important to prevent the release of radioactive materials when establishing the access routeto the fuel debris inside the PCV. Element tests are being conducted to confirm the feasibility of
key technologies by the time of making a decision on the fuel debris retrieval policy.
 It is necessary to establish the access route to the PCV inside the R/B by conducting detailed study based on
the site conditions in early stage, not to affect the schedule.

2. Development of the fuel debris retrieval equipment and devices
 Element tests are being conducted for the equipment and devices for fuel debris retrieval, which are planned
to be used for the method to be focused on ito obtain the prospect for the technical feasibility by the time ofthe determination of fuel debris retrieval policies. Appropriate radiation resistance and allowance of
maintenance and inspection will be necessary when applying fuel debris retrieval.

3. Establishment of the system equipment and working areas
 Container and system equipment are required to be installed in the building to retrieve fuel debris. Although
the conceptual design is being carried out to confirm the feasibility, it is also required to confirm the on-site
plot plan and to make coordination with the situation outside the building (e.g. other constructions, radiationdose reduction plan and ground improvement) that impede the preparation.

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4. Strategic plan for fuel debris retrieval (10) Study of the treatment for the retrieved fuel debris toward stable storage
 Establishment of the system for collection, transport and storage of fuel debris

Flow plan of the wet-type
storage for the fuel debris(Provided by IRID)

 Study on the safeguards for the fuel debris

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4. Strategic plan for fuel debris retrieval (11) Toward the determination of fuel debris retrieval policies
 Fuel debris of all Units are estimated to be scattered in the RPV lower plenum and at thebottom of the D/W. The policy may be made by combining multiple methods according to thefuel debris locations.

 In such case, in parallel with the retrieval work for initial location of retrieval, inspections andstudies are required to be performed for the fuel debris in different locations.
Operation in the next stage is considered to be continued by improving the fuel debris
retrieval method as necessary.
 In the policies, the results of the studies and findings obtained to date, fuel debris location to
be addressed first and the likely method is to be selected for each Unit from the perspectiveof ensuring safety.
→In particular, the following studies will be conducted to evaluate, such as the risks that
affect the fuel debris retrieval work.
(1)Evaluate the effect of risk reduction through the resolution of the instability of the inside of the PCV/RPV for each unit
and fuel debris location(2)Evaluate access route and retrieval method for each Unit and fuel debris location, including PCV water level arenominated and risk regarding ensuring safety, such as criticality that might be caused by the retrieval work and theleakage of radioactive materials based on the features of three methods and the results the studies.
(3) Select the first fuel debris to be retrieved and its method in a comprehensive consideration of evaluation for theestimative index based on the Five Guiding Principles.
(4) With regard to the fuel debris other than those retrieved at first, the access route and retrieval method depending on
the PCV water level are to be studied to make sure that initial retrieval work will not affect the subsequent work.

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5. Strategic plan for waste management (1) Approach to the study on radioactive waste Safe and steady storage of radioactive solid waste and study of the processing
method and disposal concept from the mid- to long-term perspective are important.

 Principles for ensuring the safety of radioactive waste disposal The internationally established safety principles such as by International Commission
on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and IAEA on radioactive waste disposal in general
are as follows.
 To contain the waste; To isolate wastes from the accessible biosphere and reduce substantially the
likelihood of, and all possible consequences of, inadvertent human access to thewaste;
 To inhibit, reduce and delay the migration of radionuclides from the waste to theaccessible biosphere at any time; To ensure that the amounts of radionuclides reaching the accessible biosphere due
to any migration from the disposal facility are such that possible radiologicalconsequences are acceptably low at all times;
 To control the release of radioactive materials to ensure that their concentrations
are at the level that will not cause significant effects on health.

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5. Strategic plan for waste management (2) Appropriate radioactive waste management
 The radioactive waste needs to be characterized and separated into categories in all stages fromgeneration to disposal.
 The main purpose of processing is to produce waste in a form that meets the criteria for the safe
processing, transport, storage and disposal of waste and thus to increase the safety of radioactive
waste management and ensure the safe disposal of waste.
 The processing shall be based on appropriate consideration of the characteristics of the waste andof the demands imposed by the different stages in its management.
 Quantities, activity and physical and chemical nature, the technologies available, the storage
capacity and the availability of a disposal facilities are taken into account in determining the level ofwaste processing.
 If waste processing is performed before the waste disposal requirements are set, it must be
remaining possible to process the waste in a way which meets those requirements once they havebeen set.
 Proper storage should be provided at all stages in waste processing prior to disposal to ensure waste
isolation and environmental protection.
 Waste shall be stored in such a manner that it can be inspected, monitored, retrieved and preservedin a condition suitable for its subsequent management and under passive condition to the extent
possible.
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5. Strategic plan for waste management (3) Evaluation and issues on the action status based on the current Roadmap
Items
1. Reduction ofgenerated waste

Current status and issues
The structure of the waste management department has been improved, and waste
management has been driven forward by the involvement of the department from thestage of developing construction project for decommissioning work.
Measures have been taken and driven forward to reduce amount of radioactive solid
wastes generation by control of bringing packing, materials and equipment into the site,
reuse and recycling.

2. Storage



A 9th solid waste storage facility is being built.
Additional 10 to 13 storage facilities will be built in phases to increase the total storage
capacity. The plan that resolve the temporary storage issues, such as solid wastes stored
outside and soil-covered interim storage has been indicated.

3. Characterization

With regard to the understanding of the solid waste properties, radiological analysis of
rubbles, characterization on secondary waste from water treatment and development ofradiological analysis technique for difficult-to-measure nuclides have been implemented.
It is important to characterize the radioactive solid waste generated when retrieving fueldebris and secondary wastes from decontamination.
Since FY 2015, the number of samples that can be radiologically analyzed per year has
increased from about 50 to 70 samples through cooperation with institutions joined.



4. Study on processing
and disposal
management

A series of these waste stream handling processes has been studied to ensure the safety
and rationality of the entire radioactive solid waste management process, from waste
generation, storage and processing to disposal, and to take an overall view of the entire
process from a broader perspective and conduct R&D.

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5. Strategic plan for waste management (4) Mid- and long-term action policy and future actions for waste management
Items
1. Reduction of generated
waste

Matters to be addressed or noted

2. Storage







Certain results have been achieved. It is important to study and take the measurescontinuously to reduce further amount of waste generation.
It is important to select appropriate technology in consideration of the generation of secondary
waste in selecting the decontamination and volume reduction method for solid radioactive
waste.

The amount of radioactive solid waste from the construction and other activities described in
the mid- and long-term Roadmap was projected, and a storage management plan wasdeveloped based on the projection.
It will be important to implement the plan and reduce the risk.
The prospect of R&D for a dehydration method to stabilize the slurry from the pretreatment
system for the multi-radionuclide removal system is in sight at the basic stage.
Studies on the stable storage such as for the sludge and concentrated liquid waste should beaccelerated.
It is required to examine the appropriate area and method to store the radioactive solid waste
generated during the fuel debris retrieval work, in parallel with examination of fuel debris
retrieval method.

3. Characterization

To obtain data efficiently, top priority should be given to obtaining data that can contribute to
the promotion of the decommissioning process and development of measures for theprocessing and disposal of radioactive solid waste.

4. Study on processing anddisposal management

It is important to retain and manage information on the attributes of radioactive solid waste,such as the history of waste generation, the history of contamination, and the concentration ofradioactive materials in the waste, and to separate the waste into categories and manage it
accordingly.
It will be necessary to actively provide the regulatory authorities with information related tothe progress of studies so that the regulatory system on processing and disposal would beestablished in a smooth manner.

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５. Strategic plan for waste management (5) Concept of waste hierarchy and countermeasures for
the Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Summary of the Waste Hierarchy

This chart is based on Strategy Effective from April2011 (print friendly version), NDA

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6. Approach to the R&D studies (1) To deal with the decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS that involves many technicallychallenges, R&D activities on a variety of fronts is being conducted by a number of organizations.
 The NDF comprehensively reviews such R&D activities in order to promote effective and efficient R&D
approaches, and seeks the overall optimization of these activities through the promotion of further
clarification and adjustment of role sharing based on their special characteristics and the expected
results of the R&D they are engaged and also through close cooperation with related organizations.
 Management of R&D will be important for application to the decommissioning.

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6. Approach to the R&D studies (2) Strengthening research cooperation
 The Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment decided to
set up the Decommissioning R&D Partnership Council in the NDF at its meeting held on May 21, 2015,
and that strengthened efforts to reflect the results and knowledge obtained through basic and genericresearch on decommissioning technologies to the decommissioning work and development works.



Development of R&D centers (the functions of mockup test facility of JAEA, Radioactive Material Analysis
and Research Facility and Collaborative Laboratories for Advanced Decommissioning Science)

Development and recruitment of human resources

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7. Future Actions
 Risk reduction strategy
 The risk reduction strategy is to be reviewed considering the changes of the situation due tothe progress of the decommissioning work and internal PCV condition analysis. Also, thecountermeasures against various risks are studied to steadily advance the decommissioning.

 Fuel debris retrieval
 The milestone, "Determination of fuel debris retrieval policies for each unit“ will be reached in FY2017.
 The "spiral-up" of the strategy is aimed to be achieved by repeating the evaluations and reviews inorder to contribute to the determination of fuel debris retrieval policies to be made in summer of 2017.
The studies on the strategy are also to be carried out towards the subsequent determination of themethodology for fuel debris retrieval and the steady progress of the decommissioning work including
actual fuel debris retrieval.

 Waste management
 The milestone, "Establishment of basic concept of processing/disposal for radioactive solid
wastes"will be reached in FY2017.
 It is important to describe the specific direction of the resolution of the issues attributable tothe features of the wastes at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, and its outline is aimed to be
indicated in the Strategic Plan 2017.

 R&D
 Improvement of the R&D effectiveness, enhancement of cooperation with relevantorganizations, cooperation with the organizations overseas are being carried out.

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