International Journal of Innovative Research and Advanced Studies (IJIRAS)
Volume 7 Issue 6, June 2020

ISSN: 2394-4404

The Legacy And Impact Of French Colonialism In Cote D'Ivoire(Ivory Coast)

Willis Otieno Maganda
PhD Candidate, International Politics,
United States International University (USIU-Africa),
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, M.A, BA,
Political Science, University of Nairobi, Kenya,
Under Secretary, Ministry of East African Community and Regional Development(Government of Kenya)

Abstract: For almost a century and a half, France has maintained a vast colonial empire in Africa. Through political,
security, economic and cultural relations, France has intervened and maintained a hegemonic control in Francophone
Africa, both to serve its interests and perpetuate neo-colonialism. The 1960s symbolized hope, sovereignty, development
and freedom for Africa. It also signified an era of equality with former colonial powers and greater participation in theinternational system. However, five decades after colonialism, most African states, including Cote d'Ivoire are plagued
with political instability and underdevelopment attributed to the legacy of French colonialism and external factors.
Keywords: Francophone Africa, neo-colonialism, sovereignty, underdevelopment, hegemony.

I.

INTRODUCTION

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKA former French colony in West Africa, Cote d'Ivoire
became an independent state on August 7, 1960 after centuries
of French colonial rule. Since then Côte d'Ivoire was known asa “beacon of hope and stability” in the West African region
and an economic power under the leadership of its first
President, Félix Houphouet-Boigny (1960-1993). On August
7, 2010, Cote d'Ivoire celebrated the 50th anniversary of its
independence from France. Likewise, 17 other African statescelebrated their 50 years of independence in 2010. The
difficult question remains: what progress has been achieved
and challenges faced to warrant a celebration? Using
dependency and neo-Marxist theory, this paper explores anddemonstrates how the legacy of French colonialism is
responsible for the contemporary crisis of underdevelopment
and political instability in Cote d'Ivoire.

Page 52

Much has been written about Africa's predicament, bothfrom modernization and dependency schools of thought.
Dependency theorist blames neo-colonialism in Africa and thepersistent crisis of underdevelopment and political instability
in African states (Frank, 1969; Amin, 1972). Frank formulated
the concept of development of underdevelopment to denotethat underdevelopment is not a natural condition, but an
artifact created by the long history of colonial domination in
Third World. The historical experience of colonialism andforeign domination have undermined the development of theThird World. Frank also formulated a „metropolis-satellite‟
concept to explain underdevelopment and domination. The
historical process that generates development in the western
metropolises also simultaneously generates underdevelopmentin the Third World satellites. This historical colonial systemperfectly captures the relationship between France and Coted'Ivoire and therefore explains the continued development of
the former and underdevelopment of the latter. In fact, thesystem of political, military, economic and cultural relations

www.ijiras.com | Email: contact@ijiras.com

International Journal of Innovative Research and Advanced Studies (IJIRAS)
Volume 7 Issue 6, June 2020

between France and Côte d'Ivoire has been described as anillustration of French neo-colonialism in Africa (Bustin, 1982;
Amin, 1973).

III. CONCEPT OF NEO-COLONIALISM
The term 'neo-colonialism' was originally coined by Third
World leaders who found that the achievement ofconstitutional independence and sovereignty did not give total
freedom to the newly formed nation-states, due to thecontinuing presence of powerful western economic interests(Nkrumah, 1965). The neo- colonialist argument is that total
independence means both political and economic freedom.
Neo-colonialism tries to encapsulate the idea that economic
power and political power that flows from it still resideelsewhere even when independence had been achieved. The
independent African states are free from direct foreign rule,
but the economic structures are still maintained and controlled
by the former colonial powers and their multinational
corporations (MNCs).
O'Connor, (1970:117) defined neo-colonialism as “thesurvival of the colonial system, in spite of formal recognitionof political independence in emerging states which had
become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of
domination by political, economic, social, military andtechnical forces. The essence of neo-colonialism is that thestate which is subject to it is in theory, independent and has all
the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality
its economic system and thus its political policy is directedfrom outside (Nkrumah, 1965: ix). According to Julius
Nyerere, Tanzania achieved “political independence in 1961”,
but attained neither economic power nor economic
independence.
We gained the political power to decide what to do. welacked the economic and administrative power which would
have given us freedom in those decisions... A nation's real
freedom depends on its capacity to do things, not on the legal
rights conferred by its internationally recognized sovereignty(Nyerere, 1973:263).

IV. HISTORICAL LEGACY OF COLONIALISM
Establishing the dynamics African colonial history isessential for understanding the root cause of Africa's politicaland economic crisis. European colonialism replaced the precolonial political and economic structures and created aculture of dependency and neopatrimonialism in Africa. The
colonial governments educated African elites to entrench theirhegemony and economic exploitation creating a dominantbourgeoisie' class and consigning the proletariat masses inpoverty. The integration of African states into the international
capitalist economy further fostered inequality between Africa
and western capitalist states.
The authoritarian and exploitative legacy of European
colonialism and neo- colonialism manifests itself in various
ways in Africa. In the 19th century, French colonized more
African territory than its European counterparts. The Colonial
Pacte Agreement (CPA) signed between France and its
Page 53

ISSN: 2394-4404

African former colonies gives France a dominant role inFrancophone Africa. It has created a structural mechanism for
French control and domination of political, military andeconomic systems of its African colonies. The CPA created
the CFA Franc Zone and a legal mechanism under which
France obtained special preference in the political andeconomic life of its colonies. The CPA has maintained French
control over the economies of African states; possession of
African foreign currency reserves and monetary policy;
control of strategic natural resources and raw materials;
monopoly in key sectors such as water, electricity ports,
infrastructure,telecommunication,transport,
energy,education civil aviation and judiciary (N'Diaye, 2005:04).
Further, under the defence agreements, in the CPA, France has
the right to intervene militarily in African Francophone states;
deploy its troops permanently in bases and military facilities
managed by France; and provide military and police training
and procurement contracts for France (Mbakwe, 2011:13).
Many African states colonized by France gained theirformal independence in the early 1960s due to anti-colonial
national liberation struggles. Despite the formal declaration of
independence, France maintains deep ties with its former
colony, Cote d'Ivoire. The Ivory Coast, known to its nonEnglish speakers as the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, is a namereflecting its French colonial history with deep political,
military, economic and cultural ties. The French administered
the colony of Côte d'Ivoire from Paris using a system of direct
and centralized administration. The French colonialadministration also adopted divide-and-rule tactic andapplying assimilation policy to educated elites. The Frenchcolonial policy incorporated concepts of assimilation andassociation. Assimilation presupposed the inherent superiority
of French culture. In practice the assimilation policy in thecolonies meant extension of the French language, institutions,laws and customs. In post-colonial era, France has maintained
its cultural legacy in Africa, especially the resulting identityconstruction encouraged within la francophone, a neo-colonialconcept. France strives to maintain its cultural legacy with
development funding towards education, scholars‟ cultural
institutes under the Agence de cooperation Culturelle ettechnique in an effort to institutionalize the linguistic, cultural,values and educational links between France and Francophone
Africa (Martin, 1995:5-80).
President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, a Pan Africanist, whofought against racism and colonialism, was a member ofFrench governments in the 1950s after being appointed first
black African minister. He worked within the French colonial
parliamentary system to liberate Ivory Coast in 1960,
becoming its first president and then a dictator until his deathin 1993. Nevertheless, the new French imperialism has
returned to Ivory Coast in the form of neo-colonialism. The
current neo-colonialism is not only associated with politicaland economic interests, but also inextricably linked withconflict resolution and peace-keeping in Ivory Coast. The
continued French political, military and economic interferencein France has perpetually kept the Ivorian state economicallypoor and politically unstable.

www.ijiras.com | Email: contact@ijiras.com

International Journal of Innovative Research and Advanced Studies (IJIRAS)
Volume 7 Issue 6, June 2020

V. ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND
UNDERDEVELOPMENT
The creation and maintenance of the French dominationof the Francophone African economies is the product of a long
period of French colonialism and perpetuated dependency of
the African states. The Ivorian economy is a product of
capitalist system of production controlled by French
imperialism, based on exploiting and exporting the wealth andnatural resources to the international capitalist market. Thiscondition accounts for the persistent underdevelopment,poverty and political instability in Cote d'Ivoire.
Previously, in the 1960s and 1970s, Cote d'Ivoire
experienced rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. It
also stood out in the West African sub-region and international
system for its political stability and economic prosperity.
Houphouet-Boigny also enjoyed a reputation of man of
wisdom and peace (Toungara, 1995:32). After independence
in 1960, President Houphouët-Boigny pushed for “economic
neoliberalism”. He opened up Côte d'Ivoire to foreign
investors and immigrant French workers. Between 1960 and
1980, the French population in Côte d'Ivoire nearly doubled,from about 30,000 to 60,000. Until 1985 Côte d'Ivoire had thehighest number of French-controlled MNCs in Africa; had thelargest percentage of French imports to and exports fromAfrica and along with Senegal; and received the largest French
aid package in Africa. For over 20 years, Côte d'Ivoire
achieved high GDP with a rate of 7.5% annually that it was
dubbed the “Ivorian miracle”. Cote d'Ivoire is rich in natural
resources such as oil, diamonds, natural gas, cocoa and coffee.
It is the largest producer of cocoa in the world, accounting for
40% of world production.
Unfortunately, since 1999. Côte d'Ivoire has faced
economic decline, political instability and despotism by
successive regimes largely attributed to its colonial legacy and
French intervention. Côte d'Ivoire has suffered what Andre
Gunder Frank called “development of underdevelopment”,
having one of the poorest populations in the world. In fact,
French colonies are the poorest in the world. The Ivory Coastsank from position 156th place on the United Nations (UN)
Human Development Index (HDI) in 2002 to 163 in 2004. In
the HDI Index 2010, six of the ten poorest states in the world
are former French colonies (United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP, 2010). First, France, does not haveprocessing industries for raw-materials and hence its cocoa
produce is exported to France. Moreover, the means of
production are owned by foreign MNCs who employ various
means to transfer profits to France to the neglect of Ivorian
local economy. Twenty years after decolonization France still
imported significant raw materials and its energy dependence
on Africa had risen from 30% in 1950 to 80% for 1988 and1989 (Martin, 1995:9-10).
Second, in an attempt to control and dominate theeconomy of her colonies, France forced Cote d'Ivoire topractice monocultures, which left the national economy
extremely vulnerable to price fluctuation in the world market.
Globalization, competition and trade liberalization havedictated prices of goods at the international capitalist markets.
This has led to deterioration of Cote d'Ivoire's terms of trade
and adverse balance of payments due to price fluctuation ofPage 54

ISSN: 2394-4404

cocoa in the world market. Consequently, since cocoa is her
main export, Cote d'Ivoire has faced economy depression
which has contributed to underdevelopment and poverty. The
depression on the Ivorian economy and adverse balance of
payments on cocoa exports, forced the government to borrowloans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World
Bank. The repayment of these loans has deprived Cote d'Ivoire
the funds needed for economic development and poverty
alleviation. This dependency on borrowing allowed the IMF
and the World Bank to impose Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs) on Cote d'Ivoire. These adjustments
resulted into high interest rates, massive capital flight, andhuge debts whose repayments undermined investments in thesocial and infrastructure sectors. Under SAPs conditionalities,
vital economic sectors such as energy, telecommunications,water supply and banking in Cote d'Ivoire were privatized towestern MNCs.
Third, Francophone African states including Cote d'Ivoire
are not allowed to have central banks and currencies. All
monetary policies are imposed by France for her own interest,
where each state has an operational account at the French
Treasury. The most important influence in the political
economy of Francophone African states is the impact of the„CFA‟ currency (Colonies Françaises d'Afrique) (French
African Colonies) formed in 1948. There are two separate
CFA Francs. The West African Economic and Monetary
Union (WAEMU) comprise eight West African states (Benin,
Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger,
Senegal and Togo. The Central African Economic andMonetary Community (CEMAC) comprise six Central
African countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo- Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon). Each ofthese two groups issues its own CFA Franc through the tworegional central banks. The WAEMU CFA franc is issued by
the Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest(BCEAO) and CEMAC CFA franc is issued by Banque desEtats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC) (Busch, 2010).
The aim of CFA Franc was to help France control thedestiny of its 14 colonies, including Cote d'Ivoire, and has
continued to maintain the Franc Zone since independence. In
exchange for France guaranteeing the CFA Franc's
convertibility, Cote d'Ivoire agreed to deposit 65% of its
foreign exchange reserves in a special account with the French
Treasury, and another 20% to cover financial liabilities; andFrench veto over the franc zone's monetary policy. In turn, theFrench Treasury has invested African foreign reserves on the
Paris Bourse. These decisions have had devastatingconsequences on Cote d'Ivoire for more than 45 years. The
result has been a combination of currency convertibility, highinterest rates, low inflation, and free capital movement.
Further, the CFA Franc's exchange rate which had
remained unchanged since 1948. was devalued by 50% in
1994 by the regional central bank dominated by French andEuropean banks. The effect of devaluation of the CFA franc
precipitated economic depression and poverty in Cote d'Ivoire.
Former Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo opposed the CFA
arrangement and initiated a process for the Ivory Coast to have
her own Central Bank and currency. This sparked anger inParis and therefore marked the beginning of Ivorian politicaland economic destabilization.

www.ijiras.com | Email: contact@ijiras.com

International Journal of Innovative Research and Advanced Studies (IJIRAS)
Volume 7 Issue 6, June 2020

Fourth, land and buildings of the Ivorian presidential
palace and national assembly is considered French property
with rent being paid to France as per colonial lease. France
still controls Ivorian airline, telephone, electricity,
infrastructure, water and banking sectors. The seaports
including Abidjan, the leading transit port in West Africa andIvorian-Burkinabe Railway are the properties of the French
Bolloré and Delmas; airports belong to ADP (Aéroports De
Paris); electricity companies to EDF (Electricité de France);
telephone companies to France telecoms (Orange); water
distribution and road construction and public works industry
to Bouygues: oil and gas to Total (biggest French oilcompany); and the banking and insurance sector is controlled
by Societe Generale, Credit Lyonnais and BNP-Paribas, AXA,Groupe Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique de l'Ouest de Coted'Ivoire (CFAO-CI) (Busch, 2010).

VI. MILITARY AND SECURITY COOPERATION
The military cooperation between France and her former
African colonies is a colonial legacy, perpetuated under neocolonialism. As earlier stated, the CPA enshrined a special
preference for France in the political, economic and defence
processes in Francophone Africa. The defence agreement
provided for technical and military assistance for African
militaries and police and the deployment of French (militaryand civilian) technical advisers. It also enables African statesto invite France to ensure their external and internal security,
including the prevention of putsches and other coups d'état"(N'Diaye, 2005:04). The defence pact had two components.
First, open and non-binding agreement on military cooperation or Technical Military Aid (AMT). It covered
education, training of servicemen and African security forces.
Second, secret and binding agreements supervised andimplemented by the French Ministry of Defence, serving as alegal basis for French interventions. These agreementsallowed France to have pre- deployed troops in Africa. In
other words, French army units are present permanently andby rotation in bases and military facilities in Africa run
entirely by the French. Indeed, the importance of Cote d'Ivoire
to France was unmistakable. Along with Senegal, it was
singled out by General Charles de Gaulle as states in which
France would intervene if necessary (N'Diaye, 2005:94).
The Franco-Ivoirian Technical Military AssistanceAccord signed on April 24, 1961 provides for the permanentbasing of troops, has ultra-secret clauses to guarantee thepersonal safety of heads of state and their families and has notbeen renegotiated for about 35 years (Chipman. 1989:119:
N'Diaye. 2005:94). It also provided for the exchange ofambassadors between the two states and reserved a privileged
position among diplomats in Paris for the Ivoirian ambassador.
The treaty also called for regular consultations between thetwo states on foreign policy matters. France agreed to protect
and represent Ivoirian interests in any state or internationalorganization (N'Diaye, 2005:94).
Since independence, France has maintained hundreds ofmarines on its military base of Port-Bouet near Abidjan. The
number of these troops steadily increased over the years to
600 in 1999, signalling a strengthening of the French
Page 55

ISSN: 2394-4404

commitment to the survival of the Ivoirian regimes(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999/2000).
France also maintains a permanent military base in Abidjan(43rd Marine Infantry Battalion) ready for intervention to any
threats against Cote d'Ivoire. This made President HouphouetBoigny, during his 30 years dictatorship to maintain a small
army (2,000). In addition, France has 47,000 Rapid
Deployment Force (RDF) for quick deployment in Africa.
Thus, every time an Ivorian regime has questioned orchallenged the French domination, it has been met withmilitary intervention and regime overthrow and coup d'états
(N'Diaye, 2005:96).

VII. PERSONAL RULE, IMPUNITY AND POLITICALMILITARIZATION
Given Houphouet-Boigny's central role in the postcolonial political and security affairs, a notable characteristicof the CPA implies a commitment to regimes, as opposed tostates (Crocker, 1969:497-498). Due to the legacy of CPA the
Ivoirian security sector inherited the features, philosophies andstructures of France's conception of a state security. The
Ivoirian security apparatus and its role in the stability of theHouphouet-Boigny's regime was created from the remnants ofthe colonial army in 1961 by the law which organized thenational defence, following the French government's 1960
plan raisonnable, establishing armies in its former colonies(N'Diaye, 2005:93). This essentially means a tradition of thearmy as the great mute; that is strictly apolitical, republican,
loyal to the state in charge of national defence under theleadership of a head of state, who is “chief of the armies withextensive formal and discretionary prerogatives in matters ofstate security” (Crocker, 1969:497-498).
Subsequently, Francophone African states are ruled byauthoritarian regimes and neopatrimonialism. This isostensibly to perpetuate the French hegemony and neocolonialism. As earlier mentioned, France ensures that allnatural resources remain under her control and exploitation by
imposing and protecting corrupt dictators and fomenting
rebellions and coups against unpopular leaders. In return, they
are rewarded with immunity and the maintenance ofhereditary leadership. For example, Omar Bongo ruled oil-rich
Gabon for 42 years, crushing all opponents with French
assistance, while granting exploitation of huge oil reserves to
French oil MNCs and consigning Gabon into abject poverty.
In 2008, after his death, his son, Omar Ali Bongo wasinstalled as president by France to perpetuate the regime andmaintain imperial colonial structures.
Second, in Togo, former French army SergeantGnassimgbé Eyadema came to power after killing President
Sylvanius Olympio in a bloody coup. Eyadema seized powerwith French help and ruled for 38 years with an iron fist,crushing all opposition until his death in 2005. France
installed his son, Faure Eyadema to perpetuate its hegemony.
In Burkina Faso, Captain Blaise Compaoré came to power in
1987, after killing Thomas Sankara and remained in power for
23 years. Third, the oil discoveries in Chad are lucrative to
French MNCs and this has maintained President Idriss Debyin power for 25 years. Lastly, in the Democratic Republic of

www.ijiras.com | Email: contact@ijiras.com

International Journal of Innovative Research and Advanced Studies (IJIRAS)
Volume 7 Issue 6, June 2020

Congo (DRC), the French puppet, General Denis Sassou
Nguesso has ruled for 30 years and in Cameroon, Paul Biyahas ruled for 35 years.
The origin of French-Ivorian relationship lies in theformer French President, Charles de Gaulle's determinationthat France would not lose its influence in sub-Saharan Africa(SSA) after losing wars of independence in Algeria and Indochina. The French model in Africa was one of stableauthoritarianism, influenced by Gaullist views on the dangers
of parliamentary democracy. It was therefore strongly
challenged by the wave of democracy movements in Africa inthe 1990s. France's failure to fully support democratization in
the 1990s has profoundly marked its image on Africa(Moncrieff, 2012:8). A constant feature of Ivoirian politics
since independence has been the tendency of the successive
regimes relying on French support and personal rule tomanipulate, politicize and interfere with the professionalism of
the military and police to keep power.
Founding President Felix Houphouet-Boigny pursued
pro-Western, capitalist economic strategy and foreign policy
in defence and promotion of French interests in Africa.
Houphouet-Boigny and his Party Démocratique de Côte
d'Ivoire (PDCI), was the principal architect of every major
policy orientation and decision of the Cote d'Ivoire over thelast half century (Zolberg, 1969:265-271). During the reign ofPresident Houphouet-Boigny and President Henry Konan
Bedie, the affairs of the state were conducted withauthoritarianism, extra-judicial killings and corruption. The
two regimes were characterised by detentions, torture,
mistreatment, torture and killing of opposition politicians andjournalists in Ivory Coast. Houphouet-Boigny surrounded
himself with French advisors and technicians; kept the Frencharmy for defence; and defended with France in influencing
post-colonial African domestic, regional and international
politics.
On his part, Konan Bédié promoted the nationalist
concept of Ivoirité and changed the constitution to allow only'100 per cent' Ivoirians to stand for the presidency. He claimed
that Ouattara's family came from Burkina Faso and that he had
faked his identity papers to hide the fact. Security agents
teared up northerners‟ documents or made it impossible torenew them, effectively depriving them of their nationality.
Bédié‟s first act as President included expelling 12,000 Ivory
Coast residents on the grounds that they were from Burkina
Faso (Busch, 2010).
Many scholars attribute the economic crisis in Ivory Coast
to the wasteful, corrupt and neopatrimonial practices
associated with Houphouet-Boigny (Faure, 1998:59-73;
William, 1988:54). The Sage of Africa had accumulated apersonal fortune of $11 billion and had become „thief Boigny'and „corrupt Boigny‟. He once publicly urged his ministers toenrich themselves and most of them were self-serving andcorrupt (William, 1988:5). This partially explains why over
130 billion CFA Francs were annually embezzled andexpropriated and countless multi-billion CFA Francs financial
scandals involving political elites, including Bedié (Ayyiteh,
1992:241-2). In addition, through undemocratic means andelaborate clientelist scheme, Houphouet-Boigny sought theloyalty and devotion of the intellectuals and business classes.

Page 56

ISSN: 2394-4404

He used PDCI to maintain control over the state (N'Diaye,
2005:92-101).
In 1990 after much resistance, violent demonstrations andresolution of the La Baule France-Africa Summit, HouphouetBoigny dissolved the one-party state system and accepted
multiparty elections and political reforms (N'Diaye, 2005:92101). Although the introduction of multiparty politics signified
the process of democratization, it did not entrench
democratization and desired political reforms as Laurent
Gbagbo lost the 1990 elections to Houphouet-Boigny. In
1991, during the pro-democracy demonstrations, the military
brutally repressed university students; and in 1995, themilitary was again suppressed the political opposition during
the succession struggle, leading to the killing at the city of
Gagnoa. The politicization of the Ivoirian military was alreadydeepened by charging it with the “civic and moral education”(New York Times, December 9, 1993). After succeeding
Houphouet-Boigny on December 9, 1993, with the support ofFrance, Henri Konan Bedié displayed authoritarian tendencies
as Ivory Coast remained undemocratic and repressive (French,
1995). During the succession struggle between Bedié andAlassane Dramane Ouattara (Houphouet-Boigny's last Prime
Minister), the army aligned itself against Bedié (New YorkTimes, December 9, 1993).

VIII.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND IVORIAN CIVILMILITARY RELATIONS

Edouard Bustin (1982:1) has forcefully argued that in thedomain of civil-military relations, African states are ultimately
the losers in the neo-colonial arrangements. First, the defence
agreements typically vest in the French President the ultimate
decision to intervene and undermine national sovereignty. It isindeed dangerous to protégé regimes, for France has been
known to overthrow leaders who refuse to serve its interests asin the December 24, 1999 coup against Bedie. Reliance on
CPA for external guarantor (France) places the Ivorian
military into confusion and loyalty dilemma on whether toserve the French military, itself or the regime (N'Diaye,
2005.99). In addition, the presence of French military advisors
perversely places French nationals to sensitive positions in
African militaries and gives them access to information for
influencing domestic politics (Chipman, 1989:24-25). This has
negatively affected the morale, institutional pride andcorporate image of the Ivorian military.
Houphouet-Boigny and Bedié policies and strategies forthe demise of civilian regime failed to eliminate militaryrestiveness and instil civilian regime in the military (N'Diaye,
2005:99). While the Ivoirian military succeeded in displacing
the civilian regime in the 1999 coup, it had a long history ofvarious forms of intervention in the political process throughcoup attempts and conspiracies. In 1962, 1963, 1973 and1980, the Ivoirian military conspired and attempted tooverthrow the government (Sigel, 1970:18-21; Welch,
1987:180). Other forms of military interference in the politicalprocess were mutinies and overt political insubordination. In
1991, the military went on strike demanding higher wages andin 1990, soldiers occupied Abidjan Airport and roamed thewww.ijiras.com | Email: contact@ijiras.com

International Journal of Innovative Research and Advanced Studies (IJIRAS)
Volume 7 Issue 6, June 2020

streets at night engaging in acts of banditry (Whiteman,
1990:19-19).
Consequently, the authoritarian and dictatorial policies
pursued and implemented by the PDCI regime under President
Houphouet-Boigny and Henri Konan-Bedie for over 40 years
have had negative implications on the Ivorian political systemespecially on civil-military relations. First, the survival of theregime rested on the will of the French government.
Houphouet-Boigny's close relationship with France was the`soundest insurance against a successful coup' (First,
1970:424). There is no doubt that PDCI regime owes most ofits maintenance and longevity to the presence of the French
military forces and advisors in Cole d'Ivoire. This “external
guarantee strategy involved stationing of French military
troops and advisors in Abidjan and training of Ivorian military
to prevent coups and gather intelligence” (French, 1994;21);and thus, undermined the professionalization, autonomy andpolitical insulation of the Ivorian military (Decalo, 1989:575).
Second, Houphouet-Boigny and his successor Henri
Konan-Bedié pursued a strategy of ethnic and politicalmanipulation, machinations and co-optation of the military
into the political and administrative system and exploitation ofinter- service rivalries to maintain power. This degraded themilitary's professional corporate self-image and heightened its
political and social awareness of the flaws of the system andthe regime. Evidence suggests that it is the alienation of the
Ivoirian military, its politicization and long history of
restiveness that culminated into the December 24, 1999 coupagainst President Bedie. The Ivoirian military wascompromised by the regime in the mismanagement of thepolitical economy in order to neutralize it (N'Diaye, 2005:9697). Top military officers joined the government in 1974 asheads of parastatals, state-owned companies and diplomatic
missions for personal enrichment. Houphouet-Boigny also
made political reliability the dominant criterion for military
promotion (Welch, 1987:182-184).
Third, the frequent interference of the military in politics
against the opposition politicized the military as it regarded
itself as a legitimate player in the political process. This
increased the likelihood of its political intervention for its own
corporate interests. Houphouet-Boigny sought the assistanceof the French to help him retain power. In the 1970s 1980s and1990s, both Houphouet-Boigny and Bedié used the military to
suppress political opposition (Huband, 1992:55-57). In 1971,
the Ivorian army and French troops intervened and masscredmembers of the Bete ethnic group accused of separatism andopposition to the Houphouet-Boigny regime (Welch,
1987:324; William, 1988:54). In the face of a combined
civilian and military threat in 1990, Houphouet-Boigny
solicited French intervention. Again in 1990, during agitation
for democratization and multiparty politics by pro-democracy
movements and political parties, President Houphouet-Boigny
used the military to brutally suppress the opposition. Colonel
Robert Guei, the future junta leader executed the mission andextended it under his presidency against the opposition in the
1995 presidential elections.

Page 57

ISSN: 2394-4404

IX. DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICALMILITARIZATIONFrance has successfully used its military presence sincedecolonization to pursue its interest and influence by
maintaining both regional hegemony and order and stability.
The continuous political and military dependency of Coted'Ivoire on France, fostered by its African political elites has
undermined political development in Cote d'Ivoire. France has
constantly intervened militarily in the political and internalaffairs of Cote d'Ivoire and thus hindered democratization andgood governance. One of the mechanisms that France has used
to maintain her presence and neo-colonial interests is conflict
resolution and peace-keeping by intervening as a mediator,
between rebels, tribes and the government of Cote d'Ivoire,disguised under the protection of French nationals. During the
French colonial rule in Africa, the protection of nationals andnational interests has been the most frequent justification of
direct imperial control.
Most of the political unrests in Cote d'Ivoire can be
attributed to the destructive military assistance received from
France. In fact, Military assistance marks the last stage of neocolonialism in Cote d'Ivoire. The military weaponry has beenused by political factions in conflicts and civil war, causing
deaths and misery to the people. Unfortunately, France has
been drawn into the conflicts, despite its main aim of only
protecting and evacuating French nationals and expatriates.
In 2000, Laurent Gbagbo ousted General Robert Guéi
after a disputed election with French military support.
However, President Gbagbo banned Alassane Dramane
Ouattara from the elections and this plunged Cote d'Ivoire into
civil war in September 2002 as Ouattara's rebel Forces
Nouvelles (EN) took over the north. The civil war civil war
led to partitioning of Cote d'Ivoire between the North and theCentre controlled by the New Forces (FN) and the South heldby the National Armed Forces of Ivory Coast (FANCI), loyal
to President Gbagbo. The conflict escalated on April 4, 2011,
when the French army (Unicorn Force) backed by 11,000 UN
troops (UNOCI) launched massive air strikes and destroyed
defence forces (FANCI) in favour of Ouattara's FN forces.
The conflict led to mass killing of over 10,000 civilians,
human rights violation, destruction of property anddisplacement of civilians.
President Gbagbo accused the French for masterminding
the rebels in the North. In other words, a Quatarra presidency
was another name for French control of Côte d'Ivoire. This
explains why France, its allies and Quatarra rejected President
Gbagbo's complaints of massive electoral fraud in in the northin favour of Quatarra. President Gbagbo had also demanded
for an international panel to investigate and analyze theelectoral process and results to settle the dispute. This action
elicited condemnation from President Gbagbo's supporters as
echoed by Koffi Charles:
The military, the police and the people are all solidly
behind President Gbagbo. We will resist any foreignintervention with the last drop of our blood and till the lastman falls. No one should underestimate our resolve to defend
our constitutionally elected president, our country and its
sovereignty. Any attempt by Ecowas or any foreign power toforcibly remove president Gbagbo will lead to a bloody civil

www.ijiras.com | Email: contact@ijiras.com

International Journal of Innovative Research and Advanced Studies (IJIRAS)
Volume 7 Issue 6, June 2020

war that may engulf the whole of West Africa. About a thirdof the Ivorian population is from the neighbouring countries:
Burkinabes alone number about three million (Quoted in
Mbakwe, 2011:12).
The overthrow of President Gbagbo in favour of his rival,
Ouattara is a testimony of French imperial hegemony in
Ivorian politics. The Ivorian state has become the major
source of patronage whose control for the battles to seize
power has become a zero-sum game. Ouattara, a Muslim
Northerner and a former IMF Deputy Managing Director is a
French protégé, married to Dominique Folloreau, a Frenchwoman, and has very close personal and cultural ties withFrance and former President, Nicholas Sarkozy (Busch, 2010).
This makes him a French puppet for perpetuating French neocolonial agenda in Cote d'Ivoire. Before the militaryintervention, France blocked Cote d'Ivoire from the West
African Central Bank to destabilize its economy. The largest
French owned banks closed to paralyze the financial system.
Further, France and the European Union (EU) imposed anembargo on all goods, including medicine and health careproducts in Cote d'Ivoire to weaken President Gbagbo.
Under the French pressure in 2010, Cote d'Ivoire held
fresh elections supervised by the UN. President Gbagbo won
the elections in the first round, but controversially lost to
Ouattara in the run off by 46% and 54% respectively. The
declaration of Ouattara as the winner by Electoral
Commission and subsequent nullification by theConstitutional Council precipitated a leadership crisis thatplunged the Cote d'Ivoire into a full-scale civil war. France
had been accused for meddling in the elections by supporting
Ouattara and manipulating the Electoral Commission, while
President Gbagbo was blamed for manipulated theConstitutional Council for the election nullification.
Nevertheless, the French assisted Quatarra to steal theelections in order to serve their interests. This view is sharedby President Gbagbo's former legal advisor, Augustin
Douoguih:
To better understand the complexity of the Ivorian crisis,
one has to know the role and culpability of the French in it andthe French hidden agenda beneath all the noise going on is aquite struggle by president Gbagbo to free Côte d'Ivoire from
French economic exploitation and a vicious Frenchgovernment using any means necessary to bring him down
(Quoted in Mbakwe, 2011:12).
In a bid to solve the Ivorian conflict, France introduced a
UN Security Council Resolution 1975 for the protection of its
12,000 civilians and manipulated the African Union (AU) andEconomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to
overthrow President Gbagbo in favour of Ouattara. Fourpresidents of the 16 member ECOWAS states met in Abuja,
Nigeria after the disputed elections and hastily suspended Côte
d'Ivoire from ECOWAS and threatened to use military force
against President Gbagbo if he failed to hand over power
peacefully to Quatarra (Mbakwe, 2011:8-10). Consequently,
the French forces invaded the presidential palace and installed
Ouattara as president and President Gbagbo was arrested by
French forces and hauled to the International Criminal Court(ICC) to face charges of crime and crimes against humanity.
In a nutshell, the real problem in the Ivorian conflict was
not about the rivalry between President Gbagbo and Quatarra,
Page 58

ISSN: 2394-4404

but between President Gbagbo and France, whose colonialroots are still firmly grounded in Côte d'Ivoire and 13 other
African states. It has been argued that until the French
connection is well understood and addressed, politicalinstability in Côte d'Ivoire will persist by definition. This viewis shared by Koffi Charles, former ambassador to the UN:
The core of the problem in Côte d'Ivoire is conspiracy by
the French government to use any means necessary to remove
Gbagbo from power because they think he is dangerous andinimical to their interests in Francophone Africa. But Gbagbo
will not allow the French to control and run Côte d'Ivoire in
their own terms (Cited in Mbakwe, 2011:10).
Under his regime, President Gbagbo hated the colonial
CPA and had attempted to break away from the Frenchcolonial yoke in Côte d'Ivoire. However, France has
vigorously opposed any move for disengagement, including
the other 13 CFA states as it would affect the French clout inthe international system and domestic economy. France would
therefore resort to military strategies and regime overthrow tomaintain its ties and colonial interests. For instance, the coup
attempt that nearly overthrew President Gbagbo in 2002, whileon a visit to Italy had the mark of French hands. He wasoffered an attractive political asylum in France by President
Jacques Chirac to relinquish power, but refused (Mbakwe,
2011:11).

X. CONCLUSION
Personal rule, corruption and French external interference
remain a daunting challenge in Francophone African states.
The political, military and economic interventions of France inthe domestic and international affairs of Cote d'Ivoire to agreater extent have contributed to underdevelopment,
militarization, authoritarianism and political instability of Coted'Ivoire. As long as France continues to assert its imperial
dominance and hegemony as the principal actor and guarantorof Cote d'Ivoire's political, military and economic system,
Cote d'Ivoire will continue to remain a failed andundemocratic state without political power, sovereignty andinfluence in the domestic, regional and international system.
Despite the undeniable effects of the legacy of Frenchcolonialism
and
neo-colonialism,
personal
rule,neopatrimonialism, corruption, militarization and authoritarianpolitical system remain a daunting challenge for Francophone
Africa, especially, Cote d'Ivoire. These domestic and external
factors have contributed to the crisis of state failure, badgovernance, political underdevelopment and dependency in
Cote d'Ivoire. With the realization that colonial systems were
detrimental to African sovereignty, political power anddevelopment, it is the responsibility of Ivorian political elites
and the political system to reject the legacy of French neocolonialism and neopatrimonialism in favour of democracy
and good governance. The experience of Cote d'Ivoire with
French neocolonialism and its negative consequences should
suffice for a rethink of the relevance of the post-colonial statein Africa. Cote d'Ivoire and other African Francophone statesshould borrow a leaf from the experience of Asia and Latin
America with neo-colonialism.

www.ijiras.com | Email: contact@ijiras.com

International Journal of Innovative Research and Advanced Studies (IJIRAS)
Volume 7 Issue 6, June 2020

REFERENCES[1] Africa Digest (1970) Ten Years in French Speaking
Africa, 27(5).
[2] Amin, S. (1973). Neo-Colonialism in West Africa. New
York: Monthly Review Press.
[3] Ayyiteh, G. (1992). Africa Betrayed. New York: St.
Martin's Press[4] Busch, G. (2010) “France and the Ivory Coast-The
Empire Strikes Back”. http://saharareporters.com/2010/12/15/france-and-ivory-coast-empire-strikes-back(Accessed on June 4, 2016).
[5] Bustin, E. (1982). The Limits of French Intervention in
Africa: A Study in Applied Neo-Colonialism, Boston:
African Studies Center[6] Chipman, J. (1989). French Power in Africa, Cambridge:
Basil Blackwell Ltd.
[7] Crocker Chester (1969). The Military Transfer of Powerin Africa: A Comparative Study of Change in the British
and French System of Order. Ph.D. Dissertation, Johns
Hopkins University.
[8] Decalo, S. (1989). Modalities of Civil-Military Stability
in Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 27 (4).
[9] Faure, Y. (1988). Côte D'ivoire: Analysing the Crisis. In
Donald Cruise O‟Brien, John Dunn and Richard Rathbone(eds.). Contemporary West African States, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[10] First, R. (1970). The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power andthe Coup d'état, London: Penguin Press.
[11] Frank, A.G. (1969). Latin America: Underdevelopment or
Revolution:
EssaysontheDevelopmentof
Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy. Vol. 165,
NYU Press.
[12] French, H. (1994). The End of an Era. Africa Report,
39(2), 20-22.
[13] Huband, M. (1992). Silencing the Opposition. Africa
Report, 37(3), 55-57.
[14] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1999).
The Military Balance 1999/2000, London: IISS.

Page 59

ISSN: 2394-4404[15] Martin, G. (1995). Continuity and Change in FrancoAfrican Relations. Journal of Modern African Studies,33(1).
[16] Mbakwe, T. (2011). Côte d'Ivoire: The Story Behind theStory. New African, No. 503, February.
[17] Moncrieff, R. (2012). French Relations With Sub-SaharanAfrica Under President Sarkozy. South African Institutefor International Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 107,
January.
[18] New York Times, Power Struggle is Simmering in Ivory
Coast. December 9, 1993.
[19] N'Diaye Boubacar (2005). Not a Miracle after All... Côted'ivoire‟s Downfall: Flawed Civil-Military Relations andMissed Opportunities. Scientia Militaria, South African
Journal of Military Studies, 33(1).
[20] Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage ofImperialism. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd.
[21] Nyerere, J.K. (1973). Freedom and Development: Uhuru
Na Maendeleo. A Selection From Writings and Speeches
1968-1973, Oxford University Press.
[22] Sigel Efrem (1970). Ivory Coast: Booming Economy,
Political Calm. Africa Report (15), 18-21, April.
[23] Toungara, J.M. (1995). Generational Tensions in the Parti
Démocratique de Cote d'Ivoire. African Studies Review,38(2).
[24] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)(2010). Human Development Report 2010: The Real
Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development.
New York: UNDP.
[25] Welch, C. (1987). “Côte d'Ivoire: Personal Rule andCivilian Control”, In Claude Welch (ed.) No Farewell toArms? Boulder: Westview Press.
[26] Welch, C. Jr. (ed.) (1976). Civilian Control of theMilitary: Theory and Cases From Developing Countries.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
[27] Whiteman, K. (1990). “The Gallic Paradox. Africa
Report, 36(1), 17-19.
[28] William, H. (1988). The Crisis of Succession. Africa
Report, 33(3), 53-55.
[29] Zolberg, A. (1969). One Party Government in the Ivory
Coast. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

www.ijiras.com | Email: contact@ijiras.com