7. World nuclear forces
Overview
At the start of 2024, nine states—the United States, the Russian Federation,
the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s
Repub­lic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and Israel—together possessed
approxi­mately 12 121 nuclear weapons, of which 9585 were considered to bepotentially oper­ationally available. An estimated 3904 of these war­heads were
deployed with operational forces (see table 7.1), including about 2100 that were
kept in a state of high operational alert—about 100 more than the pre­vious year.
Overall, the number of nuclear warheads in the world continues to decline.
However, this is only due to the USA and Russia dismantling retired warheads.
Global reductions of operational warheads appear to have stalled, and their
numbers are rising again. The USA and Russia, which together possess almost
90 per cent of all nuclear weapons, have extensive programmes under way toreplace and modernize their nuclear warheads, their missile, aircraft and sub­marine delivery systems, and their nuclear weapon production facilities (seesections I and II).
China is in the middle of a significant modernization and expansion of its
nuclear arsenal (see section V). Its nuclear stockpile is expected to continue
grow­ing over the coming decade and some projections suggest that China could
poten­tially deploy at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles as either
Russia or the USA in that period. Even so, China’s overall nuclear war­headstock­pile is expected to remain smaller than that of either of those states.
The nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear-armed states are even smaller (seesections III–IV, VI–IX), but all are either developing or deploying new weapon
systems or have announced their intention to do so. India and Pakistan also
appear to be increasing the size of their nuclear weapon inventories, and the
UK plans to increase its stockpile. North Korea’s military nuclear programme
remains central to its national security strategy and it may have assembled up
to 50 nuclear weapons and could produce more. Israel continues to maintainits long-standing policy of nuclear ambiguity, leaving significant uncertainty
about the number and characteristics of its nuclear weapons.
The availability of reliable information on the status of the nuclear arsenals
and capabilities of the nuclear-armed states varies considerably. In some cases,
estimates can be based on the amount of fissile material—plutonium and highly
enriched uranium—that a country is believed to have produced (see section X)
and on observations of missile forces.
hans m. kristensen and matt korda
SIPRI Yearbook 2024: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
www.sipriyearbook.org

272 military spending and armaments, 2023

Table 7.1. World nuclear forces, January 2024
All figures are approximate and are estimates based on assessments by the authors. The estimatespresented here are based on public information and contain some uncertainties, as reflected in
the notes to tables 7.1–7.10.
CountryaYear of first Military stockpilebnuclear test Deployed Stored c

Total

Retiredwarheads

Total
inventory

United States
RussiaUnited Kingdom
FranceChina
India
Pakistan
North Korea
Israel

1945
1949
1952
1960
1964
1974
1998
2006
..

1 770 d1 710 g
120
280
24 j
–
–
–
–

1 938 e2 670 h
105
10
476
172
170
50
90

3 708
4 380 i
225
290
500
172
170
50
90

1 336 f
1 200 f
–
..
–
..
..
..
..

5 044
5 580
225
290
500
172
170
50 k
90

3 904

5 681

9 585

2 536

12 121Total. . = not applicable or not available; – = nil or a negligible value.
Notes: SIPRI revises its world nuclear forces data each year based on new information andupdates to earlier assessments. The data for Jan. 2024 replaces all previously published SIPRI
data on world nuclear forces.
a Some states, such as the USA, use the official term ‘stockpile’ to refer to this subset of war­heads, while others, such as the UK, often use ‘stockpile’ to describe the entire nuclear inventory.
SIPRI uses the term ‘stockpile’ to refer to all deployed warheads as well as warheads in central
storage that could potentially be deployed after some preparation.
b These are warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with operational forces.
c These are warheads in central storage that would require some preparation (e.g. transportand loading on to launchers) before they could be deployed.
d This figure includes c. 1370 warheads deployed on ballistic missiles and c. 300 stored atbomber bases in the USA, as well as c. 100 non-strategic (tactical) nuclear bombs thought to be
deployed across 6 airbases in 5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states (Belgium,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Türkiye). These non-strategic bombs remain in the custodyof the USA.
e This figure includes c. 100 non-strategic nuclear bombs stored in the USA. The remainder
are strategic nuclear warheads.
f This figure refers to retired warheads that have not yet been dismantled.
g This figure includes c. 1510 strategic warheads deployed on ballistic missiles and c. 200
deployed at heavy bomber bases.
h This figure includes c. 1112 strategic and c. 1558 non-strategic warheads in central storage.
i SIPRI estimates that Russia had more strategic warheads in Jan. 2024 than in Jan. 2023 but
has revised the estimated number of non-strategic warheads downwards based on new assess­ments, resulting in a net overall decrease in the Russian military stockpile of c. 109 war­headscom­pared with the estimate for the previous year.
j SIPRI assesses that, as of Jan. 2024, China might have started to deploy a small number of its
warheads (c. 24) on their launchers.
k Information about the status and capability of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal comes withsignificant uncertainty. North Korea might have produced enough fissile material to build up to
90 nuclear warheads; however, it is likely that it has assembled fewer warheads, perhaps c. 50.

world nuclear forces 273

I. United States nuclear forceshans m. kristensen and matt korda*
As of January 2024 the United States maintained a military stockpile ofapproximately 3708 nuclear warheads, the same number as the previous year.
Approximately 1770 of these—consisting of about 1670 strategic and roughly
100 non-strategic (tactical) warheads—were deployed on ballistic missiles
and at bomber bases. In addition, about 1938 warheads were held in reserve
and around 1336 retired warheads were awaiting dismantlement (200 fewer
than the previous year’s estimate), giving a total inventory of approximately
5044 nuclear warheads (see table 7.2, end of section).
The estimates presented here are based on publicly available information
regarding the US nuclear arsenal and assessments by the authors.1 While in
2021 the USA briefly restored a policy of declassifying the size of its nuclear
stockpile and the annual number of dismantled warheads, the information
was not released in 2022 or 2023.2
The US stockpile is expected to continue to decline slightly over the next
decade as nuclear modernization programmes consolidate some nuclear
weapon types. The US Department of Energy (DOE) reported in April 2023
that it had been ‘on pace to complete the dismantlement of all war­heads
retired before FY [fiscal year] 2009 by the end of FY 2022’ but that theCovid-19 pan­demic had ‘delayed the dismantlement of a small number ofthese retired warheads until after FY 2022’.3 As for warheads retired during
and after FY 2009, the DOE reported in November 2023 that ‘War­heads
await­ing dis­mantle­ment constitute a significant fraction of the total war­head
popu­lation’, and that the DOE planned to ‘remove additional retired weapons
from . . . [US Depart­ment of Defense (DOD)] facilities’ and ‘dismantle several[retired] weapons systems’.4
This section details the USA’s holdings of nuclear weapons, both strategic(including those delivered by air, land and sea) and non-strategic. Before
doing so, it first considers the USA’s compliance with its bilateral arms control
obligations, outlines the role played by nuclear weapons in the USA’s military
doctrine and describes the country’s warhead-production capacity.
1 Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Estimating world nuclear forces: An overview and assessment ofsources’, SIPRI Commentary, 14 June 2021.
2 US Department of State, ‘Transparency in the US nuclear weapons stockpile’, Fact sheet, 5 Oct.
2021; and Kristensen, H. M., ‘While advocating nuclear transparency abroad, Biden administration
limits it at home’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 31 July 2023.
3 US Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Fiscal Year2023 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, Report to Congress (DOE: Washington, DC, Apr.
2023), p. 2-12. US fiscal years end on 30 Sep. of the named year.
4 US Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Fiscal Year2024 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, Report to Congress (DOE: Washington, DC, Nov.
2023, pp. 2-12, G-6.

* The authors wish to thank Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight for contributing invaluable
research to this publication.

274 military spending and armaments, 2023

US compliance with New START
During 2023 the USA appeared to continue to be in compliance with thelimits on deployed strategic nuclear forces prescribed by the 2010 Russian–
US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (New START).5 Under the treaty, the Russian Federation andthe USA are obligated to exchange data on their nuclear forces twice a year.
Although Russia stopped publishing and sharing treaty data in early 2023 (seesection II of this chapter), the USA initially disclosed its numbers in May 2023
by publicly declaring that it had 1419 warheads attributed to 662 deployedbal­listic missiles and heavy bombers as of 1 March 2023.6 The USA stated thatit had voluntarily released the numbers ‘In the interest of transparency andthe US commitment to responsible nuclear conduct’.7 However, the USA did
not disclose its aggregate numbers for September 2023; in January 2024 it
instead republished the numbers for March 2023.8
In addition to no longer publicly volunteering its New START aggregate
data, the USA announced four countermeasures in June 2023 in response to
Russia’s violation of the treaty. The USA (a) will not provide biannual force
data; (b) will not provide notifications (e.g. on the location and status of
deployed missiles and launchers); (c) will not facilitate Russian inspections
on US territory; and (d) will not provide telemetry information on test
launches of US intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The US Department of State said thecounter­measures were in line with international law as they aimed to induce
Russia to return to compliance.9
Just as with Russia, many of the USA’s strategic delivery systems carryfewer warheads than their maximum capacity in order to meet the limitsof New START. While New START has so far constrained US nuclear war­head loadings, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2024
directed the US Air Force (USAF) to ‘develop a plan to decrease the amount oftime required to upload additional warheads to the intercontinental ballistic
missile force in the event Presidential direction is given to exercise such aplan’.10 In addition, a report by the bipartisan US Congressional Commission
on Strategic Posture published in October 2023, while not part of official US
5 For a summary and other details of New START see annex A, section III, in this volume. On related
developments in 2023 see chapter 8, section I, in this volume.
6 US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, ‘US New START
Treaty aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms’, Fact sheet, 12 May 2023, p. 2.
7 US Department of State (note 6).
8 US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, ‘2023 report toCongress on implementation of the New START treaty’, 31 Jan. 2024, p. 4.
9 US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, ‘US countermeasuresin response to Russia’s violation of the New START treaty’, Fact sheet, 1 June 2023.
10 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, US Public Law 118-31, signed into law on
22 Dec. 2023, HR 2670, pp. 466–67.

world nuclear forces 275
policy, recommended that the USA should urgently prepare to ‘upload someor all’ of the country’s reserve warheads.11
The role of nuclear weapons in US military doctrine
The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released by the administration of
President Joe Biden affirmed three overall roles for US nuclear weapons:‘Deter strategic attacks; Assure Allies and partners; and Achieve US object­ives if deterrence fails.’12 It noted that ‘The United States would only consider
the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vitalinterests of the United States or its Allies and partners’; however, it did notelaborate on what specifically constitutes ‘vital interests’, nor did it define
the phrase ‘Allies and partners’.13 The 2022 NPR also appeared to scale backsome­what the language about the role that nuclear weapons could playagainst non-nuclear strategic attacks, a role the 2018 NPR issued by theadmin­istration of President Donald J. Trump had sought to broaden.14
The overall roles of US nuclear weapons outlined in the 2022 NPR are inline with long-held policies, but the force structure required to serve thoseroles appears to be changing. The administration of President Barack Obama(2009–17) initiated a general nuclear weapon modernization programme,
which the Trump administration (2017–21) sought to expand by adding
new low-yield and tactical nuclear weapons (see below).15 While the 2022
NPR rejected some of this expansion, the Biden administration came underincreasing pressure in 2023 to modify US posture to counterbalance Russian
and Chinese nuclear developments. For example, in October 2023 the Con­
gressional Strategic Posture Commission recommended a wide range ofurgent modifications to US strategic and regional nuclear forces.16

11 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic
Posture: Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States(Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA: Alexandria, VA, 2023), p. 48.
12 US Department of Defense (DOD), 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America(DOD: Washington, DC, Oct. 2022), 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 7.
13 US Department of Defense (note 12), p. 9.
14 US Department of Defense (note 12), p. 7; and US Department of Defense (DOD), Nuclear Posture
Review 2018 (DOD: Washington, DC, Feb. 2018). On the 2018 NPR see Kristensen, H. M., ‘US nuclear
forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2019. Note that the NPRs are public documents but the detailed requirements
for the role of nuclear weapons are described in a number of White House and US DOD documents thatremain classified.
15 For further detail see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘United States nuclear forces’, SIPRI
Yearbook 2023, pp. 252–53.
16 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (note 11), p. 48.

276 military spending and armaments, 2023

Warhead production
Since the end of the cold war, the USA has relied on refurbishment of existing
warhead types to maintain the nuclear arsenal. The National Nuclear Secur­
ity Administration (NNSA) delivered more than 200 refurbished nuclear
weapons to the US military in 2023.17 In more recent years, the USA has
moved towards a more ambitious plan focused on producing new or signifi­
cantly modified warheads. Because the plan depends heavily on the ability
to produce new pits—the plutonium core of a nuclear weapon—the NNSA
aimed to increase pit production capacity from around 10 per year to up to
30 pits in 2026 and at least 80 pits per year by 2030.18 However, the NNSA
acknowledged in 2022 that this timeline was unrealistic.19 As a result, some of
the nuclear weapon programmes described below will probably face delays
or new delivery systems could be initially deployed with existing warheads.20
Strategic nuclear forces
US offensive strategic nuclear forces include heavy bombers, land-based
ICBMs and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). These
forces, together known as the triad, changed little during 2023. SIPRI esti­mates that a total of 3508 nuclear warheads were assigned to the strategic
triad, of which an estimated 1670 warheads were deployed on ballistic mis­siles and at heavy bomber bases.
Aircraft and air-delivered weapons
As of January 2024 the USAF heavy bomber fleet included B-1Bs, B-2As and
B-52Hs. Of these, 66 (20 B-2As and 46 B-52Hs) were nuclear-capable, but
not all are operationally deployed at any given time. The B-2A can delivergravity bombs (B61-7, B61-11, B61-12 and B83-1) and the B-52H can deliver theAGM-86B/W80-1 nuclear air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). SIPRI esti­mates that approximately 788 warheads were assigned to strategic bombers,of which about 300 are deployed at bomber bases and ready for delivery on
relatively short notice. The USA is modernizing its nuclear bomber force by
upgrading nuclear command-and-control capabilities on existing bombers,
developing improved nuclear weapons (the B61-12 gravity bomb and the new

17 US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), ‘2023: Year in review: Making our visiona reality’, Feb. 2024.
18 US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), ‘Plutonium pit production’, Fact sheet,
Apr. 2019; and US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Should Further
Develop Cost, Schedule, and Risk Information for the W87-1 Warhead Program, Report no. GAO-20-73(GAO: Washington, DC, Sep. 2020), pp. 7–8, 14–15.
19 For further detail see Kristensen and Korda (note 15), pp. 253–54.
20 US Air Force (USAF), Report on Development of Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent Weapon, Report
to eight congressional committees (USAF: [Washington, DC,] May 2020), p. 4.

world nuclear forces 277
AGM-181 Long-Range Standoff, LRSO, cruise missile), and building a new
heavy bomber (the B-21 Raider).
The first six B-21s are expected to enter service in 2027; the aircraft will
gradually replace the B-1B and B-2 bombers.21 The B-21 made its first flightin November 2023.22 It is expected that the USAF will procure at least
100 (possibly as many as 145) of the new bombers, with the latest service costs
estimated at approximately $203 billion for the entire 30-year oper­ational
pro­gramme, at an estimated production cost of $550 million per air­craft;how­ever, several critical cost details remain classified.23 To accom­modate theincoming B-21s, the number of US bomber bases with nuclear capabil­ity is
expected to increase from two as of January 2024 to five by the early 2030s.24
Commercial satellite imagery indicates that a new weapons generation facil­
ity is under construction at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, which will
reinstate its former nuclear storage capabil­ity upon completion.25
The B-21 appears to have a slightly smaller weapon load than the B-2. It
will be capable of delivering four types of nuclear weapon: the B61-12 andB61-13 guided nuclear gravity bombs; the B61-11 nuclear earth-penetrator;
and the AGM-181 LRSO ALCM, which is in development. The AGM-181
LRSO will replace the AGM-86B ALCM in the early 2030s and will carry the
W80-4 nuclear war­head, a modified version of the W80-1 warhead that isused on the AGM-86B. In March 2023 the NNSA authorized the productionengineering phase for the W80-4, with the first production unit scheduled
to be ready by FY 2027 (September 2027), instead of FY 2025 as originallyplanned.26 Production is scheduled to be completed in FY 2031.27
The B61-12 was previously viewed as a replacement for all other gravity
bombs in the stockpile, including the B61-7, B61-11 and B83-1 used for stra­tegic
bombers. However, in October 2023 the Biden administration announcedplans to develop a new modification of the B61 gravity bomb, the B61-13,
possibly as part of an effort to gain Congressional approval to retire the
21 Tirpak, J. A., ‘B-21 Raider first flight now postponed to 2023’, Air and Space Forces Magazine,
20 May 2022; and US Air Force, ‘B-21 bomber to be unveiled Dec. 2’, 20 Oct. 2022.
22 Stone, M. and Swanson, D., ‘US Air Force’s new B-21 Raider “flying wing” bomber takes firstflight’, Reuters, 11 Nov. 2023.
23 Capaccio, A., ‘Under-wraps B-21 bomber is seen costing $203 billion into 2050s’, Bloomberg,
17 Nov. 2021; Tirpak, J. A., ‘A new bomber vision’, Air Force Magazine, 1 June 2020; and Stone andSwanson (note 22).
24 Dawkins, J. C., Commander, 8th Air Force and Joint-Global Strike Operations Center, Barksdale
Air Force Base, ‘B21 General Dawkins intro’, YouTube, 19 Mar. 2020, 01:35; and Kristensen, H. M.,‘USAF plans to expand nuclear bomber bases’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American
Scientists, 17 Nov. 2020.
25 Knight, M., ‘Construction of new nuclear weapons facility at Barksdale AFB’, FAS Strategic
Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 20 Feb. 2024.
26 US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), ‘W80-4 life extension program enters
phase 6.4, production engineering’, 1 May 2023.
27 Leone, D., ‘Two-year delay for first LRSO warhead, but NNSA says will still deliver on-time to Air
Force’, Defense Daily, 4 Aug. 2022.

278 military spending and armaments, 2023

B83-1.28 The B61-13 will reportedly use the warhead from the outgoing
B61-7s—and will thus have the same maximum yield of 360 kilotons—but will
be modi­fied with new safety and control features as well as a guided tail-kit
for improved accuracy and to facili­tate broad area targeting.29 According to
the US DOD, the B61-13 will not increase the size of the US stockpile because
the number of B61-12s to be produced (approximately 480) ‘will be loweredby the same amount as the number of B61-13s produced’.30
Land-based missiles
As of January 2024 the USA deployed 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III
ICBMs in 400 silos across three missile wings.31 Another 50 empty silos
are kept in a state of readiness for reloading with stored missiles if neces­sary. SIPRI estimates that 800 warheads were assigned to the ICBM force,of which 400 were deployed on the missiles. Each Minuteman III ICBM is
armed with either a 335-kt W78/Mk12A or a 300-kt W87-0/Mk21 war­head.
ICBMs carrying the W87-0 can only be loaded with one warhead, while
those carry­ing the W78 can be uploaded with up to two more warheads fora maxi­mum of three multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles(MIRVs).32 In recent years, there has been growing internal pressure on the
US government—which intensified in 2023—to re-MIRV some of the USA’s
deployed ICBMs.33
The USAF has scheduled its next-generation ICBM to begin replacing the
Minuteman III in 2028, with full replacement by 2036, although delays to thisschedule are expected.34 The first flight test of this new ICBM—the LGM-35A
Sentinel—was initially planned for 2023; however, technological and staffing
issues have caused delays, pushing the first flight test and first full func­tional
test back to FY 2024 and FY 2025, respectively.35 In 2023 commercial satel­
lite imagery revealed ongoing construction at an ICBM test launch silo at
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, one of more than 600 facilities that

28 Kristensen, H. and Korda, M., ‘Biden administration decides to build a new nuclear bomb to get
rid of an old bomb’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 27 Oct. 2023.
29 US Department of Defense, ‘Department of Defense announces pursuit of B61 gravity bomb
variant’, Press release, 27 Oct. 2023.
30 US Department of Defense, ‘Fact sheet on B61 variant development’, Fact sheet, 27 Oct. 2023.
31 US Air Force, ‘LGM-30G Minuteman III’, Fact sheet, accessed 15 Mar. 2024.
32 On the warheads and yields see also Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘United States nuclear
forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2021, p. 341.
33 Kristensen, H. M. et al., ‘Strategic Posture Commission report calls for broad nuclear buildup’,FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 12 Oct. 2023.
34 Richard, C. A., Commander, US Strategic Command, Statement before the US Senate, Armed
Services Committee, 13 Feb. 2020, p. 9. On the Sentinel see also Kristensen and Korda (note 32), p. 341.
35 ‘LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, USA’, Airforce Technology, 29 July 2022;
and US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Weapon Systems Annual Assessment, Report
no. GAO-23-106059 (GAO: Washington, DC, June 2023).

world nuclear forces 279
will require an upgrade as part of the Sentinel programme.36 Complications
related to these infrastructure upgrades have contributed to the delays andcost overruns faced by the programme: the USAF announced in January2024 that the Sentinel deployment will be delayed by up to two years and costan estimated 37 per cent more than originally expected.37 The scale of thecost overrun triggered legislation (the 1982 Nunn–McCurdy Act) that poten­
tially could result in the termination of the programme. To avoid this, the US
Secretary of Defense must investigate the cause of the overrun, put in place
mitigating measures and re-certify the programme as essential to national
security.38
Each Sentinel will be able to carry up to two warheads, with the USAF
plan­ning to produce a significantly modified warhead based on the same
design as the W87-0, known as the W87-1. The cost of the W87-1 warheadmodern­ization programme has been estimated at between $11.9 billion and$15.9 bil­lion in ‘then-year’ dollars (i.e. the values account for inflation), but
this excludes the consider­able costs of producing the plutonium pits for thewarhead.39 The pro­gramme for­mally entered the development engineering
phase in May 2023, with com­pletion of the first production unit expected
some­time in FY 2031 or FY 2032 (although the original plan was for
FY 2030).40 However, pro­duction of the W87-1 in time to meet the Sentinel’splanned deployment schedule depended on the NNSA’s projected production
rate of at least 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030 (see above). The NNSA’s
acknowledge­ment that this object­ive was unrealistic means that the Sentinel
will initially be deployed with the existing W87-0 warheads.41
The Sentinel is also expected to carry a new type of re-entry vehicle (known
as the Next Generation Re-entry Vehicle, NGRV). The USAF’s budget for
FY 2024 includes funding for ‘early acquisition activities’ for the NGRV. To
accom­modate the delays affecting production of the W87-1 warhead, theNGRV will be capable of carrying both current and future warheads.42
Sea-based missiles
The US Navy operates a fleet of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, of which 12 are normallyconsidered to be operational with the remaining 2 typically undergoing
36 US Government Accountability Office (note 35); and authors’ assessment based on analysis ofsatellite imagery.
37 Tirpak, J. A., ‘New ICBM has “critical” cost and schedule overruns, needs SecDef certification tocontinue’, Air and Space Forces Magazine, 18 Jan. 2024.
38 Knight, M., ‘“Critical” overrun of Sentinel ICBM program demands government transparency’,
FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 2 Feb. 2024.
39 US Department of Energy (note 4), pp. 8-27, 8-32.
40 US Department of Energy (note 4), pp. 1-6, 2-10, 2-11, 8-6.
41 For further detail see Kristensen and Korda (note 15), pp. 253–54.
42 US Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget
Estimates, Justification Book, vol. 3 of 4, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force (DOD:
Washington, DC, Mar. 2023).

280 military spending and armaments, 2023

maintenance at any given time. Eight of the SSBNs are based at Naval Base
Kitsap in Washington state, on the Pacific Ocean, and six at Naval Sub­marine
Base Kings Bay in Georgia, on the Atlantic. The last mid-life refuelling wascompleted in March 2022, meaning that all 14 boats are now poten­tiallydeployable until 2027, when the first Ohio-class submarine is expected toretire.43
Each Ohio-class SSBN was built to carry up to 24 Trident II SLBMs, but tomeet the New START limit on deployed launchers, 4 of the 24 initial missile
tubes on each submarine were deactivated so that the 12 SSBNs that areusually operational can carry no more than 240 missiles.44 At any given time
8–10 SSBNs are normally at sea, of which 4–5 are on alert in their designatedpatrol areas and ready to fire their missiles within 15 minutes of receiving thelaunch order. The US SSBN fleet conducts about 30 deterrence patrols per
year.45
The Trident II D5 SLBMs carry two basic warhead types: the 455-kt W88
and the W76. The latter exists in two versions: the 90-kt W76-1 and the lowyield W76-2.46 The NNSA has begun modernizing the ageing W88 war­head.
The first production unit of the W88 Alt 370 was completed on 1 July 2021 andthe warhead was formally accepted into the stockpile in 2023.47 Each SLBM
can carry up to eight warheads but normally carries an average of four or five.
SIPRI estimates that around 1920 warheads were assigned to the SSBN fleet
as of January 2024, of which approximately 970 were deployed on SLBMs.48
The low-yield W76-2, which was first deployed in late 2019 and is oper­
ational on SSBNs in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, is a modification of theW76-1 and is estimated to have an explosive yield of 8 kt.49 The 2022 NPR left
open the possibility that the W76-2 warhead might be retired as the B61-12
and the LRSO’s low-yield capabilities are fielded over the coming decade.50
Since 2017 the US Navy has been replacing its Trident II D5 SLBMs withan enhanced version, known as the D5LE (LE for ‘life extension’), which isequipped with the new Mk6 guidance system. The upgrade is scheduled for
43 Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, ‘Louisiana back underway:
Project team completes the final engineering refueling overhaul for an Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarine’, US Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, 8 Mar. 2023.
44 US Navy Office of Information, ‘Fleet ballistic missile submarines—SSBN’, Fact file, 25 May 2021.
45 See e.g. Kristensen, H., ‘US SSBN patrols steady, but mysterious reduction in Pacific in 2017’, FAS
Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 24 May 2018.
46 The older W76-0 version has been, or remains in the process of being, retired. On these warheads
see Kristensen and Korda (note 32), p. 341.
47 US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), ‘NNSA completes first production unit of
W88 Alteration 370’, 13 July 2021; and US Department of Energy (note 4), p. 2-1.
48 US Department of State (note 6).
49 Arkin, W. M. and Kristensen, H. M., ‘US deploys new low-yield nuclear submarine warhead’, FAS
Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 29 Jan. 2020; US Department of Defense,‘Statement on the fielding of the W76-2 low-yield submarine launched ballistic missile warhead’, Press
release, 4 Feb. 2020; and US military officials, Private communication with authors, 2019–20.
50 US Department of Defense (note 12), p. 20.

world nuclear forces 281
completion in 2025.51 It will arm Ohio-class SSBNs for the remainder of theirservice lives (up to 2042) and will also be deployed on the United Kingdom’s
Trident submarines (see section III).
A new class of at least 12 SSBNs (the Columbia class) is under construction
to replace the Ohio class. The lead boat in the new class, the USS District ofColumbia, is scheduled to start patrols in 2031.52 Each Columbia-class SSBN
will carry 16 missiles, initially the D5LE, but from 2039 these will be replacedwith an upgraded SLBM, the D5LE2.53
To arm the D5LE2, the NNSA has begun early design development of a
new nuclear warhead, known as the W93. This will be the first new warhead
design fielded by the USA since the end of the cold war. The W93 warhead will
be housed in a new Mk7 re-entry body (aeroshell) that will also be deployedon the UK’s new Dreadnought-class submarines (see section III). The W93
appears intended to initially supplement, rather than replace, the W76-1 andthe W88. Another new warhead is planned to replace those warheads. The
completion of the first production unit of the W93 is tentatively scheduled
for 2034–36.54
Non-strategic nuclear forces
As of January 2024 the USA had one basic type of non-strategic weapon in its
nuclear arsenal—the B61 gravity bomb, with three versions assigned to nonstrategic forces: the B61-3, the B61-4 and the new B61-12, which is scheduled
to replace the two older versions by 2026.55
SIPRI estimates that there were 200 B61 bombs in the stock­pile, of
which approximately 100 (all B61-3/-4 versions) were deployed in Europe
for potential use by US and allied combat aircraft. The bombs, which arecontrolled by the US Air Force, are deployed at six airbases in five North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states: Kleine Brogel in Bel­
gium; Büchel in Germany; Aviano and Ghedi in Italy; Volkel in the Nether­lands; and İncirlik in Türkiye.56 The remaining (c. 100) B61 bombs are thought
51 Wolfe, J., Director of US Strategic Systems Programs, ‘US nuclear weapons policy, programs,
and strategy in review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 2020 and the Future Years
Defense Program’, Statement before the US Senate, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces, 1 May 2019, p. 4.
52 Wolfe (note 51), p. 8.
53 Wolfe, J., Director of US Strategic Systems Programs, ‘FY2021 budget request for nuclear forces
and atomic energy defense activities’, Statement before the US House of Representatives, Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 3 Mar. 2020, p. 5.
54 US Department of Energy (note 3), p. 2-10.
55 Another version of the B61, the B61-10, was retired in Sep. 2016. US Department of Energy(DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Fiscal Year 2018 Stockpile Stewardship andManagement Plan, Report to Congress (DOE: Washington, DC, Nov. 2017), figures 1.1–1.7, p. 1-13.
56 For detailed overviews of the dual-capable aircraft programmes of the USA and its NATO allies
see Kristensen (note 14), pp. 299–300; and Andreasen, S. et al., Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible
NATO Nuclear Posture (Nuclear Threat Initiative: Washington, DC, Jan. 2018).

282 military spending and armaments, 2023

to be stored at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico for potential use by
US aircraft, possibly including in East Asia.57 USA-based combat air­craft
assigned this mission include F-15Es of the 366th Fighter Wing at Moun­tain
Home Air Force Base in Idaho.58
There was growing evidence in 2022 and 2023 to suggest that the USA is
upgrad­ing the nuclear storage vaults and related infrastructure at the British
Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath airbase in the UK, in order to facilitate
the potential contingency storage of nuclear weapons at the base.59 These
upgrades are taking place in the broader context of a plan to modernize up to
180 nuclear storage vaults across Europe, which probably include all active
vaults as well as dozens of vaults in caretaker status at other bases.60
Full-scale production of the B61-12 began in late 2022 and the first bombs
were formally accepted into the US military stockpile in 2023, with the entire
replace­ment process scheduled to be completed by 2026.61 Once deploy­ment
to the bases in Europe begins, the B61-3 and B61-4 bombs currently deployedat those bases will gradually be returned to the USA and dismantled. Unlike
the older versions, the B61-12 is equipped with a guided tail-kit that enables
the B61-12 to hit targets more accurately, meaning that it can use lower yields
and thus generate less radioactive fallout.62
Operations continued in 2023 to integrate the incoming B61-12 on seventypes of aircraft operated by the USA or its NATO allies: the B-2A, the new
B-21, the F-15E, the F-16C/D, the F-16MLU, the F-35A and the PA-200 (Tor­nado).63 In October 2023 the F-35A achieved technical certification to carry
the B61-12, clearing the way for USAF units in Europe to complete their
nuclear surety certifications before later receiving the new bombs.64 The
F-35A will replace all Belgian, Dutch and US F-16s and German and Italian
Tornado aircraft in the nuclear strike role.

57 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (note 14), p. 48.
58 Heflin, L., ‘53rd Wing WSEP incorporates NucWSEP, enhances readiness for real world

operations’, Press release, Air Combat Command, 9 Sep. 2021.
59 Kristensen, H. M., ‘Lakenheath air base added to nuclear weapons storage site upgrades’,FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 11 Apr. 2022; Korda, M. andKristensen, H. M., ‘Increasing evidence that the US Air Force’s nuclear mission may be returning to UK
soil’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 28 Aug. 2023; and Diver, T., ‘US tostation nuclear weapons in UK to counter threat from Russia’, Daily Telegraph, 26 Jan. 2024.
60 ‘Request for information: Vault modernization program’, System for Award Management(SAM.gov), Notice ID FA9422_VMP, 29 Aug. 2023.
61 Meub, K., ‘B61-12 production begins’, Sandia LabNews, Sandia National Laboratories, 11 Feb. 2022;
and US Department of Energy (note 4), p. 2-1.
62 Kristensen, H. M. and McKinzie, M., ‘Video shows earth-penetrating capability of B61-12 nuclear
bomb’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 14 Jan. 2016.
63 US Air Force (USAF), Acquisition Annual Report Fiscal Year 2018: Cost-effective Modernization(USAF: Washington, DC, [n.d.]), p. 24.
64 Marrow, M., ‘EXCLUSIVE: F-35A officially certified to carry nuclear bomb’, Breaking Defense,
8 Mar. 2024.

world nuclear forces 283
The 2018 NPR implemented by the Trump administration included plans
to develop a new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) that would
form part of the USA’s non-strategic nuclear arsenal. The 2022 NPR releasedby the Biden administration seemingly rejected this plan. However, in 2023
the US Congress challenged the Biden administration’s decision by authoriz­
ing funding for further research and reinstating the SLCM-N as part of thenuclear modernization programme. Despite strong initial opposition fromthe Biden administration, the NDAA for FY 2024 authorized $190 million
for the missile and associated warhead, with the aim of reaching operational
capability in 2034.65 Development of the SLCM-N would violate the US
pledge from 1992 not to develop such a weapon and could potentially resultin the first significant increase in the size of the US nuclear weapon stockpile
since 1996.66

65 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, ‘Statement of administration
policy: HR 2670—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024’, 10 July 2023; and US
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (note 10), pp. 460–62.
66 Bush, G. W., US president, ‘Address before a joint session of the Congress on the state of theunion’, 28 Jan. 1992.

284 military spending and armaments, 2023

Table 7.2. United States nuclear forces, January 2024
All figures are approximate and some are based on assessments by the authors.
Type

Designation

No. ofYear firstlaunchers deployedRange(km) aWarheads x yieldNo. ofwarheads b746

3 508cAircraft (bombers)

96/66 d

788 e

B-52H

Stratofortress

76/46

1961

B-2A

Spirit

20/20

1994

Land-based missiles (ICBMs)

400

LGM-30G Minuteman III
Mk12A
Mk21 SERV

200
200

Sea-based missiles (SLBMs)

14/280 l

UGM-133A Trident II D5LE
Mk4
Mk4A
Mk4A
Mk5

..
..
..
..

1992
2008
2019
1990

>12 000 1–8 x W76-0 100 kt–n>12 000 1–8 x W76-1 90 kt
1 511>12 000 1 x W76-2 o 8 kt
25
>12 000 1–8 x W88 455 kt
384

..
..
..
..
..

1988
2023
1987
1985
1983

  3 840 5 x B61-3, -4>2 200 2 x B61-12
  3 200 q 2 x B61-3, -4
  3 200 2 x B61-3, -4
  2 400 2 x B61-3, -4Strategic nuclear forces  16 000 20 x AGM-86B
ALCMs 5–150 kt f
  11 000 16 x B61-7, -11, -12,
B83-1 bombs hStrike Eagle
Lightning II
FalconFalcon r
Tornado r

288
800 i

1979
2006

  13 000 1–3 x W78 335 kt
  13 000 1 x W87-0 300 kt

600 j
200 k
1 920 m200 p

Non-strategic nuclear forces
F-15E
F-35A
F-16C/D
F-16MLU
PA-200

500 g

80
..
60
30
30

Total stockpile

3 708

Deployed warheads

1 770

Reserve warheads

1 938

Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement

1 336 sTotal inventory

5 044 t. . = not available or not applicable; – = nil or a negligible value; ALCM = air-launched cruise
missile; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; kt = kiloton; SERV = security-enhanced
re-entry vehicle; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.
a For aircraft, the listed range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary
according to flight profile, weapon payload and in-flight refuelling.
b These figures show the total number of warheads estimated to be assigned to nuclearcapable delivery systems. Only some of these warheads have been deployed on missiles and at
airbases, as described in the notes below.
c Of these strategic warheads, c. 1670 were deployed on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles
and at bomber bases. The remaining warheads were in central storage. This number differs fromthe number of deployed strategic warheads counted by the 2010 Russian–US Treaty on Measures
for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) because thetreaty attributes 1 weapon to each deployed bomber, even though bombers do not carry weapons
under normal circumstances. Additionally, the treaty does not count weapons stored at bomber
bases and, at any given time, some nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are
not fully loaded with warheads and are thus not counted under the treaty. The USA no longer
publishes aggregate figures for strategic nuclear forces limited by New START.

world nuclear forces 285
d The first figure is the total number of bombers in the inventory; the second is the numberof bombers that are counted as nuclear-capable under New START. The USA has declared that
it will deploy no more than 60 nuclear bombers at any given time but normally only c. 50 are
deployed, with the remaining aircraft in overhaul.
e Of the c. 788 bomber weapons, c. 300 (200 ALCMs and 100 bombs) were deployed at thebomber bases; all the rest were in central storage. Many of the gravity bombs are no longer fully
active and are slated for retirement after deployment of the B61-12 is completed in the mid 2020s.
f The B-52H is no longer configured to carry nuclear gravity bombs.
g In 2006 the US Department of Defense decided to reduce the number of ALCMs to
528 missiles. Burg, R., Director of Strategic Security in the Air, Space and Information Operations,‘ICBMs, helicopters, cruise missiles, bombers and warheads’, Statement before the US Senate,
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 28. Mar. 2007, p. 7. Since then,
the number has probably decreased gradually to c. 500 as some missiles and warheads haveprobably been expended in destructive tests.
h Strategic gravity bombs are assigned to B-2A bombers only. The maximum yield of strategic
bombs is 360 kt for the B61-7, 400 kt for the B61-11 and 1200 kt for the B83-1. However, all thesebombs, except the B61-11, have lower-yield options. Most B83-1s have been moved to the inactive
stockpile and B-2As rarely exercise with the bomb. The B61-12 was formally accepted into thestockpile in 2023 and assigned for use by B-2A bombers.
i Of the 800 ICBM warheads, only 400 were deployed on the missiles. The remaining war­heads were in central storage.
j Only 200 of these W78 warheads were deployed, as each ICBM has had its warhead load
reduced to carry a single warhead; all of the remaining warheads were in central storage.
k SIPRI estimates that another 340 W87 warheads might be in long-term storage outside thestockpile for use in the W87-1 warhead programme to replace the W78.
l The first figure is the total number of SSBNs in the US fleet; the second is the maximum
number of missiles that they can carry. However, although the 14 SSBNs can carry up to
280 missiles, 2 vessels are normally undergoing refuelling overhaul or long-term maintenanceat any given time and are not assigned missiles. The remaining 12 SSBNs can carry up to
240 missiles, but 1–2 of these vessels are usually undergoing maintenance at any given time andmay not be carrying missiles.
m Of the 1920 SLBM warheads, c. 970 were deployed on submarines as of Jan. 2024; all the rest
were in central storage. Although each D5 missile was counted under the 1991 Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START I) as carrying 8 warheads and the missile was initially flight-tested
with 14, the US Navy has reduced the warhead load of each missile to an average of 4–5 warheads.
D5 missiles equipped with the new low-yield W76-2 are estimated to carry only 1 warhead each.
n It is assumed here that all W76-0 warheads have been replaced by the W76-1.
o According to US military officials, the new low-yield W76-2 warhead will normally be
deployed on at least 2 of the SSBNs on patrol in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
p Of the 200 non-strategic bombs, c. 100 are thought to be deployed across 6 airbases in
5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, theNetherlands and Türkiye), although the weapons remain in the custody of the US Air Force. The
other c. 100 bombs were in central storage in the USA. Older B61 versions will be dismantled
once the B61-12 is deployed. The maximum yields of non-strategic bombs are 170 kt for the B61-3
and 50 kt for the B61-4. All have selective lower yields. The B61-10 was retired in 2016.
q Most sources list an unrefuelled ferry range of 2400 kilometres, but Lockheed Martin, which
produces the F-16, lists 3200 km.
r
These dual-capable aircraft are operated at airbases outside the USA by other members of
NATO.
s Up until 2018, the US government published the number of warheads dismantled each year,
but the administration of President Donald J. Trump ended this practice. The administrationof President Joe Biden temporarily restored transparency, but publication of the 2018, 2019and 2020 data showed that far fewer warheads had been dismantled than assumed (e.g. only

286 military spending and armaments, 2023
184 in 2020). Nonetheless, dismantlement of the warheads has continued, leaving an estimated1336 warheads in the dismantlement queue as of Jan. 2024.
t In addition to these intact warheads, more than 20 000 plutonium pits were stored at thePantex Plant, Texas, and perhaps 4000 uranium secondaries were stored at the Y-12 facility at
Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
Sources: US Department of Defense, various budget reports and plans, press releases anddocuments obtained under the Freedom of Information Act; US Department of Energy, various
budget reports and plans; US Air Force, US Navy and US Department of Energy, personalcommunication with officials; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ‘Nuclear notebook’, various
issues; and authors’ estimates.

world nuclear forces 287

II. Russian nuclear forceshans m. kristensen and matt korda*
As of January 2024 the Russian Federation maintained a military stockpile
of approximately 4380 nuclear warheads. About 2822 of these were strategic
warheads, of which roughly 1710 were deployed on land- and sea-based bal­
listic missiles and at bomber bases. Russia also possessed approxi­mately
1558 non-strategic (tactical) nuclear warheads, all of which are assessed to
be at central storage sites. Although the authors estimate that Russia had ahigher number of strategic warheads in January 2024 than in January 2023,
the estimated number of non-strategic warheads has been revised down­wards based on new assessments, resulting in a net overall decrease in the
Russian military stockpile of around 109 warheads compared with the esti­
mate for the previous year. As of January 2024 an additional 1200 retired
war­heads were awaiting dismantlement (200 fewer than the previous year’s
estimate, based on assumptions of the current rate of dismantlement), giving
Russia a total estimated inventory of approxi­mately 5580 nuclear warheads(see table 7.3, end of section).
These estimates are based on publicly available information about theRussian nuclear arsenal and assessments by the authors. Because of a lackof trans­parency, estimates and analysis of Russia’s nuclear weapon develop­
ments come with considerable uncertainty, particularly regarding thecoun­try’s sizable stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons. However, it
is possible to formulate a reasonable assessment of the progress of Russia’s
nuclear modernization by reviewing satellite imagery and other forms ofopen-source intelligence, official statements, industry publications and state
media interviews with Russian government officials.1
This section details Russia’s holdings of strategic and non-strategic airdelivered, land-based and sea-based nuclear weapons. Before doing so, it firstconsiders Russia’s compliance with its bilateral arms control obligations anddescribes the role played by nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine.
Russian compliance with New STARTIn February 2023 President Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s intention
to ‘suspend’ its participation in the last remaining bilateral strategic arms
control treaty between Russia and the United States, the 2010 Treaty on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive

1 Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Estimating world nuclear forces: An overview and assessment ofsources’, SIPRI Commentary, 14 June 2021.

* The authors wish to thank Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight for contributing invaluable
research to this publication.

288 military spending and armaments, 2023

Arms (New START).2 This treaty places a cap on the numbers of Russian and
US deployed strategic nuclear forces and allows for on-site inspections toverify compliance.3
Although Putin stated in 2023 that Russia planned to remain within thecentral limits set by New START, the decision to suspend treaty inspectionsindefinitely meant that the USA could not verify that Russia remained incompliance with its obligation to deploy no more than 1550 strategic war­heads.4 Nonetheless, the US assessed that Russia ‘likely did not exceed the
New START Treaty’s deployed warhead limit in 2023’.5
The last bilateral data exchanges under the treaty are from September 2022.
Russia declared that it had 1549 deployed warheads attributed to 540 stra­tegic launchers, thus remaining under the final warhead limits of New
START.6 Just as with the USA, many of Russia’s strategic delivery systems
carry fewer warheads than their maximum capacity in order to meet the New
START limits. If Russia chose to no longer comply with the treaty limits, orif the treaty were to expire without a follow-on agreement, Russia (like theUSA) could add reserve warheads to missiles and bombers and potentiallydouble its number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons.7
The role of nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine
Russia’s official deterrence policy, which was last updated in a decree in 2020,
lays out explicit conditions under which it could launch nuclear weapons:(a) the receipt of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking theterritory of Russia or its allies; (b) the use of nuclear weapons or other types
of weapon of mass destruction against Russia or its allies; (c) an attack against
Russia’s critical governmental or military sites, disruption of which would
undermine the nuclear forces; and (d) aggression against Russia with the useof conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.8
This formulation is largely consistent with previous public iterations of

2 President of Russia, ‘Presidential address to Federal Assembly’, 21 Feb. 2023.

3 For a summary and other details of New START see annex A, section III, in this volume. On related
developments in 2023 see chapter 8, section I, in this volume.
4 ‘Russia suspends START arms inspections over US travel curbs’, Reuters, 8 Aug. 2022; Atwood, K.
and Hansler, J., ‘Russia postpones nuclear arms control talks with US, State Department says’, CNN,
28 Nov. 2022; and US Department of State, ‘Report to Congress on implementation of the New START
Treaty’, Jan. 2024.
5 US Department of State (note 4), p. 6.
6 US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, ‘New START
Treaty aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms’, Fact sheet, 1 Sep. 2022.
7 Korda, M. and Kristensen, H., ‘If arms control collapses, US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals
could double in size’, FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 7 Feb. 2023. On
the negotiation of the renewal of New START see chapter 8, section I, in this volume.
8 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Basic principles of state policy of the Russian Federation on
nuclear deterrence’, Approved by Russian Presidential Executive Order no. 355, 2 June 2020.

world nuclear forces 289
Russian nuclear policy under President Putin, which also shied away from
no-first-use policies and negative security assurances.
The Russia–Ukraine war has raised questions about Russia’s nuclear doc­trine, and about where, when, how and under what conditions Russia mightuse nuclear weapons. Several speeches made by President Putin and senior
Russian officials and commentators alluding to the potential use of nuclear
weapons in the conflict have added to the uncertainty.9 For example, inJanuary 2023 Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and current
deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, stated in an interview that
‘defeat of a nuclear power in a conventional war may trigger a nuclear war’.
How­ever, use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine would appear to exceed theconditions in the 2020 decree because losing the war in Ukraine would notthreaten the existence of the Russian state.10
Strategic nuclear forces
As of January 2024 Russia had an estimated 2822 warheads assigned forpotential use by strategic launchers: heavy bombers, land-based inter­
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched bal­
listicmissiles (SLBMs). This is an increase of approximately 149 war­heads
com­pared with January 2023 due to fluctuations in the arsenal caused by
the deploy­ment of newer ICBMs with multiple independently targetablere-entry vehicles (MIRVs) as well as the introduction of a new nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).
Aircraft and air-delivered weapons
As of January 2024 the Long-Range Aviation command of the Russian Air
Force operated a fleet of approximately 67 operational heavy bombers, com­prising 15 Tu-160 (Blackjack) and 52 Tu-95MS (Bear) bombers.11 SIPRI
estimates that perhaps only 58 of these are counted as deployed under New
START. The maximum possible payload on the bombers is approximately
650 nuclear weapons; however, since some of the bombers were not fully
oper­ational, it is assumed here that Russia has not produced this many war­heads for its bomber force. SIPRI estimates that weapons exist only for the
deployed bomber force, giving a total of approximately 586 warheads. Around
200 of these weapons are probably stored at the two strategic bomber bases:
9 See e.g. President of Russia, ‘Address by the president of the Russian Federation’, 24 Feb. 2022;
President of Russia, ‘Address by the president of the Russian Federation’, 21 Sep. 2022; and ‘Russia can
defend new regions with nuclear weapons: Medvedev’, Al Jazeera, 22 Sep. 2022.
10 Faulconbridge, G. and Light, F., ‘Putin ally warns NATO of nuclear war if Russia is defeated in
Ukraine’, Reuters, 19 Jan. 2023.
11 For the missiles, aircraft and submarines discussed in this section, a designation in parentheses(e.g. Blackjack) following the Russian designation (e.g. Tu-160) is that assigned by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO).

290 military spending and armaments, 2023

Engels in Saratov oblast and Ukrainka in Amur oblast. Russia has historicallyhoused all its strategic bombers at these two bases, but commercial satellite
imagery revealed that Russia dispersed large numbers of bombers to its
Belaya (Irkutsk oblast) and Olenya (Murmansk oblast) airbases during 2023
after Ukraine attacked the Engels airbase in several drone strikes.12
Modernization of the bombers—which includes upgrades to their avionics
suites, engines and long-range nuclear and conventional cruise missiles—
continued throughout 2023 but remained subject to delays.13 Both the Tu-160
and the Tu-95 strategic bombers currently carry the Kh-55 (AS-15) airlaunched cruise missile (ALCM), but this is being replaced on the upgradedbombers by the new Kh-102 (AS-23B) ALCM. It seems likely that all of the
Tu-160s (including at least 10 brand-new Tu-160M2 bombers) and most of
the Tu-95s will eventually be upgraded to maintain a bomber force of per­haps 50–60 operational aircraft. These modernized bombers are intended
to be a temporary bridge to Russia’s next-generation bomber: the PAK-DA,
serial production of which is planned to begin in 2028–29.14 The PAK-DA will
also eventually replace all Tu-22M3M (Backfire-C) bombers deployed with
non-strategic forces (see below).15
During a visit by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to Russia’s Knevichi
airfield (near the city of Vladivostok) in September 2023, Russia revealed a
Tu-160 aircraft equipped with ‘novel’ Kh-BD cruise missiles, which could
be based upon the existing Kh-102. It is unclear, however, whether the new
missile had been deployed or whether it was still under development at theend of 2023.16
Land-based missiles
As of January 2024 the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)—the branch of
the Russian armed forces that controls land-based ICBMs—consisted of
12 missile divisions grouped into 3 armies, deploying an estimated 329 ICBMs

12 Tiwari, S., ‘After Tu-95 bomber, Russia’s Tu-22 M3 Backfire destroyed in Ukraine drone attack—reports’, Eurasian Times, 21 Aug. 2023.
13 President of Russia, ‘Meeting with workers of Gorbunov Kazan aviation factory and Tu-160M
pilots’, 25 Jan. 2018; Ignatyeva, L., ‘New Kazan strategic bombardier hits the sky’, Realnoe Vremya,
11 Jan. 2023; and President of Russia, ‘Заседание коллегии Министерства обороны’ [Ministry of
Defence Board meeting], 21 Dec. 2022.
14 ‘PAK DA demonstrational model to be ready by 2023—Source’, TASS, 2 Aug. 2021; ‘Russia
begins construction of the first PAK DA strategic bomber—Sources’, TASS, 26 May 2020; Lavrov, A.,
Kretsul, R. and Ramm, A., ‘ПАКетное соглашение: новейшему бомбардировщику назначили сроки
выхода в серию’ [PAKage agreement: The latest bomber assigned a deadline for production], Izvestia,
14 Jan. 2020; and ‘Russia tests engine for next-generation strategic missile-carrying bomber’, TASS,
31 Oct. 2022.
15 ‘Russia to test next-generation stealth strategic bomber’, TASS, 2 Aug. 2019.
16 Cook, E., ‘What is Kh-BD? Russian Tu-160 bombers armed with new long range missiles’,Newsweek, 19 Sep. 2023.

world nuclear forces 291
of different types and variations (see table 7.3).17 These ICBMs can carry amaximum of about 1244 warheads, but SIPRI estimates that they have had
their warhead load reduced to around 872 warheads to keep Russia below
the New START limit for deployed strategic warheads. These ICBMs carryapproximately half of Russia’s estimated 1710 deployed strategic warheads.
Russia is close to completing the replacement of Soviet-era ICBMs withnew types, although this process has taken much longer than expected. By
December 2023 around 88 per cent of the ICBM force had reportedly beenmodernized.18 The bulk of the modernization programme has focused on
the RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2), a MIRVed version of the RS-12M1/2 Topol-M(SS-27 Mod 1). SIPRI estimates that, as of January 2024, the number of
deployed RS-24s had risen to approximately 204 mobile- and silo-based
RS-24 missiles, including all six completed mobile divisions (at Barnaul,
Irkutsk, Nizhniy Tagil, Novosibirsk, Vypolzovo and Yoshkar-Ola).19 The
rearmament of all of these divisions means that, by the end of 2023, Russia’s
entire strategic mobile ICBM force had rearmed with post-Soviet era mis­siles.20
Deployment of silo-based RS-24s continues at Kozelsk, Kaluga oblast,with one regiment of 10 silos completed in 2018 and the second completed in2020.21 The third regiment began combat duty in December 2021 and SIPRI
estimates that four of its silos were loaded with missiles by the end of 2023.22
The 60 RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1) silos at Tatishchevo, Saratov oblast,
will also probably be upgraded to the RS-24.
Russia is in the final stages of rearming its first two regiments of the Sovietera RS-20V (SS-18 Mod 5 Satan) ICBM at Dombarovsky, Orenburg oblast,with RS-18 (SS-19 Mod 4) missiles equipped with the Avangard hypersonicglide vehicle (HGV) system. The first regiment completed its rearmament in
December 2021, while the second reportedly completed its rearmament in
December 2023, although satellite imagery indicated that construction had
not concluded by the end of the year.23
17 One of these ICBM divisions, the 8th Missile Division at Yurya, Kirov oblast, was being
modernized alongside the rest of the ICBM force; however, the division’s Sirena-M ICBMs are believedto serve as back-up launch code transmitters and therefore have not been armed with nuclear weapons.
18 Karakaev, S. V. , interviewed in Krasnaya Zvezda, ‘Стратегическая мощь России крепнет’ [Russia’s
strategic power is growing], Dzen News, 16 Dec. 2023.
19 Karakaev (note 18); and authors’ estimates.
20 Karakaev (note 18); and authors’ estimates.
21 ‘Два полка РВСН в 2021 году будут перевооружены на ракетные комплексы “Ярс”’ [Two regimentsof the Strategic Rocket Forces will be re-equipped with ‘Yars’ missile systems in 2021], TASS, 21 Dec.
2020; Karakaev, S. V., interviewed in Biryulin, R., Andreev, D. and Reznik, A., ‘Ядерный щит России
по-прежнему надёжен’ [Russia’s nuclear shield is still reliable], Krasnaya Zvezda, 16 Dec. 2022; andauthors’ assessment based on analysis of satellite imagery.
22 Karakaev, S. V., interviewed in Biryulin, R. and Andreev, D., ‘Бесспорный аргумент России’[Russia’s indisputable argument], Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 Dec. 2021; and authors’ estimates.
23 President of Russia, ‘Expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board’, 21 Dec. 2021; Karakaev(note 18); and authors’ estimates.

292 military spending and armaments, 2023

Russia has also been developing a new ‘heavy’ liquid-fuelled, silo-based
ICBM, known as the RS-28 Sarmat (SS-29), as an additional replacement for
the RS-20V. Russia is believed to have flight-tested the RS-28 only twice: inApril 2022 and in February 2023, with the latter probably being a failed test.24
Nevertheless, satellite imagery and official statements from 2023 suggest that
the RS-28 is rapidly approaching deployment.25 The first division to receive
RS-28 ICBMs will be the ICBM division at Uzhur, Krasnoyarsk krai.26 Satellite
imagery indicates that one regiment’s older RS-20Vs have already been
removed to prepare for the incoming RS-28 ICBMs and that construction for
at least four silos had been completed by the end of 2023, although it was
unclear whether any RS-28 ICBMs had been loaded into those silos.
Several new ICBM programmes, as well as various HGVs that could be
fitted on modified ICBMs, appear to be in the early stages of develop­ment.
These follow-on programmes reportedly include the ‘Yars-M’ (a MIRVcapable ICBM that uses a parallel-staging rocket booster con­figur­ation),the ‘Osina-RV’ (a modernized version of the RS-24) and the ‘Kedr’ (a nextgeneration system intended to replace the RS-24).27
In December 2023 Russia announced plans to conduct seven ICBM flighttests in 2024. However, given that in recent years Russia has launchedsignificantly fewer ICBMs than planned, it may not meet this target.28
Sea-based missiles
As of January 2024 the Russian Navy had a fleet of 12 nuclear-armed SSBNs,
made up of 5 Soviet-era Delfin-class or Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) SSBNs
and 7 Borei-class or Project 955/955A (Dolgorukiy) SSBNs. A few of these arein overhaul at any given time and not considered fully operational.
Russia plans to replace the 5 remaining Delfin-class SSBNs with new
Borei-A (or Project 955A) SSBNs. It probably aims to have a total of 12 Boreiclass SSBNs. Half will be assigned to the Northern Fleet (in the Arctic Ocean)

24 President of Russia, ‘Test launch of Sarmat ICBM’, 20 Apr. 2022; and Liebermann, O. andBertrand., N., ‘US believes Russia had failed intercontinental ballistic missile test around when Biden
was in Ukraine’, CNN, 22 Feb. 2023.
25 Korda, M. and Kristensen, H., ‘Upgrade underway for Russian silos to receive new Sarmat ICBM’,FAS Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 19 Oct. 2023; Минобороны России
(@mod_russia), Telegram, 7 Oct. 2023, <https://t.me/mod_russia/31220>; and ‘First Sarmat ICBMs
regiment to go on combat duty in December 2023–Source’, TASS, 19 Nov. 2023.
26 Karakaev (note 21).
27 Karakaev (note 18); MilitaryRussia.Ru (@militaryrussia.ru), Telegram, 15 May 2023, <https://t.me/
militaryrussiaru/5673> and <https://t.me/militaryrussiaru/5674>; Ryabkov, K., ‘«Ярс-М» и«Осина-РВ». Направления развития стратегического ракетного комплекса’ [‘Yars-M’ and ‘Osina-RV’.
Dir­ections of strategic missile complex], TopWar, 18 May 2023; M51.4ever (@M51_4ever), X, 20 Nov.
2023, <https://twitter.com/M51_4ever/status/1725181990062719000>; and Richard, C. A., Com­
mander, US Strategic Command, Statement before the US House of Representatives, Armed Services
Com­mittee on Strategic Forces, 1 Mar. 2022.
28 Karakaev (note 18).

world nuclear forces 293
and the other half to the Pacific Fleet.29 After years of delays due to technicalissues, over the past four years Russia has delivered new Borei-A SSBNs to thenavy at an average rate of one per year. One new Borei-A SSBN—Imperator
Alexandr III (also known as Emperor Alexander III)—was delivered to thenavy in 2023, with the remainder scheduled for delivery in the late 2020s or
early 2030s.30 A new design concept for a follow-on SSBN, known as ‘Arktur’or ‘Arcturus’, was unveiled in 2022. The new SSBN would be smaller thanthe current Borei class, have a reduced number of ballistic missiles and, if thedesign is approved, begin replacing the Borei SSBNs in the late 2030s.31
Each of the 12 operational SSBNs can be equipped with 16 ballistic missiles
and the Russian SSBN fleet can carry up to 992 warheads.32 However, one or
two SSBNs are normally undergoing repairs and maintenance at any given
time and are not armed. It is also possible that the warhead load on somemissiles has been reduced to meet the total warhead limit under New START.
As a result, SIPRI estimates that about 640 of the 992 warheads are deployed.
The Delfin SSBNs are thought to carry RSM-54 SLBMs, either the Sineva(SS-N-23 M2) or a modified version, known as Layner (SS-N-23 M3), while
the Borei and Borei-A SSBNs carry newer RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32) SLBMs.
In 2023 the Russian Navy continued to develop the Poseidon or Status-6(Kan­yon), a long-range, strategic nuclear-powered torpedo intended for
deploy­ment on two new types of special-purpose sub­marine: the K-329 Bel­go­rod or Project 09852, which is a converted Antei-class or Project 949A
(Oscar II) nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine (SSGN); and the
Khabar­ovsk or Project 09851.33 The Poseidon system was reportedly tested
twice in 2023.34

29 ‘Sevmash shipyard ready to continue construction of Borei-A nuclear subs—CEO’, TASS, 16 Mar.
2023.
30 Russian Federation, ‘Ceremony for raising naval flags on nuclear-powered submarines Emperor
Alexander III and Krasnoyarsk’, 11 Dec. 2023; and Sevmash, ‘На Севмаше заложили атомные подводные
крейсеры «Дмитрий Донской» и «Князь Потемкин»’ [Nuclear-powered submarine cruisers ‘Dmitry
Donskoy’ and ‘Prince Potemkin’ laid down at Sevmash], 23 Aug. 2021.
31 ‘Атомную подлодку “Арктур” оснастят новым оружием, сообщило КБ “Рубин”’ [The nuclear
submarine ‘Arktur’ will be equipped with new weapons, said CB ‘Rubin’], RIA Novosti, 16 Aug. 2022;
and Safranov, S., ‘В конструкторском бюро назвали сроки появления в ВМФ новых атомных подлодок’[The design bureau announced the timing of the appearance of new nuclear submarines in the Navy],
RIA Novosti, 21 June 2023.
32 The Delfin-class SSBNs carry RSM-54 Sineva/Layner (SS-N-23 M2/3) SLBMs, while the Borei
and Borei-A SSBNs carry RSM-56 Bulava (SS‑N-32) SLBMs. Each RSM-54 can carry up to 4 warheads,
while each RSM-56 can carry up to 6 warheads. It is assumed that each RSM-56 has had its warhead
load reduced to 4 warheads, to meet New START limits.
33 Sutton, H. I., ‘Khabarovsk-class-submarine’, Covert Shores, 20 Nov. 2020; and Sutton, H. I.,‘Poseidon torpedo’, Covert Shores, 22 Feb. 2019.
34 ‘АПЛ “Белгород” завершила бросковые испытания макета торпеды “Посейдон”’ [The design
bureau announced the timing of the appearance of the navy’s new nuclear submarines], TASS, 9 Jan.
2023; and Cook, E., ‘Russia successfully tests secret nuclear-powered “Poseidon” torpedo’, Newsweek,
10 June 2023.

294 military spending and armaments, 2023

The official handover of the Belgorod to the Russian fleet took place in July
2022.35 The Khabarovsk appeared to be in the final stages of construction at
the Sevmash shipyard at the end of 2023.36 One additional special-purposesub­marine is scheduled for delivery by 2027, for a total of at least three sub­marines, each capable of carrying up to six Poseidon torpedoes.37 How­ever,
the weapon system is unlikely to be operational for several years.38 Russia
is upgrading warhead storage facilities at the Pacific Fleet submarine basein Kamchatka krai, which will house at least two of the special-purpose
submarines and their Poseidon weapon systems.39
Non-strategic nuclear forces
Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons chiefly serve to compensate forperceived conventional inferiority relative to North Atlantic Treaty Organ­
ization (NATO) forces; to provide regional (as opposed to inter­continental)
deterrence options; and to maintain overall parity with the total US nuclear
force level.40 There has been considerable debate among Western officials andexperts about the role that non-strategic nuclear weapons have in Russian
nuclear strategy, including potential first use.41
The US Defense Intelligence Agency estimated in 2021 that Russia had
1000–2000 non-strategic warheads; this estimate was repeated in a US State
Department report to the US Congress in May 2023.42 SIPRI estimates that,35 ‘Shipbuilders deliver special-purpose sub with nuclear-powered drones to Russian Navy’, TASS,
8 July 2022.
36 ‘Submarine force armed with Poseidon torpedoes to come into operation in Kamchatka in 2025’,
TASS, 3 Apr. 2023.
37 ‘First batch of nuclear-armed drones Poseidon manufactured for special-purpose sub Belgorod’,
TASS, 16 Jan. 2023.
38 ‘Вторую подлодку-носитель “Посейдонов” планируют спустить на воду весной–летом 2021 года’[Second ‘Poseidon’ carrier submarine to be launched in spring–summer 2021], TASS, 6 Nov. 2020.
39 ‘Base for Poseidon nuclear super-torpedoes to go on stream in Kamchatka next year—Source’,
TASS, 27 Mar. 2023; and authors’ assessment based on analysis of satellite imagery.
40 There is no universally accepted definition of ‘tactical’, ‘non-strategic’ or ‘theatre’ nuclear
weapons. These terms generally refer to shorter-range weapons that are not covered by arms control
agreements regulating long-range strategic forces.
41 On this debate see e.g. US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (DOD: Washing­
ton, DC, Feb. 2018), p. 30; Kofman, M. and Fink, A. L., ‘Escalation management and nuclear employment
in Russian military strategy’, War on the Rocks, 23 June 2020; Oliker, O., ‘Moscow’s nuclear enigma:
What is Russia’s arsenal really for?’, Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2018; Stowe-Thurston, A., Korda, M.
and Kristensen, H. M., ‘Putin deepens confusion about Russian nuclear policy’, Russia Matters,
Harvard Kennedy School, 25 Oct. 2018; Tertrais, B., ‘Russia’s nuclear policy: Worrying for the wrong
reasons’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 2 (Apr. 2018); Ven Bruusgaard, K., ‘The myth of Russia’s lowered nuclear
threshold’, War on the Rocks, 22 Sep. 2017; and Kaushal, S. and Cranny-Evans, S., ‘Russia’s nonstrategic
nuclear weapons and its views on limited nuclear war’, Royal United Services Institute, 21 June 2022.
42 Berrier, S., Director, US Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Worldwide threat assessment’, Statement
for the record, US Senate, Armed Services Committee, 26 Apr. 2021; and US Department of State,‘Report to the Senate on the status of tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear weapons negotiations pursuant
to subparagraph (A)(12)(b) of the Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the New
START Treaty’, May 2023.

world nuclear forces 295
as of January 2024, Russia had nearly 1560 warheads assigned for potential
use by non-strategic forces—a lower estimate than for January 2023 as aresult of a revised assessment by the authors based on modified assumptions.
However, this new estimate still comes with a high degree of uncertainty.
Most Russian delivery systems for non-strategic nuclear weapons are dualcapable, meaning that they can also deliver conventional warheads. They areintended for use by ships and submarines, aircraft, air- and missile-defence
systems, and in army missiles.
Nuclear weapon sharing with Belarus
Russia and Belarus made numerous claims in 2023 about the deploy­mentof non-strategic nuclear weapons to Bela­rus. President Putin announced in
March that Russia had re-equipped 10 Belarusian Su-25 (Frogfoot) air­craftwith the ability to deliver nuclear weapons and had transferred dual-capable,
road-mobile 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26) short-range ballistic mis­siles
(SRBMs) to Bela­rus.43 Training of Russian launch crews was apparently com­pleted by April, and in late December 2023 Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko stated that Russia had completed its shipments of nuclear
weapons to Bela­rus.44 Belarusian railway workers claimed during the latter
half of 2023 that ‘Russian tactical nuclear weapons and related equip­ment’had entered Bela­rus through multiple transfers.45
Despite these official statements and some possible open-source indicators,
there remain several unknowns relating to the status of this deployment.
While open sources and satellite imagery imply that these warheads could be
stored at a new high-security depot near Asipovichy, Mahilyou oblast, there
was no conclusive visual evidence as of January 2024 that Russian nuclear
warheads and related personnel were deployed in Belarus.
Navy weapons
The Russian navy is estimated to have over 780 warheads assigned for use
by land-attack cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-submarine
rockets, depth bombs, and torpedoes delivered by surface ships, sub­marinesand naval aviation. Recent upgrades include the dual-capable long-range,land-attack Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), also known as the43 ‘Интервью Владимира Путина Павлу Зарубину’ [Interview with Vladimir Putin to Pavel Zarubin],Smotrim, 25 Mar. 2023.
44 ASTRA (@astrapress), Telegram, 4 Apr. 2023, <https://t.me/astrapress/24412>; and ‘Belarus
leader says Russian nuclear weapons shipments are completed, raising concern in the region’, AP,
25 Dec. 2023.
45 Community of Railway Workers of Belarus, ‘Очередной этап ввоза в Беларусь компонентов
российского тактического ядерного оружия и связанного с ним оборудования’ [The next stage of theimport of components of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and related equipment to Belarus], 12 Sep.
2023; and Community of Railway Workers of Belarus, ‘Порядок ввоза российского ядерного оружия вБеларусь’ [The procedure for the import of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus], 27 June 2023.

296 military spending and armaments, 2023

3M14 (SS-N-30A), and the dual-capable 3M55 (SS-N-26) SLCM.46 Thesemissiles are replacing Soviet-era missiles and being integrated on numerous
types of surface ship and attack submarine.47 Among these vessels is the new
Project 855/855M Yasen/Yasen-M (Severodvinsk) SSGN, of which four boats
are currently operational after the latest—named Krasnoyarsk—was com­missioned in December 2023. Five more are under construction. The first ofthese—named Arkhangelsk—left the Sevmash shipyard in November 2023
to prepare for its launch and sea trials.48 Russia is reportedly consider­ing
build­ing three add­itional Project 855M SSGNs, although this has not been
officially confirmed.49
Air force weapons
Over 330 non-strategic nuclear weapons are estimated to be assigned to
the Russian Air Force for use by Tu-22M3M intermediate-range bombers,
Su-24M (Fencer-D) fighter-bombers, Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers
and MiG-31K (Foxhound) attack aircraft.50 The new Su-57 (Felon) com­bat
aircraft is also dual-capable. Deliveries of the Su-57 to the air force con­tinued
in 2023, with 22 aircraft scheduled for delivery by the end of 2024.51
The MiG-31K is equipped with the new dual-capable 9A-7760 Kinzhal
air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). In 2022 it was oper­ational with
the Southern Military District and Northern Fleet and will eventu­
ally
be inte­grated into the Western and Central Military Districts by 2024.52

46 There is considerable confusion about the designation of what is commonly referred to as the
Kalibr missile. The Kalibr name does not refer to a specific missile but to a launcher for a familyof weapons that, in addition to the 3M14 (SS-N-30/A) land-attack versions, includes the 3M54
(SS-N-27) anti-ship cruise missile and the 91R anti-submarine missile. For further detail see US Navy,
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition (ONI: Washington, DC,
Dec. 2015), pp. 34–35.
47 It is important to caution that although a growing number of vessels can launch the dual-capable
3M14, it is uncertain how many of them have been assigned a nuclear role.
48 MilitaryRussia.Ru (@DnKornev), X, 24 Jan. 2024, <https://twitter.com/DnKornev/status/
1750366578200178964>.
49 Kornev, D., ‘Спрос с «Ясеня»: что даст флоту строительство новых атомных подлодок’ [Demand
from ‘Yasen’: What the construction of new nuclear submarines will give the fleet], Izvestia, 26 Nov.
2023; and ‘Источник сообщил, что число АПЛ семейства “Ясень” доведут до 12’ [According to a source,
the number of nuclear submarines of the Yasen family will be increased to 12], TASS, 18 Nov. 2023.
50 US Department of Defense, ‘US nuclear deterrence policy’, 1 Apr. 2019, p. 3; International Institutefor Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021 (Routledge: London, 2021); and authors’ estimates. It is
possible that the Su-30SM is also capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
51 D’Urso, S., ‘First serial production Su-57 Felon delivered to the Russian Aerospace Forces’, The
Aviationist, 30 Dec. 2020; Rob Lee (@RALee85), Twitter, 3 Feb. 2022, <https://twitter.com/RALee85/
status/1489302156729593869>; and United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), ‘ОАК передала Минобороны
очередную партию серийных самолётов пятого поколения Су-57’ [UAC handed over another batch offifth-generation Su-57s to the Defence Ministry], 28 Dec. 2022.
52 President of Russia (note 23); ‘Russia’s upgraded MiG-31 fighters to provide security for Northern
Sea Route’, TASS, 26 Nov. 2021; and Kretsul, R. and Cherepanova, A., ‘Прибавить гиперзвук: еще одинвоенный округ вооружат «Кинжалами»’ [Hypersonic boost: Another military district to be armed with‘daggers’], Izvestia, 7 June 2021.

world nuclear forces 297
Conventional Kinzhals have been used against Ukraine.53 Presi­dent Putinannounced in February 2023 that Russia would accelerate mass productionof the Kinzhal.54
Russia is also fielding the dual-capable Kh-32 (AS-4A) air-to-surface mis­sile, an upgrade of the Kh-22N (AS-4), for use on the Tu-22M3.55
Air-, coastal- and missile-defence weapons
Russian air-, coastal- and missile-defence forces are estimated to havebeen assigned around 345 nuclear warheads, although this estimate comeswith a high degree of uncertainty. Most have been assigned for use by dualcapable S-300 (SA-20) and S-400 (SA-21) air-defence forces and the Moscow
A-135 missile-defence system. Russian coastal-defence units are believed tohave been assigned a small number of nuclear weapons for anti-ship missions.
In 2023 a US State Department assessment suggested that Russia continued
to use non-strategic nuclear warheads for ‘anti-aircraft’ and ‘anti-ballistic
missile systems’.56
It is likely that the stock of warheads associated with Russia’s air-,coastal- and missile-defence forces will eventually decrease as con­ventional
air-defences improve—including the Nudol and Aerostat systems underdevelop­ment in 2023—and as legacy warheads are retired.
Army weapons
The Russian Army has an estimated 95 warheads to arm dual-capable 9K720
Iskander-M SRBMs and 9M729 (SSC-8) ground-launched cruise missiles(GLCMs). As of January 2024 the Iskander-M had completely replaced the
Tochka (SS-21) SRBM in 12 missile brigades.57 The 9M728 (SSC-7) may also
have a nuclear capability.
The dual-capable 9M729 GLCM was cited by the USA as its main reason
for withdrawing from the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediaterange and Shorter-range Missiles (INF Treaty) in 2019.58 SIPRI estimatesthat four or five 9M729 battalions have so far been co-deployed with four orfive of the Iskander-M brigades.

53 ‘Shoigu reveals Kinzhal hypersonic missile was used three times during special operation’, TASS,
21 Aug. 2022.
54 ‘Russia to continue mass production of Kinzhal hypersonic systems—Putin’, TASS, 22 Feb. 2023.
55 US Department of Defense (note 41), p. 8.
56 US Department of State (note 42).
57 Authors’ assessment based on analysis of satellite imagery and Russian reports.
58 US Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, ‘INF Treaty
at a glance’, Fact sheet, 8 Dec. 2017. For a summary and other details of the INF Treaty see annex A,
section III, in this volume. See also Topychkanov, P. and Davis, I., ‘Russian–US nuclear arms control
and disarmament’, SIPRI Yearbook 2020; and Kile, S. N., ‘Russian–US nuclear arms control anddisarmament’, SIPRI Yearbook 2018.

298 military spending and armaments, 2023

Table 7.3. Russian nuclear forces, January 2024
All figures are approximate and some are based on assessments by the authors.
Type/
Russian designation(NATO designation)

No. ofYear first Range
launchers deployed (km) a

Warheads x yieldNo. ofwarheads b

Strategic nuclear forces590

2 822 cAircraft (bombers)

67 d

586 e

Tu-95MS/M(Bear-H) f

52

1984/
2015

Tu-160M1/M2(Blackjack)

15

1987/
2021

Land-based missiles (ICBMs)

329

RS-20V Voevoda(SS-18 Mod 5 Satan)
Avangard (SS-19 Mod 4) k
RS-12M1 Topol-M(SS-27 Mod 1/mobile)
RS-12M2 Topol-M(SS-27 Mod 1/silo)
RS-24 Yars
(SS-27 Mod 2/mobile)
RS-24 Yars
(SS-27 Mod 2/silo)
RS-28 Sarmat (SS-29)
Sirena-M m

    6 500– 6–14 x 200 kt Kh-55 430 g     10 500 (AS-15A) or Kh-102(AS-23B) ALCMs
10 500– 12 x 200 kt Kh-55 or 156 h
13 200Kh-102 ALCMs,[Kh-BD], bombs
1 244 i

34

1988

10
18

10 x 500–800 kt j

340

2019
2006

  11 000–     15 000
  10 000
1 x HGV
  10 500
1 x [800 kt]

60

1997

  10 500

1 x [800 kt]

60

180

2010

  10 500[4 x 250 kt] l

720

24

2014

  10 500

4 x [250 kt]

96

..
3

[2024]
2022>10 000–[10 x 500 kt]
Command andcontrol module––   9 000

4 x 100 kt q

320 r

>8 050[6 x 100 kt] s

672

Sea-based missiles (SLBMs) 12/192 n
RSM-54 Sineva/Layner(SS-N-23 M2/3) p
RSM-56 Bulava(SS-N-32)

5/80
7/112

10
18

992 o
2007/
2014
2012

1 558 tNon-strategic nuclear forces
Navy weapons

..

784

Submarines/surface
ships/naval aircraft..

Land-attack cruise missiles, sea-launched 784
cruise missiles, anti-submarine weapons,surface-to-air missiles, depth bombs,
torpedoes u

Air force weapons289

Tu-22M3M (Backfire-C)
Su-24M/M2 (Fencer-D)
Su-34 (Fullback)Su-57 (Felon)
MiG-31K (Foxhound)

57
68
122
18
24

334
1974
1974
2006
[2024]
2018

..
..
..
..
..

2 x ASMs
2 x bombs
2 x bombs[bombs, ASMs]
1 x ALBM

114
68 v
122 v
18
12

world nuclear forces 299
Type/
Russian designation(NATO designation)

No. ofYear first Range
launchers deployed (km) a

Air, coastal and missile
defence882

53T6 (SH-08 Gazelle)
S-300/400 (SA-20/21)

68
750 w

3M55/P-800 Oniks(SS-N-26 Strobile),
3K55/K300-P Bastion(SSC-5 Stooge)
SPU-35V Redut(SSC-1B Sepal)
Army weapons

170

9K720 Iskander-M(SS-26 Stone),
9M728 Iskander-K(SSC-7 Southpaw)
9M729 (SSC-8 Screwdriver)

Warheads x yieldNo. ofwarheads b
345         30..

1 x 10 kt
1 x low kt

68
250

56

1986
1992/
2007
2015

     >400

1 x [10–100 kt]

23

8x

1973

       500

1 x 350 kt

4

150

2005

       500

1 x [10–100 kt]

75 y

20

2016

    2 350

1 x [10–100 kt]

20 z

95

Total stockpile

4 380

Deployed strategic warheads

1 710

Reserve warheads
Strategic
Non-strategic

2 670
1 112
1 558

Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement

1 200

Total inventory

5 580. . = not available or not applicable; – = nil or a negligible value; [ ] = uncertain SIPRI estimate;
ALBM = air-launched ballistic missile; ALCM = air-launched cruise missile; ASM = air-to-surface
missile; HGV = hypersonic glide vehicle; kt = kiloton; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile;
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.
a For aircraft, the listed range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary

according to flight profile, weapon payload and in-flight refuelling.
b These figures show the total number of warheads estimated to be assigned to nuclearcapable delivery systems. Only some of these warheads have been deployed on missiles and at
airbases, as described in the notes below.
c Of these strategic warheads, c. 1710 were deployed on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles
and at bomber bases. The remaining warheads were in central storage. This number differsfrom the number of deployed strategic warheads counted by the 2010 Russian–United States
Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (NewSTART) because the treaty attributes 1 weapon to each deployed bomber, even though bombers
do not carry weapons under normal circumstances. Additionally, the treaty does not countweapons stored at bomber bases and, at any given time, some nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs) are not fully loaded with warheads and are thus not counted under thetreaty. Russia no longer publishes aggregate figures for strategic nuclear forces limited by New
START.
d All of Russia’s long-range strategic bombers are nuclear-capable. Of these, only c. 58 arethought to be counted as deployed under New START. Because of ongoing bomber modern­ization, there is considerable uncertainty about how many bombers are operational.

300 military spending and armaments, 2023
e The maximum possible payload on the bombers is estimated to be c. 650 nuclear weapons

but, given that only some of the bombers are fully operational, SIPRI estimates that onlyc. 580 weapons have been assigned to the long-range bomber force. Of these, c. 200 might be
deployed and stored at the 2 strategic bomber bases. The remaining weapons are thought to bein central storage facilities.
f The 1991 Russian–US Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) distinguished between
2 variants of the Tu-95MS: the Tu-95MS6 (Bear-H6), which can carry 6 ALCMs internally, andthe Tu-95MS16 (Bear-H16), which can carry an additional 10 ALCMs on wing pylons for a totalof 16 ALCMs. However, it is unclear whether the MS16 configuration is still in use or whether
the external pylons have been removed, which would effectively turn the MS16s into MS6s. The
Tu-95MS is being upgraded to the Tu-95MSM. The upgrade adds 4 pylons, allowing the aircraft
to carry 8 Kh-101/102 (AS-23A/B) missiles externally as well as, potentially, 6 Kh-55 (AS-15B)
missiles internally, for a total of 14 ALCMs.
g This estimate assumes that c. 20 of the Tu-95MS aircraft have been upgraded and together
can carry up to 280 warheads (see note f ), while c. 25 Tu-95MS6s can carry up to 150 warheads.
It also assumes that 7 aircraft are in overhaul either for maintenance or for modernization.
h This estimate assumes that 2 Tu-160 (Blackjack) aircraft are in overhaul either for mainten­
ance or for modernization; the remaining 13 can carry up to 156 warheads.
i These ICBMs can carry a total of c. 1244 warheads, but SIPRI estimates that they have had
their warhead load reduced to c. 872 warheads, with the remaining warheads in storage.
j It is possible that, as of Jan. 2024, the RS-20Vs (SS-18 Mod 5 Satan) carried only 5 warheads
each to meet the New START limit for deployed strategic warheads.
k The missile uses a modified RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) ICBM booster with an HGV payload.
l It is possible that, as of Jan. 2024, the RS-24s (SS-27 Mod 2) carried only 3 warheads each tomeet the New START limit on deployed strategic warheads.
m The division at Yurya is equipped with the new Sirena-M nuclear command and control
missile, which is based on the RS-24 ICBM. The missiles are not nuclear-armed, but rather serveas an emergency launch communication module. They are included in this table because theirlaunchers are counted against the limits permitted under New START.
n The first figure is the total number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
in the Russian fleet; the second is the maximum number of missiles that they can carry. Of
Russia’s 12 operational SSBNs (as of Jan. 2024), 1–2 are in overhaul at any given time and do notcarry their assigned nuclear missiles and warheads (see note o).
o The warhead load on SLBMs is thought to have been reduced for Russia to stay below the
New START warhead limit. Additionally, at any given time, 1–2 SSBNs are in overhaul and do
not carry nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is estimated here that only c. 640 of the 992 SLBM
warheads have been deployed.
p The current version of the RSM-54 SLBM might be the Layner (SS-N-23 M3), a modificationof the previous version—the Sineva (SS-N-23 M2). However, the US Air Force’s National Air andSpace Intelligence Center (NASIC) did not include the Layner in its 2020 report on ballistic andcruise missile threats, and there is some uncertainty regarding its status and capability.
q In 2006 US intelligence estimated that the RSM-54 missile could carry up to 10 warheads,
but it lowered the estimate to 4 in 2009. The average number of warheads carried on each missile
has probably been limited to 4 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) tomeet the New START limits.
r SIPRI estimates that, at any given time, only 256 of these warheads are deployed on
4 operational Delfin-class (Delta IV) submarines, with the fifth boat in overhaul. The actual
number may even be lower as 2 boats often undergo maintenance at the same time.
s It is possible that, as of Jan. 2024, RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32) SLBMs carried only 4 warheads
each for Russia to meet the New START limit on deployed strategic warheads.
t According to the Russian government, non-strategic nuclear warheads are not deployedwith their delivery systems but are kept in storage facilities. Some storage facilities are near
operational bases. It is possible that there are more unreported nuclear-capable non-strategic
systems.

world nuclear forces 301
u Only submarines are assumed to be assigned nuclear torpedoes.

v This estimate assumes that half of the aircraft have a nuclear role.

w As of Jan. 2024 there were at least 80 S-300/400 (SA-20/21) sites across Russia, each withan average of 12 launchers, each with 2–4 interceptors. Each launcher has several reloads, which
are assumed likely to be conventional.
x It is assumed that all SPU-35V Redut (SSC-1B Sepal) units, except for a single silo-based
version in Crimea, had been replaced by the K-300P Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge) by Jan. 2024.
y This estimate assumes that around half of the dual-capable launchers have a secondary
nuclear role. In its 2020 report, NASIC listed the 9M728 (SSC-7 Southpaw) as ‘Conventional,
Nuclear Possible’.
z This estimate assumes that there are 5 9M729 (SSC-8 Screwdriver) battalions, each of whichis equipped with 4 launchers. Since each launcher appears to be equipped to carry 4 missiles,
this would indicate a total of 80 missiles per battalion (possibly 160 if each battalion has 1 reload
missile). However, it is assumed here that each launcher is only assigned an average of 1 nuclear
warhead (with the rest being equipped with conventional munitions), for a total of 20 warheads
across 5 battalions.
Sources: Russian Ministry of Defence, various press releases; US Department of State, START
Treaty Memoranda of Understanding, 1990–July 2009; New START aggregate data releases,
various years; US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic
and Cruise Missile Threat 2020 (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2020); US
Department of Defense (DOD), 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America(DOD: Washington, DC, Oct. 2022); US Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 (DOD: Washington, DC, Mar. 2020); DOD,
various Congressional testimonies; BBC Monitoring; Russian news media; Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces website; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance,various years; Cochran, T. B. et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 4, Soviet Nuclear Weapons(Harper & Row: New York, 1989); IHS Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, various issues; US
Naval Institute, Proceedings, various issues; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ‘Nuclear notebook’,
various issues; and authors’ estimates.

302 military spending and armaments, 2023

III. British nuclear forceshans m. kristensen and matt korda*
As of January 2024 the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapon stockpile consistedof approximately 225 warheads (see table 7.4, end of section)—an unchanged
estimate from the previous year. SIPRI assesses that around 120 of these areoperationally available for delivery by Trident II D5 submarine-launchedballistic missiles (SLBMs), with about 40 being carried on a nuclear-poweredballistic missile submarine (SSBN) that is on patrol at all times. The UK is
expected to increase the number of warheads it possesses in the coming
years.
These estimates are based on open-source information on the British
nuclear arsenal and conversations with British officials. The UK has generally
been more transparent about its nuclear activities than many other nucleararmed states. However, it has never declassified the history of its stockpile or
the actual number of warheads it possesses, and in 2021 it declared that it will
no longer publicly disclose figures for the country’s operational stock­pile,
deployed warheads or deployed missiles.1
This section briefly outlines the role played by nuclear weapons in the UK’s
military doctrine and then describes its sea-based missiles and its nuclear
weapon modernization programme.
The role of nuclear weapons in British military doctrine
In 2023 the British government published a ‘refresh’ of its Integrated Review
of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy that it had previously
published in 2021. The document included much of the same nuclearrelated language as its predecessor, noting that the UK’s negative security
assur­ance ‘remains unchanged’, and that the UK ‘would consider using . . .
nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including
the defence of [North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)] Allies’.2 Despite
this language, the UK has also stated that it remains ‘deliberately ambiguous
about precisely when, how and at what scale [it] would contemplate the1 British Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security,
Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, CP 403 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office: London, Mar. 2021),
pp. 76–77. On the challenges of collecting information on world nuclear forces more generally see
Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Estimating world nuclear forces: An overview and assessment ofsources’, SIPRI Commentary, 14 June 2021.
2 British Government, CP 403 (note 1), p. 76; and British Government, Integrated Review Refresh
2023: Responding to a More Contested and Volatile World, CP 811 (His Majesty’s Stationery Office:London, Mar. 2023), p. 33.

* The authors wish to thank Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight for contributing invaluable
research to this publication.

world nuclear forces 303
use of nuclear weapons’.3 A promised Defence Nuclear Strategy to further
flesh out a recapitalization strategy for the UK’s ‘defence nuclear enterprise’,
which is ‘collectively responsible for the development, build, maintenanceand . . . delivery’ of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, had not been published by theend of 2023.4
Like the United States, the UK operates its submarines with detargetedmis­siles, although it would take only moments to load the targeting coordin­
ates. Unlike US SSBNs, which can launch in minutes, the UK says that its
sub­marines ‘are at several days’ notice to fire’.5
Sea-based missiles
The UK is the only nuclear-armed state that operates a single type of nuclear
weapon: the country’s nuclear deterrent is entirely sea-based. The UK pos­sesses four Vanguard-class SSBNs, based at Faslane on the west coast of
Scot­land, each of which can carry up to 16 Trident II D5 submarine-launchedbal­listic missiles. In a posture known as continuous at-sea deterrence (CASD),
which began in 1969, one British SSBN carrying approximately 40 war­heads
is on patrol at all times.6 The second and third SSBNs remain in port but could
be put to sea in a crisis. The fourth is in overhaul at any given time and isunable to deploy.
In the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and For­eign Policy, the British government announced a significant increase to theupper limit of its nuclear weapon stockpile, to a maximum of 260 warheads.7
Previously, the goal had been to reach 180 warheads by the mid 2020s, as
described in the UK’s strategic defence and security reviews (SDSRs) of 2010
and 2015.8 British officials clarified in 2021 that the target of 180 war­heads
stated in the SDSRs ‘was indeed a goal, but it was never reached’.9 Instead,in its statement submitted to the 10th Review Conference of the 1968 Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in 2022, the British
3 10th NPT Review Conference, National report of the United Kingdom, NPT/CONF.2020/33,
5 Nov. 2021, para. 13.
4 British Government, CP 811 (note 2), p. 34.
5 British Ministry of Defence, ‘The UK’s nuclear deterrent: What you need to know’, 17 Feb. 2022.
6 British Ministry of Defence, ‘UK’s nuclear deterrent (CASD)’, 17 Mar. 2021.
7 British Government, CP 403 (note 1), p. 76. For further detail see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M.,‘British nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp. 371–72.
8 British Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence andSecurity Review, Cm 7948 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office: London, Oct. 2010), p. 38; and British
Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure andProsperous United Kingdom, Cm 9161 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office: London, 2015), p. 34. See also
Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘United Kingdom nuclear weapons, 2021’, Nuclear notebook, Bulletinof the Atomic Scientists, vol. 77, no. 3 (May 2021).
9 Aidan Liddle (@AidanLiddle)Twitter, 16 Mar. 2021, <https://twitter.com/aidanliddle/status/
1371912132141445120>. This information was also later confirmed by other officials. British officials,
Interviews with the authors, May 2021.

304 military spending and armaments, 2023

government stated that the new and higher number of 260 warheads ‘is aceiling, not a target, and it is not our current stockpile number’.10 While it isexpected that the British nuclear stockpile will eventually increase in size,
SIPRI assesses that there had been no change in the stockpile number as ofJanuary 2024.
Replacement of the submarines
The UK’s four Vanguard-class SSBNs entered service between December
1994 and February 2001, each with an expected service life of 25 years.11
The 2015 SDSR stated the government’s intention to replace the Vanguardclass submarines with four new SSBNs, known as the Dreadnought class.12
Construction of the third submarine, HMS Warspite, began in February
2023.13
The new submarines were originally expected to begin entering service by
2028, but this has been delayed until the early 2030s at the earliest. Reports
from 2023 suggest that the production of key components, including thereactor cores, is several years behind schedule and significantly over-budget.14
The service life of the Vanguard-class SSBNs has been com­mensur­ately
extended to an overall lifespan of about 37–38 years.15 The work to upgrade
the ageing SSBNs has also been subject to significant delays and budget over­runs. For example, the UK’s lead SSBN, HMS Vanguard, completed its refit
in May 2023 and remained in sea trials at the end of the year.16 The cost of
the Vanguard upgrade rose from an initial projection of about £200 million(US$307 million) in 2015 to more than £500 million ($688 million) in 2021,
and the refit took 89 months, which was 6 months longer than it took to build
the sub­marine.17 The next SSBN to begin a planned refit—HMS Victorious—
arrived in port in June 2023.18
The delay in the Vanguard upgrade meant that the UK’s three other SSBNs
had to extend their deterrence patrols. The length of time at sea for British
nuclear submarines has reportedly increased from about 60–70 days in the
10 10th NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2020/33 (note 3), para. 22.

11 Mills, C., Replacing the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: Progress of the Dreadnought Class,
Research Briefing no. 8010 (House of Commons Library: London, 3 May 2023), p. 10.
12 British government, Cm 9161 (note 8), para. 4.73.
13 Mills (note 11), p. 5.
14 UK National Audit Office (NAO), The Equipment Plan 2023-2033: Ministry of Defence (NAO:
London, 4 Dec. 2023), pp. 8, 17, 38; and Nuclear Information Service, ‘Increasing risk of problems in
Derby delaying Dreadnought schedule’, 7 Aug. 2023.
15 Mills (note 11), p. 10.
16 Nuclear Information Service, ‘HMS Vanguard leaves Devonport after 7 years of maintenance’,
7 July 2023.
17 British Ministry of Defence, ‘British jobs secured through upgrade to nuclear deterrent’, 4 Dec.
2015; and ‘HMS Vanguard finally sails from Devonport after more than 7 years’, Navy Lookout, 10 May
2023.
18 Royal Navy, ‘HMS Victorious arrives in Plymouth for major refit in boost to 1,000 local jobs’,
26 June 2023.

world nuclear forces 305
1970s to 150–200 days in recent years; in September 2023 one of the UK’s
SSBNs reportedly returned from a 195-day patrol.19 These extended patrols
were potentially factors contributing to several operating errors, accidents
and personnel issues that have dogged the UK’s nuclear forces in recent
years.20 In the latest incident in November 2023, a faulty depth gauge report­
edly misled the SSBN’s crew into thinking that the submarine was level when
it was still diving, nearly triggering a catastrophic accident.21
The missiles and warhead
Given that the UK draws its SLBMs from a common pool shared with theUSA, the UK is benefiting from the US Navy’s programme to extend theservice life of the Trident II D5 missile. The first and second life-extended
versions are known as the D5LE and the D5LE2, respectively; the D5LE
will function until the early 2060s and the D5LE2 until the mid 2080s (seesection I of this chapter).22
The warhead carried on the Trident II D5 is called the Holbrook, which is
produced by the UK but thought to be based closely on the USA’s W76 warhead
design. It is being incorporated into the more effective USA-produced Mk4A
re-entry body (aeroshell).23 It is possible that sufficient Mk4A-upgraded
warheads had been produced by the end of 2021 to arm the UK’s Vanguardclass SSBNs; however, the full upgrade has not yet been completed.24
In 2020 the British government announced its intention to replace
the Holbrook with a new warhead that will use the Mk7 aeroshell being
developed for the USA’s new W93 warhead (see section I).25 According to the
British Ministry of Defence (MOD), the replacement warhead is ‘not exactly

19 Sabbagh, D. and Edwards, R., ‘Safety fears as UK Trident submarines are put to sea for longestever patrols’, The Guardian, 6 Dec. 2022; and ‘Royal Navy nuclear deterrent submarines conducting
increasingly long patrols’, Navy Lookout, 22 Sep. 2023.
20 For further detail see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘British nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook
2023, p. 277.
21 Starkey, J., ‘Deep trouble: Major malfunction on Royal Navy nuclear submarine plunges warship
into “danger zone” almost crushing 140 crew to death’, The Sun, 19 Nov. 2023; and Beale, J., ‘Nucleararmed submarine suffered malfunction’, BBC, 20 Nov. 2023.
22 Mills (note 11), p. 11.
23 For detail on how the upgrade improves the weapon’s capability see Cullen, D., Extreme
Circumstances: The UK’s New Nuclear Warhead in Context (Nuclear Information Service: Reading, Aug.
2022).
24 NukewatchUK, ‘Warhead convoy movements summary 2021’, 2021; and British Ministry of
Defence, ‘The United Kingdom’s future nuclear deterrent: 2022 update to Parliament’, 8 Mar. 2023.
25 Wallace, B., British Secretary of State for Defence, ‘Nuclear deterrent’, Written statement
HCWS125, British House of Commons, 25 Feb. 2020; and Wolfe, J., Director of US Strategic Systems
Programs, ‘FY2022 budget request for nuclear forces and atomic energy defense activities’, Statement
before the US Senate, Armed Forces Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 12 May 2021,
pp. 6–7. For further detail see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘British nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook
2021, pp. 360–61.

306 military spending and armaments, 2023

the same warhead [as the W93] but . . . there is a very close connection, in
design terms and production terms’.26
Although the future of the W93 programme is being debated in the USA,
British officials stated in 2021 that the UK’s warhead-replacement pro­­­gramme
would move forward regardless of the status of the USA’s W93 pro­­gramme.27
In both the UK and the USA, the decision to introduce new war­heads isthought to stem from strong internal political pressure to enhance nuclear
infra­structure and capabilities.28 In 2022 the warhead-replacement pro­gramme entered into the ‘concept’ stage of development—the first of six
MOD acquisition stages.29
The UK has not issued an official cost estimate or timeline for its pro­gramme, but it is likely that the new warhead will come into service some­time in the late 2030s or early 2040s.30

26 Lovegrove, S., Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Statement, British House of Commons,
Defence Committee, Oral evidence: MOD annual report and accounts 2019–20, HC 1051, 8 Dec. 2020,
Q31.
27 Mehta, A., ‘UK official: American warhead decision won’t impact British nuclear plans’, Defense
News, 13 Apr. 2021.
28 Cullen (note 23), p. 6.
29 British Ministry of Defence (note 24).
30 Cullen (note 23), p. 4.

world nuclear forces 307
Table 7.4. British nuclear forces, January 2024
All figures are approximate and some are based on assessments by the authors.
Type/designation
Sea-based missiles(SLBMs)Trident II D5

No. oflaunchers

Year first
deployed

Range
(km)

Warheads x yield

4/64 a48 b

No. ofwarheads
120

1994>10 000 c

1–8 x 100 kt d

120

Total operationally available warheads

120 e

Other stored warheads

105 f

Total stockpile

225 g

kt = kiloton; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.
a The first figure is the total number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
in the British fleet; the second is the maximum number of missiles that they can carry. However,
the total number of missiles carried is lower (see note b). Of the 4 SSBNs, 1 is in overhaul at any
given time.
b The 3 operational SSBNs can carry a total of 48 Trident SLBMs. The United Kingdom haspurchased the right to 58 missiles from a pool shared with the United States Navy.
c The Trident II D5 missiles on British SSBNs are identical to the Trident II D5 missiles on US
Navy SSBNs, which have demonstrated a range of more than 10 000 kilometres in test flights.
d The British warhead is called the Holbrook, a modified version of the USA’s W76 warhead,with a potential lower-yield option.
e Of the 120 operationally available warheads, c. 40 are deployed on the single SSBN that is at
sea at any given time, with the remaining warheads assigned to the 2 other deployable SSBNs.
f This figure includes retired warheads that have not yet been dismantled. It seems likely thatthey will be reconstituted to become part of the UK’s total stockpile over the coming years (seenote g). Many of the stored warheads that have not been retired are thought to be undergoing
upgrade from the Mk4 re-entry body to the Mk4A.
g The British government declared in 2010 that its inventory would not exceed 225 warheads,
and that the UK would reduce the number of warheads in its overall nuclear stockpile to no morethan 180. Despite these stated intentions, the UK’s nuclear stockpile appears to have remained
at c. 225 warheads. The UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign
Policy, published in 2021, introduced a new ceiling of 260 warheads.

Sources: British Ministry of Defence, white papers, press releases and website; British House ofCommons, Hansard, various issues; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ‘Nuclear notebook’, various
issues; and authors’ estimates.

308 military spending and armaments, 2023

IV. French nuclear forceshans m. kristensen and matt korda*
As of January 2024 France’s nuclear weapon stockpile consisted of about
290 warheads, the same number as in January 2023. The warheads are allo­cated for delivery by 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
and approximately 50 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) produced forland- and carrier-based aircraft (see table 7.5, end of section). However, the10 warheads assigned to France’s carrier-based aircraft are thought to be kept
in central storage and are not normally deployed.
The estimate of France’s nuclear weapon stockpile is based on publicly
available information.1 France is relatively transparent about many of its
nuclear weapon activities and has in the past publicly disclosed the size of its
stockpile and details of its nuclear-related operations.2
This section begins by outlining the role played by nuclear weapons inFrance’s military doctrine. It then assesses France’s nuclear modern­izationpro­­grammes and describes its air-delivered and sea-based weapons.
The role of nuclear weapons in French military doctrine
France has stated that its nuclear weapons remain de-targeted during
peace­time and are not postured against any particular country, but rather
are intended to be used against ‘any State’ in support of an ‘all-azimuths’
con­cept of nuclear deterrence.3 France considers all of its nuclear weapons
to be strategic and reserved for the defence of France’s ‘vital interests’.4 Its
vital interests include ‘the integrity of [its] . . . territory and the pro­tection of[its] . . . population’ but ‘cannot be restricted to the national scope, because
France does not conceive its defence strategy in isolation, even in the nuclear
field’.5 This was highlighted in 2020 when President Emmanuel Macron
invited France’s European Union partners to a ‘strategic dialogue . . . on
the role played by France’s nuclear deterrence in our collective security’.6
How­ever, the suggestion of a European dimension of nuclear deterrence iscontro­versial because it remains unclear how such a mission would interact
1 Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Estimating world nuclear forces: An overview and assessment ofsources’, SIPRI Commentary, 14 June 2021.
2 See e.g. Macron, E., French President, Speech on defence and deterrence strategy, École de Guerre,
Paris, 7 Feb. 2020 (in French, with English translation).
3 Macron (note 2); French Government, Defense and National Security Strategic Review 2017
(French Government: Paris, 2017); and Tertrais, B., French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces and Future:
A Handbook, Recherches & Documents no. 04/2020 (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique: Paris,
Feb. 2020), pp. 15–16.
4 Tertrais (note 3) pp. 25–29, 62–63.
5 French Government (note 3), p. 52.
6 Macron (note 2), p. 10.

* The authors wish to thank Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight for contributing invaluable
research to this publication.

world nuclear forces 309
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s existing nuclear sharing prac­
tices. An advisor to Macron clarified in 2022 that the proposal for European
strategic dialogue remained on the table but was about connecting ‘nuclear
deterrence and European interests’ and not about ‘sharing the deterrent’.7
Other than a statement in October 2022 that France’s ‘vital interests . . .
would not be at stake if there was a nuclear ballistic attack in Ukraine or in
the region’, France is deliberately ambiguous about the circumstances underwhich it would use its nuclear weapons.8 In January 2023 France’s Chief ofStaff of the Armed Forces, General Thierry Burkhard, stated that France’s
doctrine ‘is neither that of no first use nor that of sole purpose’—the conceptthat the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter only nuclear weapon use
by other countries—and that French deterrence ‘does not revolve around thenotion of threshold, because this would allow our adversaries to consciously
manoeuvre around it and circumvent our deterrence “from the bottom up”’.9
France reserves the right to issue ‘a sole, one-time-only nuclear warning’,
suggest­ing that it could use a nuclear weapon against a symbolic target asa signal to a potential adversary.10 Although France’s doctrine includes this‘nuclear warning’ as a potential precursor to the general use of nuclear
weapons, its long-standing policy is that it ‘will never engage into a nuclear
battle or any forms of graduated response’.11 Rather, French doctrine appears
to emphasize the deterrence value of delivering massive retaliation in theform of a single strike.12
Aircraft and air-delivered weapons
The airborne component of the French nuclear forces consists of land- andcarrier-based aircraft. The French Air and Space Force has 40 deployed
nuclear-capable Rafale B aircraft based at Saint-Dizier Airbase in north-east
France. The French Naval Nuclear Air Force (Force aéronavale nucléaire,FANu) consists of a squadron of 10 Rafale M aircraft for deployment on theair­craft carrier Charles de Gaulle. The FANu and its nuclear-armed missiles
are not permanently onboard the carrier but can be rapidly deployed by the
7 Schuller, K., ‘Nukleare Abschreckung: Frankreich erneuert das Angebot, mit der EU über Atom­
waffen zu reden’ [France renews offer to talk to EU about nuclear weapons], Frankfurter Allgemeine,
14 Jan. 2022.
8 ‘Avec Emmanuel Macron’ [With Emmanuel Macron], L’événement, France 2, 12 Oct. 2022 (authortranslation). On France’s policy of ambiguity see e.g. 10th NPT Review Conference, National report ofFrance, NPT/CONF.2020/42/Rev.1, 1 Aug. 2022, p. 3.
9 Burkhard, T., Statement before the Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces, French
National Assembly, 11 Jan. 2023 (in French).
10 10th NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2020/42/Rev.1 (note 8), p. 4.
11 Macron (note 2), p. 10.
12 Tertrais, B., ‘“Destruction assurée”: The origins and development of French nuclear strategy,
1945–1981’, ed. H. D. Sokolski, Getting Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins andPractice (US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, PA, 2004), p. 66.

310 military spending and armaments, 2023

French president in support of nuclear operations.13 In 2023 France began
to upgrade its Rafale aircraft to the new F4 standard; the full upgrade isscheduled to be complete by 2025.14
The Rafale aircraft are equipped with medium-range air-to-surface cruise
missiles (air–sol moyenne portée–améliorée, ASMPA), which are currently
being refurbished.15 In March 2022 France conducted a second successful
flight test of the new version, the air–sol moyenne portée–amélioré rénové
(ASMPA-R). It subsequently approved the start of serial production of themissiles and midlife refurbishment of the upgraded missile inventory, which
will keep the ASMPA in service until 2035.16 The ASMPA-R missiles werescheduled to enter into service in October 2023 but this may have been
delayed until 2024.17 The missiles are equipped with the same warhead as the
ASMPA, the tête nucléaire aéroportée (TNA, air-launched nuclear warhead),which the missile’s producer (MBDA) says has a ‘medium energy’ yield.18
A fourth-generation air-to-surface nuclear missile (air–sol nucléaire
de 4e génération, ASN4G) is being developed with enhanced stealth andmanoeuvrability to counter potential technological improvements in air
defences.19 The ASN4G is scheduled to reach initial operational capability
in 2035 to replace the ASMPA-R and will be initially carried by the nextgeneration Rafale F5 before being integrated onto a future replacement
aircraft for the Rafale.20

13 Pintat, X. et al., ‘Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, dela défense et des forces armées par le groupe de travail “La modernisation de la dissuasion nucléaire”’[Information report made on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Armed
Forces by the working group ‘Modernization of nuclear deterrence’], Report no. 560, French Senate,
23 May 2017.
14 Mille, S. and Bellanger, J., Statements before the Committee on National Defence and the Armed
Forces, French National Assembly, 25 Jan. 2023 (in French); Hoyle, C., ‘“Now fight connected”: Why
F4-standard Rafale is a game-changer for France’, FlightGlobal, 19 June 2023; and Machi, V., ‘France
receives first new Rafale fighter jet after four-year pause’, Defense News, 11 Jan. 2023.
15 For further detail see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘French nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook
2021, p. 366.
16 Mills, C., Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: France, Research Briefing no. 9074 (House of Commons
Library: London, 28 July 2022), p. 10; and Scott, R., ‘Successful flight test of upgraded ASMPA missile
paves way for refurbishment’, Janes, 30 Mar. 2022.
17 Mille and Bellanger (note 14); and Air and Space Force (@Armee_de_lair), X, 26 Jan. 2024,<https://twitter.com/Armee_de_lair/status/1750839921529507871>.
18 MBDA, ‘ASMPA: Air-to-ground missile, medium range, enhanced’, Jan. 2015.
19 French Ministry of the Armed Forces, ‘La dissuasion nucléaire’ [Nuclear deterrence], Actu
Défense, 14 June 2018, p. 1; and Tran, P., ‘France studies nuclear missile replacement’, Defense News,
29 Nov. 2014.
20 Mille and Bellanger (note 14); and Medeiros, J., ‘“Faire FAS” : 55 ans de dissuasion nucléaire
aéroportée’ [‘Go FAS’: 55 years of airborne nuclear deterrence], Air Actualités, Oct. 2019, p. 36.

world nuclear forces 311
Sea-based missiles
The main component of France’s nuclear forces is the Strategic Oceanic
Force (Force océanique stratégique, FOST). It consists of four Le Triomphantclass nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs, or sous-marins
nucléaires lanceurs d’engins, SNLEs) based on the Île Longue peninsula near
Brest, north-west France. Each can carry 16 SLBMs. France has 48 SLBMs inservice—enough to equip the three operational SSBNs. The fourth SSBN isout of service for overhaul and maintenance work and is therefore not armed.
The French Navy maintains a continuous at-sea deterrence posture with
one SSBN on patrol at all times. In March 2022 there were reports that the
French Navy tested deploying more than one SSBN for the first time since the1980s, possibly in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.21
France’s SLBM, the M51, is undergoing a series of upgrades. The missile isequipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs)
and the first version, the M51.1, can carry up to six 100-kiloton TN 75 war­heads. The second version, the M51.2, is armed with a new warhead, the têtenucléaire océanique (TNO, sea-based nuclear warhead), which is assumed
to have a yield of 100 kt.22 In April 2023 one of France’s submarines—
Le Terrible—tested an M51 SLBM following a lengthy period in overhaul,probably indicating the completion of its upgrade to the M51.2 standard.23
Based on recent statements from French officials, SIPRI estimates that only
one of France’s four SSBNs, Le Vigilant, has yet to be upgraded to carry theM51.2 SLBM and its accompanying TNO warhead.24 To allow for targeting
flexi­bility, some of the SLBMs carried by France’s SSBNs carry fewer war­heads than others.25 France has also commenced design work on anotherupgrade, the M51.3, which is intended to have improved accuracy. France

21 Jézéquel, S., ‘Pourquoi la France a-t-elle fait appareiller trois sous-marins nucléaires au départ
de l’Ile-Longue?’ [Why did France sail three nuclear submarines from Île-Longue?], Le Télégramme,
21 Mar. 2022.
22 Groizeleau, V., ‘Dissuasion : 25 milliards en cinq ans pour le renouvellement des deux composantes’[Deterrence: 25 billion in five years for the renewal of the two components], Mer et Marine, 2 Oct.
2019; and Groizeleau, V., ‘Dissuasion : F. Hollande détaille sa vision et l’arsenal français’ [Deterrence:
F. Hollande outlines his vision and the French arsenal], Mer et Marine, 20 Feb. 2015.
23 Belhamiti, M., ‘Avis fait au nom de la commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées surle projet de loi de finances pour 2024, Tome VII, Défense: Équipement des forces—Dissuasion’ [Noticeon behalf of the Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces on the Draft Finance Bill for
2024, vol. VII, Defence: Equipment of the forces—Deterrence’, no. 1680, French National Assembly,
26 Oct. 2023.
24 Salvetti, V., Director of Military Applications at the French Alternative Energies and Atomic
Energy Commission (CEA), and Jacq, F., General Administrator of the CEA, Statements before theCommittee on National Defence and the Armed Forces, French National Assembly, 18 Jan. 2023 (inFrench).
25 Tertrais (note 3), p. 57.

312 military spending and armaments, 2023

conducted its first test launch of the M51.3 in November 2023; the missile isdue to be operational in 2025.26
A production programme for a third-generation SSBN, designated the
SNLE 3G, was officially launched in early 2021.27 The SNLE 3G will eventually
be equipped with a further modification of the M51 SLBM, the M51.4.28 The
construction of the first of four submarines in the class was scheduled to startin 2023, but work had not begun by the end of the year.29 The first submarine
is expected to be completed by 2035 and the other three submarines will bedelivered on a schedule of one boat every five years.30

26 Sébastien Lecornu (@SebLecornu), X, 18 Nov. 2023, <https://twitter.com/seblecornu/status/
1725964236780621950>. See also French Ministry of the Armed Forces, ‘Missiles balistiques
stratégiques (MSBS)’ [Strategic ballistic missiles], 28 Jan. 2020; and Parly, F., French Minister of theArmed Forces, Speech (in French), ArianeGroup, Les Mureaux, 14 Dec. 2017.
27 French Ministry of the Armed Forces, ‘Florence Parly, ministre des armées, annonce le lancement
en réalisation des sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins de 3e génération (SNLE 3G)’ [Florence
Parly, minister of the armed forces, announces the launch of the 3rd-generation nuclear-poweredballistic missile submarines (SNLE 3G)], 19 Feb. 2021; and Mackenzie, C., ‘France to begin building new
ballistic missile subs’, Defense News, 22 Feb. 2021.
28 Tertrais (note 3), pp. 56, 60, 65.
29 ‘La première tôle des futurs sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins sera découpée fin 2023’, La
Presse de la Manche, 18 Feb. 2023.
30 French Ministry of the Armed Forces (note 27); Groizeleau, ‘Dissuasion : 25 milliards en cinq ans’(note 22); and Mackenzie (note 27).

world nuclear forces 313
Table 7.5. French nuclear forces, January 2024
All figures are approximate and some are based on assessments by the authors.
Type/designation

No. oflaunchers

Year first
deployed

Range(km) aWarheads x yieldNo. ofwarheads

40

2010–112 000

1 x [<300 kt] TNAc

40

10

2010–112 000

1 x [<300 kt] TNAc

10 dLand-based aircraft
Rafale BF3/4 b
Carrier-based aircraft
Rafale MF3/4 b

Sea-based missiles 4/64 e(SLBMs)
M51.1
M51.2 f
M51.3 hTotal stockpile

16
32
–

240
2010
2016
[2025]>6 000>9 000 g>[9 000]

4–6 x 100 kt TN 7580
4–6 x 100 kt TNO
160[up to 6] x 100 kt TNO –290 i– = nil or a negligible value; [ ] = uncertain SIPRI estimate; kt = kiloton; SLBM = submarinelaunched ballistic missile; TNA = tête nucléaire aéroportée (air-launched nuclear warhead); TNO= tête nucléaire océanique (sea-based nuclear warhead).
a For aircraft, the listed range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary

according to flight profile, weapon payload and in-flight refuelling.
b The Rafale B and M aircraft both carry the ASMPA (air–sol moyenne portée–améliorée)
air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). Most sources report that the ASMPA has a range of
500–600 kilo­metres, although some suggest that it might be over 600 km. In 2023 France began
to upgrade its Rafale BF3 and MF3 aircraft to the new F4 standard; the full upgrade is scheduled
to be complete by 2025.
c There is uncertainty as to the yield of the new TNA warhead. Some non-official sources
continue to attribute a yield of 300 kt to the TNA, the same yield as the previous TN81 warhead
carried by the original ASMP missile. However, MBDA, the manufacturer of the ASMPA missilethat carries the TNA, has stated that the warhead has a ‘medium energy’ yield, which is thought
to imply less than 300 kt. The TNA also appears to be based on the same design as the TNO,
which is believed to have a yield of 100 kt. In the absence of official or consistent authoritative
sources, these numbers should be treated as uncertain estimates.
d The 10 warheads assigned to France’s carrier-based aircraft are thought to be kept in central
storage and are not normally deployed.
e The first figure is the total number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
in the French fleet; the second is the maximum number of missiles that they can carry. However,
the total number of missiles carried is lower. Of the 4 SSBNs, 1 is in overhaul at any given time.
France has 48 SLBMs in service—enough to equip the 3 operational SSBNs.
f SIPRI estimates that 1 SSBN—Le Vigilant—has yet to be upgraded to carry the M51.2 SLBM
and its accompanying TNO warhead.
g The M51.2 has a ‘much greater range’ than the 6000-km range of the M51.1 according to the
French Ministry of the Armed Forces.
h The M51.3 is under development and has not yet been deployed.
i In Feb. 2020 President Emmanuel Macron reaffirmed that the arsenal ‘is currently under
300 nuclear weapons’. A few of the warheads are thought to be undergoing maintenance andinspection at any given time.
Sources: Speeches (in French) of French presidents and defence ministers: Macron, E., Speech
on defence and deterrence strategy, École de Guerre, Paris, 7 Feb. 2020; Parly, F., French Ministerof the Armed Forces, Speech, ArianeGroup, Les Mureaux, 14 Dec. 2017; Hollande, F., Speech on
nuclear deterrence, Istres Airbase, 19 Feb. 2015; Sarkozy, N., Speech on the new defence policy,
Porte de Versailles, 17 June 2008; Sarkozy, N., Speech on the white paper on national defence

314 military spending and armaments, 2023
and security, nuclear deterrence and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Cherbourg,
21 Mar. 2008; and Chirac, J., Speech on France’s defence policy, Île Longue, Brest, 19 Jan. 2006.
Other sources: French Ministry of Defence/Ministry of the Armed Forces, various publications;
French National Assembly, various defence bills; Air Actualités, various issues; Aviation
Week & Space Technology, various issues; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ‘Nuclear Notebook’,
various issues; Tertrais, B., French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces and Future: A Handbook,
Recherches & Documents no. 04/2020 (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique: Paris, Feb.
2020); and authors’ estimates.

world nuclear forces 315

V. Chinese nuclear forceshans m. kristensen and matt korda*
As of January 2024 China maintained an estimated total stockpile of about
500 nuclear warheads. This is around 90 more than SIPRI’s estimate for theprevious year—although an estimated 60 warheads are probably assigned tolaunchers that are still in production. China’s warheads are assigned to its
operational land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and to nuclear-configured
aircraft (see table 7.6, end of section). Although the Chinese nuclear stockpile
is projected to continue growing over the coming decade and the numberof Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is likely to reachor even exceed the numbers held by either the Russian Federation or theUnited States, China’s overall nuclear warhead stockpile is still expected toremain smaller than those states’ stockpiles. It has long been assumed that
China stores its nuclear war­heads separately from its deployed launchers
during peacetime. How­ever, the country’s recent moves towards placing
solid-fuelled mis­siles in silos, con­ducting sea-based deterrence patrols and,potentially, developing a launch-on-warning (LOW) capability suggest that
China might have started mating a small number of its warheads (possibly
around 24, corres­pond­ing to one missile brigade and one fully loaded ballistic
missile submarine) with their launchers.
SIPRI’s estimate of 500 warheads relies on publicly available informationon the Chinese nuclear arsenal.1 Since China has never declared the size of
its nuclear arsenal, many of the assessments here rely on data from the US
Depart­ment of Defense (DOD) and must therefore be treated with caution.
For example, in its 2023 report to the US Congress on Chinese mili­tary
and security developments, the US DOD projected that China might field astock­pile of roughly 1000 warheads by 2030.2 This projection relies, how­ever, on several assumptions about China’s future force posture and pluto­
nium pro­duction; it remains to be seen how accurate they are.3 Notabledevelop­ments in 2023 included significant construction at China’s nuclear
test site at Lop Nur, as well as the completion and operation of China’s new

1 Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Estimating world nuclear forces: An overview and assessment ofsources’, SIPRI Commentary, 14 June 2021.
2 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina 2023, Annual Report to Congress (Office of the Secretary of Defense: Washington, DC, 19 Oct.
2023), p. 104.
3 Sokolski, H. D. (ed.), China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?, Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center (NPEC) Occasional Paper no. 2102 (NPEC: Arlington, VA, Mar. 2021).

* The authors wish to thank Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight for contributing invaluable
research to this publication.

316 military spending and armaments, 2023

CFR-600 fast-breeder reactors with Russian fuel assistance, which could be
used to increase China’s plutonium stocks.4
This section summarizes the role played by nuclear weapons in China’s
mili­tary doctrine and then describes the air-delivered, land-based and seabased nuclear weapons that constitute the three legs of China’s nascentnuclear triad.
The role of nuclear weapons in Chinese military doctrine
The Chinese government’s declared aim is to maintain China’s nuclear
capabil­ities at the minimum level required to safeguard national security,with the goal of ‘deterring other countries from using or threatening to use
nuclear weapons against China’.5 China has long maintained a policy of notusing or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed
states or nuclear weapon-free zones.6
The dramatic changes in China’s nuclear posture, especially its deploymentof quick-launch solid-fuelled missiles in silos and the possible developmentof a LOW capability, have triggered widespread discussions about longstand­ing elements of Chinese nuclear doctrine, including its stated nuclear‘no-first-use’ (NFU) policy.7 Since 2022 the US DOD has assessed that China
is implementing an ‘early warning counterstrike’ strategy—akin to a LOW
posture—using ground- and space-based sensors to enable rapid launch ofmis­siles before an adversary can destroy them.8 According to the US DOD,
China has deployed at least three early-warning satellites to facilitate thisposture.9
Despite the continuing increase in the sophistication and size of China’s
nuclear arsenal—and the absence of an explicit affirmation of an NFU policy
in China’s September 2023 proposal for ‘Reform and Development of Global
Governance’—there is no official public evidence that the Chinese govern­
ment has deviated from its long-standing core nuclear policies, including its

4 Lewis, J., ‘Nuclear test sites are too damn busy’, Arms Control Wonk, 23 Sep. 2023; Babiarz, R.,‘Satellite imagery of the Lop Nur site’, New York Times, 20 Dec. 2023; Kobayashi, Y., ‘China’s fast breeder
reactor operating? Possibility of accelerating nuclear arms race’, SPF China Observer, 30 Nov. 2023;
and Zhang, H., ‘China started operation of its first CFR-600 breeder reactor’, IPFM Blog, International
Panel on Fissile Materials, 15 Dec. 2023.
5 Chinese State Council, China’s National Defense in the New Era (Information Office of the StateCouncil: Beijing, July 2019), chapter 2.
6 ‘China reiterates non-first-use principle of nuclear weapons’, Xinhua, 18 Feb. 2018; and US
Department of Defense (note 2), p. 105.
7 See. e.g. Havrén, S. A., ‘China’s no first use of nuclear weapons policy: Change or false alarm?’, Royal
United Services Institute (RUSI), 13 Oct. 2023; and Kulacki, G., ‘Would China use nuclear weapons firstin a war with the United States?’, The Diplomat, 27 Apr. 2020.
8 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 112.
9 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 112.

world nuclear forces 317
NFU policy.10 Additionally, in its 2023 report the US DOD stated that China‘seems to believe a LOW posture is consistent with its no first use policy’.11
The Chinese nuclear posture has traditionally involved procedures forload­ing warheads on to launchers in a crisis, but with warheads, missiles
and launchers kept separate during peacetime.12 However, according to the
US DOD’s 2023 report, China’s ballistic missile submarines conduct ‘nearcontinuous at-sea deterrence patrols’ and a small number of land-based
missile units conduct ‘combat readiness duty’ and ‘high alert duty’ drills,
which ‘apparently includes assigning a missile battalion to be ready to launchand rotating to standby positions as much as monthly for unspecified periodsof time’.13 The US DOD also noted that this readiness posture allows thePeople’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force (PLARF) ‘to maintain a portionof its units on a heightened state of readiness while leaving the other portionin peacetime status with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads’,
suggesting that a few of China’s warheads are deployed on launchers.14
Aircraft and air-delivered weapons
From the 1960s to 2017 some of China’s medium-range Hong-6 or H-6 (B-6)
bombers probably served an inactive back-up contingency nuclear mission.15
In 2018, how­ever, the US DOD reported that the PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
was ‘newly re-assigned a nuclear mission’.16 The H-6N (B-6N), first fieldedin 2020, is apparently China’s ‘first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable
bomber’.17 In addition, the PLAAF has been developing its first long-range
strategic bomber, the H-20 (B-20), with an anticipated range of more than
10 000 kilo­metres, a stealthy design and dual-capability—that is, able todeliver both conventional and nuclear weapons.18

10 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Proposal of the People’s Republic of China on the Reform andDevelopment of Global Governance, 13 Sep. 2023.
11 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 112.
12 Stokes, M. A., China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System (Project 2049 Institute:
Arlington, VA, 12 Mar. 2010), p. 8; Li, B., ‘China’s potential to contribute to multilateral nuclear
disarmament’, Arms Control Today, vol. 41, no. 2 (Mar. 2011); and US Department of Defense, Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, Annual Report to Congress(Office of the Secretary of Defense: Washington, DC, 29 Nov. 2022), p. 95.
13 US Department of Defense (note 2), pp. 106, 108.
14 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 106.
15 For the aircraft, missiles and submarines discussed here, a designation in parentheses (in thiscase B-6) following the Chinese designation (in this case H-6) is that assigned by the USA.
16 US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina 2018, Annual Report to Congress (Office of the Secretary of Defense: Washington, DC, 16 May
2018), p. 75.
17 US Department of Defense (note 2), pp. 62–63.
18 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 92; and US Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretaryof Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 (US Department of Defense:
Washington, DC, Mar. 2020), figure 1.1, p. 3.

318 military spending and armaments, 2023

To arm the H-6N, China has been developing two new air-launched bal­
listic missiles (ALBMs), one of which is assessed by the USA to be potentiallynuclear-capable.19 The US DOD stated in its 2023 report that the PLAAF’s
oper­ational airborne nuclear capability was still ‘developing tactics and pro­cedures’ to conduct the nuclear mission and noted that this capability gave
China a ‘nascent nuclear triad’.20 SIPRI estimates that, as of January 2024,
around 20 nuclear warheads were assigned to PLAAF aircraft.
Land-based missiles
SIPRI estimates that approximately 346 nuclear warheads were assigned toChina’s nuclear-capable land-based ballistic missiles as of January 2024. Thisarsenal has been undergoing significant modernization as China comple­
ments its ageing silo-based, liquid-fuelled missiles with large numbers of
new mobile and silo-based, solid-fuelled models.21 However, the reliability ofsome of these newer missiles is in question after reports emerged in 2023 thatwide­spread corruption in the PLARF may have undermined the modern­ization pro­gramme. There were several purges of senior PLARF officials in
2023 and US intelligence assessments suggested that the high level of cor­
ruption meant that some of the silos had been poorly constructed, affect­ing
their ability to launch missiles effectively.22
Intercontinental ballistic missiles
In 2021 commercial satellite imagery revealed that China had started
construction of hundreds of new missile silos across northern China.23 By
Janu­ary 2024 the number of new silos under construction was approxi­
mately 350, spread out among three large fields in northern China and threemoun­tain­ous areas in east-central China. The northern silo fields are thought
19 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 63; Ashley, R., Director, US Defense Intelligence Agency,‘Worldwide threat assessment’, Statement for the record, US Senate, Armed Services Committee,
6 Mar. 2018, p. 8; US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise
Missile Threat 2020 (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2020), p. 7; and Stewart, V. R.,
Director, US Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Worldwide threat assessment’, Statement for the record,
US Senate, Armed Services Committee, 9 Feb. 2016. See also Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Chinese
nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp. 384–85.
20 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 63.
21 Missile ranges specified here refer to Western definitions. China defines missile ranges differently:
short, <1000 kilometres; medium, 1000–3000 km; long, 3000–8000 km; and intercontinental,>8000 km.
22 ‘China’s defense purge strikes at heart of Xi’s military reforms’, Bloomberg, 4 Jan. 2024; andMartin, P. and Jacobs, J., ‘US intelligence shows flawed China missiles led Xi to purge army’, Bloomberg,
4 Jan. 2024.
23 Lewis, J. and Eveleth, D., ‘Chinese ICBM silos’, Arms Control Wonk, 2 July 2021; Korda, M. andKristensen, H. M., ‘China is building a second nuclear missile silo field’, FAS Strategic Security Blog,
Federation of American Scientists, 26 July 2021; and Lee, R., ‘PLA likely begins construction of anintercontinental ballistic missile silo site near Hanggin Banner’, China Aerospace Studies Institute,
12 Aug. 2021.

world nuclear forces 319
to be intended for solid-fuelled Dongfeng (DF) ICBMs—most likely a siloedversion of the DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) at first as well as possibly the DF-41(CSS-20)—while the more mountainous sites are thought to be intended for
liquid-fuelled DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 3) and DF-5C (CSS-4 Mod 4) ICBMs.24
By January 2024 silo con­struction at the northern fields had been largelycom­pleted, along with inner and outer perimeter fences, electrical and radio
towers, and air defence systems.25 In its 2023 report the US DOD assessedthat China had ‘loaded at least some ICBMs into these silos’.26 Notably,
China’s new north­ern silo fields are located deeper inside China than any
other known ICBM base, includ­ing the new silos in east-central China,
making them less vulnerable to long-range conventional strikes.27
The US DOD estimated in its 2023 report that China possessed approxi­
mately 500 ICBM launchers with 350 missiles in its inventory, although
SIPRI assesses that these probably included training launchers and launchers
under construction, in addition to operational launchers.28
If China eventually fills each of its new silos under construction with asingle-warhead missile, it will have the capacity to deploy approxi­mately
650 war­heads on its ICBMs within another decade. If each silo were filledwith a mis­
sile equipped with three multiple independently target­able
re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), this number could rise to more than 1200 war­heads. How­ever, as of January 2024 it remained unclear how China ultim­
ately plans to operate the new silos: whether they will all be filled, whether
they will be loaded with DF-31-class or DF-41 ICBMs or a mixture of thetwo, how many warheads each missile would carry, and whether some of themissiles could potentially have a conventional strike role.29
China has three basic classes of ICBM: the DF-5, the DF-31 and the DF-41,
with variants of each type. Most have a single warhead, while a smaller but
growing number can deliver multiple warheads.
As of January 2024 SIPRI assesses that the numbers of deployed mis­siles
in the DF-5 (CSS-4) family of ICBMs were around the same as the previous
year but may be starting to increase as China has probably begun to deploy
upgraded versions in the new silos currently under construction in eastcentral China. The DF-5B version can reportedly carry up to five war­heads
per missile, while the DF-5C has a multi-megaton yield.30
24 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 104; and authors’ estimates.
25 Authors’ assessment based on analysis of satellite imagery.
26 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 104.
27 Korda and Kristensen (note 23).
28 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 67.
29 The assessment of a potential partial conventional strike role is based on circumstantial evidencein Lee, R., ‘A case for China’s pursuit of conventionally armed ICBMs’, The Diplomat, 17 Nov. 2021, as
well as the US DOD’s assessment that China ‘may be exploring development of conventionally-armed
intercontinental range missile systems’. US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 67.
30 US Department of Defense (note 2), pp. 67, 107.

320 military spending and armaments, 2023

In its 2023 report the US DOD confirmed non-governmental organization
findings that China appeared to be doubling the number of launchers insome mobile ICBM brigades from 6 to 12, although some new bases appear tohave only 8 launchers.31 China is believed to have deployed at least 2 mobile
DF-41 brigades, and a third base appears to have been completed—giving a
total of around 28 launchers.32 Preparations for the inte­gration of add­itional
DF-41 brigades into the PLARF also seem to be under way. The US DOD has
assessed that China might ultimately plan to deploy the DF-41 in road-mobile
and silo-based modes, in some or all of China’s new missile silo fields, andpoten­tially in a rail-based mode as well.33 According to the US DOD, theDF-41 can carry no more than three warheads.34
The US DOD’s 2023 report stated that China has also begun developing a
new missile called the DF-27, which could have a range of 5000–8000 km.35
However, public information about this new missile is scarce and its pur­ported range can already be covered by China’s other ICBMs. One possibility
is that the DF-27 could eventually be used in a conventional strike role, acapabil­ity that the US DOD assesses that China might be exploring.36
In August 2021 China reportedly conducted a test of what appeared to be afractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) equipped with a hyper­sonicboost-glide system.37 According to the US DOD, the tested system came close
to striking its target after flying completely around the world for approxi­
mately 40 000 km and over 100 minutes.38 While details about this new
system are scarce, if the initial reporting is accurate, then it may be intended
to counter advances in US missile defences. China has disputed that it isdevelop­ing such a system, instead calling it a ‘space vehicle’.39
Intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles
China has deployed nuclear-capable intermediate- and medium-rangebal­listic missiles since the 1960s, including a modernized version of themedium-range DF-21 (CSS-5) since the early 1990s and the intermediaterange DF-26 (CSS-18) since at least 2016. In recent years, however, China
has converted several DF-21 brigades to brigades for longer-range missiles.
31 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 107; Decker Eveleth (@dex_eve), Twitter, 3 Nov. 2021,<https://twitter.com/dex_eve/status/1456009540982374404>; and assessments based on the authors’observations.
32 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 107; Rod Lee (@roderick_s_lee), Twitter, 28 Dec. 2021,<https://twitter.com/roderick_s_lee/status/1475885536254599172>; and authors’ estimates.
33 US Department of Defense (note 12), p. 65; and US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 107.
34 US Department of Defense (note 2), pp. 67, 107.
35 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 67.
36 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 67.
37 Sevastopulo, D., ‘China conducted two hypersonic weapons tests this summer’, Financial Times,
20 Oct. 2021. See also Raju, N., ‘Developments in space security’, SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp. 573–74.
38 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 103.
39 ‘China denies report of hypersonic missile test, says tested space vehicle’, Reuters, 18 Oct. 2021.

world nuclear forces 321
In 2023, for the first time, the US DOD’s annual report to the US Congress
did not include the DF-21 in a nuclear role, implying that only conventional
DF-21Cs and DF-21Ds remain in service.40 The dual-capable DF-26 is there­
fore assessed to be the sole intermediate- or medium-range missile typewith a nuclear strike role in China’s arsenal. With an estimated range of
3000–4000 km, the missile can reach targets in India, Russia, the South China
Sea and the western Pacific Ocean, probably including US bases on Guam.41
The missile is equipped with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) thatcan be rapidly swapped with another warhead. This theoretically allows
the PLARF to switch the missile’s mission between precision con­ven­tional
strikes and nuclear strikes against ground targets—and even con­ven­tional
strikes against naval targets—relatively quickly.42
Given the apparent ending of the DF-21’s nuclear mission, it seems likelythat the DF-26 now covers the targets previously assigned to the DF-21. In
its 2023 report the US DOD noted that, among China’s nuclear forces, theDF-26 is the weapon system that is most likely to be fielded with a lower-yield
warhead ‘in the near-term’, although it remains unclear whether such options
have been produced for China’s nuclear forces, and what would constitute a‘lower’ yield (which is not necessarily the same as a ‘low-yield warhead’).43
The US DOD estimated in its 2023 report that China might have up to
250 DF-26 launchers and 500 or more DF-26 missiles in its inventory.44 How­ever, this is a larger number than is indicated by the apparent operational baseinfra­structure; the US DOD’s estimate may thus include launchers that are inpro­duction or otherwise not yet fully operational. There were sightings ofthe missile at several PLARF brigade bases during 2023, and SIPRI assesses
that six DF-26 brigades appear to be operational, with around 216 launchers
in total, although only about half of those are assumed to have a nuclear
mission.
Sea-based missiles
In 2023 China continued to pursue its strategic goal from the early 1980s ofdeveloping and deploying sea-based nuclear weapons. The PLA Navy (PLAN)
cur­rently fields six Type 094 (Jin class) nuclear-powered ballistic missile
sub­marines (SSBNs), two of which are Type 094As—upgraded variants

40 US Department of Defense (note 2), pp. 66–67.
41 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 66.
42 Pollack, J. H. and LaFoy, S., ‘China’s DF-26: A hot-swappable missile?’, Arms Control Wonk,

17 May 2020; Deng, X., ‘China deploys Dongfeng-26 ballistic missile with PLA Rocket Force’, Global
Times, 26 Apr. 2018; and US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 67.
43 US Department of Defense (note 2), pp. 111–12.
44 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 67.

322 military spending and armaments, 2023of the original design.45 The US DOD’s 2023 report assessed that these six
oper­ational SSBNs constitute China’s ‘first credible, sea-based nuclear deter­
rent’.46 China’s SSBN fleet is based at Hainan Island in the South China Sea.
Each of China’s Type 094 submarines can carry up to 12 three-stage, solidfuelled Julang (JL) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which
exist in two types: the JL-2 (CSS-N-14) and the JL-3 (CSS-N-20). China has
probably begun replacing the JL-2s with JL-3s and it is possible that thispro­cess had already been completed by January 2024.47 The JL-3 is capableof carry­ing multiple war­heads and has an estimated range of more than
10 000 km.48 How­ever, unless the range is significantly more than 10 000 km,
the JL-3 would not be able to strike the continental USA if fired from theSouth China Sea. More­over, an SSBN carrying the missile would not be able
to target Washing­ton, DC, without first passing north-east Japan where it
would be espe­cially vulner­able to US anti-submarine defences.
There has been considerable speculation about whether the missiles on
China’s SSBNs are routinely fitted with nuclear warheads. The US DOD
stated in its 2022 report to the US Congress that China ‘likely began nearcon­tinuous at-sea deterrence patrols’ in 2021. It noted in its 2023 report that
China ‘probably continued’ such patrols throughout 2022.49 This wording
implies that China may have begun intermittent patrols with nuclear
weapons onboard, which would constitute a significant change to its longstanding doctrine.
As the Type 094 SSBN is of a relatively noisy design, it was assumed that
China would end production of that class and begin construction of its nextgeneration Type 096 class, which is expected to be larger and quieter andcould potentially be equipped with more missile-launch tubes. The US DOD’s
2023 report, however, stated that China has continued to build Type 094
SSBNs, possibly due to delays in the development of the Type 096 class.50
Given the expected lifespans of the current Type 094 and the next-generation
Type 096 SSBNs, the PLAN is expected to operate both types concurrently.51
It remains unclear how many SSBNs the PLAN ultimately intends to oper­
ate. Commercial satellite imagery from July 2023 showed that China wasnearing com­pletion of two new piers at the Longpo Naval Base. This would
raise the total number of potential submarine berths at the base from 8 to 12,
although some of these could be intended for attack submarines.
45 Chan, M., ‘China’s new nuclear submarine missiles expand range in US: Analysts’, South China
Morning Post, 2 May 2021.
46 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 55.
47 Capaccio, A., ‘China has put longer-range ICBMs on its nuclear subs, US says’, Bloomberg, 19 Nov.
2022; and US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 55.
48 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 59.
49 US Department of Defense (note 12), p. 96; and US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 108.
50 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 108.
51 US Department of Defense (note 2), p. 59.

world nuclear forces 323
Table 7.6. Chinese nuclear forces, January 2024
All figures are approximate and some are based on assessments by the authors.
Type/Chinese designation(US designation)

No. ofYear firstlaunchers deployed

Aircraft20 d

H-6K (B-6)
H-6N (B-6N)
H-20 (B-20)

10
10
–

Land-based missiles

350

DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2)
6DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 3)
12DF-5C (CSS-4 Mod 4)..
DF-21A/E (CSS-5 Mod 2/6)..
DF-26 (CSS-18)
216
DF-27 (CSS-X-24)–
DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1)
DF-31A/AG (CSS-10 Mod 2) j
DF-41 (mobile version)(CSS-20)
DF-41 (silo version)(CSS-20)Range(km) aWarheads x yield b

20
2009
2020
[2030]

    3 100 1 x bomb
    3 100 1 x ALBM           . . . .

..
88
28 k
..

[2025]–
72 m

Other stored warheads n
Total stockpile

10
10
–
346

1981
  12 000 1 x 4–5 Mt
2015  13 000 5 x 200–300 kt[2024]
  13 000 1 x multi-Mt
2000/2016   >2 100e 1 x 200–300 kt
2016
  >3 000 1 x 200–300 kt[2026]
    5 000– . .
       8 000
2006
    7 200 1 x 200–300 kt
2007/2018   11 200 1 x 200–300 kt
2020
  12 000 3 x 200–300 kt
  12 000 [up to 3 x 200–300 kt]

Sea-based missiles (SLBMs) 6/72 l
JL-2 (CSS-N-14)
JL-3 (CSS-N-20)

No. ofwarheads c

6
60
..
–f
108 g
–h
. .i
88
84
..
72

2016
2022

  >7 000 1 x 200–300 kt>10 000 [Multiple]

–
72
[62]

442

500 n

. . = not available or not applicable; – = nil or a negligible value; [ ] = uncertain SIPRI estimate;
ALBM = air-launched ballistic missile; kt = kiloton; Mt = megaton; SLBM = submarine-launchedballistic missile.
a For aircraft, the listed range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary
according to flight profile, weapon payload and in-flight refuelling.
b Warhead yields are listed for illustrative purposes. Actual yields are not known, except thatolder and less accurate missiles were equipped with megaton-yield warheads. Newer long-range
missile warheads probably have yields of a few hundred kilotons, and it is possible that somewarheads have even lower yield options.
c Figures are based on estimates of 1 warhead per nuclear-capable launcher, except for the
DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 3), which is thought to be equipped with multiple independently target­
able re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and can carry up to 5 warheads, and the MIRV-capable DF-41(CSS-20), which is estimated to carry up to 3 warheads. All estimates are approximate.
It has long been assumed that China’s warheads are not deployed on launchers under normal
circumstances but are instead kept in storage facilities; however, as of Jan. 2024, SIPRI assesses
that China might have started to mate a small number of its warheads (c. 24) with their launchers.
d The number of bombers only counts those estimated to be assigned a nuclear role. H-6(B-6) bombers were used to deliver nuclear weapons during China’s nuclear weapon testing
programme (1 test used a fighter–bomber) and models of nuclear bombs are exhibited in military
museums. It is thought (but not certain) that a small number of H-6 bombers previously had asecondary contingency mission with nuclear bombs. The United States Department of Defense(DOD) reported in 2018 that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force has been reassigned a324 military spending and armaments, 2023
nuclear mission, which is expected to revolve primarily around China’s new dual-capable
ALBM.
e The range of the previously nuclear-armed DF-21 variants (see note f ), the DF-21A (CSS-5
Mod 2) and the DF-21E (Mod 6), is thought to be greater than the 1750 km reported for theoriginal DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1), which has been retired. The US Air Force (USAF) has reported
the range as 2150 km.
f In recent years China has converted several DF-21 brigades to brigades for longer-range
missiles. In 2023, for the first time, the US DOD’s annual report to the US Congress did notinclude the DF-21 in a nuclear role, implying that all of China’s remaining DF-21s now serve
exclusively in conventional strike roles.
g The DF-26 (CSS-18) is a dual-capable launcher. It is believed that some DF-26 brigades haveinherited the nuclear mission from the DF-21A/E (see note f ) and perhaps up to half had been
assigned nuclear warheads as of Jan. 2024. Only 1 nuclear warhead is assumed for each of the
DF-26’s missiles that have been assigned a nuclear mission, with any reloads assumed to beconventional.
h The range class of the DF-27 (CSS-X-24) is somewhat redundant for the nuclear strike
mission as these distances can be easily covered by China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs). This, coupled with the US DOD’s 2023 assessment that China ‘may be exploring
development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems’, suggests that theDF-27 could serve in an exclusively conventional strike role—although this is unconfirmed.
i The DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1) was not listed in the US DOD’s 2023 report to the US Congress andis believed to have been retired.
j The DF-31AG is thought to carry the same missile as the DF-31A (both have the US CSS-10
Mod 2 designation). A siloed version of the DF-31A/AG, possibly carrying the same designation,is believed to be nearing completion for eventual loading into China’s new solid-fuel silo fields.
k This number assumes that at least 2 brigades were operational as of Jan. 2024.
l The first figure is the total number of operational nuclear-powered ballistic missile sub­marines (SSBNs) in the Chinese fleet; the second is the maximum number of missiles that they
can carry.
m In Nov. 2022 the commander of the US Pacific Fleet stated that China was replacing its
deployed JL-2 SLBMs with JL-3 SLBMs. This is likely taking place on a rotational basis as eachsubmarine returns to port for routine maintenance and overhaul. It is thought that the system isalso intended to arm future Type 094 SSBNs as well as the future Type 096 SSBN, which will not
be ready for several years.
n In addition to the c. 438 warheads estimated to be assigned to operational forces, SIPRI
estimates that c. 62 warheads might have been produced for missiles nearing operational status,
for a total estimated stockpile of c. 500 warheads. China’s warhead stockpile is expected tocontinue to increase.
Sources: US Air Force (USAF), National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise
Missile Threat, various years; USAF Global Strike Command, various documents; US Central
Intelligence Agency, various documents; US Defense Intelligence Agency, various documents;
US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republicof China, Annual Report to Congress, various years; Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S. and
McKinzie, M. G., Chinese Nuclear Forces and US Nuclear War Planning (Federation of Ameri­can Scientists/Natural Resources Defense Council: Washington, DC, Nov. 2006); Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, ‘Nuclear notebook’, various issues; Google Earth satellite imagery; andauthors’ estimates.

world nuclear forces 325

VI. Indian nuclear forceshans m. kristensen and matt korda*
As of January 2024 India was estimated to have a growing stockpile of about
172 nuclear weapons—a small increase from the previous year (see table 7.7,
end of section). These weapons were assigned to a maturing nuclear triadof aircraft, land-based missiles and nuclear-powered bal­listic missile sub­marines (SSBNs). It has long been assumed that India stores its nuclear
war­heads separately from its deployed launchers during peacetime. How­ever, the country’s recent moves towards placing missiles in canisters andconduct­ing sea-based deterrence patrols suggest that India could be shift­
ing in the direction of mating some of its warheads with their launchers inpeacetime.
The warhead estimate is based on calculations of India’s inventory of
weapon-grade plutonium (see section X of this chapter), the esti­matednumber of operational nuclear-capable delivery systems, India’s nuclear
doc­trine, publicly available information on the Indian nuclear arsenal, andpri­vate con­ver­sations with defence officials.1 The Indian government has
pro­vided little public information about the size of its nuclear forces, otherthan conducting occasional parade displays and announcing missile flighttests.
This section starts by outlining the role played by nuclear weapons inIndian military doctrine. It then details India’s holdings of nuclear weapons—
its aircraft and air-delivered weapons and its land- and sea-based missiles.
The role of nuclear weapons in Indian military doctrine
The limited ranges of India’s initial nuclear systems meant that, until theearly 2010s, their only credible role was to deter Pakistan. However, with thedevelop­ment since then of longer-range missiles capable of targeting all ofChina, in recent years it appears that India has placed increased emphasis on
deter­ring China.
While India has adhered to a nuclear no-first-use (NFU) policy since 1999,
this pledge was qualified by a 2003 caveat (reaffirmed in 2018) that India
could also use nuclear forces to retaliate against attacks by non-nuclear

1 Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Estimating world nuclear forces: An overview and assessment ofsources’, SIPRI Commentary, 14 June 2021.

* The authors wish to thank Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight for contributing invaluable
research to this publication.

326 military spending and armaments, 2023

weapons of mass destruction (WMD).2 Debate about India’s commitment to
the NFU policy has increased with indications since 2018 that some parts ofIndia’s nuclear arsenal are being kept at a higher state of readiness, includ­ing
pos­sible mating of a portion of India’s warheads and launchers.3 This raisesques­tions about whether India might be transitioning towards a limited
counter­
force nuclear posture to target an adversary’s nuclear weapons
earlier in a crisis, even before they could be used.4
Similar to Pakistan (see section VII of this chapter), India has long main­tained a policy of not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-armed states.5 But given India’s 2003 statement about potential
use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear WMD attacks, the conditions forthis pledge are uncertain.
Aircraft and air-delivered weapons
India has several types of combat aircraft with performance character­istics
that potentially make them suitable as nuclear-delivery platforms, including
the Mirage 2000H, Jaguar IS and Rafale. However, there is scarcely any official
infor­mation about a nuclear role for these aircraft, with one exception: adetailed source describes how the Mirage 2000H was con­verted for a nuclear
strike role in the 1990s.6 SIPRI estimates that approxi­mately 48 nuclear grav­
ity bombs were assigned to Indian aircraft as of January 2024.
Land-based missiles
The Indian Army’s Strategic Forces Command operates five types of mobile
nuclear-capable ballistic missile: the short-range Prithvi-II and Agni-I; themedium-range Agni-II; and the intermediate-range Agni-III and Agni-IV.
2 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, ‘The Cabinet Committee on Security reviews [o]perational­
ization of India’s nuclear doctrine’, Press release, 4 Jan. 2003; Indian Ministry of External Affairs,‘Draft report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian nuclear doctrine’, 17 Aug. 1999; and Indian
Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Prime Minister felicitates crew of INS Arihant on completion of nuclear
triad’, Press release, 5 Nov. 2018.
3 For further detail see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Indian nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook
2021.
4 Clary, C. and Narang, V., ‘India’s counterforce temptations: Strategic dilemmas, doctrine, andcapabilities’, International Security, vol. 43, no. 3 (winter 2018/19); Kaushal, S. et al., ‘India’s nuclear
doctrine: The Agni-P and the stability–instability paradox’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),
8 July 2021; and Rajagopalan, R., India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence, ORF Occasional Paper
no. 247 (Observer Research Foundation: New Delhi, May 2020).
5 See e.g. Indian Ministry of External Affairs, ‘The Cabinet Committee on Security reviews[o]perational­ization of India’s nuclear doctrine’ (note 2); and Indian Ministry of External Affairs, ‘India
statement delivered by Secretary (West) at the annual high level meeting on “International Day for The
Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”’, 27 Sep. 2023, accessible via Internet Archive.
6 Kampani, G., ‘New Delhi’s long nuclear journey: How secrecy and institutional roadblocks delayed
India’s weaponization’, International Security, vol. 38, no. 4 (spring 2014), pp. 94, 97–98. For further
detail see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Indian nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2022, pp. 393–94.

world nuclear forces 327
SIPRI estimates that India had around 80 operational missiles as of January
2024. At least three new land-based ballistic missiles were in develop­ment:
the medium-range Agni-P and the intermediate-range Agni-V were nearing
operational deployment, while a variant with intercontinental range, theAgni-VI, was in the design stage.7 In 2023 unconfirmed reports emerged sug­gest­ing that India could reconfigure some of its nuclear medium-range bal­
listic mis­siles to give them conventional strike roles. How­ever, in the absenceof additional information it remains unclear whether this will happen.8
In 2023 India conducted test launches of older missiles and a critical
test for one of its new developmental missiles. In June 2023 the Agni-Pcom­pleted its first ‘pre-induction’ flight test (and fourth test of the systemoverall), thus ‘pav[ing] the way for induction of the system into the Armed
Forces’, according to the Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD).9 However, it
is likely that India will undertake additional tests of the system before theAgni-P becomes operational.
The Agni-P is described by the Indian MOD as a ‘next-generation’ nuclearcapable ballistic missile. It reportedly incorporates technology developed
specifically for the Agni-V programme, including an advanced navigation
system and a new mobile canisterized launch system, which will reduce thetime required to place the missiles on alert in a crisis.10 The warhead for thesolid-fuelled Agni-P can reportedly manoeuvre during re-entry, which could
allow the mis­sile to evade future missile defences of states in the region (e.g.
China and Pakistan). An unidentified government source initially denied that
the Agni-P was intended to replace older Agni missiles.11
In 2023 India also conducted test launches of the Prithvi-II and the Agni-I,
both of which were described by the Indian MOD as ‘proven systems’.12
India is developing a land-based version of the short-range K-15 submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM), known as the Shaurya.13 However,

7 Vikas, S. V., ‘Why India may not test Agni 6 even if DRDO is ready with technology’, OneIndia,
10 July 2019.
8 Dubey, A. K., ‘After Pralay, defence forces may opt for medium-range ballistic missiles inconventional roles for rocket force’, ANI, 5 Nov. 2023.
9 Indian Ministry of Defence, ‘“Agni Prime” ballistic missile successfully flight-tested by DRDO off
Odisha coast’, Press release, 8 June 2023.
10 Indian Ministry of Defence, ‘DRDO successfully flight tests new generation Agni P ballistic
missile’, Press release, 28 June 2021; and Rout, H. K., ‘India test fires new generation nuclear capable
Agni-Prime missile off Odisha coast’, New Indian Express, 28 June 2021.
11 Philip, S. A., ‘Agni Prime is the new missile in India’s nuclear arsenal. This is why it’s special’,
ThePrint, 30 June 2021; and Zhen, L., ‘India’s latest Agni-P missile no great threat to China: Experts’,
South China Morning Post, 1 July 2021.
12 Indian Ministry of Defence, ‘Successful training launch of short-range ballistic missile, Prithvi-II,
carried out off Odisha coast’, Press release, 10 Jan. 2023; and Indian Ministry of Defence, ‘Successful
training launch of Agni-1 ballistic missile’, Press release, 1 June 2023.
13 See e.g. Press Trust of India, ‘India successfully test-fires nuclear capable hypersonic missile
Shaurya’, Hindustan Times, 3 Oct. 2020; and Gupta, S., ‘Govt okays induction of nuke-capable Shaurya
missile amid Ladakh standoff’, Hindustan Times, 6 Oct. 2020.

328 military spending and armaments, 2023

because of the high level of uncertainty about the status of the Shaurya, it is
not included in SIPRI’s estimate for January 2024.14
India is believed to be developing the technology to deliver multiple
independ­ently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), but as of Janu­ary 2024
the status of the programme remained unclear. The technology has report­edly
been tested on the Agni-P and could potentially be used on the intermediaterange Agni-V as well as the inter­continental Agni-VI that is currently indevelop­ment.15 The Agni-VI is contro­versial because its expected range may
extend well beyond India’s pos­sible regional targets in Pakistan and China.
In 2023 there were reports that a scientist, who had previously worked at
the Indian Defence Research and Develop­ment Organ­isation (DRDO), hadclaimed that the Agni-VI’s indigenously designed launcher had completed a
success­ful test. However, the claim—which was revealed during the scientist’s
trial on charges of espionage—should be treated with caution because it ishighly likely that the system remains several years away from deployment.16
Sea-based missiles
With the aim of creating an assured second-strike capability, India has con­tinued to develop the naval component of its nascent nuclear triad and tobuild a fleet of four to six SSBNs.17 The first of these SSBNs, INS Arihant, com­pleted what the Indian government described as its first ‘deterrence patrol’ in
2018—although it seems unlikely that the missiles carried on the SSBN werearmed with nuclear warheads.18 A second SSBN, INS Arighat, was launchedin November 2017 and underwent advanced sea trials in 2021–22, but itscom­missioning into the Indian Navy has been delayed and is now expectedsome­time in 2024.19 Satellite imagery indicates that each submarine has beenequipped with a four-tube vertical-launch system and each could carry up to
12 two-stage, short-range K-15 SLBMs (which may have been renamed theB-05).20 SIPRI estimates that 12 nuclear warheads have been delivered forpotential deployment by INS Arihant and another 12 have been produced for
INS Arighat.

14 For further detail see Kristensen and Korda (note 6), p. 395.

15 Rout, H. K., ‘India to conduct first user trial of Agni-V missile’, New Indian Express, 13 Sep. 2021.

16 Inamdar, N., ‘Honey-trapped DRDO scientist shared details of India’s missile, drone programmes’,
Hindustan Times, 8 July 2023.
17 Davenport, K., ‘Indian submarine completes first patrol’, Arms Control Today, vol. 48, no. 10 (Dec.
2018).
18 Peri, D., ‘Now, India has a nuclear triad’, The Hindu, 18 Oct. 2016; Indian Prime Minister’s Office(note 2); Davenport (note 17); and Joshi, Y., ‘Angels and dangles: Arihant and the dilemma of India’s
undersea nuclear weapons’, War on the Rocks, 14 Jan. 2019.
19 Gupta, S., ‘Aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya is back on high seas’, Hindustan Times, 19 Feb. 2023.
20 Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), ‘MSS—Achievements’, 6 Sep.
2019.

world nuclear forces 329
At least two additional Arihant-class submarines are planned: India’s
third SSBN, currently known by its S4 developmental name, was reportedly
launched in November 2021, and a fourth is under construction for pos­sible
launch in 2024.21 These sub­marines are believed to be significantly larger than
the first two, with satellite imagery indicating that they are approxi­mately
20 metres longer.22 They will reportedly have eight launch tubes able to holdup to 24 K-15 missiles or 8 K-4 missiles.23 A next generation of SSBNs, known
as S5, is reportedly also in the design stage.24 The K-4 missile is in develop­
ment but probably remains several years away from being operational. Twopoten­tial test launches of the K-4 in 2022 were apparently disrupted by thepres­ence of Chinese spy ships but no known tests of the missile took place in2023—although India did test launch a K-15 SLBM in July 2023.25
India’s first naval nuclear weapon, the short-range Dhanush missile,
is a version of the dual-capable Prithvi-II that can be launched from two
Sukanya-class offshore patrol vessels.26 Given the slow speed and high degreeof vulner­ability of the Sukanya-class vessels, the system will probably beretired when the SSBN programme with longer-range missiles matures.

21 Chris Biggers (@CSBiggers), Twitter, 28 Dec. 2021, <https://twitter.com/CSBiggers/status/
1476048094580117509>; Unnithan, S., ‘A peek into India’s top secret and costliest defence project,nuclear submarines’, India Today, 10 Dec. 2017; and Bhattacharjee, S., ‘Third Arihant class submarine
quietly launched in November’, The Hindu, 4 Jan. 2022.
22 Sutton, H. I., ‘Indian Navy’s third ballistic missile submarine doubles missile armament’, Covert
Shores, 29 Dec. 2021.
23 Bhattacharjee (note 21). See also Kristensen and Korda (note 6), p. 397.
24 See e.g. Sterk, R., ‘India levels up in nuclear submarines’, Defense and Security Monitor, 1 May
2023.
25 ‘Chinese spy ships may complicate India’s missile test plans in Indian Ocean for the second monthin a row’, Swarajya, 7 Dec. 2022; and ‘DRDO test fires short range B-05LV missile from Kalam Island’,Pragativadi, 2 July 2023.
26 ‘Nuke-capable Dhanush and Prithvi-II launched’, New Indian Express, 12 Mar. 2011; and Indian
Ministry of Defence (MOD), Annual Report 2018–19 (MOD: New Delhi, 2019), p. 100.

330 military spending and armaments, 2023

Table 7.7. Indian nuclear forces, January 2024
All figures are approximate and some are based on assessments by the authors.
Type/designation

No. oflaunchers

Aircraft d84

Mirage 2000H
Jaguar IS
Rafale32
16
36

Land-based missiles

80

Prithvi-II
Agni-I
Agni-II
Agni-III
Agni-IV
Agni-V
Agni-VI
Agni-P
Sea-based missiles
Dhanush
K-15 (B-05) h
K-4

Range
(km) aWarheads x yield b

1 850
1 600
2 000

1 x 12 kt bomb
1 x 12 kt bomb
..

24
16
16
16
8
..
–

2003
2007
2011
2018
2022
[2024][2027]

250 e>700>2 000>3 200>3 500>5 000>6 000–[2025]

1 000–
2 000

1 x 12 kt
1 x 10–40 kt
1 x 10–40 kt
1 x 10–40 kt
1 x 10–40 kt
1 x 10–40 kt
1 x 10–40 kt[possible MIRV][1 x 10–40 kt]

2013
2018
[2025]

400
700
3 500

32
16
–
80

3/14 f2
12 i–jNo. ofwarheads c
48

1985
1981
2022

Other stored warheads k
Total stockpile

Year first
deployed

24
16
16
16
8
..
–
–
16

1 x 12 kt
1 x 12 kt
1 x 10–40 kt

4g
12
–
[28]

178

172 k

. . = not available or not applicable; – = nil or a negligible value; [ ] = uncertain SIPRI estimate;kt = kiloton; MIRV = multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle.
a For aircraft, the listed range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary
according to flight profile, weapon payload and in-flight refuelling.
b The yields of India’s nuclear warheads are not known. The 1998 nuclear tests demonstrated
yields of up to 12 kt. Since then, it is possible that boosted warheads have been introduced witha higher yield, perhaps up to 40 kt. There is no open-source evidence that India has developed
2-stage thermonuclear warheads.
c Aircraft and several missile types are dual-capable—that is, they can be armed with either
conventional or nuclear warheads. This estimate counts an average of 1 nuclear warhead per
launcher. All estimates are approximate.
d The Rafale is listed as a potential future nuclear delivery platform. It seems likely that it
would probably initially replace the Jaguar in that role. However, in the absence of official or
authoritative sources, SIPRI has not attributed nuclear weapons to Rafale aircraft in its estimate
for Jan. 2024. Other aircraft that could potentially have a secondary nuclear role include theSu-30MKI.
e The Prithvi-II’s range is often reported as 350 kilometres. However, the United States Air
Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center sets the range at 250 km.
f The first figure is the number of operational vessels—2 ships and 1 nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN); the second is the maximum number of missiles that they can carry.
India has launched 3 SSBNs, but only 1—INS Arihant—was believed to be operational as of Jan.
2024, and it was believed to have only a limited operational capability. The second SSBN—INS
Arighat—has conducted sea trials and might become fully operational in 2024. The third, known
as S4, was reportedly launched in Nov. 2021 but, as of Jan. 2024, its status remained unclear.

world nuclear forces 331
g Each Sukanya-class patrol ship equipped with Dhanush missiles was thought to have pos­sibly 1 reload.
h The K-15 may have been renamed the B-05. Some sources have referred to the K-15 missile as‘Sagarika’, which was the name of the missile-development project, rather than the missile itself.
i Each of India’s first 2 SSBNs has 4 missile tubes, each of which can carry 3 K-15 submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), for a total of 12 missiles per SSBN. Only 1 SSBN was believed
to be operational as of Jan. 2024 (see note f ).
j Each of the 8 missile tubes on India’s third and fourth SSBNs will be able to carry
3 K-15 SLBMs or 1 K-4 SLBM once the latter missile becomes operational.
k In addition to the c. 144 warheads estimated to be assigned to operational forces, SIPRI
estimates that c. 28 warheads might have been produced for missiles nearing operational status,
including the Agni-V and Agni-P (c. 16 warheads) and the K-15 (c. 12 warheads for INS Arighat),for a total estimated stockpile of c. 172 warheads. India’s warhead stockpile is expected tocontinue to increase.
Sources: Indian Ministry of Defence, annual reports and press releases; International Institutefor Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, various years; US Air Force (USAF), National Air
and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, various years; Indian news
media reports; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ‘Nuclear notebook’, various issues; and authors’estimates.

332 military spending and armaments, 2023

VII. Pakistani nuclear forceshans m. kristensen and matt korda*
According to SIPRI estimates, Pakistan possessed approximately 170 nuclear
warheads as of January 2024—the same number as the previous year (seetable 7.8, end of section). These weapons were assigned to Pakistan’s nascenttriad of aircraft, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, and sealaunched cruise missiles. The development of several new delivery systems
and Pakistan’s growing accumulation of fissile material (see section X of thischapter) suggest that its nuclear weapon arsenal and fissile material stock­pile
are likely to continue to expand over the next decade, although pro­jections
vary considerably.1
The Pakistani government has never publicly disclosed the size of its
nuclear arsenal. Limited official public data and exaggerated news stories
about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons mean that analysing the number and typesof Pakistani warheads and delivery vehicles is fraught with uncertainty.
SIPRI’s estimates of Pakistan’s nuclear forces thus come with less con­fidence
than those for most other nuclear-armed countries.2 The estimates in thissection are based on the authors’ analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear posture andfissile material production, analysis of commercial satellite imagery, publicstate­ments by Western officials, and private conversations with Pakistani
officials.
This section starts by outlining the role played by nuclear weapons inPakistan’s military doctrine. It then describes Pakistan’s air-delivered andland-based weapons and the nascent sea-based capability.
The role of nuclear weapons in Pakistani military doctrine
Pakistan does not have a no-first-use (NFU) doctrine and reserves the right touse nuclear weapons first in wartime, primarily due to what it perceives as an
asymmetry in the strength of its conventional forces relative to India. Pakistan
has placed an emphasis on non-strategic nuclear weapons specifically in

1 See e.g. Sundaresan, L. and Ashok, K., ‘Uranium constraints in Pakistan: How many nuclear
weapons does Pakistan have?’, Current Science, vol. 115, no. 6 (25 Sep. 2018); Salik, N., ‘Pakistan’s nuclear
force structure in 2025’, Regional Insight, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 June
2016; and Jones, G. S., ‘Pakistan’s nuclear material production for nuclear weapons’, Proliferation
Matters, 16 Feb. 2021. See also Berrier, S., Director, US Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Worldwide
threat assessment’, Statement for the record, US Senate, Armed Services Committee, 26 Apr. 2021.
On Pakistan’s fissile material stockpile see Kile, S. N. and Kristensen, H. M., ‘Pakistani nuclear forces’,
SIPRI Yearbook 2019; and International Panel on Fissile Materials, ‘Pakistan’, 31 Aug. 2021.
2 Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Estimating world nuclear forces: An overview and assessment ofsources’, SIPRI Commentary, 14 June 2021.

* The authors wish to thank Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight for contributing invaluable
research to this publication.

world nuclear forces 333
response to India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine.3 While it has no NFU doctrine,
Pakistan has regularly co-sponsored resolutions in the United Nations
General Assembly with the stated aim of assuring non-nuclear-armed statesthat it would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.4
Pakistan has been pursuing the development and deployment of new
nuclear weapons and delivery systems as part of its ‘full spectrum deter­rence
posture’ in relation to India.5 In May 2023 an advisor to Pakistan’s NationalCom­mand Authority—which oversees the country’s nuclear doctrine andweapon programmes—explained that ‘full spectrum deterrence’ denotes
Pakistan’s possession of ‘strategic, operational, and tactical’ nuclear weapons
with a wide range of yields, and noted that these could be used against ‘afull spectrum of targets’ in India, including countervalue, counterforce andbattle­field targets.6
Aircraft and air-delivered weapons
As of January 2024 Pakistan was estimated to operate a small stockpile ofnuclear gravity bombs, with cruise missiles in development.
Two versions of the Ra’ad (Hatf-8) air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)
were being developed to supplement this stockpile by providing the Pakistan
Air Force (PAF) with a nuclear-capable stand-off capability at ranges of
350–600 kilometres.7 Neither version was thought to have been operation­
ally deployed as of January 2024.

3 On the doctrine—under which India looks to maintain the capability to launch large-scaleconventional strikes or incursions against Pakistani territory at a level below the threshold at which
Pakistan would retaliate with nuclear weapons—see Kidwai, K., Advisor, Pakistani National Command
Authority, Keynote address and discussion session, 7th South Asian Strategic Stability workshop,‘Deterrence, nuclear weapons and arms control’, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
and Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), London, 6 Feb. 2020; and Saalman, L. andTopychkanov, P., South Asia’s Nuclear Challenges: Interlocking Views from India, Pakistan, China,
Russia and the United States (SIPRI: Stockholm, Apr. 2021). For a US diplomatic assessment of India’s‘Cold Start’ strategy see Roemer, T., US Ambassador to India, ‘Cold Start: A mixture of myth andreality’, Cable New Delhi 000295, 16 Feb. 2010, accessible via WikiLeaks. Although Indian officials had
previously denied the existence of the Cold Start doctrine, India’s chief of the army staff acknowledged
its existence in an interview in 2017. Unnithan, S., ‘“We will cross again”’, India Today, 4 Jan. 2017.
4 See e.g. United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Conclusion of effective international arrangements toassure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons’, A/C.1/75/L.22,
7 Oct. 2020.
5 Kidwai (note 3). For a detailed assessment of Pakistan’s nuclear posture see Tasleem, S. andDalton, T., ‘Nuclear emulation: Pakistan’s nuclear trajectory’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 4(winter 2019). See also Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Pakistani nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook
2023, p. 301.
6 Kidwai, K., Advisor, Pakistani National Command Authority, Speech at ‘25 years of Yom Takbeer:
Promoting Peace, Stability and Development’ seminar, Arms Control and Disarmament Centre,
Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Islamabad, 24 May 2023.
7 For further detail on the Ra’ad ALCM see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Pakistani nuclear
forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2021, p. 387.

334 military spending and armaments, 2023

Pakistan has several types of combat aircraft with performance character­istics that make them suitable as nuclear-delivery platforms, including
the Mirage III, the Mirage V, the F-16 and the JF-17. However, no official
sources have confirmed their nuclear-capable roles. Given this signifi­cant
uncertainty, SIPRI assesses that the Mirage III and possibly the Mirage V are
the most likely to have a nuclear-delivery role. The Mirage III has been used
for developmental test flights of the nuclear-capable Ra’ad ALCM, while theMirage V is believed to have been given a strike role with Pakistan’s small
arsenal of nuclear gravity bombs.8
When the Mirage aircraft are eventually phased out, it is possible that the
JF-17 will take over their nuclear role in the PAF and that the Ra’ad ALCM
will be integrated on to the JF-17.9 In March 2023 images emerged for the
first time of a JF-17 carrying what resembled a Ra’ad ALCM, suggesting
a potential dual-capable role for the aircraft—although this had not been
officially confirmed as of January 2024.10
Land-based missiles
As of January 2024 Pakistan’s nuclear-capable land-based missile arsenalcom­prised an estimated 126 short- and medium-range systems.
Pakistan has deployed four types of solid-fuelled, road-mobile short-range
ballistic missile: the Abdali (also designated Hatf-2), the Ghaznavi (Hatf-3),
the Shaheen-I/IA (Hatf-4) and the Nasr (Hatf-9). Except for the Abdali,
all of these missiles were showcased at the annual Pakistan Day parades in
2021 and 2022 (the scheduled 2023 parade did not take place), suggestingthat they are still operational.11 The Abdali—Pakistan’s oldest ballistic missile
type—was not displayed at these parades and has not been tested since 2013,
perhaps indicating that the missile is being superseded by newer systems.
The arsenal also included two types of operational medium-range ballistic
missile: the liquid-fuelled, road-mobile Ghauri (Hatf-5); and the two-stage,solid-fuelled, road-mobile Shaheen-II (Hatf-6).12 A longer-range variant in
8 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2022 (Routledge: London,2022), p. 297; and Dominguez, G., ‘Pakistan test-launches longer-range variant of Ra’ad II ALCM’,
Janes, 19 Feb. 2020. For further detail on the nuclear capability of the F-16s see Kristensen, H. M. andKile, S. N., ‘Pakistani nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2020, p. 370.
9 ‘Ra’ad ALCM: The custodian of Pakistan’s airborne nuclear deterrence’, PakDefense, 6 Dec.
2020; and Pakistan Strategic Forum, ‘Update on Pakistan: “JF-17 Thunder’s integration with RA’AD II
ALCM”’, 8 July 2020.
10 ‘Pakistani Thunder’, Scramble, 21 Mar. 2023.
11 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan Day Parade: 23 March 2022’, ISPR
Official, YouTube, 24 Mar. 2022; and Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan Day
Parade: March 2021’, ISPR Official, YouTube, 25 Mar. 2021.
12 United States Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise
Missile Threat 2020 (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2020), p. 25; and PakistaniInter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted successful training launch of surface tosurface ballistic missile Shaheen-II’, Press release no. PR-104/2019-ISPR, 23 May 2019.

world nuclear forces 335
development, the Shaheen-III, has been test launched at least three times—
in 2015, 2021 and 2022—but was probably not yet deployed as of January
2024.13 This missile has a claimed range of 2750 km, making it the longestrange system that Pakistan has tested to date. The Ghauri, Shaheen-II and
Shaheen-III were all displayed at the Pakistan Day Parade in 2022.
In October 2023 Pakistan conducted its second test launch (and the firstsince 2017) of the Ababeel—a developmental medium-range ballistic missilethat can reportedly deliver multiple independently-targetable re-entry
vehicles (MIRVs).14 The Pakistani government stated that the test was ‘aimed
at re-validating various design, technical parameters and performance evalu­
ation of different sub-systems of the weapon system’, suggesting that the
Ababeel was probably not yet operationally deployed as of January 2024.15
Pakistan’s pursuit of MIRV technology is most likely a countermeasure to
India’s pro­cure­ment of advanced ballistic missile defences, including the
S-400 system acquired from the Russian Federation.16
In addition to expanding its arsenal of land-based ballistic missiles,
Pakistan has continued to develop the nuclear-capable Babur (Hatf-7)
ground-launched cruise missile, with an estimated range of 350 km.17 The
Babur has been test launched about 12 times since 2005 and has been usedin army field training since 2011, indicating that the system is probably oper­
ational—although there is some uncertainty as to whether the nuclear ver­sionis also oper­ational. An upgraded version, with a claimed range of 450 km, isknown as the Babur-1A and was featured in the Pakistan Day Parade in 2022.18
A version known as the Babur-2 (sometimes referred to as the Babur-1B) has
a claimed range of 900 km and was tested most recently in December 2021.19

13 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Shaheen 3 missile test’, Press releaseno. PR-61/2015-ISPR, 9 Mar. 2015; Jamal, S., ‘Pakistan tests nuclear-capable Shaheen-III ballistic
missile’, Gulf News, 20 Jan. 2021; and DG ISPR (@OfficialDGISPR), Twitter, 9 Apr. 2022, <https://twitter.com/OfficialDGISPR/status/1512710884518359042>.
14 ‘Pakistan conducts successful flight test of Ababeel weapon system’, Radio Pakistan, 18 Oct. 2023;
and Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Press release no. PR-34/2017-ISPR, 24 Jan. 2017.
The US Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center also describes the 2017 test as involving‘the MIRV version of the Ababeel’. US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC),
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat 2017 (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, June 2017),
p. 25. On the Ababeel see also Kile and Kristensen (note 1), p. 335.
15 ‘Pakistan conducts successful flight test of Ababeel weapon system’ (note 14).
16 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2024.
17 US Air Force (note 14), p. 37.
18 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations, ‘Pakistan Day Parade: 23 March 2022’ (note 11); andPakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Press release no. PR24/2021, Pak conductedsuccessful launch of Babur cruise missile—11 Feb 2021(ISPR)’, ISPR Official, YouTube, 11 Feb. 2021.
19 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted a successful test of
an enhanced range version of the indigenously developed Babur cruise missile’, Press releaseno. PR-142/2018-ISPR, 14 Apr. 2018; Gupta, S., ‘Pakistan’s effort to launch 750km range missile crashes’,
Hindustan Times, 23 Mar. 2020; and Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted a successful test of an enhanced range version of the indigenously developed Babur cruise missile 1B’, Press release no. PR-222/2021-ISPR, 21 Dec. 2021.

336 military spending and armaments, 2023

Overall, in 2022 and 2023 Pakistan conducted significantly fewer publicmis­sile test launches than in previous years, which may be related to Paki­
stan’s ongoing political and military instability following the removal of
Imran Khan as prime minister in 2022 and his subsequent arrest in 2023.20
Sea-based missiles
As part of its efforts to achieve a secure second-strike capability, Pakistan has
sought to create a nuclear triad by developing a sea-based nuclear force. The
Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is intended to establish
a nuclear capability for the Pakistan Navy’s three Agosta-90B diesel–electricsub­marines.21 Pakistan test-launched the Babur-3 in 2017 and 2018.22

20 Turak, N., ‘Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan arrested amid tensions with military’,
CNBC, 9 May 2023.
21 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Press release no. PR-10/2017-ISPR, 9 Jan. 2017;and Panda, A. and Narang, V., ‘Pakistan tests new sub-launched nuclear-capable cruise missile. What
now?’, The Diplomat, 10 Jan. 2017.
22 Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), ‘Pakistan conducted another successful test fireof indigenously developed submarine launched cruise missile Babur having a range of 450 kms’, Press
release no. PR-125/2018-ISPR, 29 Mar. 2018. Reports of a ship-launched cruise missile test in 2019
might have been for a different missile. Gady, F.-S., ‘Pakistan’s Navy test fires indigenous anti-ship/land-attack cruise missile’, The Diplomat, 24 Apr. 2019.

world nuclear forces 337
Table 7.8. Pakistani nuclear forces, January 2024
All figures are approximate and some are based on assessments by the authors.
Type/designation

No. ofYear firstlaunchers deployed

Aircraft d

36

Mirage III/V

36 e

1998

–

..

[JF-17]Land-based missiles

126 gAbdali (Hatf-2)
Ghaznavi (Hatf-3)
Shaheen-I/IA (Hatf-4) hShaheen-II (Hatf-6)
Shaheen-III i
Ghauri (Hatf-5)
Nasr (Hatf-9)
AbabeelBabur/-1A GLCM
(Hatf-7) k
Babur-2/-1B GLCM l

10
16
16
24
–
24
24
–
12

Range
(km) aWarheads x yield bNo. ofwarheads c
36

2 100 1 x 5–12 kt bomb
36
or Ra’ad-I/II ALCM f. . Ra’ad-I/II ALCM f
–
126
10
16
16
24
–
24
24
–
12

–

2002
200 1 x 5–12 kt
2004
300 1 x 5–12 kt
2003/2022 750/900 1 x 5–12 kt
2014
2 000 1 x 10–40 kt[2024]
2 750 1 x 10–40 kt
2003
1 250 1 x 10–40 kt
2013
70 1 x 5–12 kt..
2 200 [MRV or MIRV] j
2014/[early 350/450 1 x 5–12 kt
2020s]..
900 1 x 5–12 kt–[2025]––

Sea-based missiles
Babur-3 SLCM
Other stored warheads m
Total stockpile

450 1 x 5–12 kt

[8]
162

170 m

. . = not available or not applicable; – = nil or a negligible value; [ ] = uncertain SIPRI estimate;
ALCM = air-launched cruise missile; GLCM = ground-launched cruise missile; kt = kiloton;
MIRV = multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle; MRV = multiple re-entry vehicle;
SLCM = sea-launched cruise missile.
a For aircraft, the listed range is for illustrative purposes only; actual mission range will vary
according to flight profile, weapon payload and in-flight refuelling.
b The yields of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are not known. The 1998 nuclear tests demon­
strated a yield of up to 12 kt. Since then, it is possible that boosted warheads have been introducedwith a higher yield. There is no open-source evidence that Pakistan has developed 2-stage
thermonuclear warheads.
c Aircraft and several missile types are dual-capable—that is, they can be armed with either
conventional or nuclear warheads. Cruise missile launchers (aircraft and land- and sea-based
missiles) can carry more than 1 missile. This estimate counts an average of 1 nuclear warhead
per launcher. Pakistan does not deploy its warheads on launchers but keeps them in separate
storage facilities.
d There are unconfirmed reports that Pakistan modified for a nuclear weapon-delivery rolesome of the 40 F-16 aircraft procured from the United States in the 1980s. However, it is assumed
here that the nuclear weapons assigned to aircraft are for use by Mirage aircraft. When theMirage IIIs and Vs are eventually phased out, it is possible that the JF-17 will take over their
nuclear role in the Pakistan Air Force.
e Pakistan possesses many more than 36 Mirage aircraft, but this table only includes those thatare assumed to have a nuclear weapon-delivery role.
f The Ra’ad (Hatf-8) ALCM has a claimed range of 350 km and an estimated yield of 5–12 kt.
However, there is no available evidence to suggest that the Ra’ad has been deployed and it istherefore not included in the operational warhead count. In 2017 the Pakistani military displayed

338 military spending and armaments, 2023
a Ra’ad-II variant with a reported range of 600 km. It was test flown for the first time in 2020 andseveral additional flights will be needed before it becomes operational. In 2023 images emerged
for the first time of a JF-17 carrying what resembled a Ra’ad ALCM, suggesting a potential dualcapable role for the aircraft—although this had not been officially confirmed as of Jan. 2024.
g Some launchers might have 1 or more missile reloads.
h It is unclear whether the Shaheen-IA has the same ‘Hatf-4’ designation as the Shaheen-I.
i The designation for the Shaheen-III is unknown.
j The Pakistani military claimed in 2017 that the Ababeel can deliver multiple warheads using
MIRV technology, but does not appear to have provided any further information since then.
k Pakistan has been upgrading its original Babur GLCMs to Babur-1As by improving theiravionics and target-engagement systems to hit both land and sea targets. The range of the original
Babur is listed as 350 km by the US Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, while
Pakistan claims that the range of the improved Babur-1A is 450 km.
l The Babur-2 GLCM is sometimes referred to as the Babur-1B.
m In addition to the c. 162 warheads estimated to be assigned to operational forces, SIPRI
estimates that c. 8 warheads have been produced to arm future Shaheen-III missiles, for a total
estimated stockpile of c. 170 warheads. Pakistan’s warhead stockpile is expected to continue toincrease.
Sources: Pakistani Ministry of Defence, various documents; US Air Force (USAF), National Air
and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, various years; International
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, various years; Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, ‘Nuclear notebook’, various issues; and authors’ estimates.

world nuclear forces 339

VIII. North Korean nuclear forceshans m. kristensen and matt korda*
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) main­
tains an active but highly opaque nuclear weapon programme. SIPRI esti­mates that, as of January 2024, North Korea possessed around 50 nuclear
weapons (see table 7.9, end of section), but that it probably possessed suf­
ficient fissile material for an approximate total of up to 90 nuclear devices,
depending on warhead design. Based on statements by the North Koreanleader, Kim Jong Un, and North Korea’s expanding force posture, it seems
likely that North Korea intends to increase its nuclear warhead inventory
significantly.
The estimates for North Korea are based on calculations of the amountof fis­sile material—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—that
North Korea is believed to have produced for use in nuclear weapons (seesection X of this chapter), its nuclear weapon testing history, its observ­
able missile forces and assessments by the authors. Analysing the numbers
and types of North Korean war­heads and deliv­ery vehicles is fraught withuncertainty due to limited or untrust­worthy public sources. Much of thedata presented here is derived from sources out­side North Korea, including
satellite imagery, United States govern­ment reports and statements (which
may also be biased), and expert analyses, as well as state media publications.1
North Korea has conducted a total of six nuclear explosive tests: in 2006,
2009, 2013, twice in 2016, and most recently in 2017.2 Despite construction
work at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site during 2023 and other appar­ent prep­
arations for a seventh nuclear test, no test had taken place by the end of theyear.3 North Korea claims to have non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weaponsand ‘super-large hydrogen bomb[s]’ in its inventory.4
This section continues by summarizing the role played by nuclear weaponsin North Korea’s military doctrine. It then outlines the country’s capabil­ities
for production of fissile material and nuclear warheads before describing its
mis­siles and missile programmes.

1 Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Estimating world nuclear forces: An overview and assessment ofsources’, SIPRI Commentary, 14 June 2021.
2 Fedchencko, V., ‘Nuclear explosions, 1945–2017’, SIPRI Yearbook 2018.
3 Bermudez Jr., J. S., Cha, V. and Jun, J., ‘Punggye-ri update: New activity at tunnel no. 4’, Beyond
Parallel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 May 2023.
4 Korean Central News Agency, ‘On report made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at eighth Party
Congress of WPK’, KCNA Watch, 9 Jan. 2021.

* The authors wish to thank Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight for contributing invaluable
research to this publication.

340 military spending and armaments, 2023

The role of nuclear weapons in North Korean military doctrine
North Korea has repeatedly signalled through doctrinal commitments andthe testing of new capabilities that it will continue to develop its long- andshort-range nuclear capabilities to serve as both a deterrent and potentially a
response to any perceived threat.
According to the 2022 Law on the Nuclear Weapons Policy of the Demo­cratic People’s Republic of Korea (which updated and repealed legislationfrom 2013), North Korea’s nuclear forces are required to be ‘regularly readyfor action’.5 The new law also clarified that nuclear weapons could be usedpre-emptively—contradicting an earlier pledge from October 2020 thatthey would not be used in this way—in response to a perceived nuclear or
non-nuclear attack on North Korea’s leadership or the command structureof its nuclear forces, or other significant attack against a strategic target.6
It also suggested that North Korea could use nuclear weapons to ‘seize theinitia­tive’ during wartime.7 In September 2022 Kim Jong Un declared thatthe law codified North Korea’s ‘irreversible’ status as a nuclear-armed state
and that it would ‘never give up’ its nuclear weapons.8 North Korea amended
its constitution in September 2023 to enshrine its status as a nuclear-armed
state.9
North Korea’s doctrine includes a form of negative security assurance.
According to the 2022 law, North Korea ‘shall neither threaten non-nuclear
weapon states with its nuclear weapons nor use nuclear weapons againstthem unless they join aggression or attack against North Korea in collusion
with other nuclear weapon possessing states’, with the caveat probablyreferring to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan.10 In December
2022 the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of
Korea (WPK) noted that the first mission of North Korea’s nuclear force is to

5 [Law on the Nuclear Weapons Policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea], adopted
by the Supreme People’s Assembly 8 Sep. 2022 (in Korean), Article 7. For an English translation see
Korean Central News Agency, ‘Law on DPRK’s policy on nuclear forces promulgated’, DPRK Today,
9 Sep. 2022. For details of the 2013 legislation see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘North Korean
nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2023, p. 307.
6 [Law on the Nuclear Weapons Policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] (note 5),
Article 6. On the earlier pledge not to use nuclear weapons ‘pre-emptively’ see ‘Kim Jong Un’s Octoberspeech: More than missiles’, 38 North, 13 Oct. 2020.
7 [Law on the Nuclear Weapons Policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] (note 5),
Article 6.
8 Rodong Sinmun, [State administration speech by dear comrade Kim Jong Un at the 7th sessionof the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 8 September
Juche 111 (2022)], KCNA Watch, 9 Sep. 2022 (in Korean, author translation).
9 Korean Central News Agency, ‘9th session of 14th SPA of DPRK held’, KCNA Watch, 28 Sep. 2023.
10 [Law on the Nuclear Weapons Policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] (note 5),
Article 5.

world nuclear forces 341‘deter war and safeguard peace and stability’, but that, if deterrence fails, itwill ‘carry out the second mission, which will not be for defense’.11
Fissile material and warhead production
Plutonium-production and -separation capabilities
North Korea’s plutonium-production and -separation capabilities for manu­
facturing nuclear weapons are located at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific
Research Centre in North Pyongan province.12 Since its inspectors wererequired to leave the country in 2009, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) has monitored North Korea’s nuclear programme using
open-source information and commercial satellite imagery.13
The Yongbyon complex houses an ageing 5-megawatt-electric (MW(e))
graphite-moderated research reactor, from which plutonium can beextracted. The reactor has been operational since late 2021 with inter­mit­tent
pauses for maintenance or plutonium reprocessing.14 The latest such pause
was in September 2023, when a joint intelligence assessment by South Korea
and the USA reportedly indicated that North Korea had halted reactor oper­
ations to begin reprocessing again.15
It remains unclear whether North Korea has resumed construction of the
50-MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon that began in the 1980s. Various activities
observable at the site through satellite imagery suggest that construction
may have restarted in early 2022. However, there has not been significant
construction activity visible since then.16
Over the past decade, North Korea has also been constructing an Experi­mental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) at Yongbyon.17 In December 2023 the
IAEA director general, Rafael Grossi, confirmed open-source reporting that
11 ‘Report on 6th enlarged plenary meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee’, Minju Choson, 1 Jan.
2023. See also [Law on the Nuclear Weapons Policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea](note 5), Article 1.
12 For an assessment of North Korea’s nuclear weapon production facilities and infrastructure see
Hecker, S. S., Carlin, R. L. and Serbin, E. A., ‘A comprehensive history of North Korea’s nuclear program:2018 update’, Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, 11 Feb. 2019.
13 Dixit, A., ‘IAEA ready to undertake verification and monitoring in North Korea’, International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 4 Mar. 2019.
14 United Nations, Security Council, Midterm report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to
Resolution 2680 (2023), S/2023/656, 12 Sep. 2023.
15 Shin, J., ‘Yongbyon nuclear reactor could yield weapon-grade plutonium’, Dong-a Ilbo, 5 Oct.
2023.
16 Lewis, J., Pollack, J. and Schmerler, D., ‘North Korea resuming construction at the Yongbyon
50 MW(e) reactor’, Arms Control Wonk, 10 May 2022.
17 Early statements from North Korean officials and more recent statements from Western officials
refer to the reactor as a light water reactor; however, North Korea has not explicitly referred to it assuch for years. Some analysts speculate that this change in nomenclature could imply that North Korea
has redesigned the reactor to produce weapon-grade plutonium rather than reactor-grade plutonium.
Sokolin, A., ‘North Korea regularly operating new nuclear reactor at Yongbyon: Report’, NK News,
26 Jan. 2024.

342 military spending and armaments, 2023

warm water discharge observed at the complex indicated that the reactor had
reached criticality and was likely operational.18 While it is more challenging
to process fuel derived from light water reactors than from gas-graphite
reactors, one estimate suggests that North Korea could potentially produce
approximately 20 additional kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium per yearwith its ELWR—a rate approximately four or five times greater than that ofNorth Korea’s 5-MW(e) reactor—from 2025 onwards.19
Producing reliable estimates of North Korea’s plutonium stockpile is ahighly challenging undertaking because it is difficult to assess the efficiency,
power levels and operating schedules of the respective reactors, as well as
how much plutonium has been expended in each of North Korea’s nuclear
tests and produced warheads. Different assumptions for each of these factors
result in different stockpile estimates.20 However, most estimates suggestthat North Korea probably maintained a growing stockpile of 60–80 kg of
plutonium by the end of 2023.21
Uranium-enrichment capabilities
To overcome a limited capacity to produce weapon-grade plutonium, it is
widely believed that North Korea has focused on the production of HEU
for use in its nuclear warheads. However, there is considerable uncertainty
about North Korea’s uranium-enrichment capabilities and its stock of HEU.
North Korea produces yellowcake—the raw material for reactor fuel rods—
at its Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant (Nam-chon Chemical Com­plex)
in North Hwanghae province.22 The IAEA director general reported inAug­ust 2023 that North Korea continued to operate its expanded gas centri­
fuge enrichment facility at Yongbyon as well as a possible covert centri­fuge

18 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ‘IAEA director general statement on recent
developments in the DPRK’s nuclear programme’, 147/2023, Press release, 21 Dec. 2023; and Lewis, J.
and Schmerler, D., ‘North Korea’s ELWR now appears operating’, Arms Control Wonk, 21 Dec. 2023.
19 Albright, D. et al., ‘North Korea’s ELWR: Finally operational after a long delay’, Institute for
Science and International Security, 23 Jan. 2024; and Park, S. and Puccioni, A., ‘North Korea’s pursuitof an ELWR: Potential power in nuclear ambitions?’, 38 North, 24 Jan. 2024.
20 Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) and James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), ‘Estimating North Korea’s nuclear material inventory’, 2023.
21 South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND), [2022 defence white paper] (MND: Seoul,
24 Feb. 2023) (in Korean); Dr Jeffrey Lewis (@ArmsControlWonk), Twitter, 19 Feb. 2023, <https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/1627399193936678913>; Park, Y. and Lee, S., ‘North Korea’s
nuclear warhead quantity estimates and prospects’, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, 2023 (inKorean); de Troullioud de Lanversin, J. and Kütt, M., ‘Verifying North Korea’s plutonium production
with nuclear archaeology’, Science and Global Security, vol. 29, no. 3 (2021), pp. 145–66; and Albright, D.,‘North Korean nuclear weapons arsenal: New estimates of its size and configuration’, Institute for
Science and International Security, 10 Apr. 2023.
22 Bermudez, J. S., Cha, V. and Jun, J., ‘Current status of the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant(Nam-chon Chemical Complex) and January Industrial Mine’, Beyond Parallel, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 8 Nov. 2021; and Bermudez, J. S., Cha, V. and Kim, D., ‘Recent activity at the
Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant (Nam-chon Chemical Complex) and January Industrial Mine’,
Beyond Parallel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 Mar. 2021.

world nuclear forces 343
enrichment facility at Kangson (or Kangsong), to the south-west of Pyong­yang.23
Analysts agree that North Korea has HEU production capabilities, butthere are many unknowns about how much HEU has been produced, espe­
cially given the uncertainties around activities at the Kangson site and thepossibility of additional covert enrichment sites. The stockpile estimate used
for SIPRI’s assessment of North Korea’s nuclear weapon holdings suggests a
range of 280–1500 kg of HEU (see section X).
Nuclear warhead production
It is unclear how many nuclear weapons North Korea has produced with
its fissile material, how many have been deployed on missiles, and what thedesigns and military characteristics of the country’s weapons are. North
Korea has demonstrated a thermonuclear capability (or a nuclear explosive
test with suspected thermonuclear yield) only once, in 2017.24 In addition,
most of North Korea’s nuclear tests demonstrated yields in the range of
5–15 kilotons.25 As a result, SIPRI estimates that North Korea has used onlya small portion of its HEU for thermonuclear weapons and has probably
used the majority for a larger number of fission-only single-stage weaponsdeliver­able by medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) or possibly byintermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).26
SIPRI estimates that, as of January 2024, North Korea could potentiallypro­duce up to 90 nuclear weapons with its inventory of fissile material,
depend­ing on warhead design; how­ever, it is likely that the number of oper­
ational warheads is smaller, poten­tially 50. Most of those warheads are likely
to be simple fission weapons with possible yields of 10–20 kt, similar to thosedemonstrated in the 2013 and 2016 tests, along with possibly some more
power­ful uranium and pluto­nium compos­ite pit or basic thermonuclear
designs. SIPRI’s estimate of North Korea’s oper­ational nuclear weaponarsenal is within the 20–60 range noted in the latest publicly available
intelligence assessments issued by South Korea (in 2018) and the USA (in2020).27 The number of nuclear warheads North Korea actually possesses ishighly uncertain. In 2023 Kim Jong Un made several state­ments indicating

23 International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors and General Conference, ‘Applicationof safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, Report by the Director General,
GOV/2023/41-GC(67)/20, 25 Aug. 2023.
24 Fedchencko (note 2), p. 299.
25 Fedchencko, V., ‘Nuclear explosions, 1945–2016’, SIPRI Yearbook 2017.
26 Ballistic missiles are typically divided into 4 range categories: short range (less than 1000 km),medium range (1000–3000 km), intermediate range (3000–5500 km) and intercontinental (>5500 km).
27 Kim, H., ‘Seoul: North Korea estimated to have 20–60 nuclear weapons’, AP, 2 Oct. 2018; and US
Army, North Korean Tactics, Army Techniques Publication no. 7-100.2 (Headquarters, US Departmentof the Army: Washington, DC, July 2020), p. 1-11.

344 military spending and armaments, 2023

plans to increase ‘exponentially’ North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.28 Basedon such statements and the likely continued acceleration in the country’s
fissile material production rates, North Korea’s nuclear weapon stockpile isexpected to grow in the coming years.
Non-strategic nuclear weapons
While much media attention has been paid to North Korea’s developmentof nuclear weapons for its longer-range strategic missiles, in recent years
Kim Jong Un has placed a strong emphasis on ‘mak[ing] nuclear weapons
smaller and lighter for more tactical uses’.29 This could indicate an ambition
to have the capability to respond on a more limited scale to threats that do notreach the threshold for a full-scale nuclear attack. The eventual deploymentof tactical weapons also raises questions about North Korea’s nuclear com­mand and control, particularly surrounding whether Kim has pre-delegatednuclear launch authority to his battlefield commanders.
In March 2023 state media showed Kim Jong Un inspecting 10 objects thathe claimed were Hwasan-31 ‘tactical’ nuclear devices, designed for inter­oper­
ability between at least 8 different delivery systems, although it is pos­siblethat they were mock-ups.30 However, the development of inter­operable war­heads is fraught with difficulty, given necessary differences between systems
in terms of size, shape, mass, centre of gravity and many other technologicalfactors. While it is likely that North Korea’s tactical nuclear weapons have alower yield than warheads designed for longer-range systems, a 2023 reportby a United Nations panel of experts suggested the possibility that theseweapons could possess multiple yield settings.31 Although the Russian Feder­
ation and the USA designed their tactical nuclear weapons with multiple
yield settings, it is unknown to what extent North Korea can and will do so.
Land-based missiles
North Korea is increasing both the size and capability of its ballistic missile
force, which consists of indigenously produced missile systems with ranges
from a few hundred kilometres to more than 12 000 km (see table 7.9).32
Since 2016, it has pursued the development and production of several missile
systems with progressively longer ranges and increasingly sophisti­cated28 See e.g. Korean Central News Agency, ‘Respected comrade Kim Jong Un guides work for
mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles’, KCNA Watch, 28 Mar. 2023.
29 Korean Central News Agency (note 4); and ‘Respected comrade Kim Jong Un guides military
drills of KPA units for operation of tactical nukes’, Rodong Sinmun, 10 Oct. 2022.
30 Korean Central News Agency (note 28); and United Nations, S/2023/656 (note 14).
31 United Nations, S/2023/656 (note 14).
32 US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat 2020 (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2020).

world nuclear forces 345
deliv­ery capabilities.33 It is unclear which of North Korea’s missiles can carrynuclear weapons, and there is considerable uncertainty about the oper­
ational status of North Korea’s IRBMs and intercontinental ballistic mis­siles(ICBMs)—particularly given that several systems that have been displayed or
test launched over the years may have been for technology demonstrator pro­grammes rather than for operational deployment. According to independent
analyses, North Korea may have deployed long-range missiles at several
missile bases.34
It must be emphasized that inclusion of a specific North Korean missile in
the following overview (and in table 7.9) does not necessarily indicate that it
is confirmed as nuclear-capable or as having a nuclear role.
Short-range ballistic missiles
As of January 2024 North Korea had several types of short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs), including older liquid-fuelled systems—possibly based on
Soviet R-17 (Scud) missiles—and newer solid-fuelled missiles of indigenous
design. The USA has given these newer missiles the designations KN23,
KN24 and KN25, the first two of which are known by the com­mon North
Korean designation of Hwasong-11, with different suffixes for each missile.
Between the beginning of 2019 and the end of 2023 these missiles had
been tested or launched around 70 times (but possibly many more).35 They
have been tested from several different basing modes, including wheeled
and tracked transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), rail-based launchers,
under­water launchers and land-based silos.36 In March 2023 North Korea
apparently carried out its first test of an SRBM from what appeared to bea rudimentary silo, a notable change from the country’s long history ofprioritiz­ing mobile basing modes for its missiles.37 North Korea has also
been modernizing its older SRBMs by equipping them with manoeuvrable

33 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), CNS North Korea Missile Test
Database, Nuclear Threat Initiative, as of 24 Mar. 2022.
34 Bermudez, J. S. and Cha, V., ‘Undeclared North Korea: The Yusang-ni missile operating base’,Beyond Parallel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 May 2019; Frank, M., ‘Continued
construction at Yusang-ni missile base’, Open Nuclear Network, 26 July 2021; and United Nations,
Security Council, Final report of the panel of experts submitted pursuant to Resolution 2515 (2020),
S/2021/211, 4 Mar. 2021, annexes 16–18.
35 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (note 33); United Nations, S/2023/656(note 14); Zwirko, C., ‘North Korea reveals internal names for several missile systems: Analysis’,NK News, 3 Apr. 2023; and Colin Zwirko (@ColinZwirko), X, 27 July 2023, <https://twitter.com/
colinzwirko/status/1684458112441540608?s=12&t=JpCAcqsmOTgFYzs5XwS_Hg>.
36 United Nations, S/2023/656 (note 14).
37 Joseph Dempsey (@JosephHDempsey), Twitter, 19 Mar. 2023, <https://twitter.com/JosephH
Dempsey/status/1637605502262673408>; and Zwirko, C., ‘New North Korean film reveals secret Kim
Jong Un visits to weapons factories’, NK News, 15 Jan. 2024.

346 military spending and armaments, 2023

re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) designed to evade the missile-defence systems of
nearby states (particularly South Korea and Japan).38
Medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
North Korea has four types of MRBM: the Hwasong-7 (Nodong/Rodong),
the Hwasong-9 (KN04), the Pukguksong-2 (KN15) and two variants of the
Hwasong-12 (Ga and Na) with different types of hyper­sonic glide vehicle(HGV).39 All except the Hwasong-12 variants were prob­ably oper­ational as ofJanuary 2024. Assuming that North Korea can produce a sufficiently compact
warhead, these MRBMs are its most likely nuclear-delivery systems.40 All
three operational missiles have ranges of 1000–1200 km, meaning that they
could reach targets anywhere in South Korea or Japan.41
The Hwasong-10 (BM-25/Musudan) IRBM, with an estimated range
exceeding 3000 km, has had no flight tests since 2016–17. It is likely to havebeen superseded by more sophisticated missile programmes—in particular
the Hwasong-12 (KN17), a single-stage, liquid-fuelled IRBM carried on aroad-mobile (TEL).42 For this reason, the Hwasong-10 is excluded from
SIPRI’s estimate for January 2024. North Korean state media showed Kim
Jong Un inspecting at least 26 unassembled Hwasong-12 IRBMs in January
2023.43
The two Hwasong-12 MRBM variants, which were first tested in 2021 and
2022, appear to be composed of modified Hwasong-12 boosters, each carrying
different payloads—an HGV (designated the Hwasong-12Na) and a conical
MaRV (probably designated the Hwasong-12Ga)—allowing them to conduct
what North Korea has called ‘corkscrew’ manoeuvres.44
In November 2023 North Korea announced that it had successfully con­ducted ground tests of new first- and second-stage solid-fuelled motors forthe development of a new IRBM.45
38 Panda, A., ‘Introducing the KN21, North Korea’s new take on its oldest ballistic missile’, The
Diplomat, 14 Sep. 2017.
39 For the missiles and submarines discussed in this section, a designation in parentheses (e.g.
Nodong/Rodong) following the North Korean designation (e.g. Hwasong-7) is the designation assignedby the US Department of Defense. On the Pukguksong-2 see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘North
Korean nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2022, p. 420.
40 On North Korea’s potential warhead miniaturization capability see Kile, S. N. andKristensen, H. M., SIPRI Yearbook 2019, p. 343; and Robles, P. and Choe, S., ‘Why North Korea’s latest
nuclear claims are raising alarms’, New York Times, 2 June 2023.
41 US Air Force (note 32), p. 25.
42 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (note 33).
43 NK News (@nknewsorg), Twitter, 1 Jan. 2023, <https://twitter.com/nknewsorg/status/16094399
52093446145>.
44 Chongnyon Chonwi, ‘Distinguished feat of WPK in history of leading Juche-based defence
industry success in another hypersonic missile test-fire respected comrade Kim Jong Un watches testfire in field’, KCNA Watch, 12 Jan. 2022; and Liebermann, O., Muntean, P. and Starr, B., ‘US groundedplanes as a “precaution” after a North Korean missile launch’, CNN, 11 Jan. 2022.
45 Rodong Sinmun, ‘New IRBM solid-fuel engine test conducted in DPRK’, KCNA Watch, 16 Nov.
2023.

world nuclear forces 347
Intercontinental ballistic missiles
North Korea has displayed five types of ICBM: the Hwasong-13 (KN08/
KN14), -14 (KN20), -15 (KN22), -17 (KN28) and -18 (no known US designation).
It has prioritized building and deploying an ICBM that could potentiallydeliver a nuclear warhead to targets in the USA. There remains considerable
uncertainty in US assessments of North Korea’s long-range missile capabil­ities. However, even though North Korea has never test launched an ICBM
to its maximum range on an operational trajectory, it seems highly likelythat at least some of these systems have been operationally deployed. It is
likely that the Hwasong-13 has been superseded by more sophisticated ICBM
programmes and, as a result, this system is excluded from table 7.9.46 It is also
possible that the Hwasong-14 has been superseded.
The Hwasong-15, which SIPRI assesses to be operationally deployed, has asignifi­cantly larger second stage and more powerful booster engines than the
Hwasong-14.47 The Hwasong-15 was tested once in 2023 as part of a ‘surprise
ICBM launching drill’ to demonstrate the launch unit’s combat readiness.48
The Hwasong-17 could be large enough to accommodate multiple warheads,
but this capability had not been demonstrated as of January 2024.49 The
Hwasong-17 has been test launched at least twice, with the most recent test
taking place in March 2023, to a possible range of approximately 15 000 km.50
In April 2023 North Korea test launched a new solid-fuelled ICBM known
as the Hwasong-18, which state media described as ‘the future core pivotal
means of the strategic force of the DPRK’.51 The system was subsequently
tested two more times, in July and December 2023.52
North Korean state media’s characterization of the most recent
Hwasong-15, -17 and -18 tests as ‘launching drills’—rather than ‘test-fires’
meant to validate technical performance—suggests that all three systems

46 NK News, ‘North Korea military parade 2020: Livestream & analysis’, YouTube, 10 Oct. 2020.
47 Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘North Korean nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2021, p. 402.
48 DPRK Today, ‘ICBM launching drill staged in DPRK’, KCNA Watch, 20 Feb. 2023.

49 Ankit Panda (@nktpnd), Twitter, 13 Oct. 2021, <https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/
1448073861363290124>.
50 On 24 March 2022 North Korea claimed to have test launched the Hwasong-17 with a possible
range of approximately 15 000 km. However, some analysts believe that the ICBM may have been
unsuccessfully tested on 16 March and that the missile tested on 24 March may instead have beena Hwasong-15. Zwirko, C., ‘Imagery casts doubt over North Korea’s Hwasong-17 ICBM claims’, NK
News, 25 Mar. 2022.
51 Minju Choson, ‘Another mighty entity showing continuous development of strategic force unveiledin DPRK. Respected comrade Kim Jong Un guides first test-fire of new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on
spot’, KCNA Watch, 14 Apr. 2023.
52 Korean Central News Agency, ‘Respected comrade Kim Jong Un guides test-fire of ICBM
Hwasongpho-18’, KCNA Watch, 13 July 2023; and Korean Central News Agency, ‘Clear display of
DPRK strategic forces’ toughest retaliation will and overwhelming strength launch drill of ICBM
Hwasongpho-18 conducted’, KCNA Watch, 19 Dec. 2023.

348 military spending and armaments, 2023

have been operationally deployed.53 Given the differences between the threemis­siles, it seems likely that they are intended to operate simul­taneously
rather than as replacements for each other.
Notably, North Korea’s military parade in February 2023 showcased
16 heavy TELs for its ICBMs—an unprecedented number—suggesting thatthe country may have overcome its previous constraints in indigenous heavy
TEL production.54 This could potentially allow North Korea’s mobile ICBM
force to expand more rapidly over the coming years.
Cruise missiles
By the end of 2023 North Korea had developed at least two types of landattack cruise missile (LACM) that it explicitly claims are designed to deliver
nuclear weapons: the Hwasal-1 and the Hwasal-2. Combined, these two
missile types had been tested at least a dozen times as of the end of 2023.
Although North Korea has described these LACMs as ‘strategic weapons’, italso clarified in October 2022 that the missiles were ‘deployed at the units of
the Korean People’s Army for the operation of tactical nukes’.55 Both typesof cruise missile were successfully tested to ranges of between 1500 and1800 km in March 2023. North Korean state media’s description of the tests
as ‘launching drills’ designed to ‘let the strategic cruise missile sub-units getfamiliar with action methods and handling of equipment through repeatedpractice’ suggests that both systems have been operationally deployed.56
Sea-based missiles
North Korea for several years operated only one ballistic missile submarine—
the Gorae-class (Sinpo) experimental submarine, named 8.24 Yongung. Thissub­marine can hold and launch only a single submarine-launched bal­listicmis­sile (SLBM).57 In September 2023, however, North Korea launcheda ‘newly built . . . tactical nuclear submarine No. 841’ named the Hero Kim
Kun Ok, which appears to be a heavily modi­
fied Project-633 (Romeo)

53 DPRK Today, ‘ICBM launching drill staged in DPRK’, KCNA Watch, 20 Feb. 2023; Rodong Sinmun,‘Demonstration of toughest response posture of DPRK’s strategic forces ICBM Hwasongpho-17
launched’, KCNA Watch, 17 Mar. 2023; and Korean Central News Agency, ‘Respected comrade Kim
Jong Un guides test-fire of ICBM Hwasongpho-18’ (note 52).
54 Korean Central Television (KCTV), ‘North Korean Military Parade February 8, 2023 (KCTV)’,
YouTube, 12 Feb. 2023.
55 Shin, H. and Smith, J., ‘N. Korea tests first “strategic” cruise missile with possible nuclear
capability’, Reuters, 13 Sep. 2021. See also Kristensen and Korda (note 39), pp. 421–22; and ‘Respected
comrade Kim Jong Un guides test-fire of long-range strategic cruise missiles’, Korea Central News
Agency, 13 Oct. 2022.
56 Korean Central News Agency, ‘Important weapon test and firing drill conducted in DPRK’, KCNA
Watch, 24 Mar. 2023.
57 Bermudez, J. S., Cha, V. and Jun, J., ‘Sinpo-class submarine damaged during October 19 test
launch’, Beyond Parallel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 Jan. 2022.

world nuclear forces 349
diesel–electric submarine fitted with 10 vertical missile-launch tubes: four
for large-diameter Pukguksong SLBMs and six for smaller-diameter mis­siles.58 Although it would bring a significant improvement in payload once
oper­ational, this Soviet-era submarine class has a noisy design and limited
under­water range. In a speech at the launch of the new submarine, Kim Jong
Un announced a ‘plan to convert all existing medium-sized submarines into
attack submarines equipped with tactical nuclear weapons’.59
North Korea has continued to develop its family of Pukguksong (‘Polaris’)
solid-fuelled SLBMs, with at least six increasingly larger Pukguksong iter­
ations having been displayed or tested over the years.60 However, North
Korea has conducted relatively few tests of its SLBM force and it appears
likely that the country will continue to prioritize its land-based force over its
sea-based force for the foreseeable future.
North Korea is developing a new submarine-launched cruise missile,
known as Pulhwasal-3-31. The system has been labelled a ‘strategic cruise
missile’—implying a nuclear-capable status—and state media noted that a testof the missile took place in the context of the ‘nuclear weaponization of ournavy’.61 The ‘Pulhwasal’ designation suggests that the missile is part of thesame family as the land-based Hwasal-1 and Hwasal-2 cruise missiles but thiswas unconfirmed as of January 2024. Because of the high level of uncertainty
about the status of the Pulhwasal-3-31 system, it is not included in table 7.9.
In 2023 North Korea unveiled and test launched several new iterations of an‘underwater nuclear attack drone’, all of which are part of the ‘Haeil’ family.
North Korean media stated that the system’s mission is ‘to stealthily infiltrate
into operational waters and make a super-scale radioactive tsunami throughunderwater explosion to destroy naval striker groups and major operational
ports of the enemy’.62 North Korea claims to have tested various iterations ofthe ‘Haeil’ system dozens of times, some of which included test durations of
between 40 and 70 hours. However, SIPRI assesses that the system had notbeen deployed as of January 2024.63

58 Bermudez, J. S., Cha, V. and Jun, J., ‘North Korea launches new ballistic missile submarine’,
Beyond Parallel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11 Sep. 2023.
59 Rodong Sinmun, ‘Respected comrade Kim Jong Un makes congratulatory speech at ceremony forlaunching newly-built submarine’, KCNA Watch, 9 Sep. 2023.
60 On North Korea’s earlier Pukguksong family of missiles see Kristensen and Korda (note 47),
p. 403.
61 Minju Choson, ‘Respected comrade Kim Jong Un guides test-fire of submarine-launched strategic
cruise missile’, KCNA Watch, 29 Jan. 2024.
62 Korean Central News Agency (note 56).
63 Korean Central News Agency (note 56); and Naenara, ‘An underwater strategic weapon systemtest conducted’, KCNA Watch, 8 Apr. 2023.

350 military spending and armaments, 2023

Table 7.9. North Korean forces with potential nuclear capability, January 2024
All figures are approximate and some are based on assessments by the authors. The inclusion of a
missile in this table does not necessarily indicate it is known to have a nuclear role. Systems thatare unlikely to have a nuclear or operational role are excluded.
Type/
North Korean designation(US designation)

Year firstdisplayed

Range (km)Hwasong-5/-6(Scud-B/-C)

1984/1990

300/500. . (KN18/KN21)

2017

250/450

Description and status

Land-based missiles
Single-stage, liquid-fuelled SRBMs
launched from 4-axle wheeled
TEL. NASIC estimates fewer than
100 Hwasong-5 and -6 launchers.
Operational.
Hwasong-5 and -6 variants withseparating manoeuvrable warhead.
Flight-tested in May and Aug. 2017 fromwheeled and tracked TELs.

Hwasong-11A/Ba (KN23/
KN24). . (KN25)

2018/2019

380–800

Deployment status unknown; may havebeen superseded by newer solid-fuelled
SRBMs.
New generation of solid-fuelled SRBMs.
Resemble Russia’s Iskander-M, South
Korea’s Hyunmoo-2B and the USA’s
ATACMS SRBMs.
Successfully flight-tested at least
70 times, and possibly many more,from wheeled, tracked, rail-based,
underwater and silo-based launchers
since 2019.

Hwasong-7 (Nodong/Rodong)1993>1 200

Deployment status unknown; probably
operational.
Single-stage, liquid-fuelled MRBM
launched from 5-axle wheeled
TEL. NASIC estimates fewer than
100 Hwasong-7 launchers.
Two test-launched on 18 Dec. 2022.

Hwasong-9 (KN04/
Scud-ER)

2016

1 000

Operational.
Single-stage, liquid-fuelled Scud
extended-range MRBM variant
launched from 4-axle wheeled TEL.
Flight-tested in 2016.

Pukguksong-2 (KN15)

2017>1 000

Probably operational.
Two-stage, solid-fuelled MRBM
launched from tracked TEL. Landbased version of Pukguksong-1 SLBM.
Flight-tested in 2017.
Probably operational.

world nuclear forces 351
Type/North Korean designation(US designation)

Year firstdisplayed

Range (km)Description and status

Hwasal-1/-2

2021

1 500/2 000

Land-attack cruise missiles flight-tested
multiple times between 2021 and 2023
from wheeled TELs.

Hwasong-12A/Bb

2021>1 000

Deployment status unknown; probably
operational.
Two versions of HGV carried by ashortened Hwasong-12 booster.
No flight tests of either system in
2023 after a short testing campaign in
2021–22.

Hwasong-12 (KN17)/‘New type’ IRBM

2017/2022>4 500Under development.
Single-stage, liquid-fuelled IRBM
launched from 8-axle wheeled TEL.
Flight-tested several times in 2017 with
mixed success. Last known test was on
30 Jan. 2022.
A ‘new type’ IRBM variant strongly
resembling the existing Hwasong-12
design, but with potential modifications
to the nose cone and propulsion system,
was test launched on 4 Oct. 2022.

Hwasong-14 (KN20)

2017>10 000

Deployment status unknown; probably
operational.
Two-stage, liquid-fuelled ICBM
launched from 8-axle wheeled TEL.
Successfully flight-tested twice in 2017.

Hwasong-15 (KN22)

2017>13 000

Deployment status unknown; may havebeen superseded.
Two-stage, liquid-fuelled ICBM
launched from 9-axle wheeled TEL.
Flight-tested in Feb. 2023.

Hwasong-17 (KN28)c

2020

15 000

Deployment status unknown; probably
operational.
Two-stage, liquid-fuelled ICBM
launched from 11-axle wheeled TEL.
Possibly capable of carrying MIRVs andpenetration aids.
Flight-tested in Mar. 2023.
Deployment status unknown; probably
operational.

352 military spending and armaments, 2023
Type/
North Korean designation(US designation)

Year firstdisplayed

Hwasong-18

2023

Range (km)15 000Description and status
Three-stage, solid-fuelled ICBM
launched from 9-axle wheeled TEL(same launcher as Hwasong-15).
Unveiled and flight-tested three times
in 2023, with the latest test being
described as a ‘launching drill’.
Deployment status unknown; probably
operational.

Sea-based missiles
Pukguksong-1 (KN11)

2014>1 000Two-stage, solid-fuelled SLBM.
Flight-tested several times in 2015 and2016 with mixed success. Displayed at
exhibition in Oct. 2021.

Pukguksong-3 (KN26)

Pukguksong-4

2017

2020

Deployment status unknown; may havebeen superseded.
1 900– Two-stage, solid-fuelled SLBM.
2 500 Successfully flight-tested in Oct. 2019.
Deployment status unknown; probably
not yet operational.
3 500– Two-stage, solid-fuelled SLBM.
5 400 Appears wider than Pukguksong-1 andshorter than Pukguksong-3.
No known flight tests. Displayed atparade in Oct. 2020.

Pukguksong-5

2021

Deployment status unknown; probably
not yet operational.
. . Two-stage, solid-fuelled SLBM.
Roughly same length as Pukguksong-3
with elongated shroud; possibly capableof carrying MIRVs and penetration aids.
No known flight tests. Displayed atparade in Jan. 2021 and at exhibition in
Oct. 2021.

Small ‘new type’ SLBM

2021

400–600

Deployment status unknown; probably
not yet operational.
Appears to deviate from traditional
Pukguksong SLBM design, instead
bearing similarities to KN23 SRBM.
Displayed at exhibition in Oct. 2021 andsuccessfully flight-tested a week later.
Deployment status unknown; probably
not yet operational.

world nuclear forces 353
Type/North Korean designation(US designation)

Year firstdisplayed

Unknown SLBM

2022

Range (km)Description and status. . Revealed at military parade in
Apr. 2022. Name not yet formallyannounced, but appears to be a memberof the Pukguksong family of SLBMs,
possibly Pukguksong-6.
No known flight tests.
Deployment status unknown; probably
not yet operational.

Total warheads

50 d. . = not available or not applicable; HGV = hypersonic glide vehicle; ICBM = intercontinental
ballistic missile; IRBM = intermediate-range ballistic missile; MIRV = multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicle; MRBM = medium-range ballistic missile; NASIC = US Air ForceNational Air and Space Intelligence Center; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile;
SRBM = short-range ballistic missile; TEL = transporter-erector-launcher.
Notes: Information about the status and capability of North Korea’s missiles comes with signifi­
cant uncertainty. This table includes missiles that could potentially have a nuclear capability,
whether or not confirmed as being equipped with nuclear warheads or assigned nuclear
missions. Several missiles may have been intended for development of technologies that will
eventually become operational on newer missiles. There is no publicly available evidence that
North Korea has produced an operational nuclear warhead for delivery by an ICBM.
a North Korea refers to the KN23 as the Hwasong-11Ga and the KN24 as the Hwasong-11Na.

These can be considered akin to Hwasong-11A and -11B, since Ga (가) and Na (나) are the firstand second letters in the Korean alphabet (Hangul). This indicates that these missiles are
improvements on or replacements for the original Hwasong-11 (KN02 Toksa) SRBM.
b These missiles were previously labelled as Hwasong-8 by North Korean state media, butwere redesignated as Hwasong-12Ga and -12Na sometime between 2021 and 2023. As with the
Hwasong-11 (see note a), the designations can be considered akin to Hwasong-12A and -12B.
Only the Na suffix for the Hwasong-12 variant carrying an HGV has been confirmed in official
documentation; however, SIPRI assesses that the Hwasong-12 variant carrying a conical re-entry
vehicle is probably designated with the Ga suffix.
c This missile was previously assumed to be designated the Hwasong-16; however, it was
revealed at North Korea’s Oct. 2021 Defence Development Exhibition that it is called the
Hwasong-17.
d SIPRI estimates that North Korea might have produced enough fissile material to build up to
90 nuclear warheads; however, it is likely that it has assembled fewer warheads, perhaps c. 50, of
which only a few would be thermonuclear warheads and nearly all would be lower-yield singlestage fission warheads.
Sources: US Department of Defense (DOD), 2019 Missile Defense Review (DOD: Washington,
DC, 2019); US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat, various years; IHS Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, various editions; Hecker, S., Stanford
University, Personal communication, 2020; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ‘Nuclear notebook’,
various issues; published expert analyses; and authors’ estimates. For the estimated numberof warheads see also Hecker, S., ‘What do we know about North Korea’s nuclear program?’,Presentation, Dialogue on DPRK Denuclearization Roadmaps and Verification, Kyung Hee
University, Global America Business Institute (GABI) and Natural Resources Defense Council(NRDC), 20 Oct. 2020; ‘Estimating North Korea’s nuclear stockpiles: An interview with
Siegfried Hecker’, 38 North, 30 Apr. 2021; and Fedchenko, V. and Kelley, R., ‘New methodology
offers estimates for North Korean thermonuclear stockpile’, Janes Intelligence Review, Sep.
2020, pp. 44–49.

354 military spending and armaments, 2023

IX. Israeli nuclear forceshans m. kristensen and matt korda*
As of January 2024 Israel was estimated to have a stockpile of around
90 nuclear warheads (see table 7.10, end of section), the same number as
in January 2023. This estimate is at the lower end of a possible range thatsome analysts have suggested could reach as high as 300 nuclear weapons.1
It is assumed that Israel stores its warheads separately from its deployedlaunchers during peacetime.
Israel continues to maintain its long-standing policy of nuclear ambiguity:
it neither officially confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons.2
This lack of transparency means that there is significant uncertainty about
the size of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and the yields and characteristics of its
weapons.3 The estimate here is largely based on calculations of Israel’s
inventory of weapon-grade plutonium (see section X of this chapter) and thenumber of operational nuclear-capable delivery systems. The locations of
the storage sites for the warheads, which are thought to be stored partially
unassembled, are unknown.
This section continues by briefly outlining the role played by nuclear
weapons in Israel’s military doctrine. It then outlines the country’s capabil­ities for production of fissile material before describing its air-delivered,land-based and sea-based weapons.
The role of nuclear weapons in Israeli military doctrine
Since the late 1960s the Israeli government has repeated that Israel ‘won’t
be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East’. However,to accommodate the apparent fact that Israel possesses a significant nuclear
arsenal, Israeli policymakers have previously interpreted ‘introduce nuclear
weapons’ as publicly declaring, testing or actually using the nuclear capabil­ity, which Israel says it has not yet done.4
Given that Israel does not officially acknowledge its apparent possessionof nuclear weapons, the circumstances under which it would use them arehighly unclear. Reports, based on interviews with a retired Israeli general,
1 See e.g. Luscombe, B., ‘10 questions: Jimmy Carter’, Time, 30 Jan. 2012; and Clifton, E., ‘Powellacknowledges Israeli nukes’, Lobe Log, 14 Sep. 2016.
2 On Israel’s ‘strategic ambiguity’ policy see also Cohen, A., ‘Israel’, eds H. Born, B. Gill and
H. Hänggi, SIPRI, Governing the Bomb: Civilian Control and Democratic Accountability of Nuclear
Weapons (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010).
3 Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Estimating world nuclear forces: An overview and assessment ofsources’, SIPRI Commentary, 14 June 2021.
4 For further detail see Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M., ‘Israeli nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook
2022, pp. 404–405.

* The authors wish to thank Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight for contributing invaluable
research to this publication.

world nuclear forces 355
indicate that Israel would have considered using nuclear weapons if it fearedthat it would lose the Arab–Israeli War in 1967.5 In addition, towards the endof 2023 several Israeli policymakers and commentators—including a minister
who was later suspended from the cabinet—suggested that Israel should
use nuclear weapons against Hamas fighters in Gaza.6 These two cases arenotable as they are rare examples of high-ranking Israeli officials seemingly
acknowledging the existence of Israel’s nuclear arsenal.
Military fissile material production
Declassified United States government documents indicate that Israel may
have assembled its first nuclear weapons in the late 1960s, using pluto­nium
produced by the Israel Research Reactor 2 (IRR-2) at the Negev Nuclear
Research Center (NNRC) near Dimona, in southern Israel.7 This heavy water
reactor is not under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
There is little publicly available information about its operating history andpower capacity (see section X).8 Commercial satellite imagery has revealed
progress on significant construction inside and near to the NNRC site since2021, although the purpose of this work is unknown.
Israel is estimated to have had a stockpile of 750–1110 kilograms of pluto­
nium at the start of 2023, depending on the rate at which the reactor was
also used for tritium production (see section X). Based on this esti­mate andassuming that Israel’s warhead arsenal is likely to consist of single-stage,
boosted fission weapons, Israel could hypothetically have built any­where
between 187 and 277 nuclear weapons, assuming approxi­mately 4 kg of
pluto­nium per weapon. However, as with other nuclear-armed states, Israel
is unlikely to have converted all of its plutonium into warheads and has
probably assigned nuclear weapons to only a limited number of launchers.
More­over, the available tritium required to boost the warheads would repre­
sent an additional constraint on the number of weapons Israel could build.
As a result, SIPRI estimates that Israel had approximately 90 warheads as ofJanuary 2024, rather than several hundred.
5 See e.g. Broad, W. and Sanger. D., ‘“Last secret” of 1967 war: Israel’s doomsday plan for nuclear
display’, New York Times, 3 June 2017.
6 Bachner, M., ‘Far-right minister says nuking Gaza an option, PM suspends him from cabinet
meetings’, Times of Israel, 5 Nov. 2023. For further detail on the Israel–Hamas war see chapter 1,
chapter 2, section I, and chapter 10, section II, in this volume.
7 For a history of Israel’s nuclear weapon programme see Cohen, A., The Worst-kept Secret: Israel’s
Bargain with the Bomb (Columbia University Press: New York, 2010); Burr, W. and Cohen, A., ‘Duplicity
and self-deception: Israel, the United States, and the Dimona inspections, 1964–65’, Briefing Book
no. 733, National Security Archive, 10 Nov. 2020; and Cohen, A. and Burr, W., ‘How Israel built a nuclear
program right under the Americans’ nose’, Haaretz, 17 Jan. 2021. See also Kristensen and Korda(note 4), pp. 405–407.
8 Glaser, A. and Miller, M., ‘Estimating plutonium production at Israel’s Dimona reactor’,52nd annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), 17–21 July 2011.

356 military spending and armaments, 2023

Aircraft and air-delivered weapons
Approximately 30 of Israel’s nuclear weapons are estimated to be gravity
bombs for delivery by F-16I or F-15 aircraft. The status of Israel’s F-15s is
unclear, but in 2019 a US official privately referred to them as Israel’s ‘nuclear
squadron’.9 Nuclear gravity bombs without nuclear cores would probably be
stored at protected facilities near one or two air force bases, such as Tel Nof
Air­base in central Israel and Hatzerim Airbase in the Negev desert. Israel isalso acquir­ing 50 F-35 combat aircraft from the USA. The USA and some of
its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have assigned a nuclear
mission to the F-35A (see section I), but it it is unclear whether Israel plans to
assign such a mission to its F-35s.10
Land-based missiles
Up to 50 warheads are thought to be assigned for delivery by land-based
Jericho ballistic missiles, although the Israeli government has never publicly
con­firmed that it possesses the missiles. The missiles are believed to belocated, along with their mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), incaves or bunkers at Sdot Micha Airbase near Zekharia, about 25 kilo­metres
west of Jerusalem. SIPRI assesses that each of the 23 bunkers might becapable of storing two launchers. A nearby complex with its own internal
peri­meter has four tunnels to underground facilities that could potentially be
used for war­head storage, although SIPRI assesses that the nuclear cores areprobably stored elsewhere.
Israel is upgrading its arsenal of missiles from the solid-fuelled, two-stage
Jericho II medium-range ballistic missile to the three-stage Jericho III
missile with a longer range, exceeding 4000 km. The latter first became oper­
ational in 2011 and might already have replaced the Jericho II.11 In recent
years, Israel has conducted several test launches of what it calls ‘rocket
propulsion systems’. These could be related to upgrades to its ballistic missile
force or to the development of Israeli space-launch vehicles, which use solid
rocket motors.12

9 US military official, Interview with the author (H. M. Kristensen), Oct. 2019.
10 Lockheed Martin, ‘Israel’s 5th generation fighter’, [n.d.].
11 O’Halloran, J. C. (ed.), ‘Jericho missiles’, IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015–16 (IHS Jane’s:

Coulsdon, 2015), p. 53.
12 Israeli Ministry of Defense (@Israel_MOD), Twitter, 31 Jan. 2020, <https://twitter.com/Israel_
MOD/status/1223172528992149504>; and Lewis, J., ‘Israeli rocket motor test’, Arms Control Wonk,
23 Apr. 2021.

world nuclear forces 357
Sea-based missiles
Israel operates five German-built Dolphin-class (Dolphin-I and Dolphin-II)
diesel–electric submarines.13 The submarines are based at Haifa on theMedi­ter­ranean coast. There are unconfirmed reports that all or some ofthe submarines have been equipped to launch an indigenously produced
nuclear-armed sea-launched variant of the Popeye cruise missile, giving
Israel a sea-based nuclear strike capability.14 The German government hasdenied that the submarines have the capability to carry nuclear warheads.15
How­ever, if the submarines have been equipped with nuclear missiles, SIPRI
assesses that around 10 cruise missile warheads might be available for thesub­marine fleet.
A sixth submarine, INS Drakon, was launched in August 2023 but had notentered service by the end of the year. Despite it being part of the Dolphin-IIclass, INS Drakon differs from the other submarines in its class. Most notably,
initial images suggest that the boat may be longer and probably has a verticallaunch system embedded in the sail, which could be intended for anothertype of missile that the submarine would carry in addition to the Popeye sealaunched cruise missile.16
In early 2022 Israel signed an agreement with Germany to procure three
new submarines, which will be known as the Dakar class, to replace the threeoldest Dolphin-I-class boats.17 Concept art for the Dakar-class submarines
includes an enlarged sail that, as with INS Drakon, will probably be fittedwith a vertical-launch system capable of launching existing or future missile
types.18

13 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Mar. 2024.
14 Bergman, R. et al., ‘Israel’s deployment of nuclear missiles on subs from Germany’, Der Spiegel,

4 June 2012. See also Frantz, D., ‘Israel’s arsenal is point of contention’, Los Angeles Times, 12 Oct. 2003;
and Sutton, H. I., ‘History of Israeli subs’, Covert Shores, 20 May 2017.
15 Fisher, G., ‘Israel’s German-built submarines are equipped with nuclear weapons, Der Spiegel
reports’, Times of Israel, 3 June 2012.
16 Sutton, H. I., ‘Israel launches new submarine, first in world with modern missiles in sail’, Naval
News, 14 Aug. 2023.
17 ‘Israel signs $3.4 bln submarines deal with Germany’s Thyssenkrupp’, Reuters, 20 Jan. 2022.
18 Newdick, T., ‘Our first look at Israel’s new Dakar class submarine reveals a very peculiar feature’,
The Drive, 20 Jan. 2022.

358 military spending and armaments, 2023

Table 7.10. Israeli nuclear forces, January 2024
All figures are approximate and some are based on assessments by the authors.
Type/designation

No. oflaunchers

Aircraft

125/50 b

F-16I
F-15

100/2525/25

Land-based missiles

50 dJericho II
Jericho III e

25
25

Sea-based missiles

5/20 fPopeye Turbo SLCM

20

Total stockpile

120

Year first
deployed

Range(km) aNo. ofwarheads
30

1980
1998

1 600
4 450

30
. .c
50

1990
[2011]>1 500[>4 000][2002][<1 500]

25
25
10
10
90 g

. . = not available or not applicable; [ ] = uncertain SIPRI estimate; SLCM = sea-launched cruise
missile.
a Aircraft range is for illustrative purposes only; actual range will vary according to flight

profile, weapon payload and in-flight refuelling.
b The first figure is the total number of aircraft in the inventory; the second is the numberof aircraft that might be adapted for a nuclear strike mission. It is estimated that aircraft from
2 squadrons might serve a nuclear strike role.
c It is not known whether the Israeli Air Force has added nuclear capability to the F-15 aircraft
as the United States has done, but one US official has privately described Israel’s F-15s as its‘nuclear squadron’.
d Commercial satellite images show what appear to be 23 caves or bunkers for mobile Jericho
launchers at Sdot Micha Airbase. High-resolution satellite imagery that became available in
2021 indicates that each cave appears to have 2 entrances, which suggests that each cave could
hold up to 2 launchers. If all 23 caves are full, this would amount to 46 launchers.
e The Jericho III is gradually replacing the older Jericho II, if this has not happened already.
A longer-range version with a new solid rocket motor may be under development.
f The first figure is the total number of Dolphin-class submarines in the Israeli fleet; the second
is the estimated maximum number of large-diameter missiles that they can carry. In addition to
6 standard 533-millimetre torpedo tubes, the submarines are reportedly equipped with 4 otherspecially designed 650-mm tubes that could potentially be used to launch larger nuclear-armed
SLCMs. A sixth submarine, INS Drakon, was launched in Aug. 2023 but had not entered service
as of Jan. 2024. It appears to be equipped with a vertical launch system for launching additional
missiles.
g Given the unique lack of publicly available information about Israel’s nuclear arsenal, thisestimate comes with a considerable degree of uncertainty.
Sources: Cohen, A., The Worst-kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb (Columbia University
Press: New York, 2010); Cohen, A., Israel and the Bomb (Columbia University Press: New York,
1998); US National Security Archive, various declassified US government document collections
related to Israel’s nuclear weapon programme; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance, various years; IHS Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, various issues; Fetter, S.,‘Israeli ballistic missile capabilities’, Physics and Society, vol. 19, no. 3 (July 1990); Bulletin of theAtomic Scientists, ‘Nuclear Notebook’, various issues; and authors’ estimates.

world nuclear forces 359

X. Global stocks and production of fissile materials, 2023
friederike frieß, moritz kütt, zia mian and pavel podvig
international panel on fissile materials
Materials that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction are essential
for all types of nuclear explosives, from first-generation fission weapons
to advanced thermonuclear weapons. The most common of these fissile
materials are highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. This section
gives details of military and civilian stocks, as of the beginning of 2023, of
HEU (table 7.11) and separated plutonium (table 7.12)—including in weapons—
and details of the capacity to produce these materials (tables 7.13 and 7.14). The
information in the tables is based on estimates prepared for the International
Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). The most recent annual declarations
on civilian plutonium and HEU stocks to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) give data for 31 December 2022 (INFCIRC/549).
The production of both HEU and plutonium starts with natural uranium.
Natural uranium consists almost entirely of the non-chain-reacting isotope
uranium-238 (U-238) and is only about 0.7 per cent uranium-235 (U-235).
The concentration of U-235 can be increased through enrichment—typicallyusing gas centrifuges. Uranium that has been enriched to less than 20 per
cent U-235 (typically, 3–5 per cent)—known as low-enriched uranium—issuitable for use in power reactors. Uranium that has been enriched to con­tain at least 20 per cent U-235—known as HEU—is generally taken to be thelowest concentration practicable for use in weapons. However, to minimize
the mass of the nuclear explosive, weapon-grade uranium is usually enrichedto over 90 per cent U-235.
Plutonium is produced in nuclear reactors when U-238 in the fuel is
exposed to neutrons. The plutonium is subsequently chemically separated
from spent fuel in a reprocessing operation. Plutonium comes in a variety
of isotopic mixtures, most of which are weapon-usable. Weapon designers
prefer to work with a mixture that predominantly consists of plutonium-239(Pu-239) because of its relatively low rate of spontaneous emission of neu­trons and gamma rays and the low level of heat generation from alpha decay.
Weapon-grade plutonium usually contains more than 90 per cent Pu-239.
The plutonium in typical spent fuel from power reactors (reactor-grade
plutonium) contains 50–60 per cent Pu-239 but is weapon-usable, even in a
first-generation weapon design.
All states that have a civil nuclear industry (i.e. that operate a nuclear
reactor or a uranium-enrichment plant) have some capability to produce
fissile materials that could be used for weapons. The categories for fissile
materials in tables 7.11 and 7.12 reflect the availability of these materials
for weapon purposes. Material described as ‘Not directly available for360 military spending and armaments, 2023

weapons’ and ‘Unsafeguarded’ is either material produced outside weapon
programmes or weapon-related material that states have pledged not to use
in weapons. This material is not placed under international safeguards (e.g.
IAEA or Euratom) or under bilateral monitoring. The category ‘Safeguarded/
monitored’ includes material that is subject to such controls. The data pres­ented in tables 7.11 and 7.12 accounts only for unirradiated fissile material, acategory that corresponds to the IAEA definition of ‘unirradiated direct use
material’.

world nuclear forces 361
Table 7.11. Global stocks of highly enriched uranium, 2023
All figures are tonnes and are for unirradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of the
beginning of 2023. Most of this material is 90–93% enriched uranium-235 (U-235), which istypically considered weapon-grade. Important exceptions are noted. Final totals are rounded to
the nearest 5 tonnes.

State

Total
stock

Not directly available for weapons
In oravailable
Safeguarded/
Production
for weapons Unsafeguarded monitored
statusChina
14
14 ± 3–aFrance b29
25 ± 6–
India c5–5.3 ± 2
Iran d0.1–
0.09
Israel e
0.3
0.3–
Korea, North f Uncertain Uncertain–
Pakistan g
55.1 ± 1.5–
Russia h680
672 ± 120
6i
UK k
23
22
0.6 l
USA m
483
361
122.1
Other states n
>3.9
–
–

–
3.8
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
>3.9

Total

10

1 245

1 100

135

Stopped 1987–89
Stopped 1996
Continuing
Continuing
Unknown
Uncertain
Continuing
Continuing j
Stopped 1962
Stopped 1992

a China receives HEU in fuel from Russia for its fast-neutron reactors. Since it is assumed that

this fuel is irradiated soon after the delivery, it is not included here.
b A 2014 analysis offers grounds for a significantly lower estimate of France’s stockpileof weapon-grade HEU (between 6 ± 2 tonnes and 10 ± 2 tonnes) based on evidence that the
Pierrelatte enrichment plant may have had both a much shorter effective period of operation anda smaller capacity to produce weapon-grade HEU than previously assumed.
c It is believed that India is producing HEU (enriched to 30–45%) for use as naval reactor fuel.
The estimate is for HEU enriched to 30%.
d The data for Iran is the estimate by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) asof 11 Feb. 2023 (87.5 kg). Iran started enriching uranium up to 20% on 4 Jan. 2021 and started
enriching HEU up to 60% enrichment level on 17 Apr. 2021.
e Israel may have acquired c. 300 kg of weapon-grade HEU illicitly from the USA in or before
1965. Some of this material may have been consumed in the process of producing tritium.
f North Korea is known to have a uranium-enrichment plant at Yongbyon and possibly
others elsewhere. Independent estimates of uranium-enrichment capability and possible
HEU production extrapolated to the beginning of 2023 suggest a potential accumulated HEU
stockpile in the range 280–1500 kg.
g This estimate for Pakistan assumes total HEU production of 5.2 tonnes, of which c. 100 kg
was used in nuclear weapon tests.
h This estimate assumes that the Soviet Union stopped all HEU production in 1988. It may
therefore understate the amount of HEU in Russia (see also note j).
i This material is believed to be in use in various research facilities, civilian as well as militaryrelated.
j The Soviet Union stopped production of HEU for weapons in 1988 but kept producing HEU
for civilian and non-weapon military uses. Russia continues this practice. It is assumed that the
HEU for naval and other reactors is newly produced material.
k The estimate for the UK reflects a declaration of 21.9 tonnes of military HEU as of 31 Mar.
2002, the average enrichment of which was not given.
l This figure (550 kg) is from the UK’s INFCIRC/549 declaration to the IAEA for the end of2022. As the UK has left the European Union, the material is no longer under Euratom safeguards.

362 military spending and armaments, 2023
m The amount of US HEU is given in actual tonnes, not 93%-enriched equivalent. In 2016 theUSA declared that, as of 30 Sep. 2013, its HEU inventory was 585.6 tonnes, of which 499.4 tonnes
was declared to be for ‘national security or non-national security programs including nuclear
weapons, naval propulsion, nuclear energy, and science’. This material was estimated to include
c. 360.9 tonnes of HEU in weapons and available for weapons, 121.1 tonnes of HEU reserved fornaval fuel and 17.3 tonnes of HEU reserved for research reactors. The remaining 86.2 tonnes ofthe 2013 declaration comprised 41.6 tonnes ‘available for potential down-blend to low enricheduranium or, if not possible, disposal as low-level waste’, and 44.6 tonnes in spent reactor fuel.
As of the end of 2022 the amount available for use had been reduced to c. 465.1 tonnes, which isestimated to include 89.5 tonnes of HEU in naval reserve and 14.6 tonnes reserved for research
reactors. It is estimated that at the end of 2022 the amount of material to be down-blended had
been reduced to 18 tonnes.
n The IAEA’s 2022 annual report lists 156 significant quantities of HEU under comprehensive
safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states as of the end of 2022. Without knowing the exact
enrichment levels, that means these states hold at least 3.9 tonnes of HEU since, for HEU, asignificant quantity is defined as 25 kg of U-235.
In INFCIRC/912 (from 2017) more than 20 states committed to reducing civilian HEU stocks
and providing regular reports. So far, only 2 states have reported under this scheme. At the endof 2018 (time of last declaration), Norway held less than 4 kg of HEU for civilian purposes. As of
30 June 2019, Australia held 2.7 kg of HEU for civilian purposes.
Sources: International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report2022: Fifty Years of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials,
and Nuclear Energy (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, 2022). China: Zhang, H., China’s Fissile Material
Production and Stockpile (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, 2017). France: International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), ‘Communication received from France concerning its policies regarding
the management of plutonium’, INFCIRC/549/Add.5/27, 7 Sep. 2023; and Philippe, S. andGlaser, A., ‘Nuclear archaeology for gaseous diffusion enrichment plants’, Science & Global
Security, vol. 22, no. 1 (2014). Iran: IAEA, Board of Governors, ‘Verification and monitoringin the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231
(2015)’, Report of the director general, GOV/2023/8, 28 Feb. 2023. Israel: Myers, H., ‘The realsource of Israel’s first fissile material’, Arms Control Today, vol. 37, no. 8 (Oct. 2007), p. 56; andGilinsky, V. and Mattson, R. J., ‘Revisiting the NUMEC affair’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
vol. 66, no. 2 (Mar./Apr. 2010). North Korea: Hecker, S. S., Braun, C. and Lawrence, C., ‘North
Korea’s stockpiles of fissile material’, Korea Observer, vol. 47, no. 4 (winter 2016). Russia:
Podvig, P. (ed.), The Use of Highly-Enriched Uranium as Fuel in Russia (IPFM: Washington, DC,2017). UK: British Ministry of Defence, ‘Historical accounting for UK defence highly enricheduranium’, Mar. 2006; and IAEA, ‘Communications received from the United Kingdom of GreatBritain and Northern Ireland concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium’,
INFCIRC/549/Add.8/26, 16 Nov. 2023. USA: US Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear
Security Administration, Highly Enriched Uranium, Striking a Balance: A Historical Report on
the United States Highly Enriched Uranium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization Activities
from 1945 through September 30, 1996 (DOE: Washington, DC, Jan. 2001); White House,‘Transparency in the US highly enriched uranium inventory’, Fact sheet, 31 Mar. 2016; US DOE,
FY 2021 Congressional Budget Request, vol. 1, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE:
Washington, DC, Feb. 2020), p. 593; and US DOE, Tritium and Enriched Uranium Management
Plan through 2060, Report to Congress (DOE: Washington, DC, Oct. 2015). Other states: IAEA,
IAEA Annual Report 2022 (IAEA: Vienna, 2022), annex, table A4, p. 171; IAEA, ‘Communication
dated 19 July 2019 received from the Permanent Mission of Norway concerning a joint statementon minimising and eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications’,
INFCIRC/912/Add.3, 15 Aug. 2019; and IAEA, ‘Communication dated 23 January 2020 received
from the Permanent Mission of Australia concerning the joint statement on minimising andeliminating the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications’, INFCIRC/912/Add.4,
5 Mar. 2020.

world nuclear forces 363
Table 7.12. Global stocks of separated plutonium, 2023
All figures are tonnes and are for unirradiated plutonium as of the beginning of 2023. Important
exceptions are noted. Final totals are rounded to the nearest 5 tonnes.
a

State

Total
stock

Not directly available for weapons Military
In oravailable
Safeguarded/
production
for weapons Unsafeguarded monitored
statusChina
FranceIndia
Israel d
Japan eKorea, North f
Pakistan g
Russia
UK
USA j

3
98
10
0.9
45.1
0.04
0.54
193
119.6
87.6

2.9 ± 0.6
0.04 b
6 ± 1.0–
0.68 ± 0.16
9.2 ± 5.3 c
0.85 ± 0.1
–
–
–
0.04
–
0.54 ± 0.18 –88 ± 889.5 h
3.2
116.4
38.4
46.2

–
91.9
0.4
–
45.1
–
–
15 i
–
3k

Total

555

140

155

260

Stopped in 1991
Stopped in 1992
Continuing
Continuing–
Continuing
Continuing
Stopped in 2010
Stopped in 1995
Stopped in 1988

a With the exception of India, figures for civilian stocks are based on INFCIRC/549 declarations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The data for France, Japan, Russia,
the UK and the USA is for the end of 2022, reflecting their most recent INFCIRC/549 declaration
to the IAEA. Some countries with civilian plutonium stocks do not submit an INFCIRC/549
declaration. Of these countries, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden store their plutonium
abroad, but the total amounts are too small to be noted in the table.
b These numbers are based on China’s INFCIRC/549 declaration to the IAEA for the end of
2016. As of Mar. 2024, this is the most recent declaration.
c India’s unsafeguarded civilian material is the plutonium separated from spent power-reactor
fuel. While such reactor-grade plutonium can in principle be used in weapons, it is labelled as‘Not directly available for weapons’ here since it is intended for breeder reactor fuel. It was
not placed under safeguards in the ‘India-specific’ safeguards agreement signed by the Indian
government and the IAEA on 2 Feb. 2009. India does not submit an INFCIRC/549 declaration
to the IAEA.
d Israel is believed to be operating the Dimona plutonium-production reactor. The estimate
assumes partial use of the reactor for tritium production from 1997 onwards. The estimate is forthe beginning of 2023. Without tritium production, stockpiles could be as high as 1110 kg.
e Of Japan’s plutonium stock, 35.9 tonnes are stored abroad in France (14.1 tonnes) and the UK(21.8 tonnes), the remaining 9.2 tonnes are under IAEA safeguards in Japan.
f North Korea reportedly declared a plutonium stock of 37 kg in June 2008. It is believed thatit subsequently unloaded plutonium from its 5-MW(e) reactor 3 more times, in 2009, 2016 and2018. The stockpile estimate has been reduced to account for the 6 nuclear tests conducted by
the country. North Korea’s reprocessing facility operated again in 2021 for 5 months.
g At the beginning of 2023 Pakistan was operating 4 plutonium-production reactors at its
Khushab site. This estimate assumes that Pakistan is separating plutonium from all 4 reactors.
h This material includes 64.5 tonnes of separated plutonium declared in Russia’s 2022
INFCIRC/549 declaration as civilian. Russia does not make the plutonium it reports as civilian
available to IAEA safeguards. This amount also includes 25 tonnes of weapon-origin plutonium
stored at the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility, which Russia pledged not to use for military
purposes.
i This material is weapon-grade plutonium produced between 1 Jan. 1995 and 15 Apr. 2010,
when the last Russian plutonium-production reactor was shut down. It cannot be used forweapon purposes under the terms of a 1997 Russian–US agreement on plutonium-production

364 military spending and armaments, 2023
reactors. The material is currently stored at Zheleznogorsk and is subject to monitoring by US
inspectors.
j In 2012 the USA declared a government-owned plutonium inventory of 95.4 tonnes as of
30 Sep. 2009. In its INFCIRC/549 declaration of stocks as of 31 Dec. 2022, the USA declared
49.2 tonnes of unirradiated plutonium (both separated and in mixed oxide, MOX) as part of thestock identified as excess to military purposes.
k The USA has placed c. 3 tonnes of its excess plutonium, stored at the K-Area Material Storage
Facility at the Savannah River Site, under IAEA safeguards.
Sources: International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2022:
Fifty Years of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, andNuclear Energy (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, 2022). Civilian stocks (except for India): International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ‘Communication received from certain member statesconcerning their policies regarding the management of plutonium’, INFCIRC/549, various
dates. China: Zhang, H., China’s Fissile Material Production and Stockpile (IPFM: Princeton, NJ,
2017). Israel: Glaser, A. and de Troullioud de Lanversin, J., ‘Plutonium and tritium production
in Israel’s Dimona reactor, 1964–2020’, Science & Global Security, vol. 29, no. 2 (2021). North
Korea: Kessler, G., ‘Message to US preceded nuclear declaration by North Korea’, Washington
Post, 2 July 2008; Hecker, S. S., Braun, C. and Lawrence, C., ‘North Korea’s stockpiles of fissile
material’, Korea Observer, vol. 47, no. 4 (winter 2016); and IAEA, Board of Governors and General
Conference, ‘Application of safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, Reportby the Acting Director General, GOV/2019/33-GC(63)/20, 19 Aug. 2019. Russia: Russian–US
Agreement Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No
Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation (Plutonium Management andDisposition Agreement), signed 29 Aug. and 1 Sep. 2000, amendment signed 5 Sep. 2006, enteredinto force 13 July 2011. USA: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), The UnitedStates Plutonium Balance, 1944–2009 (NNSA: Washington, DC, June 2012); and Gunter, A.,‘K-Area overview/update’, US Department of Energy, Savannah River Site, 28 July 2015.

world nuclear forces 365
Table 7.13. Significant uranium-enrichment facilities and capacity worldwide,
2023
With the exception of two facilities (marked *) that continue to use gaseous diffusion to enrichuranium in uranium-235 (U-235), all facilities use gas centrifuge isotope-separation technology.

State
Argentina b
BrazilChina cFacility nameor location

Pilcaniyeu *ResendeLanzhou
Hanzhong (Shaanxi)
EmeishanHeping *FranceGeorges Besse II
Germany
Urenco Gronau dIndia
Rattehalli
Iran eNatanzQom (Fordow)Japan
Rokkasho f
Korea, North Yongbyon g
Netherlands Urenco Almelo dPakistan
GadwalKahutaRussiaAngarsk
Novouralsk
Seversk
Zelenogorsk hUKCapenhurst d
USA
Urenco Eunice d
American Centrifuge
Plant

Type

StatusCapacity(thousands
SWU/yr) a

Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Dual-use
Civilian
Civilian
Military
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Uncertain
Civilian
Military
Military
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian

Uncertain
Expanding capacity
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Expanding capacity
Expanding capacity
Not operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational

20
50–60
4 400
2 700
4 000
230
7 500
3 600
15–30
27
2.5
..
8
5 100
..
15–45
4 000
13 300
3 800
7 900
4 500
4 400
4.5

a Separative work units per year (SWU/yr) is a measure of the effort required in an enrichment
facility to separate uranium of a given content of U-235 into two components, one with a higher
and one with a lower percentage of U-235. Where a range of capacities is shown, the capacity is
uncertain or the facility is expanding its capacity.
b In Dec. 2015 Argentina announced the reopening of its Pilcaniyeu gaseous diffusion
uranium-enrichment plant, which was shut down in the 1990s. There is no evidence of actual
production.
c An assessment of China’s enrichment capacity in 2023 suggested the addition of new enrich­ment plants, resulting in a larger total capacity compared with the estimates of previous years.
The figures for China are for Dec. 2023.
d Capacities for Urenco facilities are given for Mar. 2024 as presented at that time on thecompany’s website.
e The figures for Iran are for Nov. 2023. Since the USA’s withdrawal in 2018 from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which agreed limits on and made more transparent
Iran’s nuclear programme, Iran continues to increase enrichment capacities and levels at its
Natanz and Fordow facilities. In Apr. 2023 Iran informed the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) of plans for new research and development production lines in Building A1000
at Natanz.
f According to a Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited report from 31 Mar. 2024, no enriched uranium
has been produced since 2019.

366 military spending and armaments, 2023
g North Korea revealed its Yongbyon enrichment facility in 2010. It appears to be operational

as of 2020. It is believed that North Korea is operating at least one other enrichment facility.
h Zelenogorsk operates a centrifuge cascade for HEU production of fuel for fast reactors andresearch reactors.

Sources: Indo-Asian News Service (IANS), ‘Argentina president inaugurates enriched uranium
plant’, Business Standard (New Delhi), 1 Dec. 2015; Nuclear Engineering International, ‘Brazil’s
INB launches new centrifuge cascade’, 25 Nov. 2021; Zhang, H., ‘China’s uranium enrichment
complex’, Science & Global Security, vol. 23, no. 3 (2015); Zhang, H., China’s Fissile MaterialPro­duction and Stockpile (International Panel on Fissile Materials, IPFM: Princeton, NJ, 2017);
Zhang, H., ‘China started operation of two new enrichment plants in 2023’, IPFM Blog, 15 Dec.
2023; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Board of Governors, ‘Verification andmonitor­ing in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution
2231 (2015)’, Report by the director general, GOV/2023/57, 15 Nov. 2023; Albright, D., Burkhard, S.
and Faragasso, S., ‘Updated highlights of comprehensive survey of Iran’s advanced centrifuges’,
Institute for Science and International Security, 21 Mar. 2023; Albright, D. et al., ‘Analysis of
IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report: November 2023’, Institute for Science and Inter­national Security, 20. Nov. 2023; Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, ‘Operational status at uranium
enrichment plant’, 31 Mar. 2024; Hecker, S. S., Carlin, R. L. and Serbin, E. A., ‘A comprehensive
history of North Korea’s nuclear program: 2018 update’, Stanford University, Center for Inter­national Security and Cooperation, 11 Feb. 2019; and ‘Enrichment operations start at US HALEU
plant’, World Nuclear News, 12 Oct. 2023. Enrichment capacity data is further based on IAEA,
Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information Systems (iNFCIS); Urenco, ‘Global operations’; US
Department of Energy (DOE), Tritium and Enriched Uranium Management Plan through 2060,
Report to Congress (DOE: Washington, DC, Oct. 2015); and IPFM, Global Fissile Material Report2022: Fifty Years of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, andNuclear Energy (IPFM: Princeton, NJ, 2022).

world nuclear forces 367
Table 7.14. Significant reprocessing facilities worldwide, 2023
Facility nameor location

Fuel

Type

StatusJiuquan pilot plant
La Hague UP2
La Hague UP3
Kalpakkam
TarapurTarapur-II
Trombay
DimonaRokkasho

LWR
LWR
LWR
HWR
HWR
HWR
HWR
HWR
LWR

Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Dual-use
Dual-use
Dual-use
Military
Military
Civilian

Korea, North Yongbyon
GCR
Pakistan
Chashma
HWR
NiloreHWR
RussiaMayak RT-1, Ozersk LWR
EDC, Zheleznogorsk e LWR
UK
Sellafield f–USA
H-canyon, Savannah LWR
River Site

Military
Military
Military
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian
Civilian

Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Start planned for2024 dOperational
Starting up
Operational
Operational
Starting up
Shut down
Operational

State
China bFranceIndia cIsraelJapan

Design capacity(tHM/yr) a
50
1 000
1 000
100
100
100
50
40–100800
100–150
50–100
20–40
400
250
–
15

GCR = gas-cooled reactor; HWR = heavy water reactor; LWR = light water reactor.
a Design capacity refers to the highest amount of spent fuel the plant is designed to process

and is measured in tonnes of heavy metal per year (tHM/yr), tHM being a measure of the amountof heavy metal—uranium in these cases—that is in the spent fuel. Actual throughput is often asmall fraction of the design capacity. LWR spent fuel contains c. 1% plutonium; HWR and GCR
fuel contain c. 0.4% plutonium.
b China is building a pilot reprocessing facility near Jinta, Gansu province, with a capacity of
200 tHM/yr, to be commissioned in 2025. A second reprocessing plant of the same capacity isplanned for the same site.
c As part of the 2005 Indian–US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, India has decided
that none of its reprocessing plants will be opened for International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards inspections.
d Construction of the facility started in 1993. Since then, the planned starting date has been
postponed regularly.
e Russia continues to construct the 250 tHM/yr pilot Experimental and Demonstration Centre(EDC) at Zheleznogorsk. A pilot reprocessing line with a capacity of 5 tHM/yr was launched inJune 2018.
f The UK operated two large civilian reprocessing facilities at Sellafield, THORP and B205.
These facilities were shut down in 2018 and 2022, respectively.
Sources: ‘Japan approves 70-year plan to scrap nuclear reprocessing plant’, Kyodo News, 13 June
2018; Suzuki, T., ‘Japan’s never ending reprocessing saga’, IPFM Blog, 23 Nov. 2023; [Rosatom
ready to start ‘green’ processing of spent nuclear fuel], RIA Novosti, 29 May 2018 (in Russian);and Sellafield Ltd and Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, ‘Job done: Sellafield plant safely
completes its mission’, 19 July 2022. Data on design capacity is based on International Atomic
Energy Agency, Integrated Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information Systems (iNFCIS); and Inter­national
Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Material Report 2022: Fifty Years of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, and Nuclear Energy (IPFM: Prince­
ton, NJ, 2022).