租税資料館賞受賞論文集
第 28 回（2019 年）

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公益財団法人 租税資料館

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㸦ᮾி኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔ἲᏛᨻ἞Ꮫ◊✲⛉ࠗᅜᐙᏛ఍㞧ㄅ࠘➨  ᕳ ࣭ ྕ㸦 ᖺ  ᭶㸧➨  ᕳ ࣭ ྕ㸦 ᖺ  ᭶㸧➨  ᕳ ࣭ ྕ㸦 ᖺ  ᭶㸧 ➨  ᕳ ࣭ ྕ㸦 ᖺ  ᭶㸧➨  ᕳ ࣭ ྕ㸦 ᖺ  ᭶㸧➨  ᕳ ࣭ ྕ㸦 ᖺ  ᭶㸧ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒ࠖ✏⪅ ᒾ℩ ཭ுẶ㸦❧࿨㤋኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔㝔⏕㸧࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ୖᕳ㸦447 ࣮࣌ࢪ㸧ࠕᚑᒓ௦⌮ே㹎㹃ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⪃ᐹࠖ✏⪅ ዟᒃ ᐶ⏕Ặ㸦❧࿨㤋኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔㝔⏕㸧࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ୖᕳ㸦495 ࣮࣌ࢪ㸧‫ە‬ୗ ᕳࠕࢫࢡ࢖࣮ࢬ࢔࢘ࢺ⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㐺᱁せ௳ࡢྜ⌮ᛶุ᩿つ‽ࡢ⪃ᐹ̿ㄢ⛯⧞ᘏ࡭⌮ㄽࡢ㝈⏺࡜ቃ⏺̿ࠖ✏⪅ ᰘ⏣ 㔜ᶞẶ㸦኱㜰⤒῭኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔㝔⏕㸧࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ୗᕳ㸦3 ࣮࣌ࢪ㸧
ࠕ௬᝿㏻㈌࣭ࢺ࣮ࢡࣥ࡟ಀࡿㄢ⛯ୖࡢㅖၥ㢟
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✏⪅ ᑎ⏣ ᬡኸẶ㸦㟷ᒣᏛ㝔኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔㝔⏕㸧࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ୗᕳ㸦273 ࣮࣌ࢪ㸧（1）ࠕᙺဨ⤥୚⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᦆ㔠⟬ධせ௳ࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࠖ
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（2）

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➨㸰㸶ᅇ⛒⛯㈨ᩱ㤋㈹ᤵ㈹ᘧࡀ㸯㸯᭶㸰㸵᪥㸦Ỉ㸧ࠊᮾி࣭᪂ᐟ༊ࡢ࣮ࣜ࢞ࣟ࢖ࣖࣝ
࣍ࢸࣝᮾி࡛⾜ࢃࢀࠊ఍ሙ࡟ࡣཷ㈹⪅ࡢ௚ࠊཷ㈹సရࡢฟ∧ඖ࡛࠶ࡿᡂᩥᇽཬࡧ᪥ᮏ⤒῭ホㄽ♫ࡼࡾ㸱ྡࡢࡈ᮶㈱ࢆࡣࡌࡵࠊᙜ㈈ᅋᙺဨ➼ࡀิᖍࡋࡓࠋ Ἑ㷂↷⾜⛒⛯㈨ᩱ㤋௦⾲⌮஦ࡀࠊཷ㈹⪅࡟⾲ᙲ≧ࢆ㉗࿊ࡋࠊᣵᣜࢆ⾜ࡗࡓࠋ
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๓ิᕥࡼࡾἙ㷂↷⾜௦⾲⌮஦ࠊ㛗⃝᪼ᖹẶࠊ⸨ᒸ♸἞Ặࠊዟ㇂೺Ặࠊ㔠⏣㝣ᖾẶࠊ⋢ᅧᩥᩄ㑅⪃ጤဨ㛗ࠋᚋิᕥࡼࡾዟᒃᐶ⏕Ặࠊᰘ⏣㔜ᶞẶࠊᰘ⏣෤ᶞẶࠊ㛗ᑿඖᙪẶࠊஂᒸ㟹ᜨẶࠋ

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（3）

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（4）

⋢ᅧ㑅⪃ጤဨ㛗ࡢㅮホ⋢ᅧ࡛ࡈࡊ࠸ࡲࡍࠋ㑅⪃ጤဨࢆ௦⾲⮴ࡋࡲࡋ࡚ࠊ୍ゝࠊㅮホࢆ⏦ࡋ㏙࡭ࡉࡏ࡚࠸ࡓࡔࡁࡲࡍࠋ
⚾࡝ࡶ㑅⪃ጤဨࡣࠊ௒ᅇࡶ⛒⛯㈨ᩱ㤋㈹ࡢỈ‽ࢆⴠ࡜ࡉ࡞࠸ࡼ࠺ࠊᚰࢆ○࠸࡚ᑂᰝࢆ⾜࠸ࡲࡋࡓࠋࡑࡢ㝿࡟ࡣᚑ᮶㏻ࡾࠊㄽ⌮ᛶࠊᐇドᛶࠊ⊂๰ᛶ➼࡜࠸࠺ᑂᰝ࣏࢖ࣥࢺ࡟ຊⅬࢆ⨨ࡁ࡞ࡀࡽᑂ
ᰝࢆࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࡲࡍࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ኱ኚඃࢀࡓཷ㈹సࡢỴᐃ࡟⮳ࡾࡲࡋࡓࡇ࡜ࢆ࡜࡚ࡶᎰࡋࡃᏑࡌࡲ
ࡍࠋࡇࡇᩘᖺࠊㄽᩥࡢሙྜ࡟ࡑࡢഴྥࡀ㢧ⴭ࡞ࡢ࡛ࡍࡀࠊ௒ᅇࡢᑂᰝ࡟࠶ࡓࡾࡲࡋ࡚ࡶࡇࢀࡲ࡛ࡢ
ᑂᰝ࡟࠾࠸࡚┠࡟ࡋࡓࡢ࡜ྠࡌࡼ࠺࡞ࢸ࣮࣐ࢆྲྀࡾୖࡆ࡚ࠊྠࡌࡼ࠺࡞㈨ᩱุ࣭Ỵࢆᘬ࠸࡚ࠊㄽ
ᩥࢆసᡂࡍࡿࡼ࠺࡞ࢣ࣮ࢫࡀከ࠿ࡗࡓࡼ࠺࡟ឤࡌࡲࡍࠋ஦ົᒁࡢࢥࣆ࣌ࢳ࢙ࢵࢡ࡟ᘬࡗ࠿࠿ࡿࢣ
࣮ࢫࡶ┦ኚࢃࡽࡎከࡃ࠶ࡾࡲࡋࡓࠋ
౫ᣐࡍࡿ㈨ᩱࠊㄽᩥᵓᡂࠊㄽ⌮ࡢᒎ㛤ࡢ௙᪉ࠊࡑࢀࡽ࡟ぢࡽࢀࡿ࠶ࡿ✀ࡢᐃᆺ໬⌧㇟ࠋࡑࢀ࡟
ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊ࠸ࡼ࠸ࡼෆᚰ༴ᶵឤࢆᢪࡁࡘࡘᑂᰝࢆ㐍ࡵࡲࡋࡓࡢࡶࠊ౛ᖺ࡜ྠᵝ࡛ࡈࡊ࠸ࡲࡍࠋ
௒ᅇᛂເࡉࢀࡲࡋࡓⓙᵝࡀࠊ኱ኚⱞປࡉࢀࡲࡋࡓࡢࡶ⊂๰ᛶ➼ࠊゝ࠸᥮࠼ࡲࡍ࡜ࠊ࠸࠿࡟⮬ศ
⮬㌟ࡢどⅬ࡞ࡾࠊ≉Ⰽ࡞ࡾࢆᡴࡕฟࡍࡢ࠿ࠊ࠸࠿࡟௚ே࡜㐪ࡗࡓ୺ᙇ࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣ㆟ㄽࢆᒎ㛤ࡍࡿࡢ࠿ࠊࡑ࠺࠸࠺ࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡗࡓࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸࡛ࡋࡻ࠺࠿ࠋࡓࡔࠊࡇࢀࡲ࡛ࡢཷ㈹సရࡶࡑ࠺࡛࠶ࡾࡲࡋ
ࡓࡀࠊ௒ᅇཷ㈹ࡉࢀࡲࡋࡓⓙᵝࡢసရࡣࡑࢀࡒࢀࡢ◊✲ศ㔝࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࠊ⮬ศ࡞ࡾࡢࡋࡗ࠿ࡾ࡜ࡋ
ࡓどⅬࢆᡴࡕฟࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࡲࡋ࡚ࠊࡑࢀࡒࢀ࡟≉Ⰽࡢ࠶ࡿཷ㈹సရࡀᥞࡗࡓࡼ࠺࡟ឤࡌ࡚࠾ࡾࡲࡍࠋ

⋢ᅧ◊✲ຓᡂ➼㑅⪃ጤဨ㛗࡟ࡼࡿㅮホ౛࠼ࡤࠊᡤᚓᴫᛕࡢἲⓗ෌ᵓ⠏࡟┿ࡗྥ࠿ࡽྲྀࡾ⤌ࡲࢀࡲࡋࡓዟ㇂ඛ⏕ࡢࡈⴭ᭩ࡣࠊࡑࡢ୍㈏ࡋࡓጼໃࠊ࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣㄽ⌮ࡢ⤌ࡳ❧࡚᪉ࠊࡑࢀࡀ኱ኚ༳㇟ⓗ࡛ࡈࡊ࠸ࡲࡋࡓࠋ
ࡲࡓࠊ࣐࢖ࢡࣟࢹ࣮ࢱࡢࢩ࣑࣮ࣗࣞࢩࣙࣥศᯒࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚ࠊᡤᚓ⛯ࡢ᱁ᕪ᫝ṇຠᯝ➼ࢆᐇドࡋࡼ࠺࡜ࡉࢀࡲࡋࡓ㔠⏣ඛ⏕ࡢࡈⴭ᭩ࡣࠊ⌧௦ⓗ࡞ㄢ㢟࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊከࡃࡢ㈗㔜࡞♧၀ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠾ࡾࡲ
ࡋ࡚ࠊࡲࡓ௒ᚋࡢࢹ࣮ࢱ᭦᪂ࢆ⥆ࡅࡽࢀࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚ࠊ᭦࡞ࡿᏛ⾡ⓗ㈉⊩ࡀᮇᚅ࡛ࡁࡲࡍࠋ

（5）୍⯡ࡢ㒊ࡢㄽᩥ࡟┠ࢆ㌿ࡌࡲࡍ࡜ࠊࢃࡀᅜࡢබ௻ᴗࡢ㠀ᑐ↷ⓗ࡞ࢥࢫࢺࢥ࣮ࢻࢆศᯒࡍࡿ㛗⃝Ặࡢⱥᩥㄽᩥࠊࡇࢀࡣᅜෆᩥ⊩ࡀᑡ࡞࠸୰࡛ࠊ⮬ศ࡞ࡾࡢ௬ㄝࢆ❧࡚࡚ࢹ࣮ࢱ᳨ドࢆ㥑౑ࡋ࡚࠸
ࡿⅬࠊ࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣ✚ᴟⓗ࡟ᾏእ࡬ࡢⓎಙࢆヨࡳ࡚࠸ࡿⅬࠊࡑࢀࡽࡀホ౯ࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࡲࡍࠋ
ඃࢀࡓᏛ⾡ㄽᩥ࡜ࡋ࡚㧗࠸Ỉ‽࡟࠶ࡿ࡜ࡢホ౯ࢆཷࡅࡲࡋࡓ⸨ᒸẶࡢㄽᩥࡣࠊⅭ᭰ᕪᦆ┈࡟ᑐࡍࡿᡤᚓㄢ⛯ࡢศ㔝࡟ึࡵ࡚࣓ࢫࢆධࢀࡓࡑ࠺࠸࠺Ⅼ࡜࡜ࡶ࡟ࠊࡑࡢ⥥ᐦ࠿ࡘ⦓ᐦ࡞సᴗࡢ㐍ࡵ᪉ࡀホ౯ࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࡲࡍࠋ
ࡉࡽ࡟ಶูⓗ࡟ࡣྲྀࡾୖࡆ࡚࠾ࡾࡲࡏࢇࡀࠊ௒ᅇཷ㈹ࡉࢀࡲࡋࡓ㸵௳ࡢዡບ㈹సရࡶࡑࢀࡒࢀ
࡟≉Ⰽࡢ࠶ࡿࣘࢽ࣮ࢡ࡞సရ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ឤࡌ࡚࠾ࡾࡲࡍࠋ
࡞࠾ࠊᐇ㝿ࡢᑂᰝ࡟࠶ࡓࡾࡲࡋ࡚ࡣࠊᑓ㛛ᐙ࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣᐇົᐙࡢඛ⏕᪉ࡀࠊᇳ➹ࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜ࡢከ
࠸ⴭ᭩ࠊ࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣ୍⯡㒊㛛ㄽᩥࠊࡑࡢᑂᰝ࡜ึࡵ࡚Ꮫ⾡ⓗ࡞ㄽᩥ࡟ࢺࣛ࢖ࢆࡉࢀࡿ࡛࠶ࡾࡲࡋࡻ
࠺ዡບ㈹ㄽᩥ࡜ࡣࠊഹ࠿࡛ࡣ࠶ࡾࡲࡍࡀࠊධ㈹ࡢᇶ‽ࡀ␗࡞ࡗ࡚࠾ࡾࡲࡍࠋዡບ㈹ࡢሙྜ࡟ࡣࠊ
᏶ᡂࡉࢀࡓㄽᩥ࡜࠸࠺ࡼࡾࡣࠊࡴࡋࢁᑗ᮶ⓗ࡞Ⓨᒎࢆ⪃࠼࡚ࠊࡇࢀ࠿ࡽࡢά㌍࡬ࡢᮇᚅ࡜࡜ࡶ࡟
ࡉࡽ࡟㡹ᙇࡗ࡚ḟࡢ᪂ࡋ࠸ᴗ⦼ࢆ⏕ࡳฟࡋ࡚ḧࡋ࠸ࠊࡑ࠺࠸࠺㢪࠸ࢆ㎸ࡵࡲࡋ࡚ᑂᰝࢆࡋ࡚࠾ࡾ
ࡲࡍࠋࡑࢀ࡜࡜ࡶ࡟௒ᅇࡢⓙᵝࡢ࠾ᡭඖ࡟࠾Ώࡋࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࡲࡍㅮホ㞟ࡑࢀࢆぢ࡚࠸ࡓࡔ࠸࡚ࠊࡑࢀࡒ
ࢀࡢࡈᴗ⦼ࡀ࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟ホ౯ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿ศ࠿ࡿ࡜Ꮡࡌࡲࡍࡀࠊࡑࡇ࡛ࡣⓙᵝ᪉ࡢࡈᴗ⦼ࡀḟ࡟⥆ࡃ᪉ࠎࡢᣦᶆ࡜࡞ࡾࠊࡲࡓཧ⪃࡟࡞ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ⪃៖ࡋ࡚ࠊⱝᖸሷ࿡ࡀຠ࠸ࡓ࡜࠸࠸ࡲࡋࡻ࠺࠿ࠊ
ࡋࡻࡗࡥࡵࡢࢥ࣓ࣥࢺࡶධࢀࡉࡏ࡚࠸ࡓࡔ࠸࡚࠾ࡾࡲࡍࠋࡇࢀ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊⓙᵝࡢࡈᴗ⦼ࡀࡇ࠺
ࡸࡗࡓࡽࡶࡗ࡜Ⰻࡃ࡞ࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸࠿࡜࠸࠺ࠊゝࢃࡤ⚾࡝ࡶࡢ⪁፠ᚰ࠿ࡽࡢࢥ࣓ࣥࢺ࡜ࡋ࡚ཷࡅ
Ṇࡵ࡚࠸ࡓࡔࡅࢀࡤᖾ࠸࡛ࡈࡊ࠸ࡲࡍࠋ⛒⛯㈨ᩱ㤋㈹࡜࠸࠺௒ᅇⓙᵝ᪉ࡀࡈཷ㈹ࡉࢀࡓ㈹ࠊࡑࡢ௚࡟㈨ᩱ㤋࡛ࡣࠊ⛯ἲ➼࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿᅗ᭩ฟ∧ࡢຓᡂ࡞࡝ࢆྵࡵࡲࡋ࡚ⓙᵝࡢ◊✲άື࡬ࡢࢧ࣏࣮ࢺࢆࡉࡽ࡟඘ᐇࡉࡏࡿ࡭ࡃດࡵ࡚࠾
ࡾࡲࡍࠋ
௒ᅇཷ㈹ࡉࢀࡲࡋࡓⓙᵝ᪉ࡢࡑࡢࡼ࠺࡞ᶵ఍ࡸไᗘࢆ኱࠸࡟ά⏝ࡋ࡚ࠊ௒ᅇࡢ◊✲ࢆࡉࡽ࡟Ⓨᒎࡉࡏࠊḟࡢẁ㝵࡟ࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ᭦࡞ࡿ㧗ࡳ࡬࡜ࡑࡢ◊✲ࢆⓎᒎࡉࡏ┠ᣦࡉࢀࡲࡍࡼ࠺ࠊᚰ࠿ࡽᮇᚅ
ࡍࡿḟ➨࡛࠶ࡾࡲࡍࠋ
௨ୖࢆࡶࡕࡲࡋ࡚ࠊ⚾ࡢㅮホࡢゝⴥ࡜ࡉࡏ࡚࠸ࡓࡔࡁࡲࡍࠋ࠶ࡾࡀ࡜࠺ࡈࡊ࠸ࡲࡋࡓࠋ

㸦௧࿴ඖᖺ 11 ᭶ 27 ᪥ ➨ 28 ᅇ⛒⛯㈨ᩱ㤋㈹ᤵ㈹ᘧ࡟࡚㸧

（6）

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➨㸰㸶ᅇ ⛒⛯㈨ᩱ㤋㈹ ධ㑅సရࡢ⤂௓




（7）

（8）


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ዟ㇂ ೺ ⴭࠗᕷሙᡤᚓ࡜ᛂ⬟㈇ᢸཎ๎̿ᛂ⬟㈇ᢸཎ๎ࡢ஧ඖⓗᵓᡂ̿࠘㸦 ᰴ ᘧ ఍ ♫  ᡂ ᩥ ᇽ   ᖺ  ᭶ ห 㸧               ᮏ ㄅ ᮍ ᥖ ㍕ ➹⪅ࡣࠊձㄢ⛯≀௳࡛࠶ࡿࠕᡤᚓࠖࡢ⠊ᅖࡣ୙᫂☜࡛࠶ࡾࠊࡑࡢࡓࡵㄢ⛯ᑐ㇟ࡶ୙᫂ ☜ ࡞ ࡲ ࡲ ࡛ ࠶ ࡿ ࠊղ ᛂ ⬟ ㈇ ᢸ ཎ ๎ ࡟ ↷ ࡽ ࡋ ࡚ ࡶ ࠊ⛯ ㈇ ᢸ ⬟ ຊ ࡢ ᇶ ♏ ࡜ ࡞ ࡿࠕ ᢸ ⛯ ຊ ࠖࡣࠊྠᵝ࡟ከ⩏ⓗ࡛୙᫂☜࡛࠶ࡿࠊ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᡤᚓ⛯ࡢᇶᮏ࠿ࡽ᳨ウࡍࡿᚲせᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᣦ᦬ࡍࡿࠋᮏ᭩ࡣࠊࡑࡢࡼ࠺࡞❧ሙ࠿ࡽࠊ➹⪅ࡀⓎ⾲ࡋ࡚ࡁࡓㄽᩥ࡟ຍ➹⿵ṇࢆ ࡋ ࡚ ࠊ୍ ෉ ࡟ ࡜ ࡾ ࡲ ࡜ ࡵ ࡽ ࢀ ࡚ ࠸ ࡿ ࠋࠕ ᗎ ❶ ࠖ࡟ ࠾ ࠸ ࡚ ➹ ⪅ ࡣ ࠊᡤ ᚓ ࡜ ᢸ ⛯ ຊ ࡢ ከ ⩏ᛶࡸࠊࡑࡢᴫᛕⓗ୙᫂☜ᛶ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚➹⪅ࡀᢪࡃၥ㢟ព㆑ࢆ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡋࠊᡤᚓᴫᛕࡸᡤ
ᚓㄢ⛯ࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿᮏ᭩ࡢ඲యⓗᵓᡂࢆ⤂௓ࡍࡿࠋ
ᮏ᭩ࡢ➨㸯㒊࡛➹⪅ࡣࠊࢻ࢖ࢶ࡟࠾࠸࡚㏆᫬ὀ┠ࢆ㞟ࡵࠊᡤᚓ⛯ἲࡢゎ㔘ཎ⌮࡜ࡋ࡚ ࡶ 㔜 せ ࡞ ᙺ ๭ ࢆ ᯝ ࡓ ࡋ ࡚ ࠸ ࡿࠕ ᕷ ሙ ᡤ ᚓ ㄝ ࠖ࡟ ╔ ┠ ࡋ ࡚ ⏕ ᡂ 㐣 ⛬ ࡜ ᒎ 㛤 ≧ ἣ ࢆ ᳨ ウ ࣭ศᯒࡍࡿࠋලయⓗ࡟ࡣࠊᕷሙᡤᚓㄝࡀἲᏛⓗᡤᚓᴫᛕᵓ⠏࡟ྥࡅࡓ㔜せ࡞⣒ཱྀ࡟࡞ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ♧၀ࡋࠊἲⓗほⅬ࠿ࡽࠕᡤᚓࠖᴫᛕࢆ෌ᵓ⠏ࡍࡿࡇ࡜㸦⌮ㄽ◊✲ࡢ෌ฟⓎ㸧ࡢᚲ せ ᛶ ࢆ ᣦ ᦬ ࡍ ࡿ ࠋ ࢻ ࢖ ࢶ ุ Ỵ ࢆ ㏻ ࡌ ࡚ ᕷ ሙ ᡤ ᚓ ࢆ 㺀᥍ 㝖 ᴫ ᛕ 㺁ࡢ ど Ⅼ ࠿ ࡽ ᳨ ウ ࡋ ࠊ ➹⪅ࡣࠊࢻ࢖ࢶ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣᇶᅉཎ๎࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᗈ࠸⠊ᅖࡢ᥍㝖ᴫᛕࢆࡶࡘࡇ࡜ࢆㄽドࡍࡿࡀࠊేࡏ࡚ࠊࢃࡀᅜࡢᚲせ⤒㈝➼ࡢ᥍㝖ᴫᛕࡶࠊࢻ࢖ࢶἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ┠ⓗⓗ࡞᥍㝖ᴫᛕ࡜ᴟࡵ࡚㢮ఝࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࢃࡀᅜᡤᚓ⛯ἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᡤᚓᴫᛕ࡜᥍㝖ᴫᛕࡢ୙㐺ྜࡉࢆゎᾘࡍࡿ⤫୍ⓗゎ㔘ᇶ‽࡜ࡋ࡚ᇶᅉཎ๎ࡸᕷሙᡤᚓᴫᛕㄽ࠿ࡽ኱ࡁ࡞♧၀ࢆᚓࡽࢀࡿ࡜
ࡢぢゎࢆ㏙࡭ࡿࠋ㏆᫬ࡢᚲせ⤒㈝ᴫᛕ࡟㛵ࡍࡿࢃࡀᅜ⿢ุ౛ࢆ᳨ウࡋࡓ➹⪅ࡣࠊᇶᅉཎ๎࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᚲせ⤒㈝ࡢᤊ࠼᪉ࡢ㔜せᛶࢆᙉㄪࡍࡿࠋ
➨㸰㒊࡛ࡣࠊᡤᚓ᥍㝖㸦࡜ࡾࢃࡅࠊேⓗ᥍㝖㸧ࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ᇶ♏᥍㝖ࠊᢇ㣴᥍㝖ࠊ་⒪㈝᥍㝖ࡢࡑࢀࡒࢀ࡟↔Ⅼࢆᙜ࡚࡚ࠊࢻ࢖ࢶ࡜᪥ᮏࡢุ౛ࡸ㆟ㄽࢆ⤂௓ࡋࠊࡇࡇ࡛ࡶᕷሙᡤᚓㄝࡀᇶ♏᥍㝖ࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࢆ⪃࠼ࡿୖ࡛኱ࡁ࡞♧၀ࢆ୚࠼ࡿ࡜ࡍࡿࠋ
➨㸱㒊࡛ࡣࠊࡑࡢ௚ࡢᢸ⛯ຊࢆࡵࡄࡿၥ㢟࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊㄢ⛯㈇ᢸࡢୖ㝈ࡸࠊᦆᐖ㈺ൾ㔠࡜㠀ㄢ⛯ᡤᚓࢆྲྀࡾୖࡆ࡚⪃ᐹࢆຍ࠼ࡿࠋ
➹⪅ࡣࠊࢻ࢖ࢶ࡟࠾ࡅࡿࠕᕷሙᡤᚓㄝࠖ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᐈほⓗ⣧ᡤᚓ࡜୺ほⓗ⣧ᡤᚓࡢ஧ඖⓗ࡞ᛂ⬟㈇ᢸཎ๎ࡢ⪃࠼᪉࡟ࠊၥ㢟ゎỴ࡬ࡢ♧၀ࢆồࡵࡼ࠺࡜ࡍࡿࠋᮏ᭩඲యࢆ㏻
ࡌ࡚➹⪅ࡢពᅗࡣࠊ⤒῭ⓗ࡞ᴫᛕ࡛࠶ࡿᡤᚓࢆἲᚊⓗ࡞ᴫᛕ࡜ࡋ࡚෌ᵓ⠏ࡋࡼ࠺࡜ࡍ
ࡿ࡜ࡇࢁ࡟࠶ࡿࠋᡤᚓㄽࡢᇶ♏ࢆ࡞ࡍᴫᛕⓗၥ㢟࡟┿ࡗྥ࠿ࡽྲྀࡾ⤌ࢇ࡛࠸ࡿⅬࡸࠊᇶ♏ⓗ࡞ᡤᚓᏛㄝ࡟㛵ࡍࡿᩥ⊩ࡸࢻ࢖ࢶࡢุỴࢆ୎ᑀ࡟ㄞࡳ㎸ࡳ➹⪅࡞ࡾࡢ⌮ゎࢆヨࡳ࡚࠸ࡿⅬࠊࡉࡽ࡟ࡣ᪥ᮏࡢุỴࢆ୎ᑀ࡟᳨ドࡋࠊ┿ᦸ࡞ែᗘ࡛ศᯒ࣭⪃ᐹࡢᑐ㇟࡜
ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿⅬ࡞࡝ࠊ◊✲ࡢᡭἲࡀ༳㇟ⓗ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ᮏ᭩࡟཰㘓ࡉࢀࡓྛㄽᩥࡣࠊඖࠎࡣ୍෉࡟࡜ࡾࡲ࡜ࡵࡿࡇ࡜ࢆពᅗࡋ࡚᭩࠿ࢀࡓࡶ
ࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵ࠿ࠊศᯒᡭἲࡣᚲࡎࡋࡶ୍㈏ࡋ࡚࠾ࡽࡎࠊ᳨ウᑐ㇟ࡶ⥙⨶ⓗ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡣ࠸࠼࡞࠸ࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊࢻ࢖ࢶ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᕷሙᡤᚓᴫᛕࢆᇶ┙࡜ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊ඲⦅ࢆ
୍㈏ࡋࡓጼໃ࡛㈏ࡁㄽࡌ࡚࠸ࡿⅬ࡛⊂⮬ᛶࡀ࠶ࡾࠊㄽ⌮ࡢ⤌ࡳ❧࡚᪉ࡸㄽドࡢ௙᪉࡞（9）࡝ࡶࠊᇶ‽ࢆ‶ࡓࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ⛒⛯㈨ᩱ㤋㈹ᤵ㈹࡟ࡩࡉࢃࡋ࠸సရ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ

（ 10 ）㔠⏣ 㝣ᖾ ⴭࠗ ಶ ே ᡤ ᚓ ㄢ ⛯ ࡢ බ ᖹ ᛶ ࡜ ຠ ⋡ ᛶ ̿ ࣐ ࢖ ࢡ ࣟ ࢩ ࣑ ࣗ ࣞ ࣮ ࢩ ࣙ ࣥ ࡟ ࡼ ࡿ ᐇ ド ศ ᯒ ̿ ࠘㸦 ᰴ ᘧ ఍ ♫  ᪥ ᮏ ⤒ ῭ ホ ㄽ ♫   ᖺ  ᭶ ห 㸧          ᮏ ㄅ ᮍ ᥖ ㍕ ᮏ᭩ࡣࠊ඲ᅜᾘ㈝ᐇែㄪᰝ➼ࡢಶ⚊ࢹ࣮ࢱࢆ⏝࠸࡚ᡤᚓ⛯࣭ಶேఫẸ⛯ࡢ෌ศ㓄ຠᯝ➼ࢆᐇドࡋࡓ◊✲ࡢ㞟኱ᡂ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ௨ୗࡢࡼ࠺࡟ᵓᡂࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
➨㸯❶࡛ࡣ࣐࢖ࢡࣟࢩ࣑࣮ࣗࣞࢩࣙࣥศᯒࡢᴫせ࡜᪤Ꮡ◊✲ࡢ≧ἣࢆ⤂௓ࡋࠊ᪥ᮏ
࡛฼⏝ྍ⬟࡞ಶ⚊㸦࣐࢖ࢡࣟ㸧ࢹ࣮ࢱࡢ≉ᚩ࡜ฎ⌮᪉ἲࡢᴫせࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
➨㸰❶࡛ࡣ㸯㸷㸶㸷ᖺࠊ㸯㸷㸷㸲ᖺࠊ㸯㸷㸷㸷ᖺ࠾ࡼࡧ㸰㸮㸮㸲ᖺ࡟⥲ົ┬ࡀᐇ᪋ࡋࡓ඲ᅜᾘ㈝ᐇែㄪᰝಶ⚊ࢹ࣮ࢱࢆ⏝࠸࡚ࠊ⛯ไࡢᡤᚓ෌ศ㓄ຠᯝࢆィࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᡤᚓ᱁ᕪ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡣࠕࢱ࢖ࣝᑻᗘࠖ࡜࿧ࡤࢀࡿᣦᶆࢆ⏝࠸࡚࠾ࡾࠊ෌ศ㓄ຠᯝࡣᡤᚓ㝵⣭ูࠊᖺ㱋㝵⣭ู࡟⟬ฟࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᱁ᕪ᫝ṇࡢせᅉࡣ⛯⋡ࠊ᥍㝖࡟༊ูࡉࢀࡿࡀࠊศ
ᯒࡢ⤖ᯝࠊࡍ࡭࡚ࡢࣔࢹࣝࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚ᡤᚓ⛯࡟ࡼࡿᡤᚓ෌ศ㓄ຠᯝࡣపୗഴྥ࡟࠶ࡿࡇ
࡜ࡀ♧ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㸰㸮㸯㸳ᖺ⛯ไຠᯝࡢᙳ㡪ࢆ㸰㸮㸮㸲ᖺࢹ࣮ࢱ࡟㐺⏝ࡋࡓศᯒࡶ
⾜ࡗ࡚࠾ࡾࠊබⓗᖺ㔠➼᥍㝖ࡢῶ㢠ࡀ෌ศ㓄ຠᯝࡢపୗࡢ୺ᅉ࡜ࡋ࡚ᣲࡆࡽࢀࡿࡇ࡜
ࢆᣦ᦬ࡍࡿࠋ㧗㱋໬࡛཰ධࡢప࠸㧗㱋⪅ࡢẚ㔜ࡀ㧗ࡲࡿ࡯࡝ࠊබⓗᖺ㔠➼᥍㝖ࡢຠᯝࡀቑࡍࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡿࡀࠊබⓗᖺ㔠➼᥍㝖࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣ໅ປ⪅ࡢ⛯㈇ᢸ࡜ࡢ㛵ಀ࡛୙බᖹ࡜
࠸࠺ᣦ᦬ࡶ࠶ࡾࠊࡑࡢ⦰ῶࡣࡇ࠺ࡋࡓᢈุ࡟ᛂࡌࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ➹⪅⮬㌟ࡀㄆࡵࡿ㏻
ࡾࠊ᱁ᕪࡢᣑ኱⮬యࡀᨵᝏ࡜࠸࠺ุ᩿࡟ࡣ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸ࠋ
➨㸱❶࡛ࡣಶேఫẸ⛯ࡢᡤᚓ෌ศ㓄ຠᯝࢆࠊ➨㸰❶࡜ྠᵝ࡟ࠊࢱ࢖ࣝᑻᗘࢆ⏝࠸࡚ศᯒࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋಶேఫẸ⛯ࡣ㸰㸮㸮㸴ᖺ࡟⛯⋡ࡀࣇࣛࢵࢺ໬ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊ࡞࠾ࡶ୍
ᐃࡢ෌ศ㓄ຠᯝࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
➨㸲❶࡛ࡣᡤᚓㄢ⛯ࡢ⤒῭ཌ⏕ࢆศᯒࡍࡿࠋᐙィࡢຠ⏝㛵ᩘ࡟ࡣᶆ‽ⓗ࡞㹁㹃㹑㛵ᩘࡀ᥇⏝ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᖺ㱋ู࡟ࡳࡿ࡜ࠊ㸴㸮ṓᮍ‶࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣ㸯㸷㸶㸶ᖺ࠿ࡽ㸰㸮㸯㸳ᖺࡢ⛯ไ࡟࠿ࡅ࡚ཌ⏕ᝏ໬ࡣぢࡽࢀ࡞࠿ࡗࡓࡀࠊ㸴㸮ṓ௨ୖࡣබⓗᖺ㔠➼᥍㝖ࡢ⦰ῶࠊ⪁ᖺ⪅᥍㝖ࡢᗫṆࡶ࠶ࡾ୰㧗ᡤᚓᒙ࡛ཌ⏕ࡢᝏ໬ࡀぢཷࡅࡽࢀࡿࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊ♫఍඲య࡛ࡳ࡚࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟ホ౯ࡉࢀࡿ࠿࡜࠸࠺ศᯒࡣ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋ
➨㸳❶࡛ࡣ⛯ไࡀዪᛶࡢᑵປ㸦ປാ౪⤥㸧࡟ཬࡰࡍᙳ㡪ࢆᐇドศᯒࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋලయ
ⓗ࡟ࡣ㓄അ⪅᥍㝖ࡢぢ┤ࡋࡀᑵປ࡟୚࠼࠺ࡿຠᯝࢆ᳨ドࡋࠊ㓄അ⪅᥍㝖ࡢᗫṆࡣປാ౪ ⤥ ࡢ ቑ ຍ ࡟ ⧅ ࡀ ࡿ ࡇ ࡜ ࡀ ♧ ࡉ ࢀ ࡚ ࠸ ࡿ ࠋ௚ ᪉ ࠊࠕ ⛣ ㌿ ⓗ ᇶ ♏ ᥍ 㝖 ࠖࡢ ሙ ྜ ࡣ ࠊࡴ ࡋ ࢁ ࠊປാ౪⤥ࢆᢚไࡍࡿ᪉ྥ࡟ാࡃࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡿࠋ⛣㌿ⓗᇶ♏᥍㝖ࡣ㓄അ⪅ࡢ཰ධ㸴㸳୓෇࠿ ࡽ㸦 㓄 അ ⪅ ≉ ู ᥍ 㝖 ࡀ ゎ ᾘ ࡉ ࢀ ࡿ 㸧㸯 㸲 㸯 ୓ ෇ ࡲ ࡛ ࡢࠕ ஧ 㔜 ࡢ ᥍ 㝖 ࠖࢆ 㝖 ࡃ ࡶ ࡢ ࡛ ࠊ⤖ᯝ࡜ࡋ࡚ప཰ධ࡛ቑ⛯࡟࡞ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ⌮⏤࡛࠶ࢁ࠺ࠋ➨㸴❶࡛ࡣࠊࡇࡢ➨㸳❶࡛ࡢศᯒᡭἲࢆࠊ௒ᚋࠊᑡᏊ㧗㱋໬ࡀᛴ㏿࡟㐍ࡴ࡜ᛮࢃࢀࡿࢱ࢖ࡢࢹ࣮ࢱ࡟㐺⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᮏ᭩ࡣࠊᡤᚓ⛯ࡢ᱁ᕪ᫝ṇຠᯝࠊཌ⏕ຠᯝࠊᑵປຠᯝ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊಶ⚊ࢹ࣮ࢱࢆ⏝࠸࡞ࡀࡽໟᣓⓗ࠿ࡘሀᐇ࡟ᐇドࢆࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࢃࡀᅜ࡛ࡣࠊാࡁ᪉㸦ᑵປ㸧࡟୰❧ⓗ࡛࠶ࡾࡘࡘࠊᡤᚓ⛯ࡢ෌ศ㓄ᶵ⬟ࢆᅇ᚟ࡍࡿᚲせᛶࡀᨵࡵ࡚ၥࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇ࠺ࡋࡓ⌧௦ⓗ࡞ㄢ㢟࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࡶከࡃࡢ♧၀ࢆ୚࠼ࡿⰋ᭩࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡇࡢศ㔝ࡢ◊✲ࡣᩘከࡃぢࡽࢀࡿࡀࠊᮏ◊✲࡟ࡣࢹ࣮ࢱࡢ᭦᪂ࢆ⥆ࡅࡿࡇ࡜࡛ࠊࡉࡽ࡞ࡿᏛ⾡ⓗ㈉⊩ࢆࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᮇ
ᚅࡋࡓ࠸ࠋ（ 11 ）㛗⃝ ᪼ᖹ ✏ࠕ $V\PPHWULF&RVW%HKDYLRULQ/RFDO3XEOLF(QWHUSULVHV̿ ([SORULQJWKH3XEOLF,QWHUHVWDQG6WULYLQJIRU(IILFLHQF\̿ ࠖ 
㸦 6SULQJHUࠗ -RXUQDORI0DQDJHPHQW&RQWURO࠘ 9RO1R ᖺ  ᭶ 㸧 ୖ ᕳ  㡫 ᮏㄽᩥࡣࠊ᪥ᮏࡢᆅ᪉ᨻᗓࡀタ❧ࡍࡿබ௻ᴗࡢ㠀ᑐ⛠ⓗ࡞ࢥࢫࢺ⾜ືࢆศᯒࡍࡿࠊ
㸳❶࠿ࡽᡂࡿⱥᩥㄽᩥ࡛࠶ࡿࠋᮏㄽᩥࡀⱥᩥ࡛ᇳ➹ࡉࢀࡓ⌮⏤ࡣࠊࢃࡀᅜࡣᆅ᪉ᨻᗓ
ࡀ㸦ୖୗỈ㐨ࠊ஺㏻ࠊ㟁Ẽࠊ࢞ࢫࠊ⑓㝔࡞࡝ࡢ㸧බ௻ᴗ⤒Ⴀࢆ⾜࠺ୡ⏺࡛ࡶ᭷ᩘࡢᏑᅾ ࡛ ࠶ ࡾ ࡞ ࡀ ࡽ ࠊ 㐣 ཤ ࡟ ࠾ ࠸ ࡚ ࡣ LQVWLWXWLRQDO WKHRU\ ࡟ ᇶ ࡙ ࡃ බ ௻ ᴗ ࡟ ᑐ ࡍ ࡿ ⾜ ື ไ⣙≧ἣࢆศᯒࡋ࡚Ⓨ⾲ࡋࡓᏛ⾡◊✲ࡀᑡ࡞࠿ࡗࡓ஦᝟࡞࡝࠿ࡽࠊᾏእ࡬ࡢⓎಙࢆ┠ⓗ࡜ࡋࡓࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸࠿࡜᥎

ࡉࢀࡿࠋࡲࡎ➹⪅ࡣࠊබ௻ᴗࡀຠ⋡ᛶ࡜බඹ฼┈࡜࠸࠺஧ࡘࡢつ⠊ⓗせㄳࡢୗ࡟࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ
ᣦ᦬ࡍࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ฼┈ࡀぢ㎸ࡵ࡞࠸≧ἣ࡛ࡶࢧ࣮ࣅࢫࢆᥦ౪ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺౑࿨ ࡢ Ꮡ ᅾ ࡸ ࠊࡑ ࡢ ࡼ ࠺ ࡞ ౑ ࿨ ࡢ ୗ ࡛ ࡢ つ ⠊ ⓗ ࡞ ไ ᗘ ⓗ ᅽ ຊ ࡀ ࠊᆅ ᪉ බ ௻ ᴗ㸦 㹊 㹎 㹃 㹱 㸧ࡢ ࢥ ࢫ ࢺ ຠ ⋡ ࢆ ᯝ ࡓ ࡋ ࡚ ᝏ ໬ ࡉ ࡏ ࡚ ࡁ ࡓ ࡢ ࠿ ࡝ ࠺ ࠿ ࡜ ࠸ ࠺ ၥ 㢟 タ ᐃ ࢆ ࡍ ࡿ 㸦 ➨ 㸯 ❶ 㸧ࠋḟ࡟➹⪅ࡣࠊ◊✲ࡢ⫼ᬒ࡜ඛ⾜◊✲ࡢ⤂௓ࢆ⾜࠺ࠋศᯒࡢ㡰ᗎ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊձᆅ᪉බ௻ ᴗ ࡢ ᛶ ᱁ ࠊղ 㹊 㹎 㹃 㹱 ࡀ ┤ 㠃 ࡍ ࡿ ⤌ ⧊ ⓗ ไ ⣙㸦 ,QVWLWXWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQW㸧ࠊճ 㹊 㹎 㹃 㹱ࡢ ࢥ ࢫ ࢺ ᑐ ᛂ 㸦 FRVWEHKDYLRU㸧ࠊ մ ࡇ ࢀ ࡲ ࡛ ࡢ Ꮫ ㄝ ࡢ ື ྥ ࠊ ࡢ ྛ ༊ ศ ࡟ ἢ ࡗ ࡚ ⤂ ௓ ࢆ ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᳨ド㐣⛬࡛ࡣࠊⴭ⪅⮬㌟ࡀタᐃࡋࡓձࢥࢫࢺࡢ◳┤ᛶࡣ㹊㹎㹃㹱࡛ࡼࡾ㢧ⴭ࡛࠶ࡿࠊղ⤌⧊ⓗᅽຊࡣẸ㛫௻ᴗࡼࡾࡶ㹊㹎㹃㹱ࡢࢥࢫࢺᑐᛂࡢኚ໬࡟ࡼࡾ㛵㐃ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠊճ㹊㹎㹃㹱ࡢࢥࢫࢺᑐᛂࡣẸ㛫࡜ྠᵝࠊ⏘ᴗࢭࢡࢱ࣮ࡈ࡜࡟␗࡞ࡿࠊմ㹊㹎㹃㹱ࡢࢥࢫࢺࡢ◳┤ᛶࡣ㸯㸷㸷㸳ᖺ௨㝆ேཱྀኚ໬࡟ᙉࡃᙳ㡪ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠊյ㹊㹎㹃㹱ࡢ⟶⌮⪅ࡣ㸲ᖺࡢ௵ᮇෆ࡛㛗ᮇⓗ࡞ࢥࢫࢺᑐᛂࡢᏳᐃ໬ࢆᅗࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠊ࡜࠸࠺㸳ࡘࡢ௬ ㄝ ࢆ ᣲ ࡆ ࡚ ࢹ ࣮ ࢱ ศ ᯒ ࡢ ᳨ ド ᑐ ㇟ ࡜ ࡍ ࡿ 㸦 ➨ 㸰 ❶ 㸧ࠋ ከ ࡃ ࡢ ஦ ᴗ ᖺ ᗘ ࡢ ศ ᯒ ᑐ ㇟ ࢹ ࣮ ࢱ ࢆ $QGHUVRQ ࡽ ࡟ ࡼ ࡿ ศ ᯒ ࣔ ࢹ ࣝ ࢆ ⏝ ࠸ ࡚ ศ ᯒ ࡋࡓ㸦➨㸱❶㸧⤖ᯝࠊ➹⪅ࡣࠊ௬ㄝձ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣタᐃ࡜ࡣ㏫ࡢ⤖ㄽࡀᚓࡽࢀࠊ௬ㄝղࡣ
㸰㸮㸮㸮ᖺ௨ᚋ࡟ጇᙜࡋࠊ௬ㄝճ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣ⊂༨஦ᴗ࡜⚟♴஦ᴗ࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢࢥࢫࢺ◳┤ᛶࡢ┦㐪ࡀ᳨ドࡉࢀࡓ࡜ࡍࡿࠋ௬ㄝմ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊேཱྀኚ໬࡜ࢥࢫࢺࡢ◳┤ᛶ࡜ࡢ㛵㐃ᛶࡀ☜ㄆࡉࢀࠊ௬ㄝյ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊᨻ἞ᐙࡢᅽຊ࡟ࡼࡿ㸲ᖺࡢ௵ᮇไࡀࠊ୙ᆒ⾮࡞ࢥ ࢫ ࢺ ᑐ ᛂ ࢆ ゎ ᾘ ࡉ ࡏ ࡚ ࠸ ࡿ ࡇ ࡜ ࡀ ᳨ ド ࡉ ࢀ ࡓ ࡜ ࡍ ࡿ 㸦 ➨ 㸲 ❶ 㸧ࠋ ⤖ ㄽ ࡜ ࡋ ࡚ ➹ ⪅ ࡣ ࠊศᯒ⤖ᯝ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊබ௻ᴗࡢࢥࢫࢺ࣐ࢿࢪ࣓ࣥࢺࡣࠊᚲࡎࡋࡶ㠀ຠ⋡ⓗ࡛ࡣ࡞࠿ࡗࡓ
ࡀࠊᑗ᮶ࡣࠊࢥࢫࢺㄪᩚ⬟ຊࡣไᗘⓗせㄳࡢᙳ㡪࡛ኻࢃࢀࡿ࡛࠶ࢁ࠺࡜ண

ࡋࠊᑗ᮶࡬ࡢᥦゝ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊබ┈࡜ຠ⋡ᛶࡢࣂࣛࣥࢫ☜ಖ࡟ྥࡅࡓ⤒Ⴀ⪅ࡢດຊࡀồࡵࡽࢀࡿ࡜ࡍࡿࠋ᳨ ウ 㐣 ⛬ ࡛ ࡣ 㸪≉ ࡟ ࢥ ࢫ ࢺ ࡢ ◳ ┤ ᛶ ࡟ ↔ Ⅼ ࢆ ᙜ ࡚ ࠊձ 㐣 ཤ 㸲 㸮 ᖺ 㛫 ࡟ ࢃ ࡓ ࡿ ࢹ ࣮ ࢱ ࠊղࡑࡢ㛫ࡢኚ໬ࠊճ⏘ᴗูࡢ┦㐪Ⅼࠊմேཱྀኚ໬࡜ࡢ㛵㐃ࠊյᨻ἞ࡢᙳ㡪ຠᯝḟ➨࡜࠸࠺㸳ࡘࡢษࡾཱྀ࡛⥥ᐦ࡞᳨ウࢆࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ࡜࡚ࡶ᭷ព⩏࡞᳨ド⤖ᯝࡀᚓࡽࢀࡓ࡜ㄆ
ࡵࡽࢀࡿࠋࡶࡗ࡜ࡶࠊ㈝⏝ࡢຠ⋡ᛶ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㏻ᖖࡢ᳨ド᪉ἲ࡛࠶ࡿ㹂㹃㸿ἲ࡬ࡢゝཬࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸Ⅼ࡞࡝ࠊⱝᖸㄝ᫂୙㊊࡞࡜ࡇࢁࡸࠊ࠶ࡿ⛬ᗘண（ 12 ）

ࡉࢀࡓᥦゝෆᐜ࡜

࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡓࡾࡍࡿ㠃ࡀ࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࡣྰᐃ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊᅜෆᩥ⊩ࡀᑡ࡞࠸୰࡛ࠊ⮬ศ࡞ࡾࡢ௬ㄝࢆ❧࡚࡚ࠊࢹ࣮ࢱ᳨ドࢆ㥑౑ࡋࡓᡭἲࢆ⏝࠸࡚✚ᴟⓗ࡟ᾏእ࡟Ⓨಙࡋࡼ࠺࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿពḧࡣࠊ༑ศ࡟ホ౯ࡋ࠺ࡿࠋㄽ᪨ࡶ᫂ᛌ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ඲య࡟ㄝᚓຊࢆᣢࡘࠋ

（ 13 ）

⸨ᒸ ♸἞ ✏ࠕⅭ᭰ᕪᦆ┈࡟ᑐࡍࡿㄢ⛯̿㈌ᖯ౯್ࡢኚື࡜⛒⛯ἲ̿ࠖ㸦ᮾி኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔ἲᏛᨻ἞Ꮫ◊✲⛉ ࠗᅜᐙᏛ఍㞧ㄅ࠘➨  ᕳ ࣭  ྕ 㸦  ᖺ  ᭶ 㸧  ➨  ᕳ ࣭  ྕ 㸦  ᖺ  ᭶ 㸧 ➨  ᕳ ࣭  ྕ 㸦  ᖺ  ᭶ 㸧   ➨  ᕳ ࣭  ྕ 㸦  ᖺ  ᭶ 㸧 ➨  ᕳ ࣭  ྕ 㸦  ᖺ  ᭶ 㸧  ➨  ᕳ ࣭  ྕ 㸦  ᖺ  ᭶ 㸧 ୖ ᕳ  㡫 ᮏㄽᩥࡣ㸪Ⅽ᭰ᕪᦆ┈࡟ᑐࡍࡿᡤᚓㄢ⛯ࡢㄢ㢟ࢆࠊ࢔࣓ࣜ࢝࡟࠾ࡅࡿἲไᗘࡸ⌮ㄽࢆཧ⪃࡟ࡋࡘࡘศᯒࡋࠊᣦ᦬ࡍࡿࠋ
ᮏㄽᩥࡣ㸱❶࡛ᵓᡂࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ➨㸯❶࡛ࡣ㸪⛒⛯ἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㔠㖹㸦㈌ᖯ㸧ࡢ఩⨨࡙ ࡅ ࠿ ࡽ ࡣ ࡌ ࡵ 㸦 ➨ 㸯 ⠇ 㸧㸪 ⛒ ⛯ ἲ ࡟ ࠾ ࠸ ࡚ ࡣ ྡ ┠ ౯ ್ ୺ ⩏ ࡀ ࢹ ࣇ ࢛ ࣝ ࢺ ࡛ ࠶ ࡿ ௨ ୖ 㸪᫬㛫ⓗ࡞㈌ᖯ౯್ࡢኚື࡛࠶ࡿ࢖ࣥࣇ࣮ࣞࢩࣙࣥࡸᆅᇦ㛫ࡢ㈌ᖯ౯್ࡢኚື࡛࠶ࡿ≀౯ᆅᇦᕪ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚㈌ᖯࡢᑐෆ౯್ࡢኚືࡀ⛒⛯ἲ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡋ࠺ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆㄽࡌࡿ㸦 ➨ 㸰 ⠇ 㸧ࠋ ࡉ ࡽ ࡟ 㸪 ኚ ື ┦ ሙ ไ ࡢ ᥇ ⏝ ࡟ ࡼ ࡗ ࡚ ᅜ 㝿 ㏻ ㈌ ไ ᗘ ࡀ ኱ ᖜ ࡟ ኚ ᐜ ࡋ ࡓ ࡓ ࡵ 㸪Ⅽ ᭰ ᕪ ᦆ ┈ ࡀ Ⓨ ⏕ ࡍ ࡿ ᒁ 㠃 ࡀ ኱ ᖜ ࡟ ቑ ຍ ࡋ ࡓ ࡇ ࡜ ࢆ ᣦ ᦬ ࡋ ࡘ ࡘ㸦 ➨ 㸱 ⠇ 㸧㸪᪥ ᮏ ࡟ ࠾ ࡅࡿⅭ᭰ᕪᦆ┈࡟ᑐࡍࡿㄢ⛯ࡢ㛵ಀつᐃࡀ༑ศ࡟ᩚഛࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࡸࡑࡢつᐃ⮬యࡀ Ⅽ ᭰ ᕪ ᦆ ┈ ࡑ ࡢ ࡶ ࡢ ࡟ ╔ ┠ ࡋ ࡚ ࠸ ࡞ ࠸ ᪨ ୺ ᙇ ࡍ ࡿ㸦 ➨ 㸲 ⠇ 㸧ࠋ➨ 㸰 ❶ ࡛ ࡣ 㸪࢔ ࣓ ࣜ ࢝ྜ⾗ᅜࡢⅭ᭰ᕪᦆ┈࡟ᑐࡍࡿㄢ⛯ၥ㢟ࢆᢅ࠸㸪㸯㸷㸶㸴ᖺࡢᶵ⬟㏻㈌ᴫᛕࡢᑟධࡀⅭ᭰ᕪᦆ┈ㄢ⛯࡟࡜ࡗ࡚⏬ᮇⓗ࡞ព࿡ࢆᣢࡗࡓࡇ࡜ཬࡧ࢖ࣥࣇ࣮ࣞࢩࣙࣥࡶ⪃៖࡟ධࢀࡓ⛯ไࢆᵓ⠏ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᣦ᦬ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ➨㸱❶࡛ࡣ㸪Ⅽ᭰ᕪᦆ┈࡟ᑐࡍࡿㄢ⛯ࢆ⤒῭ᏛⓗほⅬ࠿ࡽศᯒࡋ㸪እᅜ㏻㈌ᘓ㈨⏘࡟㛵ࡍࡿ཰┈ࡣ㸪ձྡ┠ⓗ࡞฼Ꮚ㒊ศ㸪ղᐇ㉁ⓗ࡞฼Ꮚ㒊ศ㸪ճᐇ㝿ࡢ࢖ࣥࣇࣞ⋡࠿ࡽㄝ᫂ࡉࢀࡿண᝿ࡉࢀ࡞࠸Ⅽ᭰ᕪᦆ┈㒊ศ㸪մճ௨እࡢண᝿ࡉࢀ࡞࠸Ⅽ᭰ᕪᦆ┈㒊ศ㸪յ࢖ࣥࣇࣞ㒊ศ࡟ศࡅࡽࢀࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ ᮏㄽᩥࡣ㸪ᚑ᮶◊✲ࡢ⵳✚ࡀᑡ࡞࠿ࡗࡓⅭ᭰ᕪᦆ┈࡟ᑐࡍࡿᡤᚓㄢ⛯࡜࠸࠺ศ㔝࡟ጞࡵ࡚࣓ࢫࢆධࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢసᴗࢆ㐍ࡵࡿ࡟ᙜࡓࡗ࡚ࡣࠊⅭ᭰ᕪᦆ┈ࡢᮏ㉁࡟ࡲ
࡛㐳ࡗ࡚⪃ᐹࢆຍ࠼ࡿ࡜ඹ࡟㸪ಶࠎࡢㄽⅬ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢ᳨ドࢆࠊ⢭⦓࠿ࡘ୎ᑀ࡟⾜ࡗ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡑࡢసᴗࡢ⥥ᐦࡉࡣ኱࠸࡟ホ౯ࡉࢀࡿࠋ≉࡟㛤ᨺ⤒῭໬࡟࠾ࡅࡿᡤᚓᴫᛕࢆㄽ
ࡌࡓ➨㸯❶➨㸱⠇ࡸࠊ⌧⾜ἲୗ࡟࠾ࡅࡿⅭ᭰ᕪᦆ┈࡟ᑐࡍࡿㄢ⛯ࢆㄽࡌࡓྠ➨㸲⠇࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⦓ᐦ࡞ศᯒࡣ㸪ᮏㄽᩥࡀᏛ⾡ㄽᩥ࡜ࡋ࡚ඃࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ㧗࠸Ỉ‽࡟࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆዴ
ᐇ࡟♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜࠸࠼ࡼ࠺ࠋ
ࡑࡢ୍᪉࡛ࠊᮏㄽᩥ࡟ࡣࠊᝰࡋࡴ࡭ࡁⅬࡶぢࡽࢀࡿࠋᮏㄽᩥ࡟࠾ࡅࡿၥ㢟Ⅼࡢ୍ࡘࡣ㸪඲యࡢᵓᡂࡀᴟࡵ࡚࢔ࣥࣂࣛࣥࢫ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡍ࡞ࢃࡕ㸪ᮏㄽᩥ୰ࡢグ㏙ࡢ኱㒊ศࡣ➨㸯❶࡛༨ࡵࡽࢀ㸪➨㸰❶㸪➨㸱❶࡜ㄽ㏙㔞ࡣࡔࢇࡔࢇᑼࡍࡰࡳ࡟ῶᑡࡋ࡚ ࠸ ࡿ 㸦ࠕ ⤖ ࠖ ࡟ ⮳ ࡗ ࡚ ࡣ ࢃ ࡎ ࠿ 㸯 㡫 ࡋ ࠿ ࡞ ࠸ 㸧ࠋ ㄽ ᩥ ᇳ ➹ ࡟ 㝿 ࡋ ࡚ ࡣ ࠊ ඲ య ࡢ ⤫ ୍ ᛶࢆಖࡘࡇ࡜࡟ࡶᚰࢆ⏝࠸ࠊྛ❶㛫࡛ࡢࣂࣛࣥࢫࡸ඲యࡢᵓᡂࢆ⪃࠼࡚ࠊ࠶ࡿ⛬ᗘࡣయ⣔ⓗ࡟ᩚ࠼ࡿ᭩ࡁ᪉ࢆࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡶὀពࢆᡶ࠺ᚲせࡀ࠶ࢁ࠺ࠋࡲࡓࠊከࡃࡢㄽⅬ࡟ࡘࡁヲ⣽࡞ศᯒࢆຍ࠼࡚࠸ࡿⅬ࡛ࡣ㧗ࡃホ౯ࡋ࠺ࡿࡀ㸪ᮏㄽᩥࡢศᯒࡢ⤖ᯝฟࡉࢀ࡚࠸
ࡿ᭱⤊⤖ㄽࡣࠊᚲࡎࡋࡶ᫂☜࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ᭕᫕ᶍ⢶࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜࠸࠺༳㇟ࢆཷࡅࡓࠋඃ

（ 14 ）

⚽࡞Ꮫ⾡ㄽᩥ࡛࠶ࡿࡔࡅ࡟ࠊᑗ᮶ࠊⴭ᭩࡜ࡋ࡚ࡲ࡜ࡵࡿ㝿࡟ࡣࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢⅬࢆ༑ศ࡟⪃៖ࡋ࡚ࠊࡉࡽ࡞ࡿ㧗ࡳࢆ┠ᣦࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᮇᚅࡋ࡚ࡸࡲ࡞࠸ࠋ

（ 15 ）ᒾ℩ ཭ு ✏ 㸦❧࿨㤋኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔 㝔⏕ ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒ࠖ ୖ ᕳ  㡫 ➹⪅࡟ᣐࢀࡤࠊࠕ ⛣ ㌿ ౯ ᱁ ⛯ ไ ࡜ 㛵 ⛯ ホ ౯ ไ ᗘ ࡣ ࠊ㍺ ධ ౯ ᱁ ࡬ ࡢ ホ ౯ ࡟ ࠾ ࠸ ࡚ ஺ 㘒 ࡍࡿ ࠖࠋࡍ ࡞ ࢃ ࡕ ࠊ㍺ ධ ㈌ ≀ ࡢ ྲྀ ᘬ ౯ ᱁ ࡀ 㐺 ṇ ᫬ ౯ ࡟ ᑐ ࡋ ࡚ 㧗 ౯ ࡟ ࡞ ࢀ ࡤ ࡞ ࡿ ࡯ ࡝ ἲ ே ⛯ࡢῶᑡ࡜㛵⛯ࡢቑຍࢆᣍࡃࡀࠊ཯ᑐ࡟ࠊప౯࡟࡞ࢀࡤ࡞ࡿ࡯࡝ἲே⛯ࡢቑຍ࡜㛵⛯ࡢῶᑡࢆᣍࡃࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡿࠋゝ࠸᥮࠼ࢀࡤࠊ㍺ධࡍࡿ⣡⛯⪅࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࡣ཯ᑐ᪉ྥ࡟⛯㈇ᢸ
ࡀഴࡃࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไୗ࡛ࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡢ㛵ಀ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ
᭱㏆ࡢᅜ㝿ุ౛㸦⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢୗ᪉ಟṇ࡟క࠺㛵⛯ࡢ㑏௜ㄳồࢆㄆࡵ࡞࠿ࡗࡓ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺ
ࢽࢡࢫ஦௳࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㹃㹓⿢ุᡤุỴ㸧࡞࡝ࢆཧ⪃࡟ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽ᳨ウࢆ⾜࠺ࠋ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣࠊୖ᪉࡜ୗ᪉ࡢ୧᪉ྥ࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡀࠊ➹⪅ࡢၥ㢟ព㆑
ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯࡟࠾࠸࡚⣡⛯⪅ࡀ୍᪉ⓗ࡟୙฼┈ࢆ⿕ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎᅜෆ࡛ࡢ◊✲࡟ࡣ㐍ᒎࡀぢࡽࢀ࡞࠸ࠊ࡜࠸࠺ࡇ࡜࡟
࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡢ≧ἣࢆᡴ㛤ࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊ➹⪅ࡣࠊ㏆᫬ࡢ㆟ㄽࢆཧ⪃࡟ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊࢃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࡢᮃࡲࡋ࠸࠶ࡾ᪉ࢆᶍ⣴ࡍࡿࠋᮏㄽᩥࡢ඲యࡢᵓᡂࡣࠊᮏㄽ㒊ศࡢᅄ❶࡜ࠊ◊✲ࡢ┠ⓗࢆ㏙࡭ࡿᗎ❶ࠊࡑࢀ࡟㡑ᅜὶࡢ㹋㹍㹓㸦஢ゎぬ᭩㸧ࡢ⥾⤖࡜ࠊᅜෆ㸿㹎㸿࡜஦๓ᩍ♧ไᗘࡢྠ᫬⏦ㄳไᗘࡢᑟධ
ࢆᥦ᱌ࡍࡿ⤊❶࡜࠿ࡽ࡞ࡿࠋ
ᮏㄽࡢ➨㸯❶࡛ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ࡢ௙⤌ࡳࡢ㐪࠸ࢆ㏙࡭ࡓᚋࠊ㍺ධᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡼࡾ⏕ࡌࡿ⣡⛯⪅ࡢ୙฼┈࡬ࡢᑐᛂࡢᚲせᛶࢆᣦ᦬ࡋࠊ୧ไᗘࡢᕪ␗ㄪᩚࡢᚲせᛶࢆồࡵࡿ᭱㏆ࡢᅜ㝿ᶵ㛵࡟ࡼࡿᥦゝࡢ⤂௓ࢆ⾜࠺ࠋ➨㸰❶࡛ࡣࠊ㹕㹁㹍᳨࡛ウࡉࢀࡓࠕ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒ᪉ἲࡢά⏝ࢆ⫯ᐃⓗ࡟⤂௓ࡍࡿ୍᪉ࠊ㸿㹎㸿࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢ⿵ൾㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚㛵⛯ࡢ㑏௜ㄳồࢆㄆࡵ࡞࠿ࡗࡓ㹃㹓⿢ุᡤุỴࡢᢈุⓗ⤂௓ࢆࡍࡿࠋ➨㸱❶࡛➹⪅ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࢆά⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ⡿ᅜ࡜㡑ᅜࡢ௙⤌ࡳࢆ᥇ࡾ࠶ࡆࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࡟ࡼࡿ஦ᚋⓗ࡞ୗ᪉ಟṇࡀ࠶ࡗࡓሙྜ࡟ࡶࠊࡑࢀࢆ཯ᫎࡋࡓ㑏௜ࢆྍ⬟࡜ࡍ࡭ࡁࡇ࡜ࢆᥦゝࡍࡿࠋ➨㸲❶࡛ࡣࠊୖグ᳨ウࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࢃࡀᅜ࡛ࡶࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃୗ᪉ㄪᩚ㸦㑏௜㸧ࢆㄆࡵࡿ᪉ྥ᳨࡛ウࡍ࡭ࡁ᪨ࢆᥦゝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࢃࡀᅜࡢ㛵⛯ࢧ࢖ࢻ࠿ࡽࡶࠊ஦ᚋⓗ࡞⿵ൾㄪᩚࡀ⛣㌿౯᱁ୖ⾜ࢃࢀࡓ࡜ࡁ࡟㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟཯ᫎࡉࡏࡿ࡭ࡁ࠿࡝࠺࠿࡜࠸࠺ᙧ᳨࡛ウࡉࢀ࡚ࡁ࡚࠸ࡓࠋ➹⪅ࡣࠊᐇ㝿࡟㔠㖹➼ࡢᤵཷࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿᵝ࡞⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊୖ᪉ಟṇ࣭ୗ᪉ಟṇࢆၥࢃࡎ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡜ࡢ❧ሙ࡟❧ࡕ࡞ࡀࡽࡶࠊୗ᪉ಟṇ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ⡿ᅜࠊ㡑ᅜࡢไᗘࡢ୍㒊᥇⏝ࡸࠊࡑࡢᐇ᪋࡟ྥࡅࡓᅜ⛯࡜㛵⛯ࡢ୧ᙜᒁ㛫ࡢ㛵㐃᝟ሗ஺᥮ࡢᚲせᛶࢆᙉㄪࡍࡿࠋ➹⪅ࡣࠊ㏣ᚩ㢠Ⓨ⏕᫬ࡢࡳࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࡟ࡼࡿㄪᩚࡢ㛵⛯࡬ࡢ཯ᫎࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ⌧≧࡟ᑐࡋ࡚␲ၥࢆᣢࡕࠊඛ⾜◊✲ࡸᅜ㝿ᶵ㛵࡛ࡢ᳨ウ≧ἣࠊุ౛➼࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢẚ㍑ἲⓗ⪃ᐹ࡞࡝ࠊ㐺ษ࡞ᡭ㡰ࢆ㏣ࡗࡓ୹ᛕ࡞ࣜࢧ࣮ࢳ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁ⤖ㄽ࡟฿㐩ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋྛࣃ࣮ࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ᳨ウ࡟ࡣࠊ௒ᚋࡶ῝ᇼࢆࡍࡿᚲせᛶࡸవᆅࡣㄆࡵࡽ
ࢀࡿࡶࡢࡢࠊࢸ࣮࣐㑅ᢥࡢ᩾᪂ࡉ࡜㛵⛯ࡢࠕ㈍኎࡟࠿࠿ࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖ࠿ࡽࢫ
ࢱ࣮ࢺࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺᳨ウ᪉ἲ࡞࡝ࠊ୍⯡ࡢ⛯ἲㄽᩥࡢᯟ⤌ࡳ࡟࡜ࡽࢃࢀ࡞࠸࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ

（ 16 ）

ࡶࡳࡽࢀࡿࠋㄽ᪨ࡢ᫂ᛌࡉ࠿ࡽࡳ࡚ࡶࠊ⛒⛯㈨ᩱ㤋ዡບ㈹ᤵ㈹࡟༑ศ್ࡍࡿࠋ

（ 17 ）

ዟᒃ ᐶ⏕ ✏ 㸦❧࿨㤋኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔 㝔⏕㸧ࠕᚑᒓ௦⌮ே㹎㹃ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⪃ᐹࠖୖ ᕳ  㡫 ᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞஦ᴗࢆᒎ㛤ࡍࡿ௻ᴗࡢ୰࡟ࡣࠊㄢ⛯ࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊᜏஂⓗ᪋タ㸦㹎㹃㸧࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ㑊ࡅࡼ࠺࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞⤌⧊෌⦅ࢆ฼⏝ࡋ࡚ࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ࡢ
ࡼ࠺࡞஦ᴗᙧែࢆ㑅ᢥࡍࡿࢣ࣮ࢫࡀቑ࠼࡚࠸ࡿࠋᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞⤌⧊෌⦅࡛⏕ࡳฟࡉࢀࡿ᪂
ࡓ࡞஦ᴗయࢆ⏝࠸ࡿࡇ࡜࡛௦⌮ே㹎㹃ࡢㄆᐃࢆᅇ㑊ࡋࡼ࠺࡜ࡍࡿ⛒⛯ᅇ㑊⾜Ⅽ࡟ᑐฎࡍ ࡿ ࡓ ࡵ ࠊ 㹍 㹃 㹁 㹂 ࡢ 㹀 㹃 㹎 㹑 ⾜ ື ィ ⏬ 㸵 ࡀ ⟇ ᐃ ࡉ ࢀ ࠊ  ᖺ ࡟ ࡣ ࠊ 㹍 㹃 㹁 㹂 ࣔ ࢹ ࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢᨵゞ࡛ࠊ௦⌮ே㹎㹃ࡢ⠊ᅖࢆᣑᙇࡍࡿಟṇࡀ᪋ࡉࢀࡓࠋᮏㄽᩥ࡟࠾࠸࡚➹⪅ࡣࠊࡇࡢ᮲⣙ᨵṇ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࡶ௦⌮ே㹎㹃ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ᪂ࡓ࡞ၥ㢟ࡀ⏕ࡌ࡚ࡃࡿ࡜ࡢၥ㢟ព㆑ࢆࡶࡗ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡇࡢၥ㢟ព㆑࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊ➹⪅ࡣࠊᮃࡲࡋ࠸
௦⌮ே㹎㹃ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆᶍ⣴ࡋࡼ࠺࡜ࡍࡿࠋ
➹⪅ࡣࠊ➨㸯❶࡟࠾࠸࡚௦⌮ே㹎㹃࡟㛵ࡍࡿၥ㢟ࡢᡤᅾࢆᥦ㉳ࡋࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ➨㸰❶࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ௦⌮ே㹎㹃ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢ㹍㹃㹁㹂ᢎㄆ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡜ᅜ
ෆἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡜ࢆ⤂௓ࡍࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࡣࠊ㹍㹃㹁㹂ࡢ࣏࣮ࣞࢺࢆ⏝࠸࡚ ࠊ VLQJOH WD[SD\HU DSSURDFK ࡜ GXDO WD[SD\HU DSSURDFK ࡜ ࡢ ẚ ㍑ ศ ᯒ ࡸ ࠊ ࣔ ࢹ ࣝ ⛒ ⛯᮲⣙➨㸷᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡜➨㸵᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡜ࢆẚ㍑ࡍࡿసᴗࢆ⾜࠺㸦➹⪅ࡣࠊ➨㸷᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡛ࡣㄆ㆑ࡉࢀ࡞࠿ࡗࡓ฼ᚓࡀ➨㸵᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚Ꮡᅾࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࡓ ࡵ ࠊ GXDO WD[SD\HU DSSURDFK ࡢ ᪉ ࡀ ᮃ ࡲ ࡋ ࠸ ࡜ ࡍ ࡿ 㸧ࠋ ➨ 㸱 ❶ ࡛ ࡣ ࠊ GXDO WD[SD\HUDSSURDFK ࢆ ⏝ ࠸ ࡘ ࡘ ࠊ 㸰 㸮 㸯 㸴 ᖺ ࢹ ࢕ ࢫ ࢝ ࢵ ࢩ ࣙ ࣥ ࣭ ࢻ ࣛ ࣇ ࢺ ࢆ ά ⏝ ࡋ ࡓ ᩘ ್ ౛ ࢆ ᳨ウࡍࡿసᴗࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡜௦⌮ே㹎㹃㛫ࡢ฼┈㓄ศࢆ⾜࠺⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡣࠊᦆ┈≧ἣ࡟࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎ௦⌮ே㹎㹃࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼┈ࡢ㢠ࢆ⟬ᐃࡍࡿ➨㸵᮲ࡢ ┠ ⓗ ࡟ ཯ ࡋ ࡚ ࠸ ࡿ ࡇ ࡜ ࡞ ࡝ ࢆ ᣦ ᦬ ࡍ ࡿ ࠋࡇ ࢀ ࡽ ࡢ ศ ᯒ ࠊ᳨ ウ ࡢ ⤖ ᯝ ࡜ ࡋ ࡚ ࠊ➹ ⪅ ࡣ ࠊ➨㸲❶࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ➨㸷᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ࢆඃඛࡍ࡭ࡁࡇ࡜࡜ඹ࡟ࠊ➨㸷᮲࡟࠾࠸࡚ㄆ㆑ࡉࢀࡓ
ࣜࢫࢡࡣ➨㸵᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛ࡣㄆ㆑ࡋ࡞࠸࡜ࡍ࡭ࡁࡇ࡜ࢆᥦゝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞ㄢ⛯㛵ಀ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣ࡜ࡾࢃࡅࡑ࠺࡛࠶ࢁ࠺ࡀࠊ᭱᪂ࡢ⛯ไࡢືྥࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼
ࡓㄽᩥࡢᇳ➹࡟ࡣఱ࠿࡜ᅔ㞴ࢆక࠺ഴྥࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡢ୰࡛ࠊᮏㄽᩥࡣࠊ㸰㸮㸯㸳ᖺࡢ㹀㹃㹎㹑᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩බ⾲ᚋ࡟࠾࠸࡚✚ࡳṧࡉࢀࡓ᳨ウㄢ㢟࡛࠶ࡿᚑᒓ௦⌮ே㹎㹃ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉࡟╔║ࡋ࡚ࠊṇ㠃࠿ࡽㄢ㢟࡟ྲྀࡾ⤌ࢇ࡛࠸ࡿࠋ╔᝿⮬యࡣὸጔ❶ዴẶࡢㄽᩥ࡟ゐⓎࡉࢀࡓ࠿࡜ᛮࢃࢀࡿࡀࠊ╔᝿ࡢࡼࡉࠊ┠ⓗࡢ᫂☜ࡉࠊ᫂ᛌ࠿ࡘ
㐺ษ࡞ㄽ᪨ࡢᒎ㛤ࡢ௙᪉࡞࡝ࡢⅬ࡟࠾࠸࡚㝿❧ࡗ࡚࠾ࡾࠊዲឤࢆぬ࠼ࡓࠋ➨㸯❶࠾ࡼࡧ ➨ 㸰 ❶ ࡟ ࠾ ࠸ ࡚ ඛ ⾜ ◊ ✲ ࡟ ┦ ᛂ ࡢ ┠ 㓄 ࡾ ࡀ ࡞ ࡉ ࢀ ࡚ ࠸ ࡿ Ⅼ ࡶ ホ ౯ ࡛ ࡁ ࡿ ࠋ➨ 㸱 ❶ ࡢ ࠊ㹍㹃㹁㹂ࡢࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࢆ⏝࠸࡚ㄽࡌ࡚࠸ࡿ㒊ศࡀࠊᮏㄽᩥࡢᐇ㉁ⓗ࡞୰ᚰ࡛࠶ࢁ࠺ࠋࡑࡢ㝿࡟ࡶࠊࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࢆ୎ᑀ࡟ᘬ⏝ࡋࠊཧ⪃࡟ࡍࡿᡭἲࡣ༑ศホ౯࡛ࡁࡿࠋࡶࡗ࡜ࡶࠊࡑࡢ୍᪉࡛ࡣࠊᮏㄽᩥࡀࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥ
ࢻࣛࣇࢺ࡟㢗ࡾࡍࡂ࡚࠸ࡿࡼ࠺࡞༳㇟ࢆ୚࠼ࡿࡇ࡜ࡣྰࡵ࡞࠸ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ ࣙ ࣭ࣥࢻ ࣛ ࣇ ࢺ ࢆ ⏝ ࠸ ࡚ ୎ ᑀ ࡟ ᩘ ್ ౛ ࢆ ᳨ ウ ࡍ ࡿ ᡭ ἲ ࢆ ྵ ࡵ ࡚ ࠊᮏ ㄽ ᩥ ࡣ ࠊᐇ ド ⓗ ࠊ⊂๰ⓗ◊✲࡜ࡋ࡚༑ศ࡟ホ౯ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿࠋ

（ 18 ）

ᰘ⏣ 㔜ᶞ ✏ 㸦኱㜰⤒῭኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔 㝔⏕㸧ࠕࢫࢡ࢖࣮ࢬ࢔࢘ࢺ⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㐺᱁せ௳ࡢྜ⌮ᛶุ᩿つ‽ࡢ⪃ᐹ̿ㄢ⛯⧞ᘏ࡭⌮ㄽࡢ㝈⏺࡜ቃ⏺̿ࠖୗᕳ  㡫 ᖹ ᡂ 㸰 㸷 ᖺ ᗘ ࡢ ⛯ ไ ᨵ ṇ ࡛ ࢫ ࢡ ࢖ ࣮ ࢬ ࢔ ࢘ ࢺ ⛯ ไ ࡀ ᑟ ධ ࡉ ࢀ ࡓ ࡀ ࠊᮏ ㄽ ᩥ ࡢ ┠ ⓗ ࡣ ࠊྠ⛯ไࡀࢃࡀᅜ⤌⧊෌⦅⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿㄢ⛯⧞ᘏ࡭⌮ㄽ࡟࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟఩⨨௜ࡅࡽࢀࡿࡢ
࠿ࠊㄢ⛯⧞ᘏ࡭ࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿ⤌⧊෌⦅ᡂ࡜ྰㄆࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ⤌⧊෌⦅ᡂ࡜ࡢቃ⏺ࡣ࡝ࡇ࡟࠶ࡿࡢ࠿ࠊ࡜࠸࠺␲ၥ࡬ࡢゎ⟅ࢆ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡋࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊㄢ⛯⧞ᘏ࡭⌮ㄽ࡜⛒⛯ᅇ㑊ࡢ஧ࡘࡢഃ㠃࠿ࡽࠊࢫࢡ࢖࣮ࢬ࢔࢘ࢺ⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㐺᱁せ௳ࡢྜ⌮ᛶุ᩿ᇶ‽࡟ࡘ࠸᳨࡚ドࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟࠶ࡿࠋ㸯 ࠕ ⤌ ⧊ ෌ ⦅ ࡢ ព ⩏ ࠖࠊ 㸰 ࠕ ࢫ ࢡ ࢖ ࣮ ࢬ ࢔ ࢘ ࢺ ⛯ ไ ࡢ 㐺 ᱁ せ ௳ ࡢ ᑕ ⛬ ࠖࠊ 㸱 ࠕ ㄢ ⛯ ⧞ᘏ ࡭ ࡢ ⌮ ㄽ ࡟ 㛵 ࡍ ࡿ ุ ౛ ἲ ⌮ ࠖࠊ㸲ࠕ 㐺 ᱁ せ ௳ ࡜ ⛒ ⛯ ᅇ 㑊 ྰ ㄆ ࡢ ᇶ ‽ ࠖࡢ 㸲 ❶ ࡟ ࢃ ࡓ ࡿศᯒ᳨࣭ウࢆ⾜ࡗࡓ⤖ᯝࠊ➹⪅ࡣࠊḟࡢ⤖ㄽ࡟฿㐩ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ձࢫࢡ࢖࣮ࢬ࢔࢘ࢺ⛯ไ࡟⤌ࡳ㎸ࡲࢀࡓ⤌⧊෌⦅ࡢ࠺ࡕࠊ㔠㖹஺௜ᆺࡢᰴᘧ஺᥮➼࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ㹋㸤㸿㸦௻ᴗ㈙཰㸧ࡢᛶ㉁ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋղ⤌⧊෌⦅⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿㄢ⛯⧞ᘏ࡭⌮ㄽࡢ᰿ᣐࡣ㠀ᖖ࡟୙᫂░࡛࠶ࡿࠋճ⤌⧊෌⦅⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛒⛯ᅇ㑊ྰㄆつᐃ࡛࠶ࡿἲே⛯ἲ㸯㸱㸰᮲ࡢ㸰ࡶࠊᚲࡎࡋࡶ᫂☜࡛࡞࠸ࠋմୖグ㸱ࡘࡢ⌮⏤࠿ࡽࠊ⛒⛯ࡢணぢྍ⬟ᛶࡸ୰❧ᛶࡀᦆ࡞ࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋյࡇࢀࡽࡢၥ㢟ࢆゎỴࡍࡿ࡟ࡣࠊ⤌⧊෌⦅⛯ ไ ࡢ ㄢ ⛯ ⧞ ᘏ ࡭ ⌮ ㄽ ࢆ ᫂ ☜ ࡟ ࡍ ࡭ ࡁ ࡛ ࠶ ࡿ ࡀ ࠊࢃ ࡀ ᅜ ࡢ ⤌ ⧊ ෌ ⦅ ⛯ ไ ࡣ ⡿ ᅜ ࡟ ẚ ࡋ ࠊṔ ྐ ࡶ ὸ ࡃ ࠊ㠀 ᖖ ࡟ ᅔ 㞴 ࡛ ࠶ ࡿ ࠋ⡿ ᅜ ࡢ ⤌ ⧊ ෌ ⦅ ⛯ ไ ࡢ ࡼ ࠺ ࡟ ࠊᑐ ౯ せ ௳ ࡟ 㛵 ࡋ ࡚ ࡣ ࠊ⤌⧊෌⦅ࡢ㢮ᆺẖ࡟ᐃࡵࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ᖹᡂ㸰㸷ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣࠊࢫࣆࣥ࢜ࣇ⛯ไࡢ๰タࡸࠊࢫࢡ࢖࣮ࢬ࢔࢘ࢺ࡟
࠾ࡅࡿㄢ⛯ୖࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࡢᩚ⌮ࠊ㐺᱁せ௳ࡢぢ┤ࡋ࡞࡝ࠊ㹋㸤㸿ྲྀᘬ࡟኱ࡁ࡞ᙳ㡪ࡢ࠶ࡿᨵṇෆᐜࡀ┒ࡾ㎸ࡲࢀࡓࠋࢫࣆࣥ࢜ࣇ⛯ไࡀ๰タࡉࢀࡓࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾୖሙ఍♫࡟࠾ࡅࡿ஦ᴗ෌⦅ᡂࡀάᛶ໬ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮇᚅࡉࢀࡿ࡜ホ౯ࡍࡿྥࡁࡶ࠶ࡿࡀࠊ➹⪅ࡣࠊ㐺᱁せ௳ࡀᩚ⌮ࡉࢀࡓࡇ࡜ࢆホ౯ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࡶࠊ⤌⧊෌⦅⛯ไࡢㄢ⛯ࡢ⧞ᘏ࡭⌮ㄽࡢ᰿ᣐࡢ
୙᫂☜ࡉࢆྵࡵ࡚ࠊ⛒⛯ᅇ㑊ྰㄆつᐃ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶㄢ㢟ࢆᢪ࠼࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᣦ᦬ࡍࡿࠋ
➹⪅ࡢᑟࡁฟࡋࡓ⤖ㄽ࡛ࡢᣦ᦬ࡣࠊ≉࡟┠᪂ࡋ࠸ᣦ᦬࡜ࡣ࠸࠼࡞࠸ࡀࠊ࢝ࣞࣥࢺ࡞
ࢸ࣮࣐࡟ṇ㠃࠿ࡽྲྀࡾ⤌ࢇࡔㄽᩥ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ༑ศ࡟ホ౯࡛ࡁࡼ࠺ࠋㄽᩥసᡂ࡟ᙜࡓࡾࠊ
ၥ㢟ព㆑ࢆ᫂☜࡟ࡶࡗ࡚ㄢ㢟࡟ྥࡁ࠶࠾࠺࡜ࡍࡿጼໃࡸࠊ㇏ᐩ࡞ᩥ⊩ࢆᘬ⏝ࡋࡘࡘࠊ
᫂ᛌ࡟ㄽ㏙ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ࡇࢁ࡞࡝ࡶࠊ኱࠸࡟ホ౯ࡋ࡚Ⰻ࠸ࠋㄢ⛯⧞ᘏ࡭⌮ㄽ࡜⛒⛯ᅇ㑊ࡢ஧ࡘࡢഃ㠃࠿ࡽࠊࢫࢡ࢖࣮ࢬ࢔࢘ࢺ⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㐺᱁せ௳ࡢྜ⌮ᛶุ᩿ᇶ‽ࡢ᳨ドࢆࡋࡼ࠺࡜ࡍࡿ➹⪅ࡢ┠ⓗࡣࠊ༑ศ㐩ᡂ࡛ࡁ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࠶ࡿࡲ࠸࠿ࠋ඲య࡟ዲឤࡢ
ᣢ࡚ࡿㄽᩥ࡛ࠊࡇࡢ✀ࡢၥ㢟࡟ྲྀࡾ⤌ࡶ࠺࡜ࡍࡿேࡓࡕ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࡶࠊ࡜࡚ࡶⰋ࠸่⃭ࢆ୚࠼ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿ࡜ಙࡌࡿࠋࡓࡔࠊⱝᖸẼ࡟࡞ࡿࡢࡣࠊ➹⪅ࡢពぢࢆᒎ㛤ࡍࡿ࡟ᙜࡓࡗ࡚ࠊ௚⪅ࡢぢゎ㸦ᘬ⏝ᩥ⊩㸧࡟౫ᣐࡍࡿ㒊ศࡀ┠❧ࡘⅬ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ⮬ࡽࡢ┠ࢆಙࡌࠊ⮬ศ⮬㌟ࡀ୺య࡜࡞ࡗ᳨࡚ドࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡓ࡞ࡽࡤࠊ➹⪅ࡢㄽࡌࡿ࡜ࡇࢁࡶࠊࡶࡗ
࡜ㄝᚓຊࢆᣢࡕᚓࡓࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞࠿ࢁ࠺࠿ࠋ

（ 19 ）

ᰘ⏣ ෤ᶞ ✏ 㸦༓ⴥၟ⛉኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔 㝔⏕㸧
ࠕ௬᝿㏻㈌࣭ࢺ࣮ࢡࣥ࡟ಀࡿㄢ⛯ୖࡢㅖၥ㢟㸻 $6WXG\RQ7D[DWLRQ,VVXHVRIWKH&U\SWR&XUUHQF\̿ᡤᚓㄢ⛯ࡢ⌧≧࡜௒ᚋࡢㄢ⛯ࡢᅾࡾ᪉ࢆ୰ᚰ࡟̿
)RFXVLQJRQ,QFRPH7D[DWLRQDQG)XWXUH7DVNVࠖ ୗ ᕳ  㡫 ᮏ ㄽ ᩥ ࡛ ࡣ ࠊ௬ ᝿ ㏻ ㈌ ➼ ࡢ ௙ ⤌ ࡳ ࡸ ࠊࢃ ࡀ ᅜ ཬ ࡧ ㅖ እ ᅜ ࡢ ௬ ᝿ ㏻ ㈌ ➼ ࡟ 㛵 ࡍ ࡿ ⛯ ไ ࠊ⚾ἲୖࡢ㸦࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣ⤒῭ⓗ࡞㸧ᛶ㉁ࢆ⪃ᐹࡋࡓୖ࡛ࠊ௬᝿㏻㈌➼࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿᡤᚓࢆᡤ
ᚓ⛯ἲୖࡢ࠸࠿࡞ࡿᡤᚓ༊ศ࡟༊ศࡍࡿ࡭ࡁ࠿࡜࠸࠺ၥ㢟ࡸࠊ௚⛯┠࡟࠾࠸࡚⏕ࡌ࠺
ࡿ௬᝿㏻㈌➼ࡢㄢ⛯ୖࡢྲྀࡾᢅ࠸࡞࡝ࢆ⥲ྜⓗ࡟᳨ウࡍࡿࠋᮏㄽᩥ࡛ࡣࠊࣅࢵࢺࢥ࢖ࣥࡢࡳࢆㄽࡌࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃ㸰㸮㸮㸮✀࡜ࡶࡉࢀࡿ௬᝿㏻㈌➼ࡢྲྀᘬࢆど㔝࡟ධࢀࡘࡘ⪃ᐹࢆ㐍ࡵࡿࠋ௬᝿㏻㈌➼ࡢᛶ㉁ࢆㄽࡌࡿ࡟㝿ࡋ࡚ࠊ➹⪅ࡣࠊ௬᝿㏻㈌ࡢᛶ㉁ࢆᤊ࠼ࡿ࡟ࡣࠊࡑࡢᢏ⾡ⓗࣂࢵࢡ࣮࣎ࣥ࡜⚾ἲⓗᛶ㉁ཬࡧ⤒῭ⓗ
ᛶ㉁㸦㏻㈌ᛶࡢ᭷↓㸧࡟ࡼࡗุ࡚᩿ࡍ࡭ࡁ᪨ࢆᙉㄪࡍࡿࠋ⚾ἲⓗᛶ㉁ࡢ㠃࠿ࡽἲⓗᛶ㉁ࢆ⪃࠼ࡿ࡟ᙜࡓࡗ࡚➹⪅ࡣࠊ࡝ࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚㈈⏘ᶒ࡟⤖ࡧࡘࡅ࡚ㄝ᫂ࡍࡿ
ࡢࡀ㐺ษ࠿ࢆ᳨ウࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡍࡿࠋ➹⪅࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊ⚾ἲୖࡢᛶ㉁ࢆ⪃៖ࡍࡿ㝿࡟⪃ ࠼ ࡽ ࢀ ࡿ ࢔ ࣉ ࣟ ࣮ ࢳ ࡟ ࡣ ࠊ࠸ ࡎ ࢀ ࡶ ᅔ 㞴 ࡉ ࡸ 㝈 ⏺ ࡀ ࠶ ࡿ ࡀ ࠊࠕ ࢥ ࣥ ࢭ ࣥ ࢧ ࢫ㸦 Ẹ ἲ ୖࡢ ྜ ព ࡼ ࡾ ࡶ ᾘ ᴟ ⓗ 㸧ࠖࢆ ᛕ 㢌 ࡟ ⨨ ࠸ ࡚ ⌮ ゎ ࡍ ࡿ ࡇ ࡜ ࡣࠕ ྜ ⌮ ⓗ ࠿ ࡘ ⌧ ᐇ ⓗ ࡛ ࠶ ࡿ ࠖ࡜ࡋ ࡚ ࠊ ᡤ ᚓ ࡢ ᖐ ᒓ ࡜ ㄢ ⛯ ᫬ ᮇ ࡢ ၥ 㢟 ࡟ 㛵 ࡋ ࡚ ࡣ ࠊࠕ ࢥ ࣥ ࢭ ࣥ ࢧ ࢫ ࣭ ࢔ ࣉ ࣟ ࣮ ࢳ ࠖ ࡀ 㺀୍ᛂ ࡢ ゎ Ỵ ⟇ ࢆ ୚ ࠼ ࡚ ࡃ ࢀ ࡿ 㺁࡜ ࡢ ホ ౯ ࢆ ୗ ࡋ ࡚ ࠸ ࡿ ࠋ⤒ ῭ ⓗ ᛶ ㉁ ࡢ ほ Ⅼ ࠿ ࡽ ࡣ ࠊ㧗 ᗘ ࡞
ὶ㏻ᛶ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㏻㈌ᛶ࡜ಙ⏝ࡢ⿬௜ࡅࠊ౯್㈓ⶶࡸ౯್஺᥮ᡭẁ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡢᶵ⬟࡟╔┠ࡋ ࡚ ⪃ ᐹ ࡋ ࠊࠕ ㏻ ㈌ ᛶ ࡢ ᭷ ↓ ࠖ࡟ ࡼ ࡾ ࠊࡑ ࡢ ᛶ ㉁ ࡀ ␗ ࡞ ࡿ ࡇ ࡜ ࢆ ☜ ㄆ ࡋ ࡓ ࠺ ࠼ ࡛ ࠊࡑ ࢀࡒࢀࡢ௬᝿㏻㈌➼࡟㏻㈌ᛶࡢ᭷↓ࡢᇶ‽ࢆ⏝࠸࡚⛯ἲୖࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࡶ༊ูࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁࡇ
࡜ࢆ☜ㄆࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᡤᚓ༊ศ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ௬᝿㏻㈌➼ࡢ㈨⏘ヱᙜᛶࢆ๓ᥦ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊල
యⓗ࡞ྲྀᘬࡢែᵝ࡟ᛂࡌ࡚༊ศࡋࠊᡤᚓ⛯ἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿලయⓗ࡞࠶ࡿ࡭ࡁㄢ⛯㛵ಀࢆㄽࡌࡿࠋ➹⪅ࡣࠊ௬᝿㏻㈌➼࡟㛵ࢃࡿከᵝ࡞ᡤᚓ✌ᚓᙧែࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡿ࡜ࠊᡤᚓࡢ※Ἠࡸᛶ ㉁ ࡟ ᛂ ࡌ ࡓ ༊ ศ ࡀ ᚲ せ ࡛ ࠶ ࡿ ࡜ ࡋ ࡚ ࠊཎ ๎ 㞧 ᡤ ᚓ ࡜ ࡍ ࡿ ᅜ ⛯ ᗇ ぢ ゎ ࡟ ␲ ၥ ࢆ ᢞ ࡌ ࡿ ࠋⱥᅜྠᵝࠊࢃࡀᅜࡶᐃ⩏࡟࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎᡤᚓࡢᛶ㉁࡟ᛂࡌ࡚ᐇែ࡟༶ࡋࡓㄢ⛯ࢆ✚ᴟⓗ࡟᳨ウࡍࡿࡼ࠺ồࡵࡿ➹⪅ࡢ⪃࠼ࡀࡇࡇ࡛ࡶ⌧ࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
࢖ࣀ࣮࣋ࢩࣙࣥ㸦ᢏ⾡㠉᪂㸧࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬࡢ」㞧໬࣭ከᵝ໬࡟క࠸ࠊࡉࡽ࡟᪂ࡓ࡞௬
᝿㏻㈌➼ࡀⓏሙࡋࡘࡘ࠶ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡽࡢ௬᝿㏻㈌➼ྲྀᘬࡢᕷሙつᶍࡣࠊ⌧ᅾࡣ┦ᑐⓗ࡟ࡣᑠࡉ࠸࡜ࡣ࠸࠼ࠊࡑࡢྲྀᘬࡢᛶ㉁ࢆἲⓗ࡟☜ᐃࡋࠊ⛒⛯ἲᚊ୺⩏࡜⛒⛯බᖹ୺⩏ࡢ
どⅬ࠿ࡽࠊࡑࡢㄢ⛯ࡢᅾࡾ᪉ࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ୙ྍḞ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆࠊᮏㄽᩥࡣᣦ᦬ࡋ
࡚࠸ࡿࠋ௬᝿㏻㈌➼ࡢྲྀᘬࡣከᒱከᵝ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ」㞧࡛࠶ࡿࡀࠊࡑࡢㄢ⛯㛵ಀࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ๓ᥦ࡜࡞ࡿᇶ‽ࡣࠕ㏻㈌ᛶࡢ᭷↓࡛ࠖ࠶ࡿ࡜ࡢ❧ሙ࠿ࡽࠊከᵝ࡞௬᝿㏻㈌➼ࡢᛶ㉁࡜ྲྀᘬࡢᛶ᱁ࢆヲ⣽࡟᳨ウࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ௬᝿㏻㈌➼ࡢᛶ㉁࡜ྲྀᘬࡢᐇែ࡟ᑐᛂ
ࡋ࡚ㄢ⛯㛵ಀࢆᵓ⠏ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡍࡿ➹⪅ࡢぢゎࡣㄝᚓⓗ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡶࡗ࡜ࡶࠊ」㞧
࡛ࠊ➹⪅࡟ࡼࢀࡤ⌧ẁ㝵࡛ࡶ㸰㸮㸮㸮✀࡟ཬࡪ௬᝿㏻㈌➼ࡢᛶ㉁ࡸྲྀᘬࢆࡵࡄࡿㄢ⛯㛵ಀࢆࠊ⥙⨶ⓗ࡟ㄽࡌࡿࡢࡣ୙ྍ⬟࡟㏆࠸ࠋࡑࡢ୙ྍ⬟࡟㏆࠸సᴗࢆ᭱኱බ⣙ᩘ࡛♧（ 20 ）

ࡋࡓࡢࡀᮏ◊✲࡛ࡣ࡞࠿ࢁ࠺࠿ࠋᮏ◊✲ࡣࠊ୍㈏ࡋࡓព㆑ࡢୗ࡛ࠊ௬᝿㏻㈌➼ྲྀᘬࡢ⥲ྜⓗ࡞᳨ウࢆヨࡳ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ༢࡞ࡿ௬᝿㏻㈌➼ࡢゎㄝ࡟࡜࡝ࡲࡽࡎࠊࡑࡢᛶ㉁ㄽ࡟ࡲ
࡛㋃ࡳ㎸ࢇ࡛⪃ᐹࢆࡋ࡚࠸ࡿⅬࡸࠊ࢝ࣞࣥࢺ࡞ࢸ࣮࣐࡟ᯝᩒ࡟ᣮᡓࡋࡓⅬ࡛ࡶ༑ศホ౯ࡋ࠺ࡿࠋ（ 21 ）

ᑎ⏣ ᬡኸ ✏ 㸦㟷ᒣᏛ㝔኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔 㝔⏕㸧ࠕ↓ᙧ㈨⏘ྲྀᘬ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ̿ᮾிᆅ⿢ᖹᡂ㸰㸷ᖺ㸯㸯᭶㸰㸲᪥ุỴࢆ⣲ᮦ࡟̿ࠖୗ ᕳ  㡫 ᮏㄽᩥ࡛➹⪅ࡣࠊ⌧⾜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡛ᅜእ㛵㐃⪅࡜ࡢ㛫࡛ࡢ↓ᙧ㈨⏘ྲྀᘬ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ
⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊࠕ ṧ వ ฼ ┈ ศ ๭ ἲ ࠖࢆ ᭱ ࡶ 㐺 ษ ࡞ ⟬ ᐃ ᪉ ἲ ࡛ ࠶ ࡿ ࡜ ࡋ࡚ ࠸ ࡿ ࠋࡑ ࢀ ࡣ ᭱ ㏆ ࡢ ↓ ᙧ ㈨ ⏘ ྲྀ ᘬ ࡛ ࡢ ุ Ỵ㸦 ᮾ ி ᆅ ⿢ ᖹ 㸬㸧ࢆ ᳨ ウ ࡍ ࡿ ࡇ ࡜࡛ᑟࡁฟࡉࢀࡓ⤖ㄽ࡛ࡶ࠶ࡿࡀࠊ➹⪅⮬㌟ࠊṧవ฼┈ศ๭᪉ἲࢆ⏝࠸ࡓሙྜ࡛ࡶᙅⅬࡀ࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ༑ศ࡟ㄆ㆑ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡉࡽ࡟➹⪅ࡣࠊᖹᡂ㸱㸯ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇ኱⥘࡛ྲྀࡾୖࡆࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿᡤᚓ┦ᛂᛶᇶ‽࡟ゝཬࡋࠊࡶࡋᑗ᮶࡟࠾࠸࡚ᡤᚓ┦ᛂᇶ‽ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡢ㐺⏝ࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡗࡓ࡜ࡍࢀࡤࠊ⌧⾜ࡢ↓ᙧ㈨⏘ྲྀᘬ࡟ಀࢃࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡛ࡣゎỴ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ࡼ࠺࡞ゎ㔘ㄽⓗၥ㢟Ⅼࡀ❧ἲ࡟ࡼࡾゎỴࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿ࡛࠶ࢁ
࠺ࠊ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᡤᚓ┦ᛂᛶᇶ‽ࡣ㹀㹃㹎㹑່࡛࿌ࡉࢀࡓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡛࠶ࡾࠊࡑࢀࡺ࠼ࢃࡀᅜࡢᖹᡂ㸱㸯ᖺᗘࡢ⛯ไᨵṇ࡛ᑟධࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡗࡓࠋࡇࡢᇶ‽ࡣࠊ⌧ᅾࡢ࡜ࡇࢁ⡿ᅜࠊࢻ࢖ࢶཬࡧⱥᅜ࡛᥇⏝ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡳ࡛࠶ࡾࠊࡇࡢᇶ‽ࢆᐇ⏝໬ࡍࡿ࡟ᙜࡓࡗ࡚ࡣࠊከࡃ
ࡢၥ㢟ࢆඞ᭹ࡋ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸࡜ᛮࢃࢀࡿࠋ➹⪅ࡣࠊ㹆㹒㹔㹇㸦ホ౯ࡀ㞴ࡋ࠸↓ᙧ㈨⏘㸧ヱᙜᛶࡢ❧ド㈐௵ࡣㄢ⛯ᙜᒁ࡟࠶ࡿࡀࠊᡤᚓ┦ᛂᛶᇶ‽ࡢ㐺⏝ච㝖つᐃヱᙜᛶࡢ❧ド㈐௵ࡣ⣡⛯⪅࡟࠶ࡿࡇ࡜࠿ࡽࠊලయⓗ࡞㐺⏝ච㝖つᐃࡢ๰タࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋ
࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊࢃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟ᡤᚓ┦ᛂᛶᇶ‽ࢆᑟධࡍࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡿࡢ࡛࠶ࢀࡤࠊ᪂㹍㹃㹁㹂࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖࡛ࣥᥦゝࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿෆᐜࡼࡾࡶࡶࡗ࡜ලయⓗ࡛ࠊゎ㔘ࡀࡼࡾ᫂☜࡟࡞ࡿࡼ࠺࡞ෆᐜ࡟ࡋ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸࡜ࡍࡿࠋࡇࢀࡽࡣ࠸ࡎࢀࡶⓗ☜࡞ᣦ᦬࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ᛮࢃࢀࡿࠋ
ᮏㄽᩥࡀᥦฟࡉࢀࡓ᫬Ⅼ࡛ࡣࠊࢃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣᡤᚓ┦ᛂᇶ‽ࡀᮍࡔᑟධࡉࢀࡿ࡟⮳ࡗ࡚࡞࠿ࡗࡓࠋࡑࡇ࡛ᮏㄽᩥ࡛ࡣࠊᡤᚓ┦ᛂᇶ‽ࡢලయⓗ࡞ᐇ  ᪋≧ἣࢆ⪃ᐹࡍࡿ࡜ࡇࢁࡲ࡛ࡣཬࢇ࡛ࡣ࠸࡞࠸ࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊᖹᡂ㸱㸯ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇࡲ࡛࡟
Ⓨ⾲ࡉࢀ࡚ࡁࡓㄽᩥࡸᩥ⊩➼࡟ࡣ୹ᛕ࡟┠ࢆ㏻ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊㄽᩥ୰ࡢླྀ㏙࡟཯ᫎࡉࡏ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᮏ ㄽ ᩥ ࡢ ෆ ᐜ ࡣ ᫂ ᬓ ࡛ ศ ࠿ ࡾ ࡸ ࡍ ࡃ ࠊ⾲ ⌧ ຊ ࡢ ࠶ ࡿ ᭩ ࡁ ࡪ ࡾ ࡀ ࡜ ࡚ ࡶ ༳ ㇟ ⓗ ࡛ ࠶ ࡿ ࠋྛ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡢ≉Ⰽࡸࠊࡑࢀࡒࢀࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡢ࣓ࣜࢵࢺࠊࢹ࣓ࣜࢵࢺࢆ
༑ศ࡟ᢕᥱࡋࡓୖ࡛ࠊẚ㍑᳨ウࢆࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡑࡢㄽࡌ࡚࠸ࡿෆᐜ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣ༑ศ࡞ಙ
㢗ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡶࡋ࠿ࡋࡓࡽࠊᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ࡢศ㔝࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㆟ㄽࡢ㐍ᒎ≧ἣ࠿ࡽࡳ࡚ࠊࡇࡢ
✀ࡢ◊✲ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࢆࡵࡄࡿᅜ㝿⛒⛯ἲࡢ㆟ㄽ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣࠊࡍ࡛࡟ࡈࡃࢫࢱࣥ
ࢲ࣮ࢻ࡞ၥ㢟ࡢ୍ࡘ࡟࡞ࡗ࡚ࡋࡲࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࠿ࡶ▱ࢀ࡞࠸ࠋࡓ࡜࠼ࡑ࠺࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋ࡚
ࡶࠊ➹⪅ࡣࠊ࠶ࡽࡺࡿၥ㢟ࢆ⪃៖࡟ධࢀ࡞ࡀࡽࠊ㧗࠸ศᯒ⬟ຊ࡜⾲⌧ຊ࡜࡛ᮏ◊✲ࢆ௙ୖࡆ࡚࠾ࡾࠊᑗ᮶ࡇࡢศ㔝ࡢ◊✲ࢆᚿࡍே㐩࡟࡜ࡗ࡚᭷┈࡞ཧ⪃᝟ሗࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ࡢホ౯࡟ኚࢃࡾࡣ࡞࠸ࠋ࠸ࡎࢀ࡟ࡋ࡚ࡶࠊᮏㄽᩥࡣࠊḟ࡬ࡢ㆟ㄽ࡟ࡘ࡞ࡀࡿᶫΏࡋ
ᙺ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡢᙺ๭ࢆᯝࡓࡍࡇ࡜ࡀ༑ศ࡟ᮇᚅ࡛ࡁࡿෆᐜ࡜ᡂᯝࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

（ 22 ）㛗ᑿ ඖᙪ ✏ 㸦ྡྂᒇၟ⛉኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔 㝔⏕㸧ࠕᙺဨ⤥୚⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᦆ㔠⟬ධせ௳ࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࠖୗ ᕳ  㡫 ᮏ ㄽ ᩥ ࡣ ࠊṧ Ἴ ஦ ௳ ➨ 㸯 ᑂ ุ Ỵ㸦 ᮾ ி ᆅ ุ ᖹ 28.4.22 ⛯ ົ ッ ゴ ㈨ ᩱ 266 ྕ 㡰 ྕ 12849㸧
ࡢᢪ࠼ࡿၥ㢟ࢆព㆑ࡋࡘࡘࠊἲே⛯ἲ㸱㸲᮲㸰㡯ཬࡧྠἲ᪋⾜௧ࡢつᐃࢆศᯒࡍࡿࡇ࡜ ࡛ ᙺ ဨ ⤥ ୚ ࡢ ᦆ 㔠 ⟬ ධ ࡟ ࡘ ࠸ ࡚ ࡢ ไ ᗘ ⓗ ၥ 㢟 Ⅼ ࢆ ᦬ ฟ ࡋ ࠊ௒ ᚋ ࡢ ࠶ ࡾ ᪉ ࢆ ᳨ ウ ࡍ ࡿ ࠋ➹⪅ࡣࠊᖹᡂ㸯㸶ᖺᨵṇ୍࡛ᮏ໬ࡉࢀࡓᙺဨ⤥୚ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊἲேࡢ฼┈ฎศࢆண㜵ࡋࠊᰴ୺ཬࡧᙺဨࢆྏဂ⃭ບࡍࡿไᗘ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋ࡚ホ౯ࡍࡿࠋᙺဨ⤥୚ࡢᦆ㔠⟬ධᯟࡢࠕᯟྲྀࡾࠖ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊᐃᮇྠ㢠⤥୚ࡢῶ㢠ᨭ⤥ࡢሙྜ࡟ࡣᐃᮇྠ㢠࡛࡞࠸㒊ศࡢᦆ㔠୙⟬ධࢆࠊ஦๓☜ᐃᒆฟ⤥୚ࡢῶ㢠ࡢሙྜࡣ඲㢠ࡢᦆ㔠୙⟬ධࢆ୺ᙇࡍ ࡿ㸦 ➨ 㸯 ❶ 㸧ࠋṧ Ἴ ஦ ௳ 㸯 ᑂ ุ Ỵ ࡟ ࡘ ࠸ ࡚ ࡣ ࠊุ Ỵ ࡀ ᐇ ㉁ ᇶ ‽ ࢆ 㐺 ṇ ࡟ 㐺 ⏝ ࡋ ࡓ ࠿ ྰ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚␲ၥࢆ࿊ࡋࠊྠᇶ‽ࡢぢ┤ࡋࡢᚲせᛶࢆㄝࡃࠋ➹⪅ࡀ╔┠ࡍࡿࡶ࠺୍ࡘࡢุ Ỵ ࠊ ୕ ࿴ ࢡ ࣜ ࢚ ࣮ ࢩ ࣙ ࣥ ஦ ௳ ➨ 㸯 ᑂ ุ Ỵ 㸦 ᮾ ி ᆅ ุ ᖹ 24.10.9 ゴ ᭶ 59-12-3182㸧 ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ஦๓☜ᐃᒆฟ⤥୚ࡢῶ㢠ᨭ⤥ࡢሙྜ࡟ࠊ๓㏙ࡢࠕᯟྲྀࡾࠖࢆㄆࡵ࡚ࡣ࡞ࡽ࡞ ࠸ ࡜ ࠸ ࠺ ⪃ ࠼ ᪉ ࢆ ᥇ ⏝ ࡋ ࡓ ࡜ ࡋ ࡚ ✚ ᴟ ⓗ ࡞ ホ ౯ ࢆ ୚ ࠼ ࡿ㸦 ➨ 㸰 ❶ 㸧ࠋᮏ ㄽ ᩥ ࡢ ⤖ ㄽ ࢆᒎ㛤ࡍࡿ➨㸱❶ࡣࠊ๓グ᪋⾜௧ࡀ⛒⛯ἲᚊ୺⩏࡟❧⬮ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࠊἲ㸱㸲᮲㸰㡯ࡀࠕ୙┦ᙜ࡟㧗㢠࡞㒊ศࡢ㔠㢠ࢆᨻ௧࡟ⓑ⣬ጤ௵ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࠊㄢ⛯ᗇࡀἲேࡢ⮬἞࡟௓ධࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࠊἲ㸱㸲᮲㸰㡯ࡀ኱つᶍබ㛤఍♫࡟㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡓ஦౛ࡀぢᙜࡓࡽ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࠊྠ㡯ࢆ㐺⏝ࡍࡿ࡜ᐇ㉁ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡜࡞ࡗ࡚ࡋࡲ࠺ࡇ࡜࡞࡝ࡢၥ㢟Ⅼࢆᣲࡆࠊ௒ ᚋ ࡢ ࠶ ࡾ ᪉ ࡜ ࡋ ࡚ ࠊձ ᪋ ⾜ ௧ 㸵 㸮 ᮲ 㸯 ྕ ࢖ ࡢ ࠺ ࡕ ࠊࠕ ᙜ ヱ ᙺ ဨ ࡢ ⫋ ົ ࡢ ෆ ᐜ ࠖࡔ ࡅ ࢆṧࡋ௚ࡢ㸱㡯┠ࢆᗫṆࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࠊղᙺဨ⤥୚ࡢࠕ⥲㢠ࠖࡢᒆฟࢆ⩏ົ໬ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࠊࡢ
㸰Ⅼࢆᥦゝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᮏ ㄽ ᩥ ࡟ ࡣ ࠊᴗ ⦼ ࡀ ప ㏞ ࡍ ࡿ ᪥ ᮏ ௻ ᴗ ࢆ ෌ ⯆ ࡉ ࡏ ➇ த ࡟ ⏕ ࡁ ṧ ࡿ ௻ ᴗ ࢆ ⫱ ࡚ ࡿ ୖ ࡛ ࠊ┦ ᛂ ࡢ ᙺ ဨ ⤥ ୚ ࢆ ᨭ ᡶ ࠸ ᙺ ဨ ࡢ ព ㆑࣭ࣔ ࢳ ࣋ ࣮ ࢩ ࣙ ࣥ ࢆ 㧗 ᥭ ࡉ ࡏ ࡿ ࡇ ࡜ ࡀ 㔜 せ ࡛ ࠶ ࡾ ࠊ⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᙺဨ⤥୚ࡢᦆ㔠୙⟬ධつᐃࡀࡑࡢ㞀ᐖ࡟࡞ࡗ࡚ࡣ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸࡜࠸࠺➹⪅ࡢᙉ࠸᝿࠸ࡀⁱࡳฟ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡟ࡣ➹⪅ࡢ♫఍⤒㦂ࡀ཯ᫎࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ᛮࢃࢀࡿࠋ
ᮏㄽᩥࡣࠊᖹᡂ㸯㸶ᖺᨵṇᚋ࡟ࡶᚑ๓ࡢἲ≧ែࡀᏑ⨨ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿἲ㸱㸲᮲㸰㡯ཬࡧࡑࡢጤ௵࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ᪋⾜௧㸵㸮᮲㸯ྕ࢖ࡢᢪ࠼ࡿၥ㢟Ⅼࢆ஧ࡘࡢุ౛ࢆ⏝࠸࡚ᾋࡁ᙮ࡾ
࡟ࡋࡓ࠺࠼ࠊ௒ᚋࡢᙺဨ⤥୚ࡢᦆ㔠⟬ධไ㝈ࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࢆ᫂ᛌ࡟ㄽࡌ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ๓グࡢղࡣࠊᙺဨࡢ⫋ົ㐙⾜ࡢㄆ㆑ࡢᙉ໬ࠊᦆ㔠⟬ධᯟࡢᯟྲྀࡾࡢ㜵Ṇ⟇࡜ࡋ࡚఩⨨࡙ࡅࡽࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊㄝᚓຊࡢ࠶ࡿᥦゝ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡓࡔࠊձ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ㠀ྠ᪘఍♫࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠕᙜヱᙺ ဨ ࡢ ⫋ ົ ࡢ ෆ ᐜ ࡟ ↷ ࡽ ࡋ ࠊ࣭࣭࣭ ┦ ᙜ ࡛ ࠶ ࡿ ࡜ ㄆ ࡵ ࡽ ࢀ ࡿ 㔠 㢠 ࢆ ㉸ ࠼ ࡿ ሙ ྜ ࡟ ࠾ ࡅ ࡿࡑࡢ㉸࠼ࡿ㒊ศࡢ㔠㢠ࠖࢆᏑ⨨ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀࠊ࡞ࡐⴭ⪅ࡢᙉㄪࡍࡿண

ྍ⬟ᛶࡢ☜ಖࡢ

せㄳࢆ‶ࡓࡋ࠺ࡿࡢ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢㄝ᫂ࡀồࡵࡽࢀࡼ࠺ࠋ◊✲⪅ࡢ❧ሙ࡟❧ࡘ࡞ࡽࡤࠊ࡝ ࠺ ࡋ ࡚ ࡶ ㄝ ᫂ ୙ ㊊ ࡢ ឤ ࡣ ච ࢀ ࡞ ࠸ ࡀ ࠊዡ ບ ㈹ ㄽ ᩥ ࡟ ࡲ ࡛ ࠊࡑ ࡢ ㄝ ᫂ ࡲ ࡛ ồ ࡵ ࡿ ࡢ ࡣ ࠊᑡࠎ㓞࡞せồ࡞ࡢ࠿ࡶ▱ࢀ࡞࠸ࠋ࠸ࡎࢀ࡟ࡏࡼࡇࡢⅬࡣࠊᮏㄽᩥ඲యࡢព⩏ࢆᦆ࡞࠺ࡶࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠋ௨ୖࢆ⥲ྜࡋ࡚ࠊᮏㄽᩥࡣࠊ⛒⛯㈨ᩱ㤋ዡບ㈹ࢆᤵ୚ࡍࡿ࡟ࡩࡉࢃࡋ࠸ ព ḧ ⓗ ࡞ ◊ ✲ ࡛ ࠶ ࡿ ࡜ ホ ౯ ࡋ ࡓ ࠋ࡞ ࠾ ࠊᮏ ㄽ ᩥ ࡛ ྲྀ ࡾ ୖ ࡆ ࡿ ุ Ỵ ࢆ ⪃ ᐹ ࡢ ᑐ ㇟ ࡜ ࡋ ࠊྠᵝࡢどⅬࡸၥ㢟ព㆑࠿ࡽၥ㢟࡟ྲྀࡾ⤌ࡴㄽᩥࡣࠊ㏆᫬ࠊᴟࡵ࡚ከ࠸ࠋࡇࡢㄽᩥࡢࢸ

（ 23 ）

࣮࣐ࡢࡼ࠺࡟ከࡃࡢே࠿ࡽὀ┠ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿၥ㢟ࢆྲྀࡾୖࡆࡿ㝿࡟ࡣࠊࡼ࡯࡝⊂⮬ࡢㄽ
Ⅼࢆᡴࡕฟࡍ࠿ࠊ┠᪂ࡋ࠸どⅬ࠿ࡽࡢ◊✲ࢆࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀồࡵࡽࢀࡿࡇ࡜ࢆࠊ௜グࡋ࡚࠾ࡁࡓ࠸ࠋ（ 24 ）

ஂᒸ 㟹ᜨ ✏㸦⟃Ἴ኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔 㝔⏕㸧ࠕ⌧௦࡟࠾ࡅࡿᐻ፬㸦ኵ㸧᥍㝖ไᗘࡢᏑᅾព⩏ࠖ㸦 ྠ ཭ 㤋 ࠗ ௻ ᴗ ἲ ◊ ✲ ࡢ ᗎ ᭤ ᶠ ࠘  ᖺ  ᭶ ᥖ ㍕ ண ᐃ 㸧 ୗ ᕳ  㡫 ᮏㄽᩥࡣࠊ≉ูேⓗ᥍㝖ࡢ୍ࡘ࡛࠶ࡿᐻ፬㸦ኵ㸧᥍㝖ไᗘࢆྲྀࡾୖࡆࠊ፧ጻṔࡢ᭷↓ ࠊዪ ᛶ ࡜ ⏨ ᛶ ࠊṚ ู ࡜ 㞳 ፧ ࡢ 㐪 ࠸ ࡟ ࡼ ࡾ ᙜ ヱ ไ ᗘ ࡢ ྲྀ ࡾ ᢅ ࠸ ࡀ ␗ ࡞ ࡿ ࡇ ࡜ ࡟ ࡘ ࠸ ࡚ ࠊ⛒⛯බᖹ୺⩏ࡢほⅬ࠿ࡽࡑࡢᅾࡾ᪉ࢆぢ┤ࡋࠊࡼࡾබᖹ࡛⌧≧࡟༶ࡋࡓไᗘࡢᵓ⠏ࢆ┠ ᣦ ࡍ㸦 ➹ ⪅ ࡣ 㺀⪃ ᐹ 㺁ࢆ ┠ ⓗ ࡜ ࡍ ࡿ ࡀ ࠊᐇ 㝿 ࡟ ࡣ 㺀⪃ ᐹ 㺁ࢆ ㏻ ࡋ ࡚ ไ ᗘ ࡬ ࡢ ᥦ ゝ ࢆ ⾜ ࠺ 㸧ࠋ➨㸯❶࡛ࡣࠊ⌧⾜ᐻ፬㸦ኵ㸧᥍㝖ࡢព⩏࣭┠ⓗࢆ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡍࡿࠋ➹⪅ࡣࠊ➨㸰ḟୡ⏺኱ᡓࡢᡓதᮍஸேࡢᩆ῭ࡢࡓࡵ࡟๰タࡉࢀࡓᐻ፬㸦ኵ㸧᥍㝖ࡣࠊ⚟♴ⓗ࡞ᛶ㉁ࢆ᭷
ࡍࡿ≉ูேⓗ᥍㝖࡜ࡋ࡚ࡢព⩏࡙ࡅࢆࡍࡿࠋ㏣ຍⓗ㈝⏝ࢆᚲせ࡜ࡍࡿ♫఍ⓗᙅ⪅ࡢᩆ῭ࢆ┠ⓗ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᢇ㣴せ௳࡜ᡤᚓせ௳ࡢ୧⪅ࢆ㐺⏝せ௳࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿⅬ࡟ࡑࡢ≉Ⰽࢆぢฟࡍࠋ➨㸰❶࡛ࡣࠊᙜヱไᗘࡢἢ㠉ࢆᴫほࡋࠊ๰タᙜึࡼࡾࠊࡑࡢ㐺⏝⠊ᅖࡀᢇ㣴ぶ᪘ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡞࠸Ṛูࡢᐻ፬ࡸ⏨ᛶᐻኵ࡬ไᗘࡀᣑ኱ࡉࢀ࡚ࡁࡓࡇ࡜ࢆ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡍࡿࠋ➨㸱❶࡛ࡣࠊᮍ፧ࡦ࡜ࡾぶୡᖏ࡬ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊࡇࢀࡲ࡛ࡢ㆟ㄽࡢ⤒⦋ࢆ☜ㄆࡋࠊ㐺⏝ࡢ᫝㠀ࢆ᳨ウࡋࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊᮍ፧ࡢࡦ࡜ࡾぶ࡜Ṛู࣭㞳ูࡢࡦ࡜ࡾぶࢆ༊ูࡍࡿྜ⌮ᛶࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ୧⪅ࢆྠิ࡟ᢅ࠺࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡍࡿࠋ➨㸲❶࡛ࡣࠊ⿢ุ౛ࢆ᳨ウࡋࠊᙜヱไᗘࡢ㐺⏝せ௳࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⏨ዪ㛫᱁ᕪࡀ࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ⌧≧࡟ࡑࡄࢃࡎࠊࡑࡢ㠀ྜ⌮ᛶࢆᣦ᦬ࡍࡿࠋ➨㸳❶࡛ࡣࠊᢇ㣴ぶ᪘ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡞࠸ᐻ፬ࡸ㧗㱋⪅ᐻ፬ࠊ㧗ᡤᚓᐻ፬ࠊᏊ௨እࡢᢇ㣴ぶ᪘ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿᐻ፬ࠊᡂேࡋࡓᏊࢆ᭷ࡍࡿᐻ፬㸦ኵ㸧࡬ࡢไᗘ㐺⏝࡞࡝ࠊไᗘࡢ㐺⏝⠊ᅖࡢጇᙜᛶࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿࠋ➨㸴❶࡛ࡣࠊᐻ፬㸦ኵ㸧᥍㝖ไᗘᗫṆㄽࡸ᥍㝖᪉ᘧࢆྵࡵ࡚ࠊᙜヱไᗘࡢ௒ᚋࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⪃ᐹࡍࡿࠋ⤖ㄽ࡜ࡋ࡚➹⪅ࡣࠊᐻ፬㸦ኵ㸧᥍㝖ࡢᏑᅾព⩏ࢆ⫯ᐃࡋࡘࡘࡶࠊᛶูࡢ㐪࠸ࡸ፧ጻࡢ᭷↓ࠊ㞳፧࡜Ṛู࡟ࡼࡾ␗࡞ࡿ⌧ᅾࡢせ௳ࢆ⤫୍ࡋ࡚ࠊᮍᡂᖺࡢᏊࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ୍ᐃᡤᚓ௨ୗࡢࡦ࡜ࡾぶࡢࡳࢆᐻ፬㸦ኵ㸧᥍㝖ࡢ㐺⏝ᑐ㇟࡟ࡍࡿࠕࡦ࡜ࡾぶ᥍㝖ࠖ࡟ᨵࡵࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᮃࡳࠊ⤥௜௜ࡁ⛯㢠᥍㝖࡟ไᗘࢆษࡾ᭰࠼ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᥦゝࡍࡿࠋᮏㄽᩥ࡛ྲྀࡾୖࡆࡓၥ㢟ࡣࠊ⌧ᅾࠊᏛ⏺࡛ࡶㄽࡌࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ㔜せ࡞ㄽⅬࡢ୍ࡘ࡛࠶
ࡾࠊࢱ࢖࣒࣮ࣜ࡞ࢸ࣮࣐ࢆྲྀࡾୖࡆ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ➹⪅ࡣࠊἲᚊ፧ࢆ๓ᥦ࡜ࡍࡿ⌧⾜ࡢᐻ፬㸦ኵ㸧᥍㝖ไᗘࡀ♫఍≧ἣࡢኚ໬࡟ࡑࡄࢃ࡞ࡃ࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆၥ㢟どࡍࡿ࡜ඹ࡟ࠊ
ᮍ፧ࡢࡦ࡜ࡾぶ࡟ᑐࡍࡿㄢ⛯ࡢ㆟ㄽࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼࡚ࠊබᖹᛶࡢほⅬ࠿ࡽࠕᮍᡂᖺࡢᏊࢆ᭷
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ḧࡋ࠸Ⅼࡀㅖᡤ࡛ぢࡽࢀࡿࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢⅬࡶࠊᮏㄽᩥࡀ඲య࡜ࡋ࡚࡜࡚ࡶㄞࡳ
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Asymmetric &Rst %ehavior in /ocal 3ublic (nterprises(xploring the 3ublic ,nterest and 6triving for (Ificiency㛗⃝ ᪼ᖹ

6SULQJHU 発行
Journal of Management Control 掲載
2018年12月 Vol.29 No.3-4
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（ 31 ）（ 32 ）

1

Table of Contents

1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................3
2 Background and Literature Review……………………………………………………………………7
2.1 Characteristics of LPEs……………………………………………………………………………7
2.2 Institutional Constraints of LPEs………………………………………………………………….9
2.3 Cost Behavior of Public Sector Organizations…………………………………………………...11
2.4 Hypothesis Development………………………………………………………………………....13
3 Research Method and Sample Selection…………………………………………………………..….16
3.1 Research Method…………………………………………………………………………………16
3.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………………..17
4 Results………………………………………………………………………………………………...18
5 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………………...…23
References……………………………………………………………………………………………27
Appendix……………………………………………………………………………………………..31（ 33 ）

2

Abstract

Asymmetric cost behavior, which was first identified in Germany in the 1920s, has attracted theattention of researchers over the last two decades. Cost management is essential not only for commercial
enterprises (CEs) but also for public organizations. Therefore, in this research, I focus on local public
enterprises (LPEs), one type of public organization in Japan, and clarify their cost behavior. Then,
taking the perspective of institutional theory, I compare LPEs with CEs. Because LPEs are required tobehave according to the restrictions of LPE law, they are more vulnerable to institutional pressure.
Specifically, LPEs have two normative institutional constraints: (1) efficiency and (2) the public interest(i.e., the responsibility to support people’s everyday lives). Therefore, LPEs must provide certain
services even if they are unprofitable. To explore whether normative institutional pressure causes LPEs
to be cost inefficient, I compare the cost behavior of these enterprises with that of CEs in five ways. I
analyze (1) panel data covering 40 years, (2) the change over time, (3) the differences by industry type,(4) the relationship with population changes, and (5) the effect of political influence. I find that LPEs’
cost management is not necessarily cost inefficient; however, their ability to adjust costs may be lost in
the future due to the influence of institutional constraints. I therefore assert that LPE administrators
must constantly struggle to balance the institutional constraints of the public interest and efficiency
since these factors require long-term, stable management.

Keywords: local public enterprises, sticky costs, anti-sticky costs, asymmetric cost behavior, public
interest, efficiency, institutional constraints
JEL codes: H83, M41（ 34 ）

3

1 Introduction
After World War II, public enterprises (PEs) were created in both developed and developing
countries to address market deficits and capital shortfalls, promote economic development, reduce massunemployment and/or ensure national control over the overall direction of the economy (UN, 2008).
Over the long term, PEs provided public services that were directly managed by governments. However,management inefficiencies, overstaffing, inflation and rising current account deficits in the 1980s
exposed serious “government failures” and the limitations of PEs as major players in economic
development (UN, 2008). Subsequently, new public management (NPM) led public organizations(including PEs) to change their behavior from reflecting administrative aspects to reflecting managerial
aspects (Van Genugten 2008; Pérez-López et al. 2015). From the perspective of fiscal finance, theoperations of public organizations switched from recognizing soft budget constraints to recognizing
hard budget constraints (Bertero and Rondi 2000). Furthermore, in the 1990s, many public services
provided by public sector organizations were outsourced or the organizations were privatized andbecame commercial enterprises (CEs) because of pressure to improve their efficiency and effectiveness(Hefetz and Warner 2007). Thus, public service costs in public sector organizations were initiallyreduced through outsourcing or privatization (Domberger and Jensen 1997; Domberger and Rimmer
1994; Hodge 2000), but the cost reduction effects gradually decreased over the long term (Bel andCostas 2006; Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2011). Therefore, in the 2000s, the responsibility for outsourced
public services shifted again to corporatized PEs, which emphasize efficiency and have greater
independence from the government than PEs that are directly managed by governments (Hefetz andWarner 2007; Grossi and Reichard 2008; Wollmann et al. 2010). Currently, various public services areprovided by corporatized local public enterprises (LPEs) in every region of the world (Saussier andKlien 2013) (Table 1).
[Insert] Table 1. LPEs in selected countries
Recently, corporatized LPEs 1 have been found to be more efficient than LPEs directly managed by
local governments (Voorn et al. 2017). Nevertheless, LPEs are generally considered to be more costinefficient than CEs since the former face stronger institutional pressure (i.e., normative, coercive, andmimetic) than CEs (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004). In particular, from the viewpoint of normative
institutional constraints, LPE administrators are pressured by law to achieve efficiency 2 and serve thepublic interest 3. However, it is very difficult for LPE administrators to do both simultaneously. If LPE
administrators prioritize cost reductions due to the influence of efficiency pressures, the risk of1

Hereafter, in Section 1, “LPEs” refer to corporatized LPEs.
The concept of efficiency is used differently in each study focusing on the public sector (Voorn et al.
2017). In this article, efficiency refers to cost efficiency.
3 The concept of the public interest can be defined not only as a specific conceptualization of the term
“public interest” but also with a variety of meanings from very specific to very broad definitions (Pesch2005; Van Genugten 2008). Therefore, in this research, following De Bruijn et al. 2004, “public interest”
is defined as both the importance of services (i.e., necessary and convenient for everyday lives) and theroles and responsibilities of governments.
2（ 35 ）

4

declining public service quality increases. Conversely, pursuing the public interest can lead LPE
administrators to manage their costs more inefficiently. Thus, LPE administrators must strike a balance
between efficiency and the public interest under the pressure of these two normative institutional
constraints (Kawarata 2005). By contrast, CE managers aim only to maximize profits; since they are
subject to fewer institutional pressures than LPEs, they have greater flexibility in making managementchanges (Eldenburg et al. 2004; Balakrishnan et al. 2010; Holzhacker et al. 2015). However, to date,research on whether public services are more inefficiently performed by LPEs than CEs is lacking.
Therefore, my research question is whether LPEs manage their costs more inefficiently than CEs. In
this research, I focus on LPEs in Japan and clarify their cost management. In addition, I compare myresults with those for CEs based on the theoretical background of institutional theory. I choose Japanese
LPEs for two reasons. First, the number of LPEs in Japan is very high compared to the number
worldwide (Table 1). In Japan, the Local Public Enterprise Law was enacted in 1948, after World War II,
and subsequently, many LPEs were established in each municipality. Therefore, it is possible to collectdata from a large cross-sectional sample, making this empirical research more robust. Second, LPEs are
consistently the main bodies providing public services and have been continuously engaged in thisimportant role supporting civil life in Japan over the long term. Therefore, it is possible to collectconsistent, long-term time series data. The accounting system for LPEs remained unchanged until 2014 4.
Therefore, in this research, I was able to collect fiscal data from 1974 5 to 2013 and verify the long-termchanges in cost management alongside the global trends for each period, for example, the trends in
NPM since the 1980s, outsourcing or privatizing into CEs since the 1990s, and the revival of LPEs sincethe 2000s.
Additionally, I discuss how LPEs’ cost management should be sustainably controlled in the future
not only in theory but also in practice. LPEs in Japan have encountered two main issues in recent years
that have intensified the institutional constraints of achieving efficiency and serving the public interest:
population changes and a deteriorating financial situation. According to Japan’s population census, thecountry’s population had reached its upper limit and entered a stage of decline (Figure 1). In Japan, theproportion of elderly people in the total population exceeded 14% in 1995, and Japan became an aging
society. Furthermore, in 2007, this proportion exceeded 21%, representing a super-aging society. In
conjunction with this shift, the population of youth and of those in the productive ages has continued to
decline. Additionally, Japan’s suburban population has decreased dramatically. The Japanese
government reported that the percentage depopulated areas 6 of Japan has increased from 40.7% in 1972

4 LPEs in Japan adopted almost the same bookkeeping method as CEs beginning in 1966. After 2014,
the accounting standards of LPEs have changed. Many of them are based mainly on changes in thebalance sheet that this research does not pay attention to. On income statements (P/L) that I pay
attention to in this study, the method of amortizing fixed assets when purchased with subsidies has beenchanged. Before 2013, the amortizing fixed assets were accounted for only in expenses; on the other
hand, after 2014, the amortizing fixed assets were accounted for not only in expenses but also inrevenue, as the long-term advances received.
5 1974 is the first year for which data collection was possible.
6 The depopulated areas in Japan are defined in the Act on Special Measures for Promotion for
Independence for Underpopulated Areas. There are many requirements for specifying depopulated（ 36 ）

5

to 58.7% in 2015. The number of depopulated municipalities also increased from 32.3% in 1972 to
46.4% in 2015. LPEs must continue their businesses despite the institutional constraint of serving the
public interest, even if the costs of idle capacity rise due to a declining number of users caused bypopulation decreases. Conversely, the aging population, who need more public services (e.g., medical
services, care services) at a low cost, will continue to increase in the future.
[Insert] Figure 1. Population changes in Japan
A final issue is the difficulty LPEs experience in repaying bonds (Figure 2 Panel A). LPEs issue
bonds to finance new public service projects (including both maintenance and renovation projects) or to
improve the quality or expand the quantity of public services. In examining LPEs’ financial statements,
although operating revenues and expenses may be in surplus, non-operating revenues and expenses
often show deficits (Figure 2 Panel B and Panel C). This difference is due mainly to the repayment ofbonds and interest payments. Since interest payments are a fixed cost, LPE administrators must reduceother variable costs. However, cost adjustment flexibility decreases with increases in LPE bonds.
Namely, the repayment of LPE bonds requires LPE administrators to further enhance their organizations’efficiency.
[Insert] Figure 2. LPE bonds, operating and non-operating revenues and expenses
For LPEs to improve their efficiency, it is essential to consider further developing their costmanagement. Thus, clarifying LPEs’ cost behavior and understanding its movement is important for
improving LPEs’ cost management (Murray 1975; Rainey et al. 1976). In research on cost behavior,
German studies identified “Kostenremanenz” in the 1920s. Over the past 20 years, this phenomenon has
again attracted the attention of empirical researchers in management accounting (Noreen andSoderstrom 1997) and is now known as “sticky costs (cost stickiness)” (Anderson et al. 2003). Sticky
costs increase proportionally as activities increase, but when activities decrease, the costs do notdecrease symmetrically. In subsequent studies, sticky costs were found to exist in each region, country
and industry (Calleja et al. 2006; He et al. 2010; Subramaniam and Weidenmier 2016). Conversely, it
has also been verified that a change in cost may exceed the change in activity (Weiss 2011). Subsequentempirical research showed that cost behavior includes not only sticky costs but also anti-sticky, i.e.,
asymmetric, costs when activity increases and decreases (Banker and Byzalov 2014). However, mostprevious studies have focused on CEs (Malik 2012; Günther et al. 2014), and only a few studies havefocused on public sector organizations’ cost behavior (Yasukata et al. 2011; Bradbury and Scott 2014;
Cohen et al. 2014; Holzhacker et al. 2015). Therefore, the goal of this research is to examine LPEs’ costbehavior, which has not yet been analyzed. In addition, I examine whether LPEs’ cost behavior reflects
high or low sticky costs when compared to CEs from the viewpoint of institutional theory through aareas: one is that the population declined more than 33%.

（ 37 ）

6long-term empirical analysis.
Through this study, I contribute five findings to the cost behavior research. First, I find that LPEs’
cost management is not necessarily inefficient compared to CEs from the perspective of cost behavior.
Namely, I find that sticky costs exist in CEs’ cost behavior, and conversely, anti-sticky costs are
revealed in LPEs through a panel data analysis covering 40 years. In addition, I discovered that LPEs’
cost behavior contrasts with that of CEs. However, these results also contrast with the expectedconclusions in general. I believe that the lack of support for this expectation might be driven byaccounting system (regulations on dividends and retained earnings) and management system(redundancies; e.g., preparation for disasters) differences between CEs and LPEs.
Second, I discovered that after a certain period of time has passed from LPEs’ establishment,
inefficient risks in LPEs’ cost management are caused by institutional pressure to protect the public
interest. Through a timeline (year by year) analysis over 40 years, I find that LPEs’ cost behavior
gradually shifted from anti-sticky costs to sticky costs. This result also contrasts with CEs’ cost behavior,
which did not drastically change. I discovered that the adjustment ability of management resources in
LPEs was gradually lost over the long term. From the viewpoint of securing the public interest, obsolete
equipment must be repaired or replaced to maintain the quality of public services, even if revenues
decrease. I conjecture that cost-inefficient risk is affected by an increase in the costs of facilities andequipment.
Third, through an analysis by industry type, I find various characteristics of LPEs’ cost behavior ineach industry type, including high material resource industries and high human resource industries. The
diversity of cost behavior in LPEs might be caused by the resource adjustment costs in various businessenvironments and the various institutional restrictions, including the non-exclusion of public services
and the influence of monopolies.
Fourth, I discovered that depopulation and structural changes in the population influence LPEs’ costbehavior. Since population change is closely related to public service demand, the administrators of
LPEs need to manage those costs that respond sensitively to population changes. I can show how public
service providers should adjust their costs due to population changes, which suggests that the influenceof population changes must be taken into consideration to preserve LPEs’ cost adjustment ability.
Finally, I clarify how LPE administrators adjusted their costs based on changing activity levels overfour years, which equals politicians’ term in office, and verify the differences between LPEs and CEs. I
find the cost behaviors’ differences in both the speed of change and the direction of movement can becompared. Regarding the changing speed of cost behavior, LPE administrators try to adjust their costs
so that they remain proportional over four years, as they aim to operate their services in a stable mannerand attempt to balance the public interest and efficiency sustainably. Regarding the direction of
movement, one might assume that LPE administrators are subject to institutional pressure frompoliticians, who respond to public opinion, and social demands, which require the enrichment of public
services rather than excessive cost efficiency. I conjecture that LPE administrators intend to adjust theircosts to balance their proportions during politicians’ term in office.
In addition, by understanding the characteristics of LPEs’ cost behaviors from an academic
perspective, it will be possible to contribute to public administrators’ ability to manage their future costs.

（ 38 ）

7

I also contribute to practical aspects of LPE cost management in the future sustainability plans called theCompact City and Intermunicipal Cooperation.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the characteristics of LPEs from the viewpointof institutional theory, reviews the literature on public organization cost behavior and develops myresearch hypotheses. In Section 3, the research methodology is described, including the sample data, thevariable measures, and the models. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Finally, Section 5summarizes the results and concludes with a discussion of the limitations of this study and suggestions
for future research.
2 Background and Literature Review
2.1 Characteristics of LPEs
Since World War II, LPEs have been an important public service provider not only in developed
countries throughout the world but also in developing countries (UN, 2008). LPEs are called various
names within each country and region, such as “municipally owned enterprises”, “municipal
corporations”, “local public companies”, “municipal corporatizations”, and “state-owned enterprises”(Collin et al. 2009; Saussier and Klien 2013; Voorn et al.2017).
A UN (2008) report defined public enterprises as follows: a “public enterprise can be considered anorganization established by the government under public or private law, as a legal personality which isautonomous or semi-autonomous, that produces/provides goods and services on a full or partial
self-financing basis, and in which the government or a public body/agency participates by way of
having shares or representation in its decision-making structure”.
However, in the academic field, there is no definite and common definition of a public enterprise todate (Collin et al. 2009; Saussier and Klien 2013) because LPE regulations differ from country tocountry and LPEs’ service content differs from region to region. Thus, it can be stated that LPEs exist in
an institutional twilight area, as they are both public administrators and private companies (Collin et al.
2009). Because of the existence of various forms and types of LPEs in each country and region,
academics to date have not recognized common LPE issues. Based on a taxonomy, Saussier and Klien(2013) classified LPEs based on decision-making rights, organizational control, and property rights.
They distinguished between directly managed LPEs and corporatized LPEs. Additionally, Voorn et al.
(2017) described the unique features of directly managed LPEs and those of corporatized LPEs (Table
2).
[Insert] Table 2. Characteristics of directly managed LPEs and corporatized LPEs
Saussier and Klien (2013) explained that Japanese LPEs are part of the local public government andare not independent organizations. Therefore, they argued that Japanese LPEs are not suitable assubjects of empirical research because they are not financially and organically separate from local
public governments. LPEs in Japan are certainly a type of public organization owned by local
governments. However, I assert that the researchers’ argumentation is partly correct and partly wrong.
According to their taxonomy, LPEs in Japan are classified into directly managed LPEs and corporatized（ 39 ）

8

LPEs. The former are part of local public bodies, as these authors claim, but the latter are run
independently. The services provided by corporatized LPEs are funded by user fees, and the entities
must be profitable independently of local public bodies. Thus, corporatized LPEs have weakerregulations than directly managed LPEs and can be managed flexibly using their income from utilities.
It is expected that the efficiency and effectiveness of the services provided by corporatized LPEs will bepromoted over services provided by directly managed LPEs (Oshima 1971). Therefore, I argue that
corporatized LPEs in Japan are suitable for empirical analysis because they are financially andorganically separate from local public governments.
In Japan, legislation established LPEs in each municipality after World War II. The number of LPEs
increased with the increase in population: there were 6,995 enterprises in 1974, 12,629 enterprises in
2002, when they reached a peak, and recently, after a decline due to privatization or amalgamation, there
were 8,712 enterprises in 2013 (Figure 3). In addition, there are more directly managed LPEs thancorporatized LPEs. However, the number of directly managed LPEs has decreased substantially since2004 under the influence of privatization based on the institutional pressure of NPM. By contrast, thenumber of corporatized LPEs has not changed drastically for 40 years. I argue that corporatized LPEs
are also appropriate for empirical analysis because the number of such organizations is larger than thatin other countries, and data collection is possible over a longer period. For this reason, I focus on
corporatized LPEs for this analysis.
[Insert] Figure 3. Trends in the number of LPEs in Japan
Corporatized LPEs (hereafter, LPEs) are governed by an administrator appointed by the mayor andapproved by congress for a four-year term in office. Dismissal is restricted during this term. The
administrator has decision rights regarding the management of an LPE. Therefore, the administrator issimilar to the CEO of a CE. However, unlike CEOs, LPE administrators are not allowed to receive
dividends from the organization’s profits. Therefore, from the perspective of agency costs, there is little
incentive for administrators to declare a high amount of dividends (Eldenburg and Krishnan 2003).
However, if the administrator achieves a high level of performance (e.g., high evaluation of the service,cost reductions), the mayor can reappoint the administrator. Therefore, the administrators of LPEs may
strive to achieve high performance with regard to serving the public interest and achieving efficiency. In
other words, administrators may be indirectly influenced by politics (congress and the mayor).
Additionally, LPEs’ budget must be approved by both congress and the mayor, which means that LPE
administrators are accountable to both parties. Therefore, the administrators of LPEs may faceinstitutional pressure from stakeholders such as congress and the mayor.
LPEs are responsible for various public service businesses that complement the public services
offered by local governments (Ooshima 1971; Kawarata 2005). More specifically, LPEs in Japan arebusinesses that act under the LPE law and municipal ordinances. Examples of businesses in which LPEs
operate include residential water supply, industrial water supply, transportation (e.g., tramway, bus, andsubway), electricity, gas power, hospitals, and other businesses that are run by local governments
according to their own rules (Table 1). These businesses not only require a large amount of investment（ 40 ）

9that cannot be procured by the private sector but also will not necessarily be profitable for CEs.
Therefore, LPEs provide essential, lifesaving activities that cannot be managed as CEs based on
economic principles. For these reasons, administrators must attempt to recover the invested funds
appropriately and make decisions that prevent losses (Yasukata et al. 2011). Additionally, they must be
accountable to congress and the mayor in terms of securing profits and improving benefits for the public(Eldenburg and Krishnan 2008).
2.2 Institutional Constraints of LPEs
Institutions are social structures consisting of symbols, social actions and objectives, but institutions
are formed not only through social structures but also through the activities in which norms and rules
are produced. In its present form, the new institutionalism in organizational analysis provides a wide
range of theoretical and methodological benefits (Scott 2001). Neo-institutional theorists, e.g., Meyer
and Rowan (1977), noted that organizations engage in normative organizational behavior based on rules,laws, customs, traditions, and regulations with an emphasis on legitimacy, satisfactory behavior,
structural decoupling, and symbols. They also explained that organizations pursue practices that may beof little relevance to maximizing efficiency and that organizations constantly seek ways to respond topressure from external scrutiny and regulations rather than improving their performance. DiMaggio andPowell (1983) identified three forces that drive institutionalization: (1) coercive isomorphism, whichstems from political influence and the need for legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism, which results fromstandard responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative isomorphism, which is associated withprofessionalization. Among them, normative institutional pressure constrains both decision-making andorganizational behavior (Balakrishnan et al. 2010; Holzhacker et al. 2015).
Public organizations promote mainly normative institutionalization in for-profit and nonprofit
organizations since public organizations can establish rules, laws, and regulations and provide licenses
and inspections. However, public organizations experience strong institutional pressure with regard totheir role governing profit and non-profit organizations (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004). Balakrishnan
et al. (2010) also argued that the influences of institutional constraints are stronger for publicorganizations than for for-profit organizations. The authors showed that normative institutional
constraints include political pressure, legal compatibility, the corporate governance system, andfinancial support. As evidence of normative institutional pressure that constrains both decision-making
and organizational behavior, Wollmann (2000) explained that local German governments have changed
their organizational structures based on the institutional pressure of NPM. One of the reasons for thestrong influence of institutional constraints is that public organizations must respond tomultidisciplinary evaluations at all times due to the existence of an unspecified number of stakeholders(Rainey 1997). Therefore, these organizations act to acquire legitimacy by observing institutional norms
such as rules, laws, and regulations (Oliver 1991; Nee and Cao 2005), which makes them sensitive tonormative institutional pressure (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004).
For LPEs, there are two behavioral standards (codes of conduct) mandated by LPE law to stabilize
public services and to continue the business over the long term: first, fulfilling public demands to satisfy
the public interest, and second, pursuing appropriate profits by focusing on profitability and optimizing（ 41 ）

10

costs by improving efficiency. LPEs must adopt a strict code of behavior and conduct their businesswhile confronting these two normative pressures. In particular, from the perspective of the public
interest, LPEs offer public services that are essential to citizens’ lives. This system covers the provisionof public goods and services in a comprehensive manner that complements the public services provided
by local governments from the public interest perspective. In addition, the level of public service must
always be kept constant since declining quality can threaten livelihoods. Thus, LPEs have a
responsibility to support everyday lives and provide improved public benefits through theirorganizational behavior. Additionally, the evaluation of public services is conducted by all citizens, that
is, an unspecified number of people. Because such evaluations are multifaceted, as Rainey (1997) noted,
the administrators of LPEs must be concerned about serving the public interest. Thus, LPEs must
provide public services even if they are unprofitable (Ooshima 1971; Kawarata 2005). As a result,institutional pressures also affect the cost-management decisions made by the administrators ofgovernment hospitals, which are a type of public organization (Balakrishnan et al. 2010). However,
because the public interest must be balanced with efficiency, administrators cannot prioritize one over
the other (Eldenburg et al. 2004). Conversely, with regard to efficiency, LPEs must provide services
more economically, effectively, and efficiently than local municipalities (Kawarata 2005), which meansthat they must operate with limited assistance from the government. Moreover, raising public utility fees
is not easy because it will be opposed by residents. Therefore, LPE administrators must manage theirorganizations to avoid service charge increases as much as possible. As a result, they may have anxiety
due to the need for cost management and efficiency.
Because of these normative institutional constraints, LPEs’ organizational behavior differs greatly
from that of CEs. CEs act to maximize profits; because they are subject to fewer institutional pressures,
they have greater flexibility when making changes (Eldenburg et al. 2004; Balakrishnan et al. 2010;
Holzhacker et al. 2015). Therefore, institutional constraints more strongly affect the cost behavior of
public organizations than that of for-profit organizations (Holzhacker et al. 2015). To confirm thecharacteristics of public organizations, research methods that compare these organizations with a control
group, either for-profit or nonprofit organizations, are generally adopted (Sørensen 2007; Balakrishnan
et al. 2010; Holzhacker et al. 2015). Therefore, I verify LPEs’ cost behavior by comparing theseorganizations to CEs from the perspective of institutional constraints. Table 3 summarizes thedifferences in the institutional pressure experienced by LPEs and CEs according to Eldeburg et al.
(2004) and Balakrishnan et al. (2010).
[Insert] Table 3. Organizational type and expected influence on cost behavior
In their governance systems, LPEs have fewer executives than CEs. Thus, LPEs usually have only
one administrator and a few vice administrators. For this reason, the pressure from stakeholders isconcentrated on the administrators; therefore, the administrators may focus on maintaining public
service standards at a low cost in order to gain legitimacy. In terms of legal compliance, unlike CEs,
which aim only to maximize profits, LPEs are required to pursue both the public interest and efficiency.
Furthermore, in terms of political pressure, LPE administrators are accountable to residents, the local（ 42 ）

11

parliament and the mayor with regard to public service quality and cost management. If LPE
administrators prioritize cost reductions due to the influence of efficiency pressures, the risk ofdeclining public service quality will increase. Conversely, pursuing the public interest can lead LPE
administrators to manage their costs more inefficiently. Thus, LPE administrators must govern theirorganizations while considering both the public interest and efficiency, and they must behave in amanner that ensures business continuity (Kawarata 2005; Martinsons et al. 2007).
2.3 Cost Behavior of Public Sector Organizations
The concept of cost stickiness originated in the latter half of the 1920s. In Germany, Brasch (1927)
termed this phenomenon “Kostenremanenz”, and this notion was clarified through the direct observationof companies’ cost information. Recently, “Kostenremanenz” has attracted the attention of empiricalanalysts; the German term has since been translated to “cost stickiness” (“sticky costs”) by Anderson etal. (2003). Those authors examined 7,629 firms over 20 years, from 1979 to 1998, using annual
Compustat data. In addition, they verified firms’ cost behavior using models based on publishedfinancial data to determine the rate of change in net sales revenue (a proxy for the activity level as an
explanatory variable) and the rate of change for selling, general and administrative expenses (a proxyfor cost variables and the dependent variable). They found that the rate of change for costs when theactivity level decreases is smaller than it is when the activity level increases (Figure 4).
[Insert] Figure 4. Image of sticky costs and anti-sticky costs
Figure 4 shows that cost and revenue change proportionately and linearly with respect to the normal
t-1 phase of the slope from the t-1 to the t period, but sticky costs result in a slope that is less steep than
the slope near the t-1 period. Thus, “Kostenremanenz” is empirically confirmed as “cost stickiness”.
With regard to additional evidence of cost stickiness, since Anderson et al. (2003), sticky costs havebeen verified through additional empirical research using those authors’ model and have also been
confirmed to exist in other scenarios, such as inter-industry and inter-country scenarios.
In a study focused on inter-industry scenarios, Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2016) examined costbehavior by industry using Compustat data from 1979 to 2000. They showed that cost stickiness isstronger in the manufacturing industry, which has more fixed assets, than in the merchandising, service
and finance industries. However, He et al. (2010) examined the cost behavior of Japanese CEs byindustry type from 1975 to 2000 using the PACAP database. They showed that the merchandisingindustry has stickier costs than the service and manufacturing industries. As described above, various
cost behaviors have been confirmed for each industry for CEs. In addition, sticky costs were confirmed
not only in industries with high material resources but also in industries with high human resources.
In studies focused on inter-country scenarios, Calleja et al. (2006) performed an analysis using
financial data for US, UK, German, and French firms from 1988 to 2004. Their findings confirmed that
German and French firms demonstrate stronger sticky costs than firms in the UK and US. The authors
noted the possibility that differences in corporate governance and managerial oversight driven by theregulation laws in each country and the characteristics of each firm and each type of industry may also

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affect sticky costs. Using Compustat data from 1988 to 2008, Banker et al. (2013) showed that thedifferent worker protection regulations in 19 OECD countries affected labor adjustment costs. Thesestudies suggested that as industries become more regulated by law, their cost adjustment flexibility
decreases. LPEs that are highly subject to legal institutional restrictions may have a lower degree of
freedom regarding cost management than CEs. In previous studies targeting CEs, the analysis period has
mainly been set at approximately 20 years or less. Since public service providers are required to havestable management over the long term (longer than 20 years), it is necessary to further understand theirlong-term cost behavior.
Researchers have classified cost behavior for not only sticky costs but also anti-sticky costs (Weiss2011). Figure 4 shows that anti-sticky costs also result in a slope that is initially steeper but that grows
less steep as it approaches the t period. Thus, anti-stickiness results when the slope of costs forincreasing activities is lower than the slope of costs for decreasing activities. Dalla Via and Perego(2014) confirmed the existence of anti-cost stickiness for small and medium-sized enterprises. At thesame time, they noted that cost stickiness increases in large firms. Likewise, Sepasi and Hassani (2015),
and Boshch and Blandon (2011) also showed that cost stickiness is higher in large enterprises whencomparing large enterprises to small and medium-sized enterprises. These studies show that sticky costs
increase when the adjustment costs (committed capacity costs) for capacity resources such as
high-intensity assets or labor in large companies are high. That is, when the resource adjustment cost is
high, it is difficult to adjust costs according to changes in the activity level (Banker et al. 2014a).
Conversely, since the capacity resources of small and medium enterprises consists mainly of variable
costs, anti-sticky costs emerge. Günther et al. (2014) organized and described the relationship between
holding costs and adjustment costs based on the prior cost stickiness literature. The authors explainedthat the factors influencing cost stickiness can be classified into three relationship types: (1) highadjustment costs attributable to legal requirements or economic and psychological issues; (2) highholding costs attributable to opportunity costs; and (3) high holding costs attributable to social issues.
To date, most studies have focused only on CEs, and only a few empirical studies of cost behavior
have focused on public organizations. Bradbury and Scott (2014) conducted an empirical analysis of thecost behavior of New Zealand’s public municipalities from 2008 to 2012. In New Zealand,cost-management methods similar to those used by CEs have been introduced into public organizations
since the 1980s as part of an NPM plan to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of administrative
activities. With thirty years having passed since 1980, these authors examined whether cost management
improved after 2008. However, the research showed that sticky costs continued to exist in New
Zealand’s local governments and that the efficiency of local government activities had not yet improved.
Cohen et al. (2017) investigated the cost behavior of Greek local governments, which was a cause of the
Greek fiscal crisis. These authors verified asymmetric cost behavior for different cost categories.
Specifically, they focused on the difference between administrative costs and the costs of service
provision by empirically describing the cost behavior. They found that the costs of service provision (acore competence of local governments) were sticky, and administrative costs were anti-sticky. Theseauthors asserted that this asymmetric cost behavior was influenced by the decisions of local government
administrators, who were pressured by politicians and stakeholders. Additionally, they argued that local（ 44 ）

13

government administrators cannot decrease the cost of service provision in response to externalpressures, even if revenues have decreased because of a fiscal crisis. Holzhacker et al. (2015) focusedon the differences between the institutional pressures on government hospitals and those on for-profit
and nonprofit hospitals and found differences in cost behaviors. Specifically, sticky costs were prevalent
in government hospitals, which were subject to strong institutional pressures. The authors argued that
one reason for their research results is that government hospitals need to take normative actions becauseof stakeholders’ excessive pressure. The taxes, subsidies or donations from stakeholders such as local
communities or citizens’ groups force government hospitals to behave for the public interest. Yasukata
et al. (2011) showed the existence of sticky costs in the Japanese National Hospital Organization,suggesting that sticky costs appeared within labor costs because the Japanese National Hospital
Organization was strongly influenced by institutional pressures to not dismiss employees.
In analyses of these public organizations, there has been no focus to date on LPEs. LPEs haveunique characteristics among public organizations because they are required to act not only in the public
interest (similar to public organizations) but also in the interest of efficiency (similar to CEs). Therefore,
it is academically interesting to investigate how LPEs’ cost behavior has changed because such changes
reflect the pressure to act in the interest of both the public and efficiency (Figure 5).
[Insert] Figure 5. The causal relationship between the institutional constraints on and the cost behaviorof LPEs
2.4 Hypothesis Development
Based on the model developed by Anderson et al. (2003), asymmetric cost behavior, especiallysticky costs, has been evaluated in empirical studies focused on CEs. Using the same method, theasymmetric cost behavior of local governments was confirmed by Bradbury and Scott (2014) and Cohenet al. (2017). Holzhacker et al. (2015) found that the degree of sticky costs was greater in public
hospitals than in private hospitals because for-profit organizations have fewer institutional restrictions
than do public organizations. Therefore, the latter can change their governance or cost structure to
respond flexibly to increase their efficiency (Eldenburg et al. 2004; Eldenburg and Krishnan 2008;
Balakrishnan et al. 2010; Holzhacker et al. 2015). Further, public organizations are more strongly
influenced by institutional pressure than CEs (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004). Therefore, it istheorized that sticky costs can be confirmed in LPEs, given that these organizations have characteristics
similar to both public and private organizations. Additionally, LPEs are subject to the institutional
restrictions that service levels must be maintained without generating profits. Therefore, sticky costs
will be more prevalent in LPEs than in CEs. Thus, the first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis H1: Sticky costs are more prevalent in local public enterprises than in commercial
enterprises.
Günther et al. (2014) argued that asymmetric cost behavior is affected by adjustment costs, such aslegal requirements. LPEs are legally required by LPE law both to work in the public interest and to（ 45 ）

14

maximize efficiency. In addition, LPE administrators are influenced by various stakeholders against thebackground of the two normative institutional constraints. Therefore, they are required to maintain the
public service level at a low, stable cost. In other words, pressures to prioritize efficiency will weaken
the sticky costs of LPEs from the cost behavior perspective. Conversely, pressures to prioritize thepublic interest will boost LPEs’ sticky costs because public service quality must be maintained, even ifrevenues decrease. To maintain their service level, LPEs must renew or replace aging facilities over thelong term, and they must plan for these costs without increasing their service charges. When LPE
administrators are subject to strong institutional constraints, they cannot make decisions quickly(Martinsons et al. 2007) and will put off these problems to the future. Sometimes, facilities can be
repaired early in the business cycle, but after many years, it is often better to replace these facilities thanto repair them. In these cases, the replacement or repair costs may drastically increase, and LPEs’
resource adjustment ability will gradually be lost. Thus, it is believed that their cost behavior willchange based on the influence of institutional constraints, especially the requirement to protect the
public interest. Therefore, LPEs may take more time to balance their obligations due to the institutional
constraints of both protecting the public interest and achieving efficiency. Thus, the next hypothesis is asfollows:
Hypothesis H2: Institutional pressures are associated with the change in local public enterprises’
cost behavior over time, in contrast to that of commercial enterprises.
Subramaniam and Weidenmier (2016) revealed that sticky costs are stronger in manufacturingindustries with more fixed assets than in the commercial, service and finance industries. By contrast, He
et al. (2010) showed that the commercial industry’s sticky costs are higher than those of the service andmanufacturing industries. As described above, various asymmetric cost behaviors have been confirmed
for each type of industry for CEs, including cases with both high material resources (high fixed assets)
and high human resources (high labor costs). Anderson et al. (2003) argued that sticky costs will
increase when asset intensity and labor costs are high. LPEs’ businesses include not only high asset-typeindustries, such as water supply and sewerage, but also high labor cost-type industries, such astransportation and hospitals. Moreover, due to institutional constraints, various asymmetric costbehaviors should appear in all businesses, as LPEs must balance serving the public interest andachieving efficiency rather than only aiming to maximize profits, which is the goal of CEs. I conjecturethat sticky costs in LPEs will increase when these firms are pressured from the institutional constraint ofserving the public interest; conversely, LPEs’ sticky costs will decrease when they are pressured fromthe institutional constraint of achieving efficiency. Thus, the next hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis H3: Similar to that of commercial enterprises, local public enterprises’ cost behavior isassociated with the type of industry.
Banker et al. (2014b) found that sticky costs increase when demand uncertainty or the downside riskof demand increases. The demand for public services depends on population changes (Nakai 1988;（ 46 ）

15

Nakano 2016). For this reason, the administrators of LPEs are required to predict changes in public
service demand based on population changes (Nishioka et al. 2007). In Japan, the population structure
has changed significantly since 1995. The population of youth and those of production age isdecreasing; conversely, the elderly population is increasing. Furthermore, the economy and demand areexperiencing a depression, and CEs are withdrawing from depopulated regions due to a lack ofprofitability. Even if public demand decreases due to the declining population, LPEs cannot stop
providing services because of the institutional pressure to serve the public interest. In other words, fromthe perspective of the public interest, LPEs cannot reduce the quality of their public services. In addition,with the increase in elderly people, whose income is derived primarily from pensions, LPEs must
maintain the same level of public services at low prices because of the institutional pressure to achieve
efficiency. LPEs may experience increased sticky costs due to the downside risk of public demand andpublic demand uncertainty. By contrast, the market demand for CEs is affected not only by domestic
trading but also by overseas trading, so they are less affected by population changes than LPEs. I
theorize that LPEs’ cost behavior will be more strongly influenced by population changes than that ofCEs. Thus, the next hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis H4: Local public enterprises’ sticky costs are strongly influenced by population changes
since 1995 in relation to commercial enterprises.
As noted by Bradbury and Scott (2014) and Cohen et al. (2017), local government administrators are
influenced by public opinion (demand for both low-cost and high-quality services) when they make costmanagement decisions. Public organizations, including LPEs, must respond to multidisciplinary
evaluations at all times due to the existence of an unspecified number of stakeholders (Rainey 1997). In
particular, LPE administrators are appointed by the mayor and approved by congress, who are, in turn,elected by citizens. Therefore, the administrators may be sensitive to not only public opinion but also
political opinion (from mayors and local councils) if they wish to be reappointed for the next term, andthey may strive to achieve a high level of performance with regard to protecting the public interest andachieving efficiency. As a result, LPE administrators may act to control and adjust their asymmetric costbehavior in the direction of symmetric cost behavior during the political term of mayors and local
councils, which is 4 years in Japan. Thus, LPE administrators must aim for a long-term balance between
protecting the public interest and achieving efficiency due to political pressure. Conversely, CEs’
business managers may decide to control and adjust their costs with a focus on securing profits asquickly as possible, and they may not be as strongly affected by political pressure as LPEs. Thus
because of institutional constraints, LPEs’ long-term cost adjustments may be more controlled and move
more slowly than those of CEs. As a result, it is hypothesized that the administrators of LPEs makedecisions that result in asymmetric cost behavior that gradually transforms into a proportional
relationship over the long term. The final hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis H5: Local public enterprise administrators make decisions that result in the long-term,
proportional stabilization of cost behavior within a 4-year election period in（ 47 ）

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relation to commercial enterprises.
LPEs are characterized by serving the public interest and achieving efficiency. Thus, LPEs’ costbehavior is presumed to change in the context of the tradeoff between the public interest and efficiency.
Because of the need to run businesses in a stable manner, LPE administrators make deliberate decisions
from a different perspective than that of CE managers.
3 Research Method and Sample Selection
3.1 Research Method
The analytical model of Anderson et al. (2003) is the basis of recent empirical studies of costbehavior; it was adopted in studies following Anderson et al. (2003) and recently used by Bradbury and
Scott (2014), Cohen et al. (2017), and Holzhacker et al. (2015) to analyze the cost behavior of publicorganizations. Therefore, this study assumes that the model can also be applied to the analysis of LPEs’
cost behavior. Thus, to verify hypotheses 1 to 3, I adopt model 1. To examine hypothesis 1, all thesamples are analyzed through panel data analysis using model 1. Next, to verify hypothesis 2, theyear-to-year changes in cost behavior are analyzed through OLS analysis using model 1. OLS analysis
was adopted to clarify the cost behavior in prior studies (Anderson and Lanen 2007; Zanella et al. 2015).
Thus, I intend to use not only panel data analysis but also OLS analysis to verify the existence of sticky
costs. Finally, for hypothesis 3, the samples for each type of industry are analyzed through panel data
analysis using model 1.
model 1ln ቆ‫ݐݏ݋ܥ‬௜,௧ܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ቇ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ‫ כ‬ln ቆ
ቇ + ߚଶ ‫ݕ݉݉ݑܦ_݁ݏܽ݁ݎܿ݁ܦ כ‬௜,௧ ‫ כ‬ln ቆ
ቇ + ߝ௜,௧‫ݐݏ݋ܥ‬௜,௧ିଵܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଵܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଵ

LPEs’ operating expenses are substituted for Cost. Additionally, Revenue takes operating revenues
as a proxy for the activity amount. Decrease Dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when
operating revenue decreases between the t period and the previous period and 0 otherwise. All the data
are natural logarithms.
Using this model, it can be confirmed that when operating revenue increases by 1%, the costchanges E\ WKH YDOXH LQGLFDWHGE\ ȕ $GGLWLRQDOO\EHFDXVHRI WKH'HFUHDVH 'XPP\ ZKHQRSHUDWLQJ
revenue decreases by 1%, the cost decreases by ȕȕ, whereas ȕ indicates the value of the sticky or
anti-sticky costs. Therefore, when there is cost stickiness, ȕZLOOEHQHJDWLYHDQGZKHQFRVWVWLFNLQHVV
is not present (anti-VWLFN\FRVWV ȕZLOOEHSRVLWLYH
To examine hypothesis 4, I clarify the influence of the total population change and the population
structure on cost behavior. Therefore, I focus on population data from a report on population movement
based on a basic resident registration system database 7. In particular, it is necessary to clarify the7

Population data in each municipality is published as “Basic Resident Register Annual Population
Report” by statistics bureau, ministry of internal affairs and communications in Japan.

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influence of depopulation and the increasing ratio of the aging population on the cost behavior of LPEs.
For this reason, I collect population data from 1995, which is the year Japan started to become an aging
society. The population data were divided into three stages: 0-14 years old, 15-64 years old, and 65
years old and over. To evaluate hypothesis 4, I adopt the following model 2.

model 2ln ቆ‫ݐݏ݋ܥ‬௜,௧ܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ቇ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ‫ כ‬ln ቆ
ቇ + ߚଶ ‫ݕ݉݉ݑܦ_݁ݏܽ݁ݎܿ݁ܦ כ‬௜,௧ ‫ כ‬ln ቆቇ‫ݐݏ݋ܥ‬௜,௧ିଵܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଵܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଵ଺+ ෍ ߚ௡ ܲ‫݌݋‬௜,௧,௡ ‫ݕ݉݉ݑܦ_݁ݏܽ݁ݎܿ݁ܦ כ‬௜,௧ ‫ כ‬ln ቆ௡ୀଷܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ቇ + ߝ௜,௧ܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଵThe total population represents the natural logarithms of the year-over-year comparison. The young
population, the productive age population, and the elderly population are natural logarithms of each
respective proportion of the total population.
Next, to examine hypothesis 5, it is necessary to confirm the relationship between operating
revenues over 4 years and changes in operating expenses. I extend the model of Anderson et al. (2003)
and verify the hypothesis using the following model 3.
model 3ln ቆ‫ݐݏ݋ܥ‬௜,௧ܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ቇ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ‫ כ‬ln ቆ
ቇ + ߚଶ ‫ݕ݉݉ݑܦ_݁ݏܽ݁ݎܿ݁ܦ כ‬௜,௧ ‫ כ‬ln ቆቇ‫ݐݏ݋ܥ‬௜,௧ିଵܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଵܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଵ+ߚଷ ‫ כ‬ln ቆ+ߚହ ‫ כ‬ln ቆ+ߚ଻ ‫ כ‬ln ቆܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଵܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଵቇ + ߚସ ‫ݕ݉݉ݑܦ_݁ݏܽ݁ݎܿ݁ܦ כ‬௜,௧ିଵ ‫ כ‬ln ቆቇܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଶܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଶܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଶܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଶቇ + ߚ଺ ‫ݕ݉݉ݑܦ_݁ݏܽ݁ݎܿ݁ܦ כ‬௜,௧ିଶ ‫ כ‬ln ቆቇܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଷܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଷܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଷܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିଷቇ + ߚ଼ ‫ݕ݉݉ݑܦ_݁ݏܽ݁ݎܿ݁ܦ כ‬௜,௧ିଷ ‫ כ‬ln ቆ
ቇ + ߝ௜,௧ܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିସܴ݁‫݁ݑ݊݁ݒ‬௜,௧ିସ

If asymmetric cost behavior terminates over time, the sticky costs value will gradually approach 0. If
cost stickiness is confirmed by ȕLWVKRXOGFKDQJHȕȕȕ, with time, since LPE administrators
are subject to institutional restrictions and will only gradually overcome the sticky costs. In particular,
political pressure is strengthened by politicians’ 4-year term. Additionally, local elections for congress
and the mayor of each municipality in Japan are held almost simultaneously on the same day. Therefore,
LPEs’ cost behavior may be influenced by political pressure. The analysis begins at t=0, which is anelection year, and elections are held in t=0, 4, 8, 12, etc.
3.2ġġ Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
No empirical analysis of LPEs’ cost behavior has been previously performed. This research is（ 49 ）

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therefore the first to examine LPEs’ cost behavior. To obtain robust results, as much cross-sectional dataas possible should be used. I collected non-consolidated fiscal accounting data on all LPE businesses
from LPEs’ yearbooks 8. Thus, the sample population for this analysis is all local public enterprisebusinesses that are classified as corporatized LPEs. The data include 10 industry types (residential watersupply, industrial water supply, sewage, transportation, electric power, gas power, hospitals, wholesalemarket, toll road, and car parking). In addition, observations must be made over a long period toconfirm how cost behavior has changed in accordance with changes in Japan’s social environment.
To verify LPEs’ cost behavior, long-term cost data are necessary. Therefore, in this study, theanalysis period is the 40 years from 1974 to 2013, which is a longer period than that analyzed by any
previous empirical studies on cost stickiness. LPEs are legally obligated to release annual financial
reports. The financial reporting method has not changed over the 40 years under study, making it
possible to collect fiscal data over a very long period. The collected data represent 120,317 firm-years.
To control for the effect of outliers, I removed (deleted) the largest and smallest 1 percent ofobservations (outliers). I used list-wise case deletion without winsorized data to delete the observations.
That is, if there is even a single outlier in one sample, all the data from that sample are deleted (cleared).
This approach is rather conservative as a statistical method, but since there are numerous samples, I
contend that this approach is a valid statistical processing method to obtain robust analysis results. The
final sample includes 115,929 firm-years. Therefore, the sample consists of unbalanced panel data.
Additionally, to create a comparison with LPEs over the same period, I collected data provided by
Nikkei NEED-FinancialQUEST on CEs listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. LPEs’ financial statements
provide non-consolidated accounting data for various industry types, such as water supply and hospitals,
so I also collected CE non-consolidated accounting data from the Annual Securities Reports forcomparison. The collected data represent 85,705 firm-years. After excluding (deleting) outliers, thesample includes 84,343 firm-years. The descriptive statistics are calculated after the exclusion ofoutliers.
[Insert] Table 4. Descriptive statistics
4 Results
In panel data analysis, there is a process for choosing the optimal result from the model of pooled
estimates, fixed effects, and random effects. I describe all the analysis results and explain the optimal
results. First, in all panel data analyses, I used an F-test to determine whether a pooled model and afixed/random effects model is more suitable. The result confirms that the fixed/random effects model ismore suitable than the pooled model. In addition, I also conducted the Hausman test to confirm whichmodel, the fixed effects or random effects model, is suitable. In addition, I confirmed the influence of

8 LPEs’ yearbooks are edited annually by the ministry of internal affairs and communications in Japan.
They include the annual financial statement of each LPE in each municipality. The financial statements
include B/S, P/L, the detail information of expenses, etc.; these data are found in electronic databases
after 1999.

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serial correlation through the Durbin-Watson ratio. The influence of serial correlation is low in all theanalyses.
To test hypothesis 1 using model 1, I analyzed panel data for 40 years. The results showed that LPEs’
cost actions demonstrate asymmetric cost behavior (Table 5 3DQHO $  1DPHO\ ȕ ZDV  IL[HG
effects), and the positive value indicates anti-sticky costs. Conversely, the CE analysis resulted in a ȕvalue of -0.0978 (fixed effects), and the negative value indicates sticky costs (Table 5 Panel B). Thus,
hypothesis 1 was not supported.
[Insert] Table 5. Cost behavior based on the panel data analysis using model 1
Under institutional constraints, it was predicted that sticky costs would increase because LPEs are
subject to stronger institutional pressures than CEs. However, the analysis resulted in the opposite
conclusion, which was not expected. In previous studies, no research showed that public organizations’cost behavior was anti-sticky (Yasukata et al. 2011; Bradbury and Scott 2014; Cohen et al. 2017;
Holzhacker et al. 2015). Additionally, Banker and Byzalov (2014) argued that CEs’ cost behavior
generally indicated sticky costs on average. Clearly, this result is a new discovery that contrasts withprevious studies.
This result signifies that LPE administrators actively manage their resource-adjustable costs when
their operating revenue decreases and the pressure for low-cost economic efficiency increases. I believethat the lack of support for this hypothesis might be driven by the accounting (regulations on dividends
and retained earnings) and management system (redundancies, i.e., preparation for disasters such as astandby isolated power unit and food stockpiled for emergencies) differences between CEs and LPEs.
Namely, the anti-sticky costs are induced by resource-adjustable costs, which imply that there are
redundant resources caused by LPEs’ accounting and management systems.
Regarding the accounting system, I focus on the appropriation of retained earnings and the net
income of LPEs. The retained earnings of CEs are often allocated to stakeholders, such as shareholders,managers, or workers. Unlike CEs, LPEs are subject to legal restrictions regarding how they canappropriate retained earnings. Namely, it is unnecessary for LPEs to distribute their final profits tostakeholders, such as shareholders, managers, and workers. Additionally, because they can receive
preferential treatment regarding corporate tax and property tax, their retained earnings may often be
generated. However, LPEs are required to operate with moderate profits and not to maximize their net
income. Therefore, I conjecture that LPE administrators intend to ensure their management resource
slack so that they can adjust quickly when operating revenue declines. Because the slack resources in
LPEs are oriented toward preventing disasters, they are not necessary for normal operations. Therefore,
there is a great deal of room for discretion; thus, it is easy to reduce these resources. In other words,
LPE administrators may increase their management resources, thus increasing their operating expenses,
in order to avoid significantly increasing their operating profits. In fact, as shown in Panel B of Figure 2,
operating expenses and operating revenues show very similar, consistent movements over the long term.
LPEs thus may accumulate excessive management resources rather than repaying their bonds. Because
LPEs have little risk of bankruptcy, they may not make the effort to repay their debt; on the contrary, it（ 51 ）

20

is possible that they intend to bear the cost of procuring excessive management resources accordingly.
Therefore, they can use their profit for management resources instead of bond repayment.
Next regarding the management system, I focus on public sector management, especially the
redundancy of management resources. Cyert and March (1963) argued that organizations use internal
rules for different purposes to compensate for environmental changes. In public sector management,
retaining slack management resources is explained as a necessary cost “redundancy” to prepare fordisaster (Koike et al. 2015), such as retaining emergency equipment or facilities that can provide public
services in a disaster such as an earthquake, typhoon, eruption, or flood. Therefore, LPEs are allowed toretain slack management resources as redundant management resources because LPE administrators can
explain that it is necessary to secure slack resources for the public interest. That is, they earn legitimacy
for their spending by retaining slack resources as redundant resources. LPE administrators can therefore
adjust their costs for redundancy; in other words, they can increase the slack resources that aredesignated redundant resources when operating revenue is likely to exceed operating expenses;
conversely, they can easily decrease the slack resources designated as redundant resources when their
net income is in deficit and the disaster does not occur. I believe that when operating revenue isdeclining, it might actively reduce the holding costs of these slack resources, and therefore, I conjecturethat anti-sticky costs appear in LPEs. Thus, I believe that LPE administrators may avoid sticky costs andobtain legitimacy for their spending by retaining redundant management resources and adhering toregulations for the disposal of net profits.
To verify hypothesis 2, I analyzed the cross-section of cost behavior using the data for each year
separately and verified that the change was dynamic over time (Table 6 :KHQWKHȕ coefficient was
found to be not significant through the t-test of an OLS analysis, I used linear interpolation to show the
PRYHPHQWRIȕDQGDGGHGWKHapproximated curve (Figure 6). It is possible to confirm the tendency ofthe change in cost behavior through time based on the approximated curve 9. Two characteristics—sticky
costs and anti-sticky costs—were confirmed by the dynamic analysis. Panel A of Table 6 and Panel A of
)LJXUH  VKRZ WKDW ȕ FKDQJHG IURP D SRVLWLYH WR D QHJDWLYH YDOXH for LPEs’ cost behavior, that the
GHYLDWLRQVRIWKHȕ values were large and that the year-to-\HDUFKDQJHLQȕhad a negative slope. Thus,
the results robustly show that anti-sticky costs gradually weakened. EVSHFLDOO\ IURPWRȕ
had primarily positive values, indicating anti-sticky costs. However, the degree of anti-sticky costs
gradually decreased, especially after 2004, when ȕZDVSULPDULO\QHJDWLYHLQGLFDWing sticky costs. In
FRQWUDVWLQWKHDQDO\VLVRI&(VȕZDVSULPDULO\QHJDWLYH in Panel B of Table 6 and Panel B of Figure 6.
The average cost stickiness changed slightly with time but, in contrast to the results for the LPEs, there
was no significant changH LQ WKH YDOXH RI ȕ for CEs over time. Thus, institutional pressures wereassociated with the change in LPEs’ cost behavior over time, in contrast to that of CEs; hypothesis 2 waspartly supported for LPEs after around the year 2000.

9This result was equivalent and consistent with the results using panel data analysis with the time trend஼௢௦௧ோ௘௩௘௡௨௘

ோ௘௩௘௡௨௘

dummy variable: ln ൬஼௢௦௧ ೔,೟ ൰ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ‫ כ‬ln ൬ோ௘௩௘௡௨௘ ೔,೟ ൰ + ߚଶ ‫ݕ݉݉ݑܦ_݁ݏܽ݁ݎܿ݁ܦ כ‬௜,௧ ‫ כ‬ln ൬ோ௘௩௘௡௨௘ ೔,೟ ൰ + ߚଷ ‫כ‬
೔,೟షభ

೔,೟షభ

ܶ݅݉݁‫ ݀݊݁ݎݐ‬+ ߚସ ‫ݕ݉݉ݑܦ_݁ݏܽ݁ݎܿ݁ܦ כ‬௜,௧ ‫ כ‬ln ൬ோ௘௩௘௡௨௘೔,೟ோ௘௩௘௡௨௘೔,೟షభ൰ ‫ ݀݊݁ݎݐ݁݉݅ܶ כ‬+ ߝ௜,௧ .

（ 52 ）

೔,೟షభ21[Insert] Table 6. The results for individual years based on OLS analysis using model 1>,QVHUW@)LJXUHȕ value (sticky cost value) changes in each year
Considering the change in LPEs’ long-term cost behavior, one can assume that the asymmetric costbehavior changed substantially after around the year 2000. LPEs gradually lost redundancy due tosurplus profits and, simultaneously, the potential loss of cost adjustment flexibility. Additionally, LPEs
and CEs had significantly different cost behavior characteristics. I hypothesized that these different costbehavior characteristics were caused by institutional constraints, especially those serving the “public
interest”. LPEs provide services in a constant and stable manner, and the quality of the public services
must be maintained over the long term. For this purpose, LPEs must always maintain their facilities andequipment. For example, if the LPE is operating a water supply project, it will be necessary toconstantly update the water pipeline and maintain the dam facility. However, in a long-term business,
obsolete equipment must be repaired or replaced, even if revenues decrease. Moreover, it is difficult toincrease utility fees. Since repair or replacement costs, as substantial fixed costs, increase with thepassage of time 10, I suggest that increases in repair or replacement costs for large-scale facilities
gradually lead LPEs to lose redundant management resources and cost adjustment flexibility. As a result,
I assume that LPE administrators cannot gain gradual control over the efficiency of their services. In
other words, LPE management is strongly affected by institutional pressure to protect the public interest.
Therefore, I conjecture that this inefficiency risk is affected by an increase in reinvestment(replacement) costs for large-scale facilities or equipment.
Next, to verify hypothesis 3, I analyzed each industry type (Table 7) using model 1. I foundsignificant results for all industries except for the toll road business. The results show that the presenceof not only sticky costs but also anti-sticky costs was confirmed. Various cost behaviors appeared in
LPEs for each industry. Based on these results, hypothesis 3 was partially supported. I found that similar
to CEs, LPEs demonstrated diverse cost behaviors in each industry. In particular, considering theindustry types with a high ratio of human resources 11, transportation businesses’ cost behavior reflectedanti-sticky costs (ȕ ZDV 693 (fixed effects)), while hospital businesses’ cost behavior reflected
sticky costs (ȕ ZDV -0.1640 (fixed effects)). For the industry types with a high ratio of material
resources 12, residential water supply, industrial water supply, and gas power businesses’ cost behavior
reflected anti-sticky costs (ȕ ZDV 2908 (fixed effects), 0.0565 (random effects), and 0.3996 (fixed
effects)), while electricity and sewage businesses’ cost behavior reflected sticky costs (ȕZDV-0.1473

10

Repair costs (including replacement costs) increased by a factor of 7.6 times from 1974 to 2013.
According to the LPEs’ yearbook in 2013, labor cost ratios are as follows: residential water supply is
32.7%, industrial water supply is 39.6%, sewerage is 44.0%, transportation is 25.7%, electric power is
26.2%, gas power is 13.0%, and hospitals are 6.5%.
12 According to the LPEs’ yearbook in 2013, depreciation cost ratios are as follows: residential watersupply is 12.5%, industrial water supply is 11.9%, sewerage is 6.4%, transportation is 33.3%, electric
power is 25.1%, gas power is 8.5%, and hospitals are 46.5%.
11（ 53 ）

22(random effects) and -0.2656 (fixed effects)).
[Insert] Table 7. Cost behavior of each industry based on the panel data analysis using model 1
The various cost behaviors suggest that there are factors other than the influence of the adjustment
cost for human resources and material resources. It is possible that the non-exclusion of public services
and the influence of monopolies also exert an influence on cost behaviors. Public services provide
essential, lifesaving activities that cannot be managed based on CEs’ economic principles. For example,
it is impossible to cut off the electric power supply of people who do not pay their bills or to fail toprovide medical services to those who cannot pay for them. Thus, these businesses would not be
profitable for CEs. In LPE businesses with sticky costs, I conjecture that these non-exclusionary public
services (welfare services for free) make LPEs’ cost management less flexible from the perspective of
institutional constraints, especially in terms of protecting the public interest. On the other hand, these
LPEs’ businesses are projects that require substantial investment and that cannot be procured by theprivate sector; therefore, the market share ratio of LPEs is generally high 13. In these high market sharebusiness environments, it may be possible to manage their costs by accurately forecasting the necessary
resources for the future without idle capacity costs. Therefore, I believe that the evidence of anti-sticky
costs in the residential water supply business and the industrial water supply business originates frommanaging the supply based on the accurate prediction of demand.
Next, to verify hypothesis 4, I analyzed whether population changes impact LPEs’ cost behavior.
Table 8 shows the results of model 2. In Panel A of Table 8, ȕ LQGLFDWes the influence of the total
population and is -0.3080 (fixed effects); ȕ VKRZs the influence of the youth population (0-14 years
old) and is 0.5216 (fixed effects); ȕ VKRZs the influence of the productive age population and is not
significant; and ȕ LQGLFDWes the effect of the elderly population and is -0.0901 (fixed effects). In
particular, it should be noted WKDWWKHFKDQJHVLQWKHWRWDOSRSXODWLRQ ȕ DQGWKHHOGHUO\SRSXODWLRQ ȕ 
may have had negative impacts on LPEs’ cost behavior after 1995. Conversely, the youth population
acted to strengthen the anti-sticky costs.
[Insert] Table 8. Population changes and cost behavior based on the panel data analysis using model 2
In contrast, population changes also impact CEs’ cost behavior, as shown in Panel B of Table 8. The
influence of the total population ȕ is 2.4228 (fixed effects), the influence of the youth population ȕ is-0.2005 (fixed effects), the influence of the productive age population ȕis 0.8441 (fixed effects), andthe influence of the elderly population is 0.5842 (fixed effects). Thus, the results confirm that population
changes affect cost management for not only LPEs but also CEs. Furthermore, population changes,
except in the youth population, positively influence CEs’ cost management. I argue that cost
13 According to the LPEs’ yearbook in 2013, the market share ratios are as follows: residential watersupply is 99.5%, industrial water supply is 99.9%, sewerage is 91.3%, transportation (railway) is 13.4%,
electric power is 1.0%, gas power is 2.3%, and hospitals are 12.3%.

（ 54 ）

23

management corresponding to population changes is important for both CEs and LPEs. In particular,
since 1995, LPEs have had to consider that changes in the total population and the elderly population
affect cost management. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was almost supported.
Next, using model 3, I verified that LPEs’ long-term cost management was performed over 4-year
periods, verifying hypothesis 5. Thus, LPE administrators decide to control costs under normative
institutional constraints from the local parliament and mayor. The results of the analysis are shown in
Table 9, and the changes in the asymmetry of LPEs’ and CEs’ cost behaviors over 4 years are shown in
Figure 7. In the analysis of model  WKH ȕ value is the rate of change from t-1 to t, which indicates
whether the asymmetric cost behavior involved sticky costs or anti-sticky costs. Additionally, the ȕȕ
DQGȕYDOXHVUHSUHVHQWHGWKHDQQXDOFKDQJHin asymmetric cost behavior for t-1/t-2, t-2/t-3, and t-3/t-4,
respectively. The result of the analysis of LPEs in Panel A of Table 9 shows WKDWȕZDV157 (fixed
effects), and the positive value indicates that anti-sticky costs were observed over the short term.
HRZHYHUWKHDV\PPHWULFFRVWEHKDYLRUYDOXHV ȕȕDQGȕ JUDGXDOO\DSSURDFKHG]HURWKURXJKHDFKperiod and were 0.0226, -0.0179, and -0.0158 (fixed effects), respectively, and the change from a
positive value to a negative value occurred over 4 years. It can be theorized that the anti-sticky value
gradually shifted in the direction of the value of sticky costs within 4 years. Thus, the administrators of
LPEs managed their costs to approximate a proportional relationship throughout the four years, with thegoal of stable operations. Therefore, hypothesis 5 was supported.
[Insert] Table 9. Cost behavior over 4 years based on the panel data analysis using model 3[Insert] Figure 7. ȕȕȕDQGȕYDOXH (sticky cost value) change in each 4-year period
The analysis of CEs in Panel B of Table 9 FRQWUDVWVZLWKWKHDQDO\VLVRI/3(VȕZDV-0.0685 (fixed
effects), and the negative value indicates sticky costs. Additionally, the value changed in the subsequent
period. The tKUHHDV\PPHWULFFRVWEHKDYLRUYDOXHV ȕȕDQGȕ  ZHUH505, 0.0244, and -0.0070(fixed effects), respectively, and the change from a negative value to a positive value occurred over 4
years. Therefore, CE managers returned costs to a proportional relationship to secure profits as quickly
as possible.
LPEs balance the public interest and efficiency, and this process requires sustainable management.
Therefore, with a focus on the four-year change in cost behavior, it was theorized that administrators
decide to maintain their costs after anti-sticky costs are observed. Additionally, they decide to improve
services in the public interest instead of pursuing excessive efficiency, which may be due to institutionalpressure stemming from the election of a local parliament and mayor.
5 Conclusions
This study verified the long-term cost behavior of Japanese LPEs by comparing these firms with
CEs. We found five primary results. First, it was generally believed that LPEs are less efficient thanprivate enterprises (CEs), but when examining the cost behavior change, the results revealed that LPEs
are not necessarily inefficient with regard to cost stickiness. A panel data analysis covering 40 years（ 55 ）

24

showed contrasting results. The results indicated that sticky costs were confirmed for CEs, whereas
anti-sticky costs were present among LPEs. I believe that the lack of support for this expectation might
be driven by differences between CEs’ and LPEs’ accounting and management systems. In terms of thedifference in accounting systems, the regulations on dividends and retained earnings mark a differencein accounting systems. LPEs are also subject to legal restrictions regarding how they can appropriate
retained earnings, though they may often be generated since they can receive preferential treatment
regarding corporate tax and property tax. Furthermore, LPE administrators are not allowed to receive
dividends from the organization’s profits. Therefore, it is possible that LPE administrators intend toensure that they have slack management resources because LPEs are required to operate with moderate
profits and not to maximize their net income. In terms of the difference in management systems,
securing slack resources is different in CEs and LPEs. LPEs earn legitimacy for their spending byretaining slack resources as facilities for disasters (i.e., redundancies) because they must serve the public
interest. For this reason, I believe that it is possible that profits may be allocated to the expenses ofredundancies if the LPE administrator predicts an increase in profits. I also suggest that compared toCEs, LPEs have more redundancies that allow them to adjust their management resources. Based on the
results of the analysis, I argue that choosing LPEs as public service providers over outsourcing andprivatization was a successful decision in terms of cost management, and it was not a mistake since
LPEs can manage their costs by maintaining the flexibility of cost adjustment.
Second, the cross-sectional analysis for each year shows that the timeline transition of cost behavior
is different between LPEs and CEs. Namely, LPEs’ anti-sticky costs have shifted to sticky costs eventhough CEs’ cost behavior remained unchanged. Therefore, the fluctuation of LPEs’ cost behavior
suggests that LPE administrators gradually lost the flexibility to adjust costs around the year 2000. In
other words, LPEs are gradually losing redundancy due to surplus profits. I suppose that this trend has
occurred because LPEs have experienced strong institutional pressure to protect the public interest fromthe viewpoint of maintaining public service quality. Namely I conjecture that this inefficiency risk isaffected by increases in repair and replacement costs. Obsolete equipment must be repaired or replacedin order to maintain public service quality, even when revenues decrease. Since repair and replacement
costs, as fixed costs, increase with the passage of time, I suggest that increases in these costs graduallylead LPEs to lose cost adjustment flexibility. Therefore, LPEs’ business must be continually managed toreduce their costs by maintaining their ability to adjust management resources. In other words, LPE
administrators must carry out cost management that is always conscious of taking measures to maintainthe ability to adjust management resources. For this reason, LPE administrators should always be
careful to maintain a balance between efficiency and the public interest. These findings are confirmedby clarifying the change in long-term cost behavior over 40 years. Regarding the cost behavior of public
sector organizations, I argue that it is necessary to verify their cost management based on long-term
empirical analysis because of the premise that public organizations must operate stably over the longterm.
Third, in the analysis by industry, LPEs’ cost behavior showed not only anti-sticky costs but also
sticky costs. LPEs’ anti-sticky costs differ from findings in previous studies to date. Therefore, it ispossible that the panel data analysis results of the 40 years are influenced and distorted by the type of（ 56 ）

25

industry. In addition, the results of this analysis indicate a conclusion that differs from previous studies:anti-sticky costs are stronger in projects with high resource adjustment costs, such as high-intensity
assets. In other words, for projects with substantial physical assets, such as the residential water supply,
industrial water supply and gas businesses, the presence of anti-sticky costs was confirmed. Especiallyin industries with high fixed assets, market monopoly rates are also high 14 . These industries’
administrators may be able to adjust their management resources according to accurate future demand
forecasts. Therefore, anti-sticky costs appear in these industries despite high fixed assets. Conversely, in
LPE businesses with sticky costs, I conjecture that these non-exclusionary public services (welfare
services for free) make LPEs’ cost management less flexible from the perspective of institutional
constraints, especially in terms of protecting the public interest. I suggest that the influence ofmonopolies and the non-exclusionary nature of public services also influence cost behaviors. For thoseindustries in which anti-sticky costs appeared, further detailed research that focuses on thecharacteristics of each of these industries is needed. Furthermore, it is also important to clarify how
administrators can maintain cost adjustment abilities over the long term.
Fourth, I clarified the relationship between population changes and LPEs’ cost behavior. Population
changes drive changes in the demand for public services. In Japan, the increasing number of elderly
people and the decreasing population are major demographic issues. In order for LPEs to maintainstable cost management in the future, LPE administrators must engage in cost management in response
to population changes. This analysis confirmed that the population changes, the increasing elderly
population, and the decreasing total population have had a negative influence on LPEs’ cost behavior,suggesting that the impact of population changes must be taken into account when considering
management needs. Forecasting future population changes will provide accurate demand forecasts for
management. A declining population and an increasing number of elderly people are a problem not onlyin Japan but also across developed countries. I believe that determining how to reduce surplus capacity
costs based on population changes has become an important issue for LPEs throughout the world.
Fifth, I verified that asymmetric cost behaviors were resolved over subsequent periods in the 4-yeartime frame because of institutional pressure from politicians. Clearly, both LPE administrators and CE
managers acted to resolve asymmetric cost behaviors. However, there were differences in the speed ofchange and the direction of movement. In CEs, business managers promptly adjusted their costs toacquire cost management flexibility when sticky costs were present. In contrast, when anti-sticky costs
were present in LPEs, administrators managed their costs subtly and slowly, and cost behaviors
gradually shifted toward a proportional relationship over four years. Because LPEs must supply theirservices stably and sustainably, one might assume that LPE administrators should avoid responding
promptly and suddenly controlling their costs and instead attempt to balance the public interest and cost
efficiency. Regarding the direction of movement of cost behaviors over four years, LPE administrators
chose to improve services in the public interest instead of pursuing efficiency. The examination of the
four-year change in cost behaviors shows that the LPE administrators decided to maintain their costs
after anti-sticky costs were observed. One might assume that LPE administrators are subject to
14

Refer to footnote 13.

（ 57 ）

26

institutional pressure from the politicians who insist on responding to public opinion and social demands
that require the enrichment of public services rather than excessive cost efficiency. Conversely, CE
managers may aim to adjust their costs promptly to be able to manage them flexibly. Thus, from adecision-making perspective, I believe LPE administrators must aim for a long-term balance between
protecting the public interest and achieving efficiency due to institutional pressure from politicians. In
contrast, CEs’ business managers may decide to control and adjust their costs with a focus on securing
profits as quickly as possible.
Management accounting research can provide information about cost behavior and propose effective
cost management strategies not only in theory but also in practice. In public organizations, including
LPEs, it is important to understand how cost behavior will change in the future. Currently, Japan’snational and local governments are promoting two plans to resolve the two main issues of population
changes and a deteriorating financial situation. The first plan is called the Compact City Plan. It intends
to concentrate urban functions, such as public service systems, in central urban areas, thus improving
the efficiency of cost management in depopulated areas. Examples include district development plans toincrease the public transportation network of central urban areas and a renewed maintenance plan toconstruct a single building that houses many types of public services together. The second plan is theIntermunicipal Cooperation Plan, in which public services will be combined through amalgamation or
joint ventures to improve efficiency with economies of scale. By reaching agreements with different
public organizations, separately managed entities can be consolidated into one organization. For
example, in the water supply business, several LPEs can jointly develop large dams and provide water
services for a wide area that spans multiple municipalities.
Although the expectations for the Compact City Plan and the Intermunicipal Cooperation Plan are
high, the effects and benefits of these policies, such as improved public services and reduced costs, havenot been adequately explained. In addition, because the Compact City Plan and the Intermunicipal
Cooperation Plan have not been studied sufficiently in either an academic or a real-world context, we do
not know whether they will improve efficiency. Therefore, it is extremely important to understand thefuture cost behavior of public organizations to determine whether the Compact City or Intermunicipal
Cooperation Plans will provide the effective management of public organizations in the context of adeclining population and depopulated areas. Having reached these five conclusions, my research
explored how public organization administrators have made long-term cost management decisions.
In the future, research should examine the factors influencing LPEs’ asymmetric cost behavior, as
noted by Günther et al. (2014), including both internal and external factors. Especially for industries inwhich sticky costs have been confirmed, we need to determine how to maintain cost flexibility over thelong term. In contrast, in industries with anti-sticky costs, we must learn how to maintain costadjustment flexibility. It is conceivable that LPEs may be subject not only to institutional constraints,
such as achieving efficiency and protecting the public interest, but also to the non-exclusionary nature of
public services and the influence of monopolies. There is a continuing need for detailed investigationsof and research on public organizations’ asymmetric cost behavior, especially that of LPEs.

（ 58 ）

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（ 62 ）

31

Appendix
Variable

Definition

Cost

Operating expenses

Revenue

Operating revenues
The natural logarithm of total population deflated by the previous year's total

Pop _Total

population
The natural logarithm of the youth population (aged 0-14) deflated by the total

Pop_Youth

population
The natural logarithm of the middle-aged population (aged 15-64) deflated by

Pop_Middle

the total population
The natural logarithm of the elderly population (aged 65 and over) deflated by

Pop_Elder

the total population

Figure 1. Population changes in Japanper 1,000 persons
140,000

120,000

100,000

90,077

94,30280.0%
128,057
126,926
123,611 125,570
127,768
127,095
121,049
70.0%
117,060
111,940
104,665
60.0%
99,20984,11580,00050.0%

72,14740.0%

60,00030.0%
40,00020.0%

20,000

10.0%

0

0.0%
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Total population

0-14 age ratio

Created based on Japan’s population census for the year 2015.

（ 63 ）

15-64 age ratio

65 age ratio

32

Figure 2. LPE bonds, operating and non-operating revenues and expenses
Panel A: LPEs’ bonds
per 100,000,000 Yen
60,000700,000

600,000

50,000500,000
40,000400,000
30,000300,000
20,000200,000
10,000100,000

0
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

0
Amount of issued debt securities outstanding

Bond issuance volume

Created with reference to LPEs’ yearbooks
Panel B: LPEs’ operating revenues and expenses
per 1,000 Yen
12,000,000

10,000,000

8,000,000

6,000,000

4,000,000

2,000,000

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

0
Operating revenues

Created with reference to LPEs’ yearbooks（ 64 ）

Operating expenses

33

Panel C: LPEs’ non-operating revenues and expenses
per 1,000 Yen

2,000,000
1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

0
Non-operating revenues

Non-operating expenses

Created with reference to LPEs’ yearbooks
Figure 3. Trends in the number of LPEs in JapanThe number of LPEs
14,00012,00010,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

0
Corporatized LPEs

Created with reference to LPEs’ yearbooks（ 65 ）

Directly managed LPEs

34

Figure 4. Image of sticky costs and anti-sticky costs

t periodof costs

t-1 periodof costs

Cost function observed when revenue decreases fromthe previous year.
[Sticky line]
If revenuet-1Uevenuet and ȕ1䠇ȕ2ȕ1[Anti-sticky line]
If revenuet-1UHYHQXHt and ȕ1䠇ȕ2> ȕ1

ɴ1
Sticky line

ɴ1䠇ɴ2

Cost function observed whenrevenue increases from theprevious year. It increases
proportionally.

Normal line
Anti-sticky linet -1 period ofrevenuest period ofrevenues

Created with reference to Yasukata (2012)

Figure 5. The causal relationship between the institutional constraints on and the cost behavior of LPEs
Institutional constraints
Economic
efficiency

Publicinterest

Management decision

Cost behavior（ 66 ）

35

Figure 6. ȕYDOXH VWLFN\FRVWYDOXH FKDQJHVin each year 15
Panel A: LPEsġ
0.8
0.6
Linear Approximationy = -[㻌0.4

ȕ-value㻌

0

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

0.2

-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
Panel B: CEs
0.8
0.6
0.4

0.0

ȕ-value㻌

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

0.2

-0.2
Linear Approximation y = -0.0029x - 0.0341㻌
-0.4
-0.6

15

The results in 2012 and 2013 in Panel A and between 2010 and 2013 in Panel B were not significant,so the interpolation method could not be adopted.

（ 67 ）

36)LJXUHȕȕȕDQGȕYDOXH VWLFN\FRVWYDOXH FKDQJHLQHDFK-year period
0.15000.10000.05000.00001 year

2 year

3 year

-0.0500-0.1000
LPEs（ 68 ）

CEs

4 year37

Table 1. LPEs in selected countries
Number ofmunicipalities

Number of
LPEs*

Austria

2,359

149

Electricity, gas, heating, public transport, water, sewerage, waste,telecommunications, public equipement, cemeteries, public areas, health

Belgium

589

243

Electricity, gas, communication networks, funding, economic
development, water, waste, health, social care

Czech Republic

6,258

339 Public transport, electricity, gas, heating, water, waste

Denmark

275

224

Economic development, electricity, gas, heating, water, waste, public
transport, leisure, computing, housing

Estonia247

224

Electricity, gas, water, housing, public transport, heating, health, social
services, trade, waste

Finland448

944

Economic development, energy, water, sewerage, waste, public
transport, ports, telecommunications

France36,565

Tourism, planning, housing, public transport, economic development,
1,198 water, sewerage, waste, environment, leisure, culture,telecommunications, parking spaces

Germany

13,8543,500

Greece900

1,116 Water, sewerage, culture, tourism, training, careers

Italy

8,101

Regions: economic development, planning, public equipment, public
963 transport, Provinces: commercial events, tourism municipalities: energy,
water, waste, pharmacies, cemeteries

Japan

1,727

Residential water, industrial water, transport, electricity, gas, hospitals,
9,379 and other businesses that are run by each local government according
to its own rules

Latvia547

Health, heating, waste, real estate operations, sport, public transport,
669 pharmacies, water, social care, radio & TV, auditing, training, tourism,
electricity

New Zealand

85

257 -

Poland

2,489

2,415

Water, construction, waste, real estate operations, electricity, gas,
heating, public transport, trade, leisure, culture, sport

Portugal

4,037

76

Energy, public transport, tourism, environment, planning, commercial
and industrial infrastructures, health, education, food industry

Slovakia

2,920

239

Waste, water, sewerage, heating, public spaces, health, public transport,
public lighting, sport, housing, cemeteries, local television, tourism

Slovenia

193

60

Water, waste, road, cemeteries, public transport, public spaces,
electricity, heating

South Korea

232

306 -

Spain

8,106

770

Municipalities and provinces: public transport, water, real estate,planning, economic development, cemeteries

Sweden290

1,750

Energy, water, waste, public transport, housing, tourism, economic
development

United Kingdom

326

185 Economic development, tourism,public equipment, health, social care

Country

Sectors of activities**

Energy, economic development, water, waste, public transport, public
equipment, housing, banks, telecommunications

Created with reference to Saussier and Klien (2013)* LPEs include not only corporatized LPEs but also directly managed LPEs.
** Sources: Dexia Crediop (2004)（ 69 ）

38

Table 2. Characteristics of directly managed LPEs and corporatized LPEs
Directly managed LPEs

Corporatized LPEs

Decision rights

Local government

LPE management

Legal status

Local government

Corporation

Governed under

Public municipal law

Public municipal law and municipal ordinances

Organisation form

Multi-purpose

Single-purpose

Governed by

Local bureaucracy

Appointed executive board

Funded through

Taxes

User fees

Cooperative flexibility

MediumHigh

Created with reference to Saussier and Klien (2013) and Voorn et al. (2017)

Table 3. Organizational type and expected influence on cost behavior
LPEs

Institutional Pressures

GovernancesystemImportantconstituencies

Rural community members /residents / service user

Shareholders

Board composition

Officer or publicly elected figure

Business people

Board size

Small

Large

Public interests and efficiency

Profit maximization

Maximum pressure

Minimal pressure

Access to capitalFees, donations, bonds
and limited tax support

Net sales, debt and equity
financing

Emphasis on economic
returns

Soft budget constraints

Rewards for efficiency

Legal compliance
Political pressure

Financialperformance

CEs

Lack of cost only for indigent
residents
Created with reference to Eldenburg et al. (2004), Balakrishnan et al. (2010)* No compensation service for needy persons
Charity service*（ 70 ）

Preference for profits over charity
for indigent people

39

Table 4. Descriptive statistics
Panel A: LPEs
(Scale: 1,000 Yen)

Total

Mean

Standard
deviation

Cost *

1,946,197

7,320,193

Revenue **2,083,008

9,354,756

750.04101

0.09656-0.48719

Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

Residential
water
supplyIndustrial
water
supplyGas power

Hospitals

WholesalemarketCar parking

148,701

441,239

1,512,568

295,467,927

170,870

477,245

1,547,037

355,330,535-0.00904

0.02957

0.08073

0.579120.10744-0.56932-0.00933

0.021140.07433

0.66314

6,774,393

2,160

107,613

221,621603,446

295,467,927

Revenue **1,300,173

8,365,265

294

130,266

272,108735,249

355,330,535

Ln costt / costt-1

0.04577

0.10358-0.48290-0.01010

0.031160.089020.57874

Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

0.04900

0.11070-0.56601-0.00895

0.020350.07403

0.66286

Cost *

476,548889,671

1,677

62,770214,673

463,819

8,042,787

Revenue **611,846

1,125,119

708

67,160265,268

615,598

11,326,896

Ln costt / costt-1

0.019800.11230-0.48719-0.03042

0.011170.063900.56784

0.023610.10851-0.56583-0.00629

0.001770.03059

0.64851

Cost*

5,322,071

18,203,066

1,086

201,342

682,4542,744,434

225,035,329

Revenue**

7,300,351

28,571,454

75

101,462555,047

3,217,774

344,008,013

0.03273

0.08959-0.47635-0.00871

0.01830

0.05856

0.57912

Ln costt / costt-1

0.04654

0.10907-0.55551-0.00635

0.02001

0.07392

0.66314

Cost *

8,925,017

19,250,696

382

348,485

1,779,477

6,132,778

149,541,551

Revenue **8,705,197

21,195,366

1,741

306,571

1,570,819

5,174,318

163,824,708

0.01174

0.08491-0.48158-0.02899

0.011530.049290.57121

Ln costt / costt-1

0.01463

0.09550-0.53314-0.02770

0.00457

0.04682

0.65543

Cost *

1,685,005

1,401,034

7,198

715,088

1,359,032

2,324,393

7,926,889

Revenue **2,265,455

1,792,677

13,700948,625

1,911,831

3,179,656

9,605,919

Ln costt / costt-1

0.03174

0.07822-0.40621-0.01232

0.025700.069650.45241

Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

0.023990.07932-0.37420-0.01410

0.00869

0.046830.62548

Cost *

1,263,644

3,293,313

27,840

198,447

447,234

954,152

40,287,262

Revenue **1,377,663

3,505,486

27,253215,862

487,177

1,064,206

40,270,247

Ln costt / costt-1

0.04504

0.09517-0.36607-0.01443

0.02992

0.09005

0.56286

Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

0.04829

0.09993-0.28446-0.01263

0.024640.08038

0.58733

Cost *

3,090,634

3,621,221

28,828726,049

1,687,856

4,030,324

31,602,391

Revenue **2,790,521

3,360,561

700

621,644

1,463,985

3,637,399

32,298,365

Ln costt / costt-1

0.04084

0.07661-0.47925-0.00031

0.03384

0.07567

0.57704

Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

0.040110.10112-0.56932-0.00902

0.03386

0.08350

0.65367

Cost *

1,900,347

3,679,698

42,733

235,815496,231

1,091,269

16,949,597

Revenue **1,718,437

3,206,354

58,783

188,243

477,556

1,372,835

14,497,486

Ln costt / costt-1

0.01971

0.07123-0.41089-0.01870

0.014120.050880.43474

Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

0.01658
497,635

0.06003481,220-0.42070
22,252-0.01496
195,7020.00482
290,3470.03430
642,2190.51378
2,372,781

Cost *
Toll road382

0.04341

Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Electricpower

Maximum

1,065,668

Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

Transportation

MedianUpper
quartile

Cost *

Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

Sewerage

Minimum

Lower
quartile

Revenue **692,079

884,575

22,778

186,634

342,516

826,0084,569,640

Ln costt / costt-1

0.028850.13502-0.39079-0.03376

0.022080.08266

0.53742

Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

0.02526

0.15362-0.56601-0.03861

0.020850.078890.62754

Cost *

82,441

68,813

2,222

38,621

74,155

108,933

372,239

Revenue **127,903112,924

4,366

51,00898,883

174,920563,130

Ln costt / costt-1

0.00743

0.13908-0.44680-0.05085

0.00225

0.05782

0.57128

Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

0.00069

0.12528-0.53474-0.04949

0.00000

0.05577

0.66278* Operating expenses, ** Operating revenues（ 71 ）

SampleSize
115,929

64,675

7,296

4,525

2,677

1,261

2,274

32,066

516

270

369

40

Panel B: CEs(Scale: 1,000,000 Yen)

Cost *
Revenue **Total
Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Agriculture and Revenue **fishery
Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Revenue **MiningLn costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Revenue **Petroleum
Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Revenue **Construction
Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Revenue **Foods
Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Tectiles, pulp and Revenue **paper
Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Revenue **Chemicals
Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Resources and Revenue **materials
Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Machinery and Revenue **electric machinery Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Automobiles andRevenue **transportation
Ln costt / costt-1
equipment
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Revenue **Financial
Ln costt / costt-1
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1
Cost *
Broadcasting,
Revenue **software,Ln costt / costt-1
commercial etc.
Ln revenuet / revenuet-1

MeanStandard
Minimum
deviation

Lower
quartile

MedianUpper
quartile

Maximum

125,774
131,5210.03958
0.03871
94,881
96,7470.03889
0.0393160,597
62,7700.036110.03559
57,586
76,7920.046120.03331132,019
136,9410.026900.02572
72,22075,4460.060450.06093
43,36545,521
0.051200.05190
60,83866,0400.043840.04249
100,727
105,601
0.02205
0.02044
97,397
101,3240.035250.03442
136,215
141,568
0.035150.03423
363,828
369,269
0.04457
0.04371
118,766
132,2100.041430.04007648,568
659,166
0.141100.15540
152,120
153,9140.16101
0.18943
22,065
22,7790.17392
0.19552
53,898
94,1130.20656
0.23462
237,300
246,680
0.13266
0.13736
212,318
220,709
0.154420.16605
100,497
105,2420.171110.18957
122,718
131,9440.12206
0.13302294,103
306,000
0.130310.14584
374,006
382,156
0.153590.18155
531,671554,6630.130220.14288
1,715,798
1,720,356
0.15367
0.16007383,299
435,4120.120230.12611

9,127
9,817
-0.02781
0.10157
4,295
4,419-0.03284-0.03497
52,86655,544-0.05549-0.06487
10,215
15,943-0.05296-0.08351
21,094
21,748-0.04520-0.04859
5,542
6,162
-0.01157-0.01254
3,610
3,923
-0.03426-0.03882
7,817
8,578
-0.01651-0.01987
9,626
10,254-0.04353-0.05065
8,861
9,415
-0.04333-0.05260
11,284
12,113-0.02943-0.03243
18,53020,414-0.02835-0.03005
9,540
10,141-0.01427-0.01583

23,643
24,9780.03373
0.03435
17,99820,4800.028160.02480
67,05468,5660.023990.02476
55,35460,5550.022960.03760
47,33349,0450.028960.02892
16,471
17,5530.039190.03795
10,185
10,9080.033100.03393
19,003
20,4780.034510.03496
22,14323,4200.024380.02428
19,44920,626
0.038140.04087
26,03027,1800.033360.03415
59,05361,3120.03425
0.03524
24,001
25,1720.03405
0.03397

68,73772,599-0.03163
0.10635
138,252
140,4810.08908
0.09267
74,24276,6590.10066
0.09957
72,511
84,6340.131360.14985
132,397
135,4200.101850.10341
56,06359,3750.112290.11462
31,93833,3950.118770.1272154,03658,0240.092640.09632
70,41973,8370.08901
0.09562
49,93652,6400.116010.12769
63,67066,1380.096100.09974
147,589
152,949
0.11203
0.11322
63,34367,917
0.09108
0.09146

21,359,227
21,403,613
0.81494
0.85349
602,390
612,8880.73166
0.81866
101,943
104,996
0.58887
0.65909
218,544452,2280.805110.75472
2,015,551
2,168,285
0.68698
0.75482
3,464,264
3,480,490
0.814940.85105
1,045,802
1,100,228
0.792490.84832
1,563,564
1,602,062
0.803150.85053
3,678,713
3,753,397
0.788460.82038
4,862,221
4,994,719
0.80750
0.85349
10,970,663
12,079,264
0.813120.84630
21,359,227
21,403,613
0.812100.83715
6,034,976
6,371,287
0.80006
0.831822
3-0.73556-0.77351
2
3-0.58739-0.70995261
180-0.64688-0.64940
2,769
4,638
-0.35237-0.66545
174
212-0.67110-0.7425627
22-0.72516-0.76474167-0.71247-0.7734941
10-0.70580-0.73760
158
236-0.72685-0.77351
1021-0.73094-0.7730823
6-0.73524-0.7652375
51-0.73556-0.75328101
94-0.71695-0.73672* Operating expenses, ** Operating revenues（ 72 ）

SampleSize
84,343

426

82

65

5,272

6,679

6,287

10,2798,040

14,947

11,402

8,920

11,944

41

Table 5. Cost behavior based on the panel data analysis using model 1
Panel A: LPEs
Predicted
signȕ0PooledFixedeffects

Randomeffects

0.0200 ***67.38

0.0207 ***68.24

0.0200 ***67.20

0.4952 ***183.96

0.5077 ***195.33

ȕ1

䠇

0.5077 ***195.84

ȕ2

䠉

0.0677***0.0791******

0.0677

9.74

10.69

9.71

Adj.R2

0.33890.33550.3389N

115,929

115,929

115,929

DW

2.11382.18192.1138

Statistic

H-TestP-value(Degree of freedom)

393.42(2)0

PooledFixedeffects

Randomeffects

0.0023 ***8.49
0.8704 ***463.940.0026 ***9.23
0.8647 ***413.830.0028 ***7.44
0.8682 ***448.82

Panel B: CEs
Predicted
sign

ȕ0
ȕ1

䠇

ȕ2

䠉

-0.1008***-0.0978******-0.1045-28.85-24.92-28.740.83790.84670.8337

N

84,34384,34384,343DW

1.64871.8114

1.6913

Adj.R

2

H-TestStatistic

P-value(Degree of freedom)

20.48

(2)

0

)RUȕ0 ȕ1 DQGȕXSSHUGDWDLQGLFDWHFRHIILFLHQWHVWLPDWHV
lower data indicate t-statistics, *significant at the 10% level,**significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level,
Adj.R2 =Adjusted R2 , N=Number of Observations,
DW=Durbin-Watson ratio, H-Test=HausmanTest,
ȕLQGLFDWHVWKHYDOXHRIWKHVWLFN\RUDQWLVWLFN\FRVWV（ 73 ）

42

Table 6. The results for individual years based on OLS analysis using model 1
Panel A: LPEs
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

ȕ䠌

ȕ䠍

0.0834***0.0864***0.0860***0.0528***0.0667***

0.0916***0.0476***0.0255***0.0246***0.0297***0.0317***0.0197***0.0143***0.0242***0.0243***0.0384***0.0400***0.0306***0.0280***0.0231***0.0132***0.0130***0.0156***0.0105***0.0091***0.0049***0.0114***-0.0038****ȕ䠎

0.2884***0.2572***

0.3476***

0.3991***

0.4025***0.3922***0.3327***0.3887***0.4699***0.4181***0.4139***0.4338***0.5593***0.5104***0.5686***0.5471***0.5447***0.07650.5313***0.5212***

0.4643***0.5559***0.02300.4663***0.4735***0.4898***0.5487***0.5338***0.4594***0.4173***0.5785***

Adj.R20.2751

F-statistic

Prob(F-statistic)

2,656

504.750N

0.4668***0.6934***0.27302,723

512.0000.4302***0.27012,802

519.3300.2634***0.2763

2,858

546.3000.2336***

0.26482,886

520.6600.3728***0.35132,890

783.2800.2413***0.25482,934

502.4500.1806***

0.25942,962

519.6400.1482***0.29882,991

637.9900.0902*0.2515

3,028

509.4200.2455***0.2602

3,050

537.2100.2608***0.26803,075

563.7800.1810***0.34883,080

825.5900.1485***0.28683,110

626.0300.04300.3046

3,119683.800-0.01700.26253,130557.86

00.2582

3,137

546.720-0.1058**

0.25503,163

542.2800.1578***0.29283,179

658.970-0.1466***

0.19533,180

386.7400.26373,200

573.7800.2584***0.27673,204613.6000.2397***0.2874

3,218

649.5900.2175***0.2764

3,219

615.4900.1725***0.27423,230

610.9000.1411***0.27183,218

601.3400.2003***0.21713,224

447.96

00.1568***0.21933,232

454.840

2003-0.0032-0.0134

0.2736

3,198

602.980

2004-0.0028 *0.6758 ***-0.2361 ***0.30582,821

622.120

2005-0.0025

0.8186 ***-0.3796 ***0.43852,454

958.9402006

0.00170.5754 ***-0.2197 ***0.19882,725

338.9302007

0.0032 **0.4978 ***0.04390.24482,708

439.7902008

0.0033 **0.4470 ***-0.02400.24272,710

435.200

2009-0.0040 ***0.5068 ***-0.1284 ***0.2081

2,698

355.350

2010-0.0040 ***0.4387 ***-0.1333 ***0.14142,723

225.0602011

0.0052 ***0.5021 ***-0.2221 ***0.14722,687

232.870

2012

0.0061 ***0.3067 ***0.03090.10482,740

161.2502013

0.0085 ***0.3630 ***-0.05930.07992,767

121.070*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level, Adj.R2 =Adjusted R2 , N=Number of Observations（ 74 ）

43

Panel B: CEs
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

ȕ䠍

ȕ䠌
0.0298***0.0168***0.0123***0.0119***-0.0017

F-statistic

Prob(F-statistic)

1,053

6,966.39

00.9092

1,065

5,330.40

00.92361,090

6,579.05

0

Adj.R2ȕ䠎

0.8926***-0.1076***0.8543***-0.0567**0.8500***-0.0206

0.9113***0.00970.9397***0.9050***0.8879***0.9295***0.9298N

0.9332

1,149

8,025.62

0-0.1150***

0.9321

1,367

9,374.25

00.1452***0.9241

1,385

8,428.48

00.1137***0.9383

1,406

10,678.92

0-0.0363*0.94001,436

11,249.80

00.0069***0.0137***

1982

0.0096***1983

0.0059 ***0.9583 ***-0.1630 ***0.9342

1,479

10,497.84

01984

0.0033 ***0.9371 ***-0.0730 ***0.95091,525

14,756.17

01985

0.0024**

0.9439***-0.0812***0.9506

1,575

15,138.00

00.0065***0.9357***-0.0535***

0.9432

1,621

13,444.14

00.9704***-0.0997***

0.9364

1,673

12,319.27

00.9274***-0.0356*

0.9156

1,720

9,322.80

00.8948***0.0722***0.9404

1,759

13,874.49

00.9445***-0.1287***

0.9125

1,837

9,573.52

00.9377***-0.0722***0.9292

1,916

12,558.01

00.9458***-0.0883***

0.9367

1,981

14,654.93

00.9829***-0.2312***0.9381

2,053

15,552.19

0***-0.1195***

0.93042,107

14,068.74

0

1980
1981

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

0.0014-0.0027**

0.0035***0.0040***0.0073***0.0062***0.00071994-0.00140.95391995-0.0025 ***0.9156 ***-0.0387 ***0.92942,150

14,142.35

00.9173***-0.0425**0.92562,214

13,765.3400.9506***-0.1833***

0.90182,320

10,654.80

00.9527***-0.1180***0.9396

2,398

18,638.26

00.9371***-0.1462***0.92152,487

14,597.35

00.9057***-0.0351**0.89972,554

11,446.83

00.9058***-0.3004***

0.8385

2,637

6,845.2500.8670***-0.1067***

0.86902,730

9,054.0300.8663***-0.0434**

0.8287

2,869

6,938.02

00.8287***0.0063

***

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

0.0009-0.0018*

0.0023***-0.0095***-0.0055***-0.0052***

0.0021-0.0057-0.0005

0.81952,929

6,647.120***0.81042,963

6,331.68

02005

0.00230.8583

2006

0.0044 ***0.8663 ***-0.1177 ***0.81282,974

6,456.73

02007

0.0056 ***0.8797 ***-0.2054 ***0.7544

3,007

4,617.78

02008

0.0120***0.7870***-0.0728***

0.69373,054

3,457.98

00.0061***0.8248***-0.1069***0.74443,098

4,511.85

0-0.0211***0.7556***-0.02370.7156

3,112

3,914.5800.7059***-0.01110.6902

3,183

3,545.08

00.6528***0.00770.64263,206

2,881.67

00.7256***-0.0174

0.69403,698.40

0

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

-0.0009
0.00640.0012***-0.1164

3,261
2

2

*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level, Adj.R =Adjusted R , N=Number of Observations（ 75 ）

（ 76 ）

0.0168 ***6.79
0.5476 ***18.55-0.1326-1.60
0.26951,261
2.4553(2)0.0165 ***6.76
0.5541 ***19.24-0.1473 *-1.83
0.28291,261
2.4386
1.64

Fixed

0.01381.37
0.4316 ***5.90-0.1073-0.79
0.1781270
1.7883(2)

Pooled

0.01311.33
0.4400 ***6.18-0.1208-0.92
0.1951270
1.77900.42

Toll䚷road

Fixed

PooledElectric power

0.0261 ***59.80
0.4719 ***131.640.2908 ***24.29
0.311564,6752.2369(2)

0.0254 ***59.17
0.4820 ***137.780.2748 ***23.82
0.318964,6752.2075245.020.01311.31
0.4400 ***6.12-0.1208-0.91
0.1951270
1.77900.81

Random0.0165 ***6.70
0.5541 ***19.06-0.1473 *-1.81
0.28291,261
2.4386
0.44

Random

0.0254 ***58.85
0.4820 ***137.030.2748 ***23.69
0.318964,6752.20750.00

RandomFixed-0.0215 **-2.44
0.7247 ***8.28-0.7056 ***-4.94
0.1646369
2.2731(2)-0.0197 **-2.27
0.7101 ***8.28-0.6605 ***-4.75
0.1690369
2.22952.10

Car parking

0.0174 ***9.61
0.6705 ***43.62
0.3996 ***6.56
0.58922,274
2.3448(2)

Fixed

Gas power

Pooled

0.0170 ***9.50
0.6776 ***45.03
0.3908 ***6.56
0.59582,274
2.3302
8.68

Pooled

0.0135 ***9.21
0.3101 ***21.44
0.05001.56
0.09277,296
2.1746(2)

FixedRandom-0.0197 **-2.26
0.7101 ***8.25-0.6605 ***-4.74
0.1690369
2.22950.35

Random

0.0170 ***9.42
0.6776 ***44.67
0.3908 ***6.50
0.59582,274
2.3302
0.01

Random

0.0135 ***9.36
0.3111 ***22.23
0.0565 *1.83
0.10047,296
2.12570.41

Industrial water supply
0.0135 ***9.40
0.3111 ***22.33
0.0565 *1.83
0.10047,296
2.12571.80

Pooled

0.0127 ***33.69
0.6315 ***170.84-0.1581 ***-20.34
0.596032,0661.9019109.05Pooled

0.0098 ***6.71
0.4224 ***33.71-0.2731 ***-7.63
0.21804,525
1.8467
16.18

Pooled

0.0128 ***33.33
0.6279 ***166.43-0.1640 ***-20.380.595432,066
1.9436(2)

Fixed

Hospitals

0.0107 ***7.24
0.4059 ***31.17-0.2656 ***-7.27
0.2304
4,525
1.9222(2)

Fixed

SewageAdj.R2=Adjusted R21 1XPEHURI2EVHUYDWLRQV': 'XUELQ:DWVRQUDWLR+7HVW+DXVPDQ7HVWȕLQGLFDWHVWKHYDOXHRIWKHVWLFN\RUDQWLVWLFN\FRVWVUpper data indicate coefficient estimates; lower data indicate t-statistics, *: significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level,

Adj.R2N
DW
H-testȕ2

ȕ1

ȕ0

Adj.R2N
DW
H-testȕ2

ȕ1

ȕ0

Adj.R2N
DW
H-test

ȕ2

ȕ1

ȕ0

Fixed

Residential water supply

Pooled

0.0127 ***33.66
0.6315 ***170.71-0.1581 ***-20.330.596032,0661.90190.00

Random0.0100 ***6.05
0.4179 ***33.18-0.2713 ***-7.58
0.21204,525
1.86790.00

Random

0.0134 ***3.87
0.5407 ***9.49
0.2506 *1.85
0.2622516
2.0174
1.74

Pooled

0.0065 ***3.54
0.4322 ***20.75
0.04281.07
0.25632,677
2.0214
8.62

Pooled

0.0135 ***3.88
0.5297 ***9.14
0.2464 *1.80
0.2556516
2.0448(2)

FixedWholesale market

0.0073 ***3.94
0.4159 ***19.27
0.0693 *1.66
0.25452,677
2.0660(2)

FixedTransportation
Random

0.0134 ***3.85
0.5407 ***9.45
0.2506 *1.85
0.2622516
2.0174
0.42

Random

0.0065 ***3.54
0.4322 ***20.72
0.04281.07
0.25632,677
2.02140.01

44

Table 7. Cost behavior of each industry based on the panel data analysis using model 1

Panel A: LPEs

2

（ 77 ）

0.0041 ***3.23
0.8520 ***102.46-0.1697 ***-9.37
0.78516,679
1.7382(2)0.0030 **2.54
0.8671 ***123.78-0.1764 ***-11.410.7747
6,679
1.577814.22

0.0040 ***2.64
0.8624 ***117.60-0.1771 ***-10.980.7627
6,679
1.61970.00

Random

0.00841.37
0.7539 ***27.05-0.0202-0.37
0.7751426
2.0054
0.58

Fixed

0.0034 ***5.41
0.8267 ***200.41-0.0676 ***-9.31
0.8961
14,9471.8500(2)

Pooled

0.0036 ***5.94
0.8280 ***219.89-0.0638 ***-9.76
0.892014,9471.72046.44

0.0032 ***4.27
0.8283 ***215.04-0.0688 ***-10.180.8913
14,9471.7463
0.04

RandomMachinery and electric machinery

Fixed

PooledFoods

0.00591.11
0.7735 ***22.42-0.0613-0.90
0.7885426
2.1566(2)

0.00801.69
0.7606 ***28.42-0.0244-0.47
0.7818426
1.9859
1.10

Random

0.00580.47
0.8132 ***11.42-0.0289-0.21
0.806882
1.6473(2)

FixedMining0.0080 ***3.93
0.8091 ***97.56-0.1092 ***-6.56
0.7376
6,287
1.54950.00

Random

0.0025 ***4.27
0.8849 ***197.99-0.0695 ***-8.53
0.882911,402
1.6846
3.12

Pooled

0.0021 ***3.44
0.8861 ***
182.17-0.0797 ***-8.82
0.8885
11,402
1.8344(2)

Fixed

0.0025 ***3.22
0.8835 ***193.04-0.0739 ***-8.78
0.8806
11,402
1.7211
0.21

RandomAutomobiles and transportation equipment

0.0075 ***4.84
0.7865 ***83.75-0.0721 ***-3.92
0.77966,287
1.7361(2)

FixedRandom

0.00590.52
0.8134 ***12.64-0.0254-0.21
0.811282
1.63980.91

Tectiles, pulp and paper
0.0032 **2.20
0.8277 ***104.93-0.1247 ***-7.75
0.75786,287
1.480026.63

Pooled

0.00590.52
0.8134 ***12.79-0.0254-0.21
0.811282
1.63980.19

Pooled-0.0009-0.97
0.9211 ***143.12-0.1518 ***-12.420.81128,920
1.7796
1.54

Pooled0.0017 **2.12
0.8627 ***135.15-0.2071 ***-16.130.7481
10,2791.505535.10

Pooled-0.0109-0.46
0.8512 ***7.28-0.4249 **-2.07
0.576765
2.1331
9.74

Pooled-0.0008-0.76
0.9179 ***127.14-0.1515 ***-10.890.81438,920
1.8728(2)

FixedFinancial

0.0030 ***3.54
0.8503 ***121.25-0.1780 ***-12.440.7667
10,2791.6892(2)

FixedChemicals

0.00490.21
0.7625 ***6.51-0.2344-1.11
0.623765
2.3279(2)

FixedPetroleum

Adj.R2=Adjusted R21 1XPEHURI2EVHUYDWLRQV': 'XUELQ:DWVRQUDWLR+7HVW+DXVPDQ7HVWȕLQGLFDWHVWKHYDOXHRIWKHVWLFN\RUDQWLVWLFN\FRVWVUpper data indicate coefficient estimates; lower data indicate t-statistics, *: significant at the 10% level, **: significant at the 5% level, ***: significant at the 1% level,

Adj.R2N
DW
H-testȕ2

ȕ1

ȕ0

Adj.R2N
DW
H-test

ȕ2

ȕ1

ȕ0

Adj.R
N
DW
H-test

ȕ2

ȕ1

ȕ0

Fixed

Agriculture and fishery

Pooled-0.0008-0.75
0.9207 ***140.29-0.1547 ***-12.370.80808,920
1.7943
0.46

Random

0.0030 ***2.48
0.8573 ***130.29-0.2038 ***-15.370.7406
10,2791.56480.00

Random-0.0109-0.49
0.8512 ***7.72-0.4249 **-2.20
0.576765
2.1331
0.01

RandomFixed

Random

0.0021 *1.81
0.8574 ***138.79-0.0610 ***-5.71
0.86388,040
1.71860.00

0.0010 **1.98
0.9363 ***218.09-0.1186 ***-14.270.8793
11,944
1.9776
53.60

Pooled0.0010 *1.75
0.9331 ***198.05-0.1265 ***-13.640.8792
11,9442.0349(2)

Fixed0.0010 **1.98
0.9363 ***218.04-0.1186 ***-14.270.8793
11,944
1.9776
0.00

RandomBroadcasting, software, commercial etc.

0.0021 ***2.65
0.8592 ***136.03-0.0574 ***-5.22
0.87288,040
1.8629(2)

Random0.0011 *1.85
0.9576 ***205.95-0.0308 ***-3.67
0.95565,272
2.0396
0.64
Resources and materials

0.0023 ***2.99
0.8546 ***138.10-0.0535 ***-5.08
0.86208,040
1.6629108.33PooledFixed

0.0012 **2.02
0.9563 ***196.60-0.0283 ***-3.18
0.95595,272
2.1086(2)0.0011 *1.87
0.9576 ***-3.68-0.0306 ***-3.68
0.95575,272
2.03520.90

Construction
Pooled45

Panel B: CEs

46

Table 8. Population changes and cost behavior based on the panel data analysis using model 2
Panel A: LPEs
The effect of total population change

Pooled
0.0041 ***11.38
0.5321 ***96.27-0.0347 ***-3.57-0.4190 ***
-3.10

ȕ0
ȕ1
ȕ2
ȕ3

The effect of youth (0-14 years) population change

Fixedeffects

Randomeffects

0.0041 ***10.66
0.5227 ***84.53

0.0041 ***11.30
0.5321 ***95.56-0.0401 ***-3.60-0.3080 **-2.17-0.0347 ***-3.54-0.4190 ***
-3.08

ȕ0
ȕ1
ȕ2

PooledFixedeffects

Randomeffects

0.0041 ***11.38
0.5321 ***96.33

0.0041 ***10.80
0.5212 ***84.34

0.0041 ***11.30
0.5321 ***95.66

0.6357 ***7.44

0.9987 ***9.89

0.6357 ***
7.39

ȕ3

ȕ4

ȕ4

ȕ5

ȕ5

ȕ6

ȕ6

0.33727.91***

0.521610.36***

0.3372
7.85

Adj.R20.24580.2346

0.2458Adj.R20.24650.23610.2465

N

55,97655,97655,976

N

55,97655,97655,976DW

2.17752.32502.1775DW

2.17452.32272.1745

H-TestStatistic
56.96(Degree of freedom)

P-value
0(3)

The effect of middle-aged (15-64 years) population change

ȕ1ȕ2

Randomeffects

0.0041 ***11.33
0.5322 ***96.29

0.0041 ***10.60

0.0041 ***
11.25

ȕ0

0.5227 ***84.53

0.5322 ***95.58-0.0329-0.76-0.0861 *-1.67-0.0329-0.76

Randomeffects

0.0042 ***11.41

0.0041 ***10.72

0.0041 ***
11.33

ȕ1

0.5320 ***96.25

0.5224 ***84.47

0.5322 ***
95.54

ȕ2

-0.1367 ***-3.48-0.1721 ***-3.70-0.1367 ***
-3.45

ȕ4

ȕ4
-0.0954-0.90

0.0053
0.06

ȕ5

ȕ6
Adj.R

-0.0695
-2.66

ȕ6
2

N
DW
H-Test0.24570.23450.2457

Adj.R

55,97655,97655,976N

2.1768DW

2.1768
Statistic
57.83

2.3245(Degree of freedom)

(3)

0

(3)

Fixed
effects

ȕ30.00530.06

P-value(Degree of freedom)

102.74Pooledȕ3

ȕ5

Statistic

7KHHIIHFWRIHOGHUO\ \HDUV SRSXODWLRQFKDQJH

Fixedeffects

Pooledȕ0

H-Test***P-value
02

H-Test***-0.0901

***

***

-2.91

-0.0695-2.64

0.24580.2346

0.245855,97655,97655,9762.1768
Statistic

2.3246(Degree of freedom)

56.72

(3)

2.1768P-value
0)URPȕ0 to ȕ6 , upper data indicate coefficient estimates; lower data indicate t-statistics, *significant at the 10% level,**significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level, Adj.R2 =Adjusted R2 , N=Number of Observations,': 'XUELQ:DWVRQUDWLR+7HVW +DXVPDQ7HVWȕ3 PHDQV3RSBWRWDOȕ4 PHDQV3RSB\RXWKȕ5 PHDQV3RSBPLGGOHDQGȕ6 means Pop_elder（ 78 ）

47

Panel B: CEs
The effect of total population change

Pooled0.00040.94
0.8338 ***312.880.4892 ***11.81
1.3489
14.01

ȕ0
ȕ1
ȕ2
ȕ3

The effect of youth (0-14 years) population change

Fixedeffects

Randomeffects

0.0021 ***5.01

0.0010 **2.08

ȕ00.8049 ***253.810.8265 ***297.84

ȕ1-0.0567 ***-10.102.4228 ***2.71-0.0839 ***-10.101.3283
2.71

Fixed
effects

Randomeffects

0.00041.07

0.0023 ***5.58

0.0013 ***2.81

0.8336 ***312.80-0.5776 ***-16.990.8047 ***254.01-0.3699 ***-10.660.8256 ***298.87-0.5211 ***-15.51Pooled

ȕ2
ȕ3

ȕ4

ȕ4

ȕ5

ȕ5

ȕ6

ȕ6

-0.3122-14.56***-0.2005-9.21***-0.2791-13.18Adj.R20.79640.80750.7872

Adj.R20.79640.80780.7884

N

53,14653,14653,146

N

53,14653,14653,146DW

1.64781.85691.7017DW

1.64781.8523

1.6941

H-TestStatistic

P-value(Degree of freedom)248.89

H-Test0(3)

The effect of middle-aged (15-64 years) population change

Pooled0.00040.94
0.8338 ***312.880.4892 ***
11.81

ȕ0
ȕ1
ȕ2

Fixed
effects

Randomeffects

0.0023 ***5.49
0.8048 ***254.030.0013 ***2.71
0.8258 ***298.970.3057 ***7.28

0.4299 ***
10.51

ȕ0
ȕ1
ȕ2
ȕ3

ȕ4

ȕ4
1.348914.01***

0.8441
8.65

***

***

1.199612.63

ȕ6

1.1022 ***9.02

0.4299 ***10.51

0.898614.79***

0.5842******53,14653,146DW

1.64781.8525

1.694153,146DW

1.64781.8525

1.69410

1.6929 ***14.06

53,14653,146

P-value0.0013 ***2.71
0.8258 ***298.97

N

53,146(3)0.0023 ***5.59
0.8047 ***254.02

0.7883

N

401.700.00041.11
0.8336 ***312.78

8.65

Adj.R

Statistic

Randomeffects

0.80770.7883

H-TestFixedeffects

0.79640.8077(Degree of freedom)

Pooled1.199612.63

0.7964

Adj.R

0

(3)

ȕ5
ȕ6

2

P-value(Degree of freedom)

397.68

7KHHIIHFWRIHOGHUO\ \HDUV SRSXODWLRQFKDQJH

ȕ3

ȕ5

Statistic***2

H-TestStatistic(Degree of freedom)

393.74(3)

P-value
0)URPȕ0 to ȕ6 , upper data indicate coefficient estimates; lower data indicate t-statistics, *significant at the 10% level,**significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level, Adj.R2 =Adjusted R2 , N=Number of Observations,': 'XUELQ:DWVRQUDWLR+7HVW +DXVPDQ7HVWȕ3 PHDQV3RSBWRWDOȕ4 PHDQV3RSB\RXWKȕ5 PHDQV3RSBPLGGOHDQGȕ6 means Pop_elder（ 79 ）

48

Table 9. Cost behavior over 4 years based on the panel data analysis using model 3
Panel A: LPEs

Panel B: CEs

PooledFixedeffects

Randomeffects

PooledFixedeffects

Randomeffects

ȕ00.0113 ***0.0122 ***0.0113 ***0.0010 ***0.0015 ***0.0011 ***

31.30

30.76

31.10

4.03

4.45

3.78

ȕ1

0.4764 ***0.4693 ***0.4764 ***0.8748 ***0.8760 ***0.8744 ***ȕ2

0.0972141.08135.29***0.1157140.16***442.75***0.0972-0.0719428.33***-0.0685444.22******-0.0714(t/t-1)

12.26

13.89

12.18

-21.40-19.31-21.22

ȕ3

0.0586 ***0.0550 ***0.0586 ***0.0352 ***0.0346 ***0.0349 ***

18.74

17.18

18.62

18.09

17.41

18.07

ȕ4

0.0137*0.0226****0.0137(t-1/t-2)

1.74

2.76

1.73

ȕ5

0.0710 ***0.0690 ***0.0710 ***ȕ6-0.0226(t-2/t-3)

-2.94

24.95

ȕ7

0.046023.75***-0.0179

24.78
**

-2.23
***

18.13

0.0456

-2.92
***

17.58
**

0.0460

***

18.01
**

**

0.0505******0.0474

13.72

14.23

13.90

0.0229 ***0.0213 ***0.0226 ***

12.25
***

-0.0226

0.0470***0.021611.15***

0.0244

12.18
***

***

0.02176.44
0.0224 ***7.02
0.0217 ***6.50
0.0221 ***

13.52

12.45

13.40

**

**

**

ȕ8

-0.0156(t-3/t-4)-2.15
0.3194-2.09
0.3104-2.13
0.3194-2.40
0.8926-2.12
0.8956-2.44
0.8904N
DW

100,923

100,923

100,923

72,814

72,814

72,814

H-TestStatistic
138.30Adj.R2

2.1958-0.0158

2.2610(Degree of freedom)(8)-0.0156-0.0075

2.19581.9671

P-value

Statistic
285.450-0.0070

2.1173(Degree of freedom)(8))URPȕ0 to ȕ8 , upper data indicate coefficient estimates; lower data indicate t-statistics,*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level
Adj.R2 =Adjusted R2 , N=Number of Observations, DW=Durbin-Watson ratio, H-Test=HausmanTest,ȕYDOXHLVWKHUDWHRIFKDQJHIURPWWRWȕȕDQGȕYDOXHVUHSUHVHQWHGWKHDQQXDOFKDQJHLQDV\PPHWULF

cost behavior for t-1/t-2, t-2/t-3, and t-3/t-4, respectively.

（ 80 ）-0.0076

1.9863P-value0こちらの論文（pp.81-446）は、租税資料館ホームページには掲載しておりません。
下記の論文掲載誌をご参照下さい。

Ⅽ᭰ᕪᦆ┈࡟ᑐࡍࡿㄢ⛯̿㈌ᖯ౯್ࡢኚື࡜⛒⛯ἲ̿⸨ᒸ ♸἞

ฟ඾㸸ࠗᅜᐙᏛ఍㞧ㄅ࠘ࠉᮾி኱Ꮫ኱Ꮫ㝔ἲᏛᨻ἞Ꮫ◊✲⛉➨ᕳ࣭ྕ㸦ᖺ᭶㸧➨ᕳ࣭ྕ㸦ᖺ᭶㸧➨ᕳ࣭ྕ㸦ᖺ᭶㸧ࠉ➨ᕳ࣭ྕ㸦ᖺ᭶㸧➨ᕳ࣭ྕ㸦ᖺ᭶㸧➨ᕳ࣭ྕ㸦ᖺ᭶㸧（ 81 ）

（ 82 ）

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ᮏಟኈㄽᩥࢆ࣮࣋ࢫ࡜ࡋࡓᰝㄞㄽᩥࡀࠊୗグ࡟ᥖ㍕ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡲࡍࠋ

❧࿨㤋኱Ꮫ♫఍ࢩࢫࢸ࣒◊✲ᡤࠉⓎ⾜ࠉࠗ♫఍ࢩࢫࢸ࣒◊✲࠘㸰㸮㸯㸷ᖺ㸱᭶ࠉ➨㸱㸶ྕࠉ㸯㸴㸵㡫（ 447 ）（ 448 ）2018 ᖺᗘ ಟኈㄽᩥ せ᪨⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒㏆ᖺࠊࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡿከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࡢᅜቃࢆ㉺࠼ࡓࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆྲྀᘬࡀ┒ࢇ࡟⾜ࢃࢀࠊࡑࡇ࡛ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢホ౯࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣ஺㘒ࡍࡿࠋ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢホ౯࡟㱈㱒ࡀ⏕ࡌࡓሙྜࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡣ୧⪅ࡢホ౯ᇶ‽ࢆ‶ࡓࡍྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ❧ドࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞≧ἣୗ࡛ࡢ㐺ṇ࡞ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢタᐃࡣࠊከᅜ⡠௻ᴗ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚኱ࡁ࡞ᐇົ㈇ᢸ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇ࠺ࡋࡓ⫼ᬒ࠿ࡽ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ᅜ㝿ⓗ࡟㆟ㄽࡉࢀࠊ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳㸦C-529/16ࠊ
EU:C:2017:984㸧࡛ࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࡀࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟ྲྀᢅ࠺ࡢ࠿ࡀதࢃࢀࡓࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡛ࡣࠊ⌧≧ࠊࡇࡢၥ㢟࡟ᑐࡍࡿ༑
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⊂❧ࡋ࡚ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢホ౯ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟ࡘ࠸࡚᫂☜࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠋ⌧≧࡛ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ࡢ㏣ᚩ࡟ࡘ࡞ࡀࡿୖ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢࡳࡀ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛
⪃៖ࡉࢀࠊබᖹᛶ࡟Ḟࡅࡿྲྀᢅ࠸ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜࡟ᮏ✏ࡢၥ㢟ព㆑ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ
➨ 2 ❶࡛ࡣࠊᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞㆟ㄽ࡛ᥦ᱌ࡉࢀࡓ᳨ウ᱌࡜ᮏ✏ࡢၥ㢟ព㆑࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽ
ࢡࢫ஦௳ࢆศᯒࡋࠊᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞ືྥࢆ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡋࡓࠋWCO㸭OECD ඹྠ఍㆟ࢆዎᶵ࡟ᒎ㛤ࡉࢀࡓ୍㐃ࡢᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞㆟ㄽ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ
ࠕ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᑐࡍࡿᙳ㡪ࡢᐜㄆ࡜࠸࠺ 2 ࡘࡢ᳨ウ᱌ࡀᥦ♧ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ๓⪅ࡣࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ┠ⓗࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡜㢮ఝࡋࠊ᳨ウ᪉ἲࢆつᐃࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊࡑࡇ࡛ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝ࢆ≧ἣ࡟ᛂࡌ࡚ᐜㄆࡍࡿࠋᚋ⪅ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ࠺ࡕ⿵ൾㄪᩚࡸ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ
᮲㡯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢㄪᩚ࡜ࡋ࡚㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᐜㄆࡍࡿࠋ὾ᯇ࣍
ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳࡛ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬࡟⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆྵࡴྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ᐜㄆࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ♧၀ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
➨ 3 ❶࡛ࡣࠊ⡿ᅜ࡜㡑ᅜࡢᑐᛂࢆศᯒࡋࡓࠋ⡿ᅜࡢ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡣࠊἲⓗせ௳ࡀ␗࡞ࡿࡓࡵࠊ
APA ࡸ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆ‶ࡓࡋ࡚ࡶࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖࠊᚲࡎࡋࡶ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆ❧ド࡛ࡁ࡞࠸࡜ࡍࡿࡀࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ APA ࡸ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ᭷⏝ᛶࢆㄆࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
᪂ࡓ࡟බ⾲ࡉࢀࡓ HRL54831 ࡣࠊ
୍ᐃࡢせ௳ࢆࡍ࡭࡚‶ࡓࡋࡓሙྜࠊୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡶ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜
ࢆㄆࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋIRC§1059A ࡣࠊ⏦࿌ྍ⬟࡞⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢୖ㝈ࢆᐃࡵ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ᥋㏆ࡀࡳࡽࢀࡿࠋ

（ 449 ）

㡑ᅜ࡛ࡣࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡢᴗົ༠ຊ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ MOU ࢆ⥾⤖ࡋࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࢆつᐃࡍࡿᅜ⛒ἲ࡜㛵⛯ἲࢆ᥋㏆ࡉࡏࡿᨵṇࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஦
ᚋⓗ┦஫ㄪᩚไᗘࡣࠊㄪᩚᑐ㇟ࢆ㝈ᐃࡋࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡟ㄪᩚ⩏ົࢆㄢࡋ࡚࠾ࡽࡎࠊ
༑ศ࡟ᶵ⬟ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋࡑࡢᚋࠊAPA㸭ACVA ྠ᫬⏦ㄳไᗘ࡟ࡼࡾࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢホ౯ࢆ஦๓࡟᥋㏆ࡉࡏࠊ2018 ᖺᨵṇ࡟ࡼࡾࠊ฼┈࣮࣋ࢫࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆ᥇⏝ࡍࡿ௻ᴗࡶไᗘ฼⏝ࡢᑐ㇟࡟ຍ࠼ࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐ
ࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࡣࠊ୍ᐃࡢせ௳ࢆࡍ࡭࡚‶ࡓࡋࡓሙྜࠊୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡶ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿࠋ➨ 4 ❶࡛ࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࢆ᳨ウࡋࡓࠋ⌮ㄽⓗ࡟ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ࠺ࡕᐇ㝿࡟㔠㖹➼ࡢᤵཷࢆక࠺⿵ൾㄪᩚࡸ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉࠸ࡎࢀࡢㄪᩚࡢᙳ㡪ࡶ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦
௳ࡢุỴෆᐜࢆ㚷ࡳࡿ࡜ࠊୗ᪉ࡢㄪᩚࡣࠊ஦๓ᩍ♧ไᗘࢆ⏦ㄳࡋࠊᑗ᮶ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ
ࣜࢫࢡࢆྵࢇࡔྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊཎ๎ἲ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࠊAPA ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ẖᮇ⏦࿌ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ࡟㝈ᐃࡋ࡚ᑐᛂࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ࠋ
௨ୖࡢࡇ࡜࠿ࡽࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉࡜ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊᡃࡀ
ᅜࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖࠊAPA ࡟క࠺⿵ൾㄪᩚࡸ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࢆ⪃៖ࡋࡓ஦๓ᩍ♧ࡶ࠶ࡾࠊᙜヱ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ᥎ዡࡍࡿࠋࡉࡽ࡟ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡣࠊᙜヱ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼ࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿ᪨ࢆ㏻㐩ୖ࡛᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡋ࡚࠾ࡃᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊᇳ⾜ᡭ⥆ࡢᏳᐃᛶࡢほⅬ࠿ࡽࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁ㛫ࡢ༠ຊ㛵ಀࢆ⠏ࡃࡓࡵࡢ MOU ࢆ⥾⤖ࡋࠊᅜෆ APA ࡜஦๓ᩍ♧ไᗘࡢྠ᫬⏦ㄳไᗘࡢᑟධࢆ᳨ウࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࢁ࠺ࠋ

（ 450 ）࠙┠ḟࠚᗎ❶ ࡣࡌࡵ࡟ .......................................................................................................................1➨ 1 ❶ ᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ ....................................................................21㸫1 ᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ..............................................................................................21㸫2 ᡃࡀᅜࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ..............................................................................................31㸫3 ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟 ..............................................71㸫4 ᮏ✏ࡢၥ㢟ព㆑࡜┠ⓗ..............................................................................................9➨ 2 ❶ ᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞ືྥ ..........................................................................................................12
2㸫1 ㆟ㄽࡢᒎ㛤 ..............................................................................................................122㸫2 ᳨ウ᱌࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㆟ㄽཬࡧศᯒ.................................................................................132㸫2㸫1 ࠕ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝.................132㸫2㸫2 ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᑐࡍࡿᙳ㡪ࡢᐜㄆ ........................................16
2㸫3 ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳ ...............................................................................................20➨ 3 ❶ ⡿ᅜ࡜㡑ᅜࡢᑐᛂ ...................................................................................................24
3㸫1 ⡿ᅜ .......................................................................................................................24
3㸫1㸫1 㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝ ..............................................24
3㸫1㸫2 ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ ......................................25
3㸫1㸫3 ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢㄪᩚᶵ⬟࡜ࡋ࡚ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠 ..........................................28
3㸫2 㡑ᅜ .......................................................................................................................29
3㸫2㸫1 ၥ㢟ព㆑࡜ᑐᛂ࡟ྥࡅࡓ‽ഛ .......................................................................293㸫2㸫2 ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ஦ᚋ┦஫ㄪᩚไᗘ ......................................31
3㸫2㸫3

APA㸭ACVA ྠ᫬⏦ㄳไᗘ .........................................................................32

3㸫2㸫4 ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ ......................................32➨ 4 ❶ ᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢᅾࡾ᪉ࡢᥦゝ .........................................33
4㸫1 ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟㛵ࡍࡿ஦๓ᩍ♧ࡢホ౯........33
4㸫2 ไᗘෆᐜ࡟ᑐࡍࡿᥦゝ............................................................................................34
4㸫3 ไᗘᇳ⾜࡟ᑐࡍࡿᥦゝ............................................................................................36⤊❶ ࠾ࢃࡾ࡟ .....................................................................................................................37ཧ⪃ᩥ⊩ ................................................................................................................................38(i)（ 451 ）

(2)（ 452 ）

ᗎ❶ ࡣࡌࡵ࡟
 ㏆ᖺࠊࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ໬࡟ࡼࡿከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࡢᅜቃࢆ㉺࠼ࡓྲྀᘬࡀ┒ࢇ࡟⾜ࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋከᅜ
⡠௻ᴗࡢࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆྲྀᘬ࡛ࡣࠊእ㒊ࡢ➨୕⪅࡜ࡢྲྀᘬ࡜ࡣ␗࡞ࡿ౯᱁タᐃࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡓࡵࠊ
㛵㐃఍♫㛫ࡢ౯᱁᧯స࡟ࡼࡿᡤᚓࡢᾏእ⛣㌿ࠊ࠸ࢃࡺࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢၥ㢟ࡀ⏕ࡎࡿࠋࡑࡢࡼ
࠺࡞㛵㐃఍♫㛫ࡢᡤᚓ᣺᭰࡟ᑐᢠࡍࡿᥐ⨨ࡀ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡛࠶ࡾࠊᙜヱ⛯ไࡣ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊᙜ஦⪅ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡟ᘬࡁ┤ࡋ࡚ㄢ⛯ࡍࡿไᗘ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ᅜቃࢆ㊬ࡄ㛵㐃఍♫㛫ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶホ౯ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࡓࡵࠊࡑࡢホ౯࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣ஺㘒ࡍࡿࠋ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢホ౯࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㱈㱒ࡀ⏕ࡌࡓሙྜࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡣ୧⪅ࡢホ౯ᇶ‽ࢆ‶ࡓࡍྲྀᘬ౯
᱁ࢆ❧ドࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞≧ἣୗ࡛ࡢ㐺ṇ࡞ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢタᐃࡣࠊࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ࡟
஦ᴗࢆᒎ㛤ࡍࡿከᅜ⡠௻ᴗ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࠊ኱ࡁ࡞ᐇົ㈇ᢸ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡉࡽ࡟ࠊᅜ㝿࣮ࣝࣝୖࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡀ஫࠸ࡢไᗘ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍࡢ࠿ྰ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚᫂☜࡛࡞࠸ࠋࡇ ࠺ ࡋ ࡓ ⫼ ᬒ ࠿ ࡽ ࠊ WCO 㸦 World Customs Organization ࠊ ୡ ⏺ ⛯ 㛵 ᶵ ᵓ 㸧ࠊ ICC
㸦International Chamber of Commerceࠊᅜ㝿ၟᕤ఍㆟ᡤ㸧ࠊOECD 㸦Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Developmentࠊ⤒῭༠ຊ㛤Ⓨᶵᵓ㸧࡛ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㆟ㄽࢆᒎ㛤ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡉࡽ࡟ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢከᅜ⡠௻
ᴗࡀࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟ྲྀᢅ࠺ࡢ࠿ࢆதⅬ࡟ࡋࡓ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳㸦C-529/16ࠊEU:C:2017:984㸧ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡽࡢࡇ࡜ࢆ㚷ࡳࡿ࡜ࠊᡃ
ࡀᅜࡶࡇࡢၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸᳨࡚ウࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࡀࠊ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝㆟ㄽࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸
࡞࠸ࡢࡀ⌧≧࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡛ᮏ✏ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟࡟ᑐࡍࡿᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞ືྥ࡜⡿ᅜཬࡧ㡑ᅜࡢᑐᛂ≧ἣࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ┠ⓗ࡜ࡍࡿࠋ➨ 1 ❶࡛ࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࠊ୧⪅ࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ᴫほࡋࠊᮏ✏ࡢၥ㢟ព㆑ཬࡧ┠ⓗࢆ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡍࡿࠋ➨ 2 ❶࡛ࡣࠊࡇࢀࡲ࡛ᥦ㉳ࡉࢀ࡚ࡁࡓ᳨ウ᱌ཬࡧ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳ࢆศᯒࡋࠊᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞ືྥࢆ᥈ࡿࠋ➨ 3 ❶࡛ࡣࠊ⡿ᅜ࡜㡑ᅜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᑐᛂ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ศᯒࡍࡿࠋ➨ 4 ❶࡛ࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ࠶ࡾ᪉ࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿࠋ1（ 453 ）

➨ 1 ❶ ᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ1㸫1 ᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ ᅜቃࢆ㉺࠼࡚㛵㐃௻ᴗ㛫࡛ྲྀᘬࢆ⾜࠺ሙྜ࡟ࠊᙜヱ௻ᴗࡣྲྀᘬ౯᱁ 1ࢆ᜛ពⓗ࡟᧯సࡍࡿ
ࡇ࡜࡛ᡤᚓࡢᅜ㝿ⓗ⛣㌿ࡀ⏕ࡌࠊ㛵㐃௻ᴗ඲య࡛⛒⛯㈇ᢸࢆ㍍ῶࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿ 2ࠋᡃࡀᅜ࡛ࡣࠊ㛵㐃఍♫㛫ࡢ᜛ពⓗ࡞ᡤᚓࡢᅜ㝿ⓗ⛣㌿࡟ᑐฎࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊ1986 ᖺ࡟⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡀ๰タࡉࢀࡓ 3ࠋᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡣࠊෆᅜἲே࡜ࠕ≉Ṧࡢ㛵ಀࠖ࡟࠶ࡿእᅜἲே㸦௨ୗࠊࠕᅜእ㛵㐃⪅ࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ
㸧࡜ࡢ㛫࡛㈨⏘ࡢ㈍኎࣭㈨⏘ࡢ㉎ධ࣭ᙺົࡢᥦ౪ࡑࡢ௚ࡢྲྀᘬ㸦௨ୗࠊ
ࠕᅜእ
㛵㐃ྲྀᘬࠖ
㸧ࢆ⾜ࡗࡓሙྜ 4࡟ࠊᙜヱෆᅜἲேࡀᅜእ㛵㐃⪅࠿ࡽᨭᡶࢆཷࡅࡿᑐ౯ࡢ㢠ࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡟‶ࡓ࡞࠸࡜ࡁࠊཪࡣࡑࡢἲேࡀࡑࡢᅜእ㛵㐃⪅࡟ᨭᡶ࠺ᑐ౯ࡢ㢠ࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࢆ㉸࠼ࡿ࡜ࡁࠊࡑࡢྲྀᘬࡣ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡓࡶࡢ࡜ࡳ࡞ࡋ࡚ㄢ⛯ࡍࡿ㸦⛒⛯≉ูᥐ⨨ἲ㸦௨ୗࠊࠕ⛒≉ἲࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ
㸧66 ᮲ࡢ 4ձ㸧 5࡜࠸࠺ࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡜ࡣࠊᅜእ㛵㐃ྲྀᘬࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡿ࡜ࡋࡓሙྜ࡟ᨭᡶ࠺࡭ࡁᑐ
౯ࡢ㢠࡛࠶ࡾ㸦⛒≉ἲ 66 ᮲ࡢ 4ղ㸧ࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆ๓ᥦ࡜ࡍࡿࠋࡑࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ࡣࠊᇶᮏ
୕ἲ࡜ࡑࡢ௚ᨻ௧࡛ᐃࡵࡿ᪉ἲࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦⛒≉ἲ 66 ᮲ࡢ 4ղ୍㸧ࠋᇶᮏ୕ἲ࡟ࡣࠊ
⊂❧౯᱁ẚ‽ἲ㸦௨ୗࠊ
ࠕCUP ἲࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ
㸧
ࠊ෌㈍኎౯᱁ᇶ‽ἲ㸦௨ୗࠊ
ࠕRP ἲࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ
㸧ࠊཎ౯ᇶ‽ἲ㸦௨ୗࠊࠕCP ἲࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ
㸧ࡢ 3 ࡘࡢ᪉ἲࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡢ௚ᨻ௧࡛ᐃࡵࡿ᪉ἲ࡟ࡣࠊ
ẚ㍑฼┈ศ๭ἲࠊᐤ୚ᗘ฼┈ศ๭ἲࠊṧవ฼┈ศ๭ἲࠊྲྀᘬ༢఩Ⴀᴗ฼┈ἲ㸦௨ୗࠊ
ࠕTNMMࠖ
࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧ࡢ 4 ࡘࡢ᪉ἲࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟ࡼࡿ᭦ṇฎศ࡟ࡼࡿㄢ⛯ࡣࠊ⣡⛯⪅࡟࡜ࡗ࡚኱ࡁ࡞㈇ᢸ࡛࠶ࡿࡔࡅ࡛࡞
ࡃࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࡶẖᮇ஦ᴗᖺᗘᮎ࡟࠾࠸࡚ྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟㛵ࡍࡿ᝟ሗࢆせồࡋࠊㄪᰝࡍ
ࡿࡇ࡜ࡣከࡃࡢேဨ࡜᫬㛫ࢆ㈝ࡸࡍࠋࡑࡇ࡛ᡃࡀᅜ࡛ࡣࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡢ஦ົ㈇ᢸ㍍ῶཬࡧ⛯ົᙜᒁࡢไᗘᇳ⾜ࢆ㐺ษ࠿ࡘ෇⁥࡟⾜࠺ࡓࡵࠊAPA㸦Advance Pricing Arrangementࠊ஦๓☜ㄆไᗘ㸧ࢆ 1987 ᖺ࡟ୡ⏺࡛ึࡵ࡚๰タࡋࡓ 67ࠋAPA ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡟⏦࿌ࡋࡓ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ➼࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⛯ົᙜᒁࡀ᳨ドࡋࠊࡑࡢྜ⌮ᛶ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚☜ㄆ1⛣㌿౯᱁࡜ࡣࠊ
ࠕ͐㛵㐃⪅㛫ྲྀᘬ࡟࠾ࡅࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢព࿡࡛ࠖ࠶ࡿࠋ▮ෆ୍ዲࠗ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ⌮ㄽ࠘
㸦୰ኸ⤒῭♫ࠊ1999㸧1 㡫ࠋ࡞࠾ࠊᮏ✏࡛ࡣࠊ౽ᐅୖࠕྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࠖ࡜࠸࠺ᩥゝ࡛⤫୍ࡍࡿࠋࡲࡓࠊ᮲ᩥࡢᘬ⏝௨እ࡛ࠕྲྀᘬ౯㢠ࠖ࡜࠸࠺ゝⴥࢆ⏝࠸ࡿ㝿ࡣࠊࠕvalueࠖࡢ࿴ヂࠊⱝࡋࡃࡣࠊࠕㄢ⛯ୖホ౯ࡉࢀࡓྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࠖ࡜࠸࠺ព࿡࡛౑⏝ࡍࡿࠋ
2 ኴ⏣ὒࠕᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࠖ୰㔛ᐇ࡯࠿⦅ⴭࠗ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢࣇࣟࣥࢸ࢕࢔࠘
㸦᭷ᩫ㛶ࠊ2009㸧3 㡫ࠋ
3 Ⲩᕳ೺஧ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ๰タࠖࠗ᫛࿴ 61 ᖺᨵṇ⛯ไࡢࡍ࡭࡚࠘
㸦ᅜ⛯ᗇࠊ1986㸧192-193
㡫ࠋ
4 ࡇࢀࡽࡢྲྀᘬࢆ
ࠕᅜእ㛵㐃ྲྀᘬࠖ࡜࿧ࡧࠊ➨୕⪅௓ᅾྲྀᘬࡶᅜእ㛵㐃ྲྀᘬ࡜ࡳ࡞ࡉࢀࡿ㸦⛒≉ 66 ᮲ࡢ 4յࠊ⛒≉௧ 39 ᮲ࡢ 12չ㸧ࠋ
5 㔠Ꮚᏹࠗ⛒⛯ἲࠝ➨ 22 ∧ࠞ࠘㸦ᘯᩥᇽࠊ2017㸧554 㡫ࠋ
6 ኴ⏣࣭๓ᥖὀ 2࣭16-17 㡫ࠋ
7 బ⸨ṇ຾ࠗ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ⌮ㄽ࡜㐺⏝̿᪥⡿୧ᅜἲࡢẚ㍑◊✲̿࠘㸦⛯ົ⤒⌮༠఍ࠊ1997㸧
128 㡫ࠋ
2（ 454 ）

ࡋࡓሙྜ࡟ࡣࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀࡑࡢෆᐜ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚⏦࿌ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ㝈ࡾࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡣ㐺⏝ࡉࢀ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿ 8ࠋ⛯ົᙜᒁࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟ࡼࡿ᭦ṇฎศࢆ⾜࠺ሙྜ࡟ࠊ⣡⛯⪅࠿ࡽᥦ౪ࡉࢀࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁࡟㛵ࡍࡿ᝟ሗࢆᚲせ࡜ࡍࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁࡢไᗘᇳ⾜ࢆ㐺ษ࠿ࡘ෇⁥࡟⾜࠺ࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ
⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢᩥ᭩໬ཬࡧྠ᫬ᩥ᭩໬ 9ࢆ⣡⛯⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࡚㛫᥋ⓗ࡟⩏ົ໬ࡋ࡚࠸ࡓ 10ࠋᖹᡂ 28ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇ࡟ࡼࡾࠊᅜእ㛵㐃ྲྀᘬࢆ⾜࠺ἲே࡟ࡼࡿ࣮࣭ࣟ࢝ࣝࣇ࢓࢖ࣝ 11ࡢసᡂࠊཬࡧ
ከᅜ⡠ࢢ࣮ࣝࣉ࡟ࡼࡿ᭱⤊ぶ఍♫➼ᒆฟ஦㡯ࠊCbC ࣏࣮ࣞࢺ 12ࠊ࣐ࢫࢱ࣮࣭ࣇ࢓࢖ࣝ 13ࡢసᡂࡀ⩏ົ໬ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 14㸦⛒≉ἲ 66 ᮲ࡢ 4նࠊ⛒≉ἲつ๎ 22 ᮲ࡢ 10㸧ࠋ1㸫2 ᡃࡀᅜࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ㛵⛯ࡣࠊ㈌≀ࢆ㍺ධࡍࡿ⪅ࢆ⣡⛯⩏ົ⪅࡜ࡋࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࢆㄢ⛯≀௳࡜ࡋ࡚ㄢ⛯ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿ 15ࠋ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯⋡࡜ࡋ࡚ᚑ౯⛯⋡ࡀ⏝࠸ࡽࢀࡿ࡜ࡁࠊᚲࡎࡑࡢ⛯⋡ࢆ㐺⏝ࡍࡿᇶ♏࡜࡞ࡿ౯᱁ࠊࡍ࡞ࢃࡕㄢ⛯ᶆ‽࡜ࡋ࡚ࡢㄢ⛯౯᱁㸦௨ୗࠊࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧ࡀ๓ᥦ࡜࡞ࡿ 16ࠋࡇࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯࡜⛠ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 17ࠋᡃࡀᅜࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊ1994 ᖺࡢ㛵⛯ཬࡧ㈠᫆࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⯡༠ᐃ㸦௨ୗࠊࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃࠖ
࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧ࡢෆᐜࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼࡚ࠊᅜෆἲୖࡢ㛵⛯ᐃ⋡ἲ㸦௨ୗࠊࠕᐃ⋡ἲࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧࡟࠾࠸࡚つᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃᡭ㡰ࡣࠊᅗ⾲ 1 ࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿࠋ

ቑ஭Ⰻၨ㸻ᐑᓮ⿱Ꮚࠗᅜ㝿⛒⛯ἲࠝ➨ 3 ∧ࠞ࠘㸦ᮾி኱Ꮫࠊ2015㸧200 㡫ࠋ୍⯡ⓗ࡟⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢᩥ᭩໬࡜ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢ⟬ᐃࡢ᰿ᣐ࡜࡞
ࡿ᭩㢮➼ࢆసᡂࡋಖᏑࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡾࠊࡇࡢ᭩㢮➼ࢆᅜእ㛵㐃ྲྀᘬࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡓ᫬Ⅼ࡟సᡂࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆྠ᫬ᩥ᭩໬࡜࠸࠺ࠋኴ⏣࣭๓ᥖὀ 2࣭17-18 㡫ࠋ
10 ኴ⏣Ặࡣࠊᖹᡂ 22 ᖺᗘᨵṇࢆ⤒࡚ࠊ㛫᥋ⓗ࡟ᩥ᭩໬⩏ົࡀᑟධࡉࢀࡓ࡜ホ౯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ኴ⏣࣭๓ᥖὀ 2࣭18 㡫ࠋ
11 ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࢆ⟬ᐃࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ᚲせ࡜ㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿ᭩㢮࡜ࡋ࡚㈈ົ┬௧࡛ᐃࡵࡿ᭩㢮㸦⛒≉ἲ 66 ᮲ࡢ 4նࠊ⛒≉ἲつ๎ 22 ᮲ࡢ 10㸧ࠋ
12 ᅜูሗ࿌஦㡯㸦⛒≉ἲ 66 ᮲ࡢ 4նࠊ⛒≉ἲつ๎ 22 ᮲ࡢ 10 ࡢ 4㸧ࠋ
13 ஦ᴗᴫἣሗ࿌஦㡯㸦⛒≉ἲ 66 ᮲ࡢ 4 ࡢ 5ࠊ⛒≉ἲつ๎ 22 ᮲ࡢ 10 ࡢ 5㸧ࠋ
14 ᅜ⛯ᗇ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟ಀࡿᩥ᭩໬ไᗘ࡟㛵ࡍࡿᨵṇࡢ࠶ࡽࡲࡋࠖ
https://www.nta.go.jp/shiraberu/ippanjoho/pamph/pdf/h28iten-kakaku.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥
2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋ
15 㔠Ꮚ࣭๓ᥖὀ 5࣭781 㡫ࠋ
16 ἼከỤಇᏕࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯࡜ᐇ㝿౯᱁̿㛵⛯ホ౯ၥ㢟ࡢືྥ࡟㛵㐃ࡋ࡚̿ࠖ⚟ᒸ኱ᏥၟᏥㄽ
ྀ 15 ᕳ 1 ྕ 2 㡫㸦1971㸧ࠋ
17 ྠୖࠋ
893（ 455 ）

ᅗ⾲ 1㸸㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃᡭ㡰 18
㍺ධ㈌≀
࡞࠸

࠶ࡿ

㸦↓ൾㆡΏࠊ㈤㈚೉㈌≀➼㸧࠙➨ 1 ẁ㝵ࠚ
኎ᡭ࡜㈙ᡭ࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢ㍺ධྲྀᘬ㸦㍺ධ኎㈙㸧ࡢ᭷↓࠙➨ 2 ẁ㝵ࠚཎ๎ἲࢆ㐺⏝࡛ࡁ࡞࠸஦᝟ࡢ᭷↓࠶ࡿ

࣭㈙ᡭ࡟ࡼࡿ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢฎศཪࡣ౑⏝࡟ᑐࡍࡿไ㝈ࡢ᭷↓㸦1 ྕ㸧࣭㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢㄢ⛯౯᱁ࡢỴᐃࢆᅔ㞴࡜ࡍࡿ᮲௳ࡢ᭷↓㸦2 ྕ㸧
࣭㈙ᡭ࡟ࡼࡿ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢฎศཪࡣ౑⏝࡟ࡼࡿ཰┈ࡢ࠺ࡕࠊ┤᥋ཪࡣ㛫᥋࡟኎ᡭ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ㢠ࡢ᫂☜ᛶࡢ᭷↓㸦3 ྕ㸧࣭኎ᡭ࡜㈙ᡭ࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡢ᭷↓㸦4 ྕ㸧࠶ࡿ࠙➨ 3 ẁ㝵ࠚ࡞࠸≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓㸦ࠕ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖཪࡣࠕ᳨ド౯㢠࡟ࡼࡿ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖ࡟ࡼࡾุᐃ㸧
࡞࠸

࠶ࡿ

࠙ཎ๎ἲࠚ
㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁
㸦⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁㸩ㄪᩚ㢠㸧࠙௦᭰ἲࠚ࣭ྠ✀ࡲࡓࡣ㢮ఝࡢ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁
࣭ᅜෆ㈍኎౯᱁࠿ࡽ㏫⟬ࡋࡓ౯᱁࣭〇㐀ཎ౯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ౯᱁
࣭ࡑࡢ௚ࡢ᪉ἲ࡟ࡼࡾ⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡓ౯᱁㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ࡣࠊཎ๎ἲ࡜௦᭰ἲࡢ 2 ✀㢮ࡀᏑᅾࡋࠊ࡝ࡕࡽࡢ᪉ἲࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿ࠿ࡣḟࡢ 3 ẁ㝵ࡢࢫࢸࢵࣉࢆ㋃ࢇ࡛Ỵᐃࡉࢀࡿࠋ➨ 1 ẁ㝵ࡣࠊ኎ᡭ࡜㈙ᡭ࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢ㍺ධྲྀᘬࡢ᭷↓࡟ࡼࡿࢫࢡ࣮ࣜࢽࣥࢢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ㍺ධྲྀᘬࡀ࡞࠸ሙྜࠊ௦᭰ἲ࡟ࡼࡾ⟬ᐃࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋ➨ 2 ẁ㝵ࡣࠊཎ๎ἲࢆ㐺⏝࡛ࡁ࡞࠸஦᝟ࡢ᭷↓࡟ࡼࡿࢫࢡ࣮ࣜࢽࣥࢢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ㍺
ධྲྀᘬ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊཎ๎ἲࢆ㐺⏝࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ྛྕ࡟つᐃࡉࢀࡿ஦᝟㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ղྛྕ㸧ࡀ࠸ࡎࢀࡶᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸ሙྜࠊཎ๎ἲࡢ㐺⏝ࡀỴᐃࡍࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ղ㸧ࠋ➨ 3 ẁ㝵࡛ࡣࠊ኎
ᡭ࡜㈙ᡭࡢ㛫࡟≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀ࠶ࡾࠊ4 ྕࡢ஦᝟ࡀᏑᅾࡍࡿ࡜ุᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟ࡼࡿ18⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ

http://www.customs.go.jp/zeikan/seido/kanzeihyouka/keisan_index.htm
㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࢆཧ↷ࡋࠊ➹⪅ࡀ୍㒊ຍ➹ࡋ࡚సᡂࠋ
4（ 456 ）

ྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓ࡀ⪃៖ࡉࢀࡿࠋ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸ሙྜࠊ
ཎ๎ἲࡢ㐺⏝ࡀỴᐃࡉࢀࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠊ௦᭰ἲࡢ㐺⏝ࡀỴᐃࡉࢀࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ 4 ᮲ղణ᭩ࡁࠊᐃ⋡ἲᇶᮏ㏻㐩 4-19㸧ࠋཎ๎ἲࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ࡘࡁ⌧ᐇ࡟ᨭᡶࢃࢀࡓཪࡣᨭᡶࢃࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ౯᱁㸦௨ୗࠊࠕ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁ࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧࡟ᚲせ࡞ㄪᩚࢆ⾜ࡗࡓࡶࡢࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡍࡿ᪉ἲ࡛࠶ࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ձ㸧ࠋᐇ㝿ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ࡢ⌧ሙ࡛ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ 9 ๭௨ୖࢆཎ๎ἲࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡾ⟬ᐃࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ࡉࢀࡿ 19ࠋ௦᭰ἲࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀࡜ྠ✀ཪࡣ㢮ఝࡢ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡍࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ
➨ 4 ᮲ࡢ 2㸧ࠋᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ࡢ 2 ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⟬ᐃࡀ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ሙྜࠊཎ๎࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᅜෆ㈍኎౯᱁
࠿ࡽ㏫⟬ࡋࡓ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡍࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ࡢ 3ձ㸧ࠋᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ࡢ 3ձ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⟬ᐃࡀ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ሙྜࠊ〇㐀ཎ౯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡍࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ࡢ 3ղ㸧ࠋࡓࡔࡋ౛እ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ㍺ධ⪅ࡀᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ࡢ 3ղ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃࢆᕼᮃࡋࡓሙྜ
࡟ࡣࠊᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ࡢ 3ձ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡼࡾඃඛࡋ࡚㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿࠋୖグࡢ᪉ἲ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸
࡚㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࢆ⟬ᐃ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ሙྜࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ࡟㐺ྜࡍࡿ᪉ἲ࡜ࡋ࡚㛵⛯ᙜᒁ㛗ᐁࡀㄆࡵࡓ᪉ἲ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡓ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡍࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ࡢ 4㸧ࠋ
➨ 3 ẁ㝵࡟࠾ࡅࡿ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓ࡣࠊ
ࠕ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸ
ࢫࢺࠖ 20ཪࡣࠕ᳨ド౯㢠࡟ࡼࡿ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖ࡟ࡼࡾุᐃࡉࢀࡿࠋ
ࠕ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖࡣࠊ㍺ධ⪅࠿ࡽᥦฟࡉࢀࡓ㈨ᩱࡑࡢ௚ࡢ㈨ᩱࢆཧ⪃࡟
ࡋ࡚ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢᡂ❧ࡢ௙⤌ࡳࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬࡢᐇែ➼࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ᚲせ࡞᳨ウࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓ࢆุᐃࡍࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲᇶᮏ㏻㐩 4-19㸧ࠋ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸࡜ุᐃࡉࢀࡿ౛♧࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ௨ୗࡢ 6 ࡘࢆᣲࡆ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦㛵⛯ᐃ⋡ἲᇶᮏ㏻㐩 4-19ձྛྕ㸧ࠋ౛♧ձ ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ಀࡿ⏘ᴗ࡛ࡢ㏻ᖖࡢ౯᱁タᐃ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ័⾜࡟㐺ྜࡍࡿ᪉ἲ࡛ᙜヱ㍺ධ
㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯㢠ࡀタᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ
౛♧ղ ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ኎ᡭࡀ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟࡞࠸ᡃࡀᅜࡢ㈙ᡭ࡟㈍኎ࡍࡿሙྜࡢ౯᱁タᐃ᪉ᘧ࡟㐺ྜࡍࡿ᪉ἲ࡛ᙜヱ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯㢠ࡀタᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ
౛♧ճ ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯㢠ࡀࠊᙜヱ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ಀࡿࡍ࡭࡚ࡢ㈝⏝࡟ࠊ኎ᡭ࡟ࡼࡿࡇࢀ࡜
ྠ㢮ࡢ㈌≀ࡢ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ㏻ᖖࡢ฼₶ࢆຍ࠼ࡓ㢠ࢆᅇ཰ࡍࡿࡢ࡟༑ศ࡞ྲྀᘬ౯㢠࡛
࠶ࡿሙྜ

19

ᖹ⏣ဴஓࠕࢢ࣮ࣟࣂ࣭ࣝࣂ࣮࣭ࣜࣗࢳ࢙࣮ࣥୗࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࠖ㈠᫆࡜
㛵⛯ 62 ᕳ 3 ྕ 46 㡫㸦2014㸧ࠋ
20 ᡃࡀᅜࡢ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ➨ 1 ᮲ղ㸦a㸧ཬࡧ㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ㝃ᒓ᭩Ϩࡢ➨ 1 ᮲ࢆࡶ࡜࡟⟇ᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᙜヱࢸࢫࢺ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ➨ 2 ❶࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊࡉ
ࡽ࡟㆟ㄽࢆᒎ㛤ࡍࡿࠋ
5（ 457 ）

౛♧մ ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯㢠ࡀࠊ㈙ᡭ࡜≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟࡞࠸௚ࡢ〇㐀⪅➼࠿ࡽ㉎ධࡍࡿᙜヱ㍺
ධ㈌≀࡜ྠ✀ཪࡣ㢮ఝࡢ㈌≀ࡢ౯᱁࡜ྠ୍ཪࡣ㏆ఝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿྲྀᘬ౯
㢠࡛࠶ࡿሙྜ
౛♧յ ㈙ᡭࡀࠊࡑࡢᾏእ⌧ᆅἲே㸦⊂⮬ࡢἲே᱁ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿᨭᗑࢆྵࡴࠋ
㸧ࡀ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟࡞
࠸〇㐀⪅➼࠿ࡽ㉎ධࡋࡓ㈌≀ࢆᙜヱᾏእ⌧ᆅἲே࠿ࡽ㍺ධࡍࡿሙྜ࡟ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯㢠ࡀᙜヱ〇㐀⪅➼࠿ࡽࡢ㉎ධ౯㢠࡟ᙜヱᾏእ⌧ᆅἲேࡢ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ㏻ᖖࡢ฼₶ࡀୖ஌ࡏࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿྲྀᘬ౯㢠࡛࠶ࡿሙྜ
౛♧ն ㈙ᡭ࡜኎ᡭࡀ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟࠶ࡾࠊᙜヱ኎ᡭࡀ〇㐀⪅➼࠿ࡽ㉎ධࡋࡓ㈌≀ࢆᙜヱ㈙ᡭ
ࡀ㍺ධࡍࡿሙྜ࡟ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯㢠ࡀᙜヱ〇㐀⪅➼࠿ࡽ௚ࡢ኎ᡭࢆ⤒࡚ࠊࡇࢀ࡜≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟࡞࠸௚ࡢ㈙ᡭࡀ㍺ධࡍࡿᙜヱ㍺ධ㈌≀࡜ྠ✀ཪࡣ㢮ఝࡢ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯㢠࡜ྠ୍ཪࡣ㏆ఝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿྲྀᘬ౯㢠࡛࠶ࡿሙྜࠕ᳨ド౯㢠࡟ࡼࡿ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖࡣࠊྠ✀ࡲࡓࡣ㢮ఝࡢ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯㢠ࠊᅜෆ㈍኎౯
㢠࠿ࡽࡢ㏫⟬ἲ࡟ࡼࡾ⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡓㄢ⛯౯㢠ࠊ〇㐀ཎ౯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ᪉ἲ࡟ࡼࡾ⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡓㄢ⛯౯㢠ࡢ 3 ࡘࡢ᳨ド౯㢠 21ࡢ࠸ࡎࢀ࠿ࢆ⟬ᐃࡋࠊ᳨ド౯㢠࡜≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟࠾ࡅࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀ㏆ఝࡍࡿሙྜࡣࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡣ࡞࠸ࡶࡢ࡜ุᐃࡍࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ 4 ᮲ղణ᭩ࡁ㸧ࠋ
ࠕ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖཪࡣࠕ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖ࡟ࡼࡾࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡀ࠶ࡿࡶࡢ࡜ุᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊ௦᭰ἲ࡟ࡼࡾ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡀ⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡿࠋᡃࡀᅜࡢ㛵⛯ไᗘ࡛ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬࡢከᵝ໬࡟క࠸ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ࡀ」㞧໬ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜࡟㓄៖ࡋࠊ஦๓ᩍ♧ไᗘ 22ࢆᑟධࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦㛵⛯ἲ➨ 7 ᮲ճ㸧ࠋࡇࡢไᗘࡣࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ㍺ධྲྀᘬ๓࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ㸦ἲ௧ࡢゎ㔘࣭㐺⏝➼㸧࡟ࡘ࠸࡚↷఍ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊᅇ⟅ࢆཷࡅࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿไᗘ࡛࠶ࡿ 23ࠋ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࠿ࡽࡢᅇ⟅ෆᐜࡣࠊ᭱㛗 3 ᖺࡢ᭷ຠᮇ㛫ෆ࡟࠾࠸࡚ホ౯⏦࿌ཬࡧ⣡⛯⏦࿌ࡢ㝿࡟ᑛ㔜ࡉࢀࡿ 24ࠋ⣡⛯⪅࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯࡟ಀࡿண

ྍ⬟ᛶࡀᢸಖࡉࢀࠊ㍺ධᡭ⥆ࡁࡀ෇⁥࡟࡞ࡿ 25➼ࡢ฼Ⅼࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ
1㸫3 ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟᳨ド౯㢠ձࠊղࠊճࡣࠊ௦᭰ἲ࡟ࡼࡾྛࠎ⟬ᐃࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ղణࡋ᭩ࡁ㸧ࠋ᳃Ặࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ APA ࡟㢮ఝࡍࡿไᗘ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ホ౯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᳃ಙኵࠗ⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢ⤒῭Ꮫ BEPS ၥ㢟࡬ࡢᑐᛂ࡜↓ᙧ㈨⏘ホ౯࠘㸦୰ኸ⤒῭♫ࠊ2014㸧455 㡫ࠋ
23 ⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ
http://www.customs.go.jp/tetsuzuki/c-answer/imtsukan/1402_jr.htm㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ
11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋ
24 ᳃࣭๓ᥖὀ 22࣭455 㡫ࠋ
25 ஭ᮧ⪃ㄹࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࢆࡵࡄࡿ୍⪃ᐹ㹼≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟࠾ࡅࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ
୰ᚰ࡜ࡋ࡚㹼ࠖ⛯㛵◊ಟᡤㄽ㞟 45 ྕ 16 㡫㸦2014㸧ࠋ
21
22

6

（ 458 ）⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢホ౯࡟࠾࠸࡚஺㘒ࡍࡿࠋᅜ㝿࣮ࣝࣝୖࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡣ OECD ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥ㸦௨ୗࠊࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥࠖ
࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧 26࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚࠸ࡿ୍᪉࡛ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣ WTO ཬࡧ WCO ࡀ㛵୚ࡋࡓ㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚࠸ࡿ 27ࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊከࡃࡢᅜ࡛ࡣࠊࡑࡢホ౯ࢆ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣ⛯ົᙜᒁࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡀ⾜࠺ࠋ୧ㄢ⛯ᙜᒁࡣᇶᮏⓗ࡟ูࠎࡢ⤌⧊࡛㐠Ⴀࡉࢀࡿࡓࡵࠊྛࠎ⊂❧ࡋ࡚ホ౯ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢቑῶࡀ୚࠼ࡿἲே⛯࡜㛵⛯࡟ᑐࡍࡿᙳ㡪ࡣ┦཯ࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢホ౯࡟ࡘ࠸࡚஋㞳ࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀࠊ㐺ṇ࡞᫬౯࡟ᑐࡋ࡚㧗౯ཪࡣప౯࡜࡞ࡗࡓ㝿ࡢἲே⛯ࠊ㛵⛯࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࢆ⾲࡟ࡲ࡜ࡵࡓ㸦ᅗ⾲ 2 ཧ↷㸧ࠋࡇࡇ࡛ࡣࠊἲே⛯⋡ 30㸣ࠊ㛵⛯⋡ 10㸣ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ㐺ṇ࡞᫬౯ࢆ 100ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࢆ 100
࡛㍺ධࡋࡓሙྜࡢ㍺ධ௻ᴗഃࡢㄢ⛯ᡤᚓࢆ 200 ࡜ࡋࠊἲே⛯ࠊ㛵⛯ࡢ࠸ࡎࢀ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶ㍺
ධ௻ᴗഃࡀᨭᡶࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ๓ᥦ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᅗ⾲ 2㸸ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢቑῶࡀ୚࠼ࡿἲே⛯࡜㛵⛯࡬ࡢᙳ㡪 28
ไᗘ㸭

㧗౯

ప౯

㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁

㸦ń㸧㸦ń㸧ἲே⛯㸦30㸣㸧ㄢ⛯ᡤᚓࡢῶᑡ

ㄢ⛯ᡤᚓࡢቑຍ

㸦ń㸧㸦ń㸧ἲே⛯ࡢῶᑡ

ἲே⛯ࡢቑຍ

㸦ń㸧㸦ń㸧㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢቑຍ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢῶᑡ

㸦ń㸧㸦ń㸧

㛵⛯ࡢቑຍ

㛵⛯ࡢῶᑡ

㸦ń㸧㸦ń㸧

㛵⛯㸦10㸣㸧

ᅗ⾲ 2 ࠿ࡽࢃ࠿ࡿࡼ࠺࡟ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀ㐺ṇ࡞᫬౯࡟ᑐࡋ࡚㧗౯࡟࡞ࡿ࡯࡝ࠊ
ἲே⛯ࡢῶᑡ࡜㛵⛯ࡢቑຍࢆᣍࡁࠊ཯ᑐ࡟ప౯࡟࡞ࡿ࡯࡝ἲே⛯ࡢቑຍ࡜㛵⛯ࡢῶᑡࢆᣍ
ࡃࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁࡣ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀ㐺ṇ࡞᫬౯࡟ᑐࡋ࡚㧗౯࡟࡞ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆၥ㢟どࡍࡿ୍᪉࡛ࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡣప౯࡟࡞ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆၥ㢟どࡍࡿࠋ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢホ౯࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࢺ࣮ࣞࢻ࣭࢜ࣇࡢ㛵ಀᛶ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜࠸࠼ࡿࠋࡇࡢሙྜࠊ
⣡⛯⪅ࡣࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀ㧗㢠ࡍࡂ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆ❧ドࡋࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ

OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations, 2017.

26
27
28

᳃࣭๓ᥖὀ 22࣭443 㡫ࠋ➹⪅సᡂࠋ7（ 459 ）

ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀప㢠ࡍࡂ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆ❧ドࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᙉ࠸ࡽࢀࡿࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞≧ἣࡣࠊࢢ࣮ࣟࣂ
ࣝ࡟஦ᴗࢆᒎ㛤ࡍࡿከᅜ⡠௻ᴗ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࠊ኱ࡁ࡞ᐇົ㈇ᢸ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࡉࡽ࡟ࠊᅜ㝿࣮ࣝࣝୖࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡀࠊ௚᪉ࡢไᗘࡢᙳ㡪ࢆ஫࠸࡟⪃៖ࡍࡿࡢ࠿ྰ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚᫂☜࡟ࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ࡼࡿホ౯ࡣࠊᇶᮏⓗ࡟㍺ධ
ྲྀᘬ᫬Ⅼ࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡿ୍᪉࡛ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣ஦ᴗᖺᗘᮎ࡟⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿሙྜࠊ㐳ཬⓗ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ཯ᫎࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡿࡀࠊࡑࡢྍ
⬟ᛶࡣྰᐃ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ 29ࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ 30ࡀࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ཬࡰࡍᙳ㡪ࢆ⾲࡟ࡲ࡜ࡵࡓ㸦⾲ 2 ཧ↷㸧ࠋࡇࡇ࡛ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡣ 150 ࡛࠶ࡾࠊᙜヱྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆࡶࡗ࡚㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟ୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉࠸ࡎࢀ࠿ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⏕ࡌ࡚࠾ࡾࠊᙜヱ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣྲྀᘬ౯᱁㸦㛵⛯ホ౯㢠㸧ࢆ 50 ቑ㢠ཪࡣῶ㢠ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ๓ᥦ᮲௳࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᅗ⾲ 3㸸㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ཬࡰࡍᙳ㡪 31
㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬

ń

⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚᚋ

㛵⛯ホ౯㢠

150

ń

200㸦150㸩50㸧

ୖ᪉ࡢ

㛵⛯㢠

15

ń

20

⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ

㸦10㸣㸧

20ᇞ15㸻㸩5
5 ㏣ᚩ

㛵⛯ホ౯㢠

150

ń

100㸦150ᇞ50㸧

ୗ᪉ࡢ

㛵⛯㢠

15

ń

10

⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ

㸦10㸣㸧

10ᇞ15㸻ᇞ55 㑏௜

ᅗ⾲ 3 ࠿ࡽࢃ࠿ࡿࡼ࠺࡟ࠊୖ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢቑ㢠ࢆࡶࡓࡽࡋࠊ㛵⛯ࡢ
㏣ᚩࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿ୍᪉࡛ࠊୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢῶ㢠ࢆࡶࡓࡽࡋࠊ㛵⛯ࡢ㑏௜ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ࡜ࡇࢁࡀᐇ㝿࡟ࡣࠊୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡉࢀࡎࠊ㛵⛯ࡢ㑏௜ࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡞࠸஦౛ࡀከ࠸ࠋ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ⛯ົୖ୙฼࡟࡞ࡿሙ
ྜ࡟㝈ࡾࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣබᖹᛶࡢほⅬ࡛ၥ㢟ࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠼ࡿࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ

29୍㧗Ặࡣࠊࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁ࡣ͐㛵⛯➼࡟ࡶᙳ㡪ࡍࡿࠖ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜࠿ࡽࡶࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ
ᙳ㡪ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡶཷࡅࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡣ༑ศ࡟⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ
୍㧗㱟ྖࠕ➨ 11 ❶ ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࠖᮧ஭ṇ⦅ⴭࠗධ㛛 ᅜ㝿⛒⛯ἲ࠘㸦Ύᩥ♫ࠊ2013㸧210 㡫ࠋ
30 ᮏ✏࡛ࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆቑ㢠ࡍࡿࡼ࠺࡞⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆୖ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡜
࿧⛠ࡋࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆῶ㢠ࡍࡿࡼ࠺࡞⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡜࿧⛠ࡍࡿࠋ࡞࠾ࠊୖ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣࠊ㍺ධ௻ᴗഃࡢㄢ⛯ᡤᚓࢆῶ㢠ࡋࠊୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪ
ᩚࡣࠊ㍺ධ௻ᴗഃࡢㄢ⛯ᡤᚓࢆቑ㢠ࡉࡏࡿࠋ
31 ➹⪅సᡂࠋ
8（ 460 ）ICC ࡣࠊ2015 ᖺ࡟ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯࡟㛵ࡍࡿ࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ࢫࢸ࢖ࢺ࣓ࣥࢺ㸦௨ୗࠊ
ࠕICC࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ࢫࢸ࢖ࢺ࣓ࣥࢺࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧ࢆබ⾲ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 32ࠋICC ࡣࠊࡇࢀ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࡢࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆྲྀᘬࡀୡ⏺ࡢ㈠᫆ࡢ 60㸣ࢆ༨ࡵ࡚࠸ࡿ⌧≧ࢆ㚷ࡳࡿ࡜ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟ࡣ⮬⏤㈠᫆ࡢ㞀ᐖ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ௻ᴗࡢᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞Ⓨᒎࢆ㜼ᐖࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ホ౯ࡍࡿ 33ࠋࡉࡽ࡟ WCO ࡣࠊ2018 ᖺ࡟ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘཬࡧ⛣㌿౯᱁࡟㛵ࡍࡿ࢞࢖ࢻ㸦௨ୗࠊࠕWCO ࢞࢖ࢻࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧ࢆබ⾲ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 34ࠋWCO ࡣࠊࡇࢀ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢホ౯ࢆࡼࡾ᥋㏆ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜࡛ࠊࣅࢪࢿࢫୖࡢ㈇ᢸࢆ㍍ῶࡋࠊ㈠᫆ࡢಁ㐍࡟ࡘ࡞ࡀࡿ࡜ホ౯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 35ࠋ௨ୖࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࠊᅜ㝿ⓗ࡟ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࢆ᥋㏆ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜࡟ព⩏ࢆぢฟࡋࠊ୧⪅ࢆ᥋㏆ࡉࡏࡼ࠺࡜ࡍࡿព㆑ࡀ㧗ࡲࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
1㸫4 ᮏ✏ࡢၥ㢟ព㆑࡜┠ⓗ⌧ᅾࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡛ࡣࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡢ᝟ሗඹ᭷ࡣ༑ศ࡛࡞ࡃࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ᥋㏆࡟ྥࡅࡓ┠❧ࡗࡓືྥࡣ࡞࠸࡜ࡉࢀࡿ 36ࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟ྲྀᢅ࠺ࡢ࠿ࡀࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚㔜኱࡞ၥ㢟࡛࠶ࡿ 37ࠋᡃࡀᅜࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊ2011 ᖺ࡟බ⾲ࡋࡓ஦๓ᩍ♧ 38࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⪃៖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ♧၀ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡉࡽ࡟ࠊ㈈ົ┬ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓୖ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ಟṇ⏦࿌ࢆ⾜ࢃ࡞࠿ࡗࡓࡇ࡜࡛㛵⛯
ࡢ㏣ᚩㄢ⛯ 39ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓ஦౛ࢆᥖ㍕ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 4 ཧ↷㸧 40ࠋ
ICC, Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation-2015-Policy statement, 2015. ࡞࠾ࠊ
ICC ࡣࠊ2012 ᖺ࡟ࡶ ICC ࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ࢫࢸ࢖ࢺ࣓ࣥࢺࢆබ⾲ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ2015 ᖺ࡟ᨵゞ∧ࢆබ⾲ࡋࡓࠋ
33 Id., at 1.
34 WCO, WCO Guide to Customs Valuation and Transfer Pricing New edition 2018,2018. ࡞࠾ࠊWCO ࡣࠊ2015 ᖺ࡟ࡶ WCO ࢞࢖ࢻࢆබ⾲ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ2018 ᖺ࡟ᨵゞ∧ࢆබ⾲ࡋࡓࠋ
35 Id., para 1.3.
36 ᳃࣭๓ᥖὀ 22࣭442 㡫ࠋ
37 ᳃Ặࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ㛫࡛⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟ࡢ୰࡛ࠊ᭱ࡶᅔ㞴࡞ၥ㢟ࡢ 1 ࡘ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡇࡢၥ㢟ࢆホ౯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᳃࣭๓ᥖὀ 22࣭458 㡫ࠋ
38 ⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢㄢ⛯౯᱁ࡢỴᐃࢆᅔ㞴࡜ࡍࡿㄪᩚ㔠ࠖ32

http://www.customs.go.jp/zeikan/seido/kanzeihyouka/hyokajirei/hyokajirei4120002.pdf
㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋヲ⣽࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ➨ 4 ❶࡛ศᯒࡍࡿࠋ
39 ᡃࡀᅜ࡛ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ไᗘ࡟࠾ࡅࡿಟṇ⏦࿌ཬࡧ᭦ṇࡢㄳồ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᮇ㝈ࡣࠊ࡝ࡕࡽࡶ 5 ᖺ
௨ෆ࡜つᐃࡉࢀࠊಟṇ⏦࿌ࢆᛰࡗࡓሙྜࠊ㐣ᑡ⏦࿌ຍ⟬⛯㸦㛵⛯ἲ➨ 12 ᮲ࡢ 2㸧ཬࡧᘏ⁫⛯㸦㛵⛯ἲ➨ 12 ᮲㸧ࡶ௜㝶ࡋ࡚ㄢࡉࢀࡿࠋᑠᯘṇᙪ㸻∦ᒸ༟ஓࠕ␲ၥ┦ㄯ ᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡟㛵ࡍࡿἲே⛯ཬࡧ㛵⛯࣭㍺ධᾘ㈝⛯ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࠖᅜ⛯㏿ሗ 6371 ྕ 53 㡫㸦2015㸧ࠋ
40 ௨ୗࡢ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࢆཧ↷ࠋ㈈ົ┬࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㍺ධ஦ᚋㄪᰝࡢ≧ἣ㸦ᖹᡂ 30 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 14 ᪥㸧ࠖhttps://www.mof.go.jp/customs_tariff/trade/collection/ka20181114b1.htm 㸦 ᭱ ⤊ 㜀 ぴ ᪥
9（ 461 ）

ᅗ⾲ 4㸸ಟṇ⏦࿌₃ࢀ࡟ࡼࡿ㛵⛯ࡢ㏣ᚩㄢ⛯஦౛ 41
஦ົᖺᗘ

஦౛ෆᐜ

2017 ᖺᗘ㍺ධ⪅ A ࡣࠊࢻ࢖ࢶࡢ㍺ฟ⪅࠿ࡽ⮬ື㌴➼ࢆ㍺ධࡋ࡚࠸ࡓࠋA ࡣࠊ㍺ฟ⪅࡜ࡢྲྀỴࡵ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊ㐣ཤ㍺ධࡋࡓ㈌≀࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㐳ཬࡋ࡚౯᱁ࢆぢ┤ࡋࠊቑ㢠࡜࡞ࡗࡓ㔠㢠ࢆ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡜ࡋ࡚ᨭᡶࡗ࡚࠸ࡓࠋᮏ᮶ࠊࡇࡢ౯᱁
ㄪᩚ㔠ࡣㄢ⛯౯᱁࡟ྵࡵࡽࢀࡿ࡭ࡁࡶࡢࡔࡗࡓࡀࠊA ࡣಟṇ⏦࿌ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠿ࡗࡓࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ⏦࿌₃ࢀㄢ⛯౯᱁ࡣ 103 ൨ 7,105 ୓෇ࠊ㏣ᚩ⛯㢠
ࡣ 8 ൨ 3,166 ୓෇࡜࡞ࡗࡓࠋ

2016 ᖺᗘ㍺ධ⪅ A ࡣࠊ⡿ᅜ➼ࡢ㍺ฟ⪅࠿ࡽ་⒪ᶵჾ➼ࢆ㍺ධࡋ࡚࠸ࡓࠋA ࡣࠊ㍺ฟ⪅࡜ࡢྲྀỴࡵ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊ㐣ཤ㍺ධࡋࡓ㈌≀࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㐳ཬࡋ࡚౯᱁ࢆぢ┤ࡋࠊቑ㢠࡜࡞ࡗࡓ㔠㢠ࢆ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡜ࡋ࡚ᨭᡶࡗ࡚࠸ࡓࠋᮏ᮶ࠊࡇࡢ౯᱁
ㄪᩚ㔠ࡣㄢ⛯౯᱁࡟ྵࡵࡽࢀࡿ࡭ࡁࡶࡢࡔࡗࡓࡀࠊA ࡣಟṇ⏦࿌ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠿ࡗࡓࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ⏦࿌₃ࢀㄢ⛯౯᱁ࡣ 61 ൨ 8,993 ୓෇ࠊ㏣ᚩ⛯㢠
ࡣ 4 ൨ 9,564 ୓෇࡜࡞ࡗࡓࠋ

2015 ᖺᗘ㍺ධ⪅ A ࡣࠊ࢔࣓ࣜ࢝➼ࡢ㍺ฟ⪅࠿ࡽ་⒪ᶵჾ࡞࡝ࢆ㍺ධࡋ࡚࠸ࡓࠋA
ࡣࠊ㍺ฟ⪅࡜ࡢྲྀỴࡵ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊ㐣ཤ 2 ᖺࡢ㛫࡟㍺ධࡋࡓ㈌≀࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㐳ཬࡋ࡚౯᱁ࢆぢ┤ࡋࠊቑ㢠࡜࡞ࡗࡓ㔠㢠ࢆ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡜ࡋ࡚ᨭᡶࡗ࡚࠸
ࡓࠋᮏ᮶ࠊࡇࡢ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡣㄢ⛯౯᱁࡟ྵࡵࡽࢀࡿ࡭ࡁࡶࡢࡔࡗࡓࡀࠊA
ࡣಟṇ⏦࿌ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠿ࡗࡓࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ⏦࿌₃ࢀㄢ⛯౯᱁ࡣ 198 ൨
9,168 ୓෇ࠊ㏣ᚩ⛯㢠ࡣ 11 ൨ 7,634 ୓෇࡜࡞ࡗࡓࠋ

௨ୖࡢࡇ࡜࠿ࡽࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢᙳ㡪ࢆ࠶ࡿ⛬ᗘ⪃៖ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ࡜ࡇࢁࡀᐇ㝿࡟ࡣࠊୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟క࠺㛵⛯ࡢ㑏௜ࡣ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡢࡀ⌧≧࡛࠶ࡿ 42ࠋ2016 ᖺ࡟ࡣࠊᅜእ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࡀୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟క࠺㛵⛯㑏௜ࢆㄳồࡋࡓ⿢ุ㸦὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳㸧ࡶᥦ㉳ࡉࢀ࡚2018 ᖺ 12 ᭶ 28 ᪥㸧ࠋ㈈ົ┬࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㍺ධ஦ᚋㄪᰝࡢ≧ἣ㸦ᖹᡂ 29 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 7 ᪥㸧ࠖhttps://www.mof.go.jp/customs_tariff/trade/collection/ka20171107b1.htm 㸦 ᭱ ⤊ 㜀 ぴ ᪥2018 ᖺ 12 ᭶ 28 ᪥㸧ࠋ㈈ົ┬࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㍺ධ஦ᚋㄪᰝࡢ≧ἣ㸦ᖹᡂ 28 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 4 ᪥㸧ࠖhttps://www.mof.go.jp/customs_tariff/trade/collection/ka20161104b2.htm 㸦 ᭱ ⤊ 㜀 ぴ ᪥2018 ᖺ 12 ᭶ 28 ᪥㸧ࠋ
41 ྠୖࢆཧ↷ࡢࡶ࡜సᡂࠋ
42 ᑠᯘ㸻∦ᒸ࣭๓ᥖὀ 39࣭54 㡫ࠋཬࡧ PwC ⛯⌮ኈἲேࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡬ࡢᑐᛂ̿㛵⛯ࡢ
ほⅬ࠿ࡽࠖ
㸦2015㸧
ࠋ
https://www.pwc.com/jp/ja/taxnews-customs/assets/wms-jan-2015-j.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018
ᖺ 12 ᭶ 28 ᪥㸧ࠋ
10（ 462 ）

࠸ࡿ 43ࠋ௒ᚋࠊࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞⿢ุࡀࠊᅜෆ࡛ᥦ㉳ࡉࢀࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡶྰࡵ࡞࠸ࠋ ࡑࡇ࡛ᮏ✏ࡢၥ㢟ព㆑ࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ୍᪉ⓗ࡟୙฼┈ࢆ⿕ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ⌧≧࡟࠶ࡿࠋࡇࡢศ㔝࡟ᑐࡍࡿᅜෆࡢඛ⾜◊✲࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ஭ᮧẶ 44࡜Ỉ㔝Ặ 45ࡢㄽᩥࡀᣲࡆࡽࢀࡿࠋ๓
⪅ࡣࠊᙜ᫬ࡢᅜእ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ᭱᪂ࡢ㆟ㄽࢆ୰ᚰ࡟ศᯒࢆ⾜࠸ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࢆ᳨ウࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᚋ⪅ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ୧⪅ࢆ᥋㏆ࡉࡏࡿ᪉ἲࢆ᳨ウࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡽࡢඛ⾜◊✲௨ᚋࠊᅜእ࡛ࡣ᪂ࡓ࡞ືྥࡀከᩘぢཷࡅࡽࢀࡿ୍᪉࡛ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⌧≧࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣఱࡽኚ໬ࡀ࡞࠸࡜ゝࢃࡊࡿࢆᚓ࡞࠸ࠋ
ࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊᮏ✏ࡢ┠ⓗࡣࠊᚑ᮶ࡢඛ⾜◊✲௨ᚋ࡟ᒎ㛤ࡉࢀࡓ㆟ㄽࡲ࡛ศᯒ⠊ᅖࢆᣑ኱ࡋࠊᮏ✏ࡢၥ㢟ព㆑ࡢᨵၿ࡟ྥࡅࡓࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢᮃࡲࡋ࠸࠶
ࡾ᪉ࢆᥦゝࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟࠶ࡿࠋ

FG München, Beschluss v. 15.09.2016 - 14 K 1974/15. ࡇࡢ ECJ ุỴࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ➨ 3❶࡛ศᯒࡍࡿࠋ
44 ஭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ 25࣭1-70 㡫ࠋ
45 Ỉ㔝ṇኵࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ᥋Ⅼࠖ⛯ἲᏛ 577 ྕ 191-219 㡫㸦2017㸧
ࠋ
43

11

（ 463 ）

➨ 2 ❶ ᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞ືྥ2㸫1 ㆟ㄽࡢᒎ㛤⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯⛯ไࡢᮃࡲࡋ࠸࠶ࡾ᪉࡟㛵ࡍࡿᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞㆟ㄽࡣࠊ
2006 ᖺࡢ WCO
㸭OECD ඹྠ఍㆟㸦௨ୗࠊࠕඹྠ఍㆟ࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧࠿ࡽጞࡲࡗࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿ 46ࠋWCO ࡜ OECD
ࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢホ౯ࢆࠊูಶࡢไᗘ࡛࠶ࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ཮
᪉࠿ࡽ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾ⏕ࡌࡿ」㞧ᛶ࡜ࢥࢫࢺࢆၥ㢟どࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 47ࠋࡇ࠺ࡋࡓ⫼ᬒࡢࡶ࡜㛤ദࡉࢀࡓ 2006 ᖺඹྠ఍㆟࡛ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࢆ᥋㏆ 48ࡉࡏࡿࡓࡵࡢ㆟ㄽ 49ࡀᒎ㛤ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 50ࠋ᥋㏆࡟ࡘ࠸࡚✚ᴟㄽ⪅ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢホ౯ᴫᛕࡢ㢮ఝᛶ࡟╔┠ࡋࠊ୧⪅ࢆ᥋㏆ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࡢඃ఩ᛶࢆ୺ᙇࡍࡿ 51ࠋࡑࡢ୍᪉࡛ࠊៅ㔜ㄽ⪅ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ࡼࡿホ౯ᡭ⥆ୖࠊホ౯ࡢࢱ࢖࣑ࣥࢢཬࡧ⏦࿌༢఩࡟㱈㱒ࡀ࠶ࡾࠊ㐣ᗘ࡞᥋㏆࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ྰᐃⓗ࡛࠶ࡿ 52ࠋ
2007 ᖺ࡟ࡶᘬ⥆ࡁඹྠ఍㆟ࡀ㛤ദࡉࢀࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ᩥ᭩ࡢά⏝ࠊ
㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࢆ௒ᚋࡢ᳨ウㄢ㢟࡜ࡋ࡚఩⨨௜ࡅ࡚࠸ࡿ 53ࠋ஧ᗘࡢඹྠ఍㆟ࡢᚋࠊ2007 ᖺ࡟ࣇ࢛࣮࢝ࢫࢢ࣮ࣝࣉࡀ⤖ᡂࡉࢀࠊ఍ྜࡀ㛤࠿ࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࡇࡢ఍ྜࡢ┠ⓗࡣࠊඹྠ఍㆟࡛ᥦ♧ࡉࢀࡓ᳨ウㄢ㢟ࢆ㆟ㄽࡋࠊWCO ࡢ TCCV㸦TechnicalCommittee on Customs ValuationࠊWCO 㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘᢏ⾡ጤဨ఍㸧࡟ሗ࿌ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶
ࡿ 54ࠋ఍ྜ࡛ࡣࠊඹྠ఍㆟࡟࠾࠸࡚ᥦ♧ࡉࢀࡓ᳨ウㄢ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖࡢࠕ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖ㸦㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ➨ 1.2 ᮲㸦a㸧㸧࡟࠾࠸࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࢆά⏝ࡋࠊỈ㔝࣭๓ᥖὀ 45࣭191 㡫ࠋ
Liu Ping, Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation: Exploring Convergence, global
trade and customs journal, Vol 2, at 118, 2007.
48 ቑ஭Ặࡣࠊ2002 ᖺࡢㄽᩥ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ⛒⛯ไᗘ࡜㏻ၟ༠ᐃࡢ᥋Ⅼࢆㄽࡎࡿࡇ࡜ࡣࠊ␗࡞ࡿ
ࢩࢫࢸ࣒┦஫㛫ࡢ᥋Ⅼࢆ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆព࿡ࡍࡿ࡜ᩚ⌮ࡋࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞㆟ㄽ࡟ࡣࠊ୍ᐃࡢព⩏ࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿࡶࡢ࡜⪃࠼࡚࠸ࡿࠋቑ஭Ⰻၨࠕ⛒⛯ไᗘ࡜㏻ၟ༠ᐃࡢ᥋Ⅼ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ஧ࠊ୕ࡢἲⓗㄽⅬࠖ㈈ᅋἲேࢺࣛࢫࢺ 60ࠗᅜ㝿ၟྲྀᘬ࡟క࠺ἲⓗㅖၥ㢟㸦10㸧࠘㸦㈈ᅋἲேࢺࣛࢫࢺ 60ࠊ2002㸧92 㡫ࠋ
49 ቑ஭Ặࡣࠊ1996 ᖺࡢㄽᩥ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢホ౯ࢆ⤫ྜࡉࡏࡿ࠿
ྰ࠿ࡢ㆟ㄽࡣࠊ⫯ᐃ࡜ྰᐃࡢ࡝ࡕࡽࡢ❧ሙ࠿ࡽ࡛ࡶ⌮ㄽୖㄝ᫂ྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿࡀࠊ࡝ࡕࡽࡶỴᐃⓗ࡞ㄽᣐ࡟Ḟࡅࡿ࡜ホ౯ࡍࡿࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢホ౯ࢆ᏶඲⤫ྜࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡣࠊ⤫ྜࡋࡓไᗘ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᇳ⾜ࢥࢫࢺ࡜⣡⛯⪅ࡢࢥࣥࣉࣛ࢖࢔ࣥࢫࢥࢫࢺ
ࡢ཮᪉ࡀୖ᪼ࡋ࡚ࡋࡲ࠺ࡇ࡜ࢆ⌮⏤࡟ྰᐃⓗ࡛࠶ࡿࠋYoshihiro Masui, Transfer pricing and Customs Duties, Bulletin for International Fiscal
Documentation, Vol 50, No 7, at 317, 319, 1996.
50 Liu Ping, supra note 47, at 119.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Liu Ping, Transfer Pricing, Customs, Duties and VAT Rules: Can We Bridge the Gap?,
World Commerce Review, Vol 1, at 37-38, 2007.
54 WCO, Meeting of the Focus Group on Transfer Pricing Brussels, 26 October 2007,
Summary of the proceedings, at 1, 2007.
46
47

12

（ 464 ）

㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᑐࡍࡿᙳ㡪ࢆᐜㄆࡋ࡚࠸ࡃࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸࡜ࡢぢゎࢆሗ࿌ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 55ࠋ ࡇࡇࡲ࡛ࡢᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞㆟ㄽࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ᏶඲࡞ホ౯⤫ྜࡣᅔ㞴࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡢぢゎ࡟⮳ࡗࡓࡶࡢ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ௒ᚋࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢホ౯ࢆᚲせ࡞⠊ᅖ࡟࠾࠸࡚᥋㏆ࡉࡏࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿಶูၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸᳨࡚ウࡋ࡚࠸ࡃࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
2㸫2 ᳨ウ᱌࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㆟ㄽཬࡧศᯒ
2㸫2㸫1 ࠕ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࠖ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝(1) ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࡣࠊᅜ㝿ⓗ࡟ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ➨ 1 ᮲ղ㸦a㸧ཬࡧࡑࡢὀ㔘࡟࠾࠸࡚つᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 56ࠋ኎ᡭ࡜㈙ᡭ࡜ࡢ㛫࡟≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀ࠶ࡿሙྜ࡟ࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸ࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ࢆุᐃࡍࡿ㝿࡟⏝࠸ࡽࢀࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸
࡜ุᐃࡉࢀࡿ౛♧࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ௨ୗࡢ 3 ࡘࢆᣲࡆ࡚࠸ࡿ 57ࠋ౛♧ձ ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀࠊᙜヱ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㏻ᖖࡢ౯᱁タᐃ᪉ἲ࡟㐺ྜࡍࡿ᪉ἲ࡛ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀタᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠋ
౛♧ղ ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀ≉Ṧࡢ㛵ಀ࡟࡞࠸㈙ᡭ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㈍኎࡟࠾ࡅࡿ኎ᡭࡢ౯᱁タᐃ᪉ἲ࡟㐺ྜࡍࡿ᪉ἲ࡛ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀタᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠋ
౛♧ճ ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀࠊࡍ࡭࡚ࡢ㈝⏝࡟฼┈ 58ࢆຍ࠼ࡓ㢠ࢆᅇ཰ࡍࡿࡢ࡟༑ศ࡞
౯᱁࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ᫂ࡽ࠿࡜࡞ࡗࡓሙྜࠋ
(2) 2007 ᖺࣇ࢛࣮࢝ࢫࢢ࣮ࣝࣉ఍ྜ௨ᚋࡢ㆟ㄽ
2010 ᖺ࡟ࠊTCCV ࡣࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢぢゎ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ23.1 ࢆබ⾲ࡋࡓࠋTCCV ࡣࠊࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ23.1 ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ
஦౛࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࢆ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾࠸࡚ά⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀㄆ
ࡵࡽࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡢぢゎࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 59ࠋ

Id., at 2.
Ỉ㔝࣭๓ᥖὀ 45࣭197 㡫ࠋ
57 ⤒῭⏘ᴗ┬࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ༓஑ⓒ஑༑ᅄᖺࡢ㛵⛯ཬࡧ㈠᫆࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⯡༠ᐃ➨୐᮲ࡢᐇ᪋࡟㛵ࡍࡿ༠ᐃࠖ
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/wto_agreements/marrakech/html/wto09m.ht
ml㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋ
58 ௦⾲ⓗ࡞ᮇ㛫㸦౛࠼ࡤ 1 ᖺ㸧࡟ྠ㢮㈌≀ࢆ㈍኎ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾᚓࡽࢀࡿ௻ᴗࡢ฼┈ࡢ⥲㢠ࢆ཯ᫎࡍࡿ༢఩ᙜࡓࡾࡢ฼┈ࢆᣦࡍࠋ
59 WCO, TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON CUSTOMS VALUATION - COMMENTARY
55
56

23.1, Examination of the expression “circumstances surrounding the sale” under Article
1.2 (a) in relation to the use of transfer pricing studies, 29 October 2010, 2010, para 9.
13（ 465 ）

ࡑࡢᚋࠊࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ23.1 ࡢぢゎࢆᨭᣢࡍࡿ ICC ࡣࠊICC ࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ࢫࢸ࢖ࢺ࣓ࣥࢺ࡟࠾
࠸࡚ࠊࡼࡾලయⓗ࡞ 3 ࡘࡢᥦゝࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋICC ࡣࠊ➨ 1 ࡟ࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾࠸᳨࡚ドࡍࡿ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆ‶ࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠊ୍⯡ⓗ࡟≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸࡜ุᐃ࡛ࡁࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᥦゝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 60ࠋ➨ 2 ࡟ࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ❧ド㈨ᩱ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ᩥ᭩ࡢ᭷⏝ᛶࢆㄆ㆑ࡍ࡭
ࡁ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡀ⊂⮬࡟せồࡍࡿ᝟ሗࡀ࠶ࡿሙྜ࡟ࡣࠊࡑࡢ᝟ሗ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶ᫂ࡽ
࠿࡟ࡍ࡭ࡁࡇ࡜ࢆᥦゝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 61ࠋ➨ 3 ࡟ࠊከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆࡢᶵ⬟࡜ࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾࠸࡚ά⏝࡛ࡁࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᥦゝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 62ࠋ
 WCO ࢞࢖ࢻࡣࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊḟࡢࡼ࠺࡞ぢゎࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 63ࠋ౛♧ձࢆ❧ドࡍࡿ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒ㸦〇ရࡢᛶ㉁ࠊ㈍኎ᙜ஦⪅ࡢᙺ๭ཬࡧᶵ⬟㸧ࢆ❧ド㈨ᩱ࡜ࡋ࡚ά⏝ࡍࡿవᆅࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ౛♧ճ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ฼┈ࡣ᫂☜࡟ᐃ⩏ࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࠿ࡽࠊࡇࡢ฼┈ࢆႠᴗ฼┈࡜ᤊ࠼ࠊႠᴗ฼┈ࢆẚ㍑ࡋࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒ㸦TNMM ➼㸧ࢆ❧ド㈨ᩱ࡜ࡋ࡚ά⏝ࡍࡿవᆅࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ౛♧ճࢆ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒ࡟ࡼ
ࡾ❧ドࡍࡿ࡟ࡣㄢ㢟ࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜ࡉࢀࡿࠋࡑࢀࡣࠊ౛♧ճ࡜⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ୧⪅ࡀせồࡍࡿ᳨ド฼┈࡟▩┪ࡀ⏕ࡌ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿࠋ౛♧ճࡣࠊ㍺ฟ⪅ࡢ฼┈ࢆ᳨ドࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ᝿ᐃࡋ
࡚࠸ࡿ୍᪉࡛ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡣ㍺ධ⪅ࡢ฼┈ࢆ᳨ドࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ୍⯡ⓗ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ࡜ࡇࢁࡀࠊ
ࡇࡢ▩┪࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ㍺ධ⪅ࡢ฼┈ࢆ᳨ドࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ㛫᥋ⓗ࡟㍺ฟ⪅ࡢ฼┈ࢆ᳨ドࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࡓࡵࠊ኱ࡁ࡞ၥ㢟࡜ࡣ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸࡜ࡉࢀࡿࠋ
(3) ศᯒ ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᐇ㝿࡟㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢホ౯ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡣࠊྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡛࠶ࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ࢆ᳨ドࡍࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ୍᪉࡛ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᐇ
㝿࡟㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢホ౯ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡣࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓ࡢุᐃ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒ࡜≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓ࡢุᐃࡢ⤖ᯝࢆ᥋㏆ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࡀࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࢆ᥋㏆ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡘ࡞ࡀࡿ࡜ホ౯࡛ࡁࡿࠋ
≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓ࡢุᐃ᪉ἲࡢ 1 ࡘ࡛࠶ࡿ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾࠸࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝ࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡣ኱ࡁ࡞ព⩏ࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠼ࡿࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ
Jovanovich Ặࡣࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࡢ≉ᚩ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊձ᪉ἲㄽࡣ☜❧ࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠊղ᪉ἲㄽࡢ㐺⏝㡰ᗎࠊඃඛ㡰఩ࡣ࡞࠸ࠊճ㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ࡟グ㍕ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ౛♧ࡣ࠶ࡃࡲ୍࡛౛࡛࠶ࡿࠊմ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡜ྠᵝࡢ┠ⓗព㆑ࡀ࠶ࡿࠊࡇ࡜ࢆᣲࡆ࡚࠾ࡾ 64ࠊձ࠿
ICC, supra note 32, at 2-5.
Id., at 6.
62 Id.
63 WCO, supra note 34, para 5.2.2. ᐇົࡢ⌧ሙ࡛ࠊ❧ドࡉࢀࡿ౛♧ࡢ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝ࡣࠊձཪࡣ
60
61

ճ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
Juan Martin Jovanovich, Comparison between Customs Valuation and OECD64

14

（ 466 ）

ࡽճ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊᴫࡡ WCO ࢞࢖ࢻࡢぢゎ࡜୍⮴ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡼ࠺࡟ᛮࢃࢀࡿࠋմ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ
WCO ࢞࢖ࢻ࡛ࡩࢀࡽࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࡀࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡜ྠ
ᵝࡢ┠ⓗព㆑ࢆᣢࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࠿☜ㄆࡍࡿࠋJovanovich Ặࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊ㛵㐃⪅㛫ྲྀᘬࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡢᙳ㡪ࢆཷࡅ࡚࠸࡞࠸ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆせồࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ホ౯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 65ࠋࡇࡇ࡛せồࡉࢀࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡣࠊ
ࡲࡉ࡟⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡿ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ホ౯࡛ࡁࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡢᙳ㡪ࢆཷࡅ࡚࠸࡞࠸ྲྀᘬ౯᱁㸦Ҹ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁㸧࡛㍺ධྲྀᘬࡀ⾜ࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ❧ドࡍࡿሙᡤࡣࠊ㈍኎ࡢ≧ἣ࡟ಀࡿ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ஭ᮧẶࡶ Jovanovich Ặ࡜ྠᵝ࡟ࠊࠕ୧⪅ࡢ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟࠾ࡅࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢᑂᰝࡣࠊ
≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍ࡜࠸࠺ඹ㏻ㄆ㆑ࢆࡶࡕࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡋ࡚࠸
࡞࠸ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆồࡵ࡚࠸ࡿⅬ࡛ࠊ┠ⓗࡀ㢮ఝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠖ66࡜ホ౯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ௨ୖࡢほⅬ࠿ࡽࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡟࠾࠸࡚⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡜
࡯ࡰྠᵝࡢ┠ⓗព㆑ࢆᣢࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜࠸࠼ࡼ࠺ࠋ
ࡉࡽ࡟Ỉ㔝Ặࡣࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࢆ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜ࡢ᥋㏆ሙᡤ࡜࡞ࡿ᰿ᣐ
࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᙜヱࢸࢫࢺࡀ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ᯝࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿᙺ๭࡟╔┠ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ప౯ホ౯ࡢ⵹↛ᛶࢆุ᩿ࡍࡿᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿつᐃ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡀᐇົ㠃࡛ࠊᡤᚓ⛣㌿ࡢ⵹↛ᛶࡢุ᩿ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿⅬ࡟㢮ఝᛶࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜ホ౯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 67ࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊྠᵝࡢᡭ㡰㸦ձᅜእྲྀᘬࡢᐇែࢆᢕᥱࠊղᡤᚓ⛣㌿ࡢ⵹↛ᛶࡢุ᩿㸦㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣప౯ホ౯ࡢ⵹↛ᛶࡢุ᩿㸧ࠊճ⵹↛ᛶࡀ㧗࠸࡜ุ᩿ࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊᐇ㝿ࡢྲྀᘬࢆㄆࡵࡎࠊつᐃࡉࢀࡿ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆ᳨ウࠊ
մẚ㍑ᑐ㇟ྲྀᘬࡢẚ㍑ྍ⬟ᛶࢆ᳨ウ㸧࡛ᐇ᪋ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ⤂௓ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 68ࠋ 㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ᡭ㡰ղࡢᙺ๭ࢆᢸࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡣࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟ࡼࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓ࢆุᐃࡍࡿ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡼࡗ࡚ᙜヱࢸࢫࢺࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃࢆᐇ㝿࡟⾜࠺ሙᡤ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ㐣ᗘࡢẚ㍑ྍ⬟ᛶࡢホ౯㸦౛࠼ࡤ〇ရࡢ㢮ఝᛶ㸧ࢆ୚࠼ࡿᚲせࡣ࡞࠸ࡶࡢ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿ 69ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆࡢᶵ⬟࡜ࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶ᭷⏝࡞ẚ㍑᝟ሗ࡜࡞ࡾ࠺ࡿࠋ
TCCV ࡣࠊ2016 ᖺ࡟ࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾࠸࡚ TNMM ἲࢆ⏝࠸ࡓ⛣㌿౯

Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation - Two Worlds to
Tax as One - Edited by Anuschka Bakker and Belema Obuoforibo, (IBFD, 2009), at 175.
࿴ヂ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊỈ㔝࣭๓ᥖὀ 45࣭215 㡫ࠋ
65 Juan Martin Jovanovich, Customs Valuation and Transfer Pricing: Is It Possible toHarmonize Customs and Tax Rules? (Second Edition), (Kluwer Law International,
2018), at 14.
66 ஭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ 25࣭42 㡫ࠋ
67 Ỉ㔝࣭๓ᥖὀ 45࣭215 㡫ࠋ
68 Ỉ㔝࣭๓ᥖὀ 45࣭215-216 㡫ࠋ
69 Ỉ㔝࣭๓ᥖὀ 45࣭216 㡫ࠋ
15（ 467 ）

᱁ศᯒࡀά⏝ྍ⬟࡞ሙྜࡢࢣ࣮ࢫࢫࢱࢹ࢕ 14.1 ࢆබ⾲ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 70ࠋ2017 ᖺ࡟ࡣࠊCP ἲࢆ⏝࠸ࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡀά⏝ྍ⬟࡞ሙྜࡢࢣ࣮ࢫࢫࢱࢹ࢕ 14.2 ࢆබ⾲ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 71ࠋࡇࢀࡽࡢ
ࢣ࣮ࢫࢫࢱࢹ࢕ࡣࠊ௻ᴗࡀᐇ㝿࡟ࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾࠸࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࢆ
ά⏝ࡍࡿ࠺࠼࡛኱ࡁ࡞ᣦᶆ࡟࡞ࡿ࡜ホ౯࡛ࡁࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊ௻ᴗഃ࡟❧ド㈐௵ࡀ࠶ࡿ
ࡇ࡜ࢆ㚷ࡳࡿ࡜ࠊICC ࡀᥦゝࡍࡿࡼ࠺࡟ࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾࠸࡚ᚲせ࡜ࡉࢀࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ᝟ሗࢆ᫂☜࡟ᐃ⩏ࡋࠊ࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡞ᙧ࡛❧ドࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࡢ࠿ࢆ௻ᴗ
࡟ᑐࡋ࡚㛤♧ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ௨ୖࡢศᯒ࠿ࡽࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࡣࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡜ྠᵝࡢ┠ⓗࢆᣢࡕࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ᯝࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿᙺ๭ࢆ㚷ࡳࡿ࡜㐣ᗘ࡞ẚ㍑ྍ⬟ᛶࡢホ౯ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸࡜ホ౯࡛ࡁࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊᙜヱࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝ࡣࠊ⌮ㄽୖ୙ྍ⬟࡛ࡣ࡞࠸࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ
2㸫2㸫2 ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᑐࡍࡿᙳ㡪ࡢᐜㄆ(1) ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯௜㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯WCO ࢞࢖ࢻ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࣜࢫࢡࢆ௜㝶ࡍࡿ㍺ධྲྀᘬࡣࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲
㡯௜㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡜ྠᵝࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࢆ᳨ウࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡉࢀࡿ 72ࠋ1982 ᖺ࡟ࠊTCCV ࡣࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯௜㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢぢゎ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ4.1 ࢆබ⾲ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ4.1 ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡜ࡣࠊྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆᬻᐃⓗ࡞ࡶࡢ࡜ࡋࠊ᭱⤊ⓗ࡞ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ㝿࡟⪃៖ࡍࡿせ⣲ࢆつᐃࡋࡓ᮲㡯ࢆᣦࡍ࡜ࡉࢀࡿ 73ࠋཎ๎࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ㍺
ධ㈌≀ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁࡟୍ᐃࡢㄪᩚ 74ࢆຍ࠼ࡓ㢠ࢆࡶࡗ࡚⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡿ㸦㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ➨ 1 ᮲ձ㸧75ࠋࡇࡇ࡛࠸࠺⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁࡜ࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ࡘࡁࠊ኎ᡭ
࡟ᑐࡋཪࡣ኎ᡭࡢࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ㈙ᡭ࡟ࡼࡾ⾜ࢃࢀࡓཪࡣ⾜ࢃࢀࡿ࡭ࡁᨭᡶࡢ⥲㢠࡛࠶ࡿ㸦㛵⛯
WCO, CASE STUDY 14.1, USE OF TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION
WHEN EXAMINING RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 1.2. (a)OF THE AGREEMENT, 2016.
http://www.wcoomd.org/~/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/valuation/instruments-and-tools/case-study/case-study-14_1-en.pdf?db=web㸦᭱⤊ゼၥ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋ
71 WCO, CASE STUDY 14.2, USE OF TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION
WHEN EXAMINING RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 1.2. (a)OF THE AGREEMENT, 2017.
http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/media/press-release/2017/case-stu
dy-14_2_en-release-version.pdf㸦᭱⤊ゼၥ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋ
72 WCO, supra note 34, para 5.3.2.
73 WCO, TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON CUSTOMS VALUATION ̽ COMMENTARY
4.1, PRICE REVIEW CLAUSES, 23 March 1982, para 1, 1982.
74 ࡇࡢㄪᩚࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ➨ 8 ᮲࡟࠾࠸࡚つᐃࡉࢀࡓㄪᩚࡀヱᙜࡋࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣヱᙜࡋ࡞࠸ࡶࡢ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ
75 WCO, supra note 73, para 6. ཬࡧつᐃ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ⤒῭⏘ᴗ┬࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ࣭๓ᥖὀ
57ࠋ
70

16

（ 468 ）ホ౯༠ᐃ㝃ᒓ᭩Ϩࡢ➨ 1 ᮲ࡢつᐃ࡟㛵ࡍࡿὀ㔘㸧76ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ㍺ධ
㈌≀ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡣࠊᙜヱ᮲㡯࡟ᚑࡗ࡚ᨭᡶࢃࢀࡓࠊཪࡣᨭᡶࢃࢀࡿ᭱⤊ⓗ࡞⥲㢠ࢆࡶࡗ࡚⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ 77ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟࠾ࡅࡿཎ
๎ἲࡢ㐺⏝ࢆ୙ྍ⬟࡜ࡍࡿ᮲௳㸦㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ➨ 1 ᮲ձ㸦b㸧㸧࡟ࡣᇶᮏⓗ࡟ࡣヱᙜࡋ࡞࠸࡜ࡉࢀࡿ 78ࠋ㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ➨ 13 ᮲࡟ࡼࡾ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢỴᐃࢆ୍ᐃᮇ㛫㐜ࡽࡏࡿࡼ࠺࡞⏦࿌
᪉ἲ 79ࡶㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ➨ 13 ᮲㸧ࡇ࡜ࡶ㚷ࡳࡿ࡜ࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࡢࡳࢆ⌮⏤࡟ࠊཎ๎ἲ࡟ࡼࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃࢆྰᐃࡋ࡚ࡣ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 80ࠋ(2) 2007 ᖺࣇ࢛࣮࢝ࢫࢢ࣮ࣝࣉ఍ྜ௨ᚋࡢ㆟ㄽ
ICC ࡣࠊICC ࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ࢫࢸ࢖ࢺ࣓ࣥࢺ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐ
ࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ3 ࡘࡢᥦゝࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋICC ࡣࠊ➨ 1 ࡟ࠊ⿵ൾㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁ࡢ୍㒊࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆ㆑ࡋࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢᵓᡂせ⣲࡜࡞ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ
ᢎㄆࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡍࡿ 81ࠋ➨ 2 ࡟ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ㸦ୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉ࡢ㸧⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢᙳ㡪ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟཯ᫎࡉࡏࡿ᪉ἲࡣࠊຍ㔜ᖹᆒ㛵⛯⋡ࢆ㐺⏝ࡍࡿ᪉ἲ 82ཪࡣศ㢮ࢥ࣮ࢻ࡟ᚑࡗ࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㓄ศࡍࡿ᪉ἲ 83ࡢ࠸ࡎࢀ࠿࡟ࡼࡾ࡞ࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡍࡿ 84ࠋ➨ 3
࡟ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ㸦ୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉ࡢ㸧⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿ࡟࠶ࡓࡗ࡚ࠊ
ㄪᩚᑐ㇟ྲྀᘬ࡟㛵ࡍࡿໟᣓⓗ࡞ಟṇ⏦࿌᭩ࢆᥦฟࡍࡿ⩏ົࢆㄢࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࠊཬࡧࡇ
ࡢಟṇ⏦࿌᭩ࡢᥦฟ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚⏦࿌₃ࢀ࡟క࠺⨩๎ࣜࢫࢡ࠿ࡽゎᨺࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ
ᥦゝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 85ࠋ
WCO ࢞࢖ࢻࡣࠊᐇ㝿࡟㔠㖹➼ࡢᤵཷࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡼ࠺࡞⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁ࢆᵓᡂࡍࡿ୍㒊࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ㄆ㆑ࡋࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆㄆࡵ
࡚࠸ࡿ 86ࠋࡉࡽ࡟ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᑐࡍࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢᙳ㡪ࢆ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡀ⪃៖ࡍࡿሙྜࠊ
⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢヲ⣽࡜᭱⤊ⓗ࡞㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࢆᢕᥱࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡣಟṇ⏦࿌

Id., para 5. ཬࡧつᐃ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊྠୖࠋ
Id.
78 Id. ཬࡧつᐃ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊྠୖࠋ
76
77

㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ➨ 13 ᮲ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ᭱⤊Ỵᐃࢆ㐜ࡽࡏࡿᚲせࡀ⏕ࡌࡓሙྜ࡟ࡣࠊ㍺ධ
⪅ࡣ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ᢸಖࢆᥦ౪ࡍࡿࡼ࠺せồࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦㛵⛯ホ౯༠ᐃ➨ 13 ᮲㸧ࠋ
80 WCO, supra note 34, para 5.3.3. ཬࡧつᐃ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ⤒῭⏘ᴗ┬࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ࣭๓ᥖ
ὀ 57ࠋ
81 ICC, supra note 32, at 5.
82 ຍ㔜ᖹᆒ㛵⛯⋡ࡣࠊ࠶ࡿᖺࡢ㛵⛯⥲㢠ࢆྠᖺࡢྛࠎࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢྜィ㢠࡛๭ࡿࡇ࡜࡟
ࡼࡗ࡚ィ⟬ࡉࢀࡿࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡣࠊィ⟬ࡉࢀࡓຍ㔜ᖹᆒ㛵⛯⋡ࢆ⏝࠸࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ୍ᣓࡋ࡚㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟཯ᫎࡉࡏ࡚࠸ࡃࡶࡢ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ
83 ศ㢮ࢥ࣮ࢻࡣࠊࡍ࡭࡚ࡢၟရࢥ࣮ࢻཬࡧ㛵㐃㍺ධࢹ࣮ࢱࢆ㛤♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㍺ධ⪅ཬࡧ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࠿ࡽᥦ౪ࡉࢀࡿ᝟ሗࢆࡶ࡜࡟సᡂࡉࢀࡿࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡣࠊసᡂࡉࢀࡓศ㢮ࢥ࣮ࢻ࡟ᚑࡗ࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡈ࡜ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟཯ᫎࡉࡏ࡚࠸ࡃࡶࡢ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ
84 ICC, supra note 32, at 5.
85 Id., at 6.
86 WCO, supra note 34, para 5.3.2.
79

17（ 469 ）

᭩ࢆᥦฟࡍࡿ⩏ົࢆㄢࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿ 87ࠋ௒ᚋࡢㄢ㢟ࡣࠊྲྀᘬࡈ࡜࡟⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊྲྀᘬࡢ㞟ィ࣮࣋ࢫ࡛࡞ࡉࢀࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ࠸࠿࡟ᙳ㡪ࡉࡏࡿ࠿࡛࠶ࡾࠊ
ICC ࡀᥦゝࡋࡓຍ㔜ᖹᆒ㛵⛯⋡ࢆ㐺⏝ࡍࡿ᪉ἲཪࡣศ㢮ࢥ࣮ࢻ࡟ᚑࡗ࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㓄ศࡍࡿ᪉ἲࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 88ࠋ(3) ศᯒ
WCO ࢞࢖ࢻࡢぢゎࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡿ࡜ࠊ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁ࢆᵓᡂࡍࡿ୍㒊࡜ࡋ࡚ᢅࢃࢀࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣࠊᐇ㝿࡟㔠㖹➼ࡢᤵཷࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡼ࠺࡞⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡛
࠶ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ศ㢮ࡋࠊ࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡞⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࡢ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢ㆟ㄽࡀ୙༑ศ࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊࡇ
ࡢⅬ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚☜ㄆࡍࡿࠋ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ᭦ṇฎศ࡜ࡋ࡚⛯ົᙜᒁࡀ⾜࠺ㄪᩚ࡜ࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ᭦ṇฎศࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿ┠ⓗ࡛⮬୺ⓗ࡟⾜࠺ㄪᩚࡢ 2 ✀㢮࡟኱ࡁࡃศ㢮ࡉࢀࡿ 89ࠋ⛯ົᙜᒁࡀ⾜࠺⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡣࠊ➨୍ḟㄪᩚ㸦Primary Adjustment㸧ࠊᑐᛂⓗㄪᩚ㸦Corresponding Adjustment㸧ࠊ➨஧ḟㄪᩚ㸦Secondary Adjustment㸧ࡢ 3 ࡘࡢㄪᩚࡀヱᙜࡍࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿ 90ࠋࡇࢀࡽࡢㄪᩚࡣࠊᅜእ㛵㐃ྲྀᘬࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡓࡶࡢ
࡜ࡳ࡞ࡋ࡚ࠊㄢ⛯ᡤᚓࢆ෌ィ⟬ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟㛵㐃ࡋ࡚⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ࡣᙳ
㡪ࢆཬࡰࡉࡎࠊㄢ⛯ᡤᚓ࡟ࡢࡳᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍⅬ࡟≉ᚩࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ⛯ົᙜᒁࡀ⾜࠺⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣࠊྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡑࡢࡶࡢࡢㄪᩚ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ࡣᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡉ࡞࠸࡜⪃࠼ࡽ
ࢀࡿ 91ࠋ ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ⮬୺ⓗ࡟⾜࠺⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡣࠊ⿵ൾㄪᩚ㸦Compensating adjustment㸧ࠊ౯᱁ࠕ⣡ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢ 2 ࡘࡀヱᙜࡍࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿ 92ࠋ⿵ൾㄪᩚࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥ࡟ࡼࡿ࡜ࠊ
⛯⪅ࡀࠊ㛵㐃⪅㛫࡛ᐇ㝿࡟ྲྀᘬࡉࢀࡓ౯᱁࡜␗࡞ࡿ࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊ⮬ࡽࡢ⪃࠼࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊ
㛵㐃⪅㛫ྲྀᘬࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋ࡚⛯ົୖࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁࡜ࡋ࡚ሗ࿌ࡍࡿ㝿ࡢㄪᩚࠋࡇࡢㄪᩚࡣࠊ⣡⛯⏦࿌᭩ࡀᥦฟࡉࢀࡿ๓࡟⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠖ࡜ㄝ᫂ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 93ࠋ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡣࠊෆᅜἲே࡜ᅜእ㛵㐃⪅࡛⾜ࡗࡓྲྀᘬ࡟ࡘࡁࠊࡑࡢ౯᱁ࢆࠊ௬౯᱁ྲྀᘬࡢ⢭⟬ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࣏ࣜࢩ࣮࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⢭⟬ࠊ஦๓☜ㄆ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⢭⟬ࠊ஦ᴗኚ᭦࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⢭⟬ࠊ᰿ᣐࡢ࡞࠸⢭⟬➼87
88

Id., para 5.3.3.
Id., para 5.3.4.

࿴Ἴⱥ㞝ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢᐇົⓗᑐᛂࠑୖࠒࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 37 ᕳ 9 ྕ 119
㡫㸦2016㸧ࠋ
90 ࿴Ἴ࣭๓ᥖὀ 89࣭120-121 㡫ࠋ
91 ⩚ᗋṇ⚽ࠗᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ၥ㢟࡜ᨻᗓ㛫༠㆟࠘㸦኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍ࠊ2002㸧180 㡫ࠋ
92 ࿴Ἴ࣭๓ᥖὀ 89࣭121 㡫ࠋཬࡧ᳃Ặࡣࠊࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞ㄪᩚ㔠࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⿵ൾㄪᩚ
㔠࡜⾲⌧ࡍࡿࠋᙜヱㄪᩚ㔠࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ㛵ಀ⪅㛫ྲྀᘬ࡟࠾࠸࡚⛣㌿౯᱁࣏ࣜࢩ࣮࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁྲྀ
ᘬ౯᱁ࢆタᐃࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⟬ᐃࢆ⾜ࡗࡓ⤖ᯝࠊᚲせ࡜࡞ࡗࡓ⿵ൾㄪᩚ࡜ㄝ᫂ࡍࡿࠋ
᳃࣭๓ᥖὀ 22࣭458 㡫ࠋ
93 OECD, supra note 26, at 25. ࿴ヂ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲఍ࠗOECD ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥࠕከᅜ⡠௻ᴗ࡜⛯ົᙜᒁࡢࡓࡵࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⟬ᐃ࡟㛵ࡍࡿᣦ㔪ࠖ
㸦2010 ᖺ∧㸧࠘㸦᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲఍ࠊ2010㸧11 㡫ࠋ
89

18（ 470 ）

࡟ࡼࡾㄪᩚࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ᤵཷࡍࡿ㔠㖹࡜ࡉࢀࡿ 94ࠋ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ⮬୺ⓗ࡟⾜࠺⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣࠊᐇ㝿࡟㔠㖹➼ࡢᤵཷࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡓࡵࠊ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁ࢆᵓᡂࡍࡿ୍㒊࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋࡉࡽ࡟ᙜヱ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣࠊ୍⯡ⓗ࡟⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ᭦ṇฎศࢆචࢀࡿࡓࡵ࡟⣡⛯⪅ࡀ⮬୺ⓗ࡟⾜࠺ࡓࡵࠊ㛵⛯ࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ࠾࠾ࡼࡑ┠ⓗ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࡟ࡶὀ┠ࡋࡓ࠸ࠋ㛵⛯࡟ᑐࡍࡿ⛒⛯ᅇ㑊ࡢពᅗࡀᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡑࡢᙳ㡪࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⪃៖ࡋ࡚ࡶၥ㢟ࡣ࡞࠸࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ
ᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞㆟ㄽ࡛ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃㄪᩚ࡜ࡋ࡚ᢅ࠸ࠊࢥ࣓ࣥࢱࣜ
࣮4.1 ࡢぢゎ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸ࡓྲྀᢅ࠸ࢆ๓ᥦ࡟㆟ㄽࢆ㐍ࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃㄪᩚ࡜ࡋ࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿࡢ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢ㆟ㄽࡀ୙༑ศ࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊࡇ
ࡢⅬ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚☜ㄆࡍࡿࠋࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ4.1 ࡢぢゎ࡟ࡼࡿ࡜ࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡜ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ௨๓ࡢ஦๓ⓗ࡞ዎ⣙࡟Ꮡᅾࡍࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢㄪᩚつᐃ࡜ᩚ⌮࡛ࡁࡿࠋ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ⮬୺ⓗ࡟⾜࠺⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣࠊAPA ࡛
஦๓࡟つᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢチᐜ⠊ᅖෆ࡟ࠊྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀ཰ࡲࡿࡼ࠺ᐇ㝿࡟㔠㖹➼ࡢᤵཷࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢチᐜ⠊ᅖཬࡧࡑࡢ⠊ᅖ࡟཰ࡵࡿࡓࡵࡢㄪᩚ᪉ἲࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ⤖ᯝ࡟ࡼࡾタᐃࡉࢀࡿࠋ௨ୖࡢࡇ࡜࠿ࡽࠊ㍺ධ
ྲྀᘬ๓࡟ࠊAPA ࡟つᐃࡉࢀࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ⤖ᯝ㸦⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢチᐜ⠊ᅖཬࡧࡑࡢ⠊ᅖ࡟཰ࡵࡿࡓࡵࡢㄪᩚ᪉ἲ㸧ࡣࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡜ࡋ࡚ᐜㄆࡉࢀࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊAPA ࡟つᐃࡉࢀࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ⤖ᯝ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚⏕ࡌࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲
㡯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ホ౯࡛ࡁࡿࠋ
ICC ࡟ࡼࡿ➨ 2ࠊ3 ࡢᥦゝࡣࠊᡭ⥆㠃ཬࡧฎ⌮㠃࡟㛵ࡍࡿࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ஭ᮧẶࡣࠊࡇࢀࡽ
ࡢᥦゝ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸ࡓᡭ⥆ࡸฎ⌮᪉ἲࡀᐇ⾜ࡉࢀࢀࡤࠊ஦ᴗᖺᗘᮎ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⿵ൾㄪᩚࢆ୍ᣓ࡛
ࡼࡾ⡆౽࡟ฎ⌮ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ホ౯ࡋࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡜⣡⛯⪅ࡢ཮᪉࡟࡜ࡗ࡚฼౽ᛶ
ࡀ㧗࠸࡜⪃࠼࡚࠸ࡿ 95ࠋ฼౽ᛶࡢ㧗ࡉࡣ㨩ຊⓗ࡛࠶ࡿࡀࠊ␃ពࡋ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࡶ
࠶ࡿࠋ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉ࡢ࠸ࡎࢀࡢㄪᩚࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡿ࠿୙᫂☜࡞⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆྵࡴᬻᐃⓗ࡞ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ᢎㄆࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀせㄳࡉࢀࡿࠋ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡣࠊࡑࡢᢎㄆࢆ୚࠼ࡿ࡟㝿ࡋࠊ⣡⛯⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ᝟ሗࡢᥦฟࢆせồࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊᐇ㝿࡟⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡓᚋࠊ
᭱⤊ⓗ࡞ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀ☜ᐃࡋࡓẁ㝵࡛ࠊ⣡⛯⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ಟṇ⏦࿌ࢆせồࡋࠊࡑࡢ⏦࿌࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟క࠺㛵⛯ࡢ㏣ᚩཬࡧ㑏௜ࢆᐇ᪋ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ⪃៖ࡍࡿሙྜࠊୖ᪉ㄪᩚ࡜ୗ᪉ㄪᩚ࡜࡛␗࡞ࡿྲྀᢅ࠸
ࢆ⾜࠺࠿ྰ࠿ࡀ㆟ㄽ࡜࡞ࡿࠋୖ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊᙜヱㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡀቑ㢠ࡉࢀࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡣ㛵⛯ࡢ㏣ᚩࢆㄢࡉࢀࡿࠋୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯ఀ⸨㞝஧㸻ⴗ㇂ᛅ
ࠗᅗㄝ ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࠝ඲ゞ➨ 2 ∧ࠞ࠘㸦⛯ົ◊✲఍ฟ∧ᒁࠊ2012㸧
212-213㡫ࠋ
95 ஭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ 25࣭38 㡫ࠋ
94

19（ 471 ）

᱁ㄪᩚࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊᙜヱㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡀῶ㢠ࡉࢀࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡣ㛵⛯ࡢ㑏௜ࢆཷࡅࡽࢀࡿࠋ୍㒊ࡢᅜࡢ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡛ࡣࠊୖ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢࡳࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡼ࠺ࡔࡀ 96ࠊࡇࢀࡣㄢ⛯ࡢබᖹᛶࡀ☜ಖࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋ㛵⛯ࢆㄢࡍ┠ⓗࢆᅜෆ⏘ᴗࡢಖㆤࠊ࠸ࢃࡺࡿಖㆤ㛵⛯࡟୚࠼ࡓ 97ሙྜࠊ⛯཰ࡢ☜ಖ࡜࠸࠺ഃ
㠃ࡣⷧࡲࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋྛᅜࡢ㛵⛯ࢆㄢࡍ┠ⓗࡢ఩⨨௜ࡅ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊࡇࡢ㆟ㄽ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ
ぢゎࡀ␗࡞ࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ ௨ୖࡢศᯒ࠿ࡽࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟ࡘ࠸
࡚ࠊḟࡢࡼ࠺࡟ᩚ⌮࡛ࡁࡿࠋ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡍ࡭࡚ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛
⪃៖ࡍࡿᚲせࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ⮬୺ⓗ࡟⾜࠺⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢࡳࠊࡑࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࢆ᳨
ウࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ⮬୺ⓗ࡟⾜࠺⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ࠺ࡕ APA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃࡶࡢ
ࡣࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ホ౯࡛ࡁࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊᙜヱ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ
࠸࡚ࡣࠊୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉࠸ࡎࢀࡢㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
2㸫3 ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳
὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳࡛ࡣࠊ஦๓࡟⥾⤖ࡋ࡚࠸ࡓ APA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢᙳ㡪ࢆࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿ࠿ྰ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚தࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᮏ⠇࡛ࡣࠊ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳࡟
ᑐࡍࡿ࣑ࣗࣥ࣊ࣥ㈈ᨻ⿢ุᡤỴᐃཬࡧ ECJ ุỴࡢෆᐜ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ศᯒࡋࠊᮏ✏ࡢၥ㢟ព㆑࡬ࡢᑐᛂࢆ᳨ウࡋ࡚࠸ࡃࠋ
(1) ஦௳ᴫせཬࡧุỴෆᐜࠕAࠖ࡜ ࡲࡎࠊ஦௳ᴫせ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚☜ㄆࡍࡿ 98ࠋཎ࿌ࡣࠊ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ࣭ࢻ࢖ࢶ㸦௨ୗࠊ࠸࠺ࠋ㸧࡛࠶ࡾࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ㸦௨ୗࠊ
ࠕBࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧ࡢᏊ఍♫࡛࠶ࡿࠋA ࡜ B ࡣࠊAB 㛫࡛ࡢ௻ᴗࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆྲྀᘬ࡟࠾ࡅࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊࢻ࢖ࢶ⛯ົᙜᒁ࠿ࡽ APA ࡢ☜ㄆࢆཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᙜヱ APA ࡟ࡼࡾࠊṧవ฼┈ศ๭ἲ࡟ࡼࡾタᐃࡉࢀࡓႠᴗ
฼┈⋡ࡢチᐜ⠊ᅖࢆୖᅇࡿࠊཪࡣୗᅇࡿሙྜ࡟ࡣࠊ஦ᴗᖺᗘᮎ࡟࠾࠸࡚ AB 㛫࡛౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢᤵཷ࡟ࡼࡾ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
A ࡣࠊ2009 ᖺ 10 ᭶ 7 ᪥࠿ࡽ 2010
ᖺ 9 ᭶ 30 ᪥ࡲ࡛ࡢᮇ㛫࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊྛࠎࡢ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢཎ๎ἲ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ࡑࢀࡒࢀ
1.4㸣࠿ࡽ 6.7㸣ࡢ㛵⛯⋡ࢆ஌ࡌࡿࡇ࡜࡛⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡓ㛵⛯ࢆᨭᡶࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢᚋࠊ2010 ᖺ
WCO, supra note 34, para 5.3.
㛵⛯ࡢㄢ⛯┠ⓗ࡟ࡣࠊಖㆤ㛵⛯࡜㈈ᨻ㛵⛯ࡀ࠶ࡾࠊᚋ⪅࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣ㈈ᨻ཰ධࢆ୺せࡢ┠ⓗ࡜ࡍࡿࠋඛ㐍ᅜࡢከࡃࡣࠊಖㆤ㛵⛯ࡢ❧ሙࢆ࡜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㔠Ꮚ࣭๓ᥖὀ 5࣭781 㡫ࠋ
98 Judgment of 20 December 2017, Hamamatsu Photonics Deutschland GmbH v
Hauptzollamt München, C-529/16, EU:C:2017:984, paras 1-20. ࢆཧ↷ࡋࠊ஦௳ᴫせࢆࡲ࡜ࡵࡓࠋ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳ࢆ⤂௓ࡋࡓࡶࡢ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊEY ⛯⌮ኈἲே ኱ᖹὒ୍ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢ㛵⛯ୖࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟ኚ᭦ࡢྍ⬟ᛶ㸸Ḣᕞྖἲ⿢ุᡤ㸦ECJ㸧ࡢ⏬ᮇⓗ࡞ุỴࠖ㸦2018.1.18㸧
https://www.eytax.jp/tax-library/newsletters/pdf/japan_tax_alert_2_18_Jan_2018_j.pdf
㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2019 ᖺ 1 ᭶ 27 ᪥㸧
ࠋ
96

97

20

（ 472 ）

ᗘᮎ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ A ࡢႠᴗ฼┈⋡ࡀࠊAPA ࡟ࡼࡾタᐃࡉࢀࡓႠᴗ฼┈⋡ࡢチᐜ⠊ᅖࢆୗᅇࡾࠊ
A ࡣ B ࠿ࡽ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࢆཷྲྀࡿᙧ࡛ୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 5 ཧ↷㸧ࠋA ࡣࢻ࢖ࢶ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡟ᙜヱㄪᩚ࡟క࠺㛵⛯ࡢ㑏௜ࢆㄳồࡋࡓࡀࠊㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡞࠿ࡗࡓࡓࡵࠊA ࡣ
2016 ᖺ 9 ᭶ 15 ᪥࡟࣑ࣗࣥ࣊ࣥ㈈ᨻ⿢ุᡤ࡟ᥦッࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᅗ⾲ 5㸸὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳ࡢᴫせ 99ࢻ࢖ࢶ᪥ᮏࢻ࢖ࢶ⛯ົᙜᒁ

὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ

὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ࣭ࢻ࢖ࢶ
㸦A㸧
௦⌮㈍኎

㍺ධ㈌≀

㸦B㸧
౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠㸦ୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ㸧࣑ࣗࣥ࣊ࣥ㈈ᨻ⿢ุᡤࡣࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ᚑࡗ࡚⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡣࠊ஦ᴗᖺᗘᮎ࡟
࠾࠸࡚☜ᐃࡍࡿࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬࡟࠾ࡅࡿᮏ௳ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡣࠊ⥾⤖ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ APA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࣜࢫࢡࢆྵࢇࡔᬻᐃⓗ࡞౯᱁࡛࠶ࡿ 100ࠋࡼࡗ࡚ࠊᮏ௳ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡣᯫ✵ࡢ౯᱁࡛࠶ࡾࠊࡇࡢ౯᱁ࢆࡶࡗ࡚㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ࡛ࡁ࡞
࠸࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 101ࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ࣑ࣗࣥ࣊ࣥ㈈ᨻ⿢ุᡤࡣࠊECJ ࡟ 2 ࡘࡢ㉁ၥࢆᢞࡌ࡚࠸ࡿ 102ࠋ➨ 1 ࡟ࠊྲྀᘬ౯
᱁ࡀ஦ᴗᖺᗘᮎ࡟ㄪᩚࡉࢀࡿሙྜࠊᙜヱㄪᩚࡀ㛵⛯ࡢ㑏௜ཪ㏣ᚩࡢ࡝ࡕࡽ࡟ࡘ࡞ࡀࡿ࠿࡟
㛵ࢃࡽࡎࠊᙜヱྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿࡢ࠿࡜࠸࠺㉁ၥ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ➨ 2 ࡟ࠊᙜヱྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿሙྜࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ᳨ドࡸỴᐃ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊࡑ
ࡢᚋࡢ㸦ୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉ࡢ㸧⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢᙳ㡪ࢆㄆ㆑࡛ࡁࡿࡼ࠺࡞⡆౽࡞࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡣ౑⏝࡛ࡁࡿࡢ࠿࡜࠸࠺㉁ၥ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ECJ ࡣ 2017 ᖺ 12 ᭶ 20 ᪥ࠊ࣑ࣗࣥ࣊ࣥ㈈ᨻ⿢ุᡤ࠿ࡽᢞࡌࡽࢀࡓ㉁ၥ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ᅇ⟅ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ 103ࠋࡑࡢᅇ⟅ෆᐜࡣḟࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࡲ࡜ࡵࡽࢀࡿࠋ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿࡍ࡭࡚ࡢᐇ㉁ⓗ࡞⤒῭ⓗ౯್ࢆ཯ᫎࡋࠊ⪃៖ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋࡓ 104ࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡣࠊཎ๎࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ㈌≀ࢆ㍺ධࡍࡿ㝿࡟ᐇ㝿࡟ᨭᡶࢃࢀࡓࠊཪࡣᨭᡶࢃࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ

Id. ࢆཧ↷ࡋ➹⪅సᡂࠋId., para 21.
101 Id.
102 Id., para 22.
99100➨ 2 ࡢ㉁ၥࡣࠊ
➨ 1 ࡢ㉁ၥ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⫯ᐃⓗ࡛࠶ࡿሙྜ࡟ࡢࡳᅇ⟅ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ
ECJ ࡣᅇ⟅ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋId., para 36.
104 Id., para 24.
103

21（ 473 ）

౯᱁㸦ᨭᡶྍ⬟౯᱁㸧࡛࠶ࡾࠊᙜヱ౯᱁ࢆ⟬ᐃ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ሙྜ࡟㝈ࡾࠊ௦᭰ἲࡣ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ 105ࠋ⥆ࡅ࡚ࠊ㐳ཬㄪᩚࢆ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿ⤒῭ⓗ౯್࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆ㆑ࡋࠊࡑࡢᙳ
㡪ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟཯ᫎࡉࡏࡓ஦౛ࡣᏑᅾࡍࡿ 106࡜ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࡶࠊࡑࡢࡼ࠺࡞஦౛ࡣ㝈ᐃⓗ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜࡟␃ពࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 107ࠋ᭱ᚋ࡟ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㐳ཬㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉࠸ࡎࢀࡢㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࡶ㍺ධ௻ᴗ࡟⏦࿌⩏ົࢆㄢࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ 108ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊୗ᪉ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢࡳࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡀ຺᱌ࡍࡿᚲせࡣ࡞࠸࡜ุ᩿ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 109ࠋ㉁ၥ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ᭱⤊ⓗ࡞ ECJ ࡢᅇ⟅ࡣࠊ㍺ධᙜึࡢ࢖ࣥ࣎࢖ࢫ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚⏦࿌ࡉࢀࠊ஦ᴗᖺᗘ
ᮎ࡟୍ᚊ࡛⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡿᮏ௳ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬࡟࠾࠸࡚ㄪᩚࡀୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉ࡢ࠸ࡎࢀ࡛࠶ࡿ࠿ࢆㄆ▱࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡞࠸࡜ࡲ࡜ࡵ࡚࠸
ࡿ 110ࠋ
(2) ศᯒ
WCO ࢞࢖ࢻࡸ ICC ࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ࢫࢸ࢖ࢺ࣓ࣥࢺࡢぢゎࢆ⪃៖ࡍࢀࡤࠊᮏ௳⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣ
⿵ൾㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆ㆑ࡋࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ࡑࡢᙳ㡪ࢆ⪃៖ࡍࡿ࡭ࡁࡔ࡜ゎ㔘࡛ࡁࡿࠋ࡜ࡇࢁࡀ ECJ ุỴࡣࠊᮏ௳ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬࡟࠾࠸࡚୙᫂☜࡞⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࣜࢫࢡࢆྵࢇ࡛࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡞࠸࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋECJ ุỴࡣࠊᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞㆟ㄽ࡛᥎ዡࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀ
ᢅ࠸࡜▩┪ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࠊECJ ุỴ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊFriedhoff Ặࡢホ㔘 111ࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡓ࠺࠼
࡛ศᯒࡍࡿࠋFriedhoff ẶࡣࠊECJ ุỴࡢぢゎࢆᨭᣢࡍࡿሙྜࠊᮏ௳ࡢࡼ࠺࡞ከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࡢࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆ
ྲྀᘬ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊཎ๎ἲࢆ⏝࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࡣⴭࡋࡃᅔ㞴࡟࡞ࡿ࡜⪃࠼
࡚࠸ࡿ 112ࠋࡑࡢ୍᪉࡛ࠊECJ ุỴࡢぢゎ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᑐࡋ࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢᙳ
㡪ࢆ⪃៖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᯫ✵ཪࡣ᜛ពⓗ࡞㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ᤼㝖ࡢほⅬ࡛ᮃࡲࡋ࠸ሙྜࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᑐࡋ࡚⪃៖ࡉࢀࡿ࡜⪃࠼࡚࠸ࡿ 113ࠋ
ECJ ุỴ࡜ Friedhoff Ặࡢぢゎ࡟౫ᣐࡍࢀࡤࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬࡟⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࣜࢫࢡࢆྵࢇࡔྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆࡵ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠊᙜヱ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡣ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟

Id., paras 25-26.
Id., paras 27-29.
107 Id., paras 30-32.
108 Id., para 33.
109 Id., para 34.
110 Id., para 35.
105
106

MSc. M. Friedhoff, The treatment of transfer pricing adjustments for the purpose ofcustoms valuation, European customs law, 2017.
111

https://www.europesefiscalestudies.nl/upload/Paper%20Michiel%20Friedhoff.pdf 㸦 ᭱ ⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋ
112 Id.
113 Id.
22（ 474 ）

⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢᙳ㡪ࢆ⪃៖ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬࡟ཎ๎ἲ࡟ࡼࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿ࠺࠼࡛ࡢせ௳࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࣜࢫࢡࢆྵࢇࡔྲྀᘬ
౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆࡵࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ࡢุᐃࡀ㔜せ࡟࡞ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ

23（ 475 ）

➨ 3 ❶ ⡿ᅜ࡜㡑ᅜࡢᑐᛂ3㸫1 ⡿ᅜ
3㸫1㸫1 㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝ ⡿ᅜࡢ㍺ධ⪅ࡣࠊ⡿ᅜࡢ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡛࠶ࡿ CBP㸦Customs and Border Protectionࠊ⡿ᅜ⛯㛵ᅜቃ㆙ഛᒁ㸧࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊAPA ࡸ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ⤖ᯝࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆ‶ࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜
ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃୖࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆ❧ドࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜୺ᙇࡋ࡚࠸ࡓ 114ࠋCBP ࡣࠊࡇࡢ୺ᙇ࡟ᑐࡍࡿከࡃࡢ Headquarters Ruling Letter㸦௨2007 ᖺ࡟බ⾲ࡋࡓ Informed Compliance Publication
ୗࠊࠕHRLࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ
㸧115ࢆබ⾲ࡋࡓᚋࠊ㸦௨ୗࠊ
ࠕICPࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ
㸧 116࡟࠾࠸࡚ぢゎࢆᩚ⌮ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋICP ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࡢࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆྲྀᘬ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ
ྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᑐࡍࡿホ౯࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆせồࡍࡿࡀࠊἲⓗせ௳࡟኱ࡁ࡞┦㐪ࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜ࡉࢀࡿ 117ࠋἲⓗせ௳ࡢ┦㐪࡜ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ➨ 1 ࡟ࠊ⟬ᐃ༢఩ࡢ┦㐪ࡀᣲࡆࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊࡍ࡭࡚ࡢ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ✀㢮ࡈ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡀ⟬ᐃࡉࢀࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓ࡢุᐃ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶྠᵝ࡛࠶ࡿ 118ࠋ୍᪉࡛ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡣࠊ⛒⛯ᅇ㑊ࢆ㜵Ṇࡋࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡢᡤᚓࢆ㐺ษ࡟㓄ศࡋࡼ࠺࡜ࡍࡿࡀࠊࡑࡇ࡛ࡣࠊᚲࡎࡋࡶ㍺ධྲྀᘬࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡈ࡜ࡢホ౯ࡀᚲせ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ 119ࠋ
➨ 2 ࡟ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢุᐃ࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡛࠶ࡿ࠿ࡢุᐃࡢ┦㐪ࡀᣲࡆࡽࢀࡿ 120ࠋ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡢྲྀᘬ౯
᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓ࡢุᐃ᪉ἲ࡜ CUP ἲࠊRP ἲࠊCP ἲ࡜ࡣࠊ࠸ࡃࡘ࠿ࡢ㢮ఝᛶࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀ
ࡿࡀࠊ⡿ᅜࡀㄆࡵࡿ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡛࠶ࡿ฼┈ẚ‽ἲ㸦௨ୗࠊ
ࠕCPMࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ
㸧121࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝㢮ఝᛶࡀ࡞࠸࡜ࡉࢀࡿ 122ࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊCPM ࡀࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ㢮ఝᛶ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊྠᵝࡢᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ௻ᴗࡢ཰┈ᛶࡢ㢮ఝᛶࢆせồࡍࡿ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡛࠶ࡿ୍᪉࡛ࠊ≉Ṧ
CBP, DETERMINING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF TRANSACTION VALUE FOR
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS, at 11, 2007.

114

https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/icp089_3.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 12
᭶ 19 ᪥㸧ࠋ
115 HRL ࡜ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢỴᐃ࡟࠶ࡓࡗ࡚୙☜ᐇᛶࢆ࡞ࡃࡋࠊ㏻㛵ࢆᐜ᫆࡟ࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢ
᪉ἲ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ஦๓࡟㍺ධ⪅ࡀ CBP ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚㛵⛯ศ㢮ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ࠊཎ⏘ᆅつ๎➼ࢆ⤂௓ࡍࡿไᗘ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ஭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ 25࣭45 㡫ࠋ
116 ICP ࡜ࡣࠊCBP ࡀࠊ㈠᫆ᴗ⏺࡟ᑐࡍࡿ࢞࢖ࢲࣥࢫ࡜᝟ሗࢆᥦ౪ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆពᅗࡋࠊ⡿ᅜ࡛ࡢ CBP ࡢ❧ሙࡸ㐺⏝ἲཪࡣつ๎࡟㛵ࡍࡿゎ㔘࡟ࡘ࠸࡚බ㛤ࡋࡓᩥ᭩࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
஭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ 25࣭40 㡫⬮ὀ 111 ࢆཧ↷ࠋ
117 CBP, supra note 114, at 14.

Id.
Id.
120 Id., at 15.
118
119

TNMM ࡜࡯ࡰྠᵝࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡛࠶ࡿࡀࠊྲྀᘬ༢఩࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ௻ᴗ༢
఩ཪࡣᴗ✀༢఩ࡢ኎ୖ㧗฼┈⋡➼ࢆ⏝࠸ࡿⅬ࡛␗࡞ࡿࠋఀ⸨㸻ⴗ㇂࣭๓ᥖὀ 94࣭100 㡫ࠋ
122 CBP, supra note 114, at 15.
121

24（ 476 ）

㛵ಀࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓ࡢุᐃ࡟㝿ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ㢮ఝᛶ㸦ྠ✀ཪࡣ㢮ㄅࡍࡿ
㍺ධ㈌≀㸧ࢆせồࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿ࡽ࡛࠶ࡿ 123ࠋ௨ୖࡢࡇ࡜࠿ࡽࠊAPA ࡸ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ⤖ᯝࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆ‶ࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࡣࠊᚲ
ࡎࡋࡶ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆ❧ドࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ࡣ࠸࠼࡞࠸࡜ࡢぢゎ࡟⮳ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ 124ࠋ ࡋ࠿ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊCBP ࡣࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊAPA ࡸ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ
⤖ᯝࡢ᭷⏝ᛶࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿሙྜࡀ࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᣦ᦬ࡍࡿ 125ࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊࡑࡢ᭷⏝ᛶࡣࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚኱ࡁࡃ␗࡞ࡿ 126ࠋ౛࠼ࡤࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ࡼࡿホ౯࡜᭱ࡶ㢮ఝᛶࡀ㧗࠸ CUP ἲࡣࠊ᭱ࡶ㢮ఝᛶࡀప࠸ CPM ࡼࡾࡶࠊ᭷⏝ᛶࡀࡣࡿ࠿࡟㧗ࡃ࡞ࡿ 127ࠋ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ௨እ࡟ࡶࠊ⡿ᅜࡢ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡛࠶ࡿ IRS㸦Internal Revenue Serviceࠊෆᅜṓධᗇ㸧࡟ࡼࡿᢎㄆࡢ᭷↓ࠊAPA ࡢ✀㢮㸦ᅜෆ APA ཪࡣ஧ᅜ㛫 APA㸧ࠊAPA ࡢᑐ㇟ྲྀ
ᘬ࡟㛵⛯ホ౯ࡢᑐ㇟࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ㍺ධྲྀᘬࡀྵࡲࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿ྰ࠿࡞࡝ࡀ᭷⏝ᛶ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬ
ࡰࡍ 128ࠋ࡞࠾ࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࡢ❧ド㈐௵ࡣ㍺ධ⪅࡟࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊ㍺ධ⪅ࡣ CBP࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ APA ࡸ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ⤖ᯝࡢ᭷⏝ᛶࢆ❧ドࡋࠊࡑࡢ㛵㐃ᩥ᭩ࢆᥦฟࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜ࡉࢀࡿ 129ࠋ3㸫1㸫2 ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸
⡿ᅜ࡛ࡣᚑ᮶ࠊ୍⯡ⓗ࡟ࠊୖ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀቑ㢠ࡉࢀࡓሙྜࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢୖ᪉ㄪᩚࢆ⾜࠸ࠊᙜヱㄪᩚ࡟క࠺㛵⛯ࡢ㏣ᚩࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࡢ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊୗ᪉ࡢ
⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀῶ㢠ࡉࢀࡓሙྜࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢୗ᪉ㄪᩚࢆㄆࡵࡎࠊ㛵⛯ࡢ㑏௜ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚ࡇ࡞࠿ࡗࡓ⤒⦋ࡀ࠶ࡿ 130ࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞ྲྀᢅ࠸ࡣࠊ2001 ᖺ 11 ᭶࡟ࠊCBPࡀබ⾲ࡋࡓ HRL547654㸦௨ୗࠊࠕᪧ HRLࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧 131࡟࠾ࡅࡿぢゎ࡟ࡼࡿࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ࡑࡢෆᐜࢆせ⣙ࡍࡿ࡜ḟࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿ 132ࠋ
CBP ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀࠕᅛᐃ㸦fixed㸧ࠖࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ሙྜࠊ
ࠕ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁㸦transaction value㸧ࠖࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᐜㄆࡋ࡞࠸ࠋ୍᪉࡛ࠊࠕᐈほⓗ࡞ィ⟬ᘧ㸦objective formula㸧ࠖ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ㍺ධ࡟ඛ❧ࡗ࡚ྜពࡋࡓྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡀỴᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸
ࡿሙྜࠊᙜヱྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡣࠕᅛᐃ㸦fixed㸧ࠖࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ุ᩿ࡋࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬࡟࠾࠸࡚☜ᐃࡋ

Id.
Id., at 14.
125 Id., at 15.
126 Id.
127 Id., at 16. ࡞࠾ࠊ〇ရࡑࡢࡶࡢࢆẚ㍑ࡋ࡚⟬ᐃࡍࡿ᪉ἲ࡯࡝᭷⏝ᛶࡀ㧗ࡲࡾࠊ฼┈ࢆẚ
123
124㍑ࡋ࡚⟬ᐃࡍࡿ᪉ἲ࡯࡝᭷⏝ᛶࡣపࡃ࡞ࡿ࡜⪃࠼࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
128
129

Id.
Id.

130

Ỉ 㔝 ṇ ኵ 㸻 ⚄ ὠ 㝯 ᖾ ࠕ ⛣ ㌿ ౯ ᱁ ⛯ ไ ࡜ 㛵 ⛯ ࡢㄪ ࿴ ࢆ ࡵ ࡄ ࡿ ᪂ ࡓ ࡞ ືࡁ  ⡿ ᅜ ࣭
HRL548314㸦᪂࣮ࣝࣜࣥࢢࣞࢱ࣮㸧ࡢᴫせ࡜ᐇົୖࡢ␃ពⅬࠖ⤒⌮᝟ሗ 1325 ྕ 57 㡫
㸦2012㸧
ࠋ131 ⌧ᅾࡣࠊHRL547654 ࡑࡢࡶࡢࢆ㜀ぴࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸≧ἣ࡟࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
132 HRL548314, Custom bulletin and Decisions, Vol 46, No 23, at 10-11, May 30, 2012.
25（ 477 ）

ࡓྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆㄆ㆑ࡍࡿᚲせࡣ࡞࠸࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࣜࢫࢡࡀ࠶ࡾࠊ㈙ᡭཪࡣ኎ᡭ࡟ࡼࡾ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢྍྰࡸ⛬ᗘࢆ᧯స࡛ࡁࡿ≧ἣ࡟࠶ࡿሙྜࠊࠕ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁ࠖࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ᐜㄆࡋ࡞࠸࡜ࡢぢゎࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࡑࡢᚋࠊ2012 ᖺ 5 ᭶࡟ࠊCBP ࡣࠊᪧ HRL ࢆᗫṆࡋࠊ᪂ࡓ࡞ HRL54831㸦௨ୗࠊࠕ᪂ HRLࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧ࢆබ⾲ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᪂ HRL ࡣࠊ୍ᐃࡢせ௳ࢆ‶ࡓࡋࡓሙྜࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࣜࢫࢡࡀ࠶ࡿ㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶཎ๎ἲ࡟ࡼࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃࡀᐜㄆࡉ
ࢀࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢୗ᪉ㄪᩚ࡟క࠺㛵⛯ࡢ㑏௜ࡀྍ⬟࡜࡞ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡋࡓࠋࡑࡢෆᐜࢆせ⣙ࡍࡿ࡜ḟࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿࠋ
㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࣜࢫࢡࡀ࠶ࡾࠊ㈙ᡭཪࡣ኎ᡭ࡟ࡼࡾ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ
ྍྰࡸ⛬ᗘࢆ᧯స࡛ࡁࡿ≧ἣ࡟࠶ࡿሙྜ࡛ࡶࠊ௨ୗࡢ 5 ࡘࡢせ௳ 133ࢆࡍ࡭࡚‶ࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ
ሙྜࡣࠊᐈほⓗ࡞ィ⟬ᘧ࡜ࡳ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࠋ
せ௳ձ ᭩㠃࡟ࡼࡿࠕ㛵㐃⪅㛫ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁タᐃ࣏ࣜࢩ࣮㸦Intercompany Transfer Pricing
Determination policy㸧 134ࠖࡀ㍺ධ࡟ඛ❧ࡗ࡚ᩚഛࡉࢀࠊIRC§482 ࢆ⪃៖࡟ධࢀ࡚సࡽࢀࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࠋ
せ௳ղ ⡿ᅜ⣡⛯⪅ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ࢆ⡿ᅜἲேᡤᚓ⛯ࡢ☜ᐃ⏦࿌࡟⏝࠸ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࣏ࣜࢩ࣮࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆᙜヱ☜ᐃ⏦࿌࡟཯ᫎࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࠋ
せ௳ճ ௻ᴗࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁࣏ࣜࢩ࣮࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᙜヱ⛣㌿౯᱁࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ᇶ࡙ࡁ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ
ࡉࢀࡿࣜࢫࢡࡢ࠶ࡿࡍ࡭࡚ࡢ〇ရ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࠊ࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟⛣㌿౯᱁࠾ࡼࡧㄪᩚࡀỴᐃࡉࢀࡿ࠿ࢆ᫂グࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࠋ
せ௳մ ௻ᴗࡣࠊ⡿ᅜ࡛⏦ㄳࡉࢀࡿㄪᩚࢆ⿬࡙ࡅࡿ఍ィୖࡢヲ⣽㸦ᖒ⡙ࠊ㈈ົㅖ⾲㸧ࢆᩚഛࡋࠊᥦ౪ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࠋ
せ௳յ CBP ࡟ࡼࡿᙜヱ⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢᐜㄆ࡟ᙳ㡪ࡍࡿࡑࡢ௚ࡢ᮲௳ࡀᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࠋ せ௳ձ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊIRS ࡀ APA ➼ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁タᐃ࣏ࣜࢩ࣮࡟ྜពࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿ྰ࠿࡟㛵ࢃࡽࡎࠊ
CBP ࡣ IRC§482 ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟‽ᣐࡋ࡚సᡂࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆせồࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 135ࠋ
せ௳ղ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ࢆ⡿ᅜἲேᡤᚓ⛯ࡢ☜ᐃ⏦࿌࡛⏝࠸࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ཬࡧ
⛣㌿౯᱁࣏ࣜࢩ࣮࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀᙜヱ☜ᐃ⏦࿌࡟཯ᫎࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆせồࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋせ௳ճ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡉࢀࡿࣜࢫࢡࡀ࠶ࡿࡍ࡭࡚ࡢ〇ရ࡟

Id., at 13. ࿴ヂ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊỈ㔝㸻⚄ὠ࣭๓ᥖὀ 130࣭59 㡫ࠊMaho Jordan, William M.
Methenitis, Steven C. Wrappe, Rodell Molinaࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⡿ᅜ㛵⛯ἲࡢ᪂࣮ࣝ
ࣜࣥࢢࣞࢱ࣮ ⛣㌿౯᱁࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃୗ᪉ㄪᩚ࡜⡿ᅜ㛵⛯㑏௜ࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿྍ⬟ᛶ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠖ
ᅜ㝿⛯ົ 33 ᕳ 7 ྕ 78 㡫㸦2013㸧ࢆཧ↷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
134 ཎᩥ࡛ࡣࠊ
ࠕIntercompany Transfer Pricing Determination policyࠖ࡜グ㏙ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ
ࡓࡵࠊᩒ࠼࡚⛣㌿౯᱁タᐃ࣏ࣜࢩ࣮࡜࿴ヂࡋࡓࠋ
135 HRL548314, supra note 132, at 11.
133

26（ 478 ）

ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ࡢᑐ㇟࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆせồࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 136ࠋ౛࠼ࡤࠊ௻ᴗࡀ⮬ື㌴࡜⮬ື㌴㒊ရࢆ㍺ධྲྀᘬࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊタᐃࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁࣏ࣜࢩ࣮ࡀ⮬ື㌴㒊ရࡢࡳࢆᑐ㇟࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡓሙྜࠊ⮬ື㌴ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᑐࡍࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣ⪃៖ࡉࢀ࡞࠸ 137ࠋせ௳մ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊCBP ࡟ࡼࡾ᝟ሗࡢලయᛶࡣ஦౛ࡈ࡜࡟ホ౯ࡉࢀࡿࡀࠊ㍺ධ⪅ࡣ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢヲ⣽࡞グ㘓࡜ CBP ࡢศᯒ࡟ᙺ❧ࡘࡍ࡭࡚ࡢ㛵㐃ᩥ᭩ࡢᥦฟࢆ
せồࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 138ࠋせ௳յ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀࠊᐈほⓗ࡞ィ⟬ᘧ࡟ᚑࡗ࡚⾜ࢃࢀࡓ࡜࠸࠺஦ᐇࡢࡳ࡛ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ
࡜ࢆ❧ドࡋࡓ࡜ࡣ࠸࠼࡞࠸࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿ 139ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ஦๓࡟ࠊCBP ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆู㏵❧ドࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࣜࢫࢡࡢ࠶ࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᐜㄆࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆせồࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
 CBP ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࣜࢫࢡࡢ࠶ࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚⏦࿌ࡍࡿ㝿࡟ࡣࠊㄪ೵ࣉࣟࢢ࣒ࣛ㸦Reconciliation Program㸧ࡢ฼⏝ࢆ᥎ዡࡋ࡚࠾ࡾ 140ࠊḟࡢࡼ࠺࡞ᡭ㡰࡛⏦࿌ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿ࡜ㄝ᫂ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 141ࠋࡲࡎࠊ⏦࿌౯᱁➼ࡢ୍ᐃࡢせ⣲ࡣᮍỴᐃ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺ㄆ㆑ࢆ CBP ࡜㍺ධ⪅ࡢ཮᪉ࡀᣢࡕ
ࡘࡘࠊ┦ᙜ࡞ὀពࢆᡶࡗ࡚᭱኱㝈ධᡭྍ⬟࡞᝟ሗ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁ⣡⛯⏦࿌㸦entry summary㸧ࢆ⾜࠺ࠋ⥆࠸࡚ࠊᚋ᪥ࠊලయⓗ࡞ヲ⣽ࡀ☜ᐃࡋ࡚࠿ࡽ㍺ධ⪅ࡣㄪ೵⏦࿌㸦Reconciliation
entry㸧 142ࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࠊࡇࡢ⏦࿌࡛Ύ⟬㸦Liquidation㸧 143ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋ CBP ࡣࠊㄪ೵ࣉࣟࢢ࣒ࣛࢆ฼⏝ࡋࡓ⏦࿌ࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜ࡢ࣓ࣜࢵࢺ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ➨ 1 ࡟ࠊ㍺ධ⪅ࡢ⏦࿌࡟ᰂ㌾ᛶࢆ୚࠼ࠊAPA ➼࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ᭱ࡶຠ⋡ⓗ࡟⏦࿌࡛ࡁࡿࡇ࡜ࠊ➨ 2 ࡟ࠊ㍺ධ⪅ࡀࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡛ྲྀᘬࢆ⾜ࡗࡓࡇ࡜ࢆ❧ドࡍࡿᩥ᭩ࡢసᡂ
᫬㛫ࢆ☜ಖ࡛ࡁࡿࡇ࡜ࡢ 2 ࡘࢆᣲࡆ࡚࠸ࡿ 144ࠋ ᭱ᚋ࡟ࠊCBP ࡣࠊAPA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢᐇ᪋ࡢ௙᪉࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᙜヱㄪᩚࢆ⪃៖࡛ࡁࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡣ␗࡞ࡿ࡜ࡋࠊ」ᩘᖺ࡟ࢃࡓࡿ APA ᮇ㛫ᮎ࡟୍ᣓࡋ࡚⾜ࢃࢀࡿㄪᩚࡼࡾࡶࠊᖺ༢఩࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣᅄ༙ᮇ༢఩࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡿㄪᩚࡢ᪉ࡀ⪃៖ࡋࡸࡍ࠸࡜ࡢぢゎࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 145ࠋ

Id., at 13.
Id.
138 Id.
136
137
139
140
141

Ỉ㔝㸻⚄ὠ࣭๓ᥖὀ 130࣭59 㡫ࠋ
HRL548314, supra note 132, at 15.

Id.

ㄪ೵⏦࿌㸦Reconciliation entry㸧ࡣ⣡⛯⏦࿌࠿ࡽ 21 ࣧ᭶ᚋࡲ࡛࡟⾜࠺ࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿࡀࠊ
ᮇ㛫ࡢᘏ㛗ࡶྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿࠋỈ㔝㸻⚄ὠ࣭๓ᥖὀ 130࣭60 㡫ࠋ
143 ⡿ᅜ࡛ࡣࠊ⣡⛯⏦࿌ࢆ⾜ࡗࡓᚋࠊCBP ࡀཎ๎࡜ࡋ࡚ 1 ᖺ௨ෆ࡟᭱⤊ⓗ࡞㛵⛯㢠ࡢỴᐃࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡇࢀࢆΎ⟬㸦Liquidation㸧࡜࿧ࢇ࡛࠸ࡿࠋỈ㔝㸻⚄ὠ࣭๓ᥖὀ
130࣭60 㡫⬮ὀ 22ࠋ
144 HRL548314, supra note 132, at 15.
145 HRL548314, supra note 132, at 13.
142

27（ 479 ）

3㸫1㸫3 ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢㄪᩚᶵ⬟࡜ࡋ࡚ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠 ⡿ᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ1986 ᖺ࡟ᑟධࡉࢀࡓ Internal Revenue Code㸦௨ୗࠊࠕIRCࠖ࡜ࡍࡿࠋ
㸧
§1059A ࡣࠊIRC§482 146࡟つᐃࡉࢀࡿᅜእ㛵㐃⪅࠿ࡽࡢ㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡼࡾ㧗㢠࡞ྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡛⏦࿌࡛ࡁ࡞࠸᪨ࢆつᐃࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 147ࠋࡇࡢ᮲㡯ࡢ┠ⓗࡣࠊ⡿ᅜࡢ⣡⛯⪅ࡀࠊ㛵㐃஦ᴗ⪅࠿ࡽࡢ㍺ධ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࢆୖᅇࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ⏦࿌ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡗ࡚Ⓨ⏕ࡍࡿ⛯཰ࡢ୧ᦆຠᯝ㸦Whipsaw Effect㸧ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡉࢀࡿ 148ࠋ୧ᦆຠᯝ㸦Whipsaw Effect㸧࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ஭ᮧẶࡣࠊ
ࠕ…㍺ධ⪅ࡀࠊ㛵⛯࡜ἲே⛯࡛஧✀㢮ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ฼⏝ࡋࠊ㛵⛯ࡢㄢ⛯౯᱁ࢆప౯࡟⏦࿌ࡍࡿ୍᪉࡛ࠊἲே⛯ࡢ㈝⏝ࡢ⥲㢠ࢆ㧗౯࡟⏦࿌ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ㛵⛯࡜ἲே⛯࡛ࡑࢀࡒࢀప࠸⛯㢠ࢆࡶࡓࡽࡍࡇ࡜ࢆᣦࡍࠖ149࡜
ㄝ᫂ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊIRC§1059A ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ
ࠕ…ἲே⛯࡜㛵⛯ࡢ㛫ࡢᕪ㢠ࢆࠗ୧ᦆࠖ
࡜ᤊ࠼ࠊࡇࡢ୧ᦆࢆゎᾘࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ἲே⛯ࡢ⏦࿌㢠࡟ୖ㝈ࢆタࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࠖ 150࡜ホ౯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ IRC§1059A ࡀࢱ࣮ࢤࢵࢺ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ⛯཰ࡢ୧ᦆຠᯝ㸦Whipsaw Effect㸧࡜ IRC§1059A
ࡀᯝࡓࡍᙺ๭ࢆᩚ⌮ࡋࡓ㸦ᅗ⾲ 6 ཧ↷㸧ࠋ⦪㍈ࡣࠊ⣡⛯⪅࡟ࡼࡿ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢ⏦࿌㢠࡛࠶ࡾࠊ㛵⛯ࠊἲே⛯ࡢྛࠎ࡟ᑐࡍࡿࡶࡢࢆ㯮Ⅼ࡛⾲ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᅗ⾲ 6㸸ἲே⛯࡜㛵⛯ࡢ୧ᦆຠᯝ࡜ IRC§1059A ࡀᯝࡓࡍᙺ๭ 151
⏦࿌㢠
㛵⛯

㛵⛯

ἲே⛯

࣭ ࣭

⛯཰ࣉࣛࢫ

⛯཰ࣟࢫ

࣭

⛯཰ࣟࢫ

⛯཰ࣟࢫ

୧ ᦆ

࣭

ἲே⛯

㐺ṇ࡞᫬౯

IRC§1059A ᑟධ๓
IRC§1059A ᑟධᚋ⡿ᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢつᐃ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢつᐃ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
IRC§1059A ࡢつᐃෆᐜࢆ࿴ヂࡋࡓᩥ⊩࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ⏣ᓥ㝧୍ࠕ〇㐀ᴗࢱࢵࢡࢫ࣭࣊࢖ࣈࣥ
࡜㛵⛯࠾ࡼࡧἲே⛯࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⪃ᐹ̿⡿ᅜෆᅜṓධἲ 1059A ᮲ࢆ୰ᚰ࡟̿ࠖᮾிእᅜㄒ኱
Ꮫㄽ㞟 83 ྕ 214 㡫㸦2011㸧ࠋ
148 Mayra O. Lucas Mas, Section 1059A: An Obstacle to Achieving Consistent
Legislation?, International Transfer Pricing Journal, Vol.15, No.1, at 6, 2008. ཬࡧWhipsaw Effect ࡢ࿴ヂ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ⏣ᓥ࣭๓ᥖὀ 147࣭215 㡫ࠋ
149 Id. ཬࡧ஭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ 25࣭58 㡫ࠋ
146
147

150
151

஭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ 25࣭58 㡫ࠋ
➹⪅సᡂࠋ
28

（ 480 ）

㛵⛯࡛ࡣࠊ㐺ṇ࡞᫬౯ࡼࡾప౯࡞ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢ⏦࿌ࡀࠊ㛵⛯ࡢ⛯཰ࣟࢫࢆᘬࡁ㉳ࡇࡋࠊ୍᪉ࡢἲே⛯࡛ࡣࠊ㐺ṇ࡞᫬౯ࡼࡾ㧗౯࡞ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢ⏦࿌ࡀࠊἲே⛯ࡢ⛯཰ࣟࢫࢆᘬࡁ㉳ࡇࡍࠋᚑ᮶ࡣࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀᨭᡶ࠺㛵⛯ࠊἲே⛯ࢆῶ㢠ࡍࡿ┠ⓗ࡛ 2 ࡘࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ᜛ពⓗ࡟⏦࿌ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࠊࡑࡢᕪ㢠ࡀ⛯཰ࡢ୧ᦆ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡓࠋIRC§1059A ࡟ࡼࡾࠊἲே⛯࡟࠾࠸࡚⏦࿌ࡉࢀࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢୖ㝈㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ㛵⛯࡟࠾࠸࡚⏦࿌ࡉࢀࡓྲྀᘬ౯᱁㸦㸻㛵⛯ホ౯㢠㸧ࡀタᐃࡉࢀࡓࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ㛵⛯ࡢ㍍ῶࢆ≺ࡗࡓⴭࡋࡃప౯࡞ྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡢタᐃࡣࠊἲே
⛯ࡢ኱ᖜ࡞ቑ㢠ࢆࡶࡓࡽࡍࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡿࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊIRC§1059A ࡣࠊ㍺ධ⪅ࡀ୧ᦆຠᯝࢆ≺ࡗࡓྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆタᐃࡋࡼ࠺࡜ࡍࡿ࢖ࣥࢭࣥࢸ࢕ࣈࢆ᤼㝖ࡍࡿつᐃ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ホ౯࡛ࡁࡿࠋ
3㸫2 㡑ᅜ3㸫2㸫1 ၥ㢟ព㆑࡜ᑐᛂ࡟ྥࡅࡓ‽ഛ 㡑ᅜࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ㆟ㄽࡸྲྀ⤌ࡳࢆ✚ᴟⓗ࡟⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿᅜ࡜ࡋ࡚ WCO ࢞࢖ࢻୖ࡛⤂௓ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 152ࠋ㡑ᅜࡀࠊ✚ᴟⓗ࡞άືࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡣࠊ㡑ᅜ࡟㐍ฟࡋࡓእᅜ௻ᴗ➼ࡀ┤㠃ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㛵⛯࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ஧㔜ࡢ⛯㈇ᢸ㸦ᅗ⾲ 7 ཧ↷㸧ཬࡧ㔜」ㄪᰝࡢ㈇ᢸ 153ࢆᨵၿࡍ࡭ࡁၥ㢟࡜ࡋ࡚ᤊ࠼࡚࠸ࡿ࠿ࡽࡔ࡜࠸ࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 154ࠋ
ᅗ⾲ 7㸸㛵⛯࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ஧㔜ࡢ⛯㈇ᢸ 155኎ୖ౯᱁㛵⛯ホ౯㢠㸦㍺ධ౯᱁㸧ㄢ⛯ᑐ㇟⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁㸦௙ධཎ౯㸧ㄢ⛯ᑐ㇟஧㔜ࡢ⛯㈇ᢸ

㛵⛯ἲே⛯࣭ᡤᚓ⛯152 WCO, WCO Guide to Customs Valuation and Transfer Pricing New edition 2018, at
76-78, 2018.
153 ᮤẶࡣࠊࡇࡢ஧㔜ࡢ⛯㈇ᢸཬࡧ㔜」ㄪᰝࡢ㈇ᢸ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ⣡⛯⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࡚஧㔜࡟Ⓨ⏕ࡍࡿ୙฼┈࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᮤி᰿ࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢㄪ࿴࡟ྥࡅࡓ㡑ᅜࡢไᗘᨵၿෆᐜࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 36 ᕳ 4 ྕ 111 㡫㸦2016㸧ࠋ
154 KPMG Korea ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢᨵၿ᥎㐍ࠖ
jpn.kr.kpmg.com/jp/111226%20kpmg%20focus.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2019 ᖺ 1 ᭶ 6 ᪥㸧ࠋ155ྠୖࢆཧ↷ࡢ࠺࠼ࠊ୍㒊ኚ᭦ࡋ࡚సᡂࠋ
29（ 481 ） 㡑ᅜ࡟㐍ฟࡋࡓእᅜ௻ᴗ➼ࡀࠊᅜእ㛵ಀ఍♫࠿ࡽ≀ရࢆ㍺ධࡍࡿ㝿ࡣࠊྲྀᘬᙜ஦⪅㛫࡟≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀᏑᅾࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁཬࡧ⛯ົᙜᒁࡀྛࠎ⊂⮬࡟㛵⛯ホ౯㢠㸦㍺ධ౯᱁㸧࡜⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁㸦௙ධཎ౯㸧ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ 156ࠋ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡀ␗࡞ࡿࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ
ᅗ⾲ 7 ࡢࡼ࠺࡞஧㔜ࡢ⛯㈇ᢸࡸ㔜」ㄪᰝࡢ㈇ᢸࡀ⏕ࡌࡿ 157ࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞ၥ㢟ࢆゎỴࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ㛵⛯࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢㄢ⛯౯᱁ࢆ┦஫㐃ᦠཬࡧㄪᩚ࡛ࡁࡿไᗘ࡟ࡘ࠸᳨࡚ウࡋ࡚࠸
ࡿ 158ࠋ ࡇ࠺ࡋࡓ⫼ᬒࡢࡶ࡜ࠊ2008 ᖺ࠿ࡽ㡑ᅜᨻᗓࡣࠊࠕぶ௻ᴗ㸦business friendly㸧ᨻ⟇ࠖࡢ୍⎔࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟ࡢゎỴࡢࡓࡵࡢᑓᢸࢳ࣮࣒
㸦task force team㸧ࢆ⤌⧊ࡋࡓ 159ࠋ2009 ᖺ 2 ᭶࡟ࠊᑓᢸࢳ࣮࣒ࡀ⣙㸯ᖺ㛫άືࡋࡓ⤖ᯝࢆ཯ᫎࡋࡓࡶࡢ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ௻⏬㈈ᨻ㒊 160ࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ㛫࡛ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ࡢㄪ࿴ࡢࡓࡵࡢᴗົ༠ຊ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ MOU㸦Memorandum of Understandingࠊ஢ゎぬ᭩㸧ࠖࢆ⥾⤖ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 161ࠋࡇࡢ MOU ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ุ᩿ࡋࡓሙྜ࡟ࡣࠊඹྠㄪᰝ
ࢆ┦஫࡟せㄳࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࠊࡇࡢせㄳࢆཷࡅࡓᶵ㛵ࡣ㸪┦ᡭ᪉ࡢせㄳ࡟✚ᴟⓗ࡟༠ຊࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ 162ࠋࡲࡓࠊ୧ㄢ⛯ᙜᒁࡣಖ᭷ཬࡧ᳨ドࡋࡓ᝟ሗ࡜㈨ᩱࢆ┦஫࡟஺᥮࡛
ࡁࡿࡼ࠺࡟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 163ࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ୧ㄢ⛯ᙜᒁ࡟ࡼࡿㄢ⛯౯᱁ࡢホ౯ᢏ⾡ࢆ┦஫࡟ᥦ౪ࡍࡿ
ࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ 164ࠋ
3㸫2㸫2 ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ஦ᚋ┦஫ㄪᩚไᗘ ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁ㛫࡟࠾ࡅࡿ MOU ࡢ⥾⤖➼࡛ࡣࠊၥ㢟ᨵၿࡢ኱ࡁ࡞㐍ᒎࡣࡳࡽࢀ࡞
࠿ࡗࡓࡓࡵࠊ2011 ᖺ 12 ᭶ࠊᅜ㝿⛒⛯ㄪᩚἲ࡟㛵ࡍࡿἲᚊ㸦௨ୗࠊࠕᅜ⛒ἲࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ
㸧165ཬ
ࡧ㛵⛯ἲࢆᨵṇࡋ࡚ᑟධࡉࢀࡓࡢࡀࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ஦ᚋ┦஫ㄪᩚไᗘ࡛
࠶ࡿ 166ࠋ
ࡇࡢไᗘ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊ୍ᐃࡢ᮲௳ࡢࡶ࡜ࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ㛫࡟㱈㱒ࡀ⏕ࡌࡓሙྜ࡟ࠊᅜ⛒ἲཬࡧ㛵⛯ἲࡢ࠸ࡎࢀ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠊ஦ᚋⓗ࡟ホ౯㢠ࡢ㱈㱒ࡢㄪᩚࢆㄳồ࡛ࡁࡿ㸦ᅜ⛒ἲ➨ 10 ᮲ࡢ 2ࠊ㛵⛯ἲ➨ 38 ᮲ࡢ 4㸧ࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊ⣡⛯⪅࡟ࡼࡿ⮬୺ⓗ࡞ྲྀᘬ౯᱁
156

ྠୖࠋ
ྠୖࠋ
158 ྠୖࠋ
159 ᮤ࣭๓ᥖὀ 153࣭113 㡫ࠋ
160 ௻⏬㈈ᨻ㒊࡜ࡣࠊ㡑ᅜࡢ⾜ᨻᶵ㛵࡛࠶ࡾࠊㅖእᅜࡢ㈈ົ┬࡟┦ᙜࡍࡿࠋ஭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ 25࣭
60 㡫⬮ὀ 175ࠋ
161 ᮤ࣭๓ᥖὀ 153࣭113 㡫ࠋ
162 ྠୖࠋ
163 ྠୖࠋ
164 ྠୖࠋ
165 ᅜ⛒ἲ࡜ࡣࠊ㡑ᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㐣ᑡ㈨ᮏ⛯ไࢆྵࢇࡔἲ௧࡛࠶ࡿࠋ஭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ 25࣭
60 㡫ࠋ
166 ᮤ࣭๓ᥖὀ 153࣭113 㡫ࠋ
157

30（ 482 ）

ࡢㄪᩚࠊAPA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⿵ൾㄪᩚࠊ
Advance Customs Valuation Arrangement
㸦௨ୗࠊࠕACVAࠖ
࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢㄪᩚ➼࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ஦ᚋ┦஫ㄪᩚࢆㄳồ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊไ
ᗘࢆά⏝࡛ࡁࡿ≧ἣࡣ㝈ᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 167ࠋ࡞࠾ࠊ2008 ᖺ 1 ᭶࡟ᑟධࡉࢀࡓ ACVA ࡣࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀ⪅㛫ࡢ㍺ධྲྀᘬ᫬࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡢ⏦ㄳ࡟ࡼࡾ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆ஦๓࡟ᑂᰝࡍࡿไᗘ࡛࠶ࡿ㸦㛵⛯ἲ➨ 37 ᮲㸧168ࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊไᗘࡢᐇ⾜ᛶࢆ㧗ࡵࡿ┠ⓗ࡛ࠊไᗘᑟධ࡜ྠᖺ࡟ࠊᅜ㝿ྲྀᘬㄢ⛯౯᱁ㄪᩚᑂ㆟ጤဨ఍㸦௨ୗࠊࠕㄪᩚጤဨ఍ࠖ࡜࠸
࠺ࠋ㸧ࢆタ⨨ࡋ㐠⏝ࡍࡿࡼ࠺࡟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ᅜ⛒௧§17 ࡢ 3㸧 169ࠋࡇࡇ࡛ࡣࠊ⣡⛯⪅࡟ࡼࡾㄳồࡉࢀࡓ஦ᚋ┦஫ㄪᩚࢆᐜㄆࡍࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ࡢᑂ㆟ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿ 170ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊᐇ㝿࡟ࠊㄪᩚጤဨ఍࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ஦ᚋ┦஫ㄪᩚࢆᐜㄆࡍࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ࡢᑂ㆟ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓࡢࡣ 2 ௳ࡢࡳ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ࠸ࡎࢀ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶ⣡⛯⪅ࡢㄳồࢆᲠ༷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 171ࠋࡇࡢไᗘ࡟ࡣࠊ஦ᚋ┦஫ㄪᩚࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿ஦౛ࡀ㝈ᐃࡉࢀࠊㄪᩚጤဨ఍࠿ࡽࡢ່࿌࡟ᚑ࠺⩏ົࢆ⛯ົᙜᒁཬࡧ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ㄢࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸࡜࠸࠺኱ࡁ࡞Ḟ㝗ࡀ࠶ࡾࠊ᭷ຠ࡟ᶵ⬟ࡋ࡞࠿ࡗࡓ࡜ホ౯ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 172ࠋ3㸫2㸫3 APA㸭ACVA ྠ᫬⏦ㄳไᗘ ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ஦ᚋ┦஫ㄪᩚไᗘ࡟ࡣࠊ஦ᐇୖ᭷ຠ࡟ᶵ⬟ࡋ࡞࠿ࡗࡓࡓࡵࠊ௻⏬㈈ᨻ㒊ࡣࠊ2015 ᖺ࡟ APA㸭ACVA ྠ᫬⏦ㄳไᗘࢆᑟධࡋࡓ 173ࠋࡇࡢไᗘࡢᑟධ
࡟క࠸ࠊᅜ⛒ἲ➨ 6 ᮲ࡢ 3 ࡜㛵⛯ἲ➨ 37 ᮲ࡢ 2 ࡀᨵṇࡉࢀࠊᅜ⛒ἲ᪋⾜௧➨ 14 ᮲շࠊոཬࡧ㛵⛯ἲ➨ 31 ᮲ࡢ 2 ࡀ᪂タࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋつᐃෆᐜࢆせ⣙ࡍࡿ࡜ࠊḟࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿ 174ࠋ ᅜෆ APA ࢆ⏦ㄳࡍࡿᒃఫ⪅➼ࡀࠊ㛵⛯ἲ࡟ࡼࡿ ACVA ࢆ⛯ົᙜᒁࡢ㛗ᐁ࡟ྠ᫬࡟⏦ㄳࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆไᗘ໬ࡋࡓࠋྠᵝ࡟ࠊACVA ࢆ⏦ㄳࡍࡿᒃఫ⪅➼ࡣࠊᅜෆ APA ࢆ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡢ㛗ᐁ࡟ྠ᫬࡟⏦ㄳࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀไᗘ໬ࡉࢀࡓࠋࡇࢀ࡟ࡼࡾࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡢ㛗ᐁࡣࠊ┦஫༠㆟ࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࢆ஦๓࡟ㄪᩚࡍࡿࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑ
ࡢㄪᩚᑐ㇟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡜㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡀ㢮ఝࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ࡟㝈ᐃࡋࠊ᪋⾜௧࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᅜ⛒ἲୖࡢᇶᮏ୕ἲ㸦CUP ἲࠊRP ἲࠊCP ἲ㸧ཬࡧ㛵⛯ἲୖࡢ 4ࡘࡢ௦᭰ἲ㸦ྠ✀ࡢ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ἲࠊ㢮ఝࡢ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ἲࠊᅜෆ㈍኎౯᱁
࠿ࡽ㏫⟬ࡍࡿ᪉ἲࠊ〇㐀ཎ౯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ౯᱁㸧࡟㝈ᐃࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ 㡑ᅜ࡟࠶ࡿከᩘࡢከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࡣࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟࠾࠸࡚฼┈࣮࣋ࢫࡢ᪉ἲࢆ⏝Young-Joo Kim, The Current Transfer Pricing Environment for Multinational
Enterprises in Korea, Bullet in for International Taxation, para 2.5.2, June 2018.

167

KPMG Korea ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢᨵၿ᥎㐍ࠖ
jpn.kr.kpmg.com/jp/111226%20kpmg%20focus.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2019 ᖺ 1 ᭶ 6 ᪥㸧ࠋ
169 ᮤ࣭๓ᥖὀ 153࣭115 㡫ࠋ
170 ྠୖࠋ
171 ᮤ࣭๓ᥖὀ 153࣭117 㡫ࠋ
172 Young-Joo Kim, supra note 167, para 2.5.2.
173 ᮤ࣭๓ᥖὀ 153࣭118 㡫ࠋ
174 ྠୖࠋ
168

31（ 483 ）

࠸࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊࡇࡢไᗘࢆά⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸≧ἣ࡛࠶ࡗࡓ 175ࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࠊ2018 ᖺ 7᭶࡟ࠊᇶᮏ୕ἲ࡟ຍ࠼࡚ࠊTNMM ࡢࡼ࠺࡞฼┈࣮࣋ࢫࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆ㏣ຍࡍࡿᨵṇࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓ 176ࠋ
3㸫2㸫4 ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸
㡑ᅜ࡛ࡣࠊᚑ᮶ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢୖ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢᙳ㡪ࡢࡳࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟཯ᫎࡉࡏࠊ
ᙜヱㄪᩚ࡟క࠺㛵⛯ࡢ㏣ᚩࡢࡳࢆ⣡⛯⪅࡟ㄢࡋ࡚ࡁࡓ 177ࠋ2017 ᖺ 7 ᭶࡟ࠊᚑ᮶ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟
ᑐࡋ࡚᪂ࡓ࡞ぢゎࡀ♧ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࢀ࡟ࡼࡿ࡜ࠊ3 ࡘࡢせ௳㸦ձ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ APA ཪࡣ ACVAࢆ⥾⤖ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࠊղ㍺ධྲྀᘬ๓࡟ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢィ⏬࡟㛵ࡍࡿᩥ᭩ࡢ
సᡂཬࡧᥦฟࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࠊճ㔠㖹ࡢᨭᡶཪࡣཷ㡿ࡀࠊᩥ᭩໬ࡉࢀࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢィ⏬࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚⏕ࡌ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜㸧 178ࢆࡍ࡭࡚‶ࡓࡍሙྜࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍࡇ࡜ࢆᐜㄆࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 179ࠋ
Kim Ặࡣࠊࡇࡢ᪂ࡓ࡞ぢゎ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊୖ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢࡳࡔࡅ࡛࡞ࡃࠊୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶྠᵝ࡟ࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶
ࡿ࡜୺ᙇࡍࡿ 180ࠋࡇࡢせ௳࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ὀ┠ࡍ࡭ࡁⅬࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡍࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁
ㄪᩚࢆࠊAPA ཪࡣ ACVA ࡢつᐃෆᐜ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟㝈ᐃࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡇ
ࢀࡣࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡀ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚஦๓࡟ㄆ㆑࡛ࡁ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ㔜どࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜⪃࠼
ࡽࢀࡿࠋ

175
176
177

Young-Joo Kim, supra note 167, para 2.5.3.

Id.

Young-Joo Kim, supra note 167, para 2.5.4.

Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
178

32（ 484 ）

➨ 4 ❶ ᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࡢᥦゝ4㸫1 ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟㛵ࡍࡿ஦๓ᩍ♧ࡢホ౯ᡃࡀᅜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡣࠊ
2 ࡘࡢ஦๓ᩍ♧ࢆබ⾲ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ➨ 1 ࡢ஦๓ᩍ♧ࡣࠊࠕ㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡟ಀࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯ࡢ㐺⏝ࠕ㍺ධ㈌࡟ࡼࡾⓎ⏕ࡍࡿㄪᩚ㔠㸦⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟㛵ࡍࡿㄪᩚ㔠㸧ࠖ 181ࠊ➨ 2 ࡢ஦๓ᩍ♧ࡣࠊ≀ࡢㄢ⛯౯᱁ࡢỴᐃࢆᅔ㞴࡜ࡍࡿㄪᩚ㔠ࠖ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚࡛࠶ࡿ 182ࠋ
181

⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ34㸬㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡟ಀࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡾⓎ⏕ࡍࡿㄪᩚ㔠ࠖ
http://www.customs.go.jp/zeikan/seido/kanzeihyouka/hyokajirei/hyokajirei4110062.pdf
㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋ஦ᐇ㛵ಀཬࡧᅇ⟅ࡣḟࡢ࡜࠾ࡾ࡛࠶ࡿࠋᡃࡀᅜࡢ㍺ධ௻ᴗࡣࠊᅜእࡢ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ
㍺ฟ௻ᴗ࡜ࡢ㛫࡛⥾⤖ࡋࡓ኎㈙ዎ⣙࡟ࡼࡾࠊ㣗ᩱရࢆ㍺ධࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㍺ධ௻ᴗࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜ
ࡢ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢ஧ᅜ㛫ࡢ┦஫༠㆟ࢆక࠺ APA ࡢ⏦ฟࢆ⾜࠸ࠊᡃ
ࡀᅜ࡜㍺ධ┦ᡭᅜࡢ⛯ົᙜᒁ࠿ࡽ APA ࡢ☜ㄆ㏻▱ࢆཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ๓஦ᴗᖺᗘ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ㍺ධ௻ᴗࡢႠᴗ฼┈⋡ࡀᙜヱ APA ࡢつᐃࡍࡿチᐜ⠊ᅖ࠿ࡽእࢀࡓሙྜࠊᐇ⦼Ⴀᴗ
฼┈⋡ࡀࡑࡢ⠊ᅖෆ࡟࡞ࡿࡼ࠺ㄪᩚࡉࢀࡿࠋㄪᩚ᪉ἲࡣࠊ㈙ᡭ࡜኎ᡭࡢ㛫࡛ㄪᩚ㔠ࢆᤵཷ
ࡋࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆㄪᩚࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࠋᙜヱ APA ࡟ࡼࡿㄪᩚ᪉ἲ➼ࡣᙜヱ኎㈙ዎ⣙࡟࠾࠸࡚つᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㍺ධ௻ᴗࡣࠊㄪᩚ㔠ࡀⓎ⏕ࡋࡓሙྜࠊ኎㈙ዎ⣙᭩ࠊ
௙ධ᭩ࠊ㍺ධ௻ᴗ࡜㍺ฟ௻ᴗ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ ᚟ᩥ᭩➼ࡢ㛵ಀ᭩㢮ࠊㄪᩚ㔠ࡢᨭᡶཪࡣཷ㡿ࡢ஦ᐇࢆ♧ࡍ᭩㢮࡟ࡼࡾࠊᙜヱㄪᩚ㔠࡜㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ᑐᛂ㛵ಀࡀ࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚᫂
ࡽ࠿࡟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ௨ୖࡢ஦ᐇ㛵ಀࡢࡶ࡜ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟࠶ࡓࡗ࡚ࠊ㍺ධ௻ᴗࡀ㍺ฟ௻ᴗ࡟ㄪᩚ㔠ࢆᨭᡶ࠺ࠊཪࡣཷ㡿ࡍࡿሙྜࠊ࠸ࡎࢀ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶᙜヱㄪᩚ㔠ࢆ⪃៖ࡋࡓᚋࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁࡜ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿ࠿ྰ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㉁ၥࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓࠋ
㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡢᅇ⟅ࡣࠊAPA ࡢつᐃෆᐜ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚኎㈙ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡋࠊࡑࡢዎ⣙ཬࡧㄪᩚ㔠࡟㛵ࡍࡿ᝟ሗ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚᫂☜໬ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ⌮⏤࡟ࠊᮏ௳ㄪᩚ㔠ࡣࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡟௜ࡉࢀ
࡚࠸ࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯㸦኎㈙ዎ⣙㸧࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡓ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ಀࡿㄪᩚ㔠࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ุ᩿ࡋࡓࠋࡼ
ࡗ࡚ࠊᮏ௳ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢᨭᡶཬࡧཷ㡿ᚋࡢ࠸ࡎࢀࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁࡜ࡋ࡚ᢎ
ㄆࡍࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲᇶᮏ㏻㐩 4-2㸦3㸧ࢽ㸧࡜ࡢぢゎ࡟⮳ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
182 ⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ࣭๓ᥖὀ 38 ཬࡧ⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ಀࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ୖࡢྲྀᢅ࠸➼࡟㛵ࡍࡿ↷఍㸦ㄪᩚ㔠ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿሙྜࡢ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢㄢ⛯౯᱁ࡢィ⟬᪉ἲ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㸧ࠖ
www.customs.go.jp/zeikan/seido/kanzeihyouka/H23jirei/230309.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ
11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋ஦ᐇ㛵ಀཬࡧᅇ⟅ࡣḟࡢ࡜࠾ࡾ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ㍺ධ௻ᴗࡣࠊᅜእࡢ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ㍺ฟ௻ᴗ
࡜ࡢ㛫࡛⥾⤖ࡋࡓ〇ရ౪⤥ዎ⣙࡟ࡼࡾࠊ㣗ᩱရࢆ㍺ධࡍࡿࠋ㍺ධ௻ᴗࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊᙜヱ㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢ APA ࡢ⏦ฟࢆ⾜࠸ࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡜㍺ධ┦ᡭᅜࡢ⛯ົᙜᒁ࠿ࡽ☜ㄆ㏻▱ࢆཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ7 ᖺ㛫࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ㍺ධ௻ᴗࡢႠᴗ฼┈⋡ࡀᙜヱ APA
ࡢつᐃ⠊ᅖ࠿ࡽእࢀࡓሙྜࠊᐇ⦼Ⴀᴗ฼┈⋡ࡀࡑࡢ⠊ᅖෆ࡜࡞ࡿࡼ࠺ㄪᩚࡉࢀࡿࠋㄪᩚ᪉
ἲࡣࠊ᭱⤊஦ᴗᖺᗘ࡛㍺ධ௻ᴗཪࡣ㍺ฟ௻ᴗࡢ࠸ࡎࢀ࠿ࡀㄪᩚ㔠ࢆᨭᡶ࠺ࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾ࡞ࡉ
ࢀࡿࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ〇ရ౪⤥ዎ⣙࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࡣ APA ࡟ಀࡿ౯᱁ࡢㄪᩚ㔠ࢆ⪃៖ࡋࡓ౯᱁࡜ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀつᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㍺ධ௻ᴗࡣࠊᙜヱㄪᩚ㔠ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ≉ᐃࡢ๭
ྜࢆ඲㍺ධ㈌≀࡟஌ࡌ࡚㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆኚ᭦ࡍࡿணᐃ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ㛵⛯ᙜᒁ࡟ㄝ᫂
ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
33

（ 485 ）

ࡇࡢ 2 ࡘࡢ஦๓ᩍ♧࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡟ㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ APA ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ஦๓࡟᝿ᐃࡉ
ࢀ࡚࠸ࡓ⿵ൾㄪᩚࡸ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡀㄆࡵࡿሙྜࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡢሙྜࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡣࠊᙜヱㄪᩚࢆ⪃៖ࡋࡓᚋࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋࠊ⣡⛯⪅⮬㌟ࡀಟṇ⏦࿌ཬࡧ᭦ṇࡢㄳồࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡗ࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟క࠺
㛵⛯ࡢ㏣ᚩཬࡧ㑏௜ࢆㄆࡵࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊ➨ 2 ࡢ஦๓ᩍ♧ࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࠊAPA
࡟ࡼࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࠊAPA ࡀ฼┈ࢆ࣮࣋ࢫ࡟ᩘᖺศࢆ౯᱁ㄪᩚࡍࡿつᐃෆᐜ࡛࠶ࢀࡤࠊᮇ㛫ไ㝈ࡢၥ㢟ࠊㄪᩚ㔠㢠ࡢ☜ᐃࡀ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡾࠊ஦ᐇୖࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟క࠺㛵⛯ࡢ㏣ᚩཬࡧ㑏௜ࡣࡉࢀ࡞࠸ࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ
4㸫2 ไᗘෆᐜ࡟ᑐࡍࡿᥦゝ(1) 㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ᑐࡍࡿᥦゝ ᡃࡀᅜࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊAPA ࡟క࠺ୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉࠸ࡎࢀࡢ⿵ൾㄪᩚࡸ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ㄆࡵࡓሙྜࡣࠊㄪᩚࢆ⪃៖ࡋࡓᚋࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࡢぢゎ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊࡇࢀࡲ࡛ࡢᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞ືྥࡸ⡿ᅜࠊ㡑ᅜࡢᑐᛂ࡜ᩚྜࡍࡿࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊ὾ᯇ࣍ࢺࢽࢡࢫ஦௳ࡸ➨ 2 ࡢ஦๓ᩍ♧࡟ࡼࡾࠊ
APA ࡟క࠺⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࡑࡢㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡉࢀ࡞࠸ሙྜࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ
ࡑࡇ࡛ࠊୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊձ஦๓ᩍ♧ไᗘࢆ⏦ㄳࡋࠊᑗ᮶ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆྵࢇࡔྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊཎ๎ἲ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࠊղAPA ࡢෆᐜཬࡧ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ẖᮇ⏦࿌ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࡢ 2 ࡘࡢせ௳ࢆ‶ࡓࡍሙྜ࡟㝈ᐃࡋ࡚ᑐᛂࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ࠋձࡢせ௳ࢆ‶ࡓࡍ࠺࠼࡛ࠊAPA ࡸ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ⤖ᯝ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟
ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆ⣡⛯⪅ࡣ❧ドࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞ሙྜ࡟ࡣࠊ

௨ୖࡢ஦ᐇ㛵ಀࡢࡶ࡜ࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟࠶ࡓࡗ࡚ࠊྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ APA ࡟ಀࡿㄪᩚ㔠ࢆຍ⟬ࡋࡓሙྜࠊᙜヱຍ⟬ㄪᩚᚋࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁࡜ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿ࠿
ྰ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㉁ၥࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓࠋ
㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡢᅇ⟅ࡣࠊAPA ࡢつᐃෆᐜ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚〇ရ౪⤥ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡋࠊࡑࡢዎ⣙ཬࡧㄪᩚ㔠࡟㛵ࡍࡿ᝟ሗ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚༑ศ࡞ㄝ᫂ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ⌮⏤࡟ࠊᮏ௳ㄪᩚ㔠ࡣࠊ㍺ධ
ྲྀᘬ࡟௜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯㸦〇ရ౪⤥ዎ⣙㸧࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡓ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ಀࡿㄪᩚ㔠࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ุ᩿ࡋࡓࠋࡑࡋ࡚ࠊᮏ௳ຍ⟬ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢຍ⟬ᚋࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁࡜ࡋ࡚
ᢎㄆࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲᇶᮏ㏻㐩 4-2㸦3㸧ࢽ㸧ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊᮏ௳ࡢㄪᩚ᪉ἲ࡛ࡣࠊಟṇ⏦࿌ཬࡧ᭦ṇࡢㄳồࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿᮇ㝈࡛࠶ࡿ 5 ᖺ௨ෆ㸦㛵⛯ἲ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ 15ࠊ㛵⛯ἲ➨ 14 ᮲ࠊ➨ 14 ᮲ࡢ 2ࠊ➨ 14 ᮲ࡢ 3㸧࡟ࠊㄪᩚ㔠ࡢ㢠ࢆ☜ᐃ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ࠋࡼࡗ࡚ࠊᙜヱ஦ᐇࡣࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢỴᐃࢆᅔ㞴࡜ࡍࡿ᮲௳㸦ᐃ⋡ἲ➨ 4 ᮲ղ஧㸧࡟ヱᙜࡋࠊ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡣࠊ௦᭰ἲ࡟ࡼࡾ⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡿ㸦ᐃ⋡ἲᇶᮏ㏻㐩 4-2 ࡢ 2㸦4㸧㸧ࠋࡼࡗ࡚ࠊᮏ௳ຍ⟬ㄪᩚᚋࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ⌧ᐇᨭᡶ౯᱁࡜ࡋ࡚ᢎㄆࡋ࡞࠸࡜ࡢぢゎ࡟⮳ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
34（ 486 ）

⣡⛯⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝ࢆㄆࡵࡿ࡭ࡁ
࡛࠶ࡿࠋᡃࡀᅜࡢ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺࡣࠊᐃ⋡ἲᇶᮏ㏻㐩 4-19 ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊྲྀᘬ౯
᱁࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸౛ࡀ♧ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡳ࡛ࠊ⣡⛯⪅࡟ࡼࡿ❧ド᪉ἲ➼ࡣ᫂☜࡟つᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒ࡟ࡼࡿ❧ドࢆㄆࡵࡿవᆅࡀ࠶ࡿࠋղࡢせ௳ࢆ‶ࡓࡍ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡣ APA ࡢෆᐜ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ẖᮇ⏦࿌ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡣࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡢᐇົ㈇ᢸࡢቑຍࢆ⪃៖ࡋ࡚ࠊAPA ࡢ☜ㄆࢆཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿ⣡⛯⪅ࡀ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡟ẖᮇᥦฟࡍࡿ APA ࡢᖺḟሗ࿌᭩ 183࡟ࡼࡿ⏦࿌ࢆㄆࡵࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
(2) ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟ᑐࡍࡿᥦゝᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡣࠊᙜヱ⛯ไࡢ᭦ṇฎศࡀᾘ㈝⛯࡟୚࠼ࡿᙳ㡪ࡢ᭷↓࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ
⛣㌿౯᱁஦ົ㐠Ⴀせ㡿㸦௨ୗࠊࠕ㐠Ⴀせ㡿ࠖ࡜࠸࠺ࠋ㸧࡟࠾࠸࡚᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡛
ࡣࠊࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡣἲே⛯ἲࡑࡢ௚ἲே⛯࡟㛵ࡍࡿἲ௧ࡢ㐺⏝ࢆᐃࡵࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾࠊㄪᰝ
࡟ᙜࡓࡾྠ⛯ไࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡓሙྜ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࠊᾘ㈝⛯ࡢィ⟬࡟ࡣᙳ㡪ࡋ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࡟␃ពࡍ
ࡿࠖ 184࡜ㄝ᫂ࡍࡿࠋ⩚ᗋẶ࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊࡇࡢぢゎࡣጇᙜࡢࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ㛵⛯࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶྠᵝ
ࡢぢゎ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡍࡿ 185ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊ㐠Ⴀせ㡿ࡢぢゎࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ᭦ṇฎศࡢᙳ㡪ࡢࡳࢆ᳨ウࡋࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ⿵ൾㄪᩚࡸ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡜࠸ࡗࡓᮏ✏ࡀㄢ㢟࡜ࡍࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢᙳ㡪ࡲ࡛ᚲࡎࡋࡶ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋ
ᡃࡀᅜ࡛ࡣࠊ⿵ൾㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊᅜ⛯ᗇࡣࠊ
ࠕ…☜ㄆἲேࡀ☜ㄆྲྀᘬࡢᑐ౯ࡢ㢠ࢆ஦๓☜ㄆࡢෆᐜ࡟㐺ྜࡋࡓ㢠࡜ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ☜ᐃࡋࡓỴ⟬࡟࠾࠸࡚⾜࠺ᚲせ࡞ㄪᩚ…ࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁ࡞࠿ࡗࡓሙྜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ☜ㄆἲேࡢ☜ㄆྲྀᘬࡢᑐ౯ࡢ㢠ࡢㄪᩚࠖ186࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ㄝ᫂ࡍࡿࠋ
ࡘࡲࡾࠊ⿵ൾㄪᩚࡣࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀㄢ⛯ᙜᒁ࠿ࡽ APA ࡢ☜ㄆࢆཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ๓ᥦ࡜ࡋࠊAPA
ࡢෆᐜ࡟㐺ྜࡍࡿࡼ࠺࡟⣡⛯⪅⮬㌟ࡀ⾜࠺ྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᑐࡍࡿㄪᩚࢆព࿡ࡍࡿ 187ࠋᅜእ㛵㐃ྲྀᘬࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᑐࡋ࡚஦ᴗᖺᗘᮎ࡟࡞ࡉࢀࡓ APA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃㄪᩚ࡟ಀࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢྲྀᢅ
183

ᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛯ົᙜᒁࡣࠊAPA ࡢ☜ㄆࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸ࡿ௻ᴗ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠊAPA ࡢ☜ㄆෆᐜ࡟ᇶ࡙
ࡃ⏦࿌≧ἣࠊ⏕ࡌࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡢ࠶ࡿㄪᩚࠊ➼ࡢ᝟ሗࢆグ㍕ࡋࡓᖺḟሗ࿌᭩ࡢᥦฟࢆẖᮇ஦ᴗᖺᗘᮎ࡟せồࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᅜ⛯ᗇ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁஦ົ㐠Ⴀせ㡿 ➨ 6 ❶ ஦๓☜ㄆ 6-17㸦ሗ࿌᭩ࡢᥦฟ㸧ࠖ
https://www.nta.go.jp/law/jimu-unei/hojin/010601/05.htm
㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2019 ᖺ 2 ᭶ 18 ᪥㸧ࠋ
184 ᅜ⛯ᗇ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁஦ົ㐠Ⴀせ㡿 ➨ 3 ❶ ㄪᰝ 3-27㸦ᾘ㈝⛯࡜ࡢ㛵ಀ㸧ࠖ
https://www.nta.go.jp/law/zeiho-kaishaku/jimu-unei/hojin/010601/02.htm 㸦 ᭱ ⤊ 㜀 ぴ ᪥2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋ
185 ⩚ᗋ࣭๓ᥖὀ 91࣭180 㡫ࠋ
186 ᅜ⛯ᗇ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁஦ົ㐠Ⴀせ㡿 ➨ 6 ❶ ஦๓☜ㄆ 6-19㸦஦๓☜ㄆ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃㄪᩚ➼㸧ࠖhttps://www.nta.go.jp/law/jimu-unei/hojin/010601/05.htm㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21᪥㸧ࠋ187 ஭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ 25࣭53 㡫ࠋ࡞࠾ࠊ࿴ἼẶࡣࠊAPA ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚࡣ⛯ົᙜᒁࡀ஦๓࡟
ྜពࡋࡓㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ⣡⛯⪅⮬㌟ࡢุ᩿࡛⾜࠺ㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡣ⪃࠼ࡽࢀ࡞࠸࡜ࡢぢゎࢆ㏙࡭࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡉࡽ࡟ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⿵ൾㄪᩚ࡟㛵ࡍࡿㄝ᫂ࡣࠊ࠶ࡃࡲ࡛ APA ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢつᐃ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡢぢゎࢆ㏙࡭࡚࠸ࡿࠋ࿴Ἴ࣭๓ᥖὀ 89࣭121-122 㡫ࠋ
35（ 487 ）

࠸ࡀࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁஦ົ㐠Ⴀせ㡿ࡢู෉ࡢ஦౛ 26 ࡟ᥖ㍕ࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾ 188ࠊࡇࡇ࡛ࡢ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡣࠊ⤒῭ⓗຠᯝ࡟どⅬࢆ⨨࠸ࡓሙྜࠊ⿵ൾㄪᩚ࡜ྠᵝࡢᶵ⬟ࢆᯝࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ホ౯࡛ࡁࡿ 189ࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ APA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⿵ൾㄪᩚཬࡧ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢ୍㒊ࡣࠊᐇ㝿࡟ྲྀᘬ౯᱁
࡬ࡢㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀ
ࡗ࡚ࠊᐇົୖࠊ஦๓ᩍ♧࡛ࡶ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡼ࠺࡟ࠊᙜヱ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡀ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿ᪨ࢆࠊ㐠Ⴀせ㡿࡟ࡣ᫂グࡋ࡚࠾ࡃ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ 190ࠋ
4㸫3 ไᗘᇳ⾜࡟ᑐࡍࡿᥦゝ ᥦゝࡋࡓ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࢆᐇ᪋ࡍࡿࡓࡵ
࡟ࡣࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁ㛫ࡢ༠ຊ㛵ಀࡀ୙ྍḞ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡜ࡢ㛵ಀᛶ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡀಖᣢࡍࡿ᝟ሗࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢ⟬ᐃୖ᭷⏝࡟࡞ࡿ㸦㏫ࡶྠᵝ㸧࡜ࡢぢゎࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 191ࠋWCO ࢞࢖ࢻ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠊ୧ㄢ⛯ᙜᒁ㛫࡛᝟ሗ஺᥮ཬࡧඹྠㄪᰝ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ MOU ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࠊ୧ㄢ⛯ᙜᒁࡢ⫋ဨྠኈࡢ஺ὶࢆ῝ࡵࡿࡇ࡜ࠊከᅜ⡠௻ᴗ࡬ࡢᑐᛂ࡟↔Ⅼࢆ࠶࡚ࡓඹྠࡢࣅࢪࢿࢫࢳ࣮࣒ࢆ⤖ᡂࡍࡿࡇ࡜➼ࡀ᥎ዡࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 192ࠋ ⌧≧ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡣࠊ┦஫࡟⊂❧ࡋ࡚㐠Ⴀࡉࢀࠊ୧ㄢ⛯ᙜᒁ㛫࡛ࡢ᝟ሗ஺᥮ࡀ༑ศ࡛࡞࠸ࠋ௒ᚋࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࢆ᥋㏆ࡉࡏࡿ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡢ༠ຊ㛵ಀࡀࡼࡾ୍ᒙ㔜せ࡟࡞ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࠊ㡑ᅜ࡟࡞ࡽࡗ࡚ࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࢆ⟶㎄ࡍࡿ㈈ົ┬ࡀ୰ᚰ࡜࡞ࡾࠊ୧ㄢ⛯ᙜᒁ㛫ࡢ༠ຊ㛵ಀࢆ⠏ࡃࡓࡵࡢ
MOU ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊᅜෆ APA ࡜஦๓ᩍ♧ไᗘࡢྠ᫬⏦ㄳไᗘࡢᑟධࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ࠋࡇࡢไᗘࡢᑟධ࡟ࡼࡾࠊ㍺ධྲྀᘬ๓ࡢẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢホ౯ᡭ⥆ࢆ᥋㏆ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࡀྍ⬟࡜࡞ࡾࠊᇳ⾜ᡭ⥆ࡢᏳᐃᛶࡢྥ
ୖ࡟ࡘ࡞ࡀࡿࡔࢁ࠺ࠋ

188

ᅜ⛯ᗇ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕู෉ ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ㐺⏝࡟ᙜࡓࡗ࡚ࡢཧ⪃஦౛㞟ࠖ96 㡫-98 㡫https://www.nta.go.jp/shiraberu/zeiho-kaishaku/jimu-unei/hojin/010601/pdf/bessatsu.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧ࠋ
189 ⏣ᮧᩄ᫂ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไୖࡢ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢ✚ᴟⓗά⏝ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 33 ᕳ 12 ྕ 98 㡫
㸦2013㸧
ࠋ
190 ⌧ᅾࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡛ࡣࠊ⿵ൾㄪᩚཬࡧ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ἲ௧ୖࡢつᐃࡀᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ
ἲ௧࡟㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡬ࡢᙳ㡪ࢆつᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ㞴ࡋ࠸࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ
191 OECD, supra note 26, paras 1.137-1.138.
192 WCO, supra note 34, paras 6.2, 6.4.
36

（ 488 ）

⤊❶ ࠾ࢃࡾ࡟ ᮏ✏ࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ㍺ධྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࡀ᫂

☜࡛࡞ࡃࠊࡇࢀࡲ࡛㆟ㄽࡀ༑ศ࡟࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸⌧≧࡟ၥ㢟ព㆑ࢆᣢࡕࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ஺㘒࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟࡟ᑐࡍࡿᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞ືྥࢆศᯒࡋࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊᡃࡀᅜࡢ
⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉ࢆᥦゝࡋࡓࠋᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞㆟ㄽࢆศᯒࡋࡓ⤖ᯝࠊᐇ㝿࡟㔠㖹➼ࡢᤵཷࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡼ࠺࡞⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ
࠸࡚ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ࠋᡃࡀᅜࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡣࠊAPA ࡟క࠺ୖ᪉㸭ୗ᪉࠸ࡎࢀࡢ⿵ൾㄪᩚࡸ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶࠊ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃㄪᩚ࡛
࠶ࡿ࡜ㄆࡵࡓሙྜࡣࠊㄪᩚࢆ⪃៖ࡋࡓᚋࡢྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡓࡔ
ࡋࠊ⡿ᅜࡸ㡑ᅜࡣ࠸ࡃࡘ࠿ࡢせ௳ࢆ‶ࡓࡋࡓሙྜ࡟㝈ᐃࡋ࡚⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࢆ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘୖ࡛⪃៖ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࠊ⛯཰㠃࠿ࡽࡶୗ᪉ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊձ஦๓ᩍ♧ไᗘࢆ⏦ㄳࡋࠊᑗ᮶ࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆྵࢇࡔྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊཎ๎ἲ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㛵⛯ホ౯㢠ࡢ⟬ᐃࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࠊղAPA ࡢෆᐜ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ẖᮇ⏦࿌ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ
࡜ࡢ 2 ࡘࡢせ௳ࢆ‶ࡓࡍሙྜ࡟㝈ᐃࡋ࡚ᑐᛂࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡀձࡢせ௳ࢆ‶ࡓࡍࡓࡵ࡟ࠊAPA ࡸ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢ⤖ᯝ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ≉Ṧ㛵ಀࡀྲྀᘬ౯᱁࡟ᙳ
㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆ❧ドࡍࡿሙྜ࡟ࡣࠊ㈍኎࡟ಀࡿ≧ἣࡢ᳨ウࢸࢫࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ศᯒࡢά⏝ࢆㄆࡵࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋղࡢせ௳ࡣࠊ㛵⛯ᙜᒁࡀձࡢせ௳ࢆㄆࡵࡓሙྜࠊ㍺ධ
ྲྀᘬᚋ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟క࠺㛵⛯ࡢ㏣ᚩཬࡧ㑏௜ࢆ⾜࠺ࡓࡵ࡟ᚲせ࡜࡞ࡾࠊ⣡⛯⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ẖᮇ஦ᴗᖺᗘᮎ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ APA ࡢᖺḟሗ࿌᭩ࡢᥦฟࢆせồࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ࠋ
ᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟ࡼࡿ᭦ṇฎศࡣࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡉ࡞࠸࡜ࡢ
ぢゎࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋ࡞ࡀࡽࠊ⿵ൾㄪᩚࡸ୍㒊ࡢ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡀࠊ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍࡇ࡜ࡣ᫂ࡽ࠿࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊࡑࡢ᪨ࢆ㐠Ⴀせ㡿࡟࠾࠸࡚᫂グࡋ࡚࠾ࡃ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋᇳ⾜ᡭ⥆ࡢᏳᐃᛶࡢほⅬ࠿ࡽࠊ㡑ᅜ࡟࡞ࡽࡗ࡚ࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁࢆ⟶㎄ࡍࡿ㈈ົ┬ࢆ୰ᚰ࡟ࠊ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡜㛵⛯ᙜᒁ㛫࡛ࡢ᝟ሗ஺᥮ཬࡧඹྠㄪᰝ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ MOU ࢆ⥾⤖ࡋࠊᅜෆ APA ࡜஦๓ᩍ♧ไᗘࡢྠ᫬⏦ㄳไᗘࡢᑟධࢆ᳨ウࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࢁ࠺ࠋ

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࠙ཧ⪃ᩥ⊩ࠚ࿴ᩥ⊩Ӑ㞧ㄅᩥ⊩ӑ
࣭Ⲩᕳ೺஧ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ๰タࠖࠗ᫛࿴ 61 ᖺᨵṇ⛯ไࡢࡍ࡭࡚࠘㸦ᅜ⛯ᗇࠊ1986㸧࣭ᮤி᰿ࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢㄪ࿴࡟ྥࡅࡓ㡑ᅜࡢไᗘᨵၿෆᐜࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 36
ᕳ 4 ྕ㸦2016㸧୍࣭㧗㱟ྖࠕ➨ 11 ❶ ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࠖᮧ஭ṇ⦅ⴭࠗධ㛛 ᅜ㝿⛒⛯ἲ࠘㸦Ύᩥ♫ࠊ2013㸧࣭஭ᮧ⪃ㄹࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࢆࡵࡄࡿ୍⪃ᐹ㹼≉Ṧ㛵ಀ࡟࠾ࡅࡿྲྀᘬ౯᱁ࢆ
୰ᚰ࡜ࡋ࡚㹼ࠖ⛯㛵◊ಟᡤㄽ㞟 45 ྕ㸦2014㸧࣭ኴ⏣ὒࠕᡃࡀᅜࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࠖ୰㔛࡯࠿⦅ࠗ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢࣇࣟࣥࢸ࢕࢔࠘㸦᭷ᩫ㛶ࠊ
2009㸧࣭ᑠᯘṇᙪ㸻∦ᒸ༟ஓࠕ␲ၥ┦ㄯ ᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠࡟㛵ࡍࡿἲே⛯ཬࡧ㛵⛯࣭㍺ධ
ᾘ㈝⛯ࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࠖᅜ⛯㏿ሗ 6371 ྕ㸦2015㸧࣭⏣ᓥ㝧୍ࠕ〇㐀ᴗࢱࢵࢡࢫ࣭࣊࢖ࣈࣥ࡜㛵⛯࠾ࡼࡧἲே⛯࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⪃ᐹ̿⡿ᅜෆᅜṓ
ධἲ 1059A ᮲ࢆ୰ᚰ࡟̿ࠖᮾிእᅜㄒ኱Ꮫㄽ㞟 83 ྕ㸦2011㸧࣭⏣ᮧᩄ᫂ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไୖࡢ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢ✚ᴟⓗά⏝ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 33 ᕳ 12 ྕ㸦2013㸧࣭ἼከỤಇᏕࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯࡜ᐇ㝿౯᱁̿㛵⛯ホ౯ၥ㢟ࡢືྥ࡟㛵㐃ࡋ࡚̿ࠖ⚟ᒸ኱ᏥၟᏥㄽ
ྀ 15 ᕳ 1 ྕ㸦1971㸧࣭ᖹ⏣ဴஓࠕࢢ࣮ࣟࣂ࣭ࣝࣂ࣮࣭ࣜࣗࢳ࢙࣮ࣥୗࡢ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘ࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࠖ㈠᫆࡜
㛵⛯ 62 ᕳ 3 ྕ㸦2014㸧࣭ቑ஭Ⰻၨࠕ⛒⛯ไᗘ࡜㏻ၟ༠ᐃࡢ᥋Ⅼ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ஧ࠊ୕ࡢἲⓗㄽⅬࠖ㈈ᅋἲேࢺࣛࢫࢺ 60ࠗᅜ㝿ၟྲྀᘬ࡟క࠺ἲⓗㅖၥ㢟㸦10㸧࠘㸦㈈ᅋἲேࢺࣛࢫࢺ 60ࠊ2002㸧࣭Ỉ㔝ṇኵࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢ᥋Ⅼࠖ⛯ἲᏛ 577 ྕ㸦2017㸧࣭Ỉ㔝ṇኵ㸻⚄ὠ㝯ᖾࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡜㛵⛯ࡢㄪ࿴ࢆࡵࡄࡿ᪂ࡓ࡞ືࡁ ⡿ᅜ࣭HRL548314
㸦᪂࣮ࣝࣜࣥࢢࣞࢱ࣮㸧ࡢᴫせ࡜ᐇົୖࡢ␃ពⅬࠖ⤒⌮᝟ሗ 1325 ྕ㸦2012㸧࣭࿴Ἴⱥ㞝ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢᐇົⓗᑐᛂࠑୖࠒࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 37 ᕳ 9 ྕ㸦2016㸧
࣭Maho Jordan, William M Methenitis, Steven C. Wrappe, Rodell Molinaࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⡿ᅜ㛵⛯ἲࡢ᪂࣮ࣝࣜࣥࢢࣞࢱ࣮ ⛣㌿౯᱁࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃୗ᪉ㄪᩚ࡜⡿ᅜ㛵⛯㑏௜ࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿྍ⬟ᛶ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 33 ᕳ 7 ྕ㸦2013㸧Ӑ᭩⡠ӑ࣭ఀ⸨㞝஧࣭ⴗ㇂ᛅࠗᅗㄝ ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࠝ඲ゞ➨ 2 ∧ࠞ࠘㸦⛯ົ◊✲఍ฟ∧ᒁࠊ2012㸧࣭ỤἼᡞ㡰ྐࠗ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࡢ㝈⏺࡜⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢᨵ㠉࠘㸦஬⤋⯋ࠊ2012㸧࣭㔠Ꮚᏹࠗ⛒⛯ἲࠝ➨ 22 ∧ࠞ࠘㸦ᘯᩥᇽࠊ2017㸧࣭బ⸨ṇ຾ࠗ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ⌮ㄽ࡜㐺⏝̿᪥⡿୧ᅜἲࡢẚ㍑◊✲̿࠘㸦⛯ົ⤒⌮༠఍ࠊ1997㸧࣭᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲఍ࠗOECD ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥࠕከᅜ⡠௻ᴗ࡜⛯ົᙜᒁࡢࡓࡵࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⟬ᐃ࡟㛵ࡍࡿᣦ㔪ࠖ㸦2010 ᖺ∧㸧࠘㸦᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲఍ࠊ2010㸧
38（ 490 ）

࣭⩚ᗋṇ⚽ࠗᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ၥ㢟࡜ᨻᗓ㛫༠㆟࠘㸦኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍ࠊ2002㸧࣭ቑ஭Ⰻၨ㸻ᐑᓮ⿱Ꮚࠗᅜ㝿⛒⛯ἲࠝ➨ 3 ∧ࠞ࠘㸦ᮾி኱Ꮫࠊ2015㸧࣭᳃ಙኵࠗ⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢ⤒῭Ꮫ BEPS ၥ㢟࡬ࡢᑐᛂ࡜↓ᙧ㈨⏘ホ౯࠘㸦୰ኸ⤒῭♫ࠊ2014㸧Ӑ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ➼ӑ࣭⤒῭⏘ᴗ┬࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ༓஑ⓒ஑༑ᅄᖺࡢ㛵⛯ཬࡧ㈠᫆࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⯡༠ᐃ➨୐᮲ࡢᐇ᪋࡟㛵ࡍࡿ༠ᐃࠖ
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/wto_agreements/marrakech/html/wto09m.html㸦᭱⤊ゼၥ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 16 ᪥㸧
࣭KPMG Korea ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㛵⛯ホ౯ไᗘࡢᨵၿ᥎㐍ࠖ
jpn.kr.kpmg.com/jp/111226%20kpmg%20focus.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2019 ᖺ 1 ᭶ 6 ᪥㸧࣭ᅜ⛯ᗇ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟ಀࡿᩥ᭩໬ไᗘ࡟㛵ࡍࡿᨵṇࡢ࠶ࡽࡲࡋࠖ
https://www.nta.go.jp/shiraberu/ippanjoho/pamph/pdf/h28iten-kakaku.pdf㸦᭱⤊ゼၥ
᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 16 ᪥㸧࣭ᅜ⛯ᗇ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁஦ົ㐠Ⴀせ㡿 ➨ 3 ❶ ㄪᰝ 3-27㸦ᾘ㈝⛯࡜ࡢ㛵ಀ㸧ࠖ
https://www.nta.go.jp/law/zeiho-kaishaku/jimu-unei/hojin/010601/02.htm㸦᭱⤊ゼၥ᪥
2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 16 ᪥㸧࣭ᅜ⛯ᗇ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ ┦஫༠㆟ᐊ ࠕ஦๓☜ㄆࡢᴫせࠖ
http://www.nta.go.jp/kohyo/press/press/2010/sogo_kyogi/pdf/02.pdf㸦᭱⤊ゼၥ᪥ 2018ᖺ 11 ᭶ 16 ᪥㸧࣭ᅜ⛯ᗇ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕู෉ ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ㐺⏝࡟ᙜࡓࡗ࡚ࡢཧ⪃஦౛㞟ࠖ
https://www.nta.go.jp/shiraberu/zeiho-kaishaku/jimu-unei/hojin/010601/pdf/bessatsu.
pdf㸦᭱⤊ゼၥ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 16 ᪥㸧
࣭㈈ົ┬࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㍺ධ஦ᚋㄪᰝࡢ≧ἣ㸦ᖹᡂ 30 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 14 ᪥㸧ࠖhttps://www.mof.go.jp/customs_tariff/trade/collection/ka20181114b1.htm㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥
2018 ᖺ 12 ᭶ 28 ᪥㸧ࠋ࣭㈈ົ┬࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㍺ධ஦ᚋㄪᰝࡢ≧ἣ㸦ᖹᡂ 29 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 7 ᪥㸧ࠖhttps://www.mof.go.jp/customs_tariff/trade/collection/ka20171107b1.htm㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥
2018 ᖺ 12 ᭶ 28 ᪥㸧
࣭㈈ົ┬࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㍺ධ஦ᚋㄪᰝࡢ≧ἣ㸦ᖹᡂ 28 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 4 ᪥㸧ࠖhttps://www.mof.go.jp/customs_tariff/trade/collection/ka20161104b2.htm㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥
2018 ᖺ 12 ᭶ 28 ᪥㸧࣭⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ
http://www.customs.go.jp/zeikan/seido/kanzeihyouka/keisan_index.htm 㸦 ᭱ ⤊ ゼ ၥ ᪥2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 16 ᪥㸧࣭⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ
http://www.customs.go.jp/tetsuzuki/c-answer/imtsukan/1402_jr.htm㸦᭱⤊ゼၥ᪥ 2018ᖺ 11 ᭶ 16 ᪥㸧࣭⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢㄢ⛯౯᱁ࡢỴᐃࢆᅔ㞴࡜ࡍࡿㄪᩚ㔠ࠖ
http://www.customs.go.jp/zeikan/seido/kanzeihyouka/hyokajirei/hyokajirei4120002.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧
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࣭⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ㍺ධ㈌≀࡟ಀࡿ㛵⛯ホ౯ୖࡢྲྀᢅ࠸➼࡟㛵ࡍࡿ↷఍㸦ㄪᩚ㔠ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿሙྜࡢ㍺ධ㈌≀ࡢㄢ⛯౯᱁ࡢィ⟬᪉ἲ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㸧ࠖ
www.customs.go.jp/zeikan/seido/kanzeihyouka/H23jirei/230309.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧࣭⛯㛵࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪࠕ34㸬㍺ධྲྀᘬ࡟ಀࡿ౯᱁ㄪᩚ᮲㡯ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡾⓎ⏕ࡍࡿㄪᩚ㔠ࠖ
http://www.customs.go.jp/zeikan/seido/kanzeihyouka/hyokajirei/hyokajirei4110062.pd
f㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 21 ᪥㸧
࣭EY ⛯⌮ኈἲே ኱ᖹὒ୍ࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ㔠ࡢ㛵⛯ୖࡢྲྀᢅ࠸࡟ኚ᭦ࡢྍ⬟ᛶ㸸Ḣᕞྖἲ⿢ุᡤ㸦ECJ㸧ࡢ⏬ᮇⓗ࡞ุỴࠖ㸦2018㸧
japan_tax_alert_2_18_Jan_2018_j.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2019 ᖺ 1 ᭶ 27 ᪥㸧࣭PwC ⛯⌮ኈἲேࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄪᩚ࡬ࡢᑐᛂ̿㛵⛯ࡢほⅬ࠿ࡽࠖ㸦2015㸧
https://www.pwc.com/jp/ja/taxnews-customs/assets/wms-jan-2015-j.pdf 㸦 ᭱ ⤊ 㜀 ぴ ᪥2018 ᖺ 12 ᭶ 28 ᪥㸧ὒᩥ⊩Ӑ㞧ㄅㄽᩥӑ
࣭CBP, NOTICE OF REVOCATION OF A RULING LETTER HQ 547654 RELATING TO

POST-IMPORTATION ADJUSTMENTS; RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS;RECONCILIATION, Customs Bulletin and decisions, Vol 46, No 23, May 30, 2012.
࣭ICC, Transfer Pricing and Customs Valuation-2015-Policy statement, 2015.
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trade and customs journal, Vol 2, 2007.
࣭Liu Ping, Transfer Pricing, Customs, Duties and VAT Rules: Can We Bridge the Gap?,
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Administrations, 2017.
࣭Mayra O. Lucas Mas, Section 1059A: An Obstacle to Achieving Consistent Legislation?,International Transfer Pricing Journal, Vol 46, No 23, 2008.
࣭WCO, TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON CUSTOMS VALUATION ̽ COMMENTARY

4.1, PRICE REVIEW CLAUSES, 23 March 1982, 1982.
࣭WCO, Meeting of the Focus Group on Transfer Pricing Brussels, 26 October 2007,

Summary of the proceedings, 2007.
࣭WCO, TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON CUSTOMS VALUATION - COMMENTARY

23.1, Examination of the expression “circumstances surrounding the sale” under
Article 1.2 (a) in relation to the use of transfer pricing studies, 29 October 2010, 2010
࣭WCO, WCO Guide to Customs Valuation and Transfer Pricing New edition 2018, 2018.
࣭Yoshihiro Masui, Transfer pricing and Customs Duties, Bulletin for International
Fiscal Documentation, Vol 50, No.7, at 317, 1996.
40（ 492 ）

࣭ Young-Joo Kim, The Current Transfer Pricing Environment for Multinational

Enterprises in Korea, Bullet in for International Taxation, June 2018.
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2018)Ӑ࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ➼ӑ
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RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS, at 15, 2007.
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᭶ 19 ᪥㸧࣭MSc. M. Friedhoff, The treatment of transfer pricing adjustments for the purpose ofcustoms valuation, European customs law, 2017.
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WHEN EXAMINING RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 1.2.
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tudy-14_2_en-release-version.pdf㸦᭱⤊ゼၥ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 15 ᪥㸧ӐุỴӑ࣭FG München, Beschluss v. 15.09.2016 - 14 K 1974/15.
࣭ Judgment of 20 December 2017, Hamamatsu Photonics Deutschland GmbH v

Hauptzollamt München, C-529/16, EU:C:2017:984.

41（ 493 ）（ 494 ）ᚑᒓ௦⌮ே㹎㹃ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⪃ᐹዟᒃ ᐶ⏕（ 495 ）（ 496 ）せ᪨ᚑᒓ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⪃ᐹẶྡ ዟᒃ ᐶ⏕ ᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ไᗘ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᜏஂⓗ᪋タ㸦Permanent Establishment, PE㸧ࡣࠊ᭱ࡶ㔜せ࡞ᴫᛕࡢ୍ࡘ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡇࡢ PE ࡢ᭷↓࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ୍᪉ࡢᅜ࡛஦ᴗάືࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ௻ᴗࡢ஦ᴗ
ᡤᚓ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚௚᪉ࡢᅜࡀㄢ⛯࡛ࡁࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ࡀỴࡲࡿࡓࡵࠊPE ࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᅇ㑊ࡍ࡭ࡃࠊ᪂ࡓ࡞஦ᴗᙧែࢆ฼⏝ࡍࡿ௻ᴗࡀቑ࠼࡚࠸ࡿࠋ᪂ࡓ࡞஦ᴗᙧែࡢ࠺ࡕࠊᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞⤌⧊෌⦅ࢆ⏝࠸࡚ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ࡢࡼ࠺࡞ᙧែࢆ࡜ࡿ௻ᴗࡀቑ࠼࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡇࡢᙧែࢆ฼⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛௦⌮ே PE ࡢㄆᐃࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿࠋேⅭⓗ࡞ PE ᅇ㑊ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊOECD࡟࠾ࡅࡿ BEPS ⾜ືィ⏬ 7 ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ⠊ᅖ࡟㛵ࡍࡿಟṇࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡓࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ
᪂ࡓ࡟ PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣ᫂☜࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋ
≉࡟ࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔㸦㛵㐃⪅㸧ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲㸦௨ୗࠕ➨ 9 ᮲ࠖ㸧ཬࡧྠ᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲㸦௨ୗࠕ➨ 7 ᮲ࠖ㸧ࡀࡑࢀࡒࢀ࡝ࡢࡼ
࠺࡟㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿࡢ࠿᫂☜࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃࡀᅔ㞴࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࡢၥ㢟࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ2015 ᖺ BEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌ᚋ࡟ࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡀබ
⾲ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡛ᮏ✏࡛ࡣࠊࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲
࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀࢆ᫂☜࡟ࡋࠊ㐺ṇ࡞௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆᶍ⣴ࡍࡿࠋ ➨ 1 ❶࡛ࡣࠊᅜෆἲୖཬࡧ⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖࡢ PE ࡢつᐃࢆ☜ㄆࡋࠊᮏ✏࡟࠾ࡅࡿၥ㢟ࡢᡤᅾࢆ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᅜෆἲཬࡧ⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ⠊ᅖࡀᣑ኱ࡋࡓࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾࠊࡇࢀ
ࡲ࡛௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀ࡞࠿ࡗࡓࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔➼ࡀ᪂ࡓ࡟௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜
࡜࡞ࡗࡓࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾ᪂ࡓ࡞ၥ㢟ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࠋࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ࡀ㛵㐃⪅㸦➨ 9 ᮲㐺⏝㸧࡜࡞ࡗࡓሙྜࡢ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀ࡛
࠶ࡿࠋOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡜ࡑࡢࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮࡛ࣜࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ฼┈ㄪᩚ࡜➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ฼┈ࡢᖐᒓࡢ࡝ࡕࡽࡀඃඛࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࠿࡝࠺࠿ࡀ᫂☜࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢつᐃࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀࡀၥ㢟࡜࡞ࡿࠋ ➨ 2 ❶࡛ࡣࠊᅜෆἲୖཬࡧ⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆ☜ㄆࡋࠊ➨ 9
㸦single taxpayer approach ཬࡧ dual taxpayer᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟㛵ࡍࡿ 2 ࡘࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ
approach㸧ࡢẚ㍑ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ㛵㐃⪅ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚㛵㐃⪅࡟㓄ศࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡࡀࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚௦⌮ே PE ࡟㓄ศࡉࢀࡿ࡜ࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡇࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿ 2ࡘࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡀ single taxpayer approach ࡜ dual taxpayer approach ࡛࠶ࡿࠋsingle
taxpayer approach ࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫ᡭᩘᩱࡀᨭᡶࢃࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾࠊࡑࡢ௚
࡟㐙⾜ࡉࢀࡓᶵ⬟ࠊ౑⏝ࡉࢀࡓ㈨⏘ཬࡧᘬࡁཷࡅࡽࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡࡀ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐ（ 497 ）

ᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡣࢮࣟ࡟࡞ࡿ࡜࠸࠺⪃࠼᪉࡛࠶ࡿࠋ୍᪉ࠊdual taxpayer approach ࡣࠊᚑᒓ௦
⌮ேࡀࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ㐙⾜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡀᏑ
ᅾࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺⪃࠼᪉࡛࠶ࡿࠋ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢᶵ⬟ศᯒࡣྠࡌ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢศᯒࡢ
ୗ࡛ࡣᚑᒓ௦⌮ே࡟ᖐᒓࡋ࡞࠸ࣜࢫࢡ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢศᯒ࡟࠾࠸࡚ᚑᒓ௦⌮ேࡀ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ㐙⾜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ
࡚ࠊdual taxpayer approach ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠼ࡿࠋ
 ➨ 3 ❶࡛ࡣࠊdual taxpayer approach ࢆ᥇⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡢᩘ
್౛ࡢศᯒࢆ⾜࠸ࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡜ࡢ㛵ಀ࡟࠾࠸࡚⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ᣦ᦬ࡍࡿࠋ➨ 7 ᮲࡛ࡣࠊ௻ᴗࡢ⥲฼ᚓࢆ PE ࡜ࡑࡢ௚ࡢᵓᡂ㒊ศ࡜࡟㓄ศࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆồࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊPE ࡀูಶࡢ⊂❧ࡋࡓ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜௬ᐃࡋ࡚฼ᚓࡢᖐᒓࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆồࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ
ࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡛ࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡬ࡢ฼┈ࡢ༢࡞ࡿᖐᒓ࡛ࡣ
࡞ࡃࠊPE ࡜ࡑࡢ௚ࡢᵓᡂ㒊ศ࡜ࡢ㛫࡛฼┈㓄ศࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ┠ⓗ࡟཯ࡍࡿࠋ ➨ 4 ❶࡛ࡣࠊ➨ 3 ❶ࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀࢆ᫂☜࡟ࡋࠊࢃࡀᅜ
࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ᮃࡲࡋ࠸௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡢ᳨ウࢆ⾜࠺ࠋAOA ࡢ┠ⓗࡣࠊᮏᗑ࡜ PEࡢ฼┈㓄ศࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡀูಶࡢ⊂❧ࡋࡓ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜௬ᐃࡋ࡚ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡇࢀ࡟ᚑ࠸➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࢆ㐺⏝ࡋࡓሙྜࠊ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡜⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࠋձ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡢ㛫࡛཰┈ཬࡧ㈝⏝ࡢㄪᩚࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡜ࠊղ㛵㐃⪅࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡢ㛫࡛ྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆㄆ
㆑ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡿ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡛࠶ࡿࠋᒃఫᆅᅜഃ࡛ࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࠊᡤᚓච㝖᪉ᘧࡲࡓࡣእᅜ⛯㢠᥍㝖ࢆ฼⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ձࡢ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆ᤼㝖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ
ྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿࠋ※Ἠᆅᅜഃ࡛ࡣࠊղࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆ᤼㝖ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚
㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡࡣ➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ௦⌮ே PE ࡢẁ㝵࡛ㄆ㆑ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࡞࠸ࠋࡑࡢࡓ
ࡵ࡟ࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡟ࡼࡾ㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࣜࢫࢡࢆᢕᥱࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࢆඃඛࡋ࡚㐺⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ࠋ ௨ୖࡼࡾࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀཬࡧᮃࡲࡋ࠸௦⌮ே PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡣࠊ
օ➨ 9 ᮲ࢆඃඛ㐺⏝ࡋࠊֆ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯᤼㝖ࡢࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡋࡓࣜࢫࢡࡣ௦⌮ே PE ࡛ࡣㄆ㆑ࡋ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
㸺୺ࡓࡿཧ⪃ᩥ⊩㸼࣭ὸጔ❶ዴࠕBEPS Action7 ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ PE ࡢᐃ⩏࡜ PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ㸸≉࡟ single taxpayer
approach vs. double taxpayer approach ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠖ21 ୡ⣖ᨻ⟇◊✲ᡤࠗࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ᫬௦࡟
࠾ࡅࡿ᪂ࡓ࡞ᅜ㝿⛒⛯ไᗘࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉࠘㸦2017㸧
࣭Dinis Tracana, The Effect of the OECD/G20 BEPS Initiative on the Attribution ofProfits to Permanent Establishments: The Special Case of Agency Permanent
Establishments, BULLETIN FOR INTERATIONAL TAXATION, 2017.

（ 498 ）࠙┠ḟࠚᗎ❶ ࡣࡌࡵ࡟ .......................................................................................................................1➨ 1 ❶ ௦⌮ே PE ࢆࡵࡄࡿ㆟ㄽ ..........................................................................................2
 1㸫1 PE ࡢᙺ๭ .................................................................................................................2
 1㸫2 ⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖࡢ PE ......................................................................................................2
1㸫3 ௦⌮ே PE ࡟㛵ࡍࡿၥ㢟ࡢᡤᅾ ...............................................................................3
  1㸫3㸫1 ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺ ..................................................................3
  1㸫3㸫2 OECD ࡢ㆟ㄽ࡜ᡃࡀᅜࡢᑐᛂ ........................................................................6
  1㸫3㸫3 ௦⌮ே PE ࡟㛵ࡍࡿၥ㢟ࡢᡤᅾ .................................................................... 11
 1㸫4 ᑠᣓ .........................................................................................................................14➨ 2 ❶ ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㆟ㄽ ......................................................................15
 2㸫1 PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ .........................................................................................15
  2㸫1㸫1 OECD ᢎㄆ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ㸦AOA㸧 ..................................................................15
  2㸫1㸫2 ᅜෆἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ ................................................................20
  2㸫1㸫3 㛵㐃⪅࠿ࡘᚑᒓ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ .........................................................22
 2㸫2 2 ࡘࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ....................................................................................................22
  2㸫2㸫1 single taxpayer approach ............................................................................22
  2㸫2㸫2 dual taxpayer approach ...............................................................................25
  2㸫2㸫3 ᮃࡲࡋ࠸࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ ......................................................................................27
 2㸫3 ᑠᣓ .........................................................................................................................31➨ 3 ❶ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀ ...............................................32
 3㸫1 2016 ᖺࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ ....................................................................32
  3㸫1㸫1 ᩘ್౛ ............................................................................................................32
  3㸫1㸫2 ᩘ್౛࡟ᑐࡍࡿ␲⩏ ......................................................................................41
 3㸫2 2017 ᖺ࣭2018 ᖺࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ....................................................42 3㸫3 ᑠᣓ .........................................................................................................................42➨ 4 ❶ ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡬ࡢᥦゝ ...................................................................................................43 4㸫1 㐺ṇ࡞௦⌮ே PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ ......................................................................43 4㸫2 ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡬ࡢᥦゝ ...................................................................................................47⤊❶ ⤊ࢃࡾ࡟ .....................................................................................................................48ཧ⪃ᩥ⊩ ................................................................................................................................50i（ 499 ）

ᗎ❶ ࡣࡌࡵ࡟
ᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ไᗘ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᜏஂⓗ᪋タ㸦Permanent Establishment, PE㸧ࡣࠊ᭱ࡶ㔜せ࡞ᴫᛕࡢ୍ࡘ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡇࡢ PE ࡢ᭷↓࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ୍᪉ࡢᅜ࡛஦ᴗάືࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ௻ᴗࡢ஦ᴗ
ᡤᚓ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚௚᪉ࡢᅜࡀㄢ⛯࡛ࡁࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ࡀỴࡲࡿࡓࡵࠊPE ࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᅇ㑊ࡍ࡭ࡃࠊ᪂ࡓ࡞஦ᴗᙧែࢆ฼⏝ࡍࡿ௻ᴗࡀቑ࠼࡚࠸ࡿ 1ࠋ᪂ࡓ࡞஦ᴗᙧែࡢ࠺ࡕࠊᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞⤌⧊෌⦅ࢆ⏝࠸࡚ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ࡢࡼ࠺࡞ᙧែࢆ࡜ࡿ௻ᴗࡀቑ࠼࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡇࡢᙧែࢆ฼⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛௦⌮ே PE ࡢㄆᐃࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞ேⅭⓗ࡞ PE ᅇ㑊ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡓࡵ
࡟ࠊOECD ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ BEPS ⾜ືィ⏬ 7 ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ⠊ᅖ࡟㛵ࡍࡿಟṇᥦ᱌ࡀᥖࡆࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋBEPS ⾜ືィ⏬ 7 ࡢಟṇᥦ᱌࡛ࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ⠊ᅖࡀᣑ኱ࡉࢀࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩ
ࣙࢿ࢔࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡶ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆᐃࡍࡿᨵṇࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓࠋ
ࡇࡢᨵṇ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚᪂ࡓ࡞ၥ㢟ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࠋၥ㢟࡜࡞ࡿࡢࡣࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔㸦※Ἠᆅᅜࡢᒃఫἲே㸧ࡢάື࡟ࡼࡗ࡚௦⌮ே PE㸦※Ἠᆅᅜࡢ㠀ᒃఫἲே PE㸧ࡀᏑᅾࡍࡿ࡜ㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿሙྜࡢ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡜ྠ᮲⣙➨ 7᮲ࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ➨ 9 ᮲㐺⏝ࡢ㛵㐃⪅㸦ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔㸧ࡀࠊ➨ 7 ᮲㐺⏝ࡢ௦⌮ே PE
࡜࡞ࡿሙྜࠊ࡝ࢀࡔࡅࡢ฼┈ࡀࡑࢀࡒࢀ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿࡢ࠿᫂☜࡟ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋᡃࡀᅜ࡟
࠾࠸࡚ࡶ 2014 ᖺ࡟࢖ࢠࣜࢫ࡜ࡢ㛫࡟࠾࠸࡚⥾⤖ࡋࡓ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࢆ⓶ษࡾ࡟ࠊOECD ᢎㄆ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ㸦AOA㸧࡟ᇶ࡙࠸ࡓ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ⥾⤖ࢆ㐍ࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡜ྠ᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀཬࡧ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ࡶ㔜せ࡞ၥ㢟࡛࠶ࡿࠋBEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚㏣ຍⓗ࡞࢞࢖ࢲࣥࢫࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡑࡢᚋࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝
ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡀබ⾲ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࡑࡇ࡛ᮏ✏࡛ࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ 2 ࡘࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡛࠶ࡿ
single taxpayer approach ཬࡧ dual taxpayer approach ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ぢ࡚࠸ࡁࠊࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ
࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊᮃࡲࡋ࠸ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡢ᳨ウࢆ⾜࠺ࠋ➨ 1 ❶࡛ࡣࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖࡢ PE ࡢつᐃࢆ☜ㄆࡋࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟㛵ࡍࡿၥ㢟ࡢᡤᅾࢆ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡍࡿࠋ➨ 2 ❶࡛ࡣࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖཬࡧᅜෆἲୖࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆ☜ㄆࡋࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟㛵ࡍࡿ 2 ࡘࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ㸦single taxpayer approachཬࡧ dual taxpayer approach㸧ࡢẚ㍑ࢆ⾜ࡗࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ᮃࡲࡋ࠸࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿࠋ➨ 3 ❶࡛ࡣࠊࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᩘ್౛ࡢศᯒࢆ⾜࠸ࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡜ࡢ㛵ಀ࡟࠾࠸࡚⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ᣦ᦬ࡍࡿࠋ➨ 4 ❶࡛ࡣࠊ➨ 3 ❶ࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡓ
࠺࠼࡛ࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ᮃࡲࡋ࠸௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㏙࡭ࡿࠋ㔝⏣ᫀẎࠕ⾜ື 7㸸ேⅭⓗ࡞ PE ᅇ㑊ࡢ㜵Ṇࠖ୰㔛ᐇ࡯࠿⦅ࠗBEPS ࡜ࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ⤒῭άື࠘226 㡫㸦᭷ᩫ㛶ࠊ2017㸧ࠋ
1

1（ 500 ）

➨ 1 ❶ ௦⌮ே PE ࢆࡵࡄࡿ㆟ㄽ
1㸫1 PE ࡢᙺ๭ PE ࡣእᅜἲே➼ࡢ஦ᴗᡤᚓㄢ⛯࡟࠾ࡅࡿ᭱ࡶᇶᮏⓗ࡞ᴫᛕ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ஦ᴗ࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿᡤᚓ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊᒃఫᆅᅜ࡜※Ἠᆅᅜ࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢㄢ⛯ᶒࡢ㓄ศࢆᢸ࠺⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖࡢᴫᛕ࡜ࡋ࡚Ṕྐⓗ࡟Ⓨᒎࡋ࡚ࡁࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿ 23ࠋᒃఫᆅᅜㄢ⛯ࢆ᥇ࡿᅜ࡜※Ἠᆅᅜㄢ⛯ࢆ᥇ࡿᅜࡢ㛫࡛஦ᴗࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡓሙྜࢆ᝿ᐃࡍࡿࠋ
ᒃఫᆅᅜㄢ⛯ࢆ⾜࠺ᅜࡢୗ࡛ࡣࠊᡤᚓࡀ࡝ࡇ࡛⏕ࡌࡓࡢ࠿࡟࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊᅜෆ࡟ᒃఫࡋ࡚
࠸ࡿ⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ㄢ⛯ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࡀࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜㄢ⛯ࢆ⾜࠺ᅜࡢୗ࡛ࡣࠊᡤᚓࡀ⏕ࡌࡓ※Ἠᆅ࡛ㄢ⛯ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࡓࡵࠊࡇࡢ␗࡞ࡿㄢ⛯⟶㎄୺⩏ࢆ᥇⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿᅜࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚஦
ᴗࢆ⾜ࡗࡓሙྜࠊᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿ 4ࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆ᤼㝖ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊᜏஂⓗ࡞≀⌮ⓗᏑᅾ࡛࠶ࡿ PE ᴫᛕࢆ⏝࠸࡚ࠊྛᅜࡢㄢ⛯ᶒࡢ㓄ศࢆ᫂☜໬ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ ከࡃࡢᅜ࡛ࡣࠊୖグࡢࡼ࠺࡞஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆᅇ㑊ࡍ࡭ࡃࠊᅜෆἲཬࡧ⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖ࡟ PE ࡟㛵ࡍࡿᐃ⩏ࢆつᐃࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ⮬ᅜࡢ௻ᴗࡀ┦ᡭᅜ࡛஦ᴗࢆ⾜࠺ሙྜࠊ┦ᡭᅜෆ࡟ᙜヱ௻ᴗࡢ PE
࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿ஦ᴗάືࡢᣐⅬ㸦PE㸧ࡀᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸㝈ࡾࠊ┦ᡭᅜࡣᙜヱ௻ᴗࡢ஦ᴗᡤᚓᑐࡋ࡚
ㄢ⛯࡛ࡁ࡞࠸࡜ࡍࡿࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡣࠕPE ࡞ࡅࢀࡤㄢ⛯࡞ࡋࠖ࡜࿧ࡤࢀࡿཎ๎࡛࠶ࡿ 5ࠋ ❧ἲᨻ⟇ㄽୖࠊPE ࢆぢࡿどⅬ࡟ࡣ 2 ࡘࡢࡶࡢࡀ࠶ࡿࠋձPE ࡣࠊ௻ᴗࡀ஦ᴗ㐍ฟࡋ࡚ࡁ࡚ࡶࡑࡢẁ㝵࡟⮳ࡿࡲ࡛ࡣࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜࡀㄢ⛯ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡞࠸࡜࠸࠺᭱ప㝈ᗘࠊࡍ࡞ࢃࡕ㜈್ࢆព࿡ࡍࡿ㸦ᾘᴟⓗഃ㠃㸧ࡶࡢ࡜ࠊղPE ࡢᏑᅾࡀࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜࡀእᅜἲேࡢ஦ᴗᡤᚓ࡟ㄢ
⛯ࡍࡿ᰿ᣐࢆᥦ౪ࡍࡿ㸦✚ᴟⓗഃ㠃㸧ࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿ 6ࠋ㈨ᮏ㍺ධᅜࡣ PE ࡢ⠊ᅖࢆᣑ኱ࡋࡼ࠺
࡜ࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊ✚ᴟⓗഃ㠃ࢆᙉㄪࡋࠊ㈨ᮏ㍺ฟᅜࡣ PE ࡢ⠊ᅖࢆ㝈ᐃࡋࡼ࠺࡜ࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊᾘᴟ
ⓗഃ㠃ࢆᙉㄪࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿ 7ࠋ
1㸫2 ⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖࡢ PE ඛ㐍ᅜ➼ࡢᅜࠎ࡜⥾⤖ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡛ࡣࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢつᐃࢆཧ↷ࡋࠊ➨ 5 ᮲࡟ PE ࡢᐃ⩏࡟㛵ࡍࡿつᐃࢆ⨨࠸࡚࠸ࡿࠋ2014 ᖺ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡛ࡣࠊձ஦
ᴗᡤ PE㸦5 ᮲ 2 㡯㸧ࠊղᘓタ PE㸦5 ᮲ 2 㡯࣭3 㡯㸧ࠊճ௦⌮ே PE㸦5 ᮲ 5 㡯ࠊ6 㡯㸧ࡢ 3ࡘࡢ✀㢮ࡢ PE ࡀつᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊᚑᒓ௦⌮ேࡢࡳࡀ PE
࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆᐃࡉࢀࠊᅾᗜಖ᭷௦⌮ேཬࡧὀᩥྲྀᚓ௦⌮ேࡣ PE ࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆᐃࡉࢀ࡞࠸㸦ᅾᗜಖ᭷໭ᮧᑟேࠕᜏஂⓗ᪋タㄢ⛯ࢆᕠࡿ⌧௦ⓗㅖၥ㢟ࠖ㔠Ꮚᏹ┘ಟࠗ⌧௦⛒⛯ἲㅮᗙ➨ 4 ᕳ࠘124
㡫㸦᪥ᮏホㄽ♫ࠊ2017㸧ࠋ
3 ༨㒊⿱඾ࠕ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟࠾ࡅࡿࠗᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࠘ᴫᛕࡢᶵ⬟࡜㝈⏺ࠖ⥲ྜ⛯ไ◊✲ 1 ྕ 22 㡫㸦1992㸧
ࠋ
4 ໭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦2㸧124 㡫ࠋ
5 EY ⛯⌮ኈἲே⦅ⴭࠗヲゎ ᪂ࡋ࠸ᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ࡢᯟ⤌ࡳ㸦BEPS㸧ࡢᑟධ࡜ྛᅜࡢ⛯ไᑐᛂ̿௻ᴗ࡬ࡢᙳ㡪࡜␃ពⅬ̿࠘89 㡫㸦➨୍ἲつᰴᘧ఍♫ࠊ2017㸧ࠋ
6 ቑ஭Ⰻၨ㸻ᐑᓮ⿱Ꮚࠗᅜ㝿⛒⛯ἲ࠙➨ 3 ∧ࠚ
࠘93 㡫㸦ᮾி኱Ꮫฟ∧఍ࠊ2015㸧
ࠋ
7 ྠୖࠋ
2

2

（ 501 ）

௦⌮ேཬࡧὀᩥྲྀᚓ௦⌮ேࡣ‽ഛⓗཪࡣ⿵ຓⓗ࡞άື࡜ࡉࢀࡿࡓࡵ㸦2014 ᖺ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲ 4 㡯(b)(e)࣭5 㡯㸧㸧ࠋ ᚑᒓ௦⌮ே PE ࡢつᐃࡣࠊࠕ௻ᴗ࡟௦ࢃࡗ࡚⾜ືࡍࡿ⪅㸦6 㡯ࡢつᐃࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿ⊂❧ࡢᆅ఩ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ௦⌮ேࢆ㝖ࡃࠋ㸧ࡀࠊ୍ᐃࡢ⥾⣙ᅜෆ࡛ࠊᙜヱ௻ᴗࡢྡ࡟࠾࠸࡚ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿᶒ㝈ࢆ᭷ࡋࠊ࠿ࡘࠊࡇࡢᶒ㝈ࢆ཯᚟ࡋ࡚⾜౑ࡍࡿሙྜ࡟ࡣࠊᙜヱ௻ᴗࡣࠊࡑࡢ⪅ࡀᙜヱ௻ᴗࡢࡓࡵ࡟⾜࠺ࡍ࡭࡚ࡢάື࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊᙜヱ୍᪉ࡢ⥾⣙ᅜෆ࡟ᜏஂⓗ᪋タࢆ᭷ࡍࡿࡶࡢࠖ
㸦2014 ᖺ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲ 5 㡯㸧࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 8ࠋ ࡲࡓࠊࠕ௻ᴗࡣࠊ㏻ᖖࡢ᪉ἲ࡛ࡑࡢᴗົࢆ⾜࠺௰௓ேࠊၥᒇࡑࡢ௚ࡢ⊂❧ࡢᆅ఩ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ
௦⌮ேࢆ㏻ࡌ୍࡚᪉ࡢ⥾⣙ᅜෆ࡛஦ᴗάືࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜࠸࠺⌮⏤ࡢࡳ࡛ࡣࠊᙜヱ୍᪉ࡢᅜෆ࡟ᜏஂⓗ᪋タࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ࡜ࡣࡉࢀ࡞࠸ࠖ
㸦2014 ᖺ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲ 6 㡯㸧9࡜࠸࠺つᐃ࠿ࡽࠊ⊂❧௦⌮ே࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣ PE ࡢ⠊ᅖ࠿ࡽ㝖እࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
1㸫3 ௦⌮ே PE ࡟㛵ࡍࡿၥ㢟ࡢᡤᅾ1㸫3㸫1 ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺ ⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡢつᐃࡀᣑ኱ࡉࢀࡿཎᅉ࡜࡞ࡗࡓࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥ
ࢺ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ぢ࡚࠸ࡃࠋ ࡲࡎࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢㄝ᫂ࢆ⾜࠺ࠋࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡜ࡣࠊᮏேࡢࡓࡵ࡟ᮏே
ࡀಖ᭷ࡍࡿ〇ရ➼ࢆ⮬ࡽࡢྡ⩏࡛኎༷ࡍࡿ⪅࡛࠶ࡾࠊ࠸ࢃࡺࡿၥᒇႠᴗ 10࡟ࡼࡿ㛫᥋௦⌮ࡢࡇ࡜ࢆᣦࡍࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊ኱㝣ἲ㸦ࢩࣅ࣭࣮ࣝࣟ㸧ࡢୗ࡛Ⓨᒎࡋࡓᴫᛕ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ኱㝣ἲ㸦ࢩࣅ࣭࣮ࣝࣟ㸧ࡢୗ࡛ࡣࠊᮏேࡢྡ࡛ᮏேࡢࡓࡵ࡟άືࡍࡿࠕ┤᥋௦⌮ࠖ࡜⮬ᕫࡢྡ࡛ᮏே
ࡢࡓࡵ࡟άືࡍࡿࠕ㛫᥋௦⌮ࠖ㸦ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔㸧࡜࡟ศ࠿ࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 11ࠋ୍᪉ࠊⱥ⡿ἲ㸦ࢥ࣭࣮ࣔࣥࣟ㸧ࡢୗ࡛ࡣࠊ
ࠕ┤᥋௦⌮ࠖ࡜ࠕ㛫᥋௦⌮ࠖ࡜࠸࠺༊ูࡣ࡞ࡃࠊࡑࡢάືࢆᮏேࡢ
ྡ࡛⾜ࡗࡓ࠿⮬ᕫࡢྡ࡛⾜ࡗࡓ࠿ࡣ㔜せ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠋ ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿせ௳ࡣࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢゎ㔘ᣦ㔪࡜ࡋ࡚ᶵ⬟ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠕᙜヱ௻ᴗࡢྡ࡟࠾࠸࡚ዎ⣙ࢆࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ࡟グ㍕ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 12ࠋࡇࡢࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮࡛ࣜࡣࠊ
⥾⤖ࡍࡿᶒ㝈ࠖࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࡀࠊᮏேࡓࡿ௻ᴗࡢྡ࡛ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿᶒ㝈ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ⪅࡟㝈ࡽࡎࠊᮏேࡓࡿ௻ᴗࡢྡ࡛ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡶࡢࡢࠊ➨୕⪅࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢዎ⣙࡟ࡼࡾᮏேࡓࡿ௻ᴗࢆࠕᣊ᮰ࡍࡿࠖᶒ㝈ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ⪅ࡶྵࡲࢀࡿ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 1314ࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊ
OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Art.5, para.5, 2014. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᕝ➃ᗣஅࠗOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ 2010 ᖺ∧㸦ᡤᚓ࡜㈈⏘࡟ᑐࡍࡿࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙㸧
࠘25 㡫㸦᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍ࠊ2011㸧ࠋ
9 Id., Art.5, para.6. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᕝ➃࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦8㸧25 㡫ࠋ
10 ၟἲ 551 ᮲ࠕၥᒇࢺࣁ⮬ᕫࣀྡࣤ௨ࢸ௚ேࣀⅭ࣓ࢽ≀ရࣀ㈍኎ཪࣁ㈙ධࣤⅭࢫࣤᴗࢺࢫ
ࣝ⪅ࣤㅝࣇࠖ
ࠋ
11 ᯇୗ⁠᫓ࠕ௦⌮ே PE ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⪃ᐹࠖ⛯኱ㄽྀ 45 ྕ 438 㡫㸦2004㸧ࠋ
12 ⸨㇂Ṋྐࠕ⛒⛯ἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᅜ㝿ⓗつ⠊ᙧᡂ࡜ᅜෆἲ̿OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢつ⠊ᛶࢆ୰ᚰ࡟ࠖἲᚊ᫬ሗ 84 ᕳ 10 ྕ 38̾39 㡫㸦2012㸧ࠋ
13 ໭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦2㸧145 㡫ࠋ
83（ 502 ）

ᮏேࡢྡ࡛ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿ࠿ྰ࠿࡟࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊᮏேࢆἲⓗ࡟ᣊ᮰ࡍࡿዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿࠊⱥ⡿ἲ㸦ࢥ࣭࣮ࣔࣥࣟ㸧ୖࡢ௦⌮ᴫᛕࢆᛕ㢌࡟グ㍕ࡉࢀࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾ 15ࠊᮏே࡟⤒῭ⓗຠᯝࡣᖐᒓࡍࡿࡀࠊᮏேࡀἲⓗ࡟ࡣᣊ᮰ࡉࢀ࡞࠸㸦ἲⓗ࡟ᣊ᮰ࡉࢀࡿࡢࡣዎ⣙ᙜ஦⪅࡛࠶ࡿ௦⌮ே࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵ㸧኱㝣ἲ㸦ࢩࣅ࣭࣮ࣝࣟ㸧ୖࡢࠕ㛫᥋௦⌮ࠖࡣᙜヱグ㍕࡟ࡣヱᙜࡍࡿ࠿ྰ࠿᫂☜࡛࡞࠸ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ
ࠕᣊ᮰ࡍࡿࠖ࡜࠸࠺ᩥゝࡀࠕἲⓗࠖ࡟ᣊ᮰ࡉࢀࡿሙྜ࡟㝈ᐃࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ゎ㔘ࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࠿ࠊ኱㝣ἲ㸦ࢩࣅ࣭࣮ࣝࣟ㸧࡟࠾ࡅࡿࠕ㛫᥋௦⌮ࠖୖࡢࠕ⤒῭ⓗࠖ࡟ᣊ᮰ࡉࢀ
ࡿሙྜࡶྵࢇ࡛࠸ࡿ࡜ゎ㔘ࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࠿ࡀၥ㢟࡜࡞ࡿࠋ ࡇࡢⅬࡀၥ㢟࡜࡞ࡗࡓ஦౛ࡀࣇࣛࣥࢫࡢ Zimmer ஦௳ 16࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
օ஦௳ࡢᴫせ Zimmer ♫ࡣⱥᅜᡤᅾࡢぶ఍♫࡛࠶ࡾࠊࣇࣛࣥࢫ࡟タࡅࡓᏊ఍♫࡟ᑐࡋ࡚〇ရࢆ㈍኎ࡋ࡚
࠸ࡓࠋࡑࡢᚋࠊྲྀᘬ෌⦅ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊࡇࢀࡲ࡛ Zimmer ♫࡜ Buy-Sell ᆺࡢྲྀᘬ㸦௙ධ㈍኎ࡢྲྀ
ᘬᙧែ㸧ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡓࣇࣛࣥࢫᏊ఍♫ࡣࠊ⮬ᕫࡢྡ࡛ᮏே㸦Zimmer ♫㸧ࡢࡓࡵ࡟〇ရࡢ㈍኎ࢆ⾜࠺ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡜࡞ࡗࡓࠋ㈐௵ཬࡧࣜࢫࢡ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࡍ࡭࡚ぶ఍♫ࡀ㈇࠸ࠊࣇࣛ
ࣥࢫᏊ఍♫ࡣࠊぶ఍♫ࡢ஦๓ᢎㄆࢆᚓࡿࡇ࡜࡞ࡋ࡟᪤Ꮡ㢳ᐈ࡜ࡢ㛫࡛ὀᩥࢆཷࡅࠊࢹ࢕ࢫ
ࣉ࣮ࣞࢆࡋࠊὀᩥࡢཷ௜ࡅࠊ౯᱁஺΅ࠊ๭ᘬࠊศ๭᪉ἲࠊỴ῭᮲௳➼ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡓ 17ࠋ ࣇࣛࣥࢫᏊ఍♫ࡀぶ఍♫࡛࠶ࡿ Zimmer ♫ࡢᚑᒓ௦⌮ே࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿ࠿ྰ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊ➨୍ᑂ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣࠊㄢ⛯ᗇࡢ୺ᙇࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࠊᚑᒓ௦⌮ே࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓࡀࠊ⣡⛯⪅ࡣࡇࢀࢆ୙᭹࡜ࡋࠊୖ࿌ࢆ⾜ࡗࡓࠋOECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital Commentary on Art.5,
para.32.1, 2014. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᕝ➃࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦8㸧101 㡫ࠋ
15 ໭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦2㸧147 㡫ࠋ
16 Conseil d'État (Supreme Administrative Court), 31 March 2010, Société Zimmer
Limited v. Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, Nos. 304715 and308525.
17 ᕝ⏣๛ࠕࣇࣛࣥࢫᡤᅾࡢ㈍኎Ꮚ఍♫㸦ࡢࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡜ࡋ࡚ࡢᶵ⬟㸧ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡋ࡞࠸࡜ࡉࢀࡓ஦౛ࠖ⛯ົ஦౛ 48 ᕳ 8 ྕ 58 㡫㸦2016㸧ࠋ
14

4（ 503 ）

ᅗ⾲ 1 Zimmer ஦௳ࡢྲྀᘬᅗ
࠙Buy̾Sell ᆺྲྀᘬࠚ    ⱥᅜ                ࣇࣛࣥࢫ           ㈍኎           ㈍኎Ꮚ఍♫
Zimmer ♫           ௦㔠           ௦㔠㢳ᐈ࠙ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ዎ⣙ᚋࠚ    ⱥᅜ                ࣇࣛࣥࢫ        ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ዎ⣙    ㈍኎ዎ⣙㸦Ꮚ఍♫ྡ⩏㸧Ꮚ఍♫
Zimmer ♫          ᡭᩘᩱ       㢳ᐈ௦㔠ֆதⅬཬࡧุỴ Buy-Sell ྲྀᘬࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡓࣇࣛࣥࢫᏊ఍♫ࡀࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ዎ⣙࡬ࡢྲྀᘬ෌⦅ᚋࠊⱥ
௖⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲࡟࠾ࡅࡿᚑᒓ௦⌮ே࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ࡀࡇࡢ஦௳ࡢதⅬ࡛࠶ࡿࠋᚑᒓ௦
⌮ே࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿせ௳࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊࣇࣛࣥࢫᏊ఍♫ࡀ⥾⤖ࡋࡓዎ⣙ࡀᮏே㸦Zimmer ♫㸧ࢆᣊ᮰ࡍࡿ࠿࡝࠺࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚தࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ ุỴ࡛ࡣࠊ
ࠕࣇࣛࣥࢫၟἲ㸦➨ 132 ᮲̾1㸧࡟ࡼࢀࡤࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡜ࡣࠊ⮬ᕫࡢྡࢆࡶ
ࡗ࡚ࠊᮏேࡢࡓࡵ࡟άືࡍࡿ⪅ࢆ࠸࠺ࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡇࢁࠊࡇࡢつᐃࡣࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡟
ࡼࡗ࡚⥾⤖ࡉࢀࡓዎ⣙ࡣࡓ࡜࠼ࡑࢀࡀᮏேࡢࡓࡵ࡟⥾⤖ࡉࢀࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࠊᮏேࢆ┤᥋ᣊ᮰ࡍࡿࡶࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠖ18࡜ࡢ⪃࠼᪉ࡀ♧ࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡛࠶ࡿࣇࣛࣥࢫᏊ
఍♫ࡀࠊἲⓗ࡟ Zimmer ♫ࢆᣊ᮰ࡋ࡞࠸ࡢ࡛࠶ࢀࡤࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡋ࡞࠸ 19࡜ุ♧ࡉ

18ᕝ⏣࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦17㸧59 㡫ࠋᒃἼ㑥ὈࠕBEPS ࡟ࡼࡿᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ไᗘୗ࡛ࡢ❧ド㈐௵࡟ᑐࡍࡿ୍⪃ᐹࠖ⛯኱ㄽྀ 87 ྕ
305 㡫㸦2016㸧
ࠋ

19

5

（ 504 ）

ࢀࡓࠋևࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺ ࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞ุỴࡣࠊࣇࣛࣥࢫࡔࡅ࡛࡞ࡃࠊࣀ࢙࣮ࣝ࢘㸦DELL ஦௳᭱㧗⿢ุỴ㸧20ࡸ࢖ࢱࣜ࢔㸦࣎ࢫࢺ࣭ࣥࢧ࢖࢚ࣥࢸ࢕ࣇ࢕ࢵࢡ஦௳᭱㧗⿢ุỴ㸧21࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶぢཷࡅࡽࢀࡿࠋୖグࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ࡣᮏேࢆࠕᣊ᮰ࡍࡿࠖዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡋ࡞࠸⪅࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊཎ๎࡜
ࡋ࡚௦⌮ே PE ࡜ࡋ࡚ㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡞࠸ࠋ࠸ࡎࢀࡢᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠊᮏேࢆ⤒῭ⓗ࡟ᣊ᮰ࡍࡿሙྜ
ࡣ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡏࡎࠊἲⓗ࡟ᣊ᮰ࡍࡿሙྜ࡟ࡢࡳ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 22ࠋ
 ࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊBuy-Sell ᆺࡢྲྀᘬࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡓ㈍኎Ꮚ఍♫ࢆࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡟ࡋࠊࢥ࣑ࢵ
ࢩࣙࢿ࢔ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜࡢ฼┈ࢆࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࠿ࡽᮏே࡟⛣㌿ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺࡀከࡃࡢᅜ࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡗࡓࠋ ࡇࡢࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺ࡟ࡼࡾࠊ㈍኎཰┈ࡣᮏேᡤᅾᆅᅜ࡛ㄢ⛯ࡉࢀࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡛ࡣࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ࡀཷࡅྲྀࡿᡭᩘᩱ࡟ࡋ࠿ㄢ⛯ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡛ࡢㄢ⛯㢠ࡣ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝ࡢሙྜ࡛ῶᑡࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 23ࠋࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡬ࡢྲྀᘬᙧែࡢኚ᭦ࡀ
ᙧᘧⓗ࡞ࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾࠊᐇ㉁ࡣኚࢃࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ሙྜ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ㐺⏝ࢆᅇ㑊࡛ࡁࡿ≧ἣࡣከࡃࡢᅜࠎࡢ⛯ົᙜᒁ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚኱ࡁ࡞ၥ㢟࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
1㸫3㸫2 OECD ࡢ㆟ㄽ࡜ᡃࡀᅜࡢᑐᛂ
օBEPS ࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ໬࡟క࠸ከᅜ⡠௻ᴗࡀ฼┈ࢆᾏእ࡟⛣ࡍࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ⣡⛯㢠ࢆ኱ᖜ࡟๐ῶࠊሙྜ
࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࡣ࡯ࡰࢮࣟ࡟ࡍࡿᶵ఍ࡀ⏕ࡲࢀࠊㄢ⛯࣮ࣝࣝࡢ㝽㛫ࡸ࣑ࢫ࣐ࢵࢳ࡟ࡼࡾࠊ฼┈ࢆ⛯ົୖᾘኻࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࡸࠊ௻ᴗࡀ⤒῭άືࢆ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝ཪࡣ඲ࡃ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸↓⛯ࡸప⛯⋡ࡢᅜ࡬࡜⛣㌿ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀྍ⬟࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ 24ࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞ືࡁࢆ⛯※ᾐ㣗࡜฼┈⛣㌿㸦Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, BEPS㸧࡜࠸࠺ࠋ ࡇࡢ BEPS ࡟ᑐฎࡍ࡭ࡃࠊOECD ࡣ G20 ࡢせㄳࢆཷࡅ࡚ 2013 ᖺ 2 ᭶࡟ሗ࿌᭩ࠕ⛯※ᾐ㣗࡜฼┈⛣㌿࡬ࡢᑐᛂࠖ 25ࢆබ⾲ࡋࡓࠋࡑࡢᚋࠊ2013 ᖺ 7 ᭶ࠊBEPS ࡟ໟᣓⓗ࡞᪉ἲ࡛ᑐ
ฎࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ 15 㡯┠ࡢ⾜ືィ⏬㸦Action Plan㸧ࡀ♧ࡉࢀࡓ 26ࠋࡇࡢ 15 㡯┠ࡢ⾜ືィ⏬㸦ᅗ⾲ 2㸧ࡣ 2013 ᖺ 9 ᭶࡟ OECD ཬࡧ G20 ࡢຍ┕ᅜ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ᥇ᢥࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

20

Norges Hoyesterett (Supreme Court), 2 December 2011, Dell Products v. The State(Tax East), HR-2011-02245-A, Case No.2011/755.

Corte di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court), 9 Mar 2012 (hearing of Feb. 29, 2012),
Tax Chamber, Section V, Case No. 3769.
22 ໭ᮧ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦2㸧146 㡫ࠋ
23 ᕝ⏣࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦17㸧59 㡫ࠋ
24 Ỉ㔝ᛅᜏࠗࢸ࢟ࢫࢺࣈࢵࢡ⛒⛯ἲ࠘251 㡫㸦୰ኸ⤒῭♫ࠊ2016㸧
ࠋ
25 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 2013.
26 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 2013.
21

6（ 505 ）

ᅗ⾲ 2 ⾜ືィ⏬ࡢෆᐜ 27⾜ືィ⏬
1㟁Ꮚ⤒῭ࡢㄢ⛯ୖࡢㄢ㢟࡟ᑐฎࡍࡿ

2ࣁ࢖ࣈࣜࢵࢻ࣭࣑ࢫ࣐ࢵࢳྲྀỴࡵࡢຠᯝࢆ↓ຠ໬ࡍࡿ

3

CFC ⛯ไࢆᙉ໬ࡍࡿ

4฼Ꮚᦆ㔠⟬ධࡸ௚ࡢ㔠⼥ྲྀᘬࡢᨭᡶࢆ㏻ࡌࡓ⛯※ᾐ㣗ࢆไ㝈ࡍࡿ

5㏱᫂ᛶࡸᐇ㉁ᛶࢆ⪃៖ࡋࡘࡘࠊ᭷ᐖ⛯ไ࡟ᑐࡋࡼࡾຠᯝⓗ࡟ᑐᢠࡍࡿ

6

᮲⣙℃⏝ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿ

7

PE ㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗᅇ㑊ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿ8̾10⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢ⤖ᯝࡀ౯್ࡢ๰㐀࡜୍⮴ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ☜ಖࡍࡿ

11

BEPS ࡜ࡑࢀ࡟ᑐฎࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢ⾜ື࡟㛵ࡍࡿࢹ࣮ࢱ཰㞟࣭ศᯒࡍࡿ᪉ἲࡢ☜❧12⣡⛯⪅࡟℃⏝ⓗ࡞ࢱࢵࢡࢫ࣭ࣉࣛࣥࢽࣥࢢࡢዎ⣙ࢆ㛤♧ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆせồࡍࡿ13⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢᩥ᭩໬ࢆ෌᳨ウࡍࡿ

14⣮தゎỴ࣓࢝ࢽࢬ࣒ࢆࡼࡾຠᯝⓗ࡞ࡶࡢ࡟ࡍࡿ

15ከᅜ㛫༠ᐃࢆ㛤Ⓨࡍࡿ ࡇࡢ 15 㡯┠ࡢ⾜ືィ⏬ࡢෆࠊ⾜ືィ⏬ 7 ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊከᅜ⡠௻ᴗ࡟ࡼࡿ PE ㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗ࡞ᅇ㑊ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲࡜ࡑࡢࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜࢆಟṇࡍࡿᥦ᱌ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋලయⓗ࡟ࡣࠊձࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺཬࡧ㢮ఝࡢᡭἲࢆ⏝࠸ࡓ PE ㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗᅇ㑊ࠊղ≉ᐃࡢάື㝖እ㸦‽ഛⓗ࣭⿵ຓⓗ࡞ᛶ᱁ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿάື㸧ࢆ⏝࠸ࡓ PE ㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗᅇ㑊ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢಟṇᥦ᱌࡛࠶ࡿ 28ࠋ
ֆBEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩
 2015 ᖺ࡟ BEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩ࡀබ⾲ࡉࢀࡓ 29ࠋ⾜ືィ⏬ 7 ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚㏙࡭ࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡣࠊ
ձࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺཬࡧ㢮ఝࡢᡭἲࢆ㏻ࡌࡓ PE ㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗᅇ㑊ࠊղ➨ 5
᮲ 4 㡯࡟࠾ࡅࡿ≉ᐃࡢ㝖እࢆ㏻ࡌࡓ PE ㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗᅇ㑊ࠊճPE ㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗᅇ㑊ࡢࡓࡵࡢ௚ࡢᡭἲࠊմࣇ࢛࣮ࣟ࢔ࢵࣉ㸦฼ᚓࡢ PE ᖐᒓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿၥ㢟ࢆྵࡴࠋ㸧ࡢ 4 ࡘ࡛࠶ࡿࠋᮏ
✏࡛ࡣࡇࡢෆձ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㏙࡭ࡿࠋ ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩࡛ࡣࠊձ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢつᐃ㸦2014 ᖺ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5
᮲ 5 㡯㸧ࢆᅇ㑊࡛ࡁࡿ᪉ἲࡀ 3 ࡘᣲࡆࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
1 ࡘ┠ࡣࠊ1㸫3㸫1 ࡛㏙࡭ࡓࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭

Id., at 14-24. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍ࠗ⛯※ᾐ㣗࡜฼┈⛣㌿
㸦BEPS㸧⾜ືィ⏬࠘9̾17 㡫㸦᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲఍ࠊ2013㸧ࠋ
28 Id., at 32. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦27㸧23 㡫ࠋ
29 OECD (2015), Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment
Status, Action 7 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project,
OECD Publishing, Paris.
27

7（ 506 ）

࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺࡣࠊ࠶ࡿ⪅ࡀ〇ရࢆ⮬ᕫࡢྡ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᙜヱ〇ရࡢᡤ᭷⪅࡛࠶ࡿእᅜ௻ᴗ
࡟௦ࢃࡗ࡚㈍኎ࡍࡿ࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺ࡛࠶ࡾࠊእᅜ௻ᴗࡣࠊࡑࡢ〇ရࢆࠊ㈍኎ࡀㄢ⛯ୖᖐࡏ
ࡽࢀࡿ PE ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡞࠸ᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚㈍኎ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿ 30ࠋᙜヱ㈍኎ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ⪅ࡀ㈍኎ࡍ
ࡿ〇ရࢆᡤ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡢ࡛ࠊᙜヱ⪅ࡣࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞㈍኎࠿ࡽྲྀᚓࡍࡿ㈍኎཰┈࡟ࡣㄢ⛯ࡉࢀࡎࠊࡑࡢࢧ࣮ࣅࢫ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ཷࡅྲྀࡿሗ㓘㸦ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࣥ㸧࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࡢࡳㄢ⛯ࡉࢀࡿ 31ࠋ
2 ࡘ┠ࡣࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺ࡟㢮ఝࡋࡓ᪉ἲ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ࠶ࡿ⪅࡟ࡼࡗ୍࡚᪉
ࡢᅜ࡛ᐇ㉁ⓗ࡟஺΅ࡉࢀࡿዎ⣙ࡀࠊእᅜ௻ᴗ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚᭱⤊໬ࡶࡋࡃࡣᢎㄆࡉࢀࡿ࡜࠸࠺⌮⏤࡛ᙜヱᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚⥾⤖ࡉࢀ࡞࠸ሙྜࠊ࠶ࡿ⪅ࡣዎ⣙⥾⤖ᶒ㝈ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊᙜヱᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚௦⌮ே PE ࡣㄆ㆑ࡉࢀࡎࠊㄢ⛯ࡉࢀ࡞࠸ 32ࠋ
 3 ࡘ┠ࡣࠊ⊂❧௦⌮ே࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿሙྜ࡛࠶ࡿࠋዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿᶒ㝈ࢆᖖ⩦ⓗ࡟⾜౑ࡍࡿ⪅ࡀࠊእᅜ௻ᴗ࡜ᐦ᥋࡟㛵㐃ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࠊ➨ 5 ᮲ 6 㡯ࡢ㝖እつᐃࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿ⊂❧௦⌮ே࡜࡞ࡿࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢㄆᐃࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿ 33ࠋ ከࡃࡢሙྜࠊࡇࢀࡽ 3 ࡘࡢ᪉ἲ࡟ࡼࡿ PE ㄆᐃࡢᅇ㑊ࡣࠊ㈍኎ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿᅜࡢㄢ⛯࣮࣋ࢫࢆ౵㣗ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ᫂ࡽ࠿࡛࠶ࡾࠊ➨ 5 ᮲ 5 㡯ཬࡧ 6 㡯ࡢᩥゝࡢಟṇࡀᚲせ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 34ࠋ
ࡲࡓࠊBEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᨵṇࡢ⤖ᯝࠊPE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ⌧⾜࣮ࣝࣝࡀ࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿࡢ࠿ࠊ࠶ࡿ࠸ࡣࠊಟṇࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿࡢ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊゝཬࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡽࡎࠊ㏣ຍ࢞࢖ࢲࣥࢫࢆබ⾲ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ
ࡢࡳ࡛࠶ࡿ 35ࠋև➨ 5 ᮲ 5 㡯࣭6 㡯ࡢᨵṇ ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺ࡟ᑐᛂࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊ
BEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩ࡢಟṇᥦ᱌ࢆཷࡅ࡚ࠊ
2017 ᖺ࡟ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲ 5 㡯࣭6 㡯ࡢつᐃࡀᨵṇࡉࢀࡓ 36ࠋᨵṇ๓ࡢつᐃ࡛ࡣࠊࠕᙜヱ௻ᴗࡢྡ࡟࠾࠸࡚ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿᶒ㝈ࠖࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ⪅ࡀࠊࡑࡢᶒ㝈ࢆ཯᚟ࡋ࡚
⾜౑ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ࡟௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦1㸫2 ཧ↷㸧ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙ
ࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺ࡟ࡼࡾࠊᮏேࢆἲⓗ࡟ᣊ᮰ࡍࡿዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡋ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࡛ࡇࡢせ௳ࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡇࢀࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊᨵṇᚋࡢつᐃ࡛ࡣࠊ(a)ࠕᙜヱ௻ᴗࡢྡ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠖ࡜࠸࠺せ௳௨እ࡟ࠊ(b)ࠕᙜヱ௻ᴗࡀᡤ᭷ࡋࡶࡋࡃࡣ౑⏝ᶒࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ㈨⏘ࡢᡤ᭷ᶒࡢ⛣㌿ࡶࡋࡃࡣ౑⏝ᶒᤵ୚ࡢࡓࡵࠖ
ࠊ(c)ࠕᙜヱ௻ᴗ࡟ࡼࡿࢧ࣮ࣅࢫࡢᥦ౪ࡢࡓࡵࠖ 37࡟

Id., para.5. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᮏᗉ㈨ࠕ㸦௬ヂ㸧ᜏஂⓗ᪋タㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗᅇ㑊ࡢ㜵Ṇ⾜ື 7̿2015 ᖺ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩ࠖ⛒⛯◊✲ 808 ྕ 370 㡫㸦2017㸧ࠋ
31 Id., para.5. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᮏᗉ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦30㸧370 㡫ࠋ
32 Id., para.7. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᮏᗉ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦30㸧370 㡫ࠋ
33 Id., para.7. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᮏᗉ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦30㸧370 㡫ࠋ
34 Id., para.8. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᮏᗉ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦30㸧370 㡫ࠋ
35 Id., Art.5, para.19. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᮏᗉ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦30㸧394 㡫ࠋ
36 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Art.5, 2017.
37 OECD, supra note 29, Art.5, para.5. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᮏᗉ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦30㸧
30

8（ 507 ）

ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿሙྜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜ࡋࡓࠋࡇࢀ࡟ࡼࡾࠊᮏேࢆἲⓗ࡟ᣊ᮰ࡍࡿዎ⣙࡛࡞࠸࡜ࡋ࡚ࡶࠊᮏேࡀᡤ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㈨⏘ࡢᡤ᭷ᶒࡢ⛣㌿ࡸࢧ࣮ࣅࢫࡢᥦ
౪࡟㛵ࡍࡿዎ⣙ࢆ⾜࠺⪅࡛࠶ࢀࡤࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ㄆᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿࠋ ࠶ࡿ⪅࡟ࡼࡗ୍࡚᪉ࡢᅜ࡛ᐇ㉁ⓗ࡟஺΅ࡉࢀࡿዎ⣙ࡀࠊእᅜ௻ᴗ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚᭱⤊໬ࡶࡋࡃࡣᢎㄆࡉࢀࡿሙྜࠊ࠶ࡿ⪅ࡣᙜヱᅜ࡛ዎ⣙⥾⤖ᶒ㝈ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡋ࡞࠸࡜࠸࠺ᅇ㑊᪉ἲ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࡶ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲ 5 㡯ࢆᨵṇࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛ᑐᛂ
ࡉࢀࡓࠋࠕ᪥ᖖⓗ࡟⥾⤖ࡉࢀࡿዎ⣙ࡢ⥾⤖࡟ᑟࡃ୺せ࡞ᙺ๭ࢆᖖ⩦ⓗ࡟ᯝࡓࡋࠖ 38࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿ࡜ᨵṇࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࢀ࡟ࡼࡾࠊᐇ㝿࡟ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿ⪅࡛࡞ࡃ࡚ࡶࠊዎ⣙ࡢ⥾⤖࡟㛵ࡋ࡚୺せ࡞ᙺ๭ࢆᯝࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿሙྜࡣࠊ௦
⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡗࡓࠋ
௦⌮ேࡀᮏே࡜ᐦ᥋࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿ⪅࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࠊᙧᘧⓗ࡟⊂❧௦⌮ேࡢつᐃࢆ‶ࡓࡋࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢㄆᐃࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿ᪉ἲ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࡣࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲ 6 㡯ࡢつᐃࢆᨵṇࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛ᑐᛂࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓࠋ
ࠕ࠶ࡿ⪅ࡀᑓࡽཪࡣ࡯࡜ࢇ࡝ᑓࡽᐦ᥋࡞㛵㐃ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ 1 ཪࡣ
2 ௨ୖࡢ௻ᴗ࡟௦ࢃࡗ࡚⾜ືࡍࡿሙྜࠖ39ᙜヱ⪅ࡣ⊂❧௦⌮ே࡟ヱᙜࡋ࡞࠸࡜ᨵṇࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᐦ᥋࡞㛵㐃ࡢᐃ⩏࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶྠ㡯࡟࠾࠸࡚ᐃࡵࡽࢀࡓࠋ
௨ୖࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࠊBEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩࡟࠾࠸࡚ᣲࡆࡽࢀࡓ௦⌮ே PE ㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗᅇ㑊ཬࡧࡑࢀ࡟ᑐࡍࡿಟṇᥦ᱌ࡣࠊ2017 ᖺ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲ 5 㡯ཬࡧ 6 㡯࡟࠾࠸࡚཯ᫎ
ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊᨵṇࡉࢀࡓ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࢆ᪤Ꮡࡢ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟ᑟධࡍࡿࡓࡵ
࡟ࡣࠊ3000 ௨ୖ࡟ཬࡪ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢಶูࡢᨵṇࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡾࠊከ኱࡞᫬㛫ࢆせࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞
ࡿ 40ࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿ BEPS 㜵Ṇᥐ⨨ࢆ⥾⤖୺యࡢ␗࡞ࡿከᩘࡢ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟୍ᣲ࡟ᑟධࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢከᩘᅜ㛫᮲⣙㸦Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, MLI㸧ࡢ⟇ᐃࡀ່࿌ࡉࢀ
ࡓ 41ࠋMLI ࡣ 2015 ᖺ 5 ᭶࠿ࡽ⣙ 1 ᖺ༙ࡢ⟇ᐃᮇ㛫ࢆ⤒࡚ 2016 ᖺ 11 ᭶࡟බ⾲ࡉࢀࠊ2017ᖺ 6 ᭶ 7 ᪥࡟ 67 ࢝ᅜ࣭ᆅᇦ࡟ࡼࡾ⨫ྡࡀ⾜ࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 42ࠋ2019 ᖺ 1 ᭶ 23 ᪥᫬Ⅼ࡛ࡣࠊ87ࠕၥᒇዎ⣙ཬࡧࡇࢀ࡟㢮࢝ᅜ࣭ᆅᇦࡀ⨫ྡࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 43ࠋ௦⌮ே PE ࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿࡶࡢ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ
371 㡫ࠋ
38 Id., Art.5, para.5. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᮏᗉ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦30㸧371 㡫ࠋ
39 Id., Art.5, para.6. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᮏᗉ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦30㸧371 㡫ࠋ
40 ᒸ⏣⮳ᗣ㸻Ⲩ஭ඃ⨾Ꮚࠕ2019 ᖺ 1 ᭶ 1 ᪥Ⓨ⾜ࡢࠗᅜ㝿⛯ົᇶ‽࠘࡜ࡣ MLI ࡢᴫせࠖ⛯ົᘯሗ 67 ᕳ 2 ྕ 90 㡫㸦2019㸧ࠋ
41 OECD, Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures To
Prevent Base Erosion And Profit Shifting. ຍ⸨ோஂࠕ⛯※౵㣗ཬࡧ฼┈⛣㌿ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢ⛒⛯᮲⣙㛵㐃ᥐ⨨ࢆᐇ᪋ࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢከᩘᅜ㛫᮲⣙ࡢ⥾⤖ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 38 ᕳ 11 ྕ 15 㡫㸦2018㸧
ࠋ42ᒸ⏣㸻Ⲩ஭࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦40㸧90 㡫ࠋ
43 OECD, “Signatories And Parties To The Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax
Treaty Related Measures To Prevent Base Erosion And Profit Shifting Status as of 23
January 2019 ”
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf
9（ 508 ）

ࡍࡿ᪉⟇ࢆ㏻ࡌࡓᜏஂⓗ᪋タࡢᆅ఩ࡢேⅭⓗ࡞ᅇ㑊ࠖࡀ➨ 4 㒊ࡢ 12 ᮲࡟つᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 44ࠋࡇࢀ࡟ࡼࡾࠊMLI ࡢ⥾⣙ᅜࡀᙜヱつᐃࡢ㐺⏝ࢆ㑅ᢥࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠊୖグࡢ BEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌
᭩ࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡓつᐃࡀ⌧⾜ࡢ஧ᅜ㛫⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢつᐃࢆୖ᭩ࡁࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿ 45ࠋֈᡃࡀᅜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᑐᛂ ୖグࡢ BEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩ࡢෆᐜࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࠊ2017 ᖺ࡟ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡀᨵゞࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡲࡓࠊᡃࡀᅜࡀྠᖺ 6 ᭶࡟⨫ྡࡋࡓ MLI ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠊPE ㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗᅇ㑊࡟㛵ࡍࡿつᐃࡀ᥇⏝ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 46ࠋࡇࢀࢆཷࡅ࡚ᡃࡀᅜ࡛ࡣࠊᖹᡂ 30 ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ
ࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞ PE ࢆᕠࡿᅜෆእࡢ≧ἣ࡟㚷ࡳࠊPE ㄆᐃࢆேⅭⓗ࡟ᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡿ⛒⛯ᅇ㑊࡟ᑐᛂࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊᅜෆἲୖࡢ PE ࡢ⠊ᅖࢆᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞ࢫࢱࣥࢲ࣮ࢻ࡟ྜࢃࡏࡿᨵṇࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓ 47ࠋᅜෆἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ PE ࡟ࡣࠊձ஦ᴗᡤ PEࠊղᘓタ PEࠊճ௦⌮ே PEࠊ࡜࿧ࡤࢀࡿ 3 ✀㢮ࡢPE ࡀ࠶ࡿ㸦ἲἲ 2 ༑஧ࡢ༑஑㸧ࠋ஦ᴗᡤ PE ࡣࠊ஦ᴗࢆ⾜࠺᪋タ࡞࡝ࡢ≀⌮ⓗ࡞ഃ㠃࡟╔┠ࡋࠊࠕእᅜἲேࡢᅜෆ࡟࠶ࡿᨭᗑࠊᕤሙࡑࡢ௚஦ᴗࢆ⾜࠺୍ᐃࡢሙᡤ࡛ᨻ௧࡛ᐃࡵࡿࡶࡢ
㸦ἲἲ 2 ༑஧ࡢ༑஑ࡢ࢖㸧ࠖࢆ PE ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᘓタ PE ࡣࠊ⤒῭άືࡢᶵ⬟ⓗ࡞ഃ㠃࡟╔┠ࡋࠊࠕእᅜἲேࡢᅜෆ࡟࠶ࡿᘓタసᴗሙ㸦୍ᖺࢆ㉸࠼࡚⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡶࡢ㸧㸦ἲἲ 2 ༑஧ࡢ༑஑ࡢࣟ㸧ࠖࢆ PE ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ௦⌮ே PE ࡣࠊࠕእᅜἲேࡀᅜෆ࡟⨨ࡃ⮬ᕫࡢࡓࡵ࡟ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿᶒ㝈ࡢ࠶ࡿ⪅ࡑࡢ௚ࡇࢀ࡟‽ࡎࡿ⪅࡛ᨻ௧࡛ᐃࡵࡿࡶࡢ㸦ἲἲ 2 ༑஧ࡢ༑஑ࡢࣁ㸧ࠖࢆ PE ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᮏ✏࡛╔┠ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡣࠊճࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ௦⌮ே PE ࡣࠊᖹᡂ 30 ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇ๓ࠊ௨ୗࡢ 3 ✀㢮࡟༊ูࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡓࠋձእᅜἲேࡢࡓࡵ࡟ࠊࡑࡢ஦ᴗ࡟㛵ࡋዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿᶒ㝈ࢆ᭷ࡋࠊ࠿ࡘࠊࡇࢀࢆ⥅⥆ⓗ࡟ཪࡣ཯᚟ࡋ࡚⾜౑ࡍࡿ⪅㸦ᚑᒓ௦⌮ே㸧ࠊղእᅜἲே
ࡢࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ㢳ᐈࡢ㏻ᖖࡢせồ࡟ᛂࡎࡿ⛬ᗘࡢᩘ㔞ࡢ㈨⏘ࢆಖ⟶ࡋࠊ࠿ࡘࠊᙜヱ㈨⏘ࢆ㢳ᐈࡢせồ࡟ᛂࡌ࡚ᘬࡁΏࡍ⪅㸦ᅾᗜಖ᭷௦⌮ே㸧ࠊճᑓࡽཪࡣ୺࡜ࡋ୍࡚ࡢእᅜἲேࡢࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ
⥅⥆ⓗ࡟ཪࡣ཯᚟ࡋ࡚ࠊࡑࡢ஦ᴗ࡟㛵ࡋዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢὀᩥࡢྲྀᚓࠊ༠㆟ࡑࡢ௚ࡢ⾜Ⅽࡢ࠺ࡕࡢ㔜せ࡞㒊ศࢆࡍࡿ⪅㸦ὀᩥྲྀᚓ௦⌮ே㸧ࡢ 3 ✀㢮࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊᖹᡂ 30 ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇᚋࡣࠊPE ࡢᐃ⩏࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊேⅭⓗ࡞⛒⛯ᅇ㑊࡟ᑐࡍࡿᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞ࢫࢱࣥࢲ࣮ࢻ࡟
ྜࢃࡏࡿࡓࡵ 48ࠊᅾᗜಖ᭷௦⌮ேཬࡧὀᩥྲྀᚓ௦⌮ே࡟㛵ࡍࡿつᐃࢆ๐㝖ࡍࡿ࡜࡜ࡶ࡟ࠊ
BEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩ࡢෆᐜࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࠊᚑᒓ௦⌮ே࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶࡑࡢ⠊ᅖࡀᣑ኱ࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡗ

㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2019 ᖺ 1 ᭶ 25 ᪥㸧ࠋ
44 OECD, supra note 41, at 19.
45 㥖ᐑྐ༤ࠕOECD ࡢ BEPS 㜵Ṇᥐ⨨ᐇ᪋᮲⣙(MLI)࡜ EU ⛒⛯ᅇ㑊㜵Ṇᣦ௧ࠖ⛒⛯◊✲828 ྕ 272 㡫㸦2018㸧ࠋ
46 ኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍⦅ࠗᨵṇ⛯ἲࡢࡍ࡭࡚࠙ᖹᡂ 30 ᖺᗘࠚ
࠘658 㡫㸦኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍ࠊ2018㸧ࠋ
47 ྠୖࠋ
48 ᕝ⏣๛ࠕᖹᡂ 30 ᖺᗘ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ศ㔝ࡢᨵṇぢ㎸஦㡯ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 38 ᕳ 2 ྕ 52 㡫
㸦2018㸧
ࠋ
10（ 509 ）

ࡓࠋ ࡲࡓࠊୖグ௦⌮ேࡢ࠺ࡕࠊࡑࡢ஦ᴗ࡟ಀࡿᴗົࢆࠊእᅜἲே࡟ᑐࡋ࡚⊂❧ࡋ࡚⾜࠸ࠊ࠿ࡘࠊ㏻ᖖࡢ᪉ἲ࡟ࡼࡾ⾜࠺ሙྜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ௦⌮ே㸦࠸ࢃࡺࡿࠕ⊂❧௦⌮ேࠖ㸧࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊ௦
⌮ே PE ࡢ⠊ᅖ࠿ࡽ㝖እࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ᪧἲ௧ 4 ࡢ 4ճ㸧ࠋࡇࡢ⊂❧௦⌮ே࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶࠊᖹᡂ
30 ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇᚋࡣࠊᑓࡽཪࡣ୺࡜ࡋ୍࡚ཪࡣ஧௨ୖࡢ⮬ᕫ࡜≉Ṧࡢ㛵ಀ࡟࠶ࡿ⪅࡟௦ࢃࡗ࡚⾜ືࡍࡿ⪅ࡀ㝖࠿ࢀ㸦ἲ௧ 4 ࡢ 4 ո㸧ࠊࡑࡢ⠊ᅖࡀ⦰ᑠࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾࠊ௦⌮ே PEࡢ⠊ᅖࡀᣑ኱ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ ࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࠊᅜෆἲ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠊᅜ㝿ⓗືྥࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡓ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᐃ⩏࡟㛵ࡍࡿᨵṇࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ⠊ᅖࡀᣑ኱ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊᡃࡀᅜࡀ⥾⤖ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᅜෆἲୖࡢ PE ࡟㛵ࡍࡿつᐃ࡜␗࡞ࡿᐃࡵࡀ࠶ࡿሙྜ࡟ࡣࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡀඃඛࡋ࡚㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿࡢࡀ୍⯡ⓗ 49࡛࠶ࡾࠊᅜෆἲୖࡢつᐃ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠕࡑࡢ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢ㐺⏝ࢆཷࡅࡿ㠀ᒃఫ⪅➼ࡣࠊࡑࡢ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟࠾࠸࡚ᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࡜ᐃࡵࡽࢀࡓࡶࡢࢆᅜෆἲୖࡢᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࡜ࡍࡿ㸦ἲἲ 2 ༑஧ࡢ༑஑ࡓࡔࡋ᭩ࡁ㸧ࠖ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ 50ࠋ
1㸫3㸫3 ௦⌮ே PE ࡟㛵ࡍࡿၥ㢟ࡢᡤᅾ BEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩ࡀ཯ᫎࡉࢀࡓ 2017 ᖺ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ⠊ᅖࡀᣑ኱ࡉࢀࡓࠋᮏ⠇࡛ࡣࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾ⏕ࡌࡿ᪂ࡓ࡞ၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㏙࡭ࡿࠋ
 OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲ 7 㡯࡛ࡣࠊ༢࡟Ꮚ఍♫࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࢆࡶࡗ࡚ࠊࡑࡢᏊ఍♫ࡀぶ఍♫ࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿ࡜ࡣゝ࠼࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࡀ☜ㄆࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 51ࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊᏊ఍♫ࡀㄢ⛯ୖ⊂❧ࡋࡓἲⓗᐇయ࡜ࡋ࡚ྲྀࡾᢅࢃࢀࡿࡓࡵ࡛࠶ࡿ 52ࠋࡇࡢつᐃࡣࠊ࢖ࢱࣜ࢔᭱㧗⿢ุࡓࡔࡋࠊỴࡢࣇ࢕ࣜࢵࣉ࣮ࣔࣜࢫ஦௳ 53ࡀࡁࡗ࠿ࡅ࡜࡞ࡾᑟධࡉࢀࡓ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 54ࠋᏊ఍♫ࡀ୍⯡ⓗ࡞௦⌮ே PE ࡢᇶ‽࡟ヱᙜࡍࢀࡤࠊぶ఍♫ࡣᏊ఍♫ࡢ⾜࠺άື࡟㛵ࡋ࡚௦⌮ࠕᏊ఍♫ࡀ➨
ே PE ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ࡳ࡞ࡉࢀࡿ 55ࠋ➨ 5 ᮲ 7 㡯ࡢࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣࠊ
5 㡯㸦௦⌮ே PE㸧ࡢ᮲௳ࢆ‶ࡓࡍ࡞ࡽࠊ➨ 6 㡯ࡢ⊂❧௦⌮ேࡢつᐃࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿሙྜࢆ㝖ࡁࠊᏊ఍♫ࡀぶ఍♫ࡢࡓࡵ࡟⾜࠺άື࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ぶ఍♫ࡣ PE ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ࡳ࡞ࡍࠖ࡜ࡋ࡚

49㔠Ꮚᏹࠗ⛒⛯ἲ࠙➨஧༑஧∧ࠚ
࠘107 㡫㸦ᘯᩥᇽࠊ2017㸧ࠋ
኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦46㸧669 㡫ࠋ
51 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Art.5, para.7, 2010.
52 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital Commentary on Art.5,
Para.40, 2010. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᕝ➃࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦8㸧105 㡫ࠋ
53 Ministry of Finance (Tax Office) v. Philip Morris (GmBH): Corte Suprema di
Cassazione No. 7682/02.
54 ௒ᓮுᏊࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࠿ࠊPE ㄢ⛯࠿ࠖ➨ 29 ᅇࠕ᪥⛯◊✲㈹ࠖධ㑅ㄽᩥ㞟 18 㡫㸦2006㸧ࠋ55 ᕝ⏣๛㸻ᚨỌ໷ᏊࠗOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ㏲᮲ゎㄝ࠙2017ࠚ
࠘179 㡫㸦⛯ົ◊✲఍ฟ∧ᒁࠊ➨ 4 ∧ࠊ2018㸧ࠊὸጔ❶ዴࠕPE ࢆࡵࡄࡿㄢ⛯ၥ㢟ࠖ⛒⛯ἲ◊✲ 36 ྕ 28
㡫㸦2008㸧ࠋ
50

11（ 510 ）

࠸ࡿ 56ࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࠊእᅜἲேࡀ※Ἠᆅᅜ㸦S ᅜ㸧࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓᏊ఍♫㸦ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔㸧ࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚஦ᴗᒎ㛤ࢆ⾜ࡗࡓሙྜ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⪃࠼ࡿࠋእᅜἲேࡀ S ᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚஦ᴗࢆ⾜࠺ሙྜࠊᨭᗑᙧែ࡜Ꮚ఍♫ᙧែࡢ࠸ࡎࢀ࠿ࡢᙧែ࡛ Sᅜ࡟㐍ฟࡍࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿ 57ࠋᨭᗑᙧែ࡛㐍ฟࡋࡓሙྜࠊS ᅜ࡛ࡣᨭᗑ㸦PE㸧࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ
฼ᚓ࡟㝈ࡾㄢ⛯ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀチࡉࢀࡿࠋࡇࡢ࡜ࡁࡢ⣡⛯⩏ົ⪅ࡣእᅜἲே࡛࠶ࡾࠊS ᅜࡣᡤᚓ
ࡢ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡜ࡋ࡚ㄢ⛯ࡍࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 3㸧ࠋᏊ఍♫ᙧែ࡛㐍ฟࡋࡓሙྜࠊᏊ఍♫ࡢ඲ୡ⏺ᡤᚓࡀS ᅜࡢἲே⛯ࡢㄢ⛯ᑐ㇟࡜࡞ࡿࠋ⣡⛯⩏ົ⪅ࡣෆᅜἲே࡛࠶ࡿᏊ఍♫⮬㌟࡛࠶ࡾࠊS ᅜࡣᏊ఍♫ࡢᒃఫᆅᅜ࡜ࡋ࡚ㄢ⛯ࡍࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 4㸧ࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࠊᨭᗑᙧែ࡜Ꮚ఍♫ᙧែࡢ࠸ࡎࢀࡢ
ᙧែ࡛㐍ฟࡍࡿ࠿࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ㄢ⛯᪉ἲࡀ␗࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡛ࡣࠊPE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟࠶ࡓࡗ࡚ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲࡟࠶ࡓࡿつᐃࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿࠋ୍᪉ࠊᏊ఍♫ࡢᡤᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟࠶ࡓࡗ࡚ࡣ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡟࠶ࡓࡿつᐃࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ
እᅜἲேࡀ S ᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓᏊ఍♫㸦ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔㸧ࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚஦ᴗ
ࢆ⾜࠺ሙྜࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲ཬࡧྠ᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲ࡀࡑࢀࡒࢀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜
࡞ࡿࠋࡇࢀ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚࢔ࢻࣅ஦௳ 58ࢆ౛࡟ᣲࡆࡿ 59ࠋ࢔ࢻࣅ஦௳ࡣ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ஦௳ 60࡛࠶ࡾࠊ࢔ࢻࣅ US ࡢ᪥ᮏᏊ఍♫࡛࠶ࡿ࢔ࢻࣅ♫࡟⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ㸦෌㈍኎౯᱁ᇶ‽ἲ㸧ࡀ㐺⏝ྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ࡀதࢃࢀࡓ஦௳࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ࡋ࠿ࡋࠊᮏ௳࡛ᮏ᮶ၥ㢟࡜ࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁࡣࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ዎ⣙࡬ࡢኚ᭦ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡟࡞ࡿ࠿ྰ࠿࡜࠸࠺Ⅼ࡜ࠊࡶࡋ PE ࡟࡞ࡿ࡜ࡋࡓࡽࡑࡇ࡟ᖐᒓࡍ࡭ࡁᡤᚓࡀ࠸ࡃࡽ࡟࡞ࡿࡢ࠿࡜࠸࠺
Ⅼ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸ࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 61ࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊ᪥ᮏᏊ఍♫࡛࠶ࡿ࢔ࢻࣅ♫ࡢ௦⌮ே PE ヱᙜᛶ࡜ PE
ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡀၥ㢟࡛࠶ࡿ࡜୺ᙇࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࡢ஦௳ࡣࠊBEPS ࣉࣟࢪ࢙ࢡࢺ௨๓࡟㉳ࡁࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾࠊุ᪨࡟࠾࠸࡚௦⌮ே PE ࡢヱᙜᛶ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣゐࢀࡽࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ 62ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊBEPS
OECD, supra note 36, Art.5, para.116. ᕝ⏣㸻ᚨỌ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦55㸧179 㡫ࠋቑ஭Ⰻၨࠕ➨ 60 ᅇ IFA ኱఍ࡢሗ࿌̿PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࢆ୰ᚰ࡜ࡋ࡚̿ࠖ⛒⛯◊✲ 688
ྕ 141 㡫㸦2007㸧ࠋ
58 ᮾிᆅ⿢ᖹᡂ 19 ᖺ 12 ᭶ 7 ᪥㸦ゴົ᭶ሗ 54 ᕳ 8 ྕ 1652 㡫㸧ࠊᮾி㧗⿢ᖹᡂ 20 ᖺ 10 ᭶
30 ᪥㸦⛯ົッゴ㈨ᩱ㸦250 ྕ㹼㸧258 ྕ 11061 㡰ྕ㸧ࠋ59 ᮏ௳ホ㔘࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ኱⏣ὒ㸻ᡭሯᓫྐࠕ࢔ࢻࣅࢩࢫࢸ࣒ࢬ஦௳ᮾி㧗⿢ุỴࠖ୰㔛ᐇ࡯࠿ࠗ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢࣇࣟࣥࢸ࢕࢔࠘44 㡫௨ୗ㸦᭷ᩫ㛶ࠊ2011㸧ࠊ⸨ᯞ⣧ࠕ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢព⩏̿࢔ࢻࣅ஦௳ࠖ⛒⛯ุ౛ⓒ㑅➨ 5 ∧ 137 㡫㸦2011㸧ࠊᒃἼ㑥Ὀࠕ࢔ࢻࣅ஦᱌࡟ಀࡿᅜ㝿ⓗ஦ᴗ෌⦅ࡢほⅬ࠿ࡽࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄢ⛯ࡢ᳨ウ㸦ୖ㸧ࠖ⛯኱ࢪ࣮ࣕࢼࣝ 14 ྕ 123 㡫௨ୗ㸦2010㸧࡞࡝ࢆཧ⪃ࠋ
60 ᪥ᮏᏊ఍♫࡛࠶ࡿ࢔ࢻࣅ♫ࡣࠊ෌㈍኎࡜࣐࣮ࢣࢸ࢕ࣥࢢཬࡧ〇ရࢧ࣏࣮ࢺ㸦ᙺົᥦ౪㸧ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡓࡀࠊ஦ᴗ෌⦅࡟ࡼࡾࠊᙺົᥦ౪ࡢࡳࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡗࡓࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ࢔ࢻࣅ
♫ࡣ஦ᴗ෌⦅๓ࠊ኎ୖ㧗ࡢ 10%ࡢ฼┈ࢆᚓ࡚࠸ࡓࡀࠊ஦ᴗ෌⦅ᚋࡣࠊᙺົᥦ౪࡟ಀࡿࢥࢫ
ࢺࣉࣛࢫ኎ୖ㧗ࡢ 1.5%ࡢ฼┈ࡢࡳࢆᡭᩘᩱ࡜ࡋ࡚ཷࡅྲྀࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊ฼┈⋡ࡀ 8.5%
ῶᑡࡋࡓࠋࡇࢀ࡟ᑐࡋㄢ⛯ᙜᒁࡣࠊ⛒⛯≉ูᥐ⨨ἲ 66 ᮲ࡢ 4 ࡟つᐃࡍࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࢆ㐺⏝ࡋࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃቑ㢠᭦ṇཬࡧ㐣ᑡ⏦࿌ຍ⟬⛯㈿ㄢỴᐃࢆ⾜ࡗࡓࠋᮏ௳ࡣ࢔
ࢻࣅ♫ࡀࡇࢀࢆ୙᭹࡜ࡋ࡚தࢃࢀࡓ஦௳࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
61 ᕝ⏣࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦17㸧60 㡫ࠋ
62 ࢔ࢻࣅ♫ࡣࠊࠕօ᪤Ꮡࡢ࢔ࢻࣅ〇ရࡢ㈍኎ಁ㐍ཬࡧ᪂つ࢔ࢻࣅ〇ရࡢ⤂௓ཬࡧㄝ᫂ࡢࡓࡵ
56
57

12

（ 511 ）

᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩ࢆ཯ᫎࡋࡓ 2017 ᖺ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲࡛ࡣࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡟ࡘ࠸
࡚ࡶ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡗࡓࡓࡵࠊࡇࡢつᐃࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊ࢔ࢻࣅ♫ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜࡞ࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿ 63ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ௬࡟᪥ᮏᏊ఍♫࡛࠶ࡿ࢔ࢻࣅ♫ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊᏊ఍♫㸦ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔㸧ࡢᡤᚓࡢỴᐃ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣ➨ 9 ᮲ࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢỴᐃ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣ➨ 7 ᮲ࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࠋ
OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡜ࡑࡢࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮࡛ࣜࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ฼┈ㄪᩚ࡜➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ฼┈ࡢᖐᒓࡢ࡝ࡕࡽࡀඃඛࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࠿࡝࠺࠿ࡀ᫂☜࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ 64ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ
➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚࠸ࡃࡽᏊ఍♫࡟ᡤᚓࡀ⏕ࡌࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚࠸ࡃࡽ௦⌮ே PE
࡟฼ᚓࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿࡢ࠿୙᫂☜࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡜ྠ᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀཬࡧ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆ᫂☜࡟ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 5㸧ࠋࡇࢀ࡟㛵ࡍࡿሗ࿌᭩࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ2016 ᖺࠊ2017 ᖺࠊ2018 ᖺ࡟ࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ 65ࡀබ⾲ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ⡿ᅜࡣࠊPE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃࡢ㆟ㄽ࡜ࢭࢵࢺ࡛࡞ࡅࢀࡤ⾜ືィ⏬ 7 ࡢཷࡅධࢀࡣᅔ㞴࡛࠶ࡿ 66࡜⾲᫂ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ᪩ᛴ࡞ᑐᛂࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿࠋᅗ⾲ 3 S ᅜ࡟ᨭᗑᙧែ࡛㐍ฟࡋࡓሙྜ
 R ᅜ        S ᅜ
࣭PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟ㄢ⛯R♫

࣭⣡⛯⩏ົ⪅ࡣእᅜἲே㸦R ♫㸧

PE࣭OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲ࢆ㐺⏝࡟ࠊ༺኎ᴗ⪅ࢆゼၥࡋ࡚㢳ᐈ➼ࢆㄏᑟࡋࠊֆ࢔ࢻࣅ〇ရࡢ࣐࣮ࢣࢸ࢕ࣥࢢ㈝⏝ࢆ㈇ᢸࡋࠊ
࣐࣮ࢣࢸ࢕ࣥࢢࢆ⾜࠸ࠊևᮏ௳ᅜእ㛵㐃⪅࡟ࡼࡿ᪥ᮏᅜෆ࡛ࡢ࢔ࢻࣅ〇ရࡢ㈍኎ಁ㐍ཬࡧᐉఏᗈ࿌ࢆᨭ᥼ࡋࠊֈ༺኎ᴗ⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࢔ࢻࣅ〇ရࡢࢺ࣮ࣞࢽࣥࢢࢆᥦ౪ࡋࠊ։㢳ᐈ࡟ᑐࡋࢧ࣏࣮ࢺࢧ࣮ࣅࢫࢆᥦ౪ࡍࡿ࡞࡝ࡢᙺົᥦ౪⾜Ⅽࠖࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿᶒ㝈ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡋ࡞࠸ྍ⬟ᛶࡀ㧗࠸ࠋ63 ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿᶒ㝈ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸࡜ࡋ࡚ࡶࠊ᪥ᖖⓗ࡟⥾⤖ࡉࢀࡿዎ⣙ࡢࠕ⥾⤖࡟ᑟࡃ୺せ࡞ᙺ๭ࠖࢆᖖ⩦ⓗ࡟ᯝࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ヱᙜࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ
64 OECD, Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments BEPS ACTION 7, para.35, 2018.
65 OECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Public Discussion Draft BEPSACTION 7, Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments, 2016. OECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Public
Discussion Draft BEPS Action 7, Additional Guidance on Attribution of Profits toPermanent Establishments, 2017. Id.
66 ᒣᕝ༤ᶞ࡯࠿
ࠕ௻ᴗࡢ BEPS ᑐᛂࢆㄒࡾࡘࡃࡍ࠙ᚋࠚ
ࠖ⛯ົᘯሗ 68 ᕳ 11 ྕ 122 㡫㸦2016㸧
ࠋ
13（ 512 ）

ᅗ⾲ 4 S ᅜ࡟Ꮚ఍♫ᙧែ࡛㐍ฟࡋࡓሙྜ
 R ᅜ        S ᅜ࣭Ꮚ఍♫ࡢ඲ୡ⏺ᡤᚓ࡟ㄢ⛯R♫

Ꮚ఍♫࣭⣡⛯⩏ົ⪅ࡣෆᅜἲே㸦Ꮚ఍♫㸧࣭OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲ࢆ㐺⏝

ᅗ⾲ 5 S ᅜ࡟㐍ฟࡋࡓᏊ఍♫ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜ
 R ᅜ         S ᅜ࣭Ꮚ఍♫ࡢᡤᚓ࡜ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡣࡑࢀ

Ꮚ఍♫ࡒࢀ࠸ࡃࡽ࠿

R♫௦⌮ே PE

࣭OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7᮲ࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀࡣ࡝࠺࡞ࡿࡢ࠿

1㸫4 ᑠᣓ
 BEPS ࣉࣟࢪ࢙ࢡࢺ௨๓ࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺࢆ⏝࠸࡚ࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡛ࡢㄢ⛯ࢆ㏨ࢀࡼ࠺࡜ࡍࡿ⛒⛯ᅇ㑊ࡀ㢖⦾࡟⾜ࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡓࠋࡇࢀ࡟ᑐᛂࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊBEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩࡛ࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ⠊ᅖࢆᣑ኱ࡋࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔➼࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶ᪂ࡓ࡟௦⌮ே PE ࡜ࡍࡿಟṇᥦ᱌ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡓࠋࡇࡢಟṇᥦ᱌ࡣࠊ2017 ᖺ࡟ᨵṇࡉࢀࡓ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟཯ᫎࡉࢀࠊᖹᡂ 30 ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ᅜෆἲ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶ཯ᫎࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩ
ࣙࢿ࢔ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾࠊ᪂ࡓ࡞ၥ㢟ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࠋ࢔ࢻࣅ஦௳ࢆ౛࡟ぢࡿ࡜ࠊ᪥ᮏᏊ఍♫࡛࠶ࡿ࢔ࢻࣅ♫ࡣ 2017 ᖺ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢつᐃ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ௦⌮ேPE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ㧗࠸ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ࢔ࢻࣅ♫ࡣ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿ㛵㐃⪅࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊ௬࡟ࠊ࢔ࢻࣅ♫ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ㸦➨ 9 ᮲㸧࡜ PE ㄢ⛯㸦➨ 7 ᮲㸧ࡀࡑࢀࡒࢀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࠋࡇࡢ࡜ࡁࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚࠸ࡃࡽ
Ꮚ఍♫࡟ᡤᚓࡀ⏕ࡌࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚࠸ࡃࡽ௦⌮ே PE ࡟฼ᚓࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿࡢ࠿୙᫂☜࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢつᐃࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀཬࡧ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆ᫂☜࡟ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ
 ➨ 2 ❶࡛ࡣࠊᅜෆἲཬࡧ⛒⛯᮲⣙ୖࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆ☜ㄆࡋࠊ㛵㐃⪅㸦ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔㸧ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟㛵
ࡍࡿ 2 ࡘࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ㸦single taxpayer approach ཬࡧ dual taxpayer approach㸧ࡢẚ㍑
ࢆ⾜࠺ࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊᮃࡲࡋ࠸࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡢ᳨ウࢆ⾜࠺ࠋ

14（ 513 ）

➨ 2 ❶ ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㆟ㄽ
2㸫1 PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ2㸫1㸫1 OECD ᢎㄆ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ㸦AOA㸧
PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊࡇࢀࡲ࡛ከࡃࡢሗ࿌᭩ཬࡧࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡀබ⾲ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 6㸧
ࠋ2010 ᖺᨵṇ๓ࡢ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲㸦௨ୗࠕᪧ 7 ᮲ࠖ㸧࡛ࡣࠊPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓ࡟ࡢࡳㄢ⛯ࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺ᖐᒓ୺⩏ࡢ⪃࠼᪉ࡣ᥇⏝ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡓࡶࡢࡢࠊ
PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ಀࡿྛᅜࡢ⛯ἲࡸ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢゎ㔘ࡸ㐠⏝ࡀ⤫୍ࡉࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠿ࡗ
ࡓ 67ࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊྛᅜ࡛␗࡞ࡿゎ㔘ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡿ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡸ஧㔜㠀ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌ࡚
࠸ࡓ 68ࠋࡑࡢ኱ࡁ࡞ཎᅉ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊᪧ 7 ᮲ 1 㡯ࡢࠕ௻ᴗࡢ฼ᚓࠖ࡜࠸࠺ᩥゝࢆ࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟
ゎ㔘ࡍࡿ࠿࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ2 ࡘࡢ⪃࠼᪉ࡀᏑᅾࡋࡓࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿ 69ࠋࡇࡢ 2 ࡘࡢ⪃࠼᪉ࡣࠊ㛵㐃஦ᴗ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡜ᶵ⬟ⓗศ㞳௻ᴗ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡜࿧ࡤࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 70ࠋ㛵㐃஦ᴗ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡣࠊ௨ୗࡢᅗ⾲ 7 ࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿࠋ௻ᴗࡢ㛵㐃஦ᴗ࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡓ඲య࡜
ࡋ࡚ࡢ฼┈ࡀ㸦20㸧࡛࠶ࡗࡓሙྜࠊPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿᡤᚓࡣࠊࡑࡢ࠺ࡕ PE ࡢάື࡟ᖐࡏࡽࢀ
ࡿ㒊ศ࡜࡞ࡿࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊ඲య࡜ࡋ࡚ࡢ௻ᴗࡢ฼┈࡛࠶ࡿ㸦20㸧ࢆ㉸㐣ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ࡞࠸ 71ࠋ୍᪉ࠊᶵ⬟ⓗศ㞳௻ᴗ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡣࠊPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼┈ࡀࠊࡑࡢ PE ࡀࠕศ㞳࣭⊂❧ࡋࡓࠖἲே࡛࠶ࡗࡓ࡜ࡋࡓࡽ✌ᚓࡋ࡚࠸ࡓ࡛࠶ࢁ࠺฼┈࡛࠶ࡾࠊ௻ᴗ඲యࡢ฼┈࡟ࡣไ㝈ࡉࠋ
ࢀ࡞࠸ 72㸦ᅗ⾲ 8㸧

67ᮾிඹྠ఍ィ஦ົᡤ⦅ࠗPE㸦ᜏஂⓗ᪋タ㸧ㄢ⛯ࡢᐇົ࠘62̾63 㡫㸦୰ኸ⤒῭♫ࠊ2016㸧ࠋྠୖࠋ
69 ὸጔ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦55㸧30 㡫ࠋ
70 㟷ᒣ៞஧ࠕOECD ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᜏஂⓗ᪋タ㸦PE㸧ࡢᖐᒓ฼┈ࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㆟ㄽࠖ⛒⛯◊✲678 ྕ 102 㡫㸦2006㸧ࠋ71 㟷ᒣ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦70㸧118 㡫ࠋ
72 ྠୖࠋ
68

15（ 514 ）

ᅗ⾲ 6 OECD Reports on Attribution of Profit to PE 73
1

1994 ᖺ

(Issues in International Taxation No. 5) Attribution of Income toPermanent Establishment21994 ᖺ

Taxation of New Financial Instruments [Special Sessions on
Innovative Financial Transactions]31997 ᖺ

(Discussion Draft) the Taxation of Global Trading of Financial
Instruments

41998 ᖺ

(Revised Discussion Draft) the Taxation of Global Trading of
Financial Instruments

52001 ᖺ 2 ᭶

Discussion Draft on the Attribution of Profit to Permanent
Establishment: PartϨand Partϩ

6

2003 ᖺ 3 ᭶

Discussion Draft on Attribution of Profit to Permanent
Establishments (PES): Partϩ PartϪ

7

2004 ᖺ 8 ᭶

Discussion Draft of the Attribution of Profit to Permanent
Establishment: PartϨ: Partϩ: PartϪ

82005 ᖺ 6 ᭶

Discussion Draft of the Report on the Attribution of Profit toPermanent Establishment: Partϫ

92006 ᖺ 12 ᭶

Report on the Attribution of Profit to Permanent Establishment
PartϨ, Partϩ and PartϪ

102007 ᖺ 4 ᭶

Revised Commentary on Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax
Convention

11

2008 ᖺ 7 ᭶

Discussion Draft of a New Article 7 (Business Profits) of the OECD
Model Tax Convention

122008 ᖺ 7 ᭶

Report on the Attribution of Profit to Permanent Establishments

13

2008 ᖺ 7 ᭶

2008 Update to the OECD Model Tax Convention

14

2010 ᖺ 5 ᭶

Draft Contents of the 2010 Update to the OECD Model Tax
Convention

15

2010 ᖺ 7 ᭶2010 Report on the Attribution of Profit to Permanent
Establishments

162010 ᖺ 7 ᭶2010 Update to the OECD Model Tax ConventionᐑṊᩄኵࠕOECD ࣔࢹࣝ᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ 2010 ᖺᨵṇࠖ⛒⛯◊✲ 736 ྕ 262̾263 㡫㸦2011㸧ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋ

73

16（ 515 ）

ᅗ⾲ 7 㛵㐃஦ᴗ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ 74〇ရࡢ㉎ධ࡟ಀࡿᨭฟ

㈍኎

PE

ᮏᗑ

    80
                           100ᅗ⾲ 8 ᶵ⬟ⓗศ㞳௻ᴗ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ 75〇ရࡢ㉎ධ࡟ಀࡿᨭฟ

PE

ᮏᗑ

㈍኎

     80
            ALP            100 OECD ࡣࠊᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ಀࡿྛᅜࡢゎ㔘ࡢ┦㐪࠿ࡽࠊ᤼㝖ࡋࡁࢀ࡞࠸ᅜ㝿ⓗ࡞஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡸㄢ⛯ࡢ✵ⓑࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊ
⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ಀࡿᅜ㝿ᇶ‽ࢆ⟇ᐃࡋࡓ 76ࠋ
ࡑࢀࡀ OECD ᢎㄆ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ㸦Authorized OECD Approach, AOA㸧࡛࠶ࡿࠋAOA ࡣࠊ2001ᖺ࡟බ⾲ࡉࢀࡓ Working Hypothesis㸦సᴗ௬ㄝ㸧࡟௦ࢃࡿࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾࠊPE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ
⟬ᐃ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ OECD ࡀ᥎㐍ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ⪃࠼᪉࡛࠶ࡿࠋ2008 ᖺ࡟᭱⤊ⓗ࡞ࠕPE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓሗ࿌
᭩ࠖࡀ᏶ᡂࡋࠊࡑࡢෆᐜࡣ 2010 ᖺ∧ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢ᪂ࡋ࠸ 7 ᮲㸦௨ୗࠕ᪂ 7 ᮲ࠖ㸧ᶵ⬟ⓗศ㞳௻ᴗ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࢆ᥇⏝ࡋࠊ࡟඲㠃ⓗ࡟཯ᫎࡉࢀࡓ 77ࠋAOA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ᪂ 7 ᮲࡛ࡣࠊཝ᱁࡞⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚࠸ࡿ 78ࠋ௨ୗ࡛ࡣࠊᪧ 7 ᮲࡜᪂ 7 ᮲ࡢẚ㍑ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊAOA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ᪂ 7 ᮲࡟࠾ࡅࡿ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ
⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚㏙࡭ࡿࠋ
օᪧ 7 ᮲ࡢᨵṇ㡯┠ ᪧ 7 ᮲ 1 㡯ࡣࠊୖ㏙ࡢ㏻ࡾࠊ
ࠕ௻ᴗࡢ฼ᚓࠖ࡜࠸࠺ᩥゝ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ྛᅜ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚␗࡞ࡿゎ㔘ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡓࡓࡵࠊ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡸ஧㔜㠀ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌ࡚࠸ࡓࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ᪂ 7 ᮲࡛ࡣࡇࡢᩥ
ゝࡀ๐㝖ࡉࢀࠊ➨ 2 㡯ࡢつᐃ࡟ᚑࡗ࡚ࠊPE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࢆ⟬ᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜᫂グࡉࢀࡓࠋ ᪧ 7 ᮲ 2 㡯ࡣࠊPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡢィ⟬࡟࠾࠸࡚⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆ㐺⏝ࡍࡿ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊ
74㟷ᒣ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦70㸧118 㡫ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋྠୖࠋ
76 కᛅᙪࠕᜏஂⓗ᪋タࡢ⠊ᅖ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⪃ᐹ̿AOA ࡢᑟධ࡜ேⓗᙺົ࡟ಀࡿ PE ㄆᐃ̿ࠖ⛯኱ㄽྀ 67 ྕ 182 㡫㸦2010㸧ࠋ
77 కᛅᙪࠕAOA ࡢᑟධ࡜ேⓗᙺົࡢ PE ㄆᐃࠖ⛒⛯◊✲ 736 ྕ 168 㡫㸦2011㸧ࠋ78 ᮾிඹྠ఍ィ஦ົᡤ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦67㸧69 㡫ࠋ
75

17（ 516 ）

ࡑࡇ࡛᝿ᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡣࠊAOA ࡢ᏶඲࡞ᐇ᪋࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠋᪧ 7 ᮲ࡢୗ࡛ࡣࠊෆ㒊฼Ꮚࡢㄆ㆑ࡀ୙せ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ྜពࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊෆ㒊౑⏝ᩱ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶࡑࡢㄆ㆑ࡀ⚗Ṇࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇ
ࢀ࡟ᑐࡋࠊ᪂ 7 ᮲ 2 㡯ࡣࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆ㈏ᚭࡋࠊෆ㒊ྲྀᘬ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶᡤᚓࢆㄆ㆑ࡍ࡭ࡁ
࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 79ࠋ ᪧ 7 ᮲ 3 㡯ࡣࠊPE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ࡟ᙜࡓࡗ࡚ࠊ㈝⏝ࡢⓎ⏕ࡋࡓሙᡤࢆၥࢃࡎࠊᙜ
ヱ PE ࡢࡓࡵ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ㈝⏝ࡣ᥍㝖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆㄆࡵࡿ࡜ࡍࡿࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊPE ᡤᅾᆅᅜ௨እ࡛ PE ࡢࡓࡵ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ⤒㈝࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊᐇ㝿࡟ᮏᗑࡀ㈇ᢸࡋࡓ⤒㈝ࡢࡳࡀ PE ᖐᒓᡤᚓ࠿ࡽ᥍㝖࡛ࡁࡿ࡜ゎࡉࢀࡿవᆅࡀ࠶ࡾࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟᢬ゐࡍࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡓࡓࡵࠊ๐㝖ࡉࢀࡓ 80ࠋ ᪧ 7 ᮲ 4 㡯࡛ࡣࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ࡼࡿ᪉ἲ࡟௦࠼࡚௻ᴗࡢ⥲฼ᚓࢆྜ⌮ⓗ࡞ẚ⋡࡛㓄ศࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛ PE ᖐᒓᡤᚓࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ᪉ἲࡶ౛እⓗ࡟ㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡓࡀࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡜㐺ྜࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ㠀ᖖ࡟ᅔ㞴࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺⌮⏤࠿ࡽࠊ๐㝖ࡉࢀࡓ 81ࠋ
ᪧ 7 ᮲ 5 㡯ࡣࠊPE ࡢᶵ⬟ࡀ㉎ධࡢࡳ࡛ࠊ኎ୖࡑࡢ௚཰ධࡢ⋓ᚓ࡟┤᥋ᐤ୚ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ሙ
ྜ࡟ࡣࠊᙜヱ PE ࡟ࡣᖐᒓᡤᚓࢆㄆᐃࡋ࡞࠸࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡓࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࡢୗ࡛ࡣࠊ
༢⣧㉎ධ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࡑࡢᶵ⬟࡟ᛂࡌࡓሗ㓘ࡀᨭᡶࢃࢀࠊࡑࢀ࡟ಀࡿ฼ᚓࢆ PE ࡟࠾࠸࡚ㄆ㆑
ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊ๐㝖ࡉࢀࡓ 82ࠋ
 ᪧ 7 ᮲ 6 㡯ࡣࠊPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡢィ⟬᪉ἲ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⥅⥆ᛶࢆせㄳࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋAOA ࡢୗ࡛ࡣࠊᚭᗏࡋࡓ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡬ࡢ‽ᣐࡀせㄳࡉࢀࡿࡓࡵࠊࡑࡶࡑࡶྠཎ๎࡜ᇶᮏⓗ࡟␗࡞ࡿᡭἲ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࢆィ⟬ࡍࡿవᆅࡀ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࠿ࡽࠊ๐㝖ࡉࢀࡓ 83ࠋ
 ௨ୖࡢࡼ࠺࡟ᪧ 7 ᮲ࡢ㡯┠ࡣࠊ࠸ࡎࢀࡶ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫ཎ๎࡟ࡑࡄࢃ࡞࠸ࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡗࡓࡓࡵࠊ
ᨵṇཪࡣ๐㝖ࡉࢀࡓࠋᅗ⾲ 9 ࡣᪧ 7 ᮲࡜᪂ 7 ᮲ࢆẚ㍑ࡋࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ

஭ୖᗣ୍㸻௰㇂ᰤ୍㑻ࠕ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡜ AOA ໬ᚋࡢᅜෆ⛯ἲࡢ஺㘒ࠑୗࠒ㹼PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ
ᡤᚓࡢ⟬ᐃࢆࡵࡄࡾ㹼ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 33 ᕳ 10 ྕ 110̾111 㡫㸦2013㸧ࠋ80 㥖ᐑྐ༤
ࠕእᅜἲேࡢ஦ᴗᡤᚓㄢ⛯࡟࠾ࡅࡿᅜෆἲ࡜⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢ㛵ಀ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠖ⛯◊ 190
ྕ 29 㡫㸦2016㸧ࠋ
81 ྠୖࠋ
82 㥖ᐑ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦80㸧29̾30 㡫ࠋ
83 ஭ୖ㸻௰㇂࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦79㸧112 㡫ࠋ
79

18（ 517 ）

ᅗ⾲ 9 ᪧ 7 ᮲࡜᪂ 7 ᮲ࡢẚ㍑⾲ 84
ᪧ7᮲
1㡯

2㡯

᪂7᮲

PE ࡞ࡅࢀࡤㄢ⛯࡞ࡋࡢཎ๎ࠋ※Ἠ

1㡯

PE ࡞ࡅࢀࡤㄢ⛯࡞ࡋࡢཎ๎ࠋ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡛ࡢㄢ⛯ࡣࠊ௻ᴗࡢ฼ᚓࡢ࠺ࡕ

ᆅᅜ࡛ࡢㄢ⛯ࡣࠊ᪂ 2 㡯ࡢつᐃ࡟ᇶPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ㒊ศ࡟㝈ᐃࠋ࡙ࡁ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓ࡟㝈ᐃࠋPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡢィ⟬࡟࠾࠸࡚2㡯

᪂ 7 ᮲࡟ຍ࠼ࠊ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡢ᤼㝖࡟㛵
ࡍࡿ 23 ᮲࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡶࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆᇶᮏⓗ࡟᥇⏝ࠋ๎ࢆཝ᱁࡟㐺⏝㸦≉࡟ࠊෆ㒊ྲྀᘬ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆ㐺⏝ࡍࡿࡇ
࡜ࢆ᫂グ㸧
ࠋ
3㡯

PE ࡢࡓࡵ࡟⏕ࡌࡓ㈝⏝ࡣࠊࡑࡢⓎ㸦๐㝖㸧⏕ᆅࢆၥࢃࡎࠊ᥍㝖ྍ⬟ࠋ
3㡯

㸦᪂タ㸧

AOA ࡢ㐺⏝࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡢ᤼㝖ࡢࡓࡵࡢᑐᛂⓗㄪᩚ࡜┦஫༠㆟ࠋ

4㡯⤖ᯝࡀᪧ 7 ᮲ࡢཎ๎࡟㐺ྜࡍࡿࡇ࡜

㸦๐㝖㸧ࢆ᮲௳࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ௻ᴗࡢ฼ᚓࡢ⥲㢠ࢆᙜヱ௻ᴗࡢྛᵓᡂ㒊ศ࡟㓄ศࡍࡿᐃᘧᇶ‽࡟ࡼࡗ࡚฼ᚓࡢ㓄ศࢆ⾜࠺័⾜ࢆᑛ㔜ࠋ5㡯༢⣧㉎ධࡢ㠀ㄢ⛯ࡢཎ๎ࠋ

㸦๐㝖㸧

6㡯

PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡢィ⟬᪉ἲ࡟㛵㸦๐㝖㸧ࡍࡿ⥅⥆ᛶࡢせㄳࠋ
7㡯ูࡢ᮲㡯ࡢᑐ㇟ᡤᚓ࡟ᑐࡍࡿᪧ 7 ᮲

4㡯

ࡢ୙㐺⏝ࠋ

ูࡢ᮲㡯ࡢᑐ㇟ᡤᚓ࡟ᑐࡍࡿ᪂ 7 ᮲ࡢ୙㐺⏝ࠋֆ᪂ 7 ᮲࡟࠾ࡅࡿ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ
᪂ 7 ᮲ 1 㡯࡛ࡣ 2 ࡘࡢཎ๎ࡀつᐃࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ➨ 1 ࡢཎ๎ࡣࠊ୍᪉ࡢ⥾⣙ᅜࡢ௻ᴗࡀ௚
᪉ࡢ⥾⣙ᅜ࡟ PE ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸࡞ࡅࢀࡤࠊᙜヱ௚᪉ࡢ⥾⣙ᅜࡀᙜヱ௻ᴗࡢ฼ᚓ࡟ㄢ⛯ᶒࢆᣢࡘ࡭ࡁ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸㸦ᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࡞ࡅࢀࡤㄢ⛯࡞ࡋ㸧࡜࠸࠺ࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ➨ 2 ࡢཎ๎ࡣࠊPE ࡀᡤᅾࡍࡿᅜࡢㄢ⛯ᶒࡣࠊ௻ᴗࡀᙜヱᅜ࠿ࡽᚓࡓ฼ᚓࡢ࠺ࡕᙜヱ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡋ࡞࠸ࡶࡢ࡟ࡲ࡛ཬ
ࡪࡶࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸㸦ᖐᒓ୺⩏㸧࡜࠸࠺ࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ᪧ 7 ᮲ 1 㡯࡛ࡣࠊࠕࡑࡢ௻ᴗࡢ฼ᚓࡢ࠺ࡕᙜヱᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ㒊ศ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࡢࡳࠖ
⛒⛯ࢆㄢࡍࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡓࡀࠊ᪂ 7 ᮲ 1 㡯࡛ࡣࠊ
ࠕ➨ 2 㡯ࡢつᐃ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚ᙜヱకᛅᙪࠕOECD ࣔࢹࣝ᮲⣙᪂ 7 ᮲࡜እᅜ⛯㢠᥍㝖ࡢไᗘ࣭ᇳ⾜ࡢぢ┤ࡋࠖ⛯኱ࢪ࣮ࣕࢼ
ࣝ 16 ྕ 167 㡫㸦2011㸧ࠊ஭ୖ㸻௰㇂࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦79㸧111 㡫ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋ84

19（ 518 ）

ᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࠖ⛒⛯ࢆㄢࡍ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊPE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡣ➨2 㡯ࡢつᐃ࡟ᚑࡗ࡚ィ⟬ࡉࢀࡿࠋᶵ⬟ⓗศ㞳௻ᴗ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡢୗ࡛ࡣࠊPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡀࠊձᙜヱ PE ࡀࠕูಶࡢ௻ᴗ
࡛࠶ࡾࠖ࠿ࡘղࡑࡢࡼ࠺࡞௻ᴗࡀ௚ࡢ⪅ࡔࡅ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃ PE ࡀᒓࡍࡿ௻ᴗࡢ௚ࡢᵓᡂ㒊ศ࠿ࡽࡶࠕ⊂❧ࡋࡓ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿࠖ࡜࠸࠺ 2 ࡘࡢᨃไ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁỴᐃࡉࢀࡿࠋձࡀศ㞳௻ᴗࡢཎ๎࡛
࠶ࡾࠊղࡀ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ௻ᴗ඲యࡢ⥲฼ᚓࢆ PE ࡜ࡑࡢ௚ࡢᵓᡂ㒊ศ࡜࡟㓄ศࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆồࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊPE ࡀูಶࡢ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜௬ᐃࡋ࡚฼ᚓࡢᖐᒓ
ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆồࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ௻ᴗ඲య࡜ࡋ࡚ᦆኻࡀฟ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࠊ
PE ࡟฼ᚓࢆᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿࠋ
᪂ 7 ᮲ࡣࠊᶵ⬟஦ᐇศᯒ㸦➨ 1 ࢫࢸࢵࣉ㸧ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊࡑࢀ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚౯᱁Ỵᐃ㸦➨ 2 ࢫࢸࢵࣉ㸧ࢆ⾜࠺ࢶ࣮ࢫࢸࢵࣉ࣭࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࢆ᥇⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 85ࠋ➨ 1 ࢫࢸࢵࣉ࡛ࡣࠊḟࡢࡼ࠺࡞ᶵ⬟஦ᐇศᯒࢆ⾜࠺ࠋձPE ࡀᒓࡍࡿ௻ᴗ࡜⊂❧ࡢ௻ᴗ࡜ࡢྲྀᘬ࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿമᶒ࣭മົࢆࠊᚲせ࡟ᛂࡌ࡚ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࠋղ㈨⏘ࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒࡢᖐᒓ࡟㛵ಀࡍࡿ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ≉ᐃࡋࠊ㈨⏘ࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒࢆ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࠋճࣜࢫࢡࡢᘬࡁཷࡅ࡟㛵ಀࡍࡿ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ≉ᐃࡋࠊࣜࢫࢡࢆ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࠋմPE ࡢࡑࡢ௚ࡢᶵ⬟ࢆ≉ᐃࡍࡿࠋյPE ࡜ࡑࡢᒓࡍࡿ௻ᴗෆࡢ௚ࡢᵓᡂ㒊ศ࡜ࡢෆ㒊ྲྀᘬࡢ࠺ࡕࠊෆ㒊ྲྀᘬ࡜ㄆ㆑ࡍࡿࡢࡀ㐺ษ࡞ྲྀᘬ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ㄆ㆑ࡋࠊࡑࡢᛶ㉁ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࠋնPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ㈨⏘ཬࡧࣜࢫࢡ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚ࠊ㈨ᮏࢆ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࠋ➨ 2 ࢫࢸࢵࣉ࡛ࡣࠊᨃไࡉࢀࡓ௻ᴗ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚㐙⾜ࡉࢀࡓᶵ⬟ࠊ౑⏝ࡉࢀࡓ㈨⏘ཬࡧᘬࡁཷࡅࡽࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡ࡟↷ࡽࡋ⛣㌿౯᱁⟬ᐃࡢᡭẁࢆ㢮᥎㐺⏝ࡋ࡚ࠊᨃไ
ࡉࢀࡓ௻ᴗ㛫ࡢෆ㒊ྲྀᘬࡢሗ㓘ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ 86ࠋ
 PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡀỴᐃࡉࢀࢀࡤࠊಀࡿ฼ᚓࡀㄢ⛯ࡢᑐ㇟࡜࡞ࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ⱝࡋࡃࡣㄢ⛯᪉ἲ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ྛ⥾⣙ᅜࡢᅜෆἲ௧࡟࠾࠸࡚ᐃࡵࡽࢀࡿࡶࡢ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 87ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ2 㡯࡛ࡣࠊ௻ᴗࡢㄢ⛯ᡤᚓࢆ⟬ᐃࡍࡿ㝿࡟㈝⏝ࡢ᥍㝖ྍ⬟ᛶ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ྲྀࡾᢅࡗ࡚࠾ࡽࡎࠊࡑࡢ
᥍㝖ྍ⬟ᛶࡣᅜෆἲ࡟ࡼࡾゎỴࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁၥ㢟࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 88ࠋ
2㸫1㸫2 ᅜෆἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ
օᖹᡂ 26 ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇࡢ⫼ᬒ AOA ࢆ཯ᫎࡋࡓᖐᒓ୺⩏࡬ࡢᨵṇ௨๓ࡣࠊ᪥ᮏᅜෆ࡟ᨭᗑࡸᕤሙ➼ࡢ PE ࡀ࠶ࡿሙྜ࡟
ࡣࠊࡑࡢ PE ࡜ࡢ㛵㐃ᛶࢆၥࢃࡎࠊᅜෆ※Ἠᡤᚓࢆ඲࡚ࡲ࡜ࡵ࡚ㄢ⛯ࡍࡿ᪉ἲࢆ᥇ࡗ࡚࠸ࡓ
㸦⥲ྜ୺⩏㸧
ࠋࡇࡢ⫼ᬒ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊᅜෆ࡟࠾ࡅࡿෆᅜἲே࡜እᅜἲே࡜ࡢㄢ⛯ࡢබᖹᛶࢆ㔜どࡋࡓࡇ࡜࡟ຍ࠼࡚ࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡬ࡢᑐෆᢞ㈨ࡢ๭ྜࡀᴟࡵ࡚㧗࠿ࡗࡓ⡿ᅜࡀࢯ࣮ࢫ࣮ࣝࣝ㸦ᡤ

OECD, supra note 36, Art.7, para.21̾22. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᕝ➃࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦8㸧130 㡫ࠋ
86 ᮾிඹྠ఍ィ஦ົᡤ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦67㸧66 㡫ࠋ
87 ᮾிඹྠ఍ィ஦ົᡤ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦67㸧70 㡫ࠋ
88 ྠୖࠋ
85

20（ 519 ）

ᚓ※Ἠ㸧࡟㛵ࡋ࡚⥲ྜ୺⩏ࢆ᥇⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡓࡇ࡜ 89ࠊᮏᗑ➼ࡀ※Ἠᚩ཰ࡢᑐ㇟࡜࡞ࡽ࡞࠸ᅜ
ෆ※Ἠᡤᚓࢆᚓࡿሙྜࡣࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡟ᡤᅾࡍࡿᜏஂⓗ᪋タࡀእᅜἲேࢆ௦⾲ࡋ࡚⏦࿌᭩ࢆᥦฟࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᐇົୖࡢ౽ᐅ࡛࠶ࡗࡓࡇ࡜࡞࡝ࡀ࠶ࡆࡽࢀࡿ 90ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࡑࡢᚋࠊ2010 ᖺࡢ⛯⥲ྜ୺⩏࠿ࡽᖐᒓ୺⩏࡬ࡢ⛣⾜࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ゝཬࡉࢀࠊไㄪᰝ఍ᑓ㛛ᐙጤဨ఍ 91ࡢ㆟ㄽࡢ୰࡛ࠊ
ᖐᒓ୺⩏࡬ࡢ⛣⾜ㄽࡢᶵ㐠ࡀ㧗ࡲࡗ࡚࠸ࡗࡓ 92ࠋࡑࡢ⌮⏤࡜ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊᖐᒓ୺⩏ࢆ᥇⏝ࡋࡓ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࢿࢵࢺ࣮࣡ࢡࡀᚎࠎ࡟ᗈࡀࡾࠊ᮲⣙ୖࡢᐃࡵ࡜ᅜෆἲࡀ஋㞳ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡗࡓࡓ
ࡵ࡛࠶ࡿࠋᅜෆἲࢆ᮲⣙ࡢᐃࡵ࡜୍⮴ࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊձᅜෆἲࡢ⥲ྜ୺⩏࡜⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢᖐᒓ୺⩏࡟஧ඖ໬ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡓㄢ⛯ཎ๎ࡀ⡆⣲࡛࠿ࡘᅜ㝿ⓗ࡟ㄪ࿴ࡢ࡜ࢀࡓ⛯ไ࡟㏆࡙ࡃࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡾࠊղᨭᗑᙧែ࡛㐍ฟࡍࡿሙྜ࡜Ꮚ఍♫ᙧែ࡛㐍ฟࡍࡿሙྜ࡛ࠊAOA ࡟ᚑࡗ࡚ฟ᮶ࡿ㝈ࡾྠࡌྲྀࡾᢅ࠸ࢆࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡾࠊᨭᗑᙧែ࡜Ꮚ఍♫ᙧែ࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢㄢ⛯ୖࡢ࣑ࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞⌮⏤࠿ࡽࠊᖹᡂ 26 ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ
ࢫ࣐ࢵࢳࢆゎᾘࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡛ࡁࡿ 93ࠋ
AOA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᖐᒓ୺⩏࡬ࡢᨵṇࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡓࠋֆᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ ᖹᡂ 26 ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇᚋࡣࠊࡇࢀࡲ࡛ࠊእᅜἲேࡢᅜෆ※Ἠᡤᚓࡢ 1 ࡘ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡓࠕᅜ
ෆ࡟࠾࠸࡚⾜࠺஦ᴗ࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿᡤᚓࠖ࡟௦ࢃࡗ࡚ࠕPE ࡟ᖐࡏࡽࢀࡿᡤᚓࠖ
㸦PE ᖐᒓᡤᚓ㸧ࠕእᅜἲࢆ᪂ࡓ࡟ᅜෆ※Ἠᡤᚓࡢ 1 ࡘ࡜ࡋ࡚ᐃ⩏ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜ࡉࢀࡓ 94ࠋPE ᖐᒓᡤᚓ࡜ࡣࠊ
ேࡀᜏஂⓗ᪋タࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚஦ᴗࢆ⾜࠺ሙྜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊᙜヱᜏஂⓗ᪋タࡀᙜヱእᅜἲே࠿ࡽ⊂❧ࡋ࡚஦ᴗࢆ⾜࠺஦ᴗ⪅࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋࡓ࡞ࡽࡤࠊᙜヱᜏஂⓗ᪋タࡀᯝࡓࡍᶵ⬟ࠊᙜヱᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࡟࠾࠸࡚౑⏝ࡍࡿ㈨⏘ࠊᙜヱᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࡜ᙜヱእᅜἲேࡢᮏᗑ➼࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢෆ㒊ྲྀᘬࡑࡢ௚ࡢ≧ἣࢆ຺᱌ࡋ࡚ࠊᙜヱᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࡟ᖐࡏࡽࢀࡿ࡭ࡁᡤᚓࠖ
㸦ἲἲ 138ձ୍㸧࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊᅜෆἲ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶ AOA ࡢ⪃࠼᪉ࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼࡚࠾ࡾࠊ2 ࢫࢸࢵࣉ࣭࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࢆ᥇⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ἲᇶ 20㸫2㸫2㸧ࠋ PE ᖐᒓᡤᚓࡢ㔠㢠ࡣࠊእᅜἲேࡢᙜヱ஦ᴗᖺᗘࡢ PE ࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚⾜࠺஦ᴗ࡟ಀࡿ┈㔠ࡢ㢠࠿ࡽᙜヱ஦ᴗᖺᗘࡢᙜヱ஦ᴗ࡟ಀࡿᦆ㔠ࡢ㢠ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࡓ㔠㢠࡜ࡍࡿ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ἲἲ 142ձ㸧ࠋእᅜἲேࡀ PE ࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚⾜࠺஦ᴗ࡟ಀࡿ┈㔠ࡢ㢠ཪࡣᦆ㔠ࡢ㢠ࡢලయⓗィ⟬࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊูẁࡢᐃࡵࡀ࠶ࡿࡶࡢࢆ㝖ࡁࠊෆᅜἲேࡢྛ஦ᴗᖺᗘࡢᡤᚓ࡟ᑐࡍࡿἲே⛯ࡢㄢ⛯ᶆࠋ‽ཬࡧࡑࡢィ⟬࡟㛵ࡍࡿつᐃ࡟‽ࡌ࡚ィ⟬ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 95㸦ἲἲ 142ղ㸧
89ὸጔ❶ዴࠕ඲ᡤᚓ୺⩏㸦⥲ྜ୺⩏㸧࠿ࡽᖐᒓᡤᚓ୺⩏㸦ᖐᒓ୺⩏㸧࡬ࡢ⛣⾜ࢆᕠࡿ⫼ᬒࠖ⛯኱ࢪ࣮ࣕࢼࣝ 20 ྕ 62 㡫㸦2013㸧ࠋ
90 ኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍⦅ࠗᨵṇ⛯ἲࡢࡍ࡭࡚࠙ᖹᡂ 26 ᖺࠚ
࠘672 㡫㸦኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍ࠊ2014 ᖺ㸧ࠋ
91 ⛯ไㄪᰝ఍ᑓ㛛ᐙጤဨ఍ࠕᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯࡟㛵ࡍࡿㄽⅬᩚ⌮㸦ᖹᡂ 22 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 9 ᪥㸧ࠖ
http://www.cao.go.jp/zeicho/history/20092012/etc/2010/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2010/11/18/2
21109houkoku.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 9 ᭶ 9 ᪥㸧ࠋ
92 ὸጔ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦89㸧62 㡫ࠋ
93 ኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦90㸧673 㡫ࠋ
94 ᮾிඹྠ఍ィ஦ົᡤ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦67㸧72 㡫ࠋ
95 ᮾிඹྠ఍ィ஦ົᡤ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦67㸧96 㡫ࠋ
21（ 520 ）

2㸫1㸫3 㛵㐃⪅࠿ࡘᚑᒓ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ
 ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ᑐ㇟࡜࡞ࡿᏊ఍♫㸦㛵㐃⪅㸧ࡀ➨ 5 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁ௦⌮ேPE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚⪃࠼ࡿࠋᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢィ⟬ࡣࠊPE ࡀ⊂❧ࡋࡓ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺ᨃไ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊ2㸫1㸫1 ࡛㏙࡭ࡓࢶ࣮ࢫࢸࢵࣉ࣭࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡟ἢࡗ
࡚⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊ➨ 1 ࢫࢸࢵࣉ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊࣜࢫࢡࡢᘬࡁཷࡅ࡟㛵ಀࡍࡿ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ≉ᐃࡋࠊࣜࢫࢡࢆ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊ㐺ṇ࡞ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡀ⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡿࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊࡇࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡣ➨ 9 ᮲ࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿ㛵㐃⪅࡛ࡶ࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊ㛵㐃⪅ࡀ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࠿ࡽཷࡅྲྀࡗࡓᡭᩘᩱ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ㸦➨ 9 ᮲㸧ࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ㸦➨ 9 ᮲㸧ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ㛵㐃⪅ࡢᶵ⬟࣭ࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᡭᩘᩱࡀ⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡿࠋࡇࡢ࡜ࡁࠊ➨ 7 ᮲࡟࠾࠸࡚௦⌮ே PE ࡟㓄ศࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡ࡜ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟࠾࠸࡚㛵㐃⪅࡟㓄ศࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡࡀྠࡌࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿሙྜࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 10㸧ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊࡇࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡢⓎ⏕ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ2㸫2 ࡛ࡣࠊࡇࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢ 2 ࡘࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ㸦single taxpayer approach ཬࡧ dual taxpayer approach㸧࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ぢ࡚࠸ࡃࠋ
ᅗ⾲ 10 Ꮚ఍♫㸦㛵㐃⪅㸧ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜ
 R ᅜ         S ᅜ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯Ꮚ఍♫࣭Ꮚ఍♫࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡛ྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫ

R♫

ࢡࡀㄆ㆑ࡉࢀࠊ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ௦⌮ே PE⏕ࡌࡿ

2㸫2 2 ࡘࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ
2㸫2㸫1 single taxpayer approach single taxpayer approach ࡜ࡣࠊᚑᒓ௦⌮ே࡟ᑐࡍࡿሗ㓘ࡀࠊࡶࡋ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫ཎ๎࡟㐺ྜࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࡛࠶ࢀࡤࠊ㐙⾜ࡉࢀࡓᶵ⬟ࠊ౑⏝ࡉࢀࡓ㈨⏘ཬࡧᘬࡁཷࡅࡽࢀ
ࡓࣜࢫࢡ࡟ᑐࡍࡿጇᙜ࡞ሗ㓘࡛࠶ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࠊࡑࡋ࡚ࠊPE ᡤᅾᆅᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡣࡑࡢ௚࡟
㐙⾜ࡉࢀࡓᶵ⬟ࠊ౑⏝ࡉࢀࡓ㈨⏘ཬࡧᘬࡁཷࡅࡽࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡࡀ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍ࡭ࡁ᭦࡞ࡿ฼ᚓࡣᏑᅾࡋᚓ࡞࠸࡜࠸࠺⪃࠼᪉࡛࠶ࡿ 96ࠋ ௨ୗࡣࡑࡢ౛࡛࠶ࡿࠋ

OECD, Report on the Attribution of Profit to Permanent Establishments, Para.271,
2008. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍ࠗᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࡬ࡢ฼ᚓᖐᒓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿሗ࿌᭩࠘82 㡫㸦᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍ࠊ2010 ᖺ㸧
ࠋ

96

22

（ 521 ）

օᩘ್౛R ♫ࡀ௦⌮ேࢆ௓ࡉࡎ㢳ᐈ࡜ྲྀᘬࡋࡓሙྜࠊR ♫࡟ 100 ࡢ཰ධࡀⓎ⏕ࡍࡿࡀࠊ40 ࡢ㈝⏝ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿ࡜ࡍࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 11㸧
ࠋR ♫ࡣ௦⌮ᡭᩘᩱࡀ 40 ௨ୗ࡟࡞ࡿ࡜ࡁ࡟ࠊ
㸦⊂❧㸧௦⌮ே㸦A♫㸧ࢆ௓ࡋ࡚ྲྀᘬࢆ⾜࠺ࠋA ♫ࢆ௓ࡋ࡚ྲྀᘬࢆ⾜ࡗࡓሙྜࠊ௦⌮ᡭᩘᩱࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࢆ30 ࡜ࡍࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 12㸧
ࠋA ♫ࡢ㈝⏝ࡣ 0 ࡜ࡍࡿࠋᅗ⾲ 11 R ♫ࡀ A ♫ࢆ௓ࡉࡎ㢳ᐈ࡜┤᥋ྲྀᘬࡍࡿሙྜ      R ᅜ             S ᅜR♫㢳ᐈ

100㸦཰ධ㸧̾40㸦㈝⏝㸧
㸻60

ᅗ⾲ 12 R ♫ࡀ⊂❧௦⌮ே㸦A ♫㸧ࢆ௓ࡋࡓሙྜ
 R ᅜ             S ᅜR♫A♫100㸦཰ධ㸧30㸦ᡭᩘᩱ཰ධ㸧

̾30㸦ᡭᩘᩱ㈝⏝㸧

㸻30

㢳ᐈ

㸻70

23

（ 522 ）

ᅗ⾲ 13 single taxpayer approach ࡢ⪃࠼᪉R ᅜ              S ᅜ
30㸦PE ᖐᒓ཰┈㸧
̾30㸦ᡭᩘᩱ㈝⏝㸧
㸻0

PE

R♫

㢳ᐈ

100㸦཰ධ㸧S♫

̾30㸦ᡭᩘᩱ㈝⏝㸧㸻7030㸦ᡭᩘᩱ཰ධ㸧
㸻30

 R ᅜ              S ᅜ

R♫

S♫

㢳ᐈ

100㸦཰ධ㸧30㸦ᡭᩘᩱ཰ධ㸧

̾30㸦ᡭᩘᩱ㈝⏝㸧

㸻30

㸻70

 㛵㐃఍♫࡛࠶ࡿ S ♫ࡀ R ♫ࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊsingle taxpayer approachࡢୗ࡛ࡣᅗ⾲ 13 ࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿࠋPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼┈ࡣࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆࡶࡗ࡚⟬ᐃࡉࢀࡿ཰┈ࡢ㢠࠿ࡽ S ♫࡬ࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ࡼࡿ௦⌮ᡭᩘᩱ㸦arm’s length remuneration㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋ࡚ồࡵࡽࢀࡿࠋ௬࡟ R ♫ࡀ S ♫࡟ᨭᡶ࠺௦⌮ᡭᩘᩱࢆ 25 ࡞࡝࡟ୗࡆ࡚࠸ࡓ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡶࠊ
ㄢ⛯ୖࡣ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ 30 ࡢ௦⌮ᡭᩘᩱࢆᨃไࡋ࡞ࡅࢀࡤ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡣࢮࣟ࡜࡞ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊsingle taxpayer approach ࡛ࡣࠕ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ཰┈ࠖ
࡜ࠕS ♫ࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ௦⌮ᡭᩘᩱࠖࡣྠࡌ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺Ⓨ᝿࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚࠾ࡾࠊ௦
⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ཰┈ࡣࠊᨭᡶࢃࢀࡓᡭᩘᩱ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚᏶඲࡟┦ẅࡉࢀࡿࡓࡵࠊ௦⌮ே PE
࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼┈ࡣᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸ 97ࠋὸጔ❶ዴࠕBEPS Action7 ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ PE ࡢᐃ⩏࡜ PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ㸸≉࡟ single taxpayer
approach vs. double taxpayer approach ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠖ21 ୡ⣖ᨻ⟇◊✲ᡤࠗࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ᫬௦࡟
࠾ࡅࡿ᪂ࡓ࡞ᅜ㝿⛒⛯ไᗘࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉࠘21 㡫㸦2017㸧
ࠋ
97

24

（ 523 ）

ֆsingle taxpayer approach ࡬ࡢᢈุ ➨ 1 ࡢၥ㢟࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊࡇࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡣࠊࣜࢫࢡࡀἲⓗ࡟ࡣ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡟ᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ

࡜࠸࠺⌮⏤࠿ࡽࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡛㐙⾜ࡉࢀࡓάື࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿᙜヱࣜࢫࢡࢆ↓どࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
single taxpayer approach ࡣࠊࣜࢫࢡ㸦ཬࡧሗ㓘㸧ࡀ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡟ἲⓗ࡟ᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ
࡛ࡶࠊ࡞࠾ࠊPE ᡤᅾᆅᅜࡢᚑᒓ௦⌮ேࡢάື࡟ࡼࡗ࡚๰ฟࡉࢀࡓࡑࡢࣜࢫࢡ㸦ཬࡧሗ㓘㸧ࢆ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗࡢ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࡀྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿ࡜࠸࠺ࡇ࡜ࢆ඲ࡃ⪃៖࡟ධࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ ࠋࡓࡋ࠿࡟ࠊ඾ᆺⓗ࡞㈍኎௦⌮ேዎ⣙ࡢୗ࡛ࡣࠊ㛵㐃⪅ࡀၟရࡢᡤ᭷ᶒࢆ᭷ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ
Ỵࡋ࡚࡞ࡃࠊࡑࡢၟရࡣ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗࡢ㈨⏘ࡢࡲࡲ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ㛵㐃ࡍࡿᅾᗜࣜࢫࢡࡣᙜヱ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚㈇ᢸࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊᙜヱ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࠿ࡽᙜヱ㛵㐃⪅࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ᨭᡶࢃࢀࡿ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫௦⌮ᡭᩘᩱ࡟ࡣࠊᙜヱࣜࢫࢡࡢ㈇ᢸ࡟ᑐࡍࡿሗ㓘࡜࠸࠺せ⣲ࡣྵࡲࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ௬࡟ࠊᙜヱ㛵㐃⪅ࡀᅾᗜࣜࢫࢡࡢᘬࡁཷࡅཪࡣࡑࡢᚋࡢ⟶⌮࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ཬࡧᅾᗜ㈨⏘ࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒࡢỴᐃ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ㐙⾜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠊᅾᗜࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒཬࡧ㛵㐃ࡍࡿᅾᗜࣜࢫࢡࡢ㈇ᢸ࡟ᑐࡍࡿሗ㓘ࡀࠊAOA ࡢୗ࡛ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ 100ࠋ ➨ 2 ࡢၥ㢟ࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢࡳࡀ௚ࡢ✀㢮ࡢ PE㸦஦ᴗᡤ PE ࡸᘓタ PE ࡞࡝㸧࡜␗࡞

ࡗ࡚ AOA ࡢ㐺⏝ࢆཷࡅࡿⅬ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ௦⌮ே PE ௨እࡢ PE㸦஦ᴗᡤ PE ࡸᘓタ PE ࡞࡝㸧࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊᙜヱ PE ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚㐙⾜ࡉࢀࡓᶵ⬟ࡢ⤖ᯝ࡜ࡋ࡚๰ฟཪࡣ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ࡀ࡞ࡉࢀࡓ㈨⏘ཬࡧࣜࢫࢡࢆᙜヱ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࠋࡑࢀ࡟┦ᛂࡋ࡚ࠊᙜヱ㈨⏘ཬࡧࣜࢫࢡࡀᙜ↛࡞ࡀࡽ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡟ἲⓗ࡟ᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜࠸࠺஦ᐇ࡟࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊᙜヱ PE ࡟฼ᚓࢆᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࠋ
ࡋ࠿ࡋࠊsingle taxpayer approach ࡛ࡣࠊ฼ᚓࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࠊ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗࡢࣜࢫࢡཬࡧ㈨⏘࡟㛵ࡋ࡚௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࢀ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ
௦⌮ே PE ࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚஦ᴗࢆ㐙⾜ࡍࡿ௻ᴗ࡜ࠊ஦ᴗࢆ⾜࠺୍ᐃࡢሙᡤࡓࡿ PE ࢆ㏻ࡌ࡚஦ᴗࢆ
㐙⾜ࡍࡿ௻ᴗ࡜ࡢ㛫࡟࠾ࡅࡿᕪ␗ࡣࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ཬࡧ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡜ᩚྜⓗ࡛࡞࠸࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸
ࡿ 101ࠋ
2㸫2㸫2 dual taxpayer approachօᩘ್౛2㸫2㸫1 ࡢᩘ್౛ࢆ๓ᥦ࡜ࡍࡿࠋdual taxpayer approach ࡛ࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡜࠸࠺ㄢ⛯ᑐ㇟⪅࡜ S ♫࡜࠸࠺ㄢ⛯ᑐ㇟⪅ࢆࠊㄢ⛯ୖูே࡜ࡋ࡚ᢅࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
single taxpayer approach

OECD, supra note 96, para.272. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦96㸧83 㡫ࠋ
99 OECD, supra note 96, para.277. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦96㸧84 㡫ࠋ
100 OECD, supra note 96, para.279. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦96㸧84̾85 㡫ࠋ
101 OECD, supra note 96, para.273. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦96㸧83 㡫ࠋ
98

25（ 524 ）

ࡢୗ࡛ࡣࠊᶵ⬟࣭஦ᐇศᯒ࡟ࡼࡿ≉ᐃࡢࣜࢫࢡࡣỴࡋ࡚㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ࡞࠸୍᪉ࠊdual taxpayer approach ࡛ࡣࠊ㛵㐃⪅ࡀࡑࢀࡽࡢࣜࢫࢡࡢᘬࡁཷࡅ
࡟㛵ࡍࡿཪࡣࡑࡢᚋࡢ⟶⌮࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ㐙⾜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࠊㄢ⛯ୖࠊ௦⌮ேPE ࡟ࡑࢀࡽࡢࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡉࢀࡿ 102ࠋᅗ⾲ 14 dual taxpayer approach ࡢ⪃࠼᪉R ᅜ              S ᅜ
36㸦PE ᖐᒓ཰┈㸧
̾30㸦ᡭᩘᩱ㈝⏝㸧
㸻6

PE

R♫

㢳ᐈ

100㸦཰ධ㸧
̾30㸦ᡭᩘᩱ㈝⏝㸧S♫

̾6㸦PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ㸧30㸦ᡭᩘᩱ཰ධ㸧

㸻64

㸻30

PE ᖐᒓᡤᚓ 36㸦௬࡟ 36 ࡜ࡍࡿ㸧࠿ࡽᡭᩘᩱ㈝⏝ 30 ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࡓ 6 ࡀ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡜࡞
ࡾࠊS ♫ࡢᡭᩘᩱ཰ධ 30 ࡜ྜࢃࡏࡓ 36 ࡀ S ᅜࡢㄢ⛯࡟᭹ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡿࠋdual taxpayer
approach ࡛ࡣࠊࠕ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ཰┈ࠖ࡜ࠕS ♫ࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ௦⌮ᡭᩘᩱࠖࡣ
␗࡞ࡿ࡜࠸࠺Ⓨ᝿࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ֆdual taxpayer approach ࡬ࡢᢈุ dual taxpayer approach ࡬ࡢᢈุ࡛ࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡜௚ࡢ✀㢮ࡢ PE㸦஦ᴗᡤ PE ࡸᘓタ
PE ࡞࡝㸧ࢆẚ㍑ࡋࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢࡳࡀ௚ࡢ✀㢮ࡢ PE ࡀཷࡅྲྀࡿ௨ୖࡢ㉸㐣฼ᚓࢆᚓࡿ࡜
ᢈุࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ௨ୗࡣࡑࡢ౛࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
R ♫ࡀ S ♫ࢆ௓ࡉࡎ㢳ᐈ࡜ྲྀᘬࡋࡓሙྜࠊR ♫࡟ 100 ࡢ཰ධࡀⓎ⏕ࡍࡿࡀࠊ40 ࡢ㈝⏝ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࡓࡵࠊ⊂❧ࡋࡓ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿ B ♫࡟ၟရࢆ 70 ࡛኎ࡿ࡜ࡍࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 15㸧
ࠋR ♫ࡀ B ♫࡜ྠ➼ࡢᶵ⬟ࢆႠࡴᨭᗑࢆ S ᅜ࡟タ❧ࡋࡓሙྜࠊ
⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁࡛ྲྀᘬࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡿࡓࡵࠊ
ᨭᗑ࡟ၟရࢆ 70 ࡛኎ࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 16㸧ࠋOECD, supra note 96, para.271. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦96㸧82̾83 㡫ࠋ
102

26（ 525 ）

ᅗ⾲ 15 R ♫ࡀ⊂❧ࡢὶ㏻ᴗ⪅㸦B ♫㸧ࢆ⏝࠸ࡓሙྜR ᅜ             S ᅜ

R♫

B♫

㢳ᐈ

70㸦཰ධ㸧

100㸦཰ධ㸧

㸻70

̾70㸦௙ධ㸧
㸻30

ᅗ⾲ 16 R ♫ࡀ B ♫࡜ྠ➼ࡢᶵ⬟ࢆႠࡴᨭᗑࢆ⏝࠸ࡓሙྜR ᅜ             S ᅜ

R♫

㢳ᐈ

ᨭᗑ

70㸦཰ධ㸧

100㸦཰ධ㸧

㸻70

̾70㸦௙ධ㸧
㸻30⊂❧ࡢὶ㏻ᴗ⪅࡜ᨭᗑࡢሙྜࠊ࡝ࡕࡽࡶ㈍኎฼┈ 30 ࡀ S ᅜࡢㄢ⛯ᶒ࡟᭹ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟࡞ࡿ
㸦ᅗ⾲ 15 ࡜ᅗ⾲ 16㸧ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᩥ⬦࡟࡞ࡗࡓ㏵➃ࠊS ♫ࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ᇶ
࡙࠸ࡓ௦⌮ᡭᩘᩱ࡜ู࡟ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ཰┈㸦30 ࢆ㉸㐣ࡋࡓ 6 㒊ศ㸧ࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜ほᛕࡍࡿࡇ࡜㸦ᅗ⾲ 14㸧
ࡣࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲ 2 㡯ࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡜ᩚྜࡋ࡟ࡃ࠸ 103ࠋ
2㸫2㸫3 ᮃࡲࡋ࠸࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ
 single taxpayer approach ࡜ dual taxpayer approach ࢆẚ㍑ࡋࠊ࡝ࡕࡽࡀᡃࡀᅜ࡟࡜ࡗ
࡚ᮃࡲࡋ࠸࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡛࠶ࡿ࠿⪃࠼ࡿࠋ୧࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡢᢈุࢆぢࡿ࡜ࠊࡑࢀࡒࢀᖐᒓࡍࡿ
ࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚๓ᥦ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ⪃࠼᪉ࡀ␗࡞ࡿࠋsingle taxpayer approach ࡟ᑐࡍࡿᢈุ࡛
ࡣࠊࣜࢫࢡ㸦ཬࡧሗ㓘㸧ࡀ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡟ἲⓗ࡟ᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ࡛ࡶࠊ࡞࠾ࠊPE ᡤᅾᆅᅜࡢ㛵㐃⪅㸦ᚑᒓ௦⌮ே㸧ࡢάື࡟ࡼࡗ࡚๰ฟࡉࢀࡓࡑࡢࣜࢫࢡ㸦ཬࡧሗ㓘㸧ࢆ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗࡢ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࡀྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿ࡜ゝࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿࣜࢫࢡศᯒ
࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ㛵㐃⪅࡟ࡍ࡭࡚ࡢࣜࢫࢡ㸦ཬࡧሗ㓘㸧ࡀᖐᒓࡋ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆ๓ᥦ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡘ
ࡲࡾࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚㛵㐃⪅࡟ࡍ࡭࡚ࡢࣜࢫࢡ㸦ཬࡧሗ㓘㸧ࡀᖐᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࢃࡅ࡛
103ὸጔ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦97㸧23 㡫ࠋ
27（ 526 ）

ࡣ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿࣜࢫࢡ㸦ཬࡧሗ㓘㸧ࡀᏑᅾࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࠋ୍᪉ࠊdual taxpayer approach ࡟ᑐࡍࡿᢈุ࡛ࡣࠊ஦ᴗᡤ PE ➼ࡢ௦⌮ேPE ௨እࡢ PE ᖐᒓᡤᚓ࡜ẚ㍑ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ஦ᴗᡤ PE ➼ࡣ⊂❧ࡢὶ㏻ᴗ⪅࡜ྠࡌ 30 ࡢ㈍኎
฼┈࡛࠶ࡿࡀࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᩥ⬦࡟࡞ࡗࡓ㏵➃ࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ᇶ࡙࠸ࡓ௦⌮ᡭᩘᩱ 30 ࡜ࡣู࡟ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ཰┈㸦30 ࢆ㉸㐣ࡋࡓ 6 㒊ศ㸧ࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜ほᛕࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜ࢆᢈุࡋ
࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ㛵㐃⪅࡟ࡍ࡭࡚ࡢࣜࢫࢡ㸦ཬࡧሗ㓘㸧ࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ๓ᥦ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊ㛵㐃⪅࡟ࡍ࡭࡚ࡢࣜ
ࢫࢡ㸦ཬࡧሗ㓘㸦30 㒊ศ㸧㸧ࡀᖐᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿࣜࢫࢡ㸦ཬࡧሗ㓘㸧ࡣᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࠋ ࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ୧࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡢᢈุࡣࠊࡑࢀࡒࢀࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡢ๓ᥦ࡟ࡓ࡚ࡤࠊ࠸ࡎࢀࡶ
ṇᙜ໬ࡉࢀࡿࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡀ඲ࡃྠࡌ࡛࠶ࢀࡤࠊsingle taxpayer
approach ࢆ᥇⏝ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡀ␗࡞ࡿࡢ࡛࠶ࢀࡤ dual
taxpayer approach ࢆ᥇⏝ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศ
ᯒ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ẚ㍑ࢆ⾜࠺ࠋօOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃࣜࢫࢡศᯒ
 ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥ 104࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋᐇ㉁ⓗ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࡀᏑࡍࡿሙᡤ࡟㐺ṇ࡞཰┈ࢆ㓄ศࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ㔜せどࡋࠊㄡࡀࣜࢫࢡࢆ㈇ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿ࢆỴᐃࠋࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊḟࡢ 6 ࡘࡢࢫࢸࢵࣉࢆタࡅ࡚࠸ࡿ 105㸦ᅗ⾲ 17㸧

OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations 2017.
105 Id., para.1.60.
104

28（ 527 ）

ᅗ⾲ 17 ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡢ 6 ࡘࡢࢫࢸࢵࣉ 106ࢫࢸࢵࣉ 1z⤒῭ⓗ࡟㔜せ࡞ࣜࢫࢡࡢ≉ᐃ௻ᴗࢢ࣮ࣝࣉ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⤒῭ⓗ࡟㔜せ࡞ࣜࢫࢡ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢศᯒࠋ
ࢫࢸࢵࣉ 2zዎ⣙࡟ࡼࡿἲⓗ࡞ࣜࢫࢡᘬࡁཷࡅࡢศᯒ

ἲⓗ࡞ほⅬ࠿ࡽࠊ௻ᴗࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆ࡛࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࣜࢫࢡࡢᘬࡁཷࡅࡀ࡞ࡉࢀ
࡚࠸ࡿ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢศᯒࠋ
ࢫࢸࢵࣉ 3z⤒῭ⓗ࡞ᐇែࡢศᯒ⤒῭ⓗ࡞ほⅬ࠿ࡽࠊࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆ࡛ྛ௻ᴗࡀᐇ㝿࡟ᯝࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿᶵ⬟㸦࡝ࡢ௻ᴗࡀࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿㸧࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢศᯒࠋ
ࢫࢸࢵࣉ 4zࢫࢸࢵࣉ 2ࠊ3 ࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡓᩚྜᛶࡢ☜ㄆࢫࢸࢵࣉ 2ࠊ3 ࡢศᯒࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼࡚ࠊἲⓗ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅࡿ⪅࡜ࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ⪅࡜ࡢ㛫࡟୙୍⮴ࡀ࡞࠸࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡢ☜ㄆ㸦୙୍⮴ࡀ࡞࠸ሙྜ࡟ࡣࢫࢸࢵࣉ 5 ࡢᡭ㡰ࡣ୙せ㸧ࠋࢫࢸࢵࣉ 5zࣜࢫࢡࡢ㓄ศ

ࢫࢸࢵࣉ 4 ࡟࠾࠸࡚୙୍⮴ࡀࡳࡽࢀࡿሙྜ࡟ࡣࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ⪅࡟ࣜࢫࢡ㓄ศࠋ
ࢫࢸࢵࣉ 6z཰┈ࡢ㓄ศࣜࢫࢡࡢ㓄ศࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼࡚ࠊࢢ࣮ࣝࣉෆ࡛ྛ௻ᴗࡀᐇ㝿࡟ᯝࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿᶵ⬟࡟ᛂࡌ࡚㐺ṇ࡞཰┈ࢆ㓄ศࠋ ࡲࡎࠊࢫࢸࢵࣉ 1 ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ཰┈࡟ᐤ୚ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿせ⣲ࢆศᯒࡋࠊࡇࡢせ⣲࡟㛵ࡍࡿࣜࢫࢡࡢ≉ᐃࢆ⾜࠺ࠋḟ࡟ࠊࢫࢸࢵࣉ 2 ࡟࠾࠸࡚ዎ⣙ୖࠊἲⓗ࡟ㄡࡀࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿ
ࡢ࠿ࢆ≉ᐃࡍࡿࠋࢫࢸࢵࣉ 3 ࡛ࡣࠊ⤒῭ⓗほⅬ࠿ࡽㄡࡀࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࠿
ࢆ≉ᐃࡍࡿࠋࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ᶵ⬟࡜ࡣࠊࣜࢫࢡࢆྲྀᤞ㑅ᢥࡍࡿࡇ࡜ཬࡧࣜࢫࢡ࡬ࡢᑐᛂ࡟ಀࡿ
ุ᩿ཬࡧࡇࢀࡽࡢពᛮỴᐃࢆ⾜࠺ࡇ࡜ࢆᣦࡍ 107ࠋࢫࢸࢵࣉ 4 ࡛ࡣࠊࢫࢸࢵࣉ 2 ࡜ࢫࢸࢵࣉ
3 ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚≉ᐃࡉࢀࡓ஦ᐇ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊձዎ⣙ᙜ஦⪅ࡀዎ⣙᮲௳࡟ᚑࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿ࠊղࣜࢫࢡࢆ
ᘬࡁཷࡅࡿᙜ஦⪅ࡀࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊࣜࢫࢡࢆ㈇ᢸࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢ㈈ົ⬟ຊࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿
ࡢ 2 Ⅼࢆศᯒࡍࡿ 108ࠋࡇࡢ࡜ࡁࠊձཬࡧղࡢ୧᪉ཪࡣ࠸ࡎࢀ࠿ࢆ‶ࡓࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ሙྜࡣࢫ
ࢸࢵࣉ 5 ࡟㐍ࡳࠊ‶ࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࡣࢫࢸࢵࣉ 6 ࡟㐍ࡴ 109ࠋࢫࢸࢵࣉ 5 ࡛ࡣࠊࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬ
ࡁཷࡅࡿ⪅ࡀࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜ࢃ࡞࠸ࠊཪࡣࣜࢫࢡᘬࡁཷࡅࡢࡓࡵࡢ㈈ົ⬟ຊࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸࡞
106≉㞟ࠕBEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩࡟ࡳࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢ᪂ࡓ࡞どⅬ࡜ࣜࢫࢡ࣭཰┈㓄ศࡢࡋ࠿ࡓࠖ᪪
ห⤒⌮᝟ሗ 1444 ྕ 11 㡫㸦2016㸧ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋ107 OECD, supra note 104, para.1.61. ≉㞟࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦106㸧11 㡫ࠊᮧ⏣ᏲᘯࠕOECD ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥྲྀᘬ෌⦅࡟ಀࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢഃ㠃࡟ࡘ࠸࡚̿ࣜࢫࢡࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ➨
31 ᕳ➨ 6 ྕ 97 㡫㸦2011㸧ࠋ
108 Id., para.1.86.
109 Id., para.1.87.
29（ 528 ）

࠸ࡇ࡜ࡀ᫂ࡽ࠿࡟࡞ࡗࡓሙྜࠊࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊ࠿ࡘࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅࡿࡓࡵࡢ㈈ົ⬟ຊࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ௻ᴗ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࢆ㓄ศࡍ࡭ࡁ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 110ࠋ᭱ᚋ࡟ࠊࢫࢸࢵࣉ 6 ࡛ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥࡢ 2 ❶௨㝆࡟ᐃࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ᪉ἲ࡟ᚑࡗ࡚ࠊ㐺ṇ࡞౯᱁ࢆタᐃࡍࡿ࡜ࡋ
࡚࠸ࡿ 111ࠋ ࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡛ࡣࠊዎ⣙ୖࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿ௻ᴗ࡟ࣜ
ࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿࡀࠊࡑࡢ௻ᴗࡀࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜ࢃࡎࠊ㈈ົ⬟ຊࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ሙྜࡣࠊᐇ
㉁ⓗ࡟ࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊ㈈ົ⬟ຊࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ௻ᴗ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࠋ
ֆOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃࣜࢫࢡศᯒ
 ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡢሙྜࠊ࡝ࡢ௻ᴗࡀ㈨⏘ࢆᡤ᭷ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡲࡓ࡝ࡢ௻ᴗࡀࣜࢫ
ࢡࢆ㈇ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿ࡢุ᩿ࡣࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥ࡟ᚑ࠸ࠊἲⓗᣊ᮰ຊࡢ࠶ࡿዎ⣙ཪࡣ௚ࡢ☜ㄆྍ⬟࡞ἲⓗྲྀࡾỴࡵ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋࡇࢀ࡟ᑐࡋࠊ➨ 7 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡢሙ
ྜࡣࠊἲⓗ࡟㈨⏘ࢆᡤ᭷ࡋࠊࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅࠊ㈨ᮏࢆಖ᭷ࡋཪࡣศ㞳ࡋࡓ௻ᴗ࡜ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿ௻ᴗࡢᵓᡂ㒊ศ࡜࠸࠺ࡶࡢࡣᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊἲⓗ࡞ྲྀࡾỴࡵࡣᙺ࡟❧ࡓ࡞࠸ 112ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊᨃไࡉࢀࡓูಶࡢ࠿ࡘศ㞳ࡋࡓ PE ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࢆᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿ࡟ࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒࢆ⿵᏶ࡍࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ AOA ࡛ࡣࠊࣜࢫࢡࡢᘬࡁཷࡅཪࡣ⟶⌮࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㔜せ࡞ᶵ⬟ࢆᙜヱ PE ࡟ᒓࡍࡿ⫋ဨࡀ㐙⾜ࡋࡓሙྜࠊᙜヱࣜࢫࢡࢆᙜヱ PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟㸧 113ࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ≉ᐃࡋࠊࡑࡇ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࢆᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿ᪉ἲࢆ᥇ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋPE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓሗ࿌᭩࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊࡇࡢ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࡣࠊྛᴗ✀࡟ࡼࡗ࡚␗࡞ࡾ㸦౛࠼ࡤࠊ▼Ἔ᥀๐఍♫࡜㖟⾜࡛ࡣྠࡌ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠋ
㸧ࠊྠࡌᴗ✀ෆ࡛ࡶྛ௻ᴗ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚␗࡞ࡿ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦౛࠼ࡤࠊ඲࡚ࡢ▼Ἔ᥀๐఍♫ࡀྠࡌࢃࡅ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ඲࡚ࡢ㖟⾜ࡀྠࡌࢃࡅ࡛ࡶ࡞࠸ࠋ㸧 114ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ2㸫1㸫1ֆ࡛㏙࡭ࡓࢶ࣮ࢫࢸࢵࣉ࣭࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࢆ᥇
ࡗ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ➨ 1 ࢫࢸࢵࣉࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࣜࢫࢡࡢᖐᒓࢆ
⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ևᮃࡲࡋ࠸࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ ୖグࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡛ࡣࠊዎ⣙ୖࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿ௻ᴗ࡟ࣜ
ࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊࡑࡢ௻ᴗࡀࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜ࢃࡎࠊ㈈ົ⬟ຊࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ሙྜ
࡟ࡣࠊᐇ㉁ⓗ࡟ࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜࠸ࠊ㈈ົ⬟ຊࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ௻ᴗ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜

Id., para.1.98.
Id., para.1.100.
112 OECD, supra note 96, para.17. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍࣭๓110
111

ᥖὀ㸦96㸧11̾12 㡫ࠋ
113 OECD, supra note 96, para.18. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦96㸧12 㡫ࠋ
114 OECD, supra note 96, para.19. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦96㸧13 㡫ࠋ
30（ 529 ）

࡞ࡿࠋ୍᪉ࠊ➨ 7 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡛ࡣࠊ௻ᴗ࡜ዎ⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡍࡿ௻ᴗࡢᵓᡂ㒊ศ࡜࠸࠺ࡶࡢࡣᏑᅾࡏࡎࠊἲⓗ࡞ྲྀࡾỴࡵࡣᙺ࡟❧ࡓ࡞࠸ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒࢆ⿵᏶ࡋࠊ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊࣜࢫࢡࡢᖐᒓࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
 ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡀ඲ࡃྠࡌ࡛࠶ࢀࡤࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࢆ㐺⏝ࡋࡓẁ㝵࡛ࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡛ㄢ⛯ࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ฼ᚓࡀࡍ࡭࡚㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡣᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸ࠋ
ࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊsingle taxpayer approach ࡀṇᙜ໬ࡉࢀࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊୖグࡢࡼ࠺࡟ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜
➨ 7 ᮲ࡢᶵ⬟ศᯒࡣ␗࡞ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡛ࡣㄆ㆑ࡉࢀ࡞࠿ࡗࡓ฼ᚓࡀ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚Ꮡᅾࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡾࠊPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡀฟ࡚ࡃࡿࠋ௨ୖࡢ⌮⏤࠿ࡽࠊ
dual taxpayer approach ࡀṇᙜ໬ࡉࢀࡿࠋ
2㸫3 ᑠᣓ
 PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࢆ⟬ᐃࡍࡿ᪉ἲ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊOECD ࡛ࡣ AOA ࢆ᥇⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋAOA ࡛ࡣࠊ
PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡀࠊձᙜヱ PE ࡀࠕูಶࡢ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡾࠖ࠿ࡘղࡑࡢࡼ࠺࡞௻ᴗࡀ௚ࡢ⪅ࡔࡅ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃ PE ࡀᒓࡍࡿ௻ᴗࡢ௚ࡢᵓᡂ㒊ศ࠿ࡽࡶࠕ⊂❧ࡋࡓ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿࠖ࡜࠸࠺ 2 ࡘࡢᨃไ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ௻ᴗ඲య࡜ࡋ࡚ᦆኻࡀฟ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜ࡛࠶ࡗ࡚ࡶࠊPE ࡟฼ᚓࢆᖐᒓࡉࡏࡿࡇ࡜ࡀྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿࠋᅜෆἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡶᖹᡂ
26 ᖺᗘ⛯ไᨵṇ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ AOA ࡢ⪃࠼᪉ࡀᑟධࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋලయⓗ࡞ィ⟬᪉ἲ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ
⛒⛯᮲⣙ཬࡧᅜෆἲ࡜ࡶ࡟ࢶ࣮ࢫࢸࢵࣉ࣭࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡀ᥇⏝ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ 㛵㐃⪅㸦ࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔㸧ࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟࠾࠸࡚㛵㐃⪅࡟㓄ศࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡ࡜ࠊ➨ 7 ᮲࡟࠾࠸࡚௦⌮ே PE ࡟㓄ศࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡࡀྠࡌࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿሙྜࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡇࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟㛵ࡍࡿ 2 ࡘࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ㸦single taxpayer
approach ཬࡧ dual taxpayer approach㸧ࡀᏑᅾࡍࡿࠋ࡝ࡕࡽࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ࡢ࠿
࡟ࡘ࠸࡚᫂ࡽ࠿࡟ࡍ࡭ࡃࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡢẚ㍑ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡀ඲ࡃྠࡌ࡛࠶ࢀࡤࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࢆ㐺⏝ࡋࡓẁ㝵࡛ࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡛ㄢ⛯ࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ฼ᚓࡀࡍ࡭࡚㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊPE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࡣᏑᅾࡏࡎࠊsingle taxpayer
approach ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ➨ 7 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡛ࡣࠊἲⓗ࡞ྲྀࡾỴࡵࡀᙺ࡟❧ࡓ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚ࣜࢫࢡࡢᖐᒓࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒࡣ␗࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡛ࡣㄆ㆑ࡉࢀ࡞࠿ࡗࡓ฼ᚓࡀ
➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚Ꮡᅾࡍࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊdual taxpayer approach ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸࡜࠸࠼ࡿࠋ ➨ 3 ❶࡛ࡣࠊdual taxpayer approach ࢆ᥇⏝ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡢᩘ
್౛ࡢศᯒࢆ⾜࠸ࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡜ࡢ㛵ಀ࡟࠾࠸࡚⏕ࡌࡿၥ㢟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ᣦ᦬ࡍࡿࠋ
➨ 3 ❶ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝㛵ಀ3㸫1 2016 ᖺࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ
31（ 530 ）

3㸫1㸫1 ᩘ್౛ BEPS ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩ࡢಟṇᥦ᱌࡟ࡼࡾࠊ᪂ࡓ࡟ PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡗࡓ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⯡ཎ๎ࢆᐃࡵࡓࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡀ 2016 ᖺ࡟බ⾲ࡉࢀࡓࠋ௨ୗࡢօ㹼ևࡣࠊ㛵㐃⪅㸦➨ 9 ᮲㐺⏝㸧࠿ࡘ௦⌮ே PE㸦➨ 7 ᮲㐺⏝㸧࡜࡞ࡿᐇែࡀᏑᅾࡍ
ࡿሙྜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊලయⓗ࡞ᩘ್ࢆᙜ࡚ࡣࡵ࡚ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃࢆ⾜ࡗࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
օᩘ್౛ 1Prima ࡣ A ᅜࡢᒃఫ⪅࡛࠶ࡾࠊᅜෆࡢᾘ㈝⪅ྥࡅ࡟〇ရࢆ〇㐀ࡋࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢ〇ရࢆୡ⏺
୰ࡢ㢳ᐈ࡟㈍኎ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋSellCo ࡣ B ᅜ࡟ᒃఫࡍࡿ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡾࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨
9 ᮲ࡢୗ࡛ࡢ Prima ࡢ㛵㐃⪅࡛࠶ࡿࠋB ᅜ࡛㈍኎άືࢆ⾜࠺ SellCo ࡣ Prima ࡟ᚑ஦ࡋ࡚
࠾ࡾࠊࡑࡢάືࡣ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 5 ᮲ 5 㡯࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ௦⌮ே PE ࢆ⏕ࡳฟࡍ 115ࠋᅗ⾲ 18 ࡣࠊྛ௻ᴗ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ᐇ⾜ࡉࢀࡿᶵ⬟࡛࠶ࡿࠋOECD, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Public Discussion Draft BEPSACTION 7, Additional Guidance on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent
Establishments, Para.20, 2016.
115

32（ 531 ）

ᅗ⾲ 18 ᩘ್౛ 1 ࡢᶵ⬟ࡢෆヂ 116
Prima

SellCo㈍኎ᶵ⬟B ᅜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㈍኎ᡓ␎ཬࡧᕷሙࢩ࢙࢔

zz

Prima ࡛ฎ⌮ࡍࡿ㈐௵ࢆ㈇࠺ࠋ

┠ᶆࢆタᐃࡍࡿࠋz㢳ᐈ࠿ࡽࡢὀᩥࢆཷࡅࠊ㢳ᐈὀᩥࢆ㈍኎௦⌮ᗑࢆ㑅ᢥࠊᴗ⦼ࢆ┘どࡋࠊ㈍኎௦⌮ᗑ࡜ࡢ㛵ಀࢆ⥅⥆ࡍࡿ࠿ࠊ⤊஢ࡍࡿ࠿ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࠋ
B ᅜ࡛ᥦ౪ࡉࢀࡿ〇ရࡢ≉ᐃ౯᱁ࢆタzᐃࡍࡿࠋ኎ୖ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚ SellCo ࡟ᡭᩘᩱࢆᨭzᡶ࠺ࠋ࣐࣮ࢣࢸ࢕ࣥࢢཬࡧᗈ࿌ᶵ⬟zண⟬ࠊ࣐࣮ࢣࢸ࢕ࣥࢢᡓ␎ࠊᗈ࿌ࢥࣥzࢸࣥࢶࢆ B ᅜ࡜Ỵᐃࡍࡿࠋ

B ᅜ࡛ࡢ࣐࣮ࢣࢸ࢕ࣥࢢᡓ␎ࢆᐇ᪋ࡋࠊ〇ရࡢ⌧ᆅᗈ࿌ࢆ⾜࠺㝿࡟Ⓨ⏕ࡋࡓࡍ࡭࡚ࡢ㈝⏝࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ Prima ࠿ࡽᡶ࠸ᡠࡋࢆཷࡅࡿࠋ

ᅾᗜ㛵㐃ᶵ⬟zᅾᗜࡀ㢳ᐈ࡟ᒆࡃࡲ࡛ᅾᗜࢆಖᣢࡍ zࡇࡢⅬ࡛ᶵ⬟ࡣᐇ⾜ࡉࢀ࡞࠸ࠋ

ࡿࠋzᅾᗜࡢ಴ᗜ⟶⌮ࠊ㝞⭉໬ࡢࣜࢫࢡ࡜ࢥ
ࢫࢺࢆ᭱ᑠ㝈࡟ᢚ࠼࡞ࡀࡽࠊ㢳ᐈࡢὀ
ᩥࢆ㎿㏿࡟‶ࡓࡍࡓࡵ࡟〇ရࡢᅾᗜỈ‽ࢆỴᐃࡋࠊ┘どࡍࡿ㈐௵ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ

ಙ⏝㛵㐃ᶵ⬟z㢳ᐈ࡟ㄳồࡋࠊዎ⣙ୖࠊ㢳ᐈമᶒ࡟㛵zࡇࡢⅬ࡛ᶵ⬟ࡣᐇ⾜ࡉࢀ࡞࠸ࠋ

ࡍࡿಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࢆ㈇࠺ࠋ
B ᅜ࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡓ㢳ᐈ࡬ࡢࡍ࡭࡚ࡢ㈍኎

zࢆᢎㄆࡍࡿࠋz㢳ᐈമᶒࡢᅇ཰ࢆ⾜࠺ࠋࡲࡎࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᶵ⬟ศᯒ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ぢ࡚࠸ࡃࠋPrima ࡜ SellCo ࡣ㛵㐃ࡍࡿ௻ᴗ࡛࠶

ࡿࡓࡵࠊPrima ࡜ SellCo 㛫ࡢྲྀᘬࡣ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁศᯒࡉࢀࡿ 117ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥ㸦2㸫2㸫3օࡢᡭ㡰㸧࡟ᚑ࠸ࠊྲྀᘬࡢዎ⣙ୖࠊPrima ࡜ SellCo ࡢ࡝ࡕࡽࡀἲ
116
117

Id., para.24.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋId., para.25.
33（ 532 ）

ⓗ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࠿ࠊ᮲௳ࡢ☜ㄆࢆ⾜࠺ 118ࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊPrima ࡀᅾᗜཬࡧമ
ᶒࡢἲⓗᡤ᭷⪅࡛࠶ࡾࠊPrima ࡀዎ⣙ୖࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿ 119ࠋࡲࡓࠊPrima ࡣࡇࢀࡽࡢ㈨⏘࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿࣜࢫࢡࢆ⟶⌮ࡋࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆ㈇࠺㈈ົⓗ⬟ຊࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 120ࠋPrima ཬࡧ SellCo ࡢᦆ┈ཬࡧㄢ⛯฼┈ࡢᩘ್ࡣ௨ୗࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 19㸧
ࠋSellCo ࡀ
ᐇ⾜ࡍࡿ㈍኎ᶵ⬟ࢆ⪃៖ࡋ࡚ࠊPrima ࠿ࡽ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦10㸧ࡀᨭᡶࢃࢀࡿࠋSellCo ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࡣࠊPrima ࠿ࡽཷࡅྲྀࡗࡓ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦10㸧࠿ࡽႠᴗ⤒㈝㸦8㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࡓ 2 ࡜࡞ࡿ 121ࠋPrima ࡣྲྀᘬ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ᚓࡓႠᴗ཰ධ㸦200㸧ࢆ඲㢠ཷࡅྲྀࡿࠋPrima ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࡣࠊႠᴗ཰
ධ㸦200㸧࠿ࡽ኎ୖཎ౯㸦40㸧
ࠊSellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦10㸧ཬࡧࡑࡢ௚ࡢႠᴗ⤒㈝㸦20㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࡓ㸦130㸧࡜࡞ࡿ 122ࠋᅗ⾲ 19 ౛ 1 ࡢ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᩘ್౛ 123
Prima㸦A ᅜ㸧

SellCo㸦B ᅜ㸧

Ⴀᴗ཰ධ

200

኎ୖཎ౯

‫ڹ‬40

⢒฼┈

160

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝

㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ཰ධ

10

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝

‫ڹ‬8

SellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ

‫ڹ‬10

㸦Prima ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ᡶ࠸ᡠࡉࢀࡿ

Sellco ࡟ࡼࡿᗈ࿌㈝ࡢᡶ࠸ᡠࡋ‫ڹ‬7

ᗈ࿌㈝⏝௨እ㸧୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬4

ᅾᗜᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬3

಴ᗜಖ⟶

‫ڹ‬6

ㄢ⛯฼┈

130

ㄢ⛯฼┈

2

ḟ࡟ࠊ➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᶵ⬟ศᯒࢆぢ࡚࠸ࡃࠋPrima ࡀ B ᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ௦⌮ே PE➨ 7 ᮲࡟࠾ࡅࡿᶵ⬟ศᯒ࡛ࡣࠊ
࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ
➨ 7 ᮲ࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿ 124ࠋἲⓗ࡞ྲྀࡾỴࡵࡣᙺ࡟❧ࡓ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚ࣜࢫࢡࡢᖐᒓࢆ⾜࠺ࠋ
SellCo ࡣᅾᗜཬࡧമᶒ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚࠸࠿࡞ࡿ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࡶᐇ⾜ࡋ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿࣜࢫࢡࡣᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸ 125ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࡣࢮࣟ࡜࡞ࡿࠋ
Prima ཬࡧ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᦆ┈࡜ㄢ⛯฼┈ࡢᩘ್ࡣ௨ୗࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 20㸧
ࠋB ᅜ࡛ㄢ

Id., para.26.
Id., para.28.
120 Id., para.28.
121 Id., para.29.
122 Id., para.29.
123 Id., para.29.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋ
124 Id., para.32.
125 Id., para.34.
118
119

34

（ 533 ）

⛯ࡉࢀࡿ฼┈ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ┠ⓗ࡛ࠊB ᅜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿႠᴗ཰ධࡢ඲㢠㸦200㸧ࢆ௦⌮ே PE ࡟㓄ศࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ 126ࠋ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ㈍኎ᶵ⬟࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦10㸧
ࢆ SellCo ࡀཷࡅྲྀࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛ࡣࠊࡇࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦10㸧ࢆႠᴗ཰ධ㸦200㸧࠿ࡽ᥍㝖ࡍࡿ㸦B ᅜഃ࡛ࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡓࡵ㸧ࠋ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ኎ୖཎ౯ࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚Ỵᐃࡉࢀࡓ SellCo ࡬ࡢ㐺ษ࡞㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦10㸧ࡢᨭᡶ࠸ᚋࠊ௦
⌮ே PE ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࡀࢮࣟ࡟࡞ࡿࡼ࠺࡟Ỵᐃࡉࢀࡿࡓࡵࠊ190 ࡜࡞ࡿ 127ࠋࡲࡓࠊ௦⌮ே PE
ࡢ኎ୖཎ౯㸦190㸧ࡣ Prima ࡢႠᴗ཰ධ࡟┦ᙜࡍࡿ 128ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊPrima ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࡣࠊႠᴗ཰ධ㸦190㸧࠿ࡽ኎ୖཎ౯㸦40㸧ཬࡧࡑࡢ௚ࡢႠᴗ⤒㈝㸦20㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࡓ㸦130㸧࡜࡞ࡿ 129ࠋ
 ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊႠᴗ཰ධ㸦200㸧ࡀ඲㢠௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡋࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ኎ୖཎ౯㸦190㸧ࡀ Prima ࡢႠᴗ཰ධ㸦190㸧࡜࡞ࡿࡢࡣࠊBuy-Sell ᆺࡢྲྀᘬ࡜ྠࡌྲྀࡾᢅ࠸ࢆ
ᚑᒓ௦⌮ேࡀ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࠿ࡽၟရࢆ㉎ධࡋࠊࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡛࠶ࡿ 130ࠋBuy-Sell ᆺࡢྲྀᘬ࡛ࡣࠊ
※Ἠᆅᅜ࡟ᡤᅾࡍࡿ㢳ᐈ࡟㈍኎ࡍࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࣭࢔ࣞࣥࢪ࣓ࣥࢺ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊBuy-Sell ᆺ࠿ࡽࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡟஦ᴗ෌⦅ࢆ⾜ࡗࡓ࡜ࡋ࡚ࡶࠊィ⟬᪉ἲࢆྠࡌ࡟ࡍ
ࡿࡇ࡜࡛ࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿㄢ⛯㢠ࢆῶᑡࡉࡏࡿ⛒⛯ᅇ㑊⾜Ⅽࢆ㜵Ṇࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᅗ⾲ 20 ౛ 1 ࡢ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᩘ್౛ 131
Prima ᮏᗑ㸦A ᅜ㸧௦⌮ே PE㸦B ᅜ㸧

Ⴀᴗ཰ධ

190

Ⴀᴗ཰ධ

200

኎ୖཎ౯

‫ڹ‬40

኎ୖཎ౯

‫ڹ‬190

⢒฼┈

150

⢒฼┈

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝

10

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝

SellCo ࡀ㈇࠺ᗈ࿌㈝ࡢᡶ࠸ᡠࡋ

‫ڹ‬7୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬4

ᅾᗜᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬3

಴ᗜಖ⟶

‫ڹ‬6

ㄢ⛯฼┈

130

SellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ

ㄢ⛯฼┈

‫ڹ‬10

0

ֆᩘ್౛ 2 ᩘ್౛ 2 ࡣࠊႠᴗᶵ⬟ࠊ࣐࣮ࢣࢸ࢕ࣥࢢཬࡧᗈ࿌ᶵ⬟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣᩘ್౛ 1 ࡜ྠࡌ࡛࠶ࡿ

Id., para.36.
Id., para.37.
128 Id., para.37.
129 Id., para.39.
126
127

Dinis Tracana, The Effect of the OECD/G20 BEPS Initiative on the Attribution ofProfits to Permanent Establishments: The Special Case of Agency Permanent
Establishments, BULLETIN FOR INTERATIONAL TAXATION, at 223, 2017.
131 OECD, supra note 115, para.38.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋ
130

35（ 534 ）

ࡀࠊᅾᗜ㛵㐃ᶵ⬟ཬࡧಙ⏝㛵㐃ᶵ⬟ࡀ␗࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 21㸧ࠋᅗ⾲ 21 ᩘ್౛ 2 ࡢᶵ⬟ࡢෆヂ 132
Prima

SellCoᅾᗜ㛵㐃ᶵ⬟zᅾᗜࡀ㢳ᐈ࡟ᒆࡃࡲ࡛ᅾᗜࢆಖᣢࡍ zᅾᗜࡢ಴ᗜ⟶⌮ࠊ㝞⭉໬ࡢࣜࢫࢡ࡜ࢥ

ࡿࠋࢫࢺࢆ᭱ᑠ㝈࡟ᢚ࠼࡞ࡀࡽࠊ㢳ᐈࡢὀ
ᩥࢆ㎿㏿࡟‶ࡓࡍࡓࡵ࡟〇ရࡢᅾᗜỈ‽ࢆỴᐃࡋࠊ┘どࡍࡿ㈐௵ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋ

ಙ⏝㛵㐃ᶵ⬟z㢳ᐈ࡟ㄳồࡋࠊዎ⣙ୖࠊ㢳ᐈമᶒ࡟㛵zࡍࡿಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࢆ㈇࠺ࠋ

B ᅜ࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡓ㢳ᐈ࡬ࡢࡍ࡭࡚ࡢ㈍኎
ࢆᢎㄆࡍࡿࠋz㢳ᐈമᶒࡢᅇ཰ࢆ⾜࠺ࠋᩘ್౛ 1 ࡜ྠᵝ࡟ࠊPrima ࡜ SellCo 㛫ࡢྲྀᘬ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿ 133ࠋ➨ 9᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᶵ⬟ศᯒ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊPrima ࡀᅾᗜཬࡧമᶒࡢἲⓗᡤ᭷⪅࡛࠶ࡾࠊPrima ࡀዎ⣙ୖࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࡣ SellCo ࡀ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋPrima ࡀዎ⣙ୖࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿ࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊᐇ㝿࡟ࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ SellCo ࡟ᅾᗜࣜࢫࢡཬࡧಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿ㸦SellCo ࡟༑ศ
࡞㈈ົ⬟ຊࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜௬ᐃࡍࡿ㸧134ࠋࡲࡓࠊPrima ࡣᅾᗜ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚㈨㔠ࢆᣐฟࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊPrimaࡀᐇ⾜ࡍࡿᶵ⬟࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚ࠊ
SellCo ࠿ࡽ㐺ษ࡞㈨㔠㏉㑏ࢆཷࡅࡿ㈨᱁ࡀ࠶ࡿ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 135ࠋ
 Prima ཬࡧ SellCo ࡢᦆ┈࡜ㄢ⛯฼┈ࡢᩘ್ࡣ௨ୗࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 22㸧ࠋᩘ್౛ 1 ࡜␗࡞ࡾࠊSellCo ࡟ᅾᗜࣜࢫࢡ࡜ಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦30㸧ࡀᩘ್౛ 1 ࡼࡾࡶ㧗ࡃ࡞ࡾࠊ୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻ㸦4㸧ࠊᅾᗜᦆኻ㸦3㸧ࠊ಴ᗜಖ⟶㸦6㸧ࡢ㈝⏝ࡀ SellCo࡟⏕ࡌ࡚࠸ࡿࠋSellCo ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࡣࠊ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦30㸧࠿ࡽႠᴗ⤒㈝㸦8㸧ཬࡧࡑࡢ௚ࡢ㈝⏝㸦13㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࠊPrima ࡀᐇ⾜ࡍࡿᶵ⬟࡟ᑐࡍࡿ㏉㑏㸦2㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࡓ⤖ᯝࠊ7 ࡜࡞ࡿࠋPrima ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࡣࠊႠᴗ཰ධ㸦200㸧࠿ࡽ኎ୖཎ౯㸦40㸧ࠊSellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦30㸧
ࠊ
ᗈ࿌㈝㸦7㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࠊSellCo ࠿ࡽࡢ㈨㔠㏉㑏㸦2㸧ࢆຍ࠼ࡓ 125 ࡜࡞ࡿࠋᅗ⾲ 22 ౛ 2 ࡢ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᩘ್౛ 136
Prima㸦A ᅜ㸧

SellCo㸦B ᅜ㸧

Id., para.40.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋId., para.41.
134 Id., para.42.
135 Id., para.43.
136 Id., para.44.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋ
132
133

36

（ 535 ）

Ⴀᴗ཰ධ

200

㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ

30

኎ୖཎ౯

‫ڹ‬40

኎ୖཎ౯

0

⢒฼┈

160

⢒฼┈

30

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝

‫ڹ‬8

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝
SellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ

‫ڹ‬30୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬4

SellCo ࡀ㈇࠺ᗈ࿌㈝ࡢᡶ࠸ᡠࡋ

‫ڹ‬7

ᅾᗜᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬3

಴ᗜಖ⟶

‫ڹ‬6

Ⴀᴗ฼┈

9

Ⴀᴗ฼┈
SellCo ࠿ࡽࡢ㈨㔠㏉㑏
ㄢ⛯฼┈

123
2
125

Prima ࡬ࡢ㈨㔠㏉㑏
ㄢ⛯฼┈

‫ڹ‬2
7

➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᶵ⬟ศᯒ࡛ࡣࠊἲⓗ࡟㸦ዎ⣙ୖ㸧ࡣ Prima ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊ
SellCo ࡀ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟㸦ᅾᗜ⟶⌮ࠊ㈍኎ᢎㄆ㸧ࢆᐇ⾜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᅾᗜࣜࢫࢡཬࡧಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿ 137ࠋࡲࡓࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ Prima ࡀཷࡅࡓ㈨㔠㏉㑏࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ
SellCo ࡀᅾᗜ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆᐇ⾜ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊᅾᗜࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒࡣ SellCo ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
Prima ཬࡧ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᦆ┈࡜ㄢ⛯฼┈ࡢᩘ್ࡣ௨ୗࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 23㸧ࠋB ᅜ࡛ㄢ
⛯ࡉࢀࡿ฼┈ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ┠ⓗ࡛ࠊB ᅜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿႠᴗ཰ධࡢ඲㢠㸦200㸧ࢆ௦⌮ே PE ࡟㓄ศࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ 138ࠋ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ㈍኎ᶵ⬟ཬࡧࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦30㸧ࢆ SellCo ࡀཷࡅྲྀࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛ࡣࠊࡇࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ
㸦30㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡍࡿ㸦B ᅜഃ࡛ࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡓࡵ㸧 139ࠋSellCo ࡣ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆᐇ⾜ࡋ࡚࠾ࡾࠊᅾᗜࣜࢫࢡཬࡧಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊᮏ᮶࡛࠶ࢀ
ࡤࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢႠᴗ཰ධ࠿ࡽࣜࢫࢡ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㈝⏝ࡢ᥍㝖㸦୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻࠊᅾᗜᦆኻࠊ಴
ᗜಖ⟶㸧ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࡀࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊࡇࢀࡽࡢ㈝⏝ࡀ SellCo ࡢႠᴗ཰ධ࠿
ࡽࡍ࡛࡟᥍㝖ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚㈝⏝ࡢ᥍㝖ࡣ⾜ࢃ࡞࠸ࠋࡍ࡞ࢃ
ࡕࠊ୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻࠊᅾᗜᦆኻࠊ಴ᗜಖ⟶ࡣࢮࣟ࡜࡞ࡿ 140ࠋ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡣࢮࣟ
࡜࡞ࡿࡓࡵ㸦㈨㔠㏉㑏๓㸧ࠊႠᴗ཰ධ㸦200㸧࠿ࡽ SellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦30㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࡓ
㸦170㸧ࡀ኎ୖཎ౯࡜࡞ࡿࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊᅾᗜࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ SellCo ࠿ࡽࡢ㈨㔠㏉㑏࡛࠶ࡿ㸦2㸧141ࡢࡳࡀ௦⌮ே PE ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈࡜࡞ࡿࠋPrima ࡢႠᴗ཰ධࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ
㸦170㸧࡜࡞ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊPrima ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࡣࠊႠᴗ཰ධ
኎ୖཎ౯࡟┦ᙜࡍࡿࡓࡵ 142ࠊId., para.48̾51.
Id., para.53.
139 Id., para.53.
140 Id., para.55.
141 Id., para.57.
142 Id., para.55.
137
138

37

（ 536 ）

㸦170㸧࠿ࡽ኎ୖཎ౯㸦40㸧ཬࡧᗈ࿌㈝㸦7㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࡓ㸦123㸧࡜࡞ࡿࠋᅗ⾲ 23 ౛ 2 ࡢ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᩘ್౛ 143
Prima ᮏᗑ㸦A ᅜ㸧௦⌮ே PE㸦B ᅜ㸧

Ⴀᴗ཰ධ

170

Ⴀᴗ཰ධ

200

኎ୖཎ౯

‫ڹ‬40

኎ୖཎ౯

‫ڹ‬170

⢒฼┈

130

⢒฼┈

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝
SellCo ࡀ㈇࠺ᗈ࿌㈝ࡢᡶ࠸ᡠࡋ

Ⴀᴗ฼┈
SellCo ࠿ࡽࡢ㈨㔠㏉㑏
ㄢ⛯฼┈

30

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝
‫ڹ‬7

123
0
123

SellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ

‫ڹ‬30୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬0

ᅾᗜᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬0

಴ᗜಖ⟶

‫ڹ‬0

Ⴀᴗ฼┈

0

SellCo ࠿ࡽࡢ㈨㔠㏉㑏

2

ㄢ⛯฼┈

2

ևᩘ್౛ 3 ᩘ್౛ 3 ࡢᶵ⬟ࡢෆヂࡣࠊ౛ 2 ࡢࡶࡢ࡜࡯ࡰྠࡌ࡛࠶ࡿࡀࠊᅗ⾲ 24 ࡟♧ࡍࡼ࠺࡟ࠊಙ⏝㛵㐃ᶵ⬟ࡀ␗࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡍ࡞ࢃࡕࠊPrima ࡜ SellCo ࡀඹ࡟ಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ᅗ⾲ 24 ᩘ್౛ 3 ࡢᶵ⬟ࡢෆヂ 144ಙ⏝㛵㐃ᶵ⬟z

Prima ࡣዎ⣙ୖࠊ㢳ᐈമᶒ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࢆ㈇ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

z

Prima ࡜ SellCo ࡢ୧᪉࡟ಙ⏝⟶⌮ࢳ࣮࣒ࡀᏑᅾࡍࡿࠋzಙ⏝ࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿ࠿ྰ࠿ࡢ┦ㄯࢆ⾜࠺ࠋPrima ࡜ SellCo ࡣᐃᮇⓗ࡟ពᛮỴᐃࢆ⾜࠸ࠊᩘ್౛ 3 ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠊPrima ࡜ SellCo ࡣ㛵㐃ࡍࡿ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿᶵ⬟ศᯒࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋᶵ⬟ࡢෆヂࡢ㏻ࡾࠊዎ⣙ୖࡢಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࡣ Prima ࡀ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥ 1.94 ࡛ࡣࠊࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࢆ⾜࠺ᙜ஦⪅ࡀ」ᩘᏑᅾࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆ๓ᥦ࡟ࠊࠕ㸦ࢫࢸࢵ
ࣉ 4 ࡢձ࡛ศᯒࡉࢀࡓ࡜࠾ࡾ㸧ࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅࡿ㛵㐃⪅ࡀࠊ͐ࣜࢫࢡࢆࢥࣥࢺ࣮ࣟࣝࡍ
ࡿሙྜࠊࢫࢸࢵࣉ 4 ࡢղࡢୗ࡟ṧࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ࡜ࡣࠊᙜヱ㛵㐃⪅ࡀࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅࡿࡓ
ࡵࡢ㈈ົ⬟ຊࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࠿࡝࠺࠿ࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡢ㛵㐃⪅ࡀࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷ

143
144

Id., para.55.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋId., para.69.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋ38（ 537 ）

ࡅࡿࡓࡵࡢ㈈ົ⬟ຊࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿሙྜࡣࠊ௚ࡢ㛵㐃⪅ࡶྠࡌࣜࢫࢡ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ࢥࣥࢺ࣮ࣟࣝ
ࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺஦ᐇࡀࠊ᭱ึ࡟㏙࡭ࡓ㛵㐃⪅ࡢࣜࢫࢡࡢᘬࡁཷࡅ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼ࡿࡇ࡜ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ
ࢫࢸࢵࣉ 5 ࢆ᳨ウࡍࡿᚲせࡣ࡞࠸ࠋࠖ࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 145ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࡣ Prima࡜ SellCo ࡀඹ࡟⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࠊዎ⣙ୖಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࢆ㈇ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ Prima ࡀࢫࢸࢵࣉ 4 ࡢձཬࡧ 4 ࡢղࢆ‶ࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊࢫࢸࢵࣉ 5 ࡣ᳨ウࡉࢀࡎࠊPrima ࡟ಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿࠋ
ࡓࡔࡋࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥ 1.105 ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠕࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿࢥࣥࢺ࣮ࣟࣝᶵ⬟࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊᖖ࡟ࠊ㐺ษ࡟ᑐ౯ࡀᨭᡶࢃࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ࠖ࡜ࡋࠊࠕᙜ஦⪅ࡀࠊࣜࢫࢡࡢࢥࣥࢺࣟ
࣮ࣝ࡟ࡣ㈉⊩ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡀࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅ࡚࠸࡞࠸≧ἣ࡛ࡣࠊᑐ౯ࡣ͐ࢥࣥࢺ࣮ࣟࣝࡢ㈉⊩ᗘ࡟ぢྜࡗࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࡇ࡜ࡀ㐺ษ࡛࠶ࡿࠖ࡜ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 146ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࡣ㈇ᢸࡋ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡀࠊಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ SellCo ࡟ࡣࠊࡑࡢ㈉⊩ᗘ࡟ᑐࡋ࡚ᡭ
ᩘᩱࡀᨭᡶࢃࢀࡿ 147ࠋPrima ཬࡧ SellCo ࡢᦆ┈࡜ㄢ⛯฼┈ࡢᩘ್ࡣ௨ୗࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 25㸧
ࠋSellCo ࡣࠊ㈍኎ᶵ⬟࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ㸦1200㸧ࡢ࡯࠿࡟ࠊಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ᶵ⬟࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㈉⊩ᗘ࡟ᛂࡌࡓࢧ࣮ࣅࢫᡭᩘᩱ㸦110㸧ࢆཷࡅ࡜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡽࡢ཰┈࠿ࡽಙ⏝⟶⌮ࢥࢫࢺ㸦100㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࡓ㸦1210㸧ࡀ SellCo ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈࡜࡞ࡿࠋPrima ࡣࠊಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡ࡟ᑐࡍࡿࣜࢱ࣮ࣥ
㸦5000㸧ࢆ඲㢠ཷࡅྲྀࡾࠊSellCo ࡟ᑐࡍࡿᡭᩘᩱ㸦1310㸧
ࠊಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ᶵ⬟ࡢ୍㒊㸦300㸧
ཬࡧ୙Ⰻമᶒ㸦2000㸧ࡢ඲㢠ࢆ᥍㝖ࡋࡓ㸦1390㸧ࡀㄢ⛯฼┈࡜࡞ࡿࠋOECD, supra note 104, para.1.94. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᅜ⛯ᗇ HPࠕOECDከᅜ⡠௻ᴗཬࡧ⛯ົᙜᒁࡢࡓࡵࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥ 2017 ᖺ∧ࠖhttps://www.nta.go.jp/taxes/shiraberu/kokusai/oecd/tp/2017.htm㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11
᭶ 11 ᪥㸧ࠋ
146 Id., para.1.105. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᅜ⛯ᗇ HP࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦145㸧ࠋ
147 OECD, supra note 115, para.72.
145

39（ 538 ）

ᅗ⾲ 25 ౛ 3 ࡢ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᩘ್౛ 148
Prima㸦A ᅜ㸧

SellCo㸦B ᅜ㸧
5000཰┈࡟ぢ㎸ࡲࢀࡿࣜࢫࢡࣜࢱ

ࢧ࣮ࣅࢫᡭᩘᩱ㸦㈝⏝ࣉࣛ110

ࢫ 10%㸧

࣮ࣥ㸦A㸧࢖ࣥࢭࣥࢸ࢕ࣈᡭᩘᩱ

1200

㸦40%[A-B]㸧
B ᅜࡢಙ⏝⟶⌮ࢥࢫࢺ‫ڹ‬300

SellCo ࡬ࡢᩱ㔠‫ڹ‬1310୙Ⰻമᶒ㸦B㸧‫ڹ‬2000

ㄢ⛯฼┈

1390

ಙ⏝⟶⌮ࢥࢫࢺ

‫ڹ‬100ㄢ⛯฼┈1210➨ 7 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿᶵ⬟ศᯒ࡛ࡣࠊPrima ࡟௦ࢃࡗ࡚ SellCo ࡀᘬࡁཷࡅࡿ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᑐࡍࡿࣜࢫࢡࡢᖐᒓ࡜㈨⏘ࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒࡀỴᐃࡉࢀࡿ 149ࠋ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿᶵ⬟ศᯒ࡛ࡣࠊPrima ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡓࡀࠊ➨ 7 ᮲࡛ࡣ SellCo ࡀಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊSellCo ࡟ಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡍࡿ 150ࠋࡓࡔࡋࠊ
Prima ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠊಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵ࡍࡿពᛮỴᐃࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆᯝࡓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡཬࡧമᶒࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒࡣ SellCo ࡔࡅ࡛࡞ࡃ Prima ࡟ࡶᖐᒓࡍ
ࡿ 151ࠋ
 Prima ཬࡧ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᦆ┈࡜ㄢ⛯฼┈ࡢᩘ್ࡣ௨ୗࡢࡼ࠺࡟࡞ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 26㸧ࠋࡇࡢᩘ್౛࡛ࡣࠊಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡཬࡧമᶒࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒࡢ㐺ษ࡞㓄ศࡣಙ⏝⟶⌮ࡢ㈉⊩ᗘ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚
ᐃࡉࢀࡿ࡜ࡋࠊࡑࡢ㈉⊩ᗘࡣ Prima㸸௦⌮ே PE㸻3㸸1 ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ 152ࠋࡑࡢ⤖ᯝࠊࣜࢫࢡࣜࢱ࣮ࣥ㸦5000㸧ࡣࠊPrima ࡀ㸦3750㸧
ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡀ㸦1250㸧
ࠋSellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ
㸦1310㸧ࡣࠊPrima ࡀ㸦982.5㸧ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡀ㸦327.5㸧ࠋമᶒࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒࠊࡘࡲࡾ୙
Ⰻമᶒ㸦2000㸧ࡣࠊPrima ࡀ㸦1500㸧
ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡀ㸦500㸧
ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊࡍ࡭࡚ 3㸸1 ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋB ᅜࡢಙ⏝⟶⌮ࢥࢫࢺ㸦㈝⏝㸧࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛ࠊSellCo ࠿ࡽ㸦100㸧᥍㝖ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚㈝⏝ࡢ᥍㝖ࡣ⾜ࢃ࡞࠸ࠋ௨ୖࡼ
ࡾࠊPrima ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࡣ㸦967.5㸧࡜࡞ࡾࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࡣ㸦422.5㸧࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸
ࡿࠋ

Id., para.74.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋId., para.79.
150 Id., para.80.
151 Id., para.81.
152 Id., para.81.
148
149

40

（ 539 ）

ᅗ⾲ 26 ౛ 3 ࡢ OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᩘ್౛ 153
Prima ᮏᗑ㸦A ᅜ㸧ࣜࢫࢡࣜࢱ࣮ࣥ㸦⥲ಙ⏝⟶⌮௦⌮ே PE㸦B ᅜ㸧
3750ࢥࢫࢺࡢ๭ྜ࡟ẚ౛ࡍࡿ㸧
Sellco ࡬ࡢᩱ㔠㸦1310 x 75%㸧1250ࢥࢫࢺࡢ๭ྜ࡟ẚ౛ࡍࡿ㸧‫ڹ‬982.5

B ᅜࡢಙ⏝⟶⌮ࢥࢫࢺ‫ڹ‬300୙Ⰻമᶒ㸦⥲ಙ⏝⟶⌮ࢥࢫࢺ‫ڹ‬1500ࡢ๭ྜ࡟ẚ౛ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸧ㄢ⛯฼┈ࣜࢫࢡࣜࢱ࣮ࣥ㸦⥲ಙ⏝⟶⌮Sellco ࡬ࡢᩱ㔠㸦1310 x 25%㸧‫ڹ‬327.5

୙Ⰻമᶒ㸦⥲ಙ⏝⟶⌮ࢥࢫࢺ‫ڹ‬500ࡢ๭ྜ࡟ẚ౛ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸧
967.5

ㄢ⛯฼┈

422.5

3㸫1㸫2 ᩘ್౛࡟ᑐࡍࡿ␲⩏➨ 1 ࡟ࠊࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ࡛ࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡬ࡢ฼┈ࡢ༢࡞ࡿᖐᒓ
ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊPrima ᮏᗑ࡜௦⌮ே PE 㛫ࡢ฼┈㓄ศࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ 154ࠋࡇࢀࡣࠊ
➨ 7 ᮲ 2 㡯࡟཯ࡍࡿࠋ➨ 7 ᮲ 2 㡯ࡣࠊ௻ᴗ඲యࡢ฼ᚓ⥲㢠ࢆ PE ཬࡧࡑࡢ௚ࡢ㒊㛛࡟㓄ศࡋࡼ࠺࡜࠸࠺ࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊPE ࡟ᖐࡏࡽࢀࡿ฼ᚓࢆࠊ࠶ࡓ࠿ࡶᙜヱ PE ࡀศ㞳ࡋࡓ௻ᴗ࡛࠶
ࠕ௻ᴗ඲యࡀᐇ
ࡿ࠿ࡢࡼ࠺࡟⟬ᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆせồࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 155ࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊᩘ್౛ 1~3 ࡛ࡣࠊ㝿࡟ᦆ┈≧ἣ࡟࠶ࡿ࠿࡝࠺࠿࡟࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼┈ཪࡣᦆኻࡢ㢠ࢆ⟬ᐃࡍࡿࠖࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚Ỵᐃࡉࢀࡓ Prima ᮏᗑࡢ฼┈ࢆࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛௦⌮ே PE ࡜㓄ศࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞฼┈㓄ศࡢ⪃࠼᪉ࡣࠊᪧ 7 ᮲࡟࠾ࡅࡿ㛵㐃஦ᴗ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡟ఝࡓࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ⊂❧௻ᴗཎ๎ࢆᚭᗏࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ AOA ࡟཯ࡍࡿࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
➨ 2 ࡟ࠊࣜࢫࢡࡀ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛㛵㐃⪅㸦SellCo㸧࡟ᖐᒓࡋࡓሙྜࠊࣜࢫࢡࡀ㔜」
ࡍࡿࡢࢆ㜵ࡄࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛ࡣ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿࣜࢫࢡࡣࡶࡣࡸ࡞ࡃࡍ࡭
ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ 156ࠋᩘ್౛ 2 ࡛ࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᶵ⬟ศᯒࡢࡶ࡜࡛ࠊᚑ๓࡟㛵㐃⪅㸦SellCo㸧࡟๭ࡾᙜ࡚ࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡓࣜࢫࢡࢆ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡉࡏ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢᚋࠊB ᅜෆࡢ 2 ࡘࡢ␗࡞ࡿㄢ⛯ᑐ㇟ᐇయ㸦௦⌮ே PE ཬࡧ SellCo㸧࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆ᭷ࡍࡿᙳ㡪ࢆ⦆࿴ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟࠿࠿ࡿࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵㐃ࡍࡿ㈝⏝ࡢᖐᒓࢆᣄྰࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡉࢀࡓ࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢẁ㝵࡛᥍㝖ࡉࢀࡿ㈝⏝㸦ᩘ್౛ 2 ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻࠊᅾᗜᦆኻࠊ಴ᗜಖ⟶㸧ࡀࢮࣟ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
ࡇࡢࡼ࠺࡞௙⤌ࡳࡣࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ 2 㡯ࡢつᐃ࡟཯ࡍࡿࠋ
3㸫2 2017 ᖺ࣭2018 ᖺࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ
 2016 ᖺ௨ᚋࠊ2017 ᖺࠊ2018 ᖺ࡟᪂ࡓ࡞ࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡀබ⾲ࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ

Id., para.81.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋ
Dinis, supra note 130, at 227.
155 OECD, supra note 36, Art.7, para.17. ᙜヱሗ࿌᭩ࡢ᪥ᮏㄒヂ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊᕝ➃࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦8㸧
153
154

129 㡫ࠋ
Dinis, supra note 130, at 225.

156

41

（ 540 ）

2018 ᖺࡢࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡀ᭱⤊࢞࢖ࢲࣥࢫ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ ᭱⤊࢞࢖ࢲࣥࢫ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶࠊ2016 ᖺࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ࡜ྠᵝ࡟ࠊ᪂ࡓ࡟ PE
࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡗࡓ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿᇶᮏⓗ࡞᪉㔪㸦ᚑ᮶ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ
⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࢆ᪂ࡓ࡟ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿ PE ࡟ࡶ㐺⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜㸧 157ࢆ☜ㄆࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢ࠺࠼࡛ࠊࢥ
࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡜㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗࡀ㛵㐃⪅࡛࠶ࡿሙྜ࡟ࠊOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7᮲ࡢ୧᪉ࡀࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ㄢ⛯ࡉࢀࡿ฼┈ࡢ⥲㢠ࡢỴᐃ࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆཬࡰࡍࡇ࡜࡟ゝཬࡋ
࡚࠸ࡿ 158ࠋ
 OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡜ࡑࡢࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮࡛ࣜࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ฼┈ㄪᩚ࡜➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ฼┈ࡢᖐᒓࡢ࡝ࡕࡽࡀඃඛࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࠿࡝࠺࠿ࡀ᫂☜࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ 159ࠋከࡃࡢᅜࡣࠊ
᭱ึ࡟➨ 9 ᮲ࢆ㐺⏝ࡋࠊ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡜௰௓ᴗ⪅࡜ࡢ㛫ࡢᐇ㝿ࡢྲྀᘬࢆṇ☜࡟ㄆ㆑ࡍࡿ୍
᪉࡛ࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢศᯒࢆ᭱ึ࡟⾜࠸ࠊࡑࡢᚋࠊ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡜௰௓ᴗ⪅ࡢ฼┈ࢆㄪᩚࡍ࡭ࡁ
࡜ࡍࡿᅜࡶᏑᅾࡍࡿ 160ࠋ࠸ࡎࢀ࡟ࡋ࡚ࡶࠊ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿ㡰␒࡟࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜࡀㄢ⛯ᶒࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ฼┈ࡢ㔠㢠࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚ࡣ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸࡜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ 161ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊྛᅜࡣࠊᅜ
ෆἲ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆ᤼㝖ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ᚲせ࡞ไᗘࢆᩚഛࡍࡿ
ࡇ࡜ࡀồࡵࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ 162ࠋࡲࡓࠊ2017 ᖺཬࡧ 2018 ᖺࡢࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡣࠊ
3㸫1㸫1 ࡜ྠᵝ࡟ࠊ㠀ᒃఫ⪅ࡀ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚㛵㐃⪅ࢆ᭷ࡋࠊࡑࡢ㛵㐃⪅ࡢάື࡟ࡼࡗ࡚
௦⌮ே PE ࡀᏑᅾࡍࡿ࡜ㄆࡵࡽࢀࡿሙྜ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ஦౛ࢆᣲࡆ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ2016 ᖺࡢࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ࡜␗࡞ࡾࠊᣲࡆࡽࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ஦౛ࡣᩘ್ࢆ⏝࠸ࡎᩥ❶࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ㄝ
᫂ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᴫᛕࡢㄝ᫂ࡔࡅ࡛ࡣ⤖ᯝࡀ᥎ ࡋ࡟ࡃ࠸࡜࠸࠺ពぢ 163ࡶ࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊᩘ್࡟
ࡼࡿㄝ᫂ࡀᚲせ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡿࠋ3㸫3 ᑠᣓ ᪂ࡓ࡟ PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡗࡓ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ୍⯡ཎ๎ࢆᐃࡵࡓࢹ
࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡀ 2016 ᖺ࡟ᥦฟࡉࢀࡓࠋ
ࡑࡇ࡛ࡣ 3 ࡘࡢᩘ್౛ࡀ♧ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
3 ࡘࡢᩘ್౛ࡣࡑࢀࡒࢀࠊዎ⣙ୖᘬࡁཷࡅࡽࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡ࡜ᐇ㝿ࡢࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮ࡢሙᡤࡀ␗࡞ࡗ
࡚࠾ࡾࠊࡑࢀ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡀ࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟㐺⏝ࡉࢀࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡀ࠸
ࡃࡽ࡟࡞ࡿࡢ࠿ࢆ♧ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡬ࡢ฼┈ࡢ༢࡞ࡿᖐᒓࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡜௦⌮ே PE 㛫ࡢ฼┈㓄

OECD, supra note 64, para.30.
Id., para.34.
159 Id., para.35.
160 Id., para.35.
161 Id., para.35.
162 Id., para.35.
157
158⤒ᅋ㐃 HPࠕBEPS ⾜ື 7PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㏣ຍ࢞࢖ࢲࣥࢫබ㛤ウ㆟ⲡ᱌࡟ᑐࡍࡿព
ぢࠖ
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2017/069.html
㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 11 ᪥㸧
ࠋ
163

42

（ 541 ）

ศࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ௻ᴗ඲యࡀᐇ㝿࡟ᦆ┈≧ἣ࡟࠶ࡿ࠿࡝࠺࠿࡟࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼┈ཪࡣᦆኻࡢ㢠ࢆ⟬ᐃࡍࡿ࡜࠸࠺➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ┠ⓗ࡟཯ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋࡲࡓࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚㛵㐃⪅࡟ㄆ㆑ࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡࡀࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚௦
⌮ே PE ࡟ࡶㄆ㆑ࡉࢀࡓሙྜࠊྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟㈝⏝ࡢ᥍㝖ࡀᣄྰࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࣜࢫࢡࡀ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡋࡓሙྜࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛ࡣྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆㄆ㆑ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛ࡣ࡞࠸ࠋ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ࠊྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫࢡ
ࢆㄆ㆑ࡋࡓᚋ࡟ࠊࡑࡢࣜࢫࢡ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㈝⏝ࡢ᥍㝖ࢆ⾜ࢃ࡞࠸ࡢࡣࠊ➨ 7 ᮲࡟཯ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡛
࠶ࡿࠋ
 2018 ᖺࡢ᭱⤊࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖࡛ࣥࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ࡝ࡕࡽࢆඛ⾜ࡋ࡚㐺⏝ࡍࡿ࡭ࡁ࠿᫂
ゝࡉࢀ࡚࠾ࡽࡎࠊ࡝ࡕࡽࢆඛ⾜ࡋ࡚㐺⏝ࡍࡿሙྜ࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶ※Ἠᆅᅜࡀㄢ⛯ᶒࢆ᭷ࡍࡿ฼
┈ࡢ㔠㢠࡟ᙳ㡪ࢆ୚࠼࡚ࡣ࡞ࡽ࡞࠸࡜㏙࡭࡚࠸ࡿࡢࡳ࡛࠶ࡿࠋࡲࡓࠊ஦౛࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊල
యⓗ࡞ᩘ್ࢆ⏝࠸ࡎࠊᴫᛕࡢࡳࡢㄝ᫂࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ
 ➨ 4 ᮲࡛ࡣࠊ➨ 2 ❶࡜➨ 3 ❶ࢆ㋃ࡲ࠼ࡓ࠺࠼࡛ࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚ᮃࡲࡋ࠸௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡢ᳨ウࢆ⾜࠺ࠋ➨ 4 ❶ ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡬ࡢᥦゝ4㸫1 㐺ṇ࡞௦⌮ே PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ ᶵ⬟ࡢෆヂࡣᩘ್౛ 1 ࡜࡯ࡰྠࡌ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ␗࡞ࡿⅬ࡜ࡋ࡚ࠊSellCo ࡣ㈍኎ᶵ⬟࡟ຍ࠼࡚ࣜࢫࢡ┘どᶵ⬟㸦㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟㸧ࢆᐇ⾜ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 27㸧ࠋࡲࡓࠊ⛯⋡ࡣࠊPrima ᡤᅾᆅᅜࡀ 50%ࠊSellCo ᡤᅾᆅᅜࡀ 30%࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ

43（ 542 ）

ᅗ⾲ 27 ᶵ⬟ࡢෆヂ 164
Prima

SellCoᅾᗜ㛵㐃ᶵ⬟zzᅾᗜࡀ㢳ᐈ࡟ᒆࡃࡲ࡛ᅾᗜࢆಖᣢࡍzᅾᗜࢆ಴ᗜ࡟ಖ⟶ࡋࠊ〇ရࡢᅾᗜࣞ࣋ࡿࠋࣝࢆ┘どࡍࡿ㈐௵ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡇࢀࡽࡢ┠SellCo ࡀᥦ౪ࡍࡿ㐌ሗ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚ࠊ㝞ⓗࡢࡓࡵ࡟ࠊSellCo ࡣࠊᅾᗜỈ‽ࠊᅾ⭉໬ࡢࣜࢫࢡ࡜ࢥࢫࢺࢆ᭱ᑠ㝈࡟ᢚ࠼ᗜ㝞⭉໬ࡢỈ‽࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㐌ሗࢆ Prima

࡞ࡀࡽࠊ㎿㏿࡟㢳ᐈࡢὀᩥࢆ‶ࡓࡍࡓ࡟ᥦ౪ࡍࡿࠋࡵ࡟〇ရࡢᅾᗜỈ‽ࢆỴᐃࡍࡿ㈐௵ࡀ࠶ࡿࠋಙ⏝㛵㐃ᶵ⬟z㢳ᐈ࡟ㄳồࡋࠊዎ⣙ୖࠊ㢳ᐈമᶒ࡟㛵zࡍࡿಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࢆ㈇࠺ࠋ
z㢳ᐈࡢಙ⏝ᗘࢆࣞࣅ࣮ࣗࡋࠊPrima ࡟ヲ⣽࡞࣏࣮ࣞࢺࢆᥦ౪ࡍࡿࠋ

SellCo ࡀసᡂࡋࡓ࣏࣮ࣞࢺ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚z㢳ᐈࡢಙ⏝ᗘࢆ☜ㄆࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡗ

Prima ࠿ࡽࡢヲ⣽࡞ᣦ♧ࢆཷࡅྲྀࡗࡓ
ሙྜࡢ㢳ᐈമᶒࡢᅇ཰ࢆᨭ᥼ࡍࡿࠋ

࡚ࠊB ᅜ࡛⾜ࢃࢀࡓ㢳ᐈ࡬ࡢࡍ࡭࡚ࡢ㈍኎ࢆᢎㄆࡍࡿࠋz㢳ᐈമᶒࡢᅇ཰ࢆᢅ࠺ࠋ

 ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿᶵ⬟ศᯒ࡛ࡣࠊዎ⣙ୖ Prima ࡀࣜࢫࢡࢆᘬࡁཷࡅ࡚࠸ࡿࠋSellCo ࡣࠊPrimaࡀࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮࡟㛵ࡍࡿពᛮỴᐃࢆ⾜࠺ࡓࡵࡢࣜࢫࢡ┘どᶵ⬟ཬࡧ㈍኎ᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ
ࡳ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ3㸫1㸫1 ࡢᩘ್౛ 1 ࡛ࡣࠊSellCo ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱࡣ㸦10㸧࡛࠶ࡗࡓࡀࠊࡇࡢ౛࡛
ࡣ㈍኎ᶵ⬟࡟ຍ࠼࡚ࣜࢫࢡ┘どᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱࡀ
㸦15㸧࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿ 165ࠋPrima ࡣྲྀᘬ࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ᚓࡓႠᴗ཰ධ㸦200㸧ࢆ඲㢠ཷࡅྲྀࡿࠋࡲࡓࠊࣜࢫࢡཬࡧ㈨⏘ࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ㈝⏝㸦ᗈ࿌㈝ࠊ୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻࠊᅾᗜᦆኻࠊ಴ᗜಖ⟶㸧ࡣࡍ࡭࡚ Prima࡟ᖐᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 28㸧ࠋ

164
165

Dinis, supra note 130, at 230.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋId., at 231.
44

（ 543 ）

ᅗ⾲ 28 OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᩘ್౛ 166
Prima㸦A ᅜ㸧

SellCo㸦B ᅜ㸧

Ⴀᴗ཰ධ

200

㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ

15

኎ୖཎ౯

‫ڹ‬40

኎ୖཎ౯

0

⢒฼┈

160

⢒฼┈

15

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝

‫ڹ‬8

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝
SellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ

‫ڹ‬15

SellCo ࡀ㈇࠺ᗈ࿌㈝ࡢᡶ࠸ᡠࡋ

‫ڹ‬7୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬4

ᅾᗜᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬3

಴ᗜಖ⟶

‫ڹ‬6

Ⴀᴗ฼┈

125

Ⴀᴗ฼┈

7

ㄢ⛯฼┈

125

ㄢ⛯฼┈

7

ἲேᡤᚓ⛯⋡ 50%

62.5

ἲேᡤᚓ⛯⋡ 30%

2.1

 Prima ࡢࣜࢫࢡ⟶⌮࡟㛵ࡍࡿពᛮỴᐃࡣࠊSellCo ࡢࣜࢫࢡ┘どᶵ⬟࡟኱ࡁࡃ౫Ꮡࡋ࡚࠸
ࡿࡓࡵࠊSellCo ࡣࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ࡜ࡳ࡞ࡉࢀࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ
௦⌮ே PE ࡣࠊᅾᗜࣜࢫࢡཬࡧಙ⏝ࣜࢫࢡࢆ㈇࠸ࠊമᶒࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒࢆ᭷ࡍࡿࡶࡢ࡜ࡍ
ࠋ
ࡿ 167ࠋࡇࡢ࡜ࡁࡢ Prima ཬࡧ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᦆ┈ࡢィ⟬ࢆ⾜࠺㸦ᅗ⾲ 29㸧
 2016 ᖺࡢࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ࡛ࡣࠊPrima ࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡢ฼┈㓄ศࢆ⾜࠺ࡼ࠺࡞ィ⟬ࡀ⾜ࢃࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࡢ౛࡛ࡣ฼┈㓄ศࢆ⾜ࢃࡎࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡾ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼┈ࡢࡳࢆồࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋᗈ࿌㈝㸦7㸧ࠊ୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻ㸦4㸧ࠊᅾᗜᦆኻ㸦3㸧ࠊ಴ᗜಖ⟶㸦6㸧➼ࡢ㈝⏝ࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛ Prima ࡢ㈝⏝࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵
࡛ SellCo ࡀࣜࢫࢡཬࡧമᶒࡢ⤒῭ⓗᡤ᭷ᶒ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚㔜せ࡞ேⓗᶵ⬟ࢆ᭷ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡓࡵࠊ௦
⌮ே PE ࡢ㈝⏝࡜ࡋ࡚᥍㝖ࡍࡿࠋࡲࡓࠊࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ࡛ࡣ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ኎ୖཎ౯ࡀ Prima ࡢႠᴗ཰ධ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡘࡲࡾࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ Prima ࡢㄢ⛯฼┈ࢆ⟬ฟࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡜࡞ࡿࠋ➨ 7 ᮲ࡀ┠ⓗ࡜ࡍࡿࡢࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࢆ⟬ᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡛࠶ࡿࡓࡵࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ኎ୖཎ౯ࢆ Prima ࡢႠᴗ཰ධ࡜ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡣࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ⠊ᅖࢆ㉸࠼࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ኎ୖཎ౯ࢆ Prima ࡢႠᴗ཰ධ࡜ࡣࡋ࡞࠸ࠋ
ࡇࡢ⤖ᯝࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢࡑࢀࡒࢀࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚஧㔜ㄢ⛯ཬࡧ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿྍ⬟ᛶࡀ࠶ࡿࠋձPrima ࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡢ㛫࡛཰┈ཬࡧ㈝⏝ࡢㄪᩚࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜
࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡜ղSellCo ࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡢ㛫࡛ྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆㄆ㆑ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡿ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡛࠶ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 30㸧ࠋձࡢ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣࠊA ᅜࡢ Prima ࡢ⛯㢠㸦62.5㸧
࠿ࡽ B ᅜࡢ௦⌮ே PE ࡢ⛯㢠㸦2.7㸧ࢆ᥍㝖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡿእᅜ⛯㢠᥍㝖ࡸᡤᚓච㝖᪉ᘧ࡟
166
167

Id., at 231.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋId., at 232.
45

（ 544 ）

ࡼࡗ࡚ᑐᛂࡀྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿ 168ࠋղࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ
࡛ࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚ SellCo ࡟ㄆ㆑ࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡࡀࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ࡼࡗ࡚௦⌮ேPE ࡟ࡶㄆ㆑ࡉࢀࠊྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫࢡ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆᅇ㑊ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟㈝⏝ࡢ᥍㝖ࡀᣄྰࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿࠋ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡟ࣜࢫࢡࡀᖐᒓࡉࢀࡓ࡟ࡶ࠿࠿ࢃࡽࡎࠊ
௦⌮ே PE ࡢ㈝⏝ࡢ᥍㝖ࡀㄆࡵࡽࢀ࡞࠸ࡢࡣࠊ➨ 7 ᮲࡟཯ࡍࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡋࡓࣜࢫࢡࡣࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚ㄆ㆑ࡋ࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࡛⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡟ᑐᛂࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿ 169
ᅗ⾲ 29 OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃᩘ್౛ 170
Prima㸦A ᅜ㸧௦⌮ே PE㸦B ᅜ㸧

Ⴀᴗ཰ධ

200

Ⴀᴗ཰ධ

200

኎ୖཎ౯

‫ڹ‬40

኎ୖཎ౯

‫ڹ‬156

⢒฼┈

160

⢒฼┈

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝

44

Ⴀᴗ⤒㈝

SellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ

‫ڹ‬15

SellCo ࡬ࡢ㈍኎ᡭᩘᩱ

‫ڹ‬15

SellCo ࡀ㈇࠺ᗈ࿌㈝ࡢᡶ࠸ᡠࡋ

‫ڹ‬7

SellCo ࡀ㈇࠺ᗈ࿌㈝ࡢᡶ࠸ᡠ

‫ڹ‬7ࡋ୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬4୙Ⰻമᶒࡢᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬4

ᅾᗜᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬3

ᅾᗜᦆኻ

‫ڹ‬3

಴ᗜಖ⟶

‫ڹ‬6

಴ᗜಖ⟶

‫ڹ‬6

Ⴀᴗ฼┈

125

Ⴀᴗ฼┈

9

ㄢ⛯฼┈

125

ㄢ⛯฼┈

9

ἲேᡤᚓ⛯⋡ 50%

62.5

ἲேᡤᚓ⛯⋡ 30%

B ᅜ࡛ᨭᡶࢃࢀࡓ⛯㔠ࡢ᥍㝖

2.7

A ᅜࡢᡤᚓ⛯59.8

Id., at 233.
Id., at 233.
170 Id., at 232.ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋ
168
169

46

（ 545 ）

2.7

ᅗ⾲ 30 ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ཬࡧ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡢㄪᩚ⟠ᡤ
R ᅜ                 S ᅜղ㛵㐃⪅ 2.1㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ 62.5ᚑᒓ௦⌮ே PE 2.7ձ

4㸫2 ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡬ࡢᥦゝ ᡃࡀᅜࡣࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢᮍ⥾⤖ᅜࠊᪧ 7 ᮲ࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ⛒⛯᮲⣙㸦௨ୗࠕᚑ᮶ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࠖ㸧ࡢ⥾⤖ᅜࠊ᪂ 7 ᮲ࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ⛒⛯᮲⣙㸦௨ୗࠕ᪂ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࠖ㸧ࡢ⥾⤖ᅜ࡜
ࡢ㛫࡛ࠊPE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡣࠊᅗ⾲ 31 ࡢࡼ࠺࡟ 3 ࡘ࡟ศ㢮࡛ࡁࡿࠋ1 ࡘ┠ࡢ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢᮍ⥾⤖ᅜ࡜ࡢ㛫࡛ࡣࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡀᏑᅾࡋ࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊᙜ↛࡞ࡀࡽᅜෆ⛯ἲ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋ2 ࡘ┠ࡢᚑ᮶ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢ⥾⤖ᅜ࡜ࡢ㛫࡛ࡣࠊᅜෆ⛯ἲ࡜ᚑ᮶ᆺ
⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡀᏑᅾࡍࡿࡀࠊࡑࢀࡒࢀࡢつᐃࡀ␗࡞ࡿሙྜࠊᅜෆ⛯ἲ࡜␗࡞ࡿᐃࡵࢆࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ
⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢᐃࡵࡀ┤᥋㐺⏝ྍ⬟࡞ሙྜ࡟㝈ࡾࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡀඃඛࡉࢀࡿ 171ࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊᚑ
᮶ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋ3 ࡘ┠ࡢ᪂ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢ⥾⤖ᅜ࡜ࡢ㛫࡛ࡶᅜෆ⛯ἲ࡟ඃඛࡋ࡚ࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡀඃඛࡉࢀࡿࡓࡵࠊ᪂ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡀ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁ PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃࡀ⾜ࢃࢀࡿࠋࡇࡢෆࠊᮏ✏࡟࠾࠸࡚ᥦゝࢆ⾜࠺ࡢࡣࠊ3 ࡘ┠ࡢ AOA ࡟‽ᣐࡋࡓ᪂ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟ᑐࡋ࡚࡛࠶ࡿࠋ⌧ᅾࠊᡃࡀᅜ࡜ࡢ㛫࡛᪂ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿᅜࡣࠊ࢖ࢠࣜࢫࢆጞࡵ࡜ࡋࡓ
10 ࢝ᅜ࡛࠶ࡿ㸦ᅗ⾲ 32㸧ࠋᮏ✏ᇳ➹㏵୰࡟࠾࠸࡚ࡶ᪂ࡓ࡟᪂ 7 ᮲ࢆᑟධࡋࡓ᪂ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢ⥾⤖ཬࡧᨵṇࡀ⾜ࢃࢀ࡚࠾ࡾࠊ௒ᚋࡶቑຍࡋ࡚࠸ࡃ࡜⪃࠼ࡽࢀࡿࠋ
᪂ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟࠾࠸࡚ၥ㢟࡜࡞ࡿࡢࡣࠊ㠀ᒃఫ⪅ࡀ※Ἠᆅᅜ࡟࠾࠸࡚㛵㐃⪅࠿ࡘᚑᒓ௦
⌮ே PE ࡜࡞ࡿᐇయࢆ᭷ࡍࡿሙྜ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࢆࡑࢀࡒࢀ㐺⏝ࡋࡓሙྜࠊձ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡢ㛫࡛཰┈ཬࡧ㈝⏝ࡢㄪᩚࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡜ղ㛵㐃⪅࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡢ㛫࡛ྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆㄆ㆑ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡿ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࠋᒃఫᆅᅜഃ࡛ࡣձࡢ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࠋᒃఫᆅᅜࡣࠊ௦⌮ே PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࠊᡤᚓච㝖᪉ᘧཪࡣእᅜ⛯㢠᥍㝖ࢆ฼⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡗ࡚஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆ᤼㝖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿࠋ※Ἠᆅᅜഃࡣࠊղࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࠋ※ἨᆅᅜࡣࠊPE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࢆồࡵࡿ㝿࡟ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ࡼࡗ࡚㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡋࡓࣜࢫࢡࡀ࠶ࡿሙྜࠊྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫࢡࡢㄆ㆑ࢆ㑊ࡅࡿᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵ࡟ࡣࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡟ࡼࡾ㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࣜࢫࢡࢆ࠶ࡽ࠿ࡌࡵᢕᥱࡋ࡚࠾ࡃᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࢆඃඛ171

㔠Ꮚ࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦49㸧107 㡫ࠋ
47（ 546 ）

ࡋ࡚㐺⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ 172ࠋ
 3㸫2 ࡛㏙࡭ࡓࡼ࠺࡟ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ฼┈ㄪᩚ࡜➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ฼┈ࡢᖐᒓࡢ࡝ࡕࡽࡀ
ඃඛࡉࢀࡿ࡭ࡁ࠿࡝࠺࠿᫂☜࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡓࡵࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊօ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ࡼࡿศ
ᯒࢆඃඛࡋࠊֆ➨ 9 ᮲࡟࠾࠸࡚ㄆ㆑ࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡࢆ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡛ㄆ㆑ࡋ࡞࠸࡜ࡍࡿつᐃࢆᑟධࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ
ᅗ⾲ 31 PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲࡢ 3 ศ㢮 173┦ᡭᅜ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢᮍ⥾⤖ᅜᚑ᮶ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢ⥾⤖ᅜ᪂ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢ⥾⤖ᅜ

㐺⏝ἲ௧

ᅜෆ⛯ἲ

ᚑ᮶ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙᪂ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙

㸦ᅜෆ⛯ἲ࡟ඃඛ㸧㸦ᅜෆ⛯ἲ࡟ඃඛ㸧ᖐᒓ୺⩏

AOA ࡟‽ᣐPE ᖐᒓᡤᚓAOA ࡟‽ᣐࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ㸦ෆ㒊ྲྀᘬࡢ㠀ㄢ⛯➼㸧ᅗ⾲ 32 ᡃࡀᅜ࡜ࡢ㛫࡛᪂ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࢆ⥾⤖ࡋࡓᅜ
⨫ྡᖺᗘ

ᅜྡ

᮲ᩥ

2014 ᖺ

࢖ࢠࣜࢫ᪥ⱥ⛒⛯᮲⣙ 7 ᮲2015 ᖺ

ࢻ࢖ࢶ᪥⊂⛒⛯᮲⣙ 7 ᮲

2016 ᖺ

࣋ࣝࢠ࣮᪥ⓑ⛒⛯᮲⣙ 7 ᮲

2016 ᖺ

ࢫࣟ࣋ࢽ࢔᪥᪁⛒⛯᮲⣙ 7 ᮲

2017 ᖺ

࢚ࢫࢺࢽ࢔᪥ឡ⛒⛯᮲⣙ 7 ᮲

2017 ᖺ

ࢹ࣐࣮ࣥࢡ᪥୹⛒⛯᮲⣙ 7 ᮲

2018 ᖺ

࢔࢖ࢫࣛࣥࢻ

᪥ị⛒⛯᮲⣙ 7 ᮲

2018 ᖺࢫ࣌࢖ࣥ᪥す⛒⛯᮲⣙ 7 ᮲

2018 ᖺ

ࢡࣟ࢔ࢳ࢔᪥ඞ⛒⛯᮲⣙ 7 ᮲

2018 ᖺ

ࢥࣟࣥࣅ࢔᪥ဪ⛒⛯᮲⣙ 7 ᮲⤊❶ ⤊ࢃࡾ࡟ ᮏ✏࡛ࡣࠊ᪂ࡓ࡟௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ࡢᙧែࢆ࡜ࡿᏊ఍♫ࡀࠊ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿ㛵㐃⪅࡜࡞ࡿሙྜࠊ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟࠾ࡅࡿ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡀ࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡟㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡿࡢ࠿࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ㄽࡌࡓࠋ➨ 2 ❶࡛ࡣࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝᪉ἲ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ 2 ࡘࡢ࢔ࣉ࣮ࣟࢳ࡛࠶ࡿ single taxpayer approach ཬࡧ dual taxpayer approach ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠊࣜࢫࢡ
ศᯒࡢ┦㐪࠿ࡽ dual taxpayer approach ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸ࡇ࡜ࢆ♧ࡋࡓࠋ➨ 3 ❶࡛ࡣࠊdual
taxpayer approach ࢆ⏝࠸ࡓࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺࡢᩘ್౛ࢆ᳨ウࡋࡓࠋࢹ࢕ࢫ࢝ࢵ

172
173

Dinis, supra note 130, at 233. ⤒ᅋ㐃 HP࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦163㸧ࠋ஭ୖ㸻௰㇂࣭๓ᥖὀ㸦79㸧118 㡫ࢆཧ⪃࡟➹⪅సᡂࠋ48（ 547 ）

ࢩ࣭ࣙࣥࢻࣛࣇࢺ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ➨ 7 ᮲ࡣࠊ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡜ࡢ฼┈㓄ศࢆ⾜࠺ࡶࡢ࡛࠶ࡾࠊ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗࡢㄢ⛯ᶒࢆไ㝈ࡍࡿࡓࡵࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢᙺ๭ࢆ㉸࠼ࡓࡶࡢ࡜࡞ࡗ࡚࠸ࡿࡇ
࡜ࢆ♧ࡋࡓࠋ
 ➨ 7 ᮲㸦AOA㸧ࡢ┠ⓗࡣࠊ௻ᴗ඲యࡢ⥲฼ᚓࢆ PE ࡜ࡑࡢ௚ࡢᵓᡂ㒊ศ࡜࡟㓄ศࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࢆồࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࡛ࡣ࡞ࡃࠊPE ࡀูಶࡢ௻ᴗ࡛࠶ࡿ࡜௬ᐃࡋ࡚฼ᚓࡢᖐᒓࢆỴᐃࡍࡿࡇ࡜
ࢆồࡵ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡇࡢཎ๎࡟ᇶ࡙ࡁ➨ 9 ᮲࡜➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ࢆ⪃࠼ࡓሙྜࠊ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ཬࡧ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࠋձ㠀ᒃఫ⪅௻ᴗ࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡢ㛫࡛཰┈ཬࡧ㈝⏝ࡢㄪᩚࢆ⾜ࡗ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࡇ࡜࠿ࡽ⏕ࡌࡿ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡜ղ㛵㐃⪅࡜௦⌮ே PE ࡢ㛫࡛ྠ୍ࡢࣜࢫࢡࢆㄆ㆑ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡿ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯࡛࠶ࡿࠋᒃఫᆅᅜഃ࡛ࡣձࡢ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࠋᒃఫᆅᅜࡣࠊ௦⌮ேPE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࠊᡤᚓච㝖᪉ᘧཪࡣእᅜ⛯㢠᥍㝖ࢆ฼⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜࡟ࡼࡗ࡚஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆ᤼㝖ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀྍ⬟࡛࠶ࡿࠋ※Ἠᆅᅜഃ࡛ࡣࠊղࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࡀ⏕ࡌࡿࠋ※Ἠᆅᅜഃࡣࠊࡇࡢ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯ࢆ᤼㝖ࡍࡿࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫ
ࢡࡣ➨ 7 ᮲࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ௦⌮ே PE ࡢẁ㝵࡛ㄆ㆑ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࡞࠸ࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵ࡟ࡣࠊ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࡢࣜࢫࢡศᯒ࡟ࡼࡾ㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࣜࢫࢡࢆ࠶ࡽ࠿ࡌࡵᢕᥱ
ࡋ࡚࠾ࡃᚲせࡀ࠶ࡿࠋࡋࡓࡀࡗ࡚ࠊ➨ 9 ᮲ࢆඃඛࡋ࡚㐺⏝ࡍࡿࡇ࡜ࡀᮃࡲࡋ࠸࡜࠸࠼ࡿࠋ ௨ୖࡼࡾࠊ᪂ࡓ࡟௦⌮ே PE ࡜ㄆᐃࡉࢀࡿࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔ࡀࠊ㛵㐃⪅࡜࡞ࡿሙྜࡢᮃࡲࡋ
࠸ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡛ࡣࠊօ➨ 9 ᮲ࢆඃඛ㐺⏝ࡋࠊֆ⤒῭ⓗ஧㔜ㄢ⛯᤼㝖ࡢࡓࡵ࡟ࠊ➨ 9᮲࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚㛵㐃⪅࡟ᖐᒓࡉࢀࡓࣜࢫࢡࡣ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ẁ㝵࡟࠾࠸࡚ㄆ㆑ࡋ࡞࠸࡜ࡍ࡭ࡁ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ ᮏ✏࡛ࡣࠊPE ᖐᒓᡤᚓࡢ⟬ᐃ᪉ἲ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࠊAOA ࡟ᇶ࡙ࡃ➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ㐺⏝ࢆ๓ᥦ࡜ࡋ࡚
㆟ㄽࢆ㐍ࡵ࡚ࡁࡓࠋࡑࡢࡓࡵࠊᅜෆ⛯ἲཬࡧᚑ᮶ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡀ㐺⏝ࡉࢀࡓሙྜ࡟㛵ࡋ࡚ࡣㄽࡌࡽࢀ࡚࠸࡞࠸ࠋᅜෆ⛯ἲཬࡧᚑ᮶ᆺ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡬ࡢ♧၀࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࡣ௒ᚋࡢㄢ㢟࡜ࡋࡓ࠸ࠋ

49（ 548 ）

࠙ཧ⪃ᩥ⊩ࠚ࿴ᩥ⊩ࠓ᭩⡠ࠔ࣭஭ୖᗣ୍㸻௰㇂ᰤ୍㑻ࠗ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡜ᅜෆ⛯ἲࡢ஺㘒࠘㸦ၟ஦ἲົࠊ2007㸧
࣭EY ⛯⌮ኈἲே⦅ࠗヲゎ ᪂ࡋ࠸ᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ࡢᯟ⤌ࡳ㸦BEPS㸧ࡢᑟධ࡜ྛᅜࡢ⛯ไᑐᛂ̿௻ᴗ࡬ࡢᙳ㡪࡜␃ពⅬ̿࠘㸦➨୍ἲつᰴᘧ఍♫ࠊ2017㸧
࣭኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍⦅ࠗᨵṇ⛯ἲࡢࡍ࡭࡚࠙ᖹᡂ 26 ᖺᗘࠚ࠘㸦኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍ࠊ2014㸧
࣭኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍⦅ࠗᨵṇ⛯ἲࡢࡍ࡭࡚࠙ᖹᡂ 30 ᖺᗘࠚ࠘㸦኱ⶶ㈈ົ༠఍ࠊ2018㸧࣭㔠Ꮚᏹ┘ಟࠗ⌧௦⛒⛯ἲㅮᗙ➨ 4 ᕳ࠘㸦᪥ᮏホㄽ♫ࠊ2017㸧࣭㔠Ꮚᏹࠗ⛒⛯ἲ࠙➨஧༑஧∧ࠚ࠘㸦ᘯᩥᇽࠊ2017㸧࣭ᕝ⏣๛㸻ᚨỌ໷ᏊࠗOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ㏲᮲ゎㄝ࠙2014ࠚ࠘㸦⛯ົ◊✲఍
ฟ∧ᒁࠊ➨ 3 ∧ࠊ2015㸧࣭ᕝ⏣๛㸻ᚨỌ໷ᏊࠗOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࢥ࣓ࣥࢱ࣮ࣜ㏲᮲ゎㄝ࠙2017ࠚ࠘㸦⛯ົ◊✲఍
ฟ∧ᒁࠊ➨ 4 ∧ࠊ2018㸧࣭ᕝ➃ᗣஅࠗOECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ 2010 ᖺ∧㸦ᡤᚓ࡜㈈⏘࡟ᑐࡍࡿࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙㸧࠘㸦᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍ࠊ2011㸧࣭ᮾிඹྠ఍ィ஦ົᡤ⦅ࠗPE㸦ᜏஂⓗ᪋タ㸧ㄢ⛯ࡢᐇົ࠘㸦୰ኸ⤒῭♫ࠊ2016㸧࣭୰㔛ᐇ࡯࠿ࠗ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢࣇࣟࣥࢸ࢕࢔࠘
㸦᭷ᩫ㛶ࠊ2011㸧࣭୰㔛ᐇ࡯࠿⦅ࠗBEPS ࡜ࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ⤒῭άື࠘㸦᭷ᩫ㛶ࠊ2017㸧࣭᪥ᮏ⛯⌮ኈ఍㐃ྜ఍┘ಟࠗᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ࡢ⌮ㄽ࡜ᐇົ࠙➨ 5 ᕳࠚ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࠘㸦⛯ົ⤒⌮༠
఍ࠊ2010㸧࣭᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍ࠗᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࡬ࡢ฼ᚓᖐᒓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿሗ࿌᭩࠘
㸦᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍ࠊ2010ᖺ㸧࣭᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲༠఍ࠗ⛯※ᾐ㣗࡜฼┈⛣㌿㸦BEPS㸧⾜ືィ⏬࠘㸦᪥ᮏ⛒⛯◊✲఍ࠊ2013㸧࣭ቑ஭Ⰻၨ࣭ᐑᓮ⿱Ꮚࠗᅜ㝿⛒⛯ἲ࠙➨ 3 ∧ࠚ࠘㸦ᮾி኱Ꮫฟ∧఍ࠊ2015㸧࣭Ỉ㔝ᛅᜏࠗࢸ࢟ࢫࢺࣈࢵࢡ⛒⛯ἲ࠘㸦୰ኸ⤒῭♫ࠊ2016㸧ࠓ㞧ㄅㄽᩥࠔ
࣭㟷ᒣ៞஧ࠕOECD ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᜏஂⓗ᪋タ㸦PE㸧ࡢᖐᒓ฼┈ࡢ⟬ᐃ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㆟ㄽࠖ⛒⛯◊✲678 ྕ㸦2006㸧࣭ὸጔ❶ዴࠕPE ࢆࡵࡄࡿㄢ⛯ၥ㢟ࠖ⛒⛯ἲ◊✲ 36 ྕ㸦2008㸧࣭ὸጔ❶ዴࠕ඲ᡤᚓ୺⩏㸦⥲ྜ୺⩏㸧࠿ࡽᖐᒓᡤᚓ୺⩏㸦ᖐᒓ୺⩏㸧࡬ࡢ⛣⾜ࢆᕠࡿ⫼ᬒࠖ⛯኱ࢪ࣮ࣕࢼࣝ 20 ྕ㸦2013㸧࣭ὸጔ❶ዴࠕBEPS Action7 ࡟࠾ࡅࡿ PE ࡢᐃ⩏࡜ PE ࡢᖐᒓ฼ᚓ㸸≉࡟ single taxpayer
approach vs. double taxpayer approach ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠖ21 ୡ⣖ᨻ⟇◊✲ᡤࠗࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ᫬௦࡟
࠾ࡅࡿ᪂ࡓ࡞ᅜ㝿⛒⛯ไᗘࡢ࠶ࡾ᪉࠘㸦2017㸧
50（ 549 ）

࣭ᒃἼ㑥Ὀࠕ࢔ࢻࣅ஦᱌࡟ಀࡿᅜ㝿ⓗ஦ᴗ෌⦅ࡢほⅬ࠿ࡽࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁ㄢ⛯ࡢ᳨ウ㸦ୖ㸧ࠖ⛯኱ࢪ࣮ࣕࢼࣝ 14 ྕ㸦2010㸧࣭ᒃἼ㑥ὈࠕBEPS ࡟ࡼࡿᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ไᗘୗ࡛ࡢ❧ド㈐௵࡟ᑐࡍࡿ୍⪃ᐹࠖ⛯኱ㄽྀ 87 ྕ
㸦2016㸧
࣭஭ୖᗣ୍㸻௰㇂ᰤ୍㑻ࠕ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡜ AOA ໬ᚋࡢᅜෆ⛯ἲࡢ஺㘒ࠑୗࠒ㹼PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ
ᡤᚓࡢ⟬ᐃࢆࡵࡄࡾ㹼ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 33 ᕳ 10 ྕ㸦2013㸧࣭௒ᓮுᏊࠕ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไ࠿ࠊPE ㄢ⛯࠿ࠖ➨ 29 ᅇࠕ᪥⛯◊✲㈹ࠖධ㑅ㄽᩥ㞟㸦2006㸧࣭༨㒊⿱඾ࠕ⛒⛯᮲⣙࡟࠾ࡅࡿࠗᜏஂⓗ᪋タ࠘ᴫᛕࡢᶵ⬟࡜㝈⏺ࠖ⥲ྜ⛯ไ◊✲ 1 ྕ㸦1992㸧
࣭኱⏣ὒ㸻ᡭሯᓫྐࠕ࢔ࢻࣅࢩࢫࢸ࣒ࢬ஦௳ᮾி㧗⿢ุỴࠖ୰㔛ᐇ࡯࠿ࠗ⛣㌿౯᱁⛯ไࡢࣇࣟࣥࢸ࢕࢔࠘
㸦᭷ᩫ㛶ࠊ2011㸧࣭ᒸ⏣⮳ᗣ㸻Ⲩ஭ඃ⨾Ꮚࠕ2019ᖺ 1᭶ 1᪥Ⓨ⾜ࡢࠗᅜ㝿⛯ົᇶ‽࠘࡜ࡣMLIࡢᴫせࠖ⛯
ົᘯሗ67ᕳ 2ྕ㸦2019㸧࣭ຍ⸨ோஂࠕ⛯※౵㣗ཬࡧ฼┈⛣㌿ࢆ㜵Ṇࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢ⛒⛯᮲⣙㛵㐃ᥐ⨨ࢆᐇ᪋ࡍࡿࡓࡵࡢ
ከᩘᅜ㛫᮲⣙ࡢ⥾⤖ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ38ᕳ 11ྕ㸦2018㸧࣭ᕝ⏣๛ࠕࣇࣛࣥࢫᡤᅾࡢ㈍኎Ꮚ఍♫㸦ࡢࢥ࣑ࢵࢩࣙࢿ࢔࡜ࡋ࡚ࡢᶵ⬟㸧ࡀ௦⌮ே PE࡟ヱᙜࡋ࡞࠸࡜ࡉࢀࡓ஦౛ࠖ⛯ົ஦౛48ᕳ 8ྕ㸦2016㸧࣭ᕝ⏣๛ࠕᖹᡂ 30ᖺᗘ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᅜ㝿ㄢ⛯ศ㔝ࡢᨵṇぢ㎸஦㡯ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 38ᕳ 2ྕ㸦2018㸧࣭໭ᮧᑟேࠕᜏஂⓗ᪋タㄢ⛯ࢆᕠࡿ⌧௦ⓗㅖၥ㢟ࠖ㔠Ꮚᏹ┘ಟࠗ⌧௦⛒⛯ἲㅮᗙ➨ 4ᕳ࠘㸦᪥ᮏホㄽ♫ࠊ2017㸧࣭㥖ᐑྐ༤ࠕOECDࡢBEPS㜵Ṇᥐ⨨ᐇ᪋᮲⣙(MLI)࡜EU⛒⛯ᅇ㑊㜵Ṇᣦ௧ࠖ⛒⛯◊✲828ྕ㸦2018㸧࣭㥖ᐑྐ༤ࠕእᅜἲேࡢ஦ᴗᡤᚓㄢ⛯࡟࠾ࡅࡿᅜෆἲ࡜⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢ㛵ಀ࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠖ⛯◊ 190
ྕ㸦2016㸧࣭≉㞟ࠕᜏஂⓗ᪋タ㛵㐃つᐃࡢぢ┤ࡋࠖ⛯⤒㏻ಙ 73ᕳ 3ྕ㸦2018㸧࣭≉㞟ࠕBEPS᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩࡟ࡳࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢ᪂ࡓ࡞どⅬ࡜ࣜࢫࢡ࣭཰┈㓄ศࡢࡋ࠿ࡓࠖ᪪ห
⤒⌮᝟ሗ 1444ྕ㸦2016㸧࣭୰⃝ᘯ἞ࠕBEPS㜵Ṇᥐ⨨ᐇ᪋᮲⣙࡟ࡘ࠸࡚ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 38ᕳ 5ྕ㸦2018㸧࣭㔝⏣ᫀẎࠕ⾜ື7㸸ேⅭⓗ࡞ PEᅇ㑊ࡢ㜵Ṇࠖ୰㔛ᐇ࡯࠿⦅ࠗBEPS࡜ࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ⤒῭άື࠘㸦᭷ᩫ㛶ࠊ2017㸧࣭కᛅᙪࠕAOAࡢᑟධ࡜ேⓗᙺົࡢ PEㄆᐃࠖ⛒⛯◊✲ 736ྕ㸦2011㸧࣭కᛅᙪࠕOECDࣔࢹࣝ᮲⣙᪂ 7᮲࡜እᅜ⛯㢠᥍㝖ࡢไᗘ࣭ᇳ⾜ࡢぢ┤ࡋࠖ⛯኱ࢪ࣮ࣕࢼ
ࣝ 16 ྕ㸦2011㸧࣭కᛅᙪࠕᜏஂⓗ᪋タࡢ⠊ᅖ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⪃ᐹ̿AOA ࡢᑟධ࡜ேⓗᙺົ࡟ಀࡿ PE ㄆᐃ̿ࠖ⛯኱ㄽྀ 67 ྕ㸦2010㸧࣭⸨ᯞ⣧ࠕ⊂❧௻ᴗ㛫౯᱁ࡢព⩏̿࢔ࢻࣅ஦௳ࠖ⛒⛯ุ౛ⓒ㑅➨ 5 ∧㸦2011㸧࣭⸨㇂Ṋྐࠕ⛒⛯ἲ࡟࠾ࡅࡿᅜ㝿ⓗつ⠊ᙧᡂ࡜ᅜෆἲ̿OECD ࣔࢹࣝ⛒⛯᮲⣙ࡢつ⠊ᛶࢆ୰ᚰ࡟ࠖἲᚊ᫬ሗ 84 ᕳ 10 ྕ㸦2012㸧51（ 550 ）

࣭ᮏᗉ㈨ࠕ
㸦௬ヂ㸧ᜏஂⓗ᪋タㄆᐃࡢேⅭⓗᅇ㑊ࡢ㜵Ṇ ⾜ື 7̿2015 ᖺ᭱⤊ሗ࿌᭩ࠖ⛒⛯◊✲ 808 ྕ㸦2017㸧࣭ቑ஭Ⰻၨࠕ➨ 60 ᅇ IFA ኱఍ࡢሗ࿌̿PE ࡟ᖐᒓࡍࡿ฼ᚓࢆ୰ᚰ࡜ࡋ࡚̿ࠖ⛒⛯◊✲ 688
ྕ㸦2007㸧࣭ᯇୗ⁠᫓ࠕ௦⌮ே PE ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ⪃ᐹࠖ⛯኱ㄽྀ 45 ྕ㸦2004㸧࣭ᐑṊᩄኵࠕOECD ࣔࢹࣝ᮲⣙➨ 7 ᮲ࡢ 2010 ᖺᨵṇࠖ⛒⛯◊✲ 736 ྕ㸦2011㸧࣭ᮧ⏣ᏲᘯࠕOECD ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥྲྀᘬ෌⦅࡟ಀࡿ⛣㌿౯᱁ࡢഃ㠃࡟ࡘ࠸࡚̿ࣜࢫ
ࢡࡢྲྀᢅ࠸ࠖᅜ㝿⛯ົ 31 ᕳ 6 ྕ㸦2011㸧࣭ᒣᕝ༤ᶞ࡯࠿ࠕ௻ᴗࡢ BEPS ᑐᛂࢆㄒࡾࡘࡃࡍ࠙ᚋࠚ
ࠖ⛯ົᘯሗ 68 ᕳ 11 ྕ㸦2016㸧ࠓุỴࠔ࣭ᮾிᆅ⿢ᖹᡂ 19 ᖺ 12 ᭶ 7 ᪥㸦ゴົ᭶ሗ 54 ᕳ 8 ྕ 1652 㡫㸧࣭ᮾி㧗⿢ᖹᡂ 20 ᖺ 10 ᭶ 30 ᪥㸦⛯ົッゴ㈨ᩱ㸦250 ྕ㹼㸧258 ྕ 11061 㡰ྕ㸧ὒᩥ⊩ࠓ㞧ㄅㄽᩥࠔ
࣭OECD, Report on the Attribution of Profit to Permanent Establishments, 2008.
࣭OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Art.5, 2010.
࣭OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital Commentary on Art.5, 2010.
࣭OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 2013.
࣭OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 2013.
࣭OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Art.5, 2014.
࣭OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital Commentary on Art.5, 2014.
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࣮࣒࣮࣍࣌ࢪ
࣭⤒ᅋ㐃 HPࠕBEPS ⾜ື 7PE ᖐᒓ฼ᚓ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㏣ຍ࢞࢖ࢲࣥࢫබ㛤ウ㆟ⲡ᱌࡟ᑐࡍࡿព
ぢࠖ
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/policy/2017/069.html
㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 11 ᪥㸧࣭ᅜ⛯ᗇ HPࠕOECD ከᅜ⡠௻ᴗཬࡧ⛯ົᙜᒁࡢࡓࡵࡢ⛣㌿౯᱁࢞࢖ࢻࣛ࢖ࣥ 2017 ᖺ∧ࠖhttps://www.nta.go.jp/taxes/shiraberu/kokusai/oecd/tp/2017.htm
㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 11 ᪥㸧࣭ ⛯ ไ ㄪ ᰝ ఍ HP ࠕ ᅜ 㝿 ㄢ ⛯ ࡟ 㛵 ࡍ ࡿ ㄽ Ⅼ ᩚ ⌮ 㸦 ᖹ ᡂ 22 ᖺ 11 ᭶ 9 ᪥ 㸧ࠖ
http://www.cao.go.jp/zeicho/history/20092012/etc/2010/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2010/11/18/2
21109houkoku.pdf㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2018 ᖺ 9 ᭶ 9 ᪥㸧࣭OECD, “Signatories And Parties To The Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax
Treaty Related Measures To Prevent Base Erosion And Profit Shifting Status as of 23
January 2019 ”
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf
㸦᭱⤊㜀ぴ᪥ 2019 ᖺ 1 ᭶ 25 ᪥㸧

53（ 552 ）⛒⛯㈨ᩱ㤋㈹ㄽᩥ㞟 ➨ 28 ᅇ㸦2019 ᖺ㸧ୖᕳ
௧࿴ 2 ᖺ 2 ᭶ 1 ᪥Ⓨ⾜

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