(by MS Word data)

Form7
Grant No.

16－001

Research Report
Name : Manuel Jeffrey Ordaniel Sistoso (Jeffrey Ordaniel)
Organization (at the time of the grant): National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (政策研究大学院大学)
Title of Research: Determinants of Security Strategies in Maritime Southeast Asia: The Philippines, Vietnam
and Malaysia in the South China Sea, 1988-2015
Purpose of Research:（400 words）

The South China Sea disputes provide an opportunity to identify the responses of actors that are neither
small/micro states nor great powers, to threats emanating from a proximate, rising great power. Hence,
this research primarily asks: What are the security strategies of major Southeast Asian claimants toward
the South China Sea disputes and what are the factors that determine them?
This research mainly focuses on the two observed dominant security strategies employed bySoutheast Asian claimants against great power threats to their South China Sea interests, covering theperiod 1988 to 2015.

Content/Methodology of Research:（800 words）

This research argues that the primary determinant of a secondary state’s broad choice of whether
to balance or to hedge against a great power threat is the degree of the threat at a given period of time.
On the one hand, the presence of high and/or very high-level threats would automatically warrant an
intent to balance due to clarity of the great power’s intention towards, urgency of need for response
related to, and alteration of status quo or initial condition of, a concerned contested domain. On theother hand, low and medium level threats would compel a state to hedge due to the ambiguity or
uncertainty of the threat vis-à-vis its national interest at hand. In other words, high and very high-level
threats demonstrate the enforcement of the great power’s claims over a contested domain, while low andmedium level threats only exhibit the building up of normative bases and physical capabilities of thegreat power for possible enforcement of its claims in the future.
Meanwhile, another set of determinants of secondary states’ responses to threats include both
external and internal factors present at a given period of time. First, what are the available external

factors that could be used as leverage to delay or frustrate the source of threat? Are there international
multilateral mechanisms available at the time of the threat through which a global/regional public
opinion could be formed to discourage the adversarial great power? Is there a third party great power
able and willing to throw its diplomatic and/or military weight on the secondary states’ behalf? For thisresearch, external factors refer to two variables: 1) availability of multilateral regional dialogue
institutions and favorable international legal mechanisms, and 2) availability of third party state as ally,
partner or diplomatic supporter.
Second, what are the domestic factors that help determine secondary states’ responses to great
power threats? For this research, two variables are taken into consideration: 1) the claimants’ prevailingleadership perception of China, which will be identified through literature review and the researcher’s
own analysis and judgment and; 2) the claimants’ respective economic condition at a given period oftime mainly demonstrated by the average GDP growth for the period.
While internally, national polities can have varying views on China and the threat it poses, theprevailing perception of the national leadership at a given period of time impact the eventual choice ofpolicies in response to threats. This prevailing perception of China could be influenced by several
internal factors unique to each claimant states, including the leaders’ parochial concerns or self-interests,
world view, and policy priorities. Meanwhile, the economic condition (growth and stability) also
influence strategic choices because it accounts for the states’ ability to do internal balancing, inparticular military buildup and modernization, and efforts to improve maritime capabilities to monitor,
maintain presence and conduct law enforcement.
Accordingly, the existence of either very high or high-level threat emanating from China would
result in the Southeast Asian claimants’ outright balancing. First, externally, these states would haveexternal opportunities through which to resist China. Second, internally, there would be higher domestic
political pressures in favor of resisting China and protecting the threatened national interest, which
would consequently impact the prevailing leadership perception towards China. However, the range ofbalancing also depended on what exactly are the available external factors. The claimant state is
expected to pursue both hard and soft balancing if all external factors as identified are available at thetime of the threat. However, they would be limited to soft-balancing only if availability of regional
dialogue institutions and legal mechanisms are the only ones present at the time of the threat. This is thecase when there are no available third party great power presenting itself as an opportunity to resist
China threat, and when the claimant states’ economic condition is not favorable to defense buildup.
When no external opportunity is available, yet internal factors are favorable to resistance, the claimant
states are likely to do internal hard balancing only, such as through significant increases in defense
budget, major maritime weapons acquisition, and passing of a law funding military modernization,
among other efforts to strengthen offshore defense and deterrence.

Meanwhile, for both medium and low level threats, claimant states are likely to hedge against
China threat. The ambiguity on what China threat means for the claimants’ South China Sea interests
provide enough room for maneuvering and incentives for both balancing (to prepare for contingencies)
and bandwagoning (to gain the adversarial great power’s goodwill). Nevertheless, the degree of hedging
is still impacted by the identified external and internal factors, at a given period of time. When aclaimant state hedges against threat, the strategy could lean towards either balancing (selectivebalancing) or bandwagoning (selective bandwagoning). The biggest variable that should account for thisis the prevailing leadership of perception of China in Manila, Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur. If theperception is largely negative, the claimant state is likely to emphasize the balancing side of its hedging

strategy (selective balancing). If the perception is largely positive and not favorable to resistance, thenthe claimant state is likely to emphasize the bandwagoning side of the hedging strategy (selective
bandwagoning). Both selective balancing and selective bandwagoning rest under the premise that China
threat remains low or medium. Consequently, a claimant country whose leadership has a largely positive
view of China could silently do internal balancing, and suppress any effort to soft-balance the source of
threat, appearing as if it is bandwagoning because it not as loud as others in regional dialogue
institutions.
As a contribution to the literature, the research intends to advance a new perspective that treats
hard and soft balancing as complements, and that secondary states do actually employ themsimultaneously. Furthermore, as stated above, this research would also introduce a new definition forhedging as a security strategy, different from existing but insufficient definitions provided by otherrelated literature.
The tables in the next two pages demonstrate specifically the range of policy options available
for the three major Southeast Asian claimants.
A state is balancing when no bandwagoning is observed at a given period. A state is
bandwagoning when there is no balancing is observed at a given period. A state is hedging when, during
the same period, both bandwagoning and balancing initiatives are observed at varying levels, largely
lower levels.
Research Method
This research is a small-N study and adopts a mixed method. First this research conductedcomparative historical case studies of South China Sea tensions and major Southeast Asian-claimant
states’ responses per period: 1988-1994, 1995-2002, 2003-2008 and 2009-2015. The following havebeen conducted in order to gather as many data or information as possible relevant to China-related
tensions in the South China Sea and the corresponding responses (strategies/policies) of three major
Southeast Asian claimants: archival and library research using Vietnamese, Malaysian and Philippine
government databases, and archives of English newspapers in those three countries. Relevant English
language news reports from major international newswires were also included.

Qualitative Method
In testing the hypotheses and proving the arguments, this research first made use of process
tracing, essentially examining the collected sequential data by breaking them into sets of cases (tensions,
official responses, dominant rhetoric) divided by time period that constitute the “process of interests.”
The research ensured that every case had to be explainable by the generalizable principle specified in
the hypotheses. In other words, does it conform to the hypotheses already setup at the beginning of thisresearch? By doing this, the research could test the hypotheses by revealing observable patterns of statebehaviors among the three major Southeast Asian claimants vis-à-vis China threat in the South China
Sea, over time.
Quantitative Method
This research then made use of quantitative method to alternatively demonstrate the validity of
the findings. Simple mathematical equations were employed to quantify the variables.

Relative values

were assigned to every instance of the variables considered. The purpose is to quantify the degree
through which each variable would influence the degree of balancing, hedging or bandwagoning,whichever the case.
Quantifying the Variables
Degrees of China Threat (Y)Table 1 on page 16 lists the degrees of China threat and the assigned values.
L = Low = 2
M = Medium = 3
H = High = 10
V = Very High = 20
i = Instancesn = number of years in a given period
Quantifying China threat (Y)Y = (L(i)+M(i)+H(i)+V(i))/n
Availability of External Balancing Opportunities (A)Table 2. Degrees of External Balancing Opportunities
Low (Value: 1)
Membership in multilateral security arrangement such as a consultative body on defense issues
Medium (Value: 3)Strategic partnership with third-party states not considered as a great power
High (Value: 4)Strategic partnership with an interested outside great power
Very High (Value: 12)
Existence of a Mutual Defense Treaty with a great powerL = Low = 1
M = Medium = 3
H = High = 4
V = Very High = 12
i = availability

Quantifying External Balancing Opportunities (A)A = L(i)+M(i)+H(i)+V(i)Availability Regional Dialogue Institutions/Supportive Int’l Legal Mechanisms (B)Table 3. Availability Regional Dialogue Institutions and Supportive International Legal Mechanisms
Low (Value: 1)
UNCLOS not in effect/based on customary international law
Existence of ASEAN Declarations
Medium (Value: 3)
Dialogue Partnership with ASEANUNCLOS in effect but not ratified
Existence of ASEAN-China Declarations
High (Value: 6)
Full membership in ASEANUNCLOS ratification completed
Existence of Binding ASEAN-China Code of Conduct

L = Low = 1
M = Medium = 3
H = High = 6
i = availability

Quantifying Availability Regional Dialogue Institutions/Supportive Int’l Legal Mechanisms (B)B = L(i)+M(i)+H(i)+V(i)Degrees of Economic Condition (C)Table 4. Degrees of Economic Condition
Low/Poor (Value: 1)
Ave. GDP Growth 3% or underMedium/Fair (Value: 3)
Ave. GDP Growth 4-5%
High/Good (Value: 5)
Ave. GDP growth 6-7%
Very High/Very Good (Value: 7)
Ave. GDP growth 8%+

Assigned values were simply provided to economic condition at a given period depending on theclaimants’ average GDP growth.

Prevailing Leadership Perception of China (D)Table 5. Prevailing Leadership Perception of China
Very Negative (Value: 6)
Consistently negative perception of China
Moderately Negative (Value: 4)
Negative perception of China but highly dependent on Chinese action

Indifferent/Neutral (Value: 0)
No indication of perception towards China
Moderately Positive (Value: -4)
Positive perception of China but highly dependent on Chinese action
Very Positive (Value: -6)
Consistently positive perception of China

Assigned values were also provided to the prevailing leadership perception of China at a given periodusing the analyses derived from the case studies and the researcher’s judgment.
Predicting Security Strategy in Response to Threat
X = Security Strategy
Y = China threat
A = External Balancing Opportunities
B = Availability Regional Dialogue Institutions/Supportive Int’l Legal Mechanisms
C = Economic Condition
D = Prevailing Leadership Perception of China

Since this research aims to find the degree through which a secondary state would resist a threat
from a proximate great power, the following will be used:
X = Y (A+B+C+D)
Since claimant strategies are responses to China threat (primary independent variable), thedegree of the other determinants (secondary variables) of strategies at a given period of time ismultiplied to the degree of the threat.

Counting Rules for Expected Strategy:
Full Balancing: 100 and above
Selective Balancing: 50-99
Selective Bandwagoning: 1 to 49
Full Bandwagoning: 0 and below
Table 6. Bandwagoning-Hedging-Balancing Continuum (Actual Strategies)
Full Bandwagoning
Hedging
Selective Bandwagoning
Selective Balancing
1 to 49
50 to 99
0 and under
Bandwagoning side

Full Balancing
100 and above
Balancing side

Measuring Actual Strategy Employed in Response to Threat
Xactual = SB1 + SB2 + HB1 + HB2 + B1 + B2 + B3 + B4
Soft-Balancing by Internationalization (SB1)
L = Low = 1
M = Medium = 2
H = High = 3
i = Instancesn = number of years in a given period
SB1 = (L(i) + M(i) + H(i))/n
Soft-Balancing by Legalization (SB2)
L = Low = 1
M = Medium = 5
H = High = 10
V = Very High = 20
i = Instancesn = number of years in a given period
SB2 = (L(i) + M(i) + H(i) + V(i))/nInternal Hard-Balancing (HB1)
L = Low = 3
M = Medium = 10
H = High = 20
V = Very High = 30
i = Instancesn = number of years in a given period
HB1 = (L(i) + M(i) + H(i) + V(i))/n
External Hard-Balancing (HB2)
L = Low = 5
M = Medium = 15
H = High = 25
i = Instancesn = number of years in a given period
HB2 = (L(i) + M(i) + H(i))/n
Adoption of great power’s dispute management preferences (B1)
L = Low = -3
M = Medium = -5
H = High = -15
V = Very High = - 30
i = Instancesn = number of years in a given period
B1 = (L(i) + M(i) + H(i) + V(i))/n
Adoption of great power’s preferences on dispute resolution mechanism (B2)
L = Low = -3
M = Medium = -5
H = High = -15
V = Very High = -30

i = Instancesn = number of years in a given period
B2 = (L(i) + M(i) + H(i) + V(i))/n
Downplaying China threat (B3)
L = Low = -3
M = Medium = -5
H = High = -15
i = Instancesn = number of years in a given period
B3 = (L(i) + M(i) + H(i) + V(i))/n
Surrendering Claims Conditionally/Unconditionally (B4)B4 = Total of the maximum values for bandwagoning possibilities = - 129
Counting Rules for Actual Strategy Used
Full Balancing: 30 and above
Selective Balancing: 1 to 29
Selective Bandwagoning: -29 to 0
Full Bandwagoning: -29 and below
Table 7. Bandwagoning-Hedging-Balancing Continuum (Actual Strategies)
Full Bandwagoning-30 and below

Hedging
Selective Bandwagoning
0 to 29
Bandwagoning side

Selective Balancing
1 to 29

Full Balancing
30 and above
Balancing side

Since this counting rule looks at the actual strategies employed by secondary states, hedging
could be clearly categorized into two – selective bandwagoning when bandwagoning is moreemphasized than balancing; and selective balancing, when it is the other way around.

High (25)Forging alliance/ strengthening existing alliance

Medium (15)Forging strategic partnerships/strengthening
existing strategic partnerships

Deepening security/diplomatic ties withinterested outside power;
Unilateral invocation of third party great
powers’ commitments per strategic
partnership/alliance

Surrendering claims
conditionally/unconditionallyDownplaying threat

Adoption of great power’s
preferences on dispute
resolution mechanism

In unilateral official statements (ministerial
level)In unilateral official statements (head ofstate/government level)
In unilateral official/press statements(ministerial level)
In unilateral official/press statements (headof state/government level)

Medium -5

Military exercise with the sourceof threat

In statements at/during regional
dialogue institutions (ministerial/headof state levels)

In actual policy action Maximum Bandwagoning(Sum of all bandwagoning possibilities above) 129

In actual policy action
In regional dialogue institutions

Very High -30
In actual policy action

High -15
In regional dialogue institutions

In bilateral joint statements

In bilateral joint statements

Targeted
militarybuild-up(build-up
directlyconnected toa Chinarelated
tension) e.g.
passing of
new law for
the purpose

Low (5)

Averageannualdefensespending
increase overa period:>10%

Very High (30)

Average annual
defense spending
increase over a
period: 3-5%

Average annual defense spending increaseover a period: <3%

Construction ofbase/s/facilities
relevant to offshore
territorial defense)

High (20)Medium (10)Low (3)
Averageannualdefensespending
increase overa period: 510%

Filing a legal case before aninternational tribunal directly
challenging Chinese claim

Filing claims/statements/reports(unilaterally or with fellow ASEAN
claimant) before internationalorganizations (e.g. UN agencies)

Pushing for quasi-legal mechanisms andrespect for international law in regional
dialogue institutions (e.g. calling for abinding CoC, adherence to DoC)

Referencing quasi-legal mechanisms (e.g.
2002 DoC;) in official statements/press
statements/talking points
Referencing international law in official
statements; press statements; deals with
China
Semi-targeted
military buildup(prominentacquisition of
defense hardware

Very High (20)High (10)Medium (5)Low (1)

Table 9. Manifestations and Intensity of Bandwagoning Strategies
Low -3Degree of Bandwagoning
In unilateral official statements (ministerial
Adoption of great power’s
level)
dispute management
In unilateral official statements (head ofpreferences
state/government level)

External Hard Balancing

Internal Hard Balancing

Soft-balancing byLegalization

with outside powers;
Inclusion of the disputes in unilateralstatements at regional dialogue
institutions/international organizations;
Unilateral activities that inviteinternational attention/hype the disputes

High (3)Pushing for direct namingof China as the source of
threat through regional
dialogue institutions orinternationalorganizations.

Medium (2)Pushing for direct referencing ofChina’s threatening behaviors
through regional dialogue institutions(explicit mention of militarization,
land reclamation, China-related
tension)Low (1)
Pushing for inclusion of the disputes in jointstatements with ASEAN/outside great
powers/ with non-claimants

Table 8. Manifestations and Intensity of Balancing Strategies
Low (1)Degree of Balancing (Value)
Raising the disputes in regional
Soft-balancing by
dialogue institutions/bilateral meetings
Internationalization

Conclusion/Observation（400 words）
This research has important contribution to the literature. This research has demonstrated that

secondary states when threatened by a great power employ either full balancing or hedging. The latter
could be divided into selective balancing and selective bandwagoning, depending on the emphasis. The
choice ultimately has to do with the degree of the threat and also on several other factors at the time of
the threat, namely external balancing opportunities, availability of regional dialogue institutions andsupportive international legal mechanisms, economic condition, and the prevailing leadership perceptionof China. This research has sought to empirically demonstrate how secondary states would resist threatsemanating from a great power. This section will now look at the contribution of this research to theliterature.
Hard and Soft Balancing as Complements
Existing literature treats hard balancing and soft balancing as substitutes to each other. In
essence, these scholars argue that when a state is unable to do hard balancing through military buildup
or alliances, it will pursue other means of resisting threat such as using international law, multilateral
institutions and other diplomatic arrangements. This research however, revealed that secondary states dotreat hard and soft balancing as complements, not as substitutes. In essence, hard and soft balancing are
not mutually exclusive. Indeed, when a claimant state is hedging and want to increase the balancing sideof the strategy, or outrightly balancing a threat, it employs both hard and soft balancing. As observed,
Southeast Asian claimants employed soft-balancing through internationalization and legalization of theSouth China Sea disputes as mainly underpinned by the opportunities provided for by regional dialogue
institutions. At the same time, they also pursued hard-balancing internally through enhancing maritime
capability and building military power necessary for offshore territorial monitoring and defense, andexternally by strengthening existing alliances or forging new strategic partnerships with outside powers,
both in an effort to restrain the Chinese. The extent through which a state uses soft and hard balancing isdependent on several other factors as noted – external factorss (availability of regional/multilateraldialogue institutions and supportive international legal mechanisms, and outside powers) and internal
factors (prevailing leadership perception of China and economic growth and stability at a given period).
Hedging as a Security Strategy

Since there is no consensus definition of hedging in international security studies, this researchis introducing a more clarified concept of the strategy that is rather focused on how it is employed in
response to threat (similar to balancing against threat as opposed to a more comprehensive balancing
against power). In this study, hedging is defined as the simultaneous employment of bandwagoning andbalancing initiatives aimed at addressing low and medium level threats. It is unlikely for a state tocontinue to hedge when a threat had already reached high-level.
Indeed, the case studies have demonstrated that claimants faced with low and medium level
threats from China, tend to hedge, by employing some forms of bandwagoning and some forms ofbalancing at the same time. Which side is emphasized depended on internaland external factors

available at the time of the threat. As noted, hedging can be selective bandwagoning whenaccommodating the policy preferences of the adversarial great power is more emphasized. It can beselective balancing when resisting the claims and policy preferences of the adversarial great power ismore pronounced than bandwagoning.

The ambiguity or lack of clarity in the Chinese threat and theabsence of an actual and permanent change in the status quo (a claimants’ control and/or occupation of adisputed feature or maritime zone), on the one hand, allowed some room for the claimants to positively
engage Beijing and accommodate some of its policy preferences on the South China Sea issue in hopesof gaining its favor and not threaten their interests further. On the other hand, low and medium level
threats also provided enough pressure for the claimants to pursue balancing mechanisms as safeguards,
and better protect their interests.
Overall, the South China Sea disputes provided an opportunity to reveal exactly how, and underwhat circumstances secondary states resist threats emanating from a great power.