THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE CAR IN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA – Assessing the Policy Options –J. MOHAMAD, A. T. KIGGUNDU

ReportTHE RISE OF THE PRIVATE CAR IN KUALA LUMPUR,
MALAYSIA– Assessing the Policy Options –Jamilah MOHAMAD

Amin T. KIGGUNDU

Professor
Department of Geography
University of Malaya
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Researcher
Department of Geography		
University of Malaya
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia(Received March 8, 2007)

1. INTRODUCTION
In many cities today, the private car has become
an important and dominant mode of transport 1-3. The
increasing dominance of the private car as a mode oftransport is due to inherent advantages associated with
its use. The unrestricted freedom that car users enjoy is
one important reason why many people wish to own acar. Whilst public transport modes necessitate the sharingof services with strangers, the private car affords privacy
and comfort for its user.
Additionally, the private car has become more popular and dominant than public transport because it isusually available when required, takes the user from door
to door and can reach dispersed destinations. It is also
worth noting that the private car has become a symbol ofpower, status and prestige. Furthermore, private cars enable drivers to offer free lifts to travellers, and expensive
car models are often associated with wealth in society 4.
It is therefore not surprising that car ownership and use
are widely perceived as both a sign of affluence and increasing personal wealth.
According to Ohmae 5, in countries that havereached USD3000 per capita GNP (income threshold),
there is always a strong and steady demand for consumer
goods such as refrigerators, colour TVs and relatively
cheap motorcars. This, he says, was particularly thecase in Japan when it reached the USD3000 income
threshold. Ohmae further asserted that for the people
below USD3000 per capita GNP, “between say, USD1500
and USD3000, the emphasis is more on motorbikes; below USD1500, it is more on bicycles” 5. Ohmae finally

noted that “at USD5000 income threshold, there is usually a need to construct modern and high-speed highways, build up-to-date airports as well as the demand forhigh quality and posh cars”.
Rapid motorization thus became an important feature of many East Asian cities such as Bangkok, Manila,
Seoul and Jakarta 6-8. Over the 1980-1990 period, thespectacular economic performance of the East Asian
miracle economies such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia hascreated numerous employment opportunities, increased
incomes and reduced poverty9-12. In Malaysia, for example, since 1987, the economy has grown at an averageof 8.5 per cent each year, making it one of the fastestgrowing economies in the world13-15. By early 1997,
just before the Asian economic and financial crises, unemployment stood at 2.9 per cent and the poverty rate at
8 per cent16. Malaysia’s recent rapid growth in car ownership particularly in conurbations such as Kuala Lumpur
offers evidence that rising incomes are the major driving
force for car ownership.

2. RISING CAR OWNERSHIP IN FEDERALTERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR
Kuala Lumpur, as Malaysia’s capital city, has enormously benefitted from the country’s rapid economic
growth and development. The city is also one of the major recipients of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Malaysia and its contribution to the country’s GDP is quite
substantial. In the period 1986-1991, Kuala Lumpur’s
GDP grew at 7 to 12 per cent annually making it one of
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Motorization in Asia

the fastest-growing cities in Malaysia17,18. Between 1995
and 2000, the GDP for Kuala Lumpur increased from
USD 6045 million to USD 7419 million, an average annual growth of 4.6 per cent19. In addition, the per capita
GDP for Kuala Lumpur increased from USD 6514 in
1995 to USD 8086 in 2000. In other words, the per capita
GDP for the whole city increased by average of 6.1 percent annually during 1995-2000. Such developments
have contributed to the movement of people from otherparts of Malaysia into the city to seek employment and abetter quality of life.
The growth of population in Kuala Lumpur has
been very rapid, especially during the period 1970-90,
when the average annual growth rate was 4.3 per cent20.
The net-migration rates also experienced a major increaseover the period 1970-80. In 2000, the Federal Territory of
Kuala Lumpur had the highest population density in Malaysia with 1269.5 persons per square kilometre, followed
by Selangor state with 524.8 persons per square kilometre19. The total population of Kuala Lumpur increased
from 1.21 million in 1990 to about 1.42 million in year
2000. It has a total employment of about 0.84 million in2000 of which 83 per cent is in the tertiary sector.
Although Kuala Lumpur is not regarded as a megacity21 due to its relatively small size and population, there
are clear indications that the city is rapidly expanding anddeveloping into what McGee and Robinson22 have termed
as a Mega-Urban Region, covering the whole of Klang
Valley with an area of 284300 hectares, including towns
such as Petaling Jaya, Shah Alam, Klang, Subang Jaya,
Bangi and Selayang. Under Malaysia’s Vision 2020,
which aimed to transform Malaysia into a developed
nation by the year 2020, many new areas have been
identified and developed to reposition Kuala Lumpur toeffectively compete with other cities such as Bangkok,
Singapore, Jakarta and Manila for a favoured position
within the global economy 17, 18. Examples of projects
that have been implemented include the Federal Government Administrative Centre of Putrajaya, Kuala Lumpur
International Airport (KLIA), Kuala Lumpur City Centre(KLCC) and Kuala Lumpur Sentral Station (KLSS).
The new Federal Government Administrative
Centre of Putrajaya is situated in the Multimedia Super
Corridor (MSC). The MSC was designed and launched toserve as a catalyst for the development of the information
technology (IT) sector in Malaysia and to help shift the
Malaysian economy from its current input-output development model based on manufacturing and primarycommodities towards a knowledge-based economy (Keconomy)19. When fully completed, Putrajaya is expect-70

IATSS Research Vol.31 No.1, 2007

ed to accommodate 76,000 government employees.
Additionally, an important decision was taken by
the Federal Government to transfer Malaysia’s main international airport from Subang to Sepang. At Sepang,
about an hour’s drive away, a new world-class airport, theKuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) was built at
a cost of USD 2.63 billion. In short, the move to build a
new airport away from the city centre of Kuala Lumpur
as well as the development of Putrajaya about 30 km
away was intended to ease traffic congestion in the city
centre. However, these new developments are expected to
attract more people into the mega-urban region of Kuala
Lumpur, and spread out traffic over a wider region.
As the most important city in Malaysia, the Federal
Territory of Kuala Lumpur continues to be flooded with
newly-registered motor vehicles each year. The Federal
Territory’s percentage share of the newly-registered motor vehicles in the whole of Malaysia was 20.88 in 1991,
19.11 (1993), 19.59 (1994), 24.24 (1995), 27.12 (1996),
28.01 (1997), 19.13 (1998), 24.71 (1999), 24.96 (2000),
25.08 (2001) and 26.94 (2002). Its annual percentage
share plummeted to 19.13 in 1998 especially after the
1997 Asian financial crisis that badly affected car demandin Malaysia. Recently however, Kuala Lumpur’s percentage share of the total new registered motor vehicles annually in Malaysia has been going up again in tandem with
Malaysia’s gradual economic recovery.
Table 1 shows the number of vehicles registeredin Kuala Lumpur over the period 1983-2004. The tableshows spectacular increases in growth rates of motor vehicle registered except during/immediately after recession periods such as 1986-1988 and 1997. It is clear thatthe rapidly-expanding car market in the Federal Territoryof Kuala Lumpur and other parts of the Klang Valley is adirect product of the spectacular economic performanceof these areas and the huge economic role such areas play
to the general development of Malaysia (Table 1).
It is further observed that in 1995 alone about 1.4
million motor vehicles plied Kuala Lumpur city roads
each working day, exceeding the city’s population of 1.3
million. Additionally, “ the average number of vehicles
entering the city, estimated at 740,000 daily, grew at an
average annual rate of 17.5 percent during the Sixth Plan
period [1991-1995] compared with 7.4 per cent during
the Fifth Malaysia Plan period [1986-1990]” 23. Suchdevelopments will certainly require massive new investments in the city’s road sector as well as serious improvements in the traffic management aspects. The recent rapid
economic transformation, the burgeoning population as
well as the visible affluence among its inhabitants haveTHE RISE OF THE PRIVATE CAR IN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA – Assessing the Policy Options –J. MOHAMAD, A. T. KIGGUNDUTable 1 Number of motor vehicles registration (in '000s) in Federal Territory Kuala Lumpur
and annual growth rate (1983-2004)
Year

No. reg

Growth Rate (%)

Year

No. reg

Growth Rate (%)

1983
1984

236.16-285.68

20.97

1994

848.75

15.05

1995

1293.561985

327.60

52.41

14.67

1996

1465.92

1986

13.32

350.106.87

19971540.77

5.11

1987

368.735.32

1998

1857.06

20.53

1988

395.407.23

1999

2001.41

7.77

1989

443.80

12.24

2000

2158.18

7.83

1990

514.30

15.89

2001

2357.97

9.26

1991

599.66

16.60

2002

2550.00

8.14

1992

659.059.90

20032729.00

7.02

1993

737.75

11.94

2004

2966.21

8.69

Source: Road Transport Department, Federal Territory

collectively taken a heavy toll on the inadequate facilities
and services that are provided by the authorities.
It is reported that in 200724, 1.305 million vehicles
cross the Middle Ring Road (MRRI) on a daily basis
while 2.125 million vehicles cross the Middle Ring Road
(MRRII) daily. Seventy percent of vehicular trips crossing MRRI and MRRII (representing 42,600 vehicles
and 86500 vehicles respectively) during the morning
peak hour are single-occupancy vehicles (SOV). The
daily vehicular traffic at the CPA (Central Planning Area)boundary has increased by 1.7% pa (in vehicle units) and
0.7% pa (in pcu) from 1985 to 1997, and by only 0.4%
(in vehicle units) and 0.1% pa (in pcu) from 1997 to 2005.
Compared to earlier forecast by the SMURT-KL Study 25,
the present traffic volume entering the CPA boundary has
already exceeded SMURT-KL forecast of 1,187,000 pcu/
day in 2010.
Aside from the income factor, the recent rapid
growth in car ownership in the Kuala Lumpur megaurban region and Malaysia in general can be attributed tothe existence of various car assembly facilities as well as
the involvement of Malaysia into car manufacturing.
Malaysia’s auto industry began in 1926 and by the end of
1980, the industry had attracted 11 assemblers, which
produced 25 makes of commercial and passenger vehicles, 122 models and 212 variants. In 1984, “Malaysia
had a person-to-car ratio of 1 to 20.8, which was second
only to Singapore in the ASEAN region” 26.
Malaysia had, in the early 1980s, embarked on various projects, which had been outlined in the country’s
heavy industrialization program that had been drawn by
the HICOM (the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia) which had been set up in 1978. One such project was

the plan to establish a national car manufacturing plant.
In May 1983, together with the Japanese Mitsubishi
Motor Company, the Malaysian Government establisheda car manufacturing company called the National Automobile Enterprise Co Ltd (Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional Bhd) or Proton as it is internationally known. In thisjoint-venture project, the Malaysian Government contributed 70 per cent of the total paid-up capital of USD 50
million while Mitsubishi Corporation and its affiliate,
Mitsubishi Motor Corporation; each contributed 15 percent 27,28.
Proton started production in July 1985. The firstcars to be produced by Proton were named Saga and 105
Sagas were produced each day in the first year when theplant was running at 25 percent of installed capacity although it was initially designed to produce 21.3 units perhour with a volume of 40,000 units per year on a single
shift, or 120,000 cars a year over three shifts29. Since its
debut in July 1985, Proton has moved to dominate, up
until recently, the Malaysian automobile market and mostof its cars are sold locally with a small percentage (lessthan 20 percent) being exported to a few countries. By
exempting Proton from the high import duties, the government was able to offer its cars at a price that undercut
imported vehicles. In addition, imported cars in Malaysia
attract between 140 percent and 300 percent in taxes andimported car parts are charged 40 percent duty4. Suchprotectionist measures have strengthened Proton’s position in the Malaysian domestic car market and have thencontributed to the company’s viability, profitability andsurvival.
In the first nine months of its debut, Proton sold7,500 units of cars and this constituted 11 percent of the
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total market share of the passenger car market in Malaysia. Its share, however, surged to 73 percent in 1988 before falling to 62 percent in 1990 due to low domestic
demand for cars. In 1993, Proton’s market share increased
to 74 percent before falling again to about 64 percent in
the period 1995-1998. It is also important to note, thatwhile Proton’s domestic car market share has somewhat
plummeted in recent years, this does not mean that the
Malaysian Government’s measures and policies, whichwere deliberately instituted to protect its national carfrom other private car assemblers, are failing.
In 1993, the Malaysian Government establishedanother national car manufacturing company called
Perodua (Perusahaan Otomobil Kedua Sdn Bhd) tostrengthen its local auto industry before the commencement of the ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) Free Trade Area (AFTA). The shareholders of
Perodua consist of UMW Corporation Sdn Bhd (38 percent), Daihatsu Motor Co Ltd of Japan (41 percent),
Med-Bumikar Mara Sdn Bhd, PNB Equity Resource
Corporation Sdn Bhd, Mitsui & Co. Ltd of Japan andDaihaitsu (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd30. Taken together, Proton
and Perodua dominate much of the Malaysian car market. The two car manufacturing companies have a total
domestic car market share of about 90 per cent but recently Perodua has eroded Proton’s market share in
Malaysia.
It is somewhat apparent that both Proton, as well as
Perodua domestically-manufactured cars that were previously heavily protected by the Malaysian government
have greatly contributed to the country’s recent rapid motorization scenario. These locally-manufactured cars by
the two national car manufacturers, which are affordable
to many middle-class Malaysians, have contributed to theincreasing number of single-occupancy vehicles and traffic congestion.
The Federal government too, had through its ministries, provided loans to civil servants to buy cars. The factthat the majority of locally-produced cars by the two national car manufacturers is domestically sold thus makes
it untenable for the Government to promote policies that
restrict car ownership. The Malaysian Government views
its auto industry as a strategic sector that needs real support and protection. Rising car sales are also an important
sign of positive and strong consumer sentiment which the
Malaysian economy needs badly. More importantly, thecar sector generates both tax and export revenues as wellas employment and has a strong link with other industries
such as steel, rubber, glass, oil and insurance.

72

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3. Consequences of Rapid Motorization
Since the early 1980s, the motorization process in
Kuala Lumpur has been going on almost unhindered.
While private cars and motorcycles have helped to improve the mobility needs of many Asian cities, including
Kuala Lumpur, there are valid reasons to worry about therising trends of the single occupancy vehicles. One reason is that as the number of single occupancy vehicles
has risen, so has the need for ample and adequate road
space especially in the Central Business District of cities
such as Kuala Lumpur. For instance, between 1990 and
1995, Malaysia as a whole experienced a 15 per cent decrease in kilometres of road per 10,000 vehicles. Thisdecrease was particularly due “to higher rate of increasein vehicles, which grew by 41 per cent compared to 19
per cent for roads”23.
An important challenge posed by the recent rapid
motorization phenomenon in Kuala Lumpur is increasing
traffic congestion. Traffic congestion is a major urban
problem in many cities both in the developed and developing world. According to Lewis31, “Traffic congestion
is a direct result of increased traffic flow. The volume oftraffic on a link consists of a series of vehicles, the driversof which each want to minimize their own journey timeon the road. The speed and flow of the traffic is entirely
dependent on the behaviour of each vehicle’s driver. Eachvehicle’s progress therefore is necessarily dependent(except on an empty road) on how its driver adapts his or
her behaviour to that of other drivers. Thus, congestion is
primarily a function of personal behaviour and dynamics”. In addition, traffic congestion further induces accidents and air pollution.
During peak-hour periods, the average traffic flowin the CBD of Kuala Lumpur is 28 km/h, compared with
only 13 km/h in the Bangkok metropolitan region32.
While Kuala Lumpur’s traffic flow conditions have notreached a critical level, the city’s uncontrolled motorization process, the burgeoning population as well the limited ability to increase supply of physical resources suchas roads and parking facilities especially in the CBD may
help create a traffic situation similar to that of Bangkok.
Rapid motorization also has an effect on public
transport use in Kuala Lumpur. Presently, there are about
4 major private companies operating approximately
15000 bus trips per day. Taxis in Kuala Lumpur are operated by different taxi service operators. Currently, there
are about 24,721 taxis licensed in Kuala Lumpur, run by
4,183 operators. Rail services have become significant
since the implementation of two Light Rail Transit Sys-

THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE CAR IN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA – Assessing the Policy Options –J. MOHAMAD, A. T. KIGGUNDUTable 2 Average route travel speed
No.

Route

Average Route Travel Speed (km/h)
Inbound

Outbound

A.M. Peak

A.M. Peak

1986

1997

1986

1997

1.

Inner Ring Road

26.7

15.0

21.2

17.3

2.

Middle Ring Road

23.6

17.1

33.4

13.6

3.

Jln Ipoh, Jln Kuching

32.3

35.6

25.5

67.3

4.

Jln. Kepong, Jln Ipoh

25.6

19.3

17.2

28.2

5.

Karak Highway, Jln. Sentul

23.7

26.4

37.0

45.0

6.

Jln.Gombak, Jln. Pahang

10.3

12.4

36.6

27.0

7.

Jln. Ampang

19.5

10.4

24.9

19.5

8.

Jln.Cheras, Jln Pudu

15.8

14.0

34.8

22.8

9.

Seremban Highway

38.8

20.3

68.7

60.6

10.

Federal Highway II

39.9

21.7

45.7

26.9

11.

Jln. Pantai

24.3

13.4

32.7

19.6

Source: SMURT-KL STUDY, 1998

tems, ie. STAR and PUTRA. Together they provide 56
km of rail network with 49 stations. In 2000, the STARLRT on average handled 77,803 passengers per day while
PUTRA LRT handled 121,950 passengers per day in thesame year33.
In November 2004, a government-owned operator RapidKL began operation. RapidKL (Rangkaian
Pengangkutan Integrasi Deras) operates Klang Valley’s
two LRT lines – renamed Putraline and Starline, as well
as 107 bus routes. They make up about 65 percent of the
public transportation in the Klang Valley. In addition to
the LRT, the Kuala Lumpur monorail system serves downtown Kuala Lumpur with its 8.6 km route with 11 stations.
Meanwhile, KTM Komuter Trains ply along 153 km of
tracks with 40 stations connecting Kuala Lumpur to outlying townships within a 50 km radius, namely to Rawang and Seremban, and between Sentul and Port Klang. In
addition, Express Rail Link (ERL) provides two rail services, the KLIA Express and KLIA Transit servicing theMultimedia Super Corridor. In 2003, Starline had a daily
passenger ridership of 94,480, Putraline 150,494, ERL
6,014 and KL Monorail 27,00023 respectively.
Kuala Lumpur has one of the lowest public trans-

port passenger levels in Asia due in part to the rising levels of private car ownership and use. The recently-launched
Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 202034 revealed that public
transport accounted for only 20 percent of total Kuala
Lumpur passenger movements compared to 80 percent
for private transport. Obviously, such developments are
not good for the urban poor who cannot afford cars andwho badly need accessible, affordable and reliable transport to access distant places with abundant employment
opportunities.
The modal split for person trips at MRR1 using
private transport (car/taxi/motorcycle) is 54.3% (in1985), 64.1% (1997) and 61.1% (2005) while the shareof public transport (bus and, later, rail in 1997) is 37.4%
in 1985, 25.1% in 1997 and 28.6% in 2005 respectively.
Only 20% of Kuala Lumpur is within the transit corridor (i.e. areas within 400 m on each side of a rail line).
Aside from the above challenges, rapid motorization is also responsible for the increasing air pollution,
car accidents and the unpleasant noise in Kuala Lumpur.
Between 1990 and 2000, the number of reported car accidents in Kuala Lumpur increased by 92.9 per cent from
19,365 to 33,735. Table 3 shows the number of accidents

Table 3 Total road accidents in Kuala Lumpur, 1987-1996
Year

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Total No. of Accidents

20,104

18,72816,06819,36522,80024,69727,00027,43927,93933,375

DEATH

203

210

249

265

298

287

350

323

396

INJURY

2,958

2,699

3,192

3,712

3,875

4,473

4,444

4,697

4,350

CASUALTIES

Source: Compiled from the Ministry of Transport Yearbooks

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which involved deaths and injuries in Kuala Lumpur forthe years 1987-1996. In Kuala Lumpur, 52% of the total
number of fatal /serious accidents caused by vehicles,
were caused by motorcycles, 30% private cars, 10% lorries/vans, 3% buses and 2% taxis respectively.
Turning to the issue of air pollution, motor vehicles
have been blamed for the high levels of suspended particulate matter (SPM) in the air. According to Pendakur(1995) 21, in 1989, the estimated 2.8 million vehicles in
Kuala Lumpur released about 3700 tons of SPM in the
air. According to the SMURT-KL Study25, in 1997, there
is a problem with the ambient air quality in Kuala Lumpur
with unfavourable conditions prevailing at busy traffic
crossings. Daily NO2 at Pudu and Cheng Lock crossingsexceeded WHO guidelines (0.15 mg/m3 or 73 ppb) and8-hour measurement of CO at busy crossings showedvalues over the Malaysian guidelines. Extensive use ofprivate vehicles in Kuala Lumpur has also affected visibility and increased the incidence of asthma, conjunctivitis and other diseases21.

4. TRANSPORT DEMAND MANAGEMENTMEASURES
Transport Demand Management (TDM) has been
described as “the art of influencing traveler behavior forthe purpose of reducing travel demand or redistributing
travel demand in space and time”35. The initial suggestions for implementing TDM measures in Kuala Lumpur
started with the Urban Transport Policy and Planning
Study undertaken in 197336. The recommendations put
forward by its consultants included defining and preserving rights-of-way for short- and long-term improvementsfor public transport, eliminating extensive parking provision in the core area and improving the Kuala Lumpur
Central Area Traffic Circulation system.
The Area Licensing Scheme was also adopted as
one of the components of the Second Urban Transport

Project37. The key concept underlying the area licensing
scheme is that a special, supplementary license must be
obtained and displayed if a motorist wishes to enter adesignated restricted area within which congestion is tobe reduced. The intent of this scheme is that a significant
number of motorists would be discouraged from using
their private vehicles for the journey to work in the morning peak period.
The Kuala Lumpur Master Plan Transportation
Study 1981 report38 also presented short-term proposals
for bus transport improvements and proposals for continued investigations into the Light Rail Transit system. In
order to complement the selected Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan strategy, new roads and road improvements
were also recommended to provide accessibility to the
new growth centres. Bus services were to be developedwith maximum penetration into these growth areas andwould be the principal means of internal circulation as
well as serving an important feeder role to the chosen
Rail Transit System.
Other than the proposals for the LRT system, thestudy viewed that the need for traffic limitation policies
in Kuala Lumpur has not diminished since the previous
study in 1973. The team outlined a possible traffic restraint policy for Kuala Lumpur consisting of four instruments of control. They were designed to limit the use ofcertain streets, for all or part of the day, for buses andhigh-occupancy vehicles only; control the car park pricing structure; control the supply of parking in the heavily-congested commercial core, and the implementationof an earlier proposal for the imposition of a charge formotorists who enter the Central Area during the morning
peak period.
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
also completed another study in 1997 aimed at achieving
integrated urban transport strategies with the objectivesof environmental improvement in Kuala Lumpur25. The
various TDM measures include traffic constraints andTable 4 Area road pricing initiatives in Kuala Lumpur
YearStudy Recommendations

1976

World Bank-financed Second KL Urban Transport Project proposed Area Road Licensing similar to scheme in Singapore(High Occupancy Vehicle – HOV) exemption with cordon pricing

1987

Klang Valley Transport Study by JICA proposed Cordon Charge on passenger cars with less than 4 persons travelling
into the Central Area within the IRR in morning peak hours (HOV Exemption with Cordon Pricing)

1997

SMURT-KL Study by JICA proposed Overall Area Pricing in the CBD whereby charges are applied to all cars using
congested arterial road segments during peak periods

2007

KL Local Plan Study proposed Area Road Pricing Zone with Congestion Charging on 14 designated congested arterial
roads in the CBD

Source: City Hall 200774

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THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE CAR IN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA – Assessing the Policy Options –area licensing. Following the results of the study, City
Hall had planned to implement are area licensing systemin the CBD. This attempt was, however, abruptly suspended due to the insufficient public transport system atthat time.
Recently, the KL Local Plan recommended thatcongestion charging be implemented after a detailed feasibility study was carried out by City Hall Kuala Lumpur24.
The Local Plan recommended that implementation ofcongestion charging is to be undertaken after the public
transport network and systems are comprehensively inplace and working efficiently.

5. ASSESSING PRESENT AND FUTURE
POLICY OPTIONS
One of the earliest options adopted in Kuala Lumpur
has been the policy of building new motorways and toll
expressways. It is, however, imperative to note that thestrategy has somewhat failed to achieve its intended objective of curbing traffic congestion in Kuala Lumpur.
Many major roads leading to the city centre are still experiencing traffic congestion especially during peak hours.
Highway construction in Kuala Lumpur has not
only proved to be too costly but also environmentally andsocially inimical39. The ever increasing demand for mobility had prompted builders to build highways traversing
densely-populated areas. Many houses have thus been
demolished resulting in many families being displaced
and uprooted. The noise generated by the vehicles using
the new highways has become unbearable for the residents of the affected areas Meanwhile, the Federal Government has had to compensate highway concessionaires
whose toll highways have failed to achieve the forecasted
traffic volumes. Between January and June 2002, theGovernment had spent about USD184.2 million to compensate highway concessionaires for their loss of revenue
due to lower toll rates40. If the current policy of compensating highway concessionaires continues, the Government will be expected to pay about USD5 billion tovarious concessionaires over the next 20 years.
Experience from the highly-motorized countries
such as the UK and US show that road construction alone
is not sufficient to solve traffic congestion in cities andthat other policy measures such as high parking charges,
strict enforcement of parking and traffic regulations, public transport development and high fuel taxes are equallyimportant 41-43. In addition, there is a general agreement
among practitioners and academics that emphasis on road
construction only attracts more private vehicles.

J. MOHAMAD, A. T. KIGGUNDU

Turning to the issue of public transport development, it is important to mention that while many projects
have been implemented to improve the sector, there arecertain policy lacunas that need to be bridged before an
efficient, reliable, convenient and sustainable public
transport system can be established in Kuala Lumpur.
One such lacuna is the failure to control the rising trendof private car ownership, which has badly affected theperformance, efficiency and viability of public transport.
While the undeclared official policy has been not to discourage private car ownership and use without a well developed public transport system in place, experiencefrom some Asian cities such as Singapore, Hong Kongand Seoul show that the motorization process was first
restrained when there was no high quality, technologically sophisticated and high capacity light rail transit ormass rail transit systems.
Since the mid-1990s, however, there have beenvarious attempts in Kuala Lumpur to introduce a set of
new traffic management policy measures such as parkand-ride, one-way streets and the introduction of bus
lanes. An obvious example is the park-and-ride facilities
that are provided near some LRT stations to encourage
car users to use the LRT systems. Attempts to increaseparking charges have largely failed as free parking spaces
are quite pervasive in many parts of the city. The easy
availability of parking spaces in Kuala Lumpur is due to
two factors, first, the opposition faced by the city’s transport planners from businessmen; and secondly, the lackof strict enforcement of parking and traffic regulations in
the city.
Thus, in Kuala Lumpur, no real progress has been
made towards implementing the Area Licensing Scheme(ALS) proposed37. In November 1978, thirteen steel
gantries (entry gateways) were erected by City Hall as apreparation for implementing the ALS. However, aCabinet decision in May 1979 decided to reject the proposal based upon three considerations. Firstly, the public
transport supply was considered inadequate to cater for
the increased demand anticipated as a result of the introduction of the scheme. Secondly, City Hall had not provided adequate park-and-ride facilities for private car
commuters wishing to transfer to public transport use.
Thirdly, there was no provision then of an alternativeroute, outside the ALS boundary, to take through traffic
without needing to cross the CBD.
From the above discussion, it is clear that the strategies employed to alleviate traffic congestion in the Kuala
Lumpur conurbation have not worked and that a new approach is needed to overcome the problem. To be practiIATSS Research Vol.31 No.1, 200775

Motorization in Asia

cal and sustainable, the new approach should not only
focus at improving traffic flow (especially through highway construction) but also implementing measures that
may seem politically unpopular. Some of these measures(for example a congestion charging scheme, high autoand fuel taxes, high parking charges and strict parking
controls) have been recommended before in varioustransport studies that were undertaken in Kuala Lumpur
but failed to be implemented due to lack of political will
and opposition from both the ‘car owning lobby’ as wellas the business community28.
There is also a consensus among Malaysian policymakers and transport watchers, that plans to establish efficient public transport should precede efforts that aim tocontrol automobile use in the city. Such agreement andbeliefs are however refuted by Barter44 who argues thatdelaying or postponing car restraint measures is notprudent and may jeopardise or complicate future plans to
implement the same measures when the majority oftravellers have become used to private transport. Thereare examples of cities that have managed to establish
efficient and congestion-free transport systems whereby
car restraint measures preceded heavy and massive investment in high capacity and sophisticated systems suchas mass rail transit (MRT) or light rail transit (LRT) systems.

6. Concluding remarks
The main conclusion to be drawn in this paper isthat private car ownership and use have not been restrained or controlled in Kuala Lumpur. Unless deliberate and tough policies are instituted to discourage carownership and usage, like in Singapore, Tokyo and Seoul
which is still difficult in many major cities because of theemployment and revenue (both tax and export revenues)
generated by the motorcar industry, the strong link thatexists between the motorcar industry and other industries(such as steel, oil, rubber, and insurance), the increasing
power and influence of the car lobby as well as the existing deficiencies in public transport, attempts to developtransport systems that are sustainable will continue to be
an illusion.
There are critical success factors involved in determining the future of far-reaching TDM measures. Politically, as in the case of the Area Licensing Scheme, it wasnecessary to secure political acceptance and commitment
at the highest levels (project champion) in order to achieve
plan objectives. Secondly, there must be genuine public
acceptance and financial constraints must also be recog-

76

IATSS Research Vol.31 No.1, 2007

nized at the early stages of identifying possible transport
options. Policy makers need to ensure that finance would
be available for provision of selected transport facilities,
and then, there is a need to ascertain the available spending power of the population to use facilities provided,
especially in terms of fare levels. If financial considerations are not taken into account, proposals may take along time to materialize.
This paper has illustrated the attempt by transport
policy-makers in Kuala Lumpur to draw up some TDM
measures towards improving the traffic situation in Kuala
Lumpur. It has shown that while the policies have been
far-ranging, to date there has yet to be a singular successachieved with these measures.

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