H-Diplo ARTICLE REVIEW 1149
7 December 2022

Fintan Hoey, “The ‘Conceit of Controllability’: Nuclear Diplomacy, Japan’s Plutonium Reprocessing
Ambitions and US Proliferation Fears, 1974-1978.” History and Technology 37:1 (2021): 44-66. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/07341512.2021.1882126.
https://hdiplo.org/to/AR1149
Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Thomas Maddux | Production Editor: Christopher Ball

Review by Yu Takeda, Hiroshima City University
From the time that US President Dwight D. Eisenhower made the “Atoms for Peace” speech before theUnited Nations General Assembly in 1953, the international community has tried to manage the nuclear
proliferation risk of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Sensitive materials and technologies, namely
plutonium and the reprocessing technology that can extract usable uranium and plutonium from spent
nuclear fuel, were matters of particular concern. While enriched uranium could also be diverted into nuclear
explosive devices, plutonium became the main focus in the 1970s due to India’s first nuclear test in 1974,
which used the material extracted through its civilian nuclear program. Thereafter, the United States called
for global restraint from the peaceful use of plutonium, while other major industrialized countries, including
Japan, continued to defend their own programs.
Fintan Hoey’s new article sheds light on this contentious problem from both Japanese and American
perspectives, and places Japan’s plutonium utilization in “the wider context of its growing national power inthe 1970s” (46). He defined both countries’ nuclear diplomacy as efforts to control nuclear power for theirrespective purposes, which included not just the technology but also the accompanying benefits and prestige.
Japan sought to control its energy supplies by developing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, including the
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and recycling plutonium, as this provided a quasi-domestic energy supply
and the national prestige associated with mastering advanced nuclear technology. By contrast, the UnitedStates sought to control the spread of nuclear weapons by preventing the use of plutonium for its possible
diversion to nuclear explosive devices. Its efforts were a “vivid example” of science diplomacy, as the differing
views of science served different purposes, going beyond the British Royal Society’s assertion that “science is avalue-free arena and therefore the perfect ground on which to foster international cooperation” (45).
Based on these perspectives and documents from US and Japanese archives, Hoey discusses Japanese and US
nuclear diplomacy in the 1970s in four sections.
The first section begins with Japan’s domestic controversies over the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) during its signing in 1970 and its ratification in 1976. The author stressed the
problem of Japan’s international status as key to understanding the debates over the treaty. When Japanese© 2022 The Authors | CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 US

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officials discussed whether the country should go nuclear, their concerns included the equality between
nuclear have and have-not states. Some even hoped that “Japan might find itself in a position to join the
nuclear club at some point in the future” (48). The nuclear industry also insisted on equality regarding
safeguards, as nuclear-weapon states were not obliged to accept safeguards under the NPT, and the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) had a self-inspection system.
The next section discusses the shift in US nonproliferation policy after India’s first nuclear test in 1974.
While Japan dealt with the equality concerns through a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and ratified the NPT in 1976, the US government began to tighten restrictions on
plutonium. In the Nuclear Suppliers Group that was established in 1975, Hoey argues, Washington was“largely successful in persuading others to agree to a code of conduct on the sale of sensitive nuclear
technologies” but was less so in convincing other nuclear suppliers to drop their own reprocessing programs(51). This led to discussions on further restrictions against the peaceful use of plutonium during the US
presidential election in 1976; the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, Jimmy Carter, stressed theproliferation risk of plutonium, while President Gerald Ford issued a tougher nuclear nonproliferation policy
during the election campaign.
The third section briefly touches on Japan-US negotiations over Japan’s reprocessing plant in Tokai Mura, in
the north of Tokyo, which was planned to open just after President Carter’s inauguration in January 1977.
The bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement contains a US veto clause on Japan’s plutonium utilization if thematerial was of US-origin. Tokyo gained Washington’s consent for the operation of the reprocessing plant forseveral reasons, including the disorganization of US officials until the appointment of Ambassador at Large
and President’s Special Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters Gerard Smith as an ambassador on thisissue and Japan’s promise to actively participate in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE),
which was a “center-piece of the Carter administration’s attempts to change international opinion on
reprocessing” (53).
The final section discusses the INFCE and its outcomes. This international conference on the technicalaspects of nuclear power started in October 1977. However, it was “a lost cause from the start,” according to
Ambassador Smith (54). Hoey stresses that the INFCE was rather successful in undermining “the linkages
that the Carter administration was making between nuclear power and concerns regarding proliferation” (54).
Although Japan actively participated in the meeting as co-chairman of Working Group Four, which was
tasked with examining plutonium and reprocessing, its officials emphasized the energy need for plutonium
and downplay its proliferation risk. Nonetheless, Hoey argues, the United States took a unilateral approachand enacted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA).
In the conclusion, Hoey refers to the revision of the Japan-US nuclear cooperation agreement in 1988 as “amajor diplomatic breakthrough for Japan and a reversal in US policy on controlling the spread of plutonium
since the mid-1970s” (57). Ironically, however, to date, Japan’s plutonium program has suffered numerous
mishaps and accidents. In the end, both Tokyo and Washington failed to “achieve the level of control they
sought” (57).

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Overall, Hoey’s article successfully highlights the importance of status and prestige in Japan’s nuclear
diplomacy as well as of technological cooperation in US nuclear diplomacy. It is an especially welcome
contribution to the study of Japan in this particular field since previous research focused on individual
problems, such as the NPT ratification, and Japan’s material gains rather than ideational factors as amotivation behind its attitudes. 1 Despite these significant achievements, there are some areas where further
explanations and clarifications would be helpful.
First, the application of several concepts is unclear. One is the “controllability” that is applied to bothcountries’ nuclear diplomacy in the 1970s. The author compellingly discusses the failure of the latter
regarding plutonium, which is also a useful case study of science diplomacy. Nonetheless, Japan’s failure tocontrol plutonium was largely due to its domestic nuclear power development. 2 By contrast, looking back to
its nuclear ‘diplomacy’ during the 1970s, Tokyo seemed to have successfully controlled its own plutonium
utilization program against pressure from Washington.
A similar problem occurs in relation to the “nuclear diplomats,” which refers to US diplomat Gerard Smithand Japanese nuclear engineer Ryukichi Imai. While they are described as moving “between the technological,
scientific, and diplomatic worlds,” giving “effect to nuclear diplomacy” (46), there are few mentions of theseimportant roles in the article. I am sure that Ambassador Smith deserved the name. As the “tzar” on
nonproliferation matters, he played significant roles in the INFCE and the review process of the Carter
administration’s nuclear nonproliferation policy, as is discussed below.
However, these roles fall outside of the scope of Hoey’s article. Though Imai’s role in the Tokai Mura
negotiation is mentioned, he was not an effective mediator in this case. Indeed, he was widely known for his
technical knowledge and contributions to INFCIRC/153, the IAEA document that set up the framework of
NPT safeguards in 1971. 3 Nevertheless, during the early phase of the bilateral negotiations in 1977, heclashed with the Japanese government, which was not supportive of his personal ideas, and did not appear in
the negotiations thereafter. 4

Akira Kurosaki, “Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Diplomacy during the Cold War: The
Myth and Reality of a Nuclear Bombed Country,” in John Baylis and Yoko Iwama, eds., Joining the Non-Proliferation
Treaty: Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and the American Alliance (New York: Routledge, 2018) [hereafter Joining NPT]:
131-150; Yoko Iwama, “The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Decision to Join the Non-Proliferation
Treaty,” Joining NPT: 151-171; Takafumi Arai,“Satō Eisaku seiken to kakudai kakuyokushiryoku: Kakudoukatsu to
kokunaiseiji 1964-1968,” [The Sato Eisaku Administration and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Nuclear Blackmail andDomestic Politics, 1964-1968] Kokusaiseiji [International Relations], 203 (March 2021): 126-141; Eunil Cho, “Impactof the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime on Japan’s Non-Nuclear Policy, 1965-1976,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 32:1
(2021): 114-130.
2
Hitoshi Yoshioka, Shinpan genshiryoku no shakaishi: Sono nihonteki tenkai [A Social History of Nuclear Power: Its
Development in Japan, New Edition] (Tokyo: Asahi Shuppan, 2011).
3
Ryukichi Imai, “NPT hoshōsochi 10 nen ni omou,” [Thoughts on the 10th Anniversary of NPT safeguards] Kaku
Busshitsu Kanri Sentā News [Nuclear Material Control Center News] 16:3 (March 1987): 1-5.
4
Telegram TOKYO08910 from Tokyo to State, “Bureaucratic Dynamics of Nuclear Issue Updated,” June 16,
1977, National Archives and Records Administration, RG59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Access to Archival Databases,
https://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-list.jsp?cat=WR43; Yu Takeda, ‘Keizai Taikoku’ Nihon no Tai-Bei Kyōchō [‘Economic1© 2022 The Authors | CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 US

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As a Japanese “nuclear diplomat” in the 1970s, Shigefumi Tamiya, a former official of the Science andTechnology Agency and co-chairman of the INFCE Working Group Four, might be a better example. He
and UK co-chairman Sir Hermann Bondi were hailed by conference participants for their superb
chairmanship in producing a balanced working group report and were both considered for the position ofchairman of the final plenary of the INFCE. 5 His role and advice were indispensable to Japan’s success inleading the INFCE.
Second, although the author relies on Japanese primary sources, their context is not discussed. For instance,
regarding Japan’s ratification of the NPT, the article emphasizes the importance of the safeguards agreement
and the nuclear industry’s concern of being cut off from international nuclear trade had Japan not ratified it(50). While I agree with the importance of the nuclear industry, the process leading up to Japan’s ratification
was much more nuanced. Other possible factors could include Prime Minister Takeo Miki’s personalcommitment, the first review conference of the NPT in May 1975, and the emperor’s interest in this issue, toname a few. 6
This issue further leads to an overestimation of Japan’s nuclear ambition. The author discusses that the NPT’s
article IV, which recognized the inalienable right of member states to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes,
was “seen as the means by which to pursue its nuclear ambitions” (45), and that “[m]any in Japanese
officialdom were reluctant to forego the option of developing an independent deterrent” (47). They might go
too far since Japan’s nuclear power development and diplomacy were too decentralized andcompartmentalized to have pursued a single joint purpose. 7 In addition, the article cites the records of the
Gaikō Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai [Foreign Policy Planning Committee] within the Japanese foreign ministry andJapan-US policy planning talks (47-48). These forums were for brainstorming rather than policy making as
the author rightly explained (47). Although some of the participants were senior and influential diplomats,their mission was to provide analyses for other bureaus, such as the Office of Disarmament Affairs that was incharge of the NPT.
Third, a lack of discussion of secondary sources is problematic in the section regarding the INFCE. Thissection seems relatively superficial, using few statements, working group reports, and the memoir of Gerard
Smith. Considering the conference’s unprecedented scale, these sources are inadequate. Representatives andexperts from 51 countries and 7 international organizations gathered to discuss all aspects of nuclear power,
ranging from uranium mining to advanced reactors, to reprocessing, to waste disposal. It took more than two
years to produce final reports of more than 20,000 pages, while eight working groups and a coordinating

Superpower’ and Its Relations with the United States: Japan-U.S. Policy Coordination on Security, Economy, andNuclear Power, 1975-1981] (Kyoto: Minerva Shōbō, 2015) [hereafter Keizai Taikoku]: 172-173.
5
Takeda, Keizai Taikoku: 203-204.
6
Kazuhara Takanori Oral History (Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2019),
http://doi.org/10.24545/00001672; Yu Takeda, “Japan and the Creation of the NPT Regime”, Sources and Methods,
March 17, 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/japan-and-creation-npt-regime.
7
See, for example, Akira Kurosaki, “Nuclear Energy and Nuclear-Weapon Potential: A Historical Analysis of Japanin the 1960s,” Nonproliferation Review 24:1-2 (2017): 47-65.
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body discussed technical analyses, and major industrialized states held bilateral meetings. The cause was arumor that the most profitable actors in the INFCE were Xerox and airline companies. 8
In order to understand the essential aspects of this gigantic conference, secondary sources, such as reflectionsof participants, would have been particularly helpful. Such materials are abundant in Japanese since the main
topic of the INFCE, reprocessing and plutonium, were “life and death” issues for the country (53). 9 It isregrettable that the author did not consult these sources while researching Japanese diplomatic documents. 10
Based on these secondary sources and some unused US diplomatic documents, namely the National Security
Archive’s unpublished collection, the article’s explanation of the INFCE might be changed significantly in
two aspects. 11 One is the evaluation of US efforts during the INFCE. Contrary to the author’s argument, theUS government seemed to achieve part of its purposes, as President Carter’s national security advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski insisted (63, footnote 95). The original concept of the INFCE was to examine alternative
nuclear fuel cycles that did not produce separated plutonium. 12 However, well before the organizing
conference in October 1977, expert meetings of the Group of Seven (G7) significantly changed it to theneutral and non-binding technical evaluation of all nuclear fuel cycles.
Thus, US officials made efforts to achieve the refocused purpose of spreading recognition of the “proliferation
vulnerabilities” of plutonium during the INFCE (56). US allies in Europe and Asia agreed with this call.
Though they did not cease their plutonium utilization, they subsequently revised nuclear cooperationagreements with the United States in the 1980s to adopt stricter regulations on the peaceful use of nuclear
power. 13 This included full-scope safeguards, which was one of the core components of Carter’s
nonproliferation policy.
The other aspect is the influence of the INFCE on US nonproliferation policy. While the author argues thatit had “little effect on US efforts in this field” (57), the US government started to review the nuclear
nonproliferation policy in December 1978 based on discussions during the INFCE. 14 After the US Congressenacted the NNPA in March 1978, requiring the US government to tighten nonproliferation conditions fornuclear cooperation, the Carter administration instead focused on maintaining nonproliferation cooperation
with Japan and Western European countries by permitting their reprocessing programs. One such effort was“IAEA taiō INFCE no ketsuronn ni” [IAEA’s mission written in a conclusion of INFCE], Gensiryoku Sangyo
Shimbun [Atomic industry paper], October 18, 1979, https://www.jaif.or.jp/data_archives/n-paper/sinbun1979-10.pdf.
9See, for example, Shigefumi Tamiya, ed., 80nenndai Genshiryokukaihatsu no shinsenryaku [New strategy of nuclear
development in the 1980s] (Tokyo: Denryoku Shinpōsha, 1980).
10
Even if paper materials were not accessible due to the pandemic, there are several online resources, such as
Gensiryoku Sangyo Shimbun, which is cited in footnote 8.
11
National Security Archive, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Unpublished Collection”,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/NC/nuchis.html#unpub.
12
Takeda, Keizai Taikoku: 175-179.
13
Takeda, “US nonproliferation policy, nuclear cooperation, and Congress: revision of the US–Japan Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement, 1987-88,” The Nonproliferation Review 24:1 (2017): 67-81.
14
Takeda, “Beikoku no taigai seisaku ni okeru doumeikoku no yakuwari: houkatsuteki zizendoui no seiritsu, 19771982,” [U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Policy and the Western Allies: Making Programmatic Prior Consent, 1977–1982]
Kokusaiseiji 185 (2016): 114-125.
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the new policy, later named “programmatic prior consent,” which provided indefinite consent to nuclear fuelcycle programs in foreign countries only when their actual need and no proliferation risks were confirmed by
the US government.
This policy offers a good example of the work of a “nuclear diplomat,” since Ambassador Smith played amajor role in forming this principle in the final years of the Carter administration. His recommendations
were realized in the successive Reagan administration in 1982 and are still valid today as the pillar of US
nuclear cooperation with industrialized countries, including Japan.
Finally, based on the above criticisms, the description of the Japanese nuclear diplomacy seems somewhat
exaggerated. In the introduction and conclusion, Japan is described as a “challenger” to the emerging US-led
global non-proliferation order (46, 57). Nonetheless, as Hoey discusses, the Japan-US nuclear cooperationagreement provided Washington a veto over the Japanese reprocessing program (52). Although US officials
promised in 1968 that this veto, a provision of the Japan-US joint determination on “safeguardability” offacilities handling plutonium, would represent a purely technical judgment, it became a tool of politicalleverage to demand Japan go along with the US nonproliferation policy during the Carter administration. 15 In
other words, Japan was in no position to challenge the nuclear order led by the United States. The country
rather cooperated with the United States, along with Western European allies, to build a new order, one based
upon the aforementioned programmatic prior consent, while India and other developing countries criticized
any restrictions on peaceful use of nuclear power.
These criticisms aside, Fintan Hoey’s article sheds light on new factors, namely technologies and theirassociated prestige, in the Japanese and US nuclear diplomacy during the 1970s. It will be a basis for further
studies on not just the diplomatic history of the 1970s or nuclear nonproliferation, but also on science
diplomacy.

Yu Takeda is associate professor at Hiroshima City University, Japan. His recent book is Nihon no
Genshiryoku Gaikō: Shigenshōkoku 70nenn no Kutō [Japan’s Nuclear Diplomacy: A Resource-poor Country’s
70 Years of Struggle] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2018). His research focuses on Japan-US relations
during the Cold War, with particular interest in nuclear nonproliferation, and is currently working on
negotiations of the International Plutonium Storage.

Yoshinori Izumi, “Nichibei saishori kōshō ni okeru beikoku seisakukettei no bunkiten ni tsuite,” [Turning Pointof U.S. Government decision in US-JAPAN Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Negotiation in 1977] The Proceedings of theInstitute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Japan Chapter 31th Annual Meeting (2010): 1-13.
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