第184回Brown Bag Lunch Seminar「カブール再考」

日：2009年2月4日
於：財団法人国際開発高等教育機構
国際開発研究センター

山本芳幸
2009©Yoshiyuki Yamamoto
All rights reserved

Where are we ?

2009年1月17日午前9時45分

2009年1月17日午前9時45分（２）2009年1月17日午前9時45分（３）What are we looking at ?
The 1st layer: Global context– Global War on Terror (GWOT) etc. ?

The 2nd layer: Country specific– International Assistance Regime ?

The 3rd layer: Community– Human Security ?

The 1st layer: Global context
1. Origin: There are still multiple theories on thereason why the "Coalition of the Willing" nations
decided to topple the Taliban regime, and continued
the military operations to date. It is, however, nodoubt that this military operations can be placed in
the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which is termed
OEF-A for Afghanistan.
2. Measure: Therefore, in this context thesuccess/failure of post-9/11 Afghanistan is measured
by the degree of achievement and progress of GWOT.
3. Current Status: On the one hand it is not evident towhat extent OEF-A has made a positive impact onGWOT, on the other hand it is evidenced that thesecurity situation in Afghanistan has worsened
recently.

The 2nd layer: Country specific
1. UNAMA-Origin: Starting from the Security Council
Resolution 1368 of 12 Sep 2001, the international
community, represented by UN, based its decision tointervene the Afghan affairs on "Threats to internationalpeach and security caused by terrorist acts". SCR 1386 of20 Dec 01 authorized the deployment of Peace Keepers(ISAF), and SCR 1401 of 28 Mar 2008 authorized toestablish a PKO mission (UNAMA).
2. ISAF-Origin: ISAF authorized by UN SC is different fromOEF-A in its nature in that it aims to maintain thesecurity, not to combat a particular group as OEF-A does.
3. ISAF-current status: However, the distinction between thetwo military operations has been difficult, if possible,for ordinary Afghans from the outset and become
increasingly vague, particularly after NATO took over thewhole ISAF.

UN Security Council Resolutions
1368 (12 Sep 01):
Threats to international peaceand security caused by terrorist acts
1373 (28 Sep 01):
Threats to international peaceand security caused by terrorist acts
1390 (16 Jan 02):
Threats to international peaceand security caused by terrorist acts

1453 (24 Dec 02):
Neighbor Relations

1659 (15 Feb 06):
Afghanistan Compact

1378 (14 Nov 01):
Transitional Administration
1383 (6 Dec 01):
Provisional Arrangement

1386 (20 Dec 01):
ISAF Authorization

1401 (28 Mar 02):
UNAMA Authorization

1413 (23 May 02):
ISAF extension

1419 (26 Jun 02):
Loya Jirga

1444 (27 Nov 02):
ISAF extension

1471 (28 Mar 03):
UNAMA extension

1510 (13 Oct 03):
ISAF expansion

1536 (26 Mar 04):
UNAMA extension

1563 (17 Sep 04):
ISAF extension

1589 (24 Mar 05):
UNAMA extension

1623 (13 Sep 05):
ISAF extension

1662 (23 Mar 06):
UNAMA extension

1707 (12Sep 06):
ISAF extension

1746 (23 Mar 07):
UNAMA extension

1776 (19Sep 07):
ISAF extension

1806 (20 Mar 08):
UNAMA extension

1833 (22 Sep 08):
ISAF extension

The 2nd layer: Country specific (2)4.

UNAMA-Mandate: The mandate of UNAMA is vast;
virtually including all sectors, menu and/or buzzwords; Humanitarian / Post-conflict / Reconstruction/ Development Assistance; political / economic /military / Peace-building / Human Security;
Education, Health, Agriculture, Returnee,Infrastructure, Mine Action, Security Sector Reform(national army, police, DDR, counter-narcotics,justice), Rule of Law, Democratisation, Election,Governance etc...
As the international assistance is modelled in themodern western state/system with rare exceptions,virtually UNAMA is mandated to build a modern statefrom a scratch, or is destined to engage in a huge
enterprise that might well be called "externalmodernization" of Afghanistan.

The 2nd layer: Country specific (3)5.

Coordination: There existed a coordination mechanism
for Afghanistan in the pre-911 period, which was aleading case of UN coordination as part of UN Reformof Kofi Annan. After a few months vacuum period, aPKO mission, which is UNAMA, was established and wasto took over the coordinator's role.
But it took UNAMA prolonged time to build thefunctional capacity, particularly of Pillar II(Assistance), and at the same time Afghans started toquestion the UN's role of coordinator.

The 2nd layer: Country specific (4)6. Ownership: With the incapacitated function of UN
coordination on the one hand, and thebilateralization and/or competition of flagging thecontribution among donor countries on the other,
Afghan had the limited opportunity of gaining senseof ownership of the whole endeavour of reconstructing
their own country.
7. Beneficiaries: While the discussion on the structureof assistance regime and its menu was rampant, theinternational community as a whole suffered thelimited supply of indigenous knowledge of Afghanistan
to make its intervention more effective. It can be
hardly free from the fault of application oftemplates.

The 3rd layer: Community
1. Simbolism: Images and anecdotes of Afghan people inplight are extensively used as resources to media,
which in effect helped build an impression of Afghan
as passive receivers of aid rather than active
players of state builders.
2. Short of understanding: The security restriction ofgeographical movement of aid workers prevented aid
workers from understanding and learning Afghans in
the rural areas, which are majority of Afghans.
3. Template?: Lack of understanding or biased
understanding of ordinary Afghans in the rural areas
was compensated with the ideal types of community, on
which the assistance projects was largely based.

The 3rd layer: Community (2)4.

Gap: Convenience of aid organizations rather thanneeds of Afghans worked as the criteria forassistance provision, which lead to enlarge thedevelopment gap between urban dwellers and Afghans in
the traditional community.

5. Insufficient humanitarian assistance: As the OEF ismostly fought out of sight of large cities and out ofreach of aid organizations, Afghan communities inthose areas caught in the battle can hardly haveaccess to any relief.
6. Security: Disillusion on the part of Afghans in theremote rural areas prepared the room for tolerance ofAfghan communities toward the insurgents fromoutside, which worsened the overall security.

Local Structure of Governance orVillages
Decrease

Capacity to impact onsocial control

Wolaswali
Qaria
Increase

Kalay
Karanay

Broken Promises?

Undermine Afghan government ?
1. Restrictions on delivery of aid caused by worsened
security
2. Limited aid channelled through Afghan government
3. Afghan government huge reliance on foreignassistance
4. Guided by donors’ own priorities
5. Direct security expenditures - one third of aidflows
6. Aid per capita – poor compared with other postconflict nations

Unable to deliver ?

Unable to deliver ?

Unable to deliver ?

Governance Crisis – Legitimacy andCapacity
In the eyes of many Afghans, Afghan Government is
1. unable to provide for the basic needs of its
population,
2. to fulfil the international community’sidealistic need for a democracy in Afghanistan
rather than their own,
3. unable to prevent the side effects of theinternational military forces in the country,

Hard Choices
Restore the Legitimacy…. and security.
1. Afghan Government Ownership vs Accountability corruption and limited capacity
2. Reach the poor majority vs Security
3. Rely on the local structure vs Democracy Agenda

Departure from Nation-building ?

1.

Lost local support for international community’ssecurity efforts

2.

Decreased legitimacy of the central government

3.

International military forces are considered“invaders”

4.

Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO-ISAF are now taking
sides in a civil war situation

5.

Counter-narcotics “Eradication” is damaging Operation
Enduring Freedom and NATO-ISAF missions

Two Military Operations in Afghanistan

Two Military Operations in Afghanistan (2)Peace Process and Military Operations
Unstable

Conflict

Peace Keeping
Force (ISAF)

Humanitarian
AssistancePost-conflict
Assistance

PastFuture
Reconstruction
Assistance
Development
Assistance

Global War on
Terror (CF)

StablePeace

NATO-ISAF: From stabilisation to war

Operation Enduring Freedom: From a counter-terrorism
mission to a counter-guerrilla warfareMission confusion:
the international community heads into atrap

Who are insurgents ?
1. Al Qaeda-affiliated Jihadists
2. Autonomous groups (formed by factions, politically andmilitarily organised, benefiting from local support,and answering to warlords.)
3. Taliban / Neo-Taliban - who are they ?
1. Local commanders
2. Fundraiser and military trainers from Pakistan andArab countries
3. Nationalist-Islamist Pashtuns
4. Opium Smugglers and traffickers
5. People resenting international forces or thecentral government
6. Religious conservatives
7. People forced into combat
8. Poor people and those affected by eradication

Warlords in Afghanistan

Psychological War – “we cannot stand back and watch
as foreigners touch our women. Something must be done.

Core Aims of PRTs (ProvincialReconstruction Teams)

1. Improve security
2. Extend authority and legitimacy of theAfghan Government
3. Initiate and facilitate reconstruction

PRT (Provincial ReconstructionTeams)

From Senlis Council

Total military spending vs. total development
spending in Afghanistan, 2002-2006

The Cost of Weapons in Afghanistan (US$)
Type of Weapon

Lashkar Gah

Kabul

Kandahar City

AK47

166 > 498300

249 > 665

Rpd

299 > 332600

249 > 665

7.62

0.30 each

230 a box of 700

230 a box of 700

Tokerev

83 > 581

500600Macarov

83 > 665

700

800

Rpk

498 > 1,662

1,400

498 > 1,995

RPG 2+7 Launcher

300 > 700

800

400 >1,000

Rockets

25 each4050

Boosters

25 each7080

Krinkov 5.54

1,000 > 3,500

1,500 > 5,000

2,000 > 6,000

Krinkov 7.62

300 > 500

300 > 600

300 > 700

Tank Mine TV/3.6

Not known

100

Not known

Mortar 82mm

Not known

20-50

30-60

Artillery Shell

Not known

60-10080-100Source: Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War”, Graduate Institute of International Studies, page272, Geneva 2005.

Human Development Index
Literacy
Rate

EnrolmentRate

LifeExpectancy

GDP percapita

HDIHDI
Ranking

SierraLenone3645

34.3

2380.272

177

Burkina Faso

12.8

2245.8

435

0.302

175

Afghanistan

28.7

44.93

44.5

228

0.346

173

India

61

60

63.3

714

0.602

127

Pakistan

48.7

35

63769

0.527

135

Iran

77

69

70.4

2,825

0.736

99

Trukmenistan

98.8

75

62.4

3,516

0.738

97

UK

99.8

123

78.4

36,599

0.939

16

US

99.8

93

77.4

42,101

0.944

10

Average annual aid per capita for post-conflictreconstruction (three years post conflict, US$)

Afghan women’ experience of domestic violenceFour Economies in Afghanistan
・Smuggle Economy
・・Threat to neighboring countries

Drug Economy
90% of world production・ 40 to 60 % of GNP・・War Economy
・・Soviet Invasion, Civil war, War onTerrorUN Economy
・Huge expansion post-9/11

統計資料等の出典：“Afghanistan Five Years Later:
The Return of the Taliban – Taliban
Frontline now cuts half-way throughAfghanistan", September 2006, TheInternational Council on Security andDevelopment(http://www.icosgroup.net/home)

Opinion ?

yoshilog@gmail.com

Thank you.