Critical Analysis of the UNSCEAR Report“Levels and effects of radiation exposure due to the nuclear accident after the2011 Great East-Japan Earthquake andtsunami”

byPhysicians for Social Responsibility, USA
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War / Physicians in social responsibility, Germany
Physicians for Global Survival, Canada
Mexican Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Mexico
Association of Guatemalan Physicians and Scientists for the Prevention of War, Guatemala
Physicians for Social Responsibility / IPPNW, Switzerland
Danish Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (DLMK), Denmark
Medical Association for the Protection of the Environment and Against Nuclear and Biochemical Threat, Greece
French Physicians Against Nuclear Weapons (AMFPGN), France
Physicians Union Lege Artis, Serbia
Dutch Medical Association for Peace Research (NVMP), The Netherlands
Irish Doctors Environmental Association, Ireland
Association of Physicians and Medical Workers for Social Responsibility / IPPNW, Kenya
Society of Nigerian Doctors for the Welfare of Mankind, Nigeria
Physicians for Social Responsibility, Egypt
Physicians for Peace and Preservation of the Environment, Israel
Indian Doctors for Peace and Development (IDPD), India
Physicians for Peace and Social Responsibility, Malaysia
Austrian Physicians against Violence and Nuclear Dangers (OMEGA), Austria

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNSCEAR REPORT

OutlineI)

Introduction

II)

Where we agree with the UNSCEAR report

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1
2
3
4

III)

Main points of criticism

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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

IV)

Conclusion

V)

List of acronyms and abbreviations

VI)

References

Calculating collective effective doses for all of Japan
Estimating radiation doses for non-evacuated districts and neighboring prefectures
Describing a much higher marine discharge than previously reported
Correctly portraying the Fukushima catastrophe as an ongoing process rather than a singular event

The validity of UNSCEAR's source term estimates is in doubt
There are serious concerns regarding the calculations of internal radiation
The dose assessments of the Fukushima workers cannot be relied upon
The UNSCEAR report ignores the effects of fallout on the non-human biota
The special vulnerability of the embryo to radiation is not taken into accountNon-cancer diseases and hereditary effects were ignored by UNSCEAR
Comparisons of nuclear fallout with background radiation are misleading
UNSCEAR'S interpretations of the findings are questionable
The protective measures taken by the authorities are misrepresented
Conclusions from collective dose estimations are not presented

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNSCEAR REPORTI)

Introduction

the Human Rights Council, we are concerned that thepeople affected by Fukushima radioactive fallout are systematically deprived of their right to a standard of living
adequate for their health and well-being.

The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War (IPPNW) is a global federation of doctors working towards a healthier, safer and more peaceful world. In morethan 60 countries, our national affiliates are acting as advocates of nuclear abolition and proponents of a nuclearfree world. For its work, IPPNW was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1985.

On April 2nd, 2014, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) published its complete report “Levels and effects of radiation
exposure due to the nuclear accident after the 2011 greateast-Japan earthquake and tsunami”. In its press release,
UNSCEAR uses the following phrase to sum up its findings: “No discernible changes in future cancer rates andhereditary diseases are expected due to exposure to radiation as a result of the Fukushima nuclear accident”.1
This echoes the UNSCEAR press release from May 31st,
2013, which stated: “Radiation exposure following thenuclear accident at Fukushima-Daiichi did not cause any
immediate health effects. It is unlikely to be able to attribute any health effects in the future among the generalpublic and the vast majority of workers”.2

In 2011, the IPPNW Board of Directors unanimously agreed to adopt a more encompassing stance towards thegoal of a nuclear weapons-free world by addressing thestrong interdependency between the military and civilian
branches of the nuclear chain. A world without nuclear
weapons will only be possible if we also phase out nuclear energy. As physicians, we are also concerned about theenvironmental and health implications of all aspects of
the nuclear chain – from the public health impact of uranium mining and the creation of large amounts of radioactive tailings, the inherent dangers of processing andtransporting fissile material around the globe, the uncontrollable risks attached to the civil use of nuclear energy,
the dual use capability of fissile material for both civilian
and military purposes and the ensuing proliferation risk,
all the way to the global health impact of nuclear weapons testing and the unsolved problem of nuclear waste.
Every human being has the right to live in an environment
free of radioactive contamination, compatible with healthand well-being.

Current research gives no justification for such optimisticpresumptions. Although UNSCEAR’s evaluations of thecomplex data may be useful in assessing the consequences of the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe, we also feelthat the report does not reveal the true extent of the consequences of the disaster. The Belgian Association for
Radiation Protection, a member of UNSCEAR, criticizedthat the report has even retreated from the lessons ofChernobyl3 UNSCEAR draws mainly on data from the nuclear industry's publications rather than from independentsources and omits or misinterprets crucial aspects of radiation exposure. In question are also some of the assumptions, which UNSCEAR's calculations are based on.
Even a month after publication of the report, the important appendices containing the raw data have still notbeen made accessible, preventing independent verification of UNSCEAR's conclusions. For these reasons, doctors
from 19 affiliates of IPPNW have found the need to issue
this critical analysis of the UNSCEAR report.  

After the Fukushima nuclear meltdowns in March of 2011,
IPPNW physicians were approached by many affected families, local politicians and doctors in Fukushima andwere asked for their expertise on the health effects ofradioactive fallout. In the past three years, IPPNW physicians have been helping the people of the contaminatedregions gather valid scientific information and protect
their children from the harmful effects of radiation. In
many instances, IPPNW has had to confront and publicly
criticize attempts by the nuclear industry and its lobby
groups to downplay the consequences of the catastrophe. We supported the families, doctors and scientists
who opposed the government’s decree to raise the permissible annual radiation exposure level for children from
1 to 20 mSv and took a strong stance against the proponents of the Japanese “nuclear village” who publicly proclaimed that the increased radiation exposure would poseno harm to human health.

We are concerned that the apparently systematic underestimations and questionable interpretations in the report will be used by the nuclear industry to downplay the
expected health effects of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima. Furthermore, public authorities need reliableinterpretations of scientific data in order to act in the bestinterest of the public, as well as an honest assessment of
the limitations and uncertainties of available data and assumptions. The “precautionary principle” as defined by
the Declaration of Rio in 1992 dictates, that in situationsof scientific uncertainty, the worst possible outcome
should be presumed and acted upon. However, we feelthat the UNSCEAR report, which will most likely be considered by most public authorities as a reliable and scientifically sound basis for their policies, is over-optimistic andAfter the IPPNW World Congress in Japan in August of
2012, IPPNW physicians visited the contaminated regions
in Fukushima and participated in scientific conferences,public meetings and university lectures. Like Anand Grover, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health to4

misleading. This could negatively affect future public policy, scientific research, social support and health services
for the affected population in Japan. We are also worried
that the unsubstantiated and unreliable conclusions of
the UNSCEAR report could have negative long-term impacts on international radiation safety standards andemergency response guidelines and risk higher exposure
to future generations. For these reasons, we present our
medical and scientific insight on the UNSCEAR report, noting first the points with which we agree, followed by ourten main points of criticism.

II)ched in tellurium-132, iodine-132 and iodine-131 compared with the rest of Japan.”7 As a result, the highest
first-year thyroid dose in non-evacuated districts wasdetermined to be 52 mGy for a 1-year-old infant living inIwaki City.8 This is 52 times the annual absorbed dose to
the thyroid from natural background radiation (~ 1 mGy).9
UNSCEAR has furthermore calculated the average absorbed thyroid doses for the six neighboring prefectures Chiba, Gunma, Ibaraki, Iwate, Miyagi and Tochigi, acknowledging that radioactive fallout did not just affect people in
Fukushima Prefecture, but people all over Japan whocame in contact with airborne or ingested radionuclides.10
Contaminated rice, beef, sea-food, milk, milk-powder,green tea, vegetables, fruits and tap water were found allover mainland Japan and even in Japanese food expor
ts.11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22 However, UNSCEAR stopped
short of estimating doses for Tokyo and Saitama in the
Kanto region, immediately south of Chiba, which also received a significant fallout both on March 15th and 21st,
2011.23 Since produce as far as Shizuoka Prefecture, 140
km south of Tokyo, was found to be contaminated,24 notconsidering the radioactive fallout in the prefectures ofTokyo, Saitama, Kanagawa and Shizuoka reduces the estimated radiation doses of the population in these regions
and ultimately leads to an underestimation of the totalcollective lifetime dose of the Japanese population.

Where we agree with the UNSCEAR
reportThe UNSCEAR report represents an extensive project,dealing with a multitude of data. In particular, we arepleased to note the following four points:
1

Calculating collective effective doses for all of
Japan

UNSCEAR estimated the collective effective life-time doseof the entire Japanese population due to the Fukushima
nuclear catastrophe to be 48,000 Person-Sv and the collective absorbed life-time thyroid dose of the entire Japanese population to be 112,000 Person-Gy.4 This calculation represents a substantial step forward from the World
Health Organization (WHO) health assessment, which
restricted itself to calculating average individual life-timedoses. With the collective effective life-time doses, healtheffects in large populations can be calculated. It is appreciated that UNSCEAR acknowledges the linear non-threshold model and thereby rejects the use of a threshold forradiation effects of 100 mSv, used by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the past. However, there
are serious doubts regarding the estimations behind thecollective dose calculations in the UNSCEAR report, which
we believe results in systematic underestimations. This
will be further elaborated on in section III.
2

3

Describing a much higher marine dischargethan previously reported

TEPCO’s initial estimates of the total radioactive contamination of the Pacific Ocean due to the Fukushima nuclear
disaster came to 4.7 PBq. By far the biggest marine contamination, however, occurred from radioactive fallout inthe days and weeks following the initial nuclear meltdowns and was not considered in the TEPCO estimate.
Scientists from the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency(JAEA) and Kyoto University subsequently calculated thetotal amount of marine contamination from iodine-131
and cesium-137 to be 15 PBq.25 In October of 2011, calculations by the French Institute for Radioprotection and
Nuclear Safety (IRSN) topped this number by determining
27 PBq of cesium-137 marine contamination alone.26
According to the current UNSCEAR report, however, all ofthese estimates were still far too low. In determining marine contamination, the authors rely mostly on a study by
Kawamura et al from August of 2011, calculating the total
amount of radiation that entered the Pacific Ocean by deposition from the atmosphere to be 5 PBq for cesium-137
and 57 PBq for iodine-131 in the period of time between
March 12th and April 30th and an additional 4 PBq of
cesium-137 and 11 PBq of iodine-131 that were directly
released during the period of time from March 21st to
April 30th.27

Estimating radiation doses for non-evacuateddistricts and neighboring prefectures

UNSCEAR estimated the total effective dose5 and absorbed dose6 to the thyroid for non-evacuated districts ofFukushima Prefecture and six neighboring prefectures in
the first year following the accident. The UNSCEAR reportacknowledges that “the deposition of radionuclides in the
ground at locations within the South trace (Tomioka, Naraha, Hirono Towns and Iwaki City) was significantly enri5

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNSCEAR REPORT
However, even these figures most probably do not describe the full extent of marine contamination. Regarding
radioactive discharge before March 21st, Kawamurastates that “no direct release into the ocean was assumed
before March 21st because the monitoring data were notavailable during this period”.28 Also, his calculations do
not take into account any atmospheric emission after April 6th, taking the questionable stance that “there is no
information on the amounts released into the atmosphere from April 6. It was assumed, therefore, that the radioactive materials were not released into the atmospherefrom April 6.”29 Most incomprehensibly, however, all radioactive discharge after April 30th, 2011 is ignored, despite TEPCO’s recent revelation that since the beginningof the disaster, about 300 tons of radioactive discharge
reached the ocean every day, amounting to a total of about 346,500 tons during the past 38 months. Kawamura’s
study at least concedes that “it will probably be necessary to estimate the source term on oceanic and atmospheric releases more accurately at some point in the future.”30

contribute to the spread of radioactive particles.34, 35
In the UNSCEAR report, the Fukushima nuclear disaster isrecognized as an ongoing catastrophe, requiring constantreevaluation of the cumulative extent of contamination.
UNSCEAR notes that “releases to the marine environment
were ongoing at the end of December 2013” and that
“this may warrant further follow-up of exposures andtrends in the coming years.”36 UNSCEAR also reports that“groundwater, contaminated by numerous sources of radioactive material on site (e.g. leaks from storage tanks,
dispersal of contaminated reactor coolant, and depositionof radionuclides released to the atmosphere), represents
a continuing source of release to the ocean” and that“further releases could not be excluded in the future,
either inadvertently (e.g. from water continuing to be released from the reactor buildings into groundwater) or as
part of the waste management strategy adopted in theremediation of the FDNPS [Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear
Power Station] site.”37 In the long run, this may lead to anincrease in internal exposure in the general population
through radioactive isotopes from ground water supplies
and the food chain. This scenario is a realistic assessment,
considering that in many places in Eastern and Central
Europe, radioactive cesium-137 contained in mushrooms
and wild game still poses a public health concern, almost
three decades after the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown.38, 39
Unfortunately, these precautionary aspects were not stated in the UNSCEAR press release and seem to be ignoredby most media reports about the findings of the committee.

Given all the uncertainties and underestimations explained above, it can be summarized that UNSCEAR assumes
marine contamination of 68 PBq iodine-131 and 9 PBq
cesium-137. This figure exceeds JAEA’s estimate by morethan 5 times and TEPCO’s initial calculations by more than
15 times. Hence it is clear that Fukushima fallout constitutes the single highest radioactive discharge into theoceans ever recorded.31,32 According to the IAEA, Fukushima nuclear fallout already ranks as one of the prime radioactive pollutants of the world’s oceans, together withthe atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, the fallout from
Chernobyl and the radioactive discharge of nuclear reprocessing plants like Sellafield, UK or La Hague, France.33
4

III)

Correctly portraying the Fukushima 		catastrophe as an ongoing process rather thana singular event

Main points of criticism

While we believe that parts of the UNSCEAR report may
be useful in future assessments of the environmental andpublic health consequences of the Fukushima nuclear
meltdowns, we are concerned that this report could lay
the groundwork for a systematic underestimation of thetrue extent of the nuclear catastrophe. In its report to the
UN General Assembly, UNSCEAR states that “no discernible increased incidence of radiation-related health effects
are expected among exposed members of the public ortheir descendants”.40 To many people this statement
could be understood as a prediction that no health effects are to be expected, when in reality, it is merely suggesting that the health effects (e.g. cancer cases, noncancer diseases, genetic malformations and stillbirths) will
be too small to manifest themselves in epidemiologicalsurveys of the entire Japanese population. While weshare the view that many of the expected health effects
cannot be unambiguously attributable to the radioactive
contamination in north-eastern Japan, this is not true for

The nuclear industry commonly portrays the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima as a singular event, not taking into
consideration the continued emissions of radioactivity
after the initial meltdowns in March 2011. In particular,
there is usually no consideration of the continued dispersion of radioactive particles, leaks into soil and groundwater from radioactive storage tanks and the destroyed reactor cores, as well as the radioactive contamination ofsoil and groundwater due to washout of radioactive isotopes in fields, forests and urban settlements. Decontamination efforts have proven to be only temporary measures, as radiation is redistributed over previously
decontaminated areas from natural reservoirs such as
forests or fields during rainy and typhoon season, on windy days or during spring, when the flight of pollen can
61rare diseases such as childhood thyroid cancer, the incidence of which can be significantly increased in the aftermath of a nuclear catastrophe.41 It is commonly acceptedthat the exposure of a large population to even small
amounts of ionizing radiation leads to a predictable number of cancer cases, a fact also stated in the UNSCEAR
report. In the case of Fukushima, this affects not only the
population in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear plants,
but also people in other prefectures who can be affectedby internal radiation through contaminated food, water,
air-borne radioisotopes or the growing amounts of nuclear waste.

Several studies have dealt with the calculation of the Fukushima ‘source term’ – the total amount of radioactivity
released by the nuclear disaster.46 Even without addressing the fact that the emissions of radioactive particles
from Fukushima Dai-ichi continue unabated and that theavailable source term estimates only deal with the emissions during the first weeks of the disaster, there are still
various concerns regarding the source term assumptions
used in the UNSCEAR report. The authors state that theybase their calculations on the source term estimate of
Terada et al,47 but fail to mention that this study was undertaken by the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA),
which was severely criticized by the Fukushima Nuclear
Accident Independent Investigation Commission of theJapanese Diet [parliament] for its collusion with the nuclear industry and its carelessness in the field of nuclear
safety.48 JAEA has a clear conflict of interest when it comes to assessing the effects of the nuclear disaster andcannot be considered a neutral source of information inthis regard.

UNSCEAR bases many of its assumptions regarding medical radiation effects and dose estimates on the WHO/
IAEA reports published in May of 2012 and in February of
2013.42,43 The WHO reports were criticized for misrepresenting the true extent of radiation exposure, following
faulty assumptions on the vulnerability of the unborn
child to radiation and ignoring the ongoing emissions ofradioactivity from the damaged nuclear reactors. Also,
they excluded non-cancer effects of radiation without acritical discussion and were influenced to a large extent
by scientists with conflicts of interests because of close
ties to the nuclear industry.44,45

UNSCEAR argues that JAEA’s study, published on May
22nd, 2012, represents the most current assessment, although the renowned Norwegian Institute for Air Research(NILU) published its findings just three months earlier, inFebruary of 2012, and found a release of cesium-137 fourtimes higher than the JAEA estimate (37 PBq instead of 9
PBq). Furthermore, TEPCO’s own estimates of the releaseof iodine-131 from May 2012 were also more than fourtimes higher (500 PBq vs. 120 PBq).49 If the primary concern is to adequately assess possible health effects on the
population, it is not clear why UNSCEAR relies on the significantly lower source term estimates of the controversial Japanese Atomic Energy Agency rather than those ofneutral international institutions or of TEPCO itself.

Regarding the current UNSCEAR report, the establishedscientific principle still holds true that any assessment can
only be as good as the data and the assumptions that it isbased upon. Accordingly, our main points of criticism canbe summed up under these ten arguments:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

The validity of UNSCEAR’s source term 		
estimates is in doubt

The validity of UNSCEAR’s source term estimatesis in doubt
There are serious concerns regarding the
calculations of internal radiation
The dose assessments of the Fukushima workers
cannot be relied upon
The UNSCEAR report ignores the effects offallout on the non-human biota
The special vulnerability of the embryo toradiation is not taken into accountNon-cancer diseases and hereditary effects wereignored by UNSCEAR
Comparisons of nuclear fallout with backgroundradiation are misleading
UNSCEAR’S interpretations of the findings arequestionable
The protective measures taken by the authorities
are misrepresented
Conclusions from collective dose estimations are
not presented

Radioisotope
Iodine-131
Cesium-137

TEPCO~500 PBq~10 PBq

JAEA
120 PBq
9 PBq

NILU
37 PBq

Table 1: Source term estimates cited in UNSCEAR report 49

Another contentious issue regarding source term estimates is the release of other radioisotopes, such as radioactive strontium (Sr-89/-90). Upon ingestion, strontium
can accumulate in bone tissue, as it is very similar to calcium, and can cause bone marrow cancer and leukemia.
It is therefore a highly relevant environmental toxin andits effects on human health have been demonstrated innumerous nuclear accidents in the past decades. In its
report, UNSCEAR states that radioactive strontium isotopes were detected in concentrations that were higher
by four orders of magnitude [i.e. more than 10,000 times]
than those that preceded the accident.50 The report goes7

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNSCEAR REPORT
2

on to say that radioactive strontium concentrations werealways less than 1/10 of Cs-137 concentrations, except inDecember 2011, when radioactive strontium was directly
released into the ocean.51 With a marine release of Cs-137
in the magnitude of about 9 PBq, even one tenth of thisstill amounts to a significant amount of radioactive strontium released into the Pacific Ocean. And while most of
the initial radioactive fallout from Fukushima has gone
into the ocean, strontium was also detected in soil,
groundwater and sediment samples in different parts ofFukushima Prefecture.52

There are serious concerns regarding the
calculations of internal radiation

Similar to the source term, the estimated uptake of radioactive isotopes with food and drink significantly influences the total radiation dose an individual is exposed toafter a nuclear catastrophe. No matter how expertly undertaken, any assessment of health risks due to internalradiation can only be as exact as the assumptions it isbased upon. Furthermore, any dose calculation is influenced by the method of choosing food samples and of determining sample size. Estimates based on data whose
validity has to be questioned on the grounds of selective
sampling, distortion and omission are not acceptable as abasis on which to make predictions and health policy recommendations.55

Radioactive strontium isotopes should therefore be included in the assessment of radiation doses to the general
population. However, UNSCEAR states in its report that
“Sr-89 and Sr-90 deposited on the ground were significantly lower than those of Cs-137 and these radionuclides
were therefore not included in the Committee’s estimation of doses to the public.” This unfortunate omission isjustified in the rapporteur’s report of UNSCEAR’s May
2012 session as follows: “The first strontium measurements were received after the deadline and therefore
they are not included”.53 Between May of 2012 and Aprilof 2014, almost two years passed, but still, the health effects of radioactive strontium emitted by the crippledpower plant in Fukushima were not taken into consideration. The same is true for more than two dozen other radionuclides emitted in the course of the disaster, mostnotably Xenon-133 or plutonium.

Such concerns undermine the conclusions of the UNSCEAR report. Regarding radiation doses in foodstuff, UNSCEAR uses, as its one and only source, the still unpublisheddatabase of the IAEA and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).56 The IAEA was founded with the specificmission to “promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear
technologies” and to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world.”57 It therefore has a profound conflict of interest. The reliance on food sample data fromthe IAEA is not advisable, as it discredits the assessmentof internal radiation doses and makes the findings vulnerable to claims of manipulation.

While we realize the difficulties in assessing the true extent of radiation emissions after such a catastrophic
event, we have doubts as to the validity of the UNSCEAR
source term estimates due to the arguments listed above.
It is not clear why UNSCEAR decided against the moreconservative approach and instead chose to rely on thelowest published source term estimates and to omit relevant radioisotopes due to ‘deadline’ issues.

There are several contentious issues regarding the IAEA/
FAO foodstuff database. First of all, it only includes measurement data for I-131, Cs-134 and Cs-137 and so the
UNSCEAR report only considered these three radionuclides in the assessment of doses from ingestion.58 Other
radionuclides, such as Sr-89/90 were not taken into account. Also, no comment is made in the UNSCEAR report
regarding the sites where and how the IAEA food samples
were collected, raising the suspicion that selective sampling may have taken place.

On a side note, the aftermath of the Tohoku earthquake
and tsunami included environmental pollution from fires
at oil refineries and industrial areas, releasing numerous
toxic chemicals into the air.54 These chemicals can beharmful to humans and other living organisms, causing
respiratory, dermatological and hematological problems,
as well as carcinogenic and teratogenic effects. UNSCEAR
should acknowledge that exposures of individuals to hazardous chemical contamination due to the earthquake
and the tsunami may severely confound the relationshipbetween radiation exposure and carcinogenic effects.
The coexistence of radiation and chemical exposures
could have synergistic effects, possibly leading to earlier
and more severe health consequences. Health services inFukushima should be aware of this possibility so that proper monitoring is conducted in all those who were exposed to radioactive fallout.

To give a concrete example, we cite from a recent analysisof the WHO/IAEA dose assessment report from May of2012, which also bases its estimates on the IAEA/FAO
foodstuff database. The quantity and selection of foodsamples used in the calculations of the internal radiationdose in the WHO/IAEA report were shown to be inadequate and in stark contrast to samples published by theJapanese authorities early during the disaster.59 While thehighest level of radioactive contamination of vegetables
included in the WHO/IAEA report were samples with
54,100 Bq/kg of iodine-131 (incidentally found outside of
Fukushima Prefecture) and 41,000 Bq/kg of cesium-137,60
the Japanese Ministry for Science and Technology (MEXT)
found contaminated weed/leafy vegetable samples with8

iodine-131 concentrations as high as 2,540,000 Bq/kg(more than 40 times higher than the most contaminatedvegetable sample mentioned in the WHO/IAEA report)
and cesium-137 concentrations of up to 2,650,000 Bq/kg(more than 60 times higher than the most contaminatedvegetable sample mentioned in the WHO/IAEA report).
Such high levels of radiation in weeds/leafy vegetables
would suggest that produce grown in the same area
would have accumulated similar radiation doses. Even
one month after the meltdowns, MEXT scientists stillfound maximum concentrations above 100,000 Bq/kg for
iodine-131 (almost twice as high as in the WHO/IAEA report) and 900,000 Bq/kg for cesium-137 (more than 20
times higher than in the WHO/IAEA report) in weeds/leafy vegetables.61 Why are such highly contaminated samples not found in the WHO/IAEA report and could thisindicate a selection bias? No explanation was offered by
WHO or IAEA why these MEXT samples, readily available
on the website of the ministry and cited by numerous publications, were omitted in their database. By relying solely on the IAEA/FAO foodstuff database, UNSCEAR repeats the approach of the WHO/IAEA report, discredits
its assessment of internal radiation doses and makes its
findings vulnerable to the suspicion of selective data sampling.

It also needs to be recalled that at the beginning of thenuclear catastrophe, residents suffered from shortage offresh food and water due to the earthquake and the tsunami. During this period, there was no possibility for testing crops for radiation. People may therefore have consumed highly contaminated local food or water before
proper testing and regulation came into effect. This fact
receives no mention in the UNSCEAR report, which merely states that “there were insufficient data in the firstmonths following the accident to adopt a fine spatial resolution for the assessment of the ingestion doses.”66 This
may present an additional source of error in the calculation of the internal radiation dose.
3

The UNSCEAR report lists 24,832 people who were employed on the site of the nuclear catastrophe as plant workers, emergency personnel and clean-up staff. Regarding
their radiation exposure, UNSCEAR relies solely on data
received from TEPCO itself.67 The report lists 173 workers
exposed to effective doses greater than 100 mSv and about 24,659 workers who received effective doses of lessthan 100 mSv. Additionally, thirteen of these workers received thyroid doses in the range of 2 to 12 Gy.

		Radioisotope
Iodine-131
Cesium-137

WHO/IAEA
54,100 Bq/kg
41,000 Bq/kg

The dose assessments of the Fukushima
workers cannot be relied upon

JAEA
2,540,000 Bq/kg
2,650,000 Bq/kg

The Japanese Diet’s Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission accused TEPCO of collusion with the authorities and of ignoring warnings about
the possibility of Tsunamis damaging coastal nuclear power plants and gives the company a large part of the responsibility for the nuclear disaster.68 It is therefore only
natural to assume that TEPCO has a conflict of interest
when it comes to divulging facts and figures about radiation doses to its employees. There is no meaningful control or oversight of the nuclear industry in Japan and datafrom TEPCO has in the past frequently been found to betampered with and falsified.69

Table 2: Maximum radiation dose readings in plants 60, 61

Another important issue is the assumption of dietary habits, which play a large part in estimating internal radiation exposure. The authors of the UNSCEAR report assumed that “the majority of people in Japan obtain theirfood from supermarkets where food is sourced from thewhole of the country” and calculated the amount of internal radioactive exposure accordingly.62 This may seemlogical, but ignores the overwhelmingly rural character of
the affected region, where many people rely on farmer
markets and home-grown produce. The principle of ‘chisan-chisho’ or ‘consuming the food produced locally’ waswidely encouraged in Fukushima to the point where municipalities encouraged or decreed the use of local Fukushima products in school lunches.63 UNSCEAR admits thatpeople eating locally produced food “could have received
exposures significantly higher than those presented”.64
Also not taken into consideration was the nationwide governmental campaign ‘tabete ouen shiyou’, which promotes the purchase of food produced in Fukushima as an actof solidarity.65 Therefore, the assumption that people in
Fukushima eat food from the entire country probably
leads to an underestimation of the actual consumption ofcontaminated food.

Also, UNSCEAR states that only 15% of the total number
of affected workers were directly employed by TEPCO,70
while the rest (about 20,000) was employed by an obscure network of subcontractors and sub-sub-contractors.
Many of these sub-contracted companies employ temporary workers who are unaccounted for in the official statistics.71,72 There are also numerous reports about missing
dosimeters, deliberate lead casing of dosimeters to disable measurement and faulty radiation measuring instruments.73,74,75
Finally, short-lived radioisotopes such as tellurium-132,
iodine-132, iodine-133 and xenon-133 were excluded
from the calculations of workers’ exposure doses. As an
example, the report states that “no account was taken of
9

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNSCEAR REPORT
the potential contribution from intakes of shorter-lived
isotopes of iodine, in particular iodine-133; as a result, theassessed doses from internal exposure could have been
underestimated by about 20 per cent. For many workers,
because of the long delay before monitoring, iodine-131
was not detected in their thyroids; for those workers theinternal doses estimated by TEPCO and its contractors are
uncertain.”76

Unlike older radiation studies conducted under laboratory settings for short periods of time and focusing on acute responses to relatively high doses of radiation, thescientific studies of Mousseau, Møller, Lindgren and others address the much more complex question of whether or not there are measurable effects in natural populations following multiple generations of chronic exposure
to low doses of ionizing radiation.

For all of these reasons, it is difficult to accept the data
provided by TEPCO as a representative and valid basis forprognostic calculations. The UNSCEAR report, however,bases its health assessments entirely on the data fromTEPCO, most probably underestimating health effects inthis population.

As such, their observations reflect cumulative effects under natural conditions - effects that cannot be observed
under the artificial conditions used by most conventional
toxicology studies. Underlining this point, a recent review
in the Journal of Environmental Radiology suggested that
responses by organisms in Chernobyl were about eighttimes larger than predicted by conventional models.101

We also disagree with the assessment of UNSCEAR that“studies would lack sufficient statistical power to assess
the risk of cancer due to irradiation; the doses would be
too low and the population size too small”.77 Numerous
studies have shown significant health effects from lowlevel radiation exposure in very diverse populations who
were exposed to very different levels of radiation: fromuranium miners,78-83 downwinders of nuclear
tests,84-86 workers in nuclear factories,87-90 to people living in the vicinity of power plants91 and the clean-up
workers (liquidators) in Chernobyl.92-94 In the end, it is aquestion of study design and strict adherence to scientificprinciples, which in the case of TEPCO cannot be assumed, judging from the unwarranted magnitude of data
manipulation in recent years.78,79,80,81,82,83, 84,85,86, 87,88,89,90, 91,

UNSCEAR should include the findings of the current fieldstudies from Chernobyl and Fukushima, given their publication in peer reviewed scientific journals. Ignoring suchstudies gives the appearance of bias or a lack of rigor by
the UNSCEAR proceedings that can only serve to undermine any constructive or useful advice the committee
might have.
5

The UNSCEAR report divides the affected population into
three age groups: adults, children and infants. The special
situation of the unborn child was specifically not taken
into consideration: “The Committee did not explicitly estimate doses to the fetus or breast-fed infants because
they would have been similar to those to other age groups
for both external and internal radiation exposure.”102

92,93,94

4

The special vulnerability of the embryo toradiation is not taken into account

The UNSCEAR report ignores the effects offallout on the non-human biota

This approach goes against basic principles of neonatal
physiology and radiobiology, as the special vulnerabilityof the unborn child is completely ignored. While it is
known that the radiation dose for an embryo from external exposure is lower than for children and adults due tothe additional shielding of the mother’s skin, abdominal
muscles and uterus, this is not true for internal radiation,
which is the much more relevant factor in a nuclear catastrophe. Iodine-131, ingested or inhaled by the mother,accumulates in the fetal thyroid gland and can lead to thedevelopment of thyroid diseases and cancer after birth.
Another radioisotope, cesium-137, freely passes the developing placenta into the embryo, and also accumulates
in amniotic fluid and the bladder, affecting the unborn
child from all sides with beta- and gamma-radiation. Most
importantly, the effect of a given dose of radiation posesa much greater risk for an embryo than it would in children: high tissue-metabolism and mitosis rates of cells
increase the chance for mutations of the genome. As theObserved effects of low-level radiation on non-humanbiota can help to understand the consequences to humans. In its Fukushima report, UNSCEAR disregards current scientific fieldwork on actual radiation effects bystating that “the observations are not consistent with theCommittee’s assessment”95 and rather refers to its own
reports on the effects of radiation on non-human biota
from 1996 and 2008.96,97
This implies that no new knowledge has been acquiredsince then, even though a growing number of publishedecological and genetic studies from both Chernobyl and
Fukushima find substantial evidence for low dose rate radiation effects generating genetic damage such as increased mutation rates, as well as developmental abnormalities, cataracts, tumors, smaller brain sizes in birds andmammals and further injuries to populations, biologicalcommunities and ecosystems.98,99,100
10

6immune system and cell-repair mechanisms of the unborn child are not yet fully developed, they cannot adequately prevent malignancies from developing.103 UNSCEAR does state that “previous experience indicates that therelative risks for certain cancers in certain populationgroups (notably following exposure as fetus, or during infancy and childhood) are higher than for the population
average”, but gives no special consideration to unborn
children in its assessments.104

Non-cancer diseases and hereditary effects
were ignored by UNSCEAR

Non-cancer health effects such as cardiovascular diseases, endocrinological and gastrointestinal disorders, infertility, genetic mutations in offspring and miscarriages
have been reported in medical literature but are not considered in the UNSCEAR report. Instead, the authors cite
the WHO/IAEA health risk assessment, which “did not
expect any deterministic effects in any of the various
groups”. Also, they “did not expect prenatal exposure toincrease ‘the incidence of spontaneous abortion, miscarriages, perinatal mortality, congenital effects or cognitive
impairment.’”113

It is widely accepted that “in utero exposure to ionizing
radiation can be teratogenic, carcinogenic or mutagenic.
The effects are directly related to the level of exposureand the stage of fetal development. The fetus is most susceptible to radiation during organogenesis (two to sevenweeks after conception) and in the early fetal period.”105
Every exposure to ionizing radiation carries a quantifiablerisk, as numerous studies since the late 1950’s were able
to show:

This position takes for granted that non-cancer effects ofradiation would have to be deterministic, while it is just as
reasonable to assume that they may be stochastic in nature, similar to the cancer-effects of radiation. Large epidemiological studies have shown undeniable associationsof low dose ionizing radiation to non-cancer health effects. As these associations have not been scientificallychallenged, the internationally acknowledged precautionary principle in public health dictates that broad preventive measures should be taken to minimize radiation exposure of all persons at risk.

Dr. Alice Stewart undertook the first epidemiological studies of childhood cancers caused by in utero x-ray exposure. She was able to show that a single x-ray to the abdomen of a pregnant woman could result in a 50%
increase in childhood cancer incidence. Also, her studies
showed that the risk of childhood cancer increases linearly with the number of in utero x-ray exposures. No confounding variables could be identified that could offer
alternative explanations to these effects.106, 107

One striking example of non-cancer diseases associatedwith ionizing radiation is the group of cardiovascular disorders. There are numerous studies that suggest a stochastic risk of ionizing radiation for the cardiovascularsystem, possibly through radiation damage to the epithelial lining of blood vessels, similar to the effects of highblood sugar, cholesterol, fats, blood pressure or other independent risk factors:

In 1997, Doll and Wakeford concluded that “a consistentassociation has been found in many case-control studies
in different countries. The excess relative risk obtained
from combining the results of these studies has high statistical significance and suggests that, in the past, a radiographic examination of the abdomen of a pregnant woman produced a proportional increase in risk of about
40%. [...] It is concluded that radiation doses of the orderof 10 mGy received by the fetus in utero produce a consequent increase in the risk of childhood cancer.”108

Little et al proposed a plausible model for cardiovasculardisease due to fractionated low-dose ionizing radiation
exposure and suggests a linear correlation between radiation dose and effects, similar to the model used for estimating cancer cases.114

Numerous large-scale studies from around the world confirmed the findings of Stewart et al and have led to amuch more careful approach towards antenatal radiation
exposure.109, 110, 111

A Swedish study on women who received radiotherapy
due to breast-cancer showed a radiation-induced increase of cardiovascular diseases.115

It is therefore not acceptable to arbitrarily have a reference 1-year-old infant represent all infants younger than 5,
including the unborn child.112 In dismissing the effect ofthe physiological differences between an unborn and an
infant, the authors of the report effectively underestimate the health risks of this particularly vulnerable population.

A Japanese study on the Hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki found increased risks of heart disease and strokein a radiation dose range of 0-2 Gy, supporting a linear
model similar to the one used in cancer rate estimationand suggesting excess risk even at lower doses.116

11

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNSCEAR REPORT
7

Comparisons of nuclear fallout with background radiation are misleading

there is a linear relationship between radiation dose andcancer incidence. According to the comprehensive report, published in 2006 by the US National Academy of
Sciences Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of
Ionizing Radiation (BEIR-VII), full-body exposure of 10,000
people with 1 mSv of radiation stochastically leads to one
excess case of cancer. Put differently, a person exposed
to a full-body dose of 1 mSv has a 1/10,000 chance ofdeveloping cancer because of this exposure. At a dose of
10 mSv, this risk is already increased to 1/1,000 and with
100 mSv the risk is 1/100 or 1%. This calculation is true fornatural background radiation, medical radiation and radioactive fallout from a nuclear catastrophe.

The UNSCEAR report concludes that “for the general public of Japan, inhabiting areas where exposures from the
FDNPS accident in the first year were of the order of or
below annual background exposure to natural sources ofradiation (and lifetime exposures are expected to bemuch below those incurred from background radiation),
the Committee estimated that risks over their lifetimes
were so low that no discernible increase in the future incidence of health effects due to radiation exposure would
be expected among the population or their descendants.”117 This comparison is often brought up to downplay the health impact of low-level radiation and apartfrom being misleading, can cause systematic underestimations of the public health impact of a nuclear disaster.

It is therefore not scientific to argue that natural background radiation is safe or that excess radiation from nuclear fallout that stays within the dose range of natural
background radiation is harmless. If this were true, thendoctors should have no qualms about placing a child or apregnant woman under an x-ray and irradiate them with
1.5 mSv, the equivalent dose of Japanese background radiation (that would be approximately 3 x-ray examinations of the abdomen or 75 x-ray examinations of thechest)131. The medical profession, however, is well awareof the harmful effects of ionizing radiation even at doselevels comparable to background radiation. Large epidemiological studies were able to show significant medical
effects of low-level ionizing radiation. A strong correlation
between in utero x-ray exposure and childhood cancers
was already found in the 1950’s.132 More current studies
were able to show that the average cancer risk of people
who underwent CT-scans with an average dose of 4.5 mSv
rose by 24% for the first CT and by 16% for every subsequent examination. The highest increase in cancer risk
was seen in young children.133,134 Avoiding unnecessary
medical radiation from CT scans or x-rays are therefore
important public health measures, which can help prevent excess cancer cases. This principle of minimizationmust also be applied to nuclear fallout.

First of all, it is important to realize that some forms ofradiation affect the whole body (terrestrial or cosmic radiation), while ingested or inhaled radioactive particles
may only affect particular organs: iodine-131, for example, is mainly incorporated in the thyroid gland and cancause malignancies in this location, while strontium-90 is
mainly deposited in bones, causing leukemia or bone cancers. Cesium-137, on the other hand, is distributed fairly
evenly in most soft tissues, leading to the development ofsolid tumors. However, all of them have one thing in common: they deliver their radioactive dose directly and continuously to the surrounding tissue and therefore pose amuch larger danger to internal organs than external background radiation. Organ doses are therefore a better tool
for predicting cancer incidence than whole-body doses.
To put this in perspective, the average natural background radiation that an individual in Japan receives in
the course of a year amounts to ~1.5 mSv and consists of~0.3 mSv cosmic background radiation, ~0.4 mSv terrestrial radiation from radioisotopes in the ground, such as
potassium-40 or uranium-238, ~0.4 mSv per year fromthe inhalation of airborne radioactive isotopes (mostly
radon gas in houses) and ~0.4 mSv per year from ingestion, because most foods contain at least some amountof inherent radiation.118 This natural background radiation
is not harmless. Numerous well-designed studies haveshown significant associations between cancer levels andbackground radiation119, 120, 121, most notably naturally occurring radiation in groundwater122, soil123, radon levels
in homes124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, as well as the exposure to cosmic background radiation in airplanes.130 It can be assumed that a certain proportion of the ‘naturally’ occurringcases of cancer are caused by exposure to natural background radiation.

8

UNSCEAR’s interpretations of findings arequestionable

The authors of the UNSCEAR report state that their job
was to assess only radiation-related health effects.135
Apart from these, it is important to realize that a nuclear
catastrophe such as the one in Fukushima has a severe
impact on population health for a number of reasons, beit the acute stress on people during the evacuation process, psychosomatic effects and post-traumatic stressdisorder, chronic effects on people in the contaminatedzone due to lack of physical exercise outdoors, etc. These
factors should not be used to dismiss the effects of radiation exposure, however. Even after the Chernobyl disaster, the health effects on the group of liquidators were

The international scientific consensus is that there is nothreshold below which radiation poses no harm. Instead,12

blamed on “stress and unhealthy lifestyle”.136 This should
not be repeated in Fukushima.

made of external exposure based on environmental measurements.”140 Also, “relatively few measurements offoodstuff were made in the first months” and that there“was insufficient information on the transfer of radionuclides to food as a function of time for foods produced inJapan.”141 With these uncertainties, how can the collective dose estimates be presented with the level of certainty employed in the executive summary?

In its press release, UNSCEAR comes to the conclusionthat “no discernible changes in future cancer rates andhereditary diseases are expected due to exposure to radiation as a result of the Fukushima nuclear accident; and,that no increases in the rates of birth defects are expected.”137 It is important to realize that this statement is notsaying that there will be no health effects, only that commonly used epidemiological methods will not be able tofind them. This is an old strategy, already used for decades by tobacco companies or the automotive industry inorder to argue against scientific evidence showing a causal link between cigarette smoke or unfiltered exhaust
fume and lung disease. A cancer does not carry a label oforigin and can never be attributed to a single cause. However, when epidemiological evidence becomes overwhelming, causal links can be established with reasonablecertainty.

9

The protective measures taken by the 		
authorities are misrepresented

In its report and press releases, UNSCEAR frequently applauds the protective measures taken by the authorities.
Without wanting to underestimate the laudable efforts ofmany tens of thousands of emergency workers, relief coordinators and others involved in the operations aimed atpreventing even higher radiation exposure in the general
population, it seems odd that a scientific body like UNSCEAR would turn a blind eye to the many grave mistakesof the Japanese disaster management, which have rightly
been criticized not only by citizens, journalists, doctors,
scientists and politicians in the affected prefectures, butalso by the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission of the Japanese Diet:

The report itself states that “the Committee has used thephrase “no discernible increase” to express the idea thatcurrently available methods would most likely not be able
to demonstrate an increased incidence in disease statistics due to radiation exposure. This does not rule out thepossibility of future excess cases or disregard the suffering associated with any such cases should they occur.”138“The central government was not only slow in informing
municipal governments about the nuclear power plant
accident, but also failed to convey the severity of the accident. […] Specifically, only 20 percent of the residents ofthe town hosting the plant knew about the accident whenevacuation from the 3km zone was ordered at 21:23 on
the evening of March 11. Most residents within 10km of
the plant learned about the accident when the evacuation order was issued at 5:44 on March 12, more than 12hours after the Article 15 notification [nuclear disaster
response] - but received no further explanation of the accident or evacuation directions. Many residents had toflee with only the barest necessities and were forced tomove multiple times or to areas with high radiation levels.
[…] Some people evacuated to areas with high levels ofradiation and were then neglected, receiving no further
evacuation orders until April. […]However, most people reading the report, its brief executive summary or the press release, will understand thatno health effects are to be expected. By phrasing its conclusion in such a way that would most likely be misunderstood by most people, the authors are putting a ‘spin’on their report. The report’s findings, however, give nojustification for such an optimistic conclusion. The report
does not adhere to scientific standards of neutrality, butsystematically underestimates the health risks for the affected population.
Also, it is worrying that when comparing the complete
292-page report with the short 22 page summary for the
UN General Assembly and the one-page press release,the level of certainty with which interpretations are presented seems to increase, the more succinct the text becomes. While the complete report, supposedly written byscientists for scientists, includes a large number of uncertainties, these are not carried through to the more widely read, shorter documents, aimed at policy-makers, media and the general public. In its complete report,
UNSCEAR admits to “incomplete knowledge about therelease rates of radionuclides over time and the weather
conditions during the releases.”139 The authors go on tostate that “there were insufficient measurements of gamma dose rate and of radionuclides in air during the passage of the radioactive plumes for an assessment to be

The Commission concludes that the situation continued
to deteriorate because the crisis management system of
the Kantei [office of the Japanese prime minister], the regulators and other responsible agencies did not function
correctly. […]Residents’ confusion over the evacuation stemmed fromthe regulators’ negligence and failure over the years to
implement adequate measures against a nuclear disaster,
as well as a lack of action by previous governments andregulators focused on crisis management. The crisis ma13

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNSCEAR REPORT
nagement system that existed for the Kantei and the regulators should protect the health and safety of the public, but it failed in this function. […] the government andthe regulators are not fully committed to protecting public health and safety; […] they have not acted to protect
the health of the residents and to restore their welfare.”142

spersed over the Pacific Ocean and not over large municipal areas.151 The reason for this were not the “numberof measures to protect the public, including immediateand late (‘deliberate’) evacuation, sheltering in homes,
restricting distribution and consumption of contaminatedfoodstuffs”152, as the UNSCEAR report implies, but rather
sheer luck that the wind turned toward the northeast andnot towards the south, where Metropolitan Tokyo, with apopulation of more than 35 million people, was at risk ofheavy contamination. One single day of wind blowing towards the coast, however, led to a large radioactive trace
reaching dozens of kilometers inland from the crippledplant, forcing tens of thousands of people to evacuatefrom small towns and villages. Fukushima clearly showedthat even a highly industrialized country such as Japan isunable to control the inherent dangers of nuclear energy.

The distribution of stable iodine right after the nuclear
meltdown illustrates quite vividly how UNSCEAR’s praisesof the protective measures taken by Japanese authorities
are often ill-deserved. According to UNSCEAR, “medical
countermeasures included the use of stable iodine forthyroid blocking.”143 Only careful readers will notice thatstable iodine was only prescribed to about 2,000 workers
involved in the emergency response and not to the general public.144 In fact, the Japanese Diet’s Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission concluded that “although the positive effects of administering
stable iodine and the proper timing were fully known, thegovernment’s nuclear emergency response headquarters
and the prefectural government failed to give proper instructions to the public.”145 This grave error caused thousands of children to become irradiated with iodine-131.
The WHO/IAEA report on Fukushima concluded that due
to the lack of stable iodine distribution, the estimatedthyroid doses of the affected population would be “higher
than those expected in people who have undergone thyroid blocking to reduce the uptake of radioactive iodine.”146

10

Conclusions from collective dose estimations
are not presented

The UNSCEAR report includes a number of dose estimations, which can help understand the expected healtheffects of the nuclear catastrophe in Japan. While thescientific basis of the calculations underlying these estimates is questionable, as was illustrated in previous chapters, it is the interpretation of the results that is mostcritical. UNSCEAR lists collective doses in its report, butdoes not explain the expected cancer cases that would
result from these doses. In the following chapter, we will
try to explain in layman’ terms, which health consequences can be expected for the population of Japan, basedon the UNSCEAR calculations – keeping in mind that thesemost probably represent underestimations for the reasons listed above. We will restrict ourselves to cancer cases, while we have already stated above that non-cancer
diseases also represent a substantial part of the total
health effects of a nuclear catastrophe such as the one in
Fukushima.

Unlike the members of UNSCEAR, we are disturbed by theevidence that the authorities have not made public healthand safety their top priority. The Japanese government
has failed in the paramount duty of protecting its citizens.
By raising the permissible annual exposure limits to 20
mSv on April 19th, 2011, the authorities have effectively
forced many children to live in radioactively contaminated areas.147 Only after protests by parent organizations,scientists and doctors, the government advised to use
1-20 mSv per year in schools as a guide level with theaim of reducing the annual dose to 1 mSv or less.  Unfortunately, this recommendation is  not mandatory and has
not been fully implemented.148 The Japanese Ministry of
Education made a decision to restart schools in Fukushima soon after the accident without providing air conditioning units for classrooms so that windows could remain
shut to keep radioactive dust from drifting in.149 School
officials have been ignoring radiation hot spots just a few
feet outside of school premises and are reintroducing Fukushima rice to school lunches.150 None of these issues
are talked about in the UNSCEAR report.

Overall cancer cases
Today we know that there is a linear relationship between
the dose of radiation exposure and the risk of developing
cancer, with no threshold under which radiation doses
would be harmless. This model is called the linear nonthreshold model and is internationally accepted by organizations such as UNSCEAR or the WHO. In order to calculate how many cases of cancer are to be expected in an
irradiated population, it is necessary to know two variables: the total collective lifetime effective dose and theattributable cancer risk for a defined effective dose.

Finally, it is important to realize that the people of Japan
have been spared the worst-case scenario, as about 80%of the radioactive fallout of the nuclear meltdowns di-Starting with the collective lifetime effective dose, UNSCEAR calculates that in the first year of the catastrophe,14

infants in Fukushima Prefecture were exposed to wholebody radiation doses of 1.6 to 13 mSv.153 To put this inperspective, the average annual dose from natural background radiation in Japan is about 1.5 mSv, so that eventhe least exposed children in Fukushima still received
more than twice their normal radiation dose in the firstyear. These and all other estimates regarding radiation
doses are average calculations. True doses depend on alarge number of lifestyle and dietary habits, as well as
individual health factors, so that certain people, especially children, may have incurred higher doses. Because radioactive fallout and food contamination extended beyond the boundaries of Fukushima Prefecture, people allover Japan were exposed to increased levels of radiation.
According to UNSCEAR, infants in other parts of the country received whole-body doses of 0.2-2.5 mSv in the firstyear of the catastrophe.154 In general, adults received lower first-year doses than children: 1.0 to 9.3 mSv in Fukushima Prefecture and 0.1 to 1.4 in the rest of Japan, according to UNSCEAR’s estimations.155 From these averagewhole-body exposure data, UNSCEAR calculated the collective life-time effective dose for the entire Japanese
population to be 48.000 Person-Sv.156 We will use this figure in our assessment, keeping in mind that due to thereasons listed in the previous chapters and because of
UNSCEAR’s conservative method of calculating lifetime
dose, this figure most probably represents a systematic
underestimation.

estimating cancer incidence and a range of 0.05-0.19/PSv
for estimating cancer mortality.
BEIR VII risk factors
With DDREF
Without DDREF

Incidence
0.06 – 0.23 / Psv
0.09 – 0.35 / Psv

Mortality
0.03 – 0.12 / Psv
0.05 – 0.19 / Psv

Table 3: Cancer risk factors from BEIR VII report 158

Bringing together the estimated total collective dose of
48,000 Person-Sv and the risk factors explained above,
we arrive at an estimated 4,300 to 16,800 excess cases ofcancer due to the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe in Japanin the coming decades, with mortality figures ranging
between 2,400 and 9,100. UNSCEAR may call these numbers insignificant and with Japan’s relatively high baseline
incidence of cancer (approximately 630,000 new cases ofcancer per year)162, it can rightly be assumed that the additional 4,300-16,800 Fukushima-associated cancer cases
may not be noticed in national epidemiological statistics.
From an individual’s perspective however, every case ofcancer is one too many and we as doctors know the tragic
consequences that cancer has on a person’s physical andmental health, as well as the situation of the entire family.
In the case of a nuclear catastrophe, these excess cancer
cases represent preventable and man-made diseases andshould be given special attention by public health institutions.
Radiation exposure of the thyroid

The second important variable in estimating cancer incidences is the risk factor for a given radiation dose. The
most widely used source of such risk factors is the BEIR
VII report. In this report, the age- and sex-averaged lifetime attributable risk of cancer is calculated to be 1,190(615-2,305) cases per 10,000 Person-Sv (~ 0.06-0.23/PSv),
and the age- and sex-averaged lifetime attributable cancer mortality risk 610 (305-1240) cases per 10,000 Person-Sv (~ 0.03-0.12/PSv).157 The BEIR VII report still uses
an arbitrary reduction factor for low-dose ionizing radiation (DDREF) of 1.5, however. This factor has been deemed obsolete by recent studies, referenced in the latest
WHO publication on Fukushima, which states that “aDDREF of 1 would be reasonable.”158 So without the
DDREF of 1.5, the age- and sex-averaged lifetime attributable risk of developing cancer derived from the BEIR VII
report is 1.785 (923-3,458) cases per 10,000 Person-Sv (~0.09-0.35/PSv), and mortality risk 915 (458-1,860) cases
per 10,000 Person-Sv (~0.05-0.19/PSv). Recent studies
that analyze the effects of low-dose ionizing radiation on
down-winders of nuclear tests or radiation workers inover 15 countries showed that risk factors of 0.4/PSv forcancer incidence and 0.2/Sv for cancer mortality wereeven more realistic in assessing the relationship between
radiation dose and cancer.159,160,161 Nevertheless, in thispaper we will use the widely accepted numbers from the
BEIR VII report and hence a range of 0.09-0.35/PSv for

The thyroid gland is of special interest after a nuclear catastrophe, because one of the main isotopes of radioactive fallout after nuclear meltdowns is iodine-131. If ingested, iodine-131 behaves like normal iodine and isincorporated into the thyroid gland. Here, it damages
surrounding tissue with beta- and gamma-radiation until
its full decay (it has a half-life of 8 days), causing thyroid
cancer.163 After Chernobyl, the most prominently observed type of malignancy was thyroid cancer. A study published in the International Journal of Cancer in 2006 predicted more than 15,000 excess cases of thyroid cancer
due to nuclear fallout.164
The topic of thyroid cancer is predominantly a pediatricissue, as children’s susceptibility to radioactive fallout is
proportionally higher than that of adults due to their playing and eating habits. In addition, their mucous membranes have a greater permeability and their respiratory minute volume is higher so that larger amounts of fallout
are absorbed. Above-average tissue-metabolism and highrates of mitosis increase the chance that mutations cause
malignancies before they can be stopped by the body’s
self-regulatory mechanisms. As the children’s immune
systems and cell-repair mechanisms are not yet fully developed, these mechanisms cannot adequately prevent
15

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNSCEAR REPORT
the development of cancer. A recent meta-analysis foundthat “qualitative and quantitative physiological and epidemiological evidence supports infants being more vulnerable to cancer” and estimated that infants have about
10 times higher radiation risks per unit dose when it comes to radioactive fallout than adults,165 while the moreconservative International Commission on RadiologicalProtection (ICRP) assumes that the sensitivity to ionizing
radiation in young children and fetuses is higher than in
adults by only a factor of 3.166 Several international studies also found that thyroid nodules in children have amuch higher malignancy rate than in adults, between 2
and 50%.167,168,169 It becomes clear that any assessment of
thyroid pathologies in the wake of a nuclear disasterneeds to adopt a differentiated approach towards the different age groups. Looking at the methodology of the
UNSCEAR dose assessments, it is highly questionable
whether all of these factors were appropriately taken into
consideration.170

of the order of 1 mGy”.176 That means that in the first yearof the catastrophe alone, the thyroids of infants in Fukushima Prefecture were exposed to harmful radiation 15 to
83 times higher than natural background radiation. Theseand all other estimates regarding radiation doses are average calculations. True doses depend on a large numberof lifestyle and dietary habits, as well as individual healthfactors, so that certain people may have incurred higher
thyroid doses. Because radioactive iodine did not stop at
the prefectural borders of Fukushima and was found inmilk, seafood, meat, water, vegetables and rice from theregion, infants in other parts of the country were also
exposed to radioactive iodine-131 and received thyroid
doses about 2.6 to 15 times the normal annual dose. In
general, adults received lower first-year doses: 7.2 to 35
mGy in Fukushima Prefecture and 0.5 to 5.1 mGy in therest of Japan. Extrapolating the data of the average thyroid exposure, UNSCEAR calculated the collective absorbed life-time dose to the thyroid for all of Japan to be
112,000 Person-Gy177. We will use this figure in our assessment, keeping in mind that due to the many reasons
listed above and the very conservative way of calculating
lifetime doses employed by UNSCEAR, this number mostprobably represents a systematic underestimation andmay in fact be significantly higher.

In the first three months of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, radioactive iodine was detected in milk, drinking water, vegetables, rain and groundwater, as well as soil samples around Northeastern Japan,171 including parts ofdowntown Tokyo, were iodine-131 levels reached 36,000
Bq/m2 on March 23rd, 2011.172 In this context, it is important to recall that the national emergency authorities
in Japan did not give the order to administer iodine prophylaxis to the general population, potentially exposing
many children to radioactive iodine-131. According to theWHO, it can be assumed that “stable iodine tablets were
not taken by members of the public, either in Japan orelsewhere. Therefore the estimated equivalent thyroid
doses are higher than those expected in people who haveundergone thyroid blocking to reduce the uptake of radioactive iodine.”173

Regarding the risk factor, we again draw from the BEIR VII
report, which calculates the age- and sex-averaged lifetime attributable risk of thyroid cancer to be 60.5 cases
per 10,000 Person-Gy (~0,006/PGy).178 As this figure still
includes the obsolete DDREF of 1.5, the corrected ageand sex-averaged lifetime attributable risk of thyroid cancer derived from the BEIR VII report is 90.75 cases per
10,000 Person-Gy (0,009/PGy).
Taking this number and the collective absorbed life-timedose of 112,000 PGy, we arrive at an estimated 1,016 cases of thyroid cancer due to the nuclear catastrophe in
Fukushima. UNSCEAR may be right that this number does
not constitute a “discernible increased incidence”179 of
thyroid cancer, but to us doctors, it means that for morethan 1,000 people, mostly children, the direct consequence of the multiple meltdowns, the uncoordinatedevacuations, the failure to distribute stable iodine tablets
and the continuing cover-up of the risks of radioactive
contamination will be thyroid cancer.

Like all forms of malignancies, radiogenic thyroid cancer
rates show a linear relationship with radiation exposure
doses. In order to calculate how many cases of thyroid
cancer are to be expected in an exposed population, we
again need to know two figures: the total collective lifetime organ dose of the Japanese population and the attributable thyroid cancer risk for a defined organ dose.
Starting with the collective lifetime organ dose, UNSCEAR
has looked at the thyroid exposure from external and internal radiation in Fukushima Prefecture and the rest of
the country. Most affected by radioactive fallout are thechildren. According to UNSCEAR, in the first year of thecatastrophe, the thyroids of infants in Fukushima Prefecture were exposed to radiation doses between 15 and 83
mGy, “as much as one half of which arose from the ingestion of radioactivity in food”.174, 175 To put this in perspective, “the average annual absorbed dose to the thyroidfrom naturally occurring sources of radiation is typically

While it is often claimed by the nuclear lobby that the riseof thyroid cancer is of relatively small concern due togood treatment options, we should not underestimate
the impact of such diseases on children and their families.
The necessary operation and removal of the entire thyroid carries with it not just a psychological impact, but also
certain perioperative risks connected with general anesthesia and the close proximity of the vagus nerve to theoperation field. The lifelong need to take artificial thyroid16

hormones, frequent medical follow-ups, blood tests, ultrasounds, possibly fine-needle biopsies and the constantfear of a possible relapse are all very serious issues for theindividual patients and their families. The US National
Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements(NCRP) estimates that 7% of thyroid cancers caused byradiation would be fatal.180 This would mean that of theapproximately 1,000 estimated excess cases of thyroid
cancers, about 70 would lead to death. The number of
non-fatal cases, which lead to substantial hospitalizationand loss of quality of life cannot be adequately assessed,
but also have to be taken into consideration.

University from November 12th, 2013 and February 7th,
2014 were not included, even though the number of diagnosed thyroid cancers has increased from the 9 cases
mentioned in UNSCEAR’s report to the current number of
33, with another 42 suspect malignancy cases waiting for
further diagnostics. Even with an understanding that the
Fukushima thyroid examination is an ongoing process andthat secondary examination for the first round is not yet
complete, UNSCEAR could strive to incorporate the latest
results with an accurate number of cancer cases, insteadof mentioning just part of the available results.
Moreover, UNSCEAR cites an ultrasound examination in
the prefectures of Aomori, Nagasaki and Yamanashi as acomparison study, supposedly representing the normal
baseline risks.185 UNSCEAR fails to mention, however, thatthe cohorts were not matched for age, sex or other demographic characteristics and consisted primarily of students from institutions associated with national universities, not representative of the general population. In
addition, the length of ultrasound examination was said
to be longer for this study, potentially leading to moredetailed examination than the Fukushima examination.

In addition to the predictions of future thyroid cancer cases on the basis of dose estimates, there is already epidemiological data available from the first round of thyroid examinations on children aged 18 or less on 11 March
2011, performed between October 2011 and March
2014.181 It is important to note that from this first roundof screening, it is not possible to make assertions regarding the incidence of thyroid cancer, as the screening of
the entire cohort of children in the prefecture yields theprevalence (i.e. the total number of cases in the population) of thyroid cancers and only future screenings will
reveal the incidence (i.e. the rise in numbers from year toyear). So far, the prevalence of tumor-suspect thyroid biopsies in Fukushima is 29.1 per 100,000 children under
the age of 18 (absolute number: 74) and the prevalenceof confirmed cases of thyroid cancer 13.0 per 100,000(absolute number 33).182 In comparison, the incidence of
thyroid cancer in Japanese youths (< 19 years) in the years
2000 to 2007 was 0.35 per 100,000.183 While we cannot
directly compare the prevalence found in the screening
program to the incidence levels before the Fukushima disaster, this is nonetheless a worrying number, with thenumbers of detected thyroid cancers higher than expected.

Instead, UNSCEAR cited a review article published on December 3rd, 2013, stating, “The prevalence of clinicallyoccult small papillary thyroid cancers could be as high as
35% in many parts of the world,” suggesting that the highrates of cancers found in the Fukushima thyroid examinations are simply screening effects and that other pediatricpopulations would have similar rates of cancer if screened.186 This statement, however, is solely based on a Finnish autopsy study, which, interestingly enough, mentions
a prevalence of 27% and not 35% and specifically foundno clinically occult thyroid cancers in children under theage of 18. This fact is not mentioned by UNSCEAR, as it
contradicts the screening effect hypothesis.187

The assurance in the UNSCEAR report that these cases ofthyroid cancer in Fukushima are “consistent with resultsfrom a study of a cohort of Ukrainians (the “UkrAm cohort”) who had been exposed during childhood or adolescence to 131I from the Chernobyl accident”184 is difficult
to accept, as it is not explained how supposed “non-radiation-related” thyroid cancer cases were differentiatedfrom those with a “radiation-relation” in a population ofirradiated children in the Soviet Union in the late 1980’s,
when modern ultrasound devices were not available andwhere, due to governmental restrictions and limited resources, little scientific workup actually took place.
There are also some other inconsistencies in the UNSCEAR report regarding the Fukushima thyroid examinations.
While the report was released in April of 2014, it onlyused the data of the thyroid examinations up to July 31st,
2013. More current publications by Fukushima Medical
17

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNSCEAR REPORT

IV)Conclusion

have presented a more realistic picture of what effects
people can expect from the radioactive fallout in the coming decades, including thyroid cancer, leukemia, solid
tumors, non-cancer diseases and genetic defects, all ofwhich have been found in the population affected by the
Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe.

The Fukushima nuclear disaster is far from over. Despite
the declaration of “cold shutdown” by the Japanese government in December of 2011, the crippled reactors
have not yet achieved a stable status and even UNSCEAR
admits that emissions of radioisotopes are continuing unabated.188 TEPCO is struggling with an enormous amountof contaminated water, which continues to leak into thesurrounding soil and sea. Large quantities of contaminated cooling water are accumulating at the site. Failures in
the makeshift cooling systems are occurring repeatedly.
The discharge of radioactive waste will most likely continue for a long time.
Both the damaged nuclear reactors and the spent fuelponds contain vast amounts of radioactivity and arehighly vulnerable to further earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons and human error. Catastrophic releases of radioactivity could occur at any time and eliminating this risk
will take many decades. Moreover, many of Japan’s othernuclear power stations are just as sensitive to seismic catastrophes as the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant.
Attempts to make reliable forecasts for the next decades
seem futile against the backdrop of so much uncertainty.
While much of the UNSCEAR report represents useful andimportant groundwork for future assessments, it does
not in any way justify the type of ‘all-clear’ that UNSCEAR
is proposing.

Even with more realistic data, however, the number ofcancer cases induced by Fukushima radioactive fallout
may still be considered insignificant to the members of
UNSCEAR, especially given the relatively high baseline incidence of cancer in Japan. From a physician’s perspective
however, every preventable case of cancer is one too
many and the tragic consequences that cancer has on a
person’s physical and mental health, as well as the situation of the entire family have to be considered.
To reduce the horrible effects of the Fukushima nuclear
disaster on tens of thousands of families to a statisticalproblem and to dismiss these individual stories of suffering by stating that “radiation exposure following the nuclear accident at Fukushima-Daiichi [...] is unlikely to beable to attribute any health effects in the future among
the general public and the vast majority of workers”189 isinappropriate for a committee of the United Nations, anorganization that prides itself on the Declaration of Universal Human Rights.
Through the combination of a man-made nuclear disaster, corrupt operators, regulatory institutions and politicians, inadequate emergency measures, and finally throughthe systematic underestimation of radiation doses andexpected health effects, the people of Fukushima arebeing deprived of their right to a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being.

It is impossible at this point to come up with an exact prognosis of the effects that the Fukushima nuclear disasterwill have on the population in Japan. However, based on
the arguments presented in this paper, it has to be statedthat the UNSCEAR report represents a systematic underestimation and conjures up an illusion of scientific certainty that obscures the true impact of the nuclear catastrophe on health and the environment.

As physicians, primarily concerned with the health of thepeople affected by the nuclear disaster, we urge the United Nations General Assembly and the government ofJapan to realize that the affected population needs protection from further radiation exposure. In our opinion,
the following issues need to be addressed:

In its report, UNSCEAR calculates the collective effective
doses and absorbed thyroid doses for the Japanese population. However, the admitted uncertainties regarding
exposure doses, questionable data selection, faulty assumptions and the fact that ongoing radioactive emissions were not considered undermine the validity of thesecalculations. The resulting dose estimates are most likely
underestimated and do not reflect the true extent of radiation received by the affected population.

»»
All available expertise should be used for the tremendous tasks of minimizing ongoing radioactive emissions from the damaged reactors and spent fuel pools
and preventing larger emissions in the future.
»»
According to UNSCEAR, more than 24,000 workers have worked on the premises of the crippled reactors since the start of the disaster. Tens of thousands
more will be required over many decades. In addition to
the provision of adequate radiation protection, monitoring and health care for these workers, a national lifetime radiation exposure register for all workers in the
nuclear industry is required in Japan. This must include

By utilizing more neutral sets of data, acknowledging inherent uncertainties in dose estimates, citing the full range of possible exposure rates rather than the best-casescenarios, and by incorporating the latest information
about ongoing radioactive emissions, UNSCEAR could
18subcontractors as well as utility employees. Individual
workers should have ready access to their results.

son in their lungs might seem statistically small to some,in comparison with natural health hazards. But this is nota natural health hazard - and it is not a statistical issue.
The loss of even one human life, or the malformation ofeven one baby - who may be born long after we are gone
- should be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren are not merely statistics toward which we can be
indifferent.” John F. Kennedy, July 26th, 1963»»
The issue of functioning registries is also important for the civilian population. Currently, the absence ofboth effective cancer registries in most prefectures inJapan and comprehensive registers of exposed persons
with dose estimates that can be used to assess longterm health outcomes means that potential impacts willgo undetected. Such registries should be created so that
future health effects of the radioactive contamination
can be properly assessed.
»»
It is unacceptable that people are currently being
encouraged to return to some areas where they can be
expected to receive up to 20 mSv in additional annual
radiation exposure. We see no adequate alternative tominimize such unacceptable exposures other than more
relocations than have currently occurred. Logistic andfinancial support for families living in the radioactively
affected municipalities who want to move to less contaminated regions should be offered to reduce the risk of
future health effects. Evacuees should not be pressured
or bribed into returning to contaminated regions.
»»
Decontamination on the scale that would be required to sufficiently and sustainably reduce radiation
exposures has not proven feasible. Also, radioactive contamination knows no boundaries, and fallout has notbeen confined to Fukushima Prefecture alone. Parts ofTochigi, Miyagi, Ibaraki, Gunma, Saitama and Chiba havealso been contaminated. At present, government programs responding to the nuclear disaster are largely limited to Fukushima Prefecture. A national approachbased on contamination levels, not prefectural boundaries is needed.
»»
We ask the United Nations General Assembly and
the Japanese Government to study the report of the UN
Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physicaland mental health, Mr. Anand Grover, and heed his
constructive suggestions.190 The precautionary principle
should be employed in radiation protection policies.
The people of Fukushima are not being helped by false
claims and premature reassurances that no health effects
are to be expected. They need proper information, healthmonitoring, support and most of all, they need acknowledgment of their right to a standard of living adequate
for their health and well being. This should be the guiding
principle in evaluating the health effects of the nuclear
catastrophe:“The number of children and grandchildren with cancer
in their bones, with leukemia in their blood, or with poi19

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNSCEAR REPORT

V)

List of acronyms and abbreviations

BEIR

US National Academy of Sciences
Advisory Committee on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation

CT

Computer Tomography

FDNPS

Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IPPNW

International Physicians for thePrevention of Nuclear War

IRSN

French Institute for Radioprotection and
Nuclear Safety

JAEA

Japanese Atomic Energy Agency

LNT

Linear no-threshold

MAFF

Japanese Ministry Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries

MEXT

Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology

NILU

Norwegian Institute for Air Research

PSR

Physicians for Social Responsibility

TEPCO

Tokyo Electric Power Company

UNSCEAR

United Nations Scientific Committee on
the Effects of Atomic Radiation

WBC

Whole Body Counter

WHO

World Health Organization

Scientific units
Bq = Becquerel; unit for radioactivity in the International
System of Units (SI)Defined as the number of disintegrations per second
Former unit: Curie (Ci): 1 Bq = 2.7 x 10 -11 Ci
Examples used in the text:
MBq = Megabecquerel (1 x 106 Becquerel)
PBq = Petabecquerel (1 x 1015 Becquerel)
Gy = Gray; SI unit for absorbed dose by matter
Defined as the amount of energy (in Joules) absorbed permass (in kg)
Former unit: Radiation absorbed dose (rad): 1 rad = 0.01
Gy
To convert Bq into Gy, it is necessary to know the doseconversion factor relevant to the isotope in question andthe specific irradiation pathway
Examples used in the text:mGy = Milligray (1 x 10 -3 Gray)
Person-Gy = collective absorbed dose of a population(number of people x average individual dose)
Sv = Sievert; SI unit for equivalent dose by tissue
Defined as the amount of energy (in Joules) absorbed permass (in kg)
Former unit: Roentgen equivalent man (rem): 1 Sv = 100
rem
To convert Gy into Sv, the absorbed dose is multipliedwith the radiation weighting factor WR (WR = 1 for x-ray,g- and b-radiation; WR = 20 for a-radiation)
Examples used in the text:
mSv = Millisievert (1 x 10 -3 Sievert)µSv = Microsievert (1 x 10 -6 Sievert)
Person-Sv = collective equivalent dose of a population(number of people x average individual dose)

20

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